,note3 ,images of the original pages are available through ,internet ,archive4 ,see http3_/_/archive4org_/details_/ethicsdew #jj;deweuoft ,transcriber's note3 ,text enclosed by underscores is in italics 7italics74 ,text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face 7bold74 ,to indicate macron above a vowel1 the vowel has been enclosed within square brackets with equal sign just before it4 ,for example1 o is used to represent letter o with macron above it4 ,american ,science ,series ,,ethics by ,,john ,,dewey ,professor of ,philosophy in ,columbia ,university and ,,james ,h4 ,,tufts ,professor of ,philosophy in the ,university of ,chicago ,illustration ,new ,york ,henry ,holt and ,company ,london3 ,george ,bell and ,sons #aiji ,copyright1 #aijh1 by ,henry ,holt and ,company ,,preface ,the significance of this text in ,ethics lies in its effort to awaken a vital conviction of the genuine reality of moral problems and the value of reflective thought in dealing with them4 ,to this purpose are subordinated the presentation in ,part ,i4 of historic material2 the discussion in ,part ,,ii4 of the different types of theoretical interpretation1 and the consideration1 in ,part ,,iii41 of some typical social and economic problems which characterize the present4 ,experience shows that the student of morals has difficulty in getting the field objectively and definitely before him so that its problems strike him as real problems4 ,conduct is so intimate that it is not easy to analyze4 ,it is so important that to a large extent the perspective for regarding it has been unconsciously fixed by early training4 ,the historical method of approach has proved in the classroom experience of the authors an effective method of meeting these difficulties4 ,to follow the moral life through typical epochs of its development enables students to realize what is involved in their own habitual standpoints2 it also presents a concrete body of subject-matter which serves as material of analysis and discussion4 ,the classic conceptions of moral theory are of remarkable importance in illuminating the obscure places of the moral life and in giving the student clues which will enable him to explore it for himself4 ,but there is always danger of either dogmatism or a sense of unreality when students are introduced abruptly to the theoretical ideas4 ,instead of serving as tools for understanding the moral facts1 the ideas are likely to become substitutes for the facts4 ,when they are proffered ready-made1 their theoretical acuteness and cleverness may be admired1 but their practical soundness and applicability are suspected4 ,the historical introduction permits the student to be present1 as it were1 at the social situations in which the intellectual instruments were forged4 ,he appreciates their relevancy to the conditions which provoked them1 and he is encouraged to try them on simple problems before attempting the complex problems of the present4 ,by assisting in their gradual development he gains confidence in the ideas and in his power to use them4 ,in the second part1 devoted more specifically to the analysis and criticism of the leading conceptions of moral theory1 the aim accordingly has not been to instill the notions of a school nor to inculcate a ready-made system1 but to show the development of theories out of the problems and experience of every-day conduct1 and to suggest how these theories may be fruitfully applied in practical exigencies4 ,aspects of the moral life have been so thoroughly examined that it is possible to present certain principles in the confidence that they will meet general acceptance4 ,rationalism and hedonism1 for example1 have contributed toward a scientific statement of the elements of conduct1 even though they have failed as self-inclosed and final systems4 ,after the discussions of ,kant and ,mill1 ,sidgwick and ,green1 ,martineau and ,spencer1 it is possible to affirm that there is a place in the moral life for reason and a place for happiness1--a place for duty and a place for valuation4 ,theories are treated not as incompatible rival systems which must be accepted or rejected en bloc1 but as more or less adequate methods of surveying the problems of conduct4 ,this mode of approach facilitates the scientific estimation and determination of the part played by various factors in the complexity of moral life4 ,the student is put in a position to judge the problems of conduct for himself4 ,this emancipation and enlightenment of individual judgment is the chief aim of the theoretical portion4 ,in a considerable part of the field1 particularly in the political and economic portions of ,part ,,iii41 no definitive treatment is as yet possible4 ,nevertheless1 it is highly desirable to introduce the student to the examination of these unsettled questions4 ,when the whole civilized world is giving its energies to the meaning and value of justice and democracy1 it is intolerably academic that those interested in ethics should have to be content with conceptions already worked out1 which therefore relate to what is least doubtful in conduct rather than to questions now urgent4 ,moreover1 the advantages of considering theory and practice in direct relation to each other are mutual4 ,on the one hand1 as against the a priori claims of both individualism and socialism1 the need of the hour seems to us to be the application of methods of more deliberate analysis and experiment4 ,the extreme conservative may deprecate any scrutiny of the present order2 the ardent radical may be impatient of the critical and seemingly tardy processes of the investigator2 but those who have considered well the conquest which man is making of the world of nature cannot forbear the conviction that the cruder method of trial and error and the time-honored method of prejudice and partisan controversy need not longer completely dominate the regulation of the life of society4 ,they hope for a larger application of the scientific method to the problems of human welfare and progress4 ,conversely1 a science which takes part in the actual work of promoting moral order and moral progress must receive a valuable reflex influence of stimulus and of test4 ,to consider morality in the making as well as to dwell upon values already established should make the science more vital4 ,and whatever the effect upon the subject-matter1 the student can hardly appreciate the full force of his materials and methods as long as they are kept aloof from the questions which are occupying the minds of his contemporaries4 ,teachers who are limited in time will doubtless prefer to make their own selections of material1 but the following suggestions present one possible line of choice4 ,in ,part ,i41 of the three chapters dealing with the ,hebrew1 ,greek1 and modern developments1 any one may be taken as furnishing an illustration of the method2 and certain portions of ,chapter ,,ix4 may be found more detailed in analysis than is necessary for the beginner4 ,in ,part ,,ii41 ,chapters ,,xi4-,,xii4 may be omitted without losing the thread of the argument4 ,in ,part ,,iii41 any one of the specific topics--viz41 the political state1 the economic order1 the family--may be considered apart from the others4 ,some teachers may prefer to take ,parts in their entirety4 ,in this case1 any two may be chosen4 ,as to the respective shares of the work for which the authors are severally responsible1 while each has contributed suggestions and criticisms to the work of the other in sufficient degree to make the book throughout a joint work1 ,part ,i4 has been written by ,mr4 ,tufts1 ,part ,,ii4 by ,mr4 ,dewey1 and in ,part ,,iii41 ,chapters ,,xx4 and ,,xxi4 are by ,mr4 ,dewey1 ,chapters ,,xxii4-,,xxvi4 by ,mr4 ,tufts4 ,it need scarcely be said that no attempt has been made in the bibliographies to be exhaustive4 ,when the dates of publication of the work cited are given1 the plan has been in general to give1 in the case of current literature1 the date of the latest edition1 and in the case of some classical treatises the date of original publication4 ,in conclusion1 the authors desire to express their indebtedness to their colleagues and friends ,dr4 ,wright1 ,mr4 ,talbert1 and ,mr4 ,eastman1 who have aided in the reading of the proof and with other suggestions4 ,,table ,,of ,,contents ,,chapter ,,page ,i4 ,,introduction #a ,sec4 #a4 ,definition and ,method3--,ethical and moral1 specific problem1 #a2 importance of genetic study1 #c4 ,sec4 #b4 ,criterion of the moral3--,the moral in cross section1 the what and the how1 #e2 the moral as growth1 #h4 ,sec4 #c4 ,divisions of the treatment1 #ac4 ,,part ,i ,,the ,,beginnings ,,and ,,growth ,,of ,,morality ,,ii4 ,,early ,,group ,,life #ag ,sec4 #a4 ,typical facts of group life3--,primitive unity and solidarity1 #ag4 ,sec4 #b4 ,kinship and household groups3--,the kinship group1 #ba2 the family or household group1 #bc4 ,sec4 #c4 ,kinship and family groups as economic and industrial units3--,the land and the group1 #bd2 movable goods1 #be4 ,sec4 #d4 ,kinship and family groups as political bodies3--,their control over the individual1 #bf2 rights and responsibility1 #bg4 ,sec4 #e4 ,the kinship or household as a religious unit3--,totem groups1 #cj2 ancestral religion1 #ca4 ,sec4 #f4 ,age and sex groups1 #cb4 ,sec4 #g4 ,moral significance of the group1 #cd4 ,,iii4 ,,the ,,rationalizing ,,and ,,socializing ,,agencies ,,in ,,early ,,society #cg ,sec4 #a4 ,three levels of conduct3--,conduct as instinctive and governed by primal needs1 regulated by society's standards1 and by personal standards1 #cg4 ,sec4 #b4 ,rationalizing agencies3 ,work1 #dj2 arts and crafts1 #da2 war1 #db4 ,sec4 #c4 ,socializing agencies3--,cooperation1 #db2 art1 #de4 ,sec4 #d4 ,family life as idealizing and socializing agency1 #dg4 ,sec4 #e4 ,moral interpretation of this first level1 #di4 ,,iv4 ,,group ,,morality--,,customs ,,or ,,mores #ea ,sec4 #a4 ,meaning1 authority1 and origin of customs1 #ea4 ,sec4 #b4 ,means of enforcing custom3--,public approval1 taboos1 rituals1 force1 #ed4 ,sec4 #c4 ,conditions which render group control conscious3--,educational customs1 #eg2 law and justice1 #ei2 danger or crisis1 #fd4 ,sec4 #d4 ,values and defects of customary morality3--,standards1 motives1 content1 organization of character1 #fh4 ,v4 ,,from ,,custom ,,to ,,conscience2 ,,from ,,group ,,morality ,,to ,,personal ,,morality #gc ,sec4 #a4 ,contrast and collision1 #gc4 ,sec4 #b4 ,sociological agencies in the transition3--,economic forces1 #gf2 science and the arts1 #gh2 military forces1 #hj2 religious forces1 #ha4 ,sec4 #c4 ,psychological agencies3--,sex1 #ha2 private property1 #hc2 struggles for mastery and liberty1 #hd2 honor and esteem1 #he4 ,sec4 #d4 ,positive reconstruction1 #hi4 ,,vi4 ,,the ,,hebrew ,,moral ,,development #ia ,sec4 #a4 ,general character and determining principles3--,the ,hebrew and the ,greek1 #ia2 ,political and economic factors1 #ib4 ,sec4 #b4 ,religious agencies3--,covenant1 #id2 personal law-giver1 #ie2 cultus1 #ig2 prophets1 #ii2 the kingdom1 #ajj4 ,sec4 #c4 ,moral conceptions attained3--,righteousness and sin1 #ajb2 responsibility1 #ajd2 purity of motive1 #aje2 the ideal of life1 #ajg2 the social ideal1 #ajh4 ,,vii4 ,,the ,,moral ,,development ,,of ,,the ,,greeks #aaa ,sec4 #a4 ,the fundamental notes3--,convention versus nature1 #aaa2 measure1 #aab2 good and just1 #aac4 ,sec4 #b4 ,intellectual forces of individualism3--,the scientific spirit1 #aad4 ,sec4 #c4 ,commercial and political individualism3--,class interests1 #aai2 why obey laws8 #abb4 ,sec4 #d4 ,individualism and ethical theory3--,the question formulated1 #abd2 individualistic theories1 #abf4 ,sec4 #e4 ,the deeper view of nature and the good1 of the individual and the social order3--,aristotle on the natural1 #abg2 ,plato's ideal state1 #abi2 passion or reason1 #aca2 eudaemonism and the mean1 #acd2 man and the cosmos1 #ace4 ,sec4 #f4 ,the conception of the ideal3--,contrast with the actual1 #acf2 ethical significance1 #ach4 ,sec4 #g4 ,the conception of the self1 of character and responsibility3--,the poets1 #ach2 ,plato and the ,stoics1 #adj4 ,,viii4 ,,the ,,modern ,,period #adb ,sec4 #a4 ,the mediaeval ideals3--,groups and class ideals1 #adc2 the church ideal1 #ade4 ,sec4 #b4 ,main lines of modern development1 #adg4 ,sec4 #c4 ,the old and new in the beginnings of individualism1 #adi4 ,sec4 #d4 ,individualism in the progress of liberty and democracy3--,rights1 #aea4 ,sec4 #e4 ,individualism as affected by the development of industry1 commerce1 and art3--,increasing power and interests1 #aec2 distribution of goods1 #aeg2 industrial revolution raises new problems1 #aei4 ,sec4 #f4 ,the individual and the development of intelligence3--,the ,renaissance1 #afc2 the ,enlightenment1 #afe2 the present significance of scientific method1 #afg4 ,,ix4 ,a ,,general ,,comparison ,,of ,,customary ,,and ,,reflective ,,morality #aga ,sec4 #a4 ,elements of agreement and continuity3--,regime of custom1 #agb2 persistence of group morality1 #agc2 origin of ethical terms1 #age4 ,sec4 #b4 ,elements of contrast3--,differentiation of the moral1 #agg2 observing versus reflecting1 #agh2 the higher law1 #aha2 deepening of meaning1 #ahb4 ,sec4 #c4 ,opposition between individual and social aims and standards3--,withdrawal from the social order1 #ahd2 individual emancipation1 #ahf4 ,sec4 #d4 ,effects upon the individual character3--,increased possibilities of evil as well as of good1 #ahg4 ,sec4 #e4 ,moral differentiation and the social order3--,effects on the family1 #aic2 on industry and government1 #aid2 on religion1 #aie2 general relation of religion to morality1 #aig4 ,,part ,,ii ,,theory ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,life ,x4 ,,the ,,moral ,,situation #bja ,distinguishing marks of the moral situation1 #bja2 ,traits of voluntary activity1 #bjb2 ,the good and bad in non-voluntary behavior1 #bjc2 ,indifferent voluntary conduct1 #bje2 ,the moral is introduced when ends have conflicting values1 #bjg2 ,selection then depends upon1 and influences1 the nature of the self1 #bji4 ,,xi4 ,,problems ,,of ,,moral ,,theory #bab ,theory grows from practical problems1 #bab2 ,three typical problems of reflective practice1 #bac2 ,corresponding problems of theory1 #bad2 ,their historical sequence1 #bae2 ,growth of individualism1 #bbj2 ,the two types of individualism1 #bba4 ,,xii4 ,,types ,,of ,,moral ,,theory #bbd ,sec4 #a4 ,typical divisions of theories3--,teleological and jural1 #bbd2 individual and institutional1 #bbe2 empirical and intuitional1 #bbf4 ,sec4 #b4 ,division of voluntary activity into ,inner and ,outer3--,the how and the what1 #bbg2 attitude and consequences1 #bbh2 different types of each theory1 #bbi2 bearing of each theory upon problems of knowledge and of control1 #bca4 ,sec4 #c4 ,general interpretation of these theories3--,ordinary view of disposition and of consequences1 #bcb2 advantages claimed for emphasis upon consequences1 #bcd2 for emphasis upon disposition or attitude1 #bcf2 necessity of reconciliation of these theories1 #bcg4 ,,xiii4 ,,conduct ,,and ,,character #bdj ,problem of their relation1 #bdj4 ,sec4 #a4 ,the good will of ,kant3--,emphasis upon motive1 #bda2 motive with or without consequences1 #bdb2 necessity of effort1 #bdc2 overt action required to prove motive1 #bde4 ,sec4 #b4 ,the ,intention of the ,utilitarians3--,emphasis upon consequences1 #bdf2 distinction of intention from motive1 #bdg2 they are really identical1 #bdh2 motive as blind and as intelligent1 #bdi2 practical importance of insistence upon consequences1 #bea2 foresight of consequences depends upon motive1 #beb4 ,sec4 #c4 ,conduct and character3--,the nature of disposition1 #bed2 partial and complete intention1 #bef2 complexity of motives1 #beg4 ,sec4 #d4 ,morality of acts and of agents3--,subjective and objective morality1 #bei2 the doer and his deed1 #bfj2 summary1 #bfa4 ,,xiv4 ,,happiness ,,and ,,conduct3 ,,the ,,good ,,and ,,desire #bfc ,residence and nature of goodness1 #bfc2 happiness as the good1 #bfd2 love of happiness as the evil1 #bfe2 ambiguity in conception of happiness1 #bff4 ,sec4 #a4 ,the ,object of ,desire3--,is it pleasure8 #bfi2 desire presupposes instinctive appetites1 #bgj2 and objects of thought1 #bga2 happiness and desire1 #bgb2 need for standard1 #bgd4 ,sec4 #b4 ,the ,conception of ,happiness as a ,standard3--,utilitarian method1 #bge2 ,difficulty of measuring pleasure1 #bgf2 character determines the value of a pleasure1 #bgg2 ,mill's introduction of quality of pleasure1 #bgi4 ,sec4 #c4 ,the constitution of happiness3--,pleasures depend upon objects1 #bha2 they are qualitative1 #bhb2 they vary with disposition1 #bhc2 happiness as the moral good1 #bhd4 ,,xv4 ,,happiness ,,and ,,social ,,ends #bhf ,utilitarianism aims at social welfare1 #bhf2 value as a theory of social reform1 #bhg2 its aim conflicts with its hedonistic theory of motive1 #bhi2 ,bentham's method of reconciling personal and general happiness1 #bia2 ,mill's method1 #bic2 sympathy and the social self1 #bih2 the distinctively moral interest1 #cjj2 equation of virtue and happiness1 #cja2 moral democracy1 #cjc4 ,,xvi4 ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,reason ,,in ,,the ,,moral ,,life3 ,,moral ,,knowledge #cjf ,sec4 #a4 ,problem of reason and desire3--,nature of a reasonable act1 #cjf2 theories about moral knowledge1 #cjg4 ,sec4 #b4 ,kant's theory of practical reason3--,traits of morality1 #cji2 reason as a priori and formal1 #caj2 true meaning of generalization1 #cac2 the general and the social1 #cad4 ,sec4 #c4 ,moral sense intuitionalism3--,function of reason1 #cag2 habit and sense1 #cai2 invalid intuitions1 #cba2 deliberation and intuition1 #cbb2 the good man's judgment1 #cbd4 ,sec4 #d4 ,the place of general rules3--,their value1 #cbe2 casuistry1 #cbf2 and its dangers1 #cbg2 secondary ends of utilitarianism1 #cbi2 empirical rules and customs1 #ccj2 distinction of rules and principles1 #ccc2 sympathy and reasonableness1 #ccd4 ,,xvii4 ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,duty ,,in ,,the ,,moral ,,life3 ,,subjection ,,to ,,authority #ccg ,conflict of the rational with the attractive end1 #ccg4 ,sec4 #a4 ,the subjection of desire to law1 #cci2 cause of conflict of desire and thought1 #cdb2 demand for transformation of desire1 #cdc2 social character of duties1 #cde2 the social self is the universal self1 #cdf4 ,sec4 #b4 ,kantian theory3--,accord with duty versus from duty1 #cdf2 the two-fold self of ,kant1 #cdg2 criticism of ,kant1 #cdh2 emphasis falls practically on political authority1 #cea2 ,duty for duty's sake1 #cea4 ,sec4 #c4 ,the ,utilitarian theory of duty3--,the hedonistic problem1 #cec2 ,moral sanctions1 #ced2 they are too external1 #cee2 ,bain's account1 #cef2 ,spencer's account1 #ceh2 such views set up a fictitious non-social self1 #cfa4 ,sec4 #c4 ,final statement3--,growth requires disagreeable readjustments1 #cfb4 ,,xviii4 ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,the ,,self ,,in ,,the ,,moral ,,life #cfd ,problems regarding the self1 #cfd4 ,sec4 #a4 ,the doctrine of self-denial3--,explanation of its origin1 #cfe2 four objections to doctrine1 #cff4 ,sec4 #b4 ,self-assertion3--,ethical dualism1 #cfi2 naturalistic ethics1 #cfi2 false biological basis1 #cga2 misinterprets nature of efficiency1 #cgc4 ,sec4 #c4 ,self-love and benevolence2 or egoism and altruism3--,the crux of ethical speculation1 #cge2 are all motives selfish8 #cgf2 ambiguity of term selfish1 #cgg2 are results selfish8 #cgi2 self-preservation1 #chj2 rational regard for self1 #chb2 regard for others1 #chd2 the existence of other-regarding impulses1 #che2 altruism may be immoral1 #chg2 social justice necessary to moral altruism1 #chi4 ,sec4 #d4 ,the good as self-realization3--,self-realization an ambiguous idea1 #cia2 true and false consideration of the self1 #cic2 equation of personal and general happiness1 #cie4 ,,xix4 ,,the ,,virtues #cii ,introductory--virtue defined1 #cii2 natural ability and virtue1 #djj2 evolution of virtues1 #dja2 responsibility for moral judgment1 #djb2 futility of cataloguing virtues1 #djb2 their cardinal aspects1 #djc4 ,sec4 #a4 ,temperance3--,greek1 ,roman1 and ,christian conceptions1 #dje2 negative and positive aspects1 #djg2 pleasure and excitement1 #djh4 ,sec4 #b4 ,courage or persistent vigor3--,dislike of the disagreeable1 #daj2 dimensions of courage1 #daa2 optimism and pessimism1 #dab4 ,sec4 #c4 ,justice3--,three meanings of1 #dad2 justice and love1 #dae2 justice and punishment1 #daf4 ,sec4 #d4 ,wisdom or conscientiousness3--,importance of intelligent interest1 #dah2 ,greek and modern ideas of moral wisdom1 #dai2 ideals and thoughtfulness1 #dbj2 ideals and progress1 #dbb4 ,,part ,,iii ,,the ,,world ,,of ,,action ,,xx4 ,,social ,,organization ,,and ,,the ,,individual #dbg ,object of discussion1 #dbg4 ,sec4 #a4 ,growth of individuality through social organizations3--,emancipation from custom1 #dbh2 double movement towards individuality and complex associations1 #dbi2 morality and legality1 #dcb2 two-fold contribution of social environment to individual morality1 #dcc2 moral value of the state1 #dcd4 ,sec4 #b4 ,responsibility and freedom3--,liability1 #dcf2 freedom as exemption and as power1 #dcg2 legal and moral freedom1 #dch4 ,sec4 #c4 ,rights and obligations3--,their definition1 #dci2 they are correlative1 #ddj2 physical rights1 #ddb2 limitations put upon them by war and punishment1 #ddc2 by poverty1 #ddd2 mental rights1 #dde2 limitations to freedom of thought and expression1 #ddf2 education1 #ddh4 ,,xxi4 ,,civil ,,society ,,and ,,the ,,political ,,state #dea ,sec4 #a4 ,civil rights and obligations3--,their definition1 #dea2 their classes1 #deb2 significance of established remedies for wrongs1 #ded4 ,sec4 #b4 ,development of civil rights3--,contrast with savage age justice1 #def2 social harm versus metaphysical evil1 #deg2 recognition of accident and intent1 #dei2 of character and circumstances1 #dfj2 of mental incapacity1 #dfb2 significance of negligence and carelessness1 #dfd2 conflict of substantial and technical justice1 #dfe2 relations of the legal and moral1 #dfg2 reform of criminal procedure necessary1 #dfh2 also of punitive methods1 #dgj2 and of civil administration1 #dga4 ,sec4 #c4 ,political rights and obligations3--,significance of the state1 #dgc2 distrust of government1 #dgd2 indifference to politics1 #dgf2 political corruption1 #dgg2 reform of partisan machinery1 #dgh2 of governmental machinery1 #dgi2 constructive social legislation1 #dhj2 a federated humanity1 #dha4 ,sec4 #d4 ,the moral criterion of political activity3--,its statement1 #dhb2 the individualistic formula1 #dhc2 the collectivistic formula1 #dhd4 ,,xxii4 ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,the ,,economic ,,life #dhf ,sec4 #a4 ,general analysis3--,the economic in relation to happiness1 #dhg2 relation to character1 #dhh2 social aspects1 #dia4 ,sec4 #b4 ,the problem set by the new economic order3--,collective and impersonal organizations1 #die2 readjustments required1 #dif4 ,sec4 #c4 ,the agencies for carrying on commerce and industry3--,early agencies1 #dig2 the business enterprise1 #dih2 the labor union1 #dii2 reversion to group morality1 #ejj2 members and management1 #ejj2 employer and employed1 #eja2 relations to the public1 #ejb2 to the law1 #ejc4 ,sec4 #d4 ,the methods of production1 exchange1 and valuation3--,the machine1 #ejg2 basis of valuation1 #ejh4 ,sec4 #e4 ,the factors which aid ethical reconstruction3--,principles more easily seen1 #eaa4 ,,xxiii4 ,,some ,,principles ,,in ,,the ,,economic ,,order #ead #a4 ,wealth subordinate to personality1 #ead4 #b4 ,wealth and activity1 #ead4 #c4 ,wealth and public service1 #eae4 #d4 ,a change demanded from individual to collective morality1 #eag4 #e4 ,personal responsibility1 #eai4 #f4 ,publicity and legal control1 #ebj4 #g4 ,democracy and distribution1 #eba4 ,,xxiv4 ,,unsettled ,,problems ,,in ,,the ,,economic ,,order #ebc ,sec4 #a4 ,individualism and socialism3--,general statement1 #ebc2 equal opportunity1 #ebf4 ,sec4 #b4 ,individualism or free contract analyzed2 its values3--,efficiency1 #ebg2 initiative1 #ebg2 regulation of production1 #ebh4 ,sec4 #c4 ,criticisms upon individualism3--,it does not secure real freedom1 #ebh2 nor justice1 #ecj2 competition tends to destroy itself1 #eca2 position of the aristocratic individualists1 #ecb4 ,,xxv4 ,,unsettled ,,problems ,,in ,,the ,,economic ,,order 7,,continued7 #ecf ,sec4 #d4 ,the theory of public agency and control1 #ecf4 ,sec4 #e4 ,society as agency of production3--,charges against private management1 #ecg2 corruption1 #ech2 conditions of labor1 #edj2 collective agency not necessarily social1 #edd4 ,sec4 #f4 ,theories of just distribution3--,individualistic theory1 #edf2 equal division1 #edg2 a working programme1 #edh4 ,sec4 #g4 ,ownership and use of property3--,defects in the present system1 #eea4 ,sec4 #h4 ,present tendencies3--,individualistic character of the ,constitution1 #eed2 increased recognition of public welfare1 #eee2 social justice through economic1 social1 and scientific progress1 #eeg4 ,sec4 #i4 ,three special problems3--,the open versus the closed shop1 #eei2 the capitalization of corporations1 #efa2 the unearned increment1 #efd4 ,appendix3 ,prof4 ,seager's programme of social legislation1 #eff4 ,,xxvi4 ,,the ,,family #ega ,sec4 #a4 ,historical antecedents of the modern family3--,maternal type1 #egb2 paternal type1 #egb2 influence of the church1 #egf4 ,sec4 #b4 ,the psychological basis of the family3--,emotional and instinctive basis1 #egh2 common will1 #ehj2 parenthood1 #eha2 social and religious factors1 #ehb2 the children1 #ehb4 ,sec4 #c4 ,general elements of strain in family relations3--,differences between the sexes in temperament and occupation1 #ehd2 in attitude toward the family1 #ehg2 differences between parents and children1 #ehi4 ,sec4 #d4 ,special conditions which give rise to present problems3--,the economic factors1 #eij2 cultural and political factors1 #eic4 ,sec4 #e4 ,unsettled problems3--,economic problems1 #eid2 the dilemma between the domestic life and occupations outside the home1 #eie2 the family as consumer1 #eih4 ,sec4 #f4 ,unsettled problems3--,political problems1 authority within the family1 #eii2 equality or inequality1 #fjj2 isolation not the solution1 #fjb2 authority over the family1 divorce1 #fjc2 general law of social health1 #fje2 conclusion1 #fje4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,ethics ,,chapter ,i ,,introduction ,sec4 #a4 ,,definition ,,and ,,method ,provisional ,definition4--,the place for an accurate definition of a subject is at the end of an inquiry rather than at the beginning1 but a brief definition will serve to mark out the field4 ,ethics is the science that deals with conduct1 in so far as this is considered as right or wrong1 good or bad4 ,a single term for conduct so considered is moral conduct1 or the moral life4 ,another way of stating the same thing is to say that ,ethics aims to give a systematic account of our judgments about conduct1 in so far as these estimate it from the standpoint of right or wrong1 good or bad4 ,ethical and ,moral4--,the terms ethics and ethical are derived from a ,greek word ethos which originally meant customs1 usages1 especially those belonging to some group as distinguished from another1 and later came to mean disposition1 character4 ,they are thus like the ,latin word moral1 from mores1 or the ,german sittlich1 from ,sitten4 ,as we shall see1 it was in customs1 ethos1 mores1 that the moral or ethical began to appear4 ,for customs were not merely habitual ways of acting2 they were ways approved by the group or society4 ,to act contrary to the customs of the group brought severe disapproval4 ,this might not be formulated in precisely our terms--right and wrong1 good and bad1--but the attitude was the same in essence4 ,the terms ethical and moral as applied to the conduct of to-day imply of course a far more complex and advanced type of life than the old words ethos and mores1 just as economics deals with a more complex problem than the management of a household1 but the terms have a distinct value if they suggest the way in which the moral life had its beginning4 ,two ,aspects of ,conduct4--,to give a scientific account of judgments about conduct1 means to find the principles which are the basis of these judgments4 ,conduct or the moral life has two obvious aspects4 ,on the one hand it is a life of purpose4 ,it implies thought and feeling1 ideals and motives1 valuation and choice4 ,these are processes to be studied by psychological methods4 ,on the other hand1 conduct has its outward side4 ,it has relations to nature1 and especially to human society4 ,moral life is called out or stimulated by certain necessities of individual and social existence4 ,as ,protagoras put it1 in mythical form1 the gods gave men a sense of justice and of reverence1 in order to enable them to unite for mutual preservation4#a ,and in turn the moral life aims to modify or transform both natural and social environments1 to build a kingdom of man which shall be also an ideal social order--a kingdom of ,god4 ,these relations to nature and society are studied by the biological and social sciences4 ,sociology1 economics1 politics1 law1 and jurisprudence deal particularly with this aspect of conduct4 ,ethics must employ their methods and results for this aspect of its problem1 as it employs psychology for the examination of conduct on its inner side4 ,the ,specific ,problem of ,ethics4--,but ethics is not merely the sum of these various sciences4 ,it has a problem of its own which is created by just this twofold aspect of life and conduct4 ,it has to relate these two sides4 ,it has to study the inner process as determined by the outer conditions or as changing these outer conditions1 and the outward behavior or institution as determined by the inner purpose1 or as affecting the inner life4 ,to study choice and purpose is psychology2 to study choice as affected by the rights of others and to judge it as right or wrong by this standard is ethics4 ,or again1 to study a corporation may be economics1 or sociology1 or law2 to study its activities as resulting from the purposes of persons or as affecting the welfare of persons1 and to judge its acts as good or bad from such a point of view1 is ethics4 ,genetic ,study4--,when we deal with any process of life it is found to be a great aid for understanding the present conditions if we trace the history of the process and see how present conditions have come about4 ,and in the case of morality there are four reasons in particular for examining earlier stages4 ,the first is that we may begin our study with a simpler material4 ,moral life at present is extremely complex4 ,professional1 civic1 domestic1 philanthropic1 ecclesiastical1 and social obligations claim adjustment4 ,interests in wealth1 in knowledge1 in power1 in friendship1 in social welfare1 make demand for recognition in fixing upon what is good4 ,it is desirable to consider first a simpler problem4 ,in the second place1 this complex moral life is like the human body in that it contains rudiments and survivals4 ,some of our present standards and ideals were formed at one period in the past1 and some at another4 ,some of these apply to present conditions and some do not4 ,some are at variance with others4 ,many apparent conflicts in moral judgments are explained when we discover how the judgments came to be formed in the first instance4 ,we cannot easily understand the moral life of to-day except in the light of earlier morality4 ,the third reason is that we may get a more objective material for study4 ,our moral life is so intimate a part of ourselves that it is hard to observe impartially4 ,its characteristics escape notice because they are so familiar4 ,when we travel we find the customs1 laws1 and moral standards of other peoples standing out as peculiar4 ,until we have been led by some such means to compare our own conduct with that of others it probably does not occur to us that our own standards are also peculiar1 and hence in need of explanation4 ,it is as difficult scientifically as it is personally to see ourselves as others see us4 ,it is doubtless true that to see ourselves merely as others see us would not be enough4 ,complete moral analysis requires us to take into our reckoning motives and purposes which may perhaps be undiscoverable by the others4 ,but it is a great aid to this completer analysis if we can sharpen our vision and awaken our attention by a comparative study4 ,a fourth reason for a genetic study is that it emphasizes the dynamic1 progressive character of morality4 ,merely to examine the present may easily give the impression that the moral life is not a life1 a moving process1 something still in the making--but a changeless structure4 ,there is moral progress as well as a moral order4 ,this may be discovered by an analysis of the very nature of moral conduct1 but it stands out more clearly and impressively if we trace the actual development in history4 ,before attempting our analysis of the present moral consciousness and its judgments1 we shall therefore give an outline of the earlier stages and simpler phases4 ,theory and ,practice4--,finally1 if we can discover ethical principles these ought to give some guidance for the unsolved problems of life which continually present themselves for decision4 ,whatever may be true for other sciences it would seem that ethics at least ought to have some practical value4 ,in this theater of man's life it is reserved for ,god and the angels to be lookers on4 ,man must act2 and he must act well or ill1 rightly or wrongly4 ,if he has reflected1 has considered his conduct in the light of the general principles of human order and progress1 he ought to be able to act more intelligently and freely1 to achieve the satisfaction that always attends on scientific as compared with uncritical or rule-of-thumb practice4 ,socrates gave the classic statement for the study of conduct when he said1 ,a life unexamined1 uncriticized1 is not worthy of man4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,criterion ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,it is not proposed to attempt at this point an accurate or minute statement of what is implied in moral conduct1 as this is the task of ,part ,,ii4 ,but for the purposes of tracing in ,part ,i4 the beginnings of morality1 it is desirable to have a sort of rough chart to indicate to the student what to look for in the earlier stages of his exploration1 and to enable him to keep his bearings on the way4 ,certain of the characteristics of the moral may be seen in a cross-section1 a statement of the elements in moral conduct at a given time4 ,other characteristics come out more clearly by comparing later with earlier stages4 ,we give first a cross-section4 #a4 ,characteristics of the ,moral ,life in ,cross-section4--,in this cross-section the first main division is suggested by the fact that we sometimes give our attention to what is done or intended1 and sometimes to how or why the act is done4 ,these divisions may turn out to be less absolute than they seem1 but common life uses them and moral theories have often selected the one or the other as the important aspect4 ,when we are told to seek peace1 tell the truth1 or aim at the greatest happiness of the greatest number1 we are charged to do or intend some definite act4 ,when we are urged to be conscientious or pure in heart the emphasis is on a kind of attitude that might go with a variety of acts4 ,a newspaper advocates a good measure4 ,so far1 so good4 ,but people may ask1 what is the motive in this8 and if this is believed to be merely selfish1 they do not credit the newspaper with having genuine interest in reform4 ,on the other hand1 sincerity alone is not enough4 ,if a man advocates frankly and sincerely a scheme for enriching himself at the public expense we condemn him4 ,we say his very frankness shows his utter disregard for others4 ,one of the great moral philosophers has indeed said that to act rationally is all that is necessary1 but he at once goes on to claim that this implies treating every man as an end and not merely a means1 and this calls for a particular kind of action4 ,hence we may assume for the present purpose a general agreement that our moral judgments take into account both what is done or intended1 and how or why the act is done4 ,these two aspects are sometimes called the matter and the form1 or the content and the attitude4 ,we shall use the simpler terms1 the ,what and the ,how4 ,the ,what as a ,criterion4--,if we neglect for the moment the ,how and think of the ,what1 we find two main standpoints employed in judging3 one is that of higher and lower within the man's own self2 the other is his treatment of others4 ,the distinction between a higher and lower self has many guises4 ,we speak of a man as a slave to his appetites1 of another as possessed by greed for money1 of another as insatiately ambitious4 ,over against these passions we hear the praise of scientific pursuits1 of culture1 of art1 of friendship1 of meditation1 or of religion4 ,we are bidden to think of things ,greek3 semna1 nobly serious4 ,a life of the spirit is set off against the life of the flesh1 the finer against the coarser1 the nobler against the baser4 ,however misguided the forms in which this has been interpreted1 there is no doubt as to the reality of the conflicting impulses which give rise to the dualism4 ,the source is obvious4 ,man would not be here if self-preservation and self-assertion and sex instinct were not strongly rooted in his system4 ,these may easily become dominant passions4 ,but just as certainly1 man cannot be all that he may be unless he controls these impulses and passions by other motives4 ,he has first to create for himself a new world of ideal interests before he finds his best life4 ,the appetites and instincts may be natural1 in the sense that they are the beginning2 the mental and spiritual life is natural1 as ,aristotle puts it1 in the sense that man's full nature is developed only in such a life4 ,the other aspect of the ,what1 the treatment of others1 need not detain us4 ,justice1 kindness1 the conduct of the ,golden ,rule are the right and good4 ,injustice1 cruelty1 selfishness are the wrong and the bad4 ,analysis of the ,how3 the ,right and the ,good4--,we have used right and good as though they might be used interchangeably in speaking of conduct4 ,perhaps this may in the end prove to be true4 ,if an act is right1 then the hero or the saint may believe that it is also good2 if an act is good in the fullest sense1 then it will commend itself as right4 ,but right and good evidently approach conduct from two different points of view4 ,these might have been noted when speaking of the content or the ,what1 but they are more important in considering the ,how4 ,it is evident that when we speak of conduct as right we think of it as before a judge4 ,we bring the act to a standard1 and measure the act4 ,we think too of this standard as a moral law which we ought to obey4 ,we respect its authority and hold ourselves responsible4 ,the standard is conceived as a control over our impulses and desires4 ,the man who recognizes such a law and is anxious to find and to do his duty1 we call conscientious2 as governing his impulses1 he has self-control2 as squaring his conduct strictly by his standard1 he is upright and reliable4 ,if ,i think of good1 ,i am approaching conduct from the standpoint of value4 ,i am thinking of what is desirable4 ,this too is a standard1 but it is a standard regarded as an end to be sought rather than as a law4 ,i am to choose it and identify myself with it1 rather than to control myself by it4 ,it is an ideal4 ,the conscientious man1 viewed from this standpoint1 would seek to discover the true good1 to value his ends1 to form ideals1 instead of following impulse or accepting any seeming good without careful consideration4 ,in so far as impulses are directed by ideals the thoroughly good man will be straightforward1 sincere3 that is1 he will not be moved to do the good act by fear of punishment1 or by bribery1 just as the upright man will be governed by a sense of duty1 of respect for principles4 ,summary of the ,characteristics of the ,moral4--,to sum up the main characteristics of the moral life viewed in cross-section1 or when in full activity1 we may state them as follows3 ,on the side of the what1 there are two aspects3 7a7 ,the dominance of higher1 ideal interests of knowledge1 art1 freedom1 rights1 and the life of the spirit4 7b7 ,regard for others1 under its various aspects of justice1 sympathy1 and benevolence4 ,on the side of the how the important aspects are3 7a7 ,the recognition of some standard1 which may arise either as a control in the guise of right and law1 or as measure of value in the form of an ideal to be followed or good to be approved4 7b7 ,a sense of duty and respect for the law2 sincere love of the good4 7a7 and 7b7 of this latter division are both included under the conscientious attitude4 #b4 ,the ,moral as a ,growth4--,the psychologists distinguish three stages in conduct3 7a7 ,instinctive activity4 7b7 ,attention2 the stage of conscious direction or control of action by imagery2 of deliberation1 desire1 and choice4 7c7 ,habit2 the stage of unconscious activity along lines set by previous action4 ,consciousness thus occupies a curious middle ground between hereditary reflex and automatic activities upon the one hand and acquired habitual activities upon the other4 ,where the original equipment of instincts fails to meet some new situation1 when there are stimulations for which the system has no ready-made response1 consciousness appears4 ,it selects from the various responses those which suit the purpose1 and when these responses have become themselves automatic1 habitual1 consciousness betakes itself elsewhere to points where habitual accommodatory movements are as yet wanting and needed4#b ,to apply this to the moral development we need only to add that this process repeats itself over and over4 ,the starting-point for each later repetition is not the hereditary instinct1 but the habits which have been formed4 ,for the habits formed at one age of the individual's life1 or at one stage of race development1 prove inadequate for more complex situations4 ,the child leaves home1 the savage tribe changes to agricultural life1 and the old habits no longer meet the need4 ,attention is again demanded4 ,there is deliberation1 struggle1 effort4 ,if the result is successful new habits are formed1 but upon a higher level4 ,for the new habits1 the new character1 embody more intelligence4 ,the first stage1 purely instinctive action1 we do not call moral conduct4 ,it is of course not immoral2 it is merely unmoral4 ,the second stage shows morality in the making4 ,it includes the process of transition from impulse1 through desire to will4 ,it involves the stress of conflicting interests1 the processes of deliberation and valuation1 and the final act of choice4 ,it will be illustrated in our treatment of race development by the change from early group life and customs to the more conscious moral life of higher civilization4 ,the third stage1 well-organized character1 is the goal of the process4 ,but it is evidently only a relative point4 ,a good man has built up a set of habits2 a good society has established certain laws and moral codes4 ,but unless the man or society is in a changeless world with no new conditions there will be new problems4 ,and this means that however good the habit was for its time and purpose there must be new choices and new valuations4 ,a character that would run automatically in every case would be pretty nearly a mechanism4 ,it is therefore the second stage of this process that is the stage of active moral consciousness4 ,it is upon this that we focus our attention4 ,moral growth from the first on through the second stage may be described as a process in which man becomes more rational1 more social1 and finally more moral4 ,we examine briefly each of these aspects4 ,the ,rationalizing or ,idealizing ,process4--,the first need of the organism is to live and grow4 ,the first instincts and impulses are therefore for food1 self-defence1 and other immediate necessities4 ,primitive men eat1 sleep1 fight1 build shelters1 and give food and protection to their offspring4 ,the rationalizing process will mean at first greater use of intelligence to satisfy these same wants4 ,it will show itself in skilled occupations1 in industry and trade1 in the utilizing of all resources to further man's power and happiness4 ,but to rationalize conduct is also to introduce new ends4 ,it not only enables man to get what he wants2 it changes the kind of objects that he wants4 ,this shows itself externally in what man makes and in how he occupies himself4 ,he must of course have food and shelter4 ,but he makes temples and statues and poems4 ,he makes myths and theories of the world4 ,he carries on great enterprises in commerce or government1 not so much to gratify desires for bodily wants as to experience the growth of power4 ,he creates a family life which is raised to a higher level by art and religion4 ,he does not live by bread only1 but builds up gradually a life of reason4 ,psychologically this means that whereas at the beginning we want what our body calls for1 we soon come to want things which the mind takes an interest in4 ,as we form by memory1 imagination1 and reason a more continuous1 permanent1 highly-organized self1 we require a far more permanent and ideal kind of good to satisfy us4 ,this gives rise to the contrast between the material and ideal selves1 or in another form1 between the world and the spirit4 ,the ,socializing ,process4--,the socializing side of the process of development stands for an increased capacity to enter into relations with other human beings4 ,like the growth of reason it is both a means and an end4 ,it has its roots in certain instincts--sex1 gregariousness1 parental instincts--and in the necessities of mutual support and protection4 ,but the associations thus formed imply a great variety of activities which call out new powers and set up new ends4 ,language is one of the first of these activities and a first step toward more complete socialization4 ,cooperation1 in all kinds of enterprises1 interchange of services and goods1 participation in social arts1 associations for various purposes1 institutions of blood1 family1 government1 and religion1 all add enormously to the individual's power4 ,on the other hand1 as he enters into these relations and becomes a member of all these bodies he inevitably undergoes a transformation in his interests4 ,psychologically the process is one of building up a social self4 ,imitation and suggestion1 sympathy and affection1 common purpose and common interest1 are the aids in building such a self4 ,as the various instincts1 emotions1 and purposes are more definitely organized into such a unit1 it becomes possible to set off the interests of others against those interests that center in my more individual good4 ,conscious egoism and altruism become possible4 ,and in a way that will be explained1 the interests of self and others are raised to the plane of rights and justice4 ,what is ,needed to ,make ,conduct ,moral4--,all this is not yet moral progress in the fullest sense4 ,the progress to more rational and more social conduct is the indispensable condition of the moral1 but not the whole story4 ,what is needed is that the more rational and social conduct should itself be valued as good1 and so be chosen and sought2 or in terms of control1 that the law which society or reason prescribes should be consciously thought of as right1 used as a standard1 and respected as binding4 ,this gives the contrast between the higher and lower1 as a conscious aim1 not merely as a matter of taste4 ,it raises the collision between self and others to the basis of personal rights and justice1 of deliberate selfishness or benevolence4 ,finally it gives the basis for such organization of the social and rational choices that the progress already gained may be permanently secured1 while the attention1 the struggle between duty and inclination1 the conscious choice1 move forward to a new issue4 ,aristotle made these points clear3 ,but the virtues are not in this point analogous to the arts4 ,the products of art have their excellence in themselves1 and so it is enough if when produced they are of a certain quality2 but in the case of the virtues1 a man is not said to act justly or temperately 7or like a just or temperate man7 if what he does merely be of a certain sort--he must also be in a certain state of mind when he does it3 i4e41 first of all1 he must know what he is doing2 secondly1 he must choose it1 and choose it for itself2 and1 thirdly1 his act must be the expression of a formed and stable character4 ,summary of the ,characteristics of the ,moral as ,growth4--,the full cycle has three stages3 7a7 ,instinctive or habitual action4 7b7 ,action under the stress of attention1 with conscious intervention and reconstruction4 7c7 ,organization of consciously directed conduct into habits and a self of a higher order3 ,character4 ,the advance from 7a7 to and through 7b7 has three aspects4 7a7 ,it is a rationalizing and idealizing process4 ,reason is both a means to secure other ends1 and an element in determining what shall be sought4 7b7 ,it is a socializing process4 ,society both strengthens and transforms the individual4 7c7 ,it is a process in which finally conduct itself is made the conscious object of reflection1 valuation1 and criticism4 ,in this the definitely moral conceptions of right and duty1 good and virtue appear4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,divisions ,,of ,,the ,,treatment ,,part ,i41 after a preliminary presentation of certain important aspects of group life1 will first trace the process of moral development in its general outlines1 and then give specific illustrations of the process taken from the life of ,israel1 of ,greece1 and of modern civilization4 ,,part ,,ii4 will analyze conduct or the moral life on its inner1 personal side4 ,after distinguishing more carefully what is meant by moral action1 and noting some typical ways in which the moral life has been viewed by ethical theory1 it will examine the meaning of right and good1 of duty and virtue1 and seek to discover the principles underlying moral judgments and moral conduct4 ,,part ,,iii4 will study conduct as action in society4 ,but instead of a general survey1 attention will be centered upon three phases of conduct which are of especial interest and importance4 ,political rights and duties1 the production1 distribution1 and ownership of wealth1 and finally the relations of domestic and family life1 all present unsettled problems4 ,these challenge the student to make a careful examination1 for he must take some attitude as citizen on the issues involved4 ,,literature ,the literature on specific topics will be found at the beginning of each ,part1 and at the close of the several chapters4 ,we indicate here some of the more useful manuals and recent representative works1 and add some specific references on the scope and methods of ethics4 ,baldwin's ,dictionary of ,philosophy and ,psychology has selected lists 7see especially articles1 ,ethical ,theories1 ,ethics1 ,worth7 and general lists 7,vol4 ,,iii474 ,runze1 ,ethik1 #ahia1 has good bibliographies4 ,,elementary ,,texts3 ,mackenzie1 ,manual of ,ethics1 #crd ed41 #aijj2 ,muirhead1 ,elements of ,ethics1 #ahib2 ,seth1 ,a ,study of ,ethical ,principles1 #fth ed41 #aijb2 ,thilly1 ,introduction to ,ethics1 #aijj4 ,,representative ,,books ,,and ,,treatises ,,in ,,english3 ,green1 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 #ahhc 7,idealism72 ,martineau1 ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 #ahhe1 #crd ed41 #ahia 7,intuitionism72 ,sidgwick's ,methods of ,ethics1 #ahgd1 #fth ed41 #aija 7,union of ,intuitionist and ,utilitarian ,positions with careful analysis of common sense72 ,spencer1 ,the ,principles of ,ethics1 #ahib-c 7,evolution72 ,stephen's ,science of ,ethics1 #ahhb2 ,the comprehensive work of ,paulsen 7,system der ,ethik1 #ahhi1 #eth ed41 #aijj7 has been translated in part by ,thilly1 #ahii2 that of ,wundt 7,ethik1 #ahhf1 #crd ed41 #aijc71 by ,titchener1 ,gulliver1 and ,washburn1 #ahig-aija4 ,among the more recent contributions1 either to the whole field or to specific parts1 may be noted3 ,alexander1 ,moral ,order and ,progress1 #ahhi2 #bnd ed41 #ahia2 ,dewey1 ,outlines of ,ethics1 #ahia1 and ,the ,study of ,ethics1 ,a ,syllabus1 #ahid2 ,fite1 ,an ,introductory ,study of ,ethics1 #aijc2 ,hoeffding1 ,ethik 7,german tr471 #ahhg2 ,janet1 ,the ,theory of ,morals 7,eng4 tr471 #ahhd2 ,ladd1 ,the ,philosophy of ,conduct1 #aijb2 ,mezes1 ,ethics1 ,descriptive and ,explanatory1 #aijj2 ,moore1 ,principia ,ethica1 #aijc2 ,palmer1 ,the ,field of ,ethics1 #aijb1 ,the ,nature of ,goodness1 #aijc2 ,taylor1 ,the ,problem of ,conduct1 #aija2 ,rashdall1 ,the ,theory of ,good and ,evil1 #aijg2 ,bowne1 ,the ,principles of ,ethics1 #ahib2 ,rickaby1 ,moral ,philosophy1 #ahhh4 ,,histories ,,of ,,ethics3 ,sidgwick1 ,history of ,ethics1 #crd ed41 #ahib2 ,albee1 ,a ,history of ,english ,utilitarianism1 #aijb2 ,stephen1 ,the ,utilitarians1 #aijj2 ,martineau1 ,types of ,ethical ,theory2 ,whewell1 ,lectures on the ,history of ,moral ,philosophy in ,england1 #aheb1 #ahfb2 ,koestlin1 ,geschichte der ,ethik1 #b vols41 #ahha-ib 7ancient theories72 ,jodl1 ,geschichte der ,ethik1 #b vols41 #ahhb-hi 7modern72 ,wundt1 ,ethik1 ,vol4 ,,ii42 the histories of philosophy by ,windelband1 ,hoeffding1 ,erdmann1 ,ueberweg1 ,falckenberg4 ,,scope ,,and ,,method ,,of ,,ethics3 ,see the opening chapters in nearly all the works cited above1 especially ,palmer 7,field of ,ethics71 ,moore1 ,stephen1 ,spencer1 ,paulsen1 and ,wundt 7,facts of the ,moral ,life72 see also ,ritchie1 ,philosophical ,studies1 #aije1 pp4 #bfd-bia2 ,wallace1 ,lectures and ,essays on ,natural ,theology and ,ethics1 #ahih1 pp4 #aid ff42 ,dewey1 ,logical ,conditions of a ,scientific ,treatment of ,morality 7,university of ,chicago ,decennial ,publications1 #aijc72 ,stuart1 ,the ,logic of ,self-realization1 in ,university of ,california ,publications3 ,philosophy1 ,i41 #aijd2 ,small1 ,the ,significance of ,sociology for ,ethics1 #aijb2 ,hadley1 ,article ,economic ,theory in ,baldwin's ,dict4 ,,relation ,,of ,,theory ,,to ,,life3 ,green1 ,prolegomena1 ,book ,,iv42 ,dewey1 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,i41 #ahia1 pp4 #ahf-bjc2 ,james1 same journal1 ,vol4 ,i41 #ccj-ced2 ,mackenzie1 same journal1 ,vol4 ,,iv41 #ahid1 pp4 #afj-agc4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,plato1 ,protagoras1 #cbj ff4 #b ,angell1 ,psychology1 p4 #ei4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,part ,i ,,the ,,beginnings ,,and ,,growth ,,of ,,morality ,,general ,,literature ,,for ,,part ,i ,hobhouse1 ,morals in ,evolution1 #b vols41 #aijf4 ,westermarck1 ,the ,origin and ,development of ,moral ,ideas1 ,vol4 ,i41 #aijf4 ,sutherland1 ,the ,origin and ,growth of the ,moral ,instinct1 #b vols41 #ahih4 ,wundt1 ,facts of the ,moral ,life1 #aijb2 also ,ethik1 #crd ed41 #aijc1 ,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #bhj-ebc4 ,paulsen1 ,a ,system of ,ethics1 #ahii1 ,book ,i4 ,sumner1 ,folkways1 #aijg4 ,bergmann1 ,ethik als ,kulturphilosophie1 #aijd4 ,mezes1 ,ethics1 ,descriptive and ,explanatory1 ,part ,i4 ,dewey1 ,the ,evolutionary ,method as ,applied to ,morality1 ,philos4 ,review1 ,,xi41 #aijb1 pp4 #ajg-abd1 #cec-cga4 ,adam ,smith1 ,theory of ,moral ,sentiments1 #agei4 ,baldwin1 ,social and ,ethical ,interpretations1 #aijb4 ,taylor1 ,the ,problem of ,conduct1 #aija1 chap4 iii4 ,spencer1 ,data of ,ethics1 #ahgi2 ,psychology1 #ahgb1 ,part ,,ix41 chs4 v4-viii4 ,ihering1 ,der ,zweck im ,recht1 #crd ed41 #ahic4 ,steinthal1 ,allgemeine ,ethik1 #ahhe4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,early ,,group ,,life ,to understand the origin and growth of moral life1 it is essential to understand primitive society4 ,and while there is much that is uncertain1 there is one fact of capital importance which stands out clearly4 ,this is the dominant influence of group life4 ,it is not asserted that all peoples have had precisely the same type of groups1 or the same degree of group solidarity4 ,it is beyond question that the ancestors of modern civilized races lived under the general types of group life which will be outlined1 and that these types or their survivals are found among the great mass of peoples to-day4 ,sec4 #a4 ,,typical ,,facts ,,of ,,group ,,life ,consider the following incident as related by ,dr4 ,gray3 ,a ,chinese aided by his wife flogged his mother4 ,the imperial order not only commanded that the criminals should be put to death2 it further directed that the head of the clan should be put to death2 that the immediate neighbors each receive eighty blows and be sent into exile2 that the head or representatives of the graduates of the first degree 7or ,b4,a47 among whom the male offender ranked should be flogged and exiled2 that the granduncle1 the uncle1 and two elder brothers should be put to death2 that the prefect and the rulers should for a time be deprived of their rank2 that on the face of the mother of the female offender four ,chinese characters expressive of neglect of duty towards her daughter should be tattooed1 and that she be exiled to a distant province2 that the father of the female offender1 a bachelor of arts1 should not be allowed to take any higher literary degrees1 and that he be flogged and exiled2 that the son of the offenders should receive another name1 and that the lands of the offender for a time remain fallow4 7,j4 ,h4 ,,gray1 ,china1 ,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #bcg f47 ,put beside this the story of ,achan3 ,achan had taken for his own possession certain articles from the spoil of ,jericho which had been set apart or devoted to ,jehovah4 ,israel then suffered a defeat in battle4 ,when ,achan's act became known1 ,joshua and all ,israel with him took ,achan1 the son of ,zerah1 and the mantle1 and the wedge of gold1 and his sons and his daughters1 and his oxen1 and his asses1 and his sheep1 and his tent1 and all that he had4444 ,and all ,israel stoned him with stones2 and they burned them with fire and stoned them with stones4 7,,joshua vii3 #bd1 #be47 ,the converse of these situations is brought out in the regulations of the ,kumi1 a ,japanese local institution comprising five or more households3 ,as members of a ,kumi we will cultivate friendly feelings even more than with our relatives1 and will promote each other's happiness as well as share each other's grief4 ,if there is an unprincipled or lawless person in a ,kumi1 we shall all share the responsibility for him4 7,,simmons and ,,wigmore1 ,transactions1 ,asiatic ,society of ,japan1 xix41 #agg f47 ,for another aspect of the group take ,caesar's description of landholding among the ,germans3 ,no one possesses privately a definite extent of land2 no one has limited fields of his own2 but every year the magistrates and chiefs distribute the land to the clans and the kindred groups 7gentibus cognationibusque hominum7 and to those 7other groups7 who live together4 7,de ,bell4 ,gall41 ,,vi41 #bb47 ,of the ,greeks1 our intellectual ancestors1 as well as fellow ,aryans1 it is stated that in ,attica1 even to a late period1 the land remained to a large degree in possession of ideal persons1 gods1 phylae 7tribes7 or phratries1 kinships1 political communities4 ,even when the superficies of the land might be regarded as private1 mines were reserved as public4#c ,the basis on which these kinship groups rested is thus stated by ,grote3#d ,all these phratric and gentile associations1 the larger as well as the smaller1 were founded upon the same principles and tendencies of the ,grecian mind--a coalescence of the idea of worship with that of ancestry1 or of communion in certain special religious rites with communion of blood1 real or supposed4 ,the god or hero1 to whom the assembled members offered their sacrifices1 was conceived as the primitive ancestor to whom they owed their origin4 ,coulanges gives a similar statement as to the ancient family group3#e ,the members of the ancient family were united by something more powerful than birth1 affection1 or physical strength2 this was the religion of the sacred fire1 and of dead ancestors4 ,this caused the family to form a single body both in this life and in the next4 ,finally1 the following passage on clanship among the ,kafirs brings out two points3 7#a7 ,that such a group life implies feelings and ideas of a distinctive sort2 and 7#b7 that it has a strength rooted in the very necessities of life4 ,a ,kafir feels that the 'frame that binds him in' extends to the clan4 ,the sense of solidarity of the family in ,europe is thin and feeble compared to the full-blooded sense of corporate union of the ,kafir clan4 ,the claims of the clan entirely swamp the rights of the individual4 ,the system of tribal solidarity1 which has worked so well in its smoothness that it might satisfy the utmost dreams of the socialist1 is a standing proof of the sense of corporate union of the clan4 ,in olden days a man did not have any feeling of personal injury when a chief made him work for white men and then told him to give all1 or nearly all of his wages to his chief2 the money was kept within the clan1 and what was the good of the clan was the good of the individual and vice versa4 ,the striking thing about this unity of the clan is that it was not a thought-out plan imposed from without by legislation upon an unwilling people1 but it was a felt-out plan which arose spontaneously along the line of least resistance4 ,if one member of the clan suffered1 all the members suffered1 not in sentimental phraseology1 but in real fact4 7,,dudley ,,kidd1 ,savage ,childhood1 pp4 #gd f47 ,the above passages refer to ,aryan1 ,semitic1 ,mongolian1 and ,kafir peoples4 ,they could be matched by similar statements concerning nearly every people4 ,they suggest a way of living1 and a view of life very different from that of the ,american or of most ,europeans4#f ,the ,american or ,european belongs to groups of various kinds1 but he joins most of them4 ,he of course is born into a family1 but he does not stay in it all his life unless he pleases4 ,and he may choose his own occupation1 residence1 wife1 political party1 religion1 social club1 or even national allegiance4 ,he may own or sell his own house1 give or bequeath his property1 and is responsible generally speaking for no one's acts but his own4 ,this makes him an individual in a much fuller sense than he would be if all these relations were settled for him4 ,on the other hand1 the member of such groups as are referred to in our examples above1 has all1 or nearly all1 his relations fixed when he is born into a certain clan or family group4 ,this settles his occupation1 dwelling1 gods1 and politics4 ,if it doesn't decide upon his wife1 it at least usually fixes the group from which she must be taken4 ,his conditions1 in the words of ,maine1 are thus of status1 not of contract4 ,this makes a vast difference in his whole attitude4 ,it will help to bring out more clearly by contrast the character of present morality1 as well as to see moral life in the making1 if we examine more carefully this group life4 ,we shall find1 as brought out in the passages already quoted1 that the most important type of group is at once a kindred or family1 an economic1 a political1 a religious1 and a moral unit4 ,first1 however1 we notice briefly the most important types of groups4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,kinship ,,and ,,household ,,groups #a4 ,the ,kinship ,group4--,the kinship group is a body of persons who conceive of themselves as sprung from one ancestor1 and hence as having in their veins one blood4 ,it does not matter for our study whether each group has actually sprung from a single ancestor4 ,it is highly probable that the contingencies of food-supply or of war may have been an original cause for the constitution of the group1 wholly or in part4 ,but this is of no consequence for our purpose4 ,the important point is that the members of the group regard themselves as of one stock4 ,in some cases the ancestor is believed to have been an animal4 ,then we have the so-called totem group1 which is found among ,north ,american ,indians1 ,africans1 and ,australians1 and was perhaps the early form of ,semitic groups4 ,in other cases1 some hero or even some god is named as the ancestor4 ,in any case the essential part of the theory remains the same3 namely1 that one blood circulates in all the members1 and hence that the life of each is a part of the common life of the group4 ,there are then no degrees of kindred4 ,this group1 it should be noted1 is not the same as the family1 for in the family1 as a rule1 husband and wife are of different kinship groups1 and continue their several kinship relations4 ,among some peoples marriage ceremonies1 indeed1 symbolize the admission of the wife into the husband's kinship1 and in this case the family becomes a kinship group1 but this is by no means universally the case4 ,the feeling that one is first and foremost a member of a group1 rather than an individual1 is furthered among certain kin groups by a scheme of class relationship4 ,according to this system1 instead of having one definite person whom ,i1 and ,i alone1 regard and address as father or mother1 grandfather1 uncle1 brother1 sister1 ,i call any one of a given group or class of persons mother1 grandfather1 brother1 sister4 ,and any one else who is in the same class with me calls the same persons1 mother1 grandfather1 brother1 or sister4#g ,the simplest form of such a class system is that found among the ,hawaiians4 ,here there are five classes based upon the generations corresponding to what we call grandparents1 parents1 brothers and sisters1 children1 and grandchildren1 but the words used to designate them do not imply any such specific parentage as do these words with us4 ,bearing this in mind1 we may say that every one in the first class is equally grandparent to every one in the third2 every one in the third is equally brother or sister to every other in the third1 equally father or mother to every one in the fourth1 and so on4 ,in ,australia the classes are more numerous and the relationships far more intricate and complicated1 but this does not1 as might be supposed1 render the bond relatively unimportant2 on the contrary1 his relationship to every other class is one of the most important points with which each individual must be acquainted2 it determines marital relations1 food distribution1 salutations1 and general conduct to an extraordinary degree4 ,a kinship group was known as tribe or family 7,english translation7 among the ,israelites2 as genos1 phratria1 and phyle among the ,greeks1 gens and curia among the ,romans2 clan in ,scotland2 sept in ,ireland2 ,sippe in ,germany4 #b4 ,the ,family or ,household ,group4--,two kinds of families may be noted as significant for our purpose4 ,in the maternal family the woman remains among her own kin1 and the children are naturally reckoned as belonging to the mother's kin4 ,the husband and father is more or less a guest or outsider4 ,in a blood feud he would have to side with his own clan and against that of his wife if his clan quarreled with hers4 ,clan and family are thus seen to be distinct4 ,in the paternal1 which easily becomes the patriarchal family the wife leaves her relatives to live in her husband's house and among his kin4 ,she might then1 as at ,rome1 abjure her own kindred and be formally adopted into her husband's gens or clan4 ,the ,greek myth of ,orestes is an illustration of the clashing of these two conceptions of father kin and mother kin1 and ,hamlet's sparing of his mother under similar circumstances1 shows a more modern point of view4 ,it is evident that with the prevalence of the paternal type of family1 clan and household ties will mutually strengthen each other4 ,this will make an important difference in the father's relation to the children1 and gives a much firmer basis for ancestral religion4 ,but in many respects the environing atmosphere1 the pressure and support1 the group sympathy and group tradition1 are essentially similar4 ,the important thing is that every person is a member of a kindred1 and likewise1 of some family group1 and that he thinks1 feels1 and acts accordingly4#h ,sec4 #c4 ,,the ,,kinship ,,and ,,family ,,groups ,,are ,,also ,,economic ,,and ,,industrial ,,units #a4 ,the ,land and the ,group4--,in land1 as a rule1 no individual ownership in the modern sense was recognized4 ,among hunting and pastoral peoples there was1 of course1 no ownership by any group in the strict sense of modern law4 ,but none the less1 the group1 large or small1 had its fairly well-defined territory within which it hunted and fished2 in the pastoral life it had its pasture range and its wells of water4 ,with agriculture a more definite sense of possession arose4 ,but possession was by the tribe or gens or household1 not by the individual3 ,the land belonged to the clan1 and the clan was settled upon the land4 ,a man was thus not a member of the clan1 because he lived upon1 or even owned1 the land2 but he lived upon the land1 and had interests in it1 because he was a member of the clan4#i ,greek and ,german customs were quoted at the outset4 ,among the ,celts the laws of ancient ,ireland show a transitional stage4 ,the land of the tribe consisted of two distinct allotments1 the 'fechfine' or tribeland1 and the 'orta' or inheritance land4 ,this latter belonged as individual property to the men of the chieftain groups4#aj ,the ,hindoo joint-family and the house-community of the ,southern ,slavonians are present examples of group ownership4 ,they are joint in food1 worship1 and estate4 ,they have a common home1 a common table4 ,maxims of the ,slavs express their appreciation of community life3 ,the common household waxes rich2 ,the more bees in the hive1 the heavier it weighs4 ,one difficulty in the ,english administration of ,ireland has been this radical difference between the modern ,englishman's individualistic conception of property and the ,irishman's more primitive conception of group or clan ownership4 ,whether rightly or not1 the ,irish tenant refuses to regard himself as merely a tenant4 ,he considers himself as a member of a family or group which formerly owned the land1 and he does not admit the justice1 even though he cannot disprove the legality1 of an alienation of the group possession4 ,for such a clan or household as we have described is not merely equivalent to the persons who compose it at a given time4 ,its property belongs to the ancestors and to the posterity as well as to the present possessors2 and hence in some groups which admit an individual possession or use during life1 no right of devise or inheritance is permitted4 ,the property reverts at death to the whole gens or clan4 ,in other cases a child may inherit1 but in default of such an heir the property passes to the common possession4 ,the right to bequeath property to the church was long a point on which civil law and canon law were at variance4 ,the relations of the primitive clan or household group to land were therefore decidedly adapted to keep the individual's good bound up with the good of the group4 #b4 ,movable ,goods4--,in the case of movable goods1 such as tools1 weapons1 cattle1 the practice is not uniform4 ,when the goods are the product of the individual's own skill or prowess they are usually his4 ,tools1 weapons1 slaves or women captured1 products of some special craft or skill1 are thus usually private4 ,but when the group acts as a unit the product is usually shared4 ,the buffalo and salmon and large game were thus for the whole ,indian group which hunted or fished together2 and in like manner the maize which was tended by the women belonged to the household in common4 ,slavic and ,indian house communities at the present day have a common interest in the household property4 ,even women and children among some tribes are regarded as the property of the group4 ,sec4 #d4 ,,the ,,kinship ,,and ,,family ,,groups ,,were ,,political ,,bodies ,in a modern family the parents exercise a certain degree of control over the children1 but this is limited in several respects4 ,no parent is allowed to put a child to death1 or to permit him to grow up in ignorance4 ,on the other hand1 the parent is not allowed to protect the child from arrest if a serious injury has been done by him4 ,the ,state1 through its laws and officers1 is regarded by us as the highest authority in a certain great sphere of action4 ,it must settle conflicting claims and protect life and property2 in the opinion of many it must organize the life of its members where the cooperation of every member is necessary for some common good4 ,in early group life there may or may not be some political body over and above the clan or family1 but in any case the kin or family is itself a sort of political ,state4 ,not a ,state in the sense that the political powers are deliberately separated from personal1 religious1 and family ties2 men gained a new conception of authority and rose to a higher level of possibilities when they consciously separated and defined government and laws from the undifferentiated whole of a religious and kindred group4 ,but yet this primitive group was after all a ,state1 not a mob1 or a voluntary society1 or a mere family2 for 7#a7 it was a more or less permanently organized body2 7#b7 it exercised control over its members which they regarded as rightful authority1 not as mere force2 7#c7 it was not limited by any higher authority1 and acted more or less effectively for the interest of the whole4 ,the representatives of this political aspect of the group may be chiefs or sachems1 a council of elders1 or1 as in ,rome1 the ,house ,father1 whose patria potestas marks the extreme development of the patriarchal family4 ,the control exercised by the group over individual members assumes various forms among the different peoples4 ,the more important aspects are a right over life and bodily freedom1 in some cases extending to power of putting to death1 maiming1 chastising1 deciding whether newly born children shall be preserved or not2 the right of betrothal1 which includes control over the marriage portion received for its women2 and the right to administer property of the kin in behalf of the kin as a whole4 ,it is probable that among all these various forms of control1 the control over the marriage relations of women has been most persistent4 ,one reason for this control may have been the fact that the group was bound to resent injuries of a member of the group who had been married to another4 ,hence this responsibility seemed naturally to involve the right of decision as to her marriage4 ,it is ,membership in the ,group ,which ,gives the ,individual ,whatever ,rights ,he ,has4--,according to present conceptions this is still largely true of legal rights4 ,a ,state may allow a citizen of another country to own land1 to sue in its courts1 and will usually give him a certain amount of protection1 but the first-named rights are apt to be limited1 and it is only a few years since ,chief ,justice ,taney's dictum stated the existing legal theory of the ,united ,states to be that the negro had no rights which the white man was bound to respect4 ,even where legal theory does not recognize race or other distinctions1 it is often hard in practice for an alien to get justice4 ,in primitive clan or family groups this principle is in full force4 ,justice is a privilege which falls to a man as belonging to some group--not otherwise4 ,the member of the clan or the household or the village community has a claim1 but the stranger has no standing4 ,he may be treated kindly1 as a guest1 but he cannot demand justice at the hands of any group but his own4 ,in this conception of rights within the group we have the prototype of modern civil law4 ,the dealing of clan with clan is a matter of war or negotiation1 not of law2 and the clanless man is an outlaw in fact as well as in name4 ,joint ,responsibility and mutual support1 as shown in the blood feud1 was a natural consequence of this fusion of political and kindred relations4 ,in modern life ,states treat each other as wholes in certain respects4 ,if some member of a savage tribe assaults a citizen of one of the civilized nations1 the injured party invokes the help of his government4 ,a demand is usually made that the guilty party be delivered up for trial and punishment4 ,if he is not forthcoming a punitive expedition is organized against the whole tribe2 guilty and innocent suffer alike4 ,or in lieu of exterminating the offending tribe1 in part or completely1 the nation of the injured man may accept an indemnity in money or land from the offender's tribe4 ,recent dealings between ,british and ,africans1 ,germans and ,africans1 ,france and ,morocco1 the ,united ,states and the ,filipinos1 the ,powers and ,china1 illustrate this4 ,the ,state protects its own members against other ,states1 and avenges them upon other ,states4 ,each opposes a united body to the other4 ,the same principle carried out through private citizens as public agents1 and applied to towns1 is seen in the practice which prevailed in the ,middle ,ages4 ,when merchants of one country had been defrauded by those of another1 or found it impossible to collect a debt from them1 the former country issued letters of marque and reprisal1 authorizing the plunder of any citizens of the offending town until satisfaction should be obtained4 ,transfer the situation to the early clan or tribe1 and this solidarity is increased because each member is related to the rest by blood1 as well as by national unity4 ,the ,arabs do not say ,the blood of ,m4 or ,n4 has been spilt1 naming the man2 they say1 ,our blood has been spilt4#aa ,the whole group1 therefore1 feels injured and regards every man in the offender's kin as more or less responsible4 ,the next of kin1 the avenger of blood1 stands first in duty and privilege1 but the rest are all involved in greater or less degree4 ,within the ,group each member will be treated more or less fully as an individual4 ,if he takes his kinsman's wife or his kinsman's game he will be dealt with by the authorities or by the public opinion of his group4 ,he will not indeed be put to death if he kills his kinsman1 but he will be hated1 and may be driven out4 ,since the living kin is not killed for the sake of the dead kin1 everybody will hate to see him4#ab ,when now a smaller group1 like a family1 is at the same time a part of a larger group like a phratry or a tribe1 we have the phase of solidarity which is so puzzling to the modern4 ,we hold to solidarity in war or between nations2 but with a few exceptions#ac we have replaced it by individual responsibility of adults for debts and crimes so far as the civil law has jurisdiction4 ,in earlier times the higher group or authority treated the smaller as a unit4 ,achan's family all perished with him4 ,the ,chinese sense of justice recognized a series of degrees in responsibility dependent on nearness of kin or of residence1 or of occupation4 ,the ,welsh system held kinsmen as far as second cousins responsible for insult or injury short of homicide1 and as far as fifth cousins 7seventh degree of descent7 for the payment in case of homicide4 ,the mutual responsibility of kinsmen for saraal and galanas 7the ,wergild of the ,germans71 graduated according to nearness of kin to the murdered man and to the criminal1 reveals more clearly than anything else the extent to which the individual was bound by innumerable meshes to his fixed place in the tribal community4#ad ,sec4 #e4 ,,the ,,kinship ,,or ,,household ,,group ,,was ,a ,,religious ,,unit ,the kinship or household group determined largely both the ideas and the cultus of primitive religion2 conversely religion gave completeness1 value1 and sacredness to the group life4 ,kinship with unseen powers or persons was the fundamental religious idea4 ,the kinship group as a religious body simply extended the kin to include invisible as well as visible members4 ,the essential feature of religion is not unseen beings who are feared1 or cajoled1 or controlled by magic4 ,it is rather kindred unseen beings1 who may be feared1 but who are also reverenced and loved4 ,the kinship may be physical or spiritual1 but however conceived it makes gods and worshippers members of one group4#ae #a4 ,totem ,groups4--,in totem groups1 the prevailing conception is that one blood circulates in all the members of the group and that the ancestor of the whole group is some object of nature1 such as sun or moon1 plant or animal4 ,perhaps the most interesting and intelligible account of the relation between the animal ancestor and the members of the group is that which has recently been discovered in certain ,australian tribes who believe that every child1 at its birth1 is the reincarnation of some previous member of the group1 and that these ancestors were an actual transformation of animals and plants1 or of water1 fire1 wind1 sun1 moon1 or stars4 ,such totem groups cherish that animal which they believe to be their ancestor and ordinarily will not kill it or use it for food4 ,the various ceremonies of religious initiation are intended to impress upon the younger members of the group the sacredness of this kindred bond which units them to each other and to their totem4 ,the beginnings of decorative art frequently express the importance of the symbol1 and the totem is felt to be as distinctly a member of the group as is any of the human members4 #b4 ,ancestral ,religion4--,at a somewhat higher stage of civilization1 and usually in connection with the patriarchal households or groups in which kinship is reckoned through the male line1 the invisible members of the group are the departed ancestors4 ,this ancestor worship is a power to-day in ,china and ,japan1 and in the tribes of the ,caucasus4 ,the ancient ,semites1 ,romans1 ,teutons1 ,celts1 ,hindoos1 all had their kindred gods of the household4 ,the ,roman genius1 lares1 penates1 and manes1 perhaps the ,hebrew teraphim1--prized by ,laban and ,rachel1 kept by ,david1 valued in the time of ,hosea1--were loved and honored side by side with other deities4 ,sometimes the nature deities1 such as ,zeus or ,jupiter1 were incorporated with the kinship or family gods4 ,the ,greek ,hestia and ,roman ,vesta symbolized the sacredness of the hearth4 ,the kinship tie thus determined for every member of the group his religion4 ,religion ,completes the ,group4--,conversely1 this bond of union with unseen1 yet ever present and powerful kindred spirits completed the group and gave to it its highest authority1 its fullest value1 its deepest sacredness4 ,if the unseen kin are nature beings1 they symbolize for man his dependence upon nature and his kinship in some vague fashion with the cosmic forces4 ,if the gods are the departed ancestors1 they are then conceived as still potent1 like ,father ,anchises1 to protect and guide the fortunes of their offspring4 ,the wisdom1 courage1 and affection1 as well as the power of the great heroes of the group1 live on4 ,the fact that the gods are unseen enhances tremendously their supposed power4 ,the visible members of the group may be strong1 but their strength can be measured4 ,the living elders may be wise1 yet they are not far beyond the rest of the group4 ,but the invisible beings cannot be measured4 ,the long-departed ancestor may have inconceivable age and wisdom4 ,the imagination has free scope to magnify his power and invest him with all the ideal values it can conceive4 ,the religious bond is1 therefore1 fitted to be the bearer1 as the religious object is the embodiment in concrete form1 of the higher standards of the group1 and to furnish the sanction for their enforcement or adoption4 ,sec4 #f4 ,,groups ,,or ,,classes ,,on ,,the ,,basis ,,of ,,age ,,and ,,sex ,while the kindred and family groups are by far the most important for early morality1 other groupings are significant4 ,the division by ages is widespread4 ,the simplest scheme gives three classes3 7#a7 children1 7#b7 young men and maidens1 7#c7 married persons4 ,puberty forms the bound between the first and second2 marriage that between the second and third4 ,distinct modes of dress and ornament1 frequently also different residences and standards of conduct1 belong to these several classes4 ,of groups on the basis of sex1 the men's clubs are especially worthy of note4 ,they flourish now chiefly in the islands of the ,pacific1 but there are indications1 such as the common meals of the ,spartans1 of a wide spread among ,european peoples in early times4 ,the fundamental idea#af seems to be that of a common house for the unmarried young men1 where they eat1 sleep1 and pass their time1 whereas the women1 children1 and married men sleep and eat in the family dwelling4 ,but in most cases all the men resort to the clubhouse by day4 ,strangers may be entertained there4 ,it thus forms a sort of general center for the men's activities1 and for the men's conversation4 ,as such1 it is an important agency for forming and expressing public opinion1 and for impressing upon the young men just entering the house the standards of the older members4 ,further1 in some cases these houses become the center of rites to the dead1 and thus add the impressiveness of religious significance to their other activities4 ,finally1 secret societies may be mentioned as a subdivision of sex groups1 for among primitive peoples such societies are confined in almost all cases to the men4 ,they seem in many cases to have grown out of the age classes already described4 ,the transition from childhood to manhood1 mysterious in itself1 was invested with further mysteries by the old men who conducted the ceremonies of initiation4 ,masks were worn1 or the skulls of deceased ancestors were employed1 to give additional mystery and sanctity4 ,the increased power gained by secrecy would often be itself sufficient to form a motive for such organization1 especially where they had some end in view not approved by the dominant authorities4 ,sometimes they exercise strict authority over their members1 and assume judicial and punitive functions1 as in the ,vehm of the ,middle ,ages4 ,sometimes they become merely leagues of enemies to society4 ,sec4 #g4 ,,moral ,,significance ,,of ,,the ,,kindred ,,and ,,other ,,groups ,the moral in this early stage is not to be looked for as something distinct from the political1 religious1 kindred1 and sympathetic aspects of the clan1 family1 and other groups4 ,the question rather is1 ,how far are these very political1 religious1 and other aspects implicitly moral8 ,if by moral we mean a conscious testing of conduct by an inner and self-imposed standard1 if we mean a freely chosen as contrasted with a habitual or customary standard1 then evidently we have the moral only in germ4 ,for the standards are group standards1 rather than those of individual conscience2 they operate largely through habit rather than through choice4 ,nevertheless they are not set for the individual by outsiders4 ,they are set by a group of which he is a member4 ,they are enforced by a group of which he is a member4 ,conduct is praised or blamed1 punished or rewarded by the group of which he is a member4 ,property is administered1 industry is carried on1 wars and feuds prosecuted for the common good4 ,what the group does1 each member joins in doing4 ,it is a reciprocal matter3 ,a helps enforce a rule or impose a service on ,b2 he cannot help feeling it fair when the same rule is applied to himself4 ,he has to play the game1 and usually he expects to play it as a matter of course4 ,each member1 therefore1 is practicing certain acts1 standing in certain relations1 maintaining certain attitudes1 just because he is one of the group which does these things and maintains these standards4 ,and he does not act in common with the group without sharing in the group emotions4 ,it is a grotesque perversion to conceive the restraints of gods and chiefs as purely external terrors4 ,the primitive group could enter into the spirit implied in the words of the ,athenian chorus1 which required of an alien upon adoption ,to loathe whate'er our state does hateful hold1 ,to reverence what it loves4#ag ,the gregarious instinct may be the most elemental of the impulses which bind the group together1 but it is reinforced by sympathies and sentiments growing out of common life1 common work1 common danger1 common religion4 ,the morality is already implicit1 it needs only to become conscious4 ,the standards are embodied in the old men or the gods2 the rational good is in the inherited wisdom2 the respect for sex1 for property rights1 and for the common good1 is embodied in the system--but it is there4 ,nor are the union and control a wholly objective affair4 ,the corporate union was not a pretty religious fancy with which to please the mind1 but was so truly felt that it formed an excellent basis from which the altruistic sentiment might start4 ,gross selfishness was curbed1 and the turbulent passions were restrained by an impulse which the man felt welling up within him1 instinctive and unbidden4 ,clannish camaraderie was thus of immense value to the native races4#ah ,,literature ,the works of ,hobhouse1 ,sumner1 ,westermarck contain copious references to the original sources4 ,among the most valuable are3 ,,for ,,savage ,,people3 ,waitz1 ,anthropologie der ,naturvoelker1 #ahei-gb2 ,tylor1 ,primitive ,culture1 #aijc2 ,spencer and ,gillen1 ,the ,native ,tribes of ,central ,australia1 #ahii1 and ,the ,northern ,tribes of ,central ,australia1 #aijd2 ,howitt and ,fison1 ,kamilaroi and ,kurnai1 #ahhj2 ,howitt1 ,the ,native ,tribes of ,s4 ,e4 ,australia1 #aijd2 ,n4 ,thomas1 ,kinship1 ,organization and ,group ,marriages in ,australia1 #aijf2 ,morgan1 ,houses and ,house-life of the ,american ,aborigines1 #ahha1 ,the ,league of the ,iroquois1 #ahea1 ,systems of ,consanguinity1 ,smithsonian ,contributions1 #ahga1 ,ancient ,society1 #ahgg4 ,many papers in the ,reports of the ,bureau of ,ethnology1 especially by ,powell in #ast1 #ahgi-hj2 ,dorsey in #crd1 #ahha-hb1 ,mendeleff in #aith1 #ahic-id4 ,,for ,,india1 ,,china1 ,,and ,,japan3 ,lyall1 ,asiatic ,studies1 ,religious and ,social1 #ahhb2 ,gray1 ,china1 #ahgh2 ,smith1 ,chinese ,characteristics1 #ahid2 ,village ,life in ,china1 #ahii2 ,nitobe1 ,bushido1 #aije2 ,l4 ,hearn1 ,japan1 #aijd4 ,,for ,,semitic ,,and ,,indo-,,germanic ,,peoples3 ,w4 ,r4 ,smith1 ,kinship and ,marriage in ,early ,arabia1 #ahhe2 ,the ,religion of the ,semites1 #ahid2 ,w4 ,hearn1 ,the ,aryan ,household1 #ahgi2 ,coulanges1 ,the ,ancient ,city1 #ahgc2 ,seebohm1 ,the ,tribal ,system in ,wales1 #ahie1 and ,tribal ,custom in ,anglo-,saxon ,law1 #aijb2 ,krauss1 ,sitte und ,brauch der ,suedslaven1 #ahhe4 ,,general3 ,grosse1 ,die ,formen der ,familie und die ,formen der ,wirthschaft1 #ahif2 ,starke1 ,the ,primitive ,family1 #ahhi2 ,maine1 ,ancient ,law1 #ahhe2 ,mc,lennan1 ,studies in ,ancient ,history1 #ahhf2 ,rivers1 ,on the ,origin of the ,classificatory ,system of ,relationships1 in ,anthropological ,essays1 presented to ,e4 ,b4 ,tylor1 #aijg2 ,ratzel1 ,history of ,mankind1 #ahif-ih2 ,kovalevsky1 ,tableau des origines et de l',evolution de la ,famille et de la ,propriete1 #ahij2 ,giddings1 ,principles of ,sociology1 #ahif1 pp4 #aeg-afh1 #bef-bih2 ,thomas1 ,relation of ,sex to ,primitive ,social ,control in ,sex and ,society1 #aijg2 ,webster1 ,primitive ,secret ,societies1 #aijh2 ,simmel1 ,the ,sociology of ,secrecy and of ,secret ,societies1 ,american ,journal ,sociology1 ,vol4 ,,xi41 #aijf1 pp4 #dda-dih4 ,see also the references at close of ,chapters ,,vi41 ,,vii4 ,,footnotes3 #c ,wilamowitz-,moellendorf1 ,aristotle und ,athen1 ,,ii4 #ic1 #dg4 #d ,history of ,greece1 ,,iii41 #ee4 #e ,the ,ancient ,city1 p4 #ea4 #f ,russian mirs1 ,south ,slavonian joint families1 ,corsican clans with their vendettas1 and tribes in the ,caucasus still have the group interest strong1 and the feuds of the mountaineers in some of the border states illustrate family solidarity4 #g ,in all the tribes with whom we are acquainted all the terms coincide without any exception in the recognition of relationships1 all of which are dependent on the existence of a classificatory system1 the fundamental idea of which is that the women of certain groups marry the men of others4 ,each tribe has one term applied indiscriminately to the man or woman whom he actually marries and to all whom he might lawfully marry1 that is1 who belong to the right group3 ,one term to his actual mother and to all the women whom his father might lawfully have married4--,,spencer and ,,gillen1 ,native ,tribes of ,central ,australia1 p4 #eg4 #h ,the fact that primitive man is at once an individual and a member of a group--that he has as it were two personalities or selves1 an individual self and a clan-self1 or tribal-self1 as ,clifford called it1--is not merely a psychologist's way of stating things4 ,the ,kafir people1 according to their most recent student1 ,mr4 ,dudley ,kidd1 have two distinct words to express these two selves4 ,they call one the idhlozi and other the itongo4 ,the idhlozi is the individual and personal spirit born with each child--something fresh and unique which is never shared with any one else--while the itongo is the ancestral and corporate spirit which is not personal but tribal1 or a thing of the clan1 the possession of which is obtained not by birth but by certain initiatory rites4 ,the idhlozi is personal and inalienable1 for it is wrapped up with the man's personality1 and at death it lives near the grave1 or goes into the snake or totem of the clan2 but the itongo is of the clan1 and haunts the living-hut2 at death it returns to the tribal amatongo 7ancestral spirits74 ,a man's share in this clan-spirit 7itongo7 is lost when he becomes a ,christian1 or when he is in any way unfaithful to the interests of the clan1 but a man never loses his idhlozi any more than he ever loses his individuality4--,savage ,childhood1 pp4 #ad f4 #i ,hearn1 ,the ,aryan ,household1 p4 #bab4 #aj ,mac,lennan1 ,studies in ,ancient ,history1 p4 #cha4 #aa ,robertson ,smith1 ,kinship and ,marriage in ,early ,arabia1 p4 #bc4 #ab ,cited from the ,gwentian ,code4 ,seebohm1 ,the ,tribal ,system in ,wales1 p4 #ajd4 #ac ,e4g41 certain joint responsibilities of husband and wife4 #ad ,seebohm1 ,the ,tribal ,system in ,wales1 pp4 #ajc f4 #ae ,from the earliest times1 religion1 as distinct from magic or sorcery1 addresses itself to kindred and friendly beings1 who may indeed be angry with their people for a time1 but are always placable except to the enemies of their worshippers or to renegade members of the community4 ,it is not with a vague fear of unknown powers1 but with a loving reverence for known gods who are knit to their worshippers by strong bonds of kinship1 that religion in the only true sense of the word begins4--,,robertson ,,smith1 ,religion of the ,semites1 p4 #ed4 #af ,schurtz1 ,altersklassen und ,maennerbuende4 #ag ,oedipus at ,colonus1 vv4 #ahf f4 #ah ,dudley ,kidd1 ,savage ,childhood1 pp4 #gd f4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,rationalizing ,,and ,,socializing ,,agencies ,,in ,,early ,,society ,sec4 #a4 ,,three ,,levels ,,of ,,conduct ,a young man may enter a profession thinking of it only as a means of support4 ,but the work requires foresight and persistence2 it broadens his interests2 it develops his character4 ,like ,saul1 he has gone to search for asses1 he has found a kingdom4 ,or he may marry on the basis of emotional attraction4 ,but the sympathies evoked1 the cooperation made necessary1 are refining and enlarging his life4 ,both these cases illustrate agencies which are moral in their results1 although not carried on from a consciously moral purpose4 ,suppose1 however1 that children are born into the family4 ,then the parent consciously sets about controlling their conduct1 and in exercising authority almost inevitably feels the need of some standard other than caprice or selfishness4 ,suppose that in business the partners differ as to their shares in the profits1 then the question of fairness is raised2 and if one partner defaults1 the question of guilt4 ,or suppose the business encounters a law which forbids certain operations1 the problem of justice will come to consciousness4 ,such situations as these are evidently in the moral sphere in a sense in which those of the preceding paragraph are not4 ,they demand some kind of judgment1 some approval or disapproval4 ,as ,aristotle says1 it is not enough to do the acts2 it is necessary to do them in a certain way1--not merely to get the result1 but to intend it4 ,the result must be thought of as in some sense good or right2 its opposite as in some sense bad or wrong4 ,but notice that the judgments in these cases may follow either of two methods3 7#a7 ,the parent or business man may teach his child1 or practice in business1 what tradition or the accepted standard calls for2 or 7#b7 he may consider and examine the principles and motives involved4 ,action by the first method is undoubtedly moral1 in one sense4 ,it is judging according to a standard1 though it takes the standard for granted4 ,action by the second method is moral in a more complete sense4 ,it examines the standard as well4 ,the one is the method of customary morality1 the other that of reflective morality1 or of conscience in the proper sense4 ,the ,three ,levels and ,their ,motives4--,we may distinguish then three levels of conduct4 #a4 ,conduct arising from instincts and fundamental needs4 ,to satisfy these needs certain conduct is necessary1 and this in itself involves ways of acting which are more or less rational and social4 ,the conduct may be in accordance with moral laws1 though not directed by moral judgments4 ,we consider this level in the present chapter4 #b4 ,conduct regulated by standards of society1 for some more or less conscious end involving the social welfare4 ,the level of custom1 which is treated in ,chapter ,,iv4 #c4 ,conduct regulated by a standard which is both social and rational1 which is examined and criticized4 ,the level of conscience4 ,progress toward this level is outlined in ,chapters ,v4 to ,,viii4 ,the motives in these levels will show a similar scale4 ,in 7#a7 the motives are external to the end gained4 ,the man seeks food1 or position1 or glory1 or sex gratification2 he is forced to practice sobriety1 industry1 courage1 gentleness4 ,in 7#b7 the motive is to seek some good which is social1 but the man acts for the group mainly because he is of the group1 and does not conceive his own good as distinct from that of the group4 ,his acts are only in part guided by intelligence2 they are in part due to habit or accident4 7#c7 ,in full morality a man not only intends his acts definitely1 he also values them as what he can do with all his heart4 ,he does them because they are right and good4 ,he chooses them freely and intelligently4 ,our study of moral development will consider successively these three levels4 ,they all exist in present morality4 ,only the first two are found in savage life4 ,if 7#a7 existed alone it was before the group life1 which is our starting-point in this study4 ,we return now to our consideration of group life1 and note the actual forces which are at work4 ,we wish to discover the process by which the first and second levels prepare the way for the third4 ,the ,necessary ,activities of ,existence ,start the ,process4--,the prime necessities1 if the individual is to survive1 are for food1 shelter1 defense against enemies4 ,if the stock is to survive1 there must be also reproduction and parental care4 ,further1 it is an advantage in the struggle if the individual can master and acquire1 can outstrip rivals1 and can join forces with others of his kind for common ends4 ,to satisfy these needs we find men in group life engaged in work1 in war or blood feuds1 in games and festal activities1 in parental care4 ,they are getting food and booty1 making tools and houses1 conquering or enslaving their enemies1 protecting the young1 winning trophies1 and finding emotional excitement in contests1 dances1 and songs4 ,these all help in the struggle for existence4 ,but the workmen1 warriors1 singers1 parents1 are getting more4 ,they are forming certain elements of character which1 if not necessarily moral in themselves1 are yet indispensable requisites for full morality4 ,we may say therefore that nature is doing this part of moral evolution1 without the aid of conscious intention on man's part4 ,to use the terms of ,chapter ,i41 we may call this a rationalizing and socializing process1 though not a conscious moral process4 ,we notice some of the more important agencies that are operative4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,rationalizing ,,agencies #a4 ,work4--,the earlier forms of occupation1 hunting and fishing1 call for active intelligence1 although the activity is sustained to a great degree by the immediate interest or thrill of excitement1 which makes them a recreation to the civilized man4 ,quickness of perception1 alertness of mind and body1 and in some cases1 physical daring1 are the qualities most needed4 ,but in the pastoral life1 and still more with the beginning of agriculture and commerce1 the man who succeeds must have foresight and continuity of purpose4 ,he must control impulse by reason4 ,he must organize those habits which are the basis of character1 instead of yielding to the attractions of various pleasures which might lead him from the main purpose4 ,to a certain extent the primitive communism acted to prevent the individual from feeling the full force of improvidence4 ,even if he does not secure a supply of game1 or have a large enough flock to provide for the necessities of himself and his immediate family1 the group does not necessarily permit him to starve4 ,the law ,whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap does not press upon him with such relentless grasp as in the modern individualistic struggle for existence4 ,nevertheless it would be an entirely mistaken view of primitive group life to suppose that it is entirely a lazy man's paradise1 or happy-go-lucky existence4 ,the varying economic conditions are important here as measuring the amount of forethought and care required4 ,it is the shepherd ,jacob whose craft outwits ,esau the hunter2 and while the sympathy of the modern may be with ,esau1 he must remember that forethought like other valuable weapons may be used in a social as well as a selfish fashion4 ,the early ,greek appreciation of craft is probably expressed in their deification of theft and deception in ,hermes4 ,agriculture and commerce1 still more than preceding types of occupation1 demand thoughtfulness and the long look ahead4 ,the differentiation of labor has been a powerful influence for increasing the range of mental life and stimulating its development4 ,if all do the same thing1 all are much alike1 and inevitably remain on a low level4 ,but when the needs of men induce different kinds of work1 slumbering capacities are aroused and new ones are called into being4 ,the most deeply-rooted differentiation of labor is that between the sexes4 ,the woman performs the work within or near the dwelling1 the man hunts or tends the flocks or ranges abroad4 ,this probably tends to accentuate further certain organic differences4 ,among the men1 group life in its simplest phases has little differentiation except for counsel or for war4 ,but with metal working and agricultural life the field widens4 ,at first the specializing is largely by families rather than by individual choice4 ,castes of workmen may take the place of mere kinship ties4 ,later on the rules of caste in turn become a hindrance to individuality and must be broken down if the individual is to emerge to full self-direction4 #b4 ,the ,arts and ,crafts4--,aside from their influence as work1 the arts and crafts have a distinctly elevating and refining effect4 ,the textiles1 pottery1 and skilfully made tools and weapons2 the huts or houses when artistically constructed2 the so-called free or fine arts of dance and music1 of color and design--all have this common element3 they give some visible or audible embodiment for order or form4 ,the artist or craftsman must make definite his idea in order to work it out in cloth or clay1 in wood or stone1 in dance or song4 ,when thus embodied1 it is preserved1 at least for a time4 ,it is part of the daily environment of the society4 ,those who see or hear are having constantly suggested to them ideas and values which bring more meaning into life and elevate its interests4 ,moreover1 the order1 the rational plan or arrangement which is embodied in all well-wrought objects1 as well as in the fine arts in the narrow sense1 deserves emphasis4 ,plato and ,schiller have seen in this a valuable preparation for morality4 ,to govern action by law is moral1 but it is too much to expect this of the savage and the child as a conscious principle where the law opposes impulse4 ,in art as in play there is direct interest and pleasure in the act1 but in art there is also order or law4 ,in conforming to this order the savage1 or the child1 is in training for the more conscious control where the law1 instead of favoring1 may thwart or oppose impulse and desire4 #c4 ,war4--,war and the contests in games were serving to work out characteristics which received also a definite social reenforcement3 namely1 courage and efficiency1 a sense of power1 a consciousness of achievement4 ,all these1 like craft1 may be used for unmoral or even immoral ends1 but they are also highly important as factors in an effective moral personality4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,socializing ,,agencies ,cooperation and ,mutual ,aid4#ai--;,aside from their effects in promoting intelligence1 courage1 and ideality of life1 industry1 art1 and war have a common factor by which they all contribute powerfully to the social basis of morality4 ,they all require cooperation4 ,they are socializing as well as rationalizing agencies4 ,mutual aid is the foundation of success4 ,woe to him who stands alone1 e'en though his platter be never so full1 runs the ,slav proverb4 ,he that belongs to no community is like unto one without a hand4 ,those clans or groups which can work together1 and fight together1 are stronger in the struggle against nature and other men4 ,the common activities of art have value in making this community of action more possible4 ,cooperation implies a common end4 ,it means that each is interested in the success of all4 ,this common end forms then a controlling rule of action1 and the mutual interest means sympathy4 ,cooperation is therefore one of nature's most effective agencies for a social standard and a social feeling4 #a4 ,cooperation in ,industry4--,in industry1 while there was not in primitive life the extensive exchange of goods which expresses the interdependence of modern men1 there was yet much concerted work1 and there was a great degree of community of property4 ,in groups which lived by hunting or fishing1 for instance1 although certain kinds of game might be pursued by the individual hunter1 the great buffalo and deer hunts were organized by the tribe as a whole4 ,a hunting bonfire was kindled every morning at daybreak at which each brave must appear and report4 ,the man who failed to do this before the party set out on the day's hunt was harassed by ridicule4#bj ,salmon fishery was also conducted as a joint undertaking4 ,large game in ,africa is hunted in a similar fashion1 and the product of the chase is not for the individual but for the group4 ,in the pastoral life the care of the flocks and herds necessitates at least some sort of cooperation to protect these flocks from the attacks of wild beasts and from the more dreaded forays of human robbers4 ,this requires a considerable body of men1 and the journeying about in company1 the sharing together of watch and ward1 the common interest in the increase of flocks and herds1 continually strengthens the bonds between the dwellers in tents4 ,in the agricultural stage there are still certain forces at work which promote the family or tribal unity1 although here we begin to find the forces which make for individuality at work until they result in individual ownership and individual property4 ,just as at the pastoral stage1 so in this1 the cattle and the growing grain must be protected from attacks by man and beast4 ,it is only the group which can afford such protection1 and accordingly we find the ,lowland farmer always at the mercy of the ,highland clan4 #b4 ,cooperation in ,war4--,war and the blood feud1 however divisive between groups1 were none the less potent as uniting factors within the several groups4 ,the members must not only unite or be wiped out1 when the actual contest was on1 but the whole scheme of mutual help in defense or in avenging injuries and insults made constant demand upon fellow feeling1 and sacrifice for the good of all4 ,to gain more land for the group1 to acquire booty for the group1 to revenge a slight done to some member of the group1 were constant causes for war4 ,now although any individual might be the gainer1 yet the chances were that he would himself suffer even though the group should win4 ,in the case of blood revenge particularly1 most of the group were not individually interested4 ,their resentment was a sympathetic resentment1 and one author has regarded this as perhaps the most fundamental of the sources of moral emotion4 ,it was because the tribal blood had been shed1 or the women of the clan insulted1 that the group as a whole reacted1 and in the clash of battle with opposing groups1 was closer knit together4 ,ally thyself with whom thou wilt in peace1 yet know ,in war must every man be foe who is not kin4 ,comrades in arms by the very act of fighting together have a common cause1 and by the mutual help and protection given and received become1 for the time at least1 one in will and one in heart4 ,ulysses counsels ,agamemnon to marshal his ,greeks1 clan by clan and brotherhood 7phratry7 by brotherhood1 that thus brother may support and stimulate brother more effectively2 but the effect is reciprocal1 and it is indeed very probable that the unity of blood which is believed to be the tie binding together the members of the group1 is often an afterthought or pious fiction designed to account for the unity which was really due originally to the stress of common struggle4 #c4 ,art as ,socializing ,agency4--,cooperation and sympathy are fostered by the activities of art4 ,some of these activities are spontaneous1 but most of them serve some definite social end and are frequently organized for the definite purpose of increasing the unity and sympathy of the group4 ,the hunting dance or the war dance represents1 in dramatic form1 all the processes of the hunt or fight1 but it would be a mistake to suppose that this takes place purely for dramatic purposes4 ,the dance and celebration after the chase or battle may give to the whole tribe the opportunity to repeat in vivid imagination the triumphs of the successful hunter or warrior1 and thus to feel the thrill of victory and exult in common over the fallen prey4 ,the dance which takes place before the event is designed to give magical power to the hunter or warrior4 ,every detail is performed with the most exact care and the whole tribe is thus enabled to share in the work of preparation4 ,in the act of song the same uniting force is present4 ,to sing with another involves a contagious sympathy1 in perhaps a higher degree than is the case with any other art4 ,there is1 in the first place1 as in the dance1 a unity of rhythm4 ,rhythm is based upon cooperation and1 in turn1 immensely strengthens the possibility of cooperation4 ,in the bas-reliefs upon the ,egyptian monuments representing the work of a large number of men who are moving a stone1 we find the sculptured figure of a man who is beating the time for the combined efforts4 ,whether all rhythm has come from the necessities of common action or whether it has a physiological basis sufficient to account for the effect which rhythmic action produces1 in any case when a company of people begin to work or dance or sing in rhythmic movement1 their efficiency and their pleasure are immensely increased4 ,in addition to the effect of rhythm we have also in the case of song the effect of unity of pitch and of melody1 and the members of the tribe or clan1 like those who to-day sing the ,marseillaise or chant the great anthems of the church1 feel in the strongest degree their mutual sympathy and support4 ,for this reason1 the ,corroborees of the ,australian1 the sacred festivals of ,israel1 the ,mysteries and public festivals of the ,greeks1 in short1 among all peoples1 the common gatherings of the tribe for patriotic or religious purposes1 have been attended with dance and song4 ,in many cases these carry the members on to a pitch of enthusiasm where they are ready to die for the common cause4 ,melodic and rhythmic sound is a unifying force simply by reason of form1 and some of the simpler songs seem to have little else to commend them1 but at very early periods there is not merely the song but the recital1 in more or less rhythmic or literary form1 of the history of the tribe and the deeds of the ancestors4 ,this adds still another to the unifying forces of the dance and song4 ,the kindred group1 as they hear the recital1 live over together the history of the group1 thrill with pride at its glories1 suffer at its defeats2 every member feels that the clan's history is his history and the clan's blood his blood4 ,sec4 #d4 ,,family ,,life ,,as ,,an ,,idealizing ,,and ,,socializing ,,agency ,family life1 so far as it is merely on the basis of instinct1 takes its place with other agencies favored by natural selection which make for more rational and social existence4 ,various instincts are more or less at work4 ,the sex instinct brings the man and the woman together4 ,the instinct of jealousy1 and the property or possessing instinct1 may foster exclusive and permanent relations4 ,the parental instinct and affection bind the parents together and thus contribute to the formation of the social group described in the preceding chapter4 ,considering now the more immediate relations of husband and wife1 parents and children1 rather than the more general group relations1 we call attention to some of the most obvious aspects1 leaving fuller treatment for ,part ,,iii4 ,the idealizing influences of the sex instinct1 when this is subject to the general influences found in group life1 is familiar4 ,lyric song is a higher form of its manifestation1 but even a mute lover may be stimulated to fine thoughts or brave deeds4 ,courtship further implies an adaptation1 an effort to please1 which is a strong socializing force4 ,if all the world loves a lover1 it must be because the lover is on the whole a likable role4 ,but other forces come in4 ,sex love is intense1 but so far as it is purely instinctive it may be transitory4 ,family life needed more permanence than sex attraction could provide1 and before the powerful sanctions of religion1 society1 and morals were sufficient to secure permanence1 it is probable that the property interest of the husband was largely effective in building up a family life1 requiring fidelity to the married relation on the part of the wife4 ,but the most far-reaching of the forces at work in the family has been the parental instinct and affection with its consequences upon both parents and children4 ,it contributes probably more than any other naturally selected agency to the development of the race in sympathy2 it shares with work in the development of responsibility4 ,it is indeed one of the great incentives to industry throughout the higher species of animals as well as in human life4 ,the value of parental care in the struggle for existence is impressively presented by ,sutherland4#ba ,whereas the fishes which exercise no care for their eggs preserve their species only by producing these in enormous numbers1 certain species which care for them maintain their existence by producing relatively few4 ,many species produce hundreds of thousands or even millions of eggs4 ,the stickleback1 which constructs a nest and guards the young for a few days1 is one of the most numerous of fishes1 but it lays only from twenty to ninety eggs4 ,birds and mammals with increased parental care produce few young4 ,not only is parental care a valuable asset1 it is an absolute necessity for the production of the higher species4 ,in the fierce competition of the animated forms of earth1 the loftier type1 with its prolonged nervous growth1 and consequently augmented period of helplessness1 can never arise but with concomitant increases of parental care4 ,only as the emotional tendency has kept pace with the nerve development has the human race been possible4 ,the very refinements in the organism which make the adult a victor would render the infant a victim if it were without an abundance of loving assistance4#bb ,whether1 as has been supposed by some1 the parental care has also been the most effective force in keeping the parents together through a lengthened infancy1 or whether other factors have been more effective in this particular1 there is no need to enlarge upon the wide-reaching moral values of parental affection4 ,it is the atmosphere in which the child begins his experience4 ,so far as any environment can affect him1 this is a constant influence for sympathy and kindness4 ,and upon the parents themselves its transforming power1 in making life serious1 in overcoming selfishness1 in projecting thought and hope on into the future1 cannot be measured4 ,the moral order and progress of the world might conceivably spare some of the agencies which man has devised2 it could not spare this4 ,sec4 #e4 ,,moral ,,interpretation ,,of ,,this ,,first ,,level ,on this first level we are evidently dealing with forces and conduct1 not as moral in purpose1 but as valuable in result4 ,they make a more rational1 ideal1 and social life1 and this is the necessary basis for more conscious control and valuation of conduct4 ,the forces are biological or sociological or psychological4 ,they are not that particular kind of psychological activities which we call moral in the proper sense1 for this implies not only getting a good result but aiming at it4 ,some of the activities1 such as those of song and dance1 or the simpler acts of maternal care1 have a large instinctive element4 ,we cannot call these moral in so far as they are purely instinctive4 ,others imply a large amount of intelligence1 as1 for example1 the operations of agriculture and the various crafts4 ,these have purpose1 such as to satisfy hunger1 or to forge a weapon against an enemy4 ,but the end is one set up by our physical or instinctive nature4 ,so long as this is merely accepted as an end1 and not compared with others1 valued1 and chosen1 it is not properly moral4 ,the same is true of emotions4 ,there are certain emotions on the instinctive level4 ,such are parental love in its most elemental form1 sympathy as mere contagious feeling1 anger1 or resentment4 ,so far as these are at this lowest level1 so far as they signify simply a bodily thrill1 they have no claim to proper moral value4 ,they are tremendously important as the source from which strong motive forces of benevolence1 intelligent parental care1 and an ardent energy against evil may draw warmth and fire4 ,finally1 even the cooperation1 the mutual aid1 which men give1 so far as it is called out purely by common danger1 or common advantage1 is not in the moral sphere in so far as it is instinctive1 or merely give and take4 ,to be genuinely moral there must be some thought of the danger as touching others and therefore requiring our aid2 of the advantage as being common and therefore enlisting our help4 ,but even although these processes are not consciously moral they are nevertheless fundamental4 ,the activities necessary for existence1 and the emotions so intimately bound up with them1 are the cosmic roots of the moral life4 ,and often in the higher stages of culture1 when the codes and instruction of morality and society fail to secure right conduct1 these elementary agencies of work1 cooperation1 and family life assert their power4 ,society and morality take up the direction of the process and carry it further1 but they must always rely largely on these primary activities to afford the basis for intelligent1 reliable1 and sympathetic conduct4 ,,literature ,bagehot1 ,physics and ,politics1 #ahij2 ,buecher1 ,industrial ,evolution1 ,eng4 tr41 #aija1 ,arbeit und ,rythmus1 #crd ed41 #aija2 ,schurtz1 ,urgeschichte der ,kultur1 #aijj2 ,fiske1 ,cosmic ,philosophy1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 ,the ,cosmic ,roots of ,love and ,self-sacrifice in ,through ,nature to ,god1 #ahii2 ,dewey1 ,interpretation of the ,savage ,mind1 ,psychological ,review1 ,vol4 ,,ix41 #ahib1 pp4 #bag-bcj2 ,durkheim1 ,de la ,division du ,travail ,social1 #ahic2 ,p4 ,kropotkin1 ,mutual ,aid1 a ,factor in ,evolution1 #aijb2 ,,ross1 ,foundations of ,society1 #aije1 ,chap4 ,,vii42 ,baldwin1 ,article ,socionomic ,forces in his ,dictionary of ,philosophy and ,psychology2 ,giddings1 ,inductive ,sociology1 #aija2 ,small1 ,general ,sociology1 #aijf2 ,tarde1 ,les ,lois de l',imitation1 #ahie2 ,w4 ,i4 ,thomas1 ,sex and ,society1 #aijg1 pp4 #ee-agb2 ,gummere1 ,the ,beginnings of ,poetry1 #aija2 ,hirn1 ,the ,origin of ,art1 #aijj4 ,,footnotes3 #ai ,p4 ,kropotkin1 ,mutual ,aid a ,factor in ,evolution2 ,bagehot1 ,physics and ,politics4 #bj ,eastman1 ,indian ,boyhood4 #ba ,the ,origin and ,growth of the ,moral ,instinct1 ,chs4 ,,ii4-,v4 #bb ,ibid41 p4 #ii4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,group ,,morality--,,customs ,,or ,,mores ,we have seen how the natural forces of instinct lead to activities which elevate men and knit them together4 ,we consider next the means which society uses for these purposes1 and the kind of conduct which goes along with the early forms of society's agencies4 ,the organization of early society is that of group life1 and so far as the individual is merged in the group the type of conduct may be called group morality4 ,inasmuch as the agencies by which the group controls its members are largely those of custom1 the morality may be called also customary morality4 ,such conduct is what we called at the opening of the previous chapter the second level4 ,it is ethical or moral in the sense of conforming to the ethos or mores of the group4 ,sec4 #a4 ,,meaning1 ,,authority1 ,,and ,,origin ,,of ,,customs ,meaning of ,customs or ,mores4--,wherever we find groups of men living as outlined in ,chapter ,,ii41 we find that there are certain ways of acting which are common to the group--folkways4 ,some of these may be due merely to the fact that the members are born of the same stock1 just as all ducks swim4 ,but a large part of human conduct1 in savage as truly as in civilized life1 is not merely instinctive4 ,there are approved ways of acting1 common to a group1 and handed down from generation to generation4 ,such approved ways of doing and acting are customs1 or to use the ,latin term1 which ,professor ,sumner thinks brings out more clearly this factor of approval1 they are mores4#bc ,they are habits--but they are more4 ,they imply the judgment of the group that they are to be followed4 ,the welfare of the group is regarded as in some sense imbedded in them4 ,if any one acts contrary to them he is made to feel the group's disapproval4 ,the young are carefully trained to observe them4 ,at times of special importance1 they are rehearsed with special solemnity4 ,authority ,behind the ,mores4--,the old men1 or the priests1 or medicine men1 or chiefs1 or old women1 may be the especial guardians of these customs4 ,they may modify details1 or add new customs1 or invent explanations for old ones4 ,but the authority back of them is the group in the full sense4 ,not the group composed merely of visible and living members1 but the larger group which includes the dead1 and the kindred totemic or ancestral gods4 ,nor is it the group considered as a collection of individual persons4 ,it is rather in a vague way the whole mental and social world4 ,the fact that most of the customs have no known date or origin makes them seem a part of the nature of things4 ,indeed there is more than a mere analogy between the primitive regard for custom and that respect for ,nature which from the ,stoics to ,spencer has sought a moral standard in living according to nature4 ,and there is this much in favor of taking the world of custom as the standard3 the beings of this system are like the person who is expected to behave like them2 its rules are the ways in which his own kin have lived and prospered1 and not primarily the laws of cosmic forces1 plants1 and animals4 ,origin of ,customs2 ,luck4--,the origin of customs is to be sought in several concurrent factors4 ,there are in the first place the activities induced by the great primitive needs and instincts4 ,some ways of acting succeed2 some fail4 ,man not only establishes habits of acting in the successful ways2 he remembers his failures4 ,he hands successful ways down with his approval2 he condemns those that fail4 ,this attitude is reenforced by the views about good luck and bad luck4 ,primitive man--and civilized man--is not ruled by a purely rational theory of success and failure4 ,one might use the best known means with the greatest care1 yet fail of the result4 ,on the other hand1 one might get a great result with no effort at all4 ,one might also incur a calamity without any fault of his own4#bd ,grimm gives more than a thousand ancient ,german apothegms1 dicta1 and proverbs about 'luck4'#be ,both good and bad fortune are attributed to the unseen powers1 hence a case of bad luck is not thought of as a mere chance4 ,if the ship that sailed ,friday meets a storm1 or one of thirteen falls sick1 the inference is that this is sure to happen again4 ,and at this point the conception of the group welfare as bound up with the acts of every member1 comes in to make individual conformity a matter for group concern--to make conduct a matter of mores and not merely a private affair4 ,one most important1 if not the most important1 object of early legislation was the enforcement of lucky rites to prevent the individual from doing what might bring ill luck on all the tribe4 ,for the conception always was that the ill luck does not attach itself simply to the doer1 but may fall upon any member of the group4 ,the act of one member is conceived to make all the tribe impious1 to offend its particular god1 to expose all the tribe to penalties from heaven4 ,when the street statues of ,hermes were mutilated1 all the ,athenians were frightened and furious2 they thought they should all be ruined because some one had mutilated a god's image and so offended him4#bf ,the children were reproved for cutting and burning embers1 on the ground that this might be the cause for the accidental cutting of some member of the family4#bg ,in the third place1 besides these sources of custom1 in the usefulness or lucky character of certain acts1 there is also the more immediate reaction of individuals or groups to certain ways of acting according as things jump with the feelings or displease them4#bh ,an act of daring is applauded1 whether useful or not4 ,the individual judgment is caught up1 repeated1 and plays its part in the formation of group opinion4 ,individual impulse and social tradition are thus the two poles between which we move4 ,or there may even be a more conscious discussion analogous to the action of legislatures or philosophic discussion4 ,the old men among the ,australians deliberate carefully as to each step of the initiation ceremonies4 ,they make customs to be handed down4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,means ,,of ,,enforcing ,,customs ,the most general means for enforcing customs are public opinion1 taboos1 ritual or ceremony1 and physical force4 ,public ,approval uses both language and form to express its judgments4 ,its praise is likely to be emphasized by some form of art4 ,the songs that greet the returning victor1 the decorations1 costumes1 and tattoos for those who are honored1 serve to voice the general sentiment4 ,on the other hand ridicule or contempt is a sufficient penalty to enforce compliance with many customs that may be personally irksome4 ,it is very largely the ridicule of the men's house which enforces certain customs among the men of peoples which have that institution4 ,it is the ridicule or scorn of both men and women which forbids the ,indian to marry before he has proved his manhood by some notable deed of prowess in war or chase4 ,taboos4--,taboos are perhaps not so much a means for enforcing custom1 as they are themselves customs invested with peculiar and awful sanction4 ,they prohibit or ban any contact with certain persons or objects under penalty of danger from unseen beings4 ,any events supposed to indicate the activity of spirits1 such as birth and death1 are likely to be sanctified by taboos4 ,the danger is contagious2 if a ,polynesian chief is taboo1 the ordinary man fears even to touch his footprints4 ,but the taboos are not all based on mere dread of the unseen4 ,they include such acts as have been found by experience to produce unwelcome results4--,the primitive taboos correspond to the fact that the life of man is environed by perils3 ,his food quest must be limited by shunning poisonous plants4 ,his appetite must be restrained from excess4 ,his physical strength and health must be guarded from dangers4 ,the taboos carry on the accumulated wisdom of generations which has almost always been purchased by pain1 loss1 disease1 and death4 ,other taboos contain inhibitions of what will be injurious to the group4 ,the laws about the sexes1 about property1 about war1 and about ghosts1 have this character4 ,they always include some social philosophy4 7,,sumner1 ,folkways1 pp4 #cc f47 ,they may be used with conscious purpose4 ,in order to have a supply of cocoanuts for a religious festival the head men may place a taboo upon the young cocoanuts to prevent them from being consumed before they are fully ripe4 ,the conception works in certain respects to supply the purpose which is later subserved by ideas of property4 ,but it serves also as a powerful agency to maintain respect for the authority of the group4 ,ritual4--,as taboo is the great negative guardian of customs1 ritual is the great positive agent4 ,it works by forming habits1 and operates through associations formed by actually doing certain acts1 usually under conditions which appeal to the emotions4 ,the charm of music and of orderly movement1 the impressiveness of ordered masses in processions1 the awe of mystery1 all contribute to stamp in the meaning and value4 ,praise or blame encourages or inhibits2 ritual secures the actual doing and at the same time gives a value to the doing4 ,it is employed by civilized peoples more in the case of military or athletic drill1 or in training children to observe forms of etiquette1 so that these may become second nature4 ,certain religious bodies also use its agency4 ,but in primitive life it is widely and effectively used to insure for educational1 political1 and domestic customs obedience to the group standards1 which among us it secures to the codes of the army1 or to those of social etiquette4 ,examples of its elaborate and impressive use will be given below under educational ceremonies4 ,physical ,force4--,when neither group opinion1 nor taboo1 nor ritual secures conformity1 there is always in the background physical force4 ,the chiefs are generally men of strength whose word may not be lightly disregarded4 ,sometimes1 as among the ,sioux1 the older braves constitute a sort of police4 ,between different clans the blood feud is the accepted method of enforcing custom1 unless a substitute1 the wergeld1 is provided4 ,for homicide within a clan the remaining members may drive the slayer out1 and whoever meets such a ,cain may slay him4 ,if a man murdered his chief of kindred among the ancient ,welsh he was banished and it was required of every one of every sex and age within hearing of the horn to follow that exile and to keep up the barking of dogs1 to the time of his putting to sea1 until he shall have passed three score hours out of sight4#bi ,it should be borne in mind1 however1 that physical pains1 either actual or dreaded1 would go but a little way toward maintaining authority in any such group as we have regarded as typical4 ,absolutism1 with all its cruel methods of enforcing terror1 needs a more highly organized system4 ,in primitive groups the great majority support the authority of the group as a matter of course1 and uphold it as a sacred duty when it is challenged4 ,physical coercion is not the rule but the exception4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,conditions ,,which ,,bring ,,out ,,the ,,importance ,,of ,,group ,,standards ,,and ,,render ,,group ,,control ,,conscious ,although customs or mores have in them an element of social approval which makes them vehicles of moral judgment1 they tend in many cases to sink to the level of mere habits4 ,the reason--such as it was--for their original force--is forgotten4 ,they become1 like many of our forms of etiquette1 mere conventions4 ,there are1 however1 certain conditions which center attention upon their importance and lift them to the level of conscious agencies4 ,these conditions may be grouped under three heads4 7#a7 ,the education of the younger1 immature members of the group and their preparation for full membership4 7#b7 ,the constraint and restraint of refractory members and the adjustment of conflicting interests4 7#c7 ,occasions which involve some notable danger or crisis and therefore call for the greatest attention to secure the favor of the gods and avert disaster4 #a4 ,educational ,customs4--,among the most striking and significant of these are the initiation ceremonies which are so widely observed among primitive peoples4 ,they are held with the purpose of inducting boys into the privileges of manhood and into the full life of the group4 ,they are calculated at every step to impress upon the initiate his own ignorance and helplessness in contrast with the wisdom and power of the group2 and as the mystery with which they are conducted imposes reverence for the elders and the authorities of the group1 so the recital of the traditions and performances of the tribe1 the long series of ritual acts1 common participation in the mystic dance and song and decorations1 serve to reenforce the ties that bind the tribe4 ,initiation into the full privileges of manhood among the tribes of ,central ,australia1 for instance1 includes three sets of ceremonies which occupy weeks1 and even months1 for their completion4 ,the first set1 called throwing up in the air1 is performed for the boy when he has reached the age of from ten to twelve4 ,in connection with being thrown up in the air by certain prescribed members of his tribe1 he is decorated with various totem emblems and afterward the septum of his nose is bored for the insertion of the nose-bone4 ,at a period some three or four years later a larger and more formidable series of ceremonies is undertaken1 lasting for ten days4 ,a screen of bushes is built1 behind which the boy is kept during the whole period1 unless he is brought out on the ceremonial ground to witness some performance4 ,during this whole period of ten days1 he is forbidden to speak except in answer to questions4 ,he is decorated with various totem emblems1 for which every detail is prescribed by the council of the tribal fathers and tribal elder brothers4 ,he is charged to obey every command and never to tell any woman or boy what he may see4 ,the sense that something out of the ordinary is to happen to him helps to impress him strongly with a feeling of the deep importance of compliance with the tribal rules1 and further still1 with a strong sense of the superiority of the older men who know and are familiar with the mysterious rites of which he is about to learn the meaning for the first time4 ,at intervals he watches symbolic performances of men decorated like various totem animals1 who represent the doings of the animal ancestors of the clan2 he hears mysterious sounds of the so-called bull-roarers1 which are supposed by the women and uninitiated to be due to unseen spirits2 and the whole ends with the operation which symbolizes his induction into young manhood4 ,but even this is not all2 when the young man has reached the age of discretion1 when it is felt that he can fully comprehend the traditions of the tribe1 at the age of from twenty to twenty-five1 a still more impressive series of ceremonies is conducted1 which in the instance reported lasted from ,september to ,january4 ,this period was filled up with dances1 corroborees1 and inspection of the churinga or sacred emblems--stones or sticks which were supposed to be the dwellings of ancestral spirits and which are carefully preserved in the tribe1 guarded from the sight of women and boys1 but known individually to the elders as the sacred dwelling-place of father or grandfather4 ,as these were shown and passed around1 great solemnity was manifest and the relatives sometimes wept at the sight of the sacred object4 ,ceremonies imitating various totem animals1 frequently of the most elaborate sort1 were also performed4 ,the young men were told the traditions of the past history of the tribe1 and at the close of the recital they felt added reverence for the old men who had been their instructors1 a sense of pride in the possession of this mysterious knowledge1 and a deeper unity because of what they now have in common4 ,one is at a loss whether to wonder most at the possibility of the whole tribe devoting itself for three months to these elaborate functions of initiation1 or at the marvelous adaptability of such ceremonies to train the young into an attitude of docility and reverence4 ,a tribe that can enforce such a process is not likely to be wanting in one side1 at least1 of the moral consciousness1 namely1 reverence for authority and regard for the social welfare4#cj #b4 ,law and ,justice4--,the occasions for some control over refractory members will constantly arise1 even though the conflict between group and individual may need no physical sanctions to enforce the authority of the group over its members4 ,the economic motive frequently prompts an individual to leave the tribe or the joint family4 ,there was a constant tendency1 ,eastman states1 among his people1 when on a hunting expedition in the enemy's country1 to break up into smaller parties to obtain food more easily and freely4 ,the police did all they could to keep in check those parties who were intent on stealing away4 ,another illustration of the same tendency is stated by ,maine with reference to the joint families of the ,south ,slavonians3 ,the adventurous and energetic member of the brotherhood is always rebelling against its natural communism4 ,he goes abroad and makes his fortune1 and as strenuously resists the demands of his relatives to bring it into the common account4 ,or perhaps he thinks that his share of the common stock would be more profitably employed by him as capital in a mercantile venture4 ,in either case he becomes a dissatisfied member or a declared enemy of the brotherhood4#ca ,or covetousness might lead to violation of the ban1 as with ,achan4 ,sex impulse may lead a man to seek for his wife a woman not in the lawful group4 ,or1 as one of the most dangerous offenses possible1 a member of the group may be supposed to practice witchcraft4 ,this is to use invisible powers in a selfish manner1 and has been feared and punished by almost all peoples4 ,in all these cases it is of course no abstract theory of crime which leads the community to react2 it is self-preservation4 ,the tribe must be kept together for protection against enemies4 ,achan's sin is felt to be the cause of defeat4 ,the violation of sex taboos may ruin the clan4 ,the sorcerer may cause disease1 or inflict torture and death1 or bring a pestilence or famine upon the whole group4 ,none the less all such cases bring to consciousness one aspect of moral authority1 the social control over the individual4 ,and it is a social control--not an exercise of brute force or a mere terrorizing by ghosts4 ,for the chief or judge generally wins his authority by his powerful service to his tribesmen4 ,a ,gideon or ,barak or ,ehud or ,jephthah judged ,israel because he had delivered them4 ,three things1 if possessed by a man1 make him fit to be a chief of kindred3 ,that he should speak on behalf of his kin and be listened to1 that he should fight on behalf of his kin and be feared1 and that he should be security on behalf of his kin and be accepted4#cb ,if1 as is often the case1 the king or judge or chief regards himself as acting by divine right1 the authority is still within the group4 ,it is the group judging itself4 ,in its standards this primitive court is naturally on the level of customary morality1 of which it is an agent4 ,there is usually neither the conception of a general principle of justice 7our ,common ,law71 nor of a positive law enacted as the express will of the people4 ,at first the judge or ruler may not act by any fixed law except that of upholding the customs4 ,each decision is then a special case4 ,a step in advance is found when the heads or elders or priests of the tribe decide cases1 not independently of all others1 but in accordance with certain precedents or customs4 ,a legal tradition is thus established1 which1 however imperfect1 is likely to be more impartial than the arbitrary caprice of the moment1 influenced as such special decisions are likely to be by the rank or power of the parties concerned4#cc ,a law of precedents or tradition is thus the normal method at this level4 ,the progress toward a more rational standard belongs under the next chapter1 but it is interesting to note that even at an early age the myths show a conception of a divine judge who is righteous1 and a divine judgment which is ideal4 ,rhadamanthus is an embodiment of the demand for justice which human collisions and decisions awakened4 ,the conscious authority of the group is also evoked in the case of feuds or disputes between its members4 ,the case of the blood feud1 indeed1 might well be treated as belonging under war and international law rather than as a case of private conflict4 ,for so far as the members of the victim's clan are concerned1 it is a case of war4 ,it is a patriotic duty of every kinsman to avenge the shed blood4 ,the groups concerned were smaller than modern nations which go to war for similar reasons1 but the principle is the same4 ,the chief difference in favor of modern international wars is that since the groups are larger they do not fight so often and require a more serious consideration of the possibility of peaceable adjustment4 ,orestes and ,hamlet feel it a sacred duty to avenge their fathers' murders4 ,but the case is not simply that of clan against clan4 ,for the smaller group of kin1 who are bound to avenge1 are nearly always part of a larger group4 ,and the larger group may at once recognize the duty of vengeance and also the need of keeping it within bounds1 or of substituting other practices4 ,the larger group may see in the murder a pollution1 dangerous to all2#cd the blood which cries from the ground#ce renders the ground unclean and the curse of gods or the spirits of the dead may work woe upon the whole region4 ,but an unending blood feud is likewise an evil4 ,and if the injured kin can be appeased by less than blood in return1 so much the better4 ,hence the wergeld1 or indemnity1 a custom which persisted among the ,irish until late1 and seemed to the ,english judges a scandalous procedure4 ,for lesser offenses a sort of regulated duel is sometimes allowed4 ,for example1 among the ,australians the incident is related of the treatment of a man who had eloped with his neighbor's wife4 ,when the recreant parties returned the old men considered what should be done1 and finally arranged the following penalty4 ,the offender stood and called out to the injured husband1 ,i stole your woman2 come and growl4 ,the husband then proceeded to throw a spear at him from a distance1 and afterwards to attack him with a knife1 although he did not attempt to wound him in a vital part4 ,the offender was allowed to evade injury1 though not to resent the attack4 ,finally the old men said1 ,enough4 ,a curious form of private agencies for securing justice is also found in the ,japanese custom of hara-kiri1 according to which an injured man kills himself before the door of his offender1 in order that he may bring public odium upon the man who has injured him4 ,an ,indian custom of ,dharna is of similar significance1 though less violent4 ,the creditor fasts before the door of the debtor until he either is paid1 or dies of starvation4 ,it may be that he thinks that his double or spirit will haunt the cruel debtor who has thus permitted him to starve to death1 but it also has the effect of bringing public opinion to bear4 ,in all these cases of kindred feuds there is little personal responsibility1 and likewise little distinction between the accidental and intentional4 ,these facts are brought out in the opening quotations in ,chapter ,,ii4 ,the important thing for the student to observe is that like our present practices in international affairs they show a grade of morality1 a limited social unity1 whether it is called kinship feeling or patriotism2 complete morality is not possible so long as there is no complete way of settling disputes by justice instead of force4#cf #c4 ,occasions ,which ,involve ,some ,special ,danger or ,crisis4--,such occasions call for the greatest attention to secure success or avoid disaster4 ,under this head we note as typical 7a7 the occasions of birth1 marriage1 death2 7b7 seed time and harvest1 or other seasons important for the maintenance of the group2 7c7 war2 7d7 hospitality4 7a7 ,birth and ,death ,customs4--,the entrance of a new life into the world and the disappearance of the animating breath 7spiritus1 anima1 psyche71 might well impress man with the mysteries of his world4 ,whether the newborn infant is regarded as a reincarnation of an ancestral spirit as with the ,australians1 or as a new creation from the spirit world as with the ,kafirs1 it is a time of danger4 ,the mother must be purified1#cg the child1 and in some cases the father1 must be carefully guarded4 ,the elaborate customs show the group judgment of the importance of the occasion4 ,and the rites for the dead are yet more impressive4 ,for as a rule the savage has no thought of an entire extinction of the person4 ,the dead lives on in some mode1 shadowy and vague1 perhaps1 but he is still potent1 still a member of the group1 present at the tomb or the hearth4 ,the preparation of the body for burial or other disposition1 the ceremonies of interment or of the pyre1 the wailing1 and mourning costumes1 the provision of food and weapons1 or of the favorite horse or wife1 to be with the dead in the unseen world1 the perpetual homage paid--all these are eloquent4 ,the event1 as often as it occurs1 appeals by both sympathy and awe to the common feeling1 and brings to consciousness the unity of the group and the control exercised by its judgments4 ,the regulations for marriage are scarcely less important2 indeed1 they are often seemingly the most important of the customs4 ,the phrases marriage by capture and marriage by purchase1 are quite misleading if they give the impression that in early culture any man may have any woman4 ,it is an almost universal part of the clan system that the man must marry out of his own clan or totem 7exogamy71 and it is frequently specified exactly into what other clan he must marry4 ,among some the regulations are minute as to which of the age classes1 as well as to which of the kin groups1 a man of specific group must choose from4 ,the courtship may follow different rules from ours1 and the relation of the sexes in certain respects may seem so loose as to shock the student1 but the regulation is in many respects stricter than with us1 and punishment of its violation often severer4 ,there can be no doubt of the meaning of the control1 however mistaken some of its features4 ,whether the regulations for exogamy1 which provide so effectually for avoiding incest1 are reinforced by an instinctive element of aversion to sex relations with intimates1 is uncertain2 in any case1 they are enforced by the strongest taboos4 ,nor does primitive society stop with the negative side4 ,the actual marriage is invested with the social values and religious sanctions which raise the relation to a higher level4 ,art1 in garments and ornament1 in dance and epithalamium1 lends ideal values4 ,the sacred meal at the encircled hearth secures the participation of the kindred gods4 7b7 ,certain ,days or ,seasons ,important for the ,industrial ,life4--,seed time and harvest1 the winter and summer solstices1 the return of spring1 are of the highest importance to agricultural and pastoral peoples1 and are widely observed with solemn rites4 ,where the rain is the center of anxiety1 a whole ritual may arise in connection with it1 as among the ,zuni ,indians4 ,ceremonies lasting days1 involving the preparation of special symbols of clouds and lightning1 and the participation of numerous secret fraternities1 constrain the attention of all4 ,moreover1 this constraint of need1 working through the conception of what the gods require1 enforces some very positive moral attitudes3 ,a ,zuni must speak with one tongue 7sincerely7 in order to have his prayers received by the gods1 and unless his prayers are accepted no rains will come1 which means starvation4 ,he must be gentle1 and he must speak and act with kindness to all1 for the gods care not for those whose lips speak harshly4 ,he must observe continence four days previous to1 and four days following1 the sending of breath prayers through the spiritual essence of plume offerings1 and thus their passions are brought under control4 7,,mrs4 ,m4 ,c4 ,,stevenson in #bc;d ,report1 ,bureau of ,ethnology47 ,phases of the moon give other sacred days4 ,sabbaths which originally are negative--the forbidding of labor--may become later the bearers of positive social and spiritual value4 ,in any case1 all these festivals bring the group authority to consciousness1 and by their ritual promote the intimate group sympathy and consciousness of a common end4 7c7 ,war4--,war as a special crisis always brings out the significance and importance of certain customs4 ,the deliberations1 the magic1 the war paint which precede1 the obedience compelled by it to chiefs1 the extraordinary powers exercised by the chief or heads at such crises1 the sense of danger which strains the attention1 all insure attention4 ,no carelessness is permitted4 ,defeat is interpreted as a symbol of divine anger because of a violated law or custom4 ,victory brings all together to celebrate the glory of the clan and to mourn in common the warriors slain in the common cause4 ,excellence here may be so conspicuous in its service1 or in the admiration it calls out1 as to become a general term for what the group approves4 ,so the arete of the ,greeks became their general term1 and the ,latin virtus1 if not so clearly military1 was yet largely military in its early coloring4 ,the spirit of ,jehovah1 the symbol of divine approval and so of group approval1 was believed to be with ,samson and ,jephthah in their deeds of prowess in ,israel's behalf4 7d7 ,hospitality4--,to the modern man who travels without fear and receives guests as a matter of almost daily practice1 it may seem strained to include hospitality along with unusual or critical events4 ,but the ceremonies observed and the importance attached to its rites1 show that hospitality was a matter of great significance2 its customs were among the most sacred4 ,but as for us1 says ,ulysses to the ,cyclops1 we have lighted here1 and come to these thy knees1 if perchance they will give us a stranger's gift1 or make any present1 as is the due of strangers4 ,nay1 lord1 have regard to the gods1 for we are thy suppliants1 and ,zeus is the avenger of suppliants and sojourners1 ,zeus1 the god of the stranger1 who fareth in the company of reverend strangers4 ,the duty of hospitality is one of the most widely recognized4 ,westermarck has brought together a series of maxims from a great variety of races which show this forcibly4#ch ,indians1 ,kalmucks1 ,greeks1 ,romans1 ,teutons1 ,arabs1 ,africans1 ,ainos1 and other peoples are drawn upon and tell the same story4 ,the stranger is to be respected sacredly4 ,his person must be guarded from insult even if the honor of the daughter of the house must be sacrificed4#ci ,jehovah preserveth the sojourners1 and they are grouped with the fatherless and the widow in ,israel's law4#dj ,the ,romans had their dii hospitales and the duties toward a guest were even more stringent than those toward a relative--primum tutelae1 delude hospiti1 deinde clienti1 tum cognato1 postea affini4#da ,he who has a spark of caution in him1 says ,plato1 will do his best to pass through life without sinning against the stranger4 ,and there is no doubt that this sanctity of the guest's person was not due to pure kindness4 ,the whole conduct of group life is opposed to a general spirit of consideration for those outside4 ,the word guest is akin to hostis1 from which comes hostile4 ,the stranger or the guest was looked upon rather as a being who was specially potent4 ,he was a live wire4 ,he might be a medium of blessing1 or he might be a medium of hurt4 ,but it was highly important to fail in no duty toward him4 ,the definite possibility of entertaining angels unawares might not be always present to consciousness1 but there seems reason to believe that the possibility of good luck or bad luck as attending on a visitor was generally believed in4 ,it is also plausible that the importance attached to sharing a meal1 or to bodily contact1 is based on magical ideas of the way in which blessing or curse may be communicated4 ,to cross a threshold or touch a tent-rope or to eat salt1 gives a sacred claim4 ,in the right of asylum1 the refugee takes advantage of his contact with the god4 ,he lays hold of the altar and assumes that the god will protect him4 ,the whole practice of hospitality is thus the converse of the custom of blood revenge4 ,they are alike sacred--or rather the duty of hospitality may protect even the man whom the host is bound to pursue4 ,but1 whereas the one makes for group solidarity by acts of exclusive and hostile character1 the other tends to set aside temporarily the division between the we-group and the others-group4 ,under the sanction of religion it keeps open a way of communication which trade and other social interchange will widen4 ,it adds to family and the men's house a powerful agency in maintaining at least the possibility of humaneness and sympathy4 ,sec4 #d4 ,,values ,,and ,,defects ,,of ,,customary ,,morality ,these have been suggested1 in the main1 in the description of the nature of custom and its regulation of conduct4 ,we may1 however1 summarize them as a preparation for the next stage of morality4 #a4 ,the ,forming of ,standards4--,there is a standard1 a good1 a