,hegel's ,philosophy of ,mind ,by ,georg ,wilhelm ,friedrich ,hegel ,translated ,from ,the ,encyclopaedia of the ,philosophical ,sciences ,with ,five ,introductory ,essays ,by ,william ,wallace1 ,m4,a41 ,,ll4,d4 ,fellow of ,merton ,college1 and ,whyte's ,professor of ,moral ,philosophy in the ,university of ,oxford ,oxford ,clarendon ,press #ahid ,,contents ,preface4 ,five ,introductory ,essays ,in ,psychology ,and ,ethics4 ,essay ,i4 ,on ,the ,scope ,of ,a ,philosophy ,of ,mind4 ,essay ,,ii4 ,aims ,and ,methods ,of ,psychology4 ,essay ,,iii4 ,on ,some ,psychological ,aspects ,of ,ethics4 ,essay ,,iv4 ,psycho-,genesis4 ,essay ,v4 ,ethics ,and ,politics4 ,introduction4 ,section ,i4 ,mind ,subjective4 ,sub-,section ,a4 ,anthropology4 ,the ,soul4 ,sub-,section ,b4 ,phenomenology ,of ,mind4 ,consciousness4 ,sub-,section ,c4 ,psychology4 ,mind4 ,section ,,ii4 ,mind ,objective4 ,distribution4 ,sub-,section ,a4 ,law4 ,sub-,section ,b4 ,the ,morality ,of ,conscience4 ,sub-,section ,c4 ,the ,moral ,life1 ,or ,social ,ethics4 ,section ,,iii4 ,absolute ,mind4 ,sub-,section ,a4 ,art4 ,sub-,section ,b4 ,revealed ,religion4 ,sub-,section ,c4 ,philosophy4 ,index4 ,footnotes ,,preface4 ,i here offer a translation of the third or last part of ,hegel's encyclopaedic sketch of philosophy1--the ,philosophy of ,mind4 ,the volume1 like its subject1 stands complete in itself4 ,but it may also be regarded as a supplement or continuation of the work begun in my version of his ,logic4 ,i have not ventured upon the ,philosophy of ,nature which lies between these two4 ,that is a province1 to penetrate into which would require an equipment of learning ,i make no claim to1--a province1 also1 of which the present-day interest would be largely historical1 or at least bound up with historical circumstances4 ,the translation is made from the ,german text given in the ,second ,part of the ,seventh ,volume of ,hegel's ,collected ,works1 occasionally corrected by comparison with that found in the second and third editions 7of #ahbg and #ahcj7 published by the author4 ,i have reproduced only ,hegel's own paragraphs1 and entirely omitted the ,zustze of the editors4 ,these addenda--which are in origin lecture-notes--to the paragraphs are1 in the text of the ,collected ,works1 given for the first section only4 ,the psychological part which they accompany has been barely treated elsewhere by ,hegel3 but a good popular exposition of it will be found in ,erdmann's ,psychologische ,briefe4 ,the second section was dealt with at greater length by ,hegel himself in his ,philosophy of ,law 7#ahbj74 ,the topics of the third section are largely covered by his lectures on ,art1 ,religion1 and ,history of ,philosophy4 ,i do not conceal from myself that the text offers a hard nut to crack4 ,yet here and there1 even through the medium of the translation1 ,i think some light cannot fail to come to an earnest student4 ,occasionally1 too1 as1 for instance1 in #djf1 #dei1 #edi1 and still more in #eeb1 #egc1 at the close of which might stand the words ,liberavi animam meam1 the writer really 8lets himself go10 and gives his mind freely on questions where speculation comes closely in touch with life4 ,in the ,five ,introductory ,essays ,i have tried sometimes to put together1 and sometimes to provide with collateral elucidation1 some points in the ,mental ,philosophy4 ,i shall not attempt to justify the selection of subjects for special treatment further than to hope that they form a more or less connected group1 and to refer for a study of some general questions of system and method to my ,prolegomena to the ,study of ,hegel's ,philosophy which appear almost simultaneously with this volume4 ,,oxford1 ,december1 #ahic4 ,,five ,,introductory ,,essays ,,in ,,psychology ,,and ,,ethics4 ,essay ,i4 ,on ,the ,scope ,of ,a ,philosophy ,of ,mind4 ,the art of finding titles1 and of striking out headings which catch the eye or ear1 and lead the mind by easy paths of association to the subject under exposition1 was not one of ,hegel's gifts4 ,a stirring phrase1 a vivid or picturesque turn of words1 he often has4 ,but his lists of contents1 when they cease to be commonplace1 are apt to run into the bizarre and the grotesque4 ,generally1 indeed1 his rubrics are the old and 7as we may be tempted to call them7 insignificant terms of the text-books4 ,but1 in ,hegel's use of them1 these conventional designations are charged with a highly individualised meaning4 ,they may mean more--they may mean less--than they habitually pass for3 but they unquestionably specify their meaning with a unique and almost personal flavour4 ,and this can hardly fail to create and to disappoint undue expectations4 7i47 ,philosophy and its ,parts4 ,even the main divisions of his system show this conservatism in terminology4 ,the names of the three parts of the ,encyclopaedia are1 we may say1 non-significant of their peculiar contents4 ,and that for a good reason4 ,what ,hegel proposes to give is no novel or special doctrine1 but the universal philosophy which has passed on from age to age1 here narrowed and there widened1 but still essentially the same4 ,it is conscious of its continuity and proud of its identity with the teachings of ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,the earliest attempts of the ,greek philosophers to present philosophy in a complete and articulated order--attempts generally attributed to the ,stoics1 the schoolmen of antiquity--made it a tripartite whole4 ,these three parts were ,logic1 ,physics1 and ,ethics4 ,in their entirety they were meant to form a cycle of unified knowledge1 satisfying the needs of theory as well as practice4 ,as time went on1 however1 the situation changed3 and if the old names remained1 their scope and value suffered many changes4 ,new interests and curiosities1 due to altered circumstances1 brought other departments of reality under the focus of investigation besides those which had been primarily discussed under the old names4 ,inquiries became more specialised1 and each tended to segregate itself from the rest as an independent field of science4 ,the result was that in modern times the territory still marked by the ancient titles had shrunk to a mere phantom of its former bulk4 ,almost indeed things had come to such a pass that the time-honoured figures had sunk into the misery of rois fainants2 while the real business of knowledge was discharged by the younger and less conventional lines of research which the needs and fashions of the time had called up4 ,thus ,logic1 in the narrow formal sense1 was turned into an 8art0 of argumentation and a system of technical rules for the analysis and synthesis of academical discussion4 ,physics or ,natural ,philosophy restricted itself to the elaboration of some metaphysical postulates or hypotheses regarding the general modes of physical operation4 ,and ,ethics came to be a very unpractical discussion of subtleties regarding moral faculty and moral standard4 ,meanwhile a theory of scientific method and of the laws governing the growth of intelligence and formation of ideas grew up1 and left the older logic to perish of formality and inanition4 ,the successive departments of physical science1 each in turn asserting its independence1 finally left ,natural ,philosophy no alternative between clinging to its outworn hypotheses and abstract generalities1 or identifying itself 7as ,newton in his great book put it7 with the ,principia ,mathematica of the physical sciences4 ,ethics1 in its turn1 saw itself1 on one hand1 replaced by psychological inquiries into the relations between the feelings and the will and the intelligence2 while1 on the other hand1 a host of social1 historical1 economical1 and other researches cut it off from the real facts of human life1 and left it no more than the endless debates on the logical and metaphysical issues involved in free-will and conscience1 duty and merit4 ,it has sometimes been said that ,kant settled this controversy between the old departments of philosophy and the new branches of science4 ,and the settlement1 it is implied1 consisted in assigning to the philosopher a sort of police and patrol duty in the commonwealth of science4 ,he was to see that boundaries were duly respected1 and that each science kept strictly to its own business4 ,for this purpose each branch of philosophy was bound to convert itself into a department of criticism--an examination of first principles in the several provinces of reality or experience--with a view to get a distinct conception of what they were1 and thus define exactly the lines on which the structures of more detailed science could be put up solidly and safely4 ,this plan offered tempting lines to research1 and sounded well4 ,but on further reflection there emerge one or two difficulties1 hard to get over4 ,paradoxical though it may seem1 one cannot rightly estimate the capacity and range of foundations1 before one has had some familiarity with the buildings erected upon them4 ,thus you are involved in a circle3 a circle which is probably inevitable1 but which for that reason it is well to recognise at once4 ,then--what is only another way of saying the same thing--it is impossible to draw an inflexible line between premises of principle and conclusions of detail4 ,there is no spot at which criticism can stop1 and1 having done its business well1 hand on the remaining task to dogmatic system4 ,it was an instinctive feeling of this implication of system in what professed only to be criticism which led the aged ,kant to ignore his own previous professions that he offered as yet no system1 and when ,fichte maintained himself to be erecting the fabric for which ,kant had prepared the ground1 to reply by the counter-declaration that the criticism was the system--that 8the curtain was the picture40 ,the ,hegelian philosophy is an attempt to combine criticism with system1 and thus realise what ,kant had at least foretold4 ,it is a system which is self-critical1 and systematic only through the absoluteness of its criticism4 ,in ,hegel's own phrase1 it is an immanent and an incessant dialectic1 which from first to last allows finality to no dogmatic rest1 but carries out ,kant's description of an ,age of ,criticism1 in which nothing1 however majestic and sacred its authority1 can plead for exception from the all-testing ,elenchus4 ,then1 on the other hand1 ,hegel refuses to restrict philosophy and its branches to anything short of the totality4 ,he takes in its full sense that often-used phrase--the ,unity of ,knowledge4 ,logic becomes the all-embracing research of 8first principles10--the principles which regulate physics and ethics4 ,the old divisions between logic and metaphysic1 between induction and deduction1 between theory of reasoning and theory of knowledge1--divisions which those who most employed them were never able to show the reason and purpose of--because indeed they had grown up at various times and by 8natural selection0 through a vast mass of incidents3 these are superseded and merged in one continuous theory of real knowledge considered under its abstract or formal aspect1--of organised and known reality in its underlying thought-system4 ,but these first principles were only an abstraction from complete reality--the reality which nature has when unified by mind--and they presuppose the total from which they are derived4 ,the realm of pure thought is only the ghost of the ,idea--of the unity and reality of knowledge1 and it must be reindued with its flesh and blood4 ,the logical world is 7in ,kantian phrase7 only the possibility of ,nature and ,mind4 ,it comes first--because it is a system of ,first ,principles3 but these first principles could only be elicited by a philosophy which has realised the meaning of a mental experience1 gathered by interpreting the facts of ,nature4 ,natural ,philosophy is no longer--according to ,hegel's view of it--merely a scheme of mathematical ground-work4 ,that may be its first step4 ,but its scope is a complete unity 7which is not a mere aggregate7 of the branches of natural knowledge1 exploring both the inorganic and the organic world4 ,in dealing with this endless problem1 philosophy seems to be baulked by an impregnable obstacle to its progress4 ,every day the advance of specialisation renders any comprehensive or synoptic view of the totality of science more and more impossible4 ,no doubt we talk readily enough of ,science4 ,but here1 if anywhere1 we may say there is no ,science1 but only sciences4 ,the generality of science is a proud fiction or a gorgeous dream1 variously told and interpreted according to the varying interest and proclivity of the scientist4 ,the sciences1 or those who specially expound them1 know of no unity1 no philosophy of science4 ,they are content to remark that in these days the thing is impossible1 and to pick out the faults in any attempts in that direction that are made outside their pale4 ,unfortunately for this contention1 the thing is done by us all1 and1 indeed1 has to be done4 ,if not as men of science1 yet as men--as human beings--we have to put together things and form some total estimate of the drift of development1 of the unity of nature4 ,to get a notion1 not merely of the general methods and principles of the sciences1 but of their results and teachings1 and to get this not as a mere lot of fragments1 but with a systematic unity1 is indispensable in some degree for all rational life4 ,the life not founded on science is not the life of man4 ,but he will not find what he wants in the text-books of the specialist1 who is obliged to treat his subject1 as ,plato says1 8under the pressure of necessity10 and who dare not look on it in its quality 8to draw the soul towards truth1 and to form the philosophic intellect so as to uplift what we now unduly keep down7#a740 ,if the philosopher in this province does his work but badly1 he may plead the novelty of the task to which he comes as a pioneer or even an architect4 ,he finds little that he can directly utilise4 ,the materials have been gathered and prepared for very special aims2 and the great aim of science--that human life may be made a higher1 an ampler1 and happier thing1--has hardly been kept in view at all1 except in its more materialistic aspects4 ,to the philosopher the supreme interest of the physical sciences is that man also belongs to the physical universe1 or that ,mind and ,matter as we know them are 7in ,mr4 ,spencer's language7 8at once antithetical and inseparable40 ,he wants to find the place of ,man1--but of ,man as ,mind--in ,nature4 ,if the scope of ,natural ,philosophy be thus expanded to make it the unity and more than the synthetic aggregate of the several physical sciences--to make it the whole which surpasses the addition of all their fragments1 the purpose of ,ethics has not less to be deepened and widened4 ,ethics1 under that title1 ,hegel knows not4 ,and for those who cannot recognise anything unless it be clearly labelled1 it comes natural to record their censure of ,hegelianism for ignoring or disparaging ethical studies4 ,but if we take the word in that wide sense which common usage rather justifies than adopts1 we may say that the whole philosophy of ,mind is a moral philosophy4 ,its subject is the moral as opposed to the physical aspect of reality3 the inner and ideal life as opposed to the merely external and real materials of it3 the world of intelligence and of humanity4 ,it displays ,man in the several stages of that process by which he expresses the full meaning of nature1 or discharges the burden of that task which is implicit in him from the first4 ,it traces the steps of that growth by which what was no better than a fragment of nature--an intelligence located 7as it seemed7 in one piece of matter--comes to realise the truth of it and of himself4 ,that truth is his ideal and his obligation3 but it is also--such is the mystery of his birthright--his idea and possession4 ,he--like the natural universe--is 7as the ,logic has shown7 a principle of unification1 organisation1 idealisation3 and his history 7in its ideal completeness7 is the history of the process by which he1 the typical man1 works the fragments of reality 7and such mere reality must be always a collection of fragments7 into the perfect unity of a many-sided character4 ,thus the philosophy of mind1 beginning with man as a sentient organism1 the focus in which the universe gets its first dim confused expression through mere feeling1 shows how he 8erects himself above himself0 and realises what ancient thinkers called his kindred with the divine4 ,in that total process of the mind's liberation and self-realisation the portion specially called ,morals is but one1 though a necessary1 stage4 ,there are1 said ,porphyry and the later ,platonists1 four degrees in the path of perfection and self-accomplishment4 ,and first1 there is the career of honesty and worldly prudence1 which makes the duty of the citizen4 ,secondly1 there is the progress in purity which casts earthly things behind1 and reaches the angelic height of passionless serenity4 ,and the third step is the divine life which by intellectual energy is turned to behold the truth of things4 ,lastly1 in the fourth grade1 the mind1 free and sublime in self-sustaining wisdom1 makes itself an 8exemplar0 of virtue1 and is even a 8father of ,gods40 ,even so1 it may be said1 the human mind is the subject of a complicated ,teleology1--the field ruled by a multifarious ,ought1 psychological1 aesthetical1 social and religious4 ,to adjust their several claims cannot be the object of any science1 if adjustment means to supply a guide in practice4 ,but it is the purpose of such a teleology to show that social requirements and moral duty as ordinarily conceived do not exhaust the range of obligation1--of the supreme ethical ,ought4 ,how that can best be done is however a question of some difficulty4 ,for the ends under examination do not fall completely into a serial order1 nor does one involve others in such a way as to destroy their independence4 ,you cannot absolve psychology as if it stood independent of ethics or religion1 nor can aesthetic considerations merely supervene on moral4 ,still1 it may be said1 the order followed by ,hegel seems on the whole liable to fewer objections than others4 ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer1 the only ,english philosopher who has even attempted a ,system of ,philosophy1 may in this point be compared with ,hegel4 ,he also begins with a ,first ,principles1--a work which1 like ,hegel's ,logic1 starts by presenting ,philosophy as the supreme arbiter between the subordinate principles of ,religion and ,science1 which are in it 8necessary correlatives40 ,the positive task of philosophy is 7with some inconsistency or vagueness7 presented1 in the next place1 as a 8unification of knowledge40 ,such a unification has to make explicit the implicit unity of known reality3 because 8every thought involves a whole system of thoughts40 ,and such a programme might again suggest the ,logic4 ,but unfortunately ,mr4 ,spencer does not 7and he has ,francis ,bacon to justify him here7 think it worth his while to toil up the weary1 but necessary1 mount of ,purgatory which is known to us as ,logic4 ,with a nave realism1 he builds on ,cause and ,power1 and above all on ,force1 that 8,ultimate of ,ultimates10 which seems to be1 however marvellously1 a denizen both of the ,known and the ,unknowable world4 ,in the known world this ,ultimate appears under two forms1 matter and motion1 and the problem of science and philosophy is to lay down in detail and in general the law of their continuous redistribution1 of the segregation of motion from matter1 and the inclusion of motion into matter4 ,of this process1 which has no beginning and no end1--the rhythm of generation and corruption1 attraction and repulsion1 it may be said that it is properly not a first principle of all knowledge1 but the general or fundamental portion of ,natural ,philosophy to which ,mr4 ,spencer next proceeds4 ,such a philosophy1 however1 he gives only in part3 viz4 as a ,biology1 dealing with organic 7and at a further stage and under other names1 with supra-organic7 life4 ,and that the ,philosophy of ,nature should take this form1 and carry both the ,first ,principles and the later portions of the system with it1 as parts of a philosophy of evolution1 is what we should have expected from the contemporaneous interests of science7#b74 ,even a one-sided attempt to give speculative unity to those researches1 which get--for reasons the scientific specialist seldom asks--the title of biological1 is however worth noting as a recognition of the necessity of a ,natur-philosophie1--a speculative science of ,nature4 ,the third part of the ,hegelian ,system corresponds to what in the ,synthetic ,philosophy is known as ,psychology1 ,ethics1 and ,sociology4 ,and here ,mr4 ,spencer recognises that something new has turned up4 ,psychology is 8unique0 as a science3 it is a 8double science10 and as a whole quite sui generis4 ,whether perhaps all these epithets would not1 mutatis mutandis1 have to be applied also to ,ethics and ,sociology1 if these are to do their full work1 he does not say4 ,in what this doubleness consists he even finds it somewhat difficult to show4 ,for1 as his fundamental philosophy does not on this point go beyond noting some pairs of verbal antitheses1 and has no sense of unity except in the imperfect shape of a 8relation7#c70 between two things which are 8antithetical and inseparable10 he is perplexed by phrases such as 8in0 and 8out of0 consciousness1 and stumbles over the equivocal use of 8inner0 to denote both mental 7or non-spatial7 in general1 and locally sub-cuticular in special4 ,still1 he gets so far as to see that the law of consciousness is that in it neither feelings nor relations have independent subsistence1 and that the unit of mind does not begin till what he calls two feelings are made one4 ,the phraseology may be faulty1 but it shows an inkling of the a priori4 ,unfortunately it is apparently forgotten2 and the language too often reverts into the habit of what he calls the 8objective10 i4e4 purely physical1 sciences4 ,mr4 ,spencer's conception of ,psychology restricts it to the more general physics of the mind4 ,for its more concrete life he refers us to ,sociology4 ,but his ,sociology is yet unfinished3 and from the plan of its inception1 and the imperfect conception of the ends and means of its investigation1 hardly admits of completion in any systematic sense4 ,to that incipiency is no doubt due its excess in historical or anecdotal detail--detail1 however1 too much segregated from its social context1 and in general its tendency to neglect normal and central theory for incidental and peripheral facts4 ,here1 too1 there is a weakness in ,first ,principles and a love of catchwords1 which goes along with the fallacy that illustration is proof4 ,above all1 it is evident that the great fact of religion overhangs ,mr4 ,spencer with the attraction of an unsolved and unacceptable problem4 ,he cannot get the religious ideas of men into co-ordination with their scientific1 aesthetic1 and moral doctrines2 and only betrays his sense of the high importance of the former by placing them in the forefront of inquiry1 as due to the inexperience and limitations of the so-called primitive man4 ,that is hardly adequate recognition of the religious principle3 and the defect will make itself seriously felt1 should he ever come to carry out the further stage of his prospectus dealing with 8the growth and correlation of language1 knowledge1 morals1 and aesthetics40 7ii47 ,mind and ,morals4 ,a ,mental ,philosophy--if we so put what might also be rendered a ,spiritual ,philosophy1 or ,philosophy of ,spirit--may to an ,english reader suggest something much narrower than it actually contains4 ,a ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind--if we consult ,english specimens--would not imply much more than a psychology1 and probably what is called an inductive psychology4 ,but as ,hegel understands it1 it covers an unexpectedly wide range of topics1 the whole range from ,nature to ,spirit4 ,besides ,subjective ,mind1 which would seem on first thoughts to exhaust the topics of psychology1 it goes on to ,mind as ,objective1 and finally to ,absolute mind4 ,and such combinations of words may sound either self-contradictory or meaningless4 ,the first ,section deals with the range of what is usually termed ,psychology4 ,that term indeed is employed by ,hegel1 in a restricted sense1 to denote the last of the three sub-sections in the discussion of ,subjective ,mind4 ,the ,mind1 which is the topic of psychology proper1 cannot be assumed as a ready-made object1 or datum4 ,a ,self1 a self-consciousness1 an intelligent and volitional agent1 if it be the birthright of man1 is a birthright which he has to realise for himself1 to earn and to make his own4 ,to trace the steps by which mind in its stricter acceptation1 as will and intelligence1 emerges from the general animal sensibility which is the crowning phase of organic life1 and the final problem of biology1 is the work of two preliminary sub-sections--the first entitled ,anthropology1 the second the ,phenomenology of ,mind4 ,the subject of ,anthropology1 as ,hegel understands it1 is the ,soul--the raw material of consciousness1 the basis of all higher mental life4 ,this is a borderland1 where the ground is still debateable between ,nature and ,mind3 it is the region of feeling1 where the sensibility has not yet been differentiated to intelligence4 ,soul and body are here1 as the phrase goes1 in communion3 the inward life is still imperfectly disengaged from its natural co-physical setting4 ,still one with nature1 it submits to natural influences and natural vicissitudes3 is not as yet master of itself1 but the half-passive receptacle of a foreign life1 of a general vitality1 of a common soul not yet fully differentiated into individuality4 ,but it is awaking to self-activity3 it is emerging to ,consciousness1--to distinguish itself1 as aware and conscious1 from the facts of life and