,the ,works of ,george ,berkeley ,d4,d4 ,formerly ,bishop of ,cloyne ,including his ,posthumous ,works ,with ,prefaces1 ,annotations1 ,appendices1 and ,an ,account of his ,life1 by ,alexander ,campbell ,fraser ,hon4 ,d4,c4,l41 ,oxford ,hon4 ,,ll4,d4 ,glasgow and ,edinburgh2 ,emeritus ,professor of ,logic and ,metaphysics in the ,university of ,edinburgh ,in ,four ,volumes ,vol4 #a3 ,philosophical ,works1 #agje-ba ,oxford ,at the ,clarendon ,press #aija ,,contents ,preface ,george ,berkeley1 ,by ,the ,editor ,errata ,commonplace ,book4 ,mathematical1 ,ethical1 ,physical1 ,and ,metaphysical ,editor's ,preface ,to ,the ,commonplace ,book ,commonplace ,book ,an ,essay ,towards ,a ,new ,theory ,of ,vision ,editor's ,preface ,to ,the ,essay ,towards ,a ,new ,theory ,of ,vision ,dedication ,an ,essay ,towards ,a ,new ,theory ,of ,vision ,an ,appendix ,to ,the ,essay ,on ,vision ,a ,treatise ,concerning ,the ,principles ,of ,human ,knowledge ,editor's ,preface ,to ,the ,treatise ,concerning ,the ,principles ,of ,human ,knowledge ,dedication ,the ,preface ,introduction ,part ,first ,three ,dialogues ,between ,hylas ,and ,philonous ,the ,design ,of ,which ,is ,plainly ,to ,demonstrate ,the ,reality ,and ,perfection ,of ,human ,knowledge1 ,the ,incorporeal ,nature ,of ,the ,soul1 ,and ,the ,immediate ,providence ,of ,a ,deity1 ,in ,opposition ,to ,sceptics ,and ,atheists1 ,also ,to ,open ,a ,method ,for ,rendering ,the ,sciences ,more ,easy1 ,useful1 ,and ,compendious ,editor's ,preface ,dedication ,the ,preface ,the ,first ,dialogue ,the ,second ,dialogue ,the ,third ,dialogue ,de ,motu3 ,sive2 ,de ,motus ,principio ,et ,natura1 ,et ,de ,causa ,communicationis ,motuum ,editor's ,preface ,to ,de ,motu ,de ,motu ,footnotes ,,preface ,frontispiece ,more than thirty years ago ,i was honoured by a request to prepare a complete edition of the ,works of ,bishop ,berkeley1 with ,notes1 for the ,clarendon ,press1 ,oxford4 ,that edition1 which contains many of his writings previously unpublished1 appeared in #ahga4 ,it was followed in #ahgd by a volume of annotated ,selections from his philosophical works2 and in #ahha ,i prepared a small volume on 8,berkeley0 for ,blackwood's 8,philosophical ,classics40 ,the #ahga edition of the ,works originated1 ,i believe1 in an essay on 8,the ,real ,world of ,berkeley10 which ,i gave to ,macmillan's ,magazine in #ahfb1 followed by another in #ahfd1 in the ,north ,british ,review4 ,these essays suggested advantages to contemporary thought which might be gained by a consideration of final questions about man and the universe1 in the form in which they are presented by a philosopher who has suffered more from misunderstanding than almost any other modern thinker4 ,during a part of his lifetime1 he was the foremost metaphysician in ,europe in an unmetaphysical generation4 ,and in this country1 after a revival of philosophy in the later part of the eighteenth century1 idea1 matter1 substance1 cause1 and other terms which play an important part in his writings1 had lost the meaning that he intended2 while in ,germany the sceptical speculations of ,david ,hume gave rise to a reconstructive criticism1 on the part of ,kant and his successors1 which seemed at the time to have little concern with the a posteriori methods and the principles of ,berkeley4 ,the success of the attempt to recall attention to ,berkeley has far exceeded expectation4 ,nearly twenty thousand copies of the three publications mentioned above have found their way into the hands of readers in ,europe and ,america2 and the critical estimates of ,berkeley1 by eminent writers1 which have appeared since #ahga1 in ,britain1 ,france1 ,germany1 ,denmark1 ,holland1 ,italy1 ,america1 and ,india1 confirm the opinion that his ,works contain a word in season1 even for the twentieth century4 ,among others who have delivered appreciative criticisms of ,berkeley within the last thirty years are ,j4,s4 ,mill1 ,mansel1 ,huxley1 ,t4,h4 ,green1 ,maguire1 ,collyns ,simon1 the ,right ,hon4 ,a4,j4 ,balfour1 ,mr4 ,leslie ,stephen1 ,dr4 ,hutchison ,stirling1 ,professor ,t4,k4 ,abbott1 ,professor ,van der ,wyck1 ,m4 ,penjon1 ,ueberweg1 ,frederichs1 ,ulrici1 ,janitsch1 ,eugen ,meyer1 ,spicker1 ,loewy1 ,professor ,hffding of ,copenhagen1 ,dr4 ,lorenz1 ,noah ,porter1 and ,krauth1 besides essays in the chief ,british1 ,continental1 and ,american reviews4 ,the text of those ,works of ,berkeley which were published during his lifetime1 enriched with a biographical ,introduction by ,mr4 ,a4,j4 ,balfour1 carefully edited by ,mr4 ,george ,sampson1 appeared in #ahig4 ,in #aijj ,dr4 ,r4 ,richter1 of the ,university of ,leipsic1 produced a new translation into ,german of the ,dialogues between ,hylas and ,philonous1 with an excellent ,introduction and notes4 ,these estimates form a remarkable contrast to the denunciations1 founded on misconception1 by ,warburton and ,beattie in the eighteenth century4 ,in #ahii ,i was unexpectedly again asked by the ,delegates of the ,oxford ,university ,press to prepare a ,new ,edition of ,berkeley's ,works1 with some account of his life1 as the edition of #ahga was out of print2 a circumstance which ,i had not expected to occur in my lifetime4 ,it seemed presumptuous to undertake what might have been entrusted to some one probably more in touch with living thought2 and in one's eighty-second year1 time and strength are wanting for remote research4 ,but the recollection that ,i was attracted to philosophy largely by ,berkeley1 in the morning of life more than sixty years ago1 combined with the pleasure derived from association in this way with the great ,university in which he found an academic home in his old age1 moved me in the late evening of life to make the attempt4 ,and now1 at the beginning of the twentieth century1 ,i offer these volumes1 which still imperfectly realise my ideal of a final ,oxford edition of the philosopher who spent his last days in ,oxford1 and whose mortal remains rest in its ,cathedral4 ,since #ahga materials of biographical and philosophical interest have been discovered1 in addition to the invaluable collection of ,,mss4 which ,archdeacon ,rose then placed at my disposal1 and which were included in the supplementary volume of ,life and ,letters4 ,through the kindness of the late ,earl of ,egmont ,i had access1 some years ago1 to a large number of letters which passed between his ancestor1 ,sir ,john 7afterwards ,lord7 ,percival1 and ,berkeley1 between #agji and #agcj4 ,i have availed myself freely of this correspondence4 ,some interesting letters from and concerning ,berkeley1 addressed to his friend ,dr4 ,samuel ,johnson of ,stratford in ,connecticut1 afterwards ,president of ,king's ,college in ,new ,york1 appeared in #ahgd1 in ,dr4 ,beardsley's ,life of ,johnson1 illustrating ,berkeley's history from #agbi till his death4 ,for these and for further information ,i am indebted to ,dr4 ,beardsley4 ,in the present edition of ,berkeley's ,works1 the ,introductions and the annotations have been mostly re-written4 ,a short account of his romantic life is prefixed1 intended to trace its progress in the gradual development and application of his initial ,principle2 and also the external incidents of his life in their continuity1 with the help of the new material in the ,percival ,,mss4 and the correspondence with ,johnson4 ,it forms a key to the whole4 ,this biography is not intended to supersede the ,life and ,letters of ,berkeley that accompanied the #ahga edition1 which remains as a magazine of facts for reference4 ,the rearrangement of the ,works is a feature in the present edition4 ,much of the new material that was included in the #ahga edition reached me when the book was far advanced in the press1 and thus the chronological arrangement1 strictly followed in the present edition1 was not possible4 ,a chronological arrangement is suggested by ,berkeley himself4 8,i could wish that all the things ,i have published on these philosophical subjects were read in the order wherein ,i published them10 are his words in one of his letters to ,johnson2 8and a second time with a critical eye1 adding your own thought and observation upon every part as you went along40 ,the first three volumes in this edition contain the ,philosophical ,works exclusively2 arranged in chronological order1 under the three periods of ,berkeley's life4 ,the ,first ,volume includes those of his early life2 the ,second those produced in middle life2 and the ,third those of his later years4 ,the ,miscellaneous ,works are presented in like manner in the ,fourth ,volume4 ,the four little treatises in which ,berkeley in early life unfolded his new thought about the universe1 along with his college ,commonplace ,book published in #ahga1 which prepared the way for them1 form1 along with the ,life1 the contents of the ,first ,volume4 ,it is of them that the author writes thus1 in another of his letters to ,johnson3--8,i do not indeed wonder that on first reading what ,i have written men are not thoroughly convinced4 ,on the contrary1 ,i should very much wonder if prejudices which have been many years taking root should be extirpated in a few hours' reading4 ,i had no inclination to trouble the world with large volumes4 ,what ,i have done was rather with a view of giving hints to thinking men1 who have leisure and curiosity to go to the bottom of things1 and pursue them in their own minds4 ,two or three times reading these small tracts1 and making what is read the occasion of thinking1 would1 ,i believe1 render the whole familiar and easy to the mind1 and take off that shocking appearance which hath often been observed to attend speculative truths40 ,except ,johnson1 none of ,berkeley's eighteenth-century critics seem to have observed this rule4 ,alciphron1 or ,the ,minute ,philosopher1 with its supplement in the ,theory of ,visual ,language ,vindicated1 being the philosophical works of his middle life1 associated with its ,american enterprise1 form the ,second ,volume4 ,in them the conception of the universe that was unfolded in the early writings is applied1 in vindication of religious morality and ,christianity1 against the ,atheism attributed to those who called themselves ,free-thinkers2 who were treated by ,berkeley as1 at least by implication1 atheistic4 ,the ,third ,volume contains the ,analyst and ,siris1 which belong to his later life1 ,siris being especially characteristic of its serene quiet4 ,in both there is a deepened sense of the mystery of the universe1 and in ,siris especially a more comprehensive conception of the final problem suggested by human life4 ,but the metaphysics of the one is lost in mathematical controversy2 that of the other in medical controversy1 and in undigested ancient and medival learning4 ,the metaphysical importance of ,siris was long unrecognised1 although in it ,berkeley's thought culminates1 not in a paradox about ,matter1 but in the conception of ,god as the concatenating principle of the universe2 yet this reached through the conception of ,matter as real only in and through living ,mind4 ,the ,miscellaneous ,works1 after the two juvenile ,latin tracts in mathematics1 deal with observations of nature and man gathered in his travels1 questions of social economy1 and lessons in religious life4 ,several are posthumous1 and were first published in the #ahga edition4 ,of these1 perhaps the most interesting is the ,journal in ,italy4 ,the ,discourse on ,passive ,obedience is the nearest approach to ethical theory which ,berkeley has given to us1 and as such it might have taken its place in the ,first ,volume2 but on the whole it seemed more appropriately placed in the ,fourth1 where it is easily accessible for those who prefer to read it immediately after the book of ,principles4 ,i have introduced1 in an ,appendix to the ,third ,volume1 some matter of philosophical interest for which there was no place in the editorial ,prefaces or in the annotations4 ,the historical significance of ,samuel ,johnson and ,jonathan ,edwards1 as pioneers of ,american philosophy1 and also advocates of the new conception of the material world that is associated with ,berkeley1 is recognised in ,appendix ,c4 ,illustrations of the misinterpretation of ,berkeley by his early critics are presented in ,appendix ,d4 ,a lately discovered tractate by ,berkeley forms ,appendix ,e4 ,in the ,fourth ,volume1 numerous queries contained in the first edition of the ,querist1 and omitted in the later editions1 are given in an ,appendix1 which enables the reader to reconstruct that interesting tract in the form in which it originally appeared4 ,the present edition is thus really a new work1 which possesses1 ,i hope1 a certain philosophical unity1 as well as pervading biographical interest4 ,as ,berkeley is the immediate successor of ,locke1 and as he was educated by collision with the ,essay on ,human ,understanding1 perhaps ,locke ought to have had more prominence in the editorial portion of this book4 ,limitation of space partly accounts for the omission2 and ,i venture instead to refer the reader to the ,prolegomena and notes in my edition of ,locke's ,essay1 which was published by the ,clarendon ,press in #ahid4 ,i may add that an expansion of thoughts which run through the ,life and many of the annotations1 in this edition of ,berkeley1 may be found in my ,philosophy of ,theism7#a74 ,the reader need not come to ,berkeley in the expectation of finding in his ,works an all-comprehensive speculative system like ,spinoza's1 or a reasoned articulation of the universe of reality such as ,hegel is supposed to offer4 ,but no one in the succession of great ,english philosophers has1 ,i think1 proposed in a way more apt to invite reflexion1 the final alternative between ,unreason1 on the one hand1 and ,moral ,reason expressed in ,universal ,divine ,providence1 on the other hand1 as the root of the unbeginning and endless evolution in which we find ourselves involved2 as well as the further question1 ,whether this tremendous practical alternative can be settled by any means that are within the reach of man8 ,his ,philosophical ,works1 taken collectively1 may encourage those who see in a reasonable via media between ,omniscience and ,nescience the true path of progress1 under man's inevitable venture of reasonable ,faith4 ,one is therefore not without hope that a fresh impulse may be given to philosophy and religious thought by this reappearance of ,george ,berkeley1 under the auspices of the ,university of ,oxford1 at the beginning of the twentieth century4 ,his readers will at any rate find themselves in the company of one of the most attractive personalities of ,english philosophy1 who is also among the foremost of those thinkers who are masters in ,english literature--,francis ,bacon and ,thomas ,hobbes1 ,george ,berkeley and ,david ,hume4 ,a4 ,campbell ,fraser4 ,,gorton1 ,,hawthornden1 ,,midlothian1 ,march1 #aija4 ,,george ,,berkeley1 ,,by ,,the ,,editor ,i4 ,early ,life 7#afhe-agba74 ,towards the end of the reign of ,charles the ,second a certain ,william ,berkeley1 according to credible tradition1 occupied a cottage attached to the ancient ,castle of ,dysert1 in that part of the county of ,kilkenny which is watered by the ,nore4 ,little is known about this ,william ,berkeley except that he was ,irish by birth and ,english by descent4 ,it is said that his father went over to ,ireland soon after the ,restoration1 in the suite of his reputed kinsman1 ,lord ,berkeley of ,stratton1 when he was ,lord ,lieutenant4 ,william ,berkeley's wife seems to have been of ,irish blood1 and in some remote way related to the family of ,wolfe1 the hero of ,quebec4 ,it was in the modest abode in the valley of the ,nore that ,george1 the eldest of their six sons1 was born1 on ,march #ab1 #afhe4 ,there is nothing in the recorded family history of these ,dysert ,berkeleys that helps to explain the singular personality and career of the eldest son4 ,the parents have left no mark1 and make no appearance in any extant records of the family4 ,they probably made their way to the valley of the ,nore among families of ,english connexion who1 in the quarter of a century preceding the birth of ,george ,berkeley1 were finding settlements in ,ireland4 ,the family1 as it appears1 was not wealthy1 but was recognised as of gentle blood4 ,robert1 the fifth son1 became rector of ,middleton and vicar-general of ,cloyne2 and another son1 ,william1 held a commission in the army4 ,according to the ,register of ,trinity ,college1 one of the sons was born 8near ,thurles10 in #afii1 and ,thomas1 the youngest1 was born in ,tipperary1 in #agjc1 so that the family may have removed from ,dysert after the birth of ,george4 ,in what can be gleaned of the younger sons1 one finds little appearance of sympathy with the religious and philosophical genius of the eldest4 ,regarding this famous eldest son in those early days1 we have this significant autobiographical fragment in his ,commonplace ,book3 8,i was distrustful at eight years old1 and consequently by nature disposed for the new doctrines40 ,in his twelfth year we find the boy in ,kilkenny ,school4 ,the register records his entrance there in the summer of #afif1 when he was placed at once in the second class1 which seems to imply precocity1 for it is almost a solitary instance4 ,he spent the four following years in ,kilkenny4 ,the ,school was in high repute for learned masters and famous pupils2 among former pupils were the poet ,congreve and ,swift1 nearly twenty years earlier than ,george ,berkeley2 among his school-fellows was ,thomas ,prior1 his life-long friend and correspondent4 ,in the days of ,berkeley and ,prior the head master was ,dr4 ,hinton1 and the ,school was still suffering from the consequences of 8the warre in ,ireland0 which followed the ,revolution4 ,berkeley in ,kilkenny ,school is hardly visible1 and we have no means of estimating his mental state when he left it4 ,tradition says that in his school-days he was wont to feed his imagination with airy visions and romance1 a tradition which perhaps originated long after in popular misconceptions of his idealism4 ,dimly discernible at ,kilkenny1 only a few years later he was a conspicuous figure in an island that was then beginning to share in the intellectual movement of the modern world1 taking his place as a classic in ,english literature1 and as the most subtle and ardent of contemporary ,english-speaking thinkers4 ,in ,march1 #agjj1 at the age of fifteen1 ,george ,berkeley entered ,trinity ,college1 ,dublin4 ,this was his home for more than twenty years4 ,he was at first a mystery to the ordinary undergraduate4 ,some1 we are told1 pronounced him the greatest dunce1 others the greatest genius in the ,college4 ,to hasty judges he seemed an idle dreamer2 the thoughtful admired his subtle intelligence and the beauty of his character4 ,in his undergraduate years1 a mild and ingenuous youth1 inexperienced in the ways of men1 vivacious1 humorous1 satirical1 in unexpected ways inquisitive1 often paradoxical1 through misunderstandings he persisted in his own way1 full of simplicity and enthusiasm4 ,in #agjd 7the year in which ,locke died7 he passed ,bachelor of ,arts1 and became ,master in #agjg1 when he was admitted to a ,fellowship1 8the only reward of learning which that kingdom had to bestow40 ,in ,trinity ,college the youth found himself on the tide of modern thought1 for the 8new philosophy0 of ,newton and ,locke was then invading the ,university4 ,locke's ,essay1 published in #afij1 was already in vogue4 ,this early recognition of ,locke in ,dublin was chiefly due to ,william ,molyneux1 ,locke's devoted friend1 a lawyer and member of the ,irish ,parliament1 much given to the experimental methods4 ,descartes1 too1 with his sceptical criticism of human beliefs1 yet disposed to spiritualise powers commonly attributed to matter1 was another accepted authority in ,trinity ,college2 and ,malebranche was not unknown4 ,hobbes was the familiar representative of a finally materialistic conception of existence1 reproducing in modern forms the atomism of ,democritus and the ethics of ,epicurus4 ,above all1 ,newton was acknowledged master in physics1 whose ,principia1 issued three years sooner than ,locke's ,essay1 was transforming the conceptions of educated men regarding their surroundings1 like the still more comprehensive law of physical evolution in the nineteenth century4 ,john ,toland1 an ,irishman1 one of the earliest and ablest of the new sect of ,free-thinkers1 made his appearance at ,dublin in #afif1 as the author of ,christianity not ,mysterious4 ,the book was condemned by ,college dignitaries and dignified clergy with even more than ,irish fervour4 ,it was the opening of a controversy that lasted over half of the eighteenth century in ,england1 in which ,berkeley soon became prominent2 and it was resumed later on1 with greater intellectual force and in finer literary form1 by ,david ,hume and ,voltaire4 ,the collision with ,toland about the time of ,berkeley's matriculation may have awakened his interest4 ,toland was supposed to teach that matter is eternal1 and that motion is its essential property1 into which all changes presented in the outer and inner experience of man may at last be resolved4 ,berkeley's life was a continual protest against these dogmas4 ,the ,provost of ,trinity ,college in #agjj was ,dr4 ,peter ,browne1 who had already entered the lists against ,toland2 long after1 when ,bishop of ,cork1 he was in controversy with ,berkeley about the nature of man's knowledge of ,god4 ,the ,archbishop of ,dublin in the early years of the eighteenth century was ,william ,king1 still remembered as a philosophical theologian1 whose book on the ,origin of ,evil1 published in #agjb1 was criticised by ,boyle and ,leibniz4 ,dublin in those years was thus a place in which a studious youth1 who had been 8distrustful at eight years old10 might be disposed to entertain grave questions about the ultimate meaning of his visible environment1 and of the self-conscious life to which he was becoming awake4 ,is the universe of existence confined to the visible world1 and is matter the really active power in existence8 ,is ,god the root and centre of all that is real1 and if so1 what is meant by ,god8 ,can ,god be good if the world is a mixture of good and evil8 ,questions like these were ready to meet the inquisitive ,kilkenny youth in his first years at ,dublin4 ,one of his earliest interests at ,college was mathematical4 ,his first appearance in print was as the anonymous author of two ,latin tracts1 ,arithmetica and ,miscellanea ,mathematica1 published in #agjg4 ,they are interesting as an index of his intellectual inclination when he was hardly twenty2 for he says they were prepared three years before they were given to the world4 ,his disposition to curious questions in geometry and algebra is further shewn in his ,college ,commonplace ,book4 ,this lately discovered ,commonplace ,book throws a flood of light upon ,berkeley's state of mind between his twentieth and twenty-fourth year4 ,it is a wonderful revelation2 a record under his own hand of his thoughts and feelings when he first came under the inspiration of a new conception of the nature and office of the material world4 ,it was then struggling to find adequate expression1 and in it the sanguine youth seemed to find a spiritual panacea for the errors and confusions of philosophy4 ,it was able to make short work1 he believed1 with atheistic materialism1 and could dispense with arguments against sceptics in vindication of the reality of experience4 ,the mind-dependent existence of the material world1 and its true function in the universe of concrete reality1 were to be disclosed under the light of a new transforming self-evident ,principle4 8,i wonder not at my sagacity in discovering the obvious and amazing truth4 ,i rather wonder at my stupid inadvertency in not finding it out before--'tis no witchcraft to see40 ,the pages of the ,commonplace ,book give vent to rapidly forming thoughts about the things of sense and the 8ambient space0 of a youth entering into reflective life1 in company with ,descartes and ,malebranche1 ,bacon and ,hobbes1 above all1 ,locke and ,newton2 who was trying to translate into reasonableness his faith in the reality of the material world and ,god4 ,under the influence of this new conception1 he sees the world like one awakening from a confused dream4 ,the revolution which he wanted to inaugurate he foresaw would be resisted4 ,men like to think and speak about things as they have been accustomed to do3 they are offended when they are asked to exchange this for what appears to them absurdity1 or at least when the change seems useless4 ,but in spite of the ridicule and dislike of a world long accustomed to put empty words in place of living thoughts1 he resolves to deliver himself of his burden1 with the politic conciliation of a skilful advocate however2 for he characteristically reminds himself that one who 8desires to bring another over to his own opinions must seem to harmonize with him at first1 and humour him in his own way of talking40 ,in #agji1 when he was twenty-four years old1 ,berkeley presented himself to the world of empty verbal reasoners as the author of what he calls modestly ,an ,essay towards a ,new ,theory of ,vision4 ,it was dedicated to ,sir ,john ,percival1 his correspondent afterwards for more than twenty years2 but ,i have not discovered the origin of their friendship4 ,the ,essay was a pioneer1 meant to open the way for the disclosure of the ,secret with which he was burdened1 lest the world might be shocked by an abrupt disclosure4 ,in this prelude he tries to make the reader recognise that in ordinary seeing we are always interpreting visual signs2 so that we have daily presented to our eyes what is virtually an intelligible natural language2 so that in all our intercourse with the visible world we are in intercourse with all-pervading active ,intelligence4 ,we are reading absent data of touch and of the other senses in the language of their visual signs4 ,and the visual signs themselves1 which are the immediate objects of sight1 are necessarily dependent on sentient and percipient mind2 whatever may be the case with the tangible realities which the visual data signify1 a fact evident by our experience when we make use of a looking-glass4 ,the material world1 so far at least as it presents itself visibly1 is real only in being realised by living and seeing beings4 ,the mind-dependent visual signs of which we are conscious are continually speaking to us of an invisible and distant world of tangible realities2 and through the natural connexion of the visual signs with their tactual meanings1 we are able in seeing practically to perceive1 not only what is distant in space1 but also to anticipate the future4 ,the ,book of ,vision is in literal truth a ,book of ,prophecy4 ,the chief lesson of the tentative ,essay on ,vision is thus summed up3-- 8,upon the whole1 ,i think we may fairly conclude that the proper objects of ,vision constitute the ,universal ,language of ,nature2 whereby we are instructed how to regulate our actions in order to attain those things that are necessary to the preservation and well-being of our bodies1 as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive of them4 ,and the manner wherein they signify and mark out unto us the objects which are at a distance is the same with that of languages and signs of human appointment2 which do not suggest the things signified by any likeness or identity of nature1 but only by an habitual connexion that experience has made us to observe between them4 ,suppose one who had always continued blind be told by his guide that after he has advanced so many steps he shall come to the brink of a precipice1 or be stopped by a wall2 must not this to him seem very admirable and surprising8 ,he cannot conceive how it is possible for mortals to frame such predictions as these1 which to him would seem as strange and unaccountable as prophecy does to others4 ,even they who are blessed with the visive faculty may 7though familiarity make it less observed7 find therein sufficient cause of admiration4 ,the wonderful art and contrivance wherewith it is adjusted to those ends and purposes for which it was apparently designed2 the vast extent1 number1 and variety of objects that are at once1 with so much ease and quickness and pleasure1 suggested by it--all these afford subject for much and pleasing speculation1 and may1 if anything1 give us some glimmering analogous prnotion of things that are placed beyond the certain discovery and comprehension of our present state7#b740 ,berkeley took orders in the year in which his ,essay on ,vision was published4 ,on ,february #a1 #agji1 he was ordained as deacon1 in the chapel of ,trinity ,college1 by ,dr4 ,george ,ashe1 ,bishop of ,clogher4 ,origen and ,augustine1 ,anselm and ,aquinas1 ,malebranche1 ,fenelon1 and ,pascal1 ,cudworth1 ,butler1 ,jonathan ,edwards1 and ,schleiermacher1 along with ,berkeley1 are among those who are illustrious at once in the history of philosophy and of the ,christian ,church4 ,the ,church1 it has been said1 has been for nearly two thousand years the great ,ethical ,society of the world1 and if under its restrictions it has been less conspicuous on the field of philosophical criticism and free inquiry1 these names remind us of the immense service it has rendered to meditative thought4 ,the light of the ,percival correspondence first falls on ,berkeley's life in #agji4 ,the earliest extant letters from ,berkeley to ,sir ,john ,percival are in ,september1 ,october1 and ,december of that year1 dated at ,trinity ,college4 ,in one of them he pronounces ,socrates 8the best and most admirable man that the heathen world has produced40 ,another letter1 in ,march1 #agaj1 accompanies a copy of the second edition of the ,essay on ,vision4 8,i have made some alterations and additions in the body of the treatise10 he says1 8and in the appendix have endeavoured to meet the objections of the ,archbishop of ,dublin20 whose sermon he proceeds to deprecate1 for 8denying that goodness and understanding are more to be affirmed of ,god than feet or hands10 although all these may1 in a metaphorical sense4 ,how far1 or whether at all1 ,god is knowable by man1 was1 as we shall see1 matter of discussion and controversy with ,berkeley in later life2 but this shews that the subject was already in his thoughts4 ,returning to the ,essay on ,vision1 he tells ,sir ,john that 8there remains one objection1 that with regard to the uselessness of that book of mine2 but in a little time ,i hope to make what is there laid down appear subservient to the ends of morality and religion1 in a ,treatise ,i have in the press1 the design of which is to demonstrate the existence and attributes of ,god1 the immortality of the soul1 the reconciliation of ,god's foreknowledge and the freedom of man2 and by shewing the emptiness and falsehood of several parts of the speculative sciences1 to induce men to the study of religion and things useful4 ,how far my endeavours will prove successful1 and whether ,i have been all this time in a dream or no1 time will shew4 ,i do not see how it is possible to demonstrate the being of a ,god on the principles of the ,archbishop--that strictly goodness and understanding can no more be assumed of ,god than that ,he has feet or hands2 there being no argument that ,i know for ,god's existence which does not prove ,him at the same time to be an understanding and benevolent being1 in the strict1 literal1 and proper meaning of these words40 ,he adds1 8,i have written to ,mr4 ,clarke to give me his thoughts on the subject of ,god's existence1 but have got no answer40 ,the work foreshadowed in this letter appeared in the summer of #agaj1 as the 8,first part0 of a ,treatise concerning the ,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 wherein the chief causes of error and difficulty in the ,sciences1 with the grounds of ,scepticism1 ,atheism1 and ,irreligion1 are inquired into4 ,in this fragment of a larger work1 never finished1 ,berkeley's spiritual conception of matter and cosmos is unfolded1 defended1 and applied4 ,according to the ,essay on ,vision1 the world1 as far as it is visible1 is dependent on living mind4 ,according to this book of ,principles the whole material world1 as far as it can have any practical concern with the knowings and doings of men1 is real only by being realised in like manner in the percipient experience of some living mind4 ,the concrete world1 with which alone we have to do1 could not exist in its concrete reality if there were no living percipient being in existence to actualise it4 ,to suppose that it could would be to submit to the illusion of a metaphysical abstraction4 ,matter unrealised in its necessary subordination to some one's percipient experience is the chief among the illusions which philosophers have been too ready to encourage1 and which the mass of mankind1 who accept words without reflecting on their legitimate meanings1 are ready to accept blindly4 ,but we have only to reflect in order to see the absurdity of a material world such as we have experience of existing without ever being realised or made concrete in any sentient life4 ,try to conceive an eternally dead universe1 empty for ever of ,god and all finite spirits1 and you find you cannot4 ,reality can be real only in a living form4 ,percipient life underlies or constitutes all that is real4 ,the esse of the concrete material world is percipi4 ,this was the 8,new ,principle0 with which the young ,dublin ,fellow was burdened--the ,secret of the universe which he had been longing to discharge upon mankind for their benefit1 yet without sign of desire to gain fame for himself as the discoverer4 ,it is thus that he unfolds it3-- 8,some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them4 ,such ,i take this important one to be1 viz4 that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth1 in a word1 all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world1 have not any subsistence without a ,mind2 that their being is to be perceived or known2 that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me1 or do not exist in my mind1 or that of any other created spirit1 they must either have no existence at all1 or else subsist in the mind of some ,eternal ,spirit3 it being perfectly unintelligible1 and involving all the absurdity of abstraction1 to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a ,spirit7#c740 ,this does not mean denial of the existence of the world that is daily presented to our senses and which includes our own bodies4 ,on the contrary1 it affirms1 as intuitively true1 the existence of the only real matter which our senses present to us4 ,the only material world of which we have any experience consists of the appearances 7misleadingly called ideas of sense by ,berkeley7 which are continually rising as real objects in a passive procession of interpretable signs1 through means of which each finite person realises his own individual personality2 also the existence of other finite persons2 and the sense-symbolism that is more or less interpreted in the natural sciences2 all significant of ,god4 ,so the material world of concrete experience is presented to us as mind-dependent and in itself powerless3 the deepest and truest reality must always be spiritual4 ,yet this mind-dependent material world is the occasion of innumerable pleasures and pains to human percipients1 in so far as they conform to or contradict its customary laws1 commonly called the laws of nature4 ,so the sense-symbolism in which we live is found to play an important part in the experience of percipient beings4 ,but it makes us sceptics and atheists when1 in its name1 we put a supposed dead abstract matter in room of the ,divine ,active ,reason of which all natural order is the continuous providential expression4 ,accordingly1 ,god must exist1 because the material world1 in order to be a real world1 needs to be continually realised and regulated by living ,providence2 and we have all the certainty of sense and sanity that there is a 7mind-dependent7 material world1 a boundless and endlessly evolving sense-symbolism4 ,in the two years after the disclosure of his ,new ,principle we see ,berkeley chiefly through his correspondence with ,percival4 ,he was eager to hear the voice of criticism2 but the critics were slow to speak1 and when they did speak they misconceived the question1 and of course his answer to it4 8,if when you receive my book10 he writes from ,dublin1 in ,july1 #agaj1 to ,sir ,john1 who was then in ,london1 8you can procure me the opinion of some of your acquaintances who are thinking men1 addicted to the study of natural philosophy and mathematics1 ,i shall be extremely obliged to you40 ,he also asks ,percival to present the book of ,principles to ,lord ,pembroke1 to whom he had ventured to dedicate it1 as ,locke had done his ,essay4 ,the reply was discouraging4 8,i did but name the subject-matter of your book of ,principles to some ingenuous friends of mine10 ,percival says1 8and they immediately treated it with ridicule1 at the same time refusing to read it2 which ,i have not yet got one to do4 ,a physician of my acquaintance undertook to describe your person1 and argued you must needs be mad1 and that you ought to take remedies4 ,a bishop pitied you1 that a desire and vanity of starting something new should put you upon such an undertaking2 and when ,i justified you in that part of your character1 and added other deserving qualities you have1 he could not tell what to think of you4 ,another told me an ingenious man ought not to be discouraged from exerting his wit1 and said ,erasmus was not worse thought of for writing in praise of folly2 but that you are not gone as far as a gentleman in town1 who asserts not only that there is no such thing as ,matter1 but that we ourselves have no being at all40 ,it is not surprising that a book which was supposed to deny the existence of all that we see and touch should be ridiculed1 and its author called a madman4 ,what vexed the author was1 8that men who had never considered my book should confound me with the sceptics1 who doubt the existence of sensible things1 and are not positive of any one thing1 not even of their own being4 ,but whoever reads my book with attention will see that ,i question not the existence of anything we perceive by our senses4 ,fine spun metaphysics are what on all occasions ,i declaim against1 and if any one shall shew anything of that sort in my ,treatise ,i will willingly correct it40 ,a material world that was real enough to yield physical science1 to make known to us the existence of other persons and of ,god1 and which signified in very practical ways happiness or misery to sentient beings1 seemed to him sufficiently real for human science and all other purposes4 ,nevertheless1 in the ardour of youth ,berkeley had hardly fathomed the depths into which his ,new ,principle led1 and which he hoped to escape by avoiding the abstractions of 8fine-spun metaphysics40 ,in ,december ,percival writes from ,london that he has 8given the book to ,lord ,pembroke10 who 8thought the author an ingenious man1 and to be encouraged02 but for himself he 8cannot believe in the non-existence of ,matter02 and he had tried in vain to induce ,samuel ,clarke1 the great ,english metaphysician1 either to refute or to accept the ,new ,principle4 ,in ,february ,berkeley sends an explanatory letter for ,lord ,pembroke to ,percival's care4 ,in a letter in ,june he turns to social questions1 and suggests that if 8some ,irish gentlemen of good fortune and generous inclinations would constantly reside in ,england1 there to watch for the interests of ,ireland1 they might bring far greater advantage than they could by spending their incomes at home40 ,and so #agaa passes1 with responses of ignorant critics2 vain endeavours to draw worthy criticism from ,samuel ,clarke2 the author all the while doing work as a ,tutor in ,trinity ,college on a modest income2 now and then on holidays in ,meath or elsewhere in ,ireland4 ,three discourses on ,passive ,obedience in the ,college ,chapel in #agab1 misinterpreted1 brought on him the reproach of ,jacobitism4 ,yet they were designed to shew that society rests on a deeper foundation than force and calculations of utility1 and is at last rooted in principles of an immutable morality4 ,locke's favourite opinion1 that morality is a demonstrable1 seems to weigh with him in these ,discourses4 ,but ,berkeley was not yet done with the exposition and vindication of his new thought1 for it seemed to him charged with supreme practical issues for mankind4 ,in the two years which followed the publication of the ,principles he was preparing to reproduce his spiritual conception of the universe1 in the dramatic form of dialogue1 convenient for dealing popularly with plausible objections4 ,the issue was the ,three ,dialogues between ,hylas and ,philonous1 in which ,philonous argues for the absurdity of an abstract matter that is unrealised in the experience of living beings1 as against ,hylas1 who is put forward to justify belief in this abstract reality4 ,the design of the ,dialogues is to present in a familiar form 8such principles as1 by an easy solution of the perplexities of philosophers1 together with their own native evidence1 may at once recommend themselves as genuine to the mind1 and rescue philosophy from the endless pursuits it is engaged in2 which1 with a plain demonstration of the ,immediate ,providence of an all-seeing ,god1 should seem the readiest preparation1 as well as the strongest motive to the study and practice of virtue7#d740 ,when the ,dialogues were completed1 at the end of #agab1 ,berkeley resolved to visit ,london1 as he told ,percival1 8in order to print my new book of ,dialogues1 and to make acquaintance with men of merit40 ,he got leave of absence from his ,college 8for the recovery of his health10 which had suffered from study1 and perhaps too he remembered that ,bacon commends travel as 8to the younger sort a part of education40 ,berkeley made his appearance in ,london in ,january1 #agac4 ,on the #bfth of that month he writes to ,percival that he 8had crossed the ,channel from ,dublin a few days before10 describes adventures on the road1 and enlarges on the beauty of rural ,england1 which he liked more than anything he had seen in ,london4 8,mr4 ,clarke0 had already introduced him to ,lord ,pembroke4 ,he had also called on his countryman ,richard ,steele1 8who desired to be acquainted with him4 ,somebody had given him my ,treatise on the ,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 and that was the ground of his inclination to my acquaintance40 ,he anticipates 8much satisfaction in the conversation of ,steele and his friends10 adding that 8there is lately published a bold and pernicious book1 a ,discourse on ,free-thinking7#e740 ,in ,february he 8dines often with ,steele in his house in ,bloomsbury ,square10 and tells in ,march 8that you will soon hear of ,mr4 ,steele under the character of the ,guardian2 he designs his paper shall come out every day as the ,spectator40 ,the night before 8a very ingenious new poem upon #8,windsor ,forest' had been given to him by the author1 ,mr4 ,pope4 ,the gentleman is a ,papist1 but a man of excellent wit and learning1 one of those ,mr4 ,steele mentions in his last paper as having writ some of the ,spectator40 ,a few days later he has met 8,mr4 ,addison1 who has the same talents as ,steele in a high degree1 and is likewise a great philosopher1 having applied himself to the speculative studies more than any of the wits ,i know4 ,i breakfasted with him at ,dr4 ,swift's lodgings4 ,his coming in while ,i was there1 and the good temper he showed1 was construed by me as a sign of the approaching coalition of parties4 ,a play of ,mr4 ,steele's1 which was expected1 he has now put off till next winter4 ,but ,cato1 a most noble play of ,mr4 ,addison1 is to be acted in ,easter week40 ,accordingly1 on ,april #ah1 he writes that 8on ,tuesday last ,cato was acted for the first time4 ,i was present with ,mr4 ,addison and two or three more friends in a side box1 where we had a talk and two or three flasks of ,burgundy and ,champagne1 which the author 7who is a very sober man7 thought necessary to support his spirits1 and indeed it was a pleasant refreshment to us all between the ,acts4 ,some parts of the prologue1 written by ,mr4 ,pope1 a ,tory and even a ,papist1 were hissed1 being thought to savour of ,whiggism2 but the clap got much the better of the hiss4 ,lord ,harley1 who sat in the next box to us1 was observed to clap as loud as any in the house all the time of the play40 ,swift and ,pope have described this famous first night of ,cato2 now for the first time we have ,berkeley's report4 ,he adds1 8,this day ,i dined at ,dr4 ,arbuthnot's lodging in the ,queen's ,palace40 ,his countryman1 ,swift1 was among the first to welcome him to ,london1 where ,swift had himself been for four years1 8lodging in ,bury ,street10 and sending the daily journal to ,stella1 which records so many incidents of that memorable ,london life4 ,mrs4 ,vanhomrigh and her daughter1 the unhappy ,vanessa1 were living in rooms in the same street as ,swift1 and there he 8loitered1 hot and lazy1 after his morning's work10 and 8often dined out of mere listlessness40 ,berkeley was a frequent visitor at ,swift's house1 and this ,vanhomrigh connexion with ,swift had an influence on ,berkeley's fortune long afterwards4 ,on a ,sunday in ,april we find him at ,kensington1 at the ,court of ,queen ,anne1 in the company of ,swift4 8,i went to ,court to-day10 ,swift's journal records1 8on purpose to present ,mr4 ,berkeley1 one of the ,fellows of ,trinity4 ,college1 to ,lord ,berkeley of ,stratton4 ,that ,mr4 ,berkeley is a very ingenious man1 and a great philosopher1 and ,i have mentioned him to all the ministers1 and have given them some of his writings1 and ,i will favour him as much as ,i can40 ,in this1 ,swift was as good as his word4 8,dr4 ,swift10 he adds1 8is admired both by ,steele and ,addison1 and ,i think ,addison one of the best natured and most agreeable men in the world40 ,one day about this time1 at the instance of ,addison1 it seems that a meeting was arranged between ,berkeley and ,samuel ,clarke1 the metaphysical rector of ,st4 ,james's in ,piccadilly1 whose opinion he had in vain tried to draw forth two years before through ,sir ,john ,percival4 ,berkeley's personal charm was felt wherever he went1 and even 8the fastidious and turbulent ,atterbury10 after intercourse with him1 is reported to have said3 8,so much understanding1 so much knowledge1 so much innocence1 and such humility1 ,i did not think had been the portion of any but angels till ,i saw this gentleman40 ,much was expected from the meeting with ,clarke1 but ,berkeley had again to complain that although ,clarke had neither refuted his arguments nor disproved his premisses1 he had not the candour to accept his conclusion4 ,it was thus that ,berkeley became known to 8men of merit0 in that brilliant society4 ,he was also brought among persons on whom he would hardly have conferred this title4 ,he tells ,percival that he had attended several free-thinking clubs1 in the pretended character of a learner1 and that he there heard ,anthony ,collins1 author of 8the bold and pernicious book on free-thinking10 boast 8that he was able to demonstrate that the existence of ,god is an impossible supposition40 ,the promised 8demonstration0 seems to have been ,collins' ,inquiry ,concerning ,human ,liberty1 which appeared two years later1 according to which all that happens in mind and matter is the issue of natural necessity4 ,steele invited ,berkeley to contribute to the ,guardian during its short-lived existence between ,march and ,september1 #agac4 ,he took the ,discourse of ,collins for the subject of his first essay4 ,three other essays are concerned with man's hope of a future life1 and are among the few passages in his writings in which his philosophy is a meditation upon ,death4 ,in ,may1 ,percival writes to him from ,dublin that he hears the 8new book of ,dialogues is printed1 though not yet published1 and that your opinion has gained ground among the learned2 that ,mr4 ,addison has come over to your view2 and that what at first seemed shocking is become so familiar that others envy you the discovery1 and make it their own40 ,in his reply in ,june1 ,berkeley mentions that 8a clergyman in ,wiltshire has lately published a treatise wherein he advances something published three years ago in my ,principles of ,human ,knowledge40 ,the clergyman was ,arthur ,collier1 author of the ,clavis ,universalis1 or demonstration of the impossibility of an external world7#f74 ,berkeley's ,three ,dialogues were published in ,june4 ,in the middle of that same month he was in ,oxford1 8a most delightful place10 where he spent two months1 8witnessed the ,act and grand performances at the theatre1 and a great concourse from ,london and the country1 amongst whom were several foreigners40 ,the ,drury ,lane ,company had gone down to ,oxford1 and ,cato was on the stage for several nights4 ,the ,percival correspondence now first discloses this prolonged visit to ,oxford in the summer of #agac1 that ideal home from whence1 forty years after1 he departed on a more mysterious journey than any on this planet4 ,in a letter from thence to ,percival1 he had claimed ,arbuthnot as one of the converts to the 8new ,principle40 ,percival replied that ,swift demurred to this1 on which ,berkeley rejoins3 8,as to what you say of ,dr4 ,arbuthnot not being of my opinion1 it is true there has been some difference between us concerning some notions relating to the necessity of the laws of nature2 but this does not touch the main points of the non-existence of what philosophers call material substance2 against which he acknowledges he can assert nothing40 ,one would gladly have got more than this from ,berkeley1 about what touched his favourite conception of the 8arbitrariness0 of law in nature1 as distinguished from the 8necessity0 which some modern physicists are ready vaguely to take for granted4 ,the scene now changes4 ,on ,october #ae ,berkeley suddenly writes from ,london3 8,i am on the eve of going to ,sicily1 as chaplain to ,lord ,peterborough1 who is ,ambassador ,extraordinary on the coronation of the new king40 ,he had been recommended by ,swift to the ,ambassador1 one of the most extraordinary characters then in ,europe1 who a few years before had astonished the world in the war of the ,succession in ,spain1 and afterwards by his genius as a diplomatist3 in ,holland1 nearly a quarter of a century before1 he had formed an intimate friendship with ,john ,locke4 ,ten months in ,france and ,italy in the suite of ,lord ,peterborough brought the young ,irish metaphysician1 who had lately been introduced to the wits of ,london and the dons of ,oxford1 into a new world4 ,it was to him the beginning of a career of wandering and social activity1 which lasted1 with little interruption1 for nearly twenty years1 during which metaphysics and authorship were in the background4 ,on ,november #be we find him in ,paris1 writing letters to ,percival and ,prior4 8,from ,london to ,calais01 he tells ,prior1 8,i came in company of a ,flamand1 a ,spaniard1 a ,frenchman1 and three ,english servants of my ,lord4 ,the three gentlemen1 being of three different nations1 obliged me to speak the ,french language 7which is now familiar71 and gave me the opportunity of seeing much of the world in little compass4444 ,on ,november #a 7,o4,s47 ,i embarked in the stage-coach1 with a company that were all perfect strangers to me4 ,there were two ,scotch1 and one ,english gentleman4 ,one of the former happened to be the author of the ,voyage to ,st4 ,kilda and the ,account of the ,western ,isles7#g74 ,we were good company on the road2 and that day se'ennight came to ,paris4 ,i have since been taken up in viewing churches1 convents1 palaces1 colleges1 c41 which are very numerous and magnificent in this town4 ,the splendour and riches of these things surpasses belief2 but it were endless to descend to particulars4 ,i was present at a disputation in the ,sorbonne1 which indeed had much of the ,french fire in it4 ,i saw the ,irish and the ,english ,colleges4 ,in the latter ,i saw1 enclosed in a coffin1 the body of the late ,king ,james4444 ,to-morrow ,i intend to visit ,father ,malebranche1 and discourse him on certain points40 ,the ,abb ,d',aubign1 as he informs ,percival1 was to introduce him to ,malebranche1 then the chief philosopher of ,france1 whose ,vision of the world in ,god had some affinity with ,berkeley's own thought4 ,unfortunately we have no record of the intended interview with the ,french idealist1 who fourteen years before had been visited by ,addison1 also on his way to ,italy1 when ,malebranche expressed great regard for the ,english nation1 and admiration for ,newton2 but he shook his head when ,hobbes was mentioned1 whom he ventured to disparage as a 8poor silly creature40 ,malebranche died nearly two years after ,berkeley's proposed interview2 and according to a story countenanced by ,dugald ,stewart1 ,berkeley was the 8occasional cause0 of his death4 ,he found the venerable ,father1 we are told1 in a cell1 cooking1 in a pipkin1 a medicine for a disorder with which he was troubled4 ,the conversation naturally turned on ,berkeley's system1 of which ,malebranche had received some knowledge from a translation4 ,the issue of the debate proved tragical to poor ,malebranche4 ,in the heat of disputation he raised his voice so high1 and gave way so freely to the natural impetuosity of a man of genius and a ,frenchman1 that he brought on a violent increase of his disorder1 which carried him off a few days after7#h74 ,this romantic tale is1 ,i suspect1 mythical4 ,the ,percival correspondence shews that ,berkeley was living in ,london in ,october1 #agae1 the month in which ,malebranche died1 and ,i find no trace of a short sudden visit to ,paris at that time4 ,after a month spent in ,paris1 another fortnight carried ,berkeley and two travelling companions to ,italy through ,savoy4 ,they crossed ,mont ,cenis on ,new ,year's ,day in #agad--8one of the most difficult and formidable parts of the ,alps which is ever passed over by mortal man10 as he tells ,prior in a letter from ,turin4 8,we were carried in open chairs by men used to scale these rocks and precipices1 which at this season are more slippery and dangerous than at other times1 and at the best are high1 craggy1 and steep enough to cause the heart of the most valiant man to melt within him40 ,at the end of other six weeks we find him at ,leghorn1 where he spent three months1 8while my lord was in ,sicily40 ,he 8prefers ,england or ,ireland to ,italy3 the only advantage is in point of air40 ,from ,leghorn he writes in ,may a complimentary letter to ,pope1 on the occasion of the ,rape of the ,lock3 8,style1 painting1 judgment1 spirit1 ,i had already admired in your other writings2 but in this ,i am charmed with the magic of your invention1 with all those images1 allusions1 and inexplicable beauties which you raise so surprisingly1 and at the same time so naturally1 out of a trifle4444 ,i remember to have heard you mention some half-formed design of coming to ,italy4 ,what might we not expect from a muse that sings so well in the bleak climate of ,england1 if she felt the same warm sun and breathed the same air with ,virgil and ,horace40 ,in ,july we find ,berkeley in ,paris on his way back to ,england4 ,he had 8parted from ,lord ,peterborough at ,genoa1 where my lord took post for ,turin1 and thence designed passing over the ,alps1 and so through ,savoy1 on his way to ,england40 ,in ,august they are in ,london1 where the aspect of ,english politics was changed by the death of the ,queen in that month4 ,he seems to have had a fever soon after his return4 ,in ,october1 ,arbuthnot1 in one of his chatty letters to ,swift1 writes thus3 8,poor philosopher ,berkeley has now the idea of health1 which was very hard to produce in him1 for he had an idea of a strange fever upon him1 so strange that it was very hard to destroy it by introducing a contrary one40 ,our record of the two following years is a long blank1 first broken by a letter to ,percival in ,july1 #agae1 dated at ,london4 ,whether he spent any time at ,fulham with ,lord ,peterborough after their return from ,italy does not appear1 nor whether he visited ,ireland in those years1 which is not likely4 ,we have no glimpses of brilliant ,london society as in the preceding year4 ,steele was now in ,parliament4 ,swift had returned to ,dublin1 and ,addison was the ,irish chief secretary4 ,but ,pope was still at ,binfield1 among the glades of ,windsor1 and ,berkeley congratulated him after receiving the first volume of his ,homer4 ,of his own literary pursuits we hear nothing4 ,perhaps the ,second ,part of the ,principles1 which was lost afterwards in his travels1 engaged him4 ,in the end of ,july he wrote to ,lord ,percival7#i7 from ,flaxley7#aj7 on the ,severn2 and in ,august1 ,september1 ,october1 and ,november he wrote from ,london1 chiefly interested in reports about 8the rebels in ,scotland10 and 8the forces under ,lord ,mar1 which no doubt will languish and disperse in a little time4 ,the ,bishop of ,bristol assured me the other day that the ,court expect that the ,duke of ,orleans would1 in case of need1 supply them with forces against the ,pretender40 ,our next glimpse of him is in ,may1 #agaf1 when he writes to ,lord ,percival that he is 8like soon to go to ,ireland1 the ,prince of ,wales having recommended him to the ,lords ,justices for the living of ,st4 ,paul's in ,dublin40 ,this opening was soon closed1 and the visit to ,ireland was abandoned4 ,a groundless suspicion of ,jacobitism was not overcome by the interest of ,caroline1 ,princess of ,wales4 ,in ,june1 #agaf1 ,charles ,dering wrote from ,dublin1 that 8the ,lords ,justices have made a strong representation against him40 ,he had to look elsewhere for the immediate future4 ,we find him at ,turin in ,november1 #agaf1 with a fresh leave of absence for two years from his ,college4 ,it seems that ,ashe1 ,bishop of ,clogher1 had engaged him as travelling tutor to his son1 a means not then uncommon for enabling young authors of moderate fortune to see new countries and mix with society4 ,addison had visited ,italy in this way sixteen years before1 and ,adam ,smith long afterwards travelled with the young ,duke of ,buccleuch4 ,with young ,ashe1 ,berkeley crossed ,mont ,cenis a second time4 ,they reached ,rome at the beginning of #agag4 ,his ,journal in ,italy in that year1 and occasional letters to ,percival1 ,pope1 and ,arbuthnot1 shew ardent interest in nature and art4 ,with the widest views1 8this very great though singular sort of man descended into a minute detail1 and begrudged neither pains nor expense for the means of information4 ,he travelled through a great part of ,sicily on foot2 clambered over the mountains and crept into the caverns1 to investigate its natural history and discover the causes of its volcanoes2 and ,i have known him sit for hours in forges and foundries to inspect their successive operations7#aa740 ,if the ,journal had been transformed by his own hand into a book1 his letter to ,pope from ,inarime shews that the book might have rivalled ,addison's ,remarks on ,parts of ,italy in grace of style and large human interest4 ,in the summer of #agbj we find the travellers at ,florence1 afterwards for some time at ,lyons1 and in ,london at the beginning of the next year4 ,on the way home his metaphysical inspiration was revived4 ,the 8,cause of ,motion0 had been proposed by the ,french ,academy as the subject of a prize dissertation4 ,the subject gave an opportunity for further unfolding his early thought4 ,in the ,principles and the ,dialogues he had argued for the necessary dependence of matter1 for its concrete substantial reality1 upon living percipient mind4 ,he would now shew its powerlessness as it is presented to us in sense4 ,the material world1 chiefly under the category of substance1 inspired the ,principles4 ,the material world1 under the category of cause or power1 inspired the ,de ,motu4 ,this ,latin ,essay sums up the distinctive thought of ,berkeley1 as it appears in the authorship of his early life4 ,moles evolvit et agitat mentes might be taken as the formula of the materialism which he sought to dissolve4 ,mens percipit et agitat molem significantem1 cujus esse est percipi expresses what ,berkeley would substitute for the materialistic formula4 ,the end of the summer of #agba found ,berkeley still in ,london4 ,england was in the social agitation and misery consequent upon the failure of the ,south ,sea ,company1 a gigantic commercial speculation connected with ,british trade in ,america4 ,a new inspiration took possession of him4 ,he thought he saw in this catastrophe signs of a decline in public morals worse than that which followed the ,restoration4 8,political corruption01 8decay of religion10 8growth of atheism10 were descriptive words used by the thoughtful4 ,berkeley's eager imagination was apt to exaggerate the evil4 ,he became inspired by social idealism1 and found vent for his fervour in ,an ,essay towards preventing the ,ruin of ,great ,britain1 which1 as well as the ,de ,motu1 made its appearance in #agba4 ,this ,essay is a significant factor in his career4 ,it was the ,cassandra wail of a sorrowful and indignant prophet1 prepared to shake the dust from his feet1 and to transfer his eye of hope to other regions1 in which a nearer approach to ,utopia might be realised4 ,the true personality of the individual is unrealisable in selfish isolation4 ,his favourite non sibi1 sed toti mundo was henceforward more than ever the ruling maxim of his life4 ,,ii4 ,middle ,life 7#agbb-cd74 ,in ,october1 #agba1 ,berkeley was in ,dublin4 ,the register of the ,college shews that 8on ,november #ad1 #agba1 ,mr4 ,berkeley had the grace of the ,house for the ,degree of ,bachelor and ,doctor of ,divinity40 ,there is no ground for the report that he returned to ,ireland at this time as ,chaplain to the ,duke of ,grafton1 the ,lord ,lieutenant7#ab74 ,but preferment in the ,church seemed within his reach4 8,i had no sooner set foot on shore10 he wrote to ,percival in that ,october1 8than ,i heard that the ,deanery of ,dromore was vacant40 ,percival used his influence with the ,lord ,lieutenant1 and in ,february1 #agbb1 ,berkeley's patent was 8passing the ,seals for the ,deanery of ,dromore40 ,but the ,bishop of ,dromore claimed the patronage1 and this led to a protracted and ineffectual lawsuit1 which took ,berkeley to ,london in the following winter1 8to see friends and inform himself of points of law10 and he tells that 8on the way he was nearly drowned in crossing to ,holyhead7#ac740 ,berkeley's interest in church preferment was not personal4 ,he saw in it only means to an end4 ,in ,march1 #agbc1 he surprised ,lord ,percival by announcing1 in a letter from ,london1 a project which it seems for some time had occupied his thoughts4 8,it is now about ten months10 he says1 8since ,i have determined to spend the residue of my days in ,bermuda1 where ,i trust in ,providence ,i may be the mean instrument of doing great good to mankind4 ,whatever happens1 go ,i am resolved1 if ,i live4 ,half a dozen of the most ingenious and agreeable men in our ,college are with me in this project1 and since ,i came hither ,i have got together about a dozen ,englishmen of quality1 who intend to retire to those islands40 ,he then explains the project1 opening a vision of ,christian civilisation radiating from those fair islands of the ,west1 whose idyllic bliss poets had sung1 diffused over the ,new ,world1 with its magnificent possibilities in the future history of mankind4 ,i find no further record of the origin of this bright vision4 ,as it had become a practical determination 8ten months0 before ,march1 #agbc1 one is carried back to the first months after his return to ,dublin and to the ,essay that was called forth by the ,south ,sea catastrophe4 ,one may conjecture that despair of ,england and the ,old ,world--8such as ,europe breeds in her decay0--led him to look westward for the hopeful future of mankind1 moved1 perhaps1 by the connexion of the catastrophe with ,america4 ,his active imagination pictured a better ,republic than ,plato's1 and a grander ,utopia than ,more's1 emanating from a ,college in the isles of which ,waller had sung4 ,in the meantime a curious fortune unexpectedly favoured him4 ,swift's unhappy ,vanessa1 associated with ,bury ,street in #agac1 had settled on her property at ,marley ,abbey near ,dublin2 and ,swift had privately married ,stella1 as she confessed to ,vanessa1 who thereafter revoked the bequest of her fortune to ,swift1 and left it to be divided between ,berkeley and ,marshal1 afterwards an ,irish judge4 ,vanessa died in ,may1 #agbc4 ,a few days after ,berkeley wrote thus to ,lord ,percival3 8,here is something that will surprise your lordship as it doth me4 ,mrs4 ,hester ,vanhomrigh1 a lady to whom ,i was a perfect stranger1 having never in the whole course of my life exchanged a word with her1 died on ,sunday4 ,yesterday her ,will was opened1 by which it appears that ,i am constituted executor1 the advantage whereof is computed by those who understand her affairs to be worth #cjjj4444 ,my ,bermuda scheme is now stronger in my mind than ever2 this providential event having made many things easy which were otherwise before40 ,lord ,percival in reply concludes that he would 8persist more than ever in that noble scheme1 which may in some time exalt your name beyond that of ,st4 ,xavier and the most famous missionaries abroad40 ,but he warns him that1 8without the protection of ,government10 he would encounter insurmountable difficulties4 ,the ,vanessa legacy1 and the obstructions in the way of the ,deanery of ,dromore1 were the subjects of a tedious correspondence with his friend and business factotum1 8,tom ,prior10 in #agbd and the three following years4 ,in the end1 the debts of ,vanessa absorbed most of the legacy4 ,and as to the ,deanery of ,dromore1 he tells ,percival1 on ,september #ai1 #agbc3 8,i despair of seeing it end to my advantage4 ,the truth is1 my fixed purpose of going to ,bermuda sets me above soliciting anything with earnestness in this part of the world4 ,it can be of no use to me1 but as it may enable me the better to prosecute that design2 and it must be owned that the present possession of something in the ,church would make my application for an establishment in those islands more considered40 ,nevertheless1 he got a ,deanery at last4 ,in ,may1 #agbd1 he informs ,lord ,percival from ,trinity ,college3 8,yesterday ,i received my patent for the best ,deanery in the kingdom1 that of ,derry4 ,it is said to be worth #aejj per annum4 ,but as ,i do not consider it with an eye to enriching myself1 so ,i shall be perfectly contented if it facilitates and recommends my scheme of ,bermuda1 which ,i am in hopes will meet with a better reception if it comes from one possessed of so great a ,deanery40 ,in ,september he is on his way1 not to ,derry1 but to ,london1 8to raise funds and obtain a ,charter for the ,bermuda ,college from ,george the ,first10 fortified by a remarkable letter from ,swift to ,lord ,carteret1 the new ,lord ,lieutenant1 who was then in ,bath7#ad74 ,as ,swift predicted in this letter1 ,berkeley's conquests spread far and fast in ,england1 where he organised his resources during the four following years4 ,nothing shews more signally the magic of his personality than the story of his life in ,london in those years of negotiation and endeavour4 ,the proposal met with a response wonderful in a generation represented by ,walpole4 ,the subscriptions soon reached five thousand pounds1 and ,walpole was among the subscribers4 ,the ,scriblerus ,club1 meeting at ,lord ,bathurst's1 agreed to rally ,berkeley1 who was among them1 on his ,bermuda scheme4 ,he asked to be heard in defence1 and presented the case with such force of enthusiasm that the company 8were struck dumb1 and after a pause simultaneously rose and asked leave to accompany him40 ,bermuda for a time inspired ,london4 ,berkeley was not satisfied with this4 ,he remembered what ,lord ,percival had said about failure without help from ,government4 ,accordingly he obtained a ,charter from ,george the ,first early in #agbf1 and after canvassing the ,house of ,commons1 secured a grant of #bj1jjj1 with only two dissentient votes1 in ,may of that year4 ,this was the beginning of his difficulties4 ,payment was indefinitely delayed1 and he was kept negotiating2 besides1 with the help of ,prior1 he was unravelling legal perplexities in which the ,vanessa legacy was involved4 ,it was in these years that he was seen at the receptions of ,caroline at ,leicester ,fields1 when she was ,princess of ,wales1 and afterwards at ,st4 ,james's or at ,kensington1 when she became ,queen in #agbg2 not1 he says1 because he loved ,courts1 but because he loved ,america4 ,clarke was still rector of ,st4 ,james's1 and ,butler had not yet migrated to his parsonage at ,stanhope2 so their society was open to him4 ,the ,queen liked to listen to a philosophical discussion4 ,ten years before1 as ,princess of ,wales1 she had been a royal go-between in the famous correspondence between ,clarke and ,leibniz4 ,and now1 ,berkeley being in ,london1 he too was asked to her weekly reunions1 when she loved to hear ,clarke arguing with ,berkeley1 or ,berkeley arguing with ,hoadley4 ,also in #agbf ,voltaire made his lengthened visit to ,england1 a familiar figure in the circle of ,pope's friends1 attracted to the philosophy of ,locke and ,newton2 and ,voltaire mentions that he met 8the discoverer of the true theory of vision0 during his stay in ,london4 ,from the summer of #agbg until the spring of #agbh there is no extant correspondence either with ,percival or 8,tom ,prior0 to throw light on his movements4 ,in ,february1 #agbh1 he was still in ,london1 but he 8hoped to set out for ,dublin in ,march1 and to ,america in ,may40 ,there is a mystery about this visit to ,dublin4 8,i propose to set out for ,dublin about a month hence10 he writes to 8dear ,tom10 8but of this you must not give the least intimation to anybody4 ,it is of all things my earnest desire 7and for very good reasons7 not to have it known that ,i am in ,dublin4 ,speak not1 therefore1 one syllable of it to any mortal whatsoever4 ,when ,i formerly desired you to take a place for me near the town1 you gave out that you were looking for a retired lodging for a friend of yours2 upon which everybody surmised me to be the person4 ,i must beg you not to act in the like manner now1 but to take for me an entire house in your own name1 and as for yourself2 for1 all things considered1 ,i am determined upon a whole house1 with no mortal in it but a maid of your own putting1 who is to look on herself as your servant4 ,let there be two bed-chambers3 one for you1 another for me2 and1 as you like1 you may ever and anon lie there4 ,i would have the house1 with necessary furniture1 taken by the month 7or otherwise1 as you can71 for ,i propose staying not beyond that time2 and yet perhaps ,i may4 ,take it as soon as possible4444 ,let me entreat you to say nothing of this to anybody1 but to do the thing directly4444 ,i would of all things 444 have a proper place in a retired situation1 where ,i may have access to fields and sweet air provided against the moment ,i arrive4 ,i am inclined to think one may be better concealed in the outermost skirt of the suburbs1 than in the country or within the town4444 ,a house quite detached in the country ,i should have no objection to1 provided you judge that ,i shall not be liable to discovery in it4 ,the place called ,bermuda ,i am utterly against4 ,dear ,tom1 do this matter cleanly and cleverly1 without waiting for further advice4444 ,to the person from whom you hire it 7whom alone ,i would have you speak of it to7 it will not seem strange you should at this time of the year be desirous1 for your own convenience or health1 to have a place in a free and open air40 ,this mysterious letter was written in ,april4 ,from ,april till ,september ,berkeley again disappears4 ,there is in all this a curious secretiveness of which one has repeated examples in his life4 ,whether he went to ,dublin in that spring1 or why he wanted to go1 does not appear4 ,but in ,september he emerges unexpectedly at ,gravesend1 newly married1 and ready to sail for ,rhode ,island1 8in a ship of #bej tons which he had hired40 ,the marriage1 according to ,stock1 took place on ,august #a1 whether in ,ireland or in ,england ,i cannot tell4 ,the lady was ,anne1 daughter of ,john ,forster1 late ,chief ,justice1 and then ,speaker of the ,irish ,house of ,commons4 ,she shared his fortune when he was about to engage in the most romantic1 and ideally the grandest1 ,christian mission of the eighteenth century4 ,according to tradition she was a devoutly religious mystic3 ,fnelon and ,madame ,guyon were among her favourites4 8,i chose her10 he tells ,lord ,percival1 8for her qualities of mind and her unaffected inclination to books4 ,she goes with great thankfulness1 to live a plain farmer's life1 and wear stuff of her own spinning4 ,i have presented her with a spinning-wheel40 ,a letter to ,prior1 dated 8,gravesend ,september #e1 #agbh10 thus describes the little party on the eve of their departure3--8,to-morrow1 with ,god's blessing1 ,i set sail for ,rhode ,island1 with my wife and a friend of hers1 my ,lady ,handcock's daughter1 who bears us company4 ,i am married since ,i saw you to ,miss ,forster1 whose humour and turn of mind pleases me beyond anything that ,i know in her whole sex4 ,mr4 ,james7#ae71 ,mr4 ,dalton1 and ,mr4 ,smibert7#af7 go with us on this voyage4 ,we are now all together at ,gravesend1 and are engaged in one view40 ,we are further told7#ag7 that they carried stores and goods to a great value1 and that the ,dean 8embarked #bj1jjj books1 besides what the two gentlemen carried4 ,they sailed in ,september for ,rhode ,island1 where the ,dean intends to winter1 and to purchase an estate1 in order to settle a correspondence and trade between that island and ,bermudas40 ,berkeley was in his forty-fourth year1 when1 full of glowing visions of ,christian ,empire in the ,west1 8,time's noblest offspring10 he left ,england1 on his way to ,bermuda1 with the promise of ,sir ,robert ,walpole that he should receive the promised grant after he had made an investment4 ,he bought land in ,america1 but he never reached ,bermuda4 ,towards the end of ,january1 in #agbi1 the little party1 in the 8hired ship of #bej tons10 made their appearance in ,narragansett ,bay1 on the western side of ,rhode ,island4 8,blundering about the ocean10 they had touched at ,virginia on the way1 whence a correspondent1 sceptical of the enterprise1 informs ,lord ,percival that the ,dean 8had dined with the ,governor1 and visited our ,college10 but thinks that 8when the ,dean comes to put his visionary scheme into practice1 he will find it no better than a religious frenzy10 and that 8he is as much a ,don ,quixote in zeal as that renowned knight was in chivalry4 ,i wish the good ,dean may not find out at last that ,waller really kidnapt him over to ,bermuda1 and that the project he has been drawn into may not prove in every point of it poetical40 ,we have a picture of the landing at ,newport1 on a winter day early in #agbi4 8,yesterday arrived here ,dean ,berkeley of ,londonderry1 in a pretty large ship4 ,he is a gentleman of middle stature1 of an agreeable1 pleasant1 and erect aspect4 ,he was ushered into the town with a great number of gentlemen1 to whom he behaved himself after a very complaisant manner4 ',tis said he proposes to tarry here with his family about three months7#ah740 ,newport was then a flourishing town1 nearly a century old1 an emporium of ,american commerce1 in those days the rival of ,boston and ,new ,york4 ,he was 8never more agreeably surprised10 he says1 than 8at the size of the town and harbour40 ,around him was some of the softest rural and grandest ocean scenery in the world1 which had fresh charms even for one whose boyhood was spent in the valley of the ,nore1 who had lingered in the ,bay of ,naples1 and wandered in ,inarime and among the mountains of ,sicily4 ,he was seventy miles from ,boston1 and about as far from ,newhaven and ,yale ,college4 ,a range of hills crosses the centre of the island1 whence meadows slope to the rocky shore4 ,the ,gulf ,stream tempers the surrounding sea4 8,the people10 he tells ,percival1 8are industrious2 and though less orthodox have not less virtue1 and ,i am sure they have more regularity1 than those ,i left in ,europe4 ,they are indeed a strange medley of different persuasions40 ,the gentry retained the customs of the squires in ,england3 tradition tells of a cheerful society3 the fox chase1 with hounds and horses1 was a favourite recreation4 ,the society1 for so remote a region1 was well informed4 ,the family libraries and pictures which remain argue culture and refinement4 ,smibert1 the artist of the missionary party1 who had moved to ,boston1 soon found employment in ,america1 and his pictures still adorn houses in ,rhode ,island7#ai74 ,the ,dean and his young wife lived in ,newport for some months after their arrival4 ,mr4 ,honeyman1 a missionary of the ,english ,society1 had been placed there1 in ,trinity ,church1 in #agjd4 ,the church is still a conspicuous object from the harbour4 ,berkeley preached in it three days after his arrival1 and occasionally afterwards4 ,notes of his sermons are included in this edition among his ,miscellaneous ,works4 ,in the summer of #agbi he moved from ,newport to a quiet valley in the interior of the island1 where he bought a farm1 and built a house4 ,in this island-home1 named ,whitehall1 he lived for more than two years--years of domestic happiness1 and of resumed study1 much interrupted since he left ,dublin in #agac4 ,the house may still be seen1 a little aside from the road that runs eastward from ,newport1 about three miles from the town4 ,it is built of wood4 ,the south-west room was probably the library4 ,the ocean is seen in the distance1 while orchards and groves offer the shade and silence which soothed the thinker in his recluse life4 ,no invitations of the three companions of his voyage7#bj71 who had migrated to ,boston1 could allure him from this retreat1 where he diverted his anxieties about ,bermuda by the thoughts which found expression in the dialogues of ,alciphron1 redolent of ,rhode ,island and the invigorating breezes of its ocean shore4 ,tradition tells that much of ,alciphron was the issue of meditation in the open air1 at a favourite retreat1 beneath the ,hanging ,rocks1 which commands an extensive view of the beach and the ocean2 and the chair in which he sat in this alcove is still preserved with veneration4 ,while ,berkeley loved domestic quiet at ,whitehall7#ba7 and the 8still air of delightful studies10 he mixed occasionally in the society of ,newport4 ,he found it not uncongenial1 and soon after he was settled at ,whitehall he led the way in forming a club1 which held occasional meetings1 the germ of the ,redwood ,library1 still a useful ,newport institution4 ,his own house was a place of meeting for the ,new ,england missionaries4 ,illustration ,whitehall1 ,berkeley's ,residence in ,rhode ,island ,soon after his arrival in ,rhode ,island1 ,berkeley was visited by the ,reverend ,samuel ,johnson1 missionary at ,stratford1 an acute and independent thinker1 one of the two contemporary representatives of philosophy in ,america4 ,the other was ,jonathan ,edwards1 at that time ,congregational minister at ,northampton on the ,connecticut river4 ,they had both adopted a conception of the meaning and office of the material world in the economy of existence that was in many respects similar to ,berkeley's7#bb74 ,it seems that ,berkeley's book of ,principles had before this fallen into ,johnson's hands4 ,he hastened to visit the author when he heard of his arrival4 ,a succession of visits and a life-long correspondence followed4 ,the 8non-existence of ,matter10 interpreted as a whimsical and even insane paradox1 was found by ,johnson to mean the absence of unrealisable ,substance behind the real material world that is presented to our senses1 and of unrealisable ,power in the successive sense-presented appearances of which alone we are percipient4 ,he came to see the real existence of the things of sense in the constant order of the data of sense1 through which we gain our knowledge of the existence of our fellow men1 and of the omnipresent constant ,providence of ,god2 whose ,ideas are the true archetypes of the visible world4 ,he adopted and applied this conception with a lucidity and force which give him a high place among ,american thinkers4 ,all the while a cloud darkened the recluse life at ,whitehall4 ,in ,june1 #agbi1 ,berkeley explains to ,percival the circumstances and secrecy of his departure from ,england3-- 8,before ,i left ,england ,i was reduced to a difficult situation4 ,had ,i continued there1 the report would have obtained 7which ,i had found beginning to spread7 that ,i had dropped the design1 after it had cost me and my friends so much trouble and expense4 ,on the other hand1 if ,i had taken leave of my friends1 even those who assisted and approved my undertaking would have condemned my coming abroad before the ,king's bounty was received4 ,this obliged me to come away in the private manner that ,i did1 and to run the risque of a tedious winter voyage4 ,nothing less would have convinced the world that ,i was in earnest1 after the report ,i knew was growing to the contrary40 ,months passed1 and ,walpole's promise was still unfulfilled4 8,i wait here10 he tells ,lord ,percival in ,march1 #agcj1 8with all the anxiety that attends suspense1 until ,i know what ,i can depend upon1 or what course ,i am to take4 ,on the one hand ,i have no notion that the ,court would put what men call a bite upon a poor clergyman1 who depended upon charters1 grants1 votes1 and the like engagements4 ,on the other hand1 ,i see nothing done towards payment of the money40 ,later on he writes--8,as for the raillery of ,european wits1 ,i should not mind it1 if ,i saw my ,college go on and prosper2 but ,i must own the disappointments ,i have met with in this particular have nearly touched me1 not without affecting my health and spirits4 ,if the founding a ,college for the spread of religion and learning in ,america had been a foolish project1 it cannot be supposed the ,court1 the ,ministers1 and the ,parliament would have given such public encouragement to it2 and if1 after all that encouragement1 they who engaged to endow and protect it let it drop1 the disappointment indeed may be to me1 but the censure1 ,i think1 will light elsewhere40 ,the suspense was at last ended4 ,gibson1 the ,bishop of ,london1 pressed ,walpole for a final answer4 8,if10 he replied1 8you put this question to me as a ,minister1 ,i must1 and can1 assure you that the money shall most undoubtedly be paid1 as soon as suits with public convenience2 but if you ask me as a friend1 whether ,dean ,berkeley should continue in ,america expecting the payment of twenty thousand pounds1 ,i advise him by all means to return home to ,europe1 and to give up his present expectations40 ,it was thus that in #agca the ,prime ,minister of ,england crushed the project conceived ten years before1 and to which the intervening period had1 under his encouragement1 been devoted by the projector with a singular enthusiasm4 ,illustration ,berkeley's ,alcove1 ,rhode ,island ,a few months after this heavy blow1 ,berkeley1 with his wife1 and ,henry their infant child1 bade farewell to the island home4 ,they sailed from ,boston in the late autumn of #agca1 and in the following ,february we find them in ,london4 ,thus ended the romantic episode of ,rhode ,island1 with its ideal of ,christian civilisation1 which so moves the heart and touches the imagination in our retrospect of the eighteenth century4 ,of all who have ever landed on the ,american shore1 none was ever moved by a purer and more self-sacrificing spirit4 ,america still acknowledges that by ,berkeley's visit on this mission it has been invested with the halo of an illustrious name1 and associated with religious devotion to a magnificent ideal1 even if it was sought to be realised by impracticable means4 ,to reform the ,new ,world1 and mankind at last1 by a ,college on an island in the ,atlantic1 six hundred miles from ,america1 the ,indians whom it was intended to civilise being mostly in the interior of the continent1 and none in ,bermuda1 was not unnaturally considered ,quixotic2 and that it was at first supported by the ,british ,court and ,parliament is a wonderful tribute to the persuasive genius of the projector4 ,perhaps he was too much influenced by ,lord ,percival's idea1 that it could not be realised by private benevolence1 without the intervention of the ,crown4 ,but the indirect influence of ,berkeley's ,american inspiration is apparent in many ways in the intellectual and spiritual life of that great continent1 during the last century and a half1 especially by the impulse given to academical education4 ,it is the testimony of an ,american author that1 8by methods different from those intended by ,berkeley1 and in ways more manifold than even he could have dreamed1 he has since accomplished1 and through all coming time1 by a thousand ineffaceable influences1 he will continue to accomplish1 some portion at least of the results which he had aimed at in the founding of his university4 ,it is the old story over again2 the tragedy of a ,providence wiser than man's foresight2 ,god giving the victory to ,his faithful servant even through the bitterness of overruling him and defeating him7#bc740 ,american ,empire1 as we now see it with its boundless beneficent influence1 is at least an imperfect realisation of ,berkeley's dream4 ,berkeley's head quarters were in ,london1 in ,green ,street1 for more than two years after the return to ,england in the beginning of #agcb4 ,extant correspondence with ,lord ,percival ends in ,rhode ,island1 and our picture of the two years in ,london is faintly formed by letters to ,prior and ,johnson4 ,these speak of ill-health1 and breathe a less sanguine spirit4 ,the brilliant social life of former visits was less attractive now1 even if old friends had remained4 ,but ,swift had quitted ,england for ever1 and ,steele had followed ,addison to the grave4 ,gay1 the common friend of ,berkeley and ,pope1 died soon after the return from ,rhode ,island1 and ,arbuthnot was approaching his end at ,hampstead4 ,samuel ,clarke had passed away when ,berkeley was at ,whitehall2 but ,seeker now held the rectory of ,st4 ,james's1 and ,butler was in studious retirement on the ,wear2 while ,pope was at ,twickenham1 publishing his ,essay on ,man1 receiving visits from ,bolingbroke1 or visiting ,lord ,bathurst at ,cirencester ,park4 ,queen ,caroline1 too1 was holding her receptions at ,kensington2 but 8those who imagine 7as you write710 he tells ,prior in ,january1 #agcd1 8that ,i have been making my court here all this time1 would never believe 7what is most true7 that ,i have not been at the ,court or at the ,minister's but once these seven years4 ,the care of my health and the love of retirement have prevailed over whatsoever ambition might have come to my share40 ,there is a hint of a visit to ,oxford1 at ,commemoration in #agcc1 when his friend ,seeker received the honorary degree4 ,soon after he had settled in ,london1 the fruit of his studies in ,rhode ,island was given to the world in the ,seven ,dialogues of ,alciphron1 or ,the ,minute ,philosopher4 ,here the philosophical inspiration of his early years is directed to sustain faith in ,divine ,moral ,order1 and in the ,christian ,revelation4 ,alciphron is the longest1 and in literary form perhaps the most finished of his works1 unsurpassed in lively strokes of irony and satire4 ,yet if it is to be regarded as a philosophical justification of religion1 as against modern agnosticism1 one may incline to the judgment of ,mr4 ,leslie ,stephen1 that it is 8the least admirable of all its author's admirable works40 ,as we have seen1 the sect of free-thinkers was early the object of ,berkeley's ridicule and sarcasm4 ,they claimed for themselves wide intellectual vision1 yet they were blind to the deep realities of the universe2 they took exclusive credit for freedom of thought1 although their thinking was confined within the narrow compass of our data in sense4 ,the book of ,principles1 the ,dialogues1 and the ,de ,motu of his early years1 were designed to bring into clear light the absolute dependence of the world that is presented to our senses on ,omnipresent ,spirit2 and the necessary subjection of all changes in our surroundings to the immediate agency or providence of ,god4 ,boasted 8free-thinking0 was really a narrow atheism1 so he believed1 in which meaningless ,matter usurped the place that belonged in reason to ,god1 and he employed reason to disclose ,omnipotent ,intelligence in and behind the phenomena that are presented to the senses in impotent natural sequence4 ,the causes of the widespread moral corruption of the ,old ,world1 which had moved ,berkeley so profoundly1 seem to have been pondered anew during his recluse life in ,rhode ,island4 ,the decline of morals was explained by the deification of ,matter3 consequent life of sensuous pleasure accounted for decay of religion4 ,that vice is hurtful was argued by free-thinkers like ,mandeville to be a vulgar error1 and a fallacious demonstration was offered of its utility4 ,that virtue is intrinsically beautiful was taught by ,shaftesbury2 but ,berkeley judged the abstract beauty1 with which 8minute philosophers0 were contented1 unfit to move ordinary human beings to self-sacrificing action2 for this involves devotion to a ,perfect ,person by whom goodness is finally distributed4 ,religion alone inspires the larger and higher life1 in presenting distributive justice personified on the throne of the universe1 instead of abstract virtue4 ,the turning-point in ,alciphron is in man's vision of ,god4 ,this is pressed in the ,fourth ,dialogue4 ,the free-thinker asserts that 8the notion of a ,deity1 or some invisible power1 is of all prejudices the most unconquerable2 the most signal example of belief without reason for believing40 ,he demands proof--8such proof as every man of sense requires of a matter of fact4444 ,should a man ask1 why ,i believe there is a king of ,great ,britain8 ,i might answer1 ,because ,i had seen him4 ,or a king of ,spain8 ,because ,i had seen those who saw him4 ,but as for this ,king of kings1 ,i neither saw ,him myself1 nor any one else that ever did see ,him40 ,to which ,euphranor replies1 8,what if it should appear that ,god really speaks to man2 would this content you8 ,what if it shall appear plainly that ,god speaks to men by the intervention and use of arbitrary1 outward1 sensible signs1 having no resemblance or necessary connexion with the things they stand for and suggest2 if it shall appear that1 by innumerable combinations of these signs1 an endless variety of things is discovered and made known to us2 and that we are thereby instructed or informed in their different natures2 that we are taught and admonished what to shun and what to pursue2 and are directed how to regulate our motions1 and how to act with respect to things distant from us1 as well in time as place3 will this content you80 ,euphranor accordingly proceeds to shew that ,visible ,nature is a ,language1 in which the ,universal ,power that is continually at work is speaking to us all1 in a way similar to that in which our fellow men speak to us2 so that we have as much 7even more7 reason to believe in the existence of the ,universal ,person who is the ,speaker1 as we have to believe in the existence of persons around us2 who become known to us1 when they too employ sense-symbols1 in the words and actions by which we discover that we are not alone in the universe4 ,for men are really living spirits3 their bodies are only the sign of their spiritual personality4 ,and it is so with ,god1 who is also revealed in the visible world as a ,spirit4 8,in a strict sense10 says ,euphranor1 8,i do not see ,alciphron1 but only such visible signs and tokens as suggest and infer the being of that invisible thinking principle or soul4 ,even so1 in the self-same manner1 it seems to me that1 though ,i cannot with eyes of flesh behold the invisible ,god1 yet ,i do1 in the strictest sense1 behold and perceive1 by all my senses1 such signs and tokens 444 as suggest1 indicate1 and demonstrate an invisible ,god as certainly1 and with the same evidence1 at least1 as any other signs1 perceived by sense1 do suggest to me the existence of your soul1 spirit1 or thinking principle2 which ,i am convinced of only by a few signs or effects1 and the motions of one small organised body2 whereas ,i do1 at all times1 and in all places1 perceive sensible signs which evince the being of ,god40 ,in short1 ,god is the living ,soul of the ,universe2 as you and ,i are the living souls that keep our bodies and their organs in significant motion4 ,we can interpret the character of ,god in the history of the universe1 even as we can interpret the character of our neighbour by observing his words and outward actions4 ,this overwhelmed ,alciphron4 8,you stare to find that ,god is not far from any one of us1 and that in ,him we live and move and have our being10 rejoins ,euphranor4 8,you who1 in the beginning of this conference1 thought it strange that ,god should leave ,himself without a witness1 do now think it strange the witness should be so full and clear40 8,i must own ,i do10 was the reply4 8,i never imagined it could be pretended that we saw ,god with our fleshly eyes1 as plain as we see any human person whatsoever1 and that ,he daily speaks to our senses in a manifest and clear dialect40 ,although this reasoning satisfied ,alciphron1 others may think it inconclusive4 ,how one is able to discover the existence of other persons1 and even the meaning of finite personality1 are themselves questions full of speculative difficulty4 ,but1 waiving this1 the analogy between the relation of a human spirit to its body1 and that of the ,omnipresent and ,omnipotent ,spirit to the ,universe of things and persons1 fails in several respects4 ,god is supposed to be continually creating the world by constant and continuous ,providence1 and ,his ,omniscience is supposed to comprehend all its concrete relations3 a man's body is not absolutely dependent on the man's own power and providence2 and even his scientific knowledge of it1 in itself and in its relations1 is scanty and imperfect1 as his power over it is limited and conditioned4 ,then the little that a man gradually learns of what is going on in the surrounding universe is dependent on his senses3 ,omniscience comprehends ,immensity and ,eternity 7so we suppose7 in a single intuition4 ,our bodies1 moreover1 are visible things3 the universe1 this organism of ,god1 is crowded with persons1 to whom there is nothing corresponding within the organism which reveals one man to another4 ,but this is not all4 ,after ,euphranor has found that the ,universal ,power is ,universal ,spirit1 this is still an inadequate ,god2 for what we want to know is what sort of ,spirit ,god is4 ,is ,god omnipotent or of limited power1 regarded ethically1 fair or unfair in ,his treatment of persons2 good or evil1 according to the highest yet attained conception of goodness2 a ,god of love1 or a devil omnipotent8 ,i infer the character of my neighbour from his words and actions1 patent to sense in the gradual outward evolution of his life4 ,i am asked to infer the character of the ,omnipresent ,spirit from ,his words and actions1 manifested in the universe of things and persons4 ,but we must not attribute to the ,cause more than it reveals of itself in its effects4 ,god and men alike are known by the effects they produce4 ,the ,universal ,power is1 on this condition1 righteous1 fair1 and loving to the degree in which those conceptions are implied in ,his visible embodiment3 to affirm more or other than this1 on the basis of analogy alone1 is either to indulge in baseless conjecture1 or to submit blindly to dogma and authority4 ,now the universe1 as far as it comes within the range of human experience on this planet1 is full of suffering and moral disorder4 ,the 8religious hypothesis0 of a perfectly righteous and benevolent ,god is here offered to account for the appearances which the universe presents to us4 ,but do these signify exact distributive justice8 ,is not visible nature apparently cruel and unrelenting8 ,if we infer cruelty in the character of a man1 because his bodily actions cause undeserved suffering1 must we not1 by this analogy1 infer in like manner regarding the character of the ,supreme ,spirit1 manifested in the progressive evolution of the universal organism8 ,we find it impossible to determine with absolute certainty the character even of our fellow men1 from their imperfectly interpreted words and actions1 so that each man is more or less a mystery to his fellows4 ,the mystery deepens when we try to read the character of animals1--to interpret the motives which determine the overt acts of dogs or horses4 ,and if we were able to communicate by visible signs with the inhabitants of other planets1 with how much greater difficulty should we draw conclusions from their visible acts regarding their character8 ,but if this is so when we use the data of sense for reading the character of finite persons1 how infinite must be the difficulty of reading the character of the ,eternal ,spirit1 in and through the gradual evolution of the universe of things and persons1 which in this reasoning is supposed to be ,his body2 and the history of that universe the facts of ,his biography1 in and by which ,he is eternally revealing ,himself6 ,for we know nothing about the unbeginning and unending4 ,the universe of persons is assumed to have no end2 and ,i know not why its evolution must be supposed to have had a beginning1 or that there ever was a time in which ,god was unmanifested1 to finite persons4 ,shall we in these circumstances turn with ,euphranor1 in the ,fifth and ,sixth ,dialogues1 to professed revelation of the character of the ,universal ,mind presented in miraculous revelation1 by inspired prophets and apostles1 who are brought forward as authorities able to speak infallibly to the character of ,god8 ,if the whole course of nature1 or endless evolution of events1 is the ,divine ,spirit revealed in omnipresent activity1 what room is there for any other less regular revelation8 ,the universe of common experience1 it is implied by ,berkeley1 is essentially miraculous1 and therefore absolutely perfect4 ,is it consistent with fairness1 and benevolence1 and love of goodness in all moral agents for its own sake1 that the ,christian revelation should have been so long delayed1 and be still so incompletely made known8 ,is not the existence of wicked persons on this or any other planet1 wicked men or devils1 a dark spot in the visible life of ,god8 ,does not perfect goodness in ,god mean restoration of goodness in men1 for its own sake1 apart from their merit2 and must not ,omnipotent ,goodness1 infinitely opposite to all evil1 either convert to goodness all beings in the universe who have made themselves bad1 or else relieve the universe of their perpetual presence in ever-increasing wickedness8 ,sceptical criticism of this sort has found expression in the searching minute philosophy of a later day than ,berkeley's and ,alciphron's2 as in ,david ,hume and ,voltaire1 and in the agnosticism of the nineteenth century4 ,was not ,euphranor too ready to yield to the demand for a visible ,god1 whose character had accordingly to be determined by what appears in nature and man1 under the conditions of our limited and contingent experience8 ,do we not need to look below data of sensuous experience1 and among the presuppositions which must consciously or unconsciously be taken for granted in all man's dealings with the environment in which he finds himself1 for the root of trustworthy experience8 ,on merely physical reasoning1 like that of ,euphranor1 the righteous love of ,god is an unwarranted inference1 and it even seems to be contradicted by visible facts presented in the history of the world4 ,but if ,omnipotent ,goodness must a priori be attributed to the ,universal ,mind1 as an indispensable condition for man's having reliable intercourse of any sort with nature2 if this is the primary postulate necessary to the existence of truth of any kind--then the 8religious hypothesis0 that ,god is ,good1 according to the highest conception of goodness1 is no groundless fancy1 but the fundamental faith-venture in which man has to live4 ,it must stand in reason2 unless it can be demonstrated that the mixture of good and evil which the universe presents1 necessarily contradicts this fundamental presupposition3 and if so1 man is lost in pessimistic ,pyrrhonism1 and can assert nothing about anything7#bd74 ,the religious altruism1 however inadequate1 which ,berkeley offered in ,alciphron made some noise at the time of its appearance1 although its theistic argument was too subtle to be popular4 ,the conception of the visible world as ,divine ,visual ,language was 8received with ridicule by those who make ridicule the test of truth10 although it has made way since4 8,i have not seen ,dean ,berkeley10 ,gay the poet writes to ,swift in the ,may following the ,dean's return1 and very soon after the appearance of ,alciphron1 8but ,i have been reading his book1 and like many parts of it2 but in general think with you that it is too speculative40 ,warburton1 with admiration for ,berkeley1 cannot comprehend his philosophy1 and ,hoadley shewed a less friendly spirit4 ,a ,letter from a ,country ,clergyman1 attributed to ,lord ,hervey1 the 8,sporus0 of ,pope1 was one of several ephemeral attacks which the ,minute ,philosopher encountered in the year after its appearance4 ,three other critics1 more worthy of consideration1 are mentioned in one of ,berkeley's letters from ,london to his ,american friend ,johnson at ,stratford3 8,as to the ,bishop of ,cork's book1 and the other book you allude to1 the author of which is one ,baxter1 they are both very little considered here2 for which reason ,i have taken no public notice of them4 ,to answer objections already answered1 and repeat the same things1 is a needless as well as disagreeable task4 ,nor should ,i have taken notice of that ,letter about ,vision1 had it not been printed in a newspaper1 which gave it course1 and spread it through the kingdom4 ,besides1 the theory of ,vision ,i found was somewhat obscure to most people2 for which reason ,i was not displeased at an opportunity to explain it7#be740 ,the explanation was given in ,the ,theory of ,visual ,language ,vindicated1 in ,january1 #agcc1 as a supplement to ,alciphron4 ,its blot is a tone of polemical bitterness directed against ,shaftesbury7#bf74 ,although ,berkeley 8took no public notice0 of 8the ,bishop of ,cork's book7#bg70 it touched a great question1 which periodically has awakened controversy1 and been the occasion of mutual misunderstanding among the controversialists in past ages4 8,is ,god knowable by man2 or must religion be devotion to an object that is unknowable80 ,in one of his first letters to ,lord ,percival1 as we saw1 ,berkeley animadverted on a sermon by the ,archbishop of ,dublin1 which seemed to deny that there was goodness1 or understanding ,god1 any more than feet or hands4 ,an opinion somewhat similar had been attributed to ,bishop ,browne1 in his answer to ,toland1 and afterwards in #agbh1 in his ,procedure and ,limits of ,human ,understanding4 ,this touched to the quick ,berkeley's ultimate conception of the universe1 as realisable only in1 and therefore necessarily dependent on1 living mind4 ,we are reminded of the famous analogy of ,spinoza7#bh74 ,if the omnipresent and omnipotent ,mind1 on which ,euphranor rested1 can be called 8mind0 only metaphorically1 and can be called 8good0 only when the term is used without human meaning1 it may seem to be a matter of indifference whether we have unknowable ,matter or unknowable ,mind at the root of things and persons4 ,both are empty words4 ,the ,power universally at work is equally unintelligible1 equally unfit to be the object of worship in the final venture of faith1 whether we use the term ,matter or the term ,mind4 ,the universe is neither explained nor sustained by a 8mind0 that is mind only metaphorically4 ,to call this 8,god0 is to console us with an empty abstraction4 ,the minutest philosopher is ready to grant with ,alciphron that 8there is a ,god in this indefinite sense02 since nothing can be inferred from such an account of ,god about conduct or religion4 ,the ,bishop of ,cork replied to the strictures of ,euphranor in the ,minute ,philosopher4 ,he qualified and explained his former utterances in some two hundred dull pages of his ,divine ,analogy1 which hardly touch the root of the matter4 ,the question at issue is the one which underlies modern agnosticism4 ,it was raised again in ,britain in the nineteenth century1 with deeper insight1 by ,sir ,william ,hamilton2 followed by ,dean ,mansel1 in controversy with ,f4 ,d4 ,maurice1 at the point of view of ,archbishop ,king and ,bishop ,browne1 in philosophical vindication of the mysteries of ,christian faith2 by ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer and by ,huxley in a minute philosophy that has been deepened by ,hume's criticism of the rationale of theism in ,berkeley7#bi74 ,andrew ,baxter's ,inquiry into the ,nature of the ,human ,soul1 referred to in ,berkeley's letter to ,johnson1 appeared in #agcc4 ,it has a chapter on 8,dean ,berkeley's ,scheme against the existence of ,matter and a ,material ,world10 which is worthy of mention because it is the earliest elaborate criticism of the ,new ,principle1 although it had then been before the world for more than twenty years4 ,the title of the chapter shews ,baxter's imperfect comprehension of the proposition which he attempts to refute4 ,it suggests that ,berkeley argued for the non-existence of the things we see and touch1 instead of for their necessary dependence on1 or subordination to1 realising percipient ,mind1 so far as they are concrete realities4 ,baxter1 moreover1 was a ,scot2 and his criticism is interesting as a foretaste of the protracted discussion of the 8ideal theory0 by ,reid and his friends1 and later on by ,hamilton4 ,but ,baxter's book was not the first sign of ,berkeley's influence in ,scotland4 ,we are told by ,dugald ,stewart1 that 8the novelty of ,berkeley's paradox attracted very powerfully the attention of a set of young men who were then prosecuting their studies at ,edinburgh1 who formed themselves into a ,society for the express purpose of soliciting from him an explanation of some parts of his theory which seemed to them obscurely or equivocally expressed4 ,to this correspondence the amiable and excellent prelate seems to have given every encouragement2 and ,i have been told on the best authority that he was accustomed to say that his reasoning had been nowhere better understood than by this club of young ,scotsmen7#cj740 ,thus1 and afterwards through ,hume and ,reid1 ,berkeley is at the root of philosophy in ,scotland4 ,the two years of indifferent health and authorship in ,london sum up what may be called the ,american period of ,berkeley's life4 ,early in #agcd letters to ,prior open a new vista in his history4 ,he was nominated to the bishopric of ,cloyne in the south of ,ireland1 and we have now to follow him to the remote region which was his home for eighteen years4 ,the interest of the philosophic ,queen1 and perhaps some compensation for the ,bermuda disappointment1 may explain the appearance of the metaphysical and social idealist in the place where he shone as a star of the first magnitude in the ,irish ,church of the eighteenth century4 ,,iii4 ,later ,years 7#agcd-ec74 ,in ,may1 #agcd1 ,berkeley was consecrated as ,bishop of ,cloyne1 in ,st4 ,paul's ,church1 ,dublin4 ,except occasional visits1 he had been absent from ,ireland for more than twenty years4 ,he returned to spend eighteen years of almost unbroken seclusion in his remote diocese4 ,it suited a growing inclination to a recluse1 meditative life1 which had been encouraged by circumstances in ,rhode ,island4 ,the eastern and northern part in the county of ,cork formed his diocese1 bounded on the west by ,cork harbour1 and on the east by the beautiful ,blackwater and the mountains of ,waterford2 the sea1 which was its southern boundary1 approached within two miles of the episcopal residence in the village of ,cloyne4 ,as soon as he was settled1 he resumed study 8with unabated attention10 but still with indifferent health4 ,travelling had become irksome to him1 and at ,cloyne he was almost as much removed as he had been in ,rhode ,island from the thinking world4 ,cork took the place of ,newport2 but ,cork was twenty miles from ,cloyne1 while ,newport was only three miles from ,whitehall4 ,his episcopal neighbour at ,cork was ,bishop ,browne1 the critic of ,alciphron4 ,isaac ,gervais1 afterwards ,dean of ,tuam1 often enlivened the 8manse-house0 at ,cloyne by his wit and intercourse with the great world4 ,secker1 the ,bishop of ,bristol1 and ,benson1 the ,bishop of ,gloucester1 now and then exchanged letters with him1 and correspondence was kept up as of old with ,prior at ,dublin and ,johnson at ,stratford4 ,but there is no trace of intercourse with ,swift1 who was wearing out an unhappy old age1 or with ,pope1 almost the only survivor of the brilliant society of other years4 ,we are told1 indeed1 that the beauty of ,cloyne was so described to the bard of ,twickenham1 by the pen which in former days had described ,ischia1 that ,pope was almost moved to visit it4 ,and a letter from ,secker in ,february1 #agce7ca71 contains this scrap3 8,your friend ,mr4 ,pope is publishing small poems every now and then1 full of much wit and not a little keenness7#cb740 8,our common friend1 ,dr4 ,butler10 he adds1 8hath almost completed a set of speculations upon the credibility of religion from its analogy to the constitution and course of nature1 which ,i believe in due time you will read with pleasure40 ,butler's ,analogy appeared in the following year4 ,but ,i have found no remains of correspondence between ,berkeley and their 8common friend02 the two most illustrious religious thinkers of the ,anglican communion4 ,when he left ,london in #agcd ,berkeley was on the eve of what sounded like a mathematical controversy1 although it was in his intention metaphysical1 and was suggested by the ,seventh ,dialogue in ,alciphron4 ,in one of his letters to ,prior1 early in that year1 he told him that though he 8could not read1 owing to ill health10 yet his thought was as distinct as ever1 and that for amusement 8he passed his early hours in thinking of certain mathematical matters which may possibly produce something7#cc740 ,this turned1 it seems1 upon a form of scepticism among contemporary mathematicians1 occasioned by the presence of mysteries of religion4 ,the ,analyst was the issue4 ,it was followed by a controversy in which some of the most eminent mathematicians took part4 ,mathematica exeunt in mysteria might have been the motto of the ,analyst4 ,the assumptions in mathematics1 it is argued1 are as mysterious as those of theologians and metaphysicians4 ,mathematicians cannot translate into perfectly intelligible thought their own doctrines in fluxions4 ,if man's knowledge of ,god is rooted in mystery1 so too is mathematical analysis4 ,pure science at last loses itself in propositions which usefully regulate action1 but which cannot be comprehended4 ,this is the drift of the argument in the ,analyst2 but perhaps ,berkeley's inclination to extreme conclusions1 and to what is verbally paradoxical1 led him into doubtful positions in the controversy to which the ,analyst gave rise4 ,instead of ultimate imperfect comprehensibility1 he seems to attribute absolute contradiction to the ,newtonian fluxions4 ,baxter1 in his ,inquiry1 had asserted that things in ,berkeley's book of ,principles forced the author 8to suspect that even mathematics may not be very sound knowledge at the bottom40 ,the metaphysical argument of the ,analyst was obscured in a cloud of mathematics4 ,the social condition of ,ireland attracted ,berkeley almost as soon as he was settled in ,cloyne4 ,he was surrounded by a large native ,irish population and a small group of ,english colonists4 ,the natives1 long governed in the interest of the stranger1 had never learned to exert and govern themselves4 ,the self-reliance which ,berkeley preached fifteen years before1 as a mean for 8preventing the ruin of ,great ,britain10 was more wanting in ,ireland1 where the simplest maxims of social economy were neglected4 ,it was a state of things fitted to move one who was too independent to permit his aspirations to be confined to the ordinary routine of the ,irish episcopate1 and who could not forget the favourite moral maxim of his life4 ,the social chaos of ,ireland was the occasion of what to some may be the most interesting of ,berkeley's writings4 ,his thoughts found vent characteristically in a series of penetrating practical queries4 ,the ,first ,part of the ,querist appeared in #agce1 anonymously1 edited by ,dr4 ,madden of ,dublin1 who along with ,prior had lately founded a ,society for promoting industrial arts in ,ireland4 ,the ,second and ,third ,parts were published in the two following years4 ,a ,discourse to ,magistrates occasioned by the ,enormous ,licence and ,irreligion of the ,times1 which appeared in #agcf1 was another endeavour1 with like philanthropic intention4 ,and the only important break in his secluded life at ,cloyne1 in eighteen years of residence1 was when he went for some months to ,dublin in #agcg1 to render social service to ,ireland in the ,irish ,house of ,lords4 ,his metaphysic1 at first encountered by ridicule1 was now beginning to receive more serious treatment4 ,a ,scotsman had already recognised it4 ,in #agci another and more famous ,scotsman1 ,david ,hume1 refers thus to ,berkeley in one of the opening sections of his ,treatise of ,human ,nature3 8,a very material question has been started concerning abstract or general ideas--whether they be general or particular in the mind's conception of them4 ,a great philosopher1 ,dr4 ,berkeley1 has disputed the received opinion in this particular1 and has asserted that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones1 annexed to a certain term which gives them a more extensive signification1 and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals which are similar to them4 ,i look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters40 ,it does not appear that ,berkeley heard of ,hume4 ,a curious interest began to engage him about this time4 ,the years following #agci were years of suffering in the ,irish diocese4 ,it was a time of famine followed by widespread disease4 ,his correspondence is full of allusions to this4 ,it had consequences of lasting importance4 ,surrounded by disease1 he pondered remedies4 ,experience in ,rhode ,island and among ,american ,indians suggested the healing properties of tar4 ,further experiments in tar1 combined with meditation and much curious reading1 deepened and expanded his metaphysical philosophy4 ,tar seemed to grow under his experiments1 and in his thoughts1 into a ,panacea for giving health to the organism on which living mind in man is meanwhile dependent4 ,this natural dependence of health upon tar introduced thoughts of the interdependence of all things1 and then of the immediate dependence of all in nature upon ,omnipresent and ,omnipotent ,mind4 ,the living ,mind that underlies the phenomena of the universe began to be conceived under a new light4 ,since his return to the life of thought in ,rhode ,island1 he had been immersed in ,platonic and ,neoplatonic literature1 and in books of mystical ,divinity1 encouraged perhaps by the mystical disposition attributed to his wife4 ,an eccentric ingenuity connected the scientific experiments and prescriptions with the ,idealism of ,plato and ,plotinus4 ,the natural law according to which tar-water was universally restorative set his mind to work about the immanence of living ,mind4 ,he mused about a medicine thus universally beneficial1 and the thought occurred that it must be naturally charged with 'pure invisible fire1 the most subtle and elastic of bodies1 and the vital element in the universe'2 and water might be the natural cause which enables this elementary fire to be drawn out of tar and transferred to vegetable and animal organisms4 ,but the vital fire could be only a natural cause2 which in truth is no efficient cause at all1 but only a sign of divine efficiency transmitted through the world of sense3 the true cause of this and all other natural effects must be the immanent ,mind or ,reason in which we all participate2 for in ,god we live and move and have our being4 ,it is thus that ,berkeley's thought culminates in ,siris1 that ,chain of ,philosophical ,reflexions and ,inquiries concerning the ,virtues of ,tar-water1 and divers other subjects connected together and arising one from another1 which appeared in #agdd4 ,this little book made more noise at the time of its appearance than any of his books2 but not because of its philosophy1 which was lost in its medicinal promise to mankind of immunity from disease4 ,yet it was ,berkeley's last attempt to express his ultimate conception of the universe in its human and divine relations4 ,when ,siris is compared with the book of ,principles1 the immense difference in tone and manner of thought shews the change wrought in the intervening years4 ,the sanguine argumentative gladiatorship of the ,principles is exchanged for pensive speculation1 which acknowledges the weakness of human understanding1 when it is face to face with the ,immensities and ,eternities4 ,compare the opening sections of the ,introduction to the ,principles with the closing sections of ,siris4 ,the contingent data of our experience are now felt to be insufficient1 and there is a more or less conscious grounding of the ,whole in the eternal and immutable ,ideas of ,reason4 8,strictly1 the sense knows nothing4 ,we perceive1 indeed1 sounds by hearing and characters by sight4 ,but we are not therefore said to understand them4444 ,sense and experience acquaint us with the course and analogy of appearances and natural effects3 thought1 reason1 intellect1 introduce us into the knowledge of their causes4444 ,the principles of science are neither objects of sense nor imagination3 intellect and reason are alone the sure guides to truth40 ,so the shifting basis of the earlier thought is found to need support in the intellectual and moral faith that must be involved in all reasonable human intercourse with the phenomena presented in the universe4 ,the inadequate thought of ,god1 as only a ,spirit or ,person supreme among the spirits or persons1 in and through whom the material world is realised1 a thought which pervades ,alciphron1 makes way in ,siris for the thought of ,god as the infinite omnipresent ,ground1 or final sustaining ,power1 immanent in ,nature and ,man1 to which ,berkeley had become accustomed in ,neoplatonic and ,alexandrian metaphysics4 8,comprehending ,god and the creatures in ,one general notion1 we may say that all things together 7,god and the universe of ,space and ,time7 make ,one ,universe1 or 4 ,but if we should say that all things make ,one ,god1 this would be an erroneous notion of ,god2 but would not amount to atheism1 as long as ,mind or ,intellect was admitted to be 1 or the governing part4444 ,it will not seem just to fix the imputation of atheism upon those philosophers who hold the doctrine of 40 ,it is thus that he now regards ,god4 ,metaphysics and theology are accordingly one4 ,no attempt is made in ,siris to articulate the universe in the light of unifying ,mind or ,reason4 ,and we are still apt to ask what the truth and goodness at the heart of all really mean2 seeing that1 as conceived in human minds1 they vary in the gradual evolution of intellect and conscience in men4 ,omnia exeunt in mysteria is the tone of ,siris at the end4 ,the universe of reality is too much for our articulate intellectual digestion3 it must be left for omniscience2 it transcends finite intelligence and the via media of human understanding4 ,man must be satisfied to pass life1 in the infinitesimal interval between birth and death1 as a faith-venture1 which he may convert into a growing insight1 as the generations roll on1 but which can never be converted into complete knowledge4 8,in this state we must be satisfied to make the best of those glimpses within our reach4 ,it is ,plato's remark in his ,thetetus1 that while we sit still we are never the wiser2 but going into the river1 and moving up and down1 is the way to discover its depths and shallows4 ,if we exercise and bestir ourselves1 we may even here discover something4 ,the eye by long use comes to see even in the darkest cavern2 and there is no subject so obscure but we may discern some glimpse of truth by long poring on it4 ,truth is the cry of all1 but the game of a few4 ,certainly where it is the chief passion it doth not give way to vulgar cares and views2 nor is it contented with a little ardour in the early time of life3 a time perhaps to pursue1 but not so fit to weigh and revise4 ,he that would make a real progress in knowledge must dedicate his age as well as his youth1 the later growth as well as the first-fruits1 at the altar of ,truth40 ,such was ,berkeley1 and such were his last words in philosophy4 ,they may suggest the attitude of ,bacon when1 at a different view-point1 he disclaims exhaustive system3 8,i have made a beginning of the work3 the fortune of the human race will give the issue4 ,for the matter in hand is no mere felicity of speculation1 but the real business and fortunes of the human race7#cd740 ,while ,berkeley's central thought throughout his life is concerned with ,god as the one omnipresent and omnipotent ,providential ,agent in the universe1 he says little about the other final question1 of more exclusively human interest1 which concerns the destiny of men4 ,that men are born into a universe which1 as the visible expression of ,moral ,providence1 must be scientifically and ethically trustworthy2 certain not to put man to confusion intellectually or morally1 seeing that it could not otherwise be trusted for such in our ultimate venture of faith--this is one thing4 ,that all persons born into it are certain to continue living self-consciously for ever1 is another thing4 ,this is not obviously implied in the former presupposition1 whether or not it can be deduced from it1 or else discovered by other means4 ,although man's environment is essentially ,divine1 and wholly in its smallest details ,providential1 may not his body1 in its living organisation from physical birth until physical death1 be the measure of the continuance of his self-conscious personality8 ,is each man's immortal existence1 like ,god's1 indispensable8 ,doubt about the destiny of men after they die is1 at the end of the nineteenth century1 probably more prevalent than doubt about the underlying ,providence of ,god1 and ,his constant creative activity2 more perhaps than it was in the days of ,toland1 and ,collins1 and ,tindal4 ,future life had been made so familiar to the imagination by the early and mediaeval ,church1 and afterwards by the ,puritans1 as in ,milton1 ,bunyan1 and ,jonathan ,edwards1 that it then seemed to the religious mind more real than anything that is seen and touched4 ,the habit wholly formed by natural science is apt to dissipate this and to make a human life lived under conditions wholly strange to its 8minute philosophy0 appear illusory4 ,a section in the book of ,principles7#ce7 in which the common argument for the 8natural immortality0 of the human soul is reproduced1 strengthened by his new conception of what the reality of body means1 is ,berkeley's metaphysical contribution for determining between the awful alternatives of annihilation or continued self-conscious life after physical death4 ,the subject is touched1 in a less recondite way1 in two of his papers in the ,guardian1 and in the ,discourse delivered in ,trinity ,college ,chapel in #agjh1 in which a revelation of the immortality of men is presented as the special gospel of ,jesus ,christ4 ,to argue1 as ,berkeley does in the ,principles1 that men cannot be annihilated at death1 because they are spiritual substances having powers independent of the sequences of nature1 implies assumptions regarding finite persons which are open to criticism4 ,the justification in reason for our venture of faith that ,omnipotent ,goodness is at the heart of the universe is--that without this presupposition we can have no reasonable intercourse1 scientific or otherwise1 with the world of things and persons in which we find ourselves2 for reason and will are then alike paralysed by universal distrust4 ,but it can hardly be maintained a priori that men1 or other spiritual beings in the universe1 are equally with ,god indispensable to its natural order2 so that when they have once entered on conscious existence they must always continue to exist consciously4 ,is not the philosophical justification of man's hope of endless life ethical rather than metaphysical2 founded on that faith in the justice and goodness of the ,universal ,mind which has to be taken for granted in every attempt to interpret experience1 with its mixture of good and evil1 in this evanescent embodied life8 ,can a life such as this is be all for men1 in a universe that1 because it is essentially ,divine1 must operate towards the extinction of the wickedness which now makes it a mystery of ,omnipotent ,goodness8 ,a cheerful optimism appears in ,berkeley's habit of thought about death1 as we have it in his essays in the ,guardian3 a sanguine apprehension of a present preponderance of good1 and consequent anticipation of greater good after death2 unlike those whose pessimistic temperament induces a lurid picture of eternal moral disorder4 ,but his otherwise active imagination seldom makes philosophy a meditation upon death4 ,he does not seem to have exercised himself in the way those do who find in the prospect of being in the twenty-first century as they were in the first1 what makes them appalled that they have ever come at all into transitory percipient life2 or as those others who recoil from an unbodied life after physical death1 as infinitely more appalling than the thought of being transported in this body into another planet1 or even to a material world outside our solar system4 ,in one of his letters to ,johnson7#cf7 he does approach the unbodied life1 and in a characteristic way3-- 8,i see no difficulty in conceiving a change of state1 such as is vulgarly called death1 as well without as with material substance4 ,it is sufficient for that purpose that we allow sensible bodies1 i4e4 such as are immediately perceived by sight and touch2 the existence of which ,i am so far from questioning1 as philosophers are used to do1 that ,i establish it1 ,i think1 upon evident principles4 ,now it seems very easy to conceive the soul to exist in a separate state 7i4e4 divested from those limits and laws of motion and perception with which she is embarrassed here7 and to exercise herself on new ideas1 without the intervention of these tangible things we call bodies4 ,it is even very possible to apprehend how the soul may have ideas of colour without an eye1 or of sounds without an ear7#cg740 ,but while we may thus be supposed to have all our present sensuous experience in an unbodied state1 this does not enable one to conceive how unbodied persons can communicate with one another in the absence of all sense signs2 whether of the sort derived from our present senses1 or from other senses of whose data we can in this life have no imagination4 ,berkeley's tar-water enthusiasm lasted throughout the rest of his life1 and found vent in letters and pamphlets in support of his ,panacea1 from #agdd till #ageb4 ,notwithstanding this1 he was not forgetful of other interests--ecclesiastical1 and the social ones which he included in his large meaning of 8ecclesiastical40 ,the ,rising under ,charles ,edward in #agde was the occasion of a ,letter to the ,roman ,catholics of ,cloyne1 characteristically humane and liberal4 ,it was followed in #agdi by an ,exhortation to the ,roman ,catholic ,clergy of ,ireland in a similar spirit2 and this unwonted courtesy of an ,irish ,protestant bishop was received by those to whom it was addressed in a corresponding temper4 ,it is difficult to determine ,berkeley's relation to rival schools or parties in ,church and ,state4 ,his disposition was too singular and independent for a partisan4 ,some of his early writings1 as we have seen1 were suspected of high ,tory and ,jacobite leanings2 but his arguments in the suspected ,discourse were such as ordinary ,tories and ,jacobites failed to understand1 and the tenor of his words and actions was in the best sense liberal4 ,in religious thought ,siris might place him among latitudinarians2 perhaps in affinity with the ,cambridge ,platonists4 ,his true place is foremost among the religious philosophers of the ,anglican ,church2 the first to prepare the religious problem for the light in which we are invited to look at the universe by modern agnostics1 and under the modern conception of natural evolution4 ,he is the most picturesque figure in that ,anglican succession which1 in the seventeenth century1 includes ,hooker and ,cudworth2 in the eighteenth1 ,clarke and ,butler2 and in the nineteenth1 may we say ,coleridge1 in lack of a representative in orders2 although ,mansel1 ,maurice1 ,mozley1 and ,jowett are not to be forgotten1 nor ,isaac ,taylor among laymen7#ch73 ,newman and ,arnold1 illustrious otherwise1 are hardly representatives of metaphysical philosophy4 ,a more pensive tone runs through the closing years at ,cloyne4 ,attempts were made in vain to withdraw him from the 8remote corner0 to which he had been so long confined4 ,his friends urged his claims for the ,irish ,primacy4 8,i am no man's rival or competitor in this matter10 were his words to ,prior4 8,i am not in love with feasts1 and crowds1 and visits1 and late hours1 and strange faces1 and a hurry of affairs often insignificant4 ,for my own private satisfaction1 ,i had rather be master of my time than wear a diadem40 ,letters to his ,american friends1 ,johnson and ,clap1 shew him still moved by the inspiration which carried him over the ,atlantic1 and record his influence in the development of ,american colleges7#ci74 ,the home education of his three sons was another interest4 ,we are told by his widow that 8he would not trust his sons to mercenary hands4 ,though old and sickly1 he performed the constant tedious task himself40 ,of the fruit of this home education there is little to tell4 ,the death of ,william1 his favourite boy1 in #agea1 8was thought to have struck too close to his father's heart40 8,i am a man10 so he writes1 8retired from the amusements1 politics1 visits1 and what the world calls pleasure4 ,i had a little friend1 educated always under mine own eye1 whose painting delighted me1 whose music ravished me1 and whose lively gay spirit was a continual feast4 ,it has pleased ,god to take him hence40 ,the eldest son1 ,henry1 born in ,rhode ,island1 did not long survive his father4 ,george1 the third son1 was destined for ,oxford1 and this destiny was connected with a new project4 ,the 8life academico-philosophical10 which he sought in vain to realise in ,bermuda1 he now hoped to find for himself in the city of colleges on the ,isis4 8,the truth is10 he wrote to ,prior as early as ,september #agdf1 8,i have a scheme of my own for this long time past1 in which ,i propose more satisfaction and enjoyment to myself than ,i could in that high station7#dj71 which ,i neither solicited1 nor so much as wished for4 ,a greater income would not tempt me to remove from ,cloyne1 and set aside my ,oxford scheme2 which1 though delayed by the illness of my son7#da71 yet ,i am as intent upon it and as much resolved as ever40 ,the last of ,berkeley's letters which we have is to ,dean ,gervais4 ,it expresses the feeling with which in ,april1 #ageb1 he was contemplating life1 on the eve of his departure from ,cloyne4 8,i submit to years and infirmities4 ,my views in this world are mean and narrow2 it is a thing in which ,i have small share1 and which ought to give me small concern4 ,i abhor business1 and especially to have to do with great persons and great affairs4 ,the evening of life ,i choose to pass in a quiet retreat4 ,ambitious projects1 intrigues and quarrels of statesmen1 are things ,i have formerly been amused with1 but they now seem to be a vain1 fugitive dream40 ,four months after this1 ,berkeley saw ,cloyne for the last time4 ,in ,august he quitted it for ,oxford1 which he had long pictured in imagination as the ideal home of his old age4 ,when he left ,cork in the vessel which carried his wife1 his daughter1 and himself to ,bristol1 he was prostrated by weakness1 and had to be taken from ,bristol to ,oxford on a horse-litter4 ,it was late in ,august when they arrived there7#db74 ,our picture of ,berkeley at ,oxford is dim4 ,according to tradition he occupied a house in ,holywell ,street1 near the gardens of ,new ,college and not far from the cloisters of ,magdalen4 ,it was a changed world to him4 ,while he was exchanging ,ireland for ,england1 death was removing old ,english friends4 ,before he left ,cloyne he must have heard of the death of ,butler in ,june1 at ,bath1 where ,benson1 at the request of ,secker1 affectionately watched the last hours of the author of the ,analogy4 ,benson followed ,butler in ,august4 ,we hear of study resumed in improved health in the home in ,holy well ,street4 ,in ,october a ,miscellany1 containing several ,tracts on various ,subjects1 8by the ,bishop of ,cloyne10 appeared simultaneously in ,london and ,dublin4 ,the ,tracts were reprints1 with the exception of ,further ,thoughts on ,tar-water1 which may have been written before he left ,ireland4 ,the third edition of ,alciphron also appeared in this autumn4 ,but ,siris is the latest record of his philosophical thought4 ,a comparison of the ,commonplace ,book and the ,principles with the ,analyst and ,siris gives the measure of his advancement4 ,after the sanguine beginning perhaps the comparison leaves a sense of disappointment1 when we find metaphysics mixed up with mathematics in the ,analyst1 and metaphysics obscurely mixed up with medicine in ,siris4 ,it is curious that1 although in #ageb ,david ,hume's ,treatise of ,human ,nature had been before the world for thirteen years and his ,inquiry concerning ,human ,understanding for four years1 there is no allusion to ,hume by ,berkeley4 ,he was ,berkeley's immediate successor in the eighteenth-century evolution of ,european thought4 ,the sceptical criticism of ,hume was applied to the dogmatic religious philosophy of ,berkeley1 to be followed in its turn by the abstractly rational and the moral reconstructive criticism of ,kant4 ,alciphron is1 however1 expressly referred to by ,hume2 indirectly1 too1 throughout the religious agnosticism of his ,inquiry1 also afterwards in the ,dialogues on ,natural ,religion1 in a vindication of minute philosophy by profounder reasonings than those which satisfied ,lysicles and ,alciphron4 ,berkeley1 ,hume1 and ,kant are the three significant philosophical figures of their century1 each holding the supreme place successively in its beginning1 middle1 and later years4 ,perhaps ,reid in ,scotland did more than any other in his generation to make ,berkeley known2 not1 however1 for his true work in constructive religious thought1 but for his supposed denial of the reality of the things we see and touch47#dc7 ,the ideal life in ,oxford did not last long4 ,on the evening of ,sunday1 ,january #ad1 #agec1 ,berkeley was suddenly confronted by the mystery of death4 8,as he was sitting with my mother1 my sister1 and myself10 so his son wrote to ,johnson at ,stratford1 in ,october1 8suddenly1 and without the least previous notice or pain1 he was removed to the enjoyment of eternal rewards2 and although all possible means were instantly used1 no symptom of life ever appeared after2 nor could the physicians assign any cause for his death4 ,he arrived at ,oxford on ,august #be1 and had received great benefit from the change of air1 and by ,god's blessing on tar-water1 insomuch that for some years he had not been in better health than he was the instant before he left us7#dd740 ,six days later he was buried in ,oxford1 in the ,cathedral of ,christ ,church7#de71 where his tomb bears an appropriate inscription by ,dr4 ,markham1 afterwards ,archbishop of ,york4 ,,errata ,vol4 ,i ,page #ii1 line #c for #adi-hj read #adi-fj4 ,page #ii1 line #bb for--and to be 8suggested10 not signified read--instead of being only suggested4 ,page #ajj1 line #aj for hearing read seeing4 ,page #ajc1 note1 lines #e1 #f for pp4 #aaa1 #aab read p4 #baj4 ,page #bjj1 note1 line #ad for ,adam read ,robert4 ,page #cfd1 line #h from foot for and read which4 ,page #eab1 note #f1 line #c for imminent read immanent4 ,vol4 ,,ii ,page #aid1 note1 line #c for ,tyndal read ,tindal4 ,page #bjg1 line #a1 insert #ac4 before ,alc44 ,page #cgg1 line #f for antethesis read antithesis4 ,vol4 ,,iv ,page #bhe1 lines #d1 #e for ,thisus ,alus ,cujus1 c4 read ,ursus4 ,alus4 ,cuius4 c4 ,the inscription1 strictly speaking1 appears on the ,palace of the ,counts ,orsini1 and is dated ,,md4 ,,commonplace ,,book4 ,,mathematical1 ,,ethical1 ,,physical1 ,,and ,,metaphysical ,written ,at ,trinity ,college1 ,dublin1 ,in #agje-h ,first published in #ahga ,editor's ,preface ,to ,the ,commonplace ,book ,berkeley's juvenile ,commonplace ,book is a small quarto volume1 in his handwriting1 found among the ,berkeley manuscripts in possession of the late ,archdeacon ,rose4 ,it was first published in #ahga1 in my edition of ,berkeley's ,works4 ,it consists of occasional thoughts1 mathematical1 physical1 ethical1 and metaphysical1 set down in miscellaneous fashion1 for private use1 as they arose in the course of his studies at ,trinity ,college1 ,dublin4 ,they are full of the fervid enthusiasm that was natural to him1 and of sanguine expectations of the issue of the prospective authorship for which they record preparations4 ,on the title-page is written1 8,g4 ,b4 ,trin4 ,dub4 alum410 with the date #agje1 when he was twenty years of age4 ,the entries are the gradual accumulation of the next three years1 in one of which the ,arithmetica and the ,miscellanea ,mathematica made their appearance4 ,the ,new ,theory of ,vision1 given to the world in #agji1 was evidently much in his mind1 as well as the sublime conception of the material world in its necessary subordination to the spiritual world1 of which he delivered himself in his book of ,principles1 in #agaj4 ,this disclosure of ,berkeley's thoughts about things1 in the years preceding the publication of his first essays1 is indeed a precious record of the initial struggles of ardent philosophical genius4 ,it places the reader in intimate companionship with him when he was beginning to awake into intellectual and spiritual life4 ,we hear him soliloquising4 ,we see him trying to translate into reasonableness our crude inherited beliefs about the material world and the natural order of the universe1 self-conscious personality1 and the ,universal ,power or ,providence--all under the sway of a new determining ,principle which was taking profound possession of his soul4 ,he finds that he has only to look at the concrete things of sense in the light of this great discovery to see the artificially induced perplexities of the old philosophers disappear1 along with their imposing abstractions1 which turn out empty words4 ,the thinking is throughout fresh and sincere2 sometimes impetuous and one-sided2 the outcome of a mind indisposed to take things upon trust1 resolved to inquire freely1 a rebel against the tyranny of language1 morally burdened with the consciousness of a new world-transforming conception1 which duty to mankind obliged him to reveal1 although his message was sure to offend4 ,men like to regard things as they have been wont4 ,this new conception of the surrounding world--the impotence of ,matter1 and its subordinate office in the ,supreme ,economy must1 he foresees1 disturb those accustomed to treat outward things as the only realities1 and who do not care to ask what constitutes reality4 ,notwithstanding the ridicule and ill-will that his transformed material world was sure to meet with1 amongst the many who accept empty words instead of genuine insight1 he was resolved to deliver himself of his thoughts through the press1 but with the politic conciliation of a persuasive ,irish pleader4 ,the ,commonplace ,book steadily recognises the adverse influence of one insidious foe4 ,its world-transforming-,principle has been obscured by 8the mist and veil of words40 ,the abstractions of metaphysicians1 which poison human language1 had to be driven out of the author's mind before he could see the light1 and must be driven out of the minds of others before they could be got to see it along with him3 the concrete world as realisable only in percipient mind is with difficulty introduced into the vacant place4 8,the chief thing ,i pretend to is only to remove the mist and veil of words40 ,he exults in the transformed mental scene that then spontaneously rises before him4 8,my speculations have had the same effect upon me as visiting foreign countries1--in the end ,i return where ,i was before1 get my heart at ease1 and enjoy myself with more satisfaction4 ,the philosophers lose their abstract matter2 the materialists lose their abstract extension2 the profane lose their extended deity4 ,pray what do the rest of mankind lose80 ,this beneficent revolution seemed to be the issue of a simple recognition of the fact1 that the true way of regarding the world we see and touch is to regard it as consisting of ideas or phenomena that are presented to human senses1 somehow regularly ordered1 and the occasions of pleasure or pain to us as we conform to or rebel against their natural order4 ,this is the surrounding universe--at least in its relations to us1 and that is all in it that we have to do with4 8,i know not10 he says1 8what is meant by things considered in themselves1 i4e4 in abstraction4 ,this is nonsense4 ,thing and idea are words of much about the same extent and meaning4 ,existence is not conceivable without perception and volition4 ,i only declare the meaning of the word existence1 as far as ,i can comprehend it40 ,in the ,commonplace ,book we see the youth at ,trinity ,college forging the weapons which he was soon to direct against the materialism and scepticism of the generation into which he was born4 ,here are rough drafts1 crude hints of intended arguments1 probing of unphilosophical mathematicians--even ,newton and ,descartes1 memoranda of facts1 more or less relevant1 on their way into the ,essay on ,vision and the treatise on ,principles--seeds of the philosophy that was to be gradually unfolded in his life and in his books4 ,we watch the intrepid thinker1 notwithstanding the inexperience of youth1 more disposed to give battle to mathematicians and metaphysicians than to submit even provisionally to any human authority4 ,it does not seem that his scholarship or philosophical learning was extensive4 ,descartes1 ,malebranche1 and ,locke were his intimates2 ,hobbes and ,spinoza were not unknown to him2 ,newton and some lesser lights among the mathematicians are often confronted4 ,he is more rarely in company with the ancients or the mediaevalists4 ,no deep study of ,aristotle appears1 and there is even a disposition to disparage ,plato4 ,he seeks for his home in the 8new philosophy0 of experience2 without anticipations of ,kant1 as the critic of what is presupposed in the scientific reliability of any experience1 against whom his almost blind zeal against abstractions would have set him at this early stage4 8,pure intellect ,i understand not at all10 is one of his entries4 ,he asks himself1 8,what becomes of the aeternae veritates80 and his reply is1 8,they vanish40 ,when he tells himself that 8we must with the mob place certainty in the senses10 the words are apt to suggest that the senses are our only source of knowledge1 but ,i suppose his meaning is that the senses must be trustworthy1 as 'the mob' assume4 ,yet occasionally he uses language which looks like an anticipation of ,david ,hume1 as when he calls mind 8a congeries of perceptions4 ,take away perceptions10 he adds1 8and you take away mind4 ,put the perceptions and you put the mind4 ,the understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions and ideas40 ,he seems unconscious of the total scepticism which such expressions1 when strictly interpreted1 are found to involve4 ,but after all1 the reader must not apply rigorous rules of interpretation to random entries or provisional memoranda1 meant only for private use1 by an enthusiastic student who was preparing to produce books4 ,i have followed the manuscript of the ,commonplace ,book1 omitting a few repetitions of thought in the same words4 ,here and there ,berkeley's writing is almost obliterated and difficult to decipher1 apparently through accident by water in the course of his travels1 when1 as he mentions long after in one of his letters1 several of his manuscripts were lost and others were injured4 ,the letters of the alphabet which are interpreted on the first page1 and prefixed on the margin to some of the entries1 may so far help to bring the apparent chaos of entries under a few articulate heads4 ,i have added some annotations here and there as they happened to occur1 and these might have been multiplied indefinitely had space permitted4 ,commonplace ,book ,i4 ,introduction4 ,m4 ,matter4 ,p4 ,primary and ,secondary qualities4 ,e4 ,existence4 ,t4 ,time4 ,s4 ,soul--,spirit4 ,g4 ,god4 ,mo4 ,moral ,philosophy4 ,n4 ,natural ,philosophy4 ,qu4 ,if there be not two kinds of visible extension--one perceiv'd by a confus'd view1 the other by a distinct successive direction of the optique axis to each point8 7,m#a7 ,no general ideas7#df74 ,the contrary a cause of mistake or confusion in mathematiques1 c4 ,this to be intimated in ye ,introduction7#dg74 ,the ,principle may be apply'd to the difficulties of conservation1 co-operation1 c4 7,m#b7 ,trifling for the natural philosophers to enquire the cause of magnetical attractions1 c4 ,they onely search after co-existing ideas7#dh74 7,m#c7 ,qucunque in ,scriptura militant adversus ,copernicum1 militant pro me4 7,m#d7 ,all things in the ,scripture wch side with the vulgar against the learned1 side with me also4 ,i side in all things with the mob4 7,m#e7 ,i know there is a mighty sect of men will oppose me1 but yet ,i may expect to be supported by those whose minds are not so far overgrown wth madness4 ,these are far the greatest part of mankind--especially ,moralists1 ,divines1 ,politicians2 in a word1 all but ,mathematicians and ,natural ,philosophers4 ,i mean only the hypothetical gentlemen4 ,experimental philosophers have nothing whereat to be offended in me4 ,newton begs his ,principles2 ,i demonstrate mine7#di74 7,m#f7 ,i must be very particular in explaining wt is meant by things existing--in houses1 chambers1 fields1 caves1 c4--wn not perceiv'd as well as wn perceived2 and shew how the vulgar notion agrees with mine1 when we narrowly inspect into the meaning and definition of the word existence1 wh is no simple idea1 distinct from perceiving and being perceived7#ej74 ,the ,schoolmen have noble subjects1 but handle them ill4 ,the mathematicians have trifling subjects1 but reason admirably about them4 ,certainly their method and arguing are excellent4 ,god knows how far our knowledge of intellectual beings may be enlarg'd from the ,principles4 7,m#g7 ,the reverse of the ,principle ,i take to have been the chief source of all that scepticism and folly1 all those contradictions and inextricable puzzling absurdities1 that have in all ages been a reproach to human reason1 as well as of that idolatry1 whether of images or of gold1 that blinds the greatest part of the world1 and that shamefull immorality that turns us into beasts4 7,m#h7 ,vixit fuit4 1 the name for substance1 used by ,aristotle1 the ,fathers1 c4 ,if at the same time we shall make the ,mathematiques much more easie and much more accurate1 wt can be objected to us7#ea78 ,we need not force our imagination to conceive such very small lines for infinitesimals4 ,they may every whit as well be imagin'd big as little1 since that the integer must be infinite4 ,evident that wch has an infinite number of parts must be infinite4 ,we cannot imagine a line or space infinitely great--therefore absurd to talk or make propositions about it4 ,we cannot imagine a line1 space1 c41 quovis lato majus4 ,since yt what we imagine must be datum aliquod2 a thing can't be greater than itself4 ,if you call infinite that wch is greater than any assignable by another1 then ,i say1 in that sense there may be an infinite square1 sphere1 or any other figure1 wch is absurd4 ,qu4 if extension be resoluble into points it does not consist of8 ,no reasoning about things whereof we have no ideas7#eb72 therefore no reasoning about infinitesimals4 ,no word to be used without an idea4 7,m#i7 ,if uneasiness be necessary to set the ,will at work1 ,qu4 how shall we will in heaven8 ,bayle's1 ,malbranch's1 c4 arguments do not seem to prove against ,space1 but onely against ,bodies4 7,m#aj7 ,i agree in nothing wth the ,cartesians as to ye existence of ,bodies ,qualities7#ec74 ,aristotle as good a man as ,euclid1 but he was allowed to have been mistaken4 ,lines not proper for demonstration4 7,m#aa7 ,we see the house itself1 the church itself2 it being an idea and nothing more4 ,the house itself1 the church itself1 is an idea1 i4e4 an object--immediate object--of thought7#ed74 ,instead of injuring1 our doctrine much benefits geometry4 7,m#ab7 ,existence is percipi1 or percipere1 or velle1 i4e4 agere7#ee74 ,the horse is in the stable1 the books are in the study as before4 7,m#ac7 ,in physiques ,i have a vast view of things soluble hereby1 but have not leisure4 7,m#ad7 ,hyps and such like unaccountable things confirm my doctrine4 ,angle not well defined4 ,see ,pardies' ,geometry1 by ,harris1 c4 ,this one ground of trifling4 7,m#ae7 ,one idea not the cause of another--one power not the cause of another4 ,the cause of all natural things is onely ,god4 ,hence trifling to enquire after second causes4 ,this doctrine gives a most suitable idea of the ,divinity7#ef74 7,m#af7 ,absurd to study astronomy and other the like doctrines as speculative sciences4 7,m#ag7 ,the absurd account of memory by the brain1 c4 makes for me4 ,how was light created before man8 ,even so were ,bodies created before man7#eg74 7,m#ah7 ,impossible anything besides that wch thinks and is thought on should exist7#eh74 ,that wch is visible cannot be made up of invisible things4 ,m4,s4 is that wherein there are not contain'd distinguishable sensible parts4 ,now how can that wch hath not sensible parts be divided into sensible parts8 ,if you say it may be divided into insensible parts1 ,i say these are nothings4 ,extension abstract from sensible qualities is no sensation1 ,i grant2 but then there is no such idea1 as any one may try7#ei74 ,there is onely a considering the number of points without the sort of them1 this makes more for me1 since it must be in a considering thing4 ,mem4 ,before ,i have shewn the distinction between visible tangible extension1 ,i must not mention them as distinct4 ,i must not mention ,m4 ,t4 ,m4 ,v41 but in general ,m4 ,s41 c47#fj7 ,qu4 whether a ,m4 ,v4 be of any colour8 a ,m4 ,t4 of any tangible quality8 ,if visible extension be the object of geometry1 'tis that which is survey'd by the optique axis4 7,m#ai7 ,i may say the pain is in my finger1 c41 according to my doctrine7#fa74 ,mem4 ,nicely to discuss wt is meant when we say a line consists of a certain number of inches or points1 c42 a circle of a certain number of square inches1 points1 c4 ,certainly we may think of a circle1 or have its idea in our mind1 without thinking of points or square inches1 c42 whereas it should seem the idea of a circle is not made up of the ideas of points1 square inches1 c4 ,qu4 ,is any more than this meant by the foregoing expressions1 viz4 that squares or points may be perceived in or made out of a circle1 c41 or that squares1 points1 c4 are actually in it1 i4e4 are perceivable in it8 ,a line in abstract1 or ,distance1 is the number of points between two points4 ,there is also distance between a slave an emperor1 between a peasant philosopher1 between a drachm a pound1 a farthing a crown1 c42 in all which ,distance signifies the number of intermediate ideas4 ,halley's doctrine about the proportion between infinitely great quantities vanishes4 ,when men speak of infinite quantities1 either they mean finite quantities1 or else talk of that whereof they have7#fb7 no idea2 both which are absurd4 ,if the disputations of the ,schoolmen are blam'd for intricacy1 triflingness1 confusion1 yet it must be acknowledg'd that in the main they treated of great important subjects4 ,if we admire the method acuteness of the ,mathematicians--the length1 the subtilty1 the exactness of their demonstrations--we must nevertheless be forced to grant that they are for the most part about trifling subjects1 and perhaps mean nothing at all4 ,motion on #b;d thoughts seems to be a simple idea4 7,m#bj7 ,motion distinct from ye thing moved is not conceivable4 7,m#ba7 ,mem4 ,to take notice of ,newton for defining it motion2 also of ,locke's wisdom in leaving it undefin'd7#fc74 ,ut ordo partium temporis est immutabilis1 sin etiam ordo partium spatii4 ,moveantur h de locis suis1 et movebuntur 7ut ita dicam7 de seipsis4 ,truly number is immensurable4 ,that we will allow with ,newton4 7,m#bb7 ,ask a ,cartesian whether he is wont to imagine his globules without colour4 ,pellucidness is a colour4 ,the colour of ordinary light of the sun is white4 ,newton in the right in assigning colours to the rays of light4 ,a man born blind would not imagine ,space as we do4 ,we give it always some dilute1 or duskish1 or dark colour--in short1 we imagine it as visible1 or intromitted by the eye1 wch he would not do4 7,m#bc7 ,proinde vim inferunt sacris literis qui voces hasce 7v4 tempus1 spatium1 motus7 de quantitatibus mensuratis ibi interpretantur4 ,newton1 p4 #aj4 7,m#bd7 ,i differ from ,newton1 in that ,i think the recession ab axe motus is not the effect1 or index1 or measure of motion1 but of the vis impressa4 ,it sheweth not wt is truly moved1 but wt has the force impressed on it1 or rather that wch hath an impressed force4 ,d and ,p are not proportional in all circles4 d d is to #a_/d;d p as d to p_/#d2 but d and p_/#d are not in the same proportion in all circles4 ,hence 'tis nonsense to seek the terms of one general proportion whereby to rectify all peripheries1 or of another whereby to square all circles4 ,n4 ,b4 ,if the circle be squar'd arithmetically1 'tis squar'd geometrically1 