right1 which is to some degree rational and to some degree social4 ,we have seen that custom rests in part on rational conceptions of welfare4 ,it is really nothing against this that a large element of luck enters into the idea of welfare4 ,for this means merely that the actual conditions of welfare are not understood4 ,the next generation may be able to point out as equally absurd our present ignorance about health and disease4 ,the members of the group embodied in custom what they thought to be important2 they were approving some acts and forbidding or condemning others2 they were using the elders1 and the wisdom of all the past1 in order to govern life4 ,so far1 then1 they were acting morally4 ,they were also1 to a degree1 using a rational and social standard when they made custom binding on all1 and conceived its origin as immemorial4 ,when further they conceived it as approved by the gods1 they gave it all the value they knew how to put into it4 ,the standards and valuations of custom are1 however1 only partly rational4 ,many customs are irrational2 some are injurious4 ,but in them all the habitual is a large1 if not the largest1 factor4 ,and this is often strong enough to resist any attempt at rational testing4 ,dr4 ,arthur ,smith tells us of the advantage it would be in certain parts of ,china to build a door on the south side of the house in order to get the breeze in hot weather4 ,the simple and sufficient answer to such a suggestion is1 ,we don't build doors on the south side4 ,an additional weakness in the character of such irrational1 or partly rational standards1 is the misplaced energy they involve4 ,what is merely trivial is made as important and impressive as what has real significance4 ,tithing mint1 anise1 and cummin is quite likely to involve neglect of the weightier matters of the law4 ,moral life requires men to estimate the value of acts4 ,if the irrelevant or the petty is made important1 it not only prevents a high level of value for the really important act1 it loads up conduct with burdens which keep it back2 it introduces elements which must be got rid of later1 often with heavy loss of what is genuinely valuable4 ,when there are so many ways of offending the gods and when these turn so often upon mere observance of routine or formula1 it may require much subsequent time and energy to make amends4 ,the morals get an expiatory character4 #b4 ,the ,motives4--,in the motives to which it appeals1 custom is able to make a far better showing than earlier writers1 like ,herbert ,spencer1 gave it credit for4 ,it doubtless employs fear in its taboos2 it doubtless enlists the passion of resentment in its blood feuds4 ,even these are modified by a social environment4 ,for the fear of violating a taboo is in part the fear of bringing bad luck on the whole group1 and not merely on the violator4 ,we have1 therefore1 a quasi-social fear1 not a purely instinctive reaction4 ,the same is true in perhaps a stronger degree of the resentments4 ,the blood revenge is in a majority of cases not a personal but a group affair4 ,it is undertaken at personal risk and for others' interest--or rather for a common interest4 ,the resentment is thus a sympathetic resentment4#db ,regarded as a mere reaction for self-preservation this instinctive-emotional process is unmoral4 ,as a mere desire to produce pain it would be immoral4 ,but so far as it implies an attitude of reacting from a general point of view and to aid others1 it is moral4 ,aside from the passions of fear and resentment1 however1 there is a wide range of motives enlisted4 ,filial and parental affection1 some degree of affection between the sexes over and above sex passion1 respect for the aged and the beings who embody ideals however crude1 loyalty to fellow clansmen1--all these are not only fostered but actually secured by the primitive group4 ,but the motives which imply reflection--reverence for duty as the imperious law of a larger life1 sincere love of what is good for its own sake--cannot be brought to full consciousness until there is a more definite conception of a moral authority1 a more definite contrast between the one great good and the partial or temporary satisfactions4 ,the development of these conceptions requires a growth in individuality2 it requires conflicts between authority and liberty1 and those collisions between private interests and the public welfare which a higher civilization affords4 #c4 ,the ,content4--,when we consider the what of group and customary morality we note at once that the factors which make for the idealizing and expansion of interests are less in evidence than those which make for a common and social interest and satisfaction4 ,there is indeed1 as we have noted1 opportunity for memory and fancy4 ,the traditions of the past1 the myths1 the cultus1 the folk songs--these keep up a mental life which is as genuinely valued as the more physical activities4 ,but as the mode of life in question does not evoke the more abstractly rational activities--reasoning1 selecting1 choosing--in the highest degree1 the ideals lack reach and power4 ,it needs the incentives described in the following chapters to call out a true life of the spirit4 ,the social aspects of the what1 on the other hand1 are well rooted in group morality4 ,it is unnecessary to repeat what has been dwelt upon in the present and preceding chapters so fully4 ,we point out now that while the standard is social1 it is unconsciously rather than consciously social4 ,or perhaps better3 it is a standard of society but not a standard which each member deliberately makes his own4 ,he takes it as a matter of course4 ,he is in the clan1 with the gang2 he thinks and acts accordingly4 ,he cannot begin to be as selfish as a modern individualist2 he simply hasn't the imagery to conceive such an exclusive good1 nor the tools with which to carry it out4 ,but he cannot be as broadly social either4 ,he may not be able to sink so low as the civilized miser1 or debauchee1 or criminal1 but neither can he conceive or build up the character which implies facing opposition4 ,the moral hero achieves full stature only when he pits himself against others1 when he recognizes evil and fights it1 when he overcomes the world4 #d4 ,organization of ,character4--,in the organization of stable character the morality of custom is strong on one side4 ,the group trains its members to act in the ways it approves and afterwards holds them by all the agencies in its power4 ,it forms habits and enforces them4 ,its weakness is that the element of habit is so large1 that of freedom so small4 ,it holds up the average man2 it holds back the man who might forge ahead4 ,it is an anchor1 and a drag4 ,,literature ,much of the literature at the close of ,chapters ,,ii4 and ,,iii41 particularly the works of ,spencer and ,gillen and ,schurtz1 belongs here also4 ,schoolcraft1 ,indian ,tribes1 #ahea-eg2 ,eastman1 ,indian ,boyhood1 #aijb4 ,papers on various cults of ,north ,american ,indians in reports of the ,bureau of ,ethnology1 by ,stevenson1 #hth1 #ahhf-hg2 ,dorsey1 #aath1 #ahhi-ij2 ,fewkes1 #aeth1 #ahic-id1 #bast1 #ahii-aijj2 ,fletcher1 #bbnd1 #aijj-ja2 ,stevenson1 #bc;d1 #aija-jb2 ,kidd1 ,savage ,childhood1 #aijf2 ,the ,essential ,kaffir1 #aijd2 ,skeat1 ,malay ,magic1 #aijj2 ,n4 ,w4 ,thomas1 general editor of ,series1 ,the ,native ,races of the ,british ,empire1 #aijg-2 ,barton1 ,a ,sketch of ,semitic ,origins1 #aijb2 ,harrison1 ,prolegomena to the ,study of ,greek ,religion1 #aijc2 ,reinach1 ,cultes1 ,mythes et ,religions1 #b vols41 #aije2 ,frazer1 ,the ,golden ,bough1 #c vols41 #aijj2 ,marett1 ,is ,taboo ,negative ,magic8 in ,anthropological ,essays1 presented to ,e4 ,b4 ,tylor1 #aijg2 ,crawley1 ,the ,mystic ,rose1 #aijb2 ,spencer1 ,sociology1 #ahgf-if2 ,clifford1 ,on the ,scientific ,basis of ,morals in ,lectures and ,essays1 #ahhf2 ,maine1 ,early ,history of ,institutions1 #ahhh2 ,early ,law and ,custom1 #ahhf2 ,post1 ,die ,grundlagen des ,rechts und die ,grundzuege seiner ,entwicklungsgeschichte1 #ahhd2 ,ethnologische ,jurisprudenz1 #ahid-ie2 ,pollock and ,maitland1 ,history of ,english ,law1 #ahii2 ,steinmetz1 ,ethnologische ,studien zur ersten ,entwicklung der ,strafe1 #ahid4 ,,footnotes3 #bc ,w4 ,g4 ,sumner1 ,folkways4 #bd ,sumner1 ,folkways1 p4 #f4 #be ,ibid41 p4 #aa4 #bf ,bagehot1 ,physics and ,politics1 p4 #ajc4 #bg ,eastman1 ,indian ,boyhood1 p4 #ca4 #bh ,hobhouse1 ,morals in ,evolution1 ,part ,i41 p4 #af4 ,hume pointed out this twofold basis of approval4 #bi ,seebohm1 ,the ,tribal ,system of ,wales1 p4 #ei4 #cj ,the account is based on ,spencer and ,gillen1 ,the ,native ,tribes of ,central ,australia1 chs4 vii4-ix4 #ca ,maine's ,early ,law and ,custom1 p4 #bfd4 #cb ,welsh ,triads1 cited by ,seebohm1 op4 cit41 p4 #gb4 #cc ,post1 ,grundlagen des ,rechts1 pp4 #de ff4 #cd ,deuteronomy #ba3a-i2 ,numbers #ce3cc1 #cd4 #ce ,genesis #d3aj-ab2 ,job #af3ah4 #cf ,on the subject of early justice ,westermarck1 ,the ,origin and ,development of ,moral ,ideas1 ch4 vii4 ff42 ,hobhouse1 ,morals in ,evolution1 ,part ,i41 ch4 ii42 ,pollock and ,maitland1 ,history of ,english ,law4 #cg ,leviticus1 ch4 xii4 #ch ,the ,influence of ,magic on ,social ,relationships in ,sociological ,papers1 ,,ii41 #aije4 ,cf4 also ,morgan1 ,house-life4 #ci ,genesis #ai3h2 ,judges #ai3bc1 #bd4 #dj ,psalms #adf3i2 ,deuteronomy #bd3ad-bb4 #da ,gellius1 in ,westermarck1 op4 cit41 p4 #aee4 #db ,westermarck regards this as one of the fundamental elements in the beginnings of morality4 ,,chapter ,v ,,from ,,custom ,,to ,,conscience2 ,,from ,,group ,,morality ,,to ,,personal ,,morality ,sec4 #a4 ,,contrast ,,and ,,collision #a4 ,what the ,third ,level ,means4--,complete morality is reached only when the individual recognizes the right or chooses the good freely1 devotes himself heartily to its fulfillment1 and seeks a progressive social development in which every member of society shall share4 ,the group morality with its agencies of custom set up a standard1 but one that was corporate rather than personal4 ,it approved and disapproved1 that is it had an idea of good1 but this did not mean a good that was personally valued4 ,it enlisted its members1 but it was by drill1 by pleasure and pain1 and by habit1 rather than by fully voluntary action4 ,it secured steadiness by habit and social pressure1 rather than by choices built into character4 ,it maintained community of feeling and action1 but of the unconscious rather than the definitely social type4 ,finally it was rather fitted to maintain a fixed order than to promote and safeguard progress4 ,advance then must 7#a7 substitute some rational method of setting up standards and forming values1 in place of habitual passive acceptance2 7#b7 secure voluntary and personal choice and interest1 instead of unconscious identification with the group welfare1 or instinctive and habitual response to group needs2 7#c7 encourage at the same time individual development and the demand that all shall share in this development--the worth and happiness of the person and of every person4 #b4 ,collisions ,involved4--,such an advance brings to consciousness two collisions4 ,the oppositions were there before1 but they were not felt as oppositions4 ,so long as the man was fully with his group1 or satisfied with the custom1 he would make no revolt4 ,when the movement begins the collisions are felt4 ,these collisions are3 7#a7 ,the collision between the authority and interests of the group1 and the independence and private interests of the individual4 7#b7 ,the collision between order and progress1 between habit and reconstruction or reformation4 ,it is evident that there is a close connection between these two collisions2 in fact1 the second becomes in practice a form of the first4 ,for we saw in the last chapter that custom is really backed and enforced by the group1 and its merely habitual parts are as strongly supported as those parts which have a more rational basis4 ,it would perhaps be conceivable that a people should move on all together1 working out a higher civilization in which free thought should keep full reverence for social values1 in which political liberty should keep even pace with the development of government1 in which self-interest should be accompanied by regard for the welfare of others1 just as it may be possible for a child to grow into full morality without a period of storm and stress4 ,but this is not usual4 ,progress has generally cost struggle4 ,and the first phase of this struggle is opposition between the individual and the group4 ,the self-assertive instincts and impulses were present in group life1 but they were in part undeveloped because they had not enough stimulus to call them out4 ,a man could not develop his impulse for possession to its full extent if there was little or nothing for him to possess4 ,in part they were not developed because the group held them back1 and the conditions of living and fighting favored those groups which did keep them back4 ,nevertheless they were present in some degree1 always contending against the more social forces4 ,indeed what makes the opposition between group and individual so strong and so continuous is that both the social and the individual are rooted in human nature4 ,they constitute what ,kant calls the unsocial sociableness of man4 ,man cannot get on with his fellows and he cannot do without them4 ,individualism4--,the assertion by the individual of his own opinions and beliefs1 his own independence and interests1 as over against group standards1 authority1 and interests1 is known as individualism4 ,it is evident that such assertion will always mark a new level of conduct4 ,action must now be personal and voluntary4 ,it is also evident that it may be either better or worse than the level of custom and group life4 ,the first effect is likely to be1 in appearance at least1 a change for the worse4 ,the old restraints are tossed aside2 creeds outworn no longer steady or direct2 the strong or the crafty individual comes to the fore and exploits his fellows4 ,every man does what is right in his own eyes4 ,the age of the ,sophists in ,greece1 of the ,renaissance in ,italy1 of the ,enlightenment and ,romantic movement in western ,europe1 and of the industrial revolution in recent times illustrate different phases of individualism4 ,a people1 as well as an individual1 may go to pieces in its reaction against social authority and custom4 ,but such one-sided individualism is almost certain to call out prophets of a new order2 organic filaments of new structures appear2 family1 industry1 the state1 are organized anew and upon more voluntary basis4 ,those who accept the new conditions and assume responsibility with their freedom1 who direct their choices by reason instead of passion1 who aim at justice and kindness as well as at happiness1 become moral persons and gain thereby new worth and dignity4 ,while1 then1 the general movement is on the whole a movement of individualism1 it demands just as necessarily1 if there is to be moral progress1 a reconstructed individual--a person who is individual in choice1 in feeling1 in responsibility1 and at the same time social in what he regards as good1 in his sympathies1 and in his purposes4 ,otherwise individualism means progress toward the immoral4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,sociological ,,agencies ,,in ,,the ,,transition ,the agencies which bring about the change from customary and group morality to conscious and personal morality are varied4 ,just as character is developed in the child and young man by various means1 sometimes by success1 sometimes by adversity or loss of a parent1 sometimes by slow increase in knowledge1 and sometimes by a sudden right-about-face with a strong emotional basis1 so it is with peoples4 ,some1 like the ,japanese at the present1 are brought into sudden contact with the whole set of commercial and military forces from without4 ,among others1 as with the ,greeks1 a fermentation starts within1 along intellectual1 economic1 political1 and religious lines4 ,or again1 national calamities may upset all the old values1 as with the ,hebrews4 ,but we may note four typical agencies which are usually more or less active4 #a4 ,economic ,forces4--,the action of economic forces in breaking up the early kinship group or joint family may be noticed in the history of many peoples4 ,the clan flourishes in such conditions of hunting life or of simple agriculture as were found among ,australians and ,indians1 or among the ,celts in ,ireland and the ,scottish ,highlands4 ,it cannot survive when a more advanced state of agriculture prevails4 ,a certain amount of individualism will appear wherever the advantage for the individual lies in separate industry and private ownership4 ,if buffalo was to be hunted it was better to pool issues1 but for smaller game the skilful or persistent huntsman or shepherd will think he can gain more by working for himself4 ,this is intensified when agriculture and commerce take the place of earlier modes of life4 ,the farmer has to work so hard and long1 his goal is so far in the future1 that differences of character show themselves much more strongly4 ,hunting and fishing are so exciting1 and the reward is so near1 that even a man who is not very industrious will do his part4 ,but in agriculture only the hard and patient worker gets a reward and he does not like to share it with the lazy1 or even with the weaker4 ,commerce1 bargaining1 likewise puts a great premium on individual shrewdness4 ,and for a long time commerce was conducted on a relatively individual basis4 ,caravans of traders journeyed together for mutual protection but there was not any such organization as later obtained1 and each individual could display his own cunning or ability4 ,moreover commerce leads to the comparison of custom1 to interchange of ideas as well as goods4 ,all this tends to break down the sanctity of customs peculiar to a given group4 ,the trader as well as the guest may overstep the barriers set up by kin4 ,the early ,greek colonists1 among whom a great individualistic movement began1 were the traders of their day4 ,the parts of ,europe where most survives of primitive group life are those little touched by modern commerce4 ,but we get a broader view of economic influences if we consider the methods of organizing industry which have successively prevailed4 ,in early society1 and likewise in the earlier period of modern civilization1 the family was a great economic unit4 ,many or most of the industries could be advantageously carried on in the household4 ,as in the cases cited above 7p4 #fj7 the stronger or adventurous member would be constantly trying to strike out for himself4 ,this process of constant readjustment is1 however1 far less thoroughgoing in its effects on mores than the three great methods of securing a broader organization of industry4 ,in primitive society large enterprises had to be carried on by the co-operation of the group4 ,forced labor as used by the ,oriental civilizations substituted a method by which greater works like the pyramids or temples could be built1 but it brought with it the overthrow of much of the old group sympathies and mutual aid4 ,in ,greece and ,rome slavery did the drudgery and left the citizens free to cultivate art1 letters1 and government4 ,it gave opportunity and scope for the few4 ,men of power and genius arose1 and at the same time all the negative forces of individualism asserted themselves4 ,in modern times capitalism is the method for organizing industry and trade4 ,it proves more effective than forced labor or slavery in securing combination of forces and in exploiting natural resources4 ,it likewise gives extraordinary opportunities for the rise of men of organizing genius4 ,the careers of captains of industry are more fascinating than those of old-time conquerors because they involve more complex situations1 and can utilize the discoveries and labors of more men4 ,but modern capitalism has been as destructive to the morality of the ,middle ,ages1 or even of a hundred years ago1 as was forced labor or slavery to the group life and mores which they destroyed4 #b4 ,the ,progress of ,science and the ,arts4--,the effect of the progress of science and intelligence upon the mores is direct4 ,comparisons of the customs of one people with those of another bring out differences1 and arouse questions as to the reasons for such diversity4 ,and we have seen that there is more or less in the customs for which no reason can be given4 ,even if there was one originally it has been forgotten4 ,or again1 increasing knowledge of weather and seasons1 of plants and animals1 of sickness and disease1 discredits many of the taboos and ceremonials which the cruder beliefs had regarded as essential to welfare4 ,certain elements of ritual may survive under the protection of mysteries1 but the more enlightened portion of the community keeps aloof4 ,instead of the mores with their large infusion of the accidental1 the habitual1 and the impulsive1 increasing intelligence demands some rational rule of life4 ,and science joins with the various industrial and fine arts to create a new set of interests for the individual4 ,any good piece of workmanship1 any work of art however simple1 is twice blest4 ,it blesses him that makes and him that uses or enjoys4 ,the division of labor1 begun in group life1 is carried further4 ,craftsmen and artists develop increasing individuality as they construct temples or palaces1 fashion statues or pottery1 or sing of gods and heroes4 ,their minds grow with what they do4 ,side by side with the aspect of art which makes it a bond of society is the aspect which so frequently makes the skilled workman the critic1 and the artist a law to himself4 ,in the next place note the effect on those who can use and enjoy the products of the arts4 ,a new world of satisfaction and happiness is opened which each person can enter for himself4 ,in cruder conditions there was not much out of which to build up happiness4 ,food1 labor1 rest1 the thrill of hunt or contest1 the passion of sex1 the pride in children--these made up the interests of primitive life4 ,further means of enjoyment were found chiefly in society of the kin1 or in the men's house4 ,but as the arts advanced the individual could have made for him a fine house and elaborate clothing4 ,metal1 wood1 and clay minister to increasing wants4 ,a permanent and stately tomb makes the future more definite4 ,the ability to hand down wealth in durable form places a premium on its acquirement4 ,ambition has more stuff to work with4 ,a more definite1 assertive self is gradually built up4 ,good comes to have added meaning with every new want that awakes4 ,the individual is not satisfied any longer to take the group's valuation4 ,he wants to get his own good in his own way4 ,and it will often seem to him that he can get his own good most easily and surely either by keeping out of the common life or by using his fellow men to his own advantage4 ,men of culture have frequently shown their selfishness in the first way2 men of wealth in the second4 ,an aristocracy of culture1 or birth1 or wealth may come to regard the whole process of civilization as properly ministering to the wants of the select few4 ,nearly every people which has developed the arts and sciences has developed also an aristocracy4 ,in the ancient world slavery was a part of the process4 ,in modern times other forms of exploitation may serve the purpose better4 ,individualism1 released from the ties which bound up the good of one with the good of all1 tends to become exclusive and selfish2 civilization with all its opportunities for increasing happiness and increasing life has its moral risks and indirectly1 at least1 its moral evils4 ,these evils may appear as the gratification of sense and appetite and thus may be opposed to the higher life of the spirit1 which needs no outer objects or luxuries4 ,or they may appear as rooted in selfishness1 in the desire for gratifying the exclusive self of material interests or ambition1 as over against sympathy1 justice1 and kindness1 which mark a broadly human and social life4 ,in both cases serious men have sought to overcome by some form of self-denial the evils that attend on civilization1 even if they are not due to it4 #c4 ,military ,forces4--,the kinship group is a protection so long as it has to contend only with similar groups4 ,the headlong valor and tribal loyalty of ,german or ,scottish clans may even win conflicts with more disciplined troops of ,rome or ,england4 ,but permanent success demands higher organization than the old clans and tribes permitted4 ,organization means authority1 and a single directing1 controlling commander or king4 ,as ,egypt1 ,assyria1 ,phoenicia show their strength the clans of ,israel cry1 ,nay1 but we will have a king over us2 that we may also be like all the nations2 and that our king may judge us1 and go out before us1 and fight our battles4#dc ,wars afford the opportunity for the strong and unscrupulous leader to assert himself4 ,like commerce they may tend also to spread culture and thus break down barriers of ancient custom4 ,the conquests of ,babylon and ,alexander1 the ,crusades and the ,french ,revolution1 are instances of the power of military forces to destroy old customs and give individualism new scope4 ,in most cases1 it is true1 it is only the leader or tyrant who gets the advantage4 ,he uses the whole machinery of society for his own elevation4 ,nevertheless custom and group unity are broken for all4 ,respect for law must be built new from the foundation4 #d4 ,religious ,forces4--,while in general religion is a conservative agency1 it is also true that a new religion or a new departure in religion has often exercised a powerful influence on moral development4 ,the very fact that religion is so intimately bound up with all the group mores and ideals1 makes a change in religion bear directly on old standards of life4 ,the collision between old and new is likely to be fundamental and sharp4 ,a conception of ,god may carry with it a view of what conduct is pleasing to him4 ,a doctrine as to the future may require a certain mode of life4 ,a cultus may approve or condemn certain relations between the sexes4 ,conflicting religions may then force a moral attitude in weighing their claims4 ,the contests between ,jehovah and ,baal1 between ,orphic cults and the public ,greek religion1 between ,judaism and ,christianity1 ,christianity and ,roman civilization1 ,christianity and ,germanic religion1 ,catholicism and ,protestantism1 have brought out moral issues4 ,we shall notice this factor especially in ,chapters ,,vi4 and ,,viii4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,the ,,psychological ,,agencies ,the psychological forces which tend toward individualism have been already stated to be the self-assertive instincts and impulses4 ,they are all variations of the effort of the living being first to preserve itself and then to rise to more complicated life by entering into more complex relations and mastering its environment4 ,spinoza's sui esse conservare1 ,schopenhauer's will to live1 ,nietzsche's will to power1 the ,hebrew's passionate ideal of life1 and ,tennyson's ,more life1 and fuller express in varying degree the meaning of this elemental bent and process4 ,growing intelligence adds to its strength by giving greater capacity to control4 ,starting with organic needs1 this developing life process may find satisfactions in the physical world in the increasing power and mastery over nature gained by the explorer or the hunter1 the discoverer1 the craftsman1 or the artist4 ,it is when it enters the world of persons that it displays a peculiar intensity that marks the passions of individualism par excellence4 ,we note four of these tendencies toward self-assertion4 #a4 ,sex4--,the sex instinct and emotion occupies a peculiar position in this respect4 ,on the one hand it is a powerful socializing agency4 ,it brings the sexes together and is thus fundamental to the family4 ,but on the other hand it is constantly rebelling against the limits and conventions established by the social group for its regulation4 ,the statutes against illicit relations1 from the codes of ,hammurabi and ,moses to the latest efforts for stricter divorce1 attest the collision between the individual's inclination and the will of the group4 ,repeatedly some passion of sex has broken over all social1 legal1 and religious sanctions4 ,it has thus been a favorite theme of tragedy from the ,greeks to ,ibsen4 ,it finds another fitting medium in the romance4 ,it has called into existence and maintains in every large city an outcast colony of wretched creatures1 and the evils which attend are not limited in their results to those who knowingly take the risks4 ,it has worked repeated changes in the structure of the family authorized by society4 ,its value and proper regulation were points at issue in that wide-reaching change of mores attendant upon the ,reformation1 and apparently equilibrium has not yet been reached4 #b4 ,the ,demand for ,possession and ,private ,property4--,in the primitive group we have seen that there might be private property in tools or weapons1 in cattle or slaves4 ,there was little private property in land under the maternal clan2 and indeed in any case1 so long as the arts were undeveloped1 private property had necessary limits4 ,the demand for private property is a natural attendant upon individual modes of industry4 ,as we have said1 it was a common principle that what the group produced was owned by the group1 and what the individual made or captured was treated as his4 ,when individual industry came to count for more1 the individual claimed more and more as private possession4 ,the change from the maternal clan to the paternal family or household was a reenforcement to the individual control of property4 ,the father could hand down his cattle or his house to his son4 ,the joint family of ,india is indeed a type of a paternal system4 ,nevertheless the tendency is much stronger to insist on individual property where the father's goods pass to his son than where they go to his sister's children4 ,the chiefs or rulers were likely to gain the right of private property first4 ,among certain families of the ,south ,slavs to-day1 the head has his individual eating utensils1 the rest share4 ,among many people the chiefs have cattle which they can dispose of as they will2 the rest have simply their share of the kin's goods4 ,the old ,brehon laws of ,ireland show this stage4 ,but however it comes about1 the very meaning of property is1 in the first place1 exclusion of others from some thing which ,i have4 ,it is therefore in so far necessarily opposed to group unity1 opposed to any such simple solidarity of life as we find in group morality4 ,as the ,american ,indian accepts land in severalty1 the old group life1 the tribal restraints and supports1 the group custom and moral unity that went with it1 are gone4 ,he must find a new basis or go to pieces4 #c4 ,struggles for ,mastery or ,liberty4--,in most cases these cannot be separated from economic struggles4 ,masters and slaves were in economic as well as personal relations1 and nearly all class contests on a large scale have had at least one economic root1 whatever their other sources4 ,but the economic is not their only root4 ,there have been wars for glory or for liberty as well as for territory or booty or slaves4 ,as the struggle for existence has bred into the race the instinct of self-defense with its emotion of anger1 the instinct to rivalry and mastery1 and the corresponding aversion to being ruled1 so the progress of society shows trials of strength between man and man1 kin and kin1 tribe and tribe4 ,and while1 as stated in the preceding chapter1 the cooperation made necessary in war or feud is a uniting force1 there is another side to the story4 ,contests between individuals show who is master2 contests between groups tend to bring forward leaders4 ,and while such masterful men may serve the group they are quite as likely to find an interest in opposing group customs4 ,they assert an independence of the group1 or a mastery over it1 quite incompatible with the solidarity of the kinship clan1 although the patriarchal type of household under a strong head may be quite possible4 ,there comes to be one code for rich and another for poor1 one for ,patricians and another for ,plebs1 one for baron and another for peasant1 one for gentry and another for the common folk4 ,for a time this may be accepted patiently4 ,but when once the rich become arrogant1 the feudal lord insolent1 the bitter truth is faced that the customs have become mere conventions4 ,they no longer hold4 ,all the old ties are cast off4 ,the demand for freedom and equality rises1 and the collision between authority and liberty is on4 ,or the contest may be for intellectual liberty--for free thought and free speech4 ,it is sometimes considered that such liberty meets its strongest opponent in the religious or ecclesiastical organization4 ,there is no doubt a conservative tendency in religion4 ,as we have pointed out1 religion is the great conservator of group values and group standards4 ,its ritual is most elaborate1 its taboos most sacred4 ,intellectual criticism tends to undermine what is outgrown or merely habitual here as elsewhere4 ,rationalism or free thought has set itself in frequent opposition likewise to what has been claimed to be above reason4 ,nevertheless it would be absurd to attribute all the individualism to science and all the conservatism to religion4 ,scientific dogmas and idols are hard to displace4 ,schools are about as conservative as churches4 ,and on the other hand the struggle for religious liberty has usually been carried on not by the irreligious but by the religious4 ,the prophet ,amos found himself opposed by the religious organization of his day when he urged social righteousness1 and the history of the noble army of martyrs is a record of appeal to individual conscience1 or to an immediate personal relation to ,god1 as over against the formal1 the traditional1 the organized religious customs and doctrines of their age4 ,the struggle for religious toleration and religious liberty takes its place side by side with the struggles for intellectual and political liberty in the chapters of individualism4 #d4 ,the ,desire for ,honor1 or ,social ,esteem4--,james1 in his psychology of the self1 calls the recognition which a man gets from his mates his social self4 ,we are not only gregarious animals1 liking to be in sight of our fellows1 but we have an innate propensity to get ourselves noticed1 and noticed favorably by our kind4 ,no more fiendish punishment could be devised1 were such a thing physically possible1 than that one should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members thereof4#dd ,from such a punishment the cruelest bodily tortures would be a relief2 for this would make us feel that however bad might be our plight1 we had not sunk to such depth as to be unworthy of attention at all4#de ,honor or fame is a name for one of the various social selves which a man may build up4 ,it stands for what those of a given group may think or say of him4 ,it has a place and a large place in group life4 ,precedence1 salutations1 decorations in costume and bodily ornament1 praises in song for the brave1 the strong1 the cunning1 the powerful1 with ridicule for the coward or the weakling are all at work4 ,but with the primitive group the difference between men of the group is kept within bounds4 ,when more definite organization of groups for military or civil purposes begins1 when the feudal chief gathers his retainers and begins to rise above the rest of the community in strength1 finally when the progress of the arts gives greater means for display1 the desire for recognition has immensely greater scope4 ,it is increased by the instinct of emulation2 it often results in envy and jealousies4 ,it becomes then a powerful factor in stimulating individualism4 ,but while desires for honor and fame provoke individualism1 they carry with them1 like desires for property and power1 elements that make for reconstruction of the social on a higher level4 ,for honor implies some common sentiment to which the individual can make appeal4 ,group members praise or blame what accords with their feeling or desire1 but they do not act as individuals merely1 praising what pleases them as individuals4 ,they react more or less completely from the group point of view2 they honor the man who embodies the group-ideal of courage1 or other admirable and respected qualities4 ,and here comes the motive which operates to force a better ideal than mere desire of praise4 ,no group honors the man who is definitely seeking merely its applause rather than its approval--at least not after it has found him out4 ,the force of public opinion is therefore calculated to elicit a desire to be worthy of honor1 as well as to be honored4 ,this means a desire to act as a true social individual1 for it is only the true member of the group1--true clansman1--true patriot1--true martyr1--who appeals to the other members when they judge as members1 and not selfishly4 ,when now the group whose approval is sought is small1 we have class standards1 with all the provincialism1 narrowness1 and prejudice that belong to them4 ,as the honor-seeker is merely after the opinion of his class1 he is bound to be only partly social4 ,so long as he is with his kin1 or his set1 or his gang1 or his party1 or his union1 or his country--regardless of any wider appeal--he is bound to be imperfectly rational and social in his conduct4 ,the great possibilities of the desire for honor1 and of the desire to be worthy of honor1 lie then in the constant extension of the range4 ,the martyr1 the seeker for truth1 the reformer1 the neglected artist1 looks for honor from posterity2 if misjudged or neglected1 he appeals to mankind4 ,he is thus forming for himself an ideal standard4 ,and if he embodies this ideal standard in a personal1 highest possible judging companion1 his desire to be worthy of approval takes a religious form4 ,he seeks the honor that is from ,god4 ,though the innermost of the empirical selves of a man is a self of the social sort1 it yet can find its only adequate socius in an ideal world4#df ,the moral value of these three forces of individualism was finely stated by ,kant3 ,the means which nature uses to bring about the development of all the capacities she has given man is their antagonism in society1 in so far as this antagonism becomes in the end a cause of social order4 ,men have an inclination to associate themselves1 for in a social state they feel themselves more completely men3 i4e41 they are conscious of the development of their natural capacities4 ,but they have also a great propensity to isolate themselves1 for they find in themselves at the same time this unsocial characteristic3 each wishes to direct everything solely according to his own notion1 and hence expects resistance1 just as he knows that he is inclined to resist others4 ,it is just this resistance which awakens all man's powers2 this brings him to overcome his propensity to indolence1 and drives him through the lust for honor1 power1 or wealth to win for himself a rank among his fellowmen4 ,man's will is for concord1 but nature knows better what is good for the species1 and she wills discord4 ,he would like a life of comfort and pleasure2 nature wills that he be dragged out of idleness and inactive content1 and plunged into labor and trouble in order that he may find out the means of extricating himself from his difficulties4 ,the natural impulses which prompt this effort1 the sources of unsociableness and of the mutual conflict from which so many evils spring1 are then spurs to a more complete development of man's powers4#dg ,we have spoken of the forces which tend to break down the old unity of the group and bring about new organization4 ,but of course these forces are not impersonal4 ,sometimes they seem to act like the ocean tide1 pushing silently in1 and only now and then sending a wave a little higher than its fellows4 ,frequently1 however1 some great personality stands out preeminent1 either as critic of the old or builder of the new4 ,the prophets were stoned because they condemned the present2 the next generation was ready to build their sepulchers4 ,socrates is the classic example of the great man who perishes in seeking to find a rational basis to replace that of custom4 ,indeed1 this conflict--on the one hand1 the rigid system of tradition and corporate union hallowed by all the sanctions of religion and public opinion2 upon the other1 the individual making appeal to reason1 or to his conscience1 or to a higher law--is the tragedy of history4 ,sec4 #d4 ,,positive ,,reconstruction ,it must not be supposed that the moral process stops at the points indicated under the several divisions of this last section4 ,as already stated1 if the people really works out a higher type of conscious and personal morality1 it means not only a more powerful individual1 but a reconstructed individual and a reconstructed society4 ,it means not only the disintegration of the old kinship or family group1 which is an economic1 political1 and religious unity as well4 ,it means the construction of a new basis for the family2 new moral principles for business2 a distinct political state with new means for government1 new conceptions of authority and liberty2 finally1 a national or universal religion4 ,and the individual must on this higher level choose all these voluntarily4 ,more than this3 as he chooses in the presence of the new conflicting ends presented by individualism1 he sets up or adopts a standard for himself4 ,he thinks definitely of what is good and right4 ,as he recognizes its claim1 he is responsible as well as free4 ,as he identifies himself heartily with it1 he becomes sincerely and genuinely moral4 ,reverence1 duty1 and love for what is good become the quickening emotions4 ,thoughtfulness1 self-control1 aspiration toward an ideal1 courageous venturing in its achievement1 kindness and justice1 become the dominant temper1 or at least are recognized as the temper that should be dominant4 ,the conception of moral character and moral personality is brought to consciousness4 ,the development of the ,hebrews and ,greeks will show how these positive values emerge4 ,,literature ,kant's ,principles of ,politics1 tr4 by ,hastie1 #ahia1 especially the essay ,the ,idea of a ,universal ,cosmopolitical ,history2 ,hegel1 ,philosophy of ,history1 tr4 by ,sibree1 #ahha2 ,darwin1 ,the ,descent of ,man1 #ahga1 #ahhb-hg2 ,schurman1 ,the ,ethical ,import of ,darwinism1 #ahhh2 ,seth1 ,the ,evolution of ,morality1 ,mind1 ,,xiv41 #ahhi1 pp4 #bg-di2 ,williams1 ,a ,review of ,systems of ,ethics founded on the ,theory of ,evolution1 #ahic2 ,harris1 ,moral ,evolution1 #ahie2 ,tufts1 ,on ,moral ,evolution1 in ,studies in ,philosophy and ,psychology 7,garman ,commemorative ,volume71 #aijf2 ,ihering1 ,der ,kampf ums ,recht2 ,simcox1 ,natural ,law1 #ahgg2 ,sorley1 ,ethics of ,naturalism1 #ahhe4 ,,footnotes3 #dc #a ,sam4 #h3ai1 #bj4 #dd ,psychology1 ,vol4 ,i41 ch4 x4 #de ,ibid41 p4 #bic f4 #df ,james1 ,psychology1 ,i41 #caf4 #dg ,idea of a ,universal ,cosmopolitical ,history4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,the ,,hebrew ,,moral ,,development ,sec4 #a4 ,,general ,,character ,,and ,,determining ,,principles #a4 ,the ,hebrew and the ,greek4--,the general character of the ,hebrew moral development may be brought out by a contrast with that of the ,greeks4#dh ,while many phases are common1 there is yet a difference in emphasis and focus4 ,there were political and economic forces at work in ,israel1 and religious forces in ,greece4 ,nevertheless1 the moral life in one people kept close to the religious1 and in the other found independent channels4 ,conscientious conduct for the ,hebrew centered in doing the will of ,god2 for the ,greek1 in finding rational standards of good4 ,for the ,hebrew1 righteousness was the typical theme2 for the ,greek1 the ideal lay rather in measure and harmony4 ,for the ,greek1 wisdom or insight was the chief virtue2 for the ,hebrew1 the fear of the ,lord was the beginning of wisdom4 ,the social ideal of the ,hebrews was the kingdom of ,god2 of the ,greeks1 a political ,state4 ,if we distinguish in conscience two aspects1 thoughtfulness in discovering what to do and hearty desire to do the right when found1 then the ,greeks emphasize the former1 the ,hebrews the latter4 ,intellect plays a larger part with the ,greek2 emotion and the voluntary aspect of will with the ,hebrew4 ,feeling plays its part with the ,greeks largely as an aesthetic demand for measure and harmony2 with the ,hebrews it is chiefly prominent in motivation1 where it is an element in what is called the heart1 or it functions in appreciation of acts performed1 as the joy or sorrow felt when ,god approves or condemns4 ,both peoples are interesting for our study1 not only as illustrating different kinds of moral development1 but also as contributing largely to the moral consciousness of western peoples to-day4 #b4 ,the ,early ,morality4--,the accounts of the tribal life and customs in the early period after the settlement in ,canaan1 show the main features of group life which are already familiar to us4 ,clan or kinship loyalty was strong on both its good and its defective sides4 ,there were fidelity1 a jeoparding of lives unto death1 honor for group heroes1 joint responsibility1 and blood revenge4 ,there were respect for hospitality and regulation of marriage1 though not according to later standards4 ,a rough measure of justice was recognized in as ,i have done1 so ,god hath requited me4 ,but there was no public authority to restrain the wrongdoer1 except when a particularly revolting brutality shocked public sentiment4 ,festivals and sacrificial meals united the members of the family or clan more closely to each other and to their god4 ,vows must be kept inviolable even if they involved human sacrifice4 ,the interests and ends of life were simple4 ,the satisfaction of bodily wants1 the love of kin and above all of children1 the desire to be in right relation of favor and harmony with the unseen deity who protected from enemies and sent fruitful seasons1--these made their chief good4 ,the line of their progress from these rude beginnings to a lofty moral ideal lay through religion4 ,but the religious conceptions were directly related to political1 social1 and economic conditions2 hence1 both aspects must be briefly characterized4 #c4 ,political ,development4--,the political development 7a7 built up a national unity which worked to break down old group units1 7b7 strengthened military ambition and race pride1 7c7 stimulated the prophets to their highest conceptions of the divine majesty and universality1 but1 finally when the national power and hope were shattered1 7d7 compelled the most thoroughgoing reconstruction of all the values1 ideals1 and meaning of life4 ,it is not possible or necessary to trace this process in detail1 but we may point out here the general effect of the political development in bringing into clearer consciousness the conceptions of authority and law which were important factors in ,hebrew morality4 ,the earlier patriarchal head of the clan or family exercised certain political power1 but there was no explicit recognition of this4 ,government by the elders or by the heads of the household makes no clear distinction between the common kinship and the political and legal authority of the sovereign4 ,the judges1 whose rule preceded the kingdom1 were military deliverers who owed their authority to personal powers rather than to a definite provision4 ,to establish an organized political community1 a kingdom1 was then to bring into clearer recognition this element of authority which was merely implicit in the tribal organization4 ,it allowed a more distinctly voluntary relationship to be differentiated from the involuntary relationship of kinship1 or the personal relationship of the hero4 ,while1 therefore1 in the formation of the kingdom the earlier prophets saw only a rejection of ,god1 the later prophets saw in it the symbol of a higher type of relation between ,god and people4 ,it was given religious sanction and the king was regarded as the son of ,jehovah4 ,it was thus ready to serve as the scheme or setting for the moral unity and order of a people4 #d4 ,the ,economic ,factors4--,the organization and growing prosperity of the political power were attended by economic and social changes4 ,the simple agricultural life of the early period had not caused entire loss of clan organization and customs4 ,but the growth of trade and commerce under ,solomon and later kings brought in wealth and shifted the center of power and influence from country to city4 ,wealth and luxury had their usual results4 ,clashing interests asserted their strength4 ,economic and social individualism destroyed the old group solidarity4 ,at the times of the prophets ,amos1 ,hosea1 ,isaiah1 there were classes of rich and poor4 ,greed had asserted itself in rulers1 judges1 priests1 and regular prophets4 ,oppression1 land monopoly1 bribery1 extortion1 stirred moral indignation4 ,the fact that these were practiced by the most zealous observers of ritual and guardians of religion roused in the great reformers a demand for a change in religion itself4 ,not sacrifices but justice is the need of the hour and the demand of ,god4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,religious ,,agencies ,the interaction between the religious and the moral education of the ,hebrews was so intimate that it is difficult to distinguish the two1 but we may abstract certain conceptions or motives in ,israel's religion which were especially significant4 ,the general conception was that of the close personal relation between god and people4 ,israel should have no other god2 ,jehovah--at least this was the earlier thought--would have no other people4 ,he had loved and chosen ,israel2 ,israel in gratitude1 as well as in hope and fear1 must love and obey ,jehovah4 ,priests maintained his cultus2 prophets brought new commands according to the requirements of the hour2 the king represented his sovereignty and justice2 the course of events exhibited his purpose4 ,each of these elements served to provoke or elicit moral reflection or moral conduct4 #a4 ,the ,covenant ,relation was a ,moral ,conception4--,the usual religious conception is that of some blood or kin relation between people and deity4 ,this has the same potential meaning and value as that of the other relations of group life outlined in ,chapter ,,ii4 ,but it is rather a natural than a moral--i4e41 conscious and voluntary--tie4 ,to conceive of the relation between god and people as due to voluntary choice1 is to introduce a powerful agency toward making morality conscious4 ,whatever the origin of the idea1 the significant fact is that the religious and moral leaders present the relation of ,israel to ,jehovah as based on a covenant4 ,on the one hand1 ,jehovah protects1 preserves1 and prospers2 on the other1 ,israel is to obey his laws and serve no other gods4 ,this conception of mutual obligation is presented at the opening of the ,ten ,commandments1 and to this covenant relation the prophets again and again make appeal4 ,the obligation to obey the law is not ,this is the custom1 or ,our fathers did so2 it is placed on the ground that the people has voluntarily accepted ,jehovah as its god and lawgiver4 ,the meaning of this covenant and the symbols by which it was conceived1 changed with the advance of the social relationships of the people4 ,at first ,jehovah was ,lord of ,hosts1 protector in war1 and giver of prosperity1 and the early conceptions of the duty of the people seemed to include human sacrifice1 at least in extreme cases4 ,but with later prophets we find the social and family relationship of husband and father brought increasingly into use4 ,whether by personal experience or by more general reflection1 we find ,hosea interpreting the relationship between ,god and his people in both of these family conceptions4 ,the disloyalty of the people takes on the more intimate taint of a wife's unfaithfulness1 and1 conversely1 in contrast to the concepts of other religions1 the people may call ,jehovah my husband and no longer my master 7,baal74 ,the change from status to contract is thus1 in ,israel's religion1 fruitful with many moral results4 #b4 ,the ,conception of a ,personal ,lawgiver4--,the conception of a personal lawgiver raises conduct from the level of custom to the level of conscious morality4 ,so long as a child follows certain ways by imitation or suggestion1 he does not necessarily attach any moral meaning to them4 ,but if the parent expressly commands or prohibits1 it becomes a matter of obedience or disobedience4 ,choice becomes necessary4 ,character takes the place of innocence4 ,so ,jehovah's law compelled obedience or rebellion4 ,customs were either forbidden or enjoined4 ,in either case they ceased to be merely customs4 ,in the law of ,israel the whole body of observances in private life1 in ceremonial1 and in legal forms1 is introduced with a ,thus saith the ,lord4 ,we know that other ,semitic people observed the ,sabbath1 practiced circumcision1 distinguished clean from unclean beasts1 and respected the taboos of birth and death4 ,whether in ,israel all these observances were old customs given new authority by statute1 or were customs taken from other peoples under the authority of the laws of ,jehovah1 is immaterial4 ,the ethical significance of the law is that these various observances1 instead of being treated merely as customs1 are regarded as personal commands of a personal deity4 ,this makes a vital difference in the view taken of the violation of these observances4 ,when a man violates a custom he fails to do the correct thing4 ,he misses the mark4#di ,but when the observance is a personal command1 its violation is a personal disobedience2 it is rebellion2 it is an act of will4 ,the evil which follows is no longer bad luck2 it is punishment4 ,now punishment must be either right or wrong1 moral or immoral4 ,it can never be merely non-moral4 ,hence the very conception of sin as a personal offense1 and of ill as a personal punishment1 forces a moral standard4 ,in its crudest form this may take the god's commands as right simply because he utters them1 and assume that the sufferer is guilty merely because he suffers4 ,we find this in the penitential psalms of the ,babylonians4 ,these express the deepest conviction of sin and the utmost desire to please the god1 but when we try to discover what the penitent has done that wakens such remorse within him1 we find that he seems merely to feel that in some way he has failed to please ,god1 no matter how4 ,he experiences misfortune1 whether of disease1 or ill-luck1 or defeat1 and is sure that this must be due to some offense4 ,he does not know what this may be4 ,it may have been that he has failed to repeat a formula in the right manner2 it is all one4 ,he feels guilty and even exaggerates his own guilt in view of the punishment which has befallen him4 ,job's three friends apply the same logic to his case4#ej ,but side by side with the conception that the laws of ,jehovah must be obeyed because they were his commands1 there was another doctrine which was but an extension of the theory that the people had freely accepted their ruler4 ,this was that ,jehovah's commands were not arbitrary4 ,they were right2 they could be placed before the people for their approval2 they were life2 the judge of all the earth would do right4 ,we have here a striking illustration of the principle that moral standards1 at first embodied in persons1 slowly work free1 so that persons are judged by them4 #c4 ,the ,cultus as ,morally ,symbolical4--,the elaborate cultus carried on by the priests1 symbolized1 however imperfectly1 certain moral ideas4 ,the solicitous care for ceremonial purity might have no direct moral value2 the contamination from contact with birth or death or certain animals might be a very external sort of uncleanness4 ,nevertheless1 they emphasized in the most forcible manner a constant control over conduct by a standard which was set by a divine law4 ,the holiness of the priests1 as set apart to special service of ,jehovah1 emphasized the seriousness of their work2 and further1 it contributed to that distinction between spiritual and material1 between higher and lower1 which is a part of moral life4 ,moreover1 while part of this value inheres in all ritual1 the contrast between ,jehovah's worship and that of other deities challenged moral attention4 ,the gods of the land1 the various ,baals1 were worshipped upon every high hill and under every green tree4 ,as gods of fertility1 they were symbolized by the emblems of sex1 and great freedom prevailed at their festivals4 ,at certain shrines men and women gave themselves for the service of the god4 ,the first born children were not infrequently sacrificed4#ea ,these festivals and shrines seem to have been adopted more or less fully by ,israel from the ,canaanites1 but the prophets have an utterly different idea of ,jehovah's worship4 ,the god of ,sinai rejects utterly such practices4 ,license and drunkenness are not1 as the cultus of ,baal and ,astarte implied1 the proper symbols of life and deity4 ,the sensual cannot fitly symbolize the spiritual4 ,moreover1 one part of the cultus1 the sin offering1 directly implied transgression and the need of forgiveness4 ,the sins might themselves be ceremonial rather than moral1 and the method of removing them might be external--especially the process of putting the sins upon a scapegoat which should bear upon him all their iniquities into a solitary land1--nevertheless1 the solemn confession1 and the shedding of the blood which was the life1 could not but remind of responsibility and deepen reflection4 ,the need of atonement and reconciliation1 thus impressed1 symbolized the moral process of reconstructing1 of putting away a lower past1 and readjusting life to meet an ideal4 #d4 ,the ,prophets as a ,moral ,force4--,the prophets were by far the most significant moral agency in ,israel's religion4 ,in the first place1 they came to the people bearing a message from a living source of authority1 intended for the immediate situation4 ,they brought a present command for a present duty4 ,thou art the man1 of ,nathan to ,david1 ,hast thou killed1 and also taken possession8 of ,elijah to ,ahab1 had personal occasions4 ,but the great sermons of ,amos1 ,isaiah1 ,jeremiah1 were no less for the hour4 ,a licentious festival1 an ,assyrian invasion1 an ,egyptian embassy1 a plague of locusts1 an impending captivity--these inspire demand for repentance1 warnings of destruction1 promises of salvation4 ,the prophet was thus the living fountain4 ,the divine will as coming through him was still1 so to speak1 fluid1 and not congealed into institutions4 ,in the second place1 the prophets seized upon the inward purpose and social conduct of man as the all-important issues2 cultus1 sacrifice1 are unimportant4 ,i hate1 ,i despise your feasts1 and ,i will take no delight in your solemn assemblies1 cries ,amos in ,jehovah's name1 ,but let justice roll down as waters and righteousness as a mighty stream4 ,i have had enough of the burnt offerings of rams1 and the fat of fed beasts1 proclaims ,isaiah1 new moons1 and sabbaths1 the calling of assemblies1--,i cannot away with iniquity and the solemn meeting4 ,you need not ceremonial1 but moral1 purity4 ,wash you1 make you clean2 put away the evil of your doings2--seek justice1 relieve the oppressed1 judge the fatherless1 plead for the widow4 ,micah's ,shall ,i give my first-born for my transgression1 the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul8 seized upon the difference once for all between the physical and the moral2 a completely ethical standpoint is gained in his summary of religious duty3 ,what doth ,god require of thee1 but to do justly1 and to love mercy1 and to walk humbly with thy ,god8 ,and the ,new ,testament analogue marks the true ethical valuation of all the external religious manifestations1 even of the cruder forms of prophecy itself4 ,gifts1 mysteries1 knowledge1 or the body to be burned--there is a more excellent way than these4 ,for all these are in part4 ,their value is but temporary and relative4 ,the values that abide1 that stand criticism1 are that staking of oneself upon the truth and worth of one's ideal which is faith2 that aspiration and forward look which is hope2 that sum of all social charity1 sympathy1 justice1 and active helpfulness1 which is love4 ,but the greatest of these is love4 #e4 ,the ,religious ,view of the ,kingdom ,gave the ,setting for a ,social ,ideal4--,jehovah was the king of his people4 ,the human ruler in ,jerusalem was his representative4 ,the kingdom of ,israel was under divine care and had on the other hand a serious purpose4 ,the expansion and glory of the kingdom under ,solomon showed the divine favor4 ,division and calamity were not mere misfortunes1 or the victory of greater armies2 they were divine rebukes4 ,only in righteousness and justice could the nation survive4 ,on the other hand1 the confidence in ,jehovah's love for ,israel guaranteed that he would never forsake his people4 ,he would purify them and redeem them even from the grave4 ,he would establish a kingdom of law and peace1 an everlasting kingdom that should not be destroyed4 ,politics in ,israel had a moral goal4 #f4 ,religion ,gave the ,problem of ,evil a ,moral ,significance4--,the ,greek treatment of the problem of evil is found in the great tragedies4 ,an ancestral curse follows down successive generations1 dealing woe to all the unhappy house4 ,for the victims there seems to be nothing but to suffer4 ,the necessity of destiny makes the catastrophe sublime1 but also hopeless4 ,ibsen's ,ghosts is conceived in a similar spirit4 ,there is a tremendous moral lesson in it for the fathers1 but for the children only horror4 ,the ,greek and the ,scandinavian are doubtless interpreting one phase of human life--its continuity and dependence upon cosmical nature4 ,but the ,hebrew was not content with this4 ,his confidence in a divine government of the world forced him to seek some moral value1 some purpose in the event4 ,the search led along one path to a readjustment of values2 it led by another path to a new view of social interdependence4 ,the book of ,job gives the deepest study of the first of these problems4 ,the old view had been that virtue and happiness always went together4 ,prosperity meant divine favor1 and therefore it must be the good4 ,adversity meant divine punishment2 it showed wrongdoing and was itself an evil4 ,when calamity comes upon ,job1 his friends assume it to be a sure proof of his wickedness4 ,he had himself held the same view1 and since he refuses to admit his wickedness and holds fast to his integrity1 it confounds all his philosophy of life and of ,god4 ,it compels a reversal and revaluation of all values4 ,if he could only meet ,god face to face and have it out with him he believes there would be some solution4 ,but come what may1 he will not sell his soul for happiness4 ,to repent1 as his friends urge1 in order that he may be again on good terms with ,god1 would mean for him to call sin what he believes to be righteousness4 ,and he will not lie in this way4 ,god is doubtless stronger1 and if he pursues his victim relentlessly1 may convict him4 ,but be this as it may1 ,job will not let go his fundamental consciousness of right and wrong4 ,his moral self is the one anchor that holds1 is the supreme value of life4 ,as ,god liveth1 who hath taken away my right1 ,and the ,almighty who hath vexed my soul2 ,surely my lips shall not speak unrighteousness4 ,till ,i die1 ,i will not put away my integrity from me1 ,my righteousness ,i hold fast1 and will not let it go4#eb ,another suggestion of the book is that evil comes to prove man's sincerity3 ,does ,job serve ,god for naught8 and from that standpoint the answer is1 ,yes2 he does4 ,there is a disinterested love of ,god4#ec ,in this setting1 also1 the experience of suffering produces a shifting of values from the extrinsic to the internal4 ,the other treatment of the problem of suffering is found in the latter half of ,isaiah4 ,it finds an interpretation of the problem by a deeper view of social interdependence1 in which the old tribal solidarity is given1 as it were1 a transfigured meaning4 ,the individualistic interpretation of suffering was that it meant personal guilt4 ,we did esteem him stricken of ,god4 ,this breaks down4 ,the suffering servant is not wicked4 ,he is suffering for others--in some sense4 ,he hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows4 ,the conception here reached of an interrelation which involves that the suffering of the good may be due to the sin or the suffering of others1 and that the assumption of this burden marks the higher type of ethical relation1 is one of the finest products of ,israel's religion4 ,as made central in the ,christian conception of the ,cross1 it has furnished one of the great elements in the modern social consciousness4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,the ,,moral ,,conceptions ,,attained ,the moral conceptions which were thus worked out may now be brought together for convenient summary under the two heads of the ,how and the ,what indicated in our introductory chapter4 ,under the first we specify the conceptions resulting 7#a7 from recognition of a standard of right1 and an ideal of good1 7#b7 from free choice of this ideal4 ,under the ,what we indicate the content of the ideal on both its personal and its social sides4 #a4 ,righteousness and ,sin4--,righteousness and sin were not exact or contradictory opposites4 ,the righteous man was not necessarily sinless4 ,nevertheless1 the consciousness of sin1 like a dark background1 brought out more emphatically the conception of righteousness4 ,this conception had its two aspects1 derived from the civil and the religious spheres of life--spheres which were not separate for the ,hebrew4 ,on the one hand1 the just or righteous respected the moral order in human society4 ,the unrighteous was unjust1 extortionate1 cruel4 ,he did not respect the rights of others4 ,on the other hand1 the righteous man was in right relation to ,god4 ,this right relation might be tested by the divine law2 but as ,god was conceived as a living person1 loving his people1 forgiving iniquity1 transgression1 and sin1 it might also be measured by an essential harmony of spirit with the divine will4 ,there was the righteousness of the law1 and the righteousness of faith4 ,the first implies complete obedience2 the second implies that in spite of transgressions there is room for atonement#ed or reconciliation4 ,as the first means ethically the testing of conduct by a moral standard1 a moral law1 so the second stands for the thought that character is rather a matter of spirit and of constant reconstruction than of exact conformity once for all to a hard and fast rule4 ,specific acts may fail to conform1 but the life is more than a series of specific acts4 ,the measurement of conduct by the law has its value to quicken a sense of shortcoming1 but alone it may also lead either to self-righteous complacency or to despair4 ,the possibility of new adjustment1 of renewal1 of a new birth1 means liberation and life4 ,as such it may be contrasted with the ,buddhist doctrine of ,karma1 the causality from which there is no escape but by the extinction of desire4 ,sin had likewise its various aspects4 ,it stood for missing the mark1 for violating the rules of clean and unclean2 but it stood also for personal disobedience to the divine will1 for violation of the moral order of ,israel4 ,in this latter sense1 as identified by the prophets with social unrighteousness1 it is a significant ethical conception4 ,it brings out the point that evil and wrongdoing are not merely individual matters1 not merely failures2 they offend against a law which is above the private self1 against a moral order which has its rightful demands upon us4 #b4 ,personal ,responsibility4--,the transition from group to individual responsibility was thoroughly worked out by the prophets1 even if they were not able to carry full popular assent4 ,in early days the whole kin was treated as guilty for the offense of the kinsman4 ,achan's case has already been cited2 and in the case of ,korah1 ,dathan1 and ,abiram1 ,their wives and their sons and their little ones were all treated alike4#ee ,in like manner1 the family of the righteous man shared in the divine favor4 ,the later prophets pronounced a radical change4 ,the proverb1 ,the fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge1 is no more to be used1 declares ,ezekiel1 speaking for ,jehovah4 ,the soul that sinneth1 it shall die2 the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father1 neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son2 and it is especially interesting to note that the ,lord is represented as pleading with the people that this is fair1 while the people say1 ,wherefore doth not the son bear the iniquity of the father8 ,the solidarity of the family resisted the individualism of the prophetic conception1 and five hundred years after ,ezekiel the traces of the older conception still lingered in the question1 ,who did sin1 this man or his parents1 that he was born blind8#ef ,for another aspect of responsibility1 viz41 intent1 as distinct from accidental action1#eg we have certain transitional steps shown in the interesting cities of refuge#eh for the accidental homicide in which he might be safe from the avenger of blood1 provided he was swift enough of foot to reach a city of refuge before he was caught4 ,but the fullest development in the ethics of responsibility along this line seemed to take the form described under the next head4 #c4 ,sincerity1 and ,purity of ,motive4--,the ,hebrew had a philosophy of conduct which made it chiefly a matter of wisdom and folly1 but the favorite term of prophet and psalmist to symbolize the central principle was rather the heart4 ,this term stood for the voluntary disposition1 especially in its inner springs of emotions and sentiments1 affections and passions4 ,the ,greek was inclined to look askance at this side of life1 to regard the emotions as perturbations of the soul1 and to seek their control by reason1 or even their repression or elimination4 ,the ,hebrew found a more positive value in the emotional side of conduct1 and at the same time worked out the conception of a sincere and thoroughgoing interest as lying at the very root of all right life4 ,the religious influence was as elsewhere the important agency4 ,man looketh on the outward appearance1 but ,jehovah looketh on the heart1 ,if ,i regard iniquity in my heart1 ,jehovah will not hear me1 are characteristic expressions4 ,a divine vision1 which penetrates to the deepest springs of purpose and feeling1 will not tolerate pretense4 ,nor will it be satisfied with anything less than entire devotion3 the ,israelite must serve ,jehovah with all his heart4 ,outer conformity is not enough3 ,rend your heart and not your garments4 ,it is the pure in heart who have the beatific vision4 ,not external contacts1 or ceremonial uncleanness1 on which earlier ritual had insisted1 defile the man1 but rather what proceeds from the heart4 ,for the heart is the source of evil thoughts and evil deeds4#ei ,and conversely1 the interests1 the emotions1 and enthusiasms which make up the man's deepest self do not spring forth in a vacuum2 they go with the steadfast purpose and bent1 with the self of achievement4 ,where your treasure is1 there will your heart be also4 ,purity of motive in a full moral consciousness means not only 7formal7 sincerity1 but sincere love of good and right4 ,this was not stated by the ,hebrew in abstract terms1 but in the personal language of love to ,god4 ,in early days there had been more or less of external motives in the appeals of the law and the prophets4 ,fear of punishment1 hope of reward1 blessings in basket and store1 curses in land and field1 were used to induce fidelity4 ,but some of the prophets sought a deeper view1 which seems to have been reached in the bitterness of human experience4 ,hosea's wife had forsaken him1 and should not the love of people to ,jehovah be as personal and sincere as that of wife to husband8 ,she had said1 ,i will go after my lovers that give me my bread and my water1 my wood and my flax1 my oil and my drink4#fj ,is not serving ,god for hire a form of prostitution8#fa ,the calamities of the nation tested the disinterestedness of its fidelity4 ,they were the challenge of the ,adversary1 ,doth ,job fear ,god for naught8 ,and a remnant at least attested that fidelity did not depend on rewards4 ,the moral maxim that virtue is its own reward is put in personal terms by the prophet after the exile3 ,for though the fig tree shall not blossom1 neither shall fruit be in the vines2 the labor of the olive shall fail1 and the fields shall yield no meat2 the flock shall be cut off from the fold1 and there shall be no herd in the stalls3 ,yet ,i will rejoice in the ,lord1 ,i will joy in the ,god of my salvation4#fb #d4 ,the ,conception of ,life as an ,ideal4--,the content of ,israel's moral ideal on its individual side was expressed by the term ,life4 ,all the blessings that the leader of ,israel could offer his people were summarized in the phrase1 ,i have set before you life and death2 wherefore choose life4 ,the same final standard of value appears in the question of ,jesus1 ,what shall it profit a man to gain the whole world and lose his own life8 ,when we inquire what life meant1 so far as the early sources give us data for judgment1 we must infer it to have been measured largely in terms of material comfort and prosperity1 accompanied by the satisfaction of standing in right relations to the god and ruler4 ,this latter element was so closely united with the first that it was practically identical with it4 ,if the people were prosperous they might assume that they were right2 if they suffered they were surely wrong4 ,good and evil were1 therefore1 in this stage1 measured largely in terms of pleasure and pain4 ,the end to be sought and the ideal to be kept in mind was that of long and prosperous life--in her right hand length of days1 in her left hand riches and honor4 ,intellectual and aesthetic interests were not prized as such4 ,the knowledge which was valued was the wisdom for the conduct of life1 of which the beginning and crown was the fear of the ,lord4 ,the art which was valued was sacred song or poetry4 ,but the ideal values which came to bulk most in the expanding conception of life were those of personal relation4 ,family ties1 always strong among ,oriental peoples1 gained in purity4 ,love between the sexes was refined and idealized4#fc ,national feeling took on added dignity1 because of the consciousness of a divine mission4 ,above all1 personal union with ,god1 as voiced in the psalms and prophets1 became the desire4 ,he1 and not his gifts1 was the supreme good4 ,he was the fountain of life4 ,his likeness would satisfy4 ,in his light the faithful would see light4 ,but even more significant than any specific content put into the term life1 was what was involved in the idea itself4 ,the legalists had attempted to define conduct by a code1 but there was an inherent vitality in the ideal of life1 which refused to be measured or bounded4 ,the words of eternal life1 which began the new moral movement of ,christianity1 had perhaps little definite content to the fishermen1 and it is not easy to say just what they meant in moral terms to the writer of the ,fourth ,gospel who uses the phrase so often4 ,with ,paul1 life as the realm of the spirit gets definition as it stands over against the death of sin and lust4 ,but with all writers of ,old or ,new ,testament1 whatever content it had1 life meant above all the suggestion of something beyond1 the gleam and dynamic power of a future not yet understood4 ,it meant to ,paul a progress which was governed not by law or rudiments1 but by freedom4 ,such a life would set itself new and higher standards2 the laws and customs that had obtained were felt to be outgrown4 ,the significance of early ,christianity as a moral movement1 aside from its elements of personal devotion and social unity to be noticed below1 was the spirit of movement1 the sense of newly forming horizons beyond the old1 the conviction that as sons of ,god its followers had boundless possibilities1 that they were not the children of the bond woman1 but of the free4 #e4 ,the ,social ,ideal of ,justice1 ,love1 and ,peace4--,we have seen how this ideal was framed in the setting of a kingdom of ,god4 ,at first national1 it became universal1 and with a fraternity which the world is far from having realized1 it was to know neither ,jew nor ,greek1 bond nor free4 ,at first military1 it took on with seer and psalmist the form of a reign of peace and justice4 ,after the fierce and crude powers typified by the lion and the bear and the leopard had passed1 the seer saw a kingdom represented by a human form4 ,such a kingdom it was that should not pass away4 ,such was the kingdom not of this world which ,jesus presented as his message4 ,membership in this moral kingdom was for the poor in spirit1 the pure in heart1 the merciful1 the peace-makers1 the hungerers after righteousness4 ,greatness in this moral community was to depend on service1 not on power4 ,the king should not fail till he had set justice in the earth4 ,he should deliver the needy1 and the poor4 ,certain features of this ideal order have since found embodiment in social and political structures2 certain features remain for the future4 ,certain periods in history have transferred the ideal entirely to another world1 regarding human society as hopelessly given over to evil4 ,such theories find a morality possible only by renouncing society4 ,the ,hebrews presented rather the ideal of a moral order on earth1 of a control of all life by right1 of a realization of good1 and of a completeness of life4 ,it was an ideal not dreamed out in ecstatic visions of pure fancy1 but worked out in struggle and suffering1 in confidence that moral efforts are not hopeless or destined to defeat4 ,the ideal order is to be made real4 ,the divine kingdom is to come1 the divine will to be done on earth as it is in heaven4 ,,literature ,the works of ,w4 ,r4 ,smith 7,religion of the ,semites7 and ,barton 7,a ,sketch of ,semitic ,origins7 already mentioned4 ,schultz1 ,old ,testament ,theology1 tr4 #ahib2 ,marti1 ,religion of the ,old ,testament1 tr4 #aijg2 ,budde1 ,religion of the ,old ,testament to the ,exile1 #ahii2 ,h4 ,p4 ,smith1 ,old ,testament ,history1 #aijc2 ,w4 ,r4 ,smith1 ,the ,prophets of ,israel1 #ahie2 ,bruce1 ,ethics of the ,old ,testament1 #ahie2 ,peake1 ,problem of ,suffering in the ,old ,testament1 #aijd2 ,royce1 ,the ,problem of ,job in ,studies of ,good and ,evil1 #ahih2 ,pratt1 ,the ,psychology of ,religious ,belief1 #aijg1 ch4 v42 ,harnack1 ,what is ,christianity8 tr4 #aija2 ,cone1 ,rich and ,poor in the ,new ,testament1 #aijb2 ,pfleiderer1 ,primitive ,christianity1 tr4 #aijf2 ,matthews1 ,the ,social ,teaching of ,jesus1 #ahig2 ,wendt1 ,the ,teaching of ,jesus1 #ahii2 ,pfleiderer1 ,paulinism1 #ahia2 ,cone1 ,paul1 ,the ,man1 the ,missionary1 and the ,teacher1 #ahih2 ,beyschlag1 ,new ,testament ,theology1 tr4 #ahie2 ,the ,encyclopedia ,biblica1 ,the ,jewish ,encyclopedia1 and ,hastings' ,dictionary1 have numerous valuable articles4 ,,footnotes3 #dh ,m4 ,arnold1 ,hebraism and ,hellenism1 in ,culture and ,anarchy1 ch4 iv4 #di ,the ,hebrew and ,greek words for sin both mean to miss4 #ej ,the general function of punishment as bringing home to the individual the consciousness of guilt and thus awakening the action of conscience1 has an illustration in ,shakespere's conception of the prayer of ,henry ,vth before the battle of ,agincourt4 ,in ordinary life the bluff ,king ,harry devotes little time to meditation upon his own sin or that of his father1 but on the eve of possible calamity the old crime rises fresh before him4 ,stimulated by the thought of an actual penalty to be imposed by a recognized authority1 he cried3 ,not to-day1 ,o ,lord6 ,oh1 not to-day6 ,think not upon the fault my father made in compassing the crown4 #ea ,recent excavations are held to confirm the prophets on this 7,marti1 ,religion of the ,old ,testament1 pp4 #gh ff474 #eb ,job #bg3a-f4 #ec ,genung1 ,job1 ,the ,epic of the ,inner ,life4 #ed ,see ,atonement in ,literature and in ,life1 by ,charles ,a4 ,dinsmore4 ,boston1 #aijf4 #ee ,numbers #af1 ,joshua #g4 #ef ,john #i3b4 #eg ,hammurabi's code showed a disregard of intent which would make surgery a dangerous profession3 ,if a physician operate on a man for a severe wound with a bronze lancet and cause the man's death2 or open an abscess in the eye of a man with a bronze lancet and destroy the man's eye1 they shall cut off his fingers4 ,early ,german and ,english law is just as naive4 ,if a weapon was left to be repaired at a smith's and was then caught up or stolen and used to do harm1 the original owner was held responsible4 #eh ,numbers #ce1 ,deuteronomy #ai1 ,joshua #bj4 #ei ,mark #g3a-bc4 #fj ,hosea #b3e4 #fa ,h4 ,p4 ,smith1 ,old ,testament ,history1 p4 #bbb4 #fb ,habakkuk #c3ag1 #ah4 #fc ,the ,song of ,songs4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,the ,,moral ,,development ,,of ,,the ,,greeks ,sec4 #a4 ,,the ,,fundamental ,,notes ,convention versus ,nature4--,the ,hebrew moral life was developed under the relation1 first of the people1 then of the individuals1 to ,god1--a relation at once of union and of conflict4 ,it was out of the relation of the individual to social traditions and political order that the ,greek came to full consciousness of moral law on the one hand1 and a moral personality on the other4 ,and just as in ,jewish life the law and the prophets 7or1 later1 the law and the gospel7 stood for the conflicting forces1 so in ,greek life the opposition between the authority of the group1 embodied in custom and institutions1 on the one hand1 and the urging claims of developing personality1 manifest in both intelligence and desire1 on the other1 found expression in contrasted terms4 ,the authority of the group embodied in customs and institutions1 came to be regarded by the radicals as relatively external1 artificial1 and rigid4 ,it was dubbed convention1 or institution 7thesis1 what is set up74 ,the rapidly developing intelligence challenged the merely customary and traditional2 the increasing individuality challenged the superior authority of the group1 especially when this manifested itself apparently in a government of force4 ,personal intelligence and personal feeling asserted a more elemental claim1 felt themselves rooted in a more original source1 and called this source nature 7physis74 ,social tradition and authority1 individual reason and feeling1 thus confronted each other as convention and nature4 ,it was a struggle which has its analogy in the development of many a young man or young woman who is emerging from parental control to self-direction4 ,but in ,greek life more distinctly than elsewhere we see the steps of the process as a civic and not merely an individual development4 ,aeschylus1 ,sophocles1 and ,euripides presented this conflict of the individual with law or destiny as the great1 oft-repeated tragedy of human life4 ,aristophanes mocked with bitter satire the new views4 ,socrates1 ,plato1 ,aristotle1 ,cynics1 ,cyrenaics1 ,epicureans1 and ,stoics took part in the theoretical discussions4 ,measure4--,the fundamental note of all ,greek life1 before1 during1 and after this development1 was ,measure1 ,order1 ,proportion4 ,this note found expression in religion1 science1 art1 and conduct4 ,among their gods1 the ,greeks set ,moira1 ,destiny1 and ,themis1 ,custom1 ,law1 ,right4 ,they found order in the universe1 which on this account they called the cosmos4 ,they expressed it in their arts1 especially in architecture1 sculpture1 the choral dance1 and the more highly developed tragedy or lyric3 ,and all life is full of them of form and measure1 says ,plato1 as well as every constructive and creative art4 ,and surely the art of the painter and every other creative and constructive art are full of them1--weaving1 embroidery1 architecture1 and every kind of manufacture2 also nature1 animal and vegetable1--in all of them there is grace or the absence of grace2 and if our youth are to do their work in life1 must they not make these graces and harmonies their perpetual aim8 ,the best people1 the gentlemen1 were styled kaloika-gathoi--fair and good4 ,the motto at the ,delphic shrine was1 ,nothing in excess4 ,insolent disregard of propriety1 hybris1 was the quality most denounced by the early moralizing poets4 ,tityus1 ,tantalus1 and ,sisyphus1 the three special subjects of divine punishment1 suffered the penalty of insatiate desire1 or limits overstepped4 ,and after criticism and individualism had done their work1 ,plato's conception of justice1 ,aristotle's doctrine of the mean1 the ,stoic maxim of life according to nature1 have but discovered a deeper significance for the fundamental law of ,greek life4 ,the ,good and the ,just4--,the conceptions of the ,good and the ,just are developed from the two notes just presented4 ,the motive for challenge to established institutions was the awakening desire of the individual to seek his own good and to live his own life4 ,commerce was bringing a great variety of rewards to the shrewd merchant and a great variety of goods to evoke and gratify wants4 ,slavery set free the citizen from the need of manual labor and gave him leisure to cultivate his tastes4 ,the forces of individualism1 described in ,chapter ,v41 were all at work to bring the process and object of desire to consciousness4 ,moreover1 the term good was also in use to mark the popular ideal4 ,it was applied to what we should call the successful men of the day4 ,in present life our term good has become so definitely moral that probably most young persons would hesitate to say that they have it as their ideal to become good1 although few would hesitate to say that they wish to be capable and successful4 ,for social and political recognition seems to be based rather on achievement of striking results than upon what is technically called goodness4 ,but in ,greece moral goodness was not used to designate character as contrasted with results4 ,the good man was like the good lawyer or good athlete or good soldier1 the man who was efficient and conspicuous4 ,it was in the process which we are to trace that the ambiguities and deeper meanings of the term came to definition4 ,the terms ,just and ,justice were not of course merely synonyms for order and measure4 ,they had likewise the social significance coming from the courts and the assembly4 ,they stood for the control side of life1 as ,good stood for its aspect of valuation and desire4 ,but as compared with the ,hebrew conception of righteousness1 they meant much less a conformity to a law divine or human which had been already set up as standard1 and much more1 an ordering1 a regulating1 a harmonizing4 ,the rational element of measure or order was more prominent than the personal note of authority4 ,hence we shall find ,plato passing easily back and forth between justice or order in the individual and justice or order in the ,state4 ,on the other hand1 the radicals of the day could seize upon the legal usage and declare that ,justice or the ,law was purely a matter of self-interest or class interest4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,intellectual ,,forces ,,of ,,individualism ,the ,scientific ,spirit4--,the older standards were embodied in religious and political ideas and institutions2 the agency which was to disentangle and bring into clear consciousness the standards as such1 was the scientific spirit1 the knowledge and reflection of an intellectual people at a period of extraordinarily rapid development4 ,the commercial life1 the free intercourse with other peoples and civilizations1 especially in the colonies1 the absence of any generally dominating political authority1 the architectural problems suggested by a beauty-loving people1--all promoted alertness and flexibility of mind4 ,in a concrete form1 this rational character had already found expression in the quality of ,greek art4 ,reference has already been made to the formal side of ,greek art1 with its embodiment of rhythm and measure2 the subject-matter shows the same element4 ,the ,greek world1 as contrasted with the barbarian world1 was conceived by the ,greek as the realm of light contrasted with darkness2 the national ,god1 ,apollo1 embodied this ideal of light and reason1 and his fitting symbol was the sun4 ,the great ,pan-,athenaic procession1 as reproduced in the ,parthenon frieze1 celebrated the triumph of ,greek light and intelligence over barbarian darkness4 ,athena1 goddess of wisdom1 was a fitting guardian of the most ,greek of all ,greek cities4 ,greek tragedy1 beginning in hymns of worship1 soon passed over into a portrayal of the all-controlling laws of life1 as these are brought into stronger relief by a tragic collision with human agents4 ,it was1 however1 in the realm of science that this intellectual genius found field for expression in a clearly conscious manner4 ,almost all our sciences were originated by the ,greeks1 and they were particularly successful in those which called for abstract thinking in the highest degree4 ,euclid's geometry and ,aristotle's logic are conspicuous illustrations of this ability4 ,the most general conceptions of natural science3 e4g41 the conception of the atom and the whole materialistic theory of the universe2 the conception of evolution1 meaning by this the process of change according to an all-controlling law2 the conception of natural selection1 according to which those organisms survive which are fitted for their environment1--all these were the product of the keen intelligence of the ,greeks4 ,nor was their scientific ability expended upon external nature alone4 ,the conception of history as more than a series of events1 the comparative method in the study of political systems1 the analysis of literary and artistic effects1 attest the same clarity of mind and the same eager search for the most general laws of every aspect of experience4 ,science and ,religion4--,when1 now1 this scientific mind began to consider the practical guidance of life1 the older political and religious controls presented serious difficulty4 ,the gods were supposed to reward the good and punish the evil1#fd but how could this be reconciled with their practices8 ,aeschylus attempted a purifying and elevating of the divine ideal1 similar to that which ,israel's conception underwent in the work of the prophets4 ,he magnified the dignity and providential government of ,zeus1 which1 though dark1 is yet just and certain4 ,but the great obstacle was that the earlier and cruder conceptions of the gods had been fixed in literary form2 the tales of ,cronos's impiety to ,uranos1 of ,zeus' deceitful messenger and marital unfaithfulness1 of ,aphrodite's amours1 and ,hermes' gift of theft1 were all written in ,hesiod and ,homer4 ,the cruder conceptions of the gods had thus become too firmly fixed in the popular imagination to be capable of becoming the bearers of advancing ethical ideals1 and so not merely the irreverent scoffer1 but the serious tragedian1 ,euripides1 and the religious idealist1 ,plato1 do not hesitate to challenge boldly the older conceptions1 or to demand a revision of all this literature before it comes into the hands of the young4 ,social ,standards4--,the social standards of propriety and honorable conduct were likewise brought in question by advancing intelligence4 ,the word which summed up the early ,greek idea of the best type was ,kalokagathos4 ,this word was very nearly the equivalent of our ,english word gentleman4 ,it combined the elements of birth1 ability1 and refinement1 but in the earlier usage the emphasis was upon the fact of birth1 even as our terms generous1 noble1 gentle1 originally referred to membership in a gens4 ,socrates investigated the current estimates and found that the people who were generally regarded as the respectable1 or1 as we should say1 the best people of ,athens1 were not necessarily either fine or good in person or character2 the term had come to be one of convention1 without basis in reason4 ,plato goes still further and with a direct application of the rational standard to the current estimates1 pokes fun at the conventional judgment of what constitutes the respectable gentleman4 ,when they sing the praises of family and say that some one is a gentleman because he has had seven generations of wealthy ancestors1 he the philosopher thinks that their sentiments only betray the dullness and narrowness of vision of those who utter them1 and who are not educated enough to look at the whole1 nor to consider that every man has had thousands and thousands of progenitors1 and among them have been rich and poor1 kings and slaves1 ,hellenes and barbarians1 many times over4 ,and when some one boasts of a catalogue of twenty-five ancestors1 and goes back to ,heracles1 the son of ,amphitryon1 he cannot understand his poverty of ideas4 ,why is he unable to calculate that ,amphitryon had a twenty-fifth ancestor1 who might have been anybody1 and was such as fortune made him1 and he had a fiftieth1 and so on8 ,he is amused at the notion that he cannot do a sum1 and thinks that a little arithmetic would have got rid of his senseless vanity4 ,the type of life that is really noble or fine and good is to be found in the seeker for true beauty and goodness4 ,external beauty of form and appearance has its value in kindling the desire for the higher forms of beauty1--beauty of mind1 of institutions and laws1 of science1--until finally the conception of the true beauty is reached4 ,this true beauty1 as distinct from the particular beauties1 and true good1 as distinct from seeming or partial good1 are discovered only by the philosopher1 the seeker for wisdom4 ,popular ,morals4--,nor did the more positively recognized types of moral excellence fare better4 ,as recognized in common life1 they were courage1 prudence or moderation1 holiness or a certain respect for the serious things of life1 and justice3 but none of these1 ,plato argues1 is really an independent excellence1 apart from conscious and intelligent action4 ,courage1 for example1 is not really courage unless one knows and foresees the danger in all its strength2 otherwise there is merely reckless bravery4 ,prudence or moderation1 to be really excellent1 must be measured by wisdom4 ,even justice cannot be regarded as at bottom distinct from wisdom1 the true measure of all the relations of life4 ,science and the ,laws4--,the political control was likewise involved in question by the same forces of intelligence which had challenged the religious authority4 ,the frequent changes of government1 and the more or less arbitrary measures that were oftentimes adopted1 were adapted to awaken doubt as to the absolute right and authority of the laws4 ,the despot who gained control in many a ,greek city was not bound by ties of blood to all members of the community1 nor did he govern in accordance with the ancestral traditions of the tribe4 ,the political authority frequently clashed with the instincts and traditions of family and kinship4 ,under such circumstances1 the political authority was likely to be challenged and its constraining power stretched to the breaking point4 ,so in the ,antigone of ,sophocles1 the command of the ruler is opposed to the higher law of kinship and nature4 ,the law of man is not the law of nature or of ,god4 ,to disobey this conventional law of man is to be guilty of holiest crime4 ,the old standards1 both of religion and of political life1 crumbled before the analysis of the developing intelligence1 and the demand for some standard could be met only by the intelligence itself4 ,to question the old must inevitably seem irreverent and anarchical4 ,some questioned merely to doubt2 others1 and of these ,socrates was the leader1 questioned in order to find a firmer basis1 a more authoritative standard4 ,but naturally the popular mind did not distinguish between these two classes of questioners1 and so ,socrates perished1 not merely as the victim of unjust popular calumny1 but as the victim of the tragedy of moral progress1 of the change from the established to the new4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,commercial ,,and ,,political ,,individualism ,a further line of development joined forces with this growth of intelligence1 to emphasize the problem of moral control1 and to set the individual with his standards over against the objective standards of society4 ,this was the rapidly growing consciousness of individual goods and interests4 ,the commercial life1 with its possibilities of individual property1 the rapid changes of political life1 with the rise of individuals to power and privilege1 the increasing opportunities which a high civilization brought both men and women for personal enjoyment and gratification of rapidly increasing wants1 all tended to make the individual seek his own good1 and to shift the emphasis of life from the question1 ,what is proper1 or honorable8 to the question1 ,what is good--good for me8 ,class ,interests4--,the conviction that the authority of government and law was largely dictated by the very considerations of private interests which they were supposed to overrule and eliminate1 made the situation more acute4 ,for the ,greek ,states were no longer groups with common interests4 ,the growth of capital1 the corresponding eagerness for gain1 the formation of distinct classes1 each intent on its interests1 supplanted the older1 more homogeneous ,state4 ,the whole development of the political life of the ,hellenic republics depended ultimately on the decision of the question1 which of the different social classes--the capitalistic minority1 the middle class1 or the poor--should obtain the dominant place4 ,aristotle defines an oligarchy as a ,state governed in the interest of the rich2 a democracy1 as a ,state governed in the interest of the poor4 ,another contemporary writer explains a democracy as consulting the interests of the democrats1 the lower classes1 and considers this a matter of course1 for if the rich had the say1 they would do what was good for themselves but not for the multitude4 ,naturally such dominance by classes called out vigorous criticisms upon the laws and standards so established4 ,the aristocratic minority inveighed against custom or conventions which would tame the strong to the level of the weak4 ,nature demands rather the survival of the fittest1 i4e41 of the strong4 ,the enlightened spectator of the game of government1 on the other hand1 declares that all laws are made in the interest of ruling classes4 ,the reader of current criticisms on laws and courts will see how close is the parallel to present complaints4 ,we have to-day the same two classes3 ,one inveighs against governmental interference with the right to combine1 to contract1 and in general to get from the earth or from men1 women1 and children all that superior power and shrewdness can possibly extract4 ,the other complains that legislatures are owned by wealth1 that judges are appointed from corporation lawyers1 that common law is a survival of ancient aristocratic status1 and that for these reasons labor can get no justice4 ,let us first hear the plea for inequality3 ,custom and nature are generally at variance with one another2 444 for by the rule of nature1 that only is the more disgraceful which is the greater evil2 as1 for example1 to suffer injustice2 but by the rule of custom1 to do evil is the more disgraceful4 ,for this suffering of injustice is not the part of a man1 but of a slave1 who indeed had better die than live2 for when he is wronged and trampled upon1 he is unable to help himself or any other about whom he cares4 ,the reason1 as ,i conceive1 is that the makers of laws are the many weak2 and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to themselves and their own interests2 and they terrify the mightier sort of men1 and those who are able to get the better of them1 in order that they may not get the better of them2 and they say that dishonesty is shameful and unjust2 meanwhile1 when they speak of injustice1 they desire to have more than their neighbors1 for knowing their own inferiority1 they are only too glad of equality4 ,and therefore1 this seeking to have more than the many is conventionally said to be shameful and unjust1 and is called injustice1 whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse1 the more powerful than the weaker2 and in many ways she shows1 among men as well as among animals1 and indeed among whole cities and races1 that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior4 ,for on what principle of justice did ,xerxes invade ,hellas1 or his father the ,scythians8 7not to speak of numberless other examples74 ,they1 ,i conceive1 act according to nature2 yes1 and according to the law of nature2 not perhaps1 according to that artificial law which we frame and fashion1 taking the best and strongest of us from their youth upwards1 and taming them like young lions1 and charming them with the sound of the voice1 saying to them that with equality they must be content1 and that this is the honorable and the just4 ,but if there were a man who had sufficient force1 he would shake off and break through and escape from all this2 he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and charms1 and all our laws1 sinning against nature2 the slave would rise in rebellion and be lord over us1 and the light of natural justice would shine forth4 ,and this ,i take to be the lesson of ,pindar1 in the poem in which he says that ',law is the ,king of all1 mortals as well as immortals6' ,this1 as he says3 ',makes might to be right1 and does violence with exalted hand2 as ,i infer from the deeds of ,heracles1 for without buying them----' ,i do not remember the exact words1 but the meaning is1 that he carried off the oxen of ,geryon without buying them1 and without their being given to him by ,geryon1 according to the law of natural right1 and that the oxen and other possessions of the weaker and inferior properly belong to the stronger and superior4 7,,plato1 ,gorgias1 #dhb-d47 ,the essence of this view is1 therefore1 that might is right1 and that no legislation or conventional code ought to stand in the way of the free assertion of genius and power4 ,it is similar to the teaching of ,nietzsche in recent times4 ,but the other side had its complaint also4 ,the laws are made by the shepherds of the people1 as ,homer called them4 ,but who is now so simple as to suppose that the shepherds fatten or tend the sheep with a view to the good of the sheep1 and not to their own good8 ,all laws and governments really exist for the interest of the ruling class4#fe ,they rest upon convention or institution1 not upon nature4 ,why ,obey ,laws8--,and if laws and social codes are but class legislation1 conventional1 why obey them8 ,the older ,greek life had felt the motives described in ,chapter ,,iv41 though it had embodied them in symbolism and imagery4 ,the ,nemesis that followed the guilty1 the ,erinnys1 or avenging goddesses1 were the personified wrath of outraged law2 aidos1 respect or reverence1 aischyne1 regard for public opinion1 were the inner feelings4 ,but with the advancing tide of intellectual criticism and individual interest1 these sanctions were discredited2 feelings of personal enjoyment demanded recognition1 and the moralists at first appealed to this4 ,parents and tutors are always telling their sons and their wards that they are to be just2 but only not for the sake of justice1 but for the sake of character and reputation4 ,but if the only reason for justice is reputation1 there might seem to be no sufficient reason for taking the thorny path1 if there be an easier4 ,will not the youth say1 in the words of ,pindar3 ,can ,i by justice1 or by crooked ways of deceit1 ascend a loftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my days8#ff ,and if ,i decide that the crooked way is the easier1 why shall ,i not follow it8 ,my party1 or my union1 or my lawyer will stand by and see me through3 ,but ,i hear some one exclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is often difficult2 to which ,i answer1 ,nothing great is easy4 ,nevertheless1 the argument indicates this1 if we would be happy1 to be the path along which we should proceed4 ,with a view to concealment we will establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs4 ,and there are professors of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies2 and so1 partly by persuasion and partly by force1 ,i shall make unlawful gains and not be punished4 ,still ,i hear a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived1 neither can they be compelled4 ,but what if there are no gods8 or1 suppose them to have no care of human things1 why in either case should we mind about concealment8#fg ,besides1 the greatest prizes1 not only in material goods1 but even in the line of reputation1 seemed to fall to the individualist if he could only act on a sufficiently large scale4 ,he could then be both prosperous and respectable4 ,if he could steal the government1 or1 in modern phrase1 bribe a legislature to elect him to ,congress1 pass special legislation1 or grant a franchise1 he could not merely escape punishment1 but be honored by his fellows4 ,i am speaking of injustice on a large scale1 in which the advantage of the unjust is most apparent1 and my meaning will be most clearly seen in that highest form of injustice1 the perpetrator of which is the happiest of men1 as the sufferers of these who refuse to do injustice are the most miserable--,i mean tyranny which by fraud and force takes away the property of others1 not retail but wholesale2 comprehending in one things sacred as well as profane1 private and public1 for any one of which acts of wrong1 if he were detected perpetrating them singly1 he would be punished and incur great dishonor2 for they who are guilty of any of these crimes in single instances are called robbers of temples and man-stealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves4 ,but when a man has taken away the money of the citizens and made slaves of them1 then instead of these dishonorable names1 he is called happy and blessed1 not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of injustice4 ,for injustice is censured because the censurers are afraid of suffering1 and not from any fear which they have of doing injustice4 ,and thus1 as ,i have shown1 ,socrates1 injustice1 when on a sufficient scale1 has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice2 and1 as ,i said at first1 justice is the interest of the stronger1 whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest4#fh ,sec4 #d4 ,,individualism ,,and ,,ethical ,,theory ,the ,question ,formulated4--,the outcome of this first movement was thus twofold3 7a7 ,it forced the questions1 ,what is just8 ,what is good8 into clear and definite consciousness4 ,the very necessity of comparison and of getting a general standard1 forced the inquirer to disentangle the concepts previously embodied in customs and laws4 ,but when the essence was thus found and freed1 or disembodied1 as it were1 the custom seemed lifeless1 merely convention1 and the essence often quite opposed to the form4 7b7 ,it emphasized the personal interest1 the affective or emotional side of conduct1 and made the moral problem take the form1 ,what is the good8 ,furthermore1 two positive theses have been established by the very forces which have been active in disintegrating the old status4 ,if custom no longer suffices1 then reason must set the standard2 if society cannot prescribe the good to the individual1 then the individual must find some method of defining and seeking it for himself unless he is to make shipwreck of his whole venture4 ,we may bring both aspects of the problem under the conception of nature1 as opposed to convention or institution4 ,convention is indeed outgrown1 nature is the imperious authority4 ,but granting that nature is rightful master1 is nature to be sought in the primitive beginnings1 or in the fullest development8 in a life of isolation1 or in a life of society8 in the desires and passions1 or in reason and a harmonious life8 ,or1 stating the same problem otherwise3 granting that reason must fix the measure1 and the individual must define and seek the good for himself1 is the good to be found in isolation1 or is it to be sought in human society with its bonds of family1 friendship1 and justice8 ,is the end to be pleasure1 found in the gratification of desires1 irrespective of their quality1 and is it the business of reason merely to measure one gratification with another and get the most8 or is wisdom itself a good1 and is it better to satisfy certain impulses rather than others8 i4e41 shall reason form the standard as well as apply it8 ,these contrasting solutions of the problem of life may be stated then under the two pairs of antitheses3 7#a7 ,the ,individual versus the ,social2 7#b7 ,the ,immediate ,satisfaction versus an ,ideal ,standard1 at once higher and more permanent4 ,typical ,solutions4--,poets1 radicals1 sensualists1 individualists of no philosophic school1 as well as the historic philosophic schools1 contributed to the discussion and solution of these problems4 ,all sought the natural life2 but it is noteworthy that all the philosophic schools claimed ,socrates as their master1 and all sought to justify their answers by reason1 all made the wise man the ideal4 ,the ,cynics and ,cyrenaics1 ,stoics and ,epicureans1 ,plato and ,aristotle represent the various philosophic answers to these alternatives4 ,cynics and ,cyrenaics both answer 7#a7 by individualism1 but diverge on 7#b71 the ,cynics placing emphasis on independence from wants1 the ,cyrenaics on gratification of wants4 ,stoics and ,epicureans represent broader and more social development of the same principles1 the ,stoics seeking a cosmopolitan state1 the ,epicureans a community of friends2 the ,stoics emphasizing reason or wisdom as the only good2 the ,epicureans finding for wisdom a field in the selection of refined pleasures4 ,plato and ,aristotle1 with varying emphasis but essential agreement1 insist 7#a7 that the good of man is found in fulfilling completely his highest possible functions1 which is possible only in society2 7#b7 that wisdom is not merely to apply a standard but to form one2 that while neither reason alone nor feeling alone is enough for life1 yet that pleasure is rather for life than life for pleasure4 ,finally1 ,plato1 ,aristotle and the ,stoics1 as well as the tragic poets1 contribute successively to the formation of an ideal of responsible character4 ,early ,individualistic ,theories4--,cynics and ,cyrenaics were alike individualists4 ,society1 they held1 is artificial4 ,its so-called goods1 on the one hand1 and its restrictions on the other1 are to be rejected unless they favor the individual's happiness4 ,independence was the mark of wisdom among the ,cynics2 ,antisthenes1 proud of the holes in his garment2 ,diogenes1 dwelling in his tent or sleeping in the street1 scoffing at the current conventions of decency1 asking from ,philip only that he would get out of his sunshine--are the characteristic figures4 ,the state of nature was opposed to the ,state4 ,only the primitive wants were recognized as natural4 ,art and science1 family and native land1 were indifferent4 ,wealth and refinement1 fame and honor1 seemed as superfluous as those enjoyments of the senses which went beyond the satisfaction of the natural wants of hunger and sex4 ,the ,cyrenaics1 or hedonists 7hedone1 pleasure71 gave a different turn to wisdom4 ,the good is pleasure1 and wisdom is found in that prudence which selects the purest and most intense4 ,hence1 if this is the good1 why should a man trouble himself about social standards or social obligations8 ,the hedonists gladly shared the refinement of enjoyment which civilization brought with it2 they found it convenient and permissible that the intelligent man should enjoy the honey which others prepared2 but no feeling of duty or thankfulness bound them to the civilization whose fruits they enjoyed4 ,sacrifice for others1 patriotism1 and devotion to a general object1 ,theodorus declared to be a form of foolishness which it did not become the wise man to share4#fi ,sec4 #e4 ,,the ,,deeper ,,view ,,of ,,nature ,,and ,,the ,,good2 ,,of ,,the ,,individual ,,and ,,the ,,social ,,order ,value of a ,state4--,plato and ,aristotle take up boldly the challenge of individualism4 ,it may indeed be granted that existing states are too often ruled by classes4 ,there are oligarchies in which the soldier or the rich control for their own interests2 there are tyrannies in which the despot is greed and force personified2 there are democracies 7,plato was an aristocrat7 in which the mob bears rule1 and those who flatter and feed its passions are in authority4 ,but all these do but serve to bring out more clearly the conception of a true ,state1 in which the rule is by the wisest and best and is not for the interest of a class1 but for the welfare of all4 ,even as it was1 the ,state of ,athens in ,plato's day--except when it condemned a ,socrates--meant completeness and freedom of life4 ,it represented not merely a police force to protect the individual1 but stood for the complete organization of all the life which needs cooperation and mutual support4 ,the ,state provided instruction for the mind and training for the body4 ,it surrounded the citizen with an atmosphere of beauty and provided in the tragedy and comedy opportunities for every citizen to consider the larger significance of life or to join in the contagious sympathy of mirth4 ,in festivals and solemn processions it brought the citizen into unity of religious feeling4 ,to be an ,athenian citizen meant to share in all the higher possibilities which life afforded4 ,interpreting this life1 ,aristotle proclaims that it is not in isolation1 but in the ,state1 that the goal of full independence may be said to be first attained4 ,the ,natural4--,aristotle goes directly to the heart of the problem as to what is natural by asserting that nature is not to be found in the crude beginning1 but rather in the complete development4 ,the nature of anything1 e4g41 of a man1 a horse1 or a house1 may be defined to be its condition when the process of production is complete4 ,hence the ,state in which alone completeness of life is attained is in the highest sense natural3 ,the object proposed or the complete development of a thing is its highest good2 but independence which is first attained in the ,state is a complete development or the highest good and is therefore natural4 ,for as the ,state was formed to make life possible1 so it exists to make life good4 ,thus we see that the ,state is a natural institution1 that man is naturally a political animal and that one who is not a citizen of any ,state1 if the cause of his isolation be natural and not accidental1 is either a superhuman being or low in the scale of human civilization1 as he stands alone like a 'blot' on the backgammon board4 ,the 'clanless1 lawless1 hearthless man1' so bitterly described by ,homer1 is a case in point1 for he is naturally a citizen of no state and a lover of war4#gj ,nor does ,aristotle stop here4 ,with a profound insight into the relation of man to society1 and the dependence of the individual upon the social body1 a relation which modern social psychology has worked out in greater detail1 ,aristotle asserts that the ,state is not merely the goal of the individual's development1 but the source of his life4 ,again1 in the order of nature the ,state is prior to the household or individual4 ,for the whole must needs be prior to its part4 ,for instance1 if you take away the body which is the whole1 there will not remain any such thing as a hand or foot1 unless we use the same word in a different sense1 as when we speak of a stone hand as a hand4 ,for a hand separated from the body will be a disabled hand2 whereas it is the faculty or function of a thing which makes it what it is1 and therefore when things lose their function or faculty1 it is not correct to call them the same things1 but rather homonymous1 i4e41 different things having the same name4 ,we see1 then1 the ,state is a natural institution1 and also that it is prior to the individual4 ,for if the individual as a separate unit is not independent1 he must be a part and must bear the same relation to the ,state as the other parts to their wholes2 and one who is incapable of association with others or is independent and has no need of such association1 is no member of a ,state2 in other words1 he is either a brute or a ,god4#ga ,and1 moreover1 when we look into the nature of the individual1 we do not find him a being devoid of the sympathies and qualities which find their natural expression not only in the ,state1 but in various social and friendly relations4 ,there is an impulse toward the life in common 7,greek3 philia7 which expresses itself in friendship1 but which is also so essential to that recognition of others called justice that we may say it is the most just of all just things4 ,there is also a unity of disposition and purpose 7,greek3 omonoia7 which may be called political friendship4#gb ,plato's ,ideal ,state4--,how then is the ,state constituted and governed which is to provide for man's full development1 his complete good8 ,evidently two principles must control4 ,in the first place1 it must be so constituted that every man may develop in it the full capacities of his nature1 and thereby serve at once the perfection of the ,state and his own completeness2 and in the second place1 the ,state or social whole must be ruled by those best fitted for this work4 ,not the soldier1 nor the plutocrat1 nor the artisan1 but the man who knows1 is the suitable ruler for our ideal community4 ,the soldier may defend1 the artisan may support1 but the scientific or intelligent man should rule4 ,and it is evident that in settling this principle1 we have also answered our first problem2 for the soldier and the artisan will find his full development by doing the work which he can do well1 not by meddling with a task in which he must necessarily fail4 ,in order to guard against the greed which was so characteristic of the governments of his day1 ,plato would provide that the rulers and warriors should have no private property1 and not even private families4 ,their eye should be single to the good of the whole4 ,when asked as to the practicability of a ,state governed by such disinterested rulers1 and with such wisdom1 he admits indeed its difficulty1 but he stoutly demands its necessity3 ,until philosophers are kings1 or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy1 and political greatness and wisdom meet in one1 and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside1 cities will never have rest from their evils1--no1 nor the human race1 as ,i believe1--and then only will this our ,state have a possibility of life and behold the light of day4#gc ,and yet the question of the actual existence of a perfect ,state is not the question of supreme importance4 ,for ,plato has grasped the thought that man is controlled not only by what he sees1 but by what he images as desirable4 ,and if a man has once formed the image of an ideal ,state or city of this kind1 in which justice prevails1 and life reaches fuller and higher possibilities than it has yet attained1 this is the main thing3 ,in heaven1 there is laid up a pattern of it1 methinks1 which he who desires may behold1 and beholding1 may set his own house in order4 ,but whether such an one exists1 or ever will exist in fact1 is no matter3 for he will live after the manner of that city1 having nothing to do with any other4#gd ,the ,social as ,law of ,nature4--,the social nature of man1 thus vindicated by ,plato and ,aristotle1 remained as the permanent possession of ,greek thought4 ,even the ,epicureans1 who developed further the hedonistic theory of life1 emphasized the values of friendship as among the choicest and most refined sources of pleasure4 ,the ,stoics1 who in their independence of wants took up the tradition of the ,cynics1 were yet far from interpreting this as an independence of society4 ,the disintegration of the ,greek states made it impossible to find the social body in the old city-state1 and so we find with the ,stoics a certain cosmopolitanism4 ,it is the highest glory of man to be a citizen not of ,athens but of the universe1--not of the city of ,cecrops1 but of the city of ,zeus4 ,and through this conception the social nature of man was made the basis of a natural law1 which found its expression in the principles of ,roman and modern jurisprudence4 ,passion or ,reason4--,in answering the question as to the true nature of man1 ,plato and ,aristotle found the suggestions likewise for the problem of individual good4 ,for if the soldier as the seeker for fame and honor1 the avaricious man embodying the desire for wealth1 and still more1 the tyrant personifying the unbridled expression of every lust and passion1 are abhorrent1 is it not easy to see that an orderly and harmonious development of impulses under the guidance and control of reason1 is far better than that uncramped expression of desires and cravings for which some of the radical individualists and sensualists of the day were clamoring8 ,as representative of this class1 hear ,callicles3 ,i plainly assert that he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost1 and not to chastise them2 but when they have grown to their greatest1 he should have courage and intelligence to minister to them and to satisfy all his longings4 ,and this ,i affirm to be natural justice and nobility4 ,the temperate man is a fool4 ,it is only in hungering and eating1 in thirsting and drinking1 in having all his desires about him1 and gratifying every possible desire1 that man lives happily4#ge ,but even ,callicles himself admits that there are certain men1 the creatures of degraded desire1 whose lives are not ideal1 and hence that there must be some choice of pleasure4 ,and carrying out in the individual life the thought above suggested by the ,state1 ,plato raises the question as to whether man1 a complex being1 with both noble and ignoble impulses1 and with the capacity of controlling reason1 can be said to make a wise choice if he lets the passions run riot and choke out wholly his rational nature3 ,is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man1 or rather to the god in man2 and the ignoble that which subjects the man to the beast8 ,he can hardly avoid admitting this1--can he now8 ,not if he has any regard for my opinion4 ,but1 if he admits this1 we may ask him another question3 ,how would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst8 ,who can imagine that a man who sold his son or daughter into slavery for money1 especially if he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil men1 would be the gainer1 however large might be the sum which he received8 ,and will any one say that he is not a miserable caitiff who sells his own divine being to that which is most atheistical and detestable and has no pity8 ,eriphyle took the necklace as the price of her husband's life1 but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse ruin4#gf ,necessity of a ,standard for ,pleasure4--,if1 for the moment1 we rule out the question of what is noble or kalon1 and admit that the aim of life is to live pleasantly1 or if1 in other words1 it is urged as above that justice is not profitable and that hence he who would seek the highest good will seek it by some other than the thorny path1 we must recognize that the decision as to which kind of pleasure is preferable will depend on the character of the man who judges3 ,then we may assume that there are three classes of men1--lovers of wisdom1 lovers of ambition1 lovers of gain8 ,exactly4 ,and there are three kinds of pleasure1 which are their several objects8 ,very true4 ,now1 if you examine the three classes and ask of them in turn which of their lives is pleasantest1 each of them will be found praising his own and deprecating that of others2 the money-maker will contrast the vanity of honor or of learning with the solid advantages of gold and silver8 ,true1 he said4 ,and the lover of honor1--what will be his opinion8 ,will he not think that the pleasure of riches is vulgar1 while the pleasure of learning1 which has no need of honor1 he regards as all smoke and nonsense8 ,true1 he said4 ,but may we not suppose1 ,i said1 that philosophy estimates other pleasures as nothing in comparison with knowing the truth1 and in that abiding1 ever learning1 in the pursuit of truth1 not far indeed from the heaven of pleasure8 ,the other pleasures the philosopher disparages by calling them necessary1 meaning that if there were no necessity for them1 he would not have them4 ,there ought to be no doubt about that1 he replied4 ,since1 then1 the pleasure of each class and the life of each is in dispute1 and the question is not which life is most honorable1 or better or worse1 but which is the more pleasant or painless1--how shall we know8 ,i cannot tell1 he said4 ,well1 but what ought to be the criterion8 ,is any better than experience and wisdom and reason8 ,there cannot be a better1 he said4 ,if wealth and gain were the criterion1 then what the lover of gain praised and blamed would surely be the truest8 ,assuredly4 ,of if honor or victory or courage1 in that case the ambitions or contentments would decide best8 ,clearly4 ,but since experience and wisdom and reason are the judges1 the inference of course is1 that the truest pleasures are those which are approved by the lover of wisdom and reason4#gg ,it is thus evident that even if we start out to find the good in pleasure1 we need some kind of measuring art4 ,we need a standard for pleasure1 and this standard can be found only in wisdom4 ,and this forces us to maintain that wisdom is after all the good4 ,not merely intellectual attainment--a life of intellect without feeling would be just as little a true human life as would the life of an oyster1 which has feeling with no intelligence4 ,a life which includes sciences and arts1 and the pure pleasures of beauty1 presided over by wisdom and measure and symmetry1--this is ,plato's vision of the life of the individual1 viewed from within4 ,eudaemonism4--,aristotle's conception of the good is fundamentally the same4 ,it is a full development of man's capacities1 culminating in a rational and harmonious life4 ,if1 says ,aristotle1 we are to find the ultimate good1 we must try to find1 if possible1 some one end which is pursued as an end in itself1 and never as a means to something else1 and the most general term for this final end is eudaimonia1 or well-being1 for we also choose it for itself and never for the sake of something else4 ,what is the essence of well-being8 ,this1 according to ,aristotle1 is to be found by asking what is the function of man4 ,the life of nutrition and growth man has in common with the plants2 the life of sense in common with the animal4 ,it is in the life of his rational nature that we must find his especial function4 ,the good of man is exercise of his faculties in accordance with their appropriate excellence4 ,external goods are valuable because they may be instruments toward such full activity4 ,pleasure is to be valued because it perfects the activities1 and therefore perfects life1 which is the aim of human desire--rather than valued as an end in itself4 ,no one would choose to live on condition of having a child's intellect all his life1 though he were to enjoy in the highest possible degree all the pleasures of a child4#gh ,the ,mean4--,the crowning importance of wisdom as the rational measure of the ideal life is also illustrated in ,aristotle's theory of excellence 7or virtue7 as a mean4 ,this phrase is somewhat ambiguous1 for some passages would seem to indicate that it is merely striking an average between two kinds of excesses1 and finding1 as it were1 a moderate amount of feeling or action2 but there is evidently involved here just the old thought of measure1 and the mean is what right reason prescribes4 ,it is not every one who can find the mean1 but only he who has the requisite knowledge4 ,the supreme excellence or virtue is1 therefore1 the wisdom which can find the true standard for action4#gi ,the ,wise ,man4--,finally the conception of virtue as wisdom is illustrated in the ideals of the three prominent schools in later ,greek thought1--the ,sceptics1 ,epicureans1 and ,stoics4 ,the wise man among ,sceptics is he who suspends judgment where it is impossible to be certain4 ,the wise man among ,epicureans is he who chooses the finest and surest and most lasting pleasures4 ,the wise man among ,stoics is he who overcomes his emotions4 ,but in every case the ideal is expressed in the same phrase1 the wise man4 ,man and the ,cosmos4--,we see thus how ,greek thought1 starting out to challenge all society's laws and standards and bring them to the bar of knowledge1 has found a deeper value and higher validity in the true social and moral order4 ,the appeal was to the ,caesar of reason1 and reason taken in its full significance carries us beyond the immediate and transient to the broader and more permanent good4 ,nor can reason in its search for good be content1 urges ,plato1 with the superficial facts of life and society4 ,he who would find and achieve his complete function1 his full development1 must broaden his horizon still further4 ,as his own particular life is but a part of the ongoing of the larger world1 whose forces act upon him1 limit him1 and determine his possibilities1 it becomes absolutely necessary to study not merely his own end and purpose1 but the end and purpose of the universe4 ,human good requires us to know the larger good1 the ,good1 in the full and complete sense4 ,and this perfect ,good which is1 in truth1 the very essence of the universe1 is but another term for ,god1 and ,plato often uses the two as interchangeable terms4 ,so the ,nature which ,greek life was seeking gets its deepest significance and reinterprets the old religious demand for unity of the life of man with the forces of the unseen4 ,and the ,stoic later1 in his maxim ,follow ,nature1 gives more explicit recognition to the return of the circle4 ,for the great work of ,greek science had brought out into complete clearness the idea of ,nature as a system of law4 ,the universe is a rational universe1 a cosmos1 and man1 as above all else a rational being1 finds thus his kinship to the universe4 ,to follow ,nature1 therefore1 means to know the all-pervading law of ,nature and submit to it in calm acceptance or resignation4 ,all is harmonious to me that is harmonious to thee1 ,o universe2 all is fruit to me which thy seasons bring4#hj ,sec4 #f4 ,,the ,,conception ,,of ,,the ,,ideal ,contrast of ,actual and ,ideal4--,the two stages of ,greek thought which we have sketched did more than to readjust ,greek life to deeper views of the ,state and the individual2 of the good and of nature4 ,the very challenge and process brought into explicit consciousness a new feature of the moral life1 which is fundamental to true moral consciousness1 viz41 the factor of contrast between the actual and the ideal4 ,we have seen that the clash of one-sided interests and political institutions and1 in the case of ,plato1 the tragic execution of ,socrates1 obliged ,plato and ,aristotle to admit that the actual ,state did not subserve the real purpose which they were forced to seek in social organization4 ,both ,plato and ,aristotle1 therefore1 draw the picture of a ,state that should serve the complete purposes of human development4 ,and again1 in the individual life1 both the conception of the development of man's highest possibilities and the conception of a measure or standard for the conflicting desires and purposes lead on to a conception which shall embody not merely the existing status but the goal of yet unrealized purpose4 ,the ,ideal as the ,true ,reality4--,various qualities and aspirations are embodied by ,plato in this conception1 and with characteristic ,greek genius he has given to this conception of the ideal almost as concrete and definite a form as the ,greek sculptor of ,apollo gave to his ideal of light and clarity1 or the sculptor of ,aphrodite to the conception of grace4 ,as contrasted with the flux of transient emotions1 or the uncertain play of half-comprehended or futile goods1 this ideal good is conceived as eternal1 unchanging1 ever the same4 ,it is superhuman and divine4 ,as contrasted with various particular and partial goods on which the sons of men fix their affections1 it is the one universal good which is valid for all men everywhere and forever4 ,in his effort to find suitable imagery for this conception1 ,plato was aided by the religious conceptions of the ,orphic and ,pythagorean societies1 which had emphasized the pre-existence and future existence of the soul1 and its distinction from the body4 ,in its previous life1 said ,plato1 the soul has had visions of a beauty1 a truth1 and a goodness of which this life affords no adequate examples4 ,and with this memory within it of what it has looked upon before1 it judges the imperfect and finite goods of this present world and longs to fly away again and be with ,god4 ,this thought of contrast between ideal and actual1 to which ,plato in some of his writings gave the turn of a contrast between soul and body1 passed on with increased emphasis into ,stoic and later ,platonist schools1 and furnished a philosophic basis for the dualism and asceticism which is found in ,hellenistic and mediaeval morality4 ,ethical ,significance4--,while the true ethical contrast between the actual and the ideal was thus shifted over into a metaphysical contrast between soul and body1 or between what is fixed and what is changing1 the fundamental thought is highly significant1 for it merely symbolizes in objective form the characteristic of every moral judgment1 viz41 the testing and valuing of an act by some standard1 and what is even more important1 the forming of a standard by which to do the testing4 ,even ,aristotle1 who is frequently regarded as the mere describer of what is1 rather than the idealistic portrayer of what ought to be1 is no less insistent upon the significance of the ideal4 ,in fact1 his isolation of reflection or theoria from the civic virtues was used by the mediaeval church in its idealization of the contemplative life4 ,like ,plato1 he conceives the ideal as a divine element in human nature3 ,nevertheless1 instead of listening to those who advise us as men and mortals not to lift our thoughts above what is human and mortal1 we ought rather1 as far as possible1 to put off our mortality and make every effort to live in the exercise of the highest of our faculties2 for though it be but a small part of us1 yet in power and value it far surpasses all the rest4#ha ,sec4 #g4 ,,the ,,conception ,,of ,,the ,,self2 ,,of ,,character ,,and ,,responsibility ,the ,poets4--,out of the fierce competition of individual desires1 the clashing of individual ambitions1 the conflict between the individual and the state1 and the deepening of the conception of the individual's nature1 emerged also another conception of fundamental importance for the more highly developed reflective moral life1 viz41 that of the moral personality1 its character and its responsibility4 ,we may trace the development of this conception through the poets1 as well as in the philosophers4 ,aeschylus set man over against the gods1 subject to their divine laws1 but gave little play to human character or conscious self-direction4 ,with ,sophocles1 the tragic situation was brought more directly into the field of human character1 although the conception of destiny and the limitations marked thereby were still the dominant note4 ,with ,euripides1 human emotions and character are brought into the foreground4 ,stout-heartedness1 the high spirit that can endure in suffering or triumph in death1 which shows not merely in his heroes but in the women1 ,polyxena and ,medea1 ,phaedra and ,iphigenia1 evinces the growing consciousness of the self--a consciousness which will find further development in the proud and self-sufficient endurance of the ,stoic4 ,in more directly ethical lines1 we find increasing recognition of the self in the motives which are set up for human action1 and in the view which is formed of human character4 ,conscience in the earlier poets and moralists1 was largely a compound of ,nemesis1 the external messenger and symbol of divine penalty1 on the one hand1 and ,aidos1 the sense of respect or reverence for public opinion and for the higher authority of the gods1 on the other4 ,but already in the tragedians we find suggestions of a more intimate and personal conception4 ,pains sent by ,zeus in dreams may lead the individual to meditate1 and thus to better life4 ,neoptolemus1 in ,sophocles1 says1 ,all things are noisome when a man deserts ,his own true self and does what is not meet4 and ,philoctetes replies1 ,have mercy on me1 boy1 by all the gods1 ,and do not shame thyself by tricking me4 ,the whole ,antigone of ,sophocles is the struggle between obedience to the political rulers and obedience to the higher laws which as laws of reverence become virtually inner laws of duty3 ,i know ,i please the souls ,i ought to please4 ,plato4--,here1 as in the formulation of his conception of the ideal1 religious imagery helped ,plato to find a more objective statement for the conception of a moral judgment and a moral character4 ,in the final judgment of the soul after death1 ,plato sees the real self stripped bare of all external adornments of beauty1 rank1 power1 or wealth1 and standing as naked soul before the naked judge1 to receive his just reward4 ,and the very nature of this reward or penalty shows the deepening conception of the self1 and of the intrinsic nature of moral character4 ,the true penalty of injustice is not to be found in anything external1 but in the very fact that the evil doers become base and wicked3 ,they do not know the penalty of injustice1 which above all things they ought to know1--not stripes and death1 as they suppose1 which evil doers often escape1 but a penalty which cannot be escaped4 ,,theod4 ,what is that8 ,,soc4 ,there are two patterns set before them in nature2 the one blessed and divine1 the other godless and wretched2 and they do not see1 in their utter folly and infatuation1 that they are growing like the one and unlike the other1 by reason of their evil deeds2 and the penalty is that they lead a life answering to the pattern which they resemble4#hb ,the ,stoics4--,it is1 however1 in the ,stoics that we find the conception of inner reflection reaching clearest expression4 ,seneca and ,epictetus repeat again and again the thought that the conscience is of higher importance than any external judgment1--that its judgment is inevitable4 ,in these various conceptions1 we see attained the third stage of ,adam ,smith's description of the formation of conscience4#hc ,man who read his duty at first in the judgments of his fellows1 in the customs and laws and codes of honor1 and in the religious precepts of the gods1 has again come to find in gods and laws1 in custom and authority1 the true rational law of life2 but it is now a law of self4 ,not a particular or individual self1 but a self which embraces within it at once the human and the divine4 ,the individual has become social and has recognized himself as such4 ,the religious1 social1 and political judgments have become the judgments of man upon himself4 ,duty1 what is binding or necessary1 takes its place as a definite moral conception4 ,,literature ,besides the writings of ,plato 7especially1 the ,apology1 ,crito1 ,protagoras1 ,gorgias1 and ,republic71 ,xenophon 7,memorabilia71 ,aristotle 7,ethics1 ,politics71 ,cicero 7,on ,ends1 ,laws1 ,duties2 ,on the ,nature of the ,gods71 ,epictetus1 ,seneca1 ,m4 ,aurelius1 ,plutarch1 and the fragments of various ,stoics1 ,epicureans1 and ,sceptics1 the tragedies of ,aeschylus1 ,sophocles1 and ,euripides1 and the comedies of ,aristophanes 7especially the ,clouds7 afford valuable material4 ,all the histories of philosophy treat the theoretical side2 among them may be mentioned ,gomperz 7,greek ,thinkers1 #aijj-je71 ,zeller 7,socrates2 ,plato2 ,aristotle2 ,stoics1 ,epicureans1 and ,sceptics71 ,windelband1 ,benn 7,philosophy of ,greece1 #ahih1 chs4 i41 v474 ,on the ,moral ,consciousness3 ,schmidt1 ,ethik der alten ,griechen1 #ahhb4 ,on the social conditions and theories3 ,poehlmann1 ,geschichte des antiken ,kommunismus und ,sozialismus1 #ahic-aija2 ,doering1 ,die ,lehre des ,sokrates als sociales ,reformsystem1 #ahie4 ,on the religion3 ,farnell1 ,cults of the ,greek ,states1 #c vols41 #ahif2 ,rohde1 ,psyche1 #ahid4 ,on ,political ,conditions and ,theory3 ,newman1 ,introd4 to ,politics of ,aristotle1 #ahhg2 ,bradley1 ,aristotle's ,theory of the ,state in ,hellenica2 ,wilamovitz-,moellendorf1 ,aristotle und ,athen1 #aijj4 ,on ,nature and ,law of ,nature3 ,ritchie1 ,natural ,rights1 #ahie2 ,burnet1 ,int4 ,journal of ,ethics1 vii41 #ahig1 pp4 #cbh-cc2 ,hardy1 ,begriff der ,physis1 #ahhd2 ,voigt1 ,die ,lehre vom jus naturale1 #ahef-ge4 ,general3 ,denis1 ,histoire des ,theories et des ,idees ,morales dans l',antiquite1 #ahgi2 ,taylor1 ,ancient ,ideals1 #aijj2 ,caird1 ,evolution of ,theology in the ,greek ,philosophers1 #aijd2 ,janet1 ,histoire de la ,science ,politique dans ses ,rapports avec la ,morale1 #ahhg2 ,grote1 ,history of ,greece1 #dth ed41 #ahgb2 ,plato and the ,other ,companions of ,socrates1 #ahhh4 ,,footnotes3 #fd ,cf4 ,xenophon's account of the impressive appeal of ,clearchus3 ,for1 first and greatest1 the oaths which we have sworn by the gods forbid us to be enemies to each other4 ,whoever is conscious of having transgressed these1--him ,i could never deem happy4 ,for if one were at war with the gods1 ,i know not with what swiftness he might flee so as to escape1 or into what darkness he might run1 or into what stronghold he might retreat and find refuge4 ,for all things are everywhere subject to the gods1 and the gods rule all everywhere with equity4--,anabasis1 ,,ii41 v4 #fe ,republic1 ,i41 #cdc4 #ff ,republic1 ,,ii41 #cfe4 #fg ,republic1 ,,ii41 #cfe4 #fh ,republic1 ,i41 #cdc f4 #fi ,windelband1 ,history of ,philosophy1 p4 #hf4 #gj ,politics1 ,i41 ii4 ,welldon's translation4 #ga ,politics1 ,i41 ii4 ,welldon's translation4 #gb ,ethics1 ,,viii41 i42 ,,ix41 vi4 #gc ,republic1 ,v41 #dgc4 #gd ,ibid41 ,,ix41 #eib4 #ge ,gorgias1 #dia ff4 #gf ,republic1 ,,ix41 #ehi f4 #gg ,republic1 ,,ix41 #eha f4 #gh ,ethics1 ,x41 ii4-iv4 #gi ,among the various types of excellence which ,aristotle enumerates as exemplifying this principle1 the quality of high-mindedness 7,greek3 megalopsychia7 is pre-eminent1 and may be taken as embodying the trait most prized in an ,athenian gentleman4 ,the high-minded man claims much and deserves much2 lofty in his standard of honor and excellence he accepts tributes from good men as his just desert1 but despises honor from ordinary men or on trivial grounds2 good and evil fortune are alike of relatively small importance4 ,he neither seeks nor fears danger2 he is ready to confer favors and forget injuries1 slow to ask favors or cry for help2 fearless in his love and hatred1 in his truth and his independence of conduct2 not easily moved to admiration1 for nothing is great to him4 ,he loves to possess beautiful things that bring no profit1 rather than useful things that pay2 for this is characteristic of the man whose resources are in himself4 ,further1 the character of the high-minded man seems to require that his gait should be slow1 his voice deep1 his speech measured2 for a man is not likely to be in a hurry when there are few things in which he is deeply interested1 nor excited when he holds nothing to be of very great importance2 and these are the causes of a high voice and rapid movements 7,ethics1 ,,iv41 vi4-viii474 #hj ,marcus ,aurelius1 ,thoughts1 ,,iv41 #bc4 #ha ,ethics1 ,x41 vii4 #hb ,theaetetus1 #agf4 #hc ,smith held that we 7#a7 approve or disapprove the conduct of others2 7#b7 see ourselves as others see us1 judging ourselves from their standpoint2 7#c7 finally1 form a true social standard1 that of the impartial spectator4 ,this is an inner standard--conscience4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,the ,,modern ,,period ,the moral life of the modern western world differs from both ,hebrew and ,greek morality in one respect4 ,the ,hebrews and ,greeks were pioneers4 ,their leaders had to meet new situations and shape new conceptions of righteousness and wisdom4 ,modern civilization and morality1 on the other hand1 received certain ideals and standards already worked out and established4 ,these came to it partly through the literature of ,hebrews1 ,greeks1 and ,latins1 partly through ,greek art and ,roman civilization1 but chiefly1 perhaps1 through two institutions3 7#a7 ,roman government and law embodied ,stoic conceptions of a natural law of reason and of a world state1 a universal rational society4 ,this not only gave the groundwork of government and rights to the modern world2 it was a constant influence for guiding and shaping ideas of authority and justice4 7#b7 ,the ,christian ,church in its cathedrals1 its cloisters1 its ceremonials1 its orders1 and its doctrines had a most impressive system of standards1 valuations1 motives1 sanctions1 and prescriptions for action4 ,these were not of ,hebrew origin solely4 ,greek and ,roman philosophy and political conceptions were fused with more primitive teaching and conduct4 ,when the ,germans conquered the ,empire they accepted in large measure its institutions and its religion4 ,modern morality1 like modern civilization1 shows the mingled streams of ,hebrew1 ,greek1 ,roman1 and ,german or ,celtic life4 ,it contains also conceptions due to the peculiar industrial1 scientific1 and political development of modern times4 ,thus we have to-day such inherited standards as that of the honor of a gentleman side by side with the modern class standard of business honesty1 and the labor union ideal of class solidarity4 ,we have the aristocratic ideals of chivalry and charity side by side with more democratic standards of domestic and social justice4 ,we find the ,christian equal standard for the two sexes side by side with another which sets a high value on woman's chastity1 but a trivial value on man's4 ,we find a certain ideal of self-sacrifice side by side with an ideal of success as the only good4 ,we cannot hope to disentangle all the threads that enter this variegated pattern1 or rather collection of patterns1 but we can point out certain features that at the same time illustrate certain general lines of development4 ,we state first the general attitude and ideals of the ,middle ,ages1 and then the three lines along which individualism has proceeded to the moral consciousness of to-day4 ,sec4 #a4 ,,the ,,mediaeval ,,ideals ,the mediaeval attitude toward life was determined in part by the character of the ,germanic tribes with their bold1 barbaric strength and indomitable spirit1 their clan and other group organizations1 their customs or mores belonging to such a stock2 and in part by the religious ideals presented in the church4 ,the presence of these two factors was manifest in the strong contrasts everywhere present4 ,associated with mail-clad knights whose trade is war and whose delight is to combat are the men whose sacred vocation forbids the use of force altogether4 ,through lands overspread with deeds of violence1 the lonely wayfarer with the staff and badge of a pilgrim passes unarmed and in safety4 ,in sight of castles1 about whose walls fierce battles rage1 are the church and the monastery1 within the precincts of which quiet reigns and all violence is branded as sacrilege4#hd ,the harsh clashes of the ,venus music over against the solemn strains from the ,pilgrim's ,chorus in ,tannhaeuser might well symbolize not only the specific collision of the opera but the broader range of passions opposed to the religious controls and values in this mediaeval society4 ,the ,group and ,class ,ideal4--,the early ,germans and ,celts in general had the clan system1 the group ideals1 and group virtues which belonged to other ,aryan peoples1 but the very fact of the ,germanic victories shows a military spirit which included both personal heroism and good capacity for organization4 ,group loyalty was strong1 and the group valuation of strength and courage was unbounded4 ,a high value was also set on woman's chastity4 ,these qualities1 particularly the loyalty to the clan and its head1 survived longest in ,celtic peoples like the ,scots and ,irish who were not subjected to the forces of political organization4 ,every reader of ,scott is familiar with the values and defects of the type2 and the problems which it causes in modern democracy have been acutely described by ,jane ,addams4#he ,among the ,germanic peoples1 when the clan and tribal systems were followed by the more thoroughgoing demarcation of classes1 free and serfs1 lords and villains1 chevalier or knight1 and churl1 the old ,latin terms gentle and vulgar found a fitting application4 ,the term gentle was indeed given in one of its usages the force of the kindred term kind to characterize the conduct appropriate within the kin1 but in the compound gentleman it formed one of the most interesting conceptions of class morality4 ,the honor of a gentleman was determined by what the class demanded4 ,above all else the gentleman must not show fear4 ,he must be ready to fight at any instant to prove his courage4 ,his word must not be doubted4 ,this seems to have been on the ground that such doubt would be a refusal to take the man at his own estimate1 rather than because of any superlative love of truth1 for the approved way to prove the point at issue was by fighting1 not by any investigation4 ,but the class character appears in the provision that no insult from one of a lower class need be noticed4 ,homicide was not contrary to the character and honor of a gentleman4 ,nor did this require any such standard in sex relations as a woman's honor requires of a woman4 ,in conduct toward others1 the courtesy which expresses in ceremony and manner respect for personal dignity was a fine trait4 ,it did not always prevent insolence toward inferiors1 although there was in many cases the feeling1 noblesse oblige4 ,what was needed to make this ideal of gentleman a moral and not merely a class ideal1 was that it should base treatment of others on personal worth rather than on birth1 or wealth1 or race1 and that it should not rate reputation for courage above the value of human life4 ,this has been in part effected1 but many traits of the old conception live on to-day4 ,the ,ideal of the ,church4--,the ideal of life which the church presented contained two strongly contrasting elements1 which have been frequently found in religion and are perhaps inevitably present4 ,on the one hand1 a spiritual religion implies that man in comparison with ,god is finite1 weak1 and sinful2 he should therefore be of a humble and contrite heart4 ,on the other hand1 as a child of ,god he partakes of the divine and is raised to infinite worth4 ,on the one hand1 the spiritual life is not of this world and must be sought in renouncing its pleasures and lusts2 on the other hand1 if ,god is really the supreme governor of the universe1 then this world also ought to be subject to his rule4 ,in the mediaeval view of life1 the humility and withdrawal from the world were assigned to the individual2 the sublimity and the ruling authority to the church4 ,ethically this distribution had somewhat the effect of group morality in that it minimized the individual and magnified the corporate body of which he was a part4 ,asceticism and humility go hand in hand with the power of the hierarchy4 ,individual poverty--wealth of the church2 individual meekness and submission--unlimited power and authority in the church2 these antitheses reflect the fact that the church was the heir both of a kingdom of ,god and of a ,roman ,empire4 ,the humility showed itself in extreme form in the ascetic type of monasticism with its vows of poverty1 chastity1 and obedience4 ,it was reflected in the art which took for its subjects the saints1 conceived not individually1 but typically and according to tradition and authority4 ,their thin attenuated figures showed the ideal prescribed4 ,the same humility showed itself in the intellectual sphere in the preeminence given to faith as compared with reason1 while the mystic losing himself in ,god showed yet another phase of individual renunciation4 ,even charity1 with which the church sought to temper the hardship of the time1 took a form which tended to maintain or even applaud the dependent attitude of the recipient4 ,so far as life for the individual had a positive value1 this lay not in living oneself out1 but rather in the calm and the support afforded by the church3 ,a life in the church1 for the church1 through the church2 a life which she blessed in mass at morning and sent to peaceful rest by the vesper hymn2 a life which she supported by the constantly recurring stimulus of the sacraments1 relieving it by confession1 purifying it by penance1 admonishing it by the presentation of visible objects for contemplation and worship--this was the life which they of the ,middle ,ages conceived of as the rightful life of man2 it was the actual life of many1 the ideal of all4#hf ,on the other side1 the church boldly asserted the right and duty of the divine to control the world1--the religious symbol of the modern proposition that conscience should dominate political and business affairs4 ,no institution is apart from the authority of the church1 wrote ,aegidius ,colonna4 ,no one can legitimately possess field or vine except under its authority or by it4 ,heretics are not owners1 but unjustly occupy4 ,canossa symbolized the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal power1 and there is a sublime audacity1 moral as well as political1 in the famous ,bull of ,boniface ,,viii41 ,we declare that every human creature is subject to the ,roman pontiff4 ,the church as a corporate society expressed also the community of its members4 ,it was indeed no mere collection of individual believers4 ,as a divine institution1 the body of ,christ on earth1 it gave to its members rather than received from them4 ,it invested them with new worth1 instead of getting its own worth from them4 ,nevertheless1 it was not an absolute authority2 it represented the union of all in a common fellowship1 a common destiny1 and a common cause against the powers of evil4 ,the massive cathedrals which remain as the monuments of the ages of faith1 are fitting symbols of these aspects of mediaeval life4 ,they dominate their cities architecturally1 as the church dominated the life of the ages which built them4 ,they inspired within the worshipper1 on the one hand1 a sense of finiteness in the presence of the sublime2 on the other1 an elevation of soul as he became conscious of union with a power and presence