sentiency of which it is aware4 ,from this region of psychical physiology or physiological psychology1 ,hegel in the second sub-section of his first part takes us to the 8,phenomenology of ,mind10--to ,consciousness4 ,the sentient soul is also conscious--but in a looser sense of that word7#d73 it has feelings1 but can scarcely be said itself to know that it has them4 ,as consciousness1 the ,soul has come to separate what it is from what it feels4 ,the distinction emerges of a subject which is conscious1 and an object of which it is conscious4 ,and the main thing is obviously the relationship between the two1 or the ,consciousness itself1 as tending to distinguish itself alike from its subject and its object4 ,hence1 perhaps1 may be gathered why it is called ,phenomenology of ,mind4 ,mind as yet is not yet more than emergent or apparent3 nor yet self-possessed and self-certified4 ,no longer1 however1 one with the circumambient nature which it feels1 it sees itself set against it1 but only as a passive recipient of it1 a tabula rasa on which external nature is reflected1 or to which phenomena are presented4 ,no longer1 on the other hand1 a mere passive instrument of suggestion from without1 its instinct of life1 its nisus of self-assertion is developed1 through antagonism to a like nisus1 into the consciousness of self-hood1 of a ,me and ,mine as set against a ,thee and ,thine4 ,but just in proportion as it is so developed in opposition to and recognition of other equally self-centred selves1 it has passed beyond the narrower characteristic of ,consciousness proper4 ,it is no longer mere intelligent perception or reproduction of a world1 but it is life1 with perception 7or apperception7 of that life4 ,it has returned in a way to its original unity with nature1 but it is now the sense of its self-hood--the consciousness of itself as the focus in which subjective and objective are at one4 ,or1 to put it in the language of the great champion of ,realism7#e71 the standpoint of ,reason or full-grown ,mind is this3 8,the world which appears to us is our percept1 therefore in us4 ,the real world1 out of which we explain the phenomenon1 is our thought3 therefore in us40 ,the third sub-section of the theory of ,subjective ,mind--the ,psychology proper--deals with ,mind4 ,this is the real1 independent ,psych--hence the special appropriation of the term ,psychology4 8,the ,soul10 says ,herbart1 8no doubt dwells in a body3 there are1 moreover1 corresponding states of the one and the other3 but nothing corporeal occurs in the ,soul1 nothing purely mental1 which we could reckon to our ,ego1 occurs in the body3 the affections of the body are no representations of the ,ego1 and our pleasant and unpleasant feelings do not immediately lie in the organic life they favour or hinder40 ,such a ,soul1 so conceived1 is an intelligent and volitional self1 a being of intellectual and 8active0 powers or phenomena3 it is a ,mind4 ,and 8,mind10 adds ,hegel7#f71 8is just this elevation above ,nature and physical modes and above the complication with an external object40 ,nothing is external to it3 it is rather the internalising of all externality4 ,in this psychology proper1 we are out of any immediate connexion with physiology4 8,psychology as such10 remarks ,herbart1 8has its questions common to it with ,idealism0--with the doctrine that all reality is mental reality4 ,it traces1 in ,hegel's exposition of it1 the steps of the way by which mind realises that independence which is its characteristic stand-point4 ,on the intellectual side that independence is assured in language1--the system of signs by which the intelligence stamps external objects as its own1 made part of its inner world4 ,a science1 some one has said1 is after all only une langue bien faite4 ,so1 reversing the saying1 we may note that a language is an inwardised and mind-appropriated world4 ,on the active side1 the independence of mind is seen in self-enjoyment1 in happiness1 or self-content1 where impulse and volition have attained satisfaction in equilibrium1 and the soul possesses itself in fullness4 ,such a mind7#g71 which has made the world its certified possession in language1 and which enjoys itself in self-possession of soul1 called happiness1 is a free ,mind4 ,and that is the highest which ,subjective ,mind can reach4 ,at this point1 perhaps1 having rounded off by a liberal sweep the scope of psychology1 the ordinary mental philosophy would stop4 ,hegel1 instead of finishing1 now goes on to the field of what he calls ,objective ,mind4 ,for as yet it has been only the story of a preparation1 an inward adorning and equipment1 and we have yet to see what is to come of it in actuality4 ,or rather1 we have yet to consider the social forms on which this preparation rests4 ,the mind1 self-possessed and sure of itself or free1 is so only through the objective shape which its main development runs parallel with4 ,an intelligent ,will1 or a practical reason1 was the last word of the psychological development4 ,but a reason which is practical1 or a volition which is intelligent1 is realised by action which takes regular shapes1 and by practice which transforms the world4 ,the theory of ,objective ,mind delineates the new form which nature assumes under the sway of intelligence and will4 ,that intellectual world realises itself by transforming the physical into a social and political world1 the given natural conditions of existence into a freely-instituted system of life1 the primitive struggle of kinds for subsistence into the ordinances of the social state4 ,given man as a being possessed of will and intelligence1 this inward faculty1 whatever be its degree1 will try to impress itself on nature and to reproduce itself in a legal1 a moral1 and social world4 ,the kingdom of deed replaces1 or rises on the foundation of1 the kingdom of word3 and instead of the equilibrium of a well-adjusted soul comes the harmonious life of a social organism4 ,we are1 in short1 in the sphere of ,ethics and ,politics1 of ,jurisprudence and ,morals1 of ,law and ,conscience4 ,here1--as always in ,hegel's system--there is a triad of steps4 ,first the province of ,law or ,right4 ,but if we call it ,law1 we must keep out of sight the idea of a special law-giver1 of a conscious imposition of laws1 above all by a political superior4 ,and if we call it ,right1 we must remember that it is neutral1 inhuman1 abstract right3 the right whose principle is impartial and impassive uniformity1 equality1 order2--not moral right1 or the equity which takes cognisance of circumstances1 of personal claims1 and provides against its own hardness4 ,the intelligent will of ,man1 throwing itself upon the mere gifts of nature as their appointed master1 creates the world of ,property--of things instrumental1 and regarded as adjectival1 to the human personality4 ,but the autonomy of ,reason 7which is latent in the will7 carries with it certain consequences4 ,as it acts1 it also1 by its inherent quality of uniformity or universality1 enacts for itself a law and laws1 and creates the realm of formal equality or order-giving law4 ,but this is a mere equality3 which is not inconsistent with what in other respects may be excess of inequality4 ,what one does1 if it is really to be treated as done1 others may or even must do3 each act creates an expectation of continuance and uniformity of behaviour4 ,the doer is bound by it1 and others are entitled to do the like4 ,the material which the person appropriates creates a system of obligation4 ,thus is constituted--in the natural give and take of rational ,wills--in the inevitable course of human action and reaction1--a system of rights and duties4 ,this law of equality--the basis of justice1 and the seed of benevolence--is the scaffolding or perhaps rather the rudimentary framework of society and moral life4 ,or it is the bare skeleton which is to be clothed upon by the softer and fuller outlines of the social tissues and the ethical organs4 ,and thus the first range of ,objective ,mind postulates the second1 which ,hegel calls 8,morality40 ,the word is to be taken in its strict sense as a protest against the quasi-physical order of law4 ,it is the morality of conscience and of the good will1 of the inner rectitude of soul and purpose1 as all-sufficient and supreme4 ,here is brought out the complementary factor in social life3 the element of liberty1 spontaneity1 self-consciousness4 ,the motto of mere inward morality 7as opposed to the spirit of legality7 is 7in ,kant's words73 8,there is nothing without qualification good1 in heaven or earth1 but only a good will40 ,the essential condition of goodness is that the action be done with purpose and intelligence1 and in full persuasion of its goodness by the conscience of the agent4 ,the characteristic of ,morality thus described is its essential inwardness1 and the sovereignty of the conscience over all heteronomy4 ,its justification is that it protests against the authority of a mere external or objective order1 subsisting and ruling in separation from the subjectivity4 ,its defect is the turn it gives to this assertion of the rights of subjective conscience3 briefly in the circumstance that it tends to set up a mere individualism against a mere universalism1 instead of realising the unity and essential interdependence of the two4 ,the third sub-section of the theory of ,objective ,mind describes a state of affairs in which this antithesis is explicitly overcome4 ,this is the moral life in a social community4 ,here law and usage prevail and provide the fixed permanent scheme of life3 but the law and the usage are1 in their true or ideal conception1 only the unforced expression of the mind and will of those who live under them4 ,and1 on the other hand1 the mind and will of the individual members of such a community are pervaded and animated by its universal spirit4 ,in such a community1 and so constituting it1 the individual is at once free and equal1 and that because of the spirit of fraternity1 which forms its spiritual link4 ,in the world supposed to be governed by mere legality the idea of right is exclusively prominent2 and when that is the case1 it may often happen that summum jus summa injuria4 ,in mere morality1 the stress falls exclusively on the idea of inward freedom1 or the necessity of the harmony of the judgment and the will1 or the dependence of conduct upon conscience4 ,in the union of the two1 in the moral community as normally constituted1 the mere idea of right is replaced1 or controlled and modified1 by the idea of equity--a balance as it were between the two preceding1 inasmuch as motive and purpose are employed to modify and interpret strict right4 ,but this effect--this harmonisation--is brought about by the predominance of a new idea--the principle of benevolence1--a principle however which is itself modified by the fundamental idea of right or law7#h7 into a wise or regulated kindliness4 ,but what ,hegel chiefly deals with under this head is the interdependence of form and content1 of social order and personal progress4 ,in the picture of an ethical organisation or harmoniously-alive moral community he shows us partly the underlying idea which gave room for the antithesis between law and conscience1 and partly the outlines of the ideal in which that conflict becomes only the instrument of progress4 ,this organisation has three grades or three typical aspects4 ,these are the ,family1 ,civil ,society1 and the ,state4 ,the first of these1 the ,family1 must be taken to include those primary unities of human life where the natural affinity of sex and the natural ties of parentage are the preponderant influence in forming and maintaining the social group4 ,this1 as it were1 is the soul-nucleus of social organisation3 where the principle of unity is an instinct1 a feeling1 an absorbing solidarity4 ,next comes what ,hegel has called ,civil ,society1--meaning however by civil the antithesis to political1 the society of those who may be styled bourgeois1 not citoyens3--and meaning by society the antithesis to community4 ,there are other natural influences binding men together besides those which form the close unities of the family1 gens1 tribe1 or clan4 ,economical needs associate human beings within a much larger radius--in ways capable of almost indefinite expansion--but also in a way much less intense and deep4 ,civil ,society is the more or less loosely organised aggregate of such associations1 which1 if1 on one hand1 they keep human life from stagnating in the mere family1 on another1 accentuate more sharply the tendency to competition and the struggle for life4 ,lastly1 in the ,political ,state comes the synthesis of family and society4 ,of the family2 in so far as the ,state tends to develope itself on the nature-given unit of the ,nation 7an extended family1 supplementing as need arises real descent by fictitious incorporations71 and has apparently never permanently maintained itself except on the basis of a predominant common nationality4 ,of society2 in so far as the extension and dispersion of family ties have left free room for the differentiation of many other sides of human interest and action1 and given ground for the full development of individuality4 ,in consequence of this1 the ,state 7and such a state as ,hegel describes is essentially the idea or ideal of the modern ,state77#i7 has a certain artificial air about it4 ,it can only be maintained by the free action of intelligence3 it must make its laws public3 it must bring to consciousness the principles of its constitution1 and create agencies for keeping up unity of organisation through the several separate provinces or contending social interests1 each of which is inclined to insist on the right of home mis-rule4 ,the ,state--which in its actuality must always be a quasi-national state--is thus the supreme unity of ,nature and ,mind4 ,its natural basis in land1 language1 blood1 and the many ties which spring therefrom1 has to be constantly raised into an intelligent unity through universal interests4 ,but the elements of race and of culture have no essential connexion1 and they perpetually incline to wrench themselves asunder4 ,blood and judgment are for ever at war in the state as in the individual7#aj73 the cosmopolitan interest1 to which the maxim is ,ubi bene1 ibi patria1 resists the national1 which adopts the patriotic watchword of ,hector7#aa74 ,the ,state however has another source of danger in the very principle that gave it birth4 ,it arose through antagonism3 it was baptised on the battlefield1 and it only lives as it is able to assert itself against a foreign foe4 ,and this circumstance tends to intensify and even pervert its natural basis of nationality3--tends to give the very conception of the political a negative and superficial look4 ,but1 notwithstanding all these drawbacks1 the ,state in its ,idea is entitled to the name ,hobbes gave it1--the ,mortal ,god4 ,here in a way culminates the obviously objective1--we may almost say1 visible and tangible--development of ,man and ,mind4 ,here it attains a certain completeness--a union of reality and of ideality3 a quasi-immortality1 a quasi-universality4 ,what the individual person could not do unaided1 he can do in the strength of his commonwealth4 ,much that in the solitary was but implicit or potential1 is in the ,state actualised4 ,but the ,god of the ,state is a mortal ,god4 ,it is but a national and a limited mind4 ,to be actual1 one must at least begin by restricting oneself4 ,or1 rather actuality is rational1 but always with a conditioned and a relative rationality7#ab73 it is in the realm of action and re-action1--in the realm of change and nature4 ,it has warring forces outside it1--warring forces inside it4 ,its unity is never perfect3 because it never produces a true identity of interests within1 or maintains an absolute independence without4 ,thus the true and real ,state--the ,state in its ,idea--the realisation of concrete humanity1--of ,mind as the fullness and unity of nature--is not reached in any single or historical ,state3 but floats away1 when we try to seize it1 into the endless progress of history4 ,always indeed the ,state1 the historical and objective1 points beyond itself4 ,it does so first in the succession of times4 ,die ,weltgeschichte ist das ,weltgericht47#ac7 ,and in that doom of the world the eternal blast sweeps along the successive generations of the temporal1 one expelling another from the stage of time--each because it is inadequate to the ,idea which it tried to express1 and has succumbed to an enemy from without because it was not a real and true unity within4 ,but if temporal flees away before another temporal1 it abides in so far as it has1 however inadequately1 given expression and visible reality--as it points inward and upward--to the eternal4 ,the earthly state is also the city of ,god2 and if the republic of ,plato seems to find scant admission into the reality of flesh and blood1 it stands eternal as a witness in the heaven of idea4 ,behind the fleeting succession of consulates and dictatures1 of aristocracy and empire1 feuds of plebeian with patrician1 in that apparent anarchy of powers which the so-called ,roman constitution is to the superficial observer1 there is the eternal ,rome1 one1 strong1 victorious1 semper eadem3 the ,rome of ,virgil and ,justinian1 the ghost whereof still haunts with memories the seven-hilled city1 but which with full spiritual presence lives in the law1 the literature1 the manners of the modern world4 ,to find fitter expression for this ,absolute ,mind than it has in the ,ethical community--to reach that reality of which the moral world is but one-sidedly representative--is the work of ,art1 ,religion1 and ,philosophy4 ,and to deal with these efforts to find the truth and the unity of ,mind and ,nature is the subject of ,hegel's third ,section4 7iii47 ,religion and ,philosophy4 ,it may be well at this point to guard against a misconception of this serial order of exposition7#ad74 ,as stage is seen to follow stage1 the historical imagination1 which governs our ordinary current of ideas1 turns the logical dependence into a time-sequence4 ,but it is of course not meant that the later stage follows the earlier in history4 ,the later is the more real1 and therefore the more fundamental4 ,but we can only understand by abstracting and then transcending our abstractions1 or rather by showing how the abstraction implies relations which force us to go further and beyond our arbitrary arrest4 ,each stage therefore either stands to that preceding it as an antithesis1 which inevitably dogs its steps as an accusing spirit1 or it is the conjunction of the original thesis with the antithesis1 in a union which should not be called synthesis because it is a closer fusion and true marriage of minds4 ,a truth and reality1 though fundamental1 is only appreciated at its true value and seen in all its force where it appears as the reconciliation and reunion of partial and opposing points of view4 ,thus1 e4g41 the full significance of the ,state does not emerge so long as we view it in isolation as a supposed single state1 but only as it is seen in the conflict of history1 in its actual 8energy0 as a world-power among powers1 always pointing beyond itself to a something universal which it fain would be1 and yet cannot be4 ,or1 again1 there never was a civil or economic society which existed save under the wing of a state1 or in one-sided assumption of state powers to itself3 and a family is no isolated and independent unit belonging to a supposed patriarchal age1 but was always mixed up with1 and in manifold dependence upon1 political and civil combinations4 ,the true family1 indeed1 far from preceding the state in time1 presupposes the political power to give it its precise sphere and its social stability3 as is well illustrated by that typical form of it presented in the ,roman state4 ,so1 again1 religion does not supervene upon an already existing political and moral system and invest it with an additional sanction4 ,the true order would be better described as the reverse4 ,the real basis of social life1 and even of intelligence1 is religion4 ,as some thinkers quaintly put it1 the known rests and lives on the bosom of the ,unknowable4 ,but when we say that1 we must at once guard against a misconception4 ,there are religions of all sorts2 and some of them which are most heard of in the modern world only exist or survive in the shape of a traditional name and venerated creed which has lost its power4 ,nor is a religion necessarily committed to a definite conception of a supernatural--of a personal power outside the order of ,nature4 ,but in all cases1 religion is a faith and a theory which gives unity to the facts of life1 and gives it1 not because the unity is in detail proved or detected1 but because life and experience in their deepest reality inexorably demand and evince such a unity to the heart4 ,the religion of a time is not its nominal creed1 but its dominant conviction of the meaning of reality1 the principle which animates all its being and all its striving1 the faith it has in the laws of nature and the purpose of life4 ,dimly or clearly felt and perceived1 religion has for its principle 7one cannot well say1 its object7 not the unknowable1 but the inner unity of life and knowledge1 of act and consciousness1 a unity which is certified in its every knowledge1 but is never fully demonstrable by the summation of all its ascertained items4 ,as such a felt and believed synthesis of the world and life1 religion is the unity which gives stability and harmony to the social sphere2 just as morality in its turn gives a partial and practical realisation to the ideal of religion4 ,but religion does not merely establish and sanction morality2 it also frees it from a certain narrowness it always has1 as of the earth4 ,or1 otherwise put1 morality has to the keener inspection something in it which is more than the mere moral injunction at first indicates4 ,beyond the moral1 in its stricter sense1 as the obligatory duty and the obedience to law1 rises and expands the beautiful and the good3 a beautiful which is disinterestedly loved1 and a goodness which has thrown off all utilitarian relativity1 and become a free self-enhancing joy4 ,the true spirit of religion sees in the divine judgment not a mere final sanction to human morality which has failed of its earthly close1 not the re-adjustment of social and political judgments in accordance with our more conscientious inner standards1 but a certain1 though1 for our part-by-part vision1 incalculable proportion between what is done and suffered4 ,and in this liberation of the moral from its restrictions1 ,art renders no slight aid4 ,thus in different ways1 religion presupposes morality to fill up its vacant form1 and morality presupposes religion to give its laws an ultimate sanction1 which at the same time points beyond their limitations4 ,but art1 religion1 and philosophy still rest on the national culture and on the individual mind4 ,however much they rise in the heights of the ideal world1 they never leave the reality of life and circumstance behind1 and float in the free empyrean4 ,yet there are degrees of universality1 degrees in which they reach what they promised4 ,as the various psychical nuclei of an individual consciousness tend through the course of experience to gather round a central idea and by fusion and assimilation form a complete mental organisation2 so1 through the march of history1 there grows up a complication and a fusion of national ideas and aspirations1 which1 though still retaining the individuality and restriction of a concrete national life1 ultimately present an organisation social1 aesthetic1 and religious which is a type of humanity in its universality and completeness4 ,always moving in the measure and on the lines of the real development of its social organisation1 the art and religion of a nation tend to give expression to what social and political actuality at its best but imperfectly sets in existence4 ,they come more and more to be1 not mere competing fragments as set side by side with those of others1 but comparatively equal and complete representations of the many-sided and many-voiced reality of man and the world4 ,yet always they live and flourish in reciprocity with the fullness of practical institutions and individual character4 ,an abstractly universal art and religion is a delusion--until all diversities of geography and climate1 of language and temperament1 have been made to disappear4 ,if these energies are in power and reality and not merely in name1 they cannot be applied like a panacea or put on like a suit of ready-made clothes4 ,if alive1 they grow with individualised type out of the social situation3 and they can only attain a vulgar and visible universality1 so far as they attach themselves to some simple and uniform aspects1--a part tolerably identical everywhere--in human nature in all times and races4 ,art1 according to ,hegel's account1 is the first of the three expressions of ,absolute ,mind4 ,but the key-note to the whole is to be found in ,religion7#ae73 or ,religion is the generic description of that phase of mind which has found rest in the fullness of attainment and is no longer a struggle and a warfare1 but a fruition4 8,it is the conviction of all nations10 he says7#af71 8that in the religious consciousness they hold their truth2 and they have always regarded religion as their dignity and as the ,sunday of their life4 ,whatever excites our doubts and alarms1 all grief and all anxiety1 all that the petty fields of finitude can offer to attract us1 we leave behind on the shoals of time3 and as the traveller on the highest peak of a mountain range1 removed from every distinct view of the earth's surface1 quietly lets his vision neglect all the restrictions of the landscape and the world2 so in this pure region of faith man1 lifted above the hard and inflexible reality1 sees it with his mind's eye reflected in the rays of the mental sun to an image where its discords1 its lights and shades1 are softened