,illustration     ,a ,,review ,,of ,,the
 ,,systems ,,of ,,ethics ,,founded ,,on 
,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,evolution  ,,by   
,c4 ,m4 ,,williams  ,new ,york          
,,macmillan  ,,co4 ,,and ,,london #ahic 
,all rights reserved  ,,copyright1      
#ahib1 ,,by ,,macmillan  ,,co4          
,,typography ,,by ,j4 ,s4 ,,cushing     
,,co41 ,,boston1 ,u4,s4,a4  ,,presswork 
,,by ,,berwick  ,,smith1 ,,boston1      
,u4,s4,a4         99       99       99  
99       99  ,,to ,,my ,,first ,,teacher
 ,,of ,,morals  ,,my ,,mother  ,,this   
,,book ,,is ,,gratefully ,,and          
,,affectionately ,,dedicated            
,,preface   ,of the ,ethics founded on  
the theory of ,evolution1 ,i have       
considered only the independent theories
 which have been elaborated to systems4 
,i have omitted consideration of many   
works which bear on ,evolutional ,ethics
 as practical or exhortative treatises1 
or compilations of facts1 but which     
involve no distinctly worked-out theory 
of morals4 ,on the other hand1 ,i have  

ventured to include ,professor von      
,gizycki's ,moralphilosophie among the  
theoretical systems founded upon the    
theory of ,evolution1 since1 although   
the popular form of the work renders the
 prominence of the latter theory        
impracticable1 the warp of ,evolution is
 clearly perceptible throughout it4 ,in 
analyzing ,hoeffding's work1 ,i have    
made use not of the ,danish but the     
,german edition of his ,ethics1 which   
was translated with his cooeperation4   
,it is generally customary for an author
 to acknowledge1 in the preface of his  
book1 his especial indebtedness to those
 who have most influenced the growth of 
his thought in the line of research     
treated in the book4 ,but ,i find this  
duty a difficult one to perform4 ,many  
of the authors whose work has aided me  
are cited in the text4 ,but it is       
impossible1 with regard to many points1 
to say to whom one is indebted1 or most 
indebted1 since much that one reads is  
so assimilated into one's organized     

thought1 and changed in the process of  
assimilation1 that its source and       
original form are no longer remembered4 
,besides this1 much is always owed to   
personal influence and argument1 and    
also to indefinite and minute forces    
whose workings it is impossible to      
trace4 ,the growth of thought is1 like  
any other growth1 by imperceptible      
degrees and infinitesimal increments1   
and we breathe in ideas from our mental 
atmosphere as we breathe in perfumes or 
infections from our physical atmosphere4
 ,it is1 of course1 unnecessary to      
mention ,mr4 ,spencer's name in this    
connection1 since it goes without       
saying1 that every one who writes on    
,ethics in their relation to the ,theory
 of ,evolution must owe much to him1    
even where he differs from him4 ,but    
there is perhaps one name which it is   
fitting that ,i should mention here1    
since the influence of its bearer on my 
work1 although one for which ,i have    
reason to feel peculiarly indebted1 is  

not of a nature to determine its mention
 in connection with any particular      
theory4 ,i refer to my first teacher of 
,philosophy1 ,professor ,m4 ,stuart     
,phelps1 now deceased1 whose life and   
labor all those who had the privilege of
 sharing his instruction and benefiting 
by his kindness must ever hold in       
grateful remembrance4     ,,contents    
,,part ,i                               
,,pages  ,,introductory ,,remarks       
#a-b  ,,darwin                          
#b-ab  ,,wallace                        
#ab-bc  ,,haeckel                       
#bc-bh  ,,spencer                       
#bh-gf  ,,fiske                         
#gg-hb  ,,rolph                         
#hb-ajg  ,,barratt                      
#ajg-abj  ,,stephen                     
#abj-adc  ,,carneri                     
#adc-age  ,h,oe,f,f,d,i,n,g             
#age-bjj  ,,gizycki                     
#bjj-bbd  ,,alexander                   
#bbe-bfc  7,,ree7                       
#bfd-bfh  ,,part ,,ii  ,,introduction   

,refutation of a priori objections to   
,evolutional ,ethics1 and a             
statement of reasons for supposing that 
an application of the     theory of     
,evolution to ,ethics must be of use    
#bfi-bgf   ,,chapter ,i  ,,the          
,,concepts ,,of ,,evolution             
,extension of the meaning of ,darwinian 
concepts since     ,darwin--,lewes on   
the ,struggle for ,existence as         
internal--,the     mystery of ,variation
 according to ,darwin not a metaphysical
     mystery1 but one of the            
incompleteness of scientific            
knowledge--,rolph's criticism of the    
,darwinian conception of the            
,struggle for ,existence                
criticised--,general classification of  
the     theories of                     
,evolution--,fechner's theory of the    
,tendency to     ,stability--,petzoldt  
on ,fechner--,petzoldt's concepts of    
,tendency     and                       
,competition--,zoellner and ,du         
,prel--,examination of the concept      

of ,absolute ,stability1 and of a full  
stability of the universe1     in the   
light of the question as to the finite  
or infinite     character of the        
material universe--,periodicity in      
,organisms--,criticism of the concepts  
of ,cause and     ,effect--,criticism of
 ,spencer's definition of ,life--,the   
concepts     of ,heredity and           
,adaptation--,the point of dispute with 
regard to     ,variation--,darwin1      
,haeckel1 and ,eimer with regard to the 
inheritance of individual               
acquirements--,criticisms of            
,weismann--,habit in the life of the    
individual--,advantage of the     method
 pursued by ,avenarius in the ,kritik   
der reinen     ,erfahrung--,lamarck on  
the relation of ,use and                
,function--,darwin     on ,habit and    
,instinct--,function and ,tendency to   
,function--,relation of organism and    
environment--,theory of a     special   
vital force--,the relation of exercise  
to strength of     ,tendency--,the      

concepts of ,cause and ,effect as       
applied to     organism and             
environment--,relation of primary       
tendency to     later-evolved           
function--,form and ,function--,the     
mixture of types     in sexual          
propagation--,summary of conclusions    
#bgg-cjf   ,,chapter ,,ii               
,,intelligence ,,and ,,end      ,the    
question as to the extent to which      
,reason is diffused in the              
universe--,darwin and ,haeckel on       
,reason and ,instinct--,du ,prel on     
,reason as a fundamental property of all
 matter--,carneri on the     automatism 
of animals--,the dependence of theories 
on this     question on the             
starting-point assumed in the           
argument--,difficulties of assigning a  
limit-line to     ,reason--,schneider's 
criteria--,insectivorous                
plants--,knight1     ,darwin1 etc41 on  
the movements of                        
plants--,race-habits--,so-called        
reflex-action in man--,from non-analogy 

no inference     possible--,arbitrary   
nature of the assumptions involved in   
the     two starting-points of          
query--,reason  ,cause or               
,effect8--,further     criticism of the 
concepts of ,cause and ,effect--,the    
bias of the     specialist--,attempted  
definition of the province of           
reason--,definition of                  
,end--,unreliability of inference as to 
the nature of ends in other individuals2
 in other     species--,possible        
inferences from the analogy of the      
nervous     system--,certain possible   
limiting assumptions as to the province 
of knowledge in animal species--,the    
,law of the ,variation of     ,pain and 
,pleasure in function--,the ultimate    
dilemma--,examinations of ,teleological 
conceptions with respect     to the     
,tendency to ,stability--,criticism of  
,wallace on the ,origin     of ,life1 or
 of ,consciousness--,summary of         
conclusions            #cjg-cdj         
,,chapter ,,iii  ,,the ,,will           

,difficulties of definition--,the ,will 
and     ,consciousness--,involuntary    
action--,will in passivity--,the        
concept of ,choice--,ends and the       
,will--,the ,future and ,will--,the     
,external and ,will--,criticism of      
,barratt's axioms and                   
propositions--,discussion of the        
relation of ,thought and ,feeling     to
 ,will--,the argument of the            
,physiologist--,the argument of the     
,evolutionist--,the argument from social
 statistics--,the argument     from     
,psychiatry1 ,criminology1 etc4--,the   
argument from the     psychological     
principles on which ,evolutional ,ethics
 is     founded--,definition of ,natural
 ,law and ,necessity--,the positive     
factors of ,evolution--,the positive and
 active character of the     organism as
 the result of evolution--,the          
equivalence of     ,conditions and      
,results--,the positive character of the
 organism     as a part of ,nature--,the
 sense of ,freedom as the sense of      

,activity--,the theory of the ,will as  
determined by ,motives--,as             
determined by ,feeling--,as determined  
by the desirability of the     end or   
object--,the argument of ,concomitance  
and that of ,sequence     as used by    
both ,materialist and                   
,spiritualist--,the endeavor to         
prove 7#a7 the causal character of      
physiological process2 7#b7 the         
causal character of                     
,consciousness--,inconsistencies of     
these     attempts                      
#cda-cei   ,,chapter ,,iv  ,,the        
,,mutual ,,relations ,,of ,,thought1    
,,feeling1 ,,and ,,will ,,in ,,evolution
      ,hume on ,reason and              
,passion--,the constant connection of   
,thought     with ,feeling1 and with    
,feeling as pleasure or pain--,the      
question     as to whether ,thought or  
,feeling is primary--,application of    
answer to previous considerations on the
 diffusion of     ,consciousness in     
,nature--,the relation of the concepts  

of the     ,pleasurable and ,painful to 
the concept of ,end--,will as a         
constant accompaniment of               
,consciousness--,absurdities to which   
the division of ,consciousness into     
distinct faculties leads--,law     of   
the growth of functional tendency and of
 pleasure in     function--,the ,new as 
a disturber of equilibrium--,the        
pleasure     involved in the overcoming 
of obstacles--,the equilibrium of       
function as ,health--,connection of the 
pleasure of food-taking     with        
,health--,criticism of ,rolph's         
principle of the ,insatiability     of  
,life--,further criticism of ,rolph on  
the ,darwinian theory of                
,growth--,the cooerdinate progress of   
physiological adaptation with     the   
advancement of knowledge1 and with the  
variation of ,feeling     and           
,will--,the pleasure of the strongest   
motive as relative1 not                 
absolute--,the character of the ,end in 
view--,the pleasure of     anticipation 

and the pleasure of the                 
event--,criticism of     ,sidgwick on   
,hedonism--,criticism of ,rolph's theory
 of ,want as     universal              
motive--,suicide--,rest--,the diminution
 of pain with     lapse of time as      
adaptation--,pleasure in pain as        
pleasure in     function--,the relation 
of ,health to ,happiness--,the theory of
 the     absolute ,freedom of           
,feeling--,the concepts of ,cause and   
,effect as     applied to the evolution 
of ,thought1 ,feeling1 and              
,will--,application of conclusions to   
the ,teleological ,argument   #cfj-chb  
,,chapter ,v  ,,egoism ,,and ,,altruism 
,,in ,,evolution      ,prototypes in    
other animal species of what we term    
,egoism and     ,altruism in man2 care  
for the young on the part of the        
parent-animal2 mutual aid between the   
sexes2 animal                           
societies--,experiments of ,lubbock     
showing the irregularity and     caprice
 of action altruistic in form1 among the

 ants--,benno     ,scheitz on maternal  
care among lower species--,answers to   
the     argument of                     
automatism--,dependence of a theory of  
moral     ,evolution on the definition  
of ,egoism and ,altruism--,the          
significance of the terms               
progressive--,the possibility of        
differences in the form of the evolution
 of ,altruism1 in     different         
species--,the possibility of the        
combination of     different forms in   
the evolution of a single               
species--,discussion     of the question
 of the first beginning of action       
prompted by     altruistic motive--,the 
argument of the illogical nature of a   
supposed development of ,altruism from  
,egoism--,the question as to     whether
 ,health1 the ,preservation of ,species1
 or ,pleasure1 is the     actual final  
end of action--,the question of         
,heredity in relation     to that of the
 moral evolution--,stephen's            
views--,arguments from     ,ribot1      

,dugdale's ,jukes1 etc4                 
#chc-dbb   ,,chapter ,,vi  ,,conscience 
,the gradual character of the evolution 
of ,altruism--,paul     ,friedmann on   
the genesis of benevolence--,the        
observable growth     of ,altruism from 
,egoism in the individual--,human       
society as     necessitated by increase 
of the species--,criticism of ,darwin's 
form of statement on this point--,the   
mixed character of the     motives which
 lead to advancement--,the necessity of 
evolution1     primal organisms once    
having come into existence--,general    
features of the moral evolution in the  
human race--,personal and     ,social   
,virtues--,racial evolution as          
subordinate to the evolution     of the 
species--,criticism of ,stephen--,the   
theory of the     connection of         
,intelligence and ,morality--,testimony 
of ,maudsley1     ,lombroso1            
,dugdale--,the advantages of conformity 
to social     standards--,definition of 
advantage--,arguments from the general  

direction of social advancement--,the   
direction of evolution in     the race  
as a whole and in the individual not    
always the     same--,conclusion3 the   
connection of ,intelligence with        
,morality     not                       
invariable--,definition of              
,morality--,identification of           
,morality with ,justice--,special rules 
of morality--,morality as               
inward--,the virtue of                  
,truthfulness--,necessity of individual 
sacrifice--,dependence of ,justice on   
certain general features of             
particular circumstances---,definition  
of ,conscience--,the mixed     character
 of remorse--,the theory of ,conscience 
as a special     sense--,criticism of   
,utilitarianism--,criticism of some     
forms of     reaction against           
,utilitarianism--,the terms higher and  
lower     as applied to pleasures and   
ends--,the idea of a return to          
,nature--,the objection to ,evolutional 
,ethics on the ground of                

degradation--,struggle as an element of 
virtue--,the evolution of     social    
rewards and punishments--,criticism of  
the objection to     state-punishment on
 the ground of ,determinism--,morality  
and the     question of the             
,transcendental--,conscience in other   
species--,the     contempt for mere     
habit--,the concepts of ,cause and      
,effect as     applied to the moral     
evolution                               
#dbc-dfe   ,,chapter ,,vii  ,,the       
,,moral ,,progress ,,of ,,the ,,human   
,,species ,,as ,,shown ,,by ,,history   
,the assimilative character of human    
progress--,the character of     our     
savage ancestors--,greek                
civilization--,the ,greek treatment of  
children--,of old men--,human sacrifices
 among the     ,greeks--,slaughter of   
prisoners--,slavery--,the ,greek        
attitude     towards the fundamental    
virtues of trustworthiness--,athenian   
,democracy--,roman                      
civilization--,treatment of             

children--,human                        
sacrifices--,gladiatorial               
shows--,slavery--,moral character of the
     ,middle ,ages--,human sacrifice in 
,england before the ,roman              
conquest--,slave laws--,state punishment
 in ,england3 burning1     hanging1 and 
boiling1 quartering and                 
disembowelling--,women under     the    
criminal law--,blood-money--,the        
classification of                       
crimes--,caste-favor in ,english        
criminal                                
law--,mutilation--,flaying--,ordeals--,p
unishment by starvation--,the           
press--,the rack--,skevington's         
,daughter--,benefit of ,clergy--,the    
position of the ,english churl--,the    
worship of rank--,hanging for     petty 
theft--,the pillory--,brutality of      
public feeling--,condition     of the   
prisons--,jail-breaking1 bribery1       
etc4--,more concerning     women under  
the law--,favor to rank--,the logical   
consistency of     human character in   

its various directions of               
action--,general     comparison of the  
past with the present--,the evidence of 
literature--,modern                     
philanthropy--,decrease of national     
prejudices--,growth of the democratic   
spirit--,lack of imagination     a      
reason for the failure to realize the   
evils of the past--,the     ,golden ,age
 of ,man                                
#dff-dii   ,,chapter ,,viii  ,,the      
,,results ,,of ,,ethical ,,inquiry ,,on 
,,an ,,evolutional ,,basis              
,criticism of ,alexander's theory of the
 right as always absolute     right and 
as the expression1 on all planes of     
development1 of an     equal            
equilibrium--,the ,moral ,evolution as  
one involving the     whole of humanity 
and the whole earth--,gradual relaxation
 of the     ,struggle for               
,existence--,the final limitation of the
 increase in     density of             
population--,the increase of            
vitality--,the habituation     to       

progress--,the gradual cooerdination of 
individual with social     welfare      
through 7#a7 ,spread and increase of    
sympathy with the     individual on the 
part of society as a whole2 7#b7 ,growth
 of     individual predilections in the 
direction of harmony with social        
requirements--,decrease of punishment   
through 7#a7 ,increase in     general   
sympathy2 7#b7 ,increase of amenability 
of the individual     to                
influence--,increase of pleasure in     
pleasure--,the possible     egoistic    
element in sympathy with                
pain--,criticism of ,rolph on     ,want 
as necessary to induce action--,the     
moral evolution and                     
emotion--,criticism of ,spencer on      
,altruism--,criticism of ,wundt on      
,evolutional ,ethics--,the theory that  
,evolution adds nothing to              
,ethics--,criticism of ,stephen on the  
impossibility of predicting     the     
course of ,evolution--,the ,moral       
,evolution as willed--,the     motives  

furnished by ,evolutional ,ethics--,the 
theological     doctrine of a change of 
heart--,the doctrine of the             
,atonement--,divine                     
forgiveness--,theology and social       
evils--,the     prominence of the idea  
of self-salvation in ,christian         
doctrine--,human sacrifice among the    
,jews--,biblical authority for     the  
killing of witches and heretics--,the   
infliction of death for     ceremonial  
offences among the ,jews--,the visiting 
of the sins of     the fathers upon the 
children--,slave-holding1 adultery1     
murder1     etc41 by ,god's chosen1     
bloodshed and cruelty of all sorts by   
,god's express command--,animal         
sacrifice among the ,jews--,the         
original idea of ,jehovah and of        
,heaven--,the autocracy of the          
,jewish priesthood confirmed by         
,christ--,forced exegesis--,the         
asceticism of ,christianity--,slavery   
and the ,new                            
,testament--,predestination1 ,hell1 and 

the ,justification of the               
,elect--,the defence of ,christianity as
 being a comforting     belief          
#ejj-ebh   ,,chapter ,,ix  ,,the ,,ideal
 ,,and ,,the ,,way ,,of ,,its           
,,attainment      ,criticism of         
,stephen's assertion that the ideal     
cannot be     determined--,the necessity
 of the choice between evils1 under     
present social conditions--,the argument
 for individual     gratification of    
natural desire--,dangers of             
,utilitarianism--,moral right of the    
minority and the ethical     demand for 
compensation to the minority--,the      
contest between     ,individualist and  
,socialist--,criticism of ,spencer on   
personal     vice--,individualistic     
errors--,socialistic pessimism--,the    
idea of     a return to ,nature--,the   
,socialistic glorification of the       
laborer--,the agitation against         
machinery--,the agitation against       
luxury--,the abolition of luxury and the
 population question--,the     proposed 

change of social environment--,socialism
 at the     present date--,arbitrary    
character of many ,socialistic          
ideas--,criticisms of ,bellamy--,the    
idea of a                               
,revolution--,conclusions--,the         
education of the child--,the right      
of the child to state protection--,the  
advantages of parental     control--,the
 education of women--,the question of   
prostitution--,monogamy or              
polygamy8--,temporary                   
contracts--,divorce--,the argument that 
the freedom of women must     involve   
the forfeiture of chivalric feeling in  
men--,the respect     for               
age--,desirable changes in criminal     
law--,criticism of ,bellamy     on      
,crime--,the question of ,capital       
,punishment--,arguments                 
for--,arguments                         
against--,conclusions--,the conflict    
between     justice and mercy--,the     
supreme arbiter--,the courage of ,moral 
,sincerity--,heroic characters--,the    

final destruction of the human          
species--,the loss of belief in personal
 immortality--,the human     and earthly
 ideal                                  
#ebi-eha     ,a ,,review ,,of           
,,evolutional ,,ethics  ,,part ,i       
,,introductory ,,remarks  ,in the       
preface to the latest edition of his    
,natuerliche ,schoepfungsgeschichte1    
,haeckel1 writing of recent developments
 of thought on the subject of evolution1
 and the change of attitude observable  
in our later literature1 says3 ,the vast
 mass of literature1 yearly increasing  
in astonishing measure1 on the theory of
 evolution in its various branches1 best
 illustrates the remarkable change which
 public opinion has undergone4 ,twenty  
years ago1 the greater part of this     
literature was in opposition to ,darwin2
 to-day such opposition is not to be    
feared from well-informed students of   
science4 ,on the other hand1 almost the 
whole literature of biology now gives   
testimony in ,darwin's favor1 for almost

 all zooelogical1 and botanical1        
anatomic1 and ontogenetic works are     
founded upon the principles of the      
development of species1 and derive from 
,darwin their best and most fruitful    
ideas4  ,no science is a better exponent
 of this radical and important change   
than that which has to do with the      
principles of morals2 for by no science 
was the theory of evolution assailed1 in
 the beginning1 with more vehemence and 
indefatigability4 ,not only did the     
zealous adherents of ,christian dogma   
fear to find1 in the destruction of all 
distinct barriers between the different 
forms of animal life1 a ground for the  
denial of ,god's especial favor to man1 
and the worshippers of emotional morals 
become indignant at the unveiling of the
 divine ,mystic 7as if only ignorance   
were reverence1 and only the ,unknown   
worthy of homage71 but even the less    
conservative schools of philosophy often
 showed themselves unfavorable or       
hesitant towards the new ideas1 dreading

 their implications4 ,all this is       
changed4 ,if ,england's most popular    
living philosopher was among the first  
to declare himself for ,darwin1 and to  
revise his whole system in accordance   
with the theory of evolution1 so that   
this theory early began to find         
adherents among students of philosophy  
in all lands where ,english is spoken1  
it was not long before the newer schools
 of ,france and ,germany began to follow
 in their wake4 ,now every year1 and    
almost every month1 brings with it a    
fresh supply of books1 pamphlets1 and   
magazine articles on ,the ,evolution of 
,morality1 ,l',evolution de la ,morale1 
,die ,evolution der ,sittlichkeit1      
,sittlichkeit und ,darwinismus1 etc4 ,so
 many are the waters which now pour     
themselves into this common stream that 
the current threatens soon to become too
 deep and swift for any but the most    
expert swimmers4  ,in a short review of 
,evolutional ,ethics1 it will be        
impossible to consider all the          

literature that has added to our        
knowledge on this subject2 we must      
confine ourselves to the few books that 
are most prominent4 ,the first laborer  
in this line1 not only indirectly       
through general theory1 but also        
directly through particular theory1 is1 
as usual1 ,charles ,darwin2 and though  
,darwin was himself no psychologist1 and
 moreover advances his ideas on the     
origin and development of morals only in
 the tentative manner that necessarily  
attaches to a first attempt when made by
 so conscientious a thinker1 he         
doubtless suggested to all other writers
 in this field a very large part of that
 which was best in their work4 ,a       
,review of ,evolutional ,ethics must1   
therefore1 in order to start with the   
proper origin of the science1 begin with
     ,,charles ,,darwin   ,in the essay 
on ,instinct appended to ,g4 ,j4        
,romanes' ,mental ,evolution in         
,animals1#a ,darwin says3 ,the social   
instinct is indispensable to some       

animals1 useful to still more1 and      
apparently only pleasant to some few    
animals4 ,the social tendency being thus
 classed as an instinct1 it belongs to  
our work to examine what are ,darwin's  
theories as to the origin and nature of 
instinct4  ,in the chapter on ,instinct1
 in ,the ,origin of ,species1 ,darwin   
premises3 ,i have nothing to do with the
 origin of the mental powers1 any more  
than ,i have with that of life itself4#b
 ,again3 ,frederick ,cuvier and several 
of the older metaphysicians have        
compared instinct with habit4 ,this     
comparison gives1 ,i think1 an accurate 
notion of the frame of mind under which 
an instinctive action is performed1 but 
not necessarily of its origin4444 ,if we
 suppose any habitual action to become  
inherited--and it can be shown that this
 does sometimes happen--then the        
resemblance between what originally was 
a habit and an instinct becomes so close
 as not to be distinguished4444 ,but it 
would be a serious error to suppose that

 the greater number of instincts have   
been acquired by habit in one           
generation1 and then transmitted by     
inheritance to succeeding generations4  
,it can be clearly shown that the most  
wonderful instincts with which we are   
acquainted1 namely1 those of the        
hive-bee and of many ants1 could not    
possibly have been acquired by habit4#c 
,of one of the habits of these          
last-named insects ,darwin1 however1    
writes3 ,i have not rarely felt that    
small and trifling instincts were a     
greater difficulty on our theory than   
those which have so justly excited the  
wonder of mankind2 for an instinct1 if  
really of no considerable importance in 
the struggle for life1 could not be     
modified or formed through natural      
selection4 ,perhaps as striking an      
instance as can be given is that of the 
workers of the hive-bee arranged in     
files and ventilating1 by a peculiar    
movement of their wings1 the well-closed
 hive3 this ventilation has been        

artificially imitated1 and as it is     
carried on even during winter1 there can
 be no doubt that it is to bring in free
 air and displace the carbonic acid gas2
 therefore it is in truth indispensable1
 and we may imagine the stages--a few   
bees first going to the orifice to fan  
themselves--by which the instinct might 
have been arrived at4#d ,again3         
,glancing at instincts1 marvellous as   
some are1 they offer no greater         
difficulty than do corporeal structures 
on the theory of the natural selection  
of successive slight1 but profitable    
modifications4 ,we can thus understand  
why nature moves by graduated steps in  
endowing different animals of the same  
class with their several instincts4#e   
,and again3 ,as ,i believe1 the most    
wonderful of all known instincts1 that  
of the hive-bee1 can be explained by    
natural selection having taken advantage
 of numerous successive1 slight         
modifications of simpler instincts1     
natural selection having1 by slow       

degrees1 more and more perfectly led the
 bees to sweep equal spheres at a given 
distance from each other in a double    
layer1 and to build up and excavate the 
wax along the planes of intersection2   
the bees1 of course1 no more knowing    
that they swept their spheres at one    
particular distance from each other1    
than they know what are the several     
angles of the hexagonal prisms and of   
the basal rhombic plates2 the motive    
power of the process of natural         
selection having been the construction  
of cells of due strength and of the     
proper size and shape for the larvae1   
this being effected with the greatest   
possible economy of labor and wax2 that 
individual swarm which thus made the    
best cells with least labor1 and least  
waste of honey in the secretion of wax1 
having succeeded best1 and having       
transmitted their newly acquired        
economical instincts to new swarms1     
which in their turn will have had the   
best chance of succeeding in the        

struggle for existence4#f ,and further1 
of instinct in general3 ,it will be     
universally admitted that instincts are 
as important as corporeal structures for
 the welfare of each species1 under its 
present conditions of life4 ,under      
changed conditions of life1 it is at    
least possible that slight modifications
 of instinct might be profitable to a   
species2 and if it can be shown that    
instincts do vary ever so little1 then  
,i can see no difficulty in natural     
selection preserving and continually    
accumulating variations of instinct to  
any extent that was profitable4 ,it is  
thus1 as ,i believe1 that all the most  
complex and wonderful instincts have    
originated4 ,as modifications of        
corporeal structure arise from1 and are 
increased by1 use or habit1 and are     
diminished or lost by disuse1 so ,i do  
not doubt it has been with instincts2   
though ,darwin adds3 ,but ,i believe    
that the effects of habit are in many   
cases of subordinate importance to the  

effects of the natural selection of what
 may be called spontaneous variations of
 instincts2 that is1 of variations      
produced by the same unknown causes     
which produce slight deviations of      
bodily structure4 ,however1 ,no complex 
instinct can possibly be produced       
through natural selection1 except by the
 slow and gradual accumulation of       
numerous slight1 yet profitable1        
variations4#g ,and of habit as connected
 with heredity1 ,darwin writes3 ,changed
 habits produce an inherited effect1 as 
in the period of the flowering of plants
 when transported from one climate to   
another4 ,with animals the increased use
 or disuse of parts has had a more      
marked influence4444 ,no breeder doubts 
how strong is the tendency to           
inheritance2 that like produces like is 
his fundamental belief2 doubts have been
 thrown on this principle only by       
theoretical writers4444 ,if strange and 
rare deviations of structure are really 
inherited1 less strange and commoner    

deviations may be freely admitted to be 
inheritable4 ,perhaps the correct way of
 viewing the whole subject would be to  
look at the inheritance of every        
character whatever as the rule1 and     
non-inheritance as the anomaly4444 ,if  
it could be shown that our domestic     
varieties manifested a strong tendency  
to reversion--that is1 to lose their    
acquired characters whilst kept under   
the same conditions1 and whilst kept in 
a considerable body1 so that free       
intercrossing might check1 by blending  
together1 any slight deviations in their
 structure1 in such case ,i grant that  
we could deduce nothing from domestic   
varieties in regard to species4 ,but    
there is not a shadow of evidence in    
favor of this view2 to assert that we   
could not breed our cart and race       
horses1 long and short horned cattle1   
and poultry of various breeds1 and      
esculent vegetables1 for an unlimited   
number of generations1 would be opposed 
to all experience4#h ,darwin recognizes1

 in instinct1 the possibility for the   
play of a certain amount of imitation1  
as also of intelligence and             
experience1#i though denying to these   
the range attributed to them by         
,wallace4 ,and summing up his theory in 
the essay given by ,romanes1 he writes3 
,it may not be logical1 but to my       
imagination it is far more satisfactory1
 to look at the young cuckoo ejecting   
his foster brothers1 ants making slaves1
 the larvae of the ichneumidae feeding  
within the live bodies of their prey1   
cats playing with mice1 otters and      
cormorants with living fish1 not as     
instincts specially given by the        
,creator1 but as very small parts of one
 general law leading to the advancement 
of all organic bodies--,multiply1 ,vary1
 let the strongest ,live and the weakest
 ,die4  ,it will thus be seen that      
,darwin1 while confessing a disability  
to account for the origin of            
,instinct1--beginning with some form of 
instinct as already existent1 just as he

 begins with life as already            
existent1--does advance some perfectly  
definite views as to the probable       
origins of instincts1--namely1          
preservation1 in the struggle for       
existence1 of numerous slight but       
profitable variations4 ,the assertion of
 the inadequacy of habit to account for 
the origin of more complex instincts1 as
 in the case of the hive-bees1 when     
compared with the subsequent            
explanation1 in the same connection1 of 
the rise of these very instincts partly 
by habit acquired from experience and   
imitation1 partly by accidental         
modifications of simpler instincts1 both
 taken advantage of by natural          
selection1--would seem to limit the term
 habit1 as here used1 to modes of action
 acquired during the life of the        
individual2 this interpretation of the  
word being confirmed by the additional  
phrase in one generation4 ,but here1 as 
everywhere in ,darwin's work1 an unknown
 quantity appears--namely1 the cause of 

variation2 i4e4 of the differences1 or  
tendency to differ1 of offspring1 from  
the parental type4  ,in ,the ,descent of
 ,man1 published twelve years later than
 ,the ,origin of ,species1 and ,the     
,variation of ,plants and ,animals under
 ,domestication1 which appeared yet     
three years later1 ,darwin's views on   
instinct and habit are still further    
elaborated1 and a definition of the     
relation of these to reason1 pleasure1  
pain1 and the moral sense1 attempted4   
,in ,vol4 ,i4 of the former work1       
,darwin devotes two chapters to these   
subjects4 ,instinct he calls1 pages     
#aaf-abb1 inherited habit2 and on page  
#afh he says3 ,but as love1 sympathy1   
and self-command became strengthened by 
habit1 and as the power of reasoning    
becomes clearer1 so that man can value  
justly the judgments of his fellows1 he 
will feel himself impelled1 apart from  
any transitory pleasure or pain1 to     
certain lines of conduct4 ,here1 ,i take
 it1 the word habit cannot be           

interpreted as referring to one         
generation of men1 but to the race as a 
whole1 a general continuity being thus  
ascribed to the inheritance of mental   
characteristics1 and the important      
concept of progress as adaptation       
acquired4 ,in contrasting reason with   
instinct1 ,darwin thinks that instinct  
and intelligence do not1 as ,cuvier     
maintained1 stand in inverse ratio to   
each other1 but that a high degree of   
intelligence is compatible with complex 
instincts--as in the case of the beaver2
 yet it is not improbable that there is 
a certain amount of interference between
 the development of free intelligence   
and of instinct1--which latter implies  
some inherited modification of the      
brain4 ,little is known about the       
functions of the brain1 but we can      
perceive that1 as the intellectual      
powers become highly developed1 the     
various parts of the brain must be      
connected by very intricate channels of 
the freest intercommunication2 and as a 

consequence1 each separate part would   
perhaps tend to be less well fitted to  
answer to particular sensations or      
associations in a definite and          
inherited--that is1 instinctive--manner4
 ,there seems even to exist some        
relation between a low degree of        
intelligence and a strong tendency to   
the formation of fixed1 though not      
inherited habits2 for1 as a sagacious   
physician remarked to me1 persons who   
are slightly imbecile tend to act in    
everything by routine or habit2 and they
 are rendered much happier if this is   
encouraged4#aj ,darwin thinks           
instinctive action and action from habit
 may not be connected with either       
pleasure or pain1 though he would seem  
to contradict this view in the latter   
part of the passage just quoted1 and    
again where he says3 ,although a habit  
may be blindly and implicitly followed1 
independently of any pleasure or pain   
felt at the moment1 yet if it be        
forcibly and abruptly checked1 a vague  

sense of dissatisfaction is generally   
experienced4#aa  ,in writing of the     
social instinct1 ,darwin begins with it 
as already existent1 and seems1         
moreover1 to maintain concerning it a   
theory of purpose elsewhere denied in   
his works and1 indeed1 antagonistic to  
the whole principle of the struggle for 
existence4 ,he says3 ,it has often been 
assumed that animals were in the first  
place rendered social1 and that they    
feel1 as a consequence1 uncomfortable   
when separated from each other1 and     
comfortable whilst together2 but it is a
 more probable view that these          
sensations were first developed1 in     
order that those animals which would    
profit by living in society1 should be  
induced to live together1 in the same   
manner as the sense of hunger and the   
pleasure of eating were1 no doubt1 first
 acquired1 in order to induce animals to
 eat4#ab ,if it were not for the        
expressions should be induced and to    
induce1 the words in order that1 taken  

in connection with what follows1 might  
be interpreted as referring to mere     
sequence of time1 as1 on page #aii1     
where ,darwin refers to the social      
faculties simply as antecedent to       
society1 they evidently do4 ,for he     
says3 ,in order that primeval man1 or   
the ape-like progenitors of man1 should 
become social1 they must have acquired  
the same instinctive feelings which     
induce other animals to live in a body4 
,the sentences referred to which follow 
the first quotation are as follows3 ,the
 feeling of pleasure from society is    
probably an extension of the parental or
 filial affections1 since the social    
instinct seems to be developed by the   
young remaining for a long time with    
their parents2 and this extension may be
 attributed in part to habit1 but       
chiefly to natural selection4 ,with     
those animals which were benefited by   
living in close association1 the        
individuals which took the greatest     
pleasure in society would best escape   

various dangers1 whilst those that cared
 least for their comrades1 and lived    
solitary1 would perish in greater       
numbers4 ,with respect to the origin of 
the parental and filial affections1     
which apparently lie at the base of the 
social instincts1 we know not the steps 
by which they have been gained2 but we  
may infer that it has been to a large   
extent through natural selection4 ,the  
passage may possibly be consistently    
explained by the idea of the ,survival  
of the ,fittest1 but it is at least very
 unclear in its wording4 ,at the        
beginning of ,chapter ,,iv4 of the same 
book1 ,darwin also gives a synopsis of  
the development of the moral sense from 
the social instincts1 through the       
pleasure of association and service1    
remorse being a result of the power of  
representation1 regard for the          
approbation and disapprobation of       
fellows arising from sympathy with them 
until resulting habit plays a very      
important part in guiding the conduct of

 the individual4 ,another passage1      
however1 again introduces an antagonism 
between habit1 instinct1 and reason1 and
 natural selection3 ,it is impossible to
 decide in many cases whether certain   
social instincts have been acquired     
through natural selection1 or are the   
indirect result of other instincts and  
faculties1 such as sympathy1 reason1    
experience1 and a tendency to imitation2
 or again1 whether they are simply the  
result of long-continued habit4 ,darwin 
distinguishes between the all-important 
emotion of sympathy1 and that of love4  
,a mother may passionately love her     
sleeping and passive infant1 but she can
 hardly at such times be said to feel   
sympathy for it2 but he includes both   
love and sympathy under the head of     
sympathetic emotions2 and on page #afc  
he says3 ,with mankind1 selfishness1    
experience1 and imitation probably add1 
as ,mr4 ,bain has shown1 to the power of
 sympathy2 for we are led by the hope of
 receiving good in return to perform    

acts of sympathetic kindness to others2 
and sympathy is much strengthened by    
habit4 ,again1 on page #aff1 instinctive
 love and sympathy would seem to be     
contrasted with love and sympathy as    
habit1 the increase of such feelings in 
the race through habit1 elsewhere more  
or less distinctly asserted1 being here 
ignored3 ,although man1 as he now       
exists1 has few special instincts1      
having lost any which his early         
progenitors may have possessed1 this is 
no reason why he should not have        
retained1 from an extremely remote      
period1 some degree of instinctive love 
and sympathy for his fellows4 ,we are1  
indeed1 all conscious that we do possess
 such sympathetic feelings2 but our     
consciousness does not tell us whether  
they are instinctive1 having originated 
long ago in the same manner as with the 
lower animals1 or whether they have been
 acquired by each of us during our early
 years4 ,but again1 on page #bbj1       
sympathy is referred to as an element of

 the social instincts3#ac ,it should1   
however1 be borne in mind that the      
enforcement of public opinion depends on
 our appreciation of the approbation and
 disapprobation of others2 and this     
appreciation is founded on our sympathy1
 which it can hardly be doubted was     
originally developed through natural    
selection as one of the most important  
elements of the social instincts2       
though1 on pages #afg1 #afh1 the social 
instinct is again contrasted with       
sympathy1 since according to ,darwin the
 desire for the approbation of others   
and the consequent yielding to their    
wishes is the result of sympathy3 ,thus 
the social instincts1 which must have   
been acquired by man in a very rude     
state1 and probably even by his early   
ape-like progenitors1 still give the    
impulse to some of his best actions2 but
 his actions are in a higher degree     
determined by the expressed wishes and  
judgments of his fellow-men4 ,again the 
social and the maternal instincts and   

sympathy are identified and classed as  
under the dominion of the moral sense1  
pages #afh-agj3 ,it is evident1 in the  
first place1 that with mankind the      
instinctive impulses have different     
degrees of strength2 a savage1 will risk
 his own life to save that of a member  
of the same community1 but will be      
wholly indifferent about a stranger2 a  
young and timid mother urged by the     
maternal instinct will1 without a       
moment's hesitation1 run the greatest   
danger for her own infant1 but not for a
 mere fellow-creature4 ,nevertheless1   
many a civilized man1 or even boy1 who  
never before risked his life for        
another1 but full of courage and        
sympathy1 has disregarded the instinct  
of self-preservation1 and plunged at    
once into a torrent to save a drowning  
man1 though a stranger4444 ,such actions
 as the above appear to be the simple   
result of the greater strength of the   
social or maternal instincts than that  
of any other instinct or motive2 for    

they are performed too instantaneously  
for reflection1 or for pleasure or pain 
to be felt at the time2 though1 if      
prevented by any cause1 distress or even
 misery might be felt4444 ,i am aware   
that some persons maintain that actions 
performed impulsively1 as in the above  
cases1 do not come under the dominion of
 the moral sense1 and cannot be called  
moral4444 ,on the contrary1 we all feel 
that an act cannot be considered as     
perfect or as performed in the most     
noble manner1 unless it be done         
impulsively1 without deliberation or    
effort1 in the same manner as by a man  
in whom the requisite qualities are     
innate4 ,darwin defines the office of   
the moral sense as telling us what to   
do1#ad that of conscience1--which       
includes remorse1 repentance1 regret or 
shame1 fear of the gods and of the      
disapprobation of men1--as reproving us 
if we disobey it2#ae conscience seems   
elsewhere to be defined as concerned    
with resolve to better future action2   

and in still another passage1 the moral 
sense and conscience are identified4    
,but again1 in another paragraph1       
,darwin seems to ascribe remorse or     
regret1 not to the baulking of an       
instinct1 but to a judgment of having   
been baulked3 ,a man cannot prevent past
 impressions often repassing through his
 mind2 he will thus be driven to make a 
comparison between the impressions of   
past hunger1 vengeance satisfied1 or    
danger shunned at other men's cost1 with
 the almost ever-present instinct of    
sympathy1 and with his early knowledge  
of what others consider as praiseworthy 
or blamable4 ,this knowledge cannot be  
banished from his mind1 and from        
instinctive sympathy is esteemed of     
great moment4 ,he will then feel as if  
he had been baulked in following a      
present instinct or habit1 and this with
 all animals causes dissatisfaction1 or 
even misery4#af ,but1 in spite of all   
indefiniteness in the use of terms and  
uncertainty as to the interrelations of 

the social instincts1 sympathy1 reason1 
pleasure1 and the moral sense1 it is1   
after all1 comparatively easy to gather1
 after a little deeper study1 the       
general and more important features of  
,darwin's theory as to the origin of    
morality4 ,we may state these as        
follows3 ,the social instinct led men or
 their ape-like progenitors to          
society1#ag this instinct growing out of
 the parental or filial affections      
through habit and natural selection4    
,virtue is1 at first1 only tribal4#ah   
,the social qualities of sympathy1      
fidelity1 and courage implied in mutual 
aid and defence1 were no doubt acquired 
by man through the same means4 ,when two
 tribes of primeval man1 living in the  
same country1 came into competition1 if 
7other circumstances being equal7 the   
one tribe included a great number of    
courageous1 sympathetic1 and faithful   
members1 who were always ready to warn  
each other of danger1 to aid and defend 
each other1 this tribe would succeed    

better and conquer the other4444        
,selfish and contentious people will not
 cohere1 and without coherence nothing  
can be effected4 ,a tribe rich in the   
above qualities would spread and be     
victorious over other tribes2 but in the
 course of time it would1 judging from  
all past history1 be in its turn        
overcome by some other tribe still more 
highly endowed4 ,thus the social and    
moral qualities would tend slowly to    
advance and be diffused throughout the  
world4 ,though in a warlike state1 where
 courage is especially necessary to     
tribal existence1 the bravest men would 
perish in larger numbers than other men1
 and the survival of the unfittest would
 seem thus to be secured1 the influence 
of their bravery on others might excite 
the latter to imitation and do far more 
good than the begetting of offspring who
 would inherit their bravery4 ,so1 also1
 pity1 though inciting modern society to
 the preservation of the weak1 yet is   
useful in that it cultivates sympathy2  

and so1 too1 wealth1 affording leisure  
for intellectual pursuits and a wider   
choice in marriage1 tends1 in the end1  
to the preservation of the fittest      
morally1 by direct or indirect means4#ai
 ,altruistic action1 followed from      
selfish motives1 may become habit2      
habits of benevolence certainly         
strengthen the feeling of sympathy2 and 
habits followed during many generations 
probably tend to be inherited4          
,furthermore1 melancholy tends often to 
suicide1 as violence1 and               
quarrelsomeness to a bloody end1        
intemperance to the destruction of      
individual life1 and profligacy to      
disease and sterility2 so that some     
elimination of the worst dispositions   
takes place4 ,these are some of the     
probable steps of advancement1 though   
the process is too complex to be clearly
 followed out4 ,the approbation of      
others--the strengthening of sympathies 
by habit--example and                   
imitation--reason--experience and even  

self-interest--instruction during youth1
 and religious feelings--are the causes 
which lead to the advancement of        
morality4#bj ,in the paragraph just     
quoted1 ,darwin says3 ,with civilized   
nations1 as far as an advanced standard 
of morality and an increased number of  
fairly good men are concerned1 natural  
selection apparently effects but little1
 though the fundamental social instincts
 were originally thus gained2 but he    
later writes3 ,judging from all that we 
know of man and the lower animals1 there
 has always been sufficient variability 
in their intellectual and moral         
faculties for a steady advance through  
natural selection2 and he further says3 
,no doubt such advance demands many     
favorable concurrent circumstances2 but 
it may well be doubted whether the most 
favorable would have sufficed1 had not  
the rate of increase been rapid1 and the
 consequent struggle for existence      
extremely severe4#ba ,the end or aim of 
morality is the general good1 rather    

than the general happiness1 though no   
doubt the welfare and the happiness of  
the individual usually coincide2 and a  
contented1 happy tribe will flourish    
better than one that is discontented and
 unhappy4444 ,as all wish for happiness1
 the 'greatest happiness principle' will
 have become a most important secondary 
guide and object2 the social instinct1  
however1 together with sympathy 7which  
leads to our regarding the approbation  
and disapprobation of others71 having   
served as the primary impulse and       
guide4#bb ,and with regard to the       
future1 ,darwin says3 ,looking to future
 generations1 there is no cause to fear 
that the social instincts will grow     
weaker1 and we may expect that virtuous 
habits will grow stronger1 becoming     
perhaps fixed by inheritance4 ,in this  
case the struggle between our higher and
 lower impulses will be less severe1 and
 virtue will be triumphant4#bc          
,,footnotes3  #a ,p4 #cha4 ,this essay  
originally formed part of the chapter on

 ,instinct in ,the ,origin of ,species1 
but was omitted for the sake of         
condensation4  #b ,vol4 ,i4 p4 #cai4  #c
 ,pp4 #cbj1 #cba4  #d ,appendix to      
,mental ,evolution in ,animals1 pp4     
#cgh1 #cgi4 ,the italics are my own4  #e
 ,the ,origin of ,species1 ,,ii4 p4     
#bhf4  #f ,ibid4 ,i4 pp4 #cec1 #ced4  #g
 ,the ,origin of ,species1 ,i4 pp4 #cba1
 #cbb4  #h ,ibid4 ,i4 pp4 #ab-ag4  #i   
,appendix to ,mental ,evolution in      
,animals1 pp4 #cgj1 #chc2 see also ,the 
,descent of ,man1 ,i4 p4 #ajb et seq42  
and ,nature for ,feb4 #ac1 #ahgc1       
introduction to a letter to the editor  
from ,william ,higginson4  #aj ,p4 #ajc4
  #aa ,pp4 #afj1 #afa4  #ab ,p4 #afa4   
#ac ,see also p4 #aga4 ,and1 p4 #agb1   
sympathy is designated as a fundamental 
element of the social instincts4  #ad   
,p4 #agh4  #ae ,pp4 #agd1 #agh4  #af ,p4
 #agc4  #ag ,descent of ,man1 ,i4 p4    
#aii1 etc4  #ah ,ibid4 p4 #agi4  #ai    
,ibid4 pp4 #aii-bji4  #bj ,ibid4 p4     
#bab4  #ba ,ibid4 pp4 #bai1 #bbj4  #bb  

,ibid4 p4 #ahe4  #bc ,ibid4 p4 #aib4    
,,alfred ,,russel ,,wallace   ,whatever 
we may define instinct to be1 it is     
evidently some form of mental           
manifestation1 says ,wallace in his     
,contributions to ,natural ,selection   
7#ahga74 ,we know little of the senses  
of animals2 some animals may even       
possess senses which we have not1 and by
 which stores of knowledge of the       
outside world may be opened that are    
closed to us4 ,we do not know certainly1
 for instance1 what is the office of the
 little stalked balls that are the sole 
remnants of hind wings in flies1 or what
 is the office of the third joints of   
the antennae in the same insects1 though
 both these evidently correspond to some
 sense4 ,how can we pretend to fathom   
the profound mystery of the mental      
nature of animals1 and decide what or   
how much they can perceive or remember1 
reason or reflect8 ,defining instinct1  
then1 as the performance by an animal of
 complex acts1 absolutely without       

instruction1 ,wallace refuses to accept 
the theory of such action1 in any case  
where all other modes of explanation    
have not been exhausted2 for a point    
which can be proved should not be       
assumed1 and a totally unknown power    
should not be brought in to explain     
facts1 when known powers may be         
sufficient4 ,he maintains that there is 
a possibility1 for instance1 of the     
instruction of young birds by old in the
 art of nest-building4 ,it is quite     
likely that birds remember the form1    
size1 position1 and materials of the    
nest in which they were hatched1 as it  
is also probable that young birds often 
pair with old ones who have experience  
in nest-building4 ,man's architecture is
 also chiefly imitative4 ,birds brought 
up from the egg in cages do not make the
 characteristic nest of their species1  
even though the proper materials are    
supplied them1 and often make no nest at
 all1 but rudely heap together a        
quantity of materials4 ,no one has ever 

yet obtained the eggs of some bird which
 builds an elaborate nest1 hatched those
 eggs by steam or under quite a distinct
 parent1 placed them afterwards in an   
extensive aviary or covered garden1     
where the situation and the materials of
 a nest similar to that of the          
parent-birds may be found1 and then seen
 what kind of nest these birds would    
build4 ,if under these rigorous         
conditions they choose the same         
materials1 the same situation1 and      
construct the nest in the same way and  
as perfectly as their parents did1      
instinct would be proved in their case2 
now it is only assumed4444 ,so no one   
has ever carefully taken the pupae of a 
hive of bees out of the comb1 removed   
them from the presence of other bees1   
and loosed them in a large conservatory 
with plenty of flowers and food1 and    
observed what kind of cells they would  
construct4 ,but till this is done no one
 can say that1 with every new swarm     
there are no bees older than those of   

the same year1 who may be the teachers  
in forming the new comb4#bd ,young birds
 never have the song peculiar to their  
species if they have not heard it1      
whereas they acquire very easily the    
song of almost any other bird with which
 they are associated4 ,moreover1 there  
are failures and imperfections in the   
nesting of birds that are not compatible
 with the theory of instinct1 which is  
supposed to be infallible1 but are quite
 so with the theory of intelligence and 
imitation4 ,furthermore1 in their manner
 of building1 birds adapt themselves to 
circumstances and frequently alter and  
improve4 ,the theory of instincts in man
 is likewise in the wrong4 ,the sucking 
of the child1 which is said to be       
instinctive1 is merely one of those     
simple acts dependent on organization1  
like breathing or muscular motion4 ,so  
walking is evidently dependent on the   
arrangement of the bones and joints1 and
 the pleasurable exertion of the        
muscles1 which lead to the vertical     

posture becoming gradually the most     
agreeable one2 and there can be little  
doubt that an infant would learn of     
itself to walk1 even if suckled by a    
wild beast4  ,the theory of instinct    
implies innate ideas#be of a very       
definite kind1 and if established1 would
 overthrow ,mr4 ,mill's ,sensationalism 
and all the modern philosophy of        
experience4  ,the reason why natural    
selection acts so powerfully upon       
animals1 is to be found mainly in their 
individual isolation4 ,a slight injury1 
a temporary illness1 will often end in  
death1 because it leaves the individual 
powerless against its enemies4444 ,there
 is1 as a rule1 no mutual assistance    
between adults1 which enables them to   
tide over a period of sickness4 ,neither
 is there any division of labor2 each   
must fulfil all the conditions of its   
existence1 and therefore natural        
selection keeps all up to a pretty      
uniform standard4 ,but in man as we now 
behold him1 this is different4 ,he is   

social and sympathetic2 and in society1 
a division of labor takes place that    
leaves the physically defective still   
something to do by which he may sustain 
life1 and saves him from the extreme    
penalty which falls upon animals so     
defective4 ,by his skill in constructing
 for himself tools and clothing and in  
planting his own food1 man has an       
immense advantage over the animals1 in  
whom a change of structure must take    
place in adaptation to changed          
conditions4 ,moreover1 he not only      
escapes natural selection himself1 but  
is actually able to take away some of   
that power from nature1 which1 before   
his appearance1 she universally         
exercised1 establishing so his supremacy
 by means of that subtle force we term  
mind4 ,we can anticipate the time when  
the earth will produce only cultivated  
plants and domestic animals1 when man's 
selection shall have supplanted natural 
selection4  ,we must1 in future         
geological study1 trace back the        

gradually decreasing brain of former    
races to a time when the body as well   
begins materially to differ1 if we would
 wish to reach the starting-point of the
 human family4 ,before that time man had
 not mind enough to preserve his body   
from change4 ,from this point1 however1 
we shall probably see that1 while all   
other forms of animal life changed again
 and again1 man's physical character    
became fixed and almost immutable1      
advance taking place only in his mental 
and moral characteristics1 with which   
are united modifications of the brain1  
as well as of the head and face1 parts  
that are immediately connected with the 
brain and the medium of the most refined
 emotions4 ,by man's superior           
sympathetic and moral feelings1 he      
becomes fitted for the social state4    
,there is one feature1 however1 in which
 natural selection will still act upon  
him--namely1 the color of the skin1     
which1 as ,mr4 ,darwin has shown1 is    
correlated with constitutional          

peculiarities1 liability to certain     
diseases being often accompanied by     
marked external characteristics2 so     
that1 in certain countries1 certain     
tints would be likely to be weeded out1 
and certain other tints1 with which1    
again1 color and texture of the hair    
seem to be associated1 would be         
established by natural selection4       
,natural selection has no power to      
produce modifications which are in any  
degree injurious to their possessor1 and
 ,mr4 ,darwin uses the strong expression
 that a single case of this kind would  
be fatal to his theory4 ,if1 therefore1 
we find in man any characters which all 
the evidence we can obtain goes to show 
would have been actually injurious to   
him on their first appearance1 they     
could not possibly have been produced by
 natural selection4 ,neither could any  
specially developed organ have been so  
produced if it had been merely useless  
to its possessor1 or if its use were not
 proportionate to its degree of         

development4 ,such cases as these would 
prove that some other law1 or some other
 power1 than natural selection1 had been
 at work4 ,but if1 further1 we could see
 that these very modifications1 though  
hurtful or useless at the time when they
 first appeared1 became in the highest  
degree useful at a much later period1   
and are essential to the full moral and 
intellectual development of human       
nature1 we should then infer the action 
of mind1 foreseeing the future and      
preparing for it1 just as surely as we  
do when we see the breeder set himself  
to work with the determination to       
produce a definite improvement in some  
cultivated plant or domestic animal2 we 
should infer a creation by law4         
,skull-measurement shows that the brain 
of the savage was1 and is1 larger than  
it needs to be1 and capable1 if         
cultivated and developed1 of performing 
work of a degree and kind far beyond    
what he ever requires it to do4 ,in     
evidence of this1 ,wallace cites the    

measurements of ,esquimaux skulls and   
the testimony of ,paul ,broca to the    
fine form and capacity of the skulls of 
,les ,eyzies1 a race of cave-dwellers   
undoubtedly contemporary with the       
reindeer in ,southern ,france4#bf ,he   
also argues that the loss1 by man1 of   
the hairy covering so long persistent in
 the mammalia1 cannot have taken place  
on account of its lack of usefulness1   
since even the most savage tribes show a
 need of it1 endeavoring to replace it  
by artificial coverings1 especially on  
the back4 ,this naked skin is1 however1 
of importance to civilization1 since it 
leads to the adoption of both clothing  
and houses1 and develops1 through the   
former1 the sense of modesty4 ,the loss 
of the prehensile character of the whole
 foot1 and especially of the pedal      
thumb1 is a preparation for             
civilization4 ,so1 too1 the capacity of 
the human voice for music1 of little use
 to savages1 since their singing        
consists only in a sort of monotonous   

howling1 must be regarded as a          
preparation for the civilized man's     
delight in music1 and probably also for 
a higher state than that to which we    
have yet attained4  ,nor can the        
sanctity which attaches to virtue1 even 
among savages1 be explained by utility  
or natural selection4 ,the mystic sense 
of wrong1 which1 although few laws      
enforce truth1 yet attaches to untruth1 
even among whole tribes of utter        
savages1 is an example of such sanctity4
 ,wallace adds1 however1 in the same    
breath3 ,no very severe reprobation     
follows untruth4 ,in all ages1 falsehood
 has been thought venial or even        
laudable under certain conditions4 ,he  
asserts that the utilitarian doctrine is
 not sufficient to account for the      
development of the moral sense1 but     
seems1 nevertheless1 to adopt a         
utilitarian principle as the basis of   
the moral sense when he says3 ,where    
free play is allowed to the relations   
between man and man1 this feeling i4e4  

of sanctity attaches itself to those    
acts of universal utility or            
self-sacrifice which are the products of
 our affections and sympathies which we 
term moral2 and he adds3 while it may   
be1 and often is1 perverted to give the 
same sanction to acts of narrow and     
conventional utility which are really   
immoral1--as when the ,hindoo will tell 
a lie1 but will sooner starve than eat  
unclean food2 and looks upon the        
marriage of adult females as gross      
immorality4 ,the explanation of this    
inconsistency is1 according to ,wallace1
 that the strength of the moral feeling1
 in any case1 will depend on the        
individual or racial constitution1 and  
on education and habit2 and the acts to 
which its sanctions are applied will    
depend on the extent of modification of 
the simple feelings and affections by   
custom1 law1 and religion4 ,if a moral  
sense is an essential part of our       
nature1 it is easy to see that its      
sanction may often be given to acts     

which are useless or immoral1 just as   
the natural appetite for drink is       
perverted by the drunkard into the means
 of his destruction4  ,these phenomena  
of the preparation of the human being   
for civilization and morality can be    
explained only on the supposition of a  
superior intelligence which has guided  
man's development in a definite         
direction1 just as man guides the       
development of many animal forms4 ,by a 
superior intelligence is not necessarily
 meant the supreme intelligence4 ,the   
modern cultivated mind seems incapable  
of realizing between it and the ,deity  
other grades of intelligence1 which the 
law of ,continuity would1 however1 force
 us to infer3 and rejecting first causes
 for any and every especial effect in   
the universe1 except in the sense that  
the action of any intelligent being is a
 first cause1 we can still conceive that
 the development of the essentially     
human portions of man's structure may   
have been1 in this sense1 determined by 

the directing influence of some higher  
intelligent beings acting through       
natural and universal laws4#bg ,it is   
probable that the true law of this      
development lies too deep for our       
discovery4 ,wallace quotes1 in support  
of his theory1 some of ,professor       
,tyndall's much-disputed statements1--to
 the effect that the chasm between the  
phenomena of mind and those of brain is 
impassable4 ,to say that mind is a      
product or function of protoplasm1 or of
 its molecular changes1 is to use words 
to which we can attach no clear         
conception4 ,you cannot have in the     
whole what does not exist in any of the 
parts2#bh and those who argue thus      
should put forth a precise definition of
 matter with clearly enumerated         
properties1 and show that the necessary 
result of a certain complex arrangement 
of the elements or atoms of that matter 
will be the production of               
self-consciousness4 ,there is no escape 
from the dilemma1--either all matter is 

conscious1 or consciousness is#bi       
something distinct from matter1 and in  
the latter case its presence in material
 forms is a proof of the existence of   
conscious beings outside of1 and        
independent of1 what we term matter4    
,the merest rudiment of sensation or    
self-consciousness is infinitely removed
 from absolutely non-sentient or        
unconscious matter4 ,we can conceive of 
no physical addition to1 or modification
 of1 an unconscious mass which should   
create consciousness1 no step in the    
series of changes organized matter may  
undergo1 which should bring sensation   
where there was no sensation or power of
 sensation at the preceding step4 ,it is
 because the things are utterly         
incomparable and incommensurable that we
 can only conceive of sensation coming  
to matter from without1 while life may  
be conceived as merely a specific       
modification and cooerdination of the   
matter and the forces that compose the  
universe1 and with which we are         

separately acquainted4 ,we may admit    
with ,professor ,huxley1 that protoplasm
 is the 'matter of life' and the cause  
of organization2 but we cannot admit or 
conceive that protoplasm is the primary 
source of sensation and consciousness1  
or that it can ever of itself become    
conscious in the same way as we may     
perhaps conceive that it may become     
alive4  ,wallace then reaches1 without  
further preliminary discussion1 the     
conclusion that matter is essentially   
force 7arguing that we may draw this    
conclusion from the preceding           
considerations72 that matter1 as        
popularly understood1 does not exist1   
and is1 in fact1 philosophically        
inconceivable4 ,when we touch matter1 we
 only really experience sensations of   
resistance1 implying repulsive force2   
and no other sense can give us such     
apparently solid proofs of the reality  
of matter as touch does4 ,wallace       
considers it a great step in advance    
thus to get rid of the notion that      

matter is a thing in itself which can   
exist per se1 and must have been        
eternal1 since it is supposed to be     
indestructible and uncreated1--that     
force1 or the forces of nature1 are     
another thing given or added to matter1 
or else its necessary properties1--and  
that mind is yet another thing1 either a
 product of this matter and its supposed
 inherent forces1 or distinct from and  
co-existent with it2 and to be able to  
substitute for this theory the far      
simpler and more consistent belief1 that
 matter1 as an entity distinct from     
force1 does not exist2 and that ,,force 
is a product of ,,mind4  ,if we are     
satisfied that force or forces are all  
that exist in the material universe1 we 
are next led to inquire what is force4  
,we are acquainted with two kinds of    
force--our own will-force1 and the      
forces of nature4 ,freedom of the will  
cannot be disproved1 for it cannot be   
shown that there is not one-thousandth  
of a grain's difference between the     

force exerted by the body and the force 
derived from without4 ,if1 therefore1 we
 have traced one force1 however minute1 
to an origin in our will1 while we have 
no knowledge of any other primary cause 
of force1 it does not seem an improbable
 conclusion that all force may be       
will-force2 and thus1 that the whole    
universe is not merely dependent on1 but
 actually is the will of higher         
intelligences1 or of one ,supreme       
,intelligence4  ,but though ,wallace    
declares natural selection1 as the law  
of the strongest1 inadequate to account 
for man's mental and moral development1 
since the finer feelings and capacities 
could have been of no use to human      
beings in the early stages of barbarism1
 and further maintains that it is also  
difficult to understand how feelings    
developed by one set of actions could be
 transferred to acts of which the       
utility was partial1 imaginary1 or      
altogether absent1 he nevertheless has  
other passages like the following3 ,in  

proportion as physical characteristics  
become of less importance1 mental and   
moral qualities will have increasing    
influence on the well-being of the race4
 ,capacity for acting in concert for    
protection and for the acquisition of   
food and shelter2 sympathy1 which leads 
all in turn to assist each other2 the   
sense of right1 which checks            
depredations upon our fellows2 the      
smaller development of the combative and
 destructive propensities1              
self-restraint in present appetites2 and
 that intelligent foresight which       
prepares for the future1 are all        
qualities that1 from their earliest     
appearance1 must have been for the      
benefit of each community1 and would1   
therefore1 have become the subjects of  
natural selection4 ,for it is evident   
that such qualities would be for the    
well-being of man2 would guard him      
against external enemies1 against       
internal dissensions1 and against the   
effects of inclement seasons and        

impending famine1 more surely than could
 any merely physical modification4      
,tribes in which such mental and moral  
qualities were predominant would        
therefore have an advantage over other  
tribes in which they were less          
developed1 would live and maintain their
 numbers1 while the others would        
decrease and finally succumb4 ,from the 
time1 therefore1 when the social and    
sympathetic feelings came into active   
operation1 and the intellectual and     
moral faculties became fairly developed1
 man would cease to be influenced by    
natural selection in his physical form  
and structure4 ,as an animal1 he would  
remain almost stationary1 the changes of
 the surrounding universe ceasing to    
produce in him that powerful modifying  
effect which they exercise over other   
parts of the organic world4 ,but from   
the moment that the form of his body    
became stationary1 his mind would become
 subject to those very influences from  
which his body had escaped2 every slight

 variation in his mental and moral      
nature which should enable him better to
 guard against adverse circumstances1   
and combine for mutual comfort and      
protection would be preserved and       
accumulated2 the better and higher      
specimens of our race would therefore   
increase and spread1 the lower and more 
brutal would give way and successively  
die out1 and that rapid advancement of  
mental organization would occur which   
has raised the very lowest races of man 
so far above the brutes 7although       
differing so little from some of them in
 physical structure7 and1 in conjunction
 with scarcely perceptible modifications
 of form1 has developed the wonderful   
intellect of the ,european races4 ,when 
the power that had hitherto modified the
 body had its action transferred to the 
mind1 then races would advance and      
become improved1 merely by the harsh    
discipline of a sterile soil and        
inclement seasons2 under their influence
 a hardier1 a more provident1 and a more

 social race would be developed4 ,and   
especially3 ,if my conclusions are just1
 it must inevitably follow that the     
higher--the more intellectual and       
moral--must displace the lower and more 
degraded races2 and the power of natural
 selection1 still acting on his mental  
organization1 must ever lead to a more  
perfect adaptation of man's higher      
faculties to the conditions of          
surrounding nature and to the exigencies
 of the social state4 ,while his        
external form will probably ever remain 
unchanged1 except in the development of 
that perfect beauty which results from a
 healthy and well-organized body1       
refined and ennobled by the highest     
intellectual faculties and sympathetic  
emotions1 his mental constitution may   
advance and improve1 till the world is  
again inhabited by a single nearly      
homogeneous race1 no individual of which
 will be inferior to the noblest        
specimens of existing humanity4  ,our   
progress towards such a result is very  

slow1 but it still seems to be a        
progress4  ,in ,darwinism 7#ahhi71      
,wallace advocates ,weismann's theory of
 heredity4 ,with regard to instinct1 he 
uses arguments similar to those of his  
earlier work4 ,he says of the hunting   
instincts of dogs3 ,at first sight it   
appears as if the acquired habits of our
 trained dogs--pointers1 retrievers1    
etc4--are certainly inherited2 but this 
need not be the case1 because there must
 be some structural or physical         
peculiarities1 such as modifications in 
the attachments of muscles1 increased   
delicacy of smell or sight1 or peculiar 
likes and dislikes1 which are inherited2
 and from these1 peculiar habits follow 
as a natural consequence1 or are easily 
acquired4 ,so that he thus defines      
instinct1 by implication1 as he does    
also in his former book1 as inherited   
habit which has no correlative in       
physical organization1 and is           
unconnected with feelings of liking or  
disliking4 ,he further says3 ,again1    

much of the perfection of instinct is   
due to the extreme severity of the      
selection1 any failure involving        
destruction2 and adds that1 even if we  
admit the inheritance of the effects of 
the direct action of the environment on 
the individual1 the effects are so small
 in comparison with the amount of       
spontaneous variation of every part of  
the organism1 that they must be quite   
overshadowed by the latter4#cj ,in his  
theory of a higher intelligence guiding 
human development1 ,wallace seems1 in   
this book1 to have abandoned all his    
former arguments except those from the  
mental and moral faculties1 and it is   
perhaps due to a perception of the      
inconsistencies of his former utterances
 on the subject of the moral sense that 
he barely touches upon it in this book4 
,on the other hand1 he has elaborated   
his arguments from the mathematical and 
artistic faculties1 and added an        
argument from wit and humor1 none of    
which are found1 he urges1 among        

savages1 except in their very rudiments1
 and none of which could have been      
developed by natural selection1 since   
none could have been a cause of man's   
conquest in his struggles with wild     
beasts or with other tribes or nations4 
,in answer to the objection that the law
 of ,continuity1 which he has quoted as 
favoring the belief in the existence of 
grades of supernatural beings between   
man and the ,deity1 tells against the   
introduction of new causes in man's     
development1 ,wallace maintains that    
there are certainly two other points in 
evolution where such new causes come    
into play1--namely1 at the beginning of 
life and at the beginning of            
consciousness4 ,increase of complexity  
in chemical compounds1 with consequent  
instability1 even if we admit that it   
may have produced protoplasm as a       
chemical compound1 could certainly not  
have produced living                    
protoplasm1--protoplasm which has the   
power of growth and reproduction1 and of

 that continuous process of development 
which has resulted in the marvellous    
variety and complex organization of the 
whole vegetable kingdom1 or1 that is1   
vitality4#ca ,all idea of mere          
complication of structure producing     
consciousness is out of the question4   
,because man's physical structure has   
been developed from an animal form by   
natural selection1 it does not follow   
that his mental nature1 even though     
developed pari passu with it1 has been  
developed by the same causes only4#cb   
,yet1 in assuming ,weismann's theory1   
,wallace asserts3 ,whatever other causes
 have been at work1 ,natural ,selection 
is supreme1 to an extent which even     
,darwin himself hesitated to claim for  
it4 ,while admitting1 as ,darwin always 
admitted1 the cooeperation of the       
fundamental laws of growth and          
variation1 of correlation and heredity1 
in determining the direction of lines of
 variation1 or in the initiation of     
peculiar organs1 we find that variation 

and natural selection are ever-present  
agencies which take possession1 as it   
were1 of every minute change originated 
by these fundamental causes1 check or   
favor their further development1 or     
modify them in countless ways according 
to the varying needs of the organism4#cc
  ,in the opening portions of this book 
,wallace introduces a teleological      
argument to the effect that the pain    
which we ordinarily conceive as         
connected with the struggle for         
existence among lower species is mostly 
a figment of our imagination4 ,periods  
of suffering are comparatively short1   
since death speedily and without        
anticipation puts an end to those       
animals in any way incapacitated4       
,livingstone describes how1 when seized 
by a lion1 a sort of stupor succeeded   
the first shock1 so that he felt neither
 fear nor pain2 it is probable that     
terror induces this same condition in   
animals seized by beasts of prey1 and   
that their end is therefore painless    

after the first shock4 ,cold is         
generally severest at night and tends to
 produce sleep and painless extinction4 
,hunger is scarcely felt during periods 
of excitement1 and when food is scarce1 
the excitement of seeking it is at its  
greatest4 ,nor is the gradual exhaustion
 and weakness of slow starvation        
necessarily painful4  ,,footnotes3  #bd 
,for criticism of these arguments1 see  
,romanes1 ,mental ,evolution in         
,animals1 p4 #bbe1 etc42 also ,animal   
,intelligence4 ,in his second edition of
 this book 7#ahia71 ,wallace notices a  
few of the instances cited by ,romanes  
in objection to his theory3 such as the 
recognition of the hen's call by a      
chicken hatched in an incubator1 the    
fear shown1 on the other hand1 at the   
note of a hawk1 and the fear exhibited  
by most young animals at the voice or   
presence of their natural enemies4 ,of  
these he says1 however3 ,but in all     
these cases we have comparatively simple
 motions or acts induced by feelings of 

liking or disliking1 and we can see that
 they may be due to definite nervous and
 muscular cooerdinations which are      
essential to the existence of the       
species4 ,that a chicken should feel    
pleasure at the sound of a hen's voice1 
and pain or fear at that of a hawk1 and 
should move towards the one and away    
from the other1 is a fact of the same   
nature as the liking of an infant for   
milk and its dislike of beer1 with the  
motion of the head towards the one and  
away from the other when offered to it4 
,of two authentic cases of the building 
of a nest by young birds1 without       
instruction1 he says that1 in one case  
7that of ring-doves71 the nest is a very
 simple one1 and that the birds also    
received some assistance2 and in the    
other case the nest was not built with  
the neatness ordinarily characteristic  
of the species4 7,see ,natural          
,selection and ,tropical ,nature1 pp4   
#ajh-aab47 ,the most of ,romanes'       
instances and arguments he does not     

notice or answer4  #be ,in his second   
edition1 ,wallace writes not only innate
 ideas1 but innate knowledge4  #bf ,in  
the second edition of this book1        
,wallace maintains the same position    
with regard to skull-measurement as a   
criterion of mental capacity4 ,nor does 
he notice distinctions in skull-form or 
the proportions of different parts of   
the brain to each other1 except in the  
one case of the ,eyzies4  #bg ,see      
,wallace on ,miracles and ,modern       
,spiritualism1 ,the                     
,psycho-physiological ,sciences and     
their ,assailants1 and ,the ,scientific 
,aspect of the ,supernatural4  #bh      
,wallace omits this particular clause in
 his second edition4  #bi ,the second   
edition reads is1 or pertains to4  #cj  
,pp4 #ddb1 #ddc4  #ca ,this is          
contradictory of the passages on the    
subject of life above noticed as        
occurring in the ,contributions to      
,natural ,selection1 and retained in the
 second edition of that book4  #cb ,p4  

#dfc4  #cc ,p4 #ddd4     ,,ernst        
,,haeckel   ,in his ,anthropogenie      
7#ahgd71 ,haeckel says3 ,the soul1 or   
'psyche' of man has evolved1 as function
 of the cerebro-spinal nerve-chord      
simultaneously with the latter1 and just
 as1 even yet1 brain and spinal column  
develop from the simple nerve-chord1 so 
the human mind1 or the soul-activity of 
the whole human race1 has evolved1      
gradually and step by step1 from the    
lower vertebrate soul4 ',spirit' and    
'soul' are only higher and combined or  
differentiated powers of the same       
function which we designate with the    
general expression 'force4'#cd ,in his  
essay on ,cell-souls and ,soul-cells    
7#ahgh71 ,haeckel attributes to all     
animals the possession of soul1 and adds
 that we cannot wholly deny a soul to   
the plants also4 ,the possession of soul
 he defines as the capacity of          
sensibility in the organism to          
excitations of various sorts1 and of    
reaction upon these excitations with    

certain movements4 ,this uniform        
character of protoplasm gifted with soul
 permits us the hypothesis that the     
ultimate factors of the soul-life are   
the plastidules1 the invisible1         
homogeneous1 elemental particles1 or    
molecules1 of protoplasm1 which1 in     
limitless multiplicity1 compose the     
unnumbered cells4 ,the soul connected   
with the higher developments of brain   
and spinal column is likewise a higher  
development1 and differs from the soul  
connected with the uncentralized        
organization of lower species4 ,in the  
latest edition of his ,natuerliche      
,schoepfungsgeschichte 7#ahhi71 he      
further asserts that all matter is      
possessed of soul1 and that the         
antithesis which we have assumed between
 living and dead nature does not exist4 
,when a stone1 thrown into the air1     
falls to the earth according to fixed   
laws1 or when a crystal is formed in a  
solution of salts1 or when sulphur and  
quicksilver combine to form cinnabar1   

these phenomena are not more and not    
less mechanical phenomena of life than  
the growth and bloom of the plants1 than
 the propagation and sense-activity of  
animals1 than the perception and        
thought-processes of human beings4#ce   
,and both in this work and in his       
,anthropogenie he quotes the words of   
,goethe1 that matter can never exist and
 act without soul1 the soul can never   
exist and act without matter4 ,this last
 statement is1 however1 rather a        
metaphysical one1 in distinction from   
,haeckel's other statements on this     
subject1 which are properly             
naturalistic4  ,in his lecture on       
,cell-souls and ,soul-cells1 ,haeckel   
says of instinct3 ,unbiassed            
observation1 applying its tests without 
prejudice1 shows conclusively that the  
so-called 'instinct' of the animals is  
nothing else than a sum of psychical    
functions originally acquired by        
adaptation1 fixed by habit1 and         
descending from generation to generation

 by inheritance4 ,originally carried out
 with consciousness and reflection1 many
 instinctive actions of the animals have
 become unconscious1 as have1 in like   
manner1 the ordinary acts of            
intelligence in man4 ,these too1 may1   
with the same justice1 be regarded as   
the expression of innate instinct1 as   
often is the impulse to                 
self-preservation1 maternal love1 and   
the social impulse4 ,instinct is not an 
exclusive attribute of the animal-brain1
 nor is reason an especial endowment of 
man2 there is1 on the contrary1 for the 
unbiassed observer1 a long1 long scale  
of gradual improvement and evolution in 
psychic life1 which may be traced step  
by step1 from the higher to lower human 
beings1 from the perfect to the         
imperfect animals1 until we reach those 
simple worms1 whose nerve-ganglia are   
the beginning of all the numberless     
brain-forms of the scale4  ,in his      
,anthropogenie1 ,haeckel denies ,free   
,will1 maintaining that all phenomena   

are the result of mechanical            
causes--causae efficientes1 not causae  
finales4 ,in an essay on the ,relation  
of the ,theory of ,evolution in its     
present form to ,science in ,general    
7#ahgg71 he says of ,ethics3 ,by far the
 most important and the most difficult  
demand which ,practical ,philosophy     
makes upon the theory of ,evolution     
seems to be that of a new theory of     
,morals4 ,certainly in the future1 as in
 the past1 the careful development of   
moral character and of religious        
conviction must be the chief problem of 
education4 ,but until now the greater   
number of people have clung to the      
conviction that this most important     
problem could be solved only in         
connection with certain ecclesiastical  
articles of faith4 ,and since these     
dogmas1 especially as connected with    
ancient myths of the ,creation1 are in  
direct opposition to the facts of       
evolution1 the latter have been believed
 to be1 in the highest degree1 inimical 

to religion and morality4  ,this fear we
 believe to be erroneous4 ,it has its   
origin in the continual confusion of the
 true1 reasonable1 nature-religion and  
the dogmatic1 mythological1             
church-religion4 ,the ,comparative      
,history of ,religions1 an important    
branch of ,anthropology1 teaches us the 
manifold nature of outward form in which
 different peoples and epochs have1 in  
accordance with their individual        
character1 enveloped religious thought4 
,it shows us that the dogmatic teachings
 of the church-religion itself are      
subject to a slow1 continuous evolution4
 ,new churches and sects arise1 old ones
 disappear2 at the best1 a particular   
tenet of faith lasts but a few thousand 
years1 an inconsiderably short space of 
time compared with the aeons of the     
geological periods4 ,finally1 the       
,history of ,civilization shows us to   
how small an extent true morality has   
been associated with any particular     
ecclesiastical form4 ,the greatest      

rudeness and barbarity of custom often  
goes hand in hand with the absolute     
dominion of an all-powerful church2 in  
confirmation of which assertion one need
 only remember the ,middle ,ages4 ,on   
the other hand1 we behold the highest   
standard of perfection attained by men  
who have severed connection with every  
creed4  ,independent of every confession
 of faith1 there lives in the breast of 
every human being the germ of a pure    
nature-religion2 this is indissolubly   
bound up with the noblest sides of human
 life4 ,its highest commandment is love1
 the restraint of our natural egoism for
 the benefit of our fellow-men1 and for 
the good of human society whose members 
we are4 ,this natural law of morality is
 much older than all church-religion4   
,it has developed out of the social     
instincts of the animals4 ,we meet with 
its rudiments among all animals1        
especially among all mammals4 ,following
 the laws of association and of division
 of labor1 many individuals of such     

species unite to form the higher        
community of the swarm1 herd1 or tribe4 
,the existence of the latter is         
necessarily dependent upon the mutual   
relations of the members of the         
community and the sacrifices which these
 make to the whole society at the cost  
of their own egoism4 ,the consciousness 
of this necessity of self-sacrifice1 the
 sense of duty1 is nothing else than a  
social instinct4 ,but this instinct is  
always a psychical habit1 which was     
originally acquired1 but which1 becoming
 in the course of time hereditary1      
appears at last as innate4  ,in order to
 convince ourselves of the wonderful    
power of the sense of duty among        
animals1 we need only to destroy an     
ant-hill4 ,immediately we see1 in the   
midst of the destruction1 thousands of  
zealous citizens employed1 not in the   
rescue of their own precious lives1 but 
in the protection of the beloved        
community to which they belong4 ,brave  
soldiers of the ant-state prepare to    

offer strong resistance to our intruding
 finger2 instructors of youth rescue the
 so-called ant-eggs1 the precious       
larvae1 on which the future of the state
 depends2 busy workers immediately begin
 with undiminished courage to clear away
 the ruins and to prepare new dwellings4
 ,but the admirable state of            
civilization among these ants1 among    
bees and other social animals1 has been 
developed1 just as has been our own1    
from the rudest beginnings4  ,even those
 finest and most beautiful forms of     
human emotion which we especially       
celebrate in poetry are to be found     
prefigured among the animals4 ,have not 
the tender mother-love of the lioness1  
the touching affection between male and 
female parrots1 the self-sacrificing    
fidelity of the dog1 been long          
proverbial8 ,the noblest emotions of    
sympathy and love1 which direct action1 
are here1 as with human beings1 nothing 
else than ennobled instinct4 ,beginning 
with this conception1 the ,ethics of    

,evolution has to seek for no new       
principle1 but1 on the contrary1 to     
trace back the old rules of duty to     
their scientific basis4 ,long before the
 rise of all church-religion1 these     
natural commandments regulated the      
lawful relations of human beings1 as of 
gregarious animals4 ,this significant   
fact the church-religions should        
utilize1 instead of disputing4 ,for the 
future does not belong to that ,theology
 which declares war against the         
triumphant ,theory of ,evolution1 but to
 that which makes it its own1           
acknowledges it1 and turns it to        
advantage4  ,far1 therefore1 from       
fearing1 from the influence of the      
,theory of ,evolution1 a subversion of  
all accepted moral law and a destructive
 emancipation of ,egoism1 we1 on the    
contrary1 look forward to a system of   
,ethics erected upon the indestructible 
foundation of unchanging natural law1   
since at the same time with the clear   
recognition of our true place in nature1

 the study of ,anthropogeny opens to us 
the comprehension of the necessary      
character of our old rules of duty4     
,like theoretical science1 ,practical   
,philosophy and ,pedagogy will no longer
 derive their most important principles 
from so-called revelations1 but from the
 scientific truths of ,evolution4 ,this 
victory of ,monism over ,dualism opens  
to us a most hopeful prospect of an     
unending continuation of our moral1 as  
of our intellectual evolution4 ,in this 
sense1 we welcome the ,theory of        
,evolution in its present form newly    
stated by ,darwin1 as a challenge--the  
most important challenge of pure and    
applied science4  ,as touching on the   
idea of a nature-religion as conceived  
by ,haeckel1 may be noticed1 however1 a 
passage which occurs at the end of      
chapter ,,xii4 of the ,natuerliche      
,schoepfungsgeschichte1 as well as the  
passage before referred to in which it  
is asserted that we know only causae    
efficientes1 never causae finales4 ,the 

passage is as follows3 ,the general     
significance of the degenerated or      
rudimentary organs in the most important
 questions of natural philosophy cannot 
be over-estimated4 ,on these may be     
founded a theory of ,disteleology as    
opposed to the ancient1 usual           
,teleology4  ,with especial theories of 
,heredity advocated by ,haeckel we are  
not concerned1 except in one respect4   
,even in the first edition of his       
,natuerliche ,schoepfungsgeschichte1    
,haeckel makes a distinction between    
conservative and progressive            
inheritance1 and in the edition of #ahhi
 he still maintains this division       
against ,weismann and others1 claiming  
the heredity of acquired habit1 under   
certain circumstances1 and showing      
conclusively that even wounds and       
blemishes received during the life of an
 individual may be1 in some instances1  
inherited by descendants4#cf ,the laws  
of progressive heredity he gives as     
four3 7#a7 the law of the inheritance of

 adaptation2 7#b7 the law of the surer  
inheritance of qualities fixed by       
continual operation of its causes on    
individual generations2 7#c7 the law of 
homochronous inheritance or inheritance 
at a corresponding age2 7#d7 the law of 
homotypous inheritance1 which may be    
otherwise called the law of inheritance 
in corresponding parts of the body4#cg  
,having thus glanced at the special     
theories by which the great original    
authorities paved the way for a system  
of ,evolutional ,ethics1 we may direct  
our attention to the more purely        
philosophical writers who have turned   
these theories to advantage and         
elaborated them4 ,the first on the list 
is  ,,footnotes3  #cd ,p4 #gjc et seq4  
#ce ,erster ,vortrag4  #cf ,p4 #aid et  
seq4  #cg ,for illustrations and proofs 
of these laws1 see the ,natuerliche     
,schoepfungsgeschichte1 pp4 #aic-aig4   
,,herbert ,,spencer   ,in treating of   
,mr4 ,spencer's work1 it is necessary to
 begin with a book which made its       

appearance before the publication of    
,the ,origin of ,species1 namely1       
,social ,statics 7#ahea71 ,mr4          
,spencer's first noteworthy publication4
 ,in this are contained some remarkable 
statements1 which are of especial worth 
as showing in what measure the thought  
of the time was already tending in the  
direction of the revelations of its     
greatest prophet1 and science1 in       
,england as in ,germany1 was slowly     
coming to recognize the unity of nature 
in life and human progress4 ,an analysis
 of the first and theoretical part of   
this work will be1 therefore1 of use1   
and with this we will begin4  ,mr4      
,spencer opens his book with some       
criticisms of ,utilitarianism or the    
,expediency ,philosophy4 ,every rule1 in
 order to be of value1 must have a      
definite meaning4 ,the rule of the      
greatest happiness to the greatest      
number supposes mankind to be unanimous 
in the definition of the greatest       
happiness2 the standard of happiness is1

 however1 infinitely variable1 in       
nations and in individuals4 ,for        
happiness signifies a gratified state of
 all the faculties2 and no two          
individuals are alike in faculties4 ,in 
endeavoring to fix a standard1 we are   
met by such insolvable problems as3     
,what is the ratio between mental and   
bodily enjoyments constituting the      
greatest happiness8 ,which is most truly
 an element in the desired felicity1    
content or aspiration8 ,the conclusion  
we inevitably reach is that a true      
conception of what human life should be 
is possible only to the ideal man1--in  
whom the component feelings exist in    
their normal proportions4 ,the world as 
yet contains no such men1 and we are    
left with an insolvable riddle on our   
hands4  ,there is the same uncertainty  
as to the mode of obtaining the greatest
 happiness4  ,the ,expediency           
,philosophy believes that man's         
intellect is competent to observe       
accurately and to grasp at once the     

multiplied phenomena of life and derive 
therefrom the knowledge which shall     
enable him to say whether such or such  
measures will conduce to the greatest   
happiness of the greatest number4  ,if  
without knowledge of terrestrial        
phenomena and their laws1 ,newton had   
attempted a theory of planetary and     
stellar equilibrium1 he might have      
cogitated to all eternity without       
result4 ,such an attempt1 however1 would
 have been far less absurd than the     
attempt to find out the principles of   
public polity by a direct examination of
 that wonderfully intricate combination1
 ,society4 ,in order to understand      
,society it is necessary to comprehend  
,man4  ,another mistake of the          
,expediency ,philosophy is that it      
assumes the eternity of government1     
which marks a certain stage of          
civilization1 but which will by no means
 necessarily last forever4 ,time was    
when the history of a people was the    
history of its government4 ,feudalism1  

serfdom1 slavery1--all were forms of    
government4 ,progress means less        
government2 constitutional forms1       
political freedom1 democracy1 all mean  
this4 ,government is a sign of          
imperfection1 an evil necessary against 
knavery2 it must exist only so long as  
this exists4 ,the ,expediency           
,philosophy is1 however1 founded on     
government2 takes it into partnership3  
but a system of moral philosophy        
professes to be a code of correct rules 
for the best1 as well as the worst1     
members of society1 and applicable to   
humanity in its highest conceivable     
perfection4 ,of the ,expediency         
,philosophy it must1 therefore1 be said 
that it can claim no scientific         
character1 since3  ,its fundamental     
proposition is not an axiom but a       
problem to be solved2  ,it is expressed 
in terms possessing no fixed            
acceptation2  ,it would require         
omniscience to carry it into practice2  
,and1 moreover1 it takes imperfection   

for its basis4  ,the existence of       
society argues a certain fitness and    
desire of mankind for it2 without this1 
it would not exist1 as eating and       
drinking1 and the nourishment and       
protection of offspring would not take  
place if there were no corresponding    
desires1 but merely an abstract opinion 
in favor of the worth of the two4 ,in   
the method of nature1 there is always   
some prompter1 called a desire1         
answering to each of the actions which  
it is requisite for us to perform4 ,it  
is probable1 therefore1 that we shall   
find an instrumentality of this sort    
prompting us to morality4 ,in objection 
to the theory of a moral sense1 the want
 of uniformity in judgment as to what is
 right is often advanced4 ,but none deny
 the importance of appetite1 though all 
know that it is by no means an          
infallible guide in the choice of kind  
or quantity of food4 ,the same may be   
said of parental affection4 ,the        
foundation of the claim of any man that 

he has as great a right to happiness as 
any other can be found in the last      
analysis in feeling only2 he feels that 
it is so4  ,none but those committed to 
a preconceived theory can fail to       
recognize the workings of such a faculty
 as the moral sense4 ,it is clear that  
the perceptions of propriety or         
impropriety of conduct do not originate 
with the intellect but with the         
emotional faculties4 ,the intellect1    
uninfluenced by desire1 would show both 
miser and spendthrift that their habits 
were unwise2 whereas the intellect1     
influenced by desire1 makes each think  
the other a fool1 but does not enable   
him to see his own foolishness4  ,this  
is a universal law3 ,every feeling is   
accompanied by a sense of the rightness 
of those actions which give it          
gratification4 ,from an impulse to      
behave in a way we call equitable arises
 a perception that it is proper1 and a  
conviction that it is good4 ,there is1  
however1 a perpetual conflict amongst   

feelings1 from which results an         
incongruity of beliefs4  ,it has been   
said that codes derived from the moral  
sense have no stability since this sense
 ratifies one principle at one time and 
place1 another at another4 ,the same    
objection applies1 however1 to every    
other system of morals1 and happily     
there is an answer to the objection4    
,the error criticised is one of         
application1 not of doctrine4 ,the      
decisions of the ,geometric ,sense are  
conflicting2 yet there are certain      
axioms upon which all agree2 and in the 
same manner there are moral axioms to be
 found1 upon which all must agree4      
,disagreement is to be looked for among 
imperfect characters4 ,but nature's laws
 know no exception3 ,obey or suffer are 
the alternatives4 ,a progress from      
entire unconsciousness of these laws to 
the conviction that law is universal and
 inevitable1 constancy an essential     
attribute of divine rule1 is the        
substance of the progress of man4 ,the  

end of these unbending utterances is    
universal good2 we have no alternative  
but to assume the law of constancy to be
 the best possible one4 ,as with the    
physical1 so with the ethical2 all      
religions teach the inevitableness of   
punishment and reward1 with which deeds 
are necessarily and indissolubly        
connected4 ,it is of infinite importance
 to recognize and follow the laws of    
society4 ,to the objection that one     
cannot always be guided by abstract     
principles1 that there are exceptions   
where prudence must act1 it may be      
replied that there are no exceptions to 
the laws of nature2 that even if1 in a  
particular instance1 partial good may   
result1 a far greater general evil is   
entailed by the opening of the way to   
future disobediences1 and that we       
cannot1 moreover1 be sure that an       
exceptional disobedience will bring the 
anticipated benefits4 ,moral as well as 
physical evil is the result of a want of
 congruity between the faculties and    

their sphere of action4 ,with regard to 
the results of varying conditions upon  
man1 we have three alternative theories 
from which to choose3 either man remains
 entirely unaltered by his surroundings1
 or he grows more unfitted for them1 or 
else he grows more fitted for them4 ,the
 first two suppositions being absurd1 we
 are obliged to admit the remaining one4
 ,and since all evil results from       
non-adaptation1 and non-adaptation is   
being continually diminished1 it follows
 that evil must be continually          
diminishing4 ,the evil in society shows 
that man is not yet completely adapted  
to a state which requires that each     
individual shall have such desires only 
as may be fully satisfied without       
trenching upon the ability of other     
individuals to obtain a like            
satisfaction4 ,the primitive condition  
of man required that he should sacrifice
 the welfare of other beings to his own2
 the old attribute still clings to him  
in some measure2 the belief in human    

perfectibility amounts to the belief    
that man will eventually become         
completely suited to his mode of life4  
,progress is not an accident but a      
necessity2 and if1 instead of proposing 
it as a rule of human conduct1 ,bentham 
had simply assumed the greatest         
happiness to be the creative purpose1   
his position would have been tenable    
enough4 ,it is one thing1 however1 to   
hold that greatest happiness is the     
creative purpose1 and quite a different 
thing to hold that greatest happiness   
should be the immediate aim of mankind4 
,truth has two sides1 a divine and a    
human2 or1 it is for man to ascertain   
the conditions which lead to the        
greatest happiness1 and to live in      
conformity with these4  ,the men who are
 to realize this greatest sum of        
happiness must be such as can obtain    
complete happiness without diminishing  
the activity and happiness of others4   
,the first great condition of the       
attainment of the end is1 therefore1    

justice1 and1 as a supplement to this1  
negative and positive                   
beneficence1--abstinence from           
diminishing the spheres of activity of  
others1 and further1 a positive increase
 of their pleasure4 ,for man is         
sympathetic1 and the sympathetic        
pleasures increase the sum total of     
happiness4  ,the exercise#ch of all the 
faculties in which happiness consists is
 not only man's right but also his duty4
 ,for the fact of pain1 of punishment1  
proves that ,god intends and wills such 
exercise4 ,but the exercise of all the  
faculties is freedom2 all men have1     
therefore1 a right to freedom of action4
 ,this principle1 however1 implies a    
limitation of man by men1 whereby we    
arrive at the general proposition that  
every man may claim the fullest liberty 
to exercise his feelings compatible with
 the possession of a like liberty in    
every other man4 ,in the progress of    
mankind1 or adaptation1 the conduct     
which hurts necessary feelings in others

 must inevitably undergo restraint and  
consequent limitation2 conduct which    
hurts only their incidental feelings1 as
 those of caste or prejudice1 will not  
inevitably be restrained1 but if it     
springs from necessary feelings1 will1  
on the contrary1 be continued at the    
expense of these incidental feelings and
 to their final suppression4 ,morality  
is not1 therefore1 to be interpreted as 
a refraining from the infliction of any 
pain whatever1 for some sentiment must  
be wounded2 and by much wounding it is  
gradually weakened4 ,when men mutually  
behave in a way that offends some       
essential element in the nature of each1
 and all in turn have to bear the       
consequent suffering1 there will arise a
 tendency to curb the desire that makes 
them so behave4  ,questions of          
individual morality seem to present a   
difficulty to this theory of freedom4   
,thus1 for instance1 on the principle   
above adopted1 the liberty of           
drunkenness cannot be condemned as long 

as the drunkard respects a like liberty 
in others2 and here we fall into the    
inconsistency of affirming that a man is
 at liberty to do something essentially 
destructive of happiness4 ,however1 if  
we admit1 as we must1 that liberty is   
the primary law1 no desire to get a     
secondary law fulfilled can warrant us  
in breaking this primary one2 we must   
deal with secondary laws as best we can4
  ,the first principle above stated may 
also be secondarily derived4 ,the       
regulation of conduct is not left to the
 accident of a philosophical inquiry2   
the agent of morality is the ,moral     
,sense4  ,in all ages1 but more         
especially in recent ones1 have there   
been affirmations of the equality of all
 men and their equal right to happiness4
 ,when we find that a belief like this  
is not only permanent but daily gaining 
ground1 we have good reason to conclude 
that it corresponds to some essential   
element of our moral constitution2 more 
especially since we find that its       

existence is in harmony with that chief 
prerequisite to greatest happiness      
lately dwelt upon2 and that its growth  
is in harmony with the law of           
adaptation1 by which the greatest       
happiness is being wrought out4  ,to    
assert1 however1 that the sense of      
justice is but the gradually acquired   
conviction that benefits spring from    
some kinds of action1 and evils from    
other kinds1 the sympathies and         
antipathies contracted manifesting      
themselves as a love of justice and a   
hatred of injustice1 is as absurd as to 
conclude that hunger springs from a     
conviction of the benefit of eating4    
,the ,moral ,sense must be regarded as a
 special faculty1 since1 otherwise1     
there would be nothing during the       
dormancy of the other faculties1 which  
must sometimes occur1 to prevent an     
infringement on the freedom requisite   
for their future action4  ,as ,adam     
,smith has shown in his ,theory of      
,moral ,sentiments1 the proper          

regulation of our conduct to others is  
secured by means of a faculty whose     
function it is to excite in each being  
the emotions displayed by the beings    
about him4 ,the sentiment of justice is 
nothing but a sympathetic affection of  
the instinct of personal rights1 a sort 
of reflex function of it4 ,other things 
being equal1 those persons possessing   
the strongest sense of personal rights  
have1 also1 the strongest sense of the  
rights of others4 ,there is no necessary
 connection between the two2 but in the 
average of cases they bear a constant   
ratio4  ,it may be objected that if the 
truth that every man has a freedom to do
 all that he wills1 provided he infringe
 not upon the equal freedom of others1  
be an axiom1 it should be recognized by 
all1 as is not the case4 ,this          
difficulty seems in part due to the     
impossibility of making the perfect law 
recognize an imperfect state4 ,it may   
further be answered that the ,bushman   
knows nothing of the science of         

mathematics1 yet that arithmetic is a   
fact2 the difference in men's moral     
perceptions is no difficulty in our way1
 but rather illustrates the truth of our
 theory1 since man is not yet adapted to
 the social state4  ,in further         
confirmation of the doctrine of the free
 exercise of function1 it may be added  
that1 since non-fulfilment of desire    
produces misery1 if ,god is to be       
regarded as willing such non-fulfilment1
 he must be regarded as willing men's   
misery2 which is absurd4 ,if men are not
 naturally free1 then a doctrine of the 
divine right of kings is easily reached1
 and whoever is king must be regarded as
 such by divine right1 no matter how he 
reached the throne4  ,spencer then      
proceeds to apply his first principle or
 axiom of freedom to prove the right to 
life and liberty1 to the use of the     
earth1 to property and free speech2 and 
considers further the rights of women   
and of children1 and the political      
rights of individuals2 the constitution 

and duty of the state2 commerce1        
education1 and the poor-laws2 government
 colonization1 sanitary supervision1    
postal arrangements1 etc4 ,a remarkable 
feature of this part of ,social ,statics
 is that ,spencer1 while applying his   
principle with quite an opposite result 
to all other property1 advocates the    
nationalization of the land1 on the     
ground that the freedom of the          
individual is right only in so far as it
 does not hinder a like freedom in      
others2 and that the monopolization of  
the privileges of land-ownership by     
individuals does prevent the enjoyment  
of the same privilege by others4        
,,general ,,considerations  ,the course 
of civilization could not possibly have 
been other than it has been4  ,progress 
shows us that perfect individuation     
joined to the greatest mutual dependence
 will be reached in the future of the   
race4 ,there will be an ultimate        
identity of personal and social         
interests1 and a disappearance of evil4 

,spencer gives1 however1 a number of    
arguments to prove that the interest of 
society is1 at present also1 the        
interest of the individual4         99  
99       99       99       99  ,the     
,theory of ,population 7published in    
#aheb71 which is founded on the theory  
of an antagonism between the            
intellectual and the reproductive       
powers1 and on the ancient theory of a  
direct relation between skull-capacity  
or brain-size and intellectual power1   
contains this passage3 ,from the        
beginning1 pressure of population has   
been the proximate cause of progress4   
,it produced the original diffusion of  
the race4 ,it compelled men to abandon  
predatory habits and take to            
agriculture4 ,it led to the clearing of 
the earth's surface4 ,it forced men into
 the social state2 made social          
organization inevitable2 and has        
developed the social sentiments4 ,it has
 stimulated to progressive improvements 
in production1 and to increased skill   

and intelligence4 ,it is daily pressing 
us into closer contact and more mutually
 dependent relationships4 ,and after    
having caused1 as it ultimately must1   
the due peopling of the globe1 and the  
bringing of all its habitable parts into
 the highest state of culture1--after   
having brought all processes for the    
satisfaction of human wants to the      
greatest perfection1--after having1 at  
the same time1 developed the intellect  
into complete competency for its work1  
and the feelings into complete fitness  
for social life1--after having done all 
this1 we see the pressure of population1
 as it gradually finishes its work1 must
 gradually bring itself to an end4  ,in 
a letter to ,mr4 ,mill1 published in    
,bain's ,mental and ,moral ,science 7p4 
#gba1 #c;d edition71 ,spencer repudiates
 the title of ,anti-,utilitarian1 which 
,mr4 ,mill1 in view of the criticisms of
 ,utilitarianism contained in ,social   
,statics1 had applied to him4 ,he       
defines his position in respect to      

,utilitarianism as follows3 ,i have     
never regarded myself as an             
,anti-,utilitarian4 ,my dissent from the
 doctrine of ,utility as commonly       
understood1 concerns1 not the object to 
be reached by men1 but the method of    
reaching it4 ,while ,i admit that       
happiness is the ultimate end to be     
contemplated1 ,i do not admit that it   
should be the proximate end4 ,the       
,expediency ,philosophy1 having         
concluded that happiness is a thing to  
be achieved1 assumes that ,morality has 
no other business than empirically to   
generalize the results of conduct1 and  
to supply for the guidance of conduct   
nothing more than its empirical         
generalizations4  ,but the view for     
which ,i contend is1 that ,morality     
properly so-called--the science of right
 conduct--has for its object to         
determine how and why certain modes of  
conduct are detrimental1 and certain    
other modes beneficial4 ,these good and 
bad results cannot be accidental1 but   

must be necessary consequences of the   
constitution of things1 and ,i conceive 
it to be the business of ,moral ,science
 to deduce from the laws of life and the
 conditions of existence what kinds of  
action necessarily tend to produce      
happiness and what kinds to produce     
unhappiness4 ,having done this1 its     
deductions are to be recognized as laws 
of conduct2 and are to be conformed to  
irrespective of a direct estimation of  
happiness or misery4  ,perhaps an       
analogy will most clearly show my       
meaning4 ,during its early stages1      
planetary astronomy consisted of nothing
 more than accumulated observations     
respecting the positions and motions of 
the sun and planets2 from which         
accumulated observations it came by and 
by to be empirically predicted1 with an 
approach to truth1 that certain of the  
heavenly bodies would have certain      
positions at certain times4 ,but the    
modern science of planetary astronomy   
consists of deductions from the law of  

gravitation--deductions showing why the 
celestial bodies necessarily occupy     
certain places at certain times4 ,now   
the kind of relation which thus exists  
between ancient and modern astronomy is 
analogous to the kind of relation which1
 ,i conceive1 exists between the        
,expediency ,morality and ,moral        
,science properly so-called4 ,and the   
objection which ,i have to the current  
,utilitarianism is1 that it recognizes  
no more developed form of morality--does
 not see that it has reached but the    
initial stage of ,moral ,science4  ,to  
make my position fully understood1 it   
seems needful to add that1 corresponding
 to the fundamental propositions of a   
developed ,moral ,science1 there have   
been1 and still are1 developing in the  
race1 certain fundamental moral         
intuitions2 and that1 though these moral
 intuitions are the results of          
accumulated experiences of ,utility1    
gradually organized and inherited1 they 
have come to be quite independent of    

conscious experience4 ,just in the same 
way that ,i believe the intuition of    
space possessed by any living           
individual1 to have arisen from the     
organized and consolidated experiences  
of all antecedent individuals1 who      
bequeathed to him their slowly developed
 nervous organizations--just as ,i      
believe that this intuition1 requiring  
only to be made definite and complete by
 personal experiences1 has practically  
become a form of thought1 apparently    
quite independent of experience2 so do  
,i believe that the experiences of      
utility organized and consolidated      
through all past generations of the     
human race1 have been producing nervous 
modifications1 which1 by continued      
transmission and accumulation1 have     
become in us certain faculties of moral 
intuition1 certain emotions responding  
to right and wrong conduct1 which have  
no apparent basis in the individual     
experiences of utility4 ,i also hold    
that1 just as the space-intuition       

responds to the exact demonstrations of 
geometry1 and has its rough conclusions 
interpreted and verified by them1 so    
will moral intuitions respond to the    
demonstrations of ,moral ,science2 and  
will have their rough conclusions       
interpreted and verified by them4  ,in  
,recent ,discussions in ,science1       
,philosophy1 and ,morals#ci 7#ahga71    
,spencer1 after quoting portions of the 
above letter as defining his position1  
continues with a consideration of the   
continual readjustment of the compromise
 between the ideal and the practicable1 
the former of which prescribes a system 
far too good for men as they are1 the   
latter of which does not of itself tend 
to establish a system better than the   
existing one2 and he reiterates his law 
of the perfect man as follows3--        
,granted that we are chiefly interested 
in ascertaining what is relatively      
right1 it still follows that we must    
first consider what is absolutely right2
 since the one conception presupposes   

the other4 ,spencer further expressly   
repudiates empirical ,utilitarianism1   
and denies the assertion of ,mr4 ,hutton
 that he by implication recognizes no   
parentage for morals beyond that of the 
accumulation and organization of the    
facts of experience4 ,on this head he   
says3--  ,in the genesis of an idea1 the
 successive experiences1 be they of     
sounds1 colors1 touches1 tastes1 or be  
they of the special objects that combine
 many of these into groups1 have so much
 in common that each1 when it occurs1   
can be definitely thought of as like    
those which preceded it4 ,but in the    
genesis of an emotion1 the successive   
experiences so far differ that each of  
them1 when it occurs1 suggests past     
experiences which are not specifically  
similar1 but have only a general        
similarity2 and1 at the same time1 it   
suggests benefits or evils in past      
experience which likewise are various in
 their special natures1 though they have
 a certain community of general nature4 

,hence it results that the consciousness
 aroused is a multitudinous confused    
consciousness1 in which1 along with a   
certain kind of combination among       
impressions received from without1 there
 is a vague cloud of ideal combinations 
akin to them1 and a vague mass of ideal 
feelings of pleasure or pain that were  
associated with them4 ,we have abundant 
proof that feelings grow up without     
reference to recognized causes and      
consequences1 and without the possessor 
of them being able to say why they have 
grown up1 though analysis1 nevertheless1
 shows that they have been formed out of
 connected experiences4 ,the experiences
 of utility ,i refer to are those which 
become registered1 not as distinctly    
recognized connections between certain  
kinds of acts and certain kinds of      
remote results1 but those which become  
registered in the shape of associations 
between groups of feelings that have    
often recurred together1 though the     
relation between them has not been      

consciously generalized--associations   
which though little perceived1          
nevertheless serve as incentives or     
deterrents4 ,much deeper down than the  
history of the human race must we go to 
find the beginnings of these            
connections4 ,the appearances and sounds
 which excite in the infant a vague     
dread indicate danger2 and do so because
 they are the physiological             
accompaniments of destructive action4   
,what we call the natural language of   
anger is due to a partial contraction of
 those muscles which actual combat would
 call into play2 and all marks of       
irritation1 down to that passing shade  
over the brow which accompanies slight  
annoyance1 are incipient stages of these
 same contractions4 ,conversely with the
 natural language of pleasure1 and of   
that state of mind which we call        
amicable feeling2 this1 too1 has a      
physical interpretation4  ,of the       
altruistic sentiments1 ,spencer says3   
,the development of these has gone on   

only as fast as society has advanced to 
a state in which the activities are     
mainly peaceful4 ,the root of all the   
altruistic sentiments is sympathy1 and  
sympathy could become dominant only when
 the mode of life1 instead of being one 
that habitually inflicted direct pain1  
became one which conferred direct and   
indirect benefits2 the pains inflicted  
being mainly incidental and indirect4   
,sympathy is the concomitant of         
gregariousness2 the two having all along
 increased by reciprocal aid4  ,if we   
suppose all thought of rewards or       
punishments1 immediate or remote1 to be 
left out of consideration1 it is clear  
that any one who hesitates to inflict a 
pain because of the vivid representation
 of that pain which rises in his        
consciousness1 is restrained not by any 
sense of obligation or by any formulated
 doctrine of utility1 but by the painful
 associations established in him4 ,and  
it is clear that if1 after repeated     
experiences of the moral discomfort he  

has felt from witnessing the unhappiness
 indirectly caused by some of his acts1 
he is led to check himself when again   
tempted to those acts1 the restraint is 
of like nature4 ,conversely with the    
pleasure-giving acts1 repetitions of    
kind deeds and experiences of the       
sympathetic gratifications that follow  
tend continually to make stronger the   
association between deeds and feelings  
of happiness4  ,spencer continues3      
,eventually these experiences may be    
consciously generalized1 and there may  
result a deliberate pursuit of the      
sympathetic gratifications4 ,there may  
also come to be distinctly recognized   
the truths that the remoter results are 
respectively detrimental and            
beneficial--that due regard for others  
is conducive to ultimate personal       
welfare1 and disregard of others to     
ultimate personal disaster2 and then    
there may become current such summations
 of experience as 'honesty is the best  
policy4' ,but so far from regarding     

these intellectual recognitions of      
utility as preceding and causing the    
moral sentiment1 ,i regard the moral    
sentiment as preceding such recognitions
 of utility and making them possible4   
,the pleasures and pains directly       
resulting1 in experience1 from          
sympathetic and unsympathetic actions1  
had first to be slowly associated with  
such actions1 and the resulting         
incentives and deterrents frequently    
obeyed1 before there could arise the    
perceptions that sympathetic and        
unsympathetic actions are remotely      
beneficial or detrimental to the actor2 
and they had to be obeyed still longer  
and more generally before there could   
arise the perceptions that they are     
socially beneficial and detrimental4    
,when1 however1 the remote effects1     
personal and social1 have gained general
 recognition1 are expressed in current  
maxims1 and lead to injunctions having  
the religious sanction1 the sentiments  
that prompt sympathetic actions and     

check unsympathetic ones1 are immensely 
strengthened by their alliances4        
,approbation and reprobation1 divine and
 human1 come to be associated in thought
 with the sympathetic and unsympathetic 
actions respectively4 ,the commands of a
 creed1 the legal penalties1 and the    
code of social conduct1 mutually enforce
 them2 and every child1 as it grows up1 
daily has impressed on it1 by the words 
and faces and voices of those around1   
the authority of these highest          
principles4  ,the altruistic sentiments 
develop1 and altruistic action becomes  
habitual1 until at length these         
altruistic sentiments begin to call in  
question the authority of those         
ego-altruistic sentiments which once    
ruled unchallenged4  ,and ,spencer sums 
up his objections to the interpretation 
of his theory of the development of the 
moral sentiment as follows3 ,what ,i    
have said will make it clear that two   
fundamental errors have been made in the
 interpretation put upon it4 ,both      

,utility and ,experience have been      
construed in senses much too narrow4    
,utility1 convenient a word as it is    
from its comprehensiveness1 has very    
inconvenient and misleading             
implications4 ,it vividly suggests uses 
and means and proximate ends1 but very  
faintly suggests the pleasures1 positive
 or negative1 which are the ultimate    
ends1 and which1 in the ethical meaning 
of the word1 are alone considered2 and1 
further1 it implies conscious           
recognition of means and ends--implies  
the deliberate taking of some course to 
gain a perceived benefit4 ,experience1  
too1 in its ordinary acceptation1       
connotes definite perceptions of causes 
and consequences1 as standing in        
observed relations1 and is not taken to 
include the connections found in        
consciousness between states that occur 
together1 when the relation between     
them1 causal or other1 is not perceived4
 ,it is in their widest senses1 however1
 that ,i habitually use these words1 as 

will be manifest to every one who reads 
the ',principles of ,psychology4'  ,in  
his essay on ,prison ,ethics 7#ahfj71   
,spencer says3 ,the antagonistic schools
 of morals1 like many other antagonistic
 schools1 are both right and both wrong4
 ,the a priori school has its truth2 the
 a posteriori school has its truth2 and 
for the proper guidance of conduct there
 should be due recognition of both4 ,on 
the one hand1 it is asserted that there 
is an absolute standard of rectitude2   
and respecting certain classes of       
actions1 it is rightly asserted4 ,from  
the fundamental laws of life and the    
conditions of social existence are      
deducible certain imperative limitations
 to individual action--limitations which
 are essential to a perfect life1       
individual and social2 or1 in other     
words1 essential to the greatest        
possible happiness4 ,and these          
limitations1 following inevitably as    
they do from undeniable first           
principles1 deep as the nature of life  

itself1 constitute what we may          
distinguish as absolute morality4  ,on  
the other hand1 it is contended1 and in 
a sense rightly contended1 that with men
 as they are1 and society as it is1 the 
dictates of absolute morality are       
impracticable4 ,legal control1 which    
involves the infliction of pain1 alike  
on those who are restrained and on those
 who pay the cost of restraining them1  
is proved by this fact to be not        
absolutely moral1 seeing that absolute  
morality is the regulation of conduct in
 such way that pain shall not be        
inflicted4 ,wherefore1 if it be admitted
 that legal control is at present       
indispensable1 it must be admitted that 
these a priori rules cannot be          
immediately carried out4 ,and hence it  
follows that we must adapt our laws and 
actions to the existing character of    
mankind--that we must estimate the good 
or evil resulting from this or that     
arrangement1 and so reach a posteriori a
 code fitted for the time being4 ,in    

short1 we must fall back on expediency4 
,spencer then goes on to argue that an  
advanced penal code is as impossible to 
an early stage of civilization as is an 
advanced form of government2 a bloody   
penal code is both a natural product of 
the time and a needful restraint for the
 time1 and is also the only one which   
could be carried out by the existing    
administration4  ,the aim of morality is
 life1 of absolute morality complete    
life2 society is therefore justified in 
coercing the criminal who breaks through
 the conditions of life or constrains us
 to do so4 ,coercion is legitimate to   
the extent of compelling restitution1   
and preventing a repetition of          
aggressions2 no further4 ,less bloody   
systems of punishment1 wherever         
introduced1 have borne excellent fruit4 
,it may be deductively shown that the   
best of all systems must be that best   
calculated to reform the criminal2 too  
severe punishment1 instead of awakening 
a sense of guilt1 prevents the same1    

begetting a sense of injustice towards  
the inflicting power1 which causes      
resentment2 so that1 even if the        
criminal1 on reentering society1 commits
 no further crime1 he is restrained by  
the lowest of motives--fear4 ,the       
industrial system applied in prisons    
must have the best                      
results--counteracting habits of        
idleness1 strengthening self-control1   
and educating the will4  ,the principle 
of freedom1 which runs through all      
,spencer's works1 is especially enounced
 again1 in his essay1 ,the ,man versus  
the ,state 7#ahhd71 in which he combats 
the great political superstition of     
so-called paternal government4 ,he says3
 ,reduced to its lowest terms1 every    
proposal to interfere with citizens'    
activities further than by enforcing    
their mutual limitations1 is a proposal 
to improve life by breaking through the 
fundamental conditions of life4#dj  ,in 
,the ,data of ,ethics 7published #ahgd71
 ,mr4 ,spencer assumes a somewhat       

different standpoint from that of his   
earlier works bearing on morals4 ,the   
course of reasoning contained in this   
book is as follows3--  ,the doctrine    
that correlatives imply one another has1
 for one of its common examples1 the    
relation between the conceptions of     
whole and part4 ,beyond the primary     
truth that no idea of a whole can be    
framed without a nascent idea of parts  
constituting it1 and that no idea of a  
part can be framed without a nascent    
idea of some whole to which it belongs1 
there is the secondary truth that there 
can be no correct idea of a part without
 a correct idea of the correlative      
whole4 ,still less1 when part and whole 
are dynamically related1 and least of   
all when the whole is organic1 can the  
part be understood except by            
comprehension of the whole to which it  
belongs4 ,this truth holds not only of  
material but also of immaterial         
aggregates4  ,conduct is a whole and1 in
 a sense1 an organic whole1 and ,ethics1

 of which it is a part1 cannot be       
understood except through the           
understanding of the whole of conduct4  
,a definition of conduct must exclude   
purposeless actions1--such1 for         
instance1 as those of an epileptic in a 
fit4 ,hence the definition emerges      
either3 acts adjusted to ends2 or1 the  
adjustment of acts to ends2 according as
 we contemplate the formed body of acts1
 or think of the form alone4 ,and       
conduct1 in its full acceptation1 must  
be taken as comprehending all           
adjustments of acts to ends1 from the   
simplest to the most complex1 whatever  
their special natures and whether they  
are considered separately or in their   
totality4  ,a large part of conduct is  
non-ethical1 indifferent2 this passes1  
by small degrees and in countless ways1 
into conduct which is either moral or   
immoral4  ,the acts of all living       
creatures1 as acts adjusted to ends1    
come within the definition of conduct2  
the conduct of the higher animals as    

compared with that of man1 and of the   
lower animals as compared with the      
higher1 differs mainly in that the      
adjustments of acts to ends is          
relatively simple and relatively        
incomplete4 ,and as in other cases1 so  
in this case1 we must interpret the more
 developed by the less developed2 human 
conduct as a part of the whole of the   
conduct of animate beings4 ,and further3
 as1 in order to understand the part of 
human conduct with which ,ethics is     
concerned1 we must study it as a part of
 human conduct as a whole1 and in order 
to understand human conduct1 we must    
again study it as a part of the whole of
 conduct exhibited in animate beings1   
so1 in order to comprehend this too1 we 
must regard it as an outcome of former1 
less developed conduct1 out of which it 
has arisen4 ,our first step must be to  
study the evolution of conduct4         
,morphology deals with physical         
structure1 physiology with the processes
 carried on in the body4 ,but we enter  

on the subject of conduct when we begin 
to study such combinations among the    
actions of sensory and motor-organs as  
are externally manifested4  ,we saw that
 conduct is distinguished from the      
totality of actions by the exclusion of 
purposeless actions2 but during         
evolution this distinction arises by    
degrees4 ,we trace up conduct to the    
vertebrates and through the vertebrates 
to man1 and find that here the          
adjustments of acts to ends are both    
more numerous and better than among     
lower mammals2 and we find the same     
thing on comparing the doings of higher 
races of men with those of lower4 ,these
 better adjustments favor1 not only     
prolongation1 but also increased amount 
of life4  ,and among these adjustments  
of acts to ends1 there are not only such
 as further individual life but also1   
evolving with these1 such as favor the  
life of the species4 ,race-maintaining  
conduct1 like self-maintaining conduct1 
arises gradually out of that which      

cannot be called conduct4 ,the          
multitudinous creatures of all kinds    
which fill the earth are engaged in a   
continuous struggle for existence1 in   
which the adjustments of acts to ends1  
being imperfectly evolved1 miss         
completeness because they cannot be made
 by one creature without other creatures
 being prevented from making them4 ,this
 imperfectly evolved conduct introduces 
us1 by antithesis1 to conduct which is  
perfectly evolved1--such adjustments    
that each creature may make them without
 preventing other creatures making them 
also4 ,the conditions of such conduct   
cannot exist in predatory savage life2  
nor can it exist where there remains    
antagonism between individuals forming a
 group1 or between groups of            
individuals1--two traits of life        
necessarily associated1 since the nature
 which prompts international aggression 
prompts aggression of individuals on one
 another also4 ,hence the limit of      
evolution can be reached by conduct only

 in permanently peaceful societies2 can 
be approached only as war decreases and 
dies out4  ,the principle of beneficence
 is not derived by ,spencer from the    
principle of freedom1 in ,social        
,statics2 and here1 as in the latter    
book1 ,spencer has difficulty with it4  
,he says3 ,a gap in this outline must   
now be filled up4 ,there remains a      
further advance not yet even hinted4    
,for beyond so behaving that each       
achieves his ends without preventing    
others from achieving their ends1 the   
members of a society may give mutual    
help in the achievement of ends4 ,and if
 either indirectly by industrial        
cooeperation1 or directly by volunteered
 aid1 fellow-citizens can make easier   
for one another the adjustments of acts 
to ends1 then their conduct assumes a   
still higher phase of evolution2 since  
whatever facilitates the making of      
adjustments by each increases the       
totality of the adjustments made1 and   
serves to render the lives of all more  

complete4  ,thus1 then1 says ,spencer1  
we have been led to see that ,ethics has
 for its subject-matter that form which 
universal conduct assumes during the    
last stages of its evolution4  ,by      
comparing the meanings of a word in     
different connections1 and observing    
what they have in common1 we learn its  
essential significance4 ,material       
objects we are accustomed to designate  
as good or bad according as they are    
well or ill adapted to achieve          
prescribed ends4 ,the good knife is one 
which will cut2 the good gun is one     
which will carry far and true2 and so   
on4 ,so of inanimate actions1 and so1   
also1 of living things and actions4 ,a  
good jump is a jump which1 remoter ends 
ignored1 well achieves the immediate    
purpose of a jump2 and a stroke at      
billiards is called good when the       
movements are skilfully adjusted to the 
requirements4 ,so too our use of the    
words good and bad with respect to      
conduct under its ethical aspects has   

regard to the efficiency or             
non-efficiency of the adjustments of    
acts to ends4 ,this last truth is1      
through the entanglements of social     
relations1 by which men's actions often 
simultaneously affect the welfares of   
self1 of offspring1 and of              
fellow-citizens1 somewhat disguised4    
,nevertheless1 when we disentangle the  
three orders of ends1 and consider each 
separately1 it becomes clear that the   
conduct which achieves each kind of end 
is regarded as relatively good2 and     
conduct which fails to achieve it is    
regarded as relatively bad4 ,the        
goodness ascribed to a man of business1 
as such1 is measured by the activity and
 ability with which he buys and sells to
 advantage1 and may coexist with a hard 
treatment of dependents which is        
reprobated4 ,the ethical judgments we   
pass on such self-regarding acts are    
ordinarily little emphasized2 partly    
because the promptings of the           
self-regarding desires1 generally strong

 enough1 do not need moral enforcement1 
and partly because the promptings of the
 other-regarding desires1 less strong1  
do need moral enforcement4 ,with regard 
to the second class of adjustments of   
acts to ends1 which subserve the rearing
 of offspring1 we no longer find any    
obscurity in the application of the     
words good and bad to them1 according as
 they are efficient or inefficient4 ,and
 most emphatic are the application of   
the words1 in this sense1 throughout the
 third division of conduct comprising   
the deeds by which men affect one       
another4 ,always1 then1 acts are good or
 bad1 according as they are well or     
ill-adapted to ends4 ,that is1 good is  
the name we apply to the relatively more
 evolved conduct2 and bad is the name we
 apply to that which is relatively less 
evolved2 for we have seen that          
evolution1 tending ever towards         
self-preservation1 reaches its limits   
when individual life is the greatest1   
both in length and breadth2 and we now  

see that1 leaving other ends aside1 we  
regard as good the conduct furthering   
self-preservation1 and as bad the       
conduct tending to self-destruction4    
,with increasing power of maintaining   
individual life goes increasing power of
 perpetuating the species by fostering  
progeny2 and the establishment of an    
associated state both makes possible and
 requires a form of conduct such that   
life may be completed in each and in his
 offspring1 not only without preventing 
completion of it in others1 but with    
furtherance of it in others2 and this is
 the form of conduct most emphatically  
termed good4 ,moreover1 just as we saw  
that evolution becomes the highest      
possible when the conduct simultaneously
 achieves the greatest totality of life 
in self1 in offspring1 and in           
fellow-men2 so here we see that the     
conduct called good rises to the conduct
 conceived as best1 when it fulfils all 
three classes of ends at the same time4 
,has this evolution been a mistake8 ,the

 pessimist claims so1 the optimist      
claims not4 ,but there is one postulate 
in which both pessimists and optimists  
agree--namely1 that it is evident that  
life is good or bad1 according as it    
does1 or does not1 have a surplus of    
agreeable feeling2 if a future life is  
included in the theory of either1 the   
assumption is still the same1 that life 
is a blessing or a curse according as   
existence1 now considered in both       
worlds1 contains more of pleasure or of 
pain2 and the implication is therefore  
that conduct which conduces to the      
preservation of self1 the family1 and   
society1 is good or bad in the same     
measure4 ,thus there is no escape from  
the admission that conduct is good or   
bad according as its total effects are  
pleasurable or painful4 ,so that if     
self-mutilation furthered life1 and     
picking a man's pocket brightened his   
prospects1 we should regard these acts  
as good4 ,approach to such a            
constitution as effects complete        

adjustment of acts to ends of every kind
 is1 however1 an approach to perfection1
 and therefore means approach to that   
which secures greater happiness4        
,pleasure somewhere1 at some time1 to   
some being or beings1 is an inexpugnable
 element of the conception of moral aim4
  ,here follow criticisms of the        
religious school of morals1 which bases 
its system on the will of ,god1 and of  
the school of pure intuitionists1 who   
hold that men have been divinely endowed
 with moral faculties4 ,it must be      
either admitted or denied that the acts 
called good and the acts called bad     
naturally conduce1 the one to human     
well-being and the other to human       
ill-being4 ,is it admitted8 ,then the   
admission amounts to an assertion that  
the conduciveness is shown by           
experience2 and this involves           
abandonment of the doctrine that there  
is no origin for morals apart from      
divine injunctions4 ,is it denied that  
acts classed as good and bad differ in  

their effects8 ,then it is tacitly      
affirmed that human affairs would go on 
just as well in ignorance of the        
distinction2 and the alleged need for   
commandments from ,god disappears4 ,to  
affirm that we know some things to be   
right and other things to be wrong1 by  
virtue of a supernaturally given        
conscience2 and thus tacitly to affirm  
that we do not otherwise know right from
 wrong1 is tacitly to deny any natural  
relations between acts and results4 ,for
 if there exist any such relations1 then
 we may ascertain by induction1 or      
deduction1 or both1 what these are4 ,and
 if it be admitted that because of such 
natural relations happiness is produced 
by this kind of conduct1 which is       
therefore to be approved2 while misery  
is produced by that kind of conduct1    
which is therefore to be condemned2 then
 it is admitted that the rightness or   
wrongness of actions is determinable1   
and must finally be determined1 by the  
goodness or badness of the effects that 

flow from them1 which is contrary to the
 hypothesis4 ,spencer also repeats and  
enlarges upon his formerly stated       
objections to utilitarianism as         
superficial3 ,the utilitarianism which  
recognizes only the principles of       
conduct reached by induction1 is but    
preparatory to the utilitarianism which 
deduces these principles from the       
processes of life as carried on under   
established conditions of existence4    
,every science begins by accumulating   
observations1 and presently generalizes 
these empirically1 but only when it     
reaches the stage at which its empirical
 generalizations are included in a      
rational generalization1 does it become 
developed science4 ,so with ,ethics2 a  
preparation in the simpler sciences is  
presupposed4 ,it has a biological       
aspect2 since it concerns certain       
effects1 inner and outer1 individual and
 social1 of the vital changes going on  
in the highest type of animals4 ,it has 
a psychological aspect2 for its         

subject-matter is an aggregate of       
actions that are prompted by feelings   
and guided by intelligence4 ,and it has 
a sociological aspect2 for these        
actions1 some of them directly1 and all 
of them indirectly1 affect associated   
beings4 ,belonging under one aspect of  
each of these sciences1--physical1      
biological1 psychological1              
sociological1--it can find its ultimate 
interpretations only in those           
fundamental truths which are common to  
all of them1 as different aspects of    
evolving life4   ,,the ,,physical ,,view
  ,while an aggregate evolves1 not only 
the matter composing it1 but also the   
motion of that matter1 passes from an   
indefinite1 incoherent homogeneity to a 
definite1 coherent1 heterogeneity4 ,it  
is so with conduct4 ,the conduct of     
lowly organized creatures has its       
successive portions feebly connected4   
,from these up to man may be observed an
 increase in cohesion4 ,man1 even in his
 lowest state1 displays in his conduct  

far more coherent combinations of       
motions2 and in civilized man this trait
 of developed conduct becomes more      
conspicuous still4 ,but an even greater 
coherence among its component motions   
broadly distinguishes the conduct we    
call moral from the conduct we call     
immoral4 ,the application of the word   
dissolute to the last1 and of the word  
self-restrained to the first1 implies   
this fact4 ,the sequences of conduct in 
the moral man are more easily to be     
specified1 as implied by the word       
trustworthy applied to them2 while those
 of the less principled man cannot be so
 specified2 as is implied by the word   
untrustworthy4 ,indefiniteness          
accompanies incoherence in conduct that 
is little evolved2 and throughout the   
ascending stages of evolving conduct    
there is an increasingly definite       
cooerdination of the motions            
constituting it1 until we reach the     
conscientious man1 who is exact in all  
his transactions4 ,with this increase of

 definiteness and coherence goes also an
 increase of heterogeneity2 the moral   
man performs more varied duties1        
adjustments of acts to ends in more     
varied relations1 than does the immoral 
man4  ,evolution in conduct is1 like all
 other evolution1 towards               
equilibrium1--not the equilibrium       
reached by the individual in death1 but 
a moving equilibrium4 ,his evolution    
consists in a continual adjustment of   
inner to outer relations1 until a state 
of society shall be reached in which the
 individual will find his nature        
congruous with the environment4   ,,the 
,,biological ,,view  ,the truth that the
 ideally moral man is one in whom the   
moving equilibrium is perfect1 or       
approaches nearest to perfection1       
becomes1 when translated with           
physiological language1 the truth that  
he is one in whom the functions of all  
kinds are duly fulfilled4 ,either excess
 or defect in the performance of        
function results in a lowering of life1 

for the time being at least4 ,hence1 the
 performance of every function is1 in a 
sense1 a moral obligation4 ,one test of 
action is thus given us4 ,an action must
 be classed as right or wrong in respect
 of its immediate bearings1 according as
 it does or does not tend either to the 
maintenance of complete life for the    
time being or the prolongation of life  
to its full extent4 ,this is true even  
though the remoter bearings of the      
action may call for a different         
classification4 ,the seeming paradoxy of
 this statement results from the        
tendency1 so difficult to avoid1 to     
judge a conclusion which presupposes an 
ideal humanity1 by its applicability to 
humanity as now existing4 ,in the ideal 
state1 towards which evolution tends1   
any falling short of function implies   
deviation from perfectly moral conduct4 
,fit connections between acts and       
results must establish themselves in    
living things1 even before consciousness
 arises2 and after the rise of          

consciousness these connections can     
change in no other way than to become   
better established4 ,at the very outset1
 life is maintained by persistence in   
acts which conduce to it and desistence 
from acts which impede it2 and whenever 
sentience makes its appearance as an    
accompaniment1 its forms must be such   
that in the one case the produced       
feeling is of a kind that will be       
sought--pleasure1 and in the other case 
is of a kind that will be shunned--pain4
 ,so1 in the case of the seizure of     
food1 for example1 the pleasurable      
sensation1 everywhere where it arises1  
must be itself the stimulus to the      
contraction by which the pleasurable    
sensation is maintained and increased2  
or must be so bound up with the stimulus
 that the two increase together4 ,and   
this relation1 which we see is directly 
established in the case of a fundamental
 function1 must be indirectly           
established with all other functions2   
since non-establishment of it in any    

particular case implies1 in so far1     
unfitness to the conditions of          
existence4 ,sentient existence can      
evolve only on condition that           
pleasure-giving acts are life-sustaining
 acts4  ,it is true that1 in mankind as 
at present constituted1 guidance by     
present or proximate pleasures and pains
 fails throughout a wide range of cases4
 ,this arises throughout evolution by   
changes in the environment1 from which  
result partial misadjustments of the    
feelings1 necessitating readjustments4  
,this general cause of derangement has  
been operating on human beings in the   
changes from a primitive to a civilized 
condition through the direct opposition 
and struggle of the militant and the    
industrial spirit1 in a manner unusually
 decided1 persistent1 and involved4     
,but there is a still further relation  
between pleasure and welfare to be      
considered4 ,there are connections      
between pleasure in general1 and        
physiological exaltation1 and between   

pain in general and physiological       
depression4 ,every pleasure increases   
vitality1 every pain decreases vitality4
 ,non-recognition of these general      
truths vitiates moral speculation at    
large4 ',you have had your              
gratification--it is past2 and you are  
as you were before1' says the moralist  
to one2 and to another he says3 ',you   
have borne the suffering--it is over2   
and there the matter ends4' ,both       
statements are false2 leaving out of    
view indirect results1 the direct       
results are that the one has moved a    
step away from death1 and the other has 
moved a step towards death4  ,however1  
it is with the indirect results that the
 moralist is especially concerned2 since
 remote consequences of action are      
especially to be considered in ethical  
questions4 ,but doubtless a better      
understanding of biological truths would
 be to the benefit of moral theory and  
society at large4  ,spencer especially  
combats1 in a note at the end of this   

chapter1 ,barratt's theory1 stated in   
,physical ,ethics1 that movements of    
retraction and withdrawal and movements 
that secure the continuance of the      
impression of any acting force1 are the 
external marks1 respectively1 of pain   
and pleasure4 ,a great part of the vital
 processes1 even in creatures of        
developed nervous systems1 are carried  
on by unconscious reflex action1 and    
there is1 therefore1 no propriety in    
assuming the existence of what we       
understand by consciousness in creatures
 not only devoid of nervous systems but 
devoid of structures in general4 ,it is 
more proper to conceive such feelings as
 arising gradually1 by the compounding  
of ultimate elements of consciousness4  
,,the ,,psychological ,,view  ,mind     
consists of feelings and the relations  
among feelings4#da ,by compositions of  
the relations1 and ideas of relations1  
intelligence arises4 ,by composition of 
feelings1 and ideas of feelings1 emotion
 arises4 ,and1 other things equal1 the  

evolution of either is great in         
proportion as the composition is great4 
,one of the necessary implications is   
that cognition becomes higher in        
proportion as it is remoter from reflex 
action2 while emotion becomes higher in 
proportion as it is remoter from        
sensation4#db  ,the mental process by   
which1 in any case1 the adjustment of   
acts to ends is effected and which1     
under its higher forms1 becomes the     
subject-matter of ethical judgments1 is1
 as above implied1 divisible into the   
rise of a feeling or feelings           
constituting the motive1 and the thought
 or thoughts through which the motive is
 shaped and finally issues in action4   
,the first of these elements1 originally
 an excitement1 becomes a simple        
sensation2 then a compound sensation2   
then a cluster of partially presentative
 and partially representative           
sensations1 forming an incipient        
emotion2 then a cluster of exclusively  
ideal or representative sensations      

forming an emotion proper2 then a       
cluster of such clusters forming a      
compound emotion2 and eventually becomes
 a still more involved emotion composed 
of the ideal forms of such compound     
emotions4 ,the other element1 beginning 
with that immediate passage of a single 
stimulus into a single motion1 called   
reflex action1 presently comes to be a  
set of associated discharges of stimuli 
producing associated motions2           
constituting instinct4 ,step by step    
arise more entangled combinations of    
stimuli1 somewhat variable in their     
modes of union1 leading to complex      
motions1 similarly variable in their    
adjustments2 whence occasional          
hesitations in the sensori-motor        
processes4 ,presently is reached a stage
 at which the combined clusters of      
impressions1 not all present together1  
issue in actions not all simultaneous1  
implying representation of results1 or  
thought4 ,afterwards follow stages in   
which various thoughts have time to pass

 before the composite motives produce   
the appropriate actions1 until at last  
arise those long deliberations during   
which the probabilities of various      
consequences are estimated1 and the     
promptings of the correlative feelings  
balanced2 constituting calm judgment4   
,that1 under either of its aspects1 the 
later forms of this mental process are  
the higher1 ethically considered as well
 as otherwise considered1 will be       
readily seen4#dc  ,observe1 then1 what  
follows respecting the relative         
authorities of motives4 ,throughout the 
ascent from low creatures up to man1 and
 from the lowest types of man to the    
highest1 self-preservation has been     
increased by the subordination of simple
 excitations to compound                
excitations1--the subjection of         
immediate sensations to the ideas of    
sensations to come1--the overruling of  
presentative feelings by representative 
feelings1 and of representative feelings
 by re-representative feelings4 ,as life

 has advanced1 the accompanying         
sentience has become increasingly ideal2
 and among feelings produced by the     
compounding of ideas1 the highest1 and  
those which are evolved latest1 are the 
re-compounded or doubly ideal4 ,hence it
 follows that1 as guides1 the feelings  
have authorities proportionate to the   
degrees in which they are removed1 by   
their complexity and their ideality1    
from simple sensations and appetites4 ,a
 further implication is made clear by   
studying the intellectual sides of these
 mental processes by which acts are     
adjusted to ends4 ,where they are low   
and simple1 these comprehend the guiding
 only of immediate acts by immediate    
stimuli--the entire transaction in each 
case1 lasting but a moment1 refers only 
to a proximate result4 ,but with the    
development of intelligence and the     
growing ideality of the motives1 the    
ends to which the acts are adjusted     
cease to be exclusively immediate4 ,the 
more ideal motives concern ends that are

 more distant2 and with approach to the 
highest types1 present ends become      
increasingly subordinate to those future
 ends which the ideal motives have for  
their objects4 ,hence there arises a    
certain presumption in favor of a motive
 which refers to a remote good1 in      
comparison with one which refers to a   
proximate good4#dd  ,out of the three   
controls of conduct1 the political1 the 
religious1 and the social1 the first and
 the last of which are generated in the 
social state through the supremacy of   
individuals in the midst of a control   
that is also1 in some degree1 exerted by
 the whole community1 the moral         
consciousness grows2 the feeling of     
moral obligation in general arising in a
 manner analogous to that in which      
abstract ideas are generated1 out of    
concrete instances4 ,as in such         
groupings of instances the different    
components are mutually cancelled to    
form the abstract idea1 so in groupings 
of the emotions1 there takes place a    

mutual cancelling of diverse components2
 the common component is made relatively
 appreciable1 and becomes an abstract   
feeling4 ,that which the moral          
feelings--the feelings that prompt      
honesty1 truthfulness1 etc4--have in    
common1 is complexity and               
re-representative character4 ,the idea  
of authoritativeness has1 therefore1    
come to be connected with feelings      
having these traits3 the implication    
being that the lower and simpler        
feelings are without authority4 ,another
 element--that of                       
coerciveness--originated from experience
 of those several forms of restraint    
that have established themselves in the 
course of civilization--the political1  
religious1 and social4 ,by punishment is
 generated the sense of compulsion which
 the consciousness of duty includes1 and
 which the word obligation indicates4   
,this sense1 however1 becomes indirectly
 connected with the feelings            
distinguished as moral2 and slowly fades

 as these emerge from amidst the        
political1 religious1 and social        
motives1 and become distinct and        
predominant4 ,the sense of duty is1     
therefore1 transitory1 fading as a      
motive as pleasure in right-doing is    
evolved4   ,,the ,,sociological ,,view  
,not for the human race only1 but for   
every race1 there are laws of right     
living4 ,given its environment and its  
structure1 and there is1 for each kind  
of creature1 a set of actions adapted in
 their kinds1 amounts1 and combinations1
 to secure the highest conservation its 
nature permits4 ,yet in man we find an  
additional factor in the formula for    
life3 for man is sociable to a degree   
not found anywhere else among animals4  
,the conditions of the associated state 
have therefore called for an emphasizing
 of those restraints on conduct entailed
 by the presence of fellow-men4 ,from   
the sociological point of view1 then1   
,ethics becomes nothing else than a     
definite account of the forms of conduct

 that are fitted to the associated      
state1 in such wise that the lives of   
each and all may be the greatest        
possible1 alike in length and breadth4  
,but here we are met by a fact which    
forbids us thus to put in the foreground
 the welfare of citizens1 individually  
considered1 and requires us to put in   
the foreground the welfare of the       
society as a whole4 ,the life of the    
social organism must1 as an end1 rank   
above the lives of its units4 ,these two
 ends are not harmonious at the outset1 
since as long as communities are        
endangered by rival communities1 a      
sacrifice of private to public claims is
 necessary4 ,when1 however1 antagonism  
between communities shall cease1 there  
will cease to be any public claims at   
variance with private claims2 the need  
for the subordination of individual     
lives to the general life will cease1   
and the latter1 having from the         
beginning had furtherance of individual 
lives as its ultimate purpose1 will come

 to have this as its proximate purpose4 
,between the commands of duty towards   
members of the same community and       
towards those of different communities  
as between the sentiments answering to  
these relations1 there is1 at present1  
conflict4 ,in the course of evolution1  
however1 the various forms of subjection
 countenanced by a warlike              
regime--slavery1 the subjection of women
 to men1 and paternal absolutism1 become
 more and more unpopular1 and are done  
away with4 ,for each kind and degree of 
social evolution1 there is an           
appropriate compromise between the moral
 code of enmity and that of amity2 this 
is1 for the time being1                 
authoritative4#de ,but such compromise  
belongs to incomplete conduct2 the end  
of evolution is in the annihilation of  
enmity between societies as between     
individuals4 ,nor is a mere abstinence  
from mutual injury enough4 ,without     
cooeperation for satisfying wants the   
social state loses its raison d'etre4   

,in all efforts for cooeperation        
equivalence of exchange is a necessary  
basis2 all failure to fulfil such       
equivalence causes antagonism and thus a
 diminution of social coherence2 in the 
social1 as in the animal organism1 waste
 without repair destroys the equilibrium
 of the parts2 fulfilment of contract   
is1 therefore1 the primary condition of 
the welfare of society4  ,and even      
mutual punctiliousness in the fulfilment
 of contract is not sufficient to the   
moral ideal4 ,daily experience proves   
that every one would suffer many evils  
and lose many goods1 did none give him  
unpaid assistance4 ,the limit of the    
evolution of conduct is not reached     
until1 beyond avoidance of direct and   
indirect injuries to others1 there are  
spontaneous efforts to further the      
welfare of others4 ,the form of nature  
which thus adds beneficence to justice1 
is one which adaptation to the social   
state produces4 ,the social man has not 
reached that harmonization of           

constitution with conditions forming the
 limit of evolution1 so long as there   
remains space for the growth of         
faculties which1 by their exercise1     
bring positive benefit to others and    
satisfaction to self4 ,if the presence  
of fellow-men1 while putting certain    
limits to each man's sphere of activity1
 opens certain other spheres of activity
 in which feelings1 while achieving     
their gratifications1 do not diminish   
but add to the gratifications of others1
 then such spheres will inevitably be   
occupied4#df ,but of beneficence1 as    
well as of justice1 sympathy is the     
root4  ,the assumption that feelings can
 be arranged in a scale of desirability1
 against which ,mr4 ,sidgwick especially
 argues in his objections to 7empirical7
 egoistic hedonism1 is not necessarily  
an element of such hedonism1 although   
,bentham1 in naming intensity1 duration1
 certainty1 and proximity as traits     
entering into an estimation of the      
relative value of a pleasure or pain1   

has committed himself to it4 ,but if a  
debtor who cannot pay offers to compound
 for his debt by making over to me any  
one of various objects of property1 will
 ,i not endeavor to estimate their      
relative value1 though ,i may not be    
able to do it exactly2 and if ,i choose 
wrongly is therefore the ground of      
choice to be abandoned8 ,mr4 ,sidgwick's
 argument against empirical hedonism    
must tell1 moreover1 in a still greater 
degree1 against his own utilitarianism1 
since this is applicable1 not to the    
individual simply1 but to many classes  
of differing individuals4 ,to this      
difficulty must be added1 moreover1 the 
future indeterminateness of the means   
for obtaining such universal happiness4 
,mr4 ,sidgwick's objection contains1    
however1 a partial truth2 for guidance  
in the pursuit of happiness through the 
mere balancing of pleasures and pains   
is1 if partially practicable throughout 
a certain range of conduct1 futile      
throughout a much wider range4 ,it is   

quite consistent to assert that         
happiness is the ultimate aim of action1
 and at the same time to deny that it   
can be reached by making it the         
immediate aim4 ,i go with ,mr4 ,sidgwick
 as far as the conclusion that 'we must 
at least admit the desirability of      
confirming or correcting the results of 
such comparisons 7of pleasures and      
pains7 by any other method upon which we
 may find reason to rely'2 and ,i then  
go further1 and say that throughout a   
large part of conduct guidance by such  
comparisons is to be entirely set aside 
and replaced by other guidance4  ,the   
fact cited by ,mr4 ,sidgwick as the     
fundamental paradox of hedonism1 that to
 get the pleasures of pursuit one must  
forget them1 is explained by the fact   
that the pleasures of pursuit lie       
greatly in the consciousness of         
capability in the efficient use of      
means1 and the sense of the admiration  
excited thereby in others4 ,and so the  
fundamental paradox disappears4 ,yet the

 truth of the pleasure derived from     
means as distinguished from ends is of  
significance4 ,throughout the evolution 
of conduct we find a growing complexity 
of adjustment of acts to ends1 the      
interposition of more and more complex  
means1 each as a step to the next1 and  
leading to the final attainment of even 
remoter ends4 ,of these means1 each set1
 with its accompanying satisfaction1    
developed with the function1 comes at   
last to be regarded as proximate end1   
and constitutes an obligation2 and each 
later and higher order of means comes to
 take precedence in time and            
authoritativeness of each earlier and   
lower order of means4 ,in this manner   
arises the authoritativeness of moral   
requirements1 as designating the latest 
and highest order of means4  ,such means
 are more determinable than the         
end--happiness--for any society4 ,what  
constitutes happiness is more difficult 
of determination than what constitutes  
the means of its attainment4 ,we may now

 see our way to reconciling sundry      
conflicting ethical theories1 which     
generally embody portions of the truth1 
and simply require to be combined in    
proper order in order to embody the     
whole truth4 ,the theological theory    
contains a part4 ,if for the divine     
will1 supposed to be supernaturally     
revealed1 we substitute the naturally   
revealed end towards which the ,power   
manifested throughout ,evolution works2 
then1 since evolution has been1 and is  
still1 working towards the highest life1
 it follows that conformity to those    
principles by which the highest life is 
achieved1 is furtherance of that end4   
,the doctrine that perfection or        
excellence of nature should be the      
purpose of pursuit1 is in one sense     
true2 for it tacitly recognizes that    
ideal form of being which the highest   
life implies1 and to which evolution    
tends4 ,there is a truth1 also1 in the  
doctrine that virtue must be the aim2   
for this is another form of the doctrine

 that the aim must be to fulfil the     
conditions to achievement of the highest
 life4 ,that the intuitions of a moral  
faculty should guide our conduct is a   
proposition in which a truth is         
contained2 for these intuitions are the 
slowly organized results of experiences 
received by the race while living in    
presence of these conditions4 ,and that 
happiness is the supreme end is beyond  
question true2 for it is the concomitant
 of that highest life which every theory
 of moral guidance has1 distinctly or   
vaguely1 in view4  ,thus1 those ethical 
systems which make virtue1 right1       
obligation1 the cardinal aims1 are seen 
to be complementary to those ethical    
systems which make welfare1 happiness1  
pleasure1 the cardinal aims4  ,spencer  
follows up this argument with a chapter 
on the relativity of pleasures and      
pains1 and then proceeds with an        
argument against excessive altruism as1 
in the end1 selfish1 since it is        
destructive to the power for work and to

 individual life1 diminishes the vigor  
of offspring1 and finally results in the
 survival of the less altruistic as the 
fittest2 this chapter is under the      
heading ,egoism versus ,altruism4 ,it is
 followed by a chapter on ,altruism     
versus ,egoism1 in which is shown that  
some individual self-sacrifice1 at least
 to offspring1 is found far down in the 
scale of being2 that altruism is1       
therefore1 no less primordial than      
self-preservation1#dg and hence no less 
imperative2 that this altruism1 at first
 unconscious1 becomes1 in higher stages 
of evolution1 conscious2 and that if    
often selfish in motive1 it may be      
without any element of conscious        
self-regard1 although it conduces       
greatly to egoistic satisfaction4       
,indeed1 pure egoism defeats itself1    
since pleasure palls by over-indulgence1
 is dulled by maturity1 and almost      
destroyed by old age4 ,he that can find 
pleasure in ministering to that of      
others has1 however1 a source of        

pleasure which may serve in place of    
personal pleasure4 ,in the associated   
state1 a certain altruism is1 and must  
necessarily be1 an advantage to each    
member of the community4 ,whatever      
conduces to the well-being of each is   
conducive to the well-being of all4     
,here follows a criticism of            
utilitarianism as one form of pure      
altruism1 since1 according to the       
utilitarian doctrine1 each individual is
 to count for one1 not more than one1   
and the individual share of happiness   
thus becomes infinitesimal as compared  
with general happiness4 ,shall ,a1 who  
has1 by labor1 acquired some material   
happiness1 take the attitude of a       
disinterested spectator with regard to  
their use1 as ,mr4 ,mill recommends8    
,and will he1 as such1 decide on a      
division of these means to happiness    
with ,b1 ,c1 and ,d1 who have not       
labored to produce them8 ,from the      
conclusion that a really disinterested  
spectator would not decree any such     

division1 ,spencer seems to draw the    
conclusion that ,mr4 ,mill's position is
 untenable4 ,he further illustrates the 
untenability of utilitarianism 7as pure 
altruism7 by the figure of a cluster of 
bodies generating heat1 each of which   
will have1 as long as it generates heat 
for itself1 a certain amount of proper  
heat and a certain amount of heat       
derived from the others2 whereas the    
whole cluster will become cold as soon  
as each ceases to generate heat for     
itself and depends on the heat generated
 by the rest4 ,utilitarianism involves  
the further paradox that1 to achieve the
 greatest sum of happiness1 each        
individual must be more egoistic than   
altruistic4 ,for1 speaking generally1   
sympathetic pleasures must ever continue
 less intense than the pleasures with   
which there is sympathy4 ,and while the 
individual must be extremely unegoistic 
in that he is willing to yield up the   
benefit for which he has labored1 he    
must1 at the same time1 be extremely    

egoistic1 since he is so selfish as     
willingly to let others yield up to him 
the benefits they have labored for4 ,to 
assume that egoistic pleasures may be   
relinquished to any extent is to fall   
into one of those many errors of ethical
 speculation which result from ignoring 
the laws of biology4444 ,to yield up    
normal pleasure is to yield up so much  
life2 and there arises the question3--to
 what extent may this be done8444       
,surrender1 carried to a certain point1 
is extremely mischievous1 and to a      
further point1 fatal4#dh ,after         
beginning1 however1 with this assertion 
that to assume that egoistic pleasure   
may be relinquished to any extent is to 
fall1 from ignorance of biology1 into an
 error of ethical speculation1 ,spencer 
reaches only the conclusion that1 if the
 individual is to continue living1 he   
must take certain amounts of those      
pleasures which go along with the       
fulfilment of the bodily functions1 and 
that the portion of happiness which it  

is possible for him to yield up for     
redistribution is a limited portion4 ,he
 further argues that a perfectly moral  
law must be one which becomes perfectly 
practicable as human nature becomes     
perfect2 but that the law of            
utilitarianism does not so become       
practicable1 since opportunities for    
practising altruism1 which originate in 
imperfection in others1 will diminish   
and finally disappear in the ideal      
state4 ,there is no addition to         
happiness by redistribution1 and there  
is the additional labor and loss of time
 of such redistribution4 ,the conclusion
 must be that general happiness is to be
 achieved mainly through the adequate   
pursuit of their own happiness by       
individuals1 while reciprocally1 the    
happiness of individuals is to be       
achieved in part by their pursuit of the
 general happiness4 ,the chapter on the 
conciliation of altruism and egoism is  
occupied with the development of        
sympathy1 as the militant spirit grows  

less4 ,the expression of emotion1 as    
also the power of interpreting such     
expression1 must become greater as the  
impelling cause to concealment found in 
lack of sympathy1 disappears4 ,when     
conditions require any class of         
activities to be relatively great1 there
 will arise a relatively great pleasure 
accompanying that class of activities2  
the scope for altruistic activities will
 not exceed the desire for altruistic   
satisfaction4 ,such altruistic          
satisfaction1 though in a transfigured  
sense egoistic1 will not be pursued     
egoistically--that is1 from egoistic    
motives4 ,general altruism will resist  
too great altruism in the individual1   
and as the occasion for self-sacrifice  
disappears1 altruism will take on the   
ultimate form of sympathy with the      
pleasure of others produced by the      
successful activities of these4 ,and so 
there will disappear the apparently     
permanent opposition between egoism and 
altruism4  ,the last two chapters of    

,the ,data of ,ethics deal with ,ethics 
as the law of the ideal man in an ideal 
society1 and treat of the attainment of 
general principles in this science as in
 other sciences by the neglect of       
conflicting factors1 and the recognition
 of fundamental factors1 in the         
gradually accumulated knowledge of      
society4 ,on account of the diversity of
 men and societies1 a code of perfect   
personal conduct can never be made      
definite2 only certain general          
conditions of perfection can be pointed 
out4 ,as life is now carried on1 the    
conflict of claims is continual2 and    
ethical science1 here necessarily       
empirical1 can do no more than aid in   
making least objectionable compromises4 
,absolute ,ethics1 which supplies the   
law of perfect right-doing possible only
 in an ideal state1 does not greatly aid
 ,relative ,ethics1 yet it aids         
somewhat1 as keeping before             
consciousness an ideal conciliation of  
claims1 and suggesting search for the   

best form of compromise possible under  
the circumstances4  ,justice1 which     
constitutes ,part ,,iv4 of ,the         
,principles of ,ethics1 and to which    
,the ,data of ,ethics belongs as ,part  
,i41 was published 7#ahia7 in advance of
 ,parts ,,ii4 and ,,iii4 ,the argument  
of the book runs as follows3--  ,ethics 
properly involves a consideration of the
 conduct of animals as well as of human 
beings1 for the primary subject-matter  
of ,ethics is conduct considered as     
producing good and bad results to self  
or others1 or both1 not1 as most people 
believe1 conduct as calling forth       
approbation or disapprobation4 ,and even
 on this latter view1 ,ethics includes  
,animal ,ethics1 since we feel          
approbation or disapprobation with      
regard to many actions of animals4      
,animal ,ethics includes1 as its two    
cardinal principles1 the opposed classes
 of altruistic and egoistic acts4 ,for  
preservation of the species1 benefits   
received must be1 during immaturity1    

inversely proportionate to merit or     
capacities possessed1 merit being       
measured by powers of self-sustentation1
 and after maturity1 directly           
proportionate to worth as measured by   
fitness to the conditions of existence4 
,furthermore1 though the species is made
 up of individuals1 many of these       
individuals may disappear and the       
species still be preserved1 whereas its 
disappearance as a whole involves       
absolute failure in achieving the end1  
so that1 where preservation of          
individuals conflicts with preservation 
of the species1 the individuals must be 
sacrificed4  ,the principle that among  
adults benefits must be in proportion to
 merits1 implies in its biological      
aspect survival of the fittest4 ,its    
violation involves double harm to the   
species by sacrifice of the superior to 
the inferior1 and consequent increase of
 the inferior4 ,interpreted in ethical  
terms1 it is that each individual ought 
to be subject to the effects of its own 

nature and resulting conduct2 and       
throughout sub-human life this rule     
holds without qualification4 ,the same  
principle is displayed in the mutual    
relations of the parts of organisms1    
every part being nourished in proportion
 to its use or function1 a balancing of 
the relative powers of the parts being  
thus effected1 and the organism fitted  
as a whole to its existence by having   
its parts continuously proportioned to  
the requirements4 ,in a parallel manner1
 the species as a whole is fitted to its
 environment by the greater prosperity  
to self and offspring that comes to     
those better adapted4  ,but sub-human   
justice is extremely imperfect1 alike in
 general and in detail4  ,in general it 
is imperfect1 in that the sustentation  
of multitudinous species depends on the 
wholesale destruction of others2 so     
that1 in the species serving as prey1   
the relations between conduct and       
consequence are so habitually broken    
that in very few individuals are they   

long maintained4 ,it is true the        
destruction of the species serving as   
prey is the result of their natures2 but
 this violent ending of the immense     
majority implies that the species is one
 in which justice1 as above conceived1  
is displayed in but small measure4      
,sub-human justice is also imperfect in 
detail1 in that the relation between    
conduct and consequences is1 in such an 
immense proportion of cases1 broken by  
accidents1--such as scarcity of food1   
inclemencies of weather1 invasions by   
parasites1 attacks of enemies1--which   
fall indiscriminately on the superior   
and the inferior4 ,as organization      
becomes higher1 sub-human justice       
becomes more decided2 as general        
superiority increases1 there is less    
dependence on accident1 and individual  
differences become more important4      
,with the beginning of gregariousness1  
we find the new element of cooeperation1
 passive or active1 which is an         
advantage to the species4 ,this involves

 so much restraint of conflicting acts  
as will leave a balance of advantage2   
else survival of the fittest will       
exterminate the variety in which        
association begins4 ,the experience of  
the evils of not maintaining such limits
 to action results in an inherited      
tendency to maintain them4 ,the general 
consciousness of the need for           
maintaining them results in punishment  
of their disregard4 ,self-subordination 
among solitary animals is found only in 
parenthood2 among gregarious animals    
there is a further subjection of the    
individual to his kind1 and where an    
occasional sacrifice of life furthers   
the preservation of species1 sub-human  
justice may rightly have this second    
limitation4  ,in order of priority1 the 
law of relation between conduct and     
consequence1 the principle that each    
individual ought to receive the good and
 evil resulting from his own nature1    
stands first2 it is the primary law     
holding of all creatures4 ,the law of   

the restraint1 in gregarious animals1 of
 interfering acts1 is second in time and
 authority1 and is simply a             
specification of the form which the     
primary law takes under conditions of   
gregarious life1 since1 in asserting    
restriction of the interactions of      
conduct and consequence1 it tacitly     
reasserts that these interactions must  
be maintained in other individuals1 that
 is1 in all individuals4 ,the third law1
 of the occasional sacrifice of         
individuals to their kind1 is later and 
narrower in application1 and a          
qualification of the first law4 ,the    
first law is absolute for animals in    
general2 the second is absolute for     
gregarious animals2 but the third is    
relative to the existence of enemies of 
such kinds that1 in contending with     
them1 the species gains more than it    
loses by the sacrifice of a few members2
 and in the absence of such enemies this
 qualification imposed by the third law 
disappears4  ,as human life is a        

development of sub-human life1 so human 
justice is a development of sub-human   
justice4 ,according to pure justice1 the
 individual should suffer the           
consequences of his acts1 and that such 
is the general opinion is implied in    
such common expressions as3 ,he has no  
one to blame but himself2 ,he has made  
his own bed1 and now he must lie on it2 
,he has got no more than he deserved2   
or1 ,he has fairly earned his reward4   
,the truth that1 with higher            
organization1 danger from accident      
becomes less1 longevity is greater1 and 
so differences count for more1 showing  
their effects for longer periods1 and   
justice therefore becomes greater1      
applies also to human beings4 ,the rate 
of mortality decreases with man1 and    
according to his civilization4  ,more   
clearly in the case of human beings than
 in that of other animals is it shown   
that gregariousness establishes itself  
because it profits the variety4 ,where a
 variety live on wild food1 they        

associate only in small groups2 game and
 fruit1 widely distributed1 can support 
these only4 ,but greater gregariousness 
arises where agriculture makes possible 
the support of a large number on a small
 area2 and where the accompanying       
development of industries introduces    
many and various cooeperations4 ,the    
advantages of cooeperation can be had   
only by conformity to the conditions    
which association imposes--by such      
limitation of the pursuits of           
individuals as to leave a surplus of    
advantage to associated life4 ,this     
truth is illustrated by the unprosperous
 or decaying state of communities in    
which the trespasses of individuals on  
one another are so numerous and great as
 generally to prevent them from         
severally receiving the normal results  
of their labors4 ,mutual restraint being
 more imperative with human beings than 
with animals1 there is with them a still
 more marked habit of punishment4       
,through all which sets of facts is     

manifested the truth1 recognized        
practically if not theoretically1 that  
each individual1 carrying on the actions
 which subserve his life1 and not       
prevented from receiving their normal   
results1 good and bad1 shall carry on   
these actions under such restraints as  
are imposed by the carrying on of       
kindred actions by other individuals1   
who have similarly to receive such      
normal results1 good and bad4 ,and      
vaguely1 if not definitely1 this is seen
 to constitute what is called justice4  
,in the highest gregarious creature1 the
 necessity which we found1 of an        
occasional sacrifice of the individual  
in defence of species1 assumes large    
proportions1 the defence being not only 
against enemies of other kinds1 but also
 against enemies of the same kind4 ,this
 obligation is less than that of care   
for offspring1 or mutual restraint4 ,it 
exists only as necessary to protect the 
society against destruction1 hence only 
for defensive1 not for offensive1 war4  