not his own4 ,they awed the worshiping assembly and united it in a common service4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,main ,,lines ,,of ,,modern ,,development ,we have seen that the mediaeval life had two sets of standards and values3 one set by the tribal codes and the instinct of a warlike people2 the other set by a church which required renunciation while it asserted control4 ,changes may be traced in both ideals4 ,the group morality becomes refined and broadened4 ,the church standards are affected in four ways3 7a7 ,the goods of the secular life1 art1 family1 power1 wealth1 claim a place in the system of values4 7b7 ,human authority asserts itself1 at first in sovereign states with monarchs1 then in the growth of civil liberty and political democracy4 7c7 ,instead of faith1 reason asserts itself as the agency for discovering the laws of nature and of life4 7d7 ,as the result of the greater dignity and worth of the individual which is worked out in all these lines1 social virtue tends to lay less value on charity and more on social justice4 ,it must not be supposed that the movements to be outlined have resulted in the displacement or loss of the positive values in the religious ideal4 ,the morality of to-day does not ignore spiritual values2 it aims rather to use them to give fuller meaning to all experience4 ,it does not abandon law in seeking freedom1 or ignore duty because it is discovered by reason4 ,above all1 it is seeking to bring about in more intimate fashion that supremacy of the moral order in all human relations for which the church was theoretically contending4 ,and in recent times we are appreciating more thoroughly that the individual cannot attain a full moral life by himself4 ,only as he is a member of a moral society can he find scope and support for full development of will4 ,in concrete phrase1 it is just as necessary to improve the general social environment in which men1 women1 and children are to live1 in order to make better individuals1 as it is to improve the individuals in order to get a better society4 ,this was a truth which the religious conception of salvation through the church taught in other terms4 ,to follow the development of the modern moral consciousness1 we shall rely not so much on the formal writings of moral philosophers as on other sources4 ,what men value most1 and what they recognize as right1 is shown in what they work for and fight for and in how they spend their leisure4 ,this is reflected more immediately in their laws1 their art and literature1 their religion1 and their educational institutions1 although it finds ultimate expression in moral theories4 ,the more concrete aspects are suggested in this chapter1 the theories in ,chapter ,,xii4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,the ,,old ,,and ,,new ,,in ,,the ,,beginnings ,,of ,,individualism ,an interesting blending of the class ideal of the warrior and gentleman with the religious ideals of devotion to some spiritual service1 and of protection to the weak1 is afforded by chivalry4 ,the knights show their faith by their deeds of heroism1 not by renunciation4 ,but they fight for the ,holy ,sepulcher1 or for the weak and oppressed4 ,their investiture is almost as solemn as that of a priest4 ,honor and love appear as motives side by side with the quest of the ,holy ,grail4 ,chevalier ,bayard is the gallant fighter for country1 but he is also the passionate admirer of justice1 the knight sans peur et sans reproche4 ,moreover1 the literature which embodies the ideal exhibits not only feats of arms and religious symbolism4 ,parsifal is not a mere abstraction2 he has life and character4 ,and who will deny1 writes ,francke1#hg that in this character ,wolfram has put before us1 within the forms of chivalrous life1 an immortal symbol of struggling1 sinning1 despairing1 but finally redeemed1 humanity8 ,if chivalry represented in some degree a moralizing of the warrior class1 the mendicant orders represented an effort to bring religion into secular life4 ,the followers of ,st4 ,dominic and ,st4 ,francis were indeed ascetic1 but instead of maintaining the separate life of the cloister they aimed to awaken a personal experience among the whole people4 ,further1 the ,dominicans adopted the methods and conceptions of ,greek philosophy to support the doctrines of the church1 instead of relying solely on faith4 ,the ,franciscans on their part devoted an ecstatic type of piety to deeds of charity and beneficence4 ,they aimed to overcome the world rather than to withdraw from it4 ,a bolder appeal to the individual1 still within the sphere of religion1 was made when ,wyclif asserted the right of every instructed man to search the ,bible for himself1 and a strong demand for social justice found expression in ,wyclif's teaching as well as in the vision of ,piers ,plowman4 ,in the political world the growing strength of the empire sought likewise a religious sanction in its claim of a divine right1 independent of the church4 ,the claims of the civic life find also increasing recognition with the spiritual teachers4 ,the ,state had been regarded by ,augustine as a consequence of the fall of man1 but it now comes to claim and receive a moral value3 first1 with ,thomas ,aquinas1 as the institution in which man perfects his earthly nature and prepares for his higher destiny in the realm of grace2 then1 with ,dante1 as no longer subordinate to the church1 but coordinate with it4 ,finally1 the rise of the universities shows a most significant appearance of the modern spirit under the old sanctions4 ,the range of secular studies was limited and the subject-matter to be studied was chiefly the doctrine of the ,fathers4 ,the teachers who drew thousands of eager young men about them were clerics4 ,but the very fact that dialectics--the art of reasoning--was the focus of interest1 shows the dawn of a spirit of inquiry4 ,such a book as ,abelard's ,sic et ,non1 which marshaled the opposing views of the ,fathers in deadly parallel1 was a challenge to tradition and an assertion of reason4 ,and it is not without significance that the same bold thinker was the first of the mediaeval scholars to treat ethics again as a field by itself4 ,the title ,know ,thyself suggests its method4 ,the essence of the moral act is placed in the intent or resolve of the will2 the criterion for judgment is agreement or disagreement with conscience4 ,sec4 #d4 ,,individualism ,,in ,,the ,,progress ,,of ,,liberty ,,and ,,democracy ,rights4--,it is not possible or necessary here to sketch the advance of political and civil liberty4 ,finding its agents sometimes in kings1 sometimes in cities1 sometimes in an aristocracy or a ,house of ,commons1 and sometimes in a popular uprising1 it has also had as its defenders with the pen1 ,churchmen1 ,protestants1 and freethinkers1 lawyers1 publicists1 and philosophers4 ,all that can be done here is to indicate briefly the moral significance of the movement4 ,some of its protagonists have been actuated by conscious moral purpose4 ,they have fought with sword or pen not only in the conviction that their cause was just1 but because they believed it just4 ,at other times1 a king has favored a city to weaken the power of the nobility1 or the ,commons have opposed the king because they objected to taxation4 ,what makes the process significant morally is that1 whatever the motives actuating those who have fought its battles with sword or pen1 they have nearly always claimed to be fighting for rights4 ,they have professed the conviction that they are engaged in a just cause4 ,they have thus made appeal to a moral standard1 and in so far as they have sincerely sought to assert rights1 they have been recognizing in some sense a social and rational standard2 they have been building up a moral personality4 ,sometimes indeed the rights have been claimed as a matter of possession or of tradition4 ,this is to place them on the basis of customary morality4 ,but in such great crises as the ,english ,revolutions of the seventeenth century1 or the ,french and ,american ,revolutions of the eighteenth1 some deeper basis has been sought4 ,a ,milton1 a ,locke1 a ,rousseau1 a ,jefferson1 has but voiced the sentiments of a people in formulating an explicitly moral principle4 ,sometimes this has taken the form of an appeal to ,god-given rights4 ,all men are equal before ,god2 why should one man assume to command another because of birth8 ,in this sense the ,puritans stood for liberty and democracy as part of their creed of life4 ,but often the appeal to a moral principle borrowed the conceptions of ,greek philosophy and ,roman law1 and spoke of natural rights or a law of nature4#hh ,natural ,rights4--,this conception1 as we have noted1 had its origin in ,greece in the appeal from custom or convention to ,nature4 ,at first an appeal to the natural impulses and wants1 it became with the ,stoics an appeal to the rational order of the universe4 ,roman jurists found in the idea of such a law of nature the rational basis for the law of society4 ,cicero had maintained that every man had its principles innate within him4 ,it is obvious that here was a principle with great possibilities4 ,the ,roman law itself was most often used in the interest of absolutism1 but the idea of a natural law1 and so of a natural right more fundamental than any human dictate1 proved a powerful instrument in the struggle for personal rights and equality4 ,all men naturally were born free1 wrote ,milton4 ,to understand political power right1 wrote ,locke1 and derive it from its original1 we must consider what state all men are naturally in1 and that is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons1 as they think fit1 within the bounds of the law of nature2 without asking leave or depending on the will of any other man4 ,a state also of equality1 wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal4 ,these doctrines found eloquent portrayal in ,rousseau1 and appear in the ,declaration of ,independence of #aggf4 ,finally1 the effort to find in nature some basis for independence and freedom is given a new turn by ,herbert ,spencer when he points to the instinct for liberty in animals as well as in human beings as the origin of the law of freedom4 ,by one of the paradoxes of history1 the principle is now most often invoked in favor of vested interests4 ,natural easily loses the force of an appeal to reason and to social good1 and becomes merely an assertion of ancient usage1 or precedent1 or even a shelter for mere selfish interests4 ,natural rights in property may be invoked to thwart efforts to protect life and health4 ,individualism has been so successful in asserting rights that it is now apt to forget that there are no rights morally except such as express the will of a good member of society4 ,but in recognizing possible excesses we need not forget the value of the idea of rights as a weapon in the struggle in which the moral personality has gradually won its way4 ,the other side of the story has been the growth of responsibility4 ,the gain in freedom has not meant an increase in disorder2 it has been marked rather by gain in peace and security1 by an increasing respect for law1 and an increasing stability of government4 ,the external control of force has been replaced by the moral control of duty4 ,sec4 #e4 ,,individualism ,,as ,,affected ,,by ,,the ,,development ,,of ,,industry1 ,,commerce1 ,,and ,,art ,the development of industry1 commerce1 and art affects the moral life in a variety of ways1 of which three are of especial importance for our purpose4 7#a7 ,it gives new interests1 and new opportunities for individual activity4 7#b7 ,this raises the question of values4 ,are all the activities good1 and shall one satisfy whatever interest appeals to him1 or are some better than others8--the old question of kinds of happiness4 7#c7 ,it raises further the question of sharing and distribution4 ,how far may one enjoy the goods of life in an exclusive way and how far is it his duty to share with others8 ,do society's present methods of industry1 commerce1 art1 and education distribute these goods in a just manner8 ,the examination of these questions will be made in ,part ,,iii4 ,it is our purpose at this point merely to indicate the trend of the moral consciousness with regard to them4 #a4 ,the ,increasing ,power and ,interests of the ,individual4--,power for the mediaeval man could be sought in war or in the church2 interests were correspondingly limited4 ,the ,crusades1 contact1 through them and later through commerce1 with ,arabian civilization1 growing acquaintance with the literature and art of ,greece and ,rome1 were effective agencies in stimulating the modern development4 ,but when once started it needed but the opportunities of sufficient wealth and freedom to go on4 ,art and letters have depicted a variety and richness of experience which the ancient world did not feel4 ,shakspere1 ,rembrandt1 ,bunyan1 ,beethoven1 ,goethe1 ,balzac1 ,shelley1 ,byron1 ,hugo1 ,wagner1 ,ibsen1 ,thackeray1 ,eliot1 ,tolstoy1 to name almost at random1 reflect a wealth of interests and motives which show the range of the modern man4 ,commerce and the various lines of industry have opened new avenues for power4 ,no one can see the palaces or dwellings of ,venice or the old ,flemish ports1 or consider the enormous factories1 shops1 and office buildings of to-day1 without a sense of the accession to human power over nature and over the activities of fellow men which trade and industry have brought with them4 ,the use of money instead of a system of personal service--slavery or serfdom--has not only made it possible to have men's labor without owning the men1 it has aided in a vastly more effective system than the older method allowed4 ,the industrial revolution of the past century has had two causes3 one the use of machinery2 the other the combination of human labor which this makes possible4 ,so far this has greatly increased the power of the few leaders1 but not of the many4 ,it is the present problem to make possible a larger opportunity for individual freedom and power4 #b4 ,the ,values of ,art and ,industry4--,are all these wider interests and fuller powers good8 ,the church ideal and the class ideal already described gave different answers4 ,the class ideal of gentleman really expressed a form of self-assertion1 of living out one's powers fully1 and this readily welcomed the possibilities which art and its enjoyment afforded4#hi ,the gentleman of the ,renaissance1 the cavalier of ,england1 the noblesse of ,france1 were patrons of art and letters4 ,the ,romanticist urged that such free and full expression as art afforded was higher than morality with its control and limitation4 ,the church admitted art in the service of religion1 but was chary of it as an individual activity4 ,the ,puritans were more rigorous4 ,partly because they associated its churchly use with what they regarded as idolatry1 partly as a protest against the license in manners which the freedom of art seemed to encourage1 they frowned upon all forms of art except sacred literature or music4 ,their condemnation of the stage is still an element1 though probably a lessening element1 and it is not long since fiction was by many regarded with suspicion4 ,on the whole1 the modern moral consciousness accepts art as having a place in the moral life1 although it by no means follows that art can be exempt from moral criticism as to its sincerity1 healthfulness1 and perspective4 ,in the case of industry the church ideal has prevailed4 ,the class ideal of gentleman was distinctly opposed to industry1 particularly manual labor4 ,arms or the ,court was the proper profession4 ,this was more or less bound up with the fact that in primitive conditions labor was mainly performed by women or by slaves4 ,it was the business1 the virtue of men to fight4 ,so far as this class ideal was affected by the models of ancient culture1 the prejudice was strengthened4 ,the classic civilization rested on slave labor4 ,the ideal of the gentleman of ,athens was the free employment of leisure1 not active enterprise4 ,the church1 on the other hand1 maintained both the dignity and the moral value of labor4 ,not only the example of the ,founder of ,christianity and his early disciples1 who were for the most part manual laborers1 but the intrinsic moral value of work1 already referred to1 entered into the appraisal4#ij ,the ,puritans1 who have had a wide-reaching influence upon the standards of the middle and lower classes of ,england1 and upon the northern and western portions of ,america1 were insistent upon industry1 not merely for the sake of its products1--they were frugal in their consumption1--but as expressing a type of character4 ,idleness and shiftlessness were not merely ineffective1 they were sinful4 ,if any will not work1 neither let him eat1 commended itself thoroughly to this moral ideal4 ,that the laborer brought something to the common weal1 while the idler had to be supported1 was a reenforcement to the motives drawn from the relation of work to character4 ,as the middle and lower classes became increasingly influential1 the very fact that they were laborers and traders strengthened the religious ideal by a class motive4 ,it was natural that a laboring class should regard labor as honest1 though from the history of the word such a collocation of terms as honest labor would once have been as absurd as honest villain4#ia ,a further influence effective in ,america has been the fluidity of class distinctions in a new country4 ,the influence of the frontier has been all on the side of the value of work and the reprobation of idleness4 ,at least this is true for men4 ,a certain tendency has been manifest to exempt women of the well-to-do classes from the necessity of labor1 and even by training and social pressure to exclude them from the opportunity of work1 and make of them a leisure class1 but this is not likely to establish itself as a permanent moral attitude4 ,the woman will not be content to live in ,the ,doll's ,house while the man is in the real work of the world4 #c4 ,the ,distribution of the ,goods of ,life4--,mediaeval society made provision for both benevolence and justice4 ,charity1 the highest of the virtues1 had come to mean specifically the giving of goods4 ,the monasteries relieved the poor and the infirm4 ,hospitals were established4 ,the gentleman felt it to be not only a religious duty1 but a tradition of his class to be liberal4 ,to secure justice in the distribution of wealth1 various restrictions were imposed4 ,goods were not to be sold for whatever they could bring1 nor was money to be loaned at whatever rate of interest the borrower was willing to pay4 ,society aimed to find out by some means what was a reasonable price for products4 ,in the case of manufactured goods this could be fixed by the opinion of fellow craftsmen4 ,a common estimation1 where buyers and sellers met and bargained in an open market1 could be trusted to give a fair value4 ,a maximum limit was set for victuals in towns4 ,or1 again1 custom prescribed what should be the money equivalent for payments formerly made in kind1 or in personal service4#ib ,money-lending was under especial guard4 ,to ask interest for the use of money1 provided the principal was returned intact1 seemed to be taking advantage of another's necessity4 ,it was usury4 ,class morality added a different kind of restrictions4 ,as embodied in the laws1 it bound the tenants to the soil and forbade the migration of laborers4 ,the significant thing in the whole mediaeval attitude was that society attempted to control business and industry by a moral standard4 ,it did not trust the individual to make his own bargains or to conduct his business as he pleased4 ,modern ,theory3 ,free ,contract4--,the distinctive feature of the modern development has been the tendency to abandon moral restrictions and to substitute a wage system1 freedom of exchange1 and free contract4 ,it was maintained by the advocates of the new method that it was both more efficient and at least as just as the old4 ,it was more efficient because it stimulated every one to make the best possible bargain4 ,surely every man is the most interested1 and therefore the best promoter of his own welfare4 ,and if each is getting the best results for himself1 the good of the whole community will be secured4 ,for--so ran the theory1 when individualism had so far advanced--society is simply the aggregate of its members2 the good of all is the sum of the goods of the members4 ,the system also claimed to provide for justice between buyer and seller1 capitalist and laborer1 by the agencies noticed in the next paragraph4 ,competition4--,to prevent extortionate prices on the one hand1 or unduly low prices or wages on the other1 the reliance was on competition and the general principle of supply and demand4 ,if a baker charges too high for his bread1 others will set up shops and sell cheaper4 ,if a money-lender asks too high interest1 men will not borrow or will find a loan elsewhere4 ,if a wage is too low1 labor will go elsewhere2 if too high1 capital will not be able to find a profit and so will not employ labor--so runs the theory4 ,without analyzing the moral value of the theory at this point1 we notice only that1 so far as it assumes to secure fair bargains and a just distribution1 it assumes the parties to the free contract to be really free4 ,this implies that they are upon nearly equal footing4 ,in the days of hand work and small industries this was at least a plausible assumption4 ,but a new face was placed upon the situation by the industrial revolution4 ,problem ,raised by the ,industrial ,revolution4--,the introduction of machinery on a large scale near the end of the eighteenth century brought about a change which has had extraordinary economic1 social1 and moral effects4 ,the revolution had two factors3 7#a7 it used steam power instead of human muscle2 7#b7 it made possible the greater subdivision of labor1 and hence it made it profitable to organize large bodies of men under a single direction4 ,both these factors contributed to an enormous increase in productive power4 ,but this increase made an overwhelming difference in the status of capitalist and laborer4 ,without discussing the question as to whether capital received more than a fair share of the increased profit1 it was obvious that if one ,captain of ,industry were receiving even a small part of the profits earned by each of his thousand workmen1 he would be immeasurably better off than any one of them4 ,like the mounted and armored knight of the ,middle ,ages1 or the baron in his castle1 he was more than a match for a multitude of poorly equipped footmen4 ,there seemed to be in the nineteenth century an enormous disproportion between the shares of wealth which fell to capitalist and to laborer4 ,if this was the result of free contract1 what further proof was necessary that freedom was a mere empty term--a name with no reality8 ,for could it be supposed that a man would freely make an agreement to work harder and longer than any slave1 receiving scarcely the bare necessities of existence1 while the other party was to gain enormous wealth from the bargain8 ,the old class morality was not disturbed by such contrasts4 ,even the religious morality was apt to consider the distinction between rich and poor as divinely ordered1 or else as insignificant compared with eternal destiny of weal or woe4 ,but the individualistic movements have made it less easy to accept either the class morality or the religious interpretation4 ,the latter lends itself equally well to a justification of disease because it is providentially permitted4 ,moreover1 the old group morality and religious ideal had this in their favor3 they recognized an obligation of the strong to the weak1 of the group for every member1 of master for servant4 ,the cash basis seemed to banish all responsibility1 and to assert the law of each for himself as the supreme law of life--except so far as individuals might mitigate suffering by voluntary kindness4 ,economic theory seemed to show that wages must always tend toward a starvation level4 ,sympathy4--,such tendencies inevitably called out response from the sentiments of benevolence and sympathy4 ,for the spread of civilization has certainly made man more sensitive to pain1 more capable of sympathy and of entering by imagination into the situations of others4 ,it is noteworthy that the same ,adam ,smith who argued so forcibly the cause of individualism in trade1 made sympathy the basis of his moral system4 ,advance in sympathy has shown itself in the abolition of judicial torture1 in prison reform1 in the improved care of the insane and defective2 in the increased provision for hospitals1 and asylums1 and in an innumerable multitude of organizations for relief of all sorts and conditions of men4 ,missions1 aside from their distinctly ecclesiastical aims1 represent devotion of human life and of wealth to the relief of sickness and wretchedness1 and to the education of children in all lands4 ,sympathy has even extended to the animal world4 ,and the notable fact in modern sympathy and kindness1 as contrasted with the mediaeval type1 is that the growth in individuality has demanded and evoked a higher kind of benevolence4 ,instead of fostering dependence and relieving wants1 the best modern agencies aim to promote independence1 to set the man upon his own feet and enable him to achieve self-respect4 ,social settlements have been strong factors in bringing about this change of attitude4 ,justice4--,various movements looking toward greater justice in distribution have likewise been called out by the conditions since the industrial revolution4 ,naturally one reaction was to denounce the whole individualistic tendency as represented in the cash-payment basis4 ,this found its most eloquent expositor in ,carlyle4 ,his ,past and ,present is a bitter indictment of a system in which all working horses could be well fed1 and innumerable workingmen should die starved2 of a laissez-faire theory which merely says impossible when asked to remedy evils supposedly due to economic laws2 of a ,mammon ,gospel which transforms life into a mutual hostility1 with its laws-of-war named fair competition4 ,the indictment is convincing1 but the remedy proposed--a return to strong leaders with a reestablishment of personal relations--has rallied few to its support4 ,another reaction against individualistic selfishness has taken the form of communism4 ,numerous experiments have been made by voluntary associations to establish society on a moral basis by abolishing private property4 ,these new associations1 said ,owen1 one of the most ardent and generous of social reformers1 can scarcely be formed before it will be discovered that by the most simple and easy regulations all the natural wants of human nature may be abundantly supplied2 and the principle of selfishness will cease to exist for want of an adequate motive to produce it4 ,in contrast with these plans for a return to earlier conditions1 the two most conspicuous tendencies in the thought of the past century have claimed to be advancing toward freedom and justice along the lines which we have just traced4 ,the one1 which we may call individualistic reform1 has sought justice by giving free play to individual action4 ,the other1 socialism1 has aimed to use the power of the ,state to secure more adequate justice and1 as it believes1 a more genuine freedom4 ,the great reform movement in ,great ,britain during the nineteenth century emphasized free trade and free contracts4 ,it sought the causes of injustice in the survival of some privilege or vested interest which prevents the full working of the principles of free contract and competition4 ,let every man count as one2 make laws for the greatest good of the greatest number4 ,the trouble is not that there is too much individualism1 but that there is too little4 ,tax reformers like ,henry ,george have urged the same principle4 ,if land is monopolized by a few who can levy a toll upon all the rest of society1 how can justice obtain8 ,the remedy for injustice is to be found in promoting greater freedom of industry and trade4 ,socialism on the other hand claims that individualism defeats itself2 it results in tyranny1 not freedom4 ,the only way to secure freedom is through united action4 ,the merits of some of these programs for social justice will be examined in ,part ,,iii4 ,they signify that the age is finding its moral problem set anew by the collision between material interests and social good4 ,greek civilization used the industry of the many to set free the higher life--art1 government1 science--of a few4 ,the mediaeval ideal recognized the moral value of industry in relation to character4 ,the modern conscience1 resting back upon a higher appreciation of human dignity and worth1 is seeking to work out a social and economic order that shall combine both the ,greek and the mediaeval ideas4 ,it will require work and secure freedom4 ,these are necessary for the individual person4 ,but it is beginning to be seen that these values cannot be divided so that one social class shall perform the labor and the other enjoy the freedom4 ,the growth of democracy means that all members of society should share in the value and the service of work4 ,it means that all should share according to capacity in the values of free life1 of intelligence and culture4 ,can material goods be so produced and distributed as to promote this democratic ideal8 ,sec4 #f4 ,,the ,,individual ,,and ,,the ,,development ,,of ,,intelligence ,the development of intelligence in the modern world1 as in ,greece1 has two sides3 on the one hand1 a working-free from the restrictions which theology or the ,state or other social authorities imposed2 on the other hand1 positive progress in knowledge of nature and of human life4 ,under its first aspect it is known as the growth of rationalism2 under its second aspect1 as the growth of science and education4 ,we cannot separate the development into two periods1 the one negative1 the other positive1 as was convenient in the case of ,greece4 ,the negative and the positive in the modern world have gone on contemporaneously1 although the emphasis has sometimes been on one side and sometimes upon the other4 ,we may1 however1 indicate three periods as standing out with clearly defined characteristics4 7#a7 ,the ,renaissance1 in which the ,greek spirit of scientific inquiry found a new birth2 in which the discovery of new continents stimulated the imagination2 and in which new and more fruitful methods of investigation were devised in mathematics and the natural sciences4 7#b7 ,the period of the ,enlightenment1 in which the negative aspect of the process reached its sharpest definition4 ,the doctrines of revealed religion and natural religion were criticised from the standpoint of reason4 ,mysteries and superstition were alike rejected4 ,general intelligence made rapid progress4 ,it was the ,age of ,reason4 7#c7 ,the ,nineteenth ,century1 in which both the natural and social sciences underwent an extraordinary development4 ,the doctrine of evolution has brought a new point of view for considering the organic world and human institutions4 ,education has come to be regarded as both the necessary condition for the safety of society and as the right of every human being2 ,science1 in large measure set free from the need of fighting for its right to exist1 is becoming constructive2 it is assuming increasingly the duty of preserving human life and health1 of utilizing and preserving natural resources1 of directing political and economic affairs4 #a4 ,the ,renaissance4--,it would be giving a wrong impression to imply that there was no inquiry1 no use of reason in the mediaeval world4 ,the problems set by the inheritance of old-world religion and politics1 forced themselves upon the builders of castles and cathedrals1#ic of law and of dogma4 ,as indicated above1 the universities were centers of discussion in which brilliant minds often challenged received opinions4 ,men like ,roger ,bacon sought to discover nature's secrets1 and the great scholastics mastered ,greek philosophy in the interest of defending the faith4 ,but theological interest limited freedom and choice of theme4 ,it was not until the expansion of the individual along the lines already traced--in political freedom1 in the use of the arts1 in the development of commerce--that the purely intellectual interest such as had once characterized ,greece awoke4 ,a new world of possibilities seemed dawning upon the ,italian ,galileo1 the ,frenchman ,descartes1 the ,englishman ,francis ,bacon4 ,the instruments of thought had been sharpened by the dialectics of the schools2 now let them be used to analyze the world in which we live4 ,instead of merely observing nature ,galileo applied the experimental method1 putting definite questions to nature and thus preparing the way for a progress step by step toward a positive knowledge of nature's laws4 ,descartes found in mathematics a method of analysis which had never been appreciated before4 ,what seemed the mysterious path of bodies in curved lines could be given a simple statement in his analytic geometry4 ,leibniz and ,newton carried this method to triumphant results in the analysis of forces4 ,reason appeared able to discover and frame the laws of the universe--the principles of nature4 ,bacon1 with less of positive contribution in method1 sounded another note which was equally significant4 ,the human mind is liable to be clouded and hindered in its activities by certain inveterate sources of error4 ,like deceitful images or obsessions the idols of the tribe1 of the cave1 of the market1 and of the theater--due to instinct or habit1 to language or tradition--prevent the reason from doing its best work4 ,it needs vigorous effort to free the mind from these idols4 ,but this can be done4 ,let man turn from metaphysics and theology to nature and life2 let him follow reason instead of instinct or prejudice4 ,knowledge is power4 ,through it may rise above the kingdom of nature the kingdom of man4 ,in his ,new ,atlantis1 ,bacon foresees a human society in which skill and invention and government shall all contribute to human welfare4 ,these three notes1 the experimental method1 the power of rational analysis through mathematics1 and the possibility of controlling nature in the interests of man1 were characteristic of the period4 #b4 ,the ,enlightenment4--,a conflict of reason with authority went on side by side with the progress of science4 ,humanists and scientists had often set themselves against dogma and tradition4 ,the ,reformation was not in form an appeal to reason1 but the clash of authorities stimulated men to reasoning upon the respective claims of ,catholic and ,protestant4 ,and in the eighteenth century1 under the favoring influence of a broad toleration and a general growth of intelligence1 the conflict of reason with dogma reached its culmination4 ,the ,french call the period l',illumination--the illumination of life and experience by the light of reason4 ,the ,germans call it the ,aufklaerung1 the clearing-up4 ,what was to be cleared up8 ,first1 ignorance1 which limits the range of man's power and infects him with fear of the unknown2 then superstition1 which is ignorance consecrated by wont and emotion2 finally1 dogma1 which usually embodies irrational elements and seeks to force them upon the mind by the power of authority1 not of truth4 ,nor was it merely a question of intellectual criticism4 ,voltaire saw that dogma was often responsible for cruelty4 ,ignorance meant belief in witchcraft and magic4 ,from the dawn of civilization this had beset man's progress and quenched many of the brightest geniuses of the past4 ,it was time to put an end once for all to the remnants of primitive credulity2 it was time to be guided by the light of reason4 ,the movement was not all negative4 ,using the same appeal to nature1 which had served so well as a rallying cry in the development of political rights1 the protagonists of the movement spoke of a natural light which ,god had placed in man for his guidance--the candle of the ,lord set up by himself in men's minds1 which it is impossible for the breath or power of man wholly to extinguish4 ,a natural and rational religion should take the place of supposed revelation4 ,but the great achievement of the eighteenth century in the intellectual development of the individual was that the human mind came to realize the part it was itself playing in the whole realm of science and conduct4 ,man began to look within4 ,whether he called his work an ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 or a ,treatise of ,human ,nature1 or a ,theory of ,moral ,sentiments1 or a ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 the aim was to study human experience4 ,for of a sudden it was dawning upon man that1 if he was then living upon a higher level of knowledge and conduct than the animal or the savage1 this must be due to the activity of the mind4 ,it appeared that man1 not satisfied with nature1 had gone on to build a new world with institutions and morality1 with art and science4 ,this was no creation of instinct or habit2 nor could it be explained in terms of sense1 or feeling1 or impulse alone2 it was the work of that more active1 universal1 and creative type of intelligence which we call reason4 ,man1 as capable of such achievements in science and conduct1 must be regarded with new respect4 ,as having political rights1 freedom1 and responsibility1 man has the dignity of a citizen1 sovereign as well as subject4 ,as guiding and controlling his own life and that of others by the power of ideas1 not of force1 he has the dignity of a moral person1 a moral sovereignty4 ,he does not merely take what nature brings2 he sets up ends of his own and gives them worth4 ,in this1 ,kant saw the supreme dignity of the human spirit4 #c4 ,the ,present ,significance and ,task of ,scientific ,method4--,in the thought that man is able to form ends which have value for all1 to set up standards which all respect1 and thus to achieve worth and dignity in the estimation of his fellows1 the ,individualism of the eighteenth century was already pointing beyond itself4 ,for this meant that the individual attains his highest reach only as a member of a moral society4 ,but it is one thing to point out the need and meaning of a moral society1 it is another thing to bring such a society into being4 ,it has become evident during the past century that this is the central problem for human reason to solve4 ,the various social sciences1 economics1 sociology1 political science1 jurisprudence1 social psychology1 have either come into being for the first time1 or have been prosecuted with new energy4 ,psychology has assumed new significance as their instrument4 ,not that the scientific progress of the century has seen its greatest triumphs in these fields4 ,the conspicuous successes have been rather in such sciences as biology1 or in the applications of science to engineering and medicine4 ,the social sciences have been occupied largely in getting their problems stated and their methods defined4 ,but the discoveries and constructions of the nineteenth century are none the less indispensable prerequisites for a moral society4 ,for the new conditions of city life1 the new sources of disease1 the new dangers which attend every successive step away from the life of the savage1 demand all the resources of the sciences4#id ,and as the natural sciences overcome the technical difficulties which obstruct their work of aiding human welfare1 the demand will be more insistent that the social sciences contribute their share toward enabling man to fulfil his moral life4 ,some of the specific demands will become more evident1 as we study in subsequent chapters the present problems of political1 economic1 and family life4 ,education4--,the importance for the moral life of the modern development of science is paralleled by the significance of modern education4 ,the universities date from the ,middle ,ages4 ,the classical interest of humanism found its medium in the college or grammar school4 ,the invention of printing and the growth of commerce promoted elementary schools4 ,supposed necessities of popular government stimulated a general educational movement in the ,united ,states4 ,modern trade and industry have called out the technical school4 ,germany has educated for national defense and economic advance2 ,england has concerned itself preeminently for the education of statesmen and administrators2 and the ,united ,states for the education of voters4 ,but1 whatever the motive1 education has been made so general as to constitute a new element in the modern consciousness and a new factor to be reckoned with4 ,the moral right of every child to have an education1 measured not by his parents' abilities1 but by his own capacity1 is gaining recognition4 ,the moral value of a possession1 which is not1 like material goods1 exclusive1 but common1 will be more appreciated when we have worked out a more social and democratic type of training4#ie ,theoretical ,interpretation of this ,period in ,ethical ,systems4--,while the theoretical interpretation of this period is to be treated in ,part ,,ii41 we may point out here that the main lines of development which we have traced find expression in the two systems which have been most influential during the past century4 ,these are the systems of ,kant and of the ,utilitarians4 ,the political and certain aspects of the intellectual development are reflected in the system of ,kant4 ,he emphasized freedom1 the power and authority of reason1 human dignity1 the supreme value of character1 and the significance of a society in which every member is at once sovereign and subject4 ,the ,utilitarians represent the values brought out in the development of industry1 education1 and the arts4 ,they claimed that the good is happiness1 and happiness of the greatest number4 ,the demands for individual satisfaction and for social distribution of goods are voiced in this system4 ,,literature ,the histories of philosophy and of ethics give the theoretical side4 ,in addition to those previously mentioned the works of ,hoeffding1 ,falckenberg1 and ,fischer may be named4 ,stephen1 ,english ,thought in the ,eighteenth ,century1 and ,the ,utilitarians2 ,fichte1 ,characteristics of the ,present ,age 7in ,popular ,works1 tr4 by ,smith72 ,stein1 ,die sociale ,frage im ,lichte der ,philosophie1 #ahig2 ,comte1 ,positive ,philosophy1 tr4 by ,martineau1 #ahge1 ,book ,,vi4 ,tufts and ,thompson1 ,the ,individual and ,his ,relation to ,society as ,reflected in ,british ,ethics1 #ahif1 #aijd2 ,merz1 ,history of ,european ,thought in the #aith ,century1 #aijd2 ,robertson1 ,a ,short ,history of ,free ,thought1 #ahii2 ,bonar1 ,philosophy and ,political ,economy in ,some of ,their ,historical ,relations1 #ahic4 ,,on ,,the ,,mediaeval ,,and ,,renaissance ,,attitude3 ,lecky1 ,history of ,european ,morals1 #crd ed41 #ahgg2 ,adams1 ,civilization during the ,middle ,ages1 #ahie2 ,rashdall1 ,the ,universities of ,europe in the ,middle ,ages1 #ahie2 ,eicken1 ,geschichte und ,system der mittelalterlichen ,weltanschauung1 #ahgg2 ,burckhardt1 ,the ,civilization of the ,renaissance in ,italy1 #ahib2 ,draper1 ,history of the ,intellectual ,development of ,europe1 #ahgf4 ,,on ,,the ,,industrial ,,and ,,social ,,side3 ,ashley1 ,english ,economic ,history2 ,cunningham1 ,western ,civilization in ,its ,economic ,aspects1 #aijj2 and ,growth of ,english ,industry and ,commerce1 #crd ed41 #ahif-aijc2 ,hobson1 ,the ,evolution of ,modern ,capitalism1 #ahid2 ,traill1 ,social ,england1 #ahid2 ,rambaud1 ,histoire de ,civilization ,francaise1 #ahig2 ,held1 ,zwei ,buecher zur socialen ,geschichte ,englands1 #ahha2 ,carlyle1 ,past and ,present2 ,ziegler1 ,die ,geistigen und socialen ,stroemungen des neunzehnten ,jahrhunderts1 #aija4 ,,on ,,the ,,political ,,and ,,jural ,,development3 ,hadley1 ,freedom and ,responsibility in the ,evolution of ,democratic ,government1 #aijc2 ,pollock1 ,the ,expansion of the ,common ,law1 #aijd2 ,ritchie1 ,natural ,rights1 #ahie2 ,darwin and ,hegel1 #ahic1 ch4 vii42 ,dicey1 ,lectures on the ,relation of ,law and ,public ,opinion in ,england during the ,nineteenth ,century1 #aije4 ,,on ,,the ,,literary ,,side3 ,brandes1 ,the ,main ,currents in the ,literature of the ,nineteenth ,century1 #aije2 ,francke1 ,social ,forces in ,german ,literature1 #ahie2 ,carriere1 ,die ,kunst im ,zusammenhang der ,culturentwicklung und die ,ideale der ,menschheit1 #crd ed41 #ahgg-hf4 ,,footnotes3 #hd ,fisher1 ,history of the ,christian ,church1 p4 #bbg4 #he ,democracy and ,social ,ethics1 pp4 #bbb-gg2 ,newer ,ideals of ,peace1 ch4 v4 #hf ,bryce1 ,holy ,roman ,empire1 p4 #cfg4 #hg ,social ,forces in ,german ,literature1 p4 #ic4 #hh ,pp4 #acj f41 #acf4 #hi ,tolstoy1 ,what is ,art8 #ij ,p4 #dj4 #ia ,see p4 #agf4 #ib ,cunningham1 ,an ,essay on ,western ,civilization1 pp4 #gg ff4 #ic ,the writer is indebted to his colleague ,professor ,mead for the significance of this for the beginnings of modern science4 #id ,civilized man has proceeded so far in his interference with extra-human nature1 has produced for himself and the living organisms associated with him such a special state of things by his rebellion against natural selection and his defiance of ,nature's prehuman dispositions1 that he must either go on and acquire firmer control of the conditions or perish miserably by the vengeance certain to fall on the half-hearted meddler in great affairs4444 ,we may think of him as the heir to a vast and magnificent kingdom who has been finally educated so as to fit him to take possession of his property1 and is at length left alone to do his best2 he has wilfully abrogated1 in many important respects1 the laws of his ,mother ,nature by which the kingdom was hitherto governed2 he has gained some power and advantage by so doing1 but is threatened on every hand by dangers and disasters hitherto restrained3 no retreat is possible--his only hope is to control1 as he knows that he can1 the sources of these dangers and disasters4 ,they already make him wince3 how long will he sit listening to the fairy-tales of his boyhood and shrink from manhood's task8--,,ray ,,lankester1 ,the ,kingdom of ,man1 #aijg1 pp4 #ca f4 #ie ,john ,dewey1 ,the ,school and ,society4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,a ,,general ,,comparison ,,of ,,customary ,,and ,,reflective ,,morality ,to eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil may result in ultimate gain4 ,a more conscious and individualistic attitude may result in definite conceptions of duty and rights1 of values and ideals4 ,at the same time1 as humanity's eyes have been opened and its wisdom increased1 many forms of nakedness unknown in ruder conditions have been disclosed4 ,with every increase of opportunity and efficiency for good there is a corresponding opportunity for evil4 ,an immensely more complex environment gives scope for correspondingly more capable and subtle personalities4 ,some will react to the situation in such a way as to rise to a higher moral level1 both in personal integrity and in public usefulness4 ,others will find in facilities for gratifying some appetite or passion a temptation too strong for their control and will become vicious1 or will seize the chances to exploit others and become unjust in their acquirement and use of power and wealth4 ,there will be a ,nero as well as an ,aurelius1 a ,caesar ,borgia as well as a ,savonarola1 a ,jeffreys as well as a ,sidney1 a ,bentham1 or a ,howard4 ,for an ,eliot or a ,livingston or an ,armstrong1 there are the exploiters of lower races2 and for an ,elizabeth ,fry1 the women who trade in the wretchedness of their kind4 ,by the side of those who use great abilities and resources unselfishly are those who view indifferently the sacrifice of human health or life1 and pay no heed to human misery4 ,such contrasts show that the evolution of morality is also an evolution of weakness1 wretchedness1 evil1 and crime4 ,they suggest some general comparisons between custom and reflective morality4 ,they require from every age a renewed analysis of conduct and the social system4 ,as a preliminary to such an analysis1 we review in this chapter some of the general relations between the morality of custom and the morality of reflection4 ,sec4 #a4 ,,elements ,,of ,,agreement ,,and ,,continuity ,the moral life shows its continuity in two ways4 ,first1 the earlier type of group and customary morality persists in part2 in the second place1 when the moral is differentiated from the other spheres of life in which it was embedded1 it does not have to find entirely new conceptions4 ,it borrows its terms from the group life or from the various spheres1 religious1 political1 aesthetic1 economic1 which separate out from the older group unity4 ,the following quotation from ,grote will serve as a vivid restatement of the regime of custom3 ,this aggregate of beliefs and predispositions to believe1 ,ethical1 ,religious1 ,aesthetical1 and ,social1 respecting what is true or false1 probable or improbable1 just or unjust1 holy or unholy1 honorable or base1 respectable or contemptible1 pure or impure1 beautiful or ugly1 decent or indecent1 obligatory to do or obligatory to avoid1 respecting the status and relations of each individual in the society1 respecting even the admissible fashions of amusement and recreation--this is an established fact and condition of things1 the real origin of which is for the most part unknown1 but which each new member of the group is born to and finds subsisting4444 ,it becomes a part of each person's nature1 a standing habit of mind1 or fixed set of mental tendencies1 according to which particular experience is interpreted and particular persons appreciated4444 ,the community hate1 despise or deride any individual member who proclaims his dissent from their social creed4444 ,their hatred manifests itself in different ways 444 at the very least by exclusion from that amount of forbearance1 good will and estimation without which the life of an individual becomes insupportable4444 ',nomos 7,law and ,custom71 king of all' 7to borrow the phrase which ,herodotus cites from ,pindar7 exercises plenary power1 spiritual and temporal1 over individual minds2 moulding the emotions as well as the intellect1 according to the local type 444 and reigning under the appearance of habitual1 self-suggested tendencies4#if ,the important facts brought out are 7#a7 the existence in a social group of certain habits not only of acting1 but of feeling and believing about actions1 of valuing or approving and disapproving4 7#b7 ,the persistent forcing of these mental habitudes upon the attention of each new member of the group4 ,the newcomer1 whether by birth or adoption1 is introduced into a social medium whose conditions and regulations he can no more escape than he can those of his physical environment4 7#c7 ,thus the mental and practical habits of the newly introduced individual are shaped4 ,the current ways of esteeming and behaving in the community become a standing habit of his own mind2 they finally reign as habitual1 self-suggested tendencies4 ,thus he becomes a full member of the social group1 interested in the social fabric to which he belongs1 and ready to do his part in maintaining it4 #a4 ,persistence of ,group ,morality4--,comparing this state of affairs with what obtains to-day in civilized communities1 we find certain obvious points of agreement4 ,the social groups with which an individual comes in touch are now more numerous and more loosely formed4 ,but everywhere there are customs not only of acting1 but of thinking and feeling about acting4 ,each profession1 each institution1 has a code of which the individual has to take account4 ,the nature of this code1 unexpressed as well as formulated1 is brought to the attention of the individual in countless ways2 by the approval and disapproval of its public opinion2 by his own failures and successes2 by his own tendency to imitate what he sees about him1 as well as by deliberate1 intentional instruction4 ,in other words1 group morality does not vanish in order that conscious and personal morality may take its place4 ,group and customary morality is still the morality of many of us most of the time1 and of all of us for a good deal of the time4 ,we do not any of us think out all of our standards1 weigh independently our values1 make all our choices in a rational manner1 or form our characters by following a clearly conceived purpose4 ,as children we all start in a family group4 ,we continue in a school group and perhaps a church group4 ,we enter an occupation group1 and later1 it may be1 family1 political1 social1 and neighborhood groups4 ,in every one of these if we are members1 we must to a certain degree accept standards that are given4 ,we have to play according to the rules of the game4 ,as children we do this unconsciously4 ,we imitate1 or follow suggestions2 we are made to conform by all the agencies of group morality--group opinion1 ritual1 pleasure and pain1 and even by taboos2#ig above all1 we act as the others act1 and cooperate more or less to a common end4 ,we form habits which persist1 many of them as long as we live4 ,we accept many of the traditions without challenge4 ,even when we pass from the early family group to the new situations and surroundings which make us repeat more or less of the experience of the race1 a large share of our conduct and of our judgments of others is determined by the influences of group and custom4 ,and it is fortunate for progress that this is true4 ,if every one had to start anew to frame all his ideals and make his laws1 we should be in as melancholy a plight morally as we should be intellectually if we had to build each science anew4 ,the fundamental safeguards which the group provides against individual impulse and passion1 the condition of close association1 interdependence and mutual sympathy which the group affords1 the habituation to certain lines of conduct valued by the group--all this is a root on which the stem and flower of personal morality may grow4 ,individualism and intellectual activity1 however necessary to man's progress1 would give no morality did they not start out of this deeper level of common feeling and common destiny4 ,the rational and personal agencies of the third level come not to destroy1 but to fulfill the meaning of the forces and agencies of the first and second levels described in ,chapters ,,iii and ,,iv4 #b4 ,the ,moral ,conceptions4--,the conceptions for the moral are nearly all taken from the group relations or from the jural and religious aspects1 as these have been gradually brought to clearer consciousness4 ,as already noted1 the ,greek term ethical1 the ,latin moral1 the ,german sittlich1 suggest this--ethos meant the sum of the characteristic usages1 ideas1 standards1 and codes by which a group was differentiated and individualized in character from other groups4#ih ,some specific moral terms come directly from group relations4 ,the kind man acts as one of the kin4 ,when the ruling or privileged group is contrasted with the man of no family or of inferior birth1 we get a large number of terms implying superiority or inferiority in birth1 and so of general value4 ,this may or may not be due to some inherent superiority of the upper class1 but it means at least that the upper class has been most effectual in shaping language and standards of approval4 ,so noble and gentle referred to birth before they had moral value2 duty in modern usage seems to have been principally what was due to a superior4 ,many words for moral disapproval are very significant of class feeling4 ,the caitiff was a captive1 and the ,italians have their general term for morally bad1 cattivo1 from the same idea4 ,the villain was a feudal tenant1 the blackguard looked after the kettles1 the rascal was one of the common herd1 the knave was the servant2 the base and mean were opposed to the gentle and noble4 ,another set of conceptions reflects the old group approvals or combines these with conceptions of birth4 ,we have noted the twofold root of kalokagathia in ,greek4 ,honor and honesty were what the group admired1 and conversely aischros and turpe in ,greek and ,latin1 like the ,english disgraceful or shameful1 were what the group condemned4 ,virtue was the manly excellence which called out the praise of a warlike time1 while one of the ,greek terms for morally bad originally meant cowardly1 and our scoundrel has possibly the same origin4 ,the bad was probably the weak or the womanish4 ,the economic appears in merit1 what ,i have earned1 and likewise in duty and ought1 what is due or owed--though duty seems to have made itself felt especially1 as noted above1 toward a superior4 ,forethought and skill in practical affairs provided the conception of wisdom1 which was highest of the virtues for the ,greeks1 and as prudence stood high in mediaeval systems4 ,the conception of valuing and thus of forming some permanent standard of a better and a worse1 is also aided1 if not created1 by economic exchange4 ,it appears in almost identical terms in ,plato and the ,new ,testament in the challenge1 ,what shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own life8#ii ,from the processes of fine or useful arts came probably the conceptions of measure1 order1 and harmony4 ,a whole mode of considering the moral life is jural4 ,moral law1 authority1 obligation1 responsibility1 justice1 righteousness1 bring with them the associations of group control and of the more definitely organized government and law4 ,finally the last named terms bear also a religious imprint1 and numerous conceptions of the moral come from that sphere or get their specific flavor from religious usage4 ,the conceptions of the soul have contributed to the ideal of a good which is permanent1 and which is made rather by personal companionship1 than by sensuous gratification4 ,purity began as a magical and religious idea2 it came to symbolize not only freedom from contamination but singleness of purpose4 ,chastity lends a religious sacredness to a virtue which had its roots largely in the conception of property4 ,wicked is from witch4 ,we have indeed certain conceptions drawn from individual experiences of instinct1 or reflection4 ,from the sense recoil from what was disgusting such conceptions as foul1 and from kindred imagery of what suits eye or muscular sense come straightforward1 upright1 steady4 ,from the thinking process itself we have conscience4 ,this word in ,greek and ,latin was a general term for consciousness and suggests one of the distinctive1 perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the moral4 ,for it implies a conscious thoughtful attitude1 which operates not only in forming purposes1 but in measuring and valuing action by the standards it approves4 ,but it is evident that by far the larger part of our ethical terms are derived from social relations in the broad sense4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,elements ,,of ,,contrast ,differentiation of the ,moral4--,the most obvious difference between the present and the early attitude is that we now make a clear distinction between the moral aspect of behavior and other aspects such as the conventional1 the political1 the legal2 while in customary morality all activities esteemed by society were put upon the same level and enforced with the same vigor4 ,matters which we should regard as purely matters of fashion or etiquette1 or as modes of amusement1 such as styles of wearing the hair1 were imperative4 ,to mutilate the body in a certain way was as exigent as to observe certain marriage customs2 to refrain from speaking to the mother-in-law as binding as to obey the chieftain2 not to step over the shadow of the chief was even more important than not to murder the member of another tribe4 ,in general we make a clear distinction between manners and morals1 while in customary morality manners are morals1 as the very words ethical1 moral still testify4 ,when ,grote speaks of ,ethical1 ,religious1 ,aesthetical1 and ,social beliefs1 the term ethical belongs with the other terms only from a modern standpoint4 ,the characteristic thing about the condition of which he is speaking is that the religious1 aesthetical1 and social beliefs brought to bear upon the individual constitute the ethical4 ,we make the distinction between them as naturally as the regime of custom failed to make it4 ,only by imagining a social set in which failure to observe punctiliously the fashions of the set as to the proper style of dress makes the person subject to a disparagement which influences his feelings and ideas as keenly and in the same way as conviction of moral delinquency1 can we realize the frame of mind characteristic of the ethics of custom4 ,observing versus ,reflecting4--,customs may be observed4 ,indeed1 customary morality made goodness or rightness of character practically identical with observing the established order of social estimations in all departments4 ,this word observe is significant3 it means to note1 or notice as matter of fact1 by perception2 and it means to yield allegiance1 to conform to1 in action4#ajj ,the element of intelligence1 of reason1 is thus reduced to a minimum4 ,the moral values are there1 so to speak1 palpably1 tangibly2 and the individual has only to use his mind enough to notice them4 ,and since they are forced upon his notice by drastic and unrelaxing methods of discipline1 little initiative is required for even the attitude of attention4 ,but when the moral is something which is in customs and habits1 rather than those customs themselves1 the good and right do not stand out in so obvious and external fashion4 ,recognition now demands thought1 reflection2 the power of abstraction and generalization4 ,a child may be shown in a pretty direct and physical fashion the difference between meum and tuum in its bearing upon his conduct3 a fence may be pointed at which divides his yard from that of a neighbor and which draws as well the moral line between what is permissible and what is forbidden2 a whipping may intensify the observation4 ,but modern business knows also of intangible property--good will1 reputation1 credit4 ,these1 indeed1 can be bought and sold but the detection of their existence and nature demands an intelligence which is more than perception4 ,the greater number of duties and rights of which present morality consists are of just this type4 ,they are relations1 not just outward habits4 ,their acknowledgment requires accordingly something more than just to follow and reproduce existing customs4 ,it involves power to see why certain habits are to be followed1 what makes a thing good or bad4 ,conscience is thus substituted for custom2 principles take the place of external rules4 ,this is what we mean by calling present morality reflective rather than customary4 ,it is not that social customs have ceased to be1 or even have been reduced in number4 ,the exact contrary is the case4 ,it is not that they have shrunk in importance1 or that they have less significance for the individual's activity1 or claim less of his attention4 ,again1 the reverse is the case4 ,but the individual has to grasp the meaning of these customs over and above the bare fact of their existence1 and has to guide himself by their meaning and not by the mere fact noted4#aja ,custom is ,static4--,this difference introduces a second very important difference4 ,in customary morality1 there is no choice between being enmeshed in the net of social rules which control activity1 and being an outlaw--one beyond the pale1 whose hand is against every man's1 and every man's against him4 ,the extent to which social customs are regarded as of divine origin and are placed under the protection of the gods1 i4e41 the tendency of all sanctions to become religious and supernatural1 is evidence of the binding force of institutions upon the individual4 ,to violate them is impiety1 sacrilege1 and calls down the wrath of gods1 as well as of men4 ,the custom cannot be questioned4 ,to inquire means uncertainty1 and hence it is immoral1 an attack upon the very foundations of the life of the group4 ,the apparent exception1 which after all exhibits the rule1 is the case of great reforming heroes who demarcate epochs of history even in customary societies4 ,such individuals meet contemporary opposition and persecution2 it is only by victory1 by signal success over a rival faction at home1 over plague and famine1 or over an enemy abroad1 that the hero is justified4 ,thereby it is proved that the gods are with him and sanction his changes--indeed that he is their own chosen instrument4 ,then the modified or new customs and institutions have all the binding sacredness and supernatural sanction of the old4 ,it is not yet an outgrown story for the fathers to kill the prophets1 and for the sons to build and adorn their tombs1 and make them into shrines4 ,reflection ,discovers a ,higher ,law4--,but in so far as the individual's activity is directed by his comprehension of the meaning of customs1 not by his apprehension of their existence1 so far the notion of moral progress or reform in social affairs becomes ethically important and greater moral responsibility is put upon the individual just as greater practical freedom is secured to him4 ,for 7a7 the individual may set the meaning of a custom against its present form2 or 7b7 he may find the meaning of some custom much more commanding in value than that of others1 and yet find that its realization is hindered by the existence of these other customs of less moral importance4 ,on the basis of such discrimination1 the abolition or1 at least1 the modification of certain social habits is demanded4 ,so far as this sort of situation frequently recurs1 the individual 7c7 becomes more or less vaguely aware that he must not accept the current standard as justification of his own conduct1 unless it also justify itself to his own moral intelligence4 ,the fact that it exists gives it indeed a certain prima facie claim1 but no ultimate moral warrant4 ,perhaps the custom is itself wrong--and the individual is responsible for bearing this possibility in mind4 ,consequent ,transformation of ,custom4--,of course the plane of customary morality still persists2 no wholesale divergence of reflective from customary morality exists4 ,practically1 for example1 many business men do not bother themselves about the morality of certain ways of doing business4 ,such and such is the custom of the trade1 and if a man is going to do business at all he must follow its customs--or get out4 ,law1 medicine1 the ministry1 journalism1 family life1 present1 in considerable extent1 the same phenomenon4 ,customary morality persists1 almost as the core of present morality4 ,but there is still a difference4 ,a few1 at least1 are actively engaged in a moral criticism of the custom1 in a demand for its transformation2 and almost everybody is sufficiently affected by the discussions and agitations thus called out to have some lingering and uneasy idea of responsibility for his part in the maintenance of a questionable custom4 ,the duty of some exercise of discriminating intelligence as to existing customs for the sake of improvement and progress1 is thus a mark of reflective morality--of the regime of conscience as over against custom4 ,in the morally more advanced members of contemporary society1 the need of fostering a habit of examination and judgment1 of keeping the mind open1 sensitive1 to the defects and the excellences of the existing social order is recognized as obligation4 ,to reflect on one's own behavior in relation to the existing order is a standing habit of mind4 ,deepening of ,meaning4--,while the materials and conceptions of more conscious morality are provided by the earlier stages1 and taken from other spheres of life1 we find that these conceptions naturally undergo a deepening of meaning when they are used to express the more intimate and personal attitude4 ,take1 for example1 the conceptions borrowed from the jural sphere4 ,it is in the school of government and courts that man has learned to talk and think of right and law1 of responsibility and justice4 ,to make these moral instead of jural terms1 the first thing that is needed is that we make the whole process an inward one4 ,the person must himself set up a standard1 recognize it as law1 judge his conduct by it1 hold himself responsible to himself1 and seek to do justice4 ,it takes several persons to carry on these processes in the realm of government4 ,legislators1 judges1 jury1 executive officers1 all represent the ,state1 organized society4 ,that a single person can be himself lawgiver1 judge1 and jury1 as well as claimant or defendant1 shows that he is himself a complex being4 ,he is a being of passions1 appetites1 and individual interests1 but he is also a being who has a rational and social nature4 ,as a member of society he not only feels his individual interest but recognizes social interests4 ,as a rational being he not only feels the thrill of passion but responds to the authority of a law and obeys the voice of duty4 ,like a member of a democratic ,state he finds himself in the sphere of conduct1 not only a subject but a sovereign1 and feels the dignity of a person4 ,a conscientious person is in so far one who has made the law of ,god or man an inward law of life--a moral law4 ,but the act of making the process inward makes possible a deepening of meaning4 ,governments and courts are necessarily limited in purview and fallible in decisions4 ,they are sometimes too lenient1 sometimes too severe4 ,conscience implies a knowledge of the whole act--purpose1 motive1 and deed4 ,its authority makes claim for absolute obedience4 ,the laws of the ,state are felt to be binding just because they are believed to be1 on the whole1 right and just as measured by this moral court of appeal4 ,when they conflict1 the power may be with the political sovereign1 but the man whose conscience is clear believes that he follows a higher law4 ,much of the great literature of the world draws its interest from its portrayal of this fundamental fact of human experience4 ,two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe1 the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them3 the starry heavens above and the moral law within4 ,the conceptions taken from the economic sphere show similar deepening4 ,in the economic world things are good or have value if people want them4 ,it is in the experience of satisfying wants that man has learned the language of good and evil1 and to compare one good with another2 it is doubtless by the progress of science and the arts that objective standards of more permanent1 rational1 and social goods are provided4 ,when this term is taken up to a higher level and given moral meaning1 two new factors appear4 ,first the individual begins to consider his various goods and values in relation to each other and to his life as a whole4 ,in the second place1 in thus comparing the various goods and the desires they satisfy1 he begins to realize that in some way he is himself more than the mere sum of his natural instincts and appetites4 ,he finds that he can take an interest in certain things1 and is not merely passive4 ,he gives value as well as measures it4 ,he feels that as such an active and organizing judge and creator of value1 he himself has a higher worth than any of the particular things that gratify particular desires4 ,a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things that he possesseth4 ,the life is more than meat4 ,or1 to use the phrase which will be explained later1 moral good implies purpose1 character1 good will4 ,in common language1 it implies being1 and not merely having4 ,the term good where used in our judgments upon others 7as in a good man71 may have a different history4 ,as has been noted1 it may come from class feeling1 or from the praise we give to acts as they immediately please4 ,it may be akin to noble or fine or admirable4 ,all such conceptions undergo a similar transformation as they pass from the sphere of class or public opinion to become moral terms4 ,as moral they imply in the first place that we consider not merely outward acts1 but inward purpose and character4 ,they imply in the second place that we who judge are ourselves acting not as members of a class1 not as merely emotional beings1 but as social and rational4 ,our moral judgments in this sense are from a general1 a universal standard2 those of a class are partial4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,opposition ,,between ,,individual ,,and ,,social ,,aims ,,and ,,standards ,withdrawal from the ,social ,order4--,the development of reflection tends to set up a moral opposition between the individual and society4 ,sometimes conscience goes beyond the need of criticizing1 of discriminating1 of interpreting social customs1 of following their spirit rather than their letter2 it takes the form of an assertion of a purely inner1 personal morality1 so distinct from the conditions of social life that the latter are conceived to be totally lacking in positive moral significance4 ,the prescriptions of morality are thought to be revealed in conscience1 as a faculty of pure intuition or revelation1 receiving neither material nor warrant from social conditions4 ,the distinction already spoken of between the moral and the economic1 legal1 or conventional1 is conceived as a complete separation2 customs and institutions are external1 indifferent1 irrelevant1 or even hostile to the ideal and personally perceived demands of morality4 ,such a conception of morality is especially likely to arise in a period when through the clash of ways and standards of living1 all customs1 except those maintained by force and authority1 are disintegrating or relaxing4 ,such a state existed in the early years of the ,roman empire when1 for the first time in history1 local boundaries were systematically overstepped2 when the empire was a seething mixture of alien and unlike gods1 beliefs1 ideals1 standards1 practices4 ,in the almost universal flux and confusion1 external order was maintained by the crystallized legislation and administration of ,rome2 but personal aims and modes of behavior had to be ascertained by the individual thrown back upon himself4 ,christian1 ,stoic1 ,epicurean1 alike found the political order wholly external to the moral1 or in chronic opposition to it4 ,there was a withdrawal into the region of personal consciousness4 ,in some cases the withdrawal was pushed to the point where men felt that they could be truly righteous only by going by themselves into the desert1 to live as hermits2 or by forming separate communities of those who agreed in their conceptions of life2 mental and moral aloofness from prevailing social standards and habitudes was preached by all4 ,individual ,emancipation4--,in other cases1 what takes place is a consciousness of liberation2 of assertion of personal rights and privileges1 claims for new modes of activity and new kinds of enjoyment4 ,the individual feels that he is his own end2 that the impulses and capacities which he finds in himself are sacred1 and afford the only genuine law for his behavior2 that whatever restricts the full exercise of these personal powers and hampers the satisfaction of personal desires is coercive and morally abnormal4 ,existing social institutions may be practically necessary1 but they are morally undesirable2 they are to be used1 or got around in the interests of personal gratifications4 ,as some feel that social conditions are hostile to the realization of the highest moral obligations1 so others feel that they are hostile to the full possession of their rights1 of that to which they are properly entitled4 ,eventual ,transformation of ,social ,values and ,aims4--,in extreme cases1 the individual may come to believe that1 either on the basis of his true obligations or his true rights1 the very principle of society is morally indifferent or even unworthy2 that the moral life is eventually or intrinsically an individual matter1 although it happens to be outwardly led under social conditions4 ,but in the main the opposition is not to the social relations as such1 but to existing institutions and customs as inadequate4 ,then the reaction of the individual against the existing social scheme1 whether on the ground of ideals too high to be supported by it or on the ground of personal claims to which it does not afford free play1 becomes a means to the reconstruction and transformation of social habits4 ,in this way1 reflective morality is a mark of a progressive society1 just as customary morality is of a stationary society4 ,reflection on values is the method of their modification4 ,the monastic ,christian in his outward withdrawal from social life1 still maintained the conception of a perfected society1 of a kingdom of ,god or ,heaven to be established4 ,this ideal became to some extent the working method for changing the existing order4 ,the ,stoics1 who held in light esteem existing community ties1 had the conception of a universal community1 a cosmopolis1 ruled by universal law1 of which every rational being was a member and subject4 ,this notion became operative to some extent in the development of judicial and administrative systems much more generalized and equitable than the purely local customs1 laws1 and standards which it swept away4 ,the ,epicurean had the ideal of friendship on the basis of which were formed groups of congenial associates held together neither by legal ties1 nor by universal laws of reason1 nor by unity of religious aspiration and belief1 but by friendship and companionable intercourse4 ,thus were afforded other centers of social reconstruction4 ,sec4 #d4 ,,effects ,,upon ,,the ,,individual ,,character ,general ,effects4--,the characteristic differences which have been pointed out in the preceding section1 when taken together with the specific conditions of change--liberty of action and thought1 incentives to private acquisition1 facilities for power and pleasure--enable us to understand the contrasts referred to at the opening of the chapter4 ,we have1 on the one hand1 the inbred craving for power1 for acquisition1 for excitement1 for gratification of sense and appetite1 enhanced by what it feeds on4 ,we have1 on the other hand1 the progressive differentiation of the moral1 tearing the individual loose from the bonds of the external moral order and forcing him to stand on his own feet--or fall4 ,note how each of the points brought out in the preceding section operates4 7#a7 ,to separate out the moral as a distinct element from certain spheres of life1 allows the less seriously minded and the less sympathetic individuals to live complacently a trivial or unscrupulous life4 ,fashion1 social duties1 amusements1 culture emptied of all earnest meaning1 business and politics divorced from any humane or public considerations1 may be regarded as justifiable vocations4 ,a gentleman who no longer has the occupation of his fighting predecessors as an excuse for a distinct type of life1 may find the support of a large leisure class in declining any useful service to the community and devoting himself to sport2 a lady may be so engaged by the multifarious demands of society as never to notice what an utterly worthless round she follows4 7#b7 ,the fact that the morality of conscience requires reflection1 progress1 and a deeper meaning for its conception1 makes it obvious why many fail to grasp any moral meaning at all4 ,they fail to put forth the effort1 or to break with habit4 ,under customary morality it was enough to observe and to continue in the mores4 ,it requires a higher degree of insight and a greater initiative to get any moral attitude at all when the forms have become mere forms and the habits mere habits4 ,hence when a change in personal environment or in general social and economic conditions comes1 many fail to see the principles involved4 ,they remain completely satisfied with the old-fashioned virtues or intrench themselves in the righteousness and honesty of a past generation4 ,this habitual and painless morality will often mean a virtue or righteousness which involves no conflict with present conditions4 ,a man who feels honest because he does not break contracts or defraud in old-fashioned ways1 may be quite at ease about watering stock or adulterating goods4 ,a society which abhors murder with iron and explosives in the form of daggers and bombs1 may feel quite unconcerned about the preventable homicides by iron machinery1 or by explosives used in coal mines4 7#c7 ,the conflict with society which reflective morality requires1 works to thrust some below the general level1 while it raises others above it4 ,to criticize the general moral order may make a man a prophet1 but it may also make him a ,pharisee4 ,practical reaction may make reformers1 but it is likely to make another set of men dissolute2 to make them feel superior to the morality of ,philistines and therefore exempt from social restraints4 ,vices ,incident to ,reflective ,stage4--,the vices increase with civilization1 partly because of increased opportunity1 partly because of increased looseness in social restraint4 ,there is a further element4 ,when any activity of man is cut off from its original and natural relations and made the object of special attention and pursuit1 the whole adjustment is thrown out of balance4 ,what was before a useful function becomes pathological4 ,the craving for excitement or stimulation is normal within certain limits4 ,in the chase or the battle1 in the venture of the explorer or the merchant1 it functions as a healthy incentive4 ,when isolated as an end in itself1 taken out of the objective social situation1 it becomes the spring of gambling or drunkenness4 ,the instincts and emotions of sex1 possessing power and interest necessitated by their place in the continuance of the race1 become when isolated the spring of passion or of obscenity or lubricity4 ,avarice and gluttony illustrate the same law4 ,the gladiatorial shows at ,rome became base and cowardly when the ,romans were themselves no longer fighters4#ajb ,even the aspiration for what is higher and better may become an otherworldliness which leaves this world to its misery and evil4 ,such a series of pictures as ,balzac has given in his ,comedie ,humaine1 shows better than any labored description the possibilities of modern civilization4 ,there is1 moreover1 in civilized society a further most demoralizing agency unknown to earlier life4 ,as the vices are specialized and pursued they become economic and political interests4 ,vast capital is invested in the business of ministering to the vicious appetites4 ,it is pecuniarily desirable that these appetites should be stimulated as greatly as possible4 ,it makes business4 ,the tribute levied by public officials upon the illegal pursuits forms a vast fund for carrying elections4 ,the multitude engaged in the traffic or dependent upon it for favors1 can be relied upon to cast their votes as a unit for men who will guarantee protection4 ,relations to ,fellow ,men4--,the motives and occasions for selfishness and injustice have been indicated sufficiently perhaps in preceding chapters4 ,as the general process of increasing individuality and reflection goes on1 it is an increasingly easy matter to be indifferent or even unjust4 ,when all lead a common life it is easy to enter into the situation of another1 to appreciate his motives1 his needs1 and in general to put yourself in his place4 ,the external nature of the conduct makes it easy to hold all to a common standard4 ,the game must be shared2 the property--so far as there is property--respected2 the religious rites observed4 ,but when standards becomes more inward the more intelligent or rigorous may find sympathy less easy4 ,when they attempt to be charitable they may easily become condescending4 ,the pure will not soil their skirts by contact with the fallen4 ,the high-minded citizen refuses to mix in politics4 ,the scholar thinks the business man materialistic4 ,the man of breeding1 wealth1 and education finds the uneducated laborer lacking in courtesy and refinement and argues that it is useless to waste sympathy upon the masses4 ,the class terms which have become moral terms are illustrations of this attitude4 ,finally1 the moral process of building up freedom and right easily leads to a disposition to stand on rights and let other persons look out for themselves4 ,kant's doctrine1 that since all morality is personal ,i can do nothing to promote my neighbor's perfection1 is a laissez faire in ethics which he did not carry out1 but it is a not unnatural corollary of reflective morality4 ,am ,i my brother's keeper8 is much more likely to be the language of reflective1 than of customary and group life4 ,reconstructive ,forces4--,we have dwelt at length upon the disintegrating forces1 not because civilization necessarily grows worse1 but because1 having pointed out in earlier chapters the positive advances1 it becomes necessary to allude also to the other aspect of the process4 ,otherwise it might appear that there is no problem4 ,if the evolution were supposed to be all in one direction there would be no seriousness in life4 ,it is only in the pressure of constantly new difficulties and evils that moral character adds new fiber1 and moral progress emerges4 ,individualism1 self-seeking1 and desire for property force the establishment of governments and courts which protect poor as well as rich4 ,luxury and ostentation have not only called out the asceticism which renounces the world and sees in all gratification of appetite an evil2 they have brought into the fore the serious meaning of life2 they have served to emphasize the demand for social justice4 ,the countless voluntary associations for the relief of sickness1 misfortune1 and poverty2 for aiding the defective1 dependent1 and criminal2 for promoting numberless good causes--enlist a multitude in friendly co-operation4 ,the rising demand for legislation to embody the new sentiments of justice is part of the process of reconstruction4 ,and now when all the arts and goods of civilization are becoming more and more fully the work1 not of any individual's labor or skill1 but rather of the combined labor and intelligence of many1 when life in cities is necessitating greater interdependence1 finally when contrasts in conditions are brought more forcibly to notice by the very progress of knowledge and the means of knowledge1--the more thoroughly social use of all that civilization produces becomes more insistent and compelling4 ,it is not a matter of sentiment but of necessity4 ,if any one is disposed to deny the claim1 it becomes increasingly certain that ,carlyle's ,irish widow will prove her sisterhood by infecting the denier with fever2#ajc that the ignorant1 or criminal1 or miserable will jeopardize his happiness4 ,sec4 #e4 ,,moral ,,differentiation ,,and ,,the ,,social ,,order ,two processes went on side by side in the movement we have traced4 7#a7 ,the primitive group1 which was at once a kinship or family1 an economic1 a political1 a religious1 an educational1 and a moral unit1 was broken down and replaced by several distinct institutions1 each with its own special character4 7#b7 ,the moral1 which was so largely unreflective that it could be embodied in every custom and observance1 became more personal and subjective4 ,the result of this was either that the moral was now more consciously and voluntarily put into the social relations1 thereby raising them all to a higher moral level1 or that1 failing such a leavening of the distinct spheres of the social order1 the latter were emptied of moral value and lost moral restraints4 ,we notice very briefly certain illustrations of this1 leaving a fuller treatment for ,part ,,iii4 ,the ,family4--,when the family was largely determined by status1 when it was an economic1 a political1 and a religious unit1 it had a strong support4 ,but the support was largely external to the true purpose and meaning of the family4 ,only as these other elements were separated1 and the family placed on a voluntary basis1 could its true significance emerge4 ,affection and mutual supplementation of husband and wife1 love and devotion to offspring1 must stand the strains formerly distributed over several ties4 ,the best types of family life which have resulted from this more moral basis are unquestionably far superior to the older form4 ,at the same time the difficulties and perversion or subversion of the more voluntary type are manifest4 ,when no personal attachment was sought or professed1 or when marriage by purchase was the approved custom1 the marriage contracted under these conditions might have all the value which the general state of intelligence and civilization allowed4 ,when the essential feature which hallows the union has come to be recognized as a union of will and affection1 then marriage without these1 however solemnized1 almost inevitably means moral degradation4 ,and if the consent of the parties is regarded as the basis of the tie1 then it is difficult to make sure that this consent has within it enough of steadfast1 well-considered purpose and of emotional depth to take the place of all the older sanctions and to secure permanent unions4 ,the more complete responsibility for the children which has been gained by the separation of the family1 has also proved susceptible of abuse as well as of service4 ,for while savages have often practiced infanticide for economic reasons1 it is doubtful if any savage family ever equaled the more refined selfishness and cruelty of the child labor which modern families have furnished and modern society has permitted4 ,the ,economic and ,industrial4--,the economic lost powerful restraints when it became a separate activity divorced from family1 religious1 and1 in the view of some1 from moral considerations4 ,it has worked out certain important moral necessities of its own4 ,honesty1 the keeping of contracts1 the steadiness and continuity of character fostered by economic relations1 are important contributions4 ,modern business1 for example1 is the most effective agency in securing sobriety4 ,it is far more efficient than temperance societies4 ,other values of the economic and industrial process--the increase of production1 the interchange of services and goods1 the new means of happiness afforded by the increase of wealth--are obvious4 ,on the other hand1 the honesty required by business is a most technical and peculiarly limited sort4 ,it does not interfere with adulteration of goods under certain conditions1 nor with corrupt bargains with public officials4 ,the measurement of values on a purely pecuniary basis tends to release a large sphere of activity from any moral restraints4 ,the maxim ,business is business may be made the sanction for any kind of conduct not excluded by commercial standards4 ,unless there is a constant injection of moral valuation and control1 there is a tendency to subvert all other ends and standards to the purely economic4 ,law and ,government4--,to remove these functions from the kinship group as such1 is at once to bring the important principles of authority and duty1 and gradually of rights and freedom1 to consciousness4 ,only by such separation could the universality and impartiality of law be established4 ,and only by universality can the judgment of the society as a whole be guaranteed its execution as over against the variations in intelligence and right purpose of individual rulers and judges4 ,moreover1 the separation of law from morality has likewise its gain or loss4 ,on the one hand1 to separate off a definite sphere of external acts to which alone physical constraints or penalties may attach1 is at once to free a great sphere of inner thought and purpose and to enable purely psychical values and restraints to attain far greater power in conduct4 ,liberty of thought and religious belief1 sincerity and thorough responsibility1 require such a separation4 ,it is also to make possible a general law which rises above the conscience of the lower even if it does not always reach the level of the most enlightened and just4 ,to make a command a universal law is itself a steadying and elevating influence1 and it is only by a measure of abstraction from the individual1 inner aspect of conduct that this can be achieved4 ,on the other hand1 the not infrequent contrast between law and justice1 the substitution of technicality for substantials1 the conservatism which made ,voltaire characterize lawyers as the conservators of ancient barbarous usages1 above all the success with which law has been used to sanction or even facilitate nearly every form of oppression1 extortion1 class advantage1 or even judicial murder1 is a constant attestation of the twofold possibilities inherent in all institutions4 ,government in other functions exhibits similar possibilities4 ,at first it was tyranny against which the subject had to defend himself4 ,now it is rather the use of political machinery for private gain4 ,eternal vigilance is the price not only of freedom1 but of every moral value4 ,the ,religious ,life4--,when freed from interdependence with kinship1 economic1 and political association1 religion has an opportunity to become more personal and more universal4 ,when a man's religious attitude is not fixed by birth1 when worship is not so closely bound up with economic interests1 when there is not only religious toleration1 but religious liberty1 the significance of religion as a personal1 spiritual relation comes to view4 ,the kinship tie is sublimated into a conception of divine fatherhood4 ,it becomes credible that ,job does serve ,god for naught4 ,faith and purity of heart are not secured by magistrates or laws4 ,and the universality of religion is no less a gain4 ,so far as religion was of the group it tended to emphasize the boundary between ,jew and ,gentile1 ,greek and ,barbarian1 between the we-group and the others-group4 ,but when this group religion gave place to a more universal religion1 the kingdom of ,israel could give place to the kingdom of ,god2 brotherhood could transcend family or national lines4 ,in the fierce struggles of the ,middle ,ages the church was a powerful agency for restraining the powerful and softening the feuds of hostile clans and peoples4 ,the peace of ,god was not only a symbol of a far-off ideal1 but an actual relief4 ,the universality might indeed be sought by force in a crusade of ,christian against ,moslem1 or in the horror of a thirty years' war between ,catholic and ,protestant4 ,but as the conception of religion as a spiritual relation becomes clearer1 the tendency must inevitably be to disclose religion as essentially a unifying rather than a divisive and discordant force4 ,if any religion becomes universal it will be because of its universal appeal4 ,and so far as it does make universal appeal1 like science1 like art1 it invites its followers4 ,the differentiation of the moral from the religious is often difficult to trace4 ,for the religious has often been the agency through which certain of the characteristics of the moral have been brought about4 ,the inward and voluntary aspect of the moral1 as compared with the verdicts of law or public opinion1 has been emphasized4 ,but this is often developed by the religious conceptions of an all-seeing ,god1 an all-wise judge4 ,man looketh on the outer appearance1 but the ,lord looketh upon the heart has its literary parallels in ,xenophon and ,plato and ,shakspere4 ,the distinction between higher and lower values has received its most impressive symbol in the conception of another world1 in which there is neither pain nor sin1 but eternal blessedness and eternal life4 ,ideals of character1 when embodied in divine persons1 command love1 reverence1 and devotion in supreme degree4 ,a society in which love and justice are the law of life has seemed more possible1 more potent to inspire sacrifice and enthusiasm1 when envisaged as the ,kingdom of ,god4 ,but in all these illustrations we have1 not the religious as distinct from the moral1 but the religious as modified by the moral and embodying the moral in concrete examples and imagery4 ,we can see the two possible types of development1 however1 in the concrete instances of the ,hebrews and the ,greeks4 ,in ,israel religion was able to take up the moral ideals and become itself more completely ethical4 ,the prophets of religion were at the same time the moral reformers4 ,but in ,greece1 in spite of the efforts of some of the great poets1 the religious conceptions for the most part remained set and hence became superstition1 or emotional orgy1 or ecstasy1 while the moral found a distinct path of its own4 ,religion at present is confronting the problem of whether it will be able to take up into itself the newer ethical values--the scientific spirit which seeks truth1 the enhanced value of human worth which demands higher types of social justice4 99 99 99 99 99 ,a brief characterization of the respective standpoints of religion and morality may be added1 as they both aim to control and give value to human conduct4 ,the religious has always implied some relation of man's life to unseen powers or to the cosmos4 ,the relation may be the social relation of kin or friend or companion1 the political of subject to a sovereign1 the cosmic relation of dependence1 or that of seeking in the divine completer meaning or more perfect fulfillment for what is fragmentary and imperfect4 ,in its aspect of faith it holds all these ideals of power1 wisdom1 goodness1 justice1 to be real and effective4 ,the moral1 on the other hand1 concerns itself1 not with unseen beings or cosmic reality1 but with human purposes and the relations of a man to his fellows4 ,for religion1 conscience may be the voice of ,god2 for morality1 it must be stated in terms of thought and feeling4 ,the moral law must be viewed as a law which is capable of being approved1 at least--and this implies that it may also be criticized--by the mind4 ,the difference which religion states as a choice between ,god and mammon1 between heaven and earth1 morality must state in terms of good and evil1 right and wrong1 ideal interests and natural appetites4 ,instead of regarding its standards as laws established once for all by a divine authority1 morality seeks to reach principles4 ,instead of embodying its ideals in persons1 the moral seeks to reshape them continually4 ,it is for religion to hold that ,god reigns1 and therefore ,all's right with the world4 ,the moral as such must be continually overcoming evil1 continually working out ideals into conduct1 and changing the natural order into a more rational and social order4 ,,footnotes3 #if ,grote1 ,plato and the ,other ,companions of ,sokrates1 ,vol4 ,i41 p4 #bdi4 #ig ,nearly every railway journey or other occasion for observing family discipline discloses the prevalence of this agency of savage morality4 ,if you are not quiet ,i'll give you to the conductor1 the black man will get you1 ,santa ,claus will not give presents to naughty children4 ,that persons who in many respects are kindly and decent should aim to cultivate morality by a system of deliberate lying and more or less brutal cruelty is one of the interesting phenomena of education4 ,the savages who used taboos believed what they said4 #ih ,sumner1 ,folkways1 p4 #cf4 #ii ,plato's wording is given on p4 #acb4 #ajj ,recognition has the same double sense4 ,so has acknowledgment1 with greater emphasis upon rendering allegiance in action4 #aja ,logically1 this means that intelligence works conceptually1 not perceptually alone4 #ajb ,sumner1 ,folkways1 p4 #egj4 #ajc ,one of ,dr4 ,alison's ,scotch facts struck us much4 ,a poor ,irish ,widow1 her husband having died in one of the ,lanes of ,edinburgh1 went forth with her three children1 bare of all resources1 to solicit help from the ,charitable ,establishments of that ,city4 ,at this ,charitable ,establishment and then at that she was refused2 referred from one to the other1 helped by none2 till she had exhausted them all2 till her strength and heart failed her2 she sank down in typhus-fever2 died1 and infected her ,lane with fever1 so that 'seventeen other persons' died of fever there in consequence4444 ,the forlorn ,irish ,widow applies to her fellow creatures1 as if saying1 ',behold ,i am sinking1 bare of help2 ye must help me6 ,i am your sister1 bone of your bone2 one ,god made us2 ye must help me4' ,they answer1 ',no1 impossible2 thou art no sister of ours4' ,but she proves her sisterhood2 her typhus fever kills them3 7,past and ,present1 ,book ,,iii41 ch4 ii47 99 99 99 99 99 ,,part ,,ii ,,theory ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,life ,,general ,,literature ,,for ,,part ,,ii ,among the works which have had the most influence upon the development of the theory of morals are3 ,plato1 dialogues entitled ,republic1 ,laws1 ,protagoras and ,gorgias2 ,aristotle1 ,ethics2 ,cicero1 ,de ,finibus and ,de ,officiis2 ,marcus ,aurelius1 ,meditations2 ,epictetus1 ,conversations2 ,lucretius1 ,de ,rerum ,natura2 ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas 7selected and translated by ,rickaby under title of ,aquinas ,ethicus72 ,hobbes1 ,leviathan2 ,spinoza1 ,ethics2 ,shaftesbury1 ,characteristics1 and ,inquiry concerning ,virtue2 ,hutcheson1 ,system of ,moral ,philosophy2 ,butler1 ,sermons2 ,hume1 ,essays1 ,principles of ,morals2 ,adam ,smith1 ,theory of ,moral ,sentiments2 ,bentham1 ,principles of ,morals and ,legislation2 ,kant1 ,critique of ,practical ,reason1 and ,foundations of the ,metaphysics of ,ethics2 ,comte1 ,social ,physics 7in his ,course of ,positive ,philosophy72 ,mill1 ,utilitarianism2 ,spencer1 ,principles of ,ethics2 ,green1 ,prolegomena to ,ethics2 ,sidgwick1 ,methods of ,ethics2 ,selby-,bigge1 ,british ,moralists1 #b vols4 7a convenient collection of selections74 ,for contemporary treatises1 and histories consult the literature referred to in ch4 i4 of ,part ,i4 ,,chapter ,x ,,the ,,moral ,,situation ,object of ,part ,two and of ,present ,chapter4--,from the history of morals1 we turn to the theoretical analysis of reflective morality4 ,we are concerned to discover 7#a7 just what in conduct it is that we judge good and evil1 right and wrong 7conduct being a complicated thing72 7#b7 what we mean by good and evil1 right and wrong2 7#c7 on what basis we apply these conceptions to their appropriate objects in conduct4 ,but before we attempt these questions1 we must detect and identify the moral situation1 the situation in which considerations of good and evil1 right and wrong1 present themselves and are employed4 ,for some situations we employ the ideas of true and false2 of beautiful and ugly2 of skilful and awkward2 of economical and wasteful1 etc4 ,we may indeed apply the terms right and wrong to these same situations2 but if so1 it is to them in some other light4 ,what then are the differentiating traits1 the special earmarks1 presented by the situation which we identify as distinctively moral8 ,for we use the term moral in a broad sense to designate that which is either moral or immoral3 i4e41 right or wrong in the narrower sense4 ,it is the moral situation in the broad sense as distinct from the non-moral1 not from the immoral1 that we are now concerned with4 ,the ,moral ,situation ,involves ,voluntary ,activity4--,it will be admitted on all hands that the moral situation is one which1 whatever else it may or may not be1 involves a voluntary factor4 ,some of the chief traits of voluntary activity we have already become acquainted with1 as in the account by ,aristotle1 already noted 7ante1 p4 #ab74 ,the agent must know what he is about2 he must have some idea of what he is doing2 he must not be a somnambulist1 or an imbecile1 or insane1 or an infant so immature as to have no idea of what he is doing4 ,he must also have some wish1 some desire1 some preference in the matter4 ,a man overpowered by superior force might be physically compelled by some ingenious device to shoot a gun at another1 knowing what he was doing1 but his act would not be voluntary because he had no choice in the matter1 or rather because his preference was not to do the act which he is aware he is doing4 ,but if he is ordered to kill another and told if he does not he will himself be killed1 he has some will in the matter4 ,he may do the deed1 not because he likes it or wishes it in itself1 but because he wishes to save his own life4 ,the attendant circumstances may affect our judgment of the kind and degree of morality attaching to the act2 but they do not take it entirely out of the moral sphere4#ajd ,aristotle says the act must also be the expression of a disposition 7a habit or ,greek3 hexis71 a more or less settled tendency on the part of the person4 ,it must bear some relation to his character4 ,character is not1 we may say1 a third factor1 ,it is making clear what is implied in deliberation and wish4 ,there may be little deliberation in a child's act and little in an adult's1 and yet we may regard the latter as much more voluntary than the child's4 ,with the child1 the thought is superficial and casual1 because of the restricted stage of organization or growth reached 7see p4 #aj73 his act flows from organic instinct or from accidental circumstances--whim1 caprice1 and chance suggestion1 or fancy4 ,the adult's act may flow from habitual tendencies and be accompanied by an equally small amount of conscious reflection4 ,but the tendencies themselves are the outcome of prior deliberations and choices which have finally got funded into more or less automatic habits4 ,the child's act is to a slight extent the expression of character2 the adult's to a large extent4 ,in short1 we mean by character whatever lies behind an act in the way of deliberation and desire1 whether these processes be near-by or remote4 ,not ,everything ,voluntary is ,morally ,judged4--,a voluntary act may then be defined as one which manifests character1 the test of its presence being the presence of desire and deliberation2 these sometimes being present directly and immediately1 sometimes indirectly and remotely through their effects upon the agent's standing habits4 ,but we do not judge all voluntary activity from the moral standpoint4 ,some acts we judge from the standpoint of skill or awkwardness2 others as amusing or boring2 others as stupid or highly intelligent1 and so on4 ,we do not bring to bear the conceptions of right and wrong4 ,and on the other hand1 there are many things called good and bad which are not voluntary4 ,since what we are in search of must lie somewhere between these two limits1 we may begin with cases of the latter sort4 7#a7 ,not ,everything ,judged ,good or ,right is ,moral4--,we speak1 for example1 of an ill-wind2 of a good engine2 of a watch being wrong2 or of a screw being set right4 ,we speak of good and bad bread1 money1 or soil4 ,that is1 from the standpoint of value1 we judge things as means to certain results in themselves desirable or undesirable4 ,a good machine does efficiently the work for which it is designed2 bad money does not subserve the ends which money is meant to promote2 the watch that is wrong comes short of telling us time correctly4 ,we have to use the notion of value and of contribution to value2 that is a positive factor4 ,but this contribution to valuable result is not1 in inanimate objects1 something meant or intended by the things themselves4 ,if we thought the ill-wind had an idea of its own destructive effect and took pleasure in that idea1 we should attribute moral quality to it--just as men did in early times1 and so tried to influence its behavior in order to make it good4 ,among things that promote favorable or unfavorable results a line is drawn between those which just do so as matter of fact1 and those in which meaning so to do1 or intention1 plays a part4 7#b7 ,good in ,animal ,conduct4--,let us now consider the case of good and bad animal conduct4 ,we speak of a good watch-dog2 of a bad saddle-horse1 and the like4 ,moreover1 we train the dog and the horse to the right or desired kind of action4 ,we make1 we repair the watch2 but we do not train it4 ,training involves a new factor3 enlistment of the animal's tendencies2 of its own conscious attitudes and reactions4 ,we pet1 we reward by feeding1 we punish and threaten4 ,by these means we induce animals to exercise in ways that form the habits we want4 ,we modify the animal's behavior by modifying its own impulses4 ,but we do not give moral significance to the good and bad1 for we are still thinking of means to ends4 ,we do not suppose that we have succeeded in supplying the hunting dog1 for example1 with ideas that certain results are more excellent than others1 so that henceforth he acts on the basis of his own discrimination of the less and the more valuable4 ,we just induce certain habits by managing to make certain ways of acting feel more agreeable than do others4 ,thus ,james says3 ,whether the dog has the notion of your being angry or of your property being valuable in any such abstract way as we have these notions1 is more than doubtful4 ,the conduct is more likely an impulsive result of a conspiracy of outward stimuli2 the beast feels like acting so when these stimuli are present1 though conscious of no definite reason why#aje 7,psychology1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 p4 #cej1 note74 ,or putting it the other way3 if the dog has an idea of the results of guarding the house1 and is controlled in what he does by loyalty to this idea1 by the satisfaction which he takes in it1 then in calling the dog good we mean that in being good for a certain result1 he is also morally good4 7#c7 ,non-moral ,human ,acts4--,there are also acts evoked by an idea of value in the results to be reached1 which are not judged as coming within the moral sphere4 ,conduct is three-fourths of life1 but in some sense it is more3 it is four-fourths4 ,all conscious human life is concerned with ends1 and with selecting1 arranging1 and employing the means1 intellectual1 emotional1 and practical1 involved in these ends4 ,this makes conduct4 ,but it does not follow that all conduct has moral import4 ,as currently conceived1 stirring the fire1 reading a newspaper1 or eating a meal1 are acts with which morality has no concern4 ,opening the window to air the room1 putting on an overcoat when the weather is cold1 are thought of as having no ethical significance4 ,these1 however1 are all portions of conduct 7,spencer1 ,principles of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,i41 p4 #e74 ,they all involve the idea of some result worth reaching1 and the putting forth of energy to reach the result--of intelligently selected and adapted means4 ,but this may leave the act morally indifferent--innocent4 ,introduction of ,moral ,factor4--,a further quotation from ,spencer may introduce discussion of the needed moral qualification3 ,as already said1 a large part of the ordinary conduct is indifferent4 ,shall ,i walk to the water fall today8 or1 shall ,i ramble along the sea shore8 ,here the ends are ethically indifferent4 ,if ,i go to the water fall1 shall ,i go over the moor or take the path through the wood8 ,here the means are ethically indifferent4444 ,but if a friend who is with me has explored the sea shore1 but has not seen the water fall1 the choice of one or other end is no longer ethically indifferent4 ,again1 if a probable result of making the one excursion rather than the other1 is that ,i shall not be back in time to keep an appointment1 or if taking the longer route entails this risk while the shorter does not1 the decision in favor of one end or means acquires in another way an ethical character 7,spencer1 ,principles of ,ethics1 pp4 #e-f74 ,this illustration suggests two differing types of conduct2 two differing ways in which activity is induced and guided by ideas of valuable results4 ,in one case the end presents itself directly as desirable1 and the question is only as to the steps or means of achieving this end4 ,here we have conduct which1 although excited and directed by considerations of value1 is still morally indifferent4 ,such is the condition of things wherever one end is taken for granted by itself without any consideration of its relationship to other ends4 ,it is then a technical rather than a moral affair4 ,it is a question of taste and of skill--of personal preference and of practical wisdom1 or of economy1 expediency4 ,there are many different roads to most results1 and the selection of this path rather than that1 on the assumption that either path actually leads to the end1 is an intellectual1 aesthetic1 or executive1 rather than an ethical matter4 ,i may happen to prefer a marine view to that of the uplands--that is an aesthetic interest4 ,i may wish to utilize the time of the walk for thinking1 and may find the moor path less distracting2 here is a matter of intellectual economy4 ,or ,i may conclude that ,i shall best get the exercise ,i want by going to the water fall4 ,here it is a question of prudence1 of expediency1 or practical wisdom4 ,let any one of the ends1 aesthetic1 intellectual1 hygienic1 stand alone and it is a fit and proper consideration4 ,the moral issue does not arise4 ,or the various ends may be regarded as means to a further unquestioned end--say a walk with the maximum of combined aesthetic interest and physical exercise4 7#d7 ,criterion for ,moral ,factor4--,but let the value of one proposed end be felt to be really incompatible with that of another1 let it be felt to be so opposed as to appeal to a different kind of interest and choice1 in other words1 to different kinds of disposition and agency1 and we have a moral situation4 ,this is what occurs when one way of traveling means self-indulgence2 another1 kindliness or keeping an engagement4 ,there is no longer one end1 nor two ends so homogeneous that they may be reconciled by both being used as means to some more general end of undisputed worth4 ,we have alternative ends so heterogeneous that choice has to be made2 an end has to be developed out of conflict4 ,the problem now becomes what is really valuable4 ,it is the nature of the valuable1 of the desirable1 that the individual has to pass upon4#ajf ,suppose a person has unhesitatingly accepted an end1 has acquiesced in some suggested purpose4 ,then1 starting to realize it1 he finds the affair not so simple4 ,he is led to review the matter and to consider what really constitutes worth for him4 ,the process of attainment calls for toil which is disagreeable1 and imposes restraints and abandonments of accustomed enjoyments4 ,an ,indian boy1 for example1 thinks it desirable to be a good rider1 a skilful shot1 a sagacious scout4 ,then he naturally1 as we say1 disposes of his time and energy so as to realize his purpose4 ,but in trying to become a brave1 he finds that he has to submit to deprivation and hardship1 to forego other enjoyments and undergo arduous toil4 ,he finds that the end does not mean in actual realization what it meant in original contemplation--something that often happens1 for1 as ,goldsmith said3 ,in the first place1 we cook the dish to our own appetite2 in the latter1 nature cooks it for us4 ,this change in apparent worth raises a new question3 ,is the aim first set up of the value it seemed to be8 ,is it1 after all1 so important1 so desirable8 ,are not other results1 playing with other boys1 convivial companionship1 which are reached more easily and pleasantly1 really more valuable8 ,the labors and pains connected with the means employed to reach an end1 have thrown another and incompatible end into consciousness4 ,the individual no longer naturally1 but morally1 follows the selected end1 whichever of the two it be1 because it has been chosen after conscious valuation of competing aims4 ,such competitions of values for the position of control of action are inevitable accompaniments of individual conduct1 whether in civilized or in tribal life4 ,a child1 for example1 finds that the fulfillment of an appetite of hunger is not only possible1 but that it is desirable--that fulfillment brings1 or is1 satisfaction1 not mere satiety4 ,later on1 moved by the idea of this sort of value1 he snatches at food4 ,then he is made aware of other sorts of values involved in the act performed--values incompatible with just the value at which he aimed4 ,he brings down upon himself social disapproval and reproach4 ,he is termed rude1 unmannerly1 greedy1 selfish4 ,he acted in accordance with an unhesitatingly accepted idea of value4 ,but while reaching one result he accomplished also certain other results which he did not intend1 results in the way of being thought ill of1 results which are disagreeable3 negative values4 ,he is taught to raise the question of what1 after all1 in such cases is the really desirable or valuable4 ,before he is free to deliberate upon means1 he has to form an estimate of the relative worth of various possible ends1 and to be willing to forego one and select the other4 ,the chapters on ,hebrew and ,greek moral development have shown this same process at work in the life of a people4 ,summary and ,definition4--,if we sum up the three classes of instances thus far considered1 we get the following defining traits of a moral situation1 that is1 of one which is an appropriate subject of determinations of right and wrong3 ,moral experience is 7#a7 a matter of conduct1 behavior2 that is1 of activities which are called out by ideas of the worth1 the desirability of results4 ,this evocation by an idea discriminates it from the so-called behavior of a pump1 where there is no recognition of results2 and from conduct attributed to the lower animals1 where there are probably feelings and even dim imagery1 but hardly ideas of the comparative desirability or value of various ends4 ,moral experience is 7#b7 that kind of conduct in which there are ends so discrepant1 so incompatible1 as to require selection of one and rejection of the other4 ,this perception of1 and selection from1 incompatible alternatives1 discriminates moral experience from those cases of conduct which are called out and directed by ideas of value1 but which do not necessitate passing upon the real worth1 as we say1 of the value selected4 ,it is incompatibility of ends which necessitates consideration of the true worth of a given end2 and such consideration it is which brings the experience into the moral sphere4 ,conduct as moral may thus be defined as activity called forth and directed by ideas of value or worth1 where the values concerned are so mutually incompatible as to require consideration and selection before an overt action is entered upon4 ,end ,finally at ,issue4--,many questions about ends are in reality questions about means3 the artist considers whether he will paint a landscape or a figure2 this or that landscape1 and so on4 ,the general character of the end is unchanged3 it is to paint4 ,but let this end persist and be felt as desirable1 as valuable2 let at the same time an alternative end presents itself as also desirable 7say keeping an engagement71 so that the individual does not find any way of adjusting and arranging them into a common scheme 7like doing first one and then the other71 and the person has a moral problem on his hands4 ,which shall he decide for1 and why8 ,the appeal is to himself2 what does he really think the desirable end8 ,what makes the supreme appeal to him8 ,what sort of an agent1 of a person1 shall he be8 ,this is the question finally at stake in any genuinely moral situation3 ,what shall the agent be8 ,what sort of a character shall he assume8 ,on its face1 the question is what he shall do1 shall he act for this or that end4 ,but the incompatibility of the ends forces the issue back into the question of the kinds of selfhood1 of agency1 involved in the respective ends4 ,the distinctively moral situation is then one in which elements of value and control are bound up with the processes of deliberation and desire2 and are bound up in a peculiar way3 viz41 they decide what kind of a character shall control further desires and deliberations4 ,when ends are genuinely incompatible1 no common denominator can be found except by deciding what sort of character is most highly prized and shall be given supremacy4 ,the ,moral and ,indifferent ,situations4--,this criterion throws lights upon our earlier discussion of morally indifferent acts4 ,persons perform the greater bulk of their activities without any conscious reference to considerations of right and wrong1 as any one may verify for himself by recollecting the general course of his activity on any ordinary day from the time he arises in the morning to the time he goes to bed at night4 ,his deliberations and wants are mostly concerned with the ends involved in his regular vocation and recreations4 ,but at any time the question of his character as concerned with what he is doing may arise for judgment4 ,the person may later on realize that the type or kind of character which is to prevail in his further activity was involved in deeds which were performed without any such thought4 ,he then judges them morally1 approving or disapproving4 ,on the other hand1 a course of action which at the time presented a moral crisis even1 may afterwards come to be followed as a matter of course4 ,there is then no fixed line between the morally indifferent and the morally significant4 ,every act is potential subject-matter of moral judgment1 for it strengthens or weakens some habit which influences whole classes of judgments4 ,,literature ,there are comparatively few distinct analyses of the moral situation1 the topic generally being treated as a running part of the theory of the author1 or in connection with an account of character or conduct 7see references at end of ch4 xiii474 ,see1 however1 ,mezes1 ,ethics1 ,descriptive and ,explanatory1 ch4 ii42 ,martineau1 ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #ag-ed2 ,spencer1 ,principles of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,i42 ,studies in ,logical ,theory1 ,stuart1 essay on ,valuation as a ,logical ,process1 pp4 #bcg-bda1 #beg-beh1 #bgc-bge1 #bhi-bic2 ,dewey1 ,logical ,conditions of a ,scientific ,treatment of ,morality2 ,mead1 ,philosophical ,basis of ,ethics1 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 ,april1 #aijh2 ,fite1 ,introductory ,study of ,ethics1 chs4 ii41 xviii41 and xix4 ,,footnotes3 #ajd ,aristotle illustrates by a man who throws his goods overboard in a storm at sea4 ,he does not wish absolutely to lose his goods1 but he prefers losing them to losing the ship or his own life3 he wishes it under the circumstances and his act is so far voluntary4 #aje ,of course1 this is also true of a large part of human activity4 ,but these are also the cases in which we do not ascribe moral value2 or at least we do not except when we want to make the agent conscious of some reason why4 #ajf ,while we have employed ,spencer's example1 it should be noted that incompatibility of ends is not the criterion of the distinctively moral situation which ,spencer himself employs4 ,,chapter ,,xi ,,problems ,,of ,,moral ,,theory ,we have identified in its framework and main outlines the sort of voluntary activity in which the problem of good and evil appears and in which the ideas of right and wrong are employed4 ,this task1 however1 is only preliminary to theoretical analysis4 ,for it throws no light upon just what we mean by good and bad2 just what elements of complex voluntary behavior are termed right or wrong2 or why they are so termed4 ,it does not even indicate what must be discovered before such questions can be answered4 ,it only sets forth the limits of the subject-matter within which such questions arise and in reference to which they must be answered4 ,what are the distinctive problems which must be dealt with in the course of such a discussion8 ,growth of ,theory from ,practical ,problems4--,of one thing we may be sure4 ,if inquiries are to have any substantial basis1 if they are not to be wholly up in the air1 the theorist must take his departure from the problems which men actually meet in their own conduct4 ,he may define and refine these2 he may divide and systematize2 he may abstract the problems from their concrete contexts in individual lives2 he may classify them when he has thus detached them2 but if he gets away from them he is talking about something which his own brain has invented1 not about moral realities4 ,on the other hand1 the perplexities and uncertainties of direct and personal behavior invite a more abstract and systematic impersonal treatment than that which they receive in the exigencies of their occurrence4 ,the recognition of any end or authority going beyond what is embodied in existing customs1 involves some appeal to thought1 and moral theory makes this appeal more explicit and more complete4 ,if a child asks why he should tell the truth1 and is answered1 because you ought to and that is reason enough2 or1 because it will prove profitable for you to do so2 or1 because truth-telling is a condition of mutual communication and common aims1 the answer implies a principle which requires only to be made explicit to be full-fledged theory4 ,and when this principle is compared with those employed in other cases to see if they are mutually consistent2 and if not1 to find a still more fundamental reconciling principle1 we have passed over the border into ethical system4 ,types of ,theoretical ,problems4--,the practical problems which a thoughtful and progressive individual must consider in his own conduct will1 then1 give the clue to the genuine problems of moral theory4 ,the framework of one is an outline of the other4 ,the man who does not satisfy himself with sheer conventional conformity to the customs1 the ethos1 of his class will find such problems as the following forced upon his attention3--7#a7 ,he must consider the meaning of habits which have been formed more or less unreflectively--by imitation1 suggestion1 and inculcation from others--and he must consider the meaning of those customs about him to which he is invited to conform till they have become personal habits4 ,this problem of discovering the meaning of these habits and customs is the problem of stating what1 after all1 is really good1 or worth while in conduct4 7#b7 ,the one whose morality is of the reflective sort will be faced by the problem of moral advance1 of progress beyond the level which has been reached by this more or less unreflective taking on of the habits and ideas of those about him1 progress up to the level of his own reflective insight4 ,otherwise put1 he has to face the problem of what is to be the place and role in his own conduct of ideals and principles generated not by custom but by deliberation and insight4 7#c7 ,the individual must consider more consciously the relation between what is currently regarded as good by the social groups in which he is placed and in which he has to act1 and that regarded as good by himself4 ,the moment he ceases to accept conformity to custom as an adequate sanction of behavior1 he is met by discrepancy between his personally conceived goods and those reigning in the customs about him4 ,now while this detachment makes possible the birth of higher and more ideal types of morality1 and hence of systematic effort for social reform and advance2 it also makes possible 7as we have seen on the historical side1 p4 #ahi7 a more generalized and deliberate selfishness2 a less instinctive and more intentional pursuit of what the individual judges to be good for himself against what society exacts as good for itself4 ,the same reflective attitude which generates the conscientious moral reformer may generate also a more deliberate and resolute anti-social egoism4 ,in any case1 the individual who has acquired the habit of moral reflection1 is conscious of a new problem--the relation of public good to individual good4 ,in short1 the individual who is thoughtfully serious and who aims to bring his habit of reflection to bear on his conduct1 will have occasion 7#a7 to search for the elements of good and bad1 of positive and negative1 value in the situations that confront him2 7#b7 to consider the methods and principles by which he shall reach conclusions1 and 7#c7 to consider the relations between himself1 his own capacities and satisfactions1 and the ends and demands of the social situations in which he is placed4 ,the ,corresponding ,problems of ,theory4--,theory will then have similar problems to deal with4 7#a7 ,what is the ,good1 the end in any voluntary act8 7#b7 ,how is this good known8 ,is it directly perceived1 and if so1 how8 ,or is it worked out through inquiry and reflection8 ,and if so1 how8 7#c7 ,when the good is known1 how is it acknowledged2 how does it acquire authority8 ,what is the place of law1 of control1 in the moral life8 ,why is it that some ends are attractive of themselves1 while others present themselves as duties1 as involving subordination of what is naturally attractive8 7#d7 ,what is the place of selfhood in the moral process8 ,and this question assumes two forms3 7a7 ,what is the relation of the good of the self to the good of others8 7b7 ,what is the difference between the morally good and the morally bad in the self8 ,what are virtues and vices as dispositions of the self8 ,these abstract and formal questions will become more concrete if we consider them briefly in the order of their development in the history of the moral theory4 ,problem of ,knowledge of ,good ,comes ,first in ,theory4--,the clash and overlapping of customs once so local as to be isolated1 brought to ,athenian moral philosophers the problem of discovering the underlying and final good to which all the conflicting values of customs might be referred for judgment4 ,the movement initiated by ,socrates was precisely the effort to find out what is the real good1 the true end1 of all the various institutions1 customs1 and procedures current among men4 ,the explanation of conflict among men's interests1 and of lack of consistency and unity in any given person's behavior1 of the division of classes in the state1 of the diverse recommendations of different would-be moral teachers1 was that they were ignorant of their own ends4 ,hence the fundamental precept is ,know thyself1 one's own end1 one's good and one's proper function4 ,different followers of ,socrates gave very different accounts of knowledge1 and hence proposed very different final aims4 ,but they all agreed that the problem of knowing the good was the central problem1 and that if this were settled1 action in accord with good would follow of itself4 ,could it be imagined that man could know his own good and yet not seek it8 ,ignorance of good is evil and the source of evil2 insight into the real good will clear up the confusion and partiality which makes men pursue false ends and thus straighten out and put in order conduct4 ,control would follow as a matter of course from knowledge of the end4 ,such control would be no matter of coercion or external restriction1 but of subordination and organization of minor ends with reference to the final end4 ,problem of ,motive ,force4#ajg--,the problem of attaining this knowledge was seen to be attended1 however1 by peculiar obstructions and difficulties1 the growing recognition of which led to a shifting of the problem itself4 ,the dilemma1 in brief1 was this3 ,the man who is already good will have no difficulty in knowing the good both in general and in the specific clothing under which it presents itself in particular cases4 ,but the one who does not yet know the good1 does not know how to know it4 ,his ignorance1 moreover1 puts positive obstacles in his way1 for it leads him to delight in superficial and transitory ends4 ,this delight increases the hold of these ends upon the agent2 and thus it builds up an habitual interest in them which renders it impossible for the individual to get a glimpse of the final end1 to say nothing of a clear and persisting view4 ,only if the individual is habituated1 exercised1 practiced in good ends so as to take delight in them1 while he is still so immature as to be incapable of really knowing how and why they are good1 will he be capable of knowing the good when he is mature4 ,pleasure in right ends and pain in wrong must operate as a motive force in order to give experience of the good1 before knowledge can be attained and operate as the motor force4 ,division of ,problem4--,but the exercise and training requisite to form the habits which make the individual rejoice in right activity before he knows how and why it is right1 presuppose adults who already have knowledge of the good4 ,they presuppose a social order capable not merely of giving theoretic instruction1 but of habituating the young to right practices4 ,but where shall such adults be found1 and where is the social order so good that it is capable of right training of its own immature members8 ,hence the problem again shifts1 breaking up into two parts4 ,on the one hand1 attention is fixed upon the irrational appetites1 desires1 and impulses1 which hinder apprehension of the good2 on the other1 it is directed to the political laws and institutions which are capable of training the members of the ,state into a right manner of living4 ,for the most part1 these two problems went their own way independently of each other1 a fact which resulted in the momentous breach between the inner and spiritual1 and the outer and physical aspects of behavior4 ,problem of ,control of ,affections and ,desires4--,if it is the lively movements of natural appetites and desires which make the individual apprehend false goods as true ones1 and which present obstacles to knowledge of the true good1 the serious problem is evidently to check and so far as possible to abolish the power of desire to move the mind4 ,since it is anger1 fear1 hope1 despair1 sexual desire which make men regard particular things instead of the final end as good1 the great thing is wholly to free attention and judgment from the influence of such passions4 ,it may be impossible to prevent the passions2 they are natural perturbations4 ,but man can at least prevent his judgment of what is good or bad from being modified by them4 ,the ,stoic moral philosophers most emphasized the misleading influence of desire and passion1 and set up the ideal of apathy 7lack of passion7 and ataraxy 7absence of being stirred up74 ,the other moral schools1 the ,sceptics and ,epicureans1 also made independence of mind from influence of passion the immediate and working end2 the ,sceptics because they emphasized the condition of mental detachment and non-committal1 which is the state appropriate to doubt and uncertainty2 the ,epicureans because the pleasures of the mind are the only ones not at the mercy of external circumstances4 ,mental pleasures are equable1 and hence are the only ones which do not bring reactions of depression1 exhaustion1 and subsequent pain4 ,the problem of moral theory is now in effect1 if not in name1 that of control1 of authority and subordination1 of checking and restraining desire and passion4 ,problem of ,control of ,private ,interests by ,law4--,such views could at the best1 however1 affect only a comparatively small number1 the philosophers4 ,for the great masses of men in the ,roman ,empire1 the problem existed on the other line3 by what laws and what administration of laws to direct the outward acts of men into right courses1 courses at least sufficiently right so as to maintain outward peace and unity through the vast empire4 ,in the ,greek city-state1 with its small number of free citizens all directly participating in public affairs1 it was possible to conceive an ideal of a common good which should bind all together4 ,but in an ,empire covering many languages1 religions1 local customs1 varied and isolated occupations1 a single system of administration and law exercised from a single central source could alone maintain the requisite harmony4 ,the problems of legislations1 codification1 and administration were congenial to the ,latin mind1 and were forced by the actual circumstances4 ,from the external side1 then1 as well as from the internal1 the problem of control became dominant over that of value and the good4 ,problem of ,unification4--,it was the province of the moral philosophers1 of the theologians1 of the church to attempt a fusion of these elements of inner and outer control4 ,it was their aim to connect1 to synthesize these factors into one commanding and comprehensive view of life4 ,but the characteristic of their method was to suppose that the combination could be brought about1 whether intellectually or practically1 only upon a supernatural basis1 and by supernatural resources4 ,from the side of the natural constitution of both man and the ,state1 the various elements of behavior are so hopelessly at war with one another that there is no health in them nor help from them4 ,the appetites and desires are directed only upon carnal goods and form the dominant element in the person4 ,even when reason gets glimpses of the good1 the good seen is narrow in scope and temporal in duration2 and even then reason is powerless as an adequate motive4 ,we perceive the better and we follow the worse4 ,moreover1 it is useless to seek aid from the habituation1 the education1 the discipline and restraint of human institutions4 ,they themselves are corrupt4 ,the product of man's lower nature cannot be capable of enlightening and improving that nature2 at most it can only restrain outer action by appealing to fear4 ,only a divine revelation can make known man's true end2 and only divine assistance1 embodied in the ordinances and sacraments of the supernaturally founded and directed church1 can bring this knowledge home to erring individuals so as to make it effectual4 ,in theory the conception of the end1 the good1 was supreme2 but man's true good is supernatural and hence can be achieved only by supernatural assistance and in the next world4 ,in practice1 therefore1 the important thing for man in his present condition is implicit reliance upon and obedience to the requirements of the church4 ,this represents on earth the divine sovereign1 ultimate source of all moral law4 ,in effect1 the moral law became a net-work of ordinances1 prescriptions1 commands1 rewards1 penalties1 penances1 and remissions4 ,the jural point of view was completely enthroned4#ajh ,there was no problem2 there was a final1 because a supernatural solution4 ,the ,problems of ,individuality and ,citizenship4--,with the ,renaissance began the revolt against the jural view of life4 ,a sense of the joys and delights which attend the free and varied exercise of human capacities in this world was reborn4 ,the first results were a demand for natural satisfaction2 the next a profound reawakening of the antique civic and political consciousness4 ,the first in its reaction against the ,middle ,ages was more individualistic than the ,greek ideal1 to which it was in some respects allied4 ,the ,greek had emphasized the notion of value1 but had conceived this as generic1 as the fulfillment of the essential nature of man as man4 ,but with the moderns1 satisfaction1 the good1 meant something direct1 specific1 personal2 something the individual as an individual could lay hold of and possess4 ,it was an individual right2 it was final and inalienable4 ,nothing had a right to intervene or deprive the individual of it4 ,this extreme individualistic tendency was contemporaneous with a transfer of interest from the supernatural church-state over to the commercial1 social1 and political bodies with which the modern man found himself identified4 ,the rise of the free cities1 and more especially the development of national states1 with the growth of commerce and exchange1 opened to the individual a natural social whole4 ,with this his connections were direct1 in this he gained new outlets and joys1 and yet it imposed upon him definite responsibilities and exacted of him specific burdens4 ,if the individual had gained a new sense of himself as an individual1 he also found himself enmeshed in national states of a power constantly increasing in range and intensity4 ,the problem of the moral theorists was to reconcile these two tendencies1 the individualistic and that of political centralization4 ,for a time1 the individual felt the social organization in which he was set to be1 with whatever incidental inconveniences1 upon the whole an outlet and reenforcement of prized personal powers4 ,hence in observing its conditions1 he was securing the conditions of his own peace and tranquillity or even of his own freedom and achievement4 ,but the balance was easily upset1 and the problem of the relation of the individual and the social1 the private and the public1 was soon forced into prominence2 a problem which in one form or other has been the central problem of modern ethical theory4 ,individualistic ,problem4--,only for a short time1 during the first flush of new achievement and of hopeful adventure1 did extreme individualism and social interests remain naively combined4 ,the individualistic tendency found a convenient intellectual tool in a psychology which resolved the individual into an association or series of particular states of feeling and sensations2 and the good into a like collection of pleasures also regarded as particular mental states4 ,this psychological atomism made individuals as separate and disconnected as the sensations which constituted their selves were isolated and mutually exclusive4 ,social arrangements and institutions were1 in theory1 justifiable only as they could be shown to augment the sum of pleasurable states of feeling of individuals4 ,and as1 quite independent of any such precarious theory1 the demand for reform of institutions became more and more imperative1 the situation was packed by ,rousseau into a formula that man was naturally both free and good1 and that institutional life had enslaved and thereby depraved him4 ,at the same time1 there grew up an enthusiastic and optimistic faith in ,nature1 in her kindly intentions for the happiness of humanity1 and in her potency to draw it to perfection when artificial restrictions were once out of the way4 ,individuals1 separate in themselves and in their respective goods1 were thereby brought into a complete coincidence and harmony of interests4 ,nature's laws were such that if the individual obeyed them in seeking his own good he could not fail to further the happiness of others4 ,while there developed in ,france 7with original initiative from ,england7 this view of the internal isolation and external harmony of men1 a counterpart movement took place in ,germany4 ,the ,rationalistic ,problem4--,german thought inherited through both ,roman law and the natural theology and ethics of the church1 the conception that man's rational nature makes him sociable4 ,stoicism1 with its materialistic idealism1 had taught that all true laws are natural1 while all laws of nature are diffusions and potencies of reason4 ,as they bind things together in the world1 so they bind men together in societies4 ,moral theory is ,natural ,law conceived in this sense4 ,from the laws of reason1 regarded as the laws of man's generic and hence sociable nature1 all the principles of jurisprudence and of individual morals may be deduced4 ,but man has also a sensuous nature1 an appetitive nature which is purely private and exclusive4 ,since reason is higher than sense1 the authority of the ,state is magnified4 ,the juristic point of view was reinstated1 but with the important change that the law was that of a social order which is the realization of man's own rational being4#aji ,if the laws of the ,state were criticized1 the reply was that however unworthy the civic regulations and however desirable their emendation1 still the ,state is the expression of the idea of reason1 that is of man in his true generic nature4 ,hence to attempt to overthrow the government is to attack the fundamental and objective conditions of moral or rational life4 ,without the ,state1 the particularistic1 private side of man's nature would have free sway to express itself4 ,man's true moral nature is within4 ,we are then left1 from both the ,english-,french and the ,german sides1 with the problem of the relation of the individual and the social2 of the relation of the inner and outer1 of the psychological structure of the person and the social conditions and results of his behavior4 ,,literature ,see the references on the scope and methods of ethics at the end of ch4 i4 of ,part ,i41 and also1 ,sorley1 ,ethics of ,naturalism1 ch4 i41 and his ,recent ,tendencies in ,ethics2 ,fite1 ,an ,introductory ,study of ,ethics1 ch4 ii42 ,bowne1 ,principles of ,ethics1 ch4 i42 ,seth1 ,ethical ,principles1 ch4 i42 ,martineau1 ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 ,vol4 ,i41 ,introduction2 ,hensel1 ,problems of ,ethics1 in ,vol4 ,i4 of ,st4 ,louis ,congress of ,arts and ,science4 ,,footnotes3 #ajg ,on the practical side1 this was always1 as we have seen1 the prominent problem of ,hebrew thought4 ,but we are concerned here with the statement of the problem by ,plato and ,aristotle from the theoretical side4 #ajh ,the ,ten ,commandments1 divided and subdivided into all their conceivable applications1 and brought home through the confessional1 were the specific basis4 #aji ,the idealistic philosophic movement beginning with ,kant is in many important respects the outgrowth of the earlier ,naturrecht of the moral philosophers from ,grotius on4 ,,chapter ,,xii ,,types ,,of ,,moral ,,theory ,sec4 #a4 ,,typical ,,divisions ,,of ,,theories ,problems and ,theories4--,we were concerned in the last chapter with the typical problems of moral theory4 ,but it was evident that theories themselves developed and altered as now this1 now that1 problem was uppermost4 ,to regard the question of how to know the good as the central problem of moral inquiry is already to have one type of theory2 to consider the fundamental problem to be either the subordination or the satisfaction of desire is to have other types4 ,a classification of types of theory is rendered difficult1 a thoroughly satisfactory classification almost impossible1 by the fact that the problems arrange themselves about separate principles leading to cross-divisions4 ,all that we may expect to do is somewhat arbitrarily to select that principle which seems most likely to be useful in conducting inquiry4 7#a7 ,teleological and ,jural4--,one of the fundamental divisions arises from taking either ,value or ,duty1 ,good or ,right1 as the fundamental idea4 ,ethics of the first type is concerned above all with ends2 hence it is frequently called teleological theory 7,greek ,greek3 telos1 end74 ,to the other type of theory1 obligations1 imperatives1 commands1 law1 and authority1 are the controlling ideas4 ,by this emphasis1 arise the jural theories 7,latin1 jus1 law74 ,at some point1 of course1 each theory has to deal with the factor emphasized by its rival4 ,if we start with ,law as central1 the good resides in these acts which conform to its obligations4 ,the good is obedience to law1 submission to its moral authority4 ,if we start from the ,good1 laws1 rules1 are concerned with the means of defining or achieving it4 7#b7 ,individual and ,institutional4--,this fundamental division is at once cut across by another1 arising from emphasizing the problem of the individual and the social4 ,this problem may become so urgent as to force into the background the conflict between teleological and jural theories1 while in any case it complicates and subdivides them4 ,we have individualistic and institutional types of theory4 ,consider1 for example1 the following representative quotations3 ,no school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever name--gratification1 enjoyment1 happiness4 ,pleasure somewhere1 at some time1 to some being or beings1 is an element of the conception2#aaj and again1#aaj the good is universally the pleasurable4 ,and while the emphasis is here upon the good1 the desirable1 the same type of statement1 as respects emphasis upon the individual1 may be made from the side of duty4 ,for example1 it is the very essence of moral duty to be imposed by a man on himself4#aaa ,contrast both of these statements with the following3 ,what a man ought to do1 or what duties he should fulfill in order to be virtuous1 is in an ethical community not hard to say4 ,he has to do nothing except what is presented1 expressed1 and recognized in his established relations4#aab ,the individual has his truth1 real existence1 and ethical status only in being a member of the ,state4 ,his particular satisfactions1 activities1 and way of life have in this authenticated1 substantive principle1 their origin and result4#aac ,and in another connection3 ,the striving for a morality of one's own is futile and by its very nature impossible of attainment4 ,in respect to morality the saying of one of the wisest men of antiquity is the true one4 ,to be moral is to live in accord with the moral tradition of one's country4#aad ,here both the good and the law of the individual are placed on a strictly institutional basis4 7#c7 ,empirical and ,intuitional4--,another cross-division arises from consideration of the method of ascertaining and determining the nature of moral distinctions3 the method of knowledge4 ,from this standpoint1 the distinction of ethical theories into the empirical 7,greek3 empeirikos7 and the intuitional 7,latin1 intueor1 to look at or upon7 represents their most fundamental cleavage4 ,one view makes knowledge of the good and the right dependent upon recollection of prior experiences and their conditions and effects4 ,the other view makes it an immediate apprehension of the quality of an act or motive1 a trait so intrinsic and characteristic it cannot escape being seen4 ,while in general the empirical school has laid stress upon the consequences1 the consequences to be searched for were considered as either individual or social4 ,some1 like ,hobbes1 have held that it was directed upon law2 to knowledge of the commands of the state4 ,and similarly the direct perception or intuition of moral quality was by some thought to apply to recognition of differences of value1 and by others to acknowledgment of law and authority1 which again might be divine1 social1 or personal4 ,this division cleaves straight across our other bases of classification4 ,to describe a theory definitely1 it would then be necessary to state just where it stood with reference to each possible combination or permutation of elements of all three divisions4 ,moreover1 there are theories which attempt to find a deeper principle which will bridge the gulf between the two opposites4 ,complexity of ,subject-matter and ,voluntary ,activity4--,this brief survey should at least warn us of the complexity of the attempt to discriminate types of theory1 and put us on our guard against undue simplification4 ,it may also serve to remind us that various types of theory are not arbitrary personal devices and constructions1 but arise because1 in the complexity of the subject-matter1 one element or another is especially emphasized1 and the other elements arranged in different perspectives4 ,as a rule1 all the elements are recognized in some form or other by all theories2 but they are differently placed and accounted for4 ,in any case1 it is voluntary activity with which we are concerned4 ,the problem of analyzing voluntary activity into its proper elements1 and rightly arranging them1 must coincide finally with the problem of the relation of good and law of control to each other1 with the problem of the nature of moral knowledge1 and with that of the relation of the individual and social aspects of conduct4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,division ,,of ,,voluntary ,,activity ,,into ,,inner ,,and ,,outer ,the ,what and ,how of ,activity4--,starting from the side of the voluntary act1 we find in it one distinction which when forced into an extreme separation throws light upon all three divisions in theory which have been noted4 ,this is the relation between desire and deliberation as mental or private1 and the deed1 the doing1 as overt and public4 ,is there any intrinsic moral connection between the mental and the overt in activity8 ,we may analyze an act which has been accomplished into two factors1 one of which is said to exist within the agent's own consciousness2 while the other1 the external execution1 carries the mental into operation1 affects the world1 and is appreciable by others4 ,now on the face of the matter1 these two things1 while capable of intellectual discrimination1 are incapable of real separation4 ,the mental side1 the desire and the deliberation1 is for the sake of determining what shall be done2 the overt side is for the sake of making real certain precedent mental processes1 which are partial and inadequate till carried into effect1 and which occur for the sake of that effect4 ,the inner and outer are really only the how and the what of activity1 neither being real or significant apart from the other4 7,see ante1 p4 #f74 ,separation into ,attitude and ,consequences4--,but under the strain of various theories1 this organic unity has been denied2 the inner and the outer side of activity have been severed from one another4 ,when thus divided1 the inner side is connected exclusively with the will1 the disposition1 the character of the person2 the outer side is connected wholly with the consequences which flow from it1 the changes it brings about4 ,theories will then vary radically according as the so-called inner or the so-called outer is selected as the bearer and carrier of moral distinctions4 ,one theory will locate the moral quality of an act in that from which it issues2 the other in that into which it issues4 ,the following quotations put the contrast in a nutshell1 though unfortunately the exact meaning of the second is not very apparent apart from its context4 ,a motive is substantially nothing more than pleasure or pain operating in a certain manner4 ,now pleasure is in itself a good2 nay1 even setting aside immunity from pain1 the only good4444 ,it follows1 therefore1 immediately and incontestably that there is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one4 ,if motives are good or bad1 it is only on account of their effects 7,bentham1 ,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1 ch4 x41 ,sec4 #b74 ,over against this1 place the following from ,kant3 ,pure reason is practical of itself alone1 and gives to man a universal law which we call the ,moral ,law4444 ,if this law determines the will directly without any reference to objects and to pleasure or pain the action conformed to it is good in itself2 a will whose principle always conforms to this law is good absolutely in every respect and is the supreme condition of all good4 ,if now we recur to the distinction between the what and the how of action in the light of these quotations1 we get a striking result4 ,what one does is to pay money1 or speak words1 or strike blows1 and so on4 ,the how of this action is the spirit1 the temper in which it is done4 ,one pays money with a hope of getting it back1 or to avoid arrest for fraud1 or because one wishes to discharge an obligation2 one strikes in anger1 or in self-defense1 or in love of country1 and so on4 ,now the view of ,bentham says in effect that the what is significant1 and that the what consists ultimately only of the pleasures it produces2 the how is unimportant save as it incidentally affects resulting feelings4 ,the view of ,kant is that the moral core of every act is in its how1 that is in its spirit1 its actuating motive2 and that the law of reason is the only right motive4 ,what is aimed at is a secondary and 7except as determined by the inner spirit1 the how of the action7 an irrelevant matter4 ,in short the separation of the mental and the overt aspects of an act has led to an equally complete separation of its initial spirit and motive from its final content and consequence4 ,and in this separation1 one type of theory1 illustrated by ,kant1 takes its stand on the actuating source of the act2 the other1 that of ,bentham1 on its outcome4 ,for convenience1 we shall frequently refer to these types of theories as respectively the attitude and the content2 the formal and the material2 the disposition and the consequences theory4 ,the fundamental thing is that both theories separate character and conduct1 disposition and behavior2 which of the two is most emphasized being a secondary matter4 ,different ,ways of ,emphasizing ,results4--,there are1 however1 different forms of the consequences or content theory--as we shall1 for convenience1 term it4 ,some writers1 like ,spencer as quoted1 say the only consequences that are good are simply pleasures1 and that pleasures differ only in intensity1 being alike in everything but degree4 ,others say1 pleasure is the good1 but pleasures differ in quality as well as intensity and that a certain kind of pleasure is the morally good4 ,others say that natural satisfaction is not found in any one pleasure1 or in any number of them1 but in a more permanent mood of experience1 which is termed happiness4 ,happiness is different from a pleasure or from a collection of pleasures1 in being an abiding consequence or result1 which is not destroyed even by the presence of pains 7while a pain ejects a pleasure74 ,the pleasure view is called ,hedonism2 the happiness view1 ,eudaimonism4#aae ,different ,forms of the ,attitude ,theory4--,the opposite school of theory holds that the peculiar character of moral good is precisely that it is not found in consequences of action4 ,in this negative feature of the definition many different writers agree2 there is less harmony in the positive statement of just what the moral good is4 ,it is an attribute or disposition of character1 or the self1 not a trait of results experienced1 and in general such an attribute is called ,virtue4 ,but there are as many differences of opinion as to what constitutes virtue as there are on the other side as to what pleasure and happiness are4 ,in one view1 it merges1 in its outcome at least1 very closely with one form of eudaimonism4 ,if happiness be defined as the fulfillment of satisfaction of the characteristic functions of a human being1 while a certain function1 that of reason1 is regarded as the characteristic human trait whose exercise is the virtue or supreme excellence1 it becomes impossible to maintain any sharp line of distinction4 ,kant1 however1 attempted to cut under this union of happiness and virtue1 which under the form of perfectionism has been attempted by many writers1 by raising the question of motivation4 ,why does the person aim at perfection8 ,is it for the sake of the resulting happiness8 ,then we have only ,hedonism4 ,is it because the moral law1 the law of reason1 requires it8 ,then we have law morally deeper than the end aimed at4 ,we may now consider the bearing of this discussion upon theories of moral knowledge and 7#b7 of moral authority4#aaf ,i4 ,characteristic ,theories of ,moral ,knowledge4--7#a7 ,those who set chief store by the goods naturally experienced1 find that past experiences supply all the data required for moral knowledge4 ,pleasures and pains1 satisfactions and miseries1 are recurrent familiar experiences4 ,all we have to do is to note them and their occasions 7or1 put the other way1 to observe the tendency of some of our impulses and acts to bring pleasure as a consequence1 of others to effect misery71 and to make up our ends and aims accordingly4 ,as a theory of moral knowledge1 ,hedonism is thus almost always allied with empiricism1 understanding by empiricism the theory that particular past experiences furnish the method of all ideas and beliefs4 7#b7 ,the theory that the good is some type of virtuous character requires a special organ to give moral knowledge4 ,virtue is none the less the ,good1 even when it is not attained1 when it is not experienced1 that is1 as we experience a pleasure4 ,in any case1 it is not good because it is experienced1 but because it is virtue4 ,thus the attitude theory tends to connect itself with some form of ,intuitionalism1 ,rationalism1 or ,transcendentalism1 all of these terms meaning that there is something in knowledge going beyond the particular experiences4 ,intuitionalism holds there is a certain special faculty which reveals truths beyond the scope of experience2 ,rationalism1 that beside the particular elements of experience there are universal and necessary conceptions which regulate it2 ,transcendentalism1 that within experience there is a factor derived from a source transcending experience4#aag ,,ii4 ,characteristic ,theories of ,moral ,control4--,the result school tends to view authority1 control1 law1 obligation from the standpoint of means to an end2 the moralistic1 or virtue1 school to regard the idea of law as more fundamental than that of the good4 ,from the first standpoint1 the authority of a given rule lies in its power to regulate desires so that after all pleasures--or a maximum of them1 and a minimum of pains--may be had4 ,at bottom1 it is a principle of expediency1 of practical wisdom1 of adjustment of means to end4 ,thus ,hume said3 ,reason is1 and ought only to be1 the slave of the passions--that is1 the principles and rules made known by reason are1 at last1 only instruments for securing the fullest satisfaction of desires4 ,but according to the point of view of the other school1 no satisfaction is really 7i4e41 morally7 good unless it is acquired in accordance with a law existing independently of pleasurable satisfaction4 ,thus the good depends upon the law1 not the law upon the desirable end4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,general ,,interpretation ,,of ,,these ,,theories ,the ,opposition in ,ordinary ,life4--,to some extent1 similar oppositions are latent in our ordinary moral convictions1 without regard to theory4 ,indeed1 we tend1 at different times1 to pass from one point of view to the other1 without being aware of it4 ,thus1 as against the identification of goodness with a mere attitude of will2 we say1 ,it is not enough for a man to be good2 he must be good for something4 ,it is not enough to mean well2 one must mean to do well2 to excuse a man by saying he means well1 conveys a shade of depreciation4 ,hell is paved with good intentions4 ,good resolutions1 in general1 are ridiculed as not modifying overt action4 ,a tree is to be judged by its fruits4 ,faith without works is dead4 ,a man is said to be too good for this world when his motives are not effective4 ,sometimes we say1 ,so and so is a good man1 meaning to say that that is about all that can be said for him--he does not count1 or amount to anything1 practically4 ,the objection to identifying goodness with inefficiency also tends to render suspected a theory which seems to lead logically to such identification4 ,more positively we dwell upon goodness as involving service2 love is the fulfilling of the law1 and while love is a trait of character1 it is one which takes immediate action in order to bring about certain definite consequences4 ,we call a man ,pharisaical who cherishes his own good character as an end distinct from the common good for which it may be serviceable4 ,on the other hand1 indicating the supremacy of the voluntary attitude over consequences1 we have1 ,what shall a man give in exchange for his soul8 ,what shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own life8 ,let us do evil that good may come1 whose damnation is just4 ,the deep-seated objection to the maxim that the end justifies the means is hard to account for1 except upon the basis that it is possible to attain ends otherwise worthy and desirable at the expense of conduct which is immoral4 ,again1 compare ,shakspere's ,there's nothing right or wrong1 but thinking makes it so with the ,biblical ,as a man thinketh in his heart1 so is he4 ,and finally we have such sayings as1 ,take the will for the deed2 ,his heart is in the right place2 ,pereat mundus1 fiat justitia4 ,passing from this popular aspect of the matter1 we find the following grounds for the content theory3 #a4 ,it ,makes ,morality ,really ,important4--,would there be any use or sense in moral acts if they did not tend to promote welfare1 individual and social8 ,if theft uniformly resulted in great happiness and security of life1 if truth-telling introduced confusion and inefficiency into men's relations1 would we not consider the first a virtue1 and the latter a vice8#aah ,so far as the identification of goodness with mere motive 7apart from results effected by acts7 reduces morality to nullity1 there seems to be furnished a reductio ad absurdum of the theory that results are not the decisive thing4 7#b7 ,it ,makes ,morality a ,definite1 ,concrete ,thing4--,morality is found in consequences2 and consequences are definite1 observable facts which the individual can be made responsible for noting and for employing in the direction of his further behavior4 ,the theory gives morality an objective1 a tangible guarantee and sanction4 ,moreover1 results are something objective1 common to different individuals because outside them all4 ,but the doctrine that goodness consists in motives formed by and within the individual without reference to obvious1 overt results1 makes goodness something vague or else whimsical and arbitrary4 ,the latter view makes virtue either something unattainable1 or else attained by merely cultivating certain internal states having no outward results at all1 or even results that are socially harmful4 ,it encourages fanaticism1 moral crankiness1 moral isolation or pride2 obstinate persistence in a bad course in spite of its demonstrable evil results4 ,it makes morality non-progressive1 since by its assumption no amount of experience of consequences can throw any light upon essential moral elements4 7#c7 ,the ,content ,theory ,not ,only ,puts ,morality ,itself upon a ,basis of ,facts1 but ,also ,puts the ,theory of ,morality upon a ,solid ,basis4--,we know what we mean by goodness and evil when we discuss them in terms of results achieved or missed1 and can therefore discuss them intelligibly4 ,we can formulate concrete ends and lay down rules for their attainment4 ,thus there can be a science of morals just as there can be a science of any body of observable facts having a common principle4 ,but if morality depends upon purely subjective1 personal motives1 no objective observation and common interpretation are possible4 ,we are thrown back upon the capricious individual ipse dixit1 which by this theory is made final4 ,ethical theory is rendered impossible4 ,thus ,bentham1 who brings these charges 7and others7 against the virtue theory of goodness1 says at the close of the preface to his ,principles of ,morals and ,legislation 7ed4 of #ahbc73 ,truths that form the basis of political and moral science are not to be discovered but by investigations as severe as mathematical ones1 and beyond all comparison more intricate and extensive4444 ,they are not to be forced into detached and general propositions1 unincumbered with explanations and exceptions4 ,they will not compress themselves into epigrams4 ,they recoil from the tongue and the pen of the declaimer4 ,they flourish not in the same soil with sentiment4 ,they grow among thorns2 and are not to be plucked1 like daisies1 by infants as they run4444 ,there is no ,king's ,road 444 to legislative1 any more than to mathematical science4#aai ,arguments not unlike1 however1 may be adduced in favor of the attitude theory4 #a4 ,it1 and ,it ,alone1 ,places ,morality in the ,high and ,authoritative ,place ,which by ,right ,characterizes ,it4--,morality is not just a means of reaching other ends2 it is an end in itself4 ,to reduce virtue to a tool or instrumentality for securing pleasure is to prostitute and destroy it4 ,unsophisticated common sense is shocked at putting morality upon the same level with prudence1 policy1 and expediency4 ,morality is morality1 just because it possesses an absolute authoritativeness which they lack4 #b4 ,the ,morally ,good ,must be ,within the ,power of the ,individual to ,achieve4--,the amount of pleasure and pain the individual experiences1 his share of satisfaction1 depends upon outward circumstances which are beyond his control1 and which accordingly have no moral significance4 ,only the beginning1 the willing1 of an act lies with the man2 its conclusion1 its outcome in the way of consequences1 lies with the gods4 ,accident1 misfortune1 unfavorable circumstance1 may shut the individual within a life of sickness1 misery1 and discomfort4 ,they may deprive him of external goods2 but they cannot modify the moral good1 for that resides in the attitude with which one faces these conditions and results4 ,conditions hostile to prosperity may be only the means of calling forth virtues of bravery1 patience1 and amiability4 ,only consequences within character itself1 the tendency of an act to form a habit or to cultivate a disposition1 are really of moral significance4 #c4 ,motives ,furnish a ,settled and ,workable ,criterion by ,which to ,measure the ,rightness or ,wrongness of ,specific ,acts4--,consequences are indefinitely varied2 they are too much at the mercy of the unforeseen to serve as basis of measurement4 ,one and the same act may turn out in a hundred different ways according to accidental circumstances4 ,if the individual had to calculate consequences before entering upon action1 he would engage in trying to solve a problem where each new term introduced more factors4 ,no conclusion would ever be reached2 or1 if reached1 would be so uncertain that the agent would be paralyzed by doubt4 ,but since the motives are within the person's own breast1 the problem of knowing the right is comparatively simple3 the data for the judgment are always at hand and always accessible to the one who sincerely wishes to know the right4 ,conclusion4--,the fact that common life recognizes1 under certain conditions1 both theories as correct1 and that substantially the same claims may be made for both1 suggests that the controversy depends upon some underlying misapprehension4 ,their common error1 as we shall attempt to show in the sequel1 lies in trying to split a voluntary act which is single and entire into two unrelated parts1 the one termed inner1 the other1 outer2 the one called motive1 the other1 end4 ,a voluntary act is always a disposition1 or habit of the agent passing into an overt act1 which1 so far as it can1 produces certain consequences4 ,a mere motive which does not do anything1 which makes nothing different1 is not a genuine motive at all1 and hence is not a voluntary act4 ,on the other hand1 consequences which are not intended1 which are not personally wanted and chosen and striven for1 are no part of a voluntary act4 ,neither the inner apart from the outer1 nor the outer apart from the inner1 has any voluntary or moral quality at all4 ,the former is mere passing sentimentality or reverie2 the latter is mere accident or luck4 ,tendency of ,each ,theory to ,pass into the ,other4--,hence each theory1 realizing its own onesidedness1 tends inevitably to make concessions1 and to borrow factors from its competitor1 and thus insensibly to bridge the gap between them4 ,consequences are emphasized1 but only foreseen consequences2 while to foresee is a mental act whose exercise depends upon character4 ,it is disposition1 interest1 which leads an agent to estimate the consequences at their true worth2 thus an upholder of the content theory ends by falling back upon the attitude taken in forecasting and weighing results4 ,in like fashion1 the representative of the motive theory dwells upon the tendency of the motive to bring about certain effects4 ,the man with a truly benevolent disposition is not the one who indulges in indiscriminate charity1 but the one who considers the effect of his gift upon its recipient and upon society4 ,while lauding the motive as the sole bearer of moral worth1 the motive is regarded as a force working towards the production of certain results4 ,when the content theory recognizes disposition as an inherent factor in bringing about consequences1 and the attitude theory views motives as forces tending to effect consequences1 an approximation of each to the other has taken place which almost cancels the original opposition4 ,it is realized that a complete view of the place of motive in a voluntary act will conceive motive as a motor force2 as inspiring to action which will inevitably produce certain results unless this is prevented by superior external force4 ,it is also realized that only those consequences are any part of voluntary behavior which are so congenial to character as to appeal to it as good and stir it to effort to realize them4 ,we may begin the analysis of a voluntary act at whichever end we please1 but we are always carried to the other end in order to complete the analysis4 ,the so-called distinction between the inner and outer parts of an act is in reality a distinction between the earlier and the later period of its development4 ,in the following chapter we shall enter upon a direct discussion of the relation of conduct and character to one another2 we shall then apply the results of the discussion1 in successive chapters1 to the problems already raised3 ,the ,nature of ,good2 of ,knowledge2 of ,moral ,authority2 ,the ,relation of the ,self to ,others and ,society2 ,the ,characteristics of the ,virtuous ,self4 ,,literature ,many of the references in ch4 xi4 trench upon this ground4 ,compare1 also1 ,lecky1 ,history of ,european ,morals1 ,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #a-b1 and #abb-acj2 ,sidgwick1 ,methods of ,ethics1 pp4 #f-aa1 #gg-hh and #did-ejg2 ,wundt1 ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 ch4 iv42 ,mackenzie1 ,manual of ,ethics1 ,book ,,ii41 ch4 ii42 ,murray1 ,introduction to ,ethics1 p4 #adc2 ,paulsen1 ,system of ,ethics1 ,introduction1 and ,book ,,ii41 ch4 i4 ,,footnotes3 #aaj ,spencer1 ,principles of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,i41 p4 #df1 and p4 #cj4 7,italics not in original47 #aaa ,green1 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 p4 #ced4 #aab ,hegel's ,philosophy of ,right1 translated by ,dyde1 ,part ,,iii41 #aej 7p4 #aei74 #aac ,hegel's ,philosophy of ,right1 translated by ,dyde1 ,part ,,iii41 #beh 7p4 #bda74 #aad ,werke1 ,book ,i41 #chi4 #aae ,the ,greek words ,greek3 edone1 pleasure1 and ,greek3 eudaimonia1 happiness4 ,the latter conception is due chiefly to ,aristotle4 ,happiness is1 however1 a good translation only when taken very vaguely4 ,the ,greek term has a peculiar origin which influenced its meaning4 #aaf ,the differences as regards self and society will be considered in later chapters4 #aag ,for similar reasons1 the content theories tend to ally themselves with the positive sciences2 the attitude theories with philosophy as distinct from sciences4 #aah ,suppose that picking a man's pocket excited in him joyful emotions1 by brightening his prospects1 would theft be counted among crimes8--,,spencer4 #aai ,mill in his ,autobiography has given a striking account of how this phase of ,utilitarianism appealed to him4 7,see pp4 #fe-fg of ,london edition of #ahgd2 see also his ,dissertations and ,discussions1 ,vol4 ,i41 ,essay on ,bentham1 especially pp4 #cci and ff47 ,bentham introduced into morals and politics those habits of thought1 and modes of investigation1 which are essential to the idea of science2 and the absence of which made these departments of inquiry1 as physics had been before ,bacon1 a field of interminable discussion1 leading to no result4 ,it was not his opinions1 in short1 but his method1 that constituted the novelty and value of what he did4444 ,bentham's method may be shortly described as the method of detail4444 ,error lurks in generalities4 ,mill finally says3 ,he has thus1 it is not too much to say1 for the first time introduced precision of thought in moral and political philosophy4 ,instead of taking up their opinions by intuition1 or by ratiocination from premises adopted on a mere rough view1 and couched in language so vague that it is impossible to say exactly whether they are true or false1 philosophers are now forced to understand one another1 to break down the generality of their propositions1 and join a precise issue in every dispute4 ,this is nothing less than a revolution in philosophy4 ,in view of the character of the larger amount of discussions in moral and political philosophy still current1 ,mill perhaps took a too optimistic view of the extent to which this revolution had been accomplished4 ,,chapter ,,xiii ,,conduct ,,and ,,character ,problem of ,chapter4--,we have endeavored in the preceding chapters 7#a7 to identify the sort of situation in which the ideas of good and evil1 right and wrong1 in their moral sense1 are employed2 7#b7 to set forth the typical problems that arise in the analysis of this situation2 and 7#c7 to name and describe briefly the types of theory which have developed in the course of the history of the problems4 ,we have now to return to the moral situation as described1 and enter upon an independent analysis of it4 ,we shall commence this analysis1 as was indicated in the last chapter1 by considering the question of the relation of attitude and consequences to each other in voluntary activity1--not that this is the only way to approach the problem1 but that it is the way which brings out most clearly the points at issue among types of moral theory which since the early part of the nineteenth century have had the chief currency and influence4 ,accordingly the discussion will be introduced by a statement of the two most extreme doctrines that separate the inner and the outer1 the psychical and the overt aspects of activity3 viz41 the ,kantian1 exclusively emphasizing the how1 the spirit1 and motive of conduct2 the ,utilitarian1 dwelling exclusively upon its what1 its effects and consequences4 ,our positive problem is1 of course1 by means of arraying these two extreme views against each other1 to arrive at a statement of the mutual relations of attitude and act1 motive and consequence1 character and conduct4 ,we shall begin with ,kant as a representative of the attitude theory4 ,sec4 #a4 ,,the ,,good ,,will ,,of ,,kant ,kant says3 ,nothing can possibly be conceived1 in the world or out of it1 which can be called ,good without qualification1 except a ,good ,will4 ,intelligence1 wit1 judgment1 and the other talents of the mind1 however they may be named1 or courage1 resolution1 perseverance as qualities of temperament are individually good and desirable in many respects2 but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous1 if the will which is to make use of them and which1 therefore1 constitutes what is called character1 is not good4 ,it is the same with the gifts of fortune4 ,power1 riches1 honor1 even health 444 inspire pride and often presumption if there is not a ,good ,will to correct the influence of these on the mind4 ,moderation of the affections and passions1 self-control and calm deliberation are not only good in many respects1 but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person2 but they are far from deserving to be called good without qualification 444 for without the principles of a good will they may become extremely bad4 ,the coolness of a villain makes him both more dangerous and more abominable 7,kant3 ,theory of ,ethics1 tr4 by ,abbott1 pp4 #i-aj74 ,element of ,truth in ,statement4--,there can be no doubt that in some respects these ideas of ,kant meet a welcome in our ordinary convictions4 ,gifts of fortune1 talents of mind1 qualities of temperament1 are regarded as desirable1 as good1 but we qualify the concession4 ,we say they are good1 if a good use is made of them2 but that1 administered by a bad character1 they add to power for evil4 ,moreover1 ,kant's statement of the intrinsic goodness of the ,good ,will1 ,a jewel which shines by its own light 7,ibid41 p4 #aj71 awakens ready response in us4 ,some goods we regard as means and conditions--health1 wealth1 business1 and professional success4 ,they afford moral opportunities and agencies1 but need not possess moral value in and of themselves2 when they become parts1 as they may1 of a moral good1 it is because of their place and context4 ,personality1 character1 has a dignity of its own1 which forbids that it be considered a simple means for the acquisition of other goods4 ,the man who makes his good character a simple tool for securing political preferment1 is1 we should say1 prostituting and so destroying his own goodness4 ,ambiguity of ,statement4--,the statement made by ,kant1 however1 is ambiguous and open to opposed interpretations4 ,the notion that the ,good ,will is good in and of itself may be interpreted in two different ways3 7i7 ,we may hold1 for example1 that honesty is good as a trait of will because it tends inevitably to secure a desirable relationship among men2 it removes obstructions between persons and keeps the ways of action clear and open4 ,every man can count upon straightforward action when all act from honesty2 it secures for each singleness of aim and concentration of energy4 7ii7 ,but we may also mean that honesty is absolutely good as a trait of character just in and by itself1 quite apart from any influence this trait of character has in securing and promoting desirable ends4 ,in one case1 we emphasize its goodness because it arranges for and tends towards certain results2 in the other case1 we ignore the factor of tendency toward results4 ,kant's ,interpretation of ,goodness of ,will is ,formal4--,kant's further treatment leaves us in no doubt in which of these two senses he uses the term ,good ,will4 ,he goes on 7,ibid41 p4 #aj73 ,a ,good ,will is good1 not because of what it performs or effects1 not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end1 but simply by virtue of the volition2 that is1 it is good in itself4444 ,even if it should happen that1 owing to the special disfavor of fortune1 or the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature1 this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose1 if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing1 and there should remain only the ,good ,will 7not1 to be sure1 a mere wish1 but the assuming of all means in our power71 then1 like a jewel1 it would still shine by its own light as a thing which has its whole value in itself4 ,its fruitfulness or fruitlessness can neither add nor take away anything from this value4 ,and again he says3 ,an action 444 derives its moral worth not from the purpose which is to be attained by it1 but from the maxim by which it is determined and therefore depends 444 merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place1 without regard to any object of desire4444 ,the purposes which we may have in view in our actions or their effect regarded as ends and springs of will cannot give the actions an unconditional or moral worth4444 ,it cannot lie anywhere but in the principle of the ,will1 without regard to the ends which can be attained by the action 7,ibid41 p4 #af74 ,relation of ,endeavor and ,achievement to ,will4--,here1 also1 we find a certain agreement with our every-day moral experience4 ,it is undoubtedly true that in many cases we ascribe moral worth or goodness to acts without reference to the results actually attained by them2 a man who tries to rescue a drowning child is not judged only on the basis of success4 ,if he is prevented1 because he is crippled1 or because the current is too rapid for him1 we do not refuse hearty moral approbation4 ,we do not judge the goodness of the act or of the agent from the standpoint of its attained result1 which here is failure4 ,we regard the man as good because he proposed to himself a worthy end or aim1 the rescue of another1 even at the risk of harm to himself4 ,we should agree with ,kant in saying that the moral worth does not depend on the realization of the object of desire4 ,but we should regard the worth of the man to consist precisely in the fact that1 so far as he was concerned1 he aimed at a good result4 ,we do not rule out purpose1 but we approve because the purpose was good4 ,by will we mean tendencies1 desires1 and habits operating to realize results regarded as desirable4 ,will is not the sole condition of reaching a result--that is1 of making the aim an actual fact4 ,circumstances need to cooperate to insure a successful issue2 and if these fail1 the best will in the world cannot secure the transformation of desire for an end into that end4 ,we know that sometimes it is only by accident that the desirable end is not effected1 but we also know that without the proper disposition it is only by accident that the results are achieved4 ,moreover1 we know that our own attitude is not only an important condition of securing the results1 but that it is the only condition constantly under our control4 ,what we mean by calling it ours is precisely that it is that condition whose operation lies with us4 ,accordingly1 it is the key and clue to the results1 so far as they concern us4 ,so far1 given desire and endeavor1 achievement is not necessary to volition4 ,meaning ,well4--,on the other hand1 can a man justify himself on the ground that he means well1 if the meaning well does not regulate the overt acts that he performs1 and hence the consequences that proceed from them8 ,are we not justified in suspecting a person's good faith when his good intentions uniformly bring suffering to others8 ,if we do not question his good faith1 do we not regard him as needing moral enlightenment1 and a change of disposition8 ,we distinguish in our judgments of good between the fanatic and the thoroughly selfish man1 but we do not carry this distinction to the point of approving the fanatic2 of saying1 ,let him alone2 he means well1 he has a good will1 he is actuated by a sense of duty4 ,on the contrary1 we condemn his aims2 and in so far we censure him for willingly entertaining ans approving them4 ,we may1 indeed1 approve of his character with respect to its sincerity1 singleness of aim1 and its thoroughness of effort1 for such things1 taken by themselves1 or in the abstract1 are good traits of character4 ,we esteem them highly1 however1 just because they have so much to do with results2 they are1 par excellence1 executive traits4 ,but we do not approve of the man's whole character in approving these traits4 ,there is something the matter with the man in whom good traits are put to a bad use4 ,it is not true in such cases that we approve the agent but condemn his acts4 ,we approve certain phases of conduct1 and in so far regard the doer as praiseworthy2 we condemn other features of acts1 and in so far disapprove him4#abj ,overt ,action ,proves ,will4--,again1 under what circumstances do we actually take the will for the deed8 ,when do we assume that so far as the will was concerned it did aim at the result and aimed at it thoroughly1 without evasion and without reservation8 ,only when there is some action which testifies to the real presence of the motive and aim4#aba ,the man1 in our earlier instance1 must have made some effort to save the drowning child to justify either us or himself in believing that he meant to do it2 that he had the right intent4 ,the individual who habitually justifies himself 7either to others or to himself7 by insisting upon the rightness of his motives1 lays himself open to a charge of self-deception1 if not of deliberate hypocrisy1 if there are no outward evidences of effort towards the realization of his pretended motive4 ,a habitually careless child1 when blamed for some disorder or disturbance1 seeks to excuse himself by saying he didn't mean to3 i4e41 he had no intention or aim2 the results did not flow morally from him4 ,we often reply1 in effect1 that is just the trouble2 you didn't mean at all2 you ought to have meant not to do this4 ,in other words1 if you had thought about what you were doing you would not have done this and would not have brought about the undesirable results4 ,with adults there is such a thing as culpable carelessness and blameworthy negligence4 ,so far as the individual's conscious will was concerned1 everything he deliberately intended may have been entirely praiseworthy2 but we blame him because his character was such that the end appropriate to the circumstances did not occur to him4 ,we do not disapprove when the failure to think of the right purpose is due to inexperience or to lack of intellectual development2 but we do blame when the man does not employ his attained experience and intellectual capacity4 ,given these factors1 if the right end is not thought of or is quickly dismissed1 indisposition is the only remaining explanation4 ,these two facts1 that we require effort or evidence of sincerity of good will and that the character is disapproved for not entertaining certain aims1 are sufficient to prove that we do not identify will and motive with something which has nothing to do with aptness for attaining ends4 ,will or character means intelligent forethought of ends and resolute endeavor to achieve them4 ,it cannot be conceived apart from ends purposed and desired4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,the ,,intention ,,of ,,the ,,utilitarians ,emphasis of ,utilitarians upon ,ends4--,we are brought to the opposite type of moral theory1 the utilitarian1 which finds moral quality to reside in consequences1 that is to say1 in the ends achieved4 ,to the utilitarians1 motive means simply certain states of consciousness which happen to be uppermost in a man's mind as he acts4 ,not this subjective feeling existing only in the inner consciousness1 but the external outcome1 the objective change which is made in the common world1 is what counts4 ,if we can get the act done which produces the right sort of changes1 which brings the right kind of result to the various persons concerned1 it is irrelevant and misleading to bother with the private emotional state of the doer's mind4 ,murder would be none the less murder even if the consciousness of the killer were filled with the most maudlin sentiments of general philanthropy2 the rescue of a drowning man would be none the less approvable even if we happened to know that the consciousness of the rescuer were irritable and grumpy while he was performing the deed4 ,acts1 not feelings1 count1 and acts mean changes actually effected4#abb ,distinction of ,intention from ,motive4--,the utilitarians make their point by distinguishing between intention and motive1 attributing moral value exclusively to the former4 ,according to them1 intention is what a man means to do2 motive is the personal frame of mind which indicates why he means to do it4 ,intention is the concrete aim1 or purpose2 the results which are foreseen and wanted4 ,motive is the state of mind which renders these consequences1 rather than others1 interesting and attractive4 ,the following quotations are typical4 ,bentham says concerning motives3 ,if they are good or bad1 it is only on account of their effects3 good1 on account of their tendency to produce pleasure1 or avert pain3 bad1 on account of their tendency to produce pain1 or avert pleasure4 ,now the case is1 that from one and the same motive1 and from every kind of motive1 may proceed actions that are good1 others that are bad1 and others that are indifferent4 ,consequently the question of motive is totally irrelevant4 ,he goes on to give a long series of illustrations1 from which we select one3 #a4 ,a boy1 in order to divert himself1 reads an inspiring book2 the motive is accounted1 perhaps1 a good one3 at any rate1 not a bad one4 #b4 ,he sets his top a-spinning3 the motive is deemed at any rate not a bad one4 #c4 ,he sets loose a mad ox among a crowd3 his motive is now1 perhaps1 termed an abominable one4 ,yet in all three cases the motive may be the very same3 it may be neither more nor less than curiosity4#abc ,mill writes to the following effect3 ,the morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention----that is1 upon what the agent wills to do4 ,but the motive1 that is1 the feeling which made him will so to do1 when it makes no difference in the act1 makes none in the morality4#abd ,now if motives were merely inert feelings or bare states of consciousness happening to fill a person's mind apart from his desires and his ideas1 they certainly would not modify his acts1 and we should be compelled to admit the correctness of this position4 ,but ,mill gives the whole case away when he says that the motive which makes a man will something1 when it makes no difference in the act1 makes none in its morality4 ,every motive does make a difference in the act2 it makes precisely the difference between one act and another4 ,it is a contradiction in terms to speak of the motive as that which makes a man will to do an act or intend to effect certain consequences1 and then speak of the motive making no difference to the act6 ,how can that which makes an intention make no difference to it1 and to the act which proceeds from it8 ,concrete ,identity of ,motive and ,intention4--,ordinary speech uses motive and intention interchangeably4 ,it says1 indifferently1 that a man's motive in writing a letter was to warn the person addressed or was friendliness4 ,according to ,bentham and ,mill1 only so-called states of consciousness in which one feels friendly can be called motive2 the object aimed at1 the warning of the person1 is intention1 not motive4 ,again ordinary speech says either that a doctor's intention was to relieve his patient1 or that it was kind and proper1 although the act turned out badly4 ,but the utilitarians would insist that only the first usage is correct1 the latter confounding intent with motive4 ,in general1 such large terms as ambition1 revenge1 benevolence1 patriotism1 justice1 avarice1 are used to signify both motives and aims2 both dispositions from which one acts and results for which one acts4 ,it is the gist of the following discussion that common speech is essentially correct in this interchangeable use of intention and motive4 ,the same set of real facts1 the entire voluntary act1 is pointed to by both terms4 ,ambiguity in ,term ,feelings4--,there is a certain ambiguity in the term feelings as employed by ,mill and ,bentham4 ,it may mean feelings apart from ideas1 blind and vague mental states unenlightened by thought1 propelling and impelling tendencies undirected by either memory or anticipation4 ,feelings then mean sheer instincts or impulses4 ,in this sense1 they are1 as ,bentham claims1 without moral quality4 ,but also in this sense there are no intentions with which motives may be contrasted4 ,so far as an infant or an insane person is impelled by some blind impulsive tendency1 he foresees nothing1 has no object in view1 means nothing1 in his act2 he acts without premeditation and intention4 ,curiosity of this sort may be the source of acts which are harmful or useful or indifferent4 ,but no consequences were intelligently foreseen or deliberately wished for1 and hence the acts in question lie wholly outside the scope of morals1 even according to the utilitarian point of view4 ,morality is a matter of intent1 and intent there was none4 ,motive as ,intelligent4--,in some cases1 then1 motives have no moral quality whatsoever1 and1 in these cases1 it is true that intention has no moral quality either1 because there is none4 ,intention and motive are morally on the same level1 not opposed to one another4 ,but motive means not only blind feeling1 that is1 impulse without thought2 it also means a tendency which is aware of its own probable outcome when carried into effect1 and which is interested in the resulting effect4 ,it is perhaps conceivable that a child should let loose a bull in a crowd from sheer innocent curiosity to see what would happen--just as he might pour acid on a stone4 ,but if he were a normal child1 the next time the impulse presented itself he would recall the previous result3 the fright1 the damage1 the injury to life and limb1 and would foresee that similar consequences are likely to happen if he again performs a like act4 ,he now has what ,bentham and ,mill call an intention4 ,suppose he again lets loose the bull4 ,only verbally is motive now the same that it was before4 ,in fact1 curiosity is a very different thing4 ,if the child is still immature and inexperienced and unimaginative1 we might content ourselves with saying that his motive is egoistic amusement2 but we may also say it is downright malevolence characteristic of a criminal4 ,in no case should we call it curiosity4 ,when foresight enters1 intent1 purpose enters also1 and with it a change of motive from innocent1 because blind1 impulse1 to deliberate1 and hence to virtuous or blameworthy interest in effecting a certain result4 ,intention and motive are upon the same moral level4 ,intention is the outcome foreseen and wanted2 motive1 this outcome as foreseen and wanted4 ,but the voluntary act1 as such1 is an outcome1 forethought and desired1 and hence attempted4 ,this discussion brings out the positive truth for which ,bentham and ,mill stand3 viz41 that the moral quality of any impulse or active tendency can be told only by observing the sort of consequences to which it leads in actual practice4 ,as against those who insist that there are certain feelings in human nature so sacred that they do not need to be measured or tested by noting the consequences which flow from them1 so sacred that they justify an act no matter what its results1 the utilitarians are right4 ,it is true1 as ,bentham says1 that if motives are good or bad it is on account of their effects4 ,hence we must be constantly considering the effects of our various half-impulsive1 half-blind1 half-conscious1 half-unconscious motives1 in order to find out what sort of things they are--whether to be approved and encouraged1 or disapproved and checked4 ,practical ,importance of ,defining ,springs to ,action by ,results4--,this truth is of practical as well as of theoretical significance4 ,many have been taught that certain emotions are inherently so good that they are absolutely the justification of certain acts1 so that the individual is absolved from any attention whatsoever to results4 ,instance charity1 or benevolence4 ,the belief is engrained that the emotion of pity1 of desire to relieve the sufferings of others1 is intrinsically noble and elevating4 ,hence it has required much discussion and teaching to bring home1 even partially1 the evils of indiscriminate giving4 ,the fact is that pity1 sympathy1 apart from forecast of specific results to be reached by acting upon it1 is a mere psychological reaction1 as much so as is shrinking from suffering1 or as is a tendency to run away from danger2 in this blind form it is devoid of any moral quality whatsoever4 ,hence to teach that the feeling is good in itself is to make its mere discharge an end in itself4 ,this is to overlook the evil consequences in the way of fraud1 laziness1 inefficiency1 parasitism produced in others1 and of sentimentality1 pride1 self-complacency produced in the self4 ,there is no doubt that the effect of some types of moral training is to induce the belief that an individual may develop goodness of character simply by cultivating and keeping uppermost in his consciousness certain types of feelings1 irrespective of the objective results of the acts they lead to--one of the most dangerous forms of hypocrisy and of weakened moral fiber4 ,the insistence of utilitarianism that we must become aware of the moral quality of our impulses and states of mind on the basis of the results they effect1 and must control them--no matter how good they feel--by their results1 is a fundamental truth of morals4 ,existence and ,influence of ,idea of ,consequences ,depends upon ,disposition4--,but the converse is equally true4 ,behind every concrete purpose or aim1 as idea or thought of results1 lies something1 some passion1 instinct1 impulse1 habit1 interest1 which gives it a hold on the person1 which gives it motor and impelling force2 and which confers upon it the capacity to operate as motive1 as spring to action4 ,otherwise1 foreseen consequences would remain mere intellectual entities which thought might speculatively contemplate from afar1 but which would never possess weight1 influence1 power to stir effort4 ,but we must go further4 ,not only is some active tendency in the constitution of the man responsible for the motive power1 whether attractive or otherwise1 which foreseen consequences possess1 but it is responsible for the fact that this rather than that consequence is suggested4 ,a man of consistently amiable character will not be likely to have thoughts of cruelty to weigh and to dismiss2 a man of greed will be likely to have thoughts of personal gain and acquisition constantly present to him4 ,what an individual is interested in occurs to him2 what he is indifferent to does not present itself in imagination or lightly slips away4 ,active tendencies1 personal attitudes1 are thus in the end the determining causes of our having certain intentions in mind1 as well as the causes of their active or moving influence4 ,as ,bentham says1 motives make intentions4 ,influence of ,interest on ,ideas4--,purpose is but the slave of memory4 ,we can anticipate this or that only as from past experience we can construct it4 ,but recall1 re-membering 7rearticulation7 is selective4 ,we pick out certain past results1 certain formerly experienced results1 and we ignore others4 ,why8 ,because of our present interests4 ,we are interested in this or that1 and accordingly it comes to mind and dwells there2 or it fails to appear in recollection1 or if appearing1 is quickly dismissed4 ,it is important that the things from the past1 which are relevant to our present activity1 should come promptly to mind and find fertile lodgment1 and character decides how this happens4 ,says ,james3#abe ,what constitutes the difficulty for a man laboring under an unwise passion acting as if the passion were unwise8444 ,the difficulty is mental2 it is that of getting the idea of the wise action to stay before our mind at all4 ,when any strong emotional state whatever is upon us the tendency is for no images but such as are congruous with it to come up4 ,if others by chance offer themselves1 they are instantly smothered and crowded out4444 ,by a sort of self-preserving instinct which our passion has1 it feels that these chill objects the thoughts of what is disagreeable to the passion if they once but gain a lodgment1 will work and work until they have frozen the very vital spark from out of all our mood4444 ,passion's cue accordingly is always and everywhere to prevent their still small voice from being heard at all4 ,this quotation refers to a strong passion4 ,it is important to note that every interest1 every emotion1 of whatever nature or strength1 works in precisely the same way4 ,upon this hangs the entertaining of memories and ideas about things4 ,hence interest is the central factor in the development of any concrete intention1 both as to what it is and as to what it is not--that is1 what the aim would have been if the emotional attitude had been different4 ,given a certain emotional attitude1 and the consequences which are pertinent to it are thought of1 while other and equally probable consequences are ignored4 ,a man of a truly kindly disposition is sensitive to1 aware of1 probable results on other people's welfare2 a cautious person sees consequences with reference to his own standing2 an avaricious man feels results in terms of the probable increase or decrease of his possessions2 and so on4 ,the intimate relation of interest and attention forms the inseparable tie of intention1 what one will1 to motive1 why he so wills4 ,when ,bentham says that ,motives are the causes of intentions1 he states the fact1 and also reveals motive as the proper final object of moral judgment4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,conduct ,,and ,,character ,the discussion enables us to place conduct and character in relation to each other4 ,mill1 after the passage already quoted 7see above1 p4 #bdh71 to the effect that motive makes no difference to the morality of the act1 says it makes a great difference in our moral estimation of the agent1 especially if it indicates a good or a bad habitual disposition--a bent of character from which useful1 or from which hurtful1 actions are likely to arise4 ,to like effect ,bentham3 ,is there nothing1 then1 he asks1#abf about a man which can be termed good or bad1 when on such or such an occasion1 he suffers himself to be governed by such and such a motive8 ,yes1 certainly1 his disposition4 ,now disposition is a kind of fictitious entity1#abg feigned for the convenience of discourse1 in order to express what there is supposed to be permanent in a man's frame of mind1 where1 on such or such an occasion1 he has been influenced by such or such a motive1 to engage in an act1 which1 as it appeared to him1 was of such or such a tendency4 ,he then goes on to say that disposition is good or bad according to its effects4 ,a man is said to be of a mischievous#abh disposition1 when by the influence of no matter what motives1 he is presumed to be more apt to engage1 or form intentions of engaging1 in acts which are apparently of a pernicious tendency than in such as are apparently of a beneficial tendency3 of a meritorious or beneficent disposition in the opposite case4#abi ,and again3 ,it is evident that the nature of a man's disposition must depend upon the nature of the motives he is apt to be influenced by2 in other words1 upon the degree of his sensibility to the force of such and such motives4 ,for his disposition is1 as it were1 the sum of his intentions4444 ,now1 intentions1 like everything else1 are produced by the things that are their causes3 and the causes of intentions are motives4 ,if1 on any occasion1 a man forms either a good or a bad intention1 it must be by the influence of some motive4#acj ,role of ,character4--,here we have an explicit recognition of the fundamental role of character in the moral life2 and also of why it is important4 ,character is that body of active tendencies and interests in the individual which make him open1 ready1 warm to certain aims1 and callous1 cold1 blind to others1 and which accordingly habitually tend to make him acutely aware of and favorable to certain sorts of consequences1 and ignorant of or hostile to other consequences4 ,a selfish man need not consciously think a great deal of himself1 nor need he be one who1 after deliberately weighing his own claims and others' claims1 consciously and persistently chooses the former4 ,the number of persons who after facing the entire situation1 would still be anti-social enough deliberately to sacrifice the welfare of others is probably small4 ,but a man will have a selfish and egoistic character who1 irrespective of any such conscious balancing of his own and others' welfare1 is habitually more accessible to the thought of those consequences which affect himself than he is to those which bear upon others4 ,it is not so much that after thinking of the effect upon others he declines to give these thoughts any weight1 as that he habitually fails to think at all1 or to think in a vivid and complete way1 of the interests of others4 ,as we say1 he does not care2 he does not consider1 or regard1 others4#aca ,partial and ,complete ,intent4--,to ,mill's statement that morality depends on intention not upon motive1 a critic objected that on this basis a tyrant's act in saving a man from drowning would be good--the intent being rescue of life--although his motive was abominable1 namely cruelty1 for it was the reservation of the man for death by torture4 ,mill's reply is significant4 ,not so1 he answered2 there is in this case a difference of intention1 not merely of motive4 ,the rescue was not the whole act1 but only the necessary first step of an act4 ,this answer will be found to apply to every act in which a superficial analysis would seem to make intent different in its moral significance from motive4 ,take into account the remote consequences in view as well as the near1 and the seeming discrepancy disappears4 ,the intent of rescuing a man and the motive of cruelty are both descriptions of the same act1 the same moral reality2 the difference lying not in the fact1 but in the point of view from which it is named4 ,now there is in every one a tendency to fix in his mind only a part of the probable consequences of his deed2 the part which is most innocent1 upon which a favorable construction may most easily be put1 or which is temporarily most agreeable to contemplate4 ,thus the person concentrates his thought1 his forecast of consequences upon external and indifferent matters1 upon distribution of commodities1 increase of money or material resources1 and upon positively valuable results1 at the expense of other changes----changes for the worse in his disposition and in the well-being and freedom of others4 ,thus he causes to stand out in strong light all of those consequences of his activity which are beneficial and right1 and dismisses those of another nature to the dim recesses of consciousness1 so they will not trouble him with scruples about the proper character of his act4 ,since consequences are usually more or less mixed1 such half-conscious1 half-unconscious1 half-voluntary1 half-instinctive selection easily becomes a habit4 ,then the individual excuses himself with reference to the actual bad results of his behavior on the ground that he meant well1 his intention was good6 ,common sense disposes of this evasion by recognizing the reality of willing4 ,we say a man is willing to have things happen when1 in spite of the fact that in and of themselves they are objectionable and hence would not be willed in their isolation1 they are consented to1 because they are bound up with something else the person wants4 ,and to be willing to have the harm follow is really to will it4 ,the agent intends or wills all those consequences which his prevailing motive or character makes him willing under the circumstances to accept or tolerate4 ,exactly the same point comes out from the side of motive4 ,motives are complex and mixed2 ultimately the motive to an act is that entire character of an agent on account of which one alternative set of possible results appeal to him and stir him4 ,such motives as pure benevolence1 avarice1 gratitude1 revenge1 are abstractions2 we name the motive from the general trend of the issue1 ignoring contributing and indirect causes4 ,all assigned motives are more or less post-mortem affairs4 ,no actuating motive is ever as simple as reflection afterwards makes it4 ,but the justification of the simplification is that it brings to light some factor which needs further attention4 ,no one can read his own motives1 much less those of another1 with perfect accuracy2--though the more sincere and transparent the character the more feasible is the reading4 ,motives which are active in the depths of character present themselves only obscurely and subconsciously4 ,now if one has been trained to think that motive apart from intention1 apart from view of consequences flowing from an act1 is the source and justification of its morality1 a false and perverse turn is almost sure to be given to his judgment4 ,such a person fosters and keeps uppermost in the focus of his perceptions certain states of feeling1 certain emotions which he has been taught are good2 and then excuses his act1 in face of bad consequences1 on the ground that it sprang from a good motive4 ,selfish persons are always being misunderstood4 ,thus a man of naturally buoyant and amiable disposition may unconsciously learn to cultivate superficially certain emotions of good-feeling to others1 and yet act in ways which1 judged by consequences that the man might have foreseen if he had chosen to1 are utterly hostile to the interests of others4 ,such a man may feel indignant when accused of unjust or ungenerous behavior1 and calling others to account for uncharitableness1 bear witness in his own behalf that he never entertained any feelings of unkindness1 or any feelings except those of benevolence1 towards the individual in question4#acb ,only the habit of reading motives in the light of persistent1 thorough1 and minute attention to the consequences which flow from them can save a man from such moral error4 ,sec4 #d4 ,,morality ,,of ,,acts ,,and ,,of ,,agents ,subjective and ,objective ,morality4--,finally we may discuss the point at issue with reference to the supposed distinction between subjective and objective morality--an agent may be good and his act bad or vice-versa4 ,both of the schools which place moral quality either in attitude or in content1 in motive or intent independently of each other1 agree in making a distinction between the morality of an act and the morality of the agent--between objective and subjective morality4#acc ,thus1 as we have seen1 ,mill says the motive makes a difference in our moral estimate of its doer1 even when it makes none in our judgment of his action4 ,it is a common idea that certain acts are right no matter what the motive of the doer1 even when done by one with a bad disposition in doing them4 ,there can be no doubt that there is a serious difficulty in the facts themselves4 ,men actuated by a harsh and narrow desire for industrial power or for wealth produce social benefits1 stimulate invention and progress1 and raise the level of social life4 ,napoleon was doubtless moved by vanity and vainglory to an extent involving immense disregard of others' rights4 ,and yet in jurisprudence1 civil arrangements1 and education he rendered immense social service4 ,again1 the conscientious man is often guilty of bringing great evils upon society4 ,his very conviction of his own rightness may only add to the intense vigor which he puts into his pernicious acts4 ,surely1 we cannot approve the conduct1 although we are not entitled morally to condemn the conscientious doer1 who does the best he knows--or believes4 ,moral ,quality of ,doer and ,deed ,proportionate4--,if we rule out irrelevant considerations1 we find that we never1 without qualification1 invert our moral judgments of doer and deed4 ,so far as we regard ,napoleon's actions as morally good 7not merely as happening to effect certain desirable results7 we give ,napoleon credit for interest in bringing about those results1 and in so far forth1 call him good4 ,character1 like conduct1 is a highly complex thing4 ,no human being is all good or all bad4 ,even if we were sure that ,napoleon was an evil-minded man1 our judgment is of him as evil upon the whole4 ,only if we suppose him to be bad and only bad all the time is there the opposition of evil character and good actions4 ,we may believe that even in what ,napoleon did in the way of legal and civic reform he was actuated by mixed motives--by vanity1 love of greater1 because more centralized1 power1 etc4 ,but these interests in and of themselves could not have effected the results he accomplished4 ,he must have had some insight into a better condition of affairs1 and this insight evidences an interest in so far good4 ,moreover1 so far as we judge ,napoleon bad as to his character and motive in these acts1 we are entitled to hold that the actions and also the outward results were also partially evil4 ,that is1 while to some extent1 socially beneficial1 they would have been still more so if ,napoleon had been actuated by less self-centred considerations4 ,if his character had been simpler1 more sincere1 more straightforward1 then certain evil results1 certain offsets to the good he accomplished1 would not have occurred4 ,the mixture of good and evil in the results and the mixture of good and evil in the motives are proportionate to each other4 ,such is the conclusion when we recognize the complexities of character and conduct1 and do not allow ourselves to be imposed upon by a fictitious simplicity of analysis4 ,summary4--,the first quality which is the object of judgment primarily resides then in intention3 in the consequences which are foreseen and desired4 ,ultimately it resides in that disposition or characteristics of a person which are responsible for his foreseeing and desiring just such consequences rather than others4 ,the ground for judging an act on the basis of consequences not foreseen is that the powers of a man are not fixed1 but capable of modification and redirection4 ,it is only through taking into account in subsequent acts consequences of prior acts not intended in those prior acts that the agent learns the fuller significance of his own power and thus of himself4 ,every builder builds other than he knows1 whether better or worse4 ,in no case1 can he foresee all the consequences of his acts4 ,in subsequent experience these results1 mere by-products of the original volition1 enter in4 ,outer and non-moral for the original act1 they are within subsequent voluntary activity1 because they influence desire and make foresight more accurate in detail and more extensive in range4 ,this translation of consequences once wholly unforeseeable into consequences which have to be taken in account is at its maximum in the change of impulsive into intelligent action4 ,but there is no act so intelligent that its actual consequences do not run beyond its foreseen ones1 and thus necessitate a subsequent revision of intention4 ,thus the distinction of inner and outer is one involved in the growth of character and conduct4 ,only if character were not in process of change1 only if conduct were a fixed because isolated thing1 should we have that separation of the inner and the outer which underlies alike the ,kantian and the utilitarian theories4 ,in truth1 there is no separation1 but only a contrast of the different levels of desire and forethought of earlier and later activities4 ,the great need of the moral agent is thus a character which will make him as open1 as accessible as possible1 to the recognition of the consequences of his behavior4 ,,literature ,on ,,conduct ,,and ,,character in general1 see ,paulsen1 ,system of ,ethics1 pp4 #dfh-dgb2 ,mackenzie1 ,manual of ,ethics1 ,book ,i41 ch4 iii42 ,spencer1 ,principles of ,ethics1 ,part ,i41 chs4 i4-viii42 ,green1 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 pp4 #aaj-aag1 #aeb-aei2 ,alexander1 ,moral ,order and ,progress1 pp4 #dh-eb2 ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 ch4 ii42 ,mezes1 ,ethics1 ch4 iv42 ,seth1 ,ethical ,principles1 ch4 iii4 ,upon ,,motive ,,and ,,intention consult ,bentham1 ,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1 chs4 viii4 and x42 ,james ,mill1 ,analysis of ,human ,mind1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 chs4 xxii4 and xxv42 ,austin1 ,jurisprudence1 ,vol4 ,i41 chs4 xviii4-xx42 ,green1 ,prolegomena1 pp4 #cae-cbe2 ,alexander1 ,moral ,order and ,progress1 pp4 #cf-dg2 ,westermarck1 ,origin and ,development of the ,moral ,ideas1 chs4 viii41 xi41 and xiii42 ,ritchie1 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,,iv41 pp4 #hi-id1 and #bbi-bch1 where farther references are given4 ,upon ,,formal ,,and ,,material 7or subjective and objective7 ,,rightness see ,sidgwick1 ,history of ,ethics1 p4 #bjj2 ,rickaby1 ,moral ,philosophy1 p4 #c1 pp4 #cc-dj2 ,bowne1 ,principles of ,ethics1 pp4 #ci-dj2 ,brown1 ,philosophy of ,mind1 ,vol4 ,,iii41 p4 #dhi and pp4 #dii-ejj2 ,paulsen1 ,system of ,ethics1 pp4 #bbg-bcc2 ,green1 ,prolegomena1 pp4 #cag-cbc2 ,sidgwick1 ,methods of ,ethics1 pp4 #bjf-bjg4 ,,footnotes3 #abj ,when ,kant says that the coolness of a villain makes him more dangerous and more abominable1 it is suggested that it is more abominable because it is more dangerous--surely a statement of the value of will in terms of the results it tends to effect4 #aba ,kant's distinction between a mere wish1 and assuming all the means in our power1 appears to recognize this fact1 but he does not apply the fact in his theory4 #abb ,but1 as we shall see1 the utilitarians make finally a distinction between ends achieved and ends attempted4 #abc ,bentham1 ,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1 ch4 x41 ,sec4 #c4 #abd ,mill1 ,utilitarianism4 #abe ,psychology1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #efb-efc4 ,the whole passage1 pp4 #efa-efi1 should be thoroughly familiar to every ethical student2 and should be compared with what is said in ,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #bhd-bij1 about the selective tendency of feelings2 and ,vol4 ,i41 ch4 xi41 upon attention1 and ,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #eae-ebb1 upon discrimination4 ,hoeffding1 ,psychology 7translated71 is also clear and explicit with reference to the influence of our emotions upon our ideas4 7,see especially pp4 #bih-cjg47 ,the development of this fact in some of its aspects is one of the chief traits of the ,ethics of ,spinoza4 #abf ,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1 ch4 xi41 ,sec4 #a4 #abg ,bentham does not mean unreal by a fictitious entity4 ,according to his logic1 all general and abstract terms1 all words designating relations rather than elements1 are fictitious entities4 #abh ,by mischievous he means pernicious1 bad1 vicious1 or even depraved in extreme cases4 #abi ,ibid41 ch4 xi41 ,sec4 #c4 #acj ,ibid41 ,secs4 #bg and #bh4 #aca ,the fact that common moral experience1 as embodied in common speech1 uses such terms as think of1 consider1 regard1 pay attention to 7in such expressions as he is thoughtful of1 considerate of1 regardful of1 mindful of1 attentive to1 the interests of others7 in a way implying both the action of intelligence and of the affections1 is the exact counterpart of the interchangeable use1 already mentioned1 of the terms intention and motive4 #acb ,in short1 the way an individual favors himself in reading his own motives is as much an evidence of his egoism as the way he favors himself in outward action4 ,criminals can almost always assign good motives4 #acc ,formally and materially good or bad are terms also employed to denote the same distinction4 7,see ,sidgwick1 ,history of ,ethics1 pp4 #aii-bjj2 so ,bowne1 ,principles of ,ethics1 pp4 #ci-dj47 ,the familiar distinction between the formal and the material rightness of action3 ,the former depends upon the attitude of the agent's will towards his ideal of right2 the latter depends upon the harmony of the act with the laws of reality and its resulting tendency to produce and promote well-being4 ,bowne holds that both are necessary1 while formal rightness is ethically more important1 though not all important4 ,,chapter ,,xiv ,,happiness ,,and ,,conduct3 ,,the ,,good ,,and ,,desire ,we have reached a conclusion as to our first inquiry 7p4 #bja71 and have decided that the appropriate subject-matter of moral judgment is the disposition of the person as manifested in the tendencies which cause certain consequences1 rather than others1 to be considered and esteemed--foreseen and desired4 ,disposition1 motive1 intent are then judged good or bad according to the consequences they tend to produce4 ,but what are the consequences by which we determine anything to be good or bad8 ,we turn from the locus or residence of the distinctions of good and bad to the nature of the distinctions themselves4 ,what do good and bad mean as terms of voluntary behavior8 ,happiness and ,misery as the ,good and ,bad4--,there is one answer to this question which is at once so simple and so comprehensive that it has always been professed by some representative ethical theory3 the good is happiness1 well-being1 pleasure2 the bad is misery1 woe1 pain4#acd ,the agreeableness or disagreeableness attending consequences differentiates them into good and bad2 and it is because some deeds are found to lead to pleasure1 while others lead to pain1 that they are adjudged virtuous or vicious4 ,in its modern form1 this theory is known as utilitarianism4 ,bentham has given it a sweeping and clear formulation4 ,nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters1 pain and pleasure4 ,it is for them alone to point out what we ought to do as well as to determine what we shall do4 ,on the one hand1 the standard of right and wrong1 on the other chain of causes and effects1 are fastened to their throne4 ,strictly speaking nothing can be said to be good or bad but either in itself1 which is the case only with pain or pleasure2 or on account of its effects1 which is the case only with things that are the cause or preventive of pain or pleasure4 ,again3 ,by the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatever according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interests are in question4#ace ,once more3 ,the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question is the right and proper1 and the only right and proper and universally desirable end of human action4 ,only on the basis of this principle do the words 'right and wrong' and 'ought' have an intelligent meaning as applied to actions2 otherwise they have not4 ,this last statement need not mean1 however1 that all judgments of right and wrong are as matter of fact derived from a consideration of the results of action in the way of pain and pleasure1 but that upon this ground alone should our judgments be formed1 since upon this basis alone can they be justified4#acf ,axiomatic ,identification of ,good with ,happiness4--,the principle that happiness is the ultimate aim of human action and the ultimate standard of the moral value of that action is generally regarded by the utilitarians as axiomatic and not susceptible of proof4 ,as ,bentham says1 that which is used to prove everything else cannot itself be proved4 ,a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere4 ,so ,bain says 7,moral ,science1 p4 #bg71 ,now there can be no proof offered for the position that happiness is the proper end of all human procedures1 the criterion of all right conduct4 ,it is an ultimate or final assumption to be tested by reference to the individual judgments of mankind4 ,thus also ,mill 7,utilitarianism73 ,the only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that people actually see it4 ,in like manner the sole proof that it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it4#acg ,extreme ,opposition to ,happiness ,theory4--,in striking contrast to this view of the self-evident character of happiness as the all-desirable1 is the view of those to whom it is equally self-evident that to make pleasure the end of action is destructive of all morality4 ,carlyle is an interesting illustration of a violent reaction against utilitarianism4 ,his more moderate characterization of it is mechanical profit and loss theory4 ,it is an upholstery and cookery conception of morals4 ,it never gets above the level of considerations of comfort and expediency4 ,more vehemently1 it is a pig philosophy which regards the universe as a swine trough in which virtue is thought of as the attainment of the maximum possible quantity of pig's wash4 ,again1 apostrophizing man1 he says3 ,art thou nothing else than a ,vulture that flies through the ,universe seeking after ,somewhat to eat2 shrieking dolefully because ,carrion enough is not given thee8 ,of the attempt to make general happiness the end1 he says it proposes the problem of ,given a world of ,knaves1 to produce honesty from their united action1 the term knave referring to the individualistic self-seeking character of pleasure and honesty to the social outcome desired4 ,as a political theory1 he thought that utilitarianism subordinated justice to benevolence1 and in that light he referred to it as a universal syllabub of philanthrophic twaddle4 ,ambiguity in ,notion of ,happiness4--,if to some it is self-evident that happiness is the aim of action1 and success in achieving it the test both of the act and the disposition from which it proceeds2 while to others it is equally obvious that such a view means immorality or at least a base and sordid morality1 it is reasonable to suppose that the happiness does not mean the same to both parties2 that there is some fundamental ambiguity in the notion4 ,source of ,ambiguity4--,the nature of this ambiguity may be inferred from the fact that ,bentham himself--and in this he is typical of all the utilitarians--combines in his statement two aspects of happiness1 or two views of pleasure4 ,he says it is for pleasure and pain alone to point out what we ought to do1 that they are the only basis upon which our judgments of right and wrong ought to be formed1 or upon which they can be justified4 ,other things may be taken as pointing out what we ought to do2 other standards of judgment--caprice1 sympathy1 dogma--are employed4 ,but they are not the right and proper ones4 ,consideration of consequences of the act in the way of effect upon the happiness and misery of all concerned1 furnishes the only proper way of regulating the formation of right ends4 ,a certain happiness1 that of results1 is the standard4 ,but this presupposes that1 in any case there is some end1 and one which may be improper because not in accord with the standard4 ,yet this end also must be pleasure4 ,pleasure and pain determine what we shall do1 whether we act for the maximum of pleasures or not4 ,the chain of causes as well as the standard of right is fastened to them4 ,we act for pleasure1 even when we do not act for the pleasures for which we ought to act4 ,pleasure or happiness thus appears in a double role4 ,only in the case of right ends1 is it the same happiness which serves as a moving spring and as standard of judgment4 ,in other cases1 it is one pleasure which is the end in view1 and another pleasure1 one not in view1 or at least not influencing action1 which measures rightness4 ,the essence1 so to speak1 of a wrong act is precisely that the pleasures which produce it are not these pleasures which measure its goodness2 the agent is not moved to act by those pleasures and pains which as consequences settle its moral value1 but by some pleasure or pain which happens to be strongly felt at the moment of action4 ,two ,sorts of ,good4--,thus1 even from ,bentham's point of view1 there is a difference between real and apparent happiness1 between the good which moves to action and that which1 being the standard1 should move4 ,if the end of all acts is happiness and yet we require a consideration of results to show us what happiness we are justified in seeking1 then happiness is in a highly ambiguous position4 ,while from one standpoint1 it furnishes the standard of right and wrong2 from another1 it furnishes the moving spring of all wrong action2 it is that which so solicits and tempts us that we fail to employ the right standard for the regulation of our action1 and hence go astray4 ,it seems to some 7as to ,carlyle7 that this distinction is so fundamental that it is absurd to say that one and the same thing can be the standard of all right action and the moving spring of all wrong action4 ,hence they insist upon the fundamental opposition of virtue and happiness4 ,moreover1 from ,bentham's own point of view1 there is a difference between the good which first presents itself1 which first stirs desire and solicits to action1 and the good which being formed after and upon the basis of consideration of consequences1 is the right good4 ,in calling the latter the right1 we mean that it has authority over the end which first appears2 and hence has supreme claim over action4 ,so it is again evident that we are using happiness in two quite different senses2 so that if we call the first end that presents itself happiness1 the right end will be something else2 or if we call the consequences which measure the worth of the act happiness1 then the first end ought to be called something else4 ,if happiness is the natural end of all desire and endeavor1 it is absurd to say that the same happiness ought to be the end4 ,if all objects fall to the ground any way1 we do not say they ought to fall4 ,if all our acts are moved any way by pleasure and pain1 this fact1 just because it applies equally to all acts1 throws no lights upon the rightness or wrongness of any one of them4 ,or1 on the other hand1 if that for which we should act is a kind of happiness which involves full consideration of consequences1 it is misleading to call that happiness from which we act blindly or without proper forethought4 ,if happiness is to be the same as the moral good1 it must be after the right kind of happiness has been distinguished2 namely1 that which commends itself after adequate reflection4 ,our criticism of ,bentham will be directed to showing that1 so far as he conceives of happiness as simply a sum of pleasures alike in quality1 but differing only in quantity1 he cannot make this distinction4 ,as an early critic 7,hazlitt7 of ,bentham said3 ,pleasure is that which is so in itself4 ,good is that which approves itself on reflection1 or the idea of which is a source of satisfaction4 ,all pleasure is not1 therefore 7morally speaking71 equally a good2 for all pleasure does not equally bear reflecting upon4 ,we shall further try to show that the reason for ,bentham's conceiving happiness as simply a sum of pleasures is that he falls into the error already discussed1 of separating consequences from the disposition and capacities or active tendencies of the agent4 ,and that1 when we correct this error1 the proper meaning of happiness turns out to be the satisfaction1 realization1 or fulfillment of some purpose and power of the agent4 ,thus we can distinguish between the false and unsatisfactory happiness found in the expression of a more or less isolated and superficial tendency of the self1 and the true or genuine good found in the adequate fulfillment of a fundamental and fully related capacity4 ,we shall first take up the discussion under the heads just brought out3 ,i4 ,happiness as the ,natural ,end or ,object of ,desire2 ,,ii4 ,happiness as ,standard of ,judgment4 ,sec4 #a4 ,,the ,,object ,,of ,,desire ,hedonistic ,theory of ,desire4--,that phase of utilitarianism which holds that the object of desire is pleasure1 is termed hedonism1 or sometimes psychological hedonism to distinguish it from ethical hedonism1 the theory that pleasure is the standard for judging acts4 ,the fundamental fallacy of psychological hedonism has been well stated by ,green to be supposing that a desire can be aroused or created by the anticipation of its own satisfaction--i4e41 in supposing that the idea of the pleasure of exercise arouses desire for it1 when in fact the idea of exercise is pleasant only if there be already some desire for it 7,green1 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 p4 #afh74 ,given a desire already in existence1 the idea of an object which is thought of as satisfying that desire will always arouse pleasure1 or be thought of as pleasurable4 ,but hedonism fails to consider the radical difference between an object's arousing pleasure1 because it is regarded as satisfying desire1 and the thought of a pleasure arousing a desire3--although the feeling of agreeableness may intensify the movement towards the object4 ,a hungry man thinks of a beefsteak as that which would satisfy his appetite2 his thought is at once clothed with an agreeable tone and the conscious force of the appetite is correspondingly intensified2 the miser thinks of gold in a similar way2 the benevolent of an act of charity1 etc4 ,but in each case the presence of the pleasurable element is dependent upon the thought of an object which is not pleasure--the beefsteak1 the gold4 ,the thought of the object precedes the pleasure and excites it because it is felt to promise the satisfaction of a desire4 ,pleasure is the ,felt ,concomitant of ,imagining a ,desire ,realized in ,its ,appropriate ,object4--,the object of desire is not pleasure1 but some object is pleasurable because it is the congenial terminus of desire4 ,the pleasure felt is a present pleasure1 the pleasure which now accompanies the idea of the satisfied desire4 ,it intensifies the desire in its present character1 through opposition to the disagreeable tone of the experienced lack and want4 #a4 ,pleasures and ,original ,appetites4--,biological instincts and appetites exist not for the sake of furnishing pleasure1 but as activities needed to maintain life--the life of the individual and the species4 ,their adequate fulfillment is attended with pleasure4 ,such is the undoubted biological fact4 ,now if the animal be gifted with memory and anticipation1 this complicates the process1 but does not change its nature4 ,the animal in feeling hungry may now consciously anticipate the getting of food and may feel pleasure in the idea of food4 ,the pleasure henceforth attends not merely upon attained satisfaction of appetite1 but also upon appetite prior to satisfaction1 so far as that anticipates its future satisfaction4 ,but desire is still for the object1 for the food4 ,if the desire is healthy1 it will not depend for its origin upon the recollection of a prior pleasure2 the animal does not happen to recall that it got pleasure from food and thus arouse a desire for more food4 ,the desire springs up naturally from the state of the organism4 ,only a jaded and unhealthy appetite has to whip itself up by recalling previous pleasures4 ,but if there are many obstacles and discouragements in the way of getting the object which satisfies want1 the anticipation of pleasure in its fulfillment may normally intensify the putting forth of energy1 may give an extra reenforcement to flagging effort4 ,in this way1 the anticipation of pleasure has a normal place in the effective direction of activities4 ,but in any case1 the desire and its own object are primary2 the pleasure is secondary4 #b4 ,pleasure and ,acquired ,desires4--,the same point comes out even more clearly when we take into account the so-called higher desires and sentiments--those which usually enter into distinctively moral questions4 ,in these cases it is no longer a matter of the original instincts and appetites of the organism4 ,their place is taken by acquired habits and dispositions4 ,the object of a benevolent desire is the supplying of another's lack1 or the increase of his good4 ,the pleasure which accompanies the doing of a kindness to others is not the object1 for the individual thinks of the kindly act as pleasure-giving only because he already has a benevolent character which naturally expresses itself in amiable desires4 ,so far as he is not benevolent1 the act will appear repulsive rather than attractive to him2 and if it is done1 it will be not from a benevolent desire1 but from a cowardly or an avaricious desire1 the pleasure in that case attending the thought of some other objective consequence1 such as escaping unpopularity4 ,in like manner1 the aim to behave honestly1 or to obey the civil law1 or to love one's country1 leads to dwelling upon the acts and objects in which these desires and intents may be fulfilled2 and those objects which are thought of as affording fulfillment are necessarily put in a favorable and attractive light--they are regarded as sources of happiness4 ,to a patriot the thought even of possible death may arouse a glow of satisfaction as he thinks of this act as strengthening his country's existence4 ,but to suppose that this attendant pleasure is the aim and object of desire is to put the cart before the horse4 #c4 ,happiness and ,desire4--,all men1 then1 may be said to desire happiness4 ,but this happiness is not dependent upon prior experiences of pleasure1 which1 coming up in memory1 arouse desire and rivet attention upon themselves4 ,to say that the desire of a man is for happiness is only to say that happiness comes in the fulfillment of desire1 the desires arising on their own account as expressions of a state of lack or incompletion in which the person finds himself4 ,happiness thus conceived is dependent upon the nature of desire and varies with it1 while desire varies with the type of character4 ,if the desire is the desire of an honest man1 then the prosperous execution of some honorable intent1 the payment of a debt1 the adequate termination of a trust1 is conceived as happiness1 as good4 ,if it be the desire of a profligate1 then entering upon the riotous course of living now made possible by inheritance of property is taken as happiness--the one consummation greatly to be wished4 ,if we know what any person really finds desirable1 what he stakes his happiness upon1 we can read his nature4 ,in happiness1 as the anticipation of the satisfaction of desire1 there is1 therefore1 no sure or unambiguous quality2 for it may be a token of good or of bad character1 according to the sort of object which appeals to the person4 ,the present joy found in the idea of the completion of a purpose cannot be the object of desire1 for we desire only things absent4 ,but the joy is a mark of the congruity or harmony of the thought of the object1 whatever it be--health1 dissipation1 miserliness1 prodigality1 conquest1 helpfulness--with the character of the agent4 ,it is an evidence of the moving force1 the influence1 the weight1 of the conceived end2 it registers the extent in which the end is not a mere intellectual abstraction1 but is a motive 7see p4 #beb74 ,but the moral worth of this motive depends upon the character of the end in which the person finds his satisfaction4 #d4 ,confusion of ,future and ,present ,pleasure4--,it is the confusion of present pleasure1 attendant upon the thought of an object as satisfying desire1 with the pleasure that will come when the desire is satisfied1 that accounts for the persistence of the idea that pleasure is the object of desire4 ,the fact that the object of desire is now pleasurable is distorted into the statement that we seek for an absent pleasure4#ach ,a good illustration of the confusion is seen in the following quotation3 ,the love of happiness must express the sole possible motive of ,judas ,iscariot and of his ,master2 it must explain the conduct of ,stylites on his pillar or ,tiberius at ,caprae or a ,kempis in his cell or of ,nelson in the cockpit of the ,victory4 ,it must be equally good for saints and martyrs1 heroes1 cowards1 debauches1 ascetics1 mystics1 misers1 prodigals1 men1 women and babes in arms 7,leslie ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #dd74 ,this statement is true1 as we have just seen1 in the sense that different persons find different things good in accordance with their different characters or habitually dominant purposes2 that each finds his happiness in whatever he most sets his affections upon4 ,where a man's heart is1 there will his treasure be also1 and where that is which a man regards as treasure1 there also is the heart4 ,a man's character is revealed by the objects which make him happy1 whether anticipated or realized4 ,our ,ends are ,our ,happiness1 ,not a ,means to ,it4--,but the fallacy is in the words love of happiness4 ,they suggest that all alike are seeking for some one and the same thing1 some one thing labeled happiness1 identical in all cases1 differing in the way they look for it--that saints and martyrs1 heroes and cowards1 all have just the same objective goal in view--if they only knew it6 ,in so far as it is true that there are certain fundamental conditions of the self which have to be satisfied in order that there shall be a true self and a true satisfaction1 happiness is the same for all1 and is the ultimate good of all4 ,but this holds only of the standard of happiness which makes any particular conception of happiness right or wrong1 not to the conceptions actually entertained4 ,to say that all are consciously and deliberately after the same happiness is to pervert the facts4 ,happiness as standard means the genuine fulfillment of whatever is necessary to the development and integrity of the self4 ,in this sense1 it is what men ought to desire2 it is what they do desire so far as they understand themselves and the conditions of their satisfaction4 ,but as natural or psychological end1 it means that in which a man happens at a given time to find delectation1 depending upon his uppermost wishes and strongest habits4 ,hence the objection which almost every one1 including the hedonists1 feels to the statement that happiness is the conscious aim of conduct4 ,it suggests that the objects at which we ordinarily aim are not sought for themselves1 but for some ulterior gratification to ourselves4 ,in reality these ends1 so far as they correspond to our capacity and intention1 are our happiness4 ,all men love happiness--yes1 in the sense that1 having desires1 they are interested in the objects in which the desires may be realized1 no matter whether they are worthy or degraded4 ,no2 if by this be meant that happiness is something other than and beyond the conditions in which the powers of the person are brought out1 and made effective2 no1 or if it means that all love that which really will bring happiness4 ,necessity for ,standard4--,as many sorts of character1 so many sorts of things regarded as satisfactory1 as constitutive of good4 ,not all anticipations when realized are what they were expected to be4 ,the good in prospect may be apples of ,sodom1 dust and ashes1 in attainment4 ,hence some ends1 some forms of happiness1 are regarded as unworthy1 not as real or true4 ,while they appeared to be happiness during the expectancy of desire1 they are not approved as such in later reflection4 ,hence the demand for some standard good or happiness by which the individual may regulate the formation of his desires and purposes so that the present and the permanent good1 the good in desire and in reflection1 will coincide--so that the individual will find that to be satisfactory in his present view which will also permanently satisfy him4 ,from happiness as a conceived good we turn to happiness as rightly conceived good2 from happiness as result to happiness as standard4 ,as before1 we begin with the narrower utilitarian conception4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,the ,,conception ,,of ,,happiness ,,as ,a ,,standard ,utilitarian ,method4--,hedonism means that pleasure is the end of human action1 because the end of desire4 ,utilitarianism or universalistic hedonism holds that the pleasure of all affected is the standard for judging the worth of action1--not that conduciveness to happiness is the sole measure actually employed by mankind for judging moral worth1 but that it is the sole standard that should be employed4 ,many other tests may actually be used1 sympathy1 prejudice1 convention1 caprice1 etc41 but utility is the one which will enable a person to judge truly what is right or wrong in any proposed course of action4 ,the method laid down by ,bentham is as follows3 ,every proposed act is to be viewed with reference to its probable consequences in 7a7 intensity of pleasure and pains2 7b7 their duration2 7c7 their certainty or uncertainty2 7d7 their nearness or remoteness2 7e7 their fecundity--i4e41 the tendency of a pleasure to be followed by others1 or a pain by other pains2 7f7 their purity--i4e41 the tendency of a pleasure to be followed by pains and vice versa2 7g7 their extent1 that is1 the number or range of persons whose happiness is affected--with reference to whose pleasures and pains each one of the first six items ought also in strictness to be calculated6 ,then sum up all the pleasures which stand to the credit side of the account2 add the pains which are the debit items1 or liabilities1 on the other2 then take their algebraic sum1 and the balance of it on the side of pleasure will be the good tendency of the act upon the whole4 ,circle in ,method4--,bentham's argument depends wholly upon the possibility of both foreseeing and accurately measuring the amount of future pleasures and pains that will follow from the intention if it is carried into effect1 and of being able to find their algebraic sum4 ,our examination will be directed to showing that we have here the same fallacy that we have just discussed2 and that ,bentham argues in a circle4 ,for the argument purports to measure present disposition or intent by summing up future units of pleasure or pain2 but there is no way of estimating amounts of future satisfaction1 the relative intensity and weight of future possible pain and pleasure experiences1 except upon the basis of present tendencies1 the habitual aims and interests1 of the person4 7#a7 ,the only way to estimate the relative amount 7bulk1 intensity1 etc47 of a future lot of pleasure or pain1 is by seeing how agreeable to present disposition are certain anticipated consequences1 themselves not pleasures or pains at all4 7#b7 ,the only basis upon which we can be sure that there is a right estimate of future satisfactions1 is that we already have a good character as a basis and organ for forming judgment4 7#a7 ,how ,pleasures and ,pains are ,measured4--,if we keep strictly to ,bentham's own conception of pleasures as isolated entities1 all just alike in quality1 but differing in quantity--in the two dimensions of intensity and duration--the scheme he recommends is simply impossible4 ,what does it mean to say that one pleasure1 as an external and future fact1 is equal to another8 ,what practical sense is there in the notion that a pain may be found which is exactly equal to a pleasure1 so that it may just offset it or reduce it to zero8 ,how can one weigh the amount of pain in a jumping and long-continued toothache against1 say1 the pleasure of some charitable deed performed under conditions which may bring on the toothache8 ,what relevancy has the quantitative comparison to a judgment of moral worth8 ,how many units of pleasure are contained in the fulfillment of the intention to go to war for one's country8 ,how many in the fulfillment of the intention to remain at home with one's family and secure profitable contracts from the government8 ,how shall the pains involved in each set be detected and have their exact numerical force assigned them8 ,how shall one set be measured over against the other8 ,if a man is already a patriot1 one set of consequences comes into view and has weight2 if one is already a coward and a money-grubber1 another set of consequences looms up and its value is measured on a rule of very different scale4 ,present ,congeniality to ,character ,measures ,importance4--,when we analyze what occurs1 we find that this process of comparing future possible satisfactions1 to see which is the greater1 takes place on exactly the opposite basis from that set forth by ,bentham4 ,we do not compare results in the way of fixed amounts of pleasures and pains1 but we compare objective results1 changes to be effected in ourselves1 in others1 in the whole social situation2 during this comparison desires and aversions take more definite form and strength1 so that we find the idea of one result more agreeable1 more harmonious1 to our present character than another4 ,then we say it is more satisfying1 it affords more pleasure than another4 ,the satisfaction now aroused in the mind at the thought of getting even with an enemy may be stronger than the painfulness of the thought of the harm or loss that will come to him or than the thought of danger itself1--then the pleasures to follow from vengeance are esteemed more numerous1 stronger1 more lasting1 etc41 than those which would follow from abstinence4 ,or1 to say that satisfactions are about equal means that we are now at a loss to choose between them4 ,but we are not at a loss to choose because certain future pains and pleasures present themselves in and of themselves as fixed amounts irrespective of our own wishes1 habits1 and plans of life4 ,similarly we may speak of satisfactions being added to one another and the total sum increased2 or of dissatisfaction coming in as offsets and reducing the amount of satisfaction4 ,but this does not mean that pains and pleasures which we expect to arrive in the future are added and subtracted--what intelligible meaning can such a phrase possess8 ,it means that as we think first of this result and then of another1 the present happiness found in the anticipation of one is increased by the anticipation of the other2 or that the results are so incompatible that the present satisfaction1 instead of swelling and expanding as from one thought to another1 is chilled and lessened4 ,thus we might find the thought of revenge sweet 7and thus give a high valuation to the units of pleasure to result from it71 but be checked by the thought of the meanness of the act1 or of how we would feel if some one else1 whose good opinion we highly esteem1 should hear of it4 7#b7 ,congeniality to a ,good ,character the ,right ,measure4--,the net outcome of this discussion is that the practical value of our acts is defined to us at any given time by the satisfaction1 or displeasure1 we take in the ideas of changes we foresee in case the act takes place4 ,the present happiness or distaste1 depending upon the harmony between the idea in question and the character1 defines for us the value of the future consequences3 which is the reverse of saying that a calculation of future pains and pleasures determines for us the value of the act and character4 ,but this applies to any end as it happens to arise1 not to the end as we ought to form it2 we are still without a standard4 ,what has been said applies to the criminal as well as to the saint2 to the miser and the prodigal and the wisely generous alike4 ,the idea of a certain result warms the heart of each1 his heart being what it is4 ,the assassin would not be one if the thought of a murder had not been entertained by him and if the thought had not been liked and welcomed--made at home4 ,only upon the supposition that character is already good can we trust judgment1 first1 to foresee all the consequences that should be foreseen2 and1 secondly1 to respond to each foreseen consequence with the right emotional stamp of like and dislike1 pleasure and pain4 ,the ,greeks said it is the object of a moral education to see that the individual finds his pleasure in the thought of noble ends and finds his pain in the contemplation of base ends4 ,again1 as ,aristotle said3 ,the good man wills the real object of intent1 but what the bad man desires may be anything2 just as physically those in good condition want things that are wholesome1 while the diseased may take anything to be healthful2 for the good man judges correctly 7,ethics1 ,book ,,iii41 #d1 #d74 ,and again3 ,the good man is apt to go right about pleasure1 and the bad man is apt to go wrong 7,book ,,ii41 #c1 #g71 and1 finally1 ,it is only to the good man that the good presents itself as good1 for vice perverts us and causes us to err about the principle of action 7,book ,,iii41 #ab1 #aj74 ,principle of ,quality of ,pleasure as ,criterion4--,mill1 still calling himself a utilitarian1 reaches substantially the same result by 7a7 making the quality of pleasure1 not its bulk or intensity1 the standard2 and 7b7 referring differences in quality to differences in the characters which experience them4 ,it is1 he says1 quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others4 ,human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites1 and1 when once made conscious of them1 do not regard anything as happiness that does not include their gratification4 ,the higher the capacity or faculty1 the higher in quality the pleasure of its exercise and fulfillment1 irrespective of bulk4 ,but how do we know which faculty is higher1 and hence what satisfaction is more valuable8 ,by reference to the experience of the man who has had the best opportunity to exercise all the powers in question4 ,few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals1 for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasure2 no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool1 no instructed person would be an ignoramus1 no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base1 even though they should be persuaded that the fool1 the dunce or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs4 ,and again1 ,it is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied2 and a highly endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can look for1 as the world is constituted1 is imperfect4444 ,it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied2 better to be a ,socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied4 ,and if the fool or the pig is of a different opinion1 it is because he only knows his own side of the question4 ,the other party to the comparison knows both sides4 ,the net result of our discussion is1 then1 7#a7 that happiness consists in the fulfillment in their appropriate objects 7or the anticipation of such fulfillment7 of the powers of the self manifested in desires1 purposes1 efforts2 7#b7 true happiness consists in the satisfaction of those powers of the self which are of higher quality2 7#c7 that the man of good character1 the one in whom these high powers are already active1 is the judge1 in the concrete1 of happiness and misery4 ,we shall now discuss ,sec4 #c4 ,,the ,,constitution ,,of ,,happiness ,happiness consists in the agreement1 whether anticipated or realized1 of the objective conditions brought about by our endeavors with our desires and purposes4 ,this conception of happiness is contrasted with the notion that it is a sum or collection of separate states of sensation or feeling4 #a4 ,one ,view ,separates1 while the ,other ,connects1 ,pleasure and ,objective ,conditions4--,in one case1 the agreeable feeling is a kind of psychical entity1 supposed to be capable of existence by itself and capable of abstraction from the objective end of action4 ,the pleasant thing is one thing2 the pleasure1 another2 or1 rather1 the pleasant thing must be analyzed into two independent elements1 the pleasure as feeling and the thing with which it happens to be associated4 ,it is the pleasure alone1 when dissociated1 which is the real end of conduct1 an object being at best an external means of securing it4 ,it is the pleasurable feeling which happens to be associated with food1 with music1 with a landscape1 that makes it good2 health1 art1 are not good in themselves4 ,the other view holds that pleasure has no such existence by itself2 that it is only a name for the pleasant object2 that by pleasure is meant the agreement or congruity which exists between some capacity of the agent and some objective fact in which this capacity is realized4 ,it expresses the way some object meets1 fits into1 responds to1 an activity of the agent4 ,to say that food is agreeable1 means that food satisfies an organic function4 ,music is pleasant because by it certain capacities or demands of the person with respect to rhythm of hearing are fulfilled2 a landscape is beautiful because it carries to fulfillment the visual possibilities of the spectator4 #b4 ,qualities of ,pleasure ,vary with ,objects1 and with ,springs to ,action4--,when happiness is conceived as an aggregate of states of feeling1 these are regarded as homogeneous in quality1 differing from one another only in intensity and duration4 ,their qualitative differences are not intrinsic1 but are due to the different objects with which they are associated 7as pleasures of hearing1 or vision74 ,hence they disappear when the pleasure is taken by itself as an end4 ,but if agreeableness is precisely the agreeableness or congruousness of some objective condition with some impulse1 habit1 or tendency of the agent1 then1 of course1 pure pleasure is a myth4 ,any pleasure is qualitatively unique1 being precisely the harmony of one set of conditions with its appropriate activity4 ,the pleasure of eating is one thing2 the pleasure of hearing music1 another2 the pleasure of an amiable act1 another2 the pleasure of drunkenness or of anger is still another4 ,hence the possibility of absolutely different moral values attaching to pleasures1 according to the type or aspect of character which they express4 ,but if the good is only a sum of pleasures1 any pleasure1 so far as it goes1 is as good as any other--the pleasure of malignity as good as the pleasure of kindliness1 simply as pleasure4 ,accordingly ,bentham said1 the pleasure of push-pin 7a game7 is as good as that of poetry4 ,and as he said again1 since pleasure is the motive of every act1 there is no motive which in itself1 and as far as it goes1 is not good--it is bad only if it turns out in the end to produce more pain than pleasure4 ,the pleasure of malignant gossip is so far as it is pleasure a mitigation of the badness of the act4 ,not so1 if happiness is the experience into which pleasures enter so far as the tendencies of character that produce them are approved of4 ,an act may bring a pleasure and yet that pleasure be no part of happiness1 but rather a blot and blemish4 ,such would be the case1 for example1 with the pleasure which one might take in an act of charity because one had thereby put himself in a position superior to that of the recipient4 ,a good man who caught himself feeling pleasure from this phase of the act would not regard this pleasure as a further element of good attained1 but as detracting from his happiness4 ,a pleasure may be accepted or reacted against4 ,so far as not acquiesced in it is1 from the standpoint of happiness1 positively disagreeable4 ,surrender to a pleasure1 taking it to be one's happiness1 is one of the surest ways of revealing or discovering what sort of a man one is4 ,on the other hand1 the pain which a miserly man feels in his first acts of generosity may be welcomed by him as1 under the circumstances1 an element in his good1 since it is a sign of and factor in the improvement of character4 #c4 ,the ,unification of ,character4--,happiness as a sum of pleasures does not afford a basis for unifying or organizing the various tendencies and capacities of the self4 ,it makes possible at best only a mechanical compromise or external adjustment4 ,take1 for example1 the satisfaction attendant upon acting from a benevolent or a malicious impulse4 ,there can be no question that some pleasure is found in giving way to either impulse when it is strongly felt4 ,now if we regard the pleasure as a fixed state in itself1 and good or happiness as a sum of such states1 the only moral superiority that can attach to acting benevolently is that1 upon the whole1 more units of pleasure come from it than from giving way to the opposite spring of action4 ,it is simply a question of greater or less quantity in the long run4 ,each trait of character1 each act1 remains morally independent1 cut off from others4 ,its only relation to others is that which arises when its results in the way of units of agreeable or painful feeling are compared1 as to bulk1 with analogous consequences flowing from some other trait1 or act4 ,but if the fundamental thing in happiness is the relation of the desire and intention of the agent to its own successful outlet1 there is an inherent connection between our different tendencies4 ,the satisfaction of one tendency strengthens itself1 and strengthens allied tendencies1 while it weakens others4 ,a man who gives way easily to anger 7and finds gratification in it7 against the acts of those whom he regards as enemies1 nourishes unawares a tendency to irritability in all directions and thus modifies the sources and nature of all satisfaction4 ,the man who cherishes the satisfaction he derives from a landscape may increase his susceptibility to enjoyment from poetry and pictures4 ,the ,final ,question4--,the final question of happiness1 the question which marks off true and right happiness from false and wrong gratification1 comes to this3 ,can there be found ends of action1 desirable in themselves1 which reenforce and expand not only the motives from which they directly spring1 but also the other tendencies and attitudes which are sources of happiness8 ,can there be found powers whose exercise confirms ends which are stable and weakens and removes objects which occasion only restless1 peevish1 or transitory satisfaction1 and ultimately thwart and stunt the growth of happiness8 ,harmony1 reenforcement1 expansion are the signs of a true or moral satisfaction4 ,what is the good which while good in direct enjoyment also brings with it fuller and more continuous life8 ,,literature ,for pleasure as the object of desire and the psychology of hedonism1 see ,bain1 ,emotions and ,will1 ,part ,,ii41 ch4 viii42 ,rickaby1 ,moral ,philosophy1 pp4 #ed-fa1 and ,aquinas ,ethicus1 ,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #ajd-aba2 ,sidgwick1 ,methods of ,ethics1 pp4 #cd-dg1 and the whole of ,book ,,ii41 and ,book ,,iii41 chs4 xiii4 and xiv42 ,mackenzie1 ,manual of ,ethics1 ,book ,,ii41 ch4 iv42 ,muirhead1 ,elements of ,ethics1 ,book ,,iii41 ch4 i42 ,gizyeki1 ,a ,student's ,manual of ,ethical ,philosophy2 ,green1 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 pp4 #afc-agg1 #bbf-bdj1 #cgd-chh2 ,james1 ,principles of ,psychology1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #edi-eei2 ,martineau1 ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 ,part ,,ii41 ,book ,,ii41 ,branch iv4 ,for the history of hedonism1 see ,wallace1 ,epicureanism2 ,pater1 ,marius the ,epicurean2 ,sidgwick1 ,history of ,ethics1 ch4 ii41 passim and ch4 iv41 ,sec4 #ad-ag2 ,hume1 ,treatise of ,human ,nature1 ,book ,,iii41 and the references to ,bentham and ,mill in the text2 ,watson1 ,hedonistic ,theories from ,aristippus to ,spencer4 ,for the utilitarian standard1 see ,lecky1 ,history of ,european ,morals1 ,vol4 ,i41 ch4 i42 ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 chs4 iv4 and v42 ,spencer1 ,principles of ,ethics1 ,part ,i42 ,hoeffding1 ,ethik1 ch4 vii41 and ,monist1 ,vol4 ,i41 p4 #ebi2 ,paulsen1 ,system of ,ethics1 pp4 #bbb-bhf1 and #djd-dad2 ,grote1 ,examination of the ,utilitarian ,philosophy2 ,wilson and ,fowler1 ,principles of ,morals1 ,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #ih-aab2 ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #bfb-bgc2 ,green1 ,prolegomena1 pp4 #bdj-bee1 #cii-dae2 ,martineau1 ,types1 pp4 #cjh-ccd2 ,alexander1 ,moral ,order and ,progress1 pp4 #bjd-baa2 ,seth1 ,principles of ,ethics1 pp4 #id-aaa2 ,sidgwick1 ,the ,ethics of ,t4 ,h4 ,green1 ,herbert ,spencer and ,j4 ,martineau1 ,lectures ,i4-,,iv4 of the ,criticism of ,spencer4 ,compare the references sub voce ,happiness1 #hii-ijc1 in ,rand's ,bibliography1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 of ,baldwin's ,dictionary of ,philosophy and ,psychology4 ,,footnotes3 #acd ,later we shall see reasons for discriminating between happiness and pleasure4 ,but here we accept the standpoint of those who identify them4 #ace ,the context shows that this party may be either the individual1 or a limited social group or the entire community4 ,even the pleasures and pains of animals1 of the sentient creation generally1 may come into the account4 #acf ,these quotations are all taken from ,bentham's ,principles of ,morals and ,legislation2 the first1 third1 and fourth from ch4 i42 the second from ch4 xiii42 and the last from ch4 ii4 #acg ,with these statements may he compared ,spencer1 ,principles of ,ethics1 pp4 #cj-cb3 ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 pp4 #db4 ,sidgwick1 in his ,methods of ,ethics1 holds that the axiomatic character of happiness as an end proves that the position is not empirical but intuitional or a priori4 ,only as we base ourselves on certain ultimate deliverances of conscience can we he said to know that happiness is the desirable end and that the happiness of one is just as intrinsically desirable as the happiness of another4 7,see his ,methods of ,ethics1 ,book ,,iii41 chs4 xiii4 and xiv47 #ach ,this ambiguity affects the statement quoted from ,bentham that pleasure and pain determine what we shall do4 ,his implication is that pleasure as object of desire moves us2 the fact is that present pleasure1 aroused by the idea of some object1 influences us4 ,,chapter ,,xv ,,happiness ,,and ,,social ,,ends#aci ,in form1 the true good is thus an inclusive or expanding end4 ,in substance1 the only end which fulfills these conditions is the social good4 ,the utilitarian standard is social consequences4 ,to repeat our earlier quotation from ,bentham 7above1 p4 #bfd73 ,the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question is the right and proper1 and the only right and proper and universally desirable end of human action4 ,mill says1 ,to do as you would be done by1 and to love your neighbor as yourself1 constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality4 ,and again3 ,the happiness which is the ,utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness1 but that of all concerned2 as between his own happiness and that of others1 ,utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator4 ,so ,sidgwick 7,methods of ,ethics1 p4 #cgi73 ,by ,utilitarianism is here meant the ethical theory1 first distinctly formulated by ,bentham1 that the conduct which under any given circumstances is externally or objectively right is that which produces the greatest amount of happiness on the whole2 that is taking into account all whose happiness is affected by the conduct4 ,it would tend to clearness if we might call this principle1 and the method based upon it1 by some such name as ,universalistic hedonism4 ,and finally1 ,bain 7,emotions and ,will1 p4 #cjc73 ,utility is opposed to the selfish principle1 for1 as propounded1 it always implies the good of society generally and the subordination of individual interests to the general good4 ,social ,purpose of ,utilitarianism4--,its aim1 then1 was the greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible number1 a democratic1 fraternal aim4 ,in the computation of the elements of this aim1 it insisted upon the principle of social and moral equality3 every one to count for one1 and only for one4 ,the standard was the well-being of the community conceived as a community of individuals1 all of whom had equal rights and none of whom had special privileges or exclusive avenues of access to happiness4 ,in a period in which the democratic spirit in ,england was asserting itself against vested interests and class-distinctions1 against legalized inequalities of all sorts1 the utilitarian philosophy became the natural and perhaps indispensable adjunct of the liberal and reforming spirit in law1 education1 and politics4 ,every custom1 every institution1 was cross-questioned2 it was not allowed to plead precedent and prior existence as a basis for continued existence4 ,it had to prove that it conduced to the happiness of the community as a whole1 or be legislated out of existence or into reform4 ,bentham's fundamental objection to other types of moral theories than his own was not so much philosophic or theoretic as it was practical4 ,he felt that every intuitional theory tended to dignify prejudice1 convention1 and fixed customs1 and so to consecrate vested interests and inequitable institutions4 ,recognition by an ,opponent4--,the following remarks by ,t4 ,h4 ,green are the more noteworthy because coming from a consistent opponent of the theory3 ,the chief theory of conduct which in ,modern ,europe has afforded the conscientious citizen a vantage ground for judging of the competing claims on his obedience1 and enabled him to substitute a critical and intelligent for a blind and unquestioning conformity1 has no doubt been the ,utilitarian4 444 ,whatever the errors arising from its hedonistic psychology1 no other theory has been available for the social or political reformer1 combining so much truth with such ready applicability4 ,no other has offered so commanding a point of view from which to criticize the precepts and institutions presented as authoritative4#adj ,and again1 speaking of the possibility of practical service from theory1 he says3 ,the form of philosophy which in the modern world has most conspicuously rendered this service has been the ,utilitarian1 because it has most definitely announced the interest of humanity without distinction of persons or classes1 as the end by reference to which all claims upon obedience are ultimately to be measured4444 ,impartiality of reference to human well-being has been the great lesson which the ,utilitarian has had to teach4#ada ,irreconcilable ,conflict of ,motive and ,end4--,but unfortunately the assertion that the happiness of all concerned is the universally desirable end1 is mixed up by early utilitarianism with an hedonistic psychology1 according to which the desired object is private and personal pleasure4 ,what is desirable is thus so different from what is desired as to create an uncrossable chasm between the true end of action--the happiness of all1--and the moving spring of desire and action--private pleasure4 ,that there is a difference between what is naturally desired 7meaning by naturally what first arouses interest and excites endeavor7 and what is morally desirable 7understanding by this the consequences which present themselves in adequate deliberation71 is certain enough4 ,but the desirable must be capable of becoming desired1 or else there is such a contradiction that morality is impossible4 ,if1 now1 the object of desire is always private pleasure1 how can the recognition of the consequences upon the happiness or misery of others ever become an effective competitor with considerations of personal well-being1 when the two conflict8#adb ,lack of ,harmony among ,pleasurable ,ends4--,if it so happens that the activities which secure the personal pleasure also manage to affect others favorably1 so much the better2 but since1 by the theory1 the individual must be moved exclusively by desire for his own pleasure1 woe betide others if their happiness happens to stand in the way4#adc ,it could only be by accident that activities of a large number of individuals all seeking their own private pleasures should coincide in effecting the desirable end of the common happiness4 ,the outcome would1 more likely1 be a competitive war of all against all4 ,it is of such a situation that ,kant says3 ,there results a harmony like that which a certain satirical poem depicts as existing between a married couple bent on going to ruin1 ',oh1 marvelous harmony6 what he wishes1 she wishes too'2 or like what is said of the pledge of ,francis ,i4 to the ,emperor ,charles ,v41 ',what my brother wants1 that ,i want too' 7namely ,milan74#add ,the existence already noted of an unperceived and unreconcilable division between happiness in the form of future consequences1 and pleasure as object of desire and present moving spring1 thus becomes of crucial and1 for hedonistic utilitarianism1 of catastrophic importance4 ,we shall first discuss the efforts of utilitarianism to deal with the problem4 ,mill's ,formal ,method4--,we mention first a purely logical or formal suggestion of ,mill's1 not because it is of very much significance one way or the other1 but because it helps to bring out the problem4 ,no reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable1 except that each person1 so far as he believes it to be obtainable1 desires his own happiness4 ,this1 however1 being a fact1 we have not only all the proof which the case admits of1 but all which it is possible to require1 that happiness is a good2 that each person's happiness is a good to that person2 and the general happiness1 therefore1 a good to the aggregate of all persons4#ade ,it clearly does not follow that because the good of ,a and ,b and ,c1 etc41 is collectively1 or aggregately1 a good to ,a and ,b and ,c1 etc41 that therefore the good of ,a and ,b and ,c1 etc41 or of anybody beyond ,a himself1 is regarded as a good by ,a--especially when the original premise is that ,a seeks his own good4 ,because all men want to be happy themselves1 it hardly follows that each wants all to be so4 ,it does follow1 perhaps1 that that would be the reasonable thing to want4 ,if each man desires happiness for himself1 to an outside spectator looking at the matter in the cold light of intelligence1 there might be no reason why the happiness of one should be any more precious or desirable than that of another4 ,from a mathematical standpoint1 the mere fact that the individual knows he wants happiness1 and knows that others are like himself1 that they too are individuals who want happiness1 might commit each individual1 theoretically1 to the necessity of regarding the happiness of every other as equally sacred with his own4 ,but the difficulty is that there is no chance1 upon the hedonistic psychology of desire1 for this rational conviction to get in its work1 even if it be intellectually entertained4 ,the intellectual perception and the mechanism of human motivation remain opposed4 ,mill's statement1 in other words1 puts the problem which hedonistic utilitarianism has to solve4 ,materially1 as distinct from this formal statement1 utilitarianism has two instrumentalities upon which it relies3 one1 internal1 found in the nature of the individual2 the other1 external1 or in social arrangements4 ,i4 ,bentham's ,view of ,sympathetic ,pleasures4--,in the long list of pleasures moving men to action which ,bentham drew up1 he included what he called the social and the semi-social4 ,the social are the pleasures of benevolence2 the semi-social1 the pleasures of amity 7peace with one's fellows7 and of reputation4 ,the pleasures of benevolence are the pleasures resulting from the view of any pleasures supposed to be possessed by the beings who may be the objects of benevolence 7,principles of ,morals and ,legislation74 ,and if it be asked what motives lying within a man's self he has to consult the happiness of others1 in answer to this1 it cannot but be admitted that the only interests which a man at all times and upon all occasions is sure to find adequate motives for consulting are his own4 ,notwithstanding this there are no occasions on which a man has not some motives for consulting the happiness of other men4 ,in the first place1 he has1 on all occasions1 the purely social motive of sympathy and benevolence2 in the next place1 he has1 on most occasions1 the semi-social motives of amity and love of reputation 7,ibid41 ch4 xix41 ,sec4 #a74 ,so important finally are the sympathetic motives that he says ,the ,dictates of ,utility are neither more nor less than the dictates of the most extensive and enlightened 7that is1 well advised7#adf benevolence 7,ibid41 ch4 x41 ,sec4 #d74 ,in short1 we are so constituted that the happiness of others gives us happiness1 their misery creates distress in us4 ,we are also so constituted that1 even aside from direct penalties imposed upon us by others1 we are made to suffer more or less by the knowledge that they have a low opinion of us1 or that we are not popular with them4 ,the more enlightened our activity1 the more we shall see how by sympathy our pleasures are directly bound up with others1 so that we shall get more pleasure by encouraging that of others4 ,the same course will also indirectly increase our own1 because others will be likely to esteem and honor us just in the degree in which our acts conduce to their pleasure4 ,a wise or enlightened desire for our own pleasure will thus lead us to regard the pleasures of others in our activities4 ,limitations of ,doctrine4--,to state the doctrine is almost to criticize it4 ,it comes practically to saying that a sensible and prudent self-love will make us pay due heed to the effect of our activities upon the welfare of others4 ,we are to be benevolent1 but the reason is that we get more pleasure1 or get pleasure more surely and easily1 that way than in any other4 ,we are to be kind1 because upon the whole the net return of pleasure is greater that way4 ,this does not mean that ,bentham denied the existence of disinterested motives in man's make-up2 or that he held that all sympathy is coldly calculating4 ,on the contrary1 he held that sympathetic reactions to the well-being and suffering of others are involved in our make-up4 ,but as it relates to motives for action he holds that the sympathetic affections influence us only under the form of desire for our own pleasure3 they make us rejoice in the rejoicing of others1 and move us to act that others may rejoice so that we may thereby rejoice the more4 ,they do not move us to act as direct interests in the welfare of others for their own sake4#adg ,we shall find that just as ,mill transformed the utilitarian theory of motives by substituting quality of happiness for quantity of pleasures1 so he also transformed the earlier ,benthamite conception of both the internal and the external methods for relating the happiness of the individual and the welfare of society4 ,,ii4 ,mill's ,criticism4--,mill charges ,bentham with overlooking the motive in man which makes him love excellence for its own sake4 ,even under the head of sympathy1 he says3 his recognition does not extend to the more complex forms of the feeling--the love of loving1 the need of a sympathizing support1 or of an object of admiration and reverence4#adh ,self culture1 the training by the human being himself of his affections and will 444 is a blank in ,bentham's system4 ,the other and co-equal part1 the regulation of his outward actions1 must be altogether halting and imperfect without the first2 for how can we judge in what manner many an action will affect the worldly interests of ourselves or others unless we take in1 as part of the question1 its influence on the regulation of our or their affections and desires8#adi ,in other words1 ,mill saw that the weakness of ,bentham's theory lay in his supposition that the factors of character1 the powers and desires which make up disposition1 are of value only as moving us to seek pleasure2 to ,mill they have a worth of their own or are direct sources and ingredients of happiness4 ,so ,mill says3 ,i regard any considerable increase of human happiness1 through mere changes in outward circumstances1 unaccompanied by changes in the state of desires1 as hopeless4#aej ,and in his ,autobiography speaking of his first reaction against ,benthamism1 he says3 ,i1 for the first time1 gave its proper place1 among the prime necessities of human well-being1 to the internal culture of the individual4 ,i ceased to attach almost exclusive importance to the ordering of outward circumstances4444 ,the cultivation of the feelings became one of the cardinal points in my ethical and philosophical creed4#aea ,the ,social ,affections as ,direct ,interest in ,others4--,the importance of this changed view lies in the fact that it compels us to regard certain desires1 affections1 and motives as inherently worthy1 because intrinsic constituent factors of happiness4 ,thus it enables us to identify our happiness with the happiness of others1 to find our good in their good1 not just to seek their happiness as1 upon the whole1 the most effective way of securing our own4 ,our social affections are direct interests in the well-being of others2 their cultivation and expression is at one and the same time a source of good to ourselves1 and1 intelligently guided1 to others4 ,taken in this light1 it is sympathetic emotion and imagination which make the standard of general happiness not merely the desirable end1 but the desired end1 the effectively working object of endeavor4 ,intrinsic ,motivation of ,regard for ,others4--,if it is asked why the individual should thus regard the well-being of others as an inherent object of desire1 there is1 according to ,mill1 but one answer3 ,we cannot think of ourselves save as to some extent social beings4 ,hence we cannot separate the idea of ourselves and of our own good from our idea of others and of their good4 ,the natural sentiment which is the basis of the utilitarian morality1 which gives the idea of the social good weight with us1 is the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures4444 ,the social state is at once so natural1 so necessary1 and so habitual to man1 that except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction1 he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body4444 ,any condition1 therefore1 which is essential to a state of society becomes more and more an inseparable part of every person's conception of the state of things he is born into and which is the destiny of a human being4 ,this strengthening of social ties leads the individual to identify his feelings more and more with the good of others4 ,he comes1 as though instinctively1 to be conscious of himself as a being1 who1 of course1 pays regard to others4 ,the good of others becomes to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to1 like any of the physical conditions of our existence4 ,this social feeling1 finally1 however weak1 does not present itself as a superstition of education1 or a law despotically imposed from without1 but as an attribute which it would not be well to be without4444 ,few but those whose mind is a moral blank could bear to lay out their course of life on the line of paying no regard to others except so far as their own private interest compels4#aeb ,the transformation is tremendous4 ,it is no longer a question of acting for the general interest because that brings most pleasure or brings it more surely and easily4 ,it is a question of finding one's good in the good of others4 ,,iii4 ,the ,benthamite ,external ,ties of ,private and ,general ,interests4--,aside from sympathy and love of peaceful relations and good repute1 ,bentham relied upon law1 changes in political arrangements1 and the play of economic interests which make it worth while for the individual to seek his own pleasure in ways that would also conduce to the pleasure of others4 ,penal law can at least make it painful for the individual to try to get his own good in ways which bring suffering to others4 ,civil legislation can at least abolish those vested interests and class privileges which inevitably favor one at the expense of others1 and which make it customary and natural to seek and get happiness in ways which disregard the happiness of others4 ,in the industrial life each individual seeks his own advantage under such conditions that he can achieve his end only by rendering service to others1 that is1 through exchange of commodities or services4 ,the proper end of legislation is then to make political and economic conditions such that the individual while seeking his own good will at least not inflict suffering upon others1 and positively1 so far as possible1 will promote their good4#aec ,,iv4 ,mill's ,criticism4--,mill's criticism does not turn upon the importance of legislation and of social economic arrangements in promoting the identity of individual and general good4 ,on the contrary1 after identifying 7in a passage already quoted1 ante1 p4 #bhf7 the ideal of utilitarian morality with love of neighbor1 he goes on3 ,as the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal utility would enjoin1 first1 that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness of every individual as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole2 and1 secondly1 that education and opinion1 which have so vast a power over human character1 should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole4 ,the criticism turns upon the fact that unless the intrinsic social idea1 already discussed1 be emphasized1 any association of private and general happiness which law and social arrangements can effect will be external1 more or less artificial and arbitrary1 and hence dissoluble either by intellectual analysis1 or by the intense prepotency of egoistic desire4 ,mill's ,transformation4--,if1 however1 this idea of inherent social ties and of oneself as a social being is presupposed1 the various external agencies have something internal to work upon2 and their effect is internal1 not external4 ,their effect is not to establish a mere coincidence 7as with ,bentham7 between pleasure to oneself and pleasure to others1 but to protect1 strengthen1 and foster the sense1 otherwise intermittent and feeble1 of the social aspects and relations of one's own being4 ,it is for this reason that ,mill lays more stress on education than on mere external institutional changes1 and1 indeed1 conceives of the ultimate moral value of the institutional arrangements as itself educative4 ,their value to him is not that they are contrivances or pieces of machinery for making the behavior of one conduce more or less automatically to the happiness of others1 but that they train and exercise the individual in the recognition of the social elements of his own character4 ,summary of ,previous ,discussion4--,we have carried on our discussion of the relation between the common good as the standard for measuring rightness1 and pleasure as the end and spring of the individual's activity1 in terms of ,mill's development of ,bentham's utilitarianism4 ,but of course our results are general1 and they may be detached not only from this particular discussion1 but from the truth or falsity of utilitarianism as a technical theory4 ,put positively1 our results are these3 7#a7 ,moral quality is an attribute of character1 of dispositions and attitudes which express themselves in desires and efforts4 7#b7 ,those attitudes and dispositions are morally good which aim at the production1 the maintenance1 and development of ends in which the agent and others affected alike find satisfaction4 ,there is no difference 7such as early utilitarianism made7 between good as standard and as aim1 because only a voluntary preference for and interest in a social good is capable1 otherwise than by coincidence or accident1 of producing acts which have common good as their result4 ,acts which are not motivated by it as aim cannot be trusted to secure it as result2 acts which are motived by it as a living and habitual interest are the guarantee1 so far as conditions allow1 of its realization4 ,those who care for the general good for its own sake are those who are surest of promoting it4 ,the ,good ,moral ,character4--,the genuinely moral person is one1 then1 in whom the habit of regarding all capacities and habits of self from the social standpoint is formed and active4 ,such an one forms his plans1 regulates his desires1 and hence performs his acts with reference to the effect they have upon the social groups of which he is a part4 ,he is one whose dominant attitudes and interests are bound up with associated activities4 ,accordingly he will find his happiness or satisfaction in the promotion of these activities irrespective of the particular pains and pleasures that accrue4 ,social ,interests and ,sympathy4--,a genuine social interest is then something much broader and deeper than an instinctive sympathetic reaction4 ,sympathy is a genuine natural instinct1 varying in intensity in different individuals4 ,it is a precious instrumentality for the development of social insight and socialized affection2 but in and of itself it is upon the same plane as any natural endowment4 ,it may lead to sentimentality or to selfishness2 the individual may shrink from scenes of misery just because of the pain they cause him1 or may seek jovial companions because of the sympathetic pleasures he gets4 ,or he may be moved by sympathy to labor for the good of others1 but1 because of lack of deliberation and thoughtfulness1 be quite ignorant of what their good really is1 and do a great deal of harm4 ,one may wish to do unto others as he would they should do unto him1 but may err egregiously because his conception of what is desirable for himself is radically false2 or because he assumes arbitrarily that whatever he likes is good for others1 and may thus tyrannically impose his own standards upon them4 ,again instinctive sympathy is partial2 it may attach itself vehemently to those of blood kin or to immediate associates in such a way as to favor them at the expense of others1 and lead to positive injustice toward those beyond the charmed circle4#aed ,transformation of ,instinctive ,sympathies4--,it still remains true that the instinctive affectionate reactions in their various forms 7parental1 filial1 sexual1 compassionate1 sympathetic7 are the sole portions of the psychological structure or mechanism of a man which can be relied upon to work the identification of other's ends with one's own interests4 ,what is required is a blending1 a fusing of the sympathetic tendencies with all the other impulsive and habitual traits of the self4 ,when interest in power is permeated with an affectionate impulse1 it is protected from being a tendency to dominate and tyrannize2 it becomes an interest in effectiveness of regard for common ends4 ,when an interest in artistic or scientific objects is similarly fused1 it loses the indifferent and coldly impersonal character which marks the specialist as such1 and becomes an interest in the adequate aesthetic and intellectual development of the conditions of a common life4 ,sympathy does not merely associate one of these tendencies with another2 still less does it make one a means to the other's end4 ,it so intimately permeates them as to transform them both into a single new and moral interest4 ,this same fusion protects sympathy from sentimentality and narrowness4 ,blended with interest in power1 in science1 in art1 it is liberalized in quality and broadened in range4 ,in short1 the fusion of affectionate reactions with the other dispositions of the self illuminates1 gives perspective and body to the former1 while it gives social quality and direction to the latter4 ,the result of this reciprocal absorption is the disappearance of the natural tendencies in their original form and the generation of moral1 i4e41 socialized interests4 ,it is sympathy transformed into a habitual standpoint which satisfies the demand for a standpoint which will render the person interested in foresight of all obscure consequences 7ante1 p4 #bfb74 #a4 ,social ,interest and the ,happiness of the ,agent4--,we now see what is meant by a distinctively moral happiness1 and how this happiness is supreme in quality as compared with other satisfactions1 irrespective of superior intensity and duration on the part of the latter4 ,it is impossible to draw any fixed line between the content of the moral good and of natural satisfaction4 ,the end1 the right and only right end1 of man1 lies in the fullest and freest realization of powers in their appropriate objects4 ,the good consists of friendship1 family and political relations1 economic utilization of mechanical resources1 science1 art1 in all their complex and variegated forms and elements4 ,there is no separate and rival moral good2 no separate empty and rival good will4 ,nature of ,moral ,interest and ,motivation4--,yet the interest in the social or the common and progressive realization of these interests may properly be called a distinctive moral interest4 ,the degree of actual objective realization or achievement of these ends1 depends upon circumstances and accidents over which the agent has little or no control4 ,the more happily situated individual who succeeds in realizing these ends more largely we may call more fortunate2 we cannot call him morally better4 ,the interest in all other interests1 the voluntary desire to discover and promote them within the range of one's own capacities1 one's own material resources1 and the limits of one's own surroundings1 is1 however1 under one's control3 it is one's moral self4 ,the nature and exercise of this interest constitutes then the distinctively moral quality in all good purposes4 ,they are morally good not so far as objectively accomplished and possessed1 but so far as cherished in the dominant affections of the person4 ,the ,moral ,interest as ,final ,happiness4--,consequently the true or final happiness of an individual1 the happiness which is not at the mercy of circumstance and change of circumstance1 lies not in objective achievement of results1 but in the supremacy within character of an alert1 sincere1 and persistent interest in those habits and institutions which forward common ends among men4 ,mill insisted that quality of happiness was morally important1 not quantity4 ,well1 that quality which is most important is the peace and joy of mind that accompanies the abiding and equable maintenance of socialized interests as central springs of action4 ,to one in whom these interests live 7and they live to some extent in every individual not completely pathological7 their exercise brings happiness because it fulfills his life4 ,to those in whom it is the supreme interest it brings supreme or final happiness4 ,it is not preferred because it is the greater happiness1 but in being preferred as expressing the only kind of self which the agent fundamentally wishes himself to be1 it constitutes a kind of happiness with which others cannot be compared4 ,it is unique1 final1 invaluable4#aee ,identity of the ,individual and ,general ,happiness4--,no algebraic summing up of sympathetic pleasures1 utilities of friendship1 advantages of popularity and esteem1 profits of economic exchange among equals1 over against pains from legal penalties and disapproving public opinion1 and lack of sympathetic support by others1 can ever make it even approximately certain that an individual's own interest1 in terms of quantity of pleasures and pains1 is to regard the interest of others4#aef ,such a demonstration1 moreover1 if possible1 would not support but would weaken the moral life4 ,it would reduce the manifestation of character to selecting greater rather than less amounts of homogeneous ends4 ,it would degrade reflection and consideration to ingenuity in detecting where larger quantities of pleasures lie1 and to skill in performing sums of addition and subtraction4 ,even if such a scheme could be demonstrated1 every one except the most languid and phlegmatic of pleasure-seekers would reject a life built upon it4 ,not only the good1 but the more vigorous and hearty of the bad1 would scorn a life in which character1 selfhood1 had no significance1 and where the experimental discovery and testing of destiny had no place4 ,the identity of individual and general happiness is a moral matter2 it depends1 that is1 upon the reflective and intentional development of that type of character which identifies itself with common ends1 and which is happy in these ends just because it has made them its own4 #b4 ,social ,ends and the ,happiness of ,others4--,the same principle holds of the happiness of others4 ,happiness means the expression of the active tendencies of a self in their appropriate objects4 ,moral happiness means the satisfaction which comes when the dominant active tendencies are made interests in the maintenance and propagation of the things that make life worth living4 ,others1 also1 can be happy and should be happy only upon the same terms4 ,regard for the happiness of others means regard for those conditions and objects which permit others freely to exercise their own powers from their own initiative1 reflection1 and choice4 ,regard for their final happiness 7i4e41 for a happiness whose quality is such that it cannot be externally added to or subtracted from7 demands that these others shall find the controlling objects of preference1 resolution1 and endeavor in the things that are worth while4 #c4 ,happiness and ,common ,ends4--,for all alike1 in short1 the chief thing is the discovery and promotion of those activities and active relationships in which the capacities of all concerned are effectively evoked1 exercised1 and put to the test4 ,it is difficult for a man to attain a point of view from which steadily to apprehend how his own activities affect and modify those of others4 ,it is hard1 that is1 to learn to accommodate one's ends to those of others2 to adjust1 to give way here1 and fit in there with respect to our aims4 ,but difficult as this is1 it is easy compared with the difficulty of acting in such a way for ends which are helpful to others as will call out and make effective their activities4 ,moral ,democracy4--,if the vice of the criminal1 and of the coarsely selfish man is to disturb the aims and the good of others2 if the vice of the ordinary egoist1 and of every man1 upon his egoistic side1 is to neglect the interests of others2 the vice of the social leader1 of the reformer1 of the philanthropist and the specialist in every worthy cause of science1 or art1 or politics1 is to seek ends which promote the social welfare in ways which fail to engage the active interest and cooperation of others4#aeg ,the conception of conferring the good upon others1 or at least of attaining it for them1 which is our inheritance from the aristocratic civilization of the past1 is so deeply embodied in religious1 political1 and charitable institutions and in moral teachings1 that it dies hard4 ,many a man1 feeling himself justified by the social character of his ultimate aim 7it may be economic1 or educational1 or political71 is genuinely confused or exasperated by the increasing antagonism and resentment which he evokes1 because he has not enlisted in his pursuit of the common end the freely cooperative activities of others4 ,this cooperation must be the root principle of the morals of democracy4 ,it must be confessed1 however1 that it has as yet made little progress4 ,our traditional conceptions of the morally great man1 the moral hero and leader1 the exceptionally good social and political character1 all work against the recognition of this principle either in practice or theory4 ,they foster the notion that it is somebody's particular business to reach by his more or less isolated efforts 7with following1 or obedience1 or unreflective subordination on the part of others7 a needed social good4 ,some genius is to lead the way2 others are to adopt and imitate4 ,moreover1 the method of awakening and enlisting the activities of all concerned in pursuit of the end seems slow2 it seems to postpone accomplishment indefinitely4 ,but in truth a common end which is not made such by common1 free voluntary cooperation in process of achievement is common in name only4 ,it has no support and guarantee in the activities which it is supposed to benefit1 because it is not the fruit of those activities4 ,hence1 it does not stay put4 ,it has to be continually buttressed by appeal to external1 not voluntary1 considerations2 bribes of pleasure1 threats of harm1 use of force4 ,it has to be undone and done over4 ,there is no way to escape or evade this law of happiness1 that it resides in the exercise of the active capacities of a voluntary agent2 and hence no way to escape or evade the law of a common happiness1 that it must reside in the congruous exercise of the voluntary activities of all concerned4 ,the inherent irony and tragedy of much that passes for a high kind of socialized activity is precisely that it seeks a common good by methods which forbid its being either common or a good4 ,,literature ,see references upon utilitarianism at end of ch4 xiv4 ,for happiness1 see ,aristotle1 ,ethics1 ,book ,i41 and ,book ,x41 chs4 vi4-ix42 ,dickinson1 ,the ,meaning of ,good2 ,paulsen1 ,system of ,ethics1 pp4 #bfh-bhf2 ,rickaby1 ,aquinas ,ethicus1 ,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #f-ci2 ,mezes1 ,ethics1 ch4 xv42 ,santayana1 ,the ,life of ,reason2 ,rashdall1 ,the ,theory of ,good and ,evil4 ,the following histories of utilitarianism bring out the social side of the utilitarian theory3 ,albee1 ,history of ,utilitarianism2 ,stephen1 ,the ,english ,utilitarians2 ,halevy1 ,la ,formation du ,radicalisme ,philosophique1 especially ,vols4 ,i4 and ,,ii4 ,,footnotes3 #aci ,the discussion of altruism and egoism in ch4 xviii4 on the ,self1 considers some aspects of this question from another point of view4 #adj ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 p4 #cfa4 #ada ,ibid41 pp4 #cfe-ff4 ,green then goes on to argue that this service has been in spite of its hedonistic factor1 and that if the theory were generally applied with all the hedonistic implications to personal behavior in private life1 it would put impediments in the way of moral progress4 #adb ,it will be noted that we have here the same double role of pleasure that met us at the outset 7see ante1 p4 #bfg73 one sort of happiness is the moving spring of action1 because object of desire2 another and incompatible sort is the standard1 and hence proper or right end4 #adc ,it is this hedonistic element of the object of desire and moving spring which calls forth such denunciations as ,carlyle's2 on the other hand1 it is the assertion of the common happiness as the standard which calls out the indignant denial of the utilitarians2 which1 for example1 leads ,spencer to retort upon ,carlyle's epithet of pig-philosophy with a counter charge that ,carlyle's epithet is a survival of devil-worship1 since it assumes pain to be a blessing4 7,principles of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #dj-da74 #add ,abbott's ,kant's ,theory of ,ethics1 p4 #aaf4 #ade ,utilitarianism1 third paragraph of ch4 iv4 #adf ,by this phrase ,bentham refers to the necessity of controlling this spring to activity just as any other is regulated1 by reference to its consequences4 #adg ,bentham himself was not a psychologist1 and he does not state the doctrine in this extreme form4 ,but those of the ,benthamites who were psychologists1 being hedonistic in their psychology1 gave the doctrine this form4 #adh ,early ,essays1 p4 #ced4 7,reprint by ,gibbs1 ,london1 #ahig47 #adi ,ibid41 p4 #ceg4 #aej ,ibid41 p4 #djd4 #aea ,autobiography1 ,london1 #ahhd1 p4 #adc4 #aeb ,utilitarianism1 ch4 iii41 passim4 #aec ,some phases of this view as respects legislation1 etc41 are touched upon later in ch4 xviii4 #aed ,mill in his article on ,bentham says of him3 ,personal affection1 he well knew1 is as liable to operate to the injury of third parties1 and requires as much to be kept in check1 as any other feeling whatever3 and general philanthropy 444 he estimated at its true value when divorced from the feeling of duty1 as the very weakest and most unsteady of all feelings 7,op4 cit41 p4 #cef74 #aee ,it is only a poor sort of happiness that could ever come by caring very much about our own narrow pleasures4 ,we can only have the highest happiness1 such as goes along with being a great man1 by having wide thought and much feeling for the rest of the world as well as ourselves2 and this sort of happiness often brings so much pain with it1 that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we would choose before everything else1 because our souls see it is good4--,,george ,,eliot in ,romola4 #aef ,the recognition of this by many utilitarian hedonists has caused them to have recourse to the supernaturally inflicted penalties and conferred delights of a future life to make sure of balancing up the account of virtue as self-sacrificing action with happiness1 its proper end4 #aeg ,the recognition of this type of spiritual selfishness is modern4 ,it is the pivot upon which the later 7especially7 of ,ibsen's tragedies turn4 ,,chapter ,,xvi ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,reason ,,in ,,the ,,moral ,,life2 ,,moral ,,knowledge ,sec4 #a4 ,,problem ,,of ,,reason ,,and ,,desire ,intelligence and ,reason in a ,moral ,act4--,a voluntary act is one which involves intention1 purpose1 and thus some degree of deliberateness4 ,it is this trait which marks off the voluntary act from a purely unconscious one 7like that of a machine7 and from one which yields to the superior urgency of present feeling1 one which is pushed on from behind1 as an instinctive or impulsive act1 instead of being called out by some possibility ahead4 ,this factor of forethought and of preference after comparison for some one of the ends considered1 is the factor of intelligence involved in every voluntary act4 ,to be intelligent in action is1 however1 a far-reaching affair4 ,to know what one is really about is a large and difficult order to fill2 so large and difficult that it is the heart of morality4#aeh ,the relevant bearings of any act are subtler and larger than those which can be foreseen and than those which will be unless special care is taken4 ,the tendencies which strongly move one to a certain act are often exactly those which tend to prevent one's seeing the effect of the act upon his own habits and upon the well-being of others4 ,the internal forces and the external circumstance which evoke the idea of an end and of the means of attaining it are frequently also those which deflect intelligence to a narrow and partial view4 ,the demand for a standard by which to regulate judgment of ends is thus the demand not only for intelligence1 but for a certain kind of intelligence4 ,in short1 a truly moral 7or right7 act is one which is intelligent in an emphatic and peculiar sense2 it is a reasonable act4 ,it is not merely one which is thought of1 and thought of as good1 at the moment of action1 but one which will continue to be thought of as good in the most alert and persistent reflection4#aei ,for by reasonable action we mean such action as recognizes and observes all the necessary conditions2 action in which impulse1 instinct1 inclination1 habit1 opinion1 prejudice 7as the case may be7 are moderated1 guided1 and determined by considerations which lie outside of and beyond them4 ,not merely to form ends and select means1 but to judge the worth of these means and ends by a standard1 is then the distinctive province of reason in morals4 ,its outcome is moral knowledge2 that is judgments of right and wrong1 both in general1 and in the particular and perplexing cases as they arise4 ,this is the topic of the present chapter4 ,typical ,problems4--,the problem of moral knowledge is in its general form3 ,is there a distinct and separate faculty of moral reason and knowledge1 or is there but one power of judgment which varies with its object8 ,the former view is the intuitional 7from ,latin1 intueor3 to look at72 it is associated with theories1 which1 like the ,kantian1 emphasize attitudes1 not results and intentions2 while the view which holds that there is but one form of thought which1 in morals1 concerns itself with results1 and with their association with the present aim1 is the empirical4 ,there are two especial difficulties which lead to the upholding of the intuitional point of view1 difficulties which any theory of moral knowledge has to meet4 ,they are 7,i7 ,the ,relation of ,desire and ,reason1 and 7,,ii7 the ,knowledge of ,private and ,general ,good4 #a4 ,desire and ,reason4--,ordinary knowledge in practical matters follows the line set by desire4 ,hunger makes us think of food and of how to get it2 sociable desire1 of friends1 and how to secure their companionship1 and so on4 ,now a surging mass of desires1 vehement and bulky1 may concentrate itself upon the idea of any end2 and as soon as it does so1 it tends to shut out wider considerations4 ,as we have just seen1 it is the object of reason to give us a calm1 objective1 broad1 and general survey of the field4 ,desires work against this1 and unless 7so runs the argument7 there is a faculty which works wholly independent of desires1 as our ordinary practical knowledge does not1 it is absurd to suppose there can be a rational principle which will correct and curb desire4 #b4 ,private and ,general ,good4--,since the wide and permanent good is social1 it is