99 99 99 99 99 ---------------------------------------- ------------------- ,transcriber's ,note3 ,inconsistent hyphenation and spelling in the original document have been preserved4 ,superscripts are represented like so3 #a;a and ,greek words like so ,obvious typographical errors have been corrected4 ,for a complete list1 please see the end of this document4 ---------------------------------------- ------------------- 99 99 99 99 99 ,,historical ,,materialism ,,historical ,,materialism ,,and ,,the ,,economics ,,of ,,karl ,,marx ,,by ,,benedetto ,,croce ,,translated ,,by ,c4,m4 ,,meredith ,,with ,,an ,,introduction ,,by ,a4,d4 ,,lindsay ,fellow and ,lecturer of ,balliol ,college1 ,oxford ,illustration ,,london3 ,,george ,,allen ,,unwin ,,ltd4 ,,ruskin ,,house1 ,,museum ,,street1 ,w4,c4 ,,new ,,york ,,the ,,macmillan ,,co4 ,first published by ,howard ,latimer ,ltd4 #aiad ,transferred to ,george ,allen ,unwin ,ltd4 #aiae ,,all ,,rights ,,reserved ,,contents ,,introduction ix ,,chapter ,i ,,concerning ,,the ,,scientific ,,form ,,of ,,historical ,,materialism #a4 ,scope of essay3 ,labriola's book implies that historical materialism is not a philosophy of history3 ,distinction between a philosophy of history and philosophising about history3 ,reason why two have been confused3 ,materialistic theory of ,history as stated by ,labriola not an attempt to establish a law of history3 ,this contrasted with theories of monists1 and teleologists3 ,engels' statement that it is a new method erroneous3 ,new content not new method #b #b4 ,historical materialism a mass of new data of which historian becomes conscious3 ,does not state that history is nothing more than economic history1 nor does it provide a theory of history3 ,is simply investigation of influence economic needs have exercised in history3 ,this view does not detract from its importance #ab #c4 ,questions as to relations between historical materialism and socialism2 ,only possible connection lies in special historical application3 ,bearing of historical materialism upon intellectual and moral truth3 ,throws light on influence of material conditions on their development1 but does not demonstrate their relativity3 ,absolute morality a necessary postulate of socialism #ba ,,chapter ,,ii ,,concerning ,,historical ,,materialism ,,viewed ,,as ,a ,,science ,,of ,,social ,,economics #a4 ,relation between ,professor ,stammler's book on historical materialism and ,marxism3 ,distinction between pure economics and general historical economics3 ,socialism not dependent on abstract sociological theory3 ,stammler's classification of the social sciences3 ,his definition of society3 ,of social economics3 ,of social teleology3 ,nature of ,stammler's social science does not provide abstract sociology3 ,social economics must be either pure economics applied to society or a form of history #be ,,chapter ,,iii ,,concerning ,,the ,,interpretation ,,and ,,criticism ,,of ,,some ,,concepts ,,of ,,marxism ,i4 ,,of ,,the ,,scientific ,,problem ,,in ,,marx',s ',,das ,,kapital' ,das ,kapital an abstract investigation3 ,his society is not this or that society3 ,treats only of capitalist society3 ,assumption of equivalence between value and labour3 ,varying views about meaning of this law3 ,is a postulate or standard of comparison3 ,question as to value of this standard3 ,is not a moral ideal3 ,treats of economic society in so far as is a working society3 ,shows special way in which problem is solved in capitalist society3 ,marx's deductions from it #dh ,,ii4 ,,marx',s ,,problem ,,and ,,pure ,,economics 7,,general ,,economic ,,science7 ,marxian economics not general economic science and labour-value not a general concept of value3 ,engels' rejection of general economic law3 abstract concepts used by ,marx are concepts of pure economics3 relation of economic psychology to pure economics3 pure economics does not destroy history or progress #ff ,,iii4 ,,concerning ,,the ,,limitation ,,of ,,the ,,materialistic ,,theory ,,of ,,history ,historical materialism a canon of historical interpretation3 ,canon does not imply anticipation of results3 ,question as to how ,marx and ,engels understood it3 ,difficulty of ascertaining correctly and method of doing so3 ,how ,marxians understand it3 ,their metaphysical tendency3 ,instances of confusion of concepts in their writings3 ,historical materialism has not a special philosophy immanent within it #gg ,,iv4 ,,of ,,scientific ,,knowledge ,,in ,,face ,,of ,,social ,,problems ,socialism and free trade not scientific deductions3 ,obsolete metaphysics of old theory of free trade3 ,basis of modern free trade theories not strictly scientific though only possible one3 ,the desirable is not science nor the practicable3 ,scientific law only applicable under certain conditions3 ,element of daring in all action #ic ,v4 ,,of ,,ethical ,,judgment ,,in ,,face ,,of ,,social ,,problems ,meaning of ,marx's phrase the 'impotence of morality' and his remark that morality condemns what has been condemned by history3 ,profundity of ,marx's philosophy immaterial3 ,kant's position not surpassed #ajf ,,vi4 ,,conclusion ,recapitulation3 #a4 ,justification of ,marxian economics as comparative sociological economics3 #b4 ,historical materialism simply a canon of historical interpretation3 #c4 ,marxian social programme not a pure science3 #d4 ,marxism neither intrinsically moral nor anti-moral #aae ,,chapter ,,iv ,,recent ,,interpretations ,,of ,,the ,,marxian ,,theory ,,of ,,value ,,and ,,controversies ,,concerning ,,them ,i ,labriola's criticism of method and conclusions of preceeding essays answered3 ,his criticism merely destructive3 ,tendency of other thinkers to arrive at like conclusions #abj ,,ii ,meaning of phrase crisis in ,marxianism3 ,sorel's view of equivalence of value and labour mostly in agreement with view put forward above3 ,an attempt to examine profits independently of theory of value3 ,is not possible3 ,surplus product same as surplus value #aca ,,chapter ,v ,a ,,criticism ,,of ,,the ,,marxian ,,law ,,of ,,the ,,fall ,,in ,,the ,,rate ,,of ,,profits ,interpretation here given assumes acceptance of ,marx's main principles3 ,necessary decline in rate of profit on hypothesis of technical improvement3 ,two successive stages confused by ,marx3 ,more accurately a decline in amount of profit3 ,marx assumes that would be an increase of capital3 ,would be same capital and increase in rate of profits3 ,decline in rate of profits due to other reasons #adb ,,chapter ,,vi ,,on ,,the ,,economic ,,principle ,,two ,,letters ,,to ,,professor ,v4 ,,pareto ,i ,need for more comprehensive definition of the economic principle3 ,reasons why the mechanical conception erroneous1 economic fact capable of appraisement3 ,cannot be scale of values for particular action3 ,economic datum a fact of human activity3 ,distinction and connection between pleasure and choice3 ,economic datum a fact of will3 ,knowledge a necessary presupposition of will3 ,distinction between technical and economic3 ,analogy of logic and sthetic3 ,complete definition of economic datum #aei ,,ii ,disagreement 7#a7 about method 7#b7 postulates3 7#a7 ,nothing arbitrary in economic method1 analogy of classificatory sciences erroneous3 7#b7 ,metaphysical postulate that facts of human activity same as physical facts erroneous3 ,definition of practical activity in so far as admits of definition3 ,moral and economic activity and approval3 ,economic and moral remorse3 ,economic scale of values #agd ,,index ,,of ,,names #ahg ,,introduction ,the ,essays in this volume1 as will be apparent1 have all of them had an occasional origin4 ,they bear evident traces of particular controversy and contain much criticism of authors who are hardly1 if at all1 known in this country4 ,their author thought it worth while to collect them in one volume and it has been1 ,i am sure1 worth while to have them translated into ,english1 because though written on different occasions and in different controversies they have all the same purpose4 ,they are an attempt to make clear by philosophical criticism the real purpose and value of ,marx's work4 ,it is often said that it is the business of philosophy to examine and criticise the assumptions of the sciences and philosophy claims that in this work it is not an unnecessary meddler stepping in where it is not wanted4 ,for time and again for want of philosophical criticism the sciences have overstepped their bounds and produced confusion and contradiction4 ,the distinction between the proper spheres of science and history and moral judgment is not the work of either science or history or moral judgment but can only be accomplished by philosophical reflection1 and the philosopher will justify his work1 if he can show the various contending parties that his distinctions will disentangle the puzzles into which they have fallen and help them to understand one another4 ,the present state of the controversy about the value of the writings of ,karl ,marx obviously calls for some such work of disentangling4 ,no honest student can deny that his work has been of great historic importance and it is hard to believe that a book like ,das ,kapital which has been the inspiration of a great movement can be nothing but a tissue of false reasoning as some of its critics have affirmed4 ,the doctrine of the economic interpretation of history has revivified and influenced almost all modern historical research4 ,in a great part of his analysis of the nature and natural development of a capitalist society ,marx has shown himself a prophet of extraordinary insight4 ,the more debatable doctrine of the class war has at least shown the sterility of the earlier political theory which thought only in terms of the individual and his state4 ,the wonderful vitality of the ,marxian theory of labour value in spite of all the apparent refutations it has suffered at the hands of orthodox political economists is an insoluble puzzle if it had no more in it than the obvious fallacy which these refutations expose4 ,only a great book could become 'the ,bible of the working classes4' ,but the process of becoming a ,bible is a fatal process4 ,no one can read much current ,marxian literature or discuss politics or economics with those who style themselves orthodox ,marxians without coming to the conclusion that the spirit of ecclesiastical dogmatism daily growing weaker in its own home has been transplanted into the religion of revolutionary socialism4 ,many of those whose eyes have been opened to the truth as expounded by ,marx seem to have been thereby granted that faith which is the faculty of believing what we should otherwise know to be untrue1 and with them the economic interpretation of history is transformed into a metaphysical dogma of deterministic materialism4 ,the philosopher naturally finds a stumbling-block in a doctrine which is proclaimed but not argued4 ,the historian however grateful he may be for the light which economic interpretation has given him1 is up in arms against a theory which denies the individuality and uniqueness of history and reduces it to an automatic repetition of abstract formul4 ,the politician when he is told of the universal nature of the class war points triumphantly to the fact that it is a war which those who should be the chief combatants are slow to recognise or we should not find the working classes more ready to vote for a ,liberal or a ,conservative than for a ,socialist4 ,the ,socialist must on consideration become impatient with a doctrine that by its fatalistic determinism makes all effort unnecessary4 ,if ,socialism must come inevitably by the automatic working out of economic law1 why all this striving to bring it about8 ,the answer that political efforts can make no difference1 but may bring about the revolution sooner1 is too transparently inadequate a solution of the difficulty to deceive anyone for long4 ,lastly the economist can hardly tolerate a theory of value that seems to ignore entirely the law of supply and demand1 and concludes with some justice that either the theory of labour value is nonsense or that ,marx was talking about something quite apart in its nature from the value which economics discusses4 ,all these objections are continually being made to ,marxianism1 and are met by no adequate answer4 ,and just as the sceptical lecturer of the street corner argues that a religion which can make men believe in the story of ,balaam's ass must be as nonsensical as that story1 so with as little justice the academic critic or the anti-socialist politician concludes that ,socialism or at least ,marxianism is a tissue of nonsensical statements if these ridiculous dogmas are its fruit4 ,a disentangler of true and false in so-called ,marxianism is obviously needed1 and ,senatore ,croce is eminently fitted for the work4 ,much of the difficulty of ,marx comes from his relation to ,hegel4 ,he was greatly influenced by and yet had reacted from ,hegel's philosophy without making clear to others or possibly to himself what his final position in regard to ,hegel really was4 ,senatore ,croce is a ,hegelian1 but a critical one4 ,his chief criticism of ,hegel is that his philosophy tends to obscure the individuality and uniqueness of history1 and ,croce seeks to avoid that obscurity by distinguishing clearly the methods of history1 of science and of philosophy4 ,he holds that all science deals with abstractions1 with what he has elsewhere called pseudo-concepts4 ,these abstractions have no real existence1 and it is fatal to confuse the system of abstraction which science builds up with the concrete living reality4 ',all scientific laws are abstract laws1' as he says in one of these essays1 7,,iii p4 #eg71 'and there is no bridge over which to pass from the concrete to the abstract2 just because the abstract is not a reality but a form of thought1 one of our1 so to speak1 abbreviated ways of thinking4 ,and although a knowledge of the laws may light up our perception of reality1 it cannot become that perception itself4' ,the application to the doctrine of historic materialism is obvious4 ,it calls attention to one of the factors of the historical process1 the economic4 ,this factor it quite rightly treats in abstraction and isolation4 ,a knowledge of the laws of economic forces so obtained may 'light up our perception' of the real historical process1 but only darkness and confusion can result from mistaking the abstraction for reality and from the production of those a priori histories of the stages of civilisation or the development of the family which have discredited ,marxianism in the eyes of historians4 ,in the first essay and the third part of the third ,croce explains this distinction between economic science and history and their proper relation to one another4 ,the second essay reinforces the distinction by criticism of another attempt to construct a science which shall take the place of history4 ,a science in the strict sense history is not and never can be4 ,once this is clearly understood it is possible to appreciate the services rendered to history by ,marx4 ,for ,croce holds that economics is a real science4 ,the economic factors in history can be isolated and treated by themselves4 ,without such isolated treatment they cannot be understood1 and if they are not understood1 our view of history is bound to be unnecessarily narrow and onesided4 ,on the relative importance of the economic and the political and the religious factors in history he has nothing to say4 ,there is no a priori answer to the question whether any school of writers has unduly diminished or exaggerated the importance of any one of these factors4 ,their importance has varied at different times1 and can at any time only be estimated empirically4 ,it remains a service of great value to have distinguished a factor of such importance which had been previously neglected4 ,if then the economic factor in history should be isolated and treated separately1 how is it to be distinguished8 ,for it is essential to ,croce's view of science that each science has its own concepts which can be distinguished clearly from those of other sciences4 ,this question is discussed in ,essay ,,iii ,q4 #e and more specifically in ,essay ,,vi4 ,croce is specially anxious to distinguish between the spheres of economics and ethics4 ,much confusion has been caused in political economy in the past by the assumption that economics takes for granted that men behave egoistically1 i4e4 in an immoral way4 ,as a result of this assumption men have had to choose between the condemnation of economics or of mankind4 ,the believer in humanity has been full of denunciation of that monstrosity the economic man1 while the thorough-going believer in economics has assumed that the success of the economic interpretation of history proves that men are always selfish4 ,the only alternative view seemed to be the rather cynical compromise that though men were sometimes unselfish1 their actions were so prevailingly selfish that for political purposes the unselfish actions might be ignored4 ,croce insists1 and surely with justice1 that economic actions are not moral or immoral1 but in so far as they are economic1 nonmoral4 ,the moral worth of actions cannot be determined by their success or failure in giving men satisfaction4 ,for there are some things in which men find satisfaction which they yet judge to be bad4 ,we must distinguish therefore the moral question whether such and such an action is good or bad from the economic whether it is or is not useful1 whether it is a way by which men get what they1 rightly or wrongly want4 ,in economics then we are merely discussing the efficiency or utility of actions4 ,we can ask of any action whether it ought or ought not to be done at all4 ,that is a moral question4 ,we may also ask whether it is done competently or efficiently3 that is an economic question4 ,it might be contended that it is immoral to keep a public house1 but it would also have to be allowed that the discussion of the most efficient way by keeping a public house was outside the scope of the moral enquiry4 ,mrs ,weir of ,hermiston was confusing economics with ethics when she answered ,lord ,braxfield's complaints of his ill-cooked dinner by saying that the cook was a very pious woman4 ,economic action according to ,croce is the condition of moral action4 ,if action has no economic value1 it is merely aimless1 but it may have economic value without being moral1 and the consideration of economic value must therefore be independent of ethics4 ,marx1 ,croce holds was an economist and not a moralist1 and the moral judgments of socialists are not and cannot be derived from any scientific examination of economic processes4 ,so much for criticisms of ,marx or rather of exaggerated developments of ,marxianism1 which though just and important1 are comparatively obvious4 ,the most interesting part of ,signor ,croce's criticism is his interpretation of the shibboleth of orthodox ,marxians and the stumbling-block of economists1 the ,marxian theory of labour value with its corollary of surplus value4 ,marx's exposition of the doctrine in ,das ,kapital is the extreme of abstract reasoning4 ,yet it is found in a book full of concrete descriptions of the evils of the factory system and of moral denunciation and satire4 ,if ,marx's theory be taken as an account of what determines the actual value of concrete things it is obviously untrue4 ,the very use of the term surplus value is sufficient to show that it might be and sometimes is taken to be the value which commodities ought to have1 but none can read ,marx's arguments and think that he was concerned with a value which should but did not exist4 ,he is clearly engaged on a scientific not a ,utopian question4 ,croce attempts to find a solution by pointing out that the society which ,marx is describing is not this or that actual society1 but an ideal1 in the sense of a hypothetical society1 capitalist society as such4 ,marx has much to say of the development of capitalism in ,england1 but he is not primarily concerned to give an industrial history of ,england or of any other existing society4 ,he is a scientist and deals with abstractions or types and considers ,england only in so far as in it the characteristics of the abstract capitalist society are manifested4 ,the capitalism which he is analysing does not exist because no society is completely capitalist4 ,further it is to be noticed that in his analysis of value ,marx is dealing with objects only in so far as they are commodities produced by labour4 ,this is evident enough in his argument4 ,the basis of his contention that all value is 'congealed labour time' is that all things which have economic value have in common only the fact that labour has been expended on them1 and yet afterwards he admits that there are things in which no labour has been expended which yet have economic value4 ,he seems to regard this as an incidental unimportant fact4 ,yet obviously it is a contradiction which vitiates his whole argument4 ,if all things which have economic value have not had labour expended on them1 we must look elsewhere for their common characteristic4 ,we should probably say that they all have in common the fact that they are desired and that there is not an unlimited supply of them4 ,the pure economist finds the key to this analysis of value in the consideration of the laws of supply and demand1 which alone affect all things that have economic value1 and finds little difficulty in refuting ,marx's theory1 on the basis which his investigation assumes4 ,a consideration of ,marx's own argument forces us therefore to the conclusion that either ,marx was an incapable bungler or that he thought the fact that some things have economic value and are yet not the product of labour irrelevant to his argument because he was talking of economic value in two senses1 firstly in the sense of price1 and secondly in a peculiar sense of his own4 ,this indeed is borne out by his distinction of value and price4 ,croce developing this hint1 suggests that the importance of ,marx's theory lies in a comparison between a capitalist society and another abstract economic society in which there are no commodities on which labour is not expended1 and no monopoly4 ,we thus have two abstract societies1 the capitalist society which though abstract is very largely actualised in modern civilisation1 and another quite imaginary economic society of unfettered competition1 which is continually assumed by the classical economist1 but which1 as ,marx said1 could only exist where there was no private property in capital1 i4e4 in the collectivist state4 ,now in a society of that kind in which there was no monopoly and capital was at everyone's disposal equally1 the value of commodities would represent the value of the labour put into them1 and that value might be represented in units of socially necessary labour time4 ,it would still have to be admitted that an hour of one man's labour might be of much greater value to the community than two hours of another man1 but that ,marx has already allowed for4 ,the unit of socially necessary labour time is an abstraction1 and the hour of one man might contain two or any number of such abstract units of labour time4 ,what ,marx has done is to take the individualist economist at his word3 he has accepted the notion of an economic society as a number of competing individuals4 ,only he has insisted that they shall start fair and therefore that they shall have nothing to buy or sell but their labour4 ,the discrepancy between the values which would exist in such a society and actual prices represent the disturbance created by the fact that actual society is not a society of equal competitors1 but one in which certain competitors start with some kind of advantage or monopoly4 ,if this is really the kernel of ,marx's doctrine1 it bears a close relation to a simpler and more familiar contention1 that in a society where free economic competition holds sway1 each man gets what he deserves1 for his income represents the sum that society is prepared to pay for his services1 the social value of his work4 ,in this form the hours worked are supposed to be uniform1 and the differences in value are taken to represent different amounts of social service4 ,in ,marx's argument the social necessity is taken as uniform1 and the difference in value taken to represent differences in hours of work4 ,while the main abstract contention remains the same1 most of those who argue that in a system of unfettered economic competition most men get what they deserve1 rather readily ignore the existence of monopoly1 and assume that this argument justifies the existing distribution of wealth4 ,the chief purpose of ,marx's argument is to emphasise the difference between such an economic system and a capitalist society4 ,he is here1 as so often1 turning the logic of the classical economists against themselves1 and arguing that the conditions under which a purely economic distribution of wealth could take place1 could only exist in a community where monopoly had been completely abolished and all capital collectivised4 ,croce maintains that ,marx's theory of value is economic and not moral4 ,yet it is hard to read ,marx and certainly ,marxians without finding in them the implication that the values produced in such an economic society would be just4 ,if that implication be examined1 we come on an important difficulty still remaining in this theory4 ,the contention that in a system of unfettered economic competition1 men get the reward they deserve1 assumes that it is just that if one man has a greater power of serving society than another he should be more highly rewarded for his work4 ,this the individualist argument with which we compared ,marx's assumes without question4 ,but the ,marxian theory of value is frequently interpreted to imply that amount of work is the only claim to reward4 ,for differences in value it is held are created by differences in the amount of labour4 ,but the word amount may here be used in two senses4 ,when men say that the amount of work a man does should determine a man's reward2 they commonly mean that if one man works two hours and another one1 the first ought to get twice the reward of the second4 ',amount' here means the actual time spent in labour4 ,but in ,marx's theory of value amount means something quite different1 for an hour of one man's work may1 he admits1 be equal to two of another man's4 ,he means by amount a sum of abstract labour time units4 ,marx's scientific theory of value is quite consistent with different abilities getting different rewards1 the moral contention that men should get more reward if they work more and for no other reason is not4 ,the equation of work done by men of different abilities by expressing them in abstract labour time units is essential to ,marx's theory but fatal to the moral claim sometimes founded upon it4 ,further the great difficulty in allowing that it is just that men of different abilities should have different rewards1 comes from the fact that differences of ability are of the nature of monopolies4 ,in a pure economic society high rewards would be given to rare ability and although it is possible to equate work of rare ability with work of ordinary ability by expressing both as amounts of abstract labour time units1 it surely remains true that the value is determined not by the amount of abstract labour time congealed in it but by the law of supply and demand4 ,where there are differences of ability there is some kind of monopoly1 and where there is monopoly1 you cannot eliminate the influence of the relation of supply and demand in the determination of value4 ,what you imagine you have eliminated by the elimination of capital1 which you can collectivise1 remains obstinately in individual differences of ability which cannot be collectivised4 ,but here ,i have entered beyond the limits of ,croce's argument4 ,his critical appraisement of ,marx's work must be left to others to judge who have more knowledge of ,marx and of economics than ,i can lay claim to4 ,i am confident only that all students of ,marx whether they be disciples or critics1 will find in these essays illumination in a field where much bitter controversy has resulted in little but confusion and obscurity4 ,a4,d4 ,,lindsay4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,concerning ,,the ,,scientific ,,form ,,of ,,historical ,,materialism ,historical materialism is what is called a fashionable subject4 ,the theory came into being fifty years ago1 and for a time remained obscure and limited2 but during the last six or seven years it has rapidly attained great fame and an extensive literature1 which is daily increasing1 has grown up around it4 ,it is not my intention to write once again the account1 already given many times1 of the origin of this doctrine2 nor to restate and criticise the now well-known passages in which ,marx and ,engels asserted the theory1 nor the different views of its opponents1 its supporters1 its exponents1 and its correctors and corruptors4 ,my object is merely to submit to my colleagues some few remarks concerning the doctrine1 taking it in the form in which it appears in a recent book by ,professor ,antonio ,labriola1 of the ,university of ,rome#a4 ,for many reasons1 it does not come within my province to praise ,labriola's book4 ,but ,i cannot help saying as a needful explanation1 that it appears to me to be the fullest and most adequate treatment of the question4 ,the book is free from pedantry and learned tattle1 whilst it shows in every line signs of the author's complete knowledge of all that has been written on the subject3 a book1 in short1 which saves the annoyance of controversy with erroneous and exaggerated opinions1 which in it appear as superseded4 ,it has a grand opportunity in ,italy1 where the materialistic theory of history is known almost solely in the spurious form bestowed on it by an ingenious professor of economics1 who even pretends to be its inventor#b4 ,i #a4 ,scope of essay3 ,labriola's book implies that historical materialism is not a philosophy of history3 ,distinction between a philosophy of history and philosophising about history3 ,reason why two have been confused3 ,materialistic theory of history as stated by ,labriola not an attempt to establish a law of history3 ,this contrasted with theories of monists1 and teleologists3 ,engels' statement that it is a new method erroneous3 ,new content not new method4 ,any reader of ,labriola's book who tries to obtain from it a precise concept of the new theory of history1 will reach in the first instance a conclusion which must appear to him evident and incontestable1 and which ,i sum up in the following statement3 'historical materialism1 so-called1 is not a philosophy of history4' ,labriola does not state this denial explicitly2 it may even be granted that1 in words1 he sometimes says exactly the opposite4#c ,but1 if ,i am not mistaken1 the denial is contained implicitly in the restrictions which he places on the meaning of the theory4 ,the philosophical reaction of realism overthrew the systems built up by teleology and metaphysical dogmatism1 which had limited the field of the historian4 ,the old philosophy of history was destroyed4 ,and1 as if in contempt and depreciation1 the phrase1 'to construct a philosophy of history1' came to be used with the meaning3 'to construct a fanciful and artificial and perhaps prejudiced history4' ,it is true that of late books have begun to re-appear actually having as their title the 'philosophy of history4' ,this might seem to be a revival1 but it is not4 ,in fact their subject is a very different one4 ,these recent productions do not aim at supplying a new philosophy of history1 they simply offer some philosophising about history4 ,the distinction deserves to be explained4 ,the possibility of a philosophy of history presupposes the possibility of reducing the sequence of history to general concepts4 ,now1 whilst it is possible to reduce to general concepts the particular factors of reality which appear in history and hence to construct a philosophy of morality or of law1 of science or of art1 and a general philosophy1 it is not possible to work up into general concepts the single complex whole formed by these factors1 i4e4 the concrete fact1 in which the historical sequence consists4 ,to divide it into its factors is to destroy it1 to annihilate it4 ,in its complex totality1 historical change is incapable of reduction except to one concept1 that of development3 a concept empty of everything that forms the peculiar content of history4 ,the old philosophy of history regarded a conceptual working out of history as possible2 either because by introducing the idea of ,god or of ,providence1 it read into the facts the aims of a divine intelligence2 or because it treated the formal concept of development as including within itself1 logically1 the contingent determinations4 ,the case of positivism is strange in that1 being neither so boldly imaginative as to yield to the conceptions of teleology and rational philosophy1 nor so strictly realistic and intellectually disciplined as to attack the error at its roots1 it has halted halfway1 i4e4 at the actual concept of development and of evolution1 and has announced the philosophy of evolution as the true philosophy of history3 development itself--as the law which explains development6 ,were this tautology only in question little harm would result2 but the misfortune is that1 by a too easy confusion1 the concept of evolution often emerges1 in the hands of the positivists1 from the formal emptiness which belongs to it in truth1 and acquires a meaning or rather a pretended meaning1 very like the meanings of teleology and metaphysics4 ,the almost religious unction and reverence with which one hears the sacred mystery of evolution spoken of gives sufficient proof of this4 ,from such realistic standpoints1 now as always1 any and every philosophy of history has been criticised4 ,but the very reservations and criticisms of the old mistaken constructions demand a discussion of concepts1 that is a process of philosophising3 although it may be a philosophising which leads properly to the denial of a philosophy of history4 ,disputes about method1 arising out of the needs of the historian1 are added4 ,the works published in recent years embody different investigations of this kind1 and in a plainly realistic sense1 under the title of philosophy of history4 ,amongst these ,i will mention as an example a ,german pamphlet by ,simmel1 and1 amongst ourselves a compendious introduction by ,labriola himself4 ,there are1 undoubtedly1 still philosophies of history which continue to be produced in the old way3 voices clamantium in deserto1 to whom may be granted the consolation of believing themselves the only apostles of an unrecognised truth4 ,now the materialistic theory of history1 in the form in which ,labriola states it1 involves an entire abandonment of all attempt to establish a law of history1 to discover a general concept under which all the complex facts of history can be included4 ,i say 'in the form in which he states it1' because ,labriola is aware that several sections of the materialistic school of history tend to approximate to these obsolete ideas4 ,one of these sections1 which might be called that of the monists1 or abstract materialists1 is characterised by the introduction of metaphysical materialism into the conception of history4 ,as the reader knows1 ,marx1 when discussing the relation between his opinions and ,hegelianism employed a pointed phrase which has been taken too often beside the point4 ,he said that with ,hegel history was standing on its head and that it must be turned right side up again in order to replace it on its feet4 ,for ,hegel the idea is the real world1 whereas for him 7,marx7 'the ideal is nothing else than the material world' reflected and translated by the human mind4 ,hence the statement so often repeated1 that the materialistic view of history is the negation or antithesis of the idealistic view4 ,it would perhaps be convenient to study once again1 accurately and critically1 these asserted relations between scientific socialism and ,hegelianism4 ,to state the opinion which ,i have formed on the matter2 the link between the two views seems to me to be1 in the main1 simply psychological4 ,hegelianism was the early inspiration of the youthful ,marx1 and it is natural that everyone should link up the new ideas with the old as a development1 an amendment1 an antithesis4 ,in fact1 ,hegel's ,ideas--and ,marx knew this perfectly well--are not human ideas1 and to turn the ,hegelian philosophy of history upside down cannot give us the statement that ideas arise as reflections of material conditions4 ,the inverted form would logically be this3 history is not a process of the ,idea1 i4e4 of a rational reality1 but a system of forces3 to the rational view is opposed the dynamic view4 ,as to the ,hegelian dialectic of concepts it seems to me to bear a purely external and approximate resemblance to the historical notion of economic eras and of the antithetical conditions of society4 ,whatever may be the value of this suggestion1 which ,i express with hesitation1 recognising the difficulty of the problems connected with the interpretation and origin of history2--this much is evident1 that metaphysical materialism1 at which ,marx and ,engels1 starting from the extreme ,hegelian left1 easily arrived1 supplied the name and some of the components of their view of history4 ,but both the name and these components are really extraneous to the true character of their conception4 ,this can be neither materialistic nor spiritualistic1 nor dualistic nor monadistic3 within its limited field the elements of things are not presented in such a way as to admit of a philosophical discussion whether they are reducible one to another1 and are united in one ultimate source4 ,what we have before us are concrete objects1 the earth1 natural production1 animals2 we have before us man1 in whom the so-called psychical processes appear as differentiated from the so-called physiological processes4 ,to talk in this case of monism and materialism is to talk nonsense4 ,some socialist writers have expressed surprise because ,lange1 in his classic ,history of ,materialism1 does not discuss historical materialism4 ,it is needless to remark that ,lange was familiar with ,marxian socialism4 ,he was1 however1 too cautious to confuse the metaphysical materialism with which he was concerned1 with historical materialism which has no essential connection with it1 and is merely a way of speaking4 ,but the metaphysical materialism of the authors of the new historical doctrine1 and the name given to the latter1 have been not a little misleading4 ,i will refer as an example to a recent and bad little book1 which seems to me symptomatic1 by a sufficiently accredited socialist writer1 ,plechanow4#d ,the author1 designing to study historical materialism1 thinks it needful to go back to ,holbach and ,helvetius4 ,and he waxes indignant at metaphysical dualism and pluralism1 declaring that 'the most important philosophical systems were always monistic1 that is they interpreted matter and spirit as merely two classes of phenomena having a single and indivisible cause4' ,and in reference to those who maintain the distinction between the factors in history1 he exclaims3 ',we see here the old story1 always recurring1 of the struggle between eclecticism and monism1 the story of the dividing walls2 here nature1 there spirit1 etc4' ,many will be amazed at this unexpected leap from the materialistic study of history into the arms of monism1 in which they were unaware that they ought to have such confidence4 ,labriola is most careful to avoid this confusion3 ',society is a datum1' he says1 'history is nothing more than the history of society4' ,and he controverts with equal energy and success the naturalists1 who wish to reduce the history of man to the history of nature1 and the verbalists1 who claim to deduce from the name materialism the real nature of the new view of history4 ,but it