,it may be objected that war peoples the
 earth with the stronger1 but this is   
not necessarily so1 since the conquered 
may merely be fewer in number4 ,and     
further1 it is only during the earlier  
stages of human progress that the       
development of strength1 courage1 and   
cunning are of chief importance4 ,but   
for an accident1 ,persia would have     
conquered ,greece2 and ,tartar hordes   
once very nearly overwhelmed ,european  
civilization4 ,the races best fitted for
 social life do not necessarily conquer1
 and there are injurious moral reactions
 on both conquering and conquered4 ,only
 defensive war retains a quasi-ethical  
justification4 ,it belongs1 however1 to 
a transitional state1 and is not        
justified by ,absolute ,ethics4  ,as the
 organs of inferior animals are moulded 
into fitness for the requirements of    
life1 so1 simultaneously1 through       
nervous modifications1 their sensations1
 instincts1 emotions1 and intellectual  
aptitudes are also moulded to these     

requirements1--in the gregarious animals
 to the conditions of gregarious life4  
,many evolutionists appear to regard the
 variability of man as ceasing with     
civilized life1 but the whole analogy of
 nature is against such a theory2 we    
must assume that man1 like other        
animals1 is moulded to suit his         
requirements1 and that moral changes are
 among those thus wrought out4          
,aggressive actions often entail        
suffering on the individuals of a group 
performing them1 as well as on the group
 as a whole1 and on the other hand1     
harmonious cooeperation in a group      
profits the average of its members2 so  
that there is a tendency to survival of 
groups having such adaptation of nature4
 ,and just as a love of property1       
formerly gratified by possession of food
 and shelter1 came later to be extended 
to the weapons for obtaining these1 and1
 later1 even to the raw materials1 the  
pleasure in ownership becoming more and 
more abstract and remote from material  

satisfaction1 so the natural impatience 
of animal nature at restraint of its    
powers becomes in man a sentiment of    
egoistic justice1 for justice requires  
the free play of all forces in order    
that the results of character may fall  
upon the individual4 ,it is more        
difficult to understand how the         
altruistic sentiment of justice comes   
into being4 ,on one hand1 its           
implication is that it can be developed 
only by adaptation to social life2 on   
the other1 it appears that social life  
is impossible without the maintenance of
 those equitable relations which imply a
 sentiment of justice4 ,these           
requirements are fulfilled by a         
pro-altruistic sentiment of justice1    
which takes its place4 ,the first       
deterrent from aggression1 among        
animals1 is fear of retaliation2 a      
further restraint1 with man1 is fear of 
reprobation or social disgrace4 ,to     
these are to be added the feelings      
arising under political and religious   

authority--the dread of legal punishment
 and the dread of divine vengeance2 and 
these four kinds of feelings cooeperate1
 forming a body of feeling1 which checks
 the primitive tendency to pursue the   
objects of desire without regard to the 
interests of fellow-men1 and though     
containing nothing of the altruistic    
sentiment of justice1 makes social      
cooeperation possible4 ,creatures which 
become gregarious1 tend to become       
sympathetic in degrees proportionate to 
their intelligence--by sympathy being   
meant the arousing of kindred feeling by
 the witness of a display of feeling in 
others1 sympathy being fostered by      
common enjoyments and sufferings4 ,the  
altruistic sentiment of justice is slow 
in assuming a high form1 partly because 
its primary component does not become   
highly developed until a late phase of  
progress1 partly because it is          
relatively complex1 and partly because  
it implies a stretch of imagination not 
possible for low intelligences4 ,as1    

until pain has been felt1 there cannot  
be sympathy with pain1 so the altruistic
 sentiment of justice cannot be         
developed until the egoistic sentiment  
has arisen2 moreover1 the sentiment of  
justice is concerned1 not only with     
concrete pains and pleasures1 but also  
with their conditions1 and hence this   
sentiment demands a development of the  
power of mental representation4  ,there 
is a close connection between the       
sentiment of justice and the social     
type4 ,predominant militancy affords no 
scope for the egoistic sentiment of     
justice1 and at the same time sympathy  
is perpetually seared by militant       
activities4 ,on the other hand1 as fast 
as voluntary cooeperation1 which        
characterizes the industrial type of    
society1 becomes more general than      
compulsory cooeperation1 which          
characterizes the militant type of      
society1 individual activities become   
less restrained1 and the sentiment which
 rejoices in the scope for them is      

encouraged2 while simultaneously1 the   
occasions for repressing the sympathies 
become less frequent4  ,the idea of     
justice is different from the mere      
sentiment of justice2 the former        
gradually arising from the latter1 in   
the course of generations1 by experience
 of the limits to which action can be   
carried without causing resentment from 
others4 ,but since the kinds of activity
 are many and become increasingly       
various with the development of social  
life1 it is a long time before the      
general nature of the limit common to   
all cases can be conceived4 ,a further  
reason for the slowness of development  
is1 that the arising ideas of justice   
have been perpetually confused by the   
conflicting requirements of internal    
amity and external enmity4  ,two        
elements1 a positive and a negative1    
constitute the idea of justice--that of 
man's recognition of his claims to      
unimpeded activities and the results    
they bring1 and that of the limits which

 the presence of other men necessitate4 
,the primordial ideal suggested is      
inequality1 for since the principal is  
that each should receive the results due
 to his own nature1 then1 since men     
differ in their powers1 unequal benefits
 are implied4 ,but mutual limitations   
suggest a contrary idea1 experience     
showing that the bounds to which one may
 pursue his own ends are1 on the        
average1 the same for all1 so that the  
idea of equality arises4 ,unbalanced    
appreciations of these two factors in   
human justice lead to divergent moral   
and social theories4  ,among the rudest 
men the appreciations are no higher than
 among inferior gregarious animals4     
,where war has developed political      
organization the idea of inequality     
predominates1 but the idea is one1 not  
of natural1 but of artificial           
apportionment4 ,and in general1 we find 
that the primary or brute factor in     
justice is but little qualified by the  
human factor4  ,all movements are       

rhythmical1 social movements included1  
and after the idea of justice in which  
inequality predominates comes a         
conception in which the idea of equality
 unduly predominates--as in ,bentham's  
ethical theory1 where one person's      
happiness1 supposed equal in degree     
7with proper allowance made for kind71  
is accounted for exactly as much as     
another's2 and this is the theory which 
,communism would reduce to practice4 ,it
 is an absolute denial of the principle 
of inequality1 and must apply alike to  
the worthy and unworthy1 as well as to  
the superior and inferior in physical   
and intellectual capacities1 since moral
 inequalities are as much inherited as  
others4 ,here we have a deliberate      
abolition of that cardinal distinction  
between the ethics of the family and the
 ethics of the state emphasized at the  
outset--an abolition which1 as we saw1  
must eventuate in decay and             
disappearance of the species or variety 
in which it takes place4  ,the true     

principle shows an amalgamation of these
 two4 ,the equality concerns the        
mutually limited spheres of action which
 must be maintained if associated men   
are to cooeperate harmoniously4 ,the    
inequality concerns the results which   
each may achieve by carrying on his     
actions within the implied limits4 ,no  
incongruity exists when the ideas of    
equality and inequality are applied1 the
 one to the bounds and the other to the 
benefits4 ,contrariwise1 the two may be1
 and must be1 simultaneously asserted4  
,any considerable acceptance of so      
definite an idea of justice is not to be
 expected4 ,it is an idea appropriate to
 an ultimate state1 and can be but      
partially entertained during            
transitional states2 for the prevailing 
ideas must1 on the average1 be congruous
 with existing institutions and         
activities4 ,during the thirty1 or      
rather forty years' peace1 and weakening
 of militant organization1 the idea of  
justice became clearer2 but since then  

the idea of regimentation has spread4   
,it is predominant in the conception of 
socialism with its army of workers with 
appointed tasks and apportioned shares  
of products1 and every act of           
,parliament which takes money from the  
individual for public purposes shows a  
tendency in the same direction4 ,in the 
countries where militancy is most       
pronounced1 socialism is most highly    
developed4 ,sympathy1 which1 a          
generation ago1 was taking the shape of 
justice1 is relapsing into generosity2  
and the generosity is exercised by      
inflicting injustice4 ,daily legislation
 betrays little anxiety that each shall 
have that which belongs to him1 but     
great anxiety that he shall have that   
which belongs to somebody else4  ,the   
formula of justice may be expressed     
thus3 ,every man is free to do that     
which he wills1 provided he infringes   
not the equal freedom of any other man4 
,this is not to be interpreted as       
meaning that aggression is permissible  

as long as retaliation is permitted2 for
 the formula means that interference    
with another's life is limited1 that    
life shall not be impeded in one case   
further than is necessary to the        
maintenance of other lives2 it does not 
countenance a superfluous interference  
on the ground that an equal interference
 may balance it4 ,in earlier stages1 the
 conception of justice was this         
erroneous one of a balancing of         
injuries--an eye for an eye and a tooth 
for a tooth4 ,by oscillations which     
become gradually less1 social           
equilibrium is approached2 and with this
 approach to equilibrium comes approach 
to a definite theory of equilibrium4    
,in the reigning school of politics and 
morals1 scorn is expressed for every    
doctrine which implies restraint of     
immediate expediency1 or what appears to
 be such2--contempt for generalizations 
and abstract principles1 with unlimited 
faith in political machinery4 ,strangely
 enough1 we find this approval of       

political empiricism and disbelief in   
any other guidance1 in the world of     
science also4 ,the accepted scientific  
fact that causation holds of the actions
 of incorporated men as of other parts  
of nature1 remains a dead letter2 there 
is no attempt to identify the causation1
 and ridicule is visited upon those who 
endeavor to find a definite expression  
for the fundamental principle of        
harmonious social order4  ,peoples with 
whom confusion is not caused by the     
conflicting disciplines of outer war and
 internal peace1 early arrive at the    
principle of equity1 and accordingly    
some uncivilized tribes show a stronger 
sense of it than is found among         
civilized peoples4 ,nevertheless1 the   
conception of justice has slowly evolved
 to some extent1 and is expressed in    
such formulae as1 ,do unto others as ye 
would that others should do unto you    
7too sweeping a statement of the        
equality of claims1 since it implies no 
recognition of the inequality necessary 

in the shares of good respectively      
appropriate71 or in the ,kantian rule1  
which is an allotropic form of the      
,christian rule4 ,jurists1 too1 have    
recognized a natural law of equity      
underlying human law4 ,to the reproach  
that belief in such a law is an a priori
 belief1 it may be answered that a      
priori beliefs are explained by the     
theory of evolution1 as arising with    
determination of the nervous system and 
certain resulting necessities of        
thought1 and that they differ from a    
posteriori beliefs merely in the        
circumstance that they are the products 
of the experiences of innumerable       
successive individuals1 instead of the  
experiences of a single individual4 ,if 
we ask for the ground of the greatest   
happiness principle1 we come to an a    
priori belief also2 for whence is the   
postulate8 ,if it is an induction1 where
 and by whom has the induction been     
drawn2 and if it is a truth of          
experience derived from careful         

observation1 then what are the          
observations1 and when was there        
generalized that vast mass of them on   
which all politics and morals should be 
built8 ,not only are there no such      
experiences1 no such observations1 no   
such inductions1 but it is impossible   
that any should be assigned4 ,the like  
is true of ,bentham's rule3 ,everybody  
to count for one1 nobody for more than  
one1 and also of the objection to this  
rule1 that happiness cannot be divided1 
or greatest happiness obtained1 by equal
 division of the means to happiness2    
they all lead1 in the last analysis1 to 
an a priori belief4 ,moreover1 the rule 
of natural equity1 the freedom of each  
limited only by the like freedom of all1
 is not an exclusively a priori belief1 
but although the immediate dictum of the
 human consciousness after subjection to
 the discipline of prolonged social     
life1 it is deducible from the          
conditions to be fulfilled1 firstly for 
the maintenance of life at large1 and   

secondly for the maintenance of social  
life4  ,rights1 properly so-called1 are 
corollaries from the law of equal       
freedom1 and so far is it from its being
 true1 as some claim1 that the warrant  
for what are properly called rights is  
derived from law1 it is1 conversely1    
true that law derives its warrant from  
them4  ,in the application of this      
theory to practical questions1 ,mr4     
,spencer's ,justice differs from ,social
 ,statics1 which it resembles in form   
and method1 in general in the greatly   
increased conservatism of the views     
expressed4 ,this is shown in all parts  
of the book1 though perhaps most clearly
 in those parts relating to the ,rights 
of ,women1 to the ,land ,question1 and  
to the ,limits of ,state-,duties4       
,social ,statics advocated              
land-nationalization2 but ,justice1     
though still asserting the original     
right of the aggregate of men forming   
the community to the use of the earth1  
as that from which all material objects 

capable of being owned are derived and  
so that on which the right to property  
is originally dependent1 denies the     
expediency and the justice of a present 
redistribution of the land according to 
this principle2 and this because of the 
confusion of claims at the present time1
 the impossibility of ascertaining whose
 ancestors were the robbers and whose   
the robbed in the gradually arising     
monopoly1 the wrong of making           
descendants responsible for the sins of 
their ancestors1 and leaving those now  
dependent on the land without           
compensation for their loss1 and the    
fact that any claim to the land is      
merely a claim to it in its original    
condition1 not in its present state of  
drainage and cultivation effected by the
 labor of generations4 ,moreover1 under 
the existing system of ownership1 those 
who manage the land experience a direct 
connection between effort and benefit1  
while1 were it under state-ownership1   
those who managed it would experience no

 such direct connection4 ,the vices of  
officialism would inevitably entail     
immense evils4  ,the whole of the       
practical part of ,justice is especially
 directed against ,socialism2 in        
general1 the course of history shows a  
less and less interference with personal
 freedom1 and growing benefit from this 
cause4 ,the practicality of woman       
suffrage and of universal man suffrage  
at the present time is denied4 ,if      
earlier legislation was too much for the
 benefit of wealthy and ruling classes1 
recent extensions of the suffrage have  
resulted in still more injurious        
class-legislation of another sort4  ,in 
this book1 ,mr4 ,spencer seems to adhere
 to his theory of a final perfect       
adaptation to the conditions of social  
life4 ,not only is the distinction      
between ,relative and ,absolute ,ethics 
still drawn1 but there are numerous     
references to an ultimate state1 though 
certain of these references might       
suggest the view that by such a state   

was meant only the attainment of so     
great a degree of civilization as would 
involve the cessation of wars4#di ,other
 passages1 however1 seem to contradict  
this view4 ,one may be especially cited2
 it is as follows3 ,this law of the     
gradual reestablishment of deranged     
harmony1 through adaptation and         
heredity1 holding of human beings among 
others1 implies that the nature which we
 inherit from an uncivilized past1 and  
which is still very imperfectly fitted  
to the partially-civilized present1     
will1 if allowed to do so1 slowly adjust
 itself to the requirements of a        
fully-civilized future4 ,and after some 
consideration of adaptation up to the   
present time1 the paragraph concludes3  
,if1 in the course of these few thousand
 years1 the discipline of social life   
has done so much1 it is folly to suppose
 that it cannot do more--folly to       
suppose that it will not1 in course of  
time1 do all that has to be done4#ej    
,but in the abridged and revised edition

 of ,social ,statics 7#ahib71 the       
following passage occurs as part of a   
note at the end of the chapter on ,the  
,evanescence 78 ,diminution7 of ,evil4  
,the rate of progress towards any       
adapted form must diminish with the     
approach to complete adaptation1 since  
the force producing it must diminish2 so
 that other causes apart1 perfect       
adaptation can be reached only in       
infinite time4#ea  ,vol4 ,i4 of ,the    
,principles of ,ethics1 including ,parts
 ,i41 ,,ii41 and ,,iii41 appeared in    
,august1 #ahib4 ,in this volume1 ,the   
,data of ,ethics1 reprinted as ,part    
,i41 remains unchanged1 except for one  
or two unimportant sentences4 ,to this  
,part ,i4 is1 however1 appended a       
chapter which was1 according to ,mr4    
,spencer1 written for the first         
publication of ,the ,data of ,ethics1   
but was either put aside for some       
reason1 or else overlooked1 probably the
 latter1 says the author1 since it      
contains material which should have been

 embodied4 ,the chapter is headed ,the  
,conciliation1 and seems to correspond  
to the two chapters on ,trial and       
,compromise and ,conciliation which     
follow the chapters on ,egoism versus   
,altruism1 and ,altruism versus ,egoism2
 for it begins with a consideration of  
the conflict of claims shown by the last
 two chapters1 the apparent             
impossibility of the establishment of an
 equilibrium1 and the consequent        
apparent necessity of self-sacrifice4   
,but this conflict between egoism and   
altruism is merely transitional and is  
in process of gradual disappearance1 in 
the same manner in which the present    
degree of conciliation of the two has   
been reached1--namely1 by the growth of 
such a constitution in each creature as 
entails pleasure in altruistic action4  
,even with the lower animals1 the acts  
which are necessary to care for ova or  
young are the fulfilment of an instinct 
which is gratified by the act2 and in   
the human race1 conciliation between    

egoism and altruism1 which goes hand in 
hand with evolution1 has reached a high 
degree4 ,in the evolution of the human  
race itself1 from savagery to its       
present condition1 there has been a     
marked increase of this conciliation2   
this is true not only in the family1 but
 to a small extent also with regard to  
the larger groups of men constituting   
societies4 ,there is decrease of        
cruelty1 increase of justice1 both in   
the form of state institutions and in   
their methods of administration1 more   
active benevolence1 and a public        
sentiment that leads large numbers of   
people to find egoistic gratification in
 the pursuit of the general good even to
 the neglect of private interests4      
,self-sacrifice thus ceases to be       
sacrifice in the ordinary sense of the  
word1 since it comes to bring with it   
more pleasure than pain4 ,the future    
must hold in store changes analogous to 
those of the past1 but these must go on 
much more rapidly under the present     

comparatively peaceful organization of  
society than they have during the       
militant life of the past4 ,this moral  
development is retarded1 however1 not   
only by the degree of militancy yet     
existing1 but also by the necessity for 
a certain degree of bluntness of        
feeling1 too great sensitiveness to the 
suffering of others entailing1 while the
 pressure of population is as great as  
at present1 a misery that would make    
life intolerable4 ,it is likely that1   
with social progress1 human fertility   
will decrease as cerebral activity      
increases1 until a comparative balance  
of fertility and mortality is reached as
 human evolution approaches its limit of
 complete adaptation to the social      
state2 and sympathy will increase in    
proportion1 no longer entailing on its  
possessor more of pain than of pleasure1
 but the contrary4 ,sympathy is the root
 of every other kind of altruism than   
that which1 from the beginning1         
originates the parental activities4 ,it 

is the root of that higher altruism     
which1 apart from the philoprogenitive  
instinct1 produces desire for the       
happiness of others and reluctance to   
inflict pain upon them4 ,these two      
traits are inevitably associated4 ,the  
same mental faculty which reproduces in 
the individual consciousness the        
feelings that are being displayed by    
other beings1 acts equally to reproduce 
those states when they are pleasurable  
or when they are painful4  ,the general 
corollary from the above-described      
process of evolution is that1 with the  
increase of sympathy there arises the   
double result1 that by its increase it  
tends to decrease the causes of human   
misery1 and in proportion as it does    
this1 it becomes itself the cause of    
further reflected happiness received by 
each from others4 ,and the limit towards
 which this evolution approaches is one 
under which1 as the amount of pain      
suffered by those around from individual
 imperfections and from imperfections of

 social arrangement and conduct1 becomes
 relatively small1 and simultaneously   
the growth of sympathy goes on with     
little check1 the sympathy becomes at   
the same time almost exclusively a      
source of pleasure received from the    
happiness of others1 and not of pains   
received from their pains4 ,and as this 
condition is approached1 the function of
 sympathy is not that of stimulating to 
self-sacrifice and of entailing upon its
 possessor positive or negative pain1   
but its function becomes that of making 
him a recipient of positive pleasure4   
,thus altruism will overgrow egoism1    
becoming itself a source of egoistic    
pleasure1 and eventually1 with the      
diminution of the pressure of           
population1 there will come a state in  
which egoism and altruism are so        
conciliated that the one merges in the  
other4  ,among the social animals1 with 
the ant and the bee1 for instance1 who  
cannot be supposed to possess a sense of
 duty1 we see that this identification  

of egoism and altruism1 as necessary to 
social life1 has taken place to a       
considerable extent2 and since pleasure 
of every kind is the concomitant of     
nervous structure1 we can understand the
 pleasure in altruistic as well as in   
egoistic activities1 as soon as there   
exists the nervous structure answering  
to these activities4 ,as certainly as   
there yet exist in civilized men        
instincts of the chase inherited from   
savage ancestors1 there are growing up  
and will continue to grow up in men1    
these other structures which will prompt
 to altruistic activities4  ,part ,,ii4 
of ,the ,principles of ,ethics is       
concerned with ,the ,inductions of      
,ethics4 ,it opens with a chapter on the
 confusion of ethical thought due to the
 fact that1 conforming to the general   
law of evolution1 the set of conceptions
 constituting ethics1 together with the 
associated sentiments1 arise out of a   
relatively incoherent and indefinite    
consciousness2 and slowly acquire       

coherence and definiteness at the same  
time that the aggregate of them         
differentiates from the larger aggregate
 with which it originally mingled4 ,long
 remaining undistinguished1 and then but
 vaguely discernible as something       
independent1 ethics must be expected to 
acquire a distinct embodiment only when 
mental evolution has reached a high     
stage4 ,originally1 ethics has no       
existence apart from religion1 which    
holds it in solution4 ,religion itself1 
in its earliest form1 is undistinguished
 from ancestor-worship1 which passes1 in
 the second stage1 into worship of dead 
rulers1 and is a method of propitiation1
 prompted by self-interest4 ,among some 
peoples1 the idea of sin is limited to  
offences against the gods2 and in those 
other cases where there are ethical     
commands1 the propriety of not offending
 ,god is the primary reason given for   
obeying them4 ,this last phase of       
thought is illustrated by the religion  
of the ,hebrews1 among whom good and bad

 conduct was but little associated with 
the intrinsic natures of right and      
wrong4 ,the popular belief is still that
 right and wrong become such by divine  
fiat4  ,the gods of primitive1 warlike  
peoples were gods of war1 and the belief
 in the moral virtue and honor of war   
still holds large place in the thought  
of the world4 ,the ethics of enmity1    
thus taught at the same time with the   
ethics of amity necessary to the        
internal life of society1 gave rise to  
utterly inconsistent and contradictory  
sentiments and ideas1 which1 in         
considerable measure1 still exist side  
by side1 in our churches and outside    
them4  ,but1 together with these ethical
 conceptions1 there have slowly evolved 
other1 utilitarian conceptions1 derived 
from a recognition of the natural       
consequences of acts4 ,authority has    
been introduced into these conceptions  
as the source of the duty of action in  
accordance with them2 yet there has     
generally been also some perception of  

their fitness4 ,such utilitarian        
conceptions are to be found in the later
 ,hebrew writings1 among the ,egyptians1
 ,greeks1 etc4 ,the divergence of       
expediency-ethics from theological      
ethics is well illustrated in ,paley1   
who in his official character derived   
right and wrong from divine commands1   
and in his unofficial character derived 
them from observation of consequences4  
,since his day1 the last of these views 
has spread at the expense of the first4 
,a still further simultaneous origin of 
moral dictates is found in the          
sentiments which have arisen with such  
habits of conformity to rules of conduct
 as have been furthered by survival of  
the fittest4 ,we thus have a conflict of
 ethical ideas arising from the conflict
 of these various sanctions2 and also   
from the further conflict that ensues   
where a later religion has been grafted 
on a more primitive one1 as is the case 
everywhere in ,christendom4  ,among     
modern writers who assert the existence 

of a moral sense1 there is a division   
between those who regard the dicta of   
conscience as supreme1 and those who    
hold them to be subordinate to divine   
commands4 ,the two are agreed in so far 
as they regard conscience as having a   
supernatural origin2 and1 in that they  
both recognize the moral sentiment as   
innate and suppose human nature to be   
everywhere the same1 they are also1 by  
implication1 alike in supposing that the
 moral sentiment is identical in all    
men4  ,but as a matter of fact1 the     
moral sentiment is connected with       
entirely different rules among different
 peoples1 prescribing monogamy among one
 people1 polygamy among another2        
demanding faithfulness and chastity on  
the part of women among one people1     
encouraging adultery among another1 etc4
  ,common elements in all codes of rules
 for conduct are the consciousness of   
authority1 whether that of a ,god1 of a 
ruler or government1 or of conscience1  
the more or less definite sense of power

 or coercion on the part of this        
authority1 and the representation of    
public opinion4 ,these elements1        
combined in different proportions1      
result in an idea and a feeling of      
obligation1 forming a body of thought   
and feeling which may be termed         
pro-ethical1 and which1 with the mass of
 mankind1 stands in place of the        
ethical4  ,for now let us observe that  
the ethical sentiment and idea1 properly
 so-called1 are independent of the ideas
 and sentiments above described as      
derived from external authorities1 and  
coercions1 and approbations--religious1 
political1 or social4 ,the true moral   
consciousness which we name conscience  
does not refer to those extrinsic       
results of conduct which take the shape 
of praise or blame1 reward or           
punishment1 externally awarded2 but it  
refers to the intrinsic results of      
conduct which in part and by some       
intellectually perceived1 are mainly and
 by most intuitively felt4 ,the moral   

consciousness proper does not           
contemplate obligations as artificially 
imposed by an external power2 nor is it 
chiefly occupied with estimates of the  
amounts of pleasure and pain which given
 actions may produce1 though these may  
be clearly or dimly perceived2 but it is
 chiefly occupied with recognition of1  
and regard for1 those conditions by     
fulfilment of which happiness is        
achieved or misery avoided4 ,it may or  
may not be in harmony with the          
pro-ethical sentiment2 but in any case  
it is vaguely or distinctly recognized  
as the rightful ruler1 responding as it 
does to consequences which are not      
artificial and variable1 but to         
consequences which are natural and      
permanent4 ,with the established        
supremacy of this ethical sentiment1 the
 feeling of obligation retires into the 
background1 right actions being         
performed spontaneously or from liking4 
,though1 while the moral nature is      
imperfectly developed1 there may often  

arise conformity to the ethical         
sentiment under a sense of compulsion by
 it2 and though1 in other cases1        
non-conformity to it may cause          
subsequent self-reproach 7as instance a 
remembered lack of gratitude1 which may 
be a source of pain without there being 
any thought of extrinsic penalty72 yet  
with a moral nature completely balanced1
 neither of these feelings will arise1  
because that which is done is done in   
satisfaction of the appropriate desire4 
,where the really ethical sentiment     
conflicts with the factitious idea and  
sentiment of obedience to legal         
authority1 the latter may rule at the   
expense of the former1 as1 for instance1
 in the case of a pedler condemned for  
selling without a license4 ,his act of  
selling is morally justifiable1 and     
forbidding him to sell without a license
 is morally unjustifiable--is an        
interference with his due liberty which 
is ethically unwarranted4  ,the         
remainder of ,part ,,ii4 of the         

,principles of ,ethics is occupied with 
data cited to show that the amount of   
internal aggression1 of revenge and     
robbery1 is greater among peoples much  
occupied with external aggression1 and  
that these decrease1 while justice1     
generosity 7which ,mr4 ,spencer defines 
as having a double root1 in the         
philoprogenitive instinct and the       
relatively modern feeling of sympathy71 
humanity 7including kindness1 pity1     
mercy71 filial obedience1 and industry1 
increase as more peaceful habits are    
reached4 ,a greater veracity is also    
indirectly the result of this evolution1
 since a coercive internal structure of 
society is connected with external      
enmity1 and such coercive structure is  
unfavorable to veracity4 ,chastity also 
increases with the social evolution1    
though it does not necessarily          
characterize societies of the           
non-militant type4 ,its increase is     
connected with the growth of the higher 
moral and aesthetic feelings2 romantic  

love plays a predominant part in our    
art4 ,intemperance1 as causing1         
indirectly1 social evil by a lowering of
 social efficiency1 must1 in like       
manner1 decrease with social            
advancement4  ,in summing up his        
inductions1 ,spencer says3 ,though1 as  
shown in my first work1 ',social        
,statics1' ,i once espoused the doctrine
 of the intuitive moralists1444 yet it  
has gradually become clear to me that   
the qualifications required practically 
obliterate the doctrine as enunciated by
 them4 ,it has become clear to me that  
if1 among ourselves1 the current belief 
is that a man who robs and does not     
repent will be eternally damned1 while  
an accepted proverb among the ,bilochs  
is1 that ',god will not favor a man who 
does not steal and rob'2 it is          
impossible to hold that men have in     
common an innate perception of right and
 wrong4  ,but now1 while we are shown   
that the moral sense doctrine in its    
original form is not true1 we are also  

shown that it adumbrates a truth1 and a 
much higher truth4 ,for the facts       
cited444 unite in proving that the      
sentiments and ideas current in each    
society become adjusted to the kinds of 
activity predominating in it4444 ,if the
 life of internal amity continues       
unbroken from generation to generation1 
there must result not only the          
appropriate code1 but the appropriate   
emotional nature4444 ,men so conditioned
 will acquire1 to the degree needful for
 complete guidance1 that innate         
conscience which intuitive moralists    
erroneously suppose to be possessed by  
mankind at large4 ,there needs but a    
continuance of absolute peace           
externally1 and a rigorous insistance on
 non-aggression internally1 to insure   
the moulding of men into a form         
naturally characterized by all the      
virtues4 ,complete exemption from war   
has already been attained by some few   
isolated peoples4 ,may we not reasonably
 infer that the state reached by these  

small uncultured tribes may be reached  
by the great cultured nations1 when the 
life of internal amity shall be         
unqualified by the life of external     
enmity8  ,part ,,iii4 of the ,principles
 of ,ethics is occupied with practical  
considerations concerning ,the ,ethics  
of ,individual ,life1 under the headings
 ,activity1 ,rest1 ,nutrition1          
,stimulation1 ,culture1 ,amusements1    
,marriage1 ,parenthood4 ,of the general 
ethical relation of the individual to   
society1 ,spencer says3--,integration   
being the primary process of evolution1 
we may expect that the aggregate of     
conceptions constituting ethics enlarges
 at the same time that its components   
acquire heterogeneity1 definiteness1 and
 that kind of cohesion which system     
gives to them4 ,as fulfilling this      
expectation1 we may first note that     
while drawing within its range of       
judgment numerous actions of men towards
 one another which at first were not    
recognized as right or wrong1 it finally

 takes into its sphere the various      
divisions of private conduct--those     
actions of each individual which        
directly concern himself only1 and in   
but remote ways concern his fellows4    
,ethics has been commonly regarded as   
merely a system of interdicts on certain
 kinds of acts which men would like to  
do and of injunctions to perform certain
 acts which they would like not to do4  
,it says nothing about the great mass of
 acts constituting normal life1 though  
these have their ethical aspect4 ,the   
pleasurable has been too often regarded 
as outside the legitimate sphere of     
ethical approval1 where not directly the
 rightful subject of ethical            
disapproval4 ,but pleasure is an        
accompaniment of vitality1 and furthers 
the vital activities2 and if the general
 happiness is to be the aim of action1  
then the happiness of each unit is a fit
 aim2 and there is unquestionably a     
division of ethics which yields sanction
 to all the normal actions of individual

 life1 while it forbids the abnormal    
ones4 ,there is an altruistic as well as
 an egoistic justification of the care  
for self1 since the health of           
descendants and the ability to provide  
for offspring is directly concerned2 and
 since such care is needful to exclude  
the risk of becoming a burden to others4
 ,and there is a further positive       
justification of egoism which results   
from the obligation to expend some      
effort for others1 and to become1 as far
 as possible1 a source of social        
pleasure to others4  ,it will be seen1  
from the above analysis1 that the       
chapter appended to ,part ,i4 still     
speaks of an ultimate state of complete 
adjustment to social life#eb2 this      
chapter was1 however1 published from the
 original ,,ms4 without alteration4     
,some passages in ,part ,,ii4 seem to   
involve the same idea of a possible     
complete attainment of the ethical      
end1#ec but ,part ,,iii4 closes with    
reference to an approximately complete  

adjustment of the nature to the life    
which has to be led4  ,,footnotes3  #ch 
,spencer elsewhere says due exercise1   
vide p4 #gf4  #ci ,essay on ,morals and 
,moral ,sentiment4  #dj ,p4 #aje4  #da  
,vide ,principles of ,psychology4  #db  
,p4 #ajd4  #dc ,pp4 #ajd1aje4  #dd ,pp4 
#ajh1 #aji4  #de ,pp4 #acd1 #adh4  #df  
,p4 #adg4  #dg ,pp4 #bjb1 #bjc4  #dh ,p4
 #bca4  #di ,see pp4 #ga1 #aic4  #ej    
,pp4 #beh1 #bei4  #ea ,as the revision  
of the theoretical part of this book    
chiefly consists1 like its abridgment1  
in the elimination of the references to 
,divine ,will and other earlier views   
held before acquaintance with ,darwin's 
theory of life1 there is nothing in the 
book1 in distinction from ,mr4          
,spencer's other later works1 that needs
 especially to be considered here4  #eb 
,see1 for instance1 supra1 p4 #gj4  #ec 
,see supra1 p4 #ge4     ,,john ,,fiske  
,as ,herbert ,spencer's closest         
follower1 ,john ,fiske deserves to stand
 next him in order of analysis4 ,fiske  

accepts1 though evidently with          
reluctance1 what he terms the terrible  
theory of evolution1 which establishes  
the fact of man's consanguinity with    
dumb beasts4 ,in his book on ,the       
,destiny of ,man 7#ahhd71 he sets forth 
his theory of the evolution of society  
as foreshowing man's final destiny4     
,with regard to the beginnings of       
psychical development in the course of  
evolution1 he thus expresses himself3   
,at length there came a wonderful       
moment2--silent and unnoticed1 even as  
the day of the ,lord which cometh like a
 thief in the night1 there arrived that 
wonderful moment at which psychical     
changes began to be of more use than    
physical changes to the brute ancestor  
of man4 ,through further ages of        
ceaseless struggle the profitable       
variations in this creature occurred    
oftener and oftener in the brain1 and   
less often in other parts of the        
organism1 until bye and bye the size of 
his brain had been doubled and its      

complexity of structure increased a     
thousandfold1 while in other respects   
his appearance was not so very different
 from that of his brother apes4444 ,no  
fact in nature is fraught with deeper   
meaning than this two-sided fact of the 
extreme physical similarity and enormous
 psychical divergence between man and   
the group of animals to which he traces 
his pedigree4 ,it shows that when       
humanity began to be evolved1 an        
entirely new chapter in the history of  
the universe was opened4 ,henceforth the
 life of the nascent soul came to be    
first in importance1 and the bodily life
 became subordinated to it4 ,henceforth 
it appeared that the process of         
zooelogical change had come to an end1  
and a process of psychological change   
was to take its place4 ,henceforth along
 this supreme line there was to be no   
further evolution of new species through
 physical variation1 but through the    
accumulation of psychical variations one
 particular species was to be           

indefinitely perfected4444 ,henceforth1 
in short1 the dominant aspect of        
evolution was to be1 not the genesis of 
species1 but the progress of            
civilization4444 ,in the deadly struggle
 for existence1 which has raged         
throughout countless aeons of time1 the 
whole creation has been groaning and    
travailing together in order to bring   
forth that last consummate specimen of  
,god's handiwork1 the ,human ,soul4     
,and further1 of the genesis of this    
,human ,soul3 ,with the growth of the   
higher centres1 the capacities of action
 become so various and indeterminate    
that definite direction is not given to 
them until after birth4 ,by the increase
 of cerebral surface1 infancy1 which is 
the period of plasticity1 is prolonged1 
,man becomes teachable1 and though      
inherited tendencies and aptitudes still
 form the foundations of character1 yet 
the career of the individual is no      
longer wholly predetermined by the      
careers of its ancestors1 but individual

 experience comes to count as an        
enormous factor in modifying the career 
of mankind from generation to           
generation4  ,the psychical development 
of humanity since its earlier stages has
 been largely due to the reaction of    
individuals upon one another in those   
various relations which we characterize 
as social4  ,foreshadowings of social   
relations occur in the animal world4    
,rudimentary moral sentiments are also  
clearly discernible in the highest      
members of various mammalian orders and 
in all but the lowest members of our own
 order4 ,but in respect of definiteness 
and permanence1 the relations between   
animals in a state of gregariousness    
fall far short of the relations between 
individuals in the rudest human society4
 ,the primordial unit of human society  
is the family1 the establishment of     
which was made necessary and took place 
through the lengthening of infancy4     
,when childhood had come to extend over 
a period of ten or a dozen years1 a     

period which would have been doubled    
where several children were born in     
succession to the same parents1 the     
relationships between father and mother1
 brothers and sisters1 must have become 
firmly knit2 thus the family came into  
existence1 and the way was opened for   
the growth of sympathies and ethical    
feelings4 ,the rudimentary form of the  
ethical feelings was that of the        
transient affection of a female bird or 
mammal for its young4 ,first given a    
definite direction through the genesis  
of the primitive human family1 the      
development of altruism has yet scarcely
 kept pace with the general development 
of intelligence2 the advance of         
civilized man in justice and kindness   
has been less marked than his advance in
 quick intelligence4 ,but the creative  
energy which has been thus at work      
through the bygone eternity is not going
 to become quiescent to-morrow2 the     
psychical development of man is destined
 to go on in the future as it has in the

 past4 ,and from the ,origin of ,man1   
when thoroughly comprehended1 we may    
catch some glimpses of his destiny4     
,the earlier condition of things was a  
state of universal warfare1 on account  
of the limitation of the food-supply4   
,this warfare was checked by the        
beginnings of industrial civilization1  
which made it possible for a vastly     
greater population to live upon a given 
area1 and in many ways favored social   
compactness4 ,a new basis of political  
combination was now furnished by        
territorial continuity and by community 
of occupation4 ,the supply of food was  
no longer strictly limited1 for it could
 be indefinitely increased by peaceful  
industry2 and1 moreover1 in the free    
exchange of the products of labor1 it   
ceased to be true that one man's        
interest was opposed to another's4 ,men 
did not1 it is true1 at once recognize  
this fact1 but have done so only        
gradually4 ,when the clan had grown into
 the state1 and the state into the      

empire1 in which many states were       
brought together in pacific relations1  
the recognized sphere of moral          
obligation became enlarged1 until at    
length it comprehended all mankind4 ,the
 coalescence of groups of men into      
larger and larger political aggregates  
has been the chief work of civilization2
 and the chief obstacle to such         
coalescence has been warfare4 ,great    
political bodies have arisen in three   
ways4 ,the first1 conquest without      
incorporation1 proved itself suicidal4  
,the second way was conquest with       
incorporation1 but without              
representation2 and this lacking1 the   
government retrograded and gradually    
became a despotism4 ,the third method1  
federation1 has been the policy of the  
,english government4 ,the advantage of  
the habit of self-government has been   
shown in ,england's wide conquest and   
colonization4 ,the federative method of 
political union1 pacific in its very    
conception1 is assuming an              

unquestionable sway and destined to     
become universal2 the progress of the   
race will be1 as it has been1 with the  
gradual elimination of warfare4  ,in a  
race of inferior animals1 any           
maladjustment is quickly removed by     
natural selection4 ,but in man there is 
a wide interval between the highest and 
lowest degree of completeness which are 
compatible with maintenance of life2 in 
all grades of civilization above the    
lowest1 there are so many kinds of      
superiorities which severally enable men
 to survive1 notwithstanding            
accompanying inferiorities1 that natural
 selection cannot1 by itself1 rectify   
any particular unfitness4 ,hence1 the   
action of natural selection upon man has
 long since been essentially diminished 
through the operation of social         
conditions4 ,therefore the wicked       
flourish4 ,vice is but slowly           
eliminated1 because mankind has so many 
other qualities1 besides the bad ones1  
which enable it1 in spite of them1 to   

subsist and achieve progress4  ,the     
fundamental difference between civilized
 man and the savage lies in the         
representative power1 the imagination1  
by which men comprehend pleasure and    
pain in others4 ,use and disuse1 in     
place of natural selection1 have come to
 be paramount with man2 and though the  
ethical emotions are still too feeble1  
they will be more and more strengthened 
by use1 while the manifestation of      
selfish and hateful feelings will be    
more and more weakened by disuse4 ,man  
is slowly passing from a primitive      
social state1 in which he was little    
better than a brute1 toward an ultimate 
social state1 in which his character    
shall have become so transformed that   
nothing of the brute can be detected in 
it4 ,the original sin of theology is the
 brute inheritance1 which is being      
gradually eliminated2 and the message of
 ,christianity3 ,blessed are the meek1  
for they shall inherit the earth will be
 realized in the state of universal     

peace towards which mankind is tending4 
,strife and ,sorrow shall disappear4    
,peace and ,love shall reign supreme4   
,the goal of evolution is the perfecting
 of man1 whereby we see1 more than ever1
 that he is the chief object of divine  
care1 the fruition of that creative     
energy which is manifested throughout   
the knowable universe4  ,we know soul   
only in connection with body4 ,yet      
nothing could be more grossly           
unscientific than the famous remark of  
,cabanis that the brain secretes thought
 as the liver secretes bile2 the        
molecular movements of the brain and the
 phenomena of thought and feeling are   
merely concomitants related in some     
unknown way4 ,it is not even correct to 
say that thought goes on in the brain4  
,he who regards man as the consummate   
fruition of creative energy and the     
chief object of divine care1 is almost  
irresistibly driven to the belief that  
the soul's career is not completed with 
the life upon the earth4 ,difficulties  

to this theory he will meet2 yet the    
alternative view contains difficulties  
at least as great2 nor is there any     
problem in the simplest and most exact  
departments of science which does not   
speedily lead us to a transcendental    
problem that we can neither solve nor   
elude4 ,a broad common sense argument   
has often to be called in1 where        
keen-edged metaphysical analysis has    
confessed itself baffled4 ,the doctrine 
of evolution does not allow us to take  
the atheistic view of the position of   
man2 the ,darwinian theory1 properly    
understood1 replaces as much teleology  
as it destroys4 ,in the ,titanic events 
of the development of worlds from the   
nebular mist and their                  
after-destruction1 we may find no signs 
of purpose1 or even of a dramatic       
tendency2 but on the earth we do find   
distinct indications of a dramatic      
tendency2 though doubtless not of       
purpose in the limited human sense4 ,are
 we to regard the ,creator's work as    

like that of a child1 who builds houses 
out of blocks just for the pleasure of  
knocking them down again8 ,on such a    
view the riddle of the universe becomes 
a riddle without a meaning4 ,i can see  
no insuperable difficulty in the notion 
that at some period in the evolution of 
humanity this divine spark the soul may 
have acquired sufficient concentration  
and steadiness to survive the wreck of  
material forms and endure forever4 ,such
 a crowning wonder seems to me no more  
than the fit climax to a creative work  
that has been ineffably beautiful and   
marvellous in all its myriad stages4    
,fiske gives some further definition of 
social evolution in man1 in his ,cosmic 
,philosophy 7#ahgd74 ,he there denies   
the incompatibility of free-will with   
causation1 saying that it is the        
doctrine of lawlessness1 and not the    
causationist doctrine1 which is         
incompatible with liberty and           
destructive of responsibility4#ed  ,he  
further postulates heterogeneity of the 

environment as the chief proximate      
determining cause of social progress1   
and defines such evolution as a         
continuous establishment of psychical   
relations within the community1 in      
conformity to physical and psychical    
relations arising in the environment1   
during which both the community and the 
environment pass from a state of        
relatively indefinite1 incoherent       
homogeneity to a state of relatively    
definite1 coherent heterogeneity2 and   
during which the constituent units of   
the community become ever more          
distinctly individual4#ee ,the progress 
of a community1 as of an organism1 is a 
process of adaptation--the continuous   
establishment of inner relations in     
conformity to outer relations4 ,if we   
contemplate material civilization under 
its widest aspect1 we discover its      
legitimate aim to be the attainment and 
maintenance of an equilibrium between   
the wants of men and the outward means  
of satisfying them4 ,and while          

approaching this goal1 society is ever  
acquiring in its economic structure both
 greater heterogeneity and greater      
specialization4 ,it is not only that    
agriculture1 manufactures1 commerce1    
legislation1 the acts of the ruler1 the 
judge1 and the physician1 have1 since   
ancient times1 grown immeasurably       
multiform1 both in their processes and  
in their appliances2 but it is also that
 this specialization has resulted in the
 greatly increased ability of society to
 adapt itself to the emergencies by     
which it is now beset4#ef ,religion1    
too1 is adjustment2 form after form has 
been outgrown and perished1 yet the life
 of ,christianity1 incorporated in ever 
higher forms1 is continually renewed4   
,the omission of the moral feeling1 as a
 factor1 from ,comte's interpretation of
 the progress of society1 is a fatal    
defect1 since moral and social progress 
depend more on feelings than on ideas4  
,as ,wallace shows1 tribes which        
combined for mutual help and protection1

 restrained appetite by foresight1 and  
felt sympathy1 would have an advantage  
in the struggle for existence4  ,as     
surely as the astronomer can predict the
 future state of the heavens1 the       
sociologist can foresee that the process
 of adaptation must go on until1 in a   
remote future1 it comes to an end in    
proximate equilibrium4 ,the increasing  
interdependence of human interests must 
eventually go far to realize the dream  
of the philosophic poet1 of a           
,parliament of ,man1 a ,federation of   
the ,world4  ',when the kindly earth    
shall slumber1 lapt in universal law1'  
and when the desires of each individual 
shall be in proximate equilibrium with  
the means of satisfying them and with   
the simultaneous desires of all         
surrounding individuals4#eg             
,,footnotes3  #ed ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #ahi4  
#ee ,ibid4 p4 #bbc1 #bbd4  #ef ,vol4    
,,ii4 p4 #bab4  #eg ,ibid4 pp4 #bbg1    
#bbh4     ,w4 ,h4 ,,rolph  ,,biological 
,,problems 7,biologische ,probleme1     

#ahhd7   ,for what purpose are we in the
 world8 asks the philosopher1 and lays1 
with this question1 the foundation for  
later errors4 ,in the effort to rescue  
from destruction the theory of a        
creative intelligence1 teleology has    
adapted itself to many forms of         
scientific theory1 not excepting that of
 evolution4 ,it reads into evolution    
progress towards what is1 in one way or 
another1 assumed to be an end4 ,but we  
really know1 in the universe1 nothing   
but continuity1 eternal change according
 to natural law1 and so only causae     
efficientes1 never causae finales2 and  
organic development as well as processes
 in inorganic nature are to be explained
 in this manner4 ,the assumption that   
the result of a process is an end       
towards which the process was directed  
is unwarranted4 ,the question of science
 is not3 ,wherefore is any creature in  
the world8 but3 ,what is he8 ,what is   
his actual aim1 that is1 his endeavor8  
,in the answer to this question1 all    

philosophical schools have something in 
common4 ,happiness1 in one form or      
another1 is acknowledged to be the end  
of life in this sense4 ,a follower of   
the utilitarian school may define       
happiness as the sublime feeling that   
one has taken part in the continuous    
improvement of humanity1 and the        
increase of human happiness1 but his    
words are less a definition of the      
concept than a designation of the way in
 which happiness is to be arrived at4   
,the sublime feeling can be represented 
only as a feeling of happiness1 of joy4 
,the religious theory1 too1 which       
represents the joys of religion on earth
 and in heaven1 as compensating for the 
evils of this life1 makes happiness the 
end of life1 though in a different      
manner4 ,spencer is right in declaring  
that happiness1 however it may be       
defined1 always means1 in the end1 a    
greater amount of pleasure than of pain4
 ,at this point1 however1 the harmony of
 the schools ceases4 ,the question as to

 the method by which this surplus of    
pleasure is to be obtained is answered  
in different ways4 ,all say1 indeed1 by 
seeking good and avoiding evil4 ,but    
opinion is divided as to what is good   
and what is evil4  ,rolph here          
introduces a long criticism of the      
different schools4 ,against             
utilitarianism he urges that1 in so far 
as it makes the happiness of the        
greatest number its principle1 it       
asserts the right of the majority over a
 minority1 and so advocates1 by         
implication1 an absolute subjection to  
authority4  ,our whole moral education  
has for its aim to give the young as    
high a conception as possible of the    
happiness which springs from virtue and1
 on the other hand1 to decry the        
pleasure which may result from forbidden
 acts4 ,we seek1 in this manner1 to     
diminish the inward struggle and bring  
about the right result4 ,he who has     
grown up under good influences escapes  
many temptations to which a man of less 

moral education falls a prey4 ,according
 to ,wallock1 who makes the degree of   
inner struggle the measure of virtue1   
the man of better education in this     
case1 the more moral man1 must have less
 merit than the less moral man4 ,wallock
 thus founders on the rock which ,kant  
so skilfully avoids2 according to the   
former1 the man whose lusts have been   
mastered by education could never equal 
the man of evil instincts1 and the      
chastity of a ,magdalen must be regarded
 as more moral than that of a pure      
woman4  ,spencer's theory1 that the     
conduct of the higher animals is better 
adjusted to ends than that of lower     
species1 is erroneous2 the lower animals
 are exactly as well organized for the  
ends of their existence as are the      
higher animals for theirs2 the tapeworm 
is relatively just as perfect as the    
human being1 in comparison with whom he 
possesses many superior qualities4 ,the 
common judgment that the human being is 
superior does not accord with the real  

adjustment of things1 but with our human
 conception of the ideal end of         
organization1 our anthropocentric idea  
of the aim of life4 ,we foolishly       
believe that the tapeworm and every     
other animal has the same end as the    
human being1 and rank the animals       
according to this principle1 instead of 
tracing the different genealogical      
branches to a like height and then      
comparing them4 ,not the fitness for    
ends1 but the kind and multiplicity of  
the ends for which there is fitness1    
determine our judgment2 and the ends by 
which we judge are those of our own     
life4 ,we judge subjectively and        
absolutely instead of objectively and   
relatively4 ,we are ever unconsciously  
influenced by the conception that       
nature1 in creating the tapeworm1 merely
 made a false step and a step backwards 
in her way towards the creation of man4 
,that all animals are adapted1 some in a
 greater1 some in a less degree1 to the 
ends of their existence1 is proved by   

the simple fact of their existence1 that
 is1 of their survival in the struggle  
for existence2 but which are in a       
higher1 and which are in a less degree  
so adapted1 is1 in the individual       
instance1 extremely difficult to        
determine4 ,in any attempt at such an   
estimate1 we must meet with peculiar    
difficulties1 resulting from the fact   
that we judge of the adaptation to ends 
with less certainty the further from us 
any animal is in its organization4 ,a   
comparison such as ,spencer institutes  
is possible only with respect to like   
functions of similar organs in closely  
related forms4  ,the assertion that     
increase of ability for                 
self-preservation leads to better care  
for the young1 and makes of such care a 
duty1 is likewise erroneous4 ,for1 up to
 the highly organized class of the      
crustacea1 we have no example of care   
for the young4 ,in the struggle for     
existence1 the species which survive    
must be such as not only are in         

themselves best fitted for survival1 but
 as also bring forth best fitted        
progeny4 ,nor has ,spencer made clear on
 what ground natural process is to be   
regarded as identical with duty4 ,in    
truth he has succeeded in showing only  
that care for the young is wide-spread  
in the animal kingdom1 from which fact  
naturally follows that it is a quality  
which tends to the preservation of      
species4  ,it cannot be conceded that   
such a perfection as ,spencer pictures1 
where each shall fulfil all the         
functions of his own life in the most   
perfect and complete manner without     
interfering with a like freedom in      
others1 is possible4 ,the assertion     
involves the extension to all living    
beings of that ideal principle of equal 
claims which ,spencer repudiates with   
regard to man1--showing that not all men
 are capable of a like degree of        
happiness and that individuals desire1  
moreover1 pleasure differing in quality4
 ,furthermore1 a world of beings which1 

like the animals and many plants1 can   
support life only by means of organic   
material1 must1 in order to exist1      
destroy organic life1 either animal or  
vegetable4 ,the theory does not even    
hold with regard to individuals of the  
same species2 ,spencer himself          
acknowledges the truth of the principles
 of ,malthus and of ,darwin1 according  
to which1 even with the lowest rate of  
increase1 a struggle of competition must
 soon arise between individuals of the  
same species4  ,nor does ,spencer's     
proof of the fundamental character of   
altruism hold1 on investigation4 ,he    
demonstrates that through the animal    
species up to man1 there is less and    
less self-sacrifice of the mother animal
 in giving birth to offspring4 ,but this
 physical sacrifice is not altruism2    
altruism lies in conscious care for the 
young after birth1 and this is not      
lessened1 but increased1 the higher we  
ascend4  ,that morality is but greater  
adjustment of acts to ends cannot be    

admitted4 ,if1 in ordinary speech1 the  
word good refers to greatest adjustment 
to ends1 whatever the ends may be1 that 
is no proof that it must have the same  
significance in ,ethics4 ,a good shot   
may be a good one in that it hits the   
mark2 but what if it kill a man8 ,the   
acts of criminals may be as well        
adjusted to their ends and as easy to   
predict as those of a good man4         
,spencer's theory would lead1           
consistently carried out1 to the        
principle that the means justify the    
end1 an assertion that is even more     
dangerous than its opposite4 ,the fact  
is1 that in ,ethics it is the nature of 
the end which is of importance4         
,spencer endeavors to show that only    
normal exercise of function is favorable
 to life1 and so moral2--that excess and
 deprivation are both injurious4 ,it is 
not true1 however1 that excess is always
 injurious2 within certain bounds it is 
made up for by reserves in the animal   
organism4 ,or1 if ,spencer should answer

 to this objection1 that his normal is  
not to be represented by a sharp line1  
difficult to keep to1 but by a broad    
road within which excess is safe1 such a
 representation would both burden his   
theory with two dividing-lines1 and     
moreover would not save it4 ,for he has 
not deemed it necessary to treat the    
concept normal to an exact definition1  
and we find him using it in his later   
deductions in an entirely new sense--not
 as equilibrium between capacity of     
function and its exercise1 but in the   
ideal significance of a harmony between 
the claims of the individual on the one 
side1 and those of the environment on   
the other4 ,this normal is nowhere      
actually to be found and cannot1 from   
the nature of things1 be arrived at4 ,by
 addition of this significance1 the word
 normal becomes indefinite in meaning1  
and is used1 now in one sense1 now in   
the other4 ,normal exercise of function 
has1 however1 nothing to do with the    
claims of the environment1 which        

generally demands1 indeed1 a deviation  
from the normal4  ,nor is ,spencer's    
analysis of the beginning of the process
 of food-seizure1 adduced in support of 
the theory that happiness and morality  
are commensurable1 confirmed by facts4  
,according to this theory1 the process  
of food-taking begins with the contact  
of animal and food1 in which act the    
commencement of diffusion of food in the
 body of the animal causes a pleasure   
which leads to the seizure of its prey  
and the further act of devouring it4    
,the theory might hold of the lowest    
organisms1 but could not be true of any 
animal furnished with an impenetrable   
shell or skin4 ,nor would the seizure   
follow with sufficient promptness if it 
were left to the action of the pleasure 
caused by diffusion4 ,moreover1 we      
should expect to find1 according to this
 theory1 a much more general and finer  
development of the organ of taste among 
the animals1--to find it as a special   
organ on the lowest planes of animal    

life2 it is1 on the contrary1 the latest
 of the special senses to develop4 ,it  
is the reaction on the sense of touch1  
the lowest and most general of the      
special senses1 which causes the seizure
 of nourishment4 ,we must1 therefore1   
deny that pleasure is the motive to the 
seizure of food1 and so1 too1 reject the
 conclusion that it is the motive to    
every other act4  ,besides arguing that 
normal function brings pleasure1        
,spencer has attempted to prove that all
 pleasure has its spring in normal      
function1 and is therefore moral4 ,could
 he succeed in so doing1 hedonism would 
be proved4 ,for since all schools agree 
in regarding happiness as the end of    
life1 and since all these1 in common1   
acknowledge happiness to be an excess of
 pleasure over pain1 enjoyment might be 
regarded as the absolute guide4 ,but if1
 as ,spencer acknowledges1 pleasure and 
morality are only in a perfectly adapted
 society commensurate1 then in only such
 a society can pleasure be the          

criterion2 and since we do not live in a
 perfectly adapted society1 the theory  
is not applicable to us1 and if         
practicably applied would be fatal to   
society4  ,against ,spencer's theory of 
the final spontaneity of morality1 many 
objections may be urged1 among others   
especially the one that such a morality 
ceases to be morality at all1 virtue    
being possible1 as ,kant has            
demonstrated1 only where a certain      
conquest of desire is achieved4 ,such a 
morality is1 moreover1 unattainable1 an 
extravagant fancy4   ,,the ,,problem    
,,of ,,food-,,taking  ,rolph thinks     
,spencer's theory awakes the conjecture 
that it was not first arrived at through
 investigation1 but rests upon a        
preconceived opinion1 as do to a greater
 or less extent all theories on this    
subject4 ,it seems as if the author had 
first attached himself to that theory   
which best accorded with his scientific 
bias1 and then tried whether this theory
 might be proved or supported by facts  

of biology and psychology4 ,one might   
surmise1 from the very skilful1 but     
often too artificial argument1 that the 
author pursued the following train of   
thought4 ,pleasure1 and indeed the      
greatest possible pleasure1 is the end  
of endeavor in the organic world1 that  
is1 the psychical cause of endeavor4    
,may it not also be the physical cause8 
,rolph answers this question with a     
denial1 and endeavors to show that the  
taking of food has its cause in the     
insatiability of all organic substance4 
,the theory of ,spontaneous ,generation 
contains nothing impossible or          
improbable2 is1 on the contrary1 a      
necessary logical assumption not to be  
disproved by the mere result of         
experiment under conditions of the      
laboratory4 ,it is easy to imagine that 
organic elements1 which are to be found 
in great quantities in inorganic nature1
 may come together by chance1 or rather 
in the natural order of things1 to the  
formation of protoplasm4  ,the movement 

of these masses of protoplasm seems1 at 
first glance1 to set the law of         
gravitation at defiance1 but we may     
answer that an ascending balloon might  
seem1 to an uninstructed observer1 to do
 the same1 although its movement is     
merely the natural result of that force2
 it is not necessary1 therefore1 to     
assume a free inner motive1 the soul1 as
 the cause of the one motion or the     
other4 ,the first assimilation of food  
has its beginning in the process of     
endosmose and exosmose1 in which the    
protoplasm1 as in general the denser    
fluid1 increases in volume1 taking up   
more than it gives out2 the process     
occurring1 in detail1 according to the  
special relations of attraction in the  
parts4 ,the organism always takes up the
 greatest amount possible under the     
circumstances1 exactly as1 in the       
inorganic world1 water takes up the     
greatest amount possible of salt or any 
other soluble substance2 the growth of a
 crystal1 and the oxidation of iron are 

illustrations of the same principle4 ,of
 the limit of this capacity to take up  
new matter into the organism we know    
nothing2 all recent experiments go to   
show that the organism is capable1 under
 propitious circumstances1 of an        
enormous receptivity1 such as1 under    
natural conditions1 it never reaches4   
,the lower animals feed continually1 and
 their whole lives are passed in this   
employment4 ,in plants the tendency is  
seen still more clearly4 ,experiments   
with electric1 violet1 and ultra-violet 
light show an enormous growth in plants 
exposed to its action4 ,but this can be 
only an indirect growth1 namely1 the    
exorbitant acceleration of organic      
change and assimilation4 ,this fact is  
proved by experiments turning on        
increase of warmth in soil2 from which  
is seen to result an unusual development
 of that part of the plant to which     
growth is especially directed at the    
time4 ,when the warmth of an incubator  
is increased1 the animal organ          

especially engaged in development at the
 time is affected in like manner4 ,so   
that we may assume that the organism is 
capable of responding to every demand   
that nature makes upon it under normal  
conditions2 and since the greatest      
possible assimilation under the existing
 conditions is thus removed from the    
control of the creature1 the latter     
appears practically insatiable4 ,this   
insatiability must appear to the        
observer an inner impulse of the        
organism1 an effort towards increase of 
nourishment4 ,it may be called          
mechanical hunger in distinction from   
psychical hunger1 of which it is the    
basis4 ,it is not necessary to take into
 consideration1 in the question as to   
the degree of assimilation possible1 the
 amount of excretion of substance by the
 organism2 we must1 on the contrary1    
assert that this is dependent upon the  
amount of assimilation4 ,the measure of 
growth depends1 therefore1 on the degree
 of assimilation of new material4 ,this 

degree1 however1 like the degree to     
which the matter may be dissolved in a  
liquid in the case of inorganic matter1 
is especially affected by light and     
warmth4 ,the creature which comes into  
existence in the sun will experience a  
decrease of organic change when placed  
in the shade2 and the creature which    
comes into existence in the shade will  
experience an increase of such change   
under the influence of the sun1 a       
decrease again with a return to the     
shade4 ,this decrease means             
hunger1--harm4 ,experiments with        
zooespores throw an interesting light   
upon these relations4 ,they show that   
the zooespores1 although suited to very 
different degrees of light1 all shun    
darkness4 ,although when in the light   
they soon come to rest1 divide1 and     
copulate1 they remain1 in the darkness1 
in a state of continual unrest and      
motion4 ,they grow so thin that they    
almost excite pity 7,strassburger71 and 
finally perish of hunger4 ,only such    

zooespores as are distinguished by sex  
and copulate come to rest1 or those of  
such sorts as prey upon others4 ,it is  
easy to perceive that the unrest of the 
zooespores in the darkness springs from 
lack of nourishment1 from hunger2 they  
seek feverishly for the light1 without  
which assimilation follows with         
insufficient energy to satisfy need and 
render life possible4 ,in darkness1     
copulation alone can do this2 copulation
 takes1 then1 the place of normal       
nourishment4  ,or let us consider the   
case of an organism which has originated
 in the shade4 ,heat1 as we know1       
increases chemical change1 in inorganic 
as well as organic matter2 it hastens   
the disintegration of certain compounds1
 and alone renders it possible in many  
cases4 ,in general1 we may assert that  
increase of temperature within certain  
limits increases assimilation2 that is1 
capacity to assimilate4 ,therefore1 if  
an animal is placed in the sun1 its     
capacity1 that is1 its need1 to         

assimilate is increased1 although       
assimilation is much more energetic than
 before4 ,need to assimilate or hunger  
is1 therefore1 dependent upon the supply
 of food1 although1 doubtless1 also on  
other conditions1 especially those of   
light and temperature4 ,if this is true1
 the hunger of a simple organism that   
assimilates energetically must be more  
intense than that of one which          
assimilates slowly1 in spite of the     
consumption of an enormous quantity of  
food in the case of the former4         
,botanists know 7,sachs1 ,lehrbuch der  
,botanik1 p4 #fac7 that growth may be so
 hastened by too high a temperature that
 assimilation 7especially under scanty  
light7 does not suffice to provide the  
necessary material for it4 ,the         
transpiration of the leaves may be so   
increased that the roots cannot repair  
the loss4 ,and on the other hand1 a too 
low temperature of the soil may so      
diminish the action of the roots that   
even a small loss by transpiration      

cannot be repaired4  ,at what stage of  
organization psychical hunger is added  
to mechanical hunger1 or whether it may 
be identified with it1 we cannot say4   
,in any case1 the former appears        
exceedingly early1 for excitations of   
hunger may be observed in creatures very
 low in the scale of being4 ,certainly  
hunger is never absent where there is   
movement4  ,hunger1 a sense of pain1 is1
 therefore1 the first impulse to        
action4#eh  ,with a like effort in the  
attempt to obtain food1 that organism   
will be best nourished which commands   
the best means of obtaining and         
preparing its food1--the best apparatus 
for the seizure and grinding of food1   
and the best salivary gland4 ,and       
finally1 greater surface of skin1 of    
lungs1 of gills1 or of intestines1      
causes greater capacity for             
assimilation1 and since this surface is 
increased by cell-division or           
propagation1 the capacity of the        
organism for assimilation grows with its

 capacity of propagation4#ei ,protoplasm
 is never entirely homogeneous1 and we  
must suppose some difference even in the
 beginning2 such difference is1 indeed1 
fundamental through the very composition
 of protoplasm from the four fundamental
 elements1 and this or that other       
element4 ,these different elements must 
be held together by forces of           
attraction1 and the direction of these  
forces must have some common centre     
represented by some differentiation of  
the protoplasm1 whether as clearer spot1
 or as nucleus4 ,this spontaneously     
generated organism1 neither animal nor  
plant1 is nourished1 as we have seen1 by
 diffusion1 by the transformation of    
inorganic into organic substance4 ,the  
lowest organisms possess no definite    
organs for taking food2 they manifest1  
however1 phenomena of movement which are
 exactly like those of the animal       
organism1 for they appear unconditioned 
and hence voluntary4 ,locomotion is1 in 
the lowest animal forms1 the only means 

of obtaining nourishment4 ,the amoeba   
surrounds and takes in whatever is by   
chance met with4 ,animals a little      
higher in the scale swim about and seek 
their food2 or1 remaining in one place1 
they cause1 by means of cilia1 a        
movement of the water towards a certain 
part of the body1 a sort of mouth where 
the protoplasm is open and can take up  
the prey in the same manner as does the 
amoeba4 ,ascending the scale of life1 we
 find more and more complicated         
apparatus for the seizure of food1 for  
its preparation and digestion1 and the  
beginning of a nervous system1 first as 
the differentiation of certain          
muscle-cells1 then in connection with a 
special sense1 that of hearing4 ,if we  
assume any pleasure to be connected with
 the earliest acts of assimilation1 it  
must be that of the satisfaction of a   
want1 the stilling of pain in the form  
of hunger4   ,,the ,,problem ,,of       
,,perfectibility  ,in the earliest forms
 of propagation1 the younger organism is

 a true copy of that from which it      
springs1 the trifling differences being 
due1 as ,schmankewicz has shown1 to     
outer influences4 ,the differences of   
male1 female1 worker1 and soldier are   
due to such outer influences4 ,the      
differences in the younger organism1    
where propagation takes place through   
copulation1 may be explained by the     
mixture of types1 through which1 by     
action and reaction1 some qualities are 
intensified1 while some others become   
latent or are entirely destroyed4 ,to   
these mutual influences are to be added 
such as come from without1 especially   
those of warmth1 and of quantity and    
quality of food4 ,under too great an    
increase in temperature1 the young      
organism may even be destroyed1 the     
process of assimilation not being able  
to keep pace with it4 ,those variations 
which have led to the development of    
existing forms1 that is1 which were     
favorable to life1 are chiefly such as  
could be brought about by relative or   

absolute increase of assimilation4 ,this
 is true of mental1 as well as of       
physical1 qualities4  ,it is a fact     
established without doubt1 that the most
 common and most widely distributed     
species show the greatest variability1  
and that those species1 on the contrary1
 which are now rare1 although they were1
 perhaps1 at earlier periods1 the most  
common and extremely variable1 vary1 at 
the present date1 the least of all4     
,following ,darwin1 one generally draws 
the conclusion that the severity of the 
struggle for existence favors the       
formation of varieties4 ,for1 it is     
said1 the most common species fight the 
severest battle with one another1 while 
the scanty representatives of rarer     
species come the least into competition 
and continue unchanged4 ,but this theory
 is1 in two ways1 erroneous4 ,in the    
first place1 no attention is paid to the
 fact that a rare species may be exposed
 to a severe struggle against another   
species for the same nourishment1 while 

a common species may1 on the other hand1
 be exposed to no such struggle1 and1   
supporting life from a generous supply  
of food1 be subjected to but slight     
pressure4 ,the conception of the        
,darwinians means nothing more or less  
than that the individuals of a species  
vary the more1 the less favorable the   
conditions of nourishment2 and this     
cannot be conceded4 ,again1 the fact is 
to be taken into consideration1 that the
 species at present common must have    
passed through a favorable period in    
which food was so plentiful that it not 
only afforded an abundance to           
individuals past the dangers of infancy 
and youth1 but allowed1 in addition1 the
 existence of an ever-increasing number 
of individuals4 ,and it is this period  
of increase1 of abundance1 not a period 
of struggle1 which has developed the    
variations we now have before our eyes4 
,in the same manner one must conclude1  
with regard to the rarer species1 that  
the formerly existing numerous varieties

 were destroyed during the period of    
decline1 that is1 of overpowering       
pressure4 ,we have abundant proof of    
this in the fact that domesticated      
species1 which are carefully tended and 
fed1 and so wholly withdrawn from the   
struggle for existence1 vary enormously1
 and produce the most wonderful         
monstrosities4  ,to what direct causes  
the appearance of a variety is due1 is a
 question as yet unanswered4 ,but       
,weismann's investigations have shown us
 that climate plays a large part in     
their development4 ,embryology teaches  
us1 moreover1 that the development of   
the young organism does not take place  
with the same uniformity in all organs1 
but that1 on the contrary1 in one period
 one organ1 in another1 another1        
undergoes a more rapid growth1 which may
 be influenced by variations in food or 
temperature4 ,through such variations   
the development of monstrosities is     
explained4 ,we know that influences of  
nourishment are operative in the        

development of the larvae of bees to    
workers or to queens1 and we can easily 
conceive that other organs besides the  
sexual are subject to these influences4 
,the field in which such influences may 
be operative is1 indeed1 boundless4     
,all these considerations lead us to the
 conclusion that variability in general1
 but especially that variability        
resulting in a so-called improvement of 
the varieties producing it1 is an       
accompaniment of prosperous conditions4 
,this is a conclusion not yet reached in
 zooelogy1 although botanists long ago  
recognized1 in abundance of food1 the   
most essential condition for the        
development of variations4  ,darwinism  
fails to account for any need of        
nourishment beyond that necessary for   
the maintenance of the status quo of    
life4 ,according to ,darwin1 the animal 
can acquire only sufficient for the     
repair of loss4 ,the struggle for       
existence is1 therefore1 according to   
him1 a struggle of self-defence1 and its

 results could be1 at the best1 only the
 maintenance of species in their present
 position or1 in a less favorable case1 
their decline1 and finally their        
destruction4 ,but this view is wholly   
false4 ,the animal acquires not only    
enough to repair loss1 but much more4   
,how could the first amoeba have        
propagated itself1 if it consumed no    
more than it needed for mere            
self-maintenance1 and how could         
evolution have taken place8 ,we have    
seen that1 even in the inorganic world1 
there is not an equality of loss and    
repair1 but that1 in osmose1 the denser 
fluid takes up more than it gives1 while
 the fluid that is less dense loses more
 than it receives1 and the mutual       
exchange reaches the maximum possible   
under the existing circumstances4 ,it is
 this characteristic which renders the  
involuntary and forced tendency of the  
organism to satiation independent of the
 amount of waste2 this mechanical hunger
 is the spring of the insatiability of  

organisms1 and explains to us their     
increase in number1 the process of      
increasing perfection1 and individual   
development4 ,without it1 an eternity   
would not have sufficed for evolution2  
we should still have only a world of    
primitive amoebae4  ,this theory of     
development is1 then1 the opposite of   
that ordinarily assumed4 ,the latter    
asserts that increase of growth demands 
increase of nourishment1 whereas this   
asserts the fact that increase of       
nourishment determines growth4 ,the     
struggle for existence is not a struggle
 for the mere necessaries to maintain   
life1 but a struggle for increase of    
acquisition1 increase of life2 it is not
 a struggle of defence1 but an attack   
which only under certain circumstances  
becomes a defence4 ,the rule with which 
we advise our friends is1 ,forward6     
strive to better yourself6 though we may
 endeavor1 in hypocritical spirit1 to   
persuade to contentment those who come  
into competition with our interests4    

,the chief points1 therefore1 in which  
this theory differs from that of        
,darwin1 are as follows3--  ,the        
struggle for existence is really a      
struggle for increase of nourishment1 of
 life2 and independent of the supply of 
the moment1 it goes on at all times1    
hence even in a state of abundance4     
,limitation of supply by competition    
leads to fixation of the species and1 in
 the end1 to its decrease and           
disappearance4  ,sickness1 climate1 and 
direct enemies are the destructive      
agencies1 and must secure more          
propitious conditions for survivors1 the
 stronger their effect4  ,only under    
conditions of prosperity can the        
survivors propagate largely1 and perfect
 themselves1 separating into varieties  
and species4  ,the increase and         
differentiation of the organic world    
shows us that conditions of prosperity  
have been the rule1 those of want the   
exception4  ,rolph's extremely          
interesting chapter on ,propagation     

traces the sexual instinct to the       
mechanical hunger4 ,the earliest example
 which may be adduced in support of this
 theory is that of the zooespores which1
 by copulation1 sustain life for a time 
under the unfavorable conditions of     
darkness1 the thinner male representing1
 as does also the spermatozooen1 the    
seeking individual suffering from want1 
the female representing a means of      
sustenance4 ,the sex of the young       
organism is in like manner referred by  
,rolph to conditions of nourishment     
during development4 ,we now come to the 
chapter on   ,,animal ,,or ,,natural    
,,ethics  ,the existence of morality    
presupposes the existence of            
commandments of duty1 and of an         
authority4 ,among animals1 as well as   
among human beings1 we find recognized  
authority and can discern the principles
 of action which constitute the duty of 
any particular animal4 ,authority among 
the lower animals is based on might1    
which is1 indeed1 the universal source  

of authority1 without which no authority
 can exist4 ,personal authority is but a
 particular form of the authority of    
circumstances2 and to this authority    
every creature must be subject4 ,it     
consists of two factors3 the outer      
authority of the environment1 and the   
inner authority of impulse4 ,duty is    
obedience to authority4 ,the duty of the
 organism consists in action that       
corresponds to these two authorities1   
following the direction given as the    
resultant of the mixture of the two     
components4 ,that is1 that manner of    
life is right or moral which renders the
 life of the organism the fullest       
possible under the circumstances4 ,the  
unreasoning organism is unconsciously   
drawn to seek this maximum1 while the   
reasoning being seeks it through        
reflection4 ,the impulse to happiness   
includes1 therefore1 for the reasoning  
being1 the impulse to morality2 or1     
ideally expressed1 the relative morality
 equals the relative happiness2 morality

 and happiness are the same thing4  ,an 
authority without the means of enforcing
 itself is a self-contradiction4 ,the   
means by which nature makes its         
authority felt is organic excitation4   
,in proportion to its strength1 an      
excitation produces sensation1 in case  
it is not too weak to make itself felt  
at all4 ,every excitation has a definite
 significance and may come from without 
or within4 ,pleasant excitations are    
always1 primarily1 the feeling of the   
stilling of pain1 though there are      
pains1 such as1 for instance1 that of a 
wound1 the toothache1 headache1 an      
aching corn1 which have no corresponding
 feeling of pleasure4 ,nor is pleasure  
the only offspring of pain1 since pain  
may bring forth pain4 ,pleasure depends1
 in its character as pleasure as well as
 in its strength1 on the feeling        
preceding it in the organism2 that is1  
its quality is the result1 not of the   
degree of organic excitation1 but of the
 order of succession of the feelings4   

,for this reason1 the same feeling which
 brings pleasure to one individual may  
bring pain to another4  ,this whole     
deduction is at variance with ,spencer's
 theory that pleasurable excitations are
 favorable to life1 painful ones        
injurious4 ,and since observation is in 
direct opposition to his assertion1 his 
followers have been obliged to          
supplement it with the conception that  
pain is gradually weeded out by natural 
selection4 ,on the contrary1 we need    
pain at every instant1 since it is the  
impulse to action2 persistence in the   
same condition through lack of          
excitation1 must result in death2       
pleasure can never originate action1 it 
can only cause persistence in action    
already begun4 ,the fact has been too   
often overlooked1 that the motive and   
the end of an action are by no means the
 same4 ,the motive is pain1 and the end 
is either simply the stilling of pain or
 an additional positive pleasure4 ,there
 are1 therefore1 many actions which are 

directed to no concrete positive end1   
but only to the purely negative end of  
escape from pain without consideration  
of the further results2 a striking      
example of such action is suicide4 ,even
 where positive pleasure appears as an  
end1 it is never in itself the motive to
 action4 ,in order to become a motive1  
it must first be transformed into an    
excitation1 into desire for pleasure2   
and this desire for a definite or an    
indefinite pleasure is1 in its essence1 
pain--the pain of the absence of        
pleasure4#fj  ,the pleasure sought may  
be one already known through experience1
 or it may be one not yet experienced4  
,in the latter case1 the desire is      
awakened by instruction or reflection1  
or else induced by instinct4 ,but the   
motive is always the same1 namely1 a    
seeking after pleasure1 hence a feeling 
of pain4  ,this view furnishes us with a
 psychical explanation of the           
association of ideas1 the mysterious    
so-called transferrence of the feeling  

of pleasure from the end to the means4  
,pleasure begins as soon as we have     
begun the action which will bring us    
with certainty to the end desired1 and  
this pleasure may reach such a degree of
 strength at some point of the process  
as to conquer the desire for the real   
end1 hem further action1 and dispose to 
continuance at the point reached4 ,the  
action of the miser may be thus         
explained4  ,the objection that1 if pain
 is the motive1 the organism is nothing 
but a bundle of pains1 is by no means   
valid1 for it overlooks the fact that   
pain remains1 in an immense number of   
cases1 below the threshold of           
consciousness2 as in the case of organic
 action1 where it is rhythmic4 ,the same
 is true of reflex action4 ,to any close
 observer of the lower organisms1 it    
seems most probable that these possess  
consciousness 7see ,wundt1              
,physiologische ,psychologie71 nor is it
 by any means proved that the plants do 
not possess it likewise4 ,it is         

certainly remarkable that exactly the   
lowest plants1 which stand so near the  
animals in the phenomena of their life1 
exhibit movements closely resembling    
those of animals4 ,and it is1 moreover1 
a fact that automatic and reflex actions
 increase with the degree of            
organization1 and are most numerous in  
human beings4 ,with increased exercise1 
one chain of movements after the other  
is withdrawn from consciousness2 and    
through this removal from consciousness 
action gains in certainty and rapidity1 
and in energy also1 since the part of   
the force which was before lost in      
inducing consciousness is now released4 
,such removal from consciousness is1    
therefore1 a benefit to the organism1 as
 an adaptation to the increased demands 
of circumstances4 ,movements which thus 
become unconscious are each and every   
one of them movements which have but one
 definite end and an interruption of    
which either kills or seriously injures 
the organism1 or at least brings        

disorder into its life for the time     
being4 ,an easily excited consciousness 
would be an exceeding danger to the     
animal4 ,conscious action is directed to
 the attainment of variable ends by     
means which are also variable4 ,it      
cannot1 therefore1 astonish us that     
consciousness disappeared in plants     
after the loss of free motion4  ,by the 
regular exercise of certain actions or  
of trains of thought1 either through    
necessity or by habit certain tracks are
 worn or taken possession of1 so that   
the whole process1 from the excitation  
to the action resulting upon it1 takes  
place with such rapidity that we are no 
longer conscious of its separate phases 
and so of the growth of the result4     
,the first commandment of animal ethics 
is1 therefore3 ,flee pain2 and closely  
associated with it is a second          
commandment furnished by the            
insatiability of the organism1 the      
impulse to happiness1 to increase of    
life4 ,the principle of ,spencer's      

ethics1 according to which normal living
 is right living1 would result in       
stagnation4 ,right living consists1 on  
the contrary1 in progress1 in passing   
beyond the normal4 ,no educator would   
hesitate for an instant to pronounce the
 continuance of a pupil upon a present  
normal immoral1 and to oppose it with   
all his powers4 ,from day to day the    
developing organism advances the line of
 its normal activity4 ,and as in the    
individual1 so in the species3 every new
 generation exceeds in a certain measure
 the activity of the last4 ,not rest1   
but motion1 constitutes the normal2 not 
rest1 but motion1 is happiness1 and the 
spring of happiness4 ,not that being    
which has no wants1 but that which      
develops and satisfies the greatest     
possible number of wants1 is the        
happiest1 leads the most pleasurable    
life4 ,when we apply these principles to
 the animals1 we reach the conception   
that all such as lead a solitary life   
live morally when they endeavor1 with   

all their powers1 to better their own   
condition4 ,that they injure plants and 
other animals in so doing need not      
trouble us1 since they are forced to do 
so in order to maintain life4 ,the      
principle on which animal life is based 
is hence preeminently egoistic and      
acknowledges no other right than that of
 might4 ,spencer1 in speaking of        
altruism on the lowest plane of animal  
life1 makes the fundamental and quite   
fatal mistake that he does not first    
sharply and distinctly define egoism4   
,had he done this1 he would certainly   
have found that1 for egoism1 as for     
altruism1 the criterion of              
consciousness1 of will1 is              
indispensable4 ,in his definition of    
altruism as consisting in those acts    
which in any way benefit others1 he does
 nothing less than get rid of egoism    
altogether1 since there are no acts     
which do not1 in the end1 benefit others
 than the performer4 ,the greater number
 of the young brought forth by lowest   

organisms serve as food for other       
species1 and hence the parent animal1 in
 bringing forth such numbers1 favors    
these species rather than her own flesh 
and blood4 ,the fly would act           
altruistically1 according to ,spencer's 
definition1 in being caught in the net  
of the spider4  ,a creature which gets  
its food1 as do many of the lower       
species1 without exertion of its own1   
does not act egoistically1 nor does the 
animal which1 in the natural course of  
its growth1 brings forth young by       
spontaneous division2 but that animal   
may do so which acquires its food by    
means of any voluntary actions1 however 
insignificant1 or which voluntarily     
protects and cares for its young2 and   
such voluntary action increases rather  
than decreases with greater             
organization4 ,real egoism begins with  
the voluntary acquisition of food1 a    
process continued in the forced         
excretion of the young4 ,but since this 
action benefits the second generation1  

we may regard it as the connecting link 
between egoism and altruism4 ,it is not 
purely altruistic2 altruism proper      
begins with the nourishment and care of 
the young4 ,and to what degree we have a
 right to consider even this as really  
altruistic can be determined only by    
further investigation4 ,the emptying of 
the milk-glands is combined with        
pleasure2 it may therefore be regarded  
as primarily egoistic1 and furnishes us 
with a further example of the           
development of altruism from egoism4    
,altruism increases1 not only with      
higher organization1 but also with a    
higher development of social life4  ,the
 beginnings of society are to be found  
in the family life of animals2 the most 
primitive form of this is the temporary1
 voluntary association of male and      
female among the higher species2 that   
is1 the anthropoids and vertebrates4 ,on
 this merely temporary association      
follows1 as a higher stage1 the lasting 
family union1 which exists among        

comparatively few animals4 ,the         
so-called states of the animals are1 in 
their most typical instances1 nothing   
but families living in a condition of   
polyandry4  ,closer association gives   
opportunity for a misuse of the powers  
and aims of the individual1 before      
impossible4 ,examples of this are the   
theft of honey from one hive of bees by 
the workers of another1 and the carrying
 off of the young by wasps and ants1 as 
also the slaughter of the drones4 ,since
 the robber of yesterday may be the     
robbed of to-day1 such acts are harmful 
to individuals1 to the family1 and to   
the species4 ,they diminish the degree  
of life1 and are opposed to animal      
ethics4 ,the association of male and    
female1 since only temporary1 affords   
little opportunity for immorality1 and  
the duties of parents to their young    
are1 for the most part1 faithfully      
performed4 ,in striking contrast to the 
natural morality of wild animals is the 
immorality of domestic animals1 which   

give themselves up to every sort of vice
 when not restrained4 ,the moral        
conditions of any associated animals not
 under control1 whether in zooelogical  
gardens1 in the town1 or in the country1
 is1 in fact1 monstrous4 ,immorality    
increases with the closer association of
 animals4 ,the closer the contact and   
the looser the bond between the         
individuals of a species1 the greater   
the opportunity for immorality1 and the 
worse the resulting habits4 ,the        
careless life of pleasure led by animals
 that live in solitude1 is interfered   
with1 in a state of association1 by     
certain duties4 ,how far the performance
 of such duties springs from a concealed
 pleasure1 or from instinct1 or follows 
upon the command of authority1 we1      
unfortunately1 cannot say4 ,the         
limitation of gratification signifies1  
however1 decrease of pleasure4 ,the     
needs of different animals differ       
according to differing organization2    
higher organization means greater and   

more complicated desire1 the            
satisfaction of which is often          
impossible1 but it means also the       
attainment of capacity for greater      
pleasure in form and intensity4 ,hence  
even the partly attained pleasure of the
 higher animals is1 in intensity as well
 as in fulness1 much greater than the   
completely attained pleasure of the     
lower animals4   ,,humane ,,ethics      
,rolph contests ,lubbock's theory that  
the early type of man lived in a        
condition of sexual promiscuity1 and    
gives as a reason for his opinion the   
strict monogamy of those animals which  
are most closely related to man4 ,the   
customs of such animals should have as  
much weight1 as evidence1 as those of   
any of the present tribes of savages1   
since these tribes are as old as        
civilized races1 and their customs      
cannot1 therefore1 be unhesitatingly    
regarded as primary ones4  ,the real    
needs of men1 those the gratification of
 which is indispensable to the          

maintenance of life1 are few4 ,by       
experience1 and by experience alone1 can
 man learn that present gratification   
may mean future pain1 and so be withheld
 from such gratification2 for only      
disinclination to one form of pleasure  
can induce inclination to another form4 
,in the simplicity of primitive social  
conditions and the uniform character of 
action under such conditions1 rules of  
experience must have been early formed1 
which1 inherited by succeeding          
generations1 became the rules of        
conduct4#fa ,with the development of    
authority1--first the paternal          
authority1 then that of the family1 and 
finally that of the elders of the       
tribe1--the possibility of establishing 
rules of action1 and inducing morality1 
increased4 ,the very nomination of      
elders1 to which primitive authority may
 almost everywhere be traced1 shows how 
great was the respect for experience4   
,spencer remarks1 in one place in his   
,data of ,ethics1 that human beings     

first banded themselves together because
 they found it more advantageous to     
cooeperate4 ,this is only conditionally 
true4 ,before human beings could find   
association advantageous1 they must have
 accumulated experience of it4 ,that    
they did this by their own inclination  
is certainly not true4 ,wherever we find
 two solitary beings coming together by 
chance1 enmity is the first feeling     
excited1 and war the result4 ,everything
 new1 everything unknown1 causes        
aversion1 and this aversion must lead to
 misunderstandings and war the more     
surely because each of the opponents    
feels himself disturbed in his supposed 
right to limitless possession4 ,human   
beings must first have warred with one  
another before they came to the         
knowledge1 not that social life1 that   
is1 mutual forbearance1 was more        
advantageous1 but that more closely     
associated individuals gained in power  
against a common enemy by their         
association4 ,man did not choose        

society1 but was1 on the contrary1      
forced into it1 for good or evil1       
through increase of his kind4 ,the      
discovery of the first tools must have  
had an immense influence upon increase  
in the number of individuals1 which was 
before limited by struggle with wild    
animals1 and by the restriction of food 
to fruit4 ,we must conclude that1 under 
such circumstances1 a lasting contract  
was inevitable1 and that1 with it1 vices
 suddenly appeared which had before     
existed only potentially1 as            
predisposition4 ,war or theft must have 
followed the mutual limitation of       
rights1 but against this disturbance of 
the peace other members of the society  
must have banded themselves together4   
,the weaker must soon have been driven  
from their possessions by the stronger1 
and must then have united for the       
purpose of obtaining1 by association1   
what they were unable to acquire        
otherwise4 ,the growing children settled
 near their parents1 with whom they     

entered into a family union1 in which   
the father represented the authority4   
,in this arrangement is the germ of     
civil order1--of the ideas of right and 
wrong4 ,inner conflicts can at first    
scarcely have occurred1 since the       
possessions of the family were in       
common1 and a conception of theft       
between members of the family could not 
exist4 ,furthermore1 there was scarcely 
anything worth stealing1 for the        
implements must have been so primitive  
that each individual could easily       
manufacture them for himself4 ,only     
women could have been1 in the beginning1
 an object of conflict1 and for         
avoidance of this conflict laws and     
customs arose1 which are1 to our modern 
minds1 inexplicable4 ,real polyandry may
 doubtless be explained by the idea of  
the common right of possession among    
brothers2 it has1 in most cases1 this   
significance4 ,it is extended1 indeed1  
later1 to more distant relatives1 and   
gains finally a solemn significance1 the

 presentation of the wife1 or of one of 
a number of wives1 being a symbol of    
fraternity by which the guest is        
honored4  ,with the manufacture of      
better tools and weapons1 temptation to 
theft was increased1 and authority began
 to be directed inwards to the society  
itself1 since inner conflict injured the
 family in its contests with outer      
enemies4 ,what is true of the family in 
this connection1 is true of the tribe4  
,a joint egoism of the society as a     
whole must thus have been developed1 as 
soon as the first step of association   
was taken4 ,the earliest law is always  
negative1 a prohibition1 not a positive 
command4  ,war had its good as well as  
its evil side1 since it made different  
peoples acquainted and gave them        
knowledge of each other's tools1        
weapons1 and customs4 ,war was1 at      
first1 the only means by which peoples  
learned to know each other4 ,the        
establishment of peace led to the union 
of different peoples1 or at least to    

peaceful intercourse by exchange1 which 
united the tribes by common interests1  
corrected ideas1 and tempered customs4  
,the egoistic impulses1 the feeling of  
unconditional right to possession1 are  
the impulses with which the child is    
born2 morality is not inborn1 but must  
be developed by education1 as is shown  
by the example of such children as are  
neglected in education4#fb ,or1 if there
 is anything innate in the direction of 
morality1 it is merely a certain        
inherited predisposition acquired in the
 course of the thousands of years of    
social intercourse1 which makes it      
easier for us to respond to education4  
,if this is not so1 and the impulse to  
morality is innate1 why has it required 
so many centuries for man to make the   
simple connection of ideas1 that what is
 just towards one man is just towards   
another4 ,in this feeling of justice1   
acquired through an extension of egoism1
 is the root of all virtue4 ,it is the  
spring of sympathy or benevolence1 which

 can be developed only where the feeling
 of the like rights of others is strong4
  ,but an unconsidered over-estimate of 
this feeling is the source of ,spencer's
 ,utopia1 as it is of that of present   
socialism4 ,we have seen that authority 
is a primary and necessary factor of    
society4 ,authority1 virtue1 and duty   
are interdependent1 and must be of about
 the same antiquity4 ,from all          
compulsion imposed by authority1 the    
creature1 by its nature1 attempts to    
escape1 and the feeling which prompts   
this attempt has been falsely called the
 instinct of freedom4 ,authority exceeds
 its bounds1 where it issues commands   
not demanded by the general conditions  
existing in the society4 ,but though    
these conditions may demand a limitation
 of personal freedom1 their requirements
 must1 nevertheless1 in general1 be     
enforced4  ,natural and ,humane ,ethics 
may thus be at variance in some things2 
may in others1 coincide4 ,there is no   
necessary conflict and no necessary     

agreement between them2 therefore the   
theological theory of an absolute       
contradiction between them is false1 as 
is also the teleological theory of their
 coincidence4 ,the latter theory1 not   
being able to deny that the moral and   
the natural do not always coincide under
 present circumstances1 endeavors to    
avoid the difficulty by calling these   
conditions abnormal4 ,the theory falls  
into two errors3 in the first place1 it 
ignores the fact that we have our       
organs1 not for use but by use2 and that
 our inherited characteristics may be   
regarded as an adjustment to the        
conditions of our ancestors1 but not an 
adjustment to our own2 and in the second
 place1 there are no abnormal           
conditions4 ,there are new or changed   
conditions1 but either there are no     
abnormal ones1 or all are abnormal4     
,but although increase of life means    
also increase of desire1 although the   
organism is insatiable1 yet there is1 as
 we have seen1 an increase of happiness1

 both in quantity and quality1 with     
higher organization4 ,the absolute      
amount is increased1 but not the        
relative amount1 the amount realizable  
in proportion to desire4  ,want does not
 lead to improvement1 as ,darwin        
maintains1 and the individual cannot be 
just or sympathetic in a condition of   
want4 ,the freer he is from the direct  
care of the acquirement of necessities1 
the more manifold capabilities will he  
develop1 and the greater will be his    
happiness4  ,the task which authority   
must set itself1 in order to secure     
greater justice in society1 and so      
greater happiness1 is twofold1 a        
positive and a negative task4 ,the      
positive task consists in such an       
education of the young as will enable   
them by their own effort to advance     
towards their individual ideal of       
happiness1 and in the inculcation of    
such an ideal as corresponds to their   
individual talents and means1 and is    
attainable under the existing           

circumstances4 ,the negative task1      
already implied in the positive one1 is 
the imposition of necessary restrictions
 in the means used for the attainment of
 happiness4 ,within the limits set by   
justice1 the individual has a natural   
right to seek his own pleasure1 and for 
each individual an attainable maximum   
may be reckoned4 ,this is not saying1   
however1 that the individual has a just 
claim to this maximum1 in case he       
cannot1 or will not1 be sufficiently    
energetic to gain it by his own efforts4
 ,it is an error of modern times to     
suppose that the realization of         
happiness rests in any other hand than  
that of the individual himself--that the
 state can make and decree happiness4   
,happiness cannot be secured by means of
 decrees1 by a division of goods1 or by 
gifts4 ,division is always unjust1 since
 it leaves out of consideration that    
individuality of character which is the 
only measure of sensibility to pleasure4
 ,the negative part of the task is to be

 accomplished less by inculcation of    
many special virtues than by the        
continual direction of the attention to 
the fundamental virtue of justice4 ,the 
positive task is to be accomplished by  
the most thorough education of the      
intelligence of the individual1 through 
which he shall learn to inquire the     
reason of moral precepts1 to judge for  
himself1 and then to act on the decision
 he arrives at4 ,we have seen that the  
ethical education of the present time   
tends to reduce inner struggle1         
rendering the results of wrong-doing as 
repellant as possible4 ,one in whom has 
been instilled a very terrible          
conception of the sufferings resulting1 
in the present and future life1 from    
wrong-doing1 will perhaps automatically 
avoid the evil2 and the means for a     
moral education seem thus attained4     
,however1 it is not so2 for when the    
individual accustoms himself to being   
directed in action1 not by his own      
carefully won experience1 but by        

feelings instilled by others1 concerning
 the ethical character of which his own 
insight does not1 and cannot1 afford him
 any explanation1 he opens the way to   
every chance influence1 and becomes the 
plaything of unknown forces2 while he at
 the same time divests himself of that  
personal responsibility without which no
 society can exist4 ,the true ideal of  
education is such as sharpens the       
judgment and accustoms the individual to
 consider his action from all sides1 in 
the consciousness of personal           
responsibility4 ,only through such      
action is man the possessor of freedom4 
,he who acts without reflection1 from   
unreliable emotion1 is not free4 ,the   
freest possible decision is that which  
is reached as the result of such a      
careful consideration of all the single 
components of reflection that no one of 
them exceeds in its influence its real  
worth4 ,the ideal of education is not1  
therefore1 the production of spontaneous
 decision and action1 but of reasoning1 

conscious action4 ,that this principle  
is the only right one is shown by our   
former observations1 according to which1
 as society develops1 more and more     
actions are the result of reflection4   
,and in case a state of moral perfection
 is attainable1 it can be arrived at    
only as each member of the society acts 
from perfect reflection1 not from       
impulse or instinct4 ,in attempting     
social improvement1 we must take example
 by the chemist1 who does not attempt a 
chemical combination by force but       
endeavors to attain the conditions under
 which the elements will unite1 through 
their own inner laws1 to the desired1   
homogeneous body4 ,this is a wearisome  
process2 but it is the shortest and     
swiftest1 for it leads us to the desired
 end4  ,the single virtues cannot be    
regarded as ideal principles4 ,they     
contradict each other1 and whether the  
one or the other should have the        
preference depends on the individual    
case and can be decided only by         

reflection4 ,the formulation of these   
general rules of conduct under the name 
of virtues has1 practically1 only the   
advantage of reducing the numberless    
possibilities of action to a few2 but   
such principles can never be exhaustive4
 ,wherever the individual forgets this  
fact and is led to regard virtue as an  
end1 instead of as the means to an      
innocent happiness1 virtue ceases to be 
virtue and becomes its opposite4 ,thus  
thrift becomes avarice1 generosity      
extravagance1 courage foolhardiness1    
openness want of consideration1         
gentleness weakness1 and chastity       
celibacy4 ,the single virtues are only  
abstractions from special circumstances 
generalized to an ideal of action4 ,but 
in practical life1 we have to do with   
individual cases whose conditions are by
 no means ideal1 and cannot be treated  
as ideal4 ,we must act1 in each case1   
for the relative best1 not for absolute 
good2 and what is best for one sex or in
 one society may not be best for the    

other sex or in another society4 ,a     
compromise between idealism and realism 
is everywhere necessary2 and such a     
compromise is made1 despite all fine    
words to the contrary1 by every one1--by
 one only more openly or consciously    
than another4 ,it is comforting to      
remark that mankind shows itself1 and   
always has shown itself1 instinctively  
taking the road to the attainment of the
 end4  ,through an extension of         
relations1 authority1 at first          
represented by a single individual1 the 
head of the family or tribe1 reaches the
 point of development where the one     
ruler is unable to rule all parts1 and  
decide all questions1 alone1 so that he 
is obliged to call in help4 ,he         
naturally chooses men near to him1 with 
whose character he is acquainted4 ,but  
there arises1 by this division of       
authority1 the danger of its misuse to  
the disadvantage of the ruler himself4  
,since despotic government depends on   
might alone1 and the voice of the people

 has no influence1 every person in any  
way related to the ruler represents a   
danger4 ,nevertheless1 the establishment
 of new powers to assist the ruler was  
the starting-point of constitutional    
government4 ,for by this division of    
power the ruler rendered it impossible  
for himself to govern without help from 
others1 and opened the way to a contract
 of compromise with the people4 ,the    
influence of individuals upon the state 
spread1 thus1 to the people itself4     
,self-government1 pure parliamentarism1 
is the ultimate end to be reached by the
 process4  ,we have seen that neither   
pleasure1 nor utility1 nor virtue1 nor1 
finally1 religion1 can be regarded as   
the absolute means1 but only as the     
relative means to the attainment of     
happiness4 ,both the hedonist and the   
utilitarian need to correct and further 
define their principle1 as well in      
respect to the end to be attained1 as in
 respect to the means proposed4 ,their  
principles are not to be rejected1 but  

fanaticism is to be condemned4          
,principles may have exceptions2 but    
fanaticism recognizes no exceptions4    
,as to man's final end4 ,though he has  
attained to the power of shaping1 to    
some extent1 his own environment and    
means of existence1 yet he does not     
occupy an exceptional position in the   
animal kingdom1 and must cease to exist 
unless he submits to adapt himself4 ,it 
has been almost the rule that the       
highest animals of an epoch have later  
died out and been replaced by some new  
aristocracy1 developed from somewhat    
lower forms4 ,it is to be supposed that 
man1 also1 will be destroyed1 whether by
 a new ice-age or by a period of heat4  
,by the very fact of his supremacy1 he  
disturbs the primal equilibrium1 and    
originates conditions which1 even now1  
press hard upon single lands and may    
easily become dangerous to all          
civilization4 ,destruction may also     
threaten mankind morally1 for the       
development of morality hitherto gives  

no surety of its continuance4 ,every    
advancement brings with it some evil1   
every virtue contains the germs of some 
vice4 ,modern humanity has given us an  
unreasoning soft-heartedness1 with an   
extravagant malady of forgiveness which 
is nothing less than immorality itself1 
since it on the one hand undermines the 
general sense of justice1 while on the  
other it prompts and encourages         
wrong-doing4  ,,footnotes3  #eh ,for    
further arguments in support of this    
assertion1 see ,biologische ,probleme1  
pp4 #fd-ff1 etc4  #ei ,und da diese     
,flaeche durch ,zelltheilung oder       
,fortpflanzung vergroessert wird1 so    
waechst die ,aufnahmefaehigkeit des     
,organismus mit der                     
,fortpflanzungsfaehigkeit desselben 7p4 
#fg74  #fj ,und diese ,begierde444 ist  
ihrem innersten ,kerne nach1 eine       
,unlust1 ein ,leid3 das ,leid des       
,entbehrens des ,genusses 7p4 #agf74    
#fa ,bei der ,binfachheit der primitiven
 socialen ,verhaeltnisse und der        

,einfoermigkeit der ,lebenstaetigkeit   
muessen sich bald ,erfahrungsregeln     
gebildet haben1 die nun durch ,vererbung
 uebertragen und damit zu ,lebensregeln 
vertieft wurden 7p4 #aie74  #fb ,compare
 supra1 p4 #ajj1 note4     ,,alfred     
,,barratt   ,alfred ,barratt's ,physical
 ,ethics 7#ahfi7 deals with ,first      
,principles1 ,pure1 as distinguished    
from ,applied1 ,ethics1 the aim of the  
science1 as stated by the author1 being 
to try to establish the first principle 
which is the condition of further       
progress4 ,if we can establish a        
principle a priori1 and then verify its 
universality by an appeal to mental     
phenomena and to philosophical theories1
 its existence as a fact will be made   
certain2 if1 in addition to this1 we can
 connect it with laws still more general
 and with the family of natural         
sciences1 it will be no longer a fact1  
but become a scientific law1 a section  
of the universal code2 and the title of 
this essay will be justified4  ,part    

,first of ,physical ,ethics is occupied 
with the statement of axioms1           
definitions1 and propositions derived   
from general experience4 ,they are as   
follows3--  ,axiom #a4--;,actions1 like 
objects1 are capable of being classified
 according to their properties1 and of  
being measured by a definite standard4  
,obs4--,this axiom merely means that the
 qualities of actions1 like those of    
objects1 are fixed and constant1 so that
 the same action has always the same    
properties and moral value1 and1 under  
the same circumstances1 always produces 
the same effect4444 ,it follows from    
this axiom that it is possible to act so
 as to attain a definite object1 and    
thus a general end of action may be     
arrived at4444  ,axiom #b4--,the end of 
action 7being some common property or   
effect7 is a possible object of         
knowledge4  ,axiom #c4--,we are capable 
of being affected by any external object
 only through our faculties1 or 7in     
other words7 as a part of our           

consciousness4  ,axiom #d4--;,faculties 
are known only by their action1 or 7in  
other words7 so far as they are portions
 of our consciousness4  ,axiom #e4--,the
 sphere of action lies in the adaptation
 of 'inner' to 'outer' sequences1 of    
faculties to the laws of nature4  ,axiom
 #f4--,the constitution of man and other
 animal beings is an organism consisting
 of a number of parts1 each having its  
appropriate function1 and the end of    
each part results from the performance  
of its function4  ,axiom                
#g4--;,approbation is the standard      
whereby we judge of the moral value of  
actions1 and is the universal mark of   
the due performance of a function and of
 the attainment of an end4              
,,definitions  #a4 ,good is the object  
of moral approbation4 ,the highest good 
is1 therefore1 the ultimate object of   
such approbation1 the end of action4    
#b4 ,pleasure is that state of          
consciousness which follows upon the    
unimpeded performance 7as such7 of its  

function1 by one or more of the parts of
 our organism4   ,,proposition ,i  ,the 
,good is relative to our faculties4 ,for
 no object can affect us except through 
our faculties 7,axiom #c72 but to be    
known by us is to affect us2            
,therefore1 nothing can be known except 
through our faculties1 or 7in other     
words7 except in relation to our        
faculties2  ,but the ,good1 or ,end of  
,action1 is a possible object of        
knowledge 7,axiom #b72  ,hence the ,good
 is relative to our faculties4          
,corollary #a4--,the highest good of man
 at any time is relative to his         
faculties at that time4  ,corollary     
#b4--,since ideas derive their elements 
from experience1 the idea of perfect    
,good1 or ,god1 can only be an          
idealization of humanity4               
,,proposition ,,ii  ,the ,good is a     
state of ,consciousness4 ,for1 the ,good
 is a possible object of knowledge      
7,axiom #b72 but all objects of         
knowledge are states of consciousness2  

,hence the ,good is a state of          
,consciousness4 ,or1 the ,good exists   
7or is capable of being known7 only by  
affecting our faculties1 or1 in other   
words1 only as an affection of our      
faculties 7,proposition ,i72  ,but an   
affection of our faculties is a state of
 consciousness2  ,hence the ,good exists
 only as a state of consciousness4      
,obs4--444 ,to speak of anything        
existent external to our consciousness1 
is1 as we saw1 a pure hypothesis1       
incapable of proof1 perfectly           
unintelligible and void of utility4     
,when1 therefore1 we make use of the    
ordinary dualistic phraseology1 we must 
remember that the two worlds there      
distinguished are merely two divisions  
of the universe of self considered as   
distinct for convenience of language1   
but differing only as two classes       
comprehended under a common genus4      
,,proposition ,,iii  ,the ,good is      
relative to circumstances4 ,for1 the    
,good is determined by1 and therefore   

lies in action 7,axioms #g1 #f1 ,obs472 
but ,action is relative to circumstances
 7,axiom #e74 ,hence the ,good is       
relative to circumstances4              
,,proposition ,,iv  ,the ,good depends  
upon the adaptation of faculties to     
circumstances4  ,for1 the ,good is      
identical with the end 7,def472 which   
results from the performance of function
 by each part of the organism 7,axiom   
#f74  ,but the function of each part is 
its adaptation to circumstances 7,axioms
 #e1 #f73 ,hence the ,good depends upon 
the adaptation of faculties to          
circumstances4  ,corollary4--,since man 
is an organism composed of parts 7,axiom
 #f71 the whole good of man is the sum  
of the goods of his parts1 and therefore
 depends upon the adaptation of all his 
parts to their corresponding            
circumstances4   ,,proposition ,v  ,the 
,good is ,pleasure4  ,for the good      
results from the due performance of     
functions 7,prop4 ,,iv72 but the ,good  
is a state of consciousness 7,prop4     

,,ii71 therefore the ,good is the state 
of consciousness which results from the 
due performance of functions 7as such74 
,hence 7by ,definition71 the ,good is   
,pleasure4  ,obs4--,by our definitions  
of ,good and ,pleasure it was evident   
that they were coextensive1 being both  
marks of the same thing2 to prove their 
identity it was necessary to show that  
,good is a state of consciousness4  ,of 
these propositions ,barratt says that ,i
 and ,,ii are perhaps the most          
important1 since they assert the        
impossibility of ,transcendentalism4    
,part ,second of ,physical ,ethics is a 
,verification by ,special ,experience4  
,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,the ,,moral       
,,sense  ,the assumption of a moral     
sense has already been made in the      
definition of ,good as the object of    
,approbation4  ,our previous reasoning  
would lead us nevertheless to guess that
 this sense is not1 in its nature1 a    
simple and indecomposable faculty4 ,how1
 then1 did this sense arise1 and what is

 its nature and composition8  ,in the   
lowest animal organization1 there are   
merely vague and indefinite states of   
consciousness corresponding to the      
undeveloped state of physical function4 
,with the development and specialization
 of advancing evolution arises          
,perception2 by which likeness and      
unlikeness among sensations are         
distinguished1 and classification is    
begun4  ,at first only the most obvious 
resemblances are noticed1 but as        
experience progresses1 wider and wider  
classes ever tend to be formed1 till at 
last we arrive at those highest ideas   
which are coextensive with experience4  
,these1 though the last in order of     
birth1 become the starting-points of    
science--just as men formed the idea of 
stones falling long before they         
discovered the law of attraction1 yet by
 that law they afterwards 'explain' the 
former fact4 ,thus we trace the whole of
 ,perception or ,knowledge to this power
 of comparison and noting likenesses1   

and this we see to be coincident with   
the organization of consciousness into  
central meeting-places or ganglia1 in   
which different sensations are presented
 to a common tribunal and so compared   
together4 ,we see1 therefore1 that      
,perception does not originate          
consciousness2 it only organizes and    
develops it4 ,we cannot1 therefore1     
agree with ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer1 who  
will not allow consciousness to the     
lowest animals4#fc  ,the process of     
perception or ,knowledge works1 not only
 on states of consciousness themselves1 
but on the changes from one state to    
another1 or1 in other words1 on         
relations4 ,thus results1 on the one    
hand1 recognition of objects2 on the    
other1 argument and reasoning1 for the  
most abstruse reasoning is nothing more 
than a classification of relations4  ,we
 have now1 therefore1 two distinct      
divisions of ,consciousness3 ,sensation1
 which as before consists only of       
pleasure and pain1 though now of        

different kinds2 and ,perception1 which 
classifies states of consciousness and  
their relations1 and is therefore       
concerned only with change4 ,knowledge1 
therefore1 has originally no other      
object than different pleasures and     
pains1 but eventually it attends so much
 to the differences and resemblances    
that it ceases to remember the pleasure 
or pain2 in its absorption in the       
relation it well-nigh forgets the things
 related4 ,this process is furthered by 
the fact that1 as the medium gets more  
extended1 each part of it has less      
average effect upon the organism3 the   
primary pleasures and pains being spread
 over a larger surface are less intense1
 and so obtrude themselves less4 ,this  
is exemplified by the common observation
 that sensation and perception tend to  
exclude each other4444 ,nevertheless    
pleasure and pain ever remain           
indissolubly connected with             
consciousness1 though their presence is 
often unheeded1 and only the more       

violent forms force themselves on the   
attention4  ,what is true of these      
simple forms of consciousness1 is true  
of their later development4 ,the        
relation of sensation to perception is  
the same as that between the faculties  
of which these are respectively the     
germs1 emotion and intellect4 ,for      
emotion is associated sensations of     
pleasure and pain2 and intellect is     
associated perceptions of change and    
relation4 ,hence by their very nature   
these are at once mutually exclusive and
 inseparable4 ,a strong emotion drives  
out reason1 and much reasoning chills   
emotion4444 ,yet we can give some reason
 for any emotion2 and we feel some      
emotion in working a mathematical       
problem4444 ,in every intentional act it
 is evident that both are involved2 the 
end being given by emotion1 the means by
 reasoning4 ,reasoning can give no end1 
it can only arrange1 elicit1 suggest2   
emotion can give no means1 for it cannot
 classify or observe relations4 ,in the 

building up1 therefore1 of any moral    
faculty1 both these elements must take a
 part4 ,hence it will be well to trace1 
a little more closely1 their mode of    
formation1 and their connection with    
muscular activity4  ,when in the course 
of experience a certain sequence of     
sensation frequently recurs1 the        
consciousness becomes habituated to it1 
and the return of the first sensation is
 followed by an idea or associative     
image of the others4444 ,hence the idea 
of pleasure or pain not actually felt   
comes to be associated with objects1    
which1 if placed in certain different   
positions1 would effect us in the way   
imagined4444 ,pleasure may thus be      
associated through a train of ideas of  
any length4444 ,after a time this       
process becomes organic1 the            
intermediate terms are lost1 and        
pleasure is directly connected with     
sensations and ideas that are in        
themselves not distinctly pleasurable4  
,now by various trains of association1  

various pleasures and pains are         
connected with the same object4 ,these  
different combinations of pleasures and 
pains1 some of which arise1 before      
reasoning1 by unintentional association1
 but the higher of which are the results
 of automatization of reasoning1 form   
the different emotions4444  ,action in  
its origin is simply the correlative of 
sensation4 ,contractility and           
irritability are the two general        
properties of vital tissue1 or rather   
are two sides of one fundamental        
property which is also known under the  
name of sensibility--the power of       
contraction under irritation1 or of     
expressing impressed force4             
,irritability means merely the phenomena
 of consciousness1 the development of   
which we have hitherto been tracing1    
though we have been throughout obliged  
to express ourselves in the language of 
the inner1 and not of the outer         
experience4444 ,this internal           
development we have already examined2 we

 must now turn to the obverse external  
development which takes its origin in   
contractility4  ,the connection between 
these two fundamental properties is     
exceedingly intimate1 that of ultimate  
identity or at any rate inseparability4 
,for not only is contraction universally
 the result of irritation1 but the only 
evidence that we have of irritation is  
the contraction which follows1 and in   
their early stages the two represent one
 and the same process4 ,when1 however1  
the expression1 in action1 of force     
impressed in sensation1 becomes indirect
 and immediate1 the name of irritability
 is given to the immediate1 internal    
results of its impression1 while        
contractility expresses the action      
ultimately expressed4 ,hence the seat of
 irritability is preeminently the       
nervous system1 while contractility1 or 
the vis musculosa1 is the name of the   
special property of the muscular tissue4
  ,considering them however in their    
origin1 they together represent a       

certain form of the transmission of     
force4444 ,some kinds of impressed force
 are followed by movements of retraction
 and withdrawal1 others by such as      
secure a continuance of the impression4 
,these two kinds of contraction are the 
phenomena and external marks of pain and
 pleasure respectively4 ,hence the      
tissue acts so as to secure pleasure and
 avoid pain by a law as truly physical  
and natural as that whereby a needle    
turns to the pole1 or a tree to the     
light4444 ,hence1 the law of            
,self-,conservation1 or of the direction
 of ,action1 is merely another mode of  
expressing the fundamental property of  
animal tissue1 which we have every      
reason to believe is derived from the   
more elementary physical properties of  
matter4 ,the course of action is just as
 dependent on physical laws as that of a
 stone which falls to the ground4 ,the  
belief in external consciousness makes  
no difference either way2 the earliest  
phenomena of such consciousness are     

those of pleasure and pain1 therefore we
 can suppose it to exist only as        
pleasure and pain4 ,in the one case we  
say that action aims at1 or naturally   
results in1 the phenomena of pleasure2  
in the other case that it aims at the   
actual consciousness of pleasure4  ,the 
expression of impressed force1 or the   
connection of action and sensation1 is  
at first in the unorganized tissue      
direct and immediate1 without the agency
 of nervous communication1 or to return 
again to the ordinary psychological     
language1 is unintentional or           
involuntary4444 ,the earliest           
modification is due to association1     
whereby secondary sensations1 or 7as    
they are called later when they become  
perceived7 ideas are produced4 ,these   
manifest themselves as weaker           
repetitions of the primary pleasures and
 pains1 and1 therefore1 are naturally   
followed by like results4444 ,the       
process is this3 the force originally   
impressed by the first sensation1       

instead of being all expressed in       
action1 is partly induced by habituation
 into an internal channel1 and so       
transformed into the kind of force which
 generally impresses the second kind of 
sensation1 and this now produces its    
appropriate action4 ,hence part of the  
original force has undergone two        
transformations instead of one2 the     
immediate antecedent of action being the
 force produced by association1 or in   
other words1 the associated pleasure4   
,this is the rudiment of motive1 which1 
however1 is not generally called by that
 name till it is perceived4 ,the same   
process may go on through two or more   
links of association2 the first         
transformed force being again           
transformed internally instead of       
expressed1 and the second again in its  
turn1 until eventually a transformation 
is reached which finds its easiest way  
of escape in action2 the immediate      
motive power being that transformation  
of force1 or that associated pleasure1  

which immediately precedes the action4  
,actions of this kind constitute the    
lower phenomena of instinct3 and we see 
therefore that they may depend on any   
number of links of unperceived1 or1 as  
we say1 unconscious reasoning2 and that 
their motive is also 'unconscious4'     
,these actions stand half way between   
,reflex and ,voluntary ,actions4444  ,we
 now come to the third and last         
development of associated action4 ,here 
not only is each associated idea        
perceived1 but the change1 in each case1
 is also a fresh centre of association2 
whereby similar changes are connected   
with it1 and it is referred to a class4 
,hence the whole train is perceived1 not
 only by the classification of each of  
its parts with similar previous         
sensations1 but by the classification of
 each of its sequences with previous    
like sequences3 in other words1 it is   
now a chain of reasoning from the past  
to the present4 ,that associated        
pleasure from which this reasoned train 

commences is now called the motive      
7though really the immediate motive     
power lies in the last transformation   
which directly precedes the active      
expression7 and the series of ideas     
intervening between this and the action 
is called the means4 ,hence the motive  
associates the means1 and the motive    
power is transmitted through them till  
it is finally expressed in the action   
which is appropriate to the attainment  
of the pleasurable state whose idea is  
its source4 ,this association of means  
with ends is at first sight opposed to  
the natural direction1 which is from    
antecedent to consequent2 but when a    
line of nervous connection is formed1 a 
current may be transmitted indifferently
 in either direction4 ,an effect may    
lead us to think of its cause1 as easily
 as a cause associates its effect4 ,by  
the sequence of action and sensation1 a 
connection is established between their 
ideas1 which is independent of the order
 of excitation4 ,this last kind of      

action is that which we call voluntary1 
and the series of classified ideas and  
relations which lead to it is called    
,reasoning4 ,if at any point the current
 is attracted in two or more directions 
by different trains of association1     
deliberation is the result2 and the     
eventual victory of one and the         
consequent transmission of the force    
along it is entitled ,will4  ,we have   
therefore distinguished four kinds of   
action3 ,reflex ,action1 which is purely
 physical and independent of            
association1 and which is the last link 
in all the derived varieties2 ,lower    
,instinctive ,action1 which is caused by
 the first introduction of association1 
and is hardly to be distinguished in its
 phenomena from the last2444 ,higher    
,instinctive ,action1 which involves    
perception of qualities or objects2444  
and finally1 ,voluntary or ,intentional 
,action1 such as we find it in man4444  
,though we have separated these classes 
from each other for clearness of        

description1 there is no distinct line  
to be drawn anywhere between them4 ,each
 fades insensibly into the next4444     
,evolution1 we must remember1 does not  
advance by stages2 these are merely     
marks that we make ourselves1 like the  
constellations in astronomy1 for        
convenience of study4  ,finally1 we must
 remark that the last two kinds of      
,action ever tend to relapse into the   
second1 which subjectively is a mere    
form of the first4 ,association of all  
kinds tends to become organic4 ,by this 
we mean that1 as the connection becomes 
more definitely marked and easy1 the    
perpetual radiation which occurs as the 
current passes the different points on  
its path1 disappears2 and the whole     
current passes unimpaired4 ,first1 the  
radiation caused by the changes         
disappears1 and reasoning becomes       
instinct1 as in doing a mathematical    
example from mere memory of the         
different steps4 ,secondly1 the         
radiation from the different nervous    

centres also disappears1 and the current
 which ends in action becomes not only  
unreasoning but unperceived1 as in      
walking or reading aloud while thinking 
of something else4444  ,long habituation
 has two effects3 it increases the      
number of trains connected with each    
object1 and also the length of each4 ,if
 we suppose the simpler emotions to     
have1 by this time1 become organic or   
apparently simple states of             
consciousness1 a continuance of         
association tends to connect them       
together in bundles1 as they themselves 
were originally bundles of elementary   
pleasures and pains4 ,hence the emotions
 become organized in their turn so as to
 form higher emotions1 and eventually1  
when association has completed its      
work1444 this organization ends in one  
supreme emotion1 which is the head of   
the emotional or sensitive side of the  
consciousness4444  ,turning next to the 
second effect of prolonged habituation1 
we find that1 with objects or actions   

with which pleasure was at first        
associated and which so were called     
pleasurable1 further association often  
connects a subsequent pain which        
increased experience has shown always to
 follow upon the immediate pleasure4    
,this pain often more than              
counterbalances the preceding pleasure2 
hence when it is taken into the emotion1
 that emotion becomes one no longer of  
appetition but of aversion1 and the     
object or action is remembered as one   
not to be sought after but avoided4 ,it 
cannot1 however1 be called painful1     
because it causes immediate pleasure1 so
 a new name has to be invented1 and it  
is called ,bad1 or ,evil4 ,similarly1   
many things which are immediately       
associated with pain are found to be    
eventually followed by pleasure which   
more than counterbalances the pain1 and 
as this experience becomes consolidated 
by the power of association1 they       
attract rather than repel1 and for a    
name whereby to distinguish them1 are   

called ,good2 so that ,good and ,evil   
are correlative terms like ,pleasure and
 ,pain1 and mean respectively the       
greatest total ,pleasure1 and the       
greatest total ,pain4 ,now this         
experience when once acquired is never  
lost1 but by virtue of hereditary       
transmission descends from parents to   
children4 ,but1 as in the case of the   
simpler emotions1 only the results      
survive1 and not the means whereby they 
were arrived at2 so that1 in a short    
time1 the words ,good and ,evil come to 
be quite separated from ,pleasant and   
,painful2 nay1 as might be expected from
 their origin1 they tend to acquire     
exactly opposite meanings2 for ,pleasure
 and ,pain come to signify only         
immediate pleasure and pain2 and the    
final reckoning is often considerably at
 variance with the first item2 as in a  
race the man who leads for the first lap
 seldom wins in the end4444  ,this1     
then1 is the origin of the ,moral       
,sense4444 ,the ,moral ,sense1          

therefore1 is merely one of the         
emotions1 though the last of all in the 
order of evolution2 it can only claim a 
life of some two or three centuries2 and
 there are even some who still doubt its
 existence4 ,man at any rate is the only
 animal who possesses it in its latest  
development2 for even in horses and dogs
 we cannot believe that it has passed   
the intentional or conscious stage4444  
,good1 with them1 has no artificial     
meaning2 it is simply identical with the
 greatest pleasure4  ,only by complete  
and perfect obedience to all emotions   
can perfect freedom from regret be      
obtained in the gratification of all    
desire4 ,man is at present passion's    
slave1 because he is so only in part2   
for the cause of repentance is never the
 attainment of some pleasure1 but always
 the non-attainment of more3 not the    
satisfaction of one desire1 but the     
inability to satisfy all4 ,the highest  
virtue1 therefore1 consists in being    
led1 not by one desire1 but by all2 in  

the complete organization of the ,moral 
,nature4   ,,of ,,the ,,social          
,,relation ,,of ,,the ,,individual      
,when we assert the end of ,action to be
 ,pleasure1 do we mean the pleasure of  
the individual1 or universal happiness8 
,good has been shown to follow          
immediately on the adaptation of an     
organism to circumstances2 it is evident
 that external objects can affect it    
only in so far as they form part of     
these circumstances4 ,hence it follows  
that the pleasure and pain of others can
 come in only incidentally2 from the    
fact that each man is not an isolated   
unit1 but a member of society4 ,but     
further1 this social medium itself is1  
after all1 nothing but a part of the    
individual affected by it2 it is one    
division of that primary side of his    
nature1 by which the other side1 the    
emotional1 the intellectual1 the moral1 
is being continually moulded and        
fashioned2 and even if we take the      
narrower meaning of self1 the pleasures 

and pains of others cannot possibly     
affect a man's actions or emotions      
except in so far as they become a part  
of his4 ,if man aims at pleasure merely 
by the physical law of action1 that     
pleasure must evidently be ultimately   
his own2 and whether it be or be not    
preceded by phenomena which he calls the
 pleasures and pains of others1 is a    
question not of principle but of detail1
 just as the force of a pound weight is 
unaltered whether it be composed of lead
 or of feathers1 or whether it act      
directly or through pulleys4  ,the      
principle1 therefore1 is clear enough1  
that the happiness of others can have   
only an indirect influence upon the good
 of each individual4 ,but it is equally 
clear that this direct influence must be
 of no mean extent1 and that it is now  
our duty to trace its history4 ,here    
follows a scheme of the development of  
the state from the family1 which last   
was necessitated by the helplessness of 
infancy1 and from which arose the habit 

of human association4 ,we have no       
evidence from history or science that   
mankind has not always existed in a     
state of society2 there is no warrant   
for assuming an earlier condition of    
isolation4 ,hence to the human race the 
earliest ,good was inseparably bound up 
with what we now call the ,family       
,virtues4#fd ,the state1 thus           
originated1 developed as a social       
organism1 with ever greater integration1
 heterogeneity1 and complexity of parts1
 and the ,end or ,good of each          
individual became largely modified by   
the extension of the medium to which his
 actions had to be adapted2 man became a
 member1 not only of the family but of  
the state1 and the conceptions of his   
nature and duty became wider1 so that at
 last the more perfectly each attains   
his own interest1 and the more pleasure 
he gathers to his own store1 the more   
certainly does he secure the universal  
happiness of mankind4 ,if a man aims1 as
 ,spinoza remarks1 at doing real good to

 himself1 he will be sure to do most    
good to others4   ,,the ,,unselfish     
,,emotions  ,under this head is traced  
the genesis of sympathy through         
representation of the pains and         
pleasures of others and interpretation  
of them by individual experience in the 
same environment2 and the genesis of    
benevolence1 the active side of         
sympathy1 through habit associated with 
the ideas of the pleasures and pains of 
others4 ,love is defined as originally  
the association of many pleasures with  
one individual4 ,from the wider         
experience of man as a member of a state
 is developed justice or the sense of   
equality of right1 patriotism1 etc4 ,all
 these feelings are hereditary4   ,,of  
,,the ,,relation ,,of ,,man ,,to        
,,nature  ,this portion of the book     
treats of the gradual development of    
knowledge to wider and wider            
generalization2 of the extension of     
sympathy from man to the animal world   
also2 of the universality of            

consciousness1 which exists in the      
inanimate as well as the animate world2 
of the perfection of morality through   
the perfection of knowledge1 since      
knowledge moulds emotion1 and absolute  
virtue is nothing but absolute          
correspondence with nature in action    
resulting from thought2 and of the      
evolution of religion1 through          
knowledge1 to a religion of knowledge of
 the real universe or of humanity4      
,,of ,,the ,,will  ,under this heading  
the metaphysical doctrine of freedom of 
the will is combated as a contradiction 
of the laws of ,cause and ,effect4      
,praise and blame1 reward and           
punishment1 are desirable because of    
their effect on action4   ,,of          
,,obligation  ,barratt defines          
obligation as a violent motive4 ,paley  
says3 ,if a man finds the pleasure of   
sin to exceed the remorse of conscience1
 of which he alone is the judge1 the    
moral-instinct man1 so far as ,i can    
understand1 has nothing more to offer4  

,what1 then1 asks ,barratt1 has he      
himself to offer if a man finds the     
pleasure of sin to exceed the pain      
entailed by disobedience to the external
 command8 ,it may1 indeed1 be the fact  
that particular kinds of motive only    
come from particular sources1 but unless
 we can prove that those coming from a  
command are always the strongest1 we    
cannot claim for them a position such as
 that implied by the word obligation1 of
 being the highest or most universal    
motives4 ,in a contest between two      
motives1 it is not the kind but the     
quantity which decides4 ,for if two     
pleasures or pains be equal1 what does  
it matter where they came from8 ,and if 
they be not equal1 the greater1 whatever
 its source1 will always be the stronger
 motive4  ,hence obligation is nothing  
more than a 'violent motive4' ,prudence 
and duty are both the following of the  
greatest pleasure2 but so far as in     
ordinary language we make a distinction 
between them1 the pleasure aimed at in  

prudence is proximate and only slightly 
greater than the pain1 whereas in duty  
it is not only very considerably        
greater1 but the greatness is further   
glorified by a dim aureole of           
magnificent generalities and the halo of
 an unfathomable future4444  ,and as the
 result of a motive is in no way        
dependent on its external source1 so    
neither is it influenced by its mode of 
internal operation4 ,a motive may be    
strong either by its own natural force  
as a large excess of associated pleasure
 in one direction1 or by the facility   
artificially given to its expression by 
the long-continued custom1 either in    
ourselves or in our fathers1 of acting  
in a certain way on certain occasions4  
,in other words1 the strength of a      
motive is not absolute1 it is relative  
to the habits and predispositions of our
 organisms2 but the strongest motive1   
whatever its kind1 prevails in all      
cases4  ,obligation is often1 again1    
confounded with compulsion3 but         

submission to physical force is not     
morally an act at all1 because its      
,greek3 arche or immediate antecedent is
 external to us1 and therefore          
independent of our moral laws4   ,,of   
,,pleasures ,,that ,,are ,,called ,,bad 
,we saw that ,good differs from         
,pleasure simply by a widening of the   
field of calculation2 whereby the       
pleasure of the moment is often found to
 entail future pain greater than itself 
7allowance being made for perspective71 
and is therefore condemned as ,bad4     
,when1 therefore1 we speak of ,pleasure 
as opposed to ,good1 we always mean the 
pleasure of the moment2 or very often by
 a still further narrowing of the term1 
sensual as opposed to intellectual      
pleasures4  ,,footnotes3  #fc ,pp4 #ci1 
#dj4  #fd ,p4 #gc4     ,,leslie         
,,stephen  ,,the ,,science ,,of ,,ethics
 7#ahhb7   ,while with regard to the    
matter of ,ethics1--the general         
classifications of right and wrong      
conduct1--moralists are almost          

unanimous1 with regard to its form1--the
 essence and criterion of right and     
wrong1--there is great disagreement4    
,all widely spread opinions deserve     
respect by their mere existence2 they   
are phenomena to be accounted for4 ,on  
the subject of morals1 as on all other  
subjects1 opinions gradually modify and 
approach each other2 but a perfect      
agreement will probably not be arrived  
at4  ,leaving aside metaphysical        
questions1 however1 we may be able to   
find1 as in physical science1 some      
constants or ultimate elements which1   
though they1 according to the           
metaphysician's view1 require further   
analysis1 yet constitute1 within their  
sphere1 scientific knowledge independent
 of metaphysics4 ,the follower of ,hegel
 means1 in all probability1 precisely   
the same thing as the follower of ,hume1
 when he says that a mother loves her   
child2 though1 when they come to reflect
 upon certain ulterior imports of the   
phrases used1 they may come to different

 conclusions4 ,the formula remains the  
same2 for all purposes of conduct it    
evokes the same impressions1 sentiments1
 and sensible images1 and it therefore  
represents a stage at which all theories
 must coincide1 though they start1 or   
profess to start1 from the most opposite
 bases4 ,mothers love their children is 
not unconditionally true2 some mothers  
do not love their children2 but the     
statement is of worth as approximating  
scientific truth4 ,it may be well to    
attempt to ascertain in how far it may  
be rendered scientific4  ,in the        
physical sciences1 the statements of    
laws arrived at by the labor of         
generations are ideal statements1 in    
which a mass of modifying circumstances 
are disregarded for the sake of         
simplification4 ,even in these sciences1
 the power of prediction is small4 ,of  
the complicated conditions of human     
action we have even less accurate       
knowledge than of those of physical     
phenomena1 though this does not lead us1

 any more than in the physical sciences1
 to suppose that prediction would not be
 possible if we knew the conditions4 ,so
 far as man is a thing or an animal1 it 
is comparatively easy to determine his  
conduct4 ,given a starving dog and a    
lump of meat in contact1 you can predict
 the result4 ,but to determine the      
behavior of a human being with a glass  
of water presented to his lips1 you must
 be able to calculate the action of     
human motive and to unravel the tangled 
skein of thought and feeling in its     
variation in the individual under       
consideration4 ,moreover1 much of the   
life of the individual is ruled1 not by 
conscious motive1 but by automatic      
habit1 acquired through education4 ,the 
prediction of action in society as a    
unit is not less difficult than the     
prediction of individual action1 for if 
individual differences neutralize each  
other1 so that a certain uniformity in  
the influence of circumstances is shown 
by statistics1 it is not the less       

difficult to predict what these         
uniformities will be4 ,society as an    
organism1 not a mere aggregate1         
presents1 in the interaction of more    
complicated conditions1 greater         
difficulties than does the individual as
 such2 and it may be said that          
prediction of the course of history1    
even in general terms and for a brief   
period1 would require an intellect as   
much superior to that of ,socrates as   
the intellect of ,socrates is superior  
to that of an ape4  ,and yet mankind    
does possess knowledge of conduct1 which
 does not differ in kind from scientific
 knowledge2 there is1 in fact1 but one  
kind of knowledge1 which passes into    
scientific knowledge as it becomes more 
definite and articulate4 ,the knowledge 
that mankind possesses consists in what 
we have thus far taken for granted1 that
 under the same circumstances of outward
 environment and inward character1 human
 conduct does not change4 ,of society1  
as of an organism1 we cannot say a      

priori that it is so and could not have 
been otherwise2 we can only show1 a     
posteriori1 how different parts mutually
 imply each other1 so that1 given the   
whole1 we can see that any particular   
part could not have been otherwise4 ,our
 gain from such knowledge is the        
recognition that there may be           
discoverable laws of growth essentially 
relevant to our investigation of        
conduct4 ,so long as reasoning was      
conducted upon the tacit assumption that
 social phenomena can be satisfactorily 
explained by studying their constituent 
elements separately1 attention was      
diverted from the important principles  
of the interrelation of parts to the    
whole4 ,the theory of evolution brings  
out the fact that every organism1       
whether social or individual1 represents
 the product of an indefinite series of 
adjustments between it and its          
environment4 ,every race or society is  
part of a larger system1 product of the 
continuous play of a number of forces   

constantly shifting with an effort      
towards general equilibrium1 so that    
every permanent property represents1 not
 an accidental similarity1 but a        
correspondence between the organism and 
some permanent conditions of life4 ,to  
solve the problem of existence by       
calculation is an impossibility2 but our
 own lives are working it out2 the      
evolution of history is the solution of 
our problem4 ,and when we fully         
recognize that a problem is being       
solved1 we have only to gain some       
appreciation of its general nature and  
conditions1 in order to reach some      
important1 though limited1 conclusions1 
which may fairly be called scientific1  
as to the meaning of the answer4 ,these 
conclusions are not scientific in the   
sense of giving us quantitative and     
precise formulae1 but they may be so far
 scientific as to be certain and        
reliable4  ,thus we may be able to show 
how a given set of instincts corresponds
 to certain permanent conditions under  

which they were developed1 and          
7returning to the problem of differing  
theories of morals with which we        
started7 to show what is the cause of   
differing opinions4 ,our investigations 
of the problem of morality have nothing 
to do1 in the first instance1 with moral
 principles which are1 or profess to be1
 deduced from pure logic1 independent of
 any particular fact2 they deal with    
actual moral sentiments as historical   
facts4 ,the word moral1 as used in our  
considerations1 does not1 therefore1    
refer to an ideal moral code1 but to the
 one actually existing in the case      
considered4  ,ethical speculation1 as   
thus understood1 must be concerned with 
psychological inquiries--inquiries in   
regions where the vague doctrines of    
common sense have not yet crystallized  
into scientific coherence2 we must      
therefore proceed with caution4  ,the   
contention between materialist and      
idealist is irrelevant to our           
discussion4 ,the fact that mechanical   

processes underlie all mental process   
does not make the latter the less a     
fact2 nor can the mechanical statement  
ever supersede the psychological        
statement4 ,the proposition that hunger 
makes men eat will express truth1       
whatever material implications are      
involved in the statement4  ,conduct is 
determined by feeling2 we fly from pain1
 we seek pleasure2 life is a continuous 
struggle to minimize suffering and lay a
 firm grasp upon happiness4 ,good means 
everything that favors happiness1 and   
bad everything that is conducive to     
misery2 nor can any other intelligible  
meaning be assigned to the words4 ,the  
difficulty of proving these propositions
 lies in the fact that they are primary 
doctrines1 for proof of which we must   
appeal to the direct testimony of       
consciousness4 ,but critics oppose1 not 
so much the propositions themselves1 as 
certain supposed implications4 ,by pain 
and pleasure is here meant every        
conceivable form of agreeable or        

disagreeable feeling4 ,the assertion    
that conduct is determined by pain and  
pleasure is not meant as a denial that  
it is also1 in some sense1 determined by
 the reason2 but a state of             
consciousness which is neither painful  
or pleasurable cannot be an object of   
desire or aversion4 ,the reason is often
 contrasted with the feelings in its    
determination of conduct1 the reasonable
 man being defined as one who1 instead  
of being the slave of immediate impulse1
 is capable of adapting means to ends   
and following1 thus1 courses of conduct 
not in themselves agreeable but         
promising a greater total of happiness4 
,the fact is1 however1 that all         
happiness that determines the will is   
future2 conduct is determined1 in every 
case1 not by a future feeling of        
pleasure1 which1 as future1 does not yet
 exist1 but by present feeling4 ,it is  
therefore more accurate to say that     
conduct is determined by the pleasantest
 judgment than to say that it is        

determined by the judgment of what is   
pleasantest4 ,the intention of the agent
 is defined by the foreseen consequences
 of his conduct2 his end is defined by  
that part of the foreseen consequences  
which he actually desires2 and the end  
defines the motive1 that is1 the        
feeling1 which actually determines      
conduct4 ,the pleasantest end is adopted
 because the foretaste of the pleasure  
is itself pleasurable4 ,the intellect   
and the emotions are in reality related 
as form and substance1 and cannot be    
divided4  ,in the action of pain and    
pleasure1 it seems to be an obvious fact
 that pain1 as pain1 represents tension1
 that is1 a state of feeling from which 
there is a tendency to change2 pleasure 
represents equilibrium1 or a state in   
which there is a tendency to persist4   
,the worm writhes on the hook1 and the  
mind may be said to writhe under a      
painful emotion in the effort to writhe 
into some more tolerable position4 ,in  
the act of choice1 each mode of action  

is tried ideally1 and the individual    
settles into that which is1 on the      
whole1 the easiest4 ,the analogy which  
naturally offers itself and seems to    
give the best account of the facts is   
the mechanical principle of least       
resistance4 ,it is not1 perhaps1        
superfluous to remark that the volition 
may exercise a very small influence1    
even when the limiting conditions are in
 a great part ideal4 ,the more painful  
is not necessarily the less permanent   
condition4 ,it is one in which there is 
an additional chance against permanence4
 ,terror sets up so disturbed a         
condition that the mind cannot settle   
into any definite course4 ,we can no    
more alter arbitrarily the circumstances
 of our microcosm than those of the     
external world4 ,it is as difficult to  
avoid brooding in vain regret as to     
evade a physical constraint4  ,reason   
and feeling are bound together in       
inseparable unity4 ,but reason1 whatever
 its nature1 is the faculty which       

enables us to act with a view to the    
distant and the future4 ,a great part of
 conduct is automatic2 it is either not 
determined by conscious motives1 or it  
is determined by motives which1 though  
they rise for a moment to the surface of
 consciousness1 are forgotten as soon as
 felt4 ,of our conscious conduct1 again1
 part may be called instinctive and part
 reasonable4 ,these modes of action pass
 into each other by imperceptible       
degrees4 ,the instinctive may be        
converted into reasoned as the          
consequences become manifest1 and the   
reasoned become instinctive as the      
consequences are left out of account4   
,so1 again1 the instinctive action      
becomes automatic when it is performed  
without leaving any trace upon          
consciousness4 ,it may still be         
voluntary in the sense that the agent   
may be able to refrain from it if his   
attention happens to be aroused4        
,habitual actions pass through all these
 gradations4 ,when the reason is called 

into action1 it is not in virtue of a   
purely logical operation that it        
conquers if it does so2 it is in virtue 
of the fact that it reveals a new set of
 forces ready to spring into action to  
the necessary degree4  ,we may be said  
to feel by signs as well as to reason by
 signs4 ,the sight of a red flag may    
deter us from crossing a rifle range    
without calling up to our imagination   
all the effects of a bullet traversing  
the body4 ,if the motive which prompts  
us to run the risk be strong1 it may be 
necessary to convert a greater volume of
 latent1 into active emotion2 and as we 
frequently fail to do this1 we often run
 risks which we should avoid were the   
consequences distinctly contemplated4   
,the development of the whole nature    
implies a development of both the       
emotional and the intellectual nature2  
new sensibilities imply new sentiments2 
and increased range of thought is       
associated with an equal growth in      
complexity and variety of emotion4 ,the 

more reasonable being acts with emotion1
 but his emotions have more complex and 
refined methods4 ,the reasonable man is 
a better mirror of the world without    
him1 his conduct shows a better         
adaptation to ends and a greater logical
 consistency in its parts2 more harmony 
of action between the different         
instincts4 ,the important question is   
not solved by these facts4 ,we may still
 ask3 ,how is the relation between the  
different instincts1 the influence      
exerted by each member of the           
federation1 determined8  ,we start with 
certain fixed relations between our     
various instincts2 and however these may
 change afterwards1 our character is so 
far determined from the start4 ,again1  
it is plain that this inherited balance 
varies greatly with different peoples   
and gives rise to different types4 ,in  
one man the sensual passions have a     
greater relative importance than in his 
neighbor1 and so forth4 ,and the        
question arises1 whether we can         

determine which of these types is most  
reasonable4  ,in the construction of the
 bow1 we may suppose that1 from rude    
beginnings1 through discovery of better 
and better forms as adapted to ends in  
view in its construction1 a form of bow 
would finally be reached which would    
represent the maximum of efficiency4    
,this bow may be called the typical bow4
 ,as exquisitely adapted to its purpose1
 it arouses in us aesthetic             
satisfaction4 ,like the bow1 every      
organism represents the solution of a   
problem1 as well as a set of data for a 
new problem4 ,as the bow is felt out1 so
 the animal is always feeling itself    
out4 ,the problem which it solves is how
 to hold its own against the surrounding
 pressure and the active competition of 
innumerable rivals4 ,though we cannot   
apply an a priori method1 cannot define 
the materials of which men are made or  
the end which they have to fulfil1 we   
can determine to some extent their      
typical excellence4 ,recognizing the    

general nature of the great problem     
which is being worked out1 we can       
discover what is implied in some of the 
results4 ,the process of evolution must 
be1 at every moment1 a process of       
discovering a maximum of efficiency2    
though the conditions are always varying
 slowly1 and an absolute maximum is     
inconceivable4 ,at every point of the   
process1 there is a certain determinate 
direction along which development must  
take place4 ,the form which represents  
this direction is the typical form1 any 
deviation from which is a defect4 ,it is
 conceivable that the highest efficiency
 in different departments of conduct may
 imply consistent conditions4 ,the      
greatest philosopher may also be the    
greatest athlete and the greatest poet4 
,it is equally clear that there is no   
necessary connection4 ,what1 then1 is   
the relative value of different kinds of
 efficiency8 ,a complete answer to the  
question might bring out the fact1 which
 seems on other grounds probable1 that  

it is an advantage to a race to include 
a great variety of different types4 ,it 
is enough1 however1 to say that1 in     
speaking of a type1 the assertion is not
 intended1 that there is one special    
type conformity to which is a condition 
of efficiency1 but that evolution is    
always the working out of a problem1 the
 solution of which implies the          
attainment of certain general qualities4
  ,we have changed our point of view    
from the consideration of pain and      
pleasure to that of the conditions of   
existence4 ,the fact is simply1 that the
 constants in one problem are variables 
in the other4 ,given a certain          
character1 the agent does what gives him
 pleasure4 ,but if we ask how he comes  
to have that character1 the only mode of
 answering is by referring to the       
conditions of existence4 ,his character 
must be such as to fit him for the      
struggle for existence4 ,there must     
therefore be a correlation between      
painful and pernicious actions on the   

one hand1 and pleasurable and temporal  
on the other4 ,the useful in the sense  
of the pleasure-giving must             
approximately coincide with the useful  
in the sense of the life-preserving4    
,all conduct may be considered as a set 
of habits1 to each of which there is a  
corresponding instinct--the word habit  
being used to designate any mode of     
conduct1 automatic or voluntary1 which  
may be brought under a general rule1    
instinct denoting all conscious impulses
 to action1 whether including more or   
less reasoned choice1 and whether innate
 or acquired4 ,habits graduate from the 
essential processes which constitute    
life rather than maintain it1 and which 
are1 for the most part1 automatic1 to   
the most superficial and transitory4 ,in
 order that the proposition ,this habit 
is a bad one may have any real meaning1 
we must assume that the organism can    
exist without it4 ,a habit cannot be    
removed as one takes off a coat1 as has 
been too often assumed2 the whole       

character of the man is affected by its 
removal4  ,a capacity is essential if it
 is essential under normal conditions of
 environment4 ,the quality which makes a
 race survive may not always be a source
 of advantage to every individual1 or   
even to the average individual4 ,since  
the animal which is better adapted for  
continuing its species will have an     
advantage in the struggle1 even though  
it may not be so well adapted for       
pursuing its own happiness1 an instinct 
grows and decays not on account of its  
effects on the individual1 but on       
account of its effects upon the race4   
,the qualities of the individual and    
those of the race mutually imply each   
other1 since the individual can no more 
be considered apart from society than   
the apple can be considered apart from  
the tree on which it grows4 ,it remains 
true1 however1 that certain qualities of
 the apple may vary whilst the relation 
to the tree remains approximately the   
same1 as also that the individual may   

vary in his qualities to some extent1   
his relation to society remaining       
approximately constant2 and qualities   
thus variable may be regarded as1 in so 
far1 independent of society4  ,social   
development takes place without         
corresponding change of individual      
organization4 ,we cannot interpret the  
changes from savage life arrived at in  
present civilization1 as representing an
 essential1 great1 or corresponding     
difference in the innate faculties of   
the civilized man from those of the     
savage1 but must regard them rather as  
representing the accumulation of mental 
and material wealth4 ,the child1        
learning1 with the words of his         
language1 their implicit meanings1 has  
his feelings modified by them1 is thus a
 philosopher and metaphysician in the   
cradle by the associations given him1   
and is educated from infancy by the     
necessity of conforming his activities  
to those of the surrounding mass4 ,all  
organization implies uniformities of    

conduct1 and therefore continuous       
discipline4 ,society is an organism in  
this sense1 not in any mystical sense4  
,it is not an organism with a single    
centre of consciousness4  ,an           
organization implies organs2 and these  
are to be found in the various          
organizations1 political1 religious1    
etc41 by which1 through a greater or    
less division of labor1 certain special 
functions are relegated to particular   
associations4 ,we thus have not only to 
go beyond the individual and refer to   
the organs in order to determine the law
 or form of any instinct developed      
through the social factor1 but we have  
also to classify the various social     
instincts by reference to the complex   
structure of society1 which implies a   
distribution into mutually dependent    
organs4 ,moreover1 such organs1 though  
primarily directed to a specific end1   
acquire a vitality independent of any   
special end1 become organs discharging a
 complex function1 and imply the        

existence of a correspondingly complex  
set of instincts4 ,we come really to    
love an organization because it supplies
 us with a means of cultivating certain 
emotions and of enjoying the society of 
our fellows2 it would be an entirely    
inadequate account of the facts if we   
regarded it simply as the means of      
attaining that pleasure which has given 
the pretext for its formation4  ,the    
organs of society are not1 however1     
distinct from each other as the physical
 organs are distinct2 the same          
individuals may be members of various   
organizations4 ,the race is not1 in     
fact1 analogous to the higher organism1 
which forms a whole separated from all  
similar wholes1 but to an organism of   
the lower type1 which consists of       
mutually connected parts spreading      
independently in dependence upon        
external conditions1 and capable of     
indefinite extension1 not of united     
growth4 ,we may consider the race1 thus1
 as forming social tissue1 rather than  

constituting an organism4 ,the tissue is
 built up of men1 as the tissue of      
physiology is said to be built up of    
cells4 ,the laws of growth and vitality 
of the organs of society are always     
relative to the underlying properties of
 the tissue2 although1 in particular    
cases1 the more civilized race may be   
supplanted by the less civilized1 we may
 assume that these accidental and       
contingent advantages will be eliminated
 on the average1 and the general        
tendency will be to the predominance of 
those races which have intrinsically the
 strongest tissue4 ,not the state as    
such1 and 7as we have seen7 not the     
individual1 is the unit of evolution2   
the state may develop when the external 
pressure is little or nothing2 the      
social tissue is that primary unit upon 
which the process of social evolution   
impinges4 ,the family is not1 itself1 a 
mode of organization cooerdinate with   
other social organs1 but rather         
represents the immediate and primitive  

relation which holds men together4 ,it  
is quite possible to suppose men living 
together without any political and      
social organization2 but some           
association between the sexes1 however  
temporary and casual1 and some          
protection of infants by parents1 are   
absolutely necessary to the continuance 
of the race beyond a single generation4 
,a change in family associations implies
 a corresponding change of vast         
importance in the intimate structure of 
society itself1 in the social tissue4   
,the state may make a marriage law1 but 
it cannot create or modify the family   
tie beyond certain narrow limits4 ,it   
can bestow privileges upon some one kind
 of association1 but it cannot originate
 it1 cannot enforce fidelity and        
chastity4  ,the social tissue is its own
 end1 or depends upon the whole system  
of instincts possessed by man as a      
social and rational creature4  ,the     
development of society as an organic    
structure implies the development of    

customs in the race1 and habits in the  
individuals forming it4 ,there must be  
certain rules of conduct which are      
observed by all1 in order that          
corresponding rules may be observed by  
each4  ,custom in the civilized society 
may be distinguished from positive law4 
,in primitive states1 the distinction is
 imperceptible4 ,the authority of law   
itself must rest upon custom1--the      
custom of obedience4 ,but physical force
 alone1 or the dread of its application1
 cannot produce obedience2 the          
application of such force is so little  
essential that a state of society is    
conceivable1 in which it should         
disappear altogether2 men might be      
willing to obey their rulers simply from
 respect and affection4 ,the power of   
applying coercion in case of need must  
no doubt increase as the strength of the
 social bond increases2 but that bond is
 also the stronger1 in proportion as the
 need of applying it becomes less4 ,the 
whole social structure1 then1 must rest1

 in the last resort1 upon the existence 
of certain organic customs1 which cannot
 be explained from without4 ,they       
depend1 for their force and vitality1   
upon the instincts of the individual as 
modified by the social factor2 they     
correspond to a given state of the      
social tissue4 ,a legal sanction may be 
added to any custom whatever1 and thus  
it may seem that a state can make its   
own constitution and define its own     
organic laws2 in reality1 however1 the  
power of making a certain constitution  
presupposes a readiness to act together 
and accept certain rules as binding1 and
 thus implies a whole set of established
 customs1 essential to the life of the  
society and giving rise to special types
 of character in its members4 ,every law
 of conduct more or less affects the    
character of the persons subject to it1 
so long as it is enforced2 and          
necessarily1 every variation in the     
character more or less affects the      
sentiments from which the external law  

derives its force4 ,the correspondence1 
however1 is not so intimate that one    
mode of statement can always be rendered
 into the other4 ,for laws1 indeed      
elaborate codes1 are developed without  
seriously affecting the general         
character of the underlying customs1 and
 in the same way instincts may vary     
widely without producing any normal     
change in the external order1 though    
they affect the mode in which it works4 
,the essence of any law is in the mutual
 pressure of the different parts of the 
social structure4 ,any association with 
a given end will have laws determined   
with reference to that end4 ,when we    
pass1 however1 from the organ to the    
tissue1 we still have an organic        
structure with certain rules of conduct 
and corresponding instincts1 but we no  
longer have a definite end or a fixed   
material4 ,the material1 that is1 is to 
be regarded as developing and           
determining the development of the      
subsidiary organs4 ,and since the most  

efficient society normally survives1 we 
may inversely infer from the survival of
 a society that it has developed the    
properties on which its efficiency      
depends4 ,the actual laws existing at   
any period may not represent the        
greatest degree of efficiency possible2 
but they must be an approximate         
statement of the essential conditions4  
,the moral law1 as applicable to all    
members of a society1 defines some of   
the most important qualities of the     
social tissue4 ,it is as independent of 
the legislature as are the movements of 
the planets4 ,this is true whether you  
resolve morality into reason or make it 
dependent upon utility4 ,the action of  
any set of people can no more change the
 nature of facts than that of logical   
necessities4 ,this is1 however1 fully   
true only of morality as it ought to be 
in correspondence with facts4 ,actual   
morality corresponds to men's theories  
about facts1 and it may1 therefore1     
deviate from what the code would be if  

they were incapable of error4 ,but it is
 plain that1 though it varies1 it must  
vary within incomparably narrower limits
 than other systems of law1 because its 
variation is determined by far more     
general conditions2 it maintains itself1
 so to speak1 by the direct action of   
the organic instincts4 ,the doctrines of
 the greatest moral teacher1 though     
somewhat in advance of prevailing       
standards1 are successful only in       
proportion as they are congenial to     
existing sentiments1 give articulate    
shape to thoughts already obscurely     
present in the social medium4 ,like     
,socrates1 the reformer must be         
something of a midwife4 ,morality grows1
 and is not made2 that is1 it is the    
fruit of a gradual evolution of the     
organic instinct continued through many 
generations4 ,the ordinary mind resists 
any change in principles instilled into 
it from birth2 the great masses are     
sluggish in movement4  ,the moral law   
has to be expressed in the form3 ,be    

this1 not ,do this4 ,the existence of a 
character such that variations of       
circumstances will cause no deviation   
from morality is the only security for  
morals4 ,the legislator is forced to    
classify conduct by its objective       
manifestations4 ,but the cunning of the 
man who desires to evade the code can   
still devise innumerable methods of     
accomplishing his end indirectly4 ,law  
permits what it does not prohibit1 and  
is1 therefore1 in danger of producing   
hypocrisy instead of virtue4  ,the      
process by which the moral law 7or      
rather1 the law of conduct which        
includes1 but is not coincident with the
 moral law7 is developed1 is a process  
of generalization4 ,it corresponds to a 
vast induction carried on by the race as
 organized in society4 ,beginning with  
modes of conduct which are seen to be   
bad1 society gradually perceives that   
the ultimate principle of classification
 must be by the primary feelings1 that  
rules of conduct must be expressed in   

terms of character1 and other rules     
which concern the application of these  
to more special cases must take a       
subordinate position and be regarded as 
only of conditional value4 ,all these   
rules must necessarily correspond1      
within very narrow limits1 to a         
statement of the conditions of vitality 
of the tissue which they characterize4  
,in an ideal state of society1 every    
general principle would also be         
recognized in every particular rule4    
,this is a result a gradual             
approximation to which1 rather than its 
actual attainment1 must be anticipated4 
,morality implies action for the good of
 others in some sense4 ,society may be  
regarded both as an aggregate and as an 
organism4 ,there are certain qualities  
which we may suppose to vary in the     
individual without necessarily involving
 a change in the social structure4 ,how 
is the general rule1 as distinguished   
from other rules1 deduced from the      
general principle of social vitality8   

,the law of nature has but one precept1 
,be strong4 ,but when we regard the     
individual in his relations to society1 
the law takes on different forms4 ,this 
may be expressed by saying that the law 
,be strong1 has two main branches1 ,be  
prudent and ,be virtuous1 the first     
applying to cases in which the          
individual is primarily affected1 the   
other to those in which the units are   
affected through society and the social 
factor must be taken into account4  ,to 
find a classification of the virtues    
that will not run into infinite detail  
or be a simple affirmation of the       
general principle1 the internal         
development of moral character under its
 emotional and intellectual aspects may 
furnish a sufficient method4 ,the       
general formula of primary individual   
virtues is3 ,be strong4 ,the condition  
of vitality of the individual as a      
complex of instincts1 is expressed by   
the formula3 ,be temperate4 ,and the    
class of virtues referring to the       

conditions of intellectual efficiency1  
has the general rule3 ,be truthful4     
,ceteris paribus1 an increase of        
individual energy is an advantage to    
society2 and1 as a matter of fact1 we   
find that civilized society differs     
conspicuously from the ruder in         
stimulating more vigorously and         
systematically the various energies of  
its members4 ,the most conspicuous      
virtue of this class is the virtue of   
courage4 ,in more primitive conditions1 
courage1 as necessary to the            
preservation of society1 is regarded as 
a virtue in itself2 later1 some mixture 
of judgment and reason is required in   
its exercise2 and finally1 since it may 
be combined with other anti-social      
qualities1 it is not approved in the    
same manner as the more directly social 
virtues4 ,courage is now regarded merely
 as one manifestation of a character    
which is fitted for all the requirements
 of social existence4  ,the courage of  
the bulldog is blind instinct4 ,where   

such an instinct exists1 the animal     
survives by reason of it1 not because he
 forms any conscious judgment of its    
advantages4 ,it seems necessary to      
suppose that races owed their survival  
to military prowess when reflection was 
still in the most rudimentary stage4    
,the utility of courage must have been a
 very obvious discovery as soon as      
reflection became possible2 but the     
quality must have existed1 in some      
degree1 before it could be discovered1  
although the existence of a distinct    
moral sentiment doubtless implies some  
reflection4 ,moreover1 the instincts    
which imply a perception of utility must
 themselves comply with the conditions  
of existence1 must themselves be useful4
 ,increased intelligence might act to   
the disadvantage of the race by         
increasing selfish cowardice through a  
keener perception of personal1 as       
distinct from social1 risk2 but this    
cannot be true ultimately1 since we     
perceive that intelligent races have an 

advantage2 we may suppose that those    
races are most successful in which a    
perception of the vitality of courage   
goes along with an increase of courage4 
,this principle must be regarded1       
therefore1 as working1 not only through 
the less conscious instinct of the lower
 races1 but also upon the judgments of a
 highly civilized society4 ,the like is 
true1 mutatis mutandis1 of other        
qualities 7such as industry1 energy1 and
 so forth7 which belong to the same     
class4  ,the estimate of courage differs
 with respect to the two sexes1 as does 
also that of chastity4 ,the historical  
explanation is simple2 courage was      
necessary in men in early social stages1
 to race-preservation2 to women1 on the 
other hand1 has been given1 from early  
times1 a class of social functions not  
requiring courage4 ,the estimate1 once  
fixed1 survives even when some of its   
early conditions disappear4 ,the savage 
acquired his wife by knocking her down2 
to him the ideal feminine character must

 have included readiness to be knocked  
down1 or at least unreadiness to strike 
again2 and1 as some of the forms of     
marriage recall the early system1 so in 
the sentiments with which it is regarded
 there may still linger something of the
 early instinct associated with striking
 and being struck4  ,the virtues of     
chastity and temperance occupy an       
intermediate position between the       
virtues of strength and the directly    
social virtues4 ,some of them are a part
 of the prudential1 and others of the   
directly moral code4 ,temperance is     
primarily prudential1 but the sexual and
 parental instincts concern the most    
intimate structure of society4 ,our     
instinctive classification of temperance
 as higher than courage has good reason2
 the classification of it as a personal 
virtue cannot be maintained4 ,a man     
whose vice injures only himself in the  
first place1 becomes incapable of       
benefiting others4 ,as we condemn the   
man whose character is bad1 whether     

external circumstances do1 or do not1   
give him an opportunity of displaying   
it1 so we object logically to the man   
who is destroying his social qualities1 
whether the immediate effect of his     
conduct tells upon himself or upon      
others4 ,another element1 an instinctive
 disgust at sensuality1 seems to precede
 judgment upon intemperance1 with a     
strength not to be accounted for by a   
mere summing up of consequences4 ,the   
human hog revolts us as the smell of the
 sty turns our stomach4 ,the            
justification of the instinct is not    
that it implies a judgment of what is   
useful1 but rather that it is a useful  
judgment4 ,as men become more           
intellectual1 sympathetic1 and so forth1
 they gain fresh sensibilities1 which   
are not simple judgments of consequences
 but as direct1 imperative1 and         
substantial1 as any of the primitive    
sensibilities4 ,to get rid of the       
sensibility you must lower the whole    
tone of the character4 ,asceticism1     

which has arisen chiefly at times of    
great indulgence1 may have been of use  
if only as a demonstration of the       
possibility of conquering the prevailing
 passions4 ,in a similar manner1 we may 
think a great reformer1 a ,howard for   
example1 admirable1 though he neglects  
duties which must be performed in the   
ordinary case4 ,we thus admit that the  
general moral code of benevolence       
prescribes different conduct according  
to a man's opportunities and talents4   
,truth is a virtue of slow growth2 the  
savage1 like the child1 is unable to    
distinguish clearly the difference      
between imagination1 hypothesis1 and    
historical statement4 ,the perception of
 the utility of truth first takes the   
external form3 ,lie not1 which          
corresponds approximately but not       
perfectly to the internal rule3 ,be     
trustworthy4 ,the internal rule1 as     
such1 is the higher2 the external may   
have exceptions4  ,we come1 at last1 to 
the directly social virtues of justice  

and benevolence4 ,so far as truth and   
temperance are strictly virtuous1 they  
may be classed1 the one under justice1  
the other under benevolence4 ,there is  
no real conflict between justice and    
benevolence2 so far as a man is really  
benevolent1 he will not wish to benefit 
some to the injury of others4 ,justice  
seems to consist in the application to  
conduct of the principle of sufficient  
reason4  ,it is not safe to infer       
altruistic intention merely from        
altruistic consequences4 ,the sexual    
appetite appears to be the most selfish 
of impulses1 in that it prompts to      
conduct often ruinous to its objects4   
,on the other hand1 it is the root of   
all social virtues4 ,we cannot be sure  
that the hen who covers her chicks      
regards them as more than comfortable   
furniture in the nest4 ,altruism begins 
with the capability of benevolent       
intention2 where the conferring of      
pleasure upon others becomes a possible 
motive4 ,the generation of pleasure in  

others' happiness has been traced to    
association2 but1 though the pleasant   
association doubtless prepares the way  
for the higher sentiment1 the latter is 
something more4  ,it is true that all   
conduct is egoistic1 in the sense that  
all conduct has its source in the pain  
and pleasure of the doer2 but there is  
great difference between conduct that   
regards human beings as mere means to   
personal pleasure and that which takes  
into account their feelings as sentient 
beings4 ,sympathy springs from the      
primary intellectual power of           
representation4 ,i cannot properly know 
a man without knowledge of his thoughts 
and feelings4 ,cruelty is1 in many      
cases1 simple insensibility1 incapacity 
for projecting ourselves into the       
position of other beings4 ,we may desire
 the pain of others when it is useful as
 a deterrent1 or secures our own safety2
 yet to think about other beings is1 in 
general1 to stimulate our sympathies1   
our sensibility being thus quickened by 

the same power which implies            
intellectual progress4  ,to believe in  
the existence of sentient beings is to  
take into account their feelings1 to    
believe that they have feelings1 which  
may persist when ,i am not aware of     
them4 ,a real belief1 again1 implies    
that1 at the moment of belief1 ,i have  
representative sensations or emotions   
corresponding to those which imply the  
actual presence of the object4 ,to take 
sentience into account is to sympathize1
 to feel with4 ,the only condition      
necessary for the sympathy to exist1 and
 to be capable1 therefore1 of becoming a
 motive1 is that ,i should really       
believe in the object1 and hence have   
representative feelings4 ,systematically
 to ignore these relations is to act as 
,i should act if ,i were an egoist in   
the extremest sense and held that there 
were no consciousness in the world      
except my own4 ,but really to carry out 
this principle is to be an idiot2 for an
 essential part of the world as         

interesting to me is constituted by the 
feelings of other conscious agents1 and 
,i can ignore their existence only at   
the cost of losing all the intelligence 
which distinguishes me from the lower   
animals4 ,it is true that this vicarious
 sympathy1 this pain at another's pain1 
may result in our simply getting rid of 
our own pain by going away from the     
sufferer1 removing him1 or dismissing   
him from our mind2 as a fact1 these     
methods are often pursued4 ,but in many 
cases1 such a course is impossible      
without the renunciation1 at the same   
time1 of many pleasures4 ,if a man is to
 live with his friends1 he must share   
their joys and sorrows2 the choice is   
not between a particular pain and its   
absence1 but involves the whole question
 of the renunciation of companionship4  
,emotions are inevitable1 whether       
sympathetic or not1 in proportion1 not  
simply to the pain and pleasure at the  
moment1 but to the intensity and degree 
in which they form part of the world of 

the individual1--the world constituted1 
not by mere sensations1 but by the whole
 system of thoughts and emotions        
sustained by the framework of           
perception4 ,the existence of pure      
malignity must1 it is true1 be admitted2
 it may be partly explained as love of  
the sensational1 the novel2 the full    
explanation must be left to the         
psychologist4 ,sympathy is the natural  
and fundamental fact4 ,if intellectual  
progress carried with it inferior       
sociability1 it would tend to be        
eliminated2 the world would be to the   
stupid2 it must carry with it something 
which counterbalances the anti-social   
tendency4 ,reason is that which enables 
a human being to take account of future1
 as well as present pleasures4 ,the     
working of the instincts or feelings1   
which dictates conduct1 approximately   
coincides with the prevision as to the  
maximum of happiness obtainable by the  
agent2 normally1 it is prudent to be    
virtuous2 and the sympathetic motives1  

so to speak1 always develop within the  
framework provided by the other motives4
 ,to become reasonable is to act on     
general principles1 and to act          
consistently2 and this includes the     
condition that a statement of the real  
cause of my action should equally assign
 the reason of my action4 ,the law which
 my feelings actually follow must       
coincide with the principle which       
commends itself to my reason4 ,in order1
 then1 that a being provided with the   
social instincts should act reasonably  
it is necessary that he should take that
 course of conduct which gives the      
greatest chances of happiness to the    
organization of which he forms a part4  
,as the pain or pleasure in another's   
pain or pleasure is direct1 so the end  
willed is willed as pleasurable to the  
subject1 and the statement that altruism
 involves the contradiction of aiming at
 something else than the real end--the  
pleasure of the subject--in order to    
secure that end1 is erroneous4 ,the fact

 probably is that the mind flickers1    
taking into consideration various       
consistent and mutually dependent ends1 
some of which may be primarily egoistic1
 some altruistic4 ,the physician is not 
benevolent enough to cure me unless he  
expects a fee2 but he may act also out  
of sympathy2 he need not be always      
thinking of his fee4 ,our sympathies    
would be stifled1 if it were not for the
 cooeperation of motives of a different 
kind4  ,altruism is the faculty         
essentially necessary to moral conduct2 
but the altruistic sentiment is not to  
be identified with morality4 ,the       
elementary sympathy must be regulated   
and disciplined1 in order that it may   
give rise to true morality4 ,virtues1   
for instance1 which belong to the type  
of truthfulness and justice1 generally  
imply a severe restraint of the         
immediate sympathetic impulses4  ,we    
recognize the internal motive as        
desirable1 and recognize a difference   
between the man who acts only from      

prudential motives and the one who acts 
from moral motives4 ,we consider the    
latter meritorious1 that is1 that he has
 a certain claim upon society1 inasmuch 
as he has done for nothing what another 
man will only do for pay1 or has        
refrained from action from which a less 
moral man can be restrained only by     
coercion4 ,wherever society finds       
sacrifice of the individual necessary1  
it pays for it in terms of merit4 ,merit
 is the value put upon virtue2 it is a  
function of the social forces1 by which 
our characters are moulded4  ,every     
character is developed under            
circumstances1 and depends upon mutual  
adjustment with these2 we cannot        
disentangle the two factors4 ,upon the  
power to infer future action the science
 of ,ethics depends4 ,the action of the 
individual is not a matter of chance2 in
 this sense it is caused4 ,but the      
instinct from which the action springs  
is not something external to the man1   
which moves him2 there is not the man   

plus the instinct2 the whole man1       
including the instinct1 acts in a       
certain way1 in which he would not act  
if he did not possess the instinct4 ,we 
are accustomed to say that a man has    
inherited certain qualities2 but the man
 is not one thing and the inherited     
qualities another2 the whole man is     
inherited4 ,merit implies effort4 ,this 
does not mean that effort1 taken        
absolutely1 is the measure of merit4    
,such an assumption would lead to our   
excusing men for the very qualities that
 make them wicked1--the murderer because
 of his spiteful disposition1 for       
instance4 ,the man is most meritorious  
who is virtuous with the least          
effort--provided always that he has the 
normal passions of a man4 ,by these1    
however1 since they are morally neutral1
 he is accessible to temptation and to a
 certain struggle4  ,conscience appears1
 historically1 as a development of      
simpler instincts2 it is not a primary  
or a separate faculty2 material morality

 makes its appearance long before the   
conscious recognition of a moral law4   
,the existence of conscience is         
undeniable4 ,yet moralists are much     
given to exaggerate the sorrow which it 
actually excites4 ,in almost every case1
 the pain which we feel for a bad act is
 complex1 and due only in part to our   
conviction that we have broken the moral
 law4 ,if we regard conscience as a     
separate faculty judging of action by   
some inherent power1 we have to         
attribute to it reason and feeling4 ,it 
is not a primary attribute of the agent 
7to borrow ,spinoza's language71 but a  
mode of the attributes4  ,there is1     
indeed1 a sensibility which seems to    
have as good a claim as any to be       
regarded as elementary1 and which is    
clearly concerned in most of our moral  
judgments3 the sense of shame4 ,this is 
excited by the consciousness of the     
judgment of others4 ,it operates1       
however1 not only in cases of a breach  
of morality2 but often more strongly    

even in cases not concerned directly    
with morality2 and may even operate     
against the moral code4 ,but the        
variation is clearly not indefinite4    
,social development implies the         
development of a certain type of        
character1 which includes1 as essential1
 certain moral qualities2 the           
consciousness of the code and of the    
condemnation of certain classes of acts1
 which it would cause1 is implied in the
 sense of shame4 ,the sense is closely  
connected with the instinctive disgust  
before noticed4 ,it seems to have       
especial reference to decency and       
indecency4 ,the value of the sense of   
decency cannot be measured by a         
consideration of a particular set of bad
 consequences from indecent actions     
other than the shock to decency2 we must
 consider the whole difference between a
 state of society which does1 and one   
which does not1 possess it2 it is an    
essential symptom of refinement and     
delicacy4 ,again1 the judgments of      

conscience may be compared to aesthetic 
judgments4 ,the difference between the  
aesthetic and other pleasures depends   
upon the form of gratification1 not upon
 the instincts gratified1 and seems to  
correspond to the difference between    
work and play4 ,the artist may appeal to
 our moral emotions1 giving us imaginary
 ideals2 but emotion at the             
contemplation of such types is in the   
aesthetic phase when we simply enjoy    
their contemplation1 and it passes into 
the practical phase as soon as it begins
 to have a definite relation to the     
conduct of our lives4 ,only in so far as
 the moral law has become internal1 is  
the delight in heroic or benevolent     
energy spontaneous2 in so far1 we may   
speak of the existence of a moral1 as of
 an aesthetic1 sense4 ,a man of fine    
moral sensibility may1 indeed1 like the 
artist1 perceive finer moral discords   
than can be measured by formulae2 and   
may thus supply a more delicate test4   
,but the complex problem of a difference

 in moral judgment may yet be solved    
approximately by reference to the test  
of social welfare2 the highest type is  
that which is best fitted for the       
conditions of social welfare4 ,the      
collective experience of the race is    
always progressing towards a more       
accurate solution of the problem4  ,the 
utilitarian theory1 which makes         
happiness the criterion of morals1      
coincides approximately with the        
evolutionist theory which makes health  
of the society the criterion2 for1 as we
 have seen1 health and happiness        
approximately coincide4 ,the utilitarian
 theory fails1 however1 in one or two   
respects4 ,it gets rid1 as much as      
possible1 of a priori truths1 and       
rejects intuitions2 it bases its        
argument on the assumption that all     
knowledge is empirical and the ethical  
problem to be solved by a summing up of 
the consequences of action4 ,it thus    
neglects the truth which is implied by  
evolution1--that the organism itself is 

solving the problem2 it neglects the    
instinctive sense generated by social   
evolution4 ,moreover1 it considers      
society as an aggregate of similar      
individuals1 taking little account of   
the variability of human desire4 ,and1  
further1 the utilitarian theory lays its
 stress upon morality as extrinsic2     
according to it1 love of morality for   
its own sake1 as love of the means to   
the end1 must be as unreasonable as the 
miser's love for his gold4 ,association1
 in this sense1 means illusion2 and the 
more reasonable we become1 the more we  
should deliver ourselves from the       
bondage of such errors2 the theory fails
 just at the point where true morality  
begins4 ,furthermore1 in substituting   
the external rule3 ,do this1 for ,be    
this1 it seems to fall into the error of
 expediency4 ,though lying is assumed to
 be1 on the whole1 detrimental to       
happiness1 truth is maintained to be    
desirable only where it contributes to  
happiness4 ,the utilitarian destroys1 to

 some extent1 the force of the objection
 to this by asserting the danger of     
trusting ourselves4 ,the force of this  
objection is only seen1 however1 when it
 is applied1 not to the external1 but to
 the internal code2 we instinctively    
feel the danger to character in the lie1
 and hesitate to trust human nature in  
the establishment of such a precedent1  
just as we object to permitting the     
taking of life even in cases where      
prolonged life means prolonged misery1  
because we cannot trust human nature    
with the decision as to life and death4 
,we make binding laws of morality1 and  
leave it to the man of exceptional      
qualities to break them2 for the        
generality of mankind1 the stricter code
 is safer4  ,what is the sanction of    
morality8 ,why should a man be virtuous8
 ,the answer depends upon the answer to 
the previous question3 ,what is it to be
 virtuous8 ,if1 for example1 virtue     
means all such conduct as promotes      
happiness1 the motives to virtuous      

conduct must be all such motives as     
impel a man to aim at increasing the sum
 of happiness4 ,these motives constitute
 the sanction1 and the sanction may be  
defined either as an intrinsic1 or as an
 extrinsic1 sanction2 that is1 it may be
 argued either that virtuous conduct    
leads to consequences which are         
desirable to every man1 whether he be or
 be not virtuous2 or1 on the other hand1
 that virtuous conduct as such1 and     
irrespectively of any future            
consequences1 makes the agent happier4  
,the problem is1 thus1 to find a        
scientific basis for the art of conduct4
 ,the sanction must supply the motive   
power by which individuals are to be    
made virtuous4 ,this is1 for the        
practical moralist1 the culminating     
point of all ethical inquiry4 ,now there
 is1 by our theory1 a necessary and     
immediate relation between social       
vitality and morality4 ,but it does not 
follow that there is the same intimate  
connection in the individual case4 ,the 

sacrifice of some of its members may be 
essential to the welfare of the society 
itself4  ,we have1 then1 to answer three
 questions3 first1 whether the virtuous 
man1 as such1 is happier than the       
vicious2 second1 whether it is worth    
while1 on prudential grounds1 for the   
vicious man to acquire the virtuous     
character2 and third1 whether it can be 
worth while1 in the same sense1 for the 
vicious man to observe the moral law4   
,if any man outside the pulpit were to  
ask himself what were the main          
conditions of happiness1 the answer     
would certainly include health as the   
first1 most essential1 most sufficient  
condition4 ,but the whole process of    
nature1 upon the evolutionist doctrine1 
implies a correlation between the       
painful and the pernicious1 and thus the
 elaboration of types in which this     
problem is solved by an ever-increasing 
efficiency and complexity of            
organization4 ,hence we may infer that  
the typical or ideal character1 at any  

given stage of development1 the         
organization which1 as we may say1      
represents the true line of advance1    
corresponds to a maximum of vitality4   
,it seems1 again1 that this typical     
form1 as the healthiest1 must represent 
not only the strongest type--that is1   
the type most capable of resisting      
unfavorable influences--but also the    
happiest type2 for every deviation from 
it affords a strong presumption1 not    
merely of liability to the destructive  
processes which are distinctly morbid1  
but also to a diminished efficiency     
under normal conditions4 ,however1 the  
typical man1 though he is1 on this      
theory1 the virtuous man1 is also much  
more than is generally understood by    
that name4 ,happiness is the reward     
offered1 not for virtue alone1 but for  
conformity to the law of nature1 ,be    
strong4 ,beauty1 strength1 intellectual 
vigor1 aesthetic sensibility1 prudence1 
industry1 and so forth1 are all implied 
in the best type1 and are1 so far1      

conducive to happiness4 ,if virtue be   
taken in the narrower sense as implying 
chiefly the negative quality of habitual
 abstinence from forbidden actions1     
there is no reason to suppose that it   
coincides with happiness4 ,you can raise
 a presumption that moral excellence    
coincides closely with a happy nature   
only when you extend moral to include   
all admirable qualities4 ,it is chiefly 
practical reasons which cause an        
attempted evasion of this conclusion2   
the practical moralist holds that the   
non-social qualities may be left to take
 care of themselves1 but that stress    
must be laid upon the social qualities  
as the more important1 in order to      
obtain them in society4  ,sympathetic   
motives may lead to self-sacrifice2 but 
this is also true of selfish motives2   
gin is a more potent source of          
imprudence1 even in a moderate sense1   
than family affection2 and the          
sympathetic motives have on their side  
the far greater intrinsic advantage1    

that they promote ends more permanent1  
far richer in interest1 and giving a    
proper employment to all the faculties  
of our nature1 besides the intrinsic    
advantages that spring from friendly    
relations with the society of which we  
form a part4 ,it is1 however1 true that 
higher activity of any sort may cause   
pain in an uncongenial medium1 and that1
 hence1 the man who is morally in       
advance of his age may suffer through   
his morality2 every reformer who breaks 
with the world1 though for the world's  
good1 must expect much pain4 ,be good if
 you would be happy1 seems to be the    
verdict even of worldly prudence2 but it
 adds in an emphatic aside1 ,be not too 
good4 ,we must acknowledge that         
excessive virtue cannot be recommended  
to the selfish person upon grounds      
intelligible to him4 ,there is1 however1
 a general advantage in possessing more 
varied possibilities of enjoyment1 and  
in being on the side of the strongest   
forces1 those of progress4  ,extreme    

self-sacrifice is sometimes demanded of 
a man by his moral principles4 ,is the  
sacrifice worth making8 ,would ,regulus 
have suffered1 from remorse1 pain worse 
than death1 had he chosen life at the   
cost of honor1 or would he have found1  
as many do1 that remorse is amongst the 
passions most easily lived down8 ,to    
these questions can only be answered    
that morality must often involve pain1  
but that the virtuous man nevertheless  
chooses it4  ,we must thus conclude1    
leaving one great difficulty unsolved2  
and this is because this difficulty is  
intrinsically insoluble2 there is no    
absolute coincidence between virtue and 
happiness4 ,the scientific moralist has 
to do with facts2 beyond these he cannot
 go4 ,from the scientific point of view1
 we may hold that evolution implies     
progress1 and that progress implies a   
solution of many discords and an        
extirpation of many evils2 but there is 
no reason for supposing that all evil   
will be extirpated and perfect harmony  

attained4 ,new sensibilities bring with 
them new dangers2 even sympathy1 when   
not guided by knowledge1 may lead to    
rash changes productive of evil as well 
as good4 ,to improve1 whether for the   
race or the individual1 whether in      
knowledge or in sympathy1 is to be put  
in a position where a new set of        
experiments has to be tried1 and        
experience to be bought at the price of 
pain4  ,it is true that beyond the      
science lies the art2 we must incite the
 intrinsic motives to good through the  
pressure of the social factor4 ,a       
certain disadvantage to the individual  
cannot form a reason for our not        
endeavoring to make him moral as far as 
possible2 the good of society as a whole
 is involved2 and even the man who is   
himself immoral sees the advantage of   
living in a moral medium1 and would     
prefer that the world at large should   
not be guided by his own principles4    
,b4 ,,carneri   ,carneri begins his book
 on ,morality and ,darwinism            