to eternal calm4 ,in this region of mind flow the waters of forgetfulness1 from which ,psyche drinks1 and in which she drowns all her pain3 and the darknesses of this life are here softened to a dream-image1 and transfigured into a mere setting for the splendours of the ,eternal4'0 ,if we take ,religion1 in this extended sense1 we find it is the sense1 the vision1 the faith1 the certainty of the eternal in the changeable1 of the infinite in the finite1 of the reality in appearance1 of the truth in error4 ,it is freedom from the distractions and pre-occupations of the particular details of life2 it is the sense of permanence1 repose1 certainty1 rounding off1 toning down and absorbing the vicissitude1 the restlessness1 the doubts of actual life4 ,such a victory over palpable reality has no doubt its origin--its embryology--in phases of mind which have been already discussed in the first section4 ,religion will vary enormously according to the grade of national mood of mind and social development in which it emerges4 ,but whatever be the peculiarities of its original swaddling-clothes1 its cardinal note will be a sense of dependence on1 and independence in1 something more permanent1 more august1 more of a surety and stay than visible and variable nature and man1--something also which whether ,god or devil1 or both in one1 holds the keys of life and death1 of weal and woe1 and holds them from some safe vantage-ground above the lower realms of change4 ,by this central being the outward and the inward1 past and present and to come1 are made one4 ,and as already indicated1 ,religion1 emerging1 as it does1 from social man1 from mind ethical1 will retain traces of the two foci in society3 the individual subjectivity and the objective community4 ,retain them however only as traces1 which still show in the actually envisaged reconciliation4 ,for that is what religion does to morality4 ,it carries a step higher the unity or rather combination gained in the ,state3 it is the fuller harmony of the individual and the collectivity4 ,the moral conscience rests in certainty and fixity on the religious4 ,but ,religion 7thus widely understood as the faith in sempiternal and all-explaining reality7 at first appears under a guise of ,art4 ,the poem and the pyramid1 the temple-image and the painting1 the drama and the fairy legend1 these are religion3 but they are1 perhaps1 religion as ,art4 ,and that means that they present the eternal under sensible representations1 the work of an artist1 and in a perishable material of limited range4 ,yet even the carvers of a long-past day whose works have been disinterred from the plateaux of ,auvergne knew that they gave to the perishable life around them a quasi-immortality3 and the myth-teller of a savage tribe elevated the incident of a season into a perennial power of love and fear4 ,the cynic may remind us that from the finest picture of the artist1 readily 8,we turn ,to yonder girl that fords the burn40 ,and yet it may be said in reply to the cynic that1 had it not been for the deep-imprinted lesson of the artist1 it would have been but a brutal instinct that would have drawn our eyes4 ,the artist1 the poet1 the musician1 reveal the meaning1 the truth1 the reality of the world3 they teach us1 they help us1 backward younger brothers1 to see1 to hear1 to feel what our rude senses had failed to detect4 ,they enact the miracle of the loaves and fishes1 again and again3 out of the common limited things of every day they produce a bread of life in which the generations continue to find nourishment4 ,but if ,art embodies for us the unseen and the eternal1 it embodies it in the stone1 the colour1 the tone1 and the word3 and these are by themselves only dead matter4 ,to the untutored eye and taste the finest picture-gallery is only a weariness3 when the national life has drifted away1 the sacred book and the image are but idols and enigmas4 8,the statues are now corpses from which the vivifying soul has fled1 and the hymns are words whence faith has departed3 the tables of the ,gods are without spiritual meat and drink1 and games and feasts no longer afford the mind its joyful union with the being of being4 ,the works of the ,muse lack that intellectual force which knew itself strong and real by crushing gods and men in its winepress4 ,they are now 7in this iron age7 what they are for us1--fair fruits broken from the tree1 and handed to us by a kindly destiny4 ,but the gift is like the fruits which the girl in the picture presents3 she does not give the real life of their existence1 not the tree which bore them1 not the earth and the elements which entered into their substance1 nor the climate which formed their quality1 nor the change of seasons which governed the process of their growth4 ,like her1 ,destiny in giving us the works of ancient art does not give us their world1 not the spring and summer of the ethical life in which they blossomed and ripened1 but solely a memory and a suggestion of this actuality4 ,our act in enjoying them1 therefore1 is not a ,divine service3 were it so1 our mind would achieve its perfect and satisfying truth4 ,all that we do is a mere externalism1 which from these fruits wipes off some rain-drop1 some speck of dust1 and which1 in place of the inward elements of moral actuality that created and inspired them1 tries from the dead elements of their external reality1 such as language and historical allusion1 to set up a tedious mass of scaffolding1 not in order to live ourselves into them1 but only to form a picture of them in our minds4 ,but as the girl who proffers the plucked fruits is more and nobler than the natural element with all its details of tree1 air1 light1 c4 which first yielded them1 because she gathers all this together1 in a nobler way1 into the glance of the conscious eye and the gesture which proffers them2 so the spirit of destiny which offers us those works of art is more than the ethical life and actuality of the ancient people3 for it is the inwardising of that mind which in them was still self-estranged and self-dispossessed3--it is the spirit of tragic destiny1 the destiny which collects all those individualised gods and attributes of substance into the one ,pantheon4 ,and that temple of all the gods is ,mind conscious of itself as mind7#ag740 ,religion enters into its more adequate form when it ceases to appear in the guise of ,art and realises that the kingdom of ,god is within1 that the truth must be felt1 the eternal inwardly revealed1 the holy one apprehended by faith7#ah71 not by outward vision4 ,eye hath not seen1 nor ear heard1 the things of ,god4 ,they cannot be presented1 or delineated3 they come only in the witness of the spirit4 ,the human soul itself is the only worthy temple of the ,most ,high1 whom heaven1 and the heaven of heavens1 cannot contain4 ,here in truth ,god has come down to dwell with men2 and the ,son of ,man1 caught up in the effusion of the ,spirit1 can in all assurance and all humility claim that he is divinified4 ,here apparently ,absolute ,mind is reached3 the soul knows no limitation1 no struggle3 in time it is already eternal4 ,yet1 there is1 according to ,hegel1 a flaw1--not in the essence and the matter1 but in the manner and mode in which the ordinary religious consciousness represents to itself1 or pictures that unification which it feels and experiences4 8,in religion then this unification of ultimate ,being with the ,self is implicitly reached4 ,but the religious consciousness1 if it has this symbolic idea of its reconciliation1 still has it as a mere symbol or representation4 ,it attains the satisfaction by tacking on to its pure negativity1 and that externally1 the positive signification of its unity with the ultimate ,being3 its satisfaction remains therefore tainted by the antithesis of another world4 ,its own reconciliation1 therefore1 is presented to its consciousness as something far away1 something far away in the future3 just as the reconciliation which the other ,self accomplished appears as a far-away thing in the past4 ,the one ,divine ,man had but an implicit father and only an actual mother2 conversely the universal divine man1 the community1 has its own deed and knowledge for its father1 but for its mother only the eternal ,love1 which it only feels1 but does not behold in its consciousness as an actual immediate object4 ,its reconciliation therefore is in its heart1 but still at variance with its consciousness1 and its actuality still has a flaw4 ,in its field of consciousness the place of implicit reality or side of pure mediation is taken by the reconciliation that lies far away behind3 the place of the actually present1 or the side of immediacy and existence1 is filled by the world which has still to wait for its transfiguration to glory4 ,implicitly no doubt the world is reconciled with the eternal ,being2 and that ,being1 it is well known1 no longer looks upon the object as alien to it1 but in its love sees it as like itself4 ,but for self-consciousness this immediate presence is not yet set in the full light of mind4 ,in its immediate consciousness accordingly the spirit of the community is parted from its religious3 for while the religious consciousness declares that they are implicitly not parted1 this implicitness is not raised to reality and not yet grown to absolute self-certainty7#ai740 ,religion therefore1 which as it first appeared in art-worship had yet to realise its essential inwardness or spirituality1 so has now to overcome the antithesis in which its 7the religious7 consciousness stands to the secular4 ,for the peculiarly religious type of mind is distinguished by an indifference and even hostility1 more or less veiled1 to art1 to morality and the civil state1 to science and to nature4 ,strong in the certainty of faith1 or of its implicit rest in ,god1 it resents too curious inquiry into the central mystery of its union1 and in its distincter consciousness sets the foundation of faith on the evidence of a fact1 which1 however1 it in the same breath declares to be unique and miraculous1 the central event of the ages1 pointing back in its reference to the first days of humanity1 and forward in the future to the winding-up of the business of terrestrial life4 ,philosophy1 according to ,hegel's conception of it1 does but draw the conclusion supplied by the premisses of religion3 it supplements and rounds off into coherence the religious implications4 ,the unique events in ,judea nearly nineteen centuries ago are for it also the first step in a new revelation of man's relationship to ,god3 but while it acknowledges the transcendent interest of that age1 it lays main stress on the permanent truth then revealed1 and it insists on the duty of carrying out the principle there awakened to all the depth and breadth of its explication4 ,its task--its supreme task--is to explicate religion4 ,but to do so is to show that religion is no exotic1 and no mere revelation from an external source4 ,it is to show that religion is the truth1 the complete reality1 of the mind that lived in ,art1 that founded the state and sought to be dutiful and upright3 the truth1 the crowning fruit of all scientific knowledge1 of all human affections1 of all secular consciousness4 ,its lesson ultimately is that there is nothing essentially common or unclean3 that the holy is not parted off from the true and the good and the beautiful4 ,religion thus expanded descends from its abstract or 8intelligible0 world1 to which it had retired from art and science1 and the affairs of ordinary life4 ,its ,god--as a true ,god--is not of the dead alone1 but also of the living3 not a far-off supreme and ultimate ,being1 but also a man among men4 ,philosophy thus has to break down the middle partition-wall of life1 the fence between secular and sacred4 ,it is but religion come to its maturity1 made at home in the world1 and no longer a stranger and a wonder4 ,religion has pronounced in its inmost heart and faith of faith1 that the earth is the ,lord's1 and that day unto day shows forth the divine handiwork4 ,but the heart of unbelief1 of little faith1 has hardly uttered the word1 than it forgets its assurance and leans to the conviction that the prince of this world is the ,spirit of ,evil4 ,the mood of ,thodice is also--but with a difference--the mood of philosophy4 ,it asserts the ways of ,providence3 but its providence is not the ,god of the ,moralist1 or the ideal of the ,artist1 or rather is not these only1 but also the ,law of ,nature1 and more than that4 ,its aim is the ,unity of ,history4 ,the words have sometimes been lightly used to mean that events run on in one continuous flow1 and that there are no abrupt1 no ultimate beginnings1 parting age from age4 ,but the ,unity of ,history in its full sense is beyond history3 it is history 8reduced0 from the expanses of time to the eternal present3 its thousand years made one day1--made even the glance of a moment4 ,the theme of the ,unity of ,history--in the full depth of unity and the full expanse of history--is the theme of ,hegelian philosophy4 ,it traces the process in which ,mind has to be all-inclusive1 self-upholding1 one with the ,eternal reality4 8,that process of the mind's self-realisation0 says ,hegel in the close of his ,phenomenology1 8exhibits a lingering movement and succession of minds1 a gallery of images1 each of which1 equipped with the complete wealth of mind1 only seems to linger because the ,self has to penetrate and to digest this wealth of its ,substance4 ,as its perfection consists in coming completely to know what it is 7its substance71 this knowledge is its self-involution in which it deserts its outward existence and surrenders its shape to recollection4 ,thus self-involved1 it is sunk in the night of its self-consciousness3 but in that night its vanished being is preserved1 and that being1 thus in idea preserved1--old1 but now new-born of the spirit1--is the new sphere of being1 a new world1 a new phase of mind4 ,in this new phase it has again to begin afresh and from the beginning1 and again nurture itself to maturity from its own resources1 as if for it all that preceded were lost1 and it had learned nothing from the experience of the earlier minds4 ,yet is that recollection a preservation of experience3 it is the quintessence1 and in fact a higher form1 of the substance4 ,if therefore this new mind appears only to count on its own resources1 and to start quite fresh and blank1 it is at the same time on a higher grade that it starts4 ,the intellectual and spiritual realm1 which is thus constructed in actuality1 forms a succession in time1 where one mind relieved another of its watch1 and each took over the kingdom of the world from the preceding4 ,the purpose of that succession is to reveal the depth1 and that depth is the absolute comprehension of mind3 this revelation is therefore to uplift its depth1 to spread it out in breadth1 so negativing this self-involved ,ego1 wherein it is self-dispossessed or reduced to substance4 ,but it is also its time3 the course of time shows this dispossession itself dispossessed1 and thus in its extension it is no less in its depth1 the self4 ,the way to that goal1--absolute self-certainty--or the mind knowing itself as mind--is the inwardising of the minds1 as they severally are in themselves1 and as they accomplish the organisation of their realm4 ,their conservation1--regarded on the side of its free and apparently contingent succession of fact--is history3 on the side of their comprehended organisation1 again1 it is the science of mental phenomenology3 the two together1 comprehended history1 form at once the recollection and the grave-yard of the absolute ,mind1 the actuality1 truth1 and certitude of his throne1 apart from which he were lifeless and alone40 ,such in brief outline--lingering most on the points where ,hegel has here been briefest--is the range of the ,philosophy of ,mind4 ,its aim is to comprehend1 not to explain3 to put together in intelligent unity1 not to analyse into a series of elements4 ,for it psychology is not an analysis or description of mental phenomena1 of laws of association1 of the growth of certain powers and ideas1 but a 8comprehended history0 of the formation of subjective mind1 of the intelligent1 feeling1 willing self or ego4 ,for it ,ethics is part and only part of the great scheme or system of self-development2 but continuing into greater concreteness the normal endowment of the individual mind1 and but preparing the ground on which religion may be most effectively cultivated4 ,and finally ,religion itself1 released from its isolation and other-world sacrosanctity1 is shown to be only the crown of life1 the ripest growth of actuality1 and shown to be so by philosophy1 whilst it is made clear that religion is the basis of philosophy1 or that a philosophy can only go as far as the religious stand-point allows4 ,the hierarchy1 if so it be called1 of the spiritual forces is one where none can stand alone1 or claim an abstract and independent supremacy4 ,the truth of egoism is the truth of altruism3 the truly moral is the truly religious3 and each is not what it professes to be unless it anticipate the later1 or include the earlier4 7iv47 ,mind or ,spirit4 ,it may be said1 however1 that for such a range of subjects the term ,mind is wretchedly inadequate and common-place1 and that the better rendering of the title would be ,philosophy of ,spirit4 ,it may be admitted that ,mind is not all that could be wished4 ,but neither is ,spirit blameless4 ,and1 it may be added1 ,hegel's own term ,geist has to be unduly strained to cover so wide a region4 ,it serves--and was no doubt meant to serve--as a sign of the conformity of his system with the religion which sees in ,god no other-world being1 but our very self and mind1 and which worships him in spirit and in truth4 ,and if the use of a word like this could allay the 8ancient variance0 between the religious and the philosophic mood1 it would be but churlish perhaps to refuse the sign of compliance and compromise4 ,but whatever may be the case in ,german1--and even there the new wine was dangerous to the old wine-skin--it is certain that to average ,english ears the word ,spiritual would carry us over the medium line into the proper land of religiosity4 ,and to do that1 as we have seen1 is to sin against the central idea3 the idea that religion is of one blood with the whole mental family1 though the most graciously complete of all the sisters4 ,yet1 however the word may be chosen1 the philosophy of ,hegel1 like the august lady who appeared in vision to the emprisoned ,bothius1 has on her garment a sign which 8signifies the life which is on earth10 as also a sign which signifies the 8right law of heaven02 if her right-hand holds the 8book of the justice of the ,king omnipotent10 the sceptre in her left is 8corporal judgment against sin7#bj740 ,there is indeed no sufficient reason for contemning the term ,mind4 ,if ,inductive ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind has--perhaps to a dainty taste--made the word unsavoury1 that is no reason for refusing to give it all the wealth of soul and heart1 of intellect and will4 ,the mens aeterna which1 if we hear ,tacitus1 expressed the ,hebrew conception of the spirituality of ,god1 and the which ,aristotelianism set supreme in the ,soul1 are not the mere or abstract intelligence1 which late-acquired habits of abstraction have made out of them4 ,if the reader will adopt the term 7in want of a better7 in its widest scope1 we may shelter ourselves under the example of ,wordsworth4 ,his theme is--as he describes it in the ,recluse--8the ,mind and ,man03 his 8voice proclaims ,how exquisitely the individual ,mind 7,and the progressive powers perhaps no less ,of the whole species7 to the external ,world ,is fitted2--and how exquisitely too ,the external ,world is fitted to the ,mind2 ,and the creation 7by no lower name ,can it be called7 which they with blended might ,accomplish40 ,the verse which expounds that 8high argument0 speaks 8,of ,truth1 of ,grandeur1 ,beauty1 ,love and ,hope ,and melancholy ,fear subdued by ,faith40 ,and the poet adds3 8,as we look ,into our ,minds1 into the ,mind of ,man-- ,my haunt1 and the main region of my song2 ,beauty--a living ,presence of the earth ,surpassing the most fair ideal forms 444 waits upon my steps40 ,the reality duly seen in the spiritual vision 8,that inspires ,the human ,soul of universal earth ,dreaming of things to come0 will be a greater glory than the ideals of imaginative fiction ever fancied3 8,for the discerning intellect of ,man1 ,when wedded to this goodly universe ,in love and holy passion1 shall find these ,a simple produce of the common day40 ,if ,wordsworth1 thus1 as it were1 echoing the great conception of ,francis ,bacon1 8,would chant1 in lonely peace1 the spousal verse ,of this great consummation10 perhaps the poet and the essayist may help us with ,hegel to rate the ,mind--the ,mind of ,man--at its highest value4 ,essay ,,ii4 ,aims ,and ,methods ,of ,psychology4 ,it is not going too far to say that in common estimation psychology has as yet hardly reached what ,kant has called the steady walk of science--der sichere ,gang der ,wissenschaft4 ,to assert this is not1 of course1 to throw any doubts on the importance of the problems1 or on the intrinsic value of the results1 in the studies which have been prosecuted under that name4 ,it is only to note the obvious fact that a number of inquiries of somewhat discrepant tone1 method1 and tendency have all at different times covered themselves under the common title of psychological1 and that the work of orientation is as yet incomplete4 ,such a destiny seems inevitable1 when a name is coined rather as the title of an unexplored territory1 than fixed on to describe an accomplished fact4 7i47 ,psychology as a ,science and as a ,part of ,philosophy4 ,the ,de ,anima of ,aristotle1 gathering up into one the work of ,plato and his predecessors1 may be said to lay the foundation of psychology4 ,but even in it1 we can already see that there are two elements or aspects struggling for mastery3 two elements not unrelated or independent1 but hard to keep fairly and fully in unity4 ,on one hand there is the conception of ,soul as a part of ,nature1 as a grade of existence in the physical or natural universe1--in the universe of things which suffer growth and change1 which are never entirely 8without matter10 and are always attached to or present in body4 ,from this point of view ,aristotle urged that a sound and realistic psychology must1 e4g4 in its definition of a passion1 give the prominent place to its physical 7or material7 expression1 and not to its mental form or significance4 ,it must remember1 he said1 that the phenomena or 8accidents0 are what really throw light on the nature or the 8substance0 of the ,soul4 ,on the other hand1 there are two points to be considered4 ,there is1 first of all1 the counterpoising remark that the conception of ,soul as such1 as a unity and common characteristic1 will be determinative of the phenomena or 8accidents10--will settle1 as it were1 what we are to observe and look for1 and how we are to describe our observations4 ,and by the conception of ,soul1 is meant not a soul1 as a thing or agent 7subject7 which has properties attaching to it2 but soul1 as the generic feature1 the universal1 which is set as a stamp on everything that claims to be psychical4 ,in other words1 ,soul is one1 not as a single thing contrasted with its attributes1 activities1 or exercises of force 7such single thing will be shown by logic to be a metaphysical fiction72 but as the unity of form and character1 the comprehensive and identical feature1 which is present in all its manifestations and exercises4 ,but there is a second consideration4 ,the question is asked by ,aristotle whether it is completely and strictly accurate to put ,soul under the category of natural objects4 ,there is in it1 or of it1 perhaps1 something1 and something essential to it1 which belongs to the order of the eternal and self-active3 something which is 8form0 and 8energy0 quite unaffected by and separate from 8matter40 ,how this is related to the realm of the perishable and changeable is a problem on which ,aristotle has been often 7and with some reason7 believed to be obscure1 if not even inconsistent7#ba74 ,in these divergent elements which come to the fore in ,aristotle's treatment we have the appearance of a radical difference of conception and purpose as to psychology4 ,he himself does a good deal to keep them both in view4 ,but it is evident that here already we have the contrast between a purely physical or 7in the narrower sense7 8scientific0 psychology1 empirical and realistic in treatment1 and a more philosophical--what in certain quarters would be called a speculative or metaphysical--conception of the problem4 ,there is also in ,aristotle the antithesis of a popular or superficial1 and an accurate or analytic1 psychology4 ,the former is of a certain use in dealing1 say1 with questions of practical ethics and education3 the latter is of more strictly scientific interest4 ,both of these distinctions--that between a speculative and an empirical1 and that between a scientific and a popular treatment--affect the subsequent history of the study4 ,psychology is sometimes understood to mean the results of casual observation of our own minds by what is termed introspection1 and by the interpretation of what we may observe in others4 ,such observations are in the first place carried on under the guidance of distinctions or points of view supplied by the names in common use4 ,we interrogate our own consciousness as to what facts or relations of facts correspond to the terms of our national language4 ,or we attempt--what is really an inexhaustible quest--to get definite divisions between them1 and clear-cut definitions4 ,inquiries like these which start from popular distinctions fall a long way short of science3 and the inquirer will find that accidental and essential properties are given in the same handful of conclusions4 ,yet there is always much value in