must appear1 even to him1 that the name might have been more happily chosen1 and that the confusion lies1 so to speak1 inherent in it4 ,it is true that old words can be bent to new meanings1 but within limits and after due consideration4 ,in regard to the tendency to reconstruct a materialistic philosophy of history1 substituting an omnipresent ,matter for an omnipresent ,idea1 it suffices to re-assert the impossibility of any such construction1 which must become merely superfluous and tautologous unless it abandoned itself to dogmatism4 ,but there is another error1 which is remarked among the followers of the materialistic school of history1 and which is connected with the former1 viz41 to anticipate harm not only in the interpretation of history but also in the guidance of practical activities4 ,i refer to the teleological tendencies 7abstract teleology71 which also ,labriola opposes with a cutting attack4 ,the very idea of progress1 which has seemed to many the only law of history worth saving out of the many devised by philosophical and non-philosophical thinkers1 is by him deprived of the dignity of a law1 and reduced to a sufficiently narrow significance4 ,the idea of it1 says ,labriola1 is 'not only empirical1 but always incidental and hence limited'3 progress 'does not influence the sequence of human affairs like destiny or fate1 nor like the command of a law4' ,history teaches us that man is capable of progress2 and we can look at all the different series of events from this point of view3 that is all4 ,no less incidental and empirical is the idea of historical necessity1 which must be freed from all remnants of rationalism and of transcendentalism1 so that we see in it the mere recognition of the very small share left in the sequence of events1 to individuals and personal free will4 ,it must be admitted that a little of the blame for the teleological and fatalistic misunderstandings fall on ,marx himself4 ,marx1 as he once had to explain1 liked to 'coquette' with the ,hegelian terminology3 a dangerous weapon1 with which it would have been better not to trifle4 ,hence it is now thought necessary to give to several of his statements a somewhat broad interpretation in agreement with the general trend of his theories4#e ,another excuse lies in the impetuous confidence which1 as in the case of any practical work1 accompanies the practical activities of socialism1 and engenders beliefs and expectations which do not always agree with prudent critical and scientific thought4 ,it is strange to see how the positivists1 newly converted to socialism1 exceed all the others 7see the effect of a good school67 in their teleological beliefs1 and their facile predeterminations4 ,they swallow again what is worst in ,hegelianism1 which they once so violently opposed without recognising it4 ,labriola has finely said that the very forecasts of socialism are merely morphological in nature2 and1 in fact1 neither ,marx nor ,engels would ever have asserted in the abstract that communism must come about by an unavoidable necessity1 in the manner in which they foresaw it4 ,if history is always accidental1 why in this western ,europe of ours1 might not a new barbarism arise owing to the effect of incalculable circumstances8 ,why should not the coming of communism be either rendered superfluous or hastened by some of those technical discoveries1 which1 as ,marx himself has proved1 have hitherto produced the greatest revolutions in the course of history8 ,i think then that better homage would be rendered to the materialistic view of history1 not by calling it the final and definite philosophy of history but rather by declaring that properly speaking it is not a philosophy of history4 ,this intrinsic nature which is evident to those who understand it properly1 explains the difficulty which exists in finding for it a satisfactory theoretical statement2 and why to ,labriola it appears to be only in its beginnings and yet to need much development4 ,it explains too why ,engels said 7and ,labriola accepts the remark71 that it is nothing more than a new method2 which means a denial that it is a new theory4 ,but is it indeed a new method8 ,i must acknowledge that this name method does not seem to me altogether accurate4 ,when the philosophical idealists tried to arrive at the facts of history by inference1 this was truly a new method2 and there may still exist some fossil of those blessed times1 who makes such attempts at history4 ,but the historians of the materialistic school employ the same intellectual weapons and follow the same paths as1 let us say1 the philological historians4 ,they only introduce into their work some new data1 some new experiences4 ,the content is different1 not the nature of the method4 ,,ii #b4 ,historical materialism a mass of new data of which historian becomes conscious3 ,does not state that history is nothing more than economic history1 nor does it provide a theory of history3 ,is simply investigation of influence economic needs have exercised in history3 ,this view does not detract from its importance4 ,i have now reached the point which for me is fundamental4 ,historical materialism is not and cannot be a new philosophy of history or a new method2 but it is properly this2 a mass of new data1 of new experiences1 of which the historian becomes conscious4 ,it is hardly necessary to mention the overthrow a short time ago of the nave opinion of the ordinary man regarding the objectivity of history2 almost as though events spoke1 and the historian was there to hear and to record their statements4 ,anyone who sets out to write history has before him documents and narratives1 i4e4 small fragments and traces of what has actually happened4 ,in order to attempt to reconstruct the complete process1 he must fall back on a series of assumptions1 which are in fact the ideas and information which he possesses concerning the affairs of nature1 of man1 of society4 ,the pieces needed to complete the whole1 of which he has only the fragments before him1 he must find within himself4 ,his worth and skill as a historian is shown by the accuracy of his adaptation4 ,whence it clearly follows that the enrichment of these views and experiences is essential to progress in historical narration4 ,what are these points of view and experiences which are offered by the materialistic theory of history8 ,that section of ,labriola's book which discusses this appears to me excellent and sufficient4 ,labriola points out how historical narration in the course of its development1 might have arrived at the theory of historical factors2 i4e41 the notion that the sequence of history is the result of a number of forces1 known as physical conditions1 social organisations1 political institutions1 personal influences4 ,historical materialism goes beyond1 to investigate the interaction of these factors2 or rather it studies them all together as parts of a single process4 ,according to this theory--as is now well known1 and as ,marx expressed it in a classical passage--the foundations of history are the methods of production1 i4e4 the economic conditions which give rise to class distinctions1 to the constitution of rank and of law1 and to those beliefs which make up social and moral customs and sentiments1 the reflection whereof is found in art1 science and religion4 ,to understand this point of view accurately is not easy1 and it is misunderstood by all those who1 rather than take it in the concrete1 state it absolutely after the manner of an absolute philosophical truth4 ,the theory cannot be maintained in the abstract without destroying it1 i4e4 without turning it into the theory of the factors1 which is according to my view1 the final word in abstract analysis4#f ,some have supposed that historical materialism asserts that history is nothing more than economic history1 and all the rest is simply a mask1 an appearance without reality4 ,and then they labour to discover the true god of history1 whether it be the productive tool or the earth1 using arguments which call to mind the proverbial discussion about the egg and the hen4 ,friedrich ,engels was attacked by someone who applied to him to ask how the influence of such and such other historical factors ought to be understood in reference to the economic factor4 ,in the numerous letters which he wrote in reply1 and which now1 since his death1 are coming out in the reviews1 he let it be understood that1 when together with ,marx1 upon the prompting of the facts1 he conceived this new view of history1 he had not meant to state an exact theory4 ,in one of these letters he apologises for whatever exaggeration he and ,marx may have put into the controversial statements of their ideas1 and begs that attention may be paid to the practical applications made of them rather than to the theoretical expressions employed4 ,it would be a fine thing1 he exclaims1 if a formula could be given for the interpretation of all the facts of history6 ,by applying this formula1 it would be as easy to understand any period of history as to solve a simple equation4#g ,labriola grants that the supposed reduction of history to the economic factor is a ridiculous notion1 which may have occurred to one of the too hasty defenders of the theory1 or to one of its no less hasty opponents4#h ,he acknowledges the complexity of history1 how the products of the first degree first establish themselves1 and then isolate themselves and become independent2 the ideals which harden into traditions1 the persistent survivals1 the elasticity of the psychical mechanism which makes the individual irreducible to a type of his class or social position1 the unconsciousness and ignorance of their own situations often observed in men1 the stupidity and unintelligibility of the beliefs and superstitions arising out of unusual accidents and complexities4 ,and since man lives a natural as well as a social existence1 he admits the influence of race1 of temperament and of the promptings of nature4 ,and1 finally1 he does not overlook the influence of the individual1 i4e4 of the work of those who are called great men1 who if they are not the creators1 are certainly collaborators of history4 ,with all these concessions he realises1 if ,i am not mistaken1 that it is useless to look for a theory1 in any strict sense of the word1 in historical materialism2 and even that it is not what can properly be called a theory at all4 ,he confirms us in this view by his fine account of its origin1 under the stimulus of the ,french ,revolution1 that great school of sociology--as he calls it4 ,the materialistic view of history arose out of the need to account for a definite social phenomenon1 not from an abstract inquiry into the factors of historical life4 ,it was created in the minds of politicians and revolutionists1 not of cold and calculating savants of the library4 ,at this stage someone will say3--,but if the theory1 in the strict sense1 is not true1 wherein then lies the discovery8 ,in what does the novelty consist8 ,to speak in this way is to betray a belief that intellectual progress consists solely in the perfecting of the forms and abstract categories of thought4 ,have approximate observations no value in addition to theories8 ,the knowledge of what has usually happened1 everything in short that is called experience of life1 and which can be expressed in general but not in strictly accurate terms8 ,granting this limitation and understanding always an almost and an about1 there are discoveries to be made which are fruitful in the interpretation of life and of history4 ,such are the assertions of the dependence of all parts of life upon each other1 and of their origin in the economic subsoil1 so that it can be said that there is but one single history2 the discovery of the true nature of the ,state 7as it appears in the empirical world71 regarded as an institution for the defence of the ruling class2 the proved dependence of ideals upon class interests2 the coincidence of the great epochs of history with the great economic eras2 and the many other observations by which the school of historical materialism is enriched4 ,always with the aforesaid limitations1 it may be said with ,engels3 'that men make their history themselves1 but within a given limited range1 on a basis of conditions actually pre-existent1 amongst which the economic conditions1 although they may be influenced by the others1 the political and ideal1 are yet1 in the final analysis1 decisive1 and form the red thread which runs through the whole of history and guides us to an understanding thereof4 ,from this point of view too1 ,i entirely agree with ,labriola in regarding as somewhat strange the inquiries made concerning the supposed forerunners and remote authors of historical materialism1 and as quite mistaken the inferences that these inquiries will detract from the importance and originality of the theory4 ,the ,italian professor of economics to whom ,i referred at the beginning1 when convicted of a plagiarism1 thought to defend himself by saying that1 at bottom1 ,marx's idea was not peculiar to ,marx2 hence1 at worst1 he had robbed a thief4 ,he gave a list of forerunners1 reaching back as far as ,aristotle4 ,just lately1 another ,italian professor reproved a colleague with much less justice for having forgotten that the economic interpretation had been explained by ,lorenzo ,stein before ,marx1 ,i could multiply such examples4 ,all this reminds me of one of ,jean ,paul ,richter's sayings3 that we hoard our thoughts as a miser does his money2 and only slowly do we exchange the money for possessions1 and thoughts for experiences and feelings4 ,mental observations attain real importance through the realisation in thought and an insight into the fulness of their possibilities4 ,this realisation and insight have been granted to the modern socialist movement and to its intellectual leaders ,marx and ,engels4 ,we may read even in ,thomas ,more that the ,state is a conspiracy of the rich who make plots for their own convenience3 quaedam conspiratio divitum1 de suis commodis reipublicae nomine tituloque tractantium1 and call their intrigues laws3 machinamenta jam leges fiunt4#i ,and1 leaving ,sir ,thomas ,more--who1 after all1 it will be said1 was a communist--who does not know by heart ,marzoni's lines3 ,un' odiosa ,forza il mondo possiede e fa nomarsi ,dritto4444#aj ,but the materialist and socialist interpretation of the ,state is not therefore any the less new4 ,the common proverb1 indeed1 tells us that interest is the most powerful motive for human actions and conceals itself under the most varied forms2 but it is none the less true that the student of history who has previously examined the teachings of socialist criticism1 is like a short-sighted man who has provided himself with a good pair of spectacles3 he sees quite differently and many mysterious shadows reveal their exact shape4 ,in regard to historical narrative then1 the materialistic view of history resolves itself into a warning to keep its observations in mind as a new aid to the understanding of history4 ,few problems are harder than that which the historian has to solve4 ,in one particular it resembles the problem of the statesman1 and consists in understanding the conditions of a given nation at a given time in respect to their causes and functioning2 but with this difference3 the historian confines himself to exposition1 the statesman proceeds further to modification2 the former pays no penalty for misunderstanding1 whereas the latter is subjected to the severe correction of facts4 ,confronted by such a problem1 the majority of historians--,i refer in particular to the conditions of the study in ,italy--proceed at a disadvantage1 almost like the savants of the old school who constructed philology and researched into etymology4 ,aids to a closer and deeper understanding1 have come at length from different sides1 and frequently4 ,but the one which is now offered by the materialistic view of history is great1 and suited to the importance of the modern socialist movement4 ,it is true that the historian must render exact and definite in each particular instance1 that co-ordination and subordination of factors which is indicated by historical materialism1 in general1 for the greater number of cases1 and approximately2 herein lies his task and his difficulties1 which may sometimes be insurmountable4 ,but now the road has been pointed out1 along which the solution must be sought1 of some of the greatest problems of history apart from those which have been already elucidated4 ,i will say nothing of the recent attempts at an historical application of the materialistic conception1 because it is not a subject to hurry over in passing1 and ,i intend to deal with it on another occasion4 ,i will content myself with echoing ,labriola1 who gives a warning against a mistake1 common to many of these attempts4 ,this consists in retranslating1 as he says1 into economic phraseology1 the old historical perspective which of late has so often been translated into ,darwinian phraseology4 ,certainly it would not be worth while to create a new movement in historical studies in order to attain such a result4 ,,iii #c4 ,questions as to relation between historical materialism and socialism3 ,only possible connection lies in special historical application3 ,bearing of historical materialism upon intellectual and moral truth3 ,throws light on influence of material conditions on their development1 but does not demonstrate their relativity3 ,absolute morality a necessary postulate of socialism4 ,two things seem to me to deserve some further explanation4 ,what is the relation between historical materialism and socialism8 ,labriola1 if ,i am not mistaken1 is inclined to connect closely and almost to identify the two things4 ,the whole of socialism lies in the materialistic interpretation of history1 which is the truth itself of socialism2 to accept one and reject the other is to understand neither4 ,i consider this statement to be somewhat exaggerated1 or1 at least1 to need explanation4 ,if historical materialism is stripped of every survival of finality and of the benignities of providence1 it can afford no apology for either socialism or any other practical guidance for life4 ,on the other hand1 in its special historical application1 in the assertion which can be made by its means1 its real and close connection with socialism is to be found4 ,this assertion is as follows3--,society is now so constituted that socialism is the only possible solution which it contains within itself4 ,an assertion and forecast of this kind moreover will need to be filled out before it can be a basis for practical action4 ,it must be completed by motives of interest1 or by ethical and sentimental motives1 moral judgments and the enthusiasms of faith4 ,the assertion in itself is cold and powerless4 ,it will be insufficient to move the cynic1 the sceptic1 the pessimist4 ,but it will suffice to put on their guard all those classes of society who see their ruin in the sequence of history and to pledge them to a long struggle1 although the final outcome may be useless4 ,amongst these classes is the proletariat1 which indeed aims at the extinction of its class4 ,moral conviction and the force of sentiment must be added to give positive guidance and to supply an imperative ideal for those who neither feel the blind impulse of class interest1 nor allow themselves to be swept along by the whirling current of the times4 ,the final point which ,i think demands explanation1 although in this case also the difference between myself and ,labriola does not appear to be serious1 is this3 to what conclusions does historical materialism lead in regard to the ideal values of man1 in regard that is to intellectual truth and to what is called moral truth8 ,the history of the origin of intellectual truth is undoubtedly made clearer by historical materialism1 which aims at showing the influence of actual material conditions upon the opening out1 and the very development of the human intellect4 ,thus the history of opinions1 like that of science1 needs to be for the most part re-written from this point of view4 ,but those who1 on account of such considerations concerning historical origins1 return in triumph to the old relativity and scepticism1 are confusing two quite distinct classes of problem4 ,geometry owes its origin no doubt to given conditions which are worth determining2 but it does not follow that geometrical truth is something merely historical and relative4 ,the warning seems superfluous1 but even here misunderstandings are frequent and remarkable4 ,have ,i not read in some socialist author that ,marx's discoveries themselves are of merely historical importance and must necessarily be disowned4 ,i do not know what meaning this can have unless it has the very trivial one of a recognition of the limitation of all human work1 or unless it resolves itself into the no less idle remark that ,marx's thought is the offspring of his age4 ,this onesided history is still more dangerous in reference to moral truth4 ,the science of morality is evidently now in a transformation stage4 ,the ethical imperative1 whose classics are ,kant's ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 and ,herbart's ,allgemeine praktische ,philosophie1 appears no longer adequate4 ,in addition to it an historical and a formal science of morality are making their appearance1 which regard morality as a fact1 and study its universal nature apart from all preoccupations as to creeds and rules4 ,this tendency shows itself not only in socialistic circles1 but also elsewhere1 and it will be sufficient for me to refer to ,simmel's clever writings4 ,labriola is thus justified in his defence of new methods of regarding morality4 ',ethics1--he says1--for us resolves itself into an historical study of the subjective and objective conditions according to which morality develops or finds hindrances to its development4' ,but he adds cautiously1 'in this way alone1 i4e41 within these limits1 is there value in the statement that morality corresponds to the social situation1 i4e41 in the final analysis to the economic conditions1' ,the question of the intrinsic and absolute worth of the moral ideal1 of its reducibility or irreducibility to intellectual truth1 remains untouched4 ,it would perhaps have been well if ,labriola had dwelt a little more on this point4 ,a strong tendency is found in socialistic literature towards a moral relativity1 not indeed historical1 but substantial1 which regards morality as a vain imagination4 ,this tendency is chiefly due to the necessity in which ,marx and ,engels found themselves1 in face of the various types of ,utopians1 of asserting that the so-called social question is not a moral question1--i4e4 as this must be interpreted1 it cannot be solved by sermons and so-called moral methods--and to their bitter criticism of class ideals and hypocrisies4#aa ,this result was helped on1 as it seems to me1 by the ,hegelian source of the views of ,marx and ,engels2 it being obvious that in the ,hegelian philosophy ethics loses the rigidity given to it by ,kant and preserved by ,herbart4 ,and lastly the name materialism is perhaps not without influence here1 since it brings to mind at once well-understood interests and the calculating comparison of pleasures4 ,it is1 however1 evident that idealism or absolute morality is a necessary postulate of socialism4 ,is not the interest which prompts the formation of a concept of surplus-value a moral interest1 or social if it is preferred8 ,can surplus value be spoken of in pure economics8 ,does not the labourer sell his labour-power for exactly what it is worth1 given his position in existing society8 ,and1 without the moral postulate1 how could we ever explain ,marx's political activity1 and that note of violent indignation and bitter satire which is felt in every page of ,das ,kapital8 ,but enough of this1 for ,i find myself making quite elementary statements such as can only be overlooked owing to ambiguous or exaggerated phraseology4 ,and in conclusion1 ,i repeat my regret1 already expressed1 concerning this name materialism1 which is not justified in this case1 gives rise to numerous misunderstandings1 and is a cause of derision to opponents4 ,so far as history is concerned1 ,i would gladly keep to the name realistic view of history1 which denotes the opposition to all teleology and metaphysics within the sphere of history1 and combines both the contribution made by socialism to historical knowledge and those contributions which may subsequently be brought from elsewhere4 ,hence my friend ,labriola ought not to attach too much importance1 in his serious thoughts1 to the adjectives final and definite1 which have slipped from his pen4 ,did he not once tell me himself that ,engels still hoped for other discoveries which might help us to understand that mystery1 made by ourselves1 and which is ,history8 ,may1 #ahif4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,del materialismo storico1 dilucidazione preliminare1 ,rome1 ,e4 ,loescher1 #ahif4 ,see the earlier work by the same author3 ,in memoria del ',manifesto dei communisti1' #bnd ed4 ,rome1 ,e4 ,loescher1 #ahie4 #b ,i refer to the works of ,professor ,achille ,loria4 #c ,he calls it on one occasion3 'the final and definite philosophy of history4' #d ,beitrge zur ,geschichte des ,materialismus1 ,stuttgart1 #ahif4 #e ,see1 for example1 the comments upon some of ,marx's statements1 in the article ,progrs et dveloppement in the ,devenir ,social for ,march1 #ahif4 #f ,for this reason ,i do not1 like ,labriola1 call the theory of the factors a half-theory2 nor do ,i like the comparison with the ancient doctrine1 now abandoned in physics1 physiology and psychology1 of physical forces1 vital forces and mental faculties4 #g ,see a letter dated #bast ,september #ahij1 published in the ,berlin review1 ,der ,socialistische ,akademiker1 ,no #ai1 #ast ,october #ahie4 ,another1 dated #beth ,january #ahid1 is printed in ,no #bj1 #afth ,october1 of the same review4 #h ,he even distinguishes between the economic interpretation and the materialistic view of history4 ,by the first term he means 'those attempts at analysis1 which taking separately on the one hand the economic forms and categories1 and on the other for example1 law1 legislation1 politics1 custom1 proceed to study the mutual influences of the different sides of life1 thus abstractly and subjectively distinguished4' ,by the second1 on the contrary1 'the organic view of history' of the 'totality and unity of social life1' where economics itself 'is melted into the tide of a process1 to appear afterwards in so many morphological stages1 in each of which it forms the basis relatively to the rest which corresponds to and agrees with it4' #i ,utopia1 ,l4 ii 7,,thom ,,mori angli ,opera1 ,louvain #aeff1 f4 #ah47 #aj ',hateful ,force rules the world and calls itself ,justice4' #aa ,from this point of view it is worth while to note the antipathy which leaks out in socialist writings towards ,schiller1 the poet of the ,kantian morality sthetically modified1 who has become the favourite poet of the ,german middle classes4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,concerning ,,historical ,,materialism ,,viewed ,,as ,a ,,science ,,of ,,social ,,economics #a4 ,relation between ,professor ,stammler's book on historical materialism and ,marxism3 ,distinction between pure economics and general historical economics3 ,socialism not dependent on abstract sociological theory3 ,stammler's classification of the social sciences3 ,his definition of society3 ,of social economics3 ,of social teleology3 ,nature of ,stammler's social science does not provide abstract sociology3 ,social economics must be either pure economics applied to society or a form of history4 ,the attentive reader of ,professor ,stammler's book1#ab realises at the outset that it treats of the materialistic theory of history not as a fruitful guide to the interpretation of historical fact1 but as a science or philosophy of society4 ,a number of attempts have been made1 based in the first instance on ,marx's statements1 to build up on these statements a general theory of history or of society4 ,it is on these attempts then1 and not on the least bold amongst them1 that ,stammler bases his work1 making them the starting point of his criticism and reconstruction4 ,it may be precisely on this account that he chooses to discuss historical materialism in the form given to it by ,engels1--which he calls the most complete1 the authentic767 statement of the principles of social materialism4 ,he prefers this form to that of ,marx1 which he thinks too disconnected2 and which is1 indeed1 less easily reduced to abstract generalities2 whereas ,engels was one of the first to give to historical materialism a meaning more important than its original one4 ,to ,engels1 also1 as is well known1 is due the very name materialism as applied to this view of history4 ,we cannot1 indeed1 deny that the materialistic view of history has in fact developed in two directions1 distinct in kind if not in practice1 viz43 7#a7 a movement relating to the writing of history1 and 7#b7 a science and philosophy of society4 ,hence there is no ground for objecting to ,stammler's procedure1 when he confines himself to this second problem1 and takes it up at the point to which he thinks that the followers of historical materialism have brought it4 ,but it should be clearly pointed out that he does not concern himself at all with the problems of historical method4 ,he leaves out of account that is1 what1 for some people--and for me amongst them--is the side of this movement of thought which is of living and scientific interest4 ,professor ,stammler remarks how in the propositions employed by the believers in historical materialism3 'the economic factor dominates the other factors of social life1' 'the economic factor is fundamental and the others are dependent1' and the like1 the concept economic has never been defined4 ,he is justified in making this remark1 and in attaching the greatest importance to it1 if he regards and interprets those propositions as assertions of laws1 as strict propositions of social science4 ,to use as essential in statements of this kind1 a concept which could neither be defined nor explained1 and which therefore remained a mere word1 would indeed be somewhat odd4 ,but his remark is entirely irrelevant when these propositions are understood as3 'summaries of empirical observations1 by the help of which concrete social facts may be explained4' ,i do not think that any sensible person has ever expected to find in those expressions an accurate and philosophical definition of concepts2 yet all sensible people readily understand to what class of facts they refer4 ,the word economic here1 as in ordinary language1 corresponds1 not to a concept1 but to a group of rather diverse representations1 some of which are not even qualitative in content1 but quantitative4 ,when it is asserted1 that in interpreting history we must look chiefly at the economic factors1 we think at once of technical conditions1 of the distribution of wealth1 of classes and sub-classes bound together by definite common interests1 and so on4 ,it is true these different representations cannot be reduced to a single concept1 but no matter1 there is no question of that3 here we are in an entirely different sphere from that in which abstract questions are discussed4 ,this point is not without interest and may be explained more in detail4 ,if economic be understood in its strict sense1 for example1 in the sense in which it is employed in pure economics1 i4e41 if by it be meant the axiom according to which all men seek the greatest satisfaction with the least possible effort1 it is plain that to say that this factor plays a part 7essential1 dominant1 or equal to that of the others7 in social life1 would tell us nothing concrete4 ,the economic axiom is a very general and purely a formal principle of conduct4 ,it is inconceivable that anyone should act without applying1 well or ill1 the very principle of every action1 i4e41 the economic principle4 ,worse still it economic be taken in the sense which1 as we shall see1 ,professor ,stammler gives to it4 ,he understands by this word3 'all concrete social facts'2 in which sense it would at once become absurd to assert that the economic factor1 i4e41 all social facts in the concrete dominated1 a part of these facts6 ,thus in order to give a meaning to the word economic in this proposition1 it is necessary to leave the abstract and formal2 to assign definite ends to human action2 to have in mind an 'historical man1' or rather the average man of history1 or of a longer or shorter period of history2 to think1 for example1 of the need for bread1 for clothes1 for sexual relations1 for the so-called moral satisfactions1 esteem1 vanity1 power and so on4 ,the phrase economic factor now refers to groups of concrete facts1 which are built up in common speech1 and which have been better defined from the actual application made of the above-mentioned propositions in historical narrative and in the practical programmes of ,marx and his followers4 ,in the main1 this is recognised by ,professor ,stammler himself when he gives an admirable explanation of the current meaning of the expressions3 economic facts and political facts1 revolutions more political than economic and vice versa4 ,such distinctions1 he says1 can only be understood in the concrete1 in reference to the aims pursued by the different sections of society1 and to the special problems of social life4 ,according to him1 however1 ,marx's work does not deal with such trifling matters3 as1 for instance1 that so-called economic life influences ideas1 science1 art and so on3 old lumber of little consequence4 ,just as philosophical materialism does not consist in the assertion that bodily facts have an influence over spiritual1 but rather in the making of these latter a mere appearance1 without reality1 of the former3 so historical materialism must consist in asserting that economics is the true reality and that law is a fallacious appearance4 ,but1 with all deference to ,professor ,stammler1 we believe that these trifling matters1 to which he contemptuously refers1 are precisely what are dealt with in ,marx's propositions2 and1 moreover1 we think them neither so trifling nor of such little consequence4 ,hence ,professor ,stammler's book does not appear to us a criticism of the most vital part of historical materialism1 viz41 of a movement or school of historians4 ,the criticism of history is made by history2 and historical materialism is history made or in the making4 ,nor does it provide the starting point for a criticism of socialism1 as the programme of a definite social movement4 ,stammler deceives himself when he thinks that socialism is based on the materialistic philosophy of history as he expounds it3 on which philosophy are based1 on the contrary1 the illusions and caprices of some or of many socialists4 ,socialism cannot depend on an abstract sociological theory1 since the basis would be inadequate precisely because it was abstract2 nor can it depend on a philosophy of history as rhythmical or of little stability1 because the basis would be transitory4 ,on the contrary1 it is a complex fact and results from different elements2 and1 so far as concerns history1 socialism does not presuppose a philosophy of history1 but an historical conception determined by the existing conditions of society and the manner in which this has come about4 ,if we put on one side the doctrines superimposed subsequently1 and read again ,marx's pages without prejudice1 we shall then see that he had1 at bottom1 no other meaning when he referred to history as one of the factors justifying socialism4 ',the necessity for the socialisation of the means of production is not proved scientifically4' ,stammler means that the concept of necessity as employed by many ,marxians1 is erroneous2 that the denial of teleology is absurd1 and that hence the assertion of the socialisation of the means of production as the social programme is not logically accounted for4 ,this does not hinder this assertion from being possibly quite true4 ,either because1 in addition to logical demonstrations there are fortunate intuitions1 or because a conclusion can be true although derived from a false premiss3 it suffices1 obviously1 that there should be two errors which cancel one another4 ,and this would be so in our case4 ,the denial of teleology2 the tacit acceptance of this same teleology3 here is a method scientifically incorrect with a conclusion that may be valid4 ,it remains to examine the whole tissue of experiences1 deductions1 aspirations and forecasts in which socialism really consists2 and over which ,stammler passes indifferently1 content to have brought to light an error in the philosophical statement of a remote postulate1 an error which some1 or it may be many1 of the supporters and politicians of socialism commit4 ,all these reservations are needed in order to fix the scope of ,stammler's investigation2 but it would be a mistake to infer from them that we reject the starting point of the inquiry itself4 ,historical materialism--says ,professor ,stammler--has proved unable to give us a valid science of society3 we1 however1 believe that this was not its main or original object4 ,the two statements come practically to the same thing3 the science of society is not contained in the literature of the materialistic theory4 ,professor ,stammler adds that although historical materialism does not offer an acceptable social theory1 it nevertheless gives a stimulus of the utmost intensity towards the formation of such a theory4 ,this seems to us a matter of merely individual psychology3 suggestions and stimuli1 as everyone knows1 differ according to the mind that receives them4 ,the literature of historical materialism has always aroused in us a desire to study history in the concrete1 i4e41 to reconstruct the actual historical process4 ,in ,professor ,stammler1 on the contrary1 it arouses a desire to throw aside this meagre empirical history1 and to work with abstractions in order to establish concepts and general points of view4 ,the problems which he sets before himself1 might be arrived at psychologically by many other paths4 ,there is a tendency1 at present1 to enlarge unduly the boundaries of social studies4 ,but ,stammler rightly claims a definite and special subject for what ought to be called social science2 that is definite social data4 ,social science must include nothing which has not sociability as its determining cause4 ,how can ethics ever be social science1 since it is based on cases of conscience which evade all social rules8 ,custom is the social fact1 not morality4 ,how can pure economics or technology ever be social science1 since those concepts are equally applicable to the isolated individual and to societies8 ,thus in studying social data we shall see that1 considered in general1 they give rise to two distinct theories4 ,the first theory regards the concept society from the causal standpoint2 the second regards it from the teleological standpoint4 ,causality and teleology cannot be substituted the one for the other2 but one forms the complement of the other4 ,if1 then1 we pass from the general and abstract to the concrete1 we have society as existing in history4 ,the study of the facts which develop in concrete society ,stammler consigns to a science which he calls social 7or political1 or national7 economics4 ,from such facts may still be abstracted the mere form1 i4e41 the collection of rules supplied by history by which they are governed2 and this may be studied independently of the matter4 ,thus we get jurisprudence1 or the technical science of law2 which is always bound up inseparably with a given actual historical material1 which it works up by scientific method1 endeavouring to give it unity and coherence4 ,finally1 amongst social studies are also included those investigations which aim at judging and determining whether a given social order is as it ought