arithmetic or numbers being nothing but lines proportions of lines when apply'd to geometry4 ,mem4 ,to remark ,cheyne7#fd7 his doctrine of infinites4 ,extension1 motion1 time1 do each of them include the idea of succession1 so far forth they seem to be of mathematical consideration4 ,number consisting in succession distinct perception1 wch also consists in succession2 for things at once perceiv'd are jumbled and mixt together in the mind4 ,time and motion cannot be conceiv'd without succession2 and extension1 qua mathemat41 cannot be conceiv'd but as consisting of parts wch may be distinctly successively perceiv'd4 ,extension perceived at once in confuso does not belong to math4 ,the simple idea call'd ,power seems obscure1 or rather none at all1 but onely the relation 'twixt ,cause and ,effect4 ,when ,i ask whether ,a can move ,b1 if ,a be an intelligent thing1 ,i mean no more than whether the volition of ,a that ,b move be attended with the motion of ,b8 ,if ,a be senseless1 whether the impulse of ,a against ,b be followed by ye motion of ,b7#fe78 ,barrow's arguing against indivisibles1 lect4 i4 p4 #af1 is a petitio principii1 for the ,demonstration of ,archimedes supposeth the circumference to consist of more than #bd points4 ,moreover it may perhaps be necessary to suppose the divisibility ad infinitum1 in order to demonstrate that the radius is equal to the side of the hexagon4 ,shew me an argument against indivisibles that does not go on some false supposition4 ,a great number of insensibles--or thus1 two invisibles1 say you1 put together become visible2 therefore that ,m4 ,v4 contains or is made up of invisibles4 ,i answer1 the ,m4 ,v4 does not comprise1 is not composed of1 invisibles4 ,all the matter amounts to this1 viz4 whereas ,i had no idea awhile agoe1 ,i have an idea now4 ,it remains for you to prove that ,i came by the present idea because there were two invisibles added together4 ,i say the invisibles are nothings1 cannot exist1 include a contradiction7#ff74 ,i am young1 ,i am an upstart1 ,i am a pretender1 ,i am vain4 ,very well4 ,i shall endeavour patiently to bear up under the most lessening1 vilifying appellations the pride rage of man can devise4 ,but one thing ,i know ,i am not guilty of4 ,i do not pin my faith on the sleeve of any great man4 ,i act not out of prejudice or prepossession4 ,i do not adhere to any opinion because it is an old one1 a reviv'd one1 a fashionable one1 or one that ,i have spent much time in the study and cultivation of4 ,sense rather than reason or demonstration ought to be employed about lines and figures1 these being things sensible2 for as for those you call insensible1 we have proved them to be nonsense1 nothing7#fg74 7,m#be7 ,if in some things ,i differ from a philosopher ,i profess to admire1 'tis for that very thing on account whereof ,i admire him1 namely1 the love of truth4 ,this c4 7,m#bf7 ,whenever my reader finds me talk very positively1 ,i desire he'd not take it ill4 ,i see no reason why certainty should be confined to the mathematicians4 ,i say there are no incommensurables1 no surds4 ,i say the side of any square may be assign'd in numbers4 ,say you assign unto me the side of the square #aj4 ,i ask wt #aj--aj feet1 inches1 c41 or #aj points8 ,if the later1 ,i deny there is any such square1 'tis impossible #aj points should compose a square4 ,if the former1 resolve yr #aj square inches1 feet1 c4 into points1 the number of points must necessarily be a square number whose side is easily assignable4 ,a mean proportional cannot be found betwixt any two given lines4 ,it can onely be found betwixt those the numbers of whose points multiply'd together produce a square number4 ,thus betwixt a line of #b inches a line of #e inches a mean geometrical cannot be found1 except the number of points contained in #b inches multiply'd by ye number of points contained in #e inches make a square number4 ,if the wit and industry of the ,nihilarians were employ'd about the usefull practical mathematiques1 what advantage had it brought to mankind6 7,m#bg7 ,you ask me whether the books are in the study now1 when no one is there to see them8 ,i answer1 ,yes4 ,you ask me1 ,are we not in the wrong for imagining things to exist when they are not actually perceiv'd by the senses8 ,i answer1 ,no4 ,the existence of our ideas consists in being perceiv'd1 imagin'd1 thought on4 ,whenever they are imagin'd or thought on they do exist4 ,whenever they are mentioned or discours'd of they are imagin'd thought on4 ,therefore you can at no time ask me whether they exist or no1 but by reason of yt very question they must necessarily exist4 7,m#bh7 ,but1 say you1 then a chimra does exist8 ,i answer1 it doth in one sense1 i4e4 it is imagin'd4 ,but it must be well noted that existence is vulgarly restrain'd to actuall perception1 and that ,i use the word existence in a larger sense than ordinary47#fh7 ,n4 ,b4--,according to my doctrine all things are entia rationis1 i4e4 solum habent esse in intellectum4 7,m#bi7 7#fi7;,according to my doctrine all are not entia rationis4 ,the distinction between ens rationis and ens reale is kept up by it as well as any other doctrine4 ,you ask me whether there can be an infinite idea8 ,i answer1 in one sense there may4 ,thus the visual sphere1 tho' ever so small1 is infinite1 i4e4 has no end4 ,but if by infinite you mean an extension consisting of innumerable points1 then ,i ask yr pardon4 ,points1 tho' never so many1 may be numbered4 ,the multitude of points1 or feet1 inches1 c41 hinders not their numbrableness 7i4e4 hinders not their being numerable7 in the least4 ,many or most are numerable1 as well as few or least4 ,also1 if by infinite idea you mean an idea too great to be comprehended or perceiv'd all at once1 you must excuse me4 ,i think such an infinite is no less than a contradiction7#gj74 7,m#cj7 ,the sillyness of the current doctrine makes much for me4 ,they commonly suppose a material world--figures1 motions1 bulks of various sizes1 c4--according to their own confession to no purpose4 ,all our sensations may be1 and sometimes actually are1 without them2 nor can men so much as conceive it possible they should concur in any wise to the production of them4 7,m#ca7 ,ask a man1 ,i mean a philosopher1 why he supposes this vast structure1 this compages of bodies8 he shall be at a stand2 he'll not have one word to say4 ,wch sufficiently shews the folly of the hypothesis4 7,m#cb7 ,or rather why he supposes all ys ,matter8 ,for bodies and their qualities ,i do allow to exist independently of our mind4 7,m#cc7 ,qu4 ,how is the soul distinguish'd from its ideas8 ,certainly if there were no sensible ideas there could be no soul1 no perception1 remembrance1 love1 fear1 c42 no faculty could be exerted7#ga74 7,m#cd7 ,the soul is the ,will1 properly speaking1 and as it is distinct from ideas4 7,m#ce7 ,the grand puzzling question1 whether ,i sleep or wake1 easily solv'd4 ,qu4 ,whether minima or meer minima may not be compar'd by their sooner or later evanescence1 as well as by more or less points1 so that one sensible may be greater than another1 though it exceeds it not by one point8 ,circles on several radius's are not similar figures1 they having neither all nor any an infinite number of sides4 ,hence in vain to enquire after #b terms of one and ye same proportion that should constantly express the reason of the d to the p in all circles4 ,mem4 ,to remark ,wallis's harangue1 that the aforesaid proportion can neither be expressed by rational numbers nor surds4 ,we can no more have an idea of length without breadth or visibility1 than of a general figure4 ,one idea may be like another idea1 tho' they contain no common simple idea7#gb74 ,thus the simple idea red is in some sense like the simple idea blue2 'tis liker it than sweet or shrill4 ,but then those ideas wch are so said to be alike1 agree both in their connexion with another simple idea1 viz4 extension1 in their being receiv'd by one the same sense4 ,but1 after all1 nothing can be like an idea but an idea4 ,no sharing betwixt ,god ,nature or second causes in my doctrine4 7,m#cf7 ,materialists must allow the earth to be actually mov'd by the attractive power of every stone that falls from the air1 with many other the like absurditys4 ,enquire concerning the pendulum clock1 c42 whether those inventions of ,huygens1 c4 be attained to by my doctrine4 ,the 444 444 444 c4 of time are to be cast away and neglected1 as so many noughts or nothings4 ,mem4 ,to make experiments concerning minimums and their colours1 whether they have any or no1 whether they can be of that green wch seems to be compounded of yellow and blue4 7,m#cg7 ,qu4 ,whether it were not better not to call the operations of the mind ideas--confining this term to things sensible7#gc78 7,m#ch7 ,mem4 diligently to set forth how that many of the ancient philosophers run into so great absurditys as even to deny the existence of motion1 and of those other things they perceiv'd actually by their senses4 ,this sprung from their not knowing wt ,existence was1 and wherein it consisted4 ,this the source of all their folly4 ',tis on the discovering of the nature and meaning and import of ,existence that ,i chiefly insist4 ,this puts a wide difference betwixt the sceptics c4 me4 ,this ,i think wholly new4 ,i am sure this is new to me7#gd74 ,we have learn'd from ,mr4 ,locke that there may be1 and that there are1 several glib1 coherent1 methodical discourses1 which nevertheless amount to just nothing4 ,this by him intended with relation to the ,scholemen4 ,we may apply it to the ,mathematicians4 ,qu4 ,how can all words be said to stand for ideas8 ,the word blue stands for a colour without any extension1 or abstract from extension4 ,but we have not an idea of colour without extension4 ,we cannot imagine colour without extension4 ,locke seems wrongly to assign a double use of words3 one for communicating the other for recording our thoughts4 ',tis absurd to use words for recording our thoughts to ourselves1 or in our private meditations7#ge74 ,no one abstract simple idea like another4 ,two simple ideas may be connected with one the same #c;d simple idea1 or be intromitted by one the same sense4 ,but consider'd in themselves they can have nothing common1 and consequently no likeness4 ,qu4 ,how can there be any abstract ideas of colours8 ,it seems not so easily as of tastes or sounds4 ,but then all ideas whatsoever are particular4 ,i can by no means conceive an abstract general idea4 ',tis one thing to abstract one concrete idea from another of a different kind1 another thing to abstract an idea from all particulars of the same kind7#gf74 7,m#ci7 ,mem4 ,much to recommend and approve of experimental philosophy4 7,m#dj7 ,what means ,cause as distinguish'd from ,occasion8 ,nothing but a being wch wills1 when the effect follows the volition4 ,those things that happen from without we are not the cause of4 ,therefore there is some other ,cause of them1 i4e4 there is a ,being that wills these perceptions in us7#gg74 7,m#da7 7#gh7;,it should be said1 nothing but a ,will--a ,being which wills being unintelligible4 ,one square cannot be double of another4 ,hence the ,pythagoric theorem is false4 ,some writers of catoptrics absurd enough to place the apparent place of the object in the ,barrovian case behind the eye4 ,blew and yellow chequers still diminishing terminate in green4 ,this may help to prove the composition of green4 ,there is in green #b foundations of #b relations of likeness to blew yellow4 ,therefore green is compounded4 ,a mixt cause will produce a mixt effect4 ,therefore colours are all compounded that we see4 ,mem4 ,to consider ,newton's two sorts of green4 ,n4 ,b4 ,my abstract general doctrines ought not to be condemn'd by the ,royall ,society4 ',tis wt their meeting did ultimately intend4 ,v4 ,sprat's ,history ,s4 ,r47#gi7 ,mem4 ,to premise a definition of idea7#hj74 7,m#db7 ,the #b great principles of ,morality--the being of a ,god the freedom of man4 ,those to be handled in the beginning of the ,second ,book7#ha74 ,subvertitur geometria ut non practica sed speculativa4 ,archimedes's proposition about squaring the circle has nothing to do with circumferences containing less than #if points2 if the circumference contain #if points it may be apply'd1 but nothing will follow against indivisibles4 ,v4 ,barrow4 ,those curve lines that you can rectify geometrically4 ,compare them with their equal right lines by a microscope you shall discover an inequality4 ,hence my squaring of the circle as good and exact as the best4 7,m#dc7 ,qu4 whether the substance of body or anything else be any more than the collection of concrete ideas included in that thing8 ,thus the substance of any particular body is extension1 solidity1 figure7#hb74 ,of general abstract body we can have no idea4 7,m#dd7 ,mem4 ,most carefully to inculcate and set forth that the endeavouring to express abstract philosophic thoughts by words unavoidably runs a man into difficulties4 ,this to be done in the ,introduction7#hc74 ,mem4 ,to endeavour most accurately to understand what is meant by this axiom3 ,qu sibi mutuo congruunt qualia sunt4 ,qu4 what the geometers mean by equality of lines1 whether1 according to their definition of equality1 a curve line can possibly be equal to a right line8 ,if wth me you call those lines equal wch contain an equal number of points1 then there will be no difficulty4 ,that curve is equal to a right line wch contains the same points as the right one doth4 7,m#de7 ,i take not away substances4 ,i ought not to be accused of discarding substance out of the reasonable world7#hd74 ,i onely reject the philosophic sense 7wch in effect is no sense7 of the word substance4 ,ask a man not tainted with their jargon wt he means by corporeal substance1 or the substance of body4 ,he shall answer1 bulk1 solidity1 and such like sensible qualitys4 ,these ,i retain4 ,the philosophic nec quid1 nec quantum1 nec quale1 whereof ,i have no idea1 ,i discard2 if a man may be said to discard that which never had any being1 was never so much as imagin'd or conceiv'd4 7,m#df7 ,in short1 be not angry4 ,you lose nothing1 whether real or chimerical4 ,wtever you can in any wise conceive or imagine1 be it never so wild1 so extravagant1 absurd1 much good may it do you4 ,you may enjoy it for me4 ,i'll never deprive you of it4 ,n4 ,b4 ,i am more for reality than any other philosophers7#he74 ,they make a thousand doubts1 know not certainly but we may be deceiv'd4 ,i assert the direct contrary4 ,a line in the sense of mathematicians is not meer distance4 ,this evident in that there are curve lines4 ,curves perfectly incomprehensible1 inexplicable1 absurd1 except we allow points4 7,m#dg7 ,if men look for a thing where it's not to be found1 be they never so sagacious1 it is lost labour4 ,if a simple clumsy man knows where the game lies1 he though a fool shall catch it sooner than the most fleet dexterous that seek it elsewhere4 ,men choose to hunt for truth and knowledge anywhere rather than in their own understanding1 where 'tis to be found4 7,m#dh7 ,all knowledge onely about ideas4 ,locke1 ,b4 #d4 c4 #a4 7,m#di7 ,it seems improper1 liable to difficulties1 to make the word person stand for an idea1 or to make ourselves ideas1 or thinking things ideas4 7,m#ej7 ,abstract ideas cause of much trifling and mistake4 ,mathematicians seem not to speak clearly and coherently of equality4 ,they nowhere define wt they mean by that word when apply'd to lines4 ,locke says the modes of simple ideas1 besides extension and number1 are counted by degrees4 ,i deny there are any modes or degrees of simple ideas4 ,what he terms such are complex ideas1 as ,i have proved4 ,wt do the mathematicians mean by considering curves as polygons8 ,either they are polygons or they are not4 ,if they are1 why do they give them the name of curves8 ,why do not they constantly call them polygons1 treat them as such8 ,if they are not polygons1 ,i think it absurd to use polygons in their stead4 ,wt is this but to pervert language8 to adapt an idea to a name that belongs not to it but to a different idea8 ,the mathematicians should look to their axiom1 ,qu congruunt sunt qualia4 ,i know not what they mean by bidding me put one triangle on another4 ,the under triangle is no triangle--nothing at all1 it not being perceiv'd4 ,i ask1 must sight be judge of this congruentia or not8 ,if it must1 then all lines seen under the same angle are equal1 wch they will not acknowledge4 ,must the touch be judge8 ,but we cannot touch or feel lines and surfaces1 such as triangles1 c41 according to the mathematicians themselves4 ,much less can we touch a line or triangle that's cover'd by another line or triangle4 ,do you mean by saying one triangle is equall to another1 that they both take up equal spaces8 ,but then the question recurs1 what mean you by equal spaces8 ,if you mean spatia congruentia1 answer the above difficulty truly4 ,i can mean 7for my part7 nothing else by equal triangles than triangles containing equal numbers of points4 ,i can mean nothing by equal lines but lines wch 'tis indifferent whether of them ,i take1 lines in wch ,i observe by my senses no difference1 wch therefore have the same name4 ,must the imagination be judge in the aforementioned cases8 but then imagination cannot go beyond the touch and sight4 ,say you1 pure intellect must be judge4 ,i reply that lines and triangles are not operations of the mind4 ,if ,i speak positively and with the air of a mathematician in things of which ,i am certain1 'tis to avoid disputes1 to make men careful to think before they answer1 to discuss my arguments before they go to refute them4 ,i would by no means injure truth and certainty by an affected modesty submission to better judgments4 ,wt ,i lay before you are undoubted theorems2 not plausible conjectures of my own1 nor learned opinions of other men4 ,i pretend not to prove them by figures1 analogy1 or authority4 ,let them stand or fall by their own evidence4 7,m#ea7 ,when you speak of the corpuscularian essences of bodys1 to reflect on sect4 #aa4 #ab4 b4 #d4 c4 #c4 ,locke4 ,motion supposes not solidity4 ,a meer colour'd extension may give us the idea of motion4 7,m#eb7 ,any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once4 ,lib4 #d4 c4 #c4 s4 #ae4 ,locke4 7,m#ec7 ,well1 say you1 according to this new doctrine1 all is but meer idea--there is nothing wch is not an ens rationis4 ,i answer1 things are as real1 and exist in rerum natura1 as much as ever4 ,the difference between entia realia entia rationis may be made as properly now as ever4 ,do but think before you speak4 ,endeavour rightly to comprehend my meaning1 and you'll agree with me in this4 7,m#ed7 ,fruitless the distinction 'twixt real and nominal essences4 ,we are not acquainted with the meaning of our words4 ,real1 extension1 existence1 power1 matter1 lines1 infinite1 point1 and many more are frequently in our mouths1 when little1 clear1 and determin'd answers them in our understandings4 ,this must be well inculcated4 7,m#ee7 ,vain is the distinction 'twixt intellectual and material world7#hf74 ,v4 ,locke1 lib4 #d4 c4 #c4 s4 #bg1 where he says that is far more beautiful than this4 7,m#ef7 ,foolish in men to despise the senses4 ,if it were not for 7,m#eg7 them the mind could have no knowledge1 no thought at all4 ,all 444 of introversion1 meditation1 contemplation1 and spiritual acts1 as if these could be exerted before we had ideas from without by the senses1 are manifestly absurd4 ,this may be of great use in that it makes the happyness of the life to come more conceivable and agreeable to our present nature4 ,the schoolemen refiners in philosophy gave the greatest part of mankind no more tempting idea of heaven or the joys of the blest4 ,the vast1 wide-spread1 universal cause of our mistakes is1 that we do not consider our own notions4 ,i mean consider them in themselves--fix1 settle1 and determine them1--we regarding them with relation to each other only4 ,in short1 we are much out in studying the relations of things before we study them absolutely and in themselves4 ,thus we study to find out the relations of figures to one another1 the relations also of number1 without endeavouring rightly to understand the nature of extension and number in themselves4 ,this we think is of no concern1 of no difficulty2 but if ,i mistake not 'tis of the last importance1 7,m#eh7 ,i allow not of the distinction there is made 'twixt profit and pleasure4 7,m#ei7 ,i'd never blame a man for acting upon interest4 ,he's a fool that acts on any other principles4 ,the not considering these things has been of ill consequence in morality4 ,my positive assertions are no less modest than those that are introduced with 8,it seems to me10 8,i suppose10 c42 since ,i declare1 once for all1 that all ,i write or think is entirely about things as they appear to me4 ,it concerns no man else any further than his thoughts agree with mine4 ,this in the ,preface4 7,m#fj7 ,two things are apt to confound men in their reasonings one with another4 #ast4 ,words signifying the operations of the mind are taken from sensible ideas4 #bndly4 ,words as used by the vulgar are taken in some latitude1 their signification is confused4 ,hence if a man use words in a determined1 settled signification1 he is at a hazard either of not being understood1 or of speaking improperly4 ,all this remedyed by studying the understanding4 ,unity no simple idea4 ,i have no idea meerly answering the word one4 ,all number consists in relations7#hg74 ,entia realia et entia rationis1 a foolish distinction of the ,schoolemen4 7,m#fa7 ,we have an intuitive knowledge of the existence of other things besides ourselves order1 prcedaneous7#hh74 ,to the knowledge of our own existence--in that we must have ideas or else we cannot think4 7,m#fb7 ,we move our legs ourselves4 ',tis we that will their movement4 ,herein ,i differ from ,malbranch7#hi74 7,m#fc7 ,mem4 ,nicely to discuss ,lib4 #d4 c4 #d4 ,locke7#ij74 7,m#fd7 ,mem4 ,again and again to mention illustrate the doctrine of the reality of things1 rerum natura1 c4 7,m#fe7 ,wt ,i say is demonstration--perfect demonstration4 ,wherever men have fix'd determin'd ideas annexed to their words they can hardly be mistaken4 ,stick but to my definition of likeness1 and 'tis a demonstration yt colours are not simple ideas1 all reds being like1 c4 ,so also in other things4 ,this to be heartily insisted on4 7,m#ff7 ,the abstract idea of ,being or ,existence is never thought of by the vulgar4 ,they never use those words standing for abstract ideas4 7,m#fg7 ,i must not say the words thing1 substance1 c4 have been the cause of mistakes1 but the not reflecting on their meaning4 ,i will be still for retaining the words4 ,i only desire that men would think before they speak1 and settle the meaning of their words4 7,m#fh7 ,i approve not of that which ,locke says1 viz4 truth consists in the joining and separating of signs4 7,m#fi7 ,locke cannot explain general truth or knowledge without treating of words and propositions4 ,this makes for me against abstract general ideas4 ,vide ,locke1 lib4 #d4 ch4 #f4 7,m#gj7 ,men have been very industrious in travelling forward4 ,they have gone a great way4 ,but none have gone backward beyond the ,principles4 ,on that side there lies much terra incognita to be travel'd over and discovered by me4 ,a vast field for invention4 ,twelve inches not the same idea with a foot4 ,because a man may perfectly conceive a foot who never thought of an inch4 ,a foot is equal to or the same with twelve inches in this respect1 viz4 they contain both the same number of points4 ,forasmuch as to be used4 ,mem4 ,to mention somewhat wch may encourage the study of politiques1 and testify of me yt ,i am well dispos'd toward them4 7,m#ga7 ,if men did not use words for ideas they would never have thought of abstract ideas4 ,certainly genera and species are not abstract general ideas4 ,abstract ideas include a contradiction in their nature4 ,vide ,locke7#ia71 lib4 #d4 c4 #g4 s4 #i4 ,a various or mixt cause must necessarily produce a various or mixt effect4 ,this demonstrable from the definition of a cause2 which way of demonstrating must be frequently made use of in my ,treatise1 to that end definitions often prmis'd4 ,hence 'tis evident that1 according to ,newton's doctrine1 colours cannot be simple ideas4 7,m#gb7 ,i am the farthest from scepticism of any man4 ,i know with an intuitive knowledge the existence of other things as well as my own soul4 ,this is wt ,locke nor scarce any other thinking philosopher will pretend to7#ib74 7,m#gc7 ,doctrine of abstraction of very evil consequence in all the sciences4 ,mem4 ,barrow's remark4 ,entirely owing to language4 ,locke greatly out in reckoning the recording our ideas by words amongst the uses and not the abuses of language4 7,m#gd7 ,of great use ye last importance to contemplate a man put into the world alone1 with admirable abilitys1 and see how after long experience he would know wthout words4 ,such a one would never think of genera and species or abstract general ideas4 7,m#ge7 ,wonderful in ,locke that he could1 wn advanced in years1 see at all thro' a mist2 it had been so long a gathering1 was consequently thick4 ,this more to be admir'd than yt he did not see farther4 ,identity of ideas may be taken in a double sense1 either as including or excluding identity of circumstances1 such as time1 place1 c4 7,m#gf7 ,i am glad the people ,i converse with are not all richer1 wiser1 c4 than ,i4 ,this is agreeable to reason2 is no sin4 ',tis certain that if the happyness of my acquaintance encreases1 mine not proportionably1 mine must decrease4 ,the not understanding this the doctrine about relative good1 discuss'd with ,french1 ,madden7#ic71 c41 to be noticed as #b causes of mistake in judging of moral matters4 ,mem4 ,to observe 7wn you talk of the division of ideas into simple and complex7 that there may be another cause of the undefinableness of certain ideas besides that which ,locke gives2 viz4 the want of names4 7,m#gg7 ,mem4 ,to begin the ,first ,book7#id7 not with mention of sensation and reflection1 but instead of sensation to use perception or thought in general4 7,m#gh7 ,i defy any man to imagine or conceive perception without an idea1 or an idea without perception4 7,m#gi7 ,locke's very supposition that matter motion should exist before thought is absurd--includes a manifest contradiction4 ,locke's harangue about coherent1 methodical discourses amounting to nothing1 apply'd to the mathematicians4 ,they talk of determining all the points of a curve by an equation4 ,wt mean they by this8 ,wt would they signify by the word points8 ,do they stick to the definition of ,euclid8 7,m#hj7 ,we think we know not the ,soul1 because we have no imaginable or sensible idea annex'd to that sound4 ,this the effect of prejudice4 7,m#ha7 ,certainly we do not know it4 ,this will be plain if we examine what we mean by the word knowledge4 ,neither doth this argue any defect in our knowledge1 no more than our not knowing a contradiction4 ,the very existence of ideas constitutes the ,soul7#ie74 7,m#hb7 ,consciousness7#if71 perception1 existence of ideas1 seem to be all one4 ,consult1 ransack yr understanding4 ,wt find you there besides several perceptions or thoughts8 ,wt mean you by the word mind8 ,you must mean something that you perceive1 or yt you do not perceive4 ,a thing not perceived is a contradiction4 ,to mean 7also7 a thing you do not perceive is a contradiction4 ,we are in all this matter strangely abused by words4 ,mind is a congeries of perceptions7#ig74 ,take away perceptions and you take away the mind4 ,put the perceptions and you put the mind4 ,say you1 the mind is not the perception1 not that thing which perceives4 ,i answer1 you are abused by the words 8that a thing40 ,these are vague and empty words with us4 7,m#hc7 ,the having ideas is not the same thing with perception4 ,a man may have ideas when he only imagines4 ,but then this imagination presupposeth perception4 7,m#hd7 ,that wch extreamly strengthens us in prejudice is yt we think we see an empty space1 which ,i shall demonstrate to be false in the ,third ,book7#ih74 ,there may be demonstrations used even in ,divinity4 ,i mean in revealed ,theology1 as contradistinguish'd from natural2 for tho' the principles may be founded in faith1 yet this hinders not but that legitimate demonstrations might be built thereon2 provided still that we define the words we use1 and never go beyond our ideas4 ,hence 'twere no very hard matter for those who hold episcopacy or monarchy to be established jure ,divino to demonstrate their doctrines if they are true4 ,but to pretend to demonstrate or reason anything about the ,trinity is absurd4 ,here an implicit faith becomes us4 7,m#he7 ,qu4 if there be any real difference betwixt certain ideas of reflection others of sensation1 e4g4 betwixt perception and white1 black1 sweet1 c48 ,wherein1 ,i pray you1 does the perception of white differ from white men4444 ,i shall demonstrate all my doctrines4 ,the nature of demonstration to be set forth and insisted on in the ,introduction7#ii74 ,in that ,i must needs differ from ,locke1 forasmuch as he makes all demonstration to be about abstract ideas1 wch ,i say we have not nor can have4 7,m#hf7 ,the understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions or ideas4 ,qu4 ,what must one think of the will and passions8 7,m#hg7 ,a good proof that ,existence is nothing without or distinct from perception1 may be drawn from considering a man put into the world without company7#ajj74 7,m#hh7 ,there was a smell1 i4e4 there was a smell perceiv'd4 ,thus we see that common speech confirms my doctrine4 7,m#hi7 ,no broken intervals of death or annihilation4 ,those intervals are nothing2 each person's time being measured to him by his own ideas4 7,m#ij7 ,we are frequently puzzl'd and at a loss in obtaining clear and determin'd meanings of words commonly in use1 that because we imagine words stand for abstract general ideas which are altogether inconceivable4 7,m#ia7 8,a stone is a stone40 ,this a nonsensical proposition1 and such as the solitary man would never think on4 ,nor do ,i believe he would ever think on this3 8,the whole is equal to its parts10 c4 7,m#ib7 ,let it not be said that ,i take away existence4 ,i only declare the meaning of the word1 so far as ,i can comprehend it4 7,m#ic7 ,if you take away abstraction1 how do men differ from beasts8 ,i answer1 by shape1 by language4 ,rather by degrees of more and less4 ,wt means ,locke by inferences in words1 consequences of words1 as something different from consequences of ideas8 ,i conceive no such thing4 7,m#id7 ,n4 ,b4 ,much complaint about the imperfection of language7#aja74 7,m#ie7 ,but perhaps some man may say1 an inert thoughtless ,substance may exist1 though not extended1 moved1 c41 but with other properties whereof we have no idea4 ,but even this ,i shall demonstrate to be impossible1 wn ,i come to treat more particularly of ,existence4 ,will not rightly distinguish'd from ,desire by ,locke--it seeming to superadd nothing to the idea of an action1 but the uneasiness for its absence or non-existence4 7,m#if7 ,mem4 ,to enquire diligently into that strange mistery1 viz4 ,how it is that ,i can cast about1 think of this or that man1 place1 action1 wn nothing appears to introduce them into my thoughts1 wn they have no perceivable connexion with the ideas suggested by my senses at the present8 7,m#ig7 ',tis not to be imagin'd wt a marvellous emptiness scarcity of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words in his meditations4 7,m#ih7 ,incongruous in ,locke to fancy we want a sense proper to see substances with4 7,m#ii7 ,locke owns that abstract ideas were made in order to naming4 7,m#ajj7 ,the common errour of the opticians1 that we judge of distance by angles7#ajb71 strengthens men in their prejudice that they see things without and distant from their mind4 7,m#aja7 ,i am persuaded1 would men but examine wt they mean by the word existence1 they wou'd agree with me4 c4 #bj4 s4 #h4 b4 #d4 of ,locke makes for me against the mathematicians4 7,m#ajb7 ,the supposition that things are distinct from ideas takes away all real truth1 consequently brings in a universal scepticism2 since all our knowledge and contemplation is confin'd barely to our own ideas7#ajc74 7,m#ajc7 ,qu4 whether the solitary man would not find it necessary to make use of words to record his ideas1 if not in memory or meditation1 yet at least in writing--without which he could scarce retain his knowledge4 ,we read in history there was a time when fears and jealousies1 privileges of parliament1 malignant party1 and such like expressions of too unlimited and doubtful a meaning1 were words of much sway4 ,also the words ,church1 ,whig1 ,tory1 c41 contribute very much to faction and dispute4 7,m#ajd7 ,the distinguishing betwixt an idea and perception of the idea has been one great cause of imagining material substances7#ajd74 7,m#aje7 ,that ,god and blessed spirits have ,will is a manifest argument against ,locke's proofs that the ,will cannot be conceiv'd1 put into action1 without a previous uneasiness4 7,m#ajf7 ,the act of the ,will1 or volition1 is not uneasiness1 for that uneasiness may be without volition4 7,m#ajg7 ,volition is distinct from the object or idea for the same reason4 7,m#ajh7 ,also from uneasiness and idea together4 ,the understanding not distinct from particular perceptions or ideas4 ,the ,will not distinct from particular volitions4 7,m#aji7 ,it is not so very evident that an idea1 or at least uneasiness1 may be without all volition or act4 ,the understanding taken for a faculty is not really distinct from ye will4 ,this allow'd hereafter4 7,m#aaj7 ,to ask whether a man can will either side is an absurd question1 for the word can presupposes volition4 7,m#aaa7 ,anima mundi1 substantial form1 omniscient radical heat1 plastic vertue1 ,hylaschic principle--all these vanish7#aje74 7,m#aab7 ,newton proves that gravity is proportional to gravity4 ,i think that's all7#ajf74 ,qu4 whether it be the vis inerti that makes it difficult to move a stone1 or the vis attractiv1 or both1 or neither8 ,mem4 ,to express the doctrines as fully and copiously and clearly as may be4 ,also to be full and particular in answering objections7#ajg74 7,m#aac7 ,to say ye ,will is a power2 therefore volition is an act4 ,this is idem per idem4 ,wt makes men despise extension1 motion1 c41 separate them from the essence of the soul1 is that they imagine them to be distinct from thought1 and to exist in unthinking substance4 ,an extended may have passive modes of thinking good actions4 ,there might be idea1 there might be uneasiness1 there might be the greatest uneasiness wthout any volition1 therefore the4444 7,m#aad7 ,matter once allow'd1 ,i defy any man to prove that ,god is not ,matter7#ajh74 7,m#aae7 ,man is free4 ,there is no difficulty in this proposition1 if we but settle the signification of the word free--if we had an idea annext to the word free1 and would but contemplate that idea4 7,m#aaf7 ,we are imposed on by the words will1 determine1 agent1 free1 can1 c4 7,m#aag7 ,uneasiness precedes not every volition4 ,this evident by experience4 7,m#aah7 ,trace an infant in the womb4 ,mark the train succession of its ideas4 ,observe how volition comes into the mind4 ,this may perhaps acquaint you with its nature4 7,m#aai7 ,complacency seems rather to determine1 or precede1 or coincide wth constitute the essence of volition1 than uneasiness4 7,m#abj7 ,you tell me1 according to my doctrine a man is not free4 ,i answer1 tell me wt you mean by the word free1 and ,i shall resolve you7#aji74 7,m#aba7 ,qu4 ,wt do men mean when they talk of one body's touching another8 ,i say you never saw one body touch1 or 7rather7 ,i say1 ,i never saw one body that ,i could say touch'd this or that other2 for that if my optiques were improv'd1 ,i should see intervalls and other bodies behind those whch now seem to touch4 ,mem4 ,upon all occasions to use the utmost modesty--to confute the mathematicians wth the utmost civility respect1 not to style them ,nihilarians1 c4 ,n4 ,b4 ,to rein in ye satyrical nature4 ,blame me not if ,i use my words sometimes in some latitude4 ',tis wt cannot be helpt4 ',tis the fault of language that you cannot always apprehend the clear and determinate meaning of my words4 ,say you1 there might be a thinking ,substance--something unknown--wch perceives1 and supports1 and ties together the ideas7#aaj74 ,say ,i1 make it appear there is any need of it and you shall have it for me4 ,i care not to take away anything ,i can see the least reason to think should exist4 ,i affirm 'tis manifestly absurd--no excuse in the world can be given why a man should use a word without an idea7#aaa74 ,certainly we shall find that wt ever word we make use of in matter of pure reasoning has1 or ought to have1 a compleat idea1 annext to it1 i4e4 its meaning1 or the sense we take it in1 must be compleatly known4 ',tis demonstrable a man can never be brought to imagine anything should exist whereof he has no idea4 ,whoever says he does1 banters himself with words4 7,m#abb7 ,we imagine a great difference distance in respect of knowledge1 power1 c41 betwixt a man a worm4 ,the like difference betwixt man and ,god may be imagin'd2 or infinitely greater7#aab7 difference4 7,m#abc7 ,we find in our own minds a great number of different ideas4 ,we may imagine in ,god a greater number1 i4e4 that ours in number1 or the number of ours1 is inconsiderable in respect thereof4 ,the words difference and number1 old and known1 we apply to that wch is unknown4 ,but ,i am embrangled7#aac7 in words--'tis scarce possible it should be otherwise4 ,the chief thing ,i do or pretend to do is onely to remove the mist or veil of words7#aad74 ,this has occasion'd ignorance confusion4 ,this has ruined the schoolmen and mathematicians1 lawyers and divines4 7,m#abd7 ,the grand cause of perplexity darkness in treating of the ,will1 is that we imagine it to be an object of thought3 7to speak with the vulgar71 we think we may perceive1 contemplate1 and view it like any of our ideas2 whereas in truth 'tis no idea1 nor is there any idea of it4 ',tis toto clo different from the understanding1 i4e4 from all our ideas4 ,if you say the ,will1 or rather volition1 is something1 ,i answer1 there is an homonymy7#aae7 in the word thing1 wn apply'd to ideas and volition and understanding and will4 ,all ideas are passive7#aaf74 7,m#abe7 ,thing idea are much what words of the same extent and meaning4 ,why1 therefore1 do ,i not use the word thing8 ,ans4 ,because thing is of greater latitude than idea4 ,thing comprehends also volitions or actions4 ,now these are no ideas7#aag74 7,m#abf7 ,there can be perception wthout volition4 ,qu4 whether there can be volition without perception8 7,m#abg7 ,existence not conceivable without perception or volition--not distinguish'd therefrom4 7,m#abh7 ,n4 ,b4 ,several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight and touch at once4 ,not so by the other senses4 ',tis this diversity of sensations in other senses chiefly1 but sometimes in touch and sight 7as also diversity of volitions1 whereof there cannot be more than one at once1 or rather1 it seems there cannot1 for of that ,i doubt71 gives us the idea of time--or is time itself4 ,wt would the solitary man think of number8 7,m#abi7 ,there are innate ideas1 i4e4 ideas created with us7#aah74 7,m#acj7 ,locke seems to be mistaken wn he says thought is not essential to the mind7#aai74 7,m#aca7 ,certainly the mind always and constantly thinks3 and we know this too4 ,in sleep and trances the mind exists not--there is no time1 no succession of ideas7#abj74 7,m#acb7 ,to say the mind exists without thinking is a contradiction1 nonsense1 nothing4 7,m#acc7 ,folly to inquire wt determines the ,will4 ,uneasiness1 c4 are ideas1 therefore unactive1 therefore can do nothing1 therefore cannot determine the ,will7#aba74 7,m#acd7 ,again1 wt mean you by determine8 7,m#ace7 7,m#acf7 ,for want of rightly understanding time1 motion1 existence1 c41 men are forc'd into such absurd contradictions as this1 viz4 light moves #af diameters of earth in a second of time4 7,m#acg7 ',twas the opinion that ideas could exist unperceiv'd1 or before perception1 that made men think perception7#abb7 was somewhat different from the idea perceived1 i4e4 yt it was an idea of reflection2 whereas the thing perceiv'd was an idea of sensation4 ,i say1 'twas this made 'em think the understanding took it in1 receiv'd it from without2 wch could never be did not they think it existed without7#abc74 7,m#ach7 ,properly speaking1 idea is the picture of the imagination's making4 ,this is ye likeness of1 and refer'd to the real idea1 or 7if you will7 thing7#abd74 7,m#aci7 ,to ask1 have we an idea of ,will or volition1 is nonsense4 ,an idea can resemble nothing but an idea4 7,m#adj7 ,if you ask wt thing it is that wills1 ,i answer1 if you mean idea by the word thing1 or anything like any idea1 then ,i say1 'tis no thing at all that wills7#abe74 ,this how extravagant soever it may seem1 yet is a certain truth4 ,we are cheated by these general terms1 thing1 is1 c4 7,m#ada7 ,again1 if by is you mean is perceived1 or does perceive1 ,i say nothing wch is perceived or does perceive wills4 7,m#adb7 ,the referring ideas to things wch are not ideas1 the using the term 8idea of7#abf710 is one great cause of mistake1 as in other matters1 so also in this4 7,m#adc7 ,some words there are wch do not stand for ideas1 viz4 particles1 will1 c4 ,particles stand for volitions and their concomitant ideas4 7,m#add7 ,there seem to be but two colours wch are simple ideas1 viz4 those exhibited by the most and least refrangible rays2 the others1 being the intermediate ones1 may be formed by composition4 7,m#ade7 ,i have no idea of a volition or act of the mind1 neither has any other intelligence2 for that were a contradiction4 ,n4 ,b4 ,simple ideas1 viz4 colours1 are not devoid of all sort of composition1 tho' it must be granted they are not made up of distinguishable ideas4 ,yet there is another sort of composition4 ,men are wont to call those things compounded in which we do not actually discover the component ingredients4 ,bodies are said to be compounded of chymical principles1 which1 nevertheless1 come not into view till after the dissolution of the bodies--wch were not1 could not1 be discerned in the bodies whilst remaining entire4 7,m#adf7 ,all our knowledge is about particular ideas1 according to ,locke4 ,all our sensations are particular ideas1 as is evident4 ,wt use then do we make of abstract general ideas1 since we neither know nor perceive them8 7,m#adg7 ',tis allow'd that particles stand not for ideas1 and yet they are not said to be empty useless sounds4 ,the truth really is1 they stand for operations of the mind1 i4e4 volitions4 7,m#adh7 ,locke says all our knowledge is about particulars4 ,if so1 pray wt is the following ratiocination but a jumble of words8 8,omnis homo est animal2 omne animal vivit3 ergo omnis homo vivit40 ,it amounts 7if you annex particular ideas to the words 8animal0 and 8vivit07 to no more than this3 8,omnis homo est homo2 omnis homo est homo3 ergo1 omnis homo est homo40 ,a mere sport and trifling with sounds4 7,m#adi7 ,we have no ideas of vertues vices1 no ideas of moral actions7#abg74 ,wherefore it may be question'd whether we are capable of arriving at demonstration about them7#abh71 the morality consisting in the volition chiefly4 7,m#aej7 ,strange it is that men should be at a loss to find their idea of ,existence2 since that 7if such there be distinct from perception7 it is brought into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection7#abi71 methinks it should be most familiar to us1 and we best acquainted with it4 7,m#aea7 ,this ,i am sure1 ,i have no idea of ,existence7#acj71 or annext to the word ,existence4 ,and if others have that's nothing to me2 they can never make me sensible of it2 simple ideas being incommunicable by language4 7,m#aeb7 ,say you1 the unknown substratum of volitions ideas is something whereof ,i have no idea4 ,i ask1 ,is there any other being which has or can have an idea of it8 ,if there be1 then it must be itself an idea2 which you will think absurd4 7,m#aec7 ,there is somewhat active in most perceptions1 i4e4 such as ensue upon our volitions1 such as we can prevent and stop3 e4g4 ,i turn my eyes toward the sun3 ,i open them4 ,all this is active4 7,m#aed7 ,things are twofold--active or inactive4 ,the existence of active things is to act2 of inactive to be perceiv'd4 7,m#aee7 ,distinct from or without perception there is no volition2 therefore neither is there existence without perception4 7,m#aef7 ,god may comprehend all ideas1 even the ideas wch are painfull unpleasant1 without being in any degree pained thereby7#aca74 ,thus we ourselves can imagine the pain of a burn1 c4 without any misery or uneasiness at all4 7,m#aeg7 ,truth1 three sorts thereof--natural1 mathematical1 moral4 7,m#aeh7 ,agreement of relation onely where numbers do obtain3 of co-existence1 in nature3 of signification1 by including1 in morality4 7,m#aei7 ,gyant who shakes the mountain that's on him must be acknowledged4 ,or rather thus3 ,i am no more to be reckon'd stronger than ,locke than a pigmy should be reckon'd stronger than a gyant1 because he could throw off the molehill wch lay upon him1 and the gyant could onely shake or shove the mountain that oppressed him4 ,this in the ,preface4 7,m#afj7 ,promise to extend our knowledge clear it of those shamefull contradictions which embarrass it4 ,something like this to begin the ,introduction in a modest way7#acb74 7,m#afa7 ,whoever shall pretend to censure any part1 ,i desire he would read out the whole1 else he may perhaps not understand me4 ,in the ,preface or ,introduction7#acc74 7,m#afb7 ,doctrine of identity best explain'd by taking the ,will for volitions1 the ,understanding for ideas4 ,the difficulty of consciousness of wt are never acted surely solv'd thereby4 7,m#afc7 ,i must acknowledge myself beholding to the philosophers who have gone before me4 ,they have given good rules1 though certainly they do not always observe them4 ,similitude of adventurers1 who1 tho' they attained not the desired port1 they by their wrecks have made known the rocks and sands1 whereby the passage of aftercomers is made more secure easy4 ,preface or ,introduction4 7,m#afd7 ,the opinion that men had ideas of moral actions7#acd7 has render'd the demonstrating ethiques very difficult to them4 7,m#afe7 ,an idea being itself unactive cannot be the resemblance or image of an active thing4 7,m#aff7 ,excuse to be made in the ,introduction for using the word idea1 viz4 because it has obtain'd4 ,but a caution must be added4 ,scripture and possibility are the onely proofs7#ace7 with ,malbranch4 ,add to these what he calls a great propension to think so3 this perhaps may be questioned4 ,perhaps men1 if they think before they speak1 will not be found so thoroughly persuaded of the existence of ,matter4 7,m#afg7 ,on second thoughts ,i am on t'other extream4 ,i am certain of that wch ,malbranch seems to doubt of1 viz4 the existence of bodies7#acf74 7,m#afh7 ,mem4 ,to bring the killing blow at the last1 e4g4 in the matter of abstraction to bring ,locke's general triangle in the last7#acg74 7,m#afi7 ,they give good rules1 tho' perhaps they themselves do not always observe them4 ,they speak much of clear and distinct ideas1 though at the same time they talk of general abstract ideas1 c4 ,i'll instance in ,locke's opinion of abstraction1 he being as clear a writer as ,i have met with4 ,such was the candour of this great man that ,i perswade myself1 were he alive7#ach71 he would not be offended that ,i differ from him3 seeing that even in so doing ,i follow his advice1 viz4 to use my own judgement1 see with my own eyes1 not with another's4 ,introduction4 7,m#agj7 ,the word thing1 as comprising or standing for idea volition1 usefull2 as standing for idea and archetype without the mind7#aci71 mischievous and useless4 7,m#aga7 ,to demonstrate morality it seems one need only make a dictionary of words1 and see which included which4 ,at least1 this is the greatest part and bulk of the work4 7,m#agb7 ,locke's instances of demonstration in morality are1 according to his own rule1 trifling propositions4 7,m#agc7 ,qu4 ,how comes it that some ideas are confessedly allow'd by all to be onely in the mind7#adj71 and others as generally taken to be without the mind7#ada71 if1 according to you1 all are equally and only in the mind8 ,ans4 ,because that in proportion to pleasure or pain ideas are attended with desire1 exertion1 and other actions which include volition4 ,now volition is by all granted to be in spirit4 7,m#agd7 ,if men would lay aside words in thinking1 'tis impossible they should ever mistake1 save only in matters of fact4 ,i mean it seems impossible they should be positive secure that anything was true wch in truth is not so4 ,certainly ,i cannot err in matter of simple perception4 ,so far as we can in reasoning go without the help of signs1 there we have certain knowledge4 ,indeed1 in long deductions made by signs there may be slips of memory4 7,m#age7 ,from my doctrine there follows a cure for pride4 ,we are only to be praised for those things which are our own1 or of our own doing2 natural abilitys are not consequences of our volitions4 7,m#agf7 ,mem4 ,candidly to take notice that ,locke holds some dangerous opinions2 such as the infinity and eternity of ,space and the possibility of ,matter's thinking7#adb74 7,m#agg7 ,once more ,i desire my reader may be upon his guard against the fallacy of words4 ,let him beware that ,i do not impose on him by plausible empty talk1 that common dangerous way of cheating men into absurditys4 ,let him not regard my words any otherwise than as occasions of bringing into his mind determin'd significations4 ,so far as they fail of this they are gibberish1 jargon1 deserve not the name of language4 ,i desire warn him not to expect to find truth in my book1 or anywhere but in his own mind4 ,wtever ,i see myself 'tis impossible ,i can paint it out in words4 7,m#agh7 ,n4 ,b4 ,to consider well wt is meant by that wch ,locke saith concerning algebra--that it supplys intermediate ideas4 ,also to think of a method affording the same use in morals c4 that this doth in mathematiques4 7,m#agi7 ,homo is not proved to be vivens by means of any intermediate idea4 ,i don't fully agree wth ,locke in wt he says concerning sagacity in finding out intermediate ideas in matter capable of demonstration the use thereof2 as if that were the onely means of improving and enlarging demonstrative knowledge4 7,m#ahj7 ,there is a difference betwixt power volition4 ,there may be volition without power4 ,but there can be no power without volition4 ,power implyeth volition1 at the same time a connotation of the effects following the volition7#adc74 7,m#aha7 ,we have assuredly an idea of substance4 ',twas absurd of ,locke7#add7 to think we had a name without a meaning4 ,this might prove acceptable to the ,stillingfleetians4 7,m#ahb7 ,the substance of ,body we know7#ade74 ,the substance of ,spirit we do not know--it not being knowable1 it being a purus actus4 7,m#ahc7 ,words have ruin'd and overrun all the sciences--law1 physique1 chymistry1 astrology1 c4 7,m#ahd7 ,abstract ideas only to be had amongst the learned4 ,the vulgar never think they have any such1 nor truly do they find any want of them4 ,genera species abstract ideas are terms unknown to them4 7,m#ahe7 ,locke's out7#adf7--the case is different4 ,we can have an idea of body without motion1 but not of soul without thought4 7,m#ahf7 ,god ought to be worship'd4 ,this easily demonstrated when once we ascertain the signification of the words ,god1 worship1 ought4 7,m#ahg7 ,no perception1 according to ,locke1 is active4 ,therefore no perception 7i4e4 no idea7 can be the image of1 or like unto1 that which is altogether active not at all passive1 i4e4 the ,will4 7,m#ahh7 ,i can will the calling to mind something that is past1 tho' at the same time that wch ,i call to mind was not in my thoughts before that volition of mine1 consequently ,i could have had no uneasiness for the want of it4 7,m#ahi7 ,the ,will the ,understanding may very well be thought two distinct beings4 7,m#aij7 ,sed quia voluntas raro agit nisi ducente desiderio4 ,v4 ,locke1 ,epistles1 p4 #dgi1 ad ,limburgum4 ,you cannot say the m4 t4 minimum tangibile is like or one with the m4 v4 minimum visibile1 because they be both minima1 just perceiv'd1 and next door to nothing4 ,you may as well say the m4 t4 is the same with or like unto a sound1 so small that it is scarce perceiv'd4 ,extension seems to be a mode of some tangible or sensible quality according as it is seen or felt4 7,m#aia7 ,the spirit--the active thing--that wch is soul1 ,god--is the ,will alone4 ,the ideas are effects--impotent things4 7,m#aib7 ,the concrete of the will understanding ,i might call mind2 not person1 lest offence be given4 ,mem4 ,carefully to omit defining of person1 or making much mention of it4 7,m#aic7 ,you ask1 do these volitions make one ,will8 ,wt you ask is meerly about a word--unity being no more7#adg74 ,n4 ,b4 ,to use utmost caution not to give the least handle of offence to the ,church or ,churchmen4 7,m#aid7 ,even to speak somewhat favourably of the ,schoolmen1 and shew that they who blame them for jargon are not free of it themselves4 ,introd4 ,locke's great oversight seems to be that he did not begin with his third book2 at least that he had not some thought of it at first4 ,certainly the #b;d #dth books don't agree wth wt he says in ye #c;d7#adh74 7,m#aie7 ,if ,matter7#adi7 is once allow'd to exist1 clippings of weeds and parings of nails may think1 for ought that ,locke can tell2 tho' he seems positive of the contrary4 ,since ,i say men cannot mistake in short reasoning about things demonstrable1 if they lay aside words1 it will be expected this ,treatise will contain nothing but wt is certain evident demonstration1 in truth ,i hope you will find nothing in it but what is such4 ,certainly ,i take it all for such4 ,introd4 7,m#aif7 ,when ,i say ,i will reject all propositions wherein ,i know not fully and adequately and clearly1 so far as knowable1 the thing meant thereby1 this is not to be extended to propositions in the ,scripture4 ,i speak of matters of ,reason and ,philosophy--not ,revelation4 ,in this ,i think an humble1 implicit faith becomes us 7when we cannot comprehend or understand the proposition71 such as a popish peasant gives to propositions he hears at mass in ,latin4 ,this proud men may call blind1 popish1 implicit1 irrational4 ,for my part ,i think it is more irrational to pretend to dispute at1 cavil1 and ridicule holy mysteries1 i4e4 propositions about things that are altogether above our knowledge1 out of our reach4 ,when ,i shall come to plenary knowledge of the meaning of any fact1 then ,i shall yield an explicit belief4 ,introd4 ,complexation of ideas twofold4 ,ys refers to colours being complex ideas4 ,considering length without breadth is considering any length1 be the breadth wt it will4 7,m#aig7 ,i may say earth1 plants1 c4 were created before man--there being other intelligences to perceive them1 before man was created7#aej74 7,m#aih7 ,there is a philosopher7#aea7 who says we can get an idea of substance by no way of sensation or reflection1 seems to imagine that we want a sense proper for it4 ,truly if we had a new sense it could only give us a new idea4 ,now ,i suppose he will not say substance1 according to him1 is an idea4 ,for my part1 ,i own ,i have no idea can stand for substance in his and the ,schoolmen's sense of that word4 ,but take it in the common vulgar sense1 then we see and feel substance4 7,m#aii7 ,n4 ,b4 ,that not common usage1 but the ,schoolmen coined the word ,existence1 supposed to stand for an abstract general idea4 ,writers of ,optics mistaken in their principles both in judging of magnitudes and distances4 7,m#bjj7 ',tis evident yt wn the solitary man should be taught to speak1 the words would give him no other new ideas 7save only the sounds1 and complex ideas which1 tho' unknown before1 may be signified by language7 beside wt he had before4 ,if he had not1 could not have1 an abstract idea before1 he cannot have it after he is taught to speak4 7,m#bja7 8,homo est homo10 c4 comes at last to ,petrus est ,petrus1 c4 ,now1 if these identical propositions are sought after in the mind1 they will not be found4 ,there are no identical mental propositions4 ',tis all about sounds and terms4 7,m#bjb7 ,hence we see the doctrine of certainty by ideas1 and proving by intermediate ideas1 comes to nothing7#aeb74 7,m#bjc7 ,we may have certainty knowledge without ideas1 i4e4 without other ideas than the words1 and their standing for one idea1 i4e4 their being to be used indifferently4 7,m#bjd7 ,it seems to me that we have no certainty about ideas1 but only about words4 ',tis improper to say1 ,i am certain ,i see1 ,i feel1 c4 ,there are no mental propositions form'd answering to these words1 in simple perception 'tis allowed by all there is no affirmation or negation1 and consequently no certainty7#aec74 7,m#bje7 ,the reason why we can demonstrate so well about signs is1 that they are perfectly arbitrary in our power--made at pleasure4 7,m#bjf7 ,the obscure ambiguous term relation1 which is said to be the largest field of knowledge1 confounds us1 deceives us4 7,m#bjg7 ,let any man shew me a demonstration1 not verbal1 that does not depend on some false principle2 or at best on some principle of nature1 which is ye effect of ,god's will1 and we know not how soon it may be changed4 7,m#bjh7 ,qu4 ,what becomes of the tern veritates8 ,ans4 ,they vanish7#aed74 7,m#bji7 ,but1 say you1 ,i find it difficult to look beneath the words and uncover my ideas4 ,say ,i1 ,use will make it easy4 ,in the sequel of my ,book the cause of this difficulty shall be more clearly made out4 7,m#baj7 ,to view the deformity of error we need onely undress it4 7,m#baa7 8,cogito ergo sum40 ,tautology4 ,no mental proposition answering thereto4 7,m#bab7 ,knowledge1 or certainty1 or perception of agreement of ideas--as to identity and diversity1 and real existence1 vanisheth2 of relation1 becometh merely nominal2 of co-existence1 remaineth4 ,locke thought in this latter our knowledge was little or nothing4 ,whereas in this only real knowledge seemeth to be found7#aee74 7,m#bac7 ,we must wth the mob place certainty in the senses7#aef74 ',tis a man's duty1 'tis the fruit of friendship1 to speak well of his friend4 ,wonder not therefore that ,i do wt ,i do4 7,m#bad7 ,a man of slow parts may overtake truth1 c4 ,introd4 ,even my shortsightedness might perhaps be aiding to me in this matter--'twill make me bring the object nearer to my thoughts4 ,a purblind person1 c4 ,introd4 7,m#bae7 ,locke to ,limborch1 c4 ,talk of judicium intellectus preceding the volition3 ,i think judicium includes volition4 ,i can by no means distinguish these--judicium1 intellectus1 indifferentia1 uneasiness to many things accompanying or preceding every volition1 as e4g4 the motion of my hand4 7,m#baf7 ,qu4 ,wt mean you by my perceptions1 my volitions8 ,both all the perceptions ,i perceive or conceive7#aeg71 c4 are mine2 all the volitions ,i am conscious to are mine4 7,m#bag7 ,homo est agens liberum4 ,what mean they by homo and agens in this place8 7,m#bah7 ,will any man say that brutes have ideas of ,unity ,existence8 ,i believe not4 ,yet if they are suggested by all the ways of sensation1 'tis strange they should want them7#aeh74 7,m#bai7 ,it is a strange thing and deserves our attention1 that the more time and pains men have consum'd in the study of philosophy1 by so much the more they look upon themselves to be ignorant weak creatures4 ,they discover flaws and imperfections in their faculties wch other men never spy out4 ,they find themselves under a necessity of admitting many inconsistent1 irreconcilable opinions for true4 ,there is nothing they touch with their hand1 or behold with their eyes1 but has its dark sides much larger and more numerous than wt is perceived1 at length turn scepticks1 at least in most things4 ,i imagine all this proceeds from1 c4 ,exord4 ,introd47#aei7 7,m#bbj7 ,these men with a supercilious pride disdain the common single information of sense4 ,they grasp at knowledge by sheafs bundles4 7',tis well if1 catching at too much at once1 they hold nothing but emptiness air47 ,they in the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract ideas4 ,it seems not improbable that the most comprehensive sublime intellects see more m4v4's at once1 i4e4 that their visual systems are the largest4 ,words 7by them meaning all sorts of signs7 are so necessary that1 instead of being 7wn duly us'd or in their own nature7 prejudicial to the advancement of knowledge1 or an hindrance to knowledge1 without them there could in mathematiques themselves be no demonstration4 ,mem4 ,to be eternally banishing ,metaphisics1 c41 and recalling men to ,common ,sense7#afj74 7,m#bba7 ,we cannot conceive other minds besides our own but as so many selves4 ,we suppose ourselves affected wth such such thoughts such and such sensations7#afa74 7,m#bbb7 ,qu4 whether composition of ideas be not that faculty which chiefly serves to discriminate us from brutes8 ,i question whether a brute does or can imagine a blue horse or chimera4 ,naturalists do not distinguish betwixt cause and occasion4 ,useful to enquire after co-existing ideas or occasions4 7,m#bbc7 ,morality may be demonstrated as mixt mathematics4 7,m#bbd7 ,perception is passive1 but this not distinct from idea4 ,therefore there can be no idea of volition4 ,algebraic species or letters are denominations of denominations4 ,therefore ,arithmetic to be treated of before ,algebra4 #b crowns are called ten shillings4 ,hence may appear the value of numbers4 ,complex ideas are the creatures of the mind4 ,hence may appear the nature of numbers4 ,this to be deeply discuss'd4 ,i am better informed shall know more by telling me there are #aj1jjj men1 than by shewing me them all drawn up4 ,i shall better be able to judge of the bargain you'd have me make wn you tell me how much 7i4e4 the name of ye7 money lies on the table1 than by offering and shewing it without naming4 ,i regard not the idea1 the looks1 but the names4 ,hence may appear the nature of numbers4 ,children are unacquainted with numbers till they have made some progress in language4 ,this could not be if they were ideas suggested by all the senses4 ,numbers are nothing but names--never words4 ,mem4 ,imaginary roots--to unravel that mystery4 ,ideas of utility are annexed to numbers4 ,in arithmetical problems men seek not any idea of number4 ,they only seek a denomination4 ,this is all can be of use to them4 ,take away the signs from ,arithmetic and ,algebra1 and pray wt remains8 ,these are sciences purely verbal1 and entirely useless but for practice in societies of men4 ,no speculative knowledge1 no comparing of ideas in them7#afb74 ,qu4 whether ,geometry may not properly be reckon'd amongst the mixt mathematics--,arithmetic ,algebra being the only abstracted pure1 i4e4 entirely nominal--,geometry being an application of these to points7#afc78 7,m#bbe7 ,locke of ,trifling ,propositions4 b4 #d4 c4 #h ,mem4 ,well to observe con over that chapter4 7,m#bbf7 ,existence1 ,extension1 c4 are abstract1 i4e4 no ideas4 ,they are words1 unknown and useless to the vulgar4 7,m#bbg7 ,sensual pleasure is the summum bonum4 ,this the great principle of morality4 ,this once rightly understood1 all the doctrines1 even the severest of the ,gospels1 may clearly be demonstrated4 7,m#bbh7 ,sensual pleasure1 qu pleasure1 is good desirable by a wise man7#afd74 ,but if it be contemptible1 'tis not qu pleasure but qu pain1 or cause of pain1 or 7which is the same thing7 of loss of greater pleasure4 7,m#bbi7 ,wn ,i consider1 the more objects we see at once the more distant they are1 and that eye which beholds a great many things can see none of them near4 7,m#bcj7 ,by idea ,i mean any sensible or imaginable thing7#afe74 7,m#bca7 ,to be sure or certain of wt we do not actually perceive7#aff7 7,i say perceive1 not imagine71 we must not be altogether passive2 there must be a disposition to act2 there must be assent1 wch is active4 ,nay1 what do ,i talk2 there must be actual volition4 ,what do we demonstrate in ,geometry but that lines are equal or unequal8 i4e4 may not be called by the same name7#afg74 7,m#bcb7 ,i approve of this axiom of the ,schoolmen1 8,nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu407#afh7 ,i wish they had stuck to it4 ,it had never taught them the doctrine of abstract ideas4 7,m#bcc7 8,nihil dat quod non habet10 or1 the effect is contained in the cause1 is an axiom ,i do not understand or believe to be true4 7,m#bcd7 ,whoever shall cast his eyes on the writings of old or new philosophers1 and see the noise is made about formal and objective ,being1 ,will1 c4 7,m#bce7 ,absurd to argue the existence of ,god from his idea4 ,we have no idea of ,god4 ',tis impossible7#afi74 7,m#bcf7 ,cause of much errour confusion that men knew not what was meant by ,reality7#agj74 7,m#bcg7 ,des ,cartes1 in ,med4 #b1 says the notion of this particular wax is less clear than that of wax in general2 and in the same ,med41 a little before1 he forbears to consider bodies in general1 because 7says he7 these general conceptions are usually confused4 7,m#bch7 ,des ,cartes1 in ,med4 #c1 calls himself a thinking substance1 and a stone an extended substance2 and adds that they both agree in this1 that they are substances4 ,and in the next paragraph he calls extension a mode of substance4 7,m#bci7 ',tis commonly said by the philosophers1 that if the soul of man were self-existent it would have given itself all possible perfection4 ,this ,i do not understand4 7,m#bdj7 ,mem4 ,to excite men to the pleasures of the eye the ear1 which surfeit not1 nor bring those evils after them1 as others4 7,m#bda7 ,we see no variety or difference betwixt volitions1 only between their effects4 ',tis one ,will1 one ,act--distinguished by the effects4 ,this ,will1 this ,act1 is the ,spirit1 i4e4 operative principle1 soul1 c4 ,no mention of fears and jealousies1 nothing like a party4 7,m#bdb7 ,locke in his #dth ,book7#aga71 and ,des ,cartes in ,med4 #f1 use the same argument for the existence of objects1 viz4 that sometimes we see1 feel1 c4 against our will4 7,m#bdc7 ,while ,i exist or have any idea1 ,i am eternally1 constantly willing2 my acquiescing in the present state is willing4 7,m#bdd7 ,the existence of any thing imaginable is nothing different from imagination or perception7#agb74 ,volition or ,will1 ,wch is not imaginable1 regard must not be had to its existence787 444 ,first ,book4 7,m#bde7 ,there are four sorts of propositions3--8,gold is a metal20 8,gold is yellow20 8,gold is fixt20 8,gold is not a stone0--of which the first1 second1 and third are only nominal1 and have no mental propositions answering them4 7,m#bdf7 ,mem4 ,in vindication of the senses effectually to confute what ,des ,cartes saith in the last par4 of the last ,med41 viz4 that the senses oftener inform him falsely than truely--that sense of pain tells me not my foot is bruised or broken1 but ,i1 having frequently observed these two ideas1 viz4 of that peculiar pain and bruised foot go together1 do erroneously take them to be inseparable by a necessity of ,nature--as if ,nature were anything but the ordinance of the free will of ,god7#agc74 7,m#bdg7 ,des ,cartes owns we know not a substance immediately by itself1 but by this alone1 that it is the subject of several acts4 ,ans4 to #b;d objection of ,hobbs4 7,m#bdh7 ,hobbs in some degree falls in with ,locke1 saying thought is to the mind or himself as dancing to the dancer4 ,object4 7,m#bdi7 ,hobbs in his ,object4 #c ridicules those expressions of the scholastiques--8the will wills10 c4 ,so does ,locke4 ,i am of another mind7#agd74 7,m#bej7 ,des ,cartes1 in answer to ,object4 #c of ,hobbs1 owns he is distinct from thought as a thing from its modus or manner4 7,m#bea7 ,opinion that existence was distinct from perception of horrible consequence4 ,it is the foundation of ,hobbs's doctrine1 c4 7,m#beb7 ,malbranch in his illustration7#age7 differs widely from me4 ,he doubts of the existence of bodies4 ,i doubt not in the least of this4 7,m#bec7 ,i differ from ,cartesians in that ,i make extension1 colour1 c4 to exist really in bodies independent of our mind7#agf74 ,all ye carefully and lucidly to be set forth4 7,m#bed7 ,not to mention the combinations of powers1 but to say the things--the effects themselves--do really exist1 even wn not actually perceived2 but still with relation to perception7#agg74 ,the great use of the ,indian figures above the ,roman shews arithmetic to be about signs1 not ideas--or at least not ideas different from the characters themselves7#agh74 7,m#bee7 ,reasoning there may be about things or ideas1 or about actions2 but demonstration can be only verbal4 ,i question1 no matter c4 7,m#bef7 ,quoth ,des ,cartes1 ,the idea of ,god is not made by me1 for ,i can neither add to nor subtract from it4 ,no more can he add to or take from any other idea1 even of his own making4 7,m#beg7 ,the not distinguishing 'twixt ,will and ideas is a grand mistake with ,hobbs4 ,he takes those things for nothing which are not ideas7#agi74 7,m#beh7 ,say you1 ,at this rate all's nothing but idea--mere phantasm4 ,i answer1 ,everything as real as ever4 ,i hope to call a thing idea makes it not the less real4 ,truly ,i should perhaps have stuck to the word thing1 and not mentioned the word idea1 were it not for a reason1 and ,i think a good one too1 which ,i shall give in the ,second ,book7#ahj74 7,m#bei7 ,idea is the object of thought4 ,yt ,i think on1 whatever it be1 ,i call idea4 ,thought itself1 or thinking1 is no idea4 ',tis an act--i4e4 volition1 i4e4 as contradistinguished to effects--the ,will4 7,m#bfj7 ,locke1 in ,b4 #d4 c4 #e1 assigns not the right cause why mental propositions are so difficult4 ,it is not because of complex but because of abstract ideas4 ,ye idea of a horse is as complex as that of fortitude4 ,yet in saying the 8horse is white0 ,i form a mental proposition with ease4 ,but when ,i say 8fortitude is a virtue0 ,i shall find a mental proposition hard1 or not at all to be come at4 7,m#bfa7 ,pure intellect ,i understand not7#aha74 ,locke is in ye right in those things wherein he differs from ye ,cartesians1 and they cannot but allow of his opinions1 if they stick to their own principles or causes of ,existence other abstract ideas4 7,m#bfb7 ,the properties of all things are in ,god1 i4e4 there is in the ,deity ,understanding as well as ,will4 ,he is no blind agent1 and in truth a blind agent is a contradiction7#ahb74 7,m#bfc7 ,i am certain there is a ,god1 tho' ,i do not perceive ,him--have no intuition of ,him4 ,this not difficult if we rightly understand wt is meant by certainty4 7,m#bfd7 ,it seems that the ,soul1 taken for the ,will1 is immortal1 incorruptible4 7,m#bfe7 ,qu4 whether perception must of necessity precede volition8 7,m#bff7 ,error is not in the ,understanding1 but in the ,will4 ,what ,i understand or perceive1 that ,i understand4 ,there can be no errour in this4 7,m#bfg7 ,mem4 ,to take notice of ,locke's woman afraid of a wetting1 in the ,introd41 to shew there may be reasoning about ideas or things4 7,m#bfh7 ,say ,des ,cartes ,malbranch1 ,god hath given us strong inclinations to think our ideas proceed from bodies1 or that bodies do exist4 ,pray wt mean they by this8 ,would they have it that the ideas of imagination are images of1 and proceed from1 the ideas of sense8 ,this is true1 but cannot be their meaning2 for they speak of ideas of sense as themselves proceeding from1 being like unto--,i know not wt7#ahc74 7,m#bfi7 ,cartesius per ideam vult omne id quod habet esse objectivum in intellectu4 ,v4 ,tract4 de ,methodo4 7,m#bgj7 ,qu4 ,may there not be an ,understanding without a ,will8 7,m#bga7 ,understanding is in some sort an action4 7,m#bgb7 ,silly of ,hobbs1 c4 to speak of the ,will as if it were motion1 with which it has no likeness4 7,m#bgc7 ,ideas of ,sense are the real things or archetypes4 ,ideas of imagination1 dreams1 c4 are copies1 images1 of these4 7,m#bgd7 ,my doctrines rightly understood1 all that philosophy of ,epicurus1 ,hobbs1 ,spinosa1 c41 which has been a declared enemy of religion1 comes to the ground4 7,m#bge7 ,hobbs ,spinosa make ,god extended4 ,locke also seems to do the same7#ahd74 7,m#bgf7 ,ens1 res1 aliquid dicuntur termini transcendentales4 ,spinosa1 p4 #gf1 prop4 #dj1 ,eth4 part #b1 gives an odd account of their original4 ,also of the original of all universals--,homo1 ,canis1 c4 7,m#bgg7 ,spinosa 7vid4 ,prf4 ,opera ,posthum47 will have ,god to be 8omnium rerum causa immanens10 and to countenance this produces that of ,st4 ,paul1 8in ,him we live10 c4 ,now this of ,st4 ,paul may be explained by my doctrine as well as ,spinosa's1 or ,locke's1 or ,hobbs's1 or ,raphson's7#ahe71 c4 7,m#bgh7 ,the ,will is purus actus1 or rather pure spirit not imaginable1 not sensible1 not intelligible1 in no wise the object of the understanding1 no wise perceivable4 7,m#bgi7 ,substance of a spirit is that it acts1 causes1 wills1 operates1 or if you please 7to avoid the quibble yt may be made of the word 8it07 to act1 cause1 will1 operate4 ,its substance is not knowable1 not being an idea4 7,m#bhj7 ,why may we not conceive it possible for ,god to create things out of nothing8 ,certainly we ourselves create in some wise whenever we imagine4 7,m#bha7 8,ex nihilo nihil fit40 ,this 7saith ,spinoza1 ,opera ,posth4 p4 #dfd7 and the like are called veritates tern1 because 8nullam fidem habent extra mentem40 ,to make this axiom have a positive signification1 one should express it thus3 ,every idea has a cause1 i4e4 is produced by a ,will7#ahf74 7,m#bhb7 ,the philosophers talk much of a distinction 'twixt absolute relative things1 or 'twixt things considered in their own nature the same things considered with respect to us4 ,i know not wt they mean by 8things considered in themselves40 ,this is nonsense1 jargon4 7,m#bhc7 ,it seems there can be no perception--no idea--without ,will1 seeing there are no ideas so indifferent but one had rather have them than annihilation1 or annihilation than them4 ,or if there be such an equal balance1 there must be an equal mixture of pleasure and pain to cause it2 there being no ideas perfectly void of all pain uneasiness1 but wt are preferable to annihilation4 ,recipe in animum tuum1 per cogitationem vehementem1 rerum ipsarum1 non literarum aut sonorum imagines4 ,hobbs against ,wallis4 ',tis a perfection we may imagine in superior spirits1 that they can see a great deal at once with the utmost clearness and distinction2 whereas we can only see a point7#ahg74 ,mem4 ,wn ,i treat of mathematiques to enquire into the controversy 'twixt ,hobbes and ,wallis4 7,m#bhd7 ,every sensation of mine1 which happens in consequence of the general known laws of nature1 is from without1 i4e4 independent of my will1 demonstrates the being of a ,god1 i4e4 of an unextended1 incorporeal spirit1 which is omnipresent1 omnipotent1 c4 7,m#bhe7 ,i say not with ,j4,s4 ,john ,sergeant that we see solids4 ,i reject his 8solid philosophy0--solidity being only perceived by touch7#ahh74 7,m#bhf7 ,it seems to me that will and understanding--volitions and ideas--cannot be separated1 that either cannot be possibly without the other4 7,m#bhg7 ,some ideas or other ,i must have1 so long as ,i exist or will4 ,but no one idea or sort of ideas being essential7#ahi74 7,m#bhh7 ,the distinction between idea and ideatum ,i cannot otherwise conceive than by making one the effect or consequence of dream1 reverie1 imagination--the other of sense and the constant laws of nature4 7,m#bhi7 ,dico quod extensio non concipitur in se et per se1 contra quam dicit ,spinoza in ,epist4 #b;a ad ,oldenburgium4 7,m#bij7 ,my definition of the word ,god ,i think much clearer than those of ,des ,cartes ,spinoza1 viz4 8,ens summe perfectum absolute infinitum10 or 8,ens constans infinitis attributis1 quorum unumquodque est infinitum7#aij740 ',tis chiefly the connexion betwixt tangible and visible ideas that deceives1 and not the visible ideas themselves4 7,m#bia7 ,but the grand mistake is that we know not what we mean by 8we10 or 8selves10 or 8mind10 c4 ',tis most sure certain that our ideas are distinct from the mind1 i4e4 the ,will1 the ,spirit7#aia74 7,m#bib7 ,i must not mention the understanding as a faculty or part of the mind4 ,i must include understanding will in the word ,spirit--by which ,i mean all that is active4 ,i must not say that the understanding diners not from the particular ideas1 or the will from particular volitions4 7,m#bic7 ,the ,spirit1 the ,mind1 is neither a volition nor an idea4 7,m#bid7 ,i say there are no causes 7properly speaking7 but spiritual1 nothing active but ,spirit4 ,say you1 ,this is only verbal2 'tis only annexing a new sort of signification to the word cause1 why may not others as well retain the old one1 and call one idea the cause of another which always follows it8 ,i answer1 ,if you do so ,i shall drive you into many absurditys3 you cannot avoid running into opinions you'll be glad to disown1 if you stick firmly to that signification of the word ,cause4 7,m#bie7 ,in valuing good we reckon too much on the present our own4 7,m#bif7 ,there be two sorts of pleasure4 ,the one is ordained as a spur or incitement to somewhat else1 has a visible relation and subordination thereto2 the other is not4 ,thus the pleasure of eating is of the former sort1 of musick of the later sort4 ,these may be used for recreation1 those not but in order to their end4 7,m#big7 ,three sorts of useful knowledge--that of ,coexistence1 to be treated of in our ,principles of ,natural ,philosophy2 that of ,relation1 in ,mathematiques2 that of ,definition1 or inclusion1 or words 7which perhaps differs not from that of relation71 in ,morality7#aib74 7,m#bih7 ,will1 understanding1 desire1 hatred1 c41 so far forth as they are acts or active1 differ not4 ,all their difference consists in their objects1 circumstances1 c4 7,m#bii7 ,we must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of causes--physical spiritual4 7,m#cjj7 ,the physical may more properly be called occasions4 ,yet 7to comply7 we may call them causes--but then we must mean causes yt do nothing4 7,m#cja7 ,according to ,locke1 we must be in an eternal uneasiness so long as we live1 bating the time of sleep or trance1 c42 for he will have even the continuance of an action to be in his sense an action1 so requires a volition1 this an uneasiness4 7,m#cjb7 ,i must not pretend to promise much of demonstration4 ,i must cancell all passages that look like that sort of pride1 that raising of expectation in my friend4 7,m#cjc7 ,if this be the case1 surely a man had better not philosophize at all3 no more than a deformed person ought to cavil to behold himself by the reflex light of a mirrour4 7,m#cjd7 ,or thus1 like deformed persons who1 having beheld themselves by the reflex light of a mirrour1 are displeased with their diseases4 7,m#cje7 ,what can an idea be like but another idea8 ,we can compare it with nothing else--a sound like a sound1 a colour like a colour4 7,m#cjf7 ,is it not nonsense to say a smell is like a thing which cannot be smelt1 a colour is like a thing wh cannot be seen8 7,m#cjg7 ,bodies exist without the mind1 i4e4 are not the mind1 but distinct from it4 ,this ,i allow1 the mind being altogether different therefrom7#aic74 7,m#cjh7 ,certainly we should not see motion if there was no diversity of colours4 7,m#cji7 ,motion is an abstract idea1 i4e4 there is no such idea that can be conceived by itself4 7,m#caj7 ,contradictions cannot be both true4 ,men are obliged to answer objections drawn from consequences4 ,introd4 7,m#caa7 ,the ,will and ,volition are words not used by the vulgar4 ,the learned are bantered by their meaning abstract ideas4 ,speculative ,math1 as if a man was all day making hard knots on purpose to unty them again4 ,tho' it might have been otherwise1 yet it is convenient the same thing wch is ,m4,v4 should be also ,m4,t41 or very near it4 7,m#cab7 ,i must not give the soul or mind the scholastique name 8pure act10 but rather pure spirit1 or active being4 7,m#cac7 ,i must not say the ,will or ,understanding are all one1 but that they are both abstract ideas1 i4e4 none at all--they not being even ratione different from the ,spirit1 qu faculties1 or active4 7,m#cad7 ,dangerous to make idea thing terms convertible7#aid74 ,that were the way to prove spirits are nothing4 7,m#cae7 ,qu4 whether veritas stands not for an abstract idea8 7,m#caf7 ',tis plain the moderns must by their own principles own there are no bodies1 i4e4 no sort of bodies without the mind1 i4e4 unperceived4 7,m#cag7 ,qu4 whether the ,will can be the object of prescience or any knowledge8 7,m#cah7 ,if there were only one ball in the world1 it could not be moved4 ,there could be no variety of appearance4 ,according to the doctrine of infinite divisibility1 there must be some smell of a rose1 v4 g4 at an infinite distance from it4 7,m#cai7 ,extension1 tho' it exist only in the mind1 yet is no property of the mind4 ,the mind can exist without it1 tho' it cannot without the mind4 ,but in ,book ,,ii4 ,i shall at large shew the difference there is betwixt the ,soul and ,body or extended being4 7,m#cbj7 ',tis an absurd question wch ,locke puts1 whether man be free to will8 ,mem4 ,to enquire into the reason of the rule for determining questions in ,algebra4 ,it has already been observed by others that names are nowhere of more necessary use than in numbering4 7,m#cba7 ,i will grant you that extension1 colour1 c4 may be said to be without the mind in a double respect1 i4e4 as independent of our will1 and as distinct from the mind4 7,m#cbb7 ,certainly it is not impossible but a man may arrive at the knowledge of all real truth as well without as with signs1 had he a memory and imagination most strong and capacious4 ,therefore reasoning science doth not altogether depend upon words or names7#aie74 7,m#cbc7 ,i think not that things fall out of necessity4 ,the connexion of no two ideas is necessary2 'tis all the result of freedom1 i4e4 'tis all voluntary7#aif74 7,m#cbd7 ,if a man with his eyes shut imagines to himself the sun firmament1 you will not say he or his mind is the sun1 or is extended1 tho' neither sun or firmament be without mind4 7,m#cbe7 ',tis strange to find philosophers doubting disputing whether they have ideas of spiritual things or no4 ,surely 'tis easy to know4 ,vid4 ,de ,vries7#aig71 ,de ,ideis ,innatis1 p4 #fd4 7,m#cbf7 ,de ,vries will have it that we know the mind agrees with things not by idea but sense or conscientia4 ,so will ,malbranch4 ,this a vain distinction4 ,august #bhth1 #agjh4 ,the ,adventure of the ,shirt84 ,it were to be wished that persons of the greatest birth1 honour1 fortune1 would take that care of themselves1 by education1 industry1 literature1 a love of virtue1 to surpass all other men in knowledge all other qualifications necessary for great actions1 as far as they do in quality titles2 that princes out of them might always chose men fit for all employments and high trusts4 ,clov4 ,b4 #g4 ,one eternity greater than another of the same kind4 ,in what sense eternity may be limited4 7,m#cbg7 ,whether succession of ideas in the ,divine intellect8 7,m#cbh7 ,time is the train of ideas succeeding each other4 ,duration not distinguish'd from existence4 ,succession explain'd by before1 between1 after1 numbering4 ,why time in pain longer than time in pleasure8 ,duration infinitely divisible1 time not so4 7,m#cbi7 ,the same not common to all intelligences4 ,time thought infinitely divisible on account of its measure4 ,extension not infinitely divisible in one sense4 ,revolutions immediately measure train of ideas1 mediately duration4 7,m#ccj7 ,time a sensation2 therefore onely in ye mind4 ,eternity is onely a train of innumerable ideas4 ,hence the immortality of ye soul easily conceiv'd1 or rather the immortality of the person1 that of ye soul not being necessary for ought we can see4 ,swiftness of ideas compar'd with yt of motions shews the wisdom of ,god4 ,wt if succession of ideas were swifter1 wt if slower8 7,m#cca7 ,fall of ,adam1 use of idolatry1 use of ,epicurism ,hobbism1 dispute about divisibility of matter1 c4 expounded by material substances4 ,extension a sensation1 therefore not without the mind4 7,m#ccb7 ,in the immaterial hypothesis1 the wall is white1 fire hot1 c4 ,primary ideas prov'd not to exist in matter2 after the same manner yt secondary ones are prov'd not to exist therein4 ,demonstrations of the infinite divisibility of extension suppose length without breadth1 or invisible length1 wch is absurd4 7,m#ccc7 ,world wthout thought is nec quid1 nec quantum1 nec quale1 c4 7,m#ccd7 ',tis wondrous to contemplate ye ,world empty'd of all intelligences4 ,nothing properly but ,persons1 i4e4 conscious things1 do exist4 ,all other things are not so much existences as manners of ye existence of persons7#aih74 ,qu4 about the soul1 or rather person1 whether it be not compleatly known8 ,infinite divisibility of extension does suppose the external existence of extension2 but the later is false1 ergo ye former also4 ,qu4 ,blind man made to see1 would he know motion at #ast sight8 ,motion1 figure1 and extension perceivable by sight are different from those ideas perceived by touch wch goe by the same name4 ,diagonal incommensurable wth ye side4 ,qure how this can be in my doctrine8 7,m#cce7 ,qu4 how to reconcile ,newton's #b sorts of motion with my doctrine8 ,terminations of surfaces lines not imaginable per se4 ,molyneux's blind man would not know the sphere or cube to be bodies or extended at first sight7#aii74 ,extension so far from being incompatible wth1 yt 'tis impossible it should exist without thought4 7,m#ccf7 ,extension itself or anything extended cannot think--these being meer ideas or sensations1 whose essence we thoroughly know4 ,no extension but surface perceivable by sight4 7,m#ccg7 ,wn we imagine #b bowls v4 g4 moving in vacuo1 'tis only conceiving a person affected with these sensations4 7,m#cch7 ,extension to exist in a thoughtless thing or rather in a thing void of perception--thought seeming to imply action1 is a contradiction4 ,qu4 if visible motion be proportional to tangible motion8 7,m#cci7 ,in some dreams succession of ideas swifter than at other times4 7,m#cdj7 ,if a piece of matter have extension1 that must be determined to a particular bigness figure1 but c4 ,nothing wthout corresponds to our primary ideas but powers4 ,hence a direct brief demonstration of an active powerfull ,being1 distinct from us1 on whom we depend4 ,the name of colours actually given to tangible qualities1 by the relation of ye story of the ,german ,count4 ,qu4 ,how came visible tangible qualities by the same name in all languages8 ,qu4 ,whether ,being might not be the substance of the soul1 or 7otherwise thus7 whether ,being1 added to ye faculties1 compleat the real essence and adequate definition of the soul8 7,m#cda7 ,qu4 ,whether1 on the supposition of external bodies1 it be possible for us to know that any body is absolutely at rest1 since that supposing ideas much slower than at present1 bodies now apparently moving wd then be apparently at rest8 7,m#cdb7 ,qu4 ,what can be like a sensation but a sensation8 ,qu4 ,did ever any man see any other things besides his own ideas1 that he should compare them to these1 and make these like unto them8 7,m#cdc7 ,the age of a fly1 for ought that we know1 may be as long as yt of a man7#bjj74 ,visible distance heterogeneous from tangible distance demonstrated #c several ways3-- #ast4 ,if a tangible inch be equal or in any other reason to a visible inch1 thence it will follow yt unequals are equals1 wch is absurd3 for at what distance would the visible inch be placed to make it equal to the tangible inch8 #b;d4 ,one made to see that had not yet seen his own limbs1 or any thing he touched1 upon sight of a foot length would know it to be a foot length1 if tangible foot visible foot were the same idea--sed falsum id1 ergo et hoc4 #c;dly4 ,from ,molyneux's problem1 wch otherwise is falsely solv'd by ,locke and him7#bja74 7,m#cdd7 ,nothing but ideas perceivable7#bjb74 ,a man cannot compare #b things together without perceiving them each4 ,ergo1 he cannot say anything wch is not an idea is like or unlike an idea4 ,bodies c4 do exist even wn not perceived--they being powers in the active being7#bjc74 ,succession a simple idea1 succession is an abstract1 i4e4 an inconceivable idea1 ,locke says7#bjd74 ,visible extension is proportional to tangible extension1 also is encreated diminish'd by parts4 ,hence taken for the same4 ,if extension be without the mind in bodies4 ,qu4 whether tangible or visible1 or both8 ,mathematical propositions about extension motion true in a double sense4 ,extension thought peculiarly inert1 because not accompany'd wth pleasure pain3 hence thought to exist in matter2 as also for that it was conceiv'd common to #b senses1 as also the constant perception of 'em4 ,blind at #ast sight could not tell how near what he saw was to him1 nor even whether it be wthout him or in his eye7#bje74 ,qu4 ,would he not think the later8 ,blind at #ast sight could not know yt wt he saw was extended1 until he had seen and touched some one self-same thing--not knowing how minimum tangibile would look in vision4 7,m#cde7 ,mem4 ,that homogeneous particles be brought in to answer the objection of ,god's creating sun1 plants1 c4 before animals4 ,in every bodie two infinite series of extension--the one of tangible1 the other of visible4 ,all things to a blind man at first seen in a point4 ,ignorance of glasses made men think extension to be in bodies4 7,m#cdf7 ,homogeneous portions of matter--useful to contemplate them4 ,extension if in matter changes its relation wth minimum visibile1 wch seems to be fixt4 ,qu4 whether m4v4 be fix'd8 7,m#cdg7 ,each particle of matter if extended must be infinitely extended1 or have an infinite series of extension4 7,m#cdh7 ,if the world be granted to consist of ,matter1 'tis the mind gives it beauty and proportion4 ,wt ,i have said onely proves there is no proportion at all times and in all men between a visible tangible inch4 ,tangible and visible extension heterogeneous1 because they have no common measure2 also because their simplest constituent parts or elements are specifically different1 viz4 punctum visibile tangibile4 ,n4 ,b4 ,the former seems to be no good reason4 7,m#cdi7 ,by immateriality is solv'd the cohesion of bodies1 or rather the dispute ceases4 ,our idea we call extension neither way capable of infinity1 i4e4 neither infinitely small or great4 ,greatest possible extension seen under an angle wch will be less than #ahj degrees1 the legs of wch angle proceed from the ends of the extension4 7,m#cej7 ,allowing there be extended1 solid1 c4 substances without the mind1 'tis impossible the mind should know or perceive them2 the mind1 even according to the materialists1 perceiving onely the impressions made upon its brain1 or rather the ideas attending these impressions7#bjf74 ,unity in abstracto not at all divisible1 it being as it were a point1 or with ,barrow nothing at all2 in concreto not divisible ad infinitum1 there being no one idea demonstrable ad infinitum4 7,m#cea7 ,any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once4 ,locke1 b4 #d4 c4 #c4 s4 #ae4 ,qu4 whether we have clear ideas of large numbers themselves1 or onely of their relations8 7,m#ceb7 ,of solidity see ,l4 b4 #b4 c4 #d4 s4 #a1 #e1 #f4 ,if any one ask wt solidity is1 let him put a flint between his hands and he will know4 ,extension of body is continuity of solid1 c42 extension of space is continuity of unsolid1 c4 ,why may not ,i say visible extension is a continuity of visible points1 tangible extension is a continuity of tangible points8 7,m#cec7 ,mem4 ,that ,i take notice that ,i do not fall in wth sceptics1 ,fardella7#bjg71 c41 in that ,i make bodies to exist certainly1 wch they doubt of4 7,m#ced7 ,i am more certain of ye existence reality of bodies than ,mr4 ,locke2 since he pretends onely to wt he calls sensitive knowledge7#bjh71 whereas ,i think ,i have demonstrative knowledge of their existence--by them meaning combinations of powers in an unknown substratum7#bji74 7,m#cee7 ,our ideas we call figure extension1 not images of the figure and extension of matter2 these 7if such there be7 being infinitely divisible1 those not so4 ',tis impossible a material cube should exist1 because the edges of a cube will appear broad to an acute sense4 ,men die1 or are in a state of annihilation1 oft in a day4 7,m#cef7 ,powers4 ,qu4 whether more or one onely8 ,lengths abstract from breadths are the work of the mind4 ,such do intersect in a point at all angles4 ,after the same way colour is abstract from extension4 ,every position alters the line4 ,qu4 whether ideas of extension are made up of other ideas1 v4g4 idea of a foot made up of general ideas of an inch8 ,the idea of an inch length not one determin'd idea4 ,hence enquire the reason why we are out in judging of extension by the sight2 for which purpose 'tis meet also to consider the frequent sudden changes of extension by position4 ,no stated ideas of length without a minimum4 7,m#ceg7 ,material substance banter'd by ,locke1 b4 #b4 c4 #ac4 s4 #ai4 7,m#ceh7 ,in my doctrine all absurdities from infinite space c4 cease7#baj74 ,qu4 whether if 7speaking grossly7 the things we see were all of them at all times too small to be felt1 we should have confounded tangible visible extension and figure8 7,m#cei7 ,qu4 whether if succession of ideas in the ,eternal ,mind1 a day does not seem to ,god a #ajjj years1 rather than a #ajjj years a day8 ,but one only colour its degrees4 ,enquiry about a grand mistake in writers of dioptricks in assigning the cause of microscopes magnifying objects4 ,qu4 whether a born-blind man made to see would at #ast give the name of distance to any idea intromitted by sight2 since he would take distance yt that he had perceived by touch to be something existing without his mind1 but he would certainly think that nothing seen was without his mind7#baa78 7,m#cfj7 ,space without any bodies existing in rerum natura would not be extended1 as not having parts--in that parts are assigned to it wth respect to body2 from whence also the notion of distance is taken4 ,now without either parts or distance or mind1 how can there be ,space1 or anything beside one uniform ,nothing8 ,two demonstrations that blind made to see would not take all things he saw to be without his mind1 or not in a point--the one from microscopic eyes1 the other from not perceiving distance1 i4e4 radius of the visual sphere4 7,m#cfa7 ,the trees are in the park1 i4e4 whether ,i will or no1 whether ,i imagine anything about them or no4 ,let me but go thither and open my eyes by day1 ,i shall not avoid seeing them4 ,by extension blind man would mean either the perception caused in his touch by something he calls extended1 or else the power of raising that perception2 wch power is without1 in the thing termed extended4 ,now he could not know either of these to be in things visible till he had try'd4 ,geometry seems to have for its object tangible extension1 figures1 motion--and not visible7#bab74 ,a man will say a body will seem as big as before1 tho' the visible idea it yields be less than wt it was2 therefore the bigness or tangible extension of the body is different from the visible extension4 ,extension or space no simple idea--length1 breadth1 solidity being three several ideas4 ,depth or solidity now perceived by sight7#bac74 ,strange impotence of men4 ,man without ,god wretcheder than a stone or tree2 he having onely the power to be miserable by his unperformed wills1 these having no power at all7#bad74 ,length perceivable by hearing--length breadth by sight--length1 breadth1 depth by touch4 7,m#cfb7 ,wt affects us must be a thinking thing1 for wt thinks not cannot subsist4 ,number not in bodies1 it being the creature of the mind1 depending entirely on its consideration1 being more or less as the mind pleases7#bae74 ,mem4 ,qure whether extension be equally a sensation with colour8 ,the mob use not the word extension4 ',tis an abstract term of the ,schools4 7,m#cfc7 ,round figure a perception or sensation in the mind1 but in the body is a power4 ,locke1 b4 #b4 c4 #h4 s4 #h4 ,mem4 ,mark well the later part of the last cited section4 ,solids1 or any other tangible things1 are no otherwise seen than colours felt by the ,german ,count4 7,m#cfd7 8,of0 and 8thing0 causes of mistake4 ,the visible point of he who has microscopical eyes will not be greater or less than mine4 ,qu4 ,whether the propositions even axioms of geometry do not divers of them suppose the existence of lines c4 without the mind8 7,m#cfe7 ,whether motion be the measure of duration8 ,locke1 b4 #b4 c4 #ad4 s4 #ai4 ,lines points conceiv'd as terminations different ideas from those conceiv'd absolutely4 ,every position alters a line4 7,m#cff7 ,blind man at #ast would not take colours to be without his mind2 but colours would seem to be in the same place with the coloured extension3 therefore extension wd not seem to be without the mind4 ,all visible concentric circles whereof the eye is the centre are absolutely equal4 ,infinite number--why absurd--not rightly solv'd by ,locke7#baf74 ,qu4 how 'tis possible we should see flats or right lines8 ,qu4 why the moon appears greatest in the horizon7#bag78 ,qu4 why we see things erect when painted inverted7#bah78 7,m#cfg7 ,question put by ,mr4 ,deering touching the thief and paradise4 7,m#cfh7 ,matter tho' allowed to exist may be no greater than a pin's head4 ,motion is proportionable to space described in given time4 ,velocity not proportionable to space describ'd in given time4 7,m#cfi7 ,no active power but the ,will3 therefore ,matter1 if it exists1 affects us not7#bai74 ,magnitude when barely taken for the ratio partium extra partes1 or rather for co-existence succession1 without considering the parts co-existing succeeding1 is infinitely1 or rather indefinitely1 or not at all perhaps1 divisible1 because it is itself infinite or indefinite4 ,but definite1 determined magnitudes1 i4e4 lines or surfaces consisting of points whereby 7together wth distance position7 they are determin'd1 are resoluble into those points4 ,again4 ,magnitude taken for co-existence and succession is not all divisible1 but is one simple idea4 ,simple ideas include no parts nor relations--hardly separated and considered in themselves--nor yet rightly singled by any author4 ,instance in power1 red1 extension1 c4 7,m#cgj7 ,space not imaginable by any idea received from sight--not imaginable without body moving4 ,not even then necessarily existing 7,i speak of infinite space7--for wt the body has past may be conceiv'd annihilated4 7,m#cga7 ,qu4 ,what can we see beside colours8 what can we feel beside hard1 soft1 cold1 warm1 pleasure1 pain8 ,qu4 ,why not taste smell extension8 ,qu4 ,why not tangible visible extensions thought heterogeneous extensions1 so well as gustable olefactible perceptions thought heterogeneous perceptions8 or at least why not as heterogeneous as blue red8 ,moon wn horizontal does not appear bigger as to visible extension than at other times2 hence difficulties and disputes about things seen under equal angles c4 cease4 ,all potenti alike indifferent4 ,a4 ,b4 ,wt does he mean by his potentia8 ,is it the will1 desire1 person1 or all or neither1 or sometimes one1 sometimes t'other8 ,no agent can be conceiv'd indifferent as to pain or pleasure4 ,we do not1 properly speaking1 in a strict philosophical sense1 make objects more or less pleasant2 but the laws of nature do that4 7,m#cgb7 ,a finite intelligence might have foreseen #d thousand years agoe the place and circumstances1 even the most minute trivial1 of my present existence4 ,this true on supposition that uneasiness determines the will4 7,m#cgc7 ,doctrines of liberty1 prescience1 c4 explained by billiard balls4 ,wt judgement would he make of uppermost and lowermost who had always seen through an inverting glass8 ,all lines subtending the same optic angle congruent 7as is evident by an easy experiment72 therefore they are equal4 ,we have not pure simple ideas of blue1 red1 or any other colour 7except perhaps black7 because all bodies reflect heterogeneal light4 ,qu4 ,whether this be true as to sounds 7 other sensations71 there being1 perhaps1 rays of air wch will onely exhibit one particular sound1 as rays of light one particular colour4 ,colours not definable1 not because they are pure unmixt thoughts1 but because we cannot easily distinguish separate the thoughts they include1 or because we want names for their component ideas4 7,m#cgd7 ,by ,soul is meant onely a complex idea1 made up of existence1 willing1 perception in a large sense4 ,therefore it is known and it may be defined4 ,we cannot possibly conceive any active power but the ,will4 7,m#cge7 ,in moral matters men think 7'tis true7 that they are free2 but this freedom is only the freedom of doing as they please2 wch freedom is consecutive to the ,will1 respecting only the operative faculties7#bbj74 ,men impute their actions to themselves because they will'd them1 and that not out of ignorance1 but whereas they have the consequences of them1 whether good or bad4 ,this does not prove men to be indifferent in respect of desiring4 ,if anything is meant by the potentia of ,a4 ,b4 it must be desire2 but ,i appeal to any man if his desire be indifferent1 or 7to speak more to the purpose7 whether he himself be indifferent in respect of wt he desires till after he has desired it2 for as for desire itself1 or the faculty of desiring1 that is indifferent1 as all other faculties are4 ,actions leading to heaven are in my power if ,i will them3 therefore ,i will will them4 ,qu4 concerning the procession of ,wills in infinitum4 ,herein mathematiques have the advantage over metaphysiques and morality4 ,their definitions1 being of words not yet known to ye learner1 are not disputed2 but words in metaphysiques morality1 being mostly known to all1 the definitions of them may chance to be contraverted4 7,m#cgf7 ,the short jejune way in mathematiques will not do in metaphysiques ethiques3 for yt about mathematical propositions men have no prejudices1 no anticipated opinions to be encounter'd2 they not having yet thought on such matters4 ',tis not so in the other #b mentioned sciences4 ,a man must there not onely demonstrate the truth1 he must also vindicate it against scruples and established opinions which contradict it4 ,in short1 the dry1 strigose7#bba71 rigid way will not suffice4 ,he must be more ample copious1 else his demonstration1 tho' never so exact1 will not go down with most4 ,extension seems to consist in variety of homogeneal thoughts co-existing without mixture4 ,or rather visible extension seems to be the co-existence of colour in the mind4 7,m#cgg7 ,enquiring and judging are actions which depend on the operative faculties1 wch depend on the ,will1 wch is determin'd by some uneasiness2 ergo c4 ,suppose an agent wch is finite perfectly indifferent1 and as to desiring not determin'd by any prospect or consideration of good1 ,i say1 this agent cannot do an action morally good4 ,hence 'tis evident the suppositions of ,a4 ,b4 are insignificant4 ,extension1 motion1 time1 number are no simple ideas1 but include succession to them1 which seems to be a simple idea4 ,mem4 ,to enquire into the angle of contact1 into fluxions1 c4 ,the sphere of vision is equal whether ,i look onely in my hand or on the open firmament1 for #ast1 in both cases the retina is full2 #b;d1 the radius's of both spheres are equall or rather nothing at all to the sight2 #c;dly1 equal numbers of points in one t'other4 ,in the ,barrovian case purblind would judge aright4 ,why the horizontal moon greater8 ,why objects seen erect8 7,m#cgh7 ,to what purpose certain figure and texture connected wth other perceptions8 ,men estimate magnitudes both by angles and distance4 ,blind at #ast could not know distance2 or by pure sight1 abstracting from experience of connexion of sight and tangible ideas1 we can't perceive distance4 ,therefore by pure sight we cannot perceive or judge of extension4 ,qu4 ,whether it be possible to enlarge our sight or make us see at once more1 or more points1 than we do1 by diminishing the punctum visibile below #cj minutes8 7,m#cgi7 ,speech metaphorical more than we imagine2 insensible things1 their modes1 circumstances1 c4 being exprest for the most part by words borrow'd from things sensible4 ,hence manyfold mistakes4 7,m#chj7 ,the grand mistake is that we think we have ideas of the operations of our minds7#bbb74 ,certainly this metaphorical dress is an argument we have not4 ,qu4 ,how can our idea of ,god be complex compounded1 when his essence is simple uncompounded8 ,v4 ,locke1 b4 #b4 c4 #bc4 s4 #ce7bbc74 7,m#cha7 ,the impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of such things proceeds from the fault scantiness of language1 as much perhaps as from obscurity confusion of thought4 ,hence ,i may clearly and fully understand my own soul1 extension1 c41 and not be able to define them7#bbd74 7,m#chb7 ,the substance wood a collection of simple ideas4 ,see ,locke1 b4 #b4 c4 #bf4 s4 #a4 ,mem4 concerning strait lines seen to look at them through an orbicular lattice4 ,qu4 ,whether possible that those visible ideas wch are now connected with greater tangible extensions could have been connected with lesser tangible extensions1--there seeming to be no necessary connexion between those thoughts8 ,speculums seem to diminish or enlarge objects not by altering the optique angle1 but by altering the apparent distance4 ,hence ,qu4 if blind would think things diminish'd by convexes1 or enlarg'd by concaves8 7,m#chc7 ,motion not one idea4 ,it cannot be perceived at once4 7,m#chd7 ,mem4 ,to allow existence to colours in the dark1 persons not thinking1 c4--but not an actual existence4 ',tis prudent to correct men's mistakes without altering their language4 ,this makes truth glide into their souls insensibly7#bbe74 7,m#che7 ,colours in ye dark do exist really1 i4e4 were there light2 or as soon as light comes1 we shall see them1 provided we open our eyes2 and that whether we will or no4 ,how the retina is fill'd by a looking-glass8 ,convex speculums have the same effect wth concave glasses4 ,qu4 ,whether concave speculums have the same effect wth convex glasses8 ,the reason why convex speculums diminish concave magnify not yet fully assign'd by any writer ,i know4 ,qu4 ,why not objects seen confus'd when that they seem inverted through a convex lens8 ,qu4 ,how to make a glass or speculum which shall magnify or diminish by altering the distance without altering the angle8 ,no identity 7other than perfect likeness7 in any individuals besides persons7#bbf74 7,m#chf7 ,as well make tastes1 smells1 fear1 shame1 wit1 virtue1 vice1 all thoughts move wth local motion as immaterial spirit4 ,on account of my doctrine1 the identity of finite substances must consist in something else than continued existence1 or relation to determined time place of beginning to exist--the existence of our thoughts 7which being combined make all substances7 being frequently interrupted1 they having divers beginnings endings4 7,m#chg7 ,qu4 ,whether identity of person consists not in the ,will8 ,no necessary connexion between great or little optique angles and great or little extension4 ,distance is not perceived3 optique angles are not perceived4 ,how then is extension perceiv'd by sight8 ,apparent magnitude of a line is not simply as the optique angle1 but directly as the optique angle1 reciprocally as the confusion1 c4 7i4e4 the other sensations1 or want of sensation1 that attend near vision74 ,hence great mistakes in assigning the magnifying power of glasses4 ,vid4 ,molyneux1 p4 #ahb4 ,glasses or speculums may perhaps magnify or lessen without altering the optique angle1 but to no purpose4 ,qu4 ,whether purblind would think objects so much diminished by a convex speculum as another8 ,qu4 ,wherein consists identity of person8 ,not in actual consciousness2 for then ,i'm not the same person ,i was this day twelvemonth but while ,i think of wt ,i then did4 ,not in potential2 for then all persons may be the same1 for ought we know4 ,mem4 ,story of ,mr4 ,deering's aunt4 ,two sorts of potential consciousness--natural prternatural4 ,in the last but one1 ,i mean the latter4 ,if by magnitude be meant the proportion anything bears to a determined tangible extension1 as inch1 foot1 c41 this1 'tis plain1 cannot be properly per se perceived by sight2 as for determin'd visible inches1 feet1 c41 there can be no such thing obtain'd by the meer act of seeing--abstracted from experience1 c4 ,the greatness per se perceivable by the sight is onely the proportion any visible appearance bears to the others seen at the same time2 or 7which is the same thing7 the proportion of any particular part of the visual orb to the whole4 ,but mark that we perceive not it is an orb1 any more than a plain1 but by reasoning4 ,this is all the greatness the pictures have per se4 ,hereby meere seeing cannot at all judge of the extension of any object1 it not availing to know the object makes such a part of a sphrical surface except we also know the greatness of the sphrical surface2 for a point may subtend the same angle wth a mile1 so create as great an image in the retina1 i4e4 take up as much of the orb4 ,men judge of magnitude by faintness and vigorousness1 by distinctness and confusion1 with some other circumstances1 by great little angles4 ,hence 'tis plain the ideas of sight which are now connected with greatness might have been connected wth smallness1 and vice vers3 there being no necessary reason why great angles1 faintness1 and distinctness without straining1 should stand for great extension1 any more than a great angle1 vigorousness1 and confusion7#bbg74 ,my end is not to deliver metaphysiques altogether in a general scholastic way1 but in some measure to accommodate them to the sciences1 and shew how they may be useful in optiques1 geometry1 c47#bbh7 ,qu4 ,whether per se proportion of visible magnitudes be perceivable by sight8 ,this is put on account of distinctness and confusedness1 the act of perception seeming to be as great in viewing any point of the visual orb distinctly1 as in viewing the whole confusedly4 ,mem4 ,to correct my language make it as philosophically nice as possible--to avoid giving handle4 ,if men could without straining alter the convexity of their crystallines1 they might magnify or diminish the apparent diameters of objects1 the same optic angle remaining4 ,the bigness in one sense of the pictures in the fund is not determin'd2 for the nearer a man views them1 the images of them 7as well as other objects7 will take up the greater room in the fund of his eye4 ,mem4 ,introduction to contain the design of the whole1 the nature and manner of demonstrating1 c4 ,two sorts of bigness accurately to be distinguished1 they being perfectly and toto clo different--the one the proportion that any one appearance has to the sum of appearances perceived at the same time wth it1 wch is proportional to angles1 or1 if a surface1 to segments of sphrical surfaces2--the other is tangible bigness4 ,qu4 wt would happen if the sphr of the retina were enlarged or diminish'd8 ,we think by the meer act of vision we perceive distance from us1 yet we do not2 also that we perceive solids1 yet we do not2 also the inequality of things seen under the same angle1 yet we do not4 ,why may ,i not add1 ,we think we see extension by meer vision8 ,yet we do not4 ,extension seems to be perceived by the eye1 as thought by the ear4 ,as long as the same angle determines the minimum visibile to two persons1 no different conformation of the eye can make a different appearance of magnitude in the same thing4 ,but1 it being possible to try the angle1 we may certainly know whether the same thing appears differently big to two persons on account of their eyes4 ,if a man could see 444 objects would appear larger to him than to another2 hence there is another sort of purely visible magnitude beside the proportion any appearance bears to the visual sphere1 viz4 its proportion to the ,m4 ,v4 ,were there but one and the same language in the world1 and did children speak it naturally as soon as born1 and were it not in the power of men to conceal their thoughts or deceive others1 but that there were an inseparable connexion between words thoughts1 so yt posito uno1 ponitur alterum by the laws of nature2 ,qu4 would not men think they heard thoughts as much as that they see extension7#bbi78 ,all our ideas are adquate3 our knowledge of the laws of nature is not perfect adquate7#bcj74 7,m#chh7 ,men are in the right in judging their simple ideas to be in the things themselves4 ,certainly heat colour is as much without the mind as figure1 motion1 time1 c4 ,we know many things wch we want words to express4 ,great things discoverable upon this principle4 ,for want of considering wch divers men have run into sundry mistakes1 endeavouring to set forth their knowledge by sounds2 wch foundering them1 they thought the defect was in their knowledge1 while in truth it was in their language4 ,qu4 ,whether the sensations of sight arising from a man's head be liker the sensations of touch proceeding from thence or from his legs8 ,or1 ,is it onely the constant long association of ideas entirely different that makes me judge them the same8 ,wt ,i see is onely variety of colours light4 ,wt ,i feel is hard or soft1 hot or cold1 rough or smooth1 c4 ,wt resemblance have these thoughts with those8 ,a picture painted wth great variety of colours affects the touch in one uniform manner4 ,i cannot therefore conclude that because ,i see #b1 ,i shall feel #b2 because ,i see angles or inequalities1 ,i shall feel angles or inequalities4 ,how therefore can ,i--before experience teaches me--know that the visible leggs are 7because #b7 connected wth the tangible ones1 or the visible head 7because one7 connected wth the tangible head7#bca78 7,m#chi7 ,all things by us conceivable are-- #ast1 thoughts2 #bndly1 powers to receive thoughts2 #crdly1 powers to cause thoughts2 neither of all wch can possibly exist in an inert1 senseless thing4 ,an object wthout a glass may be seen under as great an angle as wth a glass4 ,a glass therefore does not magnify the appearance by the angle4 7,m#cij7 ,absurd that men should know the soul by idea--ideas being inert1 thoughtless4 ,hence ,malbranch confuted7#bcb74 ,i saw gladness in his looks4 ,i saw shame in his face4 ,so ,i see figure or distance4 ,qu4 ,why things seen confusedly thro' a convex glass are not magnify'd8 ,tho' we should judge the horizontal moon to be more distant1 why should we therefore judge her to be greater8 ,what connexion betwixt the same angle1 further distant1 and greaterness8 7,m#cia7 ,my doctrine affects the essences of the ,corpuscularians4 ,perfect circles1 c4 exist not without 7for none can so exist1 whether perfect or no71 but in the mind4 ,lines thought divisible ad infinitum1 because they are suppos'd to exist without4 ,also because they are thought the same when view'd by the naked eye1 wn view'd thro' magnifying glasses4 ,they who knew not glasses had not so fair a pretence for the divisibility ad infinitum4 ,no idea of circle1 c4 in abstract4 ,metaphysiques as capable of certainty as ethiques1 but not so capable to be demonstrated in a geometrical way2 because men see clearer have not so many prejudices in ethiques4 ,visible ideas come into the mind very distinct4 ,so do tangible ideas4 ,hence extension seen felt4 ,sounds1 tastes1 c4 are more blended4 ,qu4 ,why not extension intromitted by the taste in conjunction with the smell--seeing tastes smells are very distinct ideas8 ,blew and yellow particles mixt1 while they exhibit an uniform green1 their extension is not perceiv'd2 but as soon as they exhibit distinct sensations of blew and yellow1 then their extension is perceiv'd4 ,distinct perception of visible ideas not so perfect as of tangible--tangible ideas being many at once equally vivid4 ,hence heterogeneous extension4 ,object4 ,why a mist increases not the apparent magnitude of an object1 in proportion to the faintness7#bcc78 ,mem4 ,to enquire touching the squaring of the circle1 c4 ,that wch seems smooth round to the touch may to sight seem quite otherwise4 ,hence no necessary connexion betwixt visible ideas and tangible ones4 ,in geometry it is not prov'd that an inch is divisible ad infinitum4 ,geometry not conversant about our compleat determined ideas of figures1 for these are not divisible ad infinitum4 ,particular circles may be squar'd1 for the circumference being given a diameter may be found betwixt wch the true there is not any perceivable difference4 ,therefore there is no difference--extension being a perception2 a perception not perceivd is contradiction1 nonsense1 nothing4 ,in vain to alledge the difference may be seen by magnifying-glasses1 for in yt case there is 7'tis true7 a difference perceiv'd1 but not between the same ideas1 but others much greater1 entirely different therefrom7#bcd74 ,any visible circle possibly perceivable of any man may be squar'd1 by the common way1 most accurately2 or even perceivable by any other being1 see he never so acute1 i4e4 never so small an arch of a circle2 this being wt makes the distinction between acute dull sight1 and not the m4v41 as men are perhaps apt to think4 ,the same is true of any tangible circle4 ,therefore further enquiry of accuracy in squaring or other curves is perfectly needless1 time thrown away4 ,mem4 ,to press wt last precedes more homely1 so think on't again4 ,a meer line or distance is not made up of points1 does not exist1 cannot be imagin'd1 or have an idea framed thereof1--no more than meer colour without extension7#bce74 ,mem4 ,a great difference between considering length wthout breadth1 having an idea of1 or imagining1 length without breadth7#bcf74 ,malbranch out touching the crystallines diminishing1 ,l4 #a4 c4 #f4 ',tis possible 7 perhaps not very improbable1 that is1 is sometimes so7 we may have the greatest pictures from the least objects4 ,therefore no necessary connexion betwixt visible tangible ideas4 ,these ideas1 viz4 great relation to sphra visualis1 or to the m4 v4 7wch is all that ,i would have meant by having a greater picture7 faintness1 might possibly have stood for or signify'd small tangible extensions4 ,certainly the greater relation to s4 v4 and m4 v4 does frequently1 in that men view little objects near the eye4 ,malbranch out in asserting we cannot possibly know whether there are #b men in the world that see a thing of the same bigness4 ,v4 ,l4 #a4 c4 #f4 ,diagonal of particular square commensurable wth its side1 they both containing a certain number of m4 v4 ,i do not think that surfaces consist of lines1 i4e4 meer distances4 ,hence perhaps may be solid that sophism wch would prove the oblique line equal to the perpendicular between #b parallels4 ,suppose an inch represent a mile4 #a_/ajjj of an inch is nothing1 but #a_/ajjj of ye mile represented is something3 therefore #a_/ajjj an inch1 tho' nothing1 is not to be neglected1 because it represents something1 i4e4 #a_/ajjj of a mile4 ,particular determin'd lines are not divisible ad infinitum1 but lines as us'd by geometers are so1 they not being determin'd to any particular finite number of points4 ,yet a geometer 7he knows not why7 will very readily say he can demonstrate an inch line is divisible ad infinitum4 ,a body moving in the optique axis not perceiv'd to move by sight merely1 and without experience4 ,there is 7'tis true7 a successive change of ideas1--it seems less and less4 ,but1 besides this1 there is no visible change of place4 ,mem4 ,to enquire most diligently concerning the incommensurability of diagonale side--whether it does not go on the supposition of units being divisible ad infinitum1 i4e4 of the extended thing spoken of being divisible ad infinitum 7unit being nothing2 also v4 ,barrow1 ,lect4 ,geom471 so the infinite indivisibility deduced therefrom is a petitio principii8 ,the diagonal is commensurable with the side4 7,m#cib7 ,from ,malbranch1 ,locke1 my first arguings it can't be prov'd that extension is not in matter4 ,from ,locke's arguings it can't be proved that colours are not in bodies4 ,mem4 ,that ,i was distrustful at #h years old2 and consequently by nature disposed for these new doctrines7#bcg74 ,qu4 ,how can a line consisting of an unequal number of points be divisible ad infinitum in two equals8 ,mem4 ,to discuss copiously how why we do not see the pictures4 7,m#cic7 ,allowing extensions to exist in matter1 we cannot know even their proportions--contrary to ,malbranch4 7,m#cid7 ,i wonder how men cannot see a truth so obvious1 as that extension cannot exist without a thinking substance4 7,m#cie7 ,species of all sensible things made by the mind4 ,this prov'd either by turning men's eyes into magnifyers or diminishers4 ,yr m4 v4 is1 suppose1 less than mine4 ,let a #crd person have perfect ideas of both our m4 vs4 ,his idea of my m4 v4 contains his idea of yours1 somewhat more4 ,therefore 'tis made up of parts3 therefore his idea of my m4 v4 is not perfect or just1 which diverts the hypothesis4 ,qu4 ,whether a m4 v4 or t4 be extended8 ,mem4 ,the strange errours men run into about the pictures4 ,we think them small because should a man be suppos'd to see them their pictures would take up but little room in the fund of his eye4 ,it seems all lines can't be bisected in #b equall parts4 ,mem4 ,to examine how the geometers prove the contrary4 ',tis impossible there should be a m4 v4 less than mine4 ,if there be1 mine may become equal to it 7because they are homogeneous7 by detraction of some part or parts4 ,but it consists not of parts1 ergo c4 ,suppose inverting perspectives bound to ye eyes of a child1 continu'd to the years of manhood--when he looks up1 or turns up his head1 he shall behold wt we call under4 ,qu4 ,what would he think of up and down7#bch78 7,m#cif7 ,i wonder not at my sagacity in discovering the obvious tho' amazing truth4 ,i rather wonder at my stupid inadvertency in not finding it out before--'tis no witchcraft to see4 7,m#cig7 ,our simple ideas are so many simple thoughts or perceptions2 a perception cannot exist without a thing to perceive it1 or any longer than it is perceiv'd2 a thought cannot be in an unthinking thing2 one uniform simple thought can be like to nothing but another uniform simple thought4 ,complex thoughts or ideas are onely an assemblage of simple ideas1 and can be the image of nothing1 or like unto nothing1 but another assemblage of simple ideas1 c4 7,m#cih7 ,the ,cartesian opinion of light colours c4 is orthodox enough even in their eyes who think the ,scripture expression may favour the common opinion4 ,why may not mine also8 ,but there is nothing in ,scripture that can possibly be wrested to make against me1 but1 perhaps1 many things for me4 7,m#cii7 ,bodies c4 do exist whether we think of 'em or no1 they being taken in a twofold sense-- #a4 ,collections of thoughts4 #b4 ,collections of powers to cause those thoughts4 ,these later exist2 tho' perhaps a parte rei it may be one simple perfect power4 ,qu4 whether the extension of a plain1 look'd at straight and slantingly1 survey'd minutely distinctly1 or in the bulk and confusedly at once1 be the same8 ,n4 ,b4 ,the plain is suppos'd to keep the same distance4 ,the ideas we have by a successive1 curious inspection of ye minute parts of a plain do not seem to make up the extension of that plain view'd consider'd all together4 ,ignorance in some sort requisite in ye person that should disown the ,principle4 ,thoughts do most properly signify1 or are mostly taken for the interior operations of the mind1 wherein the mind is active4 ,those yt obey not the acts of volition1 and in wch the mind is passive1 are more properly call'd sensations or perceptions4 ,but yt is all a case of words4 ,extension being the collection or distinct co-existence of minimums1 i4e4 of perceptions intromitted by sight or touch1 it cannot be conceiv'd without a perceiving substance4 7,m#djj7 ,malbranch does not prove that the figures extensions exist not when they are not perceiv'd4 ,consequently he does not prove1 nor can it be prov'd on his principles1 that the sorts are the work of the mind1 and onely in the mind4 7,m#dja7 ,the great argument to prove that extension cannot be in an unthinking substance is1 that it cannot be conceiv'd distinct from or without all tangible or visible quality4 7,m#djb7 ,tho' matter be extended wth an indefinite extension1 yet the mind makes the sorts4 ,they were not before the mind perceiving them1 even now they are not without the mind4 ,houses1 trees1 c41 tho' indefinitely extended matter do exist1 are not without the mind4 7,m#djc7 ,the great danger of making extension exist without the mind is1 that if it does it must be acknowledg'd infinite1 immutable1 eternal1 c42--wch will be to make either ,god extended 7wch ,i think dangerous71 or an eternal1 immutable1 infinite1 increate ,being beside ,god4 7,m#djd7 ,finiteness of our minds no excuse for the geometers4 7,m#dje7 ,the ,principle easily proved by plenty of arguments ad absurdum4 ,the twofold signification of ,bodies1 viz4 #a4 ,combinations of thoughts7#bci72 #b4 ,combinations of powers to raise thoughts4 ,these1 ,i say1 in conjunction with homogeneous particles1 may solve much better the objections from the creation than the supposition that ,matter does exist4 ,upon wch supposition ,i think they cannot be solv'd4 ,bodies taken for powers do exist wn not perceiv'd2 but this existence is not actual7#bdj74 ,wn ,i say a power exists1 no more is meant than that if in the light ,i open my eyes1 and look that way1 ,i shall see it1 i4e4 the body1 c4 ,qu4 whether blind before sight may not have an idea of light and colours visible extension1 after the same manner as we perceive them wth eyes shut1 or in the dark--not imagining1 but seeing after a sort8 ,visible extension cannot be conceiv'd added to tangible extension4 ,visible and tangible points can't make one sum4 ,therefore these extensions are heterogeneous4 ,a probable method propos'd whereby one may judge whether in near vision there is a greater distance between the crystalline fund than usual1 or whether the crystalline be onely render'd more convex4 ,if the former1 then the v4 s4 is enlarg'd1 the m4 v4 corresponds to less than #cj minutes1 or wtever it us'd to correspond to4 ,stated measures1 inches1 feet1 c41 are tangible not visible extensions4 7,m#djf7 ,locke1 ,more1 ,raphson1 c4 seem to make ,god extended4 ',tis nevertheless of great use to religion to take extension out of our idea of ,god1 put a power in its place4 ,it seems dangerous to suppose extension1 wch is manifestly inert1 in ,god4 7,m#djg7 ,but1 say you1 ,the thought or perception ,i call extension is not itself in an unthinking thing or ,matter--but it is like something wch is in ,matter4 ,well1 say ,i1 ,do you apprehend or conceive wt you say extension is like unto1 or do you not8 ,if the later1 how know you they are alike8 ,how can you compare any things besides your own ideas8 ,if the former1 it must be an idea1 i4e4 perception1 thought1 or sensation--wch to be in an unperceiving thing is a contradiction7#bda74 7,m#djh7 ,i abstain from all flourish powers of words figures1 using a great plainness simplicity of simile1 having oft found it difficult to understand those that use the lofty ,platonic1 or subtil scholastique strain7#bdb74 7,m#dji7 ,whatsoever has any of our ideas in it must perceive2 it being that very having1 that passive recognition of ideas1 that denominates the mind perceiving--that being the very essence of perception1 or that wherein perception consists4 ,the faintness wch alters the appearance of the horizontal moon1 rather proceeds from the quantity or grossness of the intermediate atmosphere1 than from any change of distance1 wch is perhaps not considerable enough to be a total cause1 but may be a partial of the phenomenon4 ,n4 ,b4 ,the visual angle is less in cause the horizon4 ,we judge of the distance of bodies1 as by other things1 so also by the situation of their pictures in the eye1 or 7wch is the same thing7 according as they appear higher or lower4 ,those wch seem higher are farther off4 ,qu4 why we see objects greater in ye dark8 whether this can be solv'd by any but my ,principles8 7,m#daj7 ,the reverse of ye ,principle introduced scepticism4 7,m#daa7 ,n4 ,b4 ,on my ,principles there is a reality3 there are things3 there is a rerum natura4 ,mem4 ,the surds1 doubling the cube1 c4 ,we think that if just made to see we should judge of the distance magnitude of things as we do now2 but this is false4 ,so also wt we think so positively of the situation of objects4 ,hays's1 ,keill's7#bdc71 c4 method of proving the infinitesimals of the #c;d order absurd1 perfectly contradictions4 ,angles of contact1 verily all angles comprehended by a right line a curve1 cannot be measur'd1 the arches intercepted not being similar4 ,the danger of expounding the ,h4 ,trinity by extension4 7,m#dab7 ,qu4 ,why should the magnitude seen at a near distance be deem'd the true one rather than that seen at a farther distance8 ,why should the sun be thought many #ajjj miles rather than one foot in diameter--both being equally apparent diameters8 ,certainly men judg'd of the sun not in himself1 but wth relation to themselves4 7,m#dac7 #d ,principles whereby to answer objections1 viz4 #a4 ,bodies do really exist1 tho' not perceiv'd by us4 #b4 ,there is a law or course of nature4 #c4 ,language knowledge are all about ideas2 words stand for nothing else4 #d4 ,nothing can be a proof against one side of a contradiction that bears equally hard upon the other7#bdd74 ,what shall ,i say8 ,dare ,i pronounce the admired mathematica1 that darling of the age1 a trifle8 ,most certainly no finite extension divisible ad infinitum4 7,m#dad7 ,difficulties about concentric circles4 7,m#dae7 ,mem4 ,to examine accurately discuss the scholium of the #hth definition of ,mr4 ,newton's7#bde7 ,principia4 ,ridiculous in the mathematicians to despise ,sense4 ,qu4 ,is it not impossible there should be abstract general ideas8 ,all ideas come from without4 ,they are all particular4 ,the mind1 'tis true1 can consider one thing wthout another2 but then1 considered asunder1 they make not #b ideas4 ,both together can make but one1 as for instance colour visible extension7#bdf74 ,the end of a mathematical line is nothing4 ,locke's argument that the end of his pen is black or white concludes nothing here4 ,mem4 ,take care how you pretend to define extension1 for fear of the geometers4 ,qu4 ,why difficult to imagine a minimum8 ,ans4 ,because we are not used to take notice of 'em singly2 they not being able singly to pleasure or hurt us1 thereby to deserve our regard4 ,mem4 ,to prove against ,keill yt the infinite divisibility of matter makes the half have an equal number of equal parts with the whole4 ,mem4 ,to examine how far the not comprehending infinites may be admitted as a plea4 ,qu4 ,why may not the mathematicians reject all the extensions below the ,m4 as well as the dd1 c41 wch are allowed to be something1 consequently may be magnify'd by glasses into inches1 feet1 c41 as well as the quantities next below the ,m48 ,big1 little1 and number are the works of the mind4 ,how therefore can ye extension you suppose in ,matter be big or little8 ,how can it consist of any number of points8 7,m#daf7 ,mem4 ,strictly to remark ,locke1 b4 #b4 c4 #h4 s4 #h4 ,schoolmen compar'd with the mathematicians4 ,extension is blended wth tangible or visible ideas1 by the mind prscinded therefrom4 ,mathematiques made easy--the scale does almost all4 ,the scale can tell us the subtangent in ye parabola is double the abscisse4 ,wt need of the utmost accuracy wn the mathematicians own in rerum natura they cannot find anything corresponding wth their nice ideas4 ,one should endeavour to find a progression by trying wth the scale4 ,newton's fluxions needless4 ,anything below an ,m might serve for ,leibnitz's ,differential ,calculus4 ,how can they hang together so well1 since there are in them 7,i mean the mathematiques7 so many contradictori arguti4 ,v4 ,barrow1 ,lect4 ,a man may read a book of ,conics with ease1 knowing how to try if they are right4 ,he may take 'em on the credit of the author4 ,where's the need of certainty in such trifles8 ,the thing that makes it so much esteem'd in them is that we are thought not capable of getting it elsewhere4 ,but we may in ethiques and metaphysiques4 ,the not leading men into mistakes no argument for the truth of the infinitesimals4 ,they being nothings may perhaps do neither good nor harm1 except wn they are taken for something1 then the contradiction begets a contradiction4 a #ejj nothings a #ej nothings--an innocent silly truth4 7,m#dag7 ,my doctrine excellently corresponds wth the creation4 ,i suppose no matter1 no stars1 sun1 c4 to have existed before7#bdg74 ,it seems all circles are not similar figures1 there not being the same proportion betwixt all circumferences their diameters4 ,when a small line upon paper represents a mile1 the mathematicians do not calculate the #a_/ajjjj of the paper line1 they calculate the #a_/ajjjj of the mile4 ',tis to this they have regard1 'tis of this they think2 if they think or have any idea at all4 ,the inch perhaps might represent to their imaginations the mile1 but ye #a_/ajjjj of the inch cannot be made to represent anything1 it not being imaginable4 ,but the #a_/ajjjj of a mile being somewhat1 they think the #a_/ajjjj inch is somewhat3 wn they think of yt they imagine they think on this4 #c faults occur in the arguments of the mathematicians for divisibility ad infinitum-- #a4 ,they suppose extension to exist without the mind1 or not perceived4 #b4 ,they suppose that we have an idea of length without breadth7#bdh71 or that length without breadth does exist4 #c4 ,that unity is divisible ad infinitum4 ,to suppose a ,m4 ,s4 divisible is to say there are distinguishable ideas where there are no distinguishable ideas4 ,the ,m4 ,s4 is not near so inconceivable as the signum in magnitudine individuum4 ,mem4 ,to examine the math1 about their point--what it is--something or nothing2 and how it differs from the ,m4 ,s4 ,all might be demonstrated by a new method of indivisibles1 easier perhaps and juster than that of ,cavalierius7#bdi74 7,m#dah7 ,unperceivable perception a contradiction4 7,m#dai7 ,proprietates reales rerum omnium in ,deo1 tam corporum quum spirituum continentur4 ,clerici1 ,log4 cap4 #h4 ,let my adversaries answer any one of mine1 ,i'll yield4 ,if ,i don't answer every one of theirs1 ,i'll yield4 ,the loss of the excuse7#bej7 may hurt ,transubstantiation1 but not the ,trinity4 ,we need not strain our imaginations to conceive such little things4 ,bigger may do as well for infinitesimals1 since the integer must be an infinite4 ,evident yt wch has an infinite number of parts must be infinite4 ,qu4 ,whether extension be resoluble into points it does not consist of8 ,nor can it be objected that we reason about numbers1 wch are only words not ideas7#bea72 for these infinitesimals are words of no use1 if not supposed to stand for ideas4 ,axiom4 ,no reasoning about things whereof we have no idea4 ,therefore no reasoning about infinitesimals4 ,much less infinitesimals of infinitesimals1 c4 ,axiom4 ,no word to be used without an idea4 7,m#dbj7 ,our eyes and senses inform us not of the existence of matter or ideas existing without the mind7#beb74 ,they are not to be blam'd for the mistake4 ,i defy any man to assign a right line equal to a paraboloid1 but wn look'd at thro' a microscope they may appear unequall4 7,m#dba7 ,newton's harangue amounts to no more than that gravity is proportional to gravity4 ,one can't imagine an extended thing without colour4 ,v4 ,barrow1 ,l4 ,g4 7,m#dbb7 ,men allow colours1 sounds1 c47#bec7 not to exist without the mind1 tho' they have no demonstration they do not4 ,why may they not allow my ,principle with a demonstration8 7,m#dbc7 ,qu4 ,whether ,i had not better allow colours to exist without the mind2 taking the mind for the active thing wch ,i call 8,i10 8myself0--yt seems to be distinct from the understanding7#bed78 7,m#dbd7 ,the taking extension to be distinct from all other tangible visible qualities1 to make an idea by itself1 has made men take it to be without the mind4 ,i see no wit in any of them but ,newton4 ,the rest are meer triflers1 mere ,nihilarians4 ,the folly of the mathematicians in not judging of sensations by their senses4 ,reason was given us for nobler uses4 7,m#dbe7 ,keill's filling the world with a mite7#bee74 ,this follows from the divisibility of extension ad infinitum4 ,extension1 or length without breadth1 seems to be nothing save the number of points that lie betwixt any #b points7#bef74 ,it seems to consist in meer proportion--meer reference of the mind4 ,to what purpose is it to determine the forms of glasses geometrically8 ,sir ,isaac7#beg7 owns his book could have been demonstrated on the supposition of indivisibles4 7,m#dbf7 ,innumerable vessels of matter4 ,v4 ,cheyne4 ,i'll not admire the mathematicians4 ',tis wt any one of common sense might attain to by repeated acts4 ,i prove it by experience4 ,i am but one of human sense1 and ,i c4 ,mathematicians have some of them good parts--the more is the pity4 ,had they not been mathematicians they had been good for nothing4 ,they were such fools they knew not how to employ their parts4 ,the mathematicians could not so much as tell wherein truth certainty consisted1 till ,locke told 'em7#beh74 ,i see the best of 'em talk of light and colours as if wthout the mind4 ,by thing ,i either mean ideas or that wch has ideas7#bei74 ,nullum prclarum ingenium unquam fuit magnus mathematicus4 ,scaliger7#bfj74 ,a great genius cannot stoop to such trifles minutenesses as they consider4 #a4 7#bfa7;,all significant words stand for ideas7#bfb74 #b4 ,all knowledge about our ideas4 #c4 ,all ideas come from without or from within4 #d4 ,if from without it must be by the senses1 they are call'd sensations7#bfc74 #e4 ,if from within they are the operations of the mind1 are called thoughts4 #f4 ,no sensation can be in a senseless thing4 #g4 ,no thought can be in a thoughtless thing4 #h4 ,all our ideas are either sensations or thoughts7#bfd71 by #c1 #d1 #e4 #i4 ,none of our ideas can be in a thing wch is both thoughtless senseless7#bfe71 by #f1 #g1 #h4 #aj4 ,the bare passive recognition or having of ideas is called perception4 #aa4 ,whatever has in it an idea1 tho' it be never so passive1 tho' it exert no manner of act about it1 yet it must perceive4 #aj4 #ab4 ,all ideas either are simple ideas1 or made up of simple ideas4 #ac4 ,that thing wch is like unto another thing must agree wth it in one or more simple ideas4 #ad4 ,whatever is like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of the same sort1 or contain a simple idea of the same sort4 #ac4 #ae4 ,nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing4 #aa1 #ad4 ,another demonstration of the same thing4 #af4 ,two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been compar'd4 #ag4 ,comparing is the viewing two ideas together1 marking wt they agree in and wt they disagree in4 #ah4 ,the mind can compare nothing but its own ideas4 #ag4 #ai4 ,nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing4 #aa1 #af1 #ah4 ,n4 ,b4 ,other arguments innumerable1 both a priori a posteriori1 drawn from all the sciences1 from the clearest1 plainest1 most obvious truths1 whereby to demonstrate the ,principle1 i4e4 that neither our ideas1 nor anything like our ideas1 can possibly be in an unperceiving thing7#bff74 ,n4 ,b4 ,not one argument of any kind wtsoever1 certain or probable1 a priori or a posteriori1 from any art or science1 from either sense or reason1 against it4 ,mathematicians have no right idea of angles4 ,hence angles of contact wrongly apply'd to prove extension divisible ad infinitum4 ,we have got the ,algebra of pure intelligences4 ,we can prove ,newton's propositions more accurately1 more easily1 upon truer principles than himself7#bfg74 ,barrow owns the downfall of geometry4 ,however ,i'll endeavour to rescue it--so far as it is useful1 or real1 or imaginable1 or intelligible4 ,but for the nothings1 ,i'll leave them to their admirers4 ,i'll teach any one the whole course of mathematiques in #a_/ajj part the time that another will4 ,much banter got from the prefaces of the mathematicians4 7,m#dbg7 ,newton says colour is in the subtil matter4 ,hence ,malbranch proves nothing1 or is mistaken1 in asserting there is onely figure motion4 ,i can square the circle1 c42 they cannot4 ,wch goes on the best principles8 ,the ,billys7#bfh7 use a finite visible line for an #a_/m4 7,m#dbh7 ,marsilius ,ficinus--his appearing the moment he died solv'd by my idea of time7#bfi74 7,m#dbi7 ,the philosophers lose their abstract or unperceived ,matter4 ,the mathematicians lose their insensible sensations4 ,the profane lose their extended ,deity4 ,pray wt do the rest of mankind lose8 ,as for bodies1 c41 we have them still7#bgj74 ,n4 ,b4 ,the future nat4 philosoph4 mathem4 get vastly by the bargain7#bga74 7,m#dcj7 ,there are men who say there are insensible extensions4 ,there are others who say the wall is not white1 the fire is not hot1 c4 ,we ,irishmen cannot attain to these truths4 ,the mathematicians think there are insensible lines4 ,about these they harangue3 these cut in a point at all angles3 these are divisible ad infinitum4 ,we ,irishmen can conceive no such lines4 ,the mathematicians talk of wt they call a point4 ,this1 they say1 is not altogether nothing1 nor is it downright something4 ,now we ,irishmen are apt to think something7#bgb7 nothing are next neighbours4 ,engagements to ,p47#bgc7 on account of ye ,treatise that grew up under his eye2 on account also of his approving my harangue4 ,glorious for ,p4 to be the protector of usefull tho' newly discover'd truths4 ,how could ,i venture thoughts into the world before ,i knew they would be of use to the world8 and how could ,i know that till ,i had try'd how they suited other men's ideas8 ,i publish not this so much for anything else as to know whether other men have the same ideas as we ,irishmen4 ,this is my end1 not to be inform'd as to my own particular4 ,my speculations have the same effect as visiting foreign countries3 in the end ,i return where ,i was before1 but my heart at ease1 and enjoying life with new satisfaction4 ,passing through all the sciences1 though false for the most part1 yet it gives us the better insight and greater knowledge of the truth4 ,he that would bring another over to his opinion1 must seem to harmonize with him at first1 and humour him in his own way of talking7#bgd74 ,from my childhood ,i had an unaccountable turn of thought that way4 ,it doth not argue a dwarf to have greater strength than a giant1 because he can throw off the molehill which is upon him1 while the other struggles beneath a mountain4 ,the whole directed to practise and morality--as appears #ast1 from making manifest the nearness and omnipresence of ,god2 #b;dly1 from cutting off the useless labour of sciences1 and so forth4 ,,an ,,essay ,,towards ,a ,,new ,,theory ,,of ,,vision ,first published in #agji ,editor's ,preface ,to ,the ,essay ,towards ,a ,new ,theory ,of ,vision ,berkeley's ,essay towards a ,new ,theory of ,vision was meant to prepare the way for the exposition and defence of the new theory of the material world1 its natural order1 and its relation to ,spirit1 that is contained in his book of ,principles and in the relative ,dialogues1 which speedily followed4 ,the ,essay was the firstfruits of his early philosophical studies at ,dublin4 ,it was also the first attempt to show that our apparently immediate ,vision of ,space and of bodies extended in three-dimensioned space1 is either tacit or conscious inference1 occasioned by constant association of the phenomena of which alone we are visually percipient with assumed realities of our tactual and locomotive experience4 ,the first edition of the ,essay appeared early in #agji1 when its author was about twenty-four years of age4 ,a second edition1 with a few verbal changes and an ,appendix1 followed before the end of that year4 ,both were issued in ,dublin1 8printed by ,aaron ,rhames1 at the back of ,dick's ,coffeehouse1 for ,jeremy ,pepyat1 bookseller in ,skinner ,row40 ,in ,march1 #agcb1 a third edition1 without the ,appendix1 was annexed to ,alciphron1 on account of its relation to the ,fourth ,dialogue in that book4 ,this was the author's last revision4 ,in the present edition the text of this last edition is adopted1 after collation with those preceding4 ,the ,appendix has been restored1 and also the ,dedication to ,sir ,john ,percival1 which appeared only in the first edition4 ,a due appreciation of ,berkeley's theory of seeing1 and his conception of the visible world1 involves a study1 not merely of this tentative juvenile ,essay1 but also of its fuller development and application in his more matured works4 ,this has been commonly forgotten by his critics4 ,various circumstances contribute to perplex and even repel the reader of the ,essay1 making it less fit to be an easy avenue of approach to ,berkeley's ,principles4 ,its occasion and design1 and its connexion with his spiritual conception of the material world1 are suggested in ,sections #dc and #dd of the ,principles4 ,those sections are a key to the ,essay4 ,they inform us that in the ,essay the author intentionally uses language which seems to attribute a reality independent of all percipient spirit to the ideas or phenomena presented in ,touch2 it being beside his purpose1 he says1 to 8examine and refute0 that 8vulgar error0 in 8a work on ,vision40 ,this studied reticence of a verbally paradoxical conception of ,matter1 in reasonings about vision which are fully intelligible only under that conception1 is one cause of a want of philosophical lucidity in the ,essay4 ,another circumstance adds to the embarrassment of those who approach the ,principles and the three ,dialogues through the ,essay on ,vision4 ,the ,essay offers no exception to the lax employment of equivocal words familiar in the early literature of ,english philosophy1 but which is particularly inconvenient in the subtle discussions to which we are here introduced4 ,at the present day we are perhaps accustomed to more precision and uniformity in the philosophical use of language2 at any rate we connect other meanings than those here intended with some of the leading words4 ,it is enough to refer to such terms as idea1 notion1 sensation1 perception1 touch1 externality1 distance1 and their conjugates4 ,it is difficult for the modern reader to revive and remember the meanings which ,berkeley intends by idea and notion--so significant in his vocabulary2 and touch with him connotes muscular and locomotive experience as well as the pure sense of contact4 ,interchange of the terms outward1 outness1 externality1 without the mind1 and without the eye is confusing1 if we forget that ,berkeley implies that percipient mind is virtually coextensive with our bodily organism1 so that being 8without0 or 8at a distance from0 our bodies is being at a distance from the percipient mind4 ,i have tried in the annotations to relieve some of these ambiguities1 of which ,berkeley himself warns us 7cf4 sect4 #abj74 ,the ,essay moreover abounds in repetitions1 and interpolations of antiquated optics and physiology1 so that its logical structure and even its supreme generalisation are not easily apprehended4 ,i will try to disentangle them4 ,the reader must remember that this ,essay on ,vision is professedly an introspective appeal to human consciousness4 ,it is an analysis of what human beings are conscious of when they see1 the results being here and there applied1 partly by way of verification1 to solve some famous optical or physiological puzzle4 ,the aim is to present the facts1 the whole facts1 and nothing but the facts of our internal visual experience1 as distinguished from supposed facts and empty abstractions1 which an irregular exercise of imagination1 or abuse of words1 had put in their place4 ,the investigation1 moreover1 is not concerned with ,space in its metaphysical infinity1 but with finite sections of ,space and their relations1 which concern the sciences1 physical and mathematical1 and with real or tangible ,distance1 ,magnitude1 and ,place1 in their relation to seeing4 ,from the second section onwards the ,essay naturally falls into six ,parts1 devoted successively to the proof of the six following theses regarding the relation of ,sight to finite spaces and to things extended3-- ,i4 7,sect4 #b-ea47 ,distance1 or outness from the eye in the line of vision1 is not seen3 it is only suggested to the mind by visible phenomena and by sensations felt in the eye1 all which are somehow its arbitrarily constituted and non-resembling ,signs4 ,,ii4 7,sect4 #eb-hg47 ,magnitude1 or the amount of space that objects of sense occupy1 is really invisible3 we only see a greater or less quantity of colour1 and colour depends upon percipient mind3 our supposed visual perceptions of real magnitude are only our own interpretations of the tactual meaning of the colours we see1 and of sensations felt in the eye1 which are its ,signs4 ,,iii4 7,sect4 #hh-abj47 ,situation of objects of sense1 or their real relation to one another in ambient space1 is invisible3 what we see is variety in the relations of colours to one another3 our supposed vision of real tangible locality is only our interpretation of its visual non-resembling ,signs4 ,,iv4 7,sect4 #aba-df47 ,there is no object that is presented in common to ,sight and ,touch3 space or extension1 which has the best claim to be their common object1 is specifically as well as numerically different in ,sight and in ,touch4 ,v4 7,sect4 #adg-dh47 ,the explanation of the tactual significance of the visible and visual ,signs1 upon which human experience proceeds1 is offered in the ,theory that all visible phenomena are arbitrary signs in what is virtually the ,language of ,nature1 addressed by ,god to the senses and intelligence of ,man4 ,,vi4 7,sect4 #adi-fj47 ,the true object studied in ,geometry is the kind of ,extension given in ,touch1 not that given in ,sight3 real ,extension in all its phases is tangible1 not visible3 colour is the only immediate object of ,sight1 and colour being mind-dependent sensation1 cannot be realised without percipient mind4 ,these concluding sections are supplementary to the main argument4 ,the fact that distance or outness is invisible is sometimes regarded as ,berkeley's contribution to the theory of seeing4 ,it is rather the assumption on which the ,essay proceeds 7sect4 #b74 ,the ,essay does not prove this invisibility1 but seeks to shew how1 notwithstanding1 we learn to find outness through seeing4 ,that the relation between the visual signs of outness1 on the one hand1 and the real distance which they signify1 on the other1 is in all cases arbitrary1 and discovered through experience1 is the burden of sect4 #b-dj4 ,the previously recognised signs of 8considerably remote0 distances1 are mentioned 7sect4 #c74 ,but near distance was supposed to be inferred by a visual geometry--and to be 8suggested10 not signified by arbitrary signs4 ,the determination of the visual signs which suggest outness1 near and remote1 is ,berkeley's professed discovery regarding vision4 ,an induction of the visual signs which 8suggest0 distance1 is followed 7sect4 #dc7 by an assertion of the wholly sensuous reality of colour1 which is acknowledged to be the only immediate object of sight4 ,hence visible extension1 consisting in colour1 must be dependent for its realisation upon sentient or percipient mind4 ,it is then argued 7sect4 #dd7 that this mind-dependent visible outness has no resemblance to the tangible reality 7sect4 #de74 ,this is the first passage in the ,essay in which ,touch and its data are formally brought into view4 ,tactual or locomotive experience1 it is implied1 is needed to infuse true reality into our conceptions of distance or outness4 ,this cannot be got from seeing any more than from hearing1 or tasting1 or smelling4 ,it is as impossible to see and touch the same object as it is to hear and touch the same object4 ,visible objects and ocular sensations can only be ideal signs of real things4 ,the sections in which ,touch is thus introduced are among the most important in the ,essay4 ,they represent the outness given in hearing as wholly sensuous1 ideal1 or mind-dependent3 they recognise as more truly real that got by contact and locomotion4 ,but if this is all that man can see1 it follows that his visible world1 at any rate1 becomes real only in and through percipient mind4 ,the problem of an ,essay on ,vision is thus1 to explain how the visible world of extended colour can inform us of tangible realities1 which it does not in the least resemble1 and with which it has no necessary connexion4 ,that visible phenomena1 or else certain organic sensations involved in seeing 7sect4 #c1 #af1 #ba1 #bg71 gradually suggest the real or tangible outness with which they are connected in the divinely constituted system of nature1 is the explanation which now begins to dawn upon us4 ,here an ambiguity in the ,essay appears4 ,it concludes that the visible world cannot be real without percipient realising mind1 i4e4 not otherwise than ideally3 yet the argument seems to take for granted that we are percipient of a tangible world that is independent of percipient realising mind4 ,the reader is apt to say that the tangible world must be as dependent on percipient mind for its reality as the visible world is concluded to be1 and for the same reason4 ,this difficulty was soon afterwards encountered in the book of ,principles1 where the worlds of sight and touch are put on the same level2 and the possibility of unperceived reality in both cases is denied2 on the ground that a material world cannot be realised in the total absence of ,spirit--human and divine4 ,the term 8external0 may still be applied to tactual and locomotive phenomena alone1 if men choose2 but this not because of the ideal character of what is seen1 and the unideal reality of what is touched1 but only because tactual perceptions are found to be more firm and steady than visual4 ,berkeley preferred in this way to insinuate his new conception of the material world by degrees1 at the risk of exposing this juvenile and tentative ,essay on ,vision to a charge of incoherence4 ,the way in which visual ideas or phenomena 8suggest0 the outness or distance of things from the organ of sight having been thus explained1 in what ,i call the ,first ,part of the ,essay1 the ,second and ,third ,parts 7sect4 #eb-abj7 argue for the invisibility of real extension in two other relations1 viz4 magnitude and locality or situation4 ,an induction of the visual signs of tangible size and situation is given in those sections4 ,the result is applied to solve two problems then notable in optics1 viz4 7#a7 the reason for the greater visible size of the horizontal moon than of the moon in its meridian 7sect4 #fg-hg72 and 7#b7 the fact that objects are placed erect in vision only on condition that their images on the retina are inverted 7sect4 #hh-abj74 ,here the antithesis between the ideal world of coloured extension1 and the real world of resistant extension is pressed with vigour4 ,the 8high0 and 8low0 of the visible world is not the 8high0 and 8low0 of the tangible world 7sect4 #ia-ajf74 ,there is no resemblance and no