these attempts to get our minds cleared3 and it is indispensable for all inquiries that all alleged or reported facts of mind should be realised and reproduced in our own mental experience4 ,and this is especially the case in psychology1 just because here we cannot get the object outside us1 we cannot get or make a diagram1 and unless we give it reality by re-constructing it1--by re-interrogating our own experience1 our knowledge of it will be but wooden and mechanical4 ,and the term introspection need not be too seriously taken3 it means much more than watching passively an internal drama2 and is quite as well describable as mental projection1 setting out what was within1 and so as it were hidden and involved1 before ourselves in the field of mental vision4 ,here1 as always1 the essential point is to get ourselves well out of the way of the object observed1 and to stand1 figuratively speaking1 quite on one side4 ,but even at the best1 such a popular or empirical psychology has no special claim to be ranked as science4 ,it may no doubt be said that at least it collects1 describes1 or notes down facts4 ,but even this is not so certain as it seems4 ,its so-called facts are very largely fictions1 or so largely interpolated with error1 that they cannot be safely used for construction4 ,if psychology is to accomplish anything valuable1 it must go more radically to work4 ,it must--at least in a measure--discard from its preliminary view the data of common and current distinctions1 and try to get at something more primary or ultimate as its starting-point4 ,and this it may do in two ways4 ,it may1 in the one case1 follow the example of the physical sciences4 ,in these it is the universal practice to assume that the explanation of complex and concrete facts is to be attained by 7a7 postulating certain simple elements 7which we may call atoms1 molecules1 and perhaps units or monads71 which are supposed to be clearly conceivable and to justify themselves by intrinsic intelligibility1 and by 7b7 assuming that these elements are compounded and combined according to laws which again are in the last resort self-evident1 or such that they seem to have an obvious and palpable lucidity4 ,further1 such laws being always axioms or plain postulates of mechanics 7for these alone possess this feature of self-evident intelligibility71 they are subject to and invite all the aids and refinements of the higher mathematical calculus4 ,what the primary and self-explicative bits of psychical reality may be1 is a further question on which there may be some dispute4 ,they may be1 so to say1 taken in a more physical or in a more metaphysical way3 i4e4 more as units of nerve-function or more as elements of ideative-function4 ,and there may be differences as to how far and in what provinces the mathematical calculus may be applicable4 ,but1 in any case1 there will be a strong tendency in psychology1 worked on this plan1 to follow1 mutatis mutandis1 and at some distance perhaps1 the analogy of material physics4 ,in both the justification of the postulated units and laws will be their ability to describe and systematise the observed phenomena in a uniform and consistent way4 ,the other way in which psychology gets a foundation and ulterior certainty is different1 and goes deeper4 ,after all1 the 8scientific0 method is only a way in which the facts of a given sphere are presented in thoroughgoing interconnexion1 each reduced to an exact multiple or fraction of some other1 by an inimitably continued subtraction and addition of an assumed homogeneous element1 found or assumed to be perfectly imaginable 7conceivable74 ,but we may also consider the province in relation to the whole sphere of reality1 may ask what is its place and meaning in the whole1 what reality is in the end driving at or coming to be1 and how far this special province contributes to that end4 ,if we do this1 we attach psychology to philosophy1 or1 if we prefer so to call it1 to metaphysics1 as in the former way we established it on the principles generally received as governing the method of the physical sciences4 ,this--the relation of psychology to fundamental philosophy--is a question which also turns up in dealing with ,ethics4 ,there is on the part of those engaged in either of these inquiries a certain impatience against the intermeddling 7which is held to be only muddling7 of metaphysics with them4 ,it is clear that in a very decided way both psychology and ethics can1 up to some extent at least1 be treated as what is called empirical 7or1 to use the more ,english phrase1 inductive7 sciences4 ,on many hands they are actually so treated3 and not without result4 ,considering the tendency of metaphysical inquiries1 it may be urged that it is well to avoid preliminary criticism of the current conceptions and beliefs about reality which these sciences imply4 ,yet such beliefs are undoubtedly present and effective4 ,schopenhauer has popularised the principle that the pure empiricist is a fiction1 that man is a radically metaphysical animal1 and that he inevitably turns what he receives into a part of a dogmatic creed--a conviction how things ought to be4 ,almost without effort there grows up in him1 or flows in upon him1 a belief and a system of beliefs as to the order and values of things4 ,every judgment1 even in logic1 rests on such an order of truth4 ,he need not be able to formulate his creed3 it will influence him none the less3 nay1 his faith will probably seem more a part of the solid earth and common reality1 the less it has been reduced to a determinate creed or to a code of principles4 ,for such formulation presupposes doubt and scepticism1 which it beats back by mere assertion4 ,each human being has such a background of convictions which govern his actions and conceptions1 and of which it so startles him to suggest the possibility of a doubt1 that he turns away in dogmatic horror4 ,such ruling ideas vary1 from man to man1 and from man to woman--if we consider them in all their minuteness4 ,but above all they constitute themselves in a differently organised system or aggregate according to the social and educational stratum to which an individual belongs4 ,each group1 engaged in a common task1 it may be in the study of a part of nature1 is ideally bound and obliged by a common language1 and special standards of truth and reality for its own4 ,such a group of ideas is what ,bacon would have called a scientific fetich or idolum theatri4 ,a scientific idolum is a traditional belief or dogma as to principles1 values1 and methods1 which has so thoroughly pervaded the minds of those engaged in a branch of inquiry1 that they no longer recognise its hypothetical character1--its relation of means to the main end of their function4 ,such a collected and united theory of reality 7it is what ,hegel has designated the ,idea7 is what is understood by a natural metaphysic4 ,it has nothing necessarily to do with a supersensible or a supernatural1 if these words mean a ghostly1 materialised1 but super-finely-materialised nature1 above and beyond the present4 ,but that there is a persistent tendency to conceive the unity and coherence1 the theoretic idea of reality1 in this pseudo-sensuous 7i4e4 super-sensuous7 form1 is of course a well-known fact4 ,for the present1 however1 this aberration--this idol of the tribe--may be left out of sight4 ,by a metaphysic or fundamental philosophy1 is1 in the present instance1 meant a system of first principles--a secular and cosmic creed3 a belief in ends and values1 a belief in truth--again premising that the system in question is1 for most1 a rudely organised and almost inarticulate mass of belief and hope1 conviction and impression4 ,it is1 in short1 a natural metaphysic3 a metaphysic1 that is1 which has but an imperfect coherence1 which imperfectly realises both its nature and its limits4 ,in certain parts1 however1 it is more and better than this crude background of belief4 ,each science--or at least every group of sciences--has a more definite system or aggregate of first principles1 axioms1 and conceptions belonging to it4 ,it has1 that is1--and here in a much distincter way--its special standard of reality1 its peculiar forms of conceiving things1 its distinctions between the actual and the apparent1 c4 ,here again it will probably be found that the scientific specialist is hardly conscious that these are principles and concepts3 on the contrary1 they will be supposed self-evident and ultimate facts1 foundations of being4 ,instead of being treated as modes of conception1 more or less justified by their use and their results1 these categories will be regarded as fundamental facts1 essential conditions of all reality4 ,like popular thought in its ingrained categories1 the specialist cannot understand the possibility of any limitation to his radical ideas of reality4 ,to him they are not hypotheses1 but principles4 ,the scientific specialist may be as convinced of the universal application of his peculiar categories1 as the ,chinese or the ,eskimo that his standards are natural and final4 ,under such metaphysical or extra-empirical presuppositions all investigation1 whether it be crudely empirical or 7in the physical sense7 scientific1 is carried on4 ,and when so carried on1 it is said to be prosecuted apart from any interference from metaphysic4 ,such a nave or natural metaphysic1 not raised to explicit consciousness1 not followed as an imposed rule1 but governing with the strength of an immanent faith1 does not count for those who live under it as a metaphysic at all4 ,m4 ,jourdain was amazed suddenly to learn he had been speaking prose for forty years without knowing it4 ,but in the present case there is something worse than amazement sure to be excited by the news4 ,for the critic who thus reveals the secrets of the scientist's heart is pretty sure to go on to say that a good deal of this nave unconscious metaphysic is incoherent1 contradictory1 even bad3 that it requires correction1 revision1 and readjustment1 and has by criticism to be made one and harmonious4 ,that readjustment or criticism which shall eliminate contradiction and produce unity1 is the aim of the science of metaphysic--the science of the meta-physical element in physical knowledge3 what ,hegel has chosen to call the ,science of ,logic 7in the wide sense of the term74 ,this higher ,logic1 this science of metaphysic1 is the process to revise and harmonise in systematic completeness the imperfect or misleading and partial estimates of reality which are to be found in popular and scientific thought4 ,in the case of the run of physical sciences this revision is less necessary2 and for no very recondite reason4 ,every science by its very nature deals with a special1 a limited topic4 ,it is confined to a part or aspect of reality4 ,its propositions are not complete truths2 they apply to an artificial world1 to a part expressly cut off from the concrete reality4 ,its principles are generally cut according to their cloth1--according to the range in which they apply4 ,the only danger that can well arise is if these categories are transplanted without due reservations1 and made of universal application1 i4e4 if the scientist elects on his speciality to pronounce de omnibus rebus4 ,but in the case of psychology and ethics the harmlessness of natural metaphysics will be less certain4 ,here a general human or universal interest is almost an inevitable coefficient3 especially if they really rise to the full sweep of the subject4 ,for as such they both seem to deal not with a part of reality1 but with the very centre and purpose of all reality4 ,in them we are not dealing with topics of secondary interest1 but with the very heart of the human problem4 ,here the questions of reality and ideals1 of unity and diversity1 and of the evaluation of existence1 come distinctly to the fore4 ,if psychology is to answer the question1 ,what am ,i8 and ethics the question1 ,what ought ,i to do8 they can hardly work without some formulated creed of metaphysical character1 without some preliminary criticisms of current first principles4 7ii47 ,herbart4 ,the ,german thinker1 who has given perhaps the most fruitful stimulus to the scientific study of psychology in modern times--,johann ,friedrich ,herbart--is after all essentially a philosopher1 and not a mere scientist1 even in his psychology4 ,his psychological inquiry1 that is1 stands in intimate connexion with the last questions of all intelligence1 with metaphysics and ethics4 ,the business of philosophy1 says ,herbart1 is to touch up and finish off conceptions 7,bearbeitung der ,begriffe77#bb74 ,it finds1 as it supervenes upon the unphilosophical world1 that mere and pure facts 7if there ever are or were such purisms7 have been enveloped in a cloud of theory1 have been construed into some form of unity1 but have been imperfectly1 inadequately construed3 and that the existing concepts in current use need to be corrected1 supplemented and readjusted4 ,it has1 accordingly1 for its work to 8reconcile experience with itself7#bc710 and to elicit 8the hidden pre-suppositions without which the fact of experience is unthinkable40 ,psychology1 then1 as a branch of this philosophic enterprise1 has to readjust the facts discovered in inner experience4 ,for mere uncritical experience or merely empirical knowledge only offers problems2 it suggests gaps1 which indeed further reflection serves at first only to deepen into contradictions4 ,such a psychology is 8speculative03 i4e4 it is not content to accept the mere given1 but goes forward and backward to find something that will make the fact intelligible4 ,it employs totally different methods from the 8classification1 induction1 analogy0 familiar to the logic of the empirical sciences4 ,its 8principles10 therefore1 are not given facts3 but facts which have been manipulated and adjusted so as to lose their self-contradictory quality3 they are facts 8reduced10 by introducing the omitted relationships which they postulate if they are to be true and self-consistent7#bd74 ,while it is far from rejecting or ignoring experience1 therefore1 psychology cannot strictly be said to build upon it alone4 ,it uses experimental fact as an unfinished datum1--or it sees in experience a torso which betrays its imperfection1 and suggests completing4 ,the starting-point1 it may be said1 of ,herbart's psychology is a question which to the ordinary psychologist 7and to the so-called scientific psychologist7 has a secondary1 if it have any interest4 ,it was1 he says1 the problem of ,personality1 the problem of the ,self or ,ego1 which first led to his characteristic conception of psychological method4 8,my first discovery10 he tells us7#be71 8was that the ,self was neither primitive nor independent1 but must be the most dependent and most conditioned thing one can imagine4 ,the second was that the elementary ideas of an intelligent being1 if they were ever to reach the pitch of self-consciousness1 must be either all1 or at least in part1 opposed to each other1 and that they must check or block one another in consequence of this opposition4 ,though held in check1 however1 these ideas were not to be supposed lost3 they subsist as endeavours or tendencies to return into the position of actual idea1 as soon as the check became1 for any reason1 either in whole or in part inoperative4 ,this check could and must be calculated1 and thus it was clear that psychology required a mathematical as well as a metaphysical foundation40 ,the place of the conception of the ,ego in ,kant's and ,fichte's theory of knowledge is well known4 ,equally well known is ,kant's treatment of the soul-reality or soul-substance in his examination of ,rational ,psychology4 ,whereas the 7logical7 unity of consciousness1 or 8synthetic unity of apperception10 is assumed as a fundamental starting-point in explanation of our objective judgments1 or of our knowledge of objective existence1 its real 7as opposed to its formal7 foundation in a 8substantial0 soul is set aside as an illegitimate interpretation of1 or inference from1 the facts of inner experience4 ,the belief in the separate unity and persistence of the soul1 said ,kant1 is not a scientifically-warranted conclusion4 ,its true place is as an ineffaceable postulate of the faith which inspires human life and action4 ,herbart did not rest content with either of these--as he believed--dogmatic assumptions of his master4 ,he did not fall in cheerfully with the idealism which seemed ready to dispense with a soul1 or which justified its acceptance of empirical reality by referring to the fundamental unity of the function of judgment4 ,with a strong bent towards fully-differentiated and individualised experience ,herbart conjoined a conviction of the need of logical analysis to prevent us being carried away by the first-come and inadequate generalities4 ,the ,ego which1 in its extremest abstraction1 he found defined as the unity of subject and object1 did not seem to him to offer the proper guarantees of reality3 it was itself a problem1 full of contradictions1 waiting for solution4 ,on the other hand1 the real ,ego1 or self of concrete experience1 is very much more than this logical abstract1 and differs widely from individual to individual1 and apparently from time to time even in the same individual4 ,our self1 of which we talk so fluently1 as one and the self-same--how far does it really possess the continuity and identity with which we credit it8 ,does it not rather seem to be an ideal which we gradually form and set before ourselves as the standard for measuring our attainments of the moment1--the perfect fulfilment of that oneness of being and purpose and knowledge which we never reach8 ,sometimes even it seems no better than a name which we move along the varying phenomena of our inner life1 at one time identifying it with the power which has gained the victory in a moral struggle1 at another with that which has been defeated7#bf71 according as the attitude of the moment makes us throw now one1 now another1 aspect of mental activity in the foreground4 ,the other--or logical ,ego--the mere identity of subject and object1--when taken in its utter abstractness and simplicity1 shrivels up to something very small indeed--to a something which is little better than nothing4 ,the mere ,i which is not contra-distinguished by a ,thou and a ,he--which is without all definiteness of predication 7the ,i,i of ,fichte and ,schelling7--is only as it were a point of being cut off from all its connexions in reality1 and treated as if it were or could be entirely independent4 ,it is an identity in which subject and object have not yet appeared3 it is not a real ,i1 though we may still retain the name4 ,it is--as ,hegel's ,logic will tell us--exactly definable as ,being1 which is as yet ,nothing3 the impossible edge of abstraction on which we try--and in vain--to steady ourselves at the initial point of thought4 ,and to reach or stand at that intangible1 ungraspable point1 which slips away as we approach1 and transmutes itself as we hold it1 is not the natural beginning1 but the result of introspection and reflection on the concrete self4 ,but with this aspect of the question we are not now concerned4 ,that the unity of the ,self as an intelligent and moral being1 that the ,ego of self-consciousness was an ideal and a product of development1 was what ,herbart soon became convinced of4 ,the unity of ,self is even as given in mature experience an imperfect fact4 ,it is a fact1 that is1 which does not come up to what it promised1 and which requires to be supplemented1 or philosophically justified4 ,here and everywhere the custom of life carries us over gaps which yawn deep to the eye of philosophic reflection3 even though accident and illness force them not unfrequently even upon the blindest4 ,to trace the process of unification towards this unity--to trace1 if you like1 even the formation of the concept of such unity1 as a governing and guiding principle in life and conduct1 comes to be the problem of the psychologist1 in the largest sense of that problem4 ,from ,soul 7,seele7 to ,mind or ,spirit 7,geist7 is for ,herbart1 as for ,hegel1 the course of psychology7#bg74 ,the growth and development of mind1 the formation of a self1 the realisation of a personality1 is for both the theme which psychology has to expound4 ,and ,herbart1 not less than ,hegel1 had to bear the censure that such a conception of mental reality as a growth would destroy personality7#bh74 ,but with so much common in the general plan1 the two thinkers differ profoundly in their special mode of carrying out the task4 ,or1 rather1 they turn their strength on different departments of the whole4 ,herbart's great practical interest had been the theory of education3 8paedagogic0 is the subject of his first important writings4 ,the inner history of ideas--the processes which are based on the interaction of elements in the individual soul--are what he specially traces4 ,hegel's interests1 on the contrary1 are more towards the greater process1 the unities of historical life1 and the correlations of the powers of art1 religion1 and philosophy that work therein4 ,he turns to the macrocosm1 almost as naturally as ,herbart does to the microcosm4 ,thus1 even in ,ethics1 while ,herbart gives a delicate analysis of the distinct aspects or elements in the ,ethical idea1--the diverse headings under which the disinterested spectator within the breast measures with purely aesthetic eye his approach to unity and strength of purpose1 ,hegel seems to hurry away from the field of moral sense or conscience to throw himself on the social and political organisation of the moral life4 ,the ,general ,paedagogic of ,herbart has its pendant in ,hegel's ,philosophy of ,law and of ,history4 ,at an early period ,herbart had become impressed with the necessity of applying mathematics to psychology7#bi74 ,to the usual objection1 that psychical facts do not admit of measurement1 he had a ready reply4 ,we can calculate even on hypothetical assumptions3 indeed1 could we measure1 we should scarcely take the trouble to calculate7#cj74 ,to calculate 7i4e4 to deduce mathematically7 is to perform a general experiment1 and to perform it in the medium where there is least likelihood of error or disturbance4 ,there may be anomalies enough apparent in the mental life3 there may be the great anomalies of ,genius and of ,freedom of ,will2 but the ,newton and the ,kepler of psychology will show by calculation on assumed conditions of psychic nature that these aberrations can be explained by mechanical laws4 8,the human ,soul is no puppet-theatre3 our wishes and resolutions are no marionettes3 no juggler stands behind2 but our true and proper life lies in our volition1 and this life has its rule not outside1 but in itself3 it has its own purely mental rule1 by no means borrowed from the material world4 ,but this rule is in it sure and fixed2 and on account of this its fixed quality it has more similarity to 7what is otherwise heterogeneous7 the laws of impact and pressure than to the marvels of an alleged inexplicable freedom7#ca740 ,psychology then deals with a real1 which exhibits phenomena analogous in several respects to those discussed by statics and mechanics4 ,its foundation is a statics and mechanics of the ,soul1--as this real is called4 ,we begin by presupposing as the ultimate reality1 underlying the factitious and generally imperfect unity of self-consciousness and mind1 an essential and primary unity--the unity of an absolutely simple or individual point of being--a real point which amongst other points asserts itself1 maintains itself4 ,it has a character of its own1 but that character it only shows in and through a development conditioned by external influences4 ,the specific nature of the soul-reality is to be representative1 to produce1 or manifest itself in1 ideas 7,vorstellungen74 ,but the character only emerges into actuality in the conflict of the soul-atom with other ultimate realities in the congregation of things4 ,a soul per se or isolated is not possessed of ideas4 ,it is merely blank1 undeveloped1 formal unity1 of which nothing can be said4 ,but like other realities it defines and characterises itself by antithesis1 by resistance3 it shows what it is by its behaviour in the struggle for existence4 ,it acts in self-defence3 and its peculiar style or weapon of self-defence is an idea or representation4 ,the way the ,soul maintains itself is by turning the assailant into an idea7#cb73 and each idea is therefore a ,selbsterhaltung of the ,soul4 ,the ,soul is thus enriched--to appearance or incidentally3 and the assailant is annexed4 ,in this way the one ,soul may develop or evolve or express an innumerable variety of ideas3 for in response to whatever it meets1 the living and active ,soul ideates1 or gives rise to a representation4 ,thus1 while the soul is one1 its ideas or representations are many4 ,taken separately1 they each express the psychic self-conservation4 ,but brought in relation with each other1 as so many acts or self-affirmations of the one soul1 they behave as forces1 and tend to thwart or check each other4 ,it is as forces1 as reciprocally arresting or fostering each other1 that ideas are objects of science4 ,when a representation is thus held in check1 it is reduced to a mere endeavour or active tendency to represent4 ,thus there arises a distinction between representations proper1 and those imperfect states or acts which are partly or wholly held in abeyance4 ,but the latent phase of an idea is as essential to a thorough understanding of it as what appears4 ,it is the great blunder of empirical psychology to ignore what is sunk below the surface of consciousness4 ,and to ,herbart consciousness is not the condition but rather the product of ideas1 which are primarily forces4 ,but representations are not merely in opposition1--impinging and resisting4 ,the same reason which makes them resist1 viz4 that they are or would fain be acts of the one soul1 but are more or less incompatible1 leads them in other circumstances to form combinations with each