to be2 and whether attempts to preserve or change it are objectively justified4 ,this section may be called that of practical social problems4 ,by such definitions and divisions ,professor ,stammler exhausts every possible form of social study4 ,thus we should have the following scheme3 ,general ,study ,causal4 of ,society4 ,teleological4 of the form 7technical science of law74 ,,social ,,science4 ,study of ,concrete of the matter ,society4 7social economics74 of the possible1 7practical problems74 ,we believe that this table correctly represents his views1 although given in our own way1 and in words somewhat different from those used by him4 ,a new treatment of the social sciences1 the work of serious and keen ability1 such as ,stammler seems to possess1 cannot fail to receive the earnest attention of all students of a subject which is still so vague and controversial4 ,let us examine it then section by section4 ,the first investigation relating to society1 that concerned with causality1 would be directed to solving the problem of the nature of society4 ,many definitions have been given of this up to the present3 and none of them can be said to be generally accepted1 or even to claim wide support4 ,stammler indeed1 rejects1 after criticism1 the definitions of ,spencer or ,rmelin1 which appear to him to be the most important and to be representative of all the others4 ,society is not an organism 7,spencer71 nor is it merely something opposed to legalised society 7,rmelin73 ,society1 says ,stammler1 is 'life lived by men in common1 subject to rules which are externally binding4' ,these rules must be understood in a very wide sense1 as all those which bind men living together to something which is satisfied by outward performance4 ,they are divided1 however1 into two large classes3 rules properly speaking legal1 and rules of convention4 ,the second class includes the precepts of propriety and of custom1 the code of knightly honour1 and so on4 ,the distinctive test lies in the fact that the latter class are merely hypothetical1 while the former are imposed without being desired by those subjected to them4 ,the whole assemblage of rules1 legal and conventional1 ,stammler calls social form4 ,under these rules1 obeying them1 limiting them and even breaking them men act in order to satisfy their desires2 in this1 and in this alone1 human life consists4 ,the assemblage of concrete facts which men produce when working together in society1 i4e41 under the assumption of social rules1 ,stammler calls social matter1 or social economics4 ,rules1 and actions under rules2 these are the two elements of which every social datum consists4 ,if the rules were lacking1 we should be outside society2 we should be animals or gods1 as says the old proverb3 if the actions were lacking there would remain only an empty form1 built up hypothetically by thought1 and no portion of which was actually real4 ,thus social life appears as a single fact3 to separate its two constituent factors means either to destroy it1 or to reduce it to empty form4 ,the law governing changes within society cannot be found in something which is extra social2 not in technique and discovery1 nor in the workings of supposed natural laws1 nor in the influence of great men1 of mysterious racial and national spirit2 but it must be sought in the very centre of the social fact itself4 ,hence it is wrong to speak of a causal bond between law and economics or vice versa3 the relation between law and economics is that between the rule and the things ruled1 not one of cause and effect4 ,the determining cause of social movements and changes is then ultimately to be found in the actual working out of social rules1 which precede such changes4 ,this concrete working out1 these actions accomplished under rules1 may produce 7#a7 social mutations which are entirely quantitative 7in the number of social facts of one or another kind72 7#b7 mutations which are also qualitative consisting that is in changes in the rules themselves4 ,hence the circle of social life3 rules1 social facts arising under them2 ideas1 opinions1 desires1 efforts resulting from the facts2 changes in the rules4 ,when and how this circle originated1 that is to say when and how social life arose on the earth1 is a question for history1 which does not concern the theorist4 ,between social life and non-social life there are no gradations1 theoretically there is a gulf4 ,but as long as social life exists1 there is no escape from the circle described above4 ,the form and matter of social life thus come into conflict1 and from this conflict arises change4 ,by what test can the issue of the conflict be decided8 ,to appeal to facts1 to invent a causal necessity which may agree with some ideal necessity is absurd4 ,in addition to the law of social causality1 which has been expounded1 there must be a law of ends and ideals1 i4e41 a social teleology4 ,according to ,stammler1 historical materialism identifies1 nor would it be the only theory to attempt such an identification1 causality and teleology2 but it1 too1 cannot escape from the logical contradictions which such assertions contain4 ,much praise has been given to that section of ,professor ,stammler's book in which he shows how teleological assumptions are constantly implied by historical materialism in all its assertions of a practical nature4 ,but we confess that the discovery seems to us exceedingly easy1 not to be compared to that of ,columbus about the egg4 ,here again we must point out that the pivot of the ,marxian doctrine lies in the practical problem and not in the abstract theory4 ,the denial of finality is1 at bottom1 the denial of a merely subjective and peculiar finality4 ,and here1 too1 although the criticism as applied to historical materialism seems to us hardly accurate1 we agree with ,stammler's conclusion1 i4e41 that it is necessary to construct1 or better to reconstruct1 with fresh material1 a theory of social teleology4 ,let us omit1 for the present1 an examination of ,stammler's construction of teleology1 which includes some very fine passages 7e4g4 the criticism of the anarchist doctrine7 and ask instead3 ,what is this social science of ,stammler1 of which we have stated the striking and characteristic features8 ,the reader will have little difficulty in discovering that the second investigation1 that concerning social teleology1 is nothing but a modernised philosophy of law4 ,and the first8 ,is it that long desired and hitherto vainly sought general sociology8 ,does it give us a new and acceptable concept of society8 ,to us it appears evident that the first investigation is nothing but a formal science of law4 ,in it ,professor ,stammler studies law as a fact1 and hence he cannot find it except in society subjected to rules imposed from without4 ,in the second1 he studies law as an ideal and constructs the philosophy 7imperative7 of law4 ,we are not here questioning the value of the investigation1 but its nature4 ,the present writer is convinced that social data leave no place for an abstract independent science4 ,society is a living together2 the kind of phenomena which appear in this life together is the concern of descriptive history4 ,but it is perfectly possible to study this life together from a given point of view1 e4g41 from the legal point of view1 or1 in general1 from that of the legal and non-legal rules to which it can be subjected2 and this ,stammler has done4 ,and1 in so doing1 he has examined the nature of law1 separating the concrete individual laws and the ideal type of law2 which he has then studied apart4 ,this is the reason why ,stammler's investigation seems to us a truly scientific investigation and very well carried out1 but not an abstract and general science of society4 ,such a science is for us inconceivable1 just as a formal science of law is1 on the contrary1 perfectly conceivable4 ,as to the second investigation1 that concerning teleology1 there would be some difficulty in including it in the number of sciences if it be admitted that ideals are not subjects for science4 ,but here ,professor ,stammler himself comes to our assistance by assigning the foundation of social teleology to philosophy1 which he defines as the science of the ,true and of the ,good1 the science of the ,absolute1 and understands in a non-formal sense4 ,professor ,stammler speaks readily of a monism of the social life1 and accepts as suitable and accurate the name materialism as applied to ,marx's conception of history1 and connects this materialism with metaphysical materialism1 applying to it also ,lange's statement1 viz41 that 'materialism may be the first and lowest step of philosophy1 but it is also the most substantial and solid4' ,for him historical materialism offers truth1 but not the whole truth1 since it regards as real the matter only and not the form of social life2 hence the necessity of completing it by restoring the form to its place1 and fixing the relation between form and matter1 combining the two in the unity of social life4 ,we doubt whether ,engels and his followers ever understood the phrase social materialism in the sense which ,stammler assigns to it4 ,the parallel drawn between it and metaphysical materialism seems to us somewhat arbitrary4 ,we come to the group of concrete sciences1 i4e41 those which have for their subject society as given in history4 ,no one who has had occasion to consider the problem of the classification of the sciences1 will be inclined to give the character of independent and autonomous sciences to studies of the practical problems of this or that society1 and to jurisprudence1 and the technical study of law4 ,this latter is only an interpretation or explanation of a given existing legal system1 made either for practical reasons1 or as simple historical knowledge4 ,but what we think merits attention more than these questions of terminology and classification1 is the conception of social economics1 advanced by ,stammler2 of the second1 that is1 of the concrete social sciences1 enumerated above4 ,the difficulties arising out of this conception are more serious1 and centre on the following points2 whether it is a new and valid conception1 or whether it should be reduced to something already known2 or finally whether it is not actually erroneous4 ,stammler holds forth at length against economics regarded as a science in itself1 which has its own laws and which has its source in an original and irreducible economic principle4 ,it is a mistake1 he says1 to put forward an abstract economic science and subdivide it into economic science relating to the individual and social economic science4 ,there is no ground of union between these two sciences1 because the economics of the isolated individual offers us only concepts which are dealt with by the natural sciences and by technology1 and is nothing but an assemblage of simple natural observations1 explained by means of physiology and individual psychology4 ,social economics1 on the other hand1 offers the peculiar and characteristic conditions of the externally binding rules1 under which activities develop4 ,and what can an economic principle be if not a hypothetical maxim3 the man who wishes to secure this or that object of subjective satisfaction must employ these or those means1 'a maxim which is more or less generally obeyed1 and sometimes violated'8 ,the dilemma lies then between the natural and technological consideration and the social one3 there is no third thing4 ',ein ,drittes ist nicht da6' ,this ,stammler frequently reiterates1 and always in the same words4 ,but the dilemma 7whose unfortunate inspiration he owes to ,kant7 does not hold1 it is a case of a trilemma4 ,besides the concrete social facts1 and besides the technological and natural knowledge1 there is a third thing1 viz41 the economic principle1 or hedonistic postulate1 as it is preferred to call it4 ,stammler asserts that this third thing is not equal in value to the two first ones1 that it comes as a secondary consideration1 and we confess that we do not clearly understand what this means4 ,what he ought to prove is that this principle can be reduced to the two former ones1 viz41 to the technical or to the social conditions4 ,this he has not done1 and indeed we do not know how it could be done4 ,that economics1 thus understood1 is not social science1 we are so much the more inclined to agree since he himself says as much in calling it pure economics1 i4e41 something built up by abstraction from particular facts and hence also from the social fact4 ,but this does not mean that it is not applicable to society1 and cannot give rise to inferences in social economics4 ,the social factor is then assumed as a medium through which the economic principle displays its influence and produces definite results4 ,granted the economic principle1 and granted1 for example1 the legal regulation of private property in land1 and the existence of land differing in quality1 and granted other conditions1 then the fact of rent of land arises of necessity4 ,in this and other like examples1 which could easily be brought forward1 we have laws of social and political economics1 i4e41 deductions from the economic principle acting under given legal conditions4 ,it is true that1 under other legal conditions1 the effects would be different2 but none of the effects would occur were it not for the economic nature of man1 which is a necessary postulate1 and not to be identified with the postulate of technical knowledge1 or with any other of the social rules4 ,to know is not to will2 and to will in accordance with objective rules is not to will in accordance with ideals which are merely subjective and individual 7economic74 ,stammler might say that if the science of economics thus interpreted is not properly a social science1 he leaves it on one side1 because his object is to construct a science which may be fully entitled to the name of social economics4 ,but--let us1 too1 construct a dilemma6--this social economics1 to which he aspires1 will either be just economic science applied to definite social conditions1 in the sense now indicated1 or it will be a form of historical knowledge4 ,no third thing exists4 ,ein ,drittes ist nicht da6 ,and indeed1 for ,stammler an economic phenomenon is not any single social fact whatever1 but a group of homogeneous facts1 which offer the marks of necessity4 ,the number of economic facts required to form the group and give rise to an economic phenomenon cannot be determined in general2 but can be seen in each case4 ,by the formation of these groups1 he says1 social economics does not degenerate into a register of data concerning fact1 nor does it become purely mechanical statistics of material already given which it has merely to enumerate4 ,social economics should not merely examine into the change in the actual working out of one and the same social order1 but remains1 now as formerly1 the seat of all knowledge of actual social life4 ,it must start from the knowledge of a given social existence1 both in regard to its form and in regard to its content2 and enlarge and deepen it up to the most minute peculiarity of its actual working out1 with the accuracy of a technical science1 the conditions and concrete objects of which are clearly indicated2 and thus free the reality of social life from every obscurity4 ,hence it must make for itself a series of concepts1 which will serve the purpose of such an explanation4 ,now this account of the concept of social economics is capable of two interpretations4 ,the first is that it is intended to describe a science1 which has indeed for its object 7as is proper for sciences7 necessary connections1 in the strict sense of the word4 ,but how establish this necessity8 ,how make the concepts suitable to social economics8 ,evidently by allowing ourselves to be guided by a principle1 by abstracting a single side from concrete reality2 and if it is to be for economics this principle can be none other than the economic principle1 and social economics will consider only the economic side of a given social life4 ,profits1 rent1 interest1 labour value1 usury1 wages1 crises1 will then appear as economic phenomena necessary under given conditions of the social order1 through which the economic principle exerts its influence4 ,the other interpretation is that ,stammler's social economics does not indeed accomplish the dissolving work of analysis but considers this or that social life in the concrete4 ,in this case it could do nothing but describe a given society4 ,to describe does not mean to describe in externals and superficially2 but1 more accurately1 to free that group of facts from every obscurity1 showing what it actually is1 and describing it1 as far as possible in its naked reality4 ,but this is1 in fact1 historical knowledge1 which may assume varied forms1 or rather may define in various ways its own subject4 ,it may study a society--in all its aspects during a given period of time1 or at a given moment of its existence1 or it may even take up one or more aspects of social life and study them as they present themselves in different societies and at different times1 and so on4 ,it is history always1 even when it avails itself of comparison as an instrument of research4 ,and such a study will not have to make concepts1 but will take them as it needs them from those sciences1 which do1 in fact1 elaborate concepts4 ,thus it would have been to great interest to see the working out of this new social economics of ,stammler a little more clearly1 so that we might determine exactly in which of the aforesaid two classes it ought to be placed4 ,whether it is merely political economy in the ordinary sense1 or whether it is the concrete study of single societies and of groups of them4 ,in the latter case ,stammler has added another name or rather two names2 science of the matter of social life and social economics1 to the many phrases by which of late the old ,history has been disguised 7social history1 history of civilisation1 concrete sociology1 comparative sociology1 psychology of the populace and of the classes1 etc474 ,and the gain1 if we may be allowed to say so1 will not be great4 ,september #ahih4 ,,footnotes3 #ab ,wirthschaft und ,recht nach der materialistischen ,geschichtsauffassung1 eine socialphilophische ,untersuchung1 ,,dr ,,rudolph ,,stammler1 ,professor at the ,university of ,halle1 ,a4,s41 ,leipzig1 ,veit ,u4,c41 #ahif1 pp4 viii-#ffh4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,concerning ,,the ,,interpretation ,,and ,,criticism ,,of ,,some ,,concepts ,,of ,,marxism ,i ,,of ,,the ,,scientific ,,problem ,,in ,,marx',s ',,das ,,kapital' ,das ,kapital an abstract investigation3 ,his society is not this or that society3 ,treats only of capitalist society3 ,assumption of equivalence between value and labour3 ,varying views about meaning of this law3 ,is a postulate or standard of comparison3 ,question as to value of this standard3 ,is not a moral ideal3 ,treats of economic society in so far as is a working society3 ,shows special way in which problem is solved in capitalist society2 ,marx's deductions from it4 ,notwithstanding the many expositions1 criticisms1 summaries and even abbreviated extracts in little works of popular propaganda1 which have been made of ,karl ,marx's work1 it is far from easy1 and demands no small effort of philosophical and abstract thought1 to understand the exact nature of the investigation which ,marx carried out4 ,in addition to the intrinsic difficulty of the subject1 it does not appear that the author himself always realised fully the peculiar character of his investigation1 that is to say its theoretical distinctness from all other investigations which may be made with his economic material2 and1 throughout1 he despised and neglected all such preliminary and exact explanations as might have made his task plain4 ,then1 moreover1 account must be taken of the strange composition of the book1 a mixture of general theory1 of bitter controversy and satire1 and of historical illustrations or digressions1 and so arranged that only ,loria1 7fortunate man671 can declare ,das ,kapital to be the finest and most symmetrical of existing books2 it being1 in reality1 un-symmetrical1 badly arranged and out of proportion1 sinning against all the laws of good taste2 resembling in some particulars ,vico's ,scienza nuova4 ,then too there is the ,hegelian phraseology beloved by ,marx1 of which the tradition is now lost1 and which1 even within that tradition he adapted with a freedom that at times seems not to lack an element of mockery4 ,hence it is not surprising that ,das ,kapital has been regarded1 at one time or another1 as an economic treatise1 as a philosophy of history1 as a collection of sociological laws1 so-called1 as a moral and political book of reference1 and even1 by some1 as a bit of narrative history4 ,nevertheless the inquirer who asks himself what is the method and what the scope of ,marx's investigation1 and puts on one side1 of course1 all the historical1 controversial and descriptive portions 7which certainly form an organic part of the book but not of the fundamental investigation71 can at once reject most of the above-mentioned definitions1 and decide clearly these two points3 7#a7 ,as regards method1 ,das ,kapital is without doubt an abstract investigation2 the capitalist society studied by ,marx1 is not this or that society1 historically existing1 in ,france or in ,england1 nor the modern society of the most civilised nations1 that of ,western ,europe and ,america4 ,it is an ideal and formal society1 deduced from certain hypotheses1 which could indeed never have occurred as actual facts in the course of history4 ,it is true that these hypotheses correspond to a great extent to the historical conditions of the modern civilised world2 but this1 although it may establish the importance and interest of ,marx's investigation because the latter helps us to an understanding of the workings of the social organisms which closely concern us1 does not alter its nature4 ,nowhere in the world will ,marx's categories be met with as living and real existences1 simply because they are abstract categories1 which1 in order to live must lose some of their qualities and acquire others4 7#b7 ,as regards scope1 ,marx's investigation does not cover the whole field of economic fact1 nor even that one ultimate and dominant portion1 whence all economic facts have their source1 like rivers flowing from a mountain4 ,it limits itself1 on the contrary1 to one special economic system1 that which occurs in a society with private property in capital1 or1 as ,marx says1 in the phrase peculiar to him1 capitalist4 ,there remained untouched1 not only the other systems which have existed in history and are possible in theory1 such as monopolist society1 or society with collective capital1 but also the series of economic phenomena common to the different societies and to individual economics4 ,to sum up1 as regards method1 ,das ,kapital is not an historical description1 and as regards scope1 it is not an economic treatise1 much less an encyclopedia4 ,but1 even when these two points are settled1 the real essence of ,marx's investigation is not yet explained4 ,were ,das ,kapital nothing but what we have so far defined1 it would be merely an economic monograph on the laws of capitalist society4#ac ,such a monograph ,marx could only have made in one way3 by deciding on these laws1 and explaining them by general laws1 or by the fundamental concepts of economics2 by reducing1 in short1 the complex to the simple1 or passing1 by deductive reasoning1 and with the addition of fresh hypotheses1 from the simple to the complex4 ,he would thus have shown1 by precise exposition1 how the apparently most diverse facts of the economic world are ultimately governed by one and the same law2 or1 what is the same thing1 how this law is differently refracted as it takes effect through different organisations1 without changing itself1 since otherwise the means and indeed the test of the explanation would be lacking4 ,work of this nature had been already carried out1 to a great extent1 in ,marx's time1 and since then it has been developed yet further by economists1 and has attained a high degree of perfection1 as may be seen1 for instance1 in the economic treatises of our ,italian writers1 ,pantaleoni and ,pareto4 ,but ,i much doubt whether ,marx would have become an economist in order to devote himself to a species of research of almost solely theoretical1 or even scholastic1 interest4 ,his whole personality as a practical man and a revolutionist1 impatient of abstract investigation which had no close connection with the interests of actual life1 would have recoiled from such a course4 ,if ,das ,kapital was to have been merely an economic monograph1 it would be safe to wager that it would never have come into existence4 ,what then did ,marx accomplish1 and to what treatment did he subject the phenomena of capitalist society1 if not to that of pure economic theory8 ,marx assumed1 outside the field of pure economic theory1 a proposition2 the famous equivalence between value and labour2 i4e4 the proposition that the value of the commodities produced by labour is equal to the quantity of labour socially necessary to produce them4 ,it is only with this assumption that his special investigation begins4 ,but what connection has this proposition with the laws of capitalist society8 or what part does it play in the investigation8 ,this ,marx never explicitly states2 and it is on this point that the greatest confusions have arisen1 and that the interpreters and critics have been most at a loss4 ,some of them have explained the law of labour-value as an historical law1 peculiar to capitalist society1 all of whose manifestations it determines2#ad others rightly seeing that the manifestations of capitalist society are by no means determined by such a law1 but comply with the general economic motives characteristic of the economic nature of man1 have rejected the law as an absurdity at which ,marx arrived by pressing to its extreme consequences an unfortunate concept of ,ricardo4 ,criticism was thus bewildered between entire acceptance1 combined with a clearly erroneous interpretation1 and entire and summary rejection of ,marx's treatment2 until1 in recent years1 and especially after the appearance of the third and posthumous volume of ,das ,kapital1 it began to seek out and follow a better path4 ,in truth1 despite its eager defenders1 the ,marxian doctrine has always remained obscure2 and1 despite contemptuous and summary condemnation1 it has always displayed also an obstinate vitality not usually possessed by nonsense and sophistry4 ,for this reason it is to the credit of ,professor ,werner ,sombart1 of ,breslau ,university1 that he has declared1 in one of his lucid writings1 that ,marx's practical conclusions may be refuted from a political standpoint1 but that1 scientifically1 it is above all important to understand his ideas4#ae ,sombart1 then1 breaking openly with the interpretation of ,marx's law of value as a real law of economic phenomena1 and giving a fuller1 and ,i may say1 a bolder expression to the timid opinions already stated by another 7,c4 ,schmidt71 says1 that ,marx's law of value is not an empirical but a conceptual fact 7,keine empirische1 sondern eine gedankliche ,thatsache72 that ,marx's value is a logical fact 7eine logische ,thatsache71 which aids our thought in understanding the actual realities of economic life4#af ,this interpretation1 in its general sense1 was accepted by ,engels1 in an article written some months before his death and published posthumously4 ,to ,engels it appeared that 'it could not be condemned as inaccurate1 but that1 nevertheless1 it was too vague and might be expressed with greater precision4'#ag ,the acute and courteous remarks on the theory of value1 published lately in an article in the ,journal des ,economistes by an able ,french ,marxian1 ,sorel1 indicate a movement in the same direction4 ,in these remarks he acknowledges that there is no way of passing from ,marx's theory to actual phenomena of economic life1 and that1 although it may offer elucidation1 in a somewhat limited sense1 it does not appear further that it could ever explain1 in the scientific meaning of the word4#ah ,and now too ,professor ,labriola1 in a hasty glance at the same subject1 referring clearly to ,sombart1 and partly agreeing and partly criticising1 writes3 'the theory of value does not denote an empirical factum nor does it express a merely logical proposition1 as some have imagined2 but it is the typical premise without which all the rest would be unthinkable4'#ai ,labriola's phrase appears to me1 in fact1 somewhat more accurate than ,sombart's2 who1 moreover1 shows himself dissatisfied with his own term1 like someone who has not yet a quite definite concept in view1 and hence cannot find a satisfactory phrase4 ',conceptual fact1' 'logical fact' expresses much too little since it is evident that all sciences are interwoven from logical facts1 that is from concepts4 ,marx's labour-value is not only a logical generalisation1 it is also a fact conceived and postulated as typical1 i4e4 something more than a mere logical concept4 ,indeed it has not the inertia of the abstract but the force of a concrete fact1#bj which has in regard to capitalist society1 in ,marx's investigation1 the function of a term of comparison1 of a standard1 of a type4#ba ,this standard or type being postulated1 the investigation1 for ,marx1 takes the following form4 ,granted that value is equal to the labour socially necessary1 it is required to show with what divergencies from this standard the prices of commodities are fixed in capitalist society1 and how labour-power itself acquires a price and becomes a commodity4 ,to speak plainly1 ,marx stated the problem in unappropriate language2 he represented this typical value itself1 postulated by him as a standard1 as being the law governing the economic phenomena of capitalist society4 ,and it is the law1 if he likes1 but in the sphere of his conceptions1 not in economic reality4 ,we may conceive the divergencies from a standard as the revolt of reality when confronted by this standard which we have endowed with the dignity of law4 ,from a formal point of view there is nothing absurd about the investigation undertaken by ,marx4 ,it is a usual method of scientific analysis to regard a phenomenon not only as it exists1 but also as it would be if one of its factors were altered1 and1 in comparing the hypothetical with the real phenomenon1 to conceive the first as diverging from the second1 which is postulated as fundamental1 or the second as diverging from the first1 which is postulated in the same manner4 ,if ,i build up by deductive reasoning the moral rules which develop in two social groups which are at war one against another1 and if ,i show how they differ from the moral rules which develop in a state of peace1 ,i should be making something analogous to the comparison worked out by ,marx4 ,nor would there be great harm 7although the expression would be neither fortunate nor accurate7 in saying1 in a figurative sense1 that the law of the moral rules in time of war is the same as that of the rules in time of peace1 modified to the new conditions1 and altered in a way which seems1 ultimately1 inconsistent with itself4 ,as long as he confines himself to the limits of his hypothesis ,marx proceeds quite correctly4 ,error could come in only when he or others confuse the hypothetical with the real1 and the manner of conceiving and of judging with that of existing4 ,as long as this mistake is avoided1 the method is unassailable4 ,but the formal justification is insufficient3 we need another4 ,with a formally correct method results may be obtained which are meaningless and unimportant1 or mere mental tricks may be performed4 ,to set up an arbitrary standard of comparison1 to compare1 and deduce1 and to end by establishing a series of divergencies from this standard2 to what will this lead8 ,it is then1 the standard itself which needs justification3 i4e4 we need to decide what meaning and importance it may have for us4 ,this question too1 although not stated exactly in this way1 has occurred to ,marx's critics2 and an answer to it has been already given some time ago and by many1 by saying that the equivalence of value and labour is an ideal of social ethics1 a moral ideal4 ,but nothing could be imagined more mistaken in itself and farther from ,marx's thought than this interpretation4 ,what moral inference can ever be drawn from the premiss that value is equal to the labour socially necessary8 ,it we reflect a little1 absolutely none4 ,the establishment of this fact tells us nothing about the needs of the society1 which needs will make necessary one or another ethical-legal system of property and of methods of distribution4 ,value may certainly equal labour1 nevertheless special historical conditions will make necessary society organised in castes or in classes1 divided into governing and governed1 rulers and ruled2 with a resulting unequal distribution of the products of labour4 ,value may certainly equal labour2 but even supposing that fresh historical conditions ever make possible the disappearance of society organised in classes and the advent of a communistic society1 and even supposing that in this society distribution could take place according to the quantity of labour contributed by each person1 this distribution would still not be a deduction from the established equivalence between value and labour1 but a standard adopted for special reasons of social convenience4#bb ,nor can it be said that such an equivalence supplies in itself an idea of perfect justice 7even though unrealisable71 since the criterion of justice has no relation to the difference often due to purely natural causes1 in the ability to do more or less social labour and to produce a greater or smaller value4 ,thus neither a rule of abstract justice nor one of convenience and social utility can be derived from the equivalence between value and labour4 ,rules of either kind can only be based on consideration of a quite different grade from that of a simple economic equation4 ,sombart1 avoiding this vulgar confusion1 has been better advised in looking for the meaning of the standard set up by ,marx in the nature of society itself1 and apart from our moral judgments4 ,thus he says that labour is the economic fact of greater objective importance1 and that value1 in ,marx's view1 is nothing 'if not the economic expression of the fact of the socially productive power of labour1 as the basis of economic existence4' ,but this investigation appears to me to be merely begun and not yet worked out to a conclusion2 and if ,i might suggest wherein it needs completion1 ,i should remark that it is necessary to attempt to give clearness and precision to this word objective1 which is either ambiguous or metaphorical4 ,what is meant by an economically objective fact8 ,do not these words suggest rather a mere presentiment of a concept instead of the distinct vision of this concept itself8 ,i will add1 merely tentatively1 that the word objective 7whose correlative term is subjective7 does not seem to be in place here4 ,let us1 instead1 take account1 in a society1 only of what is properly economic life1 i4e4 out of the whole society1 only of economic society4 ,let us abstract from this latter all goods which cannot be increased by labour4 ,let us abstract further all class distinctions1 which may be regarded as accidental in reference to the general concept of economic society4 ,let us leave out of account all modes of distributing the wealth produced1 which1 as we have said1 can only be determined on grounds of convenience or perhaps of justice1 but in anycase upon considerations belonging to society as a whole1 and never from considerations belonging exclusively to economic society4 ,what is left after these successive abstractions have been made8 ,nothing but economic society in so far as it is a working society4#bc ,and in this society without class distinctions1 i4e4 in an economic society as such and whose only commodities are the products of labour1 what can value be8 ,obviously the sum of the efforts1 i4e4 the quantity of labour1 which the production of the various kinds of commodities demands4 ,and1 since we are here speaking of the economic social organism1 and not of the individual persons living in it1 it follows that this labour cannot be reckoned except by averages1 and hence as labour socially 7it is with society1 ,i repeat1 that we are here dealing7 necessary4 ,thus labour-value would appear as that determination of value peculiar to economic society as such1 when regarded only in so far as it produces commodities capable of being increased by labour4 ,from this definition the following corollary may be drawn3 the determination of labour value will have a positive conformity with facts as long as a society exists1 which produces goods by means of labour4 ,it is evident that in the imaginary county of ,cocaigne this determination would have no conformity with facts1 since all goods would exist in quantities exceeding the demand2 similarly it is also evident that the same determination could not take effect in a society in which goods were inadequate to the demand1 but could not be increased by labour4 ,but hitherto history has shown us only societies which1 in addition to the enjoyment of goods not increasable by labour1 have satisfied their needs by labour4 ,hence this equivalence between value and labour has hitherto had and will continue for an indefinite time to have1 a conformity with facts2 but1 of what kind is this conformity8 ,having ruled out 7#a7 that it is a question of a moral ideal1 and 7#b7 that it is a question of scientific law2 and having nevertheless concluded that this equivalence is a fact 7which ,marx uses as a type71 we are obliged to say1 as the only alternative1 that it is a fact1 but a fact which exists in the midst of other facts2 i4e4 a fact that appears to us empirically as opposed1 limited1 distorted by other facts1 almost like a force amongst other forces1 which produces a resultant different from what it would produce if the other forces ceased to act4 ,it is not a completely dominant fact but neither is it non-existent and merely imaginary4#bd ,it is still necessary to remark that in the course of history this fact has undergone various alterations1 i4e41 has been more or less obscured2 and here it is proper to do justice to ,engels' remark in reference to ,sombart2 that as regards the way in which the latter defines the law of value 'he does not bring out the full importance which this law possesses during the stages of economic development in which it is supreme4' ,engels makes a digression into the field of economic history to show that ,marx's law of value1 i4e4 the equivalence between value and the labour socially necessary1 has been supreme for several thousand years4#be ,supreme is too strong a term2 but it is true that the opposed influences of other facts to this law have been fewer in number and less intense under primitive communism and under medival and domestic economic conditions1 whilst they have reached a maximum in the society based on privately owned capital and more or less free universal competition1 i4e4 in the society which produces almost exclusively commodities4#bf ,marx1 then1 in postulating as typical the equivalence between value and labour and in applying it to capitalist society1 was1 as it were1 making a comparison between capitalist society and a part of itself1 isolated and raised up to an independent existence3 i4e4 a comparison between capitalist society and economic society as such 7but only in so far as it is a working society74 ,in other words1 he was studying the social problem of labour and was showing by the test implicitly established by him1 the special way in which this problem is solved in capitalist society4 ,this is the justification1 no longer formal but real1 of his method4 ,it was in virtue of this method1 and by the light thrown