urged that unless we have an independent faculty of moral knowledge1 our judgment will be subservient to the ends of private desire1 and hence will not place itself at the public point of view4 ,or1 if it does so1 it will be simply as a matter of expediency to calculate better the means for getting our own pleasure4 ,in general1 it is urged that only a faculty of knowledge completely independent of personal wishes1 habits1 purposes can secure judgments possessing inherent dignity and authoritativeness2 since these require an elevated1 impartial1 universal1 and necessary point of view4 ,we shall in the sequel attempt to show that this view of knowledge results from the false conception of desire as having pleasure for its object1 and from a false conception of the relation of intent and motive4 ,when these errors are corrected1 there is no ground to assume any special faculty of moral intelligence1 save as the one capacity of thought is specialized into a particular mental habit by being constantly occupied in judging values4 ,we shall try to show that the broad and public point of view is secured by fusion of impulses with sympathetic affections4 ,we shall begin with stating and criticizing the views of ,kant1 who upholds the doctrine of a separate independent ,moral ,reason in its most extreme form4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,kant',s ,,theory ,,of ,,practical ,,reason ,kant is at one with the hedonist as regards the natural object of desire2 it is pleasure4 ,all purposes and ends that spring from inclination and natural tendency come under one head3 self-love4 ,hence1 the ordinary use of intelligence is confined to the matter of passing upon what constitutes the individual's private happiness and how he shall secure it4 ,there are then fundamental contrasts between ordinary practical activity and genuinely moral activity1 contrasts which reflect themselves in the theory of the nature and function of moral knowledge4 7#a7 ,the moral end is unqualified1 absolute1 categorical4 ,it is not something which we can pick or leave at our option4 ,morality is the region of final ends1 ends not to be disputed or questioned2 and reason must set forth such final ends4 ,since1 however1 happiness is not a morally necessary end1 intelligence in its behalf can only give hypothetical counsel and advice3 if you would be happy1 or happy in this1 or that way1 then take such and such measures4 ,reason which promulgates ends must be of a different sort from the intelligence which simply searches for means4 7#b7 ,morality is not qualified1 but certain in its requirements4 ,the most inexperienced1 the humblest1 the one most restricted in his circumstances and opportunities1 must know what is morally required as surely as the wisest and most educated4 ,hence moral reason must utter its precepts clearly and unambiguously4 ,but no one can be sure what happiness is1 or whether a given act will bring joy or sorrow4 ,the problem of determining certainly what action would promote the happiness of a rational being is insoluble4 7,abbott's ,kant1 p4 #cf47 ,the demand for certainty of precepts in moral matters also requires a special faculty4 7#c7 ,morality1 which is inexorable and certain in its demands1 is also universal in its requirements4 ,its laws are the same yesterday1 to-day1 and forever1 the same for one as for another4 ,now happiness notoriously varies with the condition and circumstances of a person1 as well as with the conditions of different peoples and epochs4 ,intelligence with reference to happiness can only give counsel1 not even rules1 so variable is happiness4 ,it can only advise that upon the average1 under certain conditions1 a given course of action has usually promoted happiness4 ,when we add that the commands of morality are also universal with respect to the different inclinations of different individuals1 we are made emphatically aware of the necessity of a rational standpoint1 which in its impartiality totally transcends the ends and plans that grow out of the ordinary experience of an individual4 ,an ,a ,priori ,reason ,kant's ,solution4--,the net outcome is that only a reason which is separate and independent of all experience is capable of meeting the requirements of morality4 ,what smacks in its origin and aim of experience is tainted with self-love2 is partial1 temporary1 uncertain1 and relative or dependent4 ,the moral law is unqualified1 necessary1 and universal4 ,hence we have to recognize in man as a moral being a faculty of reason which expresses itself in the law of conduct a priori to all experience of desire1 pleasure1 and pain4 ,besides his sensuous nature 7with respect to which knowledge is bound up with appetite7 man has a purely rational nature1 which manifests itself in the consciousness of the absolute authority of universal law4#afj ,formal ,character of ,such ,reason4--,this extreme separation of reason from experience brings with it1 however1 a serious problem4 ,we shall first state this problem2 and then show that its artificial and insoluble character serves as a refutation of ,kant's theory of a transcendental1 or wholly non-natural and non-empirical1 mode of knowledge4 ,reason which is wholly independent of experience of desires and their results is1 as ,kant expressly declares1 purely formal4 7,abbott's ,kant1 p4 #cc2 p4 #aad47 ,that is to say1 it is empty2 it does not point out or indicate anything particular to be done4 ,it cannot say be industrious1 or prudent1 generous2 give1 or refrain from giving1 so much money to this particular man at this particular time under just these circumstances4 ,all it says is that morality is rational and requires man to follow the law of reason4 ,but the law of reason is just that a man should follow the law of reason4 ,and to the inevitable inquiry ,what then is the law of reason8 the answer still is3 ,to follow the law of reason4 ,how do we break out of this empty circle into specific knowledge of the specific right things to be done8 ,kant has an answer1 which we shall now consider4 ,kant's ,method4--,he proceeds as follows3 ,the law is indeed purely formal or empty 7since1 once more1 all specific ends are empirical and changeable71 but it is so because it is universal4 ,now nothing which is universal can contradict itself4 ,all we need to do is to take any proposed principle of any act and ask ourselves whether it can be universalized without self-inconsistency4 ,if it cannot be1 the act is wrong4 ,if it can be1 the act is right4 ,for example3 ,may ,i1 when in distress1 make a promise with the intention not to keep it8444 ,the shortest way1 and an unerring one to discover the answer to the question whether a lying promise is consistent with duty1 is to ask myself1 ,should ,i be content that my maxim 7to extricate myself from trouble by a false promise7 should hold good as a universal law1 for myself as well as for others8 ,and should ,i be able to say to myself1 every one may make a deceitful promise when he finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate himself8 ,then ,i personally become aware that while ,i can will the lie1 ,i can by no means will that lying should be a universal law4 ,for with such a law there would be no such thing as a promise4 ,no one should have any faith in the proffered intention1 or1 if they do so over hastily1 would pay one back in one's own coin at the first opportunity 7,op4 cit41 p4 #ai74 ,the principle if made universal simply contradicts itself1 and thus reveals that it is no principle at all1 not rational4 ,summing this up in a formula1 we get as our standard of right action the principle3 ,act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature 7,op4 cit41 p4 #ci74 ,the procedure thus indicated seems simple4 ,as long as an individual considers the purpose or motive of his action as if it were merely a matter of that one deed2 as if it were an isolated thing1 there is no rationality1 no consciousness of moral law or principle4 ,but let the individual imagine himself gifted with such power that1 if he acts1 the motive of his act will become a fixed1 a regular law in the constitution of things4 ,would he1 as a rational being1 be willing to bring about such a universalization1--can he1 with equanimity as a reasonable being1 contemplate such an outcome8 ,if he can1 the act is right2 if not 7as in the case of making a lying promise71 wrong4 ,no sensible person would question the instructiveness of this scheme in the concrete4 ,it indicates that the value of reason--of abstraction and generalization--in conduct is to help us escape from the partiality that flows from desire and emotion in their first and superficial manifestations1 and to attain a more unified and permanent end4 ,as a method 7though not the only one7 of realizing the full meaning of a proposed course of action1 nothing could be better than asking ourselves how we should like to be committed forever to its principle2 how we should like to have others committed to it and to treat us according to it8 ,such a method is well calculated to make us face our proposed end in its impartial consequences2 to teach the danger of cherishing merely those results which are most congenial to our passing whim and our narrow conception of personal profit4 ,in short1 by generalizing a purpose we make its general character evident4 ,but this method does not proceed 7as ,kant would have it7 from a mere consideration of moral law apart from a concrete end1 but from an end in so far as it persistently approves itself to reflection after an adequate survey of it in all its bearings4 ,it is the possibility of generalizing the concrete end that ,kant falls back upon4 ,other illustrations which ,kant offers enforce the same lesson4 ,he suggests the following3 7#a7 ,a man in despair from misfortune considers suicide4 ,now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature4 ,we see at once that a system of nature by which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling--self-love--whose nature it is to impel to the maintenance of life1 would contradict itself and therefore could not exist4 7#b7 ,a man who has a certain talent is tempted from sluggishness and love of amusement not to cultivate it4 ,but if he applies the principle he sees that1 while a system of nature might subsist if his motive became a law 7so that all people devoted their lives to idleness and amusement71 yet he cannot will that such a system should receive absolute realization4 ,as a rational being he necessarily also wills that faculties be developed since they serve for all sorts of possible purposes4 7#c7 ,a prosperous man1 who sees some one else to be wretched1 is tempted to pay no attention to it1 alleging that it is no concern of his4 ,now1 if this attitude were made a universal law of nature1 the human race might subsist and even get on after a fashion2 but it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the validity of a law of nature4 ,such a will would contradict itself1 for many cases would occur in which the one willing would need the love and sympathy of others2 he could not then without contradicting himself wish that selfish disregard should become a regular1 a fixed uniformity4 ,the ,social ,end is the ,rational ,end4--,these illustrations make it clear that the contradiction ,kant really depends upon to reveal the wrongness of acts1 is the introduction of friction and disorder among the various concrete ends of the individual4 ,he insists especially that the social relations of an act bring out its general purport4 ,a right end is one which can be projected harmoniously into the widest and broadest survey of life which the individual can make4 ,a system of nature or of conduct in which love of life should lead to its own destruction certainly contradicts itself4 ,a course of action which should include all the tendencies that make for amusement and sluggishness would be inconsistent with a scheme of life which would take account of other tendencies--such as interest in science1 in music1 in friendship1 in business achievement1 which are just as real constituents of the individual1 although perhaps not so strongly felt at the moment4 ,a totally callous and cruel mode of procedure certainly contradicts a course of life in which every individual is so placed as to be dependent upon the sympathy and upon the help of others4 ,it is the province of reason to call up a sufficiently wide view of the consequences of an intention as to enable us to realize such inconsistencies and contradictions if they exist2 to put before us1 not through any logical manipulation of the principle of contradiction1 but through memory and imagination a particular act1 proposal1 or suggestion as a portion of a connected whole of life2 to make real to us that no man1 no act1 and no satisfaction of any man1 falls or stands to itself1 but that it affects and is affected by others4 ,our conclusion is3 the right as the rational good means that which is harmonious with all the capacities and desires of the self1 that which expands them into a cooperative whole4 ,kant's ,introduction of ,social ,factors4--,the further development which ,kant gives the formula already quoted 7p4 #cab7 goes far to remove the appearance of opposition between the utilitarian social standard and his own abstract rationalism4 ,kant points out that according to his view the moral or rational will is its own end4 ,hence every rational person is always an end1 never a means3--this1 indeed1 is what we mean by a person4 ,but every normal human being is a rational person4 ,consequently another formula for his maxim is3 ,so act as to treat humanity1 whether in thine own person or in that of any other1 as an end1 never as a means merely4 ,the man who contemplates suicide uses a person merely as a means to maintaining a tolerable condition of life4 ,he who would make a lying promise to another makes that other one merely a means to his profit1 etc4 ,moreover1 since all persons are equally ends in themselves and are to be equally regarded in behavior1 we may say the standard of right is the notion of a ,kingdom of ,ends--the idea of the union of different rational beings in a system by common laws4#afa ,these propositions are rather formal1 but the moment we put definite meaning into them1 they suggest that the good for any man is that in which the welfare of others counts as much as his own4 ,the right is that action which1 so far as in it lies1 combines into a whole of common interests and purposes the otherwise conflicting aims and interests of different persons4 ,so interpreted1 the ,kantian formula differs in words1 rather than in idea1 from ,bentham's happiness of all concerned each counting for one and only one2 from ,mill's statement that the deeply rooted conception which every individual even now has of himself as a social being tends to make him feel it as one of his natural wants1 that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures4 ,in all of these formulae we find re-statements of our conception that the good is the activities in which all men participate so that the powers of each are called out1 put to use1 and reenforced4 ,consequent ,transformation of ,theory of ,reason4--,now if the common good1 in the form of a society of individuals1 as a kingdom of ends1 is the object with reference to which the ends of desire have to be rationalized1 ,kant's theory of an a priori and empty ,reason is completely made over4 ,in strict logic ,kant contradicts himself when he says that we are to generalize the end of desire1 so as to see whether it could become a universal law4 ,for according to him no end of desire 7since it is private and a form of self-love7 can possibly be generalized4 ,he is setting up as a method of enlightenment precisely the very impossibility 7impossible1 that is1 on his own theory that private happiness is the end of desire7 which made him first resort to his a priori and transcendental reason4 ,no more complete contradiction can be imagined4 ,on the other hand1 if we neglect the concrete1 empirical conditions and consequences of the object of desire1 there is no motive whatsoever that may not be generalized4 ,there is no formal contradiction in acting always on a motive of theft1 unchastity1 or insolence4 ,all that ,kant's method can require1 in strict logic1 is that the individual always1 under similar circumstances1 act from the same motive4 ,be willing to be always dishonest1 or impure1 or proud in your intent2 achieve consistency in the badness of your motives1 and you will be good6 ,doubtless no one1 not even the worst man1 would be willing to be universally consistent in his badness4 ,but this is not in the least a matter of a purely formal1 logical inconsistency of the motive with itself2#afb it is due rather to that conflict among diverse desires1 and different objects for which one strives1 which makes him aware that at some time he should want to act kindly and fairly4 ,organization of ,desires from the ,social ,standpoint4--,what ,kant is really insisting upon at bottom is1 then1 the demand for such a revision of desire as it casually and unreflectively presents itself as would make the desire a consistent expression of the whole body of the purposes of the self4 ,what he demands is that a desire shall not be accepted as an adequate motive till it has been organized into desire for an end which will be compatible with the whole system of ends involved in the capacities and tendencies of the agent4 ,this is true rationalization4 ,and he further warns us that only when a particular desire has in view a good which is social will it meet this requirement4 ,this brings us to our next problem4 ,just what is the process by which we judge of the worth of particular proposals1 plans1 courses of actions1 desires8 ,granted that a generalized good1 a socialized happiness1 is the point of view at which we must place ourselves to secure the reasonable point of view1 how does this point of view become an operative method8 ,sec4 #c4 ,,moral ,,sense ,,intuitionalism ,so far1 our conclusions are 7#a7 that the province of reason is to enable us to generalize our concrete ends2 to form such ends as are consistent with one another1 and reenforce one another1 introducing continuity and force1 where otherwise there would be division and weakness2 and 7#b7 that only social ends are ultimately reasonable1 since they alone permit us to organize our acts into consistent wholes4 ,we have now1 however1 to consider how this conception takes effect in detail2 how it is employed to determine the right or the reasonable in a given situation4 ,we shall approach this problem by considering a form of intuitionalism historically prior to that of ,kant4 ,this emphasizes the direct character of moral knowledge in particular cases1 and assimilates moral knowledge to the analogy of sense perception1 which also deals directly with specific objects2 it insists1 however1 that a different kind of faculty of knowledge operates in the knowledge of acts from that which operates in the knowledge of things4 ,our underlying aim here is to bring out the relation of immediate appreciation to deliberate reflection1 with a view to showing that the reasonable standpoint1 that of the common good1 becomes effective through the socialized attitudes and emotions of a person's own character4 ,moral ,sense4--,this theory holds that rightness is an intrinsic1 absolute quality of special acts1 and as such is immediately known or recognized for what it is4 ,just as a white color is known as white1 a high tone as high1 a hard body as existent1 etc41 so an act which is right is known as right4 ,in each case1 the quality and the fact are so intimately and inherently bound together that it is absurd to think of one and not know the other4 ,as a theory of moral judgment1 intuitionalism is thus opposed to utilitarianism1 which holds that rightness is not an inherent quality but one relative to and borrowed from external and more or less remote consequences4 ,while some forms of intuitionalism hold that this moral quality belongs to general rules or to classes of ends1 the form we are now to consider holds that the moral quality of an individual act cannot be borrowed even from a moral law1 but shines forth as an absolute and indestructible part of the motive of the act itself4 ,because the theory in question sticks to the direct perception of the immediately present quality of acts1 it is usually called1 in analogy with the direct perception of eye or ear1 the moral sense theory4 ,objections to ,theory4--,the objections to this theory in the extreme form just stated may be brought under two heads3 7#a7 ,there is no evidence to prove that all acts are directly characterized by the possession of absolute and self-evident rightness and wrongness2 there is much evidence to show that this quality when presented by acts can1 as a rule1 be traced to earlier instruction1 to the pressure of correction and punishment1 and to association with other experiences4 7#b7 ,while in this way many acts1 perhaps almost all1 of the average mature person of a good moral environment1 have acquired a direct moral coloring1 making unnecessary elaborate calculation or reference to general principles1 yet there is nothing infallible in such intuitively presented properties4 ,an act may present itself as thoroughly right and yet may be1 in reality1 wrong4 ,the function of conscious deliberation and reasoning is precisely to detect the existence of and to correct such intuitive cases4#afc ,i4 ,direct ,perception as ,effect of ,habits4--,it must be admitted1 as a result of any unprejudiced examination1 that a large part of the acts1 motives1 and plans of the adult who has had favorable moral surroundings seem to possess directly1 and in their own intrinsic make-up1 rightness or wrongness or moral indifference4 ,to think of lying or stealing is one with thinking of it as wrong2 to recall or suggest an act of kindness is the same as thinking of it as right2 to think of going after mail is to think of an act free from either rightness or wrongness4 ,with the average person it is probably rare for much time to be spent in figuring out whether an act is right or wrong1 after the idea of that act has once definitely presented itself4 ,so far as the facts of moral experience in such cases are concerned1 the moral sense theory appears to give a correct description4 7#a7 ,but the conclusion that1 therefore1 moral goodness or badness is and always has been an inherent1 absolute property of the act itself1 overlooks well-known psychological principles4 ,in all perception1 in all recognition1 there is a funding or capitalizing of the results of past experience by which the results are rendered available in new experiences4 ,even a young child recognizes a table1 a chair1 a glass of milk1 a dog1 as soon as he sees it2 there is no analysis1 no conscious interpretation4 ,distance1 direction1 size1 under normal circumstances1 are perceived with the same assurance and ease4 ,but there was a time when all these things were learning2 when conscious experimentation involving interpretation took place4 ,such perceptions1 moreover1 take place under the guidance of others2 pains are taken indelibly to stamp moral impressions by associating them with intense1 vivid1 and mysterious or awful emotional accompaniments4#afd ,anthropological and historical accounts of different races and peoples tell the same story4 ,acts once entirely innocent of moral distinctions have acquired1 under differing circumstances and sometimes for trivial and absurd reasons1 different moral values3--one and the same sort of act being stamped here as absolute guilt1 there as an act of superior and heroic virtue4 ,now it would be fallacious to argue 7as some do7 that because distinctions of moral quality have been acquired and are not innate1 they are therefore unreal when they are acquired4 ,yet the fact of gradual development proves that no fixed line exists where it can be said the case is closed2 that just this is henceforth forever right or wrong2 that there shall be no further observation of consequences1 no further correction and revision of present intuitions4 7#b7 ,our immediate moral recognitions take place1 moreover1 only under usual circumstances4 ,there is after all no such thing as complete moral maturity2 all persons are still more or less children--in process of learning moral distinctions4 ,the more intense their moral interests1 the more childlike1 the more open1 flexible1 and growing are their minds4 ,it is only the callous and indifferent1 or at least the conventional1 who find all acts and projects so definitely right and wrong as to render reflection unnecessary4 ,new occasions teach new duties1 but they teach them only to those who recognize that they are not already in possession of adequate moral judgments4 ,any other view destroys the whole meaning of reflective morality and marks a relapse to the plane of sheer custom4 ,extreme intuitionalism and extreme moral conservatism2 dislike to calculation and reflection1 for fear of innovations with attendant trouble and discomfort1 are usually found to go together4 ,,ii4 ,direct ,perception ,no ,guarantee of ,validity4--,this suggests our second objection4 ,the existence of immediate moral quality1 the direct and seemingly final possession of rightness1 as matter of fact1 is not adequate proof of validity4 ,at best1 it furnishes a presumption of correctness1 in the absence of grounds for questioning it1 in fairly familiar situations4 7a7 ,there is nothing more direct1 more seemingly self-evident1 than inveterate prejudice4 ,when class or vested interest is enlisted in the maintenance of the custom or institution which is expressed in a prejudice1 the most vicious moral judgments assume the guise of self-conscious sanctity4 7b7 ,a judgment which is correct under usual circumstances may become quite unfit1 and therefore wrong1 if persisted in under new conditions4 ,life1 individual and social1 is in constant process of change2 and there is always danger of error in clinging to judgments adjusted to older circumstances4 ,the good is the enemy of the better4 ,it is not merely false ideas of the values of life that have to be re-formed1 but ideas once true4 ,when economic1 political1 and scientific conditions are modifying themselves as rapidly and extensively as they are in our day1 it is reconstruction of moral judgment that needs emphasis1 rather than the existence of a lot of ready-made intuitions4 ,when readjustment is required1 deliberate inquiry is the only alternative to inconsiderate1 undirected1 and hence probably violent changes3--changes involving undue relaxation of moral ties on one side and arbitrary reactions on the other4 ,deliberation and ,intuition4--,it is indeed absurd to set immediate recognition of quality and indirect calculation of more or less remote consequences1 intuition and thought1 over against each other as if they were rivals4 ,for they are mutually supplementary4 ,as we saw in a previous chapter1 the foresight of future results calls out an immediate reaction of satisfaction and dissatisfaction1 of happiness or dislike4 7,see p4 #bgb47 ,it is just as false to say that we calculate only future pains and pleasures 7instead of changes in the world of things and persons7 as it is to say that anticipations of the changes to be wrought in the world by our act are not accompanied by an immediate emotional appreciation of their value4 ,the notion that deliberation upon the various alternatives open to us is simply a cold-blooded setting down of various items to our advantage1 and various other items to our disadvantage 7as ,robinson ,crusoe wrote down in bookkeeping fashion his miseries and blessings71 and then striking an algebraic balance1 implies something that never did and never could happen4 ,deliberation is a process of active1 suppressed1 rehearsal2 of imaginative dramatic performance of various deeds carrying to their appropriate issues the various tendencies which we feel stirring within us4 ,when we see in imagination this or that change brought about1 there is a direct sense of the amount and kind of worth which attaches to it1 as real and as direct1 if not as strong1 as if the act were really performed and its consequence really brought home to us4 ,deliberation as ,dramatic ,rehearsal4--,we1 indeed1 estimate the import or significance of any present desire or impulse by forecasting what it would come or amount to if carried out2 literally its consequences define its consequence1 its meaning and importance4 ,but if these consequences were conceived merely as remote1 if their picturing did not at once arouse a present sense of peace1 of fulfillment1 or of dissatisfaction1 of incompletion and irritation1 the process of thinking out consequences would remain purely intellectual4 ,it would be as barren of influence upon behavior as the mathematical speculations of a disembodied angel4 ,any actual experience of reflection upon conduct will show that every foreseen result at once stirs our present affections1 our likes and dislikes1 our desires and aversions4 ,there is developed a running commentary which stamps values at once as good or evil4 ,it is this direct sense of value1 not the consciousness of general rules or ultimate goals1 which finally determines the worth of the act to the agent4 ,here is the inexpugnable element of truth in the intuitional theory4 ,its error lies in conceiving this immediate response of appreciation as if it excluded reflection instead of following directly upon its heels4 ,deliberation is actually an imaginative rehearsal of various courses of conduct4 ,we give way1 in our mind1 to some impulse2 we try1 in our mind1 some plan4 ,following its career through various steps1 we find ourselves in imagination in the presence of the consequences that would follow3 and as we then like and approve1 or dislike and disapprove1 these consequences1 we find the original impulse or plan good or bad4 ,deliberation is dramatic and active1 not mathematical and impersonal2 and hence it has the intuitive1 the direct factor in it4 ,the advantage of a mental trial1 prior to the overt trial 7for the act after all is itself also a trial1 a proving of the idea that lies back of it71 is that it is retrievable1 whereas overt consequences remain4 ,they cannot be recalled4 ,moreover1 many trials may mentally be made in a short time4 ,the imagining of various plans carried out furnishes an opportunity for many impulses which at first are not in evidence at all1 to get under way4 ,many and varied direct sensings1 appreciations1 take place4 ,when many tendencies are brought into play1 there is clearly much greater probability that the capacity of self which is really needed and appropriate will be brought into action1 and thus a truly reasonable happiness result4 ,the tendency of deliberation to polarize the various lines of activity into opposed alternatives1 into incompatible either this or that1 is a way of forcing into clear recognition the importance of the issue4 ,the ,good ,man's ,judgments as ,standard4--,this explains the idea of ,aristotle that only the good man is a good judge of what is really good4 ,such an one will take satisfaction in the thought of noble ends and will recoil at the idea of base results4 ,because of his formed capacities1 his organized habits and tendencies1 he will respond to a suggested end with an emotion which confers its appropriate kind and shade of value4 ,the brave man is sensitive to all acts and plans so far as they involve energy and endurance in overcoming painful obstacles2 the kindly man responds at once to the elements that affect the well-being of others4 ,the moral sense or direct appreciations of the good man may thus be said to furnish the standard of right and wrong4 ,there are few persons who1 when in doubt regarding a difficult matter of conduct1 do not think of some other person in whose goodness they believe1 and endeavor to direct and clinch their own judgment by imagining how such an one would react in a similar situation--what he would find congenial and what disagreeable4 ,or else they imagine what that other person would think of them if he knew of their doing such and such an act4 ,and while this method cannot supply the standard of their own judgment1 cannot determine the right or wrong for their own situations1 it helps emancipate judgment from selfish partialities1 and it facilitates a freer and more flexible play of imagination in construing and appreciating the situation4 ,sec4 #d4 ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,general ,,rules ,between such a highly generalized and formal principle as that of ,kant1 and the judgment of particular cases1 we have intermediate generalizations2 rules which are broad as compared with individual deeds1 but narrow as compared with some one final principle4 ,what are their rational origin1 place1 and function8 ,we have here again both the empirical and the intuitional theories of knowledge1 having to deal with the same fundamental difficulty3 ,what is the relation of the special rule to the general principle on one side and to the special case on the other8 ,the more general1 the more abstractly rational the rule1 the vaguer and less applicable it is4 ,the more definite and fixed it is1 the greater the danger that it will be a ,procrustean bed1 mutilating the rich fullness of the individual act1 or destroying its grace and freedom by making it conform servilely to a hard and fast rule4 ,our analysis will accordingly be devoted to bringing to light the conditions under which a rule may be rational and yet be of specific help4 ,i4 ,intuitionalism and ,casuistry4--,utilitarianism at least holds that rules are derived from actual cases of conduct2 hence there must be points of likeness between the cases to be judged and the rules for judging them4 ,but rules which do not originate from a consideration of special cases1 which simply descend out of the blue sky1 have only the most mechanical and external relation to the individual acts to be judged4 ,suppose one is convinced that the rule of honesty was made known just in and of itself by a special faculty1 and had absolutely nothing to do with the recollection of past cases or the forecast of possible future circumstances4 ,how would such a rule apply itself to any particular case which needed to be judged8 ,what bell would ring1 what signal would be given1 to indicate that just this case is the appropriate case for the application of the rule of honest dealing8 ,and if by some miracle this question were answered so one knows that here is a case for the rule of honesty1 how would we know just what course in detail the rule calls for8 ,for the rule1 to be applicable to all cases1 must omit the conditions which differentiate one case from another2 it must contain only the very few similar elements which are to be found in all honest deeds4 ,reduced to this skeleton1 not much would be left save the bare injunction to be honest whatever happens1 leaving it to chance1 the ordinary judgment of the individual1 or to external authority to find out just what honesty specifically means in the given case4 ,this difficulty is so serious that all systems which have committed themselves to belief in a number of hard and fast rules having their origin in conscience1 or in the word of ,god impressed upon the human soul or externally revealed1 always have had to resort to a more and more complicated procedure to cover1 if possible1 all the cases4 ,the moral life is finally reduced by them to an elaborate formalism and legalism4 ,illustration in ,casuistry4--,suppose1 for example1 we take the ,ten ,commandments as a starting-point4 ,they are only ten1 and naturally confine themselves to general ideas1 and ideas stated mainly in negative form4 ,moreover1 the same act may be brought under more than one rule4 ,in order to resolve the practical perplexities and uncertainties which inevitably arise under such circumstances1 ,casuistry is built up 7from the ,latin casus1 case74 ,the attempt is made to foresee all the different cases of action which may conceivably occur1 and provide in advance the exact rule for each case4 ,for example1 with reference to the rule do not kill1 a list will be made of all the different situations in which killing might occur3--accident1 war1 fulfillment of command of political superior 7as by a hangman71 self-defense 7defense of one's own life1 of others1 of property71 deliberate or premeditated killing with its different motives 7jealousy1 avarice1 revenge1 etc471 killing with slight premeditation1 from sudden impulse1 from different sorts and degrees of provocation4 ,to each one of these possible cases is assigned its exact moral quality1 its exact degree of turpitude and innocency4 ,nor can this process end with overt acts2 all the inner springs of action which affect regard for life must be similarly classified3 envy1 animosity1 sudden rage1 sullenness1 cherishing of sense of injury1 love of tyrannical power1 hardness or hostility1 callousness--all these must be specified into their different kinds and the exact moral worth of each determined4 ,what is done for this one kind of case must be done for every part and phase of the entire moral life until it is all inventoried1 catalogued1 and distributed into pigeon-holes definitely labelled4 ,dangers of ,casuistry4--,now dangers and evils attend this way of conceiving the moral life1 7a7 ,it tends to magnify the letter of morality at the expense of its spirit4 ,it fixes attention not upon the positive good in an act1 not upon the underlying agent's disposition which forms its spirit1 nor upon the unique occasion and context which form its atmosphere1 but upon its literal conformity with ,rule ,a1 ,class ,i41 ,species #a1 sub-head 7#a71 etc4 ,the effect of this is inevitably to narrow the scope and lessen the depth of conduct4 7i47 ,it tempts some to hunt for that classification of their act which will make it the most convenient or profitable for themselves4 ,in popular speech1 casuistical has come to mean a way of judging acts which splits hairs in the effort to find a way of acting that conduces to personal interest and profit1 and which yet may be justified by some moral principle4 7ii47 ,with others1 this regard for the letter makes conduct formal and pedantic4 ,it gives rise to a rigid and hard type of character illustrated among the ,pharisees of olden and the ,puritans of modern time--the moral schemes of both classes being strongly impregnated with the notion of fixed moral rules4 7b7 ,this ethical system also tends in practice to a legal view of conduct4--,historically it always has sprung from carrying over legal ideas into morality4 ,in the legal view1 liability to blame and to punishment inflicted from without by some superior authority1 is necessarily prominent4 ,conduct is regulated through specific injunctions and prohibitions3 ,do this1 ,do not do that4 ,exactly the sort of analysis of which we have spoken above 7p4 #cbg7 in the case of killing is necessary1 so that there may be definite and regular methods of measuring guilt and assigning blame4 ,now the ideas of liability and punishment and reward are1 as we shall see in our further discussion 7chs4 xvii4 and xxi471 important factors in the conduct of life1 but any scheme of morals is defective which puts the question of avoiding punishment in the foreground of attention1 and which tends to create a ,pharisaical complacency in the mere fact of having conformed to command or rule4 7c7 ,probably the worst evil of this moral system is that it tends to deprive moral life of freedom and spontaneity and to reduce it 7especially for the conscientious who take it seriously7 to a more or less anxious and servile conformity to externally imposed rules4 ,obedience as loyalty to principle is a good1 but this scheme practically makes it the only good and conceives it not as loyalty to ideals1 but as conformity to commands4 ,moral rules exist just as independent deliverances on their own account1 and the right thing is merely to follow them4 ,this puts the center of moral gravity outside the concrete processes of living4 ,all systems which emphasize the letter more than the spirit1 legal consequences more than vital motives1 put the individual under the weight of external authority4 ,they lead to the kind of conduct described by ,st4 ,paul as under the law1 not in the spirit1 with its constant attendant weight of anxiety1 uncertain struggle1 and impending doom4 ,all ,fixed ,rules ,have ,same ,tendencies4--,many who strenuously object to all of these schemes of conduct1 to everything which hardens it into forms by emphasizing external commands1 authority and punishments and rewards1 fail to see that such evils are logically connected with any acceptance of the finality of fixed rules4 ,they hold certain bodies of people1 religious officers1 political or legal authorities1 responsible for what they object to in the scheme2 while they still cling to the idea that morality is an effort to apply to particular deeds and projects a certain number of absolute unchanging moral rules4 ,they fail to see that1 if this were its nature1 those who attempt to provide the machinery which would render it practically workable deserve praise rather than blame4 ,in fact1 the notion of absolute rules or precepts cannot be made workable except through certain superior authorities who declare and enforce them4 ,said ,locke3 ,it is no small power it gives one man over another to be the dictator of principles and teacher of unquestionable truths4 ,,ii4 ,utilitarian ,view of ,general ,rules4--,the utilitarians escape the difficulties inherent in the application to particular cases of a rule which has nothing to do with particular cases4 ,their principles for judging right and wrong in particular cases are themselves generalizations from particular observations of the effect of certain acts upon happiness and misery4 ,but if we take happiness in the technical sense of ,bentham 7as meaning1 that is1 an aggregate of isolated pleasures7 it is impossible for general rules to exist--there is nothing to generalize4 ,if1 however1 we take happiness in its common-sense form1 as welfare1 a state of successful achievement1 satisfactory realization of purpose1 there can be no doubt of the existence of maxims and formulae in which mankind has registered its experience4 ,the following quotations from ,mill bring out the essential points3 ,we think utility or happiness much too complex and indefinite an end to be sought except through the medium of various secondary ends concerning which there may be1 and often is1 agreement among persons who differ in their ultimate standard2 and about which there does in fact prevail a much greater unanimity among thinking persons1 than might be supposed from their diametrical divergence on the great questions of moral metaphysics 7,essay on ,bentham74 ,these secondary ends or principles are such matters as regard for health1 honesty1 chastity1 kindness1 and the like4 ,concerning them he says in his ,utilitarianism 7ch4 ii473 ,mankind must by this time have acquired positive beliefs as to the effects of some actions on their happiness2 and the beliefs which have thus come down are rules of morality for the multitude and for the philosopher until he has succeeded in finding better4444 ,to consider the rules of morality as improvable is one thing2 to pass over the intermediate generalizations entirely and endeavor to test each individual action directly by the first principle1 is another4444 ,nobody argues that the act of navigation is not founded on astronomy1 because sailors cannot wait to calculate the nautical almanac4 ,being rational creatures1 they go to sea with it already calculated2 and all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life with their minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong1 as well as on many of the far more difficult questions of wise and foolish4 ,empirical ,rules ,run into ,fixed ,customs4--,it cannot be denied that ,mill here states considerations which are of great value in aiding present judgments on right and wrong4 ,the student of history will have little doubt that the rules of conduct which the intuitionalist takes as ultimate deliverances of a moral faculty are in truth generalizations of the sort indicated by ,mill4 ,but the truth brought out by ,mill does not cover the ground which needs to be covered4 ,such rules at best cover customary elements2 they are based upon past habits of life1 past natural economic and political environments4 ,and1 as the student of customs knows1 greater store is often set upon trivial1 foolish1 and even harmful things than upon serious ones--upon fashions of hair-dressing1 ablutions1 worship of idols4 ,coming nearer our own conditions1 past customs certainly tolerate and sanction many practices1 such as war1 cruel business competition1 economic exploitation of the weak1 and absence of cooperative intelligent foresight1 which the more sensitive consciences of the day will not approve4 ,hence are ,unsatisfactory4--,yet such things have been so identified with happiness that to forego them means misery1 to alter them painful disturbance4 ,to take the rules of the past with any literalness as criteria of judgment in the present1 would be to return to the unprogressive morality of the regime of custom--to surrender the advance marked by reflective morality4 ,since ,bentham and ,mill were both utilitarians1 it is worth noting that ,bentham insisted upon the utilitarian standard just because he was so convinced of the unsatisfactory character of the kind of rules upon which ,mill is dwelling4 ,the ,nautical ,almanac has been scientifically calculated2 it is adapted rationally to its end2 but the rules which sum up custom are a confused mixture of class interest1 irrational sentiment1 authoritative pronunciamento1 and genuine consideration of welfare4 ,empirical ,rules ,also ,differ ,widely4--,the fact is1 moreover1 that it is only when the intermediate generalizations are taken vaguely and abstractly that there is as much agreement as ,mill claims4 ,all educated and virtuous persons in the same country practically agree upon the rules of justice1 benevolence1 and regard for life1 so long as they are taken in such a vague way that they mean anything in general and nothing in particular4 ,every one is in favor of justice in the abstract2 but existing political and economic discussions regarding tariff1 sumptuary laws1 monetary standards1 trades unions1 trusts1 the relation of capital and labor1 the regulation or ownership of public utilities1 the nationalization of land and industry1 show that large bodies of intelligent and equally well-disposed people are quite capable of finding that the principle of justice requires exactly opposite things4 ,custom still forms the background of all moral life1 nor can we imagine a state of affairs in which it should not4 ,customs are not external to individuals' courses of action2 they are embodied in the habits and purposes of individuals2 in the words of ,grote 7quoted above1 p4 #agc71 they reign under the appearance of habitual1 self-suggested tendencies4 ,laws1 formulated and unformulated1 social conventions1 rules of manners1 the general expectations of public opinion1 are all of them sources of instruction regarding conduct4 ,without them the individual would be practically helpless in determining the right courses of action in the various situations in which he finds himself4 ,through them he has provided himself in advance with a list of questions1 an organized series of points-of-view1 by which to approach and estimate each state of affairs requiring action4 ,most of the moral judgments of every individual are framed in this way4 ,for ,customs ,conflict4--,if social customs1 or individual habits1 never conflicted with one another1 this sort of guidance would suffice for the determination of right and wrong4 ,but reflection is necessitated because opposite habits set up incompatible ends1 forms of happiness between which choice has to be made4 ,hence the need of principles in judging4 ,principles of judgment cannot simply reinstate past rules of behavior1 for the simple reason that as long as these rules suffice there is no reflection and no demand for principles4 ,good and evil1 right and wrong1 are embodied in the injunctions and prohibitions of customs and institutions and are not thought about4 ,moral ,import of ,principles is ,intellectual1 ,not ,imperative4--,this brings us to the essential point in the consideration of the value of general principles4 ,rules are practical2 they are habitual ways of doing things4 ,but principles are intellectual2 they are useful methods of judging things4 ,the fundamental error of the intuitionalist and of the utilitarian 7represented in the quotation from ,mill7 is that they are on the lookout for rules which will of themselves tell agents just what course of action to pursue2 whereas the object of moral principles is to supply standpoints and methods which will enable the individual to make for himself an analysis of the elements of good and evil in the particular situation in which he finds himself4 ,no genuine moral principle prescribes a specific course of action2 rules#afe like cooking recipes1 may tell just what to do and how to do it4 ,a moral principle1 such as that of chastity1 of justice1 of the golden rule1 gives the agent a basis for looking at and examining a particular question that comes up4 ,it holds before him certain possible aspects of the act2 it warns him against taking a short or partial view of the act4 ,it economizes his thinking by supplying him with the main heads by reference to which to consider the bearings of his desires and purposes2 it guides him in his thinking by suggesting to him the important considerations for which he should be on the lookout4 ,golden ,rule as a ,tool of ,analysis4--,a moral principle1 then1 is not a command to act or forbear acting in a given way3 it is a tool for analyzing a special situation1 the right or wrong being determined by the situation in its entirety1 and not by the rule as such4 ,we sometimes hear it stated1 for example1 that the universal adoption of the ,golden ,rule would at once settle all industrial disputes and difficulties4 ,but supposing that the principle were accepted in good faith by everybody2 it would not at once tell everybody just what to do in all the complexities of his relations to others4 ,when individuals are still uncertain of what their real good may be1 it does not finally decide matters to tell them to regard the good of others as they would their own4 ,nor does it mean that whatever in detail we want for ourselves we should strive to give to others4 ,because ,i am fond of classical music it does not follow that ,i should thrust as much of it as possible upon my neighbors4 ,but the ,golden ,rule does furnish us a point of view from which to consider acts2 it suggests the necessity of considering how our acts affect the interests of others as well as our own2 it tends to prevent partiality of regard2 it warns against setting an undue estimate upon a particular consequence of pain or pleasure1 simply because it happens to affect us4 ,in short1 the ,golden ,rule does not issue special orders or commands2 but it does simplify judgment of the situations requiring intelligent deliberation4 ,sympathy as ,actuating ,principle of a ,reasonable ,judgment4--,we have had repeated occasion 7as in the discussion of intent and motive1 of intuition and deliberate calculation7 to see how artificial is the separation of emotion and thought from one another4 ,as the only effective thought is one fused by emotion into a dominant interest1 so the only truly general1 the reasonable as distinct from the merely shrewd or clever thought1 is the generous thought4 ,sympathy widens our interest in consequences and leads us to take into account such results as affect the welfare of others2 it aids us to count and weigh these consequences as counting for as much as those which touch our own honor1 purse1 or power4 ,to put ourselves in the place of another1 to see from the standpoint of his purposes and values1 to humble our estimate of our own claims and pretensions to the level they would assume in the eyes of a sympathetic and impartial observer1 is the surest way to attain universality and objectivity of moral knowledge4 ,sympathy1 in short1 is the general principle of moral knowledge1 not because its commands take precedence of others 7which they do not necessarily71 but because it furnishes the most reliable and efficacious intellectual standpoint4 ,it supplies the tool1 par excellence1 for analyzing and resolving complex cases4 ,as was said in our last chapter1 it is the fusion of the sympathetic impulses with others that is needed2 what we now add is that in this fusion1 sympathy supplies the pou sto for an effective1 broad1 and objective survey of desires1 projects1 resolves1 and deeds4 ,it translates the formal and empty reason of ,kant out of its abstract and theoretic character1 just as it carries the cold calculations of utilitarianism into recognition of the common good4 ,,literature ,for criticisms of ,kant's view of reason1 see ,caird1 ,philosophy of ,kant1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 ,book ,,ii41 ch4 ii42 ,paulsen1 ,system of ,ethics1 pp4 #aid-bjc and #cee-cfc2 ,fite1 ,introductory ,study1 pp4 #agc-ahh2 ,muirhead1 ,elements of ,ethics1 pp4 #aab-abd4 ,for intuitionalism1 see ,calderwood1 ,handbook of ,moral ,philosophy2 ,maurice1 ,conscience2 ,whewell1 ,the ,elements of ,morality2 ,martineau1 ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #if-aae2 ,mezes1 ,ethics1 ch4 iii42 ,sidgwick1 ,methods of ,ethics1 ,book ,i41 chs4 viii4-ix41 and ,book ,,iii4 entire1 but especially ch4 i42 ,history of ,ethics1 #agj-bjd1 and #bbd-bcf1 and ,lectures on ,ethics of ,green1 ,spencer1 and ,martineau1 #cfa-cgd4 ,for the moral sense theory1 see ,sidgwick1 ,history of ,ethics1 p4 #ahi2 ,shaftesbury1 ,characteristics2 ,hutcheson1 ,system of ,moral ,philosophy4 ,for casuistry1 see references in ,rand's ,bibliography1 ,vol4 ,,iii41 ,part ,,ii41 p4 #hhj4 ,for the variability of moral rules1 see ,locke1 ,essay on the ,human ,understanding1 ,book ,i42 ,bain1 ,moral ,science1 ,part ,i41 ch4 iii42 ,spencer1 ,principles of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,i41 ,part ,,ii42 ,williams1 ,review of ,evolutional ,ethics1 pp4 #dbc-dfe2 ,bowne1 ,principles of ,ethics1 ch4 v42 ,schurman1 ,the ,ethical ,import of ,darwinism2 the writings of ,westermarck and ,hobhouse elsewhere referred to1 and ,darwin1 ,descent of ,man1 ,part ,i41 chs4 iv4-v4 ,for the nature of moral judgment and the function of reason in conduct1 see ,aristotle1 ,book ,,iii41 chs4 ii4-iii41 and ,book ,,vi42 ,ladd1 ,philosophy of ,conduct1 ch4 vii42 ,sharp1 ,essay on ,analysis of the ,moral ,judgment1 in ,studies in ,philosophy and ,psychology 7,garman ,commemorative ,volume72 ,santayana1 ,life of ,reason1 ,vol4 ,i41 chs4 x4-xii42 ,bryant1 ,studies in ,character1 ,part ,,ii41 chs4 iv4-v4 ,for the social character of conscience1 see ,cooley1 ,human ,nature and the ,social ,order1 ch4 x4 ,for sympathy and conscience1 see ,adam ,smith1 ,theory of ,moral ,sentiments1 especially ,part ,,iii41 chs4 i4 and iv41 and ,part ,,iv41 chs4 i4-iii42 ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 pp4 #bbh-bch4 ,,footnotes3 #aeh ,any one can be angry3 that is quite easy4 ,any one can give money away or spend it4 ,but to do these things to the right person1 to the right amount1 at the right time1 with the right aim and in the right manner--this is not what any one can easily do4--,,aristotle1 ,ethics1 ,book ,,ii41 ch4 ix4 #aei ,compare the sentence quoted on p4 #bfh from ,hazlitt4 #afj ,this means ,duty4 ,this phase will be discussed in the next chapter4 #afa ,kant's ,theory of ,ethics1 trans4 by ,abbott1 pp4 #dg-ea4 #afb ,in last analysis ,kant is trying to derive moral enlightenment from the most abstract principle of formal logic1 the principle of ,identity1 that ,a is ,a6 #afc ,a student in an ethics class once made this remark3 ,conscience is infallible1 but we should not always follow it4 ,sometimes we should use our reason4 #afd ,compare ,locke1 ,essay on the ,human ,understanding1 ,book ,i41 ch4 iii4 #afe ,of course1 the word rule is often used to designate a principle--as in the case of the phrase golden-rule4 ,we are speaking not of the words1 but of their underlying ideas4 ,,chapter ,,xvii ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,duty ,,in ,,the ,,moral ,,life3 ,,subjection ,,to ,,authority ,conflict of ,ends as ,attractive and as ,reasonable4--,the previous discussion has brought out the contrast between a ,good or ,satisfaction which is such directly1 immediately1 by appealing attractively to desire2 and one which is such indirectly1 through considerations which reflection brings up4 ,as we have seen1 the latter must1 if entertained at all1 arouse some direct emotional response1 must be felt to be in some way satisfactory4 ,but the way may be quite unlike that of the end which attracts and holds a man irrespective of the principle brought to light by reflection4 ,the one may be intense1 vivid1 absorbing1 passing at once into overt action1 unless checked by a contrary reason4 ,the good whose claim to be good depends mainly on projection of remote considerations1 may be theoretically recognized and yet the direct appeal to the particular agent at the particular time be feeble and pallid4 ,the law of the mind may assert itself less urgently than the law of the members which wars against it4 ,two ,senses of ,term ,duty4--,this contrast gives rise to the fact of ,duty4 ,on one side is the rightful supremacy of the reasonable but remote good2 on the other side is the aversion of those springs to action which are immediately most urgent4 ,between them exists the necessity of securing for the reasonable good efficacy in operation2 or the necessity of redirecting the play of naturally dominant desires4 ,duty is also used1 to be sure1 in a looser and more external sense4 ,to identify the dutiful with the right apart from conflict1 to say that a man did his duty1 may mean that he did right1 irrespective of the prior state of his inclinations4 ,it frequently happens that the wider and larger good which is developed through reflective memory and foresight is welcomed1 is directly appreciated as good1 since it is thoroughly attractive4 ,without stress and strain1 without struggle1 it just displaces the object which unreflective impulse had suggested4 ,it is the fit and proper1 the only sensible and wise thing1 under the circumstances4 ,the man does his duty1 but is glad to do it1 and would be troubled by the thought of another line of action4 ,so far as calling the act duty brings in any new meaning1 it means that the right act is one which is found to meet the demands1 the necessities1 of the situation in which it takes place4 ,the ,romans thus spoke of duties as offices1 the performance of those functions which are appropriate to the status which every person occupies because of his social relations4 ,conscious ,conflict4--,but there are other cases in which the right end is distinctly apprehended by the person as standing in opposition to his natural inclinations1 as a principle or law which ought to be followed1 but which can be followed only by constraining the inclinations1 by snubbing and coercing them4 ,this state of affairs is well represented by the following quotation from ,matthew ,arnold1 if we take it as merely describing the facts1 not as implying a theory as to their explanation3 ,all experience with conduct brings us at last to the fact of two selves1 or instincts1 or forces--name them1 however we may and however we may suppose them to have arisen--contending for the mastery over men3 one1 a movement of first impulse and more involuntary1 leading us to gratify any inclination that may solicit us and called generally a movement of man's ordinary or passing self1 of sense1 appetite1 desire2 the other a movement of reflection and more voluntary1 leading us to submit inclination to some rule1 and called generally a movement of man's higher or enduring self1 of reason1 spirit1 will4#aff ,we shall 7,i47 present what we consider the true account of this situation of conflict in which the sense of duty is found2 7,,ii47 turn to explanations which are one-sided1 taking up 7#a7 the intuitive1 7#b7 the utilitarian theory2 and finally 7,,iii47 return with the results of this criticism to a restatement of our own theory4 ,sec4 #a4 ,,the ,,subjection ,,of ,,desire ,,to ,,law ,ordinary language sets before us some main facts3 duty suggests what is due1 a debt to be paid2 ought is connected with owe2 obligation implies being bound to something--as we speak of bounden duty4 ,we speak naturally of meeting obligations2 of duties being imposed1 laid upon one4 ,the person who is habitually careless about his duties is unruly or lawless2 one who evades or refuses them is unprincipled4 ,these ideas suggest there is something required1 exacted1 having the sanction of law1 or a regular and regulative principle2 and imply natural aversion to the requirements exacted1 a preference for something else4 ,hence duty as a conscious factor means constraint of inclination2 an unwillingness or reluctance which should be overcome but which it is difficult to surmount1 requiring an effort which only adequate recognition of the rightful supremacy of the dutiful end will enable one to put forth4 ,thus we speak of interest conflicting with principle1 and desire with duty4 ,while they are inevitably bound together1 it will be convenient to discuss separately 7#a7 ,inclination and impulse as averse to duty1 and 7#b7 ,duty as having authority1 as expressing law4 #a4 ,inclination ,averse to ,duty4--,directly and indirectly1 all desires root in certain fundamental organic wants and appetites4 ,conduct1 behavior1 implies a living organism4 ,if this organism were not equipped with an intense instinctive tendency to keep itself going1 to sustain itself1 it would soon cease to be amid the menaces1 difficulties1 rebuffs1 and failures of life4 ,life means appetites1 like hunger1 thirst1 sex2 instincts like anger1 fear1 and hope1 which are almost imperious in their struggles for satisfaction4 ,they do not arise from reflection1 but antedate it2 their existence does not depend upon consideration of consequences1 but their existence it is which tends to call out reflection4 ,their very presence in a healthy organism means a certain reservoir of energy which overflows almost spontaneously4 ,they are impulsive4 ,such tendencies1 then1 constitute an essential and fundamental part of the capacities of a person2 their realization is involved in one's happiness4 ,in all this there is nothing abnormal nor immoral4 ,but a human being is something more than a mere demand for the satisfaction of instincts of food1 sex1 and protection4 ,if we admit 7as the theory of organic evolution requires7 that all other desires and purposes are ultimately derived from these tendencies of the organism1 still it is true that the refined and highly developed forms exist side by side with crude1 organic forms1 and that the simultaneous satisfaction of the two types1 just as they stand1 is impossible4 ,organic and ,reflectively ,formed ,tendencies ,conflict4--,even if it be true1 as it may well be1 that the desires and purposes connected with property were developed out of instincts having to do with food for self and offspring1 it is still true that the developed desires do not wholly displace those out of which they developed4 ,the presence of the purposes elaborated by thought side by side with the more organic demands causes strife and the need of resolution4 ,the accumulation of property may involve subordinating the immediate urgency of hunger2 property as an institution implies that one is not free to satisfy his appetite just as he pleases1 but may have to postpone or forego satisfaction1 because the food supply belongs to another2 or that he can satisfy hunger only through some labor which in itself is disagreeable to him4 ,similarly the family springs originally out of the instinct of reproduction4 ,but the purposes and plans which go with family life are totally inconsistent with the mere gratification of sexual desire in its casual and spontaneous appearance4 ,the refined1 highly developed1 and complex purposes exact a checking1 a regulation and subordination of inclinations as they first spring up--a control to which the inclinations are not of themselves prone and against which they may rebelliously assert themselves4 ,duty ,may ,reside on the ,more ,impulsive ,side4--,it would be a great mistake1 however1 to limit the need of subordination simply to the unruly agencies of appetite4 ,habits which have been consciously or reflectively formed1 even when in their original formation these habits had the sanction and approval of reason1 require control4 ,the habits of a professional man1 of an investigator1 or a lawyer1 for example1 have been formed through careful and persistent reflection directed upon ends adjudged right4 ,virtues of painstaking industry1 of perseverance1 have been formed2 untimely and unseemly desires have been checked4 ,but as an outcome these habits1 and the desires and purposes that express them1 have perhaps become all-engrossing4 ,occupation is preoccupation4 ,it encroaches upon the attention needed for other concerns4 ,the skill gained tends to shut the individual up to narrow matters and to shut out other universes of good which should be desired4 ,domestic and civic responsibilities are perhaps felt to be insignificant details or irritating burdens unworthy of attention4 ,thus a reflective habit1 legitimate in itself1 right in its right place1 may give rise to desires and ends which involve a corrosive selfishness4 ,moreover1 that the insubordination does not reside in appetites or impulses just as appetites and impulses1 is seen in the fact that duty may lie on the side of a purpose connected with them1 and be asserted against the force of a habit formed under the supervision of thought4 ,the student or artist may find his pursuit makes him averse to satisfying the needful claims of hunger and healthy exercise4 ,the prudent business man may find himself undutifully cold to the prompting of an impulse of pity2 the student of books or special intellectual or artistic ends may find duty on the side of some direct human impulse4 ,statement of ,problem4--,such considerations show that we cannot attribute the conflict of duty and inclination simply to the existence of appetites and unreflective impulses1 as if these were in and of themselves opposed to regulation by any principle4 ,we must seek for an explanation which will apply equally to appetites and to habits of thought4 ,what is there common to the situations of him who feels it his duty to check the satisfaction of strong hunger until others have been properly served1 and of the scientific investigator who finds it his duty to check the exercise of his habit of thinking in order that he may satisfy the demands of his body8 ,statement of ,explanation4--,any habit1 like any appetite or instinct1 represents something formed1 set2 whether this has occurred in the history of the race or of the individual makes little difference to its established urgency4 ,habit is second1 if not first1 nature4 7#a7 ,habit represents facilities2 what is set1 organized1 is relatively easy4 ,it marks the line of least resistance4 ,a habit of reflection1 so far as it is a specialized habit1 is as easy and natural to follow as an organic appetite4 7#b7 ,moreover1 the exercise of any easy1 frictionless habit is pleasurable4 ,it is a commonplace that use and wont deprive situations of originally disagreeable features4 7#c7 ,finally1 a formed habit is an active tendency4 ,it only needs an appropriate stimulus to set it going2 frequently the mere absence of any strong obstacle serves to release its pent-up energy4 ,it is a propensity to act in a certain way whenever opportunity presents4 ,failure to function is uncomfortable and arouses feelings of irritation or lack4 ,reluctance to the right end1 an aversion requiring to be overcome1 if at all1 by recognition of the superior value of the right end1 is then to be accounted for on the ground of the inertia or momentum of any organized1 established tendency4 ,this momentum gives the common ground to instinctive impulses and deliberately formed habits4 ,the momentum represents the old1 an adaptation to familiar1 customary conditions4 ,so far as similar conditions recur1 the formed power functions economically and effectively1 supplying ease1 promptness1 certainty1 and agreeableness to the execution of an act4 ,but if new1 changed conditions require a serious readjustment of the old habit or appetite1 the natural tendency will be to resist this demand4 ,thus we have precisely the traits of reluctance and constraint which mark the consciousness of duty4 ,a self without habits1 one loose and fluid1 in which change in one direction is just as easy as in another1 would not have the sense of duty4 ,a self with no new possibilities1 rigidly set in conditions and perfectly accommodated to them1 would not have it4 ,but definite1 persistent1 urgent tendencies to act in a given way1 occurring at the same time with other incompatible tendencies which represent the self more adequately and yet are not organized into habits1 afford the conditions of the sense of restraint4 ,if for any reason the unorganized tendency is judged to be the truer expression of self1 we have also the sense of lawful constraint4 ,the constraint of appetite and desire is a phenomenon of practical readjustment1 within the structure of character1 due to conflict of tendencies so irreconcilable in their existing forms as to demand radical redirection4 ,when an appetite is in accord with those habits of an individual which enable him to perform his social functions1 or which naturally accrue from his social relations1 it is legitimate and good2 when it conflicts1 it is illicit1 it is lust2 we call it by hard names and we demand that it be curbed2 we regard its force as a menace to the integrity of the agent and a threat to social order4 ,when the reflective habits of an individual come into conflict with natural appetites and impulses1 the manifestation of which would enlarge or make more certain the powers of the individual in his full relations to others1 it is the reflective habits which have to be held in and redirected at the cost of whatever disagreeableness4 7#b7 ,the ,authority of ,duty4--,a duty1 in ,kant's words1 is a categorical imperative--it claims the absolute right of way as against immediate inclination4 ,that which1 on one side1 is the constraint of natural desire1 is1 on the other1 the authoritative claim of the right end to regulate4 ,over against the course of action most immediately urgent1 most easy and comfortable1 so congenial as at once to motivate action unless checked1 stands another course1 representing a wider and more far-reaching point of view1 and hence furnishing the rational end of the situation4 ,however lacking in intensity1 however austere this end1 it stands for the whole self1 and is therefore felt to be rightly supreme over any partial tendency4 ,but since it looks to realization in an uncertain future1 rather than permission just to let go what is most urgent at the moment1 it requires effort1 hard work1 work of attention more or less repulsive and uncongenial4 ,hence that sense of stress and strain1 of being pulled one way by inclination and another by the claims of right1 so characteristic of an experience of obligation4 ,social ,character of ,duties4--,but this statement describes the experience only on its formal side4 ,in the concrete1 that end which possesses claim to regulate desire is the one which grows out of the social position or function of the agent1 out of a course of action to which he is committed by a regular1 socially established connection between himself and others4 ,the man who has assumed the position of a husband and a parent has by that very fact entered upon a line of action1 something continuous1 running far into the future2 something so fundamental that it modifies and pervades his other activities1 requiring them to be coordinated or rearranged from its point of view4 ,the same thing holds1 of course1 of the calling of a doctor1 a lawyer1 a merchant1 a banker1 a judge1 or other officer of the ,state4 ,each social calling implies a continuous1 regular mode of action1 binding together into a whole a multitude of acts occurring at different times1 and giving rise to definite expectations and demands on the part of others4 ,every relationship in life1 is1 as it were1 a tacit or expressed contract with others1 committing one1 by the simple fact that he occupies that relationship1 to a corresponding mode of action4 ,every one1 willy-nilly1 occupies a social position2 if not a parent1 he is a child2 if not an officer1 then a citizen of the ,state2 if not pursuing an occupation1 he is in preparation for an occupation1 or else is living upon the results of the labors of others4 ,connection with ,selfhood4--,every one1 in short1 is in general relations to others1--relationships which enter so internally and so intimately into the very make-up of his being that he is not morally free to pick and choose1 saying1 this good is really my affair1 that other one not4 ,the mode of action which is required by the fact that the person is a member of a complex social network is a more final expression of his own nature than is the temporarily intense instinctive appetite1 or the habit which has become second nature4 ,it is not for the individual to say1 the latter is attractive and therefore really mine1 while the former is repellant and therefore an alien intruder1 to be surrendered to only if it cannot be evaded4 ,from this point of view1 the conflict of desire and duty1 of interest and principle1 expresses itself as a conflict between tendencies which have got organized into one's fixed character and which therefore appeal to him just as he is2 and those tendencies which relate to the development of a larger self1 a self which should take fuller account of social relations4 ,the ,kantian theory emphasizes the fact brought out above3 viz41 that duty represents the authority of an act expressing the reasonable and universal self over a casual and partial self2 while the utilitarian theory emphasizes the part played by social institutions and demands in creating and enforcing both special duties and the sense of duty in general4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,kantian ,,theory ,accord with ,duty versus from ,duty4--,kant points out that acts may be in accordance with duty and yet not be done from duty4 ,it is always1 for example1 a matter of duty that a dealer should not overcharge an inexperienced purchaser1 and wherever there is much commerce the prudent tradesman does not overcharge4444 ,men are thus honestly served2 but this is not enough to prove that the tradesman so acted from duty and from principles of honesty2 his own advantage required it 7,kant's ,theory of ,ethics1 ,abbott's translation1 p4 #ac74 ,in such a case the act externally viewed is in accordance with duty2 morally viewed1 it proceeds from selfish calculation of personal profit1 not from duty4 ,this is true in general of all acts which1 though outwardly right1 spring from considerations of expediency1 and are based on the consideration that honesty 7or whatever7 is the best policy4 ,persons are naturally inclined to take care of their health1 their property1 their children1 or whatever belongs to them4 ,such acts1 no matter how much they accord with duty1 are not done from duty1 but from inclination4 ,if a man is suffering1 unfortunate1 desirous of death1 and yet cherishes his life with no love for it1 but from the duty to do so1 his motive has truly moral value4 ,so if a mother cares for her child1 because she recognizes that it is her duty1 the act is truly moral4 ,from ,duty alone ,moral4--,according to ,kant1 then1 acts alone have moral import that are consciously performed from duty1 that is1 with recognition of its authority as their animating spring4 ,the idea of good and evil 7in their moral sense7 must not be determined before the moral law1 but only after it and by means of it 7,ibid41 p4 #aed74 ,all our desires and inclinations seek naturally for an end which is good--for happiness1 success1 achievement4 ,no one of them nor all of them put together1 then1 can possibly supply the motive of acting from duty4 ,hence duty and its authority must spring from another source1 from reason itself1 which supplies the consciousness of a law which ought to be the motive of every act1 whether it is or not4 ,the utilitarians completely reverse the truth of morals when they say that the idea of the good end comes first and the right is that which realizes the good end4 ,dual ,constitution of ,man4--,we are all familiar with the notion that man has a dual constitution2 that he is a creature both of sense and spirit2 that he has a carnal and an ideal nature2 a lower and a higher self1 a self of appetite and of reason4 ,now ,kant's theory of duty is a peculiar version of this common notion4 ,man's special ends and purposes all spring from desires and inclinations4 ,these are all for personal happiness and hence without moral worth4 ,they form man's sensuous1 appetitive nature1 which if not base in itself easily becomes so1 because it struggles with principle for the office of supplying motives for action4 ,the principle of a law absolutely binding1 requires the complete expulsion of the claim of desires to motivate action4 7,see ,kant's ,theory1 pp4 #gj-gi2 #acb-acf2 #aei-afc47 ,if a man were an animal1 he would have only appetite to follow2 if he were a god or angel1 he would have only reason4 ,being man1 being a peculiar compound of sense and reason1 he has put upon him the problem of resisting the natural prompting of inclination and of accepting the duty of acting from reverence for duty4 ,criticism of ,kant's ,theory4--,there is an undoubted fact back of ,kant's conception which gives it whatever plausibility it has--the fact that inclinations which are not necessarily evil tend to claim a controlling position1 a claim which has to be resisted4 ,the peculiarity of ,kant's interpretation lies in its complete and final separation of the two aspects1 higher and lower1 the appetitive and rational1 of man's nature1 and it is upon this separation1 accordingly1 that our discussion will be directed4 ,i4 ,duty and the ,affections4--,in the first place1 ,kant's absolute separation of sense or appetite from reason and duty1 because of its necessary disparagement of the affections leads to a formal and pedantic view of morality4 ,it is one thing to say that desire as it first shows itself sometimes prompts to a morally inadequate end2 it is quite another thing to say that any acceptance of an end of desire as a motive is morally wrong--that the act to be right must be first brought under a conscious acknowledgment of some law or principle4 ,only the exigencies of a ready-made theory would lead any one to think that habitual purposes that express the habitually dominant tendencies and powers of the agent1 may not suffice to keep morally sound the main tenor of behavior2 that it is impossible for regard for right ends to become organized into character and to be fused into working unity with natural impulses4 ,only a metaphysical theory regarding the separation of sense and reason in man leads to the denial of this fact4 ,between the merchant who is honest in his weights and fixed in his prices merely because he calculates that such a course is to his own advantage1 and the merchant 7if such a person could exist7 who should never sell a spool of thread or a paper of pins without having first reminded himself that his ultimate motive for so doing was respect for the law of duty1 there is the ordinary merchant who is honest because he has the desires characteristic of an honest man4 ,schiller has made fun of the artificial stringency of ,kant's theory in some verses which represent a disciple coming to ,kant with his perplexity3 ,willingly serve ,i my friends1 but ,i do it1 alas with affection4 ,hence ,i am plagued with this doubt1 virtue ,i have not attained6 to which he received the reply3 ,this is your only resource1 you must stubbornly seek to abhor them2 ,then you can do with disgust that which the law may enjoin4 ,these verses are a caricature of ,kant's position2 he does not require that affections should be crushed1 but that they should be stamped with acknowledgment of law before being accepted as motives4 ,but the verses bring out the absurd element in the notion that the affections and inclinations may not of themselves be morally adequate springs to action1--as if a man could not eat his dinner simply because he was hungry1 or be amiable to a companion because he wanted to be1 or relieve distress because his compassionate nature urged him to it4 ,it is worth while noting that some moralists have gone to the opposite extreme and have held that an act is not right unless it expresses the overflowing spontaneity of the affections2 that a man's act is only imperfectly right when he performs it not from affection1 but from coercion by duty4 ,thus ,emerson speaks of men who do by knowledge what the stones do by structure4 ,and again1 ,we love characters in proportion as they are impulsive and spontaneous4 ,when we see a soul whose acts are all regal1 graceful1 and pleasant as roses1 we must thank ,god that such things can be and are1 and not turn sourly on the angel and say1 ',crump is a better man with his grunting resistance to all his native devils4' ,the facts seem to be that while1 in a good man1 natural impulses and formed habits are adequate motive powers under ordinary conditions1 there are times when an end1 somewhat weak in its motive force because it does not express an habitually dominant power of the self1 needs to be reenforced by associations which have gathered at all periods of his past around the experience of good4 ,there is a certain reservoir of emotional force which1 while far from fluid1 is capable of transfer and application1 especially in a conscientious person4 ,kant criticizes the moral sense theory on the ground that in order to imagine the vicious man tormented with a sense of his transgressions1 it must first represent him as morally good in the main trend of his character 7,abbott1 p4 #abh74 ,well1 a man who is capable of making appeal to the sense of duty in general1 is the one in whom love of good is already dominant4 ,,ii4 ,tendency to ,fanaticism and ,idealization of ,authority4--,kant's theory of fixed and final separation between desire and reason leads us into a fatal dilemma2 either a right end is impossible1 or any end is right provided we fall back on a belief that it is our duty to perform it4 ,kant holds that every concrete end1 every definite purpose which we entertain1 comes from desire4 ,law utters no specific command except do your duty2 it stamps an end of desire as right only when it is pursued1 not because it is an end of desire1 but from duty4 ,the actual end which is before us is1 in any case1 supplied through inclination and desire4 ,reason furnishes principle as a motive4 ,we have here1 in another form1 the separation of end and motive which has already occupied us 7p4 #bdh74 ,end and motive are so disconnected1 so irrelevant to one another1 that we have no alternative except either to condemn every end1 because1 being prompted by desire1 it falls so far short of the majesty of duty2 or else fanatically to persist in any course when once we have formally brought it under the notion of duty4 ,the latter alternative would be the one chosen by a truly ,kantian agent because it is alone possible in practice4 ,but the moral fanatic does about as much evil in the world as the man of no moral principle4 ,religious wars1 persecutions1 intolerance1 harsh judgment of others1 obstinate persistence in a course of action once entered upon in spite of the testimony of experience to the harm that results2 blind devotion to narrow and one-sided aims2 deliberate opposition to art1 culture1 social amenities1 recreations1 or whatever the man of principle happens to find obnoxious3 pharisaical conviction of superiority1 of being the peculiar1 chosen instrument of the moral law2--these and the countless ills that follow in their wake1 are inevitable effects of erecting the isolated conviction of duty into a sufficient motive of action4 ,so far as these evils do not actually flow from an acceptance of the ,kantian principle1 it is because that has been promulgated and for the most part adopted1 where reverence for authority and law is strong4 ,in ,germany the ,kantian philosophy has1 upon the whole1 served as a help in criticizing law and procedure on the basis of their rationality1 while it has also served as a convenient stamp of rational sanction upon a politically authoritative regime1 already fairly reasonable1 as such matters go1 in the content of its legislation and administration4 ,,iii4 ,meaning of ,duty for ,duty's ,sake4--,it is a sound principle to do our duty as our duty1 and not for the sake of something else4 ,duty for duty's sake means1 in truth1 an act for the act's own sake2 the gift of cold water1 the word of encouragement1 the sweeping of the room1 the learning of the lesson1 the selling of the goods1 the painting of the picture1 because they are the things really called for at a given time1 and hence their own excuses for being4 ,no moral act is a means to anything beyond itself1--not even to morality4 ,but1 upon ,kant's theory1 duty for duty's sake means a special act not for its own sake1 but for the sake of abstract principle4 ,just as the hedonists regard a special act as a mere means to happiness1 so ,kant makes the concrete act a mere means to virtue4 ,as there is a hedonistic paradox1 namely that the way to get happiness is to forget it1 to devote ourselves to things and persons about us2 so there is a moralistic paradox1 that the way to get goodness is to cease to think of it--as something separate--and to devote ourselves to the realization of the full value of the practical situations in which we find ourselves4 ,men can really think of their duty only when they are thinking of specific things to be done2 to think of ,duty at large or in the abstract is one of the best ways of avoiding doing it1 or of doing it in a partial and perverted way4 ,summary of ,criticism of ,kant4--,to sum up1 the theory which regards duty as having its source in a rational self which is independent of and above the self of inclination and affection 7#a7 deprives the habitual desires and affections1 which make the difference between one concrete character and another1 of moral significance2 7#b7 commits us to an unenlightened performance of what is called duty irrespective of its real goodness2 and 7#c7 makes moral principle a remote abstraction1 instead of the vivifying soul of a concrete deed4 ,its strongest point1 its insistence upon the autonomous character of duty1 or that duty is organically connected with the self in some of its phases or functions1 will appear more clearly as we contrast it with the utilitarian theory4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,the ,,utilitarian ,,theory ,,of ,,duty ,problem of ,duty on ,hedonistic ,basis4--,the utilitarians' explanation of the constraint of desire by the authority of right is framed to meet the peculiar difficulty in which their hedonistic theory places them4 ,if pleasure is the good1 and if all desire is naturally for the good1 why should desire have to be constrained8 ,how can such a thing as duty exist at all8 ,for to say that a man is obliged or bound to seek that which he just can't help seeking is absurd4 ,there is1 according to the utilitarian1 a difference1 however1 between the pleasure which is the object of desire and that which is the standard of judgment4 ,the former is the person's own pleasure2 it is private4 ,the happiness which measures the rightness of the act is that of all persons who are affected by it4 ,in view of this divergence1 there must1 if right action is to occur1 be agencies which operate upon the individual so as to make him find his personal pleasure in that which conduces to the general welfare4 ,these influences are the expectations and demands of others so far as they attach consequences in the way of punishment1 of suffering1 and of reward and pleasure1 to the deeds of an individual4 ,in this way the natural inclination of an individual towards a certain pleasure1 or his natural revulsion from a certain pain1 may be checked and transformed by recognition that if he seeks the pleasure1 others will inflict more than an equivalent pain1 or if he bears the pain1 others will reward him with more than compensating pleasures4 ,in such cases1 we have the fact of duty or obligation4 ,there is constraint of first inclination through recognition of superior power1 this power being asserted in its expressly declared intention of rewarding and penalizing according as its prescriptions are or are not followed4 ,these are the factors3 7#a7 demands1 expectations1 rules externally imposed2 7#b7 consequences in the way of proffered reward of pleasure1 and penalty of pain2 7#c7 resulting constraint of the natural manifestation of desires4 ,in the main1 the theory is based on the analogy of legal obligations4#afg 7a7 ,bentham's ,account4--,bentham dislikes the very word duty2 and speaks preferably of the sanctions of an act4 ,the following quotations will serve to confirm the foregoing statements4 ,the happiness of the individuals of whom a community is composed is 444 the sole standard1 in conformity to which each individual ought to be made to fashion his behavior4 ,but whether it be this1 or anything else that is to be done1 there is nothing by which a man can ultimately be made to do it1 but either pain or pleasure4 ,a kind of pain or pleasure which tends to make an individual find his own good in the good of the community is a sanction4 ,of these ,bentham mentions four kinds1 of which the first alone is not due to the will of others1 but is physical4 ,thus the individual may check his inclination to drink by a thought of the ills that flow from drunkenness4 ,metaphorically1 then1 he may be said to have a duty not to drink2 strictly speaking1 however1 this is his own obvious interest4 ,the sanctions proper are 7a7 political1 consequences in the way of pleasure and pain 7especially pain7 attached to injunctions and prohibitions by a legal superior2 7b7 popular1 the consequences following from the more indefinite influence of public opinion--such as being sent to ,coventry1 being shunned1 rendered unpopular1 losing reputation1 or honor1 etc42 and 7#c7 religious1 penalties of hell and rewards of heaven attached to action by a divine being1 or similar penances and rewards by the representatives on earth 7church1 priests1 etc47 of this divine being4#afh ,value and ,deficiencies of ,this ,view4--,the strong point of this explanation of duty is obviously that it recognizes the large1 the very large1 role played by social institutions1 regulations1 and demands in bringing home to a person the fact that certain acts1 whether he is naturally so inclined or not1 should be performed4 ,but its weak point is that it tends to identify duty with coercion2 to change the ought if not into a physical must1 at least into the psychological must of fear of pain and hope of pleasure4 ,hope of reward and fear of penalty are real enough motives in human life2 but acts performed mainly or solely on their account do not1 in the unprejudiced judgment of mankind1 rank very high morally4 ,habitually to appeal to such motives is rather to weaken than to strengthen the tendencies in the individual which make for right action4 ,the difficulty lies clearly in the purely external character of the sanctions1 and this in turn is due to the fact that the obligations imposed by the demands and expectancies of others do not have any intrinsic connection with the character of the individual of whom they are exacted4 ,they are wholly external burdens and impositions4 ,the individual1 with his desires and his pleasures1 being made up out of particular states of feeling1 is complete in himself4 ,social relationships must then be alien and external2 if they modify in any way the existing body of feelings they are artificial constraints4 ,one individual merely happens to live side by side with other individuals1 who are in themselves isolated1 and are complete in their isolation4 ,if their external acts conflict1 it may be necessary to invade and change the body of feelings which make up the self from which the act flows4 ,hence duty4 ,the later development of utilitarianism tended to get away from this psychical and atomic individualism2 and to conceive the good of an individual as including within himself relations to others4 ,so far as this was done1 the demands of others1 public opinion1 laws1 etc41 became factors in the development of the individual1 and in arousing him to an adequate sense of what his good is1 and of interest in effecting it4 ,later utilitarianism dwells less than ,bentham upon external sanctions1 and more upon an unconscious shaping of the individual's character and motives through imitation1 education1 and all the agencies which mould the individual's desires into natural agreement with the social type4 ,while it is ,john ,stuart ,mill who insists most upon the internal and qualitative change of disposition that thus takes place1#afi it is ,bain and ,spencer who give the most detailed account of the methods by which it is brought about4 7b7 ,bain's ,account4--,his basis agrees with ,bentham's3 ,the proper meaning1 or import1 of the terms 7duty1 obligation7 refers to that class of action which is enforced by the sanction of punishment 7,bain1 ,emotions and ,will1 p4 #bhf74 ,but he sets less store by political legislation and the force of vague public opinion1 and more by the gradual and subtle processes of family education4 ,the lesson of obedience1 that there are things to be done whether one wishes or no1 is impressed upon the child almost unremittingly from the very first moment of life4 ,there are three stages in the complete evolution of the sense of duty4 ,the first1 the lowest and that beyond which some persons never go1 is that in which susceptibility to pleasure and pain is made use of to bring about obedience1 and a mental association is rapidly formed between the obedience and apprehended pain1 more or less magnified by fear4 ,the fact that punishment may be kept up until the child desists from the act leaves on his mind a certain dread and awful impression as connected with forbidden actions4 ,here we have in its germ conscience1 acknowledgment of duty1 in its most external form4 ,a child in a good home 7and a citizen in a good state7 soon adds other associations4 ,the command is uttered1 the penalty threatened1 by those whom he admires1 respects1 and loves4 ,this element brings in a new dread--the fear of giving pain to the beloved object4 ,such dread is more disinterested4 ,it centers rather about the point of view from which the act is held wrong than about the thought of harm to self4 ,as intelligence develops1 the person apprehends the positive ends1 the goods1 which are protected by the command put on him2 he sees the use and reason of the prohibition to which he is subject1 and approving of what it safeguards1 approves the restriction itself4 ,a new motive is added on and begirds the action with a threefold fear4444 ,if the duty prescribed has been approved of by the mind as protective of the general interests of persons engaging our sympathies1 the violation of this on our part affects us with all the pain that we feel from inflicting an injury upon those interests4 ,transformation into an ,internal ,power4--,when the child appreciates the reasons for the command1 the character of conscience is entirely transformed4 ,the fear which began as fear of the penalty that a superior power may inflict1 adds to itself the fear of displeasing a beloved person2 and is finally transformed into the dread of injuring interests the worth of which the individual appreciates and in which he shares4 ,the sense of duty now stands upon an independent foundation4 ,it is an internal ideal resemblance of public authority1 an imitation 7or facsimile7 within ourselves of the government without us4 ,regard is now had to the intent and meaning of the law and not to the mere fact of its being prescribed by some power4 ,thus there is developed a sense of obligation in general1 which may be detached from the particular deeds which were originally imposed under the sanction of penalty1 and transferred to new ends which have never even been socially imposed1 which the individual has perhaps for the first time conceived within himself4 ,the feeling and habit of obligation which was generated from social pressure remains1 but as a distinct individually cherished thing 7,bain1 ,emotions and ,will1 p4 #cai n474 ,this view of the final sense of obligation thus approximates ,kant's view of the autonomous character of duty4 7c7 ,spencer's ,account4--,herbert ,spencer 7like ,bentham7 lays emphasis upon the restraining influence of various social influences1 but lays stress1 as ,bentham does not1 upon the internal changes effected by long-continued1 unremitting pressure exercised through the entire period of human evolution4 ,taken in itself1 the consciousness of duty--the distinctively moral consciousness--is the control of proximate ends by remote ones1 of simple by complex aims1 of the sensory or presentative by the ideal or representative4 ,an undeveloped individual or race lives and acts in the present2 the mature is controlled by foresight of an indefinitely distant future4 ,the thief who steals is actuated by a simple feeling1 the mere impulse of acquisition2 the business man conducts his acquisition in view of highly complex considerations of property and ownership4 ,a low-grade intelligence acts only upon sensory stimulus1 immediately present2 a developed mind is moved by elaborate intellectual constructions1 by imaginations and ideas which far outrun the observed or observable scene4 ,each step of the development of intelligence1 of culture1 whether in the individual or the race1 is dependent upon ability to subordinate the immediate simple1 physically present tendency and aim to the remote1 compound1 and only ideally present intention 7,spencer1 ,principles of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,i41 ,part ,i1 ch4 vii474 ,subordination of ,near to ,remote ,good ,dependent on ,social ,influences4--,the conscious relinquishment of immediate and special good to gain distant and general good 444 is a cardinal trait of the self-restraint called moral4 ,but this develops out of forms of restraint which are not moral2 where the relinquishment and subordination of the present and temporary good is not consciously willed by the individual in view of a conscious appreciation of a distant and inclusive good2 but where action in view of the latter is forced upon the individual by outside authority1 operating by menace1 and having the sanction of fear4 ,these outside controls are three in number3 political or legal2 supernatural1 priestly1 or religious2 and popular4 ,all these external controls1 working through dread of pain and promise of reward1 bring about1 however1 in the individual a habit of looking to the remote1 rather than to the proximate1 end4 ,at first the thought of these extrinsic consequences1 those which do not flow from the act but from the reaction of others to it1 is mixed up with the thought of its own proper consequences4 ,but this association causes attention at least to be fixed upon intrinsic consequences that1 because of their remoteness and complexity1 might otherwise escape attention4 ,gradually the thought of them grows in clearness and efficacy and dissociates itself as a motive from the externally imposed consequences1 and there is a control which alone is truly moral4 ,the ,internal ,sanction4-- ,the truly moral deterrent from murder1 is not constituted by a representation of hanging as a consequence1 or by a representation of tortures in hell as a consequence1 or by a representation of the horror and hatred excited in fellow-men2 but by a representation of the necessary natural results--the infliction of death agony on the victim1 the destruction of all his possibilities of happiness1 the entailed sufferings to his belongings 7,spencer1 ,ibid41 p4 #abj74 ,the external constraints thus serve as a schoolmaster to bring the race and the individual to internal restraint4 ,gradually the abstract sense of coerciveness1 authoritativeness1 the need of controlling the present by the future good is disentangled1 and there arises the sense of duty in general4 ,but even this is transitory and will diminish as fast as moralization increases 7,ibid41 p4 #abg74 ,persistence in performance of a duty makes it a pleasure2 an habitually exercised obligation is naturally agreeable4 ,in the present state of evolutionary development1 obligation1 or the demands made by the external environment1 and spontaneous inclination1 or the demand of the organism1 cannot coincide4 ,but at the goal of evolution1 the organism and environment will be in perfect adjustment4 ,actions congenial to the former and appropriate to the latter will completely coincide4 ,in their proper times and places1 and proportions1 the moral sentiments will guide men just as spontaneously and adequately as now do the sensations 7,ibid41 p4 #abi74 ,criticism of ,utilitarianism4--,the utilitarian account of the development of the consciousness of duty or its emphasis upon concrete facts of social arrangements and education affords a much-needed supplement to the empty and abstract formalism of ,kant4 7i47 ,the individual is certainly brought to his actual recognition of specific duties and to his consciousness of obligation or moral law in general through social influences4 ,bain insists more upon the family training and discipline of its immature members2 ,bentham and ,spencer more upon the general institutional conditions1 or the organization of government1 law1 judicial procedure1 crystallized custom1 and public opinion4 ,in reality1 these two conditions imply and reenforce each other4 ,it is through the school of the family1 for the most part1 that the meaning of the requirements of the larger and more permanent institutions are brought home to the individual2 while1 on the other hand1 the family derives the aims and values which it enforces upon the attention of its individual members mainly from the larger society in which it finds its own setting4 7ii47 ,the later utilitarianism1 in its insistence upon an internal sanction1 upon the ideal personal1 or free facsimile of public authority1 upon regard for intrinsic consequences1 corrects the weak point in ,bentham 7who relies so unduly upon mere threat of punishment and mere fear of pain7 and approximates in practical effect1 though not in theory1 ,kant's doctrine of the connection of duty with the rational or larger self which is social1 even if individual4 ,even in its revised version utilitarianism did not wholly escape from the rigid unreal separation between the selfhood of the agent and his social surroundings forced upon it by its hedonistic psychology4 ,fictitious ,theory of ,nature of ,self4--,the supposition that the individual starts with mere love of private pleasure1 and that1 if he ever gets beyond to consideration of the good of others1 it is because others have forced their good upon him by interfering with his private pleasures1 is pure fiction4 ,the requirements1 encouragements1 and approbations of others react not primarily upon the pleasures and calculations of the individual1 but upon his activities1 upon his inclinations1 desires1 habits4 ,there is a common defect in the utilitarian and ,kantian psychology4 ,both neglect the importance of the active1 the organically spontaneous and direct tendencies which enter into the individual4 ,both assume unreal states of consciousness1 passive sensations1 and feelings4 ,active tendencies may be internally modified and redirected by the very conditions and consequences of their own exercise4 ,family discipline1 jural influences1 public opinion1 may do little1 or they may do much4 ,but their educative influence is as far from the mere association of feelings of pleasure and pain as it is from ,kant's purely abstract law4 ,social influences enable an individual to realize the weight and import of the socially available and helpful manifestations of the tendencies of his own nature and to discriminate them from those which are socially harmful or useless4 ,when the two conflict1 the perception of the former is the recognition of duties as distinct from mere inclinations4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,final ,,statement ,duty and a ,growing ,character4--,duty is what is owed by a partial isolated self embodied in established1 facile1 and urgent tendencies1 to that ideal self which is presented in aspirations which1 since they are not yet formed into habits1 have no organized hold upon the self and which can get organized into habitual tendencies and interests only by a more or less painful and difficult reconstruction of the habitual self4 ,for ,kant's fixed and absolute separation between the self of inclination and the self of reason1 we substitute the relative and shifting distinction between those factors of self which have become so definitely organized into set habits that they take care of themselves1 and those other factors which are more precarious1 less crystallized1 and which depend therefore upon conscious acknowledgment and intentionally directed affection4 ,the consciousness of duty grows out of the complex character of the self2 the fact that at any given time1 it has tendencies relatively set1 ingrained1 and embodied in fixed habits1 while it also has tendencies in process of making1 looking to the future1 taking account of unachieved possibilities4 ,the former give the solid relatively formed elements of character2 the latter1 its ideal or unrealized possibilities4 ,each must play into the other2 each must help the other out4 ,the conflict of duty and desire is thus an accompaniment of a growing self4 ,spencer's complete disappearance of obligation would mean an exhausted and fossilized self2 wherever there is progress1 tension arises between what is already accomplished and what is possible4 ,in a being whose reach should exceed his grasp1 a conflict within the self making for the readjustment of the direction of powers must always be found4 ,the value of continually having to meet the expectations and requirements of others is in keeping the agent from resting on his oars1 from falling back on habits already formed as if they were final4 ,the phenomena of duty in all their forms are thus phenomena attendant upon the expansion of ends and the reconstruction of character4 ,so far1 accordingly1 as the recognition of duty is capable of operating as a distinct reenforcing motive1 it operates most effectively1 not as an interest in duty1 or law in the abstract1 but as an interest in progress in the face of the obstacles found within character itself4 ,,literature ,the most important references on the subject of duty are given in the text4 ,to these may be added3 ,ladd1 ,philosophy of ,conduct1 chs4 v4 and xv42 ,mackenzie1 ,manual1 ,part ,i41 ch4 iv42 ,green1 ,prolegomena1 pp4 #cae-cbj1 #cec-ced and #cha-chh2 ,sharp1 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #ejj-eac2 ,muirhead1 ,elements of ,ethics1 ,book ,,ii41 ch4 ii42 ,mc,gilvary1 ,philosophical ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xi41 pp4 #ccc-ceb2 ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 pp4 #afa-aga2 ,sturt1 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,,vii41 #ccd-cde2 ,schurman1 ,philosophical ,review1 ,vol4 ,,iii41 pp4 #fda-fed2 ,guyau1 ,sketch of ,morals1 without ,obligation or ,sanction4 ,,footnotes3 #aff ,last ,essays on ,church and ,religion1 preface4 #afg ,historically it has often taken theological form4 ,thus ,paley defined virtue as doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of ,god1 and for the sake of everlasting happiness4 ,of obligation he said1 ,a man is said to be obliged1 when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another4 #afh ,the earlier ,english utilitarians 7though not called by that name71 such as ,tucker and ,paley1 assert that upon this earth there is no exact coincidence of the right and the pleasure-giving2 that it is future rewards and punishments which make the equilibrium4 ,sidgwick1 among recent writers1 has also held that no complete identification of virtue and happiness can be found apart from religious considerations4 7,see ,methods of ,ethics1 p4 #eje4 ,for theological utilitarianism see ,albee1 ,history47 #afi ,see his ,utilitarianism1 ch4 iii4 ,,chapter ,,xviii ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,the ,,self ,,in ,,the ,,moral ,,life ,we have reached the conclusion that disposition as manifest in endeavor is the seat of moral worth1 and that this worth itself consists in a readiness to regard the general happiness even against contrary promptings of personal comfort and gain4 ,this brings us to the problems connected with the nature and functions of the self4 ,we shall1 in our search for the moral self1 pass in review the conceptions which find morality in 7#a7 ,self-,denial or ,self-,sacrifice1 7#b7 ,self-,assertion1 7#c7 ,combination of ,regard for ,self and for ,others1 7#d7 ,self-,realization4 ,sec4 #a4 ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,self-,,denial ,widespread ,currency of the ,doctrine4--,the notion that real goodness1 or virtue1 consists essentially in abnegation of the self1 in denying and1 so far as may be1 eliminating everything that is of the nature of the self1 is one of the oldest and most frequently recurring notions of moral endeavor and religion1 as well as of moral theory4 ,it describes ,buddhism and1 in large measure1 the monastic ideal of ,christianity1 while1 in ,protestantism1 ,puritanism is permeated with its spirit4 ,it characterized ,cynicism and ,stoicism4 ,kant goes as far as to say that every rational being must wish to be wholly free from inclinations4 ,popular morality1 while not going so far as to hold that all moral goodness is self-denial1 yet more or less definitely assumes that self-denial on its own account1 irrespective of what comes out of it1 is morally praiseworthy4 ,a notion so deeply rooted and widely flourishing must have strong motives in its favor1 all the more so because its practical vogue is always stronger than any reasons which are theoretically set forth4 ,origin of the ,doctrine4--,the notion arises from the tendency to identify the self with one of its own factors4 ,it is one and the same self which conceives and is interested in some generous and ideal good that is also tempted by some near1 narrow1 and exclusive good4 ,the force of the latter resides in the habitual self1 in purposes which have got themselves inwrought into the texture of ordinary character4 ,hence there is a disposition to overlook the complexity of selfhood1 and to identify it with those factors in the self which resist ideal aspiration1 and which are recalcitrant to the thought of duty2 to identify the self with impulses that are inclined to what is frivolous1 sensuous and sensual1 pleasure-seeking4 ,all vice being1 then1 egoism1 selfishness1 self-seeking1 the remedy is to check it at its roots2 to keep the self down in its proper place1 denying it1 chastening it1 mortifying it1 refusing to listen to its promptings4 ,ignoring the variety and subtlety of the factors that make up the self1 all the different elements of right and of wrong are gathered together and set over against each other4 ,all the good is placed once for all in some outside source1 some higher law or ideal2 and the source of all evil is placed within the corrupted and vile self4 ,when one has become conscious of the serious nature of the moral struggle2 has found that vice is easy1 and to err natural1 needing only to give way to some habitual impulse or desire2 that virtue is arduous1 requiring resistance and strenuous effort1 one is apt to overlook the habitual tendencies which are the ministers of the higher goods4 ,one forgets that unless ideal ends were also rooted in some natural tendencies of the self1 they could neither occur to the self nor appeal to the self4 ,hence everything is swept into the idea that the self is inherently so evil that it must be denied1 snubbed1 sacrificed1 mortified4 ,in general1 to point out the truth which this theory perverts1 to emphasize the demand for constant reconstruction and rearrangement of the habitual powers of the self--is sufficient criticism of it4 ,but in detail the theory exercises such pervasive influence that it is worth while to mention specifically some of the evils that accrue from it4 #a4 ,it so ,maims and ,distorts ,human ,nature as to ,narrow the ,conception of the ,good4--,in its legitimate antagonism to pleasure-seeking1 it becomes a foe to happiness1 and an implacable enemy of all its elements4 ,art is suspected1 for beauty appeals to the lust of the eye4 ,family life roots in sexual impulses1 and property in love of power1 gratification1 and luxury4 ,science springs from the pride of the intellect2 the ,state from the pride of will4 ,asceticism is the logical result2 a purely negative conception of virtue4 ,but it surely does dishonor1 not honor1 to the moral life to conceive it as mere negative subjection of the flesh1 mere holding under control the lust of desire and the temptations of appetite4 ,all positive content1 all liberal achievement1 is cut out and morality is reduced to a mere struggle against solicitations to sin4 ,while asceticism is in no danger of becoming a popular doctrine1 there is a common tendency to conceive self-control in this negative fashion2 to fail to see that the important thing is some positive good for which a desire is controlled4 ,in general we overemphasize that side of morality which consists in abstinence and not doing wrong4 #b4 ,to ,make so ,much of ,conflict with the ,flesh1 is to ,honor the ,latter too ,much4--,it is to fix too much attention on it4 ,it is an open lesson of psychology that to oppose doing an act by mere injunction not to do it1 is to increase the power of the thing not to be done1 and to weaken the spring and effectiveness of the other motives1 which1 if positively attended to1 might keep the obnoxious motive from gaining supremacy4 ,the expulsive power of a generous affection is more to be relied upon than effort to suppress1 which keeps alive the very thing to be suppressed4 ,the history of monks and ,puritan saints alike is full of testimony to the fact that withdrawal from positive generous and wholesome aims reenforces the vitality of the lower appetites and stimulates the imagination to play about them4 ,flagellation and fasting work as long as the body is exhausted2 but the brave organism reasserts itself1 and its capacities for science1 art1 the life of the family and the ,state not having been cultivated1 sheer ineradicable physical instinct is most likely to come to the front4 #c4 ,we ,judge ,others by ,ourselves ,because ,we ,have ,no ,other ,way to ,judge4--,it is impossible for a man who conceives his own good to be in going without1 in just restricting himself1 to have any large or adequate idea of the good of others4 ,unconsciously and inevitably a hardening and narrowing of the conditions of the lives of others accompanies the reign of the ,puritanic ideal4 ,the man who takes a high view of the capacities of human nature in itself1 who reverences its possibilities and is jealous for their high maintenance in himself1 is the one most likely to have keen and sensitive appreciation of the needs of others4 ,there is1 moreover1 no selfishness1 no neglect of others more thoroughgoing1 more effectively cruel than that which comes from preoccupation with the attainment of personal goodness1 and this interest is an almost inevitable effect of devotion to the negative ideal of self-denial4 #d4 ,the ,principle ,radically ,violates ,human ,nature4--,this indeed is its claim--that human nature1 just as human nature1 requires to have violence done it4 ,but the capacities which constitute the self demand fulfillment4 ,the place1 the time1 the manner1 the degree1 and the proportion of their fulfillment1 require infinite care and pains1 and to secure this attention is the business of morals4 ,morals is a matter of direction1 not of suppression4 ,the urgency of desires and capacities for expression cannot be got rid of2 nature cannot be expelled4 ,if the need of happiness1 of satisfaction of capacity1 is checked in one direction1 it will manifest itself in another4 ,if the direction which is checked is an unconscious and wholesome one1 that which is taken will be likely to be morbid and perverse4 ,the one who is conscious of continually denying himself cannot rid himself of the idea that it ought to be made up to him2 that a compensating happiness is due him for what he has sacrificed1 somewhat increased1 if anything1 on account of the unnatural virtue he has displayed4#agj ,to be self-sacrificing is to lay up merit1 and this achievement must surely be rewarded with happiness--if not now1 then later4 ,those who habitually live on the basis of conscious self-denial are likely to be exorbitant in the demands which they make on some one near them1 some member of their family or some friend2 likely to blame others if their own virtue does not secure for itself an exacting attention which reduces others to the plane of servility4 ,often the doctrine of self-sacrifice leads to an inverted hedonism3 we are to be good--that is1 to forego pleasure--now1 that we may have a greater measure of enjoyment in some future paradise of bliss4 ,or1 the individual who has taken vows of renunciation is entitled by that very fact to represent spiritual authority on earth and to lord it over others4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,self-,,assertion ,the idea that morality consists in an unbridled assertion of self1 in its forceful aggressive manifestation1 rarely receives consistent theoretical formulation--possibly because most men are so ready to act upon it practically that explicit acknowledgment would be a hindrance rather than a help to the idea4 ,but it is a doctrine which tends to be invoked more or less explicitly as a reaction from the impotency of the self-denial dogma4 ,in reference to some superior individual or class1 some leader or group of aristocratically ordained leaders1 it is always a more or less conscious principle4 ,concerning these it is held that ordinary morality holds eventually only for the common herd1 the activities of the leader being amenable to a higher law than that of common morality4#aga ,moreover1 since the self-sacrifice morality is almost never carried out consistently--that is1 to the point of monastic asceticism1--much popular morality is an unbalanced combination of self-sacrifice in some regards and ruthless self-assertion in others4 ,it is not practicable to carry out the principle of self-denial everywhere2 it is reserved for the family life1 for special religious duties2 in business 7which is business1 not morals71 the proper thing is aggressive and unremitting self-assertion4 ,in business1 the end is success1 to make good2 weakness is failure1 and failure is disgrace1 dishonor4 ,thus in practice the two conceptions of self-denial in one region and self-assertion in another mutually support each other4 ,they give occasion for the more or less unformulated1 yet prevalent1 idea that moral considerations 7those of self-denial7 apply to a limited phase of life1 but have nothing to do with other regions in which accordingly the principle of efficiency 7that is1 personal success1 wealth1 power obtained in competitive victory7 holds supreme sway4 ,recently1 however1 there has sprung up a so-called naturalistic school of ethics which has formulated explicitly the principle of self-assertion1 and which claims to find scientific sanction for it in the evolutionary doctrine of ,darwin4 ,evolution1 it says1 is the great thing1 and evolution means the survival of the fit in the struggle for existence4 ,nature's method of progress is precisely1 so it is said1 ruthless self-assertion--to the strong the victory1 to the victorious the spoils1 and to the defeated1 woe4 ,nature affords a scene of egoistic endeavor or pressure1 suffer who may1 of struggle to get ahead1 that is1 ahead of others1 even by thrusting them down and out4 ,but the justification of this scene of rapine and slaughter is that out of it comes progress1 advance1 everything that we regard as noble and fair4 ,excellence is the sign of excelling2 the goal means outrunning others4 ,the morals of humility1 of obedience to law1 of pity1 sympathy1 are merely a self-protective device on the part of the weak who try to safeguard their weakness by setting fast limitations to the activities of the truly strong 7compare what was said of the not dissimilar doctrine among the ,greeks1 pp4 #abj-bb74 ,but the truly moral man1 in whom the principle of progress is embodied1 will break regardlessly through these meshes and traps4 ,he will carry his own plans through to victorious achievement4 ,he is the super-man4 ,the mass of men are simply food for his schemes1 valuable as furnishing needed material and tools4#agb ,practical ,vogue of the ,underlying ,idea4--,such a theory1 in and of itself1 is a literary diversion for those who1 not being competent in the fields of outer achievement1 amuse themselves by idealizing it in writing4 ,like most literary versions of science1 it rests upon a pseudo-science1 a parody of the real facts4 ,but at a time when economic conditions are putting an extraordinary emphasis upon outward achievement1 upon success in manipulating natural and social resources1 upon efficiency in exploiting both inanimate energies and the minds and bodies of other persons1 the underlying principle of this theory has a sanction and vogue which is out of all proportion to the number of those who consciously entertain it as a theory4 ,for a healthy mind1 the frank statement and facing of the theory is its best criticism4 ,its bald brutalism flourishes freely only when covered and disguised4 ,but in view of the forces at present1 and especially in ,america1 making for a more or less unconscious acceptance of its principle in practice1 it may be advisable to say something 7#a7 regarding its alleged scientific foundation1 and 7#b7 the inadequacy of its conception of efficiency4 #a4 ,the ,theory ,exaggerates the ,role of ,antagonistic ,competitive ,struggle in the ,darwinian ,theory4--7a7 ,the initial step in any progress is variation2 this is not so much struggle against other organisms1 as it is invention or discovery of some new way of acting1 involving better adaptation of hitherto merely latent natural resources1 use of some possible food or shelter not previously utilized4 ,the struggle against other organisms at work preserves from elimination a species already fixed--quite a different thing from the variation which occasions the introduction of a higher or more complex species4 7b7 ,moreover1 so far as the ,darwinian theory is concerned1 the struggle for existence may take any conceivable form2 rivalry in generosity1 in mutual aid and support1 may be the kind of competition best fitted to enable a species to survive4 ,it not only may be so1 but it is so within certain limits4 ,the rage for survival1 for power1 must not be asserted indiscriminately2 the mate of the other sex1 the young1 to some extent other individuals of the same kin1 are spared1 or1 in many cases1 protected and nourished4#agc 7c7 ,the higher the form of life1 the more effective the two methods just suggested3 namely1 the method of intelligence in discovering and utilizing new methods1 tools1 and resources as substituted for the direct method of brute conflict2 and the method of mutual protection and care substituted for mutual attack and combat4 ,it is among the lower forms of life1 not as the theory would require among the higher types1 that conditions approximate its picture of the gladiatorial show4 ,the higher species among the vertebrates1 as among insects 7like ants and bees71 are the sociable kinds4 ,it is sometimes argued that ,darwinism carried into morals would abolish charity3 all care of the hopelessly invalid1 of the economically dependent1 and in general of all the weak and helpless except healthy infants4 ,it is argued that our current standards are sentimental and artificial1 aiming to make survive those who are unfit1 and thus tending to destroy the conditions that make for advance1 and to introduce such as make towards degeneration4 ,but this argument 7#a7 wholly ignores the reflex effect of interest in those who are ill and defective in strengthening social solidarity--in promoting those ties and reciprocal interests which are as much the prerequisites of strong individual characters as they are of a strong social group4 ,and 7#b7 it fails to take into account the stimulus to foresight1 to scientific discovery1 and practical invention1 which has proceeded from interest in the helpless1 the weak1 the sick1 the disabled1 blind1 deaf1 and insane4 ,taking the most coldly scientific view1 the gains in these two respects have1 through the growth of social pity1 of care for the unfortunate1 been purchased more cheaply than we can imagine their being bought in any other way4 ,in other words1 the chief objection to this naturalistic ethics is that it overlooks the fact that1 even from the ,darwinian point of view1 the human animal is a human animal4 ,it forgets that the sympathetic and social instincts1 those which cause the individual to take the interests of others for his own and thereby to restrain his sheer brute self-assertiveness1 are the highest achievements1 the high-water mark of evolution4 ,the theory urges a systematic relapse to lower and foregone stages of biological development4 #b4 ,its ,conception of ,power1 ,efficiency1 ,achievement is ,perverse4--,compared with the gospel of abstinence1 of inefficiency1 preached by the self-denial school1 there is an element of healthy reaction in any ethical system which stresses positive power1 positive success1 positive attainment4 ,goodness has been too much identified with practical feebleness and ineptitude2 strength and solidity of accomplishment1 with unscrupulousness4 ,but power for the sake of power is as unreal an abstraction as self-denial for the sake of sacrifice1 or self-restraint for the sake of the mere restraint4 ,erected into a central principle1 it takes means for end--the fallacy of all materialism4 ,it makes little of many of the most important and excellent inherent ingredients of happiness in its eagerness to master external conditions of happiness4 ,sensitive discrimination of complex and refined distinctions of worth1 such as good taste1 the resources of poetry and history1 frank and varied social converse among intellectual equals1 the humor of sympathetic contemplation of the spectacle of life1 the capacity to extract happiness from solitude and society1 from nature and from art3--all of these1 as well as the more obvious virtues of sympathy and benevolence1 are swept aside for one coarse undiscriminating ideal of external activity1 measured by sheer quantity of external changes made and external results accumulated4 ,of such an ideal we may say1 as ,mill said1 that the judge of good1 of happiness1 is the one who has experienced its various forms2 and that as no intelligent person would consent to be a fool on account of the pleasures of the fool1 so no man of cultivated spirit would consent to be a lover of efficiency and power for the sake of brute command of the external commodities of nature and man4 ,present ,currency of ,this ,ideal4--,in spite of the extraordinary currency of this ideal at present1 there is little fear that it will be permanently established4 ,human nature is too rich and varied in its capacities and demands2 the world of nature and society is too fruitful in sources of stimulus and interest for man to remain indefinitely content with the idea of power for power's sake1 command of means for the mere sake of the means4 ,humanity has long lived a precarious and a stunted life because of its partial and easily shaken hold on natural resources4 ,starved by centuries of abstinence enforced through lack of control of the forces and methods of nature1 taught the gospel of the merit of abstention1 it is not surprising that it should be intoxicated when scientific discovery bears its fruit of power in utilization of natural forces1 or that1 temporarily unbalanced1 it should take the external conditions of happiness for happiness itself4 ,but when the values of material acquisition and achievement become familiar they will lose the contrast value they now possess2 and human endeavor will concern itself mainly with the problem of rendering its conquests in power and efficiency tributary to the life of intelligence and art and of social communication4#agd ,such a moral idealism will rest upon a more secure and extensive natural foundation than that of the past1 and will be more equitable in application and saner in content than that with which aristocracies have made us familiar4 ,it will be a democratic ideal1 a good for all1 not for a noble class2 and it will include1 not exclude1 those physical and physiological factors which aristocratic idealisms have excluded as common and unclean4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,self-,,love ,,and ,,benevolence2 ,,or1 ,,egoism ,,and ,,altruism ,for the last three centuries1 the most discussed point in ,english ethical literature 7save perhaps whether moral knowledge is intuitive or derived from experience7 has been the relation of regard for one's own self and for other selves as motives of action--the crux of all ethical speculation1 ,spencer terms it4 ,all views have been represented3 7a7 that man naturally acts from purely selfish motives and that morality consists in an enforced subjection of self-love to the laws of a common social order1 7b7 ,that man is naturally selfish1 while morality is an enlightened selfishness1 or a regard for self based upon recognition of the extent to which its happiness requires consideration of others4 7c7 ,that the tendencies of the agent are naturally selfish1 but that morality is the subjection of these tendencies to the law of duty4 7d7 ,that man's interests are naturally partly egoistic and partly sympathetic1 while morality is a compromise or adjustment of these tendencies4 7e7 ,that man's interests are naturally both1 and morality a subjection of both to conscience as umpire4 7f7 ,that they are both1 while morality is a subjection of egoistic to benevolent sentiments4 7g7 ,that the individual's interests are naturally in objective ends which primarily are neither egoistic nor altruistic2 and these ends become either selfish or benevolent at special crises1 at which times morality consists in referring them1 equally and impartially for judgment1 to a situation in which the interests of the self and of others concerned are involved3 to a common good4 ,three ,underlying ,psychological ,principles4--,we shall make no attempt to discuss these various views in detail2 but will bring into relief some of the factors in the discussion which substantiate the view 7g7 stated last4 ,it will be noted that the theories rank themselves under three heads with reference to the constitution of man's tendencies3 holding they 7#a7 naturally have in view personal ends exclusively or all fall under the principle of self-love or self-regard2 that 7#b7 some of them contemplate one's own happiness and some of them that of others2 that 7#c7 primarily they are not consciously concerned with either one's own happiness or that of others4 ,memory and reflection may show 7just as it shows other things7 that their consequences affect both the self and others1 when the recognition of this fact becomes an additional element1 either for good or for evil1 in the motivation of the act4 ,we shall consider1 first1 the various senses in which action occurs1 or is said to occur1 in behalf of the person's own self2 and then take up1 in similar fashion1 its reference to the interests of others4 ,i4 ,action in ,behalf of ,self4--#a4 ,motives as ,selfish3 ,the ,natural ,selfishness of ,man is maintained from such different standpoints and with such different objects in view that it is difficult to state the doctrine in any one generalized form4 ,by some theologians1 it has been associated with an innate corruption or depravity of human nature and been made the basis of a demand for supernatural assistance to lead a truly just and benevolent life4 ,by ,hobbes 7#aehh-afgi7 it was associated with the anti-social nature of individuals and made the basis for a plea for a strong and centralized political authority#age to control the natural war of all against all which flows inevitably from the psychological egoism4 ,by ,kant1 it was connected with the purely sense origin of desires1 and made the basis for a demand for the complete subordination of desire to duty as a motive for action4 ,morals1 like politics1 make strange bedfellows6 ,the common factor in these diverse notions1 however1 is that every act of a self must1 when left to its natural or psychological course1 have the interest of the self in view2 otherwise there would be no motive for the deed and it would not be done4 ,this theoretical and a priori view is further supported by pointing out1 sometimes in reprobation of man's sinful nature1 sometimes in a more or less cynical vein1 the lurking presence of some subtle regard for self in acts that apparently are most generous and disinterested4#agf ,ambiguity of the ,psychological ,basis4--,the notion that all action is for the self is infected with the same ambiguity as the 7analogous7 doctrine that all desire is for happiness4 ,like that doctrine1 in one sense it is a truism1 in another a falsity--this latter being the sense in which its upholders maintain it4 ,psychologically1 any object that moves us1 any object in which we imagine our impulses to rest satisfied or to find fulfillment1 becomes1 in virtue of that fact1 a factor in the self4 ,if ,i am enough interested in collecting postage stamps1 a collection of postage stamps becomes a part of my ego1 which is incomplete and restless till filled out in that way4 ,if my habits are such that ,i am not content when ,i know my neighbor is suffering from a lack of food until ,i have relieved him1 then relief of his suffering becomes a part of my selfhood4 ,if my desires are such that ,i have no rest of mind until ,i have beaten my competitor in business1 or have demonstrated my superiority in social gifts by putting my fellow at some embarrassing disadvantage1 then that sort of thing constitutes my self4 ,our instincts1 impulses1 and habits all demand appropriate objects in order to secure exercise and expression2 and these ends in their office of furnishing outlet and satisfaction to our powers form a cherished part of the me4 ,in this sense it is true1 and a truism1 that all action involves the interest of self4 ,true and ,false ,interpretation4--,but this doctrine is the exact opposite of that intended by those who claim that all action is from self-love4 ,the true doctrine says1 the self is constituted and developed through instincts and interests which are directed upon their own objects with no conscious regard necessarily for anything except those objects themselves4 ,the false doctrine implies that the self exists by itself apart from these objective ends1 and that they are merely means for securing it a certain profit or pleasure4 ,suppose1 for example1 it is a case of being so disturbed in mind by the thought of another in pain that one is moved to do something to relieve him4 ,this means that certain native instincts or certain acquired habits demand relief of others as part of themselves4 ,the well-being of the other is an interest of the self3 is a part of the self4 ,this is precisely what is meant ordinarily by unselfishness3 not lack or absence of a self1 but such a self as identifies itself in action with others' interests and hence is satisfied only when they are satisfied4 ,to find pain in the thought of others pained and to take pleasure in the thought of their relief1 is to have and to be moved by personal motives1 by states which are selfish in the sense of making up the self2 but which are the exact opposite of selfish in the sense of being the thought of some private advantage to self4#agg ,putting it roundly1 then1 the fallacy of the selfish motive theory is that it fails to see that instincts and habits directed upon objects are primary1 and that they come before any conscious thought of self as end1 since they are necessary to the constitution of that thought4 ,the following quotation from ,james#agh states the true doctrine3 ,when ,i am led by selflove to keep my seat whilst ladies stand1 or to grab something first and cut out my neighbor1 what ,i really love is the comfortable seat2 it is the thing itself which ,i grab4 ,i love them primarily1 as the mother loves her babe1 or a generous man an heroic deed4 ,wherever1 as here1 selfseeking is the outcome of simple instinctive propensity1 it is but a name for certain reflex acts4 ,something rivets my attention fatally and fatally provokes the 'selfish' response4444 ,it is true ,i am no automaton1 but a thinker4 ,but my thoughts1 like my acts1 are here concerned only with the outward things4444 ,in fact the more utterly selfish ,i am in this primitive way1 the more blindly absorbed my thought will be in the objects and impulses of my lust and the more devoid of any inward looking glance4 #b4 ,results as ,selfish3 ,ambiguity in the ,notion4--,we must then give up the notion that motives are inherently self-seeking1 in the sense that there is in voluntary acts a thought of the self as the end for the sake of which the act is performed4 ,the self-seeking doctrine may1 however1 be restated in these terms3 ,although there is no thought of self or its advantage consciously entertained1 yet our original instincts are such that their objects do as matter of result conduce primarily to the well-being and advantage of the self4 ,in this sense1 anger1 fear1 hunger1 and thirst1 etc41 are said to be egoistic or self-seeking--not that their conscious object is the self1 but that their inevitable effect is to preserve and protect the self4 ,the fact that an instinct secures self-preservation or self-development does not1 however1 make it egoistic or selfish in the moral sense2 nor does it throw any light upon the moral status of the instinct4 ,everything depends upon the sort of self which is maintained4 ,there is1 indeed1 some presumption 7see ante1 p4 #bid7 that the act sustains a social self1 that is1 a self whose maintenance is of social value4 ,if the individual organism did not struggle for food2 strive aggressively against obstacles and interferences2 evade or shelter itself against menacing superior force1 what would become of children1 fathers and mothers1 lawyers1 doctors and clergymen1 citizens and patriots--in short1 of society8 ,if we avoid setting up a purely abstract self1 if we keep in mind that every actual self is a self which includes social relations and offices1 both actual and potential1 we shall have no difficulty in seeing that self-preservative instincts may be1 and taken by and large1 must be1 socially conservative4 ,moreover1 while it is not true that if a man does not look after his own interests no one else will 7if that means that his interests are no one else's affair in any way71 it is true that no one has a right to neglect his own interests in the hope that some one else will care for them4 ,his own interests1 properly speaking1 are precisely the ends which concern him more directly than they concern any one else4 ,each man is1 so to say1 nearer himself than is any one else1 and1 therefore1 has certain duties to and about himself which cannot be performed by any other one4 ,others may present food or the conditions of education1 but the individual alone can digest the food or educate himself4 ,it is profitable for society1 not merely for an individual1 that each of us should instinctively have his powers most actively and intensely called out by the things that distinctively affect him and his own welfare4 ,any other arrangement would mean waste of social energy1 inefficiency in securing social results4 ,the quotation from ,james also makes it clear1 however1 that under certain circumstances the mere absorption in a thing1 even without conscious thought of self1 is morally offensive4 ,the pig in manners is not necessarily thinking of himself2 all that is required to make him a pig is that he should have too narrow and exclusive an object of regard4 ,the man sees simply the seat1 not the seat and the lady4 ,the boor in manners is unconscious of many of the objects in the situation which should operate as stimuli4 ,one impulse or habit is operating at the expense of others2 the self in play is too petty or narrow4 ,viewed from the standpoint of results1 the fact which constitutes selfishness in the moral sense is not that certain impulses and habits secure the well-being of the self1 but that the well-being secured is a narrow and exclusive one4 ,the forms of coarse egoism which offend us most in ordinary life are not usually due to a deliberate or self-conscious seeking of advantage for self1 but to such preoccupation with certain ends as blinds the agent to the thought of the interests of others4 ,many whose behavior seems to others most selfish would deny indignantly 7and1 from the standpoint of their definite consciousness1 honestly7 any self-seeking motives3 they would point to certain objective results1 which in the abstract are desirable1 as the true ends of their activities4 ,but none the less1 they are selfish1 because the limitations of their interests make them overlook the consequences which affect the freedom and happiness of others4 #c4 ,there are also ,cases in ,which the ,thought of the ,resulting ,consequence to the ,self ,consciously ,enters in and ,modifies the ,motive of the ,act4--,with increasing memory and foresight1 one can no more ignore the lesson of the past as to the consequences of an act upon himself than he can ignore other consequences4 ,a man who has learned that a certain act has painful consequences to himself1 whether to his body1 his reputation1 his comfort1 or his character1 is quite likely to have the thought of himself present itself as part of the foreseen consequences when the question of a similar act recurs4 ,in and of itself1 once more1 this fact throws no light upon the moral status of the act4 ,everything depends upon what sort of a self moves and how it moves4 ,a man who hesitated to rush into a burning building to rescue a suit of clothes because he thought of the danger to himself1 would be sensible2 a man who rushed out of the building just because he thought of saving himself when there were others he might have assisted1 would be contemptible4 ,the one who began taking exercise because he thought of his own health1 would be commended2 but a man who thought so continually of his own health as to shut out other objects1 would become an object of ridicule or worse4 ,there is a moral presumption that a man should make consideration of himself a part of his aim and intent4 ,a certain care of health1 of body1 of property1 of mental faculty1 because they are one's own is not only permissible1 but obligatory4 ,this is what the older moral writers spoke of as prudence1 or as reasonable self-love4 7i47 ,it is a stock argument of the universal selfishness theory to point out that a man's acknowledgment of some public need or benefit is quite likely to coincide with his recognition of some private advantage4 ,a statesman's recognition of some measure of public policy happens to coincide with perceiving that by pressing it he can bring himself into prominence or gain office4 ,a man is more likely to see the need of improved conditions of sanitation or transportation in a given locality if he has property there4 ,a man's indignation at some prevalent public ill may sleep till he has had a private taste of it4 ,we may admit that these instances describe a usual1 though not universal1 state of affairs4 ,but does it follow that such men are moved merely by the thought of gain to themselves8 ,possibly this sometimes happens2 then the act is selfish in the obnoxious sense4 ,the man has isolated his thought of himself as an end and made the thought of the improvement or reform merely an external means4 ,the latter is not truly his end at all2 he has not identified it with himself4 ,in other cases1 while the individual would not have recognized the end if the thought of himself had not been implicated1 yet after he has recognized it1 the two--the thought of himself and of the public advantage--may blend4 ,his thought of himself may lend warmth and intimacy to an object which otherwise would have been cold1 while1 at the same time1 the self is broadened and deepened by taking in the new object of regard4 7ii47 ,take the case of amusement or recreation4 ,to an adult usually engaged in strenuous pursuits1 the thought of a pleasure for the mere sake of pleasure1 of enjoyment1 of having a good time1 may appeal as an end4 ,and if the pleasure is itself innocent1 only the requirements of a preconceived theory 7like the ,kantian7 would question its legitimacy4 ,even its moral necessity is clear when relaxation is conducive to cheerfulness and efficiency in more serious pursuits4 ,but if a man discriminates mentally between himself and the play or exercise in which he finds enjoyment and relief1 thinking of himself as a distinct end to which the latter is merely means1 he is not likely to get the recreation4 ,it is by forgetting the self1 that is by taking the light and easy activity as the self of the situation1 that the benefit comes4 ,to be a lover of pleasure in the bad sense is precisely to seek amusements as excitements for a self which somehow remains outside them as their fixed and ulterior end4 7iii47 ,exactly the same analysis applies to the idea of the moral culture of the self1 of its moral perfecting4 ,every serious-minded person has1 from time to time1 to take stock of his status and progress in moral matters--to take thought of the moral self just as at other times he takes thought of the health of the bodily self4 ,but woe betides that man who1 having entered upon a course of reflection which leads to a clearer conception of his own moral capacities and weaknesses1 maintains that thought as a distinct mental end1 and thereby makes his subsequent acts simply means to improving or perfecting his moral nature4 ,such a course defeats itself4 ,at the least1 it leads to priggishness1 and its tendency is towards one of the worst forms of selfishness3 a habit of thinking and feeling that persons1 that concrete situations and relations1 exist simply to render contributions to one's own precious moral character4 ,the worst of such selfishness is that having protected itself with the mantle of interest in moral goodness1 it is proof against that attrition of experience which may always recall a man to himself in the case of grosser and more unconscious absorption4 ,a sentimentally refined egoism is always more hopeless than a brutal and naive one--though a brutal one not infrequently protects itself by adoption and proclamation of the language of the former4 ,,ii4 ,benevolence or ,regard for ,others4--,ambiguity in ,conception3 ,there is the same ambiguity in the idea of sympathetic or altruistic springs to action that there is in that of egoistic and self-regarding4 ,does the phrase refer to their conscious and express intent8 or to their objective results when put into operation1 irrespective of explicit desire and aim8 ,and1 if the latter1 are we to believe contribution to the welfare of others to be the sole and exclusive character of some springs of action1 or simply that1 under certain circumstances1 the emphasis falls more upon the good resulting to others than upon other consequences8 ,the discussion will show that the same general principles hold for benevolent as for self-regarding impulses3 namely 7#a7 that there are none which from the start are consciously such2 7#b7 that while reflection may bring to light their bearing upon the welfare of others so that it becomes an element in the conscious desire1 this is a matter of relative preponderance1 not of absolute nature2 and 7#c7 that just as conscious regard for self is not necessarily bad or selfish1 so conscious regard for others is not necessarily good3 the criterion is the whole situation in which the desire takes effect4 #a4 ,the ,existence of ,other-,regarding ,springs to ,action4--,only the preconceptions of hedonistic psychology would ever lead one to deny the existence of reactions and impulses called out by the sight of others' misery and joy and which tend to increase the latter and to relieve the former4 ,recent psychologists 7writing1 of course1 quite independently of ethical controversies7 offer lists of native instinctive tendencies such as the following3 ,anger1 jealousy1 rivalry1 secretiveness1 acquisitiveness1 fear1 shyness1 sympathy1 affection1 pity1 sexual love1 curiosity1 imitation1 play1 constructiveness4#agi ,in this inventory1 the first seven may be said to be aroused specially by situations having to do with the preservation of the self2 the next four are responses to stimuli proceeding especially from others and tending to consequences favorable to them1 while the last four are mainly impersonal4 ,but the division into self-regarding and other-regarding is not exclusive and absolute4 ,anger may be wholly other-regarding1 as in the case of hearty indignation at wrongs suffered by others2 rivalry may be generous emulation or be directed toward surpassing one's own past record4 ,love between the sexes1 which should be the source of steady1 far-reaching interest in others1 and which at times expresses itself in supreme abnegation of devotion1 easily becomes the cause of brutal and persistent egoism4 ,in short1 the division into egoistic and altruistic holds only other things being equal4 ,confining ourselves for the moment to the native psychological equipment1 we may say that man is endowed with instinctive promptings which naturally 7that is1 without the intervention of deliberation or calculation7 tend to preserve the self 7by aggressive attack as in anger1 or in protective retreat as in fear72 and to develop his powers 7as in acquisitiveness1 constructiveness1 and play72 and which equally1 without consideration of resulting ulterior benefit either to self or to others1 tend to bind the self closer to others and to advance the interests of others--as pity1 affectionateness1 or again1 constructiveness and play4 ,any given individual is naturally an erratic mixture of fierce insistence upon his own welfare and of profound susceptibility to the happiness of others--different individuals varying much in the respective intensities and proportions of the two tendencies4 #b4 ,the ,moral ,status of ,altruistic ,tendencies4--,we have expressly devoted considerable space 7ch4 xiii47 to showing that there are no motives which in and of themselves are right2 that any tendency1 whether original instinct or acquired habit1 requires sanction from the special consequences which1 in the special situation1 are likely to flow from it4 ,the mere fact that pity in general tends to conserve the welfare of others does not guarantee the rightness of giving way to an impulse of pity1 just as it happens to spring up4 ,this might mean sentimentalism for the agent1 and weakening of the springs of patience1 courage1 self-help1 and self-respect in others4 ,the persistence with which the doctrine of the evils of indiscriminate charity has to be taught is sufficient evidence that the so-called other-regarding impulses require the same control by reason as do the egoistic ones4 ,they have no inherent sacredness which exempts them from the application of the standard of the common and reasonable happiness4 ,evils of ,unregulated ,altruism4--,so much follows from the general principles already discussed4 ,but there are special dangers and evils attendant upon an exaggeration of the altruistic idea4 7i47 ,it tends to render others dependent1 and thus contradicts its own professed aim3 the helping of others4 ,almost every one knows some child who is so continuously helped by others1 that he loses his initiative and resourcefulness4 ,many an invalid is confirmed in a state of helplessness by the devoted attention of others4 ,in large social matters there is always danger of the substitution of an ideal of conscious benevolence for justice3 it is in aristocratic and feudal periods that the idea flourishes that charity 7conceived as conferring benefits upon others1 doing things for them7 is inherently and absolutely a good4 ,the idea assumes the continued and necessary existence of a dependent lower class to be the recipients of the kindness of their superiors2 a class which serves as passive material for the cultivation in others of the virtue of charity1 the higher class acquiring merit at expense of the lower1 while the lower has gratitude and respect for authority as its chief virtues4 7ii47 ,the erection of the benevolent impulse into a virtue in and of itself tends to build up egoism in others4 ,the child who finds himself unremittingly the object of attention from others is likely to develop an exaggerated sense of the relative importance of his own ego4 ,the chronic invalid1 conspicuously the recipient of the conscious altruism of others1 is happy in nature who avoids the slow growth of an insidious egoism4 ,men who are the constant subjects of abnegation on the part of their wives and female relatives rarely fail to develop a self-absorbed complacency and unconscious conceit4 7iii47 ,undue emphasis upon altruism as a motive is quite likely to react to form a peculiarly subtle egoism in the person who cultivates it4 ,others cease to be natural objects of interest and regard1 and are converted into excuses for the manifestation and nurture of one's own generous goodness4 ,underlying complacency with respect to social ills grows up because they afford an opportunity for developing and displaying this finest of virtues4 ,in our interest in the maintenance of our own benign altruism we cease to be properly disturbed by conditions which are intrinsically unjust and hateful4#ahj 7iv47 ,as present circumstances amply demonstrate1 there is the danger that the erection of benevolence into a conscious principle in some things will serve to supply rich persons with a cloak for selfishness in other directions4 ,philanthropy is made an offset and compensation for brutal exploitation4 ,a man who pushes to the breaking-point of legality aggressively selfish efforts to get ahead of others in business1 