other4 ,these combinations are of two sorts4 ,they are1 first1 complications1 or 8complexions03 a number of ideas combine by quasi-addition and juxtaposition to form a total4 ,second1 there is fusion3 ideas presenting certain degrees of contrast enter into a union where the parts are no longer separately perceptible4 ,it is easy to see how the problems of psychology now assume the form of a statics and mechanics of the mind4 ,quantitative data are to be sought in the strength of each separate single idea1 and the degree in which two or more ideas block each other3 in the degree of combination between ideas1 and the number of ideas in a combination3 and in the terms of relation between the members of a series of ideas4 ,a statical theory has to show the conditions required for what we may call the ideal state of equilibrium of the 8idea-forces03 to determine1 that is1 the ultimate degree of obscuration suffered by any two ideas of different strength1 and the conditions of their permanent combination or fusion4 ,a mechanics of the mind will1 on the contrary1 deal with the rate at which these processes are brought about1 the velocity with which in the movement of mind ideas are obscured or reawakened1 c4 ,it is fortunately unnecessary1 here1 to go further into details4 ,what ,herbart proposes is not a method for the mathematical measurement of psychic facts3 it is a theory of mechanics and statics specially adapted to the peculiarities of psychical phenomena1 where the forces are given with no sine or cosine1 where instead of gravitation we have the constant effort 7as it were elasticity7 of each idea to revert to its unchecked state4 ,he claims--in short--practically to be a ,kepler and ,newton of the mind1 and in so doing to justify the vague professions of more than one writer on mind--above all1 perhaps of ,david ,hume1 who goes beyond mere professions--to make mental science follow the example of physics4 ,and a main argument in favour of his enterprise is the declaration of ,kant that no body of knowledge can claim to be a science except in such proportion as it is mathematical4 ,and the peculiarity of this enterprise is that self-consciousness1 the ,ego1 is not allowed to interfere with the free play of psychic forces4 ,the ,ego is--psychologically--the result1 the product1 and the varying product of that play4 ,the play of forces is no doubt a unity3 but its unity lies not in the synthesis of consciousness1 but in the essential unity of ,soul4 ,and ,soul is in its essence neither consciousness1 nor self-consciousness1 nor mind3 but something on the basis of whose unity these are built up and developed7#cc74 ,the mere 8representation0 does not include the further supervenience of consciousness3 it represents1 but it is not as yet necessary that we should also be conscious that there is representation4 ,it is1 in the phrase of ,leibniz1 perception3 but not apperception4 ,it is mere straight-out1 not as yet reflected1 representation4 ,gradually there emerges through the operation of mechanical psychics a nucleus1 a floating unity1 a fixed or definite central aggregate4 ,the suggestion of mathematical method has been taken up by subsequent inquirers 7as it was pursued even before ,herbart's time71 but not in the sense he meant4 ,experimentation has now taken a prominent place in psychology4 ,but in proportion as it has done so1 psychology has lost its native character1 and thrown itself into the arms of physiology4 ,what ,herbart calculated were actions and reactions of idea-forces3 what the modern experimental school proposes to measure are to a large extent the velocities of certain physiological processes1 the numerical specification of certain facts4 ,such ascertainments are unquestionably useful2 as numerical precision is in other departments4 ,but1 taken in themselves1 they do not carry us one bit further on the way to science4 ,as experiments1 further1--to note a point discussed elsewhere7#cd7--their value depends on the point of view1 on the theory which has led to them1 on the value of the general scheme for which they are intended to provide a special new determination4 ,in many cases they serve to give a vivid reality to what was veiled under a general phrase4 ,the truth looks so much more real when it is put in figures3 as the size of a huge tree when set against a rock2 or as when ,milton bodies out his fallen angel by setting forth the ratio between his spear and the tallest ,norway pine4 ,but until the general relationship between soul and body is more clearly formulated1 such statistics will have but a value of curiosity4 7iii47 ,the ,faculty-,psychology and its ,critics4 ,what ,herbart 7as well as ,hegel7 finds perpetual ground for objecting to is the talk about mental faculties4 ,this objection is part of a general characteristic of all the higher philosophy2 and the recurrence of it gives an illustration of how hard it is for any class of men to see themselves as others see them4 ,if there be anything the vulgar believe to be true of philosophy1 it is that it deals in distant and abstruse generalities1 that it neglects the shades of individuality and reality1 and launches out into unsubstantial general ideas4 ,but it would be easy to gather from the great thinkers an anthology of passages in which they hold it forth as the great work of philosophy to rescue our conceptions from the indefiniteness and generality of popular conception1 and to give them real1 as opposed to a merely nominal1 individuality4 ,the ,wolffian school1 which ,herbart 7not less than ,kant7 found in possession of the field1 and which in ,germany may be taken to represent only a slight variant of the half-and-half attitude of vulgar thought1 was entrenched in the psychology of faculties4 ,empirical psychology1 said ,wolff7#ce71 tells the number and character of the soul's faculties3 rational psychology will tell what they 8properly0 are1 and how they subsist in soul4 ,it is assumed that there are general receptacles or tendencies of mental operation which in course of time get filled or qualified in a certain way3 and that when this question is disposed of1 it still remains to fix on the metaphysical bases of these facts4 ,that a doctrine of faculties should fix itself in psychology is not so wonderful4 ,in the non-psychical world objects are easily discriminated in space1 and the individual thing lasts through a time4 ,but a phase of mind is as such fleeting and indeterminate3 its individual features which come from its 8object0 tend soon to vanish in memory3 all freshness of definite characters wears off1 and there is left behind only a vague 8recept0 of the one and same in many1 a sort of hypostatised representative1 faint but persistent1 of what in experience was an ever-varying succession4 ,we generalise here as elsewhere3 but elsewhere the many singulars remain to confront us more effectually4 ,but in ,mind the immense variety of real imagination1 memory1 judgment is forgotten1 and the name in each case reduced to a meagre abstract4 ,thus the identity in character and operation1 having been cut off from the changing elements in its real action1 is transmuted into a substantial somewhat1 a subsistent faculty4 ,the relationship of one to another of the powers thus by abstraction and fancy created becomes a problem of considerable moment1 their causal relations in particular3 till in the end they stand outside and independent of each other1 engaged1 as ,herbart says1 in a veritable bellum omnium contra omnes4 ,but this hypostatising of faculties becomes a source of still further difficulties when it is taken in connexion with the hypostasis of the ,soul or ,self or ,ego4 ,to ,aristotle the ,soul in its general aspect is ,energy or ,essence2 and its individual phases are energies4 ,but in the hands of the untrained these conceptions came to be considerably displaced4 ,essence or ,substance came to be understood 7as may be seen in ,locke1 and still more in loose talk7 as a something1--a substratum1--or peculiar nature--7of which in itself nothing further could be said7#cf7 but which notwithstanding was permanent and perhaps imperishable73 this something subsistent exhibited certain properties or activities4 ,there thus arose1 on one hand1 the ,soul-thing1--a substance misunderstood and sensualised with a supernatural sensuousness1--a denizen of the transcendental or even of the transcendent world3 and1 on the other hand1 stood the actual manifestations1 the several exhibitions of this force1 the assignable and describable psychic facts4 ,we are accordingly brought before the problem of how this one substance or essence stands to the several entities or hypostases known as faculties4 ,and we still have in the rear the further problem of how these abstract entities stand to the real and concrete single acts and states of soul and mind4 ,this hypostatising of faculties1 and this distinction of the 8,substantial0 soul from its 8accidentia0 or phenomena1 had grown--through the materialistic proclivities of popular conception--from the indications found in ,aristotle4 ,it attained its climax1 perhaps in the ,wolffian school in ,germany1 but it has been the resort of superficial psychology in all ages4 ,for while it1 on one hand1 seemed to save the substantial ,soul on whose incorruptibility great issues were believed to hinge1 it held out1 on the other1 an open hand to the experimental inquirer1 whom it bade freely to search amongst the phenomena4 ,but if it was the refuge of pusillanimity1 it was also the perpetual object of censure from all the greater and bolder spirits4 ,thus1 the psychology of ,hobbes may be hasty and crude1 but it is at least animated by a belief that the mental life is continuous1 and not cut off by abrupt divisions severing the mental faculties4 ,the 8image0 7according to his materialistically coloured psychology7 which1 when it is a strong motion1 is called sense1 passes1 as it becomes weaker or decays1 into imagination1 and gives rise1 by its various complications and associations with others1 to reminiscence1 experience1 expectation4 ,similarly1 the voluntary motion which is an effect or a phase of imagination1 beginning at first in small motions--called by themselves 8endeavours10 and in relation to their cause 8appetites0 or 8desires7#cg70--leads on cumulatively to ,will1 which is the 8last appetite in deliberating40 ,spinoza1 his contemporary1 speaks in the same strain7#ch74 8,faculties of intellect1 desire1 love1 c41 are either utterly fictitious1 or nothing but metaphysical entities1 or universals which we are in the habit of forming from particulars4 ,will and intellect are thus supposed to stand to this or that idea1 this or that volition1 in the same way as stoniness to this or that stone1 or as man to ,peter or ,paul40 ,they are supposed to be a general something which gets defined and detached4 ,but1 in the mind1 or in the cogitant soul1 there are no such things4 ,there are only ideas3 and by an 8idea0 we are to understand not an image on the retina or in the brain1 not a 8dumb something1 like a painting on a panel7#ci710 but a mode of thinking1 or even the act of intellection itself4 ,the ideas are the mind3 mind does not have ideas4 ,further1 every 8idea10 as such1 8involves affirmation or negation10--is not an image1 but an act of judgment--contains1 as we should say1 an implicit reference to actuality1--a reference which in volition is made explicit4 ,thus 7concludes the corollary of ,eth4 ii4 #di7 8,will and ,intellect are one and the same40 ,but in any case the 8faculties0 as such are no better than entia rationis 7i4e4 auxiliary modes of representing facts74 ,leibniz speaks no less distinctly and sanely in this direction4 8,true powers are never mere possibilities3 they are always tendency and action40 ,the 8,monad0--that is the quasi-intelligent unit of existence1--is essentially activity1 and its actions are perceptions and appetitions1 i4e4 tendencies to pass from one perceptive state or act to another4 ,it is out of the variety1 the complication1 and relations of these miniature or little perceptions and appetitions1 that the conspicuous phenomena of consciousness are to be explained1 and not by supposing them due to one or other faculty4 ,the soul is a unity1 a self-developing unity1 a unity which at each stage of its existence shows itself in a perception or idea1--each such perception however being1 to repeat the oft quoted phrase1 plein de l'avenir et charg du pass3--each1 in other words1 is not stationary1 but active and urgent1 a progressive force1 as well as a representative element4 ,above all1 ,leibniz has the view that the soul gives rise to all its ideas from itself3 that its life is its own production1 not a mere inheritance of ideas which it has from birth and nature1 nor a mere importation into an empty room from without1 but a necessary result of its own constitution acting in necessary 7predetermined7 reciprocity and harmony with the rest of the universe4 ,but ,hobbes1 ,spinoza1 and ,leibniz1 were most attentively heard in the passages where they favoured or combatted the dominant social and theological prepossessions4 ,their glimpses of truer insight and even their palpable contributions in the line of a true psychology were ignored or forgotten4 ,more attention1 perhaps1 was attracted by an attempt of a very different style4 ,this was the system of ,condillac1 who1 as ,hegel says 7p4 #fa71 made an unmistakable attempt to show the necessary interconnexion of the several modes of mental activity4 ,in his ,trait des ,sensations 7#aged71 following on his ,essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines 7#agdf71 he tried to carry out systematically the deduction or derivation of all our ideas from sense1 or to trace the filiation of all our faculties from sensation4 ,given a mind with no other power than sensibility1 the problem is to show how it acquires all its other faculties4 ,let us then suppose a sentient animal to which is offered a single sensation1 or one sensation standing out above the others4 ,in such circumstances the sensation 8becomes0 7devient7 attention3 or a sensation 8is0 7est7 attention1 either because it is alone1 or because it is more lively than all the rest4 ,again3 before such a being1 let us set two sensations3 to perceive or feel 7apercevoir ou sentir7 the two sensations is the same thing 7c'est la mme chose74 ,if one of the sensations is not present1 but a sensation made already1 then to perceive it is memory4 ,memory1 then1 is only 8transformed sensation0 7sensation transforme74 ,further1 suppose we attend to both ideas1 this is 8the same thing0 as to compare them4 ,and to compare them we must see difference or resemblance4 ,this is judgment4 8,thus sensation becomes successively attention1 comparison1 judgment40 ,and--by further steps of the equating process--it appears that sensation again 8becomes0 an act of reflection4 ,and the same may be said of imagination and reasoning3 all are transformed sensations4 ,if this is so with the intelligence1 it is equally the case with the ,will4 ,to feel and not feel well or ill is impossible4 ,coupling then this feeling of pleasure or pain with the sensation and its transformations1 we get the series of phases ranging from desire1 to passion1 hope1 will4 8,desire is only the action of the same faculties as are attributed to the understanding40 ,a lively desire is a passion3 a desire1 accompanied with a belief that nothing stands in its way1 is a volition4 ,but combine these affective with the intellectual processes already noticed1 and you have thinking 7penser77#dj74 ,thus thought in its entirety is1 only and always1 transformed sensation4 ,something not unlike this1 though scarcely so simply and directly doctrinaire1 is familiar to us in some ,english psychology1 notably ,james ,mill's7#da74 ,taken in their literal baldness1 these identifications may sound strained1--or trifling4 ,but if we look beyond the words1 we can detect a genuine instinct for maintaining and displaying the unity and continuity of mental life through all its modifications1--coupled unfortunately with a bias sometimes in favour of reducing higher or more complex states of mind to a mere prolongation of lower and beggarly rudiments4 ,but otherwise such analyses are useful as aids against the tendency of inert thought to take every name in this department as a distinguishable reality3 the tendency to part will from thought--ideas from emotion--and even imagination from reason1 as if either could be what it professed without the other4 7iv47 ,methods and ,problems of ,psychology4 ,the difficulties of modern psychology perhaps lie in other directions1 but they are not less worth guarding against4 ,they proceed mainly from failure or inability to grasp the central problem of psychology1 and a disposition to let the pen 7if it be a book on the subject7 wander freely through the almost illimitable range of instance1 illustration1 and application4 ,though it is true that the proper study of mankind is man1 it is hardly possible to say what might not be brought under this head4 ,homo sum1 nihil a me alienum puto1 it might be urged4 ,placed in a sort of middle ground between physiology 7summing up all the results of physical science7 and general history 7including the contributions of all the branches of sociology71 the psychologist need not want for material4 ,he can wander into ethics1 aesthetic1 and logic1 into epistemology and metaphysics4 ,and it cannot be said with any conviction that he is actually trespassing1 so long as the ground remains so ill-fenced and vaguely enclosed4 ,a desultory collection of observations on traits of character1 anecdotes of mental events1 mixed up with hypothetical descriptions of how a normal human being may be supposed to develop his so-called faculties1 and including some dictionary-like verbal distinctions1 may make a not uninteresting and possibly bulky work entitled ,psychology4 ,it is partly a desire of keeping up to date which is responsible for the copious extracts or abstracts from treatises on the anatomy and functions of the nerve-system1 which1 accompanied perhaps by a diagram of the brain1 often form the opening chapter of a work on psychology4 ,even if these researches had achieved a larger number of authenticated results than they as yet have1 they would only form an appendix and an illustration to the proper subject7#db74 ,as they stand1 and so long as they remain largely hypothetical1 the use of them in psychology only fosters the common delusion that1 when we can picture out in material outlines a theory otherwise unsupported1 it has gained some further witness in its favour4 ,it is quite arguable indeed that it may be useful to cut out a section from general human biology which should include the parts of it that were specially interesting in connexion with the expression or generation of thought1 emotion1 and desire4 ,but in that case1 there is a blunder in singling out the brain alone1 and especially the organs of sense and voluntary motion1--except for the reason that this province of psycho-physics alone has been fairly mapped out4 ,the preponderant half of the soul's life is linked to other parts of the physical system4 ,emotion and volition1 and the general tone of the train of ideas1 if they are to be connected with their expression and physical accompaniment 7or aspect71 would require a sketch of the heart and lungs1 as well as the digestive system in general4 ,nor these alone4 ,nerve analysis 7especially confined to the larger system71 though most modern1 is not alone important1 as ,plato and ,aristotle well saw4 ,so that if biology is to be adapted for psychological use 7and if psychology deals with more than cognitive processes71 a liberal amount of physiological information seems required4 ,experimental psychology is a term used with a considerable laxity of content2 and so too is that of physiological psychology1 or psycho-physics4 ,and the laxity mainly arises because there is an uncertainty as to what is principal and what secondary in the inquiry4 ,experiment is obviously a help to observation3 and so far as the latter is practicable1 the former would seem to have a chance of introduction4 ,but in any case1 experiment is only a means to an end and only practicable under the guidance of hypothesis and theory4 ,its main value would be in case the sphere of psychology were completely paralleled with one province of physiology4 ,it was long ago maintained by ,spinoza and 7in a way by7 ,leibniz1 that there is no mental phenomenon without its bodily equivalent1 pendant1 or correspondent4 ,the ordo rerum 7the molecular system of movements7 is1 he held1 the same as the order of ideas4 ,but it is only at intervals1 under special conditions1 or when they reach a certain magnitude1 that ideas emerge into full consciousness4 ,as consciousness presents them1 they are often discontinuous1 and abrupt3 and they do not always carry with them their own explanation4 ,hence if we are confined to the larger phenomena of consciousness alone1 our science is imperfect3 many things seem anomalous2 above all1 perhaps1 will1 attention1 and the like4 ,we have seen how ,herbart 7partly following the hints of ,leibniz71 attempted to get over this difficulty by the hypothesis of idea-forces which generate the forms and matter of consciousness by their mutual impact and resistance4 ,physiological psychology substitutes for ,herbart's reals and his idea-forces a more materialistic sort of reality2 perhaps functions of nerve-cells1 or other analogous entities4 ,there1 it hopes one day to discover the underlying continuity of event which in the upper range of consciousness is often obscured1 and then the process would be1 as the phrase goes1 explained3 we should be able to picture it out without a gap4 ,these large hopes may have a certain fulfilment4 ,they may lead to the withdrawal of some of the fictitious mental processes which are still described in works of psychology4 ,but on the whole they can only have a negative and auxiliary value4 ,the value1 that is1 of helping to confute feigned connexions and to suggest truer4 ,they will be valid against the mode of thought which1 when ,psych fails us for an explanation1 turns to body1 and interpolates soul between the states of body3 the mode which1 in an older phraseology1 jumps from final causes to physical1 and from physical 7or efficient7 to final4 ,here1 as elsewhere1 the physical has its place3 and here1 more than in many places1 the physical has been unfairly treated4 ,but the whole subject requires a discussion of the so-called 8relations0 of soul and body3 a subject on which popular conceptions and so-called science are radically obscure4 8,but the danger which threatens experimental psychology10 says ,mnsterberg1 8is that1 in investigating details1 the connexion with questions of principle may be so lost sight of that the investigation finally lands at objects scientifically quite worthless7#dc74 ,psychology forgets only too easily that all those numerical statistics which experiment allows us to form are only means for psychological analysis and interpretation1 not ends in themselves4 ,it piles up numbers and numbers1 and fails to ask whether the results so formed have any theoretical value whatever3 it seeks answers before a question has been clearly and distinctly framed2 whereas the value of experimental answers always depends on the exactitude with which the question is put4 ,let me remind the reader1 how one inquirer after another made many thousand experiments on the estimation of small intervals of time1 without a single one of them raising the question what the precise point was which these experiments sought to measure1 what was the psychological occurrence in the case1 or what psychological phenomena were employed as the standard of time-intervals4 ,and so each had his own arbitrary standard of measurement1 each of them piled up mountains of numbers1 each demonstrated that his predecessor was wrong2 but neither ,estel nor ,mehner have carried the problem of the time-sense a single step further4 8,this must be all changed1 if we are not to drift into the barrenest scholastic4444 ,everywhere out of the correct perception that problems of principle demand the investigation of detailed phenomena1 and that the latter investigation must proceed in comparative independence of the question of principles1 there has grown the false belief that the description of detail phenomena is the ultimate aim of science4 ,and so1 side by side with details which are of importance to principles1 we have others1 utterly indifferent and theoretically worthless1 treated with the same zeal4 ,to the solution of their barren problems the old ,schoolmen applied a certain acuteness2 but in order to turn out masses of numbers from barren experiments1 all that is needed is a certain insensibility to fits of ennui4 ,let numbers be less collected for their own sake3 and instead1 let the problems be so brought to a point that the answers may possess the character of principles4 ,let each experiment be founded on far more theoretical considerations1 then the number of the experiments may be largely diminished7#dd740 ,what is thus said of a special group of inquiries by one of the foremost of the younger psychologists1 is not without its bearings on all the departments in which psychology can learn4 ,for physiological1 or what is technically called psychological1 experiment1 is co-ordinate with many other sources of information4 ,much1 for instance1 is to be learnt by a careful study of language by those who combine sound linguistic knowledge with psychological training4 ,it is in language1 spoken and written1 that we find at once the great instrument and the great document of the distinctively human progress from a mere ,psyche to a mature ,nous1 from ,soul to ,mind4 ,whether we look at the varieties of its structure under different ethnological influences1 or at the stages of its growth in a nation and an individual1 we get light from language on the differentiation and consolidation of ideas4 ,but here again it is easy