necessary relation1 between those two so-called extensions2 not even when the number of visible objects happen to coincide with the number of tangible objects of which they are the visual signs1 e4g4 the visible and tangible fingers on the hand3 for the born-blind1 on first receiving sight1 could not parcel out the visible phenomena in correspondence with the tangible4 ,the next ,part of the ,essay 7sect4 #aba-de7 argues for a specific as well as a numerical difference between the original data of sight and the data of touch and locomotion4 ,sight and touch perceive nothing in common4 ,extension in its various relations differs in sight from extension in touch4 ,coloured extension1 which alone is visible1 is found to be different in kind from resistant extension1 which alone is tangible4 ,and if actually perceived or concrete extensions differ thus1 the question is determined4 ,for all extension with which man can be concerned must be concrete 7sect4 #bc74 ,extension in the abstract is meaningless 7sect4 #abd-be74 ,what remains is to marshal the scattered evidence1 and to guard the foregoing conclusions against objections4 ,this is attempted in sections #abh-df4 ,the enunciation of the summary generalisation1 which forms the 8,new ,theory of ,vision0 7sect4 #adg-h71 may be taken as the ,fifth and culminating ,part of the ,essay4 ,the closing sections 7#adi-fj71 as ,i have said1 are supplementary1 and profess to determine the sort of extension--visible or tangible--with which ,geometry is concerned4 ,in concluding that it is tangible1 he tries to picture the mental state of ,idominians1 or unbodied spirits1 endowed with visual perceptions only1 and asks what their conception of outness and solid extension must be4 ,here further refinements in the interpretation of visual perception1 and its organic conditions1 which have not escaped the attention of latter psychologists and biologists1 are hinted at4 ,whether the data of sight consist of non-resembling arbitrary ,signs of the tactual distances1 sizes1 and situations of things1 is a question which some might prefer to deal with experimentally--by trial of the experience of persons in circumstances fitted to supply an answer4 ,of this sort would be the experience of the born-blind1 immediately after their sight has been restored2 the conception of extension and its relations found in persons who continue from birth unable to see2 the experience 7if it could be got7 of persons always destitute of all tactual and locomotive perceptions1 but familiar with vision2 and the facts of seeing observed in infants of the human species1 and in the lower animals4 ,berkeley did not try to verify his conclusions in this way4 ,here and there 7sect4 #da1 #db1 #gi1 #ib-ii1 #ajc1 #ajf1 #aaj1 #abh1 #acb-cg71 he conjectures what the first visual experience of those rescued from born-blindness is likely to be2 he also speculates1 as we have seen1 about the experience of unbodied spirits supposed to be able to see1 but unable to touch or move 7sect4 #aec-ei72 and in the ,appendix he refers1 in confirmation of his ,new ,theory1 to a reported case of one born blind who had obtained sight4 ,but he forms his ,theory independently of those delicate and difficult investigations4 ,his testing facts were sought introspectively4 ,indeed those physiologists and mental philosophers who have since tried to determine what vision in its purity is1 by cases either of communicated sight or of continued born-blindness1 have illustrated the truth of ,diderot's remark--8prparer et interroger un aveugle-n n'et point t une occupation indigne des talens runis de ,newton1 ,des ,cartes1 ,locke1 et ,leibniz7#bge740 ,berkeley's ,new ,theory has been quoted as a signal example of discovery in metaphysics4 ,the subtle analysis which distinguishes seeing strictly so called1 from judgments about extended things1 suggested by what we see1 appears to have been imperfectly known to the ancient philosophers4 ,aristotle1 indeed1 speaks of colour as the only proper object of sight2 but1 in passages of the ,de ,anima7#bgf7 where he names properties peculiar to particular senses1 he enumerates others1 such as motion1 figure1 and magnitude1 which belong to all the senses in common4 ,his distinction of ,proper and ,common ,sensibles appears at first to contradict ,berkeley's doctrine of the heterogeneity of the ideal visible and the real tangible worlds4 ,aristotle1 however1 seems to question the immediate perceptibility of ,common ,sensibles1 and to regard them as realised through the activity of intelligence7#bgg74 ,some writers in ,optics1 in mediaeval times1 and in early modern philosophy1 advanced beyond ,aristotle1 in explaining the relation of our matured notion of distance to what we originally perceive in seeing1 and in the fifteenth century it was discovered by ,maurolyco that the rays of light from the object converge to a focus in the eye2 but ,i have not been able to trace even the germ of the ,new ,theory in these speculations4 ,excepting some hints by ,descartes1 ,malebranche was among the first dimly to anticipate ,berkeley1 in resolving our supposed power of seeing outness into an interpretation of visual signs which we learn by experience to understand4 ,the most important part of ,malebranche's account of seeing is contained in the ,recherche de la ,vrit 7,liv4 ,i4 ch4 #i71 in one of those chapters in which he discusses the frequent fallaciousness of the senses1 and in particular of our visual perceptions of extension4 ,he accounts for their inevitable uncertainty by assigning them not to sense but to misinterpretation of what is seen4 ,he also enumerates various visual signs of distance4 ,that the ,recherche of ,malebranche1 published more than thirty years before the ,essay1 was familiar to ,berkeley before the publication of his ,new ,theory1 is proved by internal evidence1 and by his juvenile ,commonplace ,book4 ,i am not able to discover signs of a similar connexion between the ,new ,theory and the chapter on the mystery of sensation in ,glanvill's ,scepsis ,scientifica 7ch4 #e71 published some years before the ,recherche of ,malebranche1 where ,glanvill refers to 8a secret deduction10 through which--from motions1 c41 of which we are immediately percipient--we 8spell out0 figures1 distances1 magnitudes1 and colours1 which have no resemblance to them4 ,an approach to the ,new ,theory is found in a passage which first appeared in the second edition of ,locke's ,essay1 published in #afid1 to which ,berkeley refers in his own ,essay 7sect4 #acb-ce71 and which1 on account of its relative importance1 ,i shall here transcribe at length3-- 8,we are further to consider concerning ,perception that the ideas we receive by sensation are often1 in grown people1 altered by the judgment1 without our taking notice of it4 ,when we set before our eyes a round globe of any uniform colour1 e4g4 gold1 alabaster1 or jet1 it is certain that the idea thereby imprinted in our mind is of a flat circle1 variously shadowed1 with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes4 ,but1 we having by use been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us1 what alterations are made in the reflection of light by the difference in the sensible figures of bodies--the judgment presently1 by an habitual custom1 alters the appearances into their causes2 so that1 from that which is truly variety of shadow or colour1 collecting the figure1 it makes it pass for a mark of figure1 and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure and an uniform colour1 when the idea we receive from them is only a plane variously coloured1 as is evident in painting4 8,to which purpose ,i shall here insert a problem of that very ingenious and studious promoter of real knowledge1 the learned and worthy ,mr4 ,molyneux1 which he was pleased to send me in a letter some months since1 and it is this3--,suppose a man born blind1 and now adult1 and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal1 and nighly of the same bigness1 so as to tell1 when he felt the one and the other1 which is the cube and which the sphere4 ,suppose then the cube and the sphere placed on a table1 and the blind man be made to see3 quere1 whether1 by his sight1 before he touched them1 he could not distinguish and tell1 which is the globe and which the cube8 ,to which the acute and judicious proposer answers3 #8,not4' ,for1 though he has obtained the experience of how a globe1 how a cube affects his touch2 yet he has not obtained the experience that what affects his touch so and so1 must affect his sight so and so2 so that a protuberant angle in the cube1 that pressed his hand unequally1 shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube4--,i agree with this thinking gentleman1 whom ,i am proud to call my friend1 in his answer to this his problem1 and am of opinion that the blind man1 at first sight1 would not be able to say with certainty which was the globe and which the cube1 whilst he only saw them2 though he would unerringly name them by his touch1 and certainly distinguish them by the difference in their figures felt4 8,this ,i have set down1 and leave with my reader1 as an occasion for him to consider how much he may be beholden to experience1 improvement1 and acquired notions1 where he thinks he had not the least use of1 or help from them3 and the rather because this observing gentleman further adds that1 having1 upon the occasion of my book1 proposed this problem to divers very ingenious men1 he hardly ever met with one that at first gave the answer to it which he thinks true1 till by hearing his reasons they were convinced4 8,but this is not ,i think usual in any of our ideas but those received by sight3 because sight1 the most comprehensive of the senses1 conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours1 which are peculiar only to that sense2 and also the far different ideas of space1 figure1 and motion1 the several varieties of which change the appearance of its proper object1 i4e4 light and colours2 we bring ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other4 ,this1 in many cases1 by a settled habit1 in things whereof we have frequent experience1 is performed so constantly and so quick1 that we take that for the perception of our sensation1 which is an idea formed by our judgment2 so that one1 i4e4 that of sensation1 serves only to excite the other1 and is scarce taken notice of itself2 as a man who reads or hears with attention and understanding takes little notice of the character or sounds1 but of the ideas that are excited in him by them4 8,nor need we wonder that this is done with so little notice1 if we consider how very quick the actions of the mind are performed2 for1 as itself is thought to take up no space1 to have no extension1 so its actions seem to require no time1 but many of them seem to be crowded into an instant4 ,i speak this in comparison of the actions of the body4444 ,secondly1 we shall not be much surprised that this is done with us in so little notice1 if we consider how the facility we get of doing things1 by a custom of doing1 makes them often pass in us without notice4 ,habits1 especially such as are begun very early1 come at last to produce actions in us which often escape our observation4444 ,and therefore it is not so strange that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation into that of its judgment1 and make the one serve only to excite the other1 without our taking notice of it40 7,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 ,book ,,ii4 ch4 #i4 #h47 ,this remarkable passage anticipates by implication the view of an interpretation of materials originally given in the visual sense1 which1 under the name of 8suggestion10 is the ruling factor in the ,new ,theory of ,vision4 ,the following sentences relative to the invisibility of distances1 contained in the ,treatise of ,dioptrics 7published in #afij7 of ,locke's friend and correspondent ,william ,molyneux1 whose son was ,berkeley's pupil1 illustrate ,locke's statements1 and may be compared with the opening sections of the ,essay on ,vision3-- 8,in plain vision the estimate we make of the distance of objects 7especially when so far removed that the interval between our two eyes bears no sensible proportion thereto1 or when looked upon with one eye only7 is rather the act of our judgment than of sense2 and acquired by exercise1 and a faculty of comparing1 rather than natural4 ,for1 distance of itself is not to be perceived2 for1 'tis a line 7or a length7 presented to our eye with its end toward us1 which must therefore be only a point1 and that is invisible4 ,wherefore distance is chiefly perceived by means of interjacent bodies1 as by the earth1 mountains1 hills1 fields1 trees1 houses1 c4 ,or by the estimate we make of the comparative magnitude of bodies1 or of their faint colours1 c4 ,these ,i say are the chief means of apprehending the distance of objects that are considerably remote4 ,but as to nigh objects--to whose distance the interval of the eyes bears a sensible proportion--their distance is perceived by the turn of the eyes1 or by the angle of the optic axes 7,gregorii ,opt4 ,promot4 prop4 #bh74 ,this was the opinion of the ancients1 ,alhazen1 ,vitellio1 c4 ,and though the ingenious ,jesuit ,tacquet 7,opt4 ,lib4 ,i4 prop4 #b7 disapprove thereof1 and objects against it a new notion of ,gassendus 7of a man's seeing only with one eye at a time one and the same object71 yet this notion of ,gassendus being absolutely false 7as ,i could demonstrate were it not beside my present purpose71 it makes nothing against this opinion4 8,wherefore1 distance being only a line and not of itself perceivable1 if an object were conveyed to the eye by one single ray only1 there were no other means of judging of its distance but by some of those hinted before4 ,therefore when we estimate the distance of nigh objects1 either we take the help of both eyes2 or else we consider the pupil of one eye as having breadth1 and receiving a parcel of rays from each radiating point4 ,and1 according to the various inclinations of the rays from one point on the various parts of the pupil1 we make our estimate of the distance of the object4 ,and therefore 7as is said before71 by one single eye we can only judge of the distance of such objects to whose distance the breadth of the pupil has a sensible proportion4444 ,for1 it is observed before 7prop4 #bi1 sec4 #b1 see also ,gregorii ,opt4 ,promot4 prop4 #bi7 that for viewing objects remote and nigh1 there are requisite various conformations of the eye--the rays from nigh objects that fall on the eye diverging more than those from more remote objects40 7,treatise of ,dioptrics1 ,part ,i4 prop4 #ca47 ,all this helps to shew the state of science regarding vision about the time ,berkeley's ,essay appeared1 especially among those with whose works he was familiar7#bgh74 ,i shall next refer to illustrations of the change which the ,essay produced4 ,the ,new ,theory has occasioned some interesting criticism since its appearance in #agji4 ,at first it drew little attention4 ,for twenty years after its publication the allusions to it were few4 ,the account of ,cheselden's experiment upon one born blind1 published in #agbh1 in the ,philosophical ,transactions1 which seemed to bring the ,theory to the test of scientific experiment1 recalled attention to ,berkeley's reasonings4 ,the state of religious thought about the same time confirmed the tendency to discuss a doctrine which represented human vision as interpretation of a natural yet divine language1 thus suggesting ,omnipresent ,mind4 ,occasional discussions of the ,new ,theory may be found in the ,gentleman's ,magazine1 from #agcb till ,berkeley's death in #agec4 ,some criticisms may also be found in ,smith's ,optics1 published in #agch4 ,essential parts of ,berkeley's analysis are explained by ,voltaire1 in his lmens de la ,philosophie de ,newton4 ,the following from that work is here given on its own account1 and also as a prominent recognition of the new doctrine in ,france1 within thirty years from its first promulgation3-- 8,il faut absolument conclure de tout ceci1 que les distances1 les grandeurs1 les situations1 ne sont pas1 proprement parler1 des choses visibles1 c'est--dire1 ne sont pas les objets propres et immdiats de la vue4 ,l'objet propre et immdiat de la vue n'est autre chose que la lumire colore3 tout le reste1 nous ne le sentons qu' la longue et par exprience4 ,nous apprenons voir prcisment comme nous apprenons parler et lire4 ,la diffrence est1 que l'art de voir est plus facile1 et que la nature est galement tous notre matre4 8,les jugements soudains1 presque uniformes1 que toutes nos mes1 un certain ge1 portent des distances1 des grandeurs1 des situations1 nous font penser qu'il n'y a qu' ouvrir les yeux pour voir la manire dont nous voyons4 ,on se trompe2 il y faut le secours des autres sens4 ,si les hommes n'avaient que le sens de la vue1 ils n'auraient aucun moyen pour connatre l'tendue en longueur1 largeur et profondeur2 et un pur esprit ne la connatrait pas peuttre1 moins que ,dieu ne la lui rvlt4 ,il est trs difficile de sparer dans notre entendement l'extension d'un objet d'avec les couleurs de cet objet4 ,nous ne voyons jamais rien que d'tendu1 et de l nous sommes tous ports croire que nous voyons en effet l'tendue40 7lmens de la ,philos4 de ,newton1 ,seconde ,partie1 ch4 #g47 ,condillac1 in his ,essais sur l',origine des ,connaissances ,humaines 7,part ,i4 sect4 #f71 published in #agdf1 combats ,berkeley's ,new ,theory1 and maintains that an extension exterior to the eye is immediately discernible by sight2 the eye being naturally capable of judging at once of figures1 magnitudes1 situations1 and distances4 ,his reasonings in support of this 8prejudice10 as he afterwards allowed it to be1 may be found in the section entitled 8,de quelques jugemens qu'on a attribus l'me sans fondement1 ou solution d'un problme de mtaphysique40 ,here ,locke1 ,molyneux1 ,berkeley1 and ,voltaire are criticised1 and ,cheselden's experiment is referred to4 ,condillac's subsequent recantation is contained in his ,trait des ,sensations1 published in #aged1 and in his ,l',art de ,penser4 ,in the ,trait des ,sensations 7,troisime ,partie1 ch4 #c1 #d1 #e1 #f1 #g1 #h1 c47 the whole question is discussed at length1 and ,condillac vindicates what he allows must appear a marvellous paradox to the uninitiated--that we only gradually learn to see1 hear1 smell1 taste1 and touch4 ,he argues in particular that the eye cannot originally perceive an extension that is beyond itself1 and that perception of trinal space is due to what we experience in touch4 ,voltaire and ,condillac gave currency to the ,new ,theory in ,france1 and it soon became a commonplace with ,d',alembert1 ,diderot1 ,buffon1 and other ,french philosophers4 ,in ,germany we have allusions to it in the ,berlin ,memoirs and elsewhere2 but1 although known by name1 if not in its distinctive principle and latent idealism1 it has not obtained the consideration which its author's developed theory of the material as well as the visible world has received4 ,the ,kantian a priori criticism of our cognition of ,space1 and of our mathematical notions1 subsequently indisposed the ,german mind to the a posteriori reasoning of ,berkeley's ,essay4 ,its influence is apparent in ,british philosophy4 ,the following passages in ,hartley's ,observations on ,man1 published in #agdi1 illustrate the extent to which some of the distinctive parts of the new doctrine were at that time received by an eminent ,english psychologist3-- 8,distance is judged of by the quantity of motion1 and figure by the relative quantity of distance4444 ,and1 as the sense of sight is much more extensive and expedite than feeling1 we judge of tangible qualities chiefly by sight1 which therefore may be considered1 agreeably to ,bishop ,berkeley's remark1 as a philosophical language for the ideas of feeling2 being1 for the most part1 an adequate representative of them1 and a language common to all mankind1 and in which they all agree very nearly1 after a moderate degree of experience4 8,however1 if the informations from touch and sight disagree at any time1 we are always to depend upon touch1 as that which1 according to the usual ways of speaking upon these subjects1 is the true representation of the essential properties1 i4e4 as the earnest and presage of what other tangible impressions the body under consideration will make upon our feeling in other circumstances2 also what changes it will produce in other bodies2 of which again we are to determine by our feeling1 if the visual language should not happen to correspond to it exactly4 ,and it is from this difference that we call the touch the reality1 light the representative--also that a person born blind may foretell with certainty1 from his present tangible impressions1 what others would follow upon varying the circumstances2 whereas1 if we could suppose a person to be born without feeling1 and to arrive at man's estate1 he could not1 from his present visible impressions1 judge what others would follow upon varying the circumstances4 ,thus the picture of a knife1 drawn so well as to deceive his eye1 would not1 when applied to another body1 produce the same change of visible impressions as a real knife does1 when it separates the parts of the body through which it passes4 ,but the touch is not liable to these deceptions4 ,as it is therefore the fundamental source of information in respect of the essential properties of matter1 it may be considered as our first and principal key to the knowledge of the external world40 7,prop4 #cj47 ,in other parts of ,hartley's book 7e4g4 ,prop4 #eh7 the relation of our visual judgments of magnitude1 figure1 motion1 distance1 and position to the laws of association is explained1 and the associating circumstances by which these judgments are formed are enumerated in detail4 ,dr4 ,porterfield of ,edinburgh1 in his ,treatise on the ,eye1 or the ,manner and ,phenomena of ,vision 7,edinburgh1 #agei71 is an exception to the consent which the doctrine had then widely secured4 ,he maintains1 in opposition to ,berkeley1 that 8the judgments we form of the situation and distance of visible objects1 depend not on custom and experience1 but on original instinct1 to which mind is subject in our embodied state7#bgi740 ,berkeley's ,theory of ,vision1 in so far as it resolves our visual perceptions of distance into interpretation of arbitrary signs1 received the qualified approbation of ,reid1 in his ,inquiry into the ,human ,mind on the ,principles of ,common ,sense 7#agfd74 ,he criticises it in the ,inquiry1 where the doctrine of visual signs1 of which ,berkeley's whole philosophy is a development1 is accepted1 and to some extent applied4 ,with ,reid it is divorced1 however1 from the ,berkeleian conception of the material world1 although the ,theory of ,vision was the seminal principle of ,berkeley's ,theory of ,matter7#bhj74 ,this ,theory of ,matter was imperfectly conceived and then rejected by ,reid and his followers1 while the ,new ,theory of ,vision obtained the general consent of the ,scottish metaphysicians4 ,adam ,smith refers to it in his ,essays 7published in #agie7 as 8one of the finest examples of philosophical analysis that is to be found either in our own or in any other language40 ,dugald ,stewart characterises it in his ,elements as 8one of the most beautiful1 and at the same time one of the most important theories of modern philosophy40 8,the solid additions10 he afterwards remarks in his ,dissertation1 8made by ,berkeley to the stock of human knowledge1 were important and brilliant4 ,among these the first place is unquestionably due to his ,new ,theory of ,vision1 a work abounding with ideas so different from those commonly received1 and at the same time so profound and refined1 that it was regarded by all but a few accustomed to deep metaphysical reflection1 rather in the light of a philosophical romance than of a sober inquiry after truth4 ,such1 however1 has since been the progress and diffusion of this sort of knowledge1 that the leading and most abstracted doctrines contained in it form now an essential part of every elementary treatise on optics1 and are adopted by the most superficial smatterers in science as fundamental articles of their faith40 ,the ,new ,theory is accepted by ,thomas ,brown1 who proposes 7,lectures1 #bi7 to extend the scope of its reasonings4 ,with regard to perceptions of sight1 ,young1 in his ,lectures on ,intellectual ,philosophy 7p4 #ajb71 says that 8it has been universally admitted1 at least since the days of ,berkeley1 that many of those which appear to us at present to be instantaneous and primitive1 can yet be shewn to be acquired2 that most of the adult perceptions of sight are founded on the previous information of touch2 that colour can give us no conception originally of those qualities of bodies which produce it in us2 and that primary vision gives us no notion of distance1 and1 as ,i believe1 no notion of magnitude40 ,sir ,james ,mackintosh1 in his ,dissertation1 characterises the ,new ,theory of ,vision as 8a great discovery in ,mental ,philosophy40 8,nothing in the compass of inductive reasoning10 remarks ,sir ,william ,hamilton 7,reid's ,works1 p4 #ahb1 note71 8appears more satisfactory than ,berkeley's demonstration of the necessity and manner of our learning1 by a slow process of observation and comparison alone1 the connexion between the perceptions of vision and touch1 and1 in general1 all that relates to the distance and magnitude of external things7#bha740 ,the ,new ,theory of ,vision has in short been generally accepted1 so far as it was understood1 alike by the followers of ,hartley and by the associates and successors of ,reid4 ,among ,british psychologists1 it has recommended itself to rationalists and sensationalists1 to the advocates of innate principles1 and to those who would explain by accidental association what their opponents attribute to reason originally latent in man4 ,but this wide conscious assent is ,i think chiefly confined to the proposition that distance is invisible1 and hardly reaches the deeper implicates of the theory1 on its extension to all the senses1 leading to a perception of the final unity of the natural and the supernatural1 and the ultimate spirituality of the universe7#bhb74 ,dedication ,,to ,,the ,,rt4 ,,hon4 ,,sir ,,john ,,percivale1 ,,bart47#bhc71 ,,one ,,of ,,her ,,majesty',s ,,most ,,honourable ,,privy ,,council ,,in ,,the ,,kingdom ,,of ,,ireland4 ,sir1 ,i could not1 without doing violence to myself1 forbear upon this occasion to give some public testimony of the great and well-grounded esteem ,i have conceived for you1 ever since ,i had the honour and happiness of your acquaintance4 ,the outward advantages of fortune1 and the early honours with which you are adorned1 together with the reputation you are known to have amongst the best and most considerable men1 may well imprint veneration and esteem on the minds of those who behold you from a distance4 ,but these are not the chief motives that inspire me with the respect ,i bear you4 ,a nearer approach has given me the view of something in your person infinitely beyond the external ornaments of honour and estate4 ,i mean1 an intrinsic stock of virtue and good sense1 a true concern for religion1 and disinterested love of your country4 ,add to these an uncommon proficiency in the best and most useful parts of knowledge2 together with 7what in my mind is a perfection of the first rank7 a surpassing goodness of nature4 ,all which ,i have collected1 not from the uncertain reports of fame1 but from my own experience4 ,within these few months that ,i have the honour to be known unto you1 the many delightful hours ,i have passed in your agreeable and improving conversation have afforded me the opportunity of discovering in you many excellent qualities1 which at once fill me with admiration and esteem4 ,that one at those years1 and in those circumstances of wealth and greatness1 should continue proof against the charms of luxury and those criminal pleasures so fashionable and predominant in the age we live in2 that he should preserve a sweet and modest behaviour1 free from that insolent and assuming air so familiar to those who are placed above the ordinary rank of men2 that he should manage a great fortune with that prudence and inspection1 and at the same time expend it with that generosity and nobleness of mind1 as to shew himself equally remote from a sordid parsimony and a lavish inconsiderate profusion of the good things he is intrusted with--this1 surely1 were admirable and praiseworthy4 ,but1 that he should1 moreover1 by an impartial exercise of his reason1 and constant perusal of the sacred ,scriptures1 endeavour to attain a right notion of the principles of natural and revealed religion2 that he should with the concern of a true patriot have the interest of the public at heart1 and omit no means of informing himself what may be prejudicial or advantageous to his country1 in order to prevent the one and promote the other2 in fine1 that1 by a constant application to the most severe and useful studies1 by a strict observation of the rules of honour and virtue1 by frequent and serious reflections on the mistaken measures of the world1 and the true end and happiness of mankind1 he should in all respects qualify himself bravely to run the race that is set before him1 to deserve the character of great and good in this life1 and be ever happy hereafter--this were amazing and almost incredible4 ,yet all this1 and more than this1 ,,sir1 might ,i justly say of you1 did either your modesty permit1 or your character stand in need of it4 ,i know it might deservedly be thought a vanity in me to imagine that anything coming from so obscure a hand as mine could add a lustre to your reputation4 ,but1 ,i am withal sensible how far ,i advance the interest of my own1 by laying hold on this opportunity to make it known that ,i am admitted into some degree of intimacy with a person of your exquisite judgment4 ,and1 with that view1 ,i have ventured to make you an address of this nature1 which the goodness ,i have ever experienced in you inclines me to hope will meet with a favourable reception at your hands4 ,though ,i must own ,i have your pardon to ask1 for touching on what may possibly be offensive to a virtue you are possessed of in a very distinguishing degree4 ,excuse me1 ,,sir1 if it was out of my power to mention the name of ,,sir ,,john ,,percivale without paying some tribute to that extraordinary and surprising merit whereof ,i have so clear and affecting an idea1 and which1 ,i am sure1 cannot be exposed in too full a light for the imitation of others1 ,of late ,i have been agreeably employed in considering the most noble1 pleasant1 and comprehensive of all the senses7#bhd74 ,the fruit of that 7labour shall ,i call it or7 diversion is what ,i now present you with1 in hopes it may give some entertainment to one who1 in the midst of business and vulgar enjoyments1 preserves a relish for the more refined pleasures of thought and reflexion4 ,my thoughts concerning ,vision have led me into some notions so far out of the common road7#bhe7 that it had been improper to address them to one of a narrow and contracted genius4 ,but1 you1 ,,sir1 being master of a large and free understanding1 raised above the power of those prejudices that enslave the far greater part of mankind1 may deservedly be thought a proper patron for an attempt of this kind4 ,add to this1 that you are no less disposed to forgive than qualified to discern whatever faults may occur in it4 ,nor do ,i think you defective in any one point necessary to form an exact judgment on the most abstract and difficult things1 so much as in a just confidence of your own abilities4 ,and1 in this one instance1 give me leave to say1 you shew a manifest weakness of judgment4 ,with relation to the following ,essay1 ,i shall only add that ,i beg your pardon for laying a trifle of that nature in your way1 at a time when you are engaged in the important affairs of the nation1 and desire you to think that ,i am1 with all sincerity and respect1 ,,sir1 ,your most faithful and most humble servant1 ,,george ,,berkeley4 ,an ,essay ,towards ,a ,new ,theory ,of ,vision #a4 ,my design is to shew the manner wherein we perceive by ,sight the ,distance1 ,magnitude1 and ,situation of objects3 also to consider the difference there is betwixt the ideas of ,sight and ,touch1 and whether there be any idea common to both senses7#bhf74 #b4 ,it is1 ,i think1 agreed by all that ,distance1 of itself and immediately1 cannot be seen7#bhg74 ,for1 distance7#bhh7 being a line directed endwise to the eye1 it projects only one point in the fund of the eye1 which point remains invariably the same1 whether the distance be longer or shorter7#bhi74 #c4 ,i find it also acknowledged that the estimate we make of the distance of objects considerably remote is rather an act of judgment grounded on experience than of sense4 ,for example1 when ,i perceive a great number of intermediate objects1 such as houses1 fields1 rivers1 and the like1 which ,i have experienced to take up a considerable space1 ,i thence form a judgment or conclusion1 that the object ,i see beyond them is at a great distance4 ,again1 when an object appears faint and small which at a near distance ,i have experienced to make a vigorous and large appearance1 ,i instantly conclude it to be far off7#bij74 ,and this1 it is evident1 is the result of experience2 without which1 from the faintness and littleness1 ,i should not have inferred anything concerning the distance of objects4 #d4 ,but1 when an object is placed at so near a distance as that the interval between the eyes bears any sensible proportion to it7#bia71 the opinion of speculative men is1 that the two optic axes 7the fancy that we see only with one eye at once being exploded71 concurring at the object1 do there make an angle1 by means of which1 according as it is greater or lesser1 the object is perceived to be nearer or farther off7#bib74 #e4 ,betwixt which and the foregoing manner of estimating distance there is this remarkable difference3--that1 whereas there was no apparent necessary connexion between small distance and a large and strong appearance1 or between great distance and a little and faint appearance1 there appears a very necessary connexion between an obtuse angle and near distance1 and an acute angle and farther distance4 ,it does not in the least depend upon experience1 but may be evidently known by any one before he had experienced it1 that the nearer the concurrence of the optic axes the greater the angle1 and the remoter their concurrence is1 the lesser will be the angle comprehended by them4 #f4 ,there is another way1 mentioned by optic writers1 whereby they will have us judge of those distances in respect of which the breadth of the pupil hath any sensible bigness4 ,and that is the greater or lesser divergency of the rays which1 issuing from the visible point1 do fall on the pupil--that point being judged nearest which is seen by most diverging rays1 and that remoter which is seen by less diverging rays1 and so on2 the apparent distance still increasing1 as the divergency of the rays decreases1 till at length it becomes infinite1 when the rays that fall on the pupil are to sense parallel4 ,and after this manner it is said we perceive distance when we look only with one eye4 #g4 ,in this case also it is plain we are not beholden to experience3 it being a certain necessary truth that1 the nearer the direct rays falling on the eye approach to a parallelism1 the farther off is the point of their intersection1 or the visible point from whence they flow4 #h4 7#bic7,now1 though the accounts here given of perceiving near distance by sight are received for true1 and accordingly made use of in determining the apparent places of objects1 they do nevertheless seem to me very unsatisfactory1 and that for these following reasons3-- #i4 ,first7#bid71 ,it is evident that1 when the mind perceives any idea not immediately and of itself1 it must be by the means of some other idea4 ,thus1 for instance1 the passions which are in the mind of another are of themselves to me invisible4 ,i may nevertheless perceive them by sight2 though not immediately1 yet by means of the colours they produce in the countenance4 ,we often see shame or fear in the looks of a man1 by perceiving the changes of his countenance to red or pale4 #aj4 ,moreover1 it is evident that no idea which is not itself perceived can be to me the means of perceiving any other idea4 ,if ,i do not perceive the redness or paleness of a man's face themselves1 it is impossible ,i should perceive by them the passions which are in his mind4 #aa4 ,now1 from sect4 ii41 it is plain that distance is in its own nature imperceptible1 and yet it is perceived by sight7#bie74 ,it remains1 therefore1 that it be brought into view by means of some other idea1 that is itself immediately perceived in the act of vision4 #ab4 ,but those lines and angles1 by means whereof some men7#bif7 pretend to explain the perception7#big7 of distance1 are themselves not at all perceived2 nor are they in truth ever thought of by those unskilful in optics4 ,i appeal to any one's experience1 whether1 upon sight of an object1 he computes its distance by the bigness of the angle made by the meeting of the two optic axes8 or whether he ever thinks of the greater or lesser divergency of the rays which arrive from any point to his pupil8 nay1 whether it be not perfectly impossible for him to perceive by sense the various angles wherewith the rays1 according to their greater or lesser divergence1 do fall on the eye8 ,every one is himself the best judge of what he perceives1 and what not4 ,in vain shall any man7#bih7 tell me1 that ,i perceive certain lines and angles1 which introduce into my mind the various ideas of distance1 so long as ,i myself am conscious of no such thing4 #ac4 ,since therefore those angles and lines are not themselves perceived by sight1 it follows1 from sect4 x41 that the mind does not by them judge of the distance of objects4 #ad4 ,secondly7#bii71 ,the truth of this assertion will be yet farther evident to any one that considers those lines and angles have no real existence in nature1 being only an hypothesis framed by the mathematicians1 and by them introduced into optics1 that they might treat of that science in a geometrical way4 #ae4 ,the third and7#cjj7 last reason ,i shall give for rejecting that doctrine is1 that though we should grant the real existence of those optic angles1 c41 and that it was possible for the mind to perceive them1 yet these principles would not be found sufficient to explain the phenomena of distance1 as shall be shewn hereafter4 #af4 ,now it being already shewn7#cja7 that distance is suggested7#cjb7 to the mind1 by the mediation of some other idea which is itself perceived in the act of seeing1 it remains that we inquire1 what ideas or sensations there be that attend vision1 unto which we may suppose the ideas of distance are connected1 and by which they are introduced into the mind4 ,and1 first1 it is certain by experience1 that when we look at a near object with both eyes1 according as it approaches or recedes from us1 we alter the disposition of our eyes1 by lessening or widening the interval between the pupils4 ,this disposition or turn of the eyes is attended with a sensation7#cjc71 which seems to me to be that which in this case brings the idea of greater or lesser distance into the mind4 #ag4 ,not that there is any natural or necessary7#cjd7 connexion between the sensation we perceive by the turn of the eyes and greater or lesser distance4 ,but--because the mind has1 by constant experience1 found the different sensations corresponding to the different dispositions of the eyes to be attended each with a different degree of distance in the object--there has grown an habitual or customary connexion between those two sorts of ideas3 so that the mind no sooner perceives the sensation arising from the different turn it gives the eyes1 in order to bring the pupils nearer or farther asunder1 but it withal perceives the different idea of distance which was wont to be connected with that sensation4 ,just as1 upon hearing a certain sound1 the idea is immediately suggested to the understanding which custom had united with it7#cje74 #ah4 ,nor do ,i see how ,i can easily be mistaken in this matter4 ,i know evidently that distance is not perceived of itself7#cjf72 that1 by consequence1 it must be perceived by means of some other idea1 which is immediately perceived1 and varies with the different degrees of distance4 ,i know also that the sensation arising from the turn of the eyes is of itself immediately perceived2 and various degrees thereof are connected with different distances1 which never fail to accompany them into my mind1 when ,i view an object distinctly with both eyes whose distance is so small that in respect of it the interval between the eyes has any considerable magnitude4 #ai4 ,i know it is a received opinion that1 by altering the disposition of the eyes1 the mind perceives whether the angle of the optic axes1 or the lateral angles comprehended between the interval of the eyes or the optic axes1 are made greater or lesser2 and that1 accordingly1 by a kind of natural geometry1 it judges the point of their intersection to be nearer or farther off4 ,but that this is not true ,i am convinced by my own experience2 since ,i am not conscious that ,i make any such use of the perception ,i have by the turn of my eyes4 ,and for me to make those judgments1 and draw those conclusions from it1 without knowing that ,i do so1 seems altogether incomprehensible7#cjg74 #bj4 ,from all which it follows1 that the judgment we make of the distance of an object viewed with both eyes is entirely the result of experience4 ,if we had not constantly found certain sensations1 arising from the various disposition of the eyes1 attended with certain degrees of distance1 we should never make those sudden judgments from them concerning the distance of objects2 no more than we would pretend to judge of a man's thoughts by his pronouncing words we had never heard before4 #ba4 ,secondly1 an object placed at a certain distance from the eye1 to which the breadth of the pupil bears a considerable proportion1 being made to approach1 is seen more confusedly7#cjh74 ,and the nearer it is brought the more confused appearance it makes4 ,and this being found constantly to be so1 there arises in the mind an habitual connexion between the several degrees of confusion and distance2 the greater confusion still implying the lesser distance1 and the lesser confusion the greater distance of the object4 #bb4 ,this confused appearance of the object doth therefore seem to be the medium whereby the mind judges of distance1 in those cases wherein the most approved writers of optics will have it judge by the different divergency with which the rays flowing from the radiating point fall on the pupil7#cji74 ,no man1 ,i believe1 will pretend to see or feel those imaginary angles that the rays are supposed to form1 according to their various inclinations on his eye4 ,but he cannot choose seeing whether the object appear more or less confused4 ,it is therefore a manifest consequence from what has been demonstrated that1 instead of the greater or lesser divergency of the rays1 the mind makes use of the greater or lesser confusedness of the appearance1 thereby to determine the apparent place of an object4 #bc4 ,nor doth it avail to say there is not any necessary connexion between confused vision and distance great or small4 ,for ,i ask any man what necessary connexion he sees between the redness of a blush and shame8 ,and yet no sooner shall he behold that colour to arise in the face of another but it brings into his mind the idea of that passion which hath been observed to accompany it4 #bd4 ,what seems to have misled the writers of optics in this matter is1 that they imagine men judge of distance as they do of a conclusion in mathematics2 betwixt which and the premises it is indeed absolutely requisite there be an apparent necessary connexion4 ,but it is far otherwise in the sudden judgments men make of distance4 ,we are not to think that brutes and children1 or even grown reasonable men1 whenever they perceive an object to approach or depart from them1 do it by virtue of geometry and demonstration4 #be4 ,that one idea may suggest another to the mind1 it will suffice that they have been observed to go together1 without any demonstration of the necessity of their coexistence1 or without so much as knowing what it is that makes them so to coexist4 ,of this there are innumerable instances1 of which no one can be ignorant7#caj74 #bf4 ,thus1 greater confusion having been constantly attended with nearer distance1 no sooner is the former idea perceived but it suggests the latter to our thoughts4 ,and1 if it had been the ordinary course of nature that the farther off an object were placed the more confused it should appear1 it is certain the very same perception that now makes us think an object approaches would then have made us to imagine it went farther off2 that perception1 abstracting from custom and experience1 being equally fitted to produce the idea of great distance1 or small distance1 or no distance at all4 #bg4 ,thirdly1 an object being placed at the distance above specified1 and brought nearer to the eye1 we may nevertheless prevent1 at least for some time1 the appearance's growing more confused1 by straining the eye7#caa74 ,in which case that sensation supplies the place of confused vision1 in aiding the mind to judge of the distance of the object2 it being esteemed so much the nearer by how much the effort or straining of the eye in order to distinct vision is greater4 #bh4 ,i have here7#cab7 set down those sensations or ideas7#cac7 that seem to be the constant and general occasions of introducing into the mind the different ideas of near distance4 ,it is true1 in most cases1 that divers other circumstances contribute to frame our idea of distance1 viz4 the particular number1 size1 kind1 c4 of the things seen4 ,concerning which1 as well as all other the forementioned occasions which suggest distance1 ,i shall only observe1 they have none of them1 in their own nature1 any relation or connexion with it3 nor is it possible they should ever signify the various degrees thereof1 otherwise than as by experience they have been found to be connected with them4 #bi4 ,i shall proceed upon these principles to account for a phenomenon which has hitherto strangely puzzled the writers of optics1 and is so far from being accounted for by any of their theories of vision1 that it is1 by their own confession1 plainly repugnant to them2 and of consequence1 if nothing else could be objected1 were alone sufficient to bring their credit in question4 ,the whole difficulty ,i shall lay before you in the words of the learned ,doctor ,barrow1 with which he concludes his ,optic ,lectures7#cad73-- ,illustration 8,hc sunt1 qu circa partem optic prcipue mathematicam dicenda mihi suggessit meditatio4 ,circa reliquas 7qu sunt1 adeoque spiuscule pro certis principiis plausibiles conjecturas venditare necessum habent7 nihil fere quicquam admodum verisimile succurrit1 a pervulgatis 7ab iis1 inquam1 qu ,keplerus1 ,scheinerus7#cae71 ,cartesius1 et post illos alii tradiderunt7 alienum aut diversum4 ,atqui tacere malo1 quam toties oblatam cramben reponere4 ,proinde receptui cano2 nee ita tamen ut prorsus discedam1 anteaquam improbam quandam difficultatem 7pro sinceritate quam et vobis et veritati debeo minime dissimulandam7 in medium protulero1 qu doctrin nostr1 hactenus inculcat1 se objicit adversam1 ab ea saltem nullam admittit solutionem4 ,illa1 breviter1 talis est4 ,lenti vel speculo cavo ,,ebf exponatur punctum visibile ,a1 ita distans1 ut radii ex ,a manantes ex inflectione versus axem ,,ab cogantur4 ,sitque radiationis limes 7seu puncti ,a imago1 qualem supra passim statuimus7 punctum ,z4 ,inter hoc autem et inflectentis verticem ,b uspiam positus concipiatur oculus4 ,quri jam potest1 ubi loci debeat punctum ,a apparere8 ,retrorsum ad punctum ,z videri non fert natura 7cum omnis impressio sensum afficiens proveniat a partibus ,a7 ac experientia reclamat4 ,nostris autem e placitis consequi videtur1 ipsum ad partes anticas apparens1 ab intervallo longissime dissito 7quod et maximum sensibile quodvis intervallum quodammodo exsuperet71 apparere4 ,cum enim quo radiis minus divergentibus attingitur objectum1 eo 7seclusis utique prnotionibus et prjudiciis7 longius abesse sentiatur2 et quod parallelos ad oculum radios projicit1 remotissime positum stimetur3 exigere ratio videtur1 ut quod convergentibus radiis apprehenditur1 adhuc magis1 si fieri posset1 quoad apparentiam elongetur4 ,quin et circa casum hunc generatim inquiri possit1 quidnam omnino sit1 quod apparentem puncti ,a locum determinet1 faciatque quod constanti ratione nunc propius1 nunc remotius appareat8 ,cui itidem dubio nihil quicquam ex hactenus dictorum analogia responderi posse videtur1 nisi debere punctum ,a perpetuo longissime semotum videri4 ,verum experientia secus attestatur1 illud pro diversa oculi inter puncta ,b1 ,z1 positione varie distans1 nunquam fere 7si unquam7 longinquius ipso ,a libere spectato1 subinde vero multo propinquius adparere2 quinimo1 quo oculum appellentes radii magis convergunt1 eo speciem objecti propius accedere4 ,nempe1 si puncto ,b admoveatur oculus1 suo 7ad lentem7 fere nativo in loco conspicitur punctum ,a 7vel que distans1 ad speculum72 ad ,o reductus oculus ejusce speciem appropinquantem cernit2 ad ,p adhuc vicinius ipsum existimat2 ac ita sensim1 donec alicubi tandem1 velut ad ,q1 constituto oculo1 objectum summe propinquum apparens in meram confusionem incipiat evanescere4 ,qu sane cuncta rationibus atque decretis nostris repugnare videntur1 aut cum iis saltem parum amice conspirant4 ,neque nostram tantum sententiam pulsat hoc experimentum1 at ex quo cteras quas norim omnes3 veterem imprimis ac vulgatam1 nostr pr reliquis affinem1 ita convellere videtur1 ut ejus vi coactus doctissimus ,a4 ,tacquetus isti principio 7cui pene soli totam indificaverat ,catoptricam suam7 ceu infido ac inconstanti renunciarit1 adeoque suam ipse doctrinam labefactarit8 id tamen1 opinor1 minime facturus1 si rem totam inspexissit penitius1 atque difficultatis fundum attigissit4 ,apud me vero non ita pollet hc1 nec eousque prpollebit ulla difficultas1 ut ab iis qu manifeste rationi consentanea video1 discedam2 prsertim quum1 ut his accidit1 ejusmodi difficultas in singularis cujuspiam casus disparitate fundetur4 ,nimirum in prsente casu peculiare quiddam1 natur subtilitati involutum1 delitescit1 gre fortassis1 nisi perfectius explorato videndi modo1 detegendum4 ,circa quod nil1 fateor1 hactenus excogitare potui1 quod adblandiretur animo meo1 nedum plane satisfaceret4 ,vobis itaque nodum hunc1 utinam feliciore conatu1 resolvendum committo40 ,in ,english as follows3 8,i have here delivered what my thoughts have suggested to me concerning that part of optics which is more properly mathematical4 ,as for the other parts of that science 7which1 being rather physical1 do consequently abound with plausible conjectures instead of certain principles71 there has in them scarce anything occurred to my observation different from what has been already said by ,kepler1 ,scheinerus1 ,des ,cartes1 c4 ,and methinks ,i had better say nothing at all than repeat that which has been so often said by others4 ,i think it therefore high time to take my leave of this subject4 ,but1 before ,i quit it for good and all1 the fair and ingenuous dealing that ,i owe both to you and to truth obliges me to acquaint you with a certain untoward difficulty1 which seems directly opposite to the doctrine ,i have been hitherto inculcating1 at least admits of no solution from it4 ,in short it is this4 ,before the double convex glass or concave speculum ,,ebf1 let the point ,a be placed at such a distance that the rays proceeding from ,a1 after refraction or reflection1 be brought to unite somewhere in the axis ,,ab4 ,and suppose the point of union 7i4e4 the image of the point ,a1 as hath been already set forth7 to be ,z2 between which and ,b1 the vertex of the glass or speculum1 conceive the eye to be anywhere placed4 ,the question now is1 where the point ,a ought to appear4 ,experience shews that it doth not appear behind at the point ,z2 and it were contrary to nature that it should2 since all the impression which affects the sense comes from towards ,a4 ,but1 from our tenets it should seem to follow that it would appear before the eye at a vast distance off1 so great as should in some sort surpass all sensible distance4 ,for since1 if we exclude all anticipations and prejudices1 every object appears by so much the farther off by how much the rays it sends to the eye are less diverging2 and that object is thought to be most remote from which parallel rays proceed unto the eye2 reason would make one think that object should appear at yet a greater distance which is seen by converging rays4 ,moreover1 it may in general be asked concerning this case1 what it is that determines the apparent place of the point ,a1 and maketh it to appear after a constant manner1 sometimes nearer1 at other times farther off8 ,to which doubt ,i see nothing that can be answered agreeable to the principles we have laid down1 except only that the point ,a ought always to appear extremely remote4 ,but1 on the contrary1 we are assured by experience1 that the point ,a appears variously distant1 according to the different situations of the eye between the points ,b and ,z4 ,and that it doth almost never 7if at all7 seem farther off than it would if it were beheld by the naked eye2 but1 on the contrary1 it doth sometimes appear much nearer4 ,nay1 it is even certain that by how much the rays falling on the eye do more converge1 by so much the nearer does the object seem to approach4 ,for1 the eye being placed close to the point ,b1 the object ,a appears nearly in its own natural place1 if the point ,b is taken in the glass1 or at the same distance1 if in the speculum4 ,the eye being brought back to ,o1 the object seems to draw near2 and1 being come to ,p1 it beholds it still nearer3 and so on by little and little1 till at length the eye being placed somewhere1 suppose at ,q1 the object appearing extremely near begins to vanish into mere confusion4 ,all which doth seem repugnant to our principles2 at least1 not rightly to agree with them4 ,nor is our tenet alone struck at by this experiment1 but likewise all others that ever came to my knowledge are every whit as much endangered by it4 ,the ancient one especially 7which is most commonly received1 and comes nearest to mine7 seems to be so effectually overthrown thereby that the most learned ,tacquet has been forced to reject that principle1 as false and uncertain1 on which alone he had built almost his whole ,catoptrics1 and consequently1 by taking away the foundation1 hath himself pulled down the superstructure he had raised on it4 ,which1 nevertheless1 ,i do not believe he would have done1 had he but considered the whole matter more thoroughly1 and examined the difficulty to the bottom4 ,but as for me1 neither this nor any other difficulty shall have so great an influence on me1 as to make me renounce that which ,i know to be manifestly agreeable to reason4 ,especially when1 as it here falls out1 the difficulty is founded in the peculiar nature of a certain odd and particular case4 ,for1 in the present case something peculiar lies hid1 which1 being involved in the subtilty of nature1 will perhaps hardly be discovered till such time as the manner of vision is more perfectly made known4 ,concerning which1 ,i must own ,i have hitherto been able to find out nothing that has the least show of probability1 not to mention certainty4 ,i shall therefore leave this knot to be untied by you1 wishing you may have better success in it than ,i have had40 #cj4 ,the ancient and received principle1 which ,dr4 ,barrow here mentions as the main foundation of ,tacquet's7#caf7 ,catoptrics1 is1 that every 8visible point seen by reflection from a speculum shall appear placed at the intersection of the reflected ray and the perpendicular of incidence40 ,which intersection in the present case happening to be behind the eye1 it greatly shakes the authority of that principle whereon the aforementioned author proceeds throughout his whole ,catoptrics1 in determining the apparent place of objects seen by reflection from any kind of speculum4 #ca4 ,let us now see how this phenomenon agrees with our tenets7#cag74 ,the eye1 the nearer it is placed to the point ,b in the above figures1 the more distinct is the appearance of the object3 but1 as it recedes to ,o1 the appearance grows more confused2 and at ,p it sees the object yet more confused2 and so on1 till the eye1 being brought back to ,z1 sees the object in the greatest confusion of all4 ,wherefore1 by sect4 #ba1 the object should seem to approach the eye gradually1 as it recedes from the point ,b2 that is1 at ,o it should 7in consequence of the principle ,i have laid down in the aforesaid section7 seem nearer than it did at ,b1 and at ,p nearer than at ,o1 and at ,q nearer than at ,p1 and so on1 till it quite vanishes at ,z4 ,which is the very matter of fact1 as any one that pleases may easily satisfy himself by experiment4 #cb4 ,this case is much the same as if we should suppose an ,englishman to meet a foreigner who used the same words with the ,english1 but in a direct contrary signification4 ,the ,englishman would not fail to make a wrong judgment of the ideas annexed to those sounds1 in the mind of him that used them4 ,just so in the present case1 the object speaks 7if ,i may so say7 with words that the eye is well acquainted with1 that is1 confusions of appearance2 but1 whereas heretofore the greatest confusions were always wont to signify nearer distances1 they have in this case a direct contrary signification1 being connected with the greater distances4 ,whence it follows that the eye must unavoidably be mistaken1 since it will take the confusions in the sense it has been used to1 which is directly opposed to the true4 #cc4 ,this phenomenon1 as it entirely subverts the opinion of those who will have us judge of distance by lines and angles1 on which supposition it is altogether inexplicable1 so it seems to me no small confirmation of the truth of that principle whereby it is explained7#cah74 ,but1 in order to a more full explication of this point1 and to shew how far the hypothesis of the mind's judging by the various divergency of rays may be of use in determining the apparent place of an object1 it will be necessary to premise some few things1 which are already well known to those who have any skill in ,dioptrics4 #cd4 ,first1 ,any radiating point is then distinctly seen when the rays proceeding from it are1 by the refractive power of the crystalline1 accurately reunited in the retina or fund of the eye4 ,but if they are reunited either before they arrive at the retina1 or after they have passed it1 then there is confused vision4 ,illustration ,figure #a ,illustration ,figure #b ,illustration ,figure #c #ce4 ,secondly1 ,suppose1 in the adjacent figures1 ,,np represent an eye duly framed1 and retaining its natural figure4 ,in fig4 #a the rays falling nearly parallel on the eye1 are1 by the crystalline ,,ab1 refracted1 so as their focus1 or point of union ,f1 falls exactly on the retina4 ,but1 if the rays fall sensibly diverging on the eye1 as in fig4 #b1 then their focus falls beyond the retina2 or1 if the rays are made to converge by the lens ,,qs1 before they come at the eye1 as in fig4 #c1 their focus ,f will fall before the retina4 ,in which two last cases it is evident1 from the foregoing section1 that the appearance of the point ,z is confused4 ,and1 by how much the greater is the convergency or divergency of the rays falling on the pupil1 by so much the farther will the point of their reunion be from the retina1 either before or behind it1 and consequently the point ,z will appear by so much the more confused4 ,and this1 by the bye1 may shew us the difference between confused and faint vision4 ,confused vision is1 when the rays proceeding from each distinct point of the object are not accurately re-collected in one corresponding point on the retina1 but take up some space thereon--so that rays from different points become mixed and confused together4 ,this is opposed to a distinct vision1 and attends near objects4 ,faint vision is when1 by reason of the distance of the object1 or grossness of the interjacent medium1 few rays arrive from the object to the eye4 ,this is opposed to vigorous or clear vision1 and attends remote objects4 ,but to return4 #cf4 ,the eye1 or 7to speak truly7 the mind1 perceiving only the confusion itself1 without ever considering the cause from which it proceeds1 doth constantly annex the same degree of distance to the same degree of confusion4 ,whether that confusion be occasioned by converging or by diverging rays it matters not4 ,whence it follows that the eye1 viewing the object ,z through the glass ,,qs 7which by refraction causeth the rays ,,zq1 ,,zs1 c4 to converge71 should judge it to be at such a nearness1 at which1 if it were placed1 it would radiate on the eye1 with rays diverging to that degree as would produce the same confusion which is now produced by converging rays1 i4e4 would cover a portion of the retina equal to ,,dc4 7,vid4 fig4 #c1 sup47 ,but then this must be understood 7to use ,dr4 ,barrow's phrase7 8seclusis prnotionibus et prjudiciis10 in case we abstract from all other circumstances of vision1 such as the figure1 size1 faintness1 c4 of the visible objects--all which do ordinarily concur to form our idea of distance1 the mind having1 by frequent experience1 observed their several sorts or degrees to be connected with various distances4 #cg4 ,it plainly follows from what has been said1 that a person perfectly purblind 7i4e4 that could not see an object distinctly but when placed close to his eye7 would not make the same wrong judgment that others do in the forementioned case4 ,for1 to him1 greater confusions constantly suggesting greater distances1 he must1 as he recedes from the glass1 and the object grows more confused1 judge it to be at a farther distance2 contrary to what they do who have had the perception of the objects growing more confused connected with the idea of approach4 #ch4 ,hence also it doth appear1 there may be good use of computation1 by lines and angles1 in optics7#cai72 not that the mind judges of distance immediately by them1 but because it judges by somewhat which is connected with them1 and to the determination whereof they may be subservient4 ,thus1 the mind judging of the distance of an object by the confusedness of its appearance1 and this confusedness being greater or lesser to the naked eye1 according as the object is seen by rays more or less diverging1 it follows that a man may make use of the divergency of the rays1 in computing the apparent distance1 though not for its own sake1 yet on account of the confusion with which it is connected4 ,but so it is1 the confusion itself is entirely neglected by mathematicians1 as having no necessary relation with distance1 such as the greater or lesser angles of divergency are conceived to have4 ,and these 7especially for that they fall under mathematical computation7 are alone regarded1 in determining the apparent places of objects1 as though they were the sole and immediate cause of the judgments the mind makes of distance4 ,whereas1 in truth1 they should not at all be regarded in themselves1 or any otherwise than as they are supposed to be the cause of confused vision4 #ci4 ,the not considering of this has been a fundamental and perplexing oversight4 ,for proof whereof1 we need go no farther than the case before us4 ,it having been observed that the most diverging rays brought into the mind the idea of nearest distance1 and that still as the divergency decreased the distance increased1 and it being thought the connexion between the various degrees of divergency and distance was immediate--this naturally leads one to conclude1 from an ill-grounded analogy1 that converging rays shall make an object appear at an immense distance1 and that1 as the convergency increases1 the distance 7if it were possible7 should do so likewise4 ,that this was the cause of ,dr4 ,barrow's mistake is evident from his own words which we have quoted4 ,whereas had the learned ,doctor observed that diverging and converging rays1 how opposite soever they may seem1 do nevertheless agree in producing the same effect1 to wit1 confusedness of vision1 greater degrees whereof are produced indifferently1 either as the divergency or convergency of the rays increaseth2 and that it is by this effect1 which is the same in both1 that either the divergency or convergency is perceived by the eye--,i say1 had he but considered this1 it is certain he would have made a quite contrary judgment1 and rightly concluded that those rays which fall on the eye with greater degrees of convergency should make the object from whence they proceed appear by so much the nearer4 ,but it is plain it was impossible for any man to attain to a right notion of this matter so long as he had regard only to lines and angles1 and did not apprehend the true nature of vision1 and how far it was of mathematical consideration4 #dj4 ,before we dismiss this subject1 it is fit we take notice of a query relating thereto1 proposed by the ingenious ,mr4 ,molyneux1 in his ,treatise of ,dioptrics 7par4 i4 prop4 #ca4 sect4 #i71 where1 speaking of the difficulty we have been explaining1 he has these words3 8,and so he 7i4e4 ,dr4 ,barrow7 leaves this difficulty to the solution of others1 which ,i 7after so great an example7 shall do likewise2 but with the resolution of the same admirable author1 of not quitting the evident doctrine which we have before laid down1 for determining the locus objecti1 on account of being pressed by one difficulty1 which seems inexplicable till a more intimate knowledge of the visive faculty be obtained by mortals4 ,in the meantime ,i propose it to the consideration of the ingenious1 whether the locus apparens of an object placed as in this ninth section be not as much before the eye as the distinct base is behind the eye80 ,to which query we may venture to answer in the negative4 ,for1 in the present case1 the rule for determining the distance of the distinct base1 or respective focus from the glass is this3 ,as the difference between the distance of the object and focus is to the focus or focal length1 so the distance of the object from the glass is to the distance of the respective focus or distinct base from the glass4 7,molyneux1 ,dioptr41 par4 i4 prop4 #e47 ,let us now suppose the object to be placed at the distance of the focal length1 and one-half of the focal length from the glass1 and the eye close to the glass4 ,hence it will follow1 by the rule1 that the distance of the distinct base behind the eye is double the true distance of the object before the eye4 ,if1 therefore1 ,mr4 ,molyneux's conjecture held good1 it would follow that the eye should see the object twice as far off as it really is2 and in other cases at three or four times its due distance1 or more4 ,but this manifestly contradicts experience1 the object never appearing1 at farthest1 beyond its due distance4 ,whatever1 therefore1 is built on this supposition 7vid4 corol4 i4 prop4 #eg4 ibid47 comes to the ground along with it4 #da4 ,from what hath been premised1 it is a manifest consequence1 that a man born blind1 being made to see1 would at first have no idea of distance by sight3 the sun and stars1 the remotest objects as well as the nearer1 would all seem to be in his eye1 or rather in his mind4 ,the objects intromitted by sight would seem to him 7as in truth they are7 no other than a new set of thoughts or sensations1 each whereof is as near to him as the perceptions of pain or pleasure1 or the most inward passions of his soul4 ,for1 our judging objects perceived by sight to be at any distance1 or without the mind1 is 7vid4 sect1 xxviii47 entirely the effect of experience2 which one in those circumstances could not yet have attained to7#cbj74 #db4 ,it is indeed otherwise upon the common supposition--that men judge of distance by the angle of the optic axes1 just as one in the dark1 or a blind man by the angle comprehended by two sticks1 one whereof he held in each hand7#cba74 ,for1 if this were true1 it would follow that one blind from his birth1 being made to see1 should stand in need of no new experience1 in order to perceive distance by sight4 ,but that this is false has1 ,i think1 been sufficiently demonstrated4 #dc4 ,and perhaps1 upon a strict inquiry1 we shall not find that even those who from their birth have grown up in a continued habit of seeing are irrecoverably prejudiced on the other side1 to wit1 in thinking what they see to be at a distance from them4 ,for1 at this time it seems agreed on all hands1 by those who have had any thoughts of that matter1 that colours1 which are the proper and immediate object of sight1 are not without the mind4--,but then1 it will be said1 by sight we have also the ideas of extension1 and figure1 and motion2 all which may well be thought without and at some distance from the mind1 though colour should not4 ,in answer to this1 ,i appeal to any man's experience1 whether the visible extension of any object do not appear as near to him as the colour of that object2 nay1 whether they do not both seem to be in the very same place4 ,is not the extension we see coloured1 and is it possible for us1 so much as in thought1 to separate and abstract colour from extension8 ,now1 where the extension is1 there surely is the figure1 and there the motion too4 ,i speak of those which are perceived by sight7#cbb74 #dd4 ,but for a fuller explication of this point1 and to shew that the immediate objects of sight are not so much as the ideas or resemblances of things placed at a distance1 it is requisite that we look nearer into the matter1 and carefully observe what is meant in common discourse when one says1 that which he sees is at a distance from him4 ,suppose1 for example1 that looking at the moon ,i should say it were fifty or sixty semidiameters of the earth distant from me4 ,let us see what moon this is spoken of4 ,it is plain it cannot be the visible moon1 or anything like the visible moon1 or that which ,i see--which is only a round luminous plain1 of about thirty visible points in diameter4 ,for1 in case ,i am carried from the place where ,i stand directly towards the moon1 it is manifest the object varies still as ,i go on2 and1 by the time that ,i am advanced fifty or sixty semidiameters of the earth1 ,i shall be so far from being near a small1 round1 luminous flat that ,i shall perceive nothing like it--this object having long since disappeared1 and1 if ,i would recover it1 it must be by going back to the earth from whence ,i set out7#cbc74 ,again1 suppose ,i perceive by sight the faint and obscure idea of something1 which ,i doubt whether it be a man1 or a tree1 or a tower1 but judge it to be at the distance of about a mile4 ,it is plain ,i cannot mean that what ,i see is a mile off1 or that it is the image or likeness of anything which is a mile off2 since that every step ,i take towards it the appearance alters1 and from being obscure1 small1 and faint1 grows clear1 large1 and vigorous4 ,and when ,i come to the mile's end1 that which ,i saw first is quite lost1 neither do ,i find anything in the likeness of it7#cbd74 #de4 ,in these and the like instances1 the truth of the matter1 ,i find1 stands thus3--,having of a long time experienced certain ideas perceivable by touch7#cbe7--;as distance1 tangible figure1 and solidity--to have been connected with certain ideas of sight1 ,i do1 upon perceiving these ideas of sight1 forthwith conclude what tangible ideas are1 by the wonted ordinary course of nature1 like to follow4 ,looking at an object1 ,i perceive a certain visible figure and colour1 with some degree of faintness and other circumstances1 which1 from what ,i have formerly observed1 determine me to think that if ,i advance forward so many paces1 miles1 c41 ,i shall be affected with such and such ideas of touch4 ,so that1 in truth and strictness of speech1 ,i neither see distance itself1 nor anything that ,i take to be at a distance4 ,i say1 neither distance nor things placed at a distance are themselves1 or their ideas1 truly perceived by sight4 ,this ,i am persuaded of1 as to what concerns myself4 ,and ,i believe whoever will look narrowly into his own thoughts1 and examine what he means by saying he sees this or that thing at a distance1 will agree with me1 that what he sees only suggests to his understanding that1 after having passed a certain distance1 to be measured by the motion of his body1 which is perceivable by touch7#cbf71 he shall come to perceive such and such tangible ideas1 which have been usually connected with such and such visible ideas4 ,but1 that one might be deceived by these suggestions of sense1 and that there is no necessary connexion between visible and tangible ideas suggested by them1 we need go no farther than the next looking-glass or picture to be convinced4 ,note that1 when ,i speak of tangible ideas1 ,i take the word idea for any the immediate object of sense1 or understanding--in which large signification it is commonly used by the moderns7#cbg74 #df4 ,from what we have shewn1 it is a manifest consequence that the ideas of space1 outness7#cbh71 and things placed at a distance are not1 strictly speaking1 the object of sight7#cbi72 they are not otherwise perceived by the eye than by the ear4 ,sitting in my study ,i hear a coach drive along the street2 ,i look through the casement and see it2 ,i walk out and enter into it4 ,thus1 common speech would incline one to think ,i heard1 saw1 and touched the same thing1 to wit1 the coach4 ,it is nevertheless certain the ideas intromitted by each sense are widely different1 and distinct from each other2 but1 having been observed constantly to go together1 they are spoken of as one and the same thing4 ,by the variation of the noise1 ,i perceive the different distances of the coach1 and know that it approaches before ,i look out4 ,thus1 by the ear ,i perceive distance just after the same manner as ,i do by the eye4 #dg4 ,i do not nevertheless say ,i hear distance1 in like manner as ,i say that ,i see it--the ideas perceived by hearing not being so apt to be confounded with the ideas of touch as those of sight are4 ,so likewise a man is easily convinced that bodies and external things are not properly the object of hearing1 but only sounds1 by the mediation whereof the idea of this or that body1 or distance1 is suggested to his thoughts4 ,but then one is with more difficulty brought to discern the difference there is betwixt the ideas of sight and touch7#ccj73 though it be certain1 a man no more sees and feels the same thing1 than he hears and feels the same thing4 #dh4 ,one reason of which seems to be this4 ,it is thought a great absurdity to imagine that one and the same thing should have any more than one extension and one figure4 ,but1 the extension and figure of a body being let into the mind two ways1 and that indifferently1 either by sight or touch1 it seems to follow that we see the same extension and the same figure which we feel4 #di4 ,but1 if we take a close and accurate view of the matter1 it must be acknowledged that we never see and feel one and the same object7#cca74 ,that which is seen is one thing1 and that which is felt is another4 ,if the visible figure and extension be not the same with the tangible figure and extension1 we are not to infer that one and the same thing has divers extensions4 ,the true consequence is that the objects of sight and touch are two distinct things7#ccb74 ,it may perhaps require some thought rightly to conceive this distinction4 ,and the difficulty seems not a little increased1 because the combination of visible ideas hath constantly the same name as the combination of tangible ideas wherewith it is connected--which doth of necessity arise from the use and end of language7#ccc74 #ej4 ,in order1 therefore1 to treat accurately and unconfusedly of vision1 we must bear in mind that there are two sorts of objects apprehended by the eye--the one primarily and immediately1 the other secondarily and by intervention of the former4 ,those of the first sort neither are nor appear to be without the mind1 or at any distance off7#ccd74 ,they may1 indeed1 grow greater or smaller1 more confused1 or more clear1 or more faint4 ,but they do not1 cannot approach1 or even seem to approach 7#cce7 or recede from us4 ,whenever we say an object is at a distance1 whenever we say it draws near1 or goes farther off1 we must always mean it of the latter sort1 which properly belong to the touch7#ccf71 and are not so truly perceived as suggested by the eye1 in like manner as thoughts by the ear4 #ea4 ,no sooner do we hear the words of a familiar language pronounced in our ears but the ideas corresponding thereto present themselves to our minds3 in the very same instant the sound and the meaning enter the understanding3 so closely are they united that it is not in our power to keep out the one except we exclude the other also4 ,we even act in all respects as if we heard the very thoughts themselves4 ,so likewise the secondary objects1 or those which are only suggested by sight1 do often more strongly affect us1 and are more regarded1 than the proper objects of that sense2 along with which they enter into the mind1 and with which they have a far more strict connexion than ideas have with words7#ccg74 ,hence it is we find it so difficult to discriminate between the immediate and mediate objects of sight1 and are so prone to attribute to the former what belongs only to the latter4 ,they are1 as it were1 most closely twisted1 blended1 and incorporated together4 ,and the prejudice is confirmed and riveted in our thoughts by a long tract of time1 by the use of language1 and want of reflection4 ,however1 ,i doubt not but anyone that shall attentively consider what we have already said1 and shall say upon this subject before we have done 7especially if he pursue it in his own thoughts71 may be able to deliver himself from that prejudice4 ,sure ,i am1 it is worth some attention to whoever would understand the true nature of vision4 #eb4 ,i have now done with ,distance1 and proceed to shew how it is that we perceive by sight the ,magnitude of objects7#cch74 ,it is the opinion of some that we do it by angles1 or by angles in conjunction with distance4 ,but1 neither angles nor distance being perceivable by sight7#cci71 and the things we see being in truth at no distance from us7#cdj71 it follows that1 as we have shewn lines and angles not to be the medium the mind makes use of in apprehending the apparent place1 so neither are they the medium whereby it apprehends the apparent magnitude of objects4 #ec4 ,it is well known that the same extension at a near distance shall subtend a greater angle1 and at a farther distance a lesser angle4 ,and by this principle 7we are told7 the mind estimates the magnitude of an object7#cda71 comparing the angle under which it is seen with its distance1 and thence inferring the magnitude thereof4 ,what inclines men to this mistake 7beside the humour of making one see by geometry7 is1 that the same perceptions or ideas which suggest distance do also suggest magnitude4 ,but1 if we examine it1 we shall find they suggest the latter as immediately as the former4 ,i say1 they do not first suggest distance and then leave it to the judgment to use that as a medium whereby to collect the magnitude2 but they have as close and immediate a connexion with the magnitude as with the distance2 and suggest magnitude as independently of distance1 as they do distance independently of magnitude4 ,all which will be evident to whoever considers what has been already said and what follows4 #ed4 ,it has been shewn there are two sorts of objects apprehended by sight1 each whereof has its distinct magnitude1 or extension--the one1 properly tangible1 i4e4 to be perceived and measured by touch1 and not immediately falling under the sense of seeing2 the other1 properly and immediately visible1 by mediation of which the former is brought in view4 ,each of these magnitudes are greater or lesser1 according as they contain in them more or fewer points1 they being made up of points or minimums4 ,for1 whatever may be said of extension in abstract7#cdb71 it is certain sensible extension is not infinitely divisible7#cdc74 ,there is a minimum tangibile1 and a minimum visibile1 beyond which sense cannot perceive4 ,this every one's experience will inform him4 #ee4 ,the magnitude of the object which exists without the mind1 and is at a distance1 continues always invariably the same3 but1 the visible object still changing as you approach to or recede from the tangible object1 it hath no fixed and determinate greatness4 ,whenever therefore we speak of the magnitude of any thing1 for instance a tree or a house1 we must mean the tangible magnitude2 otherwise there can be nothing steady and free from ambiguity spoken of it7#cdd74 ,now1 though the tangible and visible magnitude do in truth belong to two distinct objects7#cde71 ,i shall nevertheless 7especially since those objects are called by the same name1 and are observed to coexist7#cdf771 to avoid tediousness and singularity of speech1 sometimes speak of them as belonging to one and the same thing4 #ef4 ,now1 in order to discover by what means the magnitude of tangible objects is perceived by sight1 ,i need only reflect on what passes in my own mind1 and observe what those things be which introduce the ideas of greater or lesser into my thoughts when ,i look on any object4 ,and these ,i find to be1 first1 the magnitude or extension of the visible object1 which1 being immediately perceived by sight1 is connected with that other which is tangible and placed at a distance3 secondly1 the confusion or distinctness3 and thirdly1 the vigorousness or faintness of the aforesaid visible appearance4 ,cteris paribus1 by how much the greater or lesser the visible object is1 by so much the greater or lesser do ,i conclude the tangible object to be4 ,but1 be the idea immediately perceived by sight never so large1 yet1 if it be withal confused1 ,i judge the magnitude of the thing to be but small4 ,if it be distinct and clear1 ,i judge it greater4 ,and1 if it be faint1 ,i apprehend it to be yet greater4 ,what is here meant by confusion and faintness has been explained in sect4 #ce4 #eg4 ,moreover1 the judgments we make of greatness do1 in like manner as those of distance1 depend on the disposition of the eye2 also on the figure1 number1 and situation7#cdg7 of intermediate objects1 and other circumstances that have been observed to attend great or small tangible magnitudes4 ,thus1 for instance1 the very same quantity of visible extension which in the figure of a tower doth suggest the idea of great magnitude shall in the figure of a man suggest the idea of much smaller magnitude4 ,that this is owing to the experience we have had of the usual bigness of a tower and a man1 no one1 ,i suppose1 need be told4 #eh4 ,it is also evident that confusion or faintness have no more a necessary connexion with little or great magnitude than they have with little or great distance4 ,as they suggest the latter1 so they suggest the former to our minds4 ,and1 by consequence1 if it were not for experience1 we should no more judge a faint or confused appearance to be connected with great or little magnitude than we should that it was connected with great or little distance4 #ei4 ,nor will it be found that great or small visible magnitude hath any necessary relation to great or small tangible magnitude--so that the one may certainly and infallibly be inferred from the other4 ,but1 before we come to the proof of this1 it is fit we consider the difference there is betwixt the extension and figure which is the proper object of touch1 and that other which is termed visible2 and how the former is principally1 though not immediately1 taken notice of when we look at any object4 ,this has been before mentioned7#cdh71 but we shall here inquire into the cause thereof4 ,we regard the objects that environ us in proportion as they are adapted to benefit or injure our own bodies1 and thereby produce in our minds the sensations of pleasure or pain4 ,now1 bodies operating on our organs by an immediate application1 and the hurt and advantage arising therefrom depending altogether on the tangible1 and not at all on the visible1 qualities of any object--this is a plain reason why those should be regarded by us much more than these4 ,and for this end chiefly7#cdi7 the visive sense seems to have been bestowed on animals1 to wit1 that1 by the perception of visible ideas 7which in themselves are not capable of affecting or anywise altering the frame of their bodies71 they may be able to foresee7#cej7 7from the experience they have had what tangible ideas are connected with such and such visible ideas7 the damage or benefit which is like to ensue upon the application of their own bodies to this or that body which is at a distance4 ,which foresight1 how necessary it is to the preservation of an animal1 every one's experience can inform him4 ,hence it is that1 when we look at an object1 the tangible figure and extension thereof are principally attended to2 whilst there is small heed taken of the visible figure and magnitude1 which1 though more immediately perceived1 do less sensibly affect us1 and are not fitted to produce any alteration in our bodies4 #fj4 ,that the matter of fact is true will be evident to any one who considers that a man placed at ten foot distance is thought as great as if he were placed at the distance only of five foot2 which is true1 not with relation to the visible1 but tangible greatness of the object3 the visible magnitude being far greater at one station than it is at the other4 #fa4 ,inches1 feet1 c4 are settled1 stated lengths1 whereby we measure objects and estimate their magnitude4 ,we say1 for example1 an object appears to be six inches1 or six foot long4 ,now1 that this cannot be meant of visible inches1 c4 is evident1 because a visible inch is itself no constant determinate magnitude7#cea71 and cannot therefore serve to mark out and determine the magnitude of any other thing4 ,take an inch marked upon a ruler2 view it successively1 at the distance of half a foot1 a foot1 a foot and a half1 c4 from the eye3 at each of which1 and at all the intermediate distances1 the inch shall have a different visible extension1 i4e4 there shall be more or fewer points discerned in it4 ,now1 ,i ask which of all these various extensions is that stated determinate one that is agreed on for a common measure of other magnitudes8 ,no reason can be assigned why we should pitch on one more than another4 ,and1 except there be some invariable determinate extension fixed on to be marked by the word inch1 it is plain it can be used to little purpose2 and to say a thing contains this or that number of inches shall imply no more than that it is extended1 without bringing any particular idea of that extension into the mind4 ,farther1 an inch and a foot1 from different distances1 shall both exhibit the same visible magnitude1 and yet at the same time you shall say that one seems several times greater than the other4 ,from all which it is manifest1 that the judgments we make of the magnitude of objects by sight are altogether in reference to their tangible extension4 ,whenever we say an object is great or small1 of this or that determinate measure1 ,i say1 it must be meant of the tangible and not the visible extension7#ceb71 which1 though immediately perceived1 is nevertheless little taken notice of4 #fb4 ,now1 that there is no necessary connexion between these two distinct extensions is evident from hence--because our eyes might have been framed in such a manner as to be able to see nothing but what were less than the minimum tangibile4 ,in which case it is not impossible we might have perceived all the immediate objects of sight the very same that we do now2 but unto those visible appearances there would not be connected those different tangible magnitudes that are now4 ,which shews the judgments we make of the magnitude of things placed at a distance1 from the various greatness of the immediate objects of sight1 do not arise from any essential or necessary1 but only a customary1 tie which has been observed betwixt them4 #fc4 ,moreover1 it is not only certain that any idea of sight might not have been connected with this or that idea of touch we now observe to accompany it1 but also that the greater visible magnitudes might have been connected with and introduced into our minds lesser tangible magnitudes1 and the lesser visible magnitudes greater tangible magnitudes4 ,nay1 that it actually is so1 we have daily experience--that object which makes a strong and large appearance not seeming near so great as another the visible magnitude whereof is much less1 but more faint17#cec7 and the appearance upper1 or which is the same thing1 painted lower on the retina1 which faintness and situation suggest both greater magnitude and greater distance4 #fd4 ,from which1 and from sect4 #eg and #eh1 it is manifest that1 as we do not perceive the magnitude of objects immediately by sight1 so neither do we perceive them by the mediation of anything which has a necessary connexion with them4 ,those ideas that now suggest unto us the various magnitudes of external objects before we touch them might possibly have suggested no such thing2 or they might have signified them in a direct contrary manner1 so that the very same ideas on the perception whereof we judge an object to be small might as well have served to make us conclude it great2--those ideas being in their own nature equally fitted to bring into our minds the idea of small or great1 or no size at all1 of outward objects7#ced71 just as the words of any language are in their own nature indifferent to signify this or that thing1 or nothing at all4 #fe4 ,as we see distance so we see magnitude4 ,and we see both in the same way that we see shame or anger in the looks of a man4 ,those passions are themselves invisible2 they are nevertheless let in by the eye along with colours and alterations of countenance which are the immediate object of vision1 and which signify them for no other reason than barely because they have been observed to accompany them4 ,without which experience we should no more have taken blushing for a sign of shame than of gladness4 #ff4 ,we are nevertheless exceedingly prone to imagine those things which are perceived only by the mediation of others to be themselves the immediate objects of sight1 or at least to have in their own nature a fitness to be suggested by them before ever they had been experienced to coexist with them4 ,from which prejudice every one perhaps will not find it easy to emancipate himself1 by any the clearest convictions of reason4 ,and there are some grounds to think that1 if there was one only invariable and universal language in the world1 and that men were born with the faculty of speaking it1 it would be the opinion of some1 that the ideas in other men's minds were properly perceived by the ear1 or had at least a necessary and inseparable tie with the sounds that were affixed to them4 ,all which seems to arise from want of a due application of our discerning faculty1 thereby to discriminate between the ideas that are in our understandings1 and consider them apart from each other2 which would preserve us from confounding those that are different1 and make us see what ideas do1 and what do not1 include or imply this or that other idea7#cee74 #fg4 ,there is a celebrated phenomenon7#cef7 the solution whereof ,i shall attempt to give1 by the principles that have been laid down1 in reference to the manner wherein we apprehend by sight the magnitude of objects4--,the apparent magnitude of the moon1 when placed in the horizon1 is much greater than when it is in the meridian1 though the angle under which the diameter of the moon is seen be not observed greater in the former case than in the latter2 and the horizontal moon doth not constantly appear of the same bigness1 but at some times seemeth far greater than at others4 #fh4 ,now1 in order to explain the reason of the moon's appearing greater than ordinary in the horizon1 it must be observed that the particles which compose our atmosphere do intercept the rays of light proceeding from any object to the eye2 and1 by how much the greater is the portion of atmosphere interjacent between the object and the eye1 by so much the more are the rays intercepted1 and1 by consequence1 the appearance of the object rendered more faint--every object appearing more vigorous or more faint in proportion as it sendeth more or fewer rays into the eye4 ,now1 between the eye and the moon when situated in the horizon there lies a far greater quantity of atmosphere than there does when the moon is in the meridian4 ,whence it comes to pass1 that the appearance of the horizontal moon is fainter1 and therefore1 by sect4 #ef1 it should be thought bigger in that situation than in the meridian1 or in any other elevation above the horizon4 #fi4 ,farther1 the air being variously impregnated1 sometimes more and sometimes less1 with vapours and exhalations fitted to retund and intercept the rays of light1 it follows that the appearance of the horizontal moon hath not always an equal faintness1 and1 by consequence1 that luminary1 though in the very same situation1 is at one time judged greater than at another4 #gj4 ,that we have here given the true account of the phenomena of the horizontal moon1 will1 ,i suppose1 be farther evident to any one from the following considerations3--,first1 it is plain1 that which in this case suggests the idea of greater magnitude1 must be something which is itself perceived2 for1 that which is unperceived cannot suggest to our perception any other thing7#ceg74 ,secondly1 it must be something that does not constantly remain the same1 but is subject to some change or variation2 since the appearance of the horizontal moon varies1 being at one time greater than at another4 ,thirdly1 it must not lie in the circumjacent or intermediate objects1 such as mountains1 houses1 fields1 c42 because that when all those objects are excluded from sight the appearance is as great as ever7#ceh74 ,and yet1 thirdly7#cei71 it cannot be the visible figure or magnitude2 since that remains the same1 or is rather lesser1 by how much the moon is nearer to the horizon4 ,it remains therefore1 that the true cause is that affection or alteration of the visible appearance1 which proceeds from the greater paucity of rays arriving at the eye1 and which ,i term faintness3 since this answers all the forementioned conditions1 and ,i am not conscious of any other perception that does4 #ga4 ,add to this that in misty weather it is a common observation1 that the appearance of the horizontal moon is far larger than usual1 which greatly conspires with and strengthens our opinion4 ,neither would it prove in the least irreconcilable with what we have said1 if the horizontal moon should chance sometimes to seem enlarged beyond its usual extent1 even in more serene weather4 ,for1 we must not only have regard to the mist which happens to be in the place where we stand2 we ought also to take into our thoughts the whole sum of vapours and exhalations which lie betwixt the eye and the moon3 all which co-operating to render the appearance of the moon more faint1 and thereby increase its magnitude1 it may chance to appear greater than it usually does even in the horizontal position1 at a time when1 though there be no extraordinary fog or haziness just in the place where we stand1 yet the air between the eye and the moon1 taken altogether1 may be loaded with a greater quantity of interspersed vapours and exhalations than at other times7#cfj74 #gb4 ,it may be objected that1 in consequence of our principles1 the interposition of a body in some degree opaque1 which may intercept a great part of the rays of light1 should render the appearance of the moon in the meridian as large as when it is viewed in the horizon4 ,to which ,i answer1 it is not faintness anyhow applied that suggests greater magnitude2 there being no necessary1 but only an experimental1 connexion between those two things4 ,it follows that the faintness which enlarges the appearance must be applied in such sort1 and with such circumstances1 as have been observed to attend the vision of great magnitudes4 ,when from a distance we behold great objects1 the particles of the intermediate air and vapours1 which are themselves unperceivable1 do interrupt the rays of light1 and thereby render the appearance less strong and vivid4 ,now1 faintness of appearance1 caused in this sort1 hath been experienced to co-exist with great magnitude4 ,but when it is caused by the interposition of an opaque sensible body1 this circumstance alters the case2 so that a faint appearance this way caused does not suggest greater magnitude1 because it hath not been experienced to co-exist with it4 #gc4 ,faintness1 as well as all other ideas or perceptions which suggest magnitude or distance1 does it in the same way that words suggest the notions to which they are annexed4 ,now1 it is known a word pronounced with certain circumstances1 or in a certain context with other words1 hath not always the same import and signification that it hath when pronounced in some other circumstances1 or different context of words4 ,the very same visible appearance1 as to faintness and all other respects1 if placed on high1 shall not suggest the same magnitude that it would if it were seen at an equal distance on a level with the eye4 ,the reason whereof is1 that we are rarely accustomed to view objects at a great height2 our concerns lie among things situated rather before than above us2 and accordingly our eyes are not placed on the top of our heads1 but in such a position as is most convenient for us to see distant objects standing in our way4 ,and1 this situation of them being a circumstance which usually attends the vision of distant objects1 we may from hence account for 7what is commonly observed7 an object's appearing of different magnitude1 even with respect to its horizontal extension1 on the top of a steeple1 e4g4 a hundred feet high1 to one standing below1 from what it would if placed at a hundred feet distance1 on a level with his eye4 ,for1 it hath been shewn that the judgment we make on the magnitude of a thing depends not on the visible appearance only1 but also on divers other circumstances1 any one of which being omitted or varied may suffice to make some alteration in our judgment4 ,hence1 the circumstance of viewing a distant object in such a situation as is usual and suits with the ordinary posture of the head and eyes1 being omitted1 and instead thereof a different situation of the object1 which requires a different posture of the head1 taking place--it is not to be wondered at if the magnitude be judged different4 ,but it will be demanded1 why a high object should constantly appear less than an equidistant low object of the same dimensions2 for so it is observed to be4 ,it may indeed be granted that the variation of some circumstances may vary the judgment made on the magnitude of high objects1 which we are less used to look at2 but it does not hence appear why they should be judged less rather than greater8 ,i answer1 that in case the magnitude of distant objects was suggested by the extent of their visible appearance alone1 and thought proportional thereto1 it is certain they would then be judged much less than now they seem to be4 7,vid4 sect4 #gi47 ,but1 several circumstances concurring to form the judgment we make on the magnitude of distant objects1 by means of which they appear far larger than others whose visible appearance hath an equal or even greater extension1 it follows that upon the change or omission of any of those circumstances which are wont to attend the vision of distant objects1 and so come to influence the judgments made on their magnitude1 they shall proportionally appear less than otherwise they would4 ,for1 any of those things that caused an object to be thought greater than in proportion to its visible extension being either omitted1 or applied without the usual circumstances1 the judgment depends more entirely on the visible extension2 and consequently the object must be judged less4 ,thus1 in the present case the situation of the thing seen being different from what it usually is in those objects we have occasion to view1 and whose magnitude we observe1 it follows that the very same object being a hundred feet high1 should seem less than if it was a hundred feet off1 on 7or nearly on7 a level with the eye4 ,what has been here set forth seems to me to have no small share in contributing to magnify the appearance of the horizontal moon1 and deserves not to be passed over in the explication of it4 #gd4 ,if we attentively consider the phenomenon before us1 we shall find the not discerning between the mediate and immediate objects of sight to be the chief cause of the difficulty that occurs in the explication of it4 ,the magnitude of the visible moon1 or that which is the proper and immediate object of vision7#cfa71 is no greater when the moon is in the horizon than when it is in the meridian4 ,how comes it1 therefore1 to seem greater in one situation than the other8 ,what is it can put this cheat on the understanding8 ,it has no other perception of the moon than what it gets by sight4 ,and that which is seen is of the same extent--,i say1 the visible appearance hath the very same1 or rather a less1 magnitude1 when the moon is viewed in the horizontal than when in the meridional position4 ,and yet it is esteemed greater in the former than in the latter4 ,herein consists the difficulty2 which doth vanish and admit of the most easy solution1 if we consider that as the visible moon is not greater in the horizon than in the meridian1 so neither is it thought to be so4 ,it hath been already shewn that1 in any act of vision1 the visible object absolutely1 or in itself1 is little taken notice of--the mind still carrying its view from that to some tangible ideas1 which have been observed to be connected with it1 and by that means come to be suggested by it4 ,so that when a thing is said to appear great or small1 or whatever estimate be made of the magnitude of any thing1 this is meant not of the visible but of the tangible object4 ,this duly considered1 it will be no hard matter to reconcile the seeming contradiction there is1 that the moon should appear of a different bigness1 the visible magnitude thereof remaining still the same4 ,for1 by sect4 #ef1 the very same visible extension1 with a different faintness1 shall suggest a different tangible extension4 ,when therefore the horizontal moon is said to appear greater than the meridional moon1 this must be understood1 not of a greater visible extension1 but of a greater tangible extension1 which1 by reason of the more than ordinary faintness of the visible appearance1 is suggested to the mind along with it4 #ge4 ,many attempts have been made by learned men to account for this appearance7#cfb74 ,gassendus7#cfc71 ,des ,cartes7#cfd71 ,hobbes7#cfe71 and several others have employed their thoughts on that subject2 but how fruitless and unsatisfactory their endeavours have been is sufficiently shewn in the ,philosophical ,transactions7#cff7 7,numb4 #ahg1 p4 #cad71 where you may see their several opinions at large set forth and confuted1 not without some surprise at the gross blunders that ingenious men have been forced into by endeavouring to reconcile this appearance with the ordinary principles of optics7#cfg74 ,since the writing of which there hath been published in the ,transactions 7,numb4 #ahg1 p4 #cbc7 another paper relating to the same affair1 by the celebrated ,dr4 ,wallis1 wherein he attempts to account for that phenomenon2 which1 though it seems not to contain anything new1 or different from what had been said before by others1 ,i shall nevertheless consider in this place4 #gf4 ,his opinion1 in short1 is this3--,we judge not of the magnitude of an object by the optic angle alone1 but by the optic angle in conjunction with the distance4 ,hence1 though the angle remain the same1 or even become less1 yet1 if withal the distance seem to have been increased1 the object shall appear greater4 ,now1 one way whereby we estimate the distance of anything is by the number and extent of the intermediate objects4 ,when therefore the moon is seen in the horizon1 the variety of fields1 houses1 c4 together with the large prospect of the wide extended land or sea that lies between the eye and the utmost limb of the horizon1 suggest unto the mind the idea of greater distance1 and consequently magnify the appearance4 ,and this1 according to ,dr4 ,wallis1 is the true account of the extraordinary largeness attributed by the mind to the horizontal moon1 at a time when the angle subtended by its diameter is not one jot greater than it used to be4 #gg4 ,with reference to this opinion1 not to repeat what has been already said concerning distance7#cfh71 ,i shall only observe1 first1 that if the prospect of interjacent objects be that which suggests the idea of farther distance1 and this idea of farther distance be the cause that brings into the mind the idea of greater magnitude1 it should hence follow that if one looked at the horizontal moon from behind a wall1 it would appear no bigger than ordinary4 ,for1 in that case1 the wall interposing cuts off all that prospect of sea and land1 c4 which might otherwise increase the apparent distance1 and thereby the apparent magnitude of the moon4 ,nor will it suffice to say1 the memory doth even then suggest all that extent of land1 c4 which lies within the horizon1 which suggestion occasions a sudden judgment of sense1 that the moon is farther off and larger than usual4 ,for1 ask any man who from such a station beholding the horizontal moon shall think her greater than usual1 whether he hath at that time in his mind any idea of the intermediate objects1 or long tract of land that lies between his eye and the extreme edge of the horizon8 and whether it be that idea which is the cause of his making the aforementioned judgment8 ,he will1 without doubt1 reply in the negative1 and declare the horizontal moon shall appear greater than the meridional1 though he never thinks of all or any of those things that lie between him and it4 ,and as for the absurdity of any idea's introducing into the mind another1 whilst itself is not perceived1 this has already fallen under our observation1 and is too evident to need any farther enlargement on it7#cfi74 ,secondly1 it seems impossible1 by this hypothesis1 to account for the moon's appearing1 in the very same situation1 at one time greater than at another2 which1 nevertheless1 has been shewn to be very agreeable to the principles we have laid down1 and receives a most easy and natural explication from them4 7#cgj7;,for the further clearing up of this point1 it is to be observed1 that what we immediately and properly see are only lights and colours in sundry situations and shades1 and degrees of faintness and clearness1 confusion and distinctness4 ,all which visible objects are only in the mind2 nor do they suggest aught external7#cga71 whether distance or magnitude1 otherwise than by habitual connexion1 as words do things4 ,we are also to remark1 that beside the straining of the eyes1 and beside the vivid and faint1 the distinct and confused appearances 7which1 bearing some proportion to lines and angles1 have been substituted instead of them in the foregoing part of this ,treatise71 there are other means which suggest both distance and magnitude--particularly the situation of visible points or objects1 as upper or lower2 the former suggesting a farther distance and greater magnitude1 the latter a nearer distance and lesser magnitude--all which is an effect only of custom and experience1 there being really nothing intermediate in the line of distance between the uppermost and the lowermost1 which are both equidistant1 or rather at no distance from the eye2 as there is also nothing in upper or lower which by necessary connexion should suggest greater or lesser magnitude4 ,now1 as these customary experimental means of suggesting distance do likewise suggest magnitude1 so they suggest the one as immediately as the other4 ,i say1 they do not 7vide sect4 #ec7 first suggest distance1 and then leave the mind from thence to infer or compute magnitude1 but suggest magnitude as immediately and directly as they suggest distance4 #gh4 ,this phenomenon of the horizontal moon is a clear instance of the insufficiency of lines and angles for explaining the way wherein the mind perceives and estimates the magnitude of outward objects4 ,there is1 nevertheless1 a use of computation by them7#cgb7--;in order to determine the apparent magnitude of things1 so far as they have a connexion with and are proportional to those other ideas or perceptions which are the true and immediate occasions that suggest to the mind the apparent magnitude of things4 ,but this in general may1 ,i think1 be observed concerning mathematical computation in optics--that it can never7#cgc7 be very precise and exact7#cgd71 since the judgments we make of the magnitude of external things do often depend on several circumstances which are not proportional to or capable of being defined by lines and angles4 #gi4 ,from what has been said1 we may safely deduce this consequence1 to wit1 that a man born blind1 and made to see1 would1 at first opening of his eyes1 make a very different judgment of the magnitude of objects intromitted by them from what others do4 ,he would not consider the ideas of sight with reference to1 or as having any connexion with1 the ideas of touch4 ,his view of them being entirely terminated within themselves1 he can no otherwise judge them great or small than as they contain a greater or lesser number of visible points4 ,now1 it being certain that any visible point can cover or exclude from view only one other visible point1 it follows that whatever object intercepts the view of another hath an equal number of visible points with it2 and1 consequently1 they shall both be thought by him to have the same magnitude4 ,hence1 it is evident one in those circumstances would judge his thumb1 with which he might hide a tower1 or hinder its being seen1 equal to that tower2 or his hand1 the interposition whereof might conceal the firmament from his view1 equal to the firmament3 how great an inequality soever there may1 in our apprehensions1 seem to be betwixt those two things1 because of the customary and close connexion that has grown up in our minds between the objects of sight and touch1 whereby the very different and distinct ideas of those two senses are so blended and confounded together as to be mistaken for one and the same thing--out of which prejudice we cannot easily extricate ourselves4 #hj4 ,for the better explaining the nature of vision1 and setting the manner wherein we perceive magnitudes in a due light1 ,i shall proceed to make some observations concerning matters relating thereto1 whereof the want of reflection1 and duly separating between tangible and visible ideas1 is apt to create in us mistaken and confused notions4 ,and1 first1 ,i shall observe1 that the minimum visibile is exactly equal in all beings whatsoever that are endowed with the visive faculty7#cge74 ,no exquisite formation of the eye1 no peculiar sharpness of sight1 can make it less in one creature than in another2 for1 it not being distinguishable into parts1 nor in anywise consisting of them1 it must necessarily be the same to all4 ,for1 suppose it otherwise1 and that the minimum visibile of a mite1 for instance1 be less than the minimum visibile of a man2 the latter therefore may1 by detraction of some part1 be made equal to the former4 ,it doth therefore consist of parts1 which is inconsistent with the notion of a minimum visibile or point4 #ha4 ,it will1 perhaps1 be objected1 that the minimum visibile of a man doth really and in itself contain parts whereby it surpasses that of a mite1 though they are not perceivable by the man4 ,to which ,i answer1 the minimum visibile having 7in like manner as all other the proper and immediate objects of sight7 been shewn not to have any existence without the mind of him who sees it1 it follows there cannot be any part of it that is not actually perceived and therefore visible4 ,now1 for any object to contain several distinct visible parts1 and at the same time to be a minimum visibile1 is a manifest contradiction4 #hb4 ,of these visible points we see at all times an equal number4 ,it is every whit as great when our view is contracted and bounded by near objects as when it is extended to larger and remoter ones4 ,for1 it being impossible that one minimum visibile should obscure or keep out of sight more than one other1 it is a plain consequence that1 when my view is on all sides bounded by the walls of my study1 ,i see just as many visible points as ,i could in case that1 by the removal of the study-walls and all other obstructions1 ,i had a full prospect of the circumjacent fields1 mountains1 sea1 and open firmament4 ,for1 so long as ,i am shut up within the walls1 by their interposition every point of the external objects is covered from my view4 ,but1 each point that is seen being able to cover or exclude from sight one only other corresponding point1 it follows that1 whilst my sight is confined to those narrow walls1 ,i see as many points1 or minima visibilia1 as ,i should were those walls away1 by looking on all the external objects whose prospect is intercepted by them4 ,whenever1 therefore1 we are said to have a greater prospect at one time than another1 this must be understood with relation1 not to the proper and immediate1 but the secondary and mediate objects of vision--which1 as hath been shewn1 do properly belong to the touch4 #hc4 ,the visive faculty1 considered with reference to its immediate objects1 may be found to labour of two defects4 ,first1 in respect of the extent or number of visible points that are at once perceivable by it1 which is narrow and limited to a certain degree4 ,it can take in at one view but a certain determinate number of minima visibilia1 beyond which it cannot extend its prospect4 ,secondly1 our sight is defective in that its view is not only narrow1 but also for the most part confused4 ,of those things that we take in at one prospect1 we can see but a few at once clearly and unconfusedly2 and the more we fix our sight on any one object1 by so much the darker and more indistinct shall the rest appear4 #hd4 ,corresponding to these two defects of sight1 we may imagine as many perfections1 to wit1 #ast4 ,that of comprehending in one view a greater number of visible points2 #b;dly1 of being able to view them all equally and at once1 with the utmost clearness and distinction4 ,that those perfections are not actually in some intelligences of a different order and capacity from ours1 it is impossible for us to know7#cgf74 #he4 ,in neither of those two ways do microscopes contribute to the improvement of sight4 ,for1 when we look through a microscope1 we neither see more visible points1 nor are the collateral points more distinct1 than when we look with the naked eye at objects placed at a due distance4 ,a microscope brings us1 as it were1 into a new world4 ,it presents us with a new scene of visible objects1 quite different from what we behold with the naked eye4 ,but herein consists the most remarkable difference1 to wit1 that whereas the objects perceived by the eye alone have a certain connexion with tangible objects1 whereby we are taught to foresee what will ensue upon the approach or application of distant objects to the parts of our own body--which much conduceth to its preservation7#cgg7--there is not the like connexion between things tangible and those visible objects that are perceived by help of a fine microscope4 #hf4 ,hence1 it is evident that1 were our eyes turned into the nature of microscopes1 we should not be much benefitted by the change4 ,we should be deprived of the forementioned advantage we at present receive by the visive faculty1 and have left us only the empty amusement of seeing1 without any other benefit arising from it4 ,but1 in that case1 it will perhaps be said1 our sight would be endued with a far greater sharpness and penetration than it now hath4 ,but ,i would fain know wherein consists that sharpness which is esteemed so great an excellency of sight4 ,it is certain1 from what we have already shewn7#cgh71 that the minimum visibile is never greater or lesser1 but in all cases constantly the same4 ,and in the case of microscopical eyes1 ,i see only this difference1 to wit1 that upon the ceasing of a certain observable connexion betwixt the divers perceptions of sight and touch1 which before enabled us to regulate our actions by the eye1 it would now be rendered utterly unserviceable to that purpose4 #hg4 ,upon the whole1 it seems that if we consider the use and end of sight1 together with the present state and circumstances of our being1 we shall not find any great cause to complain of any defect or imperfection in it1 or easily conceive how it could be mended4 ,with such admirable wisdom is that faculty contrived1 both for the pleasure and convenience of life4 #hh4 ,having finished what ,i intended to say concerning the ,distance and ,magnitude of objects1 ,i come now to treat of the manner wherein the mind perceives by sight their ,situation7#cgi74 ,among the discoveries of the last age1 it is reputed none of the least1 that the manner of vision has been more clearly explained than ever it had been before4 ,there is1 at this day1 no one ignorant that the pictures of external objects are painted on the retina or fund of the eye2 that we can see nothing which is not so painted2 and that1 according as the picture is more distinct or confused1 so also is the perception we have of the object7#chj74 ,but then1 in this explication of vision1 there occurs one mighty difficulty1 viz4 the objects are painted in an inverted order on the bottom of the eye3 the upper part of any object being painted on the lower part of the eye1 and the lower part of the object on the upper part of the eye2 and so also as to right and left4 ,since therefore the pictures are thus inverted1 it is demanded1 how it comes to pass that we see the objects erect and in their natural posture8 ,illustration ,figure #d #hi4 ,in answer to this difficulty1 we are told that the mind1 perceiving an impulse of a ray of light on the upper part of the eye1 considers this ray as coming in a direct line from the lower part of the object2 and1 in like manner1 tracing the ray that strikes on the lower part of the eye1 it is directed to the upper part of the object4 ,thus1 in the adjacent figure1 ,c1 the lower point of the object ,,abc1 is projected on c the upper part of the eye4 ,so likewise1 the highest point ,a is projected on a the lowest part of the eye2 which makes the representation cba inverted4 ,but the mind--considering the stroke that is made on c as coming in the straight line ,cc from the lower end of the object2 and the stroke or impulse on a1 as coming in the line ,aa from the upper end of the object--is directed to make a right judgment of the situation of the object ,,abc1 notwithstanding the picture of it be inverted4 ,moreover1 this is illustrated by conceiving a blind man1 who1 holding in his hands two sticks that cross each other1 doth with them touch the extremities of an object1 placed in a perpendicular situation7#cha74 ,it is certain this man will judge that to be the upper part of the object which he touches with the stick held in the undermost hand1 and that to be the lower part of the object which he touches with the stick in his uppermost hand4 ,this is the common explication of the erect appearance of objects1 which is generally received and acquiesced in1 being 7as ,mr4 ,molyneux tells us1 ,diopt4 part ii4 ch4 vii4 p4 #bhi7 8allowed by all men as satisfactory40 #ij4 ,but this account to me does not seem in any degree true4 ,did ,i perceive those impulses1 decussations1 and directions of the rays of light1 in like manner as hath been set forth1 then1 indeed1 it would not at first view be altogether void of probability4 ,and there might be some pretence for the comparison of the blind man and his cross sticks4 ,but the case is far otherwise4 ,i know very well that ,i perceive no such thing4 ,and1 of consequence1 ,i cannot thereby make an estimate of the situation of objects4 ,moreover1 ,i appeal to any one's experience1 whether he be conscious to himself that he thinks on the intersection made by the radius pencils1 or pursues the impulses they give in right lines1 whenever he perceives by sight the position of any object8 ,to me it seems evident that crossing and tracing of the rays1 c4 is never thought on by children1 idiots1 or1 in truth1 by any other1 save only those who have applied themselves to the study of optics4 ,and for the mind to judge of the situation of objects by those things without perceiving them1 or to perceive them without knowing it7#chb71 take which you please1 it is perfectly beyond my comprehension4 ,add to this1 that the explaining the manner of vision by the example of cross sticks1 and hunting for the object along the axes of the radius pencils1 doth suppose the proper objects of sight to be perceived at a distance from us1 contrary to what hath been demonstrated7#chc74 ,we may therefore venture to pronounce this opinion1 concerning the way wherein the mind perceives the erect appearance of objects1 to be of a piece with those other tenets of writers in optics1 which in the foregoing parts of this treatise we have had occasion to examine and refute7#chd74 #ia4 ,it remains1 therefore1 that we look for some other explication of this difficulty4 ,and ,i believe it not impossible to find one1 provided we examine it to the bottom1 and carefully distinguish between the ideas of sight and touch2 which cannot be too oft inculcated in treating of vision7#che74 ,but1 more especially throughout the consideration of this affair1 we ought to carry that distinction in our thoughts2 for that from want of a right understanding thereof1 the difficulty of explaining erect vision seems chiefly to arise4 #ib4 ,in order to disentangle our minds from whatever prejudices we may entertain with relation to the subject in hand1 nothing seems more apposite than the taking into our thoughts the case of one born blind1 and afterwards1 when grown up1 made to see4 ,and--though perhaps it may not be a task altogether easy and familiar to us1 to divest ourselves entirely of the experiences received from sight1 so as to be able to put our thoughts exactly in the posture of such a one's--we must1 nevertheless1 as far as possible1 endeavour to frame true conceptions of what might reasonably be supposed to pass in his mind7#chf74 #ic4 ,it is certain that a man actually blind1 and who had continued so from his birth1 would1 by the sense of feeling1 attain to have ideas of upper and lower4 ,by the motion of his hand1 he might discern the situation of any tangible object placed within his reach4 ,that part on which he felt himself supported1 or towards which he perceived his body to gravitate1 he would term lower1 and the contrary to this upper2 and accordingly denominate whatsoever objects he touched4 #id4 ,but then1 whatever judgments he makes concerning the situation of objects are confined to those only that are perceivable by touch4 ,all those things that are intangible1 and of a spiritual nature--his thoughts and desires1 his passions1 and in general all the modifications of his soul--to these he would never apply the terms upper and lower1 except only in a metaphorical sense4 ,he may perhaps1 by way of allusion1 speak of high or low thoughts3 but those terms1 in their proper signification1 would never be applied to anything that was not conceived to exist without the mind4 ,for1 a man born blind1 and remaining in the same state1 could mean nothing else by the words higher and lower than a greater or lesser distance from the earth2 which distance he would measure by the motion or application of his hand1 or some other part of his body4 ,it is1 therefore1 evident that all those things which1 in respect of each other1 would by him be thought higher or lower1 must be such as were conceived to exist without his mind1 in the ambient space7#chg74 #ie4 ,whence it plainly follows1 that such a one1 if we suppose him made to see1 would not at first sight think that anything he saw was high or low1 erect or inverted4 ,for1 it hath been already demonstrated1 in sect4 #da1 that he would not think the things he perceived by sight to be at any distance from him1 or without his mind4 ,the objects to which he had hitherto been used to apply the terms up and down1 high and low1 were such only as affected1 or were some way perceived by his touch4 ,but the proper objects of vision make a new set of ideas1 perfectly distinct and different from the former1 and which can in no sort make themselves perceived by touch4 ,there is1 therefore1 nothing at all that could induce him to think those terms applicable to them4 ,nor would he ever think it1 till such time as he had observed their connexion with tangible objects1 and the same prejudice7#chh7 began to insinuate itself into his understanding1 which1 from their infancy1 had grown up in the understandings of other men4 #if4 ,to set this matter in a clearer light1 ,i shall make use of an example4 ,suppose the above-mentioned blind person1 by his touch1 perceives a man to stand erect4 ,let us inquire into the manner of this4 ,by the application of his hand to the several parts of a human body1 he had perceived different tangible ideas2 which being collected into sundry complex ones7#chi7 have distinct names annexed to them4 ,thus1 one combination of a certain tangible figure1 bulk1 and consistency of parts is called the head2 another the hand2 a third the foot1 and so of the rest--all which complex ideas could1 in his understanding1 be made up only of ideas perceivable by touch4 ,he had also1 by his touch1 obtained an idea of earth or ground1 towards which he perceives the parts of his body to have a natural tendency4 ,now--by erect nothing more being meant than that perpendicular position of a man wherein his feet are nearest to the earth--if the blind person1 by moving his hand over the parts of the man who stands before him1 do perceive the tangible ideas that compose the head to be farthest from1 and those that compose the feet to be nearest to1 that other combination of tangible ideas which he calls earth1 he will denominate that man erect4 ,but1 if we suppose him on a sudden to receive his sight1 and that he behold a man standing before him1 it is evident1 in that case1 he would neither judge the man he sees to be erect nor inverted2 for he1 never having known those terms applied to any other save tangible things1 or which existed in the space without him1 and what he sees neither being tangible1 nor perceived as existing without1 he could not know that1 in propriety of language1 they were applicable to it4 #ig4 ,afterwards1 when1 upon turning his head or eyes up and down to the right and left1 he shall observe the visible objects to change1 and shall also attain to know that they are called by the same names1 and connected with the objects perceived by touch2 then1 indeed1 he will come to speak of them and their situation in the same terms that he has been used to apply to tangible things3 and those that he perceives by turning up his eyes he will call upper1 and those that by turning down his eyes he will call lower4 #ih4 ,and this seems to me the true reason why he should think those objects uppermost that are painted on the lower part of his eye4 ,for1 by turning the eye up they shall be distinctly seen2 as likewise they that are painted on the highest part of the eye shall be distinctly seen by turning the eye down1 and are for that reason esteemed lowest4 ,for we have shewn that to the immediate objects of sight1 considered in themselves1 he would not attribute the terms high and low4 ,it must therefore be on account of some circumstances which are observed to attend them4 ,and these1 it is plain1 are the actions of turning the eye up and down1 which suggest a very obvious reason why the mind should denominate the objects of sight accordingly high or low4 ,and1 without this motion of the eye--this turning it up and down in order to discern different objects--doubtless erect1 inverse1 and other the like terms relating to the position of tangible objects1 would never have been transferred1 or in any degree apprehended to belong to the ideas of sight1 the mere act of seeing including nothing in it to that purpose2 whereas the different situations of the eye naturally direct the mind to make a suitable judgment of the situation of objects intromitted by it7#cij74 #ii4 ,farther1 when he has by experience learned the connexion there is between the several ideas of sight and touch1 he will be able1 by the perception he has of the situation of visible things in respect of one another1 to make a sudden and true estimate of the situation of outward1 tangible things corresponding to them4 ,and thus it is he shall perceive7#cia7 by sight the situation of external7#cib7 objects1 which do not properly fall under that sense4 #ajj4 ,i know we are very prone to think that1 if just made to see1 we should judge of the situation of visible things as we do now4 ,but1 we are also as prone to think that1 at first sight1 we should in the same way apprehend the distance and magnitude of objects1 as we do now2 which hath been shewn to be a false and groundless persuasion4 ,and1 for the like reasons1 the same censure may be passed on the positive assurance that most men1 before they have thought sufficiently of the matter1 might have of their being able to determine by the eye1 at first view1 whether objects were erect or inverse4 #aja4 ,it will perhaps be objected to our opinion1 that a man1 for instance1 being thought erect when his feet are next the earth1 and inverted when his head is next the earth1 it doth hence follow that1 by the mere act of vision1 without any experience or altering the situation of the eye1 we should have determined whether he were erect or inverted4 ,for both the earth itself1 and the limbs of the man who stands thereon1 being equally perceived by sight1 one cannot choose seeing what part of the man is nearest the earth1 and what part farthest from it1 i4e4 whether he be erect or inverted4 #ajb4 ,to which ,i answer1 the ideas which constitute the tangible earth and man are entirely different from those which constitute the visible earth and man4 ,nor was it possible1 by virtue of the visive faculty alone1 without superadding any experience of touch1 or altering the position of the eye1 ever to have known1 or so much as suspected1 there had been any relation or connexion between them4 ,hence1 a man at first view would not denominate anything he saw1 earth1 or head1 or foot2 and consequently1 he could not tell1 by the mere act of vision1 whether the head or feet were nearest the earth4 ,nor1 indeed1 would we have thereby any thought of earth or man1 erect or inverse1 at all--which will be made yet more evident1 if we nicely observe1 and make a particular comparison between1 the ideas of both senses4 #ajc4 ,that which ,i see is only variety of light and colours4 ,that which ,i feel is hard or soft1 hot or cold1 rough or smooth4 ,what similitude1 what connexion1 have those ideas with these8 ,or1 how is it possible that any one should see reason to give one and the same name7#cic7 to combinations of ideas so very different1 before he had experienced their co-existence8 ,we do not find there is any necessary connexion betwixt this or that tangible quality1 and any colour whatsoever4 ,and we may sometimes perceive colours1 where there is nothing to be felt4 ,all which doth make it manifest that no man1 at first receiving of his sight7#cid71 would know there was any agreement between this or that particular object of his sight and any object of touch he had been already acquainted with4 ,the colours therefore of the head would to him no more suggest the idea of head7#cie7 than they would the idea of feet4 #ajd4 ,farther1 we have at large shewn 7vid4 sect4 #fc and #fd7 there is no discoverable necessary connexion between any given visible magnitude and any one particular tangible magnitude2 but that it is entirely the result of custom and experience1 and depends on foreign and accidental circumstances1 that we can1 by the perception of visible extension1 inform ourselves what may be the extension of any tangible object connected with it4 ,hence1 it is certain1 that neither the visible magnitude of head or foot would bring along with them into the mind1 at first opening of the eyes1 the respective tangible magnitudes of those parts4 #aje4 ,by the foregoing section1 it is plain the visible figure of any part of the body hath no necessary connexion with the tangible figure thereof1 so as at first sight to suggest it to the mind4 ,for1 figure is the termination of magnitude4 ,whence it follows that no visible magnitude having in its own nature an aptness to suggest any one particular tangible magnitude1 so neither can any visible figure be inseparably connected with its corresponding tangible figure1 so as of itself1 and in a way prior to experience1 it might suggest it to the understanding4 ,this will be farther evident1 if we consider that what seems smooth and round to the touch may to sight1 if viewed through a microscope1 seem quite otherwise4 #ajf4 ,from all which1 laid together and duly considered1 we may clearly deduce this inference3--,in the first act of vision1 no idea entering by the eye would have a perceivable connexion with the ideas to which the names earth1 man1 head1 foot1 c4 were annexed in the understanding of a person blind from his birth2 so as in any sort to introduce them into his mind1 or make themselves be called by the same names1 and reputed the same things with them1 as afterwards they come to be4 #ajg4 ,there doth1 nevertheless1 remain one difficulty1 which to some may seem to press hard on our opinion1 and deserve not to be passed over4 ,for1 though it be granted that neither the colour1 size1 nor figure of the visible feet have any necessary connexion with the ideas that compose the tangible feet1 so as to bring them at first sight into my mind1 or make me in danger of confounding them1 before ,i had been used to and for some time experienced their connexion2 yet thus much seems undeniable1 namely1 that the number of the visible feet being the same with that of the tangible feet1 ,i may from hence1 without any experience of sight1 reasonably conclude that they represent or are connected with the feet rather than the head4 ,i say1 it seems the idea of two visible feet will sooner suggest to the mind the idea of two tangible feet than of one head--so that the blind man1 upon first reception of the visive faculty1 might know which were the feet or two1 and which the head or one4 #ajh4 ,in order to get clear of this seeming difficulty1 we need only observe that diversity of visible objects does not necessarily infer diversity of tangible objects corresponding to them4 ,a picture painted with great variety of colours affects the touch in one uniform manner2 it is therefore evident that ,i do not1 by any necessary consecution1 independent of experience1 judge of the number of things tangible from the number of things visible4 ,i should not therefore at first opening my eyes conclude that because ,i see two ,i shall feel two4 ,how1 therefore1 can ,i1 before experience teaches me1 know that the visible legs1 because two1 are connected with the tangible legs2 or the visible head1 because one1 is connected with the tangible head8 ,the truth is1 the things ,i see are so very different and heterogeneous from the things ,i feel that the perception of the one would never have suggested the other to my thoughts1 or enabled me to pass the least judgment thereon1 until ,i had experienced their connexion7#cif74 #aji4 ,but1 for a fuller illustration of this matter1 it ought to be considered1 that number 7however some may reckon it amongst the primary qualities7#cig77 is nothing fixed and settled1 really existing in things themselves4 ,it is entirely the creature of the mind1 considering either a simple idea by itself1 or any combination of simple ideas to which it gives one name1 and so makes it pass for a unit4 ,according as the mind variously combines its ideas1 the unit varies2 and as the unit1 so the number1 which is only a collection of units1 doth also vary4 ,we call a window one1 a chimney one2 and yet a house1 in which there are many windows and many chimneys1 has an equal right to be called one2 and many houses go to the making of one city4 ,in these and the like instances1 it is evident the unit constantly relates to the particular draughts the mind makes of its ideas1 to which it affixes names1 and wherein it includes more or less1 as best suits its own ends and purposes4 ,whatever therefore the mind considers as one1 that is an unit4 ,every combination of ideas is considered as one thing by the mind1 and in token thereof is marked by one name4 ,now1 this naming and combining together of ideas is perfectly arbitrary1 and done by the mind in such sort as experience shews it to be most convenient--without which our ideas had never been collected into such sundry distinct combinations as they now are4 #aaj4 ,hence1 it follows that a man born blind1 and afterwards1 when grown up1 made to see1 would not1 in the first act of vision1 parcel out the ideas of sight into the same distinct collections that others do who have experienced which do regularly co-exist and are proper to be bundled up together under one name4 ,he would not1 for example1 make into one complex idea1 and thereby esteem and unite all those particular ideas which constitute the visible head or foot4 ,for1 there can be no reason assigned why he should do so1 barely upon his seeing a man stand upright before him4 ,there crowd into his mind the ideas which compose the visible man1 in company with all the other ideas of sight perceived at the same time4 ,but1 all these ideas offered at once to his view he would not distribute into sundry distinct combinations1 till such time as1 by observing the motion of the parts of the man and other experiences1 he comes to know which are to be separated and which to be collected together7#cih74 #aaa4 ,from what hath been premised1 it is plain the objects of sight and touch make1 if ,i may so say1 two sets of ideas1 which are widely different from each other4 ,to objects of either kind we indifferently attribute the terms high and low1 right and left1 and such like1 denoting the position or situation of things2 but then we must well observe that the position of any object is determined with respect only to objects of the same sense4 ,we say any object of touch is high or low1 according as it is more or less distant from the tangible earth3 and in like manner we denominate any object of sight high or low1 in proportion as it is more or less distant from the visible earth4 ,but1 to define the situation of visible things with relation to the distance they bear from any tangible thing1 or vice versa1 this were absurd and perfectly unintelligible4 ,for all visible things are equally in the mind1 and take up no part of the external space2 and consequently are equidistant from any tangible thing which exists without the mind7#cii74 #aab4 ,or rather1 to speak truly1 the proper objects of sight are at no distance1 neither near nor far from any tangible thing4 ,for1 if we inquire narrowly into the matter1 we shall find that those things only are compared together in respect of distance which exist after the same manner1 or appertain unto the same sense4 ,for1 by the distance between any two points1 nothing more is meant than the number of intermediate points4 ,if the given points are visible1 the distance between them is marked out by the number of the interjacent visible points2 if they are tangible1 the distance between them is a line consisting of tangible points2 but1 if they are one tangible and the other visible1 the distance between them doth neither consist of points perceivable by sight nor by touch1 i4e4 it is utterly inconceivable7#djj74 ,this1 perhaps1 will not find an easy admission into all men's understanding4 ,however1 ,i should gladly be informed whether it be not true1 by any one who will be at the pains to reflect a little1 and apply it home to his thoughts4 #aac4 ,the not observing what has been delivered in the two last sections1 seems to have occasioned no small part of the difficulty that occurs in the business of direct appearances4 ,the head1 which is painted nearest the earth1 seems to be farthest from it2 and on the other hand1 the feet1 which are painted farthest from the earth1 are thought nearest to it4 ,herein lies the difficulty1 which vanishes if we express the thing more clearly and free from ambiguity1 thus3--,how comes it that1 to the eye1 the visible head1 which is nearest the tangible earth1 seems farthest from the earth2 and the visible feet1 which are farthest from the tangible earth1 seem nearest the earth8 ,the question being thus proposed1 who sees not the difficulty is founded on a supposition that the eye or visive faculty1 or rather the soul by means thereof1 should judge of the situation of visible objects with reference to their distance from the tangible earth8 ,whereas1 it is evident the tangible earth is not perceived by sight4 ,and it hath been shewn1 in the two last preceding sections1 that the location of visible objects is determined only by the distance they bear from one another1 and that it is nonsense to talk of distance1 far or near1 between a visible and tangible thing4 #aad4 ,if we confine our thoughts to the proper objects of sight1 the whole is plain and easy4 ,the head is painted farthest from1 and the feet nearest to1 the visible earth2 and so they appear to be4 ,what is there strange or unaccountable in this8 ,let us suppose the pictures in the fund of the eye to be the immediate objects of sight7#dja74 ,the consequence is that things should appear in the same posture they are painted in2 and is it not so8 ,the head which is seen seems farthest from the earth which is seen2 and the feet which are seen seem nearest to the earth which is seen4 ,and just so they are painted4 #aae4 ,but1 say you1 the picture of the man is inverted1 and yet the appearance is erect4 ,i ask1 what mean you by the picture of the man1 or1 which is the same thing1 the visible man's being inverted8 ,you tell me it is inverted1 because the heels are uppermost and the head undermost8 ,explain me this4 ,you say that by the head's being undermost1 you mean that it is nearest to the earth2 and1 by the heels being uppermost1 that they are farthest from the earth4 ,i ask again1 what earth you mean8 ,you cannot mean the earth that is painted on the eye or the visible earth--for the picture of the head is farthest from the picture of the earth1 and the picture of the feet nearest to the picture of the earth2 and accordingly the visible head is farthest from the visible earth1 and the visible feet nearest to it4 ,it remains1 therefore1 that you mean the tangible earth2 and so determine the situation of visible things with respect to tangible things--contrary to what hath been demonstrated in sect4 #aaa and #aab4 ,the two distinct provinces of sight and touch should be considered apart1 and as though their objects had no intercourse1 no manner of relation to one another1 in point of distance or position7#djb74 #aaf4 ,farther1 what greatly contributes to make us mistake in this matter is that1 when we think of the pictures in the fund of the eye1 we imagine ourselves looking on the fund of another's eye1 or another looking on the fund of our own eye1 and beholding the pictures painted thereon4 ,suppose two eyes1 ,a and ,b4 ,a from some distance looking on the pictures in ,b sees them inverted1 and for that reason concludes they are inverted in ,b4 ,but this is wrong4 ,there are projected in little on the bottom of ,a the images of the pictures of1 suppose1 man1 earth1 c41 which are painted on ,b4 ,and1 besides these1 the eye ,b itself1 and the objects which environ it1 together with another earth1 are projected in a larger size on ,a4 ,now1 by the eye ,a these larger images are deemed the true objects1 and the lesser only pictures in miniature4 ,and it is with respect to those greater images that it determines the situation of the smaller images2 so that1 comparing the little man with the great earth1 ,a judges him inverted1 or that the feet are farthest from and the head nearest to the great earth4 ,whereas1 if ,a compare the little man with the little earth1 then he will appear erect1 i4e4 his head shall seem farthest from and his feet nearest to the little earth4 ,but we must consider that ,b does not see two earths as ,a does4 ,it sees only what is represented by the little pictures in ,a1 and consequently shall judge the man erect4 ,for1 in truth1 the man in ,b is not inverted1 for there the feet are next the earth2 but it is the representation of it in ,a which is inverted1 for there the head of the representation of the picture of the man in ,b is next the earth1 and the feet farthest from the earth--meaning the earth which is without the representation of the pictures in ,b4 ,for1 if you take the little linages of the pictures in ,b1 and consider them by themselves1 and with respect only to one another1 they are all erect and in their natural posture4 #aag4 ,farther1 there lies a mistake in our imagining that the pictures of external7#djc7 objects are painted on the bottom of the eye4 ,it has been shewn there is no resemblance between the ideas of sight and things tangible4 ,it hath likewise been demonstrated7#djd71 that the proper objects of sight do not exist without the mind4 ,whence it clearly follows that the pictures painted on the bottom of the eye are not the pictures of external objects4 ,let any one consult his own thoughts1 and then tell me1 what affinity1 what likeness1 there is between that certain variety and disposition of colours which constitute the visible man1 or picture of a man1 and that other combination of far different ideas1 sensible by touch1 which compose the tangible man4 ,but1 if this be the case1 how come they to be accounted pictures or images1 since that supposes them to copy or represent some originals or other8 #aah4 ,to which ,i answer--,in the forementioned instance1 the eye ,a takes the little images1 included within the representation of the other eye ,b1 to be pictures or copies1 whereof the archetypes are not things existing without7#dje71 but the larger pictures7#djf7 projected on its own fund2 and which by ,a are not thought pictures1 but the originals or true things themselves4 ,though if we suppose a third eye ,c1 from a due distance1 to behold the fund of ,a1 then indeed the things projected thereon shall1 to ,c1 seem pictures or images1 in the same sense that those projected on ,b do to ,a4 #aai4 ,rightly to conceive the business in hand1 we must carefully distinguish between the ideas of sight and touch1 between the visible and tangible eye2 for certainly on the tangible eye nothing either is or seems to be painted4 ,again1 the visible eye1 as well as all other visible objects1 hath been shewn to exist only in the mind7#djg72 which1 perceiving its own ideas1 and comparing them together1 does call some pictures in respect to others4 ,what hath been said1 being rightly comprehended and laid together1 does1 ,i think1 afford a full and genuine explication of the erect appearance of objects--which phenomenon1 ,i must confess1 ,i do not see how it can be explained by any theories of vision hitherto made public4 #abj4 ,in treating of these things1 the use of language is apt to occasion some obscurity and confusion1 and create in us wrong ideas4 ,for1 language being accommodated to the common notions and prejudices of men1 it is scarce possible to deliver the naked and precise truth1 without great circumlocution1 impropriety1 and 7to an unwary reader7 seeming contradictions4 ,i do1 therefore1 once for all1 desire whoever shall think it worth his while to understand what ,i have written concerning vision1 that he would not stick in this or that phrase or manner of expression1 but candidly collect my meaning from the whole sum and tenor of my discourse1 and1 laying aside the words7#djh7 as much as possible1 consider the bare notions themselves1 and then judge whether they are agreeable to truth and his own experience or no4 #aba4 ,we have shewn the way wherein the mind1 by mediation of visible ideas7#dji71 doth perceive or apprehend the distance1 magnitude1 and situation of tangible objects7#daj74 ,i come now to inquire more particularly concerning the difference between the ideas of sight and touch which are called by the same names1 and see whether there be any idea common to both senses7#daa74 ,from what we have at large set forth and demonstrated in the foregoing parts of this treatise1 it is plain there is no one self-same numerical extension1 perceived both by sight and touch2 but that the particular figures and extensions perceived by sight1 however they may be called by the same names1 and reputed the same things with those perceived by touch1 are nevertheless different1 and have an existence very distinct and separate from them4 ,so that the question is not now concerning the same numerical ideas1 but whether there be any one and the same sort or species of ideas equally perceivable to both senses8 or1 in other words1 whether extension1 figure1 and motion perceived by sight1 are not specifically distinct from extension1 figure1 and motion perceived by touch8 #abb4 ,but1 before ,i come more particularly to discuss this matter1 ,i find it proper to take into my thoughts extension in abstract7#dab74 ,for of this there is much talk2 and ,i am apt to think that when men speak of extension as being an idea common to two senses1 it is with a secret supposition that we can single out extension from all other tangible and visible qualities1 and form thereof an abstract idea1 which idea they will have common both to sight and touch4 ,we are therefore to understand by extension in abstract1 an idea7#dac7 of extension--for instance1 a line or surface entirely stripped of all other sensible qualities and circumstances that might determine it to any particular existence2 it is neither black1 nor white1 nor red1 nor hath it any colour at all1 or any tangible quality whatsoever1 and consequently it is of no finite determinate magnitude7#dad72 for that which bounds or distinguishes one extension from another is some quality or circumstance wherein they disagree4 #abc4 ,now1 ,i do not find that ,i can perceive1 imagine1 or anywise frame in my mind such an abstract idea as is here spoken of4 ,a line or surface which is neither black1 nor white1 nor blue1 nor yellow1 c42 nor long1 nor short1 nor rough1 nor smooth1 nor square1 nor round1 c4 is perfectly incomprehensible4 ,this ,i am sure of as to myself2 how far the faculties of other men may reach they best can tell4 #abd4 ,it is commonly said that the object of geometry is abstract extension4 ,but geometry contemplates figures3 now1 figure is the termination of magnitude7#dae72 but we have shewn that extension in abstract hath no finite determinate magnitude2 whence it clearly follows that it can have no figure1 and consequently is not the object of geometry4 ,it is indeed a tenet1 as well of the modern as the ancient philosophers1 that all general truths are concerning universal abstract ideas2 without which1 we are told1 there could be no science1 no demonstration of any general proposition in geometry4 ,but it were no hard matter1 did ,i think it necessary to my present purpose1 to shew that propositions and demonstrations in geometry might be universal1 though they who make them never think of abstract general ideas of triangles or circles4 #abe4 ,after reiterated efforts and pangs of thought7#daf7 to apprehend the general idea of a triangle7#dag71 ,i have found it altogether incomprehensible4 ,and surely1 if any one were able to let that idea into my mind1 it must be the author7#dah7 of the ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding3 he1 who has so far distinguished himself from the generality of writers1 by the clearness and significancy of what he says4 ,let us therefore see how this celebrated author7#dai7 describes the general or which is the same thing1 the7#dbj7 abstract idea of a triangle4 8,it must be10 says he1 8neither oblique nor rectangle1 neither equilateral1 equicrural1 nor scalenum2 but all and none of these at once4 ,in effect it is somewhat imperfect that cannot exist2 an idea1 wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together40 7,essay on ,human ,understanding1 ,b4 iv4 ch4 #g4 s4 #i47 ,this is the idea which he thinks needful for the enlargement of knowledge1 which is the subject of mathematical demonstration1 and without which we could never come to know any general proposition concerning triangles4 ,sure ,i am1 if this be the case1 it is impossible for me to attain to know even the first elements of geometry3 since ,i have not the faculty to frame in my mind such an idea as is here described7#dba74 ,that author acknowledges it doth 8require some pains and skill to form this general idea of a triangle40 7,ibid47 ,but1 had he called to mind what he says in another place1 to wit1 8that ideas of mixed modes wherein any inconsistent ideas are put together1 cannot so much as exist in the mind1 i4e4 be conceived10 7vid4 ,b4 iii4 ch4 #aj4 s4 #cc1 ibid47--,i say1 had this occurred to his thoughts1 it is not improbable he would have owned it above all the pains and skill he was master of1 to form the above-mentioned idea of a triangle1 which is made up of manifest staring contradictions4 ,that a man of such a clear understanding7#dbb71 who thought so much and so well1 and laid so great a stress on clear and determinate ideas1 should nevertheless talk at this rate1 seems very surprising4 ,but the wonder will lessen1 if it be considered that the source whence this opinion of abstract figures and extension 7#dbc7 flows is the prolific womb which has brought forth innumerable errors and difficulties1 in all parts of philosophy1 and in all the sciences4 ,but this matter1 taken in its full extent1 were a subject too vast and comprehensive to be insisted on in this place7#dbd74 ,i shall only observe that your metaphysicians and men of speculation seem to have faculties distinct from those of ordinary men1 when they talk of general or abstracted triangles and circles1 c41 and so peremptorily declare them to be the subject of all the eternal1 immutable1 universal truths in geometry7#dbe74 ,and so much for extension in abstract4 #abf4 ,some1 perhaps1 may think pure space1 vacuum1 or trine dimension1 to be equally the object