squares it in his own self-respect and in the esteem of those classes of the community who entertain like conceptions1 by gifts of hospitals1 colleges1 missions1 and libraries4 ,genuine and ,false ,altruism4--,these considerations may be met by the obvious retort that it is not true altruism1 genuine benevolence1 sincere charity1 which we are concerned with in such cases4 ,this is a true remark4 ,we are not of course criticizing true but spurious interest in others4 ,but why is it counterfeit8 ,what is the nature of the genuine article8 ,the danger is not in benevolence or altruism1 but in that conception of them which makes them equivalent to regard for others as others1 irrespective of a social situation to which all alike belong4 ,there is nothing in the selfhood of others1 because they are others1 which gives it any supremacy over selfhood in oneself4 ,just as it is exclusiveness of objective ends1 the ignoring of relations1 which is objectionable in selfishness1 so it is taking the part for the whole which is obnoxious in so-called altruism4 ,to include in our view of consequences the needs and possibilities of others on the same basis as our own1 is to take the only course which will give an adequate view of the situation4 ,there is no situation into which these factors do not enter4 ,to have a generous view of others is to have a larger world in which to act4 ,to remember that they1 like ourselves1 are persons1 are individuals who are centers of joy and suffering1 of lack and of potentiality1 is alone to have a just view of the conditions and issues of behavior4 ,quickened sympathy means liberality of intelligence and enlightened understanding4 ,the ,social ,sense versus ,altruism4--,there is a great difference in principle between modern philanthropy and the charity which assumes a superior and an inferior class4 ,the latter principle tries to acquire merit by employing one's superior resources to lessen1 or to mitigate1 the misery of those who are fixed in a dependent status4 ,its principle1 so far as others are concerned1 is negative and palliative merely4 ,the motive of what is vital in modern philanthropy is constructive and expansive because it looks to the well-being of society as a whole1 not to soothing or rendering more tolerable the conditions of a class4 ,it realizes the interdependence of interests3 that complex and variegated interaction of conditions which makes it impossible for any one individual or class really to secure1 to assure1 its own good as a separate thing4 ,its aim is general social advance1 constructive social reform1 not merely doing something kind for individuals who are rendered helpless from sickness or poverty4 ,its aim is the equity of justice1 not the inequality of conferring benefits4 ,that the sight of the misery that comes from sickness1 from insanity1 from defective organic structure 7as among the blind and deaf71 from poverty that destroys hope and dulls initiative1 from bad nutrition1 should stimulate this general quickening of the social sense is natural4 ,but just as the activities of the parent with reference to the welfare of a helpless infant are wisely directed in the degree in which attention is mainly fixed not upon weakness1 but upon positive opportunities for growth1 so the efforts of those whose activities1 by the nature of circumstances1 have to be especially remedial and palliative are most effective when centered on the social rights and possibilities of the unfortunate individuals1 instead of treating them as separate individuals to whom1 in their separateness1 good is to be done4 ,the best kind of help to others1 whenever possible1 is indirect1 and consists in such modifications of the conditions of life1 of the general level of subsistence1 as enables them independently to help themselves4#aha ,whenever conditions require purely direct and personal aid1 it is best given when it proceeds from a natural social relationship1 and not from a motive of benevolence as a separate force4#ahb ,the gift that pauperizes when proceeding from a philanthropist in his special capacity1 is a beneficent acknowledgment of the relationships of the case when it comes from a neighbor or from one who has other interests in common with the one assisted4 ,the ,private and the ,social ,self4--,the contrast between the narrow or restrictive and the general or expansive good explains why evil presents itself as a selfish end in contrast with an authoritative1 but faint1 good of others4 ,this is not1 as we have seen1 because regard for the good of self is inherently bad and regard for that of others intrinsically right2 but because we are apt to identify the self with the habitual1 with that to which we are best adjusted and which represents the customary occupation4 ,any moral crisis is thus fairly pictured as a struggle to overcome selfishness4 ,the tendency under such circumstances is to contract1 to secrete1 to hang on to what is already achieved and possessed4 ,the habitual self needs to go out of the narrowness of its accustomed grooves into the spacious air of more generous behavior4 ,sec4 #d4 ,,the ,,good ,,as ,,self-,,realization ,we now come to the theory which attempts to do justice to the one-sided truths we have been engaged with1 viz41 the idea that the moral end is self-realization4 ,like self-assertion in some respects1 it differs in conceiving the self to be realized as universal and ultimate1 involving the fulfillment of all capacities and the observance of all relations4 ,such a comprehensive self-realization includes also1 it is urged1 the truth of altruism1 since the universal self is realized only when the relations that bind one to others are fulfilled4 ,it avoids also the inconsistencies and defects of the notion of self-sacrifice for its own sake1 while emphasizing that the present incomplete self must be denied for the sake of attainment of a more complete and final self4 ,a discussion of this theory accordingly furnishes the means of gathering together and summarizing various points regarding the role of the self in the moral life4 ,ambiguity in the ,conception4--,is self-realization the end8 ,as we have had such frequent occasion to observe1 end means either the consequences actually effected1 the closing and completing phase of an act1 or the aim held deliberately in view4 ,now realization of self is an end 7though not the only end7 in the former sense4 ,every moral act in its outcome marks a development or fulfillment of selfhood4 ,but the very nature of right action forbids that the self should be the end in the sense of being the conscious aim of moral activity4 ,for there is no way of discovering the nature of the self except in terms of objective ends which fulfill its capacities1 and there is no way of realizing the self except as it is forgotten in devotion to these objective ends4 #a4 ,self-,realization as ,consequence of ,moral ,action4--,every good act realizes the selfhood of the agent who performs it2 every bad act tends to the lowering or destruction of selfhood4 ,this truth is expressed in ,kant's maxim that every personality should be regarded as always an end1 never as a means1 with its implication that a wrong intent always reduces selfhood to the status of a mere tool or device for securing some end beyond itself--the self-indulgent man treating his personal powers as mere means to securing ease1 comfort1 or pleasure4 ,it is expressed by ordinary moral judgment in its view that all immoral action is a sort of prostitution1 a lowering of the dignity of the self to base ends4 ,the destructive tendency of evil deeds is witnessed also by our common language in its conception of wrong as dissipation1 dissoluteness1 duplicity4 ,the bad character is one which is shaky1 empty1 naughty1 unstable1 gone to pieces1 just as the good man is straight1 solid1 four-square1 sound1 substantial4 ,this conviction that at bottom and in the end1 in spite of all temporary appearance to the contrary1 the right act effects a realization of the self1 is also evidenced in the common belief that virtue brings its own bliss4 ,no matter how much suffering from physical loss or from material and mental inconvenience or loss of social repute virtue may bring with it1 the quality of happiness that accompanies devotion to the right end is so unique1 so invaluable1 that pains and discomforts do not weigh in the balance4 ,it is indeed possible to state this truth in such an exaggerated perspective that it becomes false2 but taken just for what it is1 it acknowledges that whatever harm or loss a right act may bring to the self in some of its aspects1--even extending to destruction of the bodily self1--the inmost moral self finds fulfillment and consequent happiness in the good4 #b4 ,self-,realization as ,aim of ,moral ,action4--,this realization of selfhood in the right course of action is1 however1 not the end of a moral act--that is1 it is not the only end4 ,the moral act is one which sustains a whole complex system of social values2 one which keeps vital and progressive the industrial order1 science1 art1 and the ,state4 ,the patriot who dies for his country may find in that devotion his own supreme realization1 but none the less the aim of his act is precisely that for which he performs it3 the conservation of his nation4 ,he dies for his country1 not for himself4 ,he is what he would be in dying for his country1 not in dying for himself4 ,to say that his conscious aim is self-realization is to put the cart before the horse4 ,that his willingness to die for his country proves that his country's good is taken by him to constitute himself and his own good is true2 but his aim is his country's good as constituting his self-realization1 not the self-realization4 ,it is impossible that genuine artistic creation or execution should not be accompanied with the joy of an expanding selfhood1 but the artist who thinks of himself and allows a view of himself to intervene between his performance and its result1 has the embarrassment and awkwardness of self-consciousness1 which affects for the worse his artistic product4 ,and it makes little difference whether it is the thought of himself as materially profiting1 or as famous1 or as technical performer1 or as benefiting the public1 or as securing his own complete artistic culture1 that comes in between4 ,in any case1 there is loss to the work1 and loss in the very thing taken as end1 namely1 development of his own powers4 ,the problem of morality1 upon the intellectual side1 is the discovery of1 the finding of1 the self1 in the objective end to be striven for2 and then upon the overt practical side1 it is the losing of the self in the endeavor for the objective realization4 ,this is the lasting truth in the conception of self-abnegation1 self-forgetfulness1 disinterested interest4 ,the ,thought of ,self-,realization4--,since1 however1 the realization of selfhood1 the strengthening and perfecting of capacity1 is as matter of fact one phase of the objective end1 it may1 at times1 be definitely present in thought as part of the foreseen consequences2 and even1 at times1 may be the most prominent feature of the conceived results4 ,the artist1 for example a musician or painter1 may practice for the sake of acquiring skill1 that is1 of developing capacity4 ,in this case1 the usual relationship of objective work and personal power is reversed2 the product or performance being subordinated to the perfecting of power1 instead of power being realized in the use it is put to4 ,but the development of power is not conceived as a final end1 but as desirable because of an eventual more liberal and effective use4 ,it is matter of temporary emphasis4 ,something of like nature occurs in the moral life--not that one definitely rehearses or practices moral deeds for the sake of acquiring more skill and power4 ,at times the effect upon the self of a deed becomes the conspicuously controlling element in the forecast of consequences4 7,see p4 #chb47 ,for example1 a person may realize that a certain act is trivial in its effects upon others and in the changes it impresses upon the world2 and yet he may hesitate to perform it because he realizes it would intensify some tendency of his own in such a way as1 in the delicate economy of character1 to disturb the proper balance of the springs to action4 ,or1 on the other hand1 the agent may apprehend that some consequences that are legitimate and important in themselves involve1 in their attainment1 an improper sacrifice of personal capacity4 ,in such cases1 the consideration of the effect upon self-realization is not only permissible1 but imperative as a part or phase of the total end4 ,the ,problem of ,equating ,personal and ,general ,happiness4--,much moral speculation has been devoted to the problem of equating personal happiness and regard for the general good4 ,right moral action1 it is assumed1 consists especially of justice and benevolence1--attitudes which aim at the good of others4 ,but1 it is also assumed1 a just and righteous order of the universe requires that the man who seeks the happiness of others should also himself be a happy man4 ,much ingenuity has been directed to explaining away and accounting for the seeming discrepancies3 the cases where men not conspicuous for regard for others or for maintaining a serious and noble view of life seem to maintain a banking-credit on the side of happiness2 while men devoted to others1 men conspicuous for range of sympathetic affections1 seem to have a debit balance4 ,the problem is the more serious because the respective good and ill fortunes do not seem to be entirely accidental and external1 but to come as results from the moral factors in behavior4 ,it would not be difficult to build up an argument to show that while extreme viciousness or isolated egoism is unfavorable to happiness1 so also are keenness and breadth of affections4 ,the argument would claim that the most comfortable course of life is one in which the man cultivates enough intimacies with enough persons to secure for himself their support and aid1 but avoids engaging his sympathies too closely in their affairs and entangling himself in any associations which would require self-sacrifice or exposure to the sufferings of others3 a course of life in which the individual shuns those excesses of vice which injure health1 wealth1 and lessen the decent esteem of others1 but also shuns enterprises of precarious virtue and devotion to high and difficult ends4 ,real and ,artificial ,aspects of the ,problem4--,the problem thus put seems insoluble1 or soluble only upon the supposition of some prolongation of life under conditions very different from those of the present1 in which the present lack of balance between happiness and goodness will be redressed4 ,but the problem is insoluble because it is artificial4#ahc ,it assumes a ready-made self and hence a ready-made type of satisfaction of happiness4 ,it is not the business of moral theory to demonstrate the existence of mathematical equations1 in this life or another one1 between goodness and virtue4 ,it is the business of men to develop such capacities and desires1 such selves as render them capable of finding their own satisfaction1 their invaluable value1 in fulfilling the demands which grow out of their associated life4 ,such happiness may be short in duration and slight in bulk3 but that it outweighs in quality all accompanying discomforts as well as all enjoyments which may have been missed by not doing something else1 is attested by the simple fact that men do consciously choose it4 ,such a person has found himself1 and has solved the problem in the only place and in the only way in which it can be solved3 in action4 ,to demand in advance of voluntary desire and deliberate choice that it be demonstrated that an individual shall get happiness in the measure of the rightness of his act1 is to demand the obliteration of the essential factor in morality3 the constant discovery1 formation1 and reformation of the self in the ends which an individual is called upon to sustain and develop in virtue of his membership in a social whole4 ,the solution of the problem through the individual's voluntary identification of himself with social relations and aims is neither rare nor utopian4 ,it is achieved not only by conspicuous social figures1 but by multitudes of obscure figures who are faithful to the callings of their social relationships and offices4 ,that the conditions of life for all should be enlarged1 that wider opportunities and richer fields of activity should be opened1 in order that happiness may be of a more noble and variegated sort1 that those inequalities of status which lead men to find their advantage in disregard of others should be destroyed--these things are indeed necessary4 ,but under the most ideal conditions which can be imagined1 if there remain any moral element whatsoever1 it will be only through personal deliberation and personal preference as to objective and social ends that the individual will discover and constitute himself1 and hence discover the sort of happiness required as his good4 ,our final word about the place of the self in the moral life is1 then1 that the problem of morality is the formation1 out of the body of original instinctive impulses which compose the natural self1 of a voluntary self in which socialized desires and affections are dominant1 and in which the last and controlling principle of deliberation is the love of the objects which will make this transformation possible4 ,if we identify1 as we must do1 the interests of such a character with the virtues1 we may say with ,spinoza that happiness is not the reward of virtue1 but is virtue itself4 ,what1 then1 are the virtues8 ,,literature ,for asceticism1 see ,lecky1 ,history of ,european ,morals4 ,for self-denial1 ,mackenzie1 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,v41 pp4 #bgc-bie4 ,for egoism and altruism3 ,comte1 ,system of ,positive ,politics1 ,introduction1 ch4 iii41 and ,part ,,ii41 ch4 ii42 ,spencer1 ,principles of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,i41 ,part ,i41 chs4 xi4-xiv42 ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 ch4 vi42 ,paulsen1 ,system of ,ethics1 pp4 #cgi-cii2 ,sorley1 ,recent ,tendencies in ,ethics2 ,sidgwick1 ,methods of ,ethics1 pp4 #did-ejg4 ,for the doctrine of self-interest1 see ,mandeville1 ,fable of ,bees2 ,sidgwick1 ,methods of ,ethics1 ,book ,i41 ch4 vii41 and ,book ,,ii41 ch4 v42 ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 ch4 x42 ,martineau1 ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 ,part ,,ii41 ,book ,,ii41 ,branch ,i41 ch4 i42 ,fite1 ,introductory ,study1 ch4 ii4 ,for historic development of sympathy1 see ,sutherland1 ,origin and ,growth of the ,moral ,instinct4 ,for the doctrine of self-realization1 see ,aristotle1 ,ethics2 ,green1 ,prolegomena to ,ethics2 ,seth1 ,principles of ,ethics1 ,part ,i41 ch4 iii42 ,bradley1 ,ethical ,studies1 ,essay ,,ii42 ,fite1 ,introductory ,study1 ch4 xi42 ,paulsen1 ,system of ,ethics1 ,book ,,ii41 ch4 i42 ,taylor1 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,,vi41 pp4 #cef-cga2 ,palmer1 ,the ,heart of ,ethics1 and ,the ,nature of ,goodness2 ,calderwood1 ,philosophical ,review1 ,vol4 ,v41 pp4 #ccg-cea2 ,dewey1 ,philosophical ,review1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #feb-ffd2 ,bryant1 ,studies in ,character1 pp4 #ig-aag4 ,for the ethics of success1 besides the writings of ,nietzsche1 see ,plato1 ,gorgias and ,republic1 ,book ,i41 and ,sumner1 ,folkways1 ch4 xx4 ,for the social self3 ,cooley1 ,human ,nature and the ,social ,order1 chs4 v4 and vi42 for the antagonistic self1 chs4 vii4-ix4 ,for a general discussion of the ,moral ,self1 see ,bosanquet1 ,psychology of the ,moral ,self2 ,ladd1 ,philosophy of ,conduct1 ch4 ix4 7see also ch4 xviii4 on the ,good ,man74 ,,footnotes3 #agj ,compare the opening words of ,emerson's ,essay on ,compensation4 #aga ,the principle of a higher law for the few who are leaders was first explicitly asserted in modern thought by ,machiavelli4 #agb ,some phases of the writings of ,nietzsche supply relevant material for this sketch4 ,see especially his ,will for ,power1 ,beyond ,good and ,evil1 and such statements as3 ,the loss of force which suffering has already brought upon life is still further increased and multiplied by sympathy4 ,suffering itself becomes contagious through sympathy 7overlooking the reaction of sympathy to abolish the source of suffering and thus increase force74 ,sympathy thwarts1 on the whole1 in general1 the law of development1 which is the law of selection4--,works1 ,vol4 ,,xi41 p4 #bdb4 #agc ,this phase of the matter has been brought out 7possibly with some counter-exaggeration7 by ,kropotkin in his ,mutual ,aid4 #agd ,spencer puts the matter truly1 if ponderously1 in the following3 ,the citizens of a large nation industrially organized1 have reached their possible ideal of happiness when the producing1 distributing and other activities1 are such in their kinds and amounts1 that each individual finds in them a place for all his energies and aptitudes1 while he obtains the means of satisfying all his desires4 ,once more we may recognize as not only possible1 but probable1 the eventual existence of a community1 also industrial1 the members of which1 having natures similarly responding to these requirements1 are also characterized by dominant aesthetic faculties1 and achieve complete happiness only when a large part of life is filled with aesthetic activities 7,principles of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,i41 p4 #afi74 #age ,machiavelli1 transferring from theology to statecraft the notion of the corruption and selfishness of all men1 was the first modern to preach this doctrine4 #agf ,see1 for example1 ,hobbes1 ,leviathan2 ,mandeville1 ,fable of the ,bees2 and ,rochefoucauld1 ,maxims4 #agg ,compare what was said above1 p4 #bgc1 on the confusion of pleasure as end1 and as motive4 ,compare also the following from ,leslie ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #bda4 ,it is often insinuated that ,i dislike your pain because it is painful to me in some special relation4 ,i do not dislike it as your pain1 but in virtue of some particular consequence1 such1 for example1 as its making you less able to render me a service4 ,in that case ,i do not really object to your pain as your pain at all1 but only to some removable and accidental consequences4 ,the entire discussion of sympathy 7pp4 #bcj-bde71 which is admirable1 should be consulted4 #agh ,psychology1 ,vol4 ,i41 p4 #cbj4 ,the whole discussion1 pp4 #cag-cbi1 is very important4 #agi ,see1 for example1 ,james1 ,principles of ,psychology1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 ch4 xxiv4 #ahj ,measures of public or state activity in the extension1 for example1 of education 7furnishing free text-books1 adequate medical inspection1 and remedy of defects71 are opposed by good people because there are charitable agencies for doing these things4 #aha ,compare ,spencer's criticisms of ,bentham's view of happiness as a social standard in contrast with his own ideal of freedom4 ,see ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #afb-afh4 #ahb ,see ,addams1 ,democracy and ,social ,ethics1 ch4 ii4 #ahc ,compare the following extreme words of ,sumner 7,folkways1 p4 #i73 ,the great question of world philosophy always has been1 what is the real relation between happiness and goodness8 ,it is only within a few generations that men have found courage to say there is none4 ,but when ,sumner1 in the next sentence1 says1 ,the whole strength of the notion that they are correlated is in the opposite experience which proves that no evil thing brings happiness1 one may well ask what more relation any reasonable man would want4 ,for it indicates that goodness consists in active interest in those things which really bring happiness2 and while it by no means follows that this interest will bring even a preponderance of pleasure over pain to the person1 it is always open to him to find and take his dominant happiness in making this interest dominant in his life4 ,,chapter ,,xix ,,the ,,virtues ,,introductory ,definition of ,virtue4--,it is upon the self1 upon the agent1 that ultimately falls the burden of maintaining and of extending the values which make life reasonable and good4 ,the worth of science1 of art1 of industry1 of relationship of man and wife1 parent and child1 teacher and pupil1 friend and friend1 citizen and ,state1 exists only as there are characters consistently interested in such goods4 ,hence any trait of character which makes for these goods is esteemed2 it is given positive value2 while any disposition of selfhood found to have a contrary tendency is condemned--has negative value4 ,the habits of character whose effect is to sustain and spread the rational or common good are virtues2 the traits of character which have the opposite effect are vices4 ,virtue and ,approbation2 ,vice and ,condemnation4--,the approbation and disapprobation visited upon conduct are never purely intellectual4 ,they are also emotional and practical4 ,we are stirred to hostility at whatever disturbs the order of society2 we are moved to admiring sympathy of whatever makes for its welfare4 ,and these emotions express themselves in appropriate conduct4 ,to disapprove and dislike is to reprove1 blame1 and punish4 ,to approve is to encourage1 to aid1 and support4 ,hence the judgments express the character of the one who utters them--they are traits of his conduct and character2 and they react into the character of the agent upon whom they are directed4 ,they are part of the process of forming character4 ,the commendation is of the nature of a reward calculated to confirm the person in the right course of action4 ,the reprobation is of the nature of punishment1 fitted to dissuade the agent from the wrong course4 ,this encouragement and blame are not necessarily of an external sort2 the reward and the punishment may not be in material things4 ,it is not from ulterior design that society esteems and respects those attributes of an agent which tend to its own peace and welfare2 it is from natural1 instinctive response to acknowledge whatever makes for its good4 ,none the less1 the social esteem1 the honor which attend certain acts inevitably educate the individual who performs these acts1 and they strengthen1 emotionally and practically1 his interest in the right4 ,similarly1 there is an instinctive reaction of society against an infringement of its customs and ideals2 it naturally makes it hot for any one who disturbs its values4 ,and this disagreeable attention instructs the individual as to the consequences of his act1 and works to hinder the formation of dispositions of the socially disliked kind4 ,natural ,ability and ,virtue4--,there is a tendency to use the term virtue in an abstract moralistic sense--a way which makes it almost ,pharisaic in character4 ,hard and fast lines are drawn between certain traits of character labeled virtues and others called talents1 natural abilities1 or gifts of nature4 ,apart from deliberate or reflective nurture1 modesty or generosity is no less and no more a purely natural ability than is good-humor1 a turn for mechanics1 or presence of mind4 ,every natural capacity1 every talent or ability1 whether of inquiring mind1 of gentle affection or of executive skill1 becomes a virtue when it is turned to account in supporting or extending the fabric of social values2 and it turns1 if not to vice at least to delinquency1 when not thus utilized4 ,the important habits conventionally reckoned virtues are barren unless they are the cumulative assemblage of a multitude of anonymous interests and capacities4 ,such natural aptitudes vary widely in different individuals4 ,their endowments and circumstances occasion and exact different virtues1 and yet one person is not more or less virtuous than another because his virtues take a different form4 ,changes in ,virtues4--,it follows also that the meaning1 or content1 of virtues changes from time to time4 ,their abstract form1 the man's attitude towards the good1 remains the same4 ,but when institutions and customs change and natural abilities are differently stimulated and evoked1 ends vary1 and habits of character are differently esteemed both by the individual agent and by others who judge4 ,no social group could be maintained without patriotism and chastity1 but the actual meaning of chastity and patriotism is widely different in contemporary society from what it was in savage tribes or from what we may expect it to be five hundred years from now4 ,courage in one society may consist almost wholly in willingness to face physical danger and death in voluntary devotion to one's community2 in another1 it may be willingness to support an unpopular cause in the face of ridicule4 ,conventional and ,genuine ,virtue4--,when we take these social changes on a broad scale1 in the gross1 the point just made is probably clear without emphasis4 ,but we are apt to forget that minor changes are going on all the while4 ,the community's formulated code of esteem and regard and praise at any given time is likely to lag somewhat behind its practical level of achievement and possibility4 ,it is more or less traditional1 describing what used to be1 rather than what are1 virtues4 ,the respectable comes to mean tolerable1 passable1 conventional4 ,accordingly the prevailing scheme of assigning merit and blame1 while on the whole a mainstay of moral guidance and instruction1 is also a menace to moral growth4 ,hence men must look behind the current valuation to the real value4 ,otherwise1 mere conformity to custom is conceived to be virtue2#ahd and the individual who deviates from custom in the interest of wider and deeper good is censured4 ,moral ,responsibility for ,praise and ,blame4--,the practical assigning of value1 of blame and praise1 is a measure and exponent of the character of the one from whom it issues4 ,in judging others1 in commending and condemning1 we judge ourselves4 ,what we find to be praiseworthy and blameworthy is a revelation of our own affections4 ,very literally the measure we mete to others is meted to us4 ,to be free in our attributions of blame is to be censorious and uncharitable2 to be unresentful to evil is to be indifferent1 or interested perhaps chiefly in one's own popularity1 so that one avoids giving offense to others4 ,to engage profusely in blame and approbation in speech without acts which back up or attack the ends verbally honored or condemned1 is to have a perfunctory morality4 ,to cultivate complacency and remorse apart from effort to improve is to indulge in sentimentality4 ,in short1 to approve or to condemn is itself a moral act for which we are as much responsible as we are for any other deed4 ,impossibility of ,cataloguing ,virtues4--,these last three considerations3 7#a7 the intimate connection of virtues with all sorts of individual capacities and endowments1 7#b7 the change in types of habit required with change of social customs and institutions1 7#c7 the dependence of judgment of vice and virtue upon the character of the one judging1#ahe make undesirable and impossible a catalogued list of virtues with an exact definition of each4 ,virtues are numberless4 ,every situation1 not of a routine order1 brings in some special shading1 some unique adaptation1 of disposition4 ,twofold ,classification4--,we may1 however1 classify the chief institutions of social life--language1 scientific investigation1 artistic production1 industrial efficiency1 family1 local community1 nation1 humanity--and specify the types of mental disposition and interest which are fitted to maintain them flourishingly2 or1 starting from typical impulsive and instinctive tendencies1 we may consider the form they assume when they become intelligently exercised habits4 ,a virtue may be defined1 accordingly1 either as the settled intelligent identification of an agent's capacity with some aspect of the reasonable or common happiness2 or1 as a social custom or tendency organized into a personal habit of valuation4 ,from the latter standpoint1 truthfulness is the social institution of language maintained at its best pitch of efficiency through the habitual purposes of individuals2 from the former1 it is an instinctive capacity and tendency to communicate emotions and ideas directed so as to maintain social peace and prosperity4 ,in like fashion1 one might catalogue all forms of social custom and institution on one hand2 and all the species and varieties of individual equipment on the other1 and enumerate a virtue for each4 ,but the performance is so formal as not to amount to much4 ,aspects of ,virtue4--,any virtuous disposition of character exhibits1 however1 certain main traits1 a consideration of which will serve to review and summarize our analysis of the moral life4 ,i4 ,the ,interest ,must be ,entire or ,whole-hearted4--,the whole self1 without division or reservation1 must go out into the proposed object and find therein its own satisfaction4 ,virtue is integrity2 vice duplicity4 ,goodness is straight1 right2 badness is crooked1 indirect4 ,interest that is incomplete is not interest1 but 7so far as incomplete7 indifference and disregard4 ,this totality of interest we call affection1 love2 and love is the fulfilling of the law4 ,a grudging virtue is next to no virtue at all2 thorough heartiness in even a bad cause stirs admiration1 and lukewarmness in every direction is always despised as meaning lack of character4 ,surrender1 abandonment1 is of the essence of identification of self with an object4 ,,ii4 ,the ,interest ,must be ,energetic and ,hence ,persistent4--,one swallow does not make a summer nor a sporadic right act a virtuous habit4 ,fair-weather character has a proverbially bad name4 ,endurance through discouragement1 through good repute and ill1 weal and woe1 tests the vigor of interest in the good1 and both builds up and expresses a formed character4 ,,iii4 ,the ,interest ,must be ,pure or ,sincere4--,honesty is1 doubtless1 the best policy1 and it is better a man should be honest from policy than not honest at all4 ,if genuinely honest from considerations of prudence1 he is on the road to learn better reasons for honesty4 ,none the less1 we are suspicious of a man if we believe that motives of personal profit are the only stay of his honesty4 ,for circumstances might arise in which1 in the exceptional case1 it would be clear that personal advantage lay in dishonesty4 ,the motive for honesty would hold in most cases1 in ordinary and routine circumstances and in the glare of publicity1 but not in the dark of secrecy1 or in the turmoil of disturbed circumstance4 ,the eye single to the good1 the disinterested interest of moralists1 is required4 ,the motive that has to be coaxed or coerced to its work by some promise or threat is imperfect4 ,cardinal or ,indispensable ,aspects of ,virtue4--,bearing in mind that we are not attempting to classify various acts or habits1 but only to state traits essential to all morality1 we have the cardinal virtues of moral theory4 ,as whole-hearted1 as complete interest1 any habit or attitude of character involves justice and love2 as persistently active1 it is courage1 fortitude1 or vigor2 as unmixed and single1 it is temperance--in its classic sense4 ,and since no habitual interest can be integral1 enduring1 or sincere1 save as it is reasonable1 save1 that is1 as it is rooted in the deliberate habit of viewing the part in the light of the whole1 the present in the light of the past and future1 interest in the good is also wisdom or conscientiousness3--interest in the discovery of the true good of the situation4 ,without this interest1 all our interest is likely to be perverted and misleading--requiring to be repented of4 ,wisdom1 or 7in modern phrase7 conscientiousness1 is the nurse of all the virtues4 ,our most devoted courage is in the will to know the good and the fair by unflinching attention to the painful and disagreeable4 ,our severest discipline in self-control is that which checks the exorbitant pretensions of an appetite by insisting upon knowing it in its true proportions4 ,the most exacting justice is that of an intelligence which gives due weight to each desire and demand in deliberation before it is allowed to pass into overt action4 ,that affection and wisdom lie close to each other is evidenced by our language2 thoughtfulness1 regard1 consideration for others1 recognition of others1 attention to others4 ,sec4 #a4 ,,temperance ,the ,english word temperance 7particularly in its local association with agitation regarding use of intoxicating liquors7 is a poor substitute for the ,greek sophrosyne which1 through the ,latin temperantia1 it represents4 ,the ,athenian ,greek was impressed with the fact that just as there are lawless1 despotically ruled1 and self-governed communities1 so there are lawless1 and servile1 and self-ruled individuals4 ,whenever there is a self-governed soul1 there is a happy blending of the authority of reason with the force of appetite4 ,the individual's diverse nature is tempered into a living harmony of desire and intelligence4 ,reason governs not as a tyrant from without1 but as a guide to which the impulses and emotions are gladly responsive4 ,such a well-attuned nature1 as far from asceticism on one side as from random indulgence on the other1 represented the ideal of what was fair and graceful in character1 an ideal embodied in the notion of sophrosyne4 ,this was a whole-mindedness which resulted from the happy furtherance of all the elements of human nature under the self-accepted direction of intelligence4 ,it implied an aesthetic view of character2 of harmony in structure and rhythm in action4 ,it was the virtue of judgment exercised in the estimate of pleasures3--since it is the agreeable1 the pleasant1 which gives an end excessive hold upon us4 ,roman ,temperantia4--,the ,roman conceived this virtue under the term temperantia1 which conveys the same idea1 but accommodated to the ,roman genius4 ,it is connected with the word tempus1 time1 which is connected also with a root meaning divide1 distribute2 it suggests a consecutive orderliness of behavior1 a freedom from excessive and reckless action1 first this way1 and then that4 ,it means seemliness1 decorum1 decency4 ,it was moderation1 not as quantity of indulgence1 but as a moderating of each act in a series by the thought of other and succeeding acts--keeping each in sequence with others in a whole4 ,the idea of time involves time to think2 the sobering second thought expressed in seriousness and gravity4 ,the negative side1 the side of restraint1 of inhibition1 is strong1 and functions for the consistent calm and gravity of life4 ,christian ,purity4--,through the ,christian influence1 the connotation which is marked in the notion of control of sexual appetite1 became most obvious--purity4 ,passion is not so much something which disturbs the harmony of man's nature1 or which interrupts its orderliness1 as it is something which defiles the purity of spiritual nature4 ,it is the grossness1 the contamination of appetite which is insisted upon1 and temperance is the maintenance of the soul spotless and unsullied4 ,negative ,phase3--,self-control4 ,a negative aspect of self-control1 restraint1 inhibition is everywhere involved4#ahf ,it is not1 however1 desire1 or appetite1 or passion1 or impulse1 which has to be checked 7much less eliminated72 it is rather that tendency of desire and passion so to engross attention as to destroy our sense of the other ends which have a claim upon us4 ,this moderation of pretension is indispensable for every desire4 ,in one direction1 it is modesty1 humility2 the restraint of the tendency of self-conceit to distort the relative importance of the agent's and others' concerns2 in another direction1 it is chastity2 in another1 temperance in the narrower sense of that word--keeping the indulgence of hunger and thirst from passing reasonable bounds2 in another1 it is calmness1 self-possession--moderation of the transporting power of excitement2 in yet another1 it is discretion1 imposing limits upon the use of the hand1 eye1 or tongue4 ,in matters of wealth1 it is decent regulation of display and ostentation4 ,in general1 it is prudence1 control of the present impulse and desire by a view of the long run1 of proximate by remote consequences4#ahg ,positive ,phase3 ,reverence4--,the tendency of dominant passion is to rush us along1 to prevent our thinking4 ,the one thing that desire emphasizes is1 for the time being1 the most important thing in the universe4 ,this is necessary to heartiness and effectiveness of interest and behavior4 ,but it is important that the thing which thus absorbs desire should be an end capable of justifying its power to absorb4 ,this is possible only if it expresses the entire self4 ,otherwise capacities and desires which will occur later will be inconsistent and antagonistic1 and conduct will be unregulated and unstable4 ,the underlying idea in temperance is then a care of details for the sake of the whole course of behavior of which they are parts2 heedfulness1 painstaking devotion4 ,laxness in conduct means carelessness2 lack of regard for the whole life permits temporary inclinations to get a sway that the outcome will not justify4 ,in its more striking forms1 we call this care and respect reverence2 recognition of the unique1 invaluable worth embodied in any situation or act of life1 a recognition which checks that flippancy of surrender to momentary excitement coming from a superficial view of behavior4 ,a sense of momentous issues at stake means a sobering and deepening of the mental attitude4 ,the consciousness that every deed of life has an import clear beyond its immediate1 or first significance1 attaches dignity to every act4 ,to live in the sense of the larger values attaching to our passing desires and deeds is to be possessed by the virtue of temperance4 ,control of ,excitement4--,what hinders such living is1 as we have seen1 the exaggerated intensity1 the lack of proportion and perspective1 with which any appetite or desire is likely to present itself4 ,it is this which moralists of all ages have attacked under the name of pleasure--the alluring and distracting power of the momentarily agreeable4 ,seeing in this the enemy which prevents the rational survey of the whole field and the calm1 steady insight into the true good1 it is hardly surprising that moralists have attacked pleasure as the source of every temptation to stray from the straight path of reason4 ,but it is not pleasure1 it is one form of pleasure1 the pleasure of excitement1 which is the obstacle and danger4#ahh ,every impulse and desire marks a certain disturbance in the order of life1 an exaltation above the existing level1 a pressure beyond its existing limit4 ,to give way to desire1 to let it grow1 to taste to the full its increasing and intensifying excitement1 is the temptation4 ,the bodily appetites of hunger and thirst and sex1 with which we associate the grossest forms of indulgence and laxity1 exemplify the principle of expanding waves of organic stimulation4 ,but so also do many of the subtler forms of unrestraint or intemperate action4 ,the one with a clever and lively tongue is tempted to let it run away with him2 the vain man feeds upon the excitement of a personality heightened by display and the notice of others2 the angry man1 even though he knows he will later regret his surrender1 gives away to the sense of expanding power coincident with his discharge of rage4 ,the shiftless person finds it easier to take chances and let consequences take care of themselves1 while he enjoys local and casual stimulations4 ,trivialities and superficialities entangle us in a flippant life1 because each one as it comes promises to be thrilling1 while the very fear that this promise will not be kept hurries us on to new experiences4 ,to think of alternatives and consequences is not thrilling1 but serious4 ,necessity of ,superior ,interest4--,now calculation of the utilitarian type is not adequate to deal with this temptation4 ,those who are prone to reflection upon results are just those who are least likely to be carried away by excitement--unless1 as is the case with some specialists1 thinking is itself the mode of indulgence in excitement4#ahi ,with those who are carried away habitually by some mode of excitement1 the disease and the incapacity to take the proffered remedy of reflection are the same thing4 ,only some other passion will accomplish the desired control4 ,with the ,greeks1 it was aesthetic passion1 love of the grace and beauty1 the rhythm and harmony1 of a self-controlled life4 ,with the ,romans1 it was the passion for dignity1 power1 honor of personality1 evidenced in rule of appetite4 ,both of these motives remain among the strong allies of ordered conduct4 ,but the passion for purity1 the sense of something degrading and foul in surrender to the base1 an interest in something spotless1 free from adulteration1 are1 in some form or other1 the chief resource in overcoming the tendency of excitement to usurp the governance of the self4#aij ,sec4 #b4 ,,courage#aia ,,or ,,persistent ,,vigor ,while love of excitement allures man from the path of reason1 fear of pain1 dislike to hardship1 and laborious effort1 hold him back from entering it4 ,dislike of the disagreeable inhibits or contracts the putting forth of energy1 just as liking for agreeable stimulation discharges and exhausts it4 ,intensity of active interest in the good alone subdues that instinctive shrinking from the unpleasant and hard which slackens energy or turns it aside4 ,such energy of devotion is courage4 ,its etymological connection with the ,latin word for heart1 suggests a certain abundant spontaneity1 a certain overflow of positive energy2 the word was applied to this aspect of virtue when the heart was regarded as literally 7not metaphorically7 the seat of vital impulse and abundant forcefulness4 ,courage and the ,common ,good4--,one of the problems of early ,greek thought was that of discriminating courage as virtuous from a sort of animal keenness and alacrity1 easily running into recklessness and bravado4 ,it was uniformly differentiated from mere overflow of physical energy by the fact that it was exhibited in support of some common or social good4 ,it bore witness to its voluntary character by abiding in the face of threatened evil4 ,its simplest form was patriotism--willingness to brave the danger of death in facing the country's enemy from love of country4 ,and this basic largeness of spirit in which the individual sinks considerations of personal loss and harm in allegiance to an objective good remains a cardinal aspect of all right disposition4 ,courage is ,preeminently the ,executive ,side of ,every ,virtue4--,the good will1 as we saw1 means endeavor1 effort1 towards certain ends2 unless the end stirs to strenuous exertion1 it is a sentimental1 not a moral or practical end4 ,and endeavor implies obstacles to overcome1 resistance to what diverts1 painful labor4 ,it is the degree of threatened harm--in spite of which one does not swerve--which measures this depth and sincerity of interest in the good4 ,aspects of ,interest in ,execution4--,certain formal traits of courage follow at once from this general definition4 ,in its onset1 willingness in behalf of the common good to endure attendant private evils is alacrity1 promptness4 ,in its abiding and unswerving devotion1 it is constancy1 loyalty1 and faithfulness4 ,in its continual resistance to evil1 it is fortitude1 patience1 perseverance1 willingness to abide for justification an ultimate issue4 ,the totality of commitment of self to the good is decision and firmness4 ,conviction and resolution accompany all true moral endeavor4 ,these various dimensions 7intensity1 duration1 extent1 and fullness7 are1 however1 only differing expressions of one and the same attitude of vigorous1 energetic identification of agency with the object4 ,goodness and ,effectiveness4--,it is the failure to give due weight to this factor of morality 7the works of theological discussion7 which is responsible for the not uncommon idea that moral goodness means loss of practical efficacy4 ,when inner disposition is severed from outer action1 wishing divorced from executive willing1 morality is reduced to mere harmlessness2 outwardly speaking1 the best that can then be said of virtue is that it is innocent and innocuous4 ,unscrupulousness is identified with energy of execution2 and a minute and paralyzing scrupulosity with goodness4 ,it is in reaction from such futile morality that the gospel of force and of shrewdness of selecting and adapting means to the desired end1 is preached and gains hearers--as in the ,italy of the ,renaissance#aib in reaction against mediaeval piety1 and again in our own day 7see ante1 p4 #cgd74 ,moral ,courage and ,optimism4--,a characteristic modern development of courageousness is implied in the phrase moral courage1--as if all genuine courage were not moral4 ,it means devotion to the good in the face of the customs of one's friends and associates1 rather than against the attacks of one's enemies4 ,it is willingness to brave for sake of a new idea of the good the unpopularity that attends breach of custom and convention4 ,it is this type of heroism1 manifested in integrity of memory and foresight1 which wins the characteristic admiration of to-day1 rather than the outward heroism of bearing wounds and undergoing physical dangers4 ,it is attention upon which the stress falls4#aic ,this supplies1 perhaps1 the best vantage point from which to survey optimism and pessimism in their direct moral bearings4 ,the individual whose pursuit of the good is colored by honest recognition of existing and threatening evils is almost always charged with being a pessimist2 with cynical delight in dwelling upon what is morbid1 base1 or sordid2 and he is urged to be an optimist1 meaning in effect to conceal from himself and others evils that obtain4 ,optimism1 thus conceived1 is a combination of building rosy-colored castles in the air and hiding1 ostrich-like1 from actual facts4 ,as a general thing1 it will be those who have some interest at stake in evils remaining unperceived1 and hence unremedied1 who most clamor in the cause of such optimism4 ,hope and aspiration1 belief in the supremacy of good in spite of all evil1 belief in the realizability of good in spite of all obstacles1 are necessary inspirations in the life of virtue4 ,the good can never be demonstrated to the senses1 nor be proved by calculations of personal profit4 ,it involves a radical venture of the will in the interest of what is unseen and prudentially incalculable4 ,but such optimism of will1 such determination of the man that1 so far as his choice is concerned1 only the good shall be recognized as real1 is very different from a sentimental refusal to look at the realities of the situation just as they are4 ,in fact a certain intellectual pessimism1 in the sense of a steadfast willingness to uncover sore points1 to acknowledge and search for abuses1 to note how presumed good often serves as a cloak for actual bad1 is a necessary part of the moral optimism which actively devotes itself to making the right prevail4 ,any other view reduces the aspiration and hope1 which are the essence of moral courage1 to a cheerful animal buoyancy2 and1 in its failure to see the evil done to others in its thoughtless pursuit of what it calls good1 is nextdoor to brutality1 to a brutality bathed in the atmosphere of sentimentality and flourishing the catchwords of idealism4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,justice ,in ,ethical ,literature ,justice ,has ,borne at ,least ,three ,different ,senses4#aid--;,in its widest sense1 it means righteousness1 uprightness1 rectitude4 ,it sums up morality4 ,it is not a virtue1 but it is virtue4 ,the just act is the due act2 justice is fulfillment of obligation4 7#b7 ,this passes over into fairness1 equity1 impartiality1 honesty in all one's dealing with others4 7#c7 ,the narrowest meaning is that of vindication of right through the administration of law4#aid ,since ,aristotle's time 7and following his treatment7 this has been divided into 7i47 the distributive1 having to do with the assignment of honor1 wealth1 etc41 in proportion to desert1 and 7ii47 the corrective1 vindicating the law against the transgressor by effecting a requital1 redress1 which restores the supremacy of law4 ,a ,thread of ,common ,significance ,runs through ,these ,various ,meanings4--,the rational good means a comprehensive or complete end1 in which are harmoniously included a variety of special aims and values4 ,the just man is the man who takes in the whole of a situation and reacts to it in its wholeness1 not being misled by undue respect to some particular factor4 ,since the general or inclusive good is a common or social good1 reconciling and combining the ends of a multitude of private or particular persons1 justice is the preeminently social virtue3 that which maintains the due order of individuals in the interest of the comprehensive or social unity4 ,justice1 as equity1 fairness1 impartiality1 honesty1 carries the recognition of the whole over into the question of right distribution and apportionment among its parts4 ,the equitable judge or administrator is the one who makes no unjustifiable distinctions among those dealt with4 ,a fair price is one which recognizes the rights of both buyer and seller4 ,an honest man is the one who1 with respect to whatever he has to distribute to others and to receive from them1 is desirous of giving and taking just what belongs to each party concerned4 ,the fair-minded man is not bribed by pleasure into giving undue importance to some element of good nor coerced by fear of pain into ignoring some other4 ,he distributes his attention1 regard1 and attachment according to the reasonable or objective claims of each factor4 ,justice and ,sympathy or ,love4--,the most significant questions regarding justice are as to its connection with love and with condemnation and punishment4 ,it is a common notion that justice is harsh or hard in its workings and that it requires to be supplemented1 if not replaced1 by mercy4 ,taken literally this would mean that justice is not just in its workings4 ,the truth contained is that what is frequently regarded as justice is not justice1 but an imperfect substitute for it4 ,when a legal type of morality is current1 justice is regarded as the working of some fixed and abstract law2 it is the law as law which is to be reverenced2 it is law as law whose majesty is to be vindicated4 ,it is forgotten that the nobility and dignity of law are due to the place of law in securing the order involved in the realization of human happiness4 ,then the law instead of being a servant of the good is put arbitrarily above it1 as if man was made for law1 not law for man4 ,the result is inevitably harshness2 indispensable factors of happiness are ruthlessly slighted1 or ruled out2 the loveliness and grace of behavior responding freely and flexibly to the requirements of unique situations are stiffened into uniformity4 ,the formula summum jus summa injuria expresses the outcome when abstract law is insisted upon without reference to the needs of concrete cases4 ,under such conditions1 there arises a demand for tempering the sternness of justice with mercy1 and supplementing the severity of law with grace4 ,this demand means that the neglected human values shall be restored into the idea of what is just4 ,social ,justice4--,our own time has seen a generous quickening of the idea of social justice due to the growth of love1 or philanthropy1 as a working social motive4 ,in the older scheme of morals1 justice was supposed to meet all the necessary requirements of virtue2 charity was doing good in ways not obligatory or strictly exacted4 ,hence it was a source of peculiar merit in the doer1 a means of storing up a surplus of virtue to offset vice4 ,but a more generous sense of inherent social relationships binding the aims of all into one comprehensive good1 which is the result of increase of human intercourse1 democratic institutions1 and biological science1 has made men recognize that the greater part of the sufferings and miseries which afford on the part of a few the opportunity for charity 7and hence superior merit71 are really social inequities1 due to causes which may be remedied4 ,that justice requires radical improvement of these conditions displaces the notion that their effects may be here and there palliated by the voluntary merit of morally superior individuals4 ,the change illustrates1 on a wide scale1 the transformation of the conception of justice so that it joins hands with love and sympathy4 ,that human nature should have justice done it under all circumstances is an infinitely complicated and difficult requirement1 and only a vision of the capacities and accomplishments of human beings rooted in affection and sympathy can perceive and execute justly4 ,transformation of ,punitive ,justice4--,the conception of punitive or corrective justice is undergoing the same transformation4 ,aristotle stated the rule of equity in the case of wrongdoing as an arithmetical requital3 the individual was to suffer according to his deed4 ,later1 through conjunction with the idea of a divine judge inflicting retribution upon the sinner1 this notion passed into the belief that punishment is a form of justice restoring the balance of disturbed law by inflicting suffering upon the one who has done wrong4 ,the end and aim of punishment was retribution1 bringing back to the agent the evil consequences of his own deed4 ,that punishment is suffering1 that it inevitably involves pain to the guilty one1 there can be no question2 this1 whether the punishment is externally inflicted or is in the pangs of conscience1 and whether administered by parent1 teacher1 or civil authority4 ,but that suffering is for the sake of suffering1 or that suffering can in any way restore or affect the violated majesty of law1 is a different matter4 ,what erring human nature deserves or merits1 it is just it should have4 ,but in the end1 a moral agent deserves to be a moral agent2 and hence deserves that punishments inflicted should be corrective1 not merely retributive4 ,every wrongdoer should have his due4 ,but what is his due8 ,can we measure it by his past alone2 or is it due every one to regard him as a man with a future as well8 as having possibilities for good as well as achievements in bad8 ,those who are responsible for the infliction of punishment have1 as well as those punished1 to meet the requirements of justice2 and failure to employ the means and instrumentalities of punishment in a way to lead1 so far as possible1 the wrongdoer to reconsideration of conduct and re-formation of disposition1 cannot shelter itself under the plea that it vindicates law4 ,such failure comes rather from thoughtless custom2 from a lazy unwillingness to find better means2 from an admixture of pride with lack of sympathy for others2 from a desire to maintain things as they are rather than go to the causes which generate criminals4 ,sec4 #d4 ,,wisdom ,,or ,,conscientiousness ,as we have repeatedly noted1 the heart of a voluntary act is its intelligent or deliberate character4 ,the individual's intelligent concern for the good is implied in his sincerity1 his faithfulness1 and his integrity4 ,of all the habits which constitute the character of an individual1 the habit of judging moral situations is the most important1 for this is the key to the direction and to the remaking of all other habits4 ,when an act is overt1 it is irretrievably launched4 ,the agent has no more control4 ,the moral life has its center in the periods of suspended and postponed action1 when the energy of the individual is spent in recollection and foresight1 in severe inquiry and serious consideration of alternative aims4 ,only through reflection can habits1 however good in their origin and past exercise1 be readapted to the needs of the present2 only through reflection can impulses1 not yet having found direction1 be guided into the haven of a reasonable happiness4 ,greek ,emphasis upon ,insight or ,wisdom4--,it is not surprising that the ,greeks1 the first seriously to inquire into the nature of behavior and its end or good1 should have eulogized wisdom1 insight1 as the supreme virtue and the source of all the virtues4 ,now1 indeed1 it seems paradoxical to say with ,socrates that ignorance is the only vice2 that man is bad not voluntarily1 from deliberate choice1 but only from ignorance4 ,but this is largely because we discriminate between different kinds of knowledge as the ,greek did not1 and as they had no occasion for doing4 ,we have a second-hand knowledge1 a knowledge from books1 newspapers1 etc41 which was practically non-existent even in the best days of ,athens4 ,knowledge meant to them something more personal2 something like what we call a realizing sense2 an intimate and well-founded conviction4 ,to us knowledge suggests information about what others have found out1 and hence is more remote in its meaning4 ,greek knowledge was mostly directly connected with the affairs of their common associated life4 ,the very words for knowledge and art1 understanding and skill1 were hardly separated4 ,knowledge was knowledge about the city1 its traditions1 literature1 history1 customs1 purposes1 etc4 ,their astronomy was connected with their civic religion2 their geography with their own topography2 their mathematics with their civil and military pursuits4 ,now we have immense bodies of impersonal knowledge1 remote from direct bearing upon affairs4 ,knowledge has accordingly subdivided itself into theoretical or scientific and practical or moral4 ,we use the term knowledge usually only for the first kind2 hence the ,socratic position seems gratuitously paradoxical4 ,but under the titles of conscience and conscientiousness we preserve the meaning which was attached to the term knowledge4 ,it is not paradoxical to say that unconscientiousness is the fundamental vice1 and genuine conscientiousness is guarantee of all virtue4 ,conscientiousness4--,in this change from ,greek wisdom to modern conscientiousness there have been some loss and some gain4 ,the loss lies in a certain hardening of the idea of insight and deliberation1 due to the isolation of the moral good from the other goods of life4 ,the good man and the bad man have been endowed with the same faculty2 and this faculty has been treated as automatically delivering correct conclusions4 ,on the other hand1 modern conscientiousness contains less of the idea of intellectual accomplishment1 and more of the idea of interest in finding out the good in conduct4 ,wisdom tended to emphasize achieved insight2 knowledge which was proved1 guaranteed1 and unchangeable4 ,conscientiousness tends rather to fix attention upon that voluntary attitude which is interested in discovery4 ,this implies a pretty radical change in wisdom as virtue4 ,in the older sense it is an attainment2 something possessed4 ,in the modern1 it resides in the active desire and effort1 in pursuit rather than in possession4 ,the attainment of knowledge varies with original intellectual endowment2 with opportunity for leisurely reflection2 with all sorts of external conditions4 ,possession is a class idea and tends to mark off a moral aristocracy from a common herd4 ,since the activities of the latter must be directed1 on this assumption1 by attained knowledge1 its practical outcome is the necessity of the regulation of their conduct by the wisdom possessed by the superior class4 ,when1 however1 the morally important thing is the desire and effort to discover the good1 every one is on the same plane1 in spite of differences in intellectual endowment and in learning4 ,moral knowing1 as a fundamental or cardinal aspect of virtue1 is then the completeness of the interest in good exhibited in effort to discover the good4 ,since knowing involves two factors1 a direct and an indirect1 conscientiousness involves both sensitiveness and reflectiveness4#aie 7#a7 ,moral ,sensitiveness4--,the individual who is not directly aware of the presence of values needing to be perpetuated or achieved1 in the things and persons about him1 is hard and callous or tough4 ,a tender conscience is one which is immediately responsive to the presentation of good and evil4 ,the modern counterpart to the ,socratic doctrine that ignorance is the root of vice1 is that being morally cold or dead1 being indifferent to moral distinctions1 is the most hopeless of all conditions4 ,one who cares1 even if he cares in the wrong way1 has at least a spring that may be touched2 the one who is just irresponsive offers no leverage for correction or improvement4 7#b7 ,thoughtfulness4--,while the possession of such an immediate1 unreflective responsiveness to elements of good and bad must be the mainstay of moral wisdom1 the character which lies back of these intuitive apprehensions must be thoughtful and serious-minded4 ,there is no individual who1 however morally sensitive1 can dispense with cool1 calm reflection1 or whose intuitive judgments1 if reliable1 are not largely the funded outcome of prior thinking4 ,every voluntary act is intelligent3 i4e41 includes an idea of the end to be reached or the consequences to accrue4 ,such ends are ideal in the sense that they are present to thought1 not to sense4 ,but special ends1 because they are limited1 are not what we mean by ideals4 ,they are specific4 ,with the growth of the habit of reflection1 agents become conscious that the values of their particular ends are not circumscribed1 but extend far beyond the special case in question2 so far indeed that their range of influence cannot be foreseen or defined4 ,a kindly act may not only have the particular consequence of relieving present suffering1 but may make a difference in the entire life of its recipient1 or may set in radically different directions the interest and attention of the one who performs it4 ,these larger and remoter values in any moral act transcend the end which was consciously present to its doer4 ,the person has always to aim at something definite1 but as he becomes aware of this penumbra or atmosphere of far-reaching ulterior values the meaning of his special act is thereby deepened and widened4 ,an act is outwardly temporary and circumstantial1 but its meaning is permanent and expansive4 ,the act passes away2 but its significance abides in the increment of meaning given to further growth4 ,to live in the recognition of this deeper meaning of acts is to live in the ideal1 in the only sense in which it is profitable for man to dwell in the ideal4 ,our ideals1 our types of excellence1 are the various ways in which we figure to ourselves the outreaching and ever-expanding values of our concrete acts4 ,every achievement of good deepens and quickens our sense of the inexhaustible value contained in every right act4 ,with achievement1 our conception of the possible goods of life increases1 and we find ourselves called to live upon a still deeper and more thoughtful plane4 ,an ideal is not some remote all-exhaustive goal1 a fixed summum bonum with respect to which other things are only means4 ,it is not something to be placed in contrast to the direct1 local1 and tangible quality of our actual situations1 so that by contrast these latter are lightly esteemed as insignificant4 ,on the contrary1 an ideal is the conviction that each of these special situations carries with it a final value1 a meaning which in itself is unique and inexhaustible4 ,to set up ideals of perfection which are other than the serious recognition of the possibilities of development resident in each concrete situation1 is in the end to pay ourselves with sentimentalities1 if not with words1 and meanwhile it is to direct thought and energy away from the situations which need and which welcome the perfecting care of attention and affection4 ,thoughtfulness and ,progress4--,this sense of wider values than those definitely apprehended or definitely attained is a constant warning to the individual not to be content with an accomplishment4 ,conscientiousness takes more and more the form of interest in improvement1 in progress4 ,conscientiousness as sensitiveness may rest upon the plane of already secured satisfactions1 upon discriminating with accuracy their quality and degree4 ,as thoughtfulness1 it will always be on the lookout for the better4 ,the good man not only measures his acts by a standard1 but he is concerned to revise his standard4 ,his sense of the ideal1 of the undefinable because ever-expanding value of special deeds1 forbids his resting satisfied with any formulated standard2 for the very formulation gives the standard a technical quality1 while the good can be maintained only in enlarging excellence4 ,the highest form of conscientiousness is interest in constant progress4 ,love and ,courage ,required for ,thoughtfulness4--,we may close this chapter by repeating what we have already noted1 that genuine moral knowledge involves the affections and the resolute will as well as the intelligence4 ,we cannot know the varied elements of value in the lives of others and in the possibilities of our own1 save as our affections are strong4 ,every narrowing of love1 every encroachment of egoism1 means just so much blindness to the good4 ,the man who pleads good motives as excuse for acts which injure others is always one whose absorption in himself has wrought harm to his powers of perception4 ,every widening of contact with others1 every deepening of the level of sympathetic acquaintance1 magnifies in so much vision of the good4 ,finally1 the chief ally of moral thoughtfulness is the resolute courage of willingness to face the evil for the sake of the good4 ,shrinking from apprehension of the evil to others consequent upon our behavior1 because such realization would demand painful effort to change our own plans and habits1 maintains habitual dimness and narrowness of moral vision4 ,,literature ,upon the principle of virtue in general1 see ,plato1 ,republic1 #dbg-ddc2 ,aristotle1 ,ethics1 ,books ,,ii4 and ,,iv42 ,kant1 ,theory of ,ethics 7,abbott's trans471 pp4 #afd-ahb1 #cje1 #caf-cbb2 ,green1 ,prolegomena1 pp4 #bef-cad 7and for conscientiousness1 #cbc-ccg72 ,paulsen1 ,system of ,ethics1 pp4 #dge-dhb2 ,alexander1 ,moral ,order and ,progress1 pp4 #bdb-bec2 ,ladd1 ,philosophy of ,conduct1 chs4 x4 and xiv42 ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 ch4 v42 ,spencer1 ,principles of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #c-cd and #bfc-bgf2 ,sidgwick1 ,methods of ,ethics1 pp4 #b-e and #i-aj2 ,rickaby1 ,aquinas ,ethicus1 ,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #aee-aie2 ,mezes1 ,ethics1 chs4 ix4 and xvi4 ,for natural ability and virtue3 ,hume1 ,treatise1 ,part ,,ii41 ,book ,,iii41 and ,inquiry1 ,appendix ,,iv42 ,bonar1 ,intellectual ,virtues4 ,for discussions of special virtues3 ,aristotle1 ,ethics1 ,book ,,iii41 and ,book ,,vii41 chs4 i4-x42 for justice3 ,aristotle1 ,ethics1 ,book ,v42 ,rickaby1 ,moral ,philosophy1 pp4 #ajb-ajh1 and ,aquinas ,ethicus 7see ,index72 ,paulsen1 ,system of ,ethics1 pp4 #eii-fcg2 ,mezes1 ,ethics1 ch4 xiii42 ,mill1 ,utilitarianism1 ch4 v42 ,sidgwick1 ,methods of ,ethics1 ,book ,,iii41 ch4 v41 and see ,index2 also criticism of ,spencer in his ,lectures on the ,ethics of ,green1 ,spencer and ,martineau1 pp4 #bgb-cjb2 ,spencer1 ,principles of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,,ii42 ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 ch4 v4 ,for benevolence1 see ,aristotle1 ,ethics1 ,books ,,vii4-,,ix4 7on friendship72 ,rickaby1 ,moral ,philosophy1 pp4 #bcg-bdd1 and ,aquinas ,ethicus 7see charity and almsgiving in ,index72 ,paulsen1 ,system1 chs4 viii4 and x4 of ,part ,,iii42 ,mezes1 ,ethics1 ch4 xii42 ,sidgwick1 ,methods of ,ethics1 ,book ,,ii41 ch4 iv42 ,spencer1 ,principles of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,,ii42 see also the references under sympathy and altruism at end of ch4 xviii4 ,courage and temperance are discussed in chs4 x4 and xi4 of ,mezes2 in pp4 #dhe-ejd of ,paulsen2 pp4 #cbg-ccf of ,sidgwick2 ch4 xi4 of ,ladd's ,philosophy of ,conduct4 ,,footnotes3 #ahd ,this is1 of course1 the point made in ch4 iv4 on ,customs or ,mores1 save that there the emphasis was upon the epoch of customary as distinct from the reflective morals1 while here it is upon the customary factor in the present4 #ahe ,this fact might be employed to reenforce our prior conclusion that moral rules1 classifications1 etc41 are not of final importance but are of value in clarifying and judging individual acts and situations4 ,not the rule1 but the use which the person makes of the rule in approving and disapproving himself and others1 is the significant thing4 #ahf ,less is said on this point because this phase of the matter has been covered in the discussion of self-denial in the previous chapter4 ,see pp4 #cfd-fh4 #ahg ,strict hedonism would tend to reduce all virtue to prudence--the calculation of subtler and remoter consequences and the control of present behavior by its outcome4 #ahh ,says ,hazlitt1 ,the charm of criminal life1 like that of savage life1 consists in liberty1 in hardship1 in danger1 and in the contempt of death3 in one word1 in extraordinary excitement 7,essay on ,bentham74 ,but this is equally true in principle 7though not in degree7 of every temptation to turn from the straight and narrow path4 ,virtue seems dull and sober1 uninteresting1 in comparison with the increasing excitation of some desire4 ,there are as many forms of excitement as there are individual men4 #ahi ,there is something of the nature of gambling1 of taking chances on future results for the sake of present stimulation1 in all unrestraint or intemperate action4 ,and the reflection of the specialist--that is1 the one whose reflection is not subjected to responsible tests in social behavior--is a more or less exciting adventure--a speculation4 #aij ,in the last words of ,spinoza's ,ethics1 ,no one delights in the good because he curbs his appetites1 but because we delight in the good we are able to curb our lusts4 #aia ,what has been said about ,self-assertion1 in the last chapter1 anticipates in some measure what holds of this virtue4 #aib ,see ,sumner1 ,folkways1 ch4 xx4 #aic ,upon this point see ,james1 ,principles of ,psychology1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #efa-efg1 and ,royce1 ,world and ,individual1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #ced-cfj4 #aid ,this receives more attention in ch4 xxi4 of ,part ,,iii4 #aie ,compare what was said concerning the intuitive and the discursive factors in moral knowledge in ch4 xvi4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,part ,,iii ,,the ,,world ,,of ,,action ,,general ,,literature ,,for ,,part ,,iii ,addams1 ,democracy and ,social ,ethics1 #aijb1 ,newer ,ideals of ,peace1 #aijg2 ,santayana1 ,the ,life of ,reason1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 #aije2 ,bergmann1 ,ethik als ,kulturphilosophie1 #aijd1 especially pp4 #aed-cjd2 ,wundt1 ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,,iii41 ,the ,principles of ,morality and the ,departments of the ,moral ,life 7trans4 #aija72 ,spencer1 ,principles of ,ethics1 #ahic1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 ,principles of ,sociology1 #ahhb1 ,vol4 ,i41 ,part ,,ii42 ,ritchie1 ,studies in ,political and ,moral ,philosophy1 #ahhh2 ,bosanquet1 ,philosophical ,theory of the ,state1 #ahii2 ,willoughby1 ,social ,justice1 #aijj2 ,cooley1 ,human ,nature and the ,social ,order1 #aijb2 ,paulsen1 ,system der ,ethik1 #eth ed41 #aijj1 ,book ,,iv42 ,runze1 ,praktische ,ethik1 #ahia2 ,janet1 ,histoire de la ,science ,politique dans ses ,rapports avec la ,morale1 #c;d ed41 #ahhg2 ,plato1 ,the ,republic2 ,aristotle1 ,ethics1 ,book ,v41 and ,politics 7trans4 by ,welldon1 #ahhc72 ,hegel1 ,philosophy of ,right 7pub4 #ahbj1 trans4 by ,dyde1 #ahif72 ,mackenzie1 ,an ,introduction to ,social ,philosophy1 #ahij2 ,dunning1 ,history of ,political ,theories1 ,vol4 ,i41 #aijb1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 #aije2 ,stein1 ,die ,sociale ,frage im ,licht der ,philosophie1 #ahig4 ,,chapter ,,xx ,,social ,,organization ,,and ,,the ,,individual ,object of ,part and ,chapter4--,the history of morals manifests a twofold movement4 ,it reveals1 on one side1 constantly increasing stress on individual intelligence and affection4 ,the transformation of customary into reflective morals is the change from ,do those things which our kin1 class1 or city do to ,be a person with certain habits of desire and deliberation4 ,the moral history of the race also reveals constantly growing emphasis upon the social nature of the objects and ends to which personal preferences are to be devoted4 ,while the agent has been learning that it is his personal attitude which counts in his deeds1 he has also learnt that there is no attitude which is exclusively private in scope1 none which does not need to be socially valued or judged4 ,theoretic analysis enforces the same lesson as history4 ,it tells us that moral quality resides in the habitual dispositions of an agent2 and that it consists of the tendency of these dispositions to secure 7or hinder7 values which are sociably shared or sharable4 ,in ,part ,one we sketched the historical course of this development2 in ,part ,two we traced its theoretic analysis4 ,in the present and concluding ,part1 our purpose is to consider the distinctively social aspects of morality4 ,we shall consider how social institutions and tendencies supply value to the activities of individuals1 impose the conditions of the formation and exercise of their desires and aims2 and1 especially1 how they create the peculiarly urgent problems of contemporary moral life4 ,the present chapter will take up the general question1 that of the relation of social organization to individual life4 ,sec4 #a4 ,,growth ,,of ,,individuality ,,through ,,social ,,organizations ,from one point of view1 historic development represents the increasing liberation of individual powers from rigid social control4 ,sir ,john ,lubbock remarks3 ,no savage is free4 ,all over the world his daily life is regulated by a complicated and apparently most inconvenient set of customs 7as forcible as laws71 of quaint prohibitions and privileges4 ,looked at from another point of view1 emancipation from one sort of social organization means initiation into some other social order2 the individual is liberated from a small and fixed 7customary7 social group1 to become a member of a larger and progressive society4 ,the history of setting free individual power in desire1 thought1 and initiative is1 upon the whole1 the history of the formation of more complex and extensive social organizations4 ,movements that look like the disintegration of the order of society1 when viewed with reference to what has preceded them1 are factors in the construction of a new social order1 which allows freer play to individuals1 and yet increases the number of social groupings and the depth of social combinations4 ,this fact of historical development is well summed up in the following words of ,hobhouse1 set forth as a summary of a comprehensive survey of the historic development of law and justice1 of the family including the status of women and children1 of the relations between communities1 and between classes1 the rich and the poor4 ,he says3 ,amid all the variety of social institutions and the ebb and flow of historical change1 it is possible in the end to detect a double movement1 marking the transition from the lower to the higher levels of civilized law and custom4 ,on the one hand1 the social order is strengthened and extended4444 ,on this side the individual human being becomes more and more subject to social constraint1 and1 as we have frequently seen1 the changes making for the tightening of the social fabric may diminish the rights which the individual or large classes of individuals can claim4444 ,in this relation liberty and order become opposed4 ,but the opposition is not essential4 ,from the first the individual relies on social forces to maintain him in his rights1 and in the higher form of social organization we have seen order and liberty drawing together again4444 ,the best ordered community is that which gives most scope to its component members to make the best of themselves1 while the 'best' in human nature is that which contributes to the harmony and onward movement of society4444 ,the responsible human being1 man or woman1 is the center of modern ethics as of modern law1 free so far as custom and law are concerned to make his own life4444 ,the social nature of man is not diminished either on the side of its needs or its duties by the fuller recognition of personal rights4 ,the difference is that1 so far as rights and duties are conceived as attaching to human beings as such1 they become universalized1 and are therefore the care of society as a whole rather than of any partial group organization4#aif ,with this statement may be compared the words of ,green and ,alexander4 ,according to ,green1 moral progress consists in the extension of the area or range of persons whose common good is concerned1 and in the deepening or intensification in the individual of his social interest3 the settled disposition on each man's part to make the most and best of humanity in his own person and in the person of others4#aig ,alexander's formulae for moral growth are the laws of differentiation and of comprehension4 ,the first means diversification1 specialization1 differentiating the powers of an individual with increased refinement of each4 ,the law of comprehension means the steady enlargement of the size and scope of the social group 7as from clan to modern national state7 with its increased complexity of ways in which men are brought into contact with one another4#aih ,social ,life ,liberates and ,directs ,individual ,energies4--,breadth in extent of community life goes hand in hand with multiplication of the stimuli which call out an individual's powers4 ,diversification of social activities increases opportunities for his initiative and endeavor4 ,narrow and meager social life means limitation of the scope of activities in which its members may engage4 ,it means little occasion for the exercise of deliberation and choice1 without which character is both immature and fossilized2 it means1 in short1 restricted personality4 ,but a rich and varied society1 one which liberates powers otherwise torpid and latent1 also exacts that they be employed in ways consistent with its own interests4 ,a society which is extensive and complex would dissolve in anarchy and confusion were not the activities of its various members upon the whole mutually congruent4 ,the world of action is a world of which the individual is one limit1 and humanity the other2 between them lie all sorts of associative arrangements of lesser and larger scope1 families1 friendships1 schools1 clubs1 organizations for making or distributing goods1 for gathering and supplying commodities2 activities politically organized by parishes1 wards1 villages1 cities1 countries1 states1 nations4 ,every maladjustment in relations among these institutions and associated activities means loss and friction in the relations between individuals2 and thereby introduces defect1 division1 and restriction into the various powers which constitute an individual4 ,all harmonious cooperation among them means a fuller life and greater freedom of thought and action for the individual person4 ,order and ,laws4--,the world of action as a scene of organized activities going on in regular ways#aii thus presents a public or common order and authority1 with its established modes of operation1 its laws4 ,organized institutions1 from the more permanent to the more casual1 with their orderly rules of conduct1 are not1 of course1 prior to individual activity2 for their elements are individual activities related in certain ways4 ,but with respect to any one individual in his separate or distributive capacity1 there is a genuine and important sense in which the institution comes first4 ,a child is born into an already existing family with habits and beliefs already formed1 not indeed rigid beyond readaptation1 but with their own order 7arrangements74 ,he goes to schools which have their established methods and aims2 he gradually assumes membership in business1 civic1 and political organizations1 with their own settled ways and purposes4 ,only in participating in already fashioned systems of conduct does he apprehend his own powers1 appreciate their worth and realize their possibilities1 and achieve for himself a controlled and orderly body of physical and mental habits4 ,he finds the value and the principles of his life1 his satisfaction and his norms of authority1 in being a member of associated groups of persons and in playing his part in their maintenance and expansion4 ,the ,social and the ,moral4--,in customary society1 it does not occur to any one that there is a difference between what he ought to do1 i4e41 the moral1 and what those about him customarily do1 i4e41 the social4 ,the socially established is the moral4 ,reflective morality brings with it1 as we have seen1 a distinction4 ,a thoughtfully minded person reacts against certain institutions and habits which obtain in his social environment2 he regards certain ideas1 which he frames himself and which are not embodied in social habits1 as more moral than anything existing about him4 ,such reactions against custom and such projections of new ideas are necessary if there is to be progress in society4 ,but unfortunately it has often been forgotten that this distinctly personal morality1 which takes its stand against some established usage1 and which1 therefore1 for the time being has its abode only in the initiative and effort of an individual1 is simply the means of social reconstruction4 ,it is treated as if it were an end in itself1 and as if it were something higher than any morality which is or can be socially embodied4 ,at some periods1 this view has led to a monastic retreat from all social affairs for the sake of cultivating personal goodness4 ,at other times1 it has led to the political indifference of the ,cynic and ,stoic4 ,for ages1 it led to a morality of other worldliness2 to the belief that true goodness can be attained only in another kind of life and world--a belief which carried with it relative contempt and neglect of concrete social conditions in this life4 ,social affairs at best were only secular and temporal1 and1 in contrast with the eternal and spiritual salvation of the individual's own soul1 of little account4 ,after the ,renaissance and the ,protestant ,revolt1 this kind of moral individualism persisted in different forms4 ,among the hedonists1 it took the form of assuming that while social arrangements are of very great importance1 their importance lies in the fact that they hinder or help individuals in the attainment of their own private pleasures4 ,the transcendentalists 7such as ,kant7 asserted that1 since morality is wholly a matter of the inner motive1 of the personal attitude towards the moral law1 social conditions are wholly external4 ,good or evil lies wholly inside the individual's own will4 ,social institutions may help or hinder the outward execution of moral purpose2 they may be favorable or hostile to the successful outward display of virtue4 ,but they have nothing to do with originating or developing the moral purpose1 the ,good ,will1 and hence1 in themselves1 are lacking in moral significance4 ,thus ,kant made a sharp and fast distinction between morality1 appertaining solely to the individual's own inner consciousness1 and legality1 appertaining to the social and political conditions of outward behavior4 ,social institutions and laws may indeed regulate men's outer acts4 ,so far as men externally conform1 their conduct is legal4 ,but laws cannot regulate or touch men's motives1 which alone determine the morality of their behavior4 ,we shall not repeat here our prior criticisms of hedonism and utilitarianism in order to point out the falsity of this division of moral action into unrelated inner 7or private7 and outer 7or social7 factors4 ,we may recall to memory1 however1 that ,kant himself virtually passed beyond his own theory of moral individualism in insisting upon the promotion of a ,kingdom of ,ends1 in which every person is to be treated as an end in himself4 ,we may recall that the later utilitarians 7such as ,mill1 ,leslie ,stephen1 ,bain1 and ,spencer7 insisted upon the educative value of social institutions1 upon their importance in forming certain interests and habits in the individual4 ,thus social arrangements were taken out of the category of mere means to private good1 and made the necessary factors and conditions of the development of an individuality which should have a reasonable and just conception of its own nature and of its own good4 ,we may also enumerate some of the more fundamental ways in which social institutions determine individual morality4 #a4 ,apart from the social medium1 the individual would never know himself2 he would never become acquainted with his own needs and capacities4 ,he would live the life of a brute animal1 satisfying as best he could his most urgent appetites of hunger1 thirst1 and sex1 but being1 as regards even that1 handicapped in comparison with other animals4 ,and1 as we have already seen1 the wider and the richer the social relationships into which an individual enters1 the more fully are his powers evoked1 and the more fully is he brought to recognize the possibilities latent in them4 ,it is from seeing noble architecture and hearing harmonious music that the individual learns to know to what his own constructive and rhythmic tendencies1 otherwise blind and inchoate1 may come4 ,it is from achievement in industrial1 national1 and family life that he is initiated into perception of his own energy1 loyalty1 and affection4 #b4 ,social conditions not only evoke what is latent1 and bring to conscious recognition what is blind1 but they select1 encourage1 and confirm certain tendencies at the expense of others4 ,they enable the individual to discriminate the better and the worse among his tendencies and achievements4 ,there is no limit in the power of society to awaken and strengthen this habit of discrimination1 of choice after comparison1 in its individual members4 ,a small social group with fixed habits1 a clan1 a gang1 a narrow sect1 a dogmatic party1 will restrict the formation of critical powers--i4e41 of conscientiousness or moral thoughtfulness4 ,but an individual who really becomes a member of modern society1 with its multiple occupations1 its easy intercourse1 its free mobility1 its rich resources of art and science1 will have only too many opportunities for reflective judgment and personal valuation and preference4 ,the very habits of individual moral initiative1 of personal criticism of the existent order1 and of private projection of a better order1 to which moral individualists point as proofs of the purely inner nature of morality1 are themselves effects of a variable and complex social order4 ,the ,moral ,value of the ,state4--,if then we take modern social life in its broadest extent1 as including not only what has become institutionalized and more or less fossilized1 but also what is still growing 7forming and re-forming71 we may justly say that it is as true of progressive as of stationary society1 that the moral and the social are one4 ,the virtues of the individual in a progressive society are more reflective1 more critical1 involve more exercise of comparison and selection1 than in customary society4 ,but they are just as socially conditioned in their origin and as socially directed in their manifestation4 ,in rudimentary societies1 customs furnish the highest ends of achievement2 they supply the principles of social organization and combination2 and they form binding laws whose breach is punished4 ,the moral1 political1 and legal are not differentiated4 ,but village communities and city-states1 to say nothing of kingdoms and empires and modern national ,states1 have developed special organs and special regulations for maintaining social unity and public order4 ,small groups are usually firmly welded together and are exclusive4 ,they have a narrow but intense social code3--like a patriarchal family1 a gang1 a social set1 they are clannish4 ,but when a large number of such groups come together within a more inclusive social unity1 some institution grows up to represent the interests and activities of the whole as against the narrow and centrifugal tendencies of the constituent factors4 ,a society is then politically organized2 and a true public order with its comprehensive laws is brought into existence4 ,the moral importance of the development of this public point of view1 with its extensive common purposes and with a general will for maintaining them1 can hardly be overestimated4 ,without such organization1 society and hence morality would remain sectional1 jealous1 suspicious1 unfraternal4 ,sentiments of intense cohesion within would have been conjoined with equally strong sentiments of indifference1 intolerance1 and hostility to those without4 ,in the wake of the formation of ,states have followed more widely co-operative activities1 more comprehensive and hence more reasonable principles of judgment and outlook4 ,the individual has been emancipated from his relative submergence in the local and fixed group1 and set upon his own feet1 with varied fields of activity open to him in which to try his powers1 and furnished with principles of judging conduct and projecting ideals which in theory1 at least1 are as broad as the possibilities of humanity itself4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,responsibility ,,and ,,freedom ,the more comprehensive and diversified the social order1 the greater the responsibility and the freedom of the individual4 ,his freedom is the greater1 because the more numerous are the effective stimuli to action1 and the more varied and the more certain the ways in which he may fulfill his powers4 ,his responsibility is greater because there are more demands for considering the consequences of his acts2 and more agencies for bringing home to him the recognition of consequences which affect not merely more persons individually1 but which also influence the more remote and hidden social ties4 ,liability4--,freedom and responsibility have a relatively superficial and negative meaning and a relatively positive central meaning4 ,in its external aspect1 responsibility is liability4 ,an agent is free to act2 yes1 but--4 ,he must stand the consequences1 the disagreeable as well as the pleasant1 the social as well as the physical4 ,he may do a given act1 but if so1 let him look out4 ,his act is a matter that concerns others as well as himself1 and they will prove their concern by calling him to account2 and if he cannot give a satisfactory and credible account of his intention1 subject him to correction4 ,each community and organization informs its members what it regards as obnoxious1 and serves notice upon them that they have to answer if they offend4 ,the individual then is 7#a7 likely or liable to have to explain and justify his behavior1 and is 7#b7 liable or open to suffering consequent upon inability to make his explanation acceptable4 ,positive ,responsibility4--,in this way the individual is made aware of the stake the community has in his behavior2 and is afforded an opportunity to take that interest into account in directing his desires and making his plans4 ,if he does so1 he is a responsible person4 ,the agent who does not take to heart the concern which others show that they have in his conduct1 will note his liability only as an evil to which he is exposed1 and will take it into consideration only to see how to escape or evade it4 ,but one whose point of view is sympathetic and reasonable will recognize the justice of the community interest in his performances2 and will recognize the value to him of the instruction contained in its assertions of its interest4 ,such an one responds1 answers1 to the social demands made2 he is not merely called to answer4 ,he holds himself responsible for the consequences of his acts2 he does not wait to be held liable by others4 ,when society looks for responsible workmen1 teachers1 doctors1 it does not mean merely those whom it may call to account2 it can do that in any case4 ,it wants men and women who habitually form their purposes after consideration of the social consequences of their execution4 ,dislike of disapprobation1 fear of penalty1 play a part in generating this responsive habit2 but fear1 operating directly1 occasions only cunning or servility4 ,fused1 through reflection1 with other motives which prompt to action1 it helps bring about that apprehensiveness1 or susceptibility to the rights of others1 which is the essence of responsibility1 which in turn is the sole ultimate guarantee of social order4 ,the ,two ,senses of ,freedom4--,in its external aspect1 freedom is negative and formal4 ,it signifies freedom from subjection to the will and control of others2 exemption from bondage2 release from servitude2 capacity to act without being exposed to direct obstructions or interferences from others4 ,it means a clear road1 cleared of impediments1 for action4 ,it contrasts with the limitations of prisoner1 slave1 and serf1 who have to carry out the will of others4 ,effective ,freedom4--,exemption from restraint and from interference with overt action is only a condition1 though an absolutely indispensable one1 of effective freedom4 ,the latter requires 7#a7 positive control of the resources necessary to carry purposes into effect1 possession of the means to satisfy desires2 and 7#b7 mental equipment with the trained powers of initiative and reflection requisite for free preference and for circumspect and far-seeing desires4 ,the freedom of an agent who is merely released from direct external obstructions is formal and empty4 ,if he is without resources of personal skill1 without control of the tools of achievement1 he must inevitably lend himself to carrying out the directions and ideas of others4 ,if he has not powers of deliberation and invention1 he must pick up his ideas casually and superficially from the suggestions of his environment and appropriate the notions which the interests of some class insinuate into his mind4 ,if he have not powers of intelligent self-control1 he will be in bondage to appetite1 enslaved to routine1 imprisoned within the monotonous round of an imagery flowing from illiberal interests1 broken only by wild forays into the illicit4 ,legal and ,moral4--,positive responsibility and freedom may be regarded as moral1 while liability and exemption are legal and political4 ,a particular individual at a given time is possessed of certain secured resources in execution and certain formed habits of desire and reflection4 ,in so far1 he is positively free4 ,legally1 his sphere of activity may be very much wider4 ,the laws1 the prevailing body of rules which define existing institutions1 would protect him in exercising claims and powers far beyond those which he can actually put forth4 ,he is exempt from interference in travel1 in reading1 in hearing music1 in pursuing scientific research4 ,but if he has neither material means nor mental cultivation to enjoy these legal possibilities1 mere exemption means little or nothing4 ,it does1 however1 create a moral demand that the practical limitations which hem him in should be removed2 that practical conditions should be afforded which will enable him effectively to take advantage of the opportunities formally open4 ,similarly1 at any given time1 the liabilities to which an individual is actually held come far short of the accountability to which the more conscientious members of society hold themselves4 ,the morale of the individual is in advance of the formulated morality1 or legality1 of the community4 ,relation of ,legal to ,moral4--,it is1 however1 absurd to separate the legal and the ideal aspects of freedom from one another4 ,it is only as men are held liable that they become responsible2 even the conscientious man1 however much in some respects his demands upon himself exceed those which would be enforced against him by others1 still needs in other respects to have his unconscious partiality and presumption steadied by the requirements of others4 ,he needs to have his judgment balanced against crankiness1 narrowness1 or fanaticism1 by reference to the sanity of the common standard of his times4 ,it is only as men are exempt from external obstruction that they become aware of possibilities1 and are awakened to demand and strive to obtain more positive freedom4 ,or1 again1 it is the possession by the more favored individuals in society of an effectual freedom to do and to enjoy things with respect to which the masses have only a formal and legal freedom1 that arouses a sense of inequity1 and that stirs the social judgment and will to such reforms of law1 of administration and economic conditions as will transform the empty freedom of the less favored individuals into constructive realities4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,rights ,,and ,,obligations ,the ,individual and ,social in ,rights and ,obligations4--,that which1 taken at large or in a lump1 is called freedom breaks up in detail into a number of specific1 concrete abilities to act in particular ways4 ,these are termed rights4 ,any right includes within itself in intimate unity the individual and social aspects of activity upon which we have been insisting4 ,as a capacity for exercise of power1 it resides in and proceeds from some special agent1 some individual4 ,as exemption from restraint1 a secured release from obstruction1 it indicates at least the permission and sufferance of society1 a tacit social assent and confirmation2 while any more positive and energetic effort on the part of the community to guarantee and safeguard it1 indicates an active acknowledgment on the part of society that the free exercise by individuals of the power in question is positively in its own interest4 ,thus a right1 individual in residence1 is social in origin and intent4 ,the social factor in rights is made explicit in the demand that the power in question be exercised in certain ways4 ,a right is never a claim to a wholesale1 indefinite activity1 but to a defined activity2 to one carried on1 that is1 under certain conditions4 ,this limitation constitutes the obligatory phases of every right4 ,the individual is free2 yes1 that is his right4 ,but he is free to act only according to certain regular and established conditions4 ,that is the obligation imposed upon him4 ,he has a right to use public roads1 but he is obliged to turn in a certain way4 ,he has a right to use his property1 but he is obliged to pay taxes1 to pay debts1 not to harm others in its use1 and so on4 ,correspondence of ,rights and ,obligations4--,rights and obligations are thus strictly correlative4 ,this is true both in their external employment and in their intrinsic natures4 ,externally the individual is under obligation to use his right in a way which does not interfere with the rights of others4 ,he is free to drive on the public highways1 but not to exceed a certain speed1 and on condition that he turns to right or left as the public order requires4 ,he is entitled to the land which he has bought1 but this possession is subject to conditions of public registration and taxation4 ,he may use his property1 but not so that it menaces others or becomes a nuisance4 ,absolute rights1 if we mean by absolute those not relative to any social order and hence exempt from any social restriction1 there are none4 ,but rights correspond even more intrinsically to obligations4 ,the right is itself a social outcome3 it is the individual's in so far as he is himself a social member not merely physically1 but in his habits of thought and feeling4 ,he is under obligation to use his rights in social ways4 ,the more we emphasize the free right of an individual to his property1 the more we emphasize what society has done for him3 the avenues it has opened to him for acquiring2 the safeguards it has put about him for keeping2 the wealth achieved by others which he may acquire by exchanges themselves socially buttressed4 ,so far as an individual's own merits are concerned these opportunities and protections are unearned increments1 no matter what credit he may deserve for initiative and industry and foresight in using them4 ,the only fundamental anarchy is that which regards rights as private monopolies1 ignoring their social origin and intent4 ,classes of ,rights and ,obligations4--,we may discuss freedom and responsibility with respect to the social organization which secures and enforces them2 or from the standpoint of the individual who exercises and acknowledges them4 ,from the latter standpoint1 rights are conveniently treated as physical and mental3 not that the physical and mental can be separated1 but that emphasis may fall primarily on control of the conditions required to execute ideas and intentions1 or upon the control of the conditions involved in their personal formation and choice4 ,from the standpoint of the public order1 rights and duties are civil and political4 ,we shall consider them in the next chapter in connection with the organization of society in the ,state4 ,here we consider rights as inhering in an individual in virtue of his membership in society4 ,i4 ,physical ,rights4--,these are the rights to the free unharmed possession of the body 7the rights to life and limb71 exemption from homicidal attack1 from assault and battery1 and from conditions that threaten health in more obscure ways2 and positively1 the right to free movement of the body1 to use its members for any legitimate purpose1 and the right to unhindered locomotion4 ,without the exemption1 there is no security in life1 no assurance2 only a life of constant fear and uncertainty1 of loss of limb1 of injury from others1 and of death4 ,without some positive assurance1 there is no chance of carrying ideas into effect4 ,even if sound and healthy and extremely protected1 a man lives a slave or prisoner4 ,right to the control and use of physical conditions of life takes effect then in property rights1 command of the natural tools and materials which are requisite to the maintenance of the body in a due state of health and to an effective and competent use of the person's powers4 ,these physical rights to life1 limb1 and property are so basic to all achievement and capability that they have frequently been termed natural rights4 ,they are so fundamental to the existence of personality that their insecurity or infringement is a direct menace to the social welfare4 ,the struggle for human liberty and human responsibility has accordingly been more acute at this than at any other point4 ,roughly speaking1 the history of personal liberty is the history of the efforts which have safeguarded the security of life and property and which have emancipated bodily movement from subjection to the will of others4 ,unsolved ,problems3 ,war and ,punishment4--,while history marks great advance1 especially in the last four or five centuries1 as to the negative aspect of freedom or release from direct and overt tyranny1 much remains undone on the positive side4 ,it is at this point of free physical control that all conflicts of rights concentrate themselves4 ,while the limitation by war of the right to life may be cited as evidence for the fact that even this right is not absolute but is socially conditioned1 yet that kind of correspondence between individual activity and social well-being which exacts exposure to destruction as its measure1 is too suggestive of the tribal morality in which the savage shows his social nature by participation in a blood feud1 to be satisfactory4 ,social organization is clearly defective when its constituent portions are so set at odds with one another as to demand from individuals their death as their best service to the community4 ,while one may cite capital punishment to enforce1 as if in large type1 the fact that the individual holds even his right to life subject to the social welfare1 the moral works the other way to underline the failure of society to socialize its members1 and its tendency to put undesirable results out of sight and mind rather than to face responsibility for causes4 ,the same limitation is seen in methods of imprisonment1 which1 while supposed to be protective rather than vindictive1 recognize only in a few and sporadic cases that the sole sure protection of society is through education and correction of individual character1 not by mere physical isolation under harsh conditions4 ,security of ,life4--,in civilized countries the blood feud1 infanticide1 putting to death the economically useless and the aged1 have been abolished4 ,legalized slavery1 serfdom1 the subjection of the rights of wife and child to the will of husband and father1 have been done away with4 ,but many modern industries are conducted with more reference to financial gain than to life1 and the annual roll of killed1 injured1 and diseased in factory and railway practically equals the list of dead and wounded in a modern war4#bjj ,most of these accidents are preventable4 ,the willingness of parents on one side and of employers on the other1 conjoined with the indifference of the general public1 makes child-labor an effective substitute for exposure of children and other methods of infanticide practiced by savage tribes4 ,agitation for old-age pensions shows that faithful service to society for a lifetime is still inadequate to secure a prosperous old age4 ,charity and ,poverty4--,society provides assistance and remedial measures1 poorhouses1 asylums1 hospitals4 ,the exceedingly poor are a public charge1 supported by taxes as well as by alms4 ,individuals are not supposed to die from starvation nor to suffer without any relief or assistance from physical defects and disease4 ,so far1 there is growth in positive provision for the right to live4 ,but the very necessity for such extensive remedial measures shows serious defects farther back4 ,it raises the question of social responsibility for the causes of such wholesale poverty and widespread misery4 ,taken in conjunction with the idleness and display of the congested rich1 it raises the question how far we are advanced beyond barbarism in making organic provision for an effective1 as distinct from formal1 right to life and movement4 ,it is hard to say whether the heavier indictment lies in the fact that so many shirk their share of the necessary social labor and toil1 or in the fact that so many who are willing to work are unable to do so1 without meeting recurrent crises of unemployment1 and except under conditions of hours1 hygiene1 compensation1 and home conditions which reduce to a low level the positive rights of life4 ,the social order protects the property of those who have it2 but1 although historic conditions have put the control of the machinery of production in the hands of a comparatively few persons1 society takes little heed to see that great masses of men get even that little property which is requisite to secure assured1 permanent1 and properly stimulating conditions of life4 ,until there is secured to and imposed upon all members of society the right and the duty of work in socially serviceable occupations1 with due return in social goods1 rights to life and free movement will hardly advance much beyond their present largely nominal state4 ,,ii4 ,rights to ,mental ,activity4--,these rights of course are closely bound up with rights to physical well-being and activity4 ,the latter would have no meaning were it not that they subserve purposes and affections2 while the life of mind is torpid or remote1 dull or abstract1 save as it gets impact in physical conditions and directs them4 ,those who hold that the limitations of physical conditions have no moral signification1 and that their improvement brings at most an increase of more or less materialistic comfort1 not a moral advance1 fail to note that the development of concrete purposes and desires is dependent upon so-called outward conditions4 ,these conditions affect the execution of purposes and wants2 and this influence reacts to determine the further arrest or growth of needs and resolutions4 ,the sharp and unjustifiable antithesis of spiritual and material in the current conception of moral action leads many well-intentioned people to be callous and indifferent to the moral issues involved in physical and economic progress4 ,long hours of excessive physical labor1 joined with unwholesome conditions of residence and work1 restrict the growth of mental activity1 while idleness and excess of physical possession and control pervert mind1 as surely as these causes modify the outer and overt acts4 ,freedom of ,thought and ,affection4--,the fundamental forms of the right to mental life are liberty of judgment and sympathy4 ,the struggle for spiritual liberty has been as prolonged and arduous as that for physical freedom4 ,distrust of intelligence and of love as factors in concrete individuals has been strong even in those who have proclaimed most vigorously their devotion to them as abstract principles4 ,disbelief in the integrity of mind1 assertion that the divine principles of thought and love are perverted and corrupt in the individual1 have kept spiritual authority and prestige in the hands of the few1 just as other causes have made material possessions the monopoly of a small class4 ,the resulting restriction of knowledge and of the tools of inquiry have kept the masses where their blindness and dullness might be employed as further evidence of their natural unfitness for personal illumination by the light of truth and for free direction of the energy of moral warmth4#bja ,gradually1 however1 free speech1 freedom of communication and intercourse1 of public assemblies1 liberty of the press and circulation of ideas1 freedom of religious and intellectual conviction 7commonly called freedom of conscience71 of worship1 and to some extent the right to education1 to spiritual nurture1 have been achieved4 ,in the degree the individual has won these liberties1 the social order has obtained its chief safeguard against explosive change and intermittent blind action and reaction1 and has got hold of the method of graduated and steady reconstruction4 ,looked at as a mere expedient1 liberty of thought and expression is the most successful device ever hit upon for reconciling tranquillity with progress1 so that peace is not sacrificed to reform nor improvement to stagnant conservatism4#bjb ,right and ,duty of ,education4--,it is through education in its broadest sense that the right of thought and sympathy become effective4 ,the final value of all institutions is their educational influence2 they are measured morally by the occasions they afford and the guidance they supply for the exercise of foresight1 judgment1 seriousness of consideration1 and depth of regard4 ,the family1 the school1 the church1 art1 especially 7to-day7 literature1 nurture the affections and imagination1 while schools impart information and inculcate skill in various forms of intellectual technique4 ,in the last one hundred years1 the right of each individual to spiritual self-development and self-possession1 and the interest of society as a whole in seeing that each of its members has an opportunity for education1 have been recognized in publicly maintained schools with their ladder from kindergarten through the college to the engineering and professional school4 ,men and women have had put at their disposal the materials and tools of judgment2 have had opened to them the wide avenues of science1 history1 and art that lead into the larger world's culture4 ,to some extent negative exemption from arbitrary restriction upon belief and thought has been developed into positive capacities of intelligence and sentiment4 ,restrictions from ,inadequate ,economic ,conditions4--,freedom of thought in a developed constructive form is1 however1 next to impossible for the masses of men so long as their economic conditions are precarious1 and their main problem is to keep the wolf from their doors4 ,lack of time1 hardening of susceptibility1 blind preoccupation with the machinery of highly specialized industries1 the combined apathy and worry consequent upon a life maintained just above the level of subsistence1 are unfavorable to intellectual and emotional culture4 ,intellectual cowardice1 due to apathy1 laziness1 and vague apprehension1 takes the place of despotism as a limitation upon freedom of thought and speech4 ,uncertainty as to security of position1 the welfare of a dependent family1 close men's mouths from expressing their honest convictions1 and blind their minds to clear perception of evil conditions4 ,the instrumentalities of culture--churches1 newspapers1 universities1 theatres--themselves have economic necessities which tend to make them dependent upon those who can best supply their needs4 ,the congestion of poverty on one side and of culture on the other is so great that1 in the words of a distinguished economist1 we are still questioning whether it is really impossible that all should start in the world with a fair chance of leading a cultured life free from the pains of poverty and the stagnating influences of a life of excessive mechanical toil4#bjc ,we provide free schools and pass compulsory education acts1 but actively and passively we encourage conditions which limit the mass of children to the bare rudiments of spiritual nurture4 ,restriction of ,educational ,influences4--,spiritual resources are practically as much the possession of a special class1 in spite of educational advance1 as are material resources4 ,this fact reacts upon the chief educative agencies--science1 art1 and religion4 ,knowledge in its ideas1 language1 and appeals is forced into corners2 it is overspecialized1 technical1 and esoteric because of its isolation4 ,its lack of intimate connection with social practice leads to an intense and elaborate over-training which increases its own remoteness4 ,only when science and philosophy are one with literature1 the art of successful communication and vivid intercourse1 are they liberal in effect2 and this implies a society which is already intellectually and emotionally nurtured and alive4 ,art itself1 the embodiment of ideas in forms which are socially contagious1 becomes what it is so largely1 a development of technical skill1 and a badge of class differences4 ,religious emotion1 the quickening of ideas and affections by recognition of their inexhaustible signification1 is segregated into special cults1 particular days1 and peculiar exercises1 and the common life is left relatively hard and barren4 ,in short1 the limitations upon freedom both of the physical conditions and the mental values of life are at bottom expressions of one and the same divorce of theory and practice1--which makes theory remote1 sterile1 and technical1 while practice remains narrow1 harsh1 and also illiberal4 ,yet there is more cause for hope in that so much has been accomplished1 than for despondency because mental power and service are still so limited and undeveloped4 ,the intermixture and interaction of classes and nations are very recent4 ,hence the opportunities for an effective circulation of sympathetic ideas and of reasonable emotions have only newly come into existence4 ,education as a public interest and care1 applicable to all individuals1 is hardly more than a century old2 while a conception of the richness and complexity of the ways in which it should touch any one individual is hardly half a century old4 ,as society takes its educative functions more seriously and comprehensively into account1 there is every promise of more rapid progress in the future than in the past4 ,for education is most effective when dealing with the immature1 those who have not yet acquired the hard and fixed directing forms of adult life2 while1 in order to be effectively employed1 it must select and propagate that which is common and hence typical in the social values that form its resources1 leaving the eccentric1 the partial1 and exclusive gradually to dwindle4 ,upon some generous souls of the eighteenth century there dawned the idea that the cause of the indefinite improvement of humanity and the cause of the little child are inseparably bound together4 ,,literature ,kant1 ,philosophy of ,law1 #agif 7trans4 by ,hastie1 #ahhg72 ,fichte1 ,the ,science of ,rights1 #agih 7trans4 by ,kroeger1 #ahfi72 ,rousseau1 ,social ,contract1 #agfb 7trans4 by ,tozer1 #ahic72 ,bonar1 ,philosophy and ,political ,economy1 #ahic2 ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 ch4 iii4 7on ,social ,motives72 ,caird1 ,social ,philosophy of ,comte1 #ahhe2 ,sidgwick1 ,practical ,ethics1 #ahih1 ,essay on ,public ,morality2 ,sidgwick1 ,elements of ,politics1 #ahia1 ch4 iv4 on ,individualism1 vi4 on ,contract1 x4 on ,socialistic ,interferences1 xiii4 on ,law and ,morality2 ,maine1 ,ancient ,law1 #ahfa1 ,pollock's ed41 #aijf1 chs4 iii4 and iv4 on law of nature and equity2 ,stephen1 ,essays in ,political and ,moral ,philosophy1 #ahhh2 ,rickaby1 ,political and ,moral ,essays1 #aijb2 ,hobhouse1 ,morals in ,evolution1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 ch4 vii4 7on the general relation of the social and the moral74 ,on the development of rights to life1 limb1 and freedom of movement1 see ,westermarck1 chs4 xiv4-xxii41 and ,sumner1 ,folkways1 chs4 vi41 vii41 and viii42 ,hobhouse1 ,vol4 ,i41 ch4 vii4 7on slavery72 ,spencer1 ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 ,part ,,iv4 ,for charity1 see ,loch on ,charity and ,charities1 ,encyclopaedia ,britannica2 ,uhlhorn1 ,christian ,charity in the ,ancient ,church2 ,l',allemand1 ,histoire de la ,charite2 ,nicholl1 ,history of the ,english ,poor ,law1 #b vols41 #ahih4 ,,footnotes3 #aif ,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #cfg-cfh1 italics not in original4 #aig ,p4 #bfb of ,prolegomena to ,ethics2 see chs4 iii4 and iv4 of ,book ,,iii4 #aih ,alexander1 ,moral ,order and ,progress1 pp4 #chd-hih4 #aii ,this does not of course exclude change and reform4 ,it means that1 so far as a society is organized1 these changes themselves occur in regular and authorized ways4 #bjj ,it is stated1 upon good authority1 that a street railway system in a large ,american city declined to adopt an improved fender1 which made it practically impossible to kill persons1 because the annual cost would be #e1jjj more than the existing expense for damages4 ,this same system declined to adopt improved brakes which would reduce accidents to life and limb2 and it was discovered that one of its directors was largely interested in the manufacture of the old brakes4 #bja ,said ,emerson3 ,if a man is sick1 is unable1 is mean-spirited and odious1 it is because there is so much of his nature which is unlawfully withholden from him4 #bjb ,recent suppression by the police in the larger ,american cities of public meetings called to discuss unemployment or other matters deemed by some dangerous to vested interests1 shows that the value of free speech as a safety-valve has not even yet been thoroughly learned4 ,it also shows how the victories of freedom in the past have to be fought and won over again under new conditions1 if they are to be kept alive4 #bjc ,marshall1 ,principles of ,economics4 ,,chapter ,,xxi ,,civil ,,society ,,and ,,the ,,political ,,state ,we have been considering responsible freedom as it centers in and affects individuals in their distinctive capacities4 ,it implies a public order which guarantees1 defines1 and enforces rights and obligations4 ,this public order has a twofold relation to rights and duties3 7#a7 ,as the social counterpart of their exercise by individuals1 it constitutes ,civil ,society4 ,it represents those forms of associated life which are orderly and authorized1 because constituted by individuals in the exercise of their rights1 together with those special forms which protect and insure them4 ,families1 clubs1 guilds1 unions1 corporations come under the first head2 courts and civil administrative bodies1 like public railway and insurance commissions1 etc41 come under the second4 7#b7 ,the public order also fixes the fundamental terms and conditions on which at any given time rights are exercised and remedies secured2 it is organized for the purpose of defining the basic methods of exercising the activities of its constituent elements1 individual and corporate4 ,in this aspect it is the ,state4 ,sec4 #a4 ,,civil ,,rights ,,and ,,obligations ,every act brings the agent who performs it into association with others1 whether he so intends or not4 ,his act takes effect in an organized world of action2 in social arrangement and institutions4 ,so far as such combinations of individuals are recurrent or stable1 their nature and operations are definitely formulated and definitely enforceable4 ,partnerships1 clubs1 corporations1 guilds1 families are such stable unions1 with their definite spheres of action4 ,buying and selling1 teaching and learning1 producing and consuming1 are recurrent activities whose legitimate methods get prescribed4 ,these specific provinces and methods of action are defined in ,civil ,rights4 ,they express the guaranteed and regular ways in which an individual1 through action1 voluntarily enters into association or combination with others for the sake of a common end4 ,they differ from political rights and obligations in that the latter concern modes of social organization which are so fundamental that they are not left to the voluntary choice and purpose of an individual4 ,as a social being1 he must have political relationships1 must be subject to law1 pay taxes1 etc4 #a4 ,contract ,rights4--,modes of association are so numerous and variable that we can only select those aspects of civil rights which are morally most significant4 ,we shall discriminate them according as they have to do 7#a7 with the more temporary and casual combinations of individuals1 for limited and explicit purposes2 and 7#b7 with more permanent1 inclusive1 and hence less definable ends2 and 7#c7 with the special institutions which exist for guaranteeing individuals the enjoyment of their rights and providing remedies if these are infringed upon4 7#a7 ,contract rights4 ,rights of the first type are rights resulting from express or implied agreements of certain agents to do or refrain from doing specific acts1 involving exchange of services or goods to the mutual benefit of both parties in the transaction4 ,every bargain entered into1 every loaf of bread one buys or paper of pins one sells1 involves an implied and explicit contract4 ,a genuinely free agreement or contract means 7i47 that each party to the transaction secures the benefit he wants2 7ii47 that the two parties are brought into cooperative or mutually helpful relations2 and that 7iii47 the vast1 vague1 complex business of conducting social life is broken up into a multitude of specific acts to be performed and of specific goods to be delivered1 at definite times and definite places4 ,hence it is hardly surprising that one school of social moralists has found in the conception of free contract its social ideal4 ,every individual concerned assumes obligations which it is to his interest to perform so that the performance is voluntary1 not coerced2 while1 at the same time1 some other person is engaged to serve him in some way4 ,the limitations of the contract idea will concern us later4 #b4 ,the ,permanent ,voluntary ,associations4--,partnerships1 limited liability corporations1 guilds1 trades unions1 churches1 schools1 clubs1 are more permanent and comprehensive associations1 involving more far-reaching rights and obligations4 ,societies organized for conversation and sociability or conviviality1 corporations not for profit1 but for mutual enjoyment or for benevolent ends1 come under the same head4 ,most significant are the associations which1 while entered only voluntarily and having therefore a basis in contract1 are for generic ends4 ,thus they are permanent1 and cover much more than can be written in the contract4 ,marriage1 in modern society1 is entered into by contract2 but married life is not narrowed to the exchange of specific services at specific times4 ,it is a union for mutual economic and spiritual goods which are coextensive with all the interests of the parties4 ,in its connection with the generation and rearing of children1 it is a fundamental means of guarding all social interests and of directing their progress4 ,schools1 colleges1 churches1 federations of labor1 organizations of employers1 and of both together1 represent other forms of permanent voluntary organizations which may have the most far-reaching influence both upon those directly concerned and upon society at large4 #c4 ,right to ,use of ,courts4--,all civil rights get their final application and test in the right to have conflicting rights defined and infringed rights remedied by appeal to a public authority having general and final jurisdiction4 ,the right to sue and be sued may seem too legal and external a matter to be worthy of much note in an ethical treatise2 but it represents the culmination of an age-long experimentation with the problem of reconciling individual freedom and public order4 ,no civil right is effective unless it carries with it a statement of a method of enforcement and1 if necessary1 of redress and remedy4 ,otherwise it is a mere name4 ,moreover1 conflicts of civil rights are bound to occur even when there is good faith on the part of all concerned1 just because new situations arise4 ,unless there is a way of defining the respective rights of each party in the new situation1 each will arbitrarily and yet in good faith insist upon asserting his rights on the old basis3 private war results4 ,a new order is not achieved and the one already attained is threatened or disrupted4 ,the value of rights to the use of courts resides1 then1 to a comparatively small degree1 in the specific cases of deliberate wrong which are settled4 ,what is more important is that men get instruction as to the proper scope and limits of their activities1 through the provision of an effective mechanism for amicable settlement of disputes in those cases in which rights are vague and ambiguous because the situations are novel4 ,classes of ,wrongs and ,remedies4--,infringements upon rights1 such as murder1 theft1 arson1 forgery1 imply a character which is distinctly anti-social in its bent4 ,the wrong1 although done to one1 is an expression of a disposition which is dangerous to all4 ,such a wrong is a crime2 it is a matter for the direct jurisdiction of public authority4 ,it is the business of all to cooperate in giving evidence1 and it may render one a criminal accomplice to conceal or suppress evidence1 just as it is compounding a felony for the wronged individual to settle the wrong done him by arranging privately for compensation4 ,the penalty in such cases is generally personal2 imprisonment or at least a heavy fine4 ,the violation may1 however1 be of the nature of a wrong or tort1 rather than of a crime2 it may indicate a disposition indifferent to social interests or neglectful of them rather than one actively hostile to them4 ,such acts as libels1 trespasses upon the land of another1 are illustrations4 ,in such cases1 the machinery of justice is put in motion by the injured individual1 not by the commonwealth4 ,this does not mean that society as a whole has no interest in the matter2 but that under certain circumstances encouraging individuals to look out for their own rights and wrongs is socially more important than getting certain wrongs remedied irrespective of whether men stand up for their own rights or not4 ,then again1 there are civil disputes which indicate neither a criminal nor a harmful disposition1 but rather uncertainty as to what the law really is1 leading to disputes about rights--interpretations of a contract1 express or implied4 ,here the interest of society is to provide a method of settlement which will hinder the growth of ill will and private retaliation2 and which also will provide precedents and principles that will lessen uncertainty and conflict in like cases in the future4 ,peace and tranquillity are not merely the absence of open friction and disorder4 ,they mean specific1 easily-known1 and generally recognized principles which determine the province and limits of the legitimate activity of every person4 ,publicity1 standards1 rules of procedure1 remedies acknowledged in common1 are their essence4 ,res publica1 the common concern1 remains vague and latent till defined by impartial1 disinterested social organs4 ,then it is expressed in regular and guaranteed modes of activity4 ,in the pregnant phrase of ,aristotle1 the administration of justice is also its determination3 that is1 its discovery and promulgation4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,development ,,of ,,civil ,,rights ,contrast of ,primitive with ,present ,justice4--,the significance of the accomplishments and the defects of the present administration of law may be brought out by a sketch of its contrast with primitive methods4 ,in savage and barbarian society1 on account of the solidarity of the kin-group1 any member of the group is likely to be attacked for the offense of any other 7see p4 #bh74 ,he may not have participated in the act1 or have had complicity in planning it4 ,his guilt is that the same blood runs in his veins4#bjd ,the punitive attack1 moreover1 is made directly and promiscuously by the injured man and by his blood-relatives2 it is made in the heat of passion or in the vengeance of stealth as custom may decree4 ,says ,hearn1 the state did not interfere in the private quarrels of its citizens4 ,every man took care of his own property and his own household1 and every hand guarded its own head4 ,if any injury were done to any person1 he retaliated1 or made reprisals1 or otherwise sought redress1 as custom prescribed4#bje ,the reprisal may itself have called for another1 and the blood-feud was on4 ,in any case1 the state of affairs was one literally1 not metaphorically1 described as private war4 ,changes ,now ,effected4--,this state of affairs has been superseded by one in which a third1 a public and impartial authority 7#a7 takes cognizance of offenses against another individual as offenses against the commonwealth2 7#b7 apprehends the supposed offender2 7#c7 determines and applies an objective standard of judgment1 the same for all1 the law2 7#d7 tries the supposed offender according to rules of procedure1 including rules of evidence or proof1 which are also publicly promulgated2 and 7#e7 takes upon itself the punishment of the offender1 if found guilty4 ,the history of this change1 important and interesting as it is1 does not belong here4 ,we are concerned here only with the relation of public authority1 public law1 and public activity to the development of the freedom of the individual on one side and of his responsibility on the other4#bjf ,we shall point out in a number of particulars that the evolution of freedom and responsibility in individuals has coincided with the evolution of a public and impartial authority4 #a4 ,good and ,evil as ,quasi-,physical4--,there are two alternatives in the judgment of good and evil4 7#a7 ,they may be regarded as having moral significance1 that is1 as having a voluntary basis and origin4 7#b7 ,or they may be considered as substantial properties of things1 as a sort of essence diffused through them1 or as a kind of force resident in them1 in virtue of which persons and things are noxious or helpful1 malevolent or kindly4 ,savage tribes1 for instance1 cannot conceive either sickness or death as natural evils2 they are attributed to the malicious magic of an enemy4 ,similarly the evil which follows from the acts of a man is treated as a sign of some metaphysical tendency inherent in him4 ,some men bring bad luck upon everything and everybody they have anything to do with4 ,a curse is on their doings4 ,no distinction is made between such evils and those which flow from intention and character4 ,the notion of the moral or voluntary nature of good and evil hardly obtains4 ,the quasi-physical view1 bordering upon the magical1 prevails4 ,the result is that evil is thought of as a contagious matter1 transmitted from generation to generation1 from class or person to class or person2 and as something to be got rid of1 if at all1 by devices which are equally physical4 ,natural evils1 plagues1 defeats1 earthquakes1 etc41 are treated as quasi-moral1 while moral evils are treated as more than half physical4 ,sins are infectious diseases1 and natural diseases are malicious interferences of a human or divine enemy4 ,morals are materialized1 and nature is moralized or demoralized4#bjg ,now it is hardly necessary to point out the effect of such conceptions in restricting the freedom and responsibility of the individual person4 ,man is hemmed in as to thought and action on all sides by all kinds of mysterious forces working in unforeseeable ways4 ,this is true enough in his best estate4 ,when to this limitation is added a direction of energy into magical channels1 away from those controllable sources of evil which reside in human disposition1 the amount of effective freedom possible is slight4 ,this same misplacing of liability holds men accountable for acts they have not committed1 because some magic tendency for evil is imputed to them4 ,famine1 pestilence1 defeat in war are evils to be remedied by sacrifice of goods or persons or by ritualistic ceremonies2 while the remediable causes of harm in human ignorance and negligence go without attention4 #b4 ,accident and ,intention4--,under such circumstances1 little distinction can be made between the good and evil which an individual meant to do and that which he happened to do4 ,the working presumption of society1 up to a comparatively late stage of its history1 was that every harmful consequence is an evidence of evil disposition in those who were in any way concerned4 ,this limitation of freedom was accompanied by a counterpart limitation of responsibility4 ,where no harm actually resulted1 there was thought to be no harmful intent4 ,animals and even inanimate objects which do injury are baleful things and come under disapprobation and penalty4 ,even in civilized ,athens there was a survival of the practice of holding inanimate things liable4 ,if a tree fell on a man and killed him1 the tree was to be brought to trial1 and after condemnation cast beyond the civic borders1 i4e41 outlawed4#bjh ,anyhow1 the owner of an offending article was almost always penalized4 ,westermarck1#bji with reference to the guilt of animals1 cites an instance1 dated in #adeg1 when a sow and her six young ones were tried on a charge of their having murdered and partly eaten a child2 the sow1 being found guilty1 was condemned to death1 the young pigs were acquitted on account of their youth and the bad example of their mother4 ,when sticks1 stones1 and animals are held accountable for evil results1 there is little chance of discriminating intent and accident or misadventure in the case of personal agents4 ,the devil himself knoweth not the intent1 the 'thought' of man was the mediaeval maxim2 all that can be certain is that harm has come and the one who caused it must suffer2 or else no overt harm has come and no one is to blame4#baj ,harm has been done and any one concerned1 even remotely1 in the injurious situation1 is ex officio guilty2 it will not do to take chances4 ,the remoteness of an implication which may involve liability is seen in the condition of ,english law in the thirteenth century3 ,at your request ,i accompany you when you are about your own affairs3 my enemies fall upon and kill me3 you must pay for my death4 ,you take me to see a wild-beast show1 or that interesting spectacle a madman3 beast or madman kills me2 you must pay4 ,you hang up your sword2 some one else knocks it down so that it cuts me2 you must pay4#baa ,only gradually did intent clearly evolve as the central element in an act1 and thus lead to the idea of a voluntary or free act4 ,that the limitation upon the side of responsibility was equally great is obvious4 ,if a man is held liable for what he did not and could not foresee or desire1 there is no ground for his holding himself responsible for anticipating the consequences of his acts1 and forming his plans according as he foresees4 ,this comes out clearly in the obverse of what has just been said4 ,if no harm results from a willful attempt to do evil1 the individual is not blamed4 ,he goes scot free4 ,an attempt to commit a crime is no crime4#bab #c4 ,character and ,circumstances4--,even in law1 to say nothing of personal moral judgments1 we now almost as a matter of course take into account1 in judging an agent's intent1 both circumstances1 and character as inferred from past behavior4 ,we extend our view of consequences1 taking into account in judging the moral quality of a particular deed1 consequences its doer is habitually found to effect4 ,we blame the individual less for a deed if we find it contrary to his habitual course4 ,we blame him more1 if we find he has a character given to that sort of thing4 ,we take into account1 in short1 the permanent attitude and disposition of the agent4 ,we also discriminate the conditions and consequences of a deed much more carefully4 ,self-defense1 protection of others or of property1 come in as extenuating circumstances2 the degree of provocation1 the presence of immediate impulsive fear or anger1 as distinct from a definitely formed1 long-cherished idea1 are considered4 ,the questions of first or of repeated offense1 of prior criminality or good behavior1 enter in4 ,questions of heredity1 of early environment1 of early education and opportunity are being brought to-day into account4 ,we are still very backward in this respect1 both in personal and in public morals2 in private judgment and in legal procedure and penalty4 ,only recently have we1 for example1 begun to treat juvenile delinquents in special ways2 and the effort to carry appropriate methods further meets with strong opposition and the even stronger inertia of indifference4 ,it is regarded by many good people as lowering the bars of responsibility to consider early training and opportunity1 just as in its day it was so regarded to plead absence of intent in cases where evil had actually resulted4 ,it is not safe to let any one off from the rigor of the law4 ,the serious barrier1 now as earlier1 is upon the scientific or intellectual side4 ,there was a time when it did not seem feasible to pass upon intent2 it was hidden1 known only to ,god4 ,but we have now devised ways1 adequate in principle1 though faulty in detail1 to judge immediate intent2 similarly1 with the growth of anthropology1 psychology1 statistics1 and the resources of publicity in social science1 we shall in time find it possible to consider the effects of heredity1 early environment1 and training upon character and so upon intent4 ,we shall then regard present methods of judging intent to be almost as barbarous as we now consider the earlier disregard of accident and provocation4 ,above all we shall learn that increased1 not relaxed responsibility1 comes with every increase of discrimination of causes lying in character and conditions4#bac #d4 ,intellectual ,incapacity and ,thoughtlessness4--,with increasing recognition of character as the crucial element in voluntary action1 we now take into account such matters as age1 idiocy1 and insanity as factors of judgment4 ,but this also has been a slow growth4 ,if we take the one question of insanity1 for example1 in #agbd exculpation for harm resulting from a madman's acts required that the person excused be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory1 and doth not know what he is doing1 no more than an infant1 than a brute1 or a wild beast4 ,at the beginning of the nineteenth century1 the excuse was no longer that of being such a raving lunatic as is here implied2 but of knowing right and wrong from each other in the abstract4 ,by a celebrated case in #ahdc1 the rule was changed1 in ,english law1 to knowledge of the difference between right and wrong in the particular case4 ,further advance waits upon progress of science which will make it more possible to judge the specific mental condition of the person acting2 and thus do away with the abuses of the present system which tend1 on the one hand1 to encourage the pleading of insanity where none may exist2 and1 on the other hand 7by a rigid application of a technical rule71 to condemn persons really irresponsible4#bad ,popular judgment still inclines to impute clear and definite intention on the basis of results2 and to ignore conditions of intellectual confusion and bewilderment1 and justifies itself in its course on the ground that such is the only safe course4#bae ,responsibility for ,thoughtlessness4--,but the release from responsibility for deeds in which the doer is intellectually incapacitated1 is met on the other side by holding individuals of normal mental constitution responsible for some consequences which were not thought of at all4 ,we even hold men accountable for not thinking to do certain acts4 ,the former are acts of heedlessness or carelessness1 as when a mason on top of a building throws rubbish on to a street below which injures some one1 without any thought on his part of this result1 much less any deliberate desire to effect it4 ,the latter are acts of negligence1 as when1 say1 an engineer fails to note a certain signal4 ,in such cases even when no harm results1 we now hold the agent morally culpable4 ,similarly we blame children for not thinking of the consequences of their acts2 we blame them for not thinking to do certain things at a certain time--to come home when told1 and so on4 ,this is not merely a matter of judgment by others4 ,the more conscientious a person is1 the more occasions he finds to judge himself with respect to results which happened because he did not think or deliberate or foresee at all--provided he has reason to believe he would have thought of the harmful results if he had been of a different character4 ,because we were absorbed in something else we did not think1 and while1 in the abstract1 this something else may have been all right1 in the concrete it may be proof of an unworthy character4 ,the very fact that we permitted ourselves to become so absorbed that the thought of an engagement1 or of an opportunity to help some friend whom we knew to be in need1 did not occur to us1 is evidence of a selfish1 i4e41 inconsiderate1 character4 ,the case seems paradoxical and is crucial4 ,others hold us responsible because we were irresponsible in action and in order that we may become responsible4 ,we blame ourselves precisely because we discover that an unconscious preference for a private or exclusive good led us to be careless of the good of others4 ,the effect 7if the regret is genuine1 not simulated7 is to develop a habit of greater thoughtfulness in the future4 ,less and less do men accept for others or for themselves ignorance as an excuse for bad consequences1 when the ignorance itself flows from character4 ,our chief moral business is to become acquainted with consequences4 ,our moral character surely does not depend in this case1 then1 upon the fact that we had alternatives clearly in mind and chose the worse2 the difficulty is that we had only one alternative in mind and did not consciously choose at all4 ,our freedom lies in the capacity to alter our mode of action1 through having our ignorance enlightened by being held for the neglected consequences when brought to accountability by others1 or by holding ourselves accountable in subsequent reflection4 ,cases of careless acts and of acts omitted through negligence are thus crucial for any theory of freedom and responsibility4 ,either we are all wrong in blaming ourselves or others in such cases1 because there is no free or voluntary element in them2 or else there is responsibility when deliberate comparison of alternatives and conscious preference are absent4 ,there is responsibility for the absence of deliberation4 ,nature does not forbear to attach consequences to acts because of the ignorance of the one who does the deed4 ,the evil results that follow in the wake of a thoughtless act are precisely the reminders that make one take thought the next time4 ,similarly1 to be held liable by others or to take ourselves to task for forgetfulness1 inconsiderateness1 and negligence1 is the way in which to build up conscientious foresight and deliberate choice4 ,the increased complexity and danger of modern industrial activity1 the menace of electric power1 of high explosives1 of railway trains and trolley cars1 of powerful machines1 have done much to quicken recognition that negligence may be criminal1 and to reawaken the conviction of ,greek thought that thoughtless ignorance1 where knowledge is possible1 is the worst of evils4 ,the increased interdependence of men1 through travel and transportation1 collective methods of production1 and crowding of population in cities1 has widened the area of the harm likely to result from inconsiderate action1 and has strengthened the belief that adequate thoughtfulness is possible only where there is sympathetic interest in others4 #e4 ,the ,conflict of ,form and ,substance4--,the technical forms of procedure concerned in establishing and remedying rights were1 for long ages1 more important than the substantial ends by which alone the forms may be justified4 ,any effort for a remedy was nullified if the minutiae of complicated formulae 7largely magical or ritualistic in their origin7 were deviated from4 ,almost any obligation might be escaped by some quirk or turn in some slight phrase or motion1 without which no agreement was binding1 so sacramental was the importance of the very words4 ,in early days the rigidity of these semi-ritualistic performances doubtless served to check arbitrary and reckless acts1 and to impress the sense of the value of a standard4#baf ,but they survived as rudimentary organs long after they had done their work in this respect2 and after they had been eliminated from legal procedure they survived as habits of judging conduct4 ,survivals of ,spirit of ,individualistic ,litigation4--,the fact that the procedure of justice originated as methods of supplying impartial umpires for conflicts waged between individuals1 has had serious consequences4 ,it has had indeed the desirable consequence of quickening men to the perception of their rights and to their obligation as social members to maintain them intact4 ,but it has also had the undesirable result of limiting the function of the public interest to the somewhat negative one of securing fair play between contentious individuals4 ,the battle is not now fought out with fists or spears or oaths or ordeals3 but it is largely a battle of wits and of technical resources between the opposite parties and their lawyers1 with the ,state acting the part of a benevolently neutral umpire4 ,the ignorant1 the poor1 the foreign1 and the merely honest are almost inevitably at a discount in this battle4#bag ,and1 in any case1 the technical aspect of justice1 that is1 the question of proper forms gets out of true perspective4 ,the legally-minded man is likely to be one with whom technical precedents and rules are more important than the goods to be achieved and the evils to be avoided4 ,with increase of publicity and scientific methods of determining and interpreting facts1 and with a public and professional criticism which is impartial and wise1 we may anticipate that the supremacy of the general good will be increasingly recognized in cases of litigation1 and that the courts1 as organs of public justice1 will take a more active and substantial part in the management of all legal controversies4#bah ,legal and ,moral4--,but1 at the best1 definitions of rights and of remedial procedures only 7#a7 lay down general1 not individual conditions1 and 7#b71 so far as they are strict1 register precedent and custom rather than anticipate the novel and variable4 ,they can state what shall not be done4 ,except in special cases1 they cannot state what shall be done1 much less the spirit and disposition in which it shall be done4 ,in their formulations1 they present a sort of minimum limit of morality not to be overstepped by those inclined to ill4 ,they throw little light on the positive capacities and responsibilities of those who are socially minded4 ,they have a moral purpose3 they free energy from the friction attendant upon vague1 obscure1 and uncertain situations1 by enlightening men as to what they may do and how they may do it4 ,but the exaggeration of form at the expense of the substantial end and good1 leads to misplaced emphasis and false perspective4 ,the rules are treated as ends2 they are employed not to get insight into consequences1 but as justifying1 apart from consequences1 certain acts4 ,the would-be conscientious agent is led into considering goodness as a matter of obeying rules1 not of fulfilling ends4 ,the average individual conceives he has satisfied the requirements of morality when he has conformed to the average level of legal definition and prescription4 ,egoistic1 self-seeking men regard their actions as sanctioned if they have not broken the laws2 and decide this question by success in evading penalties4 ,the intelligence that should go to employing the spirit of laws to enlighten behavior is spent in ingenious inventions for observing their letter4 ,the respectable citizen of this type is one of the unsocialized forces that social reformers find among their most serious obstacles4 ,this identification of morality with the legal and jural leads to a reaction which is equally injurious3 the complete separation of the legal and the moral1 the former conceived as merely outer1 concerned entirely with acts1 not at all with motive and character4 ,the effect of this divorce is perhaps more serious upon the moral than upon the legal4 ,the separation makes morals sentimental and whimsical1 or else transcendental and esoteric4 ,it leads to neglect of the social and institutional realities which form a world of action as surely as natural objects and energies form a physical world1 and ends in the popular conception of morals as just a matter of goodness 7the goody-goodiness7 of individuals4 ,one of the most fundamental of moral duties is that of making the legal order a more adequate expression of the common good4 ,special ,problems4--,civil ,society thus imposes upon its members not only specific obligations1 but it also imposes upon all who enjoy its benefits the supreme obligation of seeing that the civic order is itself intelligently just in its methods of procedure4 ,the peculiar moral problems which men have to face as members of civil society change1 of course1 from time to time with change of conditions2 among the more urgent of present problems1 we may mention3 #a4 ,reform of ,criminal ,procedure4--,the negative side of morality is never so important as the positive1 because the pathological cannot be as important as the physiological of which it is a disturbance and perversion4 ,but no fair survey of our methods1 either of locating criminality or of punishing it1 can fail to note