to lose oneself in the world of etymology1 or to be carried away into the enticing questions of real and ideal philology4 8,the human being of the psychologist10 says ,herbart7#de71 8is the social and civilised human being who stands on the apex of the whole history through which his race has passed4 ,in him is found visibly together all the multiplicity of elements1 which1 under the name of mental faculties1 are regarded as a universal inheritance of humanity4 ,whether they are originally in conjunction1 whether they are originally a multiplicity1 is a point on which the facts are silent4 ,the savage and the new-born child give us far less occasion to admire the range of their mind than do the nobler animals4 ,but the psychologists get out of this difficulty by the unwarranted assumption that all the higher mental activities exist potentially in children and savages--though not in the animals--as a rudimentary predisposition or psychical endowment4 ,of such a nascent intellect1 a nascent reason1 and nascent moral sense1 they find recognisable traces in the scanty similarities which the behaviour of child or savage offers to those of civilised man4 ,we cannot fail to note that in their descriptions they have before them a special state of man1 and one which1 far from accurately defined1 merely follows the general impression made upon us by those beings we name civilised4 ,an extremely fluctuating character inevitably marks this total impression4 ,for there are no general facts3--the genuine psychological documents lie in the momentary states of individuals3 and there is an immeasurably long way from these to the height of the universal concept of man in general40 ,and yet ,man in general1--,man as man and therefore as mind--the concept of ,man--normal and ideal man--the complete and adequate ,idea of man--is the true terminus of the psychological process2 and whatever be the difficulties in the way1 it is the only proper goal of the science4 ,only it has to be built up1 constructed1 evolved1 developed1--and not assumed as a datum of popular imagination4 ,we want a concept1 concrete and real1 of ,man and of ,mind1 which shall give its proper place to each of the elements that1 in the several examples open to detailed observation1 are presented with unfair or exaggerated prominence4 ,the savage and the child are not to be left out as free from contributing to form the ideal3 virtues here are not more important than vices1 and are certainly not likely to be so informing3 even the insane and the idiot show us what human intelligence is and requires3 and the animals are also within the sweep of psychology4 ,man is not its theatre to the exclusion of woman2 if it records the results of introspection of the ,me1 it will find vast and copious quarries in the various modes in which an individual identifies himself with others as ,we4 ,and even the social and civilised man gets his designation1 as usual1 a potiori4 ,he is more civilised and social than others3 perhaps rather more civilised than not4 ,but always1 in some measure1 he is at the same time unsocial or anti-social1 and uncivilised4 ,each unit in the society of civilisation has to the outside observer--and sometimes even to his own self-detached and impartial survey--a certain oddity or fixity1 a gleam of irrationality1 which shows him to fall short of complete sanity or limpid and mobile intelligence4 ,he has not wholly put off the savage1--least of all1 says the cynic1 in his relations with the other sex4 ,he carries with him even to the grave some grains of the recklessness and petulance of childhood4 ,and rarely1 if ever1 can it be said of him that he has completely let the ape and tiger die4 ,but that is only one way of looking at the matter--and one which1 perhaps1 is more becoming to the pathologist and the cynic1 than to the psychologist4 ,each of these stages of psychical development1 even if that development be obviously describable as degeneration1 has something which1 duly adjusted1 has its place and function in the theory of the normally-complete human mind4 ,the animal1 the savage1 and the child1--each has its part there4 ,it is a mutilated1 one-sided and superficial advance in socialisation which cuts off the civilised creature from the natural stem of his ancestry1 from the large freedom1 the immense insouciance1 the childlikeness of his first estate4 ,there is something1 again1 wanting in the man who utterly lacks the individualising realism and tenderness of the woman1 as in the woman who can show no comprehension of view or bravery of enterprise4 ,even pathological states of mind are not mere anomalies and mere degenerations4 ,nature perhaps knows no proper degenerations1 but only by-ways and intricacies in the course of development4 ,still less is the vast enormity or irregularity of genius to be ignored4 ,it is all--to the philosophic mind--a question of degree and proportion1--though often the proportion seems to exceed the scale of our customary denominators4 ,if an element is latent or quiescent 7in arrest71 that is no index to its absolute amount3 8we know not what's resisted40 ,let us by all means keep proudly to our happy mediocrity of faculty1 and step clear of insanity or idiotcy on one hand1 and from genius or heroism on the other4 ,but the careful observer will notwithstanding note how delicately graded and how intricately combined are the steps which connect extremes so terribly disparate4 ,it is only vulgar ignorance which turns away in hostility or contempt from the imbecile and the deranged1 and only a worse than vulgar sciolism which sees in genius and the hero nothing but an aberration from its much-prized average4 ,criminalistic anthropology1 or the psychology of the criminal1 may have indulged in much frantic exaggeration as to the doom which nature and heredity have pronounced over the fruit of the womb even before it entered the shores of light3 yet they have at least served to discredit the free and easy assumption of the abstract averagist1 and shown how little the penalties of an unbending law meet the requirements of social well-being4 ,yet1 if psychology be willing to learn in all these and other provinces of the estate of man1 it must remember that1 once it goes beyond the narrow range in which the interpretations of symbol and expression have become familiar1 it is constantly liable to blunder in the inevitable effort to translate observation into theory4 ,the happy mean between making too much of palpable differences and hurrying on to a similar rendering of similar signs is the rarest of gifts4 ,or1 perhaps1 it were truer to say it is the latest and most hardly won of acquirements4 ,to learn to observe--observe with mind--is not a small thing4 ,there are rules for it--both rules of general scope and1 above all1 rules in each special department4 ,but like all 8major premisses0 in practice1 everything depends on the power of judgment1 the tact1 the skill1 the 8gift0 of applying them4 ,they work not as mere rules to be conned by rote1 but as principles assimilated into constituents of the mental life-blood3 rules which serve only as condensed reminders and hints of habits of thought and methods of research which have grown up in action and reflection4 ,to observe we must comprehend3 yet we can only comprehend by observing4 ,we all know how unintelligible--save for epochs of ampler reciprocity1 and it may be even of acquired unity of interest--the two sexes are for each other4 ,parents can remember how mysteriously minded they found their own elders2 and in most cases they have to experience the depth of the gulf which in certain directions parts them from their children's hearts4 ,even in civilised ,europe1 the ordinary member of each nation has an underlying conviction 7which at moments of passion or surprise will rise and find harsh utterance7 that the foreigner is queer1 irrational1 and absurd4 ,if the foreigner1 further1 be so far removed as a ,chinaman 7or an ,australian 8black071 there is hardly anything too vile1 meaningless1 or inhuman which the ,european will not readily believe in the case of one who1 it may be1 in turn describes him as a 8foreign devil40 ,it can only be in a fit of noble chivalry that the ,british rank and file can so far temporise with its insular prejudice as to admit of 8,fuzzy-wuzzy0 that 8,he's a poor benighted 'eathen--but a first-class fightin' man40 ,not every one is an observer who chooses to dub himself so1 nor is it in a short lapse of time and with condescension for foreign habits1 that any observer whatever can become a trustworthy reporter of the ideas some barbarian tribe holds concerning the things of earth and air1 and the hidden things of spirits and gods4 ,the 8interviewer0 no doubt is a useful being when it is necessary to find 8copy10 or when sharp-drawn characters and picturesque incidents are needed to stimulate an inert public1 ever open to be interested in some new thing4 ,but he is a poor contributor to the stored materials of science4 ,it is of other stuff that true science is made4 ,and if even years of nominal intercourse and spatial juxtaposition sometimes leave human beings1 as regards their inner selves1 in the position of strangers still1 what shall be said of the attempt to discern the psychic life of animals8 ,will the touch of curiosity which prompts us to watch the proceedings of the strange creatures1--will a course of experimentation on their behaviour under artificial conditions1--justify us in drawing liberal conclusions as to why they so behaved1 and what they thought and felt about it8 ,it is necessary in the first place to know what to observe1 and how1 and above all what for4 ,but that presumed1 we must further live with the animals not only as their masters and their examiners1 but as their friends and fellow-creatures2 we must be able--and so lightly that no effort is discernable--to lay aside the burden and garb of civilisation2 we must possess that stamp of sympathy and similarity which invites confidence1 and breaks down the reserve which our poor relations1 whether human or others1 offer to the first approaches of a strange superior4 ,it is probable that in that case we should have less occasion to wonder at their oddities or to admire their sagacity4 ,but a higher and more philosophical wonder might1 as in other cases when we get inside the heart of our subject1 take the place of the cheap and childish love of marvels1 or of the vulgar straining after comic traits4 ,of all this mass of materials the psychologist proper can directly make only a sparing use4 ,even as illustrations1 his data must not be presented too often in all their crude and undigested individuality1 or he runs the risk of leaving one-sided impressions4 ,every single instance1 individualised and historical1--unless it be exhibited by that true art of genius which we cannot expect in the average psychologist--narrows1 even though it be but slightly1 the complete and all-sided truth4 ,anecdotes are good1 and to the wise they convey a world of meaning1 but to lesser minds they sometimes suggest anything but the points they should accentuate4 ,without the detail of individual realistic study there is no psychology worth the name4 ,history1 story1 we must have3 but at the same time1 with the philosopher1 we must say1 ,i don't give much weight to stories4 ,and this is what will always--except in rare instances where something like genius is conjoined with it--make esoteric science hard and unpopular4 ,it dare not--if it is true to its idea--rest on any amount of mere instances1 as isolated1 unreduced facts4 ,yet it can only have real power so far as it concentrates into itself the life-blood of many instances1 and indeed extracts the pith and unity of all instances4 ,nor1 on the other hand1 can it turn itself too directly and intently towards practical applications4 ,all this theory of mental progress from the animate soul to the fullness of religion and science deals solely with the universal process of education3 8the education of humanity0 we may call it3 the way in which mind is made true and real7#df74 ,it is therefore a question of intricacy and of time how to carry over this general theory into the arena of education as artificially directed and planned4 ,to try to do so at a single step would be to repeat the mistake of ,plato1 if ,plato may be taken to suppose 7which seems incredible7 that a theoretical study of the dialectics of truth and goodness would enable his rulers1 without the training of special experience1 to undertake the supreme tasks of legislation or administration4 ,all politics1 like all education1 rests on these principles of the means and conditions of mental growth3 but the schooling of concrete life1 though it may not develop the faculty of formulating general laws1 will often train better for the management of the relative than a mere logical ,scholastic in first or absolute principles4 ,in conclusion1 there are one or two points which seem of cardinal importance for the progress of psychology4 7#a7 ,its difference from the physical sciences has to be set out3 in other words1 the peculiarity of psychical fact4 ,it will not do merely to say that experience marks out these boundaries with sufficient clearness4 ,on the contrary1 the terms consciousness1 feeling1 mind1 c41 are evidently to many psychologists mere names4 ,in particular1 the habits of physical research when introduced into mental study lead to a good deal of what can only be called mythology4 7#b7 ,there should be a clearer recognition of the problem of the relations of mental unity to mental elements4 ,but to get that1 a more thorough logical and metaphysical preparation is needed than is usually supposed necessary4 ,the doctrine of identity and necessity1 of universal and individual1 has to be faced1 however tedious4 7#c7 ,the distinction between first-grade and second-grade elements and factors in the mental life has to be realised4 ,the mere idea as presentative or immediate has to be kept clear of the more logico-reflective1 or normative ideas1 which belong to judgment and reasoning4 ,and the number of these grades in mental development seems endless4 7#d7 ,but1 also1 a separation is required--were it but temporary--between what may be called principles1 and what is detail4 ,at present1 in psychology1 8principles0 is a word almost without meaning4 ,a complete all-explaining system is of course impossible at present and may always be so4 ,yet if an effort of thought could be concentrated on cardinal issues1 and less padding of conventional and traditional detail were foisted in1 much might thereby be done to make detailed research fruitful4 7#e7 ,and finally1 perhaps1 if psychology be a philosophical study1 some hint as to its purpose and problem would be desirable4 ,if it is only an abstract branch of science1 of course1 no such hint is in place4 ,essay ,,iii4 ,on ,some ,psychological ,aspects ,of ,ethics4 ,allusion has already been made to the question of the boundaries between logic and psychology1 between logic and ethics1 ethics and psychology1 and psychology and epistemology4 ,each of these occasionally comes to cover ground that seems more appropriate to the others4 ,logic is sometimes restricted to denote the study of the conditions of derivative knowledge1 of the canons of inference and the modes of proof4 ,if taken more widely as the science of thought-form1 it is supposed to imply a world of fixed or stereotyped relations between ideas1 a system of stable thoughts governed by inflexible laws in an absolute order of immemorial or eternal truth4 ,as against such fixity1 psychology is supposed to deal with these same ideas as products--as growing out of a living process of thought--having a history behind them and perhaps a prospect of further change4 ,the genesis so given may be either a mere chronicle-history1 or it may be a philosophical development4 ,in the former case1 it would note the occasions of incident and circumstance1 the reactions of mind and environment1 under which the ideas were formed4 ,such a psychological genesis of several ideas is found in the ,second ,book of ,locke's ,essay4 ,in the latter case1 the account would be more concerned with the inner movement1 the action and reaction in ideas themselves1 considered not as due to casual occurrences1 but as self-developing by an organic growth4 ,but in either case1 ideas would be shown not to be ready-made and independently existing kinds in a world of idea-things1 and not to form an unchanging diagram or framework1 but to be a growth1 to have a history1 and a development4 ,psychology in this sense would be a dynamical1 as opposed to the supposed statical1 treatment of ideas and concepts in logic4 ,but it may be doubted how far it is well to call this psychology3 unless psychology deals with the contents of the mental life1 in their meaning and purpose1 instead of1 as seems proper1 merely in their character of psychic events4 ,such psychology is rather an evolutionist logic1--a dialectic process more than an analytic of a datum4 ,in the same way1 ethics may be brought into one kind of contact with psychology4 ,ethics1 like logic1 may be supposed to presuppose and to deal with a certain inflexible scheme of requirements1 a world of moral order governed by invariable or universal law2 an eternal kingdom of right1 existing independently of human wills1 but to be learned and followed out in uncompromising obedience4 ,as against this supposed absolute order1 psychology may be said to show the genesis of the idea of obligation and duty1 the growth of the authority of conscience1 the formation of ideals1 the relativity of moral ideas4 ,here also it may reach this conclusion1 by a more external or a more internal mode of argument4 ,it may try to show1 in other words1 that circumstances give rise to these forms of estimating conduct1 or it may argue that they are a necessary development in the human being1 constituted as he is4 ,it may again be doubted whether this is properly called psychology4 ,yet its purport seems ultimately to be that the objective order is misconceived when it is regarded as an external or quasi-physical order3 as a law written up and sanctioned with an external authority--as1 in ,kant's words1 a heteronomy4 ,if that order is objective1 it is so because it is also in a sense subjective3 if it is above the mere individuality of the individual1 it is still in a way identical with his true or universal self-hood4 ,thus 8psychological0 here means the recognition that the logical and the moral law is an autonomy3 that it is not given1 but though necessary1 necessary by the inward movement of the mind4 ,the metaphor of law is1 in brief1 misleading4 ,for1 according to a common1 though probably an erroneous1 analysis of that term1 the essence of a law in the political sphere is to be a species of command4 ,and that is rather a one-sidedly practical or aesthetic way of looking at it4 ,the essence of law in general1 and the precondition of every law in special1 is rather uniformity and universality1 self-consistency and absence of contradiction3 or1 in other words1 rationality4 ,its essential opposite--or its contradiction in essence--is a privilege1 an attempt at isolating a case from others4 ,it need not indeed always require bare uniformity--require i4e4 the same act to be done by different people3 but it must always require that every thing within its operation shall be treated on principles of utter and thorough harmony and consistency4 ,it requires each thing to be treated on public principles and with publicity3 nothing apart and mere singular1 as a mere incident or as a world by itself4 ,differently it may be treated1 but always on grounds of common well-being1 as part of an embracing system4 ,there is probably another sense1 however1 in which psychology comes into close relation with ethics4 ,if we look on man as a microcosm1 his inner system will more or less reproduce the system of the larger world4 ,the older psychology used to distinguish an upper or superior order of faculties from a lower or inferior4 ,thus in the intellectual sphere1 the intellect1 judgment1 and reason were set above the senses1 imagination1 and memory4 ,among the active powers1 reasonable will1 practical reason and conscience were ranked as paramount over the appetites and desires and emotions4 ,and this use of the word 8faculty0 is as old as ,plato1 who regards science as a superior faculty to opinion or imagination4 ,but this application--which seems a perfectly legitimate one--does not1 in the first instance1 belong to psychology at all4 ,no doubt it is psychically presented3 but it has an other source4 ,it springs from an appreciation1 a judgment of the comparative truth or reality of what the so-called psychical act means or expresses4 ,such faculties are powers in a hierarchy of means and ends and presuppose a normative or critical function which has classified reality4 ,psychically1 the elements which enter into knowledge are not other than those which belong to opinion3 but they are nearer an adequate rendering of reality1 they are truer1 or nearer the ,idea4 ,and in the main we may say1 that is truer or more real which succeeds in more completely organising and unifying elements--which rises more and more above the selfish or isolated part into the thorough unity of all parts4 ,the superior faculty is therefore the more thorough organisation of that which is elsewhere less harmoniously systematised4 ,opinion is fragmentary and partial3 it begins abruptly and casually from the unknown1 and runs off no less abruptly into the unknown4 ,knowledge1 on the contrary1 is unified3 and its unity gives it its strength and superiority4 ,the powers which thus exist are the subjective counterparts of objectively valuable products4 ,thus1 reason is the subjective counterpart of a world in which all the constituents are harmonised and fall into due relationship4 ,it is a product or result1 which is not psychologically1 but logically or morally important4 ,it is a faculty1 because it means that actually its possessor has ordered and systematised his life or his ideas of things4 ,psychologically1 it1 like unreason1 is a compound of elements3 but in the case of reason the composition is unendingly and infinitely consistent2 it is knowledge completely unified4 ,the distinction then is not in the strictest sense psychological3 for it has an aesthetic or normative character2 it is logical or ethical3 it denotes that the idea or the act is an approach to truth or goodness4 ,and so1 when ,butler or ,plato distinguishes reason or reflection from appetites and affections1 and even from self-love or from the heart which loves and hates1 this is not exactly a psychological division in the narrower sense4 ,that is to say3 these are1 in ,plato's words1 not merely 8parts10 but quite as much 8kinds0 and 8forms0 of soul4 ,they denote degrees in that harmonisation of mind and soul which reproduces the permanent and complete truth of things4 ,for example1 self-love1 as ,butler describes it1 has but a partial and narrowed view of the worth of acts3 it is engrossing and self-involved3 it cannot take in the full dependence of the narrower interest on the larger and eternal self4 ,so1 in ,plato1 the man of heart is but a nature which by fits and starts1 or with steady but limited vision1 realises the larger life4 ,these parts or kinds are not separate and co-existent faculties3 but grades in the co-ordination and unification of the same one human nature4 7i47 ,psychology and ,epistemology4 ,psychology however in the strict sense is extremely difficult to define4 ,those who describe it as the 8science of mind10 the 8phenomenology of consciousness10 seem to give it a wider scope than they really mean4 ,the psychologist of the straiter sect tends1 on the other hand1 to carry us beyond mind and consciousness altogether4 ,his1 it has been said1 is a psychology without a ,psych4 ,for him ,mind1 ,soul1 and ,consciousness are only current and convenient names to designate the field1 the ground on which the phenomena he observes are supposed to transact themselves4 ,but they must not on any account interfere with the operations2 any more than ,nature in general may interfere with strictly physical inquiries1 or ,life and vital force with the theories of biology4 ,the so-called ,mind is only to be regarded as a stage on which certain events represent themselves4 ,in this field1 or on this stage1 there are certain relatively ultimate elements1 variously called ideas1 presentations1 feelings1 or states of consciousness4 ,but these elements1 though called ideas1 must not be supposed more than mechanical or dynamical elements2 consciousness is rather their product1 a product which presupposes certain operations and relations between them4 ,if we are to be strictly scientific1 we must1 it is urged1 treat the factors of consciousness as not themselves conscious3 we must regard them as quasi-objective1 or in abstraction from the consciousness which surveys them4 ,the ,ego must sink into a mere receptacle or arena of psychic event2 its independent meaning or purport is to be ignored1 as beside the question4 ,when this line is once fixed upon1 it seems inevitable to go farther4 ,comte was inclined to treat psychology as falling between two stools3 it must1 he thought1 draw all its content either from physiology on the one hand1 or from social factors on the other4 ,the dominant or experimental psychology of the present day seems inclined1 without however formulating any very definite statement1 to pronounce for the former alternative4 ,it does not indeed adopt the materialistic view that mind is only a function of matter4 ,its standpoint rather is that the psychical presents itself even to unskilled observation as dependent on 7i4e4 not independent of7 or as concomitant with certain physical or corporeal facts4 ,it adds that the more accurately trained the observer becomes1 the more he comes to discover a corporeal aspect even where originally he had not surmised its existence1 and to conclude that the two cycles of psychical and