of sight and touch7#dbf74 ,but1 though we have a very great propension to think the ideas of outness and space to be the immediate object of sight1 yet1 if ,i mistake not1 in the foregoing parts of this ,essay1 that hath been clearly demonstrated to be a mere delusion1 arising from the quick and sudden suggestion of fancy1 which so closely connects the idea of distance with those of sight1 that we are apt to think it is itself a proper and immediate object of that sense1 till reason corrects the mistake7#dbg74 #abg4 ,it having been shewn that there are no abstract ideas of figure1 and that it is impossible for us1 by any precision of thought1 to frame an idea of extension separate from all other visible and tangible qualities1 which shall be common both to sight and touch--the question now remaining is7#dbh71 whether the particular extensions1 figures1 and motions perceived by sight1 be of the same kind with the particular extensions1 figures1 and motions perceived by touch8 ,in answer to which ,i shall venture to lay down the following proposition3--,the extension1 figures1 and motions perceived by sight are specifically distinct from the ideas of touch1 called by the same names2 nor is there any such thing as one idea1 or kind of idea1 common7#dbi7 to both senses4 ,this proposition may1 without much difficulty1 be collected from what hath been said in several places of this ,essay4 ,but1 because it seems so remote from1 and contrary to the received notions and settled opinion of mankind1 ,i shall attempt to demonstrate it more particularly and at large by the following arguments3-- #abh4 ,first7#dcj71 ,when1 upon perception of an idea1 ,i range it under this or that sort1 it is because it is perceived after the same manner1 or because it has a likeness or conformity with1 or affects me in the same way as the ideas of the sort ,i rank it under4 ,in short1 it must not be entirely new1 but have something in it old and already perceived by me4 ,it must1 ,i say1 have so much1 at least1 in common with the ideas ,i have before known and named1 as to make me give it the same name with them4 ,but1 it has been1 if ,i mistake not1 clearly made out7#dca7 that a man born blind would not1 at first reception of his sight1 think the things he saw were of the same nature with the objects of touch1 or had anything in common with them2 but that they were a new set of ideas1 perceived in a new manner1 and entirely different from all he had ever perceived before4 ,so that he would not call them by the same name1 nor repute them to be of the same sort1 with anything he had hitherto known4 ,and surely the judgment of such an unprejudiced person is more to be relied on in this case than the sentiments of the generality of men2 who1 in this as in almost everything else1 suffer themselves to be guided by custom1 and the erroneous suggestions of prejudice1 rather than reason and sedate reflection7#dcb74 #abi4 ,secondly1 ,light and colours are allowed by all to constitute a sort or species entirely different from the ideas of touch2 nor will any man1 ,i presume1 say they can make themselves perceived by that sense4 ,but there is no other immediate object of sight besides light and colours7#dcc74 ,it is therefore a direct consequence1 that there is no idea common to both senses4 #acj4 ,it is a prevailing opinion1 even amongst those who have thought and writ most accurately concerning our ideas1 and the ways whereby they enter into the understanding1 that something more is perceived by sight than barely light and colours with their variations4 ,the excellent7#dcd7 ,mr4 ,locke termeth sight 8the most comprehensive of all our senses1 conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours1 which are peculiar only to that sense2 and also the far different ideas of space1 figure1 and motion40 7,essay on ,human ,understanding1 ,b4 iii4 ch4 #i4 s4 #i47 ,space or distance7#dce71 we have shewn1 is no otherwise the object of sight than of hearing4 7,vid4 sect4 #df47 ,and1 as for figure and extension1 ,i leave it to any one that shall calmly attend to his own clear and distinct ideas to decide whether he has any idea intromitted immediately and properly by sight save only light and colours3 or1 whether it be possible for him to frame in his mind a distinct abstract idea of visible extension1 or figure1 exclusive of all colour2 and1 on the other hand1 whether he can conceive colour without visible extension8 ,for my own part1 ,i must confess1 ,i am not able to attain so great a nicety of abstraction4 ,i know very well that1 in a strict sense1 ,i see nothing but light and colours1 with their several shades and variations4 ,he who beside these doth also perceive by sight ideas far different and distinct from them1 hath that faculty in a degree more perfect and comprehensive than ,i can pretend to4 ,it must be owned1 indeed1 that1 by the mediation of light and colours1 other far different ideas are suggested to my mind4 ,but so they are by hearing7#dcf74 ,but then1 upon this score1 ,i see no reason why the sight should be thought more comprehensive than the hearing1 which1 beside sounds which are peculiar to that sense1 doth1 by their mediation1 suggest not only space1 figure1 and motion1 but also all other ideas whatsoever that can be signified by words4 #aca4 ,thirdly1 ,it is1 ,i think1 an axiom universally received1 that 8quantities of the same kind may be added together and make one entire sum40 ,mathematicians add lines together2 but they do not add a line to a solid1 or conceive it as making one sum with a surface4 ,these three kinds of quantity being thought incapable of any such mutual addition1 and consequently of being compared together in the several ways of proportion1 are by them for that reason esteemed entirely disparate and heterogeneous4 ,now let any one try in his thoughts to add a visible line or surface to a tangible line or surface1 so as to conceive them making one continued sum or whole4 ,he that can do this may think them homogeneous2 but he that cannot must1 by the foregoing axiom1 think them heterogeneous4 ,i acknowledge myself to be of the latter sort7#dcg74 ,a blue and a red line ,i can conceive added together into one sum and making one continued line2 but1 to make1 in my thoughts1 one continued line of a visible and tangible line added together1 is1 ,i find1 a task far more difficult1 and even insurmountable--and ,i leave it to the reflection and experience of every particular person to determine for himself4 #acb4 ,a farther confirmation of our tenet may be drawn from the solution of ,mr4 ,molyneux's problem1 published by ,mr4 ,locke in his ,essay7#dch73 which ,i shall set down as it there lies1 together with ,mr4 ,locke's opinion of it3--8,suppose a man born blind1 and now adult1 and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal1 and nighly of the same bigness1 so as to tell when he felt one and the other1 which is the cube1 and which the sphere4 ,suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table1 and the blind man made to see3 ,qure1 ,whether by his sight1 before he touched them1 he could now distinguish1 and tell1 which is the globe1 which the cube4 ,to which the acute and judicious proposer answers3 ,not4 ,for1 though he has obtained the experience of how a globe1 how a cube affects his touch2 yet he has not yet attained the experience1 that what affects his touch so or so must affect his sight so or so3 or that a protuberant angle in the cube1 that pressed his hand unequally1 shall appear to his eye as it doth in the cube4 ,i agree with this thinking gentleman1 whom ,i am proud to call my friend1 in his answer to this his problem2 and am of opinion that the blind man1 at first sight1 would not be able with certainty to say1 which was the globe1 which the cube1 whilst he only saw them40 7,essay on ,human ,understanding1 ,b4 ii4 ch4 #i4 s4 #h47 #acc4 ,now1 if a square surface perceived by touch be of the same sort with a square surface perceived by sight1 it is certain the blind man here mentioned might know a square surface as soon as he saw it4 ,it is no more but introducing into his mind1 by a new inlet1 an idea he has been already well acquainted with4 ,since therefore he is supposed to have known by his touch that a cube is a body terminated by square surfaces2 and that a sphere is not terminated by square surfaces--upon the supposition that a visible and tangible square differ only in numero1 it follows that he might know1 by the unerring mark of the square surfaces1 which was the cube1 and which not1 while he only saw them4 ,we must therefore allow1 either that visible extension and figures are specifically distinct from tangible extension and figures1 or else1 that the solution of this problem1 given by those two very7#dci7 thoughtful and ingenious men1 is wrong4 #acd4 ,much more might be laid together in proof of the proposition ,i have advanced4 ,but1 what has been said is1 if ,i mistake not1 sufficient to convince any one that shall yield a reasonable attention4 ,and1 as for those that will not be at the pains of a little thought1 no multiplication of words will ever suffice to make them understand the truth1 or rightly conceive my meaning7#ddj74 #ace4 ,i cannot let go the above-mentioned problem without some reflection on it4 ,it hath been made evident that a man blind from his birth would not1 at first sight1 denominate anything he saw1 by the names he had been used to appropriate to ideas of touch4 7,vid4 sect4 #ajf47 ,cube1 sphere1 table are words he has known applied to things perceivable by touch1 but to things perfectly intangible he never knew them applied4 ,those words1 in their wonted application1 always marked out to his mind bodies or solid things which were perceived by the resistance they gave4 ,but there is no solidity1 no resistance or protrusion1 perceived by sight4 ,in short1 the ideas of sight are all new perceptions1 to which there be no names annexed in his mind2 he cannot therefore understand what is said to him concerning them4 ,and1 to ask of the two bodies he saw placed on the table1 which was the sphere1 which the cube1 were to him a question downright bantering and unintelligible2 nothing he sees being able to suggest to his thoughts the idea of body1 distance1 or1 in general1 of anything he had already known4 #acf4 ,it is a mistake to think the same7#dda7 thing affects both sight and touch4 ,if the same angle or square which is the object of touch be also the object of vision1 what should hinder the blind man1 at first sight1 from knowing it8 ,for1 though the manner wherein it affects the sight be different from that wherein it affected his touch1 yet1 there being1 beside this manner or circumstance1 which is new and unknown1 the angle or figure1 which is old and known1 he cannot choose but discern it4 #acg4 ,visible figure and extension having been demonstrated to be of a nature entirely different and heterogeneous from tangible figure and extension1 it remains that we inquire concerning motion4 ,now1 that visible motion is not of the same sort with tangible motion seems to need no farther proof2 it being an evident corollary from what we have shewn concerning the difference there is betwixt visible and tangible extension4 ,but1 for a more full and express proof hereof1 we need only observe that one who had not yet experienced vision would not at first sight know motion7#ddb74 ,whence it clearly follows that motion perceivable by sight is of a sort distinct from motion perceivable by touch4 ,the antecedent ,i prove thus--,by touch he could not perceive any motion but what was up or down1 to the right or left1 nearer or farther from him2 besides these1 and their several varieties or complications1 it is impossible he should have any idea of motion4 ,he would not therefore think anything to be motion1 or give the name motion to any idea1 which he could not range under some or other of those particular kinds thereof4 ,but1 from sect4 #ie1 it is plain that1 by the mere act of vision1 he could not know motion upwards or downwards1 to the right or left1 or in any other possible direction4 ,from which ,i conclude1 he would not know motion at all at first sight4 ,as for the idea of motion in abstract1 ,i shall not waste paper about it1 but leave it to my reader to make the best he can of it4 ,to me it is perfectly unintelligible7#ddc74 #ach4 ,the consideration of motion may furnish a new field for inquiry7#ddd74 ,but1 since the manner wherein the mind apprehends by sight the motion of tangible objects1 with the various degrees thereof1 may be easily collected from what has been said concerning the manner wherein that sense doth suggest their various distances1 magnitudes1 and situations1 ,i shall not enlarge any farther on this subject1 but proceed to inquire what may be alleged1 with greatest appearance of reason1 against the proposition we have demonstrated to be true2 for1 where there is so much prejudice to be encountered1 a bare and naked demonstration of the truth will scarce suffice4 ,we must also satisfy the scruples that men may start in favour of their preconceived notions1 shew whence the mistake arises1 how it came to spread1 and carefully disclose and root out those false persuasions that an early prejudice might have implanted in the mind4 #aci4 ,first1 therefore1 it will be demanded how visible extension and figures come to be called by the same name with tangible extension and figures1 if they are not of the same kind with them8 ,it must be something more than humour or accident that could occasion a custom so constant and universal as this1 which has obtained in all ages and nations of the world1 and amongst all ranks of men1 the learned as well as the illiterate4 #adj4 ,to which ,i answer1 we can no more argue a visible and tangible square to be of the same species1 from their being called by the same name1 than we can that a tangible square1 and the monosyllable consisting of six letters whereby it is marked1 are of the same species1 because they are both called by the same name4 ,it is customary to call written words1 and the things they signify1 by the same name3 for1 words not being regarded in their own nature1 or otherwise than as they are marks of things1 it had been superfluous1 and beside the design of language1 to have given them names distinct from those of the things marked by them4 ,the same reason holds here also4 ,visible figures are the marks of tangible figures2 and1 from sect4 #ei1 it is plain that in themselves they are little regarded1 or upon any other score than for their connexion with tangible figures1 which by nature they are ordained to signify4 ,and1 because this language of nature7#dde7 does not vary in different ages or nations1 hence it is that in all times and places visible figures are called by the same names as the respective tangible figures suggested by them2 and not because they are alike1 or of the same sort with them4 #ada4 ,but1 say you1 surely a tangible square is liker to a visible square than to a visible circle3 it has four angles1 and as many sides2 so also has the visible square--but the visible circle has no such thing1 being bounded by one uniform curve1 without right lines or angles1 which makes it unfit to represent the tangible square1 but very fit to represent the tangible circle4 ,whence it clearly follows1 that visible figures are patterns of1 or of the same species with1 the respective tangible figures represented by them2 that they are like unto them1 and of their own nature fitted to represent them1 as being of the same sort2 and that they are in no respect arbitrary signs1 as words4 #adb4 ,i answer1 it must be acknowledged the visible square is fitter than the visible circle to represent the tangible square1 but then it is not because it is liker1 or more of a species with it2 but1 because the visible square contains in it several distinct parts1 whereby to mark the several distinct corresponding parts of a tangible square1 whereas the visible circle doth not4 ,the square perceived by touch hath four distinct equal sides1 so also hath it four distinct equal angles4 ,it is therefore necessary that the visible figure which shall be most proper to mark it contain four distinct equal parts1 corresponding to the four sides of the tangible square2 as likewise four other distinct and equal parts1 whereby to denote the four equal angles of the tangible square4 ,and accordingly we see the visible figures contain in them distinct visible parts1 answering to the distinct tangible parts of the figures signified or suggested by them4 #adc4 ,but1 it will not hence follow that any visible figure is like unto or of the same species with its corresponding tangible figure--unless it be also shewn that not only the number1 but also the kind of the parts be the same in both4 ,to illustrate this1 ,i observe that visible figures represent tangible figures much after the same manner that written words do sounds4 ,now1 in this respect1 words are not arbitrary2 it not being indifferent what written word stands for any sound4 ,but1 it is requisite that each word contain in it as many distinct characters as there are variations in the sound it stands for4 ,thus1 the single letter a is proper to mark one simple uniform sound2 and the word adultery is accommodated to represent the sound annexed to it--in the formation whereof there being eight different collisions or modifications of the air by the organs of speech1 each of which produces a difference of sound1 it was fit the word representing it should consist of as many distinct characters1 thereby to mark each particular difference or part of the whole sound4 ,and yet nobody1 ,i presume1 will say the single letter a1 or the word adultery1 are alike unto or of the same species with the respective sounds by them represented4 ,it is indeed arbitrary that1 in general1 letters of any language represent sounds at all2 but1 when that is once agreed1 it is not arbitrary what combination of letters shall represent this or that particular sound4 ,i leave this with the reader to pursue1 and apply it in his own thoughts4 #add4 ,it must be confessed that we are not so apt to confound other signs with the things signified1 or to think them of the same species1 as we are visible and tangible ideas4 ,but1 a little consideration will shew us how this may well be1 without our supposing them of a like nature4 ,these signs are constant and universal2 their connexion with tangible ideas has been learnt at our first entrance into the world2 and ever since1 almost every moment of our lives1 it has been occurring to our thoughts1 and fastening and striking deeper on our minds4 ,when we observe that signs are variable1 and of human institution2 when we remember there was a time they were not connected in our minds with those things they now so readily suggest1 but that their signification was learned by the slow steps of experience3 this preserves us from confounding them4 ,but1 when we find the same signs suggest the same things all over the world2 when we know they are not of human institution1 and cannot remember that we ever learned their signification1 but think that at first sight they would have suggested to us the same things they do now3 all this persuades us they are of the same species as the things respectively represented by them1 and that it is by a natural resemblance they suggest them to our minds4 #ade4 ,add to this that whenever we make a nice survey of any object1 successively directing the optic axis to each point thereof1 there are certain lines and figures1 described by the motion of the head or eye1 which1 being in truth perceived by feeling7#ddf71 do nevertheless so mix themselves1 as it were1 with the ideas of sight that we can scarce think but they appertain to that sense4 ,again1 the ideas of sight enter into the mind several at once1 more distinct and unmingled than is usual in the other senses beside the touch4 ,sounds1 for example1 perceived at the same instant1 are apt to coalesce1 if ,i may so say1 into one sound3 but we can perceive1 at the same time1 great variety of visible objects1 very separate and distinct from each other4 ,now1 tangible7#ddg7 extension being made up of several distinct coexistent parts1 we may hence gather another reason that may dispose us to imagine a likeness or analogy between the immediate objects of sight and touch4 ,but nothing1 certainly1 does more contribute to blend and confound them together1 than the strict and close connexion7#ddh7 they have with each other4 ,we cannot open our eyes but the ideas of distance1 bodies1 and tangible figures are suggested by them4 ,so swift1 and sudden1 and unperceived is the transit from visible to tangible ideas that we can scarce forbear thinking them equally the immediate object of vision4 #adf4 ,the prejudice7#ddi7 which is grounded on these1 and whatever other causes may be assigned thereof1 sticks so fast on our understandings1 that it is impossible1 without obstinate striving and labour of the mind1 to get entirely clear of it4 ,but then the reluctancy we find in rejecting any opinion can be no argument of its truth1 to whoever considers what has been already shewn with regard to the prejudices we entertain concerning the distance1 magnitude1 and situation of objects2 prejudices so familiar to our minds1 so confirmed and inveterate1 as they will hardly give way to the clearest demonstration4 #adg4 ,upon the whole1 ,i think we may fairly conclude7#dej7 that the proper objects of ,vision constitute the ,universal ,language of ,nature2 whereby we are instructed how to regulate our actions1 in order to attain those things that are necessary to the preservation and well-being of our bodies1 as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive of them4 ,it is by their information that we are principally guided in all the transactions and concerns of life4 ,and the manner wherein they signify and mark out unto us the objects which are at a distance is the same with that of languages and signs of human appointment2 which do not suggest the things signified by any likeness or identity of nature1 but only by an habitual connexion that experience has made us to observe between them7#dea74 #adh4 ,suppose one who had always continued blind be told by his guide that after he has advanced so many steps he shall come to the brink of a precipice1 or be stopped by a wall2 must not this to him seem very admirable and surprising8 ,he cannot conceive how it is possible for mortals to frame such predictions as these1 which to him would seem as strange and unaccountable as prophecy does to others4 ,even they who are blessed with the visive faculty may 7though familiarity make it less observed7 find therein sufficient cause of admiration4 ,the wonderful art and contrivance wherewith it is adjusted to those ends and purposes for which it was apparently designed2 the vast extent1 number1 and variety of objects that are at once1 with so much ease1 and quickness1 and pleasure1 suggested by it--all these afford subject for much and pleasing speculation1 and may1 if anything1 give us some glimmering analogous prnotion of things1 that are placed beyond the certain discovery and comprehension of our present state7#deb74 #adi4 ,i do not design to trouble myself much with drawing corollaries from the doctrine ,i have hitherto laid down4 ,if it bears the test1 others may1 so far as they shall think convenient1 employ their thoughts in extending it farther1 and applying it to whatever purposes it may be subservient to4 ,only1 ,i cannot forbear making some inquiry concerning the object of geometry1 which the subject we have been upon does naturally lead one to4 ,we have shewn there is no such idea as that of extension in abstract7#dec72 and that there are two kinds of sensible extension and figures1 which are entirely distinct and heterogeneous from each other7#ded74 ,now1 it is natural to inquire which of these is the object of geometry7#dee74 #aej4 ,some things there are which1 at first sight1 incline one to think geometry conversant about visible extension4 ,the constant use of the eyes1 both in the practical and speculative parts of that science1 doth very much induce us thereto4 ,it would1 without doubt1 seem odd to a mathematician to go about to convince him the diagrams he saw upon paper were not the figures1 or even the likeness of the figures1 which make the subject of the demonstration--the contrary being held an unquestionable truth1 not only by mathematicians1 but also by those who apply themselves more particularly to the study of logic2 ,i mean who consider the nature of science1 certainty1 and demonstration2 it being by them assigned as one reason of the extraordinary clearness and evidence of geometry1 that in that science the reasonings are free from those inconveniences which attend the use of arbitrary signs1 the very ideas themselves being copied out1 and exposed to view upon paper4 ,but1 by the bye1 how well this agrees with what they likewise assert of abstract ideas being the object of geometrical demonstration ,i leave to be considered4 #aea4 ,to come to a resolution in this point1 we need only observe what has been said in sect4 #ei1 #fj1 #fa1 where it is shewn that visible extensions in themselves are little regarded1 and have no settled determinate greatness1 and that men measure altogether by the application of tangible extension to tangible extension4 ,all which makes it evident that visible extension and figures are not the object of geometry4 #aeb4 ,it is therefore plain that visible figures are of the same use in geometry that words are4 ,and the one may as well be accounted the object of that science as the other2 neither of them being any otherwise concerned therein than as they represent or suggest to the mind the particular tangible figures connected with them4 ,there is1 indeed1 this difference betwixt the signification of tangible figures by visible figures1 and of ideas by words--that whereas the latter is variable and uncertain1 depending altogether on the arbitrary appointment of men1 the former is fixed1 and immutably the same in all times and places4 ,a visible square1 for instance1 suggests to the mind the same tangible figure in ,europe that it doth in ,america4 ,hence it is1 that the voice of nature1 which speaks to our eyes1 is not liable to that misinterpretation and ambiguity that languages of human contrivance are unavoidably subject to7#def74 ,from which may1 in some measure1 be derived that peculiar evidence and clearness of geometrical demonstrations4 #aec4 ,though what has been said may suffice to shew what ought to be determined with relation to the object of geometry1 ,i shall1 nevertheless1 for the fuller illustration thereof1 take into my thoughts the case of an intelligence or unbodied spirit1 which is supposed to see perfectly well1 i4e4 to have a clear perception of the proper and immediate objects of sight1 but to have no sense of touch7#deg74 ,whether there be any such being in nature or no1 is beside my purpose to inquire2 it suffices1 that the supposition contains no contradiction in it4 ,let us now examine what proficiency such a one may be able to make in geometry4 ,which speculation will lead us more clearly to see whether the ideas of sight can possibly be the object of that science4 #aed4 ,first1 then1 it is certain the aforesaid intelligence could have no idea of a solid or quantity of three dimensions1 which follows from its not having any idea of distance4 ,we1 indeed1 are prone to think that we have by sight the ideas of space and solids2 which arises from our imagining that we do1 strictly speaking1 see distance1 and some parts of an object at a greater distance than others2 which has been demonstrated to be the effect of the experience we have had what ideas of touch are connected with such and such ideas attending vision4 ,but the intelligence here spoken of is supposed to have no experience of touch4 ,he would not1 therefore1 judge as we do1 nor have any idea of distance1 outness1 or profundity1 nor consequently of space or body1 either immediately or by suggestion4 ,whence it is plain he can have no notion of those parts of geometry which relate to the mensuration of solids1 and their convex or concave surfaces1 and contemplate the properties of lines generated by the section of a solid4 ,the conceiving of any part whereof is beyond the reach of his faculties4 #aee4 ,farther1 he cannot comprehend the manner wherein geometers describe a right line or circle2 the rule and compass1 with their use1 being things of which it is impossible he should have any notion4 ,nor is it an easier matter for him to conceive the placing of one plane or angle on another1 in order to prove their equality2 since that supposes some idea of distance1 or external space4 ,all which makes it evident our pure intelligence could never attain to know so much as the first elements of plain geometry4 ,and perhaps1 upon a nice inquiry1 it will be found he cannot even have an idea of plain figures any more than he can of solids2 since some idea of distance is necessary to form the idea of a geometrical plane1 as will appear to whoever shall reflect a little on it4 #aef4 ,all that is properly perceived by the visive faculty amounts to no more than colours with their variations1 and different proportions of light and shade--but the perpetual mutability and fleetingness of those immediate objects of sight render them incapable of being managed after the manner of geometrical figures2 nor is it in any degree useful that they should4 ,it is true there be divers of them perceived at once2 and more of some1 and less of others3 but accurately to compute their magnitude1 and assign precise determinate proportions between things so variable and inconstant1 if we suppose it possible to be done1 must yet be a very trifling and insignificant labour4 #aeg4 ,i must confess1 it seems to be the opinion of some very ingenious men that flat or plane figures are immediate objects of sight1 though they acknowledge solids are not4 ,and this opinion of theirs is grounded on what is observed in painting1 wherein 7say they7 the ideas immediately imprinted in the mind are only of planes variously coloured1 which1 by a sudden act of the judgment1 are changed into solids3 but1 with a little attention1 we shall find the planes here mentioned as the immediate objects of sight are not visible but tangible planes4 ,for1 when we say that pictures are planes1 we mean thereby that they appear to the touch smooth and uniform4 ,but then this smoothness and uniformity1 or1 in other words1 this planeness of the picture is not perceived immediately by vision2 for it appeareth to the eye various and multiform4 #aeh4 ,from all which we may conclude that planes are no more the immediate object of sight than solids4 ,what we strictly see are not solids1 nor yet planes variously coloured--they are only diversity of colours4 ,and some of these suggest to the mind solids1 and others plane figures2 just as they have been experienced to be connected with the one or the other3 so that we see planes in the same way that we see solids--both being equally suggested by the immediate objects of sight1 which accordingly are themselves denominated planes and solids4 ,but1 though they are called by the same names with the things marked by them1 they are1 nevertheless1 of a nature entirely different1 as hath been demonstrated7#deh74 #aei4 ,what has been said is1 if ,i mistake not1 sufficient to decide the question we proposed to examine1 concerning the ability of a pure spirit1 such as we have described1 to know geometry4 ,it is1 indeed1 no easy matter for us to enter precisely into the thoughts of such an intelligence2 because we cannot1 without great pains1 cleverly separate and disentangle in our thoughts the proper objects of sight from those of touch which are connected with them4 ,this1 indeed1 in a complete degree seems scarce possible to be performed2 which will not seem strange to us1 if we consider how hard it is for any one to hear the words of his native language1 which is familiar to him1 pronounced in his ears without understanding them4 ,though he endeavour to disunite the meaning from the sound1 it will nevertheless intrude into his thoughts1 and he shall find it extreme difficult1 if not impossible1 to put himself exactly in the posture of a foreigner that never learnt the language1 so as to be affected barely with the sounds themselves1 and not perceive the signification annexed to them4 #afj4 ,by this time1 ,i suppose1 it is clear that neither abstract nor visible extension makes the object of geometry2 the not discerning of which may1 perhaps1 have created some difficulty and useless labour in mathematics4 7#dei7,sure ,i am that somewhat relating thereto has occurred to my thoughts2 which1 though after the most anxious and repeated examination ,i am forced to think it true1 doth1 nevertheless1 seem so far out of the common road of geometry1 that ,i know not whether it may not be thought presumption if ,i should make it public1 in an age wherein that science hath received such mighty improvements by new methods2 great part whereof1 as well as of the ancient discoveries1 may perhaps lose their reputation1 and much of that ardour with which men study the abstruse and fine geometry be abated1 if what to me1 and those few to whom ,i have imparted it1 seems evidently true1 should really prove to be so4 ,an ,appendix ,to ,the ,essay ,on ,vision ,this ,appendix is contained only in the second edition4 ,the censures which1 ,i am informed1 have been made on the foregoing ,essay inclined me to think ,i had not been clear and express enough in some points2 and1 to prevent being misunderstood for the future1 ,i was willing to make any necessary alterations or additions in what ,i had written4 ,but that was impracticable1 the present edition having been almost finished before ,i received this information4 ,wherefore1 ,i think it proper to consider in this place the principal objections that are come to my notice4 ,in the first place1 it is objected1 that in the beginning of the ,essay ,i argue either against all use of lines and angles in optics1 and then what ,i say is false2 or against those writers only who will have it that we can perceive by sense the optic axes1 angles1 c41 and then it is insignificant1 this being an absurdity which no one ever held4 ,to which ,i answer that ,i argue only against those who are of opinion that we perceive the distance of objects by lines and angles1 or1 as they term it1 by a kind of innate geometry4 ,and1 to shew that this is not fighting with my own shadow1 ,i shall here set down a passage from the celebrated ,des ,cartes7#dfj73-- ,illustration 8,distantiam prterea discimus1 per mutuam quandam conspirationem oculorum4 ,ut enim ccus noster duo bacilla tenens1 ,a ,e et ,c ,e1 de quorum longitudine incertus1 solumque intervallum manuum ,a et ,c1 cum magnitudine angulorum ,a ,c ,e1 et ,c ,a ,e exploratum habens1 inde1 ut ex ,geometria quadam omnibus innata1 scire potest ubi sit punctum ,e4 ,sic quum nostri oculi ,r ,s ,t et r s t ambo1 vertuntur ad ,x1 magnitudo line ,s s1 et angulorum ,x ,s s et ,x s ,s1 certos nos reddunt ubi sit punctum ,x4 ,et idem opera alterutrius possumus indagare1 loco illum movendo1 ut si versus ,x illum semper dirigentes1 prime sistamus in puncto ,s1 et statim post in puncto s1 hoc sufficiet ut magnitudo line ,s s1 et duorum angulorum ,x ,s s et ,x s ,s nostr imaginationi simul occurrant1 et distantiam puncti ,x nos edoceant3 idque per actionem mentis1 qu licet simplex judicium esse videatur1 ratiocinationem tamen quandam involutam habet1 similem illi1 qua ,geometr per duas stationes diversas1 loca inaccessa dimetiuntur40 ,illustration ,i might amass together citations from several authors to the same purpose1 but1 this being so clear in the point1 and from an author of so great note1 ,i shall not trouble the reader with any more4 ,what ,i have said on this head was not for the sake of rinding fault with other men2 but1 because ,i judged it necessary to demonstrate in the first place that we neither see distance immediately1 nor yet perceive it by the mediation of anything that hath 7as lines and angles7 a necessary connexion with it4 ,for on the demonstration of this point the whole theory depends7#dfa74 ,secondly1 it is objected1 that the explication ,i give of the appearance of the horizontal moon 7which may also be applied to the sun7 is the same that ,gassendus had given before4 ,i answer1 there is indeed mention made of the grossness of the atmosphere in both2 but then the methods wherein it is applied to solve the phenomenon are widely different1 as will be evident to whoever shall compare what ,i have said on this subject with the following words of ,gassendus3-- 8,heinc dici posse videtur3 solem humilem oculo spectatum ideo apparere majorem1 quam dum altius egreditur1 quia dum vicinus est horizonti prolixa est series vaporum1 atque adeo corpusculorum qu solis radios ita retundunt1 ut oculus minus conniveat1 et pupilla quasi umbrefacta longe magis amplificetur1 quam dum sole multum elato rari vapores intercipiuntur1 solque ipse ita splendescit1 ut pupilla in ipsum spectans contractissima efficiatur4 ,nempe ex hoc esse videtur1 cur visibilis species ex sole procedens1 et per pupillam amplificatam intromissa in retinam1 ampliorem in illa sedem occupet1 majoremque proinde creet solis apparentiam1 quam dum per contractam pupillam eodem intromissa contendit40 ,vid4 ,epist4 #a4 ,de ,apparente ,magnitudine ,solis ,humilis et ,sublimis1 p4 #f4 ,this solution of ,gassendus proceeds on a false principle1 to wit1 that the pupil's being enlarged augments the species or image on the fund of the eye4 ,thirdly1 against what is said in ,sect4 #hj1 it is objected1 that the same thing which is so small as scarce to be discerned by a man1 may appear like a mountain to some small insect2 from which it follows that the minimum visibile is not equal in respect of all creatures7#dfb74 ,i answer1 if this objection be sounded to the bottom1 it will be found to mean no more than that the same particle of matter which is marked to a man by one minimum visibile1 exhibits to an insect a great number of minima visibilia4 ,but this does not prove that one minimum visibile of the insect is not equal to one minimum visibile of the man4 ,the not distinguishing between the mediate and immediate objects of sight is1 ,i suspect1 a cause of misapprehension in this matter4 ,some other misinterpretations and difficulties have been made1 but1 in the points they refer to1 ,i have endeavoured to be so very plain that ,i know not how to express myself more clearly4 ,all ,i shall add is1 that if they who are pleased to criticise on my ,essay would but read the whole over with some attention1 they might be the better able to comprehend my meaning1 and consequently to judge of my mistakes4 ,i am informed that1 soon after the first edition of this treatise1 a man somewhere near ,london was made to see1 who had been born blind1 and continued so for about twenty years7#dfc74 ,such a one may be supposed a proper judge to decide how far some tenets laid down in several places of the foregoing ,essay are agreeable to truth2 and if any curious person hath the opportunity of making proper interrogatories to him thereon1 ,i should gladly see my notions either amended or confirmed by experience7#dfd74 ,a ,,treatise ,,concerning ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,human ,,knowledge 7#dfe7,,part ,i ,,wherein ,,the ,,chief ,,causes ,,of ,,error ,,and ,,difficulty ,,in ,,the ,,sciences1 ,,with ,,the ,,grounds ,,of ,,scepticism1 ,,atheism1 ,,and ,,irreligion1 ,,are ,,inquired ,,into ,first ,published in #agaj ,editor's ,preface ,to ,the ,treatise ,concerning ,the ,principles ,of ,human ,knowledge ,this book of ,principles contains the most systematic and reasoned exposition of ,berkeley's philosophy1 in its early stage1 which we possess4 ,like the ,essay on ,vision1 its tentative pioneer1 it was prepared at ,trinity ,college1 ,dublin4 ,its author had hardly completed his twenty-fifth year when it was published4 ,the first edition of this 8,first ,part0 of the projected ,treatise1 8printed by ,aaron ,rhames1 for ,jeremy ,pepyat1 bookseller in ,skinner ,row1 ,dublin10 appeared early in #agaj4 ,a second edition1 with minor changes1 and in which 8,part ,i0 was withdrawn from the title-page1 was published in ,london in #agcd1 8printed for ,jacob ,tonson0--on the eve of ,berkeley's settlement at ,cloyne4 ,it was the last in the author's lifetime4 ,the projected 8,second ,part0 of the ,principles was never given to the world1 and we can hardly conjecture its design4 ,in a letter in #agbi to his ,american friend1 ,samuel ,johnson1 ,berkeley mentions that he had 8made considerable progress on the ,second ,part10 but 8the manuscript10 he adds1 8was lost about fourteen years ago1 during my travels in ,italy2 and ,i never had leisure since to do so disagreeable a thing as writing twice on the same subject7#dff740 ,an edition of the ,principles appeared in ,london in #aggf1 twenty-three years after ,berkeley's death1 with a running commentary of ,remarks by the anonymous editor1 on the pages opposite the text1 in which1 according to the editor1 ,berkeley's doctrines are 8carefully examined1 and shewn to be repugnant to fact1 and his principles to be incompatible with the constitution of human nature and the reason and fitness of things40 ,in this volume the ,dialogues between ,hylas and ,philonous are appended to the ,principles1 and a 8,philosophical ,discourse concerning the nature of ,human ,being0 is prefixed to the whole1 8being a defence of ,mr4 ,locke's principles1 and some remarks on ,dr4 ,beattie's ,essay on ,truth10 by the author of the ,remarks on ,berkeley's ,principles4 ,the acuteness of the ,remarks is not in proportion to their bulk and diffuseness3 many popular misconceptions of ,berkeley are served up1 without appreciation of the impotence of matter1 and of natural causation as only passive sense-symbolism1 which is at the root of the theory of the material world against which the ,remarks are directed4 ,the ,kantian and post-,kantian ,idealism that is characteristic of the nineteenth century has recalled attention to ,berkeley1 who had produced his spiritual philosophy under the prevailing conditions of ,english thought in the preceding age1 when ,idealism in any form was uncongenial4 ,in #ahfi the book of ,principles was translated into ,german1 with annotations1 by ,ueberweg1 professor of philosophy at ,knigsberg1 the university of ,kant4 ,the ,clarendon ,press edition of the ,collected ,works of ,berkeley followed in #ahga4 ,in #ahgd an edition of the ,principles1 by ,dr4 ,kranth1 ,professor of ,philosophy in the university of ,pennsylvania1 appeared in ,america1 with annotations drawn largely from the ,clarendon ,press edition and ,ueberweg4 ,in #ahgh ,dr4 ,collyns ,simon republished the ,principles1 with discussions based upon the text1 followed by an appendix of remarks on ,kant and ,hume in their relation to ,berkeley4 ,the book of ,principles1 as we have it1 must be taken as a systematic fragment of an incompletely developed philosophy4 ,many years after its appearance1 the author thus describes the conditions3--8,it was published when ,i was very young1 and without doubt hath many defects4 ,for though the notions should be true 7as ,i verily think they are71 yet it is difficult to express them clearly and consistently1 language being framed for common use and received prejudices4 ,i do not therefore pretend that my books can teach truth4 ,all ,i hope for is that they may be an occasion to inquisitive men of discovering truth7#dfg740 ,again3--8,i had no inclination to trouble the world with large volumes4 ,what ,i have done was rather with the view of giving hints to thinking men1 who have leisure and curiosity to go to the bottom of things1 and pursue them in their own minds4 ,two or three times reading these small tracts 7,essay on ,vision1 ,principles1 ,dialogues1 ,de ,motu71 and making what is read the occasion of thinking1 would1 ,i believe1 render the whole familiar and easy to the mind1 and take off that shocking appearance which hath often been observed to attend speculative truths7#dfh740 ,the incitements to further and deeper thought thus proposed have met with a more sympathetic response in this generation than in the lifetime of ,berkeley4 ,there is internal evidence in the book of ,principles that its author had been a diligent and critical student of ,locke's ,essay4 ,like the ,essay1 it is dedicated to the ,earl of ,pembroke4 ,the word idea is not less characteristic of the ,principles than of the ,essay1 although ,berkeley generally uses it with a narrower application than ,locke1 confining it to phenomena presented objectively to our senses1 and their subjective reproductions in imagination4 ,with both ,berkeley and ,locke objective phenomena 7under the name of ideas7 are the materials supplied to man for conversion into natural science4 ,locke's reduction of ideas into simple and complex1 as well as some of his subdivisions1 reappear with modifications in the ,principles4 ,berkeley's account of ,substance and ,power1 ,space and ,time1 while different from ,locke's1 still bears marks of the ,essay4 ,concrete ,substance1 which in its ultimate meaning much perplexes ,locke1 is identified with the personal pronouns 8,i0 and 8you0 by ,berkeley1 and is thus spiritualised4 ,cause proper1 or ,power1 he finds only in the voluntary activity of persons4 ,space is presented to us in our sensuous experience of resistance to organic movements2 while it is symbolised in terms of phenomena presented to sight1 as already explained in the ,essay on ,vision4 ,time is revealed in our actual experience of change in the ideas or phenomena of which we are percipient in sense2 length of time being calculated by the changes in the adopted measure of duration4 ,infinite space and infinite time1 being necessarily incapable of finite ideation1 are dismissed as abstractions that for man must always be empty of realisable meaning4 ,indeed1 the ,commonplace ,book shews that ,locke influenced ,berkeley as much by antagonism as otherwise4 8,such was the candour of that great man that ,i persuade myself1 were he alive1 he would not be offended that ,i differed from him1 seeing that in so doing ,i follow his advice to use my own judgment1 see with my own eyes and not with another's40 ,so he argues against ,locke's opinions about the infinity and eternity of space1 and the possibility of matter endowed with power to think1 and urges his inconsistency in treating some qualities of matter as wholly material1 while he insists that others1 under the name of 8secondary10 are necessarily dependent on sentient intelligence4 ,above all he assails ,locke's 8abstract ideas0 as germs of scepticism--interpreting ,locke's meaning paradoxically4 ,next to ,locke1 ,descartes and ,malebranche are prominent in the ,principles4 ,recognition of the ultimate supremacy of ,spirit1 or the spiritual character of active power and the constant agency of ,god in nature1 suggested by ,descartes1 was congenial to ,berkeley1 but he was opposed to the mechanical conception of the universe found in the ,cartesian physical treatises4 ,that thought is synonymous with existence is a formula with which the ,french philosopher might make him familiar1 as well as with the assumption that ideas only are immediate objects of human perception2 an assumption in which ,descartes was followed by ,locke1 and philosophical thinkers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries1 but under differing interpretations of the term idea4 ,malebranche appears less in the ,principles than ,locke and ,descartes4 ,in early life1 at any rate1 ,berkeley would be less at home in the 8divine vision0 of ,malebranche than among the 8ideas0 of ,locke4 ,the mysticism of the ,recherche de la ,vrit is unlike the transparent lucidity of ,berkeley's juvenile thought4 ,but the subordinate place and office of the material world in ,malebranche's system1 and his conception of power as wholly spiritual1 approached the ,new ,principles of ,berkeley4 ,plato and ,aristotle hardly appear1 either by name or as characteristic influence1 in the book of ,principles1 which in this respect contrasts with the abundant references to ancient and mediaeval thinkers in ,siris1 and to a less extent in the ,de ,motu and ,alciphron4 ,the ,introduction to the ,principles is a proclamation of war against 8abstract ideas10 which is renewed in the body of the work1 and again more than once in the writings of ,berkeley's early and middle life1 but is significantly withdrawn in his old age4 ,in the ardour of youth1 his prime remedy for anarchy in philosophy1 and for the sceptical disposition which philosophy had been apt to generate1 was suppression of abstract ideas as impossible ideas--empty names heedlessly accepted as ideas--an evil to be counteracted by steady adherence to the concrete experience found in our senses and inner consciousness4 ,never to lose our hold of positive facts1 and always to individualise general conceptions1 are regulative maxims by which ,berkeley would make us govern our investigation of ultimate problems4 ,he takes up his position in the actual universe of applied reason2 not in the empty void of abstract reason1 remote from particulars and succession of change1 in which no real existence is found4 ,all realisable ideas must be either concrete data of sense1 or concrete data of inward consciousness4 ,it is relations embodied in particular facts1 not pretended abstract ideas1 that give fruitful meaning to common terms4 ,abstract matter1 abstract substance1 abstract power1 abstract space1 abstract time--unindividualisable in sense or in imagination--must all be void of meaning2 the issue of unlawful analysis1 which pretends to find what is real without the concrete ideas that make the real1 because percipient spirit is the indispensable factor of all reality4 ,the only lawful abstraction is nominal--the application1 that is to say1 of a name in common to an indefinite number of things which resemble one another4 ,this is ,berkeley's 8,nominalism40 ,berkeley takes ,locke as the representative advocate of the 8abstract ideas0 against which he wages war in the ,introduction to the ,principles4 ,under cover of an ambiguity in the term idea1 he is unconsciously fighting against a man of straw4 ,he supposes that ,locke means by idea only a concrete datum of sense1 or of imagination2 and he argues that we cannot without contradiction abstract from all such data1 and yet retain idea4 ,but ,locke includes among his ideas intellectual relations--what ,berkeley himself afterwards distinguished as notions1 in contrast with ideas4 ,this polemic against ,locke is therefore one of verbal confusion4 ,in later life he probably saw this1 as he saw deeper into the whole question involved4 ,this is suggested by the omission of the argument against abstract ideas1 given in earlier editions of ,alciphron1 from the edition published a year before he died4 ,in his juvenile attack on abstractions1 his characteristic impetuosity seems to carry him to the extreme of rejecting rational relations that are involved in the objectivity of sensible things and natural order1 thus resting experience at last only on phenomena--particular and contingent4 ,a preparatory draft of the ,introduction to the ,principles1 which ,i found in the manuscript department of the library of ,trinity ,college1 ,dublin1 is printed in the appendix to this edition of ,berkeley's ,philosophical ,works4 ,the variations are of some interest1 biographical and philosophical4 ,it seems to have been written in the autumn of #agjh1 and it may with advantage be compared with the text of the finished ,introduction1 as well as with numerous relative entries in the ,commonplace ,book4 ,after this ,introduction1 the ,new ,principles themselves are evolved1 in a corresponding spirit of hostility to empty abstractions4 ,the sections may be thus divided3-- i4 ,rationale of the ,principles 7sect4 #a-cc74 ii4 ,supposed ,objections to the ,principles answered 7sect4 #cd-hd74 iii4 ,consequences and ,applications of the ,principles 7sect4 #he-aef74 i4 ,rationale of the ,principles4 ,the reader may remember that one of the entries in the ,commonplace ,book runs as follows3--8,to begin the ,first ,book1 not with mention of sensation and reflexion1 but1 instead of sensation1 to use perception1 or thought in general40 ,berkeley seems there to be oscillating between ,locke and ,descartes4 ,he now adopts ,locke's account of the materials of which our concrete experience consists 7sect4 #a74 ,the data of human knowledge of existence are accordingly found in the ideas1 phenomena1 or appearances 7a7 of which we are percipient in the senses1 and 7b7 of which we are conscious when we attend to our inward passions and operations--all which make up the original contents of human experience1 to be reproduced in new forms and arrangements1 7c7 in memory and 7d7 imagination and 7e7 expectation4 ,those materials are called ideas because living mind or spirit is the indispensable realising factor3 they all presuppose living mind1 spirit1 self1 or ego to realise and elaborate them 7sect4 #b74 ,this is implied in our use of personal pronouns1 which signify1 not ideas of any of the preceding kinds1 but that which is 8entirely distinct from them1 wherein they exist1 or1 which is the same thing1 by which they are perceived40 ,in this fundamental presupposition ,descartes is more apparent than ,locke1 and there is even an unconscious forecast of ,kant and ,hegel4 ,berkeley next faces a ,new ,question which his ,new ,principles are intended to answer4 ,how is the concrete world that is presented to our senses related to ,mind or ,spirit8 ,is all or any of its reality independent of percipient experience8 ,is it true that the phenomena of which we are percipient in sense are ultimately independent of all percipient and conscious life1 and are even the ultimate basis of all that is real8 ,must we recognise in the phenomena of ,matter the substance of what we call ,mind8 ,for do we not find1 when we examine ,body and ,spirit mutually related in our personality1 that the latter is more dependent on the former1 and on the physical cosmos of which the former is a part1 than our body and its bodily surroundings are dependent on ,spirit8 ,in short1 is not the universe of existence1 in its final form1 only lifeless ,matter8 ,the claim of ,matter to be supreme is what ,berkeley produces his ,principles in order to reduce4 ,concrete reality is self-evidently unreal1 he argues1 in the total absence of percipient ,spirit1 for ,spirit is the one realising factor4 ,try to imagine the material world unperceived and you are trying to picture empty abstraction4 ,wholly material matter is self-evidently an inconceivable absurdity2 a universe emptied of all percipient life is an impossible universe4 ,the material world becomes real in being perceived3 it depends for its reality upon the spiritual realisation4 ,as colours in a dark room become real with the introduction of light1 so the material world becomes real in the life and agency of ,spirit4 ,it must exist in terms of sentient life and percipient intelligence1 in order to rise into any degree of reality that human beings at least can be at all concerned with1 either speculatively or practically4 ,matter totally abstracted from percipient spirit must go the way of all abstract ideas4 ,it is an illusion1 concealed by confused thought and abuse of words2 yet from obvious causes strong enough to stifle faith in this latent but self-evident ,principle--that the universe of sense-presented phenomena can have concrete existence only in and by sentient intelligence4 ,it is the reverse of this ,principle that ,berkeley takes to have been 8the chief source of all that scepticism and folly1 all those contradictions and inexplicable puzzling absurdities1 that have in all ages been a reproach to human reason7#dfi740 ,and indeed1 when it is fully understood1 it is seen in its own light to be the chief of 8those truths which are so near and obvious to the mind1 that a man need only open his eyes to see them4 ,for such ,i take this important one to be--that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the ,earth1 in a word1 all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world1 have not any subsistence without a ,mind0 7sect4 #f74 ,living ,mind or ,spirit is the indispensable factor of all realities that are presented to our senses1 including1 of course1 our own bodies4 ,yet this ,principle1 notwithstanding its intuitive certainty1 needs to be evoked by reflection from the latency in which it lies concealed1 in the confused thought of the unreflecting4 ,it is only gradually1 and with the help of reasoning1 that the world presented to the senses is distinctly recognised in this its deepest and truest reality4 ,and even when we see that the phenomena immediately presented to our senses need to be realised in percipient experience1 in order to be concretely real1 we are ready to ask whether there may not be substances like the things so presented1 which can exist 8without mind10 or in a wholly material way 7sect4 #h74 ,nay1 are there not some of the phenomena immediately presented to our senses which do not need living mind to make them real8 ,it is allowed by ,locke and others that all those qualities of matter which are called secondary cannot be wholly material1 and that living mind is indispensable for their realisation in nature2 but ,locke and the rest argue1 that this is not so with the qualities which they call primary1 and which they regard as of the essence of matter4 ,colours1 sounds1 tastes1 smells are all allowed to be not wholly material2 but are not the size1 shape1 situation1 solidity1 and motion of bodies qualities that are real without need for the realising agency of any ,mind or ,spirit in the universe1 and which would continue to be what they are now if all ,spirit1 divine or human1 ceased to exist8 ,the supposition that some of the phenomena of what is called ,matter can be real1 and yet wholly material1 is discussed in sections #i-ae1 in which it is argued that the things of sense cannot exist really1 in any of their manifestations1 unless they are brought into reality in some percipient life and experience4 ,it is held impossible that any quality of matter can have the reality which we all attribute to it1 unless it is spiritually realised 7sect4 #ae74 ,but may ,matter not be real apart from all its so-called qualities1 these being allowed to be not wholly material1 because real only within percipient spirit8 ,may not this wholly material ,matter be ,something that1 as it were1 exists behind the ideas1 phenomena1 or qualities that make their appearance to human beings8 ,this question1 ,berkeley would say1 is a meaningless and wholly unpractical one4 ,material substance that makes and can make no real appearance--unphenomenal or unideal--stripped of all its qualities--is only 8another name for abstract ,being10 and 8the abstract idea of ,being appeareth to me the most incomprehensible of all other4 ,when ,i consider the two parts or branches which make up the words material substance1 ,i am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them0 7sect4 #ag74 ,neither ,sense nor ,reason inform us of the existence of real material substances that exist abstractly1 or out of all relation to the secondary and primary qualities of which we are percipient when we exercise our senses4 ,by our senses we cannot perceive more than ideas or phenomena1 aggregated as individual things that are presented to us3 we cannot perceive substances that make no appearance in sense4 ,then as for reason1 unrealised substances1 abstracted from living ,spirit1 human or divine1 being altogether meaningless1 can in no way explain the concrete realisations of human experience4 ,in short1 if there are wholly unphenomenal material substances1 it is impossible that we should ever discover them1 or have any concern with them1 speculative or practical2 and if there are not1 we should have the same reason to assert that there are which we have now 7sect4 #bj74 ,it is impossible to put any meaning into wholly abstract reality4 8,to me the words mean either a direct contradiction1 or nothing at all0 7sect4 #bd74 ,the ,principle that the esse of matter necessarily involves percipi1 and its correlative ,principle that there is not any other substance than ,spirit1 which is thus the indispensable factor of all reality1 both lead on to the more obviously practical ,principle--that the material world1 per se1 is wholly powerless1 and that all changes in ,nature are the immediate issue of the agency of ,spirit 7sect4 #be-bg74 ,concrete power1 like concrete substance1 is essentially spiritual4 ,to be satisfied that the whole natural world is only the passive instrument and expression of ,spiritual ,power we are asked to analyse the sensuous data of experience4 ,we can find no reason for attributing inherent power to any of the phenomena and phenomenal things that are presented to our senses1 or for supposing that they can be active causes1 either of the changes that are continuously in progress among themselves1 or of the feelings1 perceptions1 and volitions of which spiritual beings are conscious4 ,we find the ideas or phenomena that pass in procession before our senses related to one another as signs to their meanings1 in a cosmical order that virtually makes the material world a language and a prophecy3 but this cosmical procession is not found to originate in the ideas or phenomena themselves1 and there is reason for supposing it to be maintained by ever-living ,spirit1 which thus not only substantiates the things of sense1 but explains their laws of motion and their movements4 ,yet the universe of reality is not exclusively ,one ,spirit4 ,experience contradicts the supposition4 ,i find on trial that my personal power to produce changes in the ideas or phenomena which my senses present to me is a limited power 7sect4 #bh-cc74 ,i can make and unmake my own fancies1 but ,i cannot with like freedom make and unmake presentations of sense4 ,when in daylight ,i open my eyes1 it is not in my power to determine whether ,i shall see or not2 nor is it in my power to determine what objects ,i shall see4 ,the cosmical order of sense-phenomena is independent of my will4 ,when ,i employ my senses1 ,i find myself always confronted by sensible signs of perfect ,reason and omnipresent ,will4 ,but ,i also awake in the faith that ,i am an individual person4 ,and the sense-symbolism of which the material world consists1 while it keeps me in constant and immediate relation to the ,universal ,spirit1 whose language it is1 keeps me likewise in intercourse with other persons1 akin to myself1 who are signified to me by their overt actions and articulate words1 which enter into my sensuous experience4 ,sense-given phenomena thus1 among their other instrumental offices1 are the medium of communication between human beings1 who by this means can find companions1 and make signs to them4 ,so while1 at our highest point of view1 ,nature is ,spirit1 experience shews that there is room in the universe for a plurality of persons1 individual1 and in a measure free or morally responsible4 ,if ,berkeley does not say all this1 his ,new ,principles tend thus4 ,at any rate1 in his reasoned exposition of his ,principles he is anxious to distinguish those phenomena that are presented to the senses of all mankind from the private ideas or fancies of individual men 7sect4 #bh-cc74 ,the former constitute the world which sentient beings realise in common4 ,he calls them ideas because they are unrealisable without percipient mind2 but still on the understanding that they are not to be confounded with the chimeras of imagination4 ,they are more deeply and truly real than chimeras4 ,the groups in which they are found to coexist are the individual things of sense1 whose fixed order of succession exemplifies what we call natural law1 or natural causation3 the correlation of their changes to our pleasures and pains1 desires and aversions1 makes scientific knowledge of their laws practically important to the life of man1 in his embodied state4 ,moreover1 the real ideas presented to our senses1 unlike those of imagination1 ,berkeley would imply1 cannot be either representative or misrepresentative4 ,our imagination may mislead us3 the original data of sense cannot3 although we may1 and often do1 misinterpret their relations to one another1 and to our pleasures and pains and higher faculties4 ,the divine meaning with which they are charged1 of which science is a partial expression1 they may perhaps be said to represent4 ,otherwise representative sense-perception is absurdity3 the ideas of sense cannot be representative in the way those of imagination are2 for fancies are faint representations of data of sense4 ,the appearances that sentient intelligence realises are the things of sense1 and we cannot go deeper4 ,if we prefer accordingly to call the material world a dream or a chimera1 we must understand that it is the reasonable dream in which all sentient intelligence participates1 and by which the embodied life of man must be regulated4 ,has ,berkeley1 in his juvenile ardour1 and with the impetuosity natural to him1 while seeking to demonstrate the impotence of matter1 and the omnipresent supremacy of ,spirit1 so spiritualised the material world as to make it unfit for the symbolical office in the universe of reality which he supposes it to discharge8 ,is its potential existence in ,god1 and its percipient realisation by me1 and presumably by innumerable other sentient beings1 an adequate account of the real material world existing in place and time8 ,can this universal orderly dream experienced in sense involve the objectivity implied in its being the reliable medium of social intercourse8 ,does such a material world provide me with a means of escape from absolute solitude8 ,nay1 if ,matter cannot rise into reality without percipient spirit as realising factor1 can my individual percipient spirit realise myself without independent ,matter8 ,without intelligent life ,matter is pronounced unreal4 ,but is it not also true that without ,matter1 and the special material organism we call our body1 percipient spirit is unreal8 ,does not ,nature seem as indispensable to ,spirit as ,spirit is to ,nature8 ,must we not assume at least their unbeginning and unending coexistence1 even if we recognise in ,spirit the deeper and truer reality8 ,do the ,new ,principles explain the final ground of trust and certainty about the universe of change into which ,i entered as a stranger when ,i was born8 ,if they make all that ,i have believed in as outward to be in its reality inward1 do they not disturb the balance that is necessary to all human certainties1 and leave me without any realities at all8 ,that ,berkeley at the age of twenty-five1 and educated chiefly by ,locke1 had fathomed or even entertained all these questions was hardly to be looked for4 ,how far he had gone may be gathered by a study of the sequel of his book of ,principles4 ii4 ,objections to the ,new ,principles answered 7sect4 #cd-hd74 ,the supposed ,objections1 with ,berkeley's answers1 may be thus interpreted3-- ,first objection4 7,sect4 #cd-dj47 ,the preceding ,principles banish all substantial realities1 and substitute a universe of chimeras4 ,answer4 ,this objection is a play upon the popular meaning of the word 8idea40 ,that name is appropriate to the phenomena presented in sense1 because they become concrete realities only in the experience of living ,spirit2 and so it is not confined to the chimeras of individual fancy1 which may misrepresent the real ideas of sense that are presented in the natural system independently of our will4 ,second objection4 7,sect4 #da47 ,the preceding ,principles abolish the distinction between ,perception and ,imagination--between imagining one's self burnt and actually being burnt4 ,answer4 ,real fire differs from fancied fire3 as real pain does from fancied pain2 yet no one supposes that real pain any more than imaginary pain can exist unfelt by a sentient intelligence4 ,third objection4 7,sect4 #db-dd47 ,we actually see sensible things existing at a distance from our bodies4 ,now1 whatever is seen existing at a distance must be seen as existing external to us in our bodies1 which contradicts the foregoing ,principles4 ,answer4 ,distance1 or outness1 is not visible4 ,it is a conception which is suggested gradually1 by our experience of the connexion between visible colours and certain visual sensations that accompany seeing1 on the one hand1 and our tactual experience1 on the other--as was proved in the ,essay on ,vision1 in which the ideality of the visible world is demonstrated7#dgj74 ,fourth objection4 7,sect4 #de-dh47 ,it follows from the ,new ,principles1 that the material world must be undergoing continuous annihilation and recreation in the innumerable sentient experiences in which it becomes real4 ,answer4 ,according to the ,new ,principles a thing may be realised in the sense-experience of other minds1 during intervals of its perception by my mind2 for the ,principles do not affirm dependence only on this or that mind1 but on a living ,mind4 ,if this implies a constant creation of the material world1 the conception of the universe as in a state of constant creation is not new1 and it signally displays ,divine ,providence4 ,fifth objection4 7,sect4 #di47 ,if extension and extended ,matter can exist only in mind1 it follows that extension is an attribute of mind--that mind is extended4 ,answer4 ,extension and other sensible qualities exist in mind1 not as modes of mind1 which is unintelligible1 but as ideas of which ,mind is percipient2 and this is absolutely inconsistent with the supposition that ,mind is itself extended7#dga74 ,sixth objection4 7,sect4 #ej47 ,natural philosophy proceeds on the assumption that ,matter is independent of percipient mind1 and it thus contradicts the ,new ,principles4 ,answer4 ,on the contrary1 ,matter--if it means what exists abstractly1 or in independence of all percipient ,mind--is useless in natural philosophy1 which is conversant exclusively with the ideas or phenomena that compose concrete things1 not with empty abstractions4 ,seventh objection4 7,sect4 #ea47 ,to refer all change to spiritual agents alone1 and to regard the things of sense as wholly impotent1 thus discharging natural causes as the ,new ,principles do1 is at variance with human language and with good sense4 ,answer4 ,while we may speak as the multitude do1 we should learn to think with the few who reflect4 ,we may still speak of 8natural causes10 even when1 as philosophers1 we recognise that all true efficiency must be spiritual1 and that the material world is only a system of sensible symbols1 regulated by ,divine ,will and revealing ,omnipresent ,mind4 ,eighth objection4 7,sect4 #ed1 #ee47 ,the natural belief of men seems inconsistent with the world being mind-dependent4 ,answer4 ,not so when we consider that men seldom comprehend the deep meaning of their practical assumptions2 and when we recollect the prejudices1 once dignified as good sense1 which have successively surrendered to philosophy4 ,ninth objection4 7,sect4 #ef1 #eg47 ,any ,principle that is inconsistent with our common faith in the existence of the material world must be rejected4 ,answer4 ,the fact that we are conscious of not being ourselves the cause of changes perpetually going on in our sense-ideas1 some of which we gradually learn by experience to foresee1 sufficiently accounts for the common belief in the independence of those ideas1 and is what men truly mean by this4 ,tenth objection4 7,sect4 #eh1 #ei47 ,the foregoing ,principles concerning ,matter and ,spirit are inconsistent with the laws of motion1 and with other truths in mathematics and natural philosophy4 ,answer4 ,the laws of motion1 and those other truths1 may be all conceived and expressed in consistency with the absence of independent substance and causation in ,matter4 ,eleventh objection4 7,sect4 #fj-ff47 ,if1 according to the foregoing ,principles1 the material world is merely phenomena presented by a ,power not-ourselves to our senses1 the elaborate contrivances which we find in ,nature are useless2 for we might have had all experiences that are needful without them1 by the direct agency of ,god4 ,answer4 ,elaborate contrivances in ,nature are relatively necessary as signs3 they express to us the occasional presence and some of the experience of other men1 also the constant presence and power of the ,universal ,spirit1 while the scientific interpretation of elaborately constituted ,nature is a beneficial moral and intellectual exercise4 ,twelfth objection4 7,sect4 #fg-gi47 ,although the impossibility of active ,matter may be demonstrable1 this does not prove the impossibility of inactive ,matter1 neither solid nor extended1 which may be the occasion of our having sense-ideas4 ,answer4 ,this supposition is unintelligible3 the words in which it is expressed convey no meaning4 ,thirteenth objection4 7,sect4 #hj1 #ha47 ,matter may be an unknowable ,somewhat1 neither substance nor accident1 cause nor effect1 spirit nor idea3 all the reasonings against ,matter1 conceived as something positive1 fail1 when this wholly negative notion is maintained4 ,answer4 ,this is to use the word 8,matter0 as people use the word 8nothing03 ,unknowable ,somewhat cannot be distinguished from nothing4 ,fourteenth objection4 7,sect4 #hb-hd47 ,although we cannot1 in opposition to the ,new ,principles1 infer scientifically the existence of ,matter1 in abstraction from all realising percipient life1 or form any conception1 positive or negative1 of what ,matter is2 yet ,holy ,scripture demands the faith of every ,christian in the independent reality of the material world4 ,answer4 ,the independent reality of the material world is nowhere affirmed in ,scripture4 iii4 ,consequences and ,applications of the ,new ,principles 7sect4 #he-aef74 ,in this portion of the ,treatise1 the ,new ,principles1 already guarded against objections1 are applied to enlighten and invigorate final faith1 often suffering from the paralysis of the scepticism produced by materialism2 also to improve the sciences1 including those which relate to ,mind1 in man and in ,god4 ,they are applied3-- #a4 ,to the refutation of ,scepticism as to the reality of the world 7sect4 #he-ia7 and ,god 7sect4 #ib-if72 #b4 ,to the liberation of thought from the bondage of unmeaning abstractions 7sect4 #ig-ajj72 #c4 ,to the purification of ,natural ,philosophy1 by making it an interpretation of ideas of sense1 simply in their relations of coexistence and sequence1 according to which they constitute the ,divine ,language of ,nature 7sect4 #aja-aaf72 #d4 ,to simplify ,mathematics1 by eliminating infinites and other empty abstractions 7sect4 #aag-acd72 #e4 ,to explain and sustain faith in the ,immortality of men 7sect4 #ace-add72 #f4 ,to explain the belief which each man has in the existence of other men2 as signified to him in and through sense-symbolism 7sect4 #ade72 #g4 ,to vindicate faith in ,god1 who is signified in and through the sense-symbolism of universal nature 7sect4 #adf-aef74 ,it was only by degrees that ,berkeley's ,new ,principles attracted attention4 ,a new mode of conceiving the world we live in1 by a young and unknown author1 published at a distance from the centre of ,english intellectual life1 was apt to be overlooked4 ,in connexion with the ,essay on ,vision1 however1 it drew enough of regard to make ,berkeley an object of interest to the literary world on his first visit to ,london1 three years after its publication4 ,dedication ,,to ,,the ,,right ,,honourable ,,thomas1 ,,earl ,,of ,,pembroke7#dgb71 c4 ,,knight ,,of ,,the ,,most ,,noble ,,order ,,of ,,the ,,garter1 ,,and ,,one ,,of ,,the ,,lords ,,of ,,her ,,majesty',s ,,most ,,honourable ,,privy ,,council ,,my ,,lord1 ,you will perhaps wonder that an obscure person1 who has not the honour to be known to your lordship1 should presume to address you in this manner4 ,but that a man who has written something with a design to promote ,useful ,knowledge and ,religion in the world should make choice of your lordship for his patron1 will not be thought strange by any one that is not altogether unacquainted with the present state of the church and learning1 and consequently ignorant how great an ornament and support you are to both4 ,yet1 nothing could have induced me to make you this present of my poor endeavours1 were ,i not encouraged by that candour and native goodness which is so bright a part in your lordship's character4 ,i might add1 my lord1 that the extraordinary favour and bounty you have been pleased to shew towards our ,society7#dgc7 gave me hopes you would not be unwilling to countenance the studies of one of its members4 ,these considerations determined me to lay this treatise at your lordship's feet1 and the rather because ,i was ambitious to have it known that ,i am with the truest and most profound respect1 on account of that learning and virtue which the world so justly admires in your lordship1 ,my ,lord1 ,your lordship's most humble and most devoted servant1 ,,george ,,berkeley4 ,the ,preface ,what ,i here make public has1 after a long and scrupulous inquiry7#dgd71 seemed to me evidently true and not unuseful to be known2 particularly to those who are tainted with ,scepticism1 or want a demonstration of the existence and immateriality of ,god1 or the natural immortality of the ,soul4 ,whether it be so or no ,i am content the reader should impartially examine2 since ,i do not think myself any farther concerned for the success of what ,i have written than as it is agreeable to truth4 ,but1 to the end this may not suffer1 ,i make it my request that the reader suspend his judgment till he has once at least read the whole through1 with that degree of attention and thought which the subject-matter shall seem to deserve4 ,for1 as there are some passages that1 taken by themselves1 are very liable 7nor could it be remedied7 to gross misinterpretation1 and to be charged with most absurd consequences1 which1 nevertheless1 upon an entire perusal will appear not to follow from them2 so likewise1 though the whole should be read over1 yet1 if this be done transiently1 it is very probable my sense may be mistaken2 but to a thinking reader1 ,i flatter myself it will be throughout clear and obvious4 ,as for the characters of novelty and singularity7#dge7 which some of the following notions may seem to bear1 it is1 ,i hope1 needless to make any apology on that account4 ,he must surely be either very weak1 or very little acquainted with the sciences1 who shall reject a truth that is capable of demonstration7#dgf71 for no other reason but because it is newly known1 and contrary to the prejudices of mankind4 ,thus much ,i thought fit to premise1 in order to prevent1 if possible1 the hasty censures of a sort of men who are too apt to condemn an opinion before they rightly comprehend it7#dgg74 ,introduction #a4 ,philosophy being nothing else but the study of ,wisdom and ,truth7#dgh71 it may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind1 a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge1 and be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men4 ,yet1 so it is1 we see the illiterate bulk of mankind1 that walk the high-road of plain common sense1 and are governed by the dictates of nature1 for the most part easy and undisturbed4 ,to them nothing that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend4 ,they complain not of any want of evidence in their senses1 and are out of all danger of becoming ,sceptics4 ,but no sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a superior principle--to reason1 meditate1 and reflect on the nature of things1 but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds1 concerning those things which before we seemed fully to comprehend4 ,prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts discover themselves to our view2 and1 endeavouring to correct these by reason1 we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes1 difficulties1 and inconsistencies1 which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in speculation2 till at length1 having wandered through many intricate mazes1 we find ourselves just where we were1 or1 which is worse1 sit down in a forlorn ,scepticism7#dgi74 #b4 ,the cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things1 or the natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings4 ,it is said the faculties we have are few1 and those designed by nature for the support and pleasure of life1 and not to penetrate into the inward essence and constitution of things3 besides1 the mind of man being finite1 when it treats of things which partake of ,infinity1 it is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and contradictions1 out of which it is impossible it should ever extricate itself2 it being of the nature of ,infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite7#dhj74 #c4 ,but1 perhaps1 we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault originally in our faculties1 and not rather in the wrong use we make of them4 ,it is a hard thing to suppose that right deductions from true principles should ever end in consequences which cannot be maintained or made consistent4 ,we should believe that ,god has dealt more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge which he had placed quite out of their reach4 ,this were not agreeable to the wonted indulgent methods of ,providence1 which1 whatever appetites it may have implanted in the creatures1 doth usually furnish them with such means as1 if rightly made use of1 will not fail to satisfy them4 ,upon the whole1 ,i am inclined to think that the far greater part1 if not all1 of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers1 and blocked up the way to knowledge1 are entirely owing to ourselves4 ,we have first raised a dust1 and then complain we cannot see4 #d4 ,my purpose therefore is1 to try if ,i can discover what those ,principles are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty1 those absurdities and contradictions1 into the several sects of philosophy2 insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable1 conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation of our faculties4 ,and surely it is a work well deserving our pains to make a strict inquiry concerning the ,first ,principles of ,human ,knowledge2 to sift and examine them on all sides3 especially since there may be some grounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties1 which stay and embarrass the mind in its search after truth1 do not spring from any darkness and intricacy in the objects1 or natural defect in the understanding1 so much as from false ,principles which have been insisted on1 and might have been avoided4 #e4 ,how difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem1 when ,i consider what a number of very great and extraordinary men have gone before me in the like designs7#dha71 yet ,i am not without some hopes2 upon the consideration that the largest views are not always the clearest1 and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer1 and may1 perhaps1 by a close and narrow survey1 discern that which had escaped far better eyes4 #f4 ,in order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what follows1 it is proper to premise somewhat1 by way of ,introduction1 concerning the nature and abuse of ,language4 ,but the unravelling this matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design1 by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate and perplexed1 and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge4 ,and that is the opinion that the mind hath a power of framing abstract ideas or notions of things7#dhb74 ,he who is not a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers must needs acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract ideas4 ,these are in a more especial manner thought to be the object of those sciences which go by the name of logic and metaphysics1 and of all that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime learning2 in all which one shall scarce find any question handled in such a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind1 and that it is well acquainted with them4 #g4 ,it is agreed on all hands that the qualities or modes of things do never really exist each of them apart by itself1 and separated from all others1 but are mixed1 as it were1 and blended together1 several in the same object4 ,but1 we are told1 the mind1 being able to consider each quality singly1 or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is united1 does by that means frame to itself abstract ideas4 ,for example1 there is conceived by sight an object extended1 coloured1 and moved3 this mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its simple1 constituent parts1 and viewing each by itself1 exclusive of the rest1 does frame the abstract ideas of extension1 colour1 and motion4 ,not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without extension2 but only that the mind can frame to itself by abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of extension1 and of motion exclusive of both colour and extension4 #h4 ,again1 the mind having observed that in the particular extensions perceived by sense there is something common and alike in all1 and some other things peculiar1 as this or that figure or magnitude1 which distinguish them one from another1 it considers apart1 or singles out by itself1 that which is common2 making thereof a most abstract idea of extension2 which is neither line1 surface1 nor solid1 nor has any figure or magnitude1 but is an idea entirely prescinded from all these4 ,so likewise the mind1 by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by sense that which distinguishes them one from another1 and retaining that only which is common to all1 makes an idea of colour in abstract2 which is neither red1 nor blue1 nor white1 nor any other determinate colour4 ,and1 in like manner1 by considering motion abstractedly1 not only from the body moved1 but likewise from the figure it describes1 and all particular directions and velocities1 the abstract idea of motion is framed2 which equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be perceived by sense4 #i4 ,and as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities or modes1 so does it1 by the same precision1 or mental separation1 attain abstract ideas of the more compounded beings which include several coexistent qualities4 ,for example1 the mind having observed that ,peter1 ,james1 and ,john resemble each other in certain common agreements of shape and other qualities1 leaves out of the complex or compound idea it has of ,peter1 ,james1 and any other particular man1 that which is peculiar to each1 retaining only what is common to all1 and so makes an abstract idea1 wherein all the particulars equally partake2 abstracting entirely from and cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might determine it to any particular existence4 ,and after this manner it is said we come by the abstract idea of man1 or1 if you please1 humanity1 or human nature2 wherein it is true there is included colour1 because there is no man but has some colour1 but then it can be neither white1 nor black1 nor any particular colour1 because there is no one particular colour wherein all men partake4 ,so likewise there is included stature1 but then it is neither tall stature1 nor low stature1 nor yet middle stature1 but something abstracted from all these4 ,and so of the rest4 ,moreover1 there being a great variety of other creatures that partake in some parts1 but not all1 of the complex idea of man1 the mind1 leaving out those parts which are peculiar to men1 and retaining those only which are common to all the living creatures1 frames the idea of animal2 which abstracts not only from all particular men1 but also all birds1 beasts1 fishes1 and insects4 ,the constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal are body1 life1 sense1 and spontaneous motion4 ,by body is meant body without any particular shape or figure1 there being no one shape or figure common to all animals2 without covering1 either of hair1 or feathers1 or scales1 c41 nor yet naked3 hair1 feathers1 scales1 and nakedness being the distinguishing properties of particular animals1 and for that reason left out of the abstract idea4 ,upon the same account1 the spontaneous motion must be neither walking1 nor flying1 nor creeping2 it is nevertheless a motion1 but what that motion is it is not easy to conceive4 #aj4 ,whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas1 they best can tell7#dhc74 ,for myself1 7#dhd7;,i dare be confident ,i have it not4 ,i find indeed ,i have a faculty of imagining or representing to myself1 the ideas of those particular things ,i have perceived1 and of variously compounding and dividing them4 ,i can imagine a man with two heads2 or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse4 ,i can consider the hand1 the eye1 the nose1 each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body4 ,but then whatever hand or eye ,i imagine7#dhe71 it must have some particular shape and colour4 ,likewise the idea of man that ,i frame to myself must be either of a white1 or a black1 or a tawny1 a straight1 or a crooked1 a tall1 or a low1 or a middle-sized man4 ,i cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described4 ,and it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving1 and which is neither swift nor slow1 curvilinear nor rectilinear2 and the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever4 ,to be plain1 ,i own myself able to abstract in one sense1 as when ,i consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others1 with which1 though they are united in some object1 yet it is possible they may really exist without them4 ,but ,i deny that ,i can abstract from one another1 or conceive separately1 those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated2 or that ,i can frame a general notion1 by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid--which last are the two proper acceptations of abstraction4 ,and there is ground to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case4 ,the generality of men which are simple and illiterate never pretend to abstract notions7#dhf74 ,it is said they are difficult1 and not to be attained without pains and study4 ,we may therefore reasonably conclude that1 if such there be1 they are confined only to the learned4 #aa4 ,i proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the doctrine of abstraction7#dhg71 and try if ,i can discover what it is that inclines the men of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from common sense as that seems to be4 ,there has been a late 7#dhh7;excellent and deservedly esteemed philosopher7#dhi7 who1 no doubt1 has given it very much countenance1 by seeming to think the having abstract general ideas is what puts the widest difference in point of understanding betwixt man and beast4 8,the having of general ideas10 saith he1 8is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes1 and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto4 ,for it is evident we observe no foot-steps in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas2 from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting1 or making general ideas1 since they have no use of words1 or any other general signs40 ,and a little after3--8,therefore1 ,i think1 we may suppose1 that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from man3 and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated1 and which at last widens to so wide a distance4 ,for if they have any ideas at all1 and are not bare machines 7as some would have them7#dij771 we cannot deny them to have some reason4 ,it seems as evident to me that they do1 some of them1 in certain instances1 reason1 as that they have sense2 but it is only in particular ideas1 just as they receive them from their senses4 ,they are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds1 and have not 7as ,i think7 the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction40--,essay on ,human ,understanding1 ,b4 ,,ii4 ch4 #aa4 #aj and #aa4 ,i readily agree with this learned author1 that the faculties of brutes can by no means attain to abstraction4 ,but then if this be made the distinguishing property of that sort of animals1 ,i fear a great many of those that pass for men must be reckoned into their number4 ,the reason that is here assigned1 why we have no grounds to think brutes have abstract general ideas1 is1 that we observe in them no use of words1 or any other general signs2 which is built on this supposition1 to wit1 that the making use of words implies having general ideas4 ,from which it follows that men who use language are able to abstract or generalize their ideas4 ,that this is the sense and arguing of the author will further appear by his answering the question he in another place puts3 8,since all things that exist are only particulars1 how come we by general terms80 ,his answer is3 8,words become general by being made the signs of general ideas40--,essay on ,human ,understanding1 ,b4 ,,iii4 ch4 #c4 #f4 ,but it seems that a word7#dia7 becomes general by being made the sign1 not of an abstract general idea1 but of several particular ideas1 any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind4 ,for example1 when it is said 8the change of motion is proportional to the impressed force10 or that 8whatever has extension is divisible10 these propositions are to be understood of motion and extension in general2 and nevertheless it will not follow that they suggest to my thoughts an idea7#dib7 of motion without a body moved1 or any determinate direction and velocity2 or that ,i must conceive an abstract general idea of extension1 which is neither line1 surface1 nor solid1 neither great nor small1 black1 white1 nor red1 nor of any other determinate colour4 ,it is only implied that whatever particular motion ,i consider1 whether it be swift or slow1 perpendicular1 horizontal1 or oblique1 or in whatever object1 the axiom concerning it holds equally true4 ,as does the other of every particular extension2 it matters not whether line1 surface1 or solid1 whether of this or that magnitude or figure7#dic74 #ab4 ,by observing how ideas become general1 we may the better judge how words are made so4 ,and here it is to be noted that ,i do not deny absolutely there are general ideas1 but only that there are any abstract general ideas4 ,for1 in the passages we have quoted wherein there is mention of general ideas1 it is always supposed that they are formed by abstraction1 after the manner set forth in sections #h and #i7did74 ,now1 if we will annex a meaning to our words1 and speak only of what we can conceive1 ,i believe we shall acknowledge that an idea1 which considered in itself is particular1 becomes general1 by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort7#die74 ,to make this plain by an example4 ,suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts4 ,he draws1 for instance1 a black line of an inch in length3 this1 which in itself is a particular line1 is nevertheless with regard to its signification general2 since1 as it is there used1 it represents all particular lines whatsoever2 so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines1 or1 in other words1 of a line in general7#dif74 ,and1 as that particular line becomes general by being made a sign1 so the name line1 which taken absolutely is particular1 by being a sign1 is made general4 ,and as the former owes its generality1 not to its being the sign of an abstract or general line1 but of all particular right lines that may possibly exist1 so the latter must be thought to derive its generality from the same cause1 namely1 the various particular lines which it indifferently denotes4 #ac4 ,to give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas1 and the uses they are thought necessary to1 ,i shall add one more passage out of the ,essay on ,human ,understanding1 which is as follows3--8,abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children1 or the yet unexercised mind1 as particular ones4 ,if they seem so to grown men1 it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so4 ,for1 when we nicely reflect upon them1 we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind1 that carry difficulty with them1 and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine4 ,for example1 does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle 7which is yet none of the most abstract1 comprehensive1 and difficult72 for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle1 neither equilateral1 equicrural1 nor scalenon2 but all and none of these at once8 ,in effect1 it is something imperfect1 that cannot exist2 an idea7#dig7 wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together4 ,it is true the mind1 in this imperfect state1 has need of such ideas1 and makes all the haste to them it can1 for the conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge2 to both which it is naturally very much inclined4 ,but yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection4 ,at least this is enough to shew that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with1 nor such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about40--,b4 iv4 ch4 #g4 #i4 ,if any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here described1 it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it1 nor would ,i go about it4 ,all ,i desire is that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no4 ,and this1 methinks1 can be no hard task for any one to perform4 ,what more easy than for any one to look a little into his own thoughts1 and there try whether he has1 or can attain to have1 an idea that shall correspond with the description that is here given of the general idea of a triangle--which is neither oblique nor rectangle1 equilateral1 equicrural nor scalenon1 but all and none of these at once8 #ad4 ,much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with them1 and the pains and skill requisite to the forming them4 ,and it is on all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind1 to emancipate our thoughts from particular objects1 and raise them to those sublime speculations that are conversant about abstract ideas4 ,from all which the natural consequence should seem to be1 that so difficult a thing as the forming abstract ideas was not necessary for communication1 which is so easy and familiar to all sorts of men4 ,but1 we are told1 if they seem obvious and easy to grown men1 it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so4 ,now1 ,i would fain know at what time it is men are employed in surmounting that difficulty1 and furnishing themselves with those necessary helps for discourse4 ,it cannot be when they are grown up2 for then it seems they are not conscious of any such painstaking4 ,it remains therefore to be the business of their childhood4 ,and surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract notions7#dih7 will be found a hard task for that tender age4 ,is it not a hard thing to imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of their sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets1 till they have first tacked together numberless inconsistencies1 and so framed in their minds abstract general ideas1 and annexed them to every common name they make use of8 #ae4 ,nor do ,i think them a whit more needful for the enlargement of knowledge than for communication4 ,it is1 ,i know1 a point much insisted on1 that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions1 to which ,i fully agree4 ,but then it does not appear to me that those notions are formed by abstraction in the manner premised--universality1 so far as ,i can comprehend1 not consisting in the absolute1 positive nature or conception of anything1 but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it2 by virtue whereof it is that things1 names1 or notions7#dii71 being in their own nature particular1 are rendered universal4 ,thus1 when ,i demonstrate any proposition concerning triangles1 it is supposed that ,i have in view the universal idea of a triangle3 which ought not to be understood as if ,i could frame an idea7#ejj7 of a triangle which was neither equilateral1 nor scalenon1 nor equicrural2 but only that the particular triangle ,i consider1 whether of this or that sort it matters not1 doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear triangles whatsoever1 and is in that sense universal4 ,all which seems very plain and not to include any difficulty in it7#eja74 #af4 ,but here it will be demanded1 how we can know any proposition to be true of all particular triangles1 except we have first seen it demonstrated of the abstract idea of a triangle which equally agrees to all8 ,for1 because a property may be demonstrated to agree to some one particular triangle1 it will not thence follow that it equally belongs to any other triangle which in all respects is not the same with it4 ,for example1 having demonstrated that the three angles of an isosceles rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones1 ,i cannot therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither a right angle nor two equal sides4 ,it seems therefore that1 to be certain this proposition is universally true1 we must either make a particular demonstration for every particular triangle1 which is impossible2 or once for all demonstrate it of the abstract idea of a triangle1 in which all the particulars do indifferently partake1 and by which they are all equally represented4 ,to which ,i answer1 that1 though the idea ,i have in view7#ejb7 whilst ,i make the demonstration be1 for instance1 that of an isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate length1 ,i may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles1 of what sort or bigness soever4 ,and that because neither the right angle1 nor the equality1 nor determinate length of the sides are at all concerned in the demonstration4 ,it is true the diagram ,i have in view includes all these particulars2 but then there is not the least mention made of them in the proof of the proposition4 ,it is not said the three angles are equal to two right ones1 because one of them is a right angle1 or because the sides comprehending it are of the same length4 ,which sufficiently shews that the right angle might have been oblique1 and the sides unequal1 and for all that the demonstration have held good4 ,and for this reason it is that ,i conclude that to be true of any obliquangular or scalenon which ,i had demonstrated of a particular right-angled equicrural triangle1 and not because ,i demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a triangle4 7#ejc7;,and here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular2 without attending to the particular qualities of the angles1 or relations of the sides4 ,so far he may abstract4 ,but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract1 general1 inconsistent idea of a triangle4 ,in like manner we may consider ,peter so far forth as man1 or so far forth as animal1 without framing the forementioned abstract idea1 either of man or of animal2 inasmuch as all that is perceived is not considered4 #ag4 ,it were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the ,schoolmen1 those great masters of abstraction1 through all the manifold inextricable labyrinths of error and dispute which their doctrine of abstract natures and notions seems to have led them into4 ,what bickerings and controversies1 and what a learned dust have been raised about those matters1 and what mighty advantage has been from thence derived to mankind1 are things at this day too clearly known to need being insisted on4 ,and it had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine were confined to those only who make the most avowed profession of it4 ,when men consider the great pains1 industry1 and parts that have for so many ages been laid out on the cultivation and advancement of the sciences1 and that notwithstanding all this the far greater part of them remain full of darkness and uncertainty1 and disputes that are like never to have an end2 and even those that are thought to be supported by the most clear and cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men2 and that1 taking all together1 a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit to mankind1 otherwise than by being an innocent diversion and amusement7#ejd7--;,i say1 the consideration of all this is apt to throw them into a despondency and perfect contempt of all study4 ,but this may perhaps cease upon a view of the false ,principles that have obtained in the world2 amongst all which there is none1 methinks1 hath a more wide influence7#eje7 over the thoughts of speculative men than this of abstract general ideas4 #ah4 ,i come now to consider the source of this prevailing notion1 and that seems to me to be language4 ,and surely nothing of less extent than reason itself could have been the source of an opinion so universally received4 ,the truth of this appears as from other reasons so also from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas1 who acknowledge that they are made in order to naming2 from which it is clear consequence that if there had been no such thing as speech or universal signs1 there never had been any thought of abstraction4 ,see ,b4 iii4 ch4 #f4 #ci1 and elsewhere of the ,essay on ,human ,understanding4 ,let us examine the manner wherein ,words have contributed to the origin of that mistake4--,first then1 it is thought that every name has1 or ought to have1 one only precise and settled signification2 which inclines men to think there are certain abstract determinate ideas that constitute the true and only immediate signification of each general name2 and that it is by the mediation of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing4 ,whereas1 in truth1 there is no such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to any general name1 they all signifying indifferently a great number of particular ideas4 ,all which does evidently follow from what has been already said1 and will clearly appear to any one by a little reflexion4 ,to this it will be objected that every name that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain signification4 ,for example1 a triangle is defined to be 8a plain surface comprehended by three right lines02 by which that name is limited to denote one certain idea and no other4 ,to which ,i answer1 that in the definition it is not said whether the surface be great or small1 black or white1 nor whether the sides are long or short1 equal or unequal1 nor with what angles they are inclined to each other2 in all which there may be great variety1 and consequently there is no one settled idea which limits the signification of the word triangle4 ,it is one thing for to keep a name constantly to the same definition1 and another to make it stand everywhere for the same idea7#ejf73 the one is necessary1 the other useless and impracticable4 #ai4 ,but1 to give a farther account how words came to produce the doctrine of abstract ideas1 it must be observed that it is a received opinion that language has no other end but the communicating ideas1 and that every significant name stands for an idea4 ,this being so1 and it being withal certain that names which yet are not thought altogether insignificant do not always mark out particular conceivable ideas1 it is straightway concluded that they stand for abstract notions4 ,that there are many names in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest to others determinate1 particular ideas1 or in truth anything at all1 is what nobody will deny4 ,and a little attention will discover that it is not necessary 7even in the strictest reasonings7 that significant names which stand for ideas should1 every time they are used1 excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to stand for3 in reading and discoursing1 names being for the most part used as letters are in ,algebra1 in which1 though a particular quantity be marked by each letter1 yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for7#ejg74 #bj4 ,besides1 the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language1 as is commonly supposed4 ,there are other ends1 as the raising of some passion1 the exciting to or deterring from an action1 the putting the mind in some particular disposition2 to which the former is in many cases barely subservient1 and sometimes entirely omitted1 when these can be obtained without it1 as ,i think doth7#ejh7 not unfrequently happen in the familiar use of language4 ,i entreat the reader to reflect with himself1 and see if it doth not often happen1 either in hearing or reading a discourse1 that the passions of fear1 love1 hatred1 admiration1 and disdain1 and the like1 arise immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain words1 without any ideas7#eji7 coming between4 ,at first1 indeed1 the words might have occasioned ideas that were fitting to produce those emotions2 but1 if ,i mistake not1 it will be found that1 when language is once grown familiar1 the hearing of the sounds or sight of the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions which at first were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are now quite omitted4 ,may we not1 for example1 be affected with the promise of a good thing1 though we have not an idea of what it is8 ,or is not the being threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread1 though we think not of any particular evil likely to befal us1 nor yet frame to ourselves an idea of danger in abstract8 ,if any one shall join ever so little reflection of his own to what has been said1 ,i believe that it will evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the propriety of language without the speakers designing them for marks of ideas in his own1 which he would have them raise in the mind of the hearer4 ,even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken with a design to bring into our view the ideas of those individuals that are supposed to be marked by them4 ,for example1 when a schoolman tells me 8,aristotle hath said it10 all ,i conceive he means by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which custom has annexed to that name4 ,and this effect may be so instantly produced in the minds of those who are accustomed to resign their judgment to authority of that philosopher1 as it is impossible any idea either of his person1 writings1 or reputation should go before4 7#eaj7,so close and immediate a connexion may custom establish betwixt the very word ,aristotle7#eaa7 and the motions of assent and reverence in the minds of some men4 ,innumerable examples of this kind may be given1 but why should ,i insist on those things which every one's experience will1 ,i doubt not1 plentifully suggest unto him8 #ba4 ,we have1 ,i think1 shewn the impossibility of ,abstract ,ideas4 ,we have considered what has been said for them by their ablest patrons2 and endeavoured to shew they are of no use for those ends to which they are thought necessary4 ,and lastly1 we have traced them to the source from whence they flow1 which appears evidently to be ,language4 ,it cannot be denied that words are of excellent use1 in that by their means all that stock of knowledge which has been purchased by the joint labours of inquisitive men in all ages and nations may be drawn into the view and made the possession of one single person4 ,but 7#eab7;at the same time it must be owned that most parts of knowledge have been 7#eac7so strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse of words1 and general ways of speech wherein they are delivered1 that it may almost be made a question whether language has contributed more to the hindrance or advancement of the sciences7#ead74 ,since therefore words are so apt to impose on the understanding1 ,i am resolved in my inquiries to make as little use of them as possibly ,i can7#eae73 whatever ideas ,i consider1 ,i shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my view2 keeping out of my thoughts1 so far as ,i am able1 those names which long and constant use hath so strictly united with them4 ,from which ,i may expect to derive the following advantages3-- #bb4 ,first1 ,i shall be sure to get clear of all controversies purely verbal1 the springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences has been a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound knowledge4 ,secondly1 this seems to be a sure way to extricate myself out of that fine and subtle net of abstract ideas1 which has so miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of men2 and that with this peculiar circumstance1 that by how much the finer and more curious was the wit of any man1 by so much the deeper was he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein4 ,thirdly1 so long as ,i confine my thoughts to my own ideas7#eaf71 divested of words1 ,i do not see how ,i can easily be mistaken4 ,the objects ,i consider1 ,i clearly and adequately know4 ,i cannot be deceived in thinking ,i have an idea which ,i have not4 ,it is not possible for me to imagine that any of my own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so4 ,to discern the agreements or disagreements there are between my ideas1 to see what ideas are included in any compound idea and what not1 there is nothing more requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own understanding4 #bc4 ,but the attainment of all these advantages does presuppose an entire deliverance from the deception of words2 which ,i dare hardly promise myself1 so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an union so early begun1 and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas4 ,which difficulty seems to have been very much increased by the doctrine of abstraction4 ,for1 so long as men thought abstract ideas were annexed to their words1 it does not seem strange that they should use words for ideas2 it being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word1 and retain the abstract idea in the mind2 which in itself was perfectly inconceivable4 ,this seems to me the principal cause why those who have so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside all use of words in their meditations1 and contemplating their bare ideas1 have yet failed to perform it themselves4 ,of late many have been very sensible of the absurd opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of the abuse of words4 ,and1 in order to remedy these evils1 they advise well7#eag71 that we attend to the ideas signified1 and draw off our attention from the words which signify them7#eah74 ,but1 how good soever this advice may be they have given others1 it is plain they could not have a due regard to it themselves1 so long as they thought the only immediate use of words was to signify ideas1 and that the immediate signification of every general name was a determinate abstract idea4 #bd4 ,but these being known to be mistakes1 a man may with greater ease prevent his being imposed on by words4 ,he that knows he has no other than particular ideas1 will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name4 ,and he that knows names do not always stand for ideas7#eai7 will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had4 ,it were1 therefore1 to be wished that every one would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider2 separating from them all that dress and incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind the judgment and divide the attention4 ,in vain do we extend our view into the heavens and pry into the entrails of the earth1 in vain do we consult the writings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity4 ,we need only draw the curtain of words1 to behold the fairest tree of knowledge1 whose fruit is excellent1 and within the reach of our hand4 #be4 ,unless we take care to clear the ,first ,principles of ,knowledge from the embarras and delusion of ,words1 we may make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose2 we may draw consequences from consequences1 and be never the wiser4 ,the farther we go1 we shall only lose ourselves the more irrecoverably1 and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes4 ,whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets1 ,i entreat him that he would make my words the occasion of his own thinking1 and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading that ,i had in writing them4 ,by this means it will be easy for him to discover the truth or falsity of what ,i say4 ,he will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words4 ,and ,i do not see how he can be led into an error by considering his own naked1 undisguised ideas7#ebj74 ,part ,first #a4 ,it is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge1 that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses2 or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind2 or lastly1 ideas formed by help of memory and imagination--either compounding1 dividing1 or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways4 ,by sight ,i have the ideas of light and colours1 with their several degrees and variations4 ,by touch ,i perceive hard and soft1 heat and cold1 motion and resistance2 and of all these more and less either as to quantity or degree4 ,smelling furnishes me with odours2 the palate with tastes2 and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition7#eba74 ,and as several of these are observed to accompany each other1 they come to be marked by one name1 and so to be reputed as one thing4 ,thus1 for example1 a certain colour1 taste1 smell1 figure and consistence having been observed to go together1 are accounted one distinct thing1 signified by the name apple2 other collections of ideas constitute a stone1 a tree1 a book1 and the like sensible things2 which as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love1 hatred1 joy1 grief1 and so forth7#ebb74 #b4 ,but1 besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge1 there is likewise ,something which knows or perceives them2 and exercises divers operations1 as willing1 imagining1 remembering1 about them4 ,this perceiving1 active being is what ,i call mind1 spirit1 soul1 or myself4 ,by which words ,i do not denote any one of my ideas1 but a thing entirely distinct from them1 wherein they exist1 or1 which is the same thing1 whereby they are perceived2 for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived7#ebc74 #c4 ,that neither our thoughts1 nor passions1 nor ideas formed by the imagination1 exist without the mind is what everybody will allow4 ,and to me it seems no less evident that the various sensations1 or ideas imprinted on the ,sense1 however blended or combined together 7that is1 whatever objects they compose71 cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them7#ebd74 ,i think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this1 by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term exist when applied to sensible things7#ebe74 ,the table ,i write on ,i say exists2 that is1 ,i see and feel it3 and if ,i were out of my study ,i should say it existed2 meaning thereby that if ,i was in my study ,i might perceive it1 or that some other spirit actually does perceive it4 ,there was an odour1 that is1 it was smelt2 there was a sound1 that is1 it was heard2 a colour or figure1 and it was perceived by sight or touch4 ,this is all that ,i can understand by these and the like expressions7#ebf74 ,for as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things1 without any relation to their being perceived1 that is to me perfectly unintelligible4 ,their esse is percipi2 nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them7#ebg74 #d4 ,it is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men1 that houses1 mountains1 rivers1 and in a word all sensible objects1 have an existence1 natural or real7#ebh71 distinct from their being perceived by the understanding4 ,but1 with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this ,principle may be entertained in the world1 yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may1 if ,i mistake not1 perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction4 ,for1 what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense8 and what do we perceive besides our own7#ebi7 ideas or sensations8 and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these1 or any combination of them1 should exist unperceived8 #e4 ,if we thoroughly examine this tenet7#ecj7 it will1 perhaps1 be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas4 ,for can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived1 so as to conceive them existing unperceived7#eca78 ,light and colours1 heat and cold1 extension and figures--in a word the things we see and feel--what are they but so many sensations1 notions7#ecb71 ideas1 or impressions on the sense8 and is it possible to separate1 even in thought1 any of these from perception8 ,for my part1 ,i might as easily divide a thing from itself4 ,i may1 indeed1 divide in my thoughts1 or conceive apart from each other1 those things which perhaps ,i never perceived by sense so divided4 ,thus1 ,i imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs1 or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself4 ,so far1 ,i will not deny1 ,i can abstract2 if that may properly be called abstraction which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder4 ,but my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception4 ,hence1 as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing1 so is it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it4 7#ecc7;,in truth1 the object and the sensation are the same thing1 and cannot therefore be abstracted from each other4 #f4 ,some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them4 ,such ,i take this important one to be1 viz4 that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth1 in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world1 have not any subsistence without a mind2 that their being is to be perceived or known2 that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me1 or do not exist in my mind1 or that of any other created spirit1 they must either have no existence at all1 or else subsist in the mind of some ,eternal ,spirit3 it being perfectly unintelligible1 and involving all the absurdity of abstraction1 to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit4 7#ecd7,to be convinced of which1 the reader need only reflect1 and try to separate in his own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived4 #g4 ,from what has been said it is evident there is not any other ,substance than ,spirit1 or that which perceives7#ece74 ,but1 for the fuller proof7#ecf7 of this point1 let it be considered the sensible qualities are colour1 figure1 motion1 smell1 taste1 and such like1 that is1 the ideas perceived by sense4 ,now1 for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction2 for to have an idea is all one as to perceive3 that therefore wherein colour1 figure1 and the like qualities exist must perceive them4 ,hence it is clear there can be no unthinking substance or substratum of those ideas4 #h4 ,but1 say you1 though the ideas themselves7#ecg7 do not exist without the mind1 yet there may be things like them1 whereof they are copies or resemblances2 which things exist without the mind1 in an unthinking substance7#ech74 ,i answer1 an idea can be like nothing but an idea2 a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure4 ,if we look but never so little into our thoughts1 we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas4 ,again1 ,i ask whether those supposed originals1 or external things1 of which our ideas are the pictures or representations1 be themselves perceivable or no8 ,if they are1 then they are ideas1 and we have gained our point3 but if you say they are not1 ,i appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible2 hard or soft1 like something which is intangible2 and so of the rest4 #i4 ,some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities7#eci74 ,by the former they mean extension1 figure1 motion1 rest1 solidity or impenetrability1 and number2 by the latter they denote all other sensible qualities1 as colours1 sounds1 tastes1 and so forth4 ,the ideas we have of these last they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind1 or unperceived2 but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind1 in an unthinking substance which they call ,matter4 ,by ,matter1 therefore1 we are to understand an inert7#edj71 senseless substance1 in which extension1 figure1 and motion do actually subsist4 ,but it is evident1 from what we have already shewn1 that extension1 figure1 and motion are only ideas existing in the mind7#eda71 and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea2 and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance4 ,hence1 it is plain that the very notion of what is called ,matter or corporeal substance1 involves a contradiction in it4 7#edb7;,insomuch that ,i should not think it necessary to spend more time in exposing its absurdity4 ,but1 because the tenet of the existence of ,matter7#edc7 seems to have taken so deep a root in the minds of philosophers1 and draws after it so many ill consequences1 ,i choose rather to be thought prolix and tedious than omit anything that might conduce to the full discovery and extirpation of that prejudice4 #aj4 ,they who assert that figure1 motion1 and the rest of the primary or original qualities7#edd7 do exist without the mind1 in unthinking substances1 do at the same time acknowledge that colours1 sounds1 heat1 cold1 and suchlike secondary qualities1 do not2 which they tell us are sensations1 existing in the mind alone1 that depend on and are occasioned by the different size1 texture1 and motion of the minute particles of matter7#ede74 ,this they take for an undoubted truth1 which they can demonstrate beyond all exception4 ,now1 if it be certain that those original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities1 and not1 even in thought1 capable of being abstracted from them1 it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind4 ,but ,i desire any one to reflect1 and try whether he can1 by any abstraction of thought1 conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities4 ,for my own part1 ,i see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving1 but ,i must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality1 which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind4 ,in short1 extension1 figure and motion1 abstracted from all other qualities1 are inconceivable4 ,where therefore the other sensible qualities are1 there must these be also1 to wit1 in the mind and nowhere else7#edf74 #aa4 ,again1 great and small1 swift and slow1 are allowed to exist nowhere without the mind7#edg72 being entirely relative1 and changing as the frame or position of the organs of sense varies4 ,the extension therefore which exists without the mind is neither great nor small1 the motion neither swift nor slow2 that is1 they are nothing at all4 ,but1 say you1 they are extension in general1 and motion in general4 ,thus we see how much the tenet of extended moveable substances existing without the mind depends on that strange doctrine of abstract ideas4 ,and here ,i cannot but remark how nearly the vague and indeterminate description of ,matter1 or corporeal substance1 which the modern philosophers are run into by their own principles1 resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of materia prima1 to be met with in ,aristotle and his followers4 ,without extension solidity cannot be conceived3 since therefore it has been shewn that extension exists not in an unthinking substance1 the same must also be true of solidity7#edh74 #ab4 ,that number is entirely the creature of the mind7#edi71 even though the other qualities be allowed to exist without1 will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as the mind views it with different respects4 ,thus1 the same extension is one1 or three1 or thirty-six1 according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard1 a foot1 or an inch4 ,number is so visibly relative1 and dependent on men's understanding1 that it is strange to think how any one should give it an absolute existence without the mind4 ,we say one book1 one page1 one line1 c42 all these are equally units1 though some contain several of the others4 ,and in each instance1 it is plain1 the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind7#eej74 #ac4 ,unity ,i know some7#eea7 will have to be a simple or uncompounded idea1 accompanying all other ideas into the mind4 ,that ,i have any such idea answering the word unity ,i do not find2 and if ,i had1 methinks ,i could not miss finding it2 on the contrary1 it should be the most familiar to my understanding1 since it is said to accompany all other ideas1 and to be perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflexion4 ,to say no more1 it is an abstract idea4 #ad4 ,i shall farther add1 that1 after the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence in ,matter1 or without the mind1 the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever4 ,thus1 for instance1 it is said that heat and cold are affections only of the mind1 and not at all patterns of real beings1 existing in the corporeal substances which excite them2 for that the same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another4 ,now1 why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in ,matter2 because to the same eye at different stations1 or eyes of a different texture at the same station1 they appear various1 and cannot therefore be the images of anything settled and determinate without the mind8 ,again1 it is proved that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing2 because the thing remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter1 as in case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate4 ,is it not as reasonable to say that motion is not without the mind2 since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter1 the motion1 it is acknowledged1 shall appear slower1 without any alteration in any external object7#eeb78 #ae4 ,in short1 let any one consider those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only in the mind1 and he shall find they may with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension1 figure1 and motion4 ,though it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in an outward object1 as that we do not know by sense which is the true extension or colour of the object4 ,but the arguments foregoing7#eec7 plainly shew it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all1 or other sensible quality whatsoever1 should exist in an unthinking subject without the mind1 or in truth that there should be any such thing as an outward object7#eed74 #af4 ,but let us examine a little the received opinion4 ,it is said extension is a mode or accident of ,matter1 and that ,matter is the substratum that supports it4 ,now ,i desire that you would explain to me what is meant by ,matter's supporting extension4 ,say you1 ,i have no idea of ,matter2 and therefore cannot explain it4 ,i answer1 though you have no positive1 yet1 if you have any meaning at all1 you must at least have a relative idea of ,matter2 though you know not what it is1 yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents1 and what is meant by its supporting them4 ,it is evident support cannot here be taken in its usual or literal sense1 as when we say that pillars support a building4 ,in what sense therefore must it be taken8 7#eee7 ,for my part1 ,i am not able to discover any sense at all that can be applicable to it4 #ag4 ,if we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare themselves to mean by material substance1 we shall find them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of ,being in general1 together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents4 ,the general idea of ,being appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other2 and as for its supporting accidents1 this1 as we have just now observed1 cannot be understood in the common sense of those words3 it must therefore be taken in some other sense1 but what that is they do not explain4 ,so that when ,i consider the two parts or branches which make the signification of the words material substance1 ,i am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them4 ,but why should we trouble ourselves any farther1 in discussing this material substratum or support of figure and motion and other sensible qualities8 ,does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind8 ,and is not this a direct repugnancy1 and altogether inconceivable8 #ah4 ,but1 though it were possible that solid1 figured1 moveable substances may exist without the mind1 corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies1 yet how is it possible for us to know this8 ,either we must know it by ,sense or by ,reason7#eef74 ,as for our senses1 by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations1 ideas1 or those things that are immediately perceived by sense1 call them what you will3 but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind1 or unperceived1 like to those which are perceived4 ,this the materialists themselves acknowledge4--,it remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things1 it must be by reason inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense4 ,but 77#eeg7;,i do not see7 what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind1 from what we perceive1 since the very patrons of ,matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connexion betwixt them and our ideas8 ,i say it is granted on all hands 7and what happens in dreams1 frensies1 and the like1 puts it beyond dispute7 that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now1 though no bodies existed without resembling them7#eeh74 ,hence it is evident the supposition of external bodies7#eei7 is not necessary for the producing our ideas2 since it is granted they are produced sometimes1 and might possibly be produced always1 in the same order we see them in at present1 without their concurrence4 #ai4 ,but1 though we might possibly have all our sensations without them1 yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their production1 by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise2 and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds4 ,but neither can this be said4 ,for1 though we give the materialists their external bodies1 they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced2 since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit1 or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind7#efj74 ,hence it is evident the production of ideas or sensations in our minds7#efa71 can be no reason why we should suppose ,matter or corporeal substances7#efb72 since that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with or without this supposition4 ,if therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the mind1 yet to hold they do so must needs be a very precarious opinion2 since it is to suppose1 without any reason at all1 that ,god has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless1 and serve to no manner of purpose4 #bj4 ,in short1 if there were external bodies7#efc71 it is impossible we should ever come to know it2 and if there were not1 we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now4 ,suppose--what no one can deny possible--an intelligence1 without the help of external bodies1 to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are1 imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind4 ,i ask whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the existence of ,corporeal ,substances1 represented by his ideas1 and exciting them in his mind1 that you can possibly have for believing the same thing8 ,of this there can be no question4 ,which one consideration were enough to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever arguments he may think himself to have1 for the existence of bodies without the mind4 #ba4 ,were it necessary to add any farther proof against the existence of ,matter7#efd71 after what has been said1 ,i could instance several of those errors and difficulties 7not to mention impieties7 which have sprung from that tenet4 ,it has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in philosophy1 and not a few of far greater moment in religion4 ,but ,i shall not enter into the detail of them in this place1 as well because ,i think arguments a posteriori are unnecessary for confirming what has been1 if ,i mistake not1 sufficiently demonstrated a priori1 as because ,i shall hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them4 #bb4 ,i am afraid ,i have given cause to think ,i am needlessly prolix in handling this subject4 ,for1 to what purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two1 to any one that is capable of the least reflexion8 ,it is but looking into your own thoughts1 and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound1 or figure1 or motion1 or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived4 ,this easy trial7#efe7 may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a downright contradiction4 ,insomuch that ,i am content to put the whole upon this issue3--,if you can but conceive it possible for one extended moveable substance1 or in general for any one idea1 or anything like an idea1 to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it7#eff71 ,i shall readily give up the cause4 ,and1 as for all that compages of external bodies you contend for1 ,i shall grant you its existence1 though you cannot either give me any reason why you believe it exists1 or assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist4 ,i say1 the bare possibility of your opinions being true shall pass for an argument that it is so4 #bc4 ,but1 say you1 surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees1 for instance1 in a park1 or books existing in a closet1 and nobody by to perceive them4 ,i answer1 you may so1 there is no difficulty in it4 ,but what is all this1 ,i beseech you1 more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees1 and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them8 ,but do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while8 ,this therefore is nothing to the purpose3 it only shews you have the power of imagining1 or forming ideas in your mind2 but it does not shew that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind7#efg74 ,to make out this1 it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of2 which is a manifest repugnancy4 ,when we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies7#efh71 we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas4 ,but the mind1 taking no notice of itself1 is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of1 or without the mind1 though at the same time they are apprehended by1 or exist in1 itself4 ,a little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of what is here said1 and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material substance4 #bd4 7#efi7;,could men but forbear to amuse themselves with words1 we should1 ,i believe1 soon come to an agreement in this point4 ,it is very obvious1 upon the least inquiry into our own thoughts1 to know whether it be possible for us to understand what is meant by the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves1 or without the mind7#egj74 ,to me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction1 or else nothing at all4 ,and to convince others of this1 ,i know no readier or fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own thoughts2 and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions does appear1 surely nothing more is requisite for their conviction4 ,it is on this therefore that ,i insist1 to wit1 that the absolute existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning1 or which include a contradiction4 ,this is what ,i repeat and inculcate1 and earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader4 #be4 ,all our ideas1 sensations1 notions7#ega71 or the things which we perceive1 by whatsoever names they may be distinguished1 are visibly inactive3 there is nothing of power or agency included in them4 ,so that one idea or object of thought cannot produce or make any alteration in another7#egb74 ,to be satisfied of the truth of this1 there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our ideas4 ,for1 since they and every part of them exist only in the mind1 it follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived2 but whoever shall attend to his ideas1 whether of sense or reflexion1 will not perceive in them any power or activity2 there is1 therefore1 no such thing contained in them4 ,a little attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it2 insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do anything1 or1 strictly speaking1 to be the cause of anything3 neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being1 as is evident from sect4 #h4 ,whence it plainly follows that extension1 figure1 and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations4 ,to say1 therefore1 that these are the effects of powers resulting from the configuration1 number1 motion1 and size of corpuscles7#egc71 must certainly be false4 #bf4 ,we perceive a continual succession of ideas2 some are anew excited1 others are changed or totally disappear4 ,there is therefore some cause of these ideas1 whereon they depend1 and which produces and changes them7#egd74 ,that this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas1 is clear from the preceding section4 ,it must therefore be a substance2 but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance3 it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or ,spirit7#ege74 #bg4 ,a ,spirit is one simple1 undivided active being--as it perceives ideas it is called the understanding1 and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the will4 ,hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit2 for all ideas whatever1 being passive and inert 7vid4 sect4 #be71 they cannot represent unto us1 by way of image or likeness1 that which acts4 ,a little attention will make it plain to any one1 that to have an idea which shall be like that active ,principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible4 ,such is the nature of ,spirit1 or that which acts1 that it cannot be of itself perceived1 but only by the effects which it produceth7#egf74 ,if any man shall doubt of the truth of what is here delivered1 let him but reflect and try if he can frame the idea of any power or active being2 and whether he has ideas of two principal powers1 marked by the names will and understanding1 distinct from each other1 as well as from a third idea of ,substance or ,being in general1 with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject of the aforesaid powers--which is signified by the name soul or spirit4 ,this is what some hold2 but1 so far as ,i can see1 the words will1 7#egg7understanding1 mind1 soul1 spirit1 do not stand for different ideas1 or1 in truth1 for any idea at all1 but for something which is very different from ideas1 and which1 being an agent1 cannot be like unto1 or represented by1 any idea whatsoever4 7#egh7,though it must be owned at the same time that we have some notion of soul1 spirit1 and the operations of the mind1 such as willing1 loving1 hating--inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words4 #bh4 ,i find ,i can excite ideas7#egi7 in my mind at pleasure1 and vary and shift the scene as oft as ,i think fit4 ,it is no more than willing1 and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy2 and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another4 ,this making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active4 ,thus much is certain and grounded on experience3 but when we talk of unthinking agents1 or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition1 we only amuse ourselves with words7#ehj74 #bi4 ,but1 whatever power ,i may have over my own thoughts1 ,i find the ideas actually perceived by ,sense have not a like dependence on my will4 ,when in broad daylight ,i open my eyes1 it is not in my power to choose whether ,i shall see or no1 or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view3 and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses2 the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will7#eha74 ,there is therefore some other ,will or ,spirit that produces them4 #cj4 ,the ideas of ,sense are more strong1 lively1 and distinct than those of the ,imagination7#ehb72 they have likewise a steadiness1 order1 and coherence1 and are not excited at random1 as those which are the effects of human wills often are1 but in a regular train or series--the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its ,author4 ,now the set rules1 or established methods1 wherein the ,mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of ,sense1 are called the laws of nature2 and these we learn by experience1 which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas1 in the ordinary course of things4 #ca4 ,this gives us a sort of foresight1 which enables us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life4 ,and without this we should be eternally at a loss3 we could not know how to act anything that might procure us the least pleasure1 or remove the least pain of sense4 ,that food nourishes1 sleep refreshes1 and fire warms us2 that to sow in the seed-time is the way to reap in the harvest2 and in general that to obtain such or such ends1 such or such means are conducive--all this we know1 not by discovering any necessary connexion between our ideas1 but only by the observation of the settled laws of nature2 without which we should be all in uncertainty and confusion1 and a grown man no more know how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born7#ehc74 #cb4 ,and yet this consistent uniform working1 which so evidently displays the ,goodness and ,wisdom of that ,governing ,spirit whose ,will constitutes the laws of nature1 is so far from leading our thoughts to ,him1 that it rather sends them wandering after second causes7#ehd74 ,for1 when we perceive certain ideas of ,sense constantly followed by other ideas1 and we know this is not of our own doing1 we forthwith attribute power and agency to the ideas themselves1 and make one the cause of another1 than which nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible4 ,thus1 for example1 having observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure1 we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called heat1 we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat4 ,and in like manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with sound1 we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former7#ehe74 #cc4 ,the ideas imprinted on the ,senses by the ,author of nature are called real things3 and those excited in the imagination1 being less regular1 vivid1 and constant1 are more properly termed ideas or images of things1 which they copy and represent4 ,but then our sensations1 be they never so vivid and distinct1 are nevertheless ideas7#ehf73 that is1 they exist in the mind1 or are perceived by it1 as truly as the ideas of its own framing4 ,the ideas of ,sense are allowed to have more reality7#ehg7 in them1 that is1 to be more strong1 orderly1 and coherent than the creatures of the mind2 but this is no argument that they exist without the mind4 ,they are also less dependent on the spirit or thinking substance which perceives them1 in that they are excited by the will of another and more powerful ,spirit2 yet still they are ideas3 and certainly no idea1 whether faint or strong1 can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it7#ehh74 #cd4 ,before we proceed any farther it is necessary we spend some time in answering ,objections7#ehi7 which may probably be made against the ,principles we have hitherto laid down4 ,in doing of which1 if ,i seem too prolix to those of quick apprehensions1 ,i desire ,i may be excused1 since all men do not equally apprehend things of this nature2 and ,i am willing to be understood by every one4 ,first1 then1 it will be objected that by the foregoing principles all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world1 and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place4 ,all things that exist exist only in the mind2 that is1 they are purely notional4 ,what therefore becomes of the sun1 moon1 and stars8 ,what must we think of houses1 rivers1 mountains1 trees1 stones2 nay1 even of our own bodies8 ,are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy8--,to all which1 and whatever else of the same sort may be objected1 ,i answer1 that by the ,principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in nature4 ,whatever we see1 feel1 hear1 or any wise conceive or understand1 remains as secure as ever1 and is as real as ever4 ,there is a rerum natura1 and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force4 ,this is evident from sect4 #bi1 #cj1 and #cc1 where we have shewn what is meant by real things1 in opposition to chimeras or ideas of our own framing2 but then they both equally exist in the mind1 and in that sense7#eij7 are alike ideas4 #ce4 ,i do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend1 either by sense or reflection4 ,that the things ,i see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist1 really exist1 ,i make not the least question4 ,the only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call ,matter or corporeal substance4 ,and in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind1 who1 ,i dare say1 will never miss it4 ,the ,atheist indeed will want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety2 and the ,philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great handle for trifling and disputation4 7#eia7;,but that is all the harm that ,i can see done4 #cf4 ,if any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of things1 he is very far from understanding what hath been premised in the plainest terms ,i could think of4 ,take here an abstract of what has been said3--,there are spiritual substances1 minds1 or human souls1 which will or excite ideas7#eib7 in themselves at pleasure2 but these are faint1 weak1 and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by sense3 which1 being impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature1 speak themselves the effects of a ,mind more powerful and wise than human spirits7#eic74 ,these latter are said to have more reality7#eid7 in them than the former2--by which is meant that they are more affecting1 orderly1 and distinct1 and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them7#eie74 ,and in this sense the sun that ,i see by day is the real sun1 and that which ,i imagine by night is the idea of the former4 ,in the sense here given of reality1 it is evident that every vegetable1 star1 mineral1 and in general each part of the mundane system1 is as much a real being by our principles as by any other4 ,whether others mean anything by the term reality different from what ,i do1 ,i entreat them to look into their own thoughts and see4 #cg4 ,it will be urged that thus much at least is true1 to wit1 that we take away all corporeal substances4 ,to this my answer is1 that if the word substance be taken in the vulgar sense1 for a combination of sensible qualities1 such as extension1 solidity1 weight1 and the like--this we cannot be accused of taking away3 but if it be taken in a philosophic sense1 for the support of accidents or qualities without the mind--then indeed ,i acknowledge that we take it away1 if one may be said to take away that which never had any existence1 not even in the imagination7#eif74 #ch4 ,but after all1 say you1 it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink ideas1 and are clothed with ideas4 ,i acknowledge it does so--the word idea not being used in common discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible qualities which are called things2 and it is certain that any expression which varies from the familiar use of language will seem harsh and ridiculous4 ,but this doth not concern the truth of the proposition1 which in other words is no more than to say1 we are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by our senses7#eig74 ,the hardness or softness1 the colour1 taste1 warmth1 figure1 and suchlike qualities1 which combined together7#eih7 constitute the several sorts of victuals and apparel1 have been shewn to exist only in the mind that perceives them3 and this is all that is meant by calling them ideas2 which word1 if it was as ordinarily used as thing1 would sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it4 ,i am not for disputing about the propriety1 but the truth of the expression4 ,if therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense1 which cannot exist unperceived or without the mind1 ,i shall readily grant it is more proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things rather than ideas4 #ci4 ,if it be demanded why ,i make use of the word idea1 and do not rather in compliance with custom call them things2 ,i answer1 ,i do it for two reasons3--,first1 because the term thing1 in contradistinction to idea1 is generally supposed to denote somewhat existing without the mind3 ,secondly1 because thing hath a more comprehensive signification than idea1 including spirits1 or thinking things7#eii71 as well as ideas4 ,since therefore the objects of sense exist only in the mind1 and are withal thoughtless and inactive1 ,i chose to mark them by the word idea2 which implies those properties7#fjj74 #dj4 ,but1 say what we can1 some one perhaps may be apt to reply1 he will still believe his senses1 and never suffer any arguments1 how plausible soever1 to prevail over the certainty of them4 ,be it so2 assert the evidence of sense as high as you please1 we are willing to do the same4 ,that what ,i see1 hear1 and feel doth exist1 that is to say1 is perceived by me1 ,i no more doubt than ,i do of my own being4 ,but ,i do not see how the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of anything which is not perceived by sense4 ,we are not for having any man turn sceptic and disbelieve his senses2 on the contrary1 we give them all the stress and assurance imaginable2 nor are there any principles more opposite to ,scepticism than those we have laid down1 as shall be hereafter clearly shewn7#fja74 #da4 ,secondly1 it will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real fire for instance1 and the idea of fire1 betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt1 and actually being so4 7#fjb7;,if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see1 do but put your hand into it and you will be convinced with a witness4 ,this and the like may be urged in opposition to our tenets4--,to all which the answer is evident from what hath been already said7#fjc72 and ,i shall only add in this place1 that if real fire be very different from the idea of fire1 so also is the real pain that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain1 and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is1 or can possibly be1 in an unperceiving thing1 or