by the type which he postulated1 that ,marx was able to discover and define the social origin of profit1 i4e4 of surplus value4 ,surplus value in pure economics is a meaningless word1 as is evident from the term itself2 since a surplus value is an extra value1 and thus falls outside the sphere of pure economics4 ,but it rightly has meaning and is no absurdity1 as a concept of difference1 in comparing one economic society with another1 one fact with another1 or two hypotheses with one another4 ,it is also in virtue of the same premise that he was able to arrive at the proposition3 that the products of labour in a capitalist society do not sell1 unless by exception1 for their value1 but usually for more or less1 and sometimes with great deviations from their value2 which is to say1 to put it shortly1 value does not coincide with price4 ,suppose1 by hypothesis the organisation of production were suddenly changed from a capitalist to a communistic system1 we should see at once1 not only that alteration in the fortunes of men which appeals so much to popular imagination1 but also a more remarkable change3 a change in the fortunes of things4 ,a scale of valuation of goods would then fashion itself1 very different for the most part1 from that which now exists4 ,the way in which ,marx proves this proposition1 by an analysis of the different components of the capital employed in different industries1 i4e4 of the proportion of fixed capital 7machines1 etc47 and of floating capital 7wages71 need not be explained here in detail4 ,and1 in the same way1 i4e4 by proving that fixed capital increases continually in comparison with floating capital1 ,marx tries to establish another law of capitalist society1 the law of the tendency of the rate of profits to fall4 ,technical improvement1 which in an abstract economic society would show itself in the decreased labour required to produce the same wealth1 shows itself in capitalist society in a gradual decline in the rate of profits4#bg ,but this section of ,volume ,,iii of ,das ,kapital is one of the least developed in this little worked-out posthumous book2 and it seems to me to be worth a special critical essay1 which ,i hope to write at another time1 not wishing to treat the subject here incidentally4#bh ,,ii ,,marx',s ,,problem ,,and ,,pure ,,economics 7,,general ,,economic ,,science7 ,marxian economics not general economic science and labour-value not a general concept of value3 ,engel's rejection of general economic law3 abstract concepts used by ,marx are concepts of pure economics3 relation of economic psychology to pure economics3 pure economics does not destroy history or progress4 ,marxian economics is thus a study of abstract working society showing the variations which this undergoes in the different social economic organisations4 ,this investigation ,marx carried out only in reference to one of these organisations1 i4e4 the capitalist2 contenting himself with mere hints in regard to the slave and serf organisations1 primitive communism1 the domestic system and to savage conditions4#bi ,in this sense he and ,engels declared that economics 7the economics studied by them71 was an historical science4#cj ,but here1 too1 their definition has been less happy than the investigation itself2 we know that ,marx's researches are not historical1 but hypothetical and abstract1 i4e4 theoretical4#ca ,they might better be called researches into sociological economics1 if the word sociological were not one which is employed most variously and arbitrarily4 ,if ,marx's investigation is thus limited1 if the law of value postulated by him is the special law of an abstract working society1 which only partially takes effect in economic society as given in history1 and in other hypothetical or possible economic societies1 the following results seem to follow evidently and readily3 7#a7 ,that ,marxian economics is not general economic science2 7#b7 that labour-value is not a general concept of value4 ,alongside1 then1 of the ,marxian investigation1 there can1 or rather must1 exist and flourish a general economic science1 which may determine a concept of value1 deducing it from quite different and more comprehensive principles than the special ones of ,marx4 ,and1 if the pure economists1 confined to their own special province1 have been wrong to show an ungenerous intellectual dislike for ,marx's investigations1 his followers1 in their turn1 have been wrong to regard ungratefully a branch of research which was alien to them1 calling it now useless1 and now frankly absurd4 ,such is1 in effect1 my opinion1 and ,i freely acknowledge that ,i have never been able to discover other antithesis or enmity between these two branches of research except the purely accidental one of the mutual antipathy to and mental ignorance of each other1 of two groups of students4 ,some have resorted to a political explanation2 but1 with no wish to deny that political prepossessions are often the causes of theoretical errors1 ,i do not consider an explanation as adequate and appropriate1 which resolves itself into accusing a large number of students of allowing themselves blindly and foolishly to be overcome by passions alien to science2 or1 what is worse1 of knowingly falsifying their thought and constructing a whole economic system from motives of practical opportunism4 ,indeed ,marx himself had not the time or means to adopt an attitude1 so to speak1 towards the purists1 or the hedonists1 or the utilitarians1 or the deductive or ,austrian school1 or whatever else they may call themselves4 ,but he had the greatest contempt for the oeconomia vulgaris1 under which term he was wont to include also the researches of general economics1 which explain what needs no explanation and is intuitively evident1 and leave unexplained what is more difficult and of genuine interest4 ,nor has ,engels discussed the subject2 but an indication of his opinion may be found in his attack on ,dhring4 ,dhring was struggling to find a general law of value1 which should govern all possible types of economic organisation2 and ,engels refuted him3 ',anyone who wishes to bring under the same law the political economy of ,terra del ,fuoco and that of modern ,england1 can produce nothing but the vulgarest commonplaces4' ,he scorns the truth of ultimate instance1 the eternal laws of value1 the tautologous and empty axioms which ,herr ,dhring would have produced by his method4#cb ,fixed and eternal laws are non-existent3 there is then no possibility of constructing a general science of economics1 valid for all times and in all places4 ,if ,engels had meant to refer to those who affirm the eternity and inevitability of the laws characteristic of capitalist society1 he would have been justified2 and would have been aiming his blows at a prejudice which history alone suffices to refute1 by showing as it does1 how capitalism has appeared at different times1 replacing other types of economic organisation1 and has also disappeared1 replaced by other types4 ,but in ,dhring's case the criticism was much beside the mark2 since ,dhring did not indeed mean to set up the laws of capitalist society as fixed and eternal2 but to determine a general concept of value1 which is quite another matter3 or1 in other words1 to show how1 from a purely economic point of view1 capitalist society is explained by the same general concepts as explain the other types of organisation4 ,no effort1 not even that of ,engels1 will suffice to stop such a problem from being stated and solved2 unless it were possible to destroy the human intellect1 which1 in addition to particular facts1 recognises universal concepts4 ,it would be instructive to examine the references which there are in ,marx's ,das ,kapital to unfinished analyses1 extraneous to his special method2 for in this dependence on analysis the researches of pure economics have their origin4 ,what is1 for instance1 abstract human labour 7abstrakt menschliche ,arbeit71 a concept which ,marx uses like a postulate8 ,by what method is that reduction of complex to simple labour accomplished1 to which he refers as to an obvious and ordinary matter8 ,and if1 in ,marx's hypothesis1 commodities appear as congealed labour1 or crystalised labour1 why by another hypothesis1 should not all economic goods and not only commodities1 appear as congealed methods of satisfying needs or as crystalised needs8 ,i read at one point in ,das ,kapital3 ',things which in themselves are not commodities1 e4g4 knowledge1 honour1 etc41 may be sold by their owners2 and thus1 by means of their price1 acquire the form of commodities4 ,a thing may formally have a price without having a value4 ,the expression of the price here becomes imaginary like certain quantities in mathematics4'#cc ,here is yet another difficulty1 indicated but not overcome4 ,where are these formal or imaginary prices to be found8 ,and what are they8 ,by what laws are they governed8 ,or are they perhaps like the ,greek words in ,latin prosody1 which according to the school rule1 per ,ausoniae fines sine lege vagantur8--,questions of this kind are answered by the researches of pure economics4 ,the philosopher ,lange also1 who rejected ,marx's law of value1 which he regarded as an extravagant production1 a child of sorrow1 thinking it unsuitable--and in this he was justified1 as a general law of value1 arrived at the solutions which have since been given of the latter1 a long time before the researches of the purists came into blossom4 ',some years ago1' he wrote in his book on labour problems1 ',i too worked at a new theory of value1 which should be of such a character as to show the most extreme cases of variation in value as special cases of the same formula4' ,and1 whilst adding that he had not completed it1 he intimated that the course which he attempted was the same as that hastily glanced at by ,jevons in his ,theory of political economy1 published in #ahga4cd ,to any of the more cautious and moderate ,marxians it is plainly evident that the researches of the ,hedonists are not merely to be rejected as erroneous or unfounded2 and hence an attempt has been made to vindicate them in reference to the ,marxian doctrine as an economic psychology1 having its place alongside of true economics itself4 ,but this definition contains a curious equivocation4 ,pure economics is quite apart from psychology4 ,indeed1 to begin with1 it is hard to fix the meaning of the words economic psychology4 ,the science of psychology is divided into formal and descriptive4 ,in formal psychology there is no place either for economic fact nor for any other fact which may represent a particular content4 ,in descriptive psychology1 it is true1 are included representations1 sentiments and desires of an economic content1 but included as they appear in reality1 mixed with the other psychical phenomena of different content1 and inseparable from them4 ,thus descriptive economic psychology can be1 at most1 an approximate limitation1 by which we take as a subject of special description the way in which men 7at a given time and place1 or even in the mass as hitherto they have appeared in history7 think1 feel and desire in respect to a certain class of goods which are usually called material or economic1 and which1 however1 stand in need of specification and definition4 ,subject-matter1 in truth1 better suited to history than to science1 which regards such matters only as empty and unimportant generalisations4 ,this may be seen in the long discussion of the matter by that most weighty of pedants1 ,wagner1 in his manual1 which1 of all that has been written on the question1 ,i think the most worthy of notice1 and which is yet1 in itself1 a thing very little worthy of notice or conclusive4#ce ,an enumeration and description of the various tendencies which exist in men as they appear in ordinary life3 egoistical and altruistic tendencies1 love of self-advantage and fear of disadvantage1 fear of punishment and hope of reward1 sense of honour and fear of disgrace and public contempt1 love of activity and dislike of idleness1 feeling of reverence for the moral code1 etc41 this is what ,wagner calls economic psychology2 and which might better be called3 various observations in descriptive psychology1 to be kept in mind whilst studying the practical questions of economics4#cf ,but what1 pray1 has pure economics in common with psychology8 ,the purists start from the hedonistic postulate1 i4e4 from the economic nature itself of man1 and deduce from it the concepts of utility 7economic utility which ,pareto has proposed to call by a special name1 ofelimita1 from the ,greek phelimos7 of value1 and directly1 all the other special laws in accordance with which man behaves in so far as he is an abstract homo oeconomicus4 ,they do exactly what the science of ethics does with the moral nature2 and the science of logic with the logical nature2 and so on4 ,at this rate then would ethics be a psychology of ethics and logic a psychology of logic8 ,and1 since all that we know passes through the human mind1 ontology would be a psychology of existence1 mathematics a psychology of mathematics1 and we should thus have confused the most diverse things1 ending in a disorder the aim of which would be no longer comprehensible4 ,hence we conclude1 that with care and the exercise of a little thought1 it will necessarily be agreed that pure economics is not a psychology1 but is the true and essential general science of economic facts4 ,professor ,labriola1 too1 shows a certain ill-humour which does not seem to me entirely justified1 towards the pure economists1 'who'1 he says1 'translate into psychological conceptualism the influence of risk and other analogous considerations of ordinary commercial practice6 ,and they do well--,i answer--because the mind desires to give an account even of the influences of risk and of commercial practice1 and to explain their mechanism and character4 ,and then1 psychological conceptualism2 is not this an unfortunate connection between what your intellect shows you that pure economics really is 7science which takes as its starting point an irreducible concept71 and that hazardous definition of psychology which has been criticised above8 ,are not the noun and adjective in opposition to one another8 ,and further1 ,labriola speaks contemptuously of the 'abstract atomism' of the hedonists1 in which1 'one no longer knows what history is1 and progress is reduced to mere appearance4'#cg ,here too1 it does not seem to me that his contempt is justified2 for ,labriola is well aware that in all abstract sciences1 concrete and individual things disappear and that their elements alone remain as objects to be considered3 hence this cannot be made a ground for special complaint against economic science4 ,but history and progress1 even if they are alien to the study of abstract economics1 do not therefore cease to exist and to form the subject of other studies of the human mind2 and this is what matters4 ,for my part ,i hold firmly to the economic notion of the hedonistic guide1 to utility-ophelimity1 to final utility1 and even to the explanation 7economic7 of interest on capital as arising from the different degrees of utility possessed by present and future goods4 ,but this does not satisfy the desire for a sociological1 so to speak1 elucidation of interest on capital2 and this elucidation1 with others of the same kind1 can only be obtained from the comparative considerations put before us by ,marx4#ch ,,iii ,,concerning ,,the ,,limitation ,,of ,,the ,,materialistic ,,theory ,,of ,,history ,historical materialism a canon of historical interpretation3 ,canon does not imply anticipation of results3 ,question as to how ,marx and ,engels understood it3 ,difficulty of ascertaining correctly and method of doing so3 ,how ,marxians understand it3 ,their metaphysical tendency3 ,instances of confusion of concepts in their writings3 ,historical materialism has not a special philosophy immanent within it4 ,historical materialism if it is to express something critically acceptable1 can1 as ,i have had occasion to state elsewhere1#ci be neither a new a priori notion of the philosophy of history1 nor a new method of historical thought2 it must be simply a canon of historical interpretation4 ,this canon recommends that attention be directed to the so-called economic basis of society1 in order that the forms and mutations of the latter may be better understood4 ,the concept canon ought not to raise difficulty1 especially when it is remembered that it implies no anticipation of results1 but only an aid in seeking for them2 and is entirely of empirical origin4 ,when the critic of the text of ,dante's ,comedia uses ,witte's well-known canon1 which runs3 'the difficult reading is to be preferred to the easy one1' he is quite aware that he possesses a mere instrument1 which may be useful to him in many cases1 useless in others1 and whose correct and advantageous employment depends entirely on his caution4 ,in like manner and with like meaning it must be said that historical materialism is a mere canon2 although it be in truth a canon most rich in suggestion4 ,but was it in this way that ,marx and ,engels understood it8 and is it in this way that ,marx's followers usually understand it8 ,let us begin with the first question4 ,truly a difficult one1 and offering a multiplicity of difficulties4 ,the first of these arises so to speak1 from the nature of the sources4 ,the doctrine of historical materialism is not embodied in a classical and definite book by those authors1 with whom it is as it were identified2 so that1 to discuss that book and to discuss the doctrine might seem all one thing4 ,on the contrary it is scattered through a series of writings1 composed in the course of half a century1 at long intervals1 where only the most casual mention is made of it1 and where it is sometimes merely understood or implied4 ,anyone who desired to reconcile all the forms with which ,marx's and ,engels have endowed it1 would stumble upon contradictory expressions1 which would make it impossible for the careful and methodical interpreter to decide what1 on the whole1 historical materialism meant for them4 ,another difficulty arises in regard to the weight to be attached to their expressions4 ,i do not think that there has yet been a study of what might be called ,marx's forma mentis2 with which ,engels had something in common1 partly owing to congeniality1 partly owing to imitation or influence4 ,marx1 as has been already remarked1 had a kind of abhorrence for researches of purely scholastic interest4 ,eager for knowledge of things 7,i say1 of concrete and individual things7 he attached little weight to discussions of concepts and the forms of concepts2 this sometimes degenerated into an exaggeration in his own concepts4 ,thus we find in him a curious opposition between statements which1 interpreted strictly1 are erroneous2 and yet appear to us1 and indeed are1 loaded and pregnant with truth4 ,marx was addicted1 in short1 to a kind of concrete logic4#dj ,is it best then to interpret his expressions literally1 running the risk of giving them a meaning different from what they actually bore in the writer's inmost thoughts8 ,or is it best to interpret them broadly1 running the opposite risk of giving them a meaning1 theoretically perhaps more acceptable1 but historically less true8 ,the same difficulty certainly occurs in regard to the writings of numerous thinkers2 but it is especially great in regard to those of ,marx4 ,and the interpreter must proceed with caution3 he must do his work bit by bit1 book by book1 statement by statement1 connecting indeed these various indications one with another1 but taking account of differences of time1 of actual circumstances1 of fleeting impressions1 of mental and literary habits2 and he must submit to acknowledge ambiguities and incompleteness where either exists1 resisting the temptation to confirm and complete by his own judgment4 ,it may be allowed for instance1 as it appears to me for various reasons1 that the way in which historical materialism is stated above is the same as that in which ,marx and ,engels understood it in their inmost thoughts2 or at least that which they would have agreed to as correct if they had had more time available for such labours of scientific elaboration1 and if criticism had reached them less tardily4 ,and all this is of importance up to a certain point1 for the interpreter and historian of ideas2 since for the history of science1 ,marx and ,engels are neither more nor less than they appear in their books and works2 real1 and not hypothetical or possible persons4#da ,but even for science itself1 apart from the history of it1 the hypothetical or possible ,marx and ,engels have their value4 ,what concerns us theoretically is to understand the various possible ways of interpreting the problems proposed and the solutions thought out by ,marx and ,engels1 and to select from the latter by criticism those which appear theoretically true and welcome4 ,what was ,marx's intellectual standpoint with reference to the ,hegelian philosophy of history8 ,in what consisted the criticism which he gave of it8 ,is the purport of this criticism always the same for instance in the article published in the ,deutsch-franzsische ,jahrbcher1 for #ahdd1 in the ,heilige ,familie of #ahde1 in the ,misre de la philosophie of #ahdg1 in the appendix to ,das ,komnunistische ,manifest of #ahdh1 in the preface to the ,zur ,kritik of #ahei1 and in the preface to the #bnd edition of ,das ,kapital of #ahgc8 ,is it again in ,engels' works in the ,antidhring1 in the article on ,feuerbach1 etc48 ,did ,marx ever really think of substituting1 as some have believed1 ,matter or material fact for the ,hegelian ,idea8 ,and what connection was there in his mind between the concepts material and economic8 ,again1 can the explanation given by him1 of his position with regard to ,hegel3 'the ideas determined by facts and not the facts by the ideas1' be called an inversion of ,hegel's view1 or is it not rather the inversion of that of the ideologists and doctrinaires8#db ,these are some of the questions pertaining to the history of ideas1 which will be answered some time or other3 perhaps at present the time has not yet arrived to write the history of ideas which are still in the process of development4#dc ,but1 putting aside this historical curiosity1 it concerns us now to work at these ideas in order to advance in theoretical knowledge4 ,how can historical materialism justify itself scientifically8 ,this is the question ,i have proposed to myself1 and to which the answer is given by the critical researches referred to at the beginning of this paragraph4 ,without returning to them ,i will give other examples1 taken from the same source1 that of the ,marxian literature4 ,how ought we to understand scientifically ,marx's neodialectic8 ,the final opinion expressed by ,engels on the subject seems to be this3 the dialect is the rhythm of the development of things1 i4e4 the inner law of things in their development4 ,this rhythm is not determined a priori1 and by metaphysical deduction1 but is rather observed and gathered a posteriori1 and only through the repeated observations and verifications that are made of it in various fields of reality1 can it be presupposed that all facts develop through negations1 and negations of negations4#dd ,thus the dialect would be the discovery of a great natural law1 less empty and formal than the so-called law of evolution and it would have nothing in common with the old ,hegelian dialect except the name1 which would preserve for us an historical record of the way in which ,marx arrived at it4 ,but does this natural rhythm of development exist8 ,this could only be stated from observation1 to which indeed1 ,engels appealed in order to assert its existence4 ,and what kind of a law is one which is revealed to us by observation8 ,can it ever be a law which governs things absolutely1 or is it not one of those which are now called tendencies1 or rather is it not merely a simple and limited generalisation8 ,and this recognition of rhythm through negations of negations1 it is not some rag of the old metaphysics1 from which it may be well to free ourselves4#de ,this is the investigation needed for the progress of science4 ,in like manner should other statements of ,marx and ,engels be criticised4 ,what for example shall we think of ,engels' controversy with ,dhring concerning the basis of history3 whether this is political force or economic fact8 ,will it not seem to us that this controversy can perhaps retain any value in face of ,dhring's assertion that political fact is that which is essential historically1 but in itself has not that general importance which it is proposed to ascribe to it8 ,we may reflect for a moment that ,engels' thesis3 'force protects 7schtzt7 but does not cause 7verursacht7 usurpation1' might be directly inverted into another that3 'force causes usurpation1 but economic interest protects it1' and this by the well known principle of the inter-dependence and competition of the social factors4 ,and the class war8 ,in what sense is the general statement true that history is a class war8 ,i should be inclined to say that history is a class war 7#a7 when there are classes1 7#b7 when they have antagonistic interests1 7#c7 when they are aware of this antagonism1 which would give us1 in the main1 the humourous equivalence that history is a class war only when it is a class war4 ,in fact sometimes classes have not had antagonistic interests1 and very often they are not conscious of them2 of which the socialists are well aware when they endeavour1 by efforts not always crowned with success 7with the peasantry1 for example1 they have not yet succeeded71 to arouse this consciousness in the modern proletariat4 ,as to the possibility of the non-existence of classes1 the socialists who prophesy this non-existence for the society of the future1 must at least admit that it is not a matter intrinsically necessary to historical development1 since in the future1 and without classes1 history1 it may well be hoped will continue4 ,in short even the particular statement that 'history is a class war1' has that limited value of a canon and of a point of view1 which we have allowed in general to the materialist conception4#df ,the second of the two questions proposed at the beginning is3 ,how do the ,marxians understand historical materialism8 ,to me it seems undeniable that in the ,marxian literature1 i4e4 the writings of the followers and interpreters of ,marx1 there exists in truth a metaphysical danger of which it is necessary to beware4 ,even in the writings of ,professor ,labriola some statements are met with which have recently led a careful and accurate critic to conclude that ,labriola understands historical materialism in the genuine and original sense of a metaphysic1 and that of the worst kind1 a metaphysic of the contingent4#dg ,but although ,i have myself1 on another occasion1 pointed out those statements and formulae which seem to me doubtful in ,labriola's writings1 ,i still think1 as ,i thought then1 that they are superficial outgrowths on a system of thought essentially sound2 or to speak in a manner agreeing with the considerations developed above1 that ,labriola1 having educated himself in ,marxism1 may have borrowed from it also some of its over-absolute style1 and at times a certain carelessness about the working out of concepts1 which are somewhat surprising in an old ,herbartian like himself1#dh but which he then corrects by observations and limitations always useful1 even if slightly contradictory1 because they bring us back to the ground of reality4 ,labriola1 moreover1 has a special merit1 which marks him off from the ordinary exponents and adapters of historical materialism4 ,although his theoretical formulae may here and there expose him to criticism1 when he turns to history1 i4e4 to concrete facts1 he changes his attitude1 throws off as it were1 the burden of theory and becomes cautious and circumspect3 he possesses1 in a high degree1 respect for history4 ,he shows unceasingly his dislike for formulae of every kind1 when concerned to establish and scrutinise definite processes1 nor does he forget to give the warning that there exists 'no theory1 however good and excellent in itself1 which will help us to a summary knowledge of every historical detail4'#di ,in his last book we may note especially a full inquiry into what could possibly be the nature of a history of ,christianity4 ,labriola criticises those who set up as an historical subject the essence of ,christianity1 of which it is unknown where or when it has existed2 since the history of the last centuries of the ,roman ,empire shows us merely the origin and growth of what constituted the ,christian society1 or the church1 a varying group of facts amidst varied historical conditions4 ,this critical opinion held by ,labriola seems to me perfectly correct2 since it is not meant to deny1 7what ,i myself1 do not deny7 the justification of that method of historical exposition1 which for lack of another phrase1 ,i once called histories by concepts1#ej thus distinguishing it from the historical exposition of the life of a given social group in a given place and during a given period of time4 ,he who writes the history of ,christianity1 claims in truth1 to accomplish a task somewhat similar to the tasks of the historians of literature1 of philosophy1 of art3 i4e4 to isolate a body of facts which enter into a fixed concept1 and to arrange them in a chronological series1 without however denying or ignoring the source which these facts have in the other facts of life1 but keeping them apart for the convenience of more detailed consideration4 ,the worst of it is that whereas literature1 philosophy1 art and so on are determined or determinable concepts1 ,christianity is almost solely a bond1 which unites beliefs often intrinsically very diverse2 and1 in writing the history of ,christianity1 there is often a danger of writing in reality the history of a name1 void without substance4#ea ,but what would ,labriola say if his cautious criticism were turned against that history of the origin of the family1 of private property and of class distinctions1 which is one of the most extensive historical applications made by the followers of ,marx3 desired by ,marx1 sketched out by ,engels on the lines of ,morgan's investigations1 carried on by others4 ,alas1 in this matter1 the aim was not merely to write1 as could1 perhaps1 have been done1 a useful manual of the historical facts which enter into these three concepts1 but actually an additional history was produced3 ,a history1 to use ,labriola's own phrase1 of the essence family1 of the essence class and of the essence private property1 with a predetermined cadence4 ,a 'history of the family1' to confine ourselves to one of the three groups of facts1--can only be an enumeration and description of the particular forms taken by the family amongst different races and in the course of time3 a series of particular histories1 which unite themselves into a general concept4 ,it is this which is offered by ,morgan's theories1 expounded by ,engels1 which theories modern criticism have cut away on all sides4#eb ,have they not allowed themselves to presuppose1 as an historical stage1 through which all races are fated to pass1 that chimerical matriarchate1 in which the mere reckoning of descent through the mother is confused with the predominance of woman in the family and that of woman in society8 ,have we not seen the reproofs and even the jeers directed by some ,marxians against those cautious historians who deny that it is possible to assert1 in the present condition of the criticism of sources1 the existence of a primitive communism1 or a matriarchate1 amongst the ,hellenic races8 ,indeed1 ,i do not think that throughout this investigation proof has been given of much critical foresight4 ,i should also like to call ,labriola's attention to another confusion1 very common in ,marxian writings1 between economic forms of organisation and economic epochs4 ,under the influence of evolutionist positivism1 those divisions which ,marx expressed in general3 the ,asiatic1 the antique1 the feudal and the bourgeois economic organisation1 have become four historical epochs3 communism1 slave organisation1 serf organisation1 and wage-earning organisation4 ,but the modern historian1 who is indeed not such a superficial person as the ordinary ,marxians are accustomed to say1 thus sparing themselves the trouble of taking a share in his laborious procedure1 is well aware that there are four forms of economic organisation1 which succeed and intersect one another in actual history1 often forming the oddest mixtures and sequences4 ,he recognises an ,egyptian medivalism or feudalism1 as he recognises an ,hellenic medivalism or feudalism2 he knows too of a ,german neo-medivalism which followed the flourishing bourgeois organisation of the ,german cities before the ,reformation and the discovery of the ,new ,world2 and he willingly compares the general economic conditions of the ,greco-,roman world at its zenith with those of ,europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries4 ,connected with this arbitrary conception of historical epochs1 is the other of the inquiry into the cause 7note carefully2 into the cause7 of the transition from one form to another4 ,inquiry is made1 for instance1 into the cause of the abolition of slavery1 which must be the same1 whether we are considering the decline of the ,greco-,roman world or modern ,america2 and so for serfdom1 and for primitive communism and the capitalist system3 amongst ourselves the famous ,loria has occupied himself with these absurd investigations1 the perpetual revelation of a single cause1 of which he himself does not know exactly whether it be the earth1 or population or something else--yet it should not take much to convince us1 7it would suffice for the purpose to read1 with a little care1 some books of narrative history71 that the transition from one form of economic1 or more generally1 social1 organisation1 to another1 is not the result of a single cause1 nor even of a group of causes which are always the same2 but is due to causes and circumstances which need examination for each case since they usually vary for each case4 ,death is death2 but people die of many diseases4 ,but enough of this2 and ,i may be allowed to conclude this paragraph by reference to a question which ,labriola also brings forward in his recent work1 and which he connects with the criticism of historical materialism4 ,labriola distinguishes between historical materialism as an interpretation of history1 and as a general conception of life and of the universe 7,lebens-und-,weltanschauung71 and he inquires what is the nature of the philosophy immanent in historical materialism2 and after some remarks1 he concludes that this philosophy is the tendency to monism1 and is a formal tendency4 ,here ,i take leave to point out that if into the term historical materialism two different things are intruded1 i4e43 7#a7 a method of interpretation2 7#b7 a definite conception of life and of the universe2 it is natural to find a philosophy in it1 and moreover with a tendency to monism1 because it was included therein at the outset4 ,what close connection is there between these two orders of thought8 ,perhaps a logical connection of mental coherence8 ,for my part1 ,i confess that ,i am unable to see it4 ,i believe1 on the contrary1 that ,labriola1 this time1 is simply stating propos of historical materialism what he thinks to be the necessary attitude of modern thought with regard to the problems of ontology2 or what1 according to him1 should be the standpoint of the socialist opinion in regard to the conceptions of optimism and pessimism2 and so on4 ,i believe1 in short1 that he is not making an investigation which will reveal the philosophical conceptions underlying historical materialism2 but merely a digression1 even if a digression of interest and importance4 ,and how many other most noteworthy opinions and impressions and sentiments are welcomed by socialist opinion6 ,but why christen this assemblage of new facts by the name of historical materialism1 which has hitherto expressed the well-defined meaning of a way of interpreting history8 ,is it not the task of the scientist to distinguish and analyse what in empirical reality and to ordinary knowledge appears mingled into one8 ,,iv ,,of ,,scientific ,,knowledge ,,in ,,face ,,of ,,social ,,problems ,socialism and free trade not scientific deductions3 ,obsolete metaphysics of old theory of free trade3 ,basis of modern free trade theories not strictly scientific though only possible one3 ,the desirable is not science nor the practicable3 ,scientific law only applicable under certain conditions3 ,element of daring in all action4 ,it has become a commonplace that1 owing to ,marx's work1 socialism has passed from utopia to science1 as the title of a popular booklet by ,engels expresses it2 and scientific socialism is a current term4 ,professor ,labriola does not conceal his doubts of such a term2 and he is right4 ,on the other hand1 we hear the followers of other leaders1 for instance the extreme free traders 7to whom ,i refer by preference honoris causa1 because they1 too1 are amongst the idealists of our times71 in the name of science itself1 condemn socialism as anti-scientific and declare that free trade is the only scientific opinion4 ,would it not be convenient if both sides retraced their steps and mortified their pride a little1 and acknowledged that socialism and free trade may certainly be called scientific in metaphor or hyperbole2 but that neither of them are1 or ever can be1 scientific deductions8 ,and that thus the problem of socialism1 of free trade and of any other practical social programme1 may be transferred to another region2 which is not that of pure science1 but which nevertheless is the only one suited to them8 ,let us pause for an instant at free trade4 ,it presents itself to us from two points of view1 i4e4 with a two-fold justification4 ,in the older aspect it undeniably has a metaphysical basis1 consisting in that conviction of the goodness of natural laws and that concept of nature 7natural law1 state of nature1 etc47 which1 proceeding from the philosophy of the #agth century1 was predominant in the #ahth century4#ec ',do not hinder ,nature in her work and all will be for the best4' ,a similar note is struck1 only indirectly1 by a criticism like that of ,marx2 who1 when analysing the concept of nature1 showed that it was the ideological complement of the historical development of the middle class1 a powerful weapon of which this class availed itself against the privileges and oppressions which it intended to overthrow4#ed ,now this concept may indeed have originated as a weapon made occasional use of historically1 and nevertheless be intrinsically true4 ,natural law in this case1 is equivalent to rational law2 it is necessary to deny both the rationality and the excellence of this law4 ,now1 just because of its metaphysical origin1 this concept can be rejected altogether1 but cannot be refuted in detail--it disappears with the metaphysic of which it was a part1 and it seems at length to have really disappeared4 ,peace to the sublime goodness of natural laws4 ,but free trade presents itself to us1 among its more recent supporters1 in a very different aspect--the free traders1 abandoning metaphysical postulates1 assert two theses of practical importance3 7a7 that of an economic hedonistic maximum1 which they suppose identical with the maximum of social desirability2#ee and 7b7 the other1 that this hedonistic maximum can only be completely secured by means of the fullest economic liberty4 ,these two theses certainly take us outside metaphysics and into the region of reality2 but not actually into the region of science4 ,indeed the first of them contains a statement of the ends of social life1 which may perhaps be welcome1 but is not a deduction from any scientific proposition4 ,the second thesis