physical event never interfere with each other3 that soul does not intervene in bodily process1 nor body take up and carry on psychical4 ,if it is said that the will moves the limbs1 he replies that the will which moves is really certain formerly unnoticed movements of nerve and muscle which are felt or interpreted as a discharge of power4 ,if the ocular impression is said to cause an impression on the mind1 he replies that any fact hidden under that phrase refers to a change in the molecules of the brain4 ,he will therefore conclude that for the study of psychical phenomena the physical basis1 as it may be called1 is all important4 ,only so can observation really deal with fact capable of description and measurement4 ,thus psychology1 it may be said1 tends to become a department of physiology4 ,from another standpoint1 biology may be said to receive its completion in psychology4 ,how much either phrase means1 however1 will depend on the estimate we form of biology4 ,if biology is only the study of mechanical and chemical phenomena on the peculiar field known as an organism1 and if that organism is only treated as an environment which may be ignored1 then psychology1 put on the same level1 is not the full science of mind1 any more than the other is the full study of life4 ,they both have narrowed their subject to suit the abstract scheme of the laboratory1 where the victim of experiment is either altered by mutilation and artificial restrictions1 or is dead4 ,if1 on the contrary1 biology has a substantial unity of its own to which mechanical and chemical considerations are subordinate and instrumental1 psychology may even take part with physiology without losing its essential rank4 ,but in that case1 we must1 as ,spinoza said7#dg71 think less mechanically of the animal frame1 and recognise 7after the example of ,schelling7 something truly inward 7i4e4 not merely locally inside the skin7 as the supreme phase or characteristic of life4 ,we must1 in short1 recognise sensibility as the culmination of the physiological and the beginning of the psychological4 ,to the strictly scientific psychologist1 as has been noted--or to the psychology which imitates optical and electrical science--ideas are only psychical events3 they are not ideas of anything1 relative1 i4e4 to something else2 they have no meaning1 and no reference to a reality beyond themselves4 ,they are presentations2--not representations of something outside consciousness4 ,they are appearances3 but not appearances of something3 they do not reveal anything beyond themselves4 ,they are1 we may almost say1 a unique kind of physical phenomena4 ,if we say they are presentations of something1 we only mean that in the presented something1 in the felt something1 the wished something1 we separate the quality or form or aspect of presentativeness1 of feltness1 of wishedness1 and consider this aspect by itself4 ,there are grades1 relations1 complications1 of such presentations or in such presentedness3 and with the description and explanation of these1 psychology is concerned4 ,they are fainter or stronger1 more or less correlated and antithetical4 ,presentation 7or ideation71 in short1 is the name of a train of event1 which has its peculiarities1 its laws1 its systems1 its history4 ,all reality1 it may be said1 subsists in such presentation2 it is for a consciousness1 or in a consciousness4 ,all esse1 in its widest sense1 is percipi4 ,and yet1 it seems but the commonest of experiences to say that all that is presented is not reality4 ,it is1 it has a sort of being1--is somehow presumed to exist3 but it is not reality4 ,and this reference and antithesis to what is presented is implied in all such terms as 8ideas10 8feelings10 8states of consciousness03 they are distinguished from and related to objects of sense or external facts1 to something1 as it is called1 outside consciousness4 ,thoughts and ideas are set against things and realities4 ,in their primitive stage both the child and the savage seem to recognise no such difference4 ,what they imagine is1 as we might say1 on the same plane with what they touch and feel4 ,they do not1 as we reproachfully remark1 recognise the difference between fact and fiction4 ,all of us indeed are liable to lapses into the same condition4 ,a strong passion1 a keen hope or fear1 as we say1 invests its objects with reality3 even a sanguine moment presents as fact what calmer reflection disallows as fancy4 ,with natural and sane intelligences1 however1 the recrudescence of barbarous imagination is soon dispelled1 and the difference between hallucinations and realities is established4 ,with the utterly wrecked in mind1 the reality of hallucinations becomes a permanent or habitual state4 ,with the child and the untrained it is a recurrent and a disturbing influence3 and it need hardly be added that the circle of these decepti deceptores--people with the 8lie in the ,soul0--is a large one4 ,there thus emerges a distinction of vast importance1 that of truth and falsehood1 of reality and unreality1 or between representation and reality4 ,there arise two worlds1 the world of ideas1 and the world of reality which it is supposed to represent1 and1 in many cases1 to represent badly4 ,with this distinction we are brought across the problem sometimes called ,epistemological4 ,strictly speaking1 it is really part of a larger problem3 the problem of what--if ,greek compounds must be used--may be styled ,aletheiology--the theory of truth and reality3 what ,hegel called ,logic1 and what many others have called ,metaphysics4 ,as it is ordinarily taken up1 8ideas0 are believed to be something in us which is representative or symbolical of something truly real outside us4 ,this inward something is said to be the first and immediate object of knowledge7#dh71 and gives us--in a mysterious way we need not here discuss--the mediate knowledge of the reality1 which is sometimes said to cause it4 ,ideas in the ,mind1 or in the ,subject1 or in us1 bear witness to something outside the mind1--trans-subjective--beyond us4 ,the ,mind1 ,subject1 or ,ego1 in this parallelism is evidently in some way identified with our corporeal organism3 perhaps even located1 and provided with a 8seat10 in some defined space of that organism4 ,it is1 however1 the starting-point of the whole distinction that ideas do not1 no less than they do1 conform or correspond to this supra-conscious or extra-conscious world of real things4 ,truth or falsehood arises1 according to these assumptions1 according as psychical image or idea corresponds or not to physical fact4 ,but how1 unless by some miraculous second-sight1 where the supreme consciousness1 directly contemplating by intuition the true and independent reality1 turns to compare with this immediate vision the results of the mediate processes conducted along the organs of sense1--how this agreement or disagreement of copy and original1 of idea and reality1 can be detected1 it is impossible to say4 ,as has been already noted1 the mischief lies in the hypostatisation of ideas as something existing in abstraction from things--and1 of things1 in abstraction from ideas4 ,they are two abstractions1 the first by the realist1 the second by the idealist called subjective and psychological4 ,to the realist1 things exist by themselves1 and they manage to produce a copy of themselves 7more or less exact1 or symbolical7 in our mind1 i4e4 in a materialistically-spiritual or a spiritualistically-material locus which holds 8images0 and ideas4 ,to the psychological idealist1 ideas have a substantive and primary right to existence1 them alone do we really know1 and from them we more or less legitimately are said 7but probably no one takes this seriously7 to infer or postulate a world of permanent things4 ,now ideas have no substantive existence as a sort of things1 or even images of things anywhere4 ,all this is pure mythology4 ,it is said by comparative mythologists that in some cases the epithet or quality of some deity has been substantialised 7hypostatised7 into a separate god1 who1 however 7so still to keep up the unity71 is regarded as a relative1 a son1 or daughter1 of the original4 ,so the phrase 8ideas of things0 has been taken literally as if it was double4 ,but to have an idea of a thing merely means that we know it1 or think it4 ,an idea is not given3 it is a thing which is given in the idea4 ,an idea is not an additional and intervening object of our knowledge or supposed knowledge4 ,that a thing is our object of thought is another word for its being our idea1 and that means we know it4 ,the distinction between truth and falsehood1 between reality and appearance1 is not arrived at by comparing what we have before us in our mind with some inaccessible reality beyond4 ,it is a distinction that grows up with the growth and organisation of our presentations--with their gradual systematisation and unification in one consciousness4 ,but this consciousness which thinks1 i4e4 judges and reasons1 is something superior to the contrast of physical and psychical3 superior1 i4e4 in so far as it includes and surveys the antithesis1 without superseding it4 ,it is the 8transcendental unity of consciousness0 of ,kant--his synthetic unity of apperception4 ,it means that all ideas ultimately derive their reality from their coherence with each other in an all-embracing or infinite idea4 ,real in a sense ideas always are1 but with an imperfect reality4 ,thus the education to truth is not--such a thing would be meaningless--ended by a rough and ready recommendation to compare our ideas with facts3 it must teach the art which discovers facts4 ,and the teaching may have to go through many grades or provinces3 in each of which it is possible to acquire a certain virtuosoship without being necessarily an adept in another4 ,it is through what is called the development of intellect1 judgment1 and reasoning that the faculty of truth-detecting or truth-selecting comes4 ,and the common feature of all of these is1 so to say1 their superiority to the psychological mechanism1 not in the sense of working without it and directly1 but of being the organising unity or unifier and controller and judge of that mechanism4 ,the certainty and necessity of truth and knowledge do not come from a constraint from the external thing which forces the inner idea into submission2 they come from the inner necessity of conformity and coherence in the organism of experience4 ,we in fact had better speak of ideas as experience--as felt reality3 a reality however which has its degrees and perhaps even its provinces4 ,all truth comes with the reasoned judgment1 i4e4 the syllogism--i4e4 with the institution or discovery of relations of fact or element to fact or element1 immediate or derivative1 partial and less partial1 up to its ideal coherence in one ,idea4 ,it is because this coherence is so imperfectly established in many human beings that their knowledge is so indistinguishable from opinion1 and that they separate so loosely truth from error4 ,they have not worked their way into a definitely articulated system1 where there are no gaps1 no abrupt transitions3 their mental order is so loosely put together that divergences and contradictions which vex another drop off ineffectual from them4 7ii47 ,kant1 ,fichte1 and ,hegel4 ,this was the idealism which ,kant taught and ,fichte promoted4 ,of the other idealism there are no doubt abundant traces in the language of ,kant3 and they were greedily fastened on by ,schopenhauer4 ,to him the doctrine1 that the world is my idea1 is adequately represented when it is translated into the phrase that the world is a phantasmagoria of my brain2 and escape from the subjective idealism thus initiated is found by him only through a supposed revelation of immediate being communicated in the experience of will4 ,but according to the more consistently interpreted ,kant1 the problem of philosophy consists in laying bare the supreme law or conditions of consciousness on which depend the validity of our knowledge1 our estimates of conduct1 and our aesthetic standards4 ,and these roots of reality are for ,kant in the mind--or1 should we rather say--in mind--in 8,consciousness in ,general40 ,in the ,criticism of ,pure ,reason the general drift of his examination is to show that the great things or final realities which are popularly supposed to stand in self-subsistent being1 as ultimate and all-comprehensive objects set up for knowledge1 are not 8things0 as popularly supposed1 but imperative and inevitable ideas4 ,they are not objects to be known--7these are always finite73 but rather the unification1 the basis1 or condition1 and the completion of all knowledge4 ,to know them--in the ordinary petty sense of knowledge--is as absurd and impossible as it would be1 in the ,platonic scheme of reality1 to know the idea of good which is 8on the further side of knowledge and being40 ,god and the ,soul--and the same would be true of the ,world 7though modern speculators sometimes talk as if they had it at least within their grasp7--are not mere objects of knowledge4 ,it would be truer to say they are that by which we know1 and they are what in us knows3 they make knowledge possible1 and actual4 ,kant has sometimes spoken of them as the objects of a faith of reason4 ,what he means is that reason only issues in knowledge because of and through this inevitable law of reason bidding us go on for ever in our search1 because there can be nothing isolated and nowhere any ne plus ultra in science1 which is infinite and yet only justified as it postulates or commands unity4 ,kant's central idea is that truth1 beauty1 goodness1 are not dependent on some qualities of the object1 but on the universal nature or law of consciousness4 ,beauty is not an attribute of things in their abstractness3 but of things as ideas of a subject1 and depends on the proportion and symmetry in the play of human faculty4 ,goodness is not conformity to an outward law1 but is obligatory on us through that higher nature which is our truer being4 ,truth is not conformity of ideas with supposed trans-subjective things1 but coherence and stability in the system of ideas4 ,the really infinite world is not out there1 but in here--in consciousness in general1 which is the denial of all limitation1 of all finality1 of all isolation4 ,god is the essential and inherent unity and unifier of spirit and nature--the surety that the world in all its differentiations is one4 ,the ,soul is not an essential entity1 but the infinite fruitfulness and freshness of mental life1 which forbids us stopping at anything short of complete continuity and unity4 ,the ,kingdom of ,god--the ,soul--the moral law--is within us3 within us1 as supreme1 supra-personal and infinite intelligences1 even amid all our littleness and finitude4 ,even happiness which we stretch our arms after is not really beyond us1 but is the essential self which indeed we can only reach in detail4 ,it is so both in knowledge and in action4 ,each knowledge and enjoyment in reality is limited and partial1 but it is made stable1 and it gets a touch of infinitude1 by the larger idea which it helps to realise4 ,only indeed in that antithesis between the finite and the infinite does the real live4 ,every piece of knowledge is real1 only because it assumes pro tempore certain premisses which are given3 every actual beauty is set in some defect of aesthetic completeness3 every actually good deed has to get its foil in surrounding badness4 ,the real is always partial and incomplete4 ,but it has the basis or condition of its reality in an idea--in a transcendental unity of consciousness1 which is so to say a law1 or a system and an order1 which imposes upon it the condition of conformity and coherence2 but a conformity which is essential and implicit in it4 ,fichte has called his system a ,wissenschaftslehre--a theory of knowledge4 ,modern ,german used the word ,wissenschaft1 as modern ,english uses the word ,science1 to denote the certified knowledge of piecemeal fact1 the partial unification of elements still kept asunder4 ,but by ,wissen1 as opposed to ,erkennen1 is meant the ,i know1 am aware and sure1 am in contact with reality1 as opposed to the derivative and conditional reference of something to something else which explains it4 ,the former is a wider term3 it denotes all consciousness of objective truth1 the certainty which claims to be necessary and universal1 which pledges its whole self for its assertion4 ,fichte thus unifies and accentuates the common element in the ,kantian criticisms4 ,in the first of these ,kant had begun by explaining the nature and limitation of empirical science4 ,it was essentially conditioned by the given sensation--dependent i4e4 on an unexplained and preliminary element4 ,this is what makes it science in the strict or narrow sense of the term3 its being set1 as it were1 in the unknown1 the felt1 the sense-datum4 ,the side of reality is thus the side of limitation and of presupposition4 ,but what makes it truth and knowledge in general1 on the other hand1--as distinct from a truth 7i4e4 partial truth7 and a knowledge1--is the ideal element--the mathematical1 the logical1 the rational law1--or in one word1 the universal and formal character4 ,so too every real action is on one hand the product of an impulse1 a dark1 merely given1 immediate tendency to be1 and without that would be nothing3 but on the other hand it is only an intelligent and moral action in so far as it has its constitution from an intelligence1 a formal system1 which determine its place and function4 ,it is on the latter or ideal element that ,kant makes the emphasis increasingly turn4 ,not truths1 duties1 beauties1 but truth1 duty1 beauty1 form his theme4 ,the formal element--the logical or epistemological condition of knowledge and morality and of beauty--is what he 7and still more ,fichte7 considers the prime question of fundamental philosophy4 ,his philosophy is an attempt to get at the organism of our fundamental belief--the construction1 from the very base1 of our conception of reality1 of our primary certainty4 ,in technical language1 he describes our essential nature as a ,subject-object4 ,it is the unity of an ,i am which is also ,i know that ,i am3 an ,i will which is also ,i am conscious of my will7#di74 ,here there is a radical disunion and a supersession of that disunion4 ,action and contemplation are continually outrunning each other4 ,the ,i will rests upon one ,i know1 and works up to another3 the ,i know reflects upon an ,i will1 and includes it as an element in its idea4 ,kant had brought into use the term ,deduction1 and ,fichte follows him4 ,the term leads to some confusion3 for in ,english1 by its modern antithesis to induction1 it suggests a priori methods in all their iniquity4 ,it means a kind of jugglery which brings an endless series out of one small term4 ,kant has explained that he uses it in the lawyer's sense in which a claim is justified by being traced step by step back to some acknowledged and accepted right7#ej74 ,it is a regressive method which shows us that if the original datum is to be accepted it carries along with it the legitimation of the consequence4 ,this method ,fichte applies to psychology4 ,begin1 he says like ,condillac1 with the barest nucleus of soul-life2 the mere sentiency1 or feeling3 the contact1 as it were1 with being1 at a single point4 ,but such a mere point is unthinkable4 ,you find1 as ,mr4 ,spencer says1 that 8,thought0 7or ,consciousness7 8cannot be framed out of one term only40 8,every sensation to be known as one must be perceived40 ,such is the nature of the ,ego--a subject which insists on each part being qualified by the whole and so transformed4 ,as ,mr4 ,spencer1 again1 puts it1 the mind not merely tends to revive1 to associate1 to assimilate1 to represent its own presentations1 but it carries on this process infinitely and in ever higher multiples4 ,ideas as it were are growing in complexity by re-presenting3 i4e4 by embracing and enveloping elements which cannot be found existing in separation4 ,in the mind there is no mere presentation1 no bare sensation4 ,such a unit is a fiction or hypothesis we employ1 like the atom1 for purposes of explanation4 ,the pure sensation therefore--which you admit because you must have something to begin with1 not a mere nothing1 but something so simple that it seems to stand out clear and indisputable--this pure sensation1 when you think of it1 forces you to go a good deal further4 ,even to be itself1 it must be more than itself4 ,it is like the pure or mere being of the logicians4 ,admit the simple sensation--and you have admitted everything which is required to make sensation a possible reality4 ,but you do not--in the sense of vulgar logic--deduce what follows out of the beginning4 ,from that1 taken by itself1 you will get only itself3 mere being will give you only nothing1 to the end of the chapter4 ,but1 as the phrase is1 sensation is an element in a consciousness3 it is1 when you think of it1 always more than you called it3 there is a curious 8continuity0 about the phenomena1 which makes real isolation impossible4 ,of course this 8deduction0 is not history3 it is logic4 ,it says1 if you posit sensation1 then in doing so1 you posit a good deal more4 ,you have imagination1 reason1 and many more1 all involved in your original assumption4 ,and there is a further point to be noted4 ,you cannot really stop even at reason1 at intelligence and will1 if you take these in the full sense4 ,you must realise that these only exist as part and parcel of a reasonable world4 ,an individual intelligence presupposes a society of intelligences4 ,the successive steps in this argument are presented by ,fichte in the chief works of his earlier period 7#agid-ih74 ,the works of that period form a kind of trilogy of philosophy1 by which the faint outlines of the absolute selfhood is shown acquiring definite consistency in the moral organisation of society4 ,first comes the 8,foundation for the collective philosophy40 ,it shows how our conception of reality and our psychical organisation are inevitably presupposed in the barest function of intelligence1 in the abstractest forms of logical law4 ,begin where you like1 with the most abstract and formal point of consciousness1 you are forced1 as you dwell upon it 7you identifying yourself with the thought you realise71 to go step by step on till you accept as a self-consistent and self-explanatory unity all that your cognitive and volitional nature claims to own as its birthright4 ,only in such an intelligent will is perception and sensation possible4 ,next came the 8,foundation of ,natural ,law1 on the principles of the general theory40 ,here the process of deduction is carried a step further4 ,if man is to realise himself as an intelligence with an inherent bent to action1 then he must be conceived as a person among persons1 as possessed of rights1 as incapable of acting without at the same moment claiming for his acts recognition1 generality1 and logical consecution4 ,the reference1 which in the conception of a practical intelligence was implicit1--the reference to fellow-agents1 to a world in which law rules--is thus1 by the explicit recognition of these references1 made a fact patent and positive--gesetzt1--expressly instituted in the way that the nature and condition of things postulates4 ,but this is not all3 we step from the formal and absolute into the material and relative4 ,if man is to be a real intelligence1 he must be an intelligence served by organs4 8,the rational being cannot realise its efficient individuality1 unless it ascribes to itself a material body03 a body1 moreover1 in which ,fichte believes he can show that the details of structure and organs are equally with the general corporeity predetermined by reason7#ea74 ,in the same way it is shown that the social and political organisation is required for the realisation--the making positive and yet coherent--of the rights of all individuals4 ,you deduce society by showing it is required to make a genuine individual man4 ,thirdly came the 8,system of ,ethics40 ,here it is further argued that1 at least in a certain respect7#eb71 in spite of my absolute reason and my absolute freedom1 ,i can only be fully real as a part of ,nature3 that my reason is realised in a creature of appetite and impulse4 ,from first to last this deduction is one process which may be said to have for its object to determine 8the conditions of self-hood or egoity40 ,it is the deduction of the concrete and empirical moral agent--the actual ego of actual life--from the abstract1 unconditioned ego1 which in order to be actual must condescend to be at once determining and determined4 ,in all of this ,fichte makes--especially formally--a decided advance upon ,kant4 ,in ,ethics ,kant in particular1 7--especially for readers who never got beyond the beginning of his moral treatise and were overpowered by the categorical imperative of duty7 had found the moral initiative or dynamic apparently in the other world4 ,the voice of duty seemed to speak from a region outside and beyond the individual conscience4 ,in a sense it must do so3 but it comes from a consciousness which is1 and yet is more than1 the individual4 ,it is indeed true that appearances here are deceptive3 and that the idea of autonomy1 the self-legislation of reason1 is trying to become the central conception of ,kant's ,ethics4 ,still it is ,fichte's merit to have seen this clearly1 to have held it in view unfalteringly1 and to have carried it out in undeviating system or deduction4 ,man1 intelligent1 social1 ethical1 is a being all of one piece and to be explained entirely immanently1 or from himself4 ,law and ethics are no accident either to sense or to intelligence--nothing imposed by mere external or supernal authority7#ec74 ,society is not a brand-new order of things supervening upon and superseding a state of nature1 where the individual was entirely self-supporting4 ,morals1 law1 society1 are all necessary steps 7necessary i4e4 in logic1 and hence in the long run also inevitable in course of time7 to complete the full