without the mind1 any more than its idea7#fjd74 #db4 ,thirdly1 it will be objected that we see things actually without or at a distance from us1 and which consequently do not exist in the mind2 it being absurd that those things which are seen at the distance of several miles should be as near to us as our own thoughts7#fje74--;,in answer to this1 ,i desire it may be considered that in a dream we do oft perceive things as existing at a great distance off1 and yet for all that1 those things are acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind4 #dc4 ,but1 for the fuller clearing of this point1 it may be worth while to consider how it is that we perceive distance1 and things placed at a distance1 by sight4 ,for1 that we should in truth see external space1 and bodies actually existing in it1 some nearer1 others farther off1 seems to carry with it some opposition to what hath been said of their existing nowhere without the mind4 ,the consideration of this difficulty it was that gave birth to my ,essay towards a ,new ,theory of ,vision1 which was published not long since7#fjf74 ,wherein it is shewn that distance or outness is neither immediately of itself perceived by sight7#fjg71 nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles1 or anything that hath a necessary connexion with it7#fjh72 but that it is only suggested to our thoughts by certain visible ideas1 and sensations attending vision1 which in their own nature have no manner of similitude or relation either with distance or things placed at a distance7#fji72 but1 by a connexion taught us by experience1 they come to signify and suggest them to us1 after the same manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for7#faj74 ,insomuch that a man born blind1 and afterwards made to see1 would not1 at first sight1 think the things he saw to be without his mind1 or at any distance from him4 ,see sect4 #da of the forementioned treatise4 #dd4 ,the ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely distinct and heterogeneous7#faa74 ,the former are marks and prognostics of the latter4 ,that the proper objects of sight neither exist without the mind1 nor are the images of external things1 was shewn even in that treatise7#fab74 ,though throughout the same the contrary be supposed true of tangible objects2--not that to suppose that vulgar error was necessary for establishing the notion therein laid down1 but because it was beside my purpose to examine and refute it1 in a discourse concerning ,vision4 ,so that in strict truth the ideas of sight7#fac71 when we apprehend by them distance1 and things placed at a distance1 do not suggest or mark out to us things actually existing at a distance1 but only admonish us what ideas of touch7#fad7 will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances of time1 and in consequence of such or such actions4 ,it is1 ,i say1 evident1 from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this ,treatise1 and in sect4 #adg and elsewhere of the ,essay concerning ,vision1 that visible ideas are the ,language whereby the ,governing ,spirit on whom we depend informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us1 in case we excite this or that motion in our own bodies4 ,but for a fuller information in this point ,i refer to the ,essay itself4 #de4 ,fourthly1 it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment annihilated and created anew4 ,the objects of sense exist only when they are perceived3 the trees therefore are in the garden1 or the chairs in the parlour1 no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them4 ,upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing1 and barely upon opening them it is again created7#fae74--;,in answer to all which1 ,i refer the reader to what has been said in sect4 #c1 #d1 c42 and desire he will consider whether he means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being perceived4 ,for my part1 after the nicest inquiry ,i could make1 ,i am not able to discover that anything else is meant by those words2 and ,i once more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts1 and not suffer himself to be imposed on by words4 ,if he can conceive it possible either for his ideas or their archetypes to exist without being perceived1 then ,i give up the cause4 ,but if he cannot1 he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knows not what1 and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity1 the not assenting to those propositions which at bottom have no meaning in them7#faf74 #df4 ,it will not be amiss to observe how far the received principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable with those pretended absurdities4 ,it is thought strangely absurd that upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects around me should be reduced to nothing2 and yet is not this what philosophers commonly acknowledge1 when they agree on all hands that light and colours1 which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight1 are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived8 ,again1 it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things should be every moment creating2 yet this very notion is commonly taught in the schools4 ,for the ,schoolmen1 though they acknowledge the existence of ,matter7#fag71 and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it1 are nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine conservation2 which by them is expounded to be a continual creation7#fah74 #dg4 ,farther1 a little thought will discover to us that1 though we allow the existence of ,matter or corporeal substance1 yet it will unavoidably follow1 from the principles which are now generally admitted1 that the particular bodies1 of what kind soever1 do none of them exist whilst they are not perceived4 ,for1 it is evident1 from sect4 #aa and the following sections1 that the ,matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensible ,somewhat1 which hath none of those particular qualities whereby the bodies falling under our senses are distinguished one from another4 ,but1 to make this more plain1 it must be remarked that the infinite divisibility of ,matter is now universally allowed1 at least by the most approved and considerable philosophers1 who on the received principles demonstrate it beyond all exception4 ,hence1 it follows there is an infinite number of parts in each particle of ,matter which are not perceived by sense7#fai74 ,the reason therefore that any particular body seems to be of a finite magnitude1 or exhibits only a finite number of parts to sense1 is1 not because it contains no more1 since in itself it contains an infinite number of parts1 but because the sense is not acute enough to discern them4 ,in proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more acute1 it perceives a greater number of parts in the object1 that is1 the object appears greater2 and its figure varies1 those parts in its extremities which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound it in very different lines and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense4 ,and at length1 after various changes of size and shape1 when the sense becomes infinitely acute1 the body shall seem infinite4 ,during all which there is no alteration in the body1 but only in the sense4 ,each body therefore1 considered in itself1 is infinitely extended1 and consequently void of all shape and figure4 ,from which it follows that1 though we should grant the existence of ,matter to be never so certain1 yet it is withal as certain1 the materialists themselves are by their own principles forced to acknowledge1 that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense1 nor anything like them1 exists without the mind4 ,matter1 ,i say1 and each particle thereof1 is according to them infinite and shapeless2 and it is the mind that frames all that variety of bodies which compose the visible world1 any one whereof does not exist longer than it is perceived4 #dh4 ,but1 after all1 if we consider it1 the objection proposed in sect4 #de will not be found reasonably charged on the ,principles we have premised1 so as in truth to make any objection at all against our notions4 ,for1 though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived1 yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence except only while they are perceived by us2 since there may be some other spirit that perceives them though we do not4 ,wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the mind1 ,i would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind1 but all minds whatsoever4 ,it does not therefore follow from the foregoing ,principles that bodies are annihilated and created every moment1 or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them4 #di4 ,fifthly1 it may perhaps be objected that if extension and figure exist only in the mind1 it follows that the mind is extended and figured2 since extension is a mode or attribute which 7to speak with the ,schools7 is predicated of the subject in which it exists4--,i answer1 those qualities are in the mind only as they are perceived by it2--that is1 not by way of mode or attribute1 but only by way of idea7#fbj74 ,and it no more follows the soul or mind is extended1 because extension exists in it alone1 than it does that it is red or blue1 because those colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it1 and nowhere else4 ,as to what philosophers say of subject and mode1 that seems very groundless and unintelligible4 ,for instance1 in this proposition 8a die is hard1 extended1 and square10 they will have it that the word die denotes a subject or substance1 distinct from the hardness1 extension1 and figure which are predicated of it1 and in which they exist4 ,this ,i cannot comprehend3 to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents4 ,and1 to say a die is hard1 extended1 and square is not to attribute those qualities to a subject distinct from and supporting them1 but only an explication of the meaning of the word die4 #ej4 ,sixthly1 you will say there have been a great many things explained by matter and motion2 take away these and you destroy the whole corpuscular philosophy1 and undermine those mechanical principles which have been applied with so much success to account for the phenomena4 ,in short1 whatever advances have been made1 either by ancient or modern philosophers1 in the study of nature do all proceed on the supposition that corporeal substance or ,matter doth really exist4--,to this ,i answer that there is not any one phenomenon explained on that supposition which may not as well be explained without it1 as might easily be made appear by an induction of particulars4 ,to explain the phenomena1 is all one as to shew why1 upon such and such occasions1 we are affected with such and such ideas4 ,but how ,matter should operate on a ,spirit1 or produce any idea in it1 is what no philosopher will pretend to explain2 it is therefore evident there can be no use of ,matter7#fba7 in natural philosophy4 ,besides1 they who attempt to account for things do it1 not by corporeal substance1 but by figure1 motion1 and other qualities2 which are in truth no more than mere ideas1 and therefore cannot be the cause of anything1 as hath been already shewn4 ,see sect4 #be4 #ea4 ,seventhly1 it will upon this be demanded whether it does not seem absurd to take away natural causes7#fbb71 and ascribe everything to the immediate operation of spirits8 ,we must no longer say upon these principles that fire heats1 or water cools1 but that a spirit heats1 and so forth4 ,would not a man be deservedly laughed at1 who should talk after this manner8--,i answer1 he would so3 in such things we ought to think with the learned and speak with the vulgar4 ,they who to demonstration are convinced of the truth of the ,copernican system do nevertheless say 8the sun rises10 8the sun sets10 or 8comes to the meridian02 and if they affected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appear very ridiculous4 ,a little reflection on what is here said will make it manifest that the common use of language would receive no manner of alteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets7#fbc74 #eb4 ,in the ordinary affairs of life1 any phrases may be retained1 so long as they excite in us proper sentiments1 or dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary for our well-being1 how false soever they may be if taken in a strict and speculative sense4 ,nay1 this is unavoidable1 since1 propriety being regulated by custom1 language is suited to the received opinions1 which are not always the truest4 ,hence it is impossible--even in the most rigid1 philosophic reasonings--so far to alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak as never to give a handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies4 ,but1 a fair and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor and connexion of a discourse1 making allowances for those inaccurate modes of speech which use has made inevitable4 #ec4 ,as to the opinion that there are no corporeal causes1 this has been heretofore maintained by some of the ,schoolmen1 as it is of late by others among the modern philosophers2 who though they allow ,matter to exist1 yet will have ,god alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all things7#fbd74 ,these men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was none which had any power or activity included in it2 and that by consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed to exist without the mind1 like unto the immediate objects of sense4 ,but then1 that they should suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings1 which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one effect in nature1 and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose1 since ,god might have done everything as well without them--this ,i say1 though we should allow it possible1 must yet be a very unaccountable and extravagant supposition7#fbe74 #ed4 ,in the eighth place1 the universal concurrent assent of mankind may be thought by some an invincible argument in behalf of ,matter1 or the existence of external things7#fbf74 ,must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken8 ,and if so1 what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error8--,i answer1 first1 that1 upon a narrow inquiry1 it will not perhaps be found so many as is imagined do really believe the existence of ,matter or things without the mind7#fbg74 ,strictly speaking1 to believe that which involves a contradiction1 or has no meaning in it7#fbh71 is impossible2 and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort1 ,i refer it to the impartial examination of the reader4 ,in one sense1 indeed1 men may be said to believe that ,matter exists2 that is1 they act as if the immediate cause of their sensations1 which affects them every moment1 and is so nearly present to them1 were some senseless unthinking being4 ,but1 that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those words1 and form thereof a settled speculative opinion1 is what ,i am not able to conceive4 ,this is not the only instance wherein men impose upon themselves1 by imagining they believe those propositions which they have often heard1 though at bottom they have no meaning in them4 #ee4 ,but secondly1 though we should grant a notion to be never so universally and stedfastly adhered to1 yet this is but a weak argument of its truth to whoever considers what a vast number of prejudices and false opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness1 by the unreflecting 7which are the far greater7 part of mankind4 ,there was a time when the antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon as monstrous absurdities even by men of learning3 and if it be considered what a small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind1 we shall find that at this day those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable footing in the world4 #ef4 ,but it is demanded that we assign a cause of this prejudice1 and account for its obtaining in the world4 ,to this ,i answer1 that men knowing they perceived several ideas1 whereof they themselves were1 not the authors7#fbi71 as not being excited from within1 nor depending on the operation of their wills1 this made them maintain those ideas or objects of perception1 had an existence independent of and without the mind1 without ever dreaming that a contradiction was involved in those words4 ,but1 philosophers having plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception do not exist without the mind1 they in some degree corrected the mistake of the vulgar7#fcj72 but at the same time run into another1 which seems no less absurd1 to wit1 that there are certain objects really existing without the mind1 or having a subsistence distinct from being perceived1 of which our ideas are only images or resemblances1 imprinted by those objects on the mind7#fca74 ,and this notion of the philosophers owes its origin to the same cause with the former1 namely1 their being conscious that they were not the authors of their own sensations2 which they evidently knew were imprinted from without1 and which therefore must have some cause1 distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted4 #eg4 ,but why they should suppose the ideas of sense to be excited in us by things in their likeness1 and not rather have recourse to ,spirit1 which alone can act1 may be accounted for4 ,first1 because they were not aware of the repugnancy there is1 as well in supposing things like unto our ideas existing without1 as in attributing to them power or activity4 ,secondly1 because the ,supreme ,spirit which excites those ideas in our minds1 is not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite collection of sensible ideas1 as human agents are by their size1 complexion1 limbs1 and motions4 ,and thirdly1 because ,his operations are regular and uniform4 ,whenever the course of nature is interrupted by a miracle1 men are ready to own the presence of a ,superior ,agent4 ,but1 when we see things go on in the ordinary course1 they do not excite in us any reflexion2 their order and concatenation1 though it be an argument of the greatest wisdom1 power1 and goodness in their ,creator1 is yet so constant and familiar to us1 that we do not think them the immediate effects of a ,free ,spirit2 especially since inconsistency and mutability in acting1 though it be an imperfection1 is looked on as a mark of freedom7#fcb74 #eh4 ,tenthly1 it will be objected that the notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths in philosophy and mathematics4 ,for example1 the motion of the earth is now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing reasons4 ,but1 on the foregoing ,principles1 there can be no such thing4 ,for1 motion being only an idea1 it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not3 but the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense4--,i answer1 ,that tenet1 if rightly understood1 will be found to agree with the ,principles we have premised3 for1 the question whether the earth moves or no amounts in reality to no more than this1 to wit1 whether we have reason to conclude1 from what has been observed by astronomers1 that if we were placed in such and such circumstances1 and such or such a position and distance both from the earth and sun1 we should perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets1 and appearing in all respects like one of them3 and this1 by the established rules of nature1 which we have no reason to mistrust1 is reasonably collected from the phenomena4 #ei4 ,we may1 from the experience we have had of the train and succession of ideas7#fcc7 in our minds1 often make1 ,i will not say uncertain conjectures1 but sure and well-grounded predictions concerning the ideas we shall be affected with pursuant to a great train of actions2 and be enabled to pass a right judgment of what would have appeared to us1 in case we were placed in circumstances very different from those we are in at present4 ,herein consists the knowledge of nature1 which may preserve its use and certainty very consistently with what hath been said4 ,it will be easy to apply this to whatever objections of the like sort may be drawn from the magnitude of the stars1 or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature4 #fj4 ,in the eleventh place1 it will be demanded to what purpose serves that curious organization of plants1 and the animal mechanism in the parts of animals4 ,might not vegetables grow1 and shoot forth leaves and blossoms1 and animals perform all their motions1 as well without as with all that variety of internal parts so elegantly contrived and put together2--which1 being ideas1 have nothing powerful or operative in them1 nor have any necessary connexion with the effects ascribed to them8 ,if it be a ,spirit that immediately produces every effect by a fiat1 or act of his will7#fcd71 we must think all that is fine and artificial in the works1 whether of man or nature1 to be made in vain4 ,by this doctrine1 though an artist hath made the spring and wheels1 and every movement of a watch1 and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew would produce the motions he designed2 yet he must think all this done to no purpose1 and that it is an ,intelligence which directs the index1 and points to the hour of the day4 ,if so1 why may not the ,intelligence do it1 without his being at the pains of making the movements and putting them together8 ,why does not an empty case serve as well as another8 ,and how comes it to pass1 that whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch1 there is some corresponding disorder to be found in the movements1 which being mended by a skilful hand all is right again8 ,the like may be said of all the ,clockwork of ,nature1 great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope4 ,in short1 it will be asked1 how1 upon our ,principles1 any tolerable account can be given1 or any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies and machines1 framed with the most exquisite art1 which in the common philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them1 and serve to explain abundance of phenomena8 #fa4 ,to all which ,i answer1 first1 that though there were some difficulties relating to the administration of ,providence1 and the uses by it assigned to the several parts of nature1 which ,i could not solve by the foregoing ,principles1 yet this objection could be of small weight against the truth and certainty of those things which may be proved a priori1 with the utmost evidence and rigour of demonstration7#fce74 ,secondly1 but neither are the received principles free from the like difficulties2 for1 it may still be demanded to what end ,god should take those roundabout methods of effecting things by instruments and machines1 which no one can deny might have been effected by the mere command of ,his will1 without all that apparatus4 ,nay1 if we narrowly consider it1 we shall find the objection may be retorted with greater force on those who hold the existence of those machines without the mind2 for it has been made evident that solidity1 bulk1 figure1 motion1 and the like have no activity or efficacy in them1 so as to be capable of producing any one effect in nature4 ,see sect4 #be4 ,whoever therefore supposes them to exist 7allowing the supposition possible7 when they are not perceived does it manifestly to no purpose2 since the only use that is assigned to them1 as they exist unperceived1 is that they produce those perceivable effects which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but ,spirit4 #fb4 ,but1 to come nigher the difficulty1 it must be observed that though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not absolutely necessary to the producing any effect1 yet it is necessary to the producing of things in a constant regular way1 according to the laws of nature4 ,there are certain general laws that run through the whole chain of natural effects3 these are learned by the observation and study of nature1 and are by men applied1 as well to the framing artificial things for the use and ornament of life as to the explaining the various phenomena4 ,which explication consists only in shewing the conformity any particular phenomenon hath to the general laws of nature1 or1 which is the same thing1 in discovering the uniformity there is in the production of natural effects2 as will be evident to whoever shall attend to the several instances wherein philosophers pretend to account for appearances4 ,that there is a great and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of working observed by the ,supreme ,agent hath been shewn in sect4 #ca4 ,and it is no less visible that a particular size1 figure1 motion1 and disposition of parts are necessary1 though not absolutely to the producing any effect1 yet to the producing it according to the standing mechanical laws of nature4 ,thus1 for instance1 it cannot be denied that ,god1 or the ,intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things1 might if ,he were minded to produce a miracle1 cause all the motions on the dial-plate of a watch1 though nobody had ever made the movements and put them in it4 ,but yet1 if ,he will act agreeably to the rules of mechanism1 by ,him for wise ends established and maintained in the creation1 it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker1 whereby he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them1 precede the production of the aforesaid motions2 as also that any disorder in them be attended with the perception of some corresponding disorder in the movements1 which being once corrected all is right again7#fcf74 #fc4 ,it may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the ,author of nature display ,his overruling power in producing some appearance out of the ordinary series of things4 ,such exceptions from the general rules of nature are proper to surprise and awe men into an acknowledgment of the ,divine ,being2 but then they are to be used but seldom1 otherwise there is a plain reason why they should fail of that effect4 ,besides1 ,god seems to choose the convincing our reason of ,his attributes by the works of nature1 which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make1 and are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their ,author1 rather than to astonish us into a belief of ,his ,being by anomalous and surprising events7#fcg74 #fd4 ,to set this matter in a yet clearer light1 ,i shall observe that what has been objected in sect4 #fj amounts in reality to no more than this3--ideas7#fch7 are not anyhow and at random produced1 there being a certain order and connexion between them1 like to that of cause and effect3 there are also several combinations of them1 made in a very regular and artificial manner1 which seem like so many instruments in the hand of nature that1 being hid as it were behind the scenes1 have a secret operation in producing those appearances which are seen on the theatre of the world1 being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the philosopher4 ,but1 since one idea cannot be the cause of another1 to what purpose is that connexion8 ,and since those instruments1 being barely inefficacious perceptions in the mind1 are not subservient to the production of natural effects1 it is demanded why they are made2 or1 in other words1 what reason can be assigned why ,god should make us1 upon a close inspection into ,his works1 behold so great variety of ideas1 so artfully laid together1 and so much according to rule2 it not being 7#fci7 credible that ,he would be at the expense 7if one may so speak7 of all that art and regularity to no purpose8 #fe4 ,to all which my answer is1 first1 that the connexion of ideas7#fdj7 does not imply the relation of cause and effect1 but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified4 ,the fire which ,i see is not the cause of the pain ,i suffer upon my approaching it1 but the mark that forewarns me of it4 ,in like manner the noise that ,i hear is not the effect of this or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies1 but the sign thereof7#fda74 ,secondly1 the reason why ideas are formed into machines1 that is1 artificial and regular combinations1 is the same with that for combining letters into words4 ,that a few original ideas may be made to signify a great number of effects and actions1 it is necessary they be variously combined together4 ,and to the end their use be permanent and universal1 these combinations must be made by rule1 and with wise contrivance4 ,by this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us1 concerning what we are to expect from such and such actions1 and what methods are proper to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas7#fdb74 ,which in effect is all that ,i conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said7#fdc7 that1 by discerning the figure1 texture1 and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies1 whether natural or artificial1 we may attain to know the several uses and properties depending thereon1 or the nature of the thing4 #ff4 ,hence1 it is evident that those things which1 under the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production of effects1 are altogether inexplicable and run us into great absurdities1 may be very naturally explained1 and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them1 when they are considered only as marks or signs for our information4 ,and it is the searching after and endeavouring to understand this ,language 7if ,i may so call it7 of the ,author of ,nature1 that ought to be the employment of the natural philosopher2 and not the pretending to explain things by corporeal causes1 which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds of men from that ,active ,principle1 that supreme and wise ,spirit 8in whom we live1 move1 and have our being40 #fg4 ,in the twelfth place1 it may perhaps be objected that--though it be clear from what has been said that there can be no such thing as an inert1 senseless1 extended1 solid1 figured1 moveable ,substance1 existing without the mind1 such as philosophers describe ,matter2 yet1 if any man shall leave out of his idea of ,matter the positive ideas of extension1 figure1 solidity and motion1 and say that he means only by that word an inert1 senseless substance1 that exists without the mind1 or unperceived1 which is the occasion of our ideas1 or at the presence whereof ,god is pleased to excite ideas in us--it doth not appear but that ,matter taken in this sense may possibly exist4--,in answer to which ,i say1 first1 that it seems no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents1 than it is to suppose accidents without a substance7#fdd74 ,but secondly1 though we should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist1 yet where can it be supposed to be8 ,that it exists not in the mind7#fde7 is agreed2 and that it exists not in place is no less certain1 since all place or extension exists only in the mind7#fdf71 as hath been already proved4 ,it remains therefore that it exists nowhere at all4 #fh4 ,let us examine a little the description that is here given us of ,matter4 ,it neither acts1 nor perceives1 nor is perceived3 for this is all that is meant by saying it is an inert1 senseless1 unknown substance2 which is a definition entirely made up of negatives1 excepting only the relative notion of its standing under or supporting4 ,but then it must be observed that it supports nothing at all1 and how nearly this comes to the description of a nonentity ,i desire may be considered4 ,but1 say you1 it is the unknown occasion7#fdg71 at the presence of which ideas are excited in us by the will of ,god4 ,now1 ,i would fain know how anything can be present to us1 which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion1 nor capable of producing any idea in our minds1 nor is at all extended1 nor hath any form1 nor exists in any place4 ,the words 8to be present10 when thus applied1 must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning1 and which ,i am not able to comprehend4 #fi4 ,again1 let us examine what is meant by occasion4 ,so far as ,i can gather from the common use of language1 that word signifies either the agent which produces any effect1 or else something that is observed to accompany or go before it1 in the ordinary course of things4 ,but1 when it is applied to ,matter1 as above described1 it can be taken in neither of those senses2 for ,matter is said to be passive and inert1 and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause4 ,it is also unperceivable1 as being devoid of all sensible qualities1 and so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions in the latter sense2 as when the burning my finger is said to be the occasion of the pain that attends it4 ,what therefore can be meant by calling matter an occasion8 ,this term is either used in no sense at all1 or else in some very distant from its received signification4 #gj4 ,you will perhaps say that ,matter1 though it be not perceived by us1 is nevertheless perceived by ,god1 to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds7#fdh74 ,for1 say you1 since we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner1 it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their being produced4 ,that is to say1 that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of ,matter1 corresponding to our ideas1 which1 though they do not excite them in our minds1 or anywise immediately affect us1 as being altogether passive1 and unperceivable to us1 they are nevertheless to ,god1 by whom they are perceived7#fdi71 as it were so many occasions to remind ,him when and what ideas to imprint on our minds3 that so things may go on in a constant uniform manner4 #ga4 ,in answer to this1 ,i observe that1 as the notion of ,matter is here stated1 the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing distinct from ,spirit and idea1 from perceiving and being perceived2 but whether there are not certain ,ideas 7of ,i know not what sort7 in the mind of ,god1 which are so many marks or notes that direct ,him how to produce sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method3 much after the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a tune2 though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes1 and may be entirely ignorant of them4 ,but this notion of ,matter 7which after all is the only intelligible one that ,i can pick from what is said of unknown occasions7 seems too extravagant to deserve a confutation4 ,besides1 it is in effect no objection against what we have advanced1 viz4 that there is no senseless unperceived substance4 #gb4 ,if we follow the light of reason1 we shall1 from the constant uniform method of our sensations1 collect the goodness and wisdom of the ,spirit who excites them in our minds2 but this is all that ,i can see reasonably concluded from thence4 ,to me1 ,i say1 it is evident that the being of a ,spirit--infinitely wise1 good1 and powerful--is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances of nature7#fej74 ,but1 as for inert1 senseless ,matter1 nothing that ,i perceive has any the least connexion with it1 or leads to the thoughts of it4 ,and ,i would fain see any one explain any the meanest phenomenon in nature by it1 or shew any manner of reason1 though in the lowest rank of probability1 that he can have for its existence2 or even make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition4 ,for1 as to its being an occasion1 we have1 ,i think1 evidently shewn that with regard to us it is no occasion4 ,it remains therefore that it must be1 if at all1 the occasion to ,god of exciting ideas in us2 and what this amounts to we have just now seen4 #gc4 ,it is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which induced men to suppose the existence of material substance2 that so having observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons1 we may proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded on them4 ,first1 therefore1 it was thought that colour1 figure1 motion1 and the rest of the sensible qualities or accidents1 did really exist without the mind2 and for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking substratum or substance wherein they did exist1 since they could not be conceived to exist by themselves7#fea74 ,afterwards1 in process of time1 men7#feb7 being convinced that colours1 sounds1 and the rest of the sensible1 secondary qualities had no existence without the mind1 they stripped this substratum or material substance of those qualities1 leaving only the primary ones1 figure1 motion1 and suchlike2 which they still conceived to exist without the mind1 and consequently to stand in need of a material support4 ,but1 it having been shewn that none even of these can possibly exist otherwise than in a ,spirit or ,mind which perceives them1 it follows that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of ,matter7#fec71 nay1 that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing2--so long as that word is taken to denote an unthinking substratum of qualities or accidents1 wherein they exist without the mind7#fed74 #gd4 ,but--though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that ,matter was thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents1 and1 the reason entirely ceasing1 one might expect the mind should naturally1 and without any reluctance at all1 quit the belief of what was solely grounded thereon3 yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts that we can scarce tell how to part with it1 and are therefore inclined1 since the thing itself is indefensible1 at least to retain the name2 which we apply to ,i know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being1 or occasion1 though without any shew of reason1 at least so far as ,i can see4 ,for1 what is there on our part1 or what do we perceive1 amongst all the ideas1 sensations1 notions which are imprinted on our minds1 either by sense or reflexion1 from whence may be inferred the existence of an inert1 thoughtless1 unperceived occasion8 and1 on the other hand1 on the part of an ,all-sufficient ,spirit1 what can there be that should make us believe or even suspect ,he is directed by an inert occasion to excite ideas in our minds8 #ge4 ,it is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice1 and much to be lamented1 that the mind of man retains so great a fondness1 against all the evidence of reason1 for a stupid thoughtless ,somewhat1 by the interposition whereof it would as it were screen itself from the ,providence of ,god1 and remove it farther off from the affairs of the world4 ,but1 though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of ,matter2 though1 when reason forsakes us1 we endeavour to support our opinion on the bare possibility of the thing1 and though we indulge ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to make out that poor possibility2 yet the upshot of all is--that there are certain unknown ,ideas in the mind of ,god2 for this1 if anything1 is all that ,i conceive to be meant by occasion with regard to ,god4 ,and this at the bottom is no longer contending for the thing1 but for the name7#fee74 #gf4 ,whether therefore there are such ,ideas in the mind of ,god1 and whether they may be called by the name ,matter1 ,i shall not dispute7#fef74 ,but1 if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of extension1 motion1 and other sensible qualities1 then to me it is most evidently impossible there should be any such thing2 since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should exist in1 or be supported by1 an unperceiving substance7#feg74 #gg4 ,but1 say you1 though it be granted that there is no thoughtless support of extension1 and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive1 yet there may perhaps be some inert1 unperceiving substance or substratum of some other qualities1 as incomprehensible to us as colours are to a man born blind1 because we have not a sense adapted to them4 ,but1 if we had a new sense1 we should possibly no more doubt of their existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and colours4--,i answer1 first1 if what you mean by the word ,matter be only the unknown support of unknown qualities1 it is no matter whether there is such a thing or no1 since it no way concerns us4 ,and ,i do not see the advantage there is in disputing about what we know not what1 and we know not why4 #gh4 ,but1 secondly1 if we had a new sense1 it could only furnish us with new ideas or sensations2 and then we should have the same reason against their existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already offered with relation to figure1 motion1 colour1 and the like4 ,qualities1 as hath been shewn1 are nothing else but sensations or ideas1 which exist only in a mind perceiving them2 and this is true not only of the ideas we are acquainted with at present1 but likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever7#feh74 #gi4 ,but you will insist1 ,what if ,i have no reason to believe the existence of ,matter8 what if ,i cannot assign any use to it1 or explain anything by it1 or even conceive what is meant by that word8 yet still it is no contradiction to say that ,matter exists1 and that this ,matter is in general a substance1 or occasion of ideas2 though indeed to go about to unfold the meaning1 or adhere to any particular explication of those words may be attended with great difficulties4--,i answer1 when words are used without a meaning1 you may put them together as you please1 without danger of running into a contradiction4 ,you may say1 for example1 that twice two is equal to seven2 so long as you declare you do not take the words of that proposition in their usual acceptation1 but for marks of you know not what4 ,and1 by the same reason1 you may say there is an inert thoughtless substance without accidents1 which is the occasion of our ideas4 ,and we shall understand just as much by one proposition as the other4 #hj4 ,in the last place1 you will say1 ,what if we give up the cause of material ,substance1 and stand to it that ,matter is an unknown ,somewhat--neither substance nor accident1 spirit nor idea--inert1 thoughtless1 indivisible1 immoveable1 unextended1 existing in no place8 ,for1 say you1 whatever may be urged against substance or occasion1 or any other positive or relative notion of ,matter1 hath no place at all1 so long as this negative definition of ,matter is adhered to4--,i answer1 ,you may1 if so it shall seem good1 use the word matter in the same sense as other men use nothing1 and so make those terms convertible in your style4 ,for1 after all1 this is what appears to me to be the result of that definition2 the parts whereof1 when ,i consider with attention1 either collectively or separate from each other1 ,i do not find that there is any kind of effect or impression made on my mind1 different from what is excited by the term nothing4 #ha4 ,you will reply1 perhaps1 that in the foresaid definition is included what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing--the positive abstract idea of quiddity1 entity1 or existence4 ,i own1 indeed1 that those who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if they had such an idea1 which is1 say they1 the most abstract and general notion of all3 that is to me the most incomprehensible of all others4 ,that there are a great variety of spirits of different orders and capacities1 whose faculties1 both in number and extent1 are far exceeding those the ,author of my being has bestowed on me1 ,i see no reason to deny4 ,and for me to pretend to determine1 by my own few1 stinted1 narrow inlets of perception1 what ideas the inexhaustible power of the ,supreme ,spirit may imprint upon them1 were certainly the utmost folly and presumption4 ,since there may be1 for aught that ,i know1 innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations1 as different from one another1 and from all that ,i have perceived1 as colours are from sounds7#fei74 ,but1 how ready soever ,i may be to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension1 with regard to the endless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist1 yet for any one to pretend to a notion of ,entity or ,existence1 abstracted from spirit and idea1 from perceived and being perceived1 is1 ,i suspect1 a downright repugnancy and trifling with words4 ,it remains that we consider the objections which may possibly be made on the part of ,religion4 #hb4 ,some there are who think that1 though the arguments for the real existence of bodies which are drawn from ,reason be allowed not to amount to demonstration1 yet the ,holy ,scriptures are so clear in the point1 as will sufficiently convince every good ,christian1 that bodies do really exist1 and are something more than mere ideas2 there being in ,holy ,writ innumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone1 mountains and rivers1 and cities1 and human bodies7#ffj7--,to which ,i answer that no sort of writings whatever1 sacred or profane1 which use those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation1 or so as to have a meaning in them1 are in danger of having their truth called in question by our doctrine4 ,that all those things do really exist2 that there are bodies1 even corporeal substances1 when taken in the vulgar sense1 has been shewn to be agreeable to our principles3 and the difference betwixt things and ideas1 realities and chimeras1 has been distinctly explained4 ,see sect4 #bi1 #cj1 #cc1 #cf1 c4 ,and ,i do not think that either what philosophers call ,matter1 or the existence of objects without the mind7#ffa71 is anywhere mentioned in ,scripture4 #hc4 ,again1 whether there be or be not external things7#ffb71 it is agreed on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking our conceptions1 or things only as they are known and perceived by us3 whence it plainly follows1 that in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing inconsistent with the right use and significancy of language1 and that discourse1 of what kind soever1 so far as it is intelligible1 remains undisturbed4 ,but all this seems so very manifest1 from what has been largely set forth in the premises1 that it is needless to insist any farther on it4 #hd4 ,but1 it will be urged that miracles do1 at least1 lose much of their stress and import by our principles4 ,what must we think of ,moses' rod8 was it not really turned into a serpent8 or was there only a change of ideas in the minds of the spectators8 ,and1 can it be supposed that our ,saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in ,cana than impose on the sight1 and smell1 and taste of the guests1 so as to create in them the appearance or idea only of wine8 ,the same may be said of all other miracles3 which1 in consequence of the foregoing principles1 must be looked upon only as so many cheats1 or illusions of fancy4--,to this ,i reply1 that the rod was changed into a real serpent1 and the water into real wine4 ,that this does not in the least contradict what ,i have elsewhere said will be evident from sect4 #cd and #ce4 ,but this business of real and imaginary has been already so plainly and fully explained1 and so often referred to1 and the difficulties about it are so easily answered from what has gone before1 that it were an affront to the reader's understanding to resume the explication of it in this place4 ,i shall only observe that if at table all who were present should see1 and smell1 and taste1 and drink wine1 and find the effects of it1 with me there could be no doubt of its reality7#ffc74 ,so that at bottom the scruple concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours1 but only on the received principles1 and consequently makes rather for than against what has been said4 #he4 ,having done with the ,objections1 which ,i endeavoured to propose in the clearest light1 and gave them all the force and weight ,i could1 we proceed in the next place to take a view of our tenets in their ,consequences7#ffd74 ,some of these appear at first sight--as that several difficult and obscure questions1 on which abundance of speculation has been thrown away1 are entirely banished from philosophy4 ,whether corporeal substance can think8 ,whether ,matter be infinitely divisible8 ,and how it operates on spirit8--these and the like inquiries have given infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages4 ,but1 depending on the existence of ,matter1 they have no longer any place on our ,principles4 ,many other advantages there are1 as well with regard to religion as the sciences1 which it is easy for any one to deduce from what has been premised4 ,but this will appear more plainly in the sequel4 #hf4 ,from the ,principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads--that of ideas and that of ,spirits4 ,of each of these ,i shall treat in order4 ,and ,first as to ideas1 or unthinking things4 ,our knowledge of these has been very much obscured and confounded1 and we have been led into very dangerous errors1 by supposing a two-fold existence of sense--the one intelligible or in the mind1 the other real and without the mind7#ffe74 ,whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural subsistence of their own1 distinct from being perceived by spirits4 ,this1 which1 if ,i mistake not1 hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd notion1 is the very root of ,scepticism2 for1 so long as men thought that real things subsisted without the mind1 and that their knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real things1 it follows they could not be certain that they had any real knowledge at all4 ,for how can it be known that the things which are perceived are conformable to those which are not perceived1 or exist without the mind7#fff78 #hg4 ,colour1 figure1 motion1 extension1 and the like1 considered only as so many sensations in the mind1 are perfectly known2 there being nothing in them which is not perceived4 ,but1 if they are looked on as notes or images1 referred to things or archetypes existing without the mind1 then are we involved all in scepticism4 ,we see only the appearances1 and not the real qualities of things4 ,what may be the extension1 figure1 or motion of anything really and absolutely1 or in itself1 it is impossible for us to know1 but only the proportion or relation they bear to our senses4 ,things remaining the same1 our ideas vary2 and which of them1 or even whether any of them at all1 represent the true quality really existing in the thing1 it is out of our reach to determine4 ,so that1 for aught we know1 all we see1 hear1 and feel1 may be only phantom and vain chimera1 and not at all agree with the real things existing in rerum natura4 ,all this scepticism7#ffg7 follows from our supposing a difference between things and ideas1 and that the former have a subsistence without the mind1 or unperceived4 ,it were easy to dilate on this subject1 and shew how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition of external objects4 7#ffh7;,but this is too obvious to need being insisted on4 #hh4 ,so long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking things1 distinct from their being perceived1 it is not only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real unthinking being1 but even that it exists4 ,hence it is that we see philosophers distrust their senses1 and doubt of the existence of heaven and earth1 of everything they see or feel1 even of their own bodies4 ,and after all their labouring and struggle of thought1 they are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible things7#ffi74 ,but1 all this doubtfulness1 which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world1 vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words1 and do not amuse ourselves with the terms absolute1 external1 exist1 and such like1 signifying we know not what4 ,i can as well doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which ,i actually perceive by sense3 it being a manifest contradiction that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch1 and at the same time have no existence in nature2 since the very existence of an unthinking being consists in being perceived4 #hi4 ,nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge1 which may be proof against the assaults of ,scepticism1 than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of what is meant by thing1 reality1 existence2 for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things1 or pretend to any knowledge thereof1 so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words4 ,thing or being is the most general name of all3 it comprehends under it two kinds1 entirely distinct and heterogeneous1 and which have nothing common but the name1 viz4 spirits and ideas4 ,the former are active1 indivisible1 7#fgj7;incorruptible substances3 the latter are inert1 fleeting1 7#fga7perishable passions1 or dependent beings2 which subsist not by themselves7#fgb71 but are supported by1 or exist in1 minds or spiritual substances4 7#fgc7,we comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection1 and that of other spirits by reason7#fgd74 ,we may be said to have some knowledge or notion7#fge7 of our own minds1 of spirits and active beings2 whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas4 ,in like manner1 we know and have a notion of relations between things or ideas2 which relations are distinct from the ideas or things related1 inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former4 ,to me it seems that ideas1 spirits1 and relations are all in their respective kinds the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse2 and that the term idea would be improperly extended to signify everything we know or have any notion of7#fgf74 #ij4 ,ideas imprinted on the senses are real things1 or do really exist7#fgg73 this we do not deny2 but we deny they can subsist without the minds which perceive them1 or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the mind7#fgh72 since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived1 and an idea can be like nothing but an idea4 ,again1 the things perceived by sense may be termed external1 with regard to their origin2 in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself1 but imprinted by a ,spirit distinct from that which perceives them4 ,sensible objects may likewise be said to be 8without the mind0 in another sense1 namely when they exist in some other mind4 ,thus1 when ,i shut my eyes1 the things ,i saw may still exist2 but it must be in another mind7#fgi74 #ia4 ,it were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates in the least from the reality of things4 ,it is acknowledged1 on the received principles1 that extension1 motion1 and in a word all sensible qualities1 have need of a support1 as not being able to subsist by themselves4 ,but the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities1 and consequently cannot subsist by themselves7#fhj74 ,thus far it is agreed on all hands4 ,so that in denying the things perceived by sense an existence independent of a substance or support wherein they may exist1 we detract nothing from the received opinion of their reality1 and are guilty of no innovation in that respect4 ,all the difference is that1 according to us1 the unthinking beings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from being perceived1 and cannot therefore exist in any other substance than those unextended indivisible substances1 or spirits1 which act1 and think and perceive them4 ,whereas philosophers vulgarly hold that the sensible qualities do exist in an inert1 extended1 unperceiving ,substance1 which they call ,matter1 to which they attribute a natural subsistence1 exterior to all thinking beings1 or distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever1 even the ,eternal ,mind of the ,creator2 wherein they suppose only ,ideas of the corporeal substances7#fha7 created by ,him3 if indeed they allow them to be at all created7#fhb74 #ib4 ,for1 as we have shewn the doctrine of ,matter or ,corporeal ,substance to have been the main pillar and support of ,scepticism1 so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of ,atheism and ,irreligion4 ,nay1 so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive ,matter produced out of nothing1 that the most celebrated among the ancient philosophers1 even of those who maintained the being of a ,god1 have thought ,matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with ,him7#fhc74 ,how great a friend material substance has been to ,atheists in all ages were needless to relate4 ,all their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a dependence on it1 that when this corner-stone is once removed1 the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground2 insomuch that it is no longer worth while to bestow a particular consideration on the absurdities of every wretched sect of ,atheists7#fhd74 #ic4 ,that impious and profane persons should readily fall in with those systems which favour their inclinations1 by deriding immaterial substance1 and supposing the soul to be divisible1 and subject to corruption as the body2 which exclude all freedom1 intelligence1 and design from the formation of things1 and instead thereof make a self-existent1 stupid1 unthinking substance the root and origin of all beings2 that they should hearken to those who deny a ,providence1 or inspection of a ,superior ,mind over the affairs of the world1 attributing the whole series of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity1 arising from the impulse of one body on another--all this is very natural4 ,and1 on the other hand1 when men of better principles observe the enemies of religion lay so great a stress on unthinking ,matter1 and all of them use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it2 methinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support1 and driven from that only fortress1 without which your ,epicureans1 ,hobbists1 and the like1 have not even the shadow of a pretence1 but become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world4 #id4 ,the existence of ,matter1 or bodies unperceived1 has not only been the main support of ,atheists and ,fatalists1 but on the same principle doth ,idolatry likewise in all its various forms depend4 ,did men but consider that the sun1 moon1 and stars1 and every other object of the senses1 are only so many sensations in their minds1 which have no other existence but barely being perceived1 doubtless they would never fall down and worship their own ideas2 but rather address their homage to that ,eternal ,invisible ,mind which produces and sustains all things4 #ie4 ,the same absurd principle1 by mingling itself with the articles of our faith1 hath occasioned no small difficulties to ,christians4 ,for example1 about the ,resurrection1 how many scruples and objections have been raised by ,socinians and others8 ,but do not the most plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body is denominated the same1 with regard not to the form1 or that which is perceived by sense7#fhe71 but the material substance1 which remains the same under several forms8 ,take away this material substance--about the identity whereof all the dispute is--and mean by body what every plain ordinary person means by that word1 to wit1 that which is immediately seen and felt1 which is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas3 and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing4 #if4 ,matter7#fhf7 being once expelled out of nature drags with it so many sceptical and impious notions1 such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions1 which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well as philosophers1 and made so much fruitless work for mankind1 that if the arguments we have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration 7as to me they evidently seem71 yet ,i am sure all friends to knowledge1 peace1 and religion have reason to wish they were4 #ig4 ,beside the external7#fhg7 existence of the objects of perception1 another great source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal knowledge is the doctrine of abstract ideas1 such as it hath been set forth in the ,introduction4 ,the plainest things in the world1 those we are most intimately acquainted with and perfectly know1 when they are considered in an abstract way1 appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible4 ,time1 place1 and motion1 taken in particular or concrete1 are what everybody knows2 but1 having passed through the hands of a metaphysician1 they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary sense4 ,bid your servant meet you at such a time1 in such a place1 and he shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those words4 ,in conceiving that particular time and place1 or the motion by which he is to get thither1 he finds not the least difficulty4 ,but if time be taken exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that diversify the day1 merely for the continuation of existence or duration in abstract1 then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it4 #ih4 ,for my own part1 whenever ,i attempt to frame a simple idea of time1 abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind1 which flows uniformly1 and is participated by all beings1 ,i am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties4 ,i have no notion of it at all3 only ,i hear others say it is infinitely divisible1 and speak of it in such a manner as leads me to harbour odd thoughts of my existence3 since that doctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking1 either that he passes away innumerable ages without a thought1 or else that he is annihilated every moment of his life3 both which seem equally absurd7#fhh74 ,time therefore being nothing1 abstracted from the succession of ideas in our minds1 it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind4 ,hence1 it is a plain consequence that the soul always thinks4 ,and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his thoughts or abstract the existence of a spirit from its cogitation1 will1 ,i believe1 find it no easy task7#fhi74 #ii4 ,so likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and motion from all other qualities1 and consider them by themselves1 we presently lose sight of them1 and run into great extravagances4 7#fij7 ,hence spring those odd paradoxes1 that the fire is not hot1 nor the wall white2 or that heat and colour are in the objects nothing but figure and motion4 ,all which depend on a twofold abstraction3 first1 it is supposed that extension1 for example1 may be abstracted from all other sensible qualities2 and1 secondly1 that the entity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived4 ,but1 whoever shall reflect1 and take care to understand what he says1 will1 if ,i mistake not1 acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike sensations1 and alike real2 that where the extension is1 there is the colour too1 to wit1 in his mind7#fia71 and that their archetypes can exist only in some other mind3 and that the objects of sense7#fib7 are nothing but those sensations1 combined1 blended1 or 7if one may so speak7 concreted together2 none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived4 7#fic7 ,and that consequently the wall is as truly white as it is extended1 and in the same sense4 #ajj4 ,what it is for a man to be happy1 or an object good1 every one may think he knows4 ,but to frame an abstract idea of happiness1 prescinded from all particular pleasure1 or of goodness from everything that is good1 this is what few can pretend to4 ,so likewise a man may be just and virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue4 ,the opinion that those and the like words stand for general notions1 abstracted from all particular persons and actions1 seems to have rendered morality difficult1 and the study thereof of less use to mankind4 7#fid7;,and in effect one may make a great progress in school ethics without ever being the wiser or better man for it1 or knowing how to behave himself in the affairs of life more to the advantage of himself or his neighbours than he did before4 ,and in effect the doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge4 #aja4 ,the two great provinces of speculative science conversant about ideas received from sense and their relations1 are ,natural ,philosophy and ,mathematics4 ,with regard to each of these ,i shall make some observations4 ,and first ,i shall say somewhat of ,natural ,philosophy4 ,on this subject it is that the sceptics triumph4 ,all that stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties and make mankind appear ignorant and low1 are drawn principally from this head1 namely1 that we are under an invincible blindness as to the true and real nature of things4 ,this they exaggerate1 and love to enlarge on4 ,we are miserably bantered1 say they1 by our senses1 and amused only with the outside and shew of things4 ,the real essence1 the internal qualities and constitution of every the meanest object1 is hid from our view3 something there is in every drop of water1 every grain of sand1 which it is beyond the power of human understanding to fathom or comprehend7#fie74 ,but1 it is evident from what has been shewn that all this complaint is groundless1 and that we are influenced by false principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses1 and think we know nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend4 #ajb4 ,one great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the nature of things is1 the current opinion that every thing includes within itself the cause of its properties3 or that there is in each object an inward essence1 which is the source whence its discernible qualities flow1 and whereon they depend4 ,some have pretended to account for appearances by occult qualities2 but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical causes1 to wit1 the figure1 motion1 weight1 and suchlike qualities1 of insensible particles7#fif73 whereas1 in truth1 there is no other agent or efficient cause than spirit1 it being evident that motion1 as well as all other ideas1 is perfectly inert4 ,see sect4 #be4 ,hence1 to endeavour to explain the production of colours or sounds1 by figure1 motion1 magnitude1 and the like1 must needs be labour in vain4 ,and accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory4 ,which may be said in general of those instances wherein one idea or quality is assigned for the cause of another4 ,i need not say how many hypotheses and speculations are left out1 and how much the study of nature is abridged by this doctrine7#fig74 #ajc4 ,the great mechanical principle now in vogue is attraction4 ,that a stone falls to the earth1 or the sea swells towards the moon1 may to some appear sufficiently explained thereby4 ,but how are we enlightened by being told this is done by attraction8 ,is it that that word signifies the manner of the tendency1 and that it is by the mutual drawing of bodies instead of their being impelled or protruded towards each other8 ,but nothing is determined of the manner or action1 and it may as truly 7for aught we know7 be termed impulse1 or protrusion1 as attraction4 ,again1 the parts of steel we see cohere firmly together1 and this also is accounted for by attraction2 but1 in this1 as in the other instances1 ,i do not perceive that anything is signified besides the effect itself2 for as to the manner of the action whereby it is produced1 or the cause which produces it1 these are not so much as aimed at4 #ajd4 ,indeed1 if we take a view of the several phenomena1 and compare them together1 we may observe some likeness and conformity between them4 ,for example1 in the falling of a stone to the ground1 in the rising of the sea towards the moon1 in cohesion and crystallization1 there is something alike2 namely1 an union or mutual approach of bodies4 ,so that any one of these or the like phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to a man who has nicely observed and compared the effects of nature4 ,for that only is thought so which is uncommon1 or a thing by itself1 and out of the ordinary course of our observation4 ,that bodies should tend towards the centre of the earth is not thought strange1 because it is what we perceive every moment of our lives4 ,but that they should have a like gravitation towards the centre of the moon may seem odd and unaccountable to most men1 because it is discerned only in the tides4 ,but a philosopher1 whose thoughts take in a larger compass of nature1 having observed a certain similitude of appearances1 as well in the heavens as the earth1 that argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency towards each other1 which he denotes by the general name attraction1 whatever can be reduced to that1 he thinks justly accounted for4 ,thus he explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the moon2 which to him doth not appear odd or anomalous1 but only a particular example of a general rule or law of nature4 #aje4 ,if therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural philosophers and other men1 with regard to their knowledge of the phenomena1 we shall find it consists1 not in an exacter knowledge of the efficient cause that produces them--for that can be no other than the will of a spirit--but only in a greater largeness of comprehension1 whereby analogies1 harmonies1 and agreements are discovered in the works of nature1 and the particular effects explained1 that is1 reduced to general rules1 see sect4 #fb3 which rules1 grounded on the analogy and uniformness observed in the production of natural effects1 are most agreeable and sought after by the mind2 for that they extend our prospect beyond what is present and near to us1 and enable us to make very probable conjectures touching things that may have happened at very great distances of time and place1 as well as to predict things to come3 which sort of endeavour towards ,omniscience is much affected by the mind4 #ajf4 ,but we should proceed warily in such things3 for we are apt to lay too great a stress on analogies1 and1 to the prejudice of truth1 humour that eagerness of the mind1 whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into general theorems4 ,for example1 gravitation or mutual attraction1 because it appears in many instances1 some are straightway for pronouncing universal2 and that to attract and be attracted by every other body is an essential quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever4 ,whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each other2 and1 so far is that gravitation from being essential to bodies that in some instances a quite contrary principle seems to shew itself2 as in the perpendicular growth of plants1 and the elasticity of the air4 ,there is nothing necessary or essential in the case7#fih72 but it depends entirely on the will of the ,governing ,spirit7#fii71 who causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each other according to various laws1 whilst ,he keeps others at a fixed distance2 and to some ,he gives a quite contrary tendency to fly asunder1 just as ,he sees convenient4 #ajg4 ,after what has been premised1 ,i think we may lay down the following conclusions4 ,first1 it is plain philosophers amuse themselves in vain1 when they enquire for any natural efficient cause1 distinct from a mind or spirit4 ,secondly1 considering the whole creation is the workmanship of a wise and good ,agent1 it should seem to become philosophers to employ their thoughts 7contrary to what some hold7#gjj77 about the final causes of things4 7#gja7 ,for1 besides that this would prove a very pleasing entertainment to the mind1 it might be of great advantage1 in that it not only discovers to us the attributes of the ,creator1 but may also direct us in several instances to the proper uses and applications of things4 ,and ,i must confess ,i see no reason why pointing out the various ends to which natural things are adapted1 and for which they were originally with unspeakable wisdom contrived1 should not be thought one good way of accounting for them1 and altogether worthy a philosopher4 ,thirdly1 from what has been premised1 no reason can be drawn why the history of nature should not still be studied1 and observations and experiments made2 which1 that they are of use to mankind1 and enable us to draw any general conclusions1 is not the result of any immutable habitudes or relations between things themselves1 but only of ,god's goodness and kindness to men in the administration of the world4 ,see sects4 #cj and #ca4 ,fourthly1 by a diligent observation of the phenomena within our view1 we may discover the general laws of nature1 and from them deduce other phenomena4 ,i do not say demonstrate2 for all deductions of that kind depend on a supposition that the ,author of ,nature always operates uniformly1 and in a constant observance of those rules we take for principles1 which we cannot evidently know7#gjb74 #ajh4 ,it appears from sect4 #ff1 c4 that the steady consistent methods of nature may not unfitly be styled the ,language of its ,author1 whereby ,he discovers ,his attributes to our view and directs us how to act for the convenience and felicity of life4 ,those men who frame7#gjc7 general rules from the phenomena1 and afterwards derive7#gjd7 the phenomena from those rules1 seem to consider signs7#gje7 rather than causes4 7#gjf7;,a man may well understand natural signs without knowing their analogy1 or being able to say by what rule a thing is so or so4 ,and1 as it is very possible to write improperly1 through too strict an observance of general grammar-rules2 so1 in arguing from general laws of nature1 it is not impossible we may extend7#gjg7 the analogy too far1 and by that means run into mistakes4 #aji4 7#gjh7 ,to carry on the resemblance4 ,as in reading other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and apply it to use1 rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks on the language2 so1 in perusing the volume of nature1 methinks it is beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules1 or shewing how it follows from them4 ,we should propose to ourselves nobler views1 such as to recreate and exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty1 order1 extent1 and variety of natural things3 hence1 by proper inferences1 to enlarge our notions of the grandeur1 wisdom1 and beneficence of the ,creator3 and lastly1 to make the several parts of the creation1 so far as in us lies1 subservient to the ends they were designed for--,god's glory1 and the sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures4 #aaj4 7#gji7 ,the best key for the aforesaid analogy1 or natural ,science1 will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated ,treatise of ,mechanics4 ,in the entrance of which justly admired treatise1 ,time1 ,space1 and ,motion are distinguished into absolute and relative1 true and apparent1 mathematical and vulgar3 which distinction1 as it is at large explained by the author1 does suppose those quantities to have an existence without the mind3 and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things1 to which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no relation at all4 ,,iii4 ,as for ,time1 as it is there taken in an absolute or abstracted sense1 for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things1 ,i have nothing more to add concerning it after what has been already said on that subject4 ,sects4 #ig and #ih4 ,for the rest1 this celebrated author holds there is an absolute ,space1 which1 being unperceivable to sense1 remains in itself similar and immoveable2 and relative space to be the measure thereof1 which1 being moveable and defined by its situation in respect of sensible bodies1 is vulgarly taken for immoveable space4 ,place he defines to be that part of space which is occupied by any body3 and according as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place4 ,absolute ,motion is said to be the translation of a body from absolute place to absolute place1 as relative motion is from one relative place to another4 ,and because the parts of absolute space do not fall under our senses1 instead of them we are obliged to use their sensible measures2 and so define both place and motion with respect to bodies which we regard as immoveable4 ,but it is said1 in philosophical matters we must abstract from our senses2 since it may be that none of those bodies which seem to be quiescent are truly so2 and the same thing which is moved relatively may be really at rest4 ,as likewise one and the same body may be in relative rest and motion1 or even moved with contrary relative motions at the same time1 according as its place is variously defined4 ,all which ambiguity is to be found in the apparent motions2 but not at all in the true or absolute1 which should therefore be alone regarded in philosophy4 ,and the true we are told are distinguished from apparent or relative motions by the following properties4 ,first1 in true or absolute motion1 all parts which preserve the same position with respect of the whole1 partake of the motions of the whole4 ,secondly1 the place being moved1 that which is placed therein is also moved3 so that a body moving in a place which is in motion doth participate the motion of its place4 ,thirdly1 true motion is never generated or changed otherwise than by force impressed on the body itself4 ,fourthly1 true motion is always changed by force impressed on the body moved4 ,fifthly1 in circular motion1 barely relative1 there is no centrifugal force1 which nevertheless1 in that which is true or absolute1 is proportional to the quantity of motion4 #aab4 ,but1 notwithstanding what hath been said1 ,i must confess it does not appear to me that there can be any motion other than relative7#gaj73 so that to conceive motion there must be conceived at least two bodies2 whereof the distance or position in regard to each other is varied4 ,hence1 if there was one only body in being it could not possibly be moved4 ,this seems evident1 in that the idea ,i have of motion doth necessarily include relation4--7#gaa7,whether others can conceive it otherwise1 a little attention may satisfy them4 #aac4 ,but1 though in every motion it be necessary to conceive more bodies than one1 yet it may be that one only is moved1 namely1 that on which the force causing the change in the distance or situation of the bodies is impressed4 ,for1 however some may define relative motion1 so as to term that body moved which changes its distance from some other body1 whether the force 7#gab7or action causing that change were impressed on it or no1 yet1 as relative motion is that which is perceived by sense1 and regarded in the ordinary affairs of life1 it follows that every man of common sense knows what it is as well as the best philosopher4 ,now1 ,i ask any one whether1 in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets1 the stones he passes over may be said to move1 because they change distance with his feet8 ,to me it appears that though motion includes a relation of one thing to another1 yet it is not necessary that each term of the relation be denominated from it4 ,as a man may think of somewhat which does not think1 so a body may be moved to or from another body which is not therefore itself in motion1 7#gac7 ,i mean relative motion1 for other ,i am not able to conceive4 #aad4 ,as the place happens to be variously defined1 the motion which is related to it varies7#gad74 ,a man in a ship may be said to be quiescent with relation to the sides of the vessel1 and yet move with relation to the land4 ,or he may move eastward in respect of the one1 and westward in respect of the other4 ,in the common affairs of life1 men never go beyond the ,earth to define the place of any body2 and what is quiescent in respect of that is accounted absolutely to be so4 ,but philosophers1 who have a greater extent of thought1 and juster notions of the system of things1 discover even the ,earth itself to be moved4 ,in order therefore to fix their notions1 they seem to conceive the ,corporeal ,world as finite1 and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby they estimate true motions4 ,if we sound our own conceptions1 ,i believe we may find all the absolute motion we can frame an idea of to be at bottom no other than relative motion thus defined4 ,for1 as has been already observed1 absolute motion1 exclusive of all external relation1 is incomprehensible3 and to this kind of relative motion all the above-mentioned properties1 causes1 and effects ascribed to absolute motion will1 if ,i mistake not1 be found to agree4 ,as to what is said of the centrifugal force1 that it does not at all belong to circular relative motion1 ,i do not see how this follows from the experiment which is brought to prove it4 ,see ,newton's ,philosophiae ,naturalis ,principia ,mathematica1 in ,schol4 ,def4 ,,viii4 ,for the water in the vessel1 at that time wherein it is said to have the greatest relative circular motion1 hath1 ,i think1 no motion at all3 as is plain from the foregoing section4 #aae4 ,for1 to denominate a body moved1 it is requisite1 first1 that it change its distance or situation with regard to some other body3 and secondly1 that the force occasioning that change be applied to7#gae7 it4 ,if either of these be wanting1 ,i do not think that1 agreeably to the sense of mankind1 or the propriety of language1 a body can be said to be in motion4 ,i grant indeed that it is possible for us to think a body1 which we see change its distance from some other1 to be moved1 though it have no force applied to7#gaf7 it 7in which sense there may be apparent motion72 but then it is because the force causing the change7#gag7 of distance is imagined by us to be 7#gah7;applied or impressed on that body thought to move4 ,which indeed shews we are capable of mistaking a thing to be in motion which is not1 and that is all4 7#gai7;,but it does not prove that1 in the common acceptation of motion1 a body is moved merely because it changes distance from another2 since as soon as we are undeceived1 and find that the moving force was not communicated to it1 we no longer hold it to be moved4 ,so1 on the other hand1 when one only body 7the parts whereof preserve a given position between themselves7 is imagined to exist1 some there are who think that it can be moved all manner of ways1 though without any change of distance or situation to any other bodies2 which we should not deny1 if they meant only that it might have an impressed force1 which1 upon the bare creation of other bodies1 would produce a motion of some certain quantity and determination4 ,but that an actual motion 7distinct from the impressed force1 or power1 productive of change of place in case there were bodies present whereby to define it7 can exist in such a single body1 ,i must confess ,i am not able to comprehend4 #aaf4 ,from what has been said1 it follows that the philosophic consideration of motion doth not imply the being of an absolute ,space1 distinct from that which is perceived by sense1 and related to bodies3 which that it cannot exist without the mind is clear upon the same principles that demonstrate the like of all other objects of sense4 ,and perhaps1 if we inquire narrowly1 we shall find we cannot even frame an idea of pure ,space exclusive of all body4 ,this ,i must confess seems impossible7#gbj71 as being a most abstract idea4 ,when ,i excite a motion in some part of my body1 if it be free or without resistance1 ,i say there is ,space4 ,but if ,i find a resistance1 then ,i say there is ,body3 and in proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater1 ,i say the space is more or less pure4 ,so that when ,i speak of pure or empty space1 it is not to be supposed that the word space stands for an idea distinct from1 or conceivable without1 body and motion4 ,though indeed we are apt to think every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated from all others2 which hath occasioned infinite mistakes4 ,when1 therefore1 supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body1 ,i say there still remains pure ,space2 thereby nothing else is meant but only that ,i conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all sides without the least resistance3 but if that too were annihilated then there could be no motion1 and consequently no ,space7#gba74 ,some1 perhaps1 may think the sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of pure space2 but it is plain from what we have elsewhere shewn1 that the ideas of space and distance are not obtained by that sense4 ,see the ,essay concerning ,vision4 #aag4 ,what is here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes and difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the nature of pure ,space4 ,but the chief advantage arising from it is that we are freed from that dangerous dilemma1 to which several who have employed their thoughts on that subject imagine themselves reduced1 viz4 of thinking either that ,real ,space is ,god1 or else that there is something beside ,god which is eternal1 uncreated1 infinite1 indivisible1 immutable4 ,both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions4 ,it is certain that not a few divines1 as well as philosophers of great note1 have1 from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or annihilation of space1 concluded it must be divine4 ,and some of late have set themselves particularly to shew that the incommunicable attributes of ,god agree to it4 ,which doctrine1 how unworthy soever it may seem of the ,divine ,nature1 yet ,i must confess ,i do not see how we can get clear of it1 so long as we adhere to the received opinions7#gbb74 #aah4 ,hitherto of ,natural ,philosophy4 ,we come now to make some inquiry concerning that other great branch of speculative knowledge1 to wit1 ,mathematics7#gbc74 ,these1 how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness and certainty of demonstration1 which is hardly anywhere else to be found1 cannot nevertheless be supposed altogether free from mistakes1 if in their principles there lurks some secret error which is common to the professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind4 ,mathematicians1 though they deduce their theorems from a great height of evidence1 yet their first principles are limited by the consideration of ,quantity4 ,and they do not ascend into any inquiry concerning those transcendental maxims which influence all the particular sciences2 each part whereof1 ,mathematics not excepted1 doth consequently participate of the errors involved in them4 ,that the principles laid down by mathematicians are true1 and their way of deduction from those principles clear and incontestible1 we do not deny4 ,but we hold there may be certain erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of ,mathematics1 and for that reason not expressly mentioned1 though tacitly supposed1 throughout the whole progress of that science2 and that the ill effects of those secret unexamined errors are diffused through all the branches thereof4 ,to be plain1 we suspect the mathematicians are no less deeply concerned than other men in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general ideas1 and the existence of objects without the mind4 #aai4 ,arithmetic hath been thought to have for its object abstract ideas of number4 ,of which to understand the properties and mutual habitudes1 is supposed no mean part of speculative knowledge4 ,the opinion of the pure and intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them in esteem with those philosophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness and elevation of thought4 ,it hath set a price on the most trifling numerical speculations1 which in practice are of no use1 but serve only for amusement2 and hath heretofore so far infected the minds of some1 that they have dreamed of mighty mysteries involved in numbers1 and attempted the explication of natural things by them4 ,but1 if we narrowly inquire into our own thoughts1 and consider what has been premised1 we may perhaps entertain a low opinion of those high flights and abstractions1 and look on all inquiries about numbers only as so many difficiles nugae1 so far as they are not subservient to practice1 and promote the benefit of life4 #abj4 ,unity in abstract we have before considered in sect4 #ac2 from which1 and what has been said in the ,introduction1 it plainly follows there is not any such idea4 ,but1 number being defined a collection of units1 we may conclude that1 if there be no such thing as unity1 or unit in abstract1 there are no ideas of number in abstract1 denoted by the numeral names and figures4 ,the theories therefore in ,arithmetic1 if they are abstracted from the names and figures1 as likewise from all use and practice1 as well as from the particular things numbered1 can be supposed to have nothing at all for their object4 ,hence we may see how entirely the science of numbers is subordinate to practice1 and how jejune and trifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation7#gbd74 #aba4 ,however1 since there may be some who1 deluded by the specious show of discovering abstracted verities1 waste their time in arithmetical theorems and problems which have not any use1 it will not be amiss if we more fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretence4 ,and this will plainly appear by taking a view of ,arithmetic in its infancy1 and observing what it was that originally put men on the study of that science1 and to what scope they directed it4 ,it is natural to think that at first1 men1 for ease of memory and help of computation1 made use of counters1 or in writing of single strokes1 points1 or the like1 each whereof was made to signify an unit1 i4e4 some one thing of whatever kind they had occasion to reckon4 ,afterwards they found out the more compendious ways of making one character stand in place of several strokes or points4 ,and1 lastly1 the notation of the ,arabians or ,indians came into use2 wherein1 by the repetition of a few characters or figures1 and varying the signification of each figure according to the place it obtains1 all numbers may be most aptly expressed4 ,which seems to have been done in imitation of language1 so that an exact analogy is observed betwixt the notation by figures and names1 the nine simple figures answering the nine first numeral names and places in the former1 corresponding to denominations in the latter4 ,and agreeably to those conditions of the simple and local value of figures1 were contrived methods of finding1 from the given figures or marks of the parts1 what figures and how placed are proper to denote the whole1 or vice versa4 ,and having found the sought figures1 the same rule or analogy being observed throughout1 it is easy to read them into words2 and so the number becomes perfectly known4 ,for then the number of any particular things is said to be known1 when we know the name or figures 7with their due arrangement7 that according to the standing analogy belong to them4 ,for1 these signs being known1 we can by the operations of arithmetic know the signs of any part of the particular sums signified by them2 and thus computing in signs1 7because of the connexion established betwixt them and the distinct multitudes of things1 whereof one is taken for an unit71 we may be able rightly to sum up1 divide1 and proportion the things themselves that we intend to number4 #abb4 ,in ,arithmetic1 therefore1 we regard not the things but the signs2 which nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake1 but because they direct us how to act with relation to things1 and dispose rightly of them4 ,now1 agreeably to what we have before observed of ,words in general 7sect4 #ai1 ,introd471 it happens here likewise1 that abstract ideas are thought to be signified by numeral names or characters1 while they do not suggest ideas of particular things to our minds4 ,i shall not at present enter into a more particular dissertation on this subject2 but only observe that it is evident from what has been said1 those things which pass for abstract truths and theorems concerning numbers1 are in reality conversant about no object distinct from particular numerable things2 except only names and characters1 which originally came to be considered on no other account but their being signs1 or capable to represent aptly whatever particular things men had need to compute4 ,whence it follows that to study them for their own sake would be just as wise1 and to as good purpose1 as if a man1 neglecting the true use or original intention and subserviency of language1 should spend his time in impertinent criticisms upon words1 or reasonings and controversies purely verbal7#gbe74 #abc4 ,from numbers we proceed to speak of extension7#gbf71 which1 considered as relative1 is the object of ,geometry4 ,the infinite divisibility of finite extension1 though it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom or theorem in the elements of that science1 yet is throughout the same everywhere supposed1 and thought to have so inseparable and essential a connexion with the principles and demonstrations in ,geometry that mathematicians never admit it into doubt1 or make the least question of it4 ,and as this notion is the source from whence do spring all those amusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to the plain common sense of mankind1 and are admitted with so much reluctance into a mind not yet debauched by learning2 so is it the principal occasion of all that nice and extreme subtilty1 which renders the study of ,mathematics so very difficult and tedious4 ,hence1 if we can make it appear that no finite extension contains innumerable parts1 or is infinitely divisible1 it follows that we shall at once clear the science of ,geometry from a great number of difficulties and contradictions which have ever been esteemed a reproach to human reason1 and withal make the attainment thereof a business of much less time and pains than it hitherto hath been4 #abd4 ,every particular finite extension which may possibly be the object of our thought is an idea existing only in the mind2 and consequently each part thereof must be perceived4 ,if1 therefore1 ,i cannot perceive innumerable parts in any finite extension that ,i consider1 it is certain they are not contained in it4 ,but it is evident that ,i cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line1 surface1 or solid1 which ,i either perceive by sense1 or figure to myself in my mind4 ,wherefore ,i conclude they are not contained in it4 ,nothing can be plainer to me than that the extensions ,i have in view are no other than my own ideas2 and it is no less plain that ,i cannot resolve any one of my ideas into an infinite number of other ideas2 that is1 that they are not infinitely divisible7#gbg74 ,if by finite extension be meant something distinct from a finite idea1 ,i declare ,i do not know what that is1 and so cannot affirm or deny anything of it4 ,but if the terms extension1 parts1 and the like1 are taken in any sense conceivable--that is1 for ideas1--then to say a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number is so manifest and glaring a contradiction1 that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be so4 ,and it is impossible it should ever gain the assent of any reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees1 as a converted ,gentile7#gbh7 to the belief of transubstantiation4 ,ancient and rooted prejudices do often pass into principles4 ,and those propositions which once obtain the force and credit of a principle1 are not only themselves1 but likewise whatever is deducible from them1 thought privileged from all examination4 ,and there is no absurdity so gross1 which1 by this means1 the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow7#gbi74 #abe4 ,he whose understanding is prepossessed with the doctrine of abstract general ideas may be persuaded that 7whatever be thought of the ideas of sense7 extension in abstract is infinitely divisible4 ,and one who thinks the objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps1 in virtue thereof1 be brought to admit7#gcj7 that a line but an inch long may contain innumerable parts really existing1 though too small to be discerned4 ,these errors are grafted as well in the minds of geometricians as of other men1 and have a like influence on their reasonings2 and it were no difficult thing to shew how the arguments from ,geometry made use of to support the infinite divisibility of extension are bottomed on them4 7#gca7 ,but this1 if it be thought necessary1 we may hereafter find a proper place to treat of in a particular manner4 ,at present we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathematicians are all so fond and tenacious of that doctrine4 #abf4 ,it has been observed in another place that the theorems and demonstrations in ,geometry are conversant about universal ideas 7sect4 #ae1 ,introd473 where it is explained in what sense this ought to be understood1 to wit1 the particular lines and figures included in the diagram are supposed to stand for innumerable others of different sizes2 or1 in other words1 the geometer considers them abstracting from their magnitude3 which doth not imply that he forms an abstract idea1 but only that he cares not what the particular magnitude is1 whether great or small1 but looks on that as a thing indifferent to the demonstration4 ,hence it follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be spoken of as though it contained ten thousand parts1 since it is regarded not in itself1 but as it is universal2 and it is universal only in its signification1 whereby it represents innumerable lines greater than itself1 in which may be distinguished ten thousand parts or more1 though there may not be above an inch in it4 ,after this manner1 the properties of the lines signified are 7by a very usual figure7 transferred to the sign2 and thence1 through mistake1 thought to appertain to it considered in its own nature4 #abg4 ,because there is no number of parts so great but it is possible there may be a line containing more1 the inch-line is said to contain parts more than any assignable number2 which is true1 not of the inch taken absolutely1 but only for the things signified by it4 ,but men1 not retaining that distinction in their thoughts1 slide into a belief that the small particular line described on paper contains in itself parts innumerable4 ,there is no such thing as the ten thousandth part of an inch2 but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth1 which may be signified by that inch4 ,when therefore ,i delineate a triangle on paper1 and take one side1 not above an inch for example in length1 to be the radius1 this ,i consider as divided into #aj1jjj or #ajj1jjj parts1 or more4 ,for1 though the ten thousandth part of that line considered in itself1 is nothing at all1 and consequently may be neglected without any error or inconveniency1 yet these described lines1 being only marks standing for greater quantities1 whereof it may be the ten thousandth part is very considerable1 it follows that1 to prevent notable errors in practice1 the radius must be taken of #aj1jjj parts1 or more4 #abh4 ,from what has been said the reason is plain why1 to the end any theorem may become universal in its use1 it is necessary we speak of the lines described on paper as though they contained parts which really they do not4 ,in doing of which1 if we examine the matter throughly1 we shall perhaps discover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as consisting of1 or being divisible into1 a thousand parts1 but only some other line which is far greater than an inch1 and represented by it2 and that when we say a line is infinitely divisible1 we must mean7#gcb7 a line which is infinitely great4 ,what we have here observed seems to be the chief cause1 why to suppose the infinite divisibility of finite extension has been thought necessary in geometry4 #abi4 ,the several absurdities and contradictions which flowed from this false principle might1 one would think1 have been esteemed so many demonstrations against it4 ,but1 by ,i know not what logic1 it is held that proofs a posteriori are not to be admitted against propositions relating to ,infinity4 ,as though it were not impossible even for an ,infinite ,mind to reconcile contradictions2 or as if anything absurd and repugnant could have a necessary connexion with truth1 or flow from it4 ,but whoever considers the weakness of this pretence1 will think it was contrived on purpose to humour the laziness of the mind1 which had rather acquiesce in an indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through with a severe examination of those principles it has ever embraced for true4 #acj4 ,of late the speculations about ,infinites have run so high1 and grown to such strange notions1 as have occasioned no small scruples and disputes among the geometers of the present age4 ,some there are of great note who1 not content with holding that finite lines may be divided into an infinite number of parts1 do yet farther maintain1 that each of those ,infinitesimals is itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts1 or ,infinitesimals of a second order1 and so on ad infinitum4 ,these1 ,i say1 assert there are ,infinitesimals of ,infinitesimals of ,infinitesimals1 without ever coming to an end4 ,so that according to them an inch does not barely contain an infinite number of parts1 but an infinity of an infinity of an infinity ad infinitum of parts4 ,others there be who hold all orders of ,infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at all2 thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is any positive quantity or part of extension which1 though multiplied infinitely1 can ever equal the smallest given extension4 ,and yet on the other hand it seems no less absurd to think the square1 cube1 or other power of a positive real root1 should itself be nothing at all2 which they who hold ,infinitesimals of the first order1 denying all of the subsequent orders1 are obliged to maintain4 #aca4 ,have we not therefore reason to conclude they are both in the wrong1 and that there is in effect no such thing as parts infinitely small1 or an infinite number of parts contained in any finite quantity8 ,but you will say that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very foundations of ,geometry are destroyed1 and those great men who have raised that science to so astonishing a height1 have been all the while building a castle in the air4 ,to this it may be replied1 that whatever is useful in geometry1 and promotes the benefit of human life1 does still remain firm and unshaken on our ,principles2 that science considered as practical will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what has been said4 ,but to set this in a due light17#gcc7 and shew how lines and figures may be measured1 and their properties investigated1 without supposing finite extension to be infinitely divisible1 may be the proper business of another place7#gcd74 ,for the rest1 though it should follow that some of the more intricate and subtle parts of ,speculative ,mathematics may be pared off without any prejudice to truth1 yet ,i do not see what damage will be thence derived to mankind4 ,on the contrary1 ,i think it were highly to be wished that men of great abilities and obstinate application7#gce7 would draw off their thoughts from those amusements1 and employ them in the study of such things as lie nearer the concerns of life1 or have a more direct influence on the manners4 #acb4 ,if it be said that several theorems1 undoubtedly true1 are discovered by methods in which ,infinitesimals are made use of1 which could never have been if their existence included a contradiction in it3--,i answer1 that upon a thorough examination it will not be found that in any instance it is necessary to make use of or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines1 or even quantities less than the minimum sensibile3 nay1 it will be evident this is never done1 it being impossible4 7#gcf7 ,and whatever mathematicians may think of ,fluxions1 or the ,differential ,calculus1 and the like1 a little reflexion will shew them that1 in working by those methods1 they do not conceive or imagine lines or surfaces less than what are perceivable to sense4 ,they may indeed call those little and almost insensible quantities ,infinitesimals1 or ,infinitesimals of ,infinitesimals1 if they please4 ,but at bottom this is all1 they being in truth finite2 nor does the solution of problems require the supposing any other4 ,but this will be more clearly made out hereafter4 #acc4 ,by what we have hitherto said1 it is plain that very numerous and important errors have taken their rise from those false ,principles which were impugned in the foregoing parts of this ,treatise2 and the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be most fruitful ,principles1 from whence do flow innumerable consequences1 highly advantageous to true philosophy as well as to religion4 ,particularly ,matter1 or the absolute7#gcg7 existence of corporeal objects1 hath been shewn to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of all knowledge1 whether human or divine1 have ever placed their chief strength and confidence4 ,and surely if by distinguishing the real existence of unthinking things from their being perceived1 and allowing them a subsistence of their own1 out of the minds of spirits1 no one thing is explained in nature1 but on the contrary a great many inexplicable difficulties arise2 if the supposition of ,matter7#gch7 is barely precarious1 as not being grounded on so much as one single reason2 if its consequences cannot endure the light of examination and free inquiry1 but screen themselves under the dark and general pretence of infinites being incomprehensible2 if withal the removal of this ,matter be not attended with the least evil consequence2 if it be not even missed in the world1 but everything as well1 nay much easier conceived without it2 if1 lastly1 both ,sceptics and ,atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing only spirits and ideas1 and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable both to ,reason and ,religion3 methinks we may expect it should be admitted and firmly embraced1 though it were proposed only as an hypothesis1 and the existence of ,matter had been allowed possible2 which yet ,i think we have evidently demonstrated that it is not4 #acd4 ,true it is that1 in consequence of the foregoing ,principles1 several disputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning are rejected as useless 7#gci7 and in effect conversant about nothing at all4 ,but how great a prejudice soever against our notions this may give to those who have already been deeply engaged1 and made large advances in studies of that nature1 yet by others we hope it will not be thought any just ground of dislike to the principles and tenets herein laid down1 that they abridge the labour of study1 and make human sciences more clear1 compendious1 and attainable than they were before4 #ace4 ,having despatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledge of ideas1 the method we proposed leads us in the next place to treat of spirits7#gdj73 with regard to which1 perhaps1 human knowledge is not so deficient as is vulgarly imagined4 ,the great reason that is assigned for our being thought ignorant of the nature of ,spirits is our not having an idea of it4 ,but1 surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a human understanding that it does not perceive the idea of ,spirit1 if it is manifestly impossible there should be any such idea4 ,and this if ,i mistake not has been demonstrated in section #bg4 ,to which ,i shall here add that a ,spirit has been shewn to be the only substance or support wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist3 but that this substance which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea1 or like an idea1 is evidently absurd4 #acf4 ,it will perhaps be said that we want a sense 7as some have imagined7#gda77 proper to know substances withal2 which1 if we had1 we might know our own soul as we do a triangle4 ,to this ,i answer1 that in case we had a new sense bestowed upon us1 we could only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas of sense4 ,but ,i believe nobody will say that what he means by the terms soul and substance is only some particular sort of idea or sensation4 ,we may therefore infer that1 all things duly considered1 it is not more reasonable to think our faculties defective1 in that they do not furnish us with an idea of ,spirit1 or active thinking substance1 than it would be if we should blame them for not being able to comprehend a round square7#gdb74 #acg4 ,from the opinion that ,spirits are to be known after the manner of an idea or sensation have risen many absurd and heterodox tenets1 and much scepticism about the nature of the soul4 ,it is even probable that this opinion may have produced a doubt in some whether they had any soul at all distinct from their body2 since upon inquiry they could not find they had an idea of it4 ,that an idea1 which is inactive1 and the existence whereof consists in being perceived1 should be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting by itself1 seems to need no other refutation than barely attending to what is meant by those words4 ,but perhaps you will say that though an idea cannot resemble a ,spirit in its thinking1 acting1 or subsisting by itself1 yet it may in some other respects2 and it is not necessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original4 #ach4 ,i answer1 ,if it does not in those mentioned1 it is impossible it should represent it in any other thing4 ,do but leave out the power of willing1 thinking1 and perceiving ideas1 and there remains nothing else wherein the idea can be like a spirit4 ,for1 by the word spirit we mean only that which thinks1 wills1 and perceives2 this1 and this alone1 constitutes the signification of that term4 ,if therefore it is impossible that any degree of those powers should be represented in an idea 7#gdc7or notion1 it is evident there can be no idea or notion of a ,spirit4 #aci4 ,but it will be objected that1 if there is no idea signified by the terms soul1 spirit1 and substance1 they are wholly insignificant1 or have no meaning in them4 ,i answer1 those words do mean or signify a real thing2 which is neither an idea nor like an idea1 but that which perceives ideas1 and wills1 and reasons about them4 ,what ,i am myself1 that which ,i denote by the term ,i1 is the same with what is meant by soul1 or spiritual substance4 7#gdd7;,but if ,i should say that ,i was nothing1 or that ,i was an idea or notion1 nothing could be more evidently absurd than either of these propositions4 ,if it be said that this is only quarrelling at a word1 and that1 since the immediate significations of other names are by common consent called ideas1 no reason can be assigned why that which is signified by the name spirit or soul may not partake in the same appellation4 ,i answer1 all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive1 and their existence consists only in being perceived3 whereas a soul or spirit is an active being1 whose existence consists1 not in being perceived1 but in perceiving ideas and thinking7#gde74 ,it is therefore necessary1 in order to prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike1 that we distinguish between spirit and idea4 ,see sect4 #bg4 #adj4 ,in a large sense indeed1 we may be said to have an idea 7#gdf7or rather a notion of spirit4 ,that is1 we understand the meaning of the word1 otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it4 ,moreover1 as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits by means of our own1 which we suppose to be resemblances of them1 so we know other spirits by means of our own soul3 which in that sense is the image or idea of them2 it having a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived has to those ideas perceived by another7#gdg74 #ada4 7#gdh7,the natural immortality of the soul is a necessary consequence of the foregoing doctrine4 ,but before we attempt to prove this1 it is fit that we explain the meaning of that tenet4 ,it must not be supposed that they who assert the natural immortality of the soul7#gdi7 are of opinion that it is absolutely incapable of annihilation even by the infinite power of the ,creator who first gave it being1 but only that it is not liable to be broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion ,they indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin vital flame1 or system of animal spirits1 make it perishing and corruptible as the body2 since there is nothing more easily dissipated than such a being1 which it is naturally impossible should survive the ruin of the tabernacle wherein it is inclosed4 ,and this notion hath been greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind1 as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue and religion4 ,but it hath been made evident that bodies1 of what frame or texture soever1 are barely passive ideas in the mind1 which is more distant and heterogeneous from them than light is from darkness7#gej74 ,we have shewn that the soul is indivisible1 incorporeal1 unextended2 and it is consequently incorruptible4 ,nothing can be plainer than that the motions1 changes1 decays1 and dissolutions which we hourly see befal natural bodies 7and which is what we mean by the course of nature7 cannot possibly affect an active1 simple1 uncompounded substance3 such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature2 that is to say1 the soul of man is naturally immortal7#gea74 #adb4 ,after what has been said1 it is1 ,i suppose1 plain that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless1 inactive objects1 or by way of idea4 ,spirits and ideas are things so wholly different1 that when we say 8they exist10 8they are known10 or the like1 these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures7#geb74 ,there is nothing alike or common in them2 and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties1 we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle1 seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound4 ,this is inculcated because ,i imagine it may be of moment towards clearing several important questions1 and preventing some very dangerous errors concerning the nature of the soul4 7#gec7,we may not1 ,i think1 strictly be said to have an idea of an active being1 or of an action2 although we may be said to have a notion of them4 ,i have some knowledge or notion of my mind1 and its acts about ideas2 inasmuch as ,i know or understand what is meant by these words4 ,what ,i know1 that ,i have some notion of4 ,i will not say that the terms idea and notion may not be used convertibly1 if the world will have it so4 ,but yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety1 that we distinguish things very different by different names4 ,it is also to be remarked that1 all relations including an act of the mind7#ged71 we cannot so properly be said to have an idea1 but rather a notion1 of the relations and habitudes between things4 ,but if1 in the modern way7#gee71 the word idea is extended to spirits1 and relations1 and acts1 this is1 after all1 an affair of verbal concern4 #adc4 ,it will not be amiss to add1 that the doctrine of abstract ideas has had no small share in rendering those sciences intricate and obscure which are particularly conversant about spiritual things4 ,men have imagined they could frame abstract notions of the powers and acts of the mind1 and consider them prescinded as well from the mind or spirit itself1 as from their respective objects and effects4 ,hence a great number of dark and ambiguous terms1 presumed to stand for abstract notions1 have been introduced into metaphysics and morality2 and from these have grown infinite distractions and disputes amongst the learned7#gef74 #add4 ,but1 nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in controversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and operations of the mind1 than the being used to speak of those things in terms borrowed from sensible ideas4 ,for example1 the will is termed the motion of the soul3 this infuses a belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion1 impelled and determined by the objects of sense1 as necessarily as that is by the stroke of a racket4 ,hence arise endless scruples and errors of dangerous consequence in morality4 ,all which1 ,i doubt not1 may be cleared1 and truth appear plain1 uniform1 and consistent1 could but philosophers be prevailed on to 7#geg7;depart from some received prejudices and modes of speech1 and retire into themselves1 and attentively consider their own meaning4 7#geh7;,but the difficulties arising on this head demand a more particular disquisition than suits with the design of this treatise4 #ade4 ,from what hath been said1 it is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations1 or the ideas by them1 excited in us4 ,i perceive several motions1 changes1 and combinations of ideas1 that inform me there are certain particular agents1 like myself1 which accompany them1 and concur in their production4 ,hence1 the knowledge ,i have of other spirits is not immediate1 as is the knowledge of my ideas2 but depending on the intervention of ideas1 by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself1 as effects or concomitant signs7#gei74 #adf4 ,but1 though there be some things which convince us human agents are concerned in producing them1 yet it is evident to every one that those things which are called the ,works of ,nature1 that is1 the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us1 are not produced by1 or dependent on1 the wills of men4 ,there is therefore some other ,spirit that causes them2 since it is repugnant7#gfj7 that they should subsist by themselves4 ,see sect4 #bi4 ,but1 if we attentively consider the constant regularity1 order1 and concatenation of natural things1 the surprising magnificence1 beauty and perfection of the larger1 and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of the creation1 together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole1 but above all the never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure1 and the instincts or natural inclinations1 appetites1 and passions of animals2--,i say if we consider all these things1 and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes ,one1 ,eternal1 ,infinitely ,wise1 ,good1 and ,perfect1 we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid ,spirit1 8who works all in all0 and 8by whom all things consist40 #adg4 ,hence1 it is evident that ,god is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever1 distinct from ourselves4 ,we may even assert that the existence of ,god is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men2 because the effects of ,nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents4 ,there is not any one mark that denotes a man1 or effect produced by him1 which does not more strongly evince the being of that ,spirit who is the ,author of ,nature7#gfa74 ,for it is evident that1 in affecting other persons1 the will of man hath no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body2 but that such a motion should be attended by1 or excite any idea in the mind of another1 depends wholly on the will of the ,creator4 ,he alone it is who1 8upholding all things by the word of ,his power10 maintains that intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other7#gfb74 ,and yet this pure and clear ,light which enlightens everyone is itself invisible 7#gfc7to the greatest part of mankind4 #adh4 ,it seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they cannot see ,god4 ,could we but see ,him1 say they1 as we see a man1 we should believe that ,he is1 and believing obey ,his commands4 ,but alas1 we need only open our eyes to see the ,sovereign ,lord of all things1 with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow-creatures4 ,not that ,i imagine we see ,god 7as some will have it7 by a direct and immediate view2 or see corporeal things1 not by themselves1 but by seeing that which represents them in the essence of ,god2 which doctrine is1 ,i must confess1 to me incomprehensible7#gfd74 ,but ,i shall explain my meaning4 ,a human spirit or person is not perceived by sense1 as not being an idea4 ,when therefore we see the colour1 size1 figure1 and motions of a man1 we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds2 and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections1 serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves4 ,hence it is plain we do not see a man1 if by man is meant1 that which lives1 moves1 perceives1 and thinks as we do3 but only such a certain collection of ideas1 as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion1 like to ourselves1 accompanying and represented by it4 ,and after the same manner we see ,god3 all the difference is that1 whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind1 whithersoever we direct our view we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the ,divinity3 everything we see1 hear1 feel1 or anywise perceive by sense1 being a sign or effect of the power of ,god2 as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men7#gfe74 #adi4 ,it is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one that is capable of the least reflexion than the existence of ,god1 or a ,spirit who is intimately present to our minds1 producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us1 on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence1 in short 8in whom we live1 and move1 and have our being40 ,that the discovery of this great truth1 which lies so near and obvious to the mind1 should be attained to by the reason of so very few1 is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of men1 who1 though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations of the ,deity1 are yet so little affected by them that they seem1 as it were1 blinded with excess of light7#gff74 #aej4 ,but you will say--,hath ,nature no share in the production of natural things1 and must they be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of ,god8 ,i answer1 ,if by ,nature is meant only the visible series of effects or sensations imprinted on our minds according to certain fixed and general laws1 then it is plain that ,nature1 taken in this sense1 cannot produce anything at all7#gfg74 ,but if by ,nature is meant some being distinct from ,god1 as well as from the laws of nature and things perceived by sense1 ,i must confess that word is to me an empty sound1 without any intelligible meaning annexed to it4 ,nature1 in this acceptation1 is a vain chimera1 introduced by those heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of ,god4 ,but it is more unaccountable that it should be received among ,christians1 professing belief in the ,holy ,scriptures1 which constantly ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of ,god that heathen philosophers are wont to impute to ,nature4 8,the ,lord1 ,he causeth the vapours to ascend2 ,he maketh lightnings with rain2 ,he bringeth forth the wind out of ,his treasures40 ,jerem4 x4 #ac4 8,he turneth the shadow of death into the morning1 and maketh the day dark with night40 ,amos v4 #h4 8,he visiteth the earth1 and maketh it soft with showers3 ,he blesseth the springing thereof1 and crowneth the year with ,his goodness2 so that the pastures are clothed with flocks1 and the valleys are covered over with corn40 ,see ,psal4 lxv4 ,but1 notwithstanding that this is the constant language of ,scripture1 yet we have ,i know not what aversion from believing that ,god concerns ,himself so nearly in our affairs4 ,fain would we suppose ,him at a great distance off1 and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in ,his stead2 though 7if we may believe ,saint ,paul7 8,he be not far from every one of us40 #aea4 ,it will1 ,i doubt not1 be objected that the slow1 gradual1 and roundabout methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem to have for their cause the immediate hand of an ,almighty ,agent3 besides1 monsters1 untimely births1 fruits blasted in the blossom1 rains falling in desert places1 miseries incident to human life1 and the like1 are so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and superintended by a ,spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness4 ,but the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain from sect4 #fb2 it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary in order to working by the most simple and general rules1 and after a steady and consistent manner2 which argues both the wisdom and goodness of ,god7#gfh74 7#gfi7;,for1 it doth hence follow that the finger of ,god is not so conspicuous to the resolved and careless sinner2 which gives him an opportunity to harden in his impiety and grow ripe for vengeance4 7,vid4 sect4 #eg47 ,such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of ,nature that1 whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses1 the ,hand which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood4 8,verily0 7saith the prophet7 8thou art a ,god that hidest thyself40 ,isaiah xlv4 #ae4 ,but1 though the ,lord conceal ,himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy1 who will not be at the least expense of thought7#ggj71 yet to an unbiassed and attentive mind1 nothing can be more plainly legible than the intimate presence of an ,all-wise ,spirit1 who fashions1 regulates1 and sustains the whole system of ,being4 ,it is clear1 from what we have elsewhere observed1 that the operating according to general and stated laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life1 and letting us into the secret of nature1 that without it all reach and compass of thought1 all human sagacity and design1 could serve to no manner of purpose4 ,it were even impossible there should be any such faculties or powers in the mind4 ,see sect4 #ca4 ,which one consideration abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise7#gga74 #aeb4 ,we should further consider1 that the very blemishes and defects of nature are not without their use1 in that they make an agreeable sort of variety1 and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation1 as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts4 ,we would likewise do well to examine1 whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos1 and accidental destruction of plants and animals before they come to full maturity1 as an imprudence in the ,author of nature1 be not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and saving mortals4 ,in man indeed a thrifty management of those things which he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed wisdom4 ,but we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vegetable costs the great ,creator any more pains or trouble in its production than a pebble does2 nothing being more evident than that an ,omnipotent ,spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fiat or act of his will4 ,hence it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the ,agent who produces them1 but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of ,his power4 #aec4 ,as for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world1 pursuant to the general laws of ,nature1 and the actions of finite1 imperfect ,spirits1 this1 in the state we are in at present1 is indispensably necessary to our well-being4 ,but our prospects are too narrow4 ,we take1 for instance1 the idea of some one particular pain into our thoughts1 and account it evil4 ,whereas1 if we enlarge our view1 so as to comprehend the various ends1 connexions1 and dependencies of things1 on what occasions and in what proportions we are affected with pain and pleasure1 the nature of human freedom1 and the design with which we are put into the world2 we shall be forced to acknowledge that those particular things which1 considered in themselves1 appear to be evil1 have the nature of good1 when considered as linked with the whole system of beings7#ggb74 #aed4 ,from what hath been said1 it will be manifest to any considering person1 that it is merely for want of attention and comprehensiveness of mind that there are any favourers of ,atheism or the ,manichean ,heresy to be found4 ,little and unreflecting souls may indeed burlesque the works of ,providence2 the beauty and order whereof they have not capacity1 or will not be at the pains1 to comprehend7#ggc74 ,but those who are masters of any justness and extent of thought1 and are withal used to reflect1 can never sufficiently admire the divine traces of ,wisdom and ,goodness that shine throughout the economy of ,nature4 ,but what truth is there which glares so strongly on the mind that1 by an aversion of thought1 a wilful shutting of the eyes1 we may not escape seeing it8 ,is it therefore to be wondered at1 if the generality of men1 who are ever intent on business or pleasure1 and little used to fix or open the eye of their mind1 should not have all that conviction and evidence of the ,being of ,god which might be expected in reasonable creatures7#ggd78 #aee4 ,we should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid as to neglect1 than that neglecting they should be unconvinced of such an evident and momentous truth7#gge74 ,and yet it is to be feared that too many of parts and leisure1 who live in ,christian countries1 are1 merely through a supine and dreadful negligence1 sunk into a sort of ,atheism4 7#ggf7,they cannot say there is not a ,god1 but neither are they convinced that there is4 ,for what else can it be but some lurking infidelity1 some secret misgivings of mind with regard to the existence and attributes of ,god1 which permits sinners to grow and harden in impiety8 ,since it is downright impossible that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough sense of the omnipresence1 holiness1 and justice of that ,almighty ,spirit should persist in a remorseless violation of ,his laws4 ,we ought1 therefore1 earnestly to meditate and dwell on those important points2 that so we may attain conviction without all scruple 8that the eyes of the ,lord are in every place1 beholding the evil and the good2 that ,he is with us and keepeth us in all places whither we go1 and giveth us bread to eat and raiment to put on20 that ,he is present and conscious to our innermost thoughts2 and1 that we have a most absolute and immediate dependence on ,him4 ,a clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill our hearts with an awful circumspection and holy fear1 which is the strongest incentive to ,virtue1 and the best guard against ,vice4 #aef4 ,for1 after all1 what deserves the first place in our studies is1 the consideration of ,,god and our ,,duty2 which to promote1 as it was the main drift and design of my labours1 so shall ,i esteem them altogether useless and ineffectual if1 by what ,i have said1 ,i cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the ,presence of ,god2 and1 having shewn the falseness or vanity of those barren speculations which make the chief employment of learned men1 the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary truths of the ,gospel2 which to know and to practise is the highest perfection of human nature4 ,,three ,,dialogues ,,between ,,hylas ,,and ,,philonous ,,the ,,design ,,of ,,which ,,is ,,plainly ,,to ,,demonstrate ,,the ,,reality ,,and ,,perfection ,,of ,,human ,,knowledge1 ,,the ,,incorporeal ,,nature ,,of ,,the ,,soul1 ,,and ,,the ,,immediate ,,providence ,,of ,a ,,deity1 ,,in ,,opposition ,,to ,,sceptics ,,and ,,atheists1 ,,also ,,to ,,open ,a ,,method ,,for ,,rendering ,,the ,,sciences ,,more ,,easy1 ,,useful1 ,,and ,,compendious ,first published in #agac ,editor's ,preface ,this work is the gem of ,british metaphysical literature4 ,berkeley's claim to be the great modern master of ,socratic dialogue rests1 perhaps1 upon ,alciphron1 which surpasses the conversations between ,hylas and ,philonous in expression of individual character1 and in dramatic effect4 ,here conversation is adopted as a convenient way of treating objections to the conception of the reality of ,matter which had been unfolded systematically in the book of ,principles4 ,but the lucid thought1 the colouring of fancy1 the glow of human sympathy1 and the earnestness that pervade the subtle reasonings pursued through these dialogues1 are unique in ,english metaphysical literature4 ,except perhaps ,hume and ,ferrier1 none approach ,berkeley in the art of uniting metaphysical thought with easy1 graceful1 and transparent style4 ,our surprise and admiration are increased when we recollect that this charming production of reason and imagination came from ,ireland1 at a time when that country was scarcely known in the world of letters and philosophy4 ,the immediate impression produced by the publication of the ,principles1 is shewn in ,berkeley's correspondence with ,sir ,john ,percival4 ,berkeley was eager to hear what people had to say for or against what looked like a paradox apt to shock the reader2 but in those days he was not immediately informed by professional critics4 8,if when you receive my book0--he wrote from ,dublin in ,july1 #agaj1 to ,sir ,john ,percival7#ggg71 then in ,london1--8you can procure me the opinion of some of your acquaintances who are thinking men1 addicted to the study of natural philosophy and mathematics1 ,i shall be extremely obliged to you40 ,in the following month he was informed by ,sir ,john that it was 8incredible what prejudice can work in the best geniuses1 even in the lovers of novelty4 ,for ,i did but name the subject matter of your book of ,principles to some ingenious friends of mine and they immediately treated it with ridicule1 at the same time refusing to read it1 which ,i have not yet got one to do4 ,a physician of my acquaintance undertook to discover your person1 and argued you must needs be mad1 and that you ought to take remedies4 ,a bishop pitied you1 that a desire of starting something new should put you upon such an undertaking4 ,another told me that you are not gone so far as a gentleman in town1 who asserts not only that there is no such thing as ,matter1 but that we ourselves have no being at all40 ,berkeley's reply is interesting4 8,i am not surprised10 he says1 8that ,i should be ridiculed by those who won't take the pains to understand me4 ,if the raillery and scorn of those who criticise what they will not be at the pains to understand had been sufficient to deter men from making any attempts towards curing the ignorance and errors of mankind1 we should not have been troubled with some very fair improvements in knowledge4 ,the common cry's being against any opinion seems to me1 so far from proving false1 that it may with as good reason pass for an argument of its truth4 ,however1 ,i imagine that whatever doctrine contradicts vulgar and settled opinion had need be introduced with great caution into the world4 ,for this reason it was that ,i omitted all mention of the non-existence of ,matter in the title-page1 dedication1 preface and introduction to the ,treatise on the ,principles of ,human ,knowledge2 that so the notion might steal unawares upon the reader1 who probably might never have meddled with the book if he had known that it contained such paradoxes40 ,with characteristic fervour he disclaims 8variety and love of paradox0 as motives of the book of ,principles1 and professes faith in the unreality of abstract unperceived ,matter1 a faith which he has held for some years1 8the conceit being at first warm in my imagination1 but since carefully examined1 both by my own judgment and that of ingenious friends40 ,what he especially complained of was 8that men who have never considered my book should confound me with the sceptics1 who doubt the existence of sensible things1 and are not positive as to any one truth1 no1 not so much as their own being--which ,i find by your letter is the case of some wild visionist now in ,london4 ,but whoever reads my book with attention will see that there is a direct opposition between the principles that are contained in it and those of the sceptics1 and that ,i question not the existence of anything we perceive by our senses4 ,i do not deny the existence of the sensible things which ,moses says were created by ,god4 ,they existed from all eternity1 in the ,divine ,intellect2 and they became perceptible 7i4e4 were created7 in the same manner and order as is described in ,genesis4 ,for ,i take creation to belong to things only as they respect finite spirits2 there being nothing new to ,god4 ,hence it follows that the act of creation consists in ,god's willing that those things should become perceptible to other spirits which before were known only to ,himself4 ,now both reason and scripture assure us that there are other spirits besides men1 who1 'tis possible1 might have perceived this visible world as it was successively exhibited to their view before man's creation4 ,besides1 for to agree with the ,mosaic account of the creation1 it's sufficient if we suppose that a man1 in case he was existing at the time of the chaos of sensible things1 might have perceived all things formed out of it1 in the very order set down in scripture2 all which is in no way repugnant to my principles40 ,sir ,john in his next letter1 written from ,london in ,october1 #agaf1 reports that the book of ,principles had fallen into the hands of the highest living ,english authority in metaphysical theology1 ,samuel ,clarke1 who had produced his ,demonstration of the ,being and ,attributes of ,god four years before4 ,the book had also been read by ,whiston1 ,newton's successor at ,cambridge4 8,i can only report at second-hand10 he says1 8that they think you a fair arguer1 and a clear writer2 but they say your first principles you lay down are false4 ,they look upon you as an extraordinary genius1 ranking you with ,father ,malebranche1 ,norris1 and another whose name ,i forget1 all of whom they think extraordinary men1 but of a particular turn of mind1 and their labours of little use to mankind1 on account of their abstruseness4 ,this may arise from these gentlemen not caring to think after a new manner1 which would oblige them to begin their studies anew2 or else it may be the strength of prejudice40 ,berkeley was vexed by this treatment on the part of ,clarke and ,whiston4 ,he sent under ,sir ,john's care a letter to each of them1 hoping through him to discover 8their reasons against his notions1 as truth is his sole aim40 8,as to what is said of ranking me with ,father ,malebranche and ,mr4 ,norris1 whose writings are thought to be too fine-spun to be of any great use to mankind1 ,i have this answer1 that ,i think the notions ,i embrace are not in the least agreeing with theirs1 but indeed plainly inconsistent with them in the main points1 inasmuch as ,i know few writers ,i take myself at bottom to differ more from than from them4 ,fine-spun metaphysics are what on all occasions ,i declare against1 and if any one shall shew anything of that sort in my ,treatise ,i will willingly correct it40 ,sir ,john delivered the letters to two friends of ,clarke and ,whiston1 and reported that 8,dr4 ,clarke told his friend in reply1 that he did not care to write you his thoughts1 because he was afraid it might draw him into a dispute upon a matter which was already clear to him4 ,he thought your first principles you go on are false2 but he was a modest man1 his friend said1 and uninclined to shock any one whose opinions on things of this nature differed from his own40 ,this was a disappointment to the ardent ,berkeley4 8,dr4 ,clarke's conduct seems a little surprising10 he replies4 8,that an ingenious and candid person 7as ,i take him to be7 should refuse to shew me where my error lies is something unaccountable4 ,i never expected that a gentleman otherwise so well employed as ,dr4 ,clarke should think it worth his while to enter into a dispute with me concerning any notions of mine4 ,but1 seeing it was clear to him ,i went upon false principles1 ,i hoped he would vouchsafe1 in a line or two1 to point them out to me1 that so ,i may more closely review and examine them4 ,if he but once did me this favour1 he need not apprehend ,i should give him any further trouble4 ,i should be glad if you have opportunity that you would let his friend know this4 ,there is nothing that ,i more desire than to know thoroughly all that can be said against what ,i take for truth40 ,clarke1 however1 was not to be drawn4 ,the incident is thus referred to by ,whiston1 in his ,memoirs of ,clarke4 8,mr4 ,berkeley10 he says1 8published in #agaj1 at ,dublin1 the metaphysical notion1 that matter was not a real thing7#ggh72 nay1 that the common opinion of its reality was groundless1 if not ridiculous4 ,he was pleased to send ,mr4 ,clarke and myself each of us a book4 ,after we had perused it1 ,i went to ,mr4 ,clarke to discourse with him about it1 to this effect1 that ,i1 being not a metaphysician1 was not able to answer ,mr4 ,berkeley's subtle premises1 though ,i did not believe his absurd conclusions4 ,i therefore desired that he1 who was deep in such subtleties1 but did not appear to believe ,mr4 ,berkeley's conclusion1 would answer him4 ,which task he declined40 ,what ,clarke's criticism of ,berkeley might have been is suggested by the following sentences in his ,remarks on ,human ,liberty1 published seven years after this correspondence3 8,the case as to the proof of our free agency is exactly the same as in that notable question1 whether the material world exists or no8 ,there is no demonstration of it from experience4 ,there always remains a bare possibility that the ,supreme ,being may have so framed my mind1 that ,i shall always be necessarily deceived in every one of my perceptions as in a dream--though possibly there be no material world1 nor any other creature existing besides myself4 ,and yet no man in his senses argues from thence1 that experience is no proof to us of the existence of things4 ,the bare physical possibility too of our being so framed by the ,author of ,nature as to be unavoidably deceived in this matter by every experience of every action we perform1 is no more any ground to doubt the truth of our liberty1 than the bare natural possibility of our being all our lifetime in a dream1 deceived in our natural belief of the existence of the material world1 is any just ground to doubt the reality of its existence40 ,berkeley would hardly have accepted this analogy4 ,does the conception of a material world being dependent on percipient mind for its reality imply deception on the part of the 8,supreme ,being08 8,dreams10 in ordinary language1 may signify illusory fancies during sleep1 and so understood the term is misapplied to a universally mind-dependent universe with its steady natural order4 ,berkeley disclaims emphatically any doubt of the reality of the sensible world1 and professes only to shew in what its reality consists1 or its dependence upon percipient life as the indispensable realising factor4 ,to suppose that we can be 8necessarily deceived in every one of our perceptions0 is to interpret the universe atheistically1 and virtually obliges us in final nescience to acknowledge that it is wholly uninterpretable2 so that experience is impossible1 because throughout unintelligible4 ,the moral trustworthiness or perfect goodness of the ,universal ,power is ,i suppose the fundamental postulate of science and human life4 ,if all our temporal experience can be called a dream it must at any rate be a dream of the sort supposed by ,leibniz4 8,nullo argumento absolute demonstrari potest1 dari corpora2 nec quidquam prohibet somnia qudam bene ordinata menti nostr1 objecta esse1 qu a nobis vera judicentur1 et ob consensum inter se quoad usum veris equivalent7#ggi740 ,the three ,dialogues discuss what ,berkeley regarded as the most plausible ,objections1 popular and philosophical1 to his account of living ,mind or ,spirit1 as the indispensable factor and final cause of the reality of the material world4 ,the principal aim of the ,first ,dialogue is to illustrate the contradictory or unmeaning character and sceptical tendency of the common philosophical opinion--that we perceive in sense a material world which is real only in as far as it can exist in absolute independence of perceiving mind4 ,the impossibility of any of the qualities in which ,matter is manifested to man--the primary qualities not less than the secondary--having real existence in a mindless or unspiritual universe is argued and illustrated in detail4 ,abstract ,matter1 unrealised in terms of percipient life1 is meaningless1 and the material world becomes real only in and through living perception4 ,and ,matter1 as an abstract substance without qualities1 cannot1 without a contradiction1 it is also argued1 be presented or represented1 in sense4 ,what is called matter is thus melted in a spiritual solution1 from which it issues the flexible and intelligible medium of intercourse for spiritual beings such as men are2 whose faculties moreover are educated in interpreting the cosmical order of the phenomena presented to their senses4 ,the ,second ,dialogue is in the first place directed against modifications of the scholastic account of ,matter1 which attributes our knowledge of it to inference1 founded on sense-ideas assumed to be representative1 or not presentative of the reality4 ,the advocates of ,matter independent and supreme1 are here assailed in their various conjectures--that this ,matter may be the active ,cause1 or the ,instrument1 or the ,occasion of our sense-experience2 or that it is an ,unknowable ,something somehow connected with that experience4 ,it is argued in this and in the preceding ,dialogue1 by ,philonous 7who personates ,berkeley71 that unrealised ,matter--intending by that term either a qualified substance1 or a ,something of which we cannot affirm anything--is not merely unproved1 but a proved impossibility3 it must mean nothing1 or it must mean a contradiction1 which comes to the same thing4 ,it is not perceived2 nor can it be suggested by what we perceive2 nor demonstrated by reasoning2 nor believed in as an article in the fundamental faith of intuitive reason4 ,the only consistent theory of the universe accordingly implies that concrete realities must all be either 7a7 phenomena presented to the senses1 or else 7b7 active spirits percipient of presented phenomena4 ,and neither of these two sorts of concrete realities is strictly speaking independent of the other2 although the latter1 identical amid the variations of the sensuous phenomena1 are deeper and more real than the mere data of the senses4 ,the ,second ,dialogue ends by substituting1 as concrete and intelligible ,realism1 the universal and constant dependence of the material world upon active living ,spirit1 in place of the abstract hypothetical and unintelligible ,realism1 which defends ,matter unrealised in percipient life1 as the type of reality4 ,in the ,third ,dialogue plausible objections to this conception of what the reality of the material world means are discussed4 ,is it said that the new conception is sceptical1 and ,berkeley another ,protagoras1 on account of it8 ,his answer is1 that the reality of sensible things1 as far as man can in any way be concerned with them1 does not consist in what cannot be perceived1 suggested1 demonstrated1 or even conceived1 but in phenomena actually seen and touched1 and in the working faith that future sense-experience may be anticipated by the analogies of present sense-experience4 ,but is not this negation of the ,matter that is assumed to be real and independent of ,spirit1 an unproved conjecture8 ,it is answered1 that the affirmation of this abstract matter is itself a mere conjecture1 and one self-convicted by its implied contradictions1 while its negation is only a simple falling back on the facts of experience1 without any attempt to explain them4 ,again1 is it objected that the reality of sensible things involves their continued reality during intervals of our perception of them8 ,it is answered1 that sensible things are indeed permanently dependent on ,mind1 but not on this1 that1 or the other finite embodied spirit4 ,is it further alleged that the reality of ,spirit or ,mind is open to all the objections against independent ,matter2 and that1 if we deny this ,matter1 we must in consistency allow that ,spirit can be only a succession of isolated feelings8 ,the answer is1 that there is no parity between self-conscious ,spirit1 and ,matter out of all relation to any ,spirit4 ,we find1 in memory1 our own personality and identity2 that we are not our ideas1 8but somewhat else0--a thinking1 active principle1 that perceives1 knows1 wills1 and operates about ideas1 and that is revealed as continuously real4 ,each person is conscious of himself2 and may reasonably infer the existence of other self-conscious persons1 more or less like what he is conscious of in himself4 ,a universe of self-conscious persons1 with their common sensuous experiences all under cosmical order1 is not open to the contradictions involved in a pretended universe of ,matter1 independent of percipient realising ,spirit4 ,is it still said that sane people cannot help distinguishing between the real existence of a thing and its being perceived8 ,it is answered1 that all they are entitled to mean is1 to distinguish between being perceived exclusively by me1 and being independent of the perception of all sentient or conscious beings4 ,does an objector complain that this ideal realism dissolves the distinction between facts and fancies8 ,he is reminded of the meaning of the word idea4 ,that term is not limited by ,berkeley to chimeras of fancy3 it is applied also to the objective phenomena of our sense-experience4 ,is the supposition that ,spirit is the only real ,cause of all changes in nature declaimed against as baseless8 ,it is answered1 that the supposition of unthinking ,power at the heart of the cosmos of sensible phenomena is absurd4 ,is the negation of ,abstract ,matter repugnant to the common belief of mankind8 ,it is argued in reply1 that this unrealised ,matter is foreign to common belief1 which is incapable of even entertaining the conception2 and which only requires to reflect upon what it does entertain to be satisfied with a relative or ideal reality for sensible things4 ,but1 if sensible things are the real things1 the real moon1 for instance1 it is alleged1 can be only a foot in diameter4 ,it is maintained1 in opposition to this1 that the term real moon is applied only to what is an inference from the moon1 one foot in diameter1 which we immediately perceive2 and that the former is a part of our previsive or mediate inference1 due to what is perceived4 ,the dispute1 after all1 is merely verbal1 it is next objected2 and1 since all parties refer the data of the senses and the things which they compose to a ,power external to each finite percipient1 why not call that ,power1 whatever it may be1 ,matter1 and not ,spirit8 ,the reply is1 that this would be an absurd misapplication of language4 ,but may we not1 it is next suggested1 assume the possibility of a third nature--neither idea nor ,spirit8 ,not1 replies ,philonous1 if we are to keep to the rule of having meaning in the words we use4 ,we know what is meant by a spirit1 for each of us has immediate experience of one2 and we know what is meant by sense-ideas and sensible things1 for we have immediate and mediate experience of them4 ,but we have no immediate1 and therefore can have no mediate1 experience of what is neither perceived by our senses1 nor realised in inward consciousness3 moreover1 8entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem40 ,again1 this conception of the realities implies1 it is said1 imperfection1 because sentient experience1 in ,god4 ,this objection1 it is answered1 implies a confusion between being actually sentient and merely conceiving sensations1 and employing them1 as ,god does1 as signs for expressing ,his conceptions to our minds4 ,further1 the negation of independent powerful ,matter seems to annihilate the explanations of physical phenomena given by natural philosophers4 ,but1 to be assured that it does not1 we have only to recollect what physical explanation means--that it is the reference of an apparently irregular phenomenon to some acknowledged general rule of co-existence or succession among sense-ideas4 ,it is interpretation of sense-signs4 ,is the proposed ideal ,realism summarily condemned as a novelty8 ,it can be answered1 that all discoveries are novelties at first2 and moreover that this one is not so much a novelty as a deeper interpretation of the common faith4 ,yet it seems1 at any rate1 it is said1 to change real things into mere ideas4 ,here consider on the contrary what we mean when we speak of sensible things as real4 ,the changing appearances of which we are percipient in sense1 united objectively in their cosmical order1 are what is truly meant by the realities of sense4 ,but this reality is inconsistent with the continued identity of material things1 it is complained1 and also with the fact that different persons can be percipient of the same thing4 ,not so1 ,berkeley explains1 when we attend to the true meaning of the word same1 and dismiss from our thoughts a supposed abstract idea of identity which is nonsensical4 ,but some may exclaim against the supposition that the material world exists in mind1 regarding this as an implied assertion that mind is extended1 and therefore material4 ,this proceeds1 it is replied1 on forgetfulness of what 8existence in mind0 means4 ,it is intended to express the fact that matter is real in being an objective appearance of which a living mind is sensible4 ,lastly1 is not the ,mosaic account of the creation of ,matter inconsistent with the perpetual dependence of ,matter for its reality upon percipient ,spirit8 ,it is answered that the conception of creation being dependent on the existence of finite minds is in perfect harmony with the ,mosaic account3 it is what is seen and felt1 not what is unseen and unfelt1 that is created4 ,the ,third ,dialogue closes with a representation of the new principle regarding ,matter being the harmony of two apparently discordant propositions--the one-sided proposition of ordinary common sense2 and the one-sided proposition of the philosophers4 ,it agrees with the mass of mankind in holding that the material world is actually presented to our senses1 and with the philosophers in holding that this same material world is realised only in and through the percipient experience of living ,spirit4 ,most of the objections to ,berkeley's conception of ,matter which have been urged in the last century and a half1 by its ,british1 ,french1 and ,german critics1 are discussed by anticipation in these ,dialogues4 ,the history of objections is very much a history of misconceptions4 ,conceived or misconceived1 it has tacitly simplified and purified the methods of physical science1 especially in ,britain and ,france4 ,the first elaborate criticism of ,berkeley by a ,british author is found in ,andrew ,baxter's ,inquiry into the ,nature of the ,human ,soul1 published in #agce1 in the section entitled 8,dean ,berkeley's ,scheme against the existence of ,matter examined1 and shewn to be inconclusive40 ,baxter alleges that the new doctrine tends to encourage scepticism4 ,to deny ,matter1 for the reasons given1 involves1 according to this critic1 denial of mind1 and so a universal doubt4 ,accordingly1 a few years later1 ,hume sought1 in his ,treatise of ,human ,nature1 to work out ,berkeley's