that they contain far too many survivals of barbarism4 ,compared with primitive times we have indeed won a precious conquest4 ,even as late as #ahac1 a proposal to change the penalty for stealing five shillings from death to transportation to a remote colony1 was defeated in ,england4#bai ,but we are likely in flattering ourselves upon the progress made to overlook that which it remains to make4 ,our trials are technical rather than human3 they assume that just about so much persistent criminality must persist in any case4 ,they endeavor1 in rather routine and perfunctory ways1 to label this and that person as criminal in such and such degrees1 or1 by technical devices and resources1 to acquit4 ,in many ,american states1 distrust of government1 inherited from days of tyrannical monarchy or oligarchy1 protects the accused in all sorts of ways4 ,for fear the government will unjustly infringe upon the liberty of the individual1 the latter is not only--as is just--regarded as innocent till proved guilty2 but is provided with every possible technical advantage in rules of evidence1 postponements and appeals1 advantages backed up1 in many cities1 by association with political bosses which gives him a corrupt pull4 ,on the other hand1 there is as yet no general recognition of the possibility of an unbiased scientific investigation into all the antecedents 7hereditary and environmental7 of evildoers2 an investigation which would connect the wrong done with the character of the individual committing it1 and not merely with one of a number of technical degrees of crime1 laid down in the statute books in the abstract1 without reference to particular characters and circumstances4 ,thus while the evildoer has in one direction altogether too much of a chance to evade justice1 he has in another direction a chance at only technical1 rather than at moral1 justice--justice as an individual human being4 ,it is not possible to discuss here various methods which have been proposed for remedying these defects4 ,but it is clearly the business of the more thoughtful members of society to consider the evils seriously and to interest themselves actively in their reform4 ,we need1 above all1 a change in two respects3 7a7 recognition of the possibilities of new methods of judgment which the sciences of physiology1 psychology1 and sociology have brought about2 and 7b7 surrender of that feudal conception according to which men are divided1 as it were essentially1 into two classes3 one the criminal and the other the meritorious4 ,we need to consider the ways in which the pressure and the opportunities of environment and education1 of poverty and comfortable living1 of extraneous suggestion and stimulation1 make the differences between one man and another2 and to recognize how fundamentally one human nature is at bottom4 ,juvenile courts1 probation officers1 detention officers1 mark the beginnings of what is possible1 but only the beginnings4 ,for the most part crime is still treated sordidly and by routine1 except when1 being sensational1 it is the occasion for a great battle of wits between keen prosecuting attorney and clever criminal lawyer1 with the world through the newspapers watching the display4 #b4 ,reform of ,punishment4--,emerson's bitter words are still too applicable4 ,our distrust is very expensive4 ,the money we spend for courts and prisons is very ill laid out4 ,we make1 by distrust1 the thief and burglar and incendiary1 and by our court and jail we keep him so4#bbj ,reformatories1 whose purpose is change of disposition1 not mere penalization1 have been founded2 but there are still many more prisons than reformatories4 ,and1 if it be argued that most criminals are so hardened in evil-doing that reformatories are of no use1 the answer is twofold4 ,we do not know1 because we have never systematically and intelligently tried to find out2 and1 even if it were so1 nothing is more illogical than to turn the unreformed criminal1 at the end of a certain number of months or years1 loose to prey again upon society4 ,either reform or else permanent segregation is the logical alternative4 ,indeterminate sentences1 release on probation1 discrimination of classes of offenders1 separation of the first and more or less accidental and immature offender from the old and experienced hand1 special matrons for women offenders1 introduction of education and industrial training into penitentiaries1 the finding of employment for those released--all mark improvements4 ,they are1 however1 as yet inchoate4 ,intelligent members of society need to recognize their own responsibility for the promotion of such reforms and for the discovery of new ones4 #c4 ,increase of ,administrative ,efficiency4--,in the last one hundred years1 society has rapidly grown in internal complexity4 ,commercial changes have brought about an intense concentration of population in cities2 have promoted migratory travel and intercourse1 with destruction of local ties2 have developed world markets and collective but impersonal 7corporate7 production and distribution4 ,many new problems have been created1 while at the same time many of the old agencies for maintaining order have been weakened or destroyed1 especially such as were adapted to small groups with fixed habits4 ,a great strain has thus been put upon the instrumentalities of justice4 ,pioneer conditions retarded in ,america the development of the problems incident upon industrial reconstruction4 ,the possibility of moving on1 of taking up new land1 finding unutilized resources of forest and mine1 the development of new professions1 the growth of population with new needs to be met1 stimulated and rewarded individual enterprise4 ,under such circumstances there could be no general demand for public agencies of inspection1 supervision1 and publicity4 ,but the pioneer days of ,america are practically ended4 ,american cities and states find themselves confronted with the same problems of public health1 poverty and unemployment1 congested population1 traffic and transportation1 charitable relief1 tramps and vagabondage1 and so forth1 that have troubled older countries4 ,we face these problems1 moreover1 with traditions which are averse to bureaucratic administration and public interference4 ,public regulation is regarded as a paternalistic survival1 quite unsuited to a free and independent people4 ,it would be foolish1 indeed1 to overlook or deny the great gains that have come from our ,american individualistic convictions3 the quickening of private generosity1 the growth of a generalized sense of noblesse oblige--of what every successful individual owes to his community2 of personal initiative1 self-reliance1 and versatile faculty2 of interest in all the voluntary agencies which by education and otherwise develop the individuality of every one2 and of a demand for equality of opportunity1 a fair chance1 and a square deal for all4 ,but it is certain that the country has reached a state of development1 in which these individual achievements and possibilities require new civic and political agencies if they are to be maintained as realities4 ,individualism means inequity1 harshness1 and retrogression to barbarism 7no matter under what veneer of display and luxury71 unless it is a generalized individualism3 an individualism which takes into account the real good and effective--not merely formal--freedom of every social member4 ,hence the demand for civic organs--city1 state1 and federal1--of expert inquiry1 inspection1 and supervision with respect to a large number of interests which are too widespread and too intricate to be well cared for by private or voluntary initiative4 ,the well-to-do in great cities may segregate themselves in the more healthful quarters2 they may rely upon their automobiles for local transportation2 they may secure pure milk and unadulterated foods from personal resources2 they may1 by their combined pull1 secure good schools1 policing1 lighting1 and well-paved streets for their own localities4 ,but the great masses are dependent upon public agencies for proper air1 light1 sanitary conditions of work and residence1 cheap and effective transportation1 pure food1 decent educative and recreative facilities in schools1 libraries1 museums1 parks4 ,the problems which fall to the lot of the proper organs of administrative inspection and supervision are essentially scientific problems1 questions for expert intelligence conjoined with wide sympathy4 ,in the true sense of the word political1 they are political questions3 that is1 they relate to the welfare of society as an organized community of attainment and endeavor4 ,in the cant sense of the term political1 the sense of conventional party-issues and party-lines1 they have no more to do with politics than have the multiplication table and the laws of hygiene4 ,yet they are at present almost hopelessly entangled with irrelevant political issues1 and are almost hopelessly under the heel of party-politicians whose least knowledge is of the scientific questions involved1 just as their least interest is for the human issues at stake4 ,so far civil service reform has been mainly negative3 a purging away of some of the grosser causes which have influenced appointments to office4 ,but now there is needed a constructive reform of civil administration which will develop the agencies of inquiry1 oversight1 and publicity required by modern conditions2 and which will necessitate the selection of public servants of scientifically equipped powers4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,political ,,rights ,,and ,,obligations ,no hard and fast line can be drawn between civil society and the ,state4 ,by the ,state1 however1 we denote those conditions of social organization and regulation which are most fundamental and most general3--conditions which are summed up in and expressed through the general will as manifested in legislation and its execution4 ,as a civil right is technically focused in the right to use the courts1 to sue and be sued1 that is in the right to have other claims adjudicated and enforced by a public1 impartial authority1 so a political right is technically summed up in the power to vote--either to vote directly upon laws or to vote for those who make and carry out laws4 ,to have the right in a legislative assembly to speak for or against a certain measure2 to be able to say yea or nay upon a roll-call2 to be able to put into a ballot-box a piece of paper with a number of names written thereon1 are not acts which of themselves possess the inherent value of many of the most ordinary transactions of daily life4 ,but the representative and potential significance of political rights exceeds that of any other class of rights4 ,suffrage stands for direct and active participation in the regulation of the terms upon which associated life shall be sustained1 and the pursuit of the good carried on4 ,political freedom and responsibility express an individual's power and obligation to make effective all his other capacities by fixing the social conditions of their exercise4 ,growth of ,democracy4--,the evolution of democratically regulated ,states1 as distinct from those ordered in the interests of a small group1 or of a special class1 is the social counterpart of the development of a comprehensive and common good4 ,externally viewed1 democracy is a piece of machinery1 to be maintained or thrown away1 like any other piece of machinery1 on the basis of its economy and efficiency of working4 ,morally1 it is the effective embodiment of the moral ideal of a good which consists in the development of all the social capacities of every individual member of society4 ,present ,problems3 #a4 ,distrust of ,government4--,present moral problems connected with political affairs have to do with safeguarding the democratic ideal against the influences which are always at work to undermine it1 and with building up for it a more complete and extensive embodiment4 ,the historic antecedent of our own governmental system was the exercise of a monopoly by a privileged class4#bba ,it became a democratic institution partly because the ,king1 in order to secure the monopoly1 had to concede and guarantee to the masses of the people certain rights as against the oligarchical interests which might rival his powers2 and partly because the centralization of power1 with the arbitrary despotism it created1 called out protests which finally achieved the main popular liberties3 safety of life and property from arbitrary forfeiture1 arrest1 or seizure by the sovereign2 the rights of free assembly1 petition1 a free press1 and of representation in the law-making body4 ,upon its face1 the struggle for individual liberty was a struggle against the overbearing menace of despotic rulers4 ,this fact has survived in an attitude towards government which cripples its usefulness as an agency of the general will4 ,government1 even in the most democratic countries1 is still thought of as an external ruler1 operating from above1 rather than as an organ by which people associated in pursuit of common ends can most effectively cooperate for the realization of their own aims4 ,distrust of government was one of the chief traits of the situation in which the ,american nation was born4 ,it is embodied not only in popular tradition1 and party creeds1 but in our organic laws1 which contain many provisions expressly calculated to prevent the corporate social body from effecting its ends freely and easily through governmental agencies4#bbb ,there can be no doubt that the movement to restrict the functions of government1 the laissez-faire movement1 was in its time an important step in human freedom1 because so much of governmental action was despotic in intention and stupid in execution4 ,but it is also a mistake to continue to think of a government which is only the people associated for the assuring of their own ends as if it were the same sort of thing as a government which represented the will of an irresponsible class4 ,the advance of means of publicity1 and of natural and social science1 provides not only protection against ignorant and unwise public action1 but also constructive instrumentalities of intelligent administrative activities4 ,one of the chief moral problems of the present day is1 then1 that of making governmental machinery such a prompt and flexible organ for expressing the common interest and purpose as will do away with that distrust of government which properly must endure so long as government is something imposed from above and exercised from without4 #b4 ,indifference to ,public ,concerns4--,the multiplication of private interests is a measure of social progress3 it marks the multiplication of the sources and ingredients of happiness4 ,but it also invites neglect of the fundamental general concerns which1 seeming very remote1 get pushed out of sight by the pressure of the nearer and more vivid personal interests4 ,the great majority of men have their thoughts and feelings well occupied with their family and business affairs2 with their clubs for recreation1 their church associations1 and so on4 ,politics becomes the trade of a class which is especially expert in the manipulation of their fellows and skilled in the acceleration of public opinion4 ,politics then gets a bad name1 and the aloofness from public matters of those best fitted1 theoretically1 to participate in them is further promoted4 ,the saying of ,plato1 twenty-five hundred years ago1 that the penalty good men pay for not being interested in government is that they are then ruled by men worse than themselves1 is verified in most of our ,american cities4 #c4 ,corruption4--,this indifference of the many1 which throws the management of political affairs into the hands of a few1 leads inevitably to corruption4 ,at the best1 government is administered by human beings possessed of ordinary human frailties and partialities2 and1 at the best1 therefore1 its ideal function of serving impartially the common good must be compromised in its execution4 ,but the control of the inner machinery of governmental power by a few who can work in irresponsible secrecy because of the indifference and even contempt of the many1 incites to deliberate perversion of public functions into private advantages4 ,as embezzlement is appropriation of trust funds to private ends1 so corruption1 graft1 is prostitution of public resources1 whether of power or of money1 to personal or class interests4 ,that a public office is a public trust is at once an axiom of political ethics and a principle most difficult to realize4 ,in our own day1 a special field has been opened within which corruption may flourish1 in the development of public utility companies4 ,railways1 city transportation systems1 telegraph and telephone systems1 the distribution of water and light1 require public franchises1 for they either employ public highways or they call upon the ,state to exercise its power of eminent domain4 ,these enterprises can be carried on efficiently and economically only as they are either monopolies1 or quasi-monopolies4 ,all modern life1 however1 is completely bound up with and dependent upon facilities of communication1 intercourse1 and distribution4 ,power to control the various public-service corporations carries with it1 therefore1 power to control and to tax all industries1 power to build up and cast down communities1 companies1 and individuals1 to an extent which might well have been envied by royal houses of the past4 ,it becomes then a very special object for great corporations to control the agencies of legislation and administration2 and it becomes a very special object for party leaders and bosses to get control of party machinery in order to act as brokers in franchises and in special favors--sometimes directly for money1 sometimes for the perpetuation and extension of their own power and influence1 sometimes for the success1 through influential support and contribution to party funds1 of the national party with which they are identified4 #d4 ,reforms in ,party ,machinery4--,the last decade or so of our history has been rife with schemes to improve political conditions4 ,it has become clear1 among other things1 that our national growth has carried with it the development of secondary political agencies1 not contemplated by the framers of our constitutions1 agencies which have become primary in practical matters4 ,these agencies are the machines of political parties1 with their hierarchical gradation of bosses from national to ward rulers1 bosses who are in close touch with great business interests at one extreme1 and with those who pander to the vices of the community 7gambling1 drink1 and prostitution7 at the other2 parties with their committees1 conventions1 primaries1 caucuses1 party-funds1 societies1 meetings1 and all sorts of devices for holding together and exciting masses of men to more or less blind acquiescence4 ,it is not necessary to point out the advantages which parties have subserved in concentrating and defining public opinion and responsibility in large issues2 nor to dwell upon their value in counteracting tendencies which break up and divide men into a multitude of small groups having little in common with one another4 ,but behind these advantages a vast number of abuses have sheltered themselves4 ,recent legislation and recent discussion have shown a marked tendency formally to recognize the part actually played by party machinery in the conduct of the ,state1 and to take measures to make this factor more responsible in its exercise4 ,since these measures directly affect the conditions under which the government as the organ of the general will does its work of securing the fundamental conditions of equal opportunity for all1 they have a direct moral import4 ,such questions as the ,australian ballot1 the recognition of party emblems and party groupings of names2 laws for direct primary nominations2 the registering of voters for primary as well as for final elections2 legal control of party committees and party conventions2 publicity of accounts as to the reception and use of party funds2 forbidding of contributions by corporations1 are thus as distinctly moral questions as are bribery and ballot-box stuffing4 #e4 ,reforms in ,governmental ,machinery4--,questions that concern the respective advantages of written versus unwritten constitutions are in their present state problems of technical political science rather than of morals4 ,but there are problems1 growing out of the fact that for the most part ,american constitutions were written and adopted under conditions radically unlike those of the present1 which have a direct ethical import4 ,as already noted1 our constitutions are full of evidences of distrust of popular cooperative action4 ,they did not and could not foresee the direction of industrial development1 the increased complexity of social life1 nor the expansion of national territory4 ,many measures which have proved indispensable have had therefore to be as it were smuggled in2 they have been justified by legal fictions and by interpretations which have stretched the original text to uses undreamed of4 ,at the same time1 the courts1 which are the most technical and legal of our political organs1 are supreme masters over the legislative branch1 the most popular and general4 ,the distribution of functions between the states and the nation is curiously ill-adapted to present conditions 7as the discussions regarding railway regulation indicate72 and the distribution of powers between the state and its municipalities is hardly less so1 resting in theory upon the idea of local self-government1 and in practice doing almost everything possible to discourage responsible initiative for the conduct of their own affairs on the part of municipalities4 ,these conditions have naturally brought forth a large crop of suggestions for reforms4 ,it is not intended to discuss them here1 but the more important of them1 so far as involving moral questions1 may be briefly noted4 ,the proposals termed the initiative and the referendum and the recall 7this last intended to enable the people to withdraw from office any one with whose conduct of affairs they are dissatisfied7 are clearly intended to make the ideal of democratic control more effective in practice4 ,proposals for limited or complete woman's suffrage call attention to the fact that one-half of the citizenship does the political thinking for the other half1 and emphasize the difficulty under such conditions of getting a comprehensive social standpoint 7which1 as we have already seen1 is the sympathetic and reasonable standpoint7 from which to judge social issues4 ,many sporadic propositions from this and that quarter indicate a desire to revise constitutions so as to temper their cast-iron quality and increase their flexible adaptation to the present popular will1 and so as to emancipate local communities from subjection to ,state legislatures in such a way as to give them greater autonomy and hence greater responsibility1 in the management of their own corporate affairs4 ,it is not the arguments pro and con that we are here concerned with2 but we are interested to point out that moral issues are involved in the settlement of these questions4 ,it may1 moreover1 be noted that dividing lines in the discussion are generally drawn1 consciously or unconsciously1 on the basis of the degree of faith which exists in the democratic principle and ideal1 as against the class idea in some of its many forms4 #f4 ,constructive ,social ,legislation4--,the rapid change of economic methods1 the accumulation and concentration of wealth1 the aggregation of capital and labor into distinct bodies of corporations and trusts1 on one side1 and federated labor unions1 on the other2 the development of collective agencies of production and distribution1 have brought to the focus of public attention a large number of proposals for new legislation1 almost all of which have a direct moral import4 ,these matters are discussed at length in subsequent chapters 7chs4 xxii4-xxv472 and so are passed over here with the reminder that1 while on one side they are questions of the ethics of industry1 they are also questions of the right and wrong use of political power and authority4 ,we may also note that the theoretical principle at issue1 the extension versus the restriction of governmental agencies1 so far as it is not simply a question of what is expedient under the given circumstances1 is essentially a question of a generalized versus a partial individualism4 ,the democratic movement of emancipation of personal capacities1 of securing to each individual an effective right to count in the order and movement of society as a whole 7that is1 in the common good71 has gone far enough to secure to many1 more favored than others1 peculiar powers and possessions4 ,it is part of the irony of the situation that such now oppose efforts to secure equality of opportunity to all on the ground that these efforts would effect an invasion of individual liberties and rights3 i4e41 of privileges based on inequality4 ,it requires perhaps a peculiarly sympathetic imagination to see that the question really involved is not one of magnifying the powers of the ,state against individuals1 but is one of making individual liberty a more extensive and equitable matter4 #g4 ,the ,international ,problem4--,the development of national ,states marks a tremendous step forward in the realization of the principle of a truly inclusive common good4 ,but it cannot be the final step4 ,just as clans1 sects1 gangs1 etc41 are intensely sympathetic within and intensely exclusive and jealous without1 so ,states are still arrayed against ,states1 with patriotism1 loyalty1 as an internal virtue1 and the distrust and hatred of divisive hostility as the counterpart vice4 ,the idea of humanity in the abstract has been attained as a moral ideal4 ,but the political organization of this conception1 its embodiment in law and administrative agencies1 has not been achieved4 ,international law1 arbitration treaties1 and even a court like the ,hague tribunal1 whose power is sentimental rather than political1 mark steps forward4 ,nothing could be more absurd1 from the historic point of view1 than to regard the conception of an international ,state of federated humanity1 with its own laws and its own courts and its own rules for adjudicating disputes1 as a mere dream1 an illusion of sentimental hope4 ,it is a very slight step to take forward compared with that which has substituted the authority of national ,states for the conflict of isolated clans and local communities2 or with that which has substituted a publicly administered justice for the regime of private war and retaliation4 ,the argument for the necessity 7short of the attainment of a federated international ,state with universal authority and policing of the seas7 of preparing in peace by enlarged armies and navies for the possibility of war1 must be offset at least by recognition that the possession of irresponsible power is always a direct temptation to its irresponsible use4 ,the argument that war is necessary to prevent moral degeneration of individuals may1 under present conditions1 where every day brings its fresh challenge to civic initiative1 courage1 and vigor1 be dismissed as unmitigated nonsense4 ,sec4 #d4 ,,the ,,moral ,,criterion ,,of ,,political ,,activity ,the moral criterion by which to try social institutions and political measures may be summed up as follows3 ,the test is whether a given custom or law sets free individual capacities in such a way as to make them available for the development of the general happiness or the common good4 ,this formula states the test with the emphasis falling upon the side of the individual4 ,it may be stated from the side of associated life as follows3 ,the test is whether the general1 the public1 organization and order are promoted in such a way as to equalize opportunity for all4 ,comparison with the ,individualistic ,formula4--,the formula of the individualistic school 7in the narrow sense of that term--the laissez-faire school7 reads3 ,the moral end of political institutions and measures is the maximum possible freedom of the individual consistent with his not interfering with like freedom on the part of other individuals4 ,it is quite possible to interpret this formula in such a way as to make it equivalent to that just given4 ,but it is not employed in that sense by those who advance it4 ,an illustration will bring out the difference4 ,imagine one hundred workingmen banded together in a desire to improve their standard of living by securing higher wages1 shorter hours1 and more sanitary conditions of work4 ,imagine one hundred other men who1 because they have no families to support1 no children to educate1 or because they do not care about their standard of life1 are desirous of replacing the first hundred at lower wages1 and upon conditions generally more favorable to the employer of labor4 ,it is quite clear that in offering themselves and crowding out the others1 they are not interfering with the like freedom on the part of others4 ,the men already engaged are free to work for lower wages and longer time1 if they want to4 ,but it is equally certain that they are interfering with the real freedom of the others3 that is1 with the effective expression of their whole body of activities4 ,the formula of like freedom artificially isolates some one power1 takes that in the abstract1 and then inquires whether it is interfered with4 ,the one truly moral question is what relation this particular power1 say the power to do a certain work for a certain reward1 sustains to all the other desires1 purposes1 and interests of the individual4 ,how are they affected by the way in which some one activity is exercised8 ,it is in them that the concrete freedom of the man resides4 ,we do not know whether the freedom of a man is interfered with or is assisted until we have taken into account his whole system of capacities and activities4 ,the maximum freedom of one individual consistent with equal concrete or total freedom of others1 would indeed represent a high moral ideal4 ,but the individualistic formula is condemned by the fact that it has in mind only an abstract1 mechanical1 external1 and hence formal freedom4 ,comparison with the ,collectivistic ,formula4--,there is a rival formula which may be summed up as the subordination of private or individual good to the public or general good3 the subordination of the good of the part to the good of the whole4 ,this notion also may be interpreted in a way which renders it identical with our own criterion4 ,but it is usually not so intended4 ,it tends to emphasize quantitative and mechanical considerations4 ,the individualistic formula tends in practice to emphasize the freedom of the man who has power at the expense of his neighbor weaker in health1 in intellectual ability1 in worldly goods1 and in social influence4 ,the collectivistic formula tends to set up a static social whole and to prevent the variations of individual initiative which are necessary to progress4 ,an individual variation may involve opposition1 not conformity or subordination1 to the existing social good taken statically2 and yet may be the sole means by which the existing ,state is to progress4 ,minorities are not always right2 but every advance in right begins in a minority of one1 when some individual conceives a project which is at variance with the social good as it has been established4 ,a true public or social good will accordingly not subordinate individual variations1 but will encourage individual experimentation in new ideas and new projects1 endeavoring only to see that they are put into execution under conditions which make for securing responsibility for their consequences4 ,a just social order promotes in all its members habits of criticizing its attained goods and habits of projecting schemes of new goods4 ,it does not aim at intellectual and moral subordination4 ,every form of social life contains survivals of the past which need to be reorganized4 ,the struggle of some individuals against the existing subordination of their good to the good of the whole is the method of the reorganization of the whole in the direction of a more generally distributed good4 ,not order1 but orderly progress1 represents the social ideal4 ,,literature ,green1 ,principles of ,political ,obligation1 #ahhh2 ,ritchie1 ,principles of ,state ,interference1 #ahia1 ,natural ,rights1 #ahie2 ,lioy1 ,philosophy of ,right1 #b vols41 #aija2 ,willoughby1 ,an ,examination of the ,nature of the ,state1 #ahif2 ,wilson1 ,the ,state1 #ahhi2 ,donisthorpe1 ,individualism1 #ahhi2 ,giddings1 ,democracy and ,empire1 #aijj2 ,mulford1 ,the ,nation1 #ahhb2 ,spencer1 ,principles of ,sociology1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 ,part ,v41 #ahhb1 on ,political ,institutions2 ,bentham1 ,fragment on ,government1 #aggf2 ,mill1 ,considerations on ,representative ,government1 #ahfa1 ,on ,liberty1 #ahei1 and ,the ,subjection of ,women1 #ahei2 ,austin1 ,jurisprudence1 #b vols41 #dth ed41 #ahgc2 ,hadley1 ,the ,relations between ,freedom and ,responsibility in the ,evolution of ,democratic ,government1 #aijc2 ,pollock1 ,expansion of the ,common ,law1 #aijd2 ,hall1 ,crime in ,its ,relations to ,social ,progress1 #aija2 ,philanthropy and ,social ,progress1 ,seven ,essays1 #ahic2 ,stephen 7,j4 ,f471 ,liberty1 ,equality1 ,fraternity1 #ahgc 7a criticism of ,mill's ,liberty72 ,tufts1 ,some ,contributions of ,psychology to the ,conception of ,justice1 ,philosophical ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xv41 p4 #cfa4 ,,footnotes3 #bjd ,a traveler tells of overhearing children in ,australia1 when one of their kin had injured some one in another clan1 discuss whether or no they came within the degree of nearness of relationship which made them liable to suffer4 #bje ,hearn1 ,the ,aryan ,household1 p4 #dca4 ,hearn is speaking1 moreover1 of a later and more advanced condition of society1 one lying well within civilization4 #bjf ,those interested in this important history1 as every student of morals may well be1 will find easily accessible material in the following references3 ,hobhouse1 ,morals in ,evolution1 ch4 iii4 of ,vol4 ,i42 ,hearn1 ,the ,aryan ,household1 ch4 xix42 ,westermarck1 ,the ,origin and ,development of the ,moral ,ideas1 ,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #abj-ahe1 and parts of ch4 xx42 ,sutherland1 ,origin and ,growth of the ,moral ,instinct1 chs4 xx4 and xxi42 ,pollock and ,maitland1 ,history of of ,english ,law1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #ddg-dfj and ch4 ix42 ,pollock1 ,oxford ,lectures 7,the ,king's ,peace72 ,cherry1 ,criminal ,law in ,ancient ,communities2 ,maine1 ,ancient ,law4 ,references to anthropological literature1 dealing with savage and barbarian customs1 will be found especially in ,westermarck and ,hobhouse4 #bjg ,for facts regarding the importance and nature of these conceptions1 see ,westermarck1 op4 cit41 pp4 #eb-gb2 ,robertson ,smith1 ,the ,religion of the ,semites1 pp4 #dbg-dce and #aci-adi2 ,jevons1 ,introduction to the ,history of ,religion2 ,hobhouse1 op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,,ii41 chs4 i4 and ii42 and in general facts bearing on the relations between taboos1 holiness1 and uncleanness2 ablutions1 purifications by fire1 transference by scapegoats2 also the evil power of curses1 and the early conceptions of doom and fate4 ,for a suggestive interpretation of the underlying facts1 see ,santayana1 ,the ,life of ,reason1 ,vol4 ,,iii41 chs4 iii4 and iv4 #bjh ,see ,plato1 ,laws1 ,,ix41 #hgc4 ,compare ,holmes1 ,common ,law4 ,in mediaeval and early modern ,europe1 offending objects were deodand1 that is1 devoted to ,god4 ,they were to be appropriated by the proper civil or ecclesiastical authority1 and used for charity4 ,in theory1 this lasted in ,england up to #ahdf4 ,see ,tylor1 ,primitive ,culture1 ,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #bhf-bhg2 and ,pollock and ,maitland1 op4 cit41 ,,ii41 pp4 #dga-dgb4 #bji ,op4 cit41 p4 #beg4 #baj ,the very words cause and to blame are closely connected in their origin4 ,cf4 the ,greek ,greek3 aitia4 #baa ,pollock and ,maitland1 op4 cit41 ,,ii41 p4 #dfi2 ,i41 #cj4 ,for the history of the idea of accident in ,english law with reference to homicide1 see also pp4 #dgg-dhc4 ,also ,stephen1 ,history of the ,criminal ,law in ,england1 ,vol4 ,,iii41 pp4 #caf-cgf4 #bab ,pollock and ,maitland1 ,,ii41 p4 #dgc2 see ,westermarck1 pp4 #bdj-bdg4 #bac ,the slowness and indirectness of change throw light upon the supposed distinction of justice and mercy 7see ante1 p4 #dae74 ,when the practical injustice of regarding accidental homicide or killing in self-defense as murder began to be felt1 the theory was still that the man in justice was guilty1 but that he was to be recommended to the crown for mercy or pardon4 ,this was a mean term in the evolution of our present notion of justice4 #bad ,for some of the main historic facts on intellectual disability1 see ,westermarck1 pp4 #bfd-bgg4 #bae ,popular judgment1 we may say1 tends to be as grossly utilitarian in its practice as it is grossly intuitional in its theoretical standpoint4 ,in assuming the possibility of an almost infallible1 offhand1 pat perception of right and wrong1 it commits itself practically to judging in an offhand1 analyzed way1 on the basis of the evils which overtly result4 #baf ,see ,pollock and ,maitland1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 p4 #efa1 who quote from ,ihering3 ,formulation is the sworn enemy of arbitrariness1 the twin-sister of liberty2 and who add3 ,as time goes on there is always a larger room for discretion in the law of procedure3 but discretionary powers can only be safely entrusted to judges whose impartiality is above suspicion and whose every act is exposed to public and professional criticism4 #bag ,a lawyer1 asked if the poor were not at a disadvantage in the legal maintenance of their rights1 replied3 ,not any more than they are in the other relations of life4 #bah ,the devices of equity as distinct from strict legality are of course in part intended to secure this result4 #bai ,robinson and ,beard1 ,development of ,modern ,europe1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 p4 #bjg4 #bbj ,man the ,reformer4 #bba ,the term the ,king's ,peace1 as the equivalent in ,england for the peace and order of the commonwealth1 goes back to a time when literally it meant a private possession4 ,pollock says that the desire to collect larger revenues was the chief motive for pushing the royal jurisdiction against lesser local authorities4 ,essay on the ,king's ,peace in ,oxford ,essays4 #bbb ,says ,president ,hadley3 ,the fundamental division of powers in the ,constitution of the ,united ,states is between voters on the one hand1 and property-owners on the other4 ,the forces of democracy on one side1 divided between the executive and the legislature1 are set over against the forces of property on the other side1 with the judiciary as arbiter between them4444 ,the voter could elect what officers he pleased1 so long as these officers did not try to do certain duties confided by the ,constitution to the property-holders4 ,democracy was complete as far as it went1 but constitutionally it was bound to stop short of social democracy4 ,,chapter ,,xxii ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,the ,,economic ,,life ,in considering the ethics of the economic life and of property1 so far as this latter topic has not received treatment elsewhere1 we give 7#a7 a general analysis of the ethical questions involved1 7#b7 a more specific account of the problems raised by the present tendencies of industry1 business1 and property2 we follow these analyses with 7#c7 a statement of principles1 and 7#d7 a discussion of unsettled problems4 ,sec4 #a4 ,,general ,,analysis ,both the economic process and property have three distinct ethical aspects corresponding respectively to the ethical standpoint of happiness1 character1 and social justice4 7#a7 ,the economic process supplies men with goods for their bodily wants and with many of the necessary means for satisfying intellectual1 aesthetic1 and social needs2 property represents permanence and security in these same values4 7#b7 ,through the difficulties it presents1 the work it involves1 and the incitements it offers1 the economic process has a powerful influence in evoking skill1 foresight1 and scientific control of nature1 in forming character1 and stimulating ambition to excel4 ,property means power1 control1 and the conditions for larger freedom4 7#c7 ,the economic process has an important social function4 ,through division of labor1 cooperation1 and exchange of goods and services1 it affords one of the fundamental expressions of the organic nature of society in which members are reciprocally ends to each other4 ,property1 likewise1 is not only a possessing1 but a right1 and thus1 like all rights1 involves the questions why and how far society should support the individual in his interests and claims4 ,let us examine each of these aspects further4 #a4 ,the ,economic in ,relation to ,happiness4--,subject to the important qualifications to be made below under this and the succeeding sections1 we note first that the supply of needs and wants by industry and commerce is ethically a good4 ,a constant increase in production and consumption is at least a possible factor in a fuller life4 ,wealth is a possible condition of weal1 even if it is not to be gratuitously identified with it4 ,rome is frequently cited as an example of the evil effects of material wealth4 ,but it was not wealth per se1 but wealth 7a7 gained by conquest1 and exploitation1 rather than by industry2 7b7 controlled by a minority2 and 7c7 used in largesses or in crude spectacles--rather than democratically distributed and used to minister to higher wants4 ,the present average income in the ,united ,states is about two hundred dollars a year per capita1 too small a sum to permit comfortable living1 sufficient education for children1 and the satisfaction which even a very moderate taste may seek4 ,from this point of view we may then ask of any industrial process or business method whether it is an economical and efficient method of production1 and whether it naturally tends to stimulate increased production4 ,to do this is--so far as it goes--ethically as well as economically desirable4 ,if wealth is a good1 it might seem that property must be judged by the same standard1 since it represents security in the satisfactions which wealth affords4 ,but there is an important distinction4 ,wealth means enjoyment of goods and satisfaction of wants4 ,property means the title to the exclusive use or possession of goods4 ,hence the increase of property may involve increasing exclusion of part of the community from wealth1 although the owners of the property may be increasing their own enjoyments4 ,for1 as pointed out very forcibly by ,hadley in the first chapter of his ,economics1 the public wealth of a community is by no means equal to the sum of its private property4 ,if all parks were divided up into private estates1 all schoolhouses controlled by private owners1 all water supplies and highways given into private control1 the sum of private property might be very much increased2 but the public wealth would be decreased4 ,property is one of the means of dealing with public wealth4 ,it is important to bear in mind1 however1 that it is only one means4 ,wealth may be 7#a7 privately owned and privately used2 7#b7 privately owned and publicly or commonly used2 7#c7 publicly owned1 but privately used2 7#d7 publicly owned and publicly or commonly used4 ,illustrations of these four methods are1 for the first1 among practically all peoples1 clothing and tools2 of the second1 a private estate opened to public use--as a park2 of the third1 public lands or franchises leased to individuals2 of the fourth1 public highways1 parks1 navigable rivers1 public libraries4 ,whether property in any given case is a means to happiness will depend1 then1 largely upon whether it operates chiefly to increase wealth or to diminish it4 ,the view has not been infrequent that the wealth of the community is the sum of its private property4 ,from this it is but a step to believe that the acquisition of property is the production of wealth1 and that he best serves the common good who1 other things equal1 diverts the larger share of the aggregate wealth to his own possession4#bbc ,the ethical questions as to the relation of property to happiness involve accordingly the problem of justice and can be more conveniently considered under that head4 #b4 ,relation to ,character4--,even in its aspect of satisfying human wants1 quantity of production is not the only consideration4 ,as was pointed out in the chapters on ,happiness1 the satisfaction of any and every want is not necessarily a moral good4 ,it depends upon the nature of the wants2 and as the nature of the wants reflects the nature of the man who wants1 the moral value of the economic process and of the wealth it provides must depend upon the relation of goods to persons4 ,as economists we estimate values in terms of external goods or commodities2 as ethical students we estimate values in terms of a certain quality of life4 ,we must ask first how the satisfaction of wants affects the consumers4 ,moral ,cost of ,production4--,consider next the producers4 ,it is desirable to have cheap goods1 but the price of goods or service is not measurable solely in terms of other commodities or service2 the price of an article is also1 as ,thoreau has said1 what it costs in terms of human life4 ,there is cheap production which by this standard is dear4 ,the introduction of machinery for spinning and weaving cotton cheapened cotton cloth1 but the child labor which was supposedly necessary as a factor in cheap production1 involving disease1 physical stunting1 ignorance1 and frequently premature exhaustion or death1 made the product too expensive to be tolerated4 ,at least1 it was at last recognized as too expensive in ,england2 apparently the calculation has to be made over again in every community where a new system of child labor is introduced4 ,what is true of child labor is true of many other forms of modern industry--the price in human life makes the product dear4 ,the minute subdivision of certain parts of industry with the consequent monotony and mechanical quality of the labor1 the accidents and diseases due to certain occupations1 the devices to cheapen goods by ingredients which injure the health of the consumer1 the employment of women under unsanitary conditions and for excessive hours with consequent risk to the health of themselves and their offspring--all these are part of the moral price of the present processes of industry and commerce4 ,moreover1 the relation of production to physical welfare is only one aspect of its effects upon life and character4 ,we may properly ask of any process or system whether it quickens intelligence or deadens it1 whether it necessitates the degradation of work to drudgery1 and whether it promotes freedom or hampers it4 ,to answer this last question we shall have to distinguish formal from real freedom4 ,it might be that a system favorable to the utmost formal freedom--freedom of contract--would result in the most entire absence of that real freedom which implies real alternatives4 ,if the only alternative is1 this or starve1 the real freedom is limited4 ,property and ,character4--,viewed on its positive side1 property means an expansion of power and freedom4 ,to seize1 master1 and possess is an instinct inbred by the biological process4 ,it is necessary for life2 it is a form of the ,wille zum ,leben or ,wille zur ,macht which need not be despised4 ,but in organized society possession is no longer mere animal instinct2 through expression in a social medium and by a social person it becomes a right of property4 ,this is a far higher capacity2 like all rights it involves the assertion of personality and of a rational claim upon fellow members of society for their recognition and backing4 ,fichte's doctrine1 that property is essential to the effective exercise of freedom1 is a strong statement of its moral importance to the individual4 ,over against these positive values of property are certain evils which moralists have always recognized1 evils both to the property owner and to society4 ,avarice1 covetousness1 hardness toward others1 seem to be the natural effects of the enormous possibilities of power offered by property1 joined with its exclusive character4 ,the prophets of ,israel denounced the rich1 and ,jesus's image of the difficulty found by the rich man in entering the kingdom of ,god--a moral society--has met general acceptance4 ,plato's portrayal of the ,state in which the wealthy rule sketches the perversion and disobedience of laws1 the jealousies and class hatred1 the evasion of taxes for public defense1 and gives the moral outcome3-- ,and henceforth they press forward on the path of money-getting1 losing their esteem for virtue as the esteem for wealth grows upon them4 ,for can you deny that there is such a gulf between wealth and virtue1 that when weighed as it were in the two scales of a balance one of the two always falls1 as the other rises8#bbd ,even apart from questions of just distribution1 the moral question arises as to whether an unlimited power should be given to individuals in this form1 and whether there should be unlimited right of inheritance4 ,but all these tend to pass over at once into questions of justice4 #c4 ,social ,aspects4--,the various relations of man to man1 political1 friendly1 kindred1 are developed forms of the interdependence implicit in the early group life4 ,a group of units1 each independent of the others1 would represent mass only1 but such a group as is made up of men1 women1 and children1 sustaining all the relations found in present human life1 represents something vastly more than a mass of individuals4 ,every life draws from the rest4 ,man without friendship1 love1 pity1 sympathy1 communication1 cooperation1 justice1 rights1 or duties1 would be deprived of nearly all that gives life its value4 ,the necessary help from others is obtained in various ways4 ,parental1 filial1 and other kinship ties1 friendship and pity1 give rise to certain services1 but they are necessarily limited in their sphere and exact in return a special attitude that would be intolerable if made universal4 ,the modern man does not want to be cousin to every one1 to give every one his personal friendship1 to be in a perpetual attitude of receiving favors1 or of asking and not receiving4 ,formerly the way of getting service from men outside these means was by slavery4 ,the economic relation provides for the mutual exchange of goods and services on a basis of self-respect and equality4 ,through its system of contracts it provides for future as well as present service4 ,it enables each to obtain the services of all the rest1 and in turn to contribute without incurring any other claims or relations4 ,nor does it at all diminish the moral value of these mutual exchanges of goods and services that they may be paid for4 ,it used to be the theory that in every bargain one party gained and the other lost4 ,it is now recognized that a normal transaction benefits both parties4 ,the cash payment basis1 which was at first denounced as substituting a mechanical nexus for the old personal tie1 is in reality a means for establishing a greater independence instead of the older personal relation of master and servant4 ,it enabled a man1 as ,toynbee puts it1 to sell his labor like any other commodity without selling himself4 ,but while the economic process has these moral possibilities1 the morality of any given system or practice will depend on how far these are actually realized4 ,first of all1 we may fairly ask of a process1 ,does it give to each member the kind of service needed by him8 ,in economic terms1 ,does it produce the kinds of goods which society needs and desires8 ,a method which provides for this successfully will in so far be providing against scarcity of some goods and oversupply of others1 and thus against one of the sources of crises1 irregularity of work and wages1 and ultimately against suffering and want4 ,secondly1 if the process is an expression of the mutual dependence and service of members who as persons all have1 as ,kant puts it1 intrinsic worth1 and who in our political society are recognized as equal1 we may fairly ask how it distributes the results of services rendered4 ,does the process tend to a broad and general distribution of goods in return for services rendered1 or to make the rich richer and the poor poorer8 ,or1 from another point of view1 we might ask1 ,does the process tend to reward members on a moral or equitable basis1 or upon a basis which is non-moral if not immoral or unjust4 ,thirdly1 the problem of conflicting services presents itself under several forms4 ,there is1 first1 the ever-present conflict between producer and consumer4 ,higher wages and shorter hours are good for the carpenter or the weaver1 until he pays his rent or buys clothes1 when he is interested in cheaper goods4 ,what principle can be employed to adjust such a question8 ,again1 service to the consumer may lead a producer to a price-list implying a minimum of profits4 ,one producer can afford this because of his larger business1 but it will drive his competitor from the field4 ,shall he agree to a higher price at which all can do business1 or insist on the lower which benefits the consumer and also himself8 ,the labor union is a constant embodiment of the problem of conflicting services4 ,how far shall it serve a limited group1 the union1 at the expense of other workers in the same trade--non-unionists8 ,does it make a difference whether the union is open to all1 or whether the dues are fixed so high as to limit the membership8 ,shall the apprentices be limited to keep up the wage by limiting the supply8 ,if so1 is this fair to the boys or unskilled laborers who would like to enter8 ,and granting that it is a hardship to these1 is it harder or is it kinder to them than it would be to leave the issue to the natural weeding out or starving-out procedure of natural selection in case too many enter the trade8 ,shall the hours be reduced and wages raised as high as possible1 or is there a fair standard--fair to both consumer and laborer8 ,how far may the union combine with the capitalist to raise prices to the consumer8 ,private ,property and ,social ,welfare4--,the social value of property is obviously indirect1 just as in law1 private rights are regarded as indirectly based on social welfare4 ,it is society's aim to promote the worth of its members and to favor the development of their personal dignity and freedom4 ,property may1 therefore1 claim social value in so far as it serves these ends1 unless it interferes with other social values4 ,the effect of private property has seemed to some disastrous to community of interest and feeling4 ,plato1 for example1 in his ideal state would permit his guardians no private property4 ,there would1 then1 be no quarrels over meum and tuum1 no suits or divisions1 no petty meanness or anxieties1 no plundering of fellow-citizens1 no flattery of rich by poor4 ,the mediaeval church carried out his theory4 ,even modern society preserves a certain trace of its spirit4 ,for the classes that ,plato called guardians--soldiers1 judges1 clergy1 teachers--have virtually no property1 although they are given support by society4 ,it would probably be generally agreed that it is better for the public that these classes should not have large possessions4 ,but it is obvious that private property is not the sole cause of division between individuals and classes4 ,where there is a deep-going unity of purpose and feeling1 as in the early ,christian community1 or in various other companies that have attempted to practice communism1 common ownership of wealth may be morally valuable as well as practically possible4 ,but without such unity1 mere abolition of property is likely to mean more bitter divisions1 because there is no available method for giving to each the independence which is necessary to avoid friction and promote happiness4 ,granting1 however1 the general position that some parts of wealth should be privately owned1 we must recognize that a great number of moral problems remain as to the precise conditions under which society will find it wise to entrust the control of wealth to private ownership4 ,for it must be clearly kept in mind that there is no absolute right of private property4 ,every right1 legal or moral1 derives from the social whole1 which in turn1 if it is a moral whole1 must respect the individuality of each of its members4 ,on this basis moral problems1 such as the following1 must be considered4 ,what kind of public wealth should be given into absolute control of private individuals or impersonal corporations8 ,does the institution in its present form promote the good of those who have no property as well as of those who have it1 or only of those who own8 ,would the welfare of society as a whole be promoted by giving a larger portion of public wealth into private control1 or by retaining a larger proportion than at present under public ownership8 ,should there be any limit to the amount of land or other property which an individual or corporation may own8 ,are there any cases in which private ownership operates rather to exclude the mass of society from the benefits of civilization than to give them a share of those benefits8 ,should a man be allowed to transmit all his property to his heirs1 or should it be in part reserved by society8 ,the preceding analysis has aimed to state some of the problems which belong necessarily to the economic life4 ,at the present time1 however1 the moral issues assume a new and puzzling aspect because of the changes in economic conditions4 ,it will be necessary to consider briefly these changed conditions4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,the ,,problems ,,set ,,by ,,the ,,new ,,economic ,,order ,the ,collective and ,impersonal ,organizations4--,two changes have come over a large part of the economic and industrial field4 ,the first is the change from an individual to a collective basis4 ,the second1 which is in part a consequence of the first1 is a change from personal to impersonal or corporate relations4 ,corporations are of course composed of persons1 but when organized for economic purposes they tend to become simply economic purpose incorporate1 abstracted from all other human qualities4 ,although legally they may be subjects of rights and duties1 they have but one motive1 and are thus so abstract as to be morally impersonal4 ,they tend to become machines for carrying on business1 and1 as such1 may be as powerful--and as incapable of moral considerations--as other machines4 ,ethical ,readjustment4--,both these changes require readjustment of our ethical conceptions4 ,our conceptions of honesty and justice1 of rights and duties1 got their present shaping largely in an industrial and business order when mine and thine could be easily distinguished2 when it was easy to tell how much a man produced2 when the producer sold to his neighbors1 and an employer had also the relations of neighbor to his workmen2 when responsibility could be personally located1 and conversely a man could control the business he owned or make individual contracts2 when each man had his own means of lighting1 heating1 water supply1 and frequently of transportation1 giving no opportunity or necessity for public service corporations4 ,such conceptions are inadequate for the present order4 ,the old honesty could assume that goods belonged to their makers1 and then consider exchanges and contracts4 ,the new honesty will first have to face a prior question1 ,who owns what is collectively produced1 and are the present rules of the game distributing the returns honestly and fairly8 ,the old justice in the economic field consisted chiefly in securing to each individual his rights in property or contracts4 ,the new justice must consider how it can secure for each individual a standard of living1 and such a share in the values of civilization as shall make possible a full moral life4 ,the old virtue allowed a man to act more as an individual2 the new virtue requires him to act in concerted effort if he is to achieve results4 ,individualist theories cannot interpret collectivist facts4 ,the changes in the economic and industrial processes by which not only the associated powers of present human knowledge1 skill1 and endurance1 but also the combined results of past and future skill and industry are massed and wielded1 depend on several concurrent factors4 ,we shall notice the social agency1 the technique of industry1 the technique of business1 the means of fixing value1 and the nature of property4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,the ,,agencies ,,for ,,carrying ,,on ,,commerce ,,and ,,industry ,early ,agencies4--,the early agencies for carrying on trade and industry were not organized purely for economic purposes4 ,the kindred or family group engaged in certain industries1 but this was only part of its purpose4 ,so in the various territorial groups4 ,the ,athenian city-state owned the mines2 the ,german village had its forest1 meadow1 and water as a common possession2 and the common survived long in ,english and ,american custom1 though the cattle pastured on it might be individually owned4 ,in the ,united ,states certain land was reserved for school purposes1 and if retained would now in some cases be yielding an almost incredible amount for public use2 but it has usually been sold to private individuals4 ,the national government still retains certain land for forest reserve1 but until the recent movement toward municipal ownership1 the civic community had almost ceased to be an economic factor in ,england and ,america1 except in the field of roads1 canals1 and the postoffice4 ,in both family and territorial or community control of industry1 we have the economic function exercised as only one among several others4 ,the economic helped to strengthen the other bonds of unity4 ,on the other hand1 the economic motive could not disentangle itself and stand out in all its naked force4 ,within either family or civic group the effects of the acquisitive instincts were limited by the fact that individuals in their industrial relations were also kin or neighbors4 ,the ,business ,enterprise4--,in the business enterprise--partnership1 company1 corporation1 trust1--on the other hand1 men are organized solely for economic purposes4 ,no other interests or ends are regarded4 ,corporations organized for this purpose have no souls1 because they consist of merely the abstract economic interests4 ,while in domestic and territorial agencies the acquisitive forces were to some degree beneficially controlled1 they were also injuriously hampered4 ,with the rise of business enterprise as a distinct sphere of human action1 the way was opened for a new force to manifest itself4 ,this brought with it both advantages and disadvantages for the moral and social life as a whole4 ,on the one hand1 it increased tremendously the possibilities of economic and industrial efficiency4 ,the size of the enterprise could be as large or as small as was needed for the most efficient production1 and was not1 as in family or community agency1 sometimes too small and sometimes too large4 ,the enterprise could group men according to their capacity for a particular task1 and not1 as in the other forms1 be compelled to take a group already constituted by other than economic or industrial causes4 ,further1 it could without difficulty dispense with the aged or those otherwise unsuited to its purposes4 ,when1 moreover1 as is coming to be increasingly the case1 great corporations1 each controlling scores or even hundreds of millions of capital1 are linked together in common control1 we have a tremendous force which may be wielded as a unit4 ,it is easy to assume--indeed it is difficult for managers not to assume--that the interests of such colossal organizations are of supreme importance1 and that diplomacy1 tariffs1 legislation1 and courts should be subordinate4 ,the moral dangers attaching to such corporations formed solely for economic purposes are obvious1 and have found frequent illustration in their actual workings4 ,knowing few or none of the restraints which control an individual1 the corporation has treated competitors1 employees1 and the public in a purely economic fashion4 ,this insures certain limited species of honesty1 but does not include motives of private sympathy or public duty4 ,the ,labor ,union4--,correlative to these corporate combinations of capital are ,labor ,unions of various types4 ,they are usually when first organized more complex in motive1 including social and educational ends1 and are more emotional1 or even passionate in conduct4 ,with age they tend to become more purely economic4 ,in the ,united ,states they have sought to secure better wages1 to provide benefits or insurance in case of sickness and death1 and to gain better conditions in respect of hours1 of child-labor1 and of protection against dangerous machinery1 explosions1 and occupational diseases4 ,in ,great ,britain they have also been successful in applying the cooperative plan to the purchase of goods for consumption4 ,the organizations have been most successful among the skilled trades4 ,for so far as the aim is collective bargaining1 it is evident that the union will be effective in proportion as it controls the whole supply of labor in the given trade4 ,in the unskilled forms of labor1 especially with a constant flow of immigration1 it is difficult1 if not impossible1 to maintain organizations comparable with the organizations of capital4 ,hence in conflicts it is natural to expect the moral situations which frequently occur when grossly unequal combatants are opposed4 ,the stronger has contempt for the weaker and refuses to recognize his existence4 ,the weaker1 rendered desperate by the hopelessness of his case when he contends under rules and with weapons prescribed by the stronger1 refuses to abide by the rules and resorts to violence--only to find that by this he has set himself in opposition to all the forces of organized society4 ,group ,morality ,again4--,the striking feature of the new conditions is that it means a reversion to group morality4 ,that is1 it has meant this so far4 ,society is struggling to reassert a general moral standard1 but it has not yet found a standard1 and has wavered between a rigid insistence upon outgrown laws on the one hand1 and a more or less emotional and unreasoned sympathy with new demands1 upon the other4#bbe ,group morality meant impersonal1 collective life4 ,it meant loyalty to one's own group1 little regard for others1 lack of responsibility1 and lack of a completely social standard4 ,there is1 of course1 one important difference4 ,the present collective1 impersonal agencies are not so naive as the old kinship group4 ,they can be used as effective agencies to secure definite ends1 while the manipulators secure all the advantages of the old solidarity and irresponsibility4 ,members and ,management4--,the corporation in its idea is democratic4 ,for it provides for the union of a number of owners1 some of them it may be small owners1 under an elected management4 ,it would seem to be an admirable device for maintaining concentration of power with distribution of ownership4 ,but the very size of modern enterprises and unions prevents direct control by stockholders or members4 ,they may dislike a given policy1 but they are individually helpless4 ,if they attempt to control1 it is almost impossible1 except in an extraordinary crisis1 to unite a majority for common action4#bbf ,the directors can carry on a policy and at the same time claim to be only agents of the stockholders1 and therefore not ultimately responsible4 ,what influence can the small shareholders in a railway company1 or a great industrial corporation1 or labor union1 have8 ,they unite with ease upon one point only3 they want dividends or results4 ,when an illegal policy is to be pursued1 or a legislature or jury is to be bribed1 or a non-union man is to be dealt with1 the head officials likewise seek only results4 ,they turn over the responsibility to the operating or legal department1 or to the educational committee1 and know nothing further4 ,these departments are agents for the stockholders or union1 and therefore1 feel quite at ease4 ,the stockholders are sure they never authorized anything wrong4 ,some corporations are managed for the interest of a large number of owners2 some1 on the other hand1 by ingenious contracts with side corporations formed from an inner circle1 are managed for the benefit of this inner circle4 ,the tendency1 moreover1 in the great corporations is toward a situation in which boards of directors of the great railroad1 banking1 insurance1 and industrial concerns are made up of the same limited group of men4 ,this aggregate property may then be wielded as absolutely as though owned by these individuals4 ,if it is used to carry a political election the directors1 according to ,new ,york courts1 are not culpable4 ,employer and ,employed4--,the same impersonal relation often prevails between employer and employed4 ,the ultimate employer is the stockholder1 but he delegates power to the director1 and he to the president1 and he to the foreman4 ,each is expected to get results4 ,the employed may complain about conditions to the president1 and be told that he cannot interfere with the foreman1 and to the foreman and be told that such is the policy of the company4 ,the union may serve as a similar buffer4 ,often any individual of the series would act humanely or generously1 if he were acting for himself4 ,he cannot be humane or generous with the property of others1 and hence there is no humanity or generosity in the whole system4 ,this system seems to have reached its extreme in the creation of corporations for the express purpose of relieving employers of any personal responsibility4 ,companies organized to insure employers against claims made by employees on account of injuries may be regarded as a device for distributing the burden4 ,but as the company is organized1 not primarily to pay damages1 as are life insurance companies1 but to avoid such payment1 it has a powerful motive in contesting every claim1 however just1 and in making it so expensive to prosecute a claim that the victims may prefer not to make the attempt4 ,the law's delay can nearly always be counted upon as a powerful defense when a poor man is plaintiff and a rich corporation is defendant4 ,relations to the ,public4--,the relations of corporations to the public1 and of the public to corporations1 are similarly impersonal and non-moral4 ,a convenient way of approach to this situation is offered by the ethical1 or rather non-ethical1 status of the various mechanical devices which have come into use in recent years for performing many economic services4 ,the weighing machines1 candy machines1 telephones1 are supposed to give a certain service for a penny or a nickel4 ,but if the machine is out of order1 the victim has no recourse4 ,his own attitude is correspondingly mechanical4 ,he regards himself as dealing1 not with a person1 but with a thing4 ,if he can exploit it or beat it1 so much the better4 ,now a corporation1 in the attitude which it takes and evokes1 is about half-way between the pure mechanism of a machine and the completely personal attitude of a moral individual4 ,a man is overcharged1 or has some other difficulty with an official of a railroad company4 ,it is as hopeless to look for immediate relief as it is in the case of a slot machine4 ,the conductor is just as much limited by his orders as the machine by its mechanism4 ,the man may later correspond with some higher official1 and if patience and life both persist long enough1 he will probably recover4 ,but to prevent fraud1 the company is obliged to be more rigorous than a person would be who was dealing with the case in a personal fashion4 ,hence the individual with a just grievance is likely to entertain toward the corporation the feeling that he is dealing with a machine1 not with an ethical being1 even as the company's servants are not permitted to exercise any moral consideration in dealing with the public4 ,they merely obey orders4 ,public sentiment1 which would hold an individual teamster responsible for running over a child1 or an individual stage owner responsible for reckless or careless conduct in carrying his passengers1 feels only a blind rage in the case of a railroad accident4 ,it cannot fix moral responsibility definitely upon either stockholder or management or employee1 and conversely neither stockholder1 nor manager1 nor employee#bbg feels the moral restraint which the individual would feel4 ,he is not wholly responsible1 and his share in the collective responsibility is so small as often to seem entirely negligible4 ,relations to the ,law4--,the collective business enterprises1 when incorporated1 are regarded as juristic persons1 and so gain the support of law as well as become subject to its control4 ,if the great corporation can thus gain the right of an individual1 it can enter the field of free contract with great advantage4 ,labor unions have not incorporated1 fearing1 perhaps1 to give the law control over their funds4 ,they seek a higher standard of living1 but private law does not recognize this as a right4 ,it merely protects contracts1 but leaves it to the individual to make the best contract he can4 ,as most wage-earners have no contracts1 but are liable to dismissal at any time1 the unions have seen little to be gained by incorporation4 ,they have thus missed contact with the institution in which society seeks to embody1 however tardily1 its moral ideas and have been1 in a sense1 outlaws4 ,they were such at first by no fault of their own1 for the law treated such combinations as conspiracies4 ,and they are still at two decided disadvantages4 ,first1 the capitalistic or employing corporation acting as a single juristic person may refuse to buy the labor of a union2 indeed1 according to a recent decision1 it cannot be forbidden to discharge its employees because of their membership in a union4 ,as the corporation may employ scores of thousands1 and be practically the only employer of a particular kind of labor1 it can thus enforce a virtual boycott and prevent the union from selling its labor4 ,it does not need to use a blacklist because the employers are all combined in one person4 ,on the other hand1 the union is adjudged to act in restraint of interstate commerce if it boycotts the employing corporation4 ,the union is here treated as a combination1 not as a single person4 ,the second point in which the employing body has greatly the legal advantage appears in the case of a strike4 ,men are allowed to quit work1 but this is not an effective method of exerting pressure unless the employer is anxious to keep his plant in operation and can employ no one else4 ,if he can take advantage of an open labor market and hire other workmen1 the only resource of the strikers is to induce these to join their ranks4 ,but they have been enjoined by the courts1 not only from intimidating1 but even from persuading#bbh employees to quit work4 ,the method of procedure in enforcing the injunction1 which enables the judge to fix the offense1 eliminate trial by jury1 determine the guilt1 and impose any penalty he deems fit1 has all the results of criminal process with none of its limitations1 and forms a most effective agency against the unions4 ,where persuasion is enjoined it is difficult to see how a union can exert any effective pressure except in a highly skilled trade1 where it can control all the labor supply4 ,in the field of private rights and free contract1 the labor unions are then at a disadvantage because they have no rights which are of any value for their purposes1 except1 under certain conditions1 the right to refuse to work4 ,and since this is1 in most cases1 a weapon that injures its wielder far more than his opponent1 it is not effective4 ,disappointed in the field of free contract1 the labor unions seek to enlist public agency in behalf of better sanitary conditions and in prevention of child-labor1 long hours for women1 unfair contracts1 and the like4 ,capitalistic corporations frequently resist this change of venue on the ground that it interferes with free contract or takes away property without due process of law1 and many laws have been set aside as unconstitutional on these grounds1#bbi several of them no doubt because so drawn as to appear to be in the interest of a class1 rather than in that of the public4 ,the trend in the direction of asserting larger public control both under the police power and over corporations in whose service the public has a direct interest1 will be noted later4 ,against other corporations the general public or the unsuccessful competitor has sought legal aid in legislation against trusts1 but this has mainly proved to be futile4 ,it has merely induced a change in form of organization4 ,nor has it been easy as yet for the law to exercise any effective control over the business corporation on any of the three principles invoked--namely3 to prevent monopoly1 to secure the public interest in the case of public service corporations1 and to assert police power4 ,for penalties by fine frequently fail to reach the guilty persons1 and it is difficult to fix any personal responsibility4 ,juries are unwilling to convict subordinate officials of acts which they believe to have been required by the policy of the higher officials1 while1 on the other hand1 the higher officials are seldom directly cognizant of criminal acts4 ,gradually1 however1 we may believe that the law will find a way to make both capital and labor organizations respect the public welfare1 and to give them support in their desirable ends4 ,the cooperative principle cannot be outlawed2 it must be more fully socialized4 ,sec4 #d4 ,,the ,,methods ,,of ,,production1 ,,exchange1 ,,and ,,valuation ,the ,machine4--,the technique of production has shown a similar progress from individual to collective method4 ,the earlier method was that of handicraft4 ,the present method in most occupations1 aside from agriculture1 is that of the machine4 ,but the great economic advantage of the machine is not only in the substitution of mechanical power for muscle2 it is also in the substitution of collective for individual work4 ,it is the machine which makes possible on a tremendously effective basis the division of labor and its social organization4 ,the extraordinary increase in wealth during the past century depends upon these two factors4 ,the machine itself moreover1 in its enormous expansion1 is not only a social tool1 but a social product4 ,the invention and discovery which gave rise to the new processes in industry of every sort were largely the outcome of scientific researches carried on at public expense to a great extent by men other than those who finally utilize their results4 ,they become in turn the instruments for the production of wealth1 which is thus doubly social in origin4 ,this machine process has an important bearing upon the factors of character mentioned in our analysis4 ,it standardizes efficiency2 it calls for extraordinary increase of speed2 it requires great specialization of function and often calls for no knowledge of the whole process4 ,on the other hand1 it gives a certain sense of power to control and direct highly complicated machinery4 ,in the more skilled trades there is more time and resource for intellectual1 aesthetic1 or social satisfactions4 ,the association of workmen favors discussion of common interests1 sympathy1 and cooperation2 this may evoke a readiness to sacrifice individual to group welfare1 which is quite analogous to patriotic sentiment at its best1 even if it is liable to such violent expressions as characterize patriotic sentiment at its worst4 ,the association of workmen is one of the most significant features of modern industry4 ,capital and ,credit4--,the technique of exchange of services and goods has undergone a transformation from an individual and limited to a collective and almost unlimited method4 ,the earlier form of exchange and barter limited the conduct of business to a small area1 and the simpler form of personal service involved either slavery or some personal control which was almost as direct4 ,with the use of money it became possible to make available a far greater area for exchange and to accumulate capital which represented the past labors of vast numbers of individuals4 ,with the further discovery of the possibilities of a credit system which business enterprise now employs1 it is possible to utilize in any enterprise not merely the results of the labor of the past1 but the anticipated income of the future4 ,a corporation1 as organized at present1 issues obligations in the form of bonds and stock which represent no value as yet produced1 but only the values of labor or privilege anticipated4 ,the whole technique1 therefore1 of capital and credit means a collective business enterprise4 ,it masses the work and the abilities of thousands and hundreds of thousands in the past and the future1 and wields the product as an almost irresistible agency to achieve new enterprises or to drive from the field rival enterprises4 ,basis of ,valuation4--,the whole basis for value and prices has also been changed4 ,the old basis1 employed for the most part through the ,middle ,ages in fixing the value of labor or goods1 was the amount of labor and material which had been expended4 ,the modern basis is that of supply and demand4 ,this proceeds on the theory that it is human wants which after all give value to any product4 ,i may have expended time and labor upon a book or carving1 or in the cultivation of a new vegetable1 or in the manufacture of an article for apparel1 but if no one cares to read the book or look at the carving1 if the vegetable is one that no one can eat1 or the garment is one that no one will wear1 it has no value4 ,starting then from this1 we can see how the two elements in valuation--namely1 demand and supply--are affected by social factors4 ,the demand for an article depends upon the market3 i4e41 upon how many buyers there are1 and what wants they have4 ,modern methods of communication and transportation have made the market for goods as large as the civilized world4 ,education is constantly awakening new wants4 ,the facilities for communication1 for travel1 and for education are constantly leading one part of the world to imitate the standards or fashions set by other parts4 ,we have1 therefore1 a social standard for valuation which is constantly extending in area and in intensity4 ,the other factor in valuation1 namely1 the supply1 is likewise being affected in an increasing degree by social forces4 ,with many1 if not with most1 of the commodities which are of greatest importance1 it has been found that there is less profit in an unrestricted supply than in a supply regulated in the interest of the producers4 ,the great coal mines1 the iron industries1 the manufacturers of clothing1 find it more profitable to combine and produce a limited amount4 ,the great corporations and trusts have usually signalized their acquisition of a monopoly or an approximate control of any great field of production by shutting down part of the factories formerly engaged4 ,the supply of labor is likewise limited by the policies of labor unions in limiting the number of apprentices allowed1 or by other means of keeping the union small4 ,tariffs1 whether in the interest of capital or of labor1 are a social control of the supply4 ,franchises1 whether of steam railroads1 street transportation1 gas1 electric lighting1 or other public utilities so-called1 are all of them in the nature of monopolies granted to a certain group of individuals4 ,their value is dependent upon the general need of these utilities1 coupled with the public limitation of supply4 ,in many cases the services are so indispensable to the community that the servant does not need to give special care or thought to the rendering of especially efficient service4 ,the increase in population makes the franchises enormously profitable without any corresponding increase of risk or effort on the part of the utility company4 ,but the most striking illustration of the creation of values by society is seen in the case of land4 ,that an acre of land in one part of the country is worth fifty dollars1 and in another part two hundred thousand dollars1#bcj is not due to any difference in the soil1 nor for the most part to any labor or skill or other quality of the owner4 ,it is due to the fact that in the one case there is no social demand1 whereas1 in the other1 the land is in the heart of a city4 ,in certain cases1 no doubt1 the owner of city real estate may help by his enterprise to build up the city1 but even if so this is incidental4 ,the absentee owner profits as much by the growth of the city as the foremost contributor to that growth4 ,the owner need not even improve the property by a building4 ,this enormous increase in land values has been called the unearned increment4 ,in ,america it is due very largely to features of natural location and transportation4 ,it has seemed to some writers1 such as ,henry ,george1 not only a conspicuous injustice1 but the root of all economic evil4 ,it is1 no doubt1 in many cases1 a conspicuous form of easy money1 but the principle is not different from that which is involved in nearly all departments of modern industry4 ,the wealth of modern society is really a gigantic pool4 ,no individual knows how much he creates2 it is a social product4 ,to estimate what any one should receive by an attempted estimate of what he has individually contributed is absolutely impossible4 ,sec4 #e4 ,,the ,,factors ,,which ,,aid ,,ethical ,,reconstruction ,the two distinctive features of the modern economic situation1 its collective character and its impersonal character1 are themselves capable of supplying valuable aid toward understanding the ethical problems and in making the reconstruction required4 ,for the very magnitude of modern operations and properties serves to bring out more clearly the principles involved4 ,the impersonal character allows economic forces pure and simple to be seen in their moral bearings4 ,publicity becomes a necessity4 ,just as the factories are compelled to have better light1 air1 and sanitation than the sweat shops1 so public attention is aroused and the conscience stimulated by practices of great corporations1 although these practices may be in principle precisely the same as those of private persons which escape moral reprobation4 ,in some cases1 no doubt1 the very magnitude of the operation does actually change the principle4 ,a lift on the road from an oldtime stage-driver1 or a special bargain at a country store was not likely to disturb the balance of competition as a system of free passes or secret rebates may in modern business4 ,but in other cases what the modern organizations have done is simply to exhibit the workings of competition or other economic forces on a larger scale4 ,an illustration of this is seen in the familiar fact that a law passed to correct some corporate practice is often found to apply to many practices not contemplated by the makers of the law4 ,the effect of getting a principle out into the open and at work on a large scale is to make public judgment clear and reprobation of bad practices more effective4 ,the impersonal factor likewise contributes powerfully to make condemnation easy4 ,criticism is unhampered by the considerations which complicate the situation when the conduct of an individual is in question4 ,the individual may be a good neighbor1 or a good fellow1 or have had bad luck4 ,but no one hesitates to express his opinion of a corporation1 and the average jury is not biased in its favor1 whatever may be true of the bench4 ,even the plea that the corporation includes widows and orphans among its shareholders1 which is occasionally put forth to avert interference with corporate practices1 usually falls on unsympathetic ears4 ,a higher standard will be demanded for business conduct1 a more rigid regard for public service will be exacted1 a more moderate return for invested capital in public service1 and a more liberal treatment of employees will be insisted upon from corporations than from private individuals4 ,nor does the organization of labor escape the same law4 ,when an agent of a union has been detected in calling a strike for private gain1 public sentiment has been as severe in condemnation as in the case of corporate officials who have profited at the expense of stockholders4 ,summary4--,we may summarize some of the chief points brought out by our analysis4 ,modern technique has increased enormously the productivity of labor1 but has increased its dangers to health and life1 and to some extent diminished its educating and moralizing values4 ,the impersonal agencies give vast power1 but make responsibility difficult to locate4 ,the collective agencies and the social contributions make the economic process a great social pool4 ,men put in manual labor1 skill1 capital4 ,some of it they have inherited from their kin2 some they have inherited from the inventors and scientists who have devised tools and processes2 some they have wrought themselves4 ,this pooling of effort is possible because of good government and institutions which were created by statesmen1 patriots1 and reformers1 and are maintained by similar agencies4 ,the pool is immensely productive4 ,but no one can say just how much his contribution earns4 ,shall every one keep what he can get8 ,shall all share alike8 ,or shall there be other rules for division--either made and enforced by society or made by the individual and enforced by his own conscience8 ,are our present rules adequate to such a situation as that of the present8 ,these are some of the difficult questions that modern conditions are pressing upon the man who thinks4 ,,literature ,besides the classic treatises of ,adam ,smith1 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 and ,karl ,marx1 which are important for the relation of the economic to the whole social order during the past century1 the following recent works in the general field give especial prominence to the ethical problems involved3 ,marshall1 ,principles of ,economics1 #ahih2 ,hadley1 ,economics1 #ahif2 ,clark1 ,essentials of ,economic ,theory as ,applied to ,modern ,problems of ,industry and ,public ,policy1 #aijg2 ,george1 ,progress and ,poverty1 #ahgi2 ,schmoller1 ,grundriss der allgemeinen ,staatswirtschaftslehre1 #aijj-jd2 ,bonar1 ,philosophy and ,political ,economy1 #ahic2 ,hobson1 ,the ,social ,problem1 #aija2 ,brooks1 ,the ,social ,unrest1 #aijc4 ,,on ,,modern ,,business ,,and ,,industry3 ,veblen1 ,the ,theory of ,business ,enterprise1 #aijd2 ,taylor1 ,the ,modern ,factory ,system1 #ahia2 ,hobson1 ,evolution of ,modern ,capitalism1 #ahid2 ,toynbee1 ,the ,industrial ,revolution1 #ahij2 ,adams and ,sumner1 ,labor ,problems1 #aije2 ,s4 and ,b4 ,webb1 ,history of ,trade ,unionism1 #ahid1 ,problems of ,modern ,industry1 #ahih1 and ,industrial ,democracy1 #aijb2 ,mitchell1 ,organized ,labor1 #aijc2 ,ely1 ,the ,labor ,movement in ,america1 #ahhf2 ,hollander and ,barnett1 ,studies in ,american ,trades ,unionism1 #aijg2 ,henderson1 ,social ,elements1 #ahih1 chs4 vii4-x4 ,,footnotes3 #bbc ,veblen1 ,theory of ,business ,enterprise1 p4 #bia4 #bbd ,republic1 #eej4 ,davies and ,vaughan4 #bbe ,e4g41 in a strike there is sometimes a toleration by public sentiment of a certain amount of violence where it is believed that there is no legal remedy for unfair conditions4 #bbf ,recent elections in the great insurance companies have shown this4 #bbg ,j4 ,o4 ,fagan1 in the ,atlantic ,monthly 7#aijh71 has called attention to the influence of the union in shielding individuals from the penalties of carelessness4 #bbh ,recent ,illinois decisions 7#baf ,ill41 #ceh f41 and especially #bcb ,ill41 #dca-ddj7 uphold sweeping injunctions against persuasion1 no matter how peaceable4 ,lawful competition1 which may injure the business of a person1 even though successfully directed to driving him out of business1 is not actionable4 ,but for a union to hire laborers away from an employer by money or transportation is not lawful competition4 ,the object is assumed by the court to be malicious1 i4e41 the injury of the employer4 ,the court does not entertain the possibility that to obtain an eight-hour day is as lawful an aim for the labor union as to acquire property is for an employer4 ,the decision shows clearly the difference in legal attitude toward pressure exerted by business corporations for the familiar end of acquisition1 and that exerted by the union for the novel end of a standard of living4 ,the court regards the injury to others as incidental in the former1 but as primary and therefore as malicious in the latter4 ,it may be that future generations will regard this judicial psychology somewhat as we regard some of the cases cited above1 ch4 xxi4 ,other courts have not always taken this view1 and have permitted persuasion unless it is employed in such a manner or under such circumstances as to operate on fears rather than upon their judgments or their sympathies 7#ag41 ,n4 ,y4 ,supp41 #bfd74 ,for other cases1 ,am4 and ,eng4 ,decisions in ,equity1 #aije1 p4 #efe f42 also ,eddy on ,combinations4 #bbi ,the list appended was bulletined at the ,chicago ,industrial ,exhibit of #aijf1 and reprinted in ,charities and ,the ,commons4 ,what ',freedom of ,contract' has ,meant to ,labor3 #a4 ,denial of eight-hour law for women in ,illinois4 #b4 ,denial of eight-hour law for city labor or for mechanics and ordinary laborers4 #c4 ,denial of ten-hour law for bakers4 #d4 ,inability to prohibit tenement labor4 #e4 ,inability to prevent by law employer from requiring employee as condition of securing work1 to assume all risk from injury while at work4 #f4 ,inability to prohibit employer selling goods to employees at greater profit than to non-employees4 #g4 ,inability to prohibit mine owners screening coal which is mined by weight before crediting same to employees as basis of wages4 #h4 ,inability to legislate against employer using coercion to prevent employee becoming a member of a labor union4 #i4 ,inability to restrict employer in making deductions from wages of employees4 #aj4 ,inability to compel by law payment of wages at regular intervals4 #ab4 ,inability to provide by law that laborers on public works shall be paid prevailing rate of wages4 #ac4 ,inability to compel by law payment of extra compensation for overtime4 #ad4 ,inability to prevent by law employer from holding back part of wages4 #ae4 ,inability to compel payment of wages in cash2 so that employer may pay in truck or scrip not redeemable in lawful money4 #af4 ,inability to forbid alien labor on municipal contracts4 #ag4 ,inability to secure by law union label on city printing4 ,labor representatives speak of the ironic manner in which the courts guarantee to workers3 ,the right to be maimed and killed without liability to the employer2 the right to be discharged for belonging to a union2 the right to work as many hours as employers please and under any considerations which they may impose4 ,the irony is1 of course1 not intended by the courts4 ,it is the irony inherent in a situation when rules designed to secure justice become futile1 if not a positive cause of injustice1 because of changed conditions4 #bcj ,in ,greater ,new ,york4 ,an acre on ,manhattan ,island is of course worth much more4 ,the ,report of the ,new ,york ,tax ,department for #aijg is very suggestive4 ,,chapter ,,xxiii ,,some ,,principles ,,in ,,the ,,economic ,,order ,certain problems suggested by the foregoing analysis are unsettled1 for the issues are so involved1 and in some cases1 both the facts and their interpretations are so much in controversy1 that we cannot yet formulate sure moral judgments4 ,on the other hand1 certain principles emerge with a good degree of clearness4 ,we state some of the more obvious4 #a4 ,wealth and ,property are ,subordinate in ,importance to ,personality4--,the life is more than meat4 ,most agree to this1 stated abstractly1 but many fail to make the application4 ,they may sacrifice their own health1 or human sympathy1 or family life2 or they may consent to this actively or passively as employers1 or consumers1 or citizens1 in the case of others4 ,a civilization which loses life in providing the means to live is not highly moral4 ,a society which can afford luxuries for some cannot easily justify unhealthful conditions of production1 or lack of general education4 ,an individual who gratifies a single appetite at the expense of vitality and efficiency is immoral4 ,a society which considers wealth or property as ultimate1 whether under a conception of natural rights or otherwise1 is setting the means above the end1 and is therefore unmoral or immoral4 #b4 ,wealth ,should ,depend on ,activity4--,the highest aspect of life on its individual side is found in active and resolute achievement1 in the embodying of purpose in action4 ,thought1 discovery1 creation1 mark a higher value than the satisfaction of wants1 or the amassing of goods4 ,if the latter is to be a help it must stimulate activity1 not deaden it4 ,inherited wealth without any accompanying incitement from education or class feeling or public opinion would be a questionable institution from this point of view4 ,veblen in his ,theory of the ,leisure ,class points out various forms of degeneration that may attend upon leisure1 when leisure means not merely release from mechanical labor in the interest of more intellectual activity1 but a relinquishing of all serious labor4 ,as the race has made its ascent in the presence of an environment which has constantly selected the more active persons1 society in its institutions and consciously directed processes may well plan to keep this balance between activity and reward4 ,modern charity has adopted this principle4 ,we fear to pauperize by giving aid to the poor unless we can provide some form of self-help4 ,but in its treatment of the rich1 society is not solicitous4 ,our provisions for inheritance of property undoubtedly pauperize a certain proportion of those who inherit4 ,whether this can be prevented without interfering with motives to activity on the part of those who acquire the property1 or whether the rich thus pauperized are not as well worth saving to society as the poor1 will undoubtedly become more pressing problems as the number of inheritors increases1 and society recognizes that it may have a duty to its idle rich as well as to its idle poor4 #c4 ,public ,service ,should ,go ,along with ,wealth4--,note that we do not say1 wealth should be proportionate to public service4 ,this would take us at once into the controversy between the individualist and the socialist which we shall consider later among the unsettled problems4 ,the individualist1 as represented1 for example1 by ,herbert ,spencer1 would say that except for the young1 the aged1 or the sick1 reward should be proportioned to merit4 ,the socialist1 on the other hand1 is more inclined to say1 ,from each according to his ability1 to each according to his needs4 ,in either case1 it is assumed that there should be public service4 ,leaving for later consideration the question whether we can fix any quantitative rule1 let us notice at this time why some service is a fundamental moral principle4 ,such service in the form of some economically useful contribution1 whether to the production and distribution of goods1 to the public order1 to education1 to the satisfaction of aesthetic and religious wants1 might be demanded as a matter of common honesty4 ,this would be to treat it as a just claim made by society upon each of its members4 ,there is1 of course1 no legal claim4 ,the law is far from adopting as a universal maxim1 ,if any man will not work1 neither let him eat4 ,vagrancy is not a term applied to all idlers4 ,it is sufficient for the law if some of a man's ancestors obtained possession and title by service1 or force1 or gift4 ,modern law1 in its zeal to strengthen the institution of property1 releases all the owner's posterity forever from the necessity of any useful service4 ,the old theology used to carry the conception of inherited or imputed sin and merit to extremes which modern individualism rejects4 ,but the law--at least in the ,united ,states--permits a perpetual descent of inherited property2 i4e41 of inherited permission to receive from society without rendering any personal return4 ,theologically and morally1 however1 the man of to-day repudiates any conception which would reduce him to a shadow of another4 ,he wishes to stand on his own feet1 to be rewarded or blamed according to his own acts1 not because of a deed of some one else4 ,to follow out this principle in the economic sphere would require that every man who receives aught from others should feel in duty bound to render some service4 ,merely to have been born is hardly sufficient in a democratic society1 however munificent a contribution to the social weal the ,french aristocrat may have felt this to be4 ,but it is only one aspect of the case to say that society may claim service as a just due4 ,there is another aspect--what this service means to the person himself4 ,it is his opportunity to fulfill his function in the social organism4 ,now a person is as large as his purpose and will4 ,the person1 therefore1 who identifies his purposes with the welfare of the public is thereby identifying himself with the whole social body4 ,he is no longer himself alone2 he is a social power4 ,not only the leader of society1 but every efficient servant makes himself an organ through which society itself acts and moves forward4 ,this is perhaps most conspicuous in the case of the great inventors or organizers of industry and society4 ,by serving civilization they have become its bearers and have thus shared its highest pulses4 ,but it is true of every laborer4 ,as he is an active contributor he becomes creative1 not merely receptive4 #d4 ,the ,change from ,individual to ,collective ,methods1 of ,industry and ,business ,demands a ,change from ,individual to ,collective ,types of ,morality4--,moral action is either to accomplish some positive good or to hinder some wrong or evil4 ,but under present conditions the individual by himself is practically helpless and useless for either purpose4 ,it was formerly possible for a man to set a high standard and live up to it1 irrespective of the practice or cooperation of others4 ,when a seller's market was limited to his acquaintance or a limited territory1 it might well be that honesty or even fair dealing was the best policy4 ,but with the changes that have come in business conditions the worse practices1 like a baser coinage1 tend to drive out the morally better4 ,this may not apply so thoroughly to the relations between seller and buyer1 but it applies to many aspects of trade4 ,a merchant may desire to pay his women clerks wages on which they can support life without selling their souls4 ,but if his rival across the street pays only half the wage necessary for subsistence1 it is evident the former is in so far at a disadvantage4 ,extend the same policy4 ,let the former have his goods made under good conditions and the latter have no scruple against sweating2 let the former pay taxes on an honest estimate and the latter see the assessor1 or threaten to move out of town if he is assessed for more than a figure named by himself2 let the former ask only for a fair chance1 while the latter secures legislation that favors his own interests1 or gets specifications for bids worded so that they will exclude his opponents1 or in selling to public bodies fixes the councils or school committees1 or obtains illegal favors in transportation4 ,let this continue1 and how long will the former stay in the field8 ,even as regards quality of goods1 where it would seem more plausible that honest dealing might succeed1 experience has shown that this depends on whether the frauds can be easily detected4 ,in the case of drugs and goods where the adulterations cannot be readily discovered1 there is nothing to offset the more economical procedure of the fraudulent dealer4 ,the fact that it is so difficult to procure pure drugs and pure food would seem to be most plausibly due to the fatal competition of the adulterated article4 ,or1 suppose a person has a little property invested in some one of the various corporations which offer the most convenient method for placing small sums as well as large4 ,this railroad defies the government by owning coal mines as well as transporting the product2 that public service corporation has obtained its franchise by bribery2 this corporation is an employer of child labor2 that finds it less expensive to pay a few damage suits--those it cannot fight successfully--than to adopt devices which will protect employees4 ,does a man1 or even an institution1 act morally if he invests in such corporations in which he finds himself helpless as an individual stockholder8 ,and if he sells his stock at the market price to invest the money elsewhere1 is it not still the price of fraud or blood8 ,if1 finally1 he buys insurance for his family's support1 recent investigation has shown that he may have been contributing unawares to bribery of legislatures1 and to the support of political theories to which he may be morally opposed4 ,the individual cannot be moral in independence4 ,the modern business collectivism forces a collective morality4 ,just as the individual cannot resist the combination1 so individual morality must give place to a more robust or social type4 #e4 ,to ,meet the ,change to ,corporate ,agency and ,ownership1 ,ways ,must be ,found to ,restore ,personal ,control and ,responsibility4--,freedom and responsibility must go hand in hand4 ,the moral liability limited theory cannot be accepted in the simple form in which it now obtains4 ,if society holds stockholders responsible1 they will soon cease to elect managers merely on an economic basis and will demand morality4 ,if directors are held personally responsible for their legal department1 or union officials for their committees1 directors and officials will find means to know what their subordinates are doing4 ,crime is always personal1 and it is not usual for subordinates to commit crimes for the corporation against the explicit wishes of the higher officials4 ,in certain lines the parties concerned have voluntarily sought to restore a more personal relation4#bca ,it has been found profitable to engage foremen who can get on smoothly with workmen4 ,it has proved to be good economy to treat men1 whether they sell labor or buy it1 with respect and fairness4 ,the managers of some of the great public service corporations have also recently shown a disposition to recognize some public obligations1 with the naive admission that this has been neglected4 ,labor unions are coming to see the need of conciliating public opinion if they are to gain their contests4 #f4 ,to ,meet the ,impersonal ,agencies ,society ,must ,require ,greater ,publicity and ,express ,its ,moral ,standards ,more ,fully in ,law4--,publicity is not a cure for bad practices1 but it is a powerful deterrent agency so long as the offenders care for public opinion and not solely for the approval of their own class4 ,professor ,ross#bcb maintains that in the ,united ,states classes are still so loosely formed that general approval is desired by the leaders4 ,hence he urges that it is possible to enforce moral standards by the grilling of sinners4 ,but to make this grilling a moral process society needs much more accurate information and a more impartial basis for selecting its sinners than present agencies afford4 ,the public press is itself in many respects one of the most conspicuous examples of the purely economic motive4 ,the newspaper or magazine must interest readers and not displease advertisers4 ,the news is selected1 or colored1 or worked up to suit particular classes4 ,if a speaker says what the reporter does not regard as interesting he is likely to find himself reported as saying something more striking4 ,publicity bureaus are able to point with pride to the amount of matter1 favorable to certain interests1 which they place before the public as news4 ,the particular interests singled out for exposure are likely to be determined more by the anticipated effects on circulation or advertising than by the merits of the case4 ,it is scarcely more satisfactory to leave all the education of public opinion to commercial control than to leave all elementary education to private interests4 ,publicity--scientific investigation and public discussion--is indeed indispensable1 and its greatest value is probably not in the exhilarating discharge of righteous indignation1 but in the positive elevation of standards1 by giving completer knowledge and showing the fruits of certain practices4 ,a large proportion of the public will wish to do the right thing if they can see it clearly1 and can have public support1 so that right action will not mean suicide4 ,but the logical way to meet the impersonal character of modern economic agencies is by the moral consciousness embodied in an impersonal agency1 the law4 ,the law is not to be regarded chiefly as an agency for punishing criminals4 ,it1 in the first place1 defines a standard2 and1 in the next place1 it helps the morally disposed to maintain this standard by freeing him from unscrupulous competition4 ,it is a general principle that to resort to the law is an ethical gain only when the getting something done is more important than to get it done from the right motive4 ,this evidently applies to acts of corporate bodies4 ,we do not care for their motives4 ,we are not concerned to save their souls4 ,we are concerned only for results--just the place where we have seen that the personal responsibility breaks down4 ,the value of good motives and moral purpose is in this case located in those who strive to secure and execute progressive legislation for the public good1 and in the personal spirit with which this is accepted and carried out by officials4#bcc #g4 ,every ,member of ,society ,should ,share in ,its ,wealth and in the ,values ,made ,possible by ,it4--,the quantitative basis of division and the method for giving each a share belong to the unsettled problems4 ,but the worth and dignity of every human being of moral capacity is fundamental in nearly every moral system of modern times4 ,it is implicit in the ,christian doctrine of the worth of the soul1 in the ,kantian doctrine of personality1 in the ,benthamic dictum1 every man to count as one4 ,it is imbedded in our democratic theory and institutions4 ,with the leveling and equalizing of physical and mental power brought about by modern inventions and the spread of intelligence1 no ,state is permanently safe except on a foundation of justice4 ,and justice cannot be fundamentally in contradiction with the essence of democracy4 ,this means that wealth must be produced1 distributed1 and owned justly3 that is1 so as to promote the individuality of every member of society1 while at the same time he must always function as a member1 not as an individual4 ,in defining justice some will place freedom first2 others1 a standard of living4 ,some will seek fairness by distributing to each an actual share of the goods2 others1 by giving to each a fair chance to get his share of goods4 ,others again have held that if no moral purpose is proposed and each seeks to get what he can for himself1 the result will be a just distribution because of the beneficent effects of competition4 ,still others have considered that if the economic process has once been established on the basis of contracts rather than status or slavery1 justice may be regarded as the maintenance of these contracts1 whatever the effect in actual benefits4 ,these views will be considered under the next topic as unsettled problems4 ,,literature ,in addition to the works cited at the close of the last chapter1 ,giddings1 ,the ,costs of ,progress1 in ,democracy and ,empire1 #aija2 ,bosanquet 7,mrs4 ,b471 ,the ,standard of ,life1 #ahih2 ,bosanquet1 ,b41 ,aspects of the ,social ,problem1 #ahie2 ,stephen1 ,social ,rights and ,duties1 #ahif2 ,tufts1 ,some ,contributions of ,psychology toward the ,conception of ,justice1 ,philosophical ,review1 xv41 #aijf1 pp4 #cfa-gi2 ,woods1 ,democracy1 a ,new ,unfolding of ,human ,power1 in ,studies in ,philosophy and ,psychology 7,garman ,commemorative ,volume71 #aijf4 ,,footnotes3 #bca ,hayes ,robbins in the ,atlantic ,monthly for ,june1 #aijg1 ,the ,personal ,factor in the ,labor ,problem4 #bcb ,sin and ,society4 #bcc ,see ,florence ,kelley1 ,some ,ethical ,gains through ,legislation4 ,,chapter ,,xxiv ,,unsettled ,,problems ,,in ,,the ,,economic ,,order ,under this head we propose to consider one general and three special problems on which society is at present at work1 framing new moral standards to meet new conditions4 ,many of the questions involved in the new order marshal themselves under a single antithesis4 ,will the moral values of wealth be most fully secured and justly distributed by leaving to individuals the greatest possible freedom and holding them morally responsible1 or by social agency and control8 ,the first theory is known as individualism4 ,the most convenient term for the second position would be socialism4 ,socialism1 however1 is1 for many1 an epithet rather than a scientific conception4 ,it is supposed to mean necessarily the abolition of all private enterprise or private property4 ,in its extreme form it might mean this1 as individualism in its extreme form would mean anarchy4 ,but as a practical ethical proposition we have before us neither the abolition of public agency and control--extreme individualism--nor the abolition of private agency and control4 ,we have the problem of getting the proper amount of each in order that the highest morality may prevail4 ,each theory professes to desire the fullest development and freedom of the individual4 ,the individualist seeks it through formal freedom and would limit public agency to a minimum4 ,the socialist is willing to permit limitations on formal freedom in order to secure the real freedom which he regards as more important and substantial4 ,between the extremes1 and borrowing from each1 is a somewhat indefinite programme known as the demand for equal opportunity4 ,let us consider each in a brief statement and then in a more thorough analysis4 ,sec4 #a4 ,,general ,,statement ,,of ,,the ,,positions ,,of ,,individualism ,,and ,,of ,,public ,,agency ,,and ,,control #a4 ,individualism4--,individualism#bcd believes that each man can secure his own welfare better than any one else can secure it for him4 ,it further holds that society is made up of individuals1 and hence1 if each is provided for1 the welfare of the whole is secured4 ,such goods as are social can be secured by voluntary association4 ,believing that the course of civilization has been from status to contract1 it makes free contract its central principle4 ,it should be the chief business of organized society to maintain and safeguard this freedom4 ,it locates the important feature of freedom precisely in the act of assent1 rather than in any consideration of whether the after consequences of the assent are good or bad2 nor does it ask what motives 7force and fraud aside7 brought about the assent1 or whether there was any other alternative4 ,in other words1 it regards formal freedom as fundamental4 ,if not in itself all that can be desired1 it is the first step1 and the only one which law need recognize4 ,the individual may be trusted to take other steps1 if protected in this4 ,the only restriction upon individual freedom should be that it must not interfere with the equal freedom of others4 ,in the economic sphere this restriction would mean1 must not interfere by force4 ,the theory does not regard economic pressure by competition as interference4 ,hence it favors free competition4 ,leaving out of account benevolence1 it holds that in business each should be allowed1 or even recommended1 to seek his own advantage4 ,but when the question as to the justice of the distribution reached by this method is raised1 a division appears between the democratic individualists and the survival of the fittest individualists4 ,the democratic individualists--,adam ,smith1 ,bentham1 ,mill#bce--;believed that individualism would promote the welfare of all members of society4 ,the survival of the fittest school maintains that the welfare of the race or of civilization depends on the sifting and selecting process known as the struggle for existence4 ,if the fittest are thus selected and survive1 it matters not so much what is the lot of the rest4 ,we must choose between progress through aristocratic selection and degeneration through democratic leveling4 #b4 ,theory of ,public ,agency and ,control4--,socialism 7using the word in a broad sense7 holds that society should secure to all its members the goods of life4 ,it holds that an unrestrained liberty of struggle for existence may secure the survival of the strongest1 but not necessarily of the morally best4 ,the individualist's theory emphasizes formal freedom4 ,seek first freedom and all other things will be added4 ,the socialist view emphasizes the content4 ,it would have all members of society share in education1 wealth1 and all the goods of life4 ,in this it agrees with democratic individualism4 ,but it considers this impossible on the basis of individual effort4 ,to hold that society as a whole can do nothing for the individual either ignores social goods or supposes the social will1 so powerful for democracy in the political sphere1 to be helpless and futile in the economic world4 ,to assume that all the control of economic distribution--the great field of justice--may be left to individual freedom and agency1 is as archaic as to leave the collection of taxes1 the administration of provinces1 and the education of citizens to private enterprise4 ,it regards the unregulated struggle for existence as economically wasteful and morally vicious1 both in its inequality of distribution and in the motives of egoism on which it relies4 ,individualism1 on the other hand1 so far as it is intelligent and does not lump socialism with anarchy and all other criticisms on the established order1 regards socialism as ignoring the supreme importance of active personal effort1 and the value of freedom as the keynote to progress4 #c4 ,equal ,opportunity4--,an intermediate view has for its maxim1 equal opportunity4 ,it holds with individualism that the active personality is to be stimulated and made a prime end4 ,but because it believes that not merely a few but all persons should be treated as ends1 it finds individualism condemned4 ,for it holds that an unregulated struggle for existence does not secure the end individualism professes to seek4 ,when individuals start in the race handicapped by differences in birth1 education1 family1 business1 friends1 and inherited wealth1 there is no selection of ability2 there is selection of the privileged4 ,hence it would borrow so much from socialism as to give each individual a fair start4 ,this would include public schools1 and an undefined amount of provision for sanitation1 and for governmental regulation of the stronger4 ,it is manifest1 however1 that this theory of the square deal is a name for a general aim rather than for a definite programme4 ,for a square deal1 or equality of opportunity1 might be interpreted to call for a great variety of concrete schemes1 ranging all the way from an elementary education up to public ownership of all the tools for production1 and to abolition of the right to bequeath or inherit property4 ,the peoples of ,america1 ,europe1 and ,australasia are at present working out policies which combine in various degrees the individualistic and the socialistic views4 ,most have public schools4 ,some have provision for old age and accident through either mutual or ,state systems of insurance and pensions4 ,let us analyze the moral aspects of the two opposing theories more thoroughly4 ,it is obvious that the third view is only one of a number of mediating positions4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,individualism ,,or ,,free ,,contract ,,analyzed3 ,,its ,,values ,efficiency in ,production4--,individualism can make out a strong case in respect to several of the ethical qualities which are demanded3 viz41 efficiency in production of goods1 stimulation of active and forceful character1 promotion of freedom and responsibility1 encouragement to wide diversification of occupation and thus of services1 and1 finally1 the supply to society of the kinds of goods which society wants4 ,it would be absurd to credit the enormous increase in production of wealth during the past century to individualism alone1 ignoring the contributions of science and education which have been mainly made under social auspices4 ,it would be as absurd to credit all the gains of the century in civilization and freedom to individualism as it would be to charge all the wretchedness and iniquity of the century to this same policy4 ,but1 setting aside extravagant claims1 it can scarcely be doubted that ,adam ,smith's contentions for greater individual freedom have been justified as regards the tests named4 ,granting that the great increase in amount and variety of production1 and in means of communication and distribution1 has been primarily due to two agencies1 the machine and association1 it remains true that individualism has permitted and favored association and has stimulated invention4 ,initiative and ,responsibility4--,moreover1 the general policy of turning over to individuals the power and responsibility to regulate their own acts1 is in accord with one great feature of moral development4 ,the evolution of moral personality1 as traced in our early chapters1 shows the individual at first living as a member of a kinship group which determines his economic as well as his religious and social life1 and permits him neither to strike out independently1 nor1 on the other hand1 to suffer want so long as the group has supplies4 ,individual initiative and responsibility have steadily increased1 and the economic development has undoubtedly strengthened the development of religious1 political1 and moral freedom4 ,it is the combination of these which gives the person of to-day the worth and dignity belonging to autonomy1 self-government1 and democracy4 ,regulation of ,production4--,further1 it may be said that supply and demand1 individualism's method of regulating prices and the kinds of goods produced1 not only accords with a principle of freedom1 but also gets those goods made which society most needs or wants4 ,if goods of a certain kind are scarce1 the high price stimulates production4 ,while it permits crises1 panics1 and hardship1 it at least throws the burden of avoiding hardship upon the foresight of a great many3 namely1 all producers1 rather than upon a few persons who might be designated for the purpose4 ,in thus providing a method to find out what society wants and how much1 it is performing a social service1 and1 as we have pointed out1 it is none the less a service because the goods are to be paid for2 it is all the more so because they can be paid for4 ,so far1 then1 individualism has a strong case4 ,sec4 #c4 ,,criticisms ,,upon ,,individualism ,there is undoubtedly great waste in some of its methods1 e4g41 its advertising and its competitions1 but the most serious objections to individualism are not to be found here2 they arise in connection with the other ethical criteria of economic morality4 ,they fall chiefly under two heads4 7#a7 ,does individualism provide for real as well as formal freedom8 7#b7 ,does it distribute the benefits widely or to the few8 ,does it distribute them justly or unjustly8 ,it ,does ,not ,secure ,real ,freedom4--,the distinction between real and formal#bcf freedom has been forced into prominence by several causes4 ,the division of labor trains a man for a specific kind of work4 ,if there is no opening in this he is unable to find work4 ,the continual invention of improved machinery is constantly displacing particular sets of workers and rendering their special training worthless4 ,a business panic causes immediate discharge of thousands of laborers4 ,a trust closes several of its shops1 and workmen who have purchased homes must lose their jobs or their investments1 or perhaps both4 ,the employer is no less limited in his conduct by the methods of competing firms2 but it is the wage-workers who have felt this lack of real freedom most keenly4 ,theoretically1 no one is forced to labor4 ,every one is free to choose whether he will work1 and what work he will do4 ,but in effect1 freedom of choice depends for its value upon what the alternative is4 ,if the choice is1 do this or--starve--the freedom is not worth much4 ,formal freedom excludes constraint by the direct control or will of others4 ,it excludes violence or fear of violence4 ,but subjection to the stress or fear of want1 or to the limits imposed by ignorance1 is just as fatal to freedom4 ,hunger is as coercive as violence2 ignorance fetters as hopelessly as force4 ,whether a man has any choice of occupation1 employment1 residence1 or wage1 depends on his physical strength1 education1 family ties1 and accumulated resources1 and on the pressure of present need4 ,to speak of free contract where there is gross inequality between the parties1 is to use a mere form of words4 ,free contract in this case means simply the right of the stronger to exploit the weaker4 ,individualism and ,justice4--,individualists1 as stated1 belong to two very different schools1 which we may call the democratic and aristocratic1 or perhaps more correctly1 if we may coin a word1 oligocratic4 ,democratic individualism would have every man count as one4 ,it would distribute benefits widely4 ,it holds that since society is made up of individuals all social goods will be secured if each individual seeks and finds his own4 ,aristocratic individualism#bcg has been reenforced by the ,darwinian theory of the struggle for existence as a condition for survival of the fittest1 by race prejudice1 and by imperialism4 ,it holds that civilization is for the few best1 not necessarily for the many4 ,progress lies through the selection of the few efficient1 masterful1 aggressive individuals1 races1 or nations4 ,individualism is a policy which favors these few4 ,it is ,nature's method of dealing4 ,it is of course regrettable that there should be weak1 backward1 ineffective individuals or races1 but their exploitation serves the advance of the rest1 and benevolence or charity may mitigate the most painful results4 ,the older economists of democratic individualism could properly claim two respects in which economic justice was furthered by economic processes under free management and exchange4 ,the social body is in truth made up of members1 and the old policy had been to tie up the members to make the body grow4 ,it did promote justice to remove needless and excessive restrictions4 ,in the second place1 it is true1 as the economists insisted1 that in a free exchange each party profits if he gets what he wants4 ,there is mutual benefit1 and so far as this goes there is an element of justice4 ,but while the benefit may be mutual1 the amount of advantage each gets is not necessarily the same1 and if the party who has greater shrewdness or resources takes advantage of a great need on the part of the other1 the result may be a very unequal division4 ,exchanges of a birthright for a mess of pottage will be common4 ,very well1 says the individualist1 ,esau will know better next time--or if he doesn't1 he is an object for charity4 ,but the trouble is that even if ,esau does know better he is in even poorer condition next time to make a bargain if his birthright is gone2 besides1 if starvation or misery for himself or his family is his only alternative1 what good will it do him to know better8 ,can the result1 then1 be just or fair8 ,this depends on how we define just and fair4 ,if we take a purely formal view and make formal freedom of contract the only criterion1 then any price is fair which both parties agree to4 ,the law for the most part takes this view1 assuming absence of force or fraud4 ,but this leaves out of account everything except the bare formal act of assent4 ,it is too abstract a conception of personality on which to base a definition of justice4 ,to get the true organic relation of mutual service and benefit by a system of individualism we must have the two parties to the bargain equal4 ,but in a large part of the exchange of business and services the two parties are not equal4 ,one has greater shrewdness1 better education1 more knowledge of the market1 more accumulated resources1 and1 therefore1 less pressing need than the other4 ,the moral consciousness will call prices or contracts unfair where the stronger takes advantage of the weaker's necessities1 even if the law does not4 ,competition4--,the fact of competition is depended upon by the individualist to obviate the disadvantages of the weaker party4 ,if ,a is ignorant of the market1 ,b may impose upon him2 but if ,c and ,d are competing with ,b for ,a's goods or services1 ,a will soon find out what they are worth4 ,that is1 he will get for them a social and not a purely individual valuation4 ,there is doubtless such a gain to ,a4 ,but in considering competition as removing the objections to the unfairness possible in bargaining1 we must bear in mind two things4 ,first1 competition cuts both ways4 ,it helps ,a when several compete for his goods or labor2 but1 on the other hand1 it may ruin one of the competitors4 ,if ,a is a laborer1 it is a good thing if ,x1 ,y1 and ,z1 employers1 compete for his services4 ,but if the boot is on the other foot1 if ,b1 ,c1 and ,d also are laborers and compete with ,a for a place1 we have the conditions which may lead to the sweat-shop4 ,whether there is any better way to avoid unequal distribution will be considered later4 ,the second and seemingly fatal objection to competition as a means to justice1 is that free competition under an individualistic system tends to destroy itself4 ,for the enormous powers which the new forms of economic agency and technique give to the individual who can wield them1 enable him to crush competitors4 ,the process has been repeated over and over within the past few years in various fields4 ,the only way in which a semblance of competition has been maintained in railroad business has been by appeal to the courts4 ,this is an appeal to maintain individualism by checking individualism1 and as might be expected from such a contradictory procedure1 has accomplished little4 ,nor can it be maintained that the evils may be obviated1 as ,spencer holds1 by private restraints on excessive competition4 ,as already pointed out1 if one of a body of competitors is unscrupulous1 the rest are necessarily at a disadvantage4 ,under present conditions individualism cannot guarantee1 and in many cases cannot permit1 just distribution and a true organic society4 ,the other school of individualists is not disturbed by inequality of goods4 ,it frankly accedes to the logic of unrestrained competition4 ,it stakes its case upon the importance for social welfare of the exceptionally gifted few4 ,it is important to have their services4 ,it can have them only on terms which they set1 as they will not work unless there is sufficient motive4 ,it is1 on this view1 perfectly just that all the enormous increase of wealth due to modern methods should go to the few leaders1 for their ability has produced it all4 ,the able minority of men who direct the labor of the majority are the true producers of that amount of wealth by which the annual total output1 in any given community1 exceeds what would have been produced by the laborers if left to their own devices1 whether working as isolated units or in small self-organized groups1 and controlled by no knowledge or faculties but such as are possessed in common by any one who can handle a spade or lay one brick upon another4#bch ,either from the standpoint of natural rights or from that of utilitarianism it is proper1 according to this school1 that all the increasing wealth of society1 now and in all future time1 should go to the few4 ,for1 on the one view1 it belongs to the few since they have produced it2 and1 on the other1 it must be given them if society is to have their services4 ,it is possible they may not claim it all for their exclusive possession4 ,they may be pleased to distribute some of it in gifts4 ,but this is for them to say4 ,the logical method for carrying out this programme would require an absolute abandonment by the people as a whole1 or by their representatives1 or the courts1 of any attempt to control economic conditions4 ,the courts would be limited to enforcing contracts and would cease to recognize considerations of public interest except in so far as these were accepted by the able minority4 ,all such legislation as imposes any check upon the freedom of the individual is mischievous4 ,under this head would presumably come regulation of child labor1 of hours1 of sanitary conditions1 of charges by railroads1 gas companies1 and other public service corporations4 ,graded income or inheritance taxes are also to be condemned from this standpoint4 ,it should in fairness be added that while its upholders do not allege as their main argument that individualism is for the interest of the many1 they hold1 nevertheless1 that the many are really better off under individualism than under socialism4 ,for since all the increase in wealth is due to the able few whom individualism produces1 and since some of this increase1 in cases where the few compete for the custom or labor of the many1 may fall to the share of the many or else be given them outright by the more generous1 it appears that the only hope for the many lies through the few4 ,the general naturalistic theory has been discussed in ,chapter ,,xviii4 ,here it is only necessary to point out that it is a misreading of evolution to suppose unregulated competition to be its highest category of progress1 and that it is a misinterpretation of ethics to assume that might is right4 ,with the dawn of higher forms of life1 cooperation and sympathy prove stronger forces for progress than ruthless competition4 ,the struggle for any existence that has a claim to moral recognition must be a struggle for more than physical existence or survival of force4 ,it must be a struggle for a moral existence1 an existence of rational and social beings on terms of mutual sympathy and service as well as of full individuality4 ,any claim for an economic process1 if it is to be a moral claim1 must make its appeal on moral grounds and to moral beings4 ,if it recognizes only a few as having worth1 then it can appeal only to these4 ,these few have no moral right to complain if the many1 whom they do not recognize1 refuse to recognize them4 ,summary of the ,ethics of ,individualism4--,individualism provides well for production of quantity and kinds required of goods and services2 for activity and formal freedom4 ,under present conditions of organization and modern methods it cannot be made to serve a democratic conception of justice1 but inevitably passes over into a struggle for preeminence1 in which the strong and less scrupulous will have the advantage4 ,it can be treated as just only if justice is defined as what is according to contract 7formal freedom72 or if the welfare of certain classes or individual members of society is regarded as of subordinate importance2 or1 finally1 if it is held that this welfare is to be obtained only incidentally1 as gift1 not directly through social action4 ,the criticism on individualism is then that under a collective system like that of the present1 it does scant justice to most individuals4 ,it leaves the many out from all active participation in progress or morality4#bci ,,literature ,individualism and ,socialism are discussed in the works of ,hadley1 ,veblen1 ,hobson1 ,spencer1 ,marx1 ,george1 already cited2 cf4 also ,menger1 ,the ,right to the ,whole ,produce of ,labor1 #ahii2 ,ely1 ,socialism and ,social ,reform1 #ahid2 ,bosanquet1 ,individualism and ,socialism1 in ,the ,civilization of ,christendom1 #ahic2 ,fite1 ,the ,theory of ,democracy1 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 xxviii4 7#aijg71 pp4 #a-ah2 ,huxley1 ,administrative ,nihilism1 in ,essays2 ,godwin's ,political ,justice1 #agic1 raised many of the fundamental questions4 ,recent representative ,individualistic works are3 ,spencer1 ,social ,statics1 ,the ,man versus the ,state1 various essays in ,vol4 ,,iii4 of ,essays2 ,sumner1 ,what ,social ,classes ,owe to ,each ,other1 #ahhc2 ,donisthorpe1 ,individualism1 #ahhi2 ,harris1 ,inequality and ,progress1 #ahig2 ,mallock1 ,socialism1 #aijg4 ,on ,socialism3 ,fabian ,essays in ,socialism1 edited by ,shaw1 ,london1 #ahij1 ,new ,york1 #ahia2 ,spargo1 ,socialism1 #aijf2 ,marx and ,engels1 ,the ,communist ,manifesto1 ,eng4 tr42 ,reeve1 ,the ,cost of ,competition1 #aijf2 ,rae1 ,contemporary ,socialism1 #ahia2 ,hunter1 ,socialists at ,work1 #aijh2 ,wells1 ,new ,worlds for ,old1 #aijg4 ,,footnotes3 #bcd ,see above1 pp4 #dbh f41 #dga-f1 #dhc4 #bce ,in his later years ,mill had much more confidence in the value of social agency4 #bcf ,see above1 p4 #dcg f4 #bcg ,see above1 pp4 #cfh ff4 #bch ,w4 ,h4 ,mallock1 ,socialism4 #bci ,above1 p4 #dgb4 ,,chapter ,,xxv ,,unsettled ,,problems ,,in ,,the ,,economic ,,order 7,,continued7 ,sec4 #d4 ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,public ,,agency ,,and ,,control ,the various theories of public direction1 including socialism in the technical sense1 are primarily interested in the just distribution of goods4 ,it is not so much ,how many goods can be produced8 as ,who is to get them8 ,individualism was chiefly concerned in increasing public wealth1 assuming 7in the case of the democratic individualists7 that all would get the benefit4 ,socialism is more concerned that the producing persons shall not be sacrificed1 and that each member shall benefit by the result4 ,public agency and control might assert itself 7#a7 as a method of production1 7#b7 as a method of distribution of goods and returns1 7#c7 as a method of property4 ,it is important to note at the outset that all civilized peoples have some degree of social direction in each of these fields4 7#a7 ,practically all peoples collect taxes1 coin money1 carry mails1 protect life and property1 and supply such elementary demands as those for water and drainage1 through ,state or municipal agency instead of leaving it to private initiative4 ,and in every one of the instances the work was formerly done privately4 7#b7 ,under distribution1 all progressive peoples give education through the ,state4 ,further1 the benefits of the mail service are distributed not in proportion to receipts1 but on other principles based on social welfare4 7#c7 ,as a method of property-holding1 all civilized peoples hold certain goods for common use1 and in the ,united ,states1 after a period in which it has been the policy to distribute for little or no compensation public lands1 public franchises1 and public goods of all kinds1 the public policy is now not only to retain large tracts for forest reserve1 but to construct irrigation plants1 and to provide public parks1 playgrounds1 and other forms of property to be used for common advantage4 ,just as the individualist does not necessarily carry his doctrine to the extreme of dispensing with all social agency1 at least in the matters of public protection and public health1 so the socialist does not necessarily wish to abolish private property or private enterprise4 ,we have1 then1 to consider briefly the ethical aspects of public agency for production1 public control over distribution1 public holding of wealth4 ,sec4 #e4 ,,society ,,as ,,agency ,,of ,,production ,the advantage claimed for society as an agent of production is not primarily greater efficiency1 although it is claimed that the present method is enormously wasteful except where there already is private monopoly4 ,nor is it in the social service rendered by providing great variety of goods1 and of the kinds most wanted4 ,it is rather 7#a7 that in the case of public service enterprises1 such as transportation or lighting1 fairness to the various shippers1 localities1 and other users can be secured only through public control or operation4 ,these services are as indispensable to modern life as air or navigation4 ,only by public agency can discrimination be avoided4 7#b7 ,that the prizes to be gained are here so enormous that bribery and corruption are inevitable under private management4 7#c7 ,that the profits arising from the growth of the community belong to the community1 and can only be secured if the community owns and operates such agencies of public service as transportation1 communication1 and in cities water supply and lighting4 7#d7 ,that the method of individualistic production is reckless of child life and in general of the health of workmen4 ,great ,britain is already fearing a deterioration in physical stature and capacity4 7#e7 ,the motive of self-interest1 relied upon and fostered by individualism1 is anti-social4 ,how can morality be expected to improve when the fundamental agency and method of business and industry is contradictory to morality8 7#f7 ,more complete socialism maintains that1 under modern capitalism1 a disproportionate share is sure to fall to the capitalist1 and1 more than this1 to the great capitalist4 ,modern production is complex and expensive4 ,it requires an enormous plant2 the capitalist1 not the workman1 has the tools1 and can therefore charge what he pleases4 ,the small capitalist cannot undertake competition with the great capitalist1 for the latter can undersell him until he drives him from business1 and can then recoup himself by greater gains4 ,hence the only way to secure fair distribution is through social ownership of the tools and materials for production4 ,private ,interests and ,public ,welfare4--,touching these points it may be said that the public conscience is rapidly coming to a decision upon the first five4 7#a7 ,the public has been exploited1 the officials of government have been bribed1 and individual members of society discriminated against4 ,the process of competition always involves vae victis1 but the particular factor which makes this not only hard but unjust1 is that in all these cases we have a quasi-public agency 7monopoly1 franchise1 ,state-aided corporation7 used to give private advantage4 ,this must be remedied either by public ownership or public control1 unless the ethics of the struggle for existence is accepted4 ,the corruption which has prevailed under 7#b7 must be met either by public ownership or control1 or by so reducing the value of such franchises as to leave nothing in it for the grafter and his co-operators4 ,vice--gambling1 excessive use of drugs and liquors1 prostitution--is no doubt injurious to its victims1 and when leagued with public officials and yielding enormous corruption funds to debauch politics1 it is a public evil as well4 ,but its victims are limited1 and its appearance not attractive to the great majority4 ,the exploitation and corruption practiced by the more generally successful and respectable members of society1 is far more insidious and wide-reaching4 ,it demoralizes not individuals only1 but the standards of society4 ,as to 7#c7 there is no doubt as to the rights of the matter4 ,gains due to social growth should be socially shared1 not appropriated by a few4 ,the only question is as to the best method of securing these gains4 ,european ,states and cities have gone much farther than the ,united ,states along the line of public agency1 and1 while there is still dispute as to the balance of advantage in certain cases1 there is a growing sentiment that the more intelligent and upright the community1 the more it can wisely undertake4 ,the moral principle is that the public must have its due4 ,whether it pays certain agents a salary as its own officials1 or a commission in the form of a moderate dividend1 is not so important4#bdj ,but to pay a man or a small group of promoters a million dollars to supply water or lighting or transportation1 seems no more moral than to pay such a salary to a mayor or counsel or superintendent of schools4 ,taxpayers would probably denounce such salaries as robbery4 ,such franchises as have for the most part been given in ,american cities have been licenses to collect high taxes from the citizens for the benefit of a few1 and do not differ in principle from paying excessive salaries1 except as the element of risk enters4 ,what is needed at present in the ,united ,states is a larger number of experiments in various methods of agency to see which type results in least corruption1 fairest distribution1 and best service4 ,conditions of ,labor4--,on the fourth point1 the necessity of public control to regulate child labor1 the labor of women1 sanitary conditions1 and the use of dangerous machinery1 the public conscience is also awakening4 ,decisions of the courts on the constitutionality of regulating women's labor have been somewhat at variance4 ,but the recently announced decision#bda of the ,united ,states ,supreme ,court in the ,oregon case seems likely to be decisive of the principle that women may be treated as a class4 ,freedom of contract cannot be regarded as interfering with the right to establish reasonable precautions for women's health4 ,woman may be protected from the greed as well as from the passion of man4 ,the immorality of child labor under modern conditions is also becoming clear4 ,for the public to see child life stunted physically1 mentally1 and morally by premature labor under the exhausting1 deadening1 and often demoralizing conditions of modern industry and business1 is for the public to consent to wickedness4 ,it cannot leave this matter to the conscience of individual manufacturers and parents1 for the conscientious manufacturer is at a disadvantage1 and it might with as much morality consent to a parent's starving or poisoning his child as to his injuring it in less violent manner4 ,for a society pretending to be moral to permit little children to be used up or stunted under any plea of cheap production or support of parents1 is not above the moral level of those peoples which practice infanticide to prevent economic stress4 ,indeed1 in the case of a country which boasts of its wealth1 there is far less justification than for the savage4 ,in the case of provision against accident due to dangerous machinery1 the ethical principle is also clear4 ,to throw all the burden of the accidents incident to modern production upon the families of the laborers is entirely unjust4 ,to impose it upon the conscientious manufacturer is no better1 for it places him at a disadvantage4 ,this is a necessary--except so far as it can be minimized by safety devices--part of the modern machine process4 ,it ought to be paid for either by all manufacturers1 who would then shift it to the consumers in the price of the goods1 or by the public as a whole in some form of insurance4 ,european countries have gone much farther than the ,united ,states in this direction4 ,the theory that the employer is exempt if a fellow workman contributes in any way to the accident has been applied in the ,united ,states in such a way as to free employers1 and thus the public1 from any share in the burden of a large part of accidents--except as these entail poverty and bring the victim and his family into the dependent class4 ,moreover1 it is only by public action that fair conditions of labor can be secured in many trades and under many employers4 ,for the single workman has not the slightest chance to make conditions1 and the union has no effective means to support its position unless it represents a highly skilled trade and controls completely the supply of labor4 ,it may go without saying that violence is wrong4 ,but it is often ignored that for a prosperous society to leave the laborer no remedy but violence for an intolerable condition is just as wrong4 ,motives4--7#e7 ,on the question of motives the collectivist theory is probably over-sanguine as to the gain to be effected by external means4 ,it is difficult to believe that any change in methods would eliminate selfishness4 ,there is abundant exercise of selfishness in political democracy1 and even in families4 ,further1 if it should be settled on other grounds that competition in certain cases performs a social service1 it would then be possible for a man to compete with a desire to serve the public1 just as truly as it would be possible to compete for selfish motives4 ,that a process causes pain incidentally does not necessarily pervert the motive of the surgeon or parent4 ,it does1 of course1 throw the burden of proof upon the advocate of the process4 ,rivalry need not mean enmity if the rivals are on an equal footing and play fair4 ,exploitation of ,labor4--7#f7 ,the question whether all capitalistic production first exploits the laboring class1 and then tends to absorb or drive out of business the small capitalist1 is not so easy of decision4 ,it seems to be easy to make a plausible statement for each side by statistical evidence4 ,there seems little doubt that the general standard of living for laborers is rising4 ,on the other hand1 the number of enormous fortunes seems to rise much faster1 and there is an appalling amount of poverty in the great cities4 ,this is sometimes attributed to thriftlessness or to excessively large families4 ,a careful study of an ,english agricultural community1 where the conditions seemed at least as good as the average1 showed that a family could not have over two children without sinking below the line of adequate food1 shelter1 and clothing1 to say nothing of medical attendance or other comforts4 ,in the ,united ,states there has been such a supply of land available that the stress has not been so intense4 ,just what the situation will be if the country becomes thickly settled cannot be foretold4 ,professor ,j4 ,b4 ,clark shows that the tendency in a static society would be to give the laborer more and more nearly his share--provided there is free competition for his services4 ,the difficulty is that society is not static and that a laborer cannot shift at will from trade to trade and from place to place4 ,that sometimes capital exploits labor is merely to say that the buyer sometimes gets the advantage4 ,that capital usually has the advantage in its greater resources may be admitted1 but that it invariably must seems an unwarranted deduction4 ,the multiplication of wants widens continually the number of occupations and thus increases the competition for the service of the more skilled4 ,in such cases some1 at least1 of the sellers should be in a position to make a fair bargain4 ,indeed1 recent socialists do not advocate any such complete assumption by society of all production as is presented in some of the socialistic ,utopias4 ,their principle is that the ,state must undertake the production and distribution of social wealth wherever private enterprise is dangerous or less efficient than public enterprise4#bdb ,it is for those who do not believe in public control to prove that in the great enterprises for the production of the necessaries of life1 for transportation1 banking1 mining1 and the like1 private enterprise is not dangerous4 ,the conduct of many--not all--of these enterprises in recent years1 not only in their economic aspects1 but in their recklessness of human life1 health1 and morality1 is what makes socialism a practical question4 ,if it is adopted1 it will not be for any academic or a priori reasons4 ,it will be because private enterprise fails to serve the public1 and its injustice becomes intolerable4 ,if business enterprise1 as sometimes threatens1 seeks to subordinate political and social institutions1 including legislatures and courts1 to economic interests1 the choice must be between public control and public ownership4 ,and if1 whether by the inherent nature of legal doctrine and procedure1 or by the superior shrewdness of capital in evading regulation1 control is made to appear ineffective1 the social conscience will demand ownership4 ,to subordinate the ,state to commercial interests is as immoral as to make the economic interest supreme in the individual4 ,as regards the relations between capital and labor1 it argues an undeveloped state of society that we have no machinery for determining controversy as to what is a fair wage4 ,in the long run1 and on the whole1 supply and demand may give an approximately fair adjustment1 but our present method of fighting it out in doubtful cases is barbaric4 ,the issue is decided often by violence or the no less unmoral motive of pressing want1 instead of by the moral test of what is fair4 ,and the great third interest1 the consumer1 or the public at large1 is not represented at all4 ,new ,zealand1 ,canada1 and some of the states in the ,united ,states have made beginnings4 ,the ,president undoubtedly commanded general support in his position during the coal strike1 when he maintained that the public was morally bound to take some part in the struggle4 ,must not society be lacking in resources if its only resource is to permit exploitation1 on the one hand1 or carry on all industry and business itself1 upon the other8 ,to lose the flexibility1 variety1 and keenness of interest secured by individual or associated enterprise1 would certainly be an evil4 ,early business was conducted largely by kinship organizations4 ,the pendulum has doubtless reached the other extreme in turning over to groups1 organized on a purely commercial basis1 operations that could be more equitably managed by city or state agency4 ,most favor public agency in the case of schools4 ,railroads1 gas companies1 and other monopolies are still subject to controversy4 ,but that an ideally organized society should permit associations and grouping of a great many kinds as agencies for carrying on its work seems a platform not to be abandoned until proved hopeless4 ,collective ,agency is ,not ,necessarily ,social4--,the socialist is inclined to think that if the agency of production were the government or the whole organized society this would give a genuine social agency of control4 ,this by no means follows4 ,party government and city government in the ,united ,states have shown the fallacy of this4 ,but even apart from the possibility of a corrupt boss there is still a wide gap between the collective and the socialized agency4 ,for until the members of society have reached a sufficiently high level of intelligence and character to exercise voluntary control1 and to cooperate wisely and efficiently1 there must be some central directing agency4 ,and such an agency will be morally external to a large number4 ,it doesn't matter so much what name this agent is called by--i4e41 whether he is capitalist1 or government1--so long as the control is external4 ,in general1 individuals are still without the mutual confidence