cannot be proved except by reference to experience1 i4e4 to what we know of human psychology1 and to what1 by approximate calculation1 we may suppose that psychology will still probably be in the future4 ,a calculation which can be made1 and has been made with great acumen1 with great erudition and with great caution and which hence may even be called scientific1 but only in a metaphorical and hyperbolical sense1 as we have already remarked3 hence the knowledge which it affords us1 can never have the value of strictly scientific knowledge4#ef ,pareto1 who is both one of the most intelligent and also one of the most trustworthy and sincere1 of the recent exponents and supporters of free trade1#eg does not deny the limited and approximate nature of its conclusions2 which appears to him so much the more clearly in that he uses mathematical formulae1 which show at once the degree of certainty to which statements of this kind may lay claim4 ,and1 in effect1 communism 7which has also had its metaphysical period1 and earlier still a theological period7 may1 with entire justice1 set against the two theses of free trade1 two others of its own which consist3 7a7 in a different and not purely economic estimate of the maximum of social desirability2 7b7 in the assertion that this maximum can be attained1 not through extreme free trade1 but rather through the organisation of economic forces2 which is the meaning of the famous saying concerning the leap from the reign of necessity 7free competition or anarchy7 into that of liberty 7the command of man over the forces of nature even in the sphere of the social natural life74 ,but neither can these two theses be proved2 and for the same reasons4 ,ideals cannot be proved2 and empirical calculations and practical convictions are not science4 ,pareto clearly recognises this quality in modern socialism2 and agrees that the communistic system1 as a system1 is perfectly conceivable1 i4e4 theoretically it offers no internal contradictions 7 #ddf74 ,according to him it clashes1 not with scientific laws1 but with immense practical difficulties 7l4c47 such as the difficulty of adopting technical improvements without the trial and selection secured by free competition2 the lack of stimuli to work2 the choice of officials1 which in a communistic society would be guided1 still according to him1 not by wholly technical reasons1 as in modern industry1 but on political and social grounds 7#hcg74 ,he admits the socialist criticism of the waste due to free competition2 but thinks this inevitable as a practical way of securing equilibrium of production4 ,the real problem--he says--is3 whether without the experiments of free competition it is possible to arrive at a knowledge of the line 7the line which he calls mn7 of the complete adaptation of production to demand1 and whether the expense of making a unified 7communistic7 organisation of work1 would not be greater than that needed to solve the equations of production by experiments 7#gah1 #hfg74 ,he also acknowledged that there is something parasitical in the capitalist 7,marx's sad-faced knight72 but1 at the same time1 he maintains that the capitalist renders social services1 for which we do not know how otherwise to provide4#eh ,if it be desired to state briefly the contrasts in the two different points of view1 it may be said that human psychology is regarded by the free traders as for the most part1 determined1 and by the socialists1 as for the most part changeable and adaptable4 ,now it is certain that human psychology does change and adapt itself2 but the extent and rapidity of these changes are incapable of exact determination and are left to conjecture and opinion4 ,can they ever become the subject of exact calculation8 ,if now we pass to considerations of another kind1 not of what is desirable1 that is of the ends and means admired and thought good by us2 but of what under present circumstances1 history promises us2 i4e4 of the objective tendencies of modern society1 ,i really do not know with what meaning many free traders cast on socialism the reproach of being ,utopian4 ,for quite another reason socialists might cast back the same reproach upon free trade1 if it were considered as it is at present1 and not as it was fifty years ago when ,marx composed his criticism upon it4 ,free ,trade and its recommendations turn upon an entity which now at least1 does not exist3 i4e4 the national or general interest of society2 since existing society is divided into antagonistic groups and recognises the interest of each of these groups1 but not1 or only very feebly1 a general interest4 ,upon which does free trade reckon8 ,on the landed proprietors or on the industrial classes1 on the workmen or on the holders of public dignities8 ,socialism1 on the contrary1 from ,marx onwards1 has placed little reliance on the good sense and good intentions of men1 and has declared that the social revolution must be accomplished chiefly by the effort of a class directly interested1 i4e4 the proletariat4 ,and socialism has made such advances that history must inquire whether the experience that we have of the past justifies the supposition that a social movement1 so widespread and intense1 can be reabsorbed or dispersed without fully testing itself in the sphere of facts4 ,on this matter too ,i gladly refer to ,pareto1 who acknowledges that even in that country of free traders' dreams1 in ,england1 the system is supported not owing to people's conviction of its intrinsic excellence1 but because it is in the interests of certain entrepreneurs4#ei ,and he recognises1 with political acumen1 that since social movement takes place in the same manner as all other movements1 along the line of least resistance1 it is very likely that it may be necessary to pass through a socialistic state1--in order to reach a state of free competition 7 #gia74 ,i have said that the extreme free traders1 much more than the socialists1 are idealists1 or if one prefers it1 ideologists4 ,hence in ,italy we are witnesses of this strange phenomenon1 a sort of fraternising and spiritual sympathy between socialists and free traders1 in so far as both are bitter and searching critics of the same thing1 which the former call the bourgeois tyranny and the latter bourgeois socialism4 ,but in the field of practical activity the socialists 7and here ,i no longer refer especially to ,italy7 undoubtedly make progress whilst the free traders have to limit themselves to the barrenness of evil-speaking and of aspirations1 forming a little group of well-meaning people of select intelligence1 who make audience for one another4#fj ,by this ,i mean no reproach to these sincere and thoroughly consistent free-traders3 rather ,i sincerely admire them2 their lack of success is not their own fault4 ,i wish merely to remark that if ideals1 as the philosopher says1 have short legs1 those of the free traders' ideals are indeed of the shortest4 ,i could continue this exemplification1 bringing forward various other social programmes1 such as that of state socialism1 which consists in accepting the socialist ideal1 but as an ultimate end perhaps never fully attainable1 and extending its partial attainment over a long course of centuries2 and in relying for the effective force1 not in a revolutionary class1 nor simply in the views of right thinkers1 but in the state1 conceived as a creative power1 independent of and superior to individual wills4 ,it is certainly undeniable that the function of the state1 like all social functions1 owing to a complication of circumstances1 amongst which are tradition1 reverence1 the consciousness of something which surpasses individuals1 and other impressions and sentiments which are analysed by collective psychology1 acquires a certain independence and develops a certain peculiar force2 but in the estimation of this force great mistakes are made1 as socialist criticism has clearly shown3 and1 in any case1 whether it be great or small1 we are always faced by a calculation2 and one moreover1 in the region of opinion1 which region science may1 in part1 yet bring under its power1 but which in a great degree will always be rebellious to it4 ,oh the misuses which are made of this word science6 ,once these misuses were the monopoly of metaphysics1 to whose despotic nature they appeared suitable4 ,and the strangest instances could be quoted1 even from great philosophers1 from ,hegel1 from ,schopenhauer1 from ,rosmini1 which would show how the humblest practical conclusions1 made by the passions and interests of men1 have often been metaphysically transformed into inferences from the ,spirit1 from the ,divine ,being1 from the ,nature of things1 from the finality of the universe4 ,metaphysics hypostatised what it then triumphantly inferred4 ,the youthful ,marx wittily discovered in the ,hegelianism of ,bruno ,bauer1 the pre-established harmony of critical analysis 7,kritische ,kritik7 under ,german censorship4 ,those who most frequently have the word in their mouths make a sort of ,sibyl or ,pythia of a limited intellectual function4 ,but the desirable is not science1 nor is the practicable4#fa ,is scientific knowledge then in fact superfluous in practical questions8 ,are we to assent to this absurdity8 ,the attentive reader will be well aware that we are not here discussing the utility of science1 but the possibility of inferring1 as some claim to do1 practical programmes from scientific prepositions2 and it is this possibility only which is denied4 ,science1 in so far as it consists in knowledge of the laws governing actual facts1 may be a legitimate means of simplifying problems1 making it possible to distinguish in them what can be scientifically ascertained from what can only be partially known4 ,a great number of things which are commonly disputed1 may be cleared up and accurately decided by this method4 ,to give an example1 when ,marx in opposition to ,proudhon and his ,english predecessors 7,bray1 ,gray1 etc47 showed the absurdity of creating labour bonds1 i4e4 labour-money2 and when ,engels directed similar criticisms against ,dhring1 and then again1 perhaps with less justification1 against ,rodbertus#fb or when both established the close connection between the method of production and the method of distribution1 they were working in the field proper to scientific demonstration1 trying to prove an inconsistency between the conclusions and the premisses1 i4e4 an internal contradiction in the concepts criticised4 ,the same may be said of the proof1 carefully worked out by the free traders1 of the proposition3 that protection of every kind is equivalent to a destruction of wealth4 ,and if it were possible to establish accurately that law of the tendency of the rate of profits to decline1 with which ,marx meant to correct and widen the ,ricardian law deduced from the continuous encroachments of the rent of land1 it could be said1 under certain conditions1 that the end of the bourgeois capitalist organisation was a scientific certainty1 though it would remain doubtful what could take its place4 ,this limitation 'under certain conditions' is the point to be noticed4 ,all scientific laws are abstract laws2 and there is no bridge over which to pass from the concrete to the abstract2 just because the abstract is not a reality1 but a form of thought1 one of our1 so to speak1 abbreviated ways of thinking4 ,and1 although a knowledge of the laws may light up our perception of reality1 it cannot become this perception itself4 ,here we may agree with what ,labriola justly felt1 when1 showing his dissatisfaction with the term scientific socialism1 he suggested1 though without giving any reasons1 that that of critical communism might be substituted4#fc ,if then from abstract laws and concepts we pass to observations of historical fact1 we find1 it is true1 points of agreement between our ideals and real things1 but at the same time we enter upon those difficult calculations and conjectures1 from which it is always impossible to eliminate1 as was remarked above1 the diversity of opinions and propensities4 ,in face of the future of society1 in face of the path to be pursued1 we have occasion to say with ,faust--,who can say ,i believe8 ,who can say ,i do not believe8 ,not indeed that we wish to advocate or in any way justify a vulgar scepticism4 ,but at the same time we need to be sensible of the relativity of our beliefs1 and to come to a determination in practice where indetermination is an error4 ,this is the point2 and herein lie all the troubles of men of thought2 and hence arises their practical impotence1 which art has depicted in ,hamlet4 ,neither shall we wish1 in truth1 to imitate that magistrate1 famous for miles around the district where he officiated for the justice of his decisions1 of whom ,rabelais tells us1 that he used the very simple method1 when about to make up his mind1 of offering a prayer to ,god and settling his decision by a game of odd and even4#fd ,but we must strive to attain personal conviction1 and then bear always in mind that great characters in history have had the courage to dare4 ',alea jacta est1' said ,csar2 ',gott helfe mir1 amen6' said ,luther4 ,the brave deeds of history would not be brave if they had been accompanied by a clear foresight of the consequences1 as in the case of the prophets and those inspired by ,god4 ,fortunately1 logic is not life1 and man is not intellect alone4 ,and1 whilst those same men whose critical faculty is warped1 are the men of imagination and passion1 in the life of society the intellect plays a very small part1 and with a little exaggeration it may even be said that things go their way independent of our actions4 ,let us leave them to their romances1 let them preach1 ,i will not say in the market places where they would not be believed1 but in the university lecture rooms1 or the halls of congresses and conferences--the doctrine that science 7i4e4 their science7 is the ruling queen of life4 ,and we will content ourselves by repeating with ,labriola that ',history is the true mistress of all us men1 and we are as it were vitalised by ,history4' ,v ,,of ,,ethical ,,judgment ,,in ,,face ,,of ,,social ,,problems ,meaning of ,marx's phrase the 'impotence of morality' and his remark that morality condemns what has been condemned by history3 ,profundity of ,marx's philosophy immaterial3 ,kant's position not surpassed4 ,labriola1 with his usual piquancy1 lashes those who reduce history to a case of conscience or to an error in bookkeeping4 ,with this he recalls us to the two-fold consideration 7#a7 that for ,marx the social question was not a moral question1 and 7#b7 that the analysis made by ,marx of capitalism amounts to a proof of the laws which govern a given society1 and not indeed to a proof of theft1 as some have understood it1 as though it would suffice to restore to the workman the amount of his wrongfully exacted surplus labour1 so that the accounts may turn out in order1 and the social question be satisfactorily solved4#fe ,leaving the second consideration1 which yet gives us an instance of the ludicrous travesties which may be made of a scientific theory1 let us pause for a moment over the first formula1 which usually gives the greatest offence to non-socialists2 so much so that many of them wish to put a little salt in the broth and complete socialism by morality4 ,in actual fact1 offence and moral indignation have never been caused less appropriately4 ,those remarks in ,marx's writings which savour of moral indifference1 bear a very limited and trivial meaning4 ,consider a moment1 as indeed has been considered many times1 that no social order of any kind can exist without a basis of slavery1 or serfdom1 or hired service2 that is to say that slavery1 or serfdom1 or hired service are natural conditions of social order1 and that without them a thing cannot exist1 which is so necessary to man that1 at least since he was man1 he has never done without it1 viz41 society4 ,faced by such a fact1 what meaning would our moral judgment have1 directed against these governing human beings who call themselves slave owners1 feudal lords and bourgeois capitalists1 and in favour of these governed human beings who call themselves slaves1 serfs1 free labourers2 neither of whom could be different from what they are1 nor could otherwise fulfil the function assigned to them by the very nature of things4#ff ,our condemnation would be a condemnation of the inevitable2 a ,leopardian curse directed against the brutal power which rules in secret to the general harm4 ,but moral praise or blame has reference always to an act of will1 good or bad2 and such judgments would on the contrary be directed against a fact1 which has not been willed by anyone1 but is endured by every one because it cannot be different4 ,you1 indeed1 may lament it2 but by lamenting it1 you not only do not destroy it1 you do not even touch it1 i4e41 you waste your time4 ,this is what ,marx calls the impotence of morality1 which is as much as to say that it is useless to propound questions which no effort can answer and which are therefore absurd4 ,but when1 on the other hand1 these conditions of subjection are not conceived as necessary for the social order in general1 but only as necessary for a stage in its history2 and when new conditions make their appearance which render it possible to destroy them 7as was the case in the industrial advance toward serfdom1 and as the socialists reckon will happen in the final phase of modern civilisation in regard to wage earners and capitalism72 then moral condemnation is justified1 and1 up to a certain point1 is also effective in quickening the process of destruction and in sweeping away the last remnants of the past4 ,this is the meaning of ,marx's other saying3 that morality condemns what has already been condemned by history4#fg ,i cannot manage to see any difficulty in agreeing to remarks of this kind1 even from the standpoint of the strictest ethical theories4 ,there is here no question of misunderstanding the nature of morality1 and of wishing to make it into something fortuitous or relative2 but simply of determining the conditions of human progress1 turning the attention from the inevitable effects to the fundamental causes1 and seeking remedies in the nature of things and not in our caprices and pious wishes4 ,it must needs be thought that the opposition proceeds1 not from intellectual error1 but rather from human pride1 or vanity it may be1 owing to which many desire to retain for their wretched words a little of the virtue of the divine word1 which created light by its decree4#fh ,the same feeling must perhaps be present as the basis of the horror which usually greets the other practical maxim of the socialists2 that the workman educates himself by the political struggle4 ,but ,labriola is fully justified in admiring in the advance of ,german socialism 'the truly new and imposing instance of social pedagogy2 viz4 that1 amongst such an enormous number of men1 particularly of workmen of the lower middle class1 a new consciousness is developing1 within which compete in equal degree1 a direct sense of the economic situation1 which incites to the struggle1 and the socialist propaganda understood as the goal or point of arrival4' ,what means have the preachers of moral maxims at their disposal1 to secure a result equal to this8 ,who are these workmen who combine in associations1 who read their newspapers1 discuss the acts of their delegates and accept the decisions of their congresses1 if not men who are educating themselves morally8 ,but there is not only a question of vanity and pride in that feeling of aversion1 which animates many with regard to the practical maxims of the socialists1 and in the desire1 which people also show1 of undertaking in the name of morality or religion1 the spiritual direction of the education of the working man2 nor shall we wish to be so ingenuous and complacent as to confine ourselves to such a partial explanation4 ,there is more1 there is1 ,i might almost say1 an apprehension and a fear4 ,an apprehension1 little justified1 lest the political organisation of the proletariat may lead to a brutal and unrestrained outbreak of the masses and to ,i know not what kind of social ruin2 as if such outbreaks were not recorded by history in precisely those periods in which it is usual to suppose that the dominion of religion over conscience was greatest1--as in the jacqueries of the fourteenth century in ,france1 and again in the peasants' wars in ,germany1--and in which there was no organisation and political culture amongst the common people4#fi ,a fear1 which is on the contrary thoroughly justified and arises from the knowledge that instinctive and blind proletariat movements are conquered by force2 whereas organisation combined with an enlightened consciousness1 is not conquered or only suffers temporary reverses4 ,does not ,mommsen remark1 in reference to the slave revolts in ancient ,rome2 that states would be very fortunate if they were in no other dangers besides those which might come to them from the revolts of the proletariat1 which are no greater than the dangers arising from the claws of hungry bears or wolves8 ,these statements concerning ethics and socialist pedagogy having been explained1 someone might yet ask3--,but what was the philosophical opinion of ,marx and ,engels in regard to morality8 ,were they relativists1 utilitarians1 hedonists1 or idealists1 absolutists1 or what else8 ,i may be allowed to point out that this question is of no great importance1 and is even somewhat inopportune1 since neither ,marx nor ,engels were philosophers of ethics1 nor bestowed much of their vigorous ability on such questions4 ,it is indeed of consequence to determine that their conclusions in regard to the function of morality in social movements and to the method for the education of the proletariat1 contain no contradiction of general ethical principles1 even if here and there they clash with the prejudices of current pseudo-morality4 ,their personal opinions upon the principles of ethics did not take an elaborate scientific form in their books2 and some wit and some sarcasm are not adequate grounds upon which to base a discussion of the subject4 ,and ,i will say yet more2 in ethical matters1 ,i have not yet succeeded in freeing myself from the prison of the ,kantian ,critique1 and do not yet see the position taken up by ,kant surpassed2 on the contrary1 ,i see it strengthened by some of the most modern tendencies1 and to me the way in which ,engels attacks ,dhring with regard to the principles of morality in his well-known book1 does not in truth appear very exhaustive4#gj ,here again the procedure is repeated which we have already criticised in connection with the discussions upon the general concept of value4 ,where ,dhring1 owing to the exigencies of scientific abstraction1 takes for consideration the isolated individual and explicitly states that he is dealing with an abstract illustration 7,denkschema71 ,engels remarks1 wittily but erroneously--that the isolated man is nothing but a new edition of the first ,adam in the ,garden of ,eden4 ,it is true that in that criticism are contained many well-directed blows2 and it might even be called just1 if it refers only to ethical conceptions in the sense of assemblages of special rules and moral judgments1 relative to definite social situations1 which assemblages and constructions cannot claim absolute truth for all times1 and all places1 precisely because they are always made for particular times and particular places4 ,but apart from these special constructions1 analysis offers us the essential and ruling principles of morality1 which give opportunity for questions which may1 truly1 be differently answered1 but which most certainly are not taken into account by ,marx and ,engels4 ,and1 in truth1 even if some may be able to write on the theory of knowledge according to ,marx1#ga to write on the principles of ethics according to ,marx seems to me a somewhat hopeless undertaking4 ,,vi ,,conclusion ,recapitulation3 #a4 ,justification of ,marxian economics as comparative sociological economics3 #b4 ,historical materialism simply a canon of historical interpretation3 #c4 ,marxian social programme not a pure science3 #d4 ,marxism neither intrinsically moral nor antimoral4 ,the preceding remarks are partly attempts at interpretation1 and partly critical emendations of some of the concepts and opinions expressed by ,marx and in the ,marxian literature4 ,but how many other points deserve to undergo revision6 ,beginning with that concentration of private property in a few hands1 which threatens to become something like the discredited iron law of wages1 and ending with that strange statement in the history of philosophy that the labour movement is the heir of ,german classical philosophy4 ,and attention could thus be given to another group of questions which we have not discussed 7e4g4 to the conception of future society7 in regard to their detailed elucidation and their practical and historical applications4#gb ,if that decomposition of ,marxism1 which some have predicted1#gc meant a careful critical revision1 it would indeed be welcome4 ,to sum up1 in the meantime1 the chief results which are suggested in the preceding remarks3 they maintain4 #a4 ,in regard to economic science1 the justification of ,marxian economics1 understood not as general economic science1 but as comparative sociological economics1 which is concerned with a problem of primary interest for historical and social life4 #b4 ,in regard to the philosophy of history1 the purification of historical materialism from all traces of any a priori standpoint 7whether inherited from ,hegelianism or an infection from ordinary evolutionism7 and the understanding of the theory as a simple1 albeit a fruitful1 canon of historical interpretation4 #c4 ,in regard to practical matters1 the impossibility of inferring the ,marxian social programme 7or1 indeed1 any other social programme7 from the propositions of pure science1 since the appraisement of social programmes must be a matter of empirical observations and practical convictions2 in which connection the ,marxian programme cannot but appear one of the noblest and boldest and also one of those which obtain most support from the objective conditions of existing society4 #d4 ,in regard to ethics1 the abandonment of the legend of the intrinsic immorality or of the intrinsic anti-ethical character of ,marxism4 ,i will add a remark on the second point4 ,many will think that if historical materialism is reduced to the limits within which we have confined it1 it will not only no longer be a legitimate and real scientific theory 7which we are indeed prepared to grant7 but will actually lose all importance whatever1 and against this second conclusion we once more1 as we have done already on another occasion1 make vigorous protest4 ,undoubtedly the horror expressed by some for pure science and for abstractions is inane1 since these intellectual methods are indispensable for the very knowledge of concrete reality2 but no less inane is the complete and exclusive worship of abstract propositions1 of definitions1 of theorems1 of corollaries3 almost as if these constituted a sort of aristocracy of human thought4 ,well6 the economic purists 7not to draw examples from other fields1 though numbers could be found in pure mathematics7 prove to us1 in fact1 that the discovery of scientific theorems1--strictly1 unimpeachably scientific1--is frequently neither an over-important nor over-difficult matter4 ,to be convinced thereof we need only remark how many eponimi of new theorems issue from every corner of the ,german or ,english schools4 ,and concrete reality1 i4e4 the very world in which we live and move1 and which it concerns us somewhat to know1 slips out1 unseizable1 from the broad-meshed net of abstractions and hypotheses4 ,marx1 as a sociologist1 has in truth not given us carefully worked out definitions of social phenomena1 such as may be found in the books of so many contemporary sociologists1 of the ,germans ,simmel and ,stammler1 or of the ,frenchman ,durckheim2 but he teaches us1 although it is with statements approximate in content and paradoxical in form1 to penetrate to what society is in its actual truth4 ,nay1 from this point of view1 ,i am surprised that no one has thought of calling him 'the most notable successor of the ,italian ,niccolo ,machiavelli'2 a ,machiavelli of the labour movement4 ,and ,i will also add a remark on the third point--if the social programme of ,marxism cannot be wholly included in ,marxian science1 or in any other science1 no more can the daily practice of socialist politics be1 in its turn1 wholly included in the general principles of the programme1 which programme1 if we analyse it1 determines 7#a7 an ultimate end1 7the technical organisation of society72 7#b7 an impulse1 based on history1 towards this end1 found in the objective tendencies of modern society 7the necessity for the abolition of capitalism and for a communistic organisation1 as the one possible form of progress72 7#c7 a method 7to accelerate the final phases of the bourgeoisie1 and to educate politically the class destined to succeed them74 ,marx1 owing to his political insight1 has for many years in a striking manner1 joined with1 and guided by his advice and his work1 the international socialist movement2 but he could not give precepts and dogmas for every contingency and complication that history might produce4 ,now the continuation of ,marx's political work is much more difficult than the continuation of his scientific work4 ,and1 if1 in continuing the latter1 the so-called ,marxians have sometimes fallen into a scientific dogmatism little to be admired1 some recent occurrences remind us of the danger1 that the continuation of the former may also degenerate into a dogmatism with the worst effects1 i4e4 a political dogmatism4 ,this gives food for thought to all the more cautious ,marxians1 amongst whom are ,kautsky and ,bernstein in ,germany1 and ,sorel in ,france2 ,labriola's new book1 too1 contains serious warnings on the matter4 ,november1 #ahig4 ,,footnotes3 #ac ',an immense monograph' 7of economics understood7 it is called by ,professor ,antonio ,labriola1 the most notable of the ,italian ,marxians1 in his recent book 7,discorrendo di filosophia e socialismo1 ,rome1 ,loescher1 #ahih74 ,but in an earlier work 7,in ,memoria del ',manifesto dei ,comunisti'1 #bnd ed4 ,rome1 #ahie1 p4 #cf7 he defined it as 'a philosophy of history'4 #ad ,i leave out those who regard the law of labour-value as the general law of value4 ,the refutation is obvious4 ,how could it ever be 'general' when it leaves out of account a whole category of economic goods1 that is the goods which cannot be increased by labour8 #ae ,,werner ,,sombart3 ,zur ,kritik des oekonomischen ,systems von ,karl ,marx 7in the ,archiv fr soziale ,gesetzgebung und ,statistik ,vol4 ,,vii1 #ahid1 pp4 #eee-eid74 ,i have not by me the criticism 7from the ,hedonistic point of view7 of this article by ,sombart--on the third volume of ,das ,kapital--made last year by ,,bohm ,,bawerk in the ,miscellany in honour of ,knies4 #af ,loc4 cit41 p4 #ega1 et seq4 #ag ,in the ,neue ,zeit xiv4 vol4 #a1 pp4 #d-aa1 #cg-dd1 ,i quote from the ,italian translation3 ,dal terzo volume del ',capitale1' preface and notes by ,f4 ,engels1 ,rome #ahif1 p4 #ci4 #ah ,sur la thorie ,marxiste de la valeur 7in the ,journal des ,economistes1 number for ,march #ahig1 pp4 #bbb-ca1 see p4 #bbh74 #ai ,discorrendo di socialismo e di filosophia1 p4 #ba4 #bj ,it must be carefully noticed that what ,i call a concrete fact may still not be a fact which is empirically real1 but a fact made by us hypothetically and entirely imaginary or a fact partially empirical1 i4e4 existing partially in empirical reality4 ,we shall see later on that ,marx's typical premise belongs properly to this second class4 #ba ,i accept the term employed by ,labriola so much the more readily since it is the same as that used by me a year ago4 ,see ,essay on ,loria 7,materialismio ,storico1 pp4 #dh-ej74 #bb ,in making an hypothesis of this nature1 ,marx distinguished clearly that1 in such a case1 'labour-time would serve a double purpose3 on the one hand as standard of value1 on the other as a standard of the individual share reckoned to each producer in the common labour' 7andrerseits dient die ,arbeitzeit zugleich als ,mass des individuellen ,antheils des ,producenten an der ,gemeinarbeit1 und daher auch an dem individuell verzehrbaren ,theil des ,gemein products73 ,see ,das ,kapital ,i1 p4 #de4 #bc ,this is a different thing from the workmen or operatives in our capitalist society1 who form a class1 i4e4 a portion of economic society and not economic society in general and in the abstract1 producing goods which can be increased by labour4 #bd ,it may be doubted whether this general application of labour-value to every working economic society was included in the ideas of ,marx and ,engels1 when the numerous passages are recalled in which one or other has declared many times that in the future communistic society the criterion of value will disappear and production will be based on social utility1 cf4 ,engels as early as in the ,umrisse #ahdd1 7,italian translation in ,critica sociale a4 v4 #ahie7 ,marx1 ,misre de la philosophie1 #bnd ed4 ,paris1 ,giard et ,brire4 #ahif1 p4 #hc2 ,engels ,antidhring1 p4 #cce4 ,but this must be understood in the sense that1 not being a hypothetical communistic society based on exchange1 the function of value 7in exchange7 would lose1 according to them1 its practical importance2 but not in the other sense that in the opinion of the communistic society the value of goods would no longer equal the labour which they cost to society4 ,because even in such a system of economic organisation1 value-labour would be the economic law which entirely governed the valuation of individual commodities1 produced by labour4 ,there would be that clearness of valuation which ,marx describes in his ,robinsonia1 cf4 ,das ,kapital1 p4 #dc4 #be ,dal terzo volume del ',capitale1' pp4 #db-ee4 #bf ,hence also ,marx in #d of ,chap4 ,i43 ,der ,fetischcharakter der ,waare und sein ,geheimniss 7,i4 pp4 #cg-ej7 gave a brief outline of the other economic systems of medival society1 and of the domestic system3 ',aller ,mysticismus der ,waarenwelt1 all der ,zauber und ,spuk1 welcher ,arbeitsprodukte auf grundlage der ,waarenproduktion umnebelt1 verschwindet daher sofort1 sobal wir zu anderen ,producktions formen flchten' 7p4 #db74 ,the relation between value and labour appears more clearly in the less complex economic systems1 because less opposed and obscured by other facts4 #bg ,das ,kapital1 ,book ,,iii41 sec4 ,,iii41 ,chaps4 ,,xiii41 ,,xiv41 ,,xv41 ,gesetz des tendentiellen ,falls der ,profitrate 7vol4 iii41 ,part ,i1 pp4 #aia-bdi74 #bh ,the task of ,marx's followers ought to be to free his thought from the literary form which he adopts1 to study again the questions which he propounds1 and to work them out with new and more accurate statements1 and with fresh historical illustrations4 ,in this alone can scientific progress consist4 ,the expositions made hitherto of ,marx's system1 are merely materials2 and some 7like ,aveling's7 consist entirely in a series of little summaries1 which follow the original chapter by chapter and prove even more obscure4 ,for the law of the fall in the rate of profits1 see below1 chap4 ,v4 #bi ',to follow out completely this criticism of bourgeois economics a knowledge of the capitalist form of production1 exchange and distribution is not alone adequate4 ,we ought similarly to study at least in their essential features and taken as terms of comparison1 the other forms which have preceded it in time1 or exist alongside of it in less developed countries4 ,such an investigation and comparison has hitherto been briefly expounded only by ,marx2 and we owe almost entirely to his researches what we know about pre-bourgeois theoretical economics4' 7,,engels1 ,antidhring1 p4 #aed74 ,this was written by ,engels twenty years ago2 and since then the literature of economic history has grown remarkably1 but historical research has been seldom accompanied by theoretical research4 #cj ',political economy is essentially an historical science4' 7,,engels1 l4c41 p4 #aej74 #ca ,what is strange is that ,,engels 7in the passage quoted in the penultimate note7 says himself most truly that ,marx has written theoretical economics1 nevertheless in the sentence quoted in the last note 7which appears in the same book and on the same page7 he states definitely that economics in the ,marxian sense is nothing but an historical science4 #cb ,antidhring1 pp4 #aej1 #aee4 #cc ,das ,kapital1 ,i1 p4 #fg4 #cd ,f4,a4 ,,lange1 ,die ,arbeiterfrage1 #eth ed41 ,winterthur1 #ahid1 7the author's last revision was in #ahgd7 see p4 #ccb2 cf4 p4 #bdh and on p4 #abd1 the quotation from ,gossen's book1 then very little known4 #ce ,,adolf ,,wagner1 ,grundlegung der politischen oekonomie1 #crd ,ed41 ,leipzig1 #ahib1 vol4 ,i1 pt4 ,i2 ,bk4 ,i1 ch4 i4 ,die ,wirthschaftliche ,natur des ,menschen1 pp4 #gj-acg4 #cf ,i may be allowed to remark that in similar discussions1 economists usually make the serious mistake of making the concept economic coincide with the concept egoistic4 ,but the economic is an independent sphere of human activity1 in addition to all the others1 such as the spheres of ethics1 sthetics1 logic1 etc4 ,the moral goods and the satisfaction of the higher moral needs of man1 just because they are goods1 and needs1 are taken into account in economics1 but still only as goods and needs1 not as moral or immoral1 egoistic or altruistic4 ,in like manner1 a manifestation 7by words or by any other means of expression7 is taken into account in sthetics2 but only as a manifestation not as true1 false1 moral1 immoral1 useful1 harmful1 etc4 ,economists are still impressed by the fact that ,adam ,smith wrote one book of theory and of ethics1 and another of economic theory2 which may interpret to mean that one dealt with a theory of altruistic facts and the other with one of egoistic facts4 ,but if this had been so1 ,adam ,smith would have discussed1 in both of his chief works1 facts of an ethical character1 estimable or reprehensible2 and would not have been an economist at all2 a ridiculous conclusion which is a reductio ad absurdum of the identification of economic action with egoism4 #cg ,discorrendo di socialismo e di filesophia1 l4 vi4 #ch ,it is strange how among the students of pure economics also this need for a different treatment makes itself felt1 leading them to contradictory statements and to insuperable perplexities4 ,,pantaleoni1 ,princip di economia pura1 ,florence1 ,barbara1 #ahhi1 p4 #c1 ,ch4 iii #c 7pp4 #bii-cjb71 contradicts ,bhm-,bawerk1 inquiring whence the borrower of capital at interest is able to find the wherewithal to pay the interest4 ,,pareto1 ,introd4 critica agli ,estratti del ,capitale del ,marx1 ,ital4 trans4 ,palermo1 ,sandron1 #ahid1 p4 xxx1 n43 ',the phenomena of surplus value contradicts ,marx's theory which determines values solely by labour4 ,but1 on the other hand1 there is an expropriation of the kind which ,marx condemns4 ,it is not at all proved that this expropriation helps to secure the hedonistic maximum4 ,but it is a difficult problem how to avoid this expropriation4' ,a learned and accurate ,italian work which attempts to reconcile the opinions of the hedonistic school with those of the followers of ,ricardo and ,marx1 is the memorandum of ,prof4 ,g4 ,,ricca ,,salermo1 ,la theoria del valore nella storia delle dottrine e dei fatti economici1 ,rome #ahid4 7extr4 from the ,memorie dei ,lincei1 s4 v4 vol4 ,i41 pt4 i47 #ci ,see above1 chap4 ,i4 #dj ,the over-abused ,dhring was not mistaken when he remarked that in ,marx's works expressions occur frequently 'which appear to be universal without being actually so' 7,allgemein aussehen ohne es zu sein74 ,kritische ,geschichte der ,nationalkonomie und des ,socialismus1 ,berlin1 #ahga1 p4 #ebg4 #da ,,gentile1 ,una critica del materialismo storico in the ,stud storici