negation of abstract ,matter into sceptical phenomenalism--against which ,berkeley sought to guard by anticipation1 in a remarkable passage introduced in his last edition of these ,dialogues4 ,in ,scotland the writings of ,reid1 ,beattie1 ,oswald1 ,dugald ,stewart1 ,thomas ,brown1 and ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton form a magazine of objections4 ,reid--who curiously seeks to refute ,berkeley by refuting1 not more clearly than ,berkeley had done before him1 the hypothesis of a wholly representative sense-perception--urges the spontaneous belief or common sense of mankind1 which obliges us all to recognise a direct presentation of the external material world to our senses4 ,he overlooks what with ,berkeley is the only question in debate1 namely1 the meaning of the term external2 for1 ,reid and ,berkeley are agreed in holding to the reality of a world regulated independently of the will of finite percipients1 and is sufficiently objective to be a medium of social intercourse4 ,with ,berkeley1 as with ,reid1 this is practically self-evident4 ,the same objection1 more scientifically defined--that we have a natural belief in the existence of ,matter1 and in our own immediate perception of its qualities--is ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's assumption against ,berkeley2 but ,hamilton does not explain the reality thus claimed for it4 8,men naturally believe10 he says1 8that they themselves exist--because they are conscious of a ,self or ,ego2 they believe that something different from themselves exists--because they believe that they are conscious of this ,not-self or ,non-ego40 7,discussions1 p4 #aic47 ,now1 the existence of a ,power that is independent of each finite ,ego is at the root of ,berkeley's principles4 ,according to ,berkeley and ,hamilton alike1 we are immediately percipient of solid and extended phenomena2 but with ,berkeley the phenomena are dependent on1 at the same time that they are 8entirely distinct0 from1 the percipient4 ,the ,divine and finite spirits1 signified by the phenomena that are presented to our senses in cosmical order1 form ,berkeley's external world4 ,that ,berkeley sows the seeds of ,universal ,scepticism2 that his conception of ,matter involves the ,panegoism or ,solipsism which leaves me in absolute solitude2 that his is virtually a system of ,pantheism1 inconsistent with personal individuality and moral responsibility--these are probably the three most comprehensive objections that have been alleged against it4 ,they are in a measure due to ,berkeley's imperfect criticism of first principles1 in his dread of a departure from the concrete data of experience in quest of empty abstractions4 ,in ,england and ,france1 ,berkeley's criticism of ,matter1 taken however only on its negative side1 received a countenance denied to it in ,germany4 ,hartley and ,priestley shew signs of affinity with ,berkeley4 ,also an anonymous ,essay on the ,nature and ,existence of the ,material ,world1 dedicated to ,dr4 ,priestley and ,dr4 ,price1 which appeared in #agha1 is an argument1 on empirical grounds1 which virtually makes the data of the senses at last a chaos of isolated sensations4 ,the author of the ,essay is said to have been a certain ,russell1 who died in the ,west ,indies in the end of the eighteenth century4 ,a tendency towards ,berkeley's negations1 but apart from his synthetic principles1 appears in ,james ,mill and ,j4,s4 ,mill4 ,so too with ,voltaire and the ,encyclopedists4 ,the ,dialogues between ,hylas and ,philonous were published in ,london in #agac1 8printed by ,g4 ,james1 for ,henry ,clements1 at the ,half-,moon1 in ,st4 ,paul's churchyard10 unlike the ,essay on ,vision and the ,principles1 which first appeared in ,dublin4 ,the second edition1 which is simply a reprint1 issued in #agbe1 8printed for ,william and ,john ,innys1 at the ,west ,end of ,st4 ,paul's40 ,a third1 the last in the author's lifetime1 8printed by ,jacob ,tonson10 which contains some important additions1 was published in #agcd1 conjointly with a new edition of the ,principles4 ,the ,dialogues were reprinted in #aggf1 in the same volume with the edition of the ,principles1 with ,remarks4 ,the ,dialogues have been translated into ,french and ,german4 ,the ,french version appeared at ,amsterdam in #agej4 ,the translator's name is not given1 but it is attributed to the ,abb ,jean ,paul de ,gua de ,malves7#ghj71 by ,barbier1 in his ,dictionnaire des ,ouvrages anonymes et pseudonymes1 tom4 i4 p4 #bhc4 ,it contains a ,prefatory ,note by the translator1 with three curious vignettes 7given in the note below7 meant to symbolise the leading thought in each ,dialogue7#gha74 ,a ,german translation1 by ,john ,christopher ,eschenbach1 ,professor of ,philosophy in ,rostock1 was published at ,rostock in #agef4 ,it forms the larger part of a volume entitled ,sammlung der vornehmsten ,schriftsteller die die ,wirklichkeit ihres eignen ,krpers und der ganzen ,krperwelt lugnen4 ,this professed ,collection of the most eminent authors who are supposed to deny the reality of their own bodies and of the whole material world1 consists of ,berkeley's ,dialogues1 and ,arthur ,collier's ,clavis ,universalis1 or ,demonstration of the ,non-existence or ,impossibility of an ,external ,world4 ,the volume contains some annotations1 and an ,appendix in which a counter-demonstration of the existence of ,matter is attempted4 ,eschenbach's principal argument is indirect1 and of the nature of a reductio ad absurdum4 ,he argues 7as others have done7 that the reasons produced against the independent reality of ,matter are equally conclusive against the independent reality of ,spirit4 ,an interesting circumstance connected with the ,dialogues between ,hylas and ,philonous was the appearance1 also in #agac1 of the ,clavis ,universalis1 or demonstration of the impossibility of ,matter1 of ,arthur ,collier1 in which the merely ideal existence of the sensible world is maintained4 ,the production1 simultaneously1 without concert1 of conceptions of the material world which verbally at least have much in common1 is a curious coincidence4 ,it shews that the intellectual atmosphere of the ,lockian epoch in ,england contained elements favourable to a reconsideration of the ultimate meaning of ,matter4 ,they are both the genuine produce of the age of ,locke and ,malebranche4 ,neither ,berkeley nor ,collier were1 when they published their books1 familiar with ancient ,greek speculations2 those of modern ,germany had only begun to loom in the distance4 ,absolute ,idealism1 the ,panphenomenalism of ,auguste ,comte1 and the modern evolutionary conception of nature1 have changed the conditions under which the universal problem is studied1 and are making intelligible to this generation a manner of conceiving the ,universe which1 for nearly a century and a half1 the ,british and ,french critics of ,berkeley were unable to entertain4 ,berkeley's ,principles appeared three years before the ,clavis ,universalis4 ,yet ,collier tells us that it was 8after a ten years' pause and deliberation10 that1 8rather than the world should finish its course without once offering to inquire in what manner it exists10 he had 8resolved to put himself upon the trial of the common reader1 without pretending to any better art of gaining him than dry reason and metaphysical demonstration40 ,mr4 ,benson1 his biographer1 says that it was in #agjc1 at the age of twenty-three1 that ,collier came to the conclusion that 8there is no such thing as an external world02 and he attributes the premises from which ,collier drew this conclusion to his neighbour1 ,john ,norris4 ,among ,collier's ,,mss41 there remains the outline of an essay1 in three chapters1 dated ,january1 #agjh1 on the non-externality of the visible world4 ,there are several coincidences between ,berkeley and ,collier4 ,berkeley virtually presented his new theory of ,vision as the first instalment of his explanation of the ,reality of ,matter4 ,the first of the two ,parts into which ,collier's ,clavis is divided consists of proofs that the ,visible ,world is not1 and cannot be1 external4 ,berkeley1 in the ,principles and the ,dialogues1 explains the reality of ,matter4 ,in like manner the ,second ,part of the ,clavis consists of reasonings in proof of the impossibility of an external world independent of ,spirit4 ,finally1 in his full-blown theory1 as well as in its visual germ1 ,berkeley takes for granted1 as intuitively known1 the existence of sensible ,matter2 meaning by this1 its relative existence1 or dependence on living ,mind4 ,the third proposition of ,collier's system asserts the real existence of visible matter in particular1 and of sensible matter in general4 ,the invisibility of distances1 as well as of real magnitudes and situations1 and their suggestion by interpretation of visual symbols1 propositions which occupy so large a space in ,berkeley's ,theory of ,vision1 have no counterpart in ,collier4 ,his proof of the non-externality of the visible world consists of an induction of instances of visible objects that are allowed by all not to be external1 although they seem to be as much so as any that are called external4 ,his ,demonstration consists of nine proofs1 which may be compared with the reasonings and analyses of ,berkeley4 ,collier's ,demonstration concludes with answers to objections1 and an application of his account of the material world to the refutation of the ,roman doctrine of the substantial existence of ,christ's body in the ,eucharist4 ,the universal sense-symbolism of ,berkeley1 and his pervading recognition of the distinction between physical or symbolical1 and efficient or originative causation1 are wanting in the narrow reasonings of ,collier4 ,berkeley's more comprehensive philosophy1 with its human sympathies and beauty of style1 is now recognised as a striking expression and partial solution of fundamental problems1 while ,collier is condemned to the obscurity of the ,schools7#ghb74 ,dedication ,,to ,,the ,,right ,,honourable ,,the ,,lord ,,berkeley ,,of ,,stratton7#ghc71 ,,master ,,of ,,the ,,rolls ,,in ,,the ,,kingdom ,,of ,,ireland1 ,,chancellor ,,of ,,the ,,duchy ,,of ,,lancaster1 ,,and ,,one ,,of ,,the ,,lords ,,of ,,her ,,majesty',s ,,most ,,honourable ,,privy ,,council4 ,,my ,,lord1 ,the virtue1 learning1 and good sense which are acknowledged to distinguish your character1 would tempt me to indulge myself the pleasure men naturally take in giving applause to those whom they esteem and honour3 and it should seem of importance to the subjects of ,great ,britain that they knew the eminent share you enjoy in the favour of your sovereign1 and the honours she has conferred upon you1 have not been owing to any application from your lordship1 but entirely to her majesty's own thought1 arising from a sense of your personal merit1 and an inclination to reward it4 ,but1 as your name is prefixed to this treatise with an intention to do honour to myself alone1 ,i shall only say that ,i am encouraged by the favour you have treated me with to address these papers to your lordship4 ,and ,i was the more ambitious of doing this1 because a ,philosophical ,treatise could not so properly be addressed to any one as to a person of your lordship's character1 who1 to your other valuable distinctions1 have added the knowledge and relish of ,philosophy4 ,i am1 with the greatest respect1 ,my ,lord1 ,your lordship's most obedient and most humble servant1 ,,george ,,berkeley4 ,the ,preface7#ghd7 ,though it seems the general opinion of the world1 no less than the design of nature and providence1 that the end of speculation be ,practice1 or the improvement and regulation of our lives and actions2 yet those who are most addicted to speculative studies1 seem as generally of another mind4 ,and indeed if we consider the pains that have been taken to perplex the plainest things1 that distrust of the senses1 those doubts and scruples1 those abstractions and refinements that occur in the very entrance of the sciences2 it will not seem strange that men of leisure and curiosity should lay themselves out in fruitless disquisitions1 without descending to the practical parts of life1 or informing themselves in the more necessary and important parts of knowledge4 ,upon the common principles of philosophers1 we are not assured of the existence of things from their being perceived4 ,and we are taught to distinguish their real nature from that which falls under our senses4 ,hence arise scepticism and paradoxes4 ,it is not enough that we see and feel1 that we taste and smell a thing3 its true nature1 its absolute external entity1 is still concealed4 ,for1 though it be the fiction of our own brain1 we have made it inaccessible to all our faculties4 ,sense is fallacious1 reason defective4 ,we spend our lives in doubting of those things which other men evidently know1 and believing those things which they laugh at and despise4 ,in order1 therefore1 to divert the busy mind of man from vain researches1 it seemed necessary to inquire into the source of its perplexities2 and1 if possible1 to lay down such ,principles as1 by an easy solution of them1 together with their own native evidence1 may at once recommend themselves for genuine to the mind1 and rescue it from those endless pursuits it is engaged in4 ,which1 with a plain demonstration of the ,immediate ,providence of an all-seeing ,god1 and the natural ,immortality of the soul1 should seem the readiest preparation1 as well as the strongest motive1 to the study and practice of virtue4 ,this design ,i proposed in the ,first ,part of a treatise concerning the ,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 published in the year #agaj4 ,but1 before ,i proceed to publish the ,second ,part7#ghe71 ,i thought it requisite to treat more clearly and fully of certain ,principles laid down in the ,first1 and to place them in a new light4 ,which is the business of the following ,dialogues4 ,in this ,treatise1 which does not presuppose in the reader any knowledge of what was contained in the former1 it has been my aim to introduce the notions ,i advance into the mind in the most easy and familiar manner2 especially because they carry with them a great opposition to the prejudices of philosophers1 which have so far prevailed against the common sense and natural notions of mankind4 ,if the ,principles which ,i here endeavour to propagate are admitted for true1 the consequences which1 ,i think1 evidently flow from thence are1 that ,atheism and ,scepticism will be utterly destroyed1 many intricate points made plain1 great difficulties solved1 several useless parts of science retrenched1 speculation referred to practice1 and men reduced from paradoxes to common sense4 ,and although it may1 perhaps1 seem an uneasy reflexion to some1 that when they have taken a circuit through so many refined and unvulgar notions1 they should at last come to think like other men2 yet1 methinks1 this return to the simple dictates of nature1 after having wandered through the wild mazes of philosophy1 is not unpleasant4 ,it is like coming home from a long voyage3 a man reflects with pleasure on the many difficulties and perplexities he has passed through1 sets his heart at ease1 and enjoys himself with more satisfaction for the future4 ,as it was my intention to convince ,sceptics and ,infidels by reason1 so it has been my endeavour strictly to observe the most rigid laws of reasoning4 ,and1 to an impartial reader1 ,i hope it will be manifest that the sublime notion of a ,god1 and the comfortable expectation of ,immortality1 do naturally arise from a close and methodical application of thought3 whatever may be the result of that loose1 rambling way1 not altogether improperly termed ,free-thinking by certain libertines in thought1 who can no more endure the restraints of logic than those of religion or government4 ,it will perhaps be objected to my design that1 so far as it tends to ease the mind of difficult and useless inquiries1 it can affect only a few speculative persons4 ,but if1 by their speculations rightly placed1 the study of morality and the law of nature were brought more into fashion among men of parts and genius1 the discouragements that draw to ,scepticism removed1 the measures of right and wrong accurately defined1 and the principles of ,natural ,religion reduced into regular systems1 as artfully disposed and clearly connected as those of some other sciences2 there are grounds to think these effects would not only have a gradual influence in repairing the too much defaced sense of virtue in the world1 but also1 by shewing that such parts of revelation as lie within the reach of human inquiry are most agreeable to right reason1 would dispose all prudent1 unprejudiced persons to a modest and wary treatment of those sacred mysteries which are above the comprehension of our faculties4 ,it remains that ,i desire the reader to withhold his censure of these ,dialogues till he has read them through4 ,otherwise1 he may lay them aside in a mistake of their design1 or on account of difficulties or objections which he would find answered in the sequel4 ,a ,treatise of this nature would require to be once read over coherently1 in order to comprehend its design1 the proofs1 solution of difficulties1 and the connexion and disposition of its parts4 ,if it be thought to deserve a second reading1 this1 ,i imagine1 will make the entire scheme very plain4 ,especially if recourse be had to an ,essay ,i wrote some years since upon ,vision1 and the ,treatise concerning the ,principles of ,human ,knowledge2 wherein divers notions advanced in these ,dialogues are farther pursued1 or placed in different lights1 and other points handled which naturally tend to confirm and illustrate them4 ,the ,first ,dialogue ,philonous4 ,good morrow1 ,hylas3 ,i did not expect to find you abroad so early4 ,hylas4 ,it is indeed something unusual2 but my thoughts were so taken up with a subject ,i was discoursing of last night1 that finding ,i could not sleep1 ,i resolved to rise and take a turn in the garden4 ,phil4 ,it happened well1 to let you see what innocent and agreeable pleasures you lose every morning4 ,can there be a pleasanter time of the day1 or a more delightful season of the year8 ,that purple sky1 those wild but sweet notes of birds1 the fragrant bloom upon the trees and flowers1 the gentle influence of the rising sun1 these and a thousand nameless beauties of nature inspire the soul with secret transports2 its faculties too being at this time fresh and lively1 are fit for those meditations1 which the solitude of a garden and tranquillity of the morning naturally dispose us to4 ,but ,i am afraid ,i interrupt your thoughts3 for you seemed very intent on something4 ,hyl4 ,it is true1 ,i was1 and shall be obliged to you if you will permit me to go on in the same vein2 not that ,i would by any means deprive myself of your company1 for my thoughts always flow more easily in conversation with a friend1 than when ,i am alone3 but my request is1 that you would suffer me to impart my reflexions to you4 ,phil4 ,with all my heart1 it is what ,i should have requested myself if you had not prevented me4 ,hyl4 ,i was considering the odd fate of those men who have in all ages1 through an affectation of being distinguished from the vulgar1 or some unaccountable turn of thought1 pretended either to believe nothing at all1 or to believe the most extravagant things in the world4 ,this however might be borne1 if their paradoxes and scepticism did not draw after them some consequences of general disadvantage to mankind4 ,but the mischief lieth here2 that when men of less leisure see them who are supposed to have spent their whole time in the pursuits of knowledge professing an entire ignorance of all things1 or advancing such notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly received principles1 they will be tempted to entertain suspicions concerning the most important truths1 which they had hitherto held sacred and unquestionable7#ghf74 ,phil4 ,i entirely agree with you1 as to the ill tendency of the affected doubts of some philosophers1 and fantastical conceits of others4 ,i am even so far gone of late in this way of thinking1 that ,i have quitted several of the sublime notions ,i had got in their schools for vulgar opinions4 ,and ,i give it you on my word2 since this revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature and common sense7#ghg71 ,i find my understanding strangely enlightened1 so that ,i can now easily comprehend a great many things which before were all mystery and riddle4 ,hyl4 ,i am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts ,i heard of you4 ,phil4 ,pray1 what were those8 ,hyl4 ,you were represented1 in last night's conversation1 as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered into the mind of man1 to wit1 that there is no such thing as material substance in the world4 ,phil4 ,that there is no such thing as what philosophers call material substance1 ,i am seriously persuaded3 but1 if ,i were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this1 ,i should then have the same reason to renounce this that ,i imagine ,i have now to reject the contrary opinion4 ,hyl4 ,what6 can anything be more fantastical1 more repugnant to ,common ,sense1 or a more manifest piece of ,scepticism1 than to believe there is no such thing as matter8 ,phil4 ,softly1 good ,hylas4 ,what if it should prove that you1 who hold there is1 are1 by virtue of that opinion1 a greater sceptic1 and maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to ,common ,sense1 than ,i who believe no such thing8 ,hyl4 ,you may as soon persuade me1 the part is greater than the whole1 as that1 in order to avoid absurdity and ,scepticism1 ,i should ever be obliged to give up my opinion in this point4 ,phil4 ,well then1 are you content to admit that opinion for true1 which upon examination shall appear most agreeable to ,common ,sense1 and remote from ,scepticism8 ,hyl4 ,with all my heart4 ,since you are for raising disputes about the plainest things in nature1 ,i am content for once to hear what you have to say4 ,phil4 ,pray1 ,hylas1 what do you mean by a sceptic8 ,hyl4 ,i mean what all men mean--one that doubts of everything4 ,phil4 ,he then who entertains no doubt concerning some particular point1 with regard to that point cannot be thought a sceptic4 ,hyl4 ,i agree with you4 ,phil4 ,whether doth doubting consist in embracing the affirmative or negative side of a question8 ,hyl4 ,in neither2 for whoever understands ,english cannot but know that doubting signifies a suspense between both4 ,phil4 ,he then that denies any point1 can no more be said to doubt of it1 than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of assurance4 ,hyl4 ,true4 ,phil4 ,and1 consequently1 for such his denial is no more to be esteemed a sceptic than the other4 ,hyl4 ,i acknowledge it4 ,phil4 ,how cometh it to pass then1 ,hylas1 that you pronounce me a sceptic1 because ,i deny what you affirm1 to wit1 the existence of ,matter8 ,since1 for aught you can tell1 ,i am as peremptory in my denial1 as you in your affirmation4 ,hyl4 ,hold1 ,philonous1 ,i have been a little out in my definition2 but every false step a man makes in discourse is not to be insisted on4 ,i said indeed that a sceptic was one who doubted of everything2 but ,i should have added1 or who denies the reality and truth of things4 ,phil4 ,what things8 ,do you mean the principles and theorems of sciences8 ,but these you know are universal intellectual notions1 and consequently independent of ,matter4 ,the denial therefore of this doth not imply the denying them7#ghh74 ,hyl4 ,i grant it4 ,but are there no other things8 ,what think you of distrusting the senses1 of denying the real existence of sensible things1 or pretending to know nothing of them4 ,is not this sufficient to denominate a man a sceptic8 ,phil4 ,shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies the reality of sensible things1 or professes the greatest ignorance of them2 since1 if ,i take you rightly1 he is to be esteemed the greatest sceptic8 ,hyl4 ,that is what ,i desire4 ,phil4 ,what mean you by ,sensible ,things8 ,hyl4 ,those things which are perceived by the senses4 ,can you imagine that ,i mean anything else8 ,phil4 ,pardon me1 ,hylas1 if ,i am desirous clearly to apprehend your notions1 since this may much shorten our inquiry4 ,suffer me then to ask you this farther question4 ,are those things only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately8 ,or1 may those things properly be said to be sensible which are perceived mediately1 or not without the intervention of others8 ,hyl4 ,i do not sufficiently understand you4 ,phil4 ,in reading a book1 what ,i immediately perceive are the letters2 but mediately1 or by means of these1 are suggested to my mind the notions of ,god1 virtue1 truth1 c4 ,now1 that the letters are truly sensible things1 or perceived by sense1 there is no doubt3 but ,i would know whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too4 ,hyl4 ,no1 certainly3 it were absurd to think ,god or virtue sensible things2 though they may be signified and suggested to the mind by sensible marks1 with which they have an arbitrary connexion4 ,phil4 ,it seems then1 that by sensible things you mean those only which can be perceived immediately by sense8 ,hyl4 ,right4 ,phil4 ,doth it not follow from this1 that though ,i see one part of the sky red1 and another blue1 and that my reason doth thence evidently conclude there must be some cause of that diversity of colours1 yet that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing1 or perceived by the sense of seeing8 ,hyl4 ,it doth4 ,phil4 ,in like manner1 though ,i hear variety of sounds1 yet ,i cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds8 ,hyl4 ,you cannot4 ,phil4 ,and when by my touch ,i perceive a thing to be hot and heavy1 ,i cannot say1 with any truth or propriety1 that ,i feel the cause of its heat or weight8 ,hyl4 ,to prevent any more questions of this kind1 ,i tell you once for all1 that by sensible things ,i mean those only which are perceived by sense2 and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive immediately3 for they make no inferences4 ,the deducing therefore of causes or occasions from effects and appearances1 which alone are perceived by sense1 entirely relates to reason7#ghi74 ,phil4 ,this point then is agreed between us--,that sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense4 ,you will farther inform me1 whether we immediately perceive by sight anything beside light1 and colours1 and figures7#gij72 or by hearing1 anything but sounds2 by the palate1 anything beside tastes2 by the smell1 beside odours2 or by the touch1 more than tangible qualities4 ,hyl4 ,we do not4 ,phil4 ,it seems1 therefore1 that if you take away all sensible qualities1 there remains nothing sensible8 ,hyl4 ,i grant it4 ,phil4 ,sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many sensible qualities1 or combinations of sensible qualities8 ,hyl4 ,nothing else4 ,phil4 ,heat then is a sensible thing8 ,hyl4 ,certainly4 ,phil4 ,doth the reality of sensible things consist in being perceived8 or1 is it something distinct from their being perceived1 and that bears no relation to the mind8 ,hyl4 ,to exist is one thing1 and to be perceived is another4 ,phil4 ,i speak with regard to sensible things only4 ,and of these ,i ask1 whether by their real existence you mean a subsistence exterior to the mind1 and distinct from their being perceived8 ,hyl4 ,i mean a real absolute being1 distinct from1 and without any relation to1 their being perceived4 ,phil4 ,heat therefore1 if it be allowed a real being1 must exist without the mind7#gia78 ,hyl4 ,it must4 ,phil4 ,tell me1 ,hylas1 is this real existence equally compatible to all degrees of heat1 which we perceive2 or is there any reason why we should attribute it to some1 and deny it to others8 ,and if there be1 pray let me know that reason4 ,hyl4 ,whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense1 we may be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it4 ,phil4 ,what6 the greatest as well as the least8 ,hyl4 ,i tell you1 the reason is plainly the same in respect of both4 ,they are both perceived by sense2 nay1 the greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived2 and consequently1 if there is any difference1 we are more certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a lesser degree4 ,phil4 ,but is not the most vehement and intense degree of heat a very great pain8 ,hyl4 ,no one can deny it4 ,phil4 ,and is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or pleasure8 ,hyl4 ,no1 certainly4 ,phil4 ,is your material substance a senseless being1 or a being endowed with sense and perception8 ,hyl4 ,it is senseless without doubt4 ,phil4 ,it cannot therefore be the subject of pain8 ,hyl4 ,by no means4 ,phil4 ,nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by sense1 since you acknowledge this to be no small pain8 ,hyl4 ,i grant it4 ,phil4 ,what shall we say then of your external object2 is it a material ,substance1 or no8 ,hyl4 ,it is a material substance with the sensible qualities inhering in it4 ,phil4 ,how then can a great heat exist in it1 since you own it cannot in a material substance8 ,i desire you would clear this point4 ,hyl4 ,hold1 ,philonous1 ,i fear ,i was out in yielding intense heat to be a pain4 ,it should seem rather1 that pain is something distinct from heat1 and the consequence or effect of it4 ,phil4 ,upon putting your hand near the fire1 do you perceive one simple uniform sensation1 or two distinct sensations8 ,hyl4 ,but one simple sensation4 ,phil4 ,is not the heat immediately perceived8 ,hyl4 ,it is4 ,phil4 ,and the pain8 ,hyl4 ,true4 ,phil4 ,seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived at the same time1 and the fire affects you only with one simple or uncompounded idea1 it follows that this same simple idea is both the intense heat immediately perceived1 and the pain2 and1 consequently1 that the intense heat immediately perceived is nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain4 ,hyl4 ,it seems so4 ,phil4 ,again1 try in your thoughts1 ,hylas1 if you can conceive a vehement sensation to be without pain or pleasure4 ,hyl4 ,i cannot4 ,phil4 ,or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible pain or pleasure in general1 abstracted from every particular idea of heat1 cold1 tastes1 smells8 c4 ,hyl4--,i do not find that ,i can4 ,phil4 ,doth it not therefore follow1 that sensible pain is nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas1 in an intense degree8 ,hyl4 ,it is undeniable2 and1 to speak the truth1 ,i begin to suspect a very great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving it4 ,phil4 ,what6 are you then in that sceptical state of suspense1 between affirming and denying8 ,hyl4 ,i think ,i may be positive in the point4 ,a very violent and painful heat cannot exist without the mind4 ,phil4 ,it hath not therefore1 according to you1 any real being8 ,hyl4 ,i own it4 ,phil4 ,is it therefore certain1 that there is no body in nature really hot8 ,hyl4 ,i have not denied there is any real heat in bodies4 ,i only say1 there is no such thing as an intense real heat4 ,phil4 ,but1 did you not say before that all degrees of heat were equally real2 or1 if there was any difference1 that the greater were more undoubtedly real than the lesser8 ,hyl4 ,true3 but it was because ,i did not then consider the ground there is for distinguishing between them1 which ,i now plainly see4 ,and it is this3 because intense heat is nothing else but a particular kind of painful sensation2 and pain cannot exist but in a perceiving being2 it follows that no intense heat can really exist in an unperceiving corporeal substance4 ,but this is no reason why we should deny heat in an inferior degree to exist in such a substance4 ,phil4 ,but how shall we be able to discern those degrees of heat which exist only in the mind from those which exist without it8 ,hyl4 ,that is no difficult matter4 ,you know the least pain cannot exist unperceived2 whatever1 therefore1 degree of heat is a pain exists only in the mind4 ,but1 as for all other degrees of heat1 nothing obliges us to think the same of them4 ,phil4 ,i think you granted before that no unperceiving being was capable of pleasure1 any more than of pain4 ,hyl4 ,i did4 ,phil4 ,and is not warmth1 or a more gentle degree of heat than what causes uneasiness1 a pleasure8 ,hyl4 ,what then8 ,phil4 ,consequently1 it cannot exist without the mind in an unperceiving substance1 or body4 ,hyl4 ,so it seems4 ,phil4 ,since1 therefore1 as well those degrees of heat that are not painful1 as those that are1 can exist only in a thinking substance2 may we not conclude that external bodies are absolutely incapable of any degree of heat whatsoever8 ,hyl4 ,on second thoughts1 ,i do not think it so evident that warmth is a pleasure as that a great degree of heat is a pain4 ,phil4 ,i do not pretend that warmth is as great a pleasure as heat is a pain4 ,but1 if you grant it to be even a small pleasure1 it serves to make good my conclusion4 ,hyl4 ,i could rather call it an indolence6 ,it seems to be nothing more than a privation of both pain and pleasure4 ,and that such a quality or state as this may agree to an unthinking substance1 ,i hope you will not deny4 ,phil4 ,if you are resolved to maintain that warmth1 or a gentle degree of heat1 is no pleasure1 ,i know not how to convince you otherwise than by appealing to your own sense4 ,but what think you of cold8 ,hyl4 ,the same that ,i do of heat4 ,an intense degree of cold is a pain2 for to feel a very great cold1 is to perceive a great uneasiness3 it cannot therefore exist without the mind2 but a lesser degree of cold may1 as well as a lesser degree of heat4 ,phil4 ,those bodies1 therefore1 upon whose application to our own1 we perceive a moderate degree of heat1 must be concluded to have a moderate degree of heat or warmth in them2 and those1 upon whose application we feel a like degree of cold1 must be thought to have cold in them4 ,hyl4 ,they must4 ,phil4 ,can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a man into an absurdity8 ,hyl4 ,without doubt it cannot4 ,phil4 ,is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing should be at the same time both cold and warm8 ,hyl4 ,it is4 ,phil4 ,suppose now one of your hands hot1 and the other cold1 and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water1 in an intermediate state2 will not the water seem cold to one hand1 and warm to the other7#gib78 ,hyl4 ,it will4 ,phil4 ,ought we not therefore1 by your principles1 to conclude it is really both cold and warm at the same time1 that is1 according to your own concession1 to believe an absurdity8 ,hyl4 ,i confess it seems so4 ,phil4 ,consequently1 the principles themselves are false1 since you have granted that no true principle leads to an absurdity4 ,hyl4 ,but1 after all1 can anything be more absurd than to say1 there is no heat in the fire8 ,phil4 ,to make the point still clearer2 tell me whether1 in two cases exactly alike1 we ought not to make the same judgment8 ,hyl4 ,we ought4 ,phil4 ,when a pin pricks your finger1 doth it not rend and divide the fibres of your flesh8 ,hyl4 ,it doth4 ,phil4 ,and when a coal burns your finger1 doth it any more8 ,hyl4 ,it doth not4 ,phil4 ,since1 therefore1 you neither judge the sensation itself occasioned by the pin1 nor anything like it to be in the pin2 you should not1 conformably to what you have now granted1 judge the sensation occasioned by the fire1 or anything like it1 to be in the fire4 ,hyl4 ,well1 since it must be so1 ,i am content to yield this point1 and acknowledge that heat and cold are only sensations existing in our minds4 ,but there still remain qualities enough to secure the reality of external things4 ,phil4 ,but what will you say1 ,hylas1 if it shall appear that the case is the same with regard to all other sensible qualities7#gic71 and that they can no more be supposed to exist without the mind1 than heat and cold8 ,hyl4 ,then indeed you will have done something to the purpose2 but that is what ,i despair of seeing proved4 ,phil4 ,let us examine them in order4 ,what think you of tastes--do they exist without the mind1 or no8 ,hyl4 ,can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is sweet1 or wormwood bitter8 ,phil4 ,inform me1 ,hylas4 ,is a sweet taste a particular kind of pleasure or pleasant sensation1 or is it not8 ,hyl4 ,it is4 ,phil4 ,and is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or pain8 ,hyl4 ,i grant it4 ,phil4 ,if therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking corporeal substances existing without the mind1 how can sweetness and bitterness1 that is1 pleasure and pain1 agree to them8 ,hyl4 ,hold1 ,philonous1 ,i now see what it was deluded me all this time4 ,you asked whether heat and cold1 sweetness and bitterness1 were not particular sorts of pleasure and pain2 to which ,i answered simply1 that they were4 ,whereas ,i should have thus distinguished3--those qualities1 as perceived by us1 are pleasures or pains2 but not as existing in the external objects4 ,we must not therefore conclude absolutely1 that there is no heat in the fire1 or sweetness in the sugar1 but only that heat or sweetness1 as perceived by us1 are not in the fire or sugar4 ,what say you to this8 ,phil4 ,i say it is nothing to the purpose4 ,our discourse proceeded altogether concerning sensible things1 which you defined to be1 the things we immediately perceive by our senses4 ,whatever other qualities1 therefore1 you speak of1 as distinct from these1 ,i know nothing of them1 neither do they at all belong to the point in dispute4 ,you may1 indeed1 pretend to have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive1 and assert those insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar4 ,but what use can be made of this to your present purpose1 ,i am at a loss to conceive4 ,tell me then once more1 do you acknowledge that heat and cold1 sweetness and bitterness 7meaning those qualities which are perceived by the senses71 do not exist without the mind8 ,hyl4 ,i see it is to no purpose to hold out1 so ,i give up the cause as to those mentioned qualities4 ,though ,i profess it sounds oddly1 to say that sugar is not sweet4 ,phil4 ,but1 for your farther satisfaction1 take this along with you3 that which at other times seems sweet1 shall1 to a distempered palate1 appear bitter4 ,and1 nothing can be plainer than that divers persons perceive different tastes in the same food2 since that which one man delights in1 another abhors4 ,and how could this be1 if the taste was something really inherent in the food8 ,hyl4 ,i acknowledge ,i know not how4 ,phil4 ,in the next place1 odours are to be considered4 ,and1 with regard to these1 ,i would fain know whether what hath been said of tastes doth not exactly agree to them8 ,are they not so many pleasing or displeasing sensations8 ,hyl4 ,they are4 ,phil4 ,can you then conceive it possible that they should exist in an unperceiving thing8 ,hyl4 ,i cannot4 ,phil4 ,or1 can you imagine that filth and ordure affect those brute animals that feed on them out of choice1 with the same smells which we perceive in them8 ,hyl4 ,by no means4 ,phil4 ,may we not therefore conclude of smells1 as of the other forementioned qualities1 that they cannot exist in any but a perceiving substance or mind8 ,hyl4 ,i think so4 ,phil4 ,then as to sounds1 what must we think of them3 are they accidents really inherent in external bodies1 or not8 ,hyl4 ,that they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain from hence3 because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of an air-pump sends forth no sound4 ,the air1 therefore1 must be thought the subject of sound4 ,phil4 ,what reason is there for that1 ,hylas8 ,hyl4 ,because1 when any motion is raised in the air1 we perceive a sound greater or lesser1 according to the air's motion2 but without some motion in the air1 we never hear any sound at all4 ,phil4 ,and granting that we never hear a sound but when some motion is produced in the air1 yet ,i do not see how you can infer from thence1 that the sound itself is in the air4 ,hyl4 ,it is this very motion in the external air that produces in the mind the sensation of sound4 ,for1 striking on the drum of the ear1 it causeth a vibration1 which by the auditory nerves being communicated to the brain1 the soul is thereupon affected with the sensation called sound4 ,phil4 ,what6 is sound then a sensation8 ,hyl4 ,i tell you1 as perceived by us1 it is a particular sensation in the mind4 ,phil4 ,and can any sensation exist without the mind8 ,hyl4 ,no1 certainly4 ,phil4 ,how then can sound1 being a sensation1 exist in the air1 if by the air you mean a senseless substance existing without the mind8 ,hyl4 ,you must distinguish1 ,philonous1 between sound as it is perceived by us1 and as it is in itself2 or 7which is the same thing7 between the sound we immediately perceive1 and that which exists without us4 ,the former1 indeed1 is a particular kind of sensation1 but the latter is merely a vibrative or undulatory motion in the air4 ,phil4 ,i thought ,i had already obviated that distinction1 by the answer ,i gave when you were applying it in a like case before4 ,but1 to say no more of that1 are you sure then that sound is really nothing but motion8 ,hyl4 ,i am4 ,phil4 ,whatever therefore agrees to real sound1 may with truth be attributed to motion8 ,hyl4 ,it may4 ,phil4 ,it is then good sense to speak of motion as of a thing that is loud1 sweet1 acute1 or grave4 ,hyl4 ,i see you are resolved not to understand me4 ,is it not evident those accidents or modes belong only to sensible sound1 or sound in the common acceptation of the word1 but not to sound in the real and philosophic sense2 which1 as ,i just now told you1 is nothing but a certain motion of the air8 ,phil4 ,it seems then there are two sorts of sound--the one vulgar1 or that which is heard1 the other philosophical and real8 ,hyl4 ,even so4 ,phil4 ,and the latter consists in motion8 ,hyl4 ,i told you so before4 ,phil4 ,tell me1 ,hylas1 to which of the senses1 think you1 the idea of motion belongs8 to the hearing8 ,hyl4 ,no1 certainly2 but to the sight and touch4 ,phil4 ,it should follow then1 that1 according to you1 real sounds may possibly be seen or felt1 but never heard4 ,hyl4 ,look you1 ,philonous1 you may1 if you please1 make a jest of my opinion1 but that will not alter the truth of things4 ,i own1 indeed1 the inferences you draw me into sound something oddly2 but common language1 you know1 is framed by1 and for the use of the vulgar3 we must not therefore wonder if expressions adapted to exact philosophic notions seem uncouth and out of the way4 ,phil4 ,is it come to that8 ,i assure you1 ,i imagine myself to have gained no small point1 since you make so light of departing from common phrases and opinions2 it being a main part of our inquiry1 to examine whose notions are widest of the common road1 and most repugnant to the general sense of the world4 ,but1 can you think it no more than a philosophical paradox1 to say that real sounds are never heard1 and that the idea of them is obtained by some other sense8 ,and is there nothing in this contrary to nature and the truth of things8 ,hyl4 ,to deal ingenuously1 ,i do not like it4 ,and1 after the concessions already made1 ,i had as well grant that sounds too have no real being without the mind4 ,phil4 ,and ,i hope you will make no difficulty to acknowledge the same of colours4 ,hyl4 ,pardon me3 the case of colours is very different4 ,can anything be plainer than that we see them on the objects8 ,phil4 ,the objects you speak of are1 ,i suppose1 corporeal ,substances existing without the mind8 ,hyl4 ,they are4 ,phil4 ,and have true and real colours inhering in them8 ,hyl4 ,each visible object hath that colour which we see in it4 ,phil4 ,how6 is there anything visible but what we perceive by sight8 ,hyl4 ,there is not4 ,phil4 ,and1 do we perceive anything by sense which we do not perceive immediately8 ,hyl4 ,how often must ,i be obliged to repeat the same thing8 ,i tell you1 we do not4 ,phil4 ,have patience1 good ,hylas2 and tell me once more1 whether there is anything immediately perceived by the senses1 except sensible qualities4 ,i know you asserted there was not2 but ,i would now be informed1 whether you still persist in the same opinion4 ,hyl4 ,i do4 ,phil4 ,pray1 is your corporeal substance either a sensible quality1 or made up of sensible qualities8 ,hyl4 ,what a question that is6 who ever thought it was8 ,phil4 ,my reason for asking was1 because in saying1 each visible object hath that colour which we see in it1 you make visible objects to be corporeal substances2 which implies either that corporeal substances are sensible qualities1 or else that there is something beside sensible qualities perceived by sight3 but1 as this point was formerly agreed between us1 and is still maintained by you1 it is a clear consequence1 that your corporeal substance is nothing distinct from sensible qualities7#gid74 ,hyl4 ,you may draw as many absurd consequences as you please1 and endeavour to perplex the plainest things2 but you shall never persuade me out of my senses4 ,i clearly understand my own meaning4 ,phil4 ,i wish you would make me understand it too4 ,but1 since you are unwilling to have your notion of corporeal substance examined1 ,i shall urge that point no farther4 ,only be pleased to let me know1 whether the same colours which we see exist in external bodies1 or some other4 ,hyl4 ,the very same4 ,phil4 ,what6 are then the beautiful red and purple we see on yonder clouds really in them8 ,or do you imagine they have in themselves any other form than that of a dark mist or vapour8 ,hyl4 ,i must own1 ,philonous1 those colours are not really in the clouds as they seem to be at this distance4 ,they are only apparent colours4 ,phil4 ,apparent call you them8 how shall we distinguish these apparent colours from real8 ,hyl4 ,very easily4 ,those are to be thought apparent which1 appearing only at a distance1 vanish upon a nearer approach4 ,phil4 ,and those1 ,i suppose1 are to be thought real which are discovered by the most near and exact survey4 ,hyl4 ,right4 ,phil4 ,is the nearest and exactest survey made by the help of a microscope1 or by the naked eye8 ,hyl4 ,by a microscope1 doubtless4 ,phil4 ,but a microscope often discovers colours in an object different from those perceived by the unassisted sight4 ,and1 in case we had microscopes magnifying to any assigned degree1 it is certain that no object whatsoever1 viewed through them1 would appear in the same colour which it exhibits to the naked eye4 ,hyl4 ,and what will you conclude from all this8 ,you cannot argue that there are really and naturally no colours on objects3 because by artificial managements they may be altered1 or made to vanish4 ,phil4 ,i think it may evidently be concluded from your own concessions1 that all the colours we see with our naked eyes are only apparent as those on the clouds1 since they vanish upon a more close and accurate inspection which is afforded us by a microscope4 ,then1 as to what you say by way of prevention3 ,i ask you whether the real and natural state of an object is better discovered by a very sharp and piercing sight1 or by one which is less sharp8 ,hyl4 ,by the former without doubt4 ,phil4 ,is it not plain from ,dioptrics that microscopes make the sight more penetrating1 and represent objects as they would appear to the eye in case it were naturally endowed with a most exquisite sharpness8 ,hyl4 ,it is4 ,phil4 ,consequently the microscopical representation is to be thought that which best sets forth the real nature of the thing1 or what it is in itself4 ,the colours1 therefore1 by it perceived are more genuine and real than those perceived otherwise4 ,hyl4 ,i confess there is something in what you say4 ,phil4 ,besides1 it is not only possible but manifest1 that there actually are animals whose eyes are by nature framed to perceive those things which by reason of their minuteness escape our sight4 ,what think you of those inconceivably small animals perceived by glasses8 ,must we suppose they are all stark blind8 ,or1 in case they see1 can it be imagined their sight hath not the same use in preserving their bodies from injuries1 which appears in that of all other animals8 ,and if it hath1 is it not evident they must see particles less than their own bodies2 which will present them with a far different view in each object from that which strikes our senses7#gie78 ,even our own eyes do not always represent objects to us after the same manner4 ,in the jaundice every one knows that all things seem yellow4 ,is it not therefore highly probable those animals in whose eyes we discern a very different texture from that of ours1 and whose bodies abound with different humours1 do not see the same colours in every object that we do8 ,from all which1 should it not seem to follow that all colours are equally apparent1 and that none of those which we perceive are really inherent in any outward object8 ,hyl4 ,it should4 ,phil4 ,the point will be past all doubt1 if you consider that1 in case colours were real properties or affections inherent in external bodies1 they could admit of no alteration without some change wrought in the very bodies themselves3 but1 is it not evident from what hath been said that1 upon the use of microscopes1 upon a change happening in the humours of the eye1 or a variation of distance1 without any manner of real alteration in the thing itself1 the colours of any object are either changed1 or totally disappear8 ,nay1 all other circumstances remaining the same1 change but the situation of some objects1 and they shall present different colours to the eye4 ,the same thing happens upon viewing an object in various degrees of light4 ,and what is more known than that the same bodies appear differently coloured by candle-light from what they do in the open day8 ,add to these the experiment of a prism which1 separating the heterogeneous rays of light1 alters the colour of any object1 and will cause the whitest to appear of a deep blue or red to the naked eye4 ,and now tell me whether you are still of opinion that every body hath its true real colour inhering in it2 and1 if you think it hath1 ,i would fain know farther from you1 what certain distance and position of the object1 what peculiar texture and formation of the eye1 what degree or kind of light is necessary for ascertaining that true colour1 and distinguishing it from apparent ones4 ,hyl4 ,i own myself entirely satisfied1 that they are all equally apparent1 and that there is no such thing as colour really inhering in external bodies1 but that it is altogether in the light4 ,and what confirms me in this opinion is1 that in proportion to the light colours are still more or less vivid2 and if there be no light1 then are there no colours perceived4 ,besides1 allowing there are colours on external objects1 yet1 how is it possible for us to perceive them8 ,for no external body affects the mind1 unless it acts first on our organs of sense4 ,but the only action of bodies is motion2 and motion cannot be communicated otherwise than by impulse4 ,a distant object therefore cannot act on the eye2 nor consequently make itself or its properties perceivable to the soul4 ,whence it plainly follows that it is immediately some contiguous substance1 which1 operating on the eye1 occasions a perception of colours3 and such is light4 ,phil4 ,how6 is light then a substance8 ,hyl4 ,i tell you1 ,philonous1 external light is nothing but a thin fluid substance1 whose minute particles being agitated with a brisk motion1 and in various manners reflected from the different surfaces of outward objects to the eyes1 communicate different motions to the optic nerves2 which1 being propagated to the brain1 cause therein various impressions2 and these are attended with the sensations of red1 blue1 yellow1 c4 ,phil4 ,it seems then the light doth no more than shake the optic nerves4 ,hyl4 ,nothing else4 ,phil4 ,and consequent to each particular motion of the nerves1 the mind is affected with a sensation1 which is some particular colour4 ,hyl4 ,right4 ,phil4 ,and these sensations have no existence without the mind4 ,hyl4 ,they have not4 ,phil4 ,how then do you affirm that colours are in the light2 since by light you understand a corporeal substance external to the mind8 ,hyl4 ,light and colours1 as immediately perceived by us1 ,i grant cannot exist without the mind4 ,but in themselves they are only the motions and configurations of certain insensible particles of matter4 ,phil4 ,colours then1 in the vulgar sense1 or taken for the immediate objects of sight1 cannot agree to any but a perceiving substance4 ,hyl4 ,that is what ,i say4 ,phil4 ,well then1 since you give up the point as to those sensible qualities which are alone thought colours by all mankind beside1 you may hold what you please with regard to those invisible ones of the philosophers4 ,it is not my business to dispute about them2 only ,i would advise you to bethink yourself1 whether1 considering the inquiry we are upon1 it be prudent for you to affirm--the red and blue which we see are not real colours1 but certain unknown motions and figures which no man ever did or can see are truly so4 ,are not these shocking notions1 and are not they subject to as many ridiculous inferences1 as those you were obliged to renounce before in the case of sounds8 ,hyl4 ,i frankly own1 ,philonous1 that it is in vain to stand out any longer4 ,colours1 sounds1 tastes1 in a word all those termed secondary qualities1 have certainly no existence without the mind4 ,but by this acknowledgment ,i must not be supposed to derogate anything from the reality of ,matter1 or external objects2 seeing it is no more than several philosophers maintain7#gif71 who nevertheless are the farthest imaginable from denying ,matter4 ,for the clearer understanding of this1 you must know sensible qualities are by philosophers divided into ,primary and ,secondary7#gig74 ,the former are ,extension1 ,figure1 ,solidity1 ,gravity1 ,motion1 and ,rest2 and these they hold exist really in ,bodies4 ,the latter are those above enumerated2 or1 briefly1 all sensible qualities beside the ,primary2 which they assert are only so many sensations or ideas existing nowhere but in the mind4 ,but all this1 ,i doubt not1 you are apprised of4 ,for my part1 ,i have been a long time sensible there was such an opinion current among philosophers1 but was never thoroughly convinced of its truth until now4 ,phil4 ,you are still then of opinion that extension and figures are inherent in external unthinking substances8 ,hyl4 ,i am4 ,phil4 ,but what if the same arguments which are brought against ,secondary ,qualities will hold good against these also8 ,hyl4 ,why then ,i shall be obliged to think1 they too exist only in the mind4 ,phil4 ,is it your opinion the very figure and extension which you perceive by sense exist in the outward object or material substance8 ,hyl4 ,it is4 ,phil4 ,have all other animals as good grounds to think the same of the figure and extension which they see and feel8 ,hyl4 ,without doubt1 if they have any thought at all4 ,phil4 ,answer me1 ,hylas4 ,think you the senses were bestowed upon all animals for their preservation and well-being in life8 or were they given to men alone for this end8 ,hyl4 ,i make no question but they have the same use in all other animals4 ,phil4 ,if so1 is it not necessary they should be enabled by them to perceive their own limbs1 and those bodies which are capable of harming them8 ,hyl4 ,certainly4 ,phil4 ,a mite therefore must be supposed to see his own foot1 and things equal or even less than it1 as bodies of some considerable dimension2 though at the same time they appear to you scarce discernible1 or at best as so many visible points7#gih78 ,hyl4 ,i cannot deny it4 ,phil4 ,and to creatures less than the mite they will seem yet larger8 ,hyl4 ,they will4 ,phil4 ,insomuch that what you can hardly discern will to another extremely minute animal appear as some huge mountain8 ,hyl4 ,all this ,i grant4 ,phil4 ,can one and the same thing be at the same time in itself of different dimensions8 ,hyl4 ,that were absurd to imagine4 ,phil4 ,but1 from what you have laid down it follows that both the extension by you perceived1 and that perceived by the mite itself1 as likewise all those perceived by lesser animals1 are each of them the true extension of the mite's foot2 that is to say1 by your own principles you are led into an absurdity4 ,hyl4 ,there seems to be some difficulty in the point4 ,phil4 ,again1 have you not acknowledged that no real inherent property of any object can be changed without some change in the thing itself8 ,hyl4 ,i have4 ,phil4 ,but1 as we approach to or recede from an object1 the visible extension varies1 being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater than at another4 ,doth it not therefore follow from hence likewise that it is not really inherent in the object8 ,hyl4 ,i own ,i am at a loss what to think4 ,phil4 ,your judgment will soon be determined1 if you will venture to think as freely concerning this quality as you have done concerning the rest4 ,was it not admitted as a good argument1 that neither heat nor cold was in the water1 because it seemed warm to one hand and cold to the other8 ,hyl4 ,it was4 ,phil4 ,is it not the very same reasoning to conclude1 there is no extension or figure in an object1 because to one eye it shall seem little1 smooth1 and round1 when at the same time it appears to the other1 great1 uneven1 and angular8 ,hyl4 ,the very same4 ,but does this latter fact ever happen8 ,phil4 ,you may at any time make the experiment1 by looking with one eye bare1 and with the other through a microscope4 ,hyl4 ,i know not how to maintain it2 and yet ,i am loath to give up extension1 ,i see so many odd consequences following upon such a concession4 ,phil4 ,odd1 say you8 ,after the concessions already made1 ,i hope you will stick at nothing for its oddness4 7#gii7 ,but1 on the other hand1 should it not seem very odd1 if the general reasoning which includes all other sensible qualities did not also include extension8 ,if it be allowed that no idea1 nor anything like an idea1 can exist in an unperceiving substance1 then surely it follows that no figure1 or mode of extension1 which we can either perceive1 or imagine1 or have any idea of1 can be really inherent in ,matter2 not to mention the peculiar difficulty there must be in conceiving a material substance1 prior to and distinct from extension1 to be the substratum of extension4 ,be the sensible quality what it will--figure1 or sound1 or colour1 it seems alike impossible it should subsist in that which doth not perceive it4 ,hyl4 ,i give up the point for the present1 reserving still a right to retract my opinion1 in case ,i shall hereafter discover any false step in my progress to it4 ,phil4 ,that is a right you cannot be denied4 ,figures and extension being despatched1 we proceed next to motion4 ,can a real motion in any external body be at the same time both very swift and very slow8 ,hyl4 ,it cannot4 ,phil4 ,is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal proportion to the time it takes up in describing any given space8 ,thus a body that describes a mile in an hour moves three times faster than it would in case it described only a mile in three hours4 ,hyl4 ,i agree with you4 ,phil4 ,and is not time measured by the succession of ideas in our minds8 ,hyl4 ,it is4 ,phil4 ,and is it not possible ideas should succeed one another twice as fast in your mind as they do in mine1 or in that of some spirit of another kind8 ,hyl4 ,i own it4 ,phil4 ,consequently the same body may to another seem to perform its motion over any space in half the time that it doth to you4 ,and the same reasoning will hold as to any other proportion3 that is to say1 according to your principles 7since the motions perceived are both really in the object7 it is possible one and the same body shall be really moved the same way at once1 both very swift and very slow4 ,how is this consistent either with common sense1 or with what you just now granted8 ,hyl4 ,i have nothing to say to it4 ,phil4 ,then as for solidity2 either you do not mean any sensible quality by that word1 and so it is beside our inquiry3 or if you do1 it must be either hardness or resistance4 ,but both the one and the other are plainly relative to our senses3 it being evident that what seems hard to one animal may appear soft to another1 who hath greater force and firmness of limbs4 ,nor is it less plain that the resistance ,i feel is not in the body4 ,hyl4 ,i own the very sensation of resistance1 which is all you immediately perceive1 is not in the body2 but the cause of that sensation is4 ,phil4 ,but the causes of our sensations are not things immediately perceived1 and therefore are not sensible4 ,this point ,i thought had been already determined4 ,hyl4 ,i own it was2 but you will pardon me if ,i seem a little embarrassed3 ,i know not how to quit my old notions4 ,phil4 ,to help you out1 do but consider that if extension be once acknowledged to have no existence without the mind1 the same must necessarily be granted of motion1 solidity1 and gravity2 since they all evidently suppose extension4 ,it is therefore superfluous to inquire particularly concerning each of them4 ,in denying extension1 you have denied them all to have any real existence7#hjj74 ,hyl4 ,i wonder1 ,philonous1 if what you say be true1 why those philosophers who deny the ,secondary ,qualities any real existence should yet attribute it to the ,primary4 ,if there is no difference between them1 how can this be accounted for8 ,phil4 ,it is not my business to account for every opinion of the philosophers4 ,but1 among other reasons which may be assigned for this1 it seems probable that pleasure and pain being rather annexed to the former than the latter may be one4 ,heat and cold1 tastes and smells1 have something more vividly pleasing or disagreeable than the ideas of extension1 figure1 and motion affect us with4 ,and1 it being too visibly absurd to hold that pain or pleasure can be in an unperceiving ,substance1 men are more easily weaned from believing the external existence of the ,secondary than the ,primary ,qualities4 ,you will be satisfied there is something in this1 if you recollect the difference you made between an intense and more moderate degree of heat2 allowing the one a real existence1 while you denied it to the other4 ,but1 after all1 there is no rational ground for that distinction2 for1 surely an indifferent sensation is as truly a sensation as one more pleasing or painful2 and consequently should not any more than they be supposed to exist in an unthinking subject4 ,hyl4 ,it is just come into my head1 ,philonous1 that ,i have somewhere heard of a distinction between absolute and sensible extension7#hja74 ,now1 though it be acknowledged that great and small1 consisting merely in the relation which other extended beings have to the parts of our own bodies1 do not really inhere in the substances themselves2 yet nothing obliges us to hold the same with regard to absolute extension1 which is something abstracted from great and small1 from this or that particular magnitude or figure4 ,so likewise as to motion2 swift and slow are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our own minds4 ,but1 it doth not follow1 because those modifications of motion exist not without the mind1 that therefore absolute motion abstracted from them doth not4 ,phil4 ,pray what is it that distinguishes one motion1 or one part of extension1 from another8 ,is it not something sensible1 as some degree of swiftness or slowness1 some certain magnitude or figure peculiar to each8 ,hyl4 ,i think so4 ,phil4 ,these qualities1 therefore1 stripped of all sensible properties1 are without all specific and numerical differences1 as the schools call them4 ,hyl4 ,they are4 ,phil4 ,that is to say1 they are extension in general1 and motion in general4 ,hyl4 ,let it be so4 ,phil4 ,but it is a universally received maxim that ,everything which exists is particular7#hjb74 ,how then can motion in general1 or extension in general1 exist in any corporeal substance8 ,hyl4 ,i will take time to solve your difficulty4 ,phil4 ,but ,i think the point may be speedily decided4 ,without doubt you can tell whether you are able to frame this or that idea4 ,now ,i am content to put our dispute on this issue4 ,if you can frame in your thoughts a distinct abstract idea of motion or extension1 divested of all those sensible modes1 as swift and slow1 great and small1 round and square1 and the like1 which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind1 ,i will then yield the point you contend for4 ,but if you cannot1 it will be unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no notion7#hjc7 of4 ,hyl4 ,to confess ingenuously1 ,i cannot4 ,phil4 ,can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion from the ideas of all those qualities which they who make the distinction term secondary8 ,hyl4 ,what6 is it not an easy matter to consider extension and motion by themselves1 abstracted from all other sensible qualities8 ,pray how do the mathematicians treat of them8 ,phil4 ,i acknowledge1 ,hylas1 it is not difficult to form general propositions and reasonings about those qualities1 without mentioning any other2 and1 in this sense1 to consider or treat of them abstractedly7#hjd74 ,but1 how doth it follow that1 because ,i can pronounce the word motion by itself1 ,i can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body8 or1 because theorems may be made of extension and figures1 without any mention of great or small1 or any other sensible mode or quality1 that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of extension1 without any particular size or figure1 or sensible quality7#hje71 should be distinctly formed1 and apprehended by the mind8 ,mathematicians treat of quantity1 without regarding what other sensible qualities it is attended with1 as being altogether indifferent to their demonstrations4 ,but1 when laying aside the words1 they contemplate the bare ideas1 ,i believe you will find1 they are not the pure abstracted ideas of extension4 ,hyl4 ,but what say you to pure intellect8 ,may not abstracted ideas be framed by that faculty8 ,phil4 ,since ,i cannot frame abstract ideas at all1 it is plain ,i cannot frame them by the help of pure intellect2 whatsoever faculty you understand by those words7#hjf74 ,besides1 not to inquire into the nature of pure intellect and its spiritual objects1 as virtue1 reason1 ,god1 or the like1 thus much seems manifest--that sensible things are only to be perceived by sense1 or represented by the imagination4 ,figures1 therefore1 and extension1 being originally perceived by sense1 do not belong to pure intellect3 but1 for your farther satisfaction1 try if you can frame the idea of any figure1 abstracted from all particularities of size1 or even from other sensible qualities4 ,hyl4,let me think a little----,i do not find that ,i can4 ,phil4 ,and can you think it possible that should really exist in nature which implies a repugnancy in its conception8 ,hyl4 ,by no means4 ,phil4 ,since therefore it is impossible even for the mind to disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other sensible qualities1 doth it not follow1 that where the one exist there necessarily the other exist likewise8 ,hyl4 ,it should seem so4 ,phil4 ,consequently1 the very same arguments which you admitted as conclusive against the ,secondary ,qualities are1 without any farther application of force1 against the ,primary too4 ,besides1 if you will trust your senses1 is it not plain all sensible qualities coexist1 or to them appear as being in the same place8 ,do they ever represent a motion1 or figure1 as being divested of all other visible and tangible qualities8 ,hyl4 ,you need say no more on this head4 ,i am free to own1 if there be no secret error or oversight in our proceedings hitherto1 that all sensible qualities are alike to be denied existence without the mind7#hjg74 ,but1 my fear is that ,i have been too liberal in my former concessions1 or overlooked some fallacy or other4 ,in short1 ,i did not take time to think4 ,phil4 ,for that matter1 ,hylas1 you may take what time you please in reviewing the progress of our inquiry4 ,you are at liberty to recover any slips you might have made1 or offer whatever you have omitted which makes for your first opinion4 ,hyl4 ,one great oversight ,i take to be this--that ,i did not sufficiently distinguish the object from the sensation7#hjh74 ,now1 though this latter may not exist without the mind1 yet it will not thence follow that the former cannot4 ,phil4 ,what object do you mean8 the object of the senses8 ,hyl4 ,the same4 ,phil4 ,it is then immediately perceived8 ,hyl4 ,right4 ,phil4 ,make me to understand the difference between what is immediately perceived and a sensation4 ,hyl4 ,the sensation ,i take to be an act of the mind perceiving2 besides which1 there is something perceived2 and this ,i call the object4 ,for example1 there is red and yellow on that tulip4 ,but then the act of perceiving those colours is in me only1 and not in the tulip4 ,phil4 ,what tulip do you speak of8 ,is it that which you see8 ,hyl4 ,the same4 ,phil4 ,and what do you see beside colour1 figure1 and extension7#hji78 ,hyl4 ,nothing4 ,phil4 ,what you would say then is that the red and yellow are coexistent with the extension2 is it not8 ,hyl4 ,that is not all2 ,i would say they have a real existence without the mind1 in some unthinking substance4 ,phil4 ,that the colours are really in the tulip which ,i see is manifest4 ,neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist independent of your mind or mine2 but1 that any immediate object of the senses--that is1 any idea1 or combination of ideas--should exist in an unthinking substance1 or exterior to all minds1 is in itself an evident contradiction4 ,nor can ,i imagine how this follows from what you said just now1 to wit1 that the red and yellow were on the tulip you saw1 since you do not pretend to see that unthinking substance4 ,hyl4 ,you have an artful way1 ,philonous1 of diverting our inquiry from the subject4 ,phil4 ,i see you have no mind to be pressed that way4 ,to return then to your distinction between sensation and object2 if ,i take you right1 you distinguish in every perception two things1 the one an action of the mind1 the other not4 ,hyl4 ,true4 ,phil4 ,and this action cannot exist in1 or belong to1 any unthinking thing7#haj72 but1 whatever beside is implied in a perception may8 ,hyl4 ,that is my meaning4 ,phil4 ,so that if there was a perception without any act of the mind1 it were possible such a perception should exist in an unthinking substance8 ,hyl4 ,i grant it4 ,but it is impossible there should be such a perception4 ,phil4 ,when is the mind said to be active8 ,hyl4 ,when it produces1 puts an end to1 or changes1 anything4 ,phil4 ,can the mind produce1 discontinue1 or change anything1 but by an act of the will8 ,hyl4 ,it cannot4 ,phil4 ,the mind therefore is to be accounted active in its perceptions so far forth as volition is included in them8 ,hyl4 ,it is4 ,phil4 ,in plucking this flower ,i am active2 because ,i do it by the motion of my hand1 which was consequent upon my volition2 so likewise in applying it to my nose4 ,but is either of these smelling8 ,hyl4 ,no4 ,phil4 ,i act too in drawing the air through my nose2 because my breathing so rather than otherwise is the effect of my volition4 ,but neither can this be called smelling3 for1 if it were1 ,i should smell every time ,i breathed in that manner8 ,hyl4 ,true4 ,phil4 ,smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this8 ,hyl4 ,it is4 ,phil4 ,but ,i do not find my will concerned any farther4 ,whatever more there is--as that ,i perceive such a particular smell1 or any smell at all--this is independent of my will1 and therein ,i am altogether passive4 ,do you find it otherwise with you1 ,hylas8 ,hyl4 ,no1 the very same4 ,phil4 ,then1 as to seeing1 is it not in your power to open your eyes1 or keep them shut2 to turn them this or that way8 ,hyl4 ,without doubt4 ,phil4 ,but1 doth it in like manner depend on your will that in looking on this flower you perceive white rather than any other colour8 ,or1 directing your open eyes towards yonder part of the heaven1 can you avoid seeing the sun8 ,or is light or darkness the effect of your volition8 ,hyl4 ,no1 certainly4 ,phil4 ,you are then in these respects altogether passive8 ,hyl4 ,i am4 ,phil4 ,tell me now1 whether seeing consists in perceiving light and colours1 or in opening and turning the eyes8 ,hyl4 ,without doubt1 in the former4 ,phil4 ,since therefore you are in the very perception of light and colours altogether passive1 what is become of that action you were speaking of as an ingredient in every sensation8 ,and1 doth it not follow from your own concessions1 that the perception of light and colours1 including no action in it1 may exist in an unperceiving substance8 ,and is not this a plain contradiction8 ,hyl4 ,i know not what to think of it4 ,phil4 ,besides1 since you distinguish the active and passive in every perception1 you must do it in that of pain4 ,but how is it possible that pain1 be it as little active as you please1 should exist in an unperceiving substance8 ,in short1 do but consider the point1 and then confess ingenuously1 whether light and colours1 tastes1 sounds1 c4 are not all equally passions or sensations in the soul4 ,you may indeed call them external objects1 and give them in words what subsistence you please4 ,but1 examine your own thoughts1 and then tell me whether it be not as ,i say8 ,hyl4 ,i acknowledge1 ,philonous1 that1 upon a fair observation of what passes in my mind1 ,i can discover nothing else but that ,i am a thinking being1 affected with variety of sensations2 neither is it possible to conceive how a sensation should exist in an unperceiving substance4--,but then1 on the other hand1 when ,i look on sensible things in a different view1 considering them as so many modes and qualities1 ,i find it necessary to suppose a material substratum1 without which they cannot be conceived to exist7#haa74 ,phil4 ,material substratum call you it8 ,pray1 by which of your senses came you acquainted with that being8 ,hyl4 ,it is not itself sensible2 its modes and qualities only being perceived by the senses4 ,phil4 ,i presume then it was by reflexion and reason you obtained the idea of it8 ,hyl4 ,i do not pretend to any proper positive idea of it4 ,however1 ,i conclude it exists1 because qualities cannot be conceived to exist without a support4 ,phil4 ,it seems then you have only a relative notion of it1 or that you conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving the relation it bears to sensible qualities8 ,hyl4 ,right4 ,phil4 ,be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that relation consists4 ,hyl4 ,is it not sufficiently expressed in the term substratum1 or substance8 ,phil4 ,if so1 the word substratum should import that it is spread under the sensible qualities or accidents8 ,hyl4 ,true4 ,phil4 ,and consequently under extension8 ,hyl4 ,i own it4 ,phil4 ,it is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely distinct from extension8 ,hyl4 ,i tell you1 extension is only a mode1 and ,matter is something that supports modes4 ,and is it not evident the thing supported is different from the thing supporting8 ,phil4 ,so that something distinct from1 and exclusive of1 extension is supposed to be the substratum of extension8 ,hyl4 ,just so4 ,phil4 ,answer me1 ,hylas4 ,can a thing be spread without extension8 or is not the idea of extension necessarily included in spreading8 ,hyl4 ,it is4 ,phil4 ,whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under anything must have in itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under which it is spread8 ,hyl4 ,it must4 ,phil4 ,consequently1 every corporeal substance1 being the substratum of extension1 must have in itself another extension1 by which it is qualified to be a substratum3 and so on to infinity8 ,and ,i ask whether this be not absurd in itself1 and repugnant to what you granted just now1 to wit1 that the substratum was something distinct from and exclusive of extension8 ,hyl4 ,aye but1 ,philonous1 you take me wrong4 ,i do not mean that ,matter is spread in a gross literal sense under extension4 ,the word substratum is used only to express in general the same thing with substance4 ,phil4 ,well then1 let us examine the relation implied in the term substance4 ,is it not that it stands under accidents8 ,hyl4 ,the very same4 ,phil4 ,but1 that one thing may stand under or support another1 must it not be extended8 ,hyl4 ,it must4 ,phil4 ,is not therefore this supposition liable to the same absurdity with the former8 ,hyl4 ,you still take things in a strict literal sense4 ,that is not fair1 ,philonous4 ,phil4 ,i am not for imposing any sense on your words3 you are at liberty to explain them as you please4 ,only1 ,i beseech you1 make me understand something by them4 ,you tell me ,matter supports or stands under accidents4 ,how6 is it as your legs support your body8 ,hyl4 ,no2 that is the literal sense4 ,phil4 ,pray let me know any sense1 literal or not literal1 that you understand it in4--,how long must ,i wait for an answer1 ,hylas8 ,hyl4 ,i declare ,i know not what to say4 ,i once thought ,i understood well enough what was meant by ,matter's supporting accidents4 ,but now1 the more ,i think on it the less can ,i comprehend it3 in short ,i find that ,i know nothing of it4 ,phil4 ,it seems then you have no idea at all1 neither relative nor positive1 of ,matter2 you know neither what it is in itself1 nor what relation it bears to accidents8 ,hyl4 ,i acknowledge it4 ,phil4 ,and yet you asserted that you could not conceive how qualities or accidents should really exist1 without conceiving at the same time a material support of them8 ,hyl4 ,i did4 ,phil4 ,that is to say1 when you conceive the real existence of qualities1 you do withal conceive ,something which you cannot conceive8 ,hyl4 ,it was wrong1 ,i own4 ,but still ,i fear there is some fallacy or other4 ,pray what think you of this8 ,it is just come into my head that the ground of all our mistake lies in your treating of each quality by itself4 ,now1 ,i grant that each quality cannot singly subsist without the mind4 ,colour cannot without extension1 neither can figure without some other sensible quality4 ,but1 as the several qualities united or blended together form entire sensible things1 nothing hinders why such things may not be supposed to exist without the mind4 ,phil4 ,either1 ,hylas1 you are jesting1 or have a very bad memory4 ,though indeed we went through all the qualities by name one after another1 yet my arguments1 or rather your concessions1 nowhere tended to prove that the ,secondary ,qualities did not subsist each alone by itself2 but1 that they were not at all without the mind4 ,indeed1 in treating of figure and motion we concluded they could not exist without the mind1 because it was impossible even in thought to separate them from all secondary qualities1 so as to conceive them existing by themselves4 ,but then this was not the only argument made use of upon that occasion4 ,but 7to pass by all that hath been hitherto said1 and reckon it for nothing1 if you will have it so7 ,i am content to put the whole upon this issue4 ,if you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities1 or any sensible object whatever1 to exist without the mind1 then ,i will grant it actually to be so4 ,hyl4 ,if it comes to that the point will soon be decided4 ,what more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself1 independent of1 and unperceived by1 any mind whatsoever8 ,i do at this present time conceive them existing after that manner4 ,phil4 ,how say you1 ,hylas1 can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen8 ,hyl4 ,no1 that were a contradiction4 ,phil4 ,is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is unconceived8 ,hyl4 ,it is4 ,phil4 ,the tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by you8 ,hyl4 ,how should it be otherwise8 ,phil4 ,and what is conceived is surely in the mind8 ,hyl4 ,without question1 that which is conceived is in the mind4 ,phil4 ,how then came you to say1 you conceived a house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever8 ,hyl4 ,that was ,i own an oversight2 but stay1 let me consider what led me into it4--,it is a pleasant mistake enough4 ,as ,i was thinking of a tree in a solitary place1 where no one was present to see it1 methought that was to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of2 not considering that ,i myself conceived it all the while4 ,but now ,i plainly see that all ,i can do is to frame ideas in my own mind4 ,i may indeed conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree1 or a house1 or a mountain1 but that is all4 ,and this is far from proving that ,i can conceive them existing out of the minds of all ,spirits4 ,phil4 ,you acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in a mind8 ,hyl4 ,i do4 ,phil4 ,and yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which you cannot so much as conceive8 ,hyl4 ,i profess ,i know not what to think2 but still there are some scruples remain with me4 ,is it not certain ,i see things at a distance8 ,do we not perceive the stars and moon1 for example1 to be a great way off8 ,is not this1 ,i say1 manifest to the senses8 ,phil4 ,do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like objects8 ,hyl4 ,i do4 ,phil4 ,and have they not then the same appearance of being distant8 ,hyl4 ,they have4 ,phil4 ,but you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a dream to be without the mind8 ,hyl4 ,by no means4 ,phil4 ,you ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are without the mind1 from their appearance1 or manner wherein they are perceived4 ,hyl4 ,i acknowledge it4 ,but doth not my sense deceive me in those cases8 ,phil4 ,by no means4 ,the idea or thing which you immediately perceive1 neither sense nor reason informs you that it actually exists without the mind4 ,by sense you only know that you are affected with such certain sensations of light and colours1 c4 ,and these you will not say are without the mind4 ,hyl4 ,true3 but1 beside all that1 do you not think the sight suggests something of outness or distance8 ,phil4 ,upon approaching a distant object1 do the visible size and figure change perpetually1 or do they appear the same at all distances8 ,hyl4 ,they are in a continual change4 ,phil4 ,sight therefore doth not suggest1 or any way inform you1 that the visible object you immediately perceive exists at a distance7#hab71 or will be perceived when you advance farther onward2 there being a continued series of visible objects succeeding each other during the whole time of your approach4 ,hyl4 ,it doth not2 but still ,i know1 upon seeing an object1 what object ,i shall perceive after having passed over a certain distance3 no matter whether it be exactly the same or no3 there is still something of distance suggested in the case4 ,phil4 ,good ,hylas1 do but reflect a little on the point1 and then tell me whether there be any more in it than this3 ,from the ideas you actually perceive by sight1 you have by experience learned to collect what other ideas you will 7according to the standing order of nature7 be affected with1 after such a certain succession of time and motion4 ,hyl4 ,upon the whole1 ,i take it to be nothing else4 ,phil4 ,now1 is it not plain that if we suppose a man born blind was on a sudden made to see1 he could at first have no experience of what may be suggested by sight8 ,hyl4 ,it is4 ,phil4 ,he would not then1 according to you1 have any notion of distance annexed to the things he saw2 but would take them for a new set of sensations1 existing only in his mind8 ,hyl4 ,it is undeniable4 ,phil4 ,but1 to make it still more plain3 is not distance a line turned endwise to the eye7#hac78 ,hyl4 ,it is4 ,phil4 ,and can a line so situated be perceived by sight8 ,hyl4 ,it cannot4 ,phil4 ,doth it not therefore follow that distance is not properly and immediately perceived by sight8 ,hyl4 ,it should seem so4 ,phil4 ,again1 is it your opinion that colours are at a distance7#had78 ,hyl4 ,it must be acknowledged they are only in the mind4 ,phil4 ,but do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting in the same place with extension and figures8 ,hyl4 ,they do4 ,phil4 ,how can you then conclude from sight that figures exist without1 when you acknowledge colours do not2 the sensible appearance being the very same with regard to both8 ,hyl4 ,i know not what to answer4 ,phil4 ,but1 allowing that distance was truly and immediately perceived by the mind1 yet it would not thence follow it existed out of the mind4 ,for1 whatever is immediately perceived is an idea7#hae73 and can any idea exist out of the mind8 ,hyl4 ,to suppose that were absurd3 but1 inform me1 ,philonous1 can we perceive or know nothing beside our ideas7#haf78 ,phil4 ,as for the rational deducing of causes from effects1 that is beside our inquiry4 ,and1 by the senses you can best tell whether you perceive anything which is not immediately perceived4 ,and ,i ask you1 whether the things immediately perceived are other than your own sensations or ideas8 ,you have indeed more than once1 in the course of this conversation1 declared yourself on those points2 but you seem1 by this last question1 to have departed from what you then thought4 ,hyl4 ,to speak the truth1 ,philonous1 ,i think there are two kinds of objects3--the one perceived immediately1 which are likewise called ideas2 the other are real things or external objects1 perceived by the mediation of ideas1 which are their images and representations4 ,now1 ,i own ideas do not exist without the mind2 but the latter sort of objects do4 ,i am sorry ,i did not think of this distinction sooner2 it would probably have cut short your discourse4 ,phil4 ,are those external objects perceived by sense1 or by some other faculty8 ,hyl4 ,they are perceived by sense4 ,phil4 ,how6 ,is there anything perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived8 ,hyl4 ,yes1 ,philonous1 in some sort there is4 ,for example1 when ,i look on a picture or statue of ,julius ,csar1 ,i may be said after a manner to perceive him 7though not immediately7 by my senses4 ,phil4 ,it seems then you will have our ideas1 which alone are immediately perceived1 to be pictures of external things3 and that these also are perceived by sense1 inasmuch as they have a conformity or resemblance to our ideas8 ,hyl4 ,that is my meaning4 ,phil4 ,and1 in the same way that ,julius ,csar1 in himself invisible1 is nevertheless perceived by sight2 real things1 in themselves imperceptible1 are perceived by sense4 ,hyl4 ,in the very same4 ,phil4 ,tell me1 ,hylas1 when you behold the picture of ,julius ,csar1 do you see with your eyes any more than some colours and figures1 with a certain symmetry and composition of the whole8 ,hyl4 ,nothing else4 ,phil4 ,and would not a man who had never known anything of ,julius ,csar see as much8 ,hyl4 ,he would4 ,phil4 ,consequently he hath his sight1 and the use of it1 in as perfect a degree as you8 ,hyl4 ,i agree with you4 ,phil4 ,whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to the ,roman emperor1 and his are not8 ,this cannot proceed from the sensations or ideas of sense by you then perceived2 since you acknowledge you have no advantage over him in that respect4 ,it should seem therefore to proceed from reason and memory3 should it not8 ,hyl4 ,it should4 ,phil4 ,consequently1 it will not follow from that instance that anything is perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived4 ,though ,i grant we may1 in one acceptation1 be said to perceive sensible things mediately by sense3 that is1 when1 from a frequently perceived connexion1 the immediate perception of ideas by one sense suggests to the mind others1 perhaps belonging to another sense1 which are wont to be connected with them4 ,for instance1 when ,i hear a coach drive along the streets1 immediately ,i perceive only the sound2 but1 from the experience ,i have had that such a sound is connected with a coach1 ,i am said to hear the coach4 ,it is nevertheless evident that1 in truth and strictness1 nothing can be heard but sound2 and the coach is not properly perceived by sense1 but suggested from experience4 ,so likewise when we are said to see a red-hot bar of iron2 the solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of sight1 but suggested to the imagination by the colour and figure which are properly perceived by that sense4 ,in short1 those things alone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense1 which would have been perceived in case that same sense had then been first conferred on us4 ,as for other things1 it is plain they are only suggested to the mind by experience1 grounded on former perceptions4 ,but1 to return to your comparison of ,csar's picture1 it is plain1 if you keep to that1 you must hold the real things1 or archetypes of our ideas1 are not perceived by sense1 but by some internal faculty of the soul1 as reason or memory4 ,i would therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from reason for the existence of what you call real things or material objects4 ,or1 whether you remember to have seen them formerly as they are in themselves2 or1 if you have heard or read of any one that did4 ,hyl4 ,i see1 ,philonous1 you are disposed to raillery2 but that will never convince me4 ,phil4 ,my aim is only to learn from you the way to come at the knowledge of material beings4 ,whatever we perceive is perceived immediately or mediately3 by sense1 or by reason and reflexion4 ,but1 as you have excluded sense1 pray shew me what reason you have to believe their existence2 or what medium you can possibly make use of to prove it1 either to mine or your own understanding4 ,hyl4 ,to deal ingenuously1 ,philonous1 now ,i consider the point1 ,i do not find ,i can give you any good reason for it4 ,but1 thus much seem pretty plain1 that it is at least possible such things may really exist4 ,and1 as long as there is no absurdity in supposing them1 ,i am resolved to believe as ,i did1 till you bring good reasons to the contrary4 ,phil4 ,what6 ,is it come to this1 that you only believe the existence of material objects1 and that your belief is founded barely on the possibility of its being true8 ,then you will have me bring reasons against it3 though another would think it reasonable the proof should lie on him who holds the affirmative4 ,and1 after all1 this very point which you are now resolved to maintain1 without any reason1 is in effect what you have more than once during this discourse seen good reason to give up4 ,but1 to pass over all this2 if ,i understand you rightly1 you say our ideas do not exist without the mind1 but that they are copies1 images1 or representations1 of certain originals that do8 ,hyl4 ,you take me right4 ,phil4 ,they are then like external things7#hag78 ,hyl4 ,they are4 ,phil4 ,have those things a stable and permanent nature1 independent of our senses2 or are they in a perpetual change1 upon our producing any motions in our bodies--suspending1 exerting1 or altering1 our faculties or organs of sense8 ,hyl4 ,real things1 it is plain1 have a fixed and real nature1 which remains the same notwithstanding any change in our senses1 or in the posture and motion of our bodies2 which indeed may affect the ideas in our minds1 but it were absurd to think they had the same effect on things existing without the mind4 ,phil4 ,how then is it possible that things perpetually fleeting and variable as our ideas should be copies or images of anything fixed and constant8 ,or1 in other words1 since all sensible qualities1 as size1 figure1 colour1 c41 that is1 our ideas1 are continually changing1 upon every alteration in the distance1 medium1 or instruments of sensation2 how can any determinate material objects be properly represented or painted forth by several distinct things1 each of which is so different from and unlike the rest8 ,or1 if you say it resembles some one only of our ideas1 how shall we be able to distinguish the true copy from all the false ones8 ,hyl4 ,i profess1 ,philonous1 ,i am at a loss4 ,i know not what to say to this4 ,phil4 ,but neither is this all4 ,which are material objects in themselves--perceptible or imperceptible8 ,hyl4 ,properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but ideas4 ,all material things1 therefore1 are in themselves insensible1 and to be perceived only by our ideas4 ,phil4 ,ideas then are sensible1 and their archetypes or originals insensible8 ,hyl4 ,right4 ,phil4 ,but how can that which is sensible be like that which is insensible8 ,can a real thing1 in itself invisible1 be like a colour2 or a real thing1 which is not audible1 be like a sound8 ,in a word1 can anything be like a sensation or idea1 but another sensation or idea8 ,hyl4 ,i must own1 ,i think not4 ,phil4 ,is it possible there should be any doubt on the point8 ,do you not perfectly know your own ideas8 ,hyl4 ,i know them perfectly2 since what ,i do not perceive or know can be no part of my idea7#hah74 ,phil4 ,consider1 therefore1 and examine them1 and then tell me if there be anything in them which can exist without the mind3 or if you can conceive anything like them existing without the mind4 ,hyl4 ,upon inquiry1 ,i find it is impossible for me to conceive or understand how anything but an idea can be like an idea4 ,and it is most evident that no idea can exist without the mind7#hai74 ,phil4 ,you are therefore1 by your principles1 forced to deny the reality of sensible things2 since you made it to consist in an absolute existence exterior to the mind4 ,that is to say1 you are a downright sceptic4 ,so ,i have gained my point1 which was to shew your principles led to ,scepticism4 ,hyl4 ,for the present ,i am1 if not entirely convinced1 at least silenced4 ,phil4 ,i would fain know what more you would require in order to a perfect conviction4 ,have you not had the liberty of explaining yourself all manner of ways8 ,were any little slips in discourse laid hold and insisted on8 ,or were you not allowed to retract or reinforce anything you had offered1 as best served your purpose8 ,hath not everything you could say been heard and examined with all the fairness imaginable8 ,in a word1 have you not in every point been convinced out of your own mouth8 ,and1 if you can at present discover any flaw in any of your former concessions1 or think of any remaining subterfuge1 any new distinction1 colour1 or comment whatsoever1 why do you not produce it8 ,hyl4 ,a little patience1 ,philonous4 ,i am at present so amazed to see myself ensnared1 and as it were imprisoned in the labyrinths you have drawn me into1 that on the sudden it cannot be expected ,i should find my way out4 ,you must give me time to look about me and recollect myself4 ,phil4 ,hark2 is not this the college bell8 ,hyl4 ,it rings for prayers4 ,phil4 ,we will go in then1 if you please1 and meet here again to-morrow morning4 ,in the meantime1 you may employ your thoughts on this morning's discourse1 and try if you can find any fallacy in it1 or invent any new means to extricate yourself4 ,hyl4 ,agreed4 ,the ,second ,dialogue ,hylas4 ,i beg your pardon1 ,philonous1 for not meeting you sooner4 ,all this morning my head was so filled with our late conversation that ,i had not leisure to think of the time of the day1 or indeed of anything else4 ,philonous4 ,i am glad you were so intent upon it1 in hopes if there were any mistakes in your concessions1 or fallacies in my reasonings from them1 you will now discover them to me4 ,hyl4 ,i assure you ,i have done nothing ever since ,i saw you but search after mistakes and fallacies1 and1 with that view1 have minutely examined the whole series of yesterday's discourse3 but all in vain1 for the notions it led me into1 upon review1 appear still more clear and evident2 and1 the more ,i consider them1 the more irresistibly do they force my assent4 ,phil4 ,and is not this1 think you1 a sign that they are genuine1 that they proceed from nature1 and are conformable to right reason8 ,truth and beauty are in this alike1 that the strictest survey sets them both off to advantage2 while the false lustre of error and disguise cannot endure being reviewed1 or too nearly inspected4 ,hyl4 ,i own there is a great deal in what you say4 ,nor can any one be more entirely satisfied of the truth of those odd consequences1 so long as ,i have in view the reasonings that lead to them4 ,but1 when these are out of my thoughts1 there seems1 on the other hand1 something so satisfactory1 so natural and intelligible1 in the modern way of explaining things that1 ,i profess1 ,i know not how to reject it4 ,phil4 ,i know not what way you mean4 ,hyl4 ,i mean the way of accounting for our sensations or ideas4 ,phil4 ,how is that8 ,hyl4 ,it is supposed the soul makes her residence in some part of the brain1 from which the nerves take their rise1 and are thence extended to all parts of the body2 and that outward objects1 by the different impressions they make on the organs of sense1 communicate certain vibrative motions to the nerves2 and these being filled with spirits propagate them to the brain or seat of the soul1 which1 according to the various impressions or traces thereby made in the brain1 is variously affected with ideas7#hbj74 ,phil4 ,and call you this an explication of the manner whereby we are affected with ideas8 ,hyl4 ,why not1 ,philonous8 ,have you anything to object against it8 ,phil4 ,i would first know whether ,i rightly understand your hypothesis4 ,you make certain traces in the brain to be the causes or occasions of our ideas4 ,pray tell me whether by the brain you mean any sensible thing4 ,hyl4 ,what else think you ,i could mean8 ,phil4 ,sensible things are all immediately perceivable2 and those things which are immediately perceivable are ideas2 and these exist only in the mind4 ,thus much you have1 if ,i mistake not1 long since agreed to4 ,hyl4 ,i do not deny it4 ,phil4 ,the brain therefore you speak of1 being a sensible thing1 exists only in the mind7#hba74 ,now1 ,i would fain know whether you think it reasonable to suppose that one idea or thing existing in the mind occasions all other ideas4 ,and1 if you think so1 pray how do you account for the origin of that primary idea or brain itself8 ,hyl4 ,i do not explain the origin of our ideas by that brain which is perceivable to sense--this being itself only a combination of sensible ideas--but by another which ,i imagine4 ,phil4 ,but are not things imagined as truly in the mind as things perceived7#hbb78 ,hyl4 ,i must confess they are4 ,phil4 ,it comes1 therefore1 to the same thing2 and you have been all this while accounting for ideas by certain motions or impressions of the brain2 that is1 by some alterations in an idea1 whether sensible or imaginable it matters not4 ,hyl4 ,i begin to suspect my hypothesis4 ,phil4 ,besides spirits1 all that we know or conceive are our own ideas4 ,when1 therefore1 you say all ideas are occasioned by impressions in the brain1 do you conceive this brain or no8 ,if you do1 then you talk of ideas imprinted in an idea causing that same idea1 which is absurd4 ,if you do not conceive it1 you talk unintelligibly1 instead of forming a reasonable hypothesis4 ,hyl4 ,i now clearly see it was a mere dream4 ,there is nothing in it4 ,phil4 ,you need not be much concerned at it2 for after all1 this way of explaining things1 as you called it1 could never have satisfied any reasonable man4 ,what connexion is there between a motion in the nerves1 and the sensations of sound or colour in the mind8 ,or how is it possible these should be the effect of that8 ,hyl4 ,but ,i could never think it had so little in it as now it seems to have4 ,phil4 ,well then1 are you at length satisfied that no sensible things have a real existence2 and that you are in truth an arrant sceptic8 ,hyl4 ,it is too plain to be denied4 ,phil4 ,look6 are not the fields covered with a delightful verdure8 ,is there not something in the woods and groves1 in the rivers and clear springs1 that soothes1 that delights1 that transports the soul8 ,at the prospect of the wide and deep ocean1 or some huge mountain whose top is lost in the clouds1 or of an old gloomy forest1 are not our minds filled with a pleasing horror8 ,even in rocks and deserts is there not an agreeable wildness8 ,how sincere a pleasure is it to behold the natural beauties of the earth6 ,to preserve and renew our relish for them1 is not the veil of night alternately drawn over her face1 and doth she not change her dress with the seasons8 ,how aptly are the elements disposed6 ,what variety and use 7#hbc7;in the meanest productions of nature6 ,what delicacy1 what beauty1 what contrivance1 in animal and vegetable bodies6 ,how exquisitely are all things suited1 as well to their particular ends1 as to constitute opposite parts of the whole6 ,and1 while they mutually aid and support1 do they not also set off and illustrate each other8 ,raise now your thoughts from this ball of earth to all those glorious luminaries that adorn the high arch of heaven4 ,the motion and situation of the planets1 are they not admirable for use and order8 ,were those 7miscalled erratic7 globes once known to stray1 in their repeated journeys through the pathless void8 ,do they not measure areas round the sun ever proportioned to the times8 ,so fixed1 so immutable are the laws by which the unseen ,author of nature actuates the universe4 ,how vivid and radiant is the lustre of the fixed stars6 ,how magnificent and rich that negligent profusion with which they appear to be scattered throughout the whole azure vault6 ,yet1 if you take the telescope1 it brings into your sight a new host of stars that escape the naked eye4 ,here they seem contiguous and minute1 but to a nearer view immense orbs of light at various distances1 far sunk in the abyss of space4 ,now you must call imagination to your aid4 ,the feeble narrow sense cannot descry innumerable worlds revolving round the central fires2 and in those worlds the energy of an all-perfect ,mind displayed in endless forms4 ,but1 neither sense nor imagination are big enough to comprehend the boundless extent1 with all its glittering furniture4 ,though the labouring mind exert and strain each power to its utmost reach1 there still stands out ungrasped a surplusage immeasurable4 ,yet all the vast bodies that compose this mighty frame1 how distant and remote soever1 are by some secret mechanism1 some ,divine art and force1 linked in a mutual dependence and intercourse with each other2 even with this earth1 which was almost slipt from my thoughts and lost in the crowd of worlds4 ,is not the whole system immense1 beautiful1 glorious beyond expression and beyond thought6 ,what treatment1 then1 do those philosophers deserve1 who would1 deprive these noble and delightful scenes of all reality8 ,how should those ,principles be entertained that lead us to think all the visible beauty of the creation a false imaginary glare8 ,to be plain1 can you expect this ,scepticism of yours will not be thought extravagantly absurd by all men of sense8 ,hyl4 ,other men may think as they please2 but for your part you have nothing to reproach me with4 ,my comfort is1 you are as much a sceptic as ,i am4 ,phil4 ,there1 ,hylas1 ,i must beg leave to differ from you4 ,hyl4 ,what6 ,have you all along agreed to the premises1 and do you now deny the conclusion1 and leave me to maintain those paradoxes by myself which you led me into8 ,this surely is not fair4 ,phil4 ,i deny that ,i agreed with you in those notions that led to ,scepticism4 ,you indeed said the reality of sensible things consisted in an absolute existence out of the minds of spirits1 or distinct from their being perceived4 ,and pursuant to this notion of reality1 you are obliged to deny sensible things any real existence3 that is1 according to your own definition1 you profess yourself a sceptic4 ,but ,i neither said nor thought the reality of sensible things was to be defined after that manner4 ,to me it is evident1 for the reasons you allow of1 that sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit4 ,whence ,i conclude1 not that they have no real existence1 but that1 seeing they depend not on my thought1 and have an existence distinct from being perceived by me7#hbd71 there must be some other ,mind wherein they exist4 ,as sure1 therefore1 as the sensible world really exists1 so sure is there an infinite omnipresent ,spirit who contains and supports it4 ,hyl4 ,what6 ,this is no more than ,i and all ,christians hold2 nay1 and all others too who believe there is a ,god1 and that ,he knows and comprehends all things4 ,phil4 ,aye1 but here lies the difference4 ,men commonly believe that all things are known or perceived by ,god1 because they believe the being of a ,god2 whereas ,i1 on the other side1 immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a ,god1 because all sensible things must be perceived by ,him7#hbe74 ,hyl4 ,but1 so long as we all believe the same thing1 what matter is it how we come by that belief8 ,phil4 ,but neither do we agree in the same opinion4 ,for philosophers1 though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be perceived by ,god1 yet they attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from their being perceived by any mind whatever2 which ,i do not4 ,besides1 is there no difference between saying1 ,there is a ,god1 therefore ,he perceives all things2 and saying1 ,sensible things do really exist2 and1 if they really exist1 they are necessarily perceived by an infinite ,mind3 therefore there is an infinite ,mind1 or ,god7#hbf78 ,this furnishes you with a direct and immediate demonstration1 from a most evident principle1 of the being of a ,god4 ,divines and philosophers had proved beyond all controversy1 from the beauty and usefulness of the several parts of the creation1 that it was the workmanship of ,god4 ,but that--setting aside all help of astronomy and natural philosophy1 all contemplation of the contrivance1 order1 and adjustment of things--an infinite ,mind should be necessarily inferred from7#hbg7 the bare existence of the sensible world1 is an advantage to them only who have made this easy reflexion3 ,that the sensible world is that which we perceive by our several senses2 and that nothing is perceived by the senses beside ideas2 and that no idea or archetype of an idea can exist otherwise than in a mind4 ,you may now1 without any laborious search into the sciences1 without any subtlety of reason1 or tedious length of discourse1 oppose and baffle the most strenuous advocate for ,atheism4 ,those miserable refuges1 whether in an eternal succession of unthinking causes and effects1 or in a fortuitous concourse of atoms2 those wild imaginations of ,vanini1 ,hobbes1 and ,spinoza3 in a word1 the whole system of ,atheism1 is it not entirely overthrown1 by this single reflexion on the repugnancy included in supposing the whole1 or any part1 even the most rude and shapeless1 of the visible world1 to exist without a ,mind8 ,let any one of those abettors of impiety but look into his own thoughts1 and there try if he can conceive how so much as a rock1 a desert1 a chaos1 or confused jumble of atoms2 how anything at all1 either sensible or imaginable1 can exist independent of a ,mind1 and he need go no farther to be convinced of his folly4 ,can anything be fairer than to put a dispute on such an issue1 and leave it to a man himself to see if he can conceive1 even in thought1 what he holds to be true in fact1 and from a notional to allow it a real existence7#hbh78 ,hyl4 ,it cannot be denied there is something highly serviceable to religion in what you advance4 ,but do you not think it looks very like a notion entertained by some eminent moderns7#hbi71 of seeing all things in ,god8 ,phil4 ,i would gladly know that opinion3 pray explain it to me4 ,hyl4 ,they conceive that the soul1 being immaterial1 is incapable of being united with material things1 so as to perceive them in themselves2 but that she perceives them by her union with the substance of ,god1 which1 being spiritual1 is therefore purely intelligible1 or capable of being the immediate object of a spirit's thought4 ,besides1 the ,divine essence contains in it perfections correspondent to each created being2 and which are1 for that reason1 proper to exhibit or represent them to the mind4 ,phil4 ,i do not understand how our ideas1 which are things altogether passive and inert7#hcj71 can be the essence1 or any part 7or like any part7 of the essence or substance of ,god1 who is an impassive1 indivisible1 pure1 active being4 ,many more difficulties and objections there are which occur at first view against this hypothesis2 but ,i shall only add1 that it is liable to all the absurdities of the common hypothesis1 in making a created world exist otherwise than in the mind of a ,spirit4 ,beside all which it hath this peculiar to itself2 that it makes that material world serve to no purpose4 ,and1 if it pass for a good argument against other hypotheses in the sciences1 that they suppose ,nature1 or the ,divine wisdom1 to make something in vain1 or do that by tedious roundabout methods which might have been performed in a much more easy and compendious way1 what shall we think of that hypothesis which supposes the whole world made in vain8 ,hyl4 ,but what say you8 ,are not you too of opinion that we see all things in ,god8 ,if ,i mistake not1 what you advance comes near it4 ,phil4 7#hca7;,few men think2 yet all have opinions4 ,hence men's opinions are superficial and confused4 ,it is nothing strange that tenets which in themselves are ever so different1 should nevertheless be confounded with each other1 by those who do not consider them attentively4 ,i shall not therefore be surprised if some men imagine that ,i run into the enthusiasm of ,malebranche2 though in truth ,i am very remote from it4 ,he builds on the most abstract general ideas1 which ,i entirely disclaim4 ,he asserts an absolute external world1 which ,i deny4 ,he maintains that we are deceived by our senses1 and know not the real natures or the true forms and figures of extended beings2 of all which ,i hold the direct contrary4 ,so that upon the whole there are no ,principles more fundamentally opposite than his and mine4 ,it must be owned that ,i entirely agree with what the holy ,scripture saith1 ',that in ,god we live and move and have our being4' ,but that we see things in ,his essence1 after the manner above set forth1 ,i am far from believing4 ,take here in brief my meaning3--,it is evident that the things ,i perceive are my own ideas1 and that no idea can exist unless it be in a mind3 nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by me perceived1 either themselves or their archetypes1 exist independently of my mind1 since ,i know myself not to be their author1 it being out of my power to determine at pleasure what particular ideas ,i shall be affected with upon opening my eyes or ears7#hcb73 they must therefore exist in some other ,mind1 whose ,will it is they should be exhibited to me4 ,the things1 ,i say1 immediately perceived are ideas or sensations1 call them which you will4 ,but how can any idea or sensation exist in1 or be produced by1 anything but a mind or spirit8 ,this indeed is inconceivable7#hcc74 ,and to assert that which is inconceivable is to talk nonsense3 is it not8 ,hyl4 ,without doubt4 ,phil4 ,but1 on the other hand1 it is very conceivable that they should exist in and be produced by a ,spirit2 since this is no more than ,i daily experience in myself7#hcd71 inasmuch as ,i perceive numberless ideas2 and1 by an act of my will1 can form a great variety of them1 and raise them up in my imagination3 though1 it must be confessed1 these creatures of the fancy are not altogether so distinct1 so strong1 vivid1 and permanent1 as those perceived by my senses--which latter are called real things4 ,from all which ,i conclude1 there is a ,mind which affects me every moment with all the sensible impressions ,i perceive4 ,and1 from the variety1 order1 and manner of these1 ,i conclude the ,author of them to be wise1 powerful1 and good1 beyond comprehension4 ,mark it well2 ,i do not say ,i see things by perceiving that which represents them in the intelligible ,substance of ,god4 ,this ,i do not understand2 but ,i say1 the things by me perceived are known by the understanding1 and produced by the will of an infinite ,spirit4 ,and is not all this most plain and evident8 ,is there any more in it than what a little observation in our own minds1 and that which passeth in them1 not only enables us to conceive1 but also obliges us to acknowledge8 ,hyl4 ,i think ,i understand you very clearly2 and own proof you give of a ,deity seems no less evident than it is surprising4 ,but1 allowing that ,god is the supreme and universal ,cause of all things1 yet1 may there not be still a ,third ,nature besides ,spirits and ,ideas8 ,may we not admit a subordinate and limited cause of our ideas8 ,in a word1 may there not for all that be ,matter8 ,phil4 ,how often must ,i inculcate the same thing8 ,you allow the things immediately perceived by sense to exist nowhere without the mind2 but there is nothing perceived by sense which is not perceived immediately2 therefore there is nothing sensible that exists without the mind4 ,the ,matter1 therefore1 which you still insist on is something intelligible1 ,i suppose2 something that may be discovered by reason7#hce71 and not by sense4 ,hyl4 ,you are in the right4 ,phil4 ,pray let me know what reasoning your belief of ,matter is grounded on2 and what this ,matter is1 in your present sense of it4 ,hyl4 ,i find myself affected with various ideas whereof ,i know ,i am not the cause2 neither are they the cause of themselves1 or of one another1 or capable of subsisting by themselves1 as being altogether inactive1 fleeting1 dependent beings4 ,they have therefore some cause distinct from me and them3 of which ,i pretend to know no more than that it is the cause of my ideas4 ,and this thing whatever it be1 ,i call ,matter4 ,phil4 ,tell me1 ,hylas1 hath every one a liberty to change the current proper signification attached to a common name in any language8 ,for example1 suppose a traveller should tell you that in a certain country men pass unhurt through the fire2 and1 upon explaining himself1 you found he meant by the word fire that which others call water4 ,or1 if he should assert that there are trees that walk upon two legs1 meaning men by the term trees4 ,would you think this reasonable8 ,hyl4 ,no2 ,i should think it very absurd4 ,common custom is the standard of propriety in language4 ,and for any man to affect speaking improperly is to pervert the use of speech1 and can never serve to a better purpose than to protract and multiply disputes where there is no difference in opinion4 ,phil4 ,and doth not ,matter1 in the common current acceptation of the word1 signify an extended solid moveable1 unthinking1 inactive ,substance8 ,hyl4 ,it doth4 ,phil4 ,and1 hath it not been made evident that no such substance can possibly exist7#hcf78 ,and1 though it should be allowed to exist1 yet how can that which is inactive be a cause2 or that which is unthinking be a cause of thought8 ,you may1 indeed1 if you please1 annex to the word ,matter a contrary meaning to what is vulgarly received2 and tell me you understand by it1 an unextended1 thinking1 active being1 which is the cause of our ideas4 ,but what else is this than to play with words1 and run into that very fault you just now condemned with so much reason8 ,i do by no means find fault with your reasoning1 in that you collect a cause from the phenomena3 but ,i deny that the cause deducible by reason can properly be termed ,matter7#hcg74 ,hyl4 ,there is indeed something in what you say4 ,but ,i am afraid you do not thoroughly comprehend my meaning4 ,i would by no means be thought to deny that ,god1 or an infinite ,spirit1 is the ,supreme ,cause of all things4 ,all ,i contend for is1 that1 subordinate to the ,supreme ,agent1 there is a cause of a limited and inferior nature1 which concurs in the production of our ideas1 not by any act of will1 or spiritual efficiency1 but by that kind of action which belongs to ,matter1 viz4 motion4 ,phil4 ,i find you are at every turn relapsing into your old exploded conceit1 of a moveable1 and consequently an extended1 substance1 existing without the mind4 ,what6 ,have you already forgotten you were convinced2 or are you willing ,i should repeat what has been said on that head8 ,in truth this is not fair dealing in you1 still to suppose the being of that which you have so often acknowledged to have no being4 ,but1 not to insist farther on what has been so largely handled1 ,i ask whether all your ideas are not perfectly passive and inert1 including nothing of action in them7#hch74 ,hyl4 ,they are4 ,phil4 ,and are sensible qualities anything else but ideas8 ,hyl4 ,how often have ,i acknowledged that they are not4 ,phil4 ,but is not motion a sensible quality8 ,hyl4 ,it is4 ,phil4 ,consequently it is no action8 ,hyl4 ,i agree with you4 ,and indeed it is very plain that when ,i stir my finger1 it remains passive2 but my will which produced the motion is active4 ,phil4 ,now1 ,i desire to know1 in the first place1 whether1 motion being allowed to be no action1 you can conceive any action besides volition3 and1 in the second place1 whether to say something and conceive nothing be not to talk nonsense7#hci73 and1 lastly1 whether1 having considered the premises1 you do not perceive that to suppose any efficient or active ,cause of our ideas1 other than ,spirit1 is highly absurd and unreasonable8 ,hyl4 ,i give up the point entirely4 ,but1 though ,matter may not be a cause1 yet what hinders its being an instrument1 subservient to the supreme ,agent in the production of our ideas8 ,phil4 ,an instrument say you2 pray what may be the figure1 springs1 wheels1 and motions1 of that instrument8 ,hyl4 ,those ,i pretend to determine nothing of1 both the substance and its qualities being entirely unknown to me4 ,phil4 ,what8 ,you are then of opinion it is made up of unknown parts1 that it hath unknown motions1 and an unknown shape8 ,hyl4 ,i do not believe that it hath any figure or motion at all1 being already convinced1 that no sensible qualities can exist in an unperceiving substance4 ,phil4 ,but what notion is it possible to frame of an instrument void of all sensible qualities1 even extension itself8 ,hyl4 ,i do not pretend to have any notion of it4 ,phil4 ,and what reason have you to think this unknown1 this inconceivable ,somewhat doth exist8 ,is it that you imagine ,god cannot act as well without it2 or that you find by experience the use of some such thing1 when you form ideas in your own mind8 ,hyl4 ,you are always teasing me for reasons of my belief4 ,pray what reasons have you not to believe it8 ,phil4 ,it is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence of anything1 if ,i see no reason for believing it4 ,but1 not to insist on reasons for believing1 you will not so much as let me know what it is you would have me believe2 since you say you have no manner of notion of it4 ,after all1 let me entreat you to consider whether it be like a philosopher1 or even like a man of common sense1 to pretend to believe you know not what1 and you know not why4 ,hyl4 ,hold1 ,philonous4 ,when ,i tell you ,matter is an instrument1 ,i do not mean altogether nothing4 ,it is true ,i know not the particular kind of instrument2 but1 however1 ,i have some notion of instrument in general1 which ,i apply to it4 ,phil4 ,but what if it should prove that there is something1 even in the most general notion of instrument1 as taken in a distinct sense from cause1 which makes the use of it inconsistent with the ,divine attributes8 ,hyl4 ,make that appear and ,i shall give up the point4 ,phil4 ,what mean you by the general nature or notion of instrument8 ,hyl4 ,that which is common to all particular instruments composeth the general notion4 ,phil4 ,is it not common to all instruments1 that they are applied to the doing those things only which cannot be performed by the mere act of our wills8 ,thus1 for instance1 ,i never use an instrument to move my finger1 because it is done by a volition4 ,but ,i should use one if ,i were to remove part of a rock1 or tear up a tree by the roots4 ,are you of the same mind8 ,or1 can you shew any example where an instrument is made use of in producing an effect immediately depending on the will of the agent8 ,hyl4 ,i own ,i cannot4 ,phil4 ,how therefore can you suppose that an ,all-perfect ,spirit1 on whose ,will all things have an absolute and immediate dependence1 should need an instrument in his operations1 or1 not needing it1 make use of it8 ,thus it seems to me that you are obliged to own the use of a lifeless inactive instrument to be incompatible with the infinite perfection of ,god2 that is1 by your own confession1 to give up the point4 ,hyl4 ,it doth not readily occur what ,i can answer you4 ,phil4 ,but1 methinks you should be ready to own the truth1 when it has been fairly proved to you4 ,we indeed1 who are beings of finite powers1 are forced to make use of instruments4 ,and the use of an instrument sheweth the agent to be limited by rules of another's prescription1 and that he cannot obtain his end but in such a way1 and by such conditions4 ,whence it seems a clear consequence1 that the supreme unlimited ,agent useth no tool or instrument at all4 ,the will of an ,omnipotent ,spirit is no sooner exerted than executed1 without the application of means2 which1 if they are employed by inferior agents1 it is not upon account of any real efficacy that is in them1 or necessary aptitude to produce any effect1 but merely in compliance with the laws of nature1 or those conditions prescribed to them by the ,first ,cause1 who is ,himself above all limitation or prescription whatsoever7#hdj74 ,hyl4 ,i will no longer maintain that ,matter is an instrument4 ,however1 ,i would not be understood to give up its existence neither2 since1 notwithstanding what hath been said1 it may still be an occasion7#hda74 ,phil4 ,how many shapes is your ,matter to take8 ,or1 how often must it be proved not to exist1 before you are content to part with it8 ,but1 to say no more of this 7though by all the laws of disputation ,i may justly blame you for so frequently changing the signification of the principal term7--,i would fain know what you mean by affirming that matter is an occasion1 having already denied it to be a cause4 ,and1 when you have shewn in what sense you understand occasion1 pray1 in the next place1 be pleased to shew me what reason induceth you to believe there is such an occasion of our ideas8 ,hyl4 ,as to the first point3 by occasion ,i mean an inactive unthinking being1 at the presence whereof ,god excites ideas in our minds4 ,phil4 ,and what may be the nature of that inactive unthinking being8 ,hyl4 ,i know nothing of its nature4 ,phil4 ,proceed then to the second point1 and assign some reason why we should allow an existence to this inactive1 unthinking1 unknown thing4 ,hyl4 ,when we see ideas produced in our minds1 after an orderly and constant manner1 it is natural to think they have some fixed and regular occasions1 at the presence of which they are excited4 ,phil4 ,you acknowledge then ,god alone to be the cause of our ideas1 and that ,he causes them at the presence of those occasions4 ,hyl4 ,that is my opinion4 ,phil4 ,those things which you say are present to ,god1 without doubt ,he perceives4 ,hyl4 ,certainly2 otherwise they could not be to ,him an occasion of acting4 ,phil4 ,not to insist now on your making sense of this hypothesis1 or answering all the puzzling questions and difficulties it is liable to3 ,i only ask whether the order and regularity observable in the series of our ideas1 or the course of nature1 be not sufficiently accounted for by the wisdom and power of ,god2 and whether it doth not derogate from those attributes1 to suppose ,he is influenced1 directed1 or put in mind1 when and what ,he is to act1 by an unthinking substance8 ,and1 lastly1 whether1 in case ,i granted all you contend for1 it would make anything to your purpose2 it not being easy to conceive how the external or absolute existence of an unthinking substance1 distinct from its being perceived1 can be inferred from my allowing that there are certain things perceived by the mind of ,god1 which are to ,him the occasion of producing ideas in us8 ,hyl4 ,i am perfectly at a loss what to think1 this notion of occasion seeming now altogether as groundless as the rest4 ,phil4 ,do you not at length perceive that in all these different acceptations of ,matter1 you have been only supposing you know not what1 for no manner of reason1 and to no kind of use8 ,hyl4 ,i freely own myself less fond of my notions since they have been so accurately examined4 ,but still1 methinks1 ,i have some confused perception that there is such a thing as ,matter4 ,phil4 ,either you perceive the being of ,matter immediately or mediately4 ,if immediately1 pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it4 ,if mediately1 let me know by what reasoning it is inferred from those things which you perceive immediately4 ,so much for the perception4 ,then for the ,matter itself1 ,i ask whether it is object1 substratum1 cause1 instrument1 or occasion8 ,you have already pleaded for each of these1 shifting your notions1 and making ,matter to appear sometimes in one shape1 then in another4 ,and what you have offered hath been disapproved and rejected by yourself4 ,if you have anything new to advance ,i would gladly hear it4 ,hyl4 ,i think ,i have already offered all ,i had to say on those heads4 ,i am at a loss what more to urge4 ,phil4 ,and yet you are loath to part with your old prejudice4 ,but1 to make you quit it more easily1 ,i desire that1 beside what has been hitherto suggested1 you will farther consider whether1 upon supposition that ,matter exists1 you can possibly conceive how you should be affected by it4 ,or1 supposing it did not exist1 whether it be not evident you might for all that be affected with the same ideas you now are1 and consequently have the very same reasons to believe its existence that you now can have7#hdb74 ,hyl4 ,i acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things just as we do now1 though there was no ,matter in the world2 neither can ,i conceive1 if there be ,matter1 how it should produce any idea in our minds4 ,and1 ,i do farther grant you have entirely satisfied me that it is impossible there should be such a thing as ,matter in any of the foregoing acceptations4 ,but still ,i cannot help supposing that there is ,matter in some sense or other4 ,what that is ,i do not indeed pretend to determine4 ,phil4 ,i do not expect you should define exactly the nature of that unknown being4 ,only be pleased to tell me whether it is a ,substance2 and if so1 whether you can suppose a ,substance without accidents2 or1 in case you suppose it to have accidents or qualities1 ,i desire you will let me know what those qualities are1 at least what is meant by ,matter's supporting them8 ,hyl4 ,we have already argued on those points4 ,i have no more to say to them4 ,but1 to prevent any farther questions1 let me tell you ,i at present understand by ,matter neither substance nor accident1 thinking nor extended being1 neither cause1 instrument1 nor occasion1 but ,something entirely unknown1 distinct from all these7#hdc74 ,phil4 ,it seems then you include in your present notion of ,matter nothing but the general abstract idea of entity4 ,hyl4 ,nothing else2 save only that ,i superadd to this general idea the negation of all those particular things1 qualities1 or ideas1 that ,i perceive1 imagine1 or in anywise apprehend4 ,phil4 ,pray where do you suppose this unknown ,matter to exist8 ,hyl4 ,oh ,philonous6 now you think you have entangled me2 for1 if ,i say it exists in place1 then you will infer that it exists in the mind1 since it is agreed that place or extension exists only in the mind4 ,but ,i am not ashamed to own my ignorance4 ,i know not where it exists2 only ,i am sure it exists not in place4 ,there is a negative answer for you4 ,and you must expect no other to all the questions you put for the future about ,matter4 ,phil4 ,since you will not tell me where it exists1 be pleased to inform me after what manner you suppose it to exist1 or what you mean by its existence8 ,hyl4 ,it neither thinks nor acts1 neither perceives nor is perceived4 ,phil4 ,but what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its existence8 ,hyl4 ,upon a nice observation1 ,i do not find ,i have any positive notion or meaning at all4 ,i tell you again1 ,i am not ashamed to own my ignorance4 ,i know not what is meant by its existence1 or how it exists4 ,phil4 ,continue1 good ,hylas1 to act the same ingenuous part1 and tell me sincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of ,entity in general1 prescinded from and exclusive of all thinking and corporeal beings7#hdd71 all particular things whatsoever4 ,hyl4 ,hold1 let me think a little----,i profess1 ,philonous1 ,i do not find that ,i can4 ,at first glance1 methought ,i had some dilute and airy notion of ,pure ,entity in abstract2 but1 upon closer attention1 it hath quite vanished out of sight4 ,the more ,i think on it1 the more am ,i confirmed in my prudent resolution of giving none but negative answers1 and not pretending to the least degree of any positive knowledge or conception of ,matter1 its where1 its how1 its entity1 or anything belonging to it4 ,phil4 ,when1 therefore1 you speak of the existence of ,matter1 you have not any notion in your mind8 ,hyl4 ,none at all4 ,phil4 ,pray tell me if the case stands not thus3--,at first1 from a belief of material substance1 you would have it that the immediate objects existed without the mind2 then that they are archetypes2 then causes2 next instruments2 then occasions3 lastly1 something in general1 which being interpreted proves nothing4 ,so ,matter comes to nothing4 ,what think you1 ,hylas1 is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding8 ,hyl4 ,be that as it will1 yet ,i still insist upon it1 that our not being able to conceive a thing is no argument against its existence4 ,phil4 ,that from a cause1 effect1 operation1 sign1 or other circumstance1 there may reasonably be inferred the existence of a thing not immediately perceived2 and that it were absurd for any man to argue against the existence of that thing1 from his having no direct and positive notion of it1 ,i freely own4 ,but1 where there is nothing of all this2 where neither reason nor revelation induces us to believe the existence of a thing2 where we have not even a relative notion of it2 where an abstraction is made from perceiving and being perceived1 from ,spirit and idea3 lastly1 where there is not so much as the most inadequate or faint idea pretended to--,i will not indeed thence conclude against the reality of any notion1 or existence of anything2 but my inference shall be1 that you mean nothing at all2 that you employ words to no manner of purpose1 without any design or signification whatsoever4 ,and ,i leave it to you to consider how mere jargon should be treated4 ,hyl4 ,to deal frankly with you1 ,philonous1 your arguments seem in themselves unanswerable2 but they have not so great an effect on me as to produce that entire conviction1 that hearty acquiescence1 which attends demonstration7#hde74 ,i find myself still relapsing into an obscure surmise of ,i know not what1 matter4 ,phil4 ,but1 are you not sensible1 ,hylas1 that two things must concur to take away all scruple1 and work a plenary assent in the mind8 ,let a visible object be set in never so clear a light1 yet1 if there is any imperfection in the sight1 or if the eye is not directed towards it1 it will not be distinctly seen4 ,and though a demonstration be never so well grounded and fairly proposed1 yet1 if there is withal a stain of prejudice1 or a wrong bias on the understanding1 can it be expected on a sudden to perceive clearly1 and adhere firmly to the truth8 ,no2 there is need of time and pains3 the attention must be awakened and detained by a frequent repetition of the same thing placed oft in the same1 oft in different lights4 ,i have said it already1 and find ,i must still repeat and inculcate1 that it is an unaccountable licence you take1 in pretending to maintain you know not what1 for you know not what reason1 to you know not what purpose4 ,can this be paralleled in any art or science1 any sect or profession of men8 ,or is there anything so barefacedly groundless and unreasonable to be met with even in the lowest of common conversation8 ,but1 perhaps you will still say1 ,matter may exist2 though at the same time you neither know what is meant by ,matter1 or by its existence4 ,this indeed is surprising1 and the more so because it is altogether voluntary 7#hdf7 and of your own head1 you not being led to it by any one reason2 for ,i challenge you to shew me that thing in nature which needs ,matter to explain or account for it4 ,hyl4 ,the reality of things cannot be maintained without supposing the existence of ,matter4 ,and is not this1 think you1 a good reason why ,i should be earnest in its defence8 ,phil4 ,the reality of things6 ,what things8 sensible or intelligible8 ,hyl4 ,sensible things4 ,phil4 ,my glove for example8 ,hyl4 ,that1 or any other thing perceived by the senses4 ,phil4 ,but to fix on some particular thing4 ,is it not a sufficient evidence to me of the existence of this glove1 that ,i see it1 and feel it1 and wear it8 ,or1 if this will not do1 how is it possible ,i should be assured of the reality of this thing1 which ,i actually see in this place1 by supposing that some unknown thing1 which ,i never did or can see1 exists after an unknown manner1 in an unknown place1 or in no place at all8 ,how can the supposed reality of that which is intangible be a proof that anything tangible really exists8 ,or1 of that which is invisible1 that any visible thing1 or1 in general of anything which is imperceptible1 that a perceptible exists8 ,do but explain this and ,i shall think nothing too hard for you4 ,hyl4 ,upon the whole1 ,i am content to own the existence of ,matter is highly improbable2 but the direct and absolute impossibility of it does not appear to me4 ,phil4 ,but granting ,matter to be possible1 yet1 upon that account merely1 it can have no more claim to existence than a golden mountain1 or a centaur4 ,hyl4 ,i acknowledge it2 but still you do not deny it is possible2 and that which is possible1 for aught you know1 may actually exist4 ,phil4 ,i deny it to be possible2 and have1 if ,i mistake not1 evidently proved1 from your own concessions1 that it is not4 ,in the common sense of the word ,matter1 is there any more implied than an extended1 solid1 figured1 moveable substance1 existing without the mind8 ,and have not you acknowledged1 over and over1 that you have seen evident reason for denying the possibility of such a substance8 ,hyl4 ,true1 but that is only one sense of the term ,matter4 ,phil4 ,but is it not the only proper genuine received sense8 ,and1 if ,matter1 in such a sense1 be proved impossible1 may it not be thought with good grounds absolutely impossible8 ,else how could anything be proved impossible8 ,or1 indeed1 how could there be any proof at all one way or other1 to a man who takes the liberty to unsettle and change the common signification of words8 ,hyl4 ,i thought philosophers might be allowed to speak more accurately than the vulgar1 and were not always confined to the common acceptation of a term4 ,phil4 ,but this now mentioned is the common received sense among philosophers themselves4 ,but1 not to insist on that1 have you not been allowed to take ,matter in what sense you pleased8 ,and have you not used this privilege in the utmost extent2 sometimes entirely changing1 at others leaving out1 or putting into the definition of it whatever1 for the present1 best served your design1 contrary to all the known rules of reason and logic8 ,and hath not this shifting1 unfair method of yours spun out our dispute to an unnecessary length2 ,matter having been particularly examined1 and by your own confession refuted in each of those senses8 ,and can any more be required to prove the absolute impossibility of a thing1 than the proving it impossible in every particular sense that either you or any one else understands it in8 ,hyl4 ,but ,i am not so thoroughly satisfied that you have proved the impossibility of ,matter1 in the last most obscure abstracted and indefinite sense4 ,phil4 ,when is a thing shewn to be impossible8 ,hyl4 ,when a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas comprehended in its definition4 ,phil4 ,but where there are no ideas1 there no repugnancy can be demonstrated between ideas8 ,hyl4 ,i agree with you4 ,phil4 ,now1 in that which you call the obscure indefinite sense of the word ,matter1 it is plain1 by your own confession1 there was included no idea at all1 no sense except an unknown sense2 which is the same thing as none4 ,you are not1 therefore1 to expect ,i should prove a repugnancy between ideas1 where there are no ideas2 or the impossibility of ,matter taken in an unknown sense1 that is1 no sense at all4 ,my business was only to shew you meant nothing2 and this you were brought to own4 ,so that1 in all your various senses1 you have been shewed either to mean nothing at all1 or1 if anything1 an absurdity4 ,and if this be not sufficient to prove the impossibility of a thing1 ,i desire you will let me know what is4 ,hyl4 ,i acknowledge you have proved that ,matter is impossible2 nor do ,i see what more can be said in defence of it4 ,but1 at the same time that ,i give up this1 ,i suspect all my other notions4 ,for surely none could be more seemingly evident than this once was3 and yet it now seems as false and absurd as ever it did true before4 ,but ,i think we have discussed the point sufficiently for the present4 ,the remaining part of the day ,i would willingly spend in running over in my thoughts the several heads of this morning's conversation1 and to-morrow shall be glad to meet you here again about the same time4 ,phil4 ,i will not fail to attend you4 ,the ,third ,dialogue ,philonous4 7#hdg7,tell me1 ,hylas1 what are the fruits of yesterday's meditation8 ,has it confirmed you in the same mind you were in at parting8 or have you since seen cause to change your opinion8 ,hylas4 ,truly my opinion is that all our opinions are alike vain and uncertain4 ,what we approve to-day1 we condemn to-morrow4 ,we keep a stir about knowledge1 and spend our lives in the pursuit of it1 when1 alas6 we know nothing all the while3 nor do ,i think it possible for us ever to know anything in this life4 ,our faculties are too narrow and too few4 ,nature certainly never intended us for speculation4 ,phil4 ,what6 ,say you we can know nothing1 ,hylas8 ,hyl4 ,there is not that single thing in the world whereof we can know the real nature1 or what it is in itself4 ,phil4 ,will you tell me ,i do not really know what fire or water is8 ,hyl4 ,you may indeed know that fire appears hot1 and water fluid2 but this is no more than knowing what sensations are produced in your own mind1 upon the application of fire and water to your organs of sense4 ,their internal constitution1 their true and real nature1 you are utterly in the dark as to that4 ,phil4 ,do ,i not know this to be a real stone that ,i stand on1 and that which ,i see before my eyes to be a real tree8 ,hyl4 ,know8 ,no1 it is impossible you or any man alive should know it4 ,all you know is1 that you have such a certain idea or appearance in your own mind4 ,but what is this to the real tree or stone8 ,i tell you that colour1 figure1 and hardness1 which you perceive1 are not the real natures of those things1 or in the least like them4 ,the same may be said of all other real things1 or corporeal substances1 which compose the world4 ,they have none of them anything of themselves1 like those sensible qualities by us perceived4 ,we should not therefore pretend to affirm or know anything of them1 as they are in their own nature4 ,phil4 ,but surely1 ,hylas1 ,i can distinguish gold1 for example1 from iron3 and how could this be1 if ,i knew not what either truly was8 ,hyl4 ,believe me1 ,philonous1 you can only distinguish between your own ideas4 ,that yellowness1 that weight1 and other sensible qualities1 think you they are really in the gold8 ,they are only relative to the senses1 and have no absolute existence in nature4 ,and in pretending to distinguish the species of real things1 by the appearances in your mind1 you may perhaps act as wisely as he that should conclude two men were of a different species1 because their clothes were not of the same colour4 ,phil4 ,it seems1 then1 we are altogether put off with the appearances of things1 and those false ones too4 ,the very meat ,i eat1 and the cloth ,i wear1 have nothing in them like what ,i see and feel4 ,hyl4 ,even so4 ,phil4 ,but is it not strange the whole world should be thus imposed on1 and so foolish as to believe their senses8 ,and yet ,i know not how it is1 but men eat1 and drink1 and sleep1 and perform all the offices of life1 as comfortably and conveniently as if they really knew the things they are conversant about4 ,hyl4 ,they do so3 but you know ordinary practice does not require a nicety of speculative knowledge4 ,hence the vulgar retain their mistakes1 and for all that make a shift to bustle through the affairs of life4 ,but philosophers know better things4 ,phil4 ,you mean1 they know that they know nothing4 ,hyl4 ,that is the very top and perfection of human knowledge4 ,phil4 ,but are you all this while in earnest1 ,hylas2 and are you seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the world8 ,suppose you are going to write1 would you not call for pen1 ink1 and paper1 like another man2 and do you not know what it is you call for8 ,hyl4 ,how often must ,i tell you1 that ,i know not the real nature of any one thing in the universe8 ,i may indeed upon occasion make use of pen1 ink1 and paper4 ,but what any one of them is in its own true nature1 ,i declare positively ,i know not4 ,and the same is true with regard to every other corporeal thing4 ,and1 what is more1 we are not only ignorant of the true and real nature of things1 but even of their existence4 ,it cannot be denied that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas2 but it cannot be concluded from thence that bodies really exist4 ,nay1 now ,i think on it1 ,i must1 agreeably to my former concessions1 farther declare that it is impossible any real corporeal thing should exist in nature4 ,phil4 ,you amaze me4 ,was ever anything more wild and extravagant than the notions you now maintain3 and is it not evident you are led into all these extravagances by the belief of material substance8 ,this makes you dream of those unknown natures7#hdh7 in everything4 ,it is this occasions your distinguishing between the reality and sensible appearances of things4 ,it is to this you are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else knows perfectly well4 ,nor is this all3 you are not only ignorant of the true nature of everything1 but you know not whether anything really exists1 or whether there are any true natures at all2 forasmuch as you attribute to your material beings an absolute or external existence1 wherein you suppose their reality consists4 ,and1 as you are forced in the end to acknowledge such an existence means either a direct repugnancy1 or nothing at all1 it follows that you are obliged to pull down your own hypothesis of material ,substance1 and positively to deny the real existence of any part of the universe4 ,and so you are plunged into the deepest and most deplorable scepticism that ever man was7#hdi74 ,tell me1 ,hylas1 is it not as ,i say8 ,hyl4 ,i agree with you4 ,material substance was no more than an hypothesis2 and a false and groundless one too4 ,i will no longer spend my breath in defence of it4 ,but whatever hypothesis you advance1 or whatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its stead1 ,i doubt not it will appear every whit as false3 let me but be allowed to question you upon it4 ,that is1 suffer me to serve you in your own kind1 and ,i warrant it shall conduct you through as many perplexities and contradictions1 to the very same state of scepticism that ,i myself am in at present4 ,phil4 ,i assure you1 ,hylas1 ,i do not pretend to frame any hypothesis at all7#hej74 ,i am of a vulgar cast1 simple enough to believe my senses1 and leave things as ,i find them4 ,to be plain1 it is my opinion that the real things are those very things ,i see1 and feel1 and perceive7#hea7 by my senses4 ,these ,i know2 and1 finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life1 have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings4 ,a piece of sensible bread1 for instance1 would stay my stomach better than ten thousand times as much of that insensible1 unintelligible1 real bread you speak of4 ,it is likewise my opinion that colours and other sensible qualities are on the objects4 ,i cannot for my life help thinking that snow is white1 and fire hot4 ,you indeed1 who by snow and fire mean certain external1 unperceived1 unperceiving substances1 are in the right to deny whiteness or heat to be affections inherent in them4 ,but ,i1 who understand by those words the things ,i see and feel1 am obliged to think like other folks4 ,and1 as ,i am no sceptic with regard to the nature of things1 so neither am ,i as to their existence4 ,that a thing should be really perceived by my senses7#heb71 and at the same time not really exist1 is to me a plain contradiction2 since ,i cannot prescind or abstract1 even in thought1 the existence of a sensible thing from its being perceived4 ,wood1 stones1 fire1 water1 flesh1 iron1 and the like things1 which ,i name and discourse of1 are things that ,i know4 ,and ,i should not have known them but that ,i perceived them by my senses2 and things perceived by the senses are immediately perceived2 and things immediately perceived are ideas2 and ideas cannot exist without the mind2 their existence therefore consists in being perceived2 when1 therefore1 they are actually perceived there can be no doubt of their existence4 ,away then with all that scepticism1 all those ridiculous philosophical doubts4 ,what a jest is it for a philosopher to question the existence of sensible things1 till he hath it proved to him from the veracity of ,god7#hec72 or to pretend our knowledge in this point falls short of intuition or demonstration7#hed76 ,i might as well doubt of my own being1 as of the being of those things ,i actually see and feel4 ,hyl4 ,not so fast1 ,philonous3 you say you cannot conceive how sensible things should exist without the mind4 ,do you not8 ,phil4 ,i do4 ,hyl4 ,supposing you were annihilated1 cannot you conceive it possible that things perceivable by sense may still exist7#hee78 ,phil4 ,i can2 but then it must be in another mind4 ,when ,i deny sensible things an existence out of the mind1 ,i do not mean my mind in particular1 but all minds4 ,now1 it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind2 since ,i find them by experience to be independent of it7#hef74 ,there is therefore some other ,mind wherein they exist1 during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them3 as likewise they did before my birth1 and would do after my supposed annihilation4 ,and1 as the same is true with regard to all other finite created spirits1 it necessarily follows there is an omnipresent eternal ,mind1 which knows and comprehends all things1 and exhibits them to our view in such a manner1 and according to such rules1 as ,he ,himself hath ordained1 and are by us termed the laws of nature7#heg74 ,hyl4 ,answer me1 ,philonous4 ,are all our ideas perfectly inert beings8 ,or have they any agency included in them8 ,phil4 ,they are altogether passive and inert7#heh74 ,hyl4 ,and is not ,god an agent1 a being purely active8 ,phil4 ,i acknowledge it4 ,hyl4 ,no idea therefore can be like unto1 or represent the nature of ,god8 ,phil4 ,it cannot4 ,hyl4 ,since therefore you have no idea of the mind of ,god1 how can you conceive it possible that things should exist in ,his mind8 ,or1 if you can conceive the mind of ,god1 without having an idea of it1 why may not ,i be allowed to conceive the existence of ,matter1 notwithstanding ,i have no idea of it8 ,phil4 ,as to your first question3 ,i own ,i have properly no idea1 either of ,god or any other spirit2 for these being active1 cannot be represented by things perfectly inert1 as our ideas are4 ,i do nevertheless know that ,i1 who am a spirit or thinking substance1 exist as certainly as ,i know my ideas exist7#hei74 ,farther1 ,i know what ,i mean by the terms ,i and myself2 and ,i know this immediately or intuitively1 though ,i do not perceive it as ,i perceive a triangle1 a colour1 or a sound4 ,the ,mind1 ,spirit1 or ,soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks1 acts1 and perceives4 ,i say indivisible1 because unextended2 and unextended1 because extended1 figured1 moveable things are ideas2 and that which perceives ideas1 which thinks and wills1 is plainly itself no idea1 nor like an idea4 ,ideas are things inactive1 and perceived4 ,and ,spirits a sort of beings altogether different from them4 ,i do not therefore say my soul is an idea1 or like an idea4 ,however1 taking the word idea in a large sense1 my soul may be said to furnish me with an idea1 that is1 an image or likeness of ,god--though indeed extremely inadequate4 ,for1 all the notion ,i have of ,god is obtained by reflecting on my own soul1 heightening its powers1 and removing its imperfections4 ,i have1 therefore1 though not an inactive idea1 yet in myself some sort of an active thinking image of the ,deity4 ,and1 though ,i perceive ,him not by sense1 yet ,i have a notion of ,him1 or know ,him by reflexion and reasoning4 ,my own mind and my own ideas ,i have an immediate knowledge of2 and1 by the help of these1 do mediately apprehend the possibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas7#hfj74 ,farther1 from my own being1 and from the dependency ,i find in myself and my ideas1 ,i do1 by an act of reason7#hfa71 necessarily infer the existence of a ,god1 and of all created things in the mind of ,god4 ,so much for your first question4 ,for the second3 ,i suppose by this time you can answer it yourself4 ,for you neither perceive ,matter7#hfb7 objectively1 as you do an inactive being or idea2 nor know it1 as you do yourself1 by a reflex act7#hfc72 neither do you mediately apprehend it by similitude of the one or the other7#hfd72 nor yet collect it by reasoning from that which you know immediately7#hfe74 ,all which makes the case of ,matter widely different from that of the ,deity4 7#hff7;,hyl4 ,you say your own soul supplies you with some sort of an idea or image of ,god4 ,but1 at the same time1 you acknowledge you have1 properly speaking1 no idea of your own soul4 ,you even affirm that spirits are a sort of beings altogether different from ideas4 ,consequently that no idea can be like a spirit4 ,we have therefore no idea of any spirit4 ,you admit nevertheless that there is spiritual ,substance1 although you have no idea of it2 while you deny there can be such a thing as material ,substance1 because you have no notion or idea of it4 ,is this fair dealing8 ,to act consistently1 you must either admit ,matter or reject ,spirit4 ,what say you to this8 ,phil4 ,i say1 in the first place1 that ,i do not deny the existence of material substance1 merely because ,i have no notion of it1 but because the notion of it is inconsistent2 or1 in other words1 because it is repugnant that there should be a notion of it4 ,many things1 for aught ,i know1 may exist1 whereof neither ,i nor any other man hath or can have any idea or notion whatsoever4 ,but then those things must be possible1 that is1 nothing inconsistent must be included in their definition4 ,i say1 secondly1 that1 although we believe things to exist which we do not perceive1 yet we may not believe that any particular thing exists1 without some reason for such belief3 but ,i have no reason for believing the existence of ,matter4 ,i have no immediate intuition thereof3 neither can ,i immediately from my sensations1 ideas1 notions1 actions1 or passions1 infer an unthinking1 unperceiving1 inactive ,substance--either by probable deduction1 or necessary consequence4 ,whereas the being of my ,self1 that is1 my own soul1 mind1 or thinking principle1 ,i evidently know by reflexion7#hfg74 ,you will forgive me if ,i repeat the same things in answer to the same objections4 ,in the very notion or definition of material ,substance1 there is included a manifest repugnance and inconsistency4 ,but this cannot be said of the notion of ,spirit4 ,that ideas should exist in what doth not perceive1 or be produced by what doth not act1 is repugnant4 ,but1 it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should be the subject of ideas1 or an active thing the cause of them4 ,it is granted we have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of other finite spirits2 but it will not thence follow that such spirits are on a foot with material substances3 if to suppose the one be inconsistent1 and it be not inconsistent to suppose the other2 if the one can be inferred by no argument1 and there is a probability for the other2 if we see signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like ourselves1 and see no sign or symptom whatever that leads to a rational belief of ,matter4 ,i say1 lastly1 that ,i have a notion of ,spirit1 though ,i have not1 strictly speaking1 an idea of it7#hfh74 ,i do not perceive it as an idea1 or by means of an idea1 but know it by reflexion4 ,hyl4 ,notwithstanding all you have said1 to me it seems that1 according to your own way of thinking1 and in consequence of your own principles1 it should follow that you are only a system of floating ideas1 without any substance to support them4 ,words are not to be used without a meaning4 ,and1 as there is no more meaning in spiritual ,substance than in material ,substance1 the one is to be exploded as well as the other4 ,phil4 ,how often must ,i repeat1 that ,i know or am conscious of my own being2 and that ,i myself am not my ideas1 but somewhat else7#hfi71 a thinking1 active principle that perceives1 knows1 wills1 and operates about ideas4 ,i know that ,i1 one and the same self1 perceive both colours and sounds3 that a colour cannot perceive a sound1 nor a sound a colour3 that ,i am therefore one individual principle1 distinct from colour and sound2 and1 for the same reason1 from all other sensible things and inert ideas4 ,but1 ,i am not in like manner conscious either of the existence or essence of ,matter7#hgj74 ,on the contrary1 ,i know that nothing inconsistent can exist1 and that the existence of ,matter implies an inconsistency4 ,farther1 ,i know what ,i mean when ,i affirm that there is a spiritual substance or support of ideas1 that is1 that a spirit knows and perceives ideas4 ,but1 ,i do not know what is meant when it is said that an unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or the archetypes of ideas4 ,there is therefore upon the whole no parity of case between ,spirit and ,matter4 ,hyl4 ,i own myself satisfied in this point4 ,but1 do you in earnest think the real existence of sensible things consists in their being actually perceived8 ,if so2 how comes