7,sittlichkeit und ,darwinismus1 #ahga71
 with the rejection of the older        
,spiritualism in favor of ,idealism1 on 
the ground that modern investigation has
 made it impossible for philosophy to   
assume any foundation but one sanctioned
 by science2 and with a rejection of    
dualism in favor of monism1 on the      
ground that the investigations of ,wundt
 and others have shown the psychical and
 the physical to be identical4          
,instinct is defined by ,carneri as     
thought upon the standpoint of mere     
sensation1 but following the laws of the
 same logic as governs conscious        
thought4 ,there is1 thus1 according to  
his view1 no exception to be taken to   
the conception which represents instinct
 as the action of mental force1 the     
difference between it and human reason  
as one of degree only4 ,it is           
nevertheless a confusion which ascribes 
reason to the animals4 ,even their      
intelligence is one-sided1 since it does
 not reach self-consciousness1 and it is

 not to be regarded as an unqualified   
improvement upon instinct1 since the    
latter loses both in intensity and in   
certainty of action when it no longer   
governs undisturbed by other influences3
 only such animals as are endowed with  
intelligence ever eat of injurious food4
 ,in human beings instinct has almost   
disappeared2--almost1 we say1 since     
savages do many things in an instinctive
 manner1 and even civilized men at times
 perform acts which1 on account of the  
exceeding rapidity of their execution1  
cannot be regarded as the results of    
reflection4 ,instinct may be compared to
 polarity in magnetism1 according to    
which opposites are attracted4 ,instinct
 was evolved by natural selection4 ,but 
intelligence and judgment are doubtless 
also to be found even far down in the   
scale of species4 ,the brute            
consciousness is1 nevertheless1 only a  
transition-stage1 in which the          
individual is still lost in the species2
 and1 as such1 it is not to be confused 

with human reason4 ,consciousness in the
 brutes is purely subjective1 a         
consciousness fuer sich2 while in human 
beings it is consciousness an und fuer  
sich1 consciousness that becomes        
subject-object through the concepts     
developed by language4  ,man is as      
unconditionally subject to the law of   
causality1 psychically and physically1  
as the merest atom4 ,there is no such   
thing as chance2 but in this very fact  
lies a consolation4 ,in the concept of  
individualization in its broadest sense1
 is included the conception of freedom1 
and in the very nature of man there is  
an indestructible impulse to freedom2   
his being1 as self-conscious1 is        
identical with the latter impulse4 ,this
 increases with increasing civilization1
 and has finally become the problem by  
the solution of which alone man can     
attain to self-satisfaction4 ,it is true
 that the power of choice is            
inconsistent with the law of causality2 
but in the manner in which the man1 as a

 thinking being1 takes his stand over   
against the species1 he becomes a       
person1 an individuality4 ,as one of the
 species1 he shares the characteristics 
of the species1 is an expression of the 
species-idea1 and his action is         
determined outwardly by things2 but it  
is so determined only mediately by means
 of thought1 of concepts2 these are the 
immediate determinants4 ,hence1 man's   
relation to things is a different one   
according to the grade of his knowledge4
 ,in so far as this is adequate1 that   
is1 corresponds to the truth of         
actuality1 his relation is an active    
one2 in so far as it is1 on the         
contrary1 inadequate1 the relation is a 
passive one4  ,character is inborn and  
can never be effaced but only clarified1
 though this least through the bitter   
experience of the results of action4 ,as
 the horse loses his sure-footedness    
after one fall1 and falls again more    
easily1 so we lose1 through many a deed1
 the motive furnished by the            

consciousness of never having committed 
it1 and have a greater tendency to      
repeat it4 ,if an act has bad results1  
it is more likely that an attempt to    
avoid these results by cunning will be  
made at later opportunities for the act1
 than that the act itself will be       
avoided4 ,and even if it were to be     
avoided1 such avoidance would not       
constitute an improvement of the        
character2 the latter would but hide    
itself under a mask to reappear at the  
first prospect of exemption from        
punishment4 ,that which alone can modify
 character is a considerable extension  
of knowledge4 ,for1 since all things    
influence us only in proportion to the  
worth we attribute to them1 their power 
over us must differ according to the    
correctness or incorrectness of our     
judgment4 ,therefore1 the more we regard
 things in the light of their actual    
worth and hence also in their relations 
to each other1 the more our character1  
beholding in these relations the general

 as the true1 will incline to avoid     
extremes in action4 ,a preponderantly   
sensual character remains such through  
life2 but there is no doubt that a      
careful education1 which makes it       
acquainted with nobler principles and   
develops a sensibility to true beauty1  
may ennoble it2 while1 if the education 
is1 on the contrary1 neglected1 it must 
sink deeper and deeper into the mire of 
coarseness and vulgarity4  ,character is
 the sum of its affections1 that is1 of 
all states and motions of the           
disposition4 ,these are divisible into  
passions1--included under selfishness1  
which is the general1 all-embracing     
passion1--and the active conditions of  
existence4 ,these two divisions are also
 identical with pain and pleasure1      
passion with pain1 and activity with    
pleasure4 ,all desires have their root  
in the primary instinct of              
self-preservation and self-propagation1 
the instinct of self-propagation being  
only the racial form of the instinct of 

self-preservation4 ,the instinct of     
self-propagation is the highest of all  
the passions1 yet1 as ,spinoza says1    
every form of love which recognizes     
another cause than mental freedom is    
easily turned to hate1--if it is not    
already a sort of madness1 nourished    
rather by discord than concord4 ,the    
various forms of family love1 the love  
of country1 and friendship1 noble       
sisters of love in the narrower sense1  
result in desirable activity only as    
they exist in the form of concepts4     
,civilization is nothing but the        
struggle of inadequate and adequate     
concepts1 in which1 as in the struggle  
for existence in nature1 only that is   
triumphant which1 instead of assuming a 
position of separation1 makes the       
general and the conditions of existence 
its own2 so that charity in the widest  
sense of the term is1 of all humane     
feelings1 that to which the palm has    
been given4 ,in this feeling1 the       
dialectic movement of the concept man is

 completed and perfected1 the single    
man1 instead of perishing in the        
struggle of all against all1 first      
working his way upward out of his       
species and then taking up1 in his own  
being1 the whole of mankind through the 
medium of benevolence4 ,by this         
evolution he raises himself to the level
 of the general4 ,far higher than that  
confused sympathy which1 in lending     
temporary aid to one1 brings lasting    
harm to many1 is this adequate concept2 
true benevolence is founded upon the    
clearest reasoning1 and is the activity 
of the mind's fullest power4 ,the       
discord which self-consciousness has    
caused in man can be done away with only
 by the greatest possible clarification 
of self-consciousness3 man returns      
mentally to the bosom of the universal1 
when every living thing causes him to   
exclaim in the words of the ,indian     
philosopher3 ,behold thyself4  ,ethics  
ranks higher than morals1 the latter    
merely comprising a collection of       

particular rules of conduct which1 as   
particular1 bear the stamp of the       
individual1 the non-universal4 ,the     
details of morality change according to 
epochs and peoples4 ,this change has    
been regarded as an argument that there 
is no absolute but only relative good4  
,but the concept of the ,good is1 like  
the concept of the ,beautiful1 the fruit
 of education2 that is1 it is the       
product of mind1 which1 through its own 
evolution1 arrives at ,knowledge4 ,when 
we do away with all concessions to      
one-sided1 extravagant desires1 abstain 
from placing mind above the universal   
law of causality1 and are content with  
the facts made known to us by science1  
we perceive that the absolute ,true1    
,beautiful1 and ,good1 bears the        
character of the ,universal4 ,in this   
universal character it has always       
finally found expression in human life1 
and in this character it will always    
find expression4 ,the idea which reaches
 perfect expression in the dialectic    

movement of these three concepts1 the   
,true1 the ,beautiful1 and the ,good1   
has come into existence by the mediation
 of the self-individualizing            
self-consciousness1 just as the         
evolution on the earth1 which reaches   
its completion in man1 is the outcome of
 the first chemical process4 ,not only  
have the two one law1--7mind is only in 
so far realized#fe as nature is         
expressed through it1 and the actuality 
of nature is its expression in mind7 but
 both are1 in fact1 one1 the succession 
in their development on the earth being 
a succession only in relation to the    
earth1 and for us in this respect4      
,although to our notion of time1        
thousands of millions of years lie      
between the two1 their separation does  
not represent a second for the universe 
and its eternity1 for the comprehension 
of which it must be disregarded4  ,the  
good man is he who does good for its own
 sake1 without effort1 not out of       
momentary caprice1 but out of perfect   

knowledge and conviction4 ,he is free1  
since he acts out of his own character1 
the law of nature appearing as the law  
of his own mind2 freedom lies in the    
absence of discord and strife in the    
mind4 ,the good man has strength of     
soul1 just as the man who lifts a weight
 without effort1 not he who lifts it    
only with the greatest effort1 possesses
 strength of body4  ,there is no        
absolute ,evil in contrast to the       
absolute ,good4 ,evil is negative4 ,the 
perfection of man is identical with the 
attainment of absolute ,good through    
evolution4  ,morality knows nothing of  
either reward or punishment2 for it     
there are only causes and effects4 ,this
 truth1 on which morality is based1     
lends to the freedom out of which its   
activity proceeds a deeper worth4 ,the  
eternal laws of mind point the way by   
which mankind has to proceed2 it is the 
same way by which man has become man and
 by which he must proceed1 even if he   
did not will to advance thus4 ,in the   

struggle for existence1 which knows only
 victory or destruction1 progress is a  
necessity of nature1 but it is less     
painful and more rapid the more clearly 
these laws come to be perceived by      
consciousness4 ,yet1 however clear they 
may be1 it is only by a tireless        
endeavor which shrinks from no          
sacrifice1 that progress takes place4   
,the end which morality has in view is  
distant1 for it is high2 but only with  
its attainment will mankind fully       
deserve its name when struggle has been 
transformed to labor1 when no insignia  
are recognized but those of right1 no   
weapon used but intelligence1 no banner 
raised but that of civilization4  ,in   
the volume1 ,man the ',end' of ,man     
7,der ,mensch als ,selbstzweck1 #ahgg71 
a positive criticism of ,hartmann's     
,philosophy of the ,unconscious1        
,carneri defines instinct as no form of 
real thought1 nothing dependent upon    
perception1 but merely an inherited1    
mechanical dexterity dependent upon     

sensation4 ,for the assumption that     
thought is the source of instinct must  
lead us naturally1 on account of the    
existence of the latter where the       
centralizing organ of thought is absent1
 to the theory that thought is universal
 in nature2 that is1 we shall arrive at 
a theory of atom-souls4 ,it is evident  
here that not ,carneri's definition of  
instinct so much as his conception of   
thought is changed from the one adopted 
in ,sittlichkeit und ,darwinismus1      
thought being now limited1 as it was not
 in the former book1 to self-conscious  
mental activity1 assumed to be dependent
 upon nervous centralization in the     
brain4 ,in this book also1 the author   
defines the idea as something having    
mental existence1 though not1 he says1  
in any metaphysical sense4 ,his idealism
 is not of such sort that he recognizes 
any other way to the attainment of ideas
 than that of science2 and to him the   
service of the materialist who gives us 
information concerning the function of  

the smallest nerve-fibres is of more    
worth than that of the idealist who     
originates a whole philosophical system4
 ,the work of philosophy lies in the    
rejection of all that is contrary to    
science1 and the clarification of       
ideals4  ,the will may be defined1 not  
as a definite1 separate power1 but as   
the self-conscious impulse to action    
resulting from excitation4 ,any other   
definition is inconsistent with the     
theory of evolution1 according to which 
that individuation which is the first   
condition of the struggle for existence1
 is nevertheless but the expression of  
all previously existing oppositions4 ,to
 make of the will or of the impulse to  
self-preservation anything separate and 
individual1 is as childish as to        
personify death4 ,the individual is     
totality as unity4 ,darwinism teaches   
us1 not that the world together with man
 has been created according to any      
teleological principle1 but that it has 
developed by virtue of motion4 ,the     

human being moves by virtue of          
reciprocal action and reaction with the 
world4 ,yet only by virtue of his unity 
as feeling does he think and will4      
,individuality is that which stamps all 
our activity with the mark of the ego1  
which causes us to recognize every      
impulse that moves in us as our impulse1
 to call all our willing ours4 ,the     
psychical1 the summation of functions to
 which we give this name1 reaches       
consummation in the clarification of    
feeling to consciousness1 in which the  
desire of an action or of abstinence    
from an action appears to us as our     
will4 ,as thought is based on           
perception1 so will is based on impulse2
 and since thought and will appear as   
the two highest opposites of feeling1   
and this1 according to our definition1  
springs from sensation by way of        
perception1 the will1 including action  
and abstinence from action1 arises out  
of the general sensitivity4 ,the        
progress of science authorizes the      

expectation that the close relation of  
sensitivity to simple reaction will one 
day be discovered4  ,the conceptions of 
teleology are groundless4 ,the so-called
 ends of nature have the peculiarity    
that they are according to the means4   
,it does not rain in order that there   
may be vegetation1 but vegetation exists
 because it is conditioned by the rain4 
,only with thinking man1 in his struggle
 for existence1 arises the concept of   
ends2 man has not attained to           
civilization by help of a friend2 rather
 has he wrung civilization from nature  
as an enemy2 compelled by it to the     
exertion of his whole strength1 and     
growing in cunning by exercise1 he has  
learned to use the weaknesses of his foe
 to his own advantage4 ,to want he owes 
the greatest things that he has         
accomplished4 ,by way of labor alone can
 victory over nature be achieved and    
salvation won4  ,the standpoint of faith
 is childlike4 ,faith does not reason1  
and may not do so if it wishes to remain

 faith4 ,the child can comprehend nature
 and man's relation to it only by the   
language of faith1 and there are large  
classes of people who1 for a long time1 
will be accessible to no other language 
but this4 ,but faith must decrease in   
the same ratio as mankind outgrows      
intellectual childhood4 ,in the same    
measure1 the worth of the philosophical 
solution of certain problems must       
increase2 and among the most important  
of these problems must be reckoned that 
of bridging the chasm between the       
individual and the world1 which has     
grown wider with the awakening of       
consciousness4 ,it lies in the nature of
 self-conscious thought to reach out    
beyond itself1 just as it lies in the   
nature of sense-perception to regard    
this beyond as the world to come4 ,hence
 the endless longing which seeks the    
ruler of the world to come1 and despairs
 without him2 until the supposed right  
to a future life is perceived to be the 
right to the ,only ,whole1 and an end is

 set in the attainment of this whole4   
,for the thinking man an aimless life   
has no meaning2 there is only one means 
of bridging the chasm2 namely1 that     
mankind shall set itself an end4  ,a    
final destruction of life upon the earth
 must surely come1 whether it be in the 
shape of a sudden catastrophe or as the 
result of a slow process4 ,but such an  
end can no more be regarded as the end  
in the philosophical sense than death   
can be regarded1 in the same sense1 as  
the end of the individual life4 ,by the 
development of ideas1 which are concepts
 of reason in distinction from concepts 
of the understanding1 we arrive at a    
notion of the ideal as end4  ,in the    
ethical ideal1 there is contained more  
than the empiricist can offer4 ,the     
enthusiasm with which the true artist   
starves for his art1 or the martyr      
perishes for his conviction1 can never  
be fully explained from the empirical   
standpoint4 ,one does not even need to  
be an idealist in order to act thus2 but

 the materialist or the realist who     
possesses true love of beauty and a     
heart framed for great deeds1 merely    
deceives himself when he refuses to     
acknowledge the ,all-embracing which    
therein overwhelms him4 ,sociology and  
the ,history of ,civilization can only  
point out how man has attained to the   
ideas of the ,beautiful and the ,good2  
what these are and wherefore their      
influence is so powerful1--the real     
worth of the ,beautiful and the         
,good1--thought by concepts alone can   
show4  ,the ,idea of ,man1 as he has    
already developed and may yet develop1  
is1 as far as our knowledge reaches1 the
 highest of human thoughts4 ,we are     
therefore formulating no metaphysical   
theory in personifying mankind1 and     
pointing out that the perfecting of     
which it is capable is the great end    
which it has set itself4 ,we know1 by   
our knowledge of human nature1 that     
mankind will always endeavor to be      
happy1 and that it will approach nearer 

perfection the more real and general its
 happiness becomes4  ,the particular    
rules of morality may and must change2  
but the highest principle of all        
morality is changeless4 ,from the purest
 moral feeling came ,schiller's words3  
,live with thy generation1 but be not   
its creature2 serve thy contemporaries1 
but in that which they need1 not that   
which they prize4 ,without having shared
 their guilt1 share with noble          
resignation their punishments1 and yield
 thyself freely to the yoke which they  
both illy could do without and illy     
bear4 ,by the steadfast courage with    
which thou refusest their pleasure1 thou
 shalt prove to them that it is not     
cowardice which causes thy submission4  
,in these three sentences there lies a  
whole system of ethics4  ,in the will to
 good1 indivisible from a feeling of    
freedom1 of which no power on earth can 
rob us1 lies true happiness4  ,for mind1
 as for matter1 the law of the          
indestructibility of force1 of work1 is 

true4 ,that which appears as force or   
energy is motion2 every impulse to      
motion is motion1 and only in so far as 
it appears1 can the quantity of motion1 
force1 energy1 increase or diminish2 as 
a matter of fact1 it always remains the 
same4 ,but just as the activity and     
force of matter increase with its       
differentiation1 so the activity and    
energy of the mind increase with        
intelligence4 ,it is through            
intelligence that we come to a          
comprehension of the distinction between
 good and evil1 and through intelligence
 that we are able to increase social    
prosperity1 and so morality4  ,there are
 no innate1 primary human rights2 there 
are only acquired rights which man has  
gained for himself in the process of    
development4  ,if we were to express    
negatively the end which mankind sets   
itself1 we should define it as the      
greatest possible reduction of pain4    
,conscious existence is accompanied by a
 feeling of pleasure2 but the general   

progress heedlessly overrides the       
individual being1 and we therefore have 
to erect barriers against the stream    
which thus turns pleasure into pain4    
,pain and pleasure are relative to the  
individual4 ,every sensation is         
pleasurable as long as it does not      
exceed in strength a certain limit      
corresponding1 in each case1 to the     
nature of the individual4 ,since1       
however1 every sensation becomes1 by    
perception1 feeling1 thought appears as 
a modifying factor in all pain which    
does not arise from too extreme physical
 injury4 ,the manner in which our       
perceptions1 thought-images1 are formed1
 the store of thought-images and        
concepts which we possess1 and hence our
 thought-capacity1 combined with the    
extent and clearness of our knowledge1  
are decisive not only with respect to   
the avoidance of pain and attainment of 
pleasure1 but also with respect to our  
attitude towards pain and pleasure in   
general2 every pain and every pleasure  

has1 in the last analysis1 such worth   
alone as we attribute to it4 ,the       
universalization of true education1 the 
increase of intelligence1 is1 therefore1
 the means by which man's lot may be    
bettered4  ,through the conditions of   
the earth's atmosphere1 man has grown to
 be the glorious creature that he is4   
,if we gradually give him1 by education1
 an advantageous love of life and       
pleasure therein1 and at the same time  
do not neglect the cultivation of       
ethical principles1 virtue will become1 
with the increase of happiness1 a       
necessity4  ,if intelligence is to bear 
the fruit which we thus demand of it1   
its nature must be such as not only to  
be nourished by actual life1 but also to
 uplift by its increase the whole man4  
,and this is1 in fact1 the case2 where  
it is not so1 we have to do with a      
one-sided development such as existing  
circumstances often condition1 but which
 cannot be regarded as normal4 ,this    
point of view is the necessary          

consequence of the unity which we       
postulate of man4 ,if thought and will  
have their origin in feeling1 and if    
will clarifies itself through the       
clarification of thought1 then all      
advance in thought leads1 in general1 to
 an advance in feeling1 and true        
intelligence is inseparable from true   
love4 ,we use the word love here1 as    
designating intelligence in its highest 
sense1 and declare1 moreover1 that we   
would desire to see this meaning alone  
attached to love4 ,over against the     
conception of love which we find in     
,hartmann and ,schopenhauer1 we place   
the conception of ,spinoza1 who         
designates it as a free1 reasonable     
activity1 and says of it as             
distinguished from passion that the love
 of both man and wife has for its cause1
 not a pleasing exterior merely1 but    
especially freedom of soul4  ,if we     
regard intelligence and love in their   
highest antithesis1 the one appears as  
the appropriative1 the other as the     

self-devoting conception of things4 ,but
 since we form a conception of things   
and make them our own only in proportion
 to our intelligence1 our attitude      
towards them must be according to this  
measure2 and since there is no action   
without reaction1 intelligence must be  
broadened by love as well as love       
clarified by intelligence4 ,the highest 
of all is intelligence2 but it is love  
that first lends it creative power2     
without love it cannot create1 but only 
destroy4 ,everything great and noble    
that man can point out as his work is   
due to love--love of mankind1 love of   
country1 love of knowledge1 love of art1
 love of labor in general4 ,if the      
devotion is deficient in purity1        
determined by extraneous motives1 the   
work will bear marks of the deficiency4 
,the reason why the power of love is so 
much greater than every other power is  
that its all-embracing1 boundless       
character reacts upon it as a feeling of
 eternity1 enabling it to undertake all 

things1 as if it might conquer even     
death4 ,life1 considered in its parts1  
is cheerless2 but love1 regarding it in 
its totality1 points out to it the way  
of salvation through itself4 ,love is   
the concrete element which exalts the   
abstraction of ,intelligence to         
incarnate ,idea2 therefore is love the  
idealizing principle from which         
intelligence draws belief in its own    
aims4 ,and if one questions whence comes
 the conception of immortality1         
impossible to be won from experience1   
love must confess itself guilty of      
originating it1 being unable1 to exist  
without this self-delusion4  ,carneri   
thus places himself in direct opposition
 to ,schopenhauer's and ,hartmann's     
notion of love1 which1 he says1 falls   
like a deep shadow over their whole     
conception of the world2 and he pleads  
in favor of a standpoint which shall    
make self-perfection the aim of         
existence for woman as for man4 ,he     
propounds a theory of education for     

woman which1 according to his own       
statement1 places him at one in spirit  
with ,mill2 but he avers that he cannot 
follow the latter in his more extreme   
views1 which1 he says1 were evidently   
assumed by ,mill only in view of the    
strength of the enemy with which he had 
to contend4 ,the book ends with the     
following paragraph3--  ,we do not run  
after ideals2 hence no plan floats      
before us1 according to which the world 
should be shaped anew4 ,he who          
understands how to read the book of     
,history knows that1 in no one place    
does the identity of form and content   
come more clearly into view than in     
others1 and that1 with every new        
content1 there is always a new form     
also4 ,the modern state has by no means 
outlived itself yet1 and those who      
endeavor to do away with it know not    
what they are about4 ,instead of        
thinking upon a new form1 let us devote 
our care to the clarification of the    
content4 ,no one deceives himself as to 

the suffering in the world2 but he      
deceives himself who thinks that he     
alone can bring about a better          
condition4 ,only the action of all can  
better things4 ,therefore1 that which   
remains for us to do can be summed up in
 these few words3 ,let us make every    
effort possible to place every one in a 
position to help himself4 ,this is the  
only ethical conception of universal    
reform4 ,let us prize knowledge above   
all things1 and let us show that we so  
prize it by increasing it and diffusing 
it as much as lies in our power2 let us 
prize it above all things1 and prove    
that we do so by using it for the good  
of mankind4 ,by knowledge we have become
 human beings1 because knowledge has    
brought us to a comprehension of the    
,beautiful and the ,good4 ,it is        
knowledge that sets life an end in the  
attainment of the ,good1 and knowledge  
that glorifies our path to that end4    
,let us educate for ourselves wives that
 shall not merely dimly feel what we    

think1 but such as will bring to the    
execution of our will a clear           
understanding4 ,let us educate for      
ourselves wives who1 fired by the same  
feelings as our own1 will unite their   
efforts with ours in the education of a 
generation that shall take morally the  
stand upon which the science of the     
century finds itself4 ,let us seek true 
happiness if we would find virtue4 ,it  
is to no wisdom1 but it is likewise to  
no foolishness that we owe the existence
 of the world4 ,man can be foolish2 but 
he can also be wise2 and if he is wise1 
then the world too is wisely arranged4  
,carneri begins his ,first ,principles  
of ,ethics 7,grundlegung der ,ethik1    
#ahha7 with an investigation of the     
origin of primary concepts and our      
knowledge through these4 ,in order to   
bring light into our conception1 we must
 first of all learn the way to the      
concept2 for then only can we see how   
the concept completes itself in the     
judgment1 and becomes1 in reasoning1 the

 criterion of its own worth4  ,the      
problem which first presents itself to  
us is that of ,life in general4 ,the    
problem is inseparable from that of     
corporeality4 ,if we follow phenomena to
 their last conceivable reduction1 we   
finally pass from the perception of mass
 to the concept of matter2 but further  
than this we cannot go4 ,at least1 we   
can perceive only material things1 and  
that which we call the spiritual in     
distinction from the corporeal has      
always something corporeal as its basis2
 and if we do not wish to dispense with 
the reliable guidance of experience1 we 
shall not overleap this barrier4        
,science cannot reckon with supernatural
 factors4  ,what matter is we cannot    
know2 that it exists1 however1 that the 
phenomena of nature are no empty        
seeming1 sensation1 as the felt result  
of the mutual relation between us and   
the outer world1 testifies4 ,sensation  
is the basis of our self-consciousness1 
of the only full and irrefutable        

certainty that we possess4 ,as to what  
true ,being or ,existence is1 there is  
disagreement2 but there can be none     
regarding the fact that we are conscious
 of our sensations2 and upon this       
consciousness rests the postulate of the
 materiality#ff of all existence4 ,in   
order to assert the materiality of all  
phenomena1 we are forced to distinguish 
between a corporeal and a non-corporeal 
action of matter2 matter operates       
mentally when its division or           
differentiation proceeds so far that the
 resulting phenomena can no longer be   
perceived by the senses1 but only       
conceived by thought4 ,the              
indivisibility of mind from corporeality
 follows directly from this definition  
of the mental side of nature4 ,we       
distinguish between the two only for    
convenience' sake4 ,the newer           
,psychology knows nothing of ,sensuality
 in the old sense of the word1 since the
 basis of all psychical effects is      
physical4  ,for matter operating        

mentally1 as for matter operating       
corporeally1 there are no specific      
energies2 it is1 as ,wundt expresses it1
 functionally indifferent4 ,the         
differing results of a high             
differentiation of centralized organisms
 arise in accordance with the changing  
combinations of elementary parts and    
nerve activities4 ,these results are    
not1 however1 to be regarded as the mere
 effects of matter1 but as phenomena of 
the same1 in fact1 as the consummation  
and crown of the whole evolution of     
nature4 ,even in the sense-organs we see
 the differentiation of matter advance  
beyond the sphere of sense-perception4  
,therefore1 in distinguishing between   
mind and matter1 we are still in the    
realm of the natural1 and follow the    
path of experience1 if by experience is 
understood not alone immediate          
experience1 but also the conclusions    
which directly or by strict analogy may 
be drawn from it4  ,the theory of an    
atom-soul and the theory of an          

organizing principle must be abandoned  
as teleological1 and so inconsistent    
with the facts of evolution4 ,the theory
 which holds force to be a              
transcendental existence1 a something   
outside of matter1 must also be         
rejected4 ,with the endless divisibility
 is given an endless motion1 inward or  
outward2 the endlessly divisible matter 
exists in endless motion1 or what is the
 same1 the endless motion is the        
endlessly divided matter4 ,hence motion1
 like matter1 can never diminish2 only  
the form of its appearance changes4     
,the order in nature cannot be used as  
the basis of a teleological argument2   
what we call order of nature is         
necessity as distinguished from chance4 
,for example1 the statement that the    
life of the earth requires the          
alternation of day and night means      
merely that1 since day and night        
alternate upon the earth1 only such     
beings could arise and continue in      
existence thereon as flourish under this

 alternation4  ,the first appearance of 
protoplasm introduces no strictly new   
thing1 but only a new form of matter    
with life-motion2 and the formation of  
germs is only a further step of the     
process4 ,the most important            
characteristic of all life is sensation4
 ,this is the form in which1 in all     
living things1 that which in the rest of
 nature we call reaction1 appears4 ,that
 it is so easy for us to say in the same
 breath1 the animal possesses sensation2
 and1 by this particular excitation we  
produce in him this particular          
sensation1 has its reason in the fact   
that the animal is not only capable of  
sensation1 but is1 moreover1 continually
 in a state of sensation4 ,by the fact  
of its continual reaction upon          
sensation1 it keeps itself alive4 ,hence
 the two concepts coincide1 so to speak2
 sensation is to life what divisibility 
is to matter4 ,we express with these    
words more than a similitude1 since all 
sensation is based upon motion1 is1     

indeed1 motion1 and every motion may be 
reduced to a division or differentiation
 in the broadest sense of the word4 ,all
 further distinctions1 as1 for instance1
 with respect to the mode of sensation  
7which belongs1 without doubt1 to plants
 as well as to animals71 we leave       
unnoticed2 all differences in the forms 
of life are but those of degree1 though 
they may be wide differences of degree2 
they are to be ascribed to the influence
 of outer circumstances4  ,sensation    
develops in the direction of least      
resistance4 ,in the animal world1 we    
have to distinguish between outer and   
inner factors1 with the latter of which 
a new element seems to be introduced4   
,the difference between the two is not1 
however1 one of essence1 since the will1
 too1 is determined by outward          
circumstance4 ,the inner factors of     
evolution are comprised in the germ1    
from which the individual is produced2  
while the environment constitutes the   
outer factors4 ,the individual enters   

the world with a certain reserve        
quantity of force1 which represents his 
power of resistance to outside forces1  
and he passes the more rapidly from     
youth to age the more rapidly this force
 is consumed4 ,this accumulation of     
force is1 therefore1 identical with the 
impulse to self-preservation1 which1 as 
modified by various inner and outer     
excitations1 manifests itself in various
 forms4 ,but he who1 as unimpassioned   
thinker1 desires progress1 desires also 
retrogression2 he who desires youth     
desires age1 since the two concepts are 
correlative and the one includes the    
other2 old age1 and finally death1 must 
come to our planet as a whole1 as well  
as to the human individual4 ,the        
original tendencies of the total        
character determine1 for the most part1 
the manner in which the individual      
sustains the struggle for existence2 yet
 the environment is in no less degree   
active in this determination4 ,not less 
important than the manner of reaction is

 the differing susceptibility to        
particular kinds of excitation2 the     
character resulting from the mutual     
action and reaction of individual and   
world depends upon the manner in which  
the individual adapts himself to        
circumstances1 ennobles and disciplines 
himself4  ,in idealism1 as long as it   
remains within proper bounds1 there is  
certainly truth2 he who derides it1     
derides himself4 ,but realism has also  
its truth1 as long as it does not       
misjudge the worth of concepts1 by which
 alone we clearly recognize what things 
are to us1 what their relations to us   
are1 and so how we have to deal with    
them4 ,concrete concepts inform us as to
 what is true and what is not true in   
phenomena4 ,there is no greater mistake 
than to suppose that what things are in 
themselves1 not what they are for us1 is
 of importance to us2 as if we could    
have an interest in that which things   
are not for us4 ,the decisive point is  
the fact that1 not things as they appear

 to us1 but their rightly conceived     
appearance1 their appearance as         
understood by adequate concepts1 is the 
beginning and end of knowledge4 ,hence  
the true student of nature can no more  
do without the concept than the true    
philosopher can leave material          
perception out of account4 ,stiff-necked
 ,materialism is as one-sided as        
old-time ,metaphysics2 the one has no   
meaning for its form1 the other no form 
for its content2 the one is a corpse1   
the other a ghost1 and each strives in  
vain to attain the warmth of life4      
,natural ,science and ,philosophy must  
tread different paths1 in so far as     
division of labor requires them to do   
so2 but they labor at the two sides of  
one whole4 ,nature is not a machine1 but
 life in its fullest form1 and the task 
set us is to understand her as she is1  
not to patch together a nature out of   
disconnected scraps4  ,carneri adopts   
the definition given by ,claude         
,bernard1 to whom life is neither a     

principle nor a result1 but a conflict4 
,to the chemical synthesis1 from which  
protoplasm results1 is added1 through   
mechanical integration1 morphological   
synthesis1 to whose special form        
inherited characteristics are related as
 elements4 ,through the conflict within 
living forms1 and between these and the 
rest of the world1 motion1 attaining to 
the character of function1 appears as   
continuous consumption4 ,destruction and
 renewal are inseparable correlative    
concepts4 ,this fact is contained in the
 concept of the conservation of force1  
work1 and motion4 ,we may distinguish   
between 7#a7 latent life1 such as that  
accumulated in the germ1 7#b7 the merely
 oscillating plant-life1 and 7#c7 free  
animal life4 ,with this distinction1 we 
place ourselves upon the standpoint of  
the individual1 for whom there is both  
beginning and end1 and to whom renewal  
is subordinated to destruction2 for     
consumption1 death is the characteristic
 of living in distinction from          

non-living matter4 ,if1 therefore1 we   
regard life as identical with death1 we 
merely assert that we consider death    
identical with life1 and that1 in the   
broader sense of the word1 for the      
universe as a whole1 there is no death4 
,that which ,claude ,bernard designates 
as ,construction is the differentiation 
and division of labor arising in the    
process of integration4 ,the cell       
constitutes the first integration of    
protoplasm4 ,in it1 motion takes place  
in a particular form1 organizes         
according to this form1 causes division 
and synthesis1 and impresses features of
 character that1 by their action and    
reaction with the environment1 either   
effect their own destruction1 or else   
maintain their existence1 propagate     
themselves1 become fixed1 and undergo   
further evolution4 ,in this manner      
species arise and vary3 and the more    
primitive the form1 the more variable it
 is2 the more advanced1 the more fixed4 
,hence the invariable character of the  

germ-cells4 ,in bone-formation1 it is   
clearly shown that special structure    
begins very early1--in the cell1 namely2
 but it is preserved only where it is   
aided by the necessary action and       
reaction4 ,autonomic in itself1 life    
submits itself to the general laws of   
evolution4#fg ,as the direction of      
motion is determined for whole groups of
 cells by the direction of the motion of
 the protoplasm in the single cells1 so 
organic function is determined by the   
grouping of the irritable1 contractile1 
sensible cells4 ,from the first origin  
of life up to its most perfect          
development1 everything is formed at the
 cost of other forms4 ,if life is1      
therefore1 to be conceived as a         
conflict1 it is a conflict as wide as   
the universe itself1 and we say1 with   
,claude ,bernard1 that life may be      
characterized1 but not defined4         
,everything that has sensation lives4   
,as life depends upon particular        
combinations of particular elements1 so 

sensation is the characteristic mark of 
such combinations1 and a higher form of 
that simple reaction common to nature in
 general4 ,reaction has its reason in   
the motion arising from the endless     
divisibility of matter1 through which   
the most different combinations and     
reactions are produced4 ,since we have  
before us1 in our contemplation of      
corporeal nature1 not abstract matter in
 general1 but some sixty or more special
 chemical elements1 we must1 in thinking
 of atoms1 have in mind atoms of these  
particular elements1 and not atoms of   
abstract matter in general2 of such     
atoms of matter in general1 or1 if one  
will1 of primordial matter1 we can know 
only that they would in general attract 
and repel4 ,only by degrees can a       
particular reaction of the elements have
 been developed2 and since our known    
elements have particular different      
reactions1 they must be the product of  
different combinations4 ,sensation is   
due to certain combinations of these    

elements2 when the combinations no      
longer exist1 the atoms of these        
elements still react according to their 
characteristic method as atoms of       
particular elements1 but the sensation  
dependent on their peculiar combinations
 is destroyed4 ,the atom as such is     
devoid of sensation1 and we may convert 
our earlier proposition1 making it read3
 ,only that which lives is sensible4 ,we
 know quite well how much of this course
 of reasoning is of hypothetic nature2  
but the strictest consistency cannot be 
denied it4 ,the method which explains   
life by the assumption of sensible atoms
 is a much shorter and easier one2 but  
is it not likewise a method of greater  
risk8 ,and is there no danger that1 in  
rejecting a method by which all changes 
in phenomena are referred to functions  
of combinations of elements1 we may     
seek1 in matter itself1 something that  
is not matter8 ,the above theory of     
life1 also1 takes its departure from the
 assumption that all was1 originally1 in

 the formation of the world1 living in  
the broader sense of the word4 ,but here
 we are concerned with life in the      
narrower sense of the word1 as          
distinguished from what we call dead    
nature4  ,soul is1 therefore1 according 
to our definition1 equivalent to animal 
life1 in contrast to the life of the    
plant4 ,the significance of the         
distinction lies in the intermediation  
of the general organic unity1 not in a  
qualitative division4 ,the elements are 
the same2 only their connection is      
different1 and that which distinguishes 
the animal is a centralization of the   
organs4 ,in referring to the possession 
of soul by the animal1 we simply point  
out the independent manner in which1 by 
reason of sensation1 its impulses       
govern1 and develop1 through the scale1 
up to consciousness and will4 ,of course
 the gradations are very numerous1      
inasmuch as the functions of the soul   
are determined by the development of the
 organism4 ,the difference between      

animals whose sensation attains clear   
consciousness and such as do not attain 
to more than a mechanical action1 does  
not concern us1 as long as we regard the
 psychical phenomena in their most      
general form4 ,every animal possesses   
soul2 we avoid the expression a soul1 as
 giving the soul the significance of    
something by itself4 ,in like manner1 we
 do not say that a life1 but that life  
belongs to the animal4 ,the chief       
condition necessary to soul as to life  
consists in union to a whole1 and soul  
represents the gradation by which life  
lifts itself to the plane where it      
becomes a mirror of the world4          
,sensation1 as centralized in the brain1
 becomes perception1 the sensation of a 
part becoming the sensation of the      
whole1 a feeling of the individual4 ,it 
is perceptions which cause movement4 ,to
 find a connection between perception as
 generally understood and the action of 
the muscle would be as difficult as to  
show the connection between body and    

soul in the sense of ,spirit4 ,but if we
 regard perception as feeling1 then the 
awakening of a corresponding impulse1   
and the transformation of this into     
will1 which finds expression in a       
corresponding motion1 is something so   
natural that it needs but a glance at   
the nerve-apparatus in order to         
comprehend the rapidity of the whole    
process4 ,with regard to the unconscious
 character of the greater part of the   
process1 and its corresponding rapidity1
 we have to consider the gradual nature 
of the development of the nervous       
system1 the gradual drill of the parts1 
until the whole process becomes perfect4
 ,by feeling is here not meant          
necessarily feeling as pain or pleasure4
 ,this quality of feeling does not      
necessarily belong to every perception1 
else thought1 as a train of perceptions1
 would be unbearable2 a certain strength
 of feeling is necessary in order that  
it may attain the character of pain or  
pleasure2 as we recognize a boundary at 

which sensation begins1 so we recognize 
one at which feeling begins to attain   
the character of pleasure and from      
which1 up to a second boundary-line1 it 
continues to appear as pleasure2 beyond 
this line it appears as pain4 ,moderate 
feeling is beneficial to the organism1  
immoderate feeling harmful2 hence the   
appearance of the one as pleasure1 and  
of the other as pain4 ,we say expressly 
moderate1 not weak feeling1 because too 
weak feeling may also1 under certain    
conditions1 be painful4 ,horwicz rightly
 protests against any attempt to arrange
 the feelings in an exact scale1 since a
 particular feeling may lead to quite   
different phenomena of emotion1         
according to the particular             
circumstances and the particular        
development which it undergoes in the   
organism1 and since it is furthermore   
nothing changeless and distinct1 but    
merely an energy that necessarily leads 
to activity4 ,hence it is that the      
excitation which does not pass the stage

 of sensation remains localized1 but    
when it attains to the stage of feeling 
takes possession of the whole           
individual1 and brings the essential    
tendency of his being#fh to expression4 
,as ,carneri tends to interpret the     
sensation which he predicates of the    
lower animals as a mere higher reaction 
of living matter1 and thus wholly       
mechanical1 so he tends to regard the   
activity of all animals which lack brain
 7under which he understands especially 
the nervous developments found in the   
gray matter which contains ,haeckel's   
soul-cells7 as devoid of pleasure and   
pain1 and due to mere inheritance and   
force of habit4 ,so the action of the   
ants is not to be attributed to         
intelligence1 but to mere reaction upon 
sensation due to inheritance and        
exercise2 and so the movements of a     
butterfly impaled upon a red-hot needle 
would be attributable to the hindrance  
of its flight1 not to pain4#fi ,thus1   
with ,carneri1 the words sensation1     

soul1 perception1 and feeling1 lose     
their ordinary significance2 and this   
fact must be held in mind in the        
interpretation of his assertions that   
all animals have soul1 and all animals  
have sensation4  ,carneri further cites 
,haeckel's definition of the organism as
 a cell-monarchy1 in which different    
individuals1 and different groups of    
individuals1 having different duties1   
are guided by a central power4 ,he does 
not intend thus to assume special       
centres for consciousness and will1 but 
only to assert that1 through such       
centralization1 the expression of the   
whole individual1 as total consciousness
 and total will1 takes place4  ,not only
 the brain1 but other parts of the      
nervous system1 are affected in         
perception2 and the same parts are      
operative in remembrance4 ,thus the     
association of ideas is explained4  ,as 
long as the animal remains upon the     
plane of mere instinct1 it has only     
blind impulses4#gj ,only in the most    

highly organized animals do we find the 
first traces of conscious1 though not   
yet of self-conscious1 will4 ,in that   
the animal knows what it will1 it       
distinguishes clearly the objects of its
 will1 and hence its own impulses4 ,upon
 the earlier plane of mere              
self-preservation1 the beneficial1      
harmful1 and indifferent were not yet   
made inward1 but only distinguished     
outwardly by nature in the struggle for 
existence1 in which the fittest         
survived2 in consciousness1 however1 the
 harmful and advantageous become inward1
 taking the form of pain and pleasure4  
,but the animal never gets beyond the   
concrete case1--in which his inherited  
instincts1 working with a rapidity and  
freedom we often see imitated in the    
passions of men1 sometimes act so       
advantageously as almost to deceive us  
into believing them the result of       
reflection2 yet sometimes1 again1 bring 
most disastrous results4 ,the animal    
never attains to a notion of the ,whole4

 ,associations and general perceptions  
the higher animal species have1 but not 
concepts4  ,impulses appear1 in their   
primary form in the animals1 as         
passions4#ga ,the first beginning of the
 ethical may be found in the passion of 
love in the broadest sense of the word1 
as sexual love and the love of          
offspring4 ,the first is chiefly        
exacting1 the second is higher1 in that 
it gives4  ,that which divides man      
physically from the brutes is merely the
 union of qualities1 all of which1 but  
never all of which united1 we find among
 the animals2 that which divides him    
mentally from them is self-conscious    
thought1 developed by means of speech4  
,through the development of attention1  
which arises in connection with a       
greater and greater centralization1     
sensation becomes perception1 this      
develops further to general perceptions1
 and is still further perfected to      
concepts4  ,carneri believes primitive  
man to have been1 not more benevolent   

than the animals1 but less so4 ,leaving 
out of account the carnivorous animals1 
the brutes seem to satisfy their own    
wants without interfering with the      
satisfaction of others1 and1 except     
where the possession of females is      
concerned1 to live in peace with each   
other4 ,on the other hand1 the influence
 of man upon the domestic animals may be
 seen in the greed of the dog1 who1 as  
capable of instruction1 takes on himself
 all the evil qualities of his master4  
,the cat1 who is not so intelligent as  
the dog1 is not thus influenced4  ,for  
nature there is no good and evil4 ,the  
animal which tears and devours its prey 
is no worse than the swollen stream1    
that uproots the trees in its course4   
,with consciousness1 intention awakes2  
yet in the brute this is only secondary2
 the brute distinguishes between pain   
and pleasure1 but not between these as  
the result of its own action in         
distinction from that of nature outside 
itself4 ,only the self-consciousness of 

the human being knows good and evil2    
nature does not know evil1 for she does 
not know the opposition on which it is  
based4 ,there is wisdom in the story of 
,genesis1 which sees in the beginning of
 knowledge1 the commencement of evil4   
,the awakening of self-feeling is the   
beginning of a chasm1 through the full  
development of which the individual is  
at length separated from nature4 ,with  
self-consciousness and the feeling of   
boundless isolation that therein comes  
over him1 man begins his ethical        
development4  ,but the ethical does not 
begin with the human being known to us  
by natural history2 even yet there are  
races of man which stand lower than many
 species of animals2 and the early      
development of moral activity was of    
necessity much more of the nature of    
that which we call evil than of that    
which we call good4 ,the mind is a sort 
of light2 and as warmth is indivisible  
from the motion which we call light1 and
 the first warmth of the sun could only 

burn1 so the motion which we call mind  
could at first only have destroyed2     
self-consciousness1 in its earliest     
stages1 can have produced only the      
intense feelings which lie nearer pain  
than pleasure4 ,as man came to have     
intention1 and gained new wants in      
development1 he could regard the        
intentions of his fellow-men only with  
distrust4 ,envy1 hatred1 dislike1 were  
developed long before the family1 and1  
later1 the tribe furnished opportunity  
for love4 ,self-consciousness could1 at 
first1 interpret good and evil only as  
having reference to self1 just as it    
also conceived its freedom as that of   
its own caprice4 ,the desire for        
happiness and endeavor to attain it is  
the primary incentive to all human      
undertakings4 ,it is erroneous to       
suppose that man is nearer to the brutes
 by this impulse2 the animal does not   
possess it1 has only the impulse to     
self-preservation4  ,the idea that man  
and wife together first constitute the  

complete human being1 and that the real 
future of this human being lies in the  
children--the idea of the family is1    
certainly1 of all ideas1 primordial1    
though it probably came late to         
consciousness4 ,from the family         
developed the tribe with the eldest at  
its head4 ,the more peaceful the tribe1 
the more others combined against it1 and
 by their combination compelled it still
 further to strengthen its resources4   
,the feeling of power awakened by the   
growing concord extended further and    
further1 and finally made its way to the
 individual with the full force of the  
,idea4 ,this development1 but more      
especially the compelling power of the  
struggle for existence1 soon called the 
bravest to command in place of the      
eldest of the tribe4  ,it is by the     
agency of no other being that1 in the   
mutual relation of physical and mental  
activity1 consciousness is attained2 man
 himself comes to a feeling of himself4 
,in the being endowed with soul1 who on 

the one hand attains1 through           
integration1 an independence that       
appears as the impulse to               
self-preservation1 on the other hand    
becomes conscious of this impulse to    
self-preservation through a centralized 
nervous system that raises the          
part-sensations to feelings of the      
whole1 sensation divides into two chief 
functions1 which appear as passion and  
thought4 ,we are not concerned1 in      
thought and passion1 with opposites1 but
 with an opposition which a single      
phenomenon develops through manifold    
action and reaction with the rest of the
 world of phenomena4 ,the distinction is
 merely a convenience in finer          
investigations2 there is1 in fact1 as   
little thought without emotion as       
emotion without thought4 ,and since     
emotion always manifests itself as will1
 this highest opposition is best defined
 as that of thought and will4 ,in order 
to understand the human being1 we must  
analyze these two sides of              

consciousness4  ,carneri's examination  
of the primary laws of thought can be   
only touched upon here4 ,in the law of  
,identity1 or1 negatively speaking1 the 
law of ,consistency1#gb there comes to  
our consciousness a more general        
,species which includes a determinate   
species4 ,the adequate1 clear1 correct1 
corresponding#gc concept is consistent  
with itself1 means1 the adequate concept
 finds itself again in every object     
which it includes4 ,the law of ,identity
 expresses1 therefore1 not entire       
sameness1 with which the cessation of   
all thought would be reached1 but simple
 consistency4 ,it affords us1 thus1 the 
means of recognizing the ,untrue in that
 which is not what it is called1 hence  
also the means of recognizing the ,true4
 ,the law of ,excluded ,middle contains 
an extension or doubling of the law of  
,identity1 in that the identity here    
appears1 not in the form of consistency1
 but in that of contradiction2 as1      
either--or4 ,not one1 but two cases are 

supposed1 only one of which can exist or
 be true4 ,the disjunctive proposition  
which corresponds to it is not less     
determinate than the categorical        
proposition which corresponds to the law
 or judgment of ,identity1 but is       
rather1 on the contrary1 a more forcible
 affirmation of it4 ,in this determinate
 nature lies the worth of the ,excluded 
,middle4 ,du ,bois ,raymond's address on
 the ,limits of ,knowledge has caused   
much joy to conservative thinkers2 but  
these have made much more out of it than
 it really means4 ,there is either for  
us a transcendental1 or there is not2   
and if not1 then we are limited to the  
knowledge of nature4 ,the scientific    
limit set to our knowledge by our       
hypotheses and theories is1 however1    
merely a limit set for the purpose of   
rounding knowledge to a whole1 not of   
closing it to a further advancement2 but
 such hypotheses must be consistent with
 experience and founded upon it2        
otherwise we leave knowledge behind us  

and abandon the hope of it4 ,we cannot  
say what1 within the province of        
science1 man will not know1 except that 
he never will know everything4  ,the law
 of ,causality is the most important law
 of thought1 after that of ,identity4   
,reason and result are often confused   
with cause and effect4 ,the reason on   
account of which we do a thing is not1  
however1 the cause by which it occurs4  
,the cause is the complexity of all     
conditions which make it possible1 and  
the reason of its performance coincides 
with a conscious design on our part that
 constitutes our purpose4 ,causality has
 nothing in common with the concept of  
purpose4 ,the principal of ,sufficient  
,reason has been made the bridge between
 ,causality and ,design4 ,probably human
 experience reached first the conception
 that nothing occurs without sufficient 
reason1 and only later1 by a further    
mental step1 the conviction that        
everything for which the necessary      
conditions exist takes place4 ,with this

 conviction1 the concept of causality   
became clear2 but1 at the same time the 
bridge which connects it with the theory
 of design in the succession of events  
was destroyed1 so that only a logical   
leap can restore us to this incomplete  
conception of earlier experience4       
,causal necessity excludes purposed     
necessity4 ,that which takes place may  
be regarded as1 in one direction1       
conformable to an end1 but may1 on the  
other hand1 conform to no end in any    
direction4 ,a succession of events      
conforms to purpose only in so far as it
 is regarded by a particular            
consciousness which combines it in      
thought with ends of its own or such as 
it ascribes to another consciousness4   
,in the law of ,causality1 as in the law
 of ,identity1 the necessity of         
self-consistency and the                
self-consistency of ,necessity reaches  
expression4 ,the sufficient reason is   
simply the completeness of the          
conditions1 with the existence of which 

the event takes place1 and the absence  
of which the event fails to take place4 
,spinoza's ,will and intellect are one  
and the same is the ethical law of      
,identity4 ,all thought is willed2 that 
is1 indivisible from a certain coloring 
which it has in virtue of its identity  
with the will1 just as all will is      
connected with thought2 there is1       
indeed1 a will-less thought1 which      
might1 however1 just as correctly be    
called unthinking thought1#gd just as   
unthinking willing is1 in reality1      
will-less willing4 ,in all mental       
operations1 the identity of the two     
functions is found4 ,a will is          
unthinkable without something willed--an
 end1 given by thought4 ,it is the fact 
that1 in his practical life1 man        
recognizes purpose as a necessity1 which
 causes him to read purpose into nature4
  ,at the basis of identity lies a      
concept which throws light upon the     
teleological principle4 ,this is the    
concept of the ,general4 ,the basis of  

the principle of identity is a concept  
of species which embraces the general in
 contrast to the singular and           
particular2 just as the judgment of     
,identity constitutes an advance to     
still greater ,generality4 ,the concept 
of the ,general which reaches expression
 in species coincides with the concept3 
,law of ,nature4 ,the ,law is1 for a    
particular circle of events1 what the   
,species is for a particular circle of  
objects4 ,as in the ,species1 the       
characteristics are expressed which an  
object must exhibit in order to belong  
to it1 so in the ,law the conditions are
 expressed which much exist in order    
that the instance included under it may 
take place4 ,the relation of ,identity  
to ,causality is unmistakable4 ,species 
and ,law include no mere plurality of   
objects and instances1 for as often as  
the instance comes to pass the law is   
fulfilled1 and the number belonging to a
 species is1 in conception1 limitless4  
,worlds like our earth may come into    

existence again and again2 hence        
specimens of a certain species1         
eternally destroyed1 may eternally renew
 themselves1 and instances which fall   
under a certain law may eternally occur4
 ,simply their conditions must exist in 
order that they may occur4 ,such cases  
form1 therefore1 a whole2 and this is   
,totality in ,little4 ,the importance of
 every whole which sets itself over     
against the greater whole has already   
been noticed4 ,the former whole         
constitutes the concept of              
,individuality which1 as ,undivided     
,unity1 becomes independent4 ,the       
limitlessness which we claim for the    
whole is one of conception2 we thus seek
 to make that which is incomprehensible 
conceivable4 ,the concept does not need 
to be imagined2 it may be thought4      
,every one knows what he means when he  
opposes the whole to the part4 ,the     
whole is not a larger part1 but the     
opposite of the part1 as 'all'          
constitutes the opposite of the many and

 the particular4  ,what we aim at1 in   
this analysis1 is a true ,realism in the
 conception of the ,purposeful4 ,the    
,purposeful is that which conduces to an
 end1 the ,useful4 ,from ,individuality 
follows the individual nature of ends4  
,every man has his own ends1 and in the 
attempt to attain his ends does not     
hesitate to set himself in opposition to
 all the rest of mankind4 ,if he is     
sufficiently energetic and cunning1 he  
may even succeed1 for a time1 in his    
endeavors1 to the harm of humanity4 ,yet
 to have the whole of humanity against  
oneself is to endeavor to proceed in the
 direction of greater resistance1 and   
the process must1 sooner or later1      
result in the triumph of the stronger   
power4 ,in the struggle for existence1  
in its larger as well as its smaller    
manifestations1 the individual seeks1   
with all his power1 to satisfy the      
impulse to happiness which arises with  
conscious existence2 while the species1 
as the complex of all energies developed

 by its parts1 has an impulse to        
self-preservation of its own1 which1 by 
its action as type1 has originated and  
preserved for centuries the conception  
of changeless kind4  ,here is the       
beginning of the dawn1 whose sun1       
however1 in order to become visible and 
impart warmth1 must rise still higher4  
,the certainty afforded in the law of   
,identity in positive form1 in the law  
of ,contradiction in negative form1 in  
the law of ,excluded ,middle in the form
 of an opposition1 and in the law of    
,sufficient ,reason in conditional form1
 is based upon ,causality1 ,community of
 ,species1 or ,totality4 ,for this      
reason1 deduction and induction are only
 then to be relied upon when the first  
form of reasoning has for its middle    
proposition one that expresses          
causality1 community of species1 or     
totality1 and the latter form of        
reasoning takes these for its point of  
departure4 ,the analysis of ,deduction  
is of worth as clarifying and confirming

 thought1 and thus extending its field  
as often as the syntheses of ,induction 
stand the proof of the process of       
clarification4 ,the supernaturalism of  
,dualism leads to a dead1 the natural   
character of ,monism to a living1       
dialectic1--to the dialectic of         
,becoming4 ,the concept assumes a       
concrete form1 and1 as higher and higher
 rising sun1 enables us to conceive what
 it will be to us as ,idea4 ,the        
understanding knows nothing of ideas2   
their realm is that of the reason2 yet  
since the reason is but a higher        
development of the understanding1 the   
commencement of this dawn must be       
perceptible in it4 ,moreover1 the       
division which we make between the two  
originates in our genetic treatment of  
the subject1 which seeks to explain the 
concept by showing the course of its    
development4 ,yet the distinction is no 
empty abstraction which may not claim   
life and form to a certain extent4 ,the 
human being is always the whole human   

being2 but he is not always uniformly   
developed1 either physically or         
mentally4 ,in one individual the        
understanding1 in another the reason1   
manifests itself more plainly in        
thought4 ,this is also true of the race1
 the people1 and the epoch1 as of the   
individual4 ,modern development has     
turned more and more from the ideal to  
material interests2 we seem to be       
progressing towards a reaction1 but what
 that reaction will be1 we cannot say2  
it may be a reaction in the worst sense4
 ,the mistakes of the understanding     
cannot be predicted4 ,with the point of 
culmination1 the extreme is reached1 and
 in ,spiritualism may be found traces of
 a touching of extremes4 ,yet the       
influence of the understanding is to be 
relied on in so far as it is the clear  
mirror of ,necessity4 ,the understanding
 may err1 just because it is conscious2 
but experience always corrects these    
mistakes4 ,nature1 as gifted with mind1 
is no new nature2 the laws of thought   

are the natural laws of the mind4 ,in   
their mirror the will sees the          
accomplishment of the first mental      
development1 and learns to comprehend   
this1 on higher mental planes1 as       
,common ,weal4  ,the opposition of the  
individual to the rest of the world     
which arises with self-consciousness and
 individuality is greater1 the greater  
the individuality4 ,to the struggle for 
existence is added the struggle for     
happiness1 which1 separating into       
numberless desires that gain in         
attractiveness with every obstacle      
opposed to their satisfaction1 is the   
origin of all the passions1--of greed1  
jealousy1 envy1 hatred1 etc4 ,through   
passion1 which is the exaggeration of   
activities that1 in a normal form1 are  
good1 man is led into a struggle for    
false happiness1 just as the concepts   
under which his passions arise are      
false4 ,the individual against the world
 cannot attain happiness for himself4   
,the greatest good1 peace of soul1      

freedom from passion1 is attained only  
through knowledge1 by which the concepts
 of the individual are corrected2 it is 
attained1 not as dead incapability of   
emotion1 but only as clear enjoyment of 
life after past storm4 ,labor and       
education are the path to true happiness
 and1 through true happiness1 to virtue4
 ,the passions are not separate         
existences2 the whole man is the passion
 of his heart2 the whole man feels1 just
 as the whole man thinks4 ,but just for 
this reason1 because of the identity of 
will and understanding1 the correction  
of the concept is the correction of     
will4 ,this is not saying that will and 
understanding are never in opposition to
 each other2 the apparent opposition is1
 however1 merely a hesitation of the    
will1 which does not know what it really
 will4 ,it is true that one passion can 
be conquered only by another2 we cannot 
will an emotion that leads to a certain 
course of action2 but we can fix our    
attention on the objects which produce  

it1 and by thus reaching a clear        
recognition of their actual and         
necessary relations1 affect our own     
action4 ,it is true that man does as he 
wills2 but he wills necessarily as he   
does4 ,according to the doctrine of     
freedom1 it must be exactly those who   
act without knowing wherefore they act1 
and who are thus driven by blind        
impulse1 who are the most fully         
self-determined4 ,a real freedom and    
conquest of necessity can1 on the       
contrary1 be attained only by obedience4
 ,just as1 in the animal1 the summation 
of impulses and desires reaches a focus 
in feeling1 so in man1 in proportion to 
his development1 the summation is in    
consciousness1 the focus of which is the
 point of concentration of the will's   
activity4 ,spinoza's ,will and          
understanding are one means3 the        
activity of the will is the realization 
of the activity of thought4 ,every one1 
the more self-sacrificing1 as the less  
self-sacrificing man1 does that which is

 to him the pleasantest2 egoism turns   
the scale in both cases2 only in the one
 case the egoism has a basis of broader 
love4 ,and since we act according to our
 conception of things1 the question of  
our responsibility is the question of   
our full possession of consciousness4   
,the necessity of nature must take away 
our desert1 as far as a future life and 
its reward are concerned2 but from the  
standpoint of a being who desires       
happiness and attains to it through     
evolution1 necessity gains a new aspect4
 ,natural ,selection is ,natural        
,necessity4  ,yet not in the            
understanding1 as such1 but in the      
reason1 is the reconciliation of the    
same with will4 ,reason in the narrower 
sense is a higher development of the    
understanding1 constitutes its          
completion and perfection1 and          
presupposes a high degree of culture2   
though in a wider sense1 as the         
half-unconscious modification of the    
impulses by adjustment to the needs of  

the species1 it develops early in man4  
,by it alone man becomes man in the full
 sense of the word4 ,the activity of the
 mere understanding is an analytical1   
that of the reason a synthetical one1   
the return of cold consciousness to warm
 feeling1 of abstract mind to concrete  
nature4 ,truth lies1 for the reason1 in 
,totality2 hence1 to it1 the ,general   
alone is comprehensible4 ,it has to do1 
not with abstract concepts1 to which    
nothing in the realms of the mental or  
physical corresponds1 but with concepts 
of species1 concrete concepts1 which we 
call1 in distinction from abstract      
concepts1 ideas4 ,by ideas is not meant 
existences in the ,platonic sense1 but  
the ,typical in species4  ,the impulse  
to happiness which arises with          
consciousness as thought and will1 calls
 itself ,i4 ,it is the individual who1  
with every nerve-cell and every drop of 
blood1 attempts his own realization4    
,but all individuals are alike in this1 
that they reach1 at last1 a point where 

they recognize the fact that their ego  
is but a miserable half which needs a   
,thou to its completion4 ,in the union  
of the ,thou and the ,i1 the first ,i   
becomes a complete and perfect ,i4 ,man 
and woman both realize that only        
together do they represent the whole    
human being4 ,i and ,thou together      
constitute a ,we4 ,the ego remains      
after1 as before the union1 the axis    
upon which the whole world turns4 ,but  
the egoism of mere understanding is1 by 
a broader thought1 elevated to the      
altruism of reason4 ,as the highest     
union of thought and will1 the reason   
becomes ,idea in and for itself1 actual1
 absolute ,idea4 ,with the ,we was born 
the ,saviour who should reconcile the   
sharply opposed factors of awaking      
consciousness4 ,the light of his gospel 
spread in wider and wider circles2 man  
and woman no longer beheld1 each1 merely
 his own happiness in the other2 they   
saw their mutual happiness in their     
children1 and their own and their       

children's happiness in friends1 and    
their own and their children's and their
 friends' happiness in their fellow-men4
 ,the ,i of the reason is the           
self-conscious ,we4  ,the struggle for  
happiness has brought forth1 out of the 
privileges and endeavors of individuals1
 civilization in its present form4 ,want
 and the necessity for labor have been  
the spur to endeavor and advance4       
,through the concepts of ends and of    
intention1 the self-conscious will      
further evolved ideas1 which themselves 
undergo a struggle in the activities to 
which they give rise2 and this is no    
longer the struggle for existence1 but  
the struggle for civilization4  ,there  
are three ,ideas which1 arising out of  
the extension of the ,i to ,thou and    
,we1 are the spring of all ethical      
conceptions2 these are ,love1 ,humanity1
 and ,public ,spirit4#ge ,love is the   
passion of passions and is the spring of
 all capacity to altruistic emotion4    
,love is life in its highest degree2#gf 

and by the manner in which a human being
 loves one may know what manner of man  
he is1 and what will be the nature of   
his feelings towards his fellow-men in  
other relations of life4 ,a man's       
conduct towards women is the surest test
 of his character4 ,that which ,spencer 
calls ,integration1 that which has      
created all nature1 from the first germ 
to the perfect human being1 and1 as     
preservative cell-labor1 still continues
 to create1--this infinite ,something   
comes to consciousness in the human     
being1 as ,love4 ,on the lowest plane it
 can appear only as simple impulse2 but 
what1 developing from stage to stage1 it
 can accomplish1 the history of ,love   
shows us4  ,to these three ideas of     
,love1 ,humanity 7or ,benevolence71 and 
,public ,spirit correspond three outward
 phenomena1 which bear such relation to 
them in the development of morality as  
the body bears to the soul4 ,these are3 
the ,family1 the ,state-form1 and the   
,representatives of ,great ,ideas4      

,these latter1 the men who have been    
pioneers of civilization1 we do not need
 to pity or regard as victims1 though   
life was to them a mighty struggle and a
 restless labor2 in their suffering was 
their pleasure2 and that which impelled 
them and compelled them to attain their 
end was the impulse to happiness4       
,therein lies the wonderful secret of   
the clarified impulse to happiness1 that
 it finds its highest satisfaction in   
itself4 ,such representatives of great  
ideas are those in whom the species     
overcomes the individual1 and out of the
 species man the species-man is         
developed4 ,that which they express is  
the ,true1 if only the ,true for1 and   
in1 mankind4 ,in this lies their worth2 
as worth in ,science also1 and in the   
,beautiful1 lies in the truth of the    
,idea that is therein expressed4 ,the   
,true becomes practical in the ,good4   
,the reason is thus the first condition 
of happiness1 and freedom of the will   
lies in the ethical ennoblement of      

reason1 which is nothing more nor less  
than obedience1 as the total result of  
all natural causes2 by it the individual
 is lost in the species as a whole4     
,this ethical height does not consist in
 impulse1 but in the self-conscious     
activity of will4 ,its mental expression
 is an ,ethical ,sense1 in distinction  
from the ,moral ,sense of the           
,intuitionists4 ,through it man is at   
one with himself as with his kind4  ,the
 ,ethical ,sense is not the common      
property of the species4 ,just as it    
has1 however1 reached expression in a   
few1 so it is more and more realized in 
the many by the process of evolution1   
through which a common will1 purpose1   
and good are necessarily finally evolved
 from all striving of individual wills  
after happiness4 ,ethical ideas arise as
 the result of experience1 and in them  
man gradually attains reason4  ,for the 
,reason to which ,love1 ,public ,spirit1
 and ,humanity are the natural element1 
the ,general 7,common7 as truth1 is no  

empty conception1 but a promise whose   
fulfilment is the ,good and the         
,beautiful4 ,the faithfulness of this   
,reason never swerves1 since it depends 
on no fear1 but springs from the        
clearest conviction1 and therefore is   
one with the love which it feels and    
inspires4 ,its friendship is as strong  
as it is unselfish1 for it does not call
 anything friendship that is based on   
other relations than those of mind4 ,its
 generosity is always strength1 its     
mercy never weakness4 ,as far as its    
power reaches1 so far and no farther do 
its remorse and pity extend2 for all    
passions which reduce or dim the        
activity of the soul are unreasonable4  
,the way to the attainment of the       
ethical spirit is pleasure1 which       
guides1 though it often misguides us2   
fortunately1 on the wrong paths we      
sooner or later meet with pain1 while on
 the right path we are ever accompanied 
by pleasure as transition from less to  
greater perfection1 to quote ,spinoza4  

,the feeling of ,responsibility consists
 in the soul's recognition of all its   
action and omission of action as its    
own1 and in the courage to endure the   
consequences of these4  ,the ethical    
,ideal1 which the ethical imagination as
 scientific conceives1 is the truly     
happy man1 the man fully in harmony with
 himself4 ,this idea is to be regarded  
as a star by which we are to shape our  
course1 not as an end to be fully       
attained4 ,through labor mankind        
approaches this ideal1 attains knowledge
 from experience1 and clarifies the     
concept of happiness4 ,the ,i extends   
itself to an ,i of mankind1 so that the 
individual1 in making self his end1     
comes to make the whole of mankind his  
end4 ,the ideal cannot be fully         
realized2 the happiness of all cannot be
 attained2 so that there is always      
choice between two evils1 never choice  
of perfect good1 and it is necessary to 
be content with the greatest good of the
 greatest number as principle of action4

  ,this is an ideal which is actually   
and necessarily evolved4 ,benevolence   
has become more general1 and has        
attained a degree not conceived of in   
former times4 ,the ideal of a happy     
humanity has gained definite outlines1  
and has become an earnest aim towards   
which we steer with filling sails4 ,the 
end is not to be reached by force1 which
 brings in its train evil that cannot be
 gotten rid of for generations1 but must
 be attained within the bounds          
prescribed by the state1 through        
education and increase of intelligence4 
,nor can the state declare and ensure   
happiness2 the duties of the state are  
chiefly negative1 as ,bentham has said4 
,each individual sacrifices a portion of
 his happiness in order that the rest   
may be secured to him by the state2 the 
first-named part comprises his duties1  
the rest constitutes his rights2 the    
office of the state is to hold each to  
his duties and secure to each his       
rights4 ,there is no perfect state1 just

 as there is no perfectly good          
individual2 but there is progress in    
states as in individuals4  ,the merely  
,useful can never furnish a full        
solution of the problem of ,ethics1 any 
more than ,mathematics and ,mechanics or
 ,physics and ,physiology can do so4    
,the ,perfect is much more than the     
merely ,useful4 ,spencer finds the      
condition of happiness in the exercise  
of function4 ,but he regards happiness  
as the final end of morality1 while1    
according to our system1 the latter is  
the product of the former4  ,carneri    
again pleads1 in this book1 for the like
 right of woman with man to mental      
culture1 and to labor which shall make  
her independent of the caprice of man2  
the good of the family alone to be      
regarded as the limiting factor4  ,the  
extent of ,carneri's work on the subject
 of ,ethics makes it impossible to      
consider minor points of his theory1    
such as are included1 for instance1 in  
his criticism of ,hartmann1 of          

,schopenhauer1 ,feuerbach1 and others2  
or to define more clearly than has been 
done his relation to ,spinoza1 ,kant1   
,hegel1 etc4 ,his book ,entwicklung und 
,glueckseligkeit1 published in #ahhf1 is
 a collection of essays which first     
appeared separately in ,kosmos1 and     
which1 as such1 do not hold to each     
other the relation of parts of an       
organic whole4 ,they are chiefly a      
recapitulation of the views already     
expressed in the ,grundlegung der       
,ethik1 with some extensions and        
possibly some modifications2--these     
last1 however1 chiefly of an extraneous 
character4 ,in these essays ,carneri    
demands a systematic moral training in  
the common school1 to the end of the    
development of conscience1 such training
 to be non-religious1 though not        
anti-religious excepting in case the    
religion itself be seen to transgress   
the laws of right established by humane 
reason2 he protests against the error of
 ,materialism1 as likewise against that 

of the ,apriorists and the ,ideologists 
or ,idealists in the narrower sense of  
the word2 and he reaffirms1 defines1 and
 further defends his standpoint as that 
of a ,real-idealist2 that is1 of one to 
whom ,kant is the point of departure in 
a farther evolution of theory4 ,he      
reaffirms the oneness of the universe1  
so of man with nature1 restates the     
self-identity of the individual in will 
and thought1 limits the knowledge of man
 to nature as it is for us1 but invests 
it with certainty within these bounds1  
and reasserts the necessity of the      
progress of the whole through the       
efforts of the many for happiness4 ,he  
lays further stress upon the absence of 
morality1 not only among the animals1 in
 whom at least general ethical feelings1
 in distinction from those towards      
individuals1 are not found1 but also    
among savages2 morality being not the   
incentive to1 but the product of the    
state4 ,from this standpoint1 he combats
 ,socialism as proposing impossible     

ideals1 since it presupposes ethically  
perfect men as governing and being      
governed by the laws1 and since it      
disposes of the freedom of the          
individual4 ,the theory of compulsion   
reckons without the will of man as he is
 and must be4 ,man has no primordial    
rights 7except1 perhaps1 the right to   
get and keep all he can72 he has only   
rights that he has gained by the help of
 the state4 ,there is no one commandment
 in which man's whole duty may be       
expressed1 unless it be1 perhaps1 some  
such new rendering of ,kant's words as  
this3 ,act always in such a manner that 
the maxims of thy will might be taken as
 the principle by which to render happy 
the greatest possible number of human   
beings4 ,but this can never become a    
categorical imperative for all men4     
,morality lies in the ,will to ,good1   
which becomes in the moral1 or according
 to ,carneri's phrase1 the ethical man1 
a second nature3 his sense of duty is   
joy in duty1 highest satisfaction of his

 desire for happiness4 ,it might perhaps
 be claimed that ,carneri1 in his theory
 of the ,conscience1 has in this book   
laid more stress on feeling than in his 
others2 however1 it is to be recollected
 that1 with him1 thought and feeling are
 no distinct faculties1 but that        
conscience means less an impulse        
unconscious of final ends than a        
self-conscious attitude or readiness of 
the will as the result of conviction4   
,carneri's latest book1 ,die            
,lebensfuehrung des modernen ,menschen  
7#ahia71 is practical rather than       
theoretical1 a consideration of general 
problems and rules of action4           
,,footnotes3  #fe ,wirklich4  #ff       
,stofflichkeit2 by this word ,carneri   
designates das ,gemeinsame aller        
,gegenstaendlichkeit4  #fg ,an sich     
autonom1 unterwirft sich das ,leben den 
,cesetzen1 die aus der allgemeinen      
,entwicklung sich ergeben4  #fh         
,daseinstrieb4  #fi ,pp4 #aab1 #aac4    
#gj ,dunkle ,triebe4  #ga ,affecte4  #gb

 ,widerspruchslosigkeit4  #gc           
,entsprechend4  #gd ,gedankenloses      
,denken4  #ge ,gemeinsinn oder          
,gemeingeist1 pp4 #cdj1 #daj4 ,carneri  
explains this word as equivalent to the 
,english common-sense1 but defines the  
latter as feeling for the general1 the  
universal4  #gf ,potenz4     ,,harald   
,h,oe,f,f,d,i,n,g  ,,ethics 7,ethik1    
#ahhg7   ,ethical judgments contain an  
estimate of the worth of human actions4 
,every such estimate presupposes the    
existence of a need1 a feeling which    
spurs us on to the judgment of the      
action1 as also the existence of a      
standard1 an ideal1 according to which  
we judge4 ,the motive to the ethical    
judgment may be called the basis of     
,ethics4 ,the standard involved in the  
ethical judgment determines the content 
of ,ethics1 in that it decides which    
actions1 which directions and modes of  
life1 are to be called good in the      
ethical sense4 ,the ethical basis is the
 subjective1 the standard the objective1

 principle in ,ethics2 the character of 
an ethical conception depends upon this 
presupposed basis1 the applied standard1
 and the relation between the two4  ,the
 feelings and impulses of the individual
 are not only influenced by his own     
experience1 but bear also a character   
derived from the experience of the whole
 species2 hence the ethical judgments   
delivered by the individual are the     
result of the whole experience of his   
kind4 ,it is by virtue of this          
circumstance that the ethical system of 
the individual gains its power2 as      
ethics of the species1 it is a condition
 of the health and vitality of human    
life4  ,this actual working ,ethics of  
the species and of life has been named  
,positive ,morality4 ,such ,positive    
,morality manifests itself in the       
every-day judgments and principles of   
men1 often in the form of proverbs1 and 
may express either the enduring worldly 
wisdom of a nation1 a tribe1 or a       
religious society1 or the less enduring 

public opinion of a century or an epoch4
  ,is it well to treat such ,positive   
,morality to a criticism1 which1        
arousing1 as it must1 doubts and        
questions1 will interfere with the      
certainty and energy of action that     
characterize unreflecting instinct8 ,is 
it well to examine the principles of    
such a system from a scientific         
standpoint8 ,we may answer3 ,life itself
 leads naturally to such questionings2  
only where the view is narrow and the   
problems simple is there full security  
from doubt4 ,with the growth of         
experience begins a comparison of the   
different laws and ideals1 the differing
 institutions of different epochs and   
peoples of which one learns2 or new     
experience presents problems which      
cannot be solved by means of the system 
handed down2 or the individual seeks    
some orderly arrangement of the great   
multiplicity of ethical judgments which 
he himself pronounces or hears others   
pronounce1 for the purpose of           

distinguishing between the more and the 
less important ones4 ,it is certainly a 
serious point in an individual's or a   
nation's development when reflection and
 criticism begin2 but where life leads  
naturally to such questionings1 we must 
either find some answer to them or else 
some reason why they shall not be       
answered4 ,moreover1 it is to be noticed
 that certainty and force of action are 
not absolute ,goods4 ,the greatest      
energy may take a most disastrous       
direction1 and must then be checked4 ,to
 a new and better insight1 when         
attained1 one must endeavor to secure   
all the energy possible4 ,all evolution 
consists in the diversion of energy from
 lower to higher ends4  ,a scientific   
system of ,ethics does not1 and cannot1 
take the place of ,positive ,morality2  
it only supplies the latter with a basis
 of reason1 broadens1 and develops it4  
,such a scientific system only endeavors
 to discover in accordance with what    
principles we direct our life1 and to   

secure for these1 when ascertained1     
greater clearness and inner harmony4 ,in
 the mental life of the human being1 a  
continuous action and reaction of the   
conscious and the unconscious takes     
place1 as well as of perception1        
feeling1 and will4 ,what is won in the  
one province may profit the others also4
  ,two tasks of ,scientific ,ethics1 as 
,historical ,ethics and as              
,philosophical ,ethics1 are to be       
distinguished4 ,historical ,ethics has  
to do with the description and          
explanation of the development of       
,positive ,morality4 ,philosophical     
,ethics has to decide upon the worth of 
the various forms assumed by the latter4
 ,philosophical ,ethics is a practical  
science1 and is based upon the          
supposition that we set ourselves ends  
which may be reached through human      
action4 ,every ethical judgment         
presupposes such an end1 for feeling is 
set in motion by the sight or the       
thought of an act only when the latter  

promotes1 or stands in the way of       
something1 the existence and success of 
which are desired by us4 ,not all that  
is developed as practical morality can  
be pronounced good4 ,on the other hand1 
customs which were at first assumed from
 motives which must be condemned by     
,philosophical ,ethics1 may yet prove   
themselves good1 and may be practised1  
later1 from higher motives2 and such    
customs cannot then be condemned on     
account of their origin4 ,hence1        
,philosophical ,ethics is both          
conservative and radical2 it respects   
nothing simply because it exists2 but   
since it endeavors to furnish guidance  
beyond present standards1 it attempts to
 show how that which has been developed 
historically may be given new forms and 
thus used for further progress4 ,it is  
difficult1 from a broader view1 to      
distinguish perfectly between           
,historical and ,philosophical ,ethics2 
the historian has an ideal which he     
applies more or less in his researches2 

and the philosopher in ,ethics is more  
or less ruled by the prevailing opinions
 of his time4 ,this necessitates a      
continual re-discussion of problems4    
,yet it does not prevent the existence1 
in any system1 of lasting principles    
among the less enduring ones4           
,theological ,ethics is directly opposed
 to ,historical ,ethics as well as to   
,philosophical ,ethics4 ,it builds upon 
tradition1 upon truth as something      
historically revealed4 ,so far1 it might
 appear as if ,theological ,ethics were 
related to ,historical ,ethics4 ,but the
 system of the former does not recognize
 the method of scientific research1     
since the revelation on which it is     
based is due1 according to its doctrine1
 to an interposition of supernatural    
forces not to be explained by the       
physical1 psychological1 and social laws
 that serve as the foundation of        
historical science4 ,it demands a unique
 position for its historical basis1 and 
asserts that this must be looked at in  

an entirely different light from that in
 which the rest of the history of the   
world is regarded4 ,it appears to       
approach ,philosophical ,ethics in      
instituting an examination of the worth 
of historic acts and modes of life4 ,but
 it undertakes this examination1 not    
according to any principle that can be  
found in nature1 but from the point of  
view of a supernatural revelation of an 
ideal4 ,its foundation is an absolute   
principle of ,authority2 its good is    
that which is ,god's will4 ,but how is  
the individual to be sure as to what1 in
 the single case1 is ,god's will8 ,by   
the inward testimony8 ,how is he to     
distinguish certainly between such and  
his own natural thoughts and feelings2  
what means of distinction can be        
applied8 ,in passing thus to the        
province of ,psychology1 we assume a    
human means of distinction1 and the     
principle of ,authority loses its force4
 ,or if it be said that we should       
receive this principle of ,authority    

because it answers to a need of our     
nature1 we may ask how we know that the 
need is one that should be satisfied8   
,its mere existence cannot guarantee    
that4 ,or how1 then1 are we to          
distinguish which of other wishes and   
needs of our nature should1 and which   
should not1 be gratified8 ,is the       
principle of ,authority to decide this8 
,then we argue in a circle4  ,a similar 
circle is adopted by such theologians as
 attempt to combine the two assertions3 
,the good is good because ,god wills it2
 and ,god wills it because it is good4  
,if the good is identical with ,god's   
will1 this means that he wills it       
because it is his will2 if he1 however1 
first recognizes something as good1 and 
therefore wills it1 then his will bows  
to a law and rule1 and is not1 in       
itself1 the cause whereby the ,good is  
good4  ,have we not1 as a fact1 already 
broken with the absolute principle of   
,authority as soon as we begin to       
reflect1 to endeavor to bring the       

various commandments of ,authority into 
harmony with each other1 thus applying  
the measure of our own reason to them8  
,but it is not these inner              
contradictions alone which hinder       
,philosophical ,ethics from making use  
of theological assumptions2 that which  
has called ,philosophical ,ethics into  
existence and lends it interest1 is the 
conviction that the ultimate reason of  
the ethical must lie in man himself4    
,however lofty may be the ideal1 it can 
become man's ideal only through his own 
recognition of it as ideal4 ,for this   
reason ,socrates was the founder of     
,ethics by the command3 ,know thyself6  
,in this command is expressed the       
principle of free investigation1 the    
opposite to that of blind obedience4    
,the desire to make ,ethics as far as   
possible independent of assailable      
assumptions is likewise active in the   
establishment of a system of            
,philosophical ,ethics4  ,in the great1 
sometimes too great1 regard paid to the 

distinction between the subjective and  
the objective worth of actions1 and the 
contest as to the relative importance of
 the two factors1 the fact is often     
overlooked1 that the standard by which  
ethical judgment is pronounced is itself
 of subjective nature4 ,the question    
arises as to wherefore we seek a general
 and objective standard4  ,it is a fact 
that human beings reflect upon their own
 acts1 pronouncing them1 according to   
the result of this reflection1 good or  
bad4 ,how are such judgments as these   
possible8  ,we will suppose1 first1 the 
simplest conceivable case1 namely1 that 
the acting subject pronounces judgment  
on his own act without consideration of 
the existence of other beings4 ,such a  
judgment must presuppose memory2 but it 
presupposes something more1 namely pain 
or pleasure through memory2 an end is   
aimed at only because the thought of a  
result causes pleasure4 ,in the simple  
case supposed1 the feeling which        
determines the end can be only that of  

the individual himself1 and the latter  
will judge the act as good or bad       
according as it has affected his own    
life4 ,the character and significance of
 the judgment will depend on whether the
 feeling of pain or pleasure is         
determined only by the single moment or 
has reference to the life of the        
individual as a whole4 ,the lower the   
life of consciousness1 the more isolated
 and independent are the single moments 
of time in relation to each other1 and  
the less is the significance of the     
memory and the thought of the ego as a  
whole embracing the single moments with 
their content4 ,only a half-unconscious 
instinct hinders the individual from    
losing himself in the moment2 the       
instinct of self-preservation leads him 
to consider the future and to make use  
of the experience of the past4 ,the more
 he loses himself in the moment1 the    
less is the power of judgment1 since    
comparison and action and reaction of   
the different states cannot take place4 

,the single moment bears to all others  
the relation of an absolute egoist1 who 
does not wish to relinquish any part of 
its satisfaction for their advantage4   
,and here we may perceive the           
possibility of a standpoint upon which  
all judgment is dispensed with4 ,such a 
standpoint is represented by ,aristippus
 of ,cyrene1 who asserts the sovereignty
 of the moment4 ,it is not without its  
justification4 ,ethics itself must show 
cause for the relinquishment of the     
satisfaction of the moment in favor of  
other moments4  ,if the principle of the
 sovereignty of the moment could be     
practically carried out1 no reasoning   
could overthrow it4 ,however1 there can 
scarcely be a conscious individual in   
whom there are not instincts and        
impulses which reach beyond the moment4 
,when a momentary state of feeling1 as  
the effect of an act of the subject1    
comes together in consciousness with the
 feeling determined by the conception of
 the life as totality 7the result of    

memory and comparison71 a new feeling   
arises which is either one of harmony or
 one of discord4 ,the standard by which 
judgment is pronounced is determined by 
this feeling4 ,the capacity for such    
feelings is conscience1 as this may     
manifest itself in entirely isolated    
individuals4 ,conscience1 in the        
broadest sense of the word1 is a feeling
 of relations1 and requires only a      
relation between central and peripheral 
feelings1--feelings of wider1 and       
feelings of narrower thought-connection4
 ,the single moment and the single act  
are judged according to their worth as  
parts of the individual life as         
totality4  ,and here the individual is  
confronted by the necessity of bringing 
the single parts of his life into       
harmony4 ,the problem is certainly never
 solved by any individual involuntarily4
 ,the estimation of earlier acts        
according to the assistance they give in
 this task is1 therefore1 at this point1
 of great importance to the individual4 

,the judgment pronounced is thus not    
only made possible through the central  
feeling which corresponds to the life as
 totality1 but is determined by it4 ,an 
acute sense for that which benefits the 
individual life whose single members are
 the moments1 is a condition of the     
continuance and development of the life2
 it is a higher sort of instinct of     
self-preservation1 and need not be      
confined to the continuance of physical 
life1 but may also refer to the ideal   
needs4  ,and here we come upon the      
standpoint of ,individualistic ,ethics4 
,from such a standpoint1 the problem is 
to determine1 not only how much energy  
may be used in the single moments of    
time1 but also in what manner it should 
be used in order to secure as great     
variety and many-sidedness as may be    
consistent with the interests of the    
life as totality4 ,nor are the interests
 of the life to be summed up in physical
 self-preservation2 the individual      
acquires1 in the natural course of      

things1 interests of increased ideality 
and complexity1 through which the life  
gains in content4  ,the ethical law1    
from the standpoint of ,individualism1  
is expressed by a formula which requires
 harmonious relation between the        
interest of the life as totality and the
 impulse of the moment2 it consists of  
two chief mandates3 7#a7 ,the single    
instant should have no greater          
independence than corresponds to its    
significance in the life as totality2   
7#b7 but1 on the other hand1 the single 
moments should be as richly and         
intensely lived as is consistent with   
the preservation of the life's totality4
  ,of ,individualism1 or the principle  
of the ,sovereignty of the ,individual1 
the same is true as of the sovereignty  
of the moment1 that no reasoning can    
overthrow it2 if the individual         
recognizes no end but his own life1     
there is no logical way of transition to
 another standpoint4 ,a change of aim   
can take place only through such a      

change in the central feelings which    
determine the standard of the individual
 that a wider circle of conceptions     
enter into his reflections4 ,until this 
takes place1 there is no use in         
appealing to conscience4  ,the science  
of ,ethics has often claimed to be a    
science of pure reason4 ,this claim is  
opposed to its character as a practical 
science1 since action can be judged only
 according to the ends it had in view1  
and ends presuppose feelings of pain and
 pleasure4 ,on the other hand1 there is1
 in the mere capacity for pain and      
pleasure1 no limitation of the extent of
 the circle of conceptions with which   
the feelings of pain and pleasure are   
connected4  ,individualism can be       
carried out in practice only            
approximately2 the individual has his   
origin in the species1 and lives his    
whole life as a part of the life of his 
kind1 with an organization in which the 
results of the action and passion of    
earlier generations are inherited1 and  

in a mental atmosphere which has induced
 the development of his species4 ,and   
just as the instinct of                 
self-preservation did away with the     
isolation of the single moments of the  
individual life1 becoming1 thus1 the    
basis of feelings determined by the     
interests of the life as totality1 so   
the sympathetic instincts do away with  
the isolation of the single individuals 
and determine the conditions of the life
 of the species in the minds of its     
individuals4 ,the most primitive form of
 the sympathetic instincts is exhibited 
in the family4 ,here1 however loose and 
variable the relation of man and wife   
may be1 that of mother and child cannot1
 by its nature1 be done away with or    
essentially changed4 ,in this case1 the 
sympathetic feeling springs immediately 
from the natural instinct1 and the      
relation is the nucleus which makes     
possible the higher forms of family     
life4 ,in the family circle1 the        
sympathetic feelings are cultivated1 and

 arrive at such strength that they come 
to include ever wider and wider circles 
of human beings4 ,indeed1 the           
mother-love remains forever the image   
and criterion of all sympathy1 as well  
in respect to strength as to purity4    
,when sympathy has reached full purity1 
it is a feeling of pain or pleasure     
determined by the fact that other beings
 feel pain or pleasure4 ,the most       
important point of its development was  
when it so broadened as to include all  
mankind4 ,the ,peripatetic and the      
,stoic schools of ,greek philosophy led 
to this idea of love to all humanity and
 the natural union of all men in one    
great society4 ,but this idea acquired  
greater historic importance when it     
became a chief commandment of a great   
religion1--of ,christianity4 ,to this   
sympathetic feeling the criterion of    
good and evil is no longer to be found  
in the individual life1 but is dependent
 on the life of the whole society of    
which the individual is a member4  ,yet 

sympathy is not1 from this standpoint1  
identical with the ethical feeling1     
conscience4 ,conscience is here1 too1 a 
feeling of relations determined by the  
relation between the ruling or central  
feeling of the individual and the       
results of action4 ,when the individual 
feels his own interests subordinate to  
the good of the whole of which1 through 
sympathy1 he regards himself as a part1 
the ethical feeling appears as the      
feeling of duty4 ,a feeling of duty may 
be spoken of1 likewise1 from the        
standpoint of pure ,individualism1 for  
the concept of duty expresses only the  
relation of a lower1 narrower           
consideration to a higher2 and this is  
represented1 in ,individualism1 by the  
relation of the single moments to the   
life as a whole4  ,from another point of
 view1 the ethical feeling appears1 in  
its higher development1 as the feeling  
of justice1 which1 while regarding the  
good of the whole as the chief end1     
considers also the peculiarities of     

individuals4 ,sympathy in its active    
form is impulse to share4 ,this sharing 
must be carried out according to fixed  
principles2 where sympathy is universal1
 differences of division can be         
justified only by the fact that the     
,goods divided1 if otherwise divided1   
would not be in so high a degree ,goods 
to those to whom they reverted1 or would
 not conduce to so great progress of the
 society as a whole4 ,the ethical law   
upon this standpoint1 the standpoint of 
,humane ,ethics1 can be no other as to  
content1 than that action shall conduce 
to the greatest possible welfare and the
 greatest possible progress of the      
greatest possible number of conscious   
beings2 and this law includes two chief 
mandates1 a negative and a positive     
mandate3 7#a7 ,the individual may not   
receive more than befits the position   
which1 in consequence of his peculiar   
qualities1 he occupies among his kind2  
7#b7 but1 on the other hand1 the        
capacities and impulses of every        

individual shall be as fully and richly 
developed and satisfied as is consistent
 with the demands of the life of the    
species as a whole4 ,these two mandates 
follow with logical necessity from the  
concept of society as a multiplicity of 
conscious beings united into one whole4 
,it is contrary to the unity of society1
 that an individual1 or that            
individuals1 should be wilfully         
preferred to others2 every exceptional  
position must be justified by the       
demands of the general conditions of    
life2 on the other hand1 a society is   
the more perfect the more freely and    
more independently the single members   
move1 and the larger the number of      
different possibilities it realizes1 if1
 at the same time1 unity is preserved   
and attains an ever higher character and
 ever increasing validity4  ,when the   
ethical feeling develops1 upon the basis
 of sympathy1 to the feeling of duty and
 justice1 the principle included in the 
above law becomes the standard according

 to which the individual judges his own 
actions as well as those of others1 and 
pronounces them good or bad4 ,the good  
is that which preserves and develops the
 welfare of conscious beings4  ,the     
ethical principle now arrived at applies
 to the deeds of conscious beings1      
presupposing an end in view4            
,unconscious nature affects man's life1 
but its workings have no ethical        
character4 ,the ethical judgment is     
itself determined by the principle on   
which it is pronounced1 and hence it    
serves to produce greater welfare4 ,this
 is especially to be seen where the     
judging and the acting individual are   
one and the same person2 in other cases1
 it becomes a special problem to bring  
the acting individual to the recognition
 of the principle2 this is a problem of 
psychologic-pedagogical nature4  ,the   
word welfare is used in preference to   
utility or happiness in order to prevent
 misunderstanding1 and may be defined as
 including all that serves to satisfy   

the needs of man's nature4 ,ethics must 
take into consideration all the         
gradations of life1 and cannot1         
therefore1 distinguish in the beginning 
between outer and inner1 higher and     
lower1 welfare4 ,such a distinction is  
already an ethical judgment1 and can be 
made only after determination of the    
ethical criterion4 ,another mistake is  
the stress often laid upon momentary    
feelings of pain and pleasure4 ,pain    
signifies1 it is true1 the beginning of 
the disintegration of life1 and pleasure
 its normal and harmonious development2 
yet each must be considered in its      
relation to the whole consciousness1 the
 whole character1 and the whole social  
state4 ,so-called utilitarianism has    
injured its own cause by resolving      
consciousness into a sum of feelings1   
and society into a collection of        
individuals4 ,the significance of single
 feelings of pain and pleasure for the  
welfare of society cannot be determined 
as if the problem were a simple         

arithmetical one4  ,the reasoning of    
,philosophical ,ethics must not be      
confused with practical reflection4 ,in 
the last we are led by instincts and    
impulses1 by motives of which we are1   
for the most part1 wholly unconscious1  
by thoughts and feelings the first      
origin of which we cannot designate4 ,we
 follow the positive morality to which  
we have accustomed ourselves and which  
is1 in part1 an inheritance of our      
species4 ,ethics as an art precedes     
,ethics as a science2 the aim of the    
latter is partly to show by what        
principles the former is guided1 and    
partly to correct these principles4     
,the ethical principle broadens out1    
thus1 from the single moment of the     
individual life until it embraces the   
whole of mankind2 but there are many    
points in the course of the development 
at which we can make a stand1 and there 
may1 therefore1 be as many philosophical
 systems as there are larger or smaller 
totalities4 ,the position of the man who

 holds fast consistently to a principle 
that determines the criterion by the    
family1 the caste1 the nation1 a sect1  
as highest totality1 is as unassailable 
as we have seen that of the             
individualist to be4 ,the               
psychologic-historical evolution alone  
can bring us1 through the changes which 
it produces in the feelings1 beyond     
these criterions4 ,in other words1 every
 criterion has a psychologic-historical 
basis4 ,he who is to recognize and carry
 out practically the principle of the   
greatest possible welfare1 must be no   
egoist or individualist1 no fanatical   
patriot or sectarian2 this is the       
subjective condition necessary to the   
objective principle4 ,the conscience    
which is to be regulated by the         
objective principle is always itself the
 condition of the recognition of this   
principle4 ,a system which leaves this  
fact out of consideration takes on a    
dogmatic character4 ,the basis of all   
ethical judgments is feeling4 ,by this  

is not meant1 however1 that the         
standpoint of an individual cannot be   
influenced by argument2 the feelings are
 always connected with concepts1 and    
discussion of these concepts is both    
possible and must react upon them even  
if only very gradually4  ,conscience is 
not infallible in its application of the
 objective principle2 a wider experience
 may show it to have erred4 ,conscience 
is highest authority1 but still an      
authority which may continually perfect 
itself4 ,the objective principle makes  
possible the mutual correction of       
different consciences and the           
self-correction of the conscience of the
 individual through self-judgment4  ,the
 difference between ,subjective ,ethics 
and ,objective ,ethics1 as here         
explained1 does not coincide with the   
difference between ,individual ,ethics  
and ,social ,ethics4 ,objective ,ethics 
includes both the latter1 since it      
recognizes individual peculiarities4 ,it
 has yet to be decided whether1 within  

the bounds of ,objective ,ethics1       
,individual ,ethics and ,social ,ethics 
are dependent upon each other1 or       
whether one1 and if one then which one1 
determines the other4 ,it has to be     
decided whether1 according to the       
principle of welfare1 the free          
self-development of the individual is to
 be limited by the conditions of social 
life1 or vice versa4 ,within the limits 
of ,objective ,ethics1 there may arise  
an ,individualism of another sort than  
that before mentioned1 founded1 not upon
 the sovereignty of the individual1 but 
upon the principle of welfare1 which    
demands as many independent and peculiar
 points of departure for action as      
possible4 ,the like is true1 also1 of   
the question of smaller organizations   
within larger ones4  ,the history of    
,ethics shows us that the ethical       
judgment of actions at first regarded   
the outer act itself and its results1   
but was gradually extended to include   
the motive1 the disposition1 the        

character of the acting subject4 ,it is 
perfectly natural that regard should    
first be attracted to that which is the 
object of sense-perception4 ,moreover1  
action at an earlier stage of           
development is essentially reflex       
action1 and the expression of instinct2 
the motives are simple and transparent1 
and interest does not linger long with  
them4 ,the great revolutions in ,ethics 
appear as essentially progress with     
regard to the importance accorded1 in   
ethical judgment1 to the inner factors  
of action4 ,this greater inwardness is  
combined with a generalization2 for the 
rejection of a motive is the rejection  
of all action occasioned by it1 and the 
ethical acceptance of a motive the      
acceptance of all action springing from 
it4 ,hence the transference of regard to
 inner conditions represents a great    
simplification of the ethical law4      
,examples of such a transference may be 
found in the rupture between            
,christianity and ,judaism1 and between 

,protestantism and ,catholicism4  ,in   
this way1 too1 ,objective ,ethics leads 
to ,subjective ,ethics4 ,the objective  
judgment not only presupposes a         
subjective basis1 but also finds some of
 its best objects in actions which      
spring from the same mental constitution
 which is the basis of the judgment4    
,here1 the basis of mental constitution 
and the motive coincide2 the ethical law
 demands the existence of the moral     
disposition by which it itself exists in
 the species4 ,this ,kant expresses in  
the assertion that it is a duty to      
possess conscience4 ,since the          
recognition of duties presupposes the   
existence of conscience1 it might seem  
as if here were an argument in a circle4
 ,but that this is an illusion may be   
seen from the fact that the basis of    
ethical judgment and the motive do not  
necessarily coincide and that it is not 
necessarily an imperfection when they do
 not coincide4 ,it may be necessary in  
some cases1 in accordance with the      

principle of welfare1 that other motives
 than the sense of duty shall guide the 
action2 it may be necessary and         
healthful1 for example1 that in some    
cases man should be led by the instinct 
of self-preservation1 or by an immediate
 sympathy1 to labor for the welfare of  
others1 and that conscience should not  
be aroused in every single act4 ,it may 
even be a sign of perfection when       
actions that demand exertion and        
sacrifice are carried out without the   
intervention of a sense of duty4        
,indeed1 mental drill in the end renders
 that which at first took place by means
 of a long psychological process of     
reflection and will1 direct and without 
special consciousness of its reason4    
,all ,ethics is practical ,idealism4    
,all systems assume an end1 and an end  
is not anything at present existing1 but
 something which ought to be4 ,all      
systems assume1 therefore1 strong       
feeling1 impulse1 and endeavor1 combined
 with the image of that which is the    

object of the endeavor4 ,but the ideal  
must have points of contact with        
actuality1 so that at least an approach 
to it is practicable2 it must be        
physically1 psychologically1 and        
historically possible4  ,ethical ideals 
deviate from the actual in three ways4  
,in the first place1 there is often in  
actual willing and doing something      
directly opposed to the principle of    
welfare4 ,in this case1 the office of   
,ethics is to restrain and forbid4 ,to  
this function corresponds1 in the       
practical life of the will1 the hemming 
by which involuntary1 original1 or      
acquired impulses and inclinations are  
repressed4 ,again1 actual willing and   
doing often exhibit only a weak and     
imperfect realization of that which     
,ethics demands4 ,here there must be an 
increase in the degree as well as in the
 extent of the realization4 ,to this    
corresponds1 in the practical life of   
the will1 effort and attention1 the     
power of the will1 through its influence

 upon conceptions and feelings1 to react
 upon itself4 ,and finally1 there may   
be1 in willing and doing1 a lack of     
unity and harmony2 various opposed      
tendencies and impulses may make        
themselves felt4 ,here a process of     
harmonizing and concentration is        
necessary4 ,and to this corresponds1 in 
the practical life of the will1 a       
drilling in connected action and trains 
of thought1 and in the power to make an 
end of reflection by decision4 ,in all  
three cases1 the principle of welfare is
 to be followed2 and the three processes
 are to be applied not only in the      
development of the individual but also  
in that of societies1 and of the        
species4  ,that which manifests itself  
in conscience is a species-instinct4 ,in
 the feeling of judgment1 the relation  
between central and peripheral factors  
finds expression1 neither of which1 and 
least of all the central factors1 are   
developed by individual experience1 but 
both of which are1 on the contrary1 the 

product of the experience of the        
species4 ,what ,kant called the         
,categorical ,imperative is1 in fact1 an
 instinct2 and every instinct speaks    
unconditionally1 categorically1 gives no
 reasons and admits of no excuse4  ,no  
instinct finds expression without the   
existence of conditions which call it   
forth2 but all manner of individual and 
social circumstances may furnish such   
conditions4  ,when conscience begins to 
be conscious of its office1 it manifests
 itself as an ,impulse4#gg ,the thought 
of actions which the instinctive        
judgment has recognized1 or to the      
performance of which it has perhaps     
incited1 is combined with pleasure1 the 
conception of actions of the opposite   
nature with pain4 ,the tendency arises  
to linger with the former and to repeat 
them1 and to turn from the latter1 if no
 stronger impulses of another sort make 
themselves felt4  ,conscience may       
develop1 without losing entirely its    
instinctive or impulsive character1 to  

practical reason4 ,this takes place     
through the development of the          
conceptions which determine the         
conscience as impulse1 to greater       
clearness and distinctness4 ,when       
conscience acts as instinct1 the        
individual does not know what he does4  
,if it acts as impulse1 he has a dawning
 consciousness of his acts4 ,and when it
 becomes practical reason1 there arises 
a clear consciousness of ethical laws   
and ethical ideals4 ,in different       
individuals1 conscience may appear in   
very different forms and degrees1 as    
instinct1 impulse1 practical reason1    
sense of duty1 sense of justice4        
,sometimes it appears as mainly negative
 and restraining1 sometimes again as    
chiefly positive1 partly harmonizing and
 partly increasing4 ,here it appears as 
enthusiastic devotion1 there as quiet   
and continuous tendency4 ,it would be   
impossible to name even the principal   
forms in which it may manifest itself1  
but it is of great importance to call   

attention to the fact of these          
individual differences1 since we suffer 
at present from a dogmatism that has but
 one measure for all these different    
manifestations4  ,we must go a step     
farther still4 ,there may be men who    
possess no strictly ethical feeling and 
who do not need it4 ,such men do what   
they can with their whole heart without 
applying any reflective standard to     
their own or others' acts4 ,they        
entirely absorb themselves with         
unflagging zeal in a work that perfectly
 corresponds to their capabilities and  
impulses1 without any doubt of its      
rightfulness and import4 ,they may      
devote themselves to art and science1 to
 the service of society1 or to their    
family4 ,or they belong to the class of 
happy natures who spread light and joy  
by their mere existence4 ,they act in   
accordance with the law1 without being  
in possession of the law1 and what      
objection can ,ethics have to offer to  
this8 ,ethics is for the sake of life1  

not life for the sake of ,ethics4       
,since all ethical judgments have       
conscience for their psychological      
basis1 conscience is highest authority1 
highest law-giver1 in comparison with   
which every other authority is          
subordinate and derived4 ,to wish to go 
beyond one's conscience is to wish to go
 beyond oneself4 ,when ,i yield to      
another human being whose judgment ,i   
trust more than my own1 this can be     
justified only as it takes place through
 my conscience4 ,conscience is          
infallible1 if one understands by       
infallibility that it is1 at every      
instant1 the highest judge2 this        
infallibility does not mean1 however1   
that it does not err4 ,every earnest    
conviction takes the form of conscience2
 the truth is not1 however1 secured by  
the mere form4 ,was it not from         
conviction that ,aristotle asserted the 
right of slavery1 and ,calvin1 with     
,melancthon's approval1 sent ,servetus  
to the stake8  ,not less dogmatic than  

,fichte's assertion that conscience     
never deceives us1 is the view which    
regards a system of ,ethics as merely   
the science of the forms of society and 
of outward acts1 and thus declares      
conscience to be without authority in   
comparison with outer circumstances and 
their demands4 ,the law which we obey   
must always express itself in the form  
of conscience4 ,the light which         
illumines for us all other things must  
be within ourselves4  ,here we perceive 
the possibility of a conflict between   
,subjective ,ethics and ,objective      
,ethics1 between the two principles upon
 which ,ethics is founded4 ,there can be
 no other solution to the problem than  
that we shall follow the command of     
conscience1 provided it speaks clearly  
and after sufficient deliberation4 ,it  
may be added that conscience can correct
 and control itself1 the later and more 
experienced conscience criticising the  
earlier4 ,as long as the individual acts
 according to his best conviction1 he is

 morally healthy2 hence1 from an ethical
 point of view1 a pernicious action     
carried out under the conviction that it
 is good is to be preferred to a good   
action performed with the conviction    
that it is bad4 ,in the former case1 the
 spring is pure2 in the latter it is    
corrupt4 ,only he who has courage to    
make mistakes can accomplish anything   
great4 ,it is not the cold and narrow1  
but those who are zealous for the true  
and good1 who thus err4  ,the power of  
self-correction can be developed only   
when some definite principle or         
criterion may be found4 ,such a         
principle is that of welfare4 ,the      
problem of the application of this      
principle to action is1 however1 like   
that of the application of the principle
 of causality to actual phenomena1 an   
endless one4  ,in close relation to the 
concept of ,authority stands that of    
,sanction4 ,the ,authority commands or  
forbids1 the ,sanction enables the      
command or prohibition to remain in     

force4 ,the sanction consists in the    
pain or pleasure connected with the     
observation or transgression of the     
command1 in the reward or punishment    
which one brings on oneself through     
one's action1 in the heaven or hell     
which one approaches by the action4 ,it 
is only1 however1 when the authority    
itself is an outward one that the       
sanction holds this outward relation to 
the action4 ,in this outward form it has
 no immediate ethical significance4 ,the
 ethical character of an action is      
dependent1 in subjective regard1 on its 
origin in the intention of the          
performer1 in objective regard1 on its  
harmony with the principle of welfare4  
,what ethical significance could it have
 that here a feeling of pain or pleasure
 not arising from the action itself1 is 
added to it8 ,the outer sanction of     
reward and punishment is thus but an    
educating sanction4 ,the inner sanction 
consists in a feeling of harmony and    
unity with one's own highest            

convictions1 of consistency between     
one's ideas and one's actual willing4   
,thus arises an inner peace that may be 
stronger than all contradiction and     
opposition from without4  ,such an inner
 sanction is not only an effect of the  
action1 but a feeling already present   
before the action4 ,it was the          
preservation and full development of    
this feeling that led to the decision   
and made it possible4 ,blessedness1 says
 ,spinoza1 is not the reward of virtue1 
but virtue itself4  ,the manner in which
 the ethical is so often made dependent 
upon certain fixed religious or         
speculative assumptions must be1 from an
 ethical point of view1 matter for great
 solicitude4 ,in the first place1 it is 
easy to suppose that the man who no     
longer respects these dogmas may have   
emancipated himself also from the       
ethical maxims dependent upon them1 and 
would be most consistent if he acted in 
accordance with the principle3 ,let us  
eat and drink1 for to-morrow we die4 ,in

 the second place1 action is reft of its
 ethical character when the attention is
 directed to things outside its essence 
and origin1 and considerations of reward
 and punishment are declared to be a    
necessary motive4 ,not even a belief in 
progress within the world of experience 
can have any absolute worth for ,ethics4
 ,it may be theoretically difficult to  
maintain such a belief2 and even if the 
victorious direction of evolution were  
shown to be unfavorable to ,ethics1     
ethical principles would not be         
destroyed4 ,simply the problems would be
 different2 pity and resignation would  
acquire greater importance4 ,wherever   
the ethical disposition were present1 it
 would take the side of the conquered   
and remain upon that side though the    
gods themselves were with the           
conquerors4 ,ethical worth does not     
depend upon mere might4  ,the birth-hour
 of conscience is the time when1 through
 the difference between ideal and       
actuality1 a certain feeling arises4    

,its death-hour would be the instant in 
which the difference forever            
disappeared4 ,such a disappearance might
 occur in two ways1 either through the  
conquest of the ideal by actuality or   
through that of actuality by the ideal4 
,the objection has been made to the     
theory of evolution that it fulfilled   
the first of these possibilities1 and so
 left no room for ,ethics4 ,but the very
 fact of the existence of ethical       
impulses as the actual result of        
evolution would seem to belie this      
theory4 ,and indeed1 we see that        
evolution is not physical growth alone1 
but mental as well2 and that the        
important feature of man's development  
consists in his aspiration through      
desires and impulses1 which act as      
moving forces in his life4 ,aspiration  
is necessary to his evolution1 and      
indifference and lack of sensibility an 
obstacle to it4 ,the theory of evolution
 leads directly to ,ethics1 in that it  
shows that the struggle for existence   

becomes1 in its higher forms1 a common  
struggle for the continuance and        
development of human life4 ,the theory  
of evolution takes us1 indeed1 not only 
to1 but beyond1 ,ethics2 for1 according 
to ,spencer1 the ethical sense is but an
 intermediate condition in a development
 toward a state of organic morality1    
where right-doing will be involuntary   
and natural1 and a special ethical sense
 no longer existent or necessary4 ,such 
a state would constitute the realization
 of the second alternative mentioned    
above1 with which ,ethics would come to 
an end4 ,this state is conceivable1 and 
,ethics could have no objection to offer
 to it4 ,yet we are still far from such 
a condition1 and though we may          
strengthen our courage and hope with the
 thought of a continual progress of     
human nature1 yet the assumption of such
 an end to evolution cannot have an     
essential influence upon the method of  
,ethics4  ,we must1 in fact1 suppose    
that progress will bring us new problems

 and new ideals1 that1 as the ,ethics of
 the civilized man includes whole       
provinces unknown to the savage1 so many
 relations will certainly present       
themselves in the future whose ethical  
significance our present thick-skinned  
condition1 our ignorance and egoism1    
prevent us from comprehending4  ,can one
 do more than one's duty8 ,from the     
standpoint of ethical systems which are 
founded on authority or any outward     
principle1 this question may be answered
 in the affirmative4 ,the ,roman        
,catholic ,church distinguishes1 for    
instance1 between that which is         
commanded and that which1 beyond the    
command1 is merely advised4 ,but he who 
follows an inward sanction cannot but   
feel that he has done no more than his  
duty when he has done all that lies in  
his power for the welfare of mankind4   
,it may be right1 from a pedagogical    
standpoint1 to give especial praise to  
actions that tower above the usual2 he  
who performs them1 however1 only then   

possesses the right spirit when he feels
 that he has done no more than his duty1
 and could not have done otherwise4     
,even from a pedagogical standpoint1 the
 difference between duty and merely     
counselled action1 beyond the duty      
commanded1 can be only a relative one2  
that which is1 upon a lower plane of    
development1 merely advised1 becomes1   
upon a higher plane1 one of the most    
elementary duties2 mercy to the         
conquered may be a high virtue in a     
savage1 but to the civilized man it is a
 primary rule of morals4  ,it is of the 
highest importance to keep in mind the  
fact that conscience itself is a cause1 
and that ethical judgment1 arising as a 
feeling1 takes part1 by its influence   
upon the will1 in the ethical evolution 
towards highest welfare4 ,keeping this  
in mind1 it is easy to see that ,ethics 
not only calls for no limitation of the 
law of ,causality1 but that such a      
limitation would be pernicious1 even    
destructive1 to ,ethics4  ,there are at 

least six different significations in   
which the expression freedom of the will
 may be used4  ,it may be used to denote
 absence of outward constraint2 but this
 might rather be called a freedom of    
action than a freedom of the will4  ,it 
may be used to denote absence of inner  
constraint2 the will which springs from 
pain or fear is often called unfree in  
distinction from the will which springs 
from pleasure or hope4  ,it may refer to
 energy and vitality of the will4 ,here 
the stress is laid upon the amount which
 the will can accomplish1 not1 however1 
upon its independence of causes4 ,one   
can be a determinist and yet concede    
that the will plays an important part in
 the world2 or one can be an            
indeterminist and yet assume that free  
will plays but a small part in the      
world4  ,by freedom of the will is often
 meant the power of choice4 ,this       
freedom is not opposed1 however1 to     
causality1 but to blindness of action1  
subjection to momentary impulses4 ,free 

will denotes1 in this case1             
self-conscious will4  ,or the word      
freedom may refer to the will as ruled  
by ethical motives4 ,in this sense1 only
 the good man is free4 ,this            
significance of the word is the oldest1 
comes down to us from ,socrates1 and is 
used by ,augustine1 ,spinoza1 and many  
others4  ,but the sense of the word     
freedom with which the strife between   
,determinism and ,indeterminism has to  
do is that in accordance with which a   
free will is not subject to the law of  
,causality1 is not1 like other          
phenomena1 a link in the chain of       
causes1 but is1 on the contrary1 a      
cause1 without being an effect4 ,to be  
free in will is1 according to this      
definition1 to will without             
cause1--independent of all that has gone
 before4  ,indeterminism destroys the   
bond between the individual and his     
kind1 between the individual and the    
rest of existence4 ,indeterminism is    
hence unable to regard existence as a   

totality4 ,every deeper philosophical or
 religious conception becomes1 thus1    
impossible2 the only religious          
conception consistent with              
,indeterminism is ,polytheism1 since    
every being that can form the absolute  
beginning of a chain of causes is a     
little god1 an absolute being4 ,this    
fact is to be noted1 for the reason that
 ,determinism is sometimes designated as
 a godless doctrine4  ,the assertion    
that the will is without cause1 and the 
assertion that we ourselves are the     
cause of our willing1 are two different 
assertions4 ,the last finds a cause in  
our nature4 ,thoughts and feelings1     
tendencies1 instincts1 and impulses     
arise in us1 and in these the origin of 
the acts of the will is to be sought4   
,if the will1 or a part of it1 is not   
subject to the law of ,causality1 it    
stands in relation to the whole         
personality as something isolated and   
accidental4 ,the ,indeterminist who     
asserts that ,determinism makes man a   

mere machine1 himself makes of him      
something much meaner1 something        
incoherent and accidental4 ,ethical     
judgment is based upon the assumption   
that my action is mine2 it is1          
therefore1 clear and certain only when  
motives and the decision they cause are 
known4 ,the less my actions can be      
understood by knowledge of my character1
 the more easily ,i may be regarded as  
irresponsible4 ,although law regards1 by
 its nature1 action and not motive1 yet 
even the judge must gain an insight into
 the motives1 the outer and inner       
relations from which the deed           
originated1 both in order to determine  
the degree of punishment necessary1 and 
in order even to be fully persuaded that
 the action really took place4  ,many   
recent ,indeterminists designate the    
freedom of the will as exceedingly      
small4 ,they thus extend the dissolution
 of the unity of existence and of the   
unity of personality to the act of      
willing itself4 ,moreover1 if           

responsibility depends upon freedom1 it 
is impossible to see how reward and     
punishment are to be justified upon this
 standpoint2 since the individual can   
say with reason that he is not guilty   
with respect to the whole1 but only with
 respect to a very small part of his    
act4  ,the words ,responsibility1       
,guilt1 ,accountability1 are taken1 like
 so many other ethical expressions1 from
 ,jurisprudence1 or rather they come to 
us from a time when the distinction     
between the province of ,jurisprudence  
and that of ,ethics had not yet been    
recognized4 ,that ,i am made accountable
 for my action means that ,i stand as   
the one to whom reward or punishment for
 the deed is meted out4 ,for what reason
 the action is rewarded or punished is a
 question by itself4  ,in relation to   
,ethics1 the feeling of guilt1 of       
responsibility or accountability1       
signifies that my act is subjected to   
the judgment of conscience4 ,if ,i find 
discord between my act and that which ,i

 recognize as good1 remorse arises1--a  
feeling of inner disharmony1            
unworthiness1 and self-contempt which   
may increase until it becomes the       
greatest psychical pain4 ,this feeling  
may be defined1 from a deterministic    
standpoint1 as dissatisfaction with     
oneself because one has not acted       
otherwise1 and the wish that one had    
done so4 ,this wish arises in the moment
 of reflection1 when one weighs one's   
act4 ,from the present wish is not1     
however1 to be concluded that one could 
just as well have acted otherwise at the
 moment the act took place4 ,such an    
illusion dates the experience dearly    
bought with mistake and remorse back to 
an earlier period4 ,according to the    
theory of retribution1 remorse must be  
greatest in him who has committed the   
greatest crime4 ,this is not so1        
however2 since remorse arises from a    
contrast between ideal and act1 which   
contrast can take place only when the   
conception of the ideal is strong2 the  

purest and best characters often have   
the strongest feelings of remorse4      
,remorse first arises when a new        
attitude of mind is attained different  
from that which ruled at the time of the
 action4 ,time is necessary for this new
 feeling to replace the old1 if it is to
 be more than a momentary passion1 and  
during this interval the two feelings   
are both active in consciousness4 ,this 
is the time of the birth-pains by which 
the new character comes into being4 ,the
 significance of remorse lies in the    
fact that it urges forward1 that it     
gives birth to impulse and endeavor     
after a higher plane4 ,only because     
remorse is a motive1 is it of ethical   
nature4  ,if the law of ,causality were 
not active in the realm of the          
psychical1 this ethical endeavor would  
be hopeless4 ,only where order reigns   
can the will accomplish anything4 ,only 
as we know the law of outer nature1 and 
know what conditions must be produced in
 order to bring about a certain result1 

can we serve our own ends in this       
province2 and the like is true in our   
relation to human nature4 ,here the     
problem is to find motives of the right 
sort and of sufficient strength4 ,of    
what use were all possible exertion if1 
under given conditions1 the same motive 
were followed by now this1 now the other
 entirely different decision4 ,i am     
master of my future willing only in so  
far as a causal relation exists between 
my present and my future will4 ,we find1
 therefore1 that the reason why         
responsibility goes no further back in  
the causal chain than the will1 is this3
 that it is the will which is to be     
acted on and altered4 ,that which       
precedes the act of the will interests  
us1 ethically1 only in so far as it     
influences the will4  ,it is a strange  
assertion1 sometimes made1 that the     
consistent ,determinist must be a mere  
spectator of his own and others' lives4 
,as if one could feel no pain or        
pleasure and no desire to interfere1    

because one believes life to be subject 
to law4 ,it is true that theoretical    
study may weaken practical interest2 but
 ,indeterminism is a theory as well as  
,determinism4  ,what the ethically bad  
is follows from what has already been   
said4 ,it consists of a more or less    
conscious isolation of the single moment
 in the life of the individual1 or of   
the single individual in the life of the
 species1 such that not only a hindrance
 to the welfare of individual or species
 arises1 but also a relaxation of energy
 and a diminution of the coherence of   
individual or species4 ,in most such    
cases1 inertia is at work4 ,the one     
moment demands to be lived without any  
consideration of others1 the individual 
will not move outside the circle of his 
own interests4 ,such a resistance to    
influence may be unconscious4 ,it may be
 authorized in so far as it is a        
condition of the development of real    
willing that action shall not           
immediately respond to impression4 ,in  

this resistance lies1 therefore1 the    
germ of the ethical as well as the      
non-ethical life of the will4 ,the      
clearer consciousness becomes1 the more 
this inertia takes on the character of  
defiance4 ,or the discord felt through  
consciousness of the good may be so     
painful that the individual desires to  
free himself at any price4 ,in this     
case1 no remorse is felt2 on the        
contrary1 the individual seeks to dull  
the awakened consciousness1 or to get   
rid of it4  ,it is important to note    
that conceptions develop1 in this       
connection1 faster than feelings4 ,and  
as long as the former do not find points
 of connection with the existing        
feelings1 they will have no practical   
influence4 ,the bad consists in the     
persistence1 from inertia or defiance1  
upon a lower plane of development after 
the consciousness of a higher has       
arisen4 ,evil is the animal in man1 the 
remains of an earlier plane of life4    
,from the instincts of self-preservation

 and self-propagation in their most     
primitive forms1 the ethically bad is   
produced1 and offers fierce resistance  
to harmonizing influences4  ,evil is1   
furthermore1 a sociological phenomenon2 
the general psychological elements take 
on different forms under different      
historical conditions2 society1 in its  
different forms and functions1 is always
 one of the determining factors of its  
development4 ,the criminal is1 like the 
saint1 the child of his time4  ,it      
appears1 therefore1 that the term bad is
 applied from a standpoint not shared by
 him to whom it is applied4 ,if the man 
who stands upon the lower plane of      
morals possessed the full and clear     
consciousness that the predicate of     
badness applied to his conduct1 the     
corresponding feelings and impulses must
 arise in him1 and his conduct be       
altered4 ,it is psychologically         
impossible to act against our fixed and 
full conviction1 if this is not blunted 
by other impulses4  ,the definition of  

the good must be1 on different ethical  
planes1 a different one4 ,but when a    
disinterested and universal sympathy    
determines the ethical judgment1 only   
that can be good which preserves and    
adds to the welfare of conscious beings1
 increases their pleasure or diminishes 
their pain4 ,every action which tends in
 this direction without producing       
further results of an opposite nature1  
is authorized2 every action of which the
 opposite is true is to be rejected4    
,since1 in general1 pleasure is         
connected with the healthy and natural  
use of the powers1 with that which      
preserves and benefits life1 and pain is
 connected with the opposite of this1   
,ethics merely continues the work begun 
by nature1 in aiming at human progress1 
at as rich and harmonious a development 
of human powers as is possible4 ,the    
problems of ,ethics concern1 therefore1 
the pleasures of the moment as well as  
those of the whole life1 the pleasures  
of the individual as well as those of   

the whole species4 ,this remains true   
even if we accept the pessimistic view  
that all life is pain2 the good would   
consist1 from this point of view1 in as 
great alleviation of pain as possible4  
,even the ascetic tortures himself only 
in order to gain greater good4  ,the    
ethical end as welfare is not to be     
conceived as a state of continuance on  
the same plane4 ,such a continuance is  
impossible2 evolution does not stand    
still2 every step of progress creates   
new needs1 the satisfaction of which    
again demands endeavor2 perfect         
satisfaction is impossible4 ,even the   
development of sympathy makes it easier 
to wound us in many ways and brings us  
larger duties4 ,the need of variety     
alone would make continuance upon one   
plane impossible2 we labor not only in  
order to arrive at conscious ends1 but  
also in order to relieve ourselves of   
accumulated energy4 ,the highest end    
that we can conceive is a progress in   
which each step is felt as a good       

because it affords scope for action     
without over-exertion4  ,activity is    
also welfare4 ,but it is so only in so  
far as it is healthful activity2 when   
the powers are over-exerted or          
dissipated in action1 having no common  
end1 or when their application in one   
direction is at the cost of other more  
important directions1 progress ceases to
 be welfare4 ,the evolution of          
civilization contains an element of     
blindness and heedlessness which is     
bound up with both its excellencies and 
its faults4 ,but civilization is not an 
act of choice2 it is the continuance of 
the evolution of nature4 ,progress is   
necessary2 it is impossible to remain   
upon any level attained4 ,ethics must1  
therefore1 accept progress as a fact4   
,it does not feel an admiration for an  
order of nature in which no advance     
appears possible without one-sidedness  
and dissipation of energy4 ,it is not so
 hard-hearted that it could forget1 in  
the seeming splendor of outward results1

 the anxiety and pain1 the sweat and    
blood1 with which these were won4 ,it   
demands1 therefore1 that the heavy      
burdens be lightened1 the scattered     
forces united1 and all capabilities that
 are of worth developed4 ,on the other  
hand1 ,ethics is not so sentimental and 
short-sighted that it could forget that 
progress can take place only through    
exertion and suffering4 ,its chief task 
with regard to progress is to impress   
upon the mind the fact that life should 
not be made a mere means to the solution
 of impersonal problems4 ,civilization  
is a means for the individual1 not vice 
versa4  ,the natural division of ,ethics
 is into ,individual ,ethics and ,social
 ,ethics4 ,it has sometimes been assumed
 that the whole duty of man could be    
summed up in ,individual ,ethics4       
,however1 it is not necessarily true    
that that which assists the best        
development of the individual serves    
society as a whole also4 ,when the      
attention is directed so excessively to 

oneself1 the general welfare is likely  
to be forgotten4 ,on the other hand1 a  
too great subjection of individual      
interests makes a man a mere parasite1  
robbing him of all self-dependence4     
,when ,ethics condemns the instinct of  
self-preservation1 it condemns its own  
means4 ,if the impulse to               
self-preservation1 self-assertion1 and  
self-development were evil1 then our    
essential nature would be evil1 and     
,ethics would be impossible4 ,the right 
relation of the two principles is given 
in the principle of welfare4 ,mill's    
book ,on ,liberty denies the ethical    
significance of self-development and    
forgets the individual's oneness with   
his kind1 in declaring personal vices of
 no importance to the general welfare4  
,that which ,mill wished to defend was  
the freedom of the individual1 the loss 
of which through the compulsion of      
society and the moral police he feared4 
,but he might have accomplished this    
purpose without denying the ethical     

value of self-development4 ,there is    
nothing that is a ground for greater    
solicitude than the mistake that public 
opinion and ,ethics are one1 and that a 
condition of things is no longer a      
subject for ethical condemnation when no
 outer power has the right to denounce  
it4  ,the first question which presents 
itself in ,individual ,ethics is3 ,how  
is the individual to educate himself to 
an ethical personality8 ,here the       
development and strengthening of the    
ethical principle as governing and      
determining the life of the individual  
is concerned4 ,the problem is one with  
the determination of the chief virtue   
which includes all other ethical        
qualities4 ,this virtue is justice1     
which includes in itself the two groups 
contained under ,self-assertion and     
,self-sacrifice4#gh  ,in the application
 of this general theory of ,ethics1     
,hoeffding maintains the                
radical-conservative and                
individual-social position already      

stated4 ,the principle of welfare       
demands the reconciliation of the free  
development of the individual and the   
progress of society as a whole2 the     
individual does not live to himself     
alone1 hence the state has a right to   
demand sacrifices2 but it must always be
 able to show good reason for such2 the 
burden of proof lies with the side which
 would take away the most valuable      
possession of the individual1--the right
 to free self-development in the        
ever-shifting direction of his need4    
,this very characteristic of change     
makes it impossible for the state to    
decide for the individual what are his  
needs1 and how they may be satisfied2   
hence the best course of the state is a 
chiefly restrictive one4 ,the relation  
between state-help and self-help must be
 exactly the reverse of that which      
,socialism1 in remarkable agreement with
 ,bureaucracy and ,absolutism1 asserts4 
,socialism presupposes not only         
perfection in the governed but also     

perfection in the persons to whom the   
government is entrusted4 ,it assumes1   
moreover1 that pleasure in activity and 
its resulting power of originality and  
invention would not be weakened if men's
 right of initiative were taken from    
them and their needs determined by      
others4 ,much of the good even now      
accomplished by the state in its        
functions is due to the competition with
 individual undertakings4               
,philanthropy1 on the part of           
individuals as on that of the state1    
will best follow this same principle of 
indirect aid1 in order to obtain the    
best results through education of       
character4 ,organization is desirable on
 the part of individuals1 but the state 
will achieve best results by acting     
through smaller organizations which     
afford a wider field and the possibility
 of more intelligent work4 ,in its      
methods of punishment1 also1 the state  
must have regard1 not only to prevention
 through fear1 but also and chiefly to  

the bettering of the criminal character2
 capital punishment and life-long       
imprisonment cannot be justified from a 
higher ethical standpoint4 ,freedom     
should be allowed and tolerance shown   
the various religious sects as          
corresponding to various needs4 ,the    
more liberal education of woman1 which  
will make her capable of greater        
independence of thought and action1 is  
one of the chief means to the solution  
of the marriage-question4 ,the ideal of 
marriage is free monogamy2 in polygamy1 
the purely physical must always rule2   
that part of self which one can         
surrender to many can be only the       
animal2 long association and sympathy   
alone admit to the sanctuary of love4   
,it belongs to the nature of true love  
to believe in its own endlessness2 it   
is1 therefore1 incompatible with its    
nature to arrange for a mere temporary  
union4 ,yet where an unhappy union      
exists1 divorce should be permitted4    
,strict divorce laws have always        

fettered and burdened nobler natures1   
while light-minded people have easily   
found means of escape4  ,the view that  
the artist occupies a peculiar position 
in his ideal world1 must free himself   
from the actual world1 and live only for
 his ideal1 is ethically false2 art     
should lend form to actual life1        
defining and clarifying it1 broadening  
the view and educating sympathy4 ,a     
great artist is1 at the same time1 half 
a prophet2 his whole people and epoch   
must learn to know themselves through   
him4 ,freedom is to be regarded as both 
means and end4 ,a representative        
government is not only an education for 
the people1 who through freedom alone   
can learn to use freedom1 but affords   
the state1 moreover1 a firmer foundation
 in the consciousness of its citizens   
that they are responsible for the       
existing condition of things4  ,the     
development of conscience in force and  
extent takes place through thought and  
imagination4 ,knowledge alone is not    

enough2 it must be fixed by             
exercise1--made a persistent thought1   
until it becomes1 by means of the laws  
of association1 such a thought as will  
easily come in play whenever the case   
requires it4  ,,footnotes3  #gg ,trieb4 
#gh ,selbstbehauptung und ,hingebung4   
,,georg ,,von ,,gizycki  ,,moral        
,,philosophy 7,moralphilosophie1 #ahhi7 
,moral ,philosophy has a scientific and 
a practical office4 ,its scientific task
 is to supply the human being with a    
clearer1 more thorough understanding1   
founded on ultimate reasons1 of his     
moral life4 ,its practical task is to   
answer the important question3 ,how am  
,i to act8 ,how shall ,i order my life8 
,it was not left to science first to    
direct human action4 ,custom and law    
seek to order the doing and leaving     
undone of the members of society4       
,ethical philosophy ascertains means of 
testing the actually existing ideas of  
morality1 and thus enables us to better 
law and custom4  ,a highest criterion1  

one only1 is necessary1 by which to     
judge of the morality of a deed4 ,if    
there were more than one1 the judgment  
might fall out differently from the     
different standpoints furnished by      
these4  ,when ,i regard the qualities   
which ,i consider morally good1 ,i      
perceive that they all have a direction 
conducive to the general welfare or     
happiness2 and when ,i regard the       
qualities which ,i consider morally bad1
 ,i find that they all have an aim      
prejudicial to the general welfare or   
happiness4  ,when ,i attempt to convince
 any one that certain conduct which he  
considers right is wrong1 by showing him
 that it is opposed to the general      
welfare1 my final appeal is to his      
conscience4 ,and in the same manner1    
when ,i correct some of my own moral    
conceptions1 it is my conscience which  
determines me to the proof of them1 and 
my conscience which is the standard that
 determines my decision4 ,conscience is 
the principle underlying my moral       

convictions4 ,but ,i do not possess1 in 
conscience1 a moral power which never   
errs2 hence it behooves me to judge     
carefully4 ,body and mind both have     
their laws on which depend the welfare  
and happiness of society2 the last      
results of science and human experience 
give us these laws4  ,there are few     
things in regard to which there is so   
great unanimity as there is in regard to
 the right and good4 ,in the fundamental
 questions1 all the more highly         
civilized peoples are1 for the most     
part1 agreed4  ,on the lowest planes of 
civilization1 only the narrowest tribal 
association is taken into consideration 
in morals1 but gradually1 with the      
growth of experience1 growth of the     
understanding1 which permits the        
recognition1 in a much higher degree1 of
 the results of action and the power of 
sympathy1 ever larger circles of human  
beings are regarded1--the tribe1 the    
nation1 the whole of mankind1 all       
sentient beings4 ,in this development of

 conscience and benevolence1 there is   
nothing to cause moral uncertainty or   
contempt of conscience2 for1 in that    
case1 the fact that there was once a    
time when human beings were not on the  
earth must be a reason for contempt of  
everything human4  ,we call various     
different things good1 of worth1 others 
bad1 evil2 there must be something      
common to all these1 on account of which
 we apply the common term to them4 ,that
 which is thus common to them is their  
relation to a consciousness for which   
they are good or bad1 and not to a      
merely perceiving consciousness1 but to 
one that feels and wills4 ,as true and  
false relate to the intellectual side of
 human nature1 so do good and bad relate
 to the side of feeling and will4 ,such 
things are good as are the mediate or   
immediate cause of agreeable states of  
consciousness or of the prevention or   
removal of disagreeable states2 and on  
the other hand1 such things are bad as  
are the cause of pain or the hindrance  

of pleasure4 ,we say of these things    
that they are agreeable or disagreeable4
 ,or we may use1 instead of agreeable1  
the term object of desire1 and instead  
of disagreeable1 the term object of     
aversion2 for all that is agreeable has 
an attractive influence upon the will1  
and all that is disagreeable or painful 
has a repellant one4 ,joy is that       
condition of consciousness which we seek
 to attain and preserve1 whose existence
 we prefer to its non-existence2 and    
pain is that state of consciousness     
which we seek to avoid and destroy1     
whose non-existence we prefer to its    
existence4  ,the good is often defined  
as that which conduces to some end2 but 
an end is nothing other than something  
willed2 that which conduces to an end is
 the cause of something that is willed1 
so that this explanation also refers    
back to a consciousness4  ,whatever is  
existent for us must be existent in us1 
in our consciousness4 ,our states of    
consciousness are either painful1 or    

indifferent1 or pleasant4 ,we must turn1
 therefore1 in the last analysis1 not to
 things1 but to the mind1 if we wish to 
distinguish what is good and what is    
bad2 and according to the differing     
constitution of different minds1 the    
same things may be good or bad4 ,there  
is good and bad with respect to our body
 or senses1 and good and bad with       
respect to our mind4 ,a moral good is   
one which causes conscious states of    
moral satisfaction4  ,the good has often
 been divided into the useful and the   
agreeable4 ,the agreeable is that which 
causes immediate1 the useful that which 
causes mediate pleasure4 ,a thing may be
 both useful and agreeable2 and the like
 is true of the disagreeable and the    
harmful4 ,the useful and the harmful in 
this1 as it were inner1 7subjective7    
sense1 are to be distinguished from the 
useful and the harmful in an objective  
sense2 in the last sense1 that is useful
 which tends to the preservation of     
life4 ,between the useful and harmful1  

and the pleasurable and painful1 in this
 sense1 there must exist1 as the theory 
of evolution teaches us1 a wide-reaching
 correspondence4 ,living beings do that 
which is pleasurable to them2 they avoid
 that which is painful2 they continue   
alive when they do that which is        
conducive to life and avoid that which  
is harmful to life4 ,this continuous    
process of exterminating those beings to
 whom the harmful is agreeable and the  
useful painful1 must tend to make the   
harmful coincide with the painful1 and  
the useful with the pleasurable4 ,the   
agreement is1 however1 far from being a 
perfect one2 and it is the less so1 the 
more complicated are the conditions of  
life4 ,it is the most imperfect in human
 beings4  ,good is that which causes    
pleasure or prevents pain2 that is      
better which causes more pleasure or    
prevents more pain4 ,a thing may cause  
both joy and pain2 in this case1 the    
excess decides whether a thing is good  
or bad2 and the greater the excess1 the 

better or the worse is the thing4 ,the  
greatest possible excess of satisfied   
states of consciousness in the life of a
 human being one may call his greatest  
possible happiness4 ,the greatest       
possible happiness is hence the standard
 by which good and evil are determined4 
,from these reflections is to be seen   
that a distinction is to be made between
 that which is desired and that which is
 desirable4 ,all that is desired is     
pleasurable1 yet much that is           
pleasurable has pain for its            
result1--pain that is far greater than  
the momentary pleasure4  ,the good is   
often considered as opposed to the      
agreeable1 and the bad as opposed to the
 disagreeable or painful4 ,in this case1
 by pain and pleasure are understood    
feelings of the moment1 by good and bad 
are understood enduring1 or at least    
long-continuing causes of lasting or    
oft-recurring pain or pleasure2         
momentary pleasure may be bought at the 
expense of long suffering2 and short    

pain may be the condition of the        
prevention of greater evil4  ,a thing   
may be good as regards one individual1  
bad as regards another4 ,a thing is     
truly good as regards a society when its
 total effect has for the society       
lasting beneficial results1 that is1    
accords with the happiness of the       
society during its whole existence2 and 
that is for mankind truly good which is1
 in its total effect1 beneficial to     
present and future humanity4  ,in       
general1 we may say that1 when we order 
our conduct by the thought to serve     
mankind to the best of our ability1 we  
have a satisfied consciousness1 a good  
conscience4 ,in so far1 therefore1 a    
noble deed is good for ourselves as well
 as for society4 ,the question whether  
or not the performance of our duty      
corresponds to our greatest possible    
happiness1 is a different one4 ,but the 
good man does not allow this thought the
 chief role in consciousness2 he is     
filled with the thought of doing his    

duty in devoting himself to the         
happiness of mankind1 and there is but  
one form of his own happiness which he  
will not forego1 namely1 the blessedness
 of a good conscience4 ,this            
consciousness1 this blessedness which   
unites the human being to mankind1 he   
should regard as his highest good2 for  
it is a moral good2 and the             
dissatisfaction which lies in the       
consciousness of having violated his    
duty towards mankind he should regard as
 the greatest evil4  ,it may be objected
 that this morally satisfied            
consciousness1 this sort of joy1 cannot 
be called a good4 ,a good is the cause  
of pleasurable states of consciousness4 
,but it would appear strange to claim   
that joy1 happiness1 are not goods1 and 
pain1 unhappiness1 not evils2 the terms 
good and evil and worth refer not only  
to joy and suffering1 but also to desire
 and will2 and no one doubts that       
happiness is an object of desire1 and   
pain an object of aversion4  ,from what 

has been said it appears that happiness 
cannot be defined as satisfaction of the
 desires4 ,such satisfaction may have   
unhappiness as its result4 ,not all     
desires are to be satisfied simply      
because they are desires4  ,the study of
 the history of moral conceptions       
appears to show us that most changes in 
this province are the result of a change
 of views concerning the effects of     
actions with regard to the welfare of   
society2 hence1 that they were the fruit
 of experience4 ,this process of change 
takes place1 however1 very gradually2   
the rules which are the result of       
experience are handed down1 for the most
 part1 without statement of reasons2 and
 only in a very limited measure do the  
new generations labor for a progressive 
development of moral conceptions4 ,we   
cannot wonder that a clear consciousness
 of the highest reasons of moral        
precepts is seldom to be found4 ,yet in 
civilized societies1 the conviction is  
general that at least an average        

conformity to rules of morality is the  
indispensable condition of the safety   
and the good of society4 ,the answer to 
the question3 ,what would happen if     
every one were to act thus8 has been    
regarded1 from earliest times1 as       
decisive with regard to the moral       
quality of an act4  ,when we recognize  
that actions which we call good and bad 
are so called because of their causal   
relation to pain and pleasure1 the      
belief must arise in us1 that the worth 
of qualities of character depends on the
 promise they contain of future action4 
,the most important power for the       
happiness or misery of humanity is the  
character of human beings4 ,hence the   
morally good1 excellence of character1  
is to be regarded as preeminently ,good4
 ,and so it appears that our instinctive
 judgments are justified by the         
deliberations of calm reason4  ,the     
question3 ,why shall ,i act in          
accordance with the general welfare8 is 
answered by these considerations2       

because such action is right and        
reasonable1 enjoined by conscience and  
reason1 by human nature itself in its   
higher development4 ,he who does not    
recognize this fact1 who does not find  
in it the highest and holiest of        
commandments1 and who yet desires to act
 reasonably and well1 recognizing duties
 to all men1 does not see what he       
himself really will4  ,the conception of
 right-doing is the motive of the human 
being1 in so far as he is good4 ,the    
teacher who desires to have moral       
influence will endeavor to awaken this  
motive in his hearers or readers4 ,for  
this purpose he must appeal to their    
actual characters4 ,and it is as much a 
petitio principii to assume1 in ,ethics1
 the existence of moral feelings1 as to 
assume1 in ,optics1 the existence of    
sight4 ,just as there are blind persons1
 so there are persons without moral     
feelings4 ,these are1 however1          
comparatively few2 some trace of moral  
feeling1 of conscience1 is to be found  

in almost every member of society4  ,the
 general welfare1 that is1 the greatest 
possible true happiness of all1 not the 
greatest happiness of the smallest      
number which is often the ruling        
principle of state laws1 nor the        
greatest happiness of the greatest      
number without consideration of the     
minority1--is the highest ethical       
criterion4 ,it may be difficult to      
ascertain wherein this happiness        
consists2 ,bentham demands1 for the     
determination of the worth of an action1
 a calculation of the intensity1        
duration1 certainty1 fecundity1 and     
purity1 of the feelings produced by it4 
,but the happiness and misery of mankind
 is surely the most important object of 
mankind2 it must be1 therefore1 our     
highest care to ascertain the results of
 an action as far as we are able4 ,and1 
in fact1 the most important results of  
any form of action are generally        
ascertainable4  ,to make endeavor after 
one's own and others' perfection the    

criterion of morality is to set up a    
false standard1 a form without a        
content1 since perfection designates    
merely a state that accords with some   
preconceived concept or end4 ,the       
question is3 ,what end shall human      
perfection realize8 ,the criterion of   
general welfare alone can define human  
perfection4 ,it is such a constitution  
of man's bodily and spiritual           
characteristics as conduces in the      
highest degree to general happiness4    
,too long and detailed a consideration  
of possible results is not desirable in 
every case where action is called for4  
,there is seldom time for a             
consideration of the intensity1         
duration1 etc41 of resulting pain and   
pleasure4 ,it is well1 in most cases1 to
 follow the general moral rules we have 
attained to through previous reflection4
 ,in cases of doubt1 we need to appeal  
to our highest criterion4 ,often such   
doubt may be caused by selfishness1 by  
the hidden desire to act1 after all1 for

 our own benefit2 we need1 therefore1 to
 put to ourselves the question3 ,how    
would we judge the action of another in 
our own position8 ,thus we arrive at the
 highest moral commandment1 which is3   
,so act that thy conduct1 if made       
general1 would be for the good of       
mankind4 ,and the force of example is   
here one of the factors to be           
considered4  ,it has been asked what    
right one has to assert the rule that   
each one is to count for one1 and no one
 for more than one1 in moral decisions4 
,may not one human being's capacity for 
happiness be greater than another's1 and
 his happiness1 therefore1 more to be   
considered8 ,it may be answered that bad
 men have never been embarrassed for an 
excuse for selfishness1 but that the    
arrogance of regarding one's own        
happiness as of greater worth than that 
of others has brought incalculable harm 
into the world1 and that the only safe  
method of calculation for the purpose of
 furthering the general welfare1 is the 

rule above given1--that each one shall  
count as one and no more4  ,the rule    
that the greatest possible happiness of 
all is to be striven for1 is an         
assertion that the happiness of every   
one is to be considered1 that not that  
of the lowest human being is to be      
interfered with unless such interference
 is necessary in order to prevent still 
greater harm to others2 and that no such
 interference shall be greater than is  
positively necessary in accordance with 
this aim4 ,the highest moral law is thus
 nothing more than the ,christian       
commandment of love to all men4 ,and the
 rule ,to count each as one1 no more1   
may receive the restrictive clause in so
 far as the good of the whole of society
 is not diminished by so doing4  ,some  
,darwinians are inclined to regard the  
preservation of existence as the        
criterion by which to judge the moral   
quality of action4 ,aim for the         
preservation of the species would be1   
from their standpoint1 the moral law4   

,but mere existence is not happiness2   
that is shown by the fact of suicide4   
,however1 it is true that health is one 
of the conditions of happiness4         
,pessimists are generally men of an     
unhappy temperament1 often of morbid    
physical constitution2 medical science  
must1 in its progress1 help to prevent  
the development of such morose          
dispositions4 ,want of love may also be 
a cause of pessimism2 most pessimists   
have been lonely men4 ,and want of      
employment may also lead to pessimism4  
,if we follow ,rousseau's advice not to 
listen to those who are in exceptional  
abnormal positions1 but appeal to those 
who constitute the great majority1 we   
shall conclude that1 in general1 the    
happiness of men greatly exceeds their  
misery4 ,the increase of suicide is     
often used as an argument that          
civilization has not caused an increase1
 but a decrease1 of happiness4 ,to this 
argument it may be answered that the    
religious scruples which formerly       

withheld men from this extreme step have
 diminished1 that men have grown more   
self-conscious and independent in       
action2 and that1 moreover1 our age is  
one of unrest1 a transition-period such 
as no other period has been4 ,when we   
examine the lives of tribes on a low    
plane of civilization1 we find their    
existence full of uncertainty and of    
superstitious fear1 and at the mercy of 
the forces of nature4 ,without doubt1   
much misery exists2 a great part of it1 
however1 is caused by the disappointment
 of too extreme demands for happiness2  
the individual must not require that    
life shall be continuous rapture4  ,the 
recognition of what right action is1 is 
not its accomplishment4 ,pain and       
pleasure determine the will1--the pain  
and pleasure of the person who wills1   
since he cannot feel with the feelings  
of others or will with their will any   
more than he can move with their limbs4 
,he may have a conception of the welfare
 or suffering of others1 but a mere     

mental image does not determine the     
will4 ,only when such a conception      
arouses pleasure or pain in the subject 
himself1 are will and action possible4  
,love consists in joy in the thought of 
the beloved person1 with joy in his joy1
 and pain in his pain4 ,he who seeks to 
render happy one whom he loves does not1
 as a rule1 consider the fact that he   
will himself have a joy in the happiness
 of that other2 his aim is to give      
pleasure1 not to himself1 but to the    
other4 ,but the thought of doing for him
 is combined with pleasure1 the thought 
of not doing for him is combined with   
pain2 and these present feelings        
determine the will4  ,that which        
distinguishes the moral from the immoral
 man is that1 in the former1 the notions
 of the right and good rouse strong     
feelings1--feelings of pain at the      
thought of acting contrary to them1 of  
pleasure at the thought of acting in    
accordance with them1 feelings which may
 overpower all others2 while in the     

immoral man these conceptions call forth
 no feelings or only such weak ones as  
offer no sufficient opposition to the   
influence of other feelings4 ,both men  
act from feeling1 but not from the same 
feelings4  ,do we1 by proving that the  
moral1 as well as the immoral man is    
determined in his action by feelings1   
show that the one approximates to1 or is
 identical with the other8 ,by no means4
 ,in that case1 the proof that both the 
moral man and the immoral man will with 
their own will1 and act through their   
own limbs1 that both possess arms1      
hands1 senses1 feelings1 understanding1 
in short1 that both are human beings1   
must show1 in the same manner1 an       
approximation of the moral to the       
immoral man4 ,a perceptive1             
intellectual1 objective side1 and an    
emotional1 inner1 subjective side are to
 be distinguished in all action2 and    
only the confusion of the two has led to
 the fancy that1 with the proof that all
 action proceeds from the pain or       

pleasure of the person who wills1 it is 
shown that all action1 every human      
being1 is selfish1 and that             
unselfishness is a figment of the       
imagination4 ,it is not the expected    
pleasure that moves the will2 it is only
 when the conception of future happiness
 or misery awakens present feelings     
stronger than other present feelings    
which would move the will in another    
direction1 that willing and action can  
follow in accordance with that          
conception4 ,hence1 there is nothing so 
remarkable in the sacrifice of one's own
 happiness4 ,it is not morally desirable
 that self-love should be weak1 but only
 that conscience and general benevolence
 should be stronger still4  ,many who   
have recognized the reality of sympathy 
and benevolence have not regarded them  
as primary but as evolved from egoism4  
,however1 if the word egoism is to have 
a distinct meaning1 it must be          
interpreted as the conscious preference 
of one's own good to that of others4    

,but with self-consciousness is likewise
 developed the consciousness of other   
beings1 and the latter1 as the former1  
clothes itself with feelings--with      
egoistic feelings1 and with sympathetic 
feelings as well4  ,it is further to be 
remarked that the proof that an action  
is disinterested1 is no proof of its    
moral worth4 ,the worst action1--an     
action of pure cruelty1 envy1 or hatred1
 may be disinterested1 that is1 it may  
have for its end the pain of another    
without consideration of the advantage  
of the doer4  ,the effects1 as pain or  
pleasure1 of conduct opposed to1 or in  
harmony with1 civil or moral law1 in so 
far as such effects can be predicted    
and1 as thus predicted1 they influence  
the will1 are called ,sanctions4 ,one   
may distinguish between a physical1 a   
political1 a social1 a sympathetic1 and 
a moral sanction4 ,doubtless the conduct
 recommended by self-love1 as a result  
of these sanctions1 coincides1 to a very
 large extent1 to a larger extent than  

egoists in the rule perceive1 with that 
which the good of society demands2 but  
it is just as certain that1 in many     
cases1 the way of selfish cunning and   
that of virtue diverge4 ,the outer      
sanctions do not insure the coincidence 
of duty and one's own happiness2 nor    
does the sympathetic sanction secure    
this1 for sympathy is often on the side 
opposed to duty4 ,there is but one      
sanction which is ever on the side of   
action in accordance with duty3 the     
moral sanction1 the peace and joy which 
accompany the knowledge of having done  
right4 ,duty and self-interest coincide 
the more nearly1 the better and more    
unanimous the various sanctions are1    
and1 especially1 the more strongly the  
moral feelings are developed in a       
society2 one of the tasks society has to
 set itself is to labor for the greatest
 possible concord of duty and           
self-interest4 ,but this harmony will   
never become an absolutely perfect one  
and self-sacrifice impossible4 ,man     

needs1 therefore1 some end which shall  
depend upon himself alone1 if he is to  
be kept from discouragement and despair4
 ,such an end is the consciousness of   
right-doing4 ,he who chooses this as    
highest end must devote himself to the  
service of mankind1 as well as he who   
makes the advancement of the good of    
mankind his end4 ,the thought of this   
end will prevent him from being blinded 
by self-interest in answering the       
question as to what right and duty are1 
and will also preserve him from         
permitting himself one or the other pet 
sin under the excuse that he will atone 
for it by other good actions2 it will   
compel him to the endeavor to fulfil    
every duty4 ,and though he may not be   
perfectly happy1 he will be happier than
 the man who makes the good of humanity 
his end2 since he is less dependent upon
 outer events4 ,benevolence and         
conscience are not the same4 ,the latter
 constrains us to do right1 that is1 to 
perform actions the expected results of 

which are in harmony with the general   
welfare2 it has attained its end when   
the right action is performed1 and it   
has failed to attain its end when this  
aim is frustrated4 ,man has a deep inner
 longing for happiness of some sort4    
,when he does not find it upon earth1 he
 seeks it in some other world4 ,he has  
often a deep inner yearning for         
holiness1 and a secret dissatisfaction  
in his own conduct4 ,ethics satisfies   
this double longing in commanding him to
 renounce his greatest happiness and    
endeavor to attain moral blessedness1   
the happiness of holiness4  ,perhaps    
some one may object that this is a      
selfish view of the moral life4 ,is it  
selfish to renounce one's greatest      
happiness in order to attain only peace 
of conscience8 ,that no one were without
 such selfishness6 ,he who sets himself 
this end will act better1 more in       
accordance with the good of humanity1   
than he who makes the advancement of    
human welfare his ultimate aim4 ,hence  

the human being should choose this end4 
,therefore1 the highest moral           
commandment1 the ,categorical           
,imperative1 receives this form3 ,strive
 to attain peace of conscience in       
devoting thyself to the service of      
mankind4  ,by right we understand what  
is in conformity with a standard of     
action which we recognize1 by wrong1    
what is in opposition to it4 ,the       
recognition and application of the      
standard belong to the reason4 ,but not 
to reason alone2 every rule is the      
outcome of feelings2 and this is the    
reason why ideas of right possess the   
power of motives4  ,judgment of action  
may take place in two ways3 immediately1
 through the feeling2 and mediately1    
through moral rules1 the adoption of    
which1 however1 presupposes feeling4    
,according to the disposition1 the      
education1 the circumstances1 of a man1 
the one or the other form of judgment   
prevails4 ,the words obligation1        
commandment1 duty1 law1 express the fact

 that something lies without the mere   
free pleasure of the acting individual1 
is withdrawn from its sphere4  ,it has  
been said that a distinction is to be   
made between duty and the sense of      
duty--that an objective duty still      
exists1 even when no corresponding inner
 sense of duty is present4 ,this merely 
means that some one else in distinction 
from the acting person recognizes a     
moral law1 by which he may blame the    
action4 ,duties are actions sanctioned  
by one or another sort of punishment4   
,the moral sanction is self-blame4 ,but 
not the performer of an act alone1      
others also1 pronounce judgment on his  
action1 and in the rule there exists a  
greater or less harmony between his     
judgment and that of others4 ,to        
self-condemnation is added the          
consciousness of having deserved the    
blame of others4  ,human actions are not
 only an object of displeasure or of    
indifference1 but also of praise1       
gratitude1 love1 admiration4 ,actions   

which reveal a character above the      
average are regarded as meritorious     
according to the measure of their       
superiority2 they deserve recognition1  
respect1 praise1 honor4  ,three classes 
of actions to which public opinion      
applies its sanction may be             
distinguished3 actions blamed2 those the
 neglect of which is blamed2 and those  
which are praised4 ,the first two       
classes1 sanctioned by a punishment1 are
 regarded as duty2 the last class1      
sanctioned by at least mental reward1   
are actions of desert4 ,actions the     
omission of which is punished or blamed 
are not actions of desert1 but of duty  
and obligation4  ,the boundary-line     
between duty and desert is not fixed and
 definite2 in the measure in which the  
moral condition of a society is         
perfected1 the province of that which is
 regarded as duty is extended into that 
which was formerly regarded as desert4  
,the distinction between duty and desert
 has1 in general1 only an outward       

significance2 it has regard to the      
relation to others1 to the social       
sanction4 ,the moral human being does   
not inquire what entitles him to praise1
 but simply what is right2 and he does  
not compare himself with others but with
 his moral ideal4 ,hence he recognizes1 
with regard to himself1 only duty1 not  
desert4 ,he aspires to attain1 not the  
approbation of others1 but his own1 and 
he attains this only when he has done   
that which he holds to be the best      
possible4  ,the moral significance of   
the outward sanction lies in its        
educating influence2 it acts as         
counterpoise to inclination to action   
opposed to the moral law1 and           
facilitates1 thus1 the victory of the   
moral motives1 which increase in        
strength through use4 ,if it is true    
that a condition of heteronomy always   
precedes that of autonomy1 then the     
outer sanction is the indispensable     
condition of the evolution of moral     
feelings4  ,it has sometimes been said  

that the human being is under obligation
 to others only4 ,but it seems that this
 view has proceeded from a confusion of 
the moral with the juridic significance 
of the word duty4 ,it is not to be      
doubted that the consciousness of duty  
would not develop in an individual who  
grew up in solitude1--but speech and    
reason likewise would not become his4   
,the law of morality applies not only to
 social conduct but also to conduct     
having reference to self4  ,by moral law
 is not meant a law in the sense that it
 is imposed on human beings from        
without1 by another2 it is exactly the  
peculiarity of the moral law that it is 
self-imposed as the voice of conscience4
  ,virtue is related to duty as the     
enduring characteristic to the single   
action1 or the lasting will to          
obligation1 to the ought2 virtue is a   
disposition to act in accordance with   
duty4 ,vice is a characteristic which   
continually determines actions opposed  
to duty4  ,there may be exceptional     

cases where vice is innate1 as is idiocy
 or insanity1 but the records of prisons
 and reformatories where a moral        
influence has been attempted1 show us   
that germs of good may exist even in    
those apparently wholly given over to   
vice4 ,it is true that the capacity for 
moral education is narrowed with every  
added year of life2 but it is impossible
 for us to say1 with certainty1 how     
great this decrease of capacity may     
be4#gi  ,the most essential influence   
for moral betterment is that which the  
personality of an earnest human being   
exerts by example and precept4 ,the     
awakening and strengthening of good     
impulses is not1 however1 the immediate 
destruction of the bad2 and struggle is 
often necessary if the good shall       
conquer4 ,the more frequent the victory1
 the easier it becomes4 ,every virtue   
can be acquired at least in some degree1
 if the wish to acquire it be           
sufficiently strong and persistent4     
,but although such struggle as this is  

often necessary1 exactly the sign of the
 attainment of virtue consists in the   
absence of self-compulsion2 by this     
absence1 its perfection is measured4    
,the assertion1 occasionally heard1 that
 virtue is in proportion to struggle1   
amounts to the contradictory assertion  
that the more perfect the man is1 the   
less is his virtue4 ,the truths which1  
imperfectly comprehended1 lead to this  
opinion1 are these3 ,we distinguish by  
the name of virtue that moral           
constitution which rises above the      
average4 ,it is presupposed1 however1   
that its possessor has1 in general1 the 
impulses and capacities belonging to    
human nature2 he could not be called    
temperate in any particular direction1  
if he did not possess the capacity of   
enjoyment which leads many to           
intemperance4 ,moreover1 the control of 
strong impulses from a desire to do     
right presupposes a strong sense of     
duty2 and it is on account of this sense
 of duty that we respect a man4 ,but if 

an individual distinguished by a strong 
sense of duty gradually succeeds in     
tempering his impulses and ridding      
himself of his faults1 his virtue is not
 less1 but more perfect4 ,and finally1  
the fact is also to be taken into       
consideration that1 while one cannot    
necessarily conclude1 from a man's      
innate love for some especial class of  
good actions1 that he will do his duty  
in other directions also1 this is an    
inference which can be drawn where      
actions are performed from a sense of   
duty4  ,a certain degree of intelligence
 is a condition of virtue2 a being      
without reason is not a moral being1 as 
the animal is not2 but morality requires
 only average human intelligence4       
,there is no greater error than the     
opinion that virtue is not concerned    
with action2 for virtue is excellence of
 character which leads to right action2 
action is the test of moral worth4  ,in 
olden times1 an attempt was often made  
to set up one especial form of character

 as universal ideal4 ,such an attempt is
 injustifiable1 since the nature and    
circumstances of individuals differ4 ,in
 morality1 too1 there may be            
originality4  ,in the judgment of an    
action1 two questions must be           
distinguished3 the question whether the 
action is right or wrong1 and the       
question as to what inference shall be  
drawn from it with regard to the        
character of the performer4  ,in the    
action1 there must be distinguished the 
following points3 the movement of the   
body2 the results of the act2 the act of
 the will2 the intent2 the presence or  
absence of a conviction that the action 
will not have evil results2 the part of 
the intent willed1 not merely as means  
but as end2 and the incentive1 or       
feeling from which the action springs4  
,the chief end and the incentive        
together are often called the motive4   
,the movement of the body is not an     
object of moral judgment1 as are not1   
also1 the outer results of the action as

 such4 ,nor is a mere act of the will as
 such1 but its nature1 of moral         
importance4  ,no human motive or        
incentive is1 in itself1 bad4 ,not even 
anger and hatred are in themselves evil2
 since wrath against wrong is           
justifiable4 ,yet motives are by no     
means morally of the same worth2 while  
where motives directed to the good of   
the individual are at work1 the action  
will be1 in nine cases out of ten1 in   
accordance with the general good2 it    
will be1 let us say1 in nine cases out  
of ten1 contrary to the general good    
where motives of malevolence are active4
 ,and for this reason the motive in the 
single case gives us a clue to the      
character4 ,there exists a certain      
stability of character which makes it   
likely that the individual who acts out 
of good motives on one occasion will do 
so again4 ,of greatest worth are the    
motives which spring from desire for the
 general good2 these are moral motives4 
,actions may be right1 yet immoral1 and 

moral yet wrong4 ,yet the theory that   
the objective judgment of an action1 and
 the judgment of the character of the   
doer have nothing in common is          
erroneous2 for in both cases the highest
 ground of reasonable judgment is the   
same2 namely1 the general good4  ,blame 
is not merely for the sake of prevention
 through fear2 since we may blame a deed
 and not its doer4 ,when a man does what
 we consider wrong under the impression 
that he is acting for the general good1 
we do not endeavor to frighten him from 
his conduct by blame1 but to convince   
him of his error4  ,but the significance
 of the motives of an action does not   
lie merely in our inference from them to
 the character of the doer2 from the    
actual1 or inferred1 motives of the     
action spring its most important        
results2 namely1 its influence upon the 
morality of human beings4 ,every moral  
action reacts for good upon the         
performer1 strengthening his tendency to
 such conduct2 and it is1 besides1 an   

inciting example4  ,it is not necessary 
for morality that all actions should    
take place directly from desire for the 
general good1 but only that the belief  
be present that they are in harmony with
 the general good2 duty need not be the 
only motive1 but simply the ruling one2 
one may act immediately from other      
motives4  ,the aesthetic judgment of a  
character is to be distinguished from   
the moral judgment of it4 ,much that    
pleases one aesthetically in character  
is morally indifferent2 and much that is
 morally of the greatest worth has      
little or no aesthetic value4 ,the talk 
of an identity of the beautiful and the 
good has caused much confusion4  ,things
 have particular qualities according to 
which they affect us and are affected4  
,all that ,i can predicate of things1   
all their being is their effect4 ,and   
when ,i say that a certain thing1 as    
long as it does not change1 will1 under 
the same circumstances1 operate in the  
same way1 ,i assert merely that this    

certain thing1 as long as it remains    
unchanged1 is this certain thing4 ,it   
may often be difficult or impossible to 
determine whether or not the thing has  
changed1 but if it has not changed1 it  
must1 under the same circumstances1     
operate in the same manner as formerly4 
,as everything is1 at each moment1 a    
definite thing1 so is also every human  
being2 he has definite qualities1 and if
 these do not change1 neither does his  
action under the same circumstances2 if 
it could change1 he would act according 
to that which he is not4  ,different    
individuals have different innate       
tendencies2 and differing circumstances 
develop similar tendencies in different 
ways4 ,the history of the human being is
 his character1 if we add what he has   
inherited to his own history4 ,to       
reflect upon human nature is to assume  
its conformity to law2 to deny such     
conformity involves ceasing from thought
 on it2 for thought means the conclusion
 of like from like4 ,though the action  

of the human being depends1 in a high   
degree1 upon circumstances1 we can often
 predict1 from a knowledge of his       
character1 the general nature of his    
action4 ,and if our expectation should  
be1 for once1 disappointed1 we do not   
say that his character has suddenly     
passed into its opposite1 but that we   
had an insufficient knowledge of the    
circumstances1 or that we imputed to him
 a character which he did not really    
possess4 ,we have thus to distinguish   
two groups of facts in the contemplation
 of a particular action3 the present    
constitution of the doer of the action1 
and that of the outward circumstances   
concerned2 if a change occurs in either1
 the conduct will also change4 ,criminal
 statistics are evidence of the effects 
of similar circumstances upon similar   
characters4  ,those who deny the action 
of cause and effect in the conduct of   
men as contradictory of freedom1 cannot 
refer to physical or political liberty1 
since the absence of these does not     

involve the absence of cause and effect4
 ,the free will which is said to be     
peculiar to the human being and not     
possessed by the animals1 is an absence 
of subjection to the impressions of the 
moment1 and this has been regarded as an
 activity of pure reason4 ,but1 as      
,hoeffding says1 the contest of the     
reason with the passions is really a    
contest between feelings combined with  
reflections of reason and other violent 
feelings that are combined with few     
thought-elements4 ,this free will is the
 capacity of reflection gained by       
experience4 ,it is not a negation of    
cause and effect1 for the act of the    
will is determined by the feelings1     
thoughts1 inclinations1 which precede   
it2 it may be determined by reflection  
as opposed to the impressions of the    
moment4 ,the word freedom is also used  
to denote moral freedom1 or the freedom 
from determination by immoral motives2  
in such case1 however1 moral motives    
determine4  ,but it must be remembered  

that the natural law of cause and effect
 is not like a law in the sense of the  
political law2 it is not something      
imposed from the outside4 ,natural laws 
are rules formed by men to express the  
regularity of events in one sentence2   
things do not obey the laws1 but the    
laws are according to things4 ,when we  
say3 ,gunpowder must explode when it    
comes in contact with a flame1 the      
explosion is necessary2 we do not mean  
that the gunpowder is compelled1 under  
certain circumstances1 to explode2 it   
explodes of its own essential nature4   
,necessity designates1 not a state of   
things1 but a state of the understanding
 regarding them4 ,the same is true of   
the words possible and accidental4 ,the 
accidental is the unintentional4 ,the   
bullet which accidentally killed a man  
was not sent with the intention of      
killing him4 ,or accident is used of    
that with regard to which we are        
ignorant and cannot predict2 the word   
does not1 in this sense either1 denote  

an absence of cause4 ,objectively1      
nothing is possible2 either it is1 or it
 is not4 ,great confusion is1 however1  
caused by a want of clearness in the    
interpretation of the words possible1   
impossible1 necessary1 etc41 with regard
 to the will4 ,when ,i say3 ,it is      
possible for the good man to perform    
even the worst action1 he can perform   
it2 and3 ,it is not possible for the    
good man to perform a bad act1 he cannot
 do it2 ,i use the words possible and   
can in two quite different senses4 ,the 
first sentence means3 ,even the best man
 can perform the worst act if he will2  
the second3 ,the good man never has the 
will2 it follows from his nature that he
 does not possess it2 it would be a     
self-contradiction to say that he has   
it4 ,the human being can do this or that
 if he wills1 provided no outer force   
opposes his will2 but whether he wills  
or not depends upon his character4 ,his 
will is not uncaused4  ,it has been said
 that one should not allow himself to be

 determined1 but should himself         
determine his act4 ,this assertion makes
 self something distinct from one's     
thoughts and feelings4 ,free will has   
also been interpreted as choice between 
motives4 ,the human being does not1     
however1 choose between motives but     
between acts1 and his choice is free in 
that he can1 as has been said1 choose   
this or that act if he will2 but his    
choice is not the less caused4 ,when1 in
 reflection on a past act1 the human    
being says to himself3 ,it was possible 
for me to act otherwise1 he means1 as a 
rule1 simply3 ,if ,i had thought as ,i  
do now1 ,i should not have acted thus2  
but ,i did not think as ,i do now4 ,the 
delusion that he might have acted       
differently under the same outer        
circumstances and with the same thoughts
 and feelings1 arises from the          
difficulty of realizing1 from his       
present standpoint1 his position at the 
time of action4 ,it may1 indeed1 seem to
 us1 after we have chosen a certain     

course1 that another was the easier2 but
 can it be possible that one preferred  
the former course when he yet really    
preferred the latter8 ,it is the        
strongest motive that determines the    
action4 ,or1 if it be objected to this  
assertion1 that our only criterion of   
the strength of motives is their effect 
as overcoming other motives1 the        
assertion that the will follows the     
strongest motive would still exclude    
accident in choice2 the assertion would 
amount to this3 that the motive which   
determines the will in the one instance 
will always1 under the same outer and   
inner circumstances1 determine it4 ,so  
,mill remarks that1 when we say that the
 heavier weight will weigh down the     
other1 we understand by heavier weight1 
merely the one which will weigh down the
 other4 ,nevertheless1 the sentence is  
not senseless1 since it means that there
 is1 in many or most cases1 a heavier   
weight1 and that its action is always   
the same4 ,education by others1 and     

self-education would be useless1 if the 
same thoughts and feelings could1 under 
the same circumstances1 produce now     
this1 now that totally different result1
 and not always the same one4  ,kant's  
doctrine of freedom includes practical  
freedom 7which is not1 according to his 
definition1 opposed to causality7 and   
transcendental freedom2 he seems1       
however1 not always to have kept the    
distinction between the two clearly in  
view4 ,his theory of transcendental     
freedom is grounded upon the doctrine of
 the pure ideality of time4 ,the only   
method of saving the doctrine of freedom
 is1 according to ,kant1 the theory that
 the law of necessity applies to things 
as phenomena but not to things in       
themselves4 ,if phenomena are not to be 
regarded as things in themselves1 but as
 mere thought-images1 they must         
themselves have reasons which are not   
phenomena4 ,such a cause for pure       
reason#hj is not determined by          
phenomena1 although its effects appear  

as phenomena4 ,the causal action of     
reason does not have a beginning in     
time1 but is the constant condition1    
outside time1 of all free action of the 
will4  ,kant failed1 however1 to prove  
the pure ideality of time1 as ,riehl has
 sufficiently shown4 ,moreover1 were the
 intelligibile character of reason the  
cause of action as phenomenon1 there    
would be no possibility of moral        
improvement1 since the noumenon is not  
affected by phenomena1--an inference    
which ,schopenhauer makes in adopting   
,kant's theory4 ,moreover1 if space has1
 as ,kant also assumes1 transcendental  
ideality1 plurality is not conceivable2 
hence1 the moral difference of          
characters1 and the science of ,ethics  
itself1 could have no transcendental    
significance4 ,it is evident that ,kant 
argues from the standpoint of an        
assumption of a soul-thing1 a constant  
substratum of psychical phenomena1--a   
standpoint which he himself criticizes4 
,he identifies this thing-in-itself1    

moreover1 with the reason1 although he  
himself declares that the concept of the
 thing-in-itself is but a concept       
limiting reason4#ha ,he makes the reason
 a thing-in-itself outside time1        
although it is an activity1 a process of
 consciousness in time4 ,the thought of 
duty1 of the categorical imperative1 is 
a phenomenon1 and if the will is        
determined thereby1 it is determined by 
something in time4 ,kant takes but      
little account1 moreover1 of the fact of
 birth4 ,is the intelligibile character 
born8 ,if so1 it is preceded by         
something in time2 if not1 it must be   
eternal1 existing before birth as well  
as after death4 ,and how can he assert1 
too1 that an action might have been     
other than it was1 if it depended upon  
the constitution of the intelligibile   
character1 and this is as it is1 and    
operates as it is8  ,schopenhauer's     
argument for transcendental freedom     
contains many self-contradictions1 and  
is founded on the fiction of a first    

free choice of character4 ,schopenhauer 
asserts1 however1 that character is     
innate4 ,if so1 how is it chosen8 ,the  
theory assumes that one is before he is4
 ,an act of choice presupposes a        
chooser1 and1 according to his own      
words1 ,every existentia presupposes an 
essentia2 that is1 every existence must 
have a particular being1 essence4       
,accountability assumes that some one is
 held answerable for an action or event1
 and is1 as answerable1 amenable to     
punishment4 ,the punishment may be one  
of law1 of society1 or a moral          
punishment4 ,the concept of             
responsibility is closely allied to that
 of accountability2 it assumes1 in      
general1 that a person is the author of 
a deed4 ,responsibility may be          
immediate1 when the author of the deed  
was also its performer1 or mediate1 when
 the performer was another person4      
,remorse is pain at the recognition of  
the immorality of a past action4 ,with  
the pain is often connected the wish    

that the action had not been performed4 
,this wish is naturally unreasonable1   
since it is directed to the impossible4 
,yet it is not idle1 as ,schopenhauer   
asserts1 since it has an effect upon    
future action4 ,there is often also an  
egoistic regret1 or one not called forth
 especially by the conscience1 for a    
past action4 ,this may or may not be    
moral1 according as it is or is not in  
harmony with the general welfare4  ,the 
friends of the theory of chance as      
regards the will have asserted that     
shame1 remorse1 would be impossible1 if 
the human being recognized the fact that
 his act was necessary4 ,they have      
neglected1 however1 to give any reasons 
for this remarkable assertion4 ,if a man
 recognizes that the constitution of his
 mind was such as to lead unavoidably to
 vicious acts1 this is the strongest    
motive for condemnation of his own moral
 constitution1 for pain at it1 and an   
endeavor to better it4 ,but if the act  
had no necessary foundation in his      

character1 if it was merely an accident 
that his will chose thus1 then1 since   
the act is past and there is no reason  
for drawing conclusions from it with    
regard to future action1 how does it    
concern him8  ,blame and punishment1 as 
well as self-blame1 have regard to      
character and so to the future4 ,acts   
are not blameworthy and punishable if   
they have no cause4 ,punishment is      
inflicted from two motives3 as a        
preventive1 and as an expression of the 
felt need of retribution4 ,originally1  
mankind punished from a desire for      
revenge4 ,this is not the moral motive4 
,not the criminal alone1 but the whole  
constitution of society1 is responsible 
for his crime4 ,if1 then1 punishment is 
allowable for the sake of prevention1 it
 cannot1 as an evil1 be permissible     
further than is in accordance with this 
end4 ,punishment of the insane could be 
justified only in case it could prevent 
insanity4  ,nor is desert based upon an 
uncaused character of the will4 ,we do  

not admire1 praise1 and reward great    
genius the less because genius is       
inborn2 nor do we admire the moral man  
the less because his father before him  
was distinguished by deeds of           
philanthropy4 ,we admire him for what he
 is4  ,the doctrine of causality in     
human action is far from being what it  
is sometimes called1 a doctrine of      
fatalism4 ,fatalism assumes that1       
whatever a man may do1 a power outside  
him determines the event2 but the       
recognition of cause and effect in human
 action is the recognition of the fact  
that the actions of human beings are    
never without result4  ,it is often said
 that morality is founded upon religion4
 ,assuming that1 by religion1 is meant  
the belief in a personal ,god and in the
 immortality of the soul1 is this true8 
,if a mighty tyrant commanded a man to  
do what was contrary to his conscience1 
if he promised rich reward for obedience
 and fearful torture for disobedience1  
would obedience therefore be moral8 ,why

 is it represented as wrong to follow   
,satan's commands and right to follow   
,god's will8 ,evidently not because ,god
 is mighty but because he is good1 and  
,satan is bad4 ,but if it is1 thus1 a   
matter of duty1 and not merely one of   
selfish cunning1 to obey ,god's will1   
then his will must be directed to the   
good2 and this presupposes the good to  
be something in itself1 without regard  
to the fact that ,god wills it4 ,if ,god
 is a moral being1 this must be so4     
,this is1 in fact1 an assumption which  
the moral members of society have1 in   
general1 made4 ,they boast of the morals
 of their religion1 comparing it1 in    
this respect1 with other religions2 and 
thus they subject it to the test of     
morality4 ,moreover1 when we examine the
 ,christian gospel1 we find that it in  
general assumes the moral laws as       
already existent and only urges         
obedience to them4 ,the good is1 as we  
have seen1 that which conduces to the   
general welfare4 ,the earliest religions

 had no connection with rules of        
morality2 these have developed with the 
social life of human beings and have1 in
 it1 their root4  ,as to the belief in  
immortality1 cannot the human being do  
right without the thought of the reward 
and punishment of another life8 ,as a   
matter of fact1 many good men have not  
possessed such a belief4 ,the distance  
of such an end often makes its effect a 
weak one1 and the motive may easily     
become selfish4 ,yet it is true that a  
loss of faith may include a loss of     
morality1 in case the belief exist that 
there is no basis for morality outside  
religion2 the responsibility of such a  
loss of morality lies with those who    
teach this latter doctrine4 ,through    
love to others and the thought of the   
immortality of influence1 the moral man 
gains a larger life and loses the fear  
of death4 ,he who has thus faced the    
thought of death finds life more earnest
 but not less happy4 ,each hour has not 
the less its own joy because there is an

 end1 at last4 ,nor1 in spite of the    
deep pain the loss of friends causes us1
 do we lose them wholly1 since the      
memory of all that was best in them may 
remain with us4 ,our own pain may bring 
to us a deeper sympathy with1 and love  
for1 others4  ,if we are able to love   
the good in ,god1 we may also learn to  
love the good in those about us1 and be 
incited1 by it1 to emulation4 ,the love 
of the good in men has always had       
stronger effect than love for a distant 
,god of whom but little was known4 ,it  
was the thought of the man ,buddha which
 exerted an ennobling influence upon    
thousands1 and it was the thought of    
another human being that moved the      
christians more strongly than did that  
of a ,father in ,heaven4 ,do we love    
father and mother1 brother or sister1   
wife or child1 or our friends1 for      
,god's sake8 ,why may we not love all   
men1 as we love our friends and         
children1 for their own sake8  ,it has  
been said that there is no              

accountability1 if not to ,god4 ,but if 
,god is the author of the world1 he must
 himself be the cause of evil1 either by
 direct influence or by neglect to      
avert4 ,where1 then1 is the justice of  
his punishment8 ,it does not suffice to 
answer that ,god's justice is not our   
justice2 for in that case1 what right   
have we to apply the word to him at all8
  ,history demonstrates the fact that   
morality is by no means necessarily     
connected with religion4 ,in the name of
 religion millions upon millions of     
human beings1 and these often the most  
upright and conscientious men of their  
nation1 have been put to death1 and thus
 the civilization of whole peoples has  
been retarded4 ,slavery in ,america had 
no stronger friends than the churches4  
,how is the forgiveness of sins by ,god 
to be justified8 ,are the evils which   
they caused any the less existent       
because of such forgiveness1 and is it  
well for the doer to escape1 in this    
way1 the sense of responsibility8 ,only 

labor for the good of humanity is the   
way of atonement4 ,we ourselves are the 
creators of the kingdom of              
righteousness4  ,many claim that ,ethics
 is not indeed based upon ,theology1 but
 that it needs a metaphysical1 a        
teleological1 foundation4 ,for it       
presupposes that human life has an end4 
,if we wish to ascertain how our life   
should be conducted1 we must ascertain  
what is the end ,nature has in view for 
us4  ,but an end is an effect imagined  
beforehand and willed1 which we cannot  
bring about immediately but only through
 a chain of causes4 ,these causes we    
call the means to the end4 ,they too are
 willed1 but only indirectly and because
 the end is attainable only through     
them4 ,these processes to an end are    
sometimes treated as if the causal      
succession in them were reversed1 so    
that the last effect appears as the     
beginning1 and the future determines the
 present2 in this sense1 the end has    
been called the end-cause1 because the  

final link of the process causes the    
beginning4 ,but this is a senseless     
conception1 since the future1 that which
 does not yet exist1 cannot now operate4
 ,in fact1 the succession of causes and 
effects is no more broken into in the   
processes leading to an end than in any 
other processes4 ,when a human being    
imagines to himself a result and        
endeavors to bring it about1 these      
mental processes are not future but     
present2 and they are not determined by 
an influence of the future upon the     
present1 but by an influence of the past
 upon the present2 they follow from     
experience1 that is1 from that which has
 already occurred4 ,they are causal     
processes in which the activities of    
understanding and will have part4 ,hence
 ends exist in nature in so far as they 
exist in man and the higher animals2 but
 outside these1 ends cannot be          
predicated1 unless ,nature is regarded  
either as gifted with imagination and   
will or as the creation of a being      

possessing these4 ,but imagination and  
will require1 according to all our      
experience1 a highly developed nervous  
system1 and to assume their existence   
where such a centralized system does not
 exist is scientifically injustifiable4 
,moreover1 the laws of thought by no    
means determine us to inquire after a   
cause of the whole world1 since the     
concept of cause is applicable only to  
changes1 not1 however1 to enduring      
existences and their qualities4  ,or let
 us assume that we had discovered an end
 set by ,nature4 ,then1 either it would 
appear useless to interfere with its    
attainment and unnecessary to assist in 
it1 or it would appear to us possible to
 oppose this end4 ,in this latter case1 
cause must be shown why we should       
assist1 or should resist1 the process of
 ,nature4  ,many philosophers have said 
that man should live according to his   
own nature4 ,if the word nature here    
denotes the totality of his             
characteristics1 it is evident that the 

worst actions are not less natural than 
the best4 ,therefore1 the word nature   
cannot1 as here used1 have this sense2  
the natural in this sense is not        
identical with the moral4 ,nor can the  
term as here used refer to the usual1   
for in that case the greatest moral     
excellence1 as unusual1 must be         
rejected4 ,nor can it be used to        
designate the more primary1 for in that 
case1 again1 the later developments of  
benevolence and truthfulness should be  
rejected4  ,the word can have but one   
other sense1 namely1 as opposed to      
artificial4 ,but what is in man         
artificial and what is natural8 ,it     
seems that the natural is understood as 
that which is not the work of human     
intention and reflection1 of labor1 and 
of education4 ,innate impulses would be1
 according to this definition1 natural4 
,but it is evident that one cannot      
abandon himself to his blind impulses2  
society could not exist under such      
circumstances4  ,or if it be said that1 

since all organs and impulses of the    
human being tend to preservation of the 
species1 and that this must1 therefore1 
be the end1 then let us say the         
preservation of the species1 or the good
 of mankind but not the natural life1 is
 the end for man to attempt4  ,nature as
 a whole is neither good nor bad4 ,her  
cruelty in the struggle for life is     
continuous4 ,yet this is not cruelty1 in
 so far as it is not willed4 ,she has   
often selected the best men for her     
sacrifices4 ,yet this is not all that is
 to be said of the relation of          
,darwinism to ,ethics4 ,the law of      
natural selection regulates not only the
 life of the individual but also that of
 peoples and nations4 ,evil may arise   
and prosper in society4 ,but it has no  
permanent existence4 ,the chances that  
the descendants of human beings         
possessing evil characteristics will    
long survive1 that they will not1 sooner
 or later1 perish as the result of      
conflict with the mandates of health1 or

 the laws of the state1 or the demands  
of society1 are not great4 ,in the life 
of nations1 it appears more clearly than
 in the life of the individual1 that    
,death is the price of sin4 ,should in  
any society the opinion gain power that 
the struggle for existence authorizes or
 demands a regardless pursuit of one's  
own interests1 an oppression and robbery
 of the weak by the strong1 an          
annihilation of pain through the        
annihilation of the suffering           
individuals1 an outrooting of           
conscience1 and the natural voice of    
pity which raises protest against such a
 course2 should selfishness be bred1 and
 physical strength and refined cunning  
become the highest ideal2 such a        
community would be on the verge of its  
own destruction2 it would have labored  
for this result by justifying the       
struggle of all against all1 permitting 
this the moment that a conflict of      
interests arose4 ,let times of need and 
danger1 times of national war1 come1 and

 we shall see what is the fate of a     
society in which love of country1       
self-sacrifice1 a sense of the ideal1   
respect for truth and justice1 are only 
subjects for scorn4 ,the world's history
 is its judgment-day4  ,all positive    
human authorities are subject to the    
authority of the conditions of life4 ,if
 they do not take note of the nature of 
things1 if they disturb the foundations 
of social life1 their endeavors must    
finally suffer shipwreck on the rock of 
this powerful impersonal authority4     
,natural selection is therefore a power 
of judgment1 in that it preserves the   
just and lets the evil perish4 ,will    
this war of the good with the evil      
always continue8 ,or will the perfect   
kingdom of righteousness one day        
prevail8 ,we hope this last but we      
cannot know certainly4  ,we ourselves   
shall decide our future1 by our acts4   
99       99       99       99       99  
,in an essay written for the ,society   
for ,ethical ,culture1 and read ,october