of ,crivellucci1 vol4 ,,vi1 #ahig1 pp4 #cgi-dbc1 throws doubt on the interpretation offered by me of the opinions of ,marx and ,engels1 and on the method of interpretation itself4 ,i gladly acknowledge that in my two earlier essays ,i do not clearly point out where precisely the textual interpretation ends and the really theoretical part begins2 which theoretical exposition1 only by conjecture and in the manner described above1 can be said to agree with the inmost thoughts of ,marx and ,engels4 ,in his recent book1 ,la filosofia di ,marx1 ,pisa1 ,spoerri1 #ahii 7in which the essay referred to is reprinted71 ,gentile remarks 7p4 #ajd71 that1 although it is a very convenient practice1 and in some cases legitimate and necessary 'to interpret doctrines1 by calling a part of their statement worthless or accidental in form and external and weak1 and a part the real substance and essential and vital1 it is yet necessary to justify it in some way4' ,he means certainly1 'justify it as historical interpretation1' since its justification as correction of theory cannot be doubtful4 ,it seems to me that even historically the interpretation can be justified without difficulty when it is remembered that ,marx did not insist1 7as ,gentile himself says7 on his metaphysical notions2 and did certainly insist on his historical opinions and on the political policy which he defended4 ,marx's personality as a sociological observer and the teacher of a social movement1 certainly outweighs ,marx as a metaphysician which he was almost solely as a young man4 ,that it is worth the trouble to study ,marx from all sides is not denied1 and ,gentile has now admirably expounded and criticised his youthful metaphysical ideas4 #db ,i confess that ,i have never been able to understand--however much ,i have considered the matter--the meaning of this passage 7which ought however to be very evident1 since it is quoted so often without any comment71 in the preface to the second edition of ,das ,kapital3 ',meine dialektische ,methode ist der ,grundlage nach von der ,hegel'schen nicht nur verschieden1 sondern ihr direktes ,gegentheil4 ,fr ,hegel is der ,denkprocess1 den er sogar unter dem ,namen ,idee in ein selbstndiger subjeckt verwandelt1 der ,demjurg des ,wirklichen1 das nur seine ussere ,erscheinung bildet4 ,bei mir ist umgekehrt das ,ideelle nichts ,andres als das im ,menschenkopf umgesetzte und ubersetzte ,materielle4' 7,das ,kapital ,i1 p4 xvii47 ,now it seems to me that the ,ideelle of the last phrase has no relation to the ,denkprocess and to the ,hegelian ,idea of the preceding phrase1 cf4 above pp4 #ag4 ,some have thought that by the objections there stated1 ,i intended to deny ,marx's ,hegelian inspiration4 ,it is well to repeat that ,i merely deny the logical relation affirmed between the two philosophical theories4 ,to deny ,marx's ,hegelian inspiration would be to contradict the evidence4 #dc ,answers to several of the questions suggested above are now supplied in the book already referred to1 by ,,gentile3 ,la ,filosofia di ,marx4 #dd ,antidhring1 pt4 ,i4 ch4 xlii41 especially pp4 #ach-ade1 which passage is translated into ,italian in the appendix to the book by ,labriola referred to above3 ,discorrendo di socialismo e di filosophia1 cf4 ,das ,kapital1 ,i4 p4 xvii1 ',gelingt dies und spiegelt sich nun das ,leben des stoffs ideell wieder1 so mag es aussehen1 als habe man es mit einer ,konstruction a priori zu thun4' #de ,,lange1 indeed1 in reference to ,marx's ,das ,kapital1 remarked that the ,hegelian dialectic1 'the development by antithesis and synthesis1 might almost be called an anthropological discovery4 ,only in history1 as in the life of the individual1 development by antithesis certainly does not accomplish itself so easily and radically1 nor with so much precision and symmetry as in speculative thought4' 7,die ,arbeiterfrage1 pp4 #bdh-i47 #df ,with regard to the abstract classes of ,marxian economics and the real or historical classes1 see some remarks by ,,sorel in the article referred to in the ,journal des ,economistes1 p4 #bbi4 #dg ,g4 ,,gentile1 o4c4 in ,stud storici1 p4 #dba4 cf4 #djj-dja4 #dh ,labriola has indeed an exaggerated dislike for what he calls the scholastic3 but even this exaggeration will not appear wholly unsuitable as a reaction against the method of study which usually prevails among the mere men of letters1 the niggardly scholars1 the empty talkers and jugglers with abstract thought1 and all those who lose their sense of close connection between science and life4 #di ,discorrendo di socialismo e di filosophia1 l4 ix4 #ej ,in torno alla storia della cultura 7,kulturgeschichtein ,atti dell ,accad4 ,pont42 vol4 xxv4 #ahie1 p4 #h47 #ea ',if by ,christianity is meant merely the sum of the beliefs and expectations concerning human destiny1 these beliefs'--writes ,labriola--'vary as much1 in truth1 as in the difference1 to mention only one instance1 between the free will of the ,catholics after the ,council of ,trent1 and the absolute determination of ,calvin6' 7,l4c4 ix47 #eb ,without referring to the somewhat unmethodical work of ,westermarck1 ,history cf ,human ,marriage1 see especially ,ernst ,grosse's book1 ,die ,formen der ,familie und die ,formen der ,wirthschaft1 ,freiburg in ,b41 #ahif4 #ec ,this connection is shortly but carefully dealt with by ,,ingram1 ,history of ,political ,economy1 ,edinburgh1 ,a4 ,c4 ,black1 #ahhh1 p4 #fb4 #ed ,see1 amongst many passages1 ,,marx1 ,misre de la philosophie1 p4 #afg1 et seq4 ,,engels1 ,antidhring1 p4 #a1 et seq4 #ee ,on the hedonistic maxima1 cf4 ,bertolini-,pantaleoni1 ,cenni sul concetto di massimi edonistici individuali e collectivi 7in ,giorn1 degli ,econ41 s ,,ii vol4 iv47 and ,coletti1 in the same ,giornale1 vol4 v4 #ef ,in regard to this metaphysical use of the word science2 there even exists in ,italy a ,rivista di polizia scientifica6 ,and the metaphor may pass here also4 #eg ,cours d'conomie politique1 ,lausanne1 #ahif-g4 #eh ,cf4 also his criticism of ,marx already referred to3 p4 xviii4 #ei ,sauf l',angleterre1 o rgne le libre change principalement parcequ'il est favourable aux intrts de certains entrepreneurs1 le reste des pays civiliss verse de plus en plus dans le protectionnisme 74 #ifd47 #fj ,see the ,giornale degli economisti1 excellent in all its critical sections2 and especially ,pareto's chronicles therein4 #fa ,it may be remarked that in the difficulty of distinguishing the purely scientific from the practical lies the chief cause of the dangers and poverty of the social and political sciences4 ,and we may even smile at those scientists or their ingenious admirers1 who claim to accomplish the salvation of the social and political sciences1 by applying to them the methods1 as they say1 of the natural sciences4 7,an ,italian astronomer1 ingenuous as clever1 has suggested the formation of sociological observatories which1 in a few years would make sociology something like astronomy67 ,alas6 the matter is not so simple2 all sociologists intend indeed to apply exact methods2 but how can this application succeed when one advances per ignes or over ground which moves2 d'una e d'altra parte s come l'onda chefugge e s'appressa8 7,from both sides like the wave which ebbs and flows47 #fb ,see the preface of the ,german translation of ,misre de la philosophie1 #bnd ed4 ,stuttgart1 #ahib1 and now also in ,french in the reprint of the original text of the same work 7,paris1 ,giard et ,brire1 #ahif47 #fc ,the word communism is also more appropriate1 since there are so many socialisms 7democratic state1 catholic1 etc474 ,on the relation between the materialistic theory of history and socialism1 see ,,gentile1 op4 cit41 passim4 #fd ,pantagruel1 ,,iii1 #ci-dc4 #fe ,the absurdity of this interpretation will come out clearly if it is merely remembered that there are many cases in which the capitalist manufacturer pays for the labour of his workman1 a price higher than what he then realises on the market2 cases1 it is true1 where the capitalist is proceeding towards ruin and bankruptcy2 but which he cannot1 on this account1 always avoid4 ',marx part des recherches faites par cette cole ,anglaise1 dont il avait fait une tude approfondie2 et il veut expliquer le profit sans admettre aucun brigandage4' 7,,sorel1 art4 cit41 p4 #bbg47 #ff ,see in ,antidhring1 p4 #cjc1 the historical justification of class divisions4 #fg ,from among the many passages which support this interpretation1 cf4 ,antidhring1 pp4 #aeb-c1 #bjf and especially pp4 #fa-b1 and the preface to the ,german translation of ,misre de la ,philosophie1 #bnd ed4 ,stuttgart1 #ahib pp4 ix-x1 cf4 also ,labriola1 o4c4 ,lett4 ,,viii4 #fh ,see ,,labriola1 o4c4 l4 cit41 the remarks on the difficulty with which the theory of historical materialism meets owing to mental dispositions1 and amongst those who wish to moralise socialism4 ,one instance1 in some respects analogous to this which arises from the discussions on ,marx's ethics1 is the traditional criticism of ,machiavelli's ethics3 which was refuted by ,de ,sanctis 7in the remarkable chapter devoted to ,machiavelli1 in his ,storia della letteratura71 but which continually recurs and is inserted even in ,professor ,villari's book1 who finds this defect in ,machiavelli3 that he did not consider the moral question4 ,i have always asked myself for what reason1 by what obligation1 by what agreement1 ,machiavelli was bound to discuss all kinds of questions1 even those for which he had neither preparation nor sympathy4 ,can it be said1 by way of example1 to some one who is researching in chemistry3--,your weak and erroneous spot is that you have not gone back from your detailed investigations to the general metaphysical enquiries into the principles of reality8--,machiavelli starts from the establishment of a fact3 the condition of war in which society found itself2 and gives rules suited to this state of affairs4 ,why should he1 who was not cut out for a moral philosopher1 discuss the ethics of war8 ,he goes straight to practical conclusions4 ,men are wicked--he says--and to the wicked it is needful to behave wickedly4 ,you will deceive him who would certainly deceive you4 ,you will do violence to him who would do violence to you4 ,these maxims are neither moral nor immoral1 neither beneficial nor harmful2 they become one of the two according to the subjective aims and the objective effects of the action1 i4e4 according to the intentions and the results4 ,what is evident is that a morality which desired to introduce into war the maxims of peace would be a morality for lambs fit for the slaughter1 not for men who wish to repel injustice and to maintain their rights4 ',and if men were all good1 this precept would not be good1 etc41 etc4' says ,machiavelli himself4 7,principe1 ch4 xviii74 ,villari is also troubled by the old formula concerning the 'end which justifies the means' and the 'moral end' and the 'immoral means'4 ,it is however sufficient to consider that the means1 just because they are means1 cannot be divided into moral and immoral1 but merely into suitable and unsuitable4 ,immoral means1 unless as an expression in current speech1 is a contradiction in terms4 ,the qualification moral or immoral can only belong to the end4 ,and1 in the examples usually given1 an analysis made with a little accuracy shows at once1 that it is never a question of immoral means but of immoral ends4 ,the height of the confusion is reached by those who introduce into the question the absurd distinction of private and public morality4 ,i may be pardoned the digression2 but1 as ,i said1 questions which are really analogous re-appear now in connection with the ethical maxims of ,marxism4 #fi ,and it would be to the point to draw a comparison between the peasants' rebellions1 with which modern ,italy has supplied us with another example in recent years1 and the political struggles of the ,german workmen1 or the economic struggles of the ,trade ,unions in ,england4 #gj ,see in particular ,p4,i4 ch4 ix41 ,moral und ,recht1 ,ewige ,wahrheiten4 #ga ,see1 in particular1 ,,marx',s ideas3 ,ueber ,feuerbach1 in #ahde1 in the appendix to ,engels' book1 ,ludwig ,feuerbach und der ,ausgang der ,klassischen deutschen ,philosophie1 #bnd ed4 ,stuttgart1 #ahie1 pp4 #ei-fb2 and cf4 ,,andler in ,revue de metaphysique1 #ahig1 ,,labriola1 o4c4 passim and ,,gentile1 l4c41 p4 #cai4 ,from this point of view 7i4e4 limiting the statement to the theory of knowledge7 we might speak like ,labriola of historical materialism as a philosophy of practice1 i4e4 as a particular way of conceiving and solving1 or rather of over-coming1 the problem of thought and of existence4 ,the philosophy of practice has now been designedly studied by ,gentile in the volume referred to4 #gb ,some interpretations would be merely verbal explanations4 ,to some it will appear a very hard statement that socialism aims at abolishing the ,state4 ,yet it suffices to consider that the ,state1 among socialists1 is synonymous with difference of classes and the existence of governing classes1 to understand that as in such a case1 we can speak of the origin of the ,state1 so we can speak of its end2 which does not mean the end of organised society 7cf4 ,antidhring1 p4 #cjb74 ,the conception of the way in which capitalist society will come to an end demands no little critical working out2 on this point the thought of ,marx and ,engels is not without obscurities and inconsistencies 7cf4 ,antidhring1 pp4 #bhg et seq4 and p4 #big74 #gc ,see ,,ch4 ,,andler1 ,les origines du socialisme d'tat en ,allemagne1 ,paris1 ,alcan1 #ahig4 ,andler promises a book1 and is now giving a course of lectures on the decomposition of ,marxism4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,recent ,,interpretations ,,of ,,the ,,marxian ,,theory ,,of ,,value ,,and ,,controversies ,,concerning ,,them ,i ,labriola's criticism of method and conclusions of preceeding essays answered3 ,his criticism merely destructive3 ,tendency of ether thinkers to arrive at like conclusions4 ,i have always discussed frankly the views expressed in the writings of my eminent friend ,professor ,antonio ,labriola4 ,i am therefore glad that he has taken the same liberty with me1 and has subjected to a vigorous criticism 7in the ,french edition of his book on ,socialismo e la filosofia71#gd my interpretation of the ,marxian theory of value4#ge ,labriola has been impelled to this also from a wish to prevent my opinions from appearing1 'to the reader's eyes1' as a supplement1 approved by him1 of his own personal ones4 ,and though ,i do not think that 'to the reader's eyes' 7,i will however add intelligent readers71 this would be possible1 since1 ,i have always carefully indicated the points1 and they are neither few nor unimportant1 where we disagree3 yet being convinced that clearness is never superfluous1 ,i welcome his intention to make it still plainer that ,i am not he1 and that he thinks with his mind whilst ,i think with mine4 ,labriola rejects entirely the method adopted by me1 which he describes variously as scholastic1 metaphysical1 metaphorical1 abstract1 formal logic4 ,when ,i take pains to point out the differences between homo oeconomicus and man1 moral or immoral1 between personal interest and egoism1#gf he shrugs his shoulders1 he does not refuse a certain indulgence to this traditional scholasticism1 and compares me to the man in the street who speaks of the rising or setting of the sun1 or of shining light and warm heat4 ,when ,i firmly maintain the theoretical necessity for a general economics in addition to the heterogeneous considerations of sociological economics1 he taxes me with creating1 in addition to all the visible and tangible animals1 an animal as such4 ,and he charges me1 moreover1 with wishing to attack history1 comparative philology and physiology in order to substitute for all these the plain ,logic of ,port ,royal1 so that instead of studying examples of epigenesis which have actually occurred1 such as the transitions from invertebrates to vertebrates1 from primitive communism to private property in land1 from undifferentiated roots to the systematic differentiation of nouns and verbs in the ,ariosemitic group1 it might suffice to register these facts in concepts passing from the more general to the more particular1 in the series ,a a#a a#b a#c etc4 ,but ,i hardly know how to defend myself seriously from such accusations1 because it obliges me to repeat what is too obvious1 i4e41 that to make concepts does not mean to create entities2 that to employ metaphors 7and language is all metaphor71 does not mean to believe mythology2 that to construct experiences in thought1 and scientific abstractions1 does not mean to substitute either one or the other for concrete reality2 that to make use1 when needful1 of formal logic1 does not mean to ignore fact1 growth1 history4 ,when ,marx expounds historical facts ,i know no way of approaching him except that of historical criticism1 and when he defines concepts and formulates laws1 ,i can only proceed to recognise the content of his concepts1 and to test the correctness of his inferences and deductions4 ,thus ,i have followed this second method in studying his theory of value4 ,if ,labriola knows another and better one1 let him state it4 ,but what could this other one possibly be8 ,real logic8 ,in that case let us boldly re-establish ,hegel1 it will be the lesser evil1 at least we shall understand one another4 ,or a still worse alternative1 what monstrous empirical-dialectic or evolutionist method may it be1 which confuses together and abuses two distinct procedures1 and lends itself so readily to the lovers of prophecy8 ,or is it merely a question of new phraseology by which we shall go on humbly working1 more or less well1 with the old methods1 whilst detesting the old words8 ,or again1 is this dislike for formal logic nothing but a convenient pretext for dispensing with any vindication of the concepts which are employed8 ,marx has stated his concept of value2 has expounded a process of transformation of value into price2 has reconstructed the nature of profit as surplus value4 ,for me the whole problem of ,marxian criticism is confined within these limits3--,is ,marx's conception substantially erroneous 7entirely1 owing to false premisses1 and partially1 owing to false deductions78 or1 is ,marx's conception substantially correct1 but has it been subsumed under a category to which it does not belong1 and has search been made in it for what it cannot supply1 whilst what it actually offers has been ignored8 ,having come to this second conclusion ,i have asked myself3 ,under what conditions and assumptions is ,marx's theory thinkable8 ,and this question ,i have tried to answer in my essay4 ,what ,marx wished to do1 or mistakenly thought himself to be doing is1 ,i think1 of interest to criticism up to a certain point2 although the history of science shows that thinkers have not always had the clearest and plainest knowledge of the whole of their thought2 and that it is one thing to discover a truth1 and another to define and classify the discovery when made4 ,it may be allowed that he who confuses ideological with historical research thus best reproduces ,marx's spirit2 but in this case the work will be an artistic recasting or a psychological reproduction1 not a criticism2 and will gather up with the sound also the unsound portion of ,marx's thought4 ,to go into details4 ,labriola tries to prove the emptiness or vagueness of some of my definitions and the falsity of some of my reasoning4 ,i having asserted that capitalist economics is a special case of general economics1 ,labriola remarks1 'en passant1' that it is nevertheless the only case which has given rise to a theory and to divisions of schools2 and ,i acknowledge that ,i do not understand the point of this remark1 although it is said to be made 'en passant4' ,both ,marx and ,engels lamented that the ancient and medieval economic systems had not been studied in the same way as the modern4 ,thus there are conceivable at least three economic theories1 ancient1 medieval and modern1 and is it not lawful to construct a general economics2 i4e4 to study in isolation that common element which causes these three groups of facts to be all three denoted by a common name8 ,labriola then asks what this general and extra-historical economics can consist of1 and whether it can never be of service to the conjectural psychology of primitive man3 he jests after the manner of ,engels1 who in truth has sometimes joked too much during a discussion on serious matters4 ,is it incredible that ,i too should jest8 ,but ,i do not think there is occasion to do so6 ,he wonders at my insatiability1 because having accepted the hedonistic theories1 ,i wish to accept ,marx's theories too3 as though my entire proof was not intended to make it plain that the antithesis between these theories exists only in imagination2 and that ,marx's theory is not an economic system entirely opposed to other systems 7'quelque chose de tout--fait oppos' are ,labriola's own words71 but a special and partial inquiry2 and as though by hedonism ,i meant all the personal convictions1 philosophical1 historical and political1 of those who follow1 or say that they follow1 its guidance1 and not indeed only what follows legitimately from its axiom4 ,when ,i call the explanation of the nature of profits1 offered by the hedonistic school1 an economic explanation1 he inquires sarcastically3 ',could it possibly be non-economic8' ,but my statement contains no pleonasm3 the adjective economic is added to mark off the hedonistic explanation from that of ,marx1 which1 to my thinking1 is not purely economic1 but historical and comparative1 or sociological1 if it is preferred4 ,he wonders that ,i speak of a working society1 and asks3 ',as opposed to what8' ',perhaps to the saints in paradise8' ,but ,i have pointed out the opposition between a hypothetical working society1--i4e4 such that all its goods are produced by labour1--and a society1 economic certainly1 but not exclusively working1 because it enjoys goods given by nature1 as well as the products of labour4 ,the saints in paradise form another irrelevant jest4 ,i called ,marx's concept of surplus-value a concept of difference2 and ,labriola reproaches me for not being able 'to say exactly what ,i understand by these words4' ,and yet ,i am not in the habit of speaking or writing when ,i do not exactly know what ,i want to say2 and here ,i believe that ,i have clearly expressed a thought which ,i had exceedingly clearly in my mind4 ,let us take two types of society3 type ,a consisting of #ajj persons1 who1 with capital held in common and equal labour1 produce goods which are divided in equal proportions2 type ,b consisting of #ajj persons1 #ej of whom own the land and the means of production1 i4e4 are capitalists1 and #ej are shut out from this ownership1 i4e4 are proletarians and workmen2 in the distribution1 the former receive1 in proportion to the capital which they employ1 a share in the products of the labour of the latter4 ,it is evident that in type ,a there is no place for surplus value4 ,but neither in type ,b are you justified in giving the name surplus-value to that portion of the products which is swallowed up by the capitalists1 except when you are comparing type ,b with type ,a1 and are considering the former as a contrast to the latter4 ,if type ,b is considered by itself1 which is precisely what the pure economists do and ought to do1 the product which the #ej capitalists appropriate1 i4e4 their profits1 is a result of mutual agreement1 arising out of different comparative degrees of utility4 ,turn in every direction and in pure economics you will find nothing more4 ,the expropriatory character of profit can be asserted only when to the second society1 we apply1 almost like a chemical reagent1 the standard1 which1 on the other hand1 is characteristic of a type of society founded on human equality1 a type 'which has attained the solidity of a popular conviction' 7,marx74 ,profit 'is surplus-labour not paid for'1 says ,marx1 and it may be so2 but not paid for in reference to what8 ,in existing society it is certainly paid for1 by the price which it actually secures4 ,it is a question then1 of determining in what society it would have that price which in existing society is denied it4 ,and then1 indeed1 it is a question of comparison4 ,the following of ,labriola's assertions is not original1 but is nevertheless quite gratuitous3 ',pure economics is so little extra-historical1 that it has borrowed the data from real history1 of which it makes two absolute postulates3 the freedom of labour and the freedom of competition1 pushed to their extreme by hypothesis4' ,if ,i open ,pantaleoni's well-known treatise1 ,i read in the very first paragraph of the ,teoria del valore1 ,ferrara's fundamental theory that3 'value is above all a phenomenon of the economics of the individual or isolated person4' ,so little do the legal conditions of society enter into the necessary postulates of pure economics4 ,after which1 ,labriola ought not to be horrified if ,i have written3 'that ,marx has taken his celebrated equivalence#gg between value and labour from outside the field of pure economics4 ,he will ask me3 from whence then has he taken it8 ,and ,i reply3 from a special and definite type of society1 in which the legal organisation and the pre-supposed conditions of fact make value correspond to the quantity of labour4 ,labriola does not consider justified the comparison which ,i have drawn1 7metaphor for metaphor71 between the commodities which in ,marxian economics are presented as the crystallisations of labour and the goods which in pure economics might well be called quantities of possible satisfactions for crystallised wants4 ',hitherto--he exclaims--only sorcerers have been able to believe1 or to cause it to be believed1 that by desires alone a part of ourselves might be glutinised into any goods whatsoever4' ,but what does glutinise mean8 ,to obtain the commodity a costs us x labour of a given kind1 this is ,marx's congealed labour4 ,pure economics1 using a more general formula1 states that it costs us that body of wants which we must leave unsatisfied3 this is the form of congealment which pure economics might supply4 ,there is no question1 in the one case1 of an objective reality1 as ,labriola seems to think1 or in the other of an imagined sorcery2 but in both cases it is a matter of the literary use of imaginative expressions to denote mental attitudes and elaborations4 ,in this connection ,labriola1 as if to limit their range1 says that ,marx1 as an author1 belonged to the seventeenth century4 ,may ,i be allowed1 as a humble student of literature1 and the author of several investigations into the character and origin of seventeenth century style1#gh to protest4 ,seventeenth century style consists in ingenuity1 i4e4 in putting cold intellectuality into an sthetic form2 hence the forced comparison1 the lengthy metaphor1 the play on words and the equivocations4 ,but ,marx1 on the contrary1 misuses poetic expressions1 which give the content of his thought with unrestrained vigour4 ,we find in him just the opposite of seventeenth century style3 not a lack of connection between the form and the thought1 but such a violent embrace of the former by the latter that the unlucky form sometimes runs the risk of being left suffocated4#gi ,the reader will be tired of these replies to a negative criticism2 but negative criticism is nevertheless all that ,labriola offers us4 ,what is his interpretation of ,marx's thought8 ,or which does he accept1 out of those offered8 ,here ,labriola is silent4 ,it is true that on another occasion ,i believed that ,i discerned in his statement that 'labour-value is the typical premiss in ,marx1 without which all the rest would be unthinkable1' an agreement with my thesis4 ,but ,i see now that ,i must have been deceived1 and that the words must have another meaning2 which1 however1 warned by the unlucky attempt already made1 ,i shall not attempt further to specify4 ,in the meantime ,sombart has built castles in the air2 ,sorel has made hasty or premature elaborations2 the present writer has not understood 7see p4 #bbd74 ,are we then faced by a mystery8 ,our friend1 ,labriola1 relates 7p4 #ej7 a story of ,hegel who is said to have declared that one only of his pupils had understood him4 7,the anecdote1 ,i may add1 is recounted by ,heinrich ,heine in a much wittier manner74#hj ,is the same thing to be repeated with regard to ,marx's theory of value8 ,in truth1 though without wishing to deny the difficulty of ,marx's thought and of the form in which he expresses it1 ,i think that the mystery may be at length cleared up4 ,and ,i say this1 not only on account of my inward conviction of the truth of my own interpretation1 but also on account of the agreement in which ,i find myself with several critics1 who1 almost at the same moment1 and by independent methods1 have arrived at results nearly similar to my own4 ',or1 se im mostra la mia carta il vero1 ,non lontano a discoprirsi il porto4444'#ha ,a similar tendency shows itself in what has been written on the subject by ,sombart1 in #ahid1 by ,engels in #ahie1 by myself in #ahif1 by ,sorel in #ahig1 by myself more at length in #ahig1 and again by ,sorel in ,june of last year 7#ahih74hb ,certainly truth and falsehood cannot be decided by external signs1 the intellect being the only judge of them1 and a judge who allows scope for infinite appeals4 ,but nevertheless it is natural that under the circumstances pointed out above1 a feeling of hope and confidence must arise that the discussion is about to be closed1 that the problem is at length ripe for solution4 ,,ii ,meaning of phrase crisis ,in ,marxianism3 ,sorel's view of equivalence of value and labour mostly in agreement with view put forward above3 ,an attempt to examine profits independently of theory of value3 ,is not possible3 ,surplus product same as surplus value4 ,i think it opportune1 however1 to return to those elaborations of ,sorel1 which ,labriola summarily judges with such severity1 in order to make some remarks about them1 not in refutation but in support1 and to explain a certain point where there may seem to be disagreement between us1 which perhaps has no reason to exist4 ,but here ,i may be allowed to make a remark4 ,labriola is also waging war with ,sorel3 his book ,discorrendo1 etc41 arising out of a series of friendly letters to ,sorel1 which ,i undertook to edit in ,italy1 is published in ,french with an appendix directed against me1 and a preface directed against ,sorel4 ,the ground of the quarrel is especially in connection with the so-called crisis in ,marxism4 ,now if the crisis in ,marxism be understood as the assertion of the need for a revision and correction of the scientific ideas1 of the historical beliefs1 of the material of observed facts1 which are current in ,marxian literature1 well and good3 in such a crisis ,i too believe4 ,if it means also a change in the programmes and practical methods1 ,i neither agree nor disagree1 having never concerned myself with the subject in dispute4 ,if the danger is really existent the apprehension of which seems to obsess and disturb ,labriola1 that a crisis in ,marxism of whatever kind1 or the commencement of it1 may be neutralised by those to whose interest it is to lead astray and scatter the labour movement1 then provideant consules4 ,but whether there be crisis or no crisis1 whether purely scientific or also practical1 whether apprehensions are well-founded or imagined and exaggerated1 all these things have no connection with the questions raised by me1 which relate to the erroneousness of this or that theoretical or historical statement of ,marxism1 and the way in which this or that must be understood in order to be regarded as true4 ,this is my standpoint and on this ground alone ,i admit discussion4 ,i may be mistaken1 but this must be proved to me4 ,but if1 on the contrary1 the only answer vouchsafed to me is that the crisis in ,marxism results from the international reaction1 of which ingenious critics are taking advantage1 ,i shall be left it is true1 somewhat bewildered2 but ,i shall not on this account be convinced that the theory of value is true1 in the burlesque sense1 for example1 in which it is expounded by ,stern in his well-known propagandist booklet4 ,sorel at first supposes1#hc wittily enough1 that ,marx had built up different economic spheres1 the first of which 7that of labour-value7 is the simplest2 the second1 including the phenomenon of an average rate of profit1 and the creation of cost of production1 is more complex1 and the third1 in which is observed the effect of rent of land1 is still more complex4 ,in passing from the simple to the more complex sphere1 we should find again the laws of the preceding one1 modified by the new data introduced1 which would have given rise to new phenomena4 ,in his second article he abandons this interpretation1 being convinced that ,marx's ideal construction does not aim at supplying a complete explanation of the phenomena of economics by means of the increasing complexity of his combinations4 ,and1 in my opinion1 he did well to abandon it2 not only for the excellent reason stated by him1 that ,marx's inquiry does not include an entire system of economics1 but also because the process suggested by him does not explain why ,marx1 in analysing the economic phenomena of the second or third sphere1 ever used concepts whose place was only in the first one4 ,it does not explain what ,i have called the eliptical comparison1 and herein lies the difficulty of ,marx's work1 or rather of the literary statement of his thought4 ,if the correspondence between labour and value is only realized in the simplified society of the first sphere1 why insist on translating the phenomena of the second into terms of the first8 ,why give the name transformation of surplus value to what makes its appearance as the natural economic result of capital which must have 7from its very nature as capital7 a profit8 ,does ,marx offer an explanation connecting ground and consequence1 or does he not rather draw a parallel between two different phenomena1 by which the diversities illuminating the origins of society are set in relief8 ,but ,sorel now advances to precisely this conclusion1 borrowing a happy phrase from his first article3 that ,marx's work is not intended to explain by means of laws analogous to physical laws1 but only to throw partial and indirect light on economic reality4 ,the method which ,marx employs in his inquiry1 says ,sorel1 is a metaphysical instrument2 he makes a metaphysics of economics4 ,this expression may be satisfactory or not1 according to the different meanings given to the word metaphysics2 but the idea is accurate and true4 ,marx builds an ideal construction which helps him to explain the conditions of labour in capitalist society4 ,what are the limits of ,marx's ideal construction1 and in what do his hypotheses consist8 ,i have said that the concept of labour-value is true for an ideal society1 whose only goods consist in the products of labour1 and in which there are no class distinctions4 ,sorel does not think it necessary to eliminate as ,i have done1 the divisions of classes4 ,but1 since he writes3 ',marx1 like ,ricardo1 conceived a mechanical society1 perfectly automatic1 in which competition is always at its maximum efficiency1 and exchanges are effected by means of universal information2 and he supposed that the various sociological conditions are measurable in intensity1 and that the numbers resulting can be connected by mathematical formul2 hence in such a society1 utility1 demand1 and commerce in commodities are results of the divisions of classes2 value will not in consequence be a function of this condition1 although it is truly a function of the conditions of production2 utility1 demand1 can only appear in the forms of the function1 in the parameters referring to the social divisions4' ,since he1 ,i repeat1 does not in his hypothesis1 make labour-value dependent on the division of classes1 it seems to me that this is practically to leave out the fact of the division4 ,and it is perhaps clearer to omit it explicitly4 ,we should have then3 7#a7 a working economic society without differences of classes1 law of labour-value2 7#b7 ,social divisions of classes1 origin of profit1 which1 but only in comparison with the preceding type and in so far as the concepts of the former are carried over into the latter1 may be defined as surplus-value2 7#c7 ,technical distinction between the different industries requiring different combinations of capital 7different proportions of fixed and floating capital74 ,origin of the average rate of profits1 which in relation to the preceding type1 may be regarded as a change in1 and equalisation of1 surplus-values2 7#d7 ,appropriation of the land by part of a social class4 ,pure rent2 7#e7 ,qualitative differences in land4 ,differential rent4 ,which rents1 pure and differential1 present themselves1 but only in comparison with the preceding types1 as cut off from the amounts of surplus-value and of profits4 ,sorel agrees with me that the concept of labour-value1 obtained in the manner described1 is not only not a law in the same sense as a physical law1 but is also not a law in the ethical sense1 i4e4 one that could be understood as a rule of what ought to exist4 ,it is a law1 he says1 in an entirely ,marxian sense4 ,this ,i too tried to express when ,i wrote in my essay3 ',it is a law in ,marx's conception1 but not in economic reality4 ,it is clear that we may conceive the divergencies in relation to a standard as the rebellion of reality in opposition to that standard1 to which we have given the dignity of law4' ,it seems to me that the jurist ,professor ,stammler in his book ,wirthschaft und ,recht nach der materialistischen ,geschichtsauffassung1#hd has also made the mistake of interpreting ,marx's concept as an ideal law4 ,he is absolutely correct when1 in rejecting ,kautsky's comparison between the concept of labour-value and the law of gravity--which takes effect fully on a vacuum--whilst the resistance made by air leads to special results1 he maintains that this has nothing analogous to a physical law4 ,for him1 on the other hand1 ,marx's law is justified 7at least formally7 as an attempt at investigation into what in the judgment of economists1 granted the capitalist organisation of society1 may be objectively accurate4 ,subjective judgments may differ1 but that does not affect what ought to be an objective criterion1 to divide the true from the false4 ,but can an objective criterion ever be found within the sphere of economics8 ,anyone who has rightly understood the principle of hedonistic economics must answer no4 ,and if ,stammler brings forward such an idea1 it is because in his work he expressly intends to deny the originality of economic material and the independence of economics as a science4#he ,sorel believes that ,marx's method has rendered all the assistance of which it is capable1 and cannot aid the study1 which it is needful to make1 of modern economic conditions4 ,if ,i am not mistaken he means that the hopes of the ,marxians in regard to the fruitfulness of ,marx's method are futile1 and that the pages which he has written in the history of economics are practically all that can be produced by it4 ,a good part of the third volume1 in which ,marx shows himself a simple classical economist1 and the miserable and scanty output of ,marxian economic writings subsequent to ,marx1 would suggest that ,stammler's opinion is justified by the facts4 ,but1 whilst ,sorel's book seems to me welcome in the endeavour to understand and define the score of ,marx's economic inquiries1 ,i cannot form the same judgment of another attempt made to reform the basis of ,marx's system by rejecting his method1 and a part of his results4 ,i refer to a recent book by ,dr ,antonio ,graziadei1#hf which has been much discussed during these last months4 ,graziadei's object is to examine profits independently of the theory of value3 a course