it that all mankind distinguish between them8 ,ask the first man you meet1 and he shall tell you1 to be perceived is one thing1 and to exist is another4 ,phil4 ,i am content1 ,hylas1 to appeal to the common sense of the world for the truth of my notion4 ,ask the gardener why he thinks yonder cherry-tree exists in the garden1 and he shall tell you1 because he sees and feels it2 in a word1 because he perceives it by his senses4 ,ask him why he thinks an orange-tree not to be there1 and he shall tell you1 because he does not perceive it4 ,what he perceives by sense1 that he terms a real being1 and saith it is or exists2 but1 that which is not perceivable1 the same1 he saith1 hath no being4 ,hyl4 ,yes1 ,philonous1 ,i grant the existence of a sensible thing consists in being perceivable1 but not in being actually perceived4 ,phil4 ,and what is perceivable but an idea8 ,and can an idea exist without being actually perceived8 ,these are points long since agreed between us4 ,hyl4 ,but1 be your opinion never so true1 yet surely you will not deny it is shocking1 and contrary to the common sense of men7#hga74 ,ask the fellow whether yonder tree hath an existence out of his mind3 what answer think you he would make8 ,phil4 ,the same that ,i should myself1 to wit1 that it doth exist out of his mind4 ,but then to a ,christian it cannot surely be shocking to say1 the real tree1 existing without his mind1 is truly known and comprehended by 7that is exists in7 the infinite mind of ,god4 ,probably he may not at first glance be aware of the direct and immediate proof there is of this2 inasmuch as the very being of a tree1 or any other sensible thing1 implies a mind wherein it is4 ,but the point itself he cannot deny4 ,the question between the ,materialists and me is not1 whether things have a real existence out of the mind of this or that person7#hgb71 but1 whether they have an absolute existence1 distinct from being perceived by ,god1 and exterior to all minds7#hgc74 ,this indeed some heathens and philosophers have affirmed1 but whoever entertains notions of the ,deity suitable to the ,holy ,scriptures will be of another opinion4 ,hyl4 ,but1 according to your notions1 what difference is there between real things1 and chimeras formed by the imagination1 or the visions of a dream--since they are all equally in the mind7#hgd78 ,phil4 ,the ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct2 they have1 besides1 an entire dependence on the will4 ,but the ideas perceived by sense1 that is1 real things1 are more vivid and clear2 and1 being imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us1 have not the like dependence on our will4 ,there is therefore no danger of confounding these with the foregoing3 and there is as little of confounding them with the visions of a dream1 which are dim1 irregular1 and confused4 ,and1 though they should happen to be never so lively and natural1 yet1 by their not being connected1 and of apiece with the preceding and subsequent transactions of our lives1 they might easily be distinguished from realities4 ,in short1 by whatever method you distinguish things from chimeras on your scheme1 the same1 it is evident1 will hold also upon mine4 ,for1 it must be1 ,i presume1 by some perceived difference2 and ,i am not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive4 ,hyl4 ,but still1 ,philonous1 you hold1 there is nothing in the world but spirits and ideas4 ,and this1 you must needs acknowledge1 sounds very oddly4 ,phil4 ,i own the word idea1 not being commonly used for thing1 sounds something out of the way4 ,my reason for using it was1 because a necessary relation to the mind is understood to be implied by that term2 and it is now commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate objects of the understanding4 ,but1 however oddly the proposition may sound in words1 yet it includes nothing so very strange or shocking in its sense2 which in effect amounts to no more than this1 to wit1 that there are only things perceiving1 and things perceived2 or that every unthinking being is necessarily1 and from the very nature of its existence1 perceived by some mind2 if not by a finite created mind1 yet certainly by the infinite mind of ,god1 in whom 'we live1 and move1 and have our being4' ,is this as strange as to say1 the sensible qualities are not on the objects3 or that we cannot be sure of the existence of things1 or know anything of their real natures--though we both see and feel them1 and perceive them by all our senses8 ,hyl4 ,and1 in consequence of this1 must we not think there are no such things as physical or corporeal causes2 but that a ,spirit is the immediate cause of all the phenomena in nature8 ,can there be anything more extravagant than this8 ,phil4 ,yes1 it is infinitely more extravagant to say--a thing which is inert operates on the mind1 and which is unperceiving is the cause of our perceptions1 7#hge7without any regard either to consistency1 or the old known axiom1 ,nothing can give to another that which it hath not itself4 ,besides1 that which to you1 ,i know not for what reason1 seems so extravagant is no more than the ,holy ,scriptures assert in a hundred places4 ,in them ,god is represented as the sole and immediate ,author of all those effects which some heathens and philosophers are wont to ascribe to ,nature1 ,matter1 ,fate1 or the like unthinking principle4 ,this is so much the constant language of ,scripture that it were needless to confirm it by citations4 ,hyl4 ,you are not aware1 ,philonous1 that1 in making ,god the immediate ,author of all the motions in nature1 you make ,him the ,author of murder1 sacrilege1 adultery1 and the like heinous sins4 ,phil4 ,in answer to that1 ,i observe1 first1 that the imputation of guilt is the same1 whether a person commits an action with or without an instrument4 ,in case therefore you suppose ,god to act by the mediation of an instrument1 or occasion1 called ,matter1 you as truly make ,him the author of sin as ,i1 who think ,him the immediate agent in all those operations vulgarly ascribed to ,nature4 ,i farther observe that sin or moral turpitude doth not consist in the outward physical action or motion1 but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion4 ,this is plain1 in that the killing an enemy in a battle1 or putting a criminal legally to death1 is not thought sinful2 though the outward act be the very same with that in the case of murder4 ,since1 therefore1 sin doth not consist in the physical action1 the making ,god an immediate cause of all such actions is not making ,him the ,author of sin4 ,lastly1 ,i have nowhere said that ,god is the only agent who produces all the motions in bodies4 ,it is true ,i have denied there are any other agents besides spirits2 but this is very consistent with allowing to thinking rational beings1 in the production of motions1 the use of limited powers1 ultimately indeed derived from ,god1 but immediately under the direction of their own wills1 which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions7#hgf74 ,hyl4 ,but the denying ,matter1 ,philonous1 or corporeal ,substance2 there is the point4 ,you can never persuade me that this is not repugnant to the universal sense of mankind4 ,were our dispute to be determined by most voices1 ,i am confident you would give up the point1 without gathering the votes4 ,phil4 ,i wish both our opinions were fairly stated and submitted to the judgment of men who had plain common sense1 without the prejudices of a learned education4 ,let me be represented as one who trusts his senses1 who thinks he knows the things he sees and feels1 and entertains no doubts of their existence2 and you fairly set forth with all your doubts1 your paradoxes1 and your scepticism about you1 and ,i shall willingly acquiesce in the determination of any indifferent person4 ,that there is no substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to me evident4 ,and that the objects immediately perceived are ideas1 is on all hands agreed7#hgg74 ,and that sensible qualities are objects immediately perceived no one can deny4 ,it is therefore evident there can be no substratum of those qualities but spirit2 in which they exist1 not by way of mode or property1 but as a thing perceived in that which perceives it7#hgh74 ,i deny therefore that there is any unthinking substratum of the objects of sense1 and in that acceptation that there is any material substance4 ,but if by material substance is meant only sensible body--that which is seen and felt 7and the unphilosophical part of the world1 ,i dare say1 mean no more7--then ,i am more certain of matter's existence than you or any other philosopher pretend to be4 ,if there be anything which makes the generality of mankind averse from the notions ,i espouse3 it is a misapprehension that ,i deny the reality of sensible things4 ,but1 as it is you who are guilty of that1 and not ,i1 it follows that in truth their aversion is against your notions and not mine4 ,i do therefore assert that ,i am as certain as of my own being1 that there are bodies or corporeal substances 7meaning the things ,i perceive by my senses72 and that1 granting this1 the bulk of mankind will take no thought about1 nor think themselves at all concerned in the fate of those unknown natures1 and philosophical quiddities1 which some men are so fond of4 ,hyl4 ,what say you to this8 ,since1 according to you1 men judge of the reality of things by their senses1 how can a man be mistaken in thinking the moon a plain lucid surface1 about a foot in diameter2 or a square tower1 seen at a distance1 round2 or an oar1 with one end in the water1 crooked8 ,phil4 ,he is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives1 but in the inferences he makes from his present perceptions4 ,thus1 in the case of the oar1 what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked2 and so far he is in the right4 ,but if he thence conclude that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness2 or that it would affect his touch as crooked things are wont to do3 in that he is mistaken4 ,in like manner1 if he shall conclude from what he perceives in one station1 that1 in case he advances towards the moon or tower1 he should still be affected with the like ideas1 he is mistaken4 ,but his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately1 and at present1 7it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that7 but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived3 or1 concerning the ideas that1 from what he perceives at present1 he imagines would be perceived in other circumstances4 ,the case is the same with regard to the ,copernican system4 ,we do not here perceive any motion of the earth3 but it were erroneous thence to conclude1 that1 in case we were placed at as great a distance from that as we are now from the other planets1 we should not then perceive its motion7#hgi74 ,hyl4 ,i understand you2 and must needs own you say things plausible enough4 ,but1 give me leave to put you in mind of one thing4 ,pray1 ,philonous1 were you not formerly as positive that ,matter existed1 as you are now that it does not8 ,phil4 ,i was4 ,but here lies the difference4 ,before1 my positiveness was founded1 without examination1 upon prejudice2 but now1 after inquiry1 upon evidence4 ,hyl4 ,after all1 it seems our dispute is rather about words than things4 ,we agree in the thing1 but differ in the name4 ,that we are affected with ideas from without is evident2 and it is no less evident that there must be 7,i will not say archetypes1 but7 ,powers without the mind7#hhj71 corresponding to those ideas4 ,and1 as these ,powers cannot subsist by themselves1 there is some subject of them necessarily to be admitted2 which ,i call ,matter1 and you call ,spirit4 ,this is all the difference4 ,phil4 ,pray1 ,hylas1 is that powerful ,being1 or subject of powers1 extended8 ,hyl4 ,it hath not extension2 but it hath the power to raise in you the idea of extension1 ,phil4 ,it is therefore itself unextended8 ,hyl4 ,i grant it4 ,phil4 ,is it not also active8 ,hyl4 ,without doubt4 ,otherwise1 how could we attribute powers to it8 ,phil4 ,now let me ask you two questions3 ,first1 ,whether it be agreeable to the usage either of philosophers or others to give the name ,matter to an unextended active being8 ,and1 ,secondly1 ,whether it be not ridiculously absurd to misapply names contrary to the common use of language8 ,hyl4 ,well then1 let it not be called ,matter1 since you will have it so1 but some ,third ,nature distinct from ,matter and ,spirit4 ,for what reason is there why you should call it ,spirit8 ,does not the notion of spirit imply that it is thinking1 as well as active and unextended8 ,phil4 ,my reason is this3 because ,i have a mind to have some notion of meaning in what ,i say3 but ,i have no notion of any action distinct from volition1 neither can ,i conceive volition to be anywhere but in a spirit3 therefore1 when ,i speak of an active being1 ,i am obliged to mean a ,spirit4 ,beside1 what can be plainer than that a thing which hath no ideas in itself cannot impart them to me2 and1 if it hath ideas1 surely it must be a ,spirit4 ,to make you comprehend the point still more clearly if it be possible4 ,i assert as well as you that1 since we are affected from without1 we must allow ,powers to be without1 in a ,being distinct from ourselves4 ,so far we are agreed4 ,but then we differ as to the kind of this powerful ,being7#hha74 ,i will have it to be ,spirit1 you ,matter1 or ,i know not what 7,i may add too1 you know not what7 ,third ,nature4 ,thus1 ,i prove it to be ,spirit4 ,from the effects ,i see produced1 ,i conclude there are actions2 and1 because actions1 volitions2 and1 because there are volitions1 there must be a will4 ,again1 the things ,i perceive must have an existence1 they or their archetypes1 out of my mind3 but1 being ideas1 neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an understanding2 there is therefore an understanding4 ,but will and understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit4 ,the powerful cause1 therefore1 of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech a ,spirit4 ,hyl4 ,and now ,i warrant you think you have made the point very clear1 little suspecting that what you advance leads directly to a contradiction4 ,is it not an absurdity to imagine any imperfection in ,god8 ,phil4 ,without a doubt4 ,hyl4 ,to suffer pain is an imperfection8 ,phil4 ,it is4 ,hyl4 ,are we not sometimes affected with pain and uneasiness by some other ,being8 ,phil4 ,we are4 ,hyl4 ,and have you not said that ,being is a ,spirit1 and is not that ,spirit ,god8 ,phil4 ,i grant it4 ,hyl4 ,but you have asserted that whatever ideas we perceive from without are in the mind which affects us4 ,the ideas1 therefore1 of pain and uneasiness are in ,god2 or1 in other words1 ,god suffers pain3 that is to say1 there is an imperfection in the ,divine nature3 which1 you acknowledged1 was absurd4 ,so you are caught in a plain contradiction7#hhb74 ,phil4 ,that ,god knows or understands all things1 and that ,he knows1 among other things1 what pain is1 even every sort of painful sensation1 and what it is for ,his creatures to suffer pain1 ,i make no question4 ,but1 that ,god1 though ,he knows and sometimes causes painful sensations in us1 can ,himself suffer pain1 ,i positively deny4 ,we1 who are limited and dependent spirits1 are liable to impressions of sense1 the effects of an external ,agent1 which1 being produced against our wills1 are sometimes painful and uneasy4 ,but ,god1 whom no external being can affect1 who perceives nothing by sense as we do2 whose will is absolute and independent1 causing all things1 and liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing3 it is evident1 such a ,being as this can suffer nothing1 nor be affected with any painful sensation1 or indeed any sensation at all4 ,we are chained to a body3 that is to say1 our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions4 ,by the law of our nature1 we are affected upon every alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body2 which sensible body1 rightly considered1 is nothing but a complexion of such qualities or ideas as have no existence distinct from being perceived by a mind4 ,so that this connexion of sensations with corporeal motions means no more than a correspondence in the order of nature1 between two sets of ideas1 or things immediately perceivable4 ,but ,god is a ,pure ,spirit1 disengaged from all such sympathy1 or natural ties4 ,no corporeal motions are attended with the sensations of pain or pleasure in ,his mind4 ,to know everything knowable1 is certainly a perfection2 but to endure1 or suffer1 or feel anything by sense1 is an imperfection4 ,the former1 ,i say1 agrees to ,god1 but not the latter4 ,god knows1 or hath ideas2 but ,his ideas are not conveyed to ,him by sense1 as ours are4 ,your not distinguishing1 where there is so manifest a difference1 makes you fancy you see an absurdity where there is none4 ,hyl4 ,but1 all this while you have not considered that the quantity of ,matter has been demonstrated to be proportioned to the gravity of bodies7#hhc74 ,and what can withstand demonstration8 ,phil4 ,let me see how you demonstrate that point4 ,hyl4 ,i lay it down for a principle1 that the moments or quantities of motion in bodies are in a direct compounded reason of the velocities and quantities of ,matter contained in them4 ,hence1 where the velocities are equal1 it follows the moments are directly as the quantity of ,matter in each4 ,but it is found by experience that all bodies 7bating the small inequalities1 arising from the resistance of the air7 descend with an equal velocity2 the motion therefore of descending bodies1 and consequently their gravity1 which is the cause or principle of that motion1 is proportional to the quantity of ,matter2 which was to be demonstrated4 ,phil4 ,you lay it down as a self-evident principle that the quantity of motion in any body is proportional to the velocity and ,matter taken together2 and this is made use of to prove a proposition from whence the existence of ,matter is inferred4 ,pray is not this arguing in a circle8 ,hyl4 ,in the premise ,i only mean that the motion is proportional to the velocity1 jointly with the extension and solidity4 ,phil4 ,but1 allowing this to be true1 yet it will not thence follow that gravity is proportional to ,matter1 in your philosophic sense of the word2 except you take it for granted that unknown substratum1 or whatever else you call it1 is proportional to those sensible qualities2 which to suppose is plainly begging the question4 ,that there is magnitude and solidity1 or resistance1 perceived by sense1 ,i readily grant2 as likewise1 that gravity may be proportional to those qualities ,i will not dispute4 ,but that either these qualities as perceived by us1 or the powers producing them1 do exist in a material substratum2 this is what ,i deny1 and you indeed affirm1 but1 notwithstanding your demonstration1 have not yet proved4 ,hyl4 ,i shall insist no longer on that point4 ,do you think1 however1 you shall persuade me the natural philosophers have been dreaming all this while8 ,pray what becomes of all their hypotheses and explications of the phenomena1 which suppose the existence of ,matter7#hhd78 ,phil4 ,what mean you1 ,hylas1 by the phenomena8 ,hyl4 ,i mean the appearances which ,i perceive by my senses4 ,phil4 ,and the appearances perceived by sense1 are they not ideas8 ,hyl4 ,i have told you so a hundred times4 ,phil4 ,therefore1 to explain the phenomena is1 to shew how we come to be affected with ideas1 in that manner and7#hhe7 order wherein they are imprinted on our senses4 ,is it not8 ,hyl4 ,it is4 ,phil4 ,now1 if you can prove that any philosopher has explained the production of any one idea in our minds by the help of ,matter7#hhf71 ,i shall for ever acquiesce1 and look on all that hath been said against it as nothing2 but1 if you cannot1 it is vain to urge the explication of phenomena4 ,that a ,being endowed with knowledge and will should produce or exhibit ideas is easily understood4 ,but that a ,being which is utterly destitute of these faculties should be able to produce ideas1 or in any sort to affect an intelligence1 this ,i can never understand4 ,this ,i say1 though we had some positive conception of ,matter1 though we knew its qualities1 and could comprehend its existence1 would yet be so far from explaining things1 that it is itself the most inexplicable thing in the world4 ,and yet1 for all this1 it will not follow that philosophers have been doing nothing2 for1 by observing and reasoning upon the connexion of ideas7#hhg71 they discover the laws and methods of nature1 which is a part of knowledge both useful and entertaining4 ,hyl4 ,after all1 can it be supposed ,god would deceive all mankind8 ,do you imagine ,he would have induced the whole world to believe the being of ,matter1 if there was no such thing8 ,phil4 ,that every epidemical opinion1 arising from prejudice1 or passion1 or thoughtlessness1 may be imputed to ,god1 as the ,author of it1 ,i believe you will not affirm4 ,whatsoever opinion we father on ,him1 it must be either because ,he has discovered it to us by supernatural revelation2 or because it is so evident to our natural faculties1 which were framed and given us by ,god1 that it is impossible we should withhold our assent from it4 ,but where is the revelation8 or where is the evidence that extorts the belief of ,matter8 ,nay1 how does it appear1 that ,matter1 taken for something distinct from what we perceive by our senses1 is thought to exist by all mankind2 or1 indeed1 by any except a few philosophers1 who do not know what they would be at8 ,your question supposes these points are clear2 and1 when you have cleared them1 ,i shall think myself obliged to give you another answer4 ,in the meantime1 let it suffice that ,i tell you1 ,i do not suppose ,god has deceived mankind at all4 ,hyl4 ,but the novelty1 ,philonous1 the novelty6 ,there lies the danger4 ,new notions should always be discountenanced2 they unsettle men's minds1 and nobody knows where they will end4 ,phil4 ,why the rejecting a notion that has no foundation1 either in sense1 or in reason1 or in ,divine authority1 should be thought to unsettle the belief of such opinions as are grounded on all or any of these1 ,i cannot imagine4 ,that innovations in government and religion are dangerous1 and ought to be discountenanced1 ,i freely own4 ,but is there the like reason why they should be discouraged in philosophy8 ,the making anything known which was unknown before is an innovation in knowledge3 and1 if all such innovations had been forbidden1 men would have made a notable progress in the arts and sciences4 ,but it is none of my business to plead for novelties and paradoxes4 ,that the qualities we perceive are not on the objects3 that we must not believe our senses3 that we know nothing of the real nature of things1 and can never be assured even of their existence3 that real colours and sounds are nothing but certain unknown figures and motions3 that motions are in themselves neither swift nor slow3 that there are in bodies absolute extensions1 without any particular magnitude or figure3 that a thing stupid1 thoughtless1 and inactive1 operates on a spirit3 that the least particle of a body contains innumerable extended parts3--these are the novelties1 these are the strange notions which shock the genuine uncorrupted judgment of all mankind2 and being once admitted1 embarrass the mind with endless doubts and difficulties4 ,and it is against these and the like innovations ,i endeavour to vindicate ,common ,sense4 ,it is true1 in doing this1 ,i may perhaps be obliged to use some ambages1 and ways of speech not common4 ,but1 if my notions are once thoroughly understood1 that which is most singular in them will1 in effect1 be found to amount to no more than this3--that it is absolutely impossible1 and a plain contradiction1 to suppose any unthinking ,being should exist without being perceived by a ,mind4 ,and1 if this notion be singular1 it is a shame it should be so1 at this time of day1 and in a ,christian country4 ,hyl4 ,as for the difficulties other opinions may be liable to1 those are out of the question4 ,it is your business to defend your own opinion4 ,can anything be plainer than that you are for changing all things into ideas8 ,you1 ,i say1 who are not ashamed to charge me with scepticism4 ,this is so plain1 there is no denying it4 ,phil4 ,you mistake me4 ,i am not for changing things into ideas1 but rather ideas into things7#hhh72 since those immediate objects of perception1 which1 according to you1 are only appearances of things1 ,i take to be the real things themselves7#hhi74 ,hyl4 ,things6 ,you may pretend what you please2 but it is certain you leave us nothing but the empty forms of things1 the outside only which strikes the senses4 ,phil4 ,what you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to me the very things themselves4 ,nor are they empty or incomplete1 otherwise than upon your supposition--that ,matter7#hij7 is an essential part of all corporeal things4 ,we both1 therefore1 agree in this1 that we perceive only sensible forms3 but herein we differ--you will have them to be empty appearances1 ,i real beings4 ,in short1 you do not trust your senses1 ,i do4 ,hyl4 ,you say you believe your senses2 and seem to applaud yourself that in this you agree with the vulgar4 ,according to you1 therefore1 the true nature of a thing is discovered by the senses4 ,if so1 whence comes that disagreement8 ,why is not the same figure1 and other sensible qualities1 perceived all manner of ways8 and why should we use a microscope the better to discover the true nature of a body1 if it were discoverable to the naked eye8 ,phil4 ,strictly speaking1 ,hylas1 we do not see the same object that we feel7#hia72 neither is the same object perceived by the microscope which was by the naked eye7#hib74 ,but1 in case every variation was thought sufficient to constitute a new kind or individual1 the endless number or confusion of names would render language impracticable4 ,therefore1 to avoid this1 as well as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought1 men combine together several ideas1 apprehended by divers senses1 or by the same sense at different times1 or in different circumstances1 but observed1 however1 to have some connexion in nature1 either with respect to co-existence or succession2 all which they refer to one name1 and consider as one thing4 ,hence it follows that when ,i examine1 by my other senses1 a thing ,i have seen1 it is not in order to understand better the same object which ,i had perceived by sight1 the object of one sense not being perceived by the other senses4 ,and1 when ,i look through a microscope1 it is not that ,i may perceive more clearly what ,i perceived already with my bare eyes2 the object perceived by the glass being quite different from the former4 ,but1 in both cases1 my aim is only to know what ideas are connected together2 and the more a man knows of the connexion of ideas7#hic71 the more he is said to know of the nature of things4 ,what1 therefore1 if our ideas are variable2 what if our senses are not in all circumstances affected with the same appearances8 ,it will not thence follow they are not to be trusted2 or that they are inconsistent either with themselves or anything else3 except it be with your preconceived notion of 7,i know not what7 one single1 unchanged1 unperceivable1 real ,nature1 marked by each name4 ,which prejudice seems to have taken its rise from not rightly understanding the common language of men1 speaking of several distinct ideas as united into one thing by the mind4 ,and1 indeed1 there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the philosophers are owing to the same original3 while they began to build their schemes not so much on notions as on words1 which were framed by the vulgar1 merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common actions of life1 without any regard to speculation7#hid74 ,hyl4 ,methinks ,i apprehend your meaning4 ,phil4 ,it is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our senses are not real things1 but images or copies of them4 ,our knowledge1 therefore1 is no farther real than as our ideas are the true representations of those originals4 ,but1 as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown1 it is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them2 or whether they resemble them at all7#hie74 ,we cannot1 therefore1 be sure we have any real knowledge7#hif74 ,farther1 as our ideas are perpetually varied1 without any change in the supposed real things1 it necessarily follows they cannot all be true copies of them3 or1 if some are and others are not1 it is impossible to distinguish the former from the latter4 ,and this plunges us yet deeper in uncertainty7#hig74 ,again1 when we consider the point1 we cannot conceive how any idea1 or anything like an idea1 should have an absolute existence out of a mind3 nor consequently1 according to you1 how there should be any real thing in nature7#hih74 ,the result of all which is that we are thrown into the most hopeless and abandoned scepticism4 ,now1 give me leave to ask you1 ,first1 ,whether your referring ideas to certain absolutely existing unperceived substances1 as their originals1 be not the source of all this scepticism7#hii78 ,secondly1 whether you are informed1 either by sense or reason7#ijj71 of the existence of those unknown originals8 ,and1 in case you are not1 whether it be not absurd to suppose them8 ,thirdly1 ,whether1 upon inquiry1 you find there is anything distinctly conceived or meant by the absolute or external existence of unperceiving substances7#ija78 ,lastly1 ,whether1 the premises considered1 it be not the wisest way to follow nature1 trust your senses1 and1 laying aside all anxious thought about unknown natures or substances7#ijb71 admit with the vulgar those for real things which are perceived by the senses8 ,hyl4 ,for the present1 ,i have no inclination to the answering part4 ,i would much rather see how you can get over what follows4 ,pray are not the objects perceived by the senses of one1 likewise perceivable to others present8 ,if there were a hundred more here1 they would all see the garden1 the trees1 and flowers1 as ,i see them4 ,but they are not in the same manner affected with the ideas ,i frame in my imagination4 ,does not this make a difference between the former sort of objects and the latter8 ,phil4 ,i grant it does4 ,nor have ,i ever denied a difference between the objects of sense and those of imagination7#ijc74 ,but what would you infer from thence8 ,you cannot say that sensible objects exist unperceived1 because they are perceived by many4 ,hyl4 ,i own ,i can make nothing of that objection3 but it hath led me into another4 ,is it not your opinion that by our senses we perceive only the ideas existing in our minds8 ,phil4 ,it is4 ,hyl4 ,but the same idea which is in my mind cannot be in yours1 or in any other mind4 ,doth it not therefore follow1 from your principles1 that no two can see the same thing7#ijd78 ,and is not this highly absurd8 ,phil4 ,if the term same be taken in the vulgar acceptation1 it is certain 7and not at all repugnant to the principles ,i maintain7 that different persons may perceive the same thing2 or the same thing or idea exist in different minds4 ,words are of arbitrary imposition2 and1 since men are used to apply the word same where no distinction or variety is perceived1 and ,i do not pretend to alter their perceptions1 it follows that1 as men have said before1 several saw the same thing1 so they may1 upon like occasions1 still continue to use the same phrase1 without any deviation either from propriety of language1 or the truth of things4 ,but1 if the term same be used in the acceptation of philosophers1 who pretend to an abstracted notion of identity1 then1 according to their sundry definitions of this notion 7for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic identity consists71 it may or may not be possible for divers persons to perceive the same thing7#ije74 ,but whether philosophers shall think fit to call a thing the same or no1 is1 ,i conceive1 of small importance4 ,let us suppose several men together1 all endued with the same faculties1 and consequently affected in like sort by their senses1 and who had yet never known the use of language2 they would1 without question1 agree in their perceptions4 ,though perhaps1 when they came to the use of speech1 some regarding the uniformness of what was perceived1 might call it the same thing3 others1 especially regarding the diversity of persons who perceived1 might choose the denomination of different things4 ,but who sees not that all the dispute is about a word8 to wit1 whether what is perceived by different persons may yet have the term same applied to it7#ijf78 ,or1 suppose a house1 whose walls or outward shell remaining unaltered1 the chambers are all pulled down1 and new ones built in their place2 and that you should call this the same1 and ,i should say it was not the same house3--would we not1 for all this1 perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house1 considered in itself8 ,and would not all the difference consist in a sound8 ,if you should say1 ,we differed in our notions2 for that you superadded to your idea of the house the simple abstracted idea of identity1 whereas ,i did not2 ,i would tell you1 ,i know not what you mean by the abstracted idea of identity2 and should desire you to look into your own thoughts1 and be sure you understood yourself4----,why so silent1 ,hylas8 ,are you not yet satisfied men may dispute about identity and diversity1 without any real difference in their thoughts and opinions1 abstracted from names8 ,take this farther reflexion with you--that whether ,matter be allowed to exist or no1 the case is exactly the same as to the point in hand4 ,for the ,materialists themselves acknowledge what we immediately perceive by our senses to be our own ideas4 ,your difficulty1 therefore1 that no two see the same thing1 makes equally against the ,materialists and me4 ,hyl4 7#ijg7;,ay1 ,philonous1 ,but they suppose an external archetype1 to which referring their several ideas they may truly be said to perceive the same thing4 ,phil4 ,and 7not to mention your having discarded those archetypes7 so may you suppose an external archetype on my principles2--external1 ,i mean1 to your own mind3 though indeed it must be supposed to exist in that ,mind which comprehends all things2 but then1 this serves all the ends of identity1 as well as if it existed out of a mind7#ijh74 ,and ,i am sure you yourself will not say it is less intelligible4 ,hyl4 ,you have indeed clearly satisfied me--either that there is no difficulty at bottom in this point2 or1 if there be1 that it makes equally against both opinions4 ,phil4 ,but that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions can be a proof against neither4 ,hyl4 ,i acknowledge it4 ,but1 after all1 ,philonous1 when ,i consider the substance of what you advance against ,scepticism1 it amounts to no more than this3--,we are sure that we really see1 hear1 feel2 in a word1 that we are affected with sensible impressions4 ,phil4 ,and how are we concerned any farther8 ,i see this cherry1 ,i feel it1 ,i taste it3 and ,i am sure nothing cannot be seen1 or felt1 or tasted3 it is therefore real4 ,take away the sensations of softness1 moisture1 redness1 tartness1 and you take away the cherry1 since it is not a being distinct from sensations4 ,a cherry1 ,i say1 is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions1 or ideas perceived by various senses3 which ideas are united into one thing 7or have one name given them7 by the mind1 because they are observed to attend each other4 ,thus1 when the palate is affected with such a particular taste1 the sight is affected with a red colour1 the touch with roundness1 softness1 c4 ,hence1 when ,i see1 and feel1 and taste1 in such sundry certain manners1 ,i am sure the cherry exists1 or is real2 its reality being in my opinion nothing abstracted from those sensations4 ,but if by the word cherry you mean an unknown nature1 distinct from all those sensible qualities1 and by its existence something distinct from its being perceived2 then1 indeed1 ,i own1 neither you nor ,i1 nor any one else1 can be sure it exists4 ,hyl4 ,but1 what would you say1 ,philonous1 if ,i should bring the very same reasons against the existence of sensible things in a mind which you have offered against their existing in a material substratum8 ,phil4 ,when ,i see your reasons1 you shall hear what ,i have to say to them4 ,hyl4 ,is the mind extended or unextended8 ,phil4 ,unextended1 without doubt4 ,hyl4 ,do you say the things you perceive are in your mind8 ,phil4 ,they are4 ,hyl4 ,again1 have ,i not heard you speak of sensible impressions8 ,phil4 ,i believe you may4 ,hyl4 ,explain to me now1 ,o ,philonous6 how it is possible there should be room for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind4 ,can extended things be contained in that which is unextended8 ,or1 are we to imagine impressions made on a thing void of all solidity8 ,you cannot say objects are in your mind1 as books in your study3 or that things are imprinted on it1 as the figure of a seal upon wax4 ,in what sense1 therefore1 are we to understand those expressions8 ,explain me this if you can3 and ,i shall then be able to answer all those queries you formerly put to me about my substratum4 ,phil4 ,look you1 ,hylas1 when ,i speak of objects as existing in the mind1 or imprinted on the senses1 ,i would not be understood in the gross literal sense2 as when bodies are said to exist in a place1 or a seal to make an impression upon wax4 ,my meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them2 and that it is affected from without1 or by some being distinct from itself7#iji74 ,this is my explication of your difficulty2 and how it can serve to make your tenet of an unperceiving material substratum intelligible1 ,i would fain know4 ,hyl4 ,nay1 if that be all1 ,i confess ,i do not see what use can be made of it4 ,but are you not guilty of some abuse of language in this8 ,phil4 ,none at all4 ,it is no more than common custom1 which you know is the rule of language1 hath authorised3 nothing being more usual1 than for philosophers to speak of the immediate objects of the understanding as things existing in the mind4 ,nor is there anything in this but what is conformable to the general analogy of language2 most part of the mental operations being signified by words borrowed from sensible things2 as is plain in the terms comprehend1 reflect1 discourse1 c41 which1 being applied to the mind1 must not be taken in their gross1 original sense4 ,hyl4 ,you have1 ,i own1 satisfied me in this point4 ,but there still remains one great difficulty1 which ,i know not how you will get over4 ,and1 indeed1 it is of such importance that if you could solve all others1 without being able to find a solution for this1 you must never expect to make me a proselyte to your principles4 ,phil4 ,let me know this mighty difficulty4 ,hyl4 ,the ,scripture account of the creation is what appears to me utterly irreconcilable with your notions7#iaj74 ,moses tells us of a creation3 a creation of what8 of ideas8 ,no1 certainly1 but of things1 of real things1 solid corporeal substances4 ,bring your principles to agree with this1 and ,i shall perhaps agree with you4 ,phil4 ,moses mentions the sun1 moon1 and stars1 earth and sea1 plants and animals4 ,that all these do really exist1 and were in the beginning created by ,god1 ,i make no question4 ,if by ideas you mean fictions and fancies of the mind7#iaa71 then these are no ideas4 ,if by ideas you mean immediate objects of the understanding1 or sensible things1 which cannot exist unperceived1 or out of a mind7#iab71 then these things are ideas4 ,but whether you do or do not call them ideas1 it matters little4 ,the difference is only about a name4 ,and1 whether that name be retained or rejected1 the sense1 the truth1 and reality of things continues the same4 ,in common talk1 the objects of our senses are not termed ideas1 but things4 ,call them so still3 provided you do not attribute to them any absolute external existence1 and ,i shall never quarrel with you for a word4 ,the creation1 therefore1 ,i allow to have been a creation of things1 of real things4 ,neither is this in the least inconsistent with my principles1 as is evident from what ,i have now said2 and would have been evident to you without this1 if you had not forgotten what had been so often said before4 ,but as for solid corporeal substances1 ,i desire you to shew where ,moses makes any mention of them2 and1 if they should be mentioned by him1 or any other inspired writer1 it would still be incumbent on you to shew those words were not taken in the vulgar acceptation1 for things falling under our senses1 but in the philosophic7#iac7 acceptation1 for ,matter1 or an unknown quiddity1 with an absolute existence4 ,when you have proved these points1 then 7and not till then7 may you bring the authority of ,moses into our dispute4 ,hyl4 ,it is in vain to dispute about a point so clear4 ,i am content to refer it to your own conscience4 ,are you not satisfied there is some peculiar repugnancy between the ,mosaic account of the creation and your notions8 ,phil4 ,if all possible sense which can be put on the first chapter of ,genesis may be conceived as consistently with my principles as any other1 then it has no peculiar repugnancy with them4 ,but there is no sense you may not as well conceive1 believing as ,i do4 ,since1 besides spirits1 all you conceive are ideas2 and the existence of these ,i do not deny4 ,neither do you pretend they exist without the mind4 ,hyl4 ,pray let me see any sense you can understand it in4 ,phil4 ,why1 ,i imagine that if ,i had been present at the creation1 ,i should have seen things produced into being--that is become perceptible--in the order prescribed by the sacred historian4 ,i ever before believed the ,mosaic account of the creation1 and now find no alteration in my manner of believing it4 ,when things are said to begin or end their existence1 we do not mean this with regard to ,god1 but ,his creatures4 ,all objects are eternally known by ,god1 or1 which is the same thing1 have an eternal existence in ,his mind3 but when things1 before imperceptible to creatures1 are1 by a decree of ,god1 perceptible to them1 then are they said to begin a relative existence1 with respect to created minds4 ,upon reading therefore the ,mosaic account of the creation1 ,i understand that the several parts of the world became gradually perceivable to finite spirits1 endowed with proper faculties2 so that1 whoever such were present1 they were in truth perceived by them7#iad74 ,this is the literal obvious sense suggested to me by the words of the ,holy ,scripture3 in which is included no mention1 or no thought1 either of substratum1 instrument1 occasion1 or absolute existence4 ,and1 upon inquiry1 ,i doubt not it will be found that most plain honest men1 who believe the creation1 never think of those things any more than ,i4 ,what metaphysical sense you may understand it in1 you only can tell4 ,hyl4 ,but1 ,philonous1 you do not seem to be aware that you allow created things1 in the beginning1 only a relative1 and consequently hypothetical being3 that is to say1 upon supposition there were men to perceive them2 without which they have no actuality of absolute existence1 wherein creation might terminate4 ,is it not1 therefore1 according to you1 plainly impossible the creation of any inanimate creatures should precede that of man8 ,and is not this directly contrary to the ,mosaic account8 ,phil4 ,in answer to that1 ,i say1 first1 created beings might begin to exist in the mind of other created intelligences1 beside men4 ,you will not therefore be able to prove any contradiction between ,moses and my notions1 unless you first shew there was no other order of finite created spirits in being1 before man4 ,i say farther1 in case we conceive the creation1 as we should at this time1 a parcel of plants or vegetables of all sorts produced1 by an invisible ,power1 in a desert where nobody was present--that this way of explaining or conceiving it is consistent with my principles1 since they deprive you of nothing1 either sensible or imaginable2 that it exactly suits with the common1 natural1 and undebauched notions of mankind2 that it manifests the dependence of all things on ,god2 and consequently hath all the good effect or influence1 which it is possible that important article of our faith should have in making men humble1 thankful1 and resigned to their 7#iae7;great ,creator4 ,i say1 moreover1 that1 in this naked conception of things1 divested of words1 there will not be found any notion of what you call the actuality of absolute existence4 ,you may indeed raise a dust with those terms1 and so lengthen our dispute to no purpose4 ,but ,i entreat you calmly to look into your own thoughts1 and then tell me if they are not a useless and unintelligible jargon4 ,hyl4 ,i own ,i have no very clear notion annexed to them4 ,but what say you to this8 ,do you not make the existence of sensible things consist in their being in a mind8 ,and were not all things eternally in the mind of ,god8 ,did they not therefore exist from all eternity1 according to you8 ,and how could that which was eternal be created in time8 ,can anything be clearer or better connected than this8 ,phil4 ,and are not you too of opinion1 that ,god knew all things from eternity8 ,hyl4 ,i am4 ,phil4 ,consequently they always had a being in the ,divine intellect4 ,hyl4 ,this ,i acknowledge4 ,phil4 ,by your own confession1 therefore1 nothing is new1 or begins to be1 in respect of the mind of ,god4 ,so we are agreed in that point4 ,hyl4 ,what shall we make then of the creation8 ,phil4 ,may we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of finite spirits2 so that things1 with regard to us1 may properly be said to begin their existence1 or be created1 when ,god decreed they should become perceptible to intelligent creatures1 in that order and manner which ,he then established1 and we now call the laws of nature8 ,you may call this a relative1 or hypothetical existence if you please4 ,but1 so long as it supplies us with the most natural1 obvious1 and literal sense of the ,mosaic history of the creation2 so long as it answers all the religious ends of that great article2 in a word1 so long as you can assign no other sense or meaning in its stead2 why should we reject this8 ,is it to comply with a ridiculous sceptical humour of making everything nonsense and unintelligible8 ,i am sure you cannot say it is for the glory of ,god4 ,for1 allowing it to be a thing possible and conceivable that the corporeal world should have an absolute existence extrinsical to the mind of ,god1 as well as to the minds of all created spirits2 yet how could this set forth either the immensity or omniscience of the ,deity1 or the necessary and immediate dependence of all things on ,him8 ,nay1 would it not rather seem to derogate from those attributes8 ,hyl4 ,well1 but as to this decree of ,god's1 for making things perceptible1 what say you1 ,philonous8 ,is it not plain1 ,god did either execute that decree from all eternity1 or at some certain time began to will what ,he had not actually willed before1 but only designed to will8 ,if the former1 then there could be no creation1 or beginning of existence1 in finite things7#iaf74 ,if the latter1 then we must acknowledge something new to befall the ,deity2 which implies a sort of change3 and all change argues imperfection4 ,phil4 ,pray consider what you are doing4 ,is it not evident this objection concludes equally against a creation in any sense2 nay1 against every other act of the ,deity1 discoverable by the light of nature8 ,none of which can we conceive1 otherwise than as performed in time1 and having a beginning4 ,god is a ,being of transcendent and unlimited perfections3 ,his nature1 therefore1 is incomprehensible to finite spirits4 ,it is not1 therefore1 to be expected1 that any man1 whether ,materialist or ,immaterialist1 should have exactly just notions of the ,deity1 ,his attributes1 and ways of operation4 ,if then you would infer anything against me1 your difficulty must not be drawn from the inadequateness of our conceptions of the ,divine nature1 which is unavoidable on any scheme2 but from the denial of ,matter1 of which there is not one word1 directly or indirectly1 in what you have now objected4 ,hyl4 ,i must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned to clear are such only as arise from the non-existence of ,matter1 and are peculiar to that notion4 ,so far you are in the right4 ,but ,i cannot by any means bring myself to think there is no such peculiar repugnancy between the creation and your opinion2 though indeed where to fix it1 ,i do not distinctly know4 ,phil4 ,what would you have8 ,do ,i not acknowledge a twofold state of things--the one ectypal or natural1 the other archetypal and eternal8 ,the former was created in time2 the latter existed from everlasting in the mind of ,god7#iag74 ,is not this agreeable to the common notions of divines8 or1 is any more than this necessary in order to conceive the creation8 ,but you suspect some peculiar repugnancy1 though you know not where it lies4 ,to take away all possibility of scruple in the case1 do but consider this one point4 ,either you are not able to conceive the creation on any hypothesis whatsoever2 and1 if so1 there is no ground for dislike or complaint against any particular opinion on that score3 or you are able to conceive it2 and1 if so1 why not on my ,principles1 since thereby nothing conceivable is taken away8 ,you have all along been allowed the full scope of sense1 imagination1 and reason4 ,whatever1 therefore1 you could before apprehend1 either immediately or mediately by your senses1 or by ratiocination from your senses2 whatever you could perceive1 imagine1 or understand1 remains still with you4 ,if1 therefore1 the notion you have of the creation by other ,principles be intelligible1 you have it still upon mine2 if it be not intelligible1 ,i conceive it to be no notion at all2 and so there is no loss of it4 ,and indeed it seems to me very plain that the supposition of ,matter1 that is a thing perfectly unknown and inconceivable1 cannot serve to make us conceive anything4 ,and1 ,i hope it need not be proved to you that if the existence of ,matter7#iah7 doth not make the creation conceivable1 the creation's being without it inconceivable can be no objection against its non-existence4 ,hyl4 ,i confess1 ,philonous1 you have almost satisfied me in this point of the creation4 ,phil4 ,i would fain know why you are not quite satisfied4 ,you tell me indeed of a repugnancy between the ,mosaic history and ,immaterialism3 but you know not where it lies4 ,is this reasonable1 ,hylas8 ,can you expect ,i should solve a difficulty without knowing what it is8 ,but1 to pass by all that1 would not a man think you were assured there is no repugnancy between the received notions of ,materialists and the inspired writings8 ,hyl4 ,and so ,i am4 ,phil4 ,ought the historical part of ,scripture to be understood in a plain obvious sense1 or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the way8 ,hyl4 ,in the plain sense1 doubtless4 ,phil4 ,when ,moses speaks of herbs1 earth1 water1 c4 as having been created by ,god2 think you not the sensible things commonly signified by those words are suggested to every unphilosophical reader8 ,hyl4 ,i cannot help thinking so4 ,phil4 ,and are not all ideas1 or things perceived by sense1 to be denied a real existence by the doctrine of the ,materialist8 ,hyl4 ,this ,i have already acknowledged4 ,phil4 ,the creation1 therefore1 according to them1 was not the creation of things sensible1 which have only a relative being1 but of certain unknown natures1 which have an absolute being1 wherein creation might terminate8 ,hyl4 ,true4 ,phil4 ,is it not therefore evident the assertors of ,matter destroy the plain obvious sense of ,moses1 with which their notions are utterly inconsistent2 and instead of it obtrude on us ,i know not what2 something equally unintelligible to themselves and me8 ,hyl4 ,i cannot contradict you4 ,phil4 ,moses tells us of a creation4 ,a creation of what8 of unknown quiddities1 of occasions1 or substratum8 ,no1 certainly2 but of things obvious to the senses4 ,you must first reconcile this with your notions1 if you expect ,i should be reconciled to them4 ,hyl4 ,i see you can assault me with my own weapons4 ,phil4 ,then as to absolute existence2 was there ever known a more jejune notion than that8 ,something it is so abstracted and unintelligible that you have frankly owned you could not conceive it1 much less explain anything by it4 ,but allowing ,matter to exist1 and the notion of absolute existence to be as clear as light2 yet1 was this ever known to make the creation more credible8 ,nay1 hath it not furnished the atheists and infidels of all ages with the most plausible arguments against a creation8 ,that a corporeal substance1 which hath an absolute existence without the minds of spirits1 should be produced out of nothing1 by the mere will of a ,spirit1 hath been looked upon as a thing so contrary to all reason1 so impossible and absurd1 that not only the most celebrated among the ancients1 but even divers modern and ,christian philosophers have thought ,matter co-eternal with the ,deity7#iai74 ,lay these things together1 and then judge you whether ,materialism disposes men to believe the creation of things4 ,hyl4 ,i own1 ,philonous1 ,i think it does not4 ,this of the creation is the last objection ,i can think of2 and ,i must needs own it hath been sufficiently answered as well as the rest4 ,nothing now remains to be overcome but a sort of unaccountable backwardness that ,i find in myself towards your notions4 ,phil4 ,when a man is swayed1 he knows not why1 to one side of the question1 can this1 think you1 be anything else but the effect of prejudice1 which never fails to attend old and rooted notions8 ,and indeed in this respect ,i cannot deny the belief of ,matter to have very much the advantage over the contrary opinion1 with men of a learned education4 ,hyl4 ,i confess it seems to be as you say4 ,phil4 ,as a balance1 therefore1 to this weight of prejudice1 let us throw into the scale the great advantages7#ibj7 that arise from the belief of ,immaterialism1 both in regard to religion and human learning4 ,the being of a ,god1 and incorruptibility of the soul1 those great articles of religion1 are they not proved with the clearest and most immediate evidence8 ,when ,i say the being of a ,god1 ,i do not mean an obscure general ,cause of things1 whereof we have no conception1 but ,god1 in the strict and proper sense of the word4 ,a ,being whose spirituality1 omnipresence1 providence1 omniscience1 infinite power and goodness1 are as conspicuous as the existence of sensible things1 of which 7notwithstanding the fallacious pretences and affected scruples of ,sceptics7 there is no more reason to doubt than of our own being4--,then1 with relation to human sciences4 ,in ,natural ,philosophy1 what intricacies1 what obscurities1 what contradictions hath the belief of ,matter led men into6 ,to say nothing of the numberless disputes about its extent1 continuity1 homogeneity1 gravity1 divisibility1 c4--do they not pretend to explain all things by bodies operating on bodies1 according to the laws of motion8 and yet1 are they able to comprehend how one body should move another8 ,nay1 admitting there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion of an inert being with a cause1 or in conceiving how an accident might pass from one body to another2 yet1 by all their strained thoughts and extravagant suppositions1 have they been able to reach the mechanical production of any one animal or vegetable body8 ,can they account1 by the laws of motion1 for sounds1 tastes1 smells1 or colours2 or for the regular course of things8 ,have they accounted1 by physical principles1 for the aptitude and contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts of the universe8 ,but1 laying aside ,matter and corporeal causes1 and admitting only the efficiency of an ,all-perfect ,mind1 are not all the effects of nature easy and intelligible8 ,if the phenomena are nothing else but ideas2 ,god is a spirit1 but ,matter an unintelligent1 unperceiving being4 ,if they demonstrate an unlimited power in their cause2 ,god is active and omnipotent1 but ,matter an inert mass4 ,if the order1 regularity1 and usefulness of them can never be sufficiently admired2 ,god is infinitely wise and provident1 but ,matter destitute of all contrivance and design4 ,these surely are great advantages in ,physics4 ,not to mention that the apprehension of a distant ,deity naturally disposes men to a negligence in their moral actions2 which they would be more cautious of1 in case they thought ,him immediately present1 and acting on their minds1 without the interposition of ,matter1 or unthinking second causes4--,then in ,metaphysics3 what difficulties concerning entity in abstract1 substantial forms1 hylarchic principles1 plastic natures17#iba7 substance and accident1 principle of individuation1 possibility of ,matter's thinking1 origin of ideas1 the manner how two independent substances so widely different as ,spirit and ,matter1 should mutually operate on each other8 what difficulties1 ,i say1 and endless disquisitions1 concerning these and innumerable other the like points1 do we escape1 by supposing only ,spirits and ideas8--,even the ,mathematics themselves1 if we take away the absolute existence of extended things1 become much more clear and easy2 the most shocking paradoxes and intricate speculations in those sciences depending on the infinite divisibility of finite extension2 which depends on that supposition4--,but what need is there to insist on the particular sciences8 ,is not that opposition to all science whatsoever1 that frenzy of the ancient and modern ,sceptics1 built on the same foundation8 ,or can you produce so much as one argument against the reality of corporeal things1 or in behalf of that avowed utter ignorance of their natures1 which doth not suppose their reality to consist in an external absolute existence8 ,upon this supposition1 indeed1 the objections from the change of colours in a pigeon's neck1 or the appearance of the broken oar in the water1 must be allowed to have weight4 ,but these and the like objections vanish1 if we do not maintain the being of absolute external originals1 but place the reality of things in ideas1 fleeting indeed1 and changeable2--however1 not changed at random1 but according to the fixed order of nature4 ,for1 herein consists that constancy and truth of things which secures all the concerns of life1 and distinguishes that which is real from the irregular visions of the fancy7#ibb74 ,hyl4 ,i agree to all you have now said1 and must own that nothing can incline me to embrace your opinion more than the advantages ,i see it is attended with4 ,i am by nature lazy2 and this would be a mighty abridgment in knowledge4 ,what doubts1 what hypotheses1 what labyrinths of amusement1 what fields of disputation1 what an ocean of false learning1 may be avoided by that single notion of ,immaterialism6 ,phil4 ,after all1 is there anything farther remaining to be done8 ,you may remember you promised to embrace that opinion which upon examination should appear most agreeable to ,common ,sense and remote from ,scepticism4 ,this1 by your own confession1 is that which denies ,matter1 or the absolute existence of corporeal things4 ,nor is this all2 the same notion has been proved several ways1 viewed in different lights1 pursued in its consequences1 and all objections against it cleared4 ,can there be a greater evidence of its truth8 or is it possible it should have all the marks of a true opinion and yet be false8 ,hyl4 ,i own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects4 ,but1 what security can ,i have that ,i shall still continue the same full assent to your opinion1 and that no unthought-of objection or difficulty will occur hereafter8 ,phil4 ,pray1 ,hylas1 do you in other cases1 when a point is once evidently proved1 withhold your consent on account of objections or difficulties it may be liable to8 ,are the difficulties that attend the doctrine of incommensurable quantities1 of the angle of contact1 of the asymptotes to curves1 or the like1 sufficient to make you hold out against mathematical demonstration8 ,or will you disbelieve the ,providence of ,god1 because there may be some particular things which you know not how to reconcile with it8 ,if there are difficulties attending ,immaterialism1 there are at the same time direct and evident proofs of it4 ,but for the existence of ,matter7#ibc7 there is not one proof1 and far more numerous and insurmountable objections lie against it4 ,but where are those mighty difficulties you insist on8 ,alas6 you know not where or what they are2 something which may possibly occur hereafter4 ,if this be a sufficient pretence for withholding your full assent1 you should never yield it to any proposition1 how free soever from exceptions1 how clearly and solidly soever demonstrated4 ,hyl4 ,you have satisfied me1 ,philonous4 ,phil4 ,but1 to arm you against all future objections1 do but consider3 ,that which bears equally hard on two contradictory opinions can be proof against neither4 ,whenever1 therefore1 any difficulty occurs1 try if you can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the ,materialists4 ,be not deceived by words2 but sound your own thoughts4 ,and in case you cannot conceive it easier by the help of ,materialism1 it is plain it can be no objection against ,immaterialism4 ,had you proceeded all along by this rule1 you would probably have spared yourself abundance of trouble in objecting2 since of all your difficulties ,i challenge you to shew one that is explained by ,matter3 nay1 which is not more unintelligible with than without that supposition2 and consequently makes rather against than for it4 ,you should consider1 in each particular1 whether the difficulty arises from the non-existence of ,matter4 ,if it doth not1 you might as well argue from the infinite divisibility of extension against the ,divine prescience1 as from such a difficulty against ,immaterialism4 ,and yet1 upon recollection1 ,i believe you will find this to have been often1 if not always1 the case4 ,you should likewise take heed not to argue on a petitio principii4 ,one is apt to say--,the unknown substances ought to be esteemed real things1 rather than the ideas in our minds3 and who can tell but the unthinking external substance may concur1 as a cause or instrument1 in the productions of our ideas8 ,but is not this proceeding on a supposition that there are such external substances8 ,and to suppose this1 is it not begging the question8 ,but1 above all things1 you should beware of imposing on yourself by that vulgar sophism which is called ignoratio clenchi4 ,you talked often as if you thought ,i maintained the non-existence of ,sensible ,things4 ,whereas in truth no one can be more thoroughly assured of their existence than ,i am4 ,and it is you who doubt2 ,i should have said1 positively deny it4 ,everything that is seen1 felt1 heard1 or any way perceived by the senses1 is1 on the principles ,i embrace1 a real being2 but not on yours4 ,remember1 the ,matter you contend for is an ,unknown ,somewhat 7if indeed it may be termed somewhat71 which is quite stripped of all sensible qualities1 and can neither be perceived by sense1 nor apprehended by the mind4 ,remember1 ,i say1 that it is not any object which is hard or soft1 hot or cold1 blue or white1 round or square1 c4 ,for all these things ,i affirm do exist4 ,though indeed ,i deny they have an existence distinct from being perceived2 or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever4 ,think on these points2 let them be attentively considered and still kept in view4 ,otherwise you will not comprehend the state of the question2 without which your objections will always be wide of the mark1 and1 instead of mine1 may possibly be directed 7as more than once they have been7 against your own notions4 ,hyl4 ,i must needs own1 ,philonous1 nothing seems to have kept me from agreeing with you more than this same mistaking the question4 ,in denying ,matter1 at first glimpse ,i am tempted to imagine you deny the things we see and feel3 but1 upon reflexion1 find there is no ground for it4 ,what think you1 therefore1 of retaining the name ,matter1 and applying it to sensible things8 ,this may be done without any change in your sentiments3 and1 believe me1 it would be a means of reconciling them to some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in opinion4 ,phil4 ,with all my heart3 retain the word ,matter1 and apply it to the objects of sense1 if you please2 provided you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being perceived4 ,i shall never quarrel with you for an expression4 ,matter1 or material substance1 are terms introduced by philosophers2 and1 as used by them1 imply a sort of independency1 or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind3 but are never used by common people2 or1 if ever1 it is to signify the immediate objects of sense4 ,one would think1 therefore1 so long as the names of all particular things1 with the terms sensible1 substance1 body1 stuff1 and the like1 are retained1 the word ,matter should be never missed in common talk4 ,and in philosophical discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite out3 since there is not1 perhaps1 any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind towards ,atheism than the use of that general confused term4 ,hyl4 ,well but1 ,philonous1 since ,i am content to give up the notion of an unthinking substance exterior to the mind1 ,i think you ought not to deny me the privilege of using the word ,matter as ,i please1 and annexing it to a collection of sensible qualities subsisting only in the mind4 ,i freely own there is no other substance1 in a strict sense1 than ,spirit4 ,but ,i have been so long accustomed to the term ,matter that ,i know not how to part with it3 to say1 there is no ,matter in the world1 is still shocking to me4 ,whereas to say--,there is no ,matter1 if by that term be meant an unthinking substance existing without the mind2 but if by ,matter is meant some sensible thing1 whose existence consists in being perceived1 then there is ,matter3--this distinction gives it quite another turn2 and men will come into your notions with small difficulty1 when they are proposed in that manner4 ,for1 after all1 the controversy about ,matter in the strict acceptation of it1 lies altogether between you and the philosophers3 whose principles1 ,i acknowledge1 are not near so natural1 or so agreeable to the common sense of mankind1 and ,holy ,scripture1 as yours4 ,there is nothing we either desire or shun but as it makes1 or is apprehended to make1 some part of our happiness or misery4 ,but what hath happiness or misery1 joy or grief1 pleasure or pain1 to do with ,absolute ,existence2 or with unknown entities1 abstracted from all relation to us8 ,it is evident1 things regard us only as they are pleasing or displeasing3 and they can please or displease only so far forth as they are perceived4 ,farther1 therefore1 we are not concerned2 and thus far you leave things as you found them4 ,yet still there is something new in this doctrine4 ,it is plain1 ,i do not now think with the philosophers2 nor yet altogether with the vulgar4 ,i would know how the case stands in that respect2 precisely1 what you have added to1 or altered in my former notions4 ,phil4 ,i do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions4 ,my endeavours tend only to unite1 and place in a clearer light1 that truth which was before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers3--the former being of opinion1 that those things they immediately perceive are the real things2 and the latter1 that the things immediately perceived are ideas1 which exist only in the mind7#ibd74 ,which two notions put together1 do1 in effect1 constitute the substance of what ,i advance4 ,hyl4 ,i have been a long time distrusting my senses3 methought ,i saw things by a dim light and through false glasses4 ,now the glasses are removed and a new light breaks in upon my understanding4 ,i am clearly convinced that ,i see things in their native forms1 and am no longer in pain about their unknown natures or absolute existence4 ,this is the state ,i find myself in at present2 though1 indeed1 the course that brought me to it ,i do not yet thoroughly comprehend4 ,you set out upon the same principles that ,academics1 ,cartesians1 and the like sects usually do2 and for a long time it looked as if you were advancing their philosophical ,scepticism3 but1 in the end1 your conclusions are directly opposite to theirs4 ,phil4 ,you see1 ,hylas1 the water of yonder fountain1 how it is forced upwards1 in a round column1 to a certain height2 at which it breaks1 and falls back into the basin from whence it rose3 its ascent1 as well as descent1 proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of gravitation4 ,just so1 the same ,principles which1 at first view1 lead to ,scepticism1 pursued to a certain point1 bring men back to ,common ,sense4 ,,de ,,motu3 ,,sive2 ,,de ,,motus ,,principio ,,et ,,natura1 ,,et ,,de ,,causa ,,communicationis ,,motuum ,first published in #agba ,editor's ,preface ,to ,de ,motu ,this ,latin dissertation on ,motion1 or change of place in the component atoms of the material world1 was written in #agbj1 when ,berkeley was returning to ,ireland1 after he had spent some years in ,italy1 on leave of absence from ,trinity ,college4 ,a prize for an essay on the 8,cause of ,motion10 had1 it seems1 been offered in that year by the ,paris ,academy of ,sciences4 ,the subject suggested an advance on the line of thought pursued in ,berkeley's ,principles and ,dialogues4 ,the mind-dependent reality of the material world1 prominent in those works1 was in them insisted on1 not as a speculative paradox1 but mainly in order to shew the spiritual character of the ,power that is continually at work throughout the universe4 ,this essay on what was thus a congenial subject was finished at ,lyons1 and published early in #agba1 soon after ,berkeley arrived in ,london4 ,it was reprinted in his ,miscellany in #ageb4 ,i have not found evidence that it was ever submitted to the ,french ,academy4 ,at any rate the prize was awarded to ,crousaz1 the well-known logician and professor of philosophy at ,lausanne4 ,the ,de ,motu is interesting biographically as well as philosophically1 as a revelation of ,berkeley's way of thinking about the causal relations of ,matter and ,spirit seven years after the publication of the ,dialogues4 ,in #agac his experience of life was confined to ,ireland4 ,now1 after months in ,london1 in the society of ,swift1 and ,pope1 and ,addison1 he had observed nature and men in ,france and ,italy4 ,his eager temperament and extraordinary social charm opened the way in those years of travel to frequent intercourse with famous men4 ,this1 for the time1 superseded controversy with materialism and scepticism1 and diverted his enthusiasm to nature and high art4 ,one likes to see how he handles the old questions as they now arise in the philosophical treatment of motion in space1 which was regarded by many as the key to all other phenomena presented in the material world4 ,for one thing1 the unreality of the data of sense after total abstraction of living mind1 the chief ,principle in the earlier works1 lies more in the background in the ,de ,motu4 ,yet it is tacitly assumed1 as the basis of an argument for the powerlessness of all sensible things1 and for refunding all active power in the universe into conscious agency4 ,mens agitat molem might be taken as a motto for the ,de ,motu4 ,then there is more frequent reference to scientific and philosophical authorities than in his more juvenile treatises4 ,plato and ,aristotle are oftener in view4 ,italy seems to have introduced him to the physical science of ,borelli and ,torricelli4 ,leibniz1 who died in #agaf1 when ,berkeley was in ,italy1 is named by him for the first time in the ,de ,motu4 ,perhaps he had learned something when he was abroad about the most illustrious philosopher of the time4 ,and it is interesting by the way to find in one of those years what is1 ,i think1 the only allusion to ,berkeley by ,leibniz4 ,it is contained in one of the ,german philosopher's letters to ,des ,bosses1 in #agae4 8,qui in ,hybernia corporum realitatem impugnat10 ,leibniz writes1 8videtur nec rationes afferre idoneas1 nee mentem suam satis explicare4 ,suspicor esse ex eo hominum genere qui per ,paradoxa cognosci volunt40 ,this sentence is interesting on account of the writer1 although it suggests vague1 and perhaps second-hand knowledge of the ,irishman and his principles4 ,the name of ,hobbes does not appear in the ,de ,motu4 ,yet one might have expected it1 in consideration of the supreme place which motion takes in his system1 which rests upon the principle that all changes in the universe may be resolved into change of place4 ,in the ,de ,motu the favourite language of ideal realism is abandoned for the most part4 8,bodies10 not 8ideas of sense10 are contrasted with mind or spirit1 although body still means significant appearance presented to the senses4 ,indeed the term idea occurs less often in this and the subsequent writings of ,berkeley4 ,i will now give some account of salient features in the ,de ,motu4 ,like the ,principles the tract opens with a protest against the empty abstractions1 and consequent frivolous discussions1 which even mechanical science had countenanced although dealing with matters so obvious to sense as the phenomena of motion4 ,force1 effort1 solicitation of gravity1 nisus1 are examples of abstract terms connected with motion1 to which nothing in what is presented to the senses is found to correspond4 ,yet corporeal power is spoken of as if it were something perceptible by sense1 and so found within the bodies we see and touch 7sect4 #a-c74 ,but it turns out differently when philosophers and naturalists try to imagine the physical force that is supposed to inhabit bodies1 and to explain their motions4 ,the conception of motion has been the parent of innumerable paradoxes and seeming contradictions among ancient ,greek thinkers2 for it presents1 in a striking form1 the metaphysical difficulties in the way of a reconciliation of the ,one and the ,many--difficulties which ,berkeley had already attributed to perverse abstractions1 with which philosophers amused themselves and blocked up the way to concrete knowledge2 first wantonly raising a dust1 and then complaining that they could not see4 ,nor has modern mechanical science in this respect fared better than the old philosophies4 ,even its leaders1 ,torricelli1 for instance1 and ,leibniz1 offer us scholastic shadows--empty metaphysical abstractions--when they speak about an active power that is supposed to be lodged within the things of sense4 ,torricelli tells us that the forces within the things around us1 and within our own bodies1 are 8subtle quintessences1 enclosed in a corporeal substance as in the enchanted vase of ,circe02 and ,leibniz speaks of their active powers as their 8substantial form10 whatever that can be conceived to mean4 ,others call the power to which change of place is due1 the hylarchic principle1 an appetite in bodies1 a spontaneity inherent in them2 or they assume that1 besides their extension1 solidity1 and other qualities which appear in sense1 there is also something named force1 latent in them if not patent--in all which we have a flood of words1 empty of concrete thought4 ,at best the language is metaphorical 7sect4 #b-i74 ,for showing the active cause at work in the production of motion in bodies1 it is of no avail to name1 as if it were a datum of sense1 what is not presentable to our senses4 ,let us1 instead1 turn to the only other sort of data in realised experience4 ,for we find only two sorts of realities in experience1 the one sort revealed by our senses1 the other by inward consciousness4 ,we can affirm nothing about the contents of bodies except what our senses present1 namely1 concrete things1 extended1 figured1 solid1 having also innumerable other qualities1 which seem all to depend upon change of place in the things1 or in their constituent particles4 ,the contents of mind or spirit1 on the other hand1 are disclosed to inner consciousness1 which reveals a sentient ,ego that is actively percipient and exertive4 ,and it must be in the second of these two concrete revelations of reality1 that active causation1 on which motion and all other change depends1 is to be found--not in empty abstractions1 covered by words like power1 cause1 force1 or nisus1 which correspond to nothing perceived by the senses 7sect4 #ba74 ,so that which we call body presents within itself nothing in which change of place or state can originate causally4 ,extension1 figure1 solidity1 and all the other perceptible constituents of bodies are appearances only--passive phenomena1 which succeed one another in an orderly cosmical procession1 on which doubtless our pains and pleasures largely depend4 ,but there is no sensibly perceptible power found among those sensuous appearances4 ,they can only be caused causes1 adapted1 as we presuppose1 to signify to us what we may expect to follow that appearance4 ,the reason of their significance1 i4e4 of the constancy of their sequences and coexistences1 must be sought for outside of themselves4 ,experimental research may discover new terms among the correlated cosmical sequences or coexistences1 but the newly discovered terms must still be only passive phenomena previously unperceived4 ,body means only what is presentable to the senses4 ,those who attribute to it something not perceptible by sense1 which they call the force or power in which its motions originate1 say in other words that the origin of motion is unknowable by sense 7sect4 #bb-bd74 ,turn now from things of sense1 the data of perception1 to ,mind or ,spirit1 as revealed in inner consciousness4 ,here we have a deeper and more real revelation of what underlies1 or is presupposed in1 the passive cosmical procession that is presented to the senses4 ,our inward consciousness plainly shews the thinking being actually exercising power to move its animated body4 ,we find that we can1 by a causal exertion of which we are distinctly conscious1 either excite or arrest movements in bodies4 ,in voluntary exertion we have thus a concrete example of force or power1 producing and not merely followed by motion4 ,in the case of human volition this is no doubt conditioned power2 nevertheless it exemplifies ,power on a greater scale than human1 even ,divine power1 universally and continuously operative1 in all natural motions1 and in the cosmical laws according to which they proceed 7sect4 #be-cj74 ,thus those who pretend to find force or active causation within bodies1 pretend to find what their sensuous experience does not support1 and they have to sustain their pretence by unintelligible language4 ,on the other hand1 those who explain motion by referring it to conscious exertion of personal agents1 say what is supported by their own consciousness1 and confirmed by high authorities1 including ,anaxagoras1 ,plato1 ,aristotle1 ,descartes1 and ,newton1 demonstrating that in ,spirit only do we find power to change its own state1 as well as the states and mutual relations of bodies4 ,motion in nature is ,god continuously acting 7sect4 #ca-cd74 ,but physical science is conveniently confined to the order of the passive procession of sensuous appearances1 including experiments in quest of the rules naturally exemplified in the motions of bodies3 reasoning on mathematical and mechanical principles1 it leaves the contemplation of active causation to a more exalted science 7sect4 #ce-db74 ,in all this it can hardly be said that ,berkeley has in this adequately sounded the depths of ,causation4 ,he proclaims inability to find through his senses more than sequence of significant sensuous appearances1 which are each and all empty of active power2 while he apparently insists that he has found active power in the mere feeling of exertion2 which after all1 as such1 is only one sort of antecedent sign of the motion that is found to follow it4 ,this is still only sequence of phenomena2 not active power4 ,but is not causation a relation that cannot be truly presented empirically1 either in outer or inner consciousness8 ,and is not the ,divine order that is presupposed by us in all change1 a presupposition that is inevitable in trustworthy intercourse with a changing universe2 unless we are to confess atheistically1 that our whole sensuous experience may in the end put us to utter confusion8 ,the passive1 uneasy feeling of strain1 more or less involved in the effort to move our bodies and their surroundings1 is no doubt apt to be confused with active causation2 for as ,david ,hume remarks1 8the animal nisus which we experience1 though it can afford no accurate precise idea of power1 enters very much into the vulgar1 inaccurate idea which is formed of it40 ,so when ,berkeley supposes that he has found a concrete example of originating power in the nisus of which we are conscious when we move our bodies1 he is surely too easily satisfied4 ,the nisus followed by motion is1 per se1 only a natural sequence1 a caused cause1 which calls for an originating cause that is absolutely responsible for the movement4 ,is not the index to this absolutely responsible agency an ethical one1 which points to a free moral agent as alone necessarily connected with1 or responsible for1 the changes which he can control8 ,persons are causally responsible for their own actions2 and are accordingly pronounced good or evil on account of acts of will that are not mere caused causes--passively dependent terms in the endless succession of cosmical change4 ,they must originate in self1 be absolutely self-referable1 in a word supernatural issues of the personality4 ,moral reason implies that they are not determined ab extra1 and so points to moral agents as our only concrete examples of independent power2 but this only so far as those issues go for which they are morally responsible4 ,is not faith in the ,universal ,power necessarily faith-venture in the absolutely perfect and trustworthy moral agency of ,god8 ,while the principle of ,causation1 in its application to change of place on the part of bodies and their constituent atoms1 is the leading thought in the ,de ,motu1 this essay also investigates articulately the nature of the phenomenon which we call motion 7sect4 #dc-ff74 ,it assumes that motion is only an effect1 seeing that no one who reflects can doubt that what is presented to our senses in the case of motion is altogether passive3 there is nothing in the successive appearance of the same body in different places that involves action on the part of either of the moving or the moved body1 or that can be more than inert effect 7sect4 #di74 ,and all concrete motion1 it is assumed1 must be something that can be perceived by our senses4 ,accordingly it must be a perceptible relation between bodies1 as far as it is bodily3 it could make no appearance at all if space contained only one solitary body3 a plurality of bodies is indispensable to its appearance4 ,absolute motion of a solitary body1 in otherwise absolutely empty space1 is an unmeaning abstraction1 a collocation of empty words4 ,this leads into an inquiry about relative space as well as relative place1 and the intelligibility of absolute space1 place1 and motion 7sect4 #eb-fd74 ,local motion is unintelligible unless we understand the meaning of space4 ,now some philosophers distinguish between absolute space1 which with them is ultimately the only real space1 and that which is conditioned by the senses1 or relative4 ,the former is said to be boundless1 pervading and embracing the material world1 but not itself presentable to our senses2 the other is the space marked out or differentiated by bodies contained in it1 and it is in this way exposed to our senses 7sect4 #eb74 ,what must remain after the annihilation of all bodies in the universe is relativeless1 undifferentiated1 absolute space1 of which all attributes are denied1 even its so-called extension being neither divisible nor measurable2 necessarily imperceptible by sense1 unimaginable1 and unintelligible1 in every way unrealisable in experience2 so that the words employed about it denote nothing 7sect4 #ec74 ,it follows that we must not speak of the real space which a body occupies as part of a space that is necessarily abstracted from all sentient experience2 nor of real motion as change within absolute space1 without any relation between bodies1 either perceived or conceived4 ,all change of place in one body must be relative to other bodies1 among which the moving body is supposed to change its place--our own bodies which we animate being of course recognised among the number4 ,motion1 it is argued1 is unintelligible1 as well as imperceptible and unimaginable1 without some relation between the moving body and at least one other body3 the truth of this is tested when we try to suppose the annihilation of all other bodies1 our own included1 and retain only a solitary globe3 absolute motion is found unthinkable4 ,so that1 on the whole1 to see what motion means we must rise above the mathematical postulates that are found convenient in mechanical science2 we must beware of empty abstractions2 we must treat motion as something that is real only so far as it is presented to our senses1 and remain modestly satisfied with the perceived relations under which it then appears 7sect4 #fe-ff74 ,finally1 is motion1 thus explained1 something that can be spoken of as an entity communicable from one body to another body8 ,may we think of it as a datum of sense existing in the striking body1 and then passing from it into the struck body1 the one losing exactly as much as the other receives8 7sect4 #fg74 ,deeper thought finds in those questions only a revival of the previously exploded postulate of 8force0 as something sensible1 yet distinct from all the significant appearances sense presents4 ,the language used may perhaps be permitted in mathematical hypotheses1 or postulates of mechanical science1 in which we do not intend to go to the root of things4 ,but the obvious fact is1 that the moving body shews less perceptible motion1 and the moved body more4 ,to dispute whether the perceptible motion acquired is numerically the same with that lost leads into frivolous verbal controversy about ,identity and ,difference1 the ,one and the ,many1 which it was ,berkeley's aim to expel from science1 and so to simplify its procedure and result4 ,whether we say that motion passes from the striking body into the struck1 or that it is generated anew within the struck body and annihilated in the striking1 we make virtually the same statement4 ,in each way of expression the facts remain1 that the one body presents perceptible increase of its motion and the other diminution4 ,mind or ,spirit is the active cause of all that we then see4 ,yet in mechanical science--which explains things only physically1 by shewing the significant connexion of events with their mechanical rules--terms which seem to imply the conveyance of motion out of one body into another may be pardoned1 in consideration of the limits within which physical science is confined1 and its narrower point of view4 ,in physics we confine ourselves to the sensuous signs which arise in experience1 and their natural interpretation1 in all which mathematical hypotheses are found convenient2 so that gravitation1 for example1 and other natural rules of procedure1 are spoken of as causes of the events which conform to them1 no account being taken of the ,active ,power that is ultimately responsible for the rules4 ,for the ,active ,power in which we live1 move1 and have our being1 is not a datum of sense2 meditation brings it into light4 ,but to pursue this thought would carry us beyond the physical laws of ,motion 7sect4 #fi-gb74 ,the ,de ,motu may be compared with what we found in the ,principles1 sect4 #be-bh and #aja-aag4 ,the total powerlessness of the significant appearances presented to the senses1 and the omnipotence of ,mind in the economy of external nature1 is its chief philosophical lesson4 ,de ,motu #a4 ,ad veritatem inveniendam prcipuum est cavisse ne voces males intellect7#ibe7 nobis officiant3 quod omnes fere monent philosophi1 pauci observant4 ,quanquam id quidem haud adeo difficile videtur1 in rebus prsertim physicis tractandis1 ubi locum habent sensus1 experientia1 et ratiocinium geometricum4 ,seposito igitur1 quantum licet1 omni prjudicio1 tam a loquendi consuetudine quam a philosphorum auctoritate nato1 ipsa rerum natura diligenter inspicienda4 ,neque enim cujusquam auctoritatem usque adeo valere oportet1 ut verba ejus et voces in pretio sint1 dummodo nihil clari et certi iis subesse comperiatur4 #b4 ,motus contemplatio mire torsit veterum philosophorum7#ibf7 mentes1 unde nat sunt vari opiniones supra modem difficiles1 ne dicam absurd2 qu1 quum jam fere in desuetudinem abierint1 haud merentur ut iis discutiendis nimio studio immoremur4 ,apud recentiores autem et saniores hujus vi philosophos7#ibg71 ubi de ,motu agitur1 vocabula haud pauca abstract nimium et obscur significationis occurrunt1 cujusmodi sunt solicitatio gravitatis1 conatus1 vires mortu1 c41 qu scriptis1 alioqui doctissimis1 tenebras offundunt1 sententiisque non minus a vero1 quam a sensu hominum communi abhorrentibus1 ortum prbent4 ,hc vero necesse est ut1 veritatis gratia1 non alios refellendi studio1 accurate discutiantur4 #c4 ,solicitatio et nisus1 sive conatus1 rebus solummodo animatis revera competunt7#ibh74 ,cum aliis rebus tribuuntur1 sensu metaphorico accipiantur necesse est4 ,a metaphoris autem abstinendum philosopho4 ,porro1 seclusa omni tarn anim affectione quam corporis motione1 nihil clari ac distincti iis vocibus significari1 cuilibet constabit qui modo rem serio perpenderit4 #d4 ,quamdiu corpora gravia a nobis sustinentur1 sentimus in nobismet ipsis nisum1 fatigationem1 et molestiam4 ,percipimus etiam in gravibus cadentibus motum acceleratum versus centrum telluris2 ope sensuum prterea nihil4 ,ratione tamen colligitur causam esse aliquam vel principium horum phnomenon2 illud autem gravitas vulgo nuncupatur4 ,quoniam vero causa descensus gravium cca sit et incognita1 gravitas ea acceptione proprie dici nequit qualitas sensibilis2 est igitur qualitas occulta4 ,sed vix1 et ne vix quidem1 concipere licet quid sit qualitas occulta1 aut qua ratione qualitas ulla agere aut operari quidquam possit4 ,melius itaque foret1 si1 missa qualitate occulta1 homines attenderent solummodo ad effectus sensibiles2 vocibusque abstractis 7quantumvis ill ad disserendum utiles sint7 in meditatione omissis1 mens in particularibus et concretis1 hoc est in ipsis rebus1 defigeretur4 #e4 ,vis7#ibi7 similiter corporibus tribuitur3 usurpatur autem vocabulum illud1 tanquam significaret qualitatem cognitam1 distinctamque tarn a motu1 figura1 omnique alia re sensibili1 quam ab omni animalis affectione3 id vero nihil aliud esse quam qualitatem occultam1 rem acrius rimanti constabit4 ,nisus animalis et motus corporeus vulgo spectantur tanquam symptomata et mensur hujus qualitatis occult4 #f4 ,patet igitur gravitatem aut vim frustra poni pro principio7#icj7 motus3 nunquid enim principium illud clarius cognosci potest ex eo quod dicatur qualitas occulta8 ,quod ipsum occultum est1 nihil explicat3 ut omittamus causam agentem incognitam rectius dici posse substantiam quam qualitatem4 ,porro vis1 gravitas1 et istiusmodi voces1 spius1 nec inepte1 in concreto usurpantur2 ita ut connotent corpus motum1 difficultatem resistendi1 c4 ,ubi vero a philosophis adhibentur ad significandas naturas quasdam1 ab hisce omnibus prcisas et abstractas1 qu nec sensibus subjiciuntur1 nec ulla mentis vi intelligi nec imaginatione effingi7#ica7 possunt1 turn demum errores et confusionem pariunt4 #g4 ,multos autem in errorem ducit1 quod voces generales et abstractas in disserendo utiles esse videant1 nec tamen earum vim satis capiant4 ,partim vero a consuetudine vulgari invent sunt ill ad sermonem abbreviandum1 partim a philosophis ad docendum excogitat2 non quod ad naturas rerum accommodatas sint1 qu quidem singulares et concret existunt2 sed quod idone ad tradendas disciplinas1 propterea quod faciant notiones1 vel saltem propositiones1 universales7#icb74 #h4 ,vim corpoream esse aliquid conceptu facile plerumque existimamus4 ,ii tamen qui rem accuratius inspexerunt in diversa sunt opinione2 uti apparet ex mira verborum obscuritate qua laborant1 ubi illam explicare conantur4 ,torricellius ait vim et impetum esse res quasdam abstractas subtilesque et quintessentias1 qu includuntur in substantia corporea1 tanquam in vase magico ,circes7#icc74 ,leibnitius item in natur vi explicanda hc habet--,vis activa1 primitiva1 qu est 1 anim vel form substantiali respondet4 ,vide ,acta ,erudit4 ,lips4 ,usque adeo necesse est ut vel summi viri1 quamdiu abstractionibus indulgent1 voces nulla certa significatione prditas1 et meras scholasticorum umbras sectentur4 ,alia ex neotericorum scriptis1 nec pauca quidem ea1 producere liceret2 quibus abunde constaret1 metaphysicas abstractiones non usquequaque cessisse mechanic et experimentis1 sed negotium inane philosophis etiamnum facessere4 #i4 ,ex illo fonte derivantur varia absurda1 cujus generis est illud1 vim percussionis1 utcunque exigu1 esse infinite magnam4 ,quod sane supponit1 gravitatem esse qualitatem quandam realem ab aliis omnibus diversam2 et gravitationem esse quasi actum hujus qualitatis1 a motu realiter distinctum3 minima autem percussio producit effectum majorem quam maxima gravitatio sine motu2 ilia scilicet motum aliquem edit1 hc nullum4 ,unde sequitur1 vim percussionis ratione infinita excedere vim gravitationis1 hoc est1 esse infinite magnam7#icd74 ,videantur experimenta ,galili1 et qu de definita vi percussionis scripserunt ,torricellius1 ,borellus1 et alii4 #aj4 ,veruntamen fatendum est vim nullam per se immediate sentiri2 neque aliter quam per effectum7#ice7 cognosci et mensurari4 ,sed vis mortu1 seu gravitationis simplicis1 in corpore quiescente subjecto1 nulla facta mutatione1 effectus nullus est2 percussionis autem1 effectus aliquis4 ,quoniam1 ergo1 vires sunt effectibus proportionales1 concludere licet vim mortuam7#icf7 esse nullam4 ,neque tamen propterea vim percussionis esse infinitam3 non enim oportet quantitatem ullam positivam habere pro infinita1 propterea quod ratione infinita superet quantitatem nullam sive nihil4 #aa4 ,vis gravitationis a momento secerni nequit2 momentum autem sine celeritate nullum est1 quum sit moles in celeritatem ducta3 porro celeritas sine motu intelligi non potest2 ergo nec vis gravitationis4 ,deinde vis nulla nisi per actionem innotescit1 et per eandem mensuratur2 actionem autem corporis a motu prscindere non possumus2 ergo quamdiu corpus grave plumbi subjecti vel chord figuram mutat1 tamdiu movetur2 ubi vero quiescit1 nihil agit1 vel1 quod idem est1 agere prohibetur4 ,breviter1 voces ist vis mortua et gravitatio1 etsi per abstractionem metaphysicam aliquid significare supponuntur diversum a movente1 moto1 motu et quiete1 revera tamen id totum nihil est4 #ab4 ,siquis diceret pondus appensum vel impositum agere in chordam1 quoniam impedit quominus se restituat vi elastica3 dico1 pari ratione corpus quodvis inferum agere in superius incumbens1 quoniam illud descendere prohibet3 dici vero non potest actio corporis1 quod prohibeat aliud corpus existere in eo loco quern occupat4 #ac4 ,pressionem corporis gravitantis quandoque sentimus4 ,verum sensio ista molesta oritur ex motu corporis istius gravis fibris nervisque nostri corporis communicato1 et eorundem situm immutante2 adeoque percussioni accepta referri debet4 ,in hisce rebus multis et gravibus prjudiciis laboramus1 sed illa acri atque iterata meditatione subigenda sunt7#icg71 vel potius penitus averruncanda4 #ad4 ,quo probetur quantitatem ullam esse infinitam1 ostendi oportet partem aliquam finitam homogeneam in ea infinities contineri4 ,sed vis mortua se habet ad vim percussionis1 non ut pars ad totum1 sed ut punctum ad lineam1 juxta ipsos vis infinit percussionis auctores4 ,multa in hanc rem adjicere liceret1 sed vereor ne prolixus sim4 #ae4 ,ex principiis prmissis lites insignes solvi possunt1 qu viros doctos multum exercuerunt4 ,hujus rei exemplum sit controversia illa de proportione virium4 ,una pars dum concedit1 momenta1 motus1 impetus1 data mole1 esse simpliciter ut velocitates1 affirmat vires esse ut quadrata velocitatum4 ,hanc autem sententiam supponere vim corporis distingui7#ich7 a momento1 motu1 et impetu2 eaque suppositione sublata corruere1 nemo non videt4 #af4 ,quo clarius adhuc appareat1 confusionem quandam miram per abstractiones metaphysicas in doctrinam de motu introductam esse1 videamus quantum intersit inter notiones virorum celebrium de vi et impetu4 ,leibnitius impetum cum motu confundit4 ,juxta ,newtonum7#ici7 impetus revera idem est cum vi inerti4 ,borellus7#idj7 asserit impetum non aliud esse quam gradum velocitatis4 ,alii impetum et conatum inter se differre1 alii non differre volunt4 ,plerique vim motricem motui proportionalem intelligunt4 ,nonnulli aliam aliquam vim prter motricem1 et diversimode mensurandam1 utpote per quadrata velocitatum in moles1 intelligere pr se ferunt4 ,sed infinitum esset hc prosequi4 #ag4 ,vis1 gravitas1 attractio1 et hujusmodi voces1 utiles7#ida7 sunt ad ratiocinia et computationes de motu et corporibus motis2 sed non ad intelligendam simplicem ipsius motus naturam1 vel ad qualitates totidem distinctas designandas4 ,attractionem certe quod attinet1 patet illam ab ,newtono adhiberi1 non tanquam qualitatem veram et physicam1 sed solummodo ut hypothesin mathematicam7#idb74 ,quinetiam ,leibnitius1 nisum elementarem seu solicitationem ab impetu distinguens1 fatetur illa entia non re ipsa inveniri in rerum natura1 sed abstractione facienda esse4 #ah4 ,similis ratio est compositionis et resolutionis virium quarumcunque directarum in quascunque obliquas1 per diagonalem et latera parallelogrammi4 ,hc mechanic et computationi inserviunt3 sed aliud est computationi et demonstrationibus mathematicis inservire1 aliud rerum naturam exhibere4 #ai4 ,ex recentioribus multi sunt in ea opinione1 ut putent motum neque destrui nec de novo gigni1 sed eandem7#idc7 semper motus quantitatem permanere4 ,aristoteles etiam dubium illud olim proposuit--utrum motus factus sit et corruptus1 an vero ab terno8 ,phys4 lib4 viii4 ,quod vero motus sensibilis pereat1 patet sensibus3 illi autem eundem impetum1 nisum1 aut summam virium eandem manere velle videntur4 ,unde affirmat ,borellus1 vim in percussione non imminui1 sed expandi2 impetus etiam contrarios suscipi et retineri in eodem corpore4 ,item ,leibnitius nisum ubique et semper esse in materia1 et ubi non patet sensibus1 ratione intelligi contendit4--,hc autem nimis abstracta esse et obscura1 ejusdemque fere generis cum formis substantialibus et entelechiis1 fatendum4 #bj4 ,quotquot ad explicandam motus causam atque originem1 vel principio hylarchico1 vel natur indigentia1 vel appetitu1 aut denique instinctu naturali utuntur1 dixisse aliquid potius quam cogitasse censendi sunt4 ,neque ab hisce multum absunt qui supposuerint7#idd7 partes terr esse se moventes1 aut etiam spiritus iis implantatos ad instar form1 ut assignent causam accelerationis gravium cadentium3 aut qui dixerit7#ide71 in corpore prter solidam extensionem debere etiam poni aliquid unde virium consideratio oriatur4 ,siquidem hi omnes vel nihil particulare et determinatum enuntiant2 vel1 si quid sit1 tarn difficile erit illud explicare1 quam id ipsum cujus explicandi causa adducitur7#idf74 #ba4 ,frustra ad naturam illustrandam adhibentur ea qu nec sensibus patent1 nec ratione intelligi possunt4 ,videndum ergo quid sensus1 quid experientia1 quid demum ratio iis innixa1 suadeat4 ,duo sunt summa rerum genera--corpus et anima4 ,rem extensam1 solidam1 mobilem1 figuratam1 aliisque qualitatibus qu sensibus occurrunt prditam1 ope sensuum2 rem vero sentientem1 percipientem1 intelligentem1 conscientia quadam interna cognovimus4 ,porro1 res istas plane inter se diversas esse1 longeque heterogeneas1 cernimus4 ,loquor autem de rebus cognitis3 de incognitis enim disserere nil juvat7#idg74 #bb4 ,totum id quod novimus1 cui nomen corpus indidimus1 nihil in se continet quod motus principium seu causa efficiens esse possit4 ,etenim impenetrabilitas1 extensio1 figura nullam includunt vel connotant potentiam producendi motum2 quinimo e contrario non modo illas1 verum etiam alias1 quotquot sint1 corporis qualitates sigillatim percurrentes1 videbimus omnes esse revera passivas1 nihilque iis activum inesse1 quod ullo modo intelligi possit tanquam fons et principium motus7#idh74 ,gravitatem quod attinet1 voce illa nihil cognitum et ab ipso effectu sensibili1 cujus causa quritur1 diversum significari jam ante ostendimus4 ,et sane quando corpus grave dicimus1 nihil aliud intelligimus1 nisi quod feratur deorsum2 de causa hujus effectus sensibilis nihil omnino cogitantes4 #bc4 ,de corpore itaque audacter pronunciare licet1 utpote de re comperta1 quod non sit principium motus4 ,quod si quisquam1 prter solidam extensionem ejusque modificationes1 vocem corpus qualitatem etiam occultam1 virtutem1 formam1 essentiam complecti sua significatione contendat2 licet quidem illi inutili negotio sine ideis disputare1 et nominibus nihil distincte exprimentibus abuti4 ,cterum sanior philosophandi ratio videtur ab notionibus abstractis et generalibus 7si modo notiones dici debent qu intelligi nequeunt7 quantum fieri potest abstinuisse4 #bd4 ,quicquid continetur in idea corporis novimus2 quod vero novimus in corpore1 id non esse principium motus constat7#idi74 ,qui prterea aliquid incognitum in corpore1 cujus ideam nullam habent1 comminiscuntur1 quod motus principium dicant1 ii revera nihil aliud quam principium motus esse incognitum dicunt4 ,sed hujusmodi subtilitatibus diutius immorari piget4 #be4 ,prter res corporeas alterum est genus rerum cogitantium7#iej74 ,in iis autem potentiam inesse corpora movendi1 propria experientia didicimus7#iea72 quandoquidem anima nostra pro lubitu possit ciere et sistere membrorum motus1 quacunque tandem ratione id fiat4 ,hoc certe constat1 corpora moveri ad nutum anim2 eamque proinde haud inepte dici posse principium motus3 particulare quidem et subordinatum1 quodque ipsum dependeat a primo et universali ,principio7#ieb74 #bf4 ,corpora gravia feruntur deorsum1 etsi nullo impulsu apparente agitata2 non tamen existimandum propterea in iis contineri principium motus3 cujus rei hanc rationem assignat ,aristoteles7#iec72--;,gravia et levia 7inquit7 non moventur a seipsis2 id enim vitale esset1 et se sistere possent4 ,gravia omnia una eademque certa et constanti lege centrum telluris petunt1 neque in ipsis animadvertitur principium vel facultas ulla motum istum sistendi1 minuendi1 vel1 nisi pro rata proportione1 augendi1 aut denique ullo modo immutandi3 habent adeo se passive4 ,porro idem1 stricte et accurate loquendo1 dicendum de corporibus percussivis4 ,corpora ista quamdiu moventur1 ut et in ipso percussionis momento1 si gerunt passive1 perinde scilicet atque cum quiescunt4 ,corpus iners tam agit quam corpus motum1 si res ad verum exigatur3 id quod agnoscit ,newtonus1 ubi ait1 vim inerti esse eandem cum impetu7#ied74 ,corpus autem iners et quietum nihil agit1 ergo nee motum4 #bg4 ,revera corpus que perseverat in utrovis statu1 vel motus vel quietis4 ,ista vero perseverantia non magis dicenda est actio corporis1 quam existentia ejusdem actio diceretur4 ,perseverantia nihil aliud est quam continuatio in eodem modo existendi1 qu proprie dici actio non potest4 ,cterum resistentiam1 quam experimur in sistendo corpore moto1 ejus actionem esse fingimus vana specie delusi4 ,revera enim ista resistentia quam sentimus7#iee71 passio est in nobis1 neque arguit corpus agere1 sed nos pati3 constat utique nos idem passuros fuisse1 sive corpus illud a se moveatur1 sive ab alio principio impellatur4 #bh4 ,actio et reactio dicuntur esse in corporibus3 nec incommode ad demonstrationes mechanicas7#ief74 ,sed cavendum1 ne propterea supponamus virtutem aliquam realem1 qu motus causa sive principium sit1 esse in iis4 ,etenim voces ill eodem modo intelligend sunt ac vox attractio2 et quemadmodum hc est hypothesis solummodo mathematica7#ieg71 non autem qualitas physica3 idem etiam de illis intelligi debet1 et ob eandem rationem4 ,nam sicut veritas et usus theorematum de mutua corporum attractione in philosophia mechanica stabiles manent1 utpote unice fundati in motu corporum1 sive motus iste causari supponatur per actionem corporum se mutuo attrahentium1 sive per actionem agentis alicujus a corporibus diversi impellentis et moderantis corpora2 pari ratione1 qucunque tradita sunt de regulis et legibus motuum1 simul ac theoremata inde deducta1 manent inconcussa1 dum modo concedantur effectus sensibiles1 et ratiocinia iis innixa2 sive supponamus actionem ipsam1 aut vim horum effectuum causatricem1 esse in corpore1 sive in agente incorporeo4 #bi4 ,auferantur ex idea corporis extensio1 soliditas1 figura1 remanebit nihil7#ieh74 ,sed qualitates ist sunt ad motum indifferentes1 nec in se quidquam habent quod motus principium dici possit4 ,hoc ex ipsis ideis nostris perspicuum est4 ,si igitur voce corpus significatur id quod concipimus1 plane constat inde non peti posse principium motus3 pars scilicet nulla aut attributum illius causa efficiens vera est1 qu motum producat4 ,vocem autem proferre1 et nihil concipere1 id demum indignum esset philosopho4 #cj4 ,datur res cogitans1 activa1 quam principium motus 444 in nobis experimur7#iei74 ,hanc animam1 mentem1 spiritum 444 ,datur etiam res extensa1 iners1 impenetrabilis1 444 qu a priori toto clo differt1 novumque genus7#ifj7 444 ,quantum intersit inter res cogitantes et extensas1 primus omnium deprehendens ,anaxagoras1 vir longe sapientissimus1 asserebat mentem nihil habere cum corporibus commune1 id quod constat ex primo libro ,aristotelis ,de ,anima7#ifa74 ,ex neotericis idem optime animadvertit ,cartesius7#ifb74 ,ab eo alii7#ifc7 rem satis claram vocibus obscuris impeditam ac difficilem reddiderunt4 #ca4 ,ex dictis manifestum est eos qui vim activam1 actionem1 motus principium1 in corporibus revera inesse affirmant1 sententiam nulla experientia fundatam amplecti1 eamque terminis obscuris et generalibus adstruere1 nec quid sibi velint satis intelligere4 ,e contrario1 qui mentem esse principium motus volunt1 sententiam propria experientia munitam proferunt1 hominumque omni vo doctissimorum suffragiis comprobatam4 #cb4 ,primus ,anaxagoras7#ifd7 introduxit1 qui motum inerti materi imprimeret4 ,quam quidem sententiam probat etiam ,aristoteles7#ife71 pluribusque confirmat1 aperto pronuncians primum movens esse immobile1 indivisibile1 et nullam habens magnitudinem4 ,dicere autem1 omne me vum esse mobile1 recte animadvertit idem esse ac s diceret1 omne dificativum esse dificabile1 ,physic1 lib ,plato insuper in ,timo7#iff7 tradit machinam hanc corpo seu mundum visibilem1 agitari et animari a mente1 sensum omnem fugiat4 ,quinetiam hodie philosophi siani7#ifg7 principium motuum naturalium ,deum agnoscun4 ,et ,newtonus7#ifh7 passim nec obscure innuit1 non solummodo motum ab initio a numine profectum esse1 verum adhuc systema mundanum ab eodem actu moveri4 ,hoc sacris literis consonum est3 hoc scholasticorum calculo comprobatur4 ,nam etsi ,peripatetici naturam tradant esse principium motus et quietis1 interpretantur tamen naturam naturantem esse ,deum7#ifi74 ,intelligunt nimirum corpora omnia systematis hujusce mundani a mente prpotenti juxta certam et constantem rationem7#igj7 moveri4 #cc4 ,cterum qui principium vitale corporibus tribuunt1 obscurum aliquid et rebus parum conveniens fingunt4 ,quid enim aliud est vitali principio prditum esse quam vivere8 aut vivere quam se movere1 sistere1 et statum suum mutare8 ,philosophi autem hujus sculi doctissimi pro principio indubitato ponunt1 omne corpus perseverare in statu suo1 vel quietis vel motus uniformis in directum1 nisi quatenus aliunde cogitur statum ilium mutare3 e contrario1 in anima sentimus esse facultatem tam statum suum quam aliarum rerum mutandi2 id quod proprie dicitur vitale1 animamque a corporibus longe discriminat4 #cd4 ,motum et quietem in corporibus recentiores considerant velut duos status existendi1 in quorum utrovis corpus omne sua natura iners permaneret7#iga71 nulla vi externa urgente4 ,unde colligere licet1 eandem esse causam motus et quietis1 qu est existenti corporum4 ,neque enim qurenda videtur alia causa existenti corporis successiv in diversis partibus spatii1 quam illa unde derivatur existentia ejusdem corporis successiva in diversis partibus temporis4 ,de ,deo autem ,optimo ,maximo rerum omnium ,conditore et ,conservatore tractare1 et qua ratione res cunct a summo et vero ,ente pendeant demonstrare1 quamvis pars sit scienti human prcellentissima1 spectat tamen potius ad philosophiam primam7#igb71 seu metaphysicam et theologiam1 quam ad philosophiam naturalem1 qu hodie fere omnis continetur in experimentis et mechanica4 ,itaque cognitionem de ,deo vel supponit philosophia naturalis1 vel mutuatur ab aliqua scientia superiori4 ,quanquam verissimum sit1 natur investigationem scientiis altioribus argumenta egregia ad sapientiam1 bonitatem1 et potentiam ,dei illustrandam et probandam undequaque subministrare4 #ce4 ,quod hc minus intelligantur1 in causa est1 cur nonnulli immerito repudient physic principia mathematica1 eo scilicet nomine quod illa causas rerum efficientes non assignant3 quum tamen revera ad physicam aut mechanicam spectet regulas7#igc7 solummodo1 non causas efficientes1 impulsionum attractionumve1 et ut verbo dicam1 motuum leges tradere2 ex iis vero positis phnomenon particularium solutionem1 non autem causam efficientem assignare4 #cf4 ,multum intererit considerasse quid proprie sit principium1 et quo sensu intelligenda sit vox illa apud philosophos7#igd74 ,causa quidem vera efficiens et conservatrix rerum omnium jure optimo appellatur fons et principium earundem4 ,principia vero philosophi experimentalis proprie dicenda sunt fundamenta quibus illa innititur1 seu fontes unde derivatur1 7non dico existentia1 sed7 cognitio rerum corporearum1 sensus utique ex experientia4 ,similiter1 in philosophia mechanica1 principia dicenda sunt1 in quibus fundatur et continetur universa disciplina1 leges ill motuum primari1 qu experimentis comprobat1 ratiocinio etiam excult sunt et reddit universales7#ige74 ,h motuum leges commode dicuntur principia1 quoniam ab iis tam theoremata mechanica generalia quam particulares explicationes derivantur4 #cg4 ,tum nimirum dici potest quidpiam explicari mechanice1 cum reducitur ad ista principia simplicissima et universalissima1 et per accuratum ratiocinium1 cum iis consentaneum et connexum esse ostenditur4 ,nam inventis semel natur legibus1 deinceps monstrandum est philosopho1 ex constanti harum legum observatione1 hoc est1 ex iis principiis phnomenon quodvis necessario consequi3 id quod est phnomena explicare et solvere1 causamque1 id est rationem cur fiant1 assignare4 #ch4 ,mens humana gaudet scientiam suam extendere et dilatare4 ,ad hoc autem notiones et propositiones generales efformand sunt1 in quibus quodam modo continentur propositiones et cognitiones particulares1 qu turn demum intelligi creduntur cum ex primis illis continuo nexu deducuntur4 ,hoc geometris notissimum est4 ,in mechanica etiam prmittuntur notiones1 hoc est definitiones1 et enunciationes de motu prim et generales1 ex quibus postmodum methodo mathematica conclusiones magis remot et minus generales colliguntur4 ,et sicut per applicationem theorematum geometricorum1 corporum particularium magnitudines mensurantur2 ita etiam per applicationem theorematum mechanices universalium1 systematis mundani partium quarumvis motus1 et phnomena inde pendentia1 innotescunt et determinantur3 ad quem scopum unice collineandum physico4 #ci4 ,et quemadmodum geometr1 disciplin causa1 multa comminiscuntur1 qu nec ipsi describere possunt1 nec in rerum natura invenire2 simili prorsus ratione mechanicus voces quasdam abstractas et generales adhibet1 fingitque in corporibus vim1 actionem1 attractionem1 solicitationem1 c4 qu ad theorias et enunciationes1 ut et computationes de motu apprime utiles sunt1 etiamsi in ipsa rerum veritate et corporibus actu existentibus frustra qurerentur1 non minus quam qu a geometris per abstractionem mathematicam finguntur4 #dj4 ,revera ope sensuum nil nisi effectus seu qualitates sensibiles1 et res corporeas omnino passivas1 sive in motu sint sive in quiete1 percipimus3 ratioque et experientia activum nihil prter mentem aut animam esse suadet4 ,quidquid ultra fingitur1 id ejusdem generis esse cum aliis hypothesibus et abstractionibus mathematicis existimandum3 quod penitu sanimo infigere oportet4 ,hoc ni fiat1 facile in obscuram scholasticorum subtilitatem1 qu per tot scula1 tanquam dira qudam pestis1 philosophiam corrupit1 relabi possumus4 #da4 ,principia mechanica legesque motuum aut natur universales1 sculo ultimo feliciter invent1 et subsidio geometri tractat et applicat1 miram lucem in philosophiam intulerunt4 ,principia vero metaphysica causque reales efficientes motus et existenti corporum attributorumve corporeorum nullo modo ad mechanicam aut experimenta pertinent2 neque eis lucem dare possunt1 nisi quatenus1 velut prcognita1 inserviant ad limites physic prfiniendos1 eaque ratione ad tollendas difficultates qustionesque peregrinas4 #db4 ,qui a spiritibus motus principium petunt1 ii vel rem corpoream vel incorpoream voce spiritus intelligunt4 ,si rem corpoream1 quantumvis tenuem1 tamen redit difficultas3 si incorpoream1 quantumvis id verum sit1 attamen ad physicam non proprie pertinet4 ,quod si quis philosophiam naturalem ultra limites experimentorum et mechanic extenderit1 ita ut rerum etiam incorporearum1 et inextensarum cognitionem complectatur1 latior quidem illa vocis acceptio tractationem de anima1 mente1 seu principio vitali admittit4 ,cterum commodius erit1 juxta usum jam fere receptum1 ita distinguere inter scientias1 ut singul propriis circumscribantur cancellis1 et philosophus naturalis totus sit in experimentis1 legibusque motuum1 et principiis mechanicis1 indeque depromptis ratiociniis2 quidquid autem de aliis rebus protulerit1 id superiori alicui scienti acceptum referat4 ,etenim ex cognitis natur legibus pulcherrim theori1 praxes etiam mechanic ad vitam utiles consequuntur4 ,ex cognitione autem ipsius natur ,auctoris considerationes longe prstantissim quidem ill1 sed metaphysic1 theologic1 morales oriuntur4 #dc4 ,de principiis hactenus3 nunc dicendum de natura motus7#igf74 ,atque is quidem1 cum sensibus clare percipiatur1 non tam natura sua1 quam doctis philosophorum commentis obscuratus est4 ,motus nunquam in sensus nostros incurrit sine mole corporea1 spatio1 et tempore4 ,sunt tamen qui motum1 tanquam ideam quandam simplicem et abstractam1 atque ab omnibus aliis rebus sejunctam1 contemplari student4 ,verum idea illa tenuissima et subtilissima7#igg7 intellectus aciem eludit3 id quod quilibet secum meditando experiri potest4 ,hinc nascuntur magn difficultates de natura motus1 et definitiones1 ipsa re quam illustrare debent longe obscuriores4 ,hujusmodi sunt definitiones ill ,aristotelis et ,scholasticorum7#igh71 qui motum dicunt esse actum mobilis quatenus est mobile1 vel actum entis in potentia quatenus in potentia4 ,hujusmodi etiam est illud viri7#igi7 inter recentiores celebris1 qut asserit nihil in motu esse reale prter momentaneum illud quod in vi ad mutationem nitente constitui debet4 ,porro constat1 horum et similium definitionum auctores in animo habuisse abstractam motus naturam1 seclusa omni temporis et spatii consideratione1 explicare3 sed qua ratione abstracta ilia motus quintessentia 7ut ita dicam7 intelligi possit1 non video4 #dd4 ,neque hoc contenti1 ulterius pergunt1 partesque ipsius motus a se invicem dividunt et secernunt1 quarum ideas distinctas1 tanquam entium revera distinctorum1 efformare conantur4 ,etenim sunt qui motionem a motu distinguant1 illam velut instantaneum motus elementum spectantes4 ,velocitatem insuper1 conatum1 vim1 impetum totidem res essentia diversas esse volunt1 quarum quque per propriam atque ab aliis omnibus segregatam et abstractam ideam intellectui objiciatur4 ,sed in hisce rebus discutiendis1 stantibus iis qu supra disseruimus7#ihj71 non est cur diutius immoremur4 #de4 ,multi etiam per transitum7#iha7 motum definiunt1 obliti1 scilicet1 transitum ipsum sine motu intelligi non posse1 et per motum definiri oportere4 ,verissimum adeo est definitiones1 sicut nonnullis rebus lucem1 ita vicissim aliis tenebras afferre4 ,et profecto1 quascumque res sensu percipimus1 eas clariores aut notiores definiendo efficere vix quisquam potuerit4 ,cujus rei vana spe allecti res faciles difficillimas7#ihb7 reddiderunt philosophi1 mentesque suas difficultatibus1 quas ut plurimum ipsi peperissent1 implicavere4 ,ex hocce definiendi1 simul ac abstrahendi studio1 mult tam de motu quam de aliis rebus nat subtilissim qustiones1 edemque nullius utilitatis1 hominum ingenia frustra torserunt2 adeo ut ,aristoteles ultro et spius fateatur motum esse actum quendam cognitu difficilem7#ihc71 et nonnulli ex veteribus usque eo nugis exercitati deveniebant1 ut motum omnino esse negarent7#ihd74 #df4 ,sed hujusmodi minutiis distineri piget4 ,satis sit fontes solutionum indicasse3 ad quos etiam illud adjungere libet3 quod ea qu de infinita divisione temporis et spatii in mathesi traduntur1 ob congenitam rerum naturam paradoxa et theorias spinosas 7quales sunt ill omnes in quibus agitur de infinito7#ihe77 in speculationes de motu intulerunt4 ,quidquid autem hujus generis sit1 id omne motus commune habet cum spatio et tempore1 vel potius ad ea refert acceptum4 #dg4 ,et quemadmodum ex una parte nimia abstractio seu divisio rerum vere inseparabilium1 ita ab altera parte compositio seu potius confusio rerum diversissimarum motus naturam perplexam reddidit4 ,usitatum enim est motum cum causa motus efficiente confundere7#ihf74 ,unde accidit ut motus sit quasi biformis1 unam faciem sensibus obviam1 alteram caliginosa nocte obvolutam habens4 ,inde obscuritas et confusio1 et varia de motu paradoxa originem trahunt1 dum effectui perperam tribuitur id quod revera caus solummodo competit4 #dh4 ,hinc oritur opinio illa1 eandem semper motus quantitatem conservari7#ihg74 ,quod1 nisi intelligatur de vi et potentia caus1 sive causa ilia dicatur natura1 sive 1 vel quodcunque tandem agens sit1 falsum esse cuivis facile constabit4 ,aristoteles7#ihh7 quidem l4 viii4 ,physicorum1 ubi qurit utrum motus factus sit et corruptus1 an vero ab terno tanquam vita immortalis insit rebus omnibus1 vitale principium potius1 quam effectum externum1 sive mutationem loci7#ihi71 intellexisse videtur4 #di4 ,hinc etiam est1 quod multi suspicantur motum non esse meram passionem in corporibus4 ,quod si intelligamus id quod in motu corporis sensibus objicitur1 quin omnino passivum sit nemo dubitare potest4 ,ecquid enim in se habet successiva corporis existentia in diversis locis1 quod actionem referat1 aut aliud sit quam nuduset iners effectus8 #ej4 ,peripatetici1 qui dicunt motum esse actum unum utriusque1 moventis et moti7#iij71 non satis discriminant causam ab effectu4 ,similiter1 qui nisum aut conatum in motu fingunt1 aut idem corpus simul in contrarias partes ferri putant1 eadem idearum confusione1 eadem vocum ambiguitate ludificari videntur4 #ea4 ,juvat multum1 sicut in aliis omnibus1 ita in scientia de motu accuratam diligentiam adhibere1 tam ad aliorum conceptus intelligendos quam ad suos enunciandos3 in qua re nisi peccatum esset1 vix credo in disputationem trahi potuisse1 utrum corpus indifferens sit ad motum et ad quietem1 necne4 ,quoniam enim experientia constat1 esse legem natur primariam1 ut corpus perinde perseveret in statu motus ac quietis1 quamdiu aliunde nihil accidat ad statum istum mutandum2 et propterea vim inerti sub diverso respectu esse vel resistentiam1 vel impetum1 colligitur3 hoc sensu profecto corpus dici potest sua natura indifferens ad motum vel quietem4 ,nimirum tam difficile est quietem in corpus motum1 quam motum in quiescens inducere3 cum vero corpus pariter conservet statum utrumvis1 quidni dicatur ad utrumvis se habere indifferenter8 #eb4 ,peripatetici pro varietate mutationum1 quas res aliqua subire potest1 varia motus genera distinguebant4 ,hodie de motu agentes intelligunt solummodo motum localem7#iia74 ,motus autem localis intelligi nequit nisi simul intelligatur quid sit locus3 is vero a neotericis7#iib7 definitur pars spatii quam corpus occupat3 unde dividitur in relativum et absolutum pro ratione spatii4 ,distinguunt enim inter spatium absolutum sive verum1 ac relativum sive apparens4 ,volunt scilicet dari spatium undequaque immensum1 immobile1 insensibile1 corpora universa permeans et continens1 quod vocant spatium absolutum4 ,spatium autem a corporibus comprehensum vel definitum1 sensibusque adeo subjectum1 dicitur spatium relativum1 apparens1 vulgare4 #ec4 ,fingamus itaque corpora cuncta destrui1 et in nihilum redigi4 ,quod reliquum est vocant spatium absolutum1 omni relatione qu a situ et distantiis corporum oriebatur1 simul cum ipsis corporibus1 sublata4 ,porro spatium illud est infinitum1 immobile1 indivisibile1 insensibile1 sine relatione et sine distinctione4 ,hoc est1 omnia ejus attributa sunt privativa vel negativa3 videtur igitur esse merum nihil7#iic74 ,parit solummmodo difficultatem aliquam quod extensum sit4 ,extensio autem est qualitas positiva4 ,verum qualis tandem extensio est illa qu nec dividi potest1 nec mensurari1 cujus nullam partem1 nec sensu percipere1 nec imaginatione depingere possumus8 ,etenim nihil in imaginationem cadit1 quod1 ex natura rei1 non possibile est ut sensu percipiatur2 siquidem imaginatio7#iid7 nihil aliud est quam facultas representatrix rerum sensibilium1 vel actu existentium1 vel saltem possibilium4 ,fugit insuper intellectum purum1 quum facultas illa versetur tantum circa res spirituales et inextensas1 cujusmodi sunt mentes nostr1 earumque habitus1 passiones1 virtutes1 et similia4 ,ex spatio igitur absoluto auferamus modo vocabula1 et nihil remanebit in sensu1 imaginatione1 aut intellectu3 nihil aliud ergo iis designatur1 quam pura privatio aut negatio1 hoc est1 merum nihil4 #ed4 ,confitendum omnino est nos circa hanc rem gravissimis prjudiciis teneri1 a quibus ut liberemur1 omnis animi vis exercenda4 ,etenim multi1 tantum abest quod spatium absolutum pro nihilo ducant1 ut rem esse ex omnibus 7,deo excepto7 unicam existiment1 qu annihilari non possit3 statuantque illud suapte natura necessario existere1 ternumque esse et increatum1 atque adeo attributorum divinorum particeps7#iie74 ,verum enimvero quum certissimum sit1 res omnes1 quas nominibus designamus1 per qualitates aut relationes1 vel aliqua saltem ex parte cognosci 7ineptum enim foret vocabulis uti quibus cogniti nihil1 nihil notionis1 ide vel conceptus subjiceretur71 inquiramus diligenter1 utrum formare liceat ideam ullam spatii illius puri1 realis1 absoluti1 quod post omnium corporum annihilationem perseveret existere4 ,ideam porro talem paulo acrius intuens1 reperio ideam esse nihili purissimam1 si modo idea appellanda sit4 ,hoc ipse summa adhibita diligentia expertus sum3 hoc alios pari adhibita diligentia experturos reor4 #ee4 ,decipere nos nonnunquam solet1 quod aliis omnibus corporibus imaginatione sublatis1 nostrum7#iif7 tamen manere supponimus4 ,quo supposito1 motum membrorum ab omni parte liberrimum imaginamur4 ,motus autem sine spatio concipi non potest4 ,nihilominus si rem attento animo recolamus1 constabit primo concipi spatium relativum partibus nostri corporis definitum3 #b4 movendi membra potestatem liberrimam nullo obstaculo retusam3 et prter hc duo nihil4 ,falso tamen credimus tertium aliquod1 spatium videlicet immensum1 realiter existere1 quod liberam potestatem nobis faciat movendi corpus nostrum3 ad hoc enim requiritur absentia solummodo aliorum corporum4 ,quam absentiam1 sive privationem corporum1 nihil esse positivum fateamur necesse est7#iig74 #ef4 ,cterum hasce res nisi quis libero et acri examine perspexerit1 verba et voces parum valent4 ,meditanti vero1 et rationes secum reputanti1 ni fallor1 manifestum erit1 qucunque de spatio puro et absoluto prdicantur1 ea omnia de nihilo prdicari posse4 ,qua ratione mens humana facillime liberatur a magnis difficultatibus simulque ab ea absurditate tribuendi existentiam necessariam7#iih7 ulli rei prterquam soli ,deo optimo maximo4 #eg4 ,in proclivi esset sententiam nostram argumentis a posteriori 7ut loquuntur7 ductis confirmare1 qustiones de spatio absoluto proponendo2 exempli gratia1 utrum sit substantia vel accidens8 utrum creatum vel increatum8 et absurditates ex utravis parte consequentes demonstrando4 ,sed brevitati consulendum4 ,illud tamen omitti non debet1 quod sententiam hancce ,democritus olim calculo suo comprobavit1 uti auctor est ,aristoteles #a4 i4 ,phys47#iii7 ubi hc habet3 ,democritus solidum et inane ponit principia1 quorum aliud quidem ut quod est1 aliud ut quod non est esse dicit4 ,scrupulum si forte injiciat1 quod distinctio illa inter spatium absolutum et relativum a magni nominis philosophis usurpetur1 eique quasi fundamento indificentur multa prclara theoremata1 scrupulum istum vanum esse1 ex iis qu secutura sunt1 apparebit4 #eh4 ,ex prmissis patet1 non convenire ut definiamus locum verum corporis esse partem spatii absoluti quam occupat corpus1 motumque verum seu absolutum esse mutationem loci veri et absoluti4 ,siquidem omnis locus est relativus1 ut et omnis motus4 ,veruntamen ut hoc clarius appareat1 animadvertendum est1 motum nullum intelligi posse sine determinatione aliqua seu directione1 qu quidem intelligi nequit1 nisi praeter corpus motum1 nostrum etiam corpus1 aut aliud aliquod1 simul intelligatur existere4 ,nam sursum1 deorsum1 sinistrorsum1 dextrorsum1 omnesque plag et regiones in relatione aliqua fundantur1 et necessario corpus a moto diversum connotant et supponunt4 ,adeo ut1 si reliquis corporibus in nihilum redactis1 globus1 exempli gratia1 unicus existere supponatur2 in illo motus nullus concipi possit3 usque adeo necesse est1 ut detur aliud corpus1 cujus situ motus determinari intelligatur4 ,hujus sententi veritas clarissime elucebit1 modo corporum omnium tam nostri quam aliorum1 prter globum istum unicum1 annihilationem recte supposuerimus4 #ei4 ,concipiantur porro duo globi1 et prterea nil corporeum1 existere4 ,concipiantur deinde vires quomodocunque applicari3 quicquid tandem per applicationem virium intelligamus1 motus circularis duorum globorum circa commune centrum nequit per imaginationem concipi4 ,supponamus deinde clum fixarum creari3 subito ex concepto appulsu globorum ad diversas cli istius partes motus concipietur4 ,scilicet cum motus natura sua sit relativus1 concipi non potuit priusquam darentur corpora correlata4 ,quemadmodum nec ulla relatio alia sine correlatis concipi potest4 #fj4 ,ad motum circularem quod attinet1 putant multi1 crescente motu vero circulari1 corpus necessario magis semper magisque ab axe niti4 ,hoc autem ex eo provenit1 quod1 cum motus circularis spectari possit tanquam in omni momento a duabus directionibus ortum trahens1 una secundum radium1 altera secundum tangentem2 si in hac ultima tantum directione impetus augeatur1 tum a centro recedet corpus motum1 orbita vero desinet esse circularis4 ,quod si qualiter augeantur vires in utraque directione1 manebit motus circularis1 sed acceleratus conatu1 qui non magis arguet vires recedendi ab axe1 quam accedendi ad eundem1 auctas esse4 ,dicendum igitur1 aquam in situla circumactam ascendere ad latera vasis1 propterea quod1 applicatis novis viribus in directione tangentis ad quamvis particulam aqu1 eodem instanti non applicentur nov vires quales centripet4 ,ex quo experimento nullo modo sequitur1 motum absolutum circularem per vires recedendi ab axe motus necessario dignosci4 ,porro qua ratione intelligend sunt voces ist1 vires corporum et conatus1 ex prmissis satis superque innotescit4 #fa4 ,quo modo curva considerari potest tanquam constans ex rectis infinitis1 etiamsi revera ex illis non constet1 sed quod ea hypothesis ad geometriam utilis sit1 eodem modo motus circularis spectari potest tanquam a directionibus rectilineis infinitis ortum ducens1 qu suppositio utilis est in philosophia mechanica4 ,non tamen ideo affirmandum1 impossibile esse1 ut centrum gravitatis corporis cujusvis successive existat in singulis punctis peripheriae circularis1 nulla ratione habita directionis ullius rectiline1 sive in tangente sive in radio4 #fb4 ,haud omittendum est1 motum lapidis in funda1 aut aqu in situla circumacta1 dici non posse motum vere circularem1 juxta mentem eorum qui per partes spatii absoluti definiunt loca vera corporum2 cum sit mire compositus ex motibus non solum situl vel fund1 sed etiam telluris diurno circa proprium axem1 menstruo circa commune centrum gravitatis terr et lun1 et annuo circa solem3 et propterea particula quvis lapidis vel aqu describat lineam a circulari longe abhorrentem4 ,neque revera est1 qui creditur1 conatus axifugus1 quoniam non respicit unum aliquem axem ratione spatii absoluti1 supposito quod detur tale spatium3 proinde non video quomodo appellari possit conatus unicus1 cui motus vere circularis tanquam proprio et adaequato effectui respondet4 #fc4 ,motus nullus dignosci potest1 aut mensurari1 nisi per res sensibiles4 ,cum ergo spatium absolutum nullo modo in sensus incurrat1 necesse est ut inutile prorsus sit ad distinctionem motuum4 ,prterea determinatio sive directio motui essentialis est1 ilia vero in relatione consistit4 ,ergo impossibile est ut motus absolutus concipiatur4 #fd4 ,porro quoniam pro diversitate loci relativi varius sit motus ejusdem corporis1 quinimo uno respectu moveri1 altero quiescere dici quidpiam possit7#ajjj72 ad determinandum motum verum et quietem veram1 quo scilicet tollatur ambiguitas1 et consulatur mechanic philosophorum1 qui systema rerum latius contemplantur1 satis fuerit spatium relativum fixarum clo1 tanquam quiescente spectato1 conclusum adhibere1 loco spatii absoluti4 ,motus autem et quies tali spatio relativo definiti1 commode adhiberi possunt loco absolutorum1 qui ab illis nullo symptomate discerni possunt4 ,etenim imprimantur utcunque vires1 sint quicunque conatus1 concedamus motum distingui per actiones in corpora exercitas2 nunquam tamen inde sequetur1 dari spatium illud et locum absolutum1 ejusque mutationem esse locum verum4 #fe4 ,leges motuum1 effectusque1 et theoremata eorundem proportiones et calculos continentia1 pro diversis viarum figuris1 accelerationibus itidem et directionibus diversis1 mediisque plus minusve resistentibus1 hc omnia constant sine calculatione motus absoluti4 ,uti vel ex eo patet quod1 quum secundum illorum principia qui motum absolutum inducunt1 nullo symptomate scire liceat1 utrum integra rerum compages quiescat1 an moveatur uniformiter in directum1 perspicuum sit motum absolutum nullius corporis cognosci posse4 #ff4 ,ex dictis patet ad veram motus naturam perspiciendam summopere juvaturum1 #a4 ,distinguere inter hypotheses mathematicas et naturas rerum3 #b4 ,cavere ab abstractionibus3 #c4 ,considerare motum tanquam aliquid sensibile1 vel saltem imaginabile2 mensurisque relativis esse contentos4 ,qu si fecerimus1 simul clarissima quque philosophi mechanic theoremata1 quibus reserantur natur recessus1 mundique systema calculis humanis subjicitur1 manebunt intemerata1 et motus contemplatio a mille minutiis1 subtilitatibus1 ideisque abstractis libera evadet4 ,atque hc de natura motus dicta sufficiant4 #fg4 ,restat1 ut disseramus de causa communicationis motuum7#ajja74 ,esse autem vim impressam in corpus mobile causam motus in eo1 plerique existimant4 ,veruntamen illos non assignare causam motus cognitam1 et a corpore motuque distinctam1 ex prmissis constat4 ,patet insuper vim non esse rem certam et determinatam1 ex eo quod viri summi de ilia multum diversa1 immo contraria1 proferant1 salva tamen in consequentiis veritate4 ,siquidem ,newtonus7#ajjb7 ait vim impressam consistere in actione sola1 esseque actionem exercitam in corpus ad statum ejus mutandum1 nee post actionem manere4 ,torricellius7#ajjc7 cumulum quendam sive aggregatum virium impressarum per percussionem in corpus mobile recipi1 ibidemque manere atque impetum constituere contendit4 ,idem fere ,borellus7#ajjd7 aliique prdicant4 ,at vero1 tametsi inter se pugnare videantur ,newtonus et ,torricellius1 nihilominus1 dum singuli sibi consentanea proferunt1 res satis commode ab utrisque explicatur4 ,quippe vires omnes corporibus attribut tam sunt hypotheses mathematic quam vires attractiv in planetis et sole4 ,cterum entia mathematica in rerum natura stabilem essentiam non habent3 pendent autem a notione definientis2 unde eadem res diversimode explicari potest4 #fh4 ,statuamus motum novum in corpore percusso conservari1 sive per vim insitam1 qua corpus quodlibet perseverat in statu suo vel motus vel quietis uniformis in directum2 sive per vim impressam1 durante percussione in corpus percussum receptam ibidemque permanentem2 idem erit quoad rem1 differentia existente in nominibus tantum4 ,similiter1 ubi mobile percutiens perdit1 et percussum acquirit motum1 parum refert disputare1 utrum motus acquisitus sit idem numero cum motu perdito1 ducit enim in minutias metaphysicas et prorsus nominales de identitate4 ,itaque sive dicamus motum transire a percutiente in percussum1 sive in percusso motum de novo generari1 destrui autem in percutiente1 res eodem recidit4 ,utrobique intelligitur unum corpus motum perdere1 alterum acquirere1 et prterea nihil4 #fi4 ,mentem1 qu agitat et continet universam hancce molem corpoream1 estque causa vera efficiens motus1 eandem esse1 proprie et stricte loquendo1 causam communicationis ejusdem haud negaverim4 ,in philosophia tamen physica1 causas et solutiones phnomenon a principiis mechanicis petere oportet4 ,physice igitur res explicatur non assignando ejus causam vere agentem et incorpoream1 sed demonstrando ejus connexionem cum principiis mechanicis3 cujusmodi est illud1 actionem et reactionem esse semper contrarias et quales7#ajje71 a quo1 tanquam fonte et principio primario1 eruuntur regul de motuum communicatione1 qu a neotericis1 magno scientiarum bono1 jam ante repert sunt et demonstrat4 #gj4 ,nobis satis fuerit1 si innuamus principium illud alio modo declarari potuisse4 ,nam si vera rerum natura potius quam abstracta mathesis spectetur1 videbitur rectius dici1 in attractione vel percussione passionem corporum1 quam actionem1 esse utrobique qualem4 ,exempli gratia1 lapis fune equo alligatus tantum trahitur versus equum1 quantum equus versus lapidem3 corpus etiam motum in aliud quiescens impactum1 patitur eandem mutationem cum corpore quiescente4 ,et quoad effectum realem1 percutiens est item percussum1 percussumque percutiens4 ,mutatio autem illa est utrobique1 tam in corpore equi quam in lapide1 tam in moto quam in quiescente1 passio mera4 ,esse autem vim1 virtutem1 aut actionem corpoream talium effectuum vere et proprie causatricem non constat4 ,corpus motum in quiescens impingitur2 loquimur tamen active1 dicentes illud hoc impellere3 nec absurde in mechanicis1 ubi ide mathematic potius quam ver rerum natur spectantur4 #ga4 ,in physica1 sensus et experientia1 qu ad effectus apparentes solummodo pertingunt1 locum habent2 in mechanica1 notiones abstract mathematicorum admittuntur4 ,in philosophia prima1 seu metaphysica1 agitur de rebus incorporeis1 de causis1 veritate1 et existentia rerum4 ,physicus series sive successiones rerum sensibilium contemplatur1 quibus legibus connectuntur1 et quo ordine1 quid prcedit tanquam causa1 quid sequitur tanquam effectus1 animadvertens47#ajjf7 ,atque hac ratione dicimus corpus motum esse causam motus in altero1 vel ei motum imprimere1 trahere etiam1 aut impellere4 ,quo sensu caus secund corpore intelligi debent1 nulla ratione habita ver sedis virium1 vel potentiarum actricum1 aut caus realis cui insunt4 ,porro dici possunt caus vel principia mechanica1 ultra corpus1 figuram1 motum1 etiam axiomata scienti mechanic primaria1 tanquam caus consequentium spectata4 #gb4 ,caus vere activ meditatione tantum et ratiocinio e tenebris erui quibus involvuntur possunt1 et aliquatenus cognosci4 ,spectat autem ad philosophiam primam1 seu metaphysicam1 de iis agere4 ,quodsi cuique scienti provincia sua7#ajjg7 tribuatur1 limites assignentur1 principia et objecta accurate distinguantur1 qu ad singulas pertinent1 tractare licuerit majore1 cum facilitate1 tum perspicuitate4 ,,footnotes #a ,philosophy of ,theism3 ,the ,gifford ,lectures delivered before the ,university of ,edinburgh in #ahid-if4 7,second ,edition1 #ahii47 #b ,essay on ,vision1 sect4 #adg1 #adh4 #c ,principles1 sect4 #f4 #d ,preface to the ,three ,dialogues between ,hylas and ,philonous4 #e ,by ,anthony ,collins4 #f ,see vol4 ,,iii1 ,appendix ,b4 #g ,murdoch ,martin1 a native of ,skye1 author of a ,voyage to ,st4 ,kilda 7#afih71 and a ,description of the ,western ,islands of ,scotland 7#agjc74 #h ,see ,stewart's ,works 7ed4 ,hamilton71 vol4 ,i4 p4 #afa4 ,there is a version of this story by ,de,quincey1 in his quaint essay on ,murder considered as one of the ,fine ,arts4 #i ,sir ,john became ,lord ,percival in that year4 #aj ,a place more than once visited by ,berkeley4 #aa ,bakewell's ,memoirs of the ,court of ,augustus1 vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #agg4 #ab ,a letter in ,berkeley's ,life and ,letters1 p4 #ic1 which led me to a different opinion1 ,i have now reason to believe was not written by him1 nor was it written in #agba4 ,the research of ,dr4 ,lorenz1 confirmed by internal evidence1 shews that it was written in ,october1 #afhd1 before ,berkeley the philosopher was born1 and when the ,duke of ,ormond was ,lord ,lieutenant of ,ireland4 ,the writer was probably the ,hon4 and ,rev4 ,george ,berkeley1 a ,prebendary of ,westminster in #afhg1 who died in #afid4 ,the wife of the 8pious ,robert ,nelson0 was a daughter of ,earl ,berkeley1 and this 8,george0 was her younger brother4 #ac ,percival ,,mss4 #ad ,for the letter1 see ,editor's ,preface to the ,proposal for a ,college in ,bermuda1 vol4 ,,iv4 pp4 #cdc-dd4 #ae ,afterwards ,sir ,john ,james4 #af ,smibert the artist1 who made a picture of ,berkeley in #agbe1 and afterwards in ,america of the family party then at ,gravesend4 #ag ,historical ,register1 vol4 ,,xiii1 p4 #bhi 7#agbh74 #ah ,new ,england ,weekly ,courier1 ,feb4 #c1 #agbi4 #ai ,for valuable information about ,rhode ,island1 reproduced in ,berkeley's ,life and ,correspondence and here1 ,i am indebted to ,colonel ,higginson1 to whom ,i desire to make this tardy but grateful acknowledgement4 #bj ,james1 ,dalton1 and ,smibert4 #ba ,whitehall1 having fallen into decay1 has been lately restored by the pious efforts of ,mrs4 ,livingston ,mason1 in concert with the ,rev4 ,dr4 ,e4 ,e4 ,hale1 and others4 ,this good work was completed in the summer of #aijj2 and the house is now as nearly as possible in the state in which ,berkeley left it4 #bb ,see vol4 ,,iii1 ,appendix ,c4 #bc ,three ,men of ,letters1 by ,moses ,coit ,tyler 7,new ,york1 #ahie74 ,he records some of the ,american academical and other institutions that are directly or indirectly1 due to ,berkeley4 #bd ,the thought implied in this paragraph is pursued in my ,philosophy of ,theism1 in which the ethical perfection of the ,universal ,mind is taken as the fundamental postulate in all human experience4 ,if the ,universal ,mind is not ethically perfect1 the universe 7including our spiritual constitution7 is radically untrustworthy4 #be ,life and ,letters of ,berkeley1 p4 #bbb4 #bf ,the third ,earl of ,shaftesbury1 the pupil of ,locke1 and author of the ,characteristics4 ,in addition to the well-known biography by ,dr4 ,fowler1 the present eminent ,vice-,chancellor of ,oxford1 ,shaftesbury has been interpreted in two other lately published works--a ,life by ,benjamin ,rand1 ,ph4,d4 7#aijj71 and an edition of the ,characteristics1 with an ,introduction and ,notes1 by ,john ,m4 ,robertson 7#aijj74 #bg ,the title of this book is--,things ,divine and ,supernatural conceived by ,analogy with ,things ,natural and ,human1 by the ,author of ,the ,procedure1 ,extent and ,limits of the ,human ,understanding4 ,the ,divine ,analogy appeared in #agcc1 and the ,procedure in #agbh4 #bh ,spinoza argues that what is called 8understanding0 and 8will0 in ,god1 has no more in common with human understanding and will than the dog-star in the heavens has with the animal we call a dog4 ,see ,spinoza's ,ethica1 ,i4 #ag1 ,scholium4 #bi ,the question of the knowableness of ,god1 or ,omnipotent ,moral ,perfection in the concrete1 enters into recent philosophical and theological discussion in ,britain4 ,calderwood1 in his ,philosophy of the ,infinite 7#ahed71 was one of the earliest1 and not the least acute1 of ,hamilton's critics in this matter4 ,the subject is lucidly treated by ,professor ,andrew ,seth 7,pringle-,pattison7 in his ,lectures on ,theism 7#ahig7 and in a supplement to ,calderwood's ,life 7#aijj74 ,so also ,huxley's ,david ,hume and ,professor ,iverach's ,is ,god ,knowable8 #cj ,stewart's ,works4 vol4 ,i4 pp4 #cej-a4 #ca ,berkeley ,,mss4 possessed by ,archdeacon ,rose4 #cb ,pope's poetic tribute to ,berkeley belongs to this period-- 8,even in a bishop ,i can spy desert2 ,secker is decent2 ,rundle has a heart3 ,manners with candour are to ,benson given1 ,to ,berkeley--every virtue under heaven40 ,epilogue to the ,satires4 ,also his satirical tribute to the critics of ,berkeley-- 8,truth's sacred fort th' exploded laugh shall win2 ,and ,coxcombs vanquish ,berkeley with a grin40 ,essay on ,satire1 ,part ,,ii4 #cc ,berkeley's ,life and ,letters1 p4 #baj4 #cd ,bacon's ,novuin ,organum4 ,distributio ,operis4 #ce ,section #ada4 #cf ,see 8,editor's ,preface to ,alciphron40 #cg ,compare ,essay ,,ii in the ,guardian with this4 #ch ,taylor1 in later life1 conformed to the ,anglican ,church4 #ci ,see ,berkeley's ,life and ,letters1 chap4 viii4 #dj ,the ,primacy4 #da ,this seems to have been his eldest son1 ,henry4 #db ,his son ,george was already settled at ,christ ,church4 ,henry1 the eldest son1 born in ,rhode ,island1 was then 8abroad in the south of ,france for his health10 as one of his brother ,george's letters tells us1 found among the ,johnson ,,mss4 #dc ,see ,appendix ,d4 ,reid1 like ,berkeley1 held that 8matter cannot be the cause of anything10 but this not as a consequence of the new conception of the world presented to the senses1 through which alone ,berkeley opens his way to its powerlessness2 although ,reid supposes that in his youth he followed ,berkeley in this too4 ,see ,thomas ,reid 7#ahih71 in 8,famous ,scots ,series10 where ,i have enlarged on this4 #dd ,johnson ,,mss4 #de ,that ,berkeley was buried in ,oxford is mentioned in his son's letter to ,johnson1 in which he says 3 8,his remains are interred in the ,cathedral of ,christ ,church1 and next week a monument to his memory will be erected with an inscription by ,dr4 ,markham1 a ,student of this ,college40 ,as the son was present at1 and superintended the arrangements for his father's funeral1 it can be no stretch of credulity to believe that he knew where his father was buried4 ,it may be added that ,berkeley himself had provided in his ,will 8that my body be buried in the churchyard of the parish in which ,i die40 ,the ,will1 dated ,july #ca1 #ageb1 is given in extenso in my ,life and ,letters of ,berkeley1 p4 #cde4 ,we have also the record of burial in the ,register of ,christ ,church ,cathedral1 which shews that 8on ,january ye #bjth #agec1 ye ,right ,reverend ,john 7sic7 ,berkley1 ,ld ,bishop of ,cloyne1 was buryed0 there4 ,this disposes of the statement on p4 #ag of ,diprose's ,account of the ,parish of ,saint ,clement ,danes 7#ahfh71 that ,berkeley was buried in that church4 ,i may add that a beautiful memorial of ,berkeley has lately been placed in the ,cathedral of ,cloyne1 by subscriptions in this country and largely in ,america4 ,m#a ,i4 #df 8,general ideas10 i4e4 abstract general ideas1 distinguished1 in ,berkeley's nominalism1 from concrete general ideas1 or from general names1 which are signs of any one of an indefinite number of individual objects4 ,cf4 ,principles1 ,introduction1 sect4 #af4 #dg ,introduction to the ,principles of ,human ,knowledge4 ,m#b ,n4 #dh 8co-existing ideas10 i4e4 phenomena presented in uniform order to the senses4 ,m#c ,m4 ,p4 ,m#d ,m4 ,p4 ,m#e ,m4 #di ,newton postulates a world of matter and motion1 governed mechanically by laws within itself3 ,berkeley finds himself charged with ,new ,principles1 demanded by reason1 with which ,newton's postulate is inconsistent4 ,m#f ,e4 #ej ,he attempts this in many parts of the ,principles and ,dialogues4 ,he recognises the difficulty of reconciling his ,new ,principles with the identity and permanence of sensible things4 ,m#g ,m4 ,m#h ,e4 #ea ,he contemplated thus early applications of his ,new ,principles to ,mathematics1 afterwards made in his book of ,principles1 sect4 #aah-cb4 #eb ,what ,berkeley calls ideas are either perceptible by the senses or imagined3 either way they are concrete3 abstract ideas are empty words4 ,m#i ,s4 ,m#aj ,m4 ,p4 #ec i4e4 the existence of bodies and qualities independently of--in abstraction from--all percipient mind4 ,while the spiritual theism of ,descartes is acceptable1 he rejects his mechanical conception of the material world4 ,m#aa ,m4 #ed ,but a 8house0 or a 8church0 includes more than visible ideas1 so that we cannot1 strictly speaking1 be said to see it4 ,we see immediately only visible signs of its invisible qualities4 ,m#ab ,e4 #ee ,this is added in the margin4 ,m#ac ,n4 ,m#ad ,n4 ,m#ae ,n4 #ef ,the total impotence of ,matter1 and the omnipotence of ,mind or ,spirit in ,nature1 is thus early becoming the dominant thought with ,berkeley4 ,m#af ,n4 ,m#ag ,n4 #eg ,this refers to an objection to the ,new ,principles that is apparently reinforced by recent discoveries in geology4 ,but if these contradict the ,principles1 so does the existence of a table while ,i am only seeing it4 ,m#ah ,e4 #eh ,existence1 in short1 can be realised only in the form of living percipient mind4 #ei ,berkeley hardly distinguishes uncontingent mathematical relations1 to which the sensible ideas or phenomena in which the relations are concretely manifested must conform4 #fj ,m4 ,t4 matter tangible2 ,m4 ,v4 matter visible2 ,m4 4 matter sensible4 ,the distinctions n question were made prominent in the ,essay on ,vision4 ,see sect4 #a1 #aba-de4 ,m#ai ,p4 #fa ,which the common supposition regarding primary qualities seems to contradict4 #fb ,that need not have been blotted out--'tis good sense1 if we do but determine wt we mean by thing and idea4--,,author1 on blank page of the ,,ms4 ,m#bj ,p4 ,m#ba ,n4 #fc ,see ,locke's ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,iii4 ch4 #d1 #h1 where he criticises attempts to define motion1 as involving a petitio4 ,m#bb ,p4 ,m#bc ,n4 ,m#bd ,n4 #fd ,george ,cheyne1 the physician 7known afterwards as author of the ,english ,malady71 published in #agje a work on ,fluxions1 which procured him admission to the ,royal ,society4 ,he was born in #afgj4 #fe ,this reminds us of ,hume1 and inclines towards the empirical notion of ,causation1 as merely constancy in sequence--not even continuous metamorphosis4 #ff ,this is ,berkeley's objection to abstract1 i4e4 unperceived1 quantities and infinitesimals--important in the sequel4 #fg ,the 8lines and figures0 of pure mathematics1 that is to say2 which he rejects as meaningless1 in his horror unrealisable abstractions4 ,m#be ,i4 ,m#bf ,i4 ,m#bg ,m4 ,e4 ,m#bh ,e4 #fh ,things really exist1 that is to say1 in degrees1 e4g4 in a lesser degree1 when they are imagined than when they are actually perceived by our senses2 but1 in this wide meaning of existence1 they may in both cases be said to exist4 ,m#bi ,e4 #fi ,added on blank page of the ,,ms4 #gj ,in ,berkeley's limitation of the term idea to what is presented objectively in sense1 or represented concretely in imagination4 ,accordingly 8an infinite idea0 would be an idea which transcends ideation--an express contradiction4 ,m#cj ,m4 ,m#ca ,m4 ,m#cb ,m4 ,m#cc ,s4 #ga ,does the human spirit depend on sensible ideas as much as they depend on spirit8 ,other orders of spiritual beings may be percipient of other sorts of phenomena than those presented in those few senses to which man is confined1 although self-conscious activity abstracted from all sorts of presented phenomena seems impossible4 ,but a self-conscious spirit is not necessarily dependent on our material world or our sense experience4 ,m#cd ,s4 ,m#ce ,s4 #gb ,this ,i do not altogether approve of4--,,author1 on margin4 ,m#cf ,m4 ,m#cg ,s4 #gc ,he afterwards guarded the difference1 by contrasting notion and idea1 confining the latter to phenomena presented objectively to our senses1 or represented in sensuous imagination1 and applying the former to intellectual apprehension of 8operations of the mind10 and of 8relations0 among ideas4 ,m#ch ,e4 #gd ,see ,principles1 sect4 #hi4 #ge ,is thought1 then1 independent of language8 ,can we realise thought worthy of the name without use of words8 ,this is ,berkeley's excessive juvenile reaction against verbal abstractions4 #gf ,every general notion is ideally realisable in one or other of its possible concrete or individual applications4 ,m#ci ,n4 ,m#dj ,s4 #gg ,this is the germ of ,berkeley's notion of the objectivity of the material world to individual percipients and so of the rise of individual self-consciousness4 ,m#da ,s4 #gh ,added by ,berkeley on blank page of the ,,ms4 #gi ,cf4 p4 #dbj1 note #b4 ,bishop ,sprat's ,history of the ,royal ,society appeared in #affg4 #hj ,much need2 for what he means by idea has not been attended to by his critics4 ,m#db ,i4 ,mo4 #ha ,what 8,second ,book0 is this8 ,does he refer to the 8,second ,part0 of the ,principles1 which never appeared8 ,god is the culmination of his philosophy1 in ,siris4 ,m#dc ,m4 #hb ,this is ,berkeley's material substance4 ,individual material substances are for him1 steady aggregates of sense-given phenomena1 having the efficient and final cause of their aggregation in eternally active ,mind--active mind1 human and ,divine1 being essential to their realisation for man4 ,m#dd ,i4 #hc ,cf4 ,introduction to the ,principles1 especially sect4 #ah-be4 ,m#de ,m4 #hd ,stillingfleet charges ,locke with 8discarding substance out of the reasonable part of the world40 ,m#df ,m4 #he ,the philosophers supposed the real things to exist behind our ideas1 in concealment3 ,berkeley was now beginning to think that the objective ideas or phenomena presented to the senses1 the existence of which needs no proof1 were themselves the significant and interpretable realities of physical science4 ,m#dg ,i4 ,m#dh ,m4 ,m#di ,s4 ,m#ej ,i4 ,m#ea ,n4 ,m#eb ,p4 ,m#ec ,m4 ,m#ed ,n4 ,m#ee ,m4 #hf ,if the material world can be real only in and through a percipient intelligence1 as the realising factor4 ,m#ef ,s4 ,m#eg ,mo4 ,m#eh ,mo4 ,m#ei ,mo4 ,m#fj ,i4 #hg ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #ac1 #aai-abb1 which deny the possibility of an idea or mental picture corresponding to abstract number4 ,m#fa ,m4 ,p4 #hh 8,prcedaneous10 i4e4 precedent4 ,m#fb ,s4 #hi ,who refunds human as well as natural causation into ,divine agency4 ,m#fc ,mo4 #ij ,in which ,locke treats 8,of the ,reality of ,knowledge10 including questions apt to lead ,berkeley to inquire1 ,whether we could in reason suppose reality in the absence of all realising mind4 ,m#fd ,m4 ,m#fe ,m4 ,m#ff ,e4 ,m#fg ,m4 ,m#fh ,mo4 ,m#fi ,i4 ,m#gj ,i4 ,m#ga ,i4 #ia ,locke's 8abstract idea0 is misconceived and caricatured by ,berkeley in his impetuosity4 ,m#gb ,m4 #ib ,this and other passages refer to the scepticism1 that is founded on the impossibility of our comparing our ideas of things with unperceived real things2 so that we can never escape from the circle of subjectivity4 ,berkeley intended to refute this scepticism4 ,m#gc ,i4 ,m#gd ,i4 ,m#ge ,i4 ,m#gf ,mo4 #ic ,probably ,samuel ,madden1 who afterwards edited the ,querist4 ,m#gg ,m4 #id ,this 8,first ,book0 seems to be 8,part ,i0 of the projected ,principles--the only ,part ever published4 ,here he inclines to 8perception or thought in general10 in the language of ,descartes2 but in the end he approximates to ,locke's 8sensation and reflection40 ,see ,principles1 sect4 #a1 and notes4 ,m#gh ,i4 ,m#gi ,e4 ,m#hj ,s4 ,m#ha ,s4 #ie ,does he mean1 like ,hume afterwards1 that ideas or phenomena constitute the ego1 so that ,i am only the transitory conscious state of each moment8 ,m#hb ,s4 #if 8,consciousness0--a term rarely used by ,berkeley or his contemporaries4 #ig ,this too1 if strictly interpreted1 looks like an anticipation of ,hume's reduction of the ego into successive 8impressions0--8nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions1 which succeed one another with inconceivable rapidity1 and are in a perpetual flux and movement40 ,see ,hume's ,treatise1 ,part ,,iv4 sect4 #f4 ,m#hc ,s4 ,m#hd ,m4 #ih ,what 8,third ,book0 is here projected8 ,was a 8,third ,part0 of the ,principles then in embryo8 ,m#he ,s4 #ii ,this is scarcely done in the 8,introduction0 to the ,principles4 ,m#hf ,s4 ,m#hg ,e4 #ajj ,berkeley1 as we find in the ,commonplace ,book1 is fond of conjecturing how a man all alone in the world1 freed from the abstractions of language1 would apprehend the realities of existence1 which he must then face directly1 without the use or abuse of verbal symbols4 ,m#hh ,e4 ,m#hi ,t4 ,m#ij ,i4 ,m#ia ,i4 ,m#ib ,e4 ,m#ic ,i4 ,m#id ,i4 #aja ,this 8,n4 ,b40 is expanded in the ,introduction to the ,principles4 ,m#ie ,m4 ,m#if ,s4 ,m#ig ,i4 ,m#ih ,m4 ,m#ii ,i4 ,m#ajj ,m4 #ajb ,cf4 ,essay on ,vision1 sect4 #d4 ,m#aja ,e4 ,m#ajb ,m4 #ajc ,what is immediately realised in our percipient experience must be presumed or trusted in as real1 if we have any hold of reality1 or the moral right to postulate that our universe is fundamentally trustworthy4 ,m#ajc ,i4 ,m#ajd ,s4 #ajd ,but he distinguishes1 in the ,principles and elsewhere1 between an idea of sense and a percipient ego4 ,m#aje ,s4 ,m#ajf ,s4 ,m#ajg ,s4 ,m#ajh ,s4 ,m#aji ,s4 ,m#aaj ,s4 ,m#aaa ,n4 #aje ,they reappear in ,siris4 ,m#aab ,m4 #ajf ,in one of ,berkeley's letters to ,johnson1 a quarter of a century after the ,commonplace ,book1 when he was in ,america1 he observes that 8the mechanical philosophers pretend to demonstrate that matter is proportional to gravity4 ,but their argument concludes nothing1 and is a mere circle0--as he proceeds to show4 #ajg ,in the ,principles1 sect4 #a-cc1 he seeks to fulfil the expository part of this intention2 in sect4 #cc-hd1 also in the ,dialogues between ,hylas and ,philonous1 he is 8particular in answering objections40 ,m#aac ,s4 ,m#aad ,m4 #ajh ,if ,matter is arbitrarily credited with omnipotence4 ,m#aae ,s4 ,m#aaf ,s4 ,m#aag ,s4 ,m#aah ,s4 ,m#aai ,s4 ,m#abj ,s4 #aji ,on freedom as implied in a moral and responsible agent1 cf4 ,siris1 sect4 #beg and note4 ,m#aba ,n4 #aaj ,is not this one way of expressing the ,universal ,providence and constant uniting agency of ,god in the material world8 #aaa ,here idea seems to be used in its wider signification1 including notion4 ,m#abb ,g4 #aab 8infinitely greater0--,does infinity admit of