evolution or realisation of a human being4 ,the same conditions as make man intelligent make him social and moral4 ,he does not proceed so far as to become intelligent and practical1 under terms of natural and logical development1 then to fall into the hands of a foreign influence1 an accident ab extra1 which causes him to become social and moral4 ,rather he is intelligent1 because he is a social agent4 ,hence1 in ,fichte1 the absence of the ascetic element so often stamping its character on ethics1 and representing the moral life as the enemy of the natural1 or as mainly a struggle to subdue the sensibility and the flesh4 ,with ,kant1--as becomes his position of mere inquirer--the sensibility has the place of a predominant and permanent foreground4 ,reason1 to his way of talking1 is always something of an intruder1 a stranger from a far-off world1 to be feared even when obeyed3 sublime1 rather than beautiful4 ,from the land of sense which we habitually occupy1 the land of reason is a country we can only behold from afar3 or if we can be said to have a standpoint in it1 that is only a figurative way of saying that though it is really over the border1 we can act--it would sometimes seem by a sort of make-believe--as if we were already there4 ,but these moments of high enthusiasm are rare2 and ,kant commends sobriety and warns against high-minded ,schwrmerei1 or over-strained ,mysticism4 ,for us it is reserved to struggle with a recalcitrant selfhood1 a grovelling sensibility3 it were only fantastic extravagance1 fit for 8fair souls0 who unfortunately often lapse into 8fair sinners10 should we fancy ourselves already anchored in the haven of untempted rest and peace4 ,when we come to ,fichte1 we find another spirit breathing4 ,we have passed from the age of ,frederick the ,great to the age of the ,french ,revolution2 and the breeze that burst in the ,war of ,liberation is already beginning to freshen the air4 ,boldly he pronounces the primacy of that faith of reason whereby not merely the just but all shall live4 ,your will shall show you what you really are4 ,you are essentially a rational will1 or a will-reason4 ,your sensuous nature1 of impulse and appetite1 far from being the given and found obstacle to the realisation of reason1--which ,kant strictly interpreted might sometimes seem to imply--7and in this point ,schopenhauer carries out the implications of ,kant7--is really the condition or mode of being which reason assumes1 or rises up to1 in order to be a practical or moral being4 ,far from the body and the sensible needs being a stumbling-block to hamper the free fullness of rationality and morality1 the truth rather is that it is only by body and sense1 by flesh and blood1 that the full moral and rational life can be realised7#ed74 ,or1 to put it otherwise1 if human reason 7intelligence and will7 is to be more than a mere and empty inner possibility1 if man is to be a real and concrete cognitive and volitional being1 he must be a member of an ethical and actual society1 which lives by bread1 and which marries and has children4 7iii47 ,psychology in ,ethics4 ,in this way1 for ,fichte1 and through ,fichte still more decidedly for ,hegel1 both psychology and ethics breathe an opener and ampler air than they often enjoy4 ,psychology ceases to be a mere description of psychic events1 and becomes the history of the self-organising process of human reason4 ,ethics loses its cloistered1 negative1 unnatural aspect1 and becomes a name for some further conditions of the same development1 essentially postulated to complete or supplement its shortcomings4 ,psychology--taken in this high philosophical acceptation--thus leads on to ,ethics2 and ,ethics is parted by no impassable line from ,psychology4 ,that1 at least1 is what must happen if they are still to retain a place in philosophy3 for1 as ,kant says7#ee71 8under the government of reason our cognitions cannot form a rhapsody1 but must constitute a system1 in which alone can they support and further its essential aims40 ,as parts of such a system1 they carry out their special work in subordination to1 and in the realisation of1 a single ,idea--and therefore in essential interconnexion4 ,from that interconnecting band we may however in detail-enquiry dispense ourselves2 and then we have the empirical or inductive sciences of psychology and ethics4 ,but even with these1 the necessity of the situation is such that it is only a question of degree how far we lose sight of the philosophical horizon1 and entrench ourselves in special enquiry4 ,something of the philosophic largeness must always guide us2 even when1 to further the interests of the whole1 it is necessary for the special enquirer to bury himself entirely in his part4 ,so long as each part is sincerely and thoroughly pursued1 and no part is neglected1 there is an indwelling reason in the parts which will in the long run tend to constitute the total4 ,a philosophical psychology will show us how the sane intelligence and the rational will are1 at least approximately1 built up out of elements1 and through stages and processes1 which modify and complement1 as they may also arrest and perplex1 each other4 ,the unity1 coherence1 and completeness of the intelligent self is not1 as vulgar irreflectiveness supposes and somewhat angrily maintains1 a full-grown thing or agent1 of whose actions and modes of behaviour the psychologist has to narrate the history1--a history which is too apt to degenerate into the anecdotal and the merely interesting4 ,this unity of self has to be 8deduced10 as ,fichte would say3 it has to be shown as the necessary result which certain elements in a certain order will lead to7#ef74 ,a normal mind1 self-possessed1 developed and articulated1 yet thoroughly one1 a real microcosm1 or true and full monad1 which under the mode of its individuality still represents the universe3 that is1 what psychology has to show as the product of factors and processes4 ,and it is clearly something great and good1 something valuable1 and already possessing1 by implication we may say1 an ethical character4 ,in philosophy1 at least1 it is difficult1 or rather impossible to draw a hard and fast line which shall demarcate ethical from non-ethical characters1--to separate them from other intellectual and reasonable motives4 ,kant1 as we know1 attempted to do so3 but with the result that he was forced to add a doubt whether a purely moral act could ever be said to exist7#eg72 or rather to express the certainty that if it did it was for ever inaccessible to observation4 ,all such designations of the several 8factors0 or 8moments0 in reality1 as has been hinted1 are only a potiori4 ,but they are misused when it is supposed that they connote abrupt and total discontinuity4 ,and ,kant1 after all1 only repeated in his own terminology an old and inveterate habit of thought3--the habit which in ,stoicism seemed to see sage and foolish utterly separated1 and which in the straiter sects of ,christendom fenced off saint absolutely from sinner4 ,it is a habit to which ,hegel1 and even his immediate predecessors1 are radically opposed4 ,with ,herder1 he might say1 8,ethics is only a higher physics of the mind7#eh740 ,this--the truth in ,spinozism--no doubt demands some emphasis on the word 8higher03 and it requires us to read ethics 7or something like it7 into physics2 but it is a step on the right road1--the step which ,utilitarianism and ,evolutionism had 7however awkwardly7 got their foot upon1 and which 8transcendent0 ethics seems unduly afraid of committing itself to4 ,let us say1 if we like1 that the mind is more than mere nature1 and that it is no proper object of a merely natural science4 ,but let us remember that a merely natural science is only a fragment of science3 let us add that the merely natural is an abstraction which in part denaturalises and mutilates the larger nature--a nature which includes the natural mind1 and cannot altogether exclude the ethical4 ,what have been called 8formal duties7#ei70 seem to fall under this range--the province of a philosophical psychology which unveils the conditions of personality4 ,under that heading may be put self-control1 consistency1 resolution1 energy1 forethought1 prudence1 and the like4 ,the due proportion of faculty1 the correspondence of head and heart1 the vivacity and quickness of sympathy1 the ease and simplicity of mental tone1 the due vigour of memory and the grace of imagination1 sweetness of temper1 and the like1 are parts of the same group7#fj74 ,they are lovely1 and of good report3 they are praise and virtue4 ,if it be urged that they are only natural gifts and graces1 that objection cuts two ways4 ,the objector may of course be reminded that religion tones down the self-complacency of morality4 ,yet1 first1 even apart from that1 it may be said that of virtues1 which stand independent of natural conditions--of external supply of means 7as ,aristotle would say7--nothing can be known and nothing need be said4 ,and secondly1 none of these qualities are mere gifts2--all require exercise1 habituation1 energising1 to get and keep them4 ,how much and how little in each case is nature's and how much ours is a problem which has some personal interest--due perhaps to a rather selfish and envious curiosity4 ,but on the broad field of experience and history we may perhaps accept the--apparently one-sided--proverb that 8,each man is the architect of his own fortune40 ,be this as it may1 it will not do to deny the ethical character of these 8formal duties0 on the ground e4g4 that self-control1 prudence1 and even sweetness of temper may be used for evil ends1--that one may smile and smile1 and yet be a villain4 ,that--let us reply1--on one hand1 is a fault 7if fault it be7 incidental to all virtues in detail 7for every single quality has its defect73 nay it may be a limitation attaching to the whole ethical sphere3 and1 secondly1 its inevitable limitation does not render the virtue in any case one whit less genuine so far as it goes4 ,and yet of such virtues it may be said1 as ,hume7#fa7 would say 7who calls them 8natural10 as opposed to the more artificial merits of justice and its kin71 that they please in themselves1 or in the mere contemplation1 and without any regard to their social effects4 ,but they please as entering into our idea of complete human nature1 of mind and spirit as will and intellect4 ,the moralists of last century sometimes divided the field of ethics by assigning to man three grades or kinds of duty3 duties to himself1 duties to society1 and duties to ,god4 ,for the distinction there is a good deal to be said3 there are also faults to be found with it4 ,it may be said1 amongst other things1 that to speak of duties to self is a metaphorical way of talking1 and that ,god lies out of the range of human duty altogether1 except in so far as religious service forms a part of social obligation4 ,it may be urged that man is essentially a social being1 and that it is only in his relations to other such beings that his morality can find a sphere4 ,the sphere of morality1 according to ,dr4 ,bain1 embraces whatever 8society has seen fit to enforce with all the rigour of positive inflictions4 ,positive good deeds and self-sacrifice 444 transcend the region of morality proper and occupy a sphere of their own7#fb740 ,and there is little doubt that this restriction is in accordance with a main current of usage4 ,it may even be said that there are tendencies towards a narrower usage still1 which would restrict the term to questions affecting the relations of the sexes4 ,but1 without going so far1 we may accept the standpoint which finds in the phrase 8popular or social0 sanction1 as equivalent to the moral sanction1 a description of the average level of common opinion on the topic4 ,the morality of an age or country thus denotes1 first1 the average requirement in act and behaviour imposed by general consent on the members of a community1 and secondly1 the average performance of the members in response to these requirements4 ,generally speaking the two will be pretty much the same4 ,if the society is in a state of equilibrium1 there will be a palpable agreement between what all severally expect and what all severally perform4 ,on the other hand1 as no society is ever in complete equilibrium1 this harmony will never be perfect and may often be widely departed from4 ,in what is called a single community1 if it reach a considerable bulk1 there are 7in other words7 often a number of minor societies1 more or less thwarting and modifying each other2 and different observers1 who belong in the main to one or other of these subordinate groups1 may elicit from the facts before them a somewhat different social code1 and a different grade of social observance4 ,still1 with whatever diversity of detail1 the important feature of such social ethics is that the stress is laid on the performance of certain acts1 in accordance with the organisation of society4 ,so long as the required compliance is given1 public opinion is satisfied1 and morality has got its due4 ,but in two directions this conception of morality needs to be supplementing4 ,there is1 on one hand1 what is called duty to ,god4 ,the phrase is not altogether appropriate3 for it follows too closely the analogy of social requirement1 and treats ,deity as an additional and social authority1--a lord paramount over merely human sovereigns4 ,but though there may be some use in the analogy1 to press the conception is seriously to narrow the divine character and the scope of religion4 ,as in similar cases1 we cannot change one term without altering its correlative4 ,and therefore to describe our relation to ,god under the name of duty is to narrow and falsify that relation4 ,the word is no longer applicable in this connexion without a strain1 and where it exists it indicates the survival of a conception of theocracy3 of ,god regarded as a glorification of the magistrate1 as king of kings and lord of lords4 ,it is the social world--and indeed we may say the outside of the social world--that is the sphere of duties4 ,duty is still with these reductions a great august name3 but in literal strictness it only rules over the medial sphere of life1 the sphere which lies between the individual as such and his universal humanity7#fc74 ,beyond duty1 lies the sphere of conscience and of religion4 ,and that is not the mere insistence by the individual to have a voice and a vote in determining the social order4 ,it is the sense that the social order1 however omnipotent it may seem1 is limited and finite1 and that man has in him a kindred with the ,eternal4 ,it is not very satisfactory1 either1 as ,aristotle and others have pointed out1 to speak of man's duties to himself4 ,the phrase is analogical1 like the other4 ,but it has the merit1 like that of duty to ,god1 of reminding us that the ordinary latitude occupied by morality is not all that comes under the larger scope of ethics4 ,the 8ethics of individual life0 is a subject which ,mr4 ,spencer has touched upon3 and by this title1 he means that1 besides his general relationship to others1 a human being has to mind his own health1 food1 and amusement1 and has duties as husband and parent4 ,but1 after all1 these are not matters of peculiarly individual interest4 ,they rather refer to points which society at certain epochs leaves to the common sense of the agent1--apparently on an assumption that he is the person chiefly interested4 ,and these points--as the ,greeks taught long ago--are of fundamental importance3 they are the very bases of life4 ,yet the comparative neglect in which so-called civilised societies7#fd7 hold the precepts of wisdom in relation to bodily health and vigour1 in regard to marriage and progeny1 serve to illustrate the doctrine of the ancient ,stoics that 1 or the modern idealist utterance that the ,world is my idea4 ,more and more as civilisation succeeds in its disruption of man from nature1 it shows him governed not by bare facts and isolated experiences1 but by the systematic idea under which all things are subsumed4 ,he loses the navet of the natural man1 which takes each fact as it came1 all alike good3 he becomes sentimental1 and artificial1 sees things under a conventional point of view1 and would rather die than not be in the fashion4 ,and this tendency is apparently irresistible4 ,yet the mistake lies in the one-sidedness of sentiment and convention4 ,not the domination of the idea is evil2 but the domination of a partial and fragmentary idea3 and this is what constitutes the evil of artificiality4 ,and the correction must lie not in a return to nature1 but in the reconstruction of a wider and more comprehensive idea3 an idea which shall be the unity and system of all nature2 not a fantastic idealism1 but an attempt to do justice to the more realist as well as the idealist sides of life4 ,there is however another side of individualist ethics which needs even more especial enforcement4 ,it is the formation of 8,the reason firm1 the temperate will1 ,endurance1 foresight1 strength and skill30 the healthy mind in a healthy body4 ,ethics is only too apt to suppose that will and intelligence are assumptions which need no special justification4 ,but the truth is that they vary from individual to individual in degree and structure4 ,it is the business of ethical psychology to give to these vague attributions the definiteness of a normal standard3 to show what proportions are required to justify the proper title of reason and will--to show what reason and will really are if they do what they are encouraged or expected to do4 ,it talks of the diseases of will and personality3 it must also set forth their educational ideal4 ,the first problem of ,ethics1 it may be said1 is the question of the will and its freedom4 ,but to say this is of course not to say that1 unless freedom of will be understood in some special sense1 ethics becomes impossible4 ,if the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom1 then must our conception of morality and of freedom hang together4 ,and it will clearly be indispensable to begin by some attempt to discover in what sense man may be in the most general way described as a moral agent--as an intelligent will1 or 7more briefly1 yet synonymously7 as a will4 8,the soil of law and morality10 says ,hegel7#fe71 8is the intelligent life3 and its more precise place and starting-point the will1 which is free1 in the sense that freedom is its substance and characteristic1 and the system of law the realm of freedom realised1 the world of intelligence produced out of itself as a second nature40 ,such a freedom is a freedom made and acquired1 the work of the mind's self-realisation1 not to be taken as a given fact of consciousness which must be believed7#ff74 ,to have a will--in other words1 to have freedom1 is the consummation--and let us add1 only the formal or ideal consummation--of a process by which man raises himself out of his absorption in sensation and impulse1 establishes within himself a mental realm1 an organism of ideas1 a self-consciousness1 and a self4 ,the vulgar apprehension of these things seems to assume that we have by nature1 or are born with1 a general faculty or set of general faculties1 which we subsequently fill up and embody by the aid of experience4 ,we possess--they seem to imply--so many 8forms0 and 8categories0 latent in our minds ready to hold and contain the raw materials supplied from without4 ,according to this view we have all a will and an intelligence3 the difference only is that some put more into them1 and some put less4 ,but such a separation of the general form from its contents is a piece of pure mythology4 ,it is perhaps true and safe to say that the human being is of such a character that will and intelligence are in the ordinary course inevitably produced4 ,but the forms which grow up are the more and more definite and systematic organisation of a graded experience1 of series of ideas1 working themselves up again and again in representative and re-representative degree1 till they constitute a mental or inner world of their own4 ,the will is thus the title appropriate to the final stage of a process1 by which sensation and impulse have polished and perfected themselves by union and opposition1 by differentiation and accompanying redintegration1 till they assume characters quite unsurmised in their earliest aspects1 and yet only the consolidation or self-realisation of implications4 ,thus the mental faculties are essentially acquired powers1--acquired not from without1 but by action which generates the faculties it seems to imply4 ,the process of mind is a process which creates individual centres1 raises them to completer independence2--which produces an inner life more and more self-centered and also more and more equal to the universe which it has embodied4 ,and will and intelligence are an important stage in that process4 ,herbart 7as was briefly hinted at in the first essay7 has analysed ethical appreciation 7which may or may not be accompanied by approbation7 into five distinct standard ideas4 ,these are the ideas of inward liberty1 of perfection1 of right1 benevolence1 and equity4 ,like ,hume1 he regards the moral judgment as in its purity a kind of aesthetic pronouncement on the agreement or proportion of certain activities in relations to each other4 ,two of these standard ideas1--that of inward liberty and of perfection--seem to belong to the sphere at present under review4 ,they emerge as conditions determining the normal development of human nature to an intelligent and matured personality4 ,by inward freedom ,herbart means the harmony between the will and the intellect3 what ,aristotle has named 8practical truth or reality10 and what he describes in his conception of wisdom or moral intelligence1--the power of discerning the right path and of pursuing it with will and temper3 the unity1 clear but indissoluble1 of will and discernment4 ,by the idea of perfection ,herbart means the sense of proportion and of propriety which is awakened by comparing a progress in development or an increase in strength with its earlier stages of promise and imperfection4 ,the pleasure such perception affords works in two ways3 it is a satisfaction in achievement past1 and a stimulus to achievement yet to come4 ,such ideas of inward liberty and of growth in ability or in performance govern 7at least in part7 our judgment of the individual1 and have an ethical significance4 ,indeed1 if the cardinal feature of the ethical sentiment be the inwardness and independence of its approbation and obligation1 these ideas lie at the root of all true morality4 ,inward harmony and inward progress1 lucidity of conscience and the resolution which knows no finality of effort1 are the very essence of moral life4 ,yet1 if ethics is to include in the first instance social relationships and external utilities and sanctions1 these conditions of true life must rather be described as pre-ethical4 ,the truth seems to be that here we get to a range of ethics which is far wider than what is ordinarily called practice and conduct4 ,at this stage logic1 aesthetic1 and ethic1 are yet one3 the true1 the good1 and the beautiful are still held in their fundamental unity4 ,an ethics of wide principle precedes its narrower social application2 and whereas in ordinary usage the social provinciality is allowed to prevail1 here the higher ethics emerge clear and imperial above the limitations of local and temporal duty4 ,and though it is easy to step into exaggeration1 it is still well to emphasise this larger conception of ethics4 ,the moral principle of the 8maximising of life10 as it has been called7#fg71 may be open to misconception 7--so1 unfortunately are all moral principles when stated in the effrontery of isolation73 but it has its truth in the conviction that all moral evil is marked by a tendency to lower or lessen the total vitality4 ,so too ,friedrich ,nietzsche's maxim1 ,sei vornehm7#fh71 ensue distinction1 and above all things be not common or vulgar 7gemein71 will easily lend itself to distortion4 ,but it is good advice for all that1 even though it may be difficult to define in a general formula wherein distinction consists1 to mark the boundary between self-respect and vanity or obstinacy1 or to say wherein lies the beauty and dignity of human nature4 ,kant has laid it down as the principle of duty to ask ourselves if in our act we are prepared to universalise the maxim implied by our conduct4 ,and that this--which essentially bids us look at an act in the whole of its relations and context--is a safeguard against some forms of moral evil1 is certain4 ,but there is an opposite--or rather an apparently opposite--principle which bids us be individual1 be true to our own selves1 and never allow ourselves to be dismayed from our own unique responsibility4 ,perhaps the two principles are not so far apart as they seem4 ,in any case true individuality is the last word and the first word in ethics2 though1 it may be added1 there is a good deal to be said between the two termini4 7iv47 ,an ,excursus on ,greek ,ethics4 ,it is in these regions that ,greek ethics loves to linger2 on the duty of the individual to himself1 to be perfectly lucid and true1 and to rise to ever higher heights of achievement4 ,ceteris paribus1 there is felt to be something meritorious in superiority1 something good3--even were it that you are master1 and another is slave4 ,thus navely speaks ,aristotle7#fi74 ,to a modern1 set amid so many conflicting ideals1 perhaps1 the immense possibilities of yet further growth might suggest themselves with overpowering force4 ,to him the idea of perfection takes the form of an idea of perfectibility3 and sometimes it smites down his conceit in what he has actually done1 and impresses a sense of humility in comparison with what yet remains unaccomplished4 ,an ancient ,greek apparently was little haunted by these vistas of possibilities of progress through worlds beyond worlds4 ,a comparatively simple environment1 a fixed and definite mental horizon1 had its plain and definite standards1 or at least seemed