already indicated by ,professor ,loria1 and the fallacy of which ought to be clearly evident at a glance1 without its being necessary to wait for proof from the results of the attempt4 ,a system of economics from which value is omitted1 is like logic without the concept1 ethics without duty1 sthetics without expression4 ,it is economics 444 cut off from its proper sphere4 ,but let us see for a moment how ,graziadei manages the working out of his idea4 ,in the first place he tries to prove that in ,marx's own work the theory of profits is in itself independent of that of value4 ,profits he says1 consist in surplus-value1 i4e4 in the difference between total labour and necessary labour4 ,hence it can be made to originate in surplus-value without starting from the form value itself4 ,but he himself destroys the argument when further on 7p4 #aj7 he objects that if labour is not productive labour it does not give rise to profits4 ,precisely for that reason--we answer--in order to be in a position to speak of labour which is productive1 ,marx must start from value1 and precisely for that reason1 in ,marx's thought1 the theory of profits and the theory of value are inseparably connected4 ,as to the construction1 on his own account1 of a theory of profits which is independent of that of value1 ,graziadei accomplishes this in a very curious way3 viz4 by carefully avoiding the words value and labour1 and by speaking instead only of product4 ,profits1 according to him1 do not arise out of surplus-labour or surplus-value1 but out of surplus-product2 hence we can1 and ought1 in theory1 to start from the concept of product and not concern ourselves with value1 which is a superficial growth of the final stage of the market4 ,surplus product6 ,but surplus-product1 in so far as it is an economic surplus-product1 is value4 ,certainly1 the capitalist who pays wages in kind1 and in getting back again the goods advanced by him1 also appropriates the other part of the product 7surplus-product71 can1 instead of taking this to market1 consume it himself directly 7as in ,graziadei's hypothesis74 ,but this does not alter the matter at all1 because the fact that the product is not taken to market does not mean that it has no value in exchange3 since it is true that the capitalist has obtained it by means of an exchange between himself and the labourer2 which means that he has always assessed its value in some manner4 ,and here we are again at the theory of value1 from which we have vainly attempted to escape4 ,moreover1 since ,graziadei is essentially concerned with the economics of labour1 here we are again at ,marx's exact concept of labour value4 ,tamen usque recurrit6#hg ,graziadei's book includes also some corrections of ,marx's special theories on profits and wages4 ,but ,i may be allowed to remark that the corrections to be called such ought to refer to the governing principles4 ,new facts do not weaken a theory firmly established on fundamentals2 and it is natural that1 with a change in the actual conditions1 a new casuistry will arise which ,marx could not discuss4 ,whatever forecasts he may have made in his long career as author and politician1 which the event has proved fallacious--,i do not believe he ever pretended3 ',sguaiato ,giosu 444 ,fermare il sole4'#hh ,april1 #ahii4 ,,footnotes3 #gd ,socialisme et philosophie by ,,antonio ,,labriola4 ,paris1 ,giard et ,brire1 #ahii1 see pp4 #bjg-bbd4 ,postscript to the ,french edition4 #ge ,see chap4 ,,iii4 #gf ,like an impenitent sinner ,i shall come back to this distinction1 which is essential for the solid foundation of the principles of economics1 and the evil effects of whose neglect are apparent in the discourses of economists4 #gg ,i write equivalence because ,marx writes thus1 and because for the present question this other is quite irrelevant3 viz4 whether the relation of value can be expressed in the mathematical form of a relation of equivalence4 ,but1 for my part1 and ,i follow the hedonists in this2 ,i deny entirely that the relation of value is a relation of equivalence4 ,the proof of this has already been supplied by others1 and there is no occasion to repeat it4 #gh ,see ,,croce ,giambattista ,basile e il ',cunto de li ,cunti1' ,naples1 #ahia2 ,ricerche ispano-italiane1 series ,i1 last paragraph1 7,atti dell' ,acc4 ,pontan2 vol4 xxviii1 #ahih72 ,i predicatori italiani del seicento e il gusto spagnuolo1 ,naples1 ,pierro1 #ahii2 ,i trattatisti italiani del 'concettismo' e ,baltasar ,gracian 7,atti dell' ,acc4 ,pontan2 vol4 xxix1 #ahii74 #gi ,,labriola--who reproduces ,marx's style very well here and there in his own--writes in his essay on ',das ,kommunistische ,manifest1' #bnd ,ed41 p4 #gi4 ',the ,manifesto 444 does not shed tears over nothing4 ,the tears of things have already risen on their feet of themselves1 like a spontaneously vengeful force4' ,the tears which rise on their feet may make the hair rise on the head of a man of moderate taste2 but the expression1 although violently imaginative1 is not in seventeenth century style4 #hj ,als ,hegel auf dem ,todbette lag1 sagte er3--,nur einer hat mich verstanden6 ,aber gleich darauf fgte er verdriesslich hinzu4 ,und der hat mich auch nicht verstanden6' 7,heine4 ,zur ,geschichte der ,religion und ,philosophie in ,deutschland4 ,bk4 ,,iii74 #ha ',now1 if my map shows me true1 we are not far from the sight of our haven4444' 7,ariosto1 ,orlando ,furioso47 #hb ,,sombart1 in the ,archiv fr soziale ,gesetzgebung und ,statistik1 vol4 vii41 #ahid1 pp4 #eee-eid2 ,,engels in ,neue ,zeit xiv41 vol4 i41 #d-aa1 #cg-dd2 ,,croce1 ,le teorie storiche del prof4 ,loria2 ,,sorel in the ,journal des conomistes1 no4 for ,may #aeth1 #ahig2 ,,croce1 ,per la interpretazione e la critica di alcuni concetti del marxism1 see in this volume chap4 ,,iii42 ,,sorel1 ,nuovi contributi alla teoria marxistica del valore1 in the ,giornale degli economisti1 ,june #ahih4 #hc ,in the article referred to1 in the ,journal des ,economistes4 #hd ,see pp4 #bff-h1 #feh-i4 #he ,see chap4 ,,ii4 #hf ,la produzione capitalistica1 ,turin1 ,bocca1 #ahii4 #hg ,graziadei will allow me to point out to him that it is not the first time that he has made discoveries that turn out to be equivocal4 ,some years ago when carrying on a controversy1 in the review ,critica sociale1 on the theory of the origin of profits in ,marx's system1 ,graziadei 7vol4 ,,iv41 n4 #bb1 #afth ,nov4 #ahid1 p4 #cdh7 wrote2 ',we can very readily imagine a society1 in which profits exist1 not indeed with surplus-labour1 but with no labour4 ,if1 in fact1 for all the labour now accomplished by man was substituted the work of machines1 these latter1 with a relatively small quantity of commodities would produce an enormously greater quantity4 ,now1 given a capitalist organisation of society1 this technical phenomenon would afford a basis for a social phenomenon1 viz43 that the ruling class being able to enjoy by itself alone the difference between the product and the consumption of the machine1 would see at their disposal an excess of products over the consumption of the labourers1 i4e41 a surplus-product1 much larger than when the feeble muscular force of man still co-operated in production4' ,but here ,graziadei neglects to explain how labourers could ever exist1 and profits of labour1 in a hypothetical society1 based on non-labour1 and in which all the labour actually done by man would be done by machines4 ,what would the labourers be doing there8 ,the work of ,sisyphus or the ,danaides8 ,in his hypothesis the proletariat would either be maintained by the charity of the ruling class1 or would end by rapidly disappearing1 destroyed by starvation4 ,for if he supposed that the machines would produce automatically a superfluity of goods for the whole of that society1 then he was simply constructing by hypothesis a land of ,cocaigne4 #hh ',as follower of ,joshua 444 to stop the sun4' ,,chapter ,v4 ,a ,,criticism ,,of ,,the ,,marxian ,,law ,,of ,,the ,,fall ,,in ,,the ,,rate ,,of ,,profits ,interpretation here given assumes acceptance of ,marx's main principles3 ,necessary decline in rate of profit on hypothesis of technical improvement3 ,two successive stages confused by ,marx3 ,more accurately a decline in amount of profit3 ,marx assumes that would be an increase of capital3 ,would be same capital and increase in rate of profits3 ,decline in rate of profits due to other reasons4 ,this law is set forth in the third section of the third book 7posthumous7 of ,das ,kapital4 ,a few criticisms have been made of it1 which vary from that of ,sombart1 who says that it is developed in the most striking manner 7in glnzendster ,weise71 to that of ,loria1 who defines it as 'a metaphysical pistol shot 7sic7 from beyond the ,rhine1' and thinks that he refutes it by an objection which is in fact quite inappropriate4 ,others have thought the law certainly true1 but that it explained only partially the fact of the decline in the rate of profits and required to be combined with other laws already known to classical economics4 ,but most of those who have studied ,marx's economic theories have not examined it at all2 his opponents 7like ,bhm ,bawerk7 reject it by implication1 when they reject ,marx's fundamental principles2 the ,marxians welcome it1 ,german fashion1 humbly and submissively1 without discussion1 with that lack of freedom and intellectual originality which is noticeable in all their writings4 ,the examination of it attempted here1 rests on the same basis as ,marx's theories1 i4e4 it is made from the standpoint of those who accept the essentials of these theories1 and hence the premiss of labour-value1 the distinction between fixed and floating capital1 the view of profits as arising from surplus-value1 and of the average rate of profits as arising from the equalisation1 owing to competition1 of the various rates of surplus-value4 ,it is true that ,i accept all these things in a certain sense1 which is not the sense of the ordinary ,marxian1 inasmuch as they are not looked upon as laws actually working in the economic world1 but as the results of comparative investigations into different possible forms of economic society4 ,but such a reservation1 which relates to a question discussed by me at length elsewhere1#hi has practically no effect on the present study1 whose results would be almost the same1 even if these theories of ,marx were interpreted in the sense which ,i consider erroneous4 ,the object here is no longer to determine and define accurately ,marx's fundamental concepts1 but to see whether1 from these concepts1 even when interpreted in the current manner1 it is ever possible in any way to deduce the law of the fall in the rate of profits4 ,this task ,i think impossible4 ,the law was derived by ,marx from the study of the effects of technical improvement4 ,marx states that technical improvement increases the amount and changes the form of the total capital1 increasing the proportion of fixed as compared with floating capital1 so that by this means the rate of profit is decreased2 the latter arises1 as is well-known1 out of the surplus-value1 the product of the floating capital divided by the total capital4 ,he illustrates the matter thus4 ,some technical improvement occurs2 new machines are made1 which formerly did not exist4 ,the capital employed in production has been hitherto1 we will suppose1 a total of #a1jjj1 divided into #ejj fixed and #ejj floating1 and employing #ajj labourers3 the surplus-value #ejj1 i4e4 the rate of it is #ajj per cent42 and hence the rate of profit is #ejj_/ajjj #ej per cent4 ,in consequence of the technical improvement1 and of the construction of new machines1 the #ajj labourers who are maintained by the variable capital of #ejj1 continue still to be employed in production2 but1 in order that this may be possible1 it is necessary to use a larger fixed capital1 which we may suppose #bjj larger than before4 ,hence1 as the result of the technical improvement1 there will now be a total capital of #a1bjj1 i4e4 #gjj fixed and #ejj floating2 and the rate of surplus-value remaining unchanged at #ajj per cent41 the rate of profit will be #ejj_/abjj about #da per cent41 i4e4 will have decreased from #ej per cent4 to #da per cent4 ,hence the necessary decline in the rate of profit on the hypothesis of technical improvement4 ,but this hypothesis is an actual everyday fact in modern capitalist society4 ,hence1 the actual decline of the average rate of profits in modern capitalist society4 ,but this law is more or less counteracted by other facts1 which act in a contrary sense more or less transitorily4 ,thus the fall is only a tendency4 ,in order that our study may be clear1 it is above all necessary to distinguish the two groups of facts1 or the two stages in the same capitalist society which ,marx confused and embraced in a single somewhat obscure view4 ,the first stage is marked by the fact1 pure and simple1 of a technical improvement4 ,now technical improvement1 among its logical1 or what is the same thing1 its necessary effects1 in no way includes that of an increase in the amount of total capital employed1 nor that of leaving the quantity of total capital unchanged4 ,it has rather exactly the opposite as its necessary and immediate effect3 i4e4 that of limiting the capital employed4 ,it is unnecessary to warn the reader that we are here treating of economic science and that increase and decrease refer always to economic values4 ,in its simplest form1 supposing the quantity of objects produced to be constant 7#bjj shoes are required1 and there is no reason to increase the production71 technical progress will consist1 purely and simply1 in a saving of social expense3 the same production at less expense4 ,and since all cost1 in ,marx's hypothesis resolves itself into social labour1 there will be the same production with less social labour4 ,if it were not so1 it would not be worth while to introduce this technical innovation2 there would be1 economically1 no improvement but either the status quo ante or a regression4 ,we must not take into account the other effects which would arise to increase production1 greater consumption1 increase of population1 etc3 additional and extraneous facts which are not considered here1 since we are concerned with the single fact of technical improvement1 all other conditions remaining unchanged4 ,and1 in such a case1 we cannot represent technical improvement with the increasing series of total capital which ,marx employs1 viz4 #aej1 #bjj1 #cjj1 #djj1 #ejj1 etc41 but with this decreasing one1 #aej1 #adj1 #acj1 #abj1 #aaj1 etc4 ,and to keep to the illustration used above1 if we suppose that the given technical improvement has caused a decrease of #a_/aj in the total social labour required1 we shall have in place of the original capital of #a1jjj a capital of #ijj1 no longer made up of #ejj fixed and #ejj floating1 but of #dej fixed and #dej floating4 ,the decrease must affect proportionally every part of the capital since all of it is1 in the final analysis1 a product of labour4 ,of the #ajj original labourers1 #a_/aj1 i4e4 #aj of them will remain unemployed3 a fraction of the original capital will remain unemployed2 the quantity 7or utility7 of the goods produced will remain the same4#ij ,when the description of the facts is thus corrected1 there is no doubt that the smaller total capital employed1 supposing on the one hand1 the rate of surplus-value to remain unchanged1 and1 on the other1 #aj of the original labourers to be working no longer1 would absorb an amount of surplus-value of #dej4 ,but the rate of profit would not on this account be changed2 or rather1 just for this reason the rate of profit could not be altered and would be expressed by #dej_/ijj 7as at first #ejj_/ajjj71 i4e4 it would be as at first1 #ej per cent4 ,this simplest case does not then give us ,marx's law1 but this other law2 ',technical improvement1 supposing all the other conditions remain unchanged1 causes a decrease in the amount 7not the rate7 of surplus-value and of profits4' ,this law assumes that the #a_/aj of the labourers left unemployed become entirely superfluous4 ,these ten labourers are henceforth to be a dead weight supported by the charity of others1 or to die of starvation1 or to emigrate--to a new world4 ,let them be left to their fate4 ,social production will remain at its former level1 thanks to the technical improvement1 but accomplished without their help4 ,this is the hypothesis2 but given this hypothesis1 of what importance is the law8 ,to see this clearly it will suffice to push the hypothesis yet further1 as we are entitled to do1 and suppose that the technical improvements continuing1 the employment gradually becomes superfluous1 not only of #a_/aj1 but of #a_/d1 #a_/c1 #a_/b of the labourers1 i4e4 that the employment of labourers tends to become #j4 ,in this case capitalist society as such would come entirely to an end1 since the utility of labour1 on which it is based1 would come to an end4 ,where there is nothing the ,king loses his rights2 and where labour has no utility the capitalist loses his4 ,the ex-capitalists would have no more workmen to impoverish1 but would be changed into the owners of automatic fountains of wealth2 like those fortunate mortals in the fable enriched by charmed knives1 by wonderful lamps1 by gardens producing with instantaneous and spontaneous energy all ,god's gifts4 ,in other words the law here resolves itself into a truism4 ,but ,marx did not think of this truism4 ,he wished to determine exactly the organic law of the variations in the rate of profits4 ,in fact--as is seen in the illustration given--he does not at all suppose that the energy of labour may become superfluous2 but rather that the labourers will find fresh employment with an increase in the original fixed capital4 ,given technical improvement and production also will be increased2 this is the second stage which he considers4 ,the #ajj labourers are still all working1 the fixed capital with which they work must be increased from #ejj to #gjj1 and the total has hence become #abjj4 ,the law which he deduces1 of the fall in the rate of profits 7in the illustration1 from #ej per cent4 to #da per cent47 is not a truism2 on the contrary it presents itself with all the importance and originality of a scientific discovery4 ,all den ends on seeing whether in the scientific discovery we have indeed--the truth4 ,the crux of ,marx's proof lies in the statement2 that the labourers who would have had to remain unemployed1 find on the contrary employment1 but with a capital increased by so much 7 #bjj7 over the original4 ,is this statement correct8 ,on what does ,marx base it8 ,to this fundamental proposition my criticism refers1 itself equally fundamental4 ,if it is admitted it amounts to a most complete denial of the truth of the ,marxian law4 ,nevertheless ,i state my idea in the form of a criticism and doubtfully1 because1 in dealing with a thinker of ,marx's rank1 it is necessary to proceed cautiously1 and to remember 7which ,i do not forget7 that several times errors ascribed to him have been explained as mistakes of his opponents4 ,for what reason1 ,i ask myself1 do the ten un-occupied labourers1 in order to be employed afresh1 require a constant capital larger than the original8 ,the technical improvement has not diminished the natural utility of the production 7also in our hypothesis it has not increased it either1 but has left it unchanged72 but it has only diminished its value4 ,there will be then1 with the improved technical organisation1 raw materials1 tools1 clothing1 foodstuffs1 etc41 of the same total natural utility as at first4 ,the economic value of all these products is diminished1 because in them 7to employ the metaphor chosen by ,marx71 is congealed a smaller quantity of labour1 i4e4 less by the work of ten labourers4 ,but from the point of view of power to satisfy wants1 the raw materials1 the tools1 the clothing1 the means of sustenance1 etc41 remain1 in virtue of the technical improvement1 of the same rank as at first4 ,if then capitalists and workpeople have remained as temperate as before1 and their standard of life has not risen 7and this is in the hypothesis71 the production will offer as at first means of employment and means of sustenance for the ten labourers left unoccupied4 ,by re-employing them1 i4e4 maintaining them with the original means of subsistence1 and setting them to work on the original raw materials or their new products1 the capitalists will increase their production1 or--what is the same thing--will improve its quality4 ,but since we know that1 economically1 the value of that capital has diminished1 it will come about that a capital economically smaller will absorb the same energy of labour as formerly1 i4e4 the same amount of profits2 and an equal amount of profits with a smaller total capital means an increased rate of profits4 ,exactly the opposite to what ,marx thought it possible to prove4 ,turning to our illustration1 the ten labourers will find employment with a capital which1 like the utility1 has remained the same1 but economically has decreased to #ijj4 ,this means that the rate of profits has increased from #ejj_/ajjj to #ejj_/ijj1 i4e4 from #ej per cent4 to about #ee per cent4 ,as to the rate of surplus-value1 since the entire value of the total capital is reduced1 it must no longer be calculated1 as before the technical improvement1 as #ejj_/ejj1 nor as in the first stage we considered 7in which the technical improvement had made a portion of the labour entirely superfluous7 as #dej_/dej1 but as #ejj_/dej1 i4e4 it will no longer be #ajj per cent41 but will have risen to about #aaa per cent4 ,to this criticism of mine ,i have found no answer1 either explicit or implicit1 in ,marx's work4 ,only in one passage1 where he speaks of the counteracting causes1 and in particular of surplus population 7,chap1 ,,xiv41 iv471 he hints at the case where labour power may be re-employed with a minimum capital4 ,it may be said that here ,marx passed close to the difficulty1 without striking upon it1 i4e4 without becoming aware of its importance4 ,and1 if he had struck on it1 ,i doubt whether he would have overcome it and passed on2 ,i think rather that his theory would have gone to pieces4 ,i foresee that it may be said3 you have assumed that1 owing to the technical improvement1 not only would a number of labourers remain unemployed1 but also a fraction of the original total capital1 i4e4 of means of production and means of subsistence2 and when the labourers are re-employed1 it is true that during the new cycle of production1 other fractions of unoccupied capital will not unite with the original fractions1 but precisely for this reason the quantity of production which will result will be increased1 and in the next cycle of production a still greater fraction of unoccupied capital will add itself1 unless the ten labourers do not continue to be re-employed1 in which case the un-occupied fraction will be smaller1 but the increase will become constant4 ,now all these means of production and of sustenance will not be consumed 7or will be partially consumed and partially saved71 by the capitalist class1 and hence there will be an increasing accumulation4 ,the quantities of goods saved1 owing to the impulsion of economic interest will not remain un-used in warehouses or strong boxes1 but will be thrown on the market as capital seeking employment4 ,this will increase the rate of wages1 and hence will have a depressing effect on the rate of profits4 ,very good1 but in such a case we are outside the ,marxian law4 ,the factor here considered1 is no longer technical improvement taken by itself1 but saving1 which may be1 as stated1 encouraged by technical progress1 but cannot be inferred from it4 ,for it is true that1 if we suppose the case of extravagant capitalists1 saving1 in spite of technical improvement will not take place4 ,and as technical improvement encourages saving1 so the latter1 in its turn1 by increasing wages1 encourages the increase of population1 and hence the reduction of wages1 and once again a rise in the rate of profits4 ,but1 when saving and the increase of population come upon the scene we are already within the sphere of the law of demand and supply1 i4e4 of ordinary1 accredited economics1 which ,marx despised as vulgar1 and out of dislike of which he devised his law of the fall in the rate of profits yielded by the above combination of capital owing to the effect of technical improvement4 ,i1 indeed1 believe that only the ordinary law of demand and supply can explain the variations in the rate of profit3 but to return to it is not indeed to defend ,marx's thesis1 but rather to ratify its condemnation4 ,however it is regarded1 this thesis seems to me indefensible2 and even more indefensible if1 leaving aside for a moment logical trains of reasoning and arithmetical calculations1 we look at it with the clear intuition of common sense4 ,see here--to follow the strict hypothesis set forth by ,marx--on one side a capitalist class1 and on the other a proletarian class4 ,what effect does technical improvement have8 ,it increases the wealth in the hands of the capitalist class4 ,is it not intuitively evident that1 as a result of technical improvement1 the capitalists can1 by anticipating commodities whose value is continually decreasing1 obtain the same services which they obtained at first from the proletariat8 ,and that hence the relation between value of services and value of capital will change in favour of the former1 i4e4 that the rate of profits will increase8 ,when commodities 7capital7 are anticipated1 which formerly were reproduced by five hours of labour and now are reproduced by four1 the workman will continue to work ten hours4 ,formerly with five there were ten2 now with four there is similarly ten4 ,the sponge costs less1 but the quantity of water with which it is saturated is the same4 ,how could ,marx suppose that after technical improvement1 the expenses of the capitalists would always increase1 so that proportionally profits would be in a state of perpetual decline1 and would end by making1 in face of the total costs1 a most wretched figure8 ,marx's mistake has been that he has inadvertently attributed a greater value to the fixed capital1 which after the technical improvement is worked by the same labourers as before4 ,certainly anyone who looks at a society in two successive stages of technical development1 will find in the second stage a greater number of machines and of tools of every kind4 ,this is a question of statistics1 not of economics4 ,capital 7and ,marx appears to have neglected this point for the moment7 is not estimated by its physical extension1 but by its economic value4 ,and economically that capital 7supposing all the other conditions remain constant7 must be worth less2 otherwise no technical improvement would have taken place4 ,an external circumstance which might serve to explain ,marx's error is the fact that the third book of ,das ,kapital is a posthumous work1 some parts of which are hardly sketched out1 and amongst these that of the law of the rate of profits1 which1 moreover1 does not relate to the establishment of principles1 but1 being a consequence and an application or these1 was perhaps not worked out to the same extent as the fundamental or central part of the theory4#ia ,it is probable that the author1 if he could have gone over his rough draft again1 would have materially modified it or entirely discarded it4 ,but perhaps some internal reason could also be found for this strange mistake1 in that ,marx always misused the comparative method without disclosing any distinct knowledge of his procedure4 ,and it might be that1 as already in his earlier investigations1 he perpetually transferred labour-value from a hypothetical society to the actual capitalist society1 so in this new problem he has been led to estimate the worth of the technical capital in a more advanced society at the rate of value of that in a less advanced society4 ,in this impossible attempt his method has here broken in his hands4 ,as we have disputed the actual basis of the ,marxian law1 it seems indeed superfluous to follow out its further developments1 which are advanced in a form worked out with but little care4 ,it is enough to remark that in these developments1 as in general1 throughout ,das ,kapital1 there is a continuous medley of theoretical deductions and historical descriptions1 of logical and of material connections4 ,the defect1 however1 becomes in this instance an advantage1 because many of the observations made by ,marx1 understood as historical descriptions of what usually happens in modern society1 will be found to be true and can be saved from the shipwreck1 as regards the theory of the law1 with which by chance they are feebly connected4 ,and it would even be possible to make such an investigation in respect to that very portion which we have disputed1 i4e4 to enquire what facts1 actually observed by him1 could have impelled ,marx to construct his law1 i4e4 to give of these facts an explanation which is theoretically unjustifiable4 ,marx attributed the greatest importance to the discovery of the law of the fall in the rate of profits4 ,herein lay for him 'the mystery over which all economists from ,adam ,smith onwards have toiled'2 and in the different attempts to solve the problem he saw the explanation of the divergence between the various schools of economists4 ,ricardo's bewilderment in face of the phenomenon of the progressive decrease in the rate of profits seemed to him fresh evidence of the earnestness of mind of that writer1 who discerned the vital importance of the problem for capitalist society4 ,that the solution had not been found before his1 ,marx's1 time1 appeared to him easily explicable1 when it was remembered that until then political economy had sought gropingly for the distinction between fixed and floating capital without succeeding in formulating it1 and had not been able to explain surplus-value in distinction from profits1 nor profit itself in its purity1 independently of the separate fractions of it in competition amongst themselves2 and that1 in the end1 it had been unable to analyse completely the difference in the organic composition of capital1 and much less1 the formation of the general rate of profits4 ,his explanation being now rejected1 a double problem presents itself4 ,the first question relates to fact4 ,it is needful to ask3 does the fact spoken of actually exist1 and how does it exist8 ,has a gradual decline in the rate of profits been ascertained8 ,and in which countries1 and in what circumstances8 ,the second question relates to the cause3 since1 whilst we have seen that there could only be one economic reason for the phenomenon1 7the law of demand and supply71 there may be several historical causes1 and these may vary in different cases4 ,the decline in the rate of profits may happen owing to a nominal increase in wages due to an increase in the rent of land1 or it may happen owing to a real increase in wages due to stronger organisation among the workpeople1 or it may happen owing to an increase1 also real1 in wages resulting from saving and from growing accumulations1 which increase the capital in search of employment4 ,this investigation must be made without prejudices1 whether optimistic or pessimistic1 apologetic or controversial2 and economists have sinned but too often in all these ways4 ,the listeners have seized upon the result of limited and qualified investigations1 now in order to sing a hymn to the spontaneous force of progress1 which will gradually cause the disappearance of capitalists or reduce interest to #a_/b per cent42 now in order to terrify their audience by a spectacle no less fantastic1 of landed proprietors as the sole owners of all the goods of society6#ib ,may #ahii4 ,,footnotes3 #hi ,see chaps4 ,,iii4 and ,,iv4 #ij ,we here suppose a series of productive periods already rapidly passed through1 which may suffice to replace the whole of the total capital by the new technical processes4 ,it is evident however1 that as fixed capital is replaced in successive portions1 in a first stage1 goods are used as capital1 whose cost of reproduction no longer corresponds to their original cost of production1 i4e4 whose actual social value no longer corresponds to the original one4 ,but to consider the separate stages would here cause a useless complication4 #ia ,the explanation of the way in which the average rate of profit arises belongs to the fundamental part of the third book of ,das ,kapital1 and ,marx must have thought it out together with the fundamental chapters in the first book4 #ib ,this is the case contemplated by ,ricardo in the celebrated #dd of chapter vi1 ,on ,profits3 ,marx appears to attach little importance to this case1 having complete faith in the continued technical progress of agriculture1 not to speak of other counteracting causes4 ,it is necessary to add that ,marx in conformity with his law1 maintains that the rent of land also has a tendency to fall1 although it may increase its total amount1 or its proportion in reference to industrial profits3 see vol4 iii1 #bbc-d4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,on ,,the ,,economic ,,principle ,,two ,,letters ,,to ,,professor ,v4 ,,pareto ,i ,need for more comprehensive definition of the economic principle3 ,reasons why the mechanical conception erroneous1 economic fact capable of appraisement3 ,cannot be scale of values for particular action3 ,economic datum a fact of human activity3 ,distinction and connection between pleasure and choice3 ,economic datum a fact of will3 ,knowledge a necessary presupposition of will3 ,distinction between technical and economic3 ,analogy of logic and sthetic3 ,complete definition of economic datum4 ,esteemed ,friend1 ,on reading the little paper1 which you were courteous enough to send me1 on how to state the problem of pure economics1#ic ,i at once felt a desire to discuss the subject with you4 ,other occupations have obliged me to defer the satisfaction of this wish until now2 and this has been fortunate4 ,the extracts from your new and still unpublished treatise on pure economics1 which came out in the ,march number of this ,review1#id have obliged me to abandon in part the scheme of thought which ,i had in mind2 for ,i saw from them that you had modified some of those points in your thesis1 which seemed to me most open to dispute4 ,i have on several occasions heard something like a feeling of distaste expressed for the endless discussions about value and the economic principle which absorb the energies of economic science4 ,it is said that if this splitting of hairs over the scholastic accuracy of its principle were abandoned1 the science might throw light on historical and practical questions which concern the welfare of human society4 ,apparently you have not allowed yourself to be alarmed by the threatened distaste of readers2 nor indeed am ,i4 ,can we silence the doubts which disturb us8 ,could we have assurance whilst silencing these doubts that we were not endangering just those practical issues which the majority have at heart8 ,issues which we ourselves have at heart since we are certainly not able1 like the monks of old1 to free ourselves from interest in the affairs of the age4 ,may not science be1 as ,leibniz said1 quo magis speculativa1 magis practica8 ,we must then go our way1 and endeavour to satisfy our doubts1 with all the caution and self-criticism of which we are capable2 since they cannot be suppressed4 ,on the other hand we should endeavour also not to offer our solutions to the public except when our knowledge1--wide if it may be so 7yet necessarily imperfect7--of the literature on the subject1 gives us some confidence that we are not repeating things already stated4 ,unless indeed1 other considerations make us think it opportune to repeat and to impress things which have been stated1 but without sufficient emphasis4 ,the new school of economic thought1 of which you are such a worthy representative1 has a merit of no small significance4 ,it has reacted against the anti-scientific tendencies of the historical and empirical schools1 and has restored the concept of a science of pure economics4 ,this means indeed nothing more than a science which is science2 the word pure1 unless tautologous1 is an explanation added for those who are ignorant or unmindful of what a science is4 ,economics is neither history nor discussion of practical issues3 it is a science possessing its own principle1 which is indeed called the economic principle4 ,but1 as ,i had occasion to remark at another time1#ie ,i do not consider that this principle whose fundamental character is asserted1 has hitherto been grasped in its individuality1 nor conveniently defined in relation to other groups of facts1 that is to the principles of other sciences4 ,of those conceptions of it which seem to me erroneous1 the chief ones can be reduced to four which ,i will call the mechanical1 the hedonistic1 the technological and the egoistic4 ,you have now rejected the first two1 because you think that mechanical and hedonistic considerations belong to metaphysics and psychology4 ,but ,i acknowledge that ,i am dissatisfied with your method of arriving at this praiseworthy rejection4 ,you no longer say1 indeed1 as in your previous essay3 ',l'conomie pure n'est pas seulement semblable la mchanique3 c'est1 proprement parler1 un genre de mchanique4' ,but you still say that ',pure economics employs the same methods as rational mechanics1 and has many points of contact with this science4' ,although you do not pause over the mechanical considerations1 it is not from a clear conviction that a datum in economics1 as such1 is quite different from a datum in mechanics2 but merely because it seems to you convenient to omit such considerations1 of which you do not deny1 but rather admit1 the possibility4 ,now ,i on the contrary1 say decisively that the data of economics is not that of mechanics1 or that there is no transition from the mechanical aspect of a fact to the economic aspect2 and that the very possibility of the mechanical point of view is excluded1 not as a thing which may or may not be abstracted from1 but as a contradiction in terms1 which it is needful to shun4 ,do you wish for the simplest and clearest proof of the non-mechanical nature of the economic principle8 ,note1 then1 that in the data of economics a quality appears which is on the contrary repugnant to that of mechanics4 ,to an economic fact words can be applied which express approval or disapproval4 ,man behaves economically well or ill1 with gain or loss1 suitably or unsuitably3 he behaves1 in short1 economically or uneconomically4 ,a fact in economics is1 therefore1 capable of appraisement 7positive or negative72 whilst a fact in mechanics is a mere fact1 to which praise or blame can only be attached metaphorically4 ,it seems to me that on this point we ought easily to be agreed4 ,to ascertain it1 it is sufficient to appeal to internal observation4 ,this shows us the fundamental distinction between the mechanical and the teleological1 between mere fact and value4 ,if ,i am not mistaken1 you assign to metaphysics the problem of reducing the teleological to the mechanical1 value to mere fact4 ,but observe that metaphysics cannot get rid of the distinction2 and will only labour1 with greater or less good luck1 at its old business of reconciling opposites1 or of deriving two contraries from one unity4 ,i foresee what may be advanced against this assertion of the non-mechanical nature of the economic principle4 ,it may be said3 ,what is not mechanical1 is not measurable2 and economic values1 on the contrary1 are measured4 ,although hitherto the unit of measurement has not been found1 it is yet a fact that we distinguish very readily larger and smaller1 greater and least values and construct scales of values4 ,this suffices to establish the measurability and hence the essentially mechanical nature of economic value4 ,look at the economic man1 who has before him a series of possible actions a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 