imaginable degrees8 ,m#abc ,g4 #aac 'embrangled'--perplexed--involved in disputes4 #aad ,see ,principles1 ,introduction1 sect4 #bd4 ,m#abd ,s4 #aae 8homonymy10 i4e4 equivocation4 #aaf ,voluntary or responsible activity is not an idea or datum of sense1 nor can it be realised in sensuous imagination4 ,he uses 8thing0 in the wide meaning which comprehends persons4 ,m#abe ,s4 #aag ,voluntary or responsible activity is not an idea or datum of sense1 nor can it be realised in sensuous imagination4 ,he uses 8thing0 in the wide meaning which comprehends persons4 ,m#abf ,s4 ,m#abg ,e4 ,m#abh ,t4 ,m#abi ,s4 #aah ,is this consistent with other entries8 ,m#acj ,s4 #aai ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 i4 sect4 #i-ai4 ,m#aca ,s4 #abj ,this is one way of meeting the difficulty of supposed interruptions of conscious or percipient activity4 ,m#acb ,s4 ,m#acc ,s4 #aba ,this seems to imply that voluntary action is mysteriously self-originated4 ,m#acd ,s4 ,m#ace ,n4 ,m#acf ,t4 ,m#acg ,s4 #abb 8perception40 ,he does not include the percipient4 #abc 8without10 i4e4 unrealised by any percipient4 ,m#ach ,m4 #abd ,this would make idea the term only for what is imagined1 as distinguished from what is perceived in sense4 ,m#aci ,s4 ,m#adj ,s4 #abe ,in a strict use of words1 only persons exercise will--not things4 ,m#ada ,s4 ,m#adb ,s4 #abf ,as we must do in imagination1 which 7unlike sense7 is representative2 for the mental images represent original data of sense-perception4 ,m#adc ,s4 ,m#add ,s4 ,m#ade ,s4 ,m#adf ,i4 ,m#adg ,s4 ,m#adh ,mo4 ,m#adi ,mo4 #abg ,does he not allow that we have meaning1 if not ideas1 when we use the terms virtue and vice and moral action8 #abh ,as ,locke says we are4 ,m#aej ,e4 #abi 8,existence and unity are ideas that are suggested to the understanding by every object without and every idea within4 ,when ideas are in our minds1 we consider that they exist40 ,locke's ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 #g4 sect4 #g4 ,m#aea ,e4 #acj i4e4 of ,existence in the abstract--unperceived and unperceiving--realised neither in percipient life nor in moral action4 ,m#aeb ,s4 ,m#aec ,s4 ,m#aed ,s4 ,m#aee ,s4 ,e4 ,m#aef ,g4 #aca ,this suggests that ,god knows sensible things without being sentient of any4 ,m#aeg ,n4 ,mo4 ,m#aeh ,mo4 ,m#aei ,i4 ,m#afj ,i4 #acb ,cf4 ,principles1 ,introd41 sect4 #a-e4 ,m#afa ,i4 #acc ,cf4 ,preface to ,principles2 also to ,dialogues4 ,m#afb ,s4 ,m#afc ,i4 ,m#afd ,mo4 #acd i4e4 that ethics was a science of phenomena or ideas4 ,m#afe ,s4 ,m#aff ,i4 #ace i4e4 of the independent existence of ,matter4 ,m#afg ,m4 #acf 'bodies'--i4e4 sensible things--not unrealised ,matter4 ,m#afh ,i4 c4 #acg ,cf4 ,principles1 ,introduction1 sect4 #ac4 ,m#afi ,i4 #ach ,locke died in ,october1 #agjd4 ,m#agj ,s4 #aci 8without the mind10 i4e4 abstracted from all active percipient life4 ,m#aga ,mo4 ,m#agb ,mo4 ,m#agc ,p4 ,s4 #adj e4g4 secondary qualities of sensible things1 in which pleasure and pain are prominent4 #ada e4g4 primary qualities1 in which pleasure and pain are latent4 ,m#agd ,i4 ,m#age ,mo4 ,m#agf ,m4 #adb ,see ,locke's ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 #ac4 #ba1 ch4 #ag4 #d2 also ,bk4 ,,iv4 ch4 #c4 #f2 also his controversy with ,bishop ,stillingfleet regarding the possibility of ,matter thinking4 ,with ,berkeley real space is a finite creature1 dependent for realisation on living percipient ,spirit4 ,m#agg ,i4 ,m#agh ,mo4 ,m#agi ,mo4 ,m#ahj ,s4 #adc ,but what of the origination of the volition itself8 ,m#aha ,m4 ,s4 #add ,essay1 ,bk4 ,i4 ch4 iv4 #ah4 ,see also ,locke's ,letters to ,stillingfleet4 ,m#ahb ,m4 ,s4 #ade ,it is1 according to ,berkeley1 the steady union or co-existence of a group of sense-phenomena4 ,m#ahc ,i4 ,m#ahd ,i4 ,m#ahe ,s4 #adf ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 i4 #aj--where he argues for interruptions of consciousness4 8,men think not always40 ,m#ahf ,mo4 ,m#ahg ,s4 ,m#ahh ,s4 ,m#ahi ,s4 ,m#aij ,s4 ,m#aia ,s4 ,m#aib ,s4 ,m#aic ,s4 #adg ,in other words1 the material world is wholly impotent3 all activity in the universe is spiritual4 ,m#aid ,i4 #adh ,on the order of its four books and the structure of ,locke's ,essay1 see the ,prolegomena in my edition of the ,essay1 pp4 liv-lviii4 ,m#aie ,m4 #adi i4e4 independent imperceptible ,matter4 ,m#aif ,i4 ,m#aig ,m4 #aej ,what of the earliest geological periods1 asks ,ueberweg8 ,but is there greater difficulty in such instances than in explaining the existence of a table or a house1 while one is merely seeing1 without touching8 ,m#aih ,m4 #aea ,locke explains 8substance0 as 8an uncertain supposition of we know not what40 ,essay1 ,bk4 ,i4 ch4 #d4 #ah4 ,m#aii ,e4 ,m#bjj ,i4 ,m#bja ,mo4 ,m#bjb ,mo4 #aeb ,locke makes certainty consist in the agreement of 8our ideas with the reality of things40 ,see ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 ch4 #d4 #ah4 ,here the sceptical difficulty arises1 which ,berkeley meets under his ,principle4 ,if we have no perception of reality1 we cannot compare our ideas with it1 and so cannot have any criterion of reality4 ,m#bjc ,mo4 ,m#bjd ,mo4 #aec ,this seems wrong4 ,certainty1 real certainty1 is of sensible ideas4 ,i may be certain without affirmation or negation4--,,author4 ,this needs further explanation4 ,m#bje ,mo4 ,m#bjf ,mo4 ,m#bjg ,mo4 ,m#bjh ,i4 #aed ,this entry and the preceding tends to resolve all judgments which are not what ,kant calls analytical into contingent4 ,m#bji ,i4 ,m#baj ,i4 ,m#baa ,e4 ,m#bab ,n4 ,mo4 #aee ,see ,locke's ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 ch4 #a1 #c-g1 and ch4 #c4 #g-ba4 ,the stress ,berkeley lays on 8co-existence0 is significant4 ,m#bac ,p4 #aef i4e4 we must not doubt the reality of the immediate data of sense but accept it1 as 8the mob0 do4 ,m#bad ,i4 ,m#bae ,s4 ,m#baf ,s4 #aeg ,but is imagination different from actual perception only in degree of reality8 ,m#bag ,s4 ,m#bah ,e4 #aeh ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #ac1 #abj2 also ,locke's ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 #g4 sect4 #g4 ,m#bai ,i4 #aei ,cf4 ,principles1 ,introduction1 sect4 #a4 ,m#bbj ,i4 #afj ,berkeley's aim evidently is to deliver men from empty abstractions1 by a return to more reasonably interpreted common-sense4 ,m#bba ,s4 #afa ,the sort of external world that is intelligible to us is that of which another person is percipient1 and which is objective to me1 in a percipient experience foreign to mine4 ,m#bbb ,s4 ,m#bbc ,mo4 ,m#bbd ,s4 #afb ,cf4 ,berkeley's ,arithmetica and ,miscellanea ,mathematica1 published while he was making his entries in this ,commonplace ,book4 #afc ,minima sensibilia8 ,m#bbe ,mo4 ,m#bbf ,e4 ,m#bbg ,mo4 ,m#bbh ,mo4 #afd ,pleasures1 qu pleasures1 are natural causes of correlative desires1 as pains or uneasinesses are of correlative aversions4 ,this is implied in the very nature of pleasure and pain4 ,m#bbi ,i4 ,m#bcj ,i4 #afe ,here we have his explanation of idea4 ,m#bca ,m4 ,s4 #aff ,absent things4 #afg ,here1 as elsewhere1 he resolves geometry1 as strictly demonstrable1 into a reasoned system of analytical or verbal propositions4 ,m#bcb ,i4 ,m4 #afh ,compare this with note #c1 p4 #cd2 also with the contrast between ,sense and ,reason1 in ,siris4 ,is the statement consistent with implied assumptions even in the ,principles1 apart from which they could not cohere8 ,m#bcc ,s4 ,g4 ,m#bcd ,e4 ,m#bce ,g4 #afi ,to have an idea of ,god--as ,berkeley uses idea--would imply that ,god is an immediately perceptible1 or at least an imaginable object4 ,m#bcf ,m4 ,e4 #agj ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #hi4 ,m#bcg ,i4 ,m#bch ,m4 ,s4 ,m#bci ,s4 ,m#bdj ,mo4 ,m#bda ,s4 ,m#bdb ,m4 #aga ,ch4 #aa4 #e4 ,m#bdc ,s4 ,m#bdd ,e4 #agb ,why add--8or perception08 ,m#bde ,mo4 ,m#bdf ,m4 #agc ,here we have ,berkeley's favourite thought of the divine arbitrariness of the constitution of ,nature1 and of its laws of change4 ,m#bdg ,m4 ,s4 ,m#bdh ,s4 ,m#bdi ,s4 #agd ,this suggests the puzzle1 that the cause of every volition must be a preceding volition1 and so on ad infinitum4 ,m#bej ,s4 ,m#bea ,e4 ,s4 ,m#beb ,m4 ,p4 ,e4 #age ,recherche1 ,i4 #ai4 ,m#bec ,p4 #agf i4e4 of his own individual mind4 ,m#bed ,m4 ,p4 #agg i4e4 to a percipient mind1 but not necessarily to mine2 for natural laws are independent of individual will1 although the individual participates in perception of the ordered changes4 #agh ,cf4 the ,arithmetica4 ,m#bee ,m4 ,n4 ,m#bef ,g4 ,m#beg ,s4 #agi i4e4 which are not phenomena4 ,this recognition of originative ,will even then distinguished ,berkeley4 ,m#beh ,m4 #ahj ,is this ,part ,,ii of the ,principles1 which was lost in ,italy8 ,m#bei ,i4 ,s4 ,m#bfj ,i4 ,mo4 ,m#bfa ,s4 #aha ,the thought of articulate relations to which real existence must conform1 was not then at least in ,berkeley's mind4 ,hence the empiricism and sensationalism into which he occasionally seems to rush in the ,commonplace ,book1 in his repulsion from empty abstractions4 ,m#bfb ,g4 ,s4 #ahb ,this is the essence of ,berkeley's philosophy--8a blind agent is a contradiction40 ,m#bfc ,g4 ,m#bfd ,s4 ,m#bfe ,s4 ,m#bff ,s4 ,mo4 ,m#bfg ,mo4 ,n4 ,m#bfh ,m4 #ahc ,this is the basis of ,berkeley's reasoning for the necessarily unrepresentative character of the ideas or phenomena that are presented to our senses4 ,they are the originals4 ,m#bfi ,m4 ,s4 ,m#bgj ,s4 ,m#bga ,s4 ,m#bgb ,s4 ,m#bgc ,m4 ,m#bgd ,m4 ,m#bge ,g4 #ahd ,berkeley's horror of abstract or unperceived space and atoms is partly explained by dogmas in natural philosophy that are now antiquated4 ,m#bgf ,i4 ,e4 ,m#bgg ,g4 #ahe ,ralph 8 ,raphson1 author of ,demonstratio de ,deo 7#agaj71 and also of ,de ,spatio ,reali1 seu ente ,infinito3 conamen mathematico-metaphysicum 7#afig71 to which ,berkeley refers in one of his letters to ,johnson4 ,see also ,green's ,principles of ,natural ,philosophy 7#agab74 ,the immanence of omnipotent goodness in the material world was unconsciously ,berkeley's presupposition4 ,in ,god we have our being4 ,m#bgh ,s4 ,m#bgi ,s4 ,m#bhj ,g4 ,m#bha ,e4 ,n4 #ahf ,note here ,berkeley's version of the causal principle1 which is really the central presupposition of his whole philosophy--viz4 every event in the material world must be the issue of acting ,will4 ,m#bhb ,p4 ,m#bhc ,s4 #ahg ,so ,locke on an ideally perfect memory4 ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 x4 #i4 ,m#bhd ,g4 ,m#bhe ,m4 #ahh ,john ,sergeant was the author of ,solid ,philosophy asserted against the ,fancies of the ,ideists 7,london1 #afig72 also of the ,method to ,science 7#afif74 ,he was a deserter from the ,church of ,england to the ,church of ,rome1 and wrote several pieces in defence of ,roman theology--some of them in controversy with ,tillotson4 ,m#bhf ,s4 ,m#bhg ,e4 ,s4 #ahi ,spirit and ,matter are mutually dependent2 but ,spirit is the realising factor and real agent in the universe4 ,m#bhh ,m4 ,m#bhi ,p4 ,m#bij ,g4 #aij ,see ,descartes1 ,meditations1 ,,iii2 ,spinoza1 ,epist4 ,,ii1 ad ,oldenburgium4 ,m#bia ,s4 #aia ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #b4 ,m#bib ,s4 ,m#bic ,s4 ,m#bid ,n4 ,s4 ,m#bie ,mo4 ,m#bif ,mo4 ,m#big ,mo4 ,n4 #aib ,is 8inclusion0 here virtually a synonym for verbal definition8 ,m#bih ,s4 ,m#bii ,n4 ,m#cjj ,n4 ,m#cja ,s4 ,m#cjb ,i4 ,m#cjc ,i4 ,m#cjd ,i4 ,m#cje ,m4 ,m#cjf ,m4 ,m#cjg ,m4 ,s4 #aic ,see ,principles1 sect4 #b4 ,the universe of ,berkeley consists of ,active ,spirits that perceive and produce motion in impotent ideas or phenomena1 realised in the percipient experience of persons4 ,all supposed powers in ,matter are refunded into ,spirit4 ,m#cjh ,p4 ,m#cji ,p4 ,m#caj ,i4 ,m#caa ,s4 ,m#cab ,s4 ,m#cac ,s4 ,m#cad ,s4 #aid ,when self-conscious agents are included among 8things40 ,we can have no sensuous image1 i4e4 idea1 of spirit1 although he maintains we can use the word intelligently4 ,m#cae ,mo4 ,m#caf ,m4 ,m#cag ,s4 ,g4 ,m#cah ,p4 ,m#cai ,m4 ,m#cbj ,s4 ,m#cba ,m4 ,p4 ,m#cbb ,mo4 ,n4 #aie ,berkeley insists that we should individualise our thinking--8ipsis consuescere rebus10 as ,bacon says1--to escape the dangers of artificial signs4 ,this is the drift of his assault on abstract ideas1 and his repulsion from what is not concrete4 ,he would even dispense with words in his meditations in case of being sophisticated by abstractions4 ,m#cbc ,n4 #aif ,nature or the phenomenal world in short is the revelation of perfectly reasonable ,will4 ,m#cbd ,m4 ,s4 ,m#cbe ,s4 #aig ,gerard ,de ,vries1 the ,cartesian4 ,m#cbf ,s4 ,m#cbg ,g4 ,t4 ,m#cbh ,t4 ,m#cbi ,t4 ,m#ccj ,t4 ,m#cca ,m4 ,m#ccb ,m4 ,m#ccc ,m4 ,m#ccd ,m4 #aih ,are the things of sense only modes in which percipient persons exist8 ,m#cce ,n4 #aii ,see ,locke's ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 #i4 #h4 ,m#ccf ,m4 ,s4 ,m#ccg ,m4 ,m#cch ,m4 ,m#cci ,t4 ,m#cdj ,m4 ,m#cda ,n4 ,m#cdb ,m4 ,m#cdc ,t4 #bjj ,time being relative to the capacity of the percipient4 #bja ,see ,locke's ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 #i4 #h4 ,m#cdd ,m4 #bjb ,to perceive what is not an idea 7as ,berkeley uses idea7 is to perceive what is not realised1 and therefore not real4 #bjc ,so things have a potential objective existence in the ,divine ,will4 #bjd ,with ,berkeley1 change is time1 and time1 abstracted from all changes1 is meaningless4 #bje ,could he know1 by seeing only1 even that he had a body8 ,m#cde ,m4 ,m#cdf ,m4 ,m#cdg ,m4 ,m#cdh ,m4 ,m#cdi ,m4 ,n4 ,m#cej ,n4 #bjf 8the ideas attending these impressions10 i4e4 the ideas that are correlatives of the 7by us unperceived7 organic impressions4 ,m#cea ,m4 ,m#ceb ,m4 ,m#cec ,m4 #bjg ,the ,italian physical and metaphysical philosopher ,fardella 7#afej-agah7 maintained1 by reasonings akin to those of ,malebranche1 that the existence of the material world could not be scientifically proved1 and could only be maintained by faith in authoritative revelation4 ,see his ,univers ,philosophi ,systema 7#afij71 and especially his ,logica 7#afif74 ,m#ced ,m4 #bjh ,locke's ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 ch4 #aa4 #bji ,what does he mean by 8unknown substratum08 ,m#cee ,m4 ,m#cef ,s4 ,m#ceg ,m4 ,m#ceh ,m4 #baj ,he gets rid of the infinite in quantity1 because it is incapable of concrete manifestation to the senses4 ,when a phenomenon given in sense reaches the minimum sensibile1 it reaches what is for us the margin of realisable existence3 it cannot be infinitely little and still a phenomenon3 insensible phenomena of sense involve a contradiction4 ,and so too of the infinitely large4 ,m#cei ,t4 #baa ,in short he would idealise the visible world but not the tangible world4 ,in the ,principles1 ,berkeley idealises both4 ,m#cfj ,s4 ,m#cfa ,m4 #bab ,cf4 ,essay on ,vision1 sect4 #adi-ei1 where he concludes that 8neither abstract nor visible extension makes the object of geometry40 #bac ,by the adult1 who has learned to interpret its visual signs4 #bad ,inasmuch as no physical consequences follow the volition2 which however is still self-originated4 ,m#cfb ,g4 #bae 8,a succession of ideas ,i take to constitute time1 and not to be only the sensible measure thereof1 as ,mr4 ,locke and others think40 7,berkeley's letter to ,johnson47 ,m#cfc ,p4 ,m#cfd ,m4 ,m#cfe ,t4 ,m#cff ,s4 #baf ,cf4 ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 #af1 sect4 #h4 #bag ,cf4 ,essay on ,vision1 sect4 #fg-gg4 #bah ,cf4 ,essay on ,vision1 sect4 #hh-abj4 ,m#cfg ,t4 ,m#cfh ,m4 ,m#cfi ,m4 #bai ,this is of the essence of ,berkeley's philosophy4 ,m#cgj ,m4 ,m#cga ,m4 ,m#cgb ,mo4 ,s4 ,m#cgc ,s4 ,m#cgd ,s4 ,m#cge ,s4 #bbj ,but in moral freedom originates in the agent1 instead of being 8consecutive0 to his voluntary acts or found only in their consequences4 ,m#cgf ,m4 #bba 8,strigose0 7strigosus7--meagre4 ,m#cgg ,s4 ,mo4 ,m#cgh ,n4 ,m#cgi ,i4 ,s4 ,m#chj ,s4 #bbb ,as he afterwards expresses it1 we have intelligible notions1 but not ideas--sensuous pictures--of the states or acts of our minds4 #bbc 8,omnes reales rerum proprietates continentur in ,deo40 ,what means ,le ,clerc c4 by this8 ,log4 ,i4 ch4 #h4--;,,author1 on margin4 ,m#cha ,g4 #bbd 8,si non rogas intelligo40 ,m#chb ,m4 ,m#chc ,p4,n4 ,m#chd ,m4 ,p4 #bbe ,this way of winning others to his own opinions is very characteristic of ,berkeley4 ,see p4 #ib and note4 ,m#che ,m4 ,p4 #bbf ,see ,third ,dialogue1 on sameness in things and sameness in persons1 which it puzzles him to reconcile with his ,new ,principles4 ,m#chf ,n4 ,m#chg ,s4 #bbg ,cf4 ,essay on ,vision1 sect4 #eb-fa4 #bbh ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #aja-acd4 #bbi 8distance0--on opposite page in the ,,ms4 ,cf4 ,essay on ,vision1 sect4 #adj4 #bcj ,direct perception of phenomena is adequate to the perceived phenomena2 indirect or scientific perception is inadequate1 leaving room for faith and trust4 ,m#chh ,m4 ,p4 #bca ,cf4 ,essay on ,vision1 sect4 #ajg-h4 ,m#chi ,m4 ,m#cij ,s4 #bcb ,the ,divine ,ideas of ,malebranche and the sensuous ideas of ,berkeley differ4 ,m#cia ,n4 #bcc ,cf4 ,essay on ,vision1 sect4 #ga4 #bcd ,cf4 ,malebranche1 ,recherche1 ,bk4 ,i4 c4 #f4 ,that and the following chapters seem to have been in ,berkeley's mind4 #bce ,he here assumes that extension 7visible7 is implied in the visible idea we call colour4 #bcf ,this strikingly illustrates ,berkeley's use of 8idea10 and what he intends when he argues against 8abstract0 ideas4 ,m#cib ,m4 ,p4 #bcg ,an interesting autobiographical fact4 ,from childhood he was indisposed to take things on trust4 ,m#cic ,m4 ,p4 ,m#cid ,m4 ,m#cie ,m4 #bch ,essay on ,vision1 sect4 #hh-aai4 ,m#cif ,m4 ,m#cig ,m4 ,m#cih ,m4 ,m#cii ,m4 ,m#djj ,p4 ,m#dja ,m4 ,p4 ,m#djb ,m4 ,m#djc ,m4 ,m#djd ,i4 ,m#dje ,m4 #bci 8thoughts10 i4e4 ideas of sense8 #bdj ,this1 in a crude way1 is the distinction of and 4 ,it helps to explain ,berkeley's meaning1 when he occasionally speaks of the ideas or phenomena that appear in the sense experience of different persons as if they were absolutely independent entities4 ,m#djf ,m4 ,m#djg ,m4 #bda ,to be 8in an unperceiving thing10 i4e4 to be real1 yet unperceived4 ,whatever is perceived is1 because realised only through a percipient act1 an idea--in ,berkeley's use of the word4 ,m#djh ,i4 #bdb ,this as to the 8,platonic strain0 is not in the tone of ,siris4 ,m#dji ,m4 ,m#daj ,m4 ,m#daa ,m4 #bdc ,john ,keill 7#afga-agba71 an eminent mathematician1 educated at the ,university of ,edinburgh2 in #agaj ,savilian ,professor of ,astronomy at ,oxford1 and the first to teach the ,newtonian philosophy in that ,university4 ,in #agjh he was engaged in a controversy in support of ,newton's claims to the discovery of the method of fluxions4 ,m#dab ,m4 ,p4 ,m#dac ,m4 #bdd ,this suggests a negative argument for ,kant's antinomies1 and for ,hamilton's law of the conditioned4 ,m#dad ,m4 ,m#dae ,n4 #bde ,newton became ,sir ,isaac on ,april #af1 #agje4 ,was this written before that date8 #bdf ,these may be considered separately1 but not pictured as such4 ,m#daf ,p4 ,m#dag ,m4 #bdg ,in as far as they have not been sensibly realised in finite percipient mind4 #bdh ,or rather that invisible length does exist4--,,author1 on margin4 #bdi ,bonaventura ,cavalieri 7#aeih-afdg71 the ,italian mathematician4 ,his ,geometry of ,indivisibles 7#afce7 prepared the way for the ,calculus4 ,m#dah ,m4 ,m#dai ,p4 ,g4 #bej ,by 8the excuse0 is meant the finiteness of our mind--making it possible for contradictions to appear true to us4--,,author1 on margin4 #bea ,he allows elsewhere that words with meanings not realisable in imagination1 i4e4 in the form of idea1 may discharge a useful office4 ,see ,principles1 ,introduction1 sect4 #bj4 ,m#dbj ,m4 ,p4 #beb ,we do not perceive unperceived matter1 but only matter realised in living perception--the percipient act being the factor of its reality4 ,m#dba ,m4 ,m#dbb ,p4 #bec ,the secondary qualities of things4 ,m#dbc ,m4 ,p4 #bed ,because1 while dependent on percipient sense1 they are independent of my personal will1 being determined to appear under natural law1 by ,divine agency4 ,m#dbd ,p4 ,m#dbe ,m4 #bee ,keill's ,introductio ad veram ,physicam 7,oxon4 #agjb7--,lectio #e--;a curious work1 dedicated to the ,earl of ,pembroke4 #bef ,extension without breadth--i4 e4 insensible1 intangible length--is not conceivable4 ',tis a mistake we are led into by the doctrine of abstraction4--,,author1 on margin of ,,ms4 #beg ,here 8,sir ,isaac40 ,hence written after ,april1 #agje4 ,m#dbf ,m4 #beh ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 ch4 iv4 sect4 #ah2 ch4 v4 sect4 #c1 c4 #bei ,he applies thing to self-conscious persons as well as to passive objects of sense4 #bfj ,scaligerana ,secunda1 p4 #bgj4 #bfa ,these arguments must be proposed shorter and more separate in the ,treatise4--,,author1 on margin4 #bfb 8,idea0 here used in its wider meaning--for 8operations of mind10 as well as for sense presented phenomena that are independent of individual will4 ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #a4 #bfc 8sensations10 i4e4 objective phenomena presented in sense4 #bfd ,see ,principles1 sect4 #a4 #bfe ,see ,principles1 sect4 #b4 #bff ,an 8unperceiving thing0 cannot be the factor of material reality4 #bfg ,to the utmost accuracy1 wanting nothing of perfection4 ,their solutions of problems1 themselves must own to fall infinitely short of perfection4--,,author1 on margin4 ,m#dbg ,p4 #bfh ,jean de ,billy and ,ren de ,billy1 ,french mathematicians--the former author of ,nova ,geometri ,clavis and other mathematical works4 ,m#dbh ,t4 #bfi ,according to ,baronius1 in the fifth volume of his 8,annals10 ,ficinus appeared after death to ,michael ,mercatus--agreeably to a promise he made when he was alive--to assure him of the life of the human spirit after the death of the body4 ,m#dbi ,m4 #bgj ,so far as we are factors of their reality1 in sense and in science1 or can be any practical way concerned with them4 #bga ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #aja-cd4 ,m#dcj ,p4 #bgb 8something10 i4e4 abstract something4 #bgc ,lord ,pembroke 787--to whom the ,principles were dedicated1 and to whom ,locke dedicated his ,essay4 #bgd ,this is an interesting example of a feature that is conspicuous in ,berkeley--the art of 8humoring an opponent in his own way of thinking10 which it seems was an early habit4 ,it is thus that he insinuates his ,new ,principles in the ,essay on ,vision1 and so prepares to unfold and defend them in the book of ,principles and the three ,dialogues--straining language to reconcile them with ordinary modes of speech4 #bge ,in ,diderot's ,lettre sur les aveugles1 l'usage de ceux qui voient1 where ,berkeley1 ,molyneux1 ,condillac1 and others are mentioned4 ,cf4 also ,appendix1 pp4 #aaa1 #aab2 and ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #ga1 with the note1 in which some recorded experiments are alluded to4 #bgf ,de ,anima1 ,,ii4 #f1 ,,iii4 #a1 c4 ,aristotle assigns a pre-eminent intellectual value to the sense of sight4 ,see1 for instance1 his ,metaphysics1 ,i4 #a4 #bgg ,sir ,a4 ,grant1 7,ethics of ,aristotle1 vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #agb7 remarks1 as to the doctrine that the ,common ,sensibles are apprehended concomitantly by the senses1 that3 8this is surely the true view2 we see in the apprehension of number1 figure1 and the like1 not an operation of sense1 but the mind putting its own forms and categories1 i4e4 itself1 on the external object4 ,it would follow then that the senses cannot really be separated from the mind2 the senses and the mind each contribute an element to every knowledge4 ,aristotle's doctrine of would go far1 if carried out1 to modify his doctrine of the simple and innate character of the senses1 e4g4 sight 7cf4 ,eth4 ,,ii4 #a1 #d71 and would prevent its collision with ,berkeley's ,theory of ,vision40--,see also ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 ,reid's ,works1 pp4 #hbh-hcj4 ,dugald ,stewart 7,collected ,works1 vol4 ,i4 p4 #cda1 note7 quotes ,aristotle's ,ethics1 ,,ii4 #a1 as evidence that ,berkeley's doctrine1 8with respect to the acquired perceptions of sight1 was quite unknown to the best metaphysicians of antiquity40 #bgh ,a work resembling ,berkeley's in its title1 but in little else1 appeared more than twenty years before the ,essay--the ,nova ,visionis ,theoria of ,dr4 ,briggs1 published in #afhe4 #bgi ,see ,treatise on the ,eye1 vol4 ,,ii4 pp4 #bii1 c4 #bhj ,see ,reid's ,inquiry1 ch4 v4 #c1 #e1 #f1 #g2 ch4 vi4 #bd1 and ,essays on the ,intellectual ,powers1 ,,ii4 ch4 #aj and #ai4 #bha ,while ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton 7,lectures on ,metaphysics1 lxxviii7 acknowledges the scientific validity of ,berkeley's conclusions1 as to the way we judge of distances1 he complains1 in the same lecture1 that 8the whole question is thrown into doubt by the analogy of the lower animals10 i4e4 by their probable visual instinct of distances2 and elsewhere 7,reid's ,works1 p4 #acg1 note7 he seems to hesitate about ,locke's ,solution of ,molyneux's ,problem1 at least in its application to ,cheselden's case4 ,cf4 ,leibniz1 ,nouveaux ,essais1 ,liv4 ,,ii4 ch4 #i1 in connexion with this last4 #bhb ,an almost solitary exception in ,britain to this unusual uniformity on a subtle question in psychology is found in ,samuel ,bailey's ,review of ,berkeley's ,theory of ,vision1 designed to show the unsoundness of that celebrated ,speculation1 which appeared in #ahdb4 ,it was the subject of two interesting rejoinders--a well-weighed criticism1 in the ,westminster ,review1 by ,j4,s4 ,mill1 since republished in his ,discussions2 and an ingenious ,essay by ,professor ,ferrier1 in ,blackwood's ,magazine1 republished in his ,philosophical ,remains4 ,the controversy ended on that occasion with ,bailey's ,letter to a ,philosopher in reply to some recent attempts to vindicate ,berkeley's ,theory of ,vision1 and in further elucidation of its unsoundness1 and a reply to it by each of his critics4 ,it was revived in #ahfd by ,mr4 ,abbott of ,trinity ,college1 ,dublin1 whose essay on ,sight and ,touch is 8an attempt to disprove the received 7or ,berkeleian7 ,theory of ,vision40 #bhc ,afterwards 7in #agcc7 ,earl of ,egmont4 ,born about #afhc1 he succeeded to the baronetcy in #afia1 and1 after sitting for a few years in the ,irish ,house of ,commons1 was in #agae created ,baron ,percival1 in the ,irish peerage4 ,in #agcb he obtained a charter to colonise the province of ,georgia in ,north ,america4 ,his name appears in the list of subscribers to ,berkeley's ,bermuda ,scheme in #agbf4 ,he died in #agdh4 ,he corresponded frequently with ,berkeley from #agji onwards4 #bhd ,similar terms are applied to the sense of seeing by writers with whom ,berkeley was familiar4 ,thus ,locke 7,essay1 ,,ii4 ix4 #i7 refers to sight as 8the most comprehensive of all our senses40 ,descartes opens his ,dioptrique by designating it as 8le plus universal et le plus noble de nos sens20 and he alludes to it elsewhere 7,princip4 ,,iv4 #aie7 as 8le plus subtil de tous les sens40 ,malebranche begins his analysis of sight 7,recherche1 ,i4 #f7 by describing it as 8le premier1 le plus noble1 et le plus tendu de tous les sens40 ,the high place assigned to this sense by ,aristotle has been already alluded to4 ,its office1 as the chief organ through which a conception of the material universe as placed in ambient space is given to us1 is recognised by a multitude of psychologists and metaphysicians4 #bhe ,on ,berkeley's originality in his ,theory of ,vision see the ,editor's ,preface4 #bhf ,in the first edition alone this sentence followed3--8,in treating of all which1 it seems to me1 the writers of ,optics have proceeded on wrong principles40 #bhg ,sect4 #b-ea explain the way in which we learn in seeing to judge of ,distance or ,outness1 and of objects as existing remote from our organism1 viz4 by their association with what we see1 and with certain muscular and other sensations in the eye which accompany vision4 ,sect4 #b assumes1 as granted1 the invisibility of distance in the line of sight4 ,cf4 sect4 #aa and #hh--;,first ,dialogue between ,hylas and ,philonous--,alciphron1 ,,iv4 #h--,theory of ,vision ,vindicated and ,explained1 sect4 #fb-fi4 #bhh i4e4 outness1 or distance outward from the point of vision--distance in the line of sight--the third dimension of space4 ,visible distance is visible space or interval between two points 7see sect4 #aab74 ,we can be sensibly percipient of it only when both points are seen4 #bhi ,this section is adduced by some of ,berkeley's critics as if it were the evidence discovered by him for his ,theory1 instead of being1 as it is1 a passing reference to the scientific ground of the already acknowledged invisibility of outness1 or distance in the line of sight4 ,see1 for example1 ,bailey's ,review of ,berkeley's ,theory of ,vision1 pp4 #ch-dc1 also his ,theory of ,reasoning1 p4 #agi and pp4 #bjj-g--,mill's ,discussions1 vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #ie--;,abbott's ,sight and ,touch1 p4 #aj1 where this sentence is presented as 8the sole positive argument advanced by ,berkeley40 ,the invisibility of outness is not ,berkeley's discovery1 but the way we learn to interpret its visual signs1 and what these are4 #bij i4e4 aerial and linear perspective are acknowledged signs of remote distances4 ,but the question1 in this and the thirty-six following sections1 concerns the visibility of near distances only--a few yards in front of us4 ,it was 8agreed by all0 that beyond this limit distances are suggested by our experience of their signs4 #bia ,cf4 this and the four following sections with the quotations in the ,editor's ,preface1 from ,molyneux's ,treatise of ,dioptrics4 #bib ,in the author's last edition we have this annotation3 8,see what ,des ,cartes and others have written upon the subject40 #bic ,in the first edition this section opens thus3 8,i have here set down the common current accounts that are given of our perceiving near distances by sight1 which1 though they are unquestionably received for true by mathematicians1 and accordingly made use of by them in determining the apparent places of objects1 do nevertheless10 c4 #bid ,omitted in the author's last edition4 #bie i4e4 although immediately invisible1 it is mediately seen4 ,mark1 here and elsewhere1 the ambiguity of the term perception1 which now signifies the act of being conscious of sensuous phenomena1 and again the act of inferring phenomena of which we are at the time insentient2 while it is also applied to the object perceived instead of to the percipient act2 and sometimes to imagination1 and the higher acts of intelligence4 #bif 8,some men0--8mathematicians10 in first edition4 #big i4e4 the mediate perception4 #bih 8any man0--8all the mathematicians in the world10 in first edition4 #bii ,omitted in the author's last edition4 #cjj ,omitted in the author's last edition4 #cja ,sect4 #c1 #i4 #cjb ,observe the first introduction by ,berkeley of the term suggestion1 used by him to express a leading factor in his account of the visible world1 and again in his more comprehensive account of our knowledge of the material universe in the ,principles4 ,it had been employed occasionally1 among others1 by ,hobbes and ,locke4 ,there are three ways in which the objects we have an immediate perception of in sight may be supposed to conduct us to what we do not immediately perceive3 7#a7 ,instinct1 or what ,reid calls 8original suggestion0 7,inquiry1 ch4 ,,vi4 sect4 #bj-bd72 7#b7 ,custom2 7#c7 ,reasoning from accepted premisses4 ,berkeley's 8suggestion0 corresponds to the second4 7,cf4 ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #db47 #cjc ,in the ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #ff1 it is added that this 8sensation0 belongs properly to the sense of touch4 ,cf4 also sect4 #ade of this ,essay4 #cjd ,here 8natural08necessary03 elsewheredivinely arbitrary connexion4 #cje ,that our mediate vision of outness and of objects as thus external1 is due to media which have a contingent or arbitrary1 instead of a necessary1 connexion with the distances which they enable us to see1 or of which they are the signs1 is a cardinal part of his argument4 #cjf ,sect4 #b4 #cjg ,here1 as generally in the ,essay1 the appeal is to our inward experience1 not to phenomena observed by our senses in the organism4 #cjh ,see sect4 #ce for the difference between confused and faint vision4 ,cf4 sect4 #cb-ch with this section4 ,also ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #fh4 #cji ,see sect4 #f4 #caj ,these sections presuppose previous contiguity as an associative law of mental phenomena4 #caa ,see ,reid's ,inquiry1 ch4 vi4 sect4 #bb4 #cab ,sect4 #af-bg4--;,for the signs of remote distances1 see sect4 #c4 #cac ,these are muscular sensations felt in the organ1 and degrees of confusion in a visible idea4 ,berkeley's 8arbitrary0 signs of distance1 near and remote1 are either 7a7 invisible states of the visual organ1 or 7b7 visible appearances4 #cad ,in ,molyneux's ,treatise of ,dioptrics1 ,pt4 ,i4 prop4 #ca1 sect4 #i1 ,barrow's difficulty is stated4 ,cf4 sect4 #dj below4 #cae ,christopher ,scheiner1 a ,german astronomer1 and opponent of the ,copernican system1 born #aege1 died #afej4 #caf ,andrea ,tacquet1 a mathematician1 born at ,antwerp in #afaa1 and referred to by ,molyneux as 8the ingenious ,jesuit40 ,he published a number of scientific treatises1 most of which appeared after his death1 in a collected form1 at ,antwerp in #affi4 #cag ,in what follows ,berkeley tries to explain by his visual theory seeming contradictions which puzzled the mathematicians4 #cah ,this is offered as a verification of the theory that near distances are suggested1 according to the order of nature1 by non-resembling visual signs1 contingently connected with real distance4 #cai ,cf4 sect4 #gh2 also ,new ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #ca4 #cbj ,berkeley here passes from his proof of visual 8suggestion0 of all outward distances--i4e4 intervals between extremes in the line of sight--by means of arbitrary signs1 and considers the nature of visible externality4 ,see note in ,hamilton's ,reid1 p4 #agg1 on the distinction between perception of the external world and perception of distance through the eye4 #cba ,see ,descartes1 ,dioptrique1 ,,vi--,malebranche1 ,recherche1 ,liv4 ,i4 ch4 #i1 #c--,reid's ,inquiry1 ,,vi4 #aa4 #cbb ,berkeley here begins to found1 on the experienced connexion between extension and colour1 and between visible and tangible extension1 a proof that outness is invisible4 ,from ,aristotle onwards it has been assumed that colour is the only phenomenon of which we are immediately percipient in seeing4 ,visible extension1 visible figure1 and visible motion are accordingly taken to be dependent on the sensation of colour4 #cbc ,in connexion with this and the next illustration1 ,berkeley seems to argue that we are not only unable to see distance in the line of sight1 but also that we do not see a distant object in its real visible magnitude4 ,but elsewhere he affirms that only tangible magnitude is entitled to be called real4 ,cf4 sect4 #ee1 #ei1 #fa4 #cbd ,the sceptical objections to the trustworthiness of the senses1 proposed by the ,eleatics and others1 referred to by ,descartes in his ,meditations1 and by ,malebranche in the ,first ,book of his ,recherche1 may have suggested the illustrations in this section4 ,cf4 also ,hume's ,essay ,on the ,academical or ,sceptical ,philosophy4 ,the sceptical difficulty is founded on the assumption that the object seen at different distances is the same visible object3 it is really different1 and so the difficulty vanishes4 #cbe ,here ,berkeley expressly introduces 8touch0--a term which with him includes1 not merely organic sense of contact1 but also muscular and locomotive sense-experience4 ,after this he begins to unfold the antithesis of visual and tactual phenomena1 whose subsequent synthesis it is the aim of the ,new ,theory to explain4 ,cf4 ,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 sect4 #dc--,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #bb and #be4 ,note here ,berkeley's reticence of his idealization of ,matter--tangible as well as visible4 ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #dd4 #cbf ,this connexion of our knowledge of distance with our locomotive experience points to a theory which ultimately resolves space into experience of unimpeded locomotion4 #cbg ,locke 7,essay1 ,introduction1 #h7 takes idea vaguely as 8the term which serves best to stand whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks40 ,oversight of what ,berkeley intends the term idea has made his whole conception of nature and the material universe a riddle to many1 of which afterwards4 #cbh ,the expressive term 8outness10 favoured by ,berkeley1 is here first used4 #cbi 8,we get the idea of ,space10 says ,locke1 8both by our sight and touch0 7,essay1 ,,ii4 #ac4 #b74 ,locke did not contemplate ,berkeley's antithesis of visible and tangible extension1 and the consequent ambiguity of the term extension2 which sometimes signifies coloured1 and at others resistant experience in sense4 #ccj ,for an explanation of this difficulty1 see sect4 #add4 #cca 8object0--8thing10 in the earlier editions4 #ccb ,this is the issue of the analytical portion of the ,essay4 #ccc ,cf4 sect4 #aci-dj4 #ccd ,here the question of externality1 signifying independence of all percipient life1 is again mixed up with that of the invisibility of distance outwards in the line of sight4 #cce ,omitted in author's last edition4 #ccf i4e4 including muscular and locomotive experience as well as sense of contact4 ,but what are the tangibilia themselves8 ,are they also significant1 like visibilia1 of a still ulterior reality8 ,this is the problem of the ,principles of ,human ,knowledge4 #ccg ,in this section the conception of a natural ,visual ,language1 makes its appearance1 with its implication that ,nature is 7for us7 virtually ,spirit4 ,cf4 sect4 #adj1 #adg--,principles1 sect4 #dd--;,dialogues of ,hylas and ,philonous--,alciphron1 ,,iv4 #h1 #aa--;and ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 passim4 #cch ,sect4 #eb-hg treat of the invisibility of real1 i4e4 tactual1 ,magnitude4 ,cf4 ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #ed-fa4 #cci ,sect4 #h-ae4 #cdj ,sect4 #da1 c4 #cda ,see ,molyneux's ,treatise on ,dioptrics1 ,b4 ,i4 prop4 #bh4 #cdb ,see sect4 #abb-abf4 #cdc ,in short there is a point at which1 with our limited sense1 we cease to be percipient of colour1 in seeing2 and of resistance1 in locomotion4 ,though ,berkeley regards all visible extensions as sensible1 and therefore dependent for their reality on being realised by sentient mind1 he does not mean that mind or consciousness is extended4 ,with him1 extension1 though it exists only in mind1--i4e4 as an idea seen1 in the case of visible extension1 and as an idea touched1 in the case of tangible extension1--is yet no property of mind4 ,mind can exist without being percipient of extension1 although extension cannot be realised without mind4 #cdd ,but this is true1 though less obviously1 of tangible as well as of visible objects4 #cde ,sect4 #di4 #cdf ,cf4 sect4 #aci1 #adj1 c4 #cdg 8situation0--not in the earlier editions4 #cdh ,sect4 #ee4 #cdi ,omitted in the author's last edition4 #cej ,ordinary sight is virtually foresight4 ,cf4 sect4 #he4--,see also ,malebranche on the external senses1 as given primarily for the urgent needs of embodied life1 not to immediately convey scientific knowledge1 ,recherche1 ,liv4 ,i4 ch4 #e1 #f1 #i1 c4 #cea ,sect4 #dd4--,see also sect4 #ee1 and note4 #ceb ,this supposes 8settled0 tangibilia1 but not 8settled0 visibilia4 ,yet the sensible extension given in touch and locomotive experience is also relative--an object being felt as larger or smaller according to the state of the organism1 and the other conditions of our embodied perception4 #cec ,what follows1 to end of sect4 #fc1 added in the author's last edition4 #ced 8outward objects10 i4e4 objects of which we are percipient in tactual experience1 taken in this ,essay provisionally as the real external objects4 ,see ,principles1 sect4 #dd4 #cee ,cf4 sect4 #add4 ,note1 in this and the three preceding sections1 the stress laid on the arbitrariness of the connexion between the signs which suggest magnitudes1 or other modes of extension1 and their significates4 ,this is the foundation of the ,new ,theory2 which thus resolves physical causality into a relation of signs to what they signify and predict--analogous to the relation between words and their accepted meanings4 #cef ,in sect4 #fg-gh1 ,berkeley attempts to verify the foregoing account of the natural signs of ,size1 by applying it to solve a phenomenon1 the cause of which had been long debated among men of science--the visible magnitude of heavenly bodies when seen in the horizon4 #ceg ,cf4 sect4 #aj4 #ceh ,omitted in the author's last edition4 ,cf sect4 #gf1 #gg4--,the explanation in question is attributed to ,alhazen1 and by ,bacon to ,ptolemy1 while it is sanctioned by eminent scientific names before and since ,berkeley4 #cei 8,fourthly0 in the second edition4 ,cf4 what follows with sect4 #gd4 ,why 8lesser08 #cfj ,when ,berkeley1 some years afterwards1 visited ,italy1 he remarked that distant objects appeared to him much nearer than they really were--a phenomenon which he attributed to the comparative purity of the southern air4 #cfa i4e4 the original perception1 apart from any synthetic operation of suggestion and inferential thought1 founded on visual signs4 #cfb ,in ,riccioli's ,almagest1 ,,ii4 lib4 ,x4 sect4 #f4 quest4 #ad1 we have an account of many hypotheses then current1 in explanation of the apparent magnitude of the horizontal moon4 #cfc ,gassendi's 8,epistol quatuor de apparente magnitudine solis humilis et sublimis40--,opera1 tom4 ,,iii pp4 #dbj-dgg4 ,cf4 ,appendix to this ,essay1 p4 #aaj4 #cfd ,see ,dioptrique1 ,,vi4 #cfe ,opera ,latina1 vol4 ,i1 p4 #cgf1 vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #bf-fb2 ,english ,works1 vol4 ,i4 p4 #dfb4 7,molesworth's ,edition47 #cff ,the paper in the ,transactions is by ,molyneux4 #cfg ,see ,smith's ,optics1 pp4 #fd-fg1 and ,remarks1 pp4 #dh1 c4 ,at p4 #ee ,berkeley's ,new ,theory is referred to1 and pronounced to be at variance with experience4 ,smith concludes by saying1 that in 8the second edition of ,berkeley's ,essay1 and also in a ,vindication and ,explanation of it 7called the ,visual ,language71 very lately published1 the author has made some additions to his solution of the said phenomenon2 but seeing it still involves and depends on the principle of faintness1 ,i may leave the rest of it to the reader's consideration40 ,this1 which appeared in #agch1 is one of the very few early references to ,berkeley's ,new ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated4 #cfh ,sect4 #b-ea4 #cfi ,this sentence is omitted in the author's last edition4 #cgj ,what follows to the end of this section is not contained in the first edition4 #cga i4e4 tangible4 #cgb ,cf4 sect4 #ch2 and ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #ca4 #cgc 8,never0--8hardly10 in first edition4 #cgd ,cf4 ,appendix1 p4 #bjh4--,see ,smith's ,optics1 ,b4 ,i4 ch4 v1 and ,remarks1 p4 #ef1 in which he 8leaves it to be considered1 whether the said phenomenon is not as clear an instance of the insufficiency of faintness0 as of mathematical computation4 #cge ,a favourite doctrine with ,berkeley1 according to whose theory of visibles there can be no absolute visible magnitude1 the minimum being the least that is perceivable by each seeing subject1 and thus relative to his visual capacity4 ,this section is thus criticised1 in ,january1 #ageb1 in a letter signed 8,anti-,berkeley10 in the ,gent4 ,mag4 7vol4 ,,xxii1 p4 #ab73 8,upon what his lordship asserts with respect to the minimum visibile1 ,i would observe that it is certain that there are infinite numbers of animals which are imperceptible to the naked eye1 and cannot be perceived but by the help of a microscope2 consequently there are animals whose whole bodies are far less than the minimum visibile of a man4 ,doubtless these animals have eyes1 and1 if their minimum visibile were equal to that of a man1 it would follow that they cannot perceive anything but what is much larger than their whole body2 and therefore their own bodies must be invisible to them1 because we know they are so to men1 whose minimum visibile is asserted by his lordship to be equal to theirs40 ,there is some misconception in this4 ,cf4 ,appendix to ,essay1 p4 #bji4 #cgf ,those two defects belong to human consciousness4 ,see ,locke's ,essay1 ,,ii4 #aj1 on the defects of human memory4 ,it is this imperfection which makes reasoning needful--to assist finite intuition4 ,reasoning is the sign at once of our dignity and our weakness4 #cgg ,sect4 #ei4 #cgh ,sect4 #hj-hb4 #cgi ,sect4 #hh-aai relate to the nature1 invisibility1 and arbitrary visual signs of ,situation1 or of the localities of tangible things4 ,cf4 ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #dd-ec4 #chj ,cf4 sect4 #b1 #aad1 #aaf1 #aah4 #cha ,this illustration is taken from ,descartes4 ,see ,appendix4 #chb ,sect4 #aj and #ai4 #chc ,sect4 #b-ea4 #chd ,omitted in author's last edition4 #che ,this is ,berkeley's universal solvent of the psychological difficulties involved in visual-perception4 #chf ,cf4 sect4 #ajc1 #ajf1 #aaj1 #abh1 c4 ,berkeley treats this case hypothetically in the ,essay1 in defect of actual experiments upon the born-blind1 since accumulated from ,cheselden downwards4 ,see however the ,appendix1 and ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #ga4 #chg i4e4 tangible things4 ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #dd4 #chh ,the 8prejudice10 to wit1 which ,berkeley would dissolve by his introspective analysis of vision4 ,cf4 ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #ce4 #chi ,thus forming individual concrete things out of what is perceived separately through different senses4 #cij ,this briefly is ,berkeley's solution of 8the knot about inverted images10 which long puzzled men of science4 #cia i4e4 perceive mediately--visible objects1 per se1 having no tactual situation4 ,pure vision1 he would say1 has nothing to do with 8high0 and 8low10 8great0 and 8inverted10 in the real or tactual meaning of those terms4 #cib i4e4 tangible4 #cic e4g4 8extension10 which1 according to ,berkeley1 is an equivocal term1 common 7in its different meanings7 to visibilia and tangibilia4 ,cf4 sect4 #aci1 #adj4 #cid ,cf4 sect4 #ic1 #ajf1 #aaj1 #abh4 #cie i4e4 real or tangible head4 #cif ,cf4 sect4 #adj1 #adc4 ,in the ,gent4 ,mag4 7vol4 ,,xxii4 p4 #ab71 8,anti-,berkeley0 thus argues the case of one born blind4 8,this man10 he adds1 8would1 by being accustomed to feel one hand with the other1 have perceived that the extremity of the hand was divided into fingers--that the extremities of these fingers were distinguished by certain hard1 smooth surfaces1 of a different texture from the rest of the fingers--and that each finger had certain joints or flexures4 ,now1 if this man was restored to sight1 and immediately viewed his hand before he touched it again1 it is manifest that the divisions of the extremity of the hand into fingers would be visibly perceived4 ,he would note too the small spaces at the extremity of each finger1 which affected his sight differently from the rest of the fingers2 upon moving his fingers he would see the joints4 ,though therefore1 by means of this lately acquired sense of seeing1 the object affected his mind in a new and different manner from what it did before1 yet1 as by touch he had acquired the knowledge of these several divisions1 marks1 and distinctions of the hand1 and1 as the new object of sight appeared to be divided1 marked1 and distinguished in a similar manner1 ,i think he would certainly conclude1 before he touched his hand1 that the thing which he now saw was the same which he had felt before and called his hand40 #cig ,locke1 ,essay1 ,,ii4 #h1 #af4 ,aristotle regards number as a ,common ,sensible4--,de ,anima1 ,,ii4 #f1 ,,iii4 #a4 #cih 8,if the visible appearance of two shillings had been found connected from the beginning with the tangible idea of one shilling1 that appearance would as naturally and readily have signified the unity of the 7tangible7 object as it now signifies its duplicity40 ,reid1 ,inquiry1 ,,vi4 #aa4 #cii ,here again note ,berkeley's inconvenient reticence of his full theory of matter1 as dependent on percipient life for its reality4 ,tangible things are meantime granted to be real 8without mind40 ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #dc1 #dd4 8,without the mind0--in contrast to sensuous phenomenon only4 #djj ,cf4 sect4 #aca4 #dja ,sect4 #b1 #hh1 #aaf1 #aah4 #djb ,in short1 we see only quantities of colour--the real or tactual distance1 size1 shape1 locality1 up and down1 right and left1 c41 being gradually associated with the various visible modifications of colour4 #djc i4e4 tangible4 #djd ,sect4 #da-dd4 #dje i4e4 tangible things4 #djf i4e4 visible4 #djg ,cf4 sect4 #da-dd4 ,the 8eyes0--visible and tangible--are themselves objects of sense4 #djh ,cf4 ,principles1 ,introduction1 sect4 #ba-be4 #dji 8,visible ideas0--including sensations muscular and locomotive1 felt in the organ of vision4 ,sect4 #af1 #bg1 #eg4 #daj i4e4 objects which1 in this tentative ,essay1 are granted1 for argument's sake1 to be external1 or independent of percipient mind4 #daa i4e4 to inquire whether there are1 in this instance1 ,common ,sensibles2 and1 in particular1 whether an extension of the same kind at least1 if not numerically the same1 is presented in each4 ,the ,kantian theory of an a priori intuition of space1 the common condition of tactual and visual experience1 because implied in sense-experience as such1 is not conceived by ,berkeley4 ,cf4 ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #ae4 #dab ,in the following reasoning against abstract1 as distinguished from concrete or sense presented 7visible or tangible7 extension1 ,berkeley urges some of his favourite objections to 8abstract ideas10 fully unfolded in his ,principles1 ,introduction1 sect4 #f-bj4--,see also ,alciphron1 ,,vii4 #e-h4--;,defence of ,free ,thinking in ,mathematics1 sect4 #de-dh4 #dac ,berkeley's ideas are concrete or particular--immediate data of sense or imagination4 #dad i4e4 it cannot be individualized1 either as a perceived or an imagined object4 #dae ,sect4 #aje4 #daf 8,endeavours0 in first edition4 #dag i4e4 a mental image of an abstraction1 an impossible image1 in which the extension and comprehension of the notion must be adequately pictured4 #dah 8deservedly admired author10 in the first edition4 #dai 8this celebrated author10--8that great man0 in second edition4 ,in assailing ,locke's 8abstract idea10 he discharges the meaning which ,locke intended by the term1 and then demolishes his own figment4 #dbj ,omitted in the author's last edition4 #dba ,omitted in last edition4 #dbb ,omitted in last edition4 #dbc ,omitted in last edition4 #dbd ,see ,principles1 passim4 #dbe ,omitted in author's last edition4 #dbf ,he probably has ,locke in his eye4 #dbg ,on ,berkeley's theory1 space without relation to bodies 7i4e4 insensible or abstract space7 would not be extended1 as not having parts2 inasmuch as parts can be assigned to it only with relation to bodies4 ,berkeley does not distinguish space from sensible extension4 ,cf4 ,reid's ,works1 p4 #abf1 note--in which ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton suggests that one may have an a priori conception of pure space1 and also an a posteriori perception of finite1 concrete space4 #dbh ,sect4 #aba4 ,cf4 ,new ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #ae4 #dbi i4e4 there are no ,common ,sensibles3 from which it follows that we can reason from the one sense to the other only by founding on the constant connexion of their respective phenomena1 under a natural yet 7for us7 contingent law4 ,cf4 ,new ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #bg1 #bh4 #dcj ,omitted in last edition4 #dca ,cf4 sect4 #ic1 #ajc1 #ajf1 #aaj4 #dcb ,omitted in last edition4 #dcc ,cf4 sect4 #dc1 #ajc1 c4 ,a plurality of co-existent minima of coloured points constitutes ,berkeley's visible extension2 while a plurality of successively experienced minima of resistant points constitutes his tactual extension4 ,whether we can perceive visible extension without experience of muscular movement at least in the eye1 he does not here say4 #dcd ,omitted in last edition4 #dce ,real distance belongs originally1 according to the ,essay1 to our tactual experience only--in the wide meaning of touch1 which includes muscular and locomotive perceptions1 as well as the simple perception of contact4 #dcf ,added in second edition4 #dcg ,omitted in last edition4 #dch ,see also ,locke's 8,correspondence0 with ,molyneux1 in ,locke's ,works1 vol4 ,,ix4 p4 #cd4--,leibniz1 ,nouveaux ,essais1 ,liv4 ,,ii4 ch4 #i1 who1 so far granting the fact1 disputes the heterogeneity4--,smith's ,optics4--,remarks1 #afa-agj4--;,hamilton's ,reid1 p4 #acg1 note1 and ,lect4 ,metaph4 ,,ii4 p4 #agf4 #dci ,omitted in last edition4 #ddj ,cf4 ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #gj4 #dda ,cf4 sect4 #di1 #adf1 c4 ,here 8same0 includes 8similar40 #ddb i4e4 visible and tangible motions being absolutely heterogeneous1 and the former1 at man's point of view1 only contingent signs of the latter1 we should not1 at first sight1 be able to interpret the visual signs of tactual phenomena4 #ddc ,cf4 sect4 #abb-abe4 #ddd ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #aaa-aaf2 also ,analyst1 query #ab4 ,on ,berkeley's system space in its three dimensions is unrealisable without experience of motion4 #dde ,here the term 8language of nature0 makes its appearance1 as applicable to the ideas or visual signs of tactual realities4 #ddf ,cf4 sect4 #af1 #bg1 #ig4 #ddg ,is 8tangible0 here used in its narrow meaning--excluding muscular and locomotive experience8 #ddh i4e4 as natural signs1 divinely associated with their thus implied meanings4 #ddi ,cf4 ,new ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #ce4 #dej ,berkeley1 in this section1 enunciates the principal conclusion in the ,essay1 which conclusion indeed forms his new theory of ,vision4 #dea ,a suggestion thus due to natural laws of association4 ,the explanation of the fact that we apprehend1 by those ideas or phenomena which are objects of sight1 certain other ideas1 which neither resemble them1 nor efficiently cause them1 nor are so caused by them1 nor have any necessary connexion with them1 comprehends1 according to ,berkeley1 the whole ,theory of ,vision4 8,the imagination of every thinking person10 remarks ,adam ,smith1 8will supply him with instances to prove that the ideas received by any one of the senses do readily excite such other ideas1 either of the same sense or of any other1 as have habitually been associated with them4 ,so that if1 on this account1 we are to suppose1 with a late ingenious writer1 that the ideas of sight constitute a ,visual ,language1 because they readily suggest the corresponding ideas of touch--as the terms of a language excite the ideas answering to them--,i see not but we may1 for the same reason1 allow of a tangible1 audible1 gustatory1 and olefactory language2 though doubtless the ,visual ,language will be abundantly more copious than the rest40 ,smith's ,optics4--,remarks1 p4 #bi4--;,and into this conception of a universal sense symbolism1 ,berkeley's theory of ,vision ultimately rises4 #deb ,cf4 ,alciphron1 ,dialogue ,,iv4 sect4 #aa-ae4 #dec ,sect4 #abb-abe4 #ded ,sect4 #abg-ach4 #dee ,some modern metaphysicians would say1 that neither tangible nor visible extension is the object geometry1 but abstract extension2 and others that space is a necessary implicate of sense-experience1 rather than1 per se1 an object of any single sense4 ,cf4 ,kant's explanation of the origin of our mathematical knowledge1 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft4 ,elementarlehre1 ,i4 #def ,cf4 sect4 #ea-ff1 #add4 #deg ,this is a conjecture1 not as to the probable ideas of one born blind1 but as to the ideas of an 8unbodied0 intelligence1 whose only sense was that of seeing4 ,see ,reid's speculation 7,inquiry1 ,,vi4 #i7 on the 8,geometry of ,visibles10 and the mental experience of ,idomenians1 or imaginary beings supposed to have no ideas of the material world except those got by seeing4 #deh ,cf4 sect4 #acj1 and ,new ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #eg4 ,does ,berkeley1 in this and the two preceding sections1 mean to hint that the only proper object of sight is unextended colour2 and that1 apart from muscular movement in the eye or other locomotion1 visibilia resolve into unextended mathematical points8 ,this question has not escaped more recent ,british psychologists1 including ,stewart1 ,brown1 ,mill1 and ,bain1 who seem to hold that unextended colour is perceivable and imaginable4 #dei ,the bracketed sentence is not retained in the author's last edition1 in which the first sentence of sect4 #afj is the concluding one of sect4 #aei1 and of the ,essay4 #dfj ,this passage is contained in the ,dioptrices of ,descartes1 ,,vi4 #ac2 see also ,,vi4 #aa4 #dfa ,the arbitrariness or contingency--as far as our knowledge carries us--of the connexion between the visual phenomena1 as signs1 on the one hand1 and actual distance1 as perceived through this means1 on the other4 #dfb ,cf4 sect4 #hj-hc4 #dfc ,the reference here seems to be to the case described in the ,tatler 7,no4 #ee7 of ,august #af1 #agji1 in which ,william ,jones1 born blind1 had received sight after a surgical operation1 at the age of twenty1 on the #bith of ,june preceding4 ,a medical narrative of this case appeared1 entitled ,a full and true account of a miraculous cure of a ,young ,man in ,newington1 who was born blind1 and was in five minutes brought to perfect sight1 by ,mr4 ,roger ,grant1 oculist4 ,london1 #agji4 #dfd ,cf4 ,new ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #ga1 with the relative note4 #dfe ,omitted on the title-page in the second edition1 but retained in the body of the work4 #dff ,beardsley's ,life and ,correspondence of ,samuel ,johnson1 ,d4,d41 ,first ,president of ,king's ,college1 ,new ,york1 p4 #gb 7#ahgd74 #dfg ,beardsley's ,life of ,johnson1 pp4 #ga1 #gb4 #dfh ,chandler's ,life of ,johnson1 ,appendix1 p4 #afa4 #dfi ,commonplace ,book4 #dgj ,moreover1 even if the outness or distance of things were visible1 it would not follow that either they or their distances could be real if unperceived4 ,on the contrary1 ,berkeley implies that they are perceived visually4 #dga ,it is also to be remembered that sensible things exist 8in mind10 without being exclusively mine1 as creatures of my will4 ,in one sense1 that only is mine in which my will exerts itself4 ,but1 in another view1 my involuntary states of feeling and imagination are mine1 because their existence depends on my consciousness of them2 and even sensible things are so far mine1 because1 though present in many minds in common1 they are1 for me1 dependent on my percipient mind4 #dgb ,thomas ,herbert1 eighth ,earl of ,pembroke and fifth ,earl of ,montgomery1 was the correspondent and friend of ,locke--who dedicated his famous ,essay to him1 as a work 8having some little correspondence with some parts of that nobler and vast system of the sciences your lordship has made so new1 exact1 and instructive a draft of40 ,he represents a family renowned in ,english political and literary history4 ,he was born in #afef2 was a nobleman of ,christ ,church1 ,oxford1 in #afgb2 succeeded to his titles in #afhc2 was sworn of the ,privy ,council in #afhi2 and made a ,knight of the ,garter in #agjj4 ,he filled some of the highest offices in the state1 in the reigns of ,william and ,mary1 and of ,anne4 ,he was ,lord ,lieutenant of ,ireland in #agjg1 having previously been one of the ,commissioners by whom the union between ,england and ,scotland was negotiated4 ,he died in ,january #agcc4 #dgc ,trinity ,college1 ,dublin4 #dgd ,in his ,commonplace ,book ,berkeley seems to refer his speculations to his boyhood4 ,the conception of the material world propounded in the following ,treatise was in his view before the publication of the ,new ,theory of ,vision1 which was intended to prepare the way for it4 #dge ,cf4 ,locke1 in the 8,epistle ,dedicatory0 of his ,essay4 ,notwithstanding the 8novelty0 of the ,new ,principles1 viz4 negation of abstract or unperceived ,matter1 ,space1 ,time1 ,substance1 and ,power2 and affirmation of ,mind1 as the ,synthesis1 ,substance1 and ,cause of all--much in best preceding philosophy1 ancient and modern1 was a dim anticipation of it4 #dgf ,cf4 sect4 #f1 #bb1 #bd1 c41 in illustration of the demonstrative claim of ,berkeley's initial doctrine4 #dgg ,berkeley entreats his reader1 here and throughout1 to take pains to understand his meaning1 and especially to avoid confounding the ordered ideas or phenomena1 objectively presented to our senses1 with capricious chimeras of imagination4 #dgh 8,philosophy is nothing but the true knowledge of things40 ,locke4 #dgi ,the purpose of those early essays of ,berkeley was to reconcile philosophy with common sense1 by employing reflection to make latent common sense1 or common reason1 reveal itself in its genuine integrity4 ,cf4 the closing sentences in the ,third ,dialogue between ,hylas and ,philonous4 #dhj ,cf4 ,locke's ,essay1 ,introduction1 sect4 #d-g2 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 #bc1 #ab1 c4 ,locke 7who is probably here in ,berkeley's eye7 attributes the perplexities of philosophy to our narrow faculties1 which are meant to regulate our lives1 not to remove all mysteries4 ,see also ,descartes1 ,principia1 ,i4 #bf1 #bg1 c42 ,malebranche1 ,recherche1 ,,iii4 #b4 #dha ,his most significant forerunners were ,descartes in his ,principia1 and ,locke in his ,essay4 #dhb ,here 8idea0 and 8notion0 seem to be used convertibly4 ,see sect4 #adb4 ,cf4 with the argument against abstract ideas1 unfolded in the remainder of the ,introduction1 ,principles1 sect4 #ig-ajj1 #aah-acb1 #adc2 ,new ,theory of ,vision1 sect4 #abb-abe2 ,alciphron1 ,dial4 vii4 #e-g2 ,defence of ,free ,thinking in ,mathematics1 sect4 #de-dh4 ,also ,siris1 sect4 #cbc1 #cce1 c41 where he distinguishes ,idea in a higher meaning from his sensuous ideas4 ,as mentioned in my ,preface1 the third edition of ,alciphron1 published in #ageb1 the year before ,berkeley died1 omits the three sections of the ,seventh ,dialogue which repeat the following argument against abstract ideas4 #dhc ,as in ,derodon's ,logica1 ,pt4 ,,ii4 c4 #f1 #g2 ,philosophia ,contracta1 ,i4 i4 #g-aa2 and ,gassendi1 ,leg4 ,instit41 ,i4 #h2 also ,cudworth1 ,eternal and ,immutable ,morality1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 #dhd ,omitted in second edition4 #dhe ,we must remember that what ,berkeley intends by an idea is either a percept of sense1 or a sensuous imagination2 and his argument is that none of these can be an abstraction4 ,we can neither perceive nor imagine what is not concrete and part of a succession4 #dhf 8abstract notions0--here used convertibly with 8abstract ideas40 ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #hi and #adb1 on the special meaning of notion4 #dhg ,supposed by ,berkeley to mean1 that we can imagine1 in abstraction from all phenomena presented in concrete experience1 e4g4 imagine existence1 in abstraction from all phenomena in which it manifests itself to us2 or matter1 stripped of all the phenomena in which it is realised in sense4 #dhh ,omitted in second edition4 #dhi ,locke4 #dij ,descartes1 who regarded brutes as 7sentient87 machines4 #dia 8,to this ,i cannot assent1 being of opinion that a word10 c4--in first edition4 #dib 8an idea10 i4e4 a concrete mental picture4 #dic ,so that 8generality0 in an idea is our 8consideration0 of a particular idea 7e4g4 a 8particular motion0 or a 8particular extension07 not per se1 but under general relations1 which that particular idea exemplifies1 and which1 as he shews1 may be signified by a corresponding word4 ,all ideas 7in ,berkeley's confined meaning of 8idea07 are particular4 ,we rise above particular ideas by an intellectual apprehension of their relations2 not by forming abstract pictures1 which are contradictory absurdities4 #did ,locke is surely misconceived4 ,he does not say1 as ,berkeley seems to suppose1 that in forming 8abstract ideas10 we are forming abstract mental images--pictures in the mind that are not individual pictures4 #die ,does ,locke intend more than this1 although he expresses his meaning in ambiguous words8 #dif ,it is a particular idea1 but considered relatively--a significant particular idea1 in other words4 ,we realise our notions in examples1 and these must be concrete4 #dig i4e4 8ideas0 in ,locke's meaning of idea1 under which he comprehends1 not only the particular ideas of sense and imagination--,berkeley's 8ideas0--but these considered relatively1 and so seen intellectually1 when ,locke calls them abstract1 general1 or universal4 ,omniscience in its all-comprehensive intuition may not require1 or even admit1 such general ideas4 #dih ,here and in what follows1 8abstract notion10 8universal notion10 instead of abstract idea4 ,notion seems to be here a synonym for idea1 and not taken in the special meaning which he afterwards attached to the term1 when he contrasted it with idea4 #dii 8notions10 again synonymous with ideas1 which are all particular or concrete1 in his meaning of idea1 when he uses it strictly4 #ejj idea1 i4e4 individual mental picture4 #eja ,in all this he takes no account of the intellectual relations necessarily embodied in concrete knowledge1 and without which experience could not cohere4 #ejb 8have in view10 i4e4 actually realise in imagination4 #ejc ,what follows1 to the end of this section1 was added in the second or #agcd edition4 #ejd ,so ,bacon in many passages of his ,de ,augmentis ,scientiarium and ,novum ,organum4 #eje 8wide influence10--8wide and extended sway0--in first edition4 #ejf 8idea10 i4e4 individual datum of sense or of imagination4 #ejg ,see ,leibniz on ,symbolical ,knowledge 7,opera ,philosophica1 pp4 #gi1 #hj1 ,erdmann71 and ,stewart in his ,elements1 vol4 ,i4 ch4 #d1 #a1 on our habit of using language without realising1 in individual examples or ideas1 the meanings of the common terms used4 #ejh 8doth0--8does10 here and elsewhere in first edition4 #eji 8ideas10 i4e4 representations in imagination of any of the individual objects to which the names are applicable4 ,the sound or sight of a verbal sign may do duty for the concrete idea in which the notion signified by the word might be exemplified4 #eaj ,this sentence is omitted in the second edition4 #eaa ,elsewhere he mentions ,aristotle as 8certainly a great admirer and promoter of the doctrine of abstraction10 and quotes his statement that there is hardly anything so incomprehensible to men as notions of the utmost universality2 for they are the most remote from sense4 ,metaph41 ,bk4 ,i4 ch4 #b4 #eab ,added in second edition4 #eac ,omitted in second edition4 #ead ,omitted in second edition4 #eae ,omitted in second edition4 #eaf 8my own ideas10 i4e4 the concrete phenomena which ,i can realise as perceptions of sense1 or in imagination4 #eag ,he probably refers to ,locke4 #eah ,according to ,locke1 8that which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of our ideas1 and finding out their relations1 and agreements or disagreements one with another1 has been1 ,i suppose1 the ill use of words4 ,it is impossible that men should ever truly seek1 or certainly discover1 the agreement or disagreement of ideas themselves1 whilst their thoughts flutter about1 or stick only in sounds of doubtful and uncertain significations4 ,mathematicians1 abstracting their thoughts from names1 and accustoming themselves to set before their minds the ideas themselves that they would consider1 and not sounds instead of them1 have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity1 puddering1 and confusion which has so much hindered men's progress in other parts of knowledge40 ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 ch4 #c1 #cj4 ,see also ,bk4 ,,iii4 ch4 #aj1 #aa4 #eai ,general names involve in their signification intellectual relations among ideas or phenomena2 but the relations1 per se1 are unimaginable4 #ebj ,the rough draft of the ,introduction1 prepared two years before the publication of the ,principles 7see ,appendix1 vol4 ,,iii71 should be compared with the published version4 ,he there tells that 8there was a time when1 being bantered and abused by words10 he 8did not in the least doubt0 that he was 8able to abstract his ideas02 adding that 8after a strict survey of my abilities1 ,i not only discovered my own deficiency on this point1 but also cannot conceive it possible that such a power should be even in the most perfect and exalted understanding40 ,what he thus pronounces 8impossible10 is a sensuous perception or imagination of an intellectual relation1 as to which most thinkers would agree with him4 ,but in so arguing1 he seems apt to discard the intellectual relations themselves that are necessarily embodied in experience4 ,david ,hume refers thus to ,berkeley's doctrine about 8abstract ideas03--8,a great philosopher has asserted that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term1 which gives them a more extensive signification4 ,i look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters40 7,treatise of ,h4 ,n4 ,pt4 ,i1 sect4 #g47 #eba ,this resembles ,locke's account of the ideas with which human knowledge is concerned4 ,they are all originally presented to the senses1 or got by reflexion upon the passions and acts of the mind2 and the materials contributed in this external and internal experience are1 with the help of memory and imagination1 elaborated by the human understanding in ways innumerable1 true and false4 ,see ,locke's ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,ii1 ch4 #a1 #a-e2 ch4 #aj1 #aa1 #ab4 #ebb ,the ideas or phenomena of which we are percipient in our five senses make their appearance1 not isolated1 but in individual masses1 constituting the things1 that occupy their respective places in perceived ambient space4 ,it is as qualities of things that the ideas or phenomena of sense arise in human experience4 #ebc ,this is an advance upon the language of the ,commonplace ,book1 in which 8mind0 is spoken of as only a 8congeries of perceptions40 ,here it is something 8entirely distinct0 from ideas or perceptions1 in which they exist and are perceived1 and on which they ultimately depend4 ,spirit1 intelligent and active1 presupposed with its implicates in ideas1 thus becomes the basis of ,berkeley's philosophy4 ,is this subjective idealism only8 ,locke appears in sect4 #a1 ,descartes1 if not ,kant by anticipation1 in sect4 #b4 #ebd ,this sentence expresses ,berkeley's ,new ,principle1 which filled his thoughts in the ,commonplace ,book4 ,note 8in a mind10 not necessarily in my mind4 #ebe ,that is to say1 one has only to put concrete meaning into the terms existence and reality1 in order to have 8an intuitive knowledge0 that matter depends for its real existence on percipient spirit4 #ebf ,in other words1 the things of sense become real1 only in the concrete experience of living mind1 which gives them the only reality we can conceive or have any sort of concern with4 ,extinguish ,spirit and the material world necessarily ceases to be real4 #ebg ,that esse is percipi is ,berkeley's initial ,principle1 called 8intuitive0 or self-evident4 #ebh ,mark that it is the 8natural or real existence0 of the material world1 in the absence of all realising ,spirit1 that ,berkeley insists is impossible--meaningless4 #ebi 8our own0--yet not exclusively mine4 ,they depend for their reality upon a percipient1 not on my perception4 #ecj 8this tenet10 i4e4 that the concrete material world could still be a reality after the annihilation of all realising spiritual life in the universe--divine or other4 #eca 8existing unperceived10 i4e4 existing without being realised in any living percipient experience--existing in a totally abstract existence1 whatever that can mean4 #ecb 8notions0--a term elsewhere 7see sect4 #bg1 #hi1 #adb7 restricted1 is here applied to the immediate data of the senses--the ideas of sense4 #ecc ,this sentence is omitted in the second edition4 #ecd ,in the first edition1 instead of this sentence1 we have the following3 8,to make this appear with all the light and evidence of an ,axiom1 it seems sufficient if ,i can but awaken the reflexion of the reader1 that he may take an impartial view of his own meaning1 and turn his thoughts upon the subject itself2 free and disengaged from all embarras of words and prepossession in favour of received mistakes40 #ece ,in other words1 active percipient ,spirit is at the root of all intelligible trustworthy experience4 #ecf 'proof'--8demonstration0 in first edition2 yet he calls it 8intuitive40 #ecg 8the ideas themselves10 i4e4 the phenomena immediately presented in sense1 and that are thus realised in and through the percipient experience of living mind1 as their factor4 #ech ,as those say who assume that perception is ultimately only representative of the material reality1 the very things themselves not making their appearance to us at all4 #eci ,he refers especially to ,locke1 whose account of ,matter is accordingly charged with being incoherent4 #edj 8inert40 ,see the ,de ,motu4 #eda 8ideas existing in the mind10 i4e4 phenomena of which some mind is percipient2 which are realised in the sentient experience of a living spirit1 human or other4 #edb ,what follows to the end of the section is omitted in the second edition4 #edc 8the existence of ,matter10 i4e4 the existence of the material world1 regarded as a something that does not need to be perceived in order to be real4 #edd ,sometimes called objective qualities1 because they are supposed to be realised in an abstract objectivity1 which ,berkeley insists is meaningless4 #ede ,see ,locke's ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,ii1 ch4 #h1 #ac1 #ah2 ch4 #bc1 #aa2 ,bk4 ,,iv1 ch4 #c1 #bd-bf4 ,locke suggests this relation between the secondary and the primary qualities of matter only hypothetically4 #edf 8in the mind1 and nowhere else10 i4e4 perceived or conceived1 but in no other manner can they be real or concrete4 #edg 8without the mind10 i4e4 independently of all percipient experience4 #edh ,extension is thus the distinguishing characteristic of the material world4 ,geometrical and physical solidity1 as well as motion1 imply extension4 #edi 8number is the creature of the mind10 i4e4 is dependent on being realised in percipient experience4 ,this dependence is here illustrated by the relation of concrete number to the point of view of each mind2 as the dependence of the other primary qualities was illustrated by their dependence on the organisation of the percipient4 ,in this1 the preceding1 and the following sections1 ,berkeley argues the inconsistency of the abstract reality attributed to the primary qualities with their acknowledged dependence on the necessary conditions of sense perception4 #eej ,cf4 ,new ,theory of ,vision1 sect4 #aji4 #eea e4g4 ,locke1 ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,ii1 ch4 #g1 #g2 ch4 #af1 #a4 #eeb 8without any alteration in any external object0--8without any external alteration0--in first edition4 #eec ,these arguments1 founded on the mind-dependent nature of all the qualities of matter1 are expanded in the ,first ,dialogue between ,hylas and ,philonous4 #eed 8an outward object10 i4e4 an object wholly abstract from living ,mind4 #eee ,this sentence is omitted in the second edition4 #eef 8reason10 i4e4 reasoning4 ,it is argued1 in this and the next section1 that a reality unrealised in percipient experience cannot be proved1 either by our senses or by reasoning4 #eeg ,omitted in the second edition1 and the sentence converted into a question4 #eeh ,but the ideas of which we are cognizant in waking dreams1 and dreams of sleep1 differ in important characteristics from the external ideas of which we are percipient in sense4 ,cf4 sect4 #bi-cc4 #eei 8external bodies10 i4e4 bodies supposed to be real independently of all percipients in the universe4 #efj i4e4 they cannot shew how their unintelligible hypothesis of ,matter accounts for the experience we have1 or expect to have2 or which we believe other persons have1 or to be about to have4 #efa 8the production10 c41 i4e4 the fact that we and others have percipient experience4 #efb ,mind-dependent ,matter he not only allows to exist1 but maintains its reality to be intuitively evident4 #efc i4e4 bodies existing in abstraction from living percipient spirit4 #efd 8,matter10 i4e4 abstract ,matter1 unrealised in sentient intelligence4 #efe ,the appeal here and elsewhere is to consciousness--directly in each person's experience1 and indirectly in that of others4 #eff i4e4 otherwise than in the form of an idea or actual appearance presented to our senses4 #efg ,this implies that the material world may be realised in imagination as well as in sensuous perception1 but in a less degree of reality2 for reality1 he assumes1 admits of degrees4 #efh 8to conceive the existence of external bodies10 i4e4 to conceive bodies that are not conceived--that are not ideas at all1 but which exist in abstraction4 ,to suppose what we conceive to be unconceived1 is to suppose a contradiction4 #efi ,this sentence is omitted in the second edition4 #egj 8,the existence of things without mind10 or in the absence of all spiritual life and perception1 is what ,berkeley argues against1 as meaningless1 if not contradictory2 not the existence of a material world1 when this means the realised order of nature1 regulated independently of individual will1 and to which our actions must conform if we are to avoid physical pain4 #ega ,here again notion is undistinguished from idea4 #egb ,this and the three following sections argue for the essential impotence of matter1 and that1 as far as we are concerned1 so-called 8natural causes0 are only signs which foretell the appearance of their so-called effects4 ,the material world is presented to our senses as a procession of orderly1 and therefore interpretable1 yet in themselves powerless1 ideas or phenomena3 motion is always an effect1 never an originating active cause4 #egc ,as ,locke suggests4 #egd ,this tacitly presupposes the necessity in reason of the ,principle of ,causality1 or the ultimate need for an efficient cause of every change4 ,to determine the sort of ,causation that constitutes and pervades the universe is the aim of his philosophy4 #ege ,in other words1 the material world is not only real in and through percipient spirit1 but the changing forms which its phenomena assume1 in the natural evolution1 are the issue of the perpetual activity of in-dwelling ,spirit4 ,the argument in this section requires a deeper criticism of its premisses4 #egf ,in other words1 an agent cannot1 as such1 be perceived or imagined1 though its effects can4 ,the spiritual term agent is not meaningless2 yet we have no sensuous idea of its meaning4 #egg ,omitted in second edition4 #egh ,this sentence is not contained in the first edition4 ,it is remarkable for first introducing the term notion1 to signify idealess meaning1 as in the words soul1 active power1 c4 ,here he says that 8the operations of the mind0 belong to notions1 while1 in sect4 #a1 he speaks of 8ideas perceived by attending to the #8operations' of the mind40 #egi 8ideas10 i4e4 fancies of imagination2 as distinguished from the more real ideas or phenomena that present themselves objectively to our senses4 #ehj ,with ,berkeley the world of external ideas is distinguished from ,spirit by its essential passivity4 ,active power is with him the essence of ,mind1 distinguishing me from the changing ideas of which ,i am percipient4 ,we must not attribute free agency to phenomena presented to our senses4 #eha ,in this and the four following sections1 ,berkeley mentions marks by which the ideas or phenomena that present themselves to the senses may be distinguished from all other ideas1 in consequence of which they may be termed 8external10 while those of feeling and imagination are wholly subjective or individual4 #ehb ,this mark--the superior strength and liveliness of the ideas or phenomena that are presented to the senses--was afterwards noted by ,hume4 ,see ,inquiry concerning ,human ,understanding1 sect4 ,,ii4 #ehc ,berkeley here and always insists on the arbitrary character of 8settled laws0 of change in the world1 as contrasted with 8necessary connexions0 discovered in mathematics4 ,the material world is thus virtually an interpretable natural language1 constituted in what1 at our point of view1 is arbitrariness or contingency4 #ehd ,under this conception of the universe1 8second causes0 are divinely established signs of impending changes1 and are only metaphorically called 8causes40 #ehe ,so ,schiller1 in ,don ,carlos1 ,act ,,iii1 where he represents sceptics as failing to see the ,god who veils ,himself in everlasting laws4 ,but in truth ,god is eternal law or order vitalised and moralised4 #ehf 8sensations10 with ,berkeley1 are not mere feelings1 but in a sense external appearances4 #ehg 8more reality40 ,this implies that reality admits of degrees1 and that the difference between the phenomena presented to the senses and those which are only imagined is a difference in degree of reality4 #ehh ,in the preceding sections1 two relations should be carefully distinguished--that of the material world to percipient mind1 in which it becomes real2 and that between changes in the world and spiritual agency4 ,these are ,berkeley's two leading ,principles4 ,the first conducts to and vindicates the second--inadequately1 however1 apart from explication of their root in moral reason4 ,the former gives a relation sui generis4 ,the latter gives our only example of active causality--the natural order of phenomena being the outcome of the causal energy of intending ,will4 #ehi ,sect4 #cd-hd contain ,berkeley's answers to supposed objections to the foregoing ,principles concerning ,matter and ,spirit in their mutual relations4 #eij ,to be an 8idea0 is1 with ,berkeley1 to be the imaginable object of a percipient spirit4 ,but he does not define precisely the relation of ideas to mind4 8,existence in mind0 is existence in this relation4 ,his question 7which he determines in the negative7 is1 the possibility of concrete phenomena1 naturally presented to sense1 yet out of all relation to living mind4 #eia ,omitted in second edition4 #eib i4e4 of imagination4 ,cf4 sect4 #bh-cj4 #eic ,cf4 sect4 #bi4 #eid 8more reality40 ,this again implies that reality admits of degrees4 ,what is perceived in sense is more real than what is imagined1 and eternal realities are more deeply real than the transitory things of sense4 #eie ,cf4 sect4 #cc4 8,not fictions10 i4e4 they are presentative1 and therefore cannot misrepresent4 #eif ,with ,berkeley substance is either 7a7 active reason1 i4e4 spirit--substance proper1 or 7b7 an aggregate of sense-phenomena1 called a 8sensible thing0--substance conventionally and superficially4 #eig ,and which1 because realised in living perception1 are called ideas--to remind us that reality is attained in and through percipient mind4 #eih 8combined together10 i4e4 in the form of 8sensible things10 according to natural laws4 ,cf4 sect4 #cc4 #eii 8thinking things0--more appropriately called persons4 #fjj ,berkeley uses the word idea to mark the fact1 that sensible things are real only as they manifest themselves in the form of passive objects1 presented to sense-percipient mind2 but he does not1 as popularly supposed1 regard 8sensible things0 as created and regulated by the activity of his own individual mind4 ,they are perceived1 but are neither created nor regulated1 by the individual percipient1 and are thus practically external to each person4 #fja ,cf4 sect4 #hg-ia1 against the scepticism which originates in alleged fallacy of sense4 #fjb ,omitted in second edition4 #fjc ,it is always to be remembered that with ,berkeley ideas or phenomena presented to sense are themselves the real things1 whilst ideas of imagination are representative 7or misrepresentative74 #fjd ,here feelings of pleasure or pain are spoken of1 without qualification1 as in like relation to living mind as sensible things or ideas are4 #fje ,that the ideas of sense should be seen 8at a distance of several miles0 seems not inconsistent with their being dependent on a percipient1 if ambient space is itself 7as ,berkeley asserts7 dependent on percipient experience4 ,cf4 sect4 #fg4 #fjf ,in the preceding year4 #fjg ,essay1 sect4 #b4 #fjh ,ibid4 sect4 #aa-ae4 #fji ,ibid4 sect4 #af-bh4 #faj ,ibid4 sect4 #ea4 #faa ,ibid4 sect4 #dg-di1 #aba-ada4 #fab ,ibid4 sect4 #dc4 #fac i4e4 what we are immediately percipient of in seeing4 #fad ,touch is here and elsewhere taken in its wide meaning1 and includes our muscular and locomotive experience1 all which ,berkeley included in the 8tactual0 meaning of distance4 #fae ,to explain the condition of sensible things during the intervals of our perception of them1 consistently with the belief of all sane persons regarding the material world1 is a challenge which has been often addressed to the advocates of ideal ,realism4 ,according to ,berkeley1 there are no intervals in the existence of sensible things4 ,they are permanently perceivable1 under the laws of nature1 though not always perceived by this1 that or the other individual percipient4 ,moreover they always exist really in the ,divine ,idea1 and potentially1 in relation to finite minds1 in the ,divine ,will4 #faf ,berkeley allows to bodies unperceived by me potential1 but 7for me7 not real existence4 ,when ,i say a body exists thus conditionally1 ,i mean that if1 in the light1 ,i open my eyes1 ,i shall see it1 and that if ,i move my hand1 ,i must feel it4 #fag i4e4 unperceived material substance4 #fah ,berkeley remarks1 in a letter to the ,american ,samuel ,johnson1 that 8those who have contended for a material world have yet acknowledged that natura naturans 7to use the language of the ,schoolmen7 is ,god2 and that the ,divine conservation of things is equipollent to1 and in fact the same thing with1 a continued repeated creation2--in a word1 that conservation and creation differ only as the terminus a quo4 ,these are the common opinions of ,schoolmen2 and ,durandus1 who held the world to be a machine1 like a clock made up and put in motion by ,god1 but afterwards continued to go of itself1 was therein particular1 and had few followers4 ,the very poets teach a doctrine not unlike the ,schools--mens agitat molem 7,virgil1 neid1 ,,vi74 ,the ,stoics and ,platonists are everywhere full of the same notion4 ,i am not therefore singular in this point itself1 so much as in my way of proving it40 ,cf4 ,alciphron1 ,dial4 ,,iv4 sect4 #ad2 ,vindication of ,new ,theory of ,vision1 sect4 #h1 #ag1 c42 ,siris1 passim1 but especially in the latter part4 ,see also ,correspondence between ,clarke and ,leibniz 7#agag74 ,is it not possible that the universe of things and persons is in continuous natural creation1 unbeginning and unending8 #fai ,cf4 sect4 #abc-acb4 #fbj ,he distinguishes 8idea0 from 8mode or attribute40 ,with ,berkeley1 the 8substance0 of matter 7if the term is still to be applied to sensible things7 is the naturally constituted aggregate of phenomena of which each particular thing consists4 ,now extension1 and the other qualities of sensible things1 are not1 ,berkeley argues1 8in mind0 either 7a7 according to the abstract relation of substance and attribute of which philosophers speak2 nor 7b7 as one idea or phenomenon is related to another idea or phenomenon1 in the natural aggregation of sense-phenomena which constitute1 with him1 the substance of a material thing4 ,mind and its 8ideas0 are1 on the contrary1 related as percipient to perceived--in whatever 8otherness0 that altogether sui generis relation implies4 #fba 8,matter10 i4e4 abstract material ,substance1 as distinguished from the concrete things that are realised in living perceptions4 #fbb 8take away natural causes10 i4e4 empty the material world of all originative power1 and refer the supposed powers of bodies to the constant and omnipresent agency of ,god4 #fbc ,some philosophers have treated the relation of ,matter to ,mind in perception as one of cause and effect4 ,this1 according to ,berkeley1 is an illegitimate analysis1 which creates a fictitious duality4 ,on his ,new ,principles1 philosophy is based on a recognition of the fact1 that perception is neither the cause nor the effect of its object1 but in a relation to it that is altogether sui generis4 #fbd ,he refers to ,descartes1 and perhaps ,geulinx and ,malebranche1 who1 while they argued for material substance1 denied the causal efficiency of sensible things4 ,berkeley's new ,principles are presented as the foundation in reason for this denial1 and for the essential spirituality of all active power in the universe4 #fbe ,on the principle1 8,entia non sunt multiplicanda prter necessitatem40 #fbf 8external things10 i4e4 things in the abstract4 #fbg ,that the unreflecting part of mankind should have a confused conception of what should be meant by the external reality of matter is not wonderful4 ,it is the office of philosophy to improve their conception1 making it deeper and truer1 and this was ,berkeley's preliminary task2 as a mean for shewing the impotence of the things of sense1 and conclusive evidence of omnipresent spiritual activity4 #fbh ,cf4 sect4 #d1 #i1 #ae1 #ag1 #bb1 #bd4 #fbi i4e4 their sense-ideas4--,though sense-ideas1 i4e4 the appearances presented to the senses1 are independent of the will of the individual percipient1 it does not follow that they are independent of all perception1 so that they can be real in the absence of realising percipient experience4 ,cf4 sect4 #bi-cc4 #fcj ,by shewing that what we are percipient of in sense must be idea1 or that it is immediately known by us only as sensuous appearance4 #fca i4e4 8imprinted0 by unperceived ,matter1 which1 on this dogma of a representative sense-perception1 was assumed to exist behind the perceived ideas1 and to be the cause of their appearance4 ,cf4 ,third ,dialogue between ,hylas and ,philonous4 #fcb ,hence the difficulty men have in recognising that ,divine ,reason and ,will1 and ,law in ,nature1 are coincident4 ,but the advance of scientific discovery of the laws which express ,divine ,will in nature1 instead of narrowing1 extends our knowledge of ,god4 ,and divine or absolutely reasonable 8arbitrariness0 is not caprice4 #fcc 8ideas10 i4e4 ideas of sense4 ,this 8experience0 implied an association of sensuous ideas1 according to the divine or reasonable order of nature4 #fcd ,cf4 sect4 #be-cc1 and other passages in ,berkeley's writings in which he insists upon the arbitrariness--divine or reasonable--of the natural laws and sense-symbolism4 #fce ,cf4 sect4 #c1 #d1 #f1 #bb-bd1 #bf1 in which he proceeds upon the intuitive certainty of his two leading ,principles1 concerning ,reality and ,causation4 #fcf ,in short1 what is virtually the language of universal natural order is the divine way of revealing omnipresent ,intelligence2 nor can we conceive how this revelation could be made through a capricious or chaotic succession of changes4 #fcg ,he here touches on moral purpose in miraculous phenomena1 but without discussing their relation to the divine1 or perfectly reasonable1 order of the universe4 ,relatively to a fine knowledge of nature1 they seem anomalous--exceptions from general rules1 which nevertheless express1 immediately and constantly1 perfect active ,reason4 #fch 8ideas10 i4e4 the phenomena presented to the senses4 #fci 8imaginable0--in first edition4 #fdj 8the connexion of ideas10 i4e4 the presence of law or reasonable uniformity in the coexistence and succession of the phenomena of sense2 which makes them interpretable signs4 #fda ,according to ,berkeley1 it is by an abuse of language that the term 8power0 is applied to those ideas which are invariable antecedents of other ideas--the prior forms of their existence1 as it were4 #fdb ,berkeley1 in meeting this objection1 thus implies ,universal ,natural ,symbolism as the essential character of the sensible world1 in its relation to man4 #fdc ,see ,locke's ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,iv1 ch4 #c1 #be-bh1 c41 in which he suggests that the secondary qualities of bodies may be the natural issue of the different relations and modifications of their primary qualities4 #fdd ,with ,berkeley1 material substance is merely the natural combination of sense-presented phenomena1 which1 under a divine or reasonable 8arbitrariness10 constitute a concrete thing4 ,divine ,will1 or ,active ,reason1 is the constantly sustaining cause of this combination or substantiation4 #fde i4e4 that it is not realised in a living percipient experience4 #fdf ,for 8place0 is realised only as perceived--percipient experience being its concrete existence4 ,living perception is1 with ,berkeley1 the condition of the possibility of concrete locality4 #fdg ,so in the ,cartesian theory of occasional causes4 #fdh ,so ,geulinx and ,malebranche4 #fdi ,as known in ,divine intelligence1 they are accordingly ,divine ,ideas4 ,and1 if this means that the sensible system is the expression of ,divine ,ideas1 which are its ultimate archetype--that the ,ideas of ,god are symbolised to our senses1 and then interpreted 7or misinterpreted7 by human minds1 this allies itself with ,platonic ,idealism4 #fej 8,it seems to me10 ,hume says1 8that this theory of the universal energy and operation of the ,supreme ,being is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a mind sufficiently apprised of the weakness of human reason1 and the narrow limits to which it is confined in all its operations40 ,but is it not virtually presupposed in the assumed trustworthiness of our experience of the universe8 #fea ,accordingly we are led to ask1 what the deepest support of their reality must be4 ,is it found in living ,spirit1 i4e4 ,active ,reason1 or in blind ,matter8 #feb e4g4 ,descartes1 ,malebranche1 ,locke1 c4 #fec ,in short1 if we mean by ,matter1 something unrealised in percipient experience of sense1 what is called its reality is something unintelligible4 #fed ,and if sensible phenomena are sufficiently externalised1 when regarded as regulated by ,divine ,reason4 #fee ,twenty years after the publication of the ,principles1 in a letter to his ,american friend ,johnson1 ,berkeley says3--8,i have no objection against calling the ,ideas in the mind of ,god archetypes of ours4 ,but ,i object against those archetypes by philosophers supposed to be real things1 and so to have an absolute rational existence distinct from their being perceived by any mind whatsoever2 it being the opinion of all materialists that an ideal existence in the ,divine ,mind is one thing1 and the real existence of material things another40 #fef ,berkeley's philosophy is not inconsistent with ,divine ,ideas which receive expression in the laws of nature1 and of which human science is the imperfect interpretation4 ,in this view1 assertion of the existence of ,matter is simply an expression of faith that the phenomenal universe into which we are born is a reasonable and interpretable universe2 and that it would be fully interpreted1 if our notions could be fully harmonised with the ,divine ,ideas which it expresses4 #feg ,cf4 sect4 #c-bd4 #feh ,so that superhuman persons1 endowed with a million senses1 would be no nearer this abstract ,matter than man is1 with his few senses4 #fei ,matter and physical science is relative1 so far that we may suppose in other percipients than men1 an indefinite number of additional senses1 affording corresponding varieties of qualities in things1 of course inconceivable by man4 ,or1 we may suppose an intelligence destitute of all our senses1 and so in a material world wholly different in its appearances from ours4 #ffj ,the authority of ,holy ,scripture1 added to our natural tendency to believe in external reality1 are grounds on which ,malebranche and ,norris infer a material world4 ,berkeley's material world claims no logical proof of its reality4 ,his is not to prove the reality of the world1 but to shew what we should mean when we affirm its reality1 and the basis of its explicability in science4 #ffa i4e4 existing unrealised in any intelligence--human or ,divine4 #ffb 8external things10 i4e4 things existing really1 yet out of all relation to active living spirit4 #ffc ,simultaneous perception of the 8same0 7similar87 sense-ideas1 by different persons1 as distinguished from purely individual consciousness of feelings and fancies1 is here taken as a test of the virtually external reality of the former4 ,berkeley does not ask whether the change of the rod into a serpent1 or of the water into wine1 is the issue of divine agency and order1 otherwise than as all natural evolution is divinely providential4 #ffd ,some of the ,consequences of adoption of the ,new ,principles1 in their application to the physical sciences and mathematics1 and then to psychology and theology1 are unfolded in the remaining sections of the ,principles4 #ffe ,berkeley disclaims the supposed representative character of the ideas given in sensuous perception1 and recognises as the real object only what is ideally presented in consciousness4 #fff ,so ,hume1 ,reid1 and ,hamilton1 who all see in a wholly representative sense-perception1 with its double object1 the germ of total scepticism4 ,berkeley claims that1 under his interpretation of what the reality of the material world means1 immediate knowledge of mind-dependent matter is given in sense4 #ffg 8scepticism0--8sceptical cant0 in the first edition4 #ffh ,this sentence is omitted in the second edition4 #ffi ,berkeley's argument against a finally representative perception so far resembles that afterwards employed by ,reid and ,hamilton4 ,they differ as regards the dependence of the sensible object upon percipient spirit for its reality4 #fgj ,omitted in second edition4 #fga ,omitted in second edition4 #fgb ,but whilst unthinking things depend on being perceived1 do not our spirits depend on ideas of some sort for their percipient life8 #fgc ,the important passage within brackets was added in the second edition4 #fgd 8reason10 i4e4 reasoning4 #fge 8,notion10 in its stricter meaning1 is thus confined by ,berkeley to apprehension of the ,ego1 and intelligence of relations4 ,the term 8notion10 in this contrast with his 8idea10 becomes important in his vocabulary1 although he sometimes uses it vaguely4 #fgf ,locke uses idea in this wider signification4 #fgg ,inasmuch as they are real in and through living percipient mind4 #fgh i4e4 unthinking archetypes4 #fgi ,in this section ,berkeley explains what he means by externality4 ,men cannot act1 cannot live1 without assuming an external world--in some meaning of the term 8external40 ,it is the business of the philosopher to explicate its true meaning4 #fhj i4e4 they are not substances in the truest or deepest meaning of the word4 #fha 8,ideas of the corporeal substances40 ,berkeley might perhaps say--,divine ,ideas which are themselves our world of sensible things in its ultimate form4 #fhb ,on the scheme of ideal ,realism1 8creation0 of matter is presenting to finite minds sense-ideas or phenomena1 which are1 as it were1 letters of the alphabet1 in that language of natural order which ,god employs for the expression of ,his ,ideas to us4 #fhc ,the independent eternity of ,matter must be distinguished from an unbeginning and endless creation of sensible ideas or phenomena1 in percipient spirits1 according to divine natural law and order1 with implied immanence of ,god4 #fhd ,because the question at issue with ,atheism is1 whether the universe of things and persons is finally substantiated and evolved in unthinking ,matter or in the perfect ,reason of ,god4 #fhe ,of which ,berkeley does not predicate a numerical identity4 ,cf4 ,third ,dialogue between ,hylas and ,philonous4 #fhf 8matter10 i4e4 matter abstracted from all percipient life and voluntary activity4 #fhg 8external0--not in ,berkeley's meaning of externality4 ,cf4 sect4 #ij1 note #b4 #fhh ,si non rogas1 intelligo4 ,berkeley writes long after this to ,johnson thus3--8,a succession of ideas 7phenomena7 ,i take to constitute time1 and not to be only the sensible measure thereof1 as ,mr4 ,locke and others think4 ,but in these matters every man is to think for himself1 and speak as he finds4 ,one of my earliest inquiries was about time2 which led me into several paradoxes that ,i did not think it fit or necessary to publish1 particularly into the notion that the resurrection follows the next moment after death4 ,we are confounded and perplexed about time--supposing a succession in ,god2 that we have an abstract idea of time2 that time in one mind is to be measured by succession of ideas in another mind3 not considering the true use of words1 which as often terminate in the will as in the understanding1 being employed to excite and direct action rather than to produce clear and distinct ideas40 ,cf4 ,introduction1 sect4 #bj4 #fhi ,as the esse of unthinking things is percipi1 according to ,berkeley1 so the esse of persons is percipere4 ,the real existence of individual ,mind thus depends on having ideas of some sort3 the real existence of matter depends on a percipient4 #fij ,this sentence is omitted in the second edition4 #fia ,cf4 ,new ,theory of ,vision1 sect4 #dc4 #fib 8objects of sense10 i4e4 sensible things1 practically external to each person4 ,cf4 sect4 #a1 on the meaning of thing1 as distinct from the distinguishable ideas or phenomena that are naturally aggregated in the form of concrete things4 #fic ,omitted in second edition4 #fid ,omitted in second edition4 #fie ,cf4 ,introduction1 sect4 #a-c4 ,with ,berkeley1 the real essence of sensible things is given in perception--so far as our perceptions carry us4 #fif e4g4 ,locke's ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 ch4 #c4 #fig ,berkeley advocates a ,realism1 which eliminates effective causation from the material world1 concentrates it in ,mind1 and in physical research seeks among data of sense for their divinely maintained natural laws4 #fih ,in interpreting the data of sense1 we are obliged to assume that every new phenomenon must have previously existed in some equivalent form--but not necessarily in this or that particular form1 for a knowledge of which we are indebted to inductive comparisons of experience4 #fii ,the preceding forms of new phenomena1 being finally determined by ,will1 are1 in that sense1 arbitrary2 but not capricious1 for the ,will is perfect ,reason4 ,god is the immanent cause of the natural order4 #gjj ,he probably refers to ,bacon4 #gja ,omitted in second edition4 #gjb ,what we are able to discover in the all-comprehensive order may be subordinate and provisional only4 ,nature in its deepest meaning explains itself in the ,divine ,omniscience4 #gjc i4e4 inductively4 #gjd i4e4 deductively4 #gje 8seem to consider signs10 i4e4 to be grammarians rather than philosophers3 physical sciences deal with the grammar of the divine language of nature4 #gjf 8,a man may be well read in the language of nature without understanding the grammar of it1 or being able to say10 c4--in first edition4 #gjg 8extend0--8stretch0--in first edition4 #gjh ,omitted in second edition4 #gji ,in the first edition1 the section commences thus3 8,the best grammar of the kind we are speaking of will be easily acknowledged to be a treatise of ,mechanics1 demonstrated and applied to ,nature1 by a philosopher of a neighbouring nation1 whom all the world admire4 ,i shall not take upon me to make remarks on the performance of that extraordinary person3 only some things he has advanced so directly opposite to the doctrine we have hitherto laid down1 that we should be wanting in the regard due to the authority of so great a man did we not take some notice of them40 ,he refers1 of course1 to ,newton4 ,the first edition of ,berkeley's ,principles was published in ,ireland--hence 8neighbouring nation40 ,newton's ,principia appeared in #afhg4 #gaj 8,motion10 in various aspects1 is treated specially in the ,de ,motu4 ,an imagination of trinal space presupposes locomotive experience--unimpeded1 in contrast with--impeded locomotion4 ,cf4 sect4 #aaf4 #gaa ,omitted in second edition4 #gab ,added in second edition4 #gac ,omitted in second edition4 #gad ,see ,locke's ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 #ac1 #g-aj4 #gae 8applied to0--8impressed on0--in first edition4 #gaf 8applied to0--8impressed on0--in first edition4 #gag 8the force causing the change0--which 8force10 according to ,berkeley1 can only be attributed metaphorically to the so-called impelling body2 inasmuch as bodies1 or the data of sense1 can only be signs of their consequent events1 not efficient causes of change4 #gah ,added in second edition4 #gai ,what follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second edition4 #gbj 8seems impossible0--8is above my capacity0--in first edition4 #gba ,in short1 empty ,space is the sensuous idea of unresisted motion4 ,this is implied in the ,new ,theory of ,vision4 ,he minimises ,space1 treating it as a datum of sense4 #gbb ,he probably refers to ,samuel ,clarke's ,demonstration of the ,being and ,attributes of ,god1 which appeared in #agjf1 and a treatise ,de ,spatio ,reali1 published in the same year4 #gbc ,sect4 #aah-acb are accordingly concerned with the ,new ,principles in their application to ,mathematics4 ,the foundation of the mathematical sciences engaged much of ,berkeley's thought in early life and in his later years4 ,see his ,analyst4 #gbd ,numerical relations are realised only in concrete experience4 #gbe ,cf4 ,new ,theory of ,vision1 sect4 #ajg1 c4 #gbf ,ibid4 sect4 #abb-abe1 #adi-afj4 #gbg ,an infinitely divided extension1 being unperceived1 must be unreal--if its existence is made real only in and through actual perception1 or at least imagination4 ,the only possible extension is1 accordingly1 sensible extension1 which could not be infinitely divided without the supposed parts ceasing to be perceived or real4 #gbh 8converted ,gentile0--8pagan convert0--in first edition4 #gbi ,cf4 ,locke's ,essay1 ,bk4 ,i1 ch4 #c1 #be4 #gcj 8will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit10 c4--8will not stick to affirm10 c4--in first edition4 #gca ,omitted in second edition4 ,see the ,analyst4 #gcb 8we must mean0--8we mean 7if we mean anything70--in first edition4 #gcc ,omitted in the second edition4 #gcd ,does this refer to the intended 8,part ,,ii0 of the ,principles8 #gce 8men of great abilities and obstinate application10 c4--8men of the greatest abilities and most obstinate application10 c4--in first edition4 #gcf ,what follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second edition4 #gcg 8absolute10 i4e4 abstract1 independent1 irrelative existence--as something of which there can be no sensuous perception or conception4 #gch ,matter unrealised in perception--not the material world that is realised in percipient experience of sense4 #gci ,omitted in second edition4 #gdj ,sect4 #ace-aef treat of consequences of the ,new ,principles1 in their application to sciences concerned with our notions of ,spirit or ,mind2 as distinguished from sciences of ideas in external ,nature1 and their mathematical relations4 ,individual mind1 with ,berkeley1 needs data of sense in order to its realisation in consciousness2 while it is dependent on ,god1 in a relation which he does not define distinctly4 #gda e4g4 ,locke suggests this4 #gdb ,is this analogy applicable8 #gdc ,omitted in second edition1 as he had previously learned to distinguish notion from idea4 ,cf4 sect4 #hi1 #adb4 #gdd ,ibid4 ,in the omitted passage it will be seen that he makes idea and notion synonymous4 #gde ,is the reality of mind as dependent on having ideas 7of some sort7 as ideas are on mind2 although mind is more deeply and truly real than its ideas are8 #gdf ,introduced in second edition4 #gdg ,we know other finite persons through sense-presented phenomena1 but not as themselves phenomena4 ,cf4 sect4 #ade4 ,it is a mediate knowledge that we have of other persons4 ,the question about the individuality of finite egos1 as distinguished from ,god1 ,berkeley has not touched4 #gdh ,these sentences are omitted in the second edition4 #gdi 8the soul10 i4e4 the individual ,ego4 #gej ,cf4 sect4 #b2 #be-bg4 #gea ,this is ,berkeley's application of his new conception of the reality of matter1 to the final human question of the self-conscious existence of the individual human ,ego1 after physical death4 ,philosophers and theologians were accustomed in his generation to ground their argument for a future life on the metaphysical assumption of the physical indivisibility of our self-conscious spirit1 and on our contingent connexion with the body4 8,our bodies10 says ,bishop ,butler1 8are no more ourselves1 or part of ourselves1 than any other matter around us40 ,this train of thought is foreign to us at the present day1 when men of science remind us that self-conscious life is found only in correlation with corporeal organisation1 whatever may be the abstract possibility4 ,hope of continued life after physical death seems to depend on ethical considerations more than on metaphysical arguments1 and on what is suggested by faith in the final outcome of personal life in a divinely constituted universe4 #geb ,mind and the ideas presented to the senses are at opposite poles of existence4 ,but he does not say that1 thus opposed1 they are each independent of the other4 #gec ,what follows was introduced in the second edition1 in which notion is contrasted with idea4 #ged ,here is a germ of ,kantism4 ,but ,berkeley has not analysed that activity of mind which constitutes relation1 nor systematically unfolded the relations involved in the rational constitution of experience4 ,there is more disposition to this in ,siris4 #gee ,as with ,locke1 for example4 #gef ,note this condemnation of the tendency to substantiate 8powers of mind40 #geg ,omitted in second edition4 ,berkeley was after all reluctant to 8depart from received modes of speech10 notwithstanding their often misleading associations4 #geh ,omitted in second edition4 #gei ,this is one of the notable sections in the ,principles1 as it suggests the rationale of ,berkeley's rejection of ,panegoism or ,solipsism4 ,is this consistent with his conception of the reality of the material world8 ,it is objected 7e4g4 by ,reid7 that ideal realism dissolves our faith in the existence of other persons4 ,the difficulty is to shew how appearances presented to my senses1 which are sensuous and subjective1 can be media of communication between persons4 ,the question carries us back to the theistic presupposition in the trustworthiness of experience--which is adapted to deceive if ,i am the only person existing4 ,with ,berkeley a chief function of ideas of sense is to signify other persons to each person4 ,see ,alciphron1 ,dial4 ,,iv2 ,new ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 and ,siris4 #gfj 8repugnant0--for it would involve thought in incoherence1 by paralysis of its indispensable causal presupposition4 #gfa ,is not ,god the indispensable presupposition of trustworthy experience1 rather than an empirical inference8 #gfb ,this suggests an explanation of the objective reality and significance of ideas of sense2 through which they become media of social intercourse in the fundamentally divine universe4 ,god so regulates the sense-given ideas of which human beings are individually percipient1 as that1 while numerically different1 as in each mind1 those ideas are nevertheless a sufficient medium for social intercourse1 if the ,power universally at work is morally trustworthy4 ,unless our ,god-given experience is deceiving1 ,solipsism is not a necessary result of the fact that no one but myself can be percipient of my sensuous experience4 #gfc ,omitted in second edition4 #gfd ,malebranche1 as understood by ,berkeley4 ,see ,recherche1 ,liv4 ,,iii4 p4 ii4 ch4 #f1 c4 #gfe ,for all finite persons somehow live1 and move1 and have their being 8in ,god40 ,the existence of eternal living ,mind1 and the present existence of other men1 are both inferences1 resting on the same foundation1 according to ,berkeley4 #gff ,the theistic trust in which our experience is rooted remaining latent1 or being unintelligent4 #gfg ,cf4 sect4 #be-bh1 #ea-ec1 #fj-ff4 ,his conception of ,divine causation in ,nature1 as the constant omnipresent agency in all natural law1 is the deepest part of his philosophy4 ,it is pursued in the ,de ,motu4 #gfh ,is not the unbeginning and unending natural evolution1 an articulate revelation of ,eternal ,spirit or ,active ,reason at the heart of the whole8 #gfi ,omitted in second edition4 #ggj ,so ,pascal in the ,penses4 #gga ,divine reason ever active in ,nature is the necessary correlate to reason in man2 inasmuch as otherwise the changing universe in which we live would be unfit to be reasoned about or acted in4 #ggb ,the existence of moral evil1 or what ought not to exist1 is the difficulty which besets faith in the fundamental divinity or goodness of the universe4 ,yet that faith is presupposed in interpretation of nature1 which proceeds on the postulate of universal order2 and this implies the moral trustworthiness of the world which we begin to realise when we begin to be conscious4 ,that we are living and having our being in omnipotent goodness is thus not an inference1 but the implied basis of all real inferences4 ,i have expanded this thought in my ,philosophy of ,theism4 ,we cannot prove ,god1 for we must assume ,god1 as the basis of all proof4 ,faith even in the uniformity of nature is virtually faith in omnipotent goodness immanent in the universe4 #ggc ,so ,leibniz in his ,theodice1 which was published in the same year as ,berkeley's ,principles4 #ggd ,the divine presupposition1 latent in all human reasoning and experience1 is hid from the unreflecting1 in whom the higher life is dormant1 and the ideal in the universe is accordingly undiscerned4 ,unless the universe is assumed to be physically and morally trustworthy1 i4e4 unless ,god is presupposed1 even natural science has no adequate foundation4 #gge ,our necessarily incomplete knowledge of the ,universe in which we find ourselves is apt to disturb the fundamental faith1 that the phenomena presented to us are significant of ,god4 ,yet we tacitly assume that they are thus significant when we interpret real experience1 physical or moral4 #ggf ,omitted in second edition4 #ggg ,for the following extracts from previously unpublished correspondence of ,berkeley and ,sir ,john ,percival1 ,i am indebted to the kindness of his descendant1 the late ,lord ,egmont4 #ggh ,what ,berkeley seeks to shew is1 not that the world of the senses is unreal1 but in what its reality consists4 ,is it inexplicable chaos1 or explicable expression of ever active ,intelligence1 more or less interpreted in natural science8 #ggi ,leibniz3 ,de modo distinguendi ,phenomena ,realia ab ,imaginariis 7#agjg74 #ghj ,for some information relative to ,gua de ,malves1 see ,querard's ,la ,france ,littraire1 tom4 iii4 p4 #did4 #gha ,the following is the translator's ,prefatory ,note1 on the objects of the ,dialogues1 and in explanation of the three illustrative vignettes3-- 8,l',auteur expose dans le premier ,dialogue le sentiment du ,vulgaire et celui des ,philosophes1 sur les qualits secondaires et premieres1 la nature et l'existence des corps2 et il prtend prouver en mme tems l'insuffisance de l'un et de l'autre4 ,la ,vignette qu'on voit la tte du ,dialogue1 fait allusion cet objet4 ,elle reprsente un ,philosophe dans son cabinet1 lequel est distrait de son travail par un enfant qu'il appercoit se voyant lui-mme dans un miroir1 en tendant les mains pour embrasser sa propre image4 ,le ,philosophe rit de l'erreur o il croit que tombe l'enfant2 tandis qu'on lui applique lui-mme ces mots tirs d',horace3 ,quid rides84444de te ,fabula narratur4 8,le second ,dialogue est employ exposer le sentiment de l',auteur sur le mme sujet1 savoir1 que les choses corporelles ont une existence relle dans les esprits qui les apperoivent2 mais qu'elles ne sauroient exister hors de tous les esprits la fois1 mme de l'esprit infini de ,dieu2 et que par consquent la ,matire1 prise suivant l'acception ordinaire du mot1 non seulement n'existe point1 mais seroit mme absolument impossible4 ,on a tach de reprsenter aux yeux ce sentiment dans la ,vignette du ,dialogue4 ,le mot grec qui signifie me1 dsigne l'me3 les rayons qui en partent marquent l'attention que l'me donne des ides ou objets2 les tableaux qu'on a placs aux seuls endroits o les rayons aboutissent1 et dont les sujets sont tirs de la description des beauts de la nature1 qui se trouve dans le livre1 reprsentent les ides ou objets que l'me considre1 pas le secours des facultes qu'elle a reues de ,dieu2 et l'action de l'tre suprme sur l'me est figure par un trait1 qui1 partant d'un triangle1 symbole de la ,divinit1 et perant les nuages dont le triangle est environn4 s'tend jusqu' l'me pour la vivifier2 enfin1 on a fait en sorte de rendre le mme sentiment par ces mots3 ,qu noscere cumque ,deus det1 ,esse puta4 8,l'objet du troisime ,dialogue est de rpondre aux difficults auxquelles le sentiment qu'on a tabli dans les ,dialogues prcdens1 peut tre sujet1 de l'claircir en cette sorte de plus1 d'en dvelopper toutes les heureuses consquences1 enfin de faire voir1 qu'tant bien entendu1 il revient aux notions les plus communes4 ,et comme l',auteur exprime la fin du livre cette dernire pense1 en comparant ce qu'il vient de dire1 l'eau que les deux ,interlocuteurs sont supposs voir jaillir d'un jet1 et qu'il remarque que la mme force de la gravit fait lever jusqu' une certaine hauteur et retomber ensuite dans le bassin d'o elle toit d'abord partie2 on a pris cet emblme pour le sujet de la ,vignette de ce ,dialogue2 on a reprsent en consquence dans cette dernire ,vignette les deux ,interlocuteurs1 se promenant dans le lieu o l',auteur les suppose1 et s'entretenant l-dessus1 et pour donner au ,lecteur l'explication de l'emblme1 on a mis au bas le vers suivant3 ,urget aquas vis sursum1 eadem flectitque deorsum40 #ghb ,collier never came fairly in sight of the philosophical public of last century4 ,he is referred to in ,germany by ,bilfinger1 in his ,dilucidationes ,philosophic 7#agdf71 and also in the ,ada ,eruditorum1 ,suppl4 ,,vi4 #bdd1 c41 and in ,england by ,corry in his ,reflections on ,liberty and ,necessity 7#agfa71 as well as in the ,remarks on the ,reflections1 and ,answers to the ,remarks1 pp4 #g1 #h 7#agfc71 where he is described as 8a weak reasoner1 and a very dull writer also40 ,collier was dragged from his obscurity by ,dr4 ,reid1 in his ,essays on the ,intellectual ,powers1 ,essay ,,ii4 ch4 #aj4 ,he was a subject of correspondence between ,sir ,james ,mackintosh1 then at ,bombay1 and ,dr4 ,parr1 and an object of curiosity to ,dugald ,stewart4 ,a beautiful reprint of the ,clavis 7of the original edition of which only seven copies were then known to exist7 appeared in ,edinburgh in #ahcf2 and in the following year it was included in a collection of ,metaphysical ,tracts by ,english ,philosophers of the ,eighteenth ,century1 prepared for the press by ,dr4 ,parr4 #ghc ,william1 fourth ,lord ,berkeley of ,stratton1 born about #affc1 succeeded his brother in #afig1 and died in #agda at ,bruton in ,somersetshire4 ,the ,berkeleys of ,stratton were descended from a younger son of ,maurice1 ,lord ,berkeley of ,berkeley ,castle1 who died in #acbf4 ,his descendant1 ,sir ,john ,berkeley of ,bruton1 a zealous ,royalist1 was created first ,lord ,berkeley of ,stratton in #afeh1 and in #affi became ,lord ,lieutenant of ,ireland1 an office which he held till #afgb1 when he was succeeded by the ,earl of ,essex 7see ,burke's ,extinct ,peerages74 ,it is said that ,bishop ,berkeley's father was related to him4 ,the ,bishop himself was introduced by ,dean ,swift1 in #agac1 to the ,lord ,berkeley of ,stratton1 to whom the ,dialogues are dedicated1 as 8a cousin of his ,lordship40 ,the title of ,berkeley of ,stratton became extinct on the death of the fifth ,lord in #aggc4 #ghd ,this interesting ,preface is omitted in his last edition of the ,dialogues4 #ghe ,the ,second ,part of the ,principles was never published1 and only in part written4 ,see ,editor's ,preface to the ,principles4 #ghf ,principles1 ,introduction1 sect4 #a4 #ghg ,berkeley's philosophy is professedly a 8revolt0 from abstract ideas to an enlightened sense of concrete realities4 ,in these ,dialogues ,philonous personates the revolt1 and represents ,berkeley4 ,hylas vindicates the uncritical conception of independent ,matter4 #ghh ,berkeley's zeal against ,matter in the abstract1 and all abstract ideas of concrete things1 is therefore not necessarily directed against 8universal intellectual notions0--8the principles and theorems of sciences40 #ghi ,here 8reason0 means reasoning or inference4 ,cf4 ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #db1 including the distinction between 8suggestion0 and 8inference40 #gij 8figure0 as well as colour1 is here included among the original data of sight4 #gia 8without the mind10 i4e4 unrealised by any percipient mind4 #gib ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #ad4 #gic ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #ad1 #ae4 #gid 8,sensible qualities10 i4e4 the significant appearances presented in sense4 #gie ,cf4 ,new ,theory of ,vision1 sect4 #hj-hf4 #gif ,descartes and ,locke for example4 #gig ,on ,primary and ,secondary ,qualities of ,matter1 and their mutual relations1 cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #i-ae4 ,see also ,descartes1 ,meditations1 ,,iii1 ,principia1 ,i4 sect4 #fi2 ,malebranche1 ,recherche1 ,liv4 ,,vi4 ,pt4 ,,ii4 sect4 #b2 ,locke's ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 #h4 #gih ,cf4 ,new ,theory of ,vision1 sect4 #hj4 #gii ,what follows1 within brackets1 is not contained in the first and second editions4 #hjj ,percipient mind is1 in short1 the indispensable realising factor of all the qualities of sensible things4 #hja ,cf4 ,new ,theory of ,vision1 sect4 #abb-abf2 ,principles1 sect4 #abc1 c42 ,siris1 sect4 #bgj1 c4 #hjb ,cf4 ,principles1 ,introduction1 sect4 #ae4 #hjc ,is 8notion0 here a synonym for idea8 #hjd ,cf4 ,principles1 ,introduction1 sect4 #af4 #hje 8,size or figure1 or sensible quality0--8size1 color c410 in the first and second editions4 #hjf ,in ,berkeley's later and more exact terminology1 the data or implicates of pure intellect are called notions1 in contrast to his ideas1 which are concrete or individual sensuous presentations4 #hjg ,they need living percipient mind to make them real4 #hjh ,so ,reid's ,inquiry1 ch4 ii1 sect4 #h1 #i2 ,essays on the ,intellectual ,powers1 ,,ii4 ch4 #af4 ,cf4 ,new ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #h1 c4 #hji i4e4 figured or extended visible colour4 ,cf4 ,new ,theory of ,vision1 sect4 #dc1 c4 #haj ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #be1 #bf4 #haa ,after maintaining1 in the preceding part of this ,dialogue1 the inevitable dependence of all the qualities of ,matter upon percipient ,spirit1 the argument now proceeds to dispose of the supposition that ,matter may still be an unmanifested or unqualified substratum1 independent of living percipient ,spirit4 #hab ,see the ,essay towards a ,new ,theory of ,vision1 and its ,vindication4 ,note by the ,author in the #agcd edition4 #hac ,cf4 ,essay on ,vision1 sect4 #b4 #had ,cf4 ,ibid41 sect4 #dc4 #hae 8an idea10 i4e4 a phenomenon present to our senses4 #haf ,this was ,reid's fundamental question in his criticism of ,berkeley4 #hag ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #h4 #hah ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #be1 #bf4 #hai ,in other words1 the percipient activity of a living spirit is the necessary condition of the real existence of all ideas or phenomena immediately present to our senses4 #hbj ,an 8explanation0 afterwards elaborately developed by ,hartley1 in his ,observations on ,man 7#agdi74 ,berkeley has probably ,hobbes in view4 #hba ,the brain with the human body in which it is included constitutes a part of the material world1 and must equally with the rest of the material world depend for its realisation upon percipient ,spirit as the realising factor4 #hbb ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #bc4 #hbc 8in stones and minerals0--in first and second editions4 #hbd ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #bi-cc2 also sect4 #ij4--,the permanence of a thing1 during intervals in which it may be unperceived and unimagined by human beings1 is here assumed1 as a natural conviction4 #hbe ,in other words1 men are apt to treat the omniscience of ,god as an inference from the dogmatic assumption that ,god exists1 instead of seeing that our cosmic experience necessarily presupposes omnipotent and omniscient ,intelligence at its root4 #hbf ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #ij4 ,a permanent material world is grounded on ,divine ,mind1 because it cannot but depend on ,mind1 while its reality is only partially and at intervals sustained by finite minds4 #hbg 8necessarily inferred from0--rather necessarily presupposed in4 #hbh ,the present reality of ,something implies the eternal existence of living ,mind1 if ,something must exist eternally1 and if real or concrete existence involves living ,mind4 ,berkeley's conception of material nature presupposes a theistic basis4 #hbi ,he refers of course to ,malebranche and his ,divine ,vision4 #hcj ,but ,malebranche uses idea in a higher meaning than ,berkeley does--akin to the ,platonic1 and in contrast to the sensuous phenomena which ,berkeley calls ideas4 #hca ,the passage within brackets first appeared in the third edition4 #hcb ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #be-cc4 #hcc ,cf4 ,ibid41 sect4 #c-bd4 #hcd ,i can represent to myself another mind perceiving and conceiving things2 because ,i have an example of this my own conscious life4 ,i cannot represent to myself sensible things existing totally unperceived and unimagined2 because ,i cannot1 without a contradiction1 have an example of this in my own experience4 #hce 8reason10 i4e4 by reasoning4 #hcf ,berkeley's material substance is a natural or divinely ordered aggregate of sensible qualities or phenomena4 #hcg ,inasmuch as1 according to ,berkeley1 it must be a living ,spirit1 and it would be an abuse of language to call this ,matter4 #hch ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #be1 #bf4 #hci ,it is here argued that as volition is the only originative cause implied in our experience1 and which consequently alone puts true meaning into the term ,cause1 to apply that term to what is not volition is to make it meaningless1 or at least to misapply it4 #hdj ,while thus arguing against the need for independent matter1 as an instrument needed by ,god1 ,berkeley fails to explain how dependent matter can be a medium of intercourse between persons4 ,it must be more than a subjective dream1 however well ordered1 if it is available for this purpose4 ,unless the visible and audible ideas or phenomena presented to me are actually seen and heard by other men1 how can they be instrumental in intercommunication8 #hda ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #fh-gi4 #hdb ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #bj4 #hdc ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #hj1 #ha4 #hdd i4e4 all ,spirits and their dependent ideas or phenomena4 #hde ,this1 according to ,hume 7who takes for granted that ,berkeley's reasonings can produce no conviction71 is the natural effect of ,berkeley's philosophy4--8,most of the writings of that very ingenious author 7,berkeley7 form the best lessons of scepticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers1 ,bayle not excepted4444 ,that all his arguments1 though otherwise intended1 are1 in reality1 merely sceptical1 appear from this--that they admit of no answer1 and produce no conviction4 ,their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion1 which is the result of scepticism40 7,hume's ,essays1 vol4 ,,ii4 ,note ,n1 p4 #eed47 #hdf ,omitted in last edition4 #hdg 8,tell me1 ,hylas10--8,so ,hylas0--in first and second editions4 #hdh ,variously called noumena1 8things-in-themselves10 absolute substances1 c4--which ,berkeley's philosophy banishes1 on the ground of their unintelligibility1 and thus annihilates all farther questions concerning them4 ,questions about existence are thus confined within the concrete or realising experiences of living spirits4 #hdi ,berkeley claims that his doctrine supersedes scepticism1 and excludes the possibility of fallacy in sense1 in excluding an ultimately representative perception of ,matter4 ,he also assumes the reasonableness of faith in the reality and constancy of natural law4 ,when we see an orange1 the visual sense guarantees only colour4 ,the other phenomena1 which we associate with this colour--the other 8qualities0 of the orange--are1 when we only see the orange1 matter of faith4 ,we believe them to be realisable4 #hej ,he accepts the common belief on which interpretation of sense symbols proceeds--that sensible phenomena are evolved in rational order1 under laws that are independent of1 and in that respect external to1 the individual percipient4 #hea ,mediately as well as immediately4 #heb ,we can hardly be said to have an immediate sense-perception of an individual 8thing0--meaning by 8thing0 a congeries of sense-ideas or phenomena1 presented to different senses4 ,we immediately perceive some of them1 and believe in the others1 which those suggest4 ,see the last three notes4 #hec ,he probably refers to ,descartes1 who argues for the trustworthiness of our faculties from the veracity of ,god2 thus apparently arguing in a circle1 seeing that the existence of ,god is manifested to us only through our suspected faculties4 ,but is not confidence in the trustworthiness of the ,universal ,power at the heart of the universe1 the fundamental presupposition of all human experience1 and ,god thus the basis and end of philosophy and of experience8 #hed ,as ,locke does4 ,see ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 ch4 #aa4 #hee ,cf4 ,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 sect4 #de-dh4 #hef ,and to be thus external to individual minds4 #heg ,it is here that ,berkeley differs1 for example1 from ,hume and ,comte and ,j4,s4 ,mill2 who accept sense-given phenomena1 and assume the constancy of their orderly reappearances1 as a matter of fact1 while they confess total ignorance of the cause of natural order4 7,thus ignorant1 why do they assume reason or order in nature87 ,the ground of sensible things1 which ,berkeley refers to ,divine ,power1 ,mill expresses by the term 8permanent possibility of sensation40 7,see his ,examination of ,hamilton1 ch4 #aa47 ,our belief in the continued existence of a sensible thing in our absence merely means1 with him1 our conviction1 derived from custom1 that we should perceive it under inexplicable conditions which determine its appearance4 #heh ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #be1 #bf4 #hei ,cf4 ,ibid41 sect4 #b1 #bg1 #ace-adb4 #hfj ,inasmuch as ,i am conscious of myself1 ,i can gather1 through the sense symbolism1 the real existence of other minds1 external to my own4 ,for ,i cannot1 of course1 enter into the very consciousness of another person4 #hfa 8reason10 i4e4 reasoning or necessary inference--founded here on our sense of personal dependence2 not merely on our faith in sense symbolism and the interpretability of the sensible world4 ,our belief in the existence of finite minds1 external to our own1 is1 with ,berkeley1 an application of this faith4 #hfb 8,matter10 i4e4 ,matter as abstract substance4 ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #ace-ach4 #hfc ,does this imply that with ,berkeley1 self1 as distinguished from the phenomena of which the material world consists1 is not a necessary presuppostion of experience8 ,he says in many places--,i am conscious of 8my own being10 and that my mind is myself4 ,cf4 ,principles1 sect1 #b4 #hfd ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #h4 #hfe ,cf4 ,ibid41 sect4 #bj #hff ,this important passage1 printed within brackets1 is not found in the first and second editions of the ,dialogues4 ,it is1 by anticipation1 ,berkeley's answer to ,hume's application of the objections to the reality of abstract or unperceived ,matter1 to the reality of the ,ego or ,self1 of which we are aware through memory1 as identical amid the changes of its successive states4 #hfg ,see note #d on preceding page4 #hfh ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #adb4 #hfi ,cf4 ,ibid41 sect4 #b4 ,does he assume that he exists when he is not conscious of ideas--sensible or other8 ,or1 does he deny that he is ever unconscious8 #hgj ,that is of matter supposed to exist independently of any mind4 ,berkeley speaks here of a consciousness of matter4 ,does he mean consciousness of belief in abstract material ,substance8 #hga ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #ed-eg4 #hgb ,which he does not doubt4 #hgc ,this sentence expresses the whole question between ,berkeley and his antagonists4 #hgd ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #bi-da4 #hge ,the words within brackets are omitted in the third edition4 #hgf ,the index pointing to the originative causes in the universe is thus the ethical judgment1 which fastens upon the free voluntary agency of persons1 as absolutely responsible causes1 not merely caused causes4 #hgg ,that only ideas or phenomena are presented to our senses may be assented to by those who nevertheless maintain that intelligent sensuous experience implies more than the sensuous or empirical data4 #hgh ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #di4 #hgi ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #eh4 #hhj 8without the mind10 i4e4 without the mind of each percipient person4 #hha ,this is the gist of the whole question4 ,according to the ,materialists1 sense-presented phenomena are due to unpresented1 unperceived1 abstract ,matter2 according to ,berkeley1 to living ,spirit2 according to ,hume and ,agnostics1 their origin is unknowable1 yet 7incoherently7 they claim that we can interpret them--in physical science4 #hhb ,a similar objection is urged by ,erdmann1 in his criticism of ,berkeley in the ,grundriss der ,geschichte der ,philosophie4 #hhc ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #ej2 ,siris1 sect4 #cai4 #hhd ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #eh4 #hhe 8order0--8series10 in first and second editions4 #hhf 8,matter10 i4e4 when the reality of 8matter0 is supposed to signify what ,berkeley argues cannot be2 because really meaningless4 #hhg 8the connexion of ideas10 i4e4 the physical coexistences and sequences1 maintained in constant order by ,power external to the individual1 and which are disclosed in the natural sciences4 #hhh ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #ch4 ,berkeley is not for making things subjective1 but for recognising ideas or phenomena presented to the senses as objective4 #hhi ,they are not mere illusory appearances but are the very things themselves making their appearance1 as far as our limited senses allow them to be realised for us4 #hij i4e4 abstract ,matter4 #hia ,cf4 ,new ,theory of ,vision1 sect4 #di2 and ,new ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #i1 #aj1 #ae1 c4 #hib ,cf4 ,new ,theory of ,vision1 sect4 #hd-hf4 #hic 8the connexion of ideas10 i4e4 the order providentially maintained in nature4 #hid ,cf4 ,principles1 ,introduction1 sect4 #bc-be4 #hie ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #h-aj1 #hf1 #hg4 #hif ,this difficulty is thus pressed by ,reid3--8,the ideas in my mind cannot be the same with the ideas in any other mind2 therefore1 if the objects ,i perceive be only ideas1 it is impossible that two or more such minds can perceive the same thing4 ,thus there is one unconfutable consequence of ,berkeley's system1 which he seems not to have attended to1 and from which it will be found difficult1 if at all possible1 to guard it4 ,the consequence ,i mean is this--that1 although it leaves us sufficient evidence of a ,supreme ,mind1 it seems to take away all the evidence we have of other intelligent beings like ourselves4 ,what ,i call a father1 or a brother1 or a friend1 is only a parcel of ideas in my own mind 2 they cannot possibly have that relation to another mind which they have to mine1 any more than the pain felt by me can be the individual pain felt by another4 ,i am thus left alone as the only creature of ,god in the universe0 7,hamilton's ,reid1 pp4 #bhd-bhe74 ,implied ,solipsism or ,panegoism is thus charged against ,berkeley1 unless his conception of the material world is further guarded4 #hig ,reid and ,hamilton argue in like manner against a fundamentally representative sense-perception4 #hih ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #f4 #hii ,cf4 ,ibid41 sect4 #hg-ij4 #ijj ,cf4 ,ibid41 sect4 #ah4 #ija ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #bd4 #ijb 8unknown10 i4e4 unrealised in percipient life4 #ijc ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #bh-cc4 #ijd ,see also ,collier's ,clavis ,universalis1 p4 #f3 8,two or more persons who are present at a concert of music may indeed in some measure be said to hear the same notes2 yet the sound which the one hears is not the very same with the sound which another hears1 because the souls or persons are supposed to be different40 #ije ,berkeley seems to hold that in things there is no identity other than perfect similarity--only in persons4 ,and even as to personal identity he is obscure4 ,cf4 ,siris1 sect4 #cdg1 c4 #ijf ,but the question is1 whether the very ideas or phenomena that are perceived by me can be also perceived by other persons2 and if not1 how ,i can discover that 8other persons0 exist1 or that any finite person except myself is cognizant of the ideal cosmos--if the sort of sameness that ,berkeley advocates is all that can be predicated of concrete ideas2 which are thus only similar1 or generically the same4 ,unless the ideas are numerically the same1 can different persons make signs to one another through them8 #ijg ,omitted in author's last edition4 #ijh ,this seems to imply that intercourse between finite persons is maintained through ideas or phenomena presented to the senses1 under a tacit faith in divinely guaranteed correspondence between the phenomena of which ,i am conscious1 and the phenomena of which my neighbour is conscious2 so that they are practically 8the same40 ,if we are living in a fundamentally divine1 and therefore absolutely trustworthy1 universe1 the phenomena presented to my senses1 which ,i attribute to the agency of another person1 are so attributed rightly4 ,for if not1 the so-called cosmos is adapted to mislead me4 #iji ,this explanation is often overlooked by ,berkeley's critics4 #iaj ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #hb-hd4 #iaa i4e4 if you take the term idea in its wholly subjective and popular meaning4 #iab i4e4 if you take the term idea in its objective meaning4 #iac 8philosophic10 i4e4 pseudo-philosophic1 against which he argues4 #iad ,had this their relative existence--this realisation of the material world through finite percipient and volitional life--any beginning8 ,may not ,god have been eternally presenting phenomena to the senses of percipient beings in cosmical order1 if not on this planet yet elsewhere1 perhaps under other conditions8 ,has there been any beginning in the succession of finite persons8 #iae ,in the first and second editions only4 #iaf ,is 8creation0 by us distinguishable from continuous evolution1 unbeginning and unending1 in divinely constituted order2 and is there a distinction between creation or evolution of things and creation or evolution of persons8 #iag ,cf4 ,siris1 sect4 #cdg-cdi4 #iah 8,matter10 i4e4 ,matter in this pseudo-philosophical meaning of the word4 #iai ,thus ,origen in the early ,church4 ,that 8,matter0 is co-eternal with ,god would mean that ,god is eternally making things real in the percipient experience of persons4 #ibj ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #he-aef1 in which the religious and scientific advantages of the new conception of matter and the material cosmos are illustrated1 when it is rightly understood and applied4 #iba 8substance and accident0--8subjects and adjuncts10--in the first and the second edition4 #ibb ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #bh-db4 ,in ,siris1 sect4 #bid-big1 #cjj-cah1 #cce1 #cei-cfe1 we have glimpses of thought more allied to ,platonism1 if not to ,hegelianism4 #ibc 8,matter10 i4e4 matter unrealised in any mind1 finite or ,divine4 #ibd ,these two propositions are a summary of ,berkeley's conception of the material world4 ,with him1 the immediate objects of sense1 realise in perception1 are independent of the will of the percipient1 and are thus external to his proper personality4 ,berkeley's 8material world0 of enlightened ,common ,sense1 resulting from two factors1 ,divine and human1 is independent of each finite mind2 but not independent of all living ,mind4 #ibe 8voces male intellect40 ,cf4 ,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 8,introduction10 sect4 #f1 #bc-be1 on the abuse of language1 especially by abstraction4 #ibf 8veterum philosophorum40 ,the history of ancient speculations about motion1 from the paradoxes of ,zeno downwards1 is1 in some sort1 a history of ancient metaphysics4 ,it involves ,space1 ,time1 and the material world1 with the ultimate causal relation of ,nature to ,spirit4 #ibg 8hujus vi philosophos40 ,as in ,bacon on motion1 and in the questions raised by ,newton1 ,borelli1 ,leibniz1 and others1 discussed in the following sections4 #ibh ,sect4 #c-db are concerned with the principle of ,causality1 exemplified in the motion1 or change of place and state1 that is continually going on in the material world1 and which was supposed by some to explain all the phenomena of the universe4 #ibi 8vis40 ,the assumption that active power is an immediate datum of sense is the example here offered of the abase of abstract words4 ,he proceeds to dissolve the assumption by shewing that it is meaningless4 #icj 8principio0--the ultimate explanation or originating cause4 ,cf4 sect4 #cf4 ,metaphors1 or indeed empty words1 are accepted for explanations1 it is argued1 when bodily power or force1 in any form1 e4g4 gravitation1 is taken as the real cause of motion4 ,to call these 8occult causes0 is to say nothing that is intelligible4 ,the perceived sensible effects and their customary sequences are all we know4 ,physicists are still deluded by words and metaphors4 #ica ,cf4 sect4 #ec1 where sense1 imagination1 and intelligence are distinguished4 #icb ,cf4 ,principles1 ,introd4 #af1 #bj1 #ba2 also ,alciphron1 ,dial4 ,,vii4 sect4 #h1 #ag4 #icc ,la ,materia altro non che un vaso di ,circe incantato1 il quale serve per ricettacolo della forza et de' momenti dell' impeto4 ,la forzae l'impeti sono astratti tanto sottili1 sono quintessenze tanto spiritose1 che in altre ampolle non si possono racchiudere1 fuor che nell' intima corpulenza de' solidi naturali1 ,vide ,lezioni ,accademiche4--,,author4 ,torricelli 7#afjh-dg71 the eminent ,italian physicist1 and professor of mathematics at ,florence1 who invented the barometer4 #icd ,borelli 7#afjh-gi71 ,italian professor of mathematics at ,pisa1 and then of medicine at ,florence2 see his ,de ,vi ,percussionis1 cap4 ,,xxiv4 prop4 #hh1 and cap4 ,,xxvii4 #ice 8per effectum10 i4e4 by its sensible effects--real power or active force not being a datum of the senses1 but found in the spiritual efficacy1 of which we have an example in our personal agency4 #icf 8vim mortuam40 ,the only power we can find is the living power of ,mind4 ,reason is perpetually active in the universe1 imperceptible through the senses1 and revealed to them only in its sensible effects4 8,power10 e4g4 8gravitation10 in things1 per se1 is distinguished from perceived 8motion0 only through illusion due to misleading abstraction4 ,there is no physical power1 intermediate between spiritual agency1 on the one hand1 and the sensible changes we see1 on the other4 ,cf4 sect4 #aa4 #icg 8meditatione subigenda sunt40 ,cf4 ,theory of ,vision ,vindicated1 sect4 #ce1 #gj4 #ich 8distingui40 ,it is here argued that so-called power within the things of sense is not distinguishable from the sensibly perceived sequences4 ,to the meaningless supposition that it is1 he attributes the frivolous verbal controversies among the learned mentioned in the following section4 ,the province of natural philosophy1 according to ,berkeley1 is to inquire what the rules are under which sensible effects are uniformly manifested4 ,cf4 ,siris1 sect4 #bcf1 #bdg1 #bdi4 #ici ,principia ,math4 ,def4 ,,iii4 #idj ,de ,vi ,percussionis1 cap4 ,i4 #ida 8utiles40 ,such words as 8force10 8power10 8gravity10 8attraction10 are held to be convenient in physical reasonings about the phenomena of motion1 but worthless as philosophical expressions of the cause of motion1 which transcends sense and mechanical science4 ,cf4 ,siris1 sect4 #bcd1 #bce4 #idb ,cf4 sect4 #fg4 #idc 8candem40 ,so in recent discussions on the conservation of force4 #idd ,borellus4--,,author4 ,see ,de ,vi ,percussionis1 cap4 ,,xxiii4 #ide ,leibnitius4--,,author4 #idf ,on ,berkeley's reasoning all terms which involve the assumption that real causality is something presentable to the senses are a cover for meaninglessness4 ,only through self-conscious experience of personal activity does real meaning enter into the portion of language which deals with active causation4 ,this is argued in detail in sect4 #ba-ce4 #idg ,our concrete experience is assumed to be confined to 7a7 bodies1 i4e4 the data of the senses1 and 7b7 mind or spirit--sentient1 intelligent1 active--revealed by internal consciousness4 ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #a1 #b1 in which experience is resolved into ideas and the active intelligence which they presuppose4 ,here the word idea disappears1 but1 in accordance with its signification1 8bodies0 is still regarded as aggregates of external phenomena1 the passive subjects of changes of place and state3 the idealisation of the material world is tacitly implied1 but not obtruded4 #idh 8nihilque10 c4 ,cf4 ,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 e4g4 sect4 #bf1 #fe1 #ff4 where the essential passivity of the ideas presented to the senses1 i4e4 the material world1 is maintained as a cardinal principle--on the positive ground of our percipient experience of sensible things4 ,to speak of the cause of motion as something sensible1 he argues 7sect4 #bd71 is merely to shew that we know nothing about it4 ,cf4 sect4 #bh1 #bi1 infra4 #idi ,the phenomena that can be presented to the senses are taken as the measure of what can be attributed to the material world2 and as the senses present only conditioned change of place in bodies1 we must look for the active cause in the invisible world which internal consciousness presents to us4 #iej 8genus rerum cogitantium40 ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #b4 #iea 8experientia didicimus40 ,can the merely empirical data even of internal consciousness reveal this causal connexion between volition and bodily motions1 without the venture of theistic faith8 #ieb 8a primo et universali ,principio0 i4e4 ,god1 or the ,universal ,spirit1 in whom the universe of bodies and spirits finds explanation2 in a way which ,berkeley does not attempt to unfold articulately and exhaustively in philosophical system4 #iec ,phys4 4 #d4 #bee a #e-g4 #ied ,princip4 ,math4 ,def4 ,,iii4 #iee 8resistentia40 ,our muscular sensation of resistance is apt to be accepted empirically as itself active power in the concrete1 entering very much1 as has been said1 into the often inaccurate idea of power which is formed4 ,see ,editor's ,preface4 #ief 8nec incommode40 ,cf4 sect4 #ag1 and note4 #ieg 8hypothesis mathematica40 ,cf4 sect4 #ag1 #ce1 #cf-da1 #ff1 #fg2 also ,siris1 sect4 #bej-bea4 #ieh 8nihil40 ,this section sums up ,berkeley's objections to crediting matter with real power2 the senses being taken as the test of what is contained in matter4 ,it may be compared with ,david ,hume1 ,thomas ,brown1 and ,j4,s4 ,mill on ,causation4 ,berkeley differs from them in recognising active power in spirit1 while with them he resolves causation among bodies into invariable sequence4 #iei ,can the data presented to us reveal more than sequence1 in the relation between our volitions and the corresponding movements of our bodies8 ,is not the difference found in the moral presupposition1 which supernaturalises man in his voluntary or morally responsible activity8 ,this obliges us to see ourselves as absolutely original causes of all bodily and mental states for which we can be morally approved or blamed4 #ifj 8novumque genus40 ,cf4 sect4 #ba4 ,we have here ,berkeley's antithesis of mind and matter--spirits and external phenomena presented to the senses--persons in contrast to passive ideas4 #ifa ,de ,anima1 ,i4 ii4 #ac1 #bb1 #bd4 #ifb 8,cartesius40 ,the antithesis of extended things and thinking things pervades ,descartes2 but not1 as with ,berkeley1 on the foundation of the new conception of what is truly meant by matter or sensible things4 ,see e4g4 ,principia1 ,p4 ,i4 #fc1 #fd4 #ifc 8alii40 ,does he refer to ,locke1 who suggests the possibility of matter thinking8 #ifd ,see ,aristotle1 ,de ,anima1 ,i4 ii4 #e1 #ac2 ,diogenes ,laertius1 ,lib4 ,,vi4 i4 #f4 #ife ,nat4 ,ausc4 ,,viii4 #ae2 also ,de ,anima1 ,,iii1 x4 #g4 #iff ,hardly any passage in the ,timus exactly corresponds to this4 ,the following is1 perhaps1 the most pertinent3-- 1 7p4 #cd a74 ,aristotle quotes the ,timus in the same connexion1 ,de ,anima1 ,i4 iii4 ii4 #ifg 8philosophi ,cartesiani40 ,secundum ,cartesium causa generalis omnium motuum et quietum est ,deus4--,derodon1 ,physica1 ,i4 ix4 #cj4 #ifh ,principia ,mathematica--,scholium ,generale4 #ifi 8naturam naturantem esse ,deum0--as we might say1 ,god considered as imminent cause in the universe4 ,see ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas1 ,opera1 vol4 ,,xxii4 ,quest4 #f1 p4 #bg4 #igj 8juxta certam et constantem rationem40 ,while all changes in ,nature are determined by ,will1 it is not capricious but rational ,will4 ,the so-called arbitrariness of the ,language of ,nature is relative to us1 and from our point of view4 ,in itself1 the universe of reality expresses ,perfect ,reason4 #iga 8permaneret40 ,cf4 sect4 #ea4 #igb 8spectat potius ad philosophiam primam40 ,the drift of the ,de ,motu is to distinguish the physical sequences of molecular motion1 which the physical sciences articulate1 from the ,power with which metaphysics and theology are concerned1 and which we approach through consciousness4 #igc 8regulas40 ,cf4 ,siris1 sect4 #bca-bce4 #igd ,having1 in the preceding sections1 contrasted perceived motions and their immanent originating ,power--matter and mind--physics and metaphysics--he proceeds in this and the seven following sections to explain more fully what ha means by principium and also the two meanings 7metaphysical and mechanical7 of solutio4 ,by principium1 in philosophy1 he understands universally efficient supersensible ,power4 ,in natural philosophy the term is applied to the orderly sequences manifested to our senses1 not to the active cause of the order4 #ige 8ratiocinio 444 reddit universales40 ,relations of the data of sense to universalising reason are here recognised4 #igf 8natura motus40 ,sect4 #dc-ff treat of the nature of the effect--i4e4 perceptible motion1 as distinguished from its true causal origin 7principium7 in mind or spirit4 ,the origin of motion belongs to metaphysics2 its nature1 as dependent on percipient experience1 belongs to physics4 ,is motion independent of a plurality of bodies2 or does it involve bodies in relation to other bodies1 so that absolute motion is meaningless8 ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #aaa-aaf4 #igg 8idea illa tenuissima et subtilissima40 ,the difficulty as to definition of motion is attributed to abstractions1 and the inclination of the scholastic mind to prefer these to concrete experience4 #igh ,motion is thus defined by ,aristotle3-- 1 4 ,nat4 ,ausc4 ,,iii4 ii2 see also i4 and iii4 ,cf4 ,derodon1 ,physica1 ,i4 ix4 #igi ,newton4 #ihj ,cf4 sect4 #c-db4 #iha ,descartes1 ,principia1 ,p4 ,,ii4 #be2 also ,borellus1 ,de ,vi ,percussionis1 p4 #a4 #ihb 8res faciles difficillimas40 ,cf4 ,principles1 8,introduction10 sect4 #a4 #ihc 4 ,nat4 ,ausc4 ,,iii4 ii4 #ihd e4g4 ,zeno1 in his noted argument against the possibility of motion1 referred to as a signal example of fallacy4 #ihe 8de infinite1 c40 ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #acj-acb1 and the ,analyst passim1 for ,berkeley's treatment of infinitesimals4 #ihf 8confundere40 ,cf4 sect4 #c-db for illustrations of this confusion4 #ihg ,the modern conception of the 8conservation of force40 #ihh ,aristotle states the question in ,nat4 ,ausc4 ,,viii4 cap4 i1 and solves it in cap4 iv4 #ihi 8mutatio loci0 is the effect1 i4e4 motion perceived by sense2 8vitale principium0 the real cause1 i4e4 vital rational agency4 #iij 8moventis et moti10 i4e4 as concauses4 #iia 8motum localem40 ,sect4 #eb-fe discuss the reality of absolute or empty space1 in contrast with concrete space realised in perception of the local relations of bodies4 ,the meaninglessness of absolute space and motion is argued4 ,cf4 ,principles1 sect4 #aaf1 #aag4 ,see ,locke's ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 #ac1 #ae1 #ag2 also ,papers which passed between ,mr4 ,leibnitz and ,dr4 ,clarke in #agae-af1 pp4 #ee-ei2 #gc-ha2 #ig-ajc1 c4 ,leibniz calls absolute space 8an ideal of some modern ,englishman40 #iib ,newton's ,principia1 ,def4 ,sch4 ,,iii4 ,see also ,derodon1 ,physica1 ,p4 ,i4 cap4 vi4 #a4 #iic ,cf4 ,locke on a vacuum1 and the 8possibility of space existing without matter10 ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 #ac4 #iid ,note the account here given of imagination and intellect1 as distinguished from sense1 which may be compared with 1 1 and in ,aristotelian psychology4 #iie 8attributorum divinorum particeps40 ,see ,samuel ,clarke1 in his ,demonstration1 and in the ,papers between ,clarke and ,leibnitz4 #iif 8nostrum10 sc4 corpus4 ,when we imagine space emptied of bodies1 we are apt to forget that our own bodies are part of the material world4 #iig ,vide qu contra spatium absolutum disseruntur in libro ,de ,principiis ,cognitionis ,human1 idiomate anglicano decem abhine annis edito4--,,author4 ,he refers to sect4 #aaf of the ,principles4 #iih ,he treats absolute space as nothing1 and relative space as dependent on ,perception and ,will4 #iii ,phys4 4 #e4 #ahh;a4 #bb1 #bc4 #ajjj ,see ,locke1 ,essay1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 #ac1 #g-aj4 #ajja ,sect4 #fg-gb treat of the supposed ejection of motion from the striking body into the body struck4 ,is this only metaphorical8 ,is the motion received by the latter to be supposed identical with1 or equivalent to1 that given forth by the former8 #ajjb ,principia1 ,def4 ,,iv4 #ajjc ,lezioni ,accademiche4 #ajjd ,de ,vi ,percussionis1 cap4 ,,ix4 #ajje ,newton's third law of motion4 #ajjf ,berkeley sees in motion only a link in the chain which connects the sensible and intelligible worlds--a conception unfolded in his ,siris1 more than twenty years later4 #ajjg 8provincia sua40 ,the ,de ,motu1 so far as it treats of motion perceptible to the senses1 is assigned to physics2 in contrast to theology or metaphysics1 alone concerned with active causation4