 #aj1 #ahia1 before the ,london branch  
of that society1 ,gizycki reconstructs  
his theory of the right final end of    
life1 advocating as such the ,general   
,welfare1 instead of ,peace of          
,conscience in the pursuit of the same4 
,the objections to his own former theory
 offered are1 chiefly1 that if peace of 
conscience is regarded as the final end1
 the individual is likely to take too   
little account of the outward effects of
 his action1 to be too little impressed 
by the evil results which should teach  
him greater care4 ,the good of society  
is regarded by the virtuous man as more 
important than his own happiness1 as    
that for which he is willing to         
sacrifice his own peace4  ,,footnotes3  
#gi ,the references here are to         
,lombroso1 ,der ,verbrecher1 deutsche   
,ausgabe1 ,s4 #abi u4 f42 ,h4 v4        
,valentini1 ,das ,verbrecherthum im     
preussischen ,staate1 ,s4 #bbf u4 f4    
#hj ,intelligibile ,ursache4  #ha       
,grenzbegriff4     ,s4 ,,alexander      

,,moral ,,order ,,and ,,progress 7#ahhi7
   ,the proper business of ,ethics is   
the study of moral judgments--or1 if we 
say of human conduct1 then of conduct as
 submitted to the praise or blame of    
moral judgments4 ,but these judgments   
are not mere opinions2 conduct is not   
that which is judged to be right in     
distinction from that which is right2   
and thus the analysis of such judgments 
is a systematization of both conceptions
 and facts4  ,the task of ,ethics falls 
into two parts4 ,it has 7#a7 to supply a
 catalogue raisonne of the moral        
observances of life1 the various moral  
judgments which make up the contents of 
the moral consciousness1 and 7#b7 to    
discuss what it is that the moral       
judgment1 as such1 expresses4  ,nothing 
is more striking at the present time    
than the convergence of different       
schools of ,ethics--,english            
,utilitarianism developing into         
,evolutional ,ethics1 on the one hand1  
and the idealism associated with the    

,german philosophy derived from ,kant on
 the other4 ,the convergence is not1 of 
course1 in mere practical precepts1 but 
in method also4 ,it consists in an      
objectivity or impartiality of          
treatment1 commonly called scientific4  
,there is also a convergence in general 
results which consists in a recognition 
of a kind of proportion between         
individual and society1 expressed by the
 phrase organic connection4 ,the theory 
of egoism1 pure and simple1 has been    
long dead2 ,utilitarianism succeeded it 
and enlarged the moral end4 ,evolution  
continued the process of enlarging the  
individual interest1 and has given      
precision to the relation between the   
individual and the moral law4 ,but in   
this it has added nothing new2 for      
,hegel1 in the early part of the        
century1 gave life to ,kant's formula by
 treating the law of morality as        
realized in the society and the state4  
,the change in ethical conception is not
 due to biological research alone1 but  

to the study of history also1 and to    
other general changes in the practical  
data on which its principles are built4 
,the social and political history of the
 century represents the growth of the   
idea of freedom1 which has properly two 
sides--that of individual liberty of    
healthy development1 and that of the    
solidarity of society and the           
responsibility of the individual to it4 
,with the increasing complexity of      
interests and the growth of individual  
freedom1 has come1 however1 a certain   
sense of loneliness to the individual in
 the midst of modern competition1 and   
this explains1 to a great extent1 the   
increase of suicide in the present      
century4  ,the convergence of dissimilar
 theories affords us some prospect of   
obtaining a satisfactory statement of   
the ethical truths towards which they   
seem to move4  ,our inquiry falls into  
two parts1 according as we analyze the  
conceptions which relate to the         
existence of the moral judgment or those

 connected with its growth1 maintenance1
 and change--the statics or the dynamics
 of morality4 ,to these two divisions is
 to be added a third1 preliminary       
division1 more closely allied with the  
statical examination of morality4 ,these
 three parts are represented by the     
questions3 7#a7 ,what is it that is     
good8 ,to what are the terms good and   
bad applied8 7#b7 ,why is it good8 ,what
 does its goodness mean8 7#c7 ,how does 
goodness come into being2 how is it     
maintained2 how does it advance8  ,moral
 judgments apply to voluntary action1   
that is1 action distinguished by the    
presence of an idea of the end to be    
attained not merely in consciousness but
 to consciousness1 and the conversion of
 the idea into the actual reality of    
presentation4 ,the terms good and bad1  
indeed1 are applied1 not only outside   
the realm of morals1 but also1 within   
it1 to desires and thoughts2 but to     
these only as they are the objects of   
volition1 in that the will at present   

allows them to persist in consciousness 
or in that their present occurrence is  
regarded as the result of past willing4 
,the conduct to which we apply moral    
judgment is a whole made up of many     
parts--and actions1 consequences1 and   
internal feelings have value for        
morality only in so far as they are its 
elements4  ,external action concerns    
conduct only in so far as the object of 
volitions 7which may be either internal 
or external7 is derived from this       
source4 ,voluntary external action is   
not external only1 but has also an      
internal side2 and not whether ,i       
succeed in performing a certain action  
or am prevented in the middle of it1 but
 whether ,i willed it1 is of importance 
to moral judgment4 ,conduct is sometimes
 considered separately from character2  
but this separation results from        
confusing conduct with mere action4 ,a  
character exists only in its conduct1   
and all moral actions issue from        
character4  ,the consequences cannot be 

separated from conduct in the moral     
judgment1 except in so far as they could
 not have been foreseen4 ,the           
consequences of conduct are a most      
important part of action1 in that they  
should be considered by the person      
willing1 and should influence the nature
 of his conduct4  ,the internal side of 
conduct is represented by the moral     
sentiments4 ,these are to be            
distinguished from the mere motives1    
which1 defined as something that has    
propulsive force1 whether a feeling or a
 passion1 does not enter into moral     
action except as absorbed into volition4
 ,no emotion is1 in itself1 right or    
wrong1 but is only indirectly judged as 
such as it makes a difference to the    
action--as an aptitude of mind which    
tends to this or that predominating form
 of conduct4 ,moral sentiments1 on the  
other hand1 as moral aptitudes effective
 for particular conduct1 contain an     
additional element4 ,moral sentiments1  
thus defined1 being equivalent to       

conduct1 it follows that the mere       
possession of sentiments cannot         
constitute the difference between       
intrinsic or internal1 and customary    
morality2 customs are themselves a      
matter of sentiment4 ,thus conduct as a 
concrete whole has an inward element of 
sentiment and an outward element of     
action1 and these are different1 on the 
one hand from mere given feelings1 on   
the other from mere action4 ,conduct is 
this unity of feeling and action in     
which mere feeling is modified by the   
idea of action1 and mere action becomes 
a mental1 or1 if we like1 a spiritual   
thing4 ,conduct and character are the   
same thing facing different ways4 ,think
 of a man's conduct in relation to the  
mental conditions from which it         
proceeds1 and you think of his          
character2 think of his character as it 
produces results beyond these sentiments
 themselves1 and you have conduct4      
,there are no morally indifferent acts2 
when viewed in general and broader      

lights1 all acts are either good or bad2
 though there are some cases of really  
indifferent means arising from the      
mechanism of action2 as1 for instance1  
that ,i am to go to ,london is not      
indifferent1 but we may suppose that the
 fact that ,i may go by the road or by  
the river makes no difference to my     
volition4 ,there is no distinction      
between virtue and prudence as regard   
for self1 but prudence1 in so far as it 
is compatible with social requirements1 
is a duty and a virtue4  ,ethics1 then1 
has to do with conduct as a whole in its
 external and its internal aspects4 ,in 
distinction from ,psychology1 it has to 
do with it not merely as a fact to be   
analyzed1 but with reference to its     
nature1 quality1 or content1 judged by a
 standard of value4 ,it is not dependent
 upon ,metaphysics1 but precedes it in  
order of time1 whatever may be said of  
the order of importance2 ,metaphysics   
examines1 properly1 the ultimate        
questions left over unanswered by the   

other sciences4 ,from the purely        
physical method1 ,ethics has advanced to
 a biological method2 and the doctrine  
that pleasure is the end of right action
 has been replaced by the idea of social
 vitality as the end4   ,,statical      
,,analysis--,,moral ,,order  ,the       
recognition of the reference in morality
 to society has been implied in all     
ethical theories2 theories of selfish   
pleasure themselves recognize the social
 element in individual gratification1   
even ,cyrenaic theories recommending    
selection and refinement of pleasures1  
and containing a reference to personal  
dignity which implies a conception of   
man as typical of a perfection that     
others may sympathize in and attain4    
,individualism and ,universalism in     
morals differ only in the order in which
 they take their terms4 ,to the former1 
the individual comes first and is the   
measure of the law2 to the latter1 the  
law or society comes first1 and is the  
measure of the worth of the individual4 

,nevertheless1 the ethical problem is   
very differently conceived by the two   
schools4 ,but the ,history of           
,philosophy shows a tendency to         
harmonization of the two2 we find that  
,individualism becomes more and more    
socialistic1 while ,universalism becomes
 more and more conscious of             
individuality4 ,we may trace this       
movement1 in the case of ,individualism1
 in the development of the philosophic  
theory of morality as true benevolence  
from the theory of benevolence as merely
 another form of self-love4 ,the earlier
 conceptions of ,universalism1          
emphasizing the good as something       
binding irrespective of the inclinations
 of the individual1 issue in particular 
formulae of virtue2 later conceptions   
recognize the differences of individual 
cases while still insisting on the      
universal or authoritative character of 
morality4 ,the problem receives its     
definite shape when the explanation of  
authority is sought1 not in some        

categorical imperative1 but in the very 
nature of society itself1 which1 if a   
whole1 is yet a whole made up of        
individuals4 ,ethical inquiry thus      
naturally breaks up into two parts1     
according as we consider the meaning of 
right and wrong for the individual1 or  
for society as embracing many           
individuals4  ,as far as morality       
concerns itself with the individual1 the
 good act implies a certain adjustment  
of functions to one another1 too much in
 any one direction implying a defect in 
others4 ,the good life as a whole is a  
system of consecutive acts1 where each  
function has its limits prescribed for  
it by the demands of all the other      
functions4 ,and the good character is an
 order or systematic arrangement of     
volitions4 ,the goodness of an act is   
thus a matter of equilibration or       
adjustment of the elements of an        
individual's nature4 ,in this proportion
 or adjustment consists the             
reasonableness1 rationality 7ratio1     

,greek3 logos7 of good conduct4 ,this   
does not mean that the principle of     
morality is the result of reason1 for   
moral adjustment is no more specially   
the work of reason than of any other    
mental faculty4  ,this account of good  
character uses ideas which apply1       
mutatis mutandis1 to the life of any    
organism1 as well as to the mind of man2
 it merely explains1 in terms of human  
experience1 the elements involved in the
 conception of organization2 the        
difference lies simply in the nature of 
the elements involved in the adjustment1
 the elements being1 in the case before 
us1 conscious acts4 ,to the question    
whether such a definition of morality   
would not apply rather to conduct than  
to character1 and whether1 the volitions
 being conceived as a series in time1 it
 does not dissolve the unity of         
character1 may be answered that conduct 
and character have already been shown to
 be identical1 and that unity can no    
more be denied to the series of acts    

involved than it can be denied to the   
growing plant or animal whose functions 
are successive4 ,the unity conditioned  
by time is a unity characterized by     
succession1 as that of space by         
extension4 ,the objection1 as it gathers
 its strength from a persuasion that the
 good character should be described by  
the feelings or sentiments of any one   
time1 is legitimate2 good conduct is    
built upon a man's needs or desires and 
is defined as satisfying every part of  
his nature in its proportion2 so that an
 equilibrium of the emotions and the    
moral sentiments is involved in         
morality1 and any sentiment is moral    
which can be equilibrated with the rest4
 ,the good man may be described either  
as an equilibrated order of conduct1 or 
as an equilibrium of moral sentiments or
 of the parts of his nature4            
,nevertheless1 the order of conduct is a
 prior conception to that of structural 
equilibrium4 ,in a machine1 the         
combination of parts is made in order to

 produce the motion of the engine1 and  
the equilibrium is maintained by the    
motion4 ,in the organism1 the bodily    
structure retains its proportion only in
 so far as it is in physiological       
action1 and this physiological action   
subserves the conduct of the organism1  
while in like manner the equilibrium of 
moral sentiments exists only through    
conduct and is determined by the        
requirements of conduct4 ,the           
equilibrium is effected simultaneously  
both for conduct and the moral          
structure4 ,the ideal is a plan of      
conduct1 ideal in that it is never fully
 attained4 ,the ideal is hypothetical in
 two senses4 ,it supposes that every    
member of the order is good1 whereas no 
life contains good acts only2 and that  
the order itself remains permanent1     
whereas morality is necessarily         
progressive4 ,nevertheless1 it is to be 
observed that the ideal is a realized   
ideal4 ,it is realized in every good    
act1 since the good act is the act which

 has the shape it would wear in the     
ideal order4 ,though it is adjusted to  
imaginary elements1 it realizes the     
whole so far as its own particular share
 is concerned4  ,morality implies the   
existence of society4 ,it is useless to 
inquire what would be moral in case the 
human individual were an isolated being2
 the fact is that he is not so1 and that
 all moral judgment implies not only the
 judgment of other individuals besides  
the acting individual1 but also the     
function of the acting individual as a  
member of a society4 ,yet each member of
 a society has his special individual   
work1 so that duty varies according to  
individual circumstances1 and so far    
from its being true that morality is not
 a respecter of persons1 it is a fact   
that it is always a respecter of        
persons4 ,this does not deny that there 
are certain common bounds of morality1  
which allow the formation of some       
general propositions2 nor does it mean  
that each individual is at liberty to   

construct his own moral precepts4 ,the  
individuality of morality1 which finds a
 place or vocation for each individual1 
involves an equilibrium between the     
members of society1 in which consists   
the morality of the whole4  ,the        
so-called self-regarding virtues are    
social as well as self-regarding2 their 
disregard involves evil1 not to the     
individual alone1 but to others also4   
,it may be objected that acts and       
thoughts which can never be known to    
others are condemned by conscience4 ,in 
answer it must be observed3--  7#a7     
,that the knowledge of others is a      
matter of degree2 my friends know my    
actions2 and in order to judge an       
action1 it is not necessary to suppose  
the whole nation looking on4  7#b7 ,that
 as personal morality becomes more and  
more complex1 and hence knowledge by    
others less and less possible1 we leave 
the judgment of an act more to the      
conscience of the individual1 as        
vicegerent of the moral law4 ,acts which

 are wrong when nobody knows them have  
come to be so by a process beginning    
with simple acts which are known1 that  
is1 known in their outward appearance4  
,the act1 known or unknown1 leaves its  
impress upon character1 raising or      
lowering the efficiency of the agent2   
and hence is judged good or bad4 ,the   
study of art and science has1 thus1     
moral value1 as influencing character4  
,good and bad acts and conduct are thus 
to be distinguished by their adjustment 
or non-adjustment to the social order4  
,the adjustment takes place in a similar
 manner as in a trial of strength1 and  
the compromise between the different    
individuals must be taken as measuring  
the actual forces which were engaged4   
,the social organism has both its       
morphological1 or structural1 and its   
physiological or functional aspect2 and 
here1 once more1 the order of functions 
is a prior conception to the structural 
order2 in the society1 conduct bears to 
structure the relation which            

physiological action in the body bears  
to the bodily structure4 ,the social    
ideal is doubly hypothetical1 implying  
that all members of the society are good
 and that society is statical4  ,that to
 which moral judgment applies with      
regard to the individual's relation to  
society1 is the adjustment of individual
 wills regarded either as directly      
appearing or as latent and capable of   
acting1 the occasion being given4 ,the  
moral principle in society as a whole is
 thus1 as in the case of the individual1
 a rational one1 and ,aristotle rightly 
gives the same name 7,greek3 orthos     
logos7 to it as to the principle of     
individual action4 ,the moral individual
 is the reproduction in small of the    
social order4 ,but the two conditions   
that the individual must be a harmony   
within himself1 and that he must possess
 all the powers that are required of him
 for the purposes of society1 are not   
different1 but identical4 ,for the      
absence of such powers implies the      

absence of adjustment to his conditions1
 failing which adjustment the inner     
harmony is impossible1 although life may
 be continued1 just as it may be        
continued under diseased physical       
conditions4  ,good men may thus be said 
to conform to a certain type or ideal2  
but this type is not merely something to
 which they are fashioned1 but to which 
they themselves are the contributory    
elements4 ,hence the social ideal is a  
species of which all good men are the   
individual instances2 and the species   
exists1 not1 as in the case of natural  
science1 as a generalization in the mind
 of the observer or as an identical plan
 upon which the members are organized1  
not as a mere collection of individuals1
 but as in itself an organism4 ,let it  
not be objected that1 since no society  
is in perfect equilibrium1 and the ideal
 exists only in good men1 the ideal is  
therefore as much a creation of the     
observer's mind as a natural species4   
,an ideal implies no contrast of        

observer and observed3 conduct is       
something mental3 the ideal is a reality
 of mind1 existing in the minds of those
 who act upon it4 ,the social ideal has 
thus a concrete existence in the        
collective action of good men4  ,in this
 manner1 the supposed independence of   
the tendencies towards ,individualism   
and ,universalism disappears1 the       
harmony of the individual and his       
harmony with society being identical--a 
true independence being equivalent to   
true cooeperation4  ,morality implying  
adjustment to the ideal order1 a        
realization of the bearings of our acts 
is important4 ,but we need no special   
moral faculty to teach us morality2 it  
is prompted by thoughts and feelings    
that1 as the result of a process of     
compromise1 are thoughts and feelings   
adjusted to a social order4  ,obligation
 expresses that an act is the act       
required4 ,it is that relation in which 
the single part of the order stands to  
the whole order1 when it is confronted  

by the whole1 whether we consider the   
single act in relation to the whole     
character of the individual1 or the     
single individual in his relations to   
society4 ,duty in the abstract is the   
name which comprehends obligation in all
 its details2 a duty in the concrete is 
any good act regarded in its relation to
 the whole4 ,on the other hand1 the     
whole has authority against its parts1  
and every particular duty is said to    
have authority just so far as it is     
backed by the whole mass of duties1 as  
the command of a sovereign has authority
 because it gives expression to the will
 of the whole society over which he     
presides4 ,obligation corresponds to the
 necessity under which an organism lies 
of acting in a certain manner in order  
to conform to its type4 ,duty is thus   
not necessarily antagonistic to         
inclination1 as ,kant conceived it1     
since1 in the good man1 inclinations are
 adjusted to the requirements of social 
life2 and obligation is thus different  

from compulsion1 which1 as attendant on 
authority1 applies to the bad1 not the  
good1 man4 ,the negative side of        
compulsion is responsibility1 which     
implies that1 in the case of            
transgression1 the person will be called
 to account4 ,duty1 though thus free    
from the idea of antagonism1 is itself  
always negative1 implying subjection of 
the individual to the larger order4 ,it 
is from this negativity that duty lends 
itself to the legal idea of compulsion1 
and in general wears a legal garb4  ,in 
law1 rights and duties are correlative1 
the right of one implying duties of     
others1 and vice versa2 but in morals1  
rights and duties are not merely        
correlative but identical2 it is a duty 
to insist on rights in so far as these  
rights are moral1 not merely legal1 and 
the individual has a right to the       
performance of duty4  ,the moral        
judgment is a judgment on a fact1 but   
expresses1 nevertheless1 a fact also2 it
 expresses an adjustment to an ideal    

order1 which1 if ideal1 is yet a fact1  
although never realized in its entirety4
 ,thus morality is not a mere matter of 
opinion4 ,opinions may differ with      
regard to a fact of morality as         
different individuals differ in the     
apprehension of a physical fact4 ,an    
action is not right simply because ,i   
think it is so2 but the opinion of the  
good man represents what is really good4
  ,goodness is a mental fact2 the       
apprehension of goodness1 as the passing
 of judgment upon it1 is different from 
it2 but it is nevertheless1 in another  
sense1 the goodness of the good man     
which approves or is the approbation of 
the good act2 and badness exists in the 
mind of the good man and is known as    
disapprobation4 ,the quality of an      
action is that which excites            
approbation2 its goodness or adjustment 
is nothing but the approbation of the   
good man1 but not of other men4 ,in like
 manner1 duty and the sense of duty are 
the same thing4 ,when the act judged is 

presented to the mind only as idea1 the 
feeling of approbation or disapprobation
 is that which we know as the working of
 the moral sense or conscience4  ,it is 
this truth that goodness and approbation
 are identical that ,intuitionism builds
 upon4 ,intuitionism1 however1 regards  
goodness as some new quality of action1 
peculiar and inexplicable2 while a true 
analysis looks upon goodness as no new  
quality1 the moral judgment merely      
placing a mark upon any action as       
conforming to a certain order or        
equilibrated system wanted4  ,there is  
in the good man a vague mass of moral   
sentiments and emotions2 and when the   
idea of any act comes in contact with   
these1 a feeling of satisfaction or     
dissatisfaction arises1 according as the
 idea fuses with this mass of sentiments
 or fails in adjustment to them4 ,moral 
promptings are merely promptings which  
have been adjusted on one side and the  
other until they have come to be in     
harmony with social conditions2 they    

grow out of the natural feelings by the 
process of adjustment4 ,the word        
conscience1 as it is more generally     
used1 seems to emphasize the element of 
reflection in a greater degree than     
moral sense4 ,the explanation of the    
apparent independence of conscience is  
merely that1 in the good man1 the moral 
order is realized1 and action from moral
 principle takes place spontaneously4   
,in so far as this is true1 he is1 in   
the ethical sense1 free1 yet not free in
 the sense that he is to be bound by his
 own conscience alone in opposition to  
the judgment of all other consciences2  
on the contrary1 the conscience sits as 
a tribunal on a man's acts or           
intentions1 just because it is the      
representative of the moral order4  ,in 
speaking of a perverted conscience1     
morality condemns the isolation of a    
man's ideas about right conduct1 from   
the judgment of his fellows4  ,the      
conscience1 by reason of the element of 
reflectiveness1 is higher than the moral

 sense2 and the cultivation of a refined
 conscience is the basis of all         
morality4 ,yet this very reflectiveness 
involves danger1 in that1 attaching     
itself as it does to the negative side  
of duty1 it tends to associate the      
latter with the idea of painfulness     
rather than of pleasure1 and to induce  
fear1 and also in that it tends to      
develop a morbid subjectivity of feeling
 through too much self-examination4     
,good conduct1 as good in virtue of the 
equilibrium it establishes between the  
various parts of conduct itself1 should 
contain within itself the whole         
justification of morality4 ,as such1 it 
is the end of morality1 in that it is   
both the object and purpose1 the aim or 
desire2 and in that it is also the      
standard1 criterion1 or result by which 
conduct is measured4  ,good conduct     
involves a common good as part of the   
moral order1 and so creative of a tie   
between all members of society4 ,the    
common good is thus not to be conceived 

as something that might be1 as it were1 
cut up and distributed1 but as common in
 that it involves an adjustment of      
claims4 ,the common good is thus1 in a  
sense1 objective1 or objectively valid1 
though not objective in the sense that  
it exists outside the minds of men1 but 
in the sense that it is a compromise    
between wills1 in which each mind       
surrenders merely personal whims for a  
common agreement4  ,since there seems a 
discrepancy between my own good and the 
good of others1 how do ,i make the good 
of others my object1 going beyond myself
 in the range of my interest8 ,and how  
is self-sacrifice possible8 ,the answer 
to the first question is that morality  
reconciles the likes and dislikes of    
individuals1 so that self-love and love 
of others describe the moral relation   
from opposite ends2 every act of respect
 for others is an act of                
self-furtherance4  ,we are entitled to  
assume1 as not needing proof1 that the  
instincts of altruism are as fundamental

 and original as those of self-love4    
,but if we use stricter reasoning1 we   
can see how1 in either case1 we identify
 ourselves with others4 ,altruism is    
merely a form of conduct in which the   
egoistic element1 though present1       
retires into the background2 while in   
all right egoism1 we aim at the good of 
others as well as our own good1 though  
our own good appears as the more        
prominent feature in the act of willing4
 ,we must not be understood as willing1 
in altruism1 another's good in any      
mystical sense1 in the sense of any     
identification of self with others2 we  
will the good of others in quite a      
different sense from that in which we   
will our own good1 the idea of their    
good being a representation in our mind 
from the analogy of our own experience2 
and the good attained by each party to  
the transaction is different and        
incommunicable4 ,neither must egoism or 
altruism be interpreted in the sense    
that1 in either1 reflection on the end  

as distinctively the good of self or of 
others is involved2 the moral agent in  
general throws his energies into this or
 that course of action1 because it is   
felt to be what is wanted1 without      
further reflectiveness4  ,human beings1 
as plastic shapes1 moulded by contact1  
adjust themselves to each other1 and    
thus it comes about that certain        
personal claims are waived4             
,self-sacrifice is a real fact1 a fact  
attested by the existence of the bad1 to
 whom such sacrifice involves a loss of 
happiness and is impossible4 ,it means  
the abandonment of a real good which the
 individual would seize under other     
circumstances4 ,it is sometimes         
contended that real self-sacrifice is   
impossible1 either 7#a7 because the     
sacrifice is really pleasanter to the   
agent1 or 7#b7 because he is compensated
 for his loss4 ,but the evident fact    
that self-sacrifice is pleasanter to the
 agent does not involve the seeking of  
his own pleasure by the agent1 and even 

if it be admitted that there is always  
the forecast of compensation in the mind
 of the agent1 yet part of the forecast 
is the picture of happiness foregone4   
,but here1 as before1 it may be said    
that the element of reflection1 the     
weighing of one's own and others'       
happiness against each other is read    
into the act by the onlooker1 and is not
 necessarily involved4 ,that his own    
self-sacrifice1 the compensation of his 
own consciousness of right-doing        
outweighs1 to the moral man1 the        
pleasure of lower aims1 does not mean   
that the individual is selfish in       
seeking self-sacrifice4 ,and1 in fact1  
that any ulterior aim of                
self-satisfaction beyond the act itself 
is sought1 in self-sacrifice1 by the    
moral man1 is false2 the greatest acts  
of heroism are characterized by complete
 absorption in the impersonal end       
sought1 the good of the agent thus not  
lying beyond1 but consisting in his     
action4 ,acts characterized by another  

spirit than this we do not term         
self-sacrifice4  ,as all conduct is a   
matter of will1 so morality is concerned
 not merely with the virtues1 the       
practical dealings of men1 but also with
 all that strengthens or weakens the    
will and1 in general1 conduces to       
character4 ,in judging a man1 the       
significance of his individual gifts1   
and the responsibility which attends the
 cultivation of these gifts must be     
recognized4 ,not special virtues alone  
must be considered1 but the whole man   
must be judged and the significance of  
his self-cultivation in this or that    
direction observed4 ,this does not mean 
that the exceptional faults of          
exceptional men are to be condoned4 ,on 
the contrary1 there is no reason to     
suppose that special gifts confer a     
special privilege rather than a special 
responsibility4 ,judged in the entirety 
of their character1 such men may not be 
worse than others1 and this fact should 
be regarded2 but we should not defend   

their sins as such4 ,the neglect of     
self-cultivation in one direction may be
 necessary to action in another         
direction2 but the moral criterion of   
such self-cultivation or action is to be
 found in morality as an equilibrium of 
powers4  ,perfection is not itself      
sufficient to define the end4 ,perfect  
is that which is the best possible2     
perfection as a perfect activity rather 
than a perfect state 7as we must        
conceive it7 is equivalent to the best  
possible conduct4 ,but the moral end can
 be understood as perfection only when  
by the best possible conduct is         
understood that which is the best       
possible under circumstances determined 
by morality itself4 ,the fullest        
development as demanded by morality is  
not necessarily the perfection of       
development in any particular case1 that
 is1 with regard to any particular gift 
or individual4 ,or1 in other words1     
perfection in both its absolute and its 
comparative meaning1 is a conception    

which belongs1 not to morality as such1 
but to the materials out of which       
morality is constituted4 ,take perfect  
as equivalent to best1 then perfection  
is equally involved in every good       
action4 ,the good is always the best2   
what is right is perfect2 morality      
discards degrees of comparison4 ,but the
 degree of perfection to which any power
 or individual is to be developed is    
determined1 morally1 by the principle of
 equilibrium4 ,moreover1 we may         
recognize degrees of perfection in      
individuals who are1 nevertheless1 not  
to be classified as of less or greater  
moral value4  ,there are two different  
conceptions of merit1 the one as applied
 to magnitude of actual achievement1 the
 other to magnitude of effort4 ,the     
apparent discrepancy vanishes on        
reflection1 since both conceptions apply
 to what passes beyond the average and  
measures the distance between the two4  
,against the hedonistic doctrine1 it has
 been urged by ,green that pleasure as  

such is not the end of action1 for even 
where the single pleasure is desired    
there is always the thought of a        
permanent self whose good is supposed to
 lie in the direction of this pleasure2 
while a sum of pleasures cannot1 as     
such1 be an object of desire1 since     
pleasures1 as separate and transitory in
 contradistinction from the permanent   
self1 cannot be added together in fact1 
but only in thought2 and with regard to 
a greatest sum of pleasures the         
difficulty is still greater1 since      
pleasures admit of indefinite increase1 
and their sum can never be the greatest 
possible4 ,in so far as desire is       
supposed to be for pleasures and nothing
 else1 the argument that a sum of       
pleasures cannot be desired must be     
admitted4 ,the transiency of the        
pleasures has1 however1 nothing to do   
with the question2 the reason why a sum 
of pleasures cannot form a single       
pleasure is that they are pleasures with
 a higher idea--that of a series        

involving a plan4 ,this does not prove  
that a sum of pleasures might not be the
 criterion of conduct4 ,it must be      
admitted that sum is an unfortunate     
word1 since it seems to imply that the  
pleasures must be combined in one total 
result2 but such an interpretation of   
the word is not necessary4 ,a series of 
pleasures is properly nothing more than 
an aggregate or combination of          
pleasures1 partly successive1 partly    
coexistent4 ,nor does the greatest      
possible happiness mean a happiness than
 which no greater is possible1 but the  
greatest possible under the given       
conditions4 ,the polemic is directed    
against the individualistic psychology1 
which regards mental states as a mere   
succession of events4 ,so far the       
arguments enforce a great principle2 a  
mere succession of feelings or          
sensations could never yield a          
conception of a sum apprehended as a    
sum4 ,but this is irrelevant4 ,for such 
an idea we require much more than       

sensation3 we require memory1           
perception1 the idea of a self4 ,but    
this is only saying that morality       
requires more than mere sensation1 and  
the argument assumes the standpoint it  
is fighting1 treating mental states as  
mere events4 ,it1 moreover1 introduces  
the idea of a permanent self as         
something superior to mere sensations1  
whereas perhaps this self is elaborated 
from sensational elements4 ,furthermore1
 if the proposition means that a mind   
which had only sensations could not have
 a sum of sensations1 this may be       
denied4 ,a sum is possible from three   
positions--that of the conception of a  
spectator1 that of a reflecting         
consciousness1 and that of a feeling    
consciousness which feels its states    
continuously1 though it may not feel    
them as continuous1 for such a feeling  
would argue comparison and reflection4  
,the polemic1 therefore1 while in so far
 right as it is directed against        
individualistic psychology1 seems to    

assign wrong reasons for a rejection of 
hedonism2 ,utilitarians1 while speaking 
of pleasures in the language of         
psychology1 treat them really as        
something more than mere events--treat  
them as we really combine them by       
processes much higher than sensation4 ,a
 refutation of hedonism must consist in 
showing that pleasures really differ in 
kind1 and cannot1 therefore1 be compared
 in intensity4 ,pleasure is often used  
as equivalent to a pleasant sensation2  
such pleasures differ in kind1 as in the
 case of gratified hunger1 ambition1 and
 the like1 and cannot be actually added1
 either in thought or in enjoyment1     
because incommensurable4 ,pleasure is   
often used1 also1 to refer1 not to the  
sensation itself1 but to its            
pleasantness1 and here the same thing is
 true2 if we distinguish the quality and
 the tone of feeling1 as usual in       
psychology1 the classification of tones 
as pleasurable and painful is           
insufficient4 ,the tones of colors and  

sounds1 for instance1 are more naturally
 represented by the mood of mind they   
suggest3 red has a warm tone1 black a   
sad1 gray a sober1 the organ a solemn   
tone4#hb ,the tone of some feelings is  
too indefinite for description1--a vague
 comfort or discomfort1--while the tone 
may rise to a condition to be described 
only by bliss or rapture4 ,pleasure and 
pain depend1 moreover1 not only on the  
quality and quantity of the feeling1 but
 on the whole condition of the mind1    
pleasure indicating agreement with the  
mind1 pain non-agreement4 ,every        
pleasure being a function of the        
sensation in which it is an element1 the
 supposed sum of pleasures must be made 
up of pleasures every one of which is   
qualified as that which is produced by a
 certain activity4 ,the sum of          
pleasures1 therefore1 re-introduces the 
distinctions and contents of the moral  
order1 and1 though an expression of the 
criterion of conduct1 is therefore1 like
 perfection1 not an independent         

criterion4 ,the element of quality in   
pleasure may be verified more easily as 
what may be called preferability4 ,the  
term preferability does not mean that   
there is an inherent moral value in     
every pleasure1 in virtue of which      
pleasures may be distinguished as higher
 or lower--obviously an erroneous view1 
for higher and lower is an antithesis   
established by morality itself2 the     
value depends on the kind of pleasure1  
and the preferability is that in the    
good man's mind4  ,it might be objected 
that even though pleasures differ in    
kind1 a comparison and summation of them
 might be possible1 just as comparison  
and summation of weights is possible1   
although weight depends not on bulk     
alone but also on specific gravity4 ,it 
cannot be denied that some numerical    
expression for qualities of pleasure may
 yet be found1 by which they may be     
compared4 ,but it is to be noted that1  
the higher we go in the scale of        
existence1 the more distinct becomes the

 growth of a principle of selection or  
distribution which the members of a     
combination must follow in order to     
produce a given quantitative result4 ,in
 chemistry we may obtain the atomic     
equivalent of sulphuric acid 7#ih7 in   
many ways1 but we can obtain the acid   
itself only by specific combinations in 
specific proportions4 ,in determining   
what food to give an animal1 we must    
consider not bulk alone but the         
nutritiousness of various sorts4 ,we    
might express the nutritiousness of     
various foods by numbers1 but the       
numerical equivalent would tell us      
nothing1 unless we knew the kinds of    
food to be combined4 ,and in the same   
way we might express the sum of         
pleasures as end numerically1 but until 
we know the kinds of activities and so  
of pleasures to be combined to this sum1
 the formula is useless to inform us as 
to the end or method of attaining it4   
,the popular conception of happiness    
avoids all the difficulties and         

perplexities caused by setting up       
pleasure as the end1 because in that    
conception pleasures and pains are never
 considered apart from conduct and      
character4 ,thus1 though the end        
involves pleasure1 the criterion is good
 conduct4 ,the good conduct necessarily 
involves pleasure1 for conduct which    
only outwardly conforms to the moral    
rule1 and in which the agent does not   
take pleasure1 is not really good4  ,the
 pleasure-formula thus represented as   
the standard of conduct is to be        
distinguished1 as actual ethical        
pleasure in the act1 from the pleasures 
attendant on the act as results1 and    
which may be termed pathological in a   
,kantian sense4 ,the ethical pleasure   
need not be unmixed1 for the act which  
satisfies one part of a man's nature    
does not necessarily satisfy all the    
other parts4 ,but the ethical pleasure  
must be present as the total reaction of
 character considered apart from the    
incidentals of result4  ,pleasures and  

pains may be divided into two classes1  
active and passive2 active pleasures    
being those attendant on an act1 as     
gratification of an impulse1 passive    
pleasures those which come to us as     
enjoyments1 not as the gratification of 
the impulse producing an act1 though    
perhaps resulting from our act4 ,active 
pains are those of want1 passive those  
of suffering4 ,the pleasures            
accompanying an act as pleasures of     
attainment are always pleasures of      
gratification1 but not of gratification 
merely1 for they gratify a sentiment    
directed towards an object previously   
present to the mind in idea2 and it is  
because the volition realizes the idea  
that the pleasures are called pleasures 
of attainment1 and in this fact lies    
also their ethical value4 ,the ethical  
pleasure in the action itself is not to 
be confused with the mere pleasure in   
the explicit consciousness of           
right-doing1 which argues special       
reflectiveness4 ,the ethical pleasure   

meant is identical with the feeling of  
approbation1 not as a reflection on the 
act as idea1 but as present in the act  
itself4 ,but the ethical pleasures are  
not independent of the incidental       
pleasures1 but depend upon them1 the    
latter themselves being considered in   
determining what acts are to be         
performed4  ,the pleasure-formula of the
 end represents the end in terms of all 
the ethical pleasures secured by good   
action2 and now we can see how morality 
can be expressed in terms of all the    
pleasures and pains involved in action1 
the purely ethical pleasures being      
reckoned among the rest4 ,every pleasure
 is an inducement to persistence1 every 
pain an inducement to change2 hence1    
since the society of good persons1 or   
the kingdom of powers within a man's own
 mind acquiesce in the moral order as   
the equilibrium in which all their      
claims are gratified as far as may be1  
it follows that the order of good       
conduct represents the maximum of       

happiness4 ,the end thus involves the   
greatest happiness of the greatest      
number4  ,if pleasure is but a part of  
the standard of morality1 is it1 then1  
the object of conduct8 ,if the idea     
before the mind to be realized in action
 is called the object of the action1    
then in the same sense the pleasure     
connected with the idea1 which must be  
pleasant1 is the object of conduct4 ,the
 difficulty in agreeing that the        
pleasure of the idea is part of the     
object of desire arises from two causes3
 7#a7 confusion of the object of desire 
with the character or criterion of the  
object2 7#b7 a misunderstanding of how  
the ideal object is related to the      
result4 ,as to the latter cause1 it may 
be said that the idea is only in this   
sense an idea of the result1 that the   
result is the idea as it is realized2   
the elements of the idea are derived    
from the past1 and the desire is not for
 the prospective pleasure of the end4   
,as to the first cause1 though it is    

false that the prospective pleasure must
 necessarily be part of the idea1 the   
opposite conclusion is not necessarily  
legitimate that desire is not for       
pleasure at all4 ,it is true that1 in   
order to distinguish one object from    
another1 we need to know what kind of an
 object it is2 but to conclude that1    
therefore1 the desire is not for        
pleasure1 is to confuse the actual idea 
before the mind in desire with its      
quality4 ,that we do not make pleasure  
an object in the sense that the         
pleasantness of the object itself is    
what we have before us in desire1 is    
obvious4 ,such a desire would argue a   
reflectiveness which has been shown not 
to be necessarily characteristic of     
action4 ,nor is it the pleasure of an   
act which is the cause of the desire1   
even if we suppose this not in the sense
 that reflection apprehends it as cause4
 ,to suppose this is to confuse the     
cause with its sign4 ,the pleasure is a 
function of the quality of the object4  

,the element of reflectiveness may enter
 into a consideration of the object1 and
 the prospective pleasure thus become an
 element of the object of desire4 ,but  
it is only a part2 the pleasure alone   
cannot be the object of desire4 ,the    
pleasure which is thus a part of the    
object is not a future pleasure1 but    
that which is actually present in our   
minds1 belonging to the ideal object as 
part of it--the represented pleasure of 
attainment4 ,to call the pleasure       
desired the prospective pleasure is to  
confound the reflection of the spectator
 with the actual fact in the mind of the
 agent to an act4 ,the pleasure is1     
moreover1 not pleasure in general1 but  
the pleasure of the agent2 but this is  
not stating that the act is necessarily 
selfish4  ,since every object of desire 
and will includes pleasure1 the         
so-called paradox of hedonism--that     
pleasure is lost by seeking after       
it--cannot be explained by holding that 
pleasure is not itself the object of    

desire1 and that consequently pleasure  
is never1 in enjoyment1 what it is in   
idea4 ,this last is true1 for no idea is
 in reality what it is as idea4 ,but the
 explanation lies rather in pointing out
 how foolish it is to seek for what is a
 sign or effect rather than for its     
cause4  ,in the good man1 the pleasure  
of attainment is the ethical sense of   
approbation1 and this is also goodness4 
,it may1 however1 be asserted that it is
 not this ethical pleasure1 this        
goodness as such1 that is desired by the
 good man2 again1 it is only in         
exceptional cases of reflectiveness that
 goodness or the right action as such is
 distinctively desired2 and herein lies 
,kant's mistake in asserting that a     
moral act must be done from a sense of  
duty4  ,active pains1 as wants1 are what
 prompt to action1 and are1 so1 the     
conditions of conduct4 ,though in       
themselves evil1 as pain1 they cannot be
 considered by themselves apart from the
 action to which they lead4 ,as for     

passive pains1 in so far as they are the
 result of evil action on the part of   
others1 they ought not to have occurred1
 and we try to prevent their repetition 
by punishment4 ,those sufferings        
incidental to right conduct are to be   
borne1 in so far as they are inevitable1
 as a necessary evil in that which1     
considered as a whole1 is good4 ,as soon
 as they cease to be inevitable1 they   
are to be removed4 ,we do not imagine1  
however1 that pain may ever be wholly   
removed4 ,but the statement that pain is
 inevitable to right conduct is not to  
be interpreted as an assertion that it  
is for the sake of goodness1 as a       
discipline1--a metaphysical conception  
depending on the idea of a divine       
purpose4  ,morality is thus a kind of   
optimism1 not ignoring the reality of   
pains in right conduct1 but treating    
them as part of the given conditions    
which it has to turn to the best        
account1 by the creation of a conduct   
and character involving ethical         

pleasures4 ,pessimistic theories do not 
ignore this optimism of morality2 but in
 such theories the fact of pain is      
emphasized and dwelt upon1 and morality 
is regarded only as a means of lessening
 pain1 or1 as in the case of ,von       
,hartmann1 finally getting rid of it    
altogether by a universal suicide4 ,it  
is impossible to determine whether      
existence represents an excess of pain  
or of pleasure1 since the answer to the 
problem is a matter of individual       
temperament2 and1 moreover1 pleasures   
and pains cannot be 7as yet7 merely     
quantitatively compared4 ,another error 
of pessimism consists in comparing      
pleasures and pains in detail and       
supposing the result to hold good in the
 general sum2 but even in cases where   
pleasures are greatly outweighed by     
pains1 the pains may sink in value      
considered in connection with the rest  
of life4 ,the desirability of           
non-existence could be maintained only  
as a race should be developed desiring  

it2 but the whole course of history is  
in the opposite direction4  ,the        
question1 ,is life worth living8        
involves two3 7#a7 ,is it actually      
preferable to the creature who lives it8
 7#b7 ,can any life be said to have a   
real value2 is any life subjectively1 is
 any objectively1 preferable8 ,the      
answer to the first question is the fact
 of life1 for the mysterious instinct of
 self-preservation called in to account 
for the continuance of existence is one 
of the elements to be considered in the 
problem1 cannot be excluded4 ,it is true
 that only certain kinds of life are    
preferable1 but the very meaning of the 
principle of selection is the securing  
of the life that is worth living4       
,having arrived at this answer1 we can  
no longer compare existence and         
non-existence in respect to             
preferability1 and the second problem   
presents itself to us as the question as
 to what existence is of value4 ,the    
answer is the moral life1 goodness1 as  

including all the activities of         
character4  ,the moral end has sometimes
 been defined as social vitality4       
,vitality is1 in strictness1 the energy 
to live1 and has two aspects4 ,it is    
7#a7 the force which keeps a creature   
alive1 or 7#b7 the force which keeps it 
well4 ,as implying the keeping up of    
vital functions1 the notion of continued
 existence represents the end1 but      
represents it in its lowest aspect1 its 
least and poorest significance1 and is  
an insufficient description2 for not    
existence can be the end1 but existence 
of a certain sort4 ,existence1 in fact1 
is an abstraction to which nothing      
corresponds in experience3 nothing      
exists except upon certain terms4 ,given
 the type1 the end of the creature is to
 continue the existence of that type2   
but continuance of existence is nothing 
more nor less than the performance of   
those functions which constitute the    
type of life in question3 it is not     
separated from those functions as       

something which they subserve4 ,if the  
functions in man or animal are said to  
be determined by the need of maintaining
 his existence1 it may be answered that 
his existence is these functions4 ,in   
this sense of continued existence as the
 repetition of vital functions in their 
order1 it is true1 but only secondarily 
true1 that the end is to preserve life4 
,but the doctrine of evolution implies  
much more than such preservation4 ,it   
means the victorious continuance of     
life4 ,but because a type is victorious1
 we cannot infer that the end of the    
type is to maintain its victorious      
existence in the sense of aiming at     
victory4 ,to do this is to read into the
 end a theory of how the type came into 
existence4 ,the end of a type is to act 
according to the type2 the victory over 
rivals affords the opportunity of this4 
,the preservation of existence is a     
condition of the end1 not the end       
itself2 to regard it as such is to      
confuse cause with effect4  ,vitality as

 health1 on the other hand1 implies the 
equilibrium which constitutes good      
conduct good4 ,it must1 however1 be     
observed that health is not a further   
specification or a limitation of        
continued life1 but is coextensive with 
it4  ,but health1 as applied to morals1 
is a metaphorical term4 ,morality does  
not consist in mere physical vitality2  
on the contrary1 some sacrifice of such 
vitality may be necessary1 the perfect  
physical vitality may be inconsistent   
with the development of higher and finer
 mental functions4 ,with this proviso1  
vitality as health is simply another    
name for the character of good conduct  
which wins it the title of good4  ,there
 is often a distinction made between    
virtue and duty1 the former word seeming
 to include the latter and go beyond it4
 ,however1 it is not only virtuous to do
 one's duty1 but it is also the duty of 
the individual to do his best4 ,in fact1
 the two1 virtue and duty1 are          
coextensive1 the term virtue describing 

conduct by the quality of the agent's   
mind1 the term duty by the nature of the
 act performed4 ,nevertheless1 there are
 actions to which it is more natural to 
apply the term virtue1 duty being       
colored by legal implications4 ,in the  
legal sense1 duty fixes1 not the highest
 line of conduct1 but the lowest limit1 
beneath which conduct must not fall4    
,virtue1 as contrasted with duty in the 
legal sense1 seems to be coextensive    
with merit4 ,negative merit1 however1   
where a man is good in spite of some    
great disadvantage1 does not make an act
 virtuous in distinction from dutiful   
conduct4 ,it is the duty of a man with a
 passion for drink to repress it2 but we
 do not term his performance virtuous1  
though it may be meritorious4 ,merit1   
that is1 implies a scale within the     
range of good acts themselves4 ,virtue  
and duty coincide1 however1 only so long
 as the moral value of actions are      
considered4 ,for we distinguish two     
different classes of virtues1 or two    

senses of the word virtue1 corresponding
 to the distinction of ethical and      
pathological1 the pathological virtues  
being certain gifts of emotion or       
sentiment1 which are sometimes thought  
to make action more virtuous1 but do not
 alter its real character4 ,thus1 for   
example1 the virtue of benevolence may  
be thought imperfect without kindly     
feeling1 though a man may be benevolent 
without any such spontaneous movement4  
,chastity1 again1 may in some natures be
 accompanied by1 and flow from1 a       
delicacy of feeling which makes all     
unlawful suggestions impossible4 ,now1  
if these emotions were necessary to     
their respective virtues1 we should have
 to admit that duty was less than       
virtue4 ,but we must maintain that they 
are excellences which do not alter the  
moral character of conduct1 and may be  
absent altogether and leave the agent as
 virtuous as if they were present4 ,some
 persons1 indeed1 would say that there  
was less virtue in characters which     

possessed these emotional endowments4444
 ,in themselves1 they are not virtues in
 the ethical sense1 but only 'add a     
lustre' to habits of will4 ,they may    
even be ineffectual1 as often happens   
with very good-natured persons1 or they 
may be positively bad4 ,courage1 for    
instance1 we admire even in a villain4  
,we may conclude1 then1 that these      
excellences of disposition are only     
valuable in so far as they are helps to 
virtue1 and we praise the brave villain 
on account of a quality which is of the 
utmost importance for actual goodness4  
,they enter into our ideal of the       
perfect or complete character1 though1  
if we estimate our ideal of perfection1 
we shall find1 ,i think1 that we attach 
less value to them when they are native 
than when they have been produced by a  
constant discipline4  ,it might seem1   
then1 that we could classify duties     
under virtues4 ,to a considerable extent
 such a classification is possible4 ,but
 it must be imperfect1 because there are

 duties--for example1 filial duty1 or   
the duty of casting one's vote in a     
political contest--which do not         
correspond to any general head of       
virtue1 or may be ranked under several  
heads3 and again1 we may rank along with
 virtues which stand for duties         
qualities of conduct which do not       
correspond to duties in the same sense2 
as1 for instance1 in a list of heads of 
duties1 wisdom and self-control4 ,the   
enumeration mixes up two                
classifications1 in the one of which we 
group observances together under certain
 heads1 in the other of which we        
enumerate certain elements of good      
action in general1 certain aspects which
 every good action presents1 and we     
exhibit them as qualities in the agent's
 mind4 ,the two classifications are     
combined in the ancient description of  
morality under the heads of wisdom1     
courage1 temperance1 and justice4 ,the  
better classification is by moral       
institutions1 where the moral life is   

already mapped out for us into its      
different parts4 ,such a scheme of      
classification will consider 7a7 the    
,individual1 7b7 the ,family1 7c7 the   
,society1 7d7 the ,state2 the fourth    
division including international duties1
 the third not being necessarily limited
 to a particular society1 but extending 
to all mankind4   ,,dynamical           
,,analysis--,,moral ,,growth ,,and      
,,progress  ,the previous description of
 morality supposes it to be stationary1 
and is like a section taken across the  
path of morality at any one time4 ,it   
gives us no idea of the process and     
progress of morality4 ,we have yet to   
show how the moral order is produced1   
and to examine the meaning and the law  
of moral progress4  ,as the moral       
organism may be compared to a species of
 which the various moral individuals are
 the members1 so the moral ideal may be 
regarded as a species of which the      
various ideals in the minds of good men 
are the different individuals4 ,we      

should thus expect to find the origin   
and growth of morality analogous to or1 
more strictly speaking1 identical with1 
the growth of natural species4  ,if an  
ultimate ideal were admissible1 it would
 be impossible to assert that morality  
is essentially progressive4 ,morality1  
in the sense of an equilibrium1 has at  
every stage a certain finality1 in the  
sense that it is1 for that stage1 the   
ideal adjustment4 ,but we cannot        
conceive of any ideal as final in the   
sense of stationary4 ,the good is always
 ultimate but always in motion4 ,moral  
progress admits of only two degrees of  
comparison1 the superlative being       
identical with the positive4 ,by best we
 do not imply a greater rightness in the
 ultimate condition1 but only a highest 
development4 ,spencer's conception of   
the distinction between ,absolute and   
,relative ,ethics involves the          
conception of an ultimate ideal         
congruity1 or complete adaptation of man
 to his conditions1 a mobile equilibrium

 including perfection as well as        
goodness1 present choice being never    
between wrong and an absolute right1 but
 always between two wrongs1 the lesser  
of which is to have the preference4 ,the
 picture is1 in itself1 perfectly       
legitimate2 and in so far as ,spencer   
conceives that the only ideal is the    
absolutely right conduct1 his conception
 is not only legitimate1 but true4      
,there is always1 however1 an absolute  
right that may be chosen2 and using the 
conception of a mobile equilibrium1 we  
found it to be1 not a goal of progress1 
but the meaning of goodness at any time4
 ,the distinction of good and bad 7right
 and wrong7 arises within the limited   
range of conditions that are to be met  
by good action4 ,that1 as ,sidgwick     
asserts1 there is always some course of 
conduct which is right1 the moral       
consciousness declares with certainty1  
and is thus against the relativity of   
morality4 ,mr4 ,spencer holds that any  
concomitant of pain makes an action     

wrong1 therefore it is natural for him  
to regard all present morality as only  
relative4 ,but to the good man the      
pleasure of doing right exceeds the     
possible attendant pains of an action2  
and except upon the understanding that1 
in a society of good men1 every one will
 adjust himself with equanimity to the  
needs of others1 not even the acts which
 are declared to be typical of          
absolutely right conduct can be free    
from concomitant pain4 ,will the ideal  
state exhibit no competitions1 such as  
rivalry in love1 which can be ended     
indeed with the contentment of all      
persons1 but assuredly not without      
attendant pain8  ,the general error in  
theory on this subject lies in a        
misconception of the idea of adjustment 
to environment1 the fact not being noted
 that the environment is not itself     
fixed and permanent4 ,what the          
environment is depends upon the nature  
and faculties of the individual1 the    
same environment being a different one  

for amoeba and human being1 for the     
blind man and the man possessing sight2 
and what environment is and what the    
individual does are settled at one and  
the same time1 the process of selection 
being one from both sides1 and the      
variation of both4 ,the adaptation      
wherever it exists and so far as it     
exists is1 hence1 perfect adaptation2 if
 the lower organism is adapted to its   
environment1 its adaptation is as       
perfect as that of the higher organism  
to its environment4  ,every successful  
life means adaptation4 ,every animal    
which can maintain its life is in       
adaptation to its environment4 ,the bare
 formula of adaptation means nothing    
more than the fact of existence4        
,adaptation to the conditions as such   
teaches us nothing as to the nature of  
the organism2 for all functions are     
reactions upon the conditions1 and      
therefore1 so far1 adaptations4 ,but it 
points to something behind4 ,it means   
that all the functions of the animal are

 adapted to the conditions1 and this    
means that its functions are adapted or 
adjusted to one another under the       
conditions4  ,the moral ideal consists  
in a certain equilibrium established on 
the basis of certain conditions--wants  
and sentiments in moral agents4 ,it     
involves advance just for this reason1  
because the act of adjustment implied in
 good conduct itself alters the         
sentiments of the agent1 and creates new
 needs demanding a new satisfaction4    
,the change is not always in the same   
direction1 however2 for cultivation in  
one direction may cause the individual  
to become aware of capacities or wants  
in quite another direction1 or the      
advocacy of one side of a question1     
persevered in1 may so open up the other 
side as to end in complete change of    
view4 ,in any case1 however1 there is an
 enlargement of experience1 and the old 
facts are themselves changed by it as   
well as are the individuals subject to  
it4  ,this change or adjustment leads to

 a maladjustment requiring a new        
adjustment4 ,this maladjustment is to be
 distinguished from the reaerrangements 
which are contemplated by the statical  
ideal and due to the mere rotation of   
wants in society2 the latter are within 
the moral system as a system of mobile  
equilibrium4 ,the maladjustment is of   
another sort4 ,the good act ceases to be
 good by its performance4 ,the moral    
ideal ceases to satisfy4 ,the two forms 
of change may be compared respectively  
to a shifting of position on the same   
locus1 and to such a shifting of        
position as involves a shifting of      
locus4 ,thus1 by change after change of 
this sort1 a new variety replaces its   
parent1 and this variety in time        
producing a fresh variety1 there is     
finally reached a new species4 ,progress
 thus becomes a necessary fact1 and the 
difference of so-called stationary      
societies from progressive ones can lie 
only in the comparative slowness of     
change4  ,as there is a difference      

between different societies in rate of  
change1 so there is a similar difference
 as between different parts of conduct4 
,law1 a part of morality1 lags behind in
 moral progress4 ,however1 there is     
nevertheless always advancement1        
otherwise legislators would be          
unnecessary4 ,and the direct outward    
change of form is preceded by other     
change1 laws which fall into disfavor by
 means of moral progress being modified1
 in application1 within the possible    
limits of interpretation1 and less and  
less rigidly enforced4 ,there is good   
reason why law should have a certain    
permanence4  ,the moral standard appears
 to have a similar more or less fixed   
character1 while morality itself is in  
continuous change4 ,there are two       
reasons for this appearance3 7#a7 the   
changes in the moral order are          
infinitesimal and not perceived by us   
except as accumulated through some      
period of time2 and1 moreover1 what is  
commonly called the moral standard is   

only a kind of generalization from the  
extremely various opinions of different 
persons as to what is right1 and differs
 from the real standard which registers 
the conduct constituting equilibrium1   
and is possessed by the good man4       
,perfectly good men are impossible4 ,the
 standard current is therefore nothing  
more than a common understanding1 which 
every one1 even every good man1         
expresses differently2 it is no more an 
exact expression of the truth than is1  
let us say1 a great scientific          
conception 7like development7 which     
regulates all knowledge1 but is amongst 
the educated little more than the name  
of a general way of thinking1 while the 
thing itself is becoming1 at the hands  
of men of science1 modified or even     
transformed4 7#b7 ,the mistake is often 
made of describing morality1 not by     
institutions1 but in terms of virtues1  
and while the name applied to different 
virtues remains the same1 their content 
changes from age to age4  ,this idea of 

variability affects the statical        
conception of order with regard to      
habit--the moral requirement being that 
the fixed habits of morality should not 
be so fixed as to be incapable of       
advancement2 and with regard to         
conscience1 of which it might be said   
that1 instead of representing the moral 
order1 it was more occupied in changing 
than in maintaining it1 but which in    
reality thus represents the moral order1
 to which the ideal is a changing one4  
,two difficulties or objections may     
arise with regard to this idea of a     
changing ideal4 ,the progress has been  
represented by personifying the ideal   
and supposing the person to change with 
each new ideal4 ,again1 goodness        
consists1 we saw1 of a system of conduct
 in the individual himself or in        
society1 and this system forms a series 
in time4 ,it would seem to follow that1 
if goodness is always progressive1 no   
second act would be performed under the 
same law1 although the very idea of the 

law means a series of acts4 ,but we are 
not to suppose that1 if fifty good men  
in a society act rightly1 fifty new     
ideals are established1 for the ideal   
represents the equilibrium of the       
members of the society1 and it depends  
on whether the new ideals of the fifty  
men represent the new equilibrium       
whether we shall call the persons good  
or bad4 ,again1 the ideal at any moment 
would be in fact realized in a series1  
supposing the conditions did not alter  
meanwhile2 and while the system of      
conduct is serial1 it is realized at any
 one moment in the mind of the man whose
 sentiments correspond to its           
requirements4  ,in this process we see  
exhibited the interplay of the element  
of goodness or rightness with that of   
perfection4 ,in all actual goodness1 we 
have perfection attained as well2 but in
 the statical notion of goodness        
perfection is subordinate--only that    
exercise is perfect which is legitimate4
 ,but in the notion of progressive      

goodness1 perfection regains its rights4
 ,for goodness1 having secured          
perfection1 creates new materials which 
destroy the old equilibrium and call for
 a new one4 ,goodness determines        
perfection1 but change in perfection    
determines1 therefore1 changes in       
goodness4 ,morality is the creation of a
 better2 this better is change from a   
lower to a higher development1 not the  
growth of a greater rightness4 ,all good
 conduct is absolutely good1 and the    
good man of former days was as good as  
the good man of to-day1 although he     
performed acts not allowable by the     
higher moral standard attained as       
highest development4 ,accordingly1 there
 is no such thing as an absolute        
morality1 in comparison with which other
 conduct is variable and relative4 ,the 
relativity of good conduct1 instead of  
being a reproach1 is in reality its     
highest praise1 for it implies that the 
conduct takes account of exactly those  
conditions to which it is meant to      

apply4 ,this conception of morality as  
absolute runs into that of morality as  
an eternal and identical law3 eternal1  
for the morality of given conditions    
remains eternally true for those        
conditions2 identical1 for although it  
cannot be called identical in the sense 
that virtues do not change with         
institutions1 it is identical in        
form1--as an equilibrium of social      
forces in an order of conduct4 ,the more
 important conception of the moral law  
is its unity in which1 as the stages of 
one continuous law1 its identity        
consists4 ,progress is not mere         
destruction of the lower1 but           
fulfilment4  ,in considering how        
morality arises1 it would be erroneous  
to suppose that it comes into existence 
by an actual compromise4 ,it arises     
through a process of continuous change1 
parts of which may be an insensible     
growth1 parts the self-conscious        
adoption of a proposed new scheme4 ,in  
the latter case1 a slight reform may be 

adopted with but little opposition from 
members of the society other than the   
proposer1 as meeting a recognized1      
common want2 or1 in the case of a more  
extended reform1 the idea as first      
proposed may be long contended against1 
and only finally adopted after much     
alteration by reason of contact with    
such opposition4 ,in its acceptance     
innumerable forces are combined1        
innumerable different motives determine 
its acceptation by different persons4   
,whatever the motive1 however1 the      
conduct of the person accepting it      
alters in accordance with its           
acceptation4  ,the chief importance of  
pleasure and pain lies in the part they 
take in such choice4 ,they are the tests
 of the act being suitable or the       
reverse to the character 7in the widest 
sense7 of the agent4 ,if a reform does  
not suit the character1 it will cause   
pain and urge to removal of the pain by 
resistance2 and on the other hand1 when 
the reform is accepted1 it must be that 

it gives pleasure to the persons        
concerned4 ,but in saying this we have  
to remember the distinction between     
ethical 7or effective7 and pathological 
7or incidental7 pleasures and pains4    
,the total reaction of character on a   
stimulus may be pleasurable1 but this   
pleasure results from a mixture of      
pleasures and pains weighed against one 
another4 ,this balancing of pleasures   
and pains is not reflective1 but takes  
place by a kind of intuitive act in     
which only subsequent reflection may be 
able to distinguish the elements4 ,the  
pleasure or pain involved in acceptance 
or rejection is not the ground of       
acceptance or rejection4 ,the cause of  
the acceptance or rejection is the      
nature of the reform itself1 its        
congruity or incongruity with the       
natures of the persons accepting or     
rejecting it4 ,when the new ideal is    
definitely established1 those who do not
 obey it are bad1 those who do are good4
 ,those who were good under the old may 

thus be bad under the new ideal1 and    
vice versa4  ,the gradual reform through
 the choice of individuals who act upon 
their feelings without knowing the whole
 aim or bearing of their conduct is     
similar to that where a definite reform 
is the end in view4 ,it is a gradual    
adjustment of wills under new conditions
 and represents the position of         
equilibrium which would be completely   
realized if all the society were good4  
,the new ideal is not to be defined as  
merely the will of the majority1 the    
possession of a majority being nothing  
but the fact of its prevalence4 ,the    
ground of prevalence is that it         
represents the equilibrium4 ,there is no
 virtue in mere preponderance2 it is not
 that reforms follow the majority1 but  
that a majority is attracted by a       
suitable reform4  ,a new ideal arises by
 a struggle of varieties analogous to   
that in the organic world1--the word    
struggle being metaphorical in both     
cases1 since actual conflict is not     

necessary to either4 ,the distinction of
 good and bad corresponds to the        
domination of one variety444 which has  
come to prevail in virtue of its being a
 social equilibrium1 and thus           
representing suitability to all the     
conditions of life4 ,evil is simply that
 which has been rejected and defeated in
 the struggle with the good4  ,the      
reformer1 as not representing the       
predominating ideal and so the social   
equilibrium1 and the man who turns out  
to be bad by the new ideal1 thus stand  
originally upon the same level4 ,each is
 an instance of a variety of the        
original species1 but the former is the 
successful variety2 his ideal represents
 the real forces of society and can be  
adopted by the whole4 ,the struggle is  
one of character and conduct1 and       
results not necessarily in the          
extinction of life1 but in the          
extinction of unsuitable ideals4  ,the  
distinction of the formally bad from the
 materially good rests upon the         

transition from the old ideal to the    
new1 though sometimes we use those terms
 as describing what is only legally     
wrong though morally approved4 ,a       
reformer1 until his reform is           
established1 is formally wrong4 ,he can 
be considered materially right only     
prospectively2444 time only can prove   
whether he had really forecast the      
movement of his society4 ,sometimes a   
society may be so divided1 as in our    
civil war1 that neither variety is      
predominant4 ,in such a case we must    
say1 not that there was no rule of      
right1 but that there was a different   
rule for each of the two halves of the  
nation4 ,there does not arise any need  
for the distinction of formally and     
materially right conduct1 until the     
limits have been overstepped1 within    
which it is in any age considered right 
for a man to act upon his own           
conviction4 ,these limits are placed    
very differently in different ages4     
,does good action1 then1 depend on the  

bad man as well as on the good8 ,good   
and evil arise together1 and good is    
therefore always relative to evil1 but  
we do not therefore take our morality   
from the bad4 ,we cannot1 in fact1 know 
who is bad until the standard is        
created1 but once created1 we maintain  
it against bad men by punishment4 ,but1 
on the other hand1 the moral standard   
does depend upon the forces which1 when 
allowed free play1 are distinguished as 
bad4444 ,a large part of conduct        
consists of precautions which it is not 
only legitimate but incumbent to take1  
but which we should dispense with under 
happier conditions4444 ,and in a second 
way1 morality depends on 'badness1' for 
when a habit of action which we dislike 
and call bad comes to be strong enough  
to make itself felt1 we seek to satisfy 
its claims as reasonable4 ,there is444  
no external standard by which we can    
settle once and for all what claims are 
legitimate and what are not4 ,we derive 
our conception of the reasonableness of 

things from our experience of their     
vitality and effective powers4 ,a wise  
man who thinks the feelings and beliefs 
of his neighbors ridiculous will1 by    
persuasion or force1 resist them with   
all his energies1 but when he finds them
 persist in spite of all his efforts1 he
 will recognize that there are more     
things in human nature than stir within 
the narrow limits of his own breast4 ,if
 what we now call bad conduct1 murder1  
adultery1 theft1 could be conceived to  
become predominant under greatly changed
 and of course impossible conditions1 it
 would cease to be bad and would be the 
ideal of life4  ,from the view that     
morality depends upon victory1          
misconceptions may arise4 ,the question 
may be asked3 ,should one1 in case of   
doubt1 follow one's own conviction1 or  
join the side it is thought will        
prevail8 ,but that good is created by   
predominance is a theory of the means by
 which ideals come into existence1 not a
 statement of the motive of those who   

participate in the struggle4 ,the       
struggle is between characters and their
 forces1 and not victory is the end1 but
 the assertion of certain principles4   
,interest or good in general is a       
different conception from the right or  
the morally good4 ,interest means what  
is good for an individual considered    
from his own point of view1 and without 
regard to similar claims of other       
individuals4 ,it is the maximum of      
happiness or satisfaction which he can  
secure under his conditions4 ,by        
'maximum happiness' is meant that       
distribution of satisfactions or of the 
energies which produce them1 any        
deviation from which on either side     
implies a less fulness of life4 ,it     
refers1 however1 to his good as a       
social1 not as an isolated individual4  
,as a general rule1 interest is in      
agreement with goodness2 misdeeds are   
unprofitable4 ,but there are instances  
where goodness and interest do not      
coincide1 though not in the case of the 

good man4 ,that virtue and interest are 
in general identical means1 statically1 
that morality is a reconciliation of    
interests by which wants are satisfied1 
and is established by the creation of a 
new type of character1 which has wants  
of only certain kinds2 and1 dynamically1
 it represents the fact that forces are 
arrayed on the side of the good which   
are too powerful for the bad4 ,good is  
the victorious ideal2 and though we may 
say that it would really be to the bad  
man's interest to be bad1 if            
circumstances were such that his variety
 could maintain itself1 we may add that 
such hypothetical interests cannot be   
secured4 ,however1 interest does not    
coincide with morality--  7#a7 ,where   
the individual does not care for        
punishments and social censures4 7#b7   
,where a man1 by reason of certain      
superiorities of force over others with 
whom he is more directly in contact1 is 
able to obtain power and suppress their 
resistance1 or where the moral weakness 

of others leaves him unpunished4 ,in    
these exceptional cases1 we have the    
contradictory phenomenon that an ideal  
which can maintain its existence is yet 
declared to be bad4 ,such cases mark a  
stage of transition in the process by   
which the distinction of good or bad is 
established4 ,in the struggle of animal 
species1 the same phenomenon may be     
found2 an exceptional individual of a   
vanishing variety maintains his         
existence for a time by reason of his   
exceptional endowment or of coming in   
contact merely with the weaker members  
of the successful variety4  ,there are  
two ways in which the moral ideal is    
maintained1--by education and by        
punishment4 ,punishment is the          
condemnation of wrong-doing by censure  
or by legal penalties4 ,the unpleasant  
consequences of neglect of the          
self-regarding virtues are not          
punishment2 but the reaction of the good
 forces of society against wrong-doing  
is as natural as the unpleasant physical

 effects of imprudence4  ,if the        
question as to what moral sanction is   
means1 ',what reason is there why       
morality exists8' the answer lies not in
 enumerating the penalties of           
wrong-doing1 but in tracing the origin  
of morality as an equilibrium of the    
forces of society4444 ,but the question1
 ',why should ,i be moral8' means1 most 
naturally and usually1 ,what inducements
 are there to me to do right8 ,the      
answer is that motives differ for       
different individuals4 ,with some1 outer
 social inducements1 with others1 the   
approbation and disapprobation of       
conscience are stronger4 ,these latter  
ethical pains and pleasures which are   
felt at the idea of an action stand on a
 different footing from feelings having 
regard to external rewards and          
punishments and also the prospective    
pleasures and pains of conscience4 ,the 
man who does right because he shrinks   
from prospective pains of conscience is 
not a good man1 but intermediate morally

 between the bad man who seeks only to  
escape legal punishment and the good man
 whose pains of conscience felt at the  
idea of a wrong act prevent his         
performing it4  ,punishment wears       
different shapes according to the point 
of view from which it is regarded1 but1 
in the distinctively moral view1 is     
reformatory4 ,all punishment is         
retribution1 but not in the sense that  
it is personal vengeance4 ,the value of 
this idea of retribution lies in the    
fact that it places punishment on a line
 with the process of self-assertion by  
which species maintain their life2 it is
 a part of the reaction of the organism 
against anything which impedes its      
vitality4 ,if1 however1 punishment      
avenges the evil deed1 it is a confusion
 to say that it is for the sake of      
vengeance4 ,the purpose in the mind of  
those punishing is not necessarily      
vengeance1 and the idea of mere         
retribution is repugnant to the good    
man4 ,from the juridic point of view1   

the object of punishment is prevention2 
from the moral point of view1           
reformation4 ,the reformation seeks to  
destroy a bad ideal1 and does not       
necessarily destroy the individual in   
whom it is found2 but in some cases the 
wrong-doer's mind is so perverted that  
only death1 it is judged1 will suffice4 
,here1 too1 paradoxical as it may seem1 
though perhaps the chief object of our  
punishment is the indirect one of       
bettering others1 we punish with death  
in order to make him a good man and to  
bring him within the ideal of           
society4444 ,the penalty of death is    
thought necessary to bring home to him  
the enormity of his guilt4  ,the object 
of punishment is not always achieved1   
but this matters not for its moral      
character1 which lies in its conscious  
object4 ,the idea of punishment as      
reconciling the criminal with society   
includes the aspect of retribution or   
expiation1 under which punishment may be
 viewed from without2 but it is only    

when the suffering is attended by       
reformation that it can be considered in
 a proper sense expiation or atonement4 
,responsibility differs from obligation 
by introduction of the element of       
punishment4 ,obligation is the necessity
 of good conduct which arises out of the
 relation of the act to the order of    
which it forms a part4 ,responsibility  
is the negative aspect of this relation4
 ,when ,i think of conduct as required  
of me1 ,i think of it as my duty2 when  
,i think of it as conduct which if ,i do
 not perform1 ,i shall be rightly       
punished1 ,i have the sense of          
responsibility4 ,the sense of           
responsibility is thus a knowledge of   
the requirements of the law1 and it is  
only as we have law-abiding instincts   
that we feel it2 and we feel it         
differently according as we think of the
 authority of the law as derived from   
its mere enactment or as founded upon   
the social good1 or as established in   
our own conscience and self-respect1    

which represent the social good4 ,as    
including recognition of certain conduct
 as right1 the sense of responsibility  
is more than the mere knowledge and fear
 of punishment4 ,it is only those who   
can appreciate that punishment will be  
deserved to whom the idea of            
responsibility applies4 ,there is1      
therefore1 no difference between the    
fact of responsibility and the sense of 
responsibility1 any more than there is  
between goodness and the feeling of     
approbation1 or duty and the sense of   
duty4 ,when we declare a bad man        
responsible1 we mean that the good man  
holds him to be justly punished4        
,responsibility depends1 then1 on two   
things1--that a man is capable of being 
influenced by what is right1 and that   
whatever he does is determined by his   
character4 ,this capacity depends on his
 being aware of the meaning of his acts1
 and so of their connection with other  
acts1 and contains thus an element not  
present in the relations of animals4    

,except for the authority of one or two 
great names1 there seems to be a general
 agreement that the will is determined  
by character4 ,if character means the   
principle of volition1 as it is regarded
 in our analyses1 the assertion is a    
truism4 ,it is no less true if character
 is defined as disposition2 all our     
dealings with our fellow-men reckon on  
their acting in accordance with their   
character4 ,the distinction made by     
,green that the mind acts from its own  
nature 7the motive and the whole process
 of willing being within the mind7 is no
 more and no less true of the action of 
other bodies4 ,the emergence of new     
sentiments in character might be urged  
as an argument for free will2 but this  
is of no more significance than the     
budding of trees in springtime4 ,the    
sense of freedom is the sense of choice 
between two motives2 but this merely    
depends upon the intellectual property  
that the object willed is present to    
consciousness1--in case of choice two   

objects being present to the mind4 ,so  
far is the consciousness of freedom from
 being a ground for assuming an         
arbitrary or undetermined power of      
volition that it is exactly what would  
be expected to accompany the process of 
determination when the object concerned 
was a conscious mind4 ,pull a body to   
the right with a force of twelve pounds 
and to the left with a force of eight2  
it moves to the right4 ,imagine that    
body a mind aware of the forces which   
act upon it2 it will move in the        
direction of that which1 for whatever   
reason1 appeals to it most2 and in doing
 so it will1 just because it is         
conscious1 act of itself1 and will have 
the consciousness of freedom4 ,but which
 motive is chosen is fixed and dependent
 upon character1 that cannot choose     
otherwise than it does2 and the sense of
 freedom is a sheer delusion4 ,the      
feeling that one ought to have acted    
otherwise implies another sort of       
freedom1 according to which he only is  

truly free who chooses the right2 in    
such choice it is1 however1 the         
character which acts1 and though a man  
is free1 in this sense1 if he chooses1  
his choice is determined4 ,the argument 
of free will in regard to punishment    
does not explain punishment1 but renders
 it inexplicable4 ,it would be senseless
 to punish except as1 by so doing1 we   
can influence a man's character4        
,determinism does not make punishment   
wrong2 it is not cruelty1 but kindness  
to punish3 it saves a man from worse1   
from degradation of character1 enabling 
him to change his ideal1 and thus       
bringing himself into equilibrium with  
his kind4 ,the reason of certain doubts 
which are beginning to be felt to-day   
with regard to punishment is the larger 
knowledge of the dependence of men on   
their surroundings1 hence of the        
culpability of society as a whole2 it is
 not an objection to responsibility as  
such1 but to the distribution of        
responsibility4  ,education1 the second 

means by which the moral ideal is       
defended1 is not identical with social  
progress1 by which the moral ideal is   
itself changed1 but is the individual   
progress included within each definite  
moral ideal4 ,education and progress    
are1 however1 inseparably bound         
together1 in that education goes hand in
 hand with punishment1 and in that it   
leads to the discovery of new ideals4   
,if we take only the irregular line     
which includes the good1 and discard the
 ideals which are exterminated or left  
behind1 the movement of ideals is       
continuous with education1 and progress 
may therefore be described as an        
education of society4 ,the education of 
children has to put them in possession  
of the present moral achievement1 and to
 make them independent individuals1--so 
to penetrate them with the moral order  
that it shall appear in them as         
spontaneous character4 ,it is an        
evolving of an ideal already present2   
for1 to be capable of education1 a      

person must have already set foot on the
 right path4  ,as in the physical world1
 so in the moral1 we have the survival  
of many different genera and            
species1--various ideals of conduct or  
institutions of life1 some of which may 
be grouped together by strong           
resemblances1 others of which stand to  
each other in the relation of lower to  
higher organisms2 the survival of       
archaic institutions in the higher as   
well as their history of progress       
showing their affinities with the lower4
 ,history is the palaeontology of moral 
ideals1 and provides us with a better   
means of studying the growth of morality
 than exists for the study of the growth
 of species4 ,as in the organic world1  
varieties develop from species by a     
gradual and continuous movement of      
sentiment1 each successful variation    
forming the basis of a new variation1   
and the differences of the varieties    
from each other and from the original   
species increasing with their distance  

from the original species1 until the    
difference amounts to a difference of   
species4 ,we may call these             
modifications accidental1 but1 as in the
 physical world1 they are so only as we 
regard them from the position occupied  
by a person before the event2 they have 
their causes if we can find them4 ,these
 causes are to be found in the contact  
of different minds4 ,variability depends
 to a considerable extent on the size of
 a genus1 but only in so far as greater 
size involves greater complexity and    
variety of interests2 the vast but      
homogeneous societies of the ,east being
 less progressive than the smaller but  
more complex ones of the ,west4 ,where  
freer scope is left to individual       
inclinations or aptitudes1 there the    
friction of mind against mind is more   
intense4 ,new ideas are generated in the
 more vivid consciousness of the people1
 and life becomes more inventive4       
,species developed from a common genus  
will show some common traits and some   

rules of mutual observance1 savage      
peoples which have divided into tribes  
being an exception to the latter part of
 the statement1 for the reason that     
lower societies have very little moral  
cohesion2 they may be compared to lower 
organisms which reproduce themselves by 
fission1 or to homogeneous colonies of  
animals1 like sponges4 ,under the       
generic institutions we must not include
 those which arise merely as the result 
of similar circumstances4 ,ideals once  
formed advance at very different rates1 
though the tendency to divergence is    
always being corrected by the diffusion 
of ideas4 ,but where one nation takes   
ideas from another1 these ideas are not 
borrowed1 in the sense that they come   
wholly from the other nation2 there must
 have been1 in the borrowing nation1 a  
development of ideas up to the point    
that makes the borrowing possible1--a   
similar development to that of the      
nation from which the borrowing takes   
place1 due to similar circumstances4    

,the communication of moral ideas does  
not depend upon race-community1 as is   
shown by the ready adoption of ,western 
ideas by such nations as the ,hindoos   
and ,japanese4  ,in general language1 we
 identify development and progress2 and 
this is true also in the case of        
morality4 ,goodness means progress2     
wickedness1 retrogression or else       
stagnation1 which1 compared with        
advance1 is retrogression4 ,in changing 
from one form to another1 morality      
changes from what is right under one set
 of conditions to what is right under   
another set1 and such change from good  
to good is what we mean by becoming     
better4 ,to deny this is to find some   
other standard of advance than in the   
actual movement which has taken place1  
to put an a priori conception of        
development in place of the facts4 ,the 
moral ideal is always1 therefore1 a     
progress1 for either the society is     
single1 and goodness represents the law 
of its advance1 or if the society is    

part of a larger one1 its ideal can be  
retrogressive only because the society  
is so far bad4 ,and since goodness and  
badness exhaust the field of moral      
possibilities1 if the propositions that 
goodness means progress1 and badness    
regress1 are both true1 we must be able 
to convert them1 and maintain that all  
progress is due to goodness and all     
regress to badness4 ,to do this1 we must
 distinguish between degradation and a  
mere degeneration which involves a      
return to simpler conditions as an      
adaptation to changed environment4 ,such
 degeneration as adaptation to          
circumstances1 in an individual or a    
society as a whole1 is progress4 ,fish  
who become blind by living in the dark  
become thus better fitted to their      
circumstances1 and the like is true of  
moral degeneration under simpler        
conditions4 ,old age and death are      
characteristic of the higher type of    
organism1 in distinction from the lower 
types which1 multiplying by fission1 are

 practically eternal2 they are          
conditions of the advantage of type1 in 
which the individual is partaker4 ,so a 
good society under simpler conditions is
 on the side of progress1 though it may 
lie outside the main line of advance4   
,it is true that bad persons often help 
on progress1 but the good they do lies  
in their representation of the will of  
society for progress1 the evil lies in  
their use of this will as means to their
 own ends4 ,it may be objected1 too1    
that the good man is sometimes a        
hindrance to progress through stupidity2
 but to this is to be answered that     
intellect itself becomes morally        
characterized in action4  ,all events   
and institutions are thus determined by 
their conditions2 but there is a        
movement forward distinguishable from   
the delay of stragglers and the         
resistance of enemies1 and this         
distinction is enforced by the moral    
predicates of good and bad4  ,our theory
 does not imply that whatever is1 is    

right2 such a statement involves the use
 of the word right in the sense of      
correct1 or intelligible1 accountable by
 reflection4 ,nor is the doctrine       
fatalistic4 ,fatalism implies that men  
act at the impulse of some force which  
they do not understand2 but the history 
of mankind is the history of beings who1
 through their own gift of              
consciousness1 subdue circumstances to  
their own characters4 ,in judging a     
nation's development1 we must not       
interpret it according to our own       
likings1 as progression or              
retrogression2 nor must we imagine      
retrogression from relaxation of duties 
in some certain directions1 but must    
regard the society and its institutions 
as a whole4  ,the test of higher        
organization usually given is that of   
increasing differentiation of parts with
 corresponding specialization of        
function4 ,but the main course of       
progress is not linear1 or in one       
continuous direction2 apparent          

reversions to former types are only     
apparent2 the new type stands higher    
than the old4 ,in other words1 history  
moves in cycles4 ,it follows1 from this1
 that mere differentiation is           
insufficient for definition4 ,while the 
differentiation advances1 its           
significance alters1 or1 let us say1 the
 relative places of specialization and  
of unity alter4 ,along with             
differentiation goes a process of       
integration4 ,great revolutions         
simplify4 ,the result of greater and    
greater heterogeneity is to produce a   
new principle1 which combines the       
warring elements4 ,the definition of    
progress by increased differentiation is
 lacking in two ways3 ,it tells us      
nothing of the forces by which progress 
is produced1 and it gives no connected  
view of the actual facts of historical  
development4 ,a general statement of    
progress in its formal sense is found in
 the conception of a struggle of ideals4
 ,but as in this struggle the survival  

of the fittest does not necessarily mean
 the destruction of those who           
represented the defeated ideal1 but the 
supplanting of their ideal by another1  
the movement is one of comprehension1   
and we should expect to find1 and do    
find1 the history of morality exhibit   
the gradual development of a universal  
moral order1 good not for one group of  
men but for all4 ,it would be a         
misapprehension to regard this change as
 merely quantitative1 as if the virtues 
were the same whether they applied on a 
larger or a smaller scale4 ,the         
quantitative extension is parallel with1
 and in reality proceeds from1 a change 
in the conception of the human person   
himself4 ,in primitive communities1 the 
individual is so limited that he can    
hardly be called an individual at all4  
,first among the ,greeks do we find the 
person the embodiment of the social     
order1 but in a limited sense4 ,when    
this limitation breaks down1 and the    
individual stands forth as independent  

and self-conscious1 the author of the   
laws he obeys1 we have at the same time 
the extension of the area of persons    
with whom he is in moral relation4  ,it 
matters little that the ,western ideal  
of a society of humanity is realized to 
so slight an extent4 ,the ideal exists  
and implies the inclusion of mankind4   
,the principle of democracy1 which we   
are engaged in working out1 continues1  
or perhaps supersedes1 under much more  
complex conditions and over a wider     
range of institutions1 the same         
principle as ,christianity introduced4  
,it is not merely an identical element  
in many individual states1 but a        
comprehensive ideal4 ,the power of      
naturalization1 extradition laws1       
international action among the working  
classes1 etc41 imply this4  ,this       
comprehension is not merely one of      
breadth1 but of depth as well3 the ideal
 includes not only the present of       
mankind1 but its whole future also4     
,duties have always been recognized to  

posterity1 but the range of generations 
to whom they applied was small1 and the 
interests which it was believed could be
 secured were limited also4 ,apres moi  
le deluge describes a form of           
selfishness of all ages1 but different  
ages have understood the apres moi quite
 differently4 ,at the present day1 the  
range of responsibility is extending    
indefinitely4  ,a common political ideal
 does not mean a universal peace4       
,coarser forms of dispute disappear1    
but1 on the other hand1 as nations grow 
more refined in their ideals1 they grow 
more susceptible4 ,what a political     
humanity1 or a political community of   
,europe1 would mean1 is the substitution
 of international punishment for the    
self-willed conflicts of irresponsible  
nations4  ,we cannot say what the future
 of society and of morality may         
be1--whether mankind will be able to    
take mechanical means against a period  
of ice1 or whether human society may    
not1 as a whole1 be destroyed1 to be    

replaced by a higher type of existence1 
which may arise on the earth from the   
development of humanity1 or may1 on some
 other planet1 take up the tale of human
 civilization as we take up that of the 
civilization of ,greece and ,rome4  ,two
 things follow from the progressive     
character of the moral ideal3 7#a7 that 
the classification and description of   
duties will vary with each age2 7#b7    
that1 as the ideal changes from age to  
age1 the highest moral principle or     
sentiment will change with it4  ,at the 
present time1 a belief has gained great 
authority1 that the sense of duty is    
transitory and will finally disappear2  
but whether we1 with ,spencer1 identify 
obligation with coercion1 or understand 
it as the relation of a part of conduct 
to the rest1 in neither sense is the    
proposition true as it stands4 ,if duty 
means constraint1 it by no means follows
 that constraint will cease with        
progress2 for constraint arises from    
confronting one inclination with a      

higher idea1 and its disappearance would
 mean that inclinations had become      
constant2 this is1 however1 impossible4 
,the fiction of a final stage of mobile 
equilibrium is an unwarranted conclusion
 from the fact that all morality        
involves a cycle of conduct in mobile   
equilibrium4 ,but the theory represents 
a truth1--the truth that morality at no 
time implies in itself the sense of     
duty4 ,the sense of duty1 as involving  
the hard feeling of compulsion1 of      
subjection to authority1 and bound up   
with the sense of sin1 a sense stronger 
in proportion to merit or the interval  
between first inclination and final     
moral willing1 may and is giving place  
to a higher conception4 ,in the family1 
this may already be found1 where        
self-sacrifice and aid are matters of   
affection and rendered freely4 ,in the  
higher ideal1 we have that love of man  
for a higher and larger order than      
himself which morality represents as    
solidarity with society1 a continually  

progressive society of free individuals2
 which religion represents as the love  
for and of ,god4  ,and at the last two  
questions may be asked3 7#a7 whether the
 difficulties in which ,christianity is 
placed at the present day do not arise  
from absorption of its highest idea into
 the conceptions and the practice of    
morality1 so that the religious         
sentiment is starved2 and 7#b7 whether  
the ideal of a free cooeperation in the 
progress of humanity may not be used to 
interpret the belief in immortality1    
putting in the place of individual      
immortality the continuance of life in  
the persons whom the individual may     
affect4 ,in ,the ,international ,journal
 of ,ethics ,july1 #ahib1 ,alexander    
combats some misinterpretations of      
,natural ,selection in ,morals1 which he
 says are partly due to ,spencer's      
,individualism4 ,natural ,selection in  
social life does not mean necessarily   
destruction of individuals1 but is a    
struggle of ideals1 such as that between

 ,individualism and ,collectivism1--in  
which ,selection seems to favor         
,collectivism4  ,,footnotes3  #hb ,the  
reference is here to ,wundt1 ,phys4     
,psych41 ,i4 p4 #dhe 7ed4 ,,ii474       
,,appendix ,,to ,,part ,i  ,,paul ,,ree 
,dr4 ,paul ,ree's ,source of the ,moral 
,feelings 7,ursprung der moralischen    
,empfindungen1 #ahgg71 is written from a
 pessimistic and mechanical standpoint4 
,the connection of thought and feeling  
in the region of morals is1 according to
 ,ree1 a purely1 or very nearly a       
purely1 outward one1 moral judgments not
 being the result of sympathy or        
antipathy1 or related to these feelings 
in more than an external manner1 but    
arising from associations of ideas      
engendered by education2 the ,sense of  
,justice being1 in this manner1 the     
effect of ,punishment4 ,a definite      
distinction is likewise made by ,ree1   
between vice1 which affects the         
individual only1 and badness1 which     
affects society1 the profligate who     

satisfies his lust in the most          
unrestrained manner being regarded as   
perhaps unwise1 but not bad1 as long as 
he does not seduce the pure4 ,the author
 fails1 however1 to show us how vice can
 be practised without social injury1 and
 necessarily fails also--since his      
position takes into account no organic  
relations of characteristics--to notice 
the significance of profligacy as an    
inherent feature of character4 ,he      
touches at one or two points1 only1 on  
,habit1 and at one point alone on       
,heredity1 where he raises the question 
of the hereditary character of ,vanity1 
but arrives at no conclusion4 ,he also  
makes the division of ,egoism from      
,non-egoism a definite one1 fully       
identifying the ,good with the          
,non-egoistic1 the ,bad with the        
,egoistic4 ,the ,non-egoistic really    
exists2 a man may relieve another's     
suffering in order to free himself from 
the sight of it2 or he may relieve it   
for the other's sake4 ,nevertheless1    

non-egoistic action is rare2 men are    
much more egoistic than the apes1 who   
are rivals only with regard to food and 
sexual desire1 while men are rivals not 
only with respect to these primitive    
wants1 but with respect to many others  
besides1 especially since they not only 
regard the present but provide for the  
future also4  ,vanity1 according to     
,ree1 gives rise to envy1 hatred1 and   
malignity4 ,but1 the action of these    
passions being opposed to the safety of 
society1 some persons#hc introduced     
punishment for its protection1 and fear 
of punishment1 and exchange of labor    
united men in peace4 ,deeds and never   
motives were at first considered in the 
infliction of punishment1 but1 outer    
compulsion not securing safety1 the     
ideal of an inner condition of character
 which should secure it arose4 ,good and
 useful are synonyms1 but men of later  
generations1 receiving laws without     
explanation of their origin1 fail to    
understand that the ,good was1 in its   

origin1 simply the ,useful1 that the    
,bad was1 in like manner1 the ,harmful1 
and that ,punishment is for the purpose 
of prevention and not in the nature of a
 return for things done4 ,the knowledge 
of this truth takes from life some of   
its grandeur2 but the truth remains the 
truth1 nevertheless4  ,the will is not  
free2 the mistake of regarding it as    
free is the result of the failure to    
perceive that punishment looks to the   
future1 not to the past1--is a means of 
prevention1 not a requital4 ,the right  
to punish does not rest1 therefore1 upon
 the ,sense of ,justice2 but punishment 
is justifiable as a means of prevention4
 ,its choice1 like that of other evils  
as the alternatives of greater ones1 is 
the practice of the principle1 ,the end 
justifies the means4 ,those who         
repudiate this principle have not       
generally looked deeply into its        
meaning2 moreover1 it has been misused4 
,in putting it in practice1 several     
things must be observed3--  #a4 ,the end

 to be served must be a good one2  #b4  
,the choice of means causing pain is    
permissible only when no other means are
 possible2  #c4 ,the pain must be       
reduced to the least possible2  #d4 ,the
 pain must be less than would be        
involved in the omission of this        
particular choice4         99       99  
99       99       99  ,the doctrine of  
eternal punishment is untenable1        
because3--  #a4 ,it presupposes the     
existence of a ,god4  #b4 ,supposing a  
,god to be existent1 we cannot name him 
either good or bad4 ,god is good means  
,he does good to the world and its      
inhabitants2 but of the world we know   
only the little earth1 and of ,god we   
know nothing4  #c4 ,if we will1         
nevertheless1 predicate goodness or     
badness of ,god1 we must call him bad1  
since all beings known to us suffer much
 pain and have little pleasure4 ,the    
gods of the savages1 who are not yet led
 away by theological hair-splitting1 are
 evil4  #d4 ,but if we still persist in 

naming ,god good1 then we cannot suppose
 him to be also cruel1 and even more    
cruel than the hardest-hearted of       
mortals4  #e4 ,the doctrine of eternal  
punishment assumes the existence of a   
soul2 but the difference between human  
beings and the higher animals is not so 
great that one can ascribe an especial  
soul to men4  #f4 ,but if a soul exists1
 it cannot be tortured1 since it is     
immaterial4  #g4 ,and the deeds which   
,god will thus punish deserve1 on the   
theory of punishment as prevention1 no  
requital4         99       99       99  
99       99  ,it is not immaterial to us
 whether men have a good or an evil     
opinion of us4  #a4 ,because we hope for
 advantages from a good opinion4  #b4   
,because we are vain4  ,vanity arose1 in
 the first place1 because admiration was
 useful to men1 just as it is useful to 
the birds at pairing-time1 and habit    
rendered it agreeable in itself4 ,men   
therefore desire it1 even when it has no
 especial use1 because they know that   

all admiration is followed by a strong  
feeling of pleasure4#hd ,the difference 
between man and the peacock in respect  
to vanity is merely that he desires to  
be admired for other things than outer  
appearance alone1--for courage1         
strength1 cleverness1 the tools of      
battle1 and many other things4 ,since1  
among human beings1 men and not women   
choose their mates1 endeavoring to      
obtain one or more of the most beautiful
 women possible1 women endeavor to      
render themselves beautiful1 expending  
greater efforts as the stake is greater 
in their case than in that of the       
peacock4 ,they endeavor to supplement   
their outward attractiveness by         
amiability1 cleverness1 household       
industry1 and1 in our days1 wealth2 but 
beauty always makes the strongest       
impression upon the man4 ,men desire to 
be admired rather for other things than 
outward appearance1 though for this1    
too1 to some extent4  ,but vanity may be
 objected to 7#a7 on the ground that it 

is a desire to create envy1 and envy is 
pain and gives rise to hatred2 7#b7 on  
the hedonistic ground that the vain man 
more often suffers pain from not being  
admired than experiences pleasure from  
admiration2 7#c7 on the intellectual    
ground that vanity renders a man        
incapable of impersonal interest in     
,nature1 ,art1 ,philosophy1 and         
,science4 ,entire freedom from vanity   
could1 however1 be attained only by a   
life of complete isolation4 ,because of 
these reasons for blame1 men do not     
confess that they act from vanity1 but  
give other reasons for deeds prompted by
 this feeling4#he  ,ambition may be     
blamed on grounds similar to those on   
which vanity is blamed4 ,however1 this  
feeling urges to many useful acts1 and  
without it few would find interest for  
great effort4 ,and since1 because of its
 usefulness1 ambition is less blamed    
than vanity1 men are more ready to      
acknowledge that they possess it4  ,we  
desire to appear well in the eyes of    

others1 therefore we conceal our envy   
and hatred1 and affect high courage1    
great honesty1 and charity4 ,such       
hypocrisy is bad2 but it is necessary4  
,for if men were to show themselves as  
they are1 with hearts full of hostility1
 they could not at all associate4 ,in   
order to make frankness and peace both  
possible1 men must become what they now 
pretend to be2 but this does not lie in 
their power4  ,malignant pleasure in    
others' pain arises from a comparison   
with our own more agreeable situation1  
or from the pleasure in our own         
superiority in any respect4  ,when a    
woman is seduced1 it is in the interest 
of other women to ostracise her1 since1 
if marriage were to be abolished1 women 
would lose in position2 the man who     
seduces her is blamed for bringing shame
 on her1 but not for unchastity1 for men
 have no interest in maintaining        
chastity in their own sex4  ,caprice    
arises1 not from change of mood1 but    
from the pleasure of power experienced  

in now charming by amiability1 now      
causing gloom by coldness1 and again    
inspiring fear through anger4  ,if one  
desires anything from another1 one      
should not say1 ,it is a little thing1  
but ,it is very much that ,i ask2 since 
he who is asked gives more readily when 
he thinks he will appear very kind4     
,natural ,selection does not prefer the 
individual as far as morals are         
concerned1 but only nations4 ,moral     
rules are variable1 but not steadily    
progressive4 ,man is by nature selfish2 
simply habit tames men and makes them1  
by change in nerves and muscle1 more    
amenable to rule4  ,the good man is     
probably worse off than the bad man4    
,pain exceeds pleasure in all beings4   
,everything1 love included1 becomes     
worthless when attained1 and labor      
begins again for new attainment4 ,man   
is1 moreover1 the most unhappy of all   
beings1 for he feels most strongly1 and 
in his complicated organism there is    
almost always something out of order4   

,for this reason1 sympathy#hf brings    
more pain than pleasure4 ,the bad man   
has only pangs of conscience to disturb 
him1 and1 if he is superstitious1 the   
fear of punishment after death4 ,it is  
difficult to say whether the bad man or 
the good man is happier4 ,in fact1      
happiness depends rather on temperament1
 power of self-control1 and health4     
,possibly these truths may seem harmful2
 and if the good man is higher than the 
bad man1 and goodness should be sought1 
only so much of the truth should be     
revealed as is not antagonistic to this 
end4 ,but the good man is not the       
higher1 although1 because goodness is   
useful1 our education has attempted to  
make us believe this4 ,the animals may  
be unselfish as well as man2 on the     
other hand1 the disinterested search for
 truth is not found among the animals4  
,the attainment of truth is1 moreover1  
pleasurable to the searcher1 turning    
painful desire for truth to pleasurable 
fulfilment4  ,dr4 ,ree's later book1    

,the ,origin of ,conscience 7,die       
,entstehung des ,gewissens1 #ahhe71 does
 not add anything distinctly new in     
theory to this first book2 it is rather 
noticeable for what it omits of the     
pessimism of the earlier book1 for a    
more moderate1 thoughtful1 and less     
assertive tone1 than for additional     
theories or even much further           
elaboration of the old theories1 except 
as regards the derivation of the ,sense 
of ,justice4 ,it traces the savage      
custom of the revenge of death through  
its displacement by the payment of      
blood-money1 up to the final            
substitution of state punishment4       
,punishment does not grow out of        
revenge1 but succeeds it4 ,it is not    
revenge1 though the desire that the     
guilty may be punished and the desire   
for revenge may be mixed1 in some cases4
 ,pain1 not the ,sense of ,justice1     
drives the savage to revenge4           
,punishment does not grow out of the    
,sense of ,justice1 but the latter out  

of the former4 ,the interference of the 
state with the revenge of the individual
 is at first a mediation between the two
 parties for the maintenance of peace in
 the interest of the community2 later1  
the state arrives at a method of        
punishment for the purpose of           
prevention4  ,hume's theory of the      
origin of religion has been confirmed by
 ,anthropology4 ,the savage sees in     
natural phenomena the action of living  
beings endowed with mental faculties    
like his own1 and he gradually comes to 
transfer this action to beings not in1  
but1 according to his new idea1 behind1 
phenomena4 ,the gods of primitive       
religions are moral only as the peoples 
whose gods they are1 are moral4 ,as     
society progresses1 religion falls      
behind1 and a new interpretation of old 
doctrines must be introduced in order to
 bring it up to the later standard4     
,then the gods1 as moral with the       
morality of this later date1 are        
imagined as commanding the later        

standard1 and to the fear of punishment 
by the state is added1 as a preventive  
force1 that of the punishment of the    
gods4 ,the gods command what men        
command1 forbid what men forbid4 ,the   
,god of the ,old ,testament1 ,jahveh1   
was1 like ,zeus1 a nature-god1 and took 
revenge as men did4 ,when a later date  
demanded a standard of greater humanity1
 ,christ came1 and he represented the   
,god of the ,old ,testament1 no longer  
as revengeful and passionate1 but as    
possessing the attributes of sympathy   
which he felt in himself4 ,the later    
standard of the ,new ,testament takes   
into consideration motives as well as   
deeds1 and commands positively as well  
as forbids4 ,but the ,god of the ,new   
,testament is not wholly love2 if his   
love is unreturned1 he becomes angry1   
like men4  ,the ,categoric ,imperative  
in the individual is merely the result  
of his individual education4 ,conscience
 alone accomplishes little2 other       
motives than the desire to do           

right--fear of punishment1 etc4--are    
stronger4 ,nothing is1 in itself1 good  
or bad1 but only so far as it is useful 
or harmful4  ,sympathy is to some degree
 innate1--how it arose we cannot say2   
but it has been preserved by natural    
selection4  ,,footnotes3  #hc ,p4 #df4  
#hd ,p4 #gh4  #he ,see1 in              
contradistinction to ,ree's theory of   
vanity1 ,sigwart's admirable essay on   
this subject1 contained in his ,kleine  
,schriften4  #hf ,dr4 ,ree appears to   
depart from his general theory here and 
identify sympathy with morality4     ,a 
,,review ,,of ,,evolutional ,,ethics    
,,part ,,ii     ,,introduction   ,twenty
 years ago1 any one about to deal with  
moral science from the standpoint of the
 ,theory of ,evolution1 might have      
deemed it necessary to preface his work 
with a statement of cogent reasons for  
the assumption of such a standpoint4 ,at
 a time when ,theology saw in ,darwinism
 only a weapon of the anti-theological  
party1 and when even many scientists    

were not yet decided as to the worth of 
the new ideas1 the right of the student 
to make use of them in psychological and
 ethical investigations might have been 
a subject for dispute4 ,yet even in the 
beginning the attitude of apology was   
assumed oftener without1 than within1   
,english-speaking countries1 for the    
very reason that exactly among the race 
from which ,darwin sprang1 the warfare  
of his conception of animate nature with
 older systems was fiercest4 ,at the    
present date1 the attitude of opinion is
 changed in all countries4 ,the ,theory 
of ,evolution has few1 if it can be said
 to have any1 enemies among the students
 of science4 ,with ,louis ,agassiz died 
the last opponent of ,darwinism         
deserving scientific notice1 says       
,haeckel4#hg ,theology itself has ceased
 from extreme hostilities1 and many     
theologians have even found in the idea 
of ,evolution an argument with which to 
defend teleological doctrine4 ,the      
present opponents of ,darwinism as      

applied to psychology and ethics rather 
contest its special worth for these     
provinces than deny its validity in     
them4 ,nevertheless1 a universal        
acceptance cannot be claimed for the    
theory2 and since ethics is1 above all  
other sciences1 the one that should most
 desire to persuade rather than to      
alienate1--and this the more1 the       
stronger its conviction of its own      
truth1--it may be well to state or      
restate some of the reasons which       
justify1 from almost all modern         
standpoints1 at least a tentative       
application of the ideas of ,evolution  
to ethical theory4 ,such a statement1 or
 restatement1 must be an attempt to     
demonstrate the validity of the theory  
in this province1 and to give some good 
reasons for supposing1 a priori1 that a 
survey of ethical questions from the    
point of view it furnishes may be of    
ethical utility4 ,the proof of such     
utility can be found1 ultimately1 only  
in the results of the investigation     

itself4  ,there is but one phase of the 
theological doctrine of ,creation with  
which the mere idea of an evolution of  
life1 by itself considered1 is directly 
at variance2 this is the doctrine of    
,creation as taught by the older        
,theology1 which accepted the opening   
chapters of ,genesis as literal history1
 not as1 by any possibility1 an oriental
 allegory4 ,between the theory of       
,evolution and the idea of ,creation as 
a primal formation of matter with force 
or motion in accordance with fixed laws1
 between it and the idea of an initial  
application of force from without1--an  
impulsion which set the universe in     
motion1--between it and the conception  
of a transcendental guidance through    
natural law or of a pantheistic order of
 development1 there is no such necessary
 contradiction as could justify the     
denial of ,evolution from the standpoint
 of any of these theories4 ,it is1      
therefore1 with the defenders of the    
older theological doctrine of creation  

only that an a priori defence of        
,evolution has to deal4  ,the argument  
which this doctrine has always regarded 
as one of its strongest defences is that
 of the universality of the notion of a 
,creating ,spirit4 ,but this defence is 
no longer available2 modern research has
 proved the idea to be by no means      
universal4 ,sir ,john ,lubbock says1    
,the lower races have no idea of a      
,creation2 and among those somewhat more
 advanced it is1 at first1 very         
incomplete4 ,the lower savages regard   
their gods as scarcely more powerful    
than themselves2444 they are not        
creators2 they are neither omniscient   
nor all-powerful2 far from conferring   
immortality on man1 they are not even in
 all cases immortal themselves4#hh      
,stuhr1 who was1 as ,mueller says1 a    
good observer of such matters1 reports  
that the ,siberians had no idea of a    
,creator4 ,when ,burchill suggested the 
idea of creation to the ,bachapin       
,kaffirs1 these 'asserted that          

everything made itself1' and that trees 
and herbage grew by their own will4#hi  
,as regards ,tahiti1 ,williams observes 
that the 'origin of the gods and their  
priority of existence in comparison with
 the formation of the earth1 being a    
matter of uncertainty even among the    
native priests1 involves the whole in   
the greatest obscurity4'#ij ,when the   
,capuchin missionary1 ,merolla1 asked   
the queen of ,singa in ,western ,africa 
who made the world1 she1 'without the   
least hesitation1 readily answered1 ,my 
ancestors4'#ia ,the ,bongos of ,sudan   
had no conception of there being a      
,creator1#ib the ,adipones1 the         
,californian ,indians1 before they came 
in contact with white men1 the ,crees1  
the ,zulu ,kaffirs1 the ,hottentots1 had
 no idea of a creation4 ,even in        
,sanscrit1 there is no word for         
creation1 nor does any such appear in   
the ,rigveda1 the ,zendavesta1 or in    
,homer4#ic ,the idea of a creation in   
any sense is not1 then1 universal1 and  

cannot be asserted to be innate1 a      
priori1 primordial1 or essential to     
human nature4 ,nor1 assuming the        
standpoint of belief in a ,creator1 is  
there any ground for supposing that he  
would have chosen the one rather than   
any other method of creation4 ,the      
internal as well as the external        
difficulties in the way of a too literal
 exegesis of the ,old ,testament are    
rapidly causing the abandonment of      
dogmatism with respect to this point2   
and any other interpretation than a     
literal one cannot1 as has been said1   
logically object to a theory of         
,becoming based on scientific grounds4  
,it is in the nature of many of our     
greatest scientific theories that their 
simplicity and naturalness in the       
explanation of facts fill us with a     
sense of wonder that they had not long  
before suggested themselves to          
scientists4 ,if1 for instance1 we were  
to attempt1 in a ,cartesian spirit1 to  
free ourselves from all the prejudice of

 previous dogma and regard only the     
general course of nature1 we could not  
logically avoid the conclusion1 even    
from a superficial view1 that a theory  
of the gradual development of existing  
forms has far more probability on its   
side than that of a creation from       
without which broke in upon natural     
process1 and placed ready-made suns and 
planets in the heavens1 and finished    
beasts and men upon the earth4          
,everywhere in the organic world we     
behold the process of growth1 the       
development of germs1 the passage of the
 inorganic into the organic1 and of the 
organic into the inorganic              
again1--change and transformation under 
natural law4  ,the difficulty which     
difference of form and function in the  
various species offers to a theory of   
,evolution is by no means so large as   
has often been claimed2 as great        
difference exists between the oak and   
the acorn1 from which we know it1       
nevertheless1 to spring2 as much        

contrast is exhibited between the brown 
twigs of the trees and shrubs in winter 
and the brilliant foliage and flowers   
which they put forth under the warmer   
sun of spring2 quite as great contrasts 
may be found1 in the life of every human
 being1 between the single cell and the 
individual completeness attained at     
birth1 between infancy and morally      
characterized manhood and womanhood1    
between the vigor of full maturity and  
the deterioration of age4 ,even the     
chasm between the organic and the       
inorganic is not logically impassable4  
,the necessity of nourishment is the    
natural bridge between the two1 and the 
equivalence of conditions and result1   
the indestructibility of matter and     
motion1 establish at once the necessity 
of the inference that the organic can   
exist only at the ultimate expense of   
the inorganic1 from which it is         
continually renewed4 ,were our senses   
such that1 having before been closed1   
they were suddenly opened to the        

perception of the daily observable facts
 of growth1 these would probably appear 
to us very nearly as strange1 anomalous1
 and impossible as the changes which1   
according to the ,darwinian ,theory1    
have resulted in the existence of       
different species2 and it is obvious    
that the public mind1 becoming gradually
 accustomed to the conception of the    
latter changes1 does not now regard them
 as so wonderful and anomalous as they  
appeared to it in the beginning4        
,processes involving complete change of 
form may be observed1 at the present    
time1 everywhere in nature2 but they are
 observable1 everywhere in the organic1 
as growth without breaches2 even a      
primitive science has always recognized 
the gradual character of motion1 the    
absence of gaps in the causal chain1 at 
least outside of the initiative action  
of human will4 ,such a natural          
hypothesis of creation as we have above 
supposed1 formed upon crude and         
superficial1 but as far as it goes1     

logical reasoning from facts of         
observation1 could not regard the       
process as other than a gradual one1 in 
which simpler forms and conditions must 
be supposed to have preceded more       
complex ones2 in other words1 it could  
not logically conceive the process as   
other than an evolution4  ,traces of an 
idea of ,evolution may be found in      
various crude forms in nearly all the   
earlier ,greek philosophers1 especially 
in ,anaximander1 ,heraclitus1           
,democritus1 ,empedocles1 and later in  
,aristotle4 ,such traces may even be    
found in many heathen mythologies in    
contradistinction from the ,judaic4 ,the
 progress of investigation1 establishing
 the universality of natural law and1 in
 every province1 the gradual character  
of change was1 before ,darwin1 as it has
 been since his work1 in the direction  
of such a theory1 as was shown by the   
ready acceptance with which ,darwinism  
met1 if not by the world at large1 at   
least by the majority of scientists4 ,in

 ,england1 ,france1 and ,germany1 there 
were others at work under the influence 
of thoughts similar to if not identical 
with those that inspired the researches 
and experiments of ,darwin2 and the     
nebular theory of ,kant had already     
claimed in ,astronomy what the          
,darwinian claimed in ,biology4 ,when   
,kant1 in his ,natural ,history of the  
,heavens1 which has become the fundament
 of modern ,astronomy1 says1 ',give me  
matter and ,i will make you a world1'   
what he intended to express was that the
 natural laws of matter are perfectly   
competent to render comprehensible to us
 the development of our well-known solar
 system4#id  ,in the very beginning1 the
 theory of ,evolution may be said to    
have had three distinct branches1       
represented by the ,nebular ,theory in  
,astronomy1 ,haeckel's ,ontogeny1 and   
the ,biology of ,lamarck1 ,darwin1      
,wallace1 and ,huxley2 and to these     
should properly be added the            
,sociological ,ethics of ,spencer1 which

 was not1 however1 worked out to a      
complete system4 ,but ,du ,prel says of 
later research3 ,in the progress of     
modern science1 no principle has proved 
so fruitful as that of evolution4 ,all  
branches compete with one another in its
 use1 and have brought about by its aid 
the most gratifying results4 ,geology   
interprets the significance of          
superimposed1 hardened strata of the    
earth's crust in the sense of a history 
of the earth's development2 ,biology1 in
 union with the study of fossils1       
arranges the living and petrified       
specimens of plants and animals in their
 order1 and constructs a history of the 
evolution of organic life2 ,philology   
prepares a genealogical tree of         
languages1 and finds in it signs which  
throw light on prehistoric times1 and   
reveal facts forgotten for thousands of 
years2 ,anthropology discovers in the   
form and expression of human beings     
rudimentary signs that point to a theory
 of development from lower forms2 and1  

finally1 ,history reveals the evolution 
of civilization in far-distant historic 
times2 and in all these branches it     
becomes apparent that we only then      
understand phenomena when we have       
comprehended their ,becoming4#ie  ,it is
 due to the gradual perception of the   
fact that some such theory as that of   
,evolution is implied in the very       
conception of the constancy of nature   
that there has been a continual decrease
 of that negative form of criticism     
which has made much of the gaps in the  
direct proof4 ,modern science has so    
grown to1 and by1 the theory of         
,evolution that the overthrow of the    
latter means nothing more nor less than 
the destruction of science itself in its
 highest results4 ,even those who reject
 the conclusions of ,evolution are found
 to make use of its methods1 and must do
 so perforce4 ,as the breadth and depth 
and height of the theory come to be     
perceived1 it is seen that the demand   
for complete proof is nothing more nor  

less than a demand for the perfection of
 all branches of knowledge1 the refusal 
of credit without such proof a refusal  
to place any confidence in the first    
principles of scientific theory until it
 has fully explored the universe and    
left nothing further to be discovered4  
,but science would have less ground for 
complaint1 if the opponents of          
,darwinism consistently refused1 on the 
ground of the incompleteness of our     
knowledge1 to form any theory whatever  
on the subject of man's nature and      
development1 permitting the worth of the
 evolutional theory to be determined by 
its future results in application as    
hypothesis4 ,but the peculiar spectacle 
is afforded us of a party rejecting a   
theory supported by numberless facts in 
all branches1 and whose very breaches   
the direction of discovery continually  
tends to bridge1 in favor of a dogma    
which cannot point to one scientific    
fact in its support1--a party demanding 
absolute perfection of proof as the     

condition of its acceptance of one      
theory1 while it at the same time       
fiercely defends a conception of nature 
of which it cannot furnish the most     
imperfect proof4 ,it is true that       
mankind has not beheld the evolution of 
the whole vegetable and animal kingdom4 
,but neither had any human eye ever yet 
beheld the planet ,neptune when ,le     
,verrier prophesied its existence and   
calculated its size and position4 ,the  
theory of ,evolution is a reasoning from
 the constancy of nature1 as was that of
 ,le ,verrier1 only1 in the case of the 
former1 we have the observation and     
calculations of not one scientist alone1
 but of thousands1 on which to rely4 ,to
 demand of the scientist that he shall  
produce the organic from the inorganic1 
and practically demonstrate the change  
of form and function1 and the process of
 separation of species1 before the      
possibility of such development is      
conceded1 is on a par with demanding of 
him an actual reproduction of the       

,glacial ,period before the theory of   
its previous existence shall be         
accepted4 ,there is no reason for       
supposing that1 if spontaneous          
generation once took place1 the peculiar
 complication of conditions which       
produced it will ever again recur or can
 be artificially constructed4  ,but     
science has no desire to be dogmatic4   
,it readily acknowledges the total      
absence of direct and established proof 
at this particular juncture of the      
beginning of life4 ,it can only point to
 the indirect testimony of              
,physiological ,chemistry and           
,crystallogeny1 to the simplicity of    
structure and movement in certain forms 
of life1 and finally to the observed    
constancy of nature4 ,but an exaggerated
 significance has been given to this    
chief flaw in the theory of ,evolution1 
by those who1 starting with the         
intention of defending ,theology or the 
dignity of the ,human1 have been driven 
back1 step by step1 to this point1 and  

fail to perceive that1 arrived here1    
they have already abandoned the ground  
on which contest was possible4 ,what    
significance a primal creation merely of
 lowest organisms can have1 for either a
 defence of human dignity or for        
,christian ,theology1 it is difficult to
 perceive4 ,as a matter of choice1 it   
would seem to be more consistent with   
the omnipotence and dignity of a        
,creator to suppose that these very     
simple organisms arose1 like other      
forms1 under the action of natural law  
than that special interference was      
necessary in just their case4 ,but1     
supposing such a special ,creation1 the 
following questions immediately present 
themselves from the theological         
standpoint3 ,are these special creations
 endowed with soul8 ,if so1 they must be
 immortal2 if not1 then soul arises in  
the process of evolution2 if it arises  
as do all other things1 qualities1      
functions1 by growth1--that is1 by the  
addition of infinitesimal increments 7as

 we must1 indeed1 suppose it to arise if
 we regard it as evolved7--then whence  
come these increments8 ,if they come    
direct from a ,creator1 then surely no  
special favor towards man in the        
bestowment of soul can be alleged2 and  
if they arise by natural causes1 out of 
nature1 then why may not their first    
beginning1 their first infinitesimal    
appearance1 also be supposed to be due  
to such causes8  ,the proof of an       
increase1 a growth1 of what have been   
called distinctively the mental         
faculties1 throughout the animal        
kingdom1 is every day stronger4 ,no one 
believes1 at the present date1 with     
,descartes1 that the animals are        
automata4 ,differences of mental power  
would seem to be but differences of     
degree2 the facts all point to such a   
theory4 ,the more scientific theologians
 have1 indeed1 abandoned this with the  
other minor points of contest above     
discussed1 and devoted their efforts to 
argument from the moral nature of man4  

,philology1 ,anthropology1 and ,geology 
testify to mental progress1 even in the 
human species2 and if such a progress is
 a fact1 it cannot have been without    
influence upon the moral nature of man1 
even supposing the latter to be         
,god-given4 ,indeed1 a merely physical  
progress or change cannot have been     
without such influence2 for the most    
conservative theologians admit the      
strong action of the body upon the mind4
 ,it would seem1 then1 for all reasons1 
that an investigation of the process of 
mental evolution1 or of evolution in    
general1 ought not to be without results
 significant for any system of morality4
 ,if it is true that we learn wisdom and
 morality from human history1 this can  
be so only because history gives us     
increased knowledge of the constancy of 
nature in those of its manifestations   
which specially concern the human1 and  
thus enables us better to judge the     
present and predict the future4 ,we     
should suppose that a still wider       

knowledge of our mental and physical    
evolution must be of yet greater worth  
to us in the same manner1--that the     
disclosure of more extended fields of   
nature to our vision must afford us new 
and valuable lessons with regard to     
ourselves2 just as the telescope makes  
no discovery in the most distant regions
 of space that does not prove to have1  
in the end1 its peculiar significance   
for our own planet4 ,if our             
investigations should prove fruitless1  
as all such investigations have been    
said by some to be1 the fact1           
established a posteriori1 could not be  
disputed4 ,but1 considering all the     
points above noticed1 such a result     
could not but astonish us2 and we should
 even be inclined1 after all that has   
been said1 to suspect that the fault lay
 rather in the particular method than in
 the direction of our research4         
,,footnotes3  #hg ,natuerliche          
,schoepfungsgeschichte1 #hth ed41 p4    
#aji4  #hh ,origin of ,civilization1 p4 

#cia4  #hi ,origin of ,civilization4    
#ij ,ibid4  #ia ,ibid4  #ib ,ibid4  #ic 
,ibid4  #id ,du ,prel3 ,die             
,entwicklungsgeschichte des ,weltalls4  
#ie ,die ,entwicklungsgeschichte des    
,weltalls4     ,,chapter ,i  ,,the      
,,concepts ,,of ,,evolution   ,the      
preceding considerations have made it   
evident that the idea of ,evolution has 
undergone a broadening process since    
,darwin first brought it before the     
world4 ,it is necessary to glance       
briefly at some of the chief phases and 
the general significance of this process
 in order to define the extent and      
intent of the concept as far as science 
has made such definition possible4  ,to 
,darwin himself the struggle for        
existence was always between the unities
 represented by complete organisms      
whether as isolated individuals1 or in  
family1 tribal1 or national groups4     
,everywhere in his calculations1        
appearing unchanged in his results1 is  
found the unknown quantity of variation 

from ancestral type1 the known factors  
being heredity1 and natural and sexual  
selection in the struggle for existence4
 ,wallace's ideas as to color in birds  
deprive the theory of sexual selection  
of one of its most important points of  
application in ,darwin's work4 ,it is1  
in fact1 easy to see that sexual        
selection cannot neutralize natural     
selection1 that any particular form of  
sexual selection can arise and finally  
survive only by a harmony with the      
direction of natural selection1 and that
 the two must therefore appear1 even    
from any standpoint of freedom of the   
will1 as continually attaining          
coincidence4 ,it has been said1 above1  
that the struggle for existence was1 for
 ,darwin1 between the organisms as      
unities4 ,this consistent position of   
the specialist has been criticised1 from
 a more general point of view1 by ,lewes
 in his essay on the ,nature of         
,life1#if in which he asserts that we   
must logically extend our conception of 

the struggle for existence beyond that  
of the competition and antagonism of    
organisms--the external struggle2 and   
include under it the competition and    
antagonism of tissues and organs--the   
internal struggle4 ,mr4 ,darwin1 he     
says1 has so patiently and profoundly   
meditated on the whole subject1 that we 
must be very slow in presuming him to   
have overlooked any important point4 ,i 
know that he has not altogether         
overlooked this which we are now        
considering2 but he is so preoccupied   
with the tracing out of his splendid    
discovery in all its bearings1 that he  
has thrown the emphasis mainly on the   
external struggle1 neglecting the       
internal struggle2 and has thus1 in many
 passages1 employed language which      
implies a radical distinction where--as 
,i conceive--no such distinction can be 
recognized4 ',natural ,selection1' he   
says1 'depends on the survival1 under   
various and complex circumstances1 of   
the best-fitted individuals1 but has no 

relation whatever to the primary cause  
of any modification of structure4'#ig   
,on this we may remark1 first1 that     
selection does not depend on the        
survival1 but is that survival2         
secondly1 that the best-fitted          
individual survives because of that     
modification of its structure which has 
given it the superiority2 therefore1 if 
the primary cause of this modification  
is not due to selection1 the selection  
cannot be the cause of species4 ,the    
facts which are relied on in support of 
the idea of 'fixity of species' show1 at
 any rate1 that a given superiority will
 remain stationary for thousands of     
years2 and no one supposes that the     
progeny of an organism will vary unless 
some external or internal cause of      
variation accompanies the inheritance4  
,mr4 ,darwin agrees with ,mr4 ,spencer  
in admitting the difficulty of          
distinguishing between the effects of   
some definite action of external        
conditions1 and the accumulation through

 natural selection of inherited         
variations serviceable to the organism4 
,but even in cases where the distinction
 could be clearly established1 ,i think 
we should only see an historical        
distinction1 that is to say1 one between
 effects produced by particular causes  
now in operation and effects produced by
 very complex and obscure causes in     
operation during ancestral              
development4444 ,natural ,selection is  
only the expression of the results of   
obscure physiological processes4  ,the  
last statement is one to which ,darwin  
himself would certainly not have        
objected4 ,it is an extension of the    
principle implicitly involved in all his
 work and explicitly stated in his later
 work1 although the chief emphasis is   
laid on outer conditions4 ,the extension
 of the idea of competition from the    
outer condition of organisms to the more
 ultimate physiological unities of organ
 and tissue is a philosophic gain4 ,it  
is evident1 however1 that that for which

 ,darwin is seeking is not a            
philosophical generalization which shall
 include outer and inner change under   
one highest law1 but1 first of all1 the 
particular causes of particular         
variation interesting to the specialist 
in biology4 ,it is made too clear for   
mistake in ,the ,variation of ,animals  
and ,plants under ,domestication that   
the uncertainty with regard to such     
particular forms of cause is the spring 
of his declaration of our ignorance as  
to variation4 ,the possibility of an    
inclusion of lower in higher            
generalizations he would not deny2      
though the special laws first occupy his
 attention4 ,doubtless1 his work is not1
 as is no man's1 wholly free from       
inconsistencies and                     
contradictions1--which are due1 in part1
 to the fact that every scientific      
theory is1 even in the thought of the   
individual1 an evolution4 ,but the      
declaration of mystery in the question  
of variation is not equivalent to a     

theory of accident1 of transcendental   
mystery1 or of some special organic or  
vital force1 such as ,claude ,bernard   
especially opposed2 it is merely and    
simply a statement of the mystery of    
present ignorance4 ,this fact is        
expressly stated in ,darwin's later     
work4 ,we find1 for instance1 in the    
introduction to a letter to the editor  
of ,nature1 written in #ahgc1 the origin
 of many instincts referred to          
modifications or variations in the      
brain1 which we1 in our ignorance1 most 
improperly call spontaneous or          
accidental2 and we have1 in ,the        
,variation of ,animals and ,plants under
 ,domestication1#ih such passages as the
 following3 ,when we reflect on the     
individual differences between organic  
beings in a state of nature1 as shown by
 every wild animal knowing its mate2 and
 when we reflect on the infinite        
diversity of many varieties of our      
domesticated productions1 we may well be
 inclined to exclaim1 though falsely1 as

 ,i believe1 that variability must be   
looked at as an ultimate fact1          
necessarily contingent on reproduction4 
,those authors who adopt this latter    
view would probably deny that each      
separate variation has its own proper   
exciting cause4 ,although we can seldom 
trace the precise relation between cause
 and effect1 yet the considerations     
presently to be given lead to the       
conclusion that each modification must  
have its own distinct cause4 ,it is     
probable that variability of every kind 
is directly or indirectly caused by     
changed conditions of life4 ,or1 to put 
the case under another point of view1 if
 it were possible to expose all the     
individuals of a species during many    
generations to absolutely uniform       
conditions of life1 there would be no   
variability4444 ,the causes which induce
 variability act on the mature organism1
 on the embryo1 and1 as we have good    
reason to believe1 on both sexual       
elements before impregnation has been   

effected4 ,darwin further considers1 in 
this same book1 some of the probable    
particular causes of variation1 as given
 in climate and food4 ,and it may be    
remarked1 in this connection1 that      
,rolph's criticism of the impossibility 
of progress under conditions of want is 
irrelevant as applied to ,darwin1 since 
the latter himself says expressly3 ,of  
all causes which induce variability1    
excess of food1 whether or not changed  
in nature1 is probably the most         
powerful2#ii again3 ,we have reason to  
suspect that an habitual excess of      
highly nutritive food1 or an excess     
relatively to the wear and tear of the  
organization from exercise1 is a        
powerful exciting cause of              
variability4#ajj ,rolph's criticism is  
probably due to forgetfulness of the    
fact that ,darwin limited the struggle  
for existence to that of complete       
organisms with one another1 and that1   
under such a limitation of the          
conception to external struggle1 a      

condition of want cannot be conceived as
 necessarily precluding a monopoly of   
abundance by best-fitted individuals4   
,theories with regard to the special    
outer causes and resulting physiological
 conditions of variation have been      
gradually added to1 as facts on this    
score have accumulated4 ,but1 as        
investigation advances1 the question is 
seen to involve all the problems of the 
intricate chemical and mechanical nature
 of physiological structure in its      
manifold forms and degrees of           
organization4 ,the field stretches out  
in this direction1 under our            
contemplation1 to an indefinite         
distance2 and science appears as yet to 
have passed only the outer limits of its
 territory4  ,it is certain that the    
comparatively recent science of         
,physiological ,chemistry will have many
 of the decisive words to say on this   
score1 in the future4 ,when we see the  
symmetrical and complex outgrowths      
caused by a single atom of the poison of

 a gall-insect1 we may believe that     
slight changes in the chemical nature of
 the sap or blood would lead to         
extraordinary modifications of          
structure1 says the great seer of       
evolution himself4#aja  ,among special  
theories of ,evolution1 a distinction   
may be made between3 7#a7 such special  
theories as aim at biological           
simplification by reduction of all      
organic variation to one primary form of
 cellular process2 7#b7 such theories as
 are content with less ultimate laws1 by
 which the various ascertained forms of 
change are included in one general      
statement not involving special         
physiological or physical theory but    
applicable to all forms of life2 7#c7   
such theories as aim to give distinctive
 philosophic expression to a            
generalization like the last named1     
including in this statement both        
psychical and physiological phenomena2  
and 7#d7 such theories as aim at an     
ultimate expression of the direction of 

evolution that shall include the        
phenomena of life1 both physiological   
and psychical1 under one head with all  
other natural phenomena4 ,to the first  
class belong only provisional           
hypotheses1 among the best known of     
which are those of ,pangenesis1         
,perigenesis1 and the ,continuity of the
 ,germ-,plasm4 ,to the second1 which are
 not merely tentative but have a broad  
foundation in known fact1 belongs       
,haeckel's theory of ,inheritance and   
,adaptation1 a theory restated in       
substance1 from independent research1 by
 ,eimer1 whose ultimate general factors 
of analysis are the same with           
,haeckel's1 though he deals1 beyond     
these1 with special facts and special   
theories of his own4 ,phases of the     
second class often entitle them to      
inclusion in the third4 ,an example of  
the third class is found in ,spencer's  
definition1 ,life is the continual      
adjustment of inner relations to outer  
relations4 ,the fourth and last class   

includes ,fechner's ,tendency to        
,stability and ,spencer's theory of the 
rhythm of motion 7see his ,first        
,principles71 similar to which are      
certain ideas of ,zoellner1 ,du ,prel1  
and others2 and similar elements to     
which are to be found in ,haeckel's     
,plastidule-,theory4 ,in connection with
 this class1 reference may be made to an
 article by ,dr4 ,j4 ,petzoldt in the   
,vierteljahrschrift fuer                
wissenschaftliche ,philosophie under the
 title ,maxima1 ,minima1 und ,oekonomie1
 in which1 among others1 ,fechner's     
views especially are discussed with     
reference to an ultimate principle of   
evolution4 ,the first pages on the      
,tendency to ,stability in ,fechner's   
,ideas concerning the ,evolution of the 
,organic 7,einige ,ideen zur            
,schoepfungs- und                       
,entwicklungsgeschichte der ,organismen7
 are as follows3--  ,for the sake of    
brevity ,i call relations of position   
and motions recurring at regular        

periods1 that is after like intervals1  
in the particles forming a material     
system or in the centres of whole masses
 conceived as forming a larger system1  
'stable relations4' ,among such         
relations is to be reckoned the         
condition of rest of the particles or   
masses in relation to each other1 as the
 extreme case1 which we may call the    
state of 'absolute stability'2 while a  
dissipation of the particles or masses1 
to infinity1 in different directions1   
constitutes the other extreme of        
absolute instability4  ,we do not speak 
of 'absolute stability1' but of 'full   
stability1' in cases where motion still 
takes place1 but this brings            
continually1 in exactly the same periods
 of time1 the same relations of         
particles or masses1 not only as regards
 position1 but also as regards velocity 
and direction of the motion and change  
of velocity and direction4444  ,to      
absolute and full stability may be      
added1 as third case1 that of greater or

 less approach to full stability1 which 
we may term briefly 'aproximate         
stability'444 and of which we have an   
example in the chief bodies of our solar
 system4  ,it may serve as a            
simplification of the consideration of  
stable relations of motion to remark444 
that1 in an isolated system or one under
 constant outer conditions1 exactly or  
very nearly the same relations of       
velocity and direction recur when       
exactly or very nearly the same         
relations in the position of the        
particles or masses return4 ,as regards 
the velocity1 this follows directly from
 the principle of the conservation of   
energy2 as regards the direction1 it is 
indisputably possible to assume the     
connection of its recurrence with that  
of the other relations1 although ,i     
cannot remember that a direct general   
proof of this has been found4  ,with    
these introductory specifications in    
mind1 let us assume any number of       
material particles to be restricted1 by 

forces of some sort1 to motion within   
limited space1 and the system either    
withdrawn from outer influences or under
 such as are constant2 let us1 moreover1
 suppose the system undisturbed by the  
interference of psychic freedom1 or the 
latter impossible4 ,in such case1       
certain initial positions1 velocities1  
and directions of the parts of the      
system being assumed1 all following     
states will be determined by these4 ,and
 now1 if there are among these          
conditions1 either present at the       
beginning1 or attained in the course of 
the motion1 any such as have for their  
result a return of the same states after
 a given time1 then the motion1 and so  
also the positions of the parts         
conceived as at first undergoing        
alteration in form and velocity1 will1  
unless they contain the immediate       
condition of periodic recurrence1       
continue altering until those of all the
 possible states are reached which      
contain the condition of recurrence2    

until this point is attained1 the system
 will1 so to speak1 know no rest4 ,has  
the recurrence once taken place within a
 given time1 then it must always take   
place anew within the same time1 because
 the same conditions are there to       
determine it4 ,and since these          
conditions are determinative of the     
whole course of motion from one         
recurrence to the next1 the same course 
must be repeated2 that is1 in every like
 phase of the period a like state of    
motion will exist4 ,but this gives us   
full stability of the system1 a change1 
a deviation from the attained stability 
being possible only through changes in  
outer influences1 the assumed constancy 
of which rendered the attainment of     
stability possible4  ,this principle    
appears at first purely a priori2 but   
the assumption should not be overlooked 
that there are among the conditions     
determining the motion such as lead to  
their own recurrence1 and this is to be 
taken for granted1 since it is necessary

 to assume that a system must continue  
to change until1 but only until1 the    
conditions of full stability are        
attained1 in case it is attainable2 and 
that this full stability1 when once     
reached1 cannot be again destroyed by   
the action of the system itself4 ,the   
question presents itself as to how far  
calculation and experience permit us to 
lay down a more general principle4  ,in 
a system in which only two particles or 
masses1 withdrawn from outer influences1
 are determined to motion by mutual     
attraction and the influence of a       
primary impulse in another direction1   
calculation shows us that1 motion to    
infinity being excluded1 the attainment1
 and indeed the immediate attainment1 of
 full stability is a necessity2 and for 
swinging pendula and vibrating strings  
it may be calculated1 from the nature of
 the moving forces1 that they would     
remain in a condition of fully stable   
motion if outer resistance were removed2
 for1 such obstacles present1 they pass 

through an approximately stable         
condition to one of absolute stability4 
,the power of purely mathematical       
calculation does not go beyond such     
comparatively simple cases4444  ,but if 
we call experience to our aid1 it may be
 asserted1 in accordance with very      
general facts1 that1 in a system left to
 itself or under constant outer         
conditions1 and starting from any       
conceivable state1 if not full stability
 at least a greater or less             
approximation to it is reached as final 
condition1 from which no retrogression  
takes place through the inner workings  
of the system itself4 ,the tendency to  
approximately stable conditions appears1
 or the actual state is attained1       
according to the measure in which       
variable outer influences are withdrawn4
 ,so that so little is lacking to our   
hypothesis1 that1 although it has at    
this point to make up for the           
impossibility of perfect demonstration1 
we are nevertheless justified in laying 

down the following law or principle3--  
,in every system of material parts left 
to itself or under constant outer       
influences1 so1 then1 in the material   
system of the universe1 in so far as we 
regard it as isolated1 there takes      
place1 motion to infinity being         
excluded1 a continuous progress from    
more unstable to more stable conditions1
 up to the attainment of a final        
condition of full or approximate        
stability4  ,from the union of the      
principle thus stated and that of the   
conservation of energy it follows that  
no unlimited progress of the universe to
 absolute stability1 which consists in  
perfect rest of the parts1 can take     
place4444 ,the energy manifested in the 
universe cannot be altered1 in general1 
in its amount1 but only in the form in  
which it manifests itself4 ,it cannot be
 asserted that the attainment of full   
stability in the universe would be the  
attainment of an eternal rest1 but only 
of the most perfectly adjusted motions1 

and therefore such motions as would give
 rise to no variations4444 ,but a       
condition which brings with it eternal  
repetition cannot be reached in finite  
time4  ,to elucidation of this principle
 of the ,tendency to ,stability1 says   
,dr4 ,petzoldt analyzing ,fechner's     
work1 we have only to call to           
remembrance a number of natural         
phenomena1 such as the ebb and flow of  
the tide1 the circulation of moisture1  
periodic changes of temperature1 and so 
forth1 which exhibit great periods of   
approximate stability and in which we   
notice in general no retrogression4     
,not less does the constitution of      
organisms which are1 'so to speak1      
constituted dependent upon periodicity  
of their functions1 and so upon stable  
relations of their life1' serve to      
confirm the theory4 ,only the concept of
 stability must be extended in their    
case1 since not always the same1 but    
only substitutive parts of the organic  
systems tend towards stability4         