f1 4442 which have for him a decreasing value1 indicated by the numbers #aj1 #i1 #h1 #g1 #f 444 just because he measures value1 he decides on the action a#aj1 and not on c#h or f#f4 ,and there is no fault in the deduction granted the existence of the scale of values1 which we have just illustrated by an example4 ,granted the existence3 but1 supposing this to be an illusion of ours8 ,if the man in the example1 instead of being the homo oeconomicus were the homo utopicus or heterocosmicus1 not to be found even in imaginative constructions8 ,this is precisely my opinion4 ,the supposed scale of values is an absurdity4 ,when the homo oeconomicus in the given example1 selects a1 all the other actions 7b1 c1 d1 e1 f1 4447 are not for him values smaller than a2 they are merely non-a2 they are what he rejects2 they are non-values4 ,if then the homo oeconomicus could not have a1 he would be acting under different conditions3 under conditions without a4 ,change the conditions and the economic action--as is well known--changes also4 ,and let us suppose that the conditions are such that1 for the individual acting1 b represents the action selected by him2 and c1 d1 e1 f1 444 those which he omits to do1 and which are all non-b1 i4e4 have no value4 ,if the conditions change again and it is supposed that the individual decides on c1 and then on d1 and then on e1 and so on4 ,these different economic actions1 each arising under particular conditions1 are incommensurable amongst themselves4 ,they are different2 but each is perfectly adapted to the given conditions1 and can only be judged in reference to these conditions4 ,but then what are these numbers1 #aj1 #i1 #h1 #g1 #f 4448 ,they are symbols1 symbols of what8 ,what is the reality beneath the numerical symbol8 ,the reality is the alteration in the actual conditions2 and these numbers show a succession of changes3 neither more nor less than is indicated by the alphabetic series1 for which they are substituted4 ,the absurdity involved in the notion of greater or smaller values is1 in short1 the assumption that an individual may be at the same moment under different conditions4 ,the homo oeconomicus is not at the same moment in a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 f 444 but when he is in b1 he is no longer in a2 when he is in c he is no longer in b4 ,he has before him only one action1 approved by him2 this action rules out all the others which are infinite1 and which for him are only actions not preferred 7non-values74 ,certainly physical objects form part of the data of economics2 and these1 just because they are physical1 are measurable4 ,but economics does not consider physical things and objects1 but actions4 ,the physical object is merely the brute matter of an economic act3 in measuring it we remain in the physical world1 we do not pass over to that of economics1 or else1 when measured1 the economic fact has become volatile4 ,you say that 'political economy only concerns itself with choices1 which fall on things that are variable in quantity and capable of measurement'2 but pardon me1 dear friend1 you would be much perplexed if you had to justify this wholly arbitrary limitation2 and if you had to show that the attribute measurabilility influences in any way the attribute of belonging to economics4 ,i think that ,i have explained1 shortly1 but adequately for a wise man like yourself1 the reasons why the mechanical conception of the economic principle is untenable4 ,if calculations and measurements come into problems that are called economic they do so just in so far as these are not problems in pure economics4 ,this non-mechanical datum1 which is an economic datum1 you call choice4 ,and this is all right4 ,but to choose means to choose consciously4 ,a choice made unconsciously1 is either not a choice or not unconscious4 ,you speak of the unconscious actions of man2 but these cannot be the actions of the man in so far as he is man but movements of man in so far as he is also animal4 ,they are instinctive movements2 and instinct is not choice except metaphorically4 ,hence the examples you bring forward of dogs1 of cats1 of sparrows1 of rats1 and of asses from ,buridano1 are not facts of choice2 and hence are not economic facts4 ,you consider animal economics as an unfruitful science1 which exhausts itself in descriptions4 ,look more closely and you will see that this science does not exist4 ,an economics of the animals1 understood in the sense of the naturalists1 has not been written1 not because it is not worth while1 but because it is impossible to write it4 ,whence could it be obtained unless from books such as the ,roman de ,renart and the ,animali parlanti8 ,this analysis ought to lead us to conceive of an economic datum as an act of man2 i4e4 as a fact of human activity4 ,and from this recognition is inferred in its turn the true criticism of the hedonistic conception of the economic principle4 ,you say that 'the equations of pure economics express merely the fact of a choice1 and can be drawn up independently of the ideas of pleasure and pain1' but you admit at the same time that the fact of the choice 'can be expressed equally well as a fact of pleasure4' ,it is true that every case of economic choice is at the same time1 a case of feeling3 of agreeable feeling if the economic choice is rightly made1 of disagreeable feeling1 if it is ill made4 ,man's activity develops itself in the human mind1 not under a pneumatic bell1 and an activity which develops rightly1 brings as its reflex1 a feeling of pleasure1 that which develops badly1 one of displeasure4 ,what is economically useful1 is1 at the same time pleasurable4 ,but this judgment cannot be converted4 ,the pleasurable is not always economically useful4 ,the mistake in the hedonist theory consists in making this conversion4 ,pleasure may appear unaccompanied by man's activity1 or may be accompanied by a human activity which is not economic4 ,herein lies the fundamental distinction between pleasure and choice4 ,a choice1 is in the concrete1 inseparable from the feeling of pleasure and displeasure2 but this feeling is separable from choice1 and may in fact exist independently of it4 ,if psychology be understood 7as it is usually understood7 as the science of psychical mechanism1 economics is not a psychological science2 this ,herr von ,ehrenfels fails to grasp4 ,i do not know whether you have read the two volumes hitherto published on the ,system der ,werttheorie4#if ,after devoting some hundred pages to psychological disquisitions--which ,i do not mean to discuss here--he wishes1 finally1 to prove that his definitions of value remain sound1 from whatever theory of psychology you start4 ,he does this as he asserts 7 #hg71 not because he is doubtful of himself1 but to safeguard his economic conclusions1 which are so important for the practical problems of life1 from unjustified attacks based on the standpoints of schools of psychology other than his own1 the method of the barrister1 who composes an apparent conclusion1 and makes several demands that are connected therewith subordinately4 ,it is true that there is no need for economists to spend their time on details of theoretical psychology2 so true that ,professor ,ehrenfels might spare us his3 but is it not true that economics remains the same whatever psychological theory is accepted4 ,the unity of science means that a modification at one point is never without some reaction on the others2 and the reaction is greatest when it is a question of the way of conceiving two facts1 distinct but inseparable1 like the economic and the psychical fact4 ,an economic datum is not then a hedonistic datum1 nor1 in general1 a mechanical datum4 ,but as the fact of man's activity1 it still remains to determine whether it is a fact of knowledge or of will3 whether it is theoretical or practical4 ,you1 who conceive it as choice1 can have no doubt that it is a fact of practical activity1 i4e4 of will4 ,this is also my own conclusion4 ,to choose something can only mean to will it4 ,but you somewhat obscure the conclusion now indicated when you speak of logical and illogical actions1 and place actions properly economic amongst the former4 ,logical and illogical bring us back to theoretical activity4 ,a logical or illogical action is a common way of speaking2 but it is not a way of speaking exactly or accurately4 ,the logical work of thought is quite distinct from the action of the will4 ,to reason is not to will4 ,nor is to will to reason2 but the will presupposes thought and hence logic4 ,he who does not think1 cannot even will4 ,i mean by willing1 what is known to us by the evidence of our consciousness2 not ,schopenhauer's metaphysical will4 ,in knowledge1 in so far as it is a necessary presupposition of economic action1 is found1 if not a justification1 an explanation of your phrases about logical and illogical actions4 ,economic actions are always 7we say so1 at any rate7 logical actions1 i4e4 preceded by logical acts4 ,but it is necessary to distinguish carefully the two stages3 the phenomenon and its presupposition1 since from lack of distinction between the two stages has arisen the erroneous conception of the economic principle as a technological fact4 ,i have criticised at length in other essays this confusion between technical and economic1 and ,i may be allowed to refer both to what ,i have written in my review of ,stammler's book ,wirthschaft und ,recht1 and to the more exact analyses in my recent memorandum on the ,estetica4 ,stammler maintains precisely that the economic principle can be nothing but a technical concept4 ,i would advise anyone who wishes to see at a glance1 the difference between the technical and the economic to consider carefully in what a technical error and in what an economic error respectively consist4 ,a technical error is ignorance of the laws of the material on which we wish to work3 for instance the belief that it is possible to put very heavy beams of iron on a delicate wall1 without the latter falling into ruins4 ,an economic error is the not aiming directly at one's own object2 to wish this and that1 i4e4 not really to wish either this or that4 ,a technical error is an error of knowledge3 an economic error is an error of will4 ,he who makes a technical mistake will be called1 if the mistake is a stupid one1 an ignoramus2 he who makes an economic mistake1 is a man who does not know how to behave in life3 a weak and inconclusive person4 ,and1 as is well known and proverbial1 people can be learned without being men 7practical or complete74 ,thus an economic fact is a fact of practical activity4 ,have we attained our object in this definition8 ,not yet4 ,the definition is still incomplete and to complete it we must not only cross another expanse of sea1 but avoid another rock3 viz4 that of the conception of economic data as egoistic data4 ,this error arises as follows3 if an economic fact is a practical activity1 it is still necessary to say how this activity is distinguished from moral activity4 ,but moral activity is defined as altruistic2 then1 it is inferred1 economic data will be egoistic4 ,into this mistake has fallen1 amongst others1 our able ,professor ,pantaleoni1 in his ,princip d'economia pura1 and in other writings4 ,the egoistic is not something merely different from a moral fact2 it is the antithesis of it2 it is the immoral4 ,in this way1 by making the economic principle equivalent to an egoistic fact1 instead of distinguishing economics from morality1 we should be subordinating the former to the latter1 or rather should deny it any right to exist1 recognising it as something merely negative1 as a deviation from moral activity4 ,a datum in economics is quite different4 ,it does not form an antithesis to a moral datum2 but is in the peaceable relation of condition to conditioned4 ,it is the general condition which makes the rise of ethical activity possible4 ,in the concrete1 every action 7volition7 of man is either moral or immoral1 since no actions are morally indifferent4 ,but both the moral and the immoral are economic actions2 which means that the economic action1 taken by itself1 is neither moral nor immoral4 ,strength of character1 for example1 is needed both by the honest man and by the cheat4 ,it seems to me that you approach gropingly to this conception of the economic principle1 as relating to practical actions1 which taken in the abstract1 are neither moral nor immoral2 when at one point in your last essay1 you exclude from economic consideration choices1 which have an altruistic motive2 and further on1 exclude also those which are immoral4 ,now1 since choices are necessarily either altruistic or egoistic1 either moral or immoral1 you have no way of escaping from the difficulty except the one which ,i suggest2 to regard economics as concerned with practical activity in so far as it is 7abstractly7 emptied of all content1 moral or immoral4 ,i might enlarge further on this distinction and show how it has an analogy in the sphere of theoretical activity1 where the relation of economics to ethics is repeated in the relation of sthetics to logic4 ,and ,i might point out the reason why scientific and sthetic productions cannot be subjects of economic science1 i4e4 are not economic products4 ,the reason given1 in this connection1 by ,professor ,ehrenfels1 is1 to say the least of it1 curious3 he remarks that3 'the relations of value upon which the data of logic and sthetics rest1 are so simple that they do not demand a special economic theory4' ,it should not be difficult to see that logical and sthetic values are theoretical and not practical values1 whereas economic value is a practical value1 and that it is impossible to unite an economics of the theoretical as such4 ,when1 some years ago1 the lamented ,mazzola sent me the introduction in which he had discussed ,economics and ,art1 ,i had occasion to write to him and afterwards to say to him by word of mouth1 that much more fundamental relations might be discovered between the two groups of phenomena2 and he urged me to expound my observations and inquiries4 ,this ,i have done in the essay on ,estetica1 referred to above4 ,i am sorry to be obliged to refer so many times in writing to you and to the public4 ,but here the need for brevity and clearness constrains me4 ,this1 then1 is a rapid statement of how ,i arrive at the definition of the data of economics1 which ,i should like to see at the beginning of every economic treatise4 ,the data of economics are the practical activities of men in so far as they are considered as such1 independent of any moral or immoral determination4 ,granted this definition1 and it will be seen also that the concept of utility1 or of value or of ofelimity1 is nothing but the economic action itself1 in so far as it is rightly managed1 i4e4 in so far as it is really economic4 ,in the same way as the true is thinking activity itself1 and the good is moral activity itself4 ,and to speak of things 7physical objects7 as having or not having value1 will appear simply a metaphorical usage to express those causes which we think efficacious to produce the effects which we desire1 and which are therefore our ends4 ,a is worth b1 the value of a is b1 does not mean 7the economists of the new school knew it well7 ab2 nor even as is said ab2 but that a has value for us1 and b has not4 ,and value--as you know--exists only at the moment of exchange1 i4e4 of choice4 ,to connect with these general propositions the different problems which are said to belong to economic science1 is the task of the writer of a special treatise on economics4 ,it is your task1 esteemed friend1 if after having studied these general propositions1 they seem to you acceptable4 ,to me it seems that they alone are able to safeguard the independence of economics1 not only as distinct from ,history and ,practice but as distinct from ,mechanics1 ,psychology1 ,theory of ,knowledge1 and ,ethics4 ,naples1 #aeth ,may #aijj4ig ,,ii ,disagreement 7#a7 about method 7#b7 postulates3 7#a7 ,nothing arbitrary in economic method1 analogy of classificatory sciences erroneous3 7#b7 ,metaphysical postulate that facts of human activity same as physical facts erroneous3 ,definition of practical activity in so far as admits of definition3 ,moral and economic activity and approval3 ,economic and moral remorse3 ,economic scale of values4 ,esteemed ,friend1 ,our disagreement concerning the nature of economic data has two chief sources3 disagreement on a question of method and disagreement on a question of postulates4 ,i acknowledge that one object of my first letter was to obtain from you such explanations as might set clearly in relief our disagreement on the two points indicated4--,to reduce controversies to their simplest terms1 to expose ultimate oppositions1 is1 you will agree1 an approach to truth4 ,i will explain briefly the two points at issue4 ,in regard to that of method1 although ,i agree with you in upholding the claims of a procedure that is logical1 abstract and scientific1 as compared with one that is historical 7or synthetic1 as you say71 ,i cannot in addition allow that the former procedure involves something of the nature of an arbitrary choice1 or that it can be worked out equally well in either of two ways4 ,you talk of cutting away a slice from a concrete phenomenon1 and examining this by itself2 but ,i inquire how you manage to cut away that slice8 for it is no question here of a piece of bread or of cheese into which we can actually put the knife1 but of a series of representations which we have in our consciousness1 and into which we can insert nothing except the light of our mental analysis4 ,in order to cut off your slice you would thus have to carry out a logical analysis2 i4e4 to do at the outset what you propose to do subsequently4 ,your cutting off of the slice is indeed an answer to the problem of the quid in which an economic fact consists4 ,you assume the existence of a test to distinguish what you take for the subject of your exposition from what you leave aside4 ,but the test or guiding concept must be supplied by the very nature of the theory1 and must be in conformity with it4 ,would it for instance be in conformity with the nature of the thing1 to cut away1 as you wish to do1 only that group of economic facts which relates to objects capable of measurement8 ,what intrinsic connection is there between this merely accidental attribute1 measurability1 of the objects which enter into an economic action1 and the economic action itself8 ,does measurability lead to a modification in the economic fact by changing its nature1 i4e4 by giving rise to another fact8 ,if so1 you must prove it4 ,i1 for my part1 cannot see that an economic action changes its nature whether it relates to a sack of potatoes1 or consists in an exchange of protestations of affection6 ,in your reply you refer to the need of avoiding waste of time over matters that are too simple1 for which 'it is not worth while to set in motion the great machine of mathematical reasoning4' ,but this need relates to the pedagogy of the professional chair or of the book1 not to the science in itself1 which alone we are now discussing4 ,it is quite evident that anybody who speaks or writes lays more stress on those portions which he thinks harder for his hearers and readers to grasp1 or more useful to be told4 ,but he who thinks1 i4e4 speaks with himself1 pays attention to all portions without preferences and without omissions4 ,we are now concerned with thought1 that is with the growth of science2 not with the manner of communicating it4 ,and in thought1 we cannot admit arbitrary judgments4 ,nor need we be turned aside by an analogy with the classes of facts1 made by zoology and other natural sciences4 ,the classifications of zoology and botany are not scientific operations1 but merely views in perspective2 and1 considered in relation to really scientific knowledge1 they are arbitrary4 ,he who investigates the nature of economic data1 does not1 however1 aim at putting together1 in perspective and roughly1 groups of economic cases1 as the zoologist or the botanist do1 mutilating and manipulating the inexhaustible1 infinite varieties of living creatures4 ,upon the confusion between a science and the exposition of a science is based also the belief that we can follow different paths in order to arrive at a demonstration of the same truth4 ,unless in your case1 since you are a mathematician1 it arose from a false analogy with calculation4 ,now1 calculation is not a science1 because it does not give us the reasons of things2 and hence mathematical logic is logic in a manner of speaking1 a variety of formal logic1 and has nothing to do with scientific or inventive logic4 ,when we pass to the question of the postulates1 you will certainly be surprised if ,i tell you that the disagreement between us consists in your wish to introduce a metaphysical postulate into economic science2 whereas ,i wish here to rule out every metaphysical postulate and to confine myself entirely to the analysis of the given facts4 ,the accusation of being metaphysical will seem to you the last that could ever be brought against you4 ,your implied metaphysical postulate is1 however1 this2 that the facts of man's activity are of the same nature as physical facts2 that in the one case as in the other we can only observe regularity and deduce consequences therefrom1 without ever penetrating into the inner nature of the facts2 that these facts are all alike phenomena 7meaning that they would presuppose a noumena1 which evades us1 and of which they are manifestations74 ,hence whereas ,i have called my essay ',on the economic principle1' yours is entitled ',on the economic phenomenon4' ,how could you defend this postulate of yours except by a metaphysical monism2 for example that of ,spencer8 ,but1 whilst ,spencer was anti-metaphysical and positivist in words1 ,i claim the necessity of being so in deeds2 and hence ,i cannot accept either his metaphysics or his monism1 and ,i hold to experience4 ,this testifies to me the fundamental distinction between external and internal1 between physical and mental1 between mechanics and teleology1 between passivity and activity1 and secondary distinctions involved in this fundamental one4 ,what metaphysics unites philosophy distinguishes 7and joins together72 the abstract contemplation of unity is the death of philosophy4 ,let us confine ourselves to the distinction between physical and mental4 ,whilst the external facts of nature1 admitted by empirical physical science1 are always phenomena1 since their source is by definition outside themselves1 the internal facts or activities of man1 cannot be called phenomena1 since they are their own source4 ,by this appeal to experience and by this rejection of all metaphysical intrusion1 ,i place myself in a position to meet the objection which you bring forward to my conception of economic data4 ,you think that the ambiguity of the term value comes from this1 that it denotes a very complex fact1 a collection of facts included under a single word4 ,for me1 on the contrary1 the difficulty in it arises from its denoting a very simple fact1 a summum genus1 i4e4 the fact of the very activity of man4 ,activity is value4 ,for us nothing is valuable except what is an effort of imagination1 of thought1 of will1 of our activity in any of its forms4 ,as ,kant said that there was nothing in the universe that could be called good except the good will2 so1 if we generalise1 it may be said that there is nothing in the universe that is valuable1 except the value of human activity4 ,of value as of activity you cannot demand a so-called genetic definition4 ,the simple and the original is genetically indefinable4 ,value is observed immediately in ourselves1 in our consciousness4#ih ,this observation shows us also that the summum genus 'value1' or 'mental activity' gives place to irreducible forms1 which are in the first instance those of theoretical activity and practical activity1 of theoretical values and practical values4 ,but what does practical mean8--you now ask me4 ,i believe that ,i have already answered by explaining that the theoretical is everything which is a work of contemplation1 and the practical everything that is the work of will4 ,is will an obscure term8 ,we may rather call the terms light1 warmth and so on1 obscure2 not that of will4 ,what will is1 ,i know well4 ,i find myself face to face with it throughout my life as a man4 ,even in writing this letter1 today1 in a room in an inn1 and in shaking off the laziness of country life1 ,i have willed2 and if ,i have delayed the answer for two months1 it is because ,i have been so feeble as not to know how to will4 ,you see from this that the question raised by me1 whether by choice you meant conscious or unconscious choice1 is not a careless question4 ,it is equivalent to this other one2 whether the economic fact is or is not a fact of will4 ',this does not alter the fact of the choice1' you say4 ,but indeed it does alter it6 ,if we speak of conscious choice1 we have before us a mental fact1 if of unconscious choice1 a natural fact2 and the laws of the former are not those of the latter4 ,i welcome your discovery that economic fact is the fact of choice2 but ,i am forced to mean by choice1 voluntary choice4 ,otherwise we should end by talking not only of the choices of a man who is asleep 7when he moves from side to side7 but of those of animals1 and why not8 of plants and why not again8 of minerals2 passing rapidly along the steep slope down which my friend ,professor ,c4 ,trivero has slipped in his recently published ,teoria dei bisogni1 for which may he be forgiven6#ii ,when ,i defined economic data as 'the practical activities of man1 in so far as they are considered as such1 independently of any moral or immoral determination1' ,i did not make an arbitrary judgment1 which might authorise others to do likewise1 in a science which does not tolerate arbitrary judgments2 but ,i merely distinguished further within the species practical activity1 two sub-species or grades3 pure practical activity1 7economic71 and moral practical activity1 7ethical72 will that is merely economic1 and moral will4 ,there is ambiguity in your reproach that when ,i speak of approval or disapproval as aroused by economic activity1 ,i am considering the matter from a synthetic instead of an analytic point of view1 and that approval or disapproval are extraneous factors4 ,i did not however speak 7and ,i believed that ,i had explained myself clearly71 of moral1 intellectual or sthetic approval or disapproval4 ,no1 ,i said1 and ,i repeat1 that a judgment of approval or reprobation was necessarily bound up with economic activity3 but a merely ,,economic judgment of approval or reprobation4 ',by saying that ,rhenish wine is useful to me1 has a value for me1 is ofelimo to me1 ,i mean only to say that ,i like it2 and ,i do not see how this simplest of relations can be well or ill-managed4' ,you will forgive me if in this sentence of yours ,i have italicised the words by saying4 ,here is the point4 ,certainly the mere saying does not give rise to an internal judgment of economic approval or disapproval4 ,it will give rise to a grammatical or linguistic1 i4e4 sthetic1 approval or disapproval1 according to whether the saying is clear or confused1 well or ill expressed4 ,but it is no question of saying3 it is a question of doing1 i4e4 of the action willed carried out by the movement that is willed1 of a choice of movement4 ,and do you think that the acquisition and consumption of a bottle of ,rhenish wine involves no judgment of approval or disapproval8 ,if ,i am very rich1 if my aim in life is to obtain momentary sensual pleasures1 and ,i know that ,rhenish wine will secure me one of them1 ,i buy and drink ,rhenish wine and approve my act4 ,i am satisfied with myself4 ,but if ,i do not wish to indulge in gluttony1 and if my money is all devoted to other purposes1 for which ,i wish as preferable1 and if1 in spite of this1 yielding to the temptation of the moment1 ,i buy and drink ,rhenish wine1 ,i have put myself into contradiction with myself1 and the sensual pleasure will be followed by a judgment of disapproval1 by a legitimate and fitting ,,economic ,,remorse4 ,to prove to you how1 in all this1 ,i omit every moral consideration1 ,i will give you another example3 that of a knave who thinks it ofelimo to himself to murder a man in order to rob him of a sum of money4 ,at the moment of assassination1 and although remaining a knave at heart1 he yields to an emotion of fear or to a pathological feeling of compassion1 and does not kill the man4 ,note carefully the terms of the hypothesis4 ,the knave will call himself an ass and an imbecile1 and will feel remorse for his contradictory and inconclusive conduct2 but not indeed a moral remorse 7of that he is1 by hypothesis1 incapable71 but1 precisely1 a remorse that is merely economic4 ,it seems to me that there is another confusion1 easy to dispel1 in your counter criticism to my criticism of the scale of values 7economic7 you say that 'there is no need for one person to find himself at the same moment under different conditions2 it is enough that he can picture to himself these different conditions4' ,can you in truth picture yourself being at the same moment under different conditions8 ,fancy has its laws2 and does not allow the imagination of what is unimaginable4 ,you can easily say that you picture it to yourself3 words are docile2 but1 to picture it in reality1 is1 pardon me1 another matter altogether4 ,you will not succeed in it any more than ,i4 ,ask me to imagine a lion with the head of a donkey1 and ,i will comply at once2 but ask me to imagine a lion standing at the same moment in two different places1 and ,i cannot succeed4 ,i will picture to myself1 if you like1 two similar lions1 two exactly alike1 but not the same in two different positions4 ,fancy reconstructs reality1 but possible reality1 not the impossible or what is contradictory4 ,thus my demonstration of the absurdity of the scale of values applies both to actual and to possible reality4 ,nay1 in discussing science in the abstract it was framed precisely on the mere consideration of the possible4 ,i do not know whether ,i have answered all your objections1 but ,i have endeavoured to answer all those which seem to me fundamental4 ,a dispute1 in which questions of method and of principle are at stake need not be carried on pedantically into minute details2 we must depend to some extent on the assistance of the readers1 who1 putting themselves mentally in the position of the two disputants1 work out for themselves the final application4 ,i wish merely to add that it is my strongest conviction that the reaction against metaphysics 7a far-sighted reaction in that it has freed scientific procedure from admixture with the arbitrary judgments of feeling and belief7 has been pushed forward by many so far as to destroy science itself4 ,the mathematicians who have a quick feeling for scientific procedure1 have done much for economic science by reviving in it the dignity of abstract analysis1 darkened and overwhelmed by the mass of anecdotes of the historical school4 ,but1 as it happens1 they have also introduced into it the prejudice of their profession1 and1 being themselves students of the general conditions of the physical world1 the particular prejudice that mathematics can take up in relation to economics--which is the science of man1 of a form of the conscious activity of man--the same attitude which it rightly takes up in relation to the empirical natural sciences4 ,from what ,i have now stated you will easily discover exactly how far we are in agreement in the establishment of the principles of ,economics and how far we disagree4 ,if my new observations should assist in further reducing the extent of the disagreement1 ,i shall indeed be glad4 ,perugia1 #bjth ,october1 #aijj4ajj ,,footnotes3 #ic ,comment se pose le problme de l'economie pure4 ,paper read in ,december #ahih to the ,societ ,stella4 #id ,giornale degli economisti1 ,march #aijj1 pp4 #baf-bce4 #ie ,rivista di sociologia1 ,,iii4 no4 vi41 pp4 #gdf-h1 see ,materialismo ,storico1 pp4 #aic-bjh4 #if ,,dr ,,christian ,v4 ,,ehrenfels 7,professor at ,prague ,university73 ,system der ,werttheorie1 vol4 ,i1 ,allgemeine ,werttheorie1 ,psychologie des ,begehrens1 ,leipzig1 ,reisland1 #ahig2 vol4 ,,ii1 ,grundzge einer ,ethik1 the same1 #ahih4 #ig ,,pareto answered this letter in the same journal1 ,giornale degli economisti1 ,august1 #aijj1 pp4 #aci-afb4 #ih ,i have before me ,professor ,a4 ,,graziadei's article ,intorno alla teoria edonistica del valore4 7,in ,riforma ,sociale1 ,september #aeth1 #aijj72 in which ,a4 fails to see how the purist theory of value dovetails in with the doctrines of ,psychophysics and ,psychology4 ,i can well believe it6 ,psychophysics and ,psychology are natural sciences and cannot throw light on economic fact which is mental and of value4 ,i may be allowed to point out1 that1 even three years ago1 ,i gave a warning against the confusion of economics with psychology4 7,see in this volume pp4 #gb-ge47 ,he who appeals to psychology 7naturalistic7 in order to understand economic fact1 will always meet with the delusion1 opportunely shown up by ,graziadei4 ,i have stated the reasons owing to which economics cannot dwell where the psychologists and hedonists say2 now ,graziedei has questioned the door-keepers 7,fechner1 ,wundt1 etc471 and has learnt that it does not dwell there4 ,well and good6 #ii ,,camillo ,,trivero1 ,la teoria dei bisogni1 ,turin1 ,bocca1 #aijj1 pp4 #aih4 ,trivero means by need 'the condition of a being1 either conscious or unconscious 7man1 animal1 plant1 thing71 in which it cannot remain'3 so that it can be said 'that all needs are ultimately condensed into the supreme need or end of being or becoming4' ,need for him is hence actual reality itself4 ,but since1 on the other hand1 he declares that he does not wish to solve nor even to consider the philosophical problem1 it is hard to understand what a theory of needs 7i4e4 of reality7 can be1 and for what reason he goes back to such generalities4 ,it is true that ,trivero believes that1 by going back to the general concept of need1 he can establish the parent theory on which rest the particular doctrines of needs2 and amongst them economics1 which concerns itself with economic needs4 ,if there are species--he says--we ought to determine of what genus they are species4 ,but he will allow me to remark that the genus to look for is1 as logic teaches1 the proximate genus4 ,to jump to such a great distance as to reality or to fact1 would only lead to the noble discovery3 that economic needs are part of reality1 are a group of facts4 ,and what he does is to make an equally valuable discovery3 that the true theory of history is the theory of needs1 which1 granted his definition of needs1 is as much as to say that history is history of reality and the theory of it is--the theory4 ,i have then no objection to make to the meaning which ,trivero wishes to give to the word need2 but ,i must assert that1 having given it this meaning1 he has not afterwards constructed the theory of anything1 nor thrown light on any special group of facts4 ,for real economic theory his book is quite useless4 ,economists do not recognise the needs of things and plants and animals1 but only human needs1 or those of man in so far as he is homo oeconomicus and hence a conscious being4 ,i too believe that it is right to work out philosophically the principle of economics2 but in order to do this1 ,trivero should have studied economic science4 ,he declares that 'he does not want to hold fast to anyone's petticoats4' ,this statement is superfluous if it means that each individual ought to base his own scientific convictions on reason and not on authority4 ,it is dangerous if it signifies1 on the contrary1 an intention to spare himself the trouble of studying other people's books1 and of reconstructing everything from the beginning by his own personal efforts and by the aid of general culture alone4 ,the result obtained--being far from satisfactory--should deter the author 7who will not grumble at my plain speaking71 from returning to this unfruitful method in the future4 #ajj ,,pareto answers this second letter in the ,giornale degli economisti1 ,february1 #aija1 pp4 #aca-ach4 ,,index ,,of ,,names99 99,marx's name is omitted4 ,the ,asterisks indicate notes4 ,aristotle1 #ah ,aveling1 ,e41 #ff99 ,bauer1 ,b41 #ajb ,bernstein1 ,e41 #aai ,bertolini1 ,a41 #if ,bhm-,bawerk1 #ed1 #gf199 #adb ,bray1 #ajc ,coletti1 ,f41 #aae99 ,croce1 ,b41 #abi199 #aca99 ,dhring1 ,e4 #fi1 #gi199 #hd1 #ajc1 #aad ,durckheim1 ,e41 #aah ,ehrenfels1 ,christian ,von1 #afh1 #agb ,engels1 ,f41 #g1 #aa1 #ad1 #ah1 #ai1 #be1 #bf1 #bh1 #da1 #ee1 #fc1 #fg1 #fi1 #gh-ha1 #hc1 #hd1 #hi1 #ie199 #ajc1 #aad-aaf1 #abd1 #aca99 ,fechner1 #ahj ,ferrara1 ,f41 #abg ,gentile1 ,g41 #hj199 #hc199 #hf199 #ajd199 #aae99 ,gray1 ,a41 #ajc ,graziadei1 ,a41 #ach-adj1 #agi99 ,grosse1 ,e41 #ij99 ,hegel1 ,g4,f41 #f1 #aa1 #ha-hb1 #ajb1 #abb1 #acj ,heine1 ,h41 #acj ,helvetius1 #h ,herbart1 #bd1 #be ,holbach1 #h ,kant1 ,e41 #bd1 #be1 #dc1 #aac-aad1 #agi ,kautsky1 ,k41 #aai1 #acg ,ingram1 #ie99 ,jevons1 #gb ,labriola1 ,antonio1 #a1 #e1 #i1 #aj-ae1 #ah1 #ba-bf1 #ea199 #ee1 #gf1 #hd199 #hf-ic1 #ajf1 #aji199 #aaj1 #aaa1 #aad1 #aai1 #abj-acb ,lange1 ,a4,f41 #h1 #da1 #ga1 #gb99 ,leibniz1 #afj ,loria1 ,a41 #di1 #ia1 #ach1 #adb ,machiavelli1 ,n41 #aaj199 #aah ,manzoni1 ,a41 #ai ,mommsen1 ,t41 #abb ,morgan1 #hi ,more1 ,thomas1 #ai99 ,pantaleoni1 ,m41 #gf199 #if1 #abg1 #aga ,parrto1 ,v41 #gd1 #gf199 #if-aja1 #aei-ahf ,plechanow1 ,g41 #h ,proudhon1 ,p4,g41 #ajc ,rabelais1 #aje ,ricardo1 ,d41 #ec1 #ace1 #aef1 #aeg99 ,ricca1 ,salermo ,g41 #gg99 ,richter1 ,g4,p41 #ah ,rodbertus1 ,k41 #ajc99 ,rosmini1 #ajb ,rmalin1 #cf ,sanctis 7de71 ,f41 #aaj99 ,schiller1 #be99 ,schmidt1 ,c41 #ed ,schopenhauer1 ,a41 #ajb ,simmel1 ,g41 #e1 #bd1 #aah ,smith1 ,a41 #gd99 ,sombart1 ,w41 #ed199 #ee1 #fj1 #fc1 #aca199 #adb ,sorel1 ,g41 #ee1 #hf199 #aai1 #aca-ach ,spencer1 ,h41 #cf1 #agh ,stammler1 ,r41 #bg-dg1 #aah1 #acg199 #ach1 #agj ,stein1 ,l41 #ah ,stern1 ,g41 #acc ,trivero1 ,c1 #aha199 #ahb ,villari1 ,p41 #aaj99 ,wagner1 ,a41 #gc99 ,westermarck1 ,e41 #ij99 ,witte1 #gh ,wundt1 #ahj99 ,,edinburgh2 ,j4,c4 ,,thomson ,,at ,,the ,,mercat ,,press 99 99 99 99 99 ---------------------------------------- ------------------- ,typographical errors corrected in text3 ,page ix3 philosopy replaced with philosophy ,page xxiii3 knowlege replaced with knowledge ,page #ec3 manifestions replaced with manifestations ,page #ee3 acknowleges replaced with acknowledges ,page #fj3 necesary replaced with necessary ,page #fa3 corrollary replaced with corollary ,page #he3 schutzt replaced with schtzt ,page #hf3 contigent replaced with contingent ,page #hf3 idealogical replaced with ideological ,page #ajd3 abreviated replaced with abbreviated ,page #abb3 empirical-dialetic replaced with empirical-dialectic ,page #abd3 sytems replaced with systems ,page #adi3 ,mark's replaced with ,marx's ,page #ahg3 ,duhring replaced with ,dhring ,page #ahg3 ,colatti replaced with ,coletti ,page #ahg3 ,kantsky replaced with ,kautsky ,page #ahg3 ,leibnitz replaced with ,leibniz ,page #ahh3 ,parrto replaced with ,pareto ,page #ahh3 ,plechanov replaced with ,plechanow ,page #ahh3 ,rmalin replaced with ,rmelin ,footnote #ae3 oekonomischer replaced with oekonomischen ,footnote #ae3 ,bohm replaced with ,bhm ,footnote #ae3 fur replaced with fr ,footnote #bb3 verzehbaren replaced with verzehrbaren ,footnote #db3 assere replaced with ussere ,footnote #ei3 entrepeneurs replaced with entrepreneurs ,footnote #gd3 ,briere replaced with ,brire ,footnote #hj3 fugte replaced with fgte ,footnote #hb3 fur replaced with fr ,footnote #ib3 ittle replaced with little ,footnote #ie3 ,materialismio ,storico replaced with ,materialismo ,storico ,note that on page #aff that the word 'measurabilility' is likely to be a typo either for 'measurability' or 'measurably' ---------------------------------------- ------------------- 99 99 99 99 99