and public intelligence which would enable them really to socialize the mechanically collective process4 ,sec4 #f4 ,,theories ,,of ,,just ,,distribution ,socialism as theory of distribution does not necessarily imply public operation of production4 ,by graded taxation the proceeds of production might be taken by society and either held1 used1 or distributed on some supposedly more equitable basis4 ,to give point to any inquiry as to the justice of a proposed distribution1 it would be desirable to know what is the present distribution4 ,unfortunately1 no figures are accepted by all students4 ,spahr's ,present ,distribution of ,wealth in the ,united ,states estimates that seven-eighths of the families in the ,united ,states own only one-eighth of the wealth1 and that one per cent4 own more than the remaining ninety-nine per cent4 ,this has been challenged1 but any estimate made by the economists shows such enormous disproportion as to make it incredible that the present distribution can be regarded as just on any definition of justice other than according to the principles of contract and competition4 ,suppose1 then1 the question is raised1 ,how can we make a just distribution8 ,criteria ,proposed4--,the simplest1 and at the same time most mechanical and abstract1 method would be to divide all goods equally4 ,this would be to ignore all moral and other differences1 as indeed is practically done in the suffrage4 ,if all men are accounted equal in the ,state1 why not in wealth8 ,it may be admitted that1 if society were to distribute1 it would have to do it on some system which could be objectively administered4 ,to divide wealth according to merit1 or according to efforts1 or according to needs1 would be a far more moral method4 ,but it is difficult to see how1 in the case of material goods or their money equivalent1 such a division could be made by any being not omniscient as well as absolutely just4 ,if we are to consider distribution as administered by society1 we seem reduced to the alternative of the present system or a system of equality4 #a4 ,the ,individualistic ,theory4--,it is indeed supposed by some that the individualistic or competitive system distributes on a moral basis3 viz41 according to merit4 ,this claim would have to meet the following criticisms3 7#a7 ,the first abstraction which this individualistic principle of reward usually makes it that it gives a man credit for all he achieves1 or charges him with all his failures1 without recognizing the threefold origin of these achievements or failures4 ,heredity1 society1 personal choice1 have each had some share in the result4 ,but1 in considering the ethics of competition upon this maxim1 there is evidently no attempt to discriminate between these several sources4 ,the man born with industrial genius1 presented by society with the knowledge of all that has been done in the past1 and equipped by society with all the methods and tools society can devise1 certainly has an advantage over the man of moderate talents and no education4 ,to claim that the first should be justly rewarded for his superiority would imply that the reception of one gift constitutes a just claim for another4 7#b7 ,secondly1 the theory as applied to our present system is guilty of a further abstraction in assuming that the chief1 if not the only1 way to deserve reward is by individualistic shrewdness and energy4 7#c7 ,it measures desert by service rendered without taking any account of motive or even of intent4 ,the captain of industry performs an important service to society2 therefore1 it is argued1 he should be rewarded accordingly1 quite irrespective of the question whether he was aiming at social welfare or at selfish gain4 ,it may even be plausibly argued that to reward men financially for good motives would be bribing men to be honest4 ,it is true that financial rewards will not make good citizens1 but this is irrelevant4 ,the point is that whatever other reasons1--expediency1 difficulty of estimating intent and motive1--may be urged for abstracting from everything but the result1 the one reason which cannot be urged is1 such abstraction is just4 ,a person has rights only because he is a social person4 ,but to call a man a social person because he incidentally produces useful results1 is to say that purpose and will are negligible elements of personality4#bdc #b4 ,equal ,division4--,the system of equal division is liable to the following criticism4 ,in their economic services men are not equal4 ,they are unequal not merely in talent and ability2 not merely in the value of their work2 they are unequal in their disposition4 ,to treat idle and industrious1 useless and useful1 slow and quick alike is not equality1 but inequality4 ,it is to be guilty of as palpable an abstraction as to say that all men are equally free because they are not subject to physical constraint4 ,real equality will try to treat like conditions alike1 and unlike character1 efforts1 or services differently4 ,there is1 moreover1 a psychological objection which would weigh against an equal division even if such were regarded as just4 ,the average man perhaps prefers an economic order in which there are prizes and blanks to an order in which every man draws out the same4 ,he prefers an exciting game to a sure but tame return of his investment4 ,he may call for a square deal1 but we must remember that a square deal in the great ,american game from which the metaphor is taken is not designed to make the game less one of chance4 ,it is designed to give full scope to luck and nerve4 ,a game in which every player was sure to win1 but also sure to win just what he had put in1 would be equitable1 but it would not be a game4 ,an equal distribution might rob life of its excitement and its passion4 ,possibly the very strain of the process develops some elements of character which it would be unfortunate to lose4 ,is there no alternative possible for society except an equality which is external only1 and therefore unequal1 or an inequality which charges a man with all the accrued benefits or evils of his ancestry8 ,must we either recognize no moral differences in men1 or else be more merciless than the old orthodox doctrine of hereditary or imputed guilt8 ,the theological doctrine merely made a man suffer for his ancestors' sins2 the doctrine of unlimited individualism would damn him not only for his ancestors' sins and defects1 but for the injustice suffered by his ancestors at the hands of others4 ,the analysis of the sources of a man's ability may give a clue to a third possibility1 and it is along this line that the social conscience of to-day is feeling its way4 #c4 ,a ,working ,programme4--,a man's power is due 7#a7 to physical heredity2 7#b7 to social heredity1 including care1 education1 and the stock of inventions1 information1 and institutions which enables him to be more efficient than the savage2 and finally 7#c7 to his own efforts4 ,individualism may properly claim this third factor4 ,it is just to treat men unequally so far as their efforts are unequal4 ,it is socially desirable to give as much incentive as possible to the full development of every one's powers4 ,but the very same reason demands that in the first two respects we treat men as equally as possible4 ,for it is for the good of the social body to get the most out of its members1 and it can get the most out of them only by giving them the best start possible4 ,in physical heredity the greater part is1 as yet1 wholly outside control1 but there is an important factor which is in the sphere of moral action1 namely1 the physical condition of the parents1 particularly of the mother4 ,conditions of food1 labor1 and housing should be such that every child may be physically well born4 ,in the various elements included under social heredity society has a freer hand4 ,not a free hand1 for physical and mental incapacity limit the amount of social accumulation which can be communicated1 but we are only beginning to appreciate how much of the deficiency formerly acquiesced in as hopeless may be prevented or remedied by proper food1 hygiene1 and medical care4 ,completely equal education1 likewise1 cannot be given2 not in kind1 for not all children have like interests and society does not want to train all for the same task2 nor in quantity1 for some will have neither the ability nor the disposition to do the more advanced work4 ,but as1 little by little1 labor becomes in larger degree scientific1 the ratio of opportunities for better trained men will increase1 and as education becomes less exclusively academic1 and more an active preparation for all kinds of work1 the interests of larger and larger numbers of children will be awakened4 ,such a programme as this is one of the meanings of the phrase equal opportunity1 which voices the demand widely felt for some larger conception of economic and social justice than now obtains4 ,it would make formal freedom1 formal equality before the law1 less an empty mockery by giving to every child some of the power and knowledge which are the necessary conditions of real freedom4 ,society has already gone a long way along the line of giving an equal share in education4 ,it is moving rapidly toward broader conceptions of education for all occupations--farming1 mechanics1 arts1 trade1 business--as well as for the learned professions4 ,it is making a beginning toward giving children 7see the ,report of the ,new ,york ,tenement ,house ,commission7 a chance to be born and grow up with at least a living minimum of light and air4 ,libraries and dispensaries and public health officials are bringing the science and literature of the world in increasing measure into the lives of all4 ,when by the better organization of the courts the poor man has real1 and not merely formal equality before the law1 and thereby justice itself is made more accessible to all1 another long step will be taken toward a juster order4 ,how far society can go is yet to be solved4 ,but is it not at least a working hypothesis for experiment1 that society should try to give to all its members the gains due to the social progress of the past8 ,how far the maxim of equal opportunity will logically lead it is impossible to say4 ,fortunately1 the moral problem is to work out new ideals1 not merely to administer old ones4 ,other possibilities of larger justice are noticed under ,sec4 #h below4 ,sec4 #g4 ,,ownership ,,and ,,use ,,of ,,property ,the public wealth may be controlled and used in four ways3 ,it may be 7#a7 ,privately owned and used2 7#b7 ,privately owned and publicly used2 7#c7 ,publicly held1 but privately used2 7#d7 ,publicly held and commonly used4 ,the individualist would have all wealth1 or as much as possible1 under one of the first two forms4 ,the tendency in the ,united ,states until very recently has been to divest the public of all ownership4 ,the socialist1 while favoring private ownership and use of the more strictly personal articles1 favors the public holding of much which is now privately owned--notably the land1 or the instruments of production--as versus the holding of these by private or corporate persons4 ,or1 again1 it may be maintained that while individuals should be allowed to accumulate as much property as they can1 they should not be allowed to transmit it entirely to their heirs4 ,value of ,private ,property4--,the individualist may properly point to the psychological and historical significance of private property1 which has been stated in a preceding chapter 7p4 #dij74 ,he may say that the evils there mentioned as attendant upon private property do not belong to the property in itself1 but to the exaggerated love of it4 ,he may admit that the present emphasis of attention upon the ownership of wealth1 rather than upon intellectual or aesthetic or social interests1 is not the highest type of human endeavor4 ,but he urges that the positive values of property are such that the present policy of placing no check upon property should be maintained4 ,in addition to the indirect social value through the power and freedom given to its owners1 it may be claimed that the countless educational1 charitable1 and philanthropic agencies sustained by voluntary gifts from private property1 are both the best method of accomplishing certain socially valuable work1 and have an important reflex value in promoting the active social interest of those who carry them on4 ,nor is the force of this entirely broken by the counter claim that this would justify keeping half the population in poverty in order to give the other half the satisfaction of charity4 ,no system short of absolute communism can abolish the need of friendly help4 ,defects and ,dangers in the ,present ,system4--,the first question which arises is3 ,if property is so valuable morally1 how many are profiting by it under the present system1 and how many are without its beneficent effects8 ,is the number of property-owners increasing or diminishing8 ,in one of the morally most valuable forms of property1 the number of those who profit is certainly decreasing relatively3 viz41 in the owning of homes4 ,the building of private residences has practically ceased in ,new ,york and many other cities except for the very rich4 ,with the increasing value of land the owning of homes is bound to become more and more rare4 ,only the large capitalist can put up the apartment house4 ,in the ownership of shops and industries the number of owners has relatively decreased1 that of clerks has increased4 ,the wage-workers in cities are largely propertyless4 ,the management of industries through corporations while theoretically affording opportunity for property has yet1 as ,judge ,grosscup has pointed out forcibly1 been such as to discourage the small investor1 and to prompt to the consumption of wages as fast as received4 ,the objection to individualism on this ground would then be as before1 that it is not individual enough4 ,an objection of contrary character is that the possession of property releases its owner from any necessity of active effort or service to the public4 ,it may therefore injure character on both its individual and its social side4 ,probably the absolute number of those who refrain from any social service because of their property is not very large1 and it may be questioned whether the particular persons would be socially very valuable under any system if they are now oblivious to all the moral arguments for such activity and service4 ,a more serious objection to the individualistic policy is the enormous power allowed to the holders of great properties4 ,it has been estimated that a trust fund recently created for two grandchildren will exceed five billion dollars when handed over4 ,it is easily possible that some of the private fortunes now held may1 if undisturbed1 amount to far more than the above within another generation4 ,moreover1 the power of such a fortune is not limited to its own absolute purchasing value4 ,by the presence of its owners upon directorates of industrial1 transportation1 banking1 and insurance corporations the resources of many other owners are controlled4 ,a pressure may be exerted upon political affairs compared with which actual contributions to campaign funds are of slight importance4 ,the older theory in ,america was that the injury to the private character of the owners of wealth would negative the possible dangers to the public1 since possession of large wealth would lead to relaxation of energy1 or even to dissipation4 ,it was assumed that the father acquired the fortune1 the son spent it1 and thus scattered it among the many1 and the grandson began again at the bottom of the ladder4 ,now that this theory is no longer tenable1 society will be obliged to ask how much power may safely be left to any individual4 ,it must be recognized that the present management of such natural resources as forests under the regime of private property has been extremely wasteful and threatens serious injury to the ,united ,states4 ,individual owners cannot be expected to consider the welfare of the country at large1 or of future generations2 hence the water power is impaired and the timber supply of the future threatened4 ,finally it must be remembered that many of the present evils and inequities in ownership are not due necessarily to a system of private property1 but rather to special privileges possessed by classes of individuals4 ,these may be survivals of past conquests of arms as in ,europe1 or derived by special legislation1 or due to a perfectly unconscious attitude of public morals which carries over to a new situation the customs of an early day4 ,mill's famous indictment of present conditions is not in all respects so applicable to ,america as to the older countries of ,europe1 but it has too much truth to be omitted in any ethical consideration4 ,if the choice were to be made between communism with all its chances1 and the present state of society with all its sufferings and injustices1 if the institution of private property necessarily carried with it1 as a consequence1 that the produce of labor should be apportioned as we now see it1 almost in an inverse ratio to the labor1--the largest portions to those who have not worked at all1 the next largest to those whose work is almost nominal1 and so in descending scale1 the remuneration dwindling as the work grows harder and more disagreeable1 until the most fatiguing and exhausting bodily labor cannot count with certainty on being able to earn even the necessaries of life1--if this1 or communism1 were the alternative1 all the difficulties1 great or small1 of communism would be but as dust in the balance4 ,but to make the comparison applicable1 we must compare communism at its best with the regime of individual property1 not as it is1 but as it might be made4 ,the principle of private property has never yet had a fair trial in any country4 7,polit4 ,econ41 ,book ,,ii41 ch4 i47 ,sec4 #h4 ,,present ,,tendencies ,individualistic ,foundations4--,the general tendency up to very recent time in the ,united ,states has been decidedly individualistic1 both in the policy concerning the method of holding property1 and in the legal balance between vested property rights and the social welfare4 ,public lands were granted on easy terms to homesteaders2 mines as well as soil were practically free to the prospector2 school fund lands were in most cases sold for a song instead of being kept for the public4 ,so general has been the attitude that all wealth ought to be in private hands that it has been difficult to convict men who have fraudulently obtained vast tracts of public land4 ,the magnitude of the operation has given respectability to the beneficiaries4 ,the taxing power has done little to maintain adjustment4 ,in this1 as in many other respects1 the policy of the ,united ,states has been far more individualistic than that of ,great ,britain4 ,the latter has graded income and inheritance taxes4 ,in the ,united ,states1 on the other hand1 the ,federal taxation bears more heavily on the poor as they are the large body of consumers1--not1 of course1 in the sense that the individual poor man pays more than the individual rich man1 but in the sense that a million of dollars owned by a thousand men pays more than a million owned by one man4 ,legally1 the ,constitution of the ,united ,states and certain of its amendments gave private rights extraordinary protection1 especially when contracts were construed to mean charters1 as well as private contracts4 ,the public welfare was conceived to reside almost solely in private rights4#bdd ,increased ,recognition of ,public ,welfare4--,recent policy and legal decisions show a decided change4 ,reserves of forest lands have been established4 ,water-supplies1 parks1 and many other kinds of property have been changed from private to public ownership4 ,the question as to mines has been raised4 ,graded inheritance taxes have been established in some states1 and the question of graded income taxes is likely to be more generally considered unless some other form of taxation based on the social values given to land1 or franchises1 or other forms of property seems more equitable4 ,the ,supreme ,court in recent decisions has read into the constitution two sweeping exceptions to the inviolability of property rights4#bde ,one is that of public use4 ,whenever the owner of a property devotes it to a use in which the public has an interest1 he in effect grants to the public an interest in such use1 and must to the extent of that use submit to be controlled by the public for the common good so long as he maintains the use4 ,the second exception is that of the police power which in #aijf 7#bjd ,u4 ,s41 #caa1 #cah7 was declared to extend to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of its people4 ,the application of this broad principle is still in an uncertain condition1 but there can be no question that it recognizes a changed situation4 ,when people are living in such interdependence as in the collective life of to-day1 it is no longer possible to locate public welfare in any such preponderating degree in private rights as was justified under the conditions of a new country a century ago4 ,says ,professor ,smith3 ,on the fundamental question of the relation of public policy to private property rights the ,supreme ,court has abandoned the individualist views with which the founders of the constitution were imbued2 and in its doctrines of the public use and the police power it has distinctly accepted what may be termed1 in the literal and proper sense of the word1 the socialist view4 ,in so doing1 it has unquestionably expressed the dominant opinion of the ,american people4 ,the ,american people does not accept the collectivist theory2 it believes in private property2 but it recognizes that rights of property must yield1 in cases of conflict1 to the superior rights of society at large4 ,if some of the means set forth above for securing juster distribution were adopted1 the first step toward ,mill's demand#bdf would be met4 ,if the community should reap the return for its own growth1 if taxation should be so arranged as to fall most heavily on those best able to pay rather than on those who are most honest or least able to evade1 it would seem rational to hold that society will find a way to continue the four forms of control now existing1 making such shifts as changing conditions require4 ,some of these shiftings are already evident and give promise of greater justice without loss of any of the benefits accruing from private property4 ,social ,justice through ,economic1 ,social1 and ,scientific ,progress4--,not all moral advance comes with observation1 or by political agency4 ,the economic process is providing in certain lines a substitute for property4 ,science and invention1 which are themselves a fine illustration of the balance and interaction between individual and social intelligence1 individual effort and social cooperation1 are making possible in many ways a state of society in which men have at once greater freedom and greater power through association1 greater individual development and greater socialization of interests1 less private property but greater private use and enjoyment of what is common4 ,the substitute for property provided by the economic process itself is permanence or security of support4 ,if the person can count definitely upon a future1 this is equivalent to the security of property4 ,and through the organization of modern industry supplemented by insurance and pensions1 either state1 institutional1 or in corporations1 or in mutual benefit associations1 there has been on the whole1 a great increase of security1 although it is still unfortunately true that the wage-worker may in most cases be dismissed at any moment1 and has virtually no contract1 or even any well-assured confidence of continued employment4 ,it is a mutual cooperation of economic1 social1 and scientific factors which has brought about a great increase of individual use and enjoyment through public ownership4 ,this has placed many of the things which make life worth living within the enjoyment of all1 and at the same time given a far better service to the users than the old method of private ownership4 ,in this change lies1 perhaps1 the greatest advance of justice in the economic sphere1 and a great promise for the future4 ,there was a time when if a man would sit down on a piece of ground and enjoy a fine landscape1 he must own it4 ,if he would have a plot where his children might play1 he must own it4 ,if he would travel1 he must carry his own lantern1 and furnish his own protection from thieves4 ,if he would have water1 he must sink his own well4 ,if he would send a letter1 he must own or hire a messenger4 ,if he would read a book1 he must not merely own the book1 but own or hire the author or copyist4 ,if he would educate his children1 he must own or hire the tutor4 ,we have learned that public parks1 public lighting and water works1 public libraries1 and public schools1 are better than private provision4 ,the objection which comes from the individualist to this programme is that it does too much for the individual4 ,it is better1 urges individualism1 to stimulate the individual's activity and leave his wants largely unsatisfied than to satisfy all his wants at the expense of his activity4 ,but this assumes that what is done through public agencies is done for the people and not by the people4 ,a democracy may do for itself what an aristocracy may not do for a dependent class4 ,the greatest demoralization at the present time is not to those who have not1 but to those who appropriate gains due to associated activity1 complacently supposing that they have themselves created all that they enjoy4 ,another ,great ,advance is the ,change in ,what ,makes ,up the ,chief ,values of ,life4--,in early times the values of life were largely found in food1 clothing1 personal ornaments1 bodily comfort1 sex gratifications4 ,enjoyment of these involved exclusive possession and therefore property4 ,but with the advance of civilization an increasing proportion of life's values falls in the mental realm of sharable goods4 ,satisfaction in knowledge1 in art1 in association1 in freedom1 is not diminished1 but increased when it is shared4 ,the educated man may have no more property than the illiterate4 ,he has access to a whole system of social values4 ,he has freedom2 he has a more genuinely independent type of power than accrues from the mere possession of things4 ,the society of the future will find a part of its justice in so adjusting its economic system that all may enter as fully as possible into this more social world4 ,methods of ,social ,selection4--,finally1 recognizing all the value of the competitive process in the past as a method of selecting ability1 it must be regarded as crude and wasteful4 ,it is like the method of blind trial and error which obtains in the animal world4 ,the method of ideas1 of conscious use of means to secure ends1 is the more effective and the more rational4 ,society now is gaining the scientific equipment which may allow the substitution of the more effective and less wasteful method4 ,it should discover and educate capacity instead of giving merely a precarious encouragement to certain special types4 ,sec4 #i4 ,,three ,,special ,,problems ,three special problems may be noticed about which moral judgment is as yet uncertain3 ,the open versus the closed shop1 the capitalization of corporations1 and the unearned increment4 #a4 ,the ,open versus the ,closed ,shop4--,in certain industries in which the workmen are well organized they have made contracts with employers which provide that only union men shall be employed4 ,such a shop is called a closed shop1 in distinction from an open shop in which non-union men may be employed in part or altogether4 ,the psychological motive for the demand for the closed shop is natural enough3 the union has succeeded in gaining certain advantages in hours or wages or both2 this has required some expense and perhaps some risk4 ,it is natural to feel that those who get the advantage should share the expense and effort1 and failing this1 should not be admitted to the shop4 ,if the argument stopped here it would be insufficient for a moral justification for two reasons4 ,first1 joining a union involves much more than payment of dues4 ,it means control by the union in ways which may interfere with obligations to family1 or even to the social order4 ,hence1 to exclude a fellow workman from the opportunity to work because he--perhaps for conscientious reasons--would not belong to the union1 could not be justified unless the union could make it appear that it was maintaining a social and not merely a group interest4 ,second1 in some cases unions have sought to limit output4 ,in so far as this is done not for reasons of health but to raise prices1 the union is opposing the interest of consumers4 ,here again the union must exhibit a social justification if it is to gain social approval4 ,on the other hand it may be noted that the individualist of the second sort--who believes in the competitive struggle as a moral process--has no ground on which to declare for open shop4 ,exactly the same principle which would permit combination in capital and place no limit on competitive pressure1 provided it is all done through free contracts1 can raise no objection against combinations of laborers making the best contracts possible4 ,when a syndicate of capitalists has made a highly favorable contract or successfully underwritten a large issue of stock1 it is not customary under the principle of open shop to give a share in the contract to all who ask for it1 or to let the whole public in on the ground floor4 ,nor are capitalists accustomed to leave a part of the market to be supplied by some competitor for fear such competitor may suffer if he does not have business4 ,when the capitalist argues for the open shop upon the ground of freedom and democracy1 it seems like the case of the mote and the beam4 ,an analogy with a political problem may aid3 ,has a nation the right to exclude 7or tax heavily7 goods or persons from other countries8 ,may it maintain a closed shop8 ,the policy of the ,american colonists and of the ,united ,states has varied4 ,the ,puritans maintained a closed shop on religious lines4 ,they came to this country to maintain a certain religion and polity4 ,they expelled several men who did not agree with them4 ,the ,united ,states excludes ,chinese laborers1 and imposes a tariff which in many cases is intended to be prohibitive against the products of other countries4 ,this is done avowedly to protect the laborer1 and in so far as it is effective it closes the shop4 ,the maxim ,this is a white man's country is a similar closed shop utterance4 ,on moral grounds the non-union man is in the same category as the man of alien race or country4 ,what1 if anything1 can justify a nation or smaller group from excluding others from its benefits8 ,clearly the only conditions are 7#a7 that the group or nation is existing for some morally justifiable end1 which 7#b7 would be endangered by the admission of the outsiders4 ,a colony established to work out religious or political liberty would be justified in excluding a multitude who sought to enter it and then subvert these principles4 ,if a union is working for a morally valuable end1 e4g41 a certain standard of living which is morally desirable1 and if this were threatened by the admission of non-union men1 the closed shop would seem to be justified4 ,if the purpose were merely to secure certain advantages to a small group1 and if the open shop would not lower the standard but merely extend its range of benefits1 it is hard to see why the closed shop is not a selfish principle--though no more selfish than the grounds on which the tariff is usually advocated4 #b4 ,the ,capitalization of ,corporations1 especially of public service corporations1 is a matter on which there is a difference of policy in different states1 owing probably to uncertainty as to the morality of the principles involved4 ,the two theories held are3 7a7 ,companies should issue capital stock only on the basis of money paid in2 dividends then represent a return on actual investment4 7b7 ,companies may issue whatever stock they please1 or whatever they expect their income will enable them to pay dividends upon2 dividends will then represent return for valuable privileges1 or for some utility to be marketed4 ,in behalf of this latter view it may be claimed that if the company pays dividends the investors have nothing to complain of1 and if it sells its products or transportation at market rates1 the consumer has nothing to complain of4 ,so far as the relations between corporation and investor are concerned1 the issues are simple4 ,if the stocks are issued with no expectation that they will give any return1 merely to sell1 it is pure dishonesty1 of the same type which under cruder conditions sold spavined horses or made counterfeit money1 and now assumes the more vulgar type of dealing in green goods4 ,the fact that fictitious capital can be publicly advertised1 gives it a financial but not a moral advantage4 ,this1 however1 would have such decided limitations1 credulous as human nature is1 that if fictitious capital paid no dividends it would soon have no market4 ,hence1 for the far-seeing promoter1 the pressure is toward making some at least of the fictitious capital pay dividends4 ,what is the principle in this case8 ,if we are dealing with a new and untried mode of production or public service1 the case is simply that of any speculation4 ,if a proposed product has a possible utility1 but at the same time involves so much risk that in the long run only half of such enterprises will succeed1 society may consider it worth offering a profit equal to fifty per cent4 in order to pay for the risk4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the income is to derive from valuable public franchises1 or from the growth of the community and its necessities1 the case is different4 ,here there is little1 if any1 risk for which it is fair for society to pay4 ,the excessive capital beyond the cost is designed to disguise the rate of profit1 and therefore conceal from the community the cost of the goods or service4 ,if the public demands cheaper rates it is told that the company is now paying only a fair dividend upon its stock4#bdg ,the usual method of capitalizing many enterprises of a quasi-public sort is to issue bonds to cover the cost of construction or plant1 and then one or more series of stocks which are known as velvet4 ,in part these stocks may represent a work of organization which is a legitimate public service1 but in many cases they represent devices for transferring public wealth to private property4 ,enormous sums have been taken from the public in this manner4 ,the element which makes this method particularly obnoxious is that the quasi-public corporations are given a monopoly by the community and then take advantage of this to capitalize indefinitely the necessities of a growing community4 ,in this case the conception of public service is lost sight of in the dazzling possibility of public exploitation4#bdh ,few methods of extorting wealth have equaled this4 ,in some cases bribery of public officials has added an item of expense to be collected later from the public4 ,when the various forms of public service or protected industry were first projected there was risk involved4 ,it was necessary to offer inducements to capital to engage in them4 ,it was desirable to have railroads1 gas1 water1 express service4 ,but as the factor of risk has been eliminated1 the public tires of paying double prices1 and a fair return must be estimated on the basis of actual rather than fictitious capital4 ,the public has come to have a clear idea as to the morality of such practices as have been employed in letting contracts for public buildings at prices far above market value4 ,the ,new ,york ,city courthouse and ,pennsylvania capitol offer familiar examples4 ,does it differ materially from such practices when a company charges the public an excessive price for transportation or lighting1 and when ,state or municipal authorities authorize by franchise or monopoly such excessive charges8 ,probably the conscience of the next century1 if not of the next generation1 will fail to see the superior moral quality of the latter procedure4 #c4 ,the ,unearned ,increment4--,this term is applied most frequently to the increase in land value or franchise value which is due1 not to the owner1 but to the growth of the community4 ,a tract of land is bought at a price fixed by its value as farm land4 ,a city grows up4 ,the owner of the land may have been active in the building up of industry1 but he may not4 ,an increase of values follows1 which is due to the growth of the community4 ,shall the owner have it all1 or shall the community have it all1 or shall there be a division8 ,the growth in value of a franchise for gas1 electric lighting1 transportation1 presents the same problem4 ,it is not usually recognized1 however1 that the same principle is found in every increase of value due to increasing demand4 ,the logical basis for distinction would seem to be that in some cases increase of demand calls out competition1 and the price is lowered2 the public thus receives its share in lower cost4 ,in other cases1 notably those first mentioned1 there can be no competition1 the price is therefore not often lowered unless by legislative action1 and the whole benefit goes to the owner of land or franchise4 ,as regards land1 the case is much stronger in ,europe1 for land titles were originally gained there largely by seizure1 whereas in ,america private titles have been largely through purchase4 ,individualism1 according as it argues from the platform of natural rights or from that of social welfare1 would claim either that individuals should have all the increase because they have a right to all they can get under a system of free contracts1 or that it is for the social welfare to allow them all they can get since private property is public wealth4 ,from the standpoint of natural rights the reply would seem to be unanswerable3 the community gives the increased value2 it belongs to the community4 ,from the standpoint of social welfare the answer is not so simple4 ,it might1 for example1 be socially desirable to encourage the owners of farming land by leaving to them the increase in value due to the growth of the country1 whereas city land-owners might need no such inducement4 ,investors in a new form of public service corporation might need greater inducements than would be fair to those in enterprises well established4 ,but1 although details are complex1 the social conscience is working toward this general principle3 the community should share in the values which it produces4 ,if it cannot do this by cheaper goods and better service1 it must by graded taxation1 by ownership1 or by some other means4 ,the ,british government has already considered a measure for ascertaining the land values in ,scotland as a preliminary step toward adjustment of this question4 ,,footnotes3 #bdj ,boston has an ingenious method of dividing profits4 ,the company which supplies gas must lower the price of gas in proportion as it increases its rate of dividends4 #bda ,february #bd1 #aijh4 #bdb ,spargo1 ,socialism1 #bbj-bg4 #bdc ,philosophical ,review1 xiv41 #cgj f4 #bdd ,cf4 ,j4 ,a4 ,smith1 ,the ,spirit of ,american ,government1 #aijg4 #bde ,i have followed in this paragraph the discussion of ,professor ,munroe ,smith1 ,van ,norden's ,magazine1 ,february1 #aijh4 ,for a full history see ,e4 ,freund1 ,the ,police ,power1 #aije4 #bdf ,above1 p4 #eed4 #bdg ,as in the case of gas in ,new ,york ,city1 where the court has decided that the public cannot refuse to pay interest on the value of the franchise--its own gift4 #bdh ,cf4 ,hadley1 ,economics1 p4 #aei4 ,,appendix ,,to ,,chapter ,,xxv ,,professor ,,seager',s ,,programme ,,of ,,social ,,legislation ,,with ,,special ,,reference ,,to ,,wage-,,earners ,in the conviction that in the field of social legislation the ,united ,states is behind the more progressive countries of ,europe1 ,professor ,henry ,r4 ,seager1 of ,columbia ,university1 presented the following ,outline for discussion at a meeting of the ,american ,association for ,labor ,legislation1 ,december #cj1 #aijg4 ,it is reproduced with his consent as giving concrete expression to several of the principles advocated in the foregoing chapters4 ,the ends to be aimed at in any programme of social legislation are3 ,i4 ,to protect wage-earners in the continued enjoyment of standards of living to which they are already accustomed4 ,,ii4 ,to assist them to attain to higher standards of living4 ,i4 ,measures to protect prevailing standards of living4 ,the principal contingencies which threaten standards of living already acquired are3 7#a7 industrial accidents2 7#b7 illness2 7#c7 invalidity and old age2 7#d7 premature death2 7#e7 unemployment4 ,these contingencies are not in practice adequately provided against by wage-earners themselves4 ,in consequence the losses they entail1 in the absence of any social provision against them1 fall with crushing force on the families which suffer from them1 and only too often reduce such families from a position of independence and self-respect to one of humiliating and efficiency-destroying social dependency4 ,the following remedies for the evils resulting from this situation are suggested4 7#a7 ,employers' liability laws fail to provide adequate indemnity to the victims of industrial accidents because in a large proportion of cases no legal blame attaches to the employer and because litigation under them is costly and uncertain in its outcome4 ,adequate indemnification must be sought along the line of workmen's compensation for all industrial accidents at the expense of the employer 7the ,british system7 or of compulsory accident insurance 7the ,german system74 ,the former seems to accord better with ,american ideas and traditions4 7#b7 ,the principle of workmen's compensation may be extended to include indemnity for loss of wages due to trade diseases4 ,provision against illness not directly traceable to the employment must be sought either in compulsory illness insurance or in subsidized and state-directed sick-insurance clubs4 ,trade unions may assume the functions of such clubs in organized trades4 ,the latter plan seems better suited to present ,american conditions than compulsory illness insurance4 7#c7 ,provision against invalidity and old age may be through compulsory old age insurance1 or through state old age pensions4 ,the latter1 though more costly1 are believed to be better suited to ,american conditions1 when hedged about by proper restrictions1 than compulsory old age insurance with the elaborate administrative machinery which it entails4 7#d7 ,premature death may be provided against by an extension of the machinery for caring for the victims of industrial accident and of illness to provide for their families when accident or illness results fatally4 7#e7 ,provision against losses due to unemployment is attended with great difficulties because unemployment is so frequently the consequence of incapacity or of disinclination for continuous labor4 ,the most promising plan for providing against this evil appears to be through subsidizing and supervising trade unions which pay out-of-work benefits to stimulate this side of their activity4 ,public employment bureaus and industrial colonies for the unemployed may also help to alleviate the evil of unemployment4 99 99 99 99 99 ,adequate social provision against these five contingencies along the lines suggested1 would1 it is believed1 go a long way towards solving the problem of social dependency4 ,if these concessions were made to the demands of social justice1 a more drastic policy towards social dependents than public opinion will now sanction might be inaugurated with good prospect of confining social dependency to the physically1 mentally1 and morally defective4 ,,ii4 ,measures to elevate standards of living4 ,the primary conditions essential to rising standards of living are energy and enterprise on the part of wage-earners and opportunities to make energy and enterprise count in the form of higher earnings4 ,the principal contributions which social legislation may make to advancing standards of living in the ,united ,states are believed to be3 7#a7 measures serving to encourage saving for future needs on the part of wage-earners by providing safe investments for savings2 7#b7 measures protecting wage-earners from the debilitating effects of an unregulated competition2 7#c7 measures serving to bring within the reach of all opportunities for industrial training4 ,standards of living will also be advanced1 of course1 by nearly all measures calculated to promote the general well-being1 such as tax and tariff-reform legislation1 laws safeguarding the national domain1 the public regulation of corporations1 especially those with monopolistic powers1 etc41 but these are not usually classed under the head of social legislation4 7#a7 ,the greatest present need under this head is for a postal savings bank like those of ,european countries4 ,the advantages of a postal savings bank over privately managed banks are the wider distribution of places of deposit1 post-offices being located in every section of the country1 and the greater confidence depositors would feel in such a bank4 ,once established the postal savings bank might enter the insurance field1 as has the ,british postal savings bank1 not as a rival of privately managed insurance companies1 but to bring to every wage-earner the opportunity to secure safe insurance4 ,next to providing itself opportunities for safe investment and insurance1 the government has an important duty to perform in supervising the business of privately managed savings banks and insurance companies4 ,notwithstanding the progress made in recent years in the ,united ,states in this field1 there is still something left for social legislation to accomplish4 7#b7 ,if energy and enterprise are to be kept at a maximum1 wage-earners must be protected from exhausting toil under unhealthful conditions4 ,skilled wage-earners can usually protect themselves through trade unions1 but unskilled workers1 women and children1 require legal protection4 ,under this head belong1 therefore1 the familiar types of protective labor laws4 ,the following may be specified3 7a7 ,laws prohibiting the employment of children below fourteen in all gainful pursuits4 ,such laws should be uniform throughout the ,united ,states and rigidly enforced by means of employment certificates based on convincing evidence of age and physical examination to determine fitness4 ,as provision for free public education is made more adequate to present needs the minimum age may be advanced perhaps to sixteen4 7b7 ,laws limiting the hours of labor of young persons over fourteen4 ,protection here should extend to eighteen1 at least in factory employments1 and employment certificates should be required of all under that age4 7c7 ,laws limiting the hours of labor of women4 ,in the regulation of women's work in the ,united ,states the principal needs are uniformity and machinery for efficient enforcement4 ,the last is facilitated by the plan of specifying in the law the working period for the protected classes1 and ,american courts must be brought to see the reasonableness 7administratively7 of such prescriptions4 ,the nine-hour day and prohibition of night work set a high enough standard until greater uniformity and more efficient enforcement shall have been secured4 7d7 ,prescriptions in regard to sanitation and safety appliances4 ,general prescriptions in regard to ventilation1 etc41 need to be made more exact1 and much more attention needs to be given to the special regulation of dangerous trades1 the existence of which has been largely ignored thus far in ,american legislation4 7#c7 ,the chief reason for restricting the labor of children and young persons is to permit the physical and mental development of childhood and youth to proceed unhampered and to ripen into strong1 vigorous1 and efficient manhood and womanhood4 ,to attain this end1 it is necessary to provide not only for wholesome living conditions and general free public education1 but also for special industrial training for older children superior to the training afforded in modern factories and workshops4 ,the apprenticeship system now fails as a method of industrial training1 even in those few trades which retain the forms of apprenticeship4 ,there is urgent social need for comprehensive provision for industrial training as a part of the public school system1 not to take the place of the training now given to children under fourteen1 but to hold those between fourteen and sixteen in school4 ,as this need is supplied the period of compulsory school attendance may gradually be extended up to the sixteenth year4 ,the guiding principle of such industrial training should be that it is the function of free public education in the ,united ,states not only to prepare children to lead useful1 well-rounded and happy lives1 but to command the earnings without which such lives are impossible4 ,the above programme of social legislation is urged as a step towards realizing that canon of social justice which demands for all equal industrial opportunities4 ,it is believed that it will also help to raise the standard of citizenship in the country by making both wage-earners and employers more intelligent1 more efficient1 and more truly democratic4 ,thus it will serve to prepare the way for such further industrial reorganization as may be found desirable4 ,,chapter ,,xxvi ,,the ,,family ,the family in its moral aspects has one end1 the common good of all its members1 but this has three aspects4 7#a7 ,marriage converts an attachment between man and woman1 either of passion or of friendship1 into a deliberate1 intimate1 permanent1 responsible union for a common end of mutual good4 ,it is this common end1 a good of a higher1 broader1 fuller sort than either could attain in isolation1 which lifts passion from the impulsive or selfish to the moral plane2 it is the peculiar intimacy and the peculiar demands for common sympathy and co-operation1 which give it greater depth and reach than ordinary friendship4 7#b7 ,the family is the great social agency for the care and training of the race4 7#c7 ,this function reacts upon the character of the parents4 ,tenderness1 sympathy1 self-sacrifice1 steadiness of purpose1 responsibility1 and activity1 are all demanded and usually evoked by the children4 ,a brief sketch of the development of the family and of its psychological basis1 will prepare the way for a consideration of its present problems4 ,sec4 #a4 ,,historical ,,antecedents ,,of ,,the ,,modern ,,family ,the division of the sexes appeals to the biologist as an agency for securing greater variability1 and so greater possibility of adaptation and progress4 ,it has also to the sociologist the value of giving greater variety in function1 and so a much richer society than could exist without it4 ,morally1 the realization of these values1 and the further effects upon character noted above1 depend greatly upon the terms under which the marriage union is formed and maintained4 ,the number of parties to the union1 the mode of forming it1 its stability1 and the relations of husband and wife1 parents and children1 while in the family relation1 have shown in western civilization a tendency toward certain lines of progress1 although the movement has been irregular and has been interrupted by certain halts or even reversions4 ,the ,maternal ,type4--,the early family1 certainly in many parts of the world1 was formed when a man left his father and mother to cleave unto his wife1 that is1 when the woman remained in her own group and the man came from his group to live with her4 ,this tended to give the woman continued protection--and also continued control--by her own relatives1 and made the children belong to the mother's clan4 ,as recent ethnologists seem inclined to agree1 this does not mean a matriarchal family4 ,the woman's father and brothers1 rather than the woman1 are in the last analysis the authority4 ,at the same time1 at a stage when physical force is so large a factor1 this type of family undoubtedly favors the woman's condition as compared with the next to be mentioned4 ,the ,paternal ,type4--,when the woman leaves her own group to live in the house of her husband1 it means a possible loss of backing and position for her4 ,but it means a great gain for the influence which insures the wife's fidelity1 the father's authority over the children and interest in them1 and finally the permanence of the family4 ,the power of the husband and father reached its extreme among western peoples in the patriarchate at ,rome1 which allowed him the right of life and death4 ,at its best the patriarchal type of family fostered the dignity and power of a ruler and owner1 the sense of honor which watched jealously over self and wife and children to keep the name unsullied2 finally the respective attitudes of protector and protected enhanced the charm of each for the other4 ,at its worst it meant domineering brutality1 and either the weakness of abject submission or the misery of hopeless injustice4 ,along with this building up of father right came variations in the mode of gaining a wife4 ,when the man takes a wife instead of going to his wife1 he may either capture her1 or purchase her1 or serve for her4 ,in any of these cases she may become to a certain extent his property as well as his wife4 ,this does not necessarily imply a feeling of humiliation4 ,the ,kafir women profess great contempt for a system in which a woman is not worth buying4 ,but it evidently favors a commercial theory of the whole relation4 ,the bride's consent may sometimes be a necessary part of the transaction1 but it is not always4 ,effects of ,father ,right4--,this family of father right is also likely to encourage a theory that the man should have greater freedom in marriage than the woman4 ,in the lowest types of civilization we often find the marital relations very loose from our point of view1 although1 as was noted in ,chapter ,,ii41 these peoples usually make up for this in the rigidity of the rules as to who may marry or have marriage relations4 ,with some advance in civilization and with the father right1 we are very apt to find polygamy permitted to chiefs or those who can afford it1 even though the average man may have but one wife4 ,in certain cases the wives may be an economic advantage rather than a burden4 ,it goes along with a family in which father and children are of first importance that a wife may even be glad to have her servant bear the children if they may only be reckoned as hers4 ,the husband has thus greater freedom--for polyandry seems to have been rare among civilized peoples except under stress of poverty4 ,the greater freedom of the husband is likely to appear also in the matter of divorce4 ,among many savage peoples divorce is easy for both parties if there is mutual consent1 but with the families in which father right prevails it is almost always easier for the man4 ,the ancient ,hebrew might divorce his wife for any cause he pleased1 but there is no mention of a similar right on her part1 and it doubtless did not occur to the lawgiver4 ,the code of ,hammurabi allows the man to put away the mother of his children by giving her and her children suitable maintenance1 or a childless wife by returning the bride price1 but a wife who has acted foolishly or extravagantly may be divorced without compensation or kept as a slave4 ,the woman may also claim a divorce if she has been economical and has no vice and her husband has gone out and greatly belittled her4 ,but if she fails to prove her claim and appears to be a gadder-about1 they shall throw that woman into the water4 ,india and ,china have the patriarchal family1 and the ,brahmans added the obligation of the widow never to remarry4 ,greater freedom of divorce on the part of the husband is also attended by a very different standard for marital faithfulness4 ,for the unfaithful husband there is frequently no penalty or a slight one2 for the wife it is frequently death4 ,the ,roman ,family4--,the modern family in western civilization is the product of three main forces3 the ,roman law1 the ,teutonic custom1 and the ,christian ,church4 ,early ,roman law had recognized the extreme power of the husband and father4 ,wife and children were in his hand4 ,all women must be in the tutela of some man4 ,the woman1 according to the three early forms of marriage1 passed completely from the power and hand of her father into that of her husband4 ,at the same time she was the only wife1 and divorce was rare4 ,but by the closing years of the ,republic a new method of marriage1 permitting the woman to remain in the manus of her father1 had come into vogue1 and with it an easy theory of divorce4 ,satirists have charged great degeneracy in morals as a result1 but ,hobhouse thinks that upon the whole the ,roman matron would seem to have retained the position of her husband's companion1 counselor1 and friend1 which she had held in those more austere times when marriage brought her legally under his dominion4#bdi ,the ,germanic ,family4--,the ,germanic peoples recognized an almost unlimited power of the husband4 ,the passion for liberty1 which ,caesar remarked as prevalent among them1 did not seem to require any large measure of freedom for their women4 ,in fact1 they1 like other peoples1 might be said to have satisfied the two principles of freedom and control by allotting all the freedom to the men and all1 or nearly all1 the control to the women4 ,hobhouse thus summarizes the conditions3 ,the power of the husband was strongly developed2 he might expose the infant children1 chastise his wife1 dispose of her person4 ,he could not put her to death1 but if she was unfaithful1 he was1 with the consent of the relations1 judge and executioner4 ,the wife was acquired by purchase from her own relatives without reference to her own desires1 and by purchase passed out of her family4 ,she did not inherit in early times at all1 though at a later period she acquired that right in the absence of male heirs4 ,she was in perpetual ward1 subject1 in short1 to the ,chinese rule of the three obediences1 to which must be added1 as feudal powers developed1 the rule of the king or other feudal superior4 ,and the guardianship or mundium was frankly regarded in early law rather as a source of profit to the guardian than as a means of defense to the ward1 and for this reason it fetched a price in the market1 and was1 in fact1 salable far down in the ,middle ,ages4 ,lastly1 the ,german wife1 though respected1 had not the certainty enjoyed by the early ,roman ,matron of reigning alone in the household4 ,it is true that polygamy was rare in the early ,german tribes1 but this1 as we have seen1 is universally the case where the numbers of the sexes are equal4 ,polygamy was allowed1 and was practiced by the chiefs4 ,two ,lines of ,church ,influence4--,the influence of the church on marriage and family life was in two conflicting lines4 ,on the one hand1 the homage and adoration given to ,mary and to the saints1 tended to exalt and refine the conception of woman4 ,marriage was1 moreover1 treated as a sacrament1 a holy mystery1 symbolic of the relation of ,christ and the church4 ,the priestly benediction gave religious sacredness from the beginning2 gradually a marriage liturgy sprang up which added to the solemnity of the event1 and finally the whole ceremony was made an ecclesiastical instead of a secular function4#bej ,the whole institution was undoubtedly raised to a more serious and significant position4 ,but1 on the other hand1 an ascetic stream of influence had pursued a similar course1 deepening and widening as it flowed4 ,although from the beginning those forbidding to marry had been denounced1 it had nearly always been held that the celibate life was a higher privilege4 ,if marriage was a sacrament1 it was nevertheless held that marriage made a man unfit to perform the sacraments4 ,woman was regarded as the cause of the original sin4 ,marriage was from this standpoint a concession to human weakness4 ,the generality of men and women must marry or they will do worse2 therefore1 marriage must be made easy2 but the very pure hold aloof from it as from a defilement4 ,the law that springs from this source is not pleasant to read4#bea ,it must1 however1 be noted that1 although celibacy by a selective process tended to remove continually the finer1 more aspiring men and women1 and prevent them from leaving any descendants1 it had one important value for woman4 ,the convent was at once a refuge1 and a door to activity4 ,the career open to the inmates of convents was greater than any other ever thrown open to women in the course of modern ,european history4#beb ,two important contributions to the justice of the marriage relation1 and therefore to the better theory of the family1 are in any case to be set down to the credit of the church4 ,the first was that the consent of the parties was the only thing necessary to constitute a valid marriage4 ,here the church had not only to combat old tradition and the authority of the parents1 but also the seignorial power of the feudal lord1 and it must be accounted to it for righteousness that it emancipated the woman of the servile as well as of the free classes in relation to the most important event of her life4#bec ,the other was that in maintaining as it did the indissolubility of the sacramental marriage1 it held that its violation was as bad for the husband as for the wife4 ,the older theories had looked at infidelity either as an injury to the husband's property1 or as introducing uncertainty as to the parenthood of children1 and this survives in ,dr4 ,johnson's dictum of a boundless difference4 ,the feelings of the wife1 or even of the husband1 aside from his concern for his property and children1 do not seem to have been considered4 ,the church thus modified the ,germanic and ,roman traditions1 but never entirely abolished them1 because she was divided within herself as to the real place of family life4 ,protestantism1 in its revolt from ,rome1 opposed both its theories of marriage4 ,on the one hand1 the ,reformers held that marriage is not a sacrament1 but a civil contract1 admitting of divorce4 ,on the other hand1 they regarded marriage as the most desirable state1 and abolished the celibacy of the clergy4 ,the subjection of women1 especially of married women1 has1 however1 remained as the legal theory until very recently4 ,in ,england it was the theory in ,blackstone's time that ,the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage1 or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband1 under whose wing1 protection1 and cover1 she performs everything4 ,according to the old law1 he might give her moderate correction4 ,but with us in the politer reign of ,charles ,,ii41 this power of correction began to be doubted4 ,it was not until #ahhb1 however1 that a married woman in ,england gained control of her property4 ,in the ,united ,states the old injustice of the common law has been gradually remedied by statutes until substantial equality in relation to property and children has been secured4 ,sec4 #b4 ,,the ,,psychological ,,basis ,,of ,,the ,,family ,the psychology of family life may be conveniently considered under two heads3 that of the husband and wife1 and that of parents and children1 brothers and sisters4 #a4 ,the complex sentiment1 love1 which is found in the most perfect family life1 is on the one hand 7#a7 a feeling or emotion2 on the other 7#b7 a purpose1 a will4 ,both these are modified and strengthened by 7#c7 parenthood and 7#d7 social and religious influences4 7#a7 ,the ,emotional and ,instinctive ,basis4--,as feeling or emotion love may have two roots4 ,a mental sympathy1 based on kindred tastes and interests1 is sometimes present at the outset1 but in any case it is likely to develop under the favoring conditions of a common life1 particularly if there are either children or a common work4 ,but it is well known that this is not all4 ,a friend is one thing2 a lover another4 ,the intimacy involved requires not only the more easily described and superficial attraction of mind for mind2 it demands also a deeper congeniality of the whole person1 incapable of precise formulation1 manifesting itself in the subtler emotional attitudes of instinctive reaction4 ,this instinctive1 as contrasted with the more reflective1 attraction is frequently described as one of opposites or contrasting dispositions and physical characteristics4 ,but this is nothing that enters into the feeling as a conscious factor4 ,the only explanation which we can give in the present condition of science is the biological one4 ,from the biological point of view it was a most successful venture when ,nature1 by some happy variation1 developed two sexes with slightly different characters and made their union necessary to the continuance of life in certain species4 ,by uniting in every new individual the qualities of two parents1 the chances of variation are greatly increased1 and variation is the method of progress4 ,to keep the same variety of fruit the horticulturist buds or grafts2 to get new varieties he plants seed4 ,the extraordinary progress combined with continuity of type1 which has been exhibited in the plant and animal world1 has been effected1 in part at least1 through the agency of sex4 ,this long process has developed certain principles of selection which are instinctive4 ,whether they are the best possible or not1 they represent a certain adjustment which has secured such progress as has been attained1 and such adaptation to environment as exists1 and it would be unwise1 if it were not impossible1 to disregard them4 ,marriages of convenience are certainly questionable from the biological standpoint4 ,but the instinctive basis is not in and of itself sufficient to guarantee a happy family life4 ,if man were living wholly a life of instinct1 he might trust instinct as a guide in establishing his family4 ,but since he is living an intellectual and social life as well1 intellectual and social factors must enter4 ,the instinctive basis of selection was fixed by conditions which contemplated only a more or less limited period of attachment1 with care of the young for a few years4 ,modern society requires the husband and wife to contemplate life-long companionship1 and a care for children which implies capacity in the father to provide for a great range of advantages1 and in the mother to be intellectual and moral guide and friend until maturity4 ,to trust the security of these increased demands to instinct is to invite failure4 ,instinct must be guided by reason if perfect friendship and mutual supplementation in the whole range of interests are to be added to the intenser1 but less certain1 attraction4 7#b7 ,the ,common ,will4--,but whether based on instinct or intellectual sympathy1 no feeling or emotion by itself is an adequate moral basis for the life together of a man and a woman4 ,what was said on p4 #bdi1 as to the moral worthlessness of any mere feeling abstracted from will1 applies here4 ,love or affection1 in the only sense in which it makes a moral basis of the family1 is not the affection of psychological language--the pleasant or unpleasant tone of consciousness2 it is the resolute purpose in each to seek the other's good1 or rather to seek a common good which can be attained only through a common life involving mutual self-sacrifice4 ,it is the good will of ,kant specifically directed toward creating a common good4 ,it is the formation of a small kingdom of ends in which each treats the other as end1 never as means only2 in which each is both sovereign and subject2 in which the common will1 thus created1 enhances the person of each and gives it higher moral dignity and worth4 ,and1 as in the case of all purpose which has moral value1 there is such a common good as the actual result4 ,the disposition and character of both husband and wife are developed and supplemented4 ,the male is biologically the more variable and motor4 ,he has usually greater initiative and strength4 ,economic and industrial life accentuates these tendencies4 ,but alone he is apt to become rough or hard1 to lack the feeling in which the charm and value of life are experienced4 ,on the other hand1 the woman1 partly by instinct1 it may be1 but certainly by vocation1 is largely occupied with the variety of cares on which human health1 comfort1 and morality depend4 ,she tends to become narrow1 unless supplemented by man4 ,the value of emotion and feeling in relation to this process of mutual aid and enlargement1 as in general1 is1 as ,aristotle pointed out1 to perfect the will4 ,it gives warmth and vitality to what would otherwise be in any case partial and might easily become insincere4 ,there was a profound truth which underlay the old psychology in which the heart meant at once character and passion4 7#c7 ,the ,influence of ,parenthood4--,nature takes one step at a time4 ,if all the possible consequences of family life had to be definitely forecasted1 valued1 and chosen at the outset1 many would shrink4 ,but this would be because there is as yet no capacity to appreciate new values before the actual experience of them4 ,every promise of the soul has innumerable fulfillments2 each of its joys ripens into a new want4 ,parental affection is not usually present until there are real children to evoke it4 ,at the outset the mutual love of husband and wife is enough4 ,but as the first1 more instinctive and emotional factors lose relatively1 the deeper union of will and sympathy needs community of interest if it is to become permanent and complete4 ,such community of interest is often found in sharing a business or a profession1 but under present industrial organization this is not possible as a general rule4 ,the most general and effective object of common interest is the children of the family4 ,as pointed out by ,john ,fiske1 the mere keeping of the parents together by the prolongation of infancy in the human species has had great moral influence4 ,present civilization does not merely demand that the parents cooperate eight or ten years for the child's physical support4 ,there has been a second epoch in the prolongation4 ,the parents now must cooperate until the children are through school and college1 and in business or homes of their own4 ,and the superiority of children over the other common interests is that in a different form the parents repeat the process which first took them out of their individual lives to unite for mutual helpfulness4 ,if the parents treat the children not merely as sources of gratification or pride1 but as persons1 with lives of their own to live1 with capacities to develop1 the personality of the parent is enlarged4 ,the affection between husband and wife is enriched by the new relationship it has created4 7#d7 ,social and ,religious ,factors4--,the relations of husband and wife1 parent and child1 are the most intimate of personal relations1 but they are none the less relations of social interest4 ,in fact1 just because they are so intimate1 society is the more deeply concerned4 ,or1 to put it from the individual's standpoint1 just because the parties are undertaking a profoundly personal step1 they must take it as members of a moral order4 ,the act of establishing the family signifies1 indeed1 the entrance into fuller participation in the social life2 it is the assuming of ties which make the parties in a new and deeper sense organic parts of humanity4 ,this social and cosmic meaning is appropriately symbolized by the civil and religious ceremony4 ,in its control over the marriage contract1 and in its prescriptions as to the care and education of the children1 society continues to show its interest4 ,all this lends added value and strength to the emotional and intellectual bases4 #b4 ,parent and ,child4--,the other relationships in the family1 those of parents and children1 brothers and sisters1 need no elaborate analysis4 ,the love of parents for children1 like that of man and woman1 has an instinctive basis4 ,those species which have cared for their offspring have had a great advantage in the struggle for existence4 ,nature has selected them1 and is constantly dropping the strains of any race or set which cares more for power1 or wealth1 or learning than for children4 ,tenderness1 courage1 responsibility1 activity1 patience1 forethought1 personal virtue--these are constantly evoked not by the needs of children in general1 but by the needs of our own children4 ,the instinctive response1 however1 is soon broadened in outlook and deepened in meaning4 ,intellectual activity is stimulated by the needs of providing for the physical welfare1 and1 still more1 by the necessity of planning for the unfolding mind4 ,the interchange of question and answer which forces the parent to think his whole world anew1 and which with the allied interchange of imitation and suggestion produces a give and take between all members of the family1 is constantly making for fluidity and flexibility1 for tolerance and catholicity4 ,in the thoughtful parent these educative influences are still further enriched by the problem of moral training4 ,for in each family1 as in the race1 the need of eliciting and directing right conduct in the young is one of the most important agencies in bringing home to the elders the significance of custom and authority1 of right and wrong4 ,it is natural enough1 from one standpoint1 to think of childhood as an imperfect state1 looking forward for its completeness and getting its value because of its rich promise4 ,but the biologist tells us that the child is nearer the line of progress than the more developed1 but also more rigidly set1 man4 ,and the lover of children is confident that if any age of humanity exists by its own right1 and pays as it goes1 it is childhood4 ,it is not only meet1 but a joy1 that the fathers labor for the children4 ,many1 if not most1 of the objects for which men and women strive and drudge seem less satisfactory when obtained2 because we have meanwhile outgrown the desire4 ,children afford an object of affection which is constantly unfolding new powers1 and opening new reaches of personality4#bed ,conversely1 an authority which is also tender1 patient1 sympathetic1 is the best medium to develop in the child self-control4 ,the necessity of mutual forbearance where there are several children1 of sharing fairly1 of learning to give and take1 is the best possible method of training for membership in the larger society4 ,in fact1 from the point of view of the social organism as a whole1 the family has two functions2 as a smaller group1 it affords an opportunity for eliciting the qualities of affection and character which cannot be displayed at all in the larger group2 and1 in the second place1 it is a training for future members of the larger group in those qualities of disposition and character which are essential to citizenship4#bee ,sec4 #c4 ,,general ,,elements ,,of ,,strain ,,in ,,family ,,relations ,difference in ,temperament4--,while there are intrinsic qualities of men and women that bring them together for family life1 and1 while there is in most cases a strong reenforcement afforded by the presence of children1 there are certain characteristics which tend just as inevitably to produce tension1 and those forces of tension are strengthened at the present time by certain economic1 educational1 and cultural conditions4 ,the differences between men and women may be at the basis of their instinctive attraction for each other2 they certainly have possibilities of friction as well4 ,a fundamental difference already noted is that the male is more variable1 the female more true to the type4 ,biologically at least1 the varium et mutabile is applied by the poet to the wrong sex4 ,applied to the mind and disposition1 this means probably not only a greater variation of capacity and temper as a whole1--more geniuses and also more at the other extreme than among women1--but also a greater average mobility4 ,differences ,accentuated by ,occupation4--,from the early occupations of hunting and fishing1 to the modern greater range of occupations1 any native mobility in man has found stimulation and scope1 as compared with the energies of women which have less distinct differentiation and a more limited contact with the work of others4 ,and there is another industrial difference closely connected with this1 which has been pointed out by ,ellis1#bef and ,thomas4#beg ,primitive man hunted and fought4 ,much of primitive industry1 the prototype1 so far as it existed1 of the industrial activity of the modern world1 was carried on by woman4 ,industrial progress has been signalized by the splitting off of one phase of woman's work after another1 and by the organization and expansion of this at the hands of man4 ,man's work has thus become more specialized and scientific2 woman's has remained more detailed1 complex1 and diffused4 ,her work in the family of ordering the household1 caring for the children1 securing the health and comfort of all its members1 necessarily involves personal adjustment2 hence it resists system4 ,as a result of the differentiation man has gained in greater and greater degree a scientific and objective standard for his work2 woman neither has nor can have--at least in the sphere of personal relations--the advantage of a standard4 ,business has its ratings in the quantity of sales or the ratio of net profits4 ,the professions and skilled trades have their own tests of achievement4 ,a scientist makes his discovery1 a lawyer wins his case1 an architect builds his bridge1 the mechanic his machine2 he knows whether he has done a good piece of work1 and respects himself accordingly4 ,he can appeal from the man next to him to the judgment of his profession4 ,conversely1 the standard of the trade or profession helps to lift the individual's work4 ,it is a constant stimulus1 as well as support4 ,a woman's work in the family has no such professional stimulus1 or professional vindication4 ,if the family is lenient1 the work is not held up to a high level4 ,on the other hand1 it must make its appeal to the persons immediately concerned1 and if they do not respond1 the woman feels that she has failed to do something really worth while4 ,if her work is not valued1 she feels that it is not valuable4 ,for there is no demonstrative proof of a successful home any more than there is of a good work of art4 ,it is easy enough to point out reasons why the picture or the home should please and satisfy1 but if the work itself is not convincing1 no demonstration that similar works have satisfied is of any avail4 ,the way in which men and women come into contact with others is another element in the case4 ,man comes into contact with others for the most part in an abstract way4 ,he deals not with men1 women1 and children1 but with employers or employed1 with customers or clients1 or patients4 ,he doesn't have to stand them in all their varied phases1 or enter into those intimate relations which involve strain of adjustment in its fullest extent4 ,moreover1 business or professional manner and etiquette come in to relieve the necessity of personal effort4 ,the professional manner serves the same function in dealing with others1 which habit plays in the individual life2 it takes the place of continual readjustment of attention4 ,when a man is forced to lay this aside and deal in any serious situation as a human being1 he feels a far greater strain4 ,the woman's task is less in extension1 but great in intension4 ,it obliges her to deal with the children1 at any rate1 as wholes1 and a whole child is a good deal of a strain4 ,if she does not see the whole of the husband1 it is quite likely that the part not brought home--the professional or business part of him--is the most alert1 intelligent1 and interesting phase4 ,the constant close-at-hand personal relations1 unrelieved by the abstract impersonal attitude and the generalizing activity which it invites1 constitute an element of strain which few men understand1 and which probably few could endure and possess their souls4 ,the present division of labor seems1 therefore1 to make the man excessively abstract1 the woman excessively personal1 instead of supplementing to some extent the weak side of each4 ,difference in ,attitude toward the ,family4--,as if these differences in attitude based on disposition and occupation were not enough1 we have a thoroughgoing difference in the attitude of men and women toward the very institution which invites them4 ,the man is ready enough to assent to the importance of the family for the race1 but his family means not an interference with other ambitions1 but usually an aid to their fulfillment4 ,his family is one interest among several1 and is very likely subordinate in his thought to his profession or his business4 ,in early ages to rove or conquer1 in modern life to master nature and control her resources or his fellowmen--this has been the insistent instinct which urges even the long-tossed ,ulysses from ,ithaca and from ,penelope again upon the deep4 ,woman1 on the other hand1 if she enters a family1 usually abandons any other ambition and forgets any acquired art or skill of her previous occupation4 ,to be the mistress of a home may be precisely what she would choose as a vocation4 ,but there is usually no alternative if she is to have a home at all4 ,it is not a question of a family in addition to a vocation1 but of a family as a vocation4 ,hence woman must regard family life not merely as a good2 it must be the good1 and usually the exclusive good4 ,if1 then1 a woman has accepted the family as the supreme good1 it is naturally hard to be in perfect sympathy with the man's standard of family life as secondary4 ,of course a completer vision may find that a division of labor1 a difference of function1 may carry with it a difference in standards of value2 the mastery of nature and the maintenance of the family may be neither an absolute good in itself1 but each a necessity to life and progress4 ,but neither man nor woman is always equal to this view1 and to the full sympathy for the relative value of the other's standpoint4 ,where it cuts closest is in the attitude toward breach of faith in the family tie4 ,men have severe codes for the man who cheats at cards or forges a signature1 but treat much more leniently1 or entirely ignore1 the gravest offenses against the family4 ,these latter do not seem to form a barrier to political1 business1 or social success 7among men74 ,women have a severe standard for family sanctity1 especially for their own sex4 ,but it would probably be difficult to convince most women that it is a more heinous offense to secrete a card1 or even with ,nora in ,the ,doll's ,house1 to forge a name1 than to be unfaithful4 ,it is not meant that the average man or woman approves either form of wrongdoing1 but that there is a difference of emphasis evidenced in the public attitude4 ,in view of all these differences in nature1 occupation1 and social standard it may be said that however well husband and wife may love each other1 few understand each other completely4 ,perhaps most men do not understand women at all4 ,corresponding to the psychologist's fallacy1 whose evils have been depicted by ,james1 there is a masculine fallacy and a feminine fallacy4 ,difference in ,age4--,the difference in age between parents and children brings certain inevitable hindrances to complete understanding4 ,the most thoroughgoing is that parent and children really stand concretely for the two factors of continuity and individual variation which confront each other in so many forms4 ,the parent has found his place in the social system1 and is both steadied and to some extent made rigid by the social tradition4 ,the child1 though to some extent imitating and adopting this tradition1 has as yet little reasoned adherence to it4 ,the impulses and expanding life do not find full expression in the set ways already open1 and occasionally break out new channels4 ,the conservatism of the parent may be a wiser and more social1 or merely a more hardened and narrow1 mode of conduct2 some of the child's variations may be irrational and pernicious to himself and society2 others may promise a larger reasonableness1 a more generous social order--but meanwhile certain features of the conflict between reason and impulse1 order and change1 are constantly appearing4 ,differences in valuation are also inevitable and can be bridged only by an intelligent sympathy4 ,it is easy to consider this or that to be of slight importance to the child when it is really his whole world for the time4 ,even if he does get over it1 the effect on the disposition may remain1 and affect the temper or emotional life1 even though not consciously remembered4 ,probably1 also1 most parents do not realize how early a crude but sometimes even passionate sense for fairness develops1 or how different the relative setting of an act appears if judged from the motives actually operative with the child1 and not from those which might produce such an act in a grown-up4 ,most parents and children love each other2 few reach a complete understanding4 ,sec4 #d4 ,,special ,,conditions ,,which ,,give ,,rise ,,to ,,present ,,problems ,in addition to the more general conditions of family life1 there are certain conditions at present operative which give rise to special problems1 or rather emphasize certain aspects of the permanent problems4 ,the family is quite analogous to political society4 ,there needs to be constant readjustment between order and progress1 between the control of the society and the freedom of the individual4 ,the earlier bonds of custom or force have to be exchanged in point after point for a more voluntary and moral order4 ,in the words of ,kant1 heteronomy must steadily give place to autonomy1 subordination of rank or status to division of labor with equality in dignity4 ,the elements of strain in the family life at present may fairly be expected to give rise ultimately to a better constitution of its relations4 ,the special conditions are partly economic1 partly educational and political1 but the general process is a part of the larger growth of modern civilization with the increasing development of individuality and desire for freedom4 ,it is sometimes treated as if it affected only the woman or the children2 in reality it affects the man as well1 though in less degree1 as his was not the subordinate position4 ,the ,economic ,factors4--,the industrial revolution transferred production from home to factory4 ,the household is no longer as a rule an industrial unit4 ,spinning1 weaving1 tailoring1 shoemaking1 soap-making1 iron- and wood-working1 and other trades have gone to factories4 ,men1 young unmarried women1 and to some extent married women also1 have gone with them4 ,children have lost association with one parent1 and in some cases with both4 ,the concentration of industry and business leads to cities4 ,under present means of transportation this means apartments instead of houses1 it means less freedom1 more strain1 for both mother and children1 and possible deteriorating effects upon the race which as yet are quite outside any calculation4 ,but leaving this uncertain field of effects upon child life1 we notice certain potent effects upon men and women4 ,it might be a difficult question to decide the exact gains and losses for family life due to the absence of the man from home during the day4 ,on the one hand1 too constant association is a source of friction2 on the other1 there is likely to result some loss of sympathy1 and where the working-day is long1 an almost absolute loss of contact with children4 ,if children are the great natural agencies for cultivating tenderness and affection1 it is certainly unfortunate that fathers should be deprived of this education4 ,the effect of the industrial revolution upon women has been widely noted4 ,first of all1 the opening of an increasing number of occupations to women has rendered them economically more independent4 ,they are not forced to the alternative of marriage or dependence upon relatives4 ,if already married1 even although they may have lost touch to some extent with their former occupation1 they do not feel the same compulsion to endure intolerable conditions in the home rather than again attempt self-support4 ,an incidental effect of the entrance of women upon organized occupations1 with definite hours and impersonal standards1 is to bring out more strongly by contrast the belated condition of domestic work4 ,it is difficult to obtain skilled workers for an occupation requiring nearly double the standard number of hours1 isolation instead of companionship during work1 close personal contact with an employer1 a measure of control over conduct outside of the hours on duty1 and finally the social inferiority implied by an occupation which has in it survivals of the status of the old-time servant4 ,indeed1 the mistress of the house1 if she does her own work1 doesn't altogether like her situation4 ,there is now no one general occupation which all men are expected to master irrespective of native tastes and abilities4 ,if every male were obliged to make not only his own clothing1 including head- and foot-wear1 but that of his whole family1 unassisted1 or with practically unskilled labor1 there would probably be as much misfit clothing as there is now unsatisfactory home-making1 and possibly there would be an increase of irritability and nervousness on the one side and of criticism or desertion on the other1 which would increase the present strain upon the divorce courts4 ,to an increasing number of women1 the position of being jack-at-all-trades and master-of-none is irritating4 ,the conviction that there is a great waste of effort without satisfactory results is more wearing than the actual doing of the work4 ,for the minority of women who do not keep house1 or who can be relieved entirely of domestic work by experts1 the industrial revolution has a different series of possibilities4 ,if there is a decided talent which has received adequate cultivation1 there may be an opportunity for its exercise without serious interference with family life1 but the chances are against it4 ,if the woman cannot leave her home for the entire day1 or if her husband regards a gainful occupation on her part as a reflection upon his ability to support the family1 she is practically shut out from any occupation4 ,if she has children and has an intelligent as well as an emotional interest in their welfare1 there is an unlimited field for scientific development4 ,but if she has no regular useful occupation1 she is not leading a normal life4 ,her husband very likely cannot understand why she should not1 in the words of ,veblen1 perform vicarious leisure for him1 and be satisfied therewith4 ,if she is satisfied1 so much the worse4 ,whether she is satisfied or not1 she is certainly not likely to grow mentally or morally in such an existence1 and the family life will not be helped by stagnation or frivolity4 ,in certain classes of society there is one economic feature which is probably responsible for many petty annoyances and in some cases for real degradation of spirit4 ,when the family was an industrial unit1 when exchange was largely in barter1 it was natural to think of the woman as a joint agent in production4 ,when the production moved to factories and the wage or the wealth was paid to the man and could be kept in his pocket or his check-book1 it became easy for him to think of himself as supporting the family1 to permit himself to be asked for money for household expenses or even for the wife's personal expenses1 and to consider money used in these ways as gifts to his wife or children4 ,women have more or less resistingly acquiesced in this humiliating conception1 which is fatal to a real moral relation as well as to happiness4 ,it is as absurd a conception as it would be to consider the receiving teller in a bank as supporting the bank1 or the manager of a factory as supporting all the workmen4 ,the end of the family is not economic profit1 but mutual aid1 and the continuance and progress of the race4 ,a division of labor does not give superiority and inferiority4 ,when one considers which party incurs the greater risks1 and which works with greater singleness and sincerity for the family1 it must pass as one of the extraordinary superstitions that the theory of economic dependence should have gained vogue4 ,cultural and ,political ,factors4--,educational1 cultural1 and political movements reenforce the growing sense of individuality4 ,educational and cultural advance strengthens the demand that woman's life shall have as serious a purpose as man's1 and that in carrying on her work1 whether in the family or without1 she may have some share in the grasp of mind1 the discipline of character1 and the freedom of spirit which come from the scientific spirit1 and from the intelligent1 efficient organization of work by scientific methods4 ,political democracy draws increasing attention to personal dignity1 irrespective of rank or wealth4 ,increasing legal rights have been granted to women until in most points they are now equal before the law1 although the important exception of suffrage still remains for the most part4 ,under these conditions it is increasingly difficult to maintain a family union on any other basis than that of equal freedom1 equal responsibilities1 equal dignity and authority4 ,it will probably be found that most of the tension now especially felt in family life--aside from those cases of maladaptation liable to occur under any system--results either from lack of recognition of this equality1 or from the more general economic conditions which society as a whole1 rather than any particular family1 must meet and change4 ,sec4 #e4 ,,unsettled ,,problems3 7#a7 ,,economic ,the family as an economic unit includes the relation of its members to society both as producers and as consumers4 ,the ,family and ,production4--,we have noted the industrial changes which have seemed to draw the issue sharply between the home and outside occupations4 ,we have seen that the present organization of industry1 business1 and the professions has separated most of the occupations from the family1 so that woman must choose between family and a specific occupation1 but cannot ordinarily combine the two4 ,we have said that in requiring all its women to do the same thing the family seems to exclude them from individual pursuits adapted to their talents1 and to exclude them likewise from the whole scientific and technical proficiency of modern life4 ,is this an inevitable dilemma8 ,those who think it is divide into two parties1 which accept respectively the opposite horns4 ,the one party infers that the social division of labor must be3 man to carry on all occupations outside the family1 woman to work always within the family4 ,the other party infers that the family life must give way to the industrial tendency4 7#a7 ,the domestic theory1 or as ,mrs4 ,bosanquet styles it1 the pseudo-domestic theory1 is held sincerely by many earnest friends of the family in both sexes4 ,they feel strongly the fundamental necessity of family life4 ,they believe further that they are not seeking to subordinate woman to the necessities of the race1 but rather to give her a unique position of dignity and affection4 ,in outside occupations she must usually be at a disadvantage in competition with men1 because of her physical constitution which ,nature has specialized for a different function4 ,in the family she reigns supreme4 ,with most women life is not satisfied1 experience is not full1 complete consciousness of sex and individuality is not attained1 until they have dared to enter upon the full family relations4 ,let these be preserved not merely for the race1 but especially for woman's own sake4 ,further1 it is urged1 when woman enters competitive occupations outside the home1 she lowers the scale of wages4 ,this makes it harder for men to support families1 and therefore more reluctant to establish them4 ,riehl urges that not only should married women remain at home2 unmarried women should play the part of aunt in some one's household--he says alte ,tante1 but it is not necessary to load the theory too heavily with the adjective4 7#b7 ,the other horn of the dilemma is accepted by many writers1 especially among socialists4 ,these writers assume that the family necessarily involves not only an exclusively domestic life for all women1 but also their economic dependence4 ,they believe this dependence to be not merely a survival of barbarism1 but an actual immorality in its exchange of sex attraction for economic support4 ,hence they would abandon the family or greatly modify it4 ,it must no longer be coercive2 it will be coercive under present conditions4 ,fallacies in the ,dilemma4--,each of these positions involves a fallacy which releases us from the necessity of choosing between them4 ,the root of the fallacy in each case is the conception that the economic status determines the moral end1 whereas the moral end ought to determine the economic status4 ,the fallacy of the pseudo-domestic theory lies in supposing that the home must continue its old economic form or be destroyed4 ,what is essential to the family is that man and wife1 parents and children1 should live in such close and intimate relation that they may be mutually helpful4 ,but it is not essential that present methods of house construction1 domestic service1 and the whole industrial side of home life be maintained immutable4 ,there is one fundamental division of labor between men and women4 ,the woman who takes marriage at its full scope accepts this4 ,the lines which it follows are drawn not so much by the woman's inability to work for her family in the outside world--she constantly does so when the death or illness of her husband throws the double burden upon her2 but from the obvious fact that the man is incapable of the more domestic duties incident upon the rearing of children4#beh ,but this does not involve the total life of a woman1 nor does it imply that to be a good wife and mother every woman must under all possible advances of industry continue to be cook1 seamstress1 housemaid1 and the rest4 ,true it is that if a woman steps out of her profession or trade for five1 ten1 twenty years1 it is in many cases difficult to reenter4 ,but there are some occupations where total absence is not necessary4 ,there are others where her added experience ought to be an asset instead of a handicap4 ,a mother who has been well trained ought to be a far more effective teacher in her wholesome and intelligent influence4 ,she ought to be a more efficient manager or worker in the great variety of civic and social enterprises of both paid and unpaid character4 ,there is no doubt that the present educational and social order is suffering because deprived of the competent service which many married women might render1 just as women in their turn are suffering for want of congenial occupation1 suited to their capacities and individual tastes4 ,a growing freedom in economic pursuit would improve the home1 not injure it4 ,for nothing that interferes with normal development is likely to prove beneficial to the family's highest interest4 ,the fallacy of those who would abolish the family to emancipate woman from economic dependence is in supposing that because the woman is not engaged in a gainful occupation she is therefore being supported by the man for his own pleasure4 ,this is to adopt the absurd assumptions of the very condition they denounce4 ,this theory at most1 applies to a marriage which is conceived from an entirely selfish and commercial point of view4 ,if a man marries for his own pleasure and is willing to pay a cash price2 if a woman marries for cash or support and is willing to pay the price1 there is no doubt as to the proper term for such a transaction4 ,the result is not a family in the moral sense1 and no ceremonies or legal forms can make it moral4 ,a family in the moral sense exists for a common good1 not for selfish use of others4 ,to secure this common good each member contributes a part4 ,if both husband and wife carry on gainful occupations1 well2 if one is occupied outside the home and the other within1 well also4 ,if there are children1 the woman is likely to have the far more difficult and wearing half of the common labor4 ,which plan is followed1 i4e41 whether the woman works outside or within the home1 ought to depend on which plan is better on the whole for all concerned1 and this will depend largely on the woman's own ability and tastes1 and upon the number and age of the children4 ,but the economic relation is not the essential thing4 ,the essential thing is that the economic be held entirely subordinate to the moral conception1 before marriage and after4 ,the ,family as ,consumer4--,the relation of the family as consumer to society and to the economic process at large involves also an important moral problem4 ,for while production has been taken from the home1 the selective influence of the family over production through its direction of consumption has proportionally increased4 ,and in this field the woman of the family is and should be the controlling factor4 ,as yet only the internal aspects have been considered4 ,most women regard it as their duty to buy economically1 to secure healthful food1 and make their funds go as far as possible4 ,but the moral responsibility does not stop here4 ,the consumer may have an influence in helping to secure better conditions of production1 such as sanitary workshops1 reasonable hours1 decent wages1 by a white label4 ,but this is chiefly valuable in forming public opinion to demand workrooms free from disease and legal abolition of sweatshops and child labor4 ,the greater field for the consumers' control is in determining the kind of goods that shall be produced4 ,what foods shall be produced1 what books written1 what plays presented1 what clothing made1 what houses and what furnishing shall be provided--all this may be largely determined by the consumers4 ,and the value of simplicity1 utility1 and genuineness1 is not limited to the effects upon the family which consumes4 ,the workman who makes fraudulent goods can hardly help being injured4 ,the economic waste involved in the production of what satisfies no permanent or real want is a serious indictment of our present civilization4 ,it was said1 under the subject of the economic process1 that it was an ethically desirable end to have increase of goods1 and of the kind wanted4 ,we may now add a third end3 it is important that society should learn to want the kinds of goods which give happiness and not merely crude gratification4 ,men often need most what they want least4 ,not only the happiness of life but its progress1 its unfolding of new capacities and interests1 is determined largely by the direction of the consumption4 ,woman is here the influential factor4 ,if there were no other reason for the better and wider education of woman than the desirability of more intelligent consumption1 society would have ample ground to demand it4 ,sec4 #f4 ,,unsettled ,,problems3 7#b7 ,,political ,the family may be regarded as a political unit1 first in its implication of some control of the members by the common end1 and in the second place in its relation to the authority of the ,state4 #a4 ,authority within the ,family4--,if the political character of the family were kept clearly in mind1 the internal relations of the members of the family would be on a far more moral basis and there would be less reason for friction or personal clashes4 ,if there is a group of persons which is to act as a unity1 there must be some leadership and control4 ,in many cases there will be a common conviction as to the fittest person to lead or direct1 but where the group is a permanent one with frequent occasions for divergent interests1 unity has been maintained either by force or by some agency regarded by the people as embodying their common will4 ,in the earliest forms of society this1 as we have seen1 was not clearly distinguished from personal and individual command4 ,but as the conception of the political worked free from that of the personal agent1 it could be recognized more and more that the ruler was not the man--not ,henry or ,william1--but the ,king or the ,parliament1 as representing the nation4 ,then government became a more consciously moral act4 ,obedience was not humiliating1 because the members were sovereign as well as subject4 ,it was not heteronomy but autonomy4 ,in the family the personal relation is so close that this easily overshadows the fact that there is also a family relation of a political sort4 ,the man in the patriarchal family1 and since1 has exercised1 or has had the legal right to exercise authority4 ,and with the legal theory of inequality to support him it is not strange that he should often have conceived that obedience was due to him as a person1 and not to him as1 in certain cases1 best representing the joint purpose of the family1 just as in other cases the woman best represents this same purpose4 ,equality or ,inequality4--,but even when there had been recognition of a more than personal attitude the question would at once arise1 are the members of a family to be considered as of equal or unequal importance8 ,the answer until recently has been unequivocal4 ,in spite of such apparent exceptions as chivalry1 and the court paid to beauty or wit1 or the honor accorded to individual wives and mothers1 woman has seldom been taken seriously in the laws and institutions of society4 ,opportunities for education and full participation in the thought and life of civilization are very recent4 ,public school education for girls is scarcely a century old4 ,college education for women1 in a general sense1 is of the present generation4 ,but the conviction has steadily gained that democracy cannot treat half the race as inferior in dignity1 or exclude it from the comradeship of life4 ,under primitive society a man was primarily a member of a group or caste1 and only secondarily a person4 ,a woman has been in this situation as regards her sex4 ,she is now asserting a claim to be considered primarily as a person1 rather than as a woman4 ,this general movement1 like the economic movement1 has seemed to affect the attitude of unmarried women1 and to a less degree1 of men1 toward marriage1 and to involve an instability of the family tie4 ,the question is then this3 does the family necessarily involve inequality1 or can it be maintained on a basis of equality8 ,or to put the same thing from another angle3 if the family and the modern movement toward equality are at variance1 which ought to give way8 ,the pseudo-domestic theory on this point is suggested by its general position on the economic relations of the family as already stated4 ,it believes that the family must be maintained as a distinct sphere of life1 coordinate in importance for social welfare with the intellectual1 artistic1 and economic spheres4 ,it holds1 further1 that the family can be maintained in this position only if it be kept as a unique controlling influence in woman's life1 isolated from other spheres4 ,this of course involves an exclusion of woman from a portion of the intellectual and political life1 and therefore an inferiority of development1 even if there is not an inferiority of capacity4 ,some of this school have maintained that in ,america the rapid advance in education and intelligence among women has rendered them so superior to the average man who has to leave school for business at an early age that they are unwilling to marry4 ,a ,german alliterative definition of woman's sphere has been found in the four ,k's--,kirche1 ,kinder1 ,kueche1 und ,kleider4 ,if the permanence of the family rests on the maintenance of a relation of inferiority1 it is indeed in a perilous state4 ,all the social and political forces are making toward equality1 and from the moral standpoint it is impossible successfully to deny ,mill's classic statement1 ,the only school of genuine moral sentiment is society between equals4 ,but some of the advocates of equality have accepted the same fallacious separation between the family and modern culture4 ,they have assumed that the family life must continue to be unscientific in its methods1 and meager in its interests4 ,some women--like some men--undoubtedly place a higher value on book learning1 musical and dramatic entertainment1 and other by-products of modern civilization than on the elemental human sympathies and powers which these should serve to enrich4 ,it is too easily granted that the opportunity and duty of woman as wife and mother are limited to a purely unscientific provision for physical wants to the exclusion of scientific methods1 intellectual comradeship1 and effective grappling with moral problems4 ,isolation ,not the ,solution4--,the solution for the present unrest is therefore to be found not in forcing the separation between the family on the one hand and the intellectual1 political1 and other aspects of civilization on the other1 but in a mutual permeation4 ,they think very lightly of the elemental strength of sex and parental instincts who suppose that these are to be overslaughed in any great portion of the race by cultural interests4 ,and it is to ignore the history of political progress to suppose that organic relations founded on equality and democracy are less stable than those resting on superiority and subordination4 ,the fact is that there is no part of life so much in need of all that modern science can give1 and no field for intellectual penetration and technological organization so great as the family4 ,correlative with its control over economic processes through its position as consumer1 is its influence over social1 educational1 and political life1 through its relation to the children who are constantly renewing the structure4 ,to fulfill the possibilities and even the duties of family life under modern conditions requires both scientific training and civic activity4 ,provisions for health and instruction and proper social life in school1 provisions for parks and good municipal housekeeping1 for public health and public morals1--these demand the intelligent interest of the parent and have in most cases their natural motive in the family necessities4 ,a theory of the family which would limit the parent1 especially the mother1 to the home needs first to define the limits of the home4 ,to measure its responsibilities by the limit of the street door is as absurd as to suppose that the sphere of justice is limited by the walls of the courtroom4 ,a broader education for women is certainly justified by precisely this larger meaning of the care of children and of the family interests4 ,the things of greatest importance to human life have scarcely been touched as yet by science4 ,we know more about astrophysics than about health and disease2 more about waste in steam power than about waste in foods1 or in education2 more about classical archaeology than about the actual causes of poverty1 alcoholism1 prostitution1 and childlessness1 the chief enemies of home life4 ,in the light of the actual possibilities and needs of family life two positions seem equally absurd3 the one that family life can be preserved best by isolating it1 and particularly its women1 from culture2 the other1 that it does not afford an opportunity for a full life4 ,neither of these errors can be corrected apart from the other4 ,it is in the mutual permeation and interaction of the respective spheres of family and cultural life1 not in their isolation1 that the family is to be strengthened4 ,here1 as in the economic field1 no one family can succeed entirely by itself4 ,the problem is largely a social one4 ,but every family which is free and yet united1 which shows comradeship as well as mutual devotion1 is forcing the issue and preparing the way for the more perfect family of the future4 #b4 ,authority over the ,family3 ,divorce4--,the strains which have been noticed in the foregoing paragraphs have centered public attention on the outward symptoms of unrest and maladaptation4 ,current discussions of family problems are likely to turn largely upon the increase of divorce4 ,for the reasons which have been given there has doubtless been increasing tendency to seek divorce1 and this may continue until more stable conditions are reached4 ,now that the authority of the church is less implicitly accepted1 individuals are thrown back upon their own voluntary controls1 and whether marriages are arranged by parents as in ,france1 or formed almost solely on the initiative and unguided will of the parties as in ,america1 the result is much the same4 ,two classes of persons seek divorce4 ,those of individualistic temperament1 who have formed the marriage for selfish ends or in frivolous moments1 are likely to find its constraints irksome when the expected happiness fails to be realized and the charm of novelty is past4 ,this is simply one type of immoral conduct which may be somewhat checked by public opinion or legal restraint1 but can be overcome only by a more serious and social attitude toward all life4 ,the other class finds in the bond itself1 under certain conditions1 a seemingly fatal obstacle to the very purpose which it was designed to promote3 unfaithfulness1 cruelty1 habitual intoxication1 and other less coarse1 but equally effective modes of behavior may be destructive of the common life and morally injurious to the children4 ,or alienation of spirit may leave external companionship empty of moral unity and value1 if not positively opposed to self-respect4 ,this class is evidently actuated by sincere motives4 ,how far society may be justified in permitting dissolution of the family under these conditions1 and how far it may properly insist on some personal sacrifice for the sake of larger social ends is simply another form of the problem which we considered in the economic field--the antithesis between individual rights and public welfare4 ,the solution in each case cannot be reached by any external rule4 ,it will be found only in the gradual socializing of the individual on the one hand1 and in the correlative development of society to the point where it respects all its members and makes greater freedom possible for them on the other4 ,meanwhile it must not be overlooked that the very conception of permanence in the union1 upheld by the state1 is itself effective toward thoughtful and well-considered action after as well as before marriage4 ,some causes of friction may be removed1 some tendencies to alienation may be suppressed1 if the situation is resolutely faced from the standpoint of a larger social interest rather than from that of momentary or private concern4 ,general ,law of ,social ,health4--,divorce is a symptom rather than a disease4 ,the main reliance in cases of family pathology1 as for the diseases of the industrial and economic system1 is along the lines which modern science is pursuing in the field of medicine4 ,it is isolating certain specific organisms which invade the system under favorable circumstances and disturb its equilibrium4 ,but it finds that the best1 and in fact the only ultimate protection against disease is in the general resisting power of the living process4 ,this power may be temporarily aided by stimulation or surgery1 but the ultimate source of its renewal is found in the steady rebuilding of new structures to replace the old stagnation2 the retention of broken-down tissues means weakness and danger4 ,the social organism does not escape this law4 ,science will succeed in pointing out the specific causes for many of the moral evils from which we suffer4 ,poverty1 crime1 social injustice1 breaking down of the family1 political corruption1 are not all to be accepted simply as evils or wickedness in general4 ,in many cases their amount may be greatly reduced when we understand their specific causes and apply a specific remedy4 ,but the great reliance is upon the primal forces which have brought mankind so far along the line of advance4 ,the constant remaking of values in the search for the genuinely satisfying1 the constant forming1 criticizing1 and reshaping of ideals1 the reverence for a larger law of life and a more than individual moral order1 the outgoing of sympathy and love1 the demand for justice--all these are the forces which have built our present social system1 and these must continually reshape it into more adequate expressions of genuine moral life if it is to continue unimpaired or in greater vigor4 ,we do not know in any full sense whence the life of the spirit comes1 and we cannot1 while standing upon the platform of ethics1 predict its future4 ,but if our study has shown anything1 it is that the moral is a life1 not a something ready made and complete once for all4 ,it is instinct with movement and struggle1 and it is precisely the new and serious situations which call out new vigor and lift it to higher levels4 ,ethical science tracing this process of growth1 has as its aim not to create life--for the life is present already1--but to discover its laws and principles4 ,and this should aid in making its further advance stronger1 freer1 and more assured because more intelligent4 ,,literature ,on the early history of the ,family1 see the works cited at close of ch4 ii42 also ,starcke1 ,the ,primitive ,family1 #ahhi2 ,westermarck1 ,the ,history of ,human ,marriage1 #aija2 ,howard1 ,a ,history of ,matrimonial ,institutions1 #c vols41 #aijd4 ,on present problems3 ,h4 ,bosanquet1 ,the ,family1 #aijf2 ,parsons1 ,the ,family1 #aijf2 ,bryce1 ,marriage and ,divorce in ,roman and in ,english ,law1 in ,studies in ,history and ,jurisprudence1 #aija2 ,ellis1 ,man and ,woman2 ,thomas1 ,sex and ,society1 #aijf2 ,bebel1 ,woman and ,socialism2 ,riehl1 ,die ,familie4 ,,footnotes3 #bdi ,morals in ,evolution1 ,part ,i41 p4 #baf4 #bej ,howard1 ,history of ,matrimonial ,institutions1 ,i41 ch4 vii4 #bea ,pollock and ,maitland1 ,hist4 ,eng4 ,law1 ,,ii41 #chc1 quoted in ,howard1 ,i41 #cbe-bf4 #beb ,eckstein1 ,woman under ,monasticism1 p4 #dgh4 #bec ,hobhouse1 op4 cit41 ,i41 #bah4 #bed ,helen ,bosanquet1 ,the ,family1 p4 #cac3 ',they must hinder your work very much1' ,i said to a mother busy about the kitchen1 with a two-year-old clinging to her skirt4 ',i'd never get through my work without them1' was the instant rejoinder1 and in it lay the answer to much of our sentimental commiseration of hard-worked mothers4 ,it may be hard to carry on the drudgery of daily life with the little ones clamoring around2 it is ten times harder without1 for sheer lack of something to make it worth while4 #bee ,bosanquet1 ,part ,,ii41 ch4 x4 #bef ,man and ,woman4 #beg ,sex and ,society4 #beh ,helen ,bosanquet1 ,the ,family1 p4 #bgb4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,index ,abelard1 #aej f4 ,achan1 #ah1 #bi1 #fj1 #ajd ,addams1 ,jane1 #add ,aeschylus1 #aab1 #aaf1 #aci ,aesthetic1 in ,greek valuation of conduct1 #ia1 #aab1 #aaf f41 #acc f41 #ace n41 #acg1 #djf1 #daj ,agency1 public1 see ,public ,agency2 rationalizing1 #dj-b2 socializing1 #db-h ,altruism1 discussion of theories concerning1 #chd-ia2 altruistic springs1 #che2 true and false1 #chg-h2 contrasted with social justice1 #chi ,amos1 #he ,approbation1 #cii1 #djb ,angell1 #i ,aquinas1 ,thomas1 #aej ,aristophanes1 #aab ,aristotle1 on the criterion of a moral act1 #ab1 #cg1 #bjb2 on nature and the natural1 #g1 #abg f42 on the ,state1 #abg ff42 ,eudaemonism1 #acd2 the mean1 #acd2 on highmindedness1 #ace2 on the reflective life1 #ach2 on the good man1 #bgi1 #cbd2 on the right1 #cjf n42 on justice1 #dad2 referred to1 #bcj1 #dee ,arnold1 ,m41 #ia1 #cch ,art and arts1 as a rationalizing agency1 #da f42 as a socializing agency1 #de f42 create new interests1 #gi f42 ,hebrew1 #ajg2 ,greek1 #aab1 #aad f42 mediaeval1 #adg1 #adi2 ,church and modern1 #aee2 as a good that is sharable1 #eei ,asceticism1 #ade1 #ahe1 #cff1 #egf ,attitude1 defined1 #bbi2 emphasized by one type of theory1 #bcf-g1 #bdj2 relation to will1 #bdf2 see ,motive and ,how ,augustine1 #aej ,aurelius1 ,marcus1 #acf ,authority1 of group1 #bf f42 behind customs1 #eb2 in ,israel's religion1 #if f42 of custom challenged in ,greece1 #aaa ff41 #aai ff42 of the church1 #ade-g2 conflict of reason with1 #afe f42 of duty1 #cdd2 in the family1 #eii f42 see ,duty1 ,control1 ,standard ,autonomy1 as essence of moral duty1 #bbe2 ,kant's conception of1 #afi1 #cdf1 #ceb2 in later utilitarianism1 #cfa2 in ,state and the family1 #eii f42 see ,control1 ,duty1 ,law1 ,state ,australian customs1 marriage1 #bb2 initiatory1 #eh f42 regulated duel1 #fc ,bacon1 ,francis1 #d1 #afd1 #afe ,bacon1 ,roger1 #afd ,bagehot1 #ec ,bain1 on happiness1 #bfe2 on utilitarianism1 #bhf2 his account of duty1 #cef-h ,balzac1 #ahi ,bayard1 ,chevalier1 #adi ,benevolence1 #afj f41 #cge-ia ,bentham1 on motive1 #bbh1 #bdg-h1 #ced2 on moral science1 #bce2 on disposition1 #bed-e2 on pleasure and happiness1 #bfd1 #bhf2 on utilitarian calculus1 #bge-f2 denial of quality of pleasure1 #bhb2 on pleasure of sympathy1 #bia2 democratic individualism of1 #ebe ,blackstone1 #egh ,blood feud1 #bh1 #fb f41 #gj1 #def ,boniface ,,viii41 ,bull of1 #adg ,bosanquet1 ,helen1 #ehd1 #eie f4 ,bryce1 ,james1 #adf ,caesar1 #ah ,capital and labor1 #dii1 #eja f41 #eje f41 #ecb1 #edb f4 ,capitalism1 as method of industry1 #gh1 #aeh-fj1 #dih f41 #ejh1 #ech1 #ede2 see ,capital1 ,corporation ,carelessness1 #dfb-d ,carlyle1 criticism of individualism1 #afa1 #aib2 of utilitarianism1 #bfe1 #bhi n4 ,casuistry1 #cbe-h ,categorical ,imperative1 #cdd ,celts1 clan system of1 #add2 see also ,ireland1 ,welsh ,character1 formation of1 #i f42 organization of1 in group morality1 #gb2 in ,hebrews1 #ajd-f2 among ,greeks1 #ach-da2 relation to desire and deliberation1 #bjb2 moral importance of1 #bbi1 #bcc2 relation to will1 #bdf2 relation to conduct1 ,chapter ,,xiii42 and disposition1 #bed-g2 measures the pleasant and unpleasant1 #bgg-i2 unification of1 #bhc2 its reconstruction1 #cdc1 #cfb2 recognized by law1 #dfj f4 ,charity1 in ,middle ,ages1 #adf1 #aeg2 and right to life1 #ddd2 see ,benevolence ,chastity1 #adf1 #agg ,chief1 authority of1 #fa ,child-labor1 #aic f41 #ddd1 #dhi1 #ech1 #edj f4 ,chinese customs1 #ag f41 #fi ,chivalry1 #adi f4 ,christian conceptions1 love1 #ajj2 sacrifice1 #ajb2 faith1 #ajc2 freedom1 #ajh2 social order1 #aji1 #ahg2 asceticism and authority1 #ade f41 #cfd2 unity of members1 #adg2 moral value of labor1 #aef2 relation to social order1 #ahd ff42 see ,church1 ,hebrew ,church1 its contribution to modern morality1 #adb2 its ideals1 #ade2 and jural theory of morals1 #bah f42 its influence on history of the family1 #egf-h2 see also ,religion ,cicero1 #aeb ,civil ,society1 ,chapter ,,xxi42 defined1 #dea2 reform of its administration1 #dga-c ,clark1 ,j4 ,b41 #edb ,class ideals1 of ,greeks1 #aaf f42 of ,germans and ,celts1 #add f42 honor and1 #hf f42 as source of moral terms1 #age f4 ,class interests1 #hd1 #id1 #aai-bd1 #abg1 #afb1 #dgd ,closed shop1 #eei-fa ,collective ,agencies1 see ,corporations1 ,labor ,union1 ,public ,agency1 ,socialism ,collectivism1 its formula1 #dhd2 contrasted with socialism1 #eef ,colonna1 ,aegidius1 #adg ,communism1 #afa ,competition1 modern theory of1 #aeh1 #eca1 #edb2 tends to destroy itself1 #ecb1 #ech2 crude method of selecting ability1 #eei2 ,carlyle on1 #afa ,conduct1 as subject of ethics1 #a2 two aspects of1 #b2 three stages of1 #h-aj2 three levels of1 #cg-i2 first level1 ,chapter ,,iii42 second level1 ,chapter ,,iv42 third level1 ,chapters ,v4-,,viii42 nature of1 #bje1 #bcg-h2 relation to character1 ,chapter ,,xiii42 place of happiness in1 ,chapter ,,xiv42 place of reason in1 ,chapter ,,xvi4 ,conflicting services1 problem of1 #dic ,conscience1 transition from custom to1 #gc f41 #agi2 ,greek symbols of1 #aci f42 ,stoic suggestion of1 #adj f42 with ,abelard1 #aea2 meaning of1 #ahc1 #ahh f42 analysis of1 see ,intuitionalism1 ,knowledge1 ,reason ,conscientiousness1 #dje1 #dcd ,consequences1 ,chapter ,,xiii42 importance of1 #bcd-e1 #bch2 denied by ,kant1 #bdb-d2 when foreseen form intention1 #bdg2 practical importance1 #bea2 as moral sanctions1 #ceh-fj2 as self-realization1 #cib2 accidental1 #dei-fj2 careless1 #dfc ,content1 see ,consequences1 and ,what ,contracts1 versus status1 #bj2 theory and value of1 #aeh1 #deb f41 #dif2 of little benefit to wage-earner1 #ejc-e1 #ebi f42 as obstacle to legislation1 #eje f42 analyzed1 #ebg ff4 ,control1 the right as1 #g2 in primitive group1 #bf-i1 #cb1 #cd1 #eb2 primitive means of enforcing1 #ed ff42 challenged in ,greece1 #aah ff42 problem of1 #bag-i2 theories concerning1 #bbe1 #bcb2 external and internal1 #cec-fa2 self-control1 #djg2 see ,jural1 ,law1 ,standard1 ,right ,convention1 in ,greek morals and ethics1 #aaa f41 #abd f4 ,cooperation1 and mutual aid1 #dc2 in industry1 #dc2 in war1 #dd f42 in art1 #de f42 as organized in corporations and unions1 #die-ejg ,corporations1 moral difficulties of1 #dih2 management of1 #ejj f42 relations to employes and public1 #eja ff42 require new types of morality1 #eag-bb2 capitalization of1 #efa ff4 ,corruption1 political1 #dgg1 #ecg-i ,coulanges1 #ai ,courage1 #db1 #aah1 #daj-ac ,courts1 primitive1 #fa2 as school of morality1 #ahb f42 as instruments of oppression1 #aie2 civil1 ethical value of1 #ded2 in labor disputes1 #ejd f42 on police power1 #eje f41 #eee f42 recognition of public welfare by1 #eee f4 ,covenant1 in ,hebrew moral development1 #id ff4 ,criminal ,procedure1 reform of1 #dfh-i ,criterion of the moral1 #e-ac1 #bjb ff42 of the good and right1 typical theories of1 #bbd ff42 see ,good1 ,right1 ,kant1 ,utilitarianism1 ,plato1 ,aristotle ,crusades1 #aed ,cunningham1 ,w41 #aeg ,custom1 and the term ethics1 #a2 in early group life1 #ag ff42 as second level of conduct1 #ch1 #ea2 general discussion of1 #ea ff41 #aga ff42 educational1 #eg ff42 jural1 #ei ff42 birth1 marriage1 death1 #fd f42 festal1 #fe2 hospitality1 #fg f42 values and defects of1 #fh ff42 transition to conscience from1 #gc ff42 transition among ,hebrews1 #ie f42 among ,greeks1 #aaj ff42 opposed to nature1 #abj f42 ,grote on1 #agb f42 compared with reflective morality1 #agb ff42 and moral rules1 #ccj-b1 #dca ,cultus1 of ,hebrew priesthood1 #ig ff4 ,cynics1 #aab1 #abe f4 ,cyrenaics1 #aab1 #abe f4 ,dante1 #aej ,darwinism1 and morals1 #cga f42 see ,naturalism ,deliberation1 #bjb1 #cai2 and intuition1 #cbb-c2 and conscience1 #dba2 of crucial importance1 #dfd ,democracy1 in ,greece1 #aai f42 development of1 #aea ff41 #afb f42 moral1 #cjc2 and moral problems1 #dgd-ha2 the corporation in relation to1 #ejj2 and economic problems1 #eba f42 and individualism1 #ecj1 #ece2 as agency1 #eeh2 and the family1 #eid1 #fjj f4 ,descartes1 #afd f4 ,desire1 hedonistic theory of1 #bfi2 relation to pleasure1 #bgj-a2 to happiness1 #bgb-c2 and reason1 #cjh2 their organization1 #cag2 conflict with duty1 #cci-df2 and temperance1 #djf-h ,dharna1 #fc ,distribution1 theories of1 #ede-ej2 present inequalities in1 #ede2 individualism and1 #edf2 equal division1 #edg2 a working programme1 #edh-ej ,divorce1 #egd f41 #egg1 #fjc-e ,dominicans1 #adi f4 ,duty1 ,chapter ,,xvii42 ,stoic conception1 #adj f42 origin of the term1 #agf2 standpoint of1 #bcb2 double meaning of1 #ccg2 conflict with desire1 #cdj2 explanation of1 #cdb-d1 #cfb-c2 authority of1 #cdd2 social character of1 #cde2 ,kant's view1 #cdf-eb2 utilitarian view of1 #cec-fb ,eastman1 ,charles1 #dc1 #ed1 #fj ,eckstein1 #egg ,economic conditions and forces1 in kinship and family groups1 #bd f42 help to effect transition from group morality to conscience1 #gf2 among ,hebrews1 #ic f42 among ,greeks1 #aai ff42 modern1 #aee-fc2 in reflective morality1 #aid2 restrict physical freedom1 #ddd2 and freedom of thought1 #ddg2 legislative reform of1 #dha2 in relation to happiness and character1 #dhg ff42 social aspects of1 #dia ff42 require ethical readjustment1 #dif1 #eag-bb2 impersonal character1 #eaa f42 ethical principles1 #ead ff42 unsettled problems1 #ebc-fe ,education1 moral significance of1 #afh f42 right to1 #ddf f42 restrictions upon1 #ddh f42 as a means of justice1 #edh f41 #eeg f4 ,egoism1 #bad1 #beh1 #cjc1 #dbc1 #dfg2 hedonistic1 #bhh-i 7see ,chapter ,,xv472 naturalistic theory of1 #cfh-gd2 contrasted with altruism1 #cge2 explanation of1 #cgg-ha2 reasonable self-love1 #chb2 see ,self1 ,individualism ,ellis1 ,h41 #ehd ,eliot1 ,george1 #aed1 #cja ,emerson1 #cdi1 #cej1 #ddf n41 #dgj1 #eha ,empiricism1 #bbf1 #bca1 #cjf2 discussion of1 #cbi-cb ,ends1 and ,means1 #baj2 relation of happiness to1 #bgc-d2 utilitarian1 conflicts with its hedonistic motive1 #bhi2 social and rational1 #cad2 kingdom of1 #cae and #dcc ,enlightenment1 period of1 #afc1 #afe ff4 ,epictetus1 #adj ,epicureans1 theory of life1 #abe1 #ace1 #bah2 on friendship1 #abe1 #acj1 #ahg ,ethics1 definition1 #a2 derivation of term1 #a2 specific problem of1 #b2 method of1 #c-ac ,ethos1 meaning1 #a2 ,chapter ,,iv41 #age ,eudaemonism1 #acd1 #bcj2 see ,happiness1 ,self-realization ,euripides1 #aab1 #aaf1 #aci ,evil1 problem of1 in ,israel1 #ajj ff4 ,excitement1 and pleasure1 #djh ,ezekiel1 on personal responsibility1 #ajd ,fagan1 ,j4 ,o41 #ejc ,family1 or ,household ,group1 #bc-ca2 as an agency in early society1 #dg-i2 as affected by reflective morality1 #aic2 and contract1 #dec2 history of1 #ega-h2 psychological basis of1 #egh-hd2 strain in1 #ehd-i2 present factors of strain in1 #eij-d2 and the economic order1 #eid-i2 authority in1 #eii-fjc2 and divorce1 #fjc-e ,feelings1 the hedonistic ultimate1 #bbe2 an ambiguous term1 #bdi-ea2 ,mill on importance of1 #bid ,feud1 see ,blood ,feud ,fichte1 #dij ,fisher1 ,g4 ,p41 #adc ,fiske1 ,john1 #eha ,franchises1 abuses of1 #eci ,franciscans1 #adi f4 ,francke1 ,kuno1 #adi ,freedom1 ,pauline conception1 #ajh2 formal and real1 #aeh ff41 #dcg-i1 #dhc f41 #ebe f41 #ebi1 #edi2 see ,rights ,freund1 ,e41 #eee ,galileo1 #afd ,genetic ,method in ,ethics1 #c ,gentleman1 in ,greece1 #aaf f42 mediaeval and class ideal of1 #add f41 #adi1 #aee-g ,genung1 ,j4 ,f41 #ajb ,george1 ,henry1 #afb1 #eaj f4 ,germans1 customs of1 #ah1 #ec2 character and ideals1 #adc f41 #adi2 family among1 #ege f4 ,golden ,rule2 #ccd ,good1 the1 as subject of ethics1 #a1 #g f41 #ab1 #bjc-e1 #bae1 #bcf1 #bda2 origin of the conception of moral1 #ahc f42 in group morality1 #fi-gb2 ,hebrew ideals of1 #ajg-i2 significance in ,greek thought1 #aac1 #aag1 #aai1 #abd2 ,greek individualistic and hedonistic theories of1 #abf2 ,plato on1 #aca-d1 #acf f41 #adj2 ,aristotle on1 #acd f41 #ach2 and modern civilization1 #aed ff41 #eeg f42 as happiness1 #afi1 ,chapter ,,xiv42 private and general1 #bhi-cjj1 #cjh2 the true1 #bjh1 #bhd1 #cjb2 good men as standard1 #bgi1 #cbd2 rational and sensuous1 #ccg2 wealth as1 #dhg2 see ,happiness1 ,value ,goodness1 #bcc1 #bea2 formal and material1 #bei n42 of character1 #bgi2 and happiness1 #bhd2 and social interest1 #bih2 intrinsic1 #cah-bj2 and progress1 #dbb2 see ,virtue ,government1 distrust of1 #dgd2 reform of1 #dgi-hj2 see also ,state ,gray1 ,j4 ,h41 #ag ,greeks1 early customs1 #ah f41 #df2 compared with ,hebrews1 #ia f42 moral development of1 #aaa-da1 #aig1 #bae1 #bag f4 ,green1 on duty1 #bbe2 on hedonism1 #bfi2 on practical value of utilitarianism1 #bhg-h2 on moral progress1 #dbi ,grosscup1 ,judge1 #eeb ,grote1 #ai1 #agb f41 #agh ,group ideal1 mediaeval1 #add f42 see ,class ,ideal ,group ,life1 early1 ,chapter ,,ii42 necessary to understand moral life1 #ag2 typical facts of1 #ag2 kinship1 #ba ff42 family1 #bc ff42 ownership of land in1 #bd2 other economic aspects of1 #be f42 political aspects of1 #bf-cj2 rights and responsibilities of individual in1 #bg-cj2 religious aspects of1 #cj-b2 age and sex groups in1 #cb-d2 moral significance of1 #cd f4 ,group ,morality1 #cd f41 #ea ff42 values and defects of1 #fh-gc2 in early ,hebrew life1 #ib2 in ,middle ,ages1 #add f42 persistence of1 #agc-h2 in legal progress1 #def2 and international relations1 #dha f42 in industrial conflicts1 #ejj ,habit1 and character1 #i f41 #ab1 #bjb2 effect on knowledge1 #cai2 effect upon desire1 #cdb-c ,hadley1 ,a4 ,t41 #dge n41 #dhh1 #efc ,hammurabi1 ,code of1 #hb1 #aje1 #egd ,happiness1 and pleasure1 #bcj1 #bfc2 ambiguity in conception of1 #bff2 relation to desire1 #bgb-d2 as standard1 #bge-hj2 elements in its constitution1 #bha-c2 final or moral1 #bhd2 general1 #bhf2 and sympathy1 #cjj-c2 and efficiency1 #cgc2 private and public1 #cie-g2 see ,eudaemonism1 ,good ,hazlitt1 on ,bentham1 #bfh2 on excitement1 #dji n4 ,hearn1 #bd ,hebrews1 early morality1 #ah2 moral development1 #ia-aaj2 compared with ,greek1 #ia ,hedonism1 #bcj2 ,hebrew1 #ajf f42 ,greek1 #abf1 #acb f42 criticism of1 #bfi-ge2 universalistic1 #bhf2 egoistic character of1 #bhi-id2 ,kant's1 #cji2 paradox of1 #ceb2 its theory of duty1 #cec ,hegel1 on institutional character of morals1 #bbe-f ,high-mindedness1 ,aristotle's description of1 #ace n4 ,hobhouse1 ,l4 ,t41 on formation of custom1 #ed2 on social order and individuality1 #dbh2 on the family1 #ege f41 #egg ,hoeffding1 #bec n4 ,honesty1 #ahh1 #dad1 #dif ,honor1 #he-h1 #add f41 #agf ,hosea1 #ie ,hospitality1 in group morality1 #fg ,how1 the1 in conduct1 #e-h1 #bbh f41 #bdj2 in group morality1 #fi f42 in ,hebrew morality1 #ajb ff42 in ,greek ethics1 #acf ff42 see ,attitude ,howard1 #egf ,ibsen1 #hb1 #ajj1 #aeg1 #cjc1 #ehh ,ideal1 vs4 actual in ,greek thought1 #acf-h2 meaning of1 #dba f4 ,india1 customs of1 #bf1 #fc1 #ebd ,indians 7,american71 #be1 #dc1 #ed1 #fj ,indifferent ,acts1 #bje-f1 #baj-aa ,individual1 the1 in early group life1 #bj1 #bb f41 #bg-cj1 #cd1 #ga f42 collision of with group1 #gd1 #ge f41 #hb ff41 #hh1 #ahd-g1 #dcb2 among ,hebrews1 #ajd2 development of1 in modern civilization1 #adh-fi2 as affected by reflective morality1 #ahg-ib2 and society1 #dbg-cf2 relation to corporations and unions1 #ejj-c2 see ,individualism1 ,self ,individualism1 as factor in transition from custom to conscience1 #ge2 forces producing1 #gf-hg2 in ,israel1 #id1 #ajb1 #ajd2 in ,greece1 #aad-bd1 #dcb2 in ,greek ethical theory1 #abd-f2 in modern world1 #adi-fc1 #ahd-f1 #bbj-c1 #dcb f42 in ethical theory1 #bbe f41 #bij2 ,carlyle's criticism of1 #bfe f42 hedonistic1 #bhi ff41 #cja f42 as self-assertion1 #cfh-ge2 true and false1 #dha2 political formula of1 #dhc f42 in economic theory1 #ebc-ce2 democratic1 #ebe1 #ecj f42 survival of the fittest1 #ebe1 #ecb-d2 values1 #ebg f41 #edh f42 does not secure real freedom1 #ebi2 nor justice1 #ecj ff41 #ece1 #edf f42 other defects of1 #eea ff42 in ,u4 ,s4 ,constitution1 #ecd2 on unearned increment1 #efd f42 in family1 #fjd2 see ,individual1 ,self ,industry1 as a rationalizing agency1 #ci-db2 differentiation in1 #da2 as a socializing agency1 #db f42 factor in effecting transition from custom to conscience1 #gf-h2 modern development of1 #aee-i2 agencies of1 #dig ,initiation1 in primitive tribes1 #eh ,institutions1 #aib-e1 #bbb1 #bbe-f2 see ,chapter ,,xx4 ,intention1 and ,motive1 #bdf-ed1 #beg-h1 #bfa2 and accident1 #fc1 #ajd1 #dei-fj2 see ,deliberation ,intuitionalism1 #bbf1 #bcb1 #cjf2 discussion of1 #cag-be2 and casuistry1 #cbe-h ,ireland1 ancient law of1 #bd f41 #fb1 #hc ,israel1 moral development of1 #ia-aaj1 #aig ,james1 ,william1 on the social self1 #he-g2 on animal activity1 #bjd2 on effect of emotion on ideas1 #bec ,japanese morality1 #ah ,jesus1 #ajf f41 #aji ,job1 moral theory in1 #ig1 #aja f41 #ajf ,judgments1 moral2 see ,moral ,jural influence1 #g1 #ajc1 #aac f41 #agg1 #bah-i1 #bbd1 #cbh1 #cec-f1 #dci1 #ded-e1 #dfg-h ,justice1 in primitive society1 #bg f42 as ,hebrew ideal1 #id f41 #ii f41 #ajh f42 in ,greek theory1 #aac f42 natural and conventional1 #abj f42 as interest of the stronger1 #abb-d2 modern demand for1 #adh1 #afa ff42 and charity1 #adh1 #chi f42 virtue of1 #dad-g2 development of civil1 #def-fc2 formal and substantial1 #dfe f41 #eca2 social1 #afa1 #daj1 #eba1 #eef-h2 the new1 #dif f42 and individualism1 #ecj-e2 in distribution1 theories of1 #ede-ej ,kafirs1 clanship among1 #ai1 #ce ,kant1 on unsocial sociableness of man1 #ge2 forces of progress1 #hg f42 his ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 #aff2 on dignity of man1 #afg2 general standpoint1 #afi2 individualism of1 #aia2 and the law of nature1 #bbb n42 on moral law1 #bbh-i2 on the ,good ,will1 #bda-c2 his theory of will discussed1 #bda-df2 on egoistic hedonism1 #bhi2 theory of practical reason1 #cji-ag2 theory of duty1 #cdd1 #cdf-eb2 on legality and morality1 #dcb2 cf4 also #bca1 #dib1 #ehj ,kidd1 ,dudley1 #ai1 #bc1 #ce ,kinship1 #ba ff42 see ,group ,life ,knowledge1 place in morals1 #bae2 theories of1 #bca-b2 close connection with emotion1 #bef n42 with character1 #bgi2 see ,chapter ,,xvi42 ,kant's theory of1 #cji-af2 intuitional theory of1 #cag-bd2 casuistical view1 #cbe-i2 principles in1 #ccc-d2 and sympathy1 #ccd2 and conscience1 #dah-bc ,labor1 differentiation of1 in early society1 #da2 the gentleman and1 #aef2 church and1 #aef2 and the law1 #ejd-g2 conditions of1 #edj f42 of women and children1 #edj f42 exploitation of1 #edb-d2 ,prof4 ,seager's programme for benefit of1 #eff ff42 see ,industry1 ,labor ,union1 ,capital ,labor ,union1 moral aspects of1 #dii f42 revives group morality1 #ejj2 relations to the law1 #ejc ff42 disadvantages of1 #ejc-f2 violence of1 #eda2 open and closed shop1 #eei ff4 ,laissez-faire1 #afa1 #dge ,land1 unearned increment1 #eaj f41 #efd f4 ,lankester1 ,ray1 #afh ,law1 as control in group life1 #ei-fc2 in ,hebrew moral development1 #ie-h2 righteousness of the1 #ajc2 ,greek conceptions of1 #aah-bc2 of nature1 #acj1 #acf1 #aeb1 #bbb2 ,roman1 #adb1 #aeb1 #bbb2 and government1 #aid f42 as defining rights1 #ded2 development of1 #def ff42 formal in1 #dfe2 needed reforms in1 #dfh ff42 relation to corporations and unions1 #ejc-g2 needed to embody and enforce moral standards1 #ebj f42 moral1 see ,jural2 and ,right2 see ,civil ,society1 ,courts1 ,justice1 ,legal1 ,state ,legal and ,moral1 #agg1 #ahb f41 #dcc1 #dci1 #ded-e1 #dfg-h2 see also ,jural1 ,law1 ,right ,leibniz1 #afe ,levels of conduct1 #cg-i1 #ea1 #gc ,liability1 equals external responsibility1 #dcf ,liberty1 struggle for1 #hd f42 see ,freedom1 ,rights ,life1 ,hebrew and ,christian moral ideal1 #ajg2 the moral as1 #fjf ,locke1 on natural rights1 #aeb2 on the natural light1 #aff2 his ,essay1 #aff2 on danger of fixed rules1 #cbi ,love1 between the sexes1 #ajg2 psychological analysis of1 #egh ff42 as moral ideal1 #ajj1 #ajh f4 ,lubbock1 #dbh ,machine1 in production1 #ejg f4 ,mac,lennan1 #bd ,magic1 contrasted with religion1 #cj n42 influence on morals1 #deg f42 see ,taboos ,maine1 status and contract1 #bj2 ,slav families1 #fj ,mallock1 ,w4 ,h41 #ecc ,marriage1 regulations for1 in group morality1 #fd f42 violation of1 provokes moral reflection1 #ajf2 in reflective morality1 #aic2 and contract1 #dec2 ,roman1 #egd f42 church views of1 #egf f42 see ,divorce1 ,family1 ,sex ,marti1 #ih ,mead1 ,g4 ,h41 #afd ,mean1 ,aristotle's conception of1 #acd f4 ,measure1 among ,greeks1 #aab f4 ,men's clubs and houses1 #cb f4 ,micah1 #ii ,mill1 ,john ,stuart1 on ,bentham's method1 #bce n42 on motive and intention1 #bdh2 on disposition1 #bed2 on partial and complete intent1 #bef2 on the desirable1 #bfe2 on the quality of pleasure1 #bgi-hj2 on utilitarian standard1 #bhf2 on general happiness1 #bij2 criticism of ,bentham1 #bic2 on desire for social unity1 #bid1 #bie1 #bif2 on personal affections1 #bii n42 on general rules1 #ccj2 as democratic individualist1 #ebe2 on private property1 #eec f41 #eef2 on equality in the family1 #fja ,monasticism1 #adi f41 #ahe f41 #ahg2 women under1 #egf f4 ,moral1 derivation of term1 #a f42 characteristics of1 #e-ac1 #di f41 #ea1 #gc1 #hi1 #bja-aa2 conceptions1 derivation of1 #age-g2 differentiation of1 #agg-ib2 see ,morality ,morality1 customary or group1 #ea ff42 defined1 #gc2 ,hebrew1 #ia ff4 7,chapter ,,vi472 ,greek1 #aaa ff4 7,chapter ,,vii472 ,modern1 #adb ff42 customary and reflective1 compared1 #aga ff42 subjective and objective1 #bei2 ,kant's view of1 #cji-aj2 social nature of1 #dca2 and legality1 #dcc1 #dci2 changes in1 necessitated by present economic conditions1 #dif f41 #eag ff4 ,mores1 or customs1 ,chapter ,,iv42 definition1 #ea2 authority and origin of1 #eb-d2 means of enforcing1 #ed-g1 #agb ,moses1 #hb ,motives1 #baf1 #bbh1 #bcg2 in customary morality1 #gj2 purity of1 insisted on by ,hebrews1 #aje f42 relation to effort and achievement1 #bdc-f2 relation to intention1 #bdf-ed1 #beg-h1 #bfa2 hedonistic theory of1 criticized1 #bgc1 #bhh-ib2 sympathy as1 #bih-cjj2 ,kantian view of1 #cdf-h2 egoistic1 #cgi-hj2 altruistic1 #che-f2 in business1 #ech1 #eda f4 ,naturalism1 ethical1 #cfi-ge2 and individualism1 in the economic1 #ebe1 #ecb-d2 see ,nature ,nature1 opposed to convention among ,greeks1 #aaa f42 #abd-ca1 #ace2 in modern development of rights1 #aeb f42 versus artificiality of society1 #bba f42 see ,naturalism ,nemesis1 #acb1 #aci ,newton1 #afe ,nietzsche1 #hb1 #abb1 #cgj n4 ,nineteenth ,century1 development of intelligence in1 #afc ,obligations1 #ahf2 and responsibility1 #ddj2 and rights1 #dda2 see ,duty ,opportunity1 equal1 #ebf f41 #edi ,optimism and courage1 #dab-c ,oregon case1 decision of ,u4 ,s4 ,supreme ,court in1 #edj ,ought1 #agf2 see ,duty ,owen1 #afa ,paley1 #ced n4 ,parsifal1 #adi ,parties1 political1 #dgh ,paul1 his ethics1 #ajj1 #ajh f4 ,peace1 as moral ideal1 #ajh ,perfectionism1 #bca ,pessimism1 and courage1 #dac ,pindar1 #abb ,plato1 on the necessity of the moral sense1 #b2 moral influence of art1 #db2 duty to strangers1 #fg2 on measure1 #aab2 religious critic1 #aaf2 on the gentleman1 #aag2 presents arguments of individualists1 #abj ff42 on the ,state1 #abg1 #abi f42 on the good1 #aca ff42 on pleasure1 #acb f42 on the ideal1 #acf ff42 on the self1 #adj2 on rule of wealthy1 #dia2 on private property1 #did ,pleasure1 good measured by1 among early ,hebrews1 #ajg2 ,greek doctrines of1 #abe f41 #acb f42 not the object of desire1 #bfi-ga2 quality1 #bgi1 #bhb1 #cjj2 relation to happiness1 #bcj1 #bha-c2 and sympathy1 #bia-b2 control of1 #djg-h ,police ,power1 #eje-g1 #edj f41 #eee f4 ,pollock and ,maitland1 #dfj1 #egf ,post1 #fa ,principles1 #agi2 nature of1 #ccc-d2 as motives1 #cej-b ,problems of ,moral ,theory1 ,chapter ,,xi4 7#baa-bc72 classified1 #bja1 #bad-e1 #bci1 #bfc1 #cjg ,production1 moral cost of1 #dhi2 efficiency of1 in individualistic systems1 #ebg2 regulation of1 #ebh f4 ,property1 in primitive groups1 #bd-f2 taboo as substitute for1 #ee2 as factor in growth of individualism1 #gi f41 #hc1 #id1 #aai f42 ,plato on1 #acj2 the ,church on1 #adf f42 and wealth1 #dhg f42 and character1 #dij2 social aspects of1 #dia f42 private1 and social welfare1 #dic-e2 implies public service1 #eae-g2 value of private1 #eea2 defects in present system1 #eea ff4 ,prophets1 ,hebrew1 #ii f4 ,protagoras1 #b ,protestantism1 conception of marriage1 #egg ,public ,agency1 theory of1 #ebe1 ,chapter ,,xxv42 advantages claimed by1 #ecg ff4 ,public ownership1 #did f4 ,publicity1 necessity of1 #eaa f41 #ebj f4 ,punishment1 as necessitating moral judgment1 #if f42 evil viewed as by ,hebrews1 #if f41 #aja2 and duty1 #cec-e2 and justice1 #dag2 and social welfare1 #ddb-c2 and intent1 #dfa2 reform of1 #dgj ,puritans1 conception of ,god-given rights1 #aeb2 of art1 #aee2 emphasized value of work1 #aef ,reason1 as element in the moral1 #aj1 #ab1 #dj-b2 as standard among ,greeks1 #ia1 #aca f41 #acd2 age of1 #afc1 #aff2 see ,chapter ,,xvi42 defined1 #cjf2 relation to desire1 #cjh2 a priori of ,kant1 #caj2 is social1 #cae2 value of principles1 #ccc2 and sympathy1 #ccd2 opposition to desire1 #cch1 #cdj2 and virtue1 #dje2 and conscientiousness1 #dah-bc ,religion1 in early group life1 #cj-b2 socializing force1 #ha f42 moral agency among ,hebrews1 #id-ajb2 ,greek1 #aae f41 #aci-da2 ideals of mediaeval1 #ade-g2 modern development of1 #adh-ej2 and customary morality1 #ahj2 in reflective morality1 #aie ff41 #dcb1 #ddh2 as sanction of the family1 #ehb2 see ,church4 ,renaissance1 #afc ff4 ,responsibility1 collective1 in group life1 #ag-bj1 #fc1 #gj1 #ajb2 development of personal1 #ajd f41 #ada1 #aec1 #aeh1 #ahb f42 meaning of1 #dcf-i2 for accidents1 #deh-fj2 for carelessness and negligence1 #dfc-e2 as affected by modern economic conditions1 #ejj-c1 #eai f4 ,reverence1 #cj n41 #ei1 #ga1 #adj1 #djg ,revolution1 ,american1 #aeb2 ,english1 #aea2 ,french1 #aeb2 ,industrial1 #aei1 #eia ,riehl1 ,w41 #eie ,right1 as subject of ethics and moral judgments1 #a-c1 #cg f41 #bja-c1 #bae1 #bah1 #bbd1 #cjg ff42 meaning of1 #g f41 #agg1 #ahb f41 #bbd f42 as standard1 #g1 #fi1 #hi1 #ig2 among ,hebrews as righteousness1 #ajb-d1 #aji2 among ,greeks as justice1 #aac f41 #adj2 see also ,jural1 ,justice1 ,law1 ,reason1 ,standard ,righteousness1 typical theme in ,hebrew morality1 #ia f41 #ii1 #aja1 #ajb ff41 #aji1 #ahh2 as justice1 #dad2 see ,right1 ,justice ,rights1 development of1 #hc ff41 #aea ff42 natural1 #aeb f42 modern assertion of1 #ahf2 and freedom1 #ddj2 and obligations1 #dda2 physical1 #ddb-d2 mental1 #dde-i2 civil1 #deb2 contract1 #deb2 of association1 #dec2 to use of courts1 #ded2 development of civil1 #def-ff2 political1 #dgc-d ,ritual1 #ee ,romanticists1 on art and morality1 #aee ,rome1 government and law1 contribution to modern morality of1 #adb1 #aeb1 #bah1 #bbb2 patriarchal family1 #egb1 #egd f4 ,ross1 ,e4 ,a41 #ebj ,rousseau1 #aeb f41 #bba ,rules1 general1 #cbe-ce2 and casuistry1 #cbf-h2 and legalism1 #cbh-i2 utilitarian view of1 #cbi-cb2 distinguished from principles1 #ccc-d ,sanctions1 ,bentham's theory of1 #ced2 internal1 #cei ,sceptics1 #ace1 #bah ,schiller1 #db2 on ,kant1 #cdi ,schopenhauer1 #hb ,schurtz1 #cc ,science1 as agency in effecting the transition from custom to conscience1 #gh-hj2 in ,greek development1 #aad-i2 in modern period1 #aee1 #afg f42 influence on morals1 #dfi1 #dgc-f2 as promoting justice1 #eeg-i2 and family problems1 #eic f41 #fja-c ,seager1 ,henry ,r41 programme of social legislation1 #eff ff4 ,secret societies1 #cc ,seebohm1 ,f41 #bi1 #fa ,self1 higher and lower1 #e1 #cdg f42 social1 how built up1 #aa1 #hf ff42 individual and tribal or clan1 #bc f42 ,greek conception of1 #ach-da2 the twofold1 #caj2 ,arnold on1 #cch2 ,kant on1 #cdg2 as social1 #bid1 #cde2 fictitious theory of1 #bba1 #cfa2 theories regarding its nature1 see ,chapter ,,xviii42 self-denial1 #cfd-h2 self-assertion1 #cfh-gd2 self-love and benevolence1 #cge-ia2 self-realization1 #cia-d2 see ,individual1 ,self-sacrifice ,self-sacrifice1 #cff-h2 cf4 #ajb1 #bih-cjd1 #chj-b1 #chh-ia1 #cic-e ,seneca1 #adj ,sense1 moral1 #cag-bb ,sex1 groups on the basis of1 #cb f42 as a socializing agency1 #dg f42 as prompting to self-assertion1 #hb2 taboos1 #ee1 #fj1 #fe2 in ,hebrew conceptions1 #ih1 #ajg2 in different standards for men and women1 #adb ff42 vices1 #hb1 #ahi2 psychology of1 #egh-ha2 differences between the sexes1 #ehd-h ,shakspere1 #bc1 #fb1 #ig1 #aed1 #aig ,shop1 open vs4 closed1 #eei ,simmons and ,wigmore1 #ah ,sidgwick1 ,h41 #bfe n41 #bhf ,sin1 #ih1 #ajc f41 #ajh ,slav groups1 #bj1 #bd f41 #fj1 #hc ,slavery1 #hd ,smith1 ,adam1 on the formation of conscience1 #ada2 on sympathy1 #afj2 ,theory of ,moral ,sentiments1 #aff2 as individualist1 #ebe1 #ebg ,smith1 ,arthur1 #fi ,smith1 ,h4 ,p41 #ajf ,smith1 ,j4 ,a41 #eee ,smith1 ,munroe1 #eee f4 ,smith1 ,w4 ,robertson1 #bi f4 ,social ,ends1 of utilitarianism1 #bhg 7see ,chapter ,,xv471 #bif2 and happiness1 #cjb-c2 and rationality1 #cad2 and duties1 #cch1 #cde2 and altruism1 #chi-ij2 and individuality1 #dcj ,socialism1 doctrine of1 #afb1 #ebc1 #ebe f41 #ece2 on production1 #ecg ff42 in decision of ,u4 ,s4 ,supreme ,court1 #eef2 see ,public ,agency1 ,collectivism1 ,individualism ,socializing ,process and ,agencies1 #aa1 #cc1 #db f41 #dg f41 #eg ff41 #ahf1 #aia ,socrates1 #e1 #aaf1 #aah ,sophocles1 #ce1 #aab1 #aah1 #aci f4 ,spahr1 ,c4 ,b41 #ede ,spargo1 ,john1 #edc ,speech1 freedom of1 #ddf ,spencer 7,baldwin71 and ,gillen 7,f4 ,b471 #bb1 #eh f4 ,spencer1 ,herbert1 on primitive morality1 #gj2 on nature and morality1 #eb1 #ec2 on conduct as indifferent and as ethical1 #bje-f2 on feeling as ultimate end1 #bbe2 on consequences1 #bcd n42 on happiness #bfe n42 on duty1 #ceh-fj2 on aesthetic ingredients of happiness1 #cgd n42 on reward and merit1 #eae2 on voluntary limitation of competition1 #ecb ,spinoza1 #hb1 #bec n41 #cig1 #daj n4 ,standard1 right as1 #g2 in group morality1 #cd2 custom as1 #ch1 #ea f41 #fa1 #fi f42 law of deity as1 #ie-g1 #ajc2 measure as1 #aab2 popular1 in ,greece1 #aaf f42 felt necessity of in ,greece1 #aah1 #abd2 for pleasure1 #acb f42 the mean as1 #ace f42 importance of1 #ach2 utilitarians confuse with object of desire1 #bff-i2 why necessary1 #bgd2 happiness as1 #bge-hj2 general happiness as1 ,chapter ,,xv42 the rational1 #cjg2 revision of1 #dbb2 of political action1 #dhb-e ,standard of living1 #ejc1 #ejd n41 #ebb1 #edj-b2 ,professor ,seager's programme for1 #eff-gj ,state1 the1 early group as germ of1 #bf-cj1 #fa f42 as bearer of moral ideals in ,israel1 #ib f41 #ajj1 #ajh f42 in ,greece1 #abg2 authority challenged1 #aah-bd2 ,plato and ,aristotle on1 #abg-cj2 and ,church1 #adf f41 #aej2 moral effect of organization of1 #aid f42 moral value of1 #dcd-f2 defined1 #dea2 see ,chapter ,,xxi4 ,stephen1 on love of happiness1 #bgc2 on egoism1 #cgh n42 also #bfe n4 ,stevenson1 ,mrs4 ,m4 ,c41 #ff ,stoics1 the wise man of1 #ace2 on following nature1 #acf2 on inner self1 #adj2 natural law1 #acf1 #adb1 #aeb1 #bbb2 on conflict between the moral and the actual order1 #ahe2 cosmopolitanism1 #ahg2 on control of passions1 #bag ,sumner1 on mores1 #ea2 on luck1 #ec2 on taboo1 #ee2 on ,ethos1 #age2 gladiatorial shows1 #ahi2 on relation between goodness and happiness1 #cif n4 ,sutherland1 #dh ,sympathetic ,resentment1 #dd1 #di1 #gj2 see ,sympathy ,sympathy1 as factor in socialization1 #aa1 #ce1 #dd2 fostered by art1 #de f42 and family life1 #dg f42 and hospitality1 #fh2 when moral1 #di1 #gj2 in the moral judgment1 #ada n42 modern development of1 #afj f42 ,bentham's view of1 #bia-b2 ,mill's view of1 #bic-d2 importance of1 #bih-i2 principle of knowledge1 #ccd2 and duty1 #cdh-i2 and efficiency1 #cgj-c2 and thoughtfulness1 #dfe2 see ,sympathetic ,resentment ,taboos1 #ee1 #fj f42 ,hebrew1 #if2 survival of1 in modern life1 #agd ,tariff1 protective1 #efj ,taxation1 #eee ,teleological1 types of moral theory1 #bbd2 see ,good1 ,value ,temperance1 #dje-aj2 ,greek view of1 #aag1 #djf2 ,roman1 #djg2 ,christian1 #djh ,theodorus1 #abf ,theory1 relation to practice1 #d1 #bab1 #fjf2 types of1 classified and discussed1 #bbd-ci2 see also ,problems ,thomas1 ,w41 #ehd ,thoreau1 #dhi ,totem groups1 #cj ,torts1 #dee ,toynbee1 ,a41 #dib ,trades ,unions1 see ,labor ,union ,unearned ,increment1 #eaj f41 #efd f4 ,united ,states1 individualism in1 #eed2 ,supreme ,court decisions1 #eee f4 ,utilitarianism1 relation of1 to modern civilization1 #afi2 theory of intention1 #bdf-eb2 theory of the good1 ,chapters ,,xiv4 and ,,xv42 method of1 #bge2 introduction of the idea of quality1 #bgi2 its social standard1 ,chapter ,,xv42 theory of general rules1 #cbi-ca2 theory of duty1 #cec-fa2 see also ,bentham1 ,mill ,valuation1 changed basis of1 #ejh-aa2 see ,value ,value1 as higher and lower1 #f1 #aig2 the good as1 #g f41 #ab2 measure of1 among ,hebrews1 #ajg f42 question and standard of1 among the ,greeks1 #aaf1 #aai1 #abe ff42 in modern civilization1 #aec-g1 #afi1 #aid2 transformation of1 #ahf f41 #eeh2 moral1 and incompatible ends1 #bjg-i2 and teleological theories1 #bbd2 of ,good ,will1 #bda ,veblen1 ,t4 ,b41 #dhh1 #eae1 #eib ,vices1 of reflective stage of morality1 #ahi ff4 ,virtue1 #bcj1 #cig1 ,chapter ,,xix42 origin of term1 #aef1 #agf2 general meaning1 #bcj1 #cig2 in ,greek popular usage1 #aag f42 as mean1 #acd2 as wisdom1 #ace2 highmindedness as1 #ace2 meaning in group morality1 #agf2 old-fashioned1 #ahh2 defined1 #cii-djb2 classified1 #djb-c2 aspects of1 #djc-d2 cardinal1 #dje ,voltaire1 #aff1 #aie ,voluntary ,action1 its nature1 #i f41 #bja f42 essential to morality1 #ab f41 #ci1 #di f41 #gc1 #hi2 agencies tending to evoke1 #eg1 #ge ff42 covenant as implying1 #ie2 fundamental1 in ,hebrew morality1 #ia1 #aje f42 relation to moral theories1 #bbg2 divided into inner and outer1 #bbg-cj2 #bcg-i1 #bfa1 #dcb2 place of motive and endeavor1 #bdc-f2 place of disposition1 #bed-h2 and accident1 #dei-fj2 see ,conduct ,war1 as agency in development1 #db1 #dd1 #ff1 #hd2 and right to life1 #ddb f42 and organized humanity1 #dhb ,wealth1 in ,israel1 #ic f42 in ,greece1 #aai ff42 and property1 #dhg f42 subordinate to personality1 #ead2 should depend on activity1 #ead f42 implies public service1 #eae-g2 distribution of1 #eba f41 #ede ff42 see ,property ,welsh1 kin group1 #bi1 #fa ,wergild1 #cj1 #fb ,westermarck1 #fg1 #gj1 #dei ,what1 the1 meaning of1 #e-h2 in group morality1 #ga2 in ,hebrew morality1 #ajb ff42 in ,greek theory1 #abe ff42 relation to the how as outer to inner1 #bbh-ci2 see ,attitude1 ,consequences1 ,how ,wilamowitz-,moellendorf1 #ah ,windelband1 #abf ,wisdom1 as chief excellence or virtue with ,plato1 #aah2 ,aristotle1 #ace2 ,sceptics1 ,epicureans1 and ,stoics1 #ace2 as standard for pleasure1 #acc2 nurse of all the virtues1 #dje2 as conscientiousness1 #dah-bc ,woman1 as leisure class1 #aeg1 #ahh2 as laborer1 protection for1 #dhi1 #edj2 and the family1 #egb ff42 subordination of1 #egd f42 her temperamental and occupational distinction from man1 #ehd ff42 effect of industrial revolution upon1 #eia f42 and occupations1 #eid ff42 determines consumption1 #eih f42 use of higher training for1 #eii1 #fjb2 see ,family1 ,marriage1 ,sex ,work1 see ,industry1 ,labor ,worth1 see ,value ,wyclif1 #aej ,xenophon1 #aae f4 ,zuni ceremonies1 #ff 99 99 99 99 99 ,american ,science ,series ,physics4 ,by ,a4 ,l4 ,,kimball1 ,professor in ,amherst ,college4 ,physics4 ,by ,,george ,f4 ,,barker4 ,chemistry4 ,by ,,ira ,,remsen1 ,president of the ,johns ,hopkins ,university4 ,astronomy4 ,by ,,simon ,,newcomb and ,,edward ,s4 ,,holden4 ,geology4 ,by ,,thomas ,c4 ,,chamberlin and ,,rollin ,d4 ,,salisbury1 ,professors in the ,university of ,chicago4 ,physiography4 ,by ,,rollin ,d4 ,,salisbury1 ,professor in the ,university of ,chicago4 ,general ,biology4 ,by ,,william ,t4 ,,sedgwick1 ,professor in the ,mass4 ,institute1 and ,,edmund ,b4 ,,wilson1 ,professor in ,columbia ,university4 ,botany4 ,by ,,charles ,e4 ,,bessey1 ,professor in the ,university of ,nebraska4 ,zoology4 ,by ,a4 ,s4 ,,packard1 ,professor in ,brown ,university4 ,the ,human ,body4 ,by ,h4 ,,newell ,,martin4 ,psychology4 ,by ,,william ,,james1 ,professor in ,harvard ,university4 ,ethics4 ,by ,,john ,,dewey1 ,professor in ,columbia ,university1 and ,,james ,h4 ,,tufts1 ,professor in the ,university of ,chicago4 ,political ,economy4 ,by ,,francis ,a4 ,,walker4 ,finance4 ,by ,,henry ,c4 ,,adams1 ,professor in the ,university of ,michigan4 ,for full descriptions of the ,advanced1 ,briefer1 and ,elementary ,courses published under each topic1 see the publishers' ,educational ,catalog4 ,,henry ,,holt ,,co4 #cd ,west #cc;d ,street1 ,n4 ,y4 #cgh ,wabash ,ave41 ,chicago 99 99 99 99 99 ,transcriber's note3 #a4 ,obvious errors in spelling and punctuation have been corrected without comment4 #b4 ,the original text includes ,greek characters4 ,for this text version these letters have been replaced with transliterations4 #c4 ,certain words use oe ligature in the original4 #d4 ,footnotes have been renumbered and moved from the middle of a paragraph to the end of chapters4 #e4 ,other than that1 every effort has been made to represent the text as close to the original as possible4