,experience never gives us an example of
 an isolated system2 on the contrary1   
every system is a part of higher        
systems4 ,the inner relations of its    
stability are not conditioned by its own
 parts only1 but also1 more or less1 by 
those of other systems1 so that the     
destruction of one part-system is always
 only in the direction towards the      
stability of a higher1 ultimately of the
 highest1 system2 that is1 of the system
 of the universe4  ,thus the            
teleological principle coincides with   
the principle of the ,tendency to       
,stability1 and at the same time the    
latter constitutes the link between the 
former and the law of ,causality4       
,though1 in truth1 this manner of       
looking at the matter signifies a       
generalization of the concept of 'end1' 
since it defines all stable conditions  
as ends4 ,the view is justified1        
however1 by the fact that the greatest  
possible physical satisfaction--for us1 
the criterion of teleology--is always   

bound up with the longest possible      
preservation or slow change of a stable 
organic condition4 ,the physical        
,tendency to ,stability 'bears with it a
 psychical tendency to the attainment   
and conservation of just those          
conditions' towards which the physical  
tendency is directed4  ,of the fact that
 ,lange feels the lack of the proof of  
this ',tendency to ,stability1' ,dr4    
,petzoldt says3 ,but how is there a need
 of proof here8 ,to prove is to refer   
back to known facts4 ,but what is there 
in ,fechner's remarks that stands in    
need of such a reference8 ,they simply  
draw our attention to the result of     
evolution as a state which bears1 in    
itself1 the guarantee of some           
continuance4 ,can any one contest this8 
,is there anything further to prove8 ,it
 is said that ,gauss once remarked that 
,lagrange's equations of motion are not 
proved1 but only historically stated4   
,the case is exactly the same here4 ,the
 fact is attested1 merely1 that         

evolution ends in a stable condition2   
and herein lies the pith and the great  
merit of the theory of the ,tendency to 
,stability4  ,dr4 ,petzoldt criticises1 
among other things1 especially          
,fechner's concept of approximate       
stability1 in that no distinction is    
made by the author between three        
different cases4 ,the first case        
comprises forms of motion in which      
periodicity is only approximate1 but in 
which1 nevertheless1 no retrogression in
 stability takes place2 this case is    
illustrated by our solar system4 ,the   
second case comprises forms of motion in
 which the stability increases up to a  
certain point1 but beyond this1 despite 
relative constancy in outer conditions1 
decreases again until complete          
destruction of the system supervenes2 an
 illustration of this form of motion is 
found in all organisms4 ,the third case 
comprises forms of motion which we      
cannot concede to be stable4 ,for1 if we
 ascribe periodic motion to pendula and 

musical strings which vibrate in a      
resisting medium1 this is nevertheless a
 periodicity1 which continually changes 
in the same sense1 and we certainly     
cannot say that pendula and strings     
approach1 in a resisting medium1 a      
condition of absolute1 through a        
condition of approximate1 stability4 ,we
 recognize in these vibrations1         
decreasing in amplitude1 merely unstable
 changes which tend toward a final      
stable condition1--namely that of rest4 
,the author finds a further ground of   
criticism in ,fechner's assertion that  
organisms are entirely dependent upon   
the periodicity of their functions4     
,only a part of such functions are      
periodic4 ,periodicity is not           
conceivable without stability1 but      
stability is conceivable without        
periodicity4  ,in the process of        
evolution towards a stable form of      
movement1 ,dr4 ,petzoldt recognizes     
briefly two factors1 ,tendency and      
,competition4#ajb ,tendency is defined1 

in general1 as the direction1 actual or 
potential1 of material parts or of      
mental or physical function2            
competition1 as the conflict of         
tendencies1 from which a tendency of a  
higher order results4 ,the concept of   
,competition is1 like that of ,tendency1
 to be taken in a general significance4 
,a number of forces which act upon a    
single point compete4 ,different mental 
images1 observations1 concepts1 laws1   
come into competition1 from which result
 concepts and laws of lower and higher  
orders4 ,the struggle for existence is  
only a special case of competition4     
,though this often ends with the        
immediate or gradual destruction of     
systems entering upon it1 nevertheless  
only a middle worth between all the     
competing tendencies can be ascribed to 
the resultant4 ,even the conqueror is1  
after the struggle1 other than what he  
was before it2 a part of the tendency   
destroyed by him lives on in him1 has   
combined with his original tendency to a

 resultant4 ,tendencies can as little   
disappear without compensation as can   
forces1 whether the compensation        
consists in a strengthening or in a     
weakening of others1 and the            
conservation of competing tendencies    
might be regarded as a further          
qualitative addition to the law of the  
conservation of force4 ,hence1 in the   
examination of the effects of the       
struggle for existence1 the like claim  
of all tendencies taking part in it is  
not to be left out of consideration4    
,each makes its full force felt4 ,but   
not all attain to competition2 of the   
numerous tendencies bound up in one     
organism1 only a few unite1 in the      
single case1 to a resultant1 which has a
 direction towards a definite issue4    
,the less the opposition of competing   
tendencies of concepts or laws1 the less
 the deviation of the resultant from its
 components1 and the less the change    
these have to undergo4 ,the higher      
concepts and laws are1 the less are the 

number of distinguishing marks which    
they take from all single conceptions2  
for they are the resultants of very     
strongly opposed components4#ajc        
,fechner's views are related to1 and1 to
 some extent1 dependent upon1 certain   
ones of ,zoellner adduced in connection 
with a consideration of sun-spots4#ajd  
,du ,prel1 who also acknowledges special
 indebtedness to ,zoellner1 attempted in
 his ,struggle for ,existence in the    
,heavens 7,der ,kampf ums ,dasein am    
,himmel7 to demonstrate the fact of a   
struggle and selection among the        
heavenly bodies analogous to that       
claimed for life upon the earth4 ,the   
title of the book was afterwards changed
 to ,the ,history of the ,evolution of  
the ,universe1#aje its scope having     
grown far beyond the limit of the former
 title4 ,du ,prel finds one of the chief
 advantages of an application of        
,darwinian ideas to astronomy in the    
fact that1 unlike our earth1 the heavens
 in their immensity afford us existing1 

or to our eye existing1 examples of the 
various stages of their evolution1 in   
nebular mist1 comets1 suns1 fixed stars1
 planets1 rings1 and moons1--all subject
 to processes of development1 which we  
may to some extent observe4 ,in the     
first chapter of this book1 ,du ,prel   
says3 ,the existing condition of the    
,cosmos with respect to all forms of the
 ,purposeful#ajf--whether we regard the 
realm of the organic or the             
inorganic--can be looked upon only as an
 attained1 moving equilibrium of forces4
 ,immanent in ,nature lies the capacity 
to develop from chaotic conditions to   
teleologic forms2 for1 in the ceaseless 
play of forces1 all other than such     
combinations are by their nature given  
over to destruction1 while it lies1 on  
the contrary1 in the essence of all     
purposeful combinations to be preserved4
 ,in every system of mechanical forces  
an adjustment of the same must finally  
be arrived at through the removal of all
 immanent oppositions4 ,it is impossible

 for nature to remain in chaotic        
conditions4 ,every system of forces     
tends to a state of equilibrium4 ,this  
is as true of the conflict of images in 
a human brain1 from whose mutual        
accommodation the resultant of a unified
 theory of the universe arises1 as of   
oppositions in the social organism1 of  
the conditions of power and civilization
 of neighboring peoples1 of the         
meteorologic states of the earth1 of the
 mechanical forces of a solar system1 or
 the atoms of a cosmic mist4 ,every war 
of the elements ends with an adjustment 
of ideal justice1 for every 'moment' of 
force has influence proportioned to its 
power and the duration of its           
activity4#ajg  ,there is one portion of 
,fechner's theory as above stated 7its  
metaphysical phases being beyond the    
scope of the present chapter have not   
been touched upon7 that raises a        
question which may perhaps appear to    
have in itself no special significance1 
but which nevertheless opens up1 by its 

implications1 new fields of inquiry1 and
 may possibly lead to further theory4   
,the condition of stability which       
evolution in the universe as a whole    
gradually approaches but can never      
attain to in finite time is declared1   
namely1 to be one not of rest1 but of   
motion4 ,a question might be raised1    
here1 as to the definition of the       
infinite time asserted to be necessary  
to the attainment of such full          
stability1--whether the phrase be used  
in the mathematical or the philosophic  
sense2 and the question would be found1 
,i believe1 to involve the unanswerable 
problem of the finite or infinite       
character of the universe in space4 ,of 
a universe conceived under the          
philosophic concept of spatial          
infinitude1 obviously no final state as 
the result of evolution can be          
predicated1 the evolution supposing a   
progress which1 as involving infinite   
matter1 cannot be accomplished in finite
 time4 ,if we1 however1 conceive the    

universe as occupying finite space and  
undergoing continual evolution as a     
whole in the direction of equilibrium1  
it is a question whether the end must   
not be attained in finite time4 ,for a  
universe conceived as finite1 however   
immense1 there must be a finite number1 
however great1 representing the changes 
necessary to the attainment of final    
equilibrium2 and if progress in the     
direction of such equilibrium is of     
necessity continual1 the final          
equilibrium must be attainable in finite
 time4 ,the question of the nature of   
such a state of final1 universal        
stability is bound up with the problem  
of motion through a perfect void1 and of
 the possibility of the formation of    
such a void through the concentration of
 matter4 ,leaving out of consideration  
the problem in its metaphysical form1   
which concerns the possibility of       
conceiving inter-material space1 it may 
be said that it is not now supposed that
 the heavenly bodies move through an    

absolute void2 and the existence of any 
medium opposing resistance1 however     
slight1 is a condition rendering        
impossible the attainment of absolute   
stability of motion or a full stability 
which suffers no diminution and is1     
therefore1 in effect1 an absolute       
stability4 ,it may be questioned whether
 the very nature of motion is not       
coincident with change1 and this with   
action and reaction1 or competition4    
,such a view would reduce evolution to a
 single ultimate principle1 in place of 
,darwin's ,variation and ,selection     
through struggle1 or ,petzoldt's        
,tendency and ,competition4 ,we should  
have left1 instead of these1 only the   
final principle involved in moving      
matter considered in its ultimate parts4
 ,the metaphysical problem of the       
infinite divisibility of matter need not
 here concern us2 the ultimate parts of 
an organism could not be1 however1 its  
organs as ,lewes defined them1 but      
rather1 from a positive standpoint1 the 

ultimate units recognized by science in 
cell and cell-parts4 ,we may1 indeed1   
since we know no beginning of motion1   
legitimately regard all tendency as     
itself resultant4 ,just as we cannot    
separate matter and motion1 except by   
abstraction from reality1 so1 too1 we   
cannot conceive of motion except as     
having definite direction2 and thus we  
arrive1 by a final analysis1 at the     
ultimate philosophic principles of      
matter and its motion4 ,i use these     
terms in no metaphysical sense1 but     
merely as generic terms including under 
one head specific forms of material     
combination and the specific forms of   
motion of their wholes or parts4  ,the  
question of the character of a conceived
 state of final equilibrium may be      
approached from a somewhat different    
side1 though the emphasis falls1 as     
before1 on the solidarity of the        
universe and the nature of motion as    
change4 ,we may1 for instance1 regard   
the earth as an isolated system whose   

isolation makes possible the continual  
progress of the evolution taking place  
on its surface4 ,but this whole         
evolution is1 on the other hand1        
dependent upon the light and heat of the
 sun4 ,again1 the sun is undergoing an  
evolution whose continuous progress may 
be regarded as in a certain sense       
dependent upon isolation2 but we see1 on
 reflection1 that this very process is  
the result of the cooling nature of the 
sun's surroundings1 and that it is      
sending its motion in every direction   
through space4 ,the moon1 which has     
passed through both the evolution that  
the sun is undergoing and that which is 
in progress upon the earth1 is now      
passing through another stage which the 
earth must reach in time by diffusion of
 its atmosphere1 in case its destruction
 is not accomplished by some            
catastrophic event before the arrival of
 that distant period4 ,suns and planets1
 all the heavenly bodies1 are sending   
their influence in every direction      

through the unfathomable depths of      
space2 and just as the capacity of the  
earth to be warmed by the influence of  
the sun involves its reciprocal capacity
 to act as a cooling medium for that    
body1 so the conditions throughout the  
universe must be regarded as everywhere 
interdependent and mutually implying one
 another4 ,thus we again arrive finally 
at a universal action and reaction among
 the parts of the universe1 all motion  
implying change of the direction of     
motion4 ,or1 since we may and are1 in   
fact1 obliged to regard every direction 
or form of motion as a resultant1--for  
of motion as of matter we know no       
absolute beginning1--even this simple   
assumption may supply us with the       
conclusion which we have reached in a   
more roundabout way4 ,we may regard     
motion in any direction as              
counterbalanced by a resistance in every
 other direction sufficient to produce  
it in this one2 in other words1 motion  
takes place at every instant1 in the    

direction of least resistance1 even     
though this direction may represent1 in 
the next instant1 through the action of 
new moments of force1 the greatest      
resistance4 ,any direction as well as   
any change of direction implies1 then1  
resistance2 resistance is equivalent to 
the interference of force1 or1 in other 
words1 to competition2 and competition  
may1 at any moment1 become catastrophe4 
,the difference between competition and 
catastrophe is one merely of degree1 or 
rather it is a subjective difference    
depending upon the point of view of the 
observer4 ,in other words1 all that we  
can testify to is a certain periodicity 
of motion1 all motion meeting with      
resistance1 the accumulation of which   
finally induces motion in another sense4
 ,larger periodicities are made up of   
smaller periodicities1 and1 according to
 the point of view taken1 any period of 
such motion may be regarded as an       
evolution1 that which ,fechner terms    
full stability being only the maximum   

towards which motion during that period 
tends4 ,absolute stability can be       
conceived only as perfect rest1 whether 
we conceive it as merely an abstraction1
 its realization as rendered impossible 
by the conservation of energy1 or       
whether we conceive it as possible in a 
universe regarded as finite2 an absolute
 stability of motion is a               
self-contradiction1 and a full stability
 which knows no retrogression is equally
 a self-contradiction4 ,periodicity is1 
then1 all into which the ,tendency to   
,stability resolves itself for nature as
 we know it4  ,we perceive1 in the      
actual universe1 the fact of a certain  
imperfect periodicity4 ,this wave form  
of movement in great and little plays1  
as ,spencer has shown far more          
elaborately than ,fechner1 a large part 
in the universe4  ,but the evident fact 
of a present periodicity of imperfect   
form suggests another possible          
conception4 ,we are under no necessity  
to regard the universe as finite either 

in space or time4 ,on the contrary4 ,we 
tend naturally to conceive of it as     
finite after the analogy of particular  
things which we perceive continually to 
arise and perish2 but as concerns space1
 we have no knowledge of any limit1 and1
 as concerns time1 the conception of any
 actual beginning or end to the universe
 as a whole is only the ancient naive   
idea which science has disproved in     
showing that neither matter nor motion  
ever perish4 ,an infinite universe is   
conceivable1 in which not exactly the   
same but very similar forms1 or forms of
 which the successive ones closely      
resemble each other though those widely 
separated may be very dissimilar1       
continue to arise and be destroyed to   
all eternity4 ,the conception of a      
primal nebular mist is not a necessary  
inference from astronomic phenomena2 it 
is as easy and as logical to regard the 
various phases of planetary development 
revealed to us by the telescope as so   
many phases of an evolution and         

dissolution continually recurring in    
different parts of the universe1 one    
extreme of which is represented by the  
nebular mist1 the other by the cold and 
lifeless remains of planets gradually   
suffering dissolution as they revolve   
through space4 ,the greater the         
immensity of the universe is conceived  
to be1 the nearer our conception of it  
must approach to this type4 ,but the    
term ,tendency to ,stability is         
misapplied when applied to such infinite
 and imperfect periodicity--to the      
motion1 thus conceived1 of the universe 
as a whole4  ,the periodicity in the    
life of organic species may be compared 
to the wave-motions of light and heat as
 distinguished from those of water1 the 
individual representing the single      
wave-length4 ,the analogy is not1       
however1 intended--to speak with        
,bacon--as one of nature1 but merely as 
one of mind4 ,and just here it may be   
questioned whether ,fechner may not have
 been right1 after all1 in his assertion

 of the dependency of the organism upon 
periodicity of function1 whether the    
periodic character of the individual    
life1 dependent1 as it must be supposed 
to be1 on adaptation to a medium to some
 degree resisting1 does not sacrifice   
its stability in so far as the          
increments of resistance lack           
uniformity4 ,this is evidently the case 
in large relations2 is it not logically 
necessary to suppose it so in minute    
relations1 though the fact may not be so
 evident to the coarse measurement of   
the senses8 ,experience seems to prove  
that an approximate periodicity in      
larger relations1 is most consistent    
with health2 and it must be remembered  
that the non-periodic relations are     
subordinated to periodic ones1 that not 
only in the case of waking and sleeping1
 working and eating1 but also in those  
of rest and labor1 a certain uniformity 
is necessary to the best mental and     
physical condition4 ,a close observation
 will1 ,i think1 reveal a greater       

periodicity than was at first suspected2
 since much of it is of so-called       
automatic1 unconscious1 or              
half-conscious nature4 ,it is to be     
noticed1 here1 that the termination of  
individual lives is often in the nature 
of a catastrophe1 and a uniform         
periodicity of individual development   
and decay cannot be assigned1 except in 
the form of an average that falls much  
below the figure attained by the        
thoroughly healthy individual4 ,there is
 every reason to believe that if we     
could sleep1 rise1 eat1 bathe1 exercise1
 work1 and rest with the regularity of a
 clock1 we should be the better for it  
physically4 ,but the irregularities     
outside the province of our will-power  
render it impossible for us to order our
 lives in this manner4 ,nor do we desire
 to do so4 ,for these very              
irregularities1 as representing greater 
or less change to which adaptation is   
necessary1 are1 in many cases and within
 certain lines1 the conditions and signs

 of progress2 though they may constitute
 in other cases and beyond these        
lines--that is1 where they are of too   
great intensity or duration--conditions 
of retrogression1 the imperfection in   
periodicity becoming catastrophe1 which 
may extend beyond the individual to his 
offspring4 ,we may thus infer that the  
final destruction of the individual     
organism is conditioned by its own      
progress and the progress of its        
species1 but that on the other hand1    
when the destruction of the individual  
is too abrupt1 it may mean catastrophe  
to the species also1 or at least to a   
part of it1 through heredity4  ,our     
considerations so far have been of a    
nature to convince us that not          
isolation1 but a constancy in the       
continual action of like relatively     
small increments of force in the same   
directions1 is the condition of steady  
evolution4 ,the less constant and the   
larger the increments1 the nearer the   
changes involved resemble catastrophe1  

though the catastrophes themselves may  
be regarded in another light as forming 
part of an evolution of a higher order4 
,the changes the sun is undergoing may  
be regarded as evolution in so far as   
the influence of the cooling medium is a
 constant one4 ,the earth as a whole and
 in its parts may be regarded as passing
 through a process of evolution towards 
full stability in so far as the sun's   
heat is a constant quantity1 the        
periodic changes of seasons and of day  
and night the same4 ,the relation would 
seem1 therefore1 to be one of time--the 
time-relation involved in the duration  
of outer conditions as constant with    
reference to the period required for the
 attainment of stability4 ,thus the     
sun's influence upon the earth might    
appear approximately constant to the    
human individual1 but might represent a 
rapid change in relation to some        
stupendous and long-continued evolution 
in some other part of the universe4     
,considerations which we have already   

noticed forbid our regarding any        
conditions of full as distinguished from
 absolute stability as anything other   
than peculiar states single in the      
system and thus unenduring maxima       
succeeded by decrease1 although the     
process may be1 with reference to any   
other particular process1 so slow1 the  
retrogression from the culminating point
 so gradual1 as to be1 with respect to  
this other process1 inappreciable4  ,and
 while we are busied with matters which 
involve the whole multiplicity of       
relations in the universe1 just a word  
with reference to cause and effect4     
,which one of these myriad material     
parts interacting at any moment shall we
 single out as the cause of the         
succeeding state8 ,the solidarity of the
 universe as far as the complete        
interdependence of all its parts is     
concerned is clear to us4 ,it is true we
 cannot reckon with all factors of the  
universe at once2 and the concept of    
cause and effect is therefore a useful  

one4 ,but the cause of anything must be1
 from a positive point of view1 just    
what the methods prescribed for its     
discovery in any particular case shows  
it to be3 namely1 a factor1 merely1 in  
the manifold conditions determining a   
following state1 the removal of which   
means the prevention of the succession  
of exactly that state4 ,which1 for      
instance1 shall we regard as the cause  
of an evil act--the character of a man  
or the temptation offered by            
circumstances8 ,the change or removal of
 either means the change or removal of  
the act4 ,neither is complete without   
the other1 and both are involved in the 
whole complexity of the universe1       
through heredity on the one hand and the
 action of nature external to life on   
the other4  ,and just here we may glance
 at ,spencer's definition of life as the
 continual adjustment of inner relations
 to outer relations4 ,though emphasizing
 an important side of evolution1 it is  
evidently incomplete4 ,evolution is not 

only the adjustment of inner relations  
to outer relations1 it is also the      
adjustment of outer relations to inner  
relations as well as of inner relations 
among themselves2 or it is a process of 
mutual adjustment of all the parts      
engaged in it4  ,our analysis1 though   
crude and imperfect1 may now be regarded
 as complete4 ,our scope will not allow 
of a more elaborate one4 ,it is fitting1
 therefore1 that we proceed to          
synthesis4 ,the first matter which      
presents itself to us1 in this          
connection1 is the theory of ,heredity  
and ,adaptation mentioned above4  ,the  
theory is not a new one1 wholly outside 
,darwin's conception of evolution4 ,the 
concept of ,adaptation represents simply
 the generalization of all those special
 causes with which ,darwin more         
particularly occupied himself1 and is1  
in essence1 only a proclamation of that 
universal subjection to natural law     
which ,darwin himself plainly asserted4 
,as such a4 generalization it is1       

however1 a useful one2 it furnishes us  
with an expression1 for the organic     
world1 of that universal action and     
reaction through which opposing forces  
move towards stability by mutual        
adjustment4  ,the law of ,heredity1     
again1 may be regarded as an organic    
expression of the more general principle
 according to which motion that1 in the 
sense defined above1 suffers only a     
minimum of interference1 that is1 motion
 which1 by a certain equilibrium of     
mutual relations1 is approximately or   
fully stable1 tends to continue to take 
place in nearly the same directions1 or 
nearly to repeat itself4 ,it is thus    
apparent1 also1 that ,heredity is       
closely related to the more special     
principle of ,habit1 or also of ,use and
 ,disuse1 if only we remember that1     
whatever the metaphysical truths of     
,freedom or ,determination1 the         
psychical is always accompanied by what 
may be called equivalents of the        
physical under natural law4 ,the special

 laws of ,heredity are still enveloped  
in mystery2 ,i refer1 not to that       
mystery which may be regarded as        
surrounding all ultimate facts1 if we   
choose to conceive them as expressing or
 concealing something further           
unknowable1 but to the scientific       
mystery of ignorance1 which time may    
dissolve4 ,biologists disagree on this  
question1 the ultimate decision of which
 must be left to them4 ,still some      
general criticism on the results of     
research in this direction may be       
allowable from a philosophic standpoint4
  ,the chief point at issue between     
various theories of ,heredity seems to  
be the degree of importance to be       
attached to ,adaptation3 however we may 
express the question1 this is the       
ultimate form to which it is reducible4 
,now it is obvious1 from the foregoing  
analysis1 that the form of theory which 
would be most useful to us1 if such were
 attainable1 would be one in which the  
degree of tendency to inheritance as    

well as the strength of inherited       
tendency is expressed in terms of the   
intensity and duration of exercise1 use1
 function1 habit1 or form of motion or  
action 7however we may choose to term   
it72 and variation is regarded as the   
resultant of such tendency and change in
 the environment1 or1 in other words1   
deviation from constancy of influence4  
,it may be useful to inquire to what    
extent such a general theory is         
authorized by special ones4  ,we have   
the testimony of two of the acknowledged
 greatest authorities--,darwin and      
,haeckel--as well as that of a score of 
other biologists1 and specialists in    
related branches1 to the inheritance of 
peculiarities acquired during the life  
of the individual4#ajh ,eimer lays      
especial stress on the fact1 long       
witnessed to by one class of            
specialists1 of the hereditary character
 of brain-diseases1 among which may be  
reckoned some that are without doubt due
 to direct influence of the             

environment4#aji ,haeckel and ,eimer    
even instance cases in which mutilation 
has been inherited4#aaj ,one such       
instance would be sufficient1 in        
overthrowing the general denial of the  
inheritance of individual adaptation1 to
 make probable the direct influence of  
the environment in other cases1 the     
uniformity discoverable in the workings 
of natural law leading us to suppose    
that the one instance would not be      
isolated4 ,it must have weight1 too1 as 
an argument1 in the judgment of many    
doubtful cases4 ,not one such case alone
 is furnished us1 however1 but many     
well-authenticated ones4 ,and it is to  
be remarked that even ,weismann has     
gradually parted from his original      
theory1 recognizing more and more       
clearly the element of adaptation in    
inheritance4 ,it seems open to question1
 indeed1 whether ,weismann's theory1 in 
withdrawing the germ-plasm from the     
direct influence of the environment with
 which the parent individual is in      

contact does not exempt it from the     
universal law of action and reaction4   
,eimer designates such an opposition as 
,weismann postulates of the germ-plasm  
to the rest of the organism as a        
physiological miracle1 and the          
artificial line thus drawn between the  
germ-cells before and after the         
beginning of development as opposed to  
that conformity to law shown in the     
morphological and physiological unity of
 living beings4#aaa ,ancient ideas      
seldom conceived of a universality of   
action and reaction2 and ancient belief1
 isolating phenomena1 invested each with
 some special guiding power4 ,this      
belief was maintained as the conception 
of a special vital force long after the 
increasing knowledge of nature had      
caused it to be abandoned with regard to
 inorganic phenomena2 and the theory of 
the continuity of the germ-plasm seems  
to be a survival1 with regard to the    
comparatively unexplored province of    
,embryology1 of the idea of such a      

force4  ,the elements of which the      
organism is composed are not strange    
essences or entities peculiar to the    
organic2 they are the same with those of
 inorganic matter1 though their         
combinations differ somewhat from these1
 both in chemical composition and in the
 morphological arrangement of the       
composites4 ,we can easily conceive     
these differences as cooerdinate with   
differences of general form and         
function2 but it is inconceivable that  
the continual assimilation of matter in 
growth should be at any time without    
result in function1 however             
comparatively small this result may be  
in higher forms representing an         
accumulation of energy from previous    
conditions4 ,the separation of form and 
function is an abstraction1 as is that  
of matter and motion2 we cannot suppose 
the connection of particular functions  
with particular forms1--particular      
organization1--to be accidental1 any    
more than we can suppose the particular 

properties of particular inorganic      
composites and elements to be accidental
 or these particular properties to be   
without result in the organic matter    
into which the particular composites and
 elements are taken up4  ,the           
environment must contain complementary  
conditions of function in order that the
 individual may even come into existence
 and survive at all4 ,the great question
 is1 then1 how much is to be allowed for
 original tendency in primal organisms  
and how much is to be reckoned to the   
account of the action of the environment
 in the course of evolution4 ,even if we
 go back beyond the organic1 assuming a 
development of the organic from the     
inorganic1 we must come1 in the last    
analysis1 to irresolvable elements whose
 motion1 as distinct and particular     
action and reaction1 must have definite 
form4 ,if we begin with a supposititious
 simple organism conceived as           
lowest1--the primal form to which the   
name organism may be applied1--we must  

likewise conceive of this as embodying  
motion distinctive as its form1 which   
may be regarded as concomitant and      
cooerdinate with that form1--or1 that   
is1 as function4 ,the ultimate elements 
of this organism represent positive     
factors and the primal organism itself  
must be regarded as a positive factor   
7or positive composite7 without which   
the evolution of highest organisms would
 be impossible4 ,we may1 therefore1     
regard it as in this sense embracing the
 potentialities of evolution4 ,but are  
we to regard it as representing         
potentiality in a further sense--in the 
sense that1 beyond the particular       
life-motion cooerdinate with its        
particular composition and form1 it     
represents an independent force that    
prefigures the whole animate evolution8 
,to such an assumption the              
analogy--which is something far more    
than a mere analogy--of ,embryology     
logically reduces us1 on ,weismann's    
theory1 unless we assume a fixity of    

species that practically does away with 
the whole theory of ,evolution and      
returns to the original darkness that on
 which ,darwin threw light4 ,or1 if we  
leave out of account this analogy and   
begin with sexual propagation1 the      
problem1 on ,weismann's theory1 is very 
nearly as difficult4 ,are we to look    
upon the conditions involved in the     
environment as mere negatives and simply
 developing the positive potentialities 
of the germ-plasm8 ,if we resolve the   
environment into its elements1 even the 
ultimate analysis must show it composed 
of positive factors of matter and       
motion1 each one of which has its full  
worth in any resultant of incidence4    
,the positivity of these elements takes 
from the primal germ-plasm any          
superiority of potentiality2 the        
potentiality lies also in the           
environment4 ,that the organism is in   
constant contact with the environment is
 evident2 and that this contact1        
involving incidence of force1 cannot be 

without result1 and result representing 
a full equivalent of all the factors1 is
 also evident4 ,it may seem as if we    
could understand human progress1 or     
progress in other species1 in the       
limited province open to direct         
observation1 on ,weismann's theory2 but 
evolution as a whole becomes1 on this   
theory1 a mystery1 and indeed1 as ,eimer
 terms it1 a miracle4 ,logical          
consistency thus tells against the      
theory2 and undeniable exceptions to its
 fundamental conception1 furnished by   
such authorities as ,darwin and         
,haeckel1 raise a further presumption   
against it1 that1 taken in connection   
with the logical inconsistencies        
noticed1 constitutes the strongest      
probability against its truth4  ,the    
general experience of mankind has       
recognized1 in a thousand ways1 that the
 individual is a creature of habit4 ,the
 strength of the muscle1 the cunning of 
hand or eye or ear1 mental acuteness1   
and even liability to temptation in any 

direction1 or1 on the other hand1 moral 
strength1 all are coincident with       
exercise within the bounds set by the   
normal of the organ1--that is1 within   
its ability to repair its waste in      
labor1 an ability defined by the        
food-supply and its power of            
assimilation2 for even the moral        
struggle that is so great as to exhaust 
physically ends in a weakness which may 
represent the very condition of conquest
 by the temptation opposed1 if this     
present itself again before the system  
has had time to repair its loss4 ,we may
 regard this weakness as a lessening of 
force in one particular direction1 the  
resultant of action deviating in favor  
of the other of the opposing forces or  
tendencies manifested in the struggle4  
,in this connection ,i cannot do better 
than refer to the ,kritik der reinen    
,erfahrung already mentioned1 in which  
the influence of the environment on the 
individual is minutely traced4 ,the     
special feature of the work is its      

entire freedom from the thousand        
metaphysical implications which have    
gradually gathered about our            
philosophical vocabulary and which      
render it well-nigh impossible to write 
from any new standpoint without danger  
of misunderstanding4 ,this perspicuity  
and exactness are secured by a new      
vocabulary which may seem at first      
glance1 on account of its unfamiliarity1
 elaborate and incomprehensible1 but    
which is1 when mastered1 the greatest   
possible aid to understanding4          
,nevertheless1 the terminology of the   
book and the exceeding closeness of its 
analysis1 while rendering it peculiarly 
valuable to the expert in ,philosophy1  
place it beyond the grasp of the average
 reader2 and ,ethics is a science which 
concerns1 not the specialist in         
,philosophy alone1 but all thinking     
minds4  ,the influence of exercise even 
beyond the individual has long been     
recognized4 ,lamarck advanced the theory
 that the development of organs and     

their force of action is in ratio to    
their employment4 ,darwin also laid     
stress1 particularly in his later works1
 on ,use and ,disuse1 but he often      
defined the term more specifically than 
many other authors1 ,lamarck among them1
 seem to have done4 ,the very mass and  
magnitude of ,darwin's knowledge made   
it1 as ,huxley has said1 somewhat       
unwieldy1 and1 in diverting the         
attention to minute features1 sometimes 
prevented distinctness in broad         
generalizations2 the very virtue of     
,darwin's work conditioned also its     
defect4 ,if we begin with the general   
theory of use and disuse1 we may regard 
each present form of organic action or  
function1 whether conscious or          
unconscious1 as in some manner the      
result of exercise1 the processes of    
food-taking1 digestion1 repair of waste1
 being classed1 not as1 in any case1    
mere negative reactions1 but as positive
 organic functions4 ,if we apply the    
term habit to all these1 it is evident  

that we must1 in so doing1 extend the   
significance of the word beyond its     
ordinary interpretation4 ,from our      
present point of view1 such an extension
 of meaning might be claimed to be      
legitimate2 the question here is1 in    
reality1 only one of expediency1 namely1
 whether it is not better to retain the 
more specific significance of the word4 
,it may be useful1 at least1 to indicate
 the relations of ,habit to ,use and    
,disuse4 ,in its ordinary               
interpretation1 the term habit refers   
more particularly to a form of action   
acquired during the life of the         
individual1 and may be used to imply the
 action of the will in its formation1 or
 may simply have in view the organic    
concomitants of whatever mental action  
is included in such formation4 ,since   
our present standpoint supposes a       
certain equivalence of the mental and   
physical1 that is1 uniformity in their  
connection 7without entering into the   
question of their dependence or         

independence1 or considering which1 in  
case of dependence1 is to be regarded as
 dependent1 which as fundamental and    
independent71 we may leave for the      
moment the mental side of function out  
of account1 to take it up later4        
,darwin's definition of habit was1 as we
 have seen1 no distinct and invariable  
one1 and while he speaks of inherited   
habit1 referring both to forms of action
 acquired during the life of the        
individual and to such acquired through 
use favored by constancy of environment 
during several generations1 it is not   
always plain whether he has in mind the 
action of the will1 or only its organic 
equivalents4 ,he inclines1 like many    
other authors1 to give prominence to the
 physical side of action in lower       
species1 to the mental side in higher4  
,if we use the term habit in the sense  
of tendency to function acquired by use1
 we employ what is certainly a useful   
terminology1 yet we are in danger1 if we
 do not carefully define our terms1 of  

elevating to the position of a reality  
an abstraction that has none4 ,function 
and ,tendency to ,function are not      
separable2 the distinction is not an    
inner1 but an outer one1 of favorable or
 unfavorable environment by which       
tendency to function becomes function or
 vice versa4 ,to habit1 then1 we can    
attach1 from our present standpoint1 no 
distinctive implication beyond that of  
individual acquirement1--an implication 
obviously not fundamental in a theory of
 organic function4 ,use and disuse are  
rather the fundamental concepts with    
which1 in a consideration of function   
under ,heredity and ,adaptation1 we have
 to do4  ,but1 in this connection1 it is
 also obvious that1 when we1 from our   
point of view1 distinguish between the  
organism as acted on by the environment 
and the environment as acting1 we make a
 distinction that may be both useful and
 necessary for many purposes1 but that  
is yet an arbitrary one4 ,the organism  
is not the dependent1 passive1 the      

environment the independent1 formative  
factor in the process of development1   
the organism is not purely reactive1 the
 environment active1 but the two are    
interactive2 and from their interaction 
arises change1 as resultant1 in both    
organism and environment4 ,so1 too1 if  
we return to ,fechner's conception1 the 
separation of function as effect from   
use and disuse as cause is an arbitrary 
one4 ,every function1 as representing a 
state of more or less perfect1 moving   
equilibrium1 may be regarded either as  
the final form issuing from a long      
process of action and reaction or1 as   
determined at present1 by such a        
comparative constancy of all its        
conditions as makes the line followed by
 the resultant approximately a          
repetition of that which it has followed
 before2 and we may lay stress upon     
either the inferior resistance in this  
line or the continual application of    
superior force1 the accumulation of     
energy1 in its direction4 ,use or       

exercise is function2 long continuance  
of the same or approximately the same   
form of function may be regarded as     
concomitant with a certain constancy of 
environment1 sufficient to furnish the  
complementary condition always          
necessary4 ,the present form of function
 may be regarded as the result of an    
evolution of function in the sense that 
it is the end-form assumed by the same1 
but not in a sense that separates it    
from previous forms of function by a    
distinction of kind2 since each of these
 may be regarded1 in like manner1 as the
 result of the preceding evolution4 ,as 
in the definition of ,habit1 so in that 
of ,use1 the element of animal will or  
of a distinct vital principle is likely 
to be consciously or unconsciously      
included1 lending it thus a superior    
significance to that of mere organic    
function regarded as its result4 ,again 
it must be said1 however1 that1 whatever
 the metaphysical truth of freedom1 will
 does not interfere with the equivalence

 of physical conditions and results or  
prevent perfect uniformity of relation  
between the physical and the psychical1 
and that a special vital force cannot be
 demonstrated4 ,disuse may be defined   
either as the mere discontinuance of    
,use or as ,use in a sense opposed to   
the form of function particularly under 
consideration4  ,the idea of some       
special vital principle doubtless has   
its origin in the mysterious tendency of
 every organic form to develop along    
certain lines4 ,the mystery involved is 
here1 again1 besides that of ultimate   
fact on which the metaphysician lays    
stress1 the lack of the ability of      
present science to furnish such a       
description of the process as shall     
resolve it into its elements and        
demonstrate the uniformities of relation
 among these elements in this last      
analysis4 ,but it is to be remarked that
 the metaphysician is apt to confuse    
these two meanings of the word mystery1 
and regard the mystery of the organism  

as a greater metaphysical one than that 
of simpler processes whose elements are 
better known2 and this in spite of the  
fact that he himself does not at all    
deny the uniformity in natural process  
which we term ,law1 or expect to find it
 less in an ultimate analysis than in a 
more superficial one4 ,we understand the
 simple parallelogram by which the      
physicist represents to us the action of
 two forces at incidence1 we may        
represent to ourselves the motion of any
 one of the heavenly bodies as the      
resultant of the centrifugal and        
centripetal forces1 but when we come to 
consider the formation of a crystal1 and
 watch the regularity of shape and      
grouping1 this very uniformity which had
 been before an explanation now seems   
all at once to represent an insoluble   
mystery separating the process forever  
from those others4 ,the more complicated
 the process becomes1 the more the      
mystery appears to increase1 until we   
build up1 out of a negative ignorance1  

some positive new entity to baffle us4  
,and yet neither do we deny1 as has been
 said1 the constancy of nature in its   
most final elements1 nor can it at all  
be shown or supposed that those simpler 
processes we seemed to understand were  
less along fixed lines than the more    
complicated ones4 ,if we grant1 then1   
the insoluble mystery of the            
transcendental meaning of things claimed
 by the metaphysician1 we cannot admit  
the presence of this mystery in the     
organic more than in the inorganic1 nor 
discover in the science of the former   
any further element lacking than in that
 of the latter1 except a remediable     
ignorance which1 when remedied1 can only
 reveal in new particulars the workings 
of natural law4 ,it may be remarked1 in 
this connection1 that those who are so  
ready to claim the workings of some     
special force or power in the           
development of the organism make no     
assertion of such in the so analogous   
growth of the crystal4 ,the passage of  

the inorganic into the organic and back 
into the inorganic is1 in fact1 no more 
7if the metaphysician will1 no less7    
mysterious than the evaporation of water
 and its recondensation1 the propagation
 of animal form no greater mystery than 
the continued flowing of a stream in    
spite of evaporation1 or the growth of a
 crystal to the form of its kind4 ,the  
propagation of species is1 in one sense1
 an isolated fact2 but so1 in like      
sense1 is the evaporation of water or   
the formation of the crystal of a       
particular chemical3 but none of these  
phenomena are isolated in any other     
sense1 as less or more than a part of a 
universal whole4 ,we carry our notion of
 human importance into all our science1 
and so invest with greater weight and   
mystery ignorance that concerns our own 
life and that of allied forms4 ,as we   
have seen1 a connection of use1 or of   
duration and intensity of function1 with
 its strength is evident in the         
individual1 and we are compelled to     

suppose the connection a constant one   
even where such constancy cannot be     
directly demonstrated4 ,there is        
evidently a relation likewise between   
degree1 or duration and intensity1 of   
use or exercise of function1 and        
strength of tendency in the species1    
which we must also suppose to be        
constant4 ,darwin distinctly recognizes 
this1 everywhere in his work1 in        
asserting that such function as is      
favored by the environment for several  
generations is more likely to be        
transmitted4 ,but though the separation 
of organism and environment into cause  
and effect may be useful in the solution
 of some problems1 it is yet to be kept 
in mind that the distinction is an      
arbitrary selection of some factors as  
dependent1 others as independent        
variables1 while all are1 in fact1      
interdependent4 ,function may be        
regarded as at every moment determined  
by the factors given in environment and 
organism1 in which either may seem the  

more important1 according to the        
particular case or the point of view    
from which it is regarded4 ,the tendency
 of the organism may represent such an  
accumulation of potential energy that a 
slight favorable element in the         
environment may be like a spark in a    
magazine of gunpowder1 followed by      
results seemingly most disproportionate 
to its own significance2 yet the        
accumulation of energy in the organism  
can have taken place only under previous
 favorable circumstances of the         
environment2 and if we regard the       
organism in its relation to the whole   
environment1 that is1 to the universal  
conditions outside it1 the primary      
importance may seem to attach to these4 
,but yet1 which is1 in the last         
analysis1 the more important to the     
explosion of the magazine--spark or     
powder8 ,either is insufficient without 
the other2 the two are simply           
complementary and both indispensable to 
the result4 ,so too habit1 use1 or      

exercise of function and influence of   
the environment cannot be held distinct2
 exercise of function is impossible     
without a sufficient complementary      
factor in the environment1 but this is  
evidently sufficient only with the      
existence of that tendency in the       
organism of which it is the complement4 
,regarding strong tendency as the result
 of a long process of evolution in which
 the environment has presented          
sufficient complementary elements to    
condition its development1 the strength 
of tendency being cooerdinate with the  
duration and intensity of the process of
 evolution1 we can understand that any  
such change in the environment as shall 
prevent such function may be of so much 
significance1 the suppression of the    
function represent so great departure   
from what was previous resultant1 that  
even the destruction of the organism may
 supervene in cases where longest       
exercised and strongest functions are   
prevented2 and we can understand1 from  

the same standpoint1 the slight         
comparative importance of the experience
 of individuals as influencing their    
descendants1 except under especially    
favorable conditions of the organism4   
,all biologists make much of the mixture
 of types in sexual propagation2 and    
,rolph1 perhaps1 lays especial stress on
 it in connection with progressive      
heredity4 ,he calls attention to the    
intricacy of interaction of forces at   
once introduced by it in its action and 
reaction with the environment1 and      
shows1 in this connection1 the extreme  
similarity of the younger generation to 
the parent where propagation is         
non-sexual1 that is1 does not involve   
such mixture of types4 ,it may be said  
that every new factor in development    
introduces a complexity greater as the  
complexity of the conditions already    
attained by the organism is greater1    
since its influence on the different    
elements and combinations of elements   
varies2 or 7if we choose to put it thus7

 since the possible chemical compounds  
and especially the possible combinations
 and permutations of elements and parts 
increase enormously with the increase of
 the latter in number4 ,but the         
importance of the presence of any       
particular new element in these         
complexities depends1 further1 on its   
particular nature4  ,the final decision 
of the principal question of progressive
 heredity which our argument concerns   
must be left to ,biology2 but biologists
 themselves have as yet discussed these 
questions chiefly from a philosophical  
standpoint1--on general1 as             
distinguished from specific1 grounds4   
,all theory is at this point tentative4 
,but if only for this reason we have a  
right1 in assuming a working theory1 to 
select that which seems best to accord  
with philosophic principles of universal
 application as well as with general    
biological fact4 ,for the rest1 it has  
at least been made evident1 by all that 
has been said above concerning the      

constant contact and interaction of     
organism and environment1 that the      
selection of one of these two factors as
 the positive and one as the negative1  
one as the formative the other as the   
formed1 one as the active the other as  
the passive factor1 one as independent  
the other as dependent1 one as          
invariable the other as alone variable1 
is an arbitrary one4 ,in dealing with   
the complexity of the universe1 whether 
mathematically or logically1 we cannot  
grasp all factors at once1 and so are   
obliged to regard some sides to the     
exclusion of others1 to disregard the   
variable and dependent nature of some   
factors in the consideration of that of 
others4 ,the method is useful as well as
 necessary1 useful because necessary2   
but we are too apt to forget that we are
 dealing with half-truths1 devices of   
reason1 and come to regard them as whole
 truths4 ,thus the abstraction of       
,natural ,selection is too often        
elevated to a separate entity1 a        

particular power residing in the        
environment as such4 ,it is1 on the     
contrary1 a mere fiction1 a device for  
assisting our comprehension of complex  
action and reaction4 ,not only does the 
action of the environment alter the     
organism1 the action of the organism    
also alters the environment2 or1 to put 
it more plainly1 the state of organism  
and environment at any moment is the    
result of the interaction of preceding  
states of organism and environment4     
,material combinations1 whether organic 
or inorganic1 when fitted to their      
environment1 survive2 those best fitted1
 where perfect fitness does not exist1  
thrive best2 this is only another method
 of saying that absence of resistance is
 cooerdinate with the preservation of   
form and its inherent motion to the     
extent of the non-interference4 ,as     
organic forms survive only to the extent
 to which they are in harmony with each 
other and with inorganic conditions1 so 
inorganic forms or combinations survive 

unaltered only when they are in harmony 
with other inorganic conditions and     
uninterfered with by organic forms4     
,matter and motion in some form must    
survive1 both being indestructible4     
,natural ,selection in this sense1 as at
 each moment regulating inorganic       
combinations and motions and organic    
form and function1 is either ultimately 
the origin of variation1 or else it is  
not its preserver4 ,it is to be         
remembered that the organism is1 from   
the physical point of view1 simply form 
7that is1 organization7 and function2   
when we have subtracted these1 we have  
subtracted the organism4  ,the inability
 of the reason to grasp all sides of the
 complexity of natural processes at     
once1 even where these are known1 is a  
thing to be kept in mind in our future  
investigations2 we are apt to take our  
analyses for the syntheses of nature4   
,in the preceding considerations1 an    
equivalence of the ,physical and the    
,psychical has been assumed1 which1     

though already in a measure defined1    
should have been1 perhaps1 more fully   
explained4 ,it may be repeated that1 in 
such equivalence1 no materialistic      
assumption is made of the dependence of 
the ,psychical on the ,physical2 nor is 
the intention to assert that the        
,psychical can be measured by the       
weights and measures of the ,physical4  
,the assertion is intended in the sense 
that there is always a physical function
 connected with the psychical1 and that 
the relation of the two is not an       
accidental or variable1 but a constant  
one4 ,all that is claimed is1 in other  
words1 that1 whatever the metaphysical  
truth as to the freedom of the will1    
such freedom cannot interfere with the  
constancy of nature4 ,but1 in fact1 all 
that is postulated by physical science  
in the assertion of the equivalence of  
physical forces is such a uniformity or 
constancy of relation as we postulate of
 the ,psychical and ,physical2 for the  
different forms of physical force can no

 more be measured by the same standards 
than can thought and brain-process4  ,it
 may be added1 further1 that by force as
 used in the above arguments1 no        
metaphysical entity is implied2 the word
 simply serves as the generic term      
embracing different forms of motion and 
the equivalent of motion in resistance1 
and enables us to deal with motion      
regarded as potential as well as with   
motion actually existent4  ,,footnotes3 
#if ,problems of ,life and ,mind1 second
 series1 chap4 on ,evolution4  #ig ,the 
,variation of ,plants and ,animals under
 ,domestication1 #ahfh1 ,,ii4 #bgb4  #ih
 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,chap4 ,,xxii4  #ii        
,variation of ,animals and ,plants under
 ,domestication1 ,,ii4 p4 #beg4 ,see    
also ,origin of ,species1 #fth ed41 ,i4 
pp4 #g-i1 etc4  #ajj ,variation of      
,animals and ,plants under              
,domestication1 ,,ii4 p4 #dah4  #aja    
,ibid4  #ajb ,for elaboration of        
definition and theory1 vide the article 
in question1 ,vierteljahrschrift fuer   

wissenschaftliche ,philosophie1 #ahij4  
#ajc ,as confirming this analysis of    
evolution1 reference is made to ,mach3  
,die ,mechanik in ihrer ,entwicklungen1 
p4 #abh1 and ,beitrage zur ,analyse der 
,empfindungen1 pp4 #be1 #aed2 also      
,avenarius3 ,kritik der reinen          
,erfahrung4  #ajd ,see above essay by   
,petzoldt4  #aje ,die                   
,entwicklungsgeschichte des ,weltalls1  
#ahhb4  #ajf ,gestaltungen des          
,zweckmaessigen4  #ajg ,die             
,entwicklungsgeschichte des ,weltalls1  
chap4 ,i4  #ajh ,see especially ,darwin3
 ,the ,variation of ,animals and ,plants
 under ,domestication2 ,haeckel3        
,natuerliche ,schoepfungsgeschichte1    
#hth ed41 #ahhi1 p4 #agi et seq4  #aji  
,die ,entstehung der ,arten auf ,grund  
von ,vererben erworbener ,eigenschaften1
 p4 #bjd et seq4  #aaj ,ibid4 p4 #aij et
 seq4  #aaa ,entstehung der ,arten1 p4  
#ae4     ,,chapter ,,ii  ,,intelligence 
,,and ,,end   ,it is interesting to     
notice the opinions of different        

scientists and philosophers as to the   
extent to which reason is diffused in   
the universe1 where the point lies at   
which the boundary line is to be drawn  
between reason and an automatism of     
instinct or organic action1 or whether  
any such point can be found at all1     
whether reason1 at least as             
consciousness and will1 is not inherent 
in all life1 or at least in all animal  
life1 or whether it is not1 indeed1 to  
be regarded as the cause of motion even 
outside life1 in the inorganic as well  
as the organic4 ,there is no need to    
remind ourselves of the philosophic     
conception of the ,world as ,will1 the  
,philosophy of the ,unconscious1 or the 
,theory of ,monads4 ,the theories that  
specialists in physical science have    
arrived at1 through the results of      
wide-reaching investigations in their   
own peculiar branch1 are as various as  
those of philosophers4 ,darwin carefully
 avoids drawing any distinct limit-line 
between reason and instinct1 but remarks

 that ,a little dose of judgment or     
reason1 as ,pierre ,huber expresses it1 
often comes into play1 even with animals
 low in the scale of nature4#aab        
,haeckel says3 ,unbiassed comparison and
 unprejudiced test and observation place
 it beyond doubt that so-called         
'instinct' is nothing else than a sum of
 soul-activities which1 originally      
acquired by adaptation1 have been fixed 
by habit and carried down from          
generation to generation by inheritance4
 ,originally performed with             
consciousness and reflection1 many      
instinctive actions of the animals have 
become1 in the course of time1          
unconscious1 exactly as is the case with
 the habitual activities of human       
reason4 ,these1 too1 may1 with like     
justice1 be looked upon as the workings 
of innate instinct1 as1 indeed1 the     
impulse to self-preservation1 maternal  
love1 and the social instinct often are 
regarded4 ,again1 instinct is neither   
distinctively an attribute of the brain 

of the animal1 nor is the reason an     
especial endowment of human beings4 ,on 
the contrary1 an impartial doctrine of  
soul recognizes a long1 long1 descending
 scale of gradual evolution in the life 
of the soul1 which leads from higher to 
lower human beings1 from more perfect to
 more imperfect animals1 step by step1  
down to those forms whose simple        
nerve-ganglion furnishes the            
starting-point of all the cell-less     
brain-forms of this scale4#aac ,the     
lecture in which this passage occurs not
 only argues further that the soul is   
composed of soul-activities as the brain
 is composed of cells1 but finds in all 
living cells1 all protoplasm1 the first 
element of all soul life1 sensation in  
the simple forms of pain and pleasure1  
movement in the simple forms of         
attraction and repulsion4 ,only the     
degrees of development and combination  
of soul are different in different      
beings4 ,du ,prel1 impressed with the   
evolution of order from disorder in the 

heavens as on the earth1 ascribes this  
to universal sensation as a fundamental 
quality of all matter1 which makes it   
continually tend towards a state of     
equilibrium in which collision is       
reduced to a minimum4#aad ,some         
biologists ascribe sensation1 or        
consciousness1 to animal life alone2    
some ascribe consciousness to such      
animals only as possess a nervous       
system2 some philosophers make a        
distinction between sensation1          
consciousness1 and self-consciousness1  
as shown in the scale of animal life2   
some1 again1 approaching the problem    
from another side1 lay emphasis on the  
difference between automatic and organic
 action1 instinct1 blind impulse1 and   
will4 ,carneri1 as we have seen1#aae    
holds that even the action of an animal 
so high in the scale as the butterfly   
may be pure automatism1 its fluttering  
when impaled merely the motion of a     
continued attempt at flight4  ,these    
differences in opinion seem to depend1  

in great measure1 upon the end of the   
scale of being chosen as the            
starting-point in the development of    
theory4 ,if we begin with man and assume
 intelligence to be the cause of        
design1--of the purposeful1 the         
self-preserving1--in his action1 we     
shall be likely to infer intelligence as
 the cause of self-preserving function  
in all animals1 and we shall find great 
difficulty in drawing any distinct line 
between intelligence and automatism4 ,if
 we are not students of inorganic       
nature1 the evolution to be found also  
in it1 up to the attainment of          
preservative forms of motion1 may escape
 our observation1 preoccupation with man
 and the self- or rather                
human-interested bias of observation    
blinding us to it2 but if we carry our  
considerations1 in an unprejudiced      
spirit1 on beyond the province of life1 
we may1 like ,du ,prel and others1      
arrive at a theory of intelligence as a 
universal property of matter4 ,on the   

other hand1 if we begin with inorganic  
matter and assume automatism to be the  
cause of its motion1 we are likely1     
ascending the scale of organic          
existence1 to interpret much of its     
function as due to material action and  
reaction1 and may again1 from this side1
 find so great difficulty in drawing the
 line where intelligence begins1 that we
 may fall1 as ,carneri has done1 into   
the opposite extreme to that last       
noticed1 and interpret nearly all animal
 action as unintelligent or even        
insentient4  ,let us look at the dilemma
 a little more closely4 ,might it not   
seem1 from one point of view1 as if the 
harmonious movements of the stars1 by   
which they avoid their own destruction1 
must be referred to desire and will to  
avoid it8 ,if all systems of material   
parts1 without exception or distinction1
 tend1 as ,fechner1 ,du ,prel1 and      
,petzoldt assert1 towards harmony of the
 parts such that the motion of these    
parts will become self-preservative1    

does it not seem logically necessary to 
assume that this self-preservation1     
arising in inorganic matter in the same 
manner as in organic matter1 must be due
 to the same causes as those to which we
 ascribe action towards an end1 action  
that involves self-preservation1 in the 
broadest sense of the word1 in man8 ,may
 not the heavenly bodies1 learning from 
experience in some way1 as man does1    
gradually come to choose1 though still  
in accordance with natural laws 7as man 
also invariably chooses7 that orbit     
which preserves them from collision8    
,true1 they must finally suffer         
destruction1 but so1 also1 must the     
human individual1 and the race of human 
beings4 ,the difference of evolution and
 dissolution in the two cases is only   
one of time4 ,among different species of
 nervously organized beings1 the        
duration of life also differs4 ,or1 if  
we deny the existence of intelligence in
 inorganic nature1 can we1 at least1    
descending the scale of organic being1  

find any point of which we can say1     
,here intelligence ends and automatism  
begins8 ,shall we deny the existence of 
intelligence in plants1 and if so1 how  
shall we find that dividing line between
 the plant and animal kingdoms which the
 advancement of science in many         
directions is rendering1 not more       
distinct1 but less and less so8 ,g4 ,th4
 ,schneider says1 in his book on ,the   
,human ,will3 ,the movements of touch   
and locomotion in the search for food   
are the first movements in which the    
specific animal-life may be recognized4 
,in no plant is the groping caused by   
hunger to be observed4#aaf ,but is this 
true8 ,the insectivorous plants1 for    
instance1 open their leaves when their  
prey is digested1 waiting for fresh     
prey2 and they close them again when    
prey has again entered1 thus practically
 grasping their victim and holding him  
fast4 ,although the nature of the plant 
prevents its moving from the spot where 
it grows1 are these movements less a    

search for and capture of food than     
those of the animal8 ,to say that the   
closing of the leaves depends upon the  
beginning of some chemical process in   
the plant furnishes us with no mark of  
distinction between the two1 for it is  
equally true that chemical processes    
underlie animal motion2 and to object   
that the reopening of the leaves is the 
result of the completion of assimilation
 gives us1 also1 no distinctive mark1   
since the animal's search for food is   
likewise the result of hunger and so    
connected with a particular state of the
 digestive organs4 ,the action of       
insectivorous plants draws our attention
 because the process of assimilation    
involved so resembles animal digestion2 
but1 as a point of fact1 the opening of 
petals to receive the air and sun is as 
much a search for food as the opening of
 leaves to receive insect prey4         
,schneider adds to the passage above    
quoted1 ,a further difference between   
psychical and physiological movements is

 this1 that the latter always remain the
 same1 however the excitation changes1  
while the former have1 now the character
 of attraction1 now that of repulsion4  
,it may be questioned whether this      
difference either can be demonstrated to
 be a distinctive mark4 ,we have only to
 go into a dark cellar where the        
potatoes have begun to sprout1 in order 
to see how plants that ordinarily grow  
upward will take every curve and angle  
in order to reach towards the light of  
some distant window4 ,and if we turn one
 of the tubers about1 we may watch the  
pallid sprout again turn to grow towards
 the far-away sunlight4 ,thomas ,a4     
,knight relates experiments in which    
plants of the ,virginia creeper         
7,ampelopsis quinquefolia7 were removed 
from one side of the house to the other1
 being1 in each case1 screened from     
perpendicular rays of the sun1 and      
records that1 in all cases1 the tendrils
 turned in a few hours in a direction   
pointing to the centre of the house4    

,one plant after being thus experimented
 with1 was removed to the centre of the 
house and fully exposed to the          
perpendicular light of the sun2 and a   
piece of dark-colored paper was placed  
upon one side of it1 just within reach  
of its tendrils2 and to this substance  
they soon appeared to be strongly       
attracted4 ,the paper was then placed   
upon the opposite side1 under similar   
circumstances1 and a piece of plate     
glass was substituted2 but to this      
substance the tendrils did not indicate 
any disposition to approach4 ,the       
position of the glass was then changed1 
and care was taken to adjust its surface
 to the varying position of the sun1 so 
that the light reflected might continue 
to strike the tendrils2 which then      
receded from the glass1 and appeared to 
be strongly repulsed by it4#aag ,darwin 
writes of the insectivorous ,drosera    
rotundifolia3 ,if young and active      
leaves are selected1 inorganic particles
 not larger than the head of a small    

pin1 placed on the central glands1      
sometimes cause the outer tentacles to  
bend inwards4 ,but this follows much    
more surely and quickly1 if the object  
contains nitrogenous matter which can be
 dissolved by the secretion4 ,on one    
occasion1 ,i observed the following     
unusual circumstance4 ,small bits of raw
 meat 7which acts more energetically    
than any other substance71 of paper1    
dried moss1 and of the quill of a pen1  
were placed on several leaves1 and they 
were all embraced equally well in about 
two hours4 ,on other occasions the      
above-named substances1 or more commonly
 particles of glass1 coal-cinder 7taken 
from the fire71 stone1 gold-leaf1 dried 
grass1 cork1 blotting paper1            
cotton-wool1 and hair rolled into little
 balls1 were used1 and these substances1
 though they were sometimes well        
embraced1 often caused no movement      
whatever in the outer tentacles1 or an  
extremely slight and slow movement4 ,yet
 these same leaves were proved to be in 

an active condition1 as they were       
excited to movement by substances       
yielding nitrogenous matter1 such as    
bits of raw or roast meat1 the yolk or  
white of boiled eggs1 fragments of      
insects of all orders1 spiders1 etc4 ,i 
will give only two instances4  ,minute  
flies were placed on the discs of       
several leaves1 and on others balls of  
paper1 bits of moss and quill of about  
the same size as the flies1 and the     
latter were well embraced in a few      
hours2 whereas after twenty-five hours  
only a very few tentacles were inflected
 over the other objects4 ,the bits of   
paper1 moss1 and quill were then removed
 from these leaves1 and bits of raw meat
 placed on them2 and now all the        
tentacles were soon energetically       
inflected4  ,again1 particles of        
coal-cinder 7weighing rather more than  
the flies used in the last experiment7  
were placed on the centres of three     
leaves3 after an interval of nineteen   
hours1 one of the particles was         

tolerably well embraced2 a second by a  
very few tentacles2 and a third by none4
 ,i then removed the particles from the 
two latter leaves1 and put on them      
recently killed flies4 ,these were      
fairly well embraced in seven and       
one-half hours1 and thoroughly after    
twenty and one-half hours2 the tentacles
 remaining inflected for many subsequent
 days4 ,on the other hand1 the one leaf 
which had in the course of nineteen     
hours embraced the bit of cinder        
moderately well1 and to which no fly was
 given1 after an additional thirty-three
 hours 7i4e4 in fifty-two hours from the
 time when the cinder was put on7 was   
completely reexpanded and ready to act  
again4#aah  ,from these and many other  
experiments ,darwin concludes that      
inorganic and some organic substances   
not attacked by the secretion of the    
leaf act much less quickly and          
efficiently than organic substances     
yielding soluble matter1 which is       
absorbed4  ,he also writes of the       

curvature of radicles which come in     
contact with obstacles at right         
angles3--  ,the first and most obvious  
explanation of the curvature is that it 
results merely from the mechanical      
resistance to the growth in its original
 direction4 ,nevertheless1 this         
explanation did not seem to us          
satisfactory4 ,the radicles did not     
present the appearance of having been   
subjected to a sufficient pressure to   
account for their curvature4 ,sachs has 
shown that the growing part is more     
rigid than the part immediately above1  
which has ceased to grow1 so that the   
latter might have been expected to yield
 and become curved as soon as the apex  
encountered an unyielding object2       
whereas it was the stiff1 growing part  
which became curved4 ,moreover1 an      
object which yields with the greatest   
ease will deflect a radicle3 thus1 as we
 have seen1 when the apex of the radicle
 of the bean encountered the polished   
surface of extremely thin tin-foil on   

soft sand1 no impression was left on it1
 yet the radicle became deflected at    
right angles4 ,a second explanation     
occurred to us1 namely1 that even the   
gentlest pressure might check the growth
 of the apex1 and in this case growth   
could continue only on one side1 and    
thus the radicle would assume a         
rectangular form2 but this view leaves  
wholly unexplained the curvature of the 
upper part1 extending for a length of   
#h-aj mm4  ,we were therefore led to    
suspect that the apex was sensitive to  
contact1 and that the effect was        
transmitted from it to the upper part of
 the radicle1 which was excited to bend 
away from the touching object4 ,as a    
little loop of fine thread1 hung on a   
tendril or on the petiole of a          
leaf-climbing plant1 causes it to bend1 
we thought that any hard object affixed 
to the tip of a radicle1 freely         
suspended and growing in damp air1 might
 cause it to bend if it were sensitive1 
and yet would not offer any mechanical  

resistance to its growth4444 ,sachs     
discovered that the radicle a little    
above the apex is sensitive and bends   
like a tendril towards the touching     
object4 ,but when one side of the apex  
is pressed by any object1 the growing   
part bends away from the object4#aai    
,acting on this idea1 ,darwin found1 in 
many experiments1 that the radicles of  
plants freely suspended in bottles1 when
 brought into contact with the most     
yielding substances1 bits of paper1     
etc41 were deflected1 in a very few     
hours1 from their original course1 and  
often at right angles to this4 ,he says1
 further3--  ,as the apex of a radicle  
in penetrating the ground must be       
pressed on all sides1 we wished to learn
 whether it could distinguish between   
harder1 or more resisting1 and softer   
substances4 ,a square of sanded paper   
almost as stiff as card1 and a square of
 extremely thin paper 7too thin for     
writing on7 of exactly the same size    
7about one-twentieth of an inch71 were  

fixed with shellac on opposite sides of 
the apices of twelve suspended          
radicles4444 ,in eight out of the twelve
 cases1 there could be no doubt that the
 radicle was deflected from the side to 
which the card-like paper was attached  
and towards the opposite side bearing   
the very thin paper4  ,this occurred1 in
 some instances1 in nine hours1 but in  
others not until twenty-four hours had  
elapsed4 ,moreover1 some of the four    
failures can hardly be considered as    
really failures3 thus1 in one of them in
 which the radicle remained quite       
straight1 the square of thin paper was  
found1 when both were removed from the  
apex1 to have been so thickly coated    
with shellac that it was almost as stiff
 as the card2 in the second case1 the   
radicle was bent upward into a          
semicircle1 but the deflection was not  
directly from the side bearing the card1
 and this was explained by the two      
squares having become cemented laterally
 together1 forming a sort of stiff gable

 from which the radicle was deflected2  
in the third case1 the square of card   
had been fixed by mistake in front1 and 
though there was deflection1 this might 
have been due to ,sachs's curvature2 in 
the fourth case alone1 no reason could  
be assigned why the radicle had not been
 at all deflected4  ,darwin found1      
moreover1 by experiment1 that1 when the 
tip of a radicle is burnt or cut1 it    
transmits an influence to the upper     
adjoining part1 causing it to bend away 
from the affected side4 ,this deflection
 resembles1 in a very striking manner1  
the avoidance of sources of injury and  
pain on the part of animals4  ,and at   
the end of his book on the ,movements of
 ,plants1 which contains very many other
 experiments bearing on the question of 
sensitivity in plants1 the author       
writes1 ,it is hardly an exaggeration to
 say that the tip of the radicle thus   
endowed1 and having the power of        
directing the movements of the adjoining
 parts1 acts like the brain of one of   

the lower animals4  ,it is true that the
 plant does not react with the rapidity 
which characterizes the animal2 ,darwin 
found that radicles are not sensitive to
 temporary contact1 but only to long1   
though to slight pressure4 ,it is also  
true that the physical basis of the     
movement is more simple1 and so more    
easily traceable in the plant than in   
the animal organism2 yet why lay such   
especial stress upon this side of       
plant-life1 since it is acknowledged    
that the physical basis is by no means  
peculiar to it1 but that1 on the        
contrary1 all life-processes1 in the    
animal as well as in the plant1 have    
their physical side1 although greater   
complexity of organization may make this
 more difficult to follow in the one    
case than in the other8  ,but we may    
begin at the other end of the scale and 
examine the facts presented from the    
opposite point of view4 ,the physicist  
demonstrates that force is              
indestructible2 that is1 that the sum of

 the motion and resistance to motion    
residing in indestructible matter is    
also imperishable1 that all present     
motion must be regarded as the resultant
 of previous conditions of motion and   
resistance1 as far back as we may go1   
until we reach some assumed primal state
 7which is only assumed and cannot be   
proved to have existed7 in which the    
matter composing the universe is        
supposed to have been at complete rest2 
and that every resultant bears relations
 to its component factors of force that 
are constant1 every component finding   
its full value in the resultant4 ,what  
evidence has the present state of our   
solar system and the other systems of   
heavenly bodies revealed to us by the   
telescope to offer us in proof of their 
consciousness or sentience8 ,how are the
 whirl and concentration of nebular     
mists1 the crash and collision of       
elemental bodies1 from which1 by simple 
action and reaction1 after ages of      
disharmony1 only a comparative harmony  

is arrived at as inevitable result1     
evidence of aim1 intention1 will1       
consciousness1 in the matter subject to 
this evolution8 ,do we find anything    
here except blind law8 ,the movements of
 plants1 often directly favorable to    
self-preservation1 may be explained by  
the arrangement of the cells and their  
chemical action4 ,or1 if sentience must 
be assumed to be the cause of movement  
attaining ends of self-preservation in  
plants1 how are we to account for       
organic and instinctive action in       
animals8 ,how is it1 for instance1 that 
the new-born infant sucks1 and the      
chicken but a few hours old1 even though
 it has been hatched in an incubator    
apart from its kind1 picks at the food  
strewn before it1 aiming1 too1 with     
considerable precision8#abj ,how does it
 happen that the process of breathing   
and digestion1 the beating of the heart 
and the circulation of the blood1 all so
 necessary to life1 go on with          
regularity1 though not directed by      

reason8 ,has the newly hatched chicken  
any experience to teach it what food is1
 and how it is to be seized2 or does the
 caterpillar1 which spins itself a      
cocoon1 do this with the understanding  
that it is about to enter a new phase of
 existence8 ,or1 if such important and1 
at first view1 seemingly intelligent    
action can be explained as unreasoning  
instinct1 why cannot many other actions 
of the lower animals be thus explained8 
,why may not nearly all1 if not all of  
them1 be thus explained1 and            
consciousness be regarded as the        
exclusive property of man8  ,but how    
much of the action we term automatic1   
instinctive1 or organic1 reflex or      
merely functional1 can be positively    
asserted to have no admixture of        
consciousness8 ,if we examine our own   
action closely we shall often find that 
we were1 in fact1 conscious of much that
 seems1 at first glance1 purely         
automatic4 ,it may appear to us1 for    
instance1 that reflection on the notes  

of a musical composition which we have  
known for a long time by heart hinders  
rather than helps us1 even causing us   
sometimes to fail completely in our     
performance4 ,but if we examine our     
condition at the time of such a failure1
 do we not usually find that1 when we   
began to think about what we were       
playing1 we were suddenly seized with a 
fear of failing and that the fear       
confused us8 ,or do we not find1 at     
least1 that withdrawal of our attention 
from the music by conversation that     
requires any concentration of thought is
 as likely to confuse us as too great   
attention to it8 ,a friend of mine one  
day related to me the following         
experience3 ,having a felon upon his    
finger1 he submitted to a surgical      
operation1 for which the operator       
preferred to administer an anaesthetic4 
,when he awoke to consciousness again1  
he was pleased to find the painful      
operation completely finished and the   
hand newly dressed4 ,asked whether he   

had experienced any pain1 he answered1  
,not a twinge1 whereat the surgeon      
remarked that he had screamed and       
groaned during the operation4 ,to this  
he replied that his action must have    
been merely reflex4 ,an hour or so      
later1 however1 as he was at work1 a    
sudden recollection of the whole        
operation came to him4 ,persons         
undergoing dental operations under the  
influence of laughing-gas often scream  
and make convulsive movements as if in  
pain1 though they declare1 afterwards1  
in like manner1 that they have felt     
nothing2 but may not this be due1 as in 
the case just cited1 to a mere lapse of 
memory8 ,why1 indeed1 should the patient
 scream if not in pain8 ,again1 there is
 a poison--curarine1 the ,indian arrow  
poison--which has power to deprive its  
victim of all motion1 while leaving him1
 as has been ascertained in cases in    
which it has been used as a medicine1 a 
consciousness that is more or less      
dimmed4 ,may not the seeming dimness1   

however1 be due to the incomplete       
function of memory when turned to events
 that transpired under its influence8   
,and may not the action of so-called    
anaesthetics of all sorts involve simply
 a paralysis of action similar to that  
caused by the ,indian arrow poison1     
together with a more complete lapse of  
memory than that ensuing upon the       
latter8 ,to answer that anaesthetics    
affect the brain1 and that therefore    
consciousness is not possible1 is       
begging the question1 for it is by just 
such experiments and experience of the  
apparent mental effects of anaesthetics 
in connection with peculiar brain       
conditions that theories of             
non-sensibility under these conditions  
have been arrived at4 ,states of        
somnambulism generally used to be       
classed as outside the sphere of memory 
and were therefore sometimes called     
unconscious2 but recent experiments in  
hypnotism have shown that similar states
 to these may be remembered or not      

remembered according to the individual  
case1 and that persons who1 when        
awakened1 ordinarily recall nothing of  
that which has passed in the hypnotic   
state may be made to recall all the     
events of that state if commanded to do 
so before awakening4 ,pflueger has      
attempted to demonstrate1 by many       
experiments1 that consciousness is not  
confined to the brain but is also       
connected with the spinal cord2#aba why1
 however1 draw a line at the spinal     
cord8 ,is not nerve substance the same  
with that from which the spinal cord and
 the brain develop1 are not all nerve   
cells primarily mere modifications of   
cells of the outer skin8  ,of           
unconsciousness in ourselves we can have
 no more an immediate and direct        
knowledge than of unconsciousness       
outside ourselves1 since1 in order to be
 immediately known1 it would have to be 
present in consciousness2 and a         
conscious unconsciousness is a          
self-contradiction4 ,we can only witness

 to a failure of memory at certain      
points 7which failure has already been  
shown to be untrustworthy as evidence7  
or to movements of our body to which we 
can supply no corresponding conscious   
states as premeditation4 ,but our       
inability to testify to such is merely  
negative4 ,a great deal has been made1  
in one way and another1 of the fact that
 there are links in premeditated action 
which do not come into consciousness1   
there being no knowledge1 for instance1 
of the processes in nerve and muscle    
between the movement of the arm in      
writing and the premeditation of such   
movement4 ,as a fact1 however1 none of  
the physiological processes which       
accompany the psychical are present to  
our consciousness except as given       
through the senses or through           
nerve-transmission similar to that of   
sense-perception4 ,the conscious        
elements of any present state of thought
 do not include the changes in          
brain-matter concomitant with them4 ,but

 the question may be raised1 as ,haeckel
 raises it1--though perhaps somewhat    
differently1--in his essay on           
,soul-cells and ,cell-souls1 as to      
whether the brain-cells themselves are  
not endowed with consciousness2 and any 
answer in the negative is1 evidently1 an
 assumption1 of which we can give no    
proof4 ,indeed1 the question may be     
asked1 and has been asked1 whether the  
remarkable white blood corpuscles which 
traverse our body1 and are so similar to
 certain lower forms of life1 are not to
 be regarded as distinct beings1 or     
whether1 in fact1 all the cells whose   
combined life and movement make up our  
own are not endowed with distinct being 
and consciousness4 ,again an answer in  
the negative is evidently a mere        
assumption4 ,and why stop1 in this case1
 exactly with the cells of animal life2 
why not apply our question to those of  
plant life also8 ,why not1 indeed1      
suppose all forms to be endowed with    
consciousness1 all harmonious motion to 

be accompanied by pleasure1 all         
dissolution and conflict by pain8 ,from 
analogy we may conclude something1 but  
from mere non-analogy nothing4 ,our     
experience may entitle us to the        
assertion that all beings possessing a  
nervous system are endowed with         
consciousness1 but we cannot conclude1  
therefore1 that all beings not          
possessing a nervous system are not     
endowed with consciousness4 ,we have    
associated consciousness with acts      
peculiar to man1 and hence inferred its 
presence in similar movements of animals
 similarly constructed4 ,but if we could
 examine the physiological              
accompaniments of our own thought and   
feeling and their issue in action1 if we
 could look on at all the details1 the  
chemical and mechanical changes of the  
physiological processes1 what hint      
should we find in these more than in any
 other physical processes1 from which to
 infer consciousness8 ,they are not the 
less rigidly in accordance with natural 

law than any other4 ,but our observation
 of all other processes than those of   
our own organism is a mere extraneous   
one1 like this we have imagined of the  
processes of our own body2 if there were
 consciousness in other forms we could  
not enter into it2 and how can we prove 
extraneously its non-existence8 ,our own
 stability of function and the stability
 of all life-motion has been developed  
in a perfectly similar manner to that by
 which the stability of the heavenly    
bodies has been developed1 the physical 
side of the process being just as fully 
a matter of action and reaction1 and our
 action towards ends the slowly         
progressive result of this course of    
action and reaction1 just as is the case
 with the harmonious movements of the   
systems of the heavens4 ,it would1      
moreover1 be perfectly easy to formulate
 a purely physical and mechanical       
explanation of our action1 as ,carneri  
does of the action of ants and other    
species1--to explain the plucking of a  

rose1 for instance1 as mere reaction    
upon the sense of smell and sight1 or as
 the mere mechanical action of          
cell-matter4  ,but1 again1 on the other 
hand3 ,if it is true that the nervous   
system is developed from cells of the   
outer covering of the body1 it is1      
nevertheless1 not true that those       
primary cells are the nervous system1   
any more than it is true that the lowest
 forms of life1 from which man has      
developed1 are human beings4            
,rudimentary eyes exist in some animals 
in the form of mere pigment spots1 but  
we do not suppose these pigment spots to
 endow the animal with sight as we      
understand it4 ,sight is not a function 
of all forms of life1 neither is        
hearing1 and these powers have developed
 out of forms of animal life in which   
they did not exist2 why then is it      
necessary to suppose consciousness to be
 a property of all forms of life because
 we know it to appear in some higher    
developments of life8 ,why may it not   

arise1 as do sight and hearing1 by      
gradual evolution1 as a function of     
special organisms8 ,have we any direct  
knowledge of consciousness except in    
connection with certain normal          
conditions of our own brain8 ,and1 this 
being said1 have we any means left by   
which we can prove the existence of     
consciousness1 except in connection with
 a brain similar to our own8  ,what     
grounds have we for assuming the        
existence of consciousness where the    
analogy of our own organization does not
 furnish us with an argument8 ,if we    
argue from the analogy of our own       
experience to the existence of          
consciousness in animals whose          
organization is similar to our own1 and 
then1 following down the scale of life1 
find no pause or gap at which to draw an
 exact line1 we must not the less forget
 that with the diminishing analogy the  
force of our inference diminishes in    
like degree4 ,or where is the logical   
necessity of inferring that             

consciousness must exist in the         
inorganic either because the organic    
originally developed from the inorganic1
 or because it suffers continually a    
renewal by nourishment1 which is1 in    
effect1 as much a development from the  
inorganic as the supposed primal one8   
,the pigment spot from which the eye    
arises is not the eye1 simple protoplasm
 is not the organized human being2      
whence does the physical organization   
arise8 ,are we to suppose it1 too1 as   
preexistent1 in a weaker form1 or in any
 form1 in the inorganic8 ,whence have we
 any grounds for assuming that that     
which we know only in connection with a 
certain peculiar organization exists    
elsewhere8 ,are we to suppose the color 
blue to be present in certain chemical  
elements because their chemical compound
 is blue8 ,or how is it that even       
isomeric compounds may exhibit different
 qualities8 ,shall we regard the color  
as not essentially connected with the   
chemical constitution of the supposed   

compound8 ,as a matter of fact1 color is
 one of the chemist's means of          
recognition4 ,or shall we explain the   
color by the length of light-waves or   
the construction of the eye1 correcting1
 thus1 one part of our experience by    
another1 and assuming one as fundamental
 and essential1 the other as            
non-essential8 ,we explain sound as     
wave-movement in some outer medium and  
in the ear1 correcting1 thus1 the       
hearing by sight or touch2 does this    
mean that that part of our experience   
given us through the eye or hand alone  
is truth1 and to be relied on and       
recognized as such1 while the experience
 given us through the other senses is   
non-essential and not to be accepted or 
relied on8 ,but if the eye gives us the 
truth1 then why do we1 in the case of   
color1 correct it again by another phase
 of our experience8 ,how are we to      
decide which is essential1 the          
wave-movement that is 7or may be made7  
perceptible to our eye1 or the sound    

heard by our ear1 the color directly    
seen or the length of the light-wave    
concluded from experiment8 ,as a matter 
of fact1 we emphasize one or the other  
according to the end we have in view in 
our experiment4 ,is it the length of the
 wave which causes the color1 or the    
color which causes the particular       
wave-length8 ,if we analyze brain-action
 as chemical action1 do we prove thereby
 that the consciousness concomitant with
 this peculiar chemical action under    
these peculiar conditions must exist    
elsewhere under other conditions8 ,are  
the characteristics of one chemical     
compound the same as those of another   
because both compounds are matter and   
motion8 ,if we prove that the brain     
contains cells similar to cells in other
 parts of the nervous system1 that the  
whole nervous system arises1 in the     
first instance1 from epithelium cells1  
that the whole animal is descended from 
some primal protoplasmic cell1 and that 
the cells of plants are similar1 in many

 ways1 to those of animals1 do we       
thereby prove that consciousness exists 
except as cooerdinate with the peculiar 
cells and arrangements of cells in the  
brain8 ,we have no precedent from which 
to argue1 since consciousness is to us a
 unique feature of the universe2 we know
 it immediately only as existent in     
ourselves1 and in order to obtain any   
precedent must be guilty of assuming it 
in order to prove it4  ,the dilemma     
seems1 thus1 as we analyse and inquire  
into it more closely1 to increase rather
 than decrease in significance4 ,how is 
any solution to be arrived at8  ,if we  
return to the beginning of our          
considerations on this point1 we shall  
find that1 in coming at the question    
from either side1 we have made an       
assumption4 ,our first premises were as 
follows3 ,assuming that consciousness is
 the cause of movement by which man     
attempts to arrive at his ends1 what    
reason have we for supposing            
consciousness to exist outside man8 and1

 on the other hand3 ,assuming mechanical
 action and reaction to be the cause of 
movement in inorganic nature1 what      
reason have we for assuming this to be  
the cause of action in organic          
existence8 ,let us examine these        
assumptions more closely4  ,we may      
return to the theory of the gradual     
development of stable out of unstable   
conditions as stated in different ways  
by ,zoellner1 ,fechner1 and ,du ,prel4  
,as has been shown1 the principle       
applies to organic as well as to        
inorganic nature1 and is only a broader 
principle including that of the         
,survival of the ,fittest4 ,there is a  
physical side to all psychical          
functions1 and everywhere our           
investigation shows us the physical     
following unchanging laws4 ,the         
development of the ,stable from the     
,unstable explains to us the evolution  
of function in the direction of the     
preservation of the organic forms of    
which it is the function1 as well as the

 evolution of harmonious movement in the
 heavenly bodies4 ,the explanation of   
the natural and necessary elimination of
 the inharmonious covers the whole      
ground1 and seems to assign a cause for 
every form of preservative action1 for  
the harmonious conduct which preserves  
the state or the family as a collection 
of individuals1 as well as for the      
harmony of function that preserves the  
individual4 ,as long as reason can      
change no smallest detail in the        
workings of the laws of nature1 as long 
as it can never render any motion other 
than the exact resultant of the forces  
represented in it1 what room remains for
 reason as a cause8 ,ought we not       
rather1 though from a much broader and  
therefore more convincing1 in fact from 
the broadest and hence most convincing  
view of the matter1 to regard           
consciousness1 as do many physiologists 
on narrower grounds1 as the mere        
accompaniment of material processes8    
,but this brings us again to a          

consideration of the concept of cause4  
,what do we mean by cause8 ,above1 we   
spoke of the cause of motion2 do we     
designate by this term those factors of 
preceding motion which1 continued1      
produce it as composite resultant8 ,if  
so1 why not substitute for the term     
cause of motion1 component factors of   
motion8 ,but is this1 in fact1 all we   
meant by cause8 ,was there not1 in our  
mind1 as we made use of the term1 a     
vague half-conception of some additional
 force beyond those so exactly summed up
 in the resultant1 which1 in some       
indefinable manner1 guided the process8 
,as has been sufficiently demonstrated1 
no such additional force can be shown to
 exist1 or be logically assumed in      
theory1 except in some transcendental   
sense2 nature gives us only perfect     
equivalence of forces4 ,a cause of      
motion except as the mere sum of its    
preceding components is1 therefore1 a   
natural impossibility4 ,hence the reason
 or consciousness cannot be assumed to  

be such a cause4 ,but if consciousness  
cannot be regarded as such a cause      
additional to the component factors of  
motion1 neither can anything outside    
consciousness be regarded as such a     
cause4 ,natural laws are often treated  
as if they constituted a cause2 but they
 are not entities which control nature3 
they are merely forms by which we       
express nature's constancy1 uniformity4 
,neither is constancy or uniformity a   
controlling entity3 it is simply a      
generalization1 if a universal one1     
whether we regard it as a priori or as a
 posteriori4 ,it appears1 then1 that we 
have no greater reason for regarding the
 constancy of nature or natural law as  
cause than we have for asserting reason 
to be such4  ,in this connection the    
question may be in order1 as to why the 
student of the natural sciences1 who is 
in the habit of proclaiming1 so loudly1 
the necessity or at least the constancy 
of everything in nature1 should yet     
elect to assign to consciousness the    

character of the non-essential1 that is 
the accidental4 ,action and reaction    
are1 according to him1 essential        
inherent properties of brain matter as  
such1 but consciousness is merely a     
dependent4 ,but who shall decide what   
part or form of force1 what factors of  
the universe are accidental and what    
essential8 ,if our assertion of         
constancy in natural phenomena means    
anything at all1 it means that nothing  
is accidental1 but that all factors of  
phenomena are essential4 ,is the bell   
the less silver to my eye because it    
appeals to my ear with sound1 or the    
ball the less round to touch because my 
field of vision is flat8 ,even if we    
suppose forms of matter1 and organic    
forms1 to exist without consciousness1  
can we therefore assert consciousness to
 be any the less essential1 any the less
 inherent in the nature of things1 any  
the less existent and actual1 where it  
appears8 ,if so1 what physiological     
function can we call inherent and       

essential1 since these all also arise   
with evolution8 ,heat may exist without 
light1 but is light therefore less      
essential than heat1 where it arises8   
,the very constancy which psychical     
phenomena exhibit would show their      
essential character as factors of the   
universe4 ,perhaps it is the attempt of 
the spiritualist to assign to           
consciousness something more than such a
 character which has led his adversary  
into the opposite error of asserting it 
to be something less2 but the two       
extremes of doctrine are quite equally  
far from that scientific method which   
holds to given phenomena4 ,materialism  
is as much metaphysics as ,spiritualism 
is2 and the materialist who condemns    
metaphysics condemns himself4           
,consciousness belongs to the ,actual2  
and the ,materialism which assigns it a 
place subordinate to that of other      
actual phenomena is as much dogmatism as
 is any theory which subordinates the   
other phases of the ,actual to it4 ,the 

fact that consciousness bears constant  
relation to certain physiological       
phenomena is no ground for pronouncing  
it the effect and the physiological     
phenomena the cause1 it the dependent   
and the physiological phenomena the     
independent factors2 the relations of   
all forms of force to each other are    
constant4 ,heat is constant in its      
accompaniment of light2 and yet who     
shall say the one is dependent1 the     
other independent1 the one cause1 the   
other merely effect8  ,we have only to  
regard the theories of specialists in   
order to discover how easily habitual   
occupation with one particular side1    
form1 factor1 or phase of phenomena     
inclines one to regard that side as the 
only essential one1 and all others as   
non-essential1 dependent upon it1 mere  
effect of which it is the cause4 ,the   
physicist tends to interpret everything 
by mechanical action and reaction2 the  
chemist lays more particular stress on  
the chemical properties of organic as of

 inorganic matter2 the physiologist     
emphasizes cellular structure and       
combination1 and makes much of brain    
cells1 the spinal cord1 the nervus      
sympathicus1 and the special            
sense-organs2 the biologist often       
regards the attraction and repulsion    
involved in the so-called sensibility of
 all forms of living matter as the cause
 of all life phenomena2 the anatomist   
calls attention to the arrangement of   
organs with respect to each other1 the  
mechanical adjustment of parts for      
function1 the size and shape of bones as
 caused by weight and the angle of its  
incidence1 etc41 etc42 while the        
psychologist on the other hand refers   
everything to mental causality4 ,for    
complete science1 however1 we need the  
aid of every special science1--of       
,physics1 ,chemistry1 ,biology1         
,physiology1 ,anatomy1 ,psychology1 and 
all the other branches which can        
contribute to any side of our knowledge 
of nature4 ,the desire within us for    

unity is strong1 the impulse to simplify
 by referring everything to a single    
principle almost irresistible2 and in so
 far as we do this through a conviction 
of the oneness of the universe as       
consisting of interdependent parts we   
are in a certain sense justified2 but   
until we can grasp this unity in its    
totality1 our one-sided reductions must 
remain false in so far as they make     
claim to include the whole of truth4 ,it
 may be most useful to choose out that  
side or phase of phenomena for any      
particular investigation which is most  
accessible to such investigation2 where 
the links of the psychical fail1 it may 
be necessary to scientific completeness 
or clearness to complete the chain with 
the aid of the physical1 but it should  
be borne in mind that this is a device  
of reason for convenience' sake4 ,it may
 be possible to imagine two worlds1 one 
in which the physical evolution alone   
takes place and all phenomena peculiar  
to organic function arise through the   

action and reaction of organic          
matter2#abb but the question is not what
 we can imagine but what is3 we can     
imagine many things which do not exist  
and are impossible to nature4 ,the human
 reason has also found it possible to   
conceive of spirit unconnected with     
body4  ,the materialist calls triumphant
 attention to the constancy of material 
phenomena1 and proves1 by careful       
comparison with cooerdinate psychical   
phenomena1 the uniformities in the      
latter4 ,disease of every kind1 but     
particularly those forms of disease     
which attack especially the nervous     
system--brain and spinal cord and the   
nerve endings--furnish the strong points
 of his argument1 which is thus based on
 facts no lover of truth desires to     
gainsay2 but when the materialist has   
shown us all these facts1 has he not    
proved1 with regard to the psychical1   
exactly that constancy which entitles it
 to consideration as a part of the      
actual universe subject to natural law8 

,the materialist objects that if the    
physical side of nature is the essential
 one1 the psychical cannot be essential4
 ,on what grounds is this claim based8  
,is the color of an object not essential
 to it because its shape is essential1  
or do the actual existence and change of
 color according to natural law         
interfere with the actual existence and 
change of shape according also to       
natural law8 ,does only one of our      
senses give us truth8  ,logic is very   
ready with its definitions of things and
 their properties and accidents1 as     
,physics is very ready with its analyses
 of light and color and sound1 and      
,physiology with its analyses of the    
sense organs and their relations to     
color and sound4 ,but shall we accept   
only the physiological analysis of cell 
form and action1 and reject the         
sense-synthesis of sight or hearing as  
less important1 less actual8 ,or are we 
to believe that the sense-function alone
 is essential and not also some         

actuality in its object1 as of this or  
that color8 ,are we to believe that any 
property or accident of a thing may     
change1 and the thing remain yet        
actually the same thing8 ,what are our  
essences as separated from their        
properties and accidents8 ,as a matter  
of fact1 we know nothing except we know 
it as some particular thing1 every      
change in which leaves it something     
different from what it was before4      
,changes of particular form or color are
 changes to some other particular form  
or color1 unless they are such changes  
as withdraw the object from the reach of
 the special sense of sight before      
appealed to1 as for instance in the case
 of evaporation4 ,that one form of force
 may accompany or pass into another     
makes neither one of the concomitants   
and neither the preceding nor the       
succeeding form less real4 ,as a fact1  
however1 much superstition still remains
 with us as unconscious result of just  
such withdrawals from the perception of 

one sense and analogous new appeals to  
some hitherto unaffected sense1 although
 we are accustomed to flatter ourselves 
that science has long overcome this     
superstition4 ,there is no change that  
is not a particular change1 that is not 
according to constant laws of nature1   
and1 as such1 essential to nature4      
,there is no phase of nature that exact 
science can consistently regard as      
non-essential4 ,so that1 even if reason 
does not exist in combination with all  
matter1 we have no ground for regarding 
it as non-essential where it does exist1
 and no more reason for defining it as  
effect than we have for defining it as  
cause4 ,result it may be1 as            
physiological function is result1--that 
is1 an end-form of processes of change  
which we call evolution4  ,but we have  
found our disproof and also our proof of
 the existence of reason outside the    
human species fail us wherever the      
direct evidence of extreme analogy is   
wanting1 as soon as we cease to regard  

reason as a cause of physiological      
change4 ,perhaps it will be well for us 
to define more closely the province of  
reason1 before we proceed further in our
 considerations4 ,an exhaustive analysis
 is not necessary to our purpose and it 
would be useless to attempt it at this  
point of our argument4 ,the relation of 
reason to action is what chiefly        
concerns us here1 and in this connection
 ,mr4 ,leslie ,stephen's definition of  
it as that faculty which enables us to  
act with regard to the distant and      
future might seem to designate its      
important function4#abc ,simple reaction
 on the present action of force belongs 
to all matter4 ,however1 when we        
consider further1 a certain doubt may   
rise as to the exact correctness of this
 definition or description1 for does not
 that which we call instinct often      
perform the same office for the animal  
as that which we have designated as the 
office of reason8 ,let us look into this
 question a little more closely4 ,we may

 take1 for instance1 the case of those  
insects and other animals which1 though 
never caring for or indeed seeing their 
offspring after the hatching of the     
latter1 make provision at the laying of 
the eggs for their nourishment during   
the helplessness of the first period of 
their life2 are we to suppose that these
 animals have any means of knowing that 
they are providing for their offspring8 
,can they have learned the fact from    
their own parent whom they never saw1 or
 from others of their own species who   
are in the same predicament as          
themselves8 ,as ,schneider points       
out1#abd the human infant must have     
sucked before it could have had any     
ideas1 as individual1 of the act of     
sucking4 ,the newly hatched chickens of 
,eimer's experiments above referred to  
could scarcely have had any conception  
of the act of eating before they picked 
at their food4 ,how happens it that the 
young of many of the lower animals which
 give no care to eggs or offspring yet  

know how to care for themselves after   
the peculiar manner of their kind8 ,once
 it is admitted that any acts which     
attain results that constitute desirable
 ends for the acting subject need not be
 regarded as caused by knowledge of the 
ends1 there is no reason to suppose that
 the principle may not hold of many acts
 in which a distinct knowledge of the   
end seems to play a part4 ,but what do  
we mean by end8  ,let us take1 for      
instance1 the act of eating4 ,the       
biologist and the physiologist tell us  
that the end which eating serves is the 
preservation of life2 and the biologist 
may further add--not the life of the    
individual1 alone1 but that of the      
species4 ,the very consistent           
physiologist may principally have in    
view1 in eating1 the preservation of his
 own health1 and may even take into     
consideration1 in a degree1 his possible
 future offspring1 guarding his own     
health with a view to theirs4 ,with a   
minority of other men these more general

 and distant results may to some extent 
be kept in view as ends4 ,but it is     
evident that1 with the majority of      
people1 they are1 where ends at all1    
subordinate ones1 the immediate         
satisfaction of hunger1 the pleasure of 
eating1 or the relief of physical       
depression1 appearing oftener as chief  
end4 ,and what is to be said of the     
new-born infant1 which sucks when the   
breast is placed between its lips8 what 
is the end which it has in view in      
taking nourishment8 ,shall we suppose   
it1 as individual1 to have any definite 
conception of the contrast between      
states of hunger and states of          
satisfaction1 and to possess the        
knowledge that the act of sucking is the
 proper means to the attainment of      
satisfaction as an end8 ,as the infant  
becomes the boy seating himself at table
 with a distinct conception of pleasure 
to be attained by the gratification of a
 vigorous appetite1 so the boy may      
become the physiologist eating with a   

view chiefly to his own health and to   
the further end of health in his        
offspring4 ,how does it happen that1    
thus1 the same act1 the significance of 
which remains the same1 may be performed
 and by the same individual yet with    
quite different ends1 or perhaps in some
 cases 7that of the infant7 no end at   
all1 in view8  ,when we perceive the    
sphex providing its eggs1 as is its     
wont1 with living and yet motionless and
 helpless insects1 we can scarcely      
refrain from believing that it is       
inspired by parental affection thus to  
provide for its future young2 and yet we
 might1 with quite equal reason1 suppose
 that the act of copulation1 in the case
 of the sphex1 must have in view the    
propagation of offspring and the        
preservation of the species1 since this 
is its result also2 we refrain from so  
supposing1 simply because a common      
experience furnishes us with the        
knowledge that the act of copulation1   
most necessary to the propagation of    

offspring and the preservation of the   
species1 may yet be performed with no   
direct view to either of these ends1 the
 birth of offspring being even regarded1
 in many cases1 as something to be      
avoided if possible4 ,with respect to   
all manner of acts1 we continually fall 
into error by imputing what would be our
 own end1 in case we performed the act1 
to another individual of our own species
 performing it2 and the danger of error 
is doubtless increased when we attempt  
to judge the ends of an entirely        
different species by ends in a degree   
common to our own species4 ,there is no 
reason why we should not suppose that   
some less ultimate end than that of the 
preservation of offspring may be present
 to the consciousness of the sphex      
placing food about its eggs1 just as    
some nearer end than preservation of the
 species1 health of offspring1 or even  
individual health may be present to the 
human individual in the acts of         
copulation or of food-taking4 ,and there

 remains still the further question as  
to whether the care of the sphex for its
 eggs may not be1 and continue forever1 
on the plane of the first act of        
food-taking in the human infant2 and    
then the question again arises as to    
what the nature of that plane of action 
may be4  ,these questions must remain1  
,i believe1 in great part unanswered1   
considerations such as those noticed    
above making the inference even of like 
ends from like acts very untrustworthy1 
the inference of similar ends from      
similar acts still more so1 and the     
inference of the existence of no end or 
consciousness at all a logical          
impossibility4 ,however1 a certain      
general clew is given us in the constant
 cooerdination of our own nervous system
 with psychical processes1 from which we
 may infer psychical processes in some  
manner and degree similar to our own in 
species whose nervous system greatly    
resembles our own2 the similarity need  
not be that of ends1 however4 ,the      

decreasing similarity of nervous        
organization as we descend the animal   
scale may be supposed to be cooerdinate 
with some decrease of psychical         
similarity4 ,wherein this increasing    
dissimilarity consists1 however1 we have
 yet to inquire4  ,if we return to the  
act of food-taking in the individual1 we
 perceive that1 avoiding any exact      
assumption as to the definite nature of 
the act in its first appearance in the  
infant1 we may make the general         
assertion that1 as in the case of the   
supposed physiologist who finally comes 
to eat with a direct view to the        
preservation of health in his offspring 
as well as his own preservation and     
health1 the act itself1 while remaining 
unchanged in nature1 connects itself1 in
 the process of development1 with       
various ends4 ,as the individual becomes
 conscious of farther and farther       
reaching and more and more complicated  
results of the act1 he postulates these 
as ends1 not forgetting1 however1       

important ends earlier postulated4 ,he  
may eat1 as a boy1 for the pleasure of  
eating1 later with his health and the   
capacity for useful work in view1 and   
finally to the end also1 or perhaps     
primarily1 of securing healthy          
offspring2 but he eats1 in all these    
cases2 and it is even supposable that he
 may eat the same kinds of food1        
healthful food being1 from the          
beginning1 agreeable to him4 ,the       
widening of knowledge by experience1 in 
the case of the human individual1       
furnishes him with more distant and more
 complex ends1 which were earlier       
impossible to him1 since he knew nothing
 of them4  ,something similar appears to
 be the truth in the case of the mental 
progress of the human species as a      
whole4 ,the growth of knowledge is1 in  
fact1 a growth of consciousness of the  
constant connection of particular       
processes with particular results1 and  
of human acts as affecting these2 with  
which increase of knowledge a further   

cooerdinate development in the sense of 
a postulation of further and further and
 more and more complex ends keeps pace4 
,we are continually making              
discoveries1--performing or observing   
operations some or all of the observed  
results of which are unforeseen by us1  
though these very results may be later  
sought as ends4 ,we are often able to   
predict the results even of entirely new
 experiments2 but we foresee1 and can   
therefore assume as end1 no results the 
elements of which in their connection   
with their conditions have not first    
come1 in some way1 within our knowledge4
 ,nothing is a discovery which does not 
involve some new element or new         
combination of elements4 ,the growth of 
knowledge1 in individual and species1   
and the increase in distance and        
complexity of ends never attain         
completeness1 not all results become    
known2 new discoveries are constantly   
being made which show us that we have   
hitherto been blind to results          

continually before our eyes1 action in  
accordance with which would have been   
most advantageous to us4  ,with all     
these facts before us1 how are we to    
decide as to the end in view in any     
non-human act8 ,how can we be sure      
whether the bird which covers its eggs  
is acting with a view to the production 
of offspring or merely1 as some authors 
have assumed1 to the more immediate end 
of cooling its own breast4#abe ,how do  
we know whether any feeling which we    
might term mother-love is active in the 
sphex's care for her eggs1 whether they 
are1 as some authors have suggested1 a  
part of her own ego and therefore cared 
for1 or whether the act of caring for   
them has not finally come to have some  
immediate pleasure connected with it1   
such as accompanies the satisfaction of 
hunger or the sexual instinct1 the      
pleasure itself being sought as an end8 
,how do we know even whether the impaled
 butterfly is endeavoring to escape pain
 or merely attempting to continue its   

flight8  ,there appear to be some       
general lines that we may draw4 ,thus1  
for instance1 all facts seem to justify 
the assumption that the possession of a 
nervous system involves sensibility and 
susceptibility to pain and pleasure2 and
 thus it is hardly consistent to suppose
 that the struggle of the impaled       
butterfly can be without pain4 ,it might
 be at times more agreeable to our      
selfishness to suppose animals          
insusceptible of pain1 but ,i think we  
can scarcely lay that flattering unction
 to our soul1 and must face the         
assumption of their sensibility and     
feeling4 ,the question as to whether the
 butterfly has any distinct idea of     
escape as an end to be striven for is a 
different one and not so easily solved4 
,yet as regards conscious ends1 too1 we 
may be able to arrive at some general   
conclusions with respect to the acts of 
animals1 even of those low in the scale4
 ,some such conclusions have already    
been reached in our considerations4 ,but

 it is to be noted that all these are   
purely negative--exclusions not         
inclusions4 ,we may be able to say1 for 
instance1 after careful experiment and  
observation1 that this or that act takes
 place where there is no possibility of 
previous knowledge1 on the part of the  
animal performing it1 of this or that   
result 7which we may1 however1 regard as
 an end that should especially be       
desired by the animal71 and that this   
particular result cannot1 therefore1 be 
an end present to the animal mind1 as   
such1 in performing the act4 ,lubbock   
believes that the passive state of the  
caterpillar in its cocoon during its    
transformation to a butterfly is a      
necessary condition of its preservation1
 since the mouth while undergoing change
 to an organ adapted to sucking1 and the
 digestive organs during their          
preparation for the assimilation of     
honey1 must be useless1 and therefore   
the animal in an active state must      
perish of starvation4 ,it is scarcely to

 be supposed1 however1 that the insect  
is aware of these ends of               
self-preservation involved in the state 
of passivity in the cocoon and knowingly
 seeks them as ends4 ,since the         
metamorphosis takes place but once in   
the individual life1 the insect has no  
means of learning anything about it     
beforehand from his individual          
experience 7though1 even if this were   
not true1 there would still remain the  
first instance of cocoon-spinning to be 
explained72 and it is both difficult to 
suppose that the caterpillar has always 
had opportunity to be instructed in some
 way by butterflies of his kind1 as well
 as unnecessary to suppose this1 since  
we see1 in other cases1 that acts useful
 to the individual may take place       
without previous instruction or         
experience4 ,in the case of the sphex1  
too1 as in that of many other lower     
species that provide for offspring they 
will never see1 it is not to be supposed
 that the welfare of the offspring but  

rather some result nearer than this is  
the end in view1 if any end be present  
to consciousness4  ,with regard to      
primary acts of instinct such as those  
of the newly hatched chicken1 and the   
new-born infant1 it would seem as if an 
argument like the following might hold2 
it is1 in fact1 often made use of in a  
somewhat different form4 ,we have seen  
that not only the progress of the       
individual but also that of the human   
species as a whole has involved an ever 
increasing knowledge of the connection  
of processes with their results and the 
cooerdinate assumption of these         
increasingly distant and complex results
 as ends4 ,the ends which animals with a
 less extensive knowledge of natural    
processes may postulate1 must be nearer 
and less complex than our own1 the ends 
of those whose experience affords them  
least extensive knowledge being nearest 
and simplest1 until we arrive thus at   
those lowest forms of animal life which 
cannot be supposed to have any knowledge

 that may be termed such1 whose action  
and reaction1 in its psychical aspect1  
can be figured only as vague sensation4 
,but first as to this vague sensation4  
,among our own acts1 in which blind     
instinct seems to play a rather larger  
part than reason1 there are those in    
which the gratification of the instinct 
involved is attended with a peculiar    
pleasure1 while the denial of           
gratification to a sufficient degree is 
correspondingly painful2 these are the  
acts connected with the gratification of
 the primary appetites of hunger1       
thirst1 and sex4 ,the strength of the   
appetites1 the degree of emotion        
involved in them1 seems to be directly  
cooerdinate with their character as     
connected with primary functions4 ,this 
being the case1 why may we not suppose  
the functions of the simplest forms of  
life1 which we believe to have been     
passed on from generation to generation 
almost unchanged1 for the whole period  
of time occupied in the evolution of the

 human race1 to be connected with       
feelings equally as strong as any of our
 own1 or even stronger since function   
has been exercised on these few lines   
only8 ,feeling changes direction with   
the growth of man's knowledge1 with the 
development of reason2 it may be        
connected with new and more complex     
processes2 but it would be difficult to 
prove that strength of feeling has      
increased except as connected with      
increased exercise of particular        
function--that is1 it would be difficult
 to prove that the whole sum of feeling 
has increased4 ,and if we may assume    
that it has not increased1 then we must 
suppose as great a degree of feeling to 
be possible in the lowest animals as in 
man2 and no reason appears why we should
 not suppose it to exist also in as     
great a degree in the plants and in the 
inorganic matter from which both these  
forms of the organic have sprung4#abf   
,and we have to notice a second fact3   
,if the ends present to human reason are

 nearer ones according as the knowledge 
of the individual performing them is    
narrower1 these nearer ends and the     
means of their attainment may yet be    
very clearly and thoroughly known1 the  
narrower knowledge including the minute1
 often the minutest particulars1 as far 
as it goes2 and why may we not suppose  
the so-called instinctive movements of  
animals very low in the scale of being1 
which exhibit a most perfect adaptation 
as far as it reaches1 to be connected   
with a like perfect1 if very narrow1    
action of reason8 ,or why should we draw
 a line here between the movements of   
animals and all other movements8  ,we   
are thus brought face to face with a    
dilemma to which there appears to be no 
solution4 ,if the solution is           
impossible1 however1 why attempt it8 ,in
 this case1 anything we may term        
solution can be only dogmatic assertion 
or else mere speculation4 ,if the       
question is unanswerable1 it is         
unanswerable1 and there is no use in    

further endeavor in this direction4     
,but1 in reviewing our arguments1 we    
shall find1 ,i think1 that that which   
led us astray at every turn and induced 
us to hope for an answer1 now on this   
side1 now on that1 was the tendency to  
look for some independent cause1 some   
essence1 effecting change rather than   
being effected1 or of which phenomena   
were only the properties4 ,it was this  
which made us believe that we had found 
the means to an answer in reason as the 
cause of action towards ends1 as also1  
again1 that we had found it in the      
development of the higher organism from 
the lower1 and of the organic from the  
inorganic4 ,we know no such independent 
cause1 no such essence4 ,we know only   
variables1 preceding conditions and     
succeeding conditions1 all of which     
preceding and succeeding conditions we  
must regard as equally essential since  
they are equally actual2 and we know in 
all variation a certain constancy of    
relations1 which we1 by abstraction1    

term law4  ,the argument which starts   
with the dependence of ends upon reason1
 and so infers a necessary intervention 
of reason where motion is such as to    
attain results regarded by the onlooker 
as ends to be desired1 is often applied 
in a still wider form in ,theology4 ,of 
course if we start with a definition of 
ends as results actually desired and    
premeditated1 then we may infer reason  
from the assumed existence of ends in   
any case2 but such a form of argument is
 evidently a gross case of petitio      
principii2 we assume that which is to be
 proved1--namely1 the desire and        
premeditation of the results attained4  
,this fallacy ordinarily escapes the eye
 through the double significance of the 
word end as it is generally used2 in the
 premises of the argument the use of the
 word is justifiable if no implications 
of reason and will are associated with  
it2 but1 with such a non-committal      
definition of the word1 the conclusion  
noticed could never be reached1 we      

should find ourselves at the end of the 
argument no nearer it than we were at   
the beginning4  ,the gradual development
 of stability from instability1 harmony 
from disharmony1 a state where collision
 is at a minimum from one where it was  
at a maximum1 may be regarded as        
furnishing the best phase possible of a 
teleological argument4 ,even the        
dissolution of any system is part1      
according to the theory1 of the         
evolution of some higher system of      
stability1 that is1 of one including    
more elements4 ,this leads us1 however1 
to the question of the definition of    
higher2 the friends of theological      
,teleology are very ready to define the 
development of life up to man as the    
development of higher from lower forms1 
but are they willing to regard a        
succeeding stage of still greater       
stability1 a state of barren and        
lifeless rest like that of the moon's   
surface1 which our earth will probably  
one day attain1 as a yet higher stage of

 development1 the destruction of man and
 of the earth as part of a higher       
evolution8 ,we have to consider1        
further1 that1 unless we assume some    
final state of absolute stability for   
the universe1 we can suppose only an    
asymptotic evolution towards it1 in     
which higher and higher systems of      
stability are developed only to be again
 destroyed4 ,we know nature only as     
involving such processes of evolution   
and dissolution2 we know no enduring    
stability4 ,if we regard merely the side
 of evolution in these processes1 we may
 seem to have a strong argument for     
design2 but if we give attention to the 
dissolution succeeding every evolution1 
the argument loses its force4 ,and1     
again1 if we assume the continual order 
of destruction1 reconstruction1 and     
re-destruction finally to give place to 
a condition of absolute stability1 the  
question may be recurred to whether this
 state could be one of motion1 whether  
it must not rather be conceived as one  

of absolute rest1 some frozen peace of  
which the moon's is but an imperfect    
type4 ,we may ask1 then1 whether the    
friends of the teleological argument    
would agree to designate this state1    
which is highest from a mathematical    
point of view since it includes all the 
elements of the universe1 as highest in 
any point of view favoring a theological
 theory of design4 ,the teleological    
argument is accustomed to take into     
consideration only the evolution side of
 natural process2 the pessimistic       
argument lays emphasis1 on the other    
hand1 on all forms of dissolution1--both
 views corresponding thus1 as a matter  
of fact1 to but half the truth4 ,even if
 we do not look beyond the evolution    
upon the earth1 it is evident that each 
step in advance is marked by wide-spread
 destruction1 each survival of the few  
bought at the expense of the slaughter  
of the many4 ,we may overlook the       
slaughter1 but it does not the less     
exist2 we may egoistically shut our eyes

 to the pain1 when it is not our pain1  
but it is not the less a fact4  ,but    
further than this3 ,our previous        
investigations have shown us            
difficulties on every side1 when we have
 attempted to assume reason in matter as
 the cause of stability or harmony1     
preservative action1 or the survival of 
the fittest4 ,we may argue that mere    
matter and motion cannot have produced  
such results as these2 but how do we    
know this8 ,how have we such an intimate
 acquaintance with the nature of matter 
and motion that we can assert this8     
,where were we at the origin of the     
universe 7if we suppose such7 or where  
were we at the origin of life1 that we  
should be able to be assured of this8   
,or how do we know in any case1 from an 
origin1 what might evolve with time8 ,we
 obviously cannot argue from the analogy
 of man's action1 since he is a part of 
the problem itself1 included in the     
question1 and such an analogy is a      
petitio principii4 ,if we have found it 

impossible to assume reason as cause in 
his case1 how can we1 by the analogy of 
his action and by a universal           
generalization1 assume it as a          
,universal ,cause8 ,we have1 in fact1   
absolutely no precedent from which to   
argue1 and may answer1--when ,wallace   
asserts that combinations of chemical   
compounds might produce protoplasm1 but 
that no such combinations could produce 
living or conscious                     
protoplasm1#abg--;,how do you know that 
they could not8 ,we have1 indeed1 no    
evidence to the contrary3 we do not     
know4 ,if we assume the creation of     
protoplasm or the creation of the world 
to have been analogous to any of the    
phenomena of our experience1 in which we
 find only certain constant results of  
the forces resident in matter1 then     
certainly we have no precedent for      
asserting the necessity of divine       
creation2 and if we assume the creation 
to have been essentially different from 
any of the phenomena of our experience1 

then certainly we have no data upon     
which to base any theory whatever       
concerning it4 ,but the assumption that 
the creation of protoplasm1 of the      
earth1 or of the universe1 was          
essentially different from any of the   
processes that we know1 is a mere       
assumption1 without basis3 we have no   
data from which to argue in this        
direction2 any hypothesis of such sort  
is made purely and absolutely a priori4 
,a first appearance of protoplasm upon  
the earth we must infer from the facts  
furnished us by ,geology and ,astronomy2
 but a creation of either matter or     
motion is a mere assumption4 ,as we know
 matter1 it can neither be created nor  
destroyed4 ,we cannot draw any inference
 from man's will1 for man creates       
nothing2 his action is itself a part of 
nature4 ,advanced theological doctrine  
tends more and more to limit the        
creation to the first communication of  
motion to matter or to assume some      
transcendental government of the        

universe1 known1 according to the       
assumption1 transcendentally1 or        
inferred from the existence of moral    
tendency or from desire for the         
transcendental in man4 ,with            
,transcendentalism we have1 as yet1     
nothing to do2 and with moral principle 
in its bearings on this matter we cannot
 deal until later4 ,but as for the      
hypothesis of a first communication of  
motion to dead matter1 we may remark1 as
 before1 that this is a mere hypothesis 
with no facts to support it4 ,we know   
nothing of motion apart from matter1 or 
of matter except through motion2 the two
 cannot be separated in fact1 and there 
is no reason for their separation in    
hypothesis or theory4 ,du ,prel says3   
,whether causeless motion is            
scientifically conceivable1 depends on  
whether we have to regard rest or motion
 as the natural condition of matter2 for
 a motion that is not primary must1 as  
newly appearing change1 be preceded by a
 cause4 ,but though experience might    

incline us to regard rest as the        
original condition of matter1 and       
therefore to seek a cause for every     
motion1 this is1 nevertheless1 only the 
result of an incomplete induction4 ,for 
if it is true that we never see a       
motionless body pass into a state of    
motion without a cause1 on the other    
hand1 it is just as certain that a      
moving body can never pass into a state 
of rest without cause2 and if this axiom
 can never be directly proved in        
processes on the earth1 we can1         
nevertheless1 show reason for it3 motion
 on the earth cannot be imagined without
 resistance from obstacles1 since the   
attraction of the earth and the moments 
of friction can never be removed4 ,but  
the axiom is indeed indirectly proved by
 the fact that we see the velocity of a 
body decrease in proportion to the      
resistance of obstacles2 the body can   
only then attain to a condition of rest 
when the moving force is consumed to the
 last remnant4 ,hence1 if we subtract   

the whole sum of resistance to the      
motion1 we have again the former        
condition1 the motion with its original 
velocity4444 ,which condition of matter 
is the original one1 rest or motion1    
experience cannot inform us4 ,we have as
 good reason for regarding rest as      
arrested motion1 as for regarding motion
 as disturbed rest4 ,the requirement of 
an outer cause for the first impulsion  
of matter therefore has meaning only in 
so far as rest is claimed to be the     
original1 natural condition of matter2  
but this claim cannot be substantiated1 
and the opposite is just as conceivable1
 namely1 that rest is only arrested     
motion1 and that all cosmic matter had  
motion from the beginning4#abh  ,wallace
 practically abandons his own ground1   
not only in his later works in ascribing
 much to natural selection which he was 
at first inclined to believe the effect 
of some supernatural cause1 and omitting
 from his chapters on the application of
 the conception of evolution to man     

several arguments for supernatural      
intercession employed in his earlier    
work1 but even in his first book1 by    
admitting that natural selection takes  
advantage of mental superiority just as 
it does of physical superiority4 ,we may
 notice at this point1 however1 a       
consistent inconsistency of his1 in     
that1 though he denies the existence of 
consciousness in matter1 he leaves no   
logical room for the opposite theory of 
a gradual development of consciousness1 
since he asserts that all instinctive   
actions were at first self-conscious4   
,this position is held by others also4  
,we may note here an objection of       
,wallace's that because man's physical  
structure has been developed from an    
animal form by natural selection1 it    
does not necessarily follow that his    
mental nature1 even though developed    
pari passu with it1 has been developed  
by the same causes only4 ,the question  
may be again repeated as to what is     
meant by cause2 and it will be well to  

keep distinct1 in our thought1          
transcendental cause and cosmic         
conditions4 ,we must admit that we have 
no proof of the absence of              
transcendental causes4 ,neither the     
constancy of nature nor the             
inseparability and indestructibility of 
matter and motion can prove the absence 
of such causes1 which might be entirely 
consistent with these things2 we have no
 data from which to argue that they are 
not so4  ,but though the law of         
,excluded ,middle must hold good here as
 elsewhere1 it is also to be noticed    
that the absence of proof in the natural
 order of things1 with respect to the   
non-existence of transcendental causes1 
is not equivalent to the presence of    
proof of the opposite4 ,we cannot infer1
 from the fact that no proof can be     
given of the non-existence of           
transcendental causes1 that therefore   
proof can be given of the existence of  
such causes2 or1 from the fact that     
transcendental causes may be1 that      

therefore transcendental causes are2    
they may also not be4 ,there is1 in     
fact1 absence of proof for either view4 
,of the transcendental1 if it exists1 we
 can know by definition absolutely      
nothing4 ,the man who endeavors to prove
 its existence generally bases his      
argument on this very fact in order to  
disprove the validity of any argument of
 his opponent from natural facts2 when  
he1 therefore1 after legitimately       
silencing his opponent1 goes on himself 
to prove the transcendental1 he is      
guilty of self-contradiction4 ,when     
,fiske asserts that there is no problem 
in the simplest and most exact          
departments of science which does not   
speedily lead us to a transcendental    
problem that we can neither solve nor   
elude1#abi we may admit the point1 but  
surely it does not follow1 because we   
cannot solve it1 that therefore we must 
solve it1 far less that we must solve it
 in one particular way4 ,if we cannot   
solve it1 we cannot solve it1 and there 

is an end to the matter1 unless we find 
new proof4 ,we may not be able1 as      
,fiske says1 to elude the problem1 but  
we certainly are able to elude the      
answering of it1 and must do so perforce
 if the first part of the               
assertion1--namely1 that we cannot      
answer it1--be correct4 ,when ,fiske    
urges us to accept one view because the 
alternative view contains difficulties  
at least as great1 we fail to perceive  
any grounds in this position for such   
acceptance4 ,to ,fiske's question as to 
whether we are to regard the work of the
 ,creator as like that of the child1 who
 builds houses just for the pleasure of 
knocking them down again1 we may answer 
that the existence of a ,creator must   
first be proved before we1 from a       
scientific basis1 may make any inference
 as to his purpose2 and that we         
certainly cannot use an assumption of   
his existence in order to protest       
against a theory of ,disteleology1--as  
,fiske seems to do1--if we use the      

teleological argument to prove his      
existence4  ,we may furthermore protest 
against the elevation of any negative   
term1 as1 for instance1 ,spencer's      
,unknowable1 to a term signifying a     
positive existence4 ,we do not know     
whether there is any positive           
,transcendental that is to us           
unknowable2 this mere negative term is  
admissible only on the assumption that  
it expresses such an absence of         
knowledge4 ,the ,unknowable assumed as  
existent entity is the ,unknowable      
known1--a self-contradiction4  ,a       
similar criticism may be applied to     
,spencer's use in his ,first ,principles
 of the word ,force1 spelled with a     
capital1 and defined as designating     
,absolute ,force1 an ,absolute1         
,unconditioned ,reality1 ,unconditioned 
,cause1#acj etc4 ,the attribution of    
reality to a mere mental abstraction is 
a survival of old conceptions repudiated
 by ,spencer in their older form4 ,of   
forces we know much1 but of abstract    

,force nothing1--except as an           
abstraction from reality2 and the       
dangers in the use of such a term are   
made manifest by ,spencer's elevation of
 this concept to the character assigned 
it by the other terms quoted4  ,to sum  
up4 ,we have found in nature only       
variables1 no constant and invariable   
factor1 no independent one according to 
which the others vary2 we have found no 
cause that was not also an effect2 that 
is1 we have discovered nothing but a    
chain of phenomena bearing constant     
relations to each other1 no causes      
except in this sense4 ,we have no       
precedent or data from which to assert  
that chemical combinations could not    
have resulted in protoplasm and in      
living protoplasm1 no data from which to
 assert that mere evolution could not   
have produced consciousness4 ,as a      
matter of fact1 however1 we find the    
relations of consciousness and          
physiological process as constant as    
those of the different forms of material

 force1 and while discovering no grounds
 upon which to pronounce either         
consciousness or physiological process  
the more essential1 find none1 either1  
for pronouncing one more than the other 
independent of what we call natural law4
 ,the logic of all our experience leads 
us to believe that neither protoplasm1  
nor the earth1 nor any of the parts of  
the universe1 could have originated     
otherwise than under natural law1 that  
is1 as the result of preceding natural  
conditions which must have contained all
 the factors united in the result1 and  
would thus explain to us1 if we knew    
them1 in as far as any process is       
explained by analysis1 the results      
arising from them4 ,we know matter and  
motion only as united2 we know no state 
of absolute rest1 and we have no grounds
 for supposing any initial state of such
 absolute rest1 or any state in which   
motion not previously existent in the   
universe entered4 ,on the other hand1 we
 have no proof of the absence of        

consciousness outside animal life1 and  
no proof of the non-existence of        
transcendental causes1 though likewise  
no proof of their existence4            
,,footnotes3  #aab ,origin of ,species1 
#fth ed41 ,vol4 ,i4 p4 #cbj4  #aac      
,lecture on ,cell-souls and ,soul-cells1
 #ahgh4  #aad ,entwicklungsgeschichte   
des ,weltalls1 p4 #cdi et seq4  #aae    
,see ,part ,i4 p4 #afa4  #aaf ,der      
menschliche ,wille1 p4 #ac4  #aag ,on   
the ,motions of the ,tendrils of        
,plants2 among the essays of ,knight    
published under the title1 ,a ,selection
 from ,physiological and ,horticultural 
,papers1 #ahda4  #aah ,see              
,insectivorous ,plants1 ,chaps4 ,i4 and 
,,ii4  #aai ,the ,movements of ,plants1 
,chap4 ,,iii4  #abj ,see experiments    
made by ,eimer3 ,entstehung der ,arten1 
etc41 p4 #bfc et seq4  #aba ,e4         
,pflueger3 ,die sensorischen ,functionen
 des ,rueckenmarks der ,wirbelthiere1   
#ahec4  #abb ,see ,lange3 ,geschichte   
des ,materialismus1 ,,ii4 ,theil1 p4    

#dhf4  #abc ,the ,science of ,ethics1 p4
 #fj4  #abd ,der thierische ,wille1 p4  
#afa4  #abe ,see1 for instance1 ,eimer3 
,entstehung der ,arten1 p4 #bhc4  #abf  
,carneri's instance1 cited in support of
 his theory of the possibility of       
sensation without pleasure or pain1 that
 certain nerves connected with fine     
sense-perception1 may yet be cut without
 special pain to the owner1 is a poor   
one1 first1 because highly developed    
nerves1 the media of fine perceptions1  
are especially inapt examples for       
citation in support of any theory of    
primitive sensation in lower organisms1 
and1 second1 because the problem of pain
 and pleasure in such cases is very     
different from the problem of pain and  
pleasure in connection with ordinary    
excitation of nerve endings or the outer
 covering of the organism from which the
 nervous system has developed4 ,the fact
 that1 in highly developed organisms1   
some parts are less susceptible of      
pleasure and pain might as easily be    

construed into an argument that         
corresponding parts of lower organisms  
differ1 in the same manner1 in          
susceptibility4 ,furthermore1 sensation 
being admitted1 as ,carneri admits it1  
or rather asserts it1 of all forms of   
animal life1 it is difficult to conceive
 how he can interpret the phenomena of  
appetition and repulsion as devoid of   
feeling4 ,most authors have argued1 with
 much more reason1 that pleasure and    
pain are primordial4 ,carneri's further 
argument that he who conceives the lower
 species as feeling pleasure and pain   
introduces an immense amount of pain    
into the world 7p4 #aac1 ,grundlegung   
der ,ethik7 is quite aside from the     
question as to the facts of the case4   
,nor can man create pain by his         
conception of its existence1 or destroy 
it1 if it exists1 by a refusal to       
acknowledge its existence4  #abg ,see   
,part ,i4 pp4 #ai1 #bb4  #abh ,die      
,entwicklungsgeschichte des ,weltalls1  
p4 #cej et seq4  #abi ,see ,part ,i4 p4 

#hj4  #acj ,pp4 #agj1 #aib;d4           
,,chapter ,,iii  ,,the ,,will   ,in any 
discussion of the will1 we are met at   
the outset by the difficulties of       
definition1 on which whole chapters     
might be1 and have been1 written4 ,but  
one great difficulty has already been   
considered in the discussions of the    
previous chapter1 in the questions as to
 the existence of consciousness in      
inorganic nature1 in organisms which    
differ from our own in not possessing a 
centralized nervous system1 and in      
connection with actions of our own body 
known to our centralized consciousness  
only as results4 ,leaving these         
questions open1 as we have found it     
necessary to do1 and confining          
ourselves1 in speaking of consciousness1
 to consciousness as we immediately know
 it1 or as we may1 with some degree of  
probability1 infer it in animals        
constituted similarly to ourselves1 we  
find one obstacle to our definition     
removed4 ,for by will is generally meant

 a psychical faculty2 and to speak of   
unconscious will is either a            
self-contradiction or a mere figure of  
speech4  ,we shall also find1 ,i think1 
that the most essential characteristic  
of the will as a psychical faculty is   
that it is connected with action which  
has in view some end consciously sought2
 action to which there corresponds no   
conscious end1 whether a long           
premeditated end or an end              
instantaneously comprehended and assumed
 in the moment of need1 we term reflex4 
,the question may arise as to whether   
there are not acts which we name merely 
involuntary1 which must be classified1  
from a pyschological standpoint1 as     
midway between the voluntary and the    
reflex4 ,but it may be answered that    
here1 as everywhere in connection with  
the organic1 there is difficulty in     
drawing distinct lines2 there are       
psychical conditions in which some      
strong emotion1 for instance1 terror1 so
 takes possession of the mind as almost 

to exclude plan of action1 and the      
individual appears to act1 as we say1   
unconsciously2 but ,i think this very   
adverb solves1 for us1 to all practical 
purposes1 the question we have put4     
,when we analyze such psychical         
conditions1 we often find that1 besides 
emotion1 there was some degree of       
preconception of action1 though the     
emotion so absorbed our attention at the
 time that the other appeared           
subordinate and was easily forgotten2   
but the fact that we term action of this
 sort1 where we fail to discover        
preconception1 unconsciously performed1 
would go to confirm the definition with 
which we began1 though we may have      
difficulty in deciding whether or not a 
particular action comes under the head  
of willed action1 that is1 action to a  
preconceived end4  ,another question    
which has been frequently asked1 in     
analyses of the will1 is whether mere   
abstinence from action1 the negation of 
action1 can be classed as an instance of

 willing1 willing being1 by definition1 
an active1 not a passive state4 ,it may 
be answered that1 from the physiological
 point of view1 a point of view not to  
be wholly disregarded even by the       
conservative psychologist1 the arresting
 action of the will as the control of   
lower by higher centres1 is its most    
important function4 ,and to this        
physiological fact corresponds the      
psychological fact that no stronger     
exertion of will-power is known to us   
than that sometimes necessary to the    
attainment of mere passivity4 ,a        
definition that would exclude such      
passive states from the province of the 
will must exclude1 on the same          
principle1 all other willing not issuing
 in muscular action1 and so all         
voluntary control of thought4 ,the      
choice between activity and passivity   
may be as real and as difficult as      
between two different forms of activity4
  ,we have here introduced the concept  
of choice1 and it may be well to define 

this1 and its significance in our       
definition of will1 more exactly4       
,voluntary action is1 we say1 often     
preceded by long deliberation and severe
 struggle1 ending finally in the choice 
of one of the many modes of action      
deliberated4 ,we can conceive of this   
struggle as not so long1 as shorter and 
shorter1 until it occupies so little    
time and attention as to be scarcely    
perceptible4 ,but we can conceive1 also1
 of a premeditation which includes no   
struggle1 in which one motive appears so
 strong as to exclude consideration of  
any but the one end1 and the            
deliberation has reference only to the  
best means of attaining that end4 ,the  
murderer1 inspired by a desire for      
revenge1 may seek his end with the same 
directness1 if not the same             
instantaneousness1 or with the same     
directness and instantaneousness1 as the
 dog who snaps at a piece of meat2 yet  
we call his action voluntary1 whatever  
we may think of the dog's action1 our   

conception of which may be rendered     
indistinct by our uncertainty as to the 
nature of instinct and the part it plays
 in the action of other species4 ,we    
call the action of the murderer         
voluntary because we conceive that he   
consciously sought the end involved4 ,we
 are even inclined to call it voluntary 
in cases where the criminal is moved by 
momentary passion1 since we conceive    
that he might have exerted self-control4
  ,our conception of will is1 therefore1
 closely bound up with the conception of
 conscious end1 distant or near4 ,our   
association of choice with the act is   
not always exact2 we may conceive of the
 choice as actually taking place between
 one of several ends deliberated upon1  
or as involved in the conscious         
determination of any end1 even though no
 other was deliberated upon1 even though
 all others were excluded from          
consciousness by passion2 since we      
conceive that as all definition is1 in  
fact1 exclusion1 so the determination of

 one end is in effect the negation of   
others that might have been sought1 if  
only in the form of the contrary of     
action1 inaction4  ,we are thus brought1
 first of all1 to a consideration of the
 meaning of the term end4 ,as we have   
seen in the last chapter1 an end is that
 part of the results of an action which 
consciousness especially holds in view  
in the performance of an act4 ,the end  
in view has sometimes been called the   
cause of the act1 but it is evident1 as 
both ,gizycki and ,stephen have shown1  
that a future state1 that is1 something 
which at the time of willing does not   
exist1 cannot move the will2 though the 
representation of a hoped-for end is    
concerned in action1--in just what      
capacity we have yet to determine4 ,it  
has also been urged that nothing        
external can act upon the will1 but only
 internal states of consciousness4 ,all 
depends1 here1 upon the definition of   
external and internal4 ,the distinction 
between the two is a legitimate one     

where it calls attention to the         
difference between that which is at     
present perceived and that which is only
 remembered1 or imagined from the       
elements given by memory4 ,but what is  
an object1 as present to me1 beyond what
 it is to my consciousness8 ,my         
knowledge of a thing is made up of      
various elements contributed through the
 different senses2 and this assertion is
 exactly the same as the statement that 
a thing is the sum of its qualities4 ,my
 idea of the fire1 the lamp1 or any     
other object as external1 arises from   
the fact that it appeals to more of my  
senses than one1 that1 if withdrawn from
 one or from all but one1 it may still  
be perceived by the other or others1 or 
that1 if withdrawn from all of them for 
a time by some obstacle1 it may be      
perceived again when this obstacle is   
removed2 but beyond perception or memory
 of perception1 in any case1 ,i have no 
consciousness of the object4 ,the       
perception is not1 however1 something   

distinct from consciousness1 but is     
consciousness4 ,the error above noticed 
arises from the conception of           
consciousness as a sort of place1       
another space into which we cannot get  
objects from external space2 the        
conception is a crude one1 yet it often 
enters into psychological speculation4  
,the perceived1 that is the external1   
does1 as a matter of fact1 affect our   
will4  ,there may thus be two           
definitions of the term internal and two
 of external1 as the words are generally
 used4 ,internal may mean either within 
the body or within consciousness1       
external may mean external to the body  
or external to consciousness4 ,the two  
meanings are1 in both cases1 commonly   
confused1--that is1 consciousness is    
looked upon1 as has been said1 as a sort
 of internal space within the body to   
which external things cannot get        
admission4 ,external to consciousness   
should refer simply to that which the   
individual or individuals considered do 

not perceive1 of which they are         
unconscious4 ,that of which we are      
conscious is in consciousness4 ,but all 
manner of ingenious jugglery is played  
with the help of the metaphysical       
dualism implied in the other definition 
of the terms4 ,the objection of a       
possibility of this duality of meaning  
applies to ,barratt's use of the term   
external at the opening of his book on  
,ethics1 and the objection of a         
possibility of a similar duality applies
 to many other expressions in the       
propositions and definitions with which 
he begins1--to such expressions1 for    
instance1 as relative to our faculties1 
state of consciousness1 etc4#aca        
,objection may also be taken to such    
quantification of the predicate as is   
found in ,cor4 #a of ,prop4 ,i4  ,to    
return to the question of the will4 ,the
 thought-image1 memory or perception1   
with its associations1 has been termed  
the excitation or the motive and said to
 move or determine the will to some end4

 ,thus the perception of the burning    
house is said to be that which leads me 
to give an alarm1 or the perception of  
the smoking lamp that which moves me to 
turn it down4 ,to this form of statement
 is often objected that mere thought or 
perception can never move the will1 but 
that feeling is required to do this4 ,a 
further discussion may arise as to      
whether it is feeling in the form of    
pleasure or of pain which moves the     
will4 ,many authors regard anticipated  
pleasure as a constant motive2 ,rolph1  
on the contrary1 as we have seen1       
inclines to the view that it is always  
some present pain by which we are moved 
to action4 ,and it is argued that1 since
 the direction of the will is determined
 by pleasure or by pain1 that is by     
motives1 the will is not free4  ,again1 
the physiologist calls attention to the 
fact that the so-called free action of  
the will has for its basis physiological
 processes1 all of which are in         
accordance with the strict uniformity of

 nature1 all subject to law1 and all1 as
 we must believe1 capable of exact      
prediction from the conditions which    
produce them1 if we but comprehended    
these conditions4 ,there is no gap in   
these processes where free will might   
interpose2 the whole thought-process1   
the deliberation preceding decision1 the
 moral struggle if there is one1 the    
decision itself1 and its realization in 
action1 have for their foundation       
physiological function1 which is as much
 determined by necessity as any of the  
processes in inorganic nature4 ,the     
results of past experience1 not of the  
experience of the individual only but of
 that of the whole species inherited as 
inborn tendency and capacity and        
modified by individual circumstances1   
are stored up in the organism1 the point
 of centralization being the brain2 any 
single excitation sets this whole       
complicated machinery in motion and the 
result is the act4 ,the individual1 not 
understanding this complicated process  

of reaction1 not being able to trace the
 results of experience to their source1 
to descend the whole scale of being to  
the beginnings of life and note the     
gradual development of tendency1 and    
seeing the inadequacy of the excitation 
in itself to account for the action     
following1 attributes to this a peculiar
 character1 regarding that which is     
really result as absolute beginning1    
independent cause4  ,we may consider the
 matter from still another point of     
view4 ,we may inquire whether the       
freedom predicated of the human will is 
predicated of that alone1 or of will in 
the whole range of animal life4 ,and if 
it be predicated of the human will      
alone1 we may ask at just what point of 
the evolution this is supposed to arise1
 whether1 in the gradual development1   
any particular point can be found or    
assumed to exist1 of which we can say3  
,here the animal ceases and man begins4 
,or if freedom is asserted of the whole 
range of animal will1 not1 however1 of  

plant movement or the motions of the    
inorganic1 we may again inquire as to   
the point of exact division between the 
animal and the plant4 ,evolution is1 by 
definition1 a gradual process1 a growth 
in which there are no gaps1 and of which
 our finest and most minute calculations
 by infinitesimals can give us only a   
faint conception4 ,where is there any   
point of such a process at which we can 
suppose the entrance of a totally new   
principle that cannot be regarded as    
another expression of force or merely a 
new form of animal function1 but as     
directly opposed to developed function  
and to the force that is subject to     
natural law8  ,the ,evolutionist may    
state the problem in still a new form1  
as follows3 ,the survival of any        
organism at a given period is determined
 by the fitness of that organism for the
 conditions of the environment at that  
period4 ,the form and function of the   
animal are thus1 at each moment1        
determined by the environment4 ,and     

since only functions in harmony with the
 environment render the organism capable
 of survival under that environment1 the
 functions of surviving organisms are in
 a direction favorable to the           
preservation of the form of which they  
are the functions4 ,since1 moreover1    
self-preservation in some form1 whether 
as preservation of the whole organism or
 as preservation of a part through      
satisfaction of its function 7rendered  
possible only through harmony between   
the function and the environment71      
always constitutes the end sought by the
 will1 the individual appears to himself
 to will ends1 whereas these are all    
determined for him by the survival of   
the fittest1 whose function he inherits 
and carries out subject only to the     
modification of the peculiar elements of
 his own environment4 ,if we suppose1 at
 any point of development1 an action not
 in accord with that which the laws of  
nature necessitate decided upon by the  
will1 such an action cannot be carried  

out4 ,but even a decision is impossible 
contrary to natural law1 since in       
preceding evolution there has been no   
point at which nature has not in like   
manner determined action1 and the       
present decision1 being the expression  
of function attained as the result of   
evolution1 must be as much determined as
 the action which follows4  ,or if we   
return to our conception of the         
development of stable from unstable     
conditions1 we may consider all         
evolution of higher function as         
increased adaptation1 that is1 as       
harmony with an ever wider circle of    
nature1 the reason appearing as         
corresponding concomitant knowledge of  
this widening circle1 to which the      
function of the organism is adjusted4   
,the reflection preceding decision on an
 end consists in the imagination1 by aid
 of the memory of past experience1 of   
some of the constant results of         
particular function1 to which function1 
however1 the organism is irresistibly   

moved4 ,thus that which is generally    
regarded as the greatest independence of
 nature is1 in reality1 the greatest    
subjection to nature considered as a    
whole1 although this wider subjection   
means an increasing independence of the 
mere excitation of the moment4 ,the     
ability to weigh all sides of a         
question1 sometimes termed ,freedom1 is 
rather the widest adaptation1 which     
means the widest determination by       
nature4 ,the lower organisms may be1 as 
,rolph and ,alexander assert1 as well   
adapted to their particular environment 
as the higher2 but the higher are       
adapted to a wider environment1 to more 
of the variations of the conditions on  
the earth's surface4 ,man is the most   
widely adapted of all animals4 ,this is 
a fact which we express when we say that
 man's power of adaptation is           
greatest1--that is1 that there are      
latent tendencies in him1 the result of 
former adaptations1 which may correspond
 sufficiently to new environment1 i4e4  

to environment involving many new       
elements1 to enable him to survive4     
,this wider adaptation expresses itself 
especially in the higher development of 
the nervous centres1 to which man's     
higher reason corresponds2 it is through
 the reason especially that his         
adaptiveness comes to light4  ,the      
statistician often has considerable to  
say against a doctrine of freedom of the
 will4 ,he calls attention to the       
necessary character of human action as  
evidenced by its uniformities under     
uniform circumstances1 in the various   
important relations of life4 ,these     
uniformities are not less than those    
which statistics reveal in disease and  
death and other events classed as not   
under the control of the will4  ,and to 
all this evidence we may add that of the
 history of the mental life of the      
species1 derived from the combined      
labors of the geologist1 the            
ethnologist1 the philologist1 and the   
historian4 ,everything goes to prove an 

evolution in the mental life of man1 as 
gradual1 and as much subject to the     
influence of the environment1 as his    
physical evolution has been4 ,carneri   
says1 ,the eternal laws of mind point   
out the way upon which man has to       
proceed2 it is the same way by which man
 has become man1 and by which mankind   
must go forward even if it does not will
 thus to proceed4#acb  ,and again1 the  
authorities on mental disease           
demonstrate the constant relations1 not 
only of general health of brain to      
health of mind1 and of disease of brain 
to mental unsoundness1 but also of      
particular physical symptoms to         
particular mental symptoms4 ,this       
constancy of relations is revealed with 
more certainty and distinctness by every
 step in the progress of medical        
knowledge4 ,the specialist in mental    
disease inquires with reason how we can 
acknowledge the physical processes of   
the body to be governed by natural law1 
yet assert the emancipation from law of 

the psychical processes which vary      
concomitantly with these in a manner    
that science shows to be perfectly      
constant4 ,to the testimony of          
,psychiatry may be added that of the    
comparatively new science of            
,criminology4  ,and1 finally1           
,evolutional ,ethics demonstrates the   
constancy of character1 the persistence 
of habit1 and the uniformity of its     
change under the influence of           
environment4 ,if there is no persistence
 of character and uniformity in its     
action1 we have no reason1 as various   
authors have shown1 for trust or        
distrust1 for praise or blame2 and1 ,i  
think we may add1 none for love or      
dislike1 reverence or contempt1         
enthusiasm or coldness1 in the          
contemplation of character or conduct4  
,if the fact that a man acts honorably1 
kindly1 nobly1 in one instance is not a 
warranty that we may with reason expect 
him to act similarly again under similar
 circumstances1 allowance being made for

 error in our interpretation of motive  
7which may have been merely             
self-interested where we thought it     
disinterested7 and for changes produced 
in character by the environment between 
the first act and the opportunity of the
 second1 then character is merely a     
jumbled chaos of chance1 and the name   
habit a contradiction in terms4 ,we may1
 perhaps1 respect the single act1 but we
 have no reason for respecting the      
individual performing it1 since the     
individual cannot be regarded as        
coextensive with a single act of his    
life1 and least of all when the act     
gives no clew to a permanent basis      
issuing in uniform action of which law  
can be predicated4 ,in this case1 the   
noble deed1 or any number of noble      
deeds1 afford us no security that the   
next act of the person performing them1 
or all the rest of the acts of his life1
 may not be wholly ignoble1 base1 and   
vile4  ,in the face of all the          
considerations thus offered us1 we      

cannot well find reason for accrediting 
the will with a peculiar position in the
 universe1 as emancipated from the      
natural law which we discover in all    
other phenomena4 ,but it behooves us1 in
 this connection1 to inquire as to just 
what is the significance of the term    
natural law4 ,it has already been       
implicitly defined in our previous      
considerations4 ,lewes and several other
 modern philosophical writers have given
 excellent definitions of the           
expression4 ,lewes writes as follows3   
,law is only one of two conceptions1    
7#a7 a notation of the process observed 
in phenomena1 which process we mentally 
detach and generalize by extending it to
 all similar phenomena2 7#b7 an abstract
 ,type1 which1 though originally        
constructed from the observed ,process1 
does nevertheless depart from what is   
really observed1 and substitutes an     
,ideal ,process1 constructing what would
 be the course of the process were the  
conditions different from those actually

 present4 ,the first conception is so   
far real that it expresses the observed 
series of positions4 ,it is the process 
of phenomena1 not an agent apart from   
them1 not an agency determining them1   
but simply the ideal summation of their 
positions4444 ,phenomena1 in so far as  
they are ruled1 regulated1 determined in
 this direction rather than in that1 and
 necessarily determined in the direction
 taken1444 are determined by no external
 agent corresponding to ,law1 but by    
their cooeperant factors internal and   
external2 alter one of these factors and
 the product will be differently        
determined4 ,it is owing to the very    
general misconception of the nature of  
,law1 that there arises the             
misconception of ,necessity2 the fact   
that events arrive irresistibly when    
their conditions are present is         
confounded with the conception that the 
events must arrive whether the          
conditions be present or not1 being     
fatally predetermined4 ,necessity simply

 says that whatever is1 is1 and will    
vary with varying conditions4#acc       
,neither ,natural ,law nor ,necessity is
 an entity extraneous to phenomena which
 governs or compels them2 the two are   
generalizations merely by which we      
express a certain uniformity that we    
find universal4  ,let us return to our  
analysis of the organic as matter and of
 function as its motion4 ,go as far as  
we like in our analysis1 and we still   
have left positive entities of matter   
and force1 or matter1 motion1 and the   
equivalent of motion in resistance2     
moreover1 we cannot suppose either      
matter or force to decrease by our      
analysis4 ,here1 therefore1 we have     
indestructible entities1 and these1 not 
,law and ,necessity1 are the positive   
factors4 ,but if the final divisions of 
matter leave us still positive factors1 
then the combinations of these must be  
positive also2 not only the theoretical 
atoms of the chemist1 or the organic    
cells with their motions and functions1 

but the combinations of these in        
organisms1 must be positive4  ,it is    
said that the organism answers to its   
environment as the clay to the mould2   
that it is formed by the environment and
 adjusted to it4 ,here we may inquire   
whether the adjustment referred to is   
present adjustment or that of the whole 
development of the organism4 ,if present
 action of the environment is all that  
is had in view1 it may be objected that 
not anything in the environment1 and not
 the whole environment1 is more positive
 than the organism4 ,the one of the two 
factors cannot be regarded as positive1 
the other as merely negative1 the       
environment as the active and formative1
 the organism as the passive and formed1
 the environment as determining1 the    
organism as determined4  ,but we may    
also consider the organism in the       
process of development4 ,in this case1  
we seem to find reason for regarding it 
as purely the product of the environment
 in which it has arisen4 ,the product it

 certainly is in one sense2 that is1 it 
is the end-form of a series of changes  
which we may suppose originally         
inorganic matter1 or 7if we prefer to   
begin with the lowest form of life7     
simplest forms of organic matter1 to    
have undergone4 ,but the present forms  
of matter everywhere are1 in like       
manner1 the products of the past changes
 of matter2 if we trace these changes   
which have produced present forms1 in   
the case of the inorganic as well as    
that of the organic1 back to any point  
of time which we may choose as a        
beginning1 we shall find in neither case
 more matter or a greater amount of     
force than at the present period2 we    
shall find the same matter in different 
combinations1 the same force in other   
forms4 ,present forms are not greater or
 less than past ones1 but their exact   
equivalents2 the beginning was not      
greater than the end2 the producing     
forms and forces were not greater than  
are their products4 ,by a backward      

course of thought comprehending         
evolution we may bring unity into our   
conception of the organic1 but we find  
no new factors of force1 and need to    
avoid laying stress upon the process to 
the depreciation of the importance of   
the product4 ,we may be led to suspect  
that our search after new and more      
important factors was only another form 
of the search after an independent cause
 according to which all other phenomena 
may be said to vary4 ,our mathematical  
habit of selecting some one side of     
natural process as independent1 in order
 to trace1 by its variation1 the        
variation of the others1 leads us to    
regard the one side1 phase1 or portion1 
of phenomena as actually thus           
independent2 although we forget1 in this
 assumption1 that we may select any     
phase for our mathematical independent1 
and are not confined to any particular  
one4 ,the organism is itself a part of  
the environment regarded as             
conditioning1 when we consider the      

development of other organisms1 or      
change in inorganic matter1 with which  
it is in contact4 ,our minds are unable 
to comprehend the whole of nature as    
variation only1 and we fasten on some   
one part of the process as independent  
of the general change or as holding a   
unique position in it1 from which to    
consider the variation of the rest4 ,and
 the conception of some one part of     
phenomena as cause disappointing us1 on 
closer investigation1 as far as merely  
present phenomena are concerned1 we     
remove the conception farther back into 
a dim past which we fail to analyze in  
thought with the same completeness with 
which we analyze the present4 ,we are   
not1 however1 in the habit of tracing   
back any other than just the organic    
forms to an arbitrary point which we    
call the beginning1 and emphasizing this
 in distinction from present conditions2
 in considering the inorganic1 we simply
 notice present conditions and mark the 
result of action and reaction between   

this and that other form of matter with 
which it comes in contact4  ,the action 
of the animal at any moment may be said 
to be determined by the tendency or     
potential energy inherent in it at the  
moment1 and the influence exerted by a  
particular excitation2 this is a matter 
of action and reaction2 but the force   
represented by both sides1 by that of   
organism and by that of environment1 is 
equally positive and equally represented
 again in the result4 ,particular       
emphasis has been laid1 now on the      
positive activity of the organism by one
 school of writers1 now on the activity 
of the environment as moving the        
organism to action by another school2   
but both sides contribute to the result4
 ,where action and reaction in inorganic
 matter are considered1 we do not regard
 either of two incident forces as alone 
positive2 nor do we regard one as       
overcome by the other in the sense that 
it is not fully represented in the      
result4  ,again1 if we return to the    

dispute as to the importance of the     
physiological basis of action1 the      
remark may be repeated1 that it is mere 
dogmatism to select some one phase of   
phenomena as the only essential phase1  
while all other phases are regarded as  
non-essential or subordinate4 ,the      
materialist who derides the idea of a   
,ding-an-sich is himself assuming       
something very like it1 when he         
endeavors to prove matter to be the     
cause1 essence1 or independent1 of which
 consciousness is the mere effect1      
property1 or dependent4  ,even if it    
could be said with truth that the brain 
secretes thought as the liver secretes  
bile 7and the analogy does not hold71 it
 should be borne in mind that the bile  
is no mere dependent creation of the    
liver1 but that1 before it became bile1 
it existed in another form1 was1 in     
fact1 a part of the liver of which it is
 regarded as the dependent creation4    
,matter and force have simply changed   
form2 that is all4 ,the later form is   

not rendered secondary in importance or 
less positive by the fact of its        
sequence upon the other form4 ,the      
conditions equal the result2 they are   
not greater than it4 ,where is there1 on
 closer analysis1 passivity as          
distinguished from activity8 ,all force 
is1 by definition1 active2 and all      
matter represents force4 ,we find simple
 equivalence1 that is1 a uniformity of  
relation between preceding conditions   
and succeeding conditions4 ,our ,natural
 ,law and ,necessity resolve themselves 
into this4 ,yet the conception of law as
 something extraneous to things1        
something without them not included in  
their primary nature but controlling    
them1 is a very common conception4 ,thus
 ,du ,prel1 though rejecting other forms
 of teleological argument1 bases a whole
 course of teleological reasoning upon  
the mere fact of law4#acd ,however1 we  
know of natural law merely as an        
expression of uniformities1 a           
generalization from the relations of    

things2 we have no reason for treating  
it as extraneous to the nature of things
 themselves2 and nature itself furnishes
 us with no reason for supposing the    
relations of things to be of more       
significance than things themselves2    
relations are not entities4  ,if man be 
part of nature1 it is strange that the  
force within him should be regarded as  
so shaped and compelled1 the force      
without him1 on the other hand1 as so   
compelling and mighty4 ,no part of      
nature is1 as a matter of fact1         
compelled4 ,all things act and react    
spontaneously from their own nature1 and
 man in the same manner acts from his4  
,law cannot be defined as determining   
action and reaction1 nor can ,necessity2
 they are not entities4 ,force is       
sometimes called the determining factor1
 but an abstract ,force we do not know2 
we know force only as motion or the     
equivalent of motion in resistance1 or  
as the conceived potentiality of motion4
 ,the concept of potentiality of motion 

is1 however1 again only a device of     
reason for bringing unity into our      
conception of things by accounting for  
the appearance of motion where before it
 was not4 ,potentiality is no existence1
 no reality2 actual potentiality is a   
contradiction in terms4 ,nature contains
 only actualities4 ,force is the        
abstract term by which we include       
motion1 resistance1 and the conceived   
potentiality of motion1 under one head4 
,motion again is often defined as the   
cause of movement2 but such a conception
 makes the abstract notion of a thing   
the cause of the thing itself1 unless by
 motion as the cause we understand the  
preceding motion1 and by movement as the
 effect we mean the succeeding motion1  
in which case we have to bear in mind   
the equivalence of conditions and       
results4 ,nor do we know motion as      
something apart from matter1 moving it2 
we know no abstract motion2 we know only
 things as moving1 changing1 and        
resisting motion4 ,there is no outside  

cause given us in our experience as the 
mover1 from which things are to be      
distinguished as the passive moved4     
,things move4 ,and in correspondence    
with the activity of things is doubtless
 the sense of freedom in the exertion of
 the will4 ,outer compulsion1 resistance
 to the carrying out of a course decided
 upon or desired1 has sometimes been    
interpreted as the negation of freedom  
of the will2 but it has with reason been
 objected to this definition that the   
very strongest sense of inner freedom   
may exist in connection with such       
compulsion4 ,it may be supposed that1 as
 long as there is action in the brain1  
the corresponding sense of freedom will 
exist2 or1 lest this statement be       
interpreted as materialistic1 we may say
 instead3 ,as long as consciousness     
exists1 it must by definition exist as  
activity1 with which the sense of       
freedom is indissolubly connected4  ,but
 we may look at the matter from the more
 purely psychological side4 ,the        

opponents of a theory of freedom make   
much of the determination of the will by
 motives4 ,in their argument1 the will  
is treated as if it were some separate  
material thing1 the motive another      
equally separate thing which1 when      
brought into contact with the will1 sets
 it in motion in somewhat the same      
manner as the powder in the gun drives  
the ball4 ,but the motive is not        
something external to consciousness1    
something foreign1 that1 introduced1    
impels the will to action2 nor can the  
will be compared to an organ of the     
body1 the motion of which is given us   
through our senses as the motion of a   
part1 not of the whole body4 ,the       
functions of the body are1 in this      
sense1 a part of the material world to  
us4 ,but the will is no material thing1 
no separate organ of consciousness in   
this sense4 ,in the will1 consciousness 
expresses itself2 and we cannot say that
 it is only a part of consciousness that
 thus expresses itself4 ,the motive1 as 

conscious1 belongs to that consciousness
 which finds expression in the will4  ,a
 similar form of theory to that just    
noticed regards the will as determined  
especially by feeling4 ,but feeling     
belongs as evidently to consciousness as
 does will1 nor can we say that one part
 of consciousness feels and another     
wills1 the one part being the active    
mover1 the other the passive moved2 the 
division into parts is a material one   
applicable to things occupying space1   
but not to consciousness4 ,the notion   
here of mover and moved is very similar 
to that noticed above1 of motion as     
cause1 movement as effect4  ,it is      
sometimes said that the desirability of 
an object moves or determines the will4 
,here arises the question as to whether 
the desirability of an object lies in   
the object or is only dependent upon    
consciousness as a quality of feeling4  
,thus we come1 by closer analysis1 to   
the fundamental problem of the          
connection of consciousness with the    

external world4 ,it is often said that  
desirability is a mere predication of   
consciousness and does not lie in the   
object or end itself4 ,that desirability
 is a predication of consciousness is   
true in a sense4 ,and yet it is evident 
that this predication corresponds to    
actualities existing in the thing or    
end1 on account of which it is          
pronounced desirable or1 under proper   
conditions1 desired4 ,when we analyze   
the state of consciousness itself1 we   
find it impossible to separate the      
desirability as predicated by           
consciousness and the desirability as   
predicated of the end1 the excited      
feeling and the feeling as excited by   
the object4 ,from one point of view1    
excitation and consciousness are the two
 sides of the conditions1 both of which 
are essential to the result2 but1 from  
another point of view1 it is equally    
true that the desire of the end is      
always a part of consciousness1 which   
expresses itself in the will according  

to its own inherent nature4  ,the act of
 the will1 as following excitation1 is  
sometimes treated as its mere result1   
hence subject to it1 subordinate and    
passive2 on this principle1 we could    
also define brain-action as subject to  
nerve-action and passive in comparison1 
wherever it follows4 ,the mere          
conception of the conservation of force 
would make it impossible to suppose a   
result of force to be less than         
preceding force of which it is the      
result4 ,we do not call the evolution of
 organic life on the earth subject or   
subordinate to the motion of the nebular
 mists1 or passive with respect to them4
 ,the mere sequence of one event upon   
another in time does not justify our    
pronouncing the one subordinate to the  
other or passive with respect to it1 the
 whole sum of matter and force remaining
 always the same1 and a resultant in any
 particular instance exactly            
representing its factors4  ,from our    
examination of the above arguments1 we  

perceive that the materialist uses both 
the concomitance of consciousness with  
material processes1 and1 again1 the     
sequence of particular conscious states 
upon material processes1 as proof of the
 subordination and passivity or         
dependence of consciousness1 as proof   
that the latter is effect of the        
material as cause2 indeed1 we are not at
 all sure that he does not often confuse
 the two arguments from sequence and    
from concomitance4 ,on the other hand1  
the argument of sequence is often used  
to prove the greater importance and     
activity of consciousness in contrast to
 matter1 consciousness being regarded as
 antecedent to excitation in general or 
to some particular excitation4 ,but     
consciousness is not the prius of its   
excitation in time1 since its very      
definition includes activity and this is
 not possible without excitation2       
consciousness is always the             
consciousness of something4 ,to regard  
consciousness as the logical prius of   

matter or of excitation by matter may be
 possible1 but the standpoint is either 
a purely fanciful or a purely dogmatic  
one4 ,with regard to its priority in    
respect to a particular excitation1 the 
remarks made above hold good1 that mere 
sequence does not prove subordination or
 passivity as distinguished from        
activity4 ,the fact of concomitance is  
also sometimes treated as a part of     
theories of the causal nature of        
consciousness1 the brain being regarded 
as the mere organ of mind1 the passive  
instrument upon which it acts4 ,in this 
case1 however1 as in the opposite       
argument that consciousness is dependent
 upon brain-action1 there is probably   
some indistinct idea of sequence at     
work4 ,the argument applies equally     
well1 indeed1 in either direction1 the  
materialistic or its opposite1 and      
merely this fact would lead us to       
suspect that it can be conclusive in    
neither4  ,thus1 in hunting for some    
cause and effect in the activity of the 

will1 we bring to light1 in the end1    
only a certain concomitance and         
sequence4 ,that which we call           
explanation of natural process is1 in   
fact1 in all cases1 merely a finer      
analysis of concomitance or sequence1 or
 the analysis of some new phase of it4  
,we have only the finer elements of the 
process analyzed before us in any case1 
although we are often inclined to treat 
these elements as if they were the      
essence and cause of the process to     
which they belong4 ,we explain1 for     
instance1 the green color of the leaf by
 the continually renewed presence of a  
certain chemical combination2 yet the   
green color is not less real and        
essential than the chemical composition 
which constantly accompanies it4 ,the   
musical note is not the less real to our
 ear because we can make the vibrations 
of the string and the air perceptible to
 our eye1 or because we can observe to  
some extent1 and infer further1         
vibrations of parts of the ear that are 

the physiological accompaniment of the  
note heard4 ,the light of the fire is   
not the less real because of the heat   
that ,i feel from it1 nor is either less
 actual because ,i can analyze the      
process of combustion in the case4 ,the 
shape of the leaf to my touch does not  
make its greenness of color the less    
real to my eye1 nor does change of form 
prevent change of color or prove it less
 essential in any case4 ,the smell of   
the rose does not render its color less 
real and essential1 and1 vice versa1 the
 color does not render the smell less an
 essential part of reality4 ,neither    
does the activity of the brain render   
the activity of consciousness less real1
 or interfere with its freedom1 any more
 than the activity of the consciousness 
renders that of the brain less actual or
 interferes with its free action and    
reaction4 ,my knowledge of a thing given
 me through one sense is totally        
different from the knowledge of it given
 me through other senses2 yet ,i do not 

find this various knowledge             
contradictory or irreconcilable4 ,why1  
then1 do ,i find such great difficulty  
in reconciling the simple facts of      
consciousness and brain-activity8 ,and  
why should there be such an inclination 
to give greater prominence to           
physiological process than to mental    
process1 to regard the only method of   
reconciling the two that of proclaiming 
the dependence of consciousness8  ,the  
solution of the question is not so      
difficult to find4 ,in the first place1 
our knowledge of the concomitance of    
brain-process and consciousness1 or at  
least of the constant uniformity of this
 concomitance1 is only comparatively    
recent4 ,further1 this knowledge is not 
given us immediately1 but is the        
conclusion of a process of reasoning4   
,while such concomitance as we          
immediately perceive--the concomitance  
of certain impressions on one sense with
 certain other impressions upon other   
senses--appears to us so natural as to  

need no comment1 the newness and mediate
 nature of our knowledge of this other  
concomitance incline us to regard it as 
strange and needing some especial       
explanation4 ,while the concomitant     
impressions upon the senses1 wherever   
they are constant1 become united in our 
conception to a single whole1 we fail to
 unite the elements of this mediately   
known concomitance to such a whole2     
doubtless1 however1 if a perception of  
all the details of our own              
brain-activity were the invariable      
accompaniment of thought1 we should thus
 unite them4 ,we can no more explain why
 the two activities are concomitant1    
except as we show it to be a fact and   
analyze it into its elements1 than we   
can show why just ,prussian blue should 
be the characteristic of one chemical   
compound and the green of plant-life of 
another1 why the connection of the      
colors should not be the reverse4 ,the  
importance we accord the physiological  
accompaniments of mental process is     

partly accounted for by the significance
 which attaches to more recent knowledge
 as constituting scientific progress2 in
 the effort to bring together in our    
conception the two elements of          
consciousness and brain-action1 to whose
 association we are not accustomed by   
immediate perception1 we are led to lay 
especial weight upon the facts of recent
 discovery1 which are connected with so 
great advance in science and have done  
away with so many superstitions4 ,and1  
finally1 in the rebound from the old    
superstitions1 the tendency is to       
exaggerated views in the opposite       
direction4 ,the attempt to correct      
spiritualistic ideas of a soul superior 
to the rest of nature and no part of it 
has resulted in materialism4 ,and by the
 physiological basis we now think to    
explain the facts of psychology4        
,notable enough1 says ,carlyle1 wilt    
thou find the potency of ,names2        
,witchcraft1 and all manner of          
,spectre-work and ,demonology1 we have  

now named ,madness1 and ,diseases of the
 ,nerves4 ,seldom reflecting that still 
the new question comes upon us3 ,what is
 ,madness1 what are ,nerves8 ,ever1 as  
before1 does ,madness remain a          
mysterious-terrific1 altogether infernal
 boiling-up of the ,nether ,chaotic     
,deep1 through this fair-painted ,vision
 of ,creation1 which swims thereon1     
which we name the ,real4 ,was ,luther's 
,picture of the ,devil less a ,reality1 
whether it were formed within the bodily
 eye or without it8  ,if the connection 
of physiological and psychological      
processes requires explanation1 beyond  
that of analysis1 why should we not feel
 ourselves equally required to explain1 
in like manner1 the connection of light 
with heat and sound1 and form with      
color8 ,why is it more comprehensible   
that the ball can be at the same time   
round to my touch and red or gray to my 
eye1 and that the rose can both smell   
sweet and be yellow in tint8 ,why should
 we1 in this particular instance1 make  

such a strenuous effort to find reasons 
which can never be given in this case   
any more than in the others1 and which  
we do not1 moreover1 demand in the      
others8 ,why cannot we accept the simple
 fact of concomitance in this case also8
 ,our attempts to show the reason of    
brain-activity by means of              
mind-activity1 or1 vice versa1 to       
explain mental activity as caused by1   
and dependent upon1 physiological       
activity1 must end equally in failure1  
in a one-sided dogmatism4 ,it is the    
concomitance of the two1 to the thought 
of which we are not yet used1 that      
thwarts us4 ,and yet ,zeno1 the sceptic1
 found as great difficulties in         
sequence1 and proved1 to his            
satisfaction and that of his followers1 
the utter impossibility of many things  
which we accept as simple facts without 
troubling ourselves to solve his        
problems4  ,we have seen that any       
explanation of facts beyond analysis1   
except as we assume some transcendental 

intuition1 is impossible4 ,the search   
for some further explanation embodies   
the last remnant of the idea of some    
special separate agent behind each      
single event and process1 with which    
early superstition was animated4 ,driven
 by the gradual spread of knowledge to  
more and more obscure details in        
concomitance1 and to ever greater       
distance of time in sequence1 it has    
reached the final shadows of the one1   
and the furthest ends of evolution1     
whither thought seldom travels1 in the  
other4 ,that we expect other explanation
 than analysis1 or read into analysis   
more than its real worth1 is the result 
of an indistinctness and confusion in   
our thought1 which has not yet lost the 
habit of infusing into generalizations  
and abstractions a vitality of their own
 apart from reality4 ,we continually    
hope and strive for some explanation    
that shall give us more than nature1 and
 yet1 strange to say1 we endeavor to    
found our theories in and on nature4 ,we

 acknowledge the scientific truth of the
 indestructibility of matter and force1 
the constancy of their sum1 and yet we  
nevertheless continue to construct our  
many-storied theories of causes and     
essences1 failing to notice that we are 
bringing all our concepts from a time   
when the equivalence of results and     
conditions1 of results and their        
factors1 was not yet comprehended4      
,,footnotes3  #aca ,see ,part ,i4 p4    
#ajg et seq4  #acb ,sittlichkeit und    
,darwinismus1 p4 #cfc4 ,see also1       
however1 the ,grundlegung der ,ethik1 p4
 #bhi4  #acc ,problems of ,life and     
,mind1 ,ser4 ,i4 ,vol4 ,i4 pp4 #cjh1    
#cji4  #acd ,die ,entwicklungsgeschichte
 des ,weltalls1 pp4 #ceb et seq4        
,,chapter ,,iv  ,,the ,,mutual          
,,relations ,,of ,,thought1 ,,feeling1  
,,and ,,will ,,in ,,evolution   ,hume1  
in his essay on the ,passions1 writes3  
,what is commonly1 in a popular sense1  
called reason1 and is so much           
recommended in moral discourses1 is     

nothing but a general and calm passion  
which takes a comprehensive and a       
distant view of its object1 and actuates
 the will1 without exciting any sensible
 emotion4 ,a man1 we say1 is diligent in
 his profession from reason2 that is1   
from a calm desire of riches and        
fortune4 ,a man adheres to justice from 
reason2 that is1 from a calm regard to  
public good1 or to a character with     
himself and others4 ,the same objects   
which recommend themselves to reason in 
this sense of the word1 are also the    
objects of passion1 when they are       
brought near to us1 and acquire some    
other advantages1 either of external    
situation1 or congruity to our internal 
temper2 and by that means excite a      
turbulent and sensible emotion4 ,evil at
 a great distance is avoided we say from
 reason2 evil near at hand produces     
aversion1 horror1 fear1 and is the      
object of passion4 ,we know no state of 
consciousness from which elements of    
thought are excluded2 consciousness is  

not a state of rest1 but a continual    
passage from percept to concept1 or from
 concept to percept1 or if from percept 
to percept even then with the           
intervention of concepts4 ,judgment1    
exclusion and inclusion1 has part in all
 consciousness2 and thus pleasure and   
pain must be regarded as always         
accompanied by thought-elements1 though 
the thought-factors may escape notice   
because of the prominence of violent    
emotion1 just as1 in like manner1       
feeling may draw less attention when of 
a less turbulent nature4 ,this is not   
equivalent to saying that emotion must  
always be accompanied by a              
representation of its object4 ,to this  
last statement might be objected that   
emotion may not be1 at first1 connected 
with its proper object1 just as         
so-called purely physical pain may not  
be1 in the beginning1 combined with any 
perception of the object producing it1  
may not even be localized1 in fact4 ,but
 to this objection may be answered that 

our conception of its object1 in the    
case of emotion1 is similar to our      
conception of the end of any particular 
act2 that which we regard as the object 
of the emotion may be entirely different
 from the object in the consciousness of
 the being subject to the emotion4 ,that
 is to say1 emotion speedily connects   
itself with some object1 or even if felt
 for some time as vague want is yet     
combined with thought1 in that we make  
mental search for its object or1 where  
it is too faint to induce this action1  
tend to turn to memories or imaginations
 sad or joyful1 according as the feeling
 tinges our mood with exhilaration or   
sadness2 but the objects with which it  
connects itself in thought may be quite 
other than those which onlookers regard 
as its proper object4 ,into many an     
emotion of childhood and growing        
adolescence1 for instance1 the adult    
reads a meaning and object of which he  
is aware the individual subject to the  
emotion has no thought4 ,physical       

feeling may not be connected with any   
distinct perception of the object       
producing it 7as1 for instance1 when one
 bruises oneself in the dark71 but it is
 never unconnected with thought-images4 
,the intermediate links between this    
outwardly stimulated physical feeling   
and so-called purely mental emotion are 
represented by localized organic        
feelings1 passing by imperceptible      
degrees into non-localized feeling      
experienced as mood4 ,but feeling on any
 plane is not1 as conscious1 uncombined 
with thought4  ,it follows that1 as     
connected with the human will1 emotion  
is never uncombined with thought4 ,this 
fact is implied in the definition of    
will as the conscious determination on  
some definite course of conduct which1  
as definite1 is an exclusion of other   
courses1 and thus involves judgment4    
,where action takes place without       
conscious predetermination1 we call it  
organic1 automatic1 reflex1 or          
involuntary1 the pain or pleasure       

connected with the act rising into our  
individual1 centralized consciousness   
when the action has already taken place 
or during its progress4 ,in the latter  
case1 part of the act rises into        
consciousness as result1 as already     
performed1 and the will may then        
interpose to check and prevent the      
elements not yet performed4  ,the       
question as to whether thought is always
 accompanied by feeling1 at least by    
feeling as pleasure or pain1 may appear 
more difficult than the previous one4   
,that thought is not always connected   
with violent emotion as pleasure or pain
 is evident4 ,but1 as ,hoeffding says1  
feeling may be strong and deep without  
being violent4 ,if we examine carefully 
any train even of abstract and          
apparently1 at first glance1 wholly     
unemotional reasoning1 we can generally 
trace a distinct vein of varying feeling
 accompanying the thought1--perhaps     
extreme interest in the problem involved
 and pleasure in its solution1 hope as  

we seem to be on the point of finding   
the key to it1 disappointment when the  
hope proves a delusive one1 shame or    
impatience at our failure1 or pride in  
our readiness1 and exultation when we   
have finished our work4 ,all these      
feelings may relate to the mere solution
 of the problem as end1 or may pass     
beyond it to ends more or less distant  
and complicated1 to which the solution  
of the problem then appears as means4   
,even if we could suppose all other     
feeling to be excluded1 we cannot       
conceive of a train of thought untinged 
with mood1--interest or weariness1      
exhilaration or depression1--the dim    
complex of perhaps many elements1 but   
admitting of general classification on  
the side of either the pleasurable or   
the painful1 the agreeable or the       
disagreeable4  ,is feeling the result of
 thought1 or thought the result of      
feeling8 which of the two is to be      
accorded the greater importance with    
regard to the will8 and what is the     

significance of feeling as pleasure and 
of feeling as pain with respect to the  
will8 ,these are some of the questions  
generally considered in one form or     
another in the discussion of the        
relations of mental functions4 ,the     
first question may be interpreted in any
 one of several different ways4 ,it may 
be regarded as referring to particular  
excitations1 objects1 or ends1 or to    
precedence at the earliest beginning of 
consciousness in general1 or to the     
initial state of consciousness in the   
case of the individual organism4 ,since 
we are not able to determine as to where
 consciousness does begin1 either       
absolutely in nature as a whole or      
relatively in the individual1 whether   
there is1 indeed1 any such thing as an  
initial state1 and since we can         
predicate nothing certainly as to the   
nature of such a state if there be one1 
the interpretation of the question which
 has reference to this relative or      
absolute beginning of consciousness     

cannot be answered4 ,if we regard the   
question1 however1 as having reference  
to particular excitations1 objects1 or  
ends1 it is evident that sometimes one1 
sometimes the other of the two functions
 appears more prominent in the          
beginning2 pain or pleasurable          
excitation sometimes makes itself felt  
before it is connected in consciousness 
with any distinct object1 and again     
perception may give us thought-images   
which only consideration renders painful
 or pleasurable4 ,but there is no real  
beginning in either case2 in            
consciousness as we know it1 thought and
 feeling are continually intermingled1  
and only their direction varies with    
varying excitation1 now thought1 now    
feeling1 assuming the greater           
prominence4  ,this last consideration   
has important bearings on a question    
which we have previously discussed and  
to which we may1 at this point1 revert  
for a moment4 ,the fact alone that we   
know nothing of a beginning of          

consciousness1 but only its variation1  
is sufficient to make us doubt whether  
we are in possession of any data from   
which to pronounce dogmatically on the  
absence of consciousness in the case of 
organisms differing from our own1 or    
even in the case of inorganic matter4   
,why may we not equally well suppose    
merely a difference in the direction of 
consciousness corresponding to differing
 organization and function in the one   
case and differing composition or       
constitution and corresponding motion in
 the other8 ,our error begins in        
assuming no ends possible in action     
except such as we ourselves would set1  
and so in assuming no end to be present 
in cases where no end would exist for   
the human being1 or where the end which 
would be involved for us cannot have    
come within the experience of the       
organism performing the act4 ,in the    
latter case1 we speak of blind instinct 
or of automatism4 ,we forget that an end
 is merely some one of such constant    

results of function as are brought      
within the circle of our experience2    
which end may come to lie farther and   
farther away1 for the same act1 as the  
circle of experience widens and varies  
in direction1 even in beings as similar 
as individuals of the human species4    
,with the attainment of manhood and     
womanhood1 whole regions of thought and 
feeling1 whole classes of motives1 are  
opened up which are wholly unknown to   
the child and would be incomprehensible 
to him2 the ends of the scientist1 the  
man of letters1 the idealist in morals1 
the sensualist1 and the boor1 may differ
 radically in performing the same or    
very similar acts4 ,however1 there is a 
certain community of ends in human      
beings1 due to common organization and  
experience1 which enables them to judge 
to some extent of each other's ends4    
,but these data of organization and     
experience fail us when we come to judge
 of beings not human1 and hence we are  
liable to error in their case4 ,a       

superior being of an entirely different 
species from our own might be greatly   
puzzled to discern the motives which    
could govern some of our acts1--those1  
for instance1 which incite the miser to 
starve in misery with a fortune hidden  
in the cellar4 ,a superior being of     
another species gifted with pessimistic 
views1 if we can suppose such1 regarding
 our action externally as we regard     
brute-action and plant-function1 might  
imagine our whole action to be directed 
to the attainment of our own death1     
since that is what we finally achieve as
 the result of action1 and sometimes    
with most purposeful rapidity2 and he   
might suppose the suicide1 and the      
miser1 and the opium-eater1 and the     
drunkard1 and the glutton1 to be only   
the more intelligent members of the     
species1 the others to be led chiefly by
 blind instinct4 ,it is a fundamental   
mistake to suppose that there can be no 
ends but those of which we are          
conscious4  ,the question as to the     

existence of any causal relations in the
 old sense between thought and feeling  
has already been answered in previous   
considerations2 all we can assert is    
sequence or simultaneity4 ,indeed1 as   
psychology has rarely troubled itself   
with any direct question of this sort1  
its introduction may appear foolish4    
,yet feeling is sometimes1 by           
imputation1 treated as a mere attribute 
of thought1 while again1 as we shall    
see1 it is often considered as an       
independent1 directing1 if not          
perception1 at least the subsumption of 
percepts in thought4 ,and1 indeed1 it is
 difficult to perceive why1 if feeling  
and thought be regarded as two quite    
distinct yet simultaneous activities1   
the same problem as to precedence might 
not arise1 under the concepts of cause  
and effect1 as in the case of           
physiological process and consciousness 
as a whole4  ,but a question with which 
,psychology and ,ethics have occupied   
themselves as a most important one is   

that of the relation of pleasure and    
pain to the will4 ,a point around which 
strife particularly rages is the problem
 as to whether it is the pleasurableness
 of the end which moves the will to seek
 it2 and on the view taken as to the    
truth on this point theories of freedom 
or determination of the will are often  
based1 the advocate of free will arguing
 that the power of choosing the painful 
proves his theory1 the determinist      
declaring that the invariable might of  
the pleasurable over the will shows the 
subordination of the latter4 ,but ,i    
cannot1 for my own part1 see how the    
demonstration of the fact that the will 
may be moved by the imagination of a    
painful end rather than1 or as well as1 
by that of a pleasurable one is a proof 
of its freedom2 as ,i also fail to      
perceive how it is proved that the will 
is determined because it invariably     
chooses the pleasurable rather than the 
painful end4 ,in either case1 choice may
 be said equally to depend on motive1   

and in either case the will may be said 
equally to choose4 ,it is true in either
 case that the strongest motive moves2  
it is true in either case that the will 
decides upon the act with a feeling of  
its own spontaneity and freedom1 and    
guides the movement of the body in the  
performance of the act4 ,that which is  
shown in an invariable connection of the
 will with pleasurable motives is a     
constancy which we find elsewhere in    
nature and which forbids us to regard   
will as something outside and above the 
rest of nature4 ,as we have seen1       
however1 the theory of a compulsion of  
nature anywhere by constancy or law1 or 
of the compulsion of one particular part
 by the rest1 is untenable4  ,in        
speaking of the pleasurable and painful1
 we have introduced the conception of   
ends into our considerations1 and may   
emphasize1 in another form1 the fact    
that we cannot consider indefinite      
feeling alone as the mover of the will  
to an end4 ,the pleasurableness or      

painfulness is predicated of some       
definite object or event1 and           
corresponds to definite actualities     
perceived in the object or imagined with
 the help of former experience4 ,thought
 and feeling are thus inextricably      
commingled in the state of consciousness
 leading to choice1 and the nature of   
the acting individual and that of the   
external objects concerned are equally  
essential to the result4  ,we have      
hitherto treated thought1 feeling1 and  
will1 as separate parts of              
consciousness1 defining each1 by        
implication1 much as we would define    
wheel1 tongue1 and whiffletree1 as parts
 of a wagon4 ,but the three are         
indissolubly connected in the act of the
 will1 and thought and feeling are not1 
as we have seen1 ever disconnected4 ,nor
 can we say that it is one part of      
consciousness that feels1 another that  
thinks1 and still another that wills4   
,further1 a closer analysis may render  
it doubtful whether that which we call  

will is only an occasional act of       
consciousness1 or whether it is not     
rather involved in all operations of    
consciousness as we have seen thought   
and feeling to be4 ,the identity of will
 and that which is often called         
involuntary attention has already been  
asserted by some authors1 and not the   
identity of will and outward attention  
alone1 but also of will and attention to
 the inner process of consciousness4    
,here1 however1 the dividing line       
generally sought between willed and     
unwilled1 involuntary1 or1 as we say1   
drifting thought1 becomes dim and       
uncertain4 ,but it is evident that      
attention is given to that which        
interests us for one reason or another2 
and the question logically presents     
itself as to whether thought ever       
follows a direction wholly uninteresting
 to us1 or whether it does not the      
rather always turn from such direction  
to one which has for us at least some   
degree of interest1 whether1 in short1  

the will does not in this manner1 as the
 innervation of attention1 accompany and
 direct all mental process4 ,the sense  
of effort involved in choice1 in the    
struggle of interfering impulses1 may   
bring into prominence mental activity at
 points where such obstacles and        
interferences occur2 but is not the     
mental force which we1 in this case1    
especially notice the same with that    
involved in all processes of            
consciousness8 ,just as the             
physiological process in nerve and      
muscle with which the limbs are moved in
 action1 or eye or ear innervated in the
 effort of attention1 is only the       
outcome of the processes which are      
constantly going on in the brain1 so the
 concomitant process of will or         
attention is but the expression1 in     
another form1 of the activity involved  
in all consciousness4  ,the division of 
consciousness into separate entities or 
parts has often been carried much       
further than this threefold one2 the    

division has varied with the particular 
theory and fancy of the student1 until  
some one has suggested that we might1 on
 the principle used1 assume a distinct  
faculty for dancing1 for eating1        
sleeping1 dressing1 reading1 writing1   
and so on1 ad infinitum1--the faculty1  
in each case1 being defined as the      
special activity that discharges the    
particular function assigned to it by   
the name4 ,only by abstraction and by   
the investiture of our abstractions with
 a life of their own do we arrive at a  
theory of thought1 feeling1 and will1 as
 separate entities1 or parts2 in the    
mental process itself1 they are         
indissolubly united4  ,we have seen that
 thought acquires new directions with   
the evolution of the individual1 that   
pleasure and pain attach themselves to  
new objects1 and that will is directed  
to new ends4 ,if we can discover in     
these changes any uniformities of       
relation everywhere manifest as far as  
experience extends1 the constancy of    

nature may admit of our conclusion that 
the relation is fundamental1 and we may 
be able to formulate thus a general law 
of evolution with respect to the mental 
processes4 ,such a law must1 of course1 
be interpreted1 not as governing the    
changes which it regards1 but simply as 
the expression of general facts of their
 development4 ,our considerations on    
this point are in a line with those of  
,chapter ,i2 indeed1 they are only a    
more special application and more       
careful derivation and expansion of     
points there noticed4  ,if we begin with
 our own experience1 and study the      
growth of this or that particular habit 
gradually acquired1 we notice that it   
not only becomes stronger with time1    
acquiring an intensity less and less    
easy to check1 but also that this       
increasing strength of tendency is      
accompanied with a corresponding        
increase of pleasure in the performance 
of the act4 ,the drunkard may have      
derived no especial pleasure from his   

first glass2 he may1 indeed1 have found 
the taste little to his liking1 and the 
slight succeeding dizziness             
disagreeable2 but1 with habituation1    
both gradually become agreeable4 ,the   
first fit of intoxication may be felt as
 unpleasant1 not only in the succeeding 
shame and physical depression1 but in   
itself2 though it is also conceivable   
that the state of thorough intoxication 
may have been led up to so slowly1 by   
such imperceptible degrees1 that it may 
be combined1 even in the first instance1
 with a certain degree of pleasure4 ,it 
is1 however1 evident that this pleasure 
increases with further lapse of time4   
,if we study the habits of individuals1 
we shall find a thousand little         
peculiarities of habit in which others  
than their performers would be puzzled  
to discover anything attractive1 and in 
which1 indeed1 the latter themselves    
would find difficulty in pointing out   
the source of the gratification that    
they nevertheless experience4 ,our      

habits are things we are loth to break  
with2 and we grow more loth as time     
passes1 until finally no consideration1 
no shame of scorn or pain of punishment 
in any form1 can suffice to             
counterbalance the craving of desire and
 the fierce pleasure of satisfaction1 or
 the less turbulent but not less strong 
impulse that carries us steadily in the 
course which past custom has worn for   
us4 ,customary acts are themselves      
agreeable to us1 though their results   
may bring with them disagreeable        
factors4  ,again1 this same principle is
 directly traceable in heredity4 ,we    
say1 for instance1 of the drunkard whose
 father and grandfather were drunkards  
before him1 that he has inherited a     
taste for intoxicants1 meaning1 not that
 he can feel their attraction before he 
has tasted them and experienced their   
influence1 but that the habit of        
drunkenness is one more easily formed in
 him than in the average individual1    
constitutional peculiarities            

corresponding to a pleasure derived from
 the alcohol4 ,we often notice striking 
resemblances1 not only in general       
appearance but also in mental           
characteristics and habits1 extending   
even to attitude and gesture1 between   
children and parents deceased when the  
children were yet infants4 ,i have known
 very peculiar physical habits to       
appear1 in one instance in three1 in    
another in four1 generations1 with the  
avowal of satisfaction in their practice
 on the part of the persons subject to  
them1 although neither they could       
explain1 nor onlookers comprehend1 the  
pleasure derived from them4 ,imitation  
is not always possible in such cases2 in
 one case of these two just cited1 it   
was1 in the third generation at least1  
impossible2 and even where there is     
imitation1 it is by no means proved that
 an innate tendency does not lend       
readiness to the formation of the habit4
 ,it may here be objected that we are   
venturing on too uncertain ground in    

endeavoring to formulate any general law
 of the growth of habit in relation to  
heredity1 opinions differing so much as 
to the relative importance to be        
accorded to environment and innate      
tendency in the formation of character1 
and especially as to the possibility of 
the inheritance1 by succeeding          
generations1 of new peculiarities not   
common to the species as a whole but    
acquired by individual parents4 ,as far 
as the former question is concerned1 it 
may be said that the whole development  
of plant or animal in organization and  
corresponding functions must be regarded
 as directly dependent upon present     
environment1 never independent of it2   
but that1 while it must be conceded that
 the environment is greatly concerned in
 the development of habit1 and that no  
innate tendency can manifest itself     
unless the complementary conditions of  
its appearance are presented by         
circumstance1 it may likewise be claimed
 that the influence of environment no   

more excludes heredity than heredity    
excludes the influence of the individual
 environment4 ,we tend1 generally1 to   
emphasize heredity in the case of the   
plant and the animal1 and environment in
 the case of the human being4 ,this is  
because our knowledge of species other  
than our own is merely an outward one1  
while the ideas of heredity in our own  
case are confused by our consciousness  
of the influence that even minute       
circumstances may have upon our inner   
life and character4 ,and yet just those 
who are inclined to lay most stress upon
 the power of good influences are       
generally1 strange to say1 the very ones
 who would most protest at the assertion
 of the superiority of outer conditions 
over inner ones4 ,it can scarcely be    
supposed that any law of heredity which 
applies to the rest of the animal       
kingdom does not apply to man also4     
,with respect to the second of the two  
questions noticed above1 something has  
already been said from one point of     

view1 and more will be said later from  
another4 ,at present it will be         
sufficient for our purpose to notice    
some generally admitted facts4 ,darwin  
uses a certain caution when he comes to 
the consideration of the conditions of  
inheritance1 and makes the general      
statement that the tendency to          
inheritance of any function is increased
 by the continuation of the action of   
the inducing conditions of environment  
for several generations4 ,but it may be 
questioned whether an innate tendency   
may not have favored and assisted the   
action of the environment in the later  
of these generations1 whether1 indeed1  
the continuity everywhere supposed in   
evolution does not compel us to assume1 
between the first appearance of any     
function1 trait1 or habit1 and its      
attainment1 after several generations1  
of sufficient strength to render its    
hereditary character noticeable1        
intermediate degrees of strength in the 
intermediate generations4 ,on the same  

principle on which we accept the theory 
of evolution as a logical necessity1    
despite the gaps in the proof1 we must  
also1 ,i believe1 consider development  
of any sort to be continuous increase4  
,but even the theory of the increased   
probability of the inheritance of any   
mark1 function1 trait1 or habit1 after  
several generations of inducing         
environment1 is sufficient for our      
present purpose4 ,it still remains true1
 if we regard the development of        
function or habit in its broad features1
 that the tendency to inheritance1 the  
organic significance of any function or 
habit is increased with increased       
exercise4 ,merely in the one case we    
regard the increments of increase as    
infinitesimal1 while1 in the other case1
 we regard them as of much greater than 
infinitesimal value4 ,even the theory of
 ,weismann1 which regards everything as 
present in the germ1 must formulate some
 such theory as this of the environment 
as the condition of the development of  

germinal possibilities4  ,not only are  
the strongest and most infallibly       
recurring functions those which have    
been most strongly and longest          
exercised1 but these strongest          
functions1 those to which1 as we say1   
the tendency is strongest1 are connected
 with the strongest pleasures of        
gratification and the most extreme pain 
of denial4 ,the sexual appetite is an   
example of such a function fundamental  
to all the higher forms of animal life4 
,hunger and thirst1 if long unsatisfied1
 are connected with intensest suffering 
and1 if not dulled by general ill-health
 or too great satiety1 involve a keen   
pleasure of satisfaction4 ,muscular     
exercise is a source of keen enjoyment1 
and physical inaction results in general
 depression that may become extreme if  
the inaction be long continued4  ,in    
this pain of inaction1 a new conception 
has been introduced into our            
considerations4 ,the converse of this   
pain is that involved in the            

over-exercise of any function4 ,we thus 
perceive that the pleasure involved in  
the exercise of function lies between   
two extremes1 beyond either of which is 
pain1 discomfort4 ,such pain is         
connected with the vacillations in the  
relations of food-assimilation to the   
use of accumulated energy4 ,these two   
general processes or functions of all   
organic matter are reciprocal or        
complementary1 and the too much or too  
little on either side which involves    
pain may be looked upon as a disturbance
 of equilibrium4 ,excess on either side 
means want on the other4#ace  ,and this 
brings us again to the conception of    
normal function as a stable form of     
motion4 ,long-exercised function1       
fundamental functions of animal or plant
 life are forms of motion that for a    
very long period have found their       
sufficient complementary conditions in  
the environment1 have met with but      
little interference in this environment4
 ,and thus we attain a conception of    

pleasure as that form of feeling        
accompanying forms of physiological     
motion with which there is a minimum of 
interference4 ,pleasure appears as the  
accompaniment of unimpaired and         
unimpeded function everywhere as far as 
our knowledge extends4 ,function and    
habit are essentially the same2 habit is
 merely function4 ,the functions of the 
species furnish the foundation of the   
habits of the individual1 which vary    
according to individual surroundings and
 the family peculiarities acquired      
through peculiar circumstances4 ,the    
degree of pleasure in the exercise of   
any function or habit bears constant    
relations to the strength of the        
acquired function1 while this again     
bears constant relations to degree of   
exercise1 in which the time relation    
plays a prominent part4 ,here we have1  
too1 by implication1 the explanation of 
the disagreeable character of the       
strange and new except as it corresponds
 to some tendency of the organism1 some 

capability not yet exercised1 in which  
case it appears as nothing strictly new 
but only as pleasing variety4 ,from a   
physiological point of view1 the new    
appears as that which demands a         
readjustment involving the fresh action 
of natural selection1 and the possible  
destruction of the organism in case the 
readjustment demanded is too great4     
,from the physical and mechanical view1 
the new may be regarded as a disturber  
of equilibrium4  ,to this analysis the  
objection may possibly be urged that    
obstacles often increase pleasure4 ,if1 
however1 a definition of obstacle be    
demanded1 it will soon appear that what 
is meant by an obstacle that increases  
pleasure is not anything that interferes
 with function but rather that which is 
exactly its occasion and opportunity4   
,to a man in health and vigor who sets  
off for a walk through the fields1 a    
hedge or fence in the way is no real    
obstacle1 but furnishes rather an       
agreeable diversion1 a new method of    

trying his strength and getting rid of  
superfluous muscular secretions2 it adds
 but the spice of some slight variety to
 his exercise4 ,that which is an        
interruption of one function1 may be the
 opportunity of another2 and if the     
demands of the first function for       
satisfaction are not too imperative1 the
 interruption of too great duration1 the
 obstacle may not be felt to be         
disagreeable4 ,but pain and pleasure are
 often mixed1 since the satisfaction of 
one function may be the prevention of   
another4 ,if1 in this case1 the function
 which is satisfied is a fundamental    
one1 the function which is prevented a  
subordinate one1 the pleasure exceeds   
the pain4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the   
function prevented is a fundamental one1
 the function satisfied a merely        
subordinate one1 the pain exceeds the   
pleasure4  ,with the ideas of unimpaired
 and unimpeded function as pleasurable1 
and of the new as demanding             
readjustment1 we arrive at the          

consideration of health and disease4    
,the free performance of any particular 
function is the first condition of the  
health of the organ of which it is the  
function1 the regular performance of all
 physical functions according to the    
mutual adjustment of the organs of the  
body the condition of the health of the 
organism as a whole4 ,and thus again we 
come round to the conception of pleasure
 as connected with the action that      
accords with the health of the organism4
 ,and this leads us to some remarks     
concerning the act of food-taking which 
may answer a possible objection to the  
statements made above with regard to the
 pleasure involved in the act4 ,the     
moralist and idealist are wont to       
protest against any theory that may seem
 to give prominence to the purely animal
 side of human life4 ,but first1 we have
 to do1 at present1 merely with facts on
 which ethical theory may be founded1   
not as yet with such theory itself4     
,furthermore1 the selection of the      

appetites of hunger1 thirst1 and sex1 as
 illustrating the general theory of the 
relations of pleasure and pain to       
function is not made in order to lay    
special stress upon these appetites but 
because they afford1 as fundamental1    
especially good examples4 ,and1 finally1
 it may be noticed that the pleasure    
connected with the stilling of hunger   
and thirst is not that of taste alone1  
though doubtless there are many with    
whom this pleasure is one of the most   
important of life2 on the taking of     
sufficient and proper nourishment       
depends the pleasure involved in the    
general health of the body2 the pain of 
non-satisfaction in this case is not    
simply that of a single organ but that  
of the whole organism4 ,even the        
deferment of a single meal beyond the   
usual hour often lowers the tone of the 
whole body1 and the variations of too   
much or too little strongly influence   
the mood and general happiness of the   
individual4 ,on the right use of        

nourishment depend1 in great measure1   
the ability to cope with circumstances  
and the moral power of cheerfulness4    
,in connection with the idea of a       
certain equilibrium between exercise and
 nourishment1 waste and repair1 as      
normal1 healthful1 and pleasurable1     
,rolph's principle of the ,insatiability
 of life may be considered4 ,evidently  
the facts of evolution demonstrate the  
power of the organism to advance by slow
 degrees beyond its original normal4    
,but the progress is an exceedingly slow
 one1 and the power of advance in the   
individual organism1 at any particular  
point1 by no means limitless1 but very  
definitely limited4 ,the limitations of 
the power of assimilation are evidenced 
by the evil results of over-eating1 of  
over-satiety of function in any         
direction4 ,even at an early period of  
life1 when growth is most marked1 the   
capacity for assimilation is by no means
 limitless4 ,the idea of insatiability  
is advanced by ,lewes#acf in a somewhat 

different form4 ,it may possibly be an  
aid to the comprehension of the process 
of growth to regard one factor1 namely  
the organism1 as the active side of the 
development tending to indefinite growth
 in all directions1 and the other       
factor1 the environment1 as the         
regulating1 resisting factor1 limiting  
such growth2 the conception may1        
perhaps1 be legitimately resorted to as 
we resort to various other devices which
 bring into prominence some one side of 
a process to the neglect of others but  
to the simplification of our concepts   
and calculations4 ,a similar device is  
used by ,zoellner in his consideration  
of sun-spots4#acg ,but these            
representations should not be mistaken  
for actuality4 ,the limitless expansion 
of the organism is as much a fiction as 
a theory of the limitless coercion of   
the environment resisted by the organism
 would be4 ,the latter fiction is       
involved in one interpretation of the   
,struggle for ,existence4 ,either view  

is one-sided2 environment and organism  
both alike represent active forces1 of  
both which combined1 growth is1 at each 
moment1 the exactly conditioned         
resultant4  ,we may notice another      
assertion of ,rolph's1 namely1 that     
growth is produced by increase of       
nourishment rather than that it         
demands#ach increase of nourishment as  
the ,darwinians state4 ,i do not know   
how the ,darwinians come to be          
accredited with this statement in the   
sense which is evidently criticised by  
,rolph4 ,in so far as the statement may 
be interpreted as meaning that growth   
takes place first1 and without          
nourishment1 and that the demand for    
nourishment then ensues on this growth1 
the criticism is evidently valid4 ,but  
the word demands may be interpreted in  
quite a different way as designating the
 need of growth for its conditions1 or  
rather 7for this is the ultimate        
significance of the word in this sense7 
the logical demand of the reason1 which 

cannot suppose anything to take place in
 the absence of its conditions4 ,any    
other signification of the word is      
contrary to the whole spirit of         
,darwinism1 and would accord much better
 with a theory of ,insatiability or with
 other forms of theory that imply a     
special vital principle of some sort4   
,if1 when ,rolph makes the assertion    
that increase of nourishment produces   
growth1 he refers1 by increase of       
nourishment1 to the mere act of         
mastication1 it is true that growth must
 be regarded as following upon this as  
its condition2 but growth and the       
assimilation of nourishment are         
identical4 ,and1 in fact1 assimilation  
begins in the action of the saliva in   
the act of mastication4 ,analysis of    
assimilation gives us sequence in one   
sense1 since the parts of the act follow
 upon one another2 but any              
interpretation which tends to draw a    
distinct line at any point in the       
physiological process1 or to distinguish

 between assimilation as active1        
performed1 and growth as passive1       
suffered1 should be avoided4  ,we may   
return to the consideration of pleasure 
and pain as connected with function in  
general1 with a view to a solution1 if  
possible1 of the problem of its especial
 connection with the will4 ,the brain   
may be defined1 from the point of view  
of the theory of evolution1 as the organ
 of centralization through which the    
unity of the organism is established1   
and the adaptation of parts or the      
development of special function becomes 
the adaptation or function of the whole4
 ,with this physiological adaptation1 an
 increasing breadth of knowledge by     
experience1 the deviation of feeling    
from old into new channels1 and the     
attainment of new ends of action1 are   
associated4 ,just as past adaptations   
must have their physiological           
representation in brain-organization1 so
 psychical experience is stored up to be
 remembered on sufficient suggestion1   

and finds1 thus1 its expression in      
conscious will1 just as its             
physiological concomitants must be      
supposed to find their expression in    
nervous and muscular action4 ,as we have
 seen1 pleasure follows the line of     
evolution of function1 strongest        
pleasure appearing in the direction of  
most strongly developed function1 so    
that1 just as any conflict of tendencies
 to function in the brain must result in
 conquest by the strongest tendency1 the
 line of action must always correspond  
with that of the greatest pleasure4 ,and
 just as the most strongly inherent     
function is combined with the greatest  
pleasure1 so the representation of the  
performance of this most strongly       
inherent function is1 in the conflict of
 tendencies before action1 combined with
 the greatest pleasure of anticipation4 
,this statement coincides with          
,stephen's remark that it is not the    
representation of the greatest pleasure1
 but the pleasantest representation1    

which furnishes the decisive motive to  
will4 ,contingent circumstances may     
introduce into the actual carrying out  
of the act determined upon an element of
 pain not before experienced1 in which  
the wish may arise that the act had not 
been performed2 and the strength of the 
tendency to action in this direction is 
thus diminished4  ,with regard to this  
analysis1 several things are to be      
noted4 7#a7 ,it is no more claimed that 
the strongest pleasure of anticipation  
is unmitigated pleasure than that the   
pleasure involved in the attainment of  
the end is necessarily unmitigated4     
,wherever there is interference1 there  
is also pain4 ,where any struggle is    
involved1 where any conflict of         
tendencies and wishes precedes choice1  
the struggle itself and the             
relinquishment of one or more courses in
 favor of the one chosen involve        
disagreeable elements1 and the fiercer  
the struggle the greater the pain4      
,where two extremely strong tendencies  

thus come into collision1 the pain      
involved may amount to agony4 ,our      
statement that the more pleasurable end 
or rather the one the imagination of    
which is the more pleasurable is the one
 sought by will needs therefore to be   
put into a somewhat different form1     
since1 among all the methods of action  
open to choice in any case1 there may be
 none the thought of which involves any 
positive pleasure1 though there is in   
all or most cases some one which        
promises at least a negative excess of  
pleasure1 that is1 least pain4 7#b7 ,no 
assumption is made as to the particular 
kind of representation or the particular
 kind of end with which the greatest    
pleasure of anticipation or of          
realization is combined1 whether these  
are higher or lower1 sensual or         
intellectual1 moral or immoral4 ,it is  
not by any means asserted that the most 
moral end may not be that which is      
chosen4 7#c7 ,it is not asserted that   
any direct calculation of the pleasure  

to self involved in any course of action
 necessarily contributes to choice4 7#d7
 ,the pleasure or pain connected with   
the imagination of a future event is not
 to be confused with the actual pleasure
 or pain of the event itself4 ,the      
feeling experienced in the event may be 
wholly different from that of           
anticipation4  ,in connection with the  
second point1 reference may be made to  
an assertion of ,sidgwick's in his      
attack upon ,hedonism4 ,he writes as    
follows1 ,we have to observe that men   
may and do judge remote as well as      
immediate results to be in themselves   
desirable1 without considering them in  
relation to the feelings of sentient    
beings4#aci ,the question for us here   
is1 first1 whether the emphasis of the  
assertion is on the word considering1--a
 question the context does not answer4  
,it is certainly true that decisions are
 reached1 judgments pronounced1 without 
introspection and self-analysis1 and    
without long reflection of any sort4 ,it

 is true that1 even where reflection    
does take place1 there is not           
necessarily any distinct attachment of  
the concept pleasurable to results      
considered1 whether with relation to    
self or to others4 ,the dog who snatches
 at a piece of meat does not probably   
waste any time in reflecting on the     
pleasure he will experience in eating   
it2 and yet we do not the less believe  
that if the act were not pleasurable to 
him he would not perform it4 ,it may    
also be true that a man often pronounces
 results to be desirable without noting 
or caring for their relations to other  
sentient beings2 but if these results   
are regarded by him as desirable1 then  
they must be in some way desirable to   
himself1 that is1 must have a           
pleasurable relation to his own         
feelings4 ,desire appertains to sentient
 beings and to sentient beings as such2 
a thing which is desirable must be      
desirable to a sentient being2 the      
desirable which is not desirable to a   

sentient being is the desirable which is
 not-desirable1 a self-contradiction4   
,in connection with the third of the    
points above noticed1 ,rolph's assertion
 that not pleasure but pain is the      
motive to action1 may be considered4    
,the author does not mean anything else 
than that action is in the direction    
from want1 hunger1 pain1 to ends        
involving pleasure1 so that this theory 
does not1 when analyzed1 differ         
fundamentally from theories which assume
 the motive to will to be furnished by  
the most pleasurable end or by the most 
pleasurable representation of an end4   
,the chief point of difference is the   
conception of the state of consciousness
 preceding will as invariably one of    
pain1 the want of the end willed as     
invariably painful4 ,now it is evident  
that the satisfaction of a function may 
be so long deferred as to involve the   
severest pain2 hunger1 thirst1 may reach
 a degree of intensity that is frenzy1  
muscular inaction1 in an ordinarily     

active individual1 if long persevered   
in1 may be combined with extreme        
discomfort and depression4 ,and it is   
also true that all desire involves want 
in the sense that an end is sought      
because its absence is felt as          
undesirable4 ,but want in this sense    
means merely desire1 and is not         
necessarily combined with any real pain 
of deprivation4 ,the state of           
consciousness preceding action may be1  
on the contrary1 one of exhilaration1 of
 exceeding joy of anticipation2 the     
gratification of a desire may take place
 so soon after the first appearance of  
the desire1 or the gratification of the 
desire become so certain so soon after  
the desire is first felt1 that no pain  
of want is felt at all4 ,rolph1 indeed1 
finds great difficulty in demonstrating 
his theory1 and finally resorts to the  
definition of the pain which1 as he     
asserts1 furnishes the motive to action 
as the pain of the absence of pleasure4 
,he says1 moreover1 that not all pain is

 felt as such1 since much feeling is    
below the threshold of                  
consciousness4#adj ,but unconscious pain
 and feeling below consciousness are    
mere self-contradictions4 ,specification
 of that of which1 as unconscious1 we   
know nothing is a very easy way of      
delivering oneself from the necessity of
 positive proof1 but it is a very       
unscientific one4 ,with respect to      
,rolph's assertion that pain can not be 
dispensed with1 since it is everywhere  
the motive to action1 it may be remarked
 that this statement seems to accord ill
 with ,rolph's other theory that never  
the struggle for existence but always   
states of plenty and comfort are the    
conditions of growth1 and the lengthy   
demonstration that periods of want must 
condition decline1 retrogression1 and   
finally the extinction of the species   
suffering the want4 ,from the standpoint
 of ,darwin1 the struggle for existence 
is not inconsistent with the possession 
of plenty on the part of favored        

individuals and species1 but ,rolph     
expressly denies the compatibility of   
the two principles4  ,in his theory of  
want as the universal motive to action1 
,rolph cites suicide as an extreme case 
of this want4 ,our analysis has already 
taken into consideration some of the    
cases of mental struggle and            
postponement of the satisfaction of     
desire involving pain4 ,but where one   
end greatly desired is unattainable1    
choice may yet be possible of another   
end affording partial satisfaction of   
the function corresponding to the       
desire1 and1 in cases where choice is   
necessary between two or more           
conflicting ends1 the gratification of  
one may be attended with a sufficient   
degree of pleasure to cause partial     
forgetfulness of the disappointment in  
the necessary relinquishment of the     
other ends4 ,where1 however1 the        
function denied is one of the most      
fundamental of the organism1 its denial 
may be combined with intensest pain and 

a gradual physical degeneration1 or even
 a sudden collapse of the organism1     
ending in death2 or it may induce an act
 that secures this end through the      
mediation of self-conscious will4 ,what 
is true1 in this case1 of the denial of 
some one fundamental function1 is true  
also of an accumulation of coincident   
denials of a number of lesser ones4 ,our
 desires are1 indeed1 in all cases1 more
 or less complex1 and involve the       
fulfilment of various functions2 but we 
can easily imagine such an accumulation 
of small ills as to lead to desperation4
 ,where no choice of action seems left  
us by which we may attain some one end  
deeply desired1 or where a coincidence  
of obstacles makes it appear as if there
 were no choice of action towards any   
desirable ends1 death may be chosen as a
 lesser evil than life1 the equivalent  
of a lesser pain in the absence of      
feeling altogether4 ,it may be noted1   
however1 that where suicide is prevented
 in the first moment of desperation1 the

 individual planning it may not only    
never again attempt it1 but may         
afterwards even find much pleasure in   
life4 ,as there is a high degree of     
pleasure connected with the performance 
of deeply rooted function or habit1 so  
the performance of all function is      
attended with some modicum of pleasure1 
except in such isolated moments as      
render suicide possible4 ,every end     
desired is one of function1 and all     
function furnishes ends to the will4    
,the pessimist lays emphasis upon the   
fact of the speedy loss of pleasure in  
ends attained4 ,but herein lies the     
higher pleasure of life1 that it is not 
rest but progress4 ,the pleasures we    
attain may be continually renewed if    
rightly sought1 but they cannot be      
unintermittently sustained4 ,we cannot  
rest at ends attained and find          
unlessened rapture in them4 ,rest is not
 an attribute of life2 life is          
essentially motion1 that phase of it    
which we term rest being mere change of 

function for a time4 ,the intimate      
relation1 between pleasure and an       
equilibrium of waste and repair renders 
it impossible to obtain pleasure except 
as occupation is varied in order to     
afford opportunity of recuperation to   
organs and cells before used4 ,proper   
variation1 however1 may enable us to    
return to old pleasures with ever       
renewed and even increased enjoyment4   
,but it is conceivable that the         
pleasures of gratification and the pains
 of disappointment may be so nearly     
balanced as to make life possible and   
yet endow it1 at least for a period1    
with but little joy4 ,it is to be       
noticed1 however1 that intense pain     
cannot endure1 unmodified1 for any great
 length of time4 ,as pleasure follows   
the line of customary action1 so pain   
diminishes with long-continued lack in  
any direction1 unless this direction be 
that of too fundamental function1 in    
which case the organism succumbs        
entirely and perishes4 ,either we grow  

gradually used to our disappointment and
 forget it to a great degree in other   
gratification1 or we die under it4      
,certainly there are losses the pain of 
which is never entirely forgotten1 after
 which life is never quite the same     
again2 but the first agony of such      
losses is materially modified with time2
 and many of the losses which have      
seemed worst to us at the time they     
occurred are later looked back upon     
without regret4 ,we progress to another 
stage1 and the ends we desire to gain   
are changed4 ,the habitual misanthrope1 
indeed1 generally derives a great deal  
of satisfaction from his own misery2 and
 this leads us to the apparently        
anomalous remark that even pain as      
function may come to be combined with   
pleasure2 we feel a satisfaction in our 
own capacity of emotion4 ,the           
sensitivity of the poet to pain as well 
as his sensitivity to pleasure is a     
source of often very keen gratification 
and pride to him4 ,of the weak and aged 

who have no especial pleasure in life1  
it may be said that they have also1 in  
general1 no fierce pains1 at least      
seldom such as bring desperation in     
youth4 ,having learned from experience1 
they are not subject to such exaggerated
 expectations1 and hence                
disappointments1 as accompany youth1    
vigor1 and ignorance of the realities of
 life2 and often they derive enjoyment  
from things which would have no         
attraction for the young4  ,the old     
question as to the relation between     
health and happiness may be answered by 
the statement that the two coincide4    
,the statement is not meant1 however1 in
 the sense that the happiness which we  
at present attain is coincident with    
health in an absolute sense or that1    
vice versa1 perfect happiness is1 or can
 be1 coincident with that which we      
ordinarily term health4 ,the two terms  
are generally very ill-defined2         
sometimes the one1 sometimes the other1 
is used in an absolute sense in         

connection with the discussion of the   
parallel term in a comparative sense4   
,perfect happiness must coincide with   
perfect health2 for perfect health must 
coincide with perfect fulfilment of all 
function1 and this coincides with the   
gratification of all desire4 ,at present
 desires conflict1 and the gratification
 of one is bought at the expense of     
others4 ,this partial gratification     
corresponds to a partial health2 but we 
too often forget1 in the discussion of  
health and happiness1 that health is no 
more perfect than is happiness4 ,the    
individual is not yet in harmony with   
himself4 ,but this means that he also is
 not in harmony with the environment4   
,in the development of thought1 feeling1
 and will1 we have noticed a certain    
parallelism1 the attainment of new      
knowledge1 the deviation of feeling into
 new channels1 and the direction of will
 to new ends2 indeed1 our analysis must 
bring us to regard this development as  
something more than a parallelism1      

since1 as we have seen1 thought1        
feeling1 and will1 cannot be defined as 
separate organs of mind4 ,and we are    
here led to notice a theory sometimes   
advanced1 that the feelings of one      
individual can never be changed by      
another4 ,you may present a man with    
arguments1 say the advocates of this    
theory1 but this is all2 you cannot     
bring him to act on the arguments unless
 his feeling is already of the right    
sort before you present your arguments2 
if it is not1 you cannot in any way     
alter it4 ,now a certain general        
foundation of character1 of fundamental 
feeling1 must always be conceded2 but   
this is not what these theorists mean   
when they say that arguments can never  
alter feeling4 ,of what use would it be 
to argue with my child and tell her that
 this or that act of hers is selfish1   
said a man to me not long ago of his    
three-year-old daughter2 if she is      
selfish1 arguing with her will not make 
her less so2 showing her that she is    

selfish will never have any effect upon 
her selfishness2 you may change opinions
 by argument1 but not feelings4 ,the    
theory reminds us of the old idea of the
 will as something above other phases of
 nature and so supreme above their      
influence2 it replaces this theory of   
the uncaused nature of the will by one  
of the like absolute independence of    
feeling4 ,and yet1 strange to say1 this 
theory is oftenest advanced by just     
those who assert the variability of will
 in accordance with law1 under the      
influence of the environment1 and unite 
with these already incongruous theories 
the wholly contradictory one that it is 
feeling which furnishes the motive to   
will4 ,to appeal to any one except      
through the medium of thought is        
certainly impossible2 the feelings      
cannot be influenced except by          
representation and argument4 ,feeling   
cannot be taken by itself and so        
influenced4 ,but the person endeavoring 
to convince does not desire to arouse   

indefinite feeling2 he invariably wishes
 to excite it with regard to some       
definite end4 ,to change opinion is also
 to change feeling in some degree4      
,whether an appeal to another is        
successful or not depends on the nature 
of the appeal and upon the consciousness
 of the individual to whom the appeal is
 made2 but this means that not the      
nature of consciousness alone decides   
the result4 ,in any excitation by the   
environment1 the result is conditioned1 
not by the one factor alone but by both2
 and no excitation can leave the        
individual entirely unchanged2 the      
multiplication of infinitesimal single  
excitations constitutes the whole of    
evolution4 ,a first appeal or argument  
may be felt only as disagreeable        
interference2 but an accumulation of    
appeals at first disagreeable and met   
only with rebuffs may eventually result 
in total change of both ends and        
feelings4 ,the amount of appeal         
necessary differs with the person       

appealed to2 it may be large or small1  
excessively large or excessively small1 
but the general fact remains1 that      
feelings vary as thought widens1 and    
that an accompanying change of ends     
takes place4 ,thought and feeling are   
not two separate and independent things1
 but are1 on the contrary1 vitally      
united4  ,we may put our old familiar   
question with regard to cause and effect
 in a new form in respect to the        
development of thought1 feeling1 and    
will4 ,in considering the process of    
evolution1 will1 and1 therefore1 the    
conscious exercise of function1 is      
ordinarily treated as the effect of     
pleasure2 but our course of analysis    
identifies function and its exercise and
 rather brings function into the        
foreground1 though the assertion of     
precedence in importance has been       
avoided4 ,the course was chosen partly  
because it affords an opportunity of    
propounding the following questions3 ,is
 lapse of time1 amount of exercise1 or  

pleasure1 the cause of habit8 ,or is    
habit the cause of function8 ,or is     
pleasure the cause of continued exercise
 of function8 ,or is function the cause 
of pleasure8 ,or is a minimum of        
interference the cause of pleasure and  
of function in a particular direction8  
,or is not1 rather1 continued exercise  
of function the cause of the absence of 
interference wherever and as far as it  
exists8 ,we find all these various      
suggested theories advocated1 by direct 
statement or by implication1 in the     
treatment of the evolution of function  
by different authors1 and indeed we     
frequently find several of the theories 
included1 by implication1 in the work of
 the same author4 ,the vital connection 
of unimpeded function and pleasure is   
apparent1 and the necessity of the time 
element in the development of function  
may also be asserted2 but there is not1 
according to our theory1 any reason for 
introducing the concept of cause into   
the relations4  ,our analysis of the    

development of thought1 feeling1 and    
will1 has an important bearing on the   
teleological argument4 ,if all habit    
comes1 in time1 to be pleasurable1 if   
pleasure merely follows the line of     
exercise of function1 whatever that line
 may be1 and ends are thus mere matters 
of habit1 and habit1 exercise1 is a     
matter of the action and reaction of all
 conditions1 then it is evident that the
 force of the teleological argument is  
at once destroyed4 ,we cannot pass      
beyond nature1 by this route1 to the    
inference of a transcendental cause4    
,man's action being a part of nature and
 the result of all conditions as much as
 is the motion of the wind or the waves1
 the results he produces1 like theirs1  
only change and never creation1 the only
 inference we could make from his will  
to other will must be an inference to   
will that is a part of nature1 a result 
if also a condition1 a link in the chain
 of nature1 its ends cooerdinate with   
habit but not the cause of it1 and no   

more determining than determined4       
,,footnotes3  #ace ,see ,avenarius'     
formulae of complete vital maintenance3 
f7,r7  -f7,s72 f7,r7  f7,s7  o1 ,kritik 
der reinen ,erfahrung4  #acf ,problems  
of ,life and ,mind1 ,ser4 ,,ii4 p4 #ajc4
  #acg ,see essay by ,petzoldt above    
considered4  #ach ,biologische          
,probleme1 p4 #if2 erfordern4  #aci     
,methods of ,ethics1 #dth ed4 p4 #ig4   
#adj ,biologische ,probleme1 p4 #agg et 
seq4     ,,chapter ,v  ,,egoism ,,and   
,,altruism ,,in ,,evolution   ,carneri1 
in consistency with his scepticism as to
 feeling in animals1 remarks that1 with 
man1 the struggle for happiness is added
 to the struggle for existence4 ,wallace
 and others regard man as comparatively 
withdrawn from the struggle for         
existence and the operation of natural  
selection4 ,much depends on definition  
in any statement2 but it may be repeated
 that the analogy of nervous            
organization does not permit us to      
suppose the absence of pleasure and pain

 in many species1 and that man is no    
exception to the rule that the          
disharmonious is the unstable1 and      
doomed1 by its nature1 to destruction4  
,however1 analogy does not1 as we have  
seen1 carry us far in deciding upon the 
presence or absence of consciousness1 or
 in determining the exact nature of the 
ends it posits even where we may suppose
 it to be present and conscious of ends4
 ,if1 then1 we apply the terms egoism   
and altruism to the action of plants or 
even of other animal species1 meaning1  
by these terms1 that1 in the action     
referred to1 such ends are sought and   
willed as render human conduct what we  
call altruistic1 we may be falling into 
error4 ,however1 in considering egoism  
and altruism in their relations to human
 development1 it may be useful to note  
their prototypes1 as far as external    
form is concerned1 in life on lower     
planes1 without making any assumption as
 to the internal meaning of these       
prototypes1 except in so far as1 in     

special instances1 we may be warranted  
by further particular examination of    
facts4  ,it is evident that the action  
of animals is of a sort that has as its 
immediate and most prominent result     
their own protection and preservation1  
and that they show themselves generally 
hostile to other kinds and even1 in many
 cases1 if not hostile1 at least        
indifferent1 under most circumstances1  
to their own kind4 ,yet a certain amount
 of mutual support may occasionally be  
observed even among lower species4 ,one 
of the forms of such aid most common in 
the whole range of animal species is the
 care of the parent animal for its      
offspring4 ,this care is more usual on  
the part of the female than on that of  
the male1 and where it is exercised it  
is not the exception1 but rather the    
rule1 that the mother will sacrifice    
life itself in the defence of her young4
 ,such care and self-sacrifice1         
especially marked in mammals and birds1 
are too well known to need illustration 

here4  ,mutual aid between the sexes is 
not so common or so strongly marked as  
the care of parent animals for their    
young4 ,there is often no companionship 
at all between the sexes1 and even at   
the time of mating male and female may  
show themselves hostile to each other4  
,it often happens with certain          
,epeiridae the males of whom are smaller
 than the females1 that1 after          
copulation or sometimes even before1 the
 female seizes upon the male and makes a
 meal of him4 ,sometimes1 also1 during  
the battle of two males for the         
possession of a female1 the latter      
throws her web about both and devours   
them4#ada ,female deer wandering in the 
company of a male have been observed to 
watch with indifference the contest of  
the latter with some newly arrived male1
 and on his death to lick the wounds of 
their new suitor and follow him as they 
before followed his predecessor4 ,the   
relations of male and female among the  
birds1 especially among some sorts of   

birds1 have1 on the other hand1 often   
been made the theme of the poet4  ,but  
mutual aid among the animals is not     
confined to the relations of parents and
 offspring1 and male and female4        
,whether or not we explain the societies
 of animals as merely huge families1 as 
some authors are inclined to do1 the    
fact of the association remains1 and it 
continues to be true that1 in this      
association1 much mutual assistance is  
given4 ,in this connection1 however1 may
 be cited the experiments of ,lubbock1  
showing the exceeding irregularity and  
apparent caprice with which such        
assistance is rendered among even such  
creatures as the ants1 with whom        
organization is generally regarded as   
having arrived at an unusual degree of  
development4 ,lubbock found that1       
wherever a regular battle was in        
progress1 the ants gave aid to each     
other1 but that where a single ant was  
attacked by an enemy1 the others of the 
nest generally took no part in the      

matter4 ,in many cases1 they passed by  
wounded or helpless members of their own
 colony1 leaving them to perish where a 
very small amount of help would have    
saved them4 ,in some cases1 they cared  
for the slightly wounded2 but those who 
were severely wounded they threw from   
the nest4 ,in their hostility to their  
enemies1 they were merciless and more   
persistent than in their help of        
friends4#adb ,lubbock1 arguing from such
 facts as these1 differs in opinion from
 ,grote1 who regards it as necessary to 
the maintenance of any society that some
 moral feeling should exist4 ,indeed1   
that which ,carneri asserts with regard 
to the care of offspring might be       
claimed in this case1 namely1 that the  
assistance reaches exactly so far as is 
necessary for the preservation of       
species4 ,the implication is that all   
this apparent altruism is mere          
automatism4  ,in support of a view      
similar to this1 ,benno ,scheitz quotes 
the following case1#adc which ,dr4      

,altum relates from his own experience3 
',in the ,gens d',armes ,market in      
,berlin1 ,i saw several larks and a     
robin in a cage2 the former cowered     
sorrowfully1 with somewhat roughened    
feathers1 in a corner1 but the robin was
 in full activity4 ,it ran to the       
food-cup1 seized as many ant-larvae as  
it could grasp in its bill1 and hastened
 with these to the nearest lark4 ,the   
latter1 however1 did not honor the      
solicitous robin and its food with as   
much as a look4 ,but scarcely had the   
robin offered its disdained food than it
 let this fall and hastened after fresh 
food1 offered this1 let it fall1 fetched
 fresh again1--only to begin the same   
performance anew4 ,as long as ,i watched
 this interesting spectacle1 the robin  
was thus employed1 and very soon the    
greater portion of the ant-larvae had   
been carried from the food-vessel and   
lay scattered before the different      
larks4 ,and what was here the motive of 
the redbreast in permitting itself no   

nourishment 7,i did not see that it ate 
a single one of the ant-larvae itself71 
but carrying it all to its              
fellow-prisoners1--sympathy and love for
 the larks1 who disdained all food1 and 
who could have taken the same food for  
themselves1 in the same manner1 and with
 exactly the same amount of trouble8    
,the redbreast had been caught and      
carried away from its young2 the impulse
 to feed was strongly awakened and had  
before been strongly active1 but not    
satisfied2 the bird was obliged1        
therefore1 to continue to bring food1   
although there was no longer anything to
 feed4' ,the care which female animals  
of many species1 when deprived of their 
young1 often show for the young of other
 animals of the same or other species   
that come in their way is well known4   
,among domestic animals1 the cat appears
 particularly susceptible in this       
respect1 though comparisons here are    
perhaps scarcely fair1 since1 of all    
domestic animals that are habitually    

deprived of their young1 the cat is     
about the only one that has the chance  
of coming in contact with young animals 
near the size of its own kind4 ,the cat 
has been known to adopt young rats1     
chickens1 puppies1 ducks1 and will      
generally1 during the time of suckling1 
take up readily with kittens of another 
litter4 ,galton1 in his ,inquiry into   
,human ,faculty1 mentions that the      
records of many nations have legends    
like that of ,romulus and ,remus1 these 
being surprisingly confirmed by ,general
 ,sleeman's narrative of six cases where
 children were nurtured for many years  
by wolves1 in ,oude4 ,the working ants  
of certain species show as great care   
for the slave-larvae robbed from other  
nests as do many parent animals for     
their own offspring4 ,again1 the care   
for their eggs shown by many animals who
 give no care to their young may be     
cited as evidence in favor of the theory
 of automatism4 ,in the vegetable world 
also1 similar protection is afforded    

flower and fruit1 the most wonderful    
instances of such protection being1     
perhaps1 those of the insectivorous     
plants4  ,but to all these arguments in 
favor of automatism may be answered3    
7#a7 that functions which are preserved 
and inherited must evidently be1 not    
only in animals and plants1 but also and
 equally in man1 such as favor the      
preservation of the species2 those which
 do not so favor it must perish with the
 individuals or species to which they   
belong2 7#b7 that it cannot1 indeed1 be 
assumed that a result which has never   
come within the experience of the       
species can be willed as an end1        
although1 with the species1 function    
securing results which1 from a human    
point of view1 might be regarded as     
ends1 may be preserved2 but 7#c7 that1  
as far as we assume the existence of    
consciousness at all in any species or  
individual1 we must assume pleasure and 
pain1 pleasure in customary function1   
pain in its hindrance2 and 7#d7 that1 as

 far as we can assume memory1 we may    
also feel authorized to assume that a   
remembered action may be associated with
 remembered results that come within the
 experience of the animal1 some phases  
of which may thus become1 as combined   
with pleasure or pain1 ends to seek or  
consequences to avoid4 ,there is no     
reason to be given why care for the     
young should be more pleasurable than   
care for eggs2 the one may be as        
pleasurable to some species as the other
 is to other species4 ,if we assume     
consciousness in ,dr4 ,altum's robin1 we
 may assume pleasure in the care of its 
young and also1 as a possibility1       
pleasure in the results of such care1   
the preservation and prosperity of the  
young2 whether the consciousness of the 
robin includes abstract concepts of     
preservation and prosperity1 is another 
question4 ,the human mother1 too1 is    
wont to be peculiarly tender to children
 in general1 but we do not for that     
reason infer that her kindness towards  

them is mere automatism4 ,there is no   
necessary opposition between reason and 
instinct1 and certainly none between    
emotion and instinct4 ,to the very      
functions from which we derive the most 
pleasure we are impelled by an          
irresistible innate tendency4 ,in any   
particular case1 it may be very         
difficult to determine the amount of    
reasoning power possessed by the animal1
 the exact relation of ends to means in 
its consciousness2 but it may be        
remarked that there are human mothers   
who reason little with regard to the    
preservation of the species or other    
so-called ends secured by the care they 
give their offspring2 the care is       
spontaneous1 but may not be the less a  
matter of warm affection4 ,it appears   
strange1 therefore1 that exactly that   
constancy and strength of tendency1 with
 need of satisfaction by other channels 
if the usual ones fail1 which we use as 
proof of extreme mother-tenderness in   
the case of human beings should1 in the 

case of other species1 be turned into an
 argument to disprove the existence of  
this feeling4  ,it is sometimes argued  
that the feeling of the parent animal in
 the care of its young is1 in any case1 
merely one of pleasure in the activity1 
and has no connection with the good of  
the offspring4 ,in such a case as that  
of the robin1 where the effects of the  
care come within the experience of the  
mother1 this is a mere arbitrary        
assumption1 although direct proof of the
 contrary may be impossible4 ,naturally1
 in the case of an animal which cares   
for its eggs1 but never comes in contact
 with the offspring that are hatched    
from them1 it would be impossible to    
suppose any affection for the offspring 
as such2 their existence does not come  
within the range of the animal's        
experience4 ,with regard to an animal   
whose connection with its young is      
constant1 the theory that pleasure in   
their care has no reference to their    
welfare1 has no evidence to support it  

and is unjustifiable4 ,if we cannot     
directly disprove it1 we have1 at least1
 the evidence of many facts unfavorable 
to it4 ,the distress manifested not only
 by many mammals 7who might be supposed 
to find physical discomfort merely in   
the absence of the means of relief of   
the milk-glands71 but also by other     
animals and notably birds1 in the loss  
of their young and even in any danger   
that threatens them1--the indescribably 
mournful sounds at deprivation1 the     
after depression1 and the capacity for  
self-sacrifice in their defence1 would  
lead us naturally1 from an unprejudiced 
standpoint1 to a belief in something    
very like what we term mother-love in   
human beings4 ,from ,letourneau's       
,sociology based upon ,ethnography1#add 
,i quote the following3 ,a female wren1 
observed by ,montagu1 spent sixteen     
hours a day in looking for food for her 
little ones4 ,at ,delft1 when there was 
a fire raging1 a female white stork1 not
 being able to carry away her young     

ones1 allowed herself to be burnt with  
them4444 ,j4 ,j4 ,hayes tells us of a   
female white bear forgetting the        
,esquimaux dogs1 the huntsmen1 and her  
own wounds1 in order to hide her own    
little bear with her body1 to lick her  
and to protect her4 ,in ,central        
,africa1 a female elephant1 all covered 
and pierced with javelins1 hurled at her
 by the escort of black men attending   
upon ,livingstone1 was all the while    
protecting her young one with her trunk 
which her own large body enabled her to 
cover4444 ,in ,sumatra1 a female        
orang-outang1 pursued with her little   
one by ,captain ,hall and wounded by a  
gunshot1 threw her infant on to the     
highest branches of the tree on to which
 she had climbed1 and continued1 until  
she died1 exhorting her young one to    
escape4 ,in ,brazil1 ,sphix saw a female
 of the stentor niger who1 wounded by a 
gunshot1 collected her last remaining   
strength to throw her young one on to   
one of the branches close by2 when she  

had performed this last act of duty1 she
 fell from the tree and died4 ,in       
,romanes' ,animal ,intelligence1 occurs 
the following quotation from ,dr4       
,franklin3#ade ',i have known two       
parrots1' said he1 'which had lived     
together four years1 when the female    
became weak and her legs swelled4 ,these
 were symptoms of gout1 a disease to    
which all birds of this family are very 
subject in ,england4 ,it became         
impossible for her to descend from the  
perch1 or to take her food as formerly1 
but the male was most assiduous in      
carrying it to her in his beak4 ,he     
continued feeding her in this manner    
during four months1 but the infirmities 
of his companion increased from day to  
day1 so that at last she was unable to  
support herself on the perch4 ,she      
remained at the bottom of the cage1     
making1 from time to time1 ineffectual  
efforts to regain the perch4 ,the male  
was always near her1 and with all his   
strength aided the attempts of his dear 

better half4 ,seizing the poor invalid  
by the beak or the upper part of the    
wing1 he tried to raise her1 and renewed
 his efforts several times4 ,his        
constancy1 his gestures1 and his        
continued solicitude1 all showed in this
 affectionate bird the most ardent      
desire to relieve the sufferings and    
assist the weakness of his companion4   
,but the scene became still more        
interesting when the female was dying4  
,her unhappy spouse moved around her    
incessantly1 his attention and tender   
cares redoubled4 ,he even tried to open 
her beak to give her some nourishment4  
,he ran to her1 then returned with a    
troubled and agitated look4 ,at         
intervals1 he uttered the most plaintive
 cries2 then1 with his eyes fixed on    
her1 kept a mournful silence4 ,at length
 his companion breathed her last2 from  
that moment he pined away1 and died in  
the course of a few weeks4'  ,moreover1 
care of animals for other animals shows 
itself often where neither the relation 

of parent to offspring1 nor the relation
 of sex1 nor even that of species1      
furnishes the basis4 ,aside from the    
friendship and self-sacrifice of        
domestic animals for man1 friendships1  
under domestication1 between individuals
 of all manner of ordinarily most       
hostile species are reported4 ,such     
friendship is not at all infrequent     
between dog and cat4 ,in the family of a
 relative of my own were once a quail   
and cat who were most devoted to each   
other4 ,they would spend hours playing  
together1 and were often left alone     
together for long periods4 ,the cat     
never manifested any tendency to regard 
the bird in the light of food2 she      
seemed1 however1 well aware of the      
danger it might be under from other     
cats1 and invariably drove these away   
when they endeavored to approach the    
house4 ,this cat was also friendly to a 
tame robin which preceded the quail as  
pet in the same family4  ,and           
furthermore1 assistance is frequently   

given spontaneously where there has been
 no association before the act4 ,there  
are a number of instances on record1 and
 supported by good authority1 where dogs
 have brought suffering individuals of  
their own kind to places where they had 
themselves received aid4 ,romanes cites 
from ,mr4 ,oswald ,fitch the story of a 
domestic cat who was observed to take   
out some fish-bones from the house to   
the garden1 and1 being followed1 was    
seen to have placed them in front of a  
miserably thin and evidently hungry     
stranger cat1 who was devouring them2   
not satisfied with that1 our cat        
returned1 procured a fresh supply1 and  
repeated its charitable offer1 which was
 apparently as gratefully accepted4     
,this act of benevolence over1 our cat  
returned to its customary dining-place1 
the scullery1 and ate its own dinner off
 the remainder of the bones4#adf        
,romanes says further3 ,an almost       
precisely similar case has been         
independently communicated to me by ,dr4

 ,allen ,thomson1 ,f4,r4,s4 ,the only   
difference was that ,dr4 ,thomson's cat 
drew the attention of the cook to the   
famishing stranger outside by pulling   
her dress and leading her to the place4 
,when the cook supplied the hungry cat  
with some food1 the other one paraded   
round and round while the meal was being
 discussed1 purring loudly4 ,mr4 ,h4 ,a4
 ,macpherson writes me that in #ahgf he 
had an old male cat and a kitten aged a 
few months4 ,the cat1 who had long been 
a favorite1 was jealous of the kitten   
and 'showed considerable aversion to    
it4' ,one day the floor of a room in the
 basement of the house was taken up in  
order to repair some pipes4 ,the day    
after the boards had been replaced1 the 
cat 'entered the kitchen 7he lived      
almost wholly on the drawing-room floor 
above71 rubbed against the cook1 and    
mewed without ceasing until he had      
engaged her attention4 ,he then1 by     
running to and fro1 drew her to the room
 in which the work had taken place4 ,the

 servant was puzzled until she heard a  
faint mew from beneath her feet4 ,on the
 boards being lifted1 the kitten emerged
 safe and sound1 though half-starved4   
,the cat watched the proceedings with   
the greatest interest until the kitten  
was released2 but1 on ascertaining that 
it was safe1 he at once left the room1  
without evincing any pleasure at its    
return4 ,nor did he subsequently become 
really friendly with it4'  ,i cite still
 one other instance of animal affection 
from ,romanes3 ,one of a shooting-party 
under a banian tree killed a female     
monkey1 and carried it to his tent1     
which was soon surrounded by forty or   
fifty of the tribe1 who made a great    
noise and seemed disposed to attack the 
aggressor4 ,they retreated when he      
presented his fowling-piece1 the        
dreadful effect of which they had       
witnessed1 and appeared perfectly to    
understand4 ,the head of the troop1     
however1 stood his ground1 chattering   
furiously2 the sportsman1 who perhaps   

felt some little degree of compunction  
for having killed one of the family1 did
 not like to fire at the creature1 and  
nothing short of firing would suffice to
 drive him off4 ,at length he came to   
the door of the tent1 and finding       
threats of no avail1 began a lamentable 
moaning and by the most expressive      
gesture seemed to beg for the dead body4
 ,it was given him2 he took it          
sorrowfully in his arms and bore it away
 to his expecting companions4 ,they who 
were witnesses of this extraordinary    
scene resolved never again to fire at   
one of the monkey race4#adg  ,as to the 
changeable and capricious appearance of 
the assistance rendered in animal       
associations1 by one member to another1 
it may be said that any being of a      
different species who could look into   
our towns and cities might easily find  
as great problems of caprice here as    
among the ants and bees4 ,we1 too1 leave
 our fellows to perish unaided2 we1 too1
 kill off1 by neglect and hard usage1   

often not only or chiefly our drones1   
but even some of our most industrious1  
useful members of society4 ,with us1    
too1 there is very often greater        
hostility towards enemies than kindness 
towards friends4 ,many savage tribes1   
that we certainly concede to be endowed 
with intelligence1 could learn of the   
ants1 rather than teach them1 with      
regard to the duties of mutual aid4     
,with regard to other species than his  
own1 even so-called civilized man is    
often eminently selfish and cruel4      
,among the savages the most extreme     
cruelty is often shown4 ,bain1 in an    
essay entitled ,is there ,such a ,thing 
as ,pure ,malevolence8 cites from a     
book1 ,siberian ,pictures1 together with
 mention of the pleasure shown by       
onlookers in the drowning of a man1 an  
instance where boys seemed to find a    
genuine and peculiar delight in slowly  
roasting a dog to death4#adh ,and ,bruce
 describes in his travels the feasts of 
the ,abyssinians1 where the flesh was   

cut from an ox alive and bellowing with 
pain4 ,but our police courts frequently 
bear witness to the possibility of the  
most wanton cruelty performed by people 
within our own most enlightened         
societies1 although we may claim that   
cruelty is not so general in civilized  
societies4 ,i personally have known of a
 case where1 a horse becoming suddenly  
ill and falling upon the road1 it was   
prodded by its owner with a pitchfork   
until it died of its wounds2 and of     
another case where a man fastened to a  
tree a harmless kitten that had wandered
 into his yard1 and deliberately stoned 
it to death4 ,surely we have very little
 right to criticise the slaughter of    
animals by other species1 while we      
ourselves name the taking of life sport4
 ,our criticism of the play of the cat  
with the mouse as cruel is humorous--if 
there can be any humor connected with   
cruelty--as long as we ourselves find   
delight in the prolonged struggle of the
 trout and the torture of the fox-chase4

 ,perhaps the cat may be under the      
impression that the mouse takes pleasure
 in being played with2 certainly we can 
believe that this is possible1 when     
beings who claim to possess so much     
higher intelligence can gravely assert  
that the fox enjoys the chase4  ,amongst
 so-called civilized human beings1 too1 
the care of parents for offspring is by 
no means universal1 and mothers are     
known whom not even the fear of the law 
can hinder from sacrificing their       
children by the slow torture of         
starvation for the gain of a few pounds 
or for even simple relief from the      
trouble of their rearing4 ,the reports  
of the ,society for the ,prevention of  
,cruelty to ,children show that not     
strangers but parents are the most      
frequent sinners against the child4 ,nor
 is infanticide and neglect confined to 
the poorer classes4 ,i repeat1 if a     
being of some other species enabled to  
obtain only such external knowledge of  
us as we have of other species1 some    

being beholding us1 for instance1 from  
distant planets1 should endeavor to form
 a theory of our inner egoism and       
altruism1 of sentiment and motive1 he   
might be as puzzled as we are when we   
study the conduct of bees and ants4     
,even the helplessness of the ant       
species1 ,polyergus rufescens1 at which 
we often wonder as stupidity1 has its   
parallel in some of the former          
slave-owners of the southern states of  
,north ,america1 who live in the utmost 
poverty and ignorance because they have 
lost the habits of industry and consider
 work beneath them4 ,mother-love is     
certainly the rule amongst us2 but it is
 not more constant or self-sacrificing  
than with some other species1 though it1
 in general1 accompanies the child      
farther in his career4 ,this rule is    
not1 however1 universal4 ,human mothers 
of a lower type1 who show fondness for  
their children when they are little1    
often exhibit little or none for them   
after they have grown out of arms4  ,it 

is claimed that altruism was1 in its    
origin1 egoism4 ,everything depends1 in 
theory on this point1 on our definition 
of the terms origin and altruism4 ,if we
 regard the life of animals in general  
or the life of any particular species as
 having been non-social before it was   
social1 and as having become social     
through increase of numbers1 the chance 
association which arose naturally in    
this way being favored by natural       
selection1 we must assume function      
fundamentally advantageous to self      
without regard to the results to other  
beings to have been primary1 whether or 
not we call this function egoism4 ,with 
regard to animal life in general1 we    
cannot avoid adopting some such view as 
this1 since we find few species forming 
lasting bonds of association1 a large   
number forming only exceedingly short   
ones1 and some forming none at all1 and 
since we must furthermore suppose a     
scarcity of living individuals to have  
preceded their multiplicity4 ,moreover1 

we cannot suppose consciousness to have 
been absent1 in the case of many of the 
animal species1 during the whole of this
 development4 ,and where there is       
consciousness1 pleasure must be a       
concomitant along the line of           
development1 and customary forms of     
action come to present ends1 whether or 
not the individual has the abstract     
concept of ends4  ,but we need to       
remember that even the human race has   
not yet arrived at perfection1 and that 
even moral altruism 7for not all        
altruism is necessarily moral7 is not   
yet absolutely attained in any species4 
,our ordinary use of the term is        
progressive2 that which is altruistic at
 one period of history is often looked  
upon1 at a later period1 as merely a    
higher form of egoism4 ,this fact should
 be borne in mind when1 in ,ethics or   
,political ,economy1 we inquire whether 
man was1 in the beginning1 altruistic4  
,what do we mean here by altruism1 and  
what by beginning8 ,a similar criticism 

may be made on the rather more usual    
question as to whether man was1 in the  
beginning1 social2 what is the beginning
 of our species1 and what degree of     
association is necessary in order that  
the individuals associating may be      
termed social8 ,the question is a       
difficult one to answer from any point  
of view4 ,while the majority of human   
beings1 even the most savage1 show some 
degree of gregariousness1 there appear  
to be some tribes that are even less    
social in their habits than the most of 
our ape-cousins4 ,mr4 ,dalton says of   
the savages of ,inner ,borneo that they 
live in the most perfect state of       
nature1 do not cultivate the earth or   
live in huts1 do not eat either rice or 
salt1 and do not associate with each    
other1 but wander like wild animals in  
the forest4 ,the sexes meet in the      
jungle1 or the man carries away a woman 
from some campong4 ,when the children   
are old enough to shift for themselves1 
they usually separate1 neither one      

afterwards thinking of the other4#adi   
,as to just what form the development of
 altruism from egoism may have assumed  
in the case of any particular species1  
or how the individuals of the species   
may first have been led to association1 
the state of science does not1 at       
present1 enable us to say4 ,most        
authors1 indeed1 incline to class all   
social development as having its origin 
in some one form of family relation4    
,rolph1 for instance1 refers it to the  
necessary association of the sexes1 at  
certain times1 for the purpose of       
copulation4 ,others regard the care of  
the female for its young as the primary 
form from which all social organization 
has developed4 ,inasmuch1 however1 as   
the line of ascent from primitive       
protoplasm to man cannot be regarded as 
straight1 but has very many branches1 it
 is quite conceivable that the          
development may have taken place in     
different ways in different branches or 
different species2 and the very various 

forms which social organization shows in
 different species is direct evidence in
 favor of such a supposition4 ,thus it  
is not1 for instance1 in some species1  
the mother animal1 but the male1 who    
cares for the young1 and again1 in other
 cases1 affectionate relations of the   
sexes are not a prominent feature of the
 social structure4 ,the attitude of a   
swarm of bees towards the queen1 her    
progeny1 and the drones1 presents       
aspects entirely different from those of
 ant-nests or human tribal or state     
organization4 ,in some species where the
 female exhibits considerable care and  
concern for her eggs or offspring1 there
 is no especial friendliness between the
 sexes1 and in other cases1 where no    
care is given to offspring1 there is    
still apparently some degree of         
friendliness1 or at least of physical   
attraction1 between male and female4 ,it
 is not only conceivable that the habit 
of association may have been developed  
by different means in different species1

 but it is also conceivable that1 in    
some cases1 several forms of family     
relation may have assisted equally1 and 
in other cases have united1 even if not 
in equal measure1 in producing the      
result4 ,the association of parent with 
offspring1 for instance1 is in most     
cases impossible without some degree of 
association between the offspring4      
,however we may suppose social relations
 to have originated in the case of any  
particular species1 whether through the 
sexual or the parental relations or     
through both combined1 and whether we   
trace these relations themselves back1  
in the one instance1 to the original    
union of the sexes in the individual1   
and propagation as self-division1 in the
 other to the unity of mother and       
offspring before the individual life    
commences1 or whether we simply begin   
with some non-hostile contact of        
individuals as already existent1 it is  
evident that1 with increasing           
competition1 cooeperation must be to the

 advantage of those cooeperating4 ,those
 individuals whose single strength is   
supplemented by the aid of others must  
succeed best in the struggle for        
existence4 ,moreover1 with the exercise 
of altruistic forms of action1 we must  
suppose pleasure in its exercise to     
increase1 in so far as we suppose any   
consciousness at all in the animal      
performing the action4 ,the greater the 
degree of exercise1 the greater the     
pleasure connected with the action1 and 
the more readily the organism will      
respond to conditions permitting its    
accomplishment2 while repetition1 again1
 must increase tendency to repetition4  
,this is true not only of exactly the   
same form of action1 but also of similar
 forms1 that is1 of forms having some   
like elements4 ,the conditions of action
 are never exactly the same2 the        
environment is continually changing2 but
 the animal tends to choose1 among      
possible forms of action1 that which    
corresponds most nearly to most         

exercised and pleasurable forms4  ,at   
just what period we are to regard the   
altruistic forms of action as becoming  
in spirit altruistic depends1 as has    
already been said1 on our definition of 
the degree of disinterested feeling     
necessary to altruism proper1 aside from
 our theories of the existence and form 
of consciousness in the case of any     
particular species at any particular    
point of development4 ,in the case of   
even disinterested human action1 the    
altruism is not generally1 or at least  
in very many cases1 wholly unmixed with 
any thought of self1 though this thought
 may not hold first place4 ,if          
self-sacrifice be the test of altruistic
 feeling1 then we must suppose the      
latter to exist1 in some relations1 even
 far down in the scale of being4 ,in    
this case1 just as in other cases where 
choice is necessary1 the stronger       
tendency conquers even with the result  
of pain of disappointment in some other 
direction4 ,the case of altruistic      

action is hence not unique in this      
respect1 and it might perhaps be argued 
that such self-sacrifice would therefore
 be possible without any consideration  
or consciousness of the good accruing to
 others through its performance4 ,but if
 we analyze the development of any      
habit1 we find that the pleasure of the 
act speedily connects itself with all   
the constant results of the act that    
come within the experience of the       
performer of the act and are recognized 
as its results4 ,any result at first    
unpleasant must1 if it is constant1     
either lead to the discontinuance of the
 act or else1 with time1 lose much of   
its quality of unpleasantness4 ,either  
the expected pain of this one factor is 
sufficient to counterbalance the        
pleasure awaited in the act1 and a      
repetition of the act is thus avoided1  
or1 as in all other cases of habitual   
experience1 the pain or discomfort      
gradually diminishes1 until1 if the     
habit be long enough continued1 pleasure

 takes its place4 ,the pleasure of      
others must be a constant result of     
action that secures their welfare1 and  
if this result comes within the         
conscious experience of the performer of
 the action1 we can scarcely avoid      
supposing that1 even if his action is in
 the beginning purely selfish1 the      
pleasure of those benefited must come in
 time to play a part in the pleasure of 
the performer4 ,the part it plays will  
not be1 in the beginning1 naturally1 a  
very important one1 but its importance  
will increase with time4 ,if this is    
true in a measure even of the           
individual1 it is doubly true of the    
species4 ,wherever1 therefore1 we may   
suppose the existence of sufficient     
intelligence for the inference of       
pleasure from its outer signs in others1
 it must be admitted to be possible and 
even probable that constant habits of   
self-sacrifice and helpfulness to others
 will be accompanied by some measure of 
altruistic feeling4 ,and even if we     

suppose an insufficiency of intelligence
 for such inference1 it is still        
possible and even probable that the     
constant symptoms of pleasure in others 
will come to be a part of the conditions
 of the pleasure of the individual or   
the species in whom habits of           
self-sacrifice have become constant1    
although their inner significance is not
 recognized4 ,it may be objected that1  
if actual altruistic feeling were       
present in animals which show a certain 
amount of helpfulness towards others of 
their kind1 this altruism would not     
desert these others at the very time of 
their greatest need or when any great   
peril to self is involved1 or that it   
would show itself in many other acts    
than just those which1 as in the case of
 the ants1 secure the preservation of a 
society1 or in that of some other       
species give a certain protection to the
 female during breeding time4 ,the      
argument is wholly inconclusive1 and has
 already been answered4 ,the action of  

natural selection in the preservation of
 those forms of tendency that secure the
 preservation of the species does not   
annul the action of the will or render  
the presence of strong emotion in the   
direction of the tendency thus preserved
 impossible2 on the contrary1 we must   
suppose all tendency1 in man equally    
with other animal species1 to be the    
result of natural selection4 ,and in    
man1 too1 altruism that is sufficient   
for some degree of sacrifice is         
insufficient for a greater4 ,in man1 as 
in other species1 altruistic feeling and
 altruistic action vary according to the
 particular directions in which habit in
 the species and in the individual has  
been cultivated4 ,men and women who are 
not kind to each other will frequently  
be kind to little children4 ,the average
 ,englishman is kind to his dog in spite
 of his total indifference to the pain  
inflicted on the very nearly if not     
quite as intelligent fox2 and he will   
grow indignant to the verge of tears    

over abuse of a horse1 while he will    
regard the like abuse with little or no 
emotion when it is inflicted on a       
miserable donkey4 ,i doubt if the       
average ,englishman would shoot horses  
or dogs1 even if they were good for food
 and useless otherwise1 and abounded    
wild in ,great ,britain4 ,but this is   
merely because association and habit    
have made him acquainted with the       
capacity of feeling in the horse and    
dog1 and have accustomed him to humane  
treatment of them4  ,an argument        
sometimes advanced against the theory of
 a derivation of altruism from egoism is
 that such altruism has no premises or  
reasons2 if1 say the advocates of this  
argument1 a man performs an apparently  
altruistic act to-day from selfish      
motives1 and performs the same act      
to-morrow without calculation of the    
benefit to self to be gained from       
it1--if such a change were              
possible1--then this man must simply    
have forgotten his motives for the act4 

,but this is not altruism proper4 ,such 
action is the result of a logical       
confusion1 but it can never be altruism4
 ,altruism proper has a motive1 and this
 motive is the desire to do good to     
others4 ,with regard to this argument it
 may simply be said that it is wholly   
untenable from any evolutionist         
standpoint2 it destroys at once the     
possibility of any moral progress4      
,intended to defend altruism and moral  
principle in general from what is       
designated as degradation1 it is itself 
degrading in its denial of the          
compatibility of natural and moral      
advance4 ,it posits the assertion that  
nothing can ever become that which it   
was not from the beginning1 an assertion
 utterly inconsistent with any theory of
 growth1 whether evolutional or         
otherwise4 ,it is contradictory1 too1 of
 the directly observed every-day facts  
of individual experience4 ,the ends with
 which we perform our acts1 and the same
 acts1 certainly change from day to day4

 ,the adult would have reason for shame 
were the ends with which he performs    
certain acts the same with those with   
which he performed those same acts when 
he was a child4 ,the emotions with which
 we regard life and its various         
relations alter every day4 ,if the      
change from egoism to altruism could be 
pronounced logical confusion1 then all  
mental evolution must constitute an     
increase of intellectual disorder1 a    
continuous progress towards less instead
 of greater intelligence4 ,where is the 
beginning of feeling and what was       
feeling in the beginning8 ,of what      
nature were the motives of our ape-like 
progenitors1 and of what nature the     
first motive that appeared in the       
universe8 and how have we ever arrived  
at the possession of other motives than 
these8 ,what a confusion worse          
confounded must be our present motives1 
and of what a chaos of thought and      
emotion must the human intellect        
consist6 ,the origin of any such        

argument as this1 intended to disprove  
the theory of a derivation of altruism  
from egoism1 is probably in the failure 
to distinguish the fact that both       
altruism and egoism1 as we know them1   
are comparative1 not absolute4          
,naturally1 absolute altruism could not 
develop immediately from absolute       
egoism1 that is1 the one could not      
change immediately into the other4 ,but 
there are very few human beings in whom 
some degree of altruism does not exist2 
and all we may note directly of change  
of motive in ourselves1 as well as all  
we ever could note of change in external
 action in other species1 is gradual    
increase in this direction4 ,in the     
individual case it is quite possible for
 change to take place in the opposite   
direction of the development of greater 
egoism4  ,in connection with the        
discussion of the development of        
motives1 we may inquire what is the     
final end of action2 ,i refer not to the
 ideal end but the actual end1 although 

the two are not always distinguished in 
the answer to this question4 ,the       
confusion of the two generally arises   
from forgetfulness of the fact that an  
end is the part of the result of an act 
particularly willed by the performer4   
,the concept is again a teleological    
one1 although often advanced1 in some   
form1 by persons of materialistic views4
 ,thus some authors1 looking at the     
process of evolution as continual       
survival of the fittest1 and observing  
that natural selection thus tends       
continually towards health1 so that the 
action of existing species is1 in a     
large and ever increasing measure1      
favorable to health1 assert that the    
latter is the end of action4 ,others1 in
 like manner and from similar premises1 
argue that the preservation of the      
species is the end of action2 or        
sometimes the logical inaccuracy        
involved in making health or the        
preservation of species the universal   
end of action is partly concealed by    

giving the assertion the form that one  
or the other of these is the end        
attained by action4 ,to these statements
 may be answered3 ,the health of the    
individual1 although it sometimes       
appears as the end willed1 is by no     
means the constant and universal end1   
but1 on the contrary1 rather an         
infrequent end4 ,as to the preservation 
of the species1 the concept has never   
been heard of by a majority of human    
beings1 and a thing cannot be an end to 
those who have not heard of it4 ,it is  
doubtful1 moreover1 whether even those  
to whom it is familiar often1 if ever1  
make it the end of action4 ,with regard 
to pleasure1 it has already been said   
that special calculation of the pleasure
 to accrue to self is by no means a     
necessary part of the motive to action4 
,attention may again be called to the   
fact that it is not the future pleasure 
that decides the will to action in the  
case of struggle of conflicting         
tendencies1 but that it is the more     

pleasurable representation1 and that it 
is present pleasure which decides in any
 case4 ,or1 rather1 it is not the       
pleasure1 the feeling alone1 that       
decides1 for feeling is never found     
alone2 it is always combined with       
thought-images4 ,the strength of        
pleasurable feeling is the tone in which
 the intensity of the function manifests
 itself1 and according to which it tends
 to further expression in action4 ,in   
the imagination of action and its       
results1 or the thought of it1          
reflection may linger especially on any 
one of its elements1--on any part of the
 action or its results as inferred from 
the analogy of past experience2 the     
pleasure to self is not necessarily the 
element on which the mind lays stress1  
and the pleasure to others may be the   
element with which thought is           
particularly occupied and which turns   
the scale of choice2 just as1 also1 in  
the actual action and its results1 the  
pleasure in pleasure or benefit accruing

 to others may more than counterbalance 
the pain which some other inevitable    
phase of the action or its results      
brings with it4  ,much that has been    
said of the development of egoism from  
altruism still holds true of the        
individual1 even if the idea of a       
progress in altruism through heredity be
 surrendered4 ,the consideration of the 
question of heredity is1 however1       
necessary to any complete or            
wide-reaching theory of moral progress4 
,hitherto1 the actuality of the         
inheritance of altruistic tendency has  
been assumed on the strength of previous
 considerations with regard to heredity 
in general1 according to which we could 
not conceive all the multifarious       
differences which appear in all the     
species and varieties of animal nature  
to have been present in simplest primal 
organisms1 or all the differences of the
 different species and varieties which  
have arisen through sexual propagation  
from common ancestors to have been      

present as inherent potentialities in   
the germ-plasm1 as such1 of their common
 ancestors1 and so cannot consider the  
lesser variations which go to make up   
the larger ones as due merely to the    
germ-plasm4 ,it remains for us to       
examine the facts more particularly with
 respect to this special form of        
tendency4 ,stephen says3 ,an unreasoning
 animal can only adapt itself to new    
circumstances1 except within a very     
narrow range1 by acquiring a new        
organization2 or1 in other words1 by    
becoming a different animal4 ,its habits
 and instincts may therefore remain     
fixed through countless generations4    
,but man1 by accumulating experiences1  
can virtually alter both his faculties  
and his surroundings without altering   
his organization4 ,when this            
accumulation extends beyond the         
individual1 it implies a social         
development1 and explains the enormous  
changes wrought within historical times1
 and which define the difference between

 the savage and the civilized man4#aej  
,briefly1 society exists as it exists in
 virtue of this organization1 which is  
as real as the organization of any      
material instrument1 though it depends  
upon habits and instincts instead of    
arrangements of tangible and visible    
objects4#aea ,children1 no doubt1 start 
with infinitely varying aptitudes for   
moral culture1 as they start with       
stomachs of varying strength of         
digestion2 but1 in every case1 the      
action of the social medium is an       
essential factor of the result4#aeb     
,now1 in the first place1 objection may 
be made to the term unreasoning animal1 
in that1 whatever we may think with     
regard to inorganic matter and          
plant-life or even with regard to the   
lower forms of animal-life1 the whole   
theory of evolution is opposed to the   
supposition that reason suddenly arises 
in man2 and in that we have1 moreover1  
in the case of many of the higher       
species1 very conclusive evidence of the

 presence of some degree of reason4 ,mr4
 ,stephen does not elsewhere make any   
positive assertion of the entire absence
 of reason in animals2 yet to his remark
 that ,it may be that germs of this     
capacity i4e4 the capacity to learn by  
experience and impart this knowledge to 
others are to be found in the lower     
animals he adds1 but we shall make no   
sensible error if we regard it1 as it   
has always been regarded1 as the        
exclusive prerogative of humanity4#aec  
,that is1 we make no sensible error if  
we regard the progress of other animal  
species than our own to be wholly       
organic1 that of our own species1 on the
 other hand1 to be wholly an            
accumulation of common knowledge4 ,the  
division between man and the rest of the
 animal kingdom is thus made a very     
distinct and absolute line4 ,it may be  
noticed1 second1 that the third         
quotation of the three cited            
consecutively above contains a very     
different statement from that of the    

first quotation4 ,and it may be said1   
third1 that the second quotation1 while 
seeming to bear out the first1 is in    
reality a contradiction of it1 since it 
makes social organization dependent upon
 habits and instincts4  ,exactly what is
 it that is meant by the alteration of  
organization which is pronounced        
unnecessary to the virtual alteration of
 human faculties8 ,from the modern      
spiritualistic1 the materialistic1 the  
positivistic1 or any modern standpoint  
at all1 it is difficult to perceive how 
mental alteration can be supposed       
without the assumption of an exactly    
corresponding physiological change4 ,in 
view of the exceedingly minute structure
 of the nervous system1 which is chiefly
 affected by such change1 we may suppose
 this change to be so fine as to be     
imperceptible to sense-perception1 but1 
since it must1 in any case1 be exactly  
cooerdinate with the psychical change1  
,i fail to see how we can scientifically
 regard the one and at the same time    

ignore the other and pronounce it of no 
significance4 ,and if we suppose any    
fixation of psychical alteration1 we    
cannot avoid likewise supposing an      
exactly cooerdinate fixation of         
physiological alteration4 ,of course the
 question remains as to the extent to   
which fixation takes place in either    
case1 and this question we have yet to  
consider4 ,the weakness of ,mr4         
,stephen's position lies in his         
assumption of fixation on the one side  
and his denial of it on the other4  ,how
 far are the moral qualities acquired in
 one generation inherited by the next8  
,inasmuch as all development is by      
inappreciable increments1 all change of 
organization gradual1 or1 in psychical  
terms1 inasmuch as character varies only
 slowly from the grooves of established 
habit1 there is a general truth in the  
statement that all habit prominent      
enough to be noticed as such can        
generally be traced farther back than   
the next generation only4 ,nevertheless1

 here are a few cases for the           
,weismannites3--  ,gall speaks of a     
,russian family in which the father and 
grandfather had died prematurely1 the   
victims of taste for strong drink4 ,the 
grandson1 at the age of five1 manifested
 the same liking in the highest degree4 
,trelat1 in his work ',folie ,lucide1'  
states that a lady of regular life and  
economical habits was subject to fits of
 uncontrollable dipsomania4 ,loathing   
her state1 she called herself a         
miserable drunkard1 and mixed the most  
disgusting substances with her wine1 but
 all in vain2 the passion was stronger  
than her will4 ,the mother and the uncle
 of this lady had also been subject to  
dipsomania4  ,charles ,x----1 son of an 
eccentric and intemperate father1       
manifested instincts of great cruelty   
from infancy4 ,he was sent at an early  
age to various schools1 but was expelled
 from them all4 ,being forced to enlist 
in the army1 he sold his uniform for    
drink and only escaped a sentence of    

death on the testimony of physicians1   
who declared that he was the victim of  
an irresistible appetite4 ,he was placed
 under restraint1 and died of general   
paralysis4  ,a man belonging to the     
educated class1 and charged with        
important functions1 succeeded for a    
long time in concealing his alcoholic   
habits from the eyes of the public2 his 
family were the only sufferers by it4   
,he had five children1 only one of whom 
lived to maturity4 ,instincts of cruelty
 were manifested in this child1 and from
 an early age its sole delight was to   
torture animals in every conceivable    
way4 ,he was sent to school1 but could  
not learn4 ,in the proportions of the   
head he presented the character of      
microcephalism1 and in the field of     
intellectual acquisition he could only  
reach a certain low stage1 beyond which 
further progress was impossible4 ,at the
 age of nineteen he had to be sent to an
 asylum for the insane4  ,a man of an   
excellent family of laboring people was 

early addicted to drink1 and died of    
chronic alcoholism1 leaving seven       
children4 ,the first two of these died1 
at an early age1 of convulsions4 ,the   
third became insane at twenty-two1 and  
died an idiot4 ,the fourth1 after       
various attempts at suicide1 fell into  
the lowest grade of idiocy4 ,the fifth1 
of passionate and misanthropic temper1  
broke off all relations with his family4
 ,his sister suffers from nervous       
disorder1 which chiefly takes the form  
of hysteria1 with intermittent attacks  
of insanity4 ,the seventh1 a very       
intelligent workman1 but of nervous     
temperament1 freely gives expression to 
the gloomiest forebodings as to his     
intellectual future4  ,dr4 ,morel gives 
the history of a family living in the   
,vosges1 in which the great-grandfather 
was a drunkard1 and died from the       
effects of intoxication2 and the        
grandfather1 subject to the same        
passion1 died a maniac4 ,he had a son   
far more sober than himself1 but subject

 to hypochondria and of homicidal       
tendencies2 the son of this latter was  
stupid1 idiotic4 ,here we see1 in the   
first generation1 alcoholic excess2 in  
the second1 hereditary dipsomania2 in   
the third1 hypochondria2 and in the     
fourth1 idiocy and probable extinction  
of the race4#aed  ,it is the general    
testimony of authorities that mental    
disease may thus appear in one          
generation as general tendency to       
excess1 in another as homicidal mania1  
in another as microcephalism1 etc4 ,here
 we have examples of the hereditary     
character of what we recognize as       
nervous disease1 which yet has its moral
 as well as its intellectual side4      
,there are few who do not recognize the 
power of the parent1 through injury to  
his own health1 to affect the health of 
his children2 and yet that which we call
 disease is not more physical than that 
which we call moral characteristic4     
,however1 the physical side of that     
which we call normal moral              

characteristic is more withdrawn from   
observation2 that which is recognized as
 mental disease forms1 in this respect1 
a link between what we term ill-health  
and mental characteristic4 ,the physical
 features of what we term ill-health    
attract our attention especially because
 of the weakness and incapacity or the  
distinct physical pain involved2 the    
physical side of insanity comes also    
more or less distinctly to our notice1  
but the physical accompaniments of      
normal characteristic attract less      
attention4 ,and yet all these three     
conditions have each a psychical and    
each a physiological side4 ,it is       
therefore difficult to understand how   
the possibility of the inheritance of   
ill-health from want or excess can be   
acknowledged and yet the possibility of 
the inheritance of psychical            
characteristic acquired by the parent be
 doubted2 the latter has its organic    
side as much as the former4 ,and no     
better illustration of this fact can be 

found than in just such cases as those  
above cited1 where that which appears in
 the first place as mere excess1 that   
is1 moral characteristic as we          
ordinarily term it1 takes finally the   
form of microcephalism1 idiocy1 or      
insanity4  ,man's early existence as an 
individual is distinguished by the      
length of duration of a condition of    
helplessness1 at the beginning of which1
 beyond the fundamental so-called       
organic action1 only a few simple       
activities manifest themselves4 ,the    
human being is born with almost         
everything to acquire1 and the earlier  
years1 during which habits are slowly   
accumulating1 appear peculiarly adaptive
 or formative4 ,the human child is      
peculiarly susceptible1 as regards      
mental and moral acquirements1 to the   
nature of his surroundings4 ,but this   
fact does not necessarily mean any more 
than what ,stephen asserts in the last  
of the three quotations above cited1    
namely1 that the social medium is an    

essential factor of the result2 it does 
not necessarily exclude the inheritance 
of moral or immoral tendency acquired   
under civilization or even by near      
ancestors4 ,even in cases of the        
inheritance of the most extreme passion 
for alcohol1 we cannot suppose that the 
taste would ever have manifested itself1
 had alcohol never come within the reach
 of the inheriting individual4 ,the     
young kitten that has never tasted meat 
will snatch at a piece as soon as it    
scents it2 but we cannot suppose that   
the evidently inherited taste for flesh 
would ever appear1 did flesh never come 
within the range of its                 
sense-perception4 ,since a suitable     
environment must always be conceived as 
essential to the development even of the
 most inveterate inherited qualities1   
and since man's mental and especially   
his moral superiority has been developed
 in connection with social conditions1  
it is conceivable that1 these conditions
 failing1 his mental and moral          

development may show a lack cooerdinate 
with the degree of such failure4 ,and   
here is an answer to those who1 in      
contesting the theory of any moral      
inheritance1 state their views in the   
final form that if any inheritance at   
all can be claimed1 it can only be as a 
certain degree of readiness in          
responding to the conditions of         
civilization2 no inheritance can ever be
 anything more than this2 the existence1
 to a sufficient degree1 of             
complementary conditions in the         
environment is always necessary to the  
development of tendency4 ,it is1        
therefore1 conceivable that the child of
 civilized parents of a higher type of  
morality1 if carried off1 in infancy1 by
 savages1 might fail to exhibit the high
 character of its parents1 just as it is
 conceivable and more than probable that
 it would fail to exhibit their higher  
intellectual gifts4 ,it is also         
conceivable that the child of moral     
parentage may inherit the capacity of   

high moral development and yet fall into
 crime1 if circumstances afford him no  
education save that of association with 
hardened criminals4 ,we might only with 
reason expect to find1 in the case of   
the supposed child abducted by savages1 
a certain mental acuteness applied to   
savage affairs and some greater degree  
of humane feeling1 dominated1 however1  
by savage conceptions2 as also greater  
ease in the acquirement of civilized    
ideas and customs in case of a return to
 higher surroundings before maturity2   
and we might only expect to find1 in the
 case of the child brought up among     
criminals1 a greater degree of that     
primitive honor and faithfulness which  
may exist among criminals4 ,modern      
reformatories have testified to the     
possibility of the redemption of a large
 number of criminals from their evil    
life1 but they have shown1 nevertheless1
 that there is a lust of cupidity1 a    
love of meanness1 and an animality from 
which rescue is almost if not quite     

impossible4 ,the reaction of men whose  
past opportunities have been about      
equal1 upon effort for their reform1    
exhibits also very different degrees of 
readiness4 ,the testimony of            
reformatories for the young is          
especially of worth on this point2 and  
,i once heard ,mrs4 ,mary ,a4           
,livermore1 whose interest in           
reformatories and prisons is well known1
 describe the faces of many of the      
children to be found in a certain       
institution of this sort1 as bearing    
fearful witness to the fact that they   
had been mortgaged to the devil before  
they were born4 ,i remember a number of 
cases cited by the matron of a certain  
orphan asylum showing that children     
taken from their home at too early an   
age to have learned the sins of their   
parents by imitation may yet repeat     
those sins4 ,out of three children of   
the same parents1 the one of whom was a 
drunkard and prostitute1 the other a    
thief1 one developed1 at a very early   

age1 a tendency to dishonesty1 another  
an extreme morbid eroticism1 and the    
third child appeared to have escaped the
 evil inheritance2 but he was still very
 young when ,i last heard of him4 ,the  
two children did not exhibit these evil 
traits at their entrance to the home1   
but developed them later4  ,and here it 
may be noticed that the fact of the     
unformed character of the infant does   
not prove that the tendencies which make
 their appearance in later life are     
wholly the result of the environment4   
,it has been remarked by biologists and 
pathologists that inherited             
characteristics tend to appear at an age
 corresponding to that at which they    
appeared in the progenitor4 ,the        
caterpillar does not undergo            
metamorphosis with a less regularity    
because it is not1 in the beginning1 a  
butterfly1 and the beard does not the   
less appear in the adult human male     
because he was not born bearded4        
,diseases of the brain often develop1   

for several generations1 at nearly the  
same age1 and there seems to be no      
reason why we should not suppose the    
like to be true in the case of many     
normal characteristics4 ,ribot cites    
from ,voltaire the following case3 ',i  
have with my own eyes1' he writes1 'seen
 a suicide that is worthy of the        
attention of physicians4 ,a thoughtful  
professional man1 of mature age1 of     
regular habits1 having no strong        
passions1 and beyond the reach of want1 
committed suicide on the #agth of       
,october1 #agfi1 leaving behind him1    
addressed to the council of his native  
city1 an apology for his voluntary      
death1 which it was not thought         
advisable to publish1 lest men should be
 encouraged to quit a life whereof so   
much evil is spoken4 ,so far there is   
nothing extraordinary1 since instances  
of this kind are everywhere to be found2
 but here is the astonishing feature of 
the case3 his father and his brother had
 committed suicide at the same age as   

himself4 ,what hidden disposition of    
mind1 what sympathy1 what concurrence of
 physical laws1 caused this father and  
his two sons to perish by their own hand
 and by the same form of death1 just    
when they had acquired the same year of 
their age8'#aee ,ribot continues3--     
,since ,voltaire's day1 the history of  
mental disease has registered a great   
number of similar facts4 ,they abound in
 ,gall1 ,esquirol1 ,moreau of ,tours1   
and in all the writers on insanity4     
,esquirol knew a family in which the    
grandmother1 mother1 daughter1 and      
grandson1 committed suicide4 ',a father 
of taciturn disposition1' says ,falret1 
'had five sons4 ,the eldest1 at the age 
of forty1 threw himself out of a        
third-story window2 the second strangled
 himself at the age of thirty-five2 the 
third threw himself out of a window2 the
 fourth shot himself2 a cousin of theirs
 drowned himself for a trifling cause4  
,in the ,oroten family1 the oldest in   
,teneriffe1 two sisters were affected   

with suicidal mania1 and their brother1 
grandfather1 and two uncles1 put an end 
to their own lives4'444 ,the point which
 excited ,voltaire's surprise1 viz4 the 
heredity of suicide at a definite age1  
has been often noticed3 ',m4 ,l----1 a  
monomaniac1' says ,moreau of ,tours1    
'put an end to his life at the age of   
thirty4 ,his son had hardly attained the
 same age when he was attacked with the 
same monomania1 and made two attempts at
 suicide4 ,another man1 in the prime of 
life1 fell into a melancholy state and  
drowned himself2 his son1 of good       
constitution1 wealthy1 and the father of
 two gifted children1 drowned himself at
 the same age4 ,a wine-taster who had   
made a mistake as to the quality of a   
wine threw himself into the water in a  
fit of desperation4 ,he was rescued1 but
 afterwards accomplished his purpose4   
,the physician who had attended him     
ascertained that this man's father and  
one of his brothers had committed       
suicide at the same age and in the same 

way4'444  ,a woman named ,olhaven fell  
ill of a serious disorder1 which obliged
 her to wean her daughter1 six weeks    
old4 ,this complaint of the mother began
 by an irresistible desire to kill her  
child4 ,this purpose was discovered in  
season to prevent it4 ,she was next     
seized with a violent fever which       
utterly blotted the fact from her       
memory1 and she afterwards proved a most
 devoted mother to her daughter4 ,this  
daughter1 become a mother in her turn1  
took two children to nurse4 ,for some   
days she had suffered from fatigue and  
from 'movements in the stomach1' when   
one evening as she was in her room with 
the infants1 one of them on her lap1 she
 was suddenly seized by a strong desire 
to cut its throat4 ,alarmed by the      
horrible temptation1 she ran from the   
spot with the knife in her hand1 and    
sought in singing1 dancing1 and sleep1 a
 refuge from the thoughts that haunted  
her4 ,hardly had she fallen asleep when 
she started up1 her mind filled with the

 same idea1 which now was irresistible4 
,she was1 however1 controlled1 and in a 
measure calmed4 ,the homicidal delirium 
recurred1 and finally gave way1 only    
after many remedies had been employed4  
,these are only a few out of the many   
instances that might be given of        
recurrence1 at the same age or under the
 stimulation of similar conditions1 of  
so-called pathological states4 ,science 
has hitherto given more study to such   
cases than to the inheritance of        
healthful conditions1 though the line   
between healthful mental conditions and 
mental disease is very difficult to     
draw1 and the assumption that all       
suicides are more insane than many of   
the people who are regarded as sane is  
unwarranted2 of course if one starts    
with the premise that suicide is always 
a symptom of insanity1 then the         
conclusion follows naturally that all   
suicides are insane2 but this is a mere 
argument in a circle4 ,as far as the    
inheritance of healthy or normal mental 

characteristics is concerned1 we do know
 at least1 from general observation1    
that a child often exhibits1 as it      
develops1 more and more rather than less
 and less the characteristics of some   
progenitor2 and this1 moreover1 in many 
cases where the possibility of imitation
 is excluded4 ,observations might       
possibly be made here in a line with    
former reflections on man's adaptability
 and ,haeckel's theory of the prenatal  
existence of the individual as repeating
 the history of his species4 ,in the    
case of postnatal as well as in that of 
prenatal existence1 the action of the   
environment can no more be left out of  
account than can that of heredity2 and  
the influence of favorable or of        
unfavorable conditions at corresponding 
periods of development may explain the  
exaggerated growth or1 on the other     
hand1 the dwarfed character or          
non-appearance of tendencies associated 
in their development with these periods4
 ,but at present such observations can  

be little more than speculation4 ,we may
 at least say1 however1 that ,mr4       
,leslie ,stephen's statement of the     
case1 namely1 that children start with  
infinitely varying capacities but that  
the environment of civilization is that 
which finally makes them what they      
become morally and mentally1 should     
rather be reversed2 for it is rather    
true that children are born into the    
world on about the same level mentally  
and morally 7for we observe but little  
difference in the faculties of new-born 
babes71 but that they by no means react1
 in development1 upon the same or a     
similar environment in a similar manner4
 ,the case of the ,athenian baby1 whose 
probable equality with the modern infant
 is used by ,mr4 ,stephen as an argument
 that the human race has made no        
progress as far as innate qualities are 
concerned1 would therefore scarcely be a
 case in point1 even if it were capable 
of proof1--as it is not4 ,but it cannot 
be called a case in point in any sense1 

the ,english baby with which ,mr4       
,stephen compares the ,athenian infant  
not being of ,athenian descent4 ,any    
comparison of this sort1 to be of worth 
in the discussion of the element of     
heredity in human progress1 must be     
between the baby of the primitive savage
 ,briton and the modern ,british infant4
 ,the ,athenians arrived at a high      
degree of social development2 but the   
very fact that neither their            
civilization nor even that of ,rome was 
acquired by the less civilized races who
 were their conquerors is rather        
testimony in favor of the theory of the 
hereditary1 organic character of the    
habits and capacities acquired in the   
course of civilization4 ,nor have the   
,athenians transmitted their type       
unmixed2 there is no pure ,athenian or  
,greek race at the present day with     
which we could compare the ancient      
,greeks1 even if we desired to affirm so
 great an independence of circumstances 
as would assure to such a race the      

unimpaired faculties of their ancestors 
in spite of all the changes in their    
environment which history records4 ,not 
only the environment was changed and    
mixed2 the stock1 also1 of that race    
which once regarded all strangers as    
barbarians became equally impure4 ,and  
assuredly the comparison of the average 
child of to-day with an ,archimedes or a
 ,themistocles is anything but a fair   
one4#aef ,taken with the qualification  
of the predicate which ,mr4 ,stephen    
cautiously introduces in asserting that 
the innate qualities of the average     
modern child are not radically superior 
to those of the greatest ancients1 it   
leads us to suspect that ,mr4 ,stephen  
is not1 himself1 very thoroughly        
convinced of what he attempts to prove4 
,we may agree with ,mr4 ,stephen that   
,if ,homer or ,plato had been born      
amongst the ,hottentots1 they could no  
more have composed the ',iliad' or the  
',dialogues' than ,beethoven could have 
composed his music1 however fine his ear

 or delicate his organization1 in the   
days when the only musical instrument   
was the tom-tom#aeg2 for certainly no   
one can reach the same heights under an 
unfavorable environment that he might   
have attained under a favorable one2 and
 that ,homer could have expressed1 in   
the ruder poetry which he might still   
have composed among ,hottentots1 the    
sentiments of the ,iliad1 or ,beethoven 
have produced his sonatas with the      
assistance of the tom-tom 7provided that
 remained the only instrument after the 
appearance of an individual of such     
musical capacity as a ,beethoven71      
cannot be conceived4 ,but it is also    
inconceivable that a ,beethoven1 a      
,homer1 or a ,plato1 could be born among
 the ,hottentots1 if to be born among   
them means to be born of their stock4   
,in order to make any direct comparison 
between the capacities of the           
descendants of civilized parents and    
those of uncivilized progenitors1 we    
ought to be able to compare average     

results obtained in savage infants      
removed1 in earliest infancy1 to the    
advantages of civilization1 with the    
average mental and moral acquirements of
 individuals born under those           
influences4 ,we need to compare         
averages1 ,i say1 and not one or two    
individual cases alone2 for1 in order to
 assert the organic and hereditary      
character of human progress up to and   
under civilization1 we are by no means  
compelled to prove a like advance in all
 parts of a nation or people1 or even   
advance at all in every part4 ,it is    
conceivable1 and wholly in accordance   
with the general course of evolution1   
that types should remain stationary     
while other types are advancing1 that   
lower types should continue to exist    
side by side with higher ones that have 
developed out of them1 and even that1 in
 some lines of descent1 retrogression   
should take place while the species or a
 society as a whole is progressing4 ,but
 our data for comparison of averages are

 not1 by any means1 as satisfactory as  
could be wished2 for nowhere are the    
direct descendants of uncivilized races 
given equal advantages with those of the
 descendants of peoples already         
civilized4 ,galton's comparison of the  
negro with the white man is1 for this   
reason1 too extreme in its conclusions  
as to the hereditary character of       
intellect4 ,yet some general facts may  
be noted4 ,and perhaps no better field  
for comparison is afforded us than the  
,united ,states1 where the white        
population is not the mere offshoot and 
tributary of a nation the great majority
 of whose better representatives inhabit
 a distant land1 but an independent and 
successful nation1 and where the negro  
race1 while yet untutored1 was suddenly 
endowed with a liberty nominally as     
great as that of the white man1 together
 with a part in the government and a    
right to state education4 ,this liberty 
may be1 indeed is1 in many parts of the 
,south1 a mere pretence1 though even    

there toleration is gradually being     
acquired2 but in the ,north the negro is
 treated on very nearly the same footing
 with the white man1 the indignities    
offered him having their origin1 for the
 most part1 with former slave-holders1  
not with the born and bred ,northerner4 
,negro children have free access to the 
northern schools1 where they may often  
be seen sitting side by side with white 
children2 and the best of ,american     
universities are open to negro students4
 ,if1 then1 the average of opinion1 even
 in the ,north1 maintains a certain     
amount of condescension towards the     
,african1 this condescension is no      
greater in degree than that maintained  
by the aristocracy of ,europe towards   
the so-called lower 7not the lowest7    
classes1 and in spite of which many have
 risen to prominence from those classes4
 ,indeed1 the measure of condescension  
is rather less than the average         
manifested by master to underling in    
many ,european countries not so         

democratic as ,england2 it would compare
 favorably with the attitude of the     
petty ,german officials to the ordinary 
citizen of the less well-to-do classes4 
,it may mean discouragement1 but there  
is no reason why it should1 in all      
cases1 mean failure4 ,yet1 as a fact1   
very few of pure negro blood have risen 
to any prominence whatever1 and the     
average of intelligence appears         
comparatively low2 the large majority of
 those who have risen to eminence have  
had some admixture of the blood of the  
white race4 ,the ,american ,indian      
appears to be more capable of           
cultivation2 but he has enjoyed fewer   
advantages than the negro4 ,the ,indian 
children at the schools provided for    
them do not1 however1 appear to exhibit 
the degree of intelligence possessed by 
white children4 ,on the other hand1 the 
mixture of white and ,indian blood seems
 to produce1 sometimes1 rather more than
 the average of intelligence4 ,the      
writer is acquainted with two cases of  

this kind4 ,the first was that of the   
daughter of an ignorant ,indian father1 
who lived entirely by hunting and       
fishing1 and of an almost as ignorant   
white mother4 ,the child1 who had at    
first no advantages save those afforded 
by a primitive district school1         
nevertheless early developed an         
insatiable love of study1 gained access 
to a higher school1 and finally to what 
was1 in her time1 the highest school for
 women in the country4 ,here she did    
housework1 during a course of four      
years1 in order partly to pay her       
expenses1 supplying the remaining sum   
for tuition afterwards out of her       
earnings as a teacher4 ,by clothing     
herself1 summer and winter1 in cheap    
prints1 she also saved enough to buy the
 time of a sister who had been bound    
out1 assisted in the education of the   
rest of the family1 and taught a school 
whose excellence is remembered and      
praised to this day4 ,but the ,indian is
 commonly supposed to be of higher stock

 than the ,african negro2 he certainly  
exhibits1 even in his uncivilized state1
 a cunning1 a courage1 and a            
persistence1 of a higher type than that 
of the ,african2 and the superiority of 
a mixture between this alert type and   
the intelligence of the white man is    
thus explained4 ,i repeat1 though the   
subtle results of many minute           
accumulating influences of individual   
environment must undoubtedly be taken   
into consideration in our judgment of   
different races1 the difference of      
opportunity does not seem to account    
fully for the great difference of       
attainment4  ,it must be noticed1 too1  
that1 in comparing the negro with the   
white man in the ,united ,states1 we    
have not compared a wholly savage people
 with a civilized one2 for the negro has
 been1 for several generations1 in      
contact with civilization1 and must have
 gained something from this contact4 ,it
 is to be greatly doubted whether the   
infants of those ,siberians of whose    

pleasure in the suffering of other      
beings an instance was given above      
would1 even under the best of           
influences1 develop into individuals of 
much real benevolence4 ,the average     
child of civilized society is somewhat  
callous to the sufferings of animals1   
partly because he does not realize the  
reality of those sufferings2 yet ,i have
 seen lost kittens tenderly cared for by
 ragged little street urchins2 and ,i   
have more than once heard small boys1   
playing in the gutter1 exclaim at the   
beating of a donkey or a horse4 ,the    
child repeats1 perhaps1 to some extent1 
the history of his race's origin in     
savagery4 ,yet it is to be seriously    
doubted whether the children of the     
savages described as delighting in      
cutting their meat from living animals  
would attain1 even under the most       
careful training1 the average           
spontaneous humanity of the lad of      
civilized progenitors1 or would ever    
become truly humane men and women4 ,it  

is conceivable that superior mental and 
moral capacity may remain comparatively 
undeveloped1 proper environment lacking1
 but we begin to see the fallacy of     
concluding1 from such cases1 the        
non-hereditary character of capacity    
when we suppose such cases as those     
above1 of the rearing of savage infants 
under civilization4 ,it must be added of
 the very isolated cases--of which much 
is often made--in which the children of 
civilized parents have been stolen by   
savages1 at an early age1 7#a7 that it  
is not1 and cannot be1 maintained that  
all the descendants of civilized        
progenitors are endowed with superior   
mental and moral tendency2 and 7#b7 that
 such instances are too few in number to
 furnish1 alone1 the basis of any       
theory4 ,the evidence furnished us by   
the general results of neglect in the   
midst of civilization is more to the    
point2 but1 even in these cases1 it must
 be shown that the children came of good
 parentage in order that the evidence   

may be admitted as telling against the  
theory of heredity4 ,every breeder of   
animals counts with the greatest        
confidence upon the action of the laws  
of heredity2 and no reason can be given 
why these laws should not work in the   
case of man1 why he should be the one   
species exempt from them4 ,it is        
impossible to cross the dog with the    
wolf without perceiving the result of   
the crossing1 in the mental as well as  
the physical characteristics of the     
offspring2 and the dog does not differ  
more from the wolf than does civilized  
man1 in the most advanced nations1 from 
the savage4 ,even his physical          
characteristics1 the contour of the head
 and face especially1 the form of the   
features as well as the expression1 are 
different and imply a higher type4      
,and1 in discussing lower types in the  
midst of civilization1 we cannot do     
better than give some consideration to  
,dugdale's remarkable book on the       
,jukes1 which has already been          

mentioned4 ,in this book is traced the  
history of five hundred and forty       
persons belonging to seven generations  
of descendants of five sisters1 there   
being much intermarrying among them4    
,out of two hundred and fifty-two ,juke 
women1 whose history is traced1         
thirty-three were illegitimate1 eighteen
 were mothers of bastards before        
marriage1 twelve the mothers of bastards
 after marriage1 fifty-three were       
prostitutes 7the cases of eight being   
unascertained71 thirteen were barren1   
eleven kept brothels1 thirty-seven had  
syphilis1 forty-five received1 at some  
time1 outdoor relief1 the total number  
of years amounting to two hundred and   
forty-two1 twenty-four received         
almshouse relief1 the time reaching a   
total of thirty-five years1 and sixteen 
were committed for crimes for a total of
 one and three-fourths years1 the number
 of offences being twenty-four4 ,out of 
two hundred and twenty-five ,juke men1  
forty-nine were illegitimate1 twenty    

were prostitutes1 one kept a brothel1   
fourteen were afflicted with syphilis1  
fifty received outdoor relief1 the time 
being1 in total1 two hundred and seventy
 years1 twenty-nine were in the         
almshouse for a total of forty-six      
years1 and thirty-three were committed  
for crime for a total of eighty-nine and
 a half years1 the number of offences   
being fifty-nine4 ,the lines with which 
the ,jukes cohabited or intermarried    
were naturally of a low moral type1 but 
they do not show nearly as high a       
percentage of crime and pauperism2 thus 
among the marriageable women of the     
,jukes1 we find the percentage of       
harlotry to be #eb4dj1 among those of   
the intermarrying or cohabiting lines   
only #da4gf4 ,of the stock of ,ada      
,juke1 known to the police as ,margaret1
 the mother of criminals1 nine offenders
 were sent to prison for a total of     
sixty years1 their crimes constituting  
fifty-four per cent of all the crimes   
against property recorded of the ,jukes1

 and including burglary1 grand larceny1 
and highway robbery2 besides one murder 
and three attempts at rape4 ,dugdale    
thus describes his first acquaintance   
with the ,jukes4 ,in ,july1 #ahgd1 the  
,new ,york ,prison ,association having  
deputed me to visit thirteen of the     
county jails of this state and report   
thereupon1 ,i made a tour of inspection 
in pursuance of that appointment4 ,no   
specially striking cases of criminal    
careers1 traceable through several      
generations1 presented themselves till  
---- ,county was reached4 ,here1        
however1 were found six persons1 under  
four family names1 who turned out to be 
blood relations in some degree4 ,the    
oldest1 a man of forty-five1 was waiting
 trial for receiving stolen goods2 his  
daughter1 aged eighteen1 held as witness
 against him2 her uncle1 aged forty-two1
 burglary in the first degree2 the      
illegitimate daughter of the latter's   
wife1 aged twelve years1 upon which     
child the latter had attempted rape1 to 

be sent to the reformatory for vagrancy2
 and two brothers in another branch of  
the family1 aged respectively nineteen  
and fourteen1 accused of an assault with
 intent to kill1 they having maliciously
 pushed a child over a high cliff and   
nearly killed him4 ,upon trial1 the     
oldest was acquitted1 though the goods  
stolen were found in his house1 his     
previous good character saving him2 the 
guilt belonged to his brother-in-law1   
the man aged forty-two above-mentioned1 
who was living in the house4 ,this      
brother-in-law is an illegitimate child1
 an habitual criminal1 and the son of an
 unpunished and cautious thief4 ,he had 
two brothers and one sister1 all of whom
 are thieves1 the sister being the      
contriver of crime1 they its executors4 
,the daughter of this woman1 the girl   
aged eighteen above-mentioned1          
testified1 at the trial which resulted  
in convicting her uncle and procuring   
his sentence for twenty years to state  
prison1 that she was forced to join him 

in his last foray1 that he had loaded   
her with the booty and beat her on the  
journey home1 over two miles1 because   
she lagged under the load4 ,when this   
girl was released1 her family in jail1  
and thus left without a home1 she was   
forced to make her lodging in a brothel 
on the outskirts of the city4 ,next     
morning she applied to the judge to be  
recommitted to prison 'for protection'  
against certain specified carnal        
outrages required of her and submitted  
to4 ,she has since been sent to the     
house of refuge4 ,of the two boys1 one  
was discharged by the grand jury2 the   
other was tried and received five years'
 imprisonment in ,sing ,sing4  ,these   
six persons belonged to a long lineage1 
reaching back to the early colonists1   
and had intermarried so slightly with   
the emigrant population of the ,old     
,world that they may be called a        
strictly ,american family4 ,they had    
lived in the same locality for          
generations1 and were so despised by the

 respectable community that their family
 name had come to be used generically as
 a term of reproach4  ,that this was    
deserved became manifest on slight      
inquiry4 ,it was found that out of      
twenty-nine males1 in ages ranging from 
fifteen to seventy-five1 the immediate  
blood-relations of these six persons1   
seventeen of them were criminals1 or    
fifty-eight per cent2 while fifteen were
 convicted of some degree of offence1   
and received seventy-one years of       
sentence4444 ,the crimes and            
misdemeanors they committed were assault
 and battery1 assault with intent to    
kill1 murder1 attempt at rape1 petit    
larceny1 grand larceny1 burglary1       
forgery1 cruelty to animals4  ,but this 
book of ,dugdale's1 which traces so     
clearly and thoroughly long lines of    
criminal descent1 makes manifest1 also1 
the influence of environment4 ,we find1 
for instance1 in the line of the        
illegitimate posterity of ,ada ,juke1   
generation five1 the case of a male     

descendant1 who was sentenced to ,sing  
,sing for three years at the age of     
twenty-two1 but who1 leaving prison at  
the expiration of his sentence1         
abandoned crime and settled down to     
steady employment4 ,a second case is    
that of another male descendant of ,ada1
 who assisted his brother in burglary at
 the age of twelve1 and served probably 
some thirteen or fourteen years in      
prison1 but later reformed and took to  
stone-quarrying1 having learned1 says   
,dugdale1 industrious habits in prison4 
,a brother of this man1 who had also    
served sentences in jail for assault and
 battery1 and a term of two years at    
,sing ,sing for burglary 7the term      
beginning at the age of twenty-two71    
moved at the age of thirty-one into the 
same county as his brother1 and went    
into the business of quarrying4 ,a      
female descendant in the illegitimate   
line of ,ada1 generation five1 who seems
 to have followed a dissolute life up to
 the age of fifteen1 at this point      

married a ,german1 a steady1            
industrious1 plodding man1 and settled  
down into a reputable woman4 ,in the    
legitimate line of ,ada1 again1         
generation five1 we find the case of a  
girl said to have been born in the      
poorhouse1 who was adopted out from     
there into a wealthy family1 and is     
doing well4 ,in all these cases1 the    
reform was the result of contact1 during
 the earlier period of life1 with new   
elements inducing industry and sobriety4
 ,such cases might lead us to doubt the 
conclusions we should otherwise feel    
justified in drawing with regard to the 
action of heredity1 and must certainly  
render us cautious not to impute the    
whole character of the individual to    
heredity alone4 ,but the complicated    
nature of all social relations should   
restrain us from laying all stress upon 
any one element in those relations1 in  
any case4 ,here1 again1 we recur to the 
conception of conditions and results in 
distinction from that of cause and      

effect4 ,if statistics such as these of 
the ,jukes included minute and careful  
statements as to mental and physical    
characteristics and resemblances1 they  
would undeniably be much more reliable  
basis for conclusions as to the         
hereditary nature of character4         
,nevertheless1 incomplete though this   
evidence be1 it is by no means such that
 it can be logically disregarded4 ,it is
 to be said of such cases of reform and 
respectability as those noticed under   
favorable influences 7#a7 that we are   
not informed as to its exact extent and 
motive and have no means of knowing what
 these were2 7#b7 that1 if reversion to 
ancestral types is possible in the sense
 of deterioration1 there is no reason   
why it should not be possible in the    
opposite sense also1--no reason why     
better characters should not1 through1  
perhaps1 some favorable prenatal        
influence at exactly the right period of
 development1 occasionally crop out in a
 line of general baseness2#aeh and 7#c7 

that the admixture of a strain of       
somewhat better blood may produce1 or   
some especial crossing be favorable to1 
the development of higher character in a
 part1 though not necessarily all1 of   
the offspring4 ,when the domestic pig   
and the wild boar or the wolf and the   
dog are crossed1 says ,ribot1#aei some  
of the progeny inherit the savage1 and  
others the domestic instincts4 ,similar 
facts have been observed by ,girou in   
the crossing of different races of dogs 
and cats4 ,we know quite well that the  
same law governs the transmission of    
character in human beings4 ,in a family 
of children1 some will inherit the      
characteristics of the father1 some     
those of the mother4 ,mr4 ,jenkins of   
the ,bureau of ,police of ,brooklyn1    
,n4,y41 related to me a case that had   
come under his notice4 ,of a family     
consisting of father1 mother1 two sons1 
and a daughter1 the mother was a        
hard-working1 honest washerwoman1 while 
the father was depraved in his          

tendencies2 and of the three children   
the daughter resembled the mother in    
character1 the sons1 on the other hand1 
their father4 ,one of the sons was      
sentenced to prison for a bad case of   
burglary1 and was shot while attempting 
to escape2 and on the same day on which 
his picture was removed from the rogues'
 gallery1 his brother's was hung in its 
place1 the latter having1 with calm     
deliberation and preparation1 murdered a
 girl with whom he had some relation4 ,a
 similar case is recorded by ,gall1     
where the mother represented the good1  
the father the evil stock1 and of five  
children three were condemned to severe 
penalties for thieving1 the other two   
lived correct lives4 ,it is to be       
noticed that1 of the three cases of     
better character among the ,jukes cited 
above1 the two reformed characters were 
brothers4 ,it is by no means proved by  
these cases that all or a majority of   
the ,jukes were capable1 even under the 
best of influences1 of a like betterment

 of character4 ,on the contrary3 the    
general characteristics of extreme      
licentiousness attaching to the whole   
family1 on which ,dugdale lays special  
stress1--a licentiousness extending even
 to cohabitation and marriage with the  
negroes at a time when the latter were  
yet in slavery and regarded as little   
more than animals1--as well as the      
exceeding viciousness and inhumanity    
exhibited in some of the crimes 7witness
 the attempted rape on the niece of     
twelve and the pushing of the child over
 the cliff71 show a tendency of         
character much below the average4 ,nor  
was the prison discipline which         
accomplished the reform of the two      
brothers the only opportunity of steady 
industry1 or the prison the only        
reformatory environment afforded4       
,dugdale mentions an extensive employer 
of labor1 located near the original     
settlement of the ,jukes1 who employs   
several members of it1 treating them    
with firmness and unvaryingly scrupulous

 fairness1 interposing his authority and
 checking them in incipient crime4 ,he  
acts as their banker and1 as school     
trustee1 arranges1 where widows depend  
upon their boys for support1 that they  
shall work for him and go to school     
alternate weeks4 ,if1 indeed1 the family
 is located1 as it seems to be1 in the  
rather sparsely settled districts of    
northern ,new ,york1 it is scarcely     
likely to suffer great isolation1 as it 
might in the midst of a city1 or to be  
excluded from means of honest           
livelihood4 ,dugdale mentions1 indeed1  
that this employer has not taken up this
 work as a 'mission1' but strictly as a 
business man1 who1 finding himself      
placed where he must employ the rude    
laborers of his locality1 deals with    
them on the sound and healthy basis of  
commercial contract1 honestly carried   
out and rigidly enforced4               
,unfortunately1 ,dugdale does not       
furnish us with any exact information as
 to the result of this very humane      

course of treatment4 ,we can only revert
 to his remark that1 though the ,jukes  
had lived in this neighborhood for      
generations where work was evidently not
 lacking nor kind and judicious         
treatment absent1 their name was used   
generically1 by the reputable community1
 as a term of reproach4  ,we have       
already noticed some inconsistencies in 
,stephen's theory of human progress as  
merely that of an accumulation of       
knowledge4 ,but he practically          
contradicts1 elsewhere in his work1 this
 view of advancement4 ,on page #bja of  
the ,science of ,ethics1 he says        
distinctly3 ,as men become more         
intellectual1 sympathetic1 and so forth1
 they gain fresh sensibilities1 which   
are not simple judgments of consequences
 hitherto improved1 but as direct1      
imperative1 and substantial as any of   
the primitive sensibilities4 ,even if   
this statement were meant to apply to   
the individual alone1 a great difficulty
 must lie in the way of any theory that 

sensibilities so inherent1 sensibilities
 as direct1 imperative1 and substantial 
as any of the primitive sensibilities1  
will not affect the character of        
descendants through inheritance1 in the 
same manner as these primitive          
sensibilities are acknowledged to affect
 it4 ,but elsewhere ,stephen remarks3   
,an instinct grows and decays not on    
account of its effects on the           
individual1 but on account of its       
effects upon the race4 ,the animal      
which1 on the whole1 is better adapted  
for continuing its species1 will have an
 advantage in the struggle1 even though 
it may not be so well adapted for       
pursuing its own happiness4 ,he is      
careful to use the word happiness here1 
but the division under which the        
sentence appears is headed1 ,social and 
,individual ,utility1 and he distinctly 
states1 on the preceding page1 that the 
social instincts may be a disadvantage  
to the individual in the struggle for   
existence4 ,he writes1 in this          

connection3 ,the process by which the   
correlation of pernicious and painful   
states is worked out is one which1 by   
its very nature1 must take a number of  
generations4 ,races survive in virtue of
 the completeness of this               
correlation4#afj ,this is ,darwinism    
applied to humanity2 and1 surely1 since 
the human race has existed in the social
 state for very many generations1 we    
must suppose1 according to the theory   
thus stated1 continuous organic advance1
 even if we did not consider the passage
 in connection with the assertion of the
 gain1 with increasing intelligence and 
sympathy1 of sensibilities as direct1   
imperative1 and substantial as any      
primitive ones4 ,again ,mr4 ,stephen    
writes3 ,it is true1 generally1 that    
each man has certain capacities for     
moral as for every other kind of        
development1 and capacities which vary  
from the top to the bottom of the scale4
 ,no process of education or discipline 
whatever would convert a ,judas         

,iscariot into a ,paul or ,john4#afa    
,then education1 the environment of     
civilization1 is not the only factor in 
the production of character4 ,nor is it1
 according to ,mr4 ,stephen's own words1
 the only important factor4 ,if         
capacities vary from the top to the     
bottom of the scale1 then surely this   
variation cannot be an unimportant      
element of development4 ,as a matter of 
fact1 ,mr4 ,stephen himself lays        
especial stress upon inherited          
characteristic as the basis of          
character4 ,he says1 for example3 ,the  
character is determined for each        
individual by its original constitution1
 though the character is modified as the
 reason acts4444 ,but1 after all1 we    
start with a certain balance of feeling1
 with certain fixed relations between   
our various instincts2 and1 however     
these may change afterwards1 our        
character is so far determined from the 
start4 ,again1 it is plain that this    
varies greatly with different peoples   

and gives rise to different types4#afb  
,surely the formation of types at least 
cannot be a matter of the individual    
alone4 ,furthermore1 ,mr4 ,stephen      
distinctly asserts a growth of          
intelligence in the savage--which we    
cannot suppose to stop short with the   
beginning of civilization--while he     
especially emphasizes the fact that the 
emotions develop concomitantly with the 
intellect4 ,he says also3 ,we assume an 
organic change to occur--no matter      
how--in certain individuals of a        
species1 and that change to be inherited
 by their descendants2 and thus two     
competing varieties to arise1 one of    
which may be supplanted by the other1 or
 each of which may supplant the other in
 a certain part of the common domain4   
,some such process is clearly occurring 
in the case of human variations4        
,everywhere we see a competition between
 different races1 and the more savage   
vanishing under the approach of the more
 civilized4 ,certain races seem to      

possess enormous expansive powers1      
whilst others remain limited within     
fixed regions or are slowly passing out 
of existence4 ,so far as human          
development supposes an organic change  
in the individual 81 we may suppose that
 this process is actually going on and  
that1 for example1 the white man may be 
slowly pushing savage races out of      
existence4 ,i do not ask whether this is
 the fact1 because for my purpose it is 
irrelevant4 ,we are considering the     
changes which take place without such   
organic development1 not as denying the 
existence of organic developments1 but  
simply because they are so slow and     
their influence so gradual that they do 
not come within our sphere4 ,they       
belong1 as astronomers say1 to the      
secular1 not to the periodic changes4   
,confining ourselves1 therefore1 to the 
changes which are1 in my phrase1        
products of the 'social factor1' and    
which assume the constancy of the       
individual organism1#afc etc4 ,the      

passage is of importance as             
acknowledging the reality of organic    
progress2 but it is full of the         
self-contradictions which we have       
already noticed4 ,it starts with the    
,darwinian assumption that organic      
change occurring in individuals is      
directly inheritable by their           
descendants2 this assumption1 having    
done its office1 however1 is discarded1 
and we are told that any organic change 
cannot be that of individuals but must  
be that of societies1 or at least that  
it must be of such sort that we have not
 only no need to consider it with regard
 to the individual life1 but even no    
need to consider it in the study of the 
whole development of a society under    
civilization1 or rather that we have no 
need to study it at all as soon as we   
have the social medium to fall back upon
 for an explanation of progress2 and    
finally1 in direct contradiction to the 
assumption first made1 a constancy of   
the individual organism is asserted4    

,this assertion is also in direct       
contradiction to the assertion before   
noticed that character is determined by 
original constitution and that original 
capacity differs infinitely#afd in      
different individuals4 ,we are indebted 
to ,mr4 ,stephen for a very minute      
analysis of the influence of even       
smallest details of circumstance upon   
character2 surely1 while we are thus    
emphasizing the delicacy of nervous     
organization that answers1 with the     
sensibility of a gold-leaf electroscope1
 to the slightest variations in the     
environment1 we cannot logically leave  
out of account the results of such      
variation in inheritance because these1 
too1 are minute4 ,and surely we cannot  
conceive that an organism so sensitive  
to the influence of environment is yet  
so inflexible and unalterable as far as 
the transmission of its changes to      
offspring is concerned4 ,on any sound   
physiological theory1 we cannot avoid   
supposing that all these minute changes 

in character which ,stephen refers to   
the action of the social environment are
 accompanied by exact physiological     
equivalents4 ,then either these changes 
of organization are not inheritable1--in
 which case the organism does not       
propagate itself but something different
 from itself1 and we have no alternative
 but to resort to some such theory as   
that of ,weismann1--or else these       
changes are inheritable 7subject1 of    
course1 to all the variations which     
individual circumstances of development 
must induce71 in which case their       
inheritance must be of quite as much    
importance as their origin to any theory
 of social progress4 ,as we have said1  
,weismann has gradually come to admit   
some influence of the environment on the
 germ-plasm4 ,we can indeed conceive of 
the representation of all previous      
development of the species in the       
individual1 and of the determination of 
the degree of importance assumed1 in the
 organism1 by any particular acquirement

 or tendency by the coincidence of      
circumstance1 but we can scarcely       
conceive logically of a propagation of  
organization that does not represent all
 the influences which have made that    
organization what it is4 ,even from     
,stephen's standpoint1 it is difficult  
to understand how the organization of   
society1 which he admits to be no       
organization on the plane of the higher 
animal1 but of a much lower type1 can be
 of so much importance in the advance of
 mankind1 its variations the condition  
of progress1 and yet the much more      
interdependent organization of the      
animal body be supposed to remain       
constant and take no part in this       
progress4 ,it is difficult to comprehend
 how so much stress can be laid on the  
mere external influence of the units of 
society on each other1 and1 at the same 
time1 the far more intimate and direct  
influence of parents on their offspring 
can be deemed of so little importance as
 to warrant our disregarding it         

altogether4 ,it is especially difficult 
to understand how it is that heredity   
can be disregarded1 not merely in its   
influence on the individual or even on  
the generation1 but in all its manifold1
 intricate1 and prolonged workings since
 man first extended family life to      
tribal organization2 and this1 too1 in  
spite of the acknowledgment that        
progress through heredity is real if    
slow4 ,it is strange that there should  
always be a tendency to draw a distinct 
line between social man and all the rest
 of the animal kingdom1 as if1 when     
society began1 all former laws ceased   
from operation4 ,thus it is sometimes   
said that natural selection no longer   
acts on the individual because it acts  
on societies as wholes also2 as well say
 that it cannot act on inner            
organization because it acts on the     
organism as a whole4 ,as a matter of    
fact1 it affects society through        
individuals1 and the individual through1
 or rather in1 his organization4 ,if it 

is true1 as ,stephen asserts1 that      
change of social tissue is primary and  
fundamental to all external social      
change1 it is not the less true that    
change of individual organization is    
fundamental to all change of external   
action4 ,no theory of development which 
goes beyond the individual life and     
considers the progress of society as a  
whole can scientifically disregard the  
element of heredity in this progress4   
,,footnotes3  #ada ,i am indebted for   
these facts to ,dr4 ,auguste ,forel4    
#adb ,ants1 ,wasps1 and ,bees1 ,chap4   
,v4  #adc ,zur psychologischen          
,wuerdigung der darwin'schen ,theorie4  
#add ,pp4 #ada1 #adb1 translation by    
,henry ,m4 ,trollope4  #ade ,eng4 ed4   
,internat4 ,scientific ,ser41 p4 #bgf2  
quoted from ,the ,zooelogist4  #adf     
,mental ,evolution in ,animals1 p4 #cde2
 cited from an article in ,nature1      
#ahhc4  #adg ,animal ,intelligence1 p4  
#dgb4  #adh ,mind1 ,vol4 ,,viii4  #adi  
,lubbock3 ,the ,origin of ,civilisation1

 pp4 #i1 #aj4  #aej ,the ,science of    
,ethics1 pp4 #ajc1 #ajd4  #aea ,ibid4 p4
 #aji4  #aeb ,the ,science of ,ethics1  
p4 #dai4  #aec ,ibid4 p4 #ajc4  #aed    
,ribot3 ,heredity4 ,here we have        
examples which show that disease1 as    
well as healthful organization and      
function1 are subject to variation2 and 
it may occur to us to wonder that no one
 has thought of referring these         
variations to some supernatural         
interference or special inner           
spontaneity2 that theories which assume 
some transcendental agency or some      
spontaneously acting vital principle as 
the cause of normal1 healthful variation
 have yet either left the variations of 
disease out of consideration or else    
simply referred them to influence of the
 environment4 ,the reason for this1 as  
far as transcendental interference is   
concerned1 is evident2 any theory of    
teleology in such cases must point to   
malevolent not benevolent design4  #aee 
,heredity1 pp4 #abd1 #abe4 ,quoted from 

the ,dictionnaire ,philosophique1       
article ,caton4  #aef ,the ,science of  
,ethics1 pp4 #ajb1 #ajc4  #aeg ,the     
,science of ,ethics1 p4 #ajg4  #aeh ,see
 previous observations on this subject1 
p4 #djh4  #aei ,heredity1 ,engl4 trans41
 p4 #hd4  #afj ,the ,science of ,ethics1
 pp4 #ia1 #ib4  #afa ,ibid41 p4 #dcb4   
,the italics are mine4  #afb ,ibid41 pp4
 #gb1 #gc4  #afc ,p4 #aba4  #afd ,see   
above1 p4 #djj4     ,,chapter ,,vi4     
,,conscience   ,the exact circumstances 
which led1 in any particular line of    
descent1 to the final production of     
self-conscious altruism we cannot know4 
,we may1 perhaps1 as has been hinted1   
trace the whole development to the      
original union of the sexes in lower1   
asexual species1 and of mother and      
offspring2 and we may suppose the final 
self-conscious altruism to have been led
 up to gradually by habit1 in any case1 
the history of all function being       
gradual evolution4 ,thus we may suppose 
it possible that1 in some cases1 the    

care of offspring may have been preceded
 by a habit of care1 on the part of the 
female animal1 for her eggs1 which1 as  
habit1 was pleasurable1 but was         
connected with no consciousness of the  
offspring produced from the eggs until  
some new circumstance of environment    
brought them within ken4 ,of the        
development of habit in general and of  
pleasure in it1 we have plenty of       
illustrations in our own individual     
experience1 and we can even watch1 in   
our own case1 the process of the        
increase of altruism along old lines as 
well as its growth in new directions2   
and we may thus gain a conception of    
what must have been the general nature  
of its earliest development1 in any     
case4  ,in ,volume ,,iii of ,mind1 ,paul
 ,friedmann has an interesting essay on 
,the ,genesis of ,disinterested         
,benevolence1 in which he relates the   
following3 ,a man had to throw away some
 water and1 stepping out of his house1  
threw it upon a heap of rubbish1 where  

some faded plants were nearly dying4 ,at
 that moment1 he paid no attention to   
them1 took no interest in their pitiable
 state4 ,the next day1 having again some
 water to throw away1 the man stepped   
out at the same place1 when he remarked 
that the plants had raised their stems  
and regained some life4 ,he understood  
that this was the result of his act of  
the day before1 his interest was        
awakened1 and as he held a jar with     
water in his hand1 he again threw its   
contents over the plants4 ,on the       
following day the same took place2 the  
benevolent feeling1 the interest in the 
recovery and welfare of the plants      
augmented1 and the man tended the plants
 with increasing care4 ,when he found1  
one day1 that the rubbish and plants had
 been carted away1 he felt a real       
annoyance4 ,the feeling of the man was  
in this case real disinterested         
benevolence4 ,the plants were neither   
fine nor useful1 and the place where    
they stood was ugly and out of the way1 

so that the man had no advantage from   
their growth4 ,nor had the man a general
 wish to rear plants1 for there were a  
number of other plants sorely in want of
 care1 but to which the man did not     
transfer his affections4 ,he had loved  
these individual plants4 ,friedmann says
 further3 ,formerly rather hostile to   
dogs1 now that ,i have a dog myself1 ,i 
feel well inclined towards the whole    
canine species1 but most to that part of
 it which has some characteristic       
feature in common with my favorite4     
,features of the first quotation may    
remind us of some former considerations 
of ours in which attention and interest 
were found to run parallel4 ,we may take
 exception1 however1 to ,friedmann's    
definition of the extension of          
benevolent feeling from an individual of
 a class to the whole of the class or to
 beings resembling them in any way as a 
sort of logical confusion4 ,this view   
has already been criticised4 ,the adult 
being at least does not confuse         

individuals1 or even if he may          
occasionally do so1 such confusion is   
not at all the distinguishing feature of
 progress in altruism2 it is merely an  
accident1 not anything that is          
characteristic4 ,the recognition of old 
features in new objects is the opposite 
of confusion2 it would rather indicate a
 logical confusion1 a lack of           
intelligence1 if we failed to remember  
that which has formerly given us        
pleasure1 and to find1 in similar       
objects1 some renewal of that pleasure4 
,it would have been just as logical1 for
 instance1 and more truly benevolent1 if
 the man who tended the plants had cared
 also for the other plants mentioned as 
sorely in want of care1 and which he    
seems to have left to perish4  ,we may  
often notice the growth of altruistic   
from egoistic as well as of egoistic    
from altruistic motives1 in ourselves2  
for retrogression as well as progression
 in altruism is possible with the       
individual4 ,if we feel bitterly towards

 some human being1 for instance1 the    
best and surest remedy is to perform    
some act of kindness towards him4 ,we   
may contemplate and carry out the deed  
with merely a sense of gratification and
 egoistic elation at our own generosity1
 but we are more than likely to         
experience some degree of change of     
feeling before we have finished4 ,on the
 other hand1 our heart often seems to   
harden and fill with greater animosity  
towards those we have injured1 the      
longer we continue this course of       
injurious action and the more positive  
the injury inflicted4 ,a certain degree 
of generosity must1 it is true1 already 
exist in order that we may be able to   
show kindness to an enemy1 just as      
hostility must also be present in order 
that we may be able to commence a course
 of injury or unkindness2 but both      
kindly feeling and animosity increase   
constantly with their exercise4 ,we are 
never exactly the same after our deeds  
that we are before them4  ,says ,george 

,eliot3 ,it would be a poor result of   
all our anguish and our wrestling if we 
won nothing but our old selves at the   
end of it--if we could return to the    
same blind loves1 the same              
self-confident blame1 the same light    
thoughts of human suffering1 the same   
frivolous gossip over blighted human    
lives4#afe ,and again3 ,the creature we 
help to save1 though only a half-reared 
linnet1 bruised and lost by the         
wayside--how we watch and fence it1 and 
dote on its signs of recovery4#aff      
,whatever the particular circumstances  
that led1 in the particular line of     
animal descent by which the species we  
distinctively term human finally came   
into existence1 to the extension of     
temporary to life-long association1 and 
whether this life-long association began
 only with man1 or earlier with his     
ape-like progenitors1 certain it is that
 increase of numbers must finally       
condition society4 ,the internal1 like  
the external process1 is a gradual one1 

an evolution2 and we cannot1 therefore1 
suppose society as life-long association
 to have begun with the existence of no 
altruistic feeling whatever4 ,in so far1
 ,darwin's assertion that the social    
instinct led men to society contains a  
measure of truth2 but it is to be       
remembered that the social instinct at  
the beginning of social life cannot have
 been the same with the social instinct 
of present civilization1 which is the   
product of long development2 pleasure in
 function1 its ends1 and objects1       
increases concomitantly with exercise4  
,darwin's statement is1 hence1 liable to
 misconstruction4 ,there is a similar   
truth in ,rolph's criticism of          
,spencer's theory that men adopted      
social life because they found it       
advantageous1 on the ground that men    
must first have had experience of the   
advantages of association before they   
could have been aware of them4 ,but the 
experience which continually leads to a 
step in advance may not be1 at every    

point1 for every step1 the experience of
 the individual or individuals taking   
the step2 it is quite possible that some
 steps may be taken from the observance 
of the experience of others2 at least   
this is possible if we suppose any      
degree of intelligence and reason in the
 individuals taking the step4 ,the      
introduction of the idea of a           
calculation of advantages is1           
furthermore1 exceedingly useful4 ,for1  
while the social instinct1 the desire   
for and pleasure in all the various     
function connected with association with
 other beings1 may be of assistance in  
bringing about any advance in           
association1 the selfish instinct1      
already in existence before the         
evolution of any considerable degree of 
altruistic impulse1 may influence and   
induce the advance1 where the social    
instinct is not1 alone1 of sufficient   
strength4 ,at the beginning of social   
life1 as at every later point of        
advancement1 motives are mixed1 and     

selfishness may prepare the way for     
unselfishness4  ,at any point of        
evolution1 there must be1 among         
contending species or individuals1 some 
who are stronger or who have1 through   
some circumstance1 the advantage over   
the others2 given even a moderate number
 of individuals1 and it is hardly       
possible that all should be defeated and
 destroyed in any struggle1 like the    
famous cats of ,kilkenny4 ,this being   
the case1 and change of organization    
being continually conditioned by contact
 with new elements of environment1      
advancement1 evolution1 becomes a       
necessity1 no natural catastrophe       
occurring to destroy all life4 ,there is
 no mystery about evolution in this     
sense4 ,advancement in society is still 
more comprehensible to us by the fact of
 the element of reason involved in it2  
from the beginning of life-association  
among human beings or their immediate   
progenitors1 the existence of some more 
intelligent individuals than the rest1  

who will perceive the advantages of     
association1 may be assumed4 ,and thus  
at each step1 as the growing density of 
population continually renders          
increasing cooeperation increasingly    
advantageous1 we may suppose the        
vanguard to be composed of the more     
intelligent and the more social4        
,sympathy prompts not only to the       
conferring of pleasure1 it prompts also 
to the prevention of injurious conduct1 
on the part of others1 towards the being
 or beings with whom sympathy is felt4  
,a conception of the advantage of mutual
 aid may assist as a motive in this4    
,the earliest mutual aid was1 to a great
 extent1 one of cooeperation against    
enemies4 ,in one way and another1 this  
mutual defence must have extended to the
 compulsion of positive beneficial      
conduct1 on the part of others1 towards 
the being or beings with whom sympathy  
was felt4 ,such compulsion may be       
exerted by different tribes1 or by      
different members of the same tribe1 on 

each other2 the means of compulsion are 
revenges of different sorts1 benefit1   
assistance of some sort1 being1 on the  
other hand1 often the reward of ready   
compliance4 ,this compulsion may be felt
 as greater or less according to the    
degree of reluctance to perform any form
 of action required under pain of the   
penalty4 ,if the thoughts are occupied  
with the possible reward1 and not with  
the punishment1 then no outer compulsion
 is felt1 but a choice of advantage is  
made4 ,this choice again may not be     
wholly one of selfish calculation2 some 
altruistic feeling may be involved4 ,a  
form of action at first chosen with     
reluctance1 and merely because of the   
fear of punishment or revenge1 may come 
to be performed later without           
hesitation1 and more under the hope of  
reward than the fear of punishment2 and 
this same form of action may come to be 
performed finally with sympathy as the  
prominent feeling1 the hope of reward   
becoming more and more secondary4 ,each 

increase of sympathy1 again1 reacts upon
 the environment as represented by other
 individuals1 and thus the relations and
 influence of men on each other become  
more and more complicated4 ,any habit of
 cruelty or hostility which has been1 at
 former stages1 united with prosperity  
may thus become1 through the action and 
reaction of increasing altruism1 a      
disadvantage to the individual member of
 any society2 or it is also conceivable 
that a formerly advantageous egoistic   
form of action may become               
disadvantageous through the advent of   
some new influence from outside the     
particular society in which it is       
practised4 ,father ,phil1 in ,lover's   
story of ,handy ,andy1 relates an       
anecdote of an engagement in ,spain1 in 
which the dragoons of a regiment1       
retreating under hot fire1 paused at the
 crossing of a river to take up behind  
them some women of the camp-followers1  
who had difficulty in crossing1 and     
thereupon found themselves followed by  

cheers1 instead of shots1 from their    
,french foes4 ,i do not intend to       
intimate that the motive for the deed   
was self-interest2 but it is easy to    
conceive similar instances in which     
humanity might become an advantage and  
be practised at first from              
self-interest1 not by individuals merely
 but by a whole tribe2 this must be     
frequently the case when less civilized 
peoples come in contact with more       
civilized peoples4 ,and this leads us to
 remark that habits of sympathy and     
justice exercised within a people will  
be likely to manifest themselves in     
relations with other peoples also1 in   
degree as the sympathy is real and the  
benevolence inward4 ,but the attitudes  
of different peoples towards each other 
remain long hostile1 since the partial  
surrender of tribal or national         
interests necessary to compact often    
involves too great sacrifices to be     
acquiesced in at an early stage of      
development4 ,and the individual is     

necessarily influenced1 to a great      
extent1 by the feelings of those among  
whom he is born1 with regard to the     
hostile nation4 ,but this is retracing  
our analysis4  ,altruism is thus        
increased directly by the perception and
 choice of cooeperation as advantageous1
 by the spread of altruistic feeling and
 the compulsion of the social           
environment1 as well as by the higher   
means of persuasion and affection1 in   
which altruism itself affects the       
increase of altruism2 and it is also    
increased indirectly by the aid of      
natural selection between individuals1  
families1 neighborhoods1 and groups of  
all sorts1 cooeperation becoming more   
and more advantageous with the increased
 density of population4  ,it is scarcely
 necessary to remark that natural       
selection acts also with regard to the  
egoistic or personal virtues2 for these 
have regard1 primarily1 to the          
preservation of the individual in the   
best condition for labor and            

cheerfulness4 ,it is evident that in    
this direction also the moral must      
continually gain the advantage4 ,either 
the injurious is perceived and avoided1 
or the individual failing to perceive   
and avoid it suffers physical injury and
 deterioration1 and1 unless a different 
course is adopted in time1 brings at    
last destruction to himself or to his   
stock4 ,but our analysis goes further2  
for the egoistic virtues are evidently  
not purely egoistic2 and society will   
come with time to insist on this fact1  
and to render these virtues still more  
advantageous and their neglect still    
more disadvantageous2 while the growth  
of the altruistic feelings will infuse  
the individual with the desire to       
perform his duty to others in this      
respect also4 ,the purely egoistic      
character of so-called personal virtues1
 for the assertion of which so much has 
been written1 is a myth4 ,no man can    
make a sot of himself or indeed injure  
himself in any way without reducing his 

power to benefit society and harming    
those nearest to him4 ,self-preservation
 and the preservation of one's own      
health may conflict with altruistic     
virtues at times2 that is to say1       
virtues both of which are altruistic1   
though the altruistic character of one  
is more direct than the other1 may      
conflict2 in which case1 choice is      
necessary4 ,and it is strange to note1  
at this point1 that just those systems  
which lay most stress on individual     
welfare1 that is1 emphasize the fact    
that the preservation of individual     
health and the development of individual
 capacity are advantageous to society1  
are the very ones that also defend the  
freedom of the individual to practise   
so-called personal vice4 ,the two       
theories do not well accord2 surely1 if 
the individual is of so much importance 
to society1 his vice cannot be without  
injurious results to it4 ,only when     
egoistic care for health has become     
infused with the higher altruism1 does  

it become truly virtue2 then care for   
self ceases to be the mere means to     
isolated pleasure1 and becomes the means
 to the happiness of others where it was
 often1 before1 the means to their      
misery1 and even their destruction4  ,in
 the evolution of higher animal forms   
from lower1 the lower do not necessarily
 pass out of existence with the         
development of the higher2 in society1  
however1 the contact is close and       
continuous1 and the competition         
unremitting2 there is1 therefore1 some  
elimination1 though a very gradual one1 
of lower types4 ,the lower forms may    
exist for a long time beside the higher2
 in other words1 society as a whole     
progresses slowly on account of the     
immense complication of relations within
 it4 ,we find it including many grades  
of altruistic and egoistic virtue1 and  
can testify only to a progress that     
renders the extremes of vice and cruelty
 less and less the rule and more and    
more the exception4  ,and this brings us

 to the further consideration of a point
 not long ago touched upon1 namely1 the 
high degree of civilization attained by 
certain ancient peoples4 ,not the whole 
race of man1 it is evident1 advances    
together to higher grades of            
civilization1 as not all individuals or 
all lines of descent in the same society
 fall under the same influences and     
advance at a like rate4 ,at the present 
date1 the greater part of ,africa as    
well as portions of other countries are 
inhabited by rude and savage tribes1 the
 rest of the world1 not classed as      
savage1 representing very many different
 grades and phases of progress4 ,after  
the conquest of ,greece by ,rome and of 
,rome by the tribes from the ,north1 the
 higher degree of civilization of the   
conquered nations was partly lost by    
them and partly acquired by their       
conquerors2 that is1 nothing was really 
lost1 but two different forces met and  
partly neutralized each other2 the      
resultant represented1 in this case as  

in all others1 the complication1 the    
algebraic sum1 of the two4 ,in the essay
 before referred to1 ,dr4 ,petzoldt     
calls attention to the extremely unique 
character of the productions of         
,inner-,african tribes before they have 
come in contact with white men1 and     
cites ,bastian's testimony that even one
 short visit from a white man is often  
enough to destroy the peculiarity of the
 type4 ,new tendencies are introduced1  
and the stability is immediately        
diminished1 though only to progress     
gradually to a newer1 higher form4 ,the 
comparative sparsity of the human race  
in ancient times rendered it possible   
for single isolated peoples to attain to
 a high degree of culture while the     
greater part of the earth was inhabited 
by the uncivilized2 and the increase of 
the species since that time1 though     
necessitating wider contact and closer  
relations1 and so rendering the newer   
civilization necessarily a wider one1   
has yet not been sufficient to make     

isolated savagery in lands not reached  
by the spreading circle1 impossible4    
,the ancient civilization was lost1 but 
not lost in the sense that its force    
ever perished2 it found its full        
representation--but no more--in the     
result that arose from blending with a  
lower grade4 ,the same process is being 
repeated wherever civilized man1 on the 
borders of civilization1 comes in       
contact with savage or half-civilized   
man4 ,the two races may dwell side by   
side1 separated from intimate           
association1 but their contiguity is yet
 marked by a certain amount of change on
 both sides1--a change the greater the  
greater the degree of association and   
the greater the isolation of those on   
the border-lands from the rest of the   
civilized world1 and the longer this    
state of things persists4 ,we are here  
reminded particularly of ,fechner's     
formula of the process of evolution1 in 
which the concepts of isolation as      
favoring the steady advancement of the  

process on its own peculiar lines1 and  
of new contact as new disturbance from  
which issues new development1 are most  
prominent4 ,if we regard especially the 
ethical features of this contact at the 
borders1 it may be remarked both that   
savages gain gradually more humanity    
from contact with civilized nations1 and
 that white men1 on the other hand1     
lose1 in constant contact with savages1 
some of the humanity which they have    
displayed in the midst of their own     
nation4 ,they grow used to sights of    
cruelty1 much of which it is impossible 
for them to prevent2 they are roused to 
anger1 hatred1 and retaliation by acts  
of deception1 treachery1 and cruelty1   
and they find1 moreover1 that kindness  
is often mistaken for weakness by the   
bloody and revengeful people with whom  
they have to do1 who are often used to  
respect only or chiefly the brute force 
which can compel obedience4 ,i do not   
intend here to represent the white man  
as the incarnation of sympathy and      

humanity2 even in the midst of society1 
as we have already sufficiently noticed1
 his apparent altruism may be1 to a     
large degree1 the outcome of selfish    
motives1 natural tendency being         
restrained through fear of punishment or
 hope of gain of some sort4 ,there are  
grades within societies as well as      
grades represented by societies as      
wholes4 ,but several things are to be   
taken into account in the comparison of 
the white man with the savage under     
circumstances of contact4 ,in the first 
place1 we have to remember that1 while  
the white man is1 to a great extent1    
withdrawn from the control of the       
society to which he belongs1 secure from
 their judgment for the time being and  
with the prospect1 often1 of probable   
security from it for all time1 since    
reports of his actions may never reach  
the ears of more civilized societies1   
the individual savage is still          
restrained by whatever of law and moral 
sentiment exists in his own tribe2 his  

vengeance1 whatever it is1 is to a great
 extent under the control of his chiefs4
 ,again1 the power of the savage to     
inflict injury is not so great as that  
of the white man1 who has all the       
implements of advanced cooeperation at  
his disposal4 ,the mere love of power   
always presents a temptation1 and       
pleasure in demonstrating superiority is
 a common human emotion4 ,furthermore1  
it must be considered that the          
opportunities for selfishness afforded  
on the borders of civilization are      
likely to attract1 in the majority1 just
 those men whose social ties and social 
instinct are weakest1 whose greed       
perceives here the opportunity of       
unscrupulous gratification1 and is drawn
 by it4 ,and lastly1 it is to be noticed
 that not by any means all the          
individuals belonging to more advanced  
societies who come in contact with      
savages use them with inhumanity1 or    
even retaliate on treachery and injury4 
,the great differences exhibited1 under 

such circumstances1 by persons whose    
opportunities have been very similar is 
a strong argument in favor of inherent1 
innate grades of altruism1 and so of    
hereditary character4 ,the same is true 
of the fact that the ,greeks and ,romans
 did retain much of their culture even  
in contact with lower grades of         
civilization1 handing it down1 in a     
degree1 to this day2 and that their     
conquerors only in the lapse of many    
generations pulled themselves up to this
 level1 which was attained1 at last1    
rather in countries removed from direct 
contact with it and so1 we may argue1 to
 a great extent1 through their own      
natural evolution4 ,the general analysis
 of the amalgamation at the borders of  
civilization still remains true in the  
long run1 however individual savages and
 individual white men may represent     
exceptions to it4  ,mr4 ,stephen's      
analysis of the development of altruism 
from egoism1 while in the main true and 
one of the most minute analyses on this 

subject that we possess1 opens1 through 
its ambiguity of terms1 the way to      
inaccuracy of thought and to errors of  
theory into which ,i am not at all sure 
that the author does not himself fall at
 some points4 ,starting with an implied 
definition of sympathy as actual feeling
 with other sentient beings through the 
intellectual comprehension of their     
emotions1 and acknowledging that        
sympathy in this sense may not lead     
directly to altruism1 he uses the same  
word also1 later in the analysis1 in the
 higher sense1 and at some points       
appears to confound the two meanings2 so
 that1 as there is a similar ambiguity  
in the use of the word idiot1 or moral  
idiot1 in the same connection1 his      
theory seems to fall into the mistake of
 asserting the normal association of    
intellectual comprehension with         
altruism4 ,he writes3--  ,it is not more
 true that to think of a fire is to     
revive the sensations of warmth than it 
is true that to think of a man is to    

revive the emotions and thoughts which  
we attribute to him4 ,to think of him in
 any other sense is to think of the mere
 doll or statue1 the outside framework1 
not of the organized mass of            
consciousness which determines all the  
relations in which he is most deeply    
interesting to us4 ,the primary sympathy
 is1 of course1 modified in a thousand  
ways--by the ease or difficulty with    
which we can adopt his feelings2 by the 
attractiveness or repulsiveness of the  
feelings revealed2 by the degree in     
which circumstances force us into       
cooeperation or antagonism2 and by      
innumerable incidental associations     
which make it pleasant or painful to    
share his feelings4 ,if by sympathy we  
mean this power of vicarious emotion1 it
 may give rise to antipathy1 to hatred1 
rivalry1 and jealousy1 and even to the  
diabolical perversion of pleasure in    
another's pain4#afg ,the pain given by  
your pain may simply induce me to shut  
my eyes4 ,the ,pharisee who passed by on

 the other side may have disliked the   
sight of the wounded traveller as much  
as the good ,samaritan4 ,indeed1 the    
sight of suffering often directs        
irritation against the sufferer4 ,dives 
is often angry with ,lazarus for        
exposing his sores before a respectable 
mansion1 and sometimes goes so far as to
 think1 illogically perhaps1 that the   
beggar must have cultivated his misery  
in order to irritate the nerves of his  
neighbors4 ,to give the order3 ',take   
away that damned ,lazarus1' may be as   
natural an impulse as to say3 ',give him
 the means of curing his ailments4'#afh 
,to believe in the existence of a       
sentient being is to believe that it has
 feelings which may persist when ,i am  
not aware of them4 ,a real belief1      
again1 implies that1 at the moment of   
belief1 ,i have representative          
sensations or emotions corresponding to 
those which imply the actual presence of
 the object4 ,again1 a material object  
has an interest only so far as it is a  

condition of some kind of feeling1 and1 
when the sympathies are not concerned1  
of some feeling of my own1 whether      
implying or not implying any foretaste  
of the future4 ,to take any interest in 
any material object1 except in this     
relation1 is unreasonable1 as it is     
unreasonable to desire food which cannot
 nourish or fire which cannot warm4 ,i  
want something which has by hypothesis  
no relation to my wants4 ,the same is   
true of the sentient object so long1 and
 only so long1 as ,i do not take its    
sentience into account4 ,but to take the
 sentience into account is to           
sympathize1 or at least the sympathy is 
implied in the normal or only possible  
case4 ,the only condition necessary for 
the sympathy to exist and to be capable 
therefore of becoming a motive1 is that 
,i should really believe in the object1 
and have1 therefore1 representative     
feelings4 ,to believe in it is to feel  
for it1 to have sympathies which        
correspond to my representations1 less  

vivid as the object is more distant and 
further from the sphere of my possible  
influence1 but still real and therefore 
effective motives4 ,systematically to   
ignore these relations1 then1 is to act 
as if ,i were an egoist in the extremest
 sense1 and held that there was no      
consciousness in the world except my    
own4 ,but really to carry out this      
principle is to be an idiot1 for an     
essential part of the world as          
interesting to me is constituted by the 
feelings of other conscious agents1 and 
,i can only ignore their existence at   
the cost of losing all the intelligence 
which distinguishes me from the lower   
animal4#afi ,a similar use of the word  
idiot occurs in the following passage   
with regard to the relations of moral   
action to conviction3 ,it is a simple   
'objective' fact that a man acts rightly
 or wrongly in a given case1 and a fact 
which may be proved to him2 and1        
further1 though the proof will be thrown
 away if he is a moral idiot1 that is1  

entirely without the capacities upon    
which morality is founded1 the proof is 
one which must always affect his        
character if we suppose the truth to be 
assimilated1 and not the verbal formula 
to be merely learned by rote4#agj ,to   
learn really to appreciate the general  
bearings of moral conduct is to learn to
 be moral in the normally constituted   
man4 ,here the author adds1 however1    
though we must always make the condition
 that a certain aptitude of character   
exists4#aga ,again he writes3 ,but it   
remains to be admitted that there is    
apparently such a thing as pleasure in  
the pain of others--pure                
malignity--which we call 'devilish' to  
mark that it is abnormal and significant
 of a perverted nature4#agb ,and in the 
same connection--where he is1 at first1 
seemingly intent on proving only the    
normal connection of pain with the sight
 of suffering1 admitting that this      
sympathetic pain may lead to brutality  
instead of altruistic action towards the

 sufferer--he says3 ,sympathy is the    
natural and fundamental fact4 ,even the 
most brutal of mankind are generally    
sympathetic so far as to feel rather    
pain than pleasure at the sight of      
suffering4 ,the scum of a civilized     
population gathered to pick pockets on a
 race-course would be pained at the     
sight of a child in danger of being run 
over or brutally assaulted by a ruffian1
 and would be disposed to rescue it1 or 
at least to cheer a rescuer1 unless     
their spontaneous emotion were          
overpowered by some extrinsic           
sentiment4#agc ,and finally3 ,the direct
 and normal case is that in which       
sympathy leads to genuine altruism1 or  
feeling in accordance with that which it
 reflects4#agd  ,the terms in these     
passages are thus evidently very loosely
 used1 and the charge above made is1 ,i 
think1 substantiated1--that the author  
himself finally falls into the error    
following upon a confusion of the       
various meanings1 and comes to assert   

what he elsewhere distinctly denies1    
namely1 the normal connection of        
intellect and morality1 of the          
comprehension of suffering with that    
form of sympathy which issues in        
altruistic action4 ,the problem is an   
interesting one1 and it may be well for 
us to look into it a little further4    
,during the last few years a number of  
books have been written in which the    
attempt has been made to prove the      
general physical1 and especially the    
cerebral1 and so the intellectual       
inferiority of a large number of        
criminals4 ,there may be a difference of
 opinion as to the value of exact       
weights and measures except in so far as
 they demonstrate an actual nervous     
deformity of some sort2 and it may be   
said that the cases examined for        
distinctly cerebral defect are too few  
to admit of the formation of any        
universal1 definite1 theory or law4 ,but
 some degree of importance must         
assuredly be attached1 by the           

unprejudiced reader1 to the more purely 
psychological evidence obtained in many 
cases1 as well as to the evidence of the
 tendency to brain-disease often found  
in the direct line of descent4 ,indeed1 
in the case of some of the photographs  
issued with ,lombroso's ,l',homme       
,criminel1 not more than a glance is    
needed to convince one that the         
possessors of such heads and faces      
cannot be normal men and women4 ,to this
 testimony from the criminologists may  
be added that of many eminent           
specialists in mental diseases1 whose   
evidence goes to show the degeneration  
of the moral sense in cases of          
brain-disease4 ,maudesley says1 for     
instance1 of moral feeling3 ,whoever is 
destitute of it is1 to that extent1 a   
defective being2 he marks the beginning 
of race-degeneracy2 and if propitious   
influence do not chance to check or to  
neutralize the morbid tendency1 his     
children will exhibit a further degree  
of degeneracy1 and be actual morbid     

varieties4 ,whether the particular      
outcome of the morbid strain shall be   
vice1 or madness1 or crime1 will depend 
much on the circumstances of life4 ,when
 we make a scientific study of the      
fundamental meaning of those deviations 
from the sound type which issue in      
insanity and crime1 by searching inquiry
 into the laws of their genesis1 it     
appears that these forms of human       
degeneracy do not lie so far asunder as 
they are commonly supposed to do4       
,moreover1 theory is here confirmed by  
observation2 for it has been pointed out
 by those who have made criminals their 
study1 that they oftentimes spring from 
families in which insanity1 epilepsy1 or
 some allied neurosis exists1 that many 
of them are weak-minded1 epileptic1 or  
actually insane1 and that they are apt  
to die from diseases of the nervous     
system and from tubercular diseases4#age
 ,to the history proper of the ,jukes1  
,dugdale has appended a series of tables
 giving further information as to the   

stock1 environment1 and present         
condition of some two hundred and       
thirty-three criminals committed for    
various crimes1 each of which crimes    
heads a separate list4 ,these lists are 
decidedly interesting1 particularly as  
affording us some considerable          
information with regard to psychological
 characteristics and environment1 under 
the headings3 ,neglected ,children1     
,orphans1 ,habitual ,criminals1 ,first  
,offenders1 ,reformable1 ,hopeless1 etc4
 ,from the table of percentages we      
remark that1 in the ,neurotic ,stock1   
the highest percentage 7#dj4dg7 is      
reached in arson and the crimes against 
persons1 or crimes of impulse1 as       
,dugdale terms them1 while #bc4jc is the
 percentage of neurotic stock in the    
whole number of criminals examined4     
,this close relationship between nervous
 disorders and crime1 says ,dugdale1    
runs parallel with the experience of    
,england1 where 'the ratio of insane to 
sane criminals is thirty-four times as  

great as the ratio of lunatics to the   
whole population of ,england1 or1 if we 
take half the population to represent   
the adults which supply the convict     
prisons1 we shall have the criminal     
lunatics in excess in the high          
proportion of seventeen to one4'        
,dugdale further quotes from ,dr4 ,bruce
 ,thomson1 surgeon to the ,general      
,prison of ,scotland1 the following     
words3 ,on a close acquaintance with    
criminals1 of eighteen years' standing1 
,i consider that nine in ten are of     
inferior intellect1 but that all are    
excessively cunning4 ,dr4 ,thomson says 
also3 ,in all my experience1 ,i have    
never seen such an accumulation of      
morbid appearances as ,i witness in the 
post-mortem examinations of the         
prisoners who die here4 ,scarcely one of
 them can be said to die of one disease1
 for almost every organ of the body is  
more or less diseased2 and the wonder to
 me is that life could have been        
supported in such a diseased frame4     

,but with regard to this last quotation1
 it may be remarked that1 although many 
modern students of crime tend to look   
upon the general diseased condition of  
body among criminals as the cause of    
their criminality1 it is generally1 as a
 matter of fact1 a cumulative growth1   
vicious acts appearing now as condition1
 now as result1 in its increase4 ,vice  
is directly connected with disease1 and 
crime against others1 even where it does
 not itself directly involve vice1 is   
still likely to be connected with it1   
since the man who is immoral in one     
direction is not likely to be restrained
 from immorality in what is ordinarily  
considered a direction of lesser wrong2 
and the self-gratification of vice      
always presents a temptation to the man 
of coarser fibre4 ,dugdale notices that 
pauperism often appears in the younger  
members of a family where crime appears 
in the elder branches1 his explanation  
being that crime is a sign of           
comparative vigor1 pauperism of greater 

physical weakness4  ,we have found some 
connection between intellectual         
incapacity and moral lack in the shape  
of crime1 but the cases are extreme     
ones4 ,the question is not3 ,are the    
extremes of criminality connected with  
mental incapacity8 but1 ,is the power of
 intellectual comprehension1 is         
intelligence1 always associated with    
sympathy and altruism8 ,is the          
connection of these two general8 ,or1   
conversely3 ,is lack of sympathy and    
altruism in general a sign of mental    
incapacity1 of the power of             
comprehension for another's suffering8  
,the individual may be supposed to be   
naturally endowed with a certain basis  
of tendency1 which1 as cooerdinate with 
a nervous organization that1 as         
organization1 is of definite nature1 is 
also definite4 ,i do not intend1 here or
 elsewhere1 to lay especial stress on   
the physical1 as distinguished from the 
psychical2 merely1 it is convenient for 
reference4 ,the individual character and

 life must be the continual progressive 
issue of this basis of tendency or      
capacity and the developing and         
modifying factors of environment4       
,individuals will1 therefore1 but in    
very different degrees and manners1     
reflect the moral standard of the       
society as organization1 the class1 and 
the family1 to which they belong1 the   
importance assumed by the class or      
family relations being according to the 
closeness and duration of association1  
and the natural aptitude of the         
individual for one or another sort of   
influence4 ,aside from altruistic       
considerations1 the individual will find
 it to his advantage to conform to the  
standards of these environments1 at     
least in a considerable degree4 ,the    
standards may1 however1 conflict1 so    
that there is also a conflict of        
advantages4 ,moreover1 circumstances may
 arise such that conformity to all or   
any of these standards presents much    
greater disadvantage than advantage1    

involving great sacrifice1 which may    
reach even to personal destruction4 ,but
 while a single anti-social act to avert
 personal destruction may involve       
greater advantage to the individual1 as 
life represents an advantage over death1
 and while such an act is more an       
advantage and less a disadvantage as it 
involves less conflict with social      
standards 7if it is the theft of food1  
for instance1 rather than murder71 any  
continued course of crime in so-called  
civilized society must be attended with 
many risks to the evil-doer1 and present
 gain may mean future loss of a much    
higher degree4 ,deeds conflicting with  
general social standards are punished by
 penalties which are larger as the      
conflict is greater in the eye of the   
state4 ,the individual who lays himself 
liable to legal punishment or social    
ostracism is foolish as well as1 in very
 many cases1 bad2 of course1 it is      
possible that his conduct may rise above
 the moral standards as well as that it 

may fall below them4 ,but we are now    
considering cases where it is1 by the   
assumption1 supposed to fall below them4
 ,it is easy to perceive1 from this     
standpoint1 that great and persistent   
criminals are likely to be of inferior  
intellect1 as well as wanting in moral  
aptitude1 although1 whatever reasoning  
capacity they possess being developed in
 the line of their own interest in their
 accustomed occupation1 they may appear 
to the more moral1 who are not practised
 in this direction1 to possess a high   
degree of cunning4  ,the honest man has 
generally a better chance than the      
habitual criminal1 however small his    
chance may be4 ,further1 education of   
any sort1 which is also intellectual    
elevation1 gives the individual better  
chances of earning his own living       
honestly1 and so renders the advantages 
on this side greater1 and also endows   
with the power of perceiving these      
advantages4 ,but these are only general 
truths1 applying1 again1 to extreme     

cases4 ,there may be cases in which     
there seems1 at least1 to be no choice  
left between crime and a life           
continually on the verge of starvation2 
and though the crime means also         
continual risk1 and higher risk as the  
crime is greater and so1 in general1    
more lucrative1 the advantage may still 
be reckoned by the individual as on its 
side4 ,in this case1 the individual may 
discover1 in the end1 that his          
calculation was mistaken2 but the       
mistake may not be so great1 the balance
 of disadvantage on the side of         
conformity with social standards so     
excessive1 as to prove him below the    
average of intellect in his mistaking4  
,the wisest men make many mistakes in   
calculating the results of their action4
 ,again1 the cleverer a man is1 the     
greater is his power to cope with the   
risk of detection and to avoid it4 ,it  
may be objected that the single         
individual cannot hope to compete       
continually with the organized action of

 all society1 and that the criminal     
must1 at times1 submit to some degree of
 punishment1 even if escaping its worst 
phases4 ,but if he feels no shame at the
 disgrace of the punishment1 it may not 
mean to him the greater disadvantage4   
,but here we come round to the          
altruistic and moral emotions1 for shame
 is present only where the individual   
has a desire to please1 and is pained at
 the disapproval of others2 that is1    
shame implies and requires1 in the      
degree in which it exists1 social and   
altruistic capacity4 ,furthermore1 when 
we come to examine the concept of       
advantage1 we find that it is as        
relative as that of end1 and will be    
judged according to the individual      
predilections2 to the non-sympathetic1  
shameless man it is an advantage to get 
on at whatever cost to others2 to the   
moral man no gain appears an advantage  
at the expense of principle4 ,and1 as   
there are all degrees of altruism in the
 bases of character of different        

individuals1 so the advantage1 in any   
particular case1 will lie at very       
different points according to the       
individual mind reflecting on it4 ,only 
the general truths may be asserted1     
that1 even to the man of less than the  
average moral aptitude1 great punishment
 must appear a disadvantage1 while even 
to the man of considerable moral        
principle death for the sake of his     
convictions is a thing to be hesitated  
at4  ,we may return to view the question
 in the light of the general facts of   
social evolution4 ,we found that only   
the general assertion could be made1    
that the advantages of cooeperation1 the
 disadvantages of strife and discord1   
increase with the closer relations of   
men1 and that the adoption of           
cooeperation follows this line of       
advantage by individual choice1 and by  
the disadvantage under which the less   
social as the less fit1 labor1 the      
latter tending gradually to disappear   
leaving the field to the more social4   

,thus the whole progress is the result  
of the will of the human being1 as well 
as of the other forces of nature2 it is 
only as the individual chooses1 that    
progress is possible4 ,but lower types  
survive long beside the more            
progressive1 higher ones4 ,the          
individual is not so reasonable that he 
always perceives his own more enduring  
advantage1 or always chooses it even    
when he perceives it2 he may choose     
momentary gratification at the          
acknowledged risk1 and even with the    
certainty1 of great future loss4 ,nor   
can it be averred that the individual   
always suffers seriously from action at 
variance with even the average standard2
 simply1 the line of survival gradually 
changes in favor of altruism1 so that   
escape is less frequent and less        
probable2 and the lines of greatest     
deviation from the altruism demanded at 
any period by the line of advance tend  
to disappear2 but the altruism demanded 
by any line of advance is not1 up to the

 present time1 an absolute altruism1 nor
 do all deviations from it result in    
destruction to the individual even in   
extreme cases4 ,the fact of the growing 
disadvantage of selfishness1 and its    
destructive tendency1 remains1          
nevertheless4 ,it may be expressed in   
another form in the statement that power
 of all sorts is increased by           
civilization1 and where a cooerdinate   
increase of self-restraint does not     
accompany the increased power1 it must  
lead to destruction1 either in the case 
of the individual1 or if not so         
abruptly1 then in the case of his       
descendants4 ,the closer contact of     
human beings and increased knowledge and
 cooeperation mean growing opportunity  
of good or evil1 to self and others4    
,the destructive forces lie as well in  
the workings of social organization1 in 
the will of man1 as in nature outside   
man4 ,legal justice1 public opinion1 and
 the opinion of the smaller circle of   
personal friends and acquaintances1 all 

have their part4 ,any degree of social  
instinct developed in the course of     
social evolution only assists in        
rendering social punishments of all     
sorts the more felt2 and thus each      
increment of advance assists in further 
advance4 ,men who persist in action     
antagonistic to social demands1 action  
which they themselves acknowledge to be 
immoral1 may yet feel the condemnation  
of society so much1 that1 even while yet
 persisting1 they destroy their vitality
 by alcoholism or other excesses to     
drown regret and remorse2 habit chains  
them1 in many cases1 where the          
condemnation of others reaches them only
 late4 ,but the whole process of social 
evolution is one of very gradual        
assimilation1 and neither in the world  
as a whole1 in the nation or race1 or in
 the tribe1 clan1 family1 locality1 or  
class1 is it one of equal advance on all
 sides4 ,the cooeperation adopted may   
be1 at different points1 that of        
individuals against individuals1 of     

tribes against tribes1 of nations       
against nations1 or of classes against  
classes4  ,from still another point of  
view1 we may look upon the evolution of 
man as an intellectual as well as a     
moral one4 ,we may count the continual  
gain of new experience1 and the         
variation of thought1 feeling1 and will 
in accordance with knowledge1 as        
adjustment to new elements of the       
environment1 and so1 as organic         
progress4 ,since1 indeed1 knowledge and 
the application of knowledge to more and
 more distant and more and more complex 
and general ends is just what we        
designate as higher reason in man as    
compared with other animal species1 we  
cannot logically regard the further     
progress of this same sort in the human 
species itself as other than an increase
 of reason4 ,here1 again1 it is strange 
that an exact line of division between  
the human species and the rest of life  
should so often be drawn2 that1 although
 we acknowledge the necessity of an     

intellectual evolution having taken     
place from the lower species up to man1 
and recognize this intellectual         
evolution as the concomitant of wider   
adaptation1 and although we recognize   
also man's continuing adaptation or     
experience as cooerdinate with progress 
in knowledge1 we yet should be able to  
regard the human race as stationary as  
far as reason1 intellect1 is concerned4 
,evolution no more stands still in man  
than it did before his advent 7if we may
 still use a word denoting a definite   
beginning1 of the evolution of a        
species74 ,and the reality of an        
intellectual evolution at the same time 
with the moral evolution being          
acknowledged1 it follows that the two   
must to some extent coincide4#agf ,but  
we have again to remember that the      
evolution is not on exactly the same    
lines in all individuals or parts of    
society1 that not all lines of descent  
may be called also those of progress4   
,sympathy is a progressive term2 there  

are numberless degrees of it represented
 by the different individuals who form  
society1 at their different periods of  
development and in their different      
moods4 ,nor can we distinguish between  
natural sympathy and extrinsic sentiment
 which may interfere with it2 since     
feelings are no separate entities1 all  
sentiment that bears on a subject is    
intrinsic1 and the final sympathy or    
non-sympathetic feeling is a fusion and 
not a mere mixture of the various       
emotions which go to make it4 ,we cannot
 assert that genuine altruism is the    
normal case1 even of the present period 
of social development1 and certainly not
 when we are considering morality as an 
evolution4 ,we may hope that the        
standard of future generations will come
 to be as much superior to our present  
standard as that standard is superior to
 the savage standard2 but it is scarcely
 to be expected that the men of that    
better time1 although they may look back
 at this age with as much horror as that

 with which we regard the savage        
children roasting their dog for sport1  
will pronounce it one of general idiocy 
or even of moral idiocy4 ,the virtue of 
,stephen's analysis lies in the especial
 notice it takes of the different       
degrees and phases of that which we term
 sympathy2 its fault lies in not        
sufficiently distinguishing between     
these phases1 by definition1 throughout 
the argument2 and this fault leads1 as  
we have seen1 to a final confusion of   
the different meanings1 the substitution
 of the one for the other1 and so the   
proving of the higher meaning by the    
lower4 ,it is scarcely true1 even in    
civilized society1 that a comprehension 
of the feelings of others is naturally  
associated with a feeling with them1    
even in the lower sense2 and it is      
certainly not true that it is naturally 
associated with genuine altruism4  ,the 
assertion that1 in ignoring the         
sentience of living beings in thought   
about them1 a man is ignoring a thing of

 importance to himself1 is cooerdinate  
with the assertion that1 in so doing1 he
 is ignoring an essential part of the   
world as interesting to him2 for that   
which appears of importance to a man is 
that which interests him2 and it is true
 that interest and attention are        
cooerdinate4 ,but one thing may appear  
to one man important1 another to        
another4 ,we generally consider a thing 
in the relations and phases which       
interest us1 but not all its relations  
or phases always interest us4 ,we do not
 follow out all the possible lines of   
thought connected with a thing1 we do   
not regard it in all its aspects every  
time we think about it2 we think more or
 less by symbols or parts2 and ,stephen 
says that we feel by symbols also4#agg  
,it is by no means true of all men1 or  
true of any man at all times1 that      
others are most deeply interesting to   
him in their relations of thought and   
feeling2 there are many cases where they
 would be quite as interesting if they  

were mere automata1 provided only that  
they could be depended on to perform the
 same actions4 ,and it is perfectly     
possible to regard them in the light of 
their actions and the significance of   
these for us1 leaving quite out of      
account the psychical meaning of the    
actions1 and this also without at all   
losing all the intelligence which       
distinguishes one from the lower animal4
 ,nor is sympathy cooerdinate with      
interest in the thoughts and emotions of
 others2 revenge is very normal1 yet it 
rejoices in just the fact that the      
living being can be made to suffer4     
,the irritation noticed by ,stephen1 as 
sometimes directed against others whose 
suffering is a source of pain1 is of    
especial interest as bearing on the     
habit of some animals--wild cattle1 for 
instance--of setting with fury on a     
wounded comrade1 and putting him to a   
violent death4 ,a recent writer has     
attempted to explain this habit as a    
frantic and unintelligent endeavor to   

render some assistance to a suffering   
friend2 but the explanation seems       
improbable1 especially as we find a     
corresponding impulse to cruelty even in
 human society of a higher type4 ,in the
 action of the animal1 there is the     
possibility and even the probability of 
still another impulse--that excitement  
and exhilaration which seems to possess 
many species at the sight and smell of  
blood1 and which finds its counterpart  
in the peculiar pleasure that many men  
of coarser sensibilities derive from    
bull-fights1 prize-fights1 cock-fights1 
etc41 and that doubtless comes down to  
us from a time when the struggle for    
existence was continually a bloody one4 
,just how the two instincts may be      
related in the animal1 it is difficult1 
from a human standpoint1 to say4  ,our  
analysis has hitherto omitted all       
definition of morality and conscience4  
,the words should properly1 for some    
reasons1 have been defined before this4 
,but any definition must have assumed   

that which could logically be asserted  
only at the end of the preceding        
considerations4 ,the definitions are    
involved in these considerations4 ,it is
 evident that morality1 as we ordinarily
 define it1 has a very intimate         
connection with the relations of        
individuals to each other2 and though we
 may conceive of a morality of the      
individual passing an entire existence  
in solitude on a desert island devoid of
 animal-life1 we become aware1 when we  
reflect on the condition of such an     
imaginary personage1 that many of the   
ordinary grounds of moral action1 and   
moral judgment of action1 are wanting in
 his case4 ,such a person cannot1 by our
 assumption1 beget others who may       
inherit his psychical and physical      
qualities1 and cannot injure man or     
beast directly or indirectly4 ,he has   
only his own welfare to consider1 and if
 he chooses rather an animal indulgence 
in such pleasures as may be within his  
reach1 we may possibly disapprove of his

 conduct1 but we cannot find especial   
grounds for asserting that he has not a 
right to his choice4 ,it may be said    
that this case is only imaginary1 and   
that1 in all actual cases of such       
isolation there is no certainty that the
 individual may not1 at some future     
time1 come in contact with other living 
animals or with human beings4 ,but this 
being admitted1 we immediately come back
 again to the conception of morality as 
dependent upon our relations to others4 
,in spite of all that has been said in  
favor of egoistic morality1 of duties to
 self as the source and reason of       
morality1 it becomes evident that       
altruism is a most important element of 
even that which we term egoistic or     
personal morality4 ,in fact1 we find    
difficulty in distinguishing1 on a      
higher plane1 between the duties of     
egoism and those of altruism2 in both we
 have to consider others as well as     
ourselves4 ,and we begin to suspect that
 we are making a mistake in separating1 

in a definition1 things which must be   
indissolubly united in actual practice2 
and we surmise that such a mistake may  
lie at the root of the many             
disagreements as to whether the         
preference is to be given to egoism or  
to altruism in ,ethics4 ,in all         
evolution1 the results of former        
adaptation are not lost in new2 merely  
the old assumes a higher form4 ,so      
egoism is not lost in altruism1 but     
assumes a higher form2 the care for self
 becomes identical1 according to the    
degree of altruism1 with the care for   
others4 ,this fact has been utilized for
 the assertion that all altruism is     
merely egoism4 ,the argument commits the
 fallacy of using the word egoism in two
 senses1 the one of which1 the higher   
sense1 is used to prove the other4 ,we  
need to remember that the fact of       
development implies degrees1 and that   
neither egoism nor altruism is an       
absolute term4 ,a certain care of self1 
physically and mentally1 is necessary to

 cheerfulness1 health1 sympathy1 and the
 due performance of labor and           
kindnesses2 just as1 conversely1 in     
society1 the health and happiness of the
 individual are dependent upon the aid  
of others4 ,the antagonistic character  
of the two principles is gradually      
modified in evolution and disappears    
altogether in some cases of action2 in  
the contemplation of the ideal1 it      
vanishes completely4 ,care for self     
gains a new significance in the light of
 love or affection for any other being1 
and in the action and reaction of       
character in human society1 this newer  
significance gradually spreads1         
leavening the whole of mankind4 ,our    
analysis is unable to trace its workings
 and significance in all the complicated
 relations of men4 ,in like manner it is
 difficult to decide1 in any particular 
case1 what the exact course is1 which1  
in view of the far-reaching results of  
an act through the action and reaction  
of these relations1 is the right one4   

,the moral decision must be reached     
through a consideration which should be 
nearer the ideal1 the nearer it comes to
 a consideration of all results1 a due  
allowance being made for the uncertainty
 of distant results4 ,this uncertainty  
must1 other things being equal1 diminish
 the influence of considerations of the 
far future on the decision1 and should  
properly do so2 although relative       
importance may1 again1 render the mere  
possibility of some one result a        
sufficient reason for choosing or       
abstaining from an act in the face of   
all other certainties and probabilities4
 ,again1 the power of calculating       
distant results is increased with the   
growth of knowledge1 and man comes1     
thus1 to obtain greater and greater     
power to shape the world about him and  
mould his own life to the attainment of 
his ends4 ,with this power              
responsibility is also increased2 the   
adult thief who rears children to theft 
bears the chief responsibility in the   

beginning of their career1 and a very   
large share of it later on2 the         
experienced man of the world1 who       
understands whither he is tending1 is   
much more responsible than the ignorant 
girl whom he seduces4  ,the highest     
morality demands1 therefore1 careful    
judgment4 ,the factors to be considered 
are the complicated relations of men in 
the society of which the judge and actor
 himself is a member2 morality may thus 
be identified with justice in the       
highest sense of the word4 ,the decision
 is always a difficult one on account of
 the great complexity of the factors    
concerned2 this every man perceives who 
endeavors1 with unbiassed mind1 to      
discover exactly what the most moral    
course is in any particular case4 ,some 
one course may be evidently immoral2 but
 that does not necessarily decide what  
the moral course is1 for there may be   
very many courses open to choice1 or    
there may be at least more than one     
other as alternative to the manifestly  

immoral one4 ,moreover1 the necessity   
for action forbids that we spend all our
 time in reflection and choice4 ,moral  
responsibility demands1 however1 that we
 never cease from the endeavor to       
discover where justice lies4  ,a certain
 constancy in the constitution of       
society1 and the necessity for constancy
 or consistency in the action of the    
individual1 give rise to certain general
 rules of conduct that develop and      
change somewhat as society changes2     
special rules of conduct which          
supplement these general rules change   
constantly4 ,in the societies of a      
primitive sort1 held together by only   
the loosest of bonds1 personal          
retaliation is in vogue and is          
considered moral4 ,revenge is a duty4   
,in societies of a higher sort          
retaliation is taken from the hands of  
the individual in all matters of        
importance1 at least as far as the      
revenge consists in definite action1 the
 motive of which can be demonstrated4   

,the ,englishman may still knock down   
the man who insults him1 but he may not 
avenge a murder4 ,not only the negative 
morality of abstinence from violence is 
demanded of the citizen of a so-called  
civilized society1 a certain reliability
 in the relations of cooeperation is    
also necessary for the general welfare1 
and thus honesty comes to be encouraged 
and dishonesty to be discouraged by     
legal punishment and social contempt4   
,dishonesty in word is not so often     
punished directly by law as dishonesty  
of act1 but there are many cases where  
it is impossible to distinguish between 
the two1 and other cases where the lie  
is directly punishable because of the   
consequences which it involves4 ,beyond 
this1 society begins early to discourage
 lying in some sort1 though the love of 
and respect for truth obviously grows   
with social development4 ,cooerdinately 
with the development of cooeperation and
 mutual dependence1 constancy in all the
 multifarious directions and complex    

relations of that cooeperation and      
dependence1 becomes more and more       
desirable4  ,but constancy is not to be 
secured as an outward fact except as it 
becomes a part of the inward character  
of men1 a constant habit4 ,the man who  
lies occasionally is in at least some   
danger of developing a habit in the     
direction of lying1 as he is also in    
danger of destroying the confidence of  
others if they discover that he         
sometimes lies2 for they have no means  
of knowing to exactly what extent       
untruthfulness is1 or is becoming1 a    
habit in his case1 or in what instances 
it may manifest itself1 in what not4    
,moreover1 the distrust so engendered   
may lead to anticipatory deception on   
their side1 and so the circle of        
distrust and untruthfulness spreads     
until it is met somewhere by determined 
truth that demands truth in return4     
,thus1 in spite of all that is said in  
favor of the occasional lie1 we         
instinctively feel the danger of it1    

though we may not be able1 until after  
much consideration1 to assign the exact 
reason for our feeling4 ,we may admit   
that there are occasions when the lie   
may be justifiable2 but we feel that    
these occasions must1 then1 be very     
exceptional4 ,in general1 it is         
desirable to discipline ourselves to as 
close an approach to the truth as       
possible4 ,if ,i lie in a dozen         
instances1 in what ,i consider a good   
cause1 ,i am very likely to lie again   
when the temptation of some merely      
personal gain presents itself4 ,the     
habit of truth or falsehood is1 further 
than this1 one of the most subtle and   
intricate relations in our character3   
nothing is more difficult than the      
facing of the exact truth with regard to
 ourselves2 cowardice and self-deception
 with regard to our own traits and      
motives are very common1 and only the   
most earnest and constant effort can    
enable us to gain that moral courage    
that is the first requisite of          

self-knowledge and so self-control4 ,any
 weakening of the will in the contrary  
direction is dangerous4 ,truth is not an
 easy thing2 it is as difficult as      
justice2 in fact1 that which is justice 
in action and the judgment which leads  
to action1 is truth in the premises of  
which the judgment is the issue4 ,we    
have most of us known persons who had so
 accustomed themselves to lying that    
they seemed no longer able to           
distinguish between truth and falsehood1
 facts and mere impressions4 ,certainly 
where matters of high importance which  
deeply concern the public welfare are at
 stake1 we cannot admit falsehood to be 
desirable for the sake of any personal  
gain2 and even though we may find       
excuses for the failure of human courage
 in the face of mortal danger1 there are
 those of us who will still continue to 
think a ,bruno's defiance of death for  
the sake of his conviction the nobler   
and better choice4 ,i have heard it     
argued that this philosopher might have 

contributed more to the world through a 
continuation of his life than he did    
through his death4 ,but surely it was   
one of the highest services that he     
could do mankind to show a superstitious
 and dogmatic age that high moral       
purpose and steadfastness were not      
necessarily associated with this or that
 religious dogma4 ,his death drew the   
attention of thoughtful and good men as 
nothing else could have drawn it4 ,but  
beyond this consideration1 and even     
leaving out of account the desirability 
of the habit of truth and the necessity 
of its action in the single instance1 it
 is doubtful whether there is any other 
benefit we can confer on our fellow-men 
so great as just the assurance that they
 can rely on us4 ,the bitter cry of     
human nature everywhere repeats the     
faithlessness of those on whom trust has
 been staked2 and the rescue of many a  
man from despair and waste of life has  
been through the discovery of some one  
soul whose truth and constancy were     

steadfast and unchangeable4 ,belief in  
others is belief in our own             
possibilities2 and distrust of others is
 distrust of self1 at least for the most
 thoughtful and introspective men4 ,the 
examples of such men as ,socrates and   
,bruno stand to the world as pledges of 
the power of faithfulness in humanity4  
,they are the rocks on which pessimism  
must shatter1 and the betrayed and      
sorrowful may build their faith4 ,this  
is1 ,i believe1 the secret of our       
veneration for such men as these1 who   
died1 not in an ecstasy of religious    
emotion or under the hope of especial   
glory as a reward for martyrdom1 but    
faithful to a calm conviction1 and      
sustained only by the love of truth and 
their fellow-men4  ,and this brings us  
to a consideration of the sacrifice of  
the individual4 ,the cases may be few   
where the highest standard can demand of
 a man such entire and final sacrifice  
as the instances we have just noted1    
even though it may look upon this       

sacrifice as the highest4 ,but it is    
evident that some degree of             
self-sacrifice is often necessary to the
 welfare of society1 and however        
important we may consider the welfare of
 the individual1 it cannot be regarded  
as more important than the welfare of   
the whole of society as an aggregate of 
many individuals1 or even as more       
important than the welfare of a large   
number of other individuals1 a          
considerable portion of society4 ,the   
legitimate degree of sacrifice1 where   
interests conflict and choice is        
necessary between the sacrifice of the  
single individual and the sacrifice of  
many1 is a question that can be decided 
only according to the particular        
circumstances of the case4 ,everything  
depends upon the number of individuals  
on both sides1 whose interests conflict1
 on the nature of the sacrifices        
necessary1 and the results of these     
sacrifices to the society as a whole1 as
 well as1 in some cases1 on the         

character of the individuals concerned4 
,it is often denied that the nature of  
the individuals whose interests         
conflict1 between whom choice must be   
made1 can ever affect that choice if it 
is made under principles of justice4    
,and in general1 doubtless1 there is    
danger of injustice in distinctions     
between individuals2 but it is scarcely 
to be doubted that1 if it were necessary
 to choose between the life of a great  
philanthropist and that of a persistent 
and hardened criminal1 if1 for instance1
 both were drowning and it were possible
 to save only one1 the choice of most   
would fall1 and fall rightly1 on the    
philanthropist4 ,the fact that moral    
choice must take different directions   
under different circumstances is        
sometimes construed into an argument    
against any fixity of moral             
commandments1 an argument for a narrow  
expediency4 ,it certainly establishes   
the rule that obedience to any rule of  
action should never be blind4           

,nevertheless1 if our preceding         
considerations be correct1 the          
uniformities in social relations admit  
of the establishment of certain general 
rules which the moral man will follow   
under most circumstances4  ,we come     
finally to the definition of conscience4
 ,in humanity as a whole1 and in the    
single societies of which it is         
composed1 a certain moral evolution may 
be perceived which we have found reasons
 for believing to be internal as well as
 external1 a matter of heredity as well 
as of instruction4 ,in this internal    
sense1 conscience1 as innate capacity1  
or tendency1 may be said to be an       
instinct4 ,we may not be able to explain
 how the inheritance takes place in this
 case any more than we are able to      
explain how it is possible that the     
chicken just from the shell may pick at 
his food without instruction1 and just  
what psychical process1 if any1         
accompanies the first performance of the
 act2 or to explain how it is that the  

sexual instinct appears in later life as
 an inheritance of species1 and why it  
acts uniformly4 ,we can only say that1  
the proper conditions of stimulation    
7which are always necessary in the case 
of any instinct7 being present1 the     
action takes place4 ,we are unable to   
analyze the earliest appearance of      
sympathy1 benevolence1 and the sense of 
obligation1 in our individual           
experience1 the power of self-analysis  
appearing much later in life4 ,that     
which1 when we become capable of        
reflection1 we term conscience1 consists
 in pleasure in forms of action         
furthering the welfare of society--forms
 gradually moulded to habit with the    
development of social relations1--and in
 a corresponding pain at the realization
 of having failed of such action2 the   
knowledge of the demand1 by society as a
 whole or by a part of society1 of      
action in accord with the general       
welfare1 and the sense of the justice of
 this demand1 constituting the feeling  

of obligation and duty4 ,this feeling is
 early nourished in the family1 the     
obligation we acknowledge being towards 
our parents first and foremost4 ,we have
 found motives to be often of a mixed   
character2 and this is often also the   
case with remorse1 the pain we          
experience at having failed in our duty4
 ,it may contain an egoistic element of 
regret or dread at having rendered      
ourselves liable to punishment or loss  
of some sort4  ,our whole analysis of   
the course by which conscience is       
developed tends to show the truth of    
that which ,darwin claimed1 namely1 that
 the moral instinct is a development and
 organization of many special instincts4
 ,but there are those who claim         
conscience to be a special sense1 and   
who generally mean much more than merely
 that it is1 at present1 an organization
 of subordinate instincts4 ,a dim       
analogy of the special sense organs     
generally has part in their conception1 
and religious reference is often made to

 the original constitution of man4 ,but 
evolution knows nothing of an original  
constitution of man2 it knows only of a 
gradual development of the human4 ,and  
it must be remembered that1 in          
evolution1 that may become inherent     
which was not so before4 ,any theory    
which regards even an organization of   
special instincts as a special sense    
may1 moreover1 be objected to on the    
same grounds on which the old idea of   
special faculties of thought1 feeling1  
and will was criticized4 ,the old       
argument1 used to prop the belief in    
conscience as an original1 higher gift1 
and so1 in the original creation of     
fixed species1--the argument that the   
same fundamental rules of moral conduct 
are to be found in all societies1--has  
already been answered in the            
demonstration that uniformities of human
 nature and necessary similarities in   
all social constitution render the      
fundamental rules of forbearance1 aid1  
honesty1 and truth necessary to all     

societies alike2 while our analysis of  
the course of development by which      
social organization grows more and more 
complex1 shows the necessity as well as 
the reality of progress in outward and  
inward observance of these rules4 ,du   
,prel argues that even life on any of   
the heavenly bodies1 supposing such to  
exist1 must have some points of         
resemblance to our own1 although the    
differences due to different planetary  
conditions may be great2 but            
resemblances must assuredly be          
considerable where there is a common    
basis of species4  ,the ,utilitarians   
are doubtless right in asserting that   
all rules of morality may be traced to  
utility4 ,however1 there is considerable
 ambiguity about the word utility4 ,mr4 
,spencer's earlier objections to        
,utilitarianism1 given in ,social       
,statics1--namely1 that we cannot make  
the greatest good of the greatest number
 our object because it is impossible to 
perceive1 without omniscience1 where the

 greatest good lies1 and because the    
standard of utility is a changing one1  
cannot be regarded as apposite1 for we  
might as well say that a man cannot     
endeavor to secure his own health1 or   
that it is not well for him to do so1   
because he does not possess a knowledge 
of all the intricate workings of the    
organs of his body and so may make      
mistakes1 or that he cannot seek it     
to-day because the conditions necessary 
to secure it will have changed by       
to-morrow2 but ,mr4 ,spencer's later    
objections to ,utilitarianism touch an  
important truth4 ,he says1 for instance1
 in his ,recent ,discussions in         
,science1 ,philosophy1 and ,morals3     
,utility1 convenient a word as it is    
from its comprehensiveness1 has very    
inconvenient and misleading             
implications4 ,it vividly suggests uses 
and means and proximate ends2 but very  
faintly suggests the pleasures1 positive
 or negative1 which are the ultimate    
ends1 and which1 in the ethical meaning 

of the word1 are alone considered4      
,stephen has another pertinent criticism
 of ,utilitarianism1 namely that the    
utilitarian1 in his anxiety to have his 
feet on solid earth1 and to assign      
definite and tangible grounds for every 
conclusion1 is likely to favor the      
prosaic rather than the poetical1 and to
 leave out of account1 or rank as of    
little importance1 finer sorts of       
pleasure4#agh ,the utilitarian is1 in   
fact1 liable to fall into a similar     
error to that already noticed on the    
part of those who claim that egoism is  
the foundation of all morality1 present 
as past4 ,while accepting the theory of 
evolution1 the utilitarian fails to     
perceive1 in many cases1 that this lends
 to his terms a progressive and         
increasingly complex meaning4 ,the error
 has its source1 doubtless1 in the fact 
that the utilitarian school represents a
 recoil from the older1 superstitious   
,intuitionalism1 which not only defended
 a doctrine of conscience as a sort of  

supernatural or half-supernatural       
instinct1 on a plane above ordinary     
instinct1 but1 relying upon it as of    
such character1 practically denied to   
reason any authority in matters of      
morality4 ,in the strong reaction from  
these ideas1 and under the fear of      
ceding any ground of advantage to the   
enemy1 ,utilitarianism has gone to an   
equally inadmissible extreme of         
disregarding mere impulses of sympathy1 
and has tended to reject all conceptions
 of morality where it was not possible  
to unravel1 beyond the criticism of     
opponents1 the intricate web of social  
conditions4 ,it is for this reason also 
that ,utilitarianism is often egoistic2 
in the endeavor to analyze back to      
tangible grounds of action1 it was much 
easier to adopt the evidently original  
basis of sympathy and altruism--that is1
 egoism--as the present basis also1 than
 to trace out later developments in the 
many-sided organization of society4 ,in 
rejecting instinct1 it was but          

consistent and natural to overlook also 
the significance of habit in matters of 
morality2 and thus the poet1 the moral  
enthusiast1 the martyr1 and the rigid   
adherent of truth1 came to be looked at 
askance4 ,i do not mean to aver that all
 ,utilitarianism has fallen into these  
errors1 though the tendency is          
distinctly in this direction2 neither   
the connection of a theory of utility   
with a disregard of the finer sorts of  
happiness1 and the more distant and     
complex workings of social forces1 nor  
the connection of a theory of moral     
instinct with superstition1 is a        
necessary one4  ,a re-reaction against  
this bald ,utilitarianism has set in2   
but some of the forms which it takes on 
can no more be indorsed by the          
consistent evolutionist than can the    
system from which it is a revolt4 ,when 
,sidgwick defends ,intuitionalism with  
the argument that the rightness of some 
kinds of action is known without        
consideration of ulterior consequences1 

we may answer that it is true that      
tradition furnishes us with many rules  
that we may follow without consideration
 of the consequences of our acts1 but   
that it is very doubtful whether we act 
with the highest degree of morality in  
so doing4 ,as to the knowing of the     
rightness of the acts1 this is surely a 
matter of judgment1 must1 therefore1    
involve the considerations of           
consequences in some form1 though the   
course of reasoning followed to the     
attainment of what is often termed      
knowledge in this sense may not be      
elaborate1 and may1 indeed1 go no       
farther than a reflection on the        
approval and disapproval of society4    
,the terms higher and lower have been   
used in our previous considerations with
 regard to pleasures4 ,the legitimacy of
 their use in this connection has often 
been questioned4 ,from an evolutional   
standpoint1 however1 either they are    
legitimate here1 or else objection may  
be made1 on similar grounds1 to their   

application to man as distinguished from
 the brutes or even from the original   
protoplasmic cell with which evolution  
began4 ,the later developments of the   
desires1 the newer social ends1 are as  
much higher as the human species is     
higher than the species from which it   
has been evolved through continued      
adaptation4 ,as1 in the attainment of   
altruism1 egoism is not lost in the     
sense that the individual no longer     
seeks that which is most pleasurable to 
him1 but simply reaches a higher plane1 
so the fundamental animal desires and   
instincts still move us1 but in a quite 
different form1 being closely           
interwoven1 in their later development1 
with all the ideals and aspirations with
 which social life has supplied us4 ,the
 advocates of a return to nature make1  
therefore1 a fundamental mistake in     
theory4 ,human development is also      
natural4 ,the same mistake is made when 
we are told that we must be animals in  
practice because we are animals by      

nature1 or that we must copy nature     
because we are a part of it4 ,the former
 assertion ordinarily commits the       
fallacy of using the word animal in two 
senses4 ,the latter assertion involves  
the fallacy of first making man a part  
of the nature1 which he is to copy1 in  
order1 then1 to prove that he must      
regard himself as something outside     
nature and must1 therefore1 slavishly   
follow4 ,but if man is himself a part of
 the nature he must copy1 one may       
question why he may not simply copy     
himself rather than any other part2 for 
obviously he is unable to copy all      
parts1 there being many antagonisms in  
nature4 ,i have heard the argument used 
in defence of cruelty to animals2 nature
 is cruel1 therefore man must be cruel4 
,but as a matter of fact1 there is no   
more reason why man should copy any     
other part of nature1 than there is     
reason why the horse should imitate the 
habits of the hog1 or turtle-doves take 
example by the tiger4 ,necessity may    

sometime compel a choice between two    
cruelties1 to which there is no third   
alternative2 but this is a different    
argument2 let us say1 in this case1 that
 we are so compelled 7if1 indeed1 there 
is no other alternative2 for this       
argument1 like the other1 is often used 
as a convenient excuse for mere         
selfishness1 where there are            
alternatives72 let us not employ a      
wholly fallacious and misleading        
argument which opens the way to the free
 exercise of selfish disposition4       
,objections are often made to theories  
of the development of higher moral      
qualities from egoism1 on the ground    
that such a derivation is degrading to  
that which is best in man4 ,some color  
is lent to this view by arguments like  
that just noticed4 ,but we may question 
whether facts can be logically chosen or
 rejected according to their            
agreeableness1 or even their moral      
utility1 in any case4 ,and1 again1 some 
of us may fail to discover any          

degradation in this theory of evolution4
 ,the flower may grow from carrion1 but 
we do not find it the less beautiful1   
the less pleasing to our various senses4
 ,and we should have exactly as good    
reason to regard the carrion as elevated
 by its office as to regard the flower  
as degraded by the source of its life4  
,as a matter of fact1 we merely find the
 flower pleasing and the carrion        
abhorrent4 ,we are used to this         
particular connection of the pleasing   
with the abhorrent1 and accept it as we 
accept much that may be to us           
disagreeable in our own physical        
organization2 but we have not yet       
accustomed ourselves to the ideas of    
mental and moral evolution1 and our     
recoil from them is an illustration of  
the displeasing character of the wholly 
,new4 ,the same argument of degradation 
was at first brought forward also       
against the theory of an evolution of   
the human form from that of lower       
species1 and of the purely intellectual 

faculties from the animal mind4  ,the   
question as to whether struggle is an   
essential element of virtue has been so 
thoroughly answered by ,gizycki1        
,stephen1 and others1 that it would be  
superfluous to say much about it here2  
however1 our analysis would not be      
complete without some consideration of  
it4 ,the man is the strongest1 writes   
,stephen1 who can lift the heaviest     
weight or who can lift a given weight   
with the greatest ease4 ,but 7and it is 
a proof of the loose argument which has 
often been accepted in ethical disputes7
 the two cases have sometimes been      
confounded4 ,it would plainly be absurd 
to say1 ',the man is strongest who lifts
 the greatest weight1 therefore the man 
who makes the greatest effort2 therefore
 the man who makes the greatest struggle
 to lift a given weight4' ,but it has   
occasionally been said that a man is    
most virtuous who resists the greatest  
temptation2 therefore the man who has   
the greatest struggle2 therefore the man

 who has the greatest difficulty in     
resisting a given temptation4 ,though   
the fallacy does not occur in this bare 
form1 it is not infrequently implied in 
the assumption that the effort1 taken   
absolutely1 is the measure of merit4444 
,we are thus led to excuse a man for the
 very qualities which make him wicked4  
,true1 he committed a murder1 but he was
 so spiteful that he could not help it2 
or he was exceedingly kind1 but he is so
 good-natured that it cost him no       
effort4#agi  ,the difficulty lies in the
 fact that the struggle arising in any  
particular case may result from any one 
of several general conditions of        
character1 between which it is often    
difficult to distinguish4 ,an absence of
 struggle may mean simply a general     
weakness of character which makes a man 
ready to yield to any and almost all    
momentary influences1 good or evil2 the 
agreement with another's argument may   
signify absence of the power to reason  
for oneself2 but1 on the other hand1 it 

may mean the highest intellectual power 
of unbiassed judgment2 the act that     
follows such agreement as its result may
 mean will-power1 or it may mean        
vacillating weakness that1 if led by a  
good influence at the present moment1   
will be as easily or nearly as easily   
swayed by an evil one1 the next4 ,we are
 all acquainted with persons who        
invariably agree with all sides1 and    
shilly-shally in a corresponding manner 
in their action1 accomplishing little or
 no positive good in any direction1     
though often positive evil4 ,for the    
reason of this frequent weakness of     
character in what we call the           
good-natured person1 the term           
good-natured has come to have a certain 
idea of mental and moral inferiority    
connected with it4 ,in a similar manner1
 some men who are generally called good 
are swayed to a greater extent by       
tradition and lack of courage to act for
 themselves than by strong desire to    
know and do the right1 and thus1 very   

unfortunately1 the excellent word good  
even comes to be looked upon with a     
certain degree of disdain4 ,on the other
 hand1 a man may find much difficulty in
 doing right in a certain instance1     
because of the strength of emotions that
 would be1 under ordinary circumstances1
 morally desirable and are1 in          
themselves1 admirable even in the moment
 of his temptation1 although a yielding 
to this temptation would1 nevertheless1 
involve great wrong4 ,no one could blame
 the agony and struggle of the switchman
 who1 in the moment when he is about to 
rescue a passenger-train from imminent  
collision by switching it to another    
track1 suddenly perceives his baby-girl 
seated upon the rails4 ,strong and      
ennobling love between man and woman may
 involve1 under certain conditions1     
temptation and struggle2 even the best  
of our impulses may not always be       
followed1 if we desire to act morally4  
,few1 if any persons could refuse       
admiration and respect to the love      

between ,phillip ,tredennis and ,mrs4   
,amory in ,mrs4 ,burnett's ,through one 
,administration4 ,but not all strong    
feeling is of an admirable nature2 the  
revengefulness of the murderer1 the     
vicious lust of a ,joseph ,phillippe1   
the impatience of the constitutionally  
belligerent man1 are not to be praised1 
but condemned4 ,stephen's argument1     
therefore1 that struggle is adjudged an 
element of virtuous character in many   
cases because its absence would show a  
defect in some faculty of enjoyment1    
includes too much2 for ,jack the        
,ripper1 and others who especially      
delight in crime1 possess faculties of  
enjoyment the entire absence of which in
 other men we do not look upon as a     
defect4#ahj ,stephen restates his       
position in another form1 saying that   
,if a man resists any inducement because
 it has no charms for him1 his act does 
not prove virtue unless the inducement  
be such as to appeal only to the wicked4
 ,it is only because1 incidentally1     

those qualities moulded in human        
society1 and therefore fundamentally    
good1 may come into conflict with each  
other1 that we fall into the habit of   
connecting the idea of struggle with    
morality2 in face of the fact that      
readier response to moral stimulus must 
constitute all moral advancement4  ,and 
these reflections lead us to remark on  
the common fallacy that strength of     
emotion means necessarily a lack of the 
moral direction of emotion1 and that    
conversely moral self-direction argues  
weakness of emotional capacity4 ,the    
direction of emotion is changed with    
evolution1 as we have seen1 but this    
does not mean that emotion is lessened  
in force4 ,in the man of highest        
morality1 the emotions are merely       
moulded to a greater harmony with social
 needs1 a harmony that is not weakness  
but strength1 not mere narrow reaction  
upon momentary impulse or one-sided     
sympathy with a few to the exclusion of 
the many1 but1 in contrast to this lower

 impulsiveness1 an all-sidedness that is
 the result of reflection and choice4 ,i
 say this all-sidedness is the result of
 reflection2 for ,i do not mean to      
intimate that the moral man is less     
impulsive than the immoral man1 or that 
he is obliged to consider long before   
every act4 ,merely his impulsiveness is 
of a higher sort2 in it both racial and 
individual adjustments to social needs  
find expression2 and reason always      
stands1 figuratively speaking1 in the   
background1 ready to suppress the       
spontaneity where the conditions are    
such that it ceases to be moral4 ,it has
 been part of our whole analysis to show
 that reason and instinct1 thought and  
feeling1 are by no means antagonistic4  
,simply1 feeling may take one direction 
in one man1 another in another2 in the  
criminal1 it is developed in the        
direction of anti-social acts2 in the   
profligate1 it takes the same direction1
 but in a less degree2 the original     
savage is stronger in him than in the   

moral man1 who belongs to a later and   
higher type1 and finds his pleasure in  
acts in accordance with the welfare of  
his fellow-men and fellow-women4 ,as the
 human being is a higher development    
than other species because he is adapted
 to a wider circle of nature1 so just as
 truly the moral man is a higher human  
development1 because function is1 in    
him1 adjusted to a wider circle of      
conditions--to complex social           
requirements which represent the        
happiness of his fellow-men4 ,altruism  
is not1 because a later development1    
artificial1 as ,barratt calls it1 any   
more than man is artificial in          
comparison with the ape1 or the ape is  
artificial in comparison with original  
protoplasm4 ,nor can virtue consist1 as 
,barratt conceives1 in a yielding to all
 emotions1#aha as long as man has not   
yet attained the highest summit of      
morality where all emotions follow moral
 directions1 without conflicts and      
without constraint4 ,but neither can    

morality be distinguished as a          
constraining power opposed to instinct  
and emotion in general1#ahb as ,stephen 
at one point defines it4 ,struggle and  
constraint are not necessarily elements 
of moral action2 kind and moral action  
often follows upon impulse with no      
effort whatever2 and1 on the other hand1
 the basest characters may know struggle
 of an extreme nature when the          
directions of self-interest conflict4   
,we have already noticed the origin of  
punishment in revenge1 which is the     
outcome of a fundamental1 egoistic      
instinct of self-defence2 and we have   
traced its development up to the        
monopolization of its extremer forms by 
society as a whole through state        
organization4 ,it is impossible for     
analysis to give any adequate           
representation of the workings of       
,reward and ,punishment in society1     
except as we draw an exact line between 
legal and other forms4 ,but such a      
distinction1 however convenient for     

particular purposes1 is obviously       
scientifically injustifiable in a       
general theory of social morals4 ,the   
constraint of family disinheritance and 
social ostracism1 of threats of all     
sorts1 of vituperation1 of disapproval  
and coldness1 are only higher forms of  
revenge or punishment1 by which men     
influence each other's action1 as       
savages influence each other through    
physical suffering and the fear of it1  
in a more primitive and less humane     
manner2 and state reward for services1  
praise1 and approval1 are all forms of  
encouragement1 by which men similarly   
incite each other not merely to a       
negative abstention from undesirable    
acts1 but to a positive performance of  
desirable acts4 ,with the development of
 sympathy1 punishment tends to become   
less brutal on the one side1 while1 on  
the other1 the less brutal forms come to
 have as great influence as the more    
brutal ones formerly had4 ,furthermore1 
the distinct calculation of the         

attainment of egoistic ends gives place 
to the impulsive reaction of the sense  
of justice on the one hand1 and1 on the 
other1 to the readier response to       
disapproval and to the desires of       
others1 through social predispositions  
and affections which are more altruistic
 than egoistic4  ,but there are two     
diametrically opposed schools1 neither  
of which perfectly agrees with the      
theory of will as stated in a preceding 
chapter of this work1 and both of which 
may therefore take exception to the     
theory of recompense which follows      
naturally upon that theory4 ,the one1   
the school which asserts ,free ,will not
 in a natural1 but in a supernatural1 or
 half supernatural sense1 may object to 
the grounds for punishment assumed in   
our analysis2 this school is answered by
 the demonstration of the actual course 
of development taken by reward and      
punishment4 ,the other school maintains1
 on the ground that man is a part of    
nature1 that there is no merit in       

conscientiousness1 and that evil-doing1 
being as much dependent upon            
organization and social environment as  
disease1 cannot1 on scientific grounds1 
be punishable4 ,it is to be noticed1    
however1 that many of the advocates of  
the theory that state punishment is     
injustifiable yet inflict punishment    
upon their own children2 and we may     
remind them1 in this connection1 that   
they can scarcely claim the will of the 
child to be freer or less the result of 
general social conditions than that of  
the adult1 and that1 moreover1 they     
themselves are the most immediate links 
in the chain of conditions producing    
this will4 ,furthermore1 they are       
inconsistent in their practice if they  
visit any blame on evil-doers or        
criminals2 they are logically restricted
 to1 at most1 an ,i differ with you in  
opinion1 to ,jack-the-,ripper1 to the   
cruelest of slave hunters1 or to the    
,chinese who are said to have regarded  
with indifference the burning of their  

fellow-men on the ship ,shanghai1 while 
they exerted themselves to secure the   
wreckage4 ,nor1 if punishment and blame 
are inadmissible1 on the ground of the  
determination of the will1 can they     
consistently show greater consideration 
to benevolent than to malevolent men1 no
 matter how great the public benefits   
these men have conferred1 or what aid   
they have given to the advancement of   
society8 ,if it is unjust to punish     
criminals because their acts are        
determined1 then it is also wholly      
unjust to the rest of mankind to praise 
a ,bruno1 or a dying ,sir ,philip       
,sidney giving the cup of water offered 
him to another4 ,if good men might be   
criminals1 had they the criminal        
organization1 it is equally true that   
ordinary and selfish men might be       
,brunos and ,sir ,philip ,sidneys if    
they had the organization of ,brunos and
 ,sir ,philip ,sidneys2 why then do     
ordinary men the injustice of praising  
and admiring such nobility of character8

 ,nor can a theory of determinism which 
refuses to blame the individual         
consistently lay the blame of crime and 
badness on society as a whole1 as it    
often does2 for society as a whole is   
composed of individuals1 all of whom are
 equally determined in their action4    
,or1 if we choose to regard society as a
 unit1 then it may be said that it is as
 much the product of nature as a whole  
as the individual is its product4 ,if it
 be objected that we do not blame nature
 as a whole because it is soulless1 we  
may inquire what is meant by soulless2  
society has no composite soul1 no soul  
except in its individuals4 ,the real    
significance of the objection is that we
 cannot influence nature1 by our blame1 
to the production of better characters2 
but it is also true that we cannot      
influence society except through the    
individuals composing it2 and here we   
have1 again1 in a nutshell1 the real    
reason and justification of punishment  
and blame4  ,the ,socialists have been  

prominent of late in disclaiming the    
right of the state to punish1 on the    
ground that society as a whole is       
responsible for the evil of individual  
characters4 ,but it is not noticeable   
that all ,socialists refrain from       
blaming non-socialistic and conservative
 individuals1 although it is obviously  
true that these are quite as much       
determined1 and as irresponsible from a 
deterministic point of view1 as are the 
criminals4 ,moreover1 even the mildest  
,socialists advocate the measure of     
denying food to the man who can work but
 will not do so4 ,by what right do these
 determinists make use of the expression
 can but will not8 ,and what right have 
they1 on their own showing1 to          
administer this chastisement to the lazy
 man8 ,surely sloth cannot be           
interpreted as preeminently a power of  
will1 which no other man possesses2 and 
surely sloth is1 as much as criminality1
 the product of social conditions4 ,if  
it be objected that this denial of food 

is no punishment but merely a letting   
alone1 we may inquire whether the       
starvation which used to be inflicted on
 prisoners for some offences was not a  
positive form of punishment4 ,and if it 
be said that the slothful man has it in 
his power1 at any time1 to escape       
starvation by beginning to work1 we may 
answer that the state says to the       
criminal1 also1 that he has nothing to  
do with its penalties as long as he     
abstains from the acts for which they   
are imposed4 ,why should the vindictive 
man1 the ,joseph ,phillippes1 the       
,jukes1 and ,eyrauds of the future      
receive sustenance1 care1 and kindness1 
in homes set apart for their especial   
use1 while the man who is merely        
indolent is driven to solitude and the  
roots and herbs of the forest for the   
support of existence8 ,perhaps1 in such 
case1 the indolent man may claim        
society's greater indulgence by taking  
to crime4  ,these determinists are      
sometimes heard to make the assertion   

that the punishment of criminals is     
wrong1 but that punishment of children  
must still be resorted to for their own 
sake as well as for that of society1    
since their character can be disciplined
 and bettered by it4 ,when we arrive at 
this inconsistency1 we get at the root  
of the whole objection to state         
punishment of criminals4 ,there is a    
growing dissatisfaction with present    
methods of punishment1 and this         
dissatisfaction1 insufficiently         
analyzed1 takes the form of objection to
 punishment altogether4 ,benevolence is 
progressing beyond present laws1 and    
demands their change2 that is the gist  
of the whole matter4  ,in the light of  
our analysis of the evolution of        
morality1 we may repeat the inquiry1    
left unanswered at the beginning of this
 work1 as to whether1 in the province of
 morals more than in other provinces1 we
 find a supernatural element or an      
element which1 in any way1 gives us an  
intimation of the supernatural or       

transcendental4 ,the question must be   
replied to in the negative4 ,if it be   
objected that we must not expect to find
 the supernatural in the natural1 we may
 reply that that is just what we have   
not expected to do4 ,the fallacy of such
 an expectation does not lie with us4   
,nature gives us no intimation of a     
supernature1 when we cease to see it    
with the uncomprehending eye of the     
untutored savage4 ,nor can the gross1   
cruel1 and superstitious savage be      
regarded as1 in contrast to more social 
and humane man1 better fitted to be the 
medium of spiritual truth4  ,and this   
brings us to the discussion of the      
presence or absence of conscience in    
lower animal species4 ,we have found    
that some species have social           
organization quite as elaborate as that 
of many savage tribes1 and even more    
elaborate than that of some tribes4 ,we 
are able to view these organizations    
only in their external features2 we     
cannot1 however1 in most cases1 suppose 

the species to be devoid of             
consciousness of some sort1 and         
consciousness involves1 in any case1    
pleasure in accustomed function and in  
its constantly experienced results2 the 
two1 action and experience of its       
results1 are1 in fact1 both functional4 
,the argument of inconstancy1 and of    
inconstancy at points at which it is not
 found among men1 has been shown to be  
absolutely valueless as directed against
 any theory of the existence of sympathy
 and social instinct among other animal 
species4 ,we too are inconstant in our  
altruism2 and habits of altruistic      
action do not necessarily take the same 
course with other species that they do  
with us1 differences in social          
organization rendering differences of   
habit necessary4 ,if other species fall 
below us in self-sacrifice for the      
community in some respects1 they often  
surpass us in others4 ,we may conclude1 
then1 that habits of mutual assistance1 
habits which we perceive to be          

externally altruistic1 must also be     
supposed to be connected in many cases  
with some internal corresponding        
feelings of the same nature as those    
which we term1 in man1 altruistic and   
social4 ,i do not see how we can avoid  
this conclusion unless we deny all      
consciousness to other species2 for     
consciousness must involve1 on any      
plane1 feeling as pleasure and pain4    
,and on the supposition of memory1 and  
of the connection in memory of those    
things and events which are constantly  
connected in experience1 we must suppose
 the seeking of ends1 also1 though they 
are1 probably1 in most cases1 much      
nearer ends than our human ones4 ,it may
 be true1 as ,professor ,morgan thinks1 
that animals have no general concept of 
ends and means2 but a general concept of
 ends and means is not necessary to the 
recognition of the fact that this or    
that particular form of action will have
 this or that particular result4 ,it is 
not necessary to apply the terms ends   

and means to events in order to         
understand their connection as following
 upon each other with constancy4        
,moreover1 we are accustomed to count   
only our own ends as ends proper1 and   
so1 only our own wisdom as wisdom2 and  
thus we term other species stupid for   
not understanding just our wisdom and   
acting on a line with us2 but certainly 
there are plenty of human beings whom we
 do not term wanting in reasoning powers
 who seek their own destruction or harm 
much more stupidly than many animals2   
and1 on the other hand1 there are many  
animals who act much more consistently  
for their own and others' welfare than a
 large number of mankind do4 ,if the    
failure of other species to comprehend  
our language and understand our action  
is to be termed stupid1 then what shall 
we term our failure to understand their 
methods of communication and motives of 
action8 ,it is time for us to emancipate
 ourselves from this narrow             
anthropomorphism in which we are        

accustomed to live1 and to realize and  
acknowledge that there may be other     
consciousness than our own1 with quite  
other thoughts1 feelings1 habits1 ends1 
and motives4 ,it is a part of our       
customary egoism that we prefer to exalt
 ourselves2 it is more gratifying to our
 vanity1 as well as more convenient to  
our conscience1 to regard other species 
as half-automatic and beneath our       
sympathy2 we thus have excuse for using 
them as we like4 ,so we call the tiger  
cruel because he is carnivorous as we   
ourselves are2 we call the fox cunning  
and sly for lying in ambush for his     
prey2 but when we go out to take1 by    
similar means1 our special prey1 we call
 our action a triumph of superior       
reason4 ,we term the fox a thief1 too1  
when he takes again from us what we are 
continually taking1 and what we took    
originally1 from the beasts4 ,what we   
regard as right and justifiable and even
 admirable in ourselves we regard as    
wrong1 cruel1 mean1 selfish1            

underhanded1 abhorrent1 and worthy of   
all punishment in the animals4 ,as for  
the faithfulness unto death displayed by
 many animals1 we do not regard that as 
heroism or worthy our admiration1       
although we might often take pattern    
from it4 ,how should we understand other
 species8 ,we are not accustomed to     
associate this or that feeling of       
pleasure in ourselves with a pricking up
 of ears or a wagging of tail1 or our   
deepest despondency and pain at repulse 
with this or that peculiar posture or   
animal cry4 ,a faint trembling of the   
human hand from fear or pain will stir  
us with the most profound sympathy2 but 
the sensitive quiver of the whole body  
in some helpless1 hopeless animal1 that 
cannot speak its fear or crave for mercy
 in the human tongue1 touches but seldom
 an answering chord in our hearts4      
,shame on our vanity and our            
hard-heartedness6  ,the whole of our    
analysis has tended to lay emphasis on  
habit4 ,and this leads us to comment on 

a certain disdain and contempt for habit
 and custom which is continually arising
 in some quarters4 ,the whole history of
 mankind is the history of the          
formation1 gradual change1 and spread of
 the change1 of habit1 and of custom as 
the social form of the latter4 ,with the
 progress of society1 habits and customs
 grow old and must be discarded2 but    
only careful consideration can show us  
when change is desirable4 ,it is1       
therefore1 both stupid and foolish to   
inveigh against a habit merely because  
it is habit or because it is of long    
standing4 ,originality1 intellectual    
superiority1 does not consist in a      
contempt for custom merely as custom1   
but in the power to weigh all sides1 to 
view a matter in all lights1 without    
regard to its age or newness1 and to    
decide on its worth according to its    
inherent merits or defects4 ,in the     
rebellion from the slavery to tradition 
as such1 the opposite1 equally          
unreasonable extreme of denunciation of 

all existing custom is often reached4   
,thus1 some followers of ,socrates1     
adhering slavishly to the word of their 
master but failing to comprehend its    
inner meaning1 dispensed with all the   
social usages of their nation1 and      
despised its laws4 ,of late patriotism  
is denounced as mere race-prejudice     
founded on habit and association4 ,but  
all our affections are matters of habit 
and association4 ,doubtless1 patriotism 
may often involve narrowness and        
injustice2 so also may a mother's love  
for her child1 or any other of the forms
 of the preference of affection4        
,however1 it does not follow1 therefore1
 that mother-love is to be denounced and
 rejected2 what we need is not less     
mother-love1 or father-love1 but a      
counterbalancing sympathy for other     
human beings outside the family1 also4  
,and so too we do not want less love of 
country1 but the infusion of it with a  
broader humanity and justice4 ,the love 
of a mother need not render her less1   

but may1 on the contrary1 render her    
more1 sympathetic2 and the love of      
country may be combined with a          
wide-reaching regard for the welfare of 
other men outside the nation to which   
the patriot belongs4 ,in fact1 the      
mother who is incapable of peculiar love
 for her own child is not likely to be  
capable of deep sympathy with other     
human beings2 and ,i am inclined to     
believe that there must be something    
lacking in a man's general moral        
constitution when he feels no peculiar  
regard for the land to which he belongs4
 ,if it is foolish1 as is sometimes     
asserted1 to love one country more than 
another1 simply because we happen to    
have been born in it1 then it is also   
equally foolish to love our mother      
simply because she happens to be our    
mother4 ,there may be other lands as    
good as ours1 and possibly there may be 
other mothers as good as ours2 but      
affection does not reason thus4  ,is    
social development the cause of an      

increase in sympathy1 or is the increase
 of sympathy the cause of social        
progress and prosperity8 ,or is increase
 of population the cause of both by     
forcing men to companionship8 ,or is    
not1 rather1 increase of population the 
effect of prosperity8 ,in his work on   
,recent ,discussions in ,science1       
,philosophy1 and ,morals1 ,herbert      
,spencer writes of the altruistic       
sentiments3 ,the development of these   
has gone on only as fast as society has 
advanced to a state in which the        
activities are mainly peaceful4 ,the    
root of all the altruistic sentiments is
 sympathy1 and sympathy could have      
become dominant only when the mode of   
life1 instead of being one that         
habitually inflicted direct pain1 became
 one which conferred direct and indirect
 benefits2 the pains inflicted being    
mainly incidental and indirect2 and in  
an essay on ,progress1 the author       
writes3 ,social progress is supposed to 
consist in the produce of a greater     

quantity and variety of the articles    
required for satisfying men's wants2 in 
the increasing security of person and   
property2 in widening freedom of action2
 whereas1 rightly understood1 social    
progress consists in those changes of   
structure in the social organism which  
have entailed these consequences4 ,the  
two paragraphs appear contradictory of  
each other1 the first laying emphasis   
upon outer conditions as cause of inner 
change1 the second seeming to emphasize 
inner conditions as cause2 but the terms
 of the second quotation are somewhat   
ambiguous4 ,as to the first1 to do ,mr4 
,spencer full justice1 he corrects this 
a little farther down1 where he says    
that sympathy is the concomitant of     
gregariousness1 the two having all along
 increased by reciprocal aid4  ,the root
 of the whole difficulty1 with regard to
 our theories of cause and effect in    
social development1 as with regard to   
our theories of cause and effect in     
other parts of nature1 lies in our      

desire for unity and simplicity4        
,instead of attempting to unravel the   
intricate web of the conditions1 we fix 
our attention on some one feature or    
side of the process1 and regard the     
whole development as revolving round    
this pivot4  ,it is easy to find        
examples1 in the history of science and 
opinion1 of the errors into which the   
concepts of cause and effect have led   
men1 and of the repeated recurrence of  
uncertainty to which the unveiling of   
these errors in the further march of    
knowledge1 has led4 ,for instance1 we   
find some writers on nervous diseases   
adhering to the view that insanity is   
sometimes the effect of a weak yielding 
to a violent disposition2 more          
contending that the violence is itself  
the effect of incipient insanity2 and   
still others opining that both violence 
of disposition and insanity are the     
effect of a general diseased state of   
the system4 ,ancient schools of medicine
 traced all diseases to the blood1 and  

so drained off the fluid2 and the patent
 medicines of to-day generally select   
some one organ as the source of all     
disease4 ,i once heard the assertion    
that a certain woman had died with grief
 contested by a physician on the ground 
that the cause of her death was         
consumption2 he added that deaths from  
sudden mental shock were known to       
medicine1 but the cases were rare2      
another medical man suggested that the  
system might not have been in a         
perfectly healthy condition at the time 
of the shock1 in those cases2 and the   
first man seemed a little puzzled when a
 third person suggested that there was  
doubtless a physical basis in every     
case4  ,,footnotes3  #afe ,adam ,bede4  
#aff ,daniel ,deronda4  #afg ,the       
,science of ,ethics1 pp4 #bch1 #bci4    
,the italics are mine4  #afh ,ibid4 pp4 
#bdb1 #bdc4  #afi ,as above1 pp4 #bee1  
#bef4 ,the italics are mine4  #agj      
,ibid4 p4 #ddc4  #aga ,ibid4 p4 #dda4   
,the italics are mine4  #agb ,ibid4 p4  

#bcf4 ,the italics are mine4  #agc      
,ibid4 p4 #bcg4  #agd ,ibid4 p4 #bci4   
,the italics are here also mine4  #age  
,the ,pathology of ,mind1 #ajb et seq4  
#agf ,in this general and limited sense1
 but only in this general and limited   
sense1 does ,spencer's assertion that   
more moral conduct shows a greater      
adjustment of means to ends1 correspond 
to the facts4  #agg ,see ,the ,science  
of ,ethics1 p4 #fb4  #agh ,the ,science 
of ,ethics1 pp4 #cge1 #cgf4  #agi ,the  
,science of ,ethics1 p4 #cjj4  #ahj ,the
 ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #cja4  #aha    
,see ,part ,i1 this book1 p4 #aag4  #ahb
 ,the ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #caj4     
,,chapter ,,vii  ,,the ,,moral          
,,progress ,,of ,,the ,,race ,,as       
,,shown ,,by ,,history   ,the necessity 
of the constant assimilation of savage  
tribes1 of the peopling of thinly       
inhabited areas1 renders social         
evolution as a whole exceedingly slow4  
,nor can there be1 even in isolated     
peoples1 any sudden leap from savagery  

to civilization2 in other words the term
 civilization is not of absolute but of 
comparative1 progressive1 import4 ,nor  
can we suppose the social evolution to  
have been only outward2 we cannot       
suppose that our cave-dwelling1         
man-eating1 rude ancestors1 if they     
could have been suddenly transported1 in
 infancy even1 into the midst of modern 
civilization by means of a ,carlylean   
wishing-cap1 or by some method of       
projection in time similar to that by   
which men promise to knock each other   
into the middle of next week1 would have
 been able to equal modern men in mental
 and moral attainment4 ,we may gain some
 idea of the gentle manners and moral   
character of our early progenitors from 
the customs of savage peoples of the    
present day2 although a very large      
number of these stand upon a higher     
plane than did the ancient savages known
 to geology4 ,i insert a few extracts   
from ,lubbock3--  ,mr4 ,galbraith1 who  
lived for many years1 as ,indian agent1 

among the ,sioux 7,north ,america71 thus
 describes them3 ',they are bigoted1    
barbarous1 and exceedingly              
superstitious4 ,they regard most of the 
vices as virtues4 ,theft1 arson1 rape1  
and murder1 are among them regarded as  
the means of distinction2 and the young 
,indian from childhood is taught to     
regard killing as the highest of        
virtues4 ,in their dances and at their  
feasts1 the warriors recite their deeds 
of theft1 pillage1 and slaughter1 as    
precious things2 and the highest1 indeed
 the only1 ambition of a young brave is 
to secure the feather1 which is but a   
record of his having murdered or        
participated in the murder1 of some     
human being--whether man1 woman1 or     
child1 it is immaterial2 and after he   
has secured his first feather1 appetite 
is whetted to increase the number in his
 cap1 as an ,indian brave is estimated  
by the number of his feathers4'#ahc     
',conscience1' says ,burton1 'does not  
exist in ,eastern ,africa1 and          

repentance expresses regret for missed  
opportunities of mortal crime4 ,robbery 
constitutes an honorable man2           
murder--the more atrocious the midnight 
crime the better--makes the hero4'#ahd  
,in ,tahiti1 the missionaries considered
 that 'not less than two-thirds of the  
children were murdered by their         
parents4' ,mr4 ,ellis adds1 ',i do not  
recollect having met with a female in   
the islands1 during the whole period of 
my residence there1 who had been a      
mother while idolatry prevailed1 who had
 not imbrued her hands in the blood of  
her offspring4' ,mr4 ,nott also makes   
the same assertion4 ,girls were more    
often killed than boys1 because they    
were of less use in fishing and in      
war4#ahe  ,williams tells us that       
'offences1 in ,fijian estimation1 are   
light or grave according to the rank of 
the offender4 ,murder by a chief is less
 heinous than a petty larceny committed 
by a man of low rank4'#ahf  ,among the  
,khonds of ,central ,india1 human       

sacrifices prevailed until quite lately4
 ',a stout stake is driven into the soil
 and to it the victim is fastened1      
seated1 and anointed with ghee1 oil1 and
 turmeric1 decorated with flowers1 and  
worshipped during the day by the        
assembly4 ,at nightfall the licentious  
revelry is resumed1 and on the third    
morning the victim gets some milk to    
drink1 when the presiding priest        
implores the goddess to shower her      
blessings on the people4 ,after the mock
 ceremony1 nevertheless1 the victim is  
taken to the grove where the sacrifice  
is to be carried out2 and to prevent    
resistance1 the bones of the arms and   
legs are broken1 or the victim drugged  
with opium or datura1 when the janni    
wounds his victim with the axe4 ,this   
act is followed up by the crowd4 ,a     
number now press forward to obtain a    
piece of his flesh1 and in a moment he  
is stripped to the bones4'  ,an almost  
identical custom prevails among the     
,marimos1 a tribe of ,south ,africa much

 resembling the ,bechuanas4444          
,schoolcraft mentions a444 sacrifice to 
the ',spirit of ,corn' among the        
,pawnees4 ,the victim was first tortured
 by being suspended over a fire4 ',at a 
given signal1 a hundred arrows were let 
fly1 and her whole body was pierced4    
,these were immediately withdrawn1 and  
her flesh cut from her bones in small   
pieces which were put into baskets and  
carried into the cornfield1 where the   
grain was being planted1 and the blood  
squeezed out on each hill4'#ahg ,human  
sacrifices occurred in ,guinea1 and     
,burton saw 'at ,benin ,city a young    
woman lashed to a scaffolding upon the  
summit of a tall blasted tree1 and being
 devoured by the turkey-buzzards4 ,the  
people declared it to be a fetich or    
charm for bringing rain4'444  ,captain  
,cook describes human sacrifices as     
prevalent among the islanders of the    
,pacific1 and especially in the         
,sandwich group4444 ,war captives were  
frequently sacrificed in ,brazil4#ahh   

,the lowest races have no institution of
 marriage4 ,true love is almost unknown 
among them1 and marriage in its lowest  
phases is by no means a matter of       
affection and companionship4444 ,in     
,north ,america1 the ,tinne ,indians had
 no word for 'dear' and 'beloved'2 and  
the ,algonquin language is stated to    
have contained no verb meaning 'to      
love1' so that when the ,bible was      
translated by the missionaries into that
 language it was necessary to invent a  
word for the purpose4#ahi  ,the position
 of women in ,australia seems1 indeed1  
to be wretched in the extreme4 ,they are
 treated with the utmost brutality1     
beaten and speared in the limbs on the  
most trivial provocation4 ',few women1' 
says ,eyre1 'will be found1 upon        
examination1 to be free from frightful  
scars upon the head or the marks of     
spear-wounds upon the body4 ,i have seen
 a young woman who1 from the number of  
these marks1 appeared to have been      
almost riddled with spear-wounds4'#aij  

,collins thus describes the manner in   
which the natives about ,sydney used to 
procure wives3 ',the poor wretch is     
stolen upon in the absence of her       
protectors4 ,being first stupefied with 
blows1 inflicted with clubs or wooden   
swords1 on the head1 back1 and          
shoulders1 every one of which is        
followed by a stream of blood1 she is   
then dragged through the woods by one   
arm1 with a perseverance and violence   
that it might be supposed would displace
 it from its socket4 ,this outrage is   
not resented by the relations of the    
female1 who only retaliate by a similar 
outrage when they find an               
opportunity4'#aia  ,indeed1 says        
,lubbock1 ,i do not remember a single   
instance in which a savage is recorded  
as having shown any symptoms of remorse2
 and almost the only case ,i can call to
 mind1 in which a man belonging to one  
of the lower races has accounted for an 
act by saying explicitly that it was    
right1 was when ,mr4 ,hunt asked a young

 ,fijian why he had killed his          
mother4#aib  ,we have direct evidence1  
in many present or recent customs1 of   
so-called civilized or half-civilized   
nations1 that the barbarous customs     
described in ,the ,origin of            
,civilization1 and in the books of many 
travellers1 are not the original and    
special inventions of modern savages    
merely1 but that similar customs        
prevailed among our progenitors4        
,lubbock notices many of these4 ,the    
marriage ceremonies of many peoples are 
particularly suggestive of a time when  
violent capture was the means of        
obtaining a wife1 and cruelty of        
treatment was her usual portion4#aic    
,human sacrifices were common among many
 peoples of ancient ,europe2 and the    
cancellation of responsibility for      
murder with fines 7often nominal in the 
case of the murder of a man of lower    
rank7 was a widely spread custom4 ,in   
,russia1 writes ,lubbock1 as in         
,scandinavia1 human sacrifices continued

 down to the introduction of            
,christianity4 ,in ,mexico and ,peru    
they seem to have been peculiarly       
numerous4 ,mueller has suggested that   
this may have partly arisen from the    
fact that these nations were not        
softened by the possession of domestic  
animals4#aid ,various estimates have    
been made of the number of human victims
 annually sacrificed in the ,mexican    
temples4 ,mueller thinks #bejj is a     
moderate estimate2 and in one year it   
appears to have exceeded #ajj1jjj4 ,in  
,northern ,europe1 human sacrifices were
 not uncommon4 ,the ,yarl of the        
,orkneys is recorded to have sacrificed 
the son of the ,king of ,norway to ,odin
 in the year #hic4 ,in #iic1 ,hakon     
,yarl sacrificed his own son to the     
gods4 ,donald1 ,king of ,sweden1 was    
burnt by his people as a sacrifice to   
,odin1 in consequence of a severe       
famine4 ,at ,upsala was a celebrated    
temple1 round which an eye-witness      
assured ,adam of ,bremen that he had    

seen the corpses of seventy-two victims 
hanging up at one time4#aie  ,a peculiar
 confusion as to the definition of      
morality sometimes gives rise to such   
vagaries of theory as the defence of    
murder committed by savages1 and other  
cruelties practised1 on the ground that 
these things are not considered sins in 
the moral code of the peoples among     
which they are practised2 murder is thus
 excused on the plea that wrecking is   
also looked upon as permissible2#aif and
 ,wallace thinks that savages live up to
 their simple moral code as well as     
civilized human beings to their         
elaborate one1 so that they are1 in     
reality1 as moral as these latter4 ,it  
should not be forgotten1 however1 that  
the moral code is itself the product of 
the tribe and represents its moral      
sentiment4 ,lubbock remarks that if a   
man's simple moral code permits him to  
rob and murder1 the code is at least an 
unfortunate one for the victims4#aig ,on
 the other hand1 ,lubbock himself       

defends human sacrifice as the result of
 deep and earnest religious feeling4#aih
 ,but if sympathy were strong1 such     
sacrifices would be impossible1 and the 
religious code would be altered just as 
the religious code of ,christians is    
altered to keep up with social progress4
 ,opinion and feeling are not two       
separable things1 one of which may      
advance while the other remains behind2 
when feeling becomes strong enough1 the 
opinion arises that this or that custom 
before practised is wrong4 ,as long as  
man is cruel by nature1 however1        
conscience will not torment him for     
cruelty1 and it is possible for him to  
regard it as wholly justifiable4  ,but  
,i am of the opinion that moral progress
 has been made not only since the time  
of our savage ancestors1 but even also  
since the time of the great ancients1 in
 spite of the obstacles to such         
advancement presented in the necessity  
of the moral assimilation of immense    
races of savages1--the leavening of the 

whole of ,europe4 ,i believe that modern
 civilization has caught up to and      
surpassed the ancient4 ,the knowledge we
 have of ancient peoples is necessarily 
most imperfect2 nevertheless1 we may1 ,i
 believe1 discover considerable evidence
 of general moral inferiority to the    
present day4 ,any advance that has been 
made will be likely to be most          
observable in those general virtues     
which lie at the foundation of all      
social cooeperation--truthfulness in    
word and honesty in act1 and the gradual
 widening of concepts of justice from   
individual and class privilege and race 
prejudice1 to the inclusion of mankind  
as a whole4 ,and the growth of sympathy 
will be most noticeable in the treatment
 of those classes of beings which       
possess least physical means of         
compelling respect for their            
rights--animals1 children1 women1 the   
poor1 and ignorant1 and sick1 and aged4 
,we may begin with the children4 ,the   
,lacedemonian custom of giving over the 

weak and defective children to          
destruction is familiar to us all4      
,before ,solon1 children were often sold
 by ,athenian parents for debt2 and even
 during the ages of greatest culture1   
the exposure of children seems to have  
been a common ,athenian practice1       
regarded with little or no disapproval  
by the general public4 ,mahaffy writes3 
,the cool way in which ,plato in his    
,republic speaks of exposing children1  
shows that1 as we should expect1 with   
the increase of luxury1 and the decay of
 the means of satisfying it1 the        
destruction of infants came more and    
more into the fashion4 ,what can be more
 painfully affecting than the practice  
implied by ,socrates1 when he is        
comparing himself to a midwife 7,theaet4
 #aea ,b474 ',and if ,i abstract and    
expose your first-born1 because ,i      
discover that the conception you have   
formed is a vain shadow1 do not quarrel 
with me1 as the manner of women is1 when
 their first children are taken from    

them4 ,for ,i have actually known some  
men ready to bite me when first ,i have 
deprived them of a darling folly4'#aii  
,that the exposure of children is       
generally mentioned only incidentally by
 ,greek writers1 is perhaps the         
strongest argument of all that the      
custom was regarded with indifference by
 the majority4 ,a considerable number of
 the exposed children seem to have been 
rescued to be brought up as prostitutes1
 but many must have perished miserably4 
,we have reason for doubting whether the
 average ,greek would have shown an     
equal sympathy to that of ,mr4          
,stephen's modern pickpockets1 in the   
supposed case of danger to a child on   
the race-course2#bjj--unless1 indeed1   
the child were an especially fine bit of
 animal flesh4  ,the same narrow sort of
 expediency in morals which permitted   
the exposure of children is exhibited1  
again1 in the lack of regard for the    
aged shown by the ,athenians at all     
periods of their history2--in ,sparta   

the old men were treated with some      
considerable respect4 ,says ,mahaffy3   
,the strongest case against the         
,periclean ,greeks1 and one which marks 
their parentage most clearly from their 
,homeric ancestors1 is the treatment of 
their old men4 ,for here it is no       
inferior class1 but their equals1 nay   
even those to whom they directly owed   
their greatness1 whom they cast aside   
with contempt when their days of        
usefulness had passed by4444 ,the ,greek
 lawgivers were accordingly most        
explicit in enjoining upon children the 
nurture and support of aged parents who 
could otherwise expect little from the  
younger generation4 ,the ,attic law     
alone added a qualification1 that the   
children were to be without             
responsibility if their parents had     
neglected to educate them4 ,aristophanes
 describes the treatment of the aged in 
his ,wasps1--where he declares that the 
only chance of respect or even safety is
 to retain the power of acting as a     

juryman1 so extorting homage from the   
accused and supporting himself by his   
pay without depending on his children4  
,when he comes home with his fee1 they  
are glad to see him1 in fact he is able 
to support a second wife and younger    
children1 as the passage plainly        
implies1 whereas otherwise the father   
must look towards his son and his son's 
steward to give him his daily bread1    
'uttering imprecations and mutterings   
lest he knead me a deadly cake1' a dark 
insinuation which opens to us terrible  
suspicions4#bja  ,the women of ,greece  
were comparatively well cared for1 as   
might be expected in a nation and       
country peculiarly susceptible to the   
influence of grace and beauty2 they were
 consequently of a comparatively        
admirable type4 ,however1 we are fond1  
,i think1 of indulging in this respect1 
our preference for believing the        
romantic2 so that we usually select     
carefully the best instances and infer  
that the standard of all ,greece was on 

this plane4 ,the reasons for this are   
manifold4 ,we have the habit of         
imagining1 from ,greek art1 that all    
,greek women were beautiful2 and it is  
unpleasant to associate moral           
inferiority with great beauty1 or to    
imagine its being treated with          
unkindness or disrespect4 ,again1 we are
 pleased at discovering examples of love
 and faithfulness even in the far-away  
ages1 and the pleasure of the discovery 
exalts the few instances with which     
,greek literature provides us to a      
disproportionate importance and         
significance4 ,disappointed at not      
finding their perfect ideal in their own
 age and nation1 men have pleased       
themselves with the imagination of      
perfection in an object belonging to    
another age1 with regard to which no    
sordid reality of every-day relation and
 common1 vulgar needs could intervene to
 check enthusiasm4 ,furthermore1 it is  
safer to admire those distant from us in
 time and place1 since we are secure    

from any demand of faithfulness and     
self-sacrifice from their side4 ,poets  
and artists have assisted us in this    
license of agreeable fancy4 ,so we      
dwell1 with special emphasis1 on the    
beauty of ,penelope's character1 which  
is not at all exceptionally faithful as 
measured by modern standards2 we warm   
over the story of ,antigone while we    
pass by1 without special enthusiasm1 a  
thousand instances as admirable in our  
own day and within our own observation2 
and we read1 with delight1 the tale of  
the ,greek who encouraged his ignorant  
child-wife by gentle treatment until she
 overcame her timidity1 became tame and 
docile1 and was persuaded to discard    
cosmetics and high-heeled shoes and     
devote herself to her household duties2 
though the most of us would regard the  
forced marriage of such a child1 if it  
occurred in our own day1 as no more than
 child-barter1 and the conduct of the   
husband 7doubtless not worsened by his  
representation of it7 as but a moderate 

exhibition of common decency4 ,mahaffy  
says of the ,greeks of the ,homeric age3
 ,there is ample evidence that the      
lower-class women1 the slaves and even  
the free servants1 were subjected to the
 hardest and most distressing sorts of  
work1 the carrying of water1 and the    
grinding of hand-mills2 in fact we see  
them standing to men-servants nearly in 
the same relation that the              
,north-,american squaw stands to her    
husband--over-taxed1 slave-driven1 worn 
out even with field-work1 while he is   
idling1 or smoking1 or sleeping4#bjb    
,the wives of ,athens of all periods    
were little more than a higher class of 
household servants1 with almost no      
share1 by education1 in either the      
science or the art that was the delight 
of their nation and made its            
superiority4 ,the position of the       
hetairai was better in some respects2   
but the apparently widely spread        
preference of the ,greeks of the        
cultured classes for what we term       

unnatural crime argues against any      
considerable degree of education even in
 their case4 ,women were sometimes found
 in the ,greek schools of philosophy1   
but these were evidently isolated cases4
 ,the passage from the ,theaetetus above
 quoted shows us the unhappy and        
subservient position of ,athenian women 
in one respect2 and many other passages 
of ,plato throw an unfavorable light    
upon their lot2 though we have1 perhaps1
 to remember that the central figure of 
the ,dialogues had some personal reason 
for being a woman-hater4 ,the outcasts  
from society as we call them were not   
the immoral and the profligate1 but the 
honorable and virtuous4 ,accordingly1   
when we consult the literature of the   
day1 we find women treated either with  
contemptuous ridicule in comedy1 or with
 still more contemptuous silence in     
history4#bjc  ,human sacrifices were not
 unknown to the earlier ,greeks4 ,of the
 later days1 of ,athenian culture1      
,mahaffy says3 ,plutarch tells us that  

,themistocles was forced by the         
acclamations of the army to sacrifice   
three ,persian prisoners of distinction 
brought in just before the battle of    
,salamis1 though he was greatly affected
 at the terrible nature of the          
sacrifice1 so that it appears to have   
been then unusual4 ,but ,aristophanes1  
long after1 makes allusions to what he  
calls ,greek3 pharmakoi1 as still       
remembered at ,athens1 if not still in  
use 7,ran4 #gcb71 and which the         
scholiasts explain1 chiefly from        
,hipponax1 as a sort of human scapegoat1
 chosen for ugliness or deformity 7a    
very ,greek standpoint7 and sacrificed  
for the expiation of the state in days  
of famine and pestilence1 or of other   
public disaster4 ,i think that          
,aristophanes alludes to the custom as  
bygone1 though the scholiasts do not    
think so2 but its very familiarity to   
his audience shows a disregard of human 
life strange enough in so advanced a    
legal system as that of democratic      

,athens4#bjd  ,mahaffy calls attention  
to the exceeding cruelty practised by   
the ,greeks in the ,peloponnesian war1  
and adds3 ,it was not merely among      
,corcyreans1 or among ,thracian         
mercenaries1 but among the leaders of   
,greece that we find this disgusting    
feature4 ,the ,spartans put to death in 
cold blood #bbe prisoners whom they took
 in ,plataea after a long and heroic    
defence4444 ,but this is a mere trifle  
when we hear from ,plutarch that        
,lysander1 after the battle of          
,a,egospotami1 put to death #cjjj       
prisoners 7,alcib4 c4 #cg cp4 the       
details in his ,lysander1 c4 #ac71444   
,athenians1 men of education and of     
culture4444 ,the unfortunate ,athenian  
general1 according to ,theophrastus     
7,plut4 ,lys4 #ac71 submits with        
dignified resignation to a fate which he
 confesses would have attended the      
,lacedemonians had they been vanquished4
  ,for the ,athenians1 with their       
boasted clemency and culture1 were very 

nearly as cruel as their enemies4 ,in   
the celebrated affair of the            
,mitylenaeans1 which ,thucydides tells  
at length in his third book1 the first  
decree of the ,athenians was to massacre
 the whole male population of the       
captured city4 ,they repented of this   
decree1 because ,diodotus proved to     
them1 not that it was inhuman1 but that 
it was inexpedient4 ,mahaffy argues1 in 
opposition to ,grote1 that there was no 
real sentiment of sympathy in the       
repentance of the ,athenians in this    
affair1 for how could the imagined      
details of the massacre of #fjjj men in 
,lesbos have been a motive1 when the    
,athenians did1 at the same time1 have  
the ringleaders executed at ,athens1 and
 they were more than #ajjj men 7,thuc4  
,,iii4 #cj74 ,these were executed       
together1 by the hands of ,athenians1   
not with fire-arms but with swords and  
knives4 ,a few years after1 the         
inhabitants of ,melos1 many hundreds in 
number1 were put to the sword1 when     

conquered after a brave resistance      
7,thuc4 ,v4 #aaf71 and here1 ,i fear1   
merely for the purpose of making way for
 a colony of ,athenian citizens1 who    
went out to occupy the houses and lands 
of their victims4#bje  ,the practice of 
torturing witnesses in court was common 
in ,periclean ,athens4 ,on this point1  
,mahaffy writes3 ,our best authorities  
on this question are1 of course1 the    
early orators1 especially ,antiphon1 in 
whose speeches on cases of homicide this
 feature constantly recurs4 ,it is well 
known that in such cases the accused    
might offer his own slaves to be        
tortured1 in order to challenge evidence
 against himself2 and it was thought a  
weak point in his case if he refused to 
do so when challenged4 ,it is also well 
known that the accusers were bound to   
make good any permanent injury1 such as 
maiming1 done to these slaves4  ,but    
there were both restrictions and        
extensions of this practice as yet but  
little noticed4 ,it was not the custom  

to torture slaves who gave evidence to a
 fact1 but only if they denied any      
knowledge1 or appeared to suppress it in
 the interest of their master           
7,antiphon1 ,tetral4 ,a1 ,greek3 g74 ,on
 the other hand1 it was common enough to
 torture female slaves and also free    
men4444  444 ,almost all the orators    
speak of it as an infallible means of   
ascertaining the truth4 ,demosthenes    
says it has never been known to         
fail4#bjf ,the restrictions on certain  
extremities of torture in court diminish
 in importance when we consider that the
 poor slave stood1 in reality1 in all   
cases1 between two alternatives of      
suffering1 that inflicted by the court  
and that likely to be inflicted by his  
master in case his evidence displeased  
the latter4 ,that he was a piece of     
property of some value was doubtless no 
more a safeguard to the ,greek slave    
under the hands of his master than it   
has been in any modern slave-holding    
country2 the ,greek was doubtless at    

least as liable as the man of to-day to 
forget ultimate loss in the rage of     
present anger and the malevolent        
pleasure of revenge4  ,the condition of 
slaves among the ,greeks furnishes us1  
indeed1 with one of our strongest       
arguments against their moral code4 ,we 
do not need to mention the ,helots1     
whose name has become a synonym of      
degradation and misery4 ,slaves formed  
the greater part of the working         
population of ,athens1 and were much    
more numerous than the freemen4 ,nor    
were they necessarily even of inferior  
race or education4 ,not only did all    
prisoners taken in war become slaves1   
with their descendants forever1 except  
as their masters chose to emancipate    
them 7and the possession of such a      
superfluity sometimes rendered the      
,athenians generous in this respect71   
but1 until the time of ,solon1 freemen  
might be sold into bondage for          
debt1--and not alone for a large debt1  
but also for a small one1 and not merely

 until the debt was paid1 but for all   
time4 ,nor have we reason to suppose    
that freemen were treated1 even in the  
days of ,athens' greatest culture1 with 
great humanity4 ,at the opening of the  
,euthryphro there is a story told which 
is not intended to be anything          
exceptional1 and which shows that the   
free laborer1 or dependent1 had not     
bettered his position since the days    
when ,achilles cited him as the most    
miserable creature upon earth4 ',now the
 man who is dead1' says ,euthryphro1    
'was a poor dependent of mine who worked
 for us as a free field-laborer at      
,naxos1 and one day1 in a fit of drunken
 passion1 he got into a quarrel with one
 of our domestic servants slaves and    
slew him4 ,my father bound him hand and 
foot and threw him into a ditch1 and    
then sent to ,athens to ask of a diviner
 what he should do with him4 ,meantime1 
he had no care or thought of him1       
deeming him a murderer1 and that even if
 he did die1 there would be no great    

harm4 ,and this was just what happened4 
,for such was the effect of cold and    
hunger and chains upon him that before  
the messenger returned from the diviner 
he was dead4 ,and my father and family  
are angry with me for taking the part of
 the murderer and prosecuting my        
father4'#bjg  ,we have not much evidence
 as to the treatment of animals in      
ancient ,greece4 ,race-horses are likely
 to have been well cared for1--as long  
as they were young and swift or         
beautiful4 ,but it does not appear      
probable1 from what we know of the      
,greek attitude towards slaves and      
dependents1 women and children1 that a  
,society for the ,prevention of ,cruelty
 to ,animals would have flourished in   
,greece4  ,when we come to inquire as to
 the moral status of the ,greeks with   
regard to honesty1 truthfulness1 and    
reliability in general1 we find them    
particularly lacking4 ,their failure to 
come up with modern standards in this   
respect every schoolboy knows4 ,ulysses 

is called the man of many wiles1 with   
evident intent to compliment4 ,in the   
poems of ,theognis1 favorites with the  
,greek nobility1 it was openly          
recommended to fawn upon your enemy1 to 
deceive him till he was in your power1  
and then wreak vengeance upon him4 ,it  
is usual1 among critics1 to speak of    
this as the attitude of ,theognis1 and  
of the special aristocracy to which he  
belonged4 ,they forget that we find the 
same attitude in the moral ,pindar      
7,pyth4 ii4 #hd74 ,it is expounded by   
,hesiod as proximate 799,greek3 ,erg4   
#afe sqq471 by ,thucydides as universal1
 at a later epoch4#bjh ,mahaffy says of 
the ,greeks up to the time of           
,thucydides1 that they had been often   
treacherous and cruel1 generally        
dishonest and selfish2 but1 withal1     
often generous and gentlemanly1 always  
clever and agreeable1 and always carried
 away by a love of beauty more than by a
 respect for truth4#bji ,at the time of 
,darius1 the ,milesians1 who had        

involved that king in a bloody and      
expensive war1 and burned his ,lydian   
capital1 were yet treated kindly by him 
when taken prisoners1 and settled in his
 own country4 ,in return they were      
always trying to beg or embezzle the    
treasure of the king at ,susa4 ,there   
was1 indeed1 a single exception1        
,scythes1 tyrant of ,zancle--who asked  
leave to visit ,sicily1 and returned to 
die in ,persia4 ',him ,darius considered
 to be the most righteous of all those  
who had gone up to him from ,greece1 in 
that he kept his promise to the great   
king4'  ,what an evidence of ,greek     
dishonesty4 ,we can well fancy the      
,aryan barons of ,darius' court speaking
 in the tone of the ,roman ,juvenal4 ,to
 them1 too1 the ,graeculus esuriens was 
but too well known1--with his           
fascination1 his cleverness1 and1       
withal1 his mean and selfish knavery4 ,i
 need hardly remind the ,greek scholar1 
continues ,mahaffy1 that all through the
 ,ionic revolt1 and through the ,persian

 wars1 this treachery and this          
selfishness were the mainstays of the   
,persians2 in fact1 had they depended   
upon these more completely1 the         
subjugation of ,greece would have been a
 mere question of time4#baj  ,there was 
a certain ,glaucus at ,sparta1          
celebrated for justice1 as well as in   
other respects1 to whom a ,milesian1 who
 had heard of his fame1 came and        
entrusted a treasure1 wishing as he     
said1 to get the benefit of his justice1
 since ,ionia was disturbed4 ,of course1
 such a temptation was too much even for
 this paragon of ,greek honesty4 ,when  
the heirs of the ,milesian came with    
their tokens and claimed the treasure1  
he professed to know nothing of the     
affair1 though when they had gone away1 
he consulted the oracle as to whether he
 might spend the money1 and was so      
strongly rebuked1 that he finally gave  
it back4#baa ,this ,mahaffy mentions as 
an instance where the influence of the  
oracle was a moral one4  ,there remains 

one general and especially significant  
criticism to be made on ,greek morals as
 a whole2 the great mass of the people  
were little cared for and in a state of 
unfreedom4 ,professor ,robiou of ,rennes
 aptly remarks that the democracy of    
ancient times1 and that of ,athens in   
particular1 had little in common with   
modern democracy4 ,the very large       
majority of the working population were 
slaves1 and had1 consequently1 no rights
 of any sort1 so that the 'laborers1' at
 whose political rights ,xenophon and   
,aristophanes jest1 were generally what 
we call patrons4444  ,as for the        
laborers and the inhabitants of the     
environs and villages1 since political  
rights could be exercised only at the   
,athenian ,pnyx and there was no idea of
 a representative system1 it is clear   
that the presence of many of them in the
 assembly could be only an exception1 in
 spite of the modest indemnity which was
 offered them2 among the country people 
the large and middle-class proprietors  

alone were in a condition to take part  
regularly4 ,that is to say1 one has no  
difficulty in concluding that1 in       
comparison with other times and other   
countries1 the ,athenian democracy was  
an aristocracy4#bab ,and we may add     
that1 all things considered1 the great  
mass of the people had less of liberty  
and privilege1 were far more subject to 
the despotism and caprice of the few1   
than in most modern monarchies4 ,in what
 modern country not inhabited by savages
 would a man be permitted1 at the       
present day1 to throw even a murderer   
into a ditch and leave him to perish of 
hunger and cold8 ,the carelessness of   
the ,greeks in regard to the inner      
spirit of morals is often excused on the
 ground that it was at least combined   
with a large degree of tolerance2 but   
this tolerance appears to be1 to a great
 extent1 mythical4 ,the politics of     
,athens ostracized men whose opinion was
 feared by the state1 or rather by a    
certain number of citizens1 and the     

,greek religion stained its records with
 the death of ,socrates and the         
persecution of other philosophers4      
,stilpo was exiled for doubting whether 
the ,athene of ,phidias was a goddess   
and the books of ,anaxagoras and        
,protagoras were publicly burned4 ,there
 was1 moreover1 an inquisitorial bureau 
at ,athens4#bac ,however1 it is true    
that the ,greeks were1 as a people1 too 
little in earnest and too superstitious 
to fall into doubt of the national      
mythology4  ,we have less difficulty in 
showing the superiority of modern to    
,roman civilization1 and for the reason1
 partly1 that we know more about ,roman1
 than we do about ,greek civilization4  
,the ,romans were1 from the beginning1 a
 robust and warlike people1 and the     
military discipline which made them     
conquerors extended into their social   
relations and even into their family    
life4 ,the exposure of children appears 
to have been a common practice1 and     
looked upon leniently even after direct 

infanticide was visited with some degree
 of general disapproval4 ,parents were  
the absolute masters of their children1 
having the power to put them to death1  
or to sell them as slaves2 and this was 
not only true of children in their      
younger years1 but during the whole life
 of the father4 ,livy and ,valerius     
,maximus give numerous instances of     
parents who had put their children to   
death4 ,it is recorded1 however1 that   
,hadrian banished a man who had killed  
his son1 and decreed that whatever a son
 might earn in military service should  
belong to himself2 while ,alexander     
,severus forbade the killing of adult   
sons1 and ,diocletian rendered the sale 
of children illegal4#bad ,lecky however 
remarks that the sale of children in    
case of great necessity1 though         
denounced by the ,fathers1 continued    
long after the time of ,theodosius1 nor 
does any ,christian emperor appear to   
have enforced the humane enactments of  
,diocletian4#bae  ,human sacrifices     

occurred among the ,romans far more     
frequently than among the ,greeks1 and  
continued even down to a late date1 says
 ,mahaffy4 ,in the year #df ,b4,c41     
,caesar sacrificed two soldiers on the  
altar in the ,campus ,martius4 ,augustus
 is said to have sacrificed a maiden    
named ,gregoria4 ,even ,trajan1 when    
,antioch was rebuilt1 sacrificed        
,calliope1 and placed her statue in the 
theatre4 ,under ,commodus1 and later    
emperors1 human sacrifices appear to    
have been more common2 and a gladiator  
appears to have been sacrificed to      
,jupiter ,latialis even in the time of  
,constantine4 ,yet these awful rites had
 been expressly forbidden ,b4,c4 #ie2   
and ,pliny asserts that in his time they
 were never openly solemnized4#baf  ,if1
 however1 the direct sacrifice of human 
victims came in time to be forbidden1   
there grew out of it1 at a comparatively
 early period1 a custom very nearly if  
not quite as barbarous1 which was       
practised on an immense scale and down  

to a late date2 namely1 the gladiatorial
 contests4 ,the men who took part in    
these contests were either slaves1      
criminals1 military captives1 or men    
especially trained for the profession4  
,many of these last were exposed        
children who had been rescued for the   
purpose2 their number being also        
recruited from other ranks4 ,lecky seems
 to excuse the condemnation of military 
captives to these shows1 saying that    
their fate could not strike the early   
,romans with the horror it would now    
inspire1 for the right of the conquerors
 to massacre their prisoners was almost 
universally admitted4#bag ,the argument 
is similar to that noticed and          
criticised above--one bad principle     
cannot be an excuse for another1 though 
the two are1 doubtless1 in this case1   
cooerdinate4 ,every criminal can give us
 a reason for his crime out of the      
uniformity of his own character4 ,the   
question is1 simply1 whether we are     
considering the facts from a purely     

indifferent standpoint1 as historical1  
or from an ethical standpoint2 and if   
from the latter1 then we must have some 
standard of measurement4 ,we may choose 
to make this1 in all cases1 the average 
of the period and nation2 though there  
will be1 in that case1 considerable     
difficulty in determining the average4  
,or we may use some ideal standard1     
which1 as ideal1 does not vary with all 
variations of the society considered1   
but is constant4 ,but we have no logical
 right1 having assumed the one standard1
 to confuse it with the other1 treating 
the two as interchangeable4 ,the        
standard of any age by which men judged 
their deeds is also part of the morality
 of the age1 by which we may judge it4  
,as for the criminals who fought in the 
arena1 they were sometimes pardoned1    
when victorious1 so that society        
received back again its most muscular1  
or skilful and alert criminals4 ,of all 
,roman authors and rulers1 ,lecky       
mentions only ,seneca1 ,plutarch1       

,petronius1 ,junius ,mauricus1 and      
,marcus ,aurelius1 who condemn the      
games4#bah ,cicero is undecided on the  
subject2 rather in favor of them4 ,the  
great satirist1 ,juvenal1 though he     
repeatedly mentions1 does not condemn   
them4 ,and of all the great historians  
who recorded them not one seems to have 
been conscious that he was recording a  
barbarity1 not one appears to have seen 
in them any greater evils than an       
increasing tendency to pleasure and an  
excessive multiplication of a dangerous 
class4 ,on the other hand1 the attempt  
to introduce them into ,athens was      
unsuccessful4#bai  ,an immense increase 
of gladiators and gladiatorial shows    
took place in the earlier days of the   
empire1 when the increase of slavery    
freed a large portion of the ,roman     
population from the necessity of labor1 
and men came to occupy themselves with  
amusements1 on the one hand as a        
profession1 on the other as means of    
passing the time4 ,in the days of the   

,republic1 the slaves were comparatively
 few in number and probably treated with
 more care1 though scarcely with much   
consideration2 all things were permitted
 the master by law1 says ,lecky1 though 
probably the censor might interfere in  
extreme cases4 ,the elder ,cato speaks  
of slaves simply as instruments for     
obtaining wealth1 and he encouraged     
masters1 both by his precept and his    
example1 to sell them as useless when   
aged and infirm4#bbj ,under ,titus and  
,trajan probably occurred the greatest  
number of shows that were compressed    
into a short time1444 and no ,roman     
seems to have imagined that the fact of 
#cjjj men having been compelled to fight
 under the one1 and #aj1jjj under the   
other1 cast the faintest shadow upon    
their characters4#bba ,moreover1 the    
mere desire for novelty impelled the    
people to every excess or refinement of 
barbarity4 ,the simple combat became at 
last insipid1 and every variety of      
atrocity was devised to stimulate the   

flagging interest4 ,at one time a bear  
and a bull1 chained together1 rolled in 
fierce contest along the sand2 at       
another1 criminals dressed in the skins 
of wild beasts were thrown to bulls1    
which were maddened by red-hot irons1 or
 by darts tipped with burning pitch4    
,four hundred bears were killed on a    
single day under ,caligula2 three       
hundred on another day under ,claudius4 
,under ,nero1 four hundred tigers fought
 with bulls and elephants2 four hundred 
bears and three hundred lions were      
slaughtered by his soldiers4 ,in a      
single day1 at the dedication of the    
,colosseum by ,titus1 five thousand     
animals perished4444 ,lions1 tigers1    
elephants1 rhinoceroses1 hippopotami1   
giraffes1 bulls1 stags1 even crocodiles 
and serpents1 were employed to give     
novelty to the spectacle4 ,nor was any  
form of human suffering wanting4 ,the   
first ,gordian1 when edile1 gave twelve 
spectacles1 in each of which from one   
hundred and fifty to five hundred pair  

of gladiators appeared4 ,eight hundred  
pair fought at the triumph of ,aurelian4
 ,ten thousand men fought during the    
games of ,trajan4444 ,under ,domitian1  
an army of feeble dwarfs was compelled  
to fight1 and more than once female     
gladiators descended to fight in the    
arena4 ,a criminal personating a        
fictitious character was nailed to a    
cross1 and there torn by a bear4        
,another1 representing ,scaevola1 was   
compelled to hold his hand in a real    
flame4 ,a third1 as ,hercules1 was burnt
 alive upon the pile4 ,so intense was   
the craving for blood1 that a prince was
 less unpopular if he neglected the     
distribution of corn than if he         
neglected the games2 and ,nero himself1 
on account of his munificence in this   
respect1 was probably the sovereign who 
was most beloved by the ,roman          
multitude4 ,heliogabalus and ,galerius  
are reported1 when dining1 to have      
regaled themselves with the sight of    
criminals torn by wild beasts4 ,it was  

said of the latter that 'he never supped
 without human blood4' ,moreover1 the   
prince was most popular who1 at the show
 of thumbs1 permitted no consideration  
of economy to make him hesitate to      
sanction the popular award4#bbb ,even in
 the closing years of the fourth        
century1 the prefect ,symmachus1 who was
 regarded as one of the most estimable  
pagans of his age1 collected some ,saxon
 prisoners to fight in honor of his son4
 ,they strangled themselves in prison1  
and ,symmachus lamented the misfortune  
that had befallen him from their        
'impious hands1' but endeavored to calm 
his feelings by recalling the patience  
of ,socrates and the precepts of        
philosophy4#bbc  ,the conquest of       
,greece is alleged to have bettered     
somewhat the position of ,roman slaves1 
since it involved the introduction of   
many slaves who were the intellectual   
superiors of their masters4 ,but        
whatever good this may have effected    
seems to have been counteracted by the  

increase in number of the slaves and the
 consequent diminution in value of the  
individual slave as a piece of property4
 ,on the whole1 the position of the     
slaves of ,north ,america1 before the   
war of emancipation1 bad as it was in   
some cases1 seems to have been1 on the  
average1 quite paradisiacal when        
compared with that of their ,roman      
forerunners4 ,it has already been       
mentioned that ,cato urged his          
compatriots to sell their aged slaves4  
,old and infirm slaves were constantly  
exposed to perish on an island in the   
,tiber4 ,it was also customary1 in case 
of the murder of the master1 to put all 
the slaves of the household to death who
 were not in chains or helpless at the  
time of the murder4 ,the testimony of   
the slave was generally received only   
under torture2 he might be tortured in  
the attempt to compel evidence against  
his master2 but1 if he1 of his own free 
will1 accused his master of any crime1  
except treason1 he was condemned to the 

arena4 ,there were different punishments
 for slaves and for men of rank4        
,numerous acts of the most odious       
barbarity were committed4 ,the          
well-known anecdotes of ,flaminius      
ordering a slave to be killed to        
gratify1 by the spectacle1 the curiosity
 of a guest2 of ,vedius ,pollio feeding 
his fish on the flesh of slaves2 and of 
,augustus sentencing a slave who had    
killed and eaten a favorite quail1 to   
crucifixion1 are the extreme examples   
that are recorded2 for we need 6 not    
regard as an historical fact the famous 
picture in ,juvenal of a ,roman lady in 
a moment of caprice1 ordering her       
unoffending servant to be crucified4 ,we
 have1 however1 many other very horrible
 glimpses of slave life at the close of 
the ,republic and in the early days of  
the ,empire4 ,the marriage of slaves was
 entirely unrecognized by law1 and1 in  
their case1 the words adultery1 incest1 
or polygamy had no legal meaning4444    
,when executed for a crime1 their deaths

 were of a most hideous kind4 ,the      
ergastula1 or private prisons of the    
masters1 were frequently their only     
sleeping places4444 ,we read of slaves  
chained as porters to the doors1 and    
cultivating the fields in chains4 ,ovid 
and ,juvenal describe the fierce ,roman 
ladies tearing their servants' faces1   
and thrusting the long pins of their    
brooches into their flesh4 ,the master1 
at the close of the ,republic1 had full 
power to sell his slave as a gladiator  
or as a combatant with wild beasts4#bbd 
,lecky admonishes us that we should not 
judge the whole institution of ,roman   
slavery by this one side of the picture4
 ,he calls attention to the respect in  
which learned ,greek slaves were often  
held1 as showing a better phase of the  
system2 but it is quite possible that   
certain slaves or classes of slaves     
should be held in respect and that the  
rest of the slaves should be treated1   
nevertheless1 with anything but respect 
or kindness4 ,the great wonder to the   

modern mind is that the ,romans felt at 
liberty to hold learned ,greeks slaves  
at all4 ,lecky points out that slaves   
were emancipated in great numbers2 but  
we must remember1 first1 that slaves    
were very plentiful1 further1 that      
freedmen and their descendants remained 
bound1 by a sort of feudal tie1 to their
 former masters until the third         
generation1 and moreover that it was    
considered an honor to have many        
freedmen in one's following2 so that the
 advantage of manumission was often1 as 
,lecky himself says1 on the side of the 
master4 ,slaves were sometimes          
emancipated to prevent their revealing  
crimes of their masters under torture1  
and many slaves were given their liberty
 especially in order that they might    
make a show in the funeral train4       
,augustus1 indeed1 found it necessary to
 restrict emancipation by will to one   
hundred slaves4#bbe ,seneca mentions    
that masters who ill-treated their      
slaves were the object of public odium2 

but then it may occur to us to inquire  
what the ,romans considered             
ill-treatment2 some of the laws which   
,lecky cites in evidence of the         
improvement of the slave's position in  
the third or last of the periods under  
which he considers this position may    
appear to his readers as much evidence  
against1 as in favor of1 kindness on the
 part of the masters4 ,the ,petronian   
law1 he says1 which was issued by       
,augustus1 or more probably by ,nero1   
forbade the master to condemn his slave 
to combat with wild beasts without a    
sentence from a judge4 ,we may inquire  
as to how difficult it was to obtain    
such a sentence4 ,under ,claudius some  
citizens exposed their sick slaves on   
the island of ,a,esculapius in the      
,tiber to avoid the trouble of tending  
them1 and the emperor decreed that if 6 
the slave so exposed recovered from his 
sickness1 he should become free1 and    
also that masters who killed their      
slaves instead of exposing them should  

be punished as murderers4444 ,under     
,nero1 a judge was appointed to hear    
their complaints1 and was instructed to 
punish masters who treated them with    
barbarity1 made them the instruments of 
lust1 or withheld from them a sufficient
 quantity of the necessaries of life4444
 ,domitian made a law1 which was        
afterwards reiterated1 forbidding the   
,oriental custom of mutilating slaves   
for sensual purposes1 and the reforms   
were renewed with great energy in the   
period of the ,antonines4#bbf ,hadrian  
and his two successors formally deprived
 masters of the right of killing their  
slaves2 forbade them to sell slaves to  
the lanistae or speculators in          
gladiators2 destroyed the ergastula or  
private prisons2 ordered that1 when a   
master was murdered1 those slaves only  
should be tortured who were within      
hearing2 appointed officers through all 
the provinces to hear the complaints of 
slaves2 enjoined that no master should  
treat slaves with excessive 8 severity2 

and commanded that1 when such severity  
was proved1 the master should be        
compelled to sell the slave he had      
ill-treated4#bbg ,the humanity of the   
last law is open to dispute4 ,moreover1 
,lecky does not notice1 here1 that      
,constantine nevertheless felt it       
necessary to limit the punishment of    
slaves by prohibiting its administration
 with a cudgel1 though not with the     
lash1 and forbidding poison1 mortal     
wounds1 various kinds of torture1       
stoning1 hanging1 mutilation1 or        
throwing from a height4#bbh ,but he     
mentions two facts which indicate some  
degree of humanity in certain           
directions1 and namely3 that1 though the
 law did not recognize the marriage of a
 slave1 it appears not to have been     
common to separate his family2 also1    
that the private property of slaves was 
recognized by their masters1 though part
 or all of it usually reverted to the   
master on the death of the slave4 ,the  
great mass of evidence goes to show1    

however1 that what the ,romans termed   
humanity to slaves would have been1 in  
the eyes of modern civilized peoples1   
extreme barbarity4  ,women1 among the   
,romans1 were1 like their children1     
under the control of the head of the    
family--father or husband4 ,the father  
disposed absolutely of the hand of his  
daughter and sometimes even possessed   
the power of breaking off marriages that
 had been actually contracted4 ,in the  
forms of marriage1 however1 which were  
usual in the earlier periods of ,rome1  
the absolute power passed into the hands
 of the husband1 and he had the right1  
in some cases1 of putting her to death4 
,the power appears to have become quite 
obsolete during the ,empire2 but the    
first legal act 7which was rather of the
 nature of an exhortation than of a     
command7 against it was issued by       
,antoninus ,pius1 and it was only       
definitely abolished under              
,diocletian4#bbi ,roman women had1 at   
first1 no share by law in the heritage  

of their fathers2 but public opinion    
revolted1 in some cases1 from the law1  
and gradually this was considerably     
altered4 ,when marriage became1 under   
the ,empire1 a mere matter of mutual    
consent1 divorce a mere matter of       
repudiation1 the daughter1 though       
married1 often remained in her father's 
house1 having full control over her own 
property4 ,practically1 if not always   
legally1 the position of women among the
 ,romans seems to have been considerably
 better than among the ,greeks2 ,roman  
wives became1 gradually1 far more nearly
 the equals of their husbands than      
,greek wives ever were1 and appear to   
have received a proportionately greater 
degree of love4 ,their position1        
however1 falls far behind that of even  
,german women at the present day1 and   
certainly much behind that of every     
other civilized nation4  ,after         
recording the use of animals in the     
public games1 there is little need of   
considering the subject of their        

treatment specially2 there can be no    
doubt as to its probable nature2 though 
certain famous ,romans had their brute  
favorites4  ,it is sometimes argued     
that1 though we are morally superior to 
the ,greeks and ,romans in some         
respects1 we fall short of their        
standard in other respects4 ,doubtless  
new forms of evil may arise in later    
periods1 which were impossible under old
 forms of government and the social     
relations of earlier peoples4 ,each     
period and nation will1 according to its
 circumstances1 have its own peculiar   
forms of vice and misery4 ,but the      
question which we are considering is not
 whether or not we have some forms of   
evil which the ancients did not possess1
 but whether the particular forms which 
prevail among us are or are not worse   
than those which prevailed in ,greece   
and ,rome1 and1 in general1 whether the 
average of sympathy and altruistic      
action in modern times and among the    
foremost peoples is greater than the    

average among the ,greeks and ,romans4  
,and it must be recollected1 moreover1  
in considering the question1 that while 
the evil in our midst is brought very   
vividly before our eyes through the     
medium of our many methods of           
news-carrying and of wide personal      
observation1--through our railways1 our 
telegraphs1 our many newspapers and     
periodicals1--we have1 in reality1 when 
all is told1 very scanty knowledge of   
the daily life of the common people1 of 
the ordinary1 every-day miseries and    
sufferings1 among the ,greeks and       
,romans4 ,but there are some features of
 these facts that tell in favor of      
modern times2 for the ancients were but 
little impressed by the miseries of the 
poorer classes2 and just the spirit that
 notes and makes much of our modern     
inhumanity is evidence of a broader     
sympathy peculiar to our later times4   
,of ,europe as a whole in the centuries 
after ,rome's decline and its loss of   
power1 it is not necessary to say much1 

in order to prove the moral superiority 
of modern times4 ,we are all acquainted 
with the fierce contests between        
,christianity and its opponents1 with   
the mutual persecutions1 the martyrdoms 
of ,christians and the retaliation of   
,christians upon heretics1 with the     
license and bigotry of the clergy1 the  
robbery and oppression of the poor and  
dependent by these as well as by the    
titled castle-owners1 the burning of    
witches1 the general intellectual and   
moral darkness which spread and covered 
even the lands of former comparative    
civilization and was lifted only as     
,europe as a whole advanced to a higher 
stage4  ,but without entering into any  
extended discussion of this complicated 
process of development as a whole1 after
 the disturbance of the old equilibrium1
 it may not be undesirable to note the  
general course of events in some one    
country as typical1 not in its special  
features1 but in its general moral      
import1 of the course of development in 

the other countries of ,europe also4    
,the manner of the growth of state and  
social recompense for evil out of       
individual and tribal vengeance has     
already been touched upon4 ,the enemy   
within1 and the enemy without the tribe1
 the foe of the battle-field and the    
criminal were regarded1 at many stages1 
with much the same feeling of animosity1
 the advantage being rather in favor of 
the criminal4 ,to the ,greek all those  
who were not ,greeks were barbarians1   
against whom but little justice or mercy
 was necessary2 and1 as we have seen1   
the ,romans condemned to the arena their
 war-captives equally with their        
criminals1 together with slaves who were
 also1 originally1 war-captives4 ,crime 
is1 in ruder societies1 hardly          
distinguished from other forms of       
aggression that are1 later1 not included
 under this head4 ,the definition of    
crime differs greatly in different      
periods of a people's history1 changing 
as the conceptions of morality as duty  

to society as a whole emerge from the   
crude conceptions of individual and     
tribal constraint through revenge4 ,it  
is for this reason that the history of  
criminal law and the administration of  
justice constitute1 in reality1 a       
history of moral evolution4 ,there is   
nothing that is a clearer index of the  
moral status of a people than its       
treatment of those considered to be     
malefactors4  ,caesar and ,tacitus both 
mention human sacrifices as taking place
 in ,england before the ,roman conquest2
 but little is known certainly on the   
subject4 ,the ,romans1 of course1       
introduced their own laws and customs1  
which existed side by side with many    
ancient ones not wholly abolished4 ,the 
torture and burning of slaves for       
various offences was customary4 ,these  
penalties were gradually mitigated4 ,but
 the invasion of the ,teutonic tribes   
seems to have introduced many new       
barbarities4 ,in the first half of the  
tenth century1 for instance1 appears a  

law which condemned to the stake female 
slaves who had stolen from any but their
 masters1 the wood to be piled about    
them by eighty other slaves of their own
 sex2 this last office being designed1  
doubtless1 to impress the lesson upon   
the minds of the eighty attendants4     
,later1 many heretics were burned1 and  
the writ for the burning of heretics was
 not abolished until the reign of       
,charles ,,ii41 though it was           
practically annulled by the laws of     
#afdh4 ,however1 in #afdi1 a number of  
women were burned for witchcraft in     
,berwickshire1 and burning continued to 
be practised1 much later1 in cases of   
heresy and witchcraft2 still later in   
cases of high and petty treason1 and up 
to the time of ,george ,,iii41 for      
murder4 ,in the thirtieth year of the   
latter's reign1 a statute was passed    
substituting hanging for burning4 ,in   
#aghd1 a woman was burnt at ,portsmouth 
for the murder of her husband4 ,during  
the last years1 however1 in which the   

sentence was carried out1 it seems to   
have been customary for the executioner 
to wring the malefactor's neck before   
the burning4 ,but comparatively trivial 
offences1 among these false coining1    
were classed as treason1 and it is      
noticeable also that the stake seems to 
have been a favorite punishment in the  
case of women-offenders1 even in later  
days4#bcj ,in the year #aecj1 two       
persons of the household of the ,bishop 
of ,rochester having died from poison   
thrown into some porridge by the cook1  
an ,act of ,poisoning was passed1       
according to which offenders coming     
under its definition were to be boiled  
to death4 ,the statute was shortly      
afterwards repealed1 but the bishop's   
cook was publicly executed in accordance
 with its provision4#bca  ,but simple   
burning or hanging was1 for the most    
part1 considered much too good for the  
man who had committed high treason2 he  
was given the mere mockery of a trial1  
and1 if convicted1 was hanged1 was taken

 down while yet alive1 disembowelled1   
and his entrails burnt1 was beheaded1   
and quartered4 ,law modifying this      
penalty first comes into prominence in  
the reign of ,william ,,iii4#bcb ,when  
,richard ,i4 sailed with his army for   
the ,holy ,land1 it was ordained that   
whoever killed a man on board ship was  
to be tied to the corpse and thrown into
 the sea1 whosoever killed a man on     
shore was to be burnt alive with the    
corpse1 while simply drawing blood with 
a knife was to be punished with the loss
 of a hand1 and a thief was to be       
shaved1 treated to a head-bath of       
boiling pitch and feathers1 and put     
ashore at the first place the vessel    
touched at4#bcc  ,the payment of        
blood-money was a common custom among   
the ,teutons1 and so little distinction 
was made between greater and lesser     
crime that1 while a murderer could      
commonly buy off the relatives of his   
victim1 the petty thief often suffered  
death or mutilation for his offence4    

,pike says of these punishments in the  
early history of ,britain3 ,it was for  
the free man of low estate1 for the     
slave1 and for women1 that the greatest 
atrocities were reserved4 ,men branded  
on the forehead1 without hands1 without 
feet1 without tongues1 lived as an      
example of the danger which attended the
 commission of petty crimes1 and as a   
warning to all who had the misfortune of
 holding no higher position than that of
 a churl4 ,the horrors of the ,danish   
invasions had no tendency to mitigate   
these severities2 and those who were    
chastised with whips before were        
chastised with scorpions afterwards4    
,new ingenuity was brought to bear upon 
the art of mutilation1 which was        
practised in every form4 ,the eyes were 
plucked out2 the nose1 the ears1 and the
 upper lip were cut off2 the scalp was  
torn away2 and sometimes even1 there is 
reason to believe1 the whole body was   
flayed alive4#bcd ,the law of the tenth 
century1 according to which a female    

slave who had committed theft was burnt 
alive by eighty women-executioners1 has 
already been mentioned2 parallel to this
 law was the law that a male slave who  
was a thief was to be stoned to death by
 eighty slaves1 any one of whom1 who    
missed the mark three times1 was to be  
whipped three times4 ,if a thief was a  
free woman1 she was to be thrown down a 
precipice or drowned4#bce ,the law did  
not favor women4  ,the dividing line    
between mutilation and torture is a     
difficult one to draw4 ,one of the      
earlier forms of trial was by ordeal4   
,the accused1 with his hand bound in    
cloth1 was compelled to snatch a stone  
from elbow or wrist-depth in a caldron  
of boiling water1 or to lift a weight of
 heated metal4 ,if1 at the end of three 
days1 when the cloth which bound the arm
 was removed1 no scald or burn was      
visible1 the accused was pronounced     
innocent4 ,these ordeals took place in  
the church with much sprinkling of holy 
water and other ceremony4 ,the clergy   

themselves seem to have had less trying 
substitutes for these ordeals1 often    
being compelled only to take oath on the
 sacrament1 or to partake of consecrated
 bread or cheese which was supposed to  
produce evil results in case of guilt4  
,as ,pike suggests1 it is quite possible
 that1 as priests had the preparing of  
this bread or cheese1 it may sometimes  
have come up to expectations in this    
respect2 as it is also possible that the
 cloths bound on the arm of the layman  
who was to undergo the ordeal of fire or
 water may have been differently        
arranged in different cases4#bcf ,as    
late as the reign of ,king ,john1 trial 
was made by ordeal1 and mention is also 
made of it in the reign of ,henry ,,ii4 
,it was not formally abolished until the
 year #abai4bcg ,for remaining mute     
before accusers in court1 the dire      
penalty of imprisonment with starvation 
was inflicted1 in the reign of ,edward  
,i41 and to this punishment was added1  
about the time of ,henry ,,iv41 torture 

by the press4#bch ,in #aegj1 a man found
 guilty of forging warrants for the     
arrest of two persons was sentenced to  
the pillory for two days1 on the first  
of which one ear1 on the second the     
other1 was to be nailed to the pillory  
in such a manner that he must by his own
 proper motion tear it away4#bci ,the   
rack is supposed to have been introduced
 into ,england in the reign of ,henry   
,,vi41 and in the reign of ,henry       
,,viii4 was added ,skevington's         
,daughter1 an instrument by which       
offenders were compressed rather than   
extended until the miserable human being
 lost all form but that of a globe4     
,blood was forced from fingers1 toes1   
nostrils1 and mouth1 and ribs and       
breast-bone were commonly broken in4    
,the thumb-screw was also in use1 and   
there was a ,dungeon among ,rats1 and a 
chamber in the ,tower called ,little    
,ease1 in which it was impossible either
 to stand upright or to lie at full     
length4#bdj ,the press was not abolished

 until the reign of ,george ,,iii4#bda  
,it is recorded of the case of          
,burnworth1 tried for murder in #agbf1  
that he bore pressure of nearly four    
hundred weight1 for an hour and         
three-quarters1 before begging for mercy
 and pleading ,not ,guilty4 ,he was1    
however1 found guilty and hanged4#bdb   
,in #afcj1 ,alexander ,leighton was     
punished for framing1 publishing1 and   
dispensing a scandalous book against    
kings1 peers1 and prelates1 in the      
following manner3 he was whipped1 put in
 the pillory1 had one of his ears cut   
off and one side of his nose slit1 was  
branded on one cheek with a red-hot     
iron1 was afterwards returned to the    
,fleet to be kept in close custody1 and 
seven days later was whipped again at   
the pillory1 had the other ear cut off1 
his other nostril slit1 and his other   
cheek branded4#bdc ,as late as #agcd1   
,john ,durant1 who either was1 or       
pretended to be1 deaf and unable to     
read1 had his thumbs tied and the knot  

drawn hard because he did not answer the
 accusation of the court2 he was also   
threatened with the press4#bdd          
,excepting in cases where the press was 
used1 torture was not1 according to     
,pike1 practised in ,england after the  
first part of the seventeenth century2  
but the case just cited is a            
contradiction of so broad an assertion4 
,the introductions of customs of penance
 did much towards rendering the         
differences in the punishment and       
general treatment of the poor and rich1 
the humble and noble1 more conspicuous4 
,as for the clergy1 they had special    
benefits given them1 and were           
accustomed1 in the early days of        
,britain1 to murder1 rob1 and indulge   
their passions very nearly as they      
chose1 without interference from the    
state4#bde ,but the ,benefit of ,clergy1
 which rendered any one subject to it1  
practically exempt from the ordinary    
punishments for most of the greater     
crimes1 was applicable1 in later        

centuries1 not only to clergymen proper1
 but also to all clerks1 the term       
including every one who had been married
 and could read4#bdf ,the position of   
the slave after the ,teutonic invasion  
has been noticed4 ,the position of the  
churl was nearly as bad4 ,the infliction
 of a penalty which he could not pay1   
and which none would pay for him1       
rendered him utterly bankrupt in        
freedom4444 ,if he left the place       
assigned to him it was held that he had 
stolen his own body4 ,he could be       
summarily hanged when caught1 and his   
life was worth nothing to his lord1 or  
even to his kindred1 unless they        
redeemed him4 ,this was the fate which  
was continually impending over the free 
man of low estate if he had the         
misfortune to make enemies among those  
who had the power to save or condemn    
him4#bdg ,in the reign of ,edward ,i41 a
 statute was passed which made it a     
grave offence to devise or tell any     
false news of prelates1 dukes1 earls1   

barons1 or nobles of the realm4 ,others1
 too1 were enumerated as being within   
the meaning of the act--the ,chancellor1
 the ,justices of either ,bench1 and all
 the great officers of state4 ,under    
,richard ,,ii41 the statute was         
reenacted and made more stringent4#bdh  
,for most trivial offences of all sorts1
 extreme punishment was meted out4      
,mutilation was often inflicted merely  
for the killing of game belonging to the
 ,king's forests1 and though the ,forest
 ,charter of ,henry ,,iii4 provided that
 no one should1 in future1 lose life or 
limb for the sake of the ,king's deer1  
the penalty does not seem to have gone  
out of use at this period1 for other    
offences4 ,in the reign of ,edward      
,,iii41 a tailor was sentenced1 for     
brawling in court1 to imprisonment in   
the ,tower of ,london for life and the  
loss of his right hand2 and the rolls of
 ,gaol ,delivery of this period show    
conclusively that the ordinary          
punishments were hanging1 the pillory1  

and the tumbrel or dung-cart4#bdi ,late 
in the reign of ,henry ,,viii41 an act  
was passed condemning any person who    
struck another so that blood was drawn1 
within the limits of the ,king's house1 
to the loss of his right hand4 ,the     
pillory was in use up to the reign of   
,queen ,victoria2 it could be applied to
 perjurers and suborners of perjury     
until the year #ahcg4 ,it was even      
applied to women for no greater crime   
than fortune-telling1 late in the       
eighteenth century4#bej ,of the other   
punishments associated with the old     
spirit of violence1 and inflicted in    
public1 the chief was whipping4 ,it was 
commonly awarded to men guilty of petty 
thefts4444 ,instances in which women    
were whipped were by no means uncommon  
at the very end of the eighteenth       
century4 ,until #ahjh1 pocket-picking1  
until #ahaa1 stealing from              
bleaching-grounds1 were punished with   
death4 ,in #ahac1 #ahaf1 and #ahah1 a   
bill was introduced to abolish capital  

punishment for a theft of five shillings
 from shops2 but it was defeated in the 
,house of ,lords4 ,in #ahbj1 the amount 
necessary to the death-sentence was     
raised to ,l#ae4 ,until #ahcb1 horse1   
cattle1 and sheep stealing1 theft from a
 dwelling-house1 and forgery1 were      
capital offences4 ,in #ahcc1            
house-breaking2 in #ahcd1 returning from
 transportation before expiration of the
 sentence2 and1 in #ahce1 sacrilege and 
letter-stealing ceased to be punished   
with death4 ,but it was not until #ahfa 
that hanging was limited by law to cases
 of murder and treason4#bea  ,the worst 
element of the punishment by pillory or 
in any manner in public did not lie so  
much in the punishment itself1 as in the
 violence of the mob1 which appears to  
have been regarded as a legitimate part 
of the ceremony1 and against which the  
criminal seldom received any protection4
 ,sometimes1 the man or woman sentenced 
to the pillory for a petty offence died 
of stoning at the hands of the          

onlookers2 and ,pike writes of the      
burning of a woman in #agba1 for        
coining3 ,her last wish was that she    
might say a prayer in peace4 ,but the   
mob which had come out to take its ease 
and its pleasure had no mind to         
sacrifice its rights for the comfort of 
a criminal4 ,a woman at the stake was a 
good butt for filthy missiles and ribald
 jests2 the yelling rabble would not    
permit the poor wretch to collect her   
thoughts1 or to hear her own words1 and 
instead of sympathy they gave her       
stones4 ,when the fire was kindled1 even
 the consuming flames must have seemed  
less cruel than the men and women       
standing around4#beb  ,we all know the  
condition in which ,howard found the    
prisons of his day2 and if we possess   
strong powers of imagination1 we may    
perchance be able partly to conceive    
what must have been their state in days 
when the people knew but very little of 
what passed within prison-walls1 and the
 keepers wielded an almost absolute     

power over the prisoners4 ,if the abuses
 which were common even two centuries   
ago were to occur in only a few         
instances to-day1 the whole ,english    
nation would flame with indignation4 ,in
 the fourteenth century1 jail-breaking  
was frequent in cases where the prisoner
 could afford to pay for his escape2    
judges were often bribed2 a clerk who   
was delivered over to the bishop before 
or after sentence1 according to the     
,benefit of ,clergy1 could still be     
acquitted by the bishop in case the     
requisite number of compurgators were   
found to swear to belief in his         
innocence2 and1 moreover1 clerks who had
 been convicted could not afterwards be 
tried for any offence committed before  
their conviction4 ,on the other hand1 if
 a woman attempted to obtain sentence   
against the murderer of a relative1 she 
had not only to fear the revenge of the 
man's allies1 who seem to have had      
things very much their own way2 but in  
case courage deserted her at the last1  

and she failed to appear against the    
accused1 she was waived or outlawed2    
again it may be remarked that the laws  
of ,england did not favor women4#bec    
,writs were forged1 juries were packed1 
judges1 justices1 and sheriffs bribed4  
,in the reign of ,james ,i41 the young  
countess of ,essex1 who1 having fallen  
in love with ,lord ,rochester during the
 absence of her husband1 had obtained a 
divorce to marry him1 became angry with 
a friend of her lover who counselled him
 against the marriage1 caused him to be 
imprisoned in the ,tower1 had the       
,lieutenant and under-keeper of the     
,tower replaced by friends of hers1 and 
through the aid of these administered   
poison to him4 ,the countess and her    
husband were arrested on charge of      
causing the death1 and the former       
pleaded1 the latter was proved1 guilty4 
,yet the two were pardoned1 though some 
of their accomplices were executed4#bed 
,it is impossible that such customs     
should exist1 in legal relations1 in    

connection with great justice and       
sympathy in other relations4 ,some      
allowance may be made for idiosyncrasy1 
for individual and national             
peculiarities2 it is possible that a    
bloody-minded and cruel ruler may find  
pleasure in petting pigeons1 but his    
pleasure will be likely to be rather of 
an egoistic order1 and his apparent     
kindness easily turned to cruelty if    
anger comes upon him4 ,so1 too1 the     
cruel potentate may prove a kind husband
 and friend1 as long as his own         
interests coincide1 and do not conflict1
 with those of his friends or his       
family4 ,but the man who is consistently
 treacherous and unfeeling in any one   
relation will not1 as a rule1 show      
consideration and tenderness in other   
relations1 except in so far as these    
other relations subserve his own ends of
 gain or vanity2 the point where they   
part company with such ends is the point
 where he will resort to another mode of
 action4 ,the same is true of nations4  

,accordingly1 we find brigandage and    
open robbery common even down to the end
 of the last century1 and not only on   
the part of the poorer classes1 or      
rather not so much on their part as on  
that of princes1 nobles1 and even the   
clergy2 we find pirating and wreckage   
common on the sea2 we find intrigue upon
 intrigue at court1 nobles and members  
of the royal family continually plotting
 each other's murder1 but nevertheless  
escaping punishment and received with   
adulation2 we find the much-praised     
heroes of the ,crusades devasting the   
lands through which they passed1        
violating wives and daughters of their  
hosts1 and deserting to the enemy for   
bribes2 we find wholesale massacres of  
unoffending ,jews2 we find perjury a    
profession1 station an excuse for nearly
 every crime1 religion a cloak for      
extortion and vice1 and oppression of   
the poor and lowly universal4 ,and yet  
we weep over modern deterioration6  ,we 
forget1 when we read--perhaps with an   

exclamation that man is as much a savage
 as ever--how the onlookers at the      
burning of the ,shanghai made no effort 
to save lives but only to secure spoil1 
that it is only a short time since such 
scenes must have been common enough on  
all the shores of ,europe2 we forget1   
when we shudder with horror at an       
exceptional case of unjust or brutal    
punishment on the borders of our        
civilization1 that it is not long since 
torture and mutilation1 barbarities of  
every sort1 were practised among the    
foremost nations of the world1 and for  
the most trivial offences4 ,nor do we   
always remember1 when we grow indignant 
at the hard case of our poor1 that there
 was a time when the excess of indigent 
population was prevented only by famines
 and pestilences which killed their     
thousands upon thousands1 and of which  
we very seldom see the like in modern   
times2 we forget that there was a time  
when the desperate rising of the        
continental peasantry against the bitter

 oppression of the landowners drew from 
even the reformer ,luther the           
exclamation that the revolters ought to 
be throttled collectively4 ,i have no   
intention to underrate present evils or 
to excuse them by past ones4 ,i see no  
reason for believing that the present   
age should rest upon its laurels2 on the
 contrary1 ,i believe that we are only  
at the beginning of civilization2 but ,i
 see no need for denying past evolution 
in order to make this assertion4        
,starvation is not easier to a man      
to-day1 because it is proved to him that
 many more men died of hunger in the    
past than die of it in the present      
century4 ,but just for this reason1 ,i  
fail to understand why there should be  
so much effort expended by certain      
reformers in the attempt to disprove    
what history and observation yet so     
plainly show1--namely1 that the         
condition of the masses at present1     
taken for all in all1 is much better    
than it has ever been before2 that      

misery is not so extreme or             
proportionately so widely spread2 that  
the worst sorts of crime are decreasing2
 that justice is more general1 and that 
sympathy is warmer1 than in any previous
 age4 ,it is true that we have new      
methods of exploiting the poor2 but we  
need to consider how our ancestors would
 have used those opportunities had they 
possessed them2 and we need also to     
remember1 with regard to a particular   
form of evil1 that some time is         
necessary for society as a whole to grow
 to a comprehension of its increase and 
importance1 and to reach unanimity of   
opinion as to action for its removal4   
,as forms of evil change1 some one      
particular form may increase for a time1
 swallowing up in itself1 as the larger 
wave accumulates several small ones1    
various other forms1 until the slowly   
gathered resistance of public opinion   
brings the reaction4  ,we may gather    
valuable evidence as to our progress1   
even in comparison with recent times1 by

 reference to our artistic literature4  
,true1 the great writers have often been
 far ahead of their times4 ,but if we   
regard the average1 we shall soon       
perceive the signs to which ,i refer4   
,the stilted mannerisms of the ancient  
novel mark the absence of democratic    
feeling1 and witness to the less general
 diffusion of true kindness1 which1     
wherever it appears1 tends to           
simplicity1 having no need of           
mannerisms4 ,nothing1 too1 is more      
indicative of our advancement than the  
change in conceptions of humor2 for to  
know what a nation laughs about is to   
know what are its ideals and            
shortcomings4 ,earlier humor is often   
mere vulgarity or brutality1 or a       
mixture of the two2 obscenity1 vice1 and
 the heartless torture of the weak and  
helpless are its favorite themes1 and   
appear in the characters of its heroes  
and ideals4 ,the truthfulness of ,victor
 ,hugo's description of earlier ,british
 fun1 in his ,l',homme qui rit1 is borne

 witness to by ,english literature4     
,all modern literature marks the        
progress of the democratic idea4 ,our   
history and our art are full of the     
people4 ,the very unrest and            
dissatisfaction of the time are signs of
 a more general and a better education1 
an increase of sympathy in degree and   
extent1 and1 ,i believe1 of better      
nourishment and a more energetic        
physique4 ,the higher ideals which were 
once the property of the few are become 
the property of the many4 ,our          
institutions are grown more democratic  
and humane4 ,we have our free hospitals 
and dispensaries1 our soup-kitchens and 
cheap lodging-houses1 our asylums for   
the deaf1 the dumb1 the blind1 old      
people and orphans1 the weak and        
afflicted of all kinds1 our guilds1     
,settlements1 and ,open-air charities1  
our creches1 our refuges and            
reformatories1 our societies for the    
,prevention of ,cruelty to ,children and
 to ,animals1 our ,open ,doors1 and     

,midnight ,missions1 our trade and      
industrial schools1 and our free schools
 and scholarships and free libraries4   
,in times of famine1 disease1 and       
disaster1 we band together to aid1 and  
funds for the distressed pour in from   
every side1 and not only from people of 
the nation to which the sufferers       
belong1 but often also from those of    
distant parts of the world4 ,fancy the  
,greeks subscribing to a fund in aid of 
cholera-stricken barbarians2 imagine the
 ,romans1 even1 clubbing together1 in   
every part of the world to which they   
had wandered1 to succour the sufferers  
by a ,johnstown flood2 or conceive of   
the wealthy classes of the ,middle ,ages
 furnishing fires and food as did the   
,parisians during the unusual winter    
cold of #ahij-ia6  ,not only has        
sympathy become more wildly diffused    
within the state2 it has spread outside 
it also4 ,national narrowness is slowly 
disappearing4 ,the federation of the    
states of ,europe and of the civilized  

world is no longer looked upon as a     
mad-man's fancy but as a sober          
possibility or even a probability4 ,it  
is now agreed that war between the      
,english-speaking nations of the        
earth1--between ,england and her        
colonies1 or ,england and the ,united   
,states1 is very nearly1 if not quite1  
an impossibility4 ,the union of three of
 the most powerful nations of ,europe1  
not for war but for peace1 is assuredly 
of great political importance in itself2
 but of even more importance in the     
influence insensibly exerted by its     
continuance upon the opinions of the    
world4 ,the masses of the people        
themselves are becoming more and more   
cosmopolitan1 and we have an            
ever-increasing number of international 
unions and congresses1 political1       
scientific1 artistic1 and ethical4  ,on 
the whole1 it is1 perhaps1 as much a    
lack of imagination as anything which   
makes us fall into the mistake of       
underestimating our own age and         

overestimating all others4 ,the crimes  
and abuses far away in times different  
from our own are difficult to conceive1 
and stir our blood even less than those 
distant in space2 the sufferings of the 
,middle ,ages1 or even of one or two    
centuries ago1 are more difficult to    
realize and move us less than a famine  
or flood in ,china or a murder in the   
heart of ,africa4 ,the things           
immediately before our eyes affect us   
most2 and it is well1 for many reasons1 
that this is so4 ,nevertheless1         
idealization of the past is evil in its 
consequences4 ,for1 if present progress 
is to some men an excuse for easy-going 
inactivity1 the extent of existing evil 
is even more often an excuse for the    
same selfish course4  ,man has had1 in  
all periods1 the tendency1 in his       
discontent with the present1 to invest  
with ideal attributes of every sort some
 past period in which the special evils 
he deplores did not1 perhaps1 exist2 the
 dissatisfied of all times have imagined

 a golden age somewhere in the past4    
,the old1 who look on the innovations of
 a younger generation with distrust1 and
 are likely to mistake1 in remembrance1 
the gold of their own life's morning for
 an outer radiance independent of their 
youth1 add to our delusion2 while the   
young confuse their increasing knowledge
 of the evil of the world with an       
increase of the evil itself4 ,but the   
more science progresses1 and the greater
 our acquaintance with the facts of     
history becomes1 the more these         
delusions tend to disappear4 ,the       
much-praised simplicity of our ancestors
 was1 in truth1 a half-savagery1 where  
the higher forms of justice were not    
practised1 that finer tact and          
consideration which makes life best     
worth living was unknown1 and many of   
the faults which we most deplore in our 
own day were considered rather virtues  
than otherwise4 ,it is a moral pity that
 poets and philosophers have lent the   
beauty of their verse and the dignity of

 their eloquence to the idealization of 
the past4 ,indeed1      ,i do distrust  
the poet who discerns     ,no character 
or glory in his times1     ,and trundles
 back his soul five hundred years1      
,past moat and drawbridge1 into a       
castle-court1     ,to sing--oh1 not of  
lizard or of toad     ,alive i' the     
ditch there1--'twere excusable1     ,but
 of some black chief1 half knight1 half 
sheep-lifter1     ,some beauteous dame1 
half chattel and half queen1     ,as    
dead as must be1 for the greater part1  
,the poems made on their chivalric      
bones4#bee  ,it is an especial pity that
 the reformer should ever devote his    
effort to the upholding of the old idea 
of the inferiority of the present to the
 past4 ,not in the past1 but in the     
future1 lies the ,golden ,age of man4   
,,footnotes3  #ahc ,the ,origin of      
,civilization1 pp4 #cig1 #cih4  #ahd    
,ibid4 pp4 #djb1 #djc4  #ahe ,ibid4 p4  
#cih4  #ahf ,ibid4 p4 #djg4  #ahg ,see1 
as above1 pp4 #cfh1 #cfi4  #ahh ,ibid4  

p4 #cga4  #ahi ,ibid4 p4 #fi4  #aij     
,ibid4 p4 #gb4  #aia ,ibid4 pp4 #aab1   
#aac4  #aib ,see1 as above1 p4 #dje4    
#aic ,see ,lubbock1 ,prehistoric ,times1
 also especially ,chaps4 ,,iii4 and     
,,iv4 of ,the ,origin of ,civilization4 
#aid ,cause or effect1 which8 ,mexico is
 not a country poor in animal life4     
#aie ,the ,origin of ,civilization1 pp4 
#cgb1 #cgc4  #aif ,see ,the ,origin of  
,civilization1 p4 #cif4  #aig ,ibid4 p4 
#cih4  #aih ,ibid4 p4 #cga4  #aii       
,social ,life in ,greece1 #c;d ed4 p4   
#bgb4  #bjj ,the ,science of ,ethics1 p4
 #bcg4  #bja ,social ,life in ,greece1  
p4 #bdc et seq4  #bjb ,lectures on      
,primitive ,civilization1 p4 #bai et    
seq4  #bjc ,mahaffy3 ,three ,epochs in  
the ,social ,development of the ,ancient
 ,greeks1 pp4 #ca1 #cb4  #bjd ,social   
,life in ,greece1 p4 #bch4  #bje ,social
 ,life in ,greece1 p4 #bcd et seq4  #bjf
 ,ibid4 p4 #bci et seq4 ,the italics are
 mine4  #bjg ,social ,life in ,greece1  
p4 #bgb et seq4  #bjh ,social ,life in  

,greece1 p4 #ig et seq4  #bji ,ibid4 p4 
#aeg4  #baj ,social ,life in ,greece1 p4
 #afj et seq4  #baa ,ibid4 p4 #afb et   
seq4  #bab ,les ,institutions de la     
,grece1 p4 #dg et seq4  #bac ,lecky1    
,history of ,european ,morals1 ,i4 p4   
#cih4  #bad ,ibid4 p4 #bii et seq4  #bae
 ,lecky1 ,history of ,european ,morals1 
,,ii4 p4 #ca4  #baf ,the ,origin of     
,civilization1 p4 #cgb4  #bag ,history  
of ,european ,morals1 ,i4 p4 #bhe4  #bah
 ,history of ,european ,morals1 ,i4 p4  
#bhf et seq4  #bai ,ibid4 p4 #bgf4  #bbj
 ,ibid4 p4 #cja4  #bba ,history of      
,european ,morals1 ,i4 p4 #bhg et seq4  
#bbb ,ibid4 p4 #bhj et seq4  #bbc       
,history of ,european ,morals1 ,i4 p4   
#bhg4  #bbd ,history of ,european       
,morals1 ,i4 p4 #cjb et seq4  #bbe      
,ibid4 p4 #bcf4  #bbf ,compare1 however1
 ,history of ,european ,morals1 ,i4 p4  
#bfc3 ,ionian slaves of a surpassing    
beauty1 ,alexandrian slaves1 famous for 
their subtle skill in stimulating the   
jaded senses of the confirmed and sated 

libertine1 became the ornaments of every
 patrician house1 the companions and    
instructors of the young4444 ,the slave 
population was itself a hotbed of vice1 
and it contaminated all with which it   
came in contact4  #bbg ,history of      
,european ,morals1 ,i4 p4 #cjc et seq4  
,the italics are mine4  #bbh ,l4 ,o4    
,pike1 ,crime in ,england1 ,i4 p4 #bj4  
#bbi ,history of ,european ,morals1     
,,ii4 p4 #bii4  #bcj ,l4 ,o4 ,pike1 ,a  
,history of ,crime in ,england1 ,i4 pp4 
#ea1 #cdd et seq42 ,,ii4 pp4 #ach1 #agf1
 #agg1 #bhg1 #cgi et seq4  #bca ,ibid4  
,,ii4 pp4 #ha1 #hb4  #bcb ,ibid4 ,i4 p4 
#bbf2 ,,ii4 pp4 #he1 #hf1 #agd et seq41 
#cbd et seq4  #bcc ,ibid4 ,i4 pp4 #afh1 
#afi4  #bcd ,history of ,crime1 ,i4 p4  
#ej4  #bce ,ibid4 p4 #ea4  #bcf ,history
 of ,crime1 ,i4 p4 #eb et seq4  #bcg    
,ibid4 ,i4 pp4 #bjd1 #baj4  #bch ,ibid4 
,i4 p4 #baj et seq4  #bci ,ibid4 ,,ii4  
p4 #he4  #bdj ,ibid4 ,,ii4 pp4 #hg-hi4  
#bda ,ibid4 ,,ii4 p4 #cdf4  #bdb ,ibid4 
,,ii4 p4 #bhc4  #bdc ,history of ,crime1

 ,,ii4 pp4 #afb1 #afc4  #bdd ,ibid4     
,,ii4 p4 #bhd4  #bde ,ibid4 ,i4 p4 #eb  
et seq41 p4 #adf et seq4  #bdf ,ibid4   
,i4 p4 #big et seq4  #bdg ,ibid ,i4 p4  
#hi et seq4  #bdh ,history of ,crime1   
,,ii4 p4 #cih et seq4  #bdi ,ibid4 ,i4  
p4 #bac4  #bej ,ibid4 ,,ii4 pp4 #hb1    
#hc1 #cgg et seq4  #bea ,ibid4 ,,ii4 p4 
#dej et seq4  #beb ,see as above1 ,,ii4 
p4 #bhh4  #bec ,as above1 ,i4 p4 #bgj et
 seq4  #bed ,ibid4 ,,ii4 p4 #ade et seq4
  #bee ,mrs4 ,browning1 ,aurora ,leigh4 
,,chapter ,,viii  ,,the ,,results ,,of  
,,ethical ,,inquiry ,,on ,,an           
,,evolutional ,,basis   ,in ,professor  
,alexander's statement that the good man
 of former days was as good as the good 
man of to-day1#bef the standard applied 
to the two cases compared is not the    
same2 the comparison is not a direct one
 between the two men1 according to some 
common rule1 but resembles a            
mathematical statement of proportion1 or
 comparison of ratios2 the man named    
good according to the standard of one   

age stands to the social conditions of  
that age as the man named good by the   
standard of a later age to the social   
conditions of his age4 ,the implication 
of this double standard is1 however1    
easily overlooked1 so that the statement
 stands in danger of the reproach of    
misleading as a begging of the question2
 in the good man of former days1 the    
moral verdict is already delivered4 ,a  
question of moral expediency arises     
here4 ,how are we to define the good man
 of former days8 ,shall we declare1 for 
instance1 that that cannibal who        
fulfilled the ideal of pity in his      
society by sparing his conquered foe to 
abject and miserable slavery1 instead of
 cooking him for dinner1 was good1 and  
as good as the man of highest           
benevolence of the present day8 ,or     
suppose an ,australian savage who varies
 the tribal custom of wooing by         
carefully carrying home his victim after
 reducing her to unconsciousness1       
instead of dragging her over the ground 

at risk of life and limb1 thus          
fulfilling a high tribal ideal2 shall we
 compare such a man with lovers like    
,mill or ,browning and pronounce him as 
good as the latter8 ,or1 to take less   
extreme cases1 shall we compare the     
,spartan of one period1 with his ideal  
of successful theft1 with a ,socrates or
 a ,bruno dying for sake of what they   
believed to be the truth1 and pronounce 
one no better than the other8 ,no one   
denies the right of the individual to   
fix the significance of his own terms1  
provided he adheres to this significance
 consistently2 but mankind thinks slowly
 and painfully1 and the double purpose  
of language1 in the communication of    
thought to others and the registration  
of it as a stepping-stone to our own    
further reasoning1 is likely to be      
frustrated by a too peculiar use of     
terms4 ,in ,ethics1 this question of    
expediency takes on a moral aspect2 and 
,alexander's definition of absolute     
right and wrong as action in accordance 

with1 or opposition to1 a standard fixed
 by the age and nation is likely to lead
 to moral as well as intellectual       
confusion--to the excuse of wrong-doing 
because of circumstances1 on the one    
hand1 and the dogmatic assertion of     
infallibility on the other1 or at least 
to the confusion of the ideal standard  
with the easy-going standard of the     
average man of his age4  ,but it is true
 that this criticism is scarcely        
conclusive alone4 ,for the definitions  
criticised are on a line with the idea  
of progress as at each moment           
establishing the equilibrium of the     
society1 and fulfil the demand for      
self-consistency4 ,a criticism of the   
use1 in ethical theory1 of a continually
 changing standard of moral judgment1   
must concern the more fundamental idea  
of a continually established            
equilibrium4  ,to the practical         
considerations of the possible confusion
 of the ideal with the average standard 
through ,alexander's idea of the        

judgment of an age by its own standard1 
it might be objected that the moral     
standard implied in his theory is not at
 all the average standard1 but the      
standard as represented by the ideal in 
the mind of the good man of his age4#beg
  ,to this may be answered that he whom 
we regard as the good man of his age is 
by no means necessarily in harmony with 
his age1 as is proved by the persecution
 that many good men endure2 and the     
statement that the good man is not in   
harmony with his age means that he does 
not represent the character of his      
society as a whole1 and cannot1         
therefore1 be said to express an        
attained equilibrium of the society4    
,his sentiments and ideal are not the   
sentiments and ideal of the society as a
 whole considered as an adjustment of   
sentiments and ideals4 ,if it be        
replied1 to this1 that the good men of  
their age who undergo persecution must  
be regarded1 according to ,alexander's  
theory1 as only prospectively good1--as 

representing an ideal that has not yet  
been proved to be the victorious        
variety1#beh then we are driven to      
return to the conclusion that1 by the   
good man of his age who represents the  
social equilibrium1 ,alexander          
designates1 not the man who leads the   
moral van1 or he who plans an advance1  
but he who is carried on by it1 the man 
who represents the preponderating mass  
of opinion1 the ideal of the majority or
 the average ideal2 and the practical   
criticisms above made hold good4        
,whatever may be said of our judgment of
 a past age by present standards1 the   
standard by which we judge present      
action is not at all the average        
standard1 but the highest moral ideal we
 can discover2 and in this fact lies the
 whole significance of ,ethics4  ,or    
there is another form in which          
,alexander combines his idea of the good
 man and that of a social equilibrium4  
,according to this interpretation1 the  
equilibrium the good man represents is  

not an actually attained equilibrium1   
but merely one that would be secured    
were his ideal universally carried      
out1--an equilibrium realized only in so
 far as men are good4#bei ,in this case1
 indeed1 the ideal may be rescued from  
the reproach of representing only the   
average1 easy-going morality2 but1 at   
the same time1 all the remarks that make
 present morality absolute because it   
represents and maintains a present      
social equilibrium1 and the argument in 
a line with such remarks that all       
maintenance of existence means          
adjustment to the conditions1 or        
equilibrium1 become inapplicable4 ,it   
might be contended that the whole       
dilemma is avoided by ,alexander in the 
assertion that wickedness has but little
 share in the life of society#bfj--that 
is1 that goodness prevails2 but such a  
statement may be disputed1 except as    
morality is judged by the average       
standard2 and1 in this case1 the        
argument begs the question1 and the old 

problem recurs4 ,it may further be added
 that the action of the good man in any 
other sense cannot represent the course 
that would be followed by every man1    
were all men good like himself1 for his 
action takes into consideration the fact
 that all men are not good like himself 
and is a compromise with inideal        
conditions4  ,there is1 in fact1 and has
 been up to the present time1 no full   
equilibrium of any society as a whole1  
and certainly no absolute equilibrium   
such as must coexist with an absolute   
right1 which would be its expression4   
,du ,prel1 to illustrate his conception 
of the evolution of the systems of the  
heavens1 imagines a group of dancers1   
each of whom sets out to dance a figure 
of her own without reference to the     
movements of the others2 and he points  
out that if1 in all cases of collision1 
the colliding parties either withdraw   
from the group or else move from this   
point together1 a harmony of movement   
must finally be attained4#bfa ,we may   

conceive of momentary equilibrium of    
small portions of a society1 just as1 in
 the case of such a group of dancers1 we
 may conceive of any moment as possibly 
representing an absence of collision in 
some one part of the company1 although1 
in other parts1 many collisions are     
taking place4 ,but there is1 at present1
 no general equilibrium of ideals1 no   
common ideal for any society as a whole1
 but1 on the contrary1 a mass of        
conflicting ideals continually at war   
with one another2 although1 of course1  
there may be calculated an average ideal
 made up from all extremes1 and there   
may be discerned a preponderating ideal 
in smaller portions of a society that   
form a body by themselves4 ,the         
isolation of such portions is1 however1 
only relative1 and any equilibrium that 
can be spoken of as attained by them is 
most imperfect4 ,the good man1 in so far
 as we regard his goodness as inherited1
 may be said to represent an            
equilibrium2 but it is only the         

equilibrium of some one favored line of 
descent1 and not an absolute1 but a     
relative1 equilibrium4 ,in so far as we 
regard the good man's goodness as the   
further result of especial association  
with good men1 it may be1 to a large    
extent1 in harmony with their ideals1   
and may hence represent a certain       
equilibrium among men who preserve      
themselves from intimacy with           
individuals of low ideals or only       
average morality1 thus forming a partly 
isolated body2 but this equilibrium1    
again1 is only a relative equilibrium1  
just as the isolation of the group is   
only partial4 ,if our definition of     
morality is progressive and not         
statical1 the good man must be he who   
leads the advance4 ,but such a man is   
not representative of his society as a  
whole4  ,alexander regards the          
infliction of incidental pains as of    
little consequence for the absolute     
rightness of conduct4 ,but the necessity
 of these pains has a reactive influence

 on character4 ,that1 in order to do the
 work which ,i can do best and which1   
therefore1 ,i ought to do for society1  
,i must pass many beggars in the street 
without inquiry into their cases1 and   
much misery of all sorts without        
materially lessening it1 has a certain  
detrimental result to myself4 ,all pain1
 the sight of which is endured without  
the taking of active measures for its   
alleviation1 vitiates the sympathies2   
and1 on the other hand1 a certain       
hardness of heart is necessary to the   
endurance of mere existence1 at the     
present time2 a certain selfishness to  
the enjoyment even of a life spent in   
moral effort2 for perfect sympathy would
 make life unbearable in sight and      
hearing of the suffering of many of our 
fellow-creatures4 ,the need for         
self-defence has been felt at all stages
 of the world's progress--in olden times
 for self-defence of a brutal sort1 in  
modern days for a less and less brutal  
self-defence2 such self-defence is at   

present imperative1 lest the yielding to
 one person result not only in a lack of
 fulfilment of our own duties to others 
than the one1 but also in the           
strengthening1 in that one1 of a        
selfishness and dogmatism which may     
issue in further evil to others4 ,and   
yet all resistance1 where and in so far 
as carried out1 vitiates temper and     
benevolence4  ,alexander's position is  
positivistic in that it aims not to go  
beyond the facts2 and this position     
might seem to lead naturally to the     
judgment of each age by a standard      
possible to the individuals of that age1
 that is1 existent1 in some form1 in the
 society judged2 and it might seem to   
lead1 also1 to the assertion of an      
absolute right where the existence of   
wrong is unfelt4 ,but to this might be  
answered that1 as soon as the higher    
standard does exist1 the wrong may be   
judged by it2 and that the judgment of a
 right as yet including elements of     
wrong implies the existence of another  

and higher standard as one of the facts4
 ,if ,du ,prel's company of dancers were
 automata1 incapable of forecasting     
collisions1 we might regard a momentary 
absence of collision in some one part of
 the company1 from the standpoint of the
 automata concerned1 as absolute        
equilibrium1 since our judgment would   
have no regard to the rest of the       
company or the next move of the figures 
at present in equilibrium4 ,but human   
beings are not automata1 and the theory 
which regards the moral evolution from  
the standpoint of the ideals actually   
existent in society must take into      
consideration the actual realization    
which enters into the practical ideals  
of a large part of society1 of the      
contrast of those ideals with a         
conceived higher standard at present    
impracticable4 ,it is true that the     
consciousness of past ages1 not         
comprehending in so great a degree the  
complexity of human interests1 or       
looking so far into the future to       

distant results as does present mankind1
 had not so strong a sense of this      
contrast4 ,but the contrast has arisen1 
was vaguely conceived even in           
far-distant times1 and has continually  
grown more definite and pronounced in   
human thought4 ,so far from its being   
true1 as ,professor ,alexander          
conceives1 that conscience always       
asserts the possibility of an absolutely
 right course1#bfb it may be said that1 
although doubtless the mind always      
conceives1 amongst the courses open to  
choice1 some best course1 there is a    
growing realization of the evil to      
conduct and character1 of self and      
others1 involved in any course possible 
under present conditions4 ,the assertion
 of an absolute right1 with an exact    
boundary-line dividing it from wrong1   
belongs to past ,ethics2 the            
appreciation of present evil doubtless  
differs in degree in different persons2 
but it is increasing both in extent and 
in intent1 and is the explanation of the

 tendency to believe the present age    
worse than all past ages4 ,it is not the
 sign of growing evil1 but is1 on the   
contrary1 a part of a growing good2     
nevertheless1 it registers the existence
 of present evil4 ,there are few men of 
the present date1 excepting the very    
young and exceptionally healthy and     
happy1 who would agree with ,alexander1 
that it is ridiculous to suppose that   
wickedness occupies a considerable space
 in the life of a society4  ,professor  
,alexander himself acknowledges the     
progress of society towards a state of  
good that shall be good not for a part  
of the human race merely but for the    
whole2 and he recognizes also the fact  
that this extension of the ideal to the 
whole race means a progress in intent   
also4 ,such an ultimate state is        
certainly not ultimate in the sense that
 it is eternal2 but it may be considered
 permanent in the same sense as the     
equilibrium of the solar system is      
permanent--in the sense that it remains 

practically the same for a period long  
to human thought4 ,it expresses a       
perfect1 though not an absolute1        
equilibrium4 ,as such1 it does not      
involve absolute happiness any more than
 absolute preservation of existence1    
immortality3 it implies only the        
reduction of pain to a minimum through  
increasing wisdom and sympathy2 through 
the endeavor1 on the one hand1 of a     
far-seeing and sympathetic society to   
protect the individual from             
disappointment1 and through such        
increase1 on the other1 of the ethical  
pleasures that what ,alexander terms    
incidental pains become inappreciable by
 contrast4  ,the evolution of human     
society is not an evolution of one state
 or country alone but of the habitable  
globe2 a condition of full equilibrium  
can be reached only when1 in one way or 
another1 all countries are gathered into
 the circle of civilization and         
sympathy4 ,until this happens1 the      
isolation of single societies must be   

repeatedly broken in upon and the       
process of equilibration disturbed by   
the introduction of new elements to     
which adjustment must take place2 the   
new adjustment being in the sense of    
progress towards a higher system of     
equilibrium1 that is1 one of more       
elements1 and the whole process         
constituting a continual progress in the
 direction of a full stability of ,life 
upon the earth4 ,while despotisms exist 
to pour into other1 freer countries     
their hunted and miserable subjects1    
unused to the responsibilities of       
self-government1 and often as unfit for 
peace as is the dog who has been always 
chained and tormented1 democracy must   
feel the evils of tyranny even in her   
own system4 ,while uncivilized1 or      
mentally1 morally1 and physically       
degraded human beings exist in one      
country1 men in other parts of the world
 are not secure from contact either     
directly with these lowest orders1 or1  
at least1 with those who have been      

rendered less honorable or more callous 
to suffering by their influence or      
habituation to their suffering4 ,and    
while war rouses hatred1 and hatred     
results in war1 there will also be1 in  
societies1 internal fluctuations1       
jealousies1 hatreds4 ,lack of sympathy1 
violence1 or indifference to suffering  
in one respect or direction is likely to
 be accompanied by lack of sympathy1    
violence1 indifference1 in other        
respects3 while1 again1 violence is     
likely to beget violence1 indifference  
indifference1 between individuals1      
classes1 parties1 or nations4 ,different
 degrees of progress may be visible in  
different countries2 but the more       
facilities of communication increase1   
the more inevitable it will become that 
the evils existing in any one nation    
will affect all1 as also that the       
progress of any one nation will affect  
all2 in other words1 progress must tend1
 more and more1 to equalization in all  
countries4 ,fechner's ideas of the      

,tendency to ,stability thus explain the
 loss of ,greek and ,roman civilization1
 as well as the insoluble mystery which 
,wallace finds in the fact of the       
attainment of greatness among earlier   
peoples1 there being no agency at work1 
then or now1#bfc calculated to do more  
than weed out the lower types4#bfd      
,increasing sympathy is a continual     
accompaniment of the increasingly close 
relations of men to each other through  
the gradual peopling of all parts of the
 earth1 but especially through the      
increasing facilities of communication  
by which the distant is brought into    
contact with us2 but the sympathy is of 
gradual growth1 and the continual       
renewal of the struggle for existence   
induces renewed evils1 so that it might 
seem1 at first glance1 as if the evil   
must continue indefinitely and          
undiminished1 only changing its form4   
,as long as no absolute equilibrium has 
been attained1 doubtless evil of some   
sort must exist2 change is inevitably   

accompanied by disadvantages as well as 
advantages1 everywhere4 ,but several    
facts are to be noticed4 ,first3 ,the   
statement which has often been made1    
that the severity of the struggle for   
existence is increased in the social    
state and grows with the growth of      
society1 is erroneous4 ,that is to say1 
more is doubtless continually demanded  
of the individual1 but it is no abstract
 principle or law outside man which     
makes this demand3 it is the increased  
power of the average of society which   
makes it2 or1 that is1 the increased    
requirements of the age are met with    
increased capacity1 and this would still
 remain true if we reckoned capacity as 
merely dependent upon the inheritance of
 knowledge and implements4 ,cooeperation
 increases resources2 and the average   
length of life is shown to increase with
 the progress of civilization4 ,there is
 a lagging minority who suffer1 for one 
reason or another1 in the advance2 these
 represent the inherently inferior      

types1 or the types which suffer        
temporarily from outer disadvantage4    
,the evils of competition in human      
society are not greater1 they are simply
 more evident to human beings than the  
evils elsewhere in nature4 ,the         
tragedies of the woods are bloody but   
short2 death puts a speedy end to       
sufferings1 and the earth quickly hides 
the victims4 ,in society1 on the other  
hand1 cooeperation preserves not only   
the aged and feeble1 the deformed and   
idiotic1 of the more privileged classes2
 it even suffices to enable the most    
miserable to drag out a forlorn         
existence somewhat longer4 ,it forbids  
the mother who finds her child a burden 
simply to leave it by the roadside as   
the savage mother does1 and it will give
 a penny or two against starvation where
 it will not bestow enough for comfort4 
,this prolongation of suffering is thus 
the sign of an increased but not yet    
sufficient sympathy2 in other words1    
evil not only changes its form with     

social evolution2 it also gradually     
loses its force4 ,to suppose1 indeed1   
that renewed progress must always be    
attended with as great evils as to-day  
attend it1 is to make the erroneous     
supposition that character has no       
constancy1 and the sympathy for one's   
fellow-men gained in one relation will  
wholly fail to act in others4  ,again1  
it might possibly be thought that       
increase in density of population1 even 
as condition of the closer contact      
necessary to increase of sympathy1 must 
go on ad infinitum1 with                
ever-increasing1 or at least            
ever-renewed1 misery1 until the         
individual be left with barely          
standing-room2 indeed1 the picture of   
such a denouement has occasionally been 
drawn4 ,but it is to be remembered that 
the conditions of mutual comprehension1 
dependence1 and sympathy1 come to lie1  
in later social stages1 less and less in
 mere density of population and more and
 more in those many devices of modern   

life which we have termed means of      
communication4 ,the increase of the     
human species must tend1 in time1 to    
self-correction2 the only alternative is
 the extinction of the race through     
growing unhealthfulness of conditions4  
,but this alternative is an             
impossibility2 the human species cannot 
be annihilated as a whole except through
 some catastrophic event which          
interferes with the present course of   
evolution by the destruction of the     
earth--or through that final gradual    
decay which must accompany the earth's  
decline in power of nourishment4 ,from  
internal causes we cannot expect the    
species to perish2 for again in this    
case it is impossible that a struggle   
should be continued until the last      
individuals are destroyed4 ,indeed1 the 
idea of destruction through insanitary  
crowding gives us at once a             
contradiction of the supposition of     
limitless increase1 and a partial       
solution of the question4 ,but the later

 and higher solution of the question is 
another4 ,the fittest will survive2 and 
the fittest will be those who perceive  
the evils of overcrowding and take      
active measures to avoid it4 ,the       
fittest will be those who perceive that 
they are acting for the good of their   
children1 and that of society as a      
whole1 if they do not bring into the    
world more offspring than they can      
furnish with a healthy constitution1    
good moral training1 and a sufficient   
education for self-support and comfort  
under conditions of normal labor4 ,the  
term health is not an absolute one2 but 
if we once suppose a start made in the  
direction of the decrease of pressure1  
we must suppose1 other things being     
equal1 that those lines of descent and  
parts of society in which it arises will
 be favored in the struggle for         
existence1 and will come to supplant    
other parts4 ,to suppose that the       
increase of pressure can go on ad       
infinitum is1 indeed1 to reckon--if we  

look at the matter from the purely      
psychological side--without man's       
reason4 ,social development and moral   
theory have not favored any limitation  
of progeny as long as population was    
sparse4 ,but certain facts are beginning
 to be recognized3 7#a7 that the        
propagation of their kind by the        
criminally constituted and by the       
hopelessly diseased is immoral2 7#b7    
that the propagation of offspring to    
such poverty and ignorance as stunts    
them physically1 and makes their        
entrance into the criminal or pauper    
classes a probability1 is also immoral2 
and 7#c7 that duty does not demand of   
men and women that they shall sacrifice 
health and happiness1 and drag out a    
miserable1 overworked1 joyless existence
 in illy rearing an over-large and      
probably weakly family4 ,the greatest   
favor1 privilege1 and luxury that       
parents can confer upon children is that
 of health1 and the next greatest is    
that of healthy parents1 neither        

ill-tempered with care nor morbid and   
dull with overwork1 but alert to        
perceive and ready to sympathize in all 
their trials and aspirations1 and       
endowed with sufficient leisure to give 
some attention to that quite as         
important duty as child-bearing--the    
character-training of children4         
,selfishness is1 of course1 possible in 
the direction of limitation of increase 
as in every other direction1 and in this
 case it must defeat the end to a great 
extent2 but such selfishness must tend  
to correct itself as sympathy develops  
and society1 in its approval1 recognizes
 and demands more and more what is for  
the good of all4  ,the course of our    
reasoning does not pretend to predict an
 absolute social equilibrium1 which must
 include the immortality of man on the  
earth1 together with the prevention of  
every accident and of every             
disappointment whatsoever4 ,a word has  
already been said as to the probable    
necessity of the death of the           

individual2 and with death are given    
also disease and age and their attendant
 mental evils4 ,we may suppose1 however1
 under an increased healthfulness of    
general conditions1 an increase of      
vitality which shall make death1 in an  
ever greater proportion of cases1 rather
 the issue of a gradual failure of the  
powers than the result of violent       
illness4 ,that the tendency is in this  
direction is demonstrated by the gradual
 increase of the length of life4 ,a high
 degree of mental1 moral1 and physical  
harmony in human society is no more     
wonderful or inconceivable than the high
 degree of harmony already attained in  
the movements of our own solar system4  
,on the one hand1 social progress means 
the attainment of results which call    
less and less for reform2 and1 on the   
other hand1 we are accustoming ourselves
 to social change2 reforms1 the like of 
which would once have convulsed the     
world are now accomplished with little  
inconvenience1 and we are able to go    

forward with a rapidity of which no     
former age was capable4  ,we may look at
 social development from still another  
point of view1 as a process by which the
 preservation of the individual         
gradually becomes cooerdinate with the  
preservation and welfare of the species4
 ,darwin surmises that the work of the  
benevolent or intellectually great man  
for his people may be as important for  
its welfare and the determination of its
 conquest in the struggle for existence 
as is the propagation of offspring4 ,as 
social organization progresses1 and the 
relations of men become more intimate   
and complex1 all the acts of the        
individual grow to be of greater and    
greater significance for his kind1      
while1 reciprocally1 the health and     
happiness of the individual increase in 
importance for his kind4 ,and thus1 from
 both sides1 virtue and health1 virtue  
and happiness1 also tend towards        
coincidence in the individual life1 and 
environment comes more and more to favor

 the virtuous4 ,sympathy1 which is for  
the general good in many relations1     
increases in strength as inward         
characteristic and acts with more and   
more certainty and universality1 so that
 the society which has been merciful and
 helpful in a degree towards many       
individuals comes to show mercy and     
helpfulness in a greater degree1 and    
with more uniformity1 towards more and  
more individuals2 while1 at the same    
time1 the welfare and the happiness of  
the individual become more and more     
cooerdinate with the welfare of society 
as a whole1 and the latter is           
accordingly more universally sought4    
,this does not necessarily mean that it 
is sought from motives of self-interest2
 on the contrary1 as society progresses1
 the individual is more and more moulded
 to such harmony with its needs that he 
finds his happiness in seeking its      
welfare4  ,the earlier punishments of   
offenders were extreme and cruel2 the   
majority1 in endeavoring to protect     

itself1 had little regard for the       
individual1 as the individual also had  
little regard for the welfare of the    
majority4 ,with social progress1        
however1 the majority become more humane
 even towards their enemy1 the criminal4
 ,the checks which the fear of extreme  
physical punishment alone could impose  
at an earlier period are gradually      
succeeded by the checks furnished in the
 approval and disapproval of society as 
a whole1 and of those to whom the       
individual is bound by ties of affection
 and of respect4 ,that is1 in the       
sympathetic feelings themselves a       
dependence on others is developed which 
acts as an effectual preventive and     
stimulus1 and must become more and more 
effectual as society advances and the   
range of sympathy widens4 ,this         
increasingly altruistic form of even the
 checks to evil is taken no account of  
by the pessimist4 ,as the necessity for 
severity decreases1 severity even in    
social disapproval must lessen2 as the  

individual comes to yield more readily  
and promptly to a slight spur1 extremer 
methods will be discarded4 ,thus fear   
will be1 by degrees1 replaced by hope4  
,this development is seen not only in   
sectarian matters but also in the       
history of religious thought2 nearly    
every religion has had its heaven and   
its hell1 but with social progress and  
the broadening of sympathy1 the hell    
falls more and more into disrepute1 the 
motive of heavenly reward being rather  
emphasized4  ,as sympathy broadens1 we  
come to feel1 not alone pain at the pain
 of others1 but in an increased degree  
and with regard to ever wider circles1  
pleasure also in their pleasure4 ,the   
altruistic pleasure afforded by the     
relief of pain1 as the more necessary to
 the preservation of existence1 has been
 the earliest developed4 ,a great good  
in its province1 it may contain1        
nevertheless1 an element of vanity that 
opposes itself to a further evolution4  
,there is no doubt that a certain kind  

of benevolence would greatly miss the   
gratification and self-aggrandizement   
experienced in the relief of poverty and
 suffering4 ,the higher but not yet so  
universal capacity is that of rejoicing 
in others' good and happiness as well as
 sympathizing in their sorrow4 ,this    
capacity shows itself as yet chiefly in 
the more intimate relations of love and 
friendship4 ,in these1 too1 the         
influence of approval and disapproval is
 powerful1 and the pleasure we give a   
friend in being worthy of his esteem may
 make our best happiness4 ,here we have 
a hint of an increasing union of love   
for the individual and love for the     
ideal which must tend to raise          
friendship itself to the highest plane4 
,as a result of our considerations1 we  
may deny the truth of ,rolph's assertion
 that the stimulus of want will be      
forever necessary in order to secure    
exertion--that is1 if by want is meant  
misery or great pain of any sort2 if    
merely desire is meant1 which the       

anticipation and early accomplishment of
 satisfaction may prevent from becoming 
pain1 we may admit the statement4 ,in   
this case1 however1 the argument which  
,rolph deduces against the possibility  
of a final state of social harmony is   
invalid4  ,but it is not the intention  
of our argument to assert that all      
desires without exception will be       
fulfilled in any future condition of    
society4 ,what may be said is that1 in  
an increasing degree1 sympathy will     
endeavor to satisfy the wants of the    
individual1 while1 on the other hand1   
the approval and fellow-feeling of      
society1 and the consciousness of having
 performed his duty1 will come to       
represent to the individual1 in a       
greater and greater degree1 recompense  
for personal loss4 ,this change of      
direction in desire and gratification is
 no weakening of it3 it is no more      
necessarily true that the man of perfect
 principle is poorer in emotion than the
 man whose passions lead him to         

sacrifice his fellow men than it is true
 that the average man of civilized      
society is poorer in emotion than the   
brutal savage4 ,merely1 human evolution 
is a continual development of higher and
 more complex emotions1 which rise into 
force on the proper occasion to modify  
the more primitive ones1 or1 more       
accurately speaking1 the lower emotions 
of the savage themselves take on a      
higher form through organization with   
later ones4  ,spencer1 in criticising   
theories of altruistic morals1 endeavors
 to show that time and energy are lost  
in the distribution1 through others1 of 
the happiness or means of happiness     
which might with more profit1 because a 
better understanding of need1 be sought 
by the individual himself2 and he       
remarks1 that it is a question how much 
of the happiness which means also       
vitality the individual may rightly     
sacrifice to society4 ,but the refusal  
of individuals to sacrifice anything of 
personal gratification must lead1 under 

present conditions of desire1 to extreme
 sacrifice on the part of other         
individuals2 so that the principle of   
the illegitimacy of sacrifice logically 
contradicts itself4 ,it is not perfectly
 clear what is meant by a division and  
redistribution of happiness1 or the     
means of happiness1 against which       
,spencer directs his argument4 ,it is   
probable that the author has in mind1   
and is especially opposing1 a particular
 school of theorists whose ideas we will
 consider later on4 ,suffice it to say1 
at this point1 that social harmony can  
never be reached by the stubborn        
continuance of each in his line of      
inharmonious conduct1 but can only be   
attained by such gradual moulding of    
habit and desire that by natural        
organization individuals will come to be
 in harmony with each other4 ,it is the 
history of social evolution that the    
individual1 though always determining   
what are his own needs1 as it is obvious
 that he can best do1 is increasingly   

aided in satisfying them by             
cooeperation1 while he also gives       
increasing aid in return4 ,against the  
list of the advantages of egoism        
enumerated by ,spencer and others1 ,i   
would muster the advantages of altruism1
 for by cooeperation alone can the      
individual attain the pleasures which   
now so often lie beyond his reach2 by it
 alone can society attain a higher      
plane2 and the pleasures of altruism are
 the highest and the most unfailing4    
,the selfish man will suffer            
disappointment and loss as well as the  
benevolent man1 and he will lack the    
refuge of sympathy and of the power to  
find happiness in the happiness of      
others4 ,what man who has felt the joys 
of sympathy would exchange even the     
hardships it brings for the brutal      
liberty and unmoved selfishness of the  
savage6 what man who has known the joys 
of the higher1 the more unselfish love1 
would exchange them for the ungoverned  
and quickly-palling pleasures of the    

profligate6 ,these joys first lend life 
worth and meaning2 through association  
and altruism1 cooeperation in action and
 feeling1 man first becomes a power in  
the world4 ,yet the man who is capable  
of the higher sympathy is incapable of a
 selfish calculation of its personal    
advantages to him4  ,wundt has an       
objection to ,evolutional ,ethics as it 
is understood by this treatise1 on the  
score of the assumptions with regard to 
moral inheritance involved4 ,how1 out of
 tendencies stored up in the nervous    
system1 moral conceptions arise1 is1 and
 remains1 a mystery1 he says4#bfe ,the  
problem is nothing more or less than    
that of the connection of brain-function
 and psychical process1 in inheritance2 
and we may say again that we no more    
perceive the necessity of explaining the
 how of this before accepting the       
evident facts1 than we see the necessity
 of explaining1 in the same sense1 the  
connection between light and heat1 or   
between the seen vibrations and the     

heard note4 ,moreover1 the mystery      
belongs as much to the conservation of  
character in the individual life as to  
its conservation in the race2 if an     
explanation be necessary before         
acceptance of the facts in the one case1
 it is assuredly necessary in the other 
also2 and its necessity must be fatal to
 ,physiological ,psychology4 ,it is time
 that that ancient scarecrow of         
superstition1 a mystery1 were removed   
from the field of science4 ,when ,wundt 
further proceeds to interpret ,spencer's
 theory of heredity as one of the       
inheritance of distinct and definite    
ideas in their original form1 he reads  
into the theory what ,spencer himself1  
with his conceptions of instinct and    
reflex action1 never put there1 and     
what1 moreover1 no modern writer on     
philosophy has distinctly asserted4     
,this present treatise is much more open
 to ,wundt's criticism than is          
,spencer's work1 though it makes no     
positive assertion as to the nature of  

instinct and so-called automatism1 but  
leaves the question as to their         
unconscious character open4 ,the        
appearance of common psychical phenomena
 at the period of puberty1 and with     
characteristics peculiar1 moreover1 to  
the particular lines of descent1 would  
be enough to establish the fact of      
heredity1 if no other testimony were    
forthcoming2 and yet no one can explain 
the sudden appearance of these phenomena
 at a certain age4  ,but the most of the
 objections to ,evolutional ,ethics are 
not on such score as this4 ,a while ago1
 the conservatives in ,ethics declared  
that the theory of ,evolution1 even if  
true1 had nothing to do with morals1    
which occupied a region far above the   
plane of science4 ,now1 the most of the 
conservative schools content themselves 
with merely asserting that evolution may
 be true even in application to ,ethics1
 but that it is useless in this         
province1 since it adds nothing of value
 to theory or practice4 ,it may be well 

to examine into this assertion4 ,a      
priori1 we could scarcely suppose that  
increased knowledge in any branch could 
fail to be of importance to that branch 
and to affect it in some manner4        
,knowledge is power1 and we should      
presume not less so in ,ethics than in  
any other science4  ,the assertion that 
,evolution adds nothing to theory would 
indeed be as just with regard to other  
sciences as with regard to ,ethics2 or1 
rather1 it would be more just with      
regard to the natural sciences4 ,for    
they at least recognized1 before the    
appearance of the theory of ,evolution1 
the element of constancy ordinarily     
called law1 and attempted to formulate  
this constancy as a basis of thought and
 action4 ,to these concepts of constancy
 and the predictions founded upon them1 
the theory of ,evolution merely added   
greater certainty and a more extended   
range1 supplying the bond of union      
between various branches1 and showing   
the inner relation of many before       

disconnected theories2 its whole force  
was one of clarification4 ,but the work 
of ,evolution for ,ethics1 though of a  
similar nature1 has been of even greater
 degree and significance2 it has unified
 and clarified the attempts made to     
discover a basis for moral principles   
and has rendered that foundation for the
 first time secure2 it has cleared away1
 with one sweep1 the rubbish of ancient 
superstition1 made exact methods        
possible1 and raised ,ethics to the     
plane of a ,science4 ,if it had added   
anything absolutely new and entirely    
unconnected with previous theory1 it    
would be as unintelligible to us as     
,calculus to a ,fiji-,islander2 if it   
had no intimate and vital connection    
with foregoing ideas1 it would meet with
 no comprehension or acceptance4        
,science1 too1 is an evolution1 not a   
creation4 ,the value of the theory of   
,evolution lies in the very fact that it
 is simply an addition1 though a large  
one1 to previous thought1 a higher phase

 of conception which rises naturally out
 of the old4 ,but the cavillers say on  
the one hand3 ,it teaches a theory of   
conscience as instinct1 therefore we may
 still cling to the old and unaltered   
doctrine of the veiled and sacred       
'mystery of ,feeling'2 and on the other 
hand3 ,we already accepted a basis of   
reason and ,utility1 therefore our      
theory1 not being overthrown1 needs no  
alteration4 ,both schools forget that1  
in science as elsewhere1 the new        
develops from the old1 but evolution    
brings with it1 nevertheless1 a         
difference of degree that finally issues
 in difference of kind4 ,it has been    
said even by one belonging to the       
advanced school of ,ethics1 that1 if the
 course of ,evolution could be shown to 
prescribe immoral conduct1 the duty of  
the moral man would be to oppose        
evolution even if he perished in the    
attempt4 ,the conception which lies at  
the basis of this assertion is as       
erroneous as that which asserts that man

 must go forward on the path taken by   
evolution whether he will or no4#bff ,to
 suppose the will of society opposing   
the course of ,evolution is to suppose a
 self-contradiction4 ,nature and man's  
will are not two different things in    
this process2 man is the part of nature 
which is involved in the evolution      
considered4 ,our prediction of the      
direction of social development is a    
prediction of his will2 he will will in 
certain ways constant in the broad sense
 in which all nature is constant1       
constant as character and reason are    
constant4 ,the individual has assuredly 
the power to oppose himself to all other
 individuals1 if he so wills2 and his   
influence will not be lost2 but it is   
exactly this willing and the mutual     
influence of individuals upon each other
 which the theory of ,evolution1 as     
applied to ,ethics1 endeavors to take   
into account4 ,the result in prediction 
cannot be properly likened1 as it is    
likened by ,stephen1#bfg to the         

inference of the future of an organic   
whole from its present parts4 ,it does  
not define the progress in society as a 
whole from a study of the individual2 it
 is1 on the contrary1 an inference of   
the future of the whole from its past   
and present considered in the light of  
general natural laws1 and is as         
legitimate as the computation of the    
future position of heavenly bodies from 
their observed past movements and       
present position2 though we can         
doubtless make only general predictions 
from general observations4 ,or1 if we   
approach the question from another side1
 we may say that the science of ,ethics 
endeavors to ascertain the ideal by     
which the welfare of all may be         
attained1 and that the solution of this 
problem cannot be given otherwise than  
through rules for the attainment of the 
general health in the broadest sense of 
the word2 for this corresponds to a     
final harmony of desires through        
survival of the fittest4  ,the power of 

prediction is1 thus1 evidently not to be
 interpreted as if the evolution of     
morality would go on except through the 
human will1 and through this will in    
individuals4 ,in any assertion to the   
contrary1 the same old contradictory    
division is assumed1 of nature as active
 opposed to nature as passive2 man is   
first regarded as a part of nature and  
then again as outside nature and        
compelled by it4 ,we divide him into two
 parts3 the one necessarily coincident  
with the nature in himself1 the other   
antagonistic to it2 the one absolutely  
passive1 the other active2 and yet these
 two are the same1 and we regard them as
 the same from other points of view4    
,nor does prediction impose any laws    
upon the will from without2 it is simply
 inference from the observed relations  
in the action of individuals3 it does   
not create or alter those relations4 ,it
 reckons1 not from man as compelled by  
,necessity1 but from man as possessing  
will and acting from reason4 ,if man is 

reasonable1 he will perceive that it is 
for the good of himself as well as for  
that of the rest of his race to attain a
 state of harmony2 as he is reasonable1 
he will perceive that social progress is
 for his benefit as well as for that of 
others4 ,the increasing solidarity of   
society continually rendering progress  
desirable1 and the line of the fittest1 
that is1 of those who will in a manner  
that best fits them for social          
conditions1 continually tending to      
coincidence with the line of moral      
progress1 the final triumph of the moral
 is assured4 ,it is not in any way      
denied that man chooses this course of  
advancement4 ,on the contrary1 wherever 
we begin in our analysis1 we come round 
finally to the variation of reason1     
emotion1 and will4  ,as above noticed1  
the false interpretation of the         
significance of ,evolutional ,ethics on 
the subject of man's will in relation to
 progress sometimes gives rise to the   
opposite erroneous impression to that   

just noticed1 to the impression1 namely1
 that progress will go on whether men   
strive for it or not1 and that it is of 
no particular consequence what the      
individual does1 or at least that       
,evolutional ,ethics can furnish nothing
 but statistics and predictions1 never  
motives to right-doing4 ,this confusion 
has caused much self-contradiction1 has 
given rise to the most of the discussion
 on the subject of ,absolute and        
,relative ,ethics1 and has impelled     
certain authors to close their books    
with something very like a half doubt of
 the efficacy of their own method except
 as one of observation4 ,but the value  
of ,evolutional ,ethics lies not only in
 the fact that it goes deeper than any  
other system and analyzes more clearly  
the ground of moral conduct1--thus      
removing doubt with those who are open  
to conviction1 and furnishing a less    
fallible criterion to those who desire  
to perceive where right lies in order to
 perform it1--but in that it also       

renders obvious the fact that conduct   
opposed to the welfare of society       
becomes1 with time1 more and more       
disadvantageous4 ,the individual may    
escape punishment for his misdeeds3 but 
the chances against him are greater1 the
 greater these misdeeds and the longer  
they are persisted in2 it is the average
 of the line of moral progress that is  
favored by natural selection4 ,a system 
of ,ethics is a part of the environment 
which acts on the individual2 its force 
is no more lost than is that of any     
other part of the environment1 although 
the result in the particular case will  
depend1 also1 on the character of the   
individual appealed to4 ,but if         
,evolutional ,ethics cannot bring any   
such force to bear on the individual as 
will change his character in an instant1
 rendering him apt and ready to act     
according to the ideal1 whatever may    
have been his previous character1 there 
is neither any other system of ,ethics  
which can do this1 and there has seldom 

been one so sanguine as to hope to do   
it4 ,theological ,ethics1 or rather1    
,theology1 has asserted the possibility 
of such instant transformation1 and the 
doctrine of ,socrates that the knowledge
 of right will secure its performance is
 a much less extreme instance of a      
similar idea4 ,but ,evolutional ,ethics1
 while rendering manifest the necessity 
of unceasing endeavor1 affords us       
encouragement by its assurance of the   
possibility of progress1 and its        
demonstration of the fact that the force
 of endeavor can no more be lost than   
any other force4 ,it adds dignity to the
 smallest acts1 and lends earnestness   
and worth to life4 ,it neither contains 
any excuses for inaction nor leaves any 
reason open to pessimism except a       
selfish one2 to the man to whom his own 
selfish gratification is all in all1 the
 knowledge of social evolution is not a 
matter of encouragement and rejoicing2  
but to the lover of his kind it must be4
 ,evolutional ,ethics admonishes us to  

labor1 yet teaches us the necessity of  
patience1 since1 however the individual 
will1 nothing arises all at once1 and   
the evolution of morals in society as a 
whole must1 like all other evolutions1  
be a gradual1 because a many-sided one4 
,it admonishes us1 too1--and this is    
well1--that we cannot sin without       
leaving ineffaceable stains upon our own
 character4 ,the past is never dead1    
either in its results outside ourselves 
or in our habit2 and it is not the      
drunkard only who one day awakens to    
find himself irrevocably moulded1 by    
steps of habit so slight as to have been
 almost imperceptible1 to that which he 
once loathed and detested4 ,our deeds   
are like children that are born to us2  
they live and act apart from our own    
will4 ,nay1 children may be strangled1  
but deeds never2 they have an           
indestructible life both in and out of  
our consciousness4#bfh ,we may not be a 
mere spectator of the struggle for      
existence even if we will2 the dead     

weight of inaction is itself a force    
opposed to other force4 ,willy1 nilly1  
so long as we live we must bear the     
responsibility of taking a part for or  
against the progress and welfare of the 
world4  ,but there is1 as ,i have said1 
a system which asserts the possibility  
of instant entire change of character1  
as well as of the forgiveness and       
obliteration of past sins4 ,what manner 
of obliteration is this8 ,not the       
obliteration of the consequences of the 
acts1 since that is impossible1 but an  
obliteration of responsibility for them 
such that the doer may erase them from  
his conscience4 ,the innocent on whom   
the evil results fall are1 then1        
according to this view1 the only ones   
who shall suffer for them4 ,the doctrine
 of the ,atonement takes away that sense
 of personal responsibility which is    
most essential to morality1 and this    
removal of responsibility explains the  
ease with which ,christians of all ages 
have combined a fervid religiosity with 

vice and crime4 ,christian theories of  
morals of the present day forbid the    
issue of indulgences2 but the           
consciousness that full and free        
forgiveness is always waiting to receive
 the offender whenever he gets ready to 
repent1 even if it is not until his     
death-bed1 is most pernicious in its    
results4 ,so we learn1 for instance1    
that the ,mollie ,maguires1 a league    
formed in the mines of ,pennsylvania a  
few years ago1 for the express purpose  
of murder by cooeperation1 were in the  
habit of opening their meetings with    
prayer1 and of withdrawing regularly    
from the society1 for one quarter of the
 year1 to attend church1 in order then  
to murder with an easy conscience for   
the other three quarters4 ,the senior   
member of ,conan ,doyle's ,firm of      
,girdlestone is no mere fiction of the  
imagination4 ,i have no desire to join  
with those who pronounce all            
,christians1 or everything in ,christian
 doctrine1 morally unsound2 ,i only     

maintain that the doctrine of the       
,atonement is in itself pernicious1 and 
is shown to be so by its easy           
reconciliation with evil action4        
,theological ,ethics is defective in    
other respects also4 ,a system which    
represents ,god as accomplishing his own
 will in the world in mysterious ways1  
to question which is sacrilege1 has     
necessarily led to the excusing of much 
evil as punishment or discipline1 and so
 to inaction against it4 ,men can do so 
little themselves to make the world     
better1 said a fervent ,christian to me 
not long since2 we must leave these     
things to ,god4 ,so1 poverty has been   
held to be a mysterious dispensation of 
,providence which it was not necessary  
to do away with even if its abolishment 
were possible1 but the slight           
alleviation of which was counted among  
the means of atonement for other sin4   
,thus it has been in other ways than in 
itself a curse to mankind1 furnishing a 
sort of indulgence for the immoralities 

of the rich4 ,poverty has even been     
represented as a blessing1 since it was 
to be compensated with double joy in the
 hereafter4 ,the ,christian1 pointing   
the miserable and starving to ,heaven as
 a recompense for pain1 experienced1    
without largely inconveniencing himself1
 a sense of his own piety and desert1   
and exerting himself to no radical cure 
but only to a meagre dole of charity1   
shifted all responsibility of the cure  
or its omission1 by prayer1 to ,god4 ,so
 ,salter is led to exclaim3 ,if we must 
pray1 let us pray to men2 for there all 
the trouble lies4 ,could you1 ,o        
churches1 but open the hearts of your   
worshippers as you seek to move the     
heart of ,god1 the need for all other   
prayer would soon be gone4#bfi  ,again1 
,theology has continually taught that   
man's first duty was to save his own    
soul from hell1 and in this doctrine1   
ideas of repentance and redemption1     
faith and worship1 have played a larger 
part than mere morality4 ,the tendency  

has1 therefore1 been towards an         
other-worldliness1 an egoism of the     
,hereafter1 rather than a fulfilment of 
the commandment of love4 ,faith has been
 exalted above love of ,truth1 and blind
 obedience above reasoning morality4    
,thus it was that ,christians entered1  
with such zeal1 into the persecution of 
heretics4 ,had the commandment of       
justice3 do unto others as ye would that
 they should do unto you1 been followed1
 the ,inquisition could never have taken
 place4 ,but ,christians forget1 when   
they point to this commandment in       
evidence of the superiority of          
,christian ,ethics1 that it is not the  
only command or doctrine that the ,bible
 contains4 ,nor is this conception of   
love to others1 which ,christians have  
continually cited as testimony of the   
divine origin of their religion1        
confined to ,christianity or even       
original with it4 ,many other religions 
contain it4 ,the ,buddhist religion     
enjoins towards all creatures such love 

as that with which a mother watches over
 her own child1 her only child4  ,it is 
true that the majority of the           
objectionable points of ,christian      
,ethics are found in the ,old           
,testament4 ,this testament is1 however1
 accepted as the exponent of divine     
truth1 though the authority it now      
possesses is slight in comparison with  
that which it formerly held4 ,yet       
,christ himself says3 ,think not ,i am  
come to destroy the ,law 7i4e41 the     
,pentateuch71#bgj or the ,prophets1 ,i  
come not to destroy1 but to fulfil4     
,for1 verily1 ,i say unto you1 ,till    
heaven and earth pass1 one jot or one   
tittle shall in no wise pass from the   
,law till all be fulfilled4 ,whosoever1 
therefore1 shall break one of these     
least commandments and shall teach men  
so1 he shall be called the least in the 
kingdom of heaven2 but whosoever shall  
do and teach them1 the same shall be    
called great in the kingdom of heaven4  
,repeatedly1 ,christ shows himself a    

strict conformant to the ,jewish code4  
,but if we examine the ,pentateuch1 the 
,jewish ,law1 we shall easily find on   
what grounds the burning of heretics and
 witches1 and all the other cruelties of
 the ,middle ,ages were committed in the
 name of ,christianity4 ,lubbock writes1
 for instance3#bga ,among the ,jews1 we 
find a system of animal sacrifice on a  
great scale1 and symbols of human       
sacrifice which can1 ,i think1 only be  
understood on the hypothesis that the   
latter were once usual4 ,the case of    
,jephthah's daughter is generally looked
 upon as exceptional2 but the           
twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth verses of
 the twenty-seventh chapter of          
,leviticus appear to indicate that human
 sacrifices were at one time habitual1  
among the ,jews4 ,see also #b ,sam4 xxi4
 #a1 #e-i1 #ad4 ,in ,lev4 xx4 #bg2 ,ex4 
xxii4 #ah1 the stoning of witches is    
commanded4 ,in ,ex4 xxii4 #bj2 ,deut4   
xiii4 #a-e1 #f-aj1 #ad1 #ae2 xvii4 #a-e2
 xviii4 #bj1 it was commanded that men  

be put to death for idolatry or heresy  
or for dreaming dreams in the service of
 another god1 and that idolatrous cities
 should be utterly destroyed even to the
 cattle within them4 ,superstition and  
insanity must have fared ill among the  
,jews4 ,ex4 xxxi4 #ad1 #ae2 xxxv4 #b1   
#c2 sentence of death is pronounced on  
any who shall perform even so much labor
 as the kindling of a fire on the       
,sabbath2 and ,num4 xv4 #cb-cf1 describe
 how a man was put to death1 by ,god's  
command to ,moses1 for gathering sticks 
on that day4 ,death was also commanded  
for murmuring and for all sorts of      
ceremonial offences2 see1 for instance1 
,ex4 xii4 #ae1 #ai2 xxx4 #cc-ch2 ,lev4  
vii4 #bj-bg2 xvii4 #h-aj1 #ac-af2 xix4  
#e-h2 xxiii4 #bi1 #cj2 xxiv4 #aj-af1    
#bc2 ,num4 i4 #ea2 iii4 #aj1 #ch2 iv4   
#ae1 #ah-bj2 xi4 #a2 xvii4 #ac2 xviii4  
#c1 #g1 #bb2 see also especially ,deut4 
xxviii4 #ae-fh2 xxxii4 #bb-db4 ,command 
of subjection to the priesthood on pain 
of death is found in ,deut4 xvii4 #h-ab1

 and examples of fearful punishment for 
protest against its supremacy are given 
in ,num4 xvi4 #c-ae1 #bj1 #ba1 #bf-ce1  
#da-dg1 #di4 ,it may be noticed1 that   
here the children are represented as    
perishing with the parents by ,god's    
express command and miracle4 ,many      
instances of the stoning and putting to 
death of whole families for the sins of 
some member or members of the family are
 recorded in the ,old ,testament1 and   
prove that the expression visiting the  
sins of the fathers upon the children1  
and upon the children's children1 unto  
the third and to the fourth generation1 
is not to be interpreted as a mere      
reference to heredity1 as many have     
endeavored to prove it to be4 ,see on   
this point ,is4 xiv4 #ba2 also ,ps4 cix4
 #g-bj2 cxxxvii4 #i4 ,the origin of     
ordeals may be traced to ,num4 v4       
#aa-ca4  ,the ,old ,testament also      
sanctions slavery1 and makes no protest 
against the selling of children into    
slavery2 see ,ex4 xxi4 #b-f1 #g2 ,lev4  

xxv4 #dd-dg2 although the ,israelites   
were to treat slaves and servants of    
their own nation with much greater      
kindness than that used towards those of
 other nations4 ,ex4 xxi4 #bj1 #ba1     
prescribes that a man shall not be      
punished for beating his servant to     
death1 provided the servant does not die
 directly under his hand1 but linger a  
day or two2 for he is his money4        
,christians have often protested that   
their religion cannot be held           
responsible for the sins of the         
prophets1--for ,david's murder of ,uriah
 in order to obtain the wife with whom  
he had already committed adultery2 for  
his torture of the ,ammonites with saws 
and axes and harrows and fire1 and his  
houghing of the horses of a thousand    
,moabitish chariots2 for ,solomon's     
concubinage and his slaughter of ,joab  
according to ,david's last orders2 for  
,elijah's wholesale slaughter of the    
priests of ,baal2 or for the thousand   
other vices1 crimes1 and atrocities     

described in the ,old ,testament as     
committed by ,god's chosen men1         
generally without punishment or protest 
from him4 ,however1 the case is not so  
easily dismissed when we find just as   
great cruelties and atrocities directly 
ascribed to ,god's express command or   
miraculous interposition4 ,a large      
number of such are included in the      
passages already noticed2 and we further
 find descriptions of a destruction from
 ,god for the crime of                  
census-taking#bgb--a ,chron4 xxi4 #a1   
#aa-ae--;for touching the ark in the    
endeavor to save it from a fall--#b     
,sam4 vi4 #f1 #g1--;and for many other  
trifling offences4 ,god is always       
represented as favoring the ,israelites 
in their wars and massacres1 and often  
as commanding the slaughter of          
thousands2 so that we can easily        
understand how it happened that the     
cowardly murderers of the ,duke of      
,gloucester1 in the time of ,richard    
,,ii41 swore upon the ,body of ,christ  

before a certain chaplain of ,st4       
,george in the church of ,our ,lady of  
,calais1 that they would not disclose   
the murder they were about to           
perpetrate1#bgc as also1 on what        
precedent ,russia1 at the present day1  
has her war-engines blessed by priests  
of the ,god of ,battles4 ,deut4 xx4     
#aj-ae1 commands the slaughter of males 
captured in a siege1 but the sparing    
alive of women and children as booty2   
and ,num4 xxxi4 describes a case in     
which the command was carried out1 with 
the reservation of a certain portion of 
young girls for the priests4 ,see also  
,deut4 xxi4 #aj-ad4 ,furthermore1 a     
religion that makes man absolute ruler  
of the earth and all living things1 and 
sanctions animal sacrifice1 cannot      
conduce to a sense of the duty of       
self-restraint towards other species1   
and is1 in fact1 often used as an excuse
 for the autocracy and cruelty of man4  
,it is1 indeed1 strange to see civilized
 peoples of the nineteenth century      

proclaiming the divine origin of laws   
and beliefs like these--laws and beliefs
 at least as barbarous as those of the  
,greeks and ,romans whose gods the      
,christians deride1 and far behind the  
,ethics of some philosophical systems   
produced among those heathen peoples4   
,as has been said1 various attempts have
 been made to explain away these        
barbarities1 or to withdraw all         
responsibility for them from ,god1 to   
whom the ,old ,testament often directly 
ascribes them4 ,but in the light of what
 we know of other primitive peoples the 
customs of the ,jews are only too easily
 comprehensible2 the same barbarities of
 human and animal sacrifice1 slavery1   
murder without pity1 and unscrupulous   
cruelty of every sort1 were to be found1
 as we have seen1 among many other      
ancient peoples4 ,as for withdrawing the
 responsibility from the ,god of the    
,jews1 ,christians forget that1 in      
denying the divine origin of the cruel1 
brutal1 and obscene laws ascribed to    

,god together with other laws of less   
barbarity but of organic growth with    
these1 they are forever destroying the  
grounds of belief in any assertion of   
divine supervision1 and throwing doubt1 
by implication1 on the ,new ,testament  
as well1 since ,christ and his followers
 were believers in the ,law and the     
,prophets1 and often refer to their     
assertions and accounts of divine       
direction4 ,but most religions have     
claimed1 and do claim1 the divine origin
 and ratification of their laws1 as a   
means of enforcing them4  ,the ,god of  
the ,jews1 ,jehovah1 was originally a   
nature-god1 the god of the heavens1 like
 ,zeus1 ,jupiter1 and many other of the 
greatest gods of other peoples4 ,science
 has exploded ancient ideas of the sky2 
but the ,christians still cling to the  
old terms brought into use at a time    
when men believed in a flat earth and a 
region of spirits above floored by an   
opaque heaven4 ,the ,god of the ,jews   
was1 like the gods of all primitive     

peoples1 a jealous and revengeful god1  
rather to be feared than loved2 for to  
such peoples1 possessing few resources  
against the powers of nature and        
ignorant of their character1 the        
destructive forces of the elements      
appeared at first rather evil than good1
 and therefore to be conciliated and    
appeased2 the gods take on their        
friendly character only as man comes to 
learn how the forces of nature may be   
employed for his benefit1 and as he     
slowly attains1 in himself1 to          
sympathetic and moral feeling4          
,accordingly1 the ,jews were continually
 occupied with all manner of            
propitiatory offerings of their most    
valuable possessions--their herds and   
the fruits of the earth2 and these were 
burnt under the impression common to    
nearly all primitive and savage tribes1 
that they suffered by fire a sort of    
death and entered the spiritual world4  
,gradually1 the ,jews became more       
civilized1 and took on the higher ideals

 of ,eastern religions with which they  
came in contact2 but even to very recent
 date1 the fear of ,god was regarded as 
the chief essential emotion on the part 
of the worshipper4 ,of late1 as social  
ideals have become higher1 and sympathy 
more general1 the idea of love1 lost for
 a time through the mixture of ,eastern 
peoples with more barbaric ones1 has    
come to the fore4 ,that a doctrine of   
polytheism is clearly taught in ,gen4   
iii4 #bb2 vi4 #a-d1 ,christians do not  
generally even notice4 ,the idea of     
demigods1 found in the latter verse1 is 
called by them1 when they meet with it  
in the ,greek or ,roman religion1 a     
myth2 and the idea of sexual intercourse
 between men and gods1 also taught in   
these verses1 is held worthy of all     
abhorrence1 when these heathen religions
 are under consideration4 ,the fact is1 
that exegesis1 forced to advance by     
progressing civilization1 has left far  
behind the simple original meaning of   
bible-texts1--such obvious meaning as   

,christians find in the ,buddhist1      
,persian1 or ,egyptian ,scriptures1 when
 they peruse them4 ,this is true of the 
,new ,testament as well as of the ,old4 
,the ,christian religion has indeed     
developed into a system of ,christian   
philosophy as different from the        
,christianity warranted by the ,old and 
,new ,testaments as were the later      
,buddhist philosophies from original    
,buddhism4  ,when ,christ conferred upon
 his ,apostles the power to forgive     
sins1 he laid the foundation for papal  
authority1 and confirmed the ancient    
authority of the priesthood1 preparing  
the way for that organization of        
priestcraft which figured so prominently
 in all the sorrowful history of the    
,middle ,ages4 ,moreover1 the vein of   
sadness and the subordination of natural
 modes of life which mark his teaching  
as they mark only in a greater degree   
those of the ,buddha1 easily led to the 
celibacy and mortification of the flesh 
which so long condemned the most        

aspiring from a moral point of view1 the
 most gentle and conscientious1 to a    
life of loneliness1 and peopled the     
world with the progeny of the less      
moral4 ,indeed1 if we read ,matt4 xix4  
#ab correctly1 ,christ distinctly taught
 emasculation as a high religious       
virtue4  ,the ,new ,testament tolerated 
the slavery upheld by the ,old          
,testament1 and we not only find no     
protest whatever against it1 but we even
 find ,paul returning a runaway slave to
 his master4 ,not only ,paul1 but ,john 
also1 taught both predestination and    
hell-fire for idolaters and unbelievers1
 as well as for the fearful and         
doubtful1 equally with murderers1       
whoremongers1 and liars3 ,rev4 xvii4 #h2
 xx4 #ae4 ,christ himself plainly       
proclaims the damnation of              
unbelievers--,matt4 xxii4 #ac1 #ad2     
xxiii4 #ad1 #cc2 ,mark xvi4 #af2        
etc4--and he at the same time asserts a 
very positive doctrine of               
predestination1 avowing that he himself 

takes special pains that many of those  
to whom he preaches shall not be able to
 understand him1 believe1 and be saved3 
,mark iv4 #aa1 #ab2 ,john xii4 #ci1 #dj4
 ,his language on these subjects is very
 clear1 and bears no sign of being      
intended as figurative1 though modern   
,christians prefer to regard it as such 
rather than to relinquish a religion the
 morals of which would1 by other        
interpretation1 be proved inadequate to 
the demands of the standards of higher  
civilization2 the same method of        
exegesis applied to the sacred books of 
,confucianism or of ,buddhism1 from     
which it now appears probable that very 
many of the ,christian ideas were       
derived1 would suit them ill4 ,but even 
if ,christ's language were figurative1  
it must have some meaning2 the wrath and
 vengeance of ,god are continually      
spoken of in the ,new ,testament as well
 as in the ,old4 ,such expressions were 
not looked upon1 until of late1 as      
figurative1 and they doubtless did much 

to justify1 to the minds of earlier     
,christians1 the burning of heretics4   
,the justification of all sin in ,god's 
elect1 a permanent indulgence1 is       
plainly taught by ,paul1 ,rom4 viii4    
#cc2 iv4 #e-h2 #a ,cor4 vi4 #ab4 ,let us
 take the ,buddhist ,scriptures1 and1 in
 the light of the better passages1 or in
 the light of ,siddhartha's devotion to 
truth and to his fellow men1 interpret  
the passages which1 morally1 we find    
wanting1 and we shall find this religion
 as beautiful as the ,christian4  ,a    
chief reason often advanced by          
,christians for continued faith in their
 religion1 is the comfort conferred by a
 belief in immortality and the          
forgiveness of sins through ,christ2    
that is1 the rescue of men from the     
wrath of ,god through the offering of an
 innocent being1 a human sacrifice1     
which was to bear this wrath1 and       
appease it1 according to the old ,jewish
 idea of the scapegoat4 ,the morality of
 the last doctrine we have already      

condemned2 there is no real making      
atonement in this world2 we should      
recognize this fact1 bear the           
responsibility of our deeds1 and in the 
light of past experience1 avoid the     
repetition of our old sins4 ,and the    
moral question as to mortality or       
immortality is not3 ,what is the        
pleasanter to believe8 but ,what is the 
truth8 ,in this recommendation of the   
pleasant in belief1 we have but an      
illustration of one of the chief defects
 of ,christian theory1 which lays most  
stress upon faith and far less upon a   
love of the ,truth at all costs4 ,the   
peace of the ,christian's death-bed is  
often made one of the chief arguments in
 favor of the ,christian religion4 ,but 
the mind in which there exists the noble
 love of truth will seek this only at   
the cost of all peace and blind content4
  ,on the general connection of faith   
and morals1 ,clifford writes3 ,belief in
 ,god and in a future life is a source  
of refined and elevated pleasure to     

those who can hold it4 ,but the         
foregoing of a refined and elevated     
pleasure1 because it appears that we    
have no right to indulge in it1 is not  
in itself1 and cannot produce as its    
consequences1 a decline of morality4#bgd
 ,indeed1 ,christianity1 as has been    
already remarked1 and as is conclusively
 shown by any conscientious and         
unprejudiced examination of the ,bible  
itself1 leaves room for an ease of      
conscience and a self-excuse in even    
very great sins1 which no high standard 
of morals can tolerate4 ,how many of    
those who attend church regularly1 on   
,sunday1 are restrained by their        
religion from practising vice and       
injustice on week-days1 under the       
consolation1 if their conscience        
troubles them at all1 that their prayers
 for forgiveness and the bestowal of    
charity1 or even1 in extremity1 a       
death-bed repentance will make their    
peace with ,god8 ,in place of an attempt
 at reparation towards men1 against whom

 sin is really done1 ,christians are    
taught to seek the forgiveness of ,god4 
,some there are1 indeed1 who remember   
only the law of love and endeavor to    
follow it4 ,all honor to them4 ,but they
 are adherents of a modern ,christian   
,philosophy1 the product of many good   
men who have winnowed out the wheat of  
their religion and left the chaff2 they 
are not followers of the ,bible1 or even
 of the ,new ,testament1 as a whole4    
,many there are who are perceiving this1
 and the old system needs replacement   
with a newer and higher--with a system  
which affords clear and evident grounds 
for moral action1 leaves no room for    
mysticism1 self-justification1 or       
inaction1 offers no opiate to           
conscience4 ,such a system must be      
founded on the solid rock of scientific 
,truth2 not on any doctrine of blind    
obedience to traditions2 it must take   
into account man's evolution1 that it   
may progress with his progress4  ,many  
term the ,ethics of science dry and     

uninspiring1 and turn1 with preference1 
to religions which1 if they give us     
mysticism or pessimism1 give us poetry  
also2 for man is an emotional as well as
 an intellectual being2 and there may be
 much poetry in pessimism4 ,but again1  
it may be said that the ,truth is that  
which we should first seek4 ,and        
especially let it be remembered that1 if
 poetry is lacking1 it may be that the  
deficiency is in ourselves4 ,it is a    
history many times repeated1 that men   
call their age and its ideas dry and    
uninteresting1 and seek their ideals and
 inspirations in the past1 until the    
master-mind arises1 who boldly faces and
 interprets the realities about him2 and
 then men exclaim and wonder1 and find  
that their own blindness1 and not the   
age1 was at fault4 ,we cling by habit to
 the old and fear the new2 and so we    
have yet to inspire these new ideals    
with the beauty gained by association   
and habit2 in themselves1 they do not   
lack beauty4 ,in truth1 as ,i believe   

that there is more of poetry in the gray
 wires strung across our streets and    
guiding the swift1 silent1 fearful      
forces in which lies power to light a   
city or destroy a life1 than ever was in
 any feeble-flamed ,grecian lamp1 so ,i 
believe also that1 in the dry1 hard1    
cold-seeming facts of modern science    
there lurks more poetry than all the    
ages gone have known2 though we may need
 the poet to interpret it to us4 ,the   
highest poetry is that of love2 and it  
is the realization of this poetry that  
the ,ethics of ,evolution teaches1      
promises1 and enjoins4 ,certainly the   
superficial ,utilitarianism which looks 
only at external forms of government and
 customs and the arithmetically         
calculated relations of men1 not at     
their inner character and the organic   
complexity of moral questions1 cannot   
satisfy in the long run4 ,nor can the   
bald ,materialism satisfy which1        
standing by its analysis in physical    
terms like the physiologist in the      

dissecting-room with his chemicals about
 him and the dead nerves and muscles in 
his hand1 exclaims with a triumph that  
is half a sneer3 ,this is all4 ,it is   
not all4 ,the synthesis of nature and of
 life cannot be represented by its parts
 merely2 the bond of organization       
wanting1 all is wanting4 ,nor is the    
action in the brain more real1 more     
forceful1 more spontaneous1 or freer1   
than the love for a friend1 the thought 
of him1 or the will to do him a         
kindness4  ,,footnotes3  #bef ,moral    
,order and ,progress1 p4 #bib2 ,part    
,i41 this book1 pp4 #bej1 #bea4  #beg   
,moral ,order and ,progress1 p4 #bhg1   
etc42 ,part ,i4 p4 #bdi1 this book4     
#beh ,moral ,order and ,progress1 pp4   
#cjg1 #cab2 ,part ,i4 pp4 #bej1 #beb1   
#bec1 this book4  #bei ,moral ,order and
 ,progress1 ,book ,i4 ,chap4 ,,ii42     
,part ,i4 pp4 #bca1 #bcb1 this book4    
#bfj ,moral ,order and ,progress1 p4    
#ccb4  #bfa ,see ,die                   
,entwicklungsgeschichte des ,weltalls4  

#bfb ,moral ,order and ,progress1 p4    
#bgj2 ,part ,i41 this book1 p4 #bdg4    
#bfc ,on the theory of ,weismann4  #bfd 
,human ,progress1 ,past and ,present1   
,the ,arena for ,jan41 #ahib4  #bfe     
,ethik1 p4 #cdd4  #bff ,see ,part ,i4 p4
 #adg4  #bfg ,the ,science of ,ethics1  
pp4 #cb-cd4  #bfh ,george ,eliot1       
,romola4  #bfi ,salter1 ,ethical        
,religion4  #bgj ,it is strange that    
even enlightened ,christians often1     
without thinking1 interpret the         
,scriptures referred to by ,christ as if
 they1 in some way1 included the ,new   
,testament1 which was not written till  
long after his death4  #bga ,the ,origin
 of ,civilization1 p4 #cgc4  #bgb       
,superstitious fears are often awakened 
in savage tribes1 and among the ignorant
 of our own more advanced societies1 by 
attempts at census-taking4  #bgc ,pike1 
,history of ,crime1 ,i4 p4 #dje4  #bgd  
,essays and ,lectures1 ,the ,influence  
upon ,morality of a ,decline in         
,religious ,belief4     ,,chapter ,,ix  

,,the ,,ideal ,,and ,,the ,,way ,,of    
,,its ,,attainment   ,mr4 ,stephen      
questions the possibility of our        
determining at all what a state of ideal
 morality should be4 ,i should contend1 
on the contrary1 that there would be    
little disagreement in opinions as to   
what the ideal should be1 but that      
rather our chief difficulties must lie  
in the determination of the course to be
 pursued in order to attain to the      
ideal4 ,the profligate1 it is true1 will
 not be likely to acknowledge that      
self-control and faithfulness are parts 
of an ideal condition if he thinks that 
the acknowledgment binds him in any way 
to faithfulness and self-control in his 
own conduct2 and the dishonest man will 
be chary of admitting that honesty is   
desirable if his consciousness suggests 
that he ought therefore to practise     
unvarying honesty himself4 ,but the     
dishonest man is generally very         
thoroughly convinced of the desirability
 of honor and uprightness in every one  

else2 and the profligate also is        
generally both among the loudest in his 
denunciation of unfaithfulness in those 
he feels should be true to him1 and     
sufficiently ready to acknowledge the   
social advantages of principles opposite
 to his own1 if you can but convince him
 that it is only a matter of pure theory
 you are discussing1 which will         
doubtless never be put in practice by   
society as a whole1 and which in no way 
interferes with your thorough approval  
of his own action4 ,so1 too1 the cruel1 
the rough1 and the rude1 will easily    
confess that unselfishness1 unfailing   
kindness1 tact1 and consideration in the
 rest of society1 are what the world    
needs4 ,did these virtues exist1 there  
would be no need of the choice between  
evils now necessary4 ,that which really 
troubles us is this choice1 the         
difficulty of ascertaining just what    
course is the best1 which brings us     
nearest to our ideal1 assists most      
effectually in hastening development    

towards that goal4 ,for there is no     
course1 under existing conditions1 which
 is wholly advantageous to society1 none
 which does not involve some evil4 ,it  
follows1 from this1 that it is          
insufficient to show that any particular
 course involves some advantage to some 
one in order to demonstrate that it is  
the right one1 as also that it is       
insufficient to show that a course      
involves evil to some one in order to   
demonstrate that it is wrong4 ,it is not
 proved that1 because the restraint of  
any particular desire or passion is     
attended with pain to the individual1 it
 is wrong4 ,the argument has often been1
 and is still1 advanced--seemingly with 
the idea that it is conclusive--that the
 indulgence of physical passion in youth
 tends to sobriety and steadiness in    
later years2 and1 with a similar idea   
apparently1 a dramatic critic falls into
 a rhapsody over the manner in which the
 characters in a recent play come out   
purified by the evil they have wrought  

or endured4#bge ,but even if this       
argument were scientifically sound1 it  
would not prove the desirability of     
self-indulgence1 since not the          
individual alone is to be considered4   
,the argument is1 however1 erroneous4   
,with advancing years comes in general1 
in any case1 a diminution of passion1 or
 at least a greater admixture of reason2
 but apart from this1 indulgence tends  
to increase desire and tendency1 except 
as excess may lead to morbid conditions1
 or the disregard of higher instincts to
 disappointment and cynicism4 ,when we  
are told1 in another play than the one  
mentioned above1 and apparently with the
 idea that the statement is an excuse1  
that the hero could find no other outlet
 for the exuberance of his youth than   
the seduction of an innocent girl1 we   
may see no reason to doubt the          
assertion1 but we may question whether  
society has not a right1 nevertheless1  
to suppress a little of such exuberance 
or turn it into other channels4 ,the man

 born with fierce and ungovernable fury 
in his disposition may likewise feel a  
strong propensity to express the        
exuberance of his youth in a murder or  
two2 but ,i see no reason why society   
should permit him to do so4 ,the passion
 of anger is also a perfectly natural   
one1 and the ungovernable fury which led
 to murder was not an exception with our
 ancestors of the savage plane1 but the 
rule4 ,not all natural passion is to be 
indulged simply because it is natural2  
and even the fact that a tendency is    
good in moderation and under certain    
restrictions is no proof that it is good
 or to be indulged in immoderation1 or  
without these restrictions4 ,it can have
 been only by restriction of the natural
 savage fury that this fury grew less   
prominent in character4 ,the cannibal   
transported into civilized society may  
still have a strong and perfectly       
natural hunger for my spareribs1 but    
that is no sufficient reason why he     
should get them4 ,jack the ,ripper is   

endowed1 evidently1 with a very         
passionate love for his human           
vivisection1 and finds it an outlet for 
an exuberance which also bubbles out    
otherwise in many ways2 yet ,i think    
society will be justified in putting a  
peremptory end to that exuberance1 when 
it gets the opportunity4  ,morality is  
indeed a matter of welfare1 and so1 of  
the gratification of desire and         
tendency2 but neither the present alone1
 nor the single individual in preference
 to all the rest of society1 is to be   
considered4 ,effort should be exerted   
continually for the reduction of pain to
 a minimum1 in every respect possible1  
with regard to the individual and the   
minority as well as with regard to the  
majority1 though the greater good and   
the greater number must always take     
precedence4 ,the rule of the majority   
may be asserted to be moral in that it  
is the best possible expedient where    
there is disagreement of desires4 ,the  
necessity for choice between evils is   

the origin of the principle of the      
,greatest ,good to the ,greatest        
,number1 and this1 as has been said1    
covers all the ground1 if rightly       
applied4 ,but it offers a temptation to 
stop with the mere comparison of two    
sums of individuals and degrees of      
happiness for the time being1 without   
taking into the problem the wider       
results of a particular choice to       
society as a whole1 through habit and   
personal influence4 ,the consideration  
of these last important factors has led1
 on the other hand1 to such rules as    
that of ,kant1--,act so that the maxims 
of thy will might be taken as the       
principle of universal action2 and this 
rule1 because it goes deeper1 is less   
likely to lead to error4 ,the moral     
requirement of continual effort to find 
the best method of reducing the evil    
still remaining1 of recompensing the    
individual and the minority for the good
 of which they are necessarily deprived1
 needs especial emphasis2 for the       

continual direction of attention to     
effort for progress1 even where no      
outward change is1 for the moment1      
possible1 constitutes an inward progress
 in character which is ever ready to    
issue in external progress the instant  
opportunity presents itself4 ,present   
pain to individuals is the sign of      
imperfection in those permitting it and 
those suffering it1 and must result in  
increase of tendency in this direction  
of imperfection unless it takes place   
only in spite of the most vigorous      
effort for its prevention4 ,even the    
reformer must choose that to which he   
would chiefly apply his endeavor1 with  
some necessary withdrawal of effort from
 other directions4 ,yet the neglect of  
any present opportunity of reform or    
benefit1 though it may sometimes be     
necessitated for the gain of some more  
important future good1 is still an      
outer1 and also1 especially1 an inner   
evil1 which can be compensated only by a
 high degree of superiority in the      

future good to be obtained4 ,as the man 
who1 perhaps from the fear of failing in
 thoroughness1 leaves all original work 
until middle age1 is likely to find his 
power of originality much deteriorated  
by that time1 so the man who is cruel   
to-day1 in order to be kind in some     
wider respect later on1 is likely to    
find1 on the final arrival of           
opportunity1 if the period through which
 the unkindness is exercised be a long  
one1 that his capacity for kindness has 
diminished4 ,every neglect of present   
opportunity is a loss to character as   
well as an external loss4 ,when the     
present good passed over for the sake of
 the future includes the welfare of     
whole lives1 the question of choice and 
the postponement of good becomes still  
graver2 when it includes generations1 we
 need to consider earnestly before we   
take on ourselves the responsibility of 
a choice that shall prefer the future4  
,i cannot agree with those who believe  
or practically live out the idea that   

the present generation is only or       
chiefly for the sake of the future      
generation1 the parents only for the    
sake of their children1 or the          
individual only for the sake of society 
as a whole4 ,we need to remember that   
the race includes present and future1   
and parents and children1 and has no    
existence outside the individuals that  
compose it4 ,it is difficult to         
reconcile the many conflicting          
principles2 and thus it appears that    
morality is not easy1 even where earnest
 desire for it exists1 and that         
different views with regard to it may be
 conscientiously held4 ,the difficulty  
only increases the duty of continual    
endeavor to reconcile the many different
 conditions of happiness and welfare4   
,we come thus naturally to a question of
 the day1--the contest between the      
,individualist and the ,socialist4      
,what has already been said makes it    
sufficiently evident that1 if           
,individualism is to be maintained at   

all1 it cannot be upheld on the ground  
that the doings of the individual are of
 no importance to society1 and his sins 
may therefore not be interfered with by 
society4 ,in ,social ,statics1 ,mr4     
,spencer secures freedom for personal   
vice by turning his principle that a man
 has a right to seek his own ends as    
long as he does not prevent others from 
the pursuit of their ends1 into the     
entirely different one1 that a man has a
 right to seek a certain end if he does 
not prevent others from seeking the same
 end4#bgf ,the argument in this form is 
applied to drunkenness1 but it could as 
well be used to prove the moral         
rightness of murder or any other crime1 
the sole condition being that the       
murderer did not prevent others from    
committing the crime also4  ,nor is the 
,individualism less self-contradictory  
which bases its theory on the principle 
that it is the office of civil law to   
guard the rights of the individual4     
,what individual8 ,all individuals8 ,if 

so1 then assuredly it is the duty of the
 ,state to see that the laborer is paid 
a fair price for his work4  ,nor can it 
be shown1 as ,hoeffding asserts1 that   
intellectual labor benefits the whole of
 society1 while manual labor is less    
valuable because it is for a few4 ,the  
intellectual laborer knows well of what 
value to him and his ilk is the manual  
labor which feeds him1 clothes him1 and 
manufactures the thousand and one things
 necessary for his comfort1 leaving him 
leisure to pursue his studies with all  
material wants provided for4 ,the       
satisfaction of our material wants is   
the very first requisite of life1       
without which intellectual labor would  
be an impossibility4  ,there are1       
however1 many degrees and shades of     
,individualism4 ,as ,hoeffding says1    
,individualism may be identical with    
,egoism1 but it need not be so4 ,and1   
moreover1 as has been noticed1 the      
adherents of theories of ,egoistic      
,morals are not necessarily adherents of

 any theory of selfishness4  ,the       
theories bearing the name of ,socialism 
are also very various1--quite as much so
 as those included under the head of    
,individualism4 ,it is1 therefore1 both 
confusing to consider ,socialism without
 some notice of the distinction between 
these various phases of theory1 and is  
likely to lead to protest from one side 
or the other4 ,but no single party of   
,socialists can be treated exclusively  
as the ,socialists2 a minority of the   
party cannot expect to be regarded as   
anything but a minority4  ,of the       
tendency to represent the whole of the  
present order of society as utterly     
bad1--a tendency not confined to the    
,socialist party1 but nevertheless      
strongly developed in many parts of     
it1--considerable has already been said4
 ,as ,hoeffding remarks1 it is difficult
 to perceive how1 in an utterly corrupt 
society1 any foundation may be found on 
which to build the almost flawless      
society the ,socialist proposes to      

institute4 ,if the course of evolution  
has hitherto been propitious to the     
increase of evil1 it is difficult to    
find any scientific grounds for a belief
 that evolution will now proceed to     
favor the good4 ,if man1 as a being     
possessing reason1 has hitherto chosen1 
in increasing degree1 injustice towards 
his fellow-man1 it is scarcely possible 
for any one who proceeds upon the       
supposition of constancy in the action  
of man as a part of nature to hope that 
future events will exhibit exactly      
opposite characters4 ,assuredly1 we are 
far enough from the goal yet1 but in    
order to demonstrate this fact it is not
 necessary to prove that we are worse   
than any previous age has been4 ,the    
tendency to lay stress1 by every means1 
on present evil1 in the endeavor to     
impress its reality and undesirability  
upon the mind of society1 is            
comprehensible2 and doubtless1 too1 as  
the troubles of the individual are      
likely to appear to himself among the   

hardest possible1 so to those on whom   
the evils of the age press most severely
 these are likely to seem greater than  
the evils of any other times4 ,but this 
method of regarding history is not the  
less erroneous4 ,in the age of chivalry 
men had at least a common ideal1 said a 
,socialist to me1 not long since4 ,but  
what an ideal6 ,and unity of purpose is 
not by any means necessarily a sign of a
 high plane4 ,it may1 on the contrary1  
signify stupidity1 lack of the power of 
independent thought4 ,the first result  
of thought on any particular subject is 
sure to be a division of opinion1       
although mutual criticism gradually     
evolves harmony from the strife1 and    
brings about a degree of unity again1 on
 a higher plane2 for the mutual         
criticism is sure to have been of       
intellectual use4 ,the ,socialists      
themselves have demonstrated the fact   
that division of opinion necessarily    
arises when men begin to think upon any 
question1 for with the development of   

their party many different phases of    
socialistic theory have appeared4 ,the  
history of the division of the ,church  
into sects1 and of the mutual criticism 
of these sects1 has been the history of 
religious progress4  ,with some         
,socialists1 again1 the already         
criticised idea of a return to nature   
plays a conspicuous part4 ,but we have  
never departed from nature2 we are as   
much a part of nature1 as natural1 as we
 ever were4 ,or1 if we are to return1   
who shall tell us at just what point we 
leave the artificial and arrive at the  
natural8 ,there are no stopping-places1 
no stations or pauses1 in the scale of  
evolution4 ,there is only continual     
change by inappreciable increments4 ,the
 theory of evolution carries with it no 
significance which could authorize us to
 consider that we had arrived at our    
goal at one point rather than at        
another4 ,and1 again1 if we are to give 
up the artificial customs of later      
development and return to earlier       

habits1 then customs of altruistic      
action1 as the most distinctive and     
characteristic of later forms of        
conduct1 must be chiefly affected4 ,if1 
however1 by a return to nature is meant 
the adoption of a simpler mode of life  
in some classes in order that a less    
simple but more healthful one may become
 possible in other classes1 the question
 of the desirability of such a change   
is1 of course1 open to discussion2 but  
let us consider it under these terms    
then4 ,to designate the proposed mode of
 life as a return to the natural1 thus  
making present modes of life artificial1
 is to smuggle in an illegitimate       
assumption against the latter4  ,it is  
the habit of a portion of the ,socialist
 party to represent the laborer as the  
epitome of all the virtues1 the         
capitalist as his moral opposite4 ,this 
view cannot be other than erroneous1    
considered from any standpoint4 ,moral  
evil cannot affect one part of a closely
 united society without affecting the   

other parts also1 though it may assume  
different forms in different parts4     
,this should be1 in reality1 the        
,socialist's strongest argument1 and is1
 indeed1 one which he constantly makes  
use of in other connections4 ,if the    
steady labor of one class is often      
associated with certain virtues1 there  
are many elements of its surroundings   
which tend to develop and encourage     
certain vices also2 and if1 on the other
 hand1 excessive wealth is often the    
condition1 as well as the result1 of    
selfishness1 still the relief from      
material anxieties may be used1 on the  
other hand1 as opportunity for other    
useful labor1 and leaves room1 indeed1  
for a development of finer intellectual 
and moral qualities4 ,to reply that much
 greater good would accompany other     
conditions is irrelevant2 for we are not
 now comparing actualities with ideals1 
but one class of people with another    
under existing circumstances4  ,a       
somewhat similar phase of idea to that  

just considered is found in the         
agitation against machinery4 ,this      
agitation is not of recent date1        
however2 it began over two centuries    
ago1 and would1 if it had succeeded1    
have deprived the world of nearly all   
the comforts and conveniences which     
have1 since then1 become possible4      
,doubtless the abolishment of machinery 
would temporarily furnish labor to all  
the unemployed4 ,indeed1 it has been    
computed1 from facts supplied by the    
statistical bureau of ,berlin1 that it  
would require about double the number of
 inhabitants now on the face of the     
globe to perform the labor accomplished 
by the steam works of the principal     
civilized lands4 ,but the increase of   
the earth's inhabitants depends1 to a   
great extent1 on the favorable or       
unfavorable circumstances of the        
environment2 and we cannot suppose      
otherwise than that the sudden accession
 of abundant means of livelihood would  
cause a very great acceleration of the  

rate of increase and so a speedy return 
of the old problem4 ,even supposing that
 a certain recklessness of sexual       
indulgence would be done away with under
 better circumstances which afforded    
access to other means of pleasure than  
the purely physical1 this               
over-indulgence leads quite as often to 
sterility and disease as to excess of   
offspring4 ,habit and opinion not being 
matters of instantaneous or even rapid  
change1 the new order of society would  
very largely depend upon the character  
and ideas acquired under the old order1 
and population must increase with a     
rapidity fostered by an immense         
multiplication of regular marriages1 and
 by more healthful surroundings for     
offspring at all ages4 ,unchecked1 as   
hitherto1 by the excessive mortality due
 to famine1 filth1 and neglect1 it must 
soon arrive at a point where the        
questions of competition again present  
themselves4 ,but machinery is a relative
 term4 ,every tool and device for       

lightening labor is1 in fact1 a machine1
 and takes1 by definition1 from the     
labor of the world4 ,when1 therefore1 we
 should find ourselves face to face with
 the former conditions1 ,i do not see   
that any consistent course would lie    
before us but the doing away with our   
more complicated tools1 and1 later1 with
 our less complicated ones1 and so on1  
as the increase of the world's          
inhabitants brought again and again the 
recurrence of questions of competition1 
until we should arrive1 at length1 at   
that ancient state of things where all  
transport would be made by porters1 land
 ploughed by the pointed stick1 and     
clothes--if we consented to withdraw    
labor from the cultivation of the earth 
for the manufacture of such             
luxuries--would require for the         
preparation of each garment several     
weeks1 months1 or even years of work4 ,i
 do not see where else the theory of the
 abolishment of machinery for the sake  
of supplying labor to the unemployed can

 logically and practically lead1        
especially as the withdrawal of         
machinery must mean1 in the end1 the    
withdrawal of those opportunities for   
cultivating the arts and sciences which 
the leisure from merely mechanical      
pursuits alone can give4 ,under more    
primitive conditions of labor1 the      
ignorance of the masses must spread more
 and more1 until its widening circle    
must take in the great majority of men1 
as was the case when these primitive    
conditions prevailed4 ,in other words1  
the abolishment of machinery means      
social retrogression1 and1 if affording 
temporary relief1 leaves the race1 in   
the end1 on a lower plane of evolution1 
with the work of advancement to its     
former plane all to do over again4  ,and
 this brings us to the consideration of 
another point1 namely1 the agitation    
against luxury1--an agitation carried on
 not1 like that against machinery1 by   
only a portion1 if a considerable       
portion1 of the ,socialist party1 but by

 that party as a whole4 ,we may inquire1
 then1 as to what luxury is4 ,the       
,socialists find considerable trouble in
 defining it2 they generally content    
themselves with the word alone1 leaving 
it undefined or referring1 with a       
general indefiniteness1 to velvets1     
jewels1 and laces1 or diamonds and      
silks2 the ,german ,socialists have     
sometimes shown particular antipathy to 
the glace glove2 and a society of       
,english ,socialists listened1 not long 
ago1 to a lecture in which1 as an       
example of the reforms proposed by      
,socialism1 it was prophesied that the  
evening-dresses of the future would be  
made of more lasting though not less    
delicate and beautiful material4 ,this  
last would assuredly be desirable1 if it
 could be carried out2 but it remains to
 be seen in how far it is practicable4  
,the things which are the most delicate1
 whether they be clothing or other      
articles1 are ordinarily likewise the   
most perishable2 the union of delicacy  

of texture with endurance is a problem  
that can be solved only by gradual      
improvement if at all2 and it is        
probable that it can be solved only     
relatively in some cases and not at all 
in others2 yet there are few people who 
will not find delicacy an attribute of  
beauty4 ,few will disagree with ,m4 de  
,laveleye that beauty of costume must   
consist rather in harmony of colors and 
purity of line than in the mere         
costliness of the goods2 however1 in a  
large number of cases1 excess of price  
corresponds to some actual superiority  
of color1 durability1 or texture1 in the
 goods4 ,doubtless it is true that some 
things 7,m4 de ,laveleye instances      
opium7 may cost much money and yet be   
useless or even harmful2 but this very  
limited assertion cannot1 by any logical
 method1 be converted into an assertion 
that the price of an article is an      
argument against it4 ,even the extra    
price demanded and paid for novelties   
corresponds to an actual1 general desire

 for variety1 and if this is often      
carried too far1 the fact still remains 
that the want is inherent in all human  
nature1 indeed1 in all life1 and cannot 
be entirely disregarded4 ,the proposal  
of ,m4 de ,laveleye to reinstitute a    
national dress is1 for this reason1 a   
foolish and inartistic one4 ,no two     
people are suited to exactly the same   
costume2 and the more society develops  
the more the individual shows a desire  
for individuality in dress4 ,no nation  
with a sense of beauty will ever consent
 to eternal sameness4  ,luxury is       
relative1 as ,m4 de ,laveleye himself   
acknowledges4 ,we might define it1 as he
 does at one point1#bgg by excess of    
price or labor expended4 ,in that case1 
such articles as those ,african dresses 
which it takes several years to         
manufacture would assuredly come under  
the head of luxuries1 and must1 as such1
 be condemned from the standpoint of the
 tribal plane of advancement2 though    
they are not equal in texture or taste  

of ornamentation to many of the cheapest
 of ,english goods1 within the reach of 
all but the very poorest4 ,what are1    
with ,europeans1 the bare necessities1  
or comforts of lowest grade1 represent  
the extreme of luxury to the ,africans  
on whose plane our ancestors once stood4
 ,many of the things which are regarded 
by the average individual of to-day as  
indispensable--every-day comforts--were 
within the reach of only the wealthy    
few1 a century ago1 and could be had    
only as rare and choice articles1 to be 
preserved with the greatest care4 ,the  
comforts of a century ago represent1    
again1 the luxuries of a preceding age1 
and so on4 ,almost all products of labor
 are costly and rare before they can    
become cheap and abundant4 ,had our     
ancestors entertained a socialistic     
prejudice against the luxuries of their 
age1 and resolved1 with one accord1 to  
forego their manufacture as supplying   
only artificial needs1 we should not    
have had them to-day2 but it is doubtful

 whether the social problem would be any
 nearer solution than it is4 ,the       
agitation against machinery1 at least1  
is ill combined with an agitation       
against luxury2 for every removal of    
machinery must make luxuries out of what
 were1 before1 mere comforts1 and       
advance the things now regarded as      
necessities to the plane of the present 
comforts1 as far as expenditure of labor
 is regarded4 ,m4 de ,laveleye          
distinguishes between rational and      
primitive needs and irrational1         
superfluous1 or spurious1 ones2 and he  
defines the rational ones as those which
 reason asserts and hygiene             
determines4#bgh ,but from the merely    
hygienic point of view1 every need bears
 with it1 by its very existence1 a title
 to some consideration1 health and the  
gratification of desires being most     
intimately connected4 ,certainly luxury 
is not necessarily inconsistent with the
 most healthy physique1 or the longest  
life4 ,many of the things ordinarily    

looked upon as luxuries present         
unusually favorable conditions for      
health4 ,nor can the question be decided
 by arbitrarily pronouncing all desires 
for luxury spurious4 ,to ,m4 de         
,laveleye and a minority of others they 
may appear so2 but what right has the   
individual to the assumption that all   
needs beyond his own are spurious8 ,even
 the poorer classes of society would1   
for the most part1 be very glad to      
possess the luxuries of the rich1 and   
find them desirable2 in other words1    
those desires which ,m4 de ,laveleye    
pronounces spurious appertain to very   
nearly all human beings who have at all 
formed a conception of their            
possibility4 ,the savage does not desire
 what we term luxury in as far as he    
knows nothing of it4 ,the argument that 
luxury is wrong or irrational simply    
because men once were able to do without
 it is by no means conclusive4 ,the     
conditions of life1 the employments of  
human beings1 are far different now from

 those of the time when men lived in    
houses of osier4 ,primitive the desire  
for luxury may not be2 but if we attempt
 to determine what is primitive in man1 
we shall meet with excessive            
difficulties4 ,and again1 if we decide  
the question on the basis of any        
assumption against the non-primitive1 we
 must1 in all consistency1 exclude1 as  
has already been said1 all higher       
ethical emotion and the love of art and 
science2 none of these can be pronounced
 primitive4 ,possibly we might define   
hunger1 thirst1 sexual appetite1 and the
 desire for a comfortable degree of     
warmth1 as the most primitive human     
needs2 and these1 indeed1 are soon      
satisfied2 but the man who has no needs 
beyond these can not represent the      
social ideal4 ,the whole history of     
civilization from century to century is 
the history of the formation of new     
needs and the gradual satisfaction of   
these in larger and larger circles1     
until their objects1 from costly and    

hardly obtainable rarities1 have become 
articles of common use4 ,with this      
course of development1 coarseness has   
decreased1 refinement and taste have    
become more general4 ,nor can we1 as has
 before been stated1 divide the human   
being into his separate desires and     
functions1 and assume that he can get   
rid of this or that one without         
influencing all4 ,the desires of the    
human being are of organic growth1 and  
the desire for luxury has an organic    
connection with the taste and refinement
 with which it has grown4 ,it is        
impossible that the love of beauty in   
general should develop without the      
appearance of a desire for beauty in the
 details of every-day life1--in         
utensils1 clothing1 surroundings of     
every sort2 as it is impossible1 also1  
that this desire for beauty in          
particulars should be dispensed with    
without a corresponding retrogression in
 refinement and love of beauty in       
general4 ,one of the chief expenses of  

,american entertainments is the         
profusion of flowers used in decoration1
 and often most artistically arranged2  
and whatever else may be said on the    
subject1 the pleasure derived from them 
can scarcely be termed spurious or      
irrational4 ,not all large sums spent by
 the rich are given for mere display or 
for sensuality2 they may be spent for   
scientific experiments on a large scale1
 like those of ,edison1 for travel1 for 
books1 for statuary and fine pictures1  
for fine architecture1 for rich         
tapestries and carpets1 and even in     
great measure for appliances and methods
 that secure greater cleanliness and    
more healthful ways of living           
altogether4 ,nor are the appliances of  
art and culture as desirable in huge    
museums or draughty and ill-ventilated  
libraries1 or anywhere else where the   
individual is forced into the noise and 
numerous other annoyances of a          
promiscuous crowd1 as in his own home1  
arranged according to his own           

peculiarities of taste1 and associated  
with all the joys of love and domestic  
freedom4 ,when sympathy has become so   
general and so strong that not only men 
but women also can find their best      
intellectual enjoyment in public places1
 these reasons will cease to be of any  
force1 but at present they have even    
moral force2 and since inherent         
character is a matter of evolution1 a   
condition of general sympathy and mutual
 consideration1 and even of universal   
common decency1 must be of slow growth4 
,it may further be said1 in particular1 
that there is no material more used by  
artists than the so-much-decried velvet2
 again1 many people of taste1 who       
otherwise spend money for little more   
than the necessities of life1 find a    
peculiar delight in the delicacy of fine
 laces1 and are willing to forego many  
other pleasures in order to possess     
them4 ,george ,eliot's ,dorothea1       
otherwise simple of habit1 content with 
her plain wool gown1 found a peculiar   

fascination in the colors of an emerald 
bracelet1 and numerous persons confess  
to a similar pleasure in the changing   
rainbow of the diamond1 or the clear    
blue of the sapphire4 ,these desires and
 pleasures exist2 they exist in people  
of comparative taste2 they exist as the 
result of human progress2 they are not  
confined to a few individuals2 and they 
cannot be dismissed with a mere         
arbitrary definition of them as         
artificial1 superfluous1 irrational1 or 
spurious4  ,the more cultivated         
,socialist complains of the lack of     
taste in society2 and an artist who is  
also a ,socialist not long ago expressed
 his regret that art was at present     
unable to prevent the wearing of        
unbecoming forms of dress1 etc4 ,but we 
trust that this is not a hint that      
socialistic government would undertake  
to decree what forms of dress should be 
adopted2 and we scarcely think that it  
could supply taste itself to all people1
 or render differences of taste         

impossible4 ,taste is1 like everything  
else1 a matter of evolution2 it must    
make its experiments1 and undergo many  
failures for every step in advance4 ,the
 modern average of taste is as much in  
advance upon the average of our savage  
ancestors as the modern average of      
morals is an advance upon savage morals4
 ,the ideal of taste is1 by definition1 
above the average2 and it may be doubted
 whether the time will ever come when   
there will not be both degrees and      
differences of taste1 and also an       
aesthetic superiority of taste among    
those who devote their lives to art that
 will render the average poor to them4  
,if1 then1 we are to condemn luxury on  
any tenable scientific grounds1 we must 
face the fact that it is an organic     
feature of the progress of human society
 in intellectual and moral character1   
and a part of human happiness2 and we   
must show1 over against these undeniable
 facts1 outweighing reasons for         
condemning it4 ,the matter is more      

difficult than a superficial            
,utilitarianism perceives4  ,the        
question seems to be one of the         
relinquishment of certain things on the 
part of one class1 in order that another
 may be elevated to a higher plane4     
,certainly1 no one can deny that the    
present misery and degradation in       
society is a moral wrong1 and that it is
 our duty to seek some method by which  
it may be removed as speedily as        
possible4 ,but what is the degree of    
relinquishment which will suffice to    
raise all the poor to a plane of        
comfort8 ,without defining the tastes   
for the refinements or elegancies of    
life as spurious1 or1 except as they are
 personally injurious or associated with
 idleness1 as in themselves bad1 we must
 admit that there are many exaggerations
 of expenditure for the mere pleasure of
 the moment to a very small minority of 
individuals1 which1 in view of the joys 
the same sums might secure for          
multitudes1 cannot be justified4 ,but   

suppose that we do away with the        
spending of immense sums for the        
entertainment of princes and potentates1
 with the lavishing of wealth on a      
single dinner1 on a single reception1 on
 carriages built for the mere purpose of
 carrying a single millionaire bride to 
the church-door1 and with the other     
expenses of this order2 shall we be     
able1 as a result1 to supply all the    
destitute with comforts8 ,or to what    
length must we go1 to what grade of     
luxury must we descend in our reforms1  
in order to secure this8 ,it would      
certainly not be for the general good   
that society as a whole should          
relinquish all the refinements that it  
has won in its evolution and be reduced 
to a mere bread-and-butter level in the 
equalizing process4 ,beyond the         
superficial utilitarian comparison of   
the two classes we have to consider also
 the welfare of society as a whole4 ,if 
we cannot morally defend the sacrifice  
of the general good to one class1       

neither can we defend its sacrifice to  
another class4  ,and here we come again 
to the population question4 ,it is      
foolish to suppose that character1 as   
already formed1 at any period1 in       
adults1 as inherited correlative with   
physical organization1 and as further   
influenced by the contact of children   
with parents1 husbands with wives1      
friends with friends1 and classes with  
classes1 could be changed in the        
twinkling of an eye4 ,it is foolish to  
suppose that men would become all at    
once1 with the accession of comfort1    
wise1 prudent1 self-controlled1 and     
unselfish4 ,on the contrary1 those      
unused to prosperity are generally the  
ones who use it least well when their   
lot is suddenly changed4 ,many would not
 perceive or realize what results their 
action would have on the condition of   
future generations1 and many would not  
care as long as they themselves escaped 
those results4 ,we cannot1 therefore1   
conceive otherwise than that the rate of

 increase of population would suffer an 
immense acceleration1 were prosperity to
 be all at once secured to all classes4 
,supposing1 then1 that the equalization 
of wealth1 or that even comfort to the  
poorer classes1 were possible without a 
return to too primitive a standard of   
life for all society1 would the reform  
be a permanent one8  ,the population    
question is one that the majority of    
,socialists systematically avoid4 ,but  
however avoided theoretically1 it cannot
 be avoided when we come to practice2   
and for this reason practical men are   
likely to steer clear of theories that  
take no account of it4 ,there is a      
reason for this almost universal        
avoidance of the population question by 
,socialists2 it is1 in fact1 a question 
which stands in the way of the very     
large majority of socialistic projects4 
,but even the more advanced of          
,socialists take but little notice of   
its importance4 ,at a recent meeting of 
the ,london ,fabian ,society1 a large   

number present seemed to agree with a   
member who argued that population might 
be left to take its own course since    
there is only a tendency to too rapid   
increase4 ,naturally1 there is only a   
tendency to increase beyond the food    
supply1 since beyond this limit         
comes--death from privation and disease2
 and since even beyond the limit of     
comfort come morbid conditions which    
gradually bring death4 ,if the theory of
 the ,fabian in question is not laisser 
faire1 then ,i do not know what is4 ,but
 the population question never has      
solved itself and never will2 it can    
only be solved by definite intention4   
,at the same discussion mentioned above1
 another debater objected to any        
decrease in the size of the families of 
laborers1 on the ground that such       
decrease would tend to lower wages and  
so also to lower the standard of life4  
,but the payment of higher wages1 either
 on an average to correspond with an    
actual average of larger families1 or in

 particular cases in view of the size of
 family in these cases1 can never       
constitute a raising of the standard of 
life2 on the contrary1 the wages would  
be paid on the old standard for the     
individual1 and competition would be    
increased by the actual increase of     
population4 ,the standard of life is1   
and can be1 raised only as a higher     
standard for the individual is demanded 
and obtained4  ,but to these various    
arguments may be objected by the        
,socialists that under socialistic      
government the whole environment of     
human society would be changed1 and so  
the old rules would be of no force4 ,and
 this brings us to another point4  ,a   
word continually in the mouth of certain
 of the ,socialists is environment4 ,man
 is what he is1 say they1 by virtue of  
his environment4 ,change the            
environment1 and he must change4 ,the   
present bad condition of things is due  
to the environment2 crime is the effect 
of poverty1 selfishness of competition2 

therefore1 we have but to introduce the 
socialistic form of government in order 
to do away with poverty and crime at the
 same time with competition4 ,the       
argument is attractive and seems to     
solve the question as easily and        
indisputably as if it were a mere       
elementary problem in ,geometry4 ,but   
the solution does not at all harmonize  
with the course of analysis followed in 
this essay4 ,from the idea of an        
individual introduced into social       
conditions where poverty is absent1 it  
generalizes to the whole of society     
introduced to a new set of laws4 ,it    
forgets1 in its definition of           
environment1 that men themselves are the
 most important factor of the           
environment1 and that1 in order to      
change the environment1 one must change 
the moral character of men with respect 
to each other4 ,the whole argument makes
 the mistake of choosing the one of two 
concomitants as alone cause and         
regarding the other as alone effect4 ,it

 is perfectly true that1 if you can     
abolish poverty1 you will also have     
abolished crime and sin2 and1 without   
looking farther1 the ,socialist regards 
this as conclusive evidence that the    
system he proposes is logically         
demonstrated to be the right and sure   
cure for present evil2 but it may be    
added that it is quite equally true     
that1 if you can abolish crime and sin1 
you will have abolished poverty1 also2  
and then it may be further said that    
neither can be abolished1 as a whole1   
first1 in order that the other may be   
gotten rid of through its disappearance4
 ,competition is no more the cause of   
selfishness1 than selfishness is the    
cause of competition2 the present legal 
system1 the present form of government  
is no more the cause of the evils in    
society than the other evils in society 
are the cause of the defects in the     
present form of government4 ,man's      
nature is no more the effect of the     
social environment than the social      

conditions are the effect of his nature4
 ,extreme poverty and crime or vice work
 reciprocally for each other's increase1
 or they increase and decrease with what
 may be termed oscillations2 poverty    
results in vice and vice in poverty1 or 
vice in poverty1 and poverty again in   
vice2 in the individual1 either may be  
primary1 may precede the other4 ,it is  
as true that you must change men's      
characters in order to change all the   
outer evils of the environment as it is 
that you must change the outer evils in 
order to change men's characters4 ,it is
 as true that you must get rid of crime 
and vice in order to get rid of poverty 
as it is that you must get rid of       
poverty in order to get rid of crime and
 vice4 ,here is the new version of the  
serpent with its tail in its mouth2 but 
here it is not a symbol of eternity1 but
 of evolution4 ,there is no one cause of
 the evils in society1 but all existing 
things are interdependent conditions4   
,there is1 therefore1 no possibility of 

getting rid of any one of them at one   
stroke1 its abolishment to be followed  
by the disappearance of the others2 as  
they increase1 so they must             
decrease1--by reciprocal action1 or     
complex action and reaction4  ,if we    
imagine1 for a moment1 a whole society  
of savages suddenly introduced to a set 
of ideal laws by--we will say--some one 
individual from out an ideal society1   
who proclaims these laws and then       
returns to his own land1 we shall not be
 able to imagine such laws remaining in 
force for any great length of time4 ,if 
we suppose our own ancestors of the     
stone age introduced to our own laws by 
some one from out the present century   
returning to them as ,mark ,twain's     
,yankee returned to the court of ,king  
,arthur1 we shall not imagine those laws
 as very long binding2 and nothing could
 be truer to facts of psychology than   
the gigantic tragedy with which ,mr4    
,clemens' book closes4 ,no set of ideal 
laws introduced to an inideal society   

can be regarded as the environment of   
that society1 which shall render it     
ideal4 ,the more democratic a country1  
the more the passing1 even1 of a law or 
measure depends on the general          
sentiment2 but many laws have been      
passed and many measures of government  
projected which have failed completely  
in administration because they were too 
far in advance of the general moral     
status4 ,external morality of           
institutions and internal morality of   
character in society as a union of many 
individuals can only increase together1 
and gradually1 by reciprocal action4 ,in
 other words1 the evolution necessary to
 the attainment of any ideal condition  
where poverty and crime are eliminated  
must be internal as well as external2   
and this is a fact that few ,socialists 
recognize1 at least practically1 and    
that even the ,fabians1 accepting as    
they do the theory of evolution1        
continually fail to take account of in  
the application of their theories4 ,they

 have indeed received the theory of     
evolution as regards external           
institutions2 but1 with perhaps a few   
exceptions1 they have not regarded it in
 its inner1 psychical significance4     
,this is made evident by the continual  
recurrence of such references and       
remarks as we have criticised1 which    
trace all evil to our artificial system1
 refer to character as bad because      
saturated with immoral principles by our
 commercial system1#bgi and reckon upon 
a change in this artificial system      
which1 first accomplished1 will cause a 
revolution in character4 ,the           
acknowledgment of the necessity of      
evolution is1 for the most part1        
forgotten in practical discussion2 and  
the reason of this forgetfulness is     
easily understood from just the fact    
noticed--that the evolution1 the        
necessity of which is recognized1 is the
 mere external one of state             
institutions4 ,character is regarded in 
any case as a dependent1 an effect2 and 

this is in accordance with the old      
theory of the will as passive and as    
determined by the rest of nature1 never 
as the active and independent factor    
determining and instituting4 ,thus1 even
 a ,fabian is likely to look with only  
half-approval at institutions like the  
,society for ,ethical ,culture1 which   
has for its first object the cultivation
 of character2 and many ,socialists1    
until very lately the great majority1   
have regarded all improvements which did
 not bear directly towards ,socialism as
 mere temporizing4 ,the socialistic     
government was to be first established1 
and this would perform all the reforms  
necessary2 or1 rather1 evils would      
disappear of themselves when once it was
 established4 ,fortunately1 ,socialism  
is itself undergoing an evolution4  ,but
 again1 even those ,socialists who talk 
of an evolution up to socialistic forms 
are continually found representing the  
ease with which government might1 at    
present1 take over the business of the  

nation4 ,this is the natural result of  
the fact that the evolution recognized  
as necessary is only that of            
institutions1 not that of character4    
,the perception1 on the other hand1 that
 character is not1 at present1 capable  
of receiving or administering a         
socialistic form of government1 is the  
reason of much of the resistance opposed
 to a party which1 whatever a very small
 minority may claim as to theory1 is    
practically endeavoring to force a      
system of government upon peoples not   
prepared for carrying it out with       
success4 ,there are few governments1 as 
yet1 where even the democratic idea has 
sufficiently taken root to render the   
people at all used to self-government2  
and where they exist1 the good they     
confer is not unmixed4 ,i am not        
advancing an argument against democracy2
 but the defects of human nature which  
render its benefits of a mixed character
 must hinder in an incomparably greater 
measure a scheme which would place all  

power1 even to the control of all       
wealth1 in the hands of the             
administration2 in other words1         
,socialism1 if introduced to-day1 could 
no more get rid of poverty and crime    
than democracy can get rid of them2 and 
the gulf between the old and the new    
order being so great a one1 the danger  
attending the new institutions would be 
particularly great4 ,as ,hoeffding      
remarks1 it is not proved1 because we   
intrust many things to state-government 
7with mixed good and evil7 that it would
 be well to intrust the management of   
all matters to it4 ,the ,socialists     
propose to secure the perfection of     
system by making the government         
responsible to the people and the       
executive responsible to the government2
 but in democratic governments this     
principle is already carried out4 ,are  
we to suppose that the possession of    
still greater power and so still larger 
opportunities for fraud would afford the
 people greater security8 ,or how could 

the responsibility of the legislative   
and administrative functions to the     
people be still better secured than it  
is anywhere at present8 ,the power of   
the people might be extended to include 
interference with both functions4 ,but  
the socialistic government must1 in any 
case1 be excessively complicated2 even  
,bellamy1 whose government is much      
simplified by the supposition of the    
immediate attainment of an ideal        
character through the action of the     
social environment1 designates the      
scheme as very elaborate4 ,the          
difficulties of direct interference with
 the legislative functions in countries 
larger than ,switzerland 7where the     
referendum is occasionally resorted to71
 the difficulties of deciding on        
evidence before the court of the whole  
country in cases where the power of     
deposition might be used1 the labor of  
arriving at a general verdict about     
which there should be no dispute1 the   
strife and party feeling which must be  

thus continually engendered in the      
contest of opinions as long as men have 
not attained to an ideal character1     
would be likely1 if such powers of      
national interference were often        
exercised1 to keep the country in a     
state of continual uproar2 while1 on the
 other hand1 if peace were purchased at 
the sacrifice of the power of direct    
interference1 the machinery of state    
would no more than at present secure the
 nation from fraud1 which must be       
greater as the power in the hands of a  
socialistic government would be larger4 
,to the man of principle1 it would      
doubtless appear foolish as well as     
wrong to sacrifice position1 comparative
 comfort1 and the esteem of             
fellow-citizens1 for mere gain in wealth
 by dishonest means2 but as long as     
there are many men by whom temporary    
gratification is often preferred even at
 the sacrifice of more lasting pleasure1
 and selfish pleasure is of more account
 than public esteem1 as long as there   

are men to whom the element of          
excitement in crime is an attraction1 as
 long as women are often unscrupulous   
and men the slaves of passion1 as long  
as there are those who find the power to
 command by means of wealth more        
desirable than security in moderation1  
and as long as there remain others who  
will bow down to wealth fraudulently    
acquired1 as long1 too1 as there are    
countries anywhere upon the earth in    
which malefactors may find refuge1 the  
chances of fraud under a socialistic    
government are large4 ,they must be     
particularly large where inordinate     
luxury and the hope of it are abolished2
 for1 leaving out of account all        
question as to the morality of luxury1  
there are undoubtedly many men who      
desire as much of it as they can obtain4
 ,bellamy discreetly supposes his ideal 
government to be adopted at once by all 
nations1 thus paying no attention to the
 obviously very different degrees of    
social development represented by those 

different nations4 ,but as long as any  
communication of trade whatever existed 
with nations still under the old regime1
 ingenuity could devise ways of theft1  
and foreign lands would constitute a    
goal for the enjoyment of the spoil4    
,there are1 and will be for very many   
years yet1 plenty of places of refuge   
for the clever thief4 ,moreover1        
communication and commerce with other   
lands not only being necessary but      
becoming daily more and more desirable1 
a law excluding all foreigners would be 
difficult to establish2 and this being  
the case1 the social equilibrium must be
 continually disturbed1 and inner       
character affected by the influx from   
other nations4  ,there is another       
general objection to socialistic schemes
 which bears on the point of their      
application to present conditions1      
namely1 their arbitrary nature1 the     
manner in which they would decide       
summarily many questions on which       
society is at present most at variance  

and different individuals entertain the 
most conflicting opinions1 the          
comparative value of which can be tested
 only by experiment4 ,this feature of   
,socialism is inseparable from the      
general condition of things4 ,many feel1
 therefore1 and feel with reason1 that  
sympathy is not yet sufficiently general
 and strong to warrant the entrusting of
 all interests of the individual to a   
majority of his fellow-men4 ,it is even 
a question whether free scientific      
investigation would not be imperilled if
 some ,socialists had their way4 ,it is 
not long since that ,i heard an         
evolutionary ,socialist expressing his  
opinion emphatically that the waste of  
time and energy in the pursuit of       
ambitions never to be realized was so   
undesirable that he questioned whether  
the individual ought to be permitted to 
choose a vocation in which it is        
believed he will fail4 ,but the element 
of interest that causes a man to choose 
a given occupation is the very factor   

which most often results in efficient   
labor2 and it is the testimony of many  
that the perseverance possible through  
love of their work has prevailed in     
direct opposition to the predictions of 
onlookers4 ,thousands of men have       
succeeded against all expectations4 ,it 
is by no means those who apparently     
possess most ability who succeed best or
 profit the world most by their work4   
,there are projects of arbitrariness    
very similar in sort and nearly as great
 in degree in all the ,socialistic      
schemes in which the questions of the   
day are furnished with cut and dried    
answers4 ,it is strange1 for instance1  
that ,american advocates of women's     
right to a free choice of a vocation    
have failed to discover with what       
dexterity ,bellamy avoids the whole     
question of women's capacity1 by the    
discreetly blind remark that they are   
not only inferior to men in strength1   
but further disqualified in special ways
 7a formula which the author finds so   

successful that he repeats the words in 
a subsequent essay71 while he appears   
practically to side with the            
,conservatives in thought on the matter4
 ,the government of ,bellamy provides1  
furthermore1 that one can change his    
vocation only up to the age of          
thirty-five1 and even to this date only 
under proper restrictions2 the          
experience of mankind has shown1        
however1 that a man's best inspirations 
may come to him after this age1 and lead
 to a development of talents heretofore 
unsuspected even by himself4 ,the aids  
to choice in a state may be as numerous 
as you like2 but they can never give a  
man of thirty the experience and mental 
development of the man of thirty-five1  
thirty-seven1 or forty4 ,the assistance 
which the judgment of others can give in
 the choice of a vocation is1 for the   
most part1 of little use to the adult2  
and whatever the minor advantages of an 
elimination of the certain amount of    
disturbance consequent on changes of    

occupation1 the harm to society of      
restriction on efforts in any direction 
of useful labor must more than          
counterbalance these4  ,the method of   
newspaper-editing in ,bellamy's state is
 also peculiar4 ,the people who desire  
any special interest to be brought      
before the public choose an editor1     
establish a newspaper reflecting their  
opinions and devoted especially to their
 locality1 trade1 or profession1 and    
when the editor fails to give           
satisfaction in his publications1 simply
 remove him4 ,this method would1 ,i     
fear1 scarcely meet the desires of any  
editor possessed with a brain1 and to   
whom his profession was something more  
than a matter of mere automatism4       
,indeed1 the whole order of ,bellamy's  
state is of too military and automatic a
 character2 though it is easy1 in a work
 of fiction1 to represent the members of
 his industrial army as universally     
content and universally virtuous4  ,it  
is in consequence of the more or less   

distinct perception that1 for all these 
reasons1 human nature of the present    
time is unsuited to the absolute        
cooeperation involved in ,socialism1    
that many ,individualists advocate a    
continuation of the system of           
competition4 ,from ancient savagery up  
to our present half-civilization has    
been a gradual evolution1 not of        
government with character as its effect1
 but of government and character as     
cooerdinates1 or 7if we view them in    
another light7 as advancing by mutual   
action and reaction2 and our future must
 constitute a like gradual evolution    
7though with continual acceleration of  
velocity7 of character and government as
 cooerdinates2 the attempt of           
individuals or parties to force one of  
these cooerdinates before the other must
 always result in failure4 ,it is true1 
as ,mr4 ,grant ,allen stated in a       
lecture before the ,london              
,fabians--designed as refutation of the 
,individualistic theory that competition

 is necessary for the best social       
evolution--that natural selection favors
 cooeperation1#bhj that is1 that those  
societies in which the efforts of       
individuals are most supplemented by the
 aid of others1 have the best chance of 
life and health both as wholes and in   
their individual units2 but this fact   
does not do away with the necessity of  
the evolution of cooeperation           
cooerdinate with character4 ,we know    
now1 says another ,fabian1 that in      
natural selection at the stage of       
development where the existence of      
civilized man is at stake1 the units    
selected from are not individuals but   
societies4#bha ,this1 however1 we do not
 know4 ,natural selection acts on cell1 
on individual1 and on all the various   
social units to which men combine1 in   
their multiplicity of relations4 ,it    
does not cease to act on individuals    
because it acts also on social          
organizations1 any more than it ceases  
to act on cells in acting on organisms  

as wholes2 it is only true that the line
 of the preservation of the individual  
and that of the preservation of the     
whole of society approach each other    
more and more nearly with social        
progress4 ,the tendency of the whole of 
social evolution has been one of        
increasing cooeperation cooerdinate with
 increasing social instinct or sympathy 
in all its complex relations and        
dependences2 and with the attainment of 
the maximum of sympathy we can not well 
imagine or suppose anything else than   
the maximum of cooeperation4 ,on the    
other hand1 the gradual nature of social
 evolution up to this maximum1 and the  
contest of differing opinions1 secures a
 sufficient experiment1 and so the      
protection of the people from tyranny   
under another name2 for it is not the   
emotional nature of man alone which must
 grow to greater harmony1 it is also his
 intellectual nature2 as opinions are   
brought nearer and nearer to each other 
by mutual criticism1 men become more    

capable of cooeperation2 and this       
intellectual agreement represents the   
line of adjustment or natural selection1
 since it is the conclusion reached by  
means of experience--the common         
knowledge bought through the practical  
application of various principles4 ,a   
tribe of savages would be incapable of  
administration of the government of our 
so-called civilized states1 as also of  
obedience to it3--both because the      
individual would rebel in opinion and in
 emotion at the barriers imposed by it1 
and because the functions of            
administration in the hands of savages  
would tend to injustice that would be   
greater as the sphere of government     
exceeded that to which the tribe had    
been used2 and for similar reasons1 the 
present age is incapable of that maximum
 of cooeperation in all relations which 
is involved in ,socialism4 ,even the    
aesthetic use of wealth1 moderation and 
taste in enjoyment1 must be learned by  
degrees2 it cannot be infused by any    

government4 ,the savage envies1 in our  
more civilized states1 chiefly the      
opportunities for the gorging of good   
things and for self-adornment which they
 afford2 and the savage lack of         
self-control where alcohol is concerned1
 is proverbial2 the average of more     
civilized societies shows a much greater
 self-control and moderation in the face
 of opportunities of purely sensual     
gratification1 and a much greater love  
of more aesthetic and more moral        
pleasures4 ,or rather1 we should perhaps
 say1 as before1 the sensuality becomes 
more refined1 and is gratified in more  
moral ways1 through its organization    
with higher instincts4 ,it is not among 
the wealthier classes1 who have had the 
use of wealth1 that taste is poorest2 on
 the contrary1 the average of taste is  
smaller1 the outlay for foolish ornament
 of all sorts larger in proportion to   
means1 in the poorer classes2 and were  
these classes to come without change of 
character into possession of            

considerable means of enjoyment1 it is  
to be suspected that expenditure for    
tasteless adornments would1 in many     
cases1 and especially among the women1  
precede and exceed expenditure for      
higher things4  ,and this brings me to a
 more especial consideration of that    
very large portion of the ,socialist    
party who acknowledge no necessity for  
an evolution up to ,socialism in any    
sense1 but desire a revolution4 ,bellamy
 distinctly denies the necessity of an  
evolution1 and many of his followers    
agree with him on this point2 but the   
revolution he believes in and hopes for 
is a bloodless and peaceful one4 ,to    
this conception the preceding objections
 sufficiently apply4  ,a revolution in  
the ordinary sense of the word is       
always1 however1 the sign of powerful   
opposition between two parties1 of which
 one may gain the immediate ascendancy  
by force2 but will surely be exposed1   
afterwards1 to the long-enduring hatred1
 opposition1 and revenge of a strong    

minority1 that will make itself felt    
with an energy greatly increased by the 
vindictiveness which naturally follows  
on war and defeat4 ,france is still     
suffering from her revolutions even at  
this length of time after their         
occurrence4 ,where the people have no   
vote and real influence upon the        
government1 and even the expression of  
opinion is restricted by law1 so that to
 gain an influence is practically       
impossible1 a political revolution may  
take place2 but its results1 both       
immediate and remote1 must contain a    
very large modicum of evil even if some 
advance is accomplished by it4 ,a       
revolution to obtain the establishment  
of absolute cooeperation would be       
self-contradictory1 and the             
self-contradiction of character implied 
in it would result in its failure2 it   
could not happen in a country at all    
prepared for absolute cooeperation1 or  
even for a very high degree of          
cooeperation4 ,a revolution in any      

country at the present time would have  
to reckon with all sorts of depraved    
tastes and vicious characters1 matters  
of organization and inheritance which   
neither in the individual1 nor in the   
line of descent1 could be gotten rid of 
in a day2 which must1 indeed1 affect    
society for many generations1 and before
 they could be eradicated would do away 
with ,socialism or destroy its success4 
,poverty and crime cannot be banished by
 any device of mere legislation2 only   
with time and by gradual means can they 
be gotten rid of4  ,socialism is1 then1 
as a whole1 too impetuous1 if           
,individualism is1 as a whole1 too      
reluctant4 ,but ,socialism is undergoing
 an evolution1 as has been said4        
,arising as the voice of the poor1 the  
oppressed1 the miserable1 the hungry1 it
 has made itself heard and has          
materially modified public opinion1     
while it has1 at the same time1 been    
itself modified1 according to the       
universal law of the equilibration of   

forces4 ,forced by necessity            
practically1 and gradually altered by   
criticism as to theory1 it is coming to 
give its energies less and less to a    
consideration of the final socialistic  
government which should do away with the
 necessity of further reforms because   
accomplishing an immediate and universal
 one1 and devoting them more and more to
 present measures of reform1 many of    
which are simply liberal measures       
proposed by non-,socialists and such as 
would have had no meaning to the        
majority of ,socialists of a few years  
past1 or would have been regarded by    
them as useless temporizing4 ,in its    
mutual action and reaction with         
,individualism1 it will doubtless still 
more modify and be modified1 so that    
more and more ground for united action  
will be won4 ,the cause of the laborer  
is the most urgent of our times2 but    
increase of wages will be of very little
 use except as it is steadily           
accompanied by aids to knowledge and    

self-direction1 aids in the formation of
 character1 in the use of self and of   
the means of enjoyment2 otherwise1 the  
laborer must continually defeat his own 
cause1 and renew the old problems4  ,the
 education of self-control must begin   
with the child4 ,the education of the   
child is never to be considered by      
itself2 the child is not one individual 
and the adult another1 neither is there 
any dividing line between childhood and 
maturity2 and that which the individual 
is to become in later life he must grow 
towards as a child4 ,the habits which   
the man would exercise the child must   
learn4 ,in ,germany1 where the military 
spirit prevails1 implicit obedience to  
authority is ranked among the highest   
virtues1 and habits of strict military  
discipline are carried into the family  
as well as exercised in all public      
relations4 ,in countries where more     
democratic ideas are strong1 the older  
methods are giving way to milder ones4  
,these sometimes degenerate into the    

opposite extreme of careless indulgence1
 with bad results2 but taken on the     
average1 their beneficial influence is  
seen in the greater alertness1          
originality1 and openness of the        
children brought up under them4         
,frankness and originality are on the   
average incompatible with harsh or stern
 treatment2 the latter is more likely to
 generate craftiness1 fawning hypocrisy1
 or an unloving and unlovable rigidity  
of character2 and any of these qualities
 is compatible with secret              
self-indulgence in any form1 wherever   
this is possible4 ,only an education in 
freedom can teach the use of freedom4   
,the old1 hard1 religious idea of       
breaking the will 7the natural outcome  
of a religion based on blind faith1     
fear1 and unquestioning obedience7 was a
 sad blunder2 what we need is not less  
but more will1 with better direction of 
it4 ,true1 the wisdom of experience must
 always guide the young2 but its        
guidance1 to attain the best results1   

should make itself as little felt as    
authority as possible1 and should       
withdraw into the background as early as
 possible4 ,not that it should          
degenerate into slipshod yielding to    
importunities1 but that it should       
endeavor to give reasons rather than    
mere rules of conduct1 to instil        
principles and ideas rather than laws1  
and so to develop the power of          
self-direction4 ,it is often objected   
that the young child is incapable of    
comprehending principles2 but so is the 
infant incapable of comprehending       
speech1 and yet it is through the use of
 speech to the infant that comprehension
 is gradually attained2 as sounds are   
fixed in the receptive memory of the    
infant1 and slowly acquire meaning1 so  
ethical principles1 simply stated1 may  
be communicated1 and will be better and 
better understood as the child develops4
 ,this method of instruction is1 rightly
 understood1 as far from weakness as it 
is from tyranny and dogmatism2 indeed1  

no method demands in the instructor so  
much care1 thought1 and patience4 ,it   
must be judicious and consistent1 never 
capricious1 and its fundamental         
principle must be the cultivation of    
justice through justice1 and so of      
kindness through kindness4 ,especially  
should the young be prepared in the     
home1 by self-knowledge1 for the trials 
and temptations which menace in the     
world outside1 through the passions of  
maturity4 ,to the earnest man or woman1 
nothing appears more trivial than the   
false shame which hinders1 even in the  
home and between parents and children1  
the moral discussion of some of the most
 important of human relations for good  
or evil4 ,to the pure all things are    
pure2 but1 unfortunately1 it is also    
true that to the impure all things are  
impure4 ,nothing is more injurious to   
children than the morbid curiosity      
stimulated through the secrecy and      
deception which are ordinarily          
practised1 and which inspires them with 

the sense of a mystery that is half     
criminal1 half sacred4 ,curiosity grows 
under such tuition1 a disproportionate  
interest is awakened and often comes to 
be satisfied from sources outside the   
home1 with an admixture of deplorable   
vulgarity1 the influence of which is not
 soon lost4 ,such a tuition tends1 not  
to purity of thought1 but to impurity1  
and often directly to vice4 ,the mystery
 with which natural1 and what may be    
perfectly moral1 relations is thus      
invested1 is often the source of a fatal
 attraction to ignorant youth4 ,what we 
need to make out of our children is not 
puppets of which the world as well as   
ourselves may pull the wires1 but       
earnest and self-comprehending men and  
women1 self-reliant and fearless because
 life is no strange country filled with 
unknown shadows and pitfalls1 but a     
pleasant land1 whose dangers1 known1 may
 be avoided1 and the road through which 
leads to a comprehended and desirable   
goal4  ,parental power was once held    

sacred and beyond interference2         
nevertheless the use made of it does not
 seem to have been always a sacred one4 
,the ,roman law allowed parents to put  
their children to death4 ,the modern    
state has tended1 on the other hand1 to 
take away more and more power from the  
parents1 extending its protection to the
 helpless child4 ,and this is well2 the 
child1 as well as the adult1 should have
 the right of protection against abuse4 
,nevertheless1 the theories which would 
relegate the whole education and care of
 the child to the state must be regarded
 as too extreme4 ,whatever disadvantages
 there may be in the government of      
parents1 especially at the present day  
when the education of women is still so 
inadequate1 there is yet nothing which  
the child cannot better miss out of his 
education than the influence of parental
 love1 the lack of which no state       
institution can ever supply4 ,granted   
that parental government is of a most   
mistaken sort in some cases1 and that it

 is not perfect in any case1 it still   
remains true that family affection      
furnishes one of mankind's greatest     
joys1 and that the love of the parent   
should1 and even does1 on the average1  
make the best protection and educator   
weak and clinging childhood can have4   
,no one who has at all studied the      
condition of children in orphan asylums 
and other institutions under the care of
 the state1 can have failed to notice1  
even in those institutions managed with 
the greatest kindness1 the immense      
difference in happiness and             
attractiveness between their inmates and
 the children used to family love and   
mother's caresses4 ,the lack of love    
makes the child unlovable4 ,the         
fundamental method of reform lies1 not  
in the withdrawal of all power from     
parents1 but rather in the better       
preparation of men1 and especially of   
women1 to fulfil the duties of          
parentage4 ,such a preparation must     
consist1 however1 less in any particular

 study than in such general physical1   
intellectual1 and moral discipline and  
education as shall expand all the powers
 in health and harmony1 thus securing to
 children a good physical inheritance   
and an early guidance both wise and     
moral4 ,a higher morality must          
particularly emphasize the fact that not
 self alone or even merely the two      
parties to a marriage are to be         
considered2 that the welfare of possible
 offspring must be regarded2 and that1  
therefore1 marriage with the morally    
unfit is a crime against future         
generations as well as against self1 and
 marriage of the physically unfit1 where
 offspring are permitted1 is equally a  
wrong4 ,the old idea1 encouraged in     
women1 that it was a good and noble use 
of life to marry a man in order to      
reform him1 is beginning to go out of   
vogue2 and future standards will not    
tolerate the present social dogma that1 
however much of a profligate a man may  
have been1 whatever associates he may   

have affected1 however he may have      
betrayed the innocent and debauched his 
own moral sense1 he is still fit to mate
 with any pure and good woman4  ,the    
necessity of a better physical and      
intellectual education for the mothers  
of the race1 as a preparation for the   
adequate performance of their duties1   
must be1 at the present time1 especially
 emphasized4 ,the task of the mother in 
the early training of children is one   
that requires practical knowledge of the
 world1 broad views1 and that power of  
judgment which is possible only through 
mental discipline4 ,superstition1       
narrowness1 subjection to tradition and 
dogma1 are incompatible with efficient  
motherhood4 ,the education must1 then1  
be real1 no cramming with stale facts   
and staler theories2 it must advance    
with the science of the day1 and deal   
with its vital questions4  ,but the     
standpoint which regards women only as  
means to ends outside themselves1 which 
calculates all the advantages to be     

permitted them by the measure alone of  
their usefulness to husbands or         
children1 is a poor one4 ,to afford to  
all individuals the full and free       
development of capacity must be the     
ideal of society4 ,the ancient          
conceptions which laid little emphasis  
practically1 whatever they might do     
theoretically1 upon the woman's right to
 opportunities for her own sake1 which  
made meekness and self-abnegation her   
chief virtues1 and fixed its regard     
always upon future generations in her   
case1 is one that cannot be defended    
from a higher ethical standpoint4 ,if no
 man lives unto himself alone1 neither  
should any man1 or woman either1 be     
expected to spend his life merely as a  
means to others and having no end in    
himself4 ,every human being has a right 
to a share in the general privileges and
 pleasures4 ,for their own sake1 and    
that of society as a whole1 as well as  
for that of their immediate friends and 
family1 women should share equally with 

men the benefits of mental culture1 its 
aesthetic enjoyments1 its consolations  
and distractions1 and the calm and      
self-poise bestowed by its broad        
outlook4 ,to women as well as to men    
applies what has already been said of   
the folly and sin of ignorance of the   
world4 ,we have only to look at ,france 
in order to perceive the evils of a     
system which brings girls to maturity in
 a condition of seclusion1 ignorance1   
and dependence1 and then suddenly       
launches them upon society wholly       
unprepared to withstand the temptations 
it presents4 ,the evil results of a less
 degree of the same system are visible  
all over the world4 ,on the other hand1 
it is in just that                      
country--,america--where women have had 
the most freedom1 that they are also    
most capable of enduring freedom1 and   
that their civilizing influence is most 
visible4 ,they are not the less womanly 
for this liberty1 and society is very   
much the better for it4 ,indeed1 their  

attractiveness and the power they wield 
through it is not equalled in any other 
country4 ,i wonder1 writes ,george      
,eliot1 whether the subtle measuring of 
forces will ever come to measure the    
force there would be in one beautiful   
woman whose mind was as noble as her    
face was beautiful--who made a man's    
passion for her rush in one current with
 all the great aims of his life4 ,it is 
terrible--the keen1 bright eye of a     
woman when it has once been turned with 
admiration on what is severely true2 but
 then the severely true rarely comes    
within its range of vision4  ,the       
questions of marriage and prostitution  
may be reduced to the single question of
 the desirability of monogamy4 ,no one  
can well deny the evils attending the   
existence of a class of prostitutes     
isolated from moral associations1       
despised and ill-treated1 daily sinking 
lower and lower through this isolation1 
and contaminating1 by their influence1  
those who come in contact with them4    

,the practical question is1 then1 would 
it be well for society as a whole to    
assume another attitude1 of open        
approval1 towards prostitution1 to admit
 those who are now outcasts to a        
position on a par with faithful wives   
and pure maidens4 ,this was the position
 of ,athenian prostitutes1 and it       
existed together with1 we may suppose1  
comparative chastity on the part of     
maidens and faithfulness on the part of 
wives4 ,these1 however1 did not take    
part in the social life of the men1 but 
lived in seclusion in their homes2 it   
would be impossible to accord a similar 
position to prostitutes in modern       
society unless with the practical       
surrender of any demand or expectancy of
 faithfulness on the part of wives1 or  
of chastity on the part of maidens4     
,even in ,france1 where the position of 
prostitutes most nearly approximates the
 ,athenian1 a very distinct             
dividing-line is drawn between the      
demi-monde and the rest of society2 and1

 indeed1 special precautions are taken  
to secure the chastity of girls4 ,in    
like manner1 purity might perhaps still 
be secured in girls1 after the admission
 of prostitutes to a position of        
equality with other women1 by a convent 
education and the greatest watchfulness2
 but the lack of self-dependence would  
be likely to be followed1 as it now so  
often is in ,france1 only in far greater
 degree1 by excesses after the          
attainment of comparative self-direction
 with marriage4 ,the profligate soon    
tires of the prostitute1 and desires    
higher game2 unbridled license begets   
morbid passion2 the sense of honor is   
blunted2 the pure cease to be safe      
except as far as they are able1 by      
self-control and self-defence1 to       
protect themselves2 and for such        
self-poise only an education of freedom1
 of knowledge of the world and of self1 
can prepare4 ,nor could even such a     
system of seclusion as we have imagined 
exist for any length of time side by    

side with the full acceptance of        
prostitution as perfectly honorable and 
right2 the two things are               
self-contradictory and incompatible2 in 
,france1 faithfulness is not less       
desired of wives than in other          
countries4 ,indeed1 the majority of men 
in civilized countries would never      
consent to a system of general          
promiscuity2 they desire women1 that is1
 a large number of women1 a sufficient  
number to supply them with wives1 to    
remain pure1 whatever liberty they      
demand for themselves4 ,the whole       
progress of society has been in the     
direction of monogamy1 and the reason of
 this is obvious3 as reason and taste   
develop1 man ceases to be satisfied with
 the mere enjoyments of the animal2 he  
develops higher powers and instincts    
which also demand their satisfaction2   
these powers1 too1 are not separate     
entities1 but are organized with the    
more primitive capacities and the whole 
organization becomes another through    

their appearance4 ,as the social        
instinct grows1 and intellect comes to  
take a higher place1 the mere or chiefly
 physical passion felt between the sexes
 of lower species becomes the higher    
human love1 an organized instinct in    
which all the moral and intellectual    
desires1 the highest aims and emotions  
of the individual are fused to a whole4 
,moreover1 momentary pleasure becomes1  
with social progress1 indeed with all   
evolution1 less and less the ruling     
power2 man1 above all creatures1 comes  
to demand enduring sources of           
satisfaction4 ,faithfulness in love is  
as necessary to perfect satisfaction as 
is faithfulness in friendship2 and the  
long as well as the close companionship 
of congenial natures is now1 and must   
more and more become1 the spring of our 
highest human joys4 ,disappointment in  
marriage may incline the individual to  
doubt1 by a universalization from his   
own case1--to which disappointment is   
prone1--whether life-long love and      

faithfulness are possible2 but he still 
must feel that this is the ideal4 ,it   
has been said that men are naturally    
polygamous1 women monogamous2 but this  
statement is obviously erroneous1 since 
men by no means favor general polygamy2 
even the savage is capable of jealousy1 
and men have continually used the       
superior power they have possessed in   
law and public opinion to emphasize the 
exclusive claim they have upon the women
 they take to wife4 ,it is only true    
that1 having also had the power in their
 hands of refusing a like faithfulness  
to that which they demand from women1   
they have used this power to their own  
advantage4 ,women desire faithful love  
on the part of men quite as much as men 
desire it on the part of women2 and     
women are quite as capable of physical  
excesses and of fickleness as are men1  
when the restraints of public opinion   
and social law are once broken over4  ,a
 condition of promiscuity is impossible 
in an ideal society1 and can never be   

the goal towards which we tend4 ,men    
would not submit to it in the women they
 loved2 and if it is not possible for   
wives1 then we have left us only the    
alternative of prostitution in its      
present form1 increasingly worse in     
character as the ideal of faithfulness  
is more universally demanded and more   
completely carried out in wives1 and the
 necessary cooerdinate social ostracism 
and disgrace of the prostitute          
increases4 ,but this also cannot        
assuredly be our ideal2 the increasing  
misery of the class of prostitutes is   
not a thing to be sought4 ,the whole    
theory which tolerates prostitution is1 
in fact1 illogical and only devised as a
 prop for the selfishness of men1 who   
are content to take their pleasure at   
the expense of so much misery4 ,the same
 thing cannot be1 as some one has said1 
at once right for the man to demand and 
infamous for the woman to permit4 ,where
 the act is one to which both sexes are 
necessary1 it must1 if it be right at   

all1 be right for both1 and if it is    
wrong1 then wrong for both4 ,and this   
would remain true even if it were proved
 that1 because of greater strength or   
for any other reason1 the sexual passion
 of men ought not to be restrained2 for1
 the responsibility of the prostitute's 
misery is thus laid at the door of men2 
if the women who ply this traffic are   
prompted by no passion1 but only        
compelled by destitution1 then the blame
 of their unhappy compulsion to such a  
traffic rests more than ever on the     
heads of those who furnish the demand to
 which their supply answers4 ,in any    
case1 the man is an accessory before the
 fact to a thing which he acknowledges  
wrong on the part of its performer4     
,but the plea that passion is stronger  
in the man for an act which dates back  
to the point in evolution where sexual  
propagation first began1 and which has  
been performed equally by both sexes    
through all the range of species up to  
man1 and even equally by both sexes of  

the human species except during the     
comparatively short period of higher    
civilization1 is absurd4 ,the difference
 between the sexes in degree of sexual  
gratification is1 among those who       
transmit their instincts to offspring1  
not great even under civilization4      
,there is probably more excess in       
marriage than outside it4 ,but apart    
from this fact1 the fact of             
cross-heredity is to be taken into      
consideration4 ,the sexual is no more   
than any other instinct a separate part 
of the individual character2 it is      
organically interwoven with all other   
instincts and tendencies2 and it is     
scarcely supposable that thus fused with
 the rest of character1 it would not be 
subject1 as all other traits1 to        
cross-inheritance from father to        
daughter as well as from mother to      
son1--that the father's life would not1 
in many cases1 affect his daughter's    
propensities1 and the mother's life her 
son's4 ,this a priori reasoning is      

supported by facts of observation1 among
 which those of pathology and           
criminology are naturally the most      
marked4 ,man is an animal2 but1 as we   
have said before1 he is not a beast1 nor
 does he need to imitate the beasts4 ,he
 has his own social organization and    
must determine his own moral laws4 ,the 
old theory1 that any restraint at all of
 sexual passion is a crime against      
nature1 and likely to result in great   
physical evil1 is now exploded4 ,even if
 it were true that some evil to the     
individual was always the result of any 
restraint1 the good of the individual is
 not the absolute criterion of right1   
and cannot stand against the claim of   
society as a whole2 the unrestrained    
indulgence of sexual passion could no   
more be justified on this ground1 and   
because of the fact that it is a natural
 instinct1 than the absolute indulgence 
of anger can be justified because anger 
is a natural passion1 and its expression
 doubtless a great satisfaction and     

relief to the individual4 ,but very many
 medical men1 and among them such men as
 ,professor ,krafft-,ebbing1 the ,german
 authority on nervous diseases1 are now 
denying that self-restraint has such    
evil results as have been attributed to 
it4 ,krafft-,ebbing says1 on the        
contrary1 that while physical excess is 
very often the precursor of harm1       
self-restraint is seldom so1 except in  
cases of abnormal and morbid            
appetite4#bhb  ,in other countries than 
the ,united ,states and ,england1 the   
plea of poetry or romance is often heard
 in defence of prostitution1 and as an  
excuse for the seduction of pure women4 
,but if this is poetry1 which must so   
end in the bitter misery1 the shame1    
degradation1 despair1 and even often the
 utter destruction of its heroines1     
then1 in the name of pity1 let us have  
less of poetry and more of common       
humanity4 ,to a man of anything but     
selfish instincts1 poetry or romance    
could never be an excuse for connivance 

at such misery1 either by direct act or 
in any way by influence4 ,nor is the    
poetry or romance of the highest order1 
in any case4 ,there is no romance so    
powerful1 no poetry so thrilling1 nor   
any passion so strong1 as that to which 
all the springs of intellectual         
aspiration and moral aim converge1 and  
which draws its sweetness and force from
 a purity tainted by no degradation of  
ideals1 galled by no bitter and         
humiliating recollections1 checked by no
 self-consciousness of concealment and  
deceit4 ,compared with such a feeling1  
the romance of the man of the world is  
tame and flat1 his poetry but the       
doggerel jingle of the third-rate       
variety-show4 ,physical passion the     
human being shares with every dog and   
other brute down to nearly the lowest   
forms of animal life2 love is as truly  
of higher species as the aesthetic sense
 of the artist is of higher nature than 
the delight of the savage in gauds4 ,the
 old idea that strong emotion of any    

kind was incompatible with perfect      
morality has already been sufficiently  
discussed4 ,but this delusion has been  
the excuse of many a life of profound   
selfishness4 ,it has led to the theory  
that the artistic nature must           
necessarily be unrestrained in the      
gratification of its impulses1 and has  
furnished the libertine with a fine     
sense of kinship with the poet through  
the imitation of his sins4 ,perhaps the 
poetry of the lives of ,robert and      
,elizabeth ,barrett ,browning has been  
to the world as great a gratification   
and of as high worth as any that they   
ever wrote on paper4 ,it has dispelled  
once and forever the false theory of the
 necessities of the artistic            
temperament1 and has enabled us to      
perceive the higher beauty of enduring  
love4  ,it is often urged in defence of 
the sexual sins of the poet or the      
musician1 that they are natural to his  
temperament and that1 moreover1 he must 
be acquainted with all phases of life4  

,but why is it not also urged1 then1    
that he ought to be at liberty to give  
way to ungoverned fury1 if he has       
inherited a tendency in that direction1 
or that he is justified in committing   
murder1 arson1 and all the other crimes 
in the catalogue for the sake of the    
experience and the greater power of     
portrayal thus gained8 ,if the excuse   
suffices for one crime against the      
welfare of human beings1 it should      
suffice also for others4 ,dickens might 
possibly have been able to draw the     
character of ,bill ,sykes1 to depict his
 crime and the succeeding emotions with 
greater power and faithfulness1 had he  
himself experienced all that which he   
wished to portray2 nevertheless1 society
 cannot concede that he would have been 
justified in killing for the sake of his
 art2 and neither can it concede1 from a
 higher ethical standpoint1 that any    
other act in direct opposition to the   
general welfare is justifiable for the  
sake of art4 ,it may be possible for the

 artist1 by torturing a slave to death1 
to paint a more realistic picture of    
dying agony2 but however glorious the   
art1 the man of finer sense and stronger
 sympathies must be revolted by it4     
,society can even better miss a little  
of its art than take it at the price of 
human misery4  ,but it is to be         
questioned whether the artist does not  
lose as much as he gains1 or even more1 
by an immoral license of any sort4      
,true1 the artist must know human       
nature2 but the best portrayers of      
criminal characters have not themselves 
been criminals2 and if ever we should   
have a murderer-poet1 we should in all  
probability feel the lack1 in his verse1
 of various things1 among these of the  
higher realism which comprehends higher 
as well as lower types4 ,it is          
impossible to be merely the spectator of
 one's own life even if one is an       
artist2 and especially is this true     
where passion is concerned4 ,the        
emotions one feels1 the acts one        

performs1 must mould one's character1   
one's thought1 opinion1 the mental world
 in which one lives1 and so one's       
creative genius4 ,nature is by no means 
all dunghill or reptile-haunted swamp1  
or even common kitchen2 she has also her
 seas and mountains1 and skies1 her     
fields and woods1 and even her sunny    
gardens and dainty parlors4 ,the        
snow-mountain glowing under the flush of
 dawn is as real as the reeking         
dunghill2 but the power to appreciate   
and portray the one may be lost by too  
close association with the other1 as the
 fine sense of smell is dulled by       
sojourning in foul odors4 ,to the rake1 
the character of the self-controlled and
 virtuous becomes incomprehensible and  
chimerical2 and his attempts to         
represent it are likely to be tinged    
with an atmosphere of unreality4 ,of    
this we have much evidence in           
literature4 ,to raise oneself to the    
higher standard in practice and         
comprehension requires an effort2 but it

 is comparatively easy to allow oneself 
to sink to a level for which generations
 of one's ancestors has prepared innate 
if latent tendencies4 ,on the other     
hand1 though we desire to know men and  
things through art1 we desire to keep   
with us through its aid1 above all1 that
 which most pleases us in the actual    
world--the beautiful in form1 coloring1 
and idea1 in nature outside man and in  
man himself2 the good1 if it is the     
truly good1 and not cant or hypocrisy1  
is also the beautiful1 and the loss of  
the power to portray it is a large one4 
,and beyond the more easily definable   
loss which we have noticed1 there is a  
still further one1 felt in a subtle     
tone1 a shade1 an atmosphere2 and which1
 if closely knit with our moral         
perceptions1 is still an aesthetic as   
well as a moral one4 ,the evolution of  
morality1 could1 indeed1 no more take   
place without leaving its impress on art
 than without leaving it on humor4 ,the 
higher sense of humor1 in very          

proportion to its keenness1 experiences 
a revulsion at the grotesque and gross  
vulgarity which passes for humor among  
the savage and half-civilized2 and with 
time1 the immoral comes to revolt too   
much to permit of aesthetic enjoyment4  
,had ,dickens been a murderer himself1  
instead of the tender-hearted man he    
was1 the world would doubtless have lost
 in every way aesthetically as well as  
morally by the fact4 ,the old theory of 
the total emancipation of art from all  
claims of morality cannot be maintained 
from even the aesthetic standpoint1 and 
certainly not from the ethical          
standpoint4 ,art has every right to be  
non-moral 7if that which delights       
innocently is ever anything but         
positively moral71 but it has none to be
 immoral1--to use the mighty power it   
possesses in the cause of evil of any   
sort4  ,nor is it even true that all    
nature belongs to art4 ,in all its      
history1 sculpture has never1 except in 
a few isolated cases1 reproduced the    

forms of the withered and decrepit4 ,the
 painter of the extreme realistic school
 may occasionally portray the scenes of 
the dissecting-room1 but pictures of    
sores and ulcers are left to adorn the  
pages of medical works or               
patent-medicine advertisements4 ,there  
are moral sores and ulcers as little    
suited to artistic literature1 and      
belonging properly to works on social   
healing alone4 ,the depiction of evil in
 due proportion and with such           
limitations belongs to the accurate     
representation of human character4 ,but 
let its portrayal include no sin against
 man2 let not the artist dip his hands  
in the dunghill1 for humanity's sake and
 also for his art's sake2 lest his      
picture reek of it1 and we find the     
offal mixed with the colors4  ,the cant 
and superstition with which marriage has
 often been invested has doubtless been 
the source of the rebellion of many     
vigorous and original minds from the old
 morality2 the morality founded on      

tradition and not on reason and sympathy
 has always this disadvantage4          
,undoubtedly1 the sale of human flesh   
for gold or any other sordid            
consideration1 is evil1 whether done    
under the sanction of the marriage-law  
or without it4 ,undoubtedly also1 the   
marriage-rite performs no miracle or    
magic spell1 as the superstition of the 
past has imagined4 ,nevertheless1 it is 
of importance as a civil contract1 a    
public acknowledgment1 which furnishes  
data to the state1 and places it in a   
position to protect any injured party1  
and to fix the responsibility for the   
maintenance and education of offspring4 
,considering the number of individuals  
whose welfare is seriously concerned in 
these most intimate relations of life1  
with all their passions1 the state      
cannot relinquish this right of         
arbitration1 which should especially be 
employed for the protection of the      
weaker individuals concerned--the wife  
and children4 ,unfortunately1 it has1 as

 yet1 too often been used rather in     
securing the power of tyranny and abuse 
than in protecting4 ,this fact is       
perceptible even in modern law1 as1 for 
instance1 in the unequal divorce-laws of
 ,england1 and in the fact that         
wife-beaters are often treated with     
great leniency by ,english magistrates1 
while the man who abuses his mistress is
 liable to relatively severe punishment 
as having no especial power over the    
latter4 ,it is1 undoubtedly1 the result 
of such laws1 together with other evils 
incidental to the average of marriages  
under the present conditions of human   
character1 that on some sides a theory  
has grown up in favor of the total      
abolition of marriage4 ,but neither in  
its general application1 nor in this    
particular instance1 is the ,anarchistic
 conception which finds the source of   
all evil in law1 scientifically         
justifiable4 ,the conditions of the evil
 lie in human nature itself1 in the     
incompleteness of its evolution2 of the 

present stage the injustice of present  
law is a part4 ,the remedy lies1        
therefore1 as far as the law is         
concerned1 in its correction1 not in its
 abolishment4  ,the ideal of love is    
enduring faithfulness4 ,but when that   
ideal is not only unfulfilled1 but      
marriage brings1 instead of happiness1  
only misery1 shall the bond be          
indissoluble1 difficult1 or easy to     
loose8  ,in countries where women are   
wholly dependent upon men1 perfect      
facility of divorce means substantially 
the power of repudiation on the part of 
men4 ,as long as women are incapable of 
efficient self-support1 the advantage of
 very easy divorce lies largely on the  
side of the husband4 ,marriage concerns1
 in any case1 the welfare1 not of one   
person alone but that of husband1 wife1 
and children1 and society as a whole    
must place some restrictions on the     
selfish action of the individual which  
may be to the lasting disadvantage of   
all others concerned4 ,but as society   

advances1 as the education and social   
independence of women increase1 too     
great stringency becomes undesirable1   
its advantages continually diminish in  
comparison with its disadvantages4      
,forced family relations where all the  
affection that might render them for the
 good of those thus related is lacking1 
are obviously in themselves undesirable1
 and in most cases where wife and       
children can be provided for            
independently of such relations1 an evil
 to be avoided4 ,assuredly1 it is       
undesirable that the moral should be    
tied indissolubly1 or practically so1 to
 the immoral1--that a mother1 for       
instance1 should not only be forced to  
bring forth children to a father whose  
evil qualities they may inherit1 but be 
compelled to endure the further ruin of 
their character through his influence1  
besides bearing the personal agony of   
the enforced companionship with a man   
whose principles she can but despise4   
,but all character is at present faulty2

 and a desire for perfection in husband 
or wife therefore certain to            
disappointment2 hence1 the              
relinquishment of all                   
divorce-restrictions whatsoever is too  
likely to lead to promiscuity2 and      
unless such appears desirable to        
society1 neither public opinion nor     
state-law can place the power of        
repudiation in the hands of individuals4
 ,it is a choice of evils2 the state    
must take human nature as it finds it1  
and deal with it on this basis4 ,it has 
sometimes been proposed to make some    
substitution for the old form of        
marriage1 as1 for instance1 by the      
adoption of a period of probation1 of   
two1 three1 or five years' marriage     
before the signing of the final         
life-contract2 by this method1 it was   
proposed to obviate the necessity for   
divorce4 ,as far as this last proposal  
is concerned1 it may be remarked that   
applications for divorce are by no means
 always made in the earlier period of   

married life1 and that1 furthermore1 any
 such arrangement would offer the very  
best opportunities for the unscrupulous 
libertine4  ,but beyond this1 it may be 
repeated that1 as ,hoeffding has said1  
it is not in the nature of love worthy  
the name to calculate the possibility of
 its own ending1 and that the highest   
form of love is enduring4 ,enduring     
relation must1 then1 form the ideal on  
which we must fix our eyes1 even while  
failing to attain it2 divorce1 while    
given in cases where union seems no     
longer desirable1 must be looked upon as
 indicating a failure of marriage to    
fulfil its end4 ,the influence of an    
ideal held in mind is the continual     
moulding of reality to a form more      
nearly resembling it4 ,but to descend to
 a form of contract which starts with   
the assumption of separation as possible
 or probable is to lose sight of the    
ideal1 to relinquish it from            
imagination1 and to do away with its    
influence upon public opinion1 and so   

upon the evolution of institutions and  
habits4 ,we certainly need better       
divorce-laws and the wider recognition  
of the desirability of divorce in many  
cases1 but not the practical acceptance 
of an ideal of promiscuity4  ,the plan  
of such short contracts could never be  
carried out practically for any length  
of time1 in any modern civilized        
society4 ,even if adopted for a time1 it
 would speedily be abolished4 ,man      
naturally desires and takes means of    
enforcing1 at first with the lower means
 of compulsion1 then with the higher    
through the sympathies themselves1      
faithfulness in woman2 woman also1 and  
equally1 desires faithfulness in man1   
but is not able to secure it4 ,the      
gradual growth of woman's social        
independence must1 however1 place her   
more and more in a position to know of  
the life of men and to enforce the      
faithfulness she desires2 that is1 to   
punish unfaithfulness with the same     
penalties of disability for marriage by 

which men have hitherto enforced        
faithfulness in women4 ,we may easily   
perceive that this is the direction of  
development4 ,in countries where women  
are wholly dependent upon men1 the      
character of a suitor in any respect is 
a thing little inquired into1 the chief 
object of the parents1 who ordinarily   
have the most to say about the matter1  
being to secure a husband for the girl  
at any cost4 ,with the progress of      
society1 women become less and less     
ready to accept the known drunkard or   
the confessed libertine1 and it is only 
the seclusion of women and their        
consequent ignorance of the lives of men
 that makes marriage1 at present1 still 
comparatively easy to the discreet and  
clever profligate4 ,the cooerdinate     
increase of regard for purity in wives  
with the aggravation of the character of
 prostitution1 supposed above for the   
sake of the discussion1 is possible only
 up to a certain point1 as an           
oscillation in one direction resistance 

to which is continually accumulating1   
and must result in reaction in the      
opposite direction4 ,the two principles 
are mutually contradictory1             
incompatible1 and impossible as enduring
 factors in the same society4 ,the      
growth of a more widely diffused and    
stronger sentiment against prostitution 
and in favor of faithfulness has1       
indeed1 as yet led chiefly to the       
greater exclusion of prostitutes from   
association with the rest of society1   
and made profligacy more and more       
secret2 but1 at the same time1 the      
gradually increasing sympathy has formed
 an accumulating resistance which is    
rapidly taking shape in the realization 
that the prostitute is not more guilty  
in furnishing the supply than is the man
 whose demand makes self-profanation a  
source of income1 that the misery of    
prostitution is immoral1 and that the   
only remedy is prevention4 ,there is no 
alternative to this remedy that progress
 can realize except1 as has been shown1 

general promiscuity4 ,it is best1 then1 
that we should make up our minds between
 these two and act accordingly2 for the 
action of every individual tells1 for   
good or ill1 upon society as a whole4   
,what is the ideal8 ,i think the answer 
is plain2 no man who has any conception 
of the higher joys of love which is also
 friendship1 intellectual companionship1
 can hesitate2 and if this is so1 then  
duty is plain also4 ,no man has a right 
to deplore the evil by word who         
encourages it in any way by his act4    
,it is sometimes averred by those who   
oppose the economic independence and    
educational equality of women with men1 
that women can mingle with the world on 
a plane of equality with men only at the
 sacrifice of all the chivalry and      
admiration which men now give to women4 
,but this objection opposes every step  
of women's progress1 from the harem     
upwards1 and every step has proved its  
falseness4 ,true1 in the lands where    
women are freest1 they are less favored 

with insincere and fulsome compliments1 
with vows and protestations which1 when 
put to the test1 mean nothing1 or worse 
than nothing4 ,the case is1 however1 far
 otherwise with the attentions which    
mark sincere regard1 and the            
consideration paid by physical strength 
to comparative weakness4 ,it would1     
indeed1 be peculiar if higher           
intellectual powers1 a clearer insight  
into the severely true1 the cultivation 
of that nobility of character which     
results from self-knowledge through     
knowledge of others and the habit of    
self-reliance1 should render women less 
attractive4 ,the pioneers in any cause  
need to be the hardier individuals1 and 
so are often those who please little    
aesthetically2 and the kicks and scoffs 
of the world may take from the          
disposition what little grace it at     
first possessed2 but this does not prove
 the moral rightness of the kicks and   
scoffs1 or the moral culpability of     
those who dare to adhere to their       

purpose in spite of them4 ,in the       
countries where excessive difficulties  
are placed in the way of women's work in
 the higher professions 7there are very 
few placed in the way of her overwork in
 other directions71 these have resulted 
naturally in the suppression of effort  
on the part of the majority of the more 
finely constituted and more sensitive1  
and have left the field to the hardier  
and less fine2 but in the ,united       
,states1 where women are freest in every
 way1 they have lost neither in natural 
grace nor in the attention and regard of
 men2 on the contrary1 they have gained 
in both1 and they have1 furthermore1    
left the mark of their refining         
influence on the whole civilization of  
the country4 ,as long as women are      
weaker than men physically1 a higher    
moral standard must have regard for this
 weakness4 ,when1 through a more        
healthful life1 women become more nearly
 equal to men in endurance1 certain     
forms of attention will be less         

necessary1 and will1 doubtless1 fall off
 somewhat1 only to make room for a      
higher plane of mutual helpfulness4 ,yet
 ,i doubt whether the time will ever    
come when the grace and beauty of women1
 the associations of love and the       
memories of family affection1 will not  
stir men of finer fibre to peculiar     
kindness1 repaid as the appreciation of 
women can well repay4  ,there is another
 protest--which comes especially from   
the party that most exclaims against the
 evils of competition--against the      
superstitious respect for age4 ,the     
reason is1 obviously1 that age tends by 
nature to conservatism4 ,but the evils  
of the struggle for existence are not   
those alone of outward conditions2 these
 are often far less hard than the bitter
 spirit of mental antagonism that sears 
and saddens the heart4 ,youth is daring 
and originative2 middle age is less     
venturesome1 but it possesses1 on the   
other hand1 a wider range of experience4
 ,between youth and youth1 or youth and 

middle age1 the battle is more equal4   
,but age no longer possesses the power  
to cope with the world physically or    
mentally2 it is fixed in habit1 and apt 
to follow one accustomed round of       
thought2 we are certainly not likely to 
convince it by violence4 ,it has borne  
its share of violence and has done its  
part in the battle4 ,it has advanced    
with its generation1 though it may not  
be able to advance any longer with ours4
 ,our ideal should certainly be that of 
forbearance1 not of intolerance towards 
it4  ,modern opinion is becoming        
dissatisfied with the old methods of    
dealing with criminals--with the methods
 which continually return the criminal  
to society not bettered by              
incarceration1 and ready to commit all  
manner of crimes again4 ,both the       
protection of society and the welfare of
 the criminal would be better served by 
a course of discipline that should only 
then give him back to society when he is
 fitted to live in harmony with it and  

to enjoy the advantages conferred by    
such harmony4 ,recent experiments in    
reformatories have demonstrated the     
immense advantage of methods which      
attempt something like this4 ,among the 
improved reformatories for children1    
many of them without walls1 bolts1 or   
bars1 some have sent out cured from     
eighty to eighty-five per cent of the   
offenders committed to them4 ,the       
,elmira reformatory deals especially    
with offenders sentenced for their first
 state's prison offence1 and its method 
is at once eminently humane and         
remarkably successful4 ,offenders may be
 sent to it at the discretion of the    
judges4 ,it contains three grades4      
,members of the first of these wear     
better clothing1 eat better food1 enjoy 
various special privileges1 and are     
used1 to some extent1 as officers and   
monitors for the other grades4 ,members 
of the second grade are less well       
provided for and honored than those of  
the first2 and members of the third     

grade are worst clothed and fed1 and    
have the fewest privileges4 ,every man  
who enters the prison is submitted to a 
minute examination as to his            
antecedents1 his mental1 moral1 and     
physical condition and capabilities4 ,he
 is then placed in the second grade1    
from which he may go up or down1        
according to his work and conduct4      
,eight hours' work a day are required1  
and compulsory school is held in the    
evening1 at which the common ,english   
branches are taught1 and elementary     
instruction given in ,law1 ,political   
,economy1 ,ethics1 etc4 ,discussion and 
thought on the subjects taught are      
encouraged1 and everything possible is  
done to awaken interest4 ,perfect work  
and conduct for six months--the standard
 of perfection is high--and a mark of   
#ge in a scale of #ajj in the school    
secure a man advance into the next      
higher grade2 and the same standard     
maintained for six months in the highest
 grade entitle a man to release on      

parole2 so that the term of imprisonment
 need not exceed a year4 ,the man must  
be willing1 industrious1 good-tempered1 
obedient1 energetic1 who gets release in
 this time4 ,work is found for every man
 released2 he is closely watched for six
 months more1 and if his conduct does   
not keep up the standard required1 he is
 returned to the reformatory and must   
begin over again2 if1 on the other hand1
 his conduct and work1 an attested      
report of which must be handed in each  
month1 is satisfactory for these six    
months1 he is honorably discharged4 ,the
 obdurate malefactors serve out their   
full sentence1 as they would in state's 
prison4 ,of those who go out from the   
institution1 eighty per cent return to  
society reformed2 and the superintendent
 is of the opinion that this percentage 
could still be raised were the time of  
detention made indeterminate and wholly 
dependent upon reform4 ,all prison      
reformers are coming to recognize the   
desirability of such indeterminate      

sentences4 ,the work of the men at      
,elmira pays over two-thirds of the     
expenses of the institution1 and even if
 we consider only dollars and cents1    
this method of dealing with crime is    
evidently the cheapest2 for under the   
old method we have to take into account 
the expenses of the later crimes of the 
men released without improvement of     
character4 ,the method of parole of     
first offenders1 newly introduced into  
,france1 and in use to some extent in   
other countries also1 seems to have     
rather less to recommend it1 except in  
special cases2 since the moral1         
intellectual1 and industrial discipline 
of the reformatory are lacking4  ,in all
 such reformatory work it may be        
remarked that hard labor and stringent  
discipline1 as well as consistent       
kindness1 are found absolutely          
necessary2 and it is to be noted that   
the disinclination of criminals for     
labor and regularity of life is one of  
the greatest obstacles in the way of    

their reform4#bhc ,judge ,green quotes  
from ,mr4 ,hough on this point3 ,those  
who are in control of penal institutions
 meet with no more pernicious influence 
than that exerted by certain            
well-meaning but mistaken               
philanthropists who are impelled by     
kindly hearts to slop over with         
sentiment4 ,no criminal is so hard to   
reach as the one who fancies himself    
injured or has a grievance against      
society4 ,aside from treatment that     
compels him to feel resentment1 there is
 no one thing that will so quickly bring
 this feeling as to have some           
tender-hearted1 benevolent person tell  
him that they think his penalty is far  
more severe than his offence warrants1  
especially now that he has promised to  
pray regularly and abandon his wicked   
ways4#bhd ,in connection with this      
point1 we may notice ,bellamy's theory  
of crime as ,atavism1 to be treated in  
the hospitals4 ,whether or not we regard
 crime as disease1 a distinction must be

 drawn between the disease that may be  
regarded as physical weakness and that  
which does not necessarily imply such   
weakness1 though it may imply some      
physical defect in the sense that the   
psychical characteristic has always its 
physical cooerdinate4 ,we may call the  
places where our criminals are treated  
prisons1 or we may call them hospitals2 
but the name will not alter the fact    
that crime1 and even the crime the      
tendency to which manifests itself early
 in life and is most incorrigible1      
needs1 for the most part1 a wholly      
different treatment from that pursued   
with the sick or the insane4 ,discipline
 and labor may come into play in the    
insane asylum1 and medicine and hygiene 
in the prison2 but the methods are1     
nevertheless1 widely separated1 and need
 to be so in order to attain any        
success4 ,bellamy's conception of the   
character of the criminal by            
nature--such as he imagines as alone    
existing under the conditions of his    

ideal state--as rarely untruthful1 does 
not at all accord with the facts of     
,psychology and ,criminology4 ,total    
unreliability is one of the chief       
characteristics of the criminal by      
nature4 ,he lies even where there is    
nothing to be gained by lying and often 
much to be lost2 he lies apparently for 
the mere pleasure of lying2 or he is    
crafty and cunning1 and the smallest    
gain suffices to furnish him with a     
motive for falsehood4 ,in mankind1 as a 
whole1 the love of truth1 one of the    
latest developments of the moral sense1 
is likewise one of those earliest lost  
in any moral deterioration2 and to      
suppose men1 as a rule1 strictly        
truthful and yet capable of committing  
crimes of any sort1 especially in a     
general ideal state of society and      
morals1 is to suppose a psychological   
contradiction4 ,moreover1 the antipathy 
of the criminal to undergoing the       
penalty of his crime would still remain 
as long as the discipline and labor of  

the places for criminal treatment were  
not abolished2 and even the restrictions
 of incarceration would render the      
penalty disagreeable1 since liberty is  
always preferable to confinement4 ,and  
if we consider the indefinite sentence1 
which all prison reformers now regard as
 the first condition of the successful  
treatment of crime1 to be introduced1   
the reasons for pleading ,not ,guilty   
would by no means be removed4 ,but ,i   
doubt whether a society of high moral   
development would sanction the doubling 
of the penalty which ,bellamy conceives1
 as the punishment of simply a lie to   
escape it4  ,the question of capital    
punishment is more difficult than at    
first glance appears4 ,one of the       
arguments often advanced in opposition  
to this form of punishment is that the  
fear of it is no preventive of the crime
 of murder 7for which alone1 in times of
 peace1 it is still imposed in civilized
 countries71 since murder still takes   
place4 ,but the argument in this form is

 practically worthless2 we might as well
 say that art exhibitions do nothing to 
form taste1 since many people who visit 
them are still lacking in aesthetic     
feeling4 ,the fact that men have gone   
away from public executions and         
committed murder is more to the purpose1
 as an indication that the influence of 
the spectacle is probably a bad one4 ,as
 to the private execution within        
prison-walls1 it is difficult to suppose
 that the mere knowledge of it could    
arouse a desire for blood1 as the sight 
of it may be imagined to do4 ,if we     
abandon capital punishment on this      
ground merely1 ought we not1 in         
consistency1 to do away with all        
representations of violent death on the 
stage and all description of it in      
fiction1 since these things must affect 
the imagination full as vividly4 ,the   
gladiatorial shows of ,rome were        
doubtless undesirable from a            
humanitarian point of view1 not only in 
themselves1 but also in their results2  

and it might be undesirable for most    
individuals to accustom themselves to   
the spectacle of the butchering of their
 meat2 but1 whether or not we agree with
 the vegetarians as to the social       
significance and influence of the use of
 animal-food 7necessarily1 of course1 we
 must concede that every fact has an    
influence of some sort1 and in some     
degree1 upon the mind71 it can scarcely 
be claimed that the mere knowledge that 
beeves are slaughtered somewhere is     
likely to influence the mind to such an 
extent as to lead to a morbid desire to 
imitate the deed2 nor1 the stimulating  
excitement of the actual spectacle of   
execution lacking1 is it likely that the
 mere knowledge of its actuality should 
incite to the taking of human life4 ,on 
the contrary1 it appears far more likely
 that the would-be murderer should      
connect the thought of it with the      
possibilities of his own future in case 
of detection and arrest1 and that he    
should1 thus1 be rather deterred from   

crime by it4  ,the vital questions      
appear to be whether we have a right    
thus to sacrifice life1 and whether the 
evil which the murderer brings upon     
society may not be better prevented in  
some other way4 ,leaving out of         
consideration1 for a moment1 a point    
which will be considered later1 the two 
questions will be seen to resolve       
themselves into one4 ,if ,i should      
perceive an innocent man about to be    
murdered by a villain1 who was on the   
point of plunging his knife into his    
victim's heart1 and ,i had in my hand at
 the time a loaded revolver1 my duty    
would be plain4 ,i should have no choice
 as to the responsibility for one man's 
life2 only the choice would be left me  
as to which life ,i would be responsible
 for2 and to spare the murderer would be
 to make myself an accomplice in the    
murder4 ,the responsibility lies with   
every society to do the utmost in its   
power to prevent the murder of citizens 
who are1 in the majority of cases1      

better men than their murderer2 and the 
life1 even1 of the murderer cannot stand
 out against the life of better men4    
,if1 then1 the death sentence is the    
best preventive of murder1 and society  
refuses to inflict it nevertheless1 it  
makes itself the accomplice of the      
murderer as much as is the man who      
stands by and permits the knife to be   
plunged into the victim's heart1 rather 
than shoot down its wielder4 ,it is not 
mercy that spares the guilty to         
sacrifice the innocent4 ,if1 then1 we   
must be responsible for the death of any
 man1 let it be for that of the murderer
 rather than for that of his victims4   
,it is easy enough to say1 as do some on
 this point1 that it should never become
 a principle of society to do evil in   
order that good may come2 but as long as
 there are conflicting conditions in    
society1 there can be no choice of      
absolute good2 the only choice is       
between lesser and greater evils4       
,forgetting this1 and looking only on   

the one side of the question on which   
their sympathy has especially been      
excited1 reformers are sometimes guilty 
of choosing the greater evil in order   
that a lesser good may come4 ,it is1    
therefore1 not sufficient to brand      
capital punishment a relic of barbarism1
 in order to prove that it should be    
abolished4  ,the problem of prevention  
of murder includes various elements3 it 
includes the question of the possible   
repetition of the crime by the          
individual on trial1 the question of his
 influence by precept and example1 and  
that of his possible propagation of     
offspring who may inherit his evil      
propensities2 and it also includes the  
question of the check of fear in other  
would-be murderers4  ,it has been       
claimed that imprisonment for life would
 act as an effectual preventive in all  
these respects4 ,there may be1 however1 
various objections to this penalty4 ,in 
the first place1 an unconditional       
life-sentence without hope of pardon is 

difficult to establish1 especially in   
democratic countries2 and its justice is
 doubtful1 in case it were possible4    
,even if sentences of this sort were to 
be passed1 pity would be likely to      
interfere later with their execution4   
,and then the momentous question arises 
as to whether it would always be        
well-directed pity4 ,the men in whom the
 right of pardon is vested are not      
always wise in their use of it1 and in  
democratic countries they are guided to 
a considerable extent by the will of    
importunate portions of society which is
 often still less wise4 ,the            
sentimentality which now vents itself in
 loading down violent criminals with    
flowers1 fruit1 gifts of all sorts1     
letters1 photographs1 commiserations for
 their misfortune1 and even offers of   
marriage1 is likely to stand in the way 
of the safety of society in case the    
murderer lives4 ,this sentimentality1   
which in many countries exalts the      
criminal into a hero1 and in ,france    

turns the police court into a           
fashionable place of amusement1 were it 
not to be followed by the dread ending  
which the sterner members of society    
exact1 and were the hope of pardon still
 open1 might invest arrest with even    
some attractions to the murderer1 who is
 frequently a hero in his own eyes4 ,the
 prominence of a desire for notoriety is
 evident in criminals of the            
,jack-the-,ripper and other types4 ,the 
sentimentality which is unable to       
distinguish between a legitimate mercy1 
and the mercy to the individual which   
amounts to the worst of cruelty to many 
others1 is1 indeed1 a continual danger  
to society and a hindrance to useful    
reforms4  ,again1 if the criminal be    
condemned to life-imprisonment1 there is
 always the possibility of his escape to
 be considered1 and the fact that he    
will probably stick at nothing to       
accomplish his escape4 ,the dangers of  
ultimate success may not be so large2   
our prisons are nowadays strongly built1

 the warders and other officers are very
 seldom open to bribes1 and the         
proportion of escapes is extremely      
small4 ,nevertheless1 the hopelessness  
of a life-sentence must constitute a    
strong motive for the stimulation of    
effort and ingenuity2 and it can        
scarcely be hoped that a man who has not
 before hesitated at murder1 and who has
 no greater penalty to fear in case of  
any number of repetitions of the crime1 
will hesitate when his liberty and all  
it means to him of freedom from irksome 
discipline and restraint of vice1 is at 
stake4 ,and in case of escape society   
has to fear1 not only repetitions of the
 crime1 but also the numberless and     
complex workings of the criminal's      
influence on others1 and the propagation
 of offspring who may inherit his evil  
propensities4  ,and1 furthermore1 if the
 sentence of life-imprisonment is       
carried out1 the murderer's influence on
 the other tenants of the prison is to  
be considered1 in case he is not kept in

 solitary confinement4 ,the preservation
 of a large number of desperate         
criminals1 in contact with the less     
corrupt ones whose reform is being      
attempted1 has many objections4         
,criminals have more than once stated   
that they learned their worst principles
 from companions in prison1 and many of 
our prisons and many of our             
reformatories have been called mere     
schools of vice4 ,moreover1 in          
maintaining our desperate criminals1 we 
are spending large sums for their       
comfort while hundreds of better men are
 left to starve1 and thousands are more 
poorly clothed and fed4  ,the fact that 
murder has not increased in some        
countries where the death-sentence has  
been abolished may be admitted as       
evidence in the matter1 but cannot be   
regarded1 alone1 as conclusive4 ,for1   
first1 that which is for the general    
good in one country may not be so in    
another1 the national temperament1 form 
of government1 and general habits of    

which are different4 ,and1 furthermore1 
it may be said that1 although statistics
 undoubtedly must have some meaning in  
all cases1 the complication of social   
conditions renders it often difficult to
 say just what the significance may be  
in the particular case4 ,in the         
diminution of murders1 other            
circumstances may have been at work     
which would have lessened the number    
even if the death-sentence had not been 
abolished4 ,at least1 experiments with  
regard to the abolition of the          
death-penalty have been too few to      
render any categorical assertion on the 
subject possible4  ,but some of the     
above-stated objections to the abolition
 of capital punishment might be removed 
by the provision of separate prisons for
 malefactors condemned to               
life-imprisonment1 with separate wards  
according to the moral condition of the 
prisoners1 little communication being   
allowed between even those in the same  
ward1 or communication only under       

supervision1 and such instruction being 
given as would enable the individual to 
occupy the hours not devoted to labor in
 study1 reading1 or other mental        
recreation4  ,green1 in his book on     
crime1 calls attention to the very      
undesirable vindictiveness sometimes    
aroused1 by sentence of death1 in the   
minds of the condemned and of his       
friends1 and notices the general evil of
 the feeling in the minds of criminals  
that the state is their deadly foe1     
defiance of the laws being thus raised  
to the plane of legitimate warfare upon 
an enemy4 ,the ,hon4 ,john ,j4 ,wheeler1
 in a paper quoted by ,green1 lays      
especial stress on the desirability of  
convincing the criminal that not revenge
 but the protection of society is aimed 
at in state-punishment4  ,again1 the    
question may be asked whether the       
sentimental tendency to regard the      
criminal as a hero is not fostered by   
the death-sentence--whether the pity    
aroused at so extreme a fate would not  

be inclined to take a less harmful form 
if the treatment of the criminal were at
 once firm and humane but less          
sensational4 ,doubtless1 the glory of   
crime and half its attractiveness for a 
large class of morbid criminals would be
 departed1 if we could come to regard   
the latter with commiseration as of a   
lower and abnormal type of humanity and 
to treat them as such4 ,but it must be  
remembered that society1 as a whole1 is 
yet far from so scientific a conception2
 and that combined firmness and kindness
 of treatment is difficult to secure1   
both in prison-officials and in those   
officers who have the power of pardon at
 present placed in their hands4 ,we need
 obviously many reforms in our system of
 sentence and pardon1 as well as in the 
management of our prisons4 ,we need more
 men like ,mr4 ,brockway of ,elmira1    
,mr4 ,wardwell of ,virginia1 and those  
other modern reformers of prison-life   
whose office is to them a matter of     
humanity and not merely of business4    

,and especially1 we need more firmness  
in society as a whole2 sympathy and     
mercy may be evils in the path of human 
progress when they deteriorate into a   
weakness which sacrifices the innocent  
in a mistaken humanity towards the      
guilty4 ,in order to be well directed1  
sympathy must consider all men1 and not 
the individual alone2 only then is it an
 unmitigated good4  ,but as for the     
argument noticed above with regard to   
the employment of large sums of money   
for the maintenance of the criminal     
classes while the class of honest       
laborers is yet in destitution1 it      
cannot be considered1 on close          
inspection1 as of great weight4         
,certainly it would not be well to      
maintain the criminal in luxury while   
other reforms were waiting4 ,but if we  
act on the principle of deferring all   
less important reforms until all the    
more important ones are accomplished1 we
 shall be in danger of not reforming at 
all4 ,any reform that is well-timed and 

possible is important2 for the          
complication of social relations makes  
all reforms of weight in their wider    
significance4 ,no reforms can or should 
be made in a lump2 improvement must come
 from all sides and little by little2   
sympathy must be consistent and         
influence social conditions in every    
direction gradually as it gradually     
increases4 ,it is the superficial       
,utilitarianism which bids us wait such 
a reform as this1 though possible1 for  
another1--the same sort of              
,utilitarianism which advocates the     
introduction of the ,spartan custom of  
preserving only well-formed and vigorous
 infants1 and advises the administration
 of painless poisons to those hopelessly
 ill and suffering4 ,all these things   
have their relation to character1 and1  
therefore1 to other social evils1 or    
reforms4  ,and here we are brought      
finally to the consideration of the     
point hitherto left out of account1--a  
point which bears1 however1 a strong    

argument2 namely1 the fact of the       
possible condemnation of innocent men to
 death4 ,even since the limitation of   
capital punishment to cases of murder   
the innocent have been hung or          
guillotined in mistake for the guilty4  
,and for such mistakes there is no      
reparation2 the grave never gives up its
 dead4 ,men have sometimes been         
discovered to be innocent in spite of   
the strongest evidence against them2    
human observation is defective1 human   
memory fallible1 human                  
character--especially such as often     
appears in evidence against the         
murderer--by no means always strictly   
honorable and honest4 ,even confessions 
of guilt have sometimes been proved     
false4 ,as with regard to other         
propositions to place the power of the  
life or death of individuals in the     
hands of their fellow men1 the question 
presents itself as to whether the use of
 so great power is not dangerous4 ,and  
this appears to me the decisive point of

 our inquiry4  ,societies are being     
formed for the abolition of capital     
punishment1 and feeling is growing      
strong in its favor4 ,let us hope1      
however1 that the reformers will adopt a
 policy stringent and judicious as well 
as merciful2--that they will not forget 
that1 in order to render the            
preservation of the murderer harmless to
 society we need other reforms in law   
and prison management4  ,in general1 it 
may be said of all questions1 that the  
conflict between the principles of      
justice and mercy1 known to theological 
,ethics1 resolves itself1 from a higher 
point of view1 into the question of     
justice only4 ,the mercy which is not   
justice1 is either mercy to one at the  
expense of others1 or mercy that spares 
the offender in one respect to his own  
greater disadvantage in another4 ,the   
ideal character is thus at once gentle  
and strong4  ,we have followed the      
development of altruism from egoism up  
to the point where the thought of       

punishment ensuing upon the             
non-performance of duty ceases to play a
 large part in the motive to action1 the
 reward of the pleasure of others and of
 their gratitude and love forming a     
complex motive4 ,but beyond even the    
incentives of love there lies still a   
higher motive which1 in cases of        
conflict1 must figure as the highest    
morally4 ,in an ideal state1 the social 
sanction could not conflict with duty2  
but until we reach such a state1 the    
independence of moral motive must be    
observed1 the moral man must do what    
appears to him right1 in spite of public
 opinion4 ,the course has its dangers1  
and the principle must be carried out   
with caution1 the questions involving   
such a course be carefully considered   
from all sides and in all lights4 ,but  
when this has been done1 the sense of   
duty remains supreme4 ,in the ideal man1
 the consciousness of duty performed    
should constitute the strongest         
pleasure1 the consciousness of failure  

in duty the severest pain4 ,this is the 
solution of the problem ,ibsen gives us 
in ,rosmersholm2 society has not        
advanced from savagery by permitting all
 pleasures which the individual desires2
 nor can it advance further towards the 
ideal by permitting the individual to   
choose those pleasures which the future 
shall regard as evidence of our present 
semi-barbarous state1 since they are    
pleasures inimical to the peace of      
others and the general good of society2 
as in the past1 so in the present and   
future1 the harmony between pleasure and
 duty 7that is between the conflicting  
pleasures of individuals7 can be        
attained only by habit which shall bring
 the desires of the individual into     
harmony with duty4 ,thus only can all   
desires1 the happiness of all           
individuals1 attain to harmony1--to full
 equilibrium4  ,and this leads me to    
remark that we have reason to doubt the 
moral conviction of very many who       
protest against the immoral and         

superstitious restriction of personal   
pleasure in certain directions4 ,were   
such individuals morally convinced1 were
 duty to their fellow men really        
uppermost in their minds1 they would not
 choose darkness and secrecy for their  
deeds1 but after careful and thorough   
statement of their opinions and reasons 
would show the earnestness of their     
belief by open act4 ,the man whose moral
 conviction is to him the highest duty  
does not fear public opinion1 but dares 
to follow that which seems to him right1
 in the face of slander2 therefore1 we  
suspect the man who hides his deeds1 of 
seeking his own pleasure and not that of
 society as a whole4      ,conscience is
 harder than our enemies1     ,knows    
more1 accuses with more nicety1     ,nor
 needs to question ,rumor if we fall    
,below the perfect level of our thought4
     ,i fear no outward arbiter1  says  
,don ,silva in ,the ,spanish ,gypsy4    
,but for our encouragement1 let us      
contemplate the heroic characters which 

progress has developed4 ,from these we  
may take hope and courage1 in these we  
may find the best results of the moral  
evolution of our race1 and the promise  
of the better future which man alone can
 work out by ever-renewed effort4 ,the  
love of such characters1 and even the   
knowledge that they exist1 is the       
highest joy of human association1 a joy 
which the present age may feel in a     
degree that no former age has known2 and
 herein lies the greater beauty of the  
present time over all others4 ,the      
thought of such characters can sustain  
us even in our own self-doubt4 ,what man
 has done1 man can do4 ,nay1 he shall do
 more1 much more4  ,the question as to  
the final destruction of the human race1
 whether by sudden catastrophe or slow  
decay1 can little affect happiness1 at  
present1 or for very many ages to come4 
,as yet1 evolution is in the direction  
of a greater harmony that means         
continually greater pleasure to life4   
,we have not reached our maximum1 we are

 evolving upwards towards it4 ,the      
pessimist is fond of making much of the 
final end of our planet2 but the healthy
 and successful will be happy in spite  
of future ages1 and the extent and      
degree of happiness will continue to    
increase for such an immense period of  
time that there is no reason for        
considering the destruction of our race 
as exerting any important influence on  
ethical theory4 ,the loss of our faith  
in individual immortality is a far      
greater source of present pain4 ,it     
leaves death a harder sorrow2--but it   
lends life new meaning4 ,the good we    
strive for lies no longer in a world of 
dreams on the other side the grave2 it  
is brought down to earth and waits to be
 realized by human hands1 through human 
labor4 ,we are called on to forsake the 
finer egoism that centred all its care  
on self-salvation1 for a love of our own
 kind that shall triumph over death1 and
 leave its impress on the joy of        
generations to come4 ,there is something

 lost in the dissolution of the old     
faith to us who were reared in it4 ,the 
hope of restitution1 to the individual1 
from supernatural cause1 here or        
hereafter1 is forever done away with4   
,there is no restitution4 ,in our       
favorite novel1 when the doors are      
closed and the lights extinguished1 that
 some unspeakable sorrow may hide itself
 in darkness and silence1 we can always 
turn back the leaves till we are again  
in the midst of light and music and     
dancing1 and the heart for which the    
tragic knife is pitilessly sharpening in
 the hand of ,destiny1 is yet untouched4
 ,but in the book of ,reality1 there is 
no turning back2 the pages are burned   
before our eyes as we read4 ,sooner or  
later1 we all of us reach the point     
where that which made life most worth   
living has passed away from us forever4 
,there is no help save the knowledge of 
the fact1 that shall make us all draw   
closer in sympathy and by mutual        
kindness render loss less bitter4 ,as we

 accept the ,truth1 and bow our head to 
the ,inevitable1 we may learn a less    
narrow happiness for this life and for  
the ,hereafter1 from the great pioneers 
of ,scientific ,doubt and pure          
,humanitarianism1 one of whom has       
written3--      ,oh1 may ,i join the    
choir invisible     ,of those immortal  
dead who live again     ,in minds made  
better by their presence2 live     ,in  
pulses stirred to generosity1     ,in   
deeds of daring rectitude1 in scorn     
,for miserable aims that end with self1 
,in thoughts sublime that pierce the    
night like stars1     ,and with their   
mild persistence urge man's search      
,to vaster issues4                   ,so
 to live is heaven3     ,to make undying
 music in the world1     ,breathing as  
beauteous order that controls     ,with 
growing sway the growing life of man4   
99444499444499444499                    
,this is life to come1     ,which       
martyred men have made more glorious    
,for us who strive to follow4 ,may ,i   

reach     ,that purest heaven1 be to    
other souls     ,the cup of strength in 
some great agony1     ,enkindle generous
 ardor1 feed pure love1     ,beget the  
smiles that have no cruelty1--     ,be  
the sweet presence of a good diffused1  
,and in diffusion ever more intense4    
,so shall ,i join the choir invisible1  
,whose music is the gladness of the     
world4  ,,footnotes3  #bge ,it should be
 said1 in justice to the play in        
question1 that the idea of purification 
by evil was evidently not present to its
 author4  #bgf ,see ,part ,i4 p4 #cc1   
this book2 ,social ,statics1 #hg-hi4    
#bgg ,le ,luxe1 p4 #b4  #bgh ,le ,luxe1 
p4 #ab4  #bgi ,fabian ,essays in        
,socialism1 pp4 #bg1 #ade1 etc4  #bhj ,i
 have used the word here as elsewhere in
 its more general1 not in its specific1 
technical sense4  #bha ,fabian ,essays1 
p4 #eg4  #bhb ,see ,jahrbuecher fuer    
,psychiatrie1 #ahhi1 ,ueber ,neurosen   
und ,psychosen durch sexuelle           
,abstinenz4  #bhc ,see essay by ,charles

 ,dudley ,warner in the ,north ,american
 ,review for ,april1 #ahhe4  #bhd ,s4   
,m4 ,green3 ,crime1 ,art4 ,,iii4 ,chap4 
,v4     ,works on ,philosophy           
,,published ,,by  ,,macmillan  ,,co4    
,,ethics4--,,metaphysics4--,,logic4--,,p
sychology4  ,,aristotle3 ,outlines of   
the ,philosophy of ,aristotle4 ,compiled
 by ,,edwin ,,wallace1 ,m4,a4 ,third    
edition enlarged4 ,pitt ,press ,series4 
#afmo4 #a4aj1 net4  ,,bacon3 ,novum     
,organon and ,advancement of ,learning4 
,edited with notes by ,j4 ,,devey1      
,m4,a4 ,bohn ,library4 #a4ej1 net4  ----
 ,novum ,organon4 ,translated by ,g4 ,w4
 ,,kitchin1 ,m4,a4 #hvo4 ,bohn ,library4
 #b4ej1 net4  ,,balfour 7,a4 ,j473 ,a   
,defence of ,philosophic ,doubt4 ,an    
,essay on the ,foundations of ,belief4  
#hvo4 #c4ej1 net4  ,,bax4 ,,works ,,by  
,e4 ,,belfort ,,bax3  ,a ,manual of the 
,history of ,philosophy1 for the ,use of
 ,students4 ,bohn ,library4 #a4ej1 net4 
,the ,problem of ,reality4 #abmo4 #ij   
cents4  ,,birks4 ,,works ,,by ,,thomas  

,r4 ,,birks3  ,first ,principles of     
,moral ,science4 #abmo4 #b4ej4  ,modern 
,utilitarianism2 or1 the ,systems of    
,paley1 ,bentham1 and ,mill ,examined   
and ,compared4 #abmo4 #b4jj4  ,modern   
,physical ,fatalism and the ,doctrine of
 ,evolution4 ,including an examination  
of ,herbert ,spencer's ,first           
,principles4 #abmo4 #b4jj4  ,,boole     
7,g473 ,a ,treatise on the ,calculus of 
,finite ,differences4 ,third edition1   
#abmo4 #b4fj1 net4  ,,bosanquet4 ,,works
 ,,by ,,bernard ,,bosanquet1 ,m4,a43    
,logic2 or1 the ,morphology of          
,knowledge4 #b vols4 #e4be1 net4  ,the  
,history of ,a,esthetics4 ,the ,library 
of ,philosophy4 #hvo4 #b4ge1 net4       
,,burnet 7,j473 ,early ,greek           
,philosophy4 #hvo4 #b4ej1 net4  ,,caird 
7,e473 ,the ,critical ,philosophy of    
,emmanuel ,kant4 #b vols4 #hvo4 #g4ej1  
net4  ,essays on ,literature and        
,philosophy4 #b vols4 #c4jj4            
,,calderwood4 ,,works ,,by ,,henry      
,,calderwood1 ,,ll4,d43  ,a ,handbook of

 ,moral ,philosophy4 ,fourteenth        
edition4 #abmo4 #a4ej1 net4  ,the       
,relations of ,mind and ,brain4 ,third  
edition4 #hvo4 #d4jj4  ,,clifford4      
,,works ,,by ,,william ,,kingdon        
,,clifford3  ,lectures and ,essays4     
,edited by ,,leslie ,,stephen and ,f4   
,,pollock1 with an ,introduction4 ,new  
edition4 #b4ej4  ,seeing and ,thinking4 
,with ,diagrams4 ,nature ,series4 #a4ej4
  ,,comte',s ,philosophy of the         
,sciences1 being an ,exposition of the  
,principles of the ,cours de            
,philosophie ,positive4 ,by ,g4 ,h4     
,,lewes1 author of ,the ,life of        
,goethe1 ,biographical ,history of      
,philosophy1 etc4 ,bohn ,library4 #a4ej1
 net4  ,,devey 7,j473 ,logic2 or1 the   
,science of ,inference4 ,a ,systematic  
,view of the ,principles of ,evidence   
and the ,methods of ,inference in the   
,various ,departments of ,human         
,knowledge4 ,a ,popular ,manual4 ,with  
,index4 ,bohn ,library4 #a4ej1 net4     
,,erdmann 7,j4 ,e473 ,a ,history of     

,philosophy4 ,english translation edited
 by ,,williston ,s4 ,,hough1 ,professor 
of ,philosophy in the ,university of    
,minnesota4 ,the ,library of            
,philosophy4 #c vols4 #hvo4 #aj4ej1 net4
  ---- ,an ,outline of ,erdmann's       
,history of ,philosophy4 ,by ,,henry ,c4
 ,,king1 ,professor of ,philosophy in   
,oberlin ,college4 #cj cents4  ,,fowler 
7,t473 ,the ,elements of ,logic1        
,deductive and ,inductive4 #afmo4 #a4ge1
 net4  ---- ,progressive ,morality4 ,an 
,essay in ,ethics4 #abmo4 #a4ej4        
,,fowler 7,t47 and ,,wilson 7,j4 ,m473  
,the ,principles of ,morals4 #hvo4      
,,part ,i4 7,introductory ,chapters47   
#a4be4     ,,ii4 7,being the ,body of   
the ,work47 #b4ge4  ,,green 7,t4 ,h473  
,prolegomena to ,ethics4 ,edited by ,a4 
,c4 ,,bradley1 ,m4,a4 ,third edition4   
#hvo4 #c4be1 net4  ,,hartmann 7,e4      
,,von73 ,philosophy of the ,unconscious4
 ,speculative ,results accorded to the  
,inductive ,method of ,physical         
,science4 ,translated in ,english by ,w4

 ,c4 ,,coupland1 ,m4,a4 #c vols4 #hvo4  
#g4ej1 net4  ,,hegel3 ,logic4           
,translated from the ,encyclopaedia of  
the ,philosophical ,sciences4 ,with     
,prolegomena by ,w4 ,,wallace1 ,m4,a4 #b
 vols4 #hvo4      ,,vol4 ,i4            
,prolegomena4 ,new edition in           
preparation4     ,,ii4 ,translation4    
,new edition4 #b4ej1 net4  ,,hegel3     
,lectures on the ,philosophy of         
,history4 ,translated by ,j4 ,,sibree1  
,m4,a4 ,bohn ,library4 #a4ej1 net4      
,h,oe,f,f,d,i,n,g 7,prof4 ,h473         
,outlines of ,psychology4 ,translated by
 ,m4 ,g4 ,,lowndes4 #abmo4 #a4ej1 net4  
,,jardine 7,r473 ,the ,elements of the  
,psychology of ,cognition4 ,second      
edition1 revised4 #abmo4 #a4ej1 net4    
,,jevons4 ,,works ,,by ,w4 ,,stanley    
,,jevons4  ,the ,principles of ,science4
 ,a ,treatise on ,logic and ,scientific 
,method4 #abmo4 #b4ge1 net4  ,elementary
 ,lessons in ,logic3 ,deductive and     
,inductive4 ,with copious ,questions and
 ,examples1 and a ,vocabulary of        

,logical ,terms4 ,new edition4 #ahmo4   
#dj cents1 net4  ,studies in ,deductive 
,logic4 ,a ,manual for ,students4       
,second edition4 #abmo4 #a4fj1 net4     
,pure ,logic2 and other ,minor ,works4  
,edited by ,,robert ,,adamson1 ,m4,a41  
,,ll4,d41 and ,,harriet ,a4 ,,jevons4   
,preface by ,prof4 ,,adamson4 #hvo4     
#b4ej1 net4  ,,kant3 ,critique of the   
,pure ,reason4 ,translated into ,english
 by ,f4 ,,max ,m,ue,l,l,e,r4 ,with an   
,introduction by ,,ludwig ,,noire4 #b   
vols4 #hvo4 #h4jj4  ---- ,the           
,translation4 ,complete4 ,sold          
separately4 #c4ej4  ---- ,kant's        
,critical ,philosophy for ,english      
,readers4 ,by ,,john ,p4 ,,mahaffy1     
,d4,d41 and ,,john ,h4 ,,bernard1 ,b4,d4
 ,a new and complete edition4  ,,vol4   
,i4 ,the ,kritik of the ,pure ,reason   
,explained and ,defended4 #a4ge1 net4   
,,ii4 ,translation of the ,prolegomena4 
,with ,notes and ,appendices4 #a4ej1    
net4  ---- ,critique of ,judgment4      
,translated by ,j4 ,h4 ,,bernard4 #hvo4 

#c4ej4  ---- ,critique of ,pure ,reason4
 ,translated by ,j4 ,m4 ,d4             
,,meiklejohn4 ,bohn ,library4 #a4ej1    
net4  ---- ,prolegomena and             
,metaphysical ,foundations of ,natural  
,science4 ,translated1 with ,biography  
and ,memoir1 by ,e4 ,,belfort ,,bax4    
,bohn ,library4 #a4ej1 net4  ---- ,the  
,philosophy of ,kant4 ,as contained in  
,extracts from his own ,writings4       
,selected and translated by ,,john      
,,watson1 ,,ll4,d4 #a4ge1 net4  ,,keynes
 7,j4 ,n473 ,studies and ,exercises in  
,formal ,logic4 #abmo4 #b4ge1 net4      
,,king 7,prof4 ,h4 ,c473 ,an ,outline of
 ,erdmann's ,history of ,philosophy4 ,by
 ,,henry ,c4 ,,king1 ,professor of      
,philosophy1 ,oberlin ,college4 #cj     
cents4  ,,laurie 7,s4 ,s473 ,the        
,institutes of ,education1 comprising a 
,rational ,introduction to ,psychology4 
#afmo4 #a4jj4  ,,leibnitz3 ,critique of 
,locke4 ,new ,essays on the             
,understanding4 ,by the ,author of the  
,system of ,pre-established ,harmony4   

,translated from the ,french by ,,alfred
 ,g4 ,,langley1 ,a4,m4 #abmo4 ,in the   
press4  ,,library ,,of ,,philosophy     
7,,the73 ,edited by ,j4 ,h4 ,,muirhead1 
,m4,a4  ,a ,history of ,philosophy4 ,by 
,,johann ,,eduard ,,erdmann1 ,professor 
of ,philosophy1 ,university of ,halle4  
,english translation edited by          
,,williston ,s4 ,,hough1 ,ph4,m41       
,professor of ,philosophy1 ,university  
of ,minnesota4 #c vols4 ,large #hvo4    
#aj4ej1 net4  ,development of ,theology4
 ,in ,germany since ,kant1 and ,great   
,britain since #ahbe4 ,by ,,otto        
,,pfleiderer1 ,d4,d41 ,professor of     
,theology in the ,university of ,berlin4
 ,translated1 under the author's        
supervision1 by ,j4 ,,frederick ,,smith4
 ,large #hvo4 #b4ge1 net4  ,the ,history
 of ,a,esthetics4 ,by ,b4 ,,bosanquet1  
,m4,a41 ,author of ,logic2 or1 the      
,morphology of ,knowledge2 ,translator  
of ,lotze's ,system of ,philosophy4     
#b4ge1 net4  ,,locke3 ,philosophical    
,works4 ,with ,preliminary ,discourse1  

,analysis of ,locke's ,doctrine of      
,ideas1 ,notes by ,j4 ,a4 ,st4 ,john1   
,index1 and ,portrait of the ,author4   
,bohn ,library4 #b vols41 each #a4jj1   
net4  ,,lotze',s ,,system ,,of          
,,philosophy4  ,,part ,i4 ,logic4 ,in   
,three ,books4 ,of ,thought1 ,of        
,investigation1 and ,of ,knowledge4     
,english translation by ,,bosanquet4 #b 
vols4 #abmo4 #c4jj1 net4  ,,part ,,ii4  
,metaphysic4 ,in ,three ,books3         
,ontology1 ,cosmology1 and ,psychology4 
,english translation by ,,bosanquet4 #b 
vols4 #c4jj1 net4  ,outlines of a       
,philosophy of ,religion4 ,by ,,herman  
,,lotze4 ,edited by ,f4 ,c4 ,,conybeare1
 ,m4,a4 #ij cents4  ,,mackenzie3 ,an    
,introduction to ,social ,philosophy4   
,by ,,john ,s4 ,,mackenzie1 ,m4,a41     
,b4,a41 ,assistant ,lecturer on         
,philosophy in ,owens ,college1         
,manchester1 formerly ,examiner in      
,philosophy in the ,university of       
,glasgow4 #hvo4 #b4fj1 net4  ,,mahaffy  
7,j4 ,p47 and ,,bernard 7,j4 ,h473      

,kant's ,critical ,philosophy for       
,english ,readers4  ,,vol4 ,i4 ,the     
,kritik of the ,pure ,reason ,explained 
and ,defended4 #a4ge1 net4  ,,ii4       
,translation of the ,prolegomena4 ,with 
,notes and ,appendices4 #a4ej1 net4     
,,marshall3 ,a ,short ,history of ,greek
 ,philosophy4 ,by ,,john ,,marshall1    
,m4,a41 ,oxon41 ,,ll4,d4 #abmo4 #a4aj1  
net4  ,,martineau4 ,,works ,,by ,,james 
,,martineau1 ,,ll4,d43  ,types of       
,ethical ,theory4 ,new and cheaper      
edition4 ,in one volume4 #abmo4 #b4fj1  
net4  ,spinoza3 ,a ,study of4 ,with     
portrait4 ,second edition4 #b4jj4       
,,masson 7,d473 ,recent ,british        
,philosophy4 ,a ,review with            
,criticisms4 ,third edition4 #a4ge4     
,,maudsley 7,,henry1 ,m4,d473 ,body and 
,mind4 ,an ,inquiry into their          
,connection and ,mutual ,influence4     
,second edition1 enlarged4 #b4jj4       
,,maurice 7,f4 ,d473 ,moral and         
,metaphysical ,philosophy4 #b vols4     
#hvo4 #f4jj4  ,,vol4 ,i4 ,ancient       

,philosophy from the ,first to the      
,thirteenth ,centuries4  ,,ii4          
,fourteenth ,century and the ,french    
,revolution1 with a ,glimpse into the   
,nineteenth ,century4  ,,mayor 7,j4     
,b473 ,a ,sketch of ,ancient ,philosophy
 from ,thales to ,cicero4 ,pitt ,press  
,series4 #afmo4 #ij cents1 net4         
,,miller 7,professor73 ,history         
,philosophically ,illustrated1 from the 
,fall of the ,roman ,empire to the      
,french ,revolution4 ,bohn ,library4 #d 
vols41 each #a4jj4  ,,murphy 7,j4 ,j473 
,habit and ,intelligence4 ,essays on the
 ,laws of ,life and ,mind4 ,second      
edition1 revised and rewritten4 ,with   
illustrations4 #hvo4 #e4jj4             
,,pfleiderer3 ,the ,development of      
,theology in ,germany since ,kant1 and  
its ,progress in ,great ,britain since  
#ahbe4 ,by ,,otto ,,pfleiderer1 ,d4,d4  
,translated1 under the author's         
supervision1 by ,j4 ,,frederick ,,smith4
 ,the ,library of ,philosophy4 #hvo4    
#b4ge1 net4  ,,ray 7,p4 ,k473 ,a        

,text-,book of ,deductive ,logic for    
,students4 #a4be1 net4  ,,ryland 7,f473 
,the ,student's ,manual of ,psychology  
and ,ethics4 ,cloth1 red edges4 #eth    
edition1 revised and enlarged4 #abmo4   
#a4jj4  ,,schlegel4 ,,works ,,by ,f4    
,,schlegel3  ,on the ,philosophy of     
,history4 ,translated1 with a ,memoir of
 the ,author1 by ,j4 ,b4 ,,robertson4   
,bohn ,library4 #a4jj1 net4  ,on the    
,philosophy of ,life and ,the           
,philosophy of ,language4 ,translated by
 ,a4 ,j4 ,w4 ,,morrison1 ,m4,a4 ,bohn   
,library4 #a4jj1 net4  ,,schopenhauer4  
,,works ,,by ,a4 ,,schopenhauer3  ,on   
the ,fourfold ,root of the ,principle of
 ,sufficient ,reason and ,on the ,will  
in ,nature4 ,translated from the        
,german4 ,bohn ,library4 #a4ej1 net4    
,essays4 ,selected and translated by ,e4
 ,,belfort ,,bax4 ,bohn ,library4 #a4ej1
 net4  ,essays4 ,selected and translated
 by ,t4 ,,bailey ,,saunders4 ,five      
volumes in a box1 #d4ej2 or1 #ij cents  
each3      ,the ,wisdom of ,life4       

,counsels and ,maxims4     ,religion3 ,a
 ,dialogue4     ,the ,art of            
,literature4     ,studies in ,pessimism4
  ,,sidgwick4 ,,works ,,by ,,professor  
,,henry ,,sidgwick3  ,the ,methods of   
,ethics4 ,fourth edition4 #hvo4 #c4ej1  
net4  ,outlines of the ,history of      
,ethics for ,english ,readers4 #a4be1   
net4  ,,spinoza3 ,a ,study of4 ,by      
,,james ,,martineau4 #b4jj4  ---- ,chief
 ,works4 ,translated1 with              
,introduction1 by ,r4 ,h4 ,m4 ,,elwes4  
#b vols4  ,,vol4 ,i4 ,tractatus         
,theologico-,politicus2 ,political      
,treatise4 #a4ej1 net4  ,,ii4           
,improvement of the ,understanding2     
,ethics2 ,letters4 #a4ej1 net4          
,,stewart 7,j4 ,h473 ,notes on the      
,nicomachean ,ethics of ,aristotle4     
#hvo4 #b vols4 #h4jj1 net4  ,,stewart   
and ,,tait4 ,,works ,,by ,,professor    
,,balfour ,,stewart and ,p4 ,g4 ,,tait3 
,the ,unseen ,universe3 ,physical       
,speculation on a ,future ,state4 #a4be4
  ,paradoxical ,philosophy3 ,a ,sequel  

to ,the ,unseen ,universe4 #a4ge4       
,,thornton 7,w4 ,t41 ,c4 ,b473          
,old-,fashioned ,ethics and             
,common-,sense ,metaphysics4 #hvo4      
#b4ej4  ,,venn4 ,,works ,,by ,,john     
,,venn1 ,m4,a43      ,the ,logic of     
,chance4 ,third edition4 #b4ge1 net4    
,symbolic ,logic4 #b4ge1 net4           
,principles of ,empirical or ,inductive 
,logic4 #hvo4 #d4ej1 net4  ,,warner     
7,f473 ,a ,course of ,lectures on the   
,growth and ,means of ,training the     
,mental ,faculty4 ,delivered in the     
,university at ,cambridge4 #abmo4       
,cloth4 #ij cents1 net4  ,,watson4      
,,works ,,by ,,john ,,watson1 ,,ll4,d43 
,kant and his ,english ,critics4 ,a     
,comparison of ,critical and ,empirical 
,philosophy4 #hvo4 #d4jj4  ,the         
,philosophy of ,kant1 as contained in   
,extracts from his own ,writings4       
,selected and ,translated4 #a4ge1 net4  
,,williams 7,c4 ,m473 ,a ,review of the 
,systems of ,ethics founded on the      
,theory of ,evolution4 #abmo4 ,shortly4 

,,wilson 7,j4 ,m47 and ,,fowler 7,t473  
,the ,principles of ,morals4 #hvo4      
,,part ,i4 7,introductory ,chapters47   
,,ii4 7,being the ,body of the ,work47  
#b4ge4  ,,ziehen 7,prof4 ,t473          
,introduction to ,physiological         
,psychology4 ,translated by ,c4 ,c4     
,,van ,,lieuw and ,dr4 ,,otto ,,beyer4  
#a4ej1 net4   ,,macmillan  ,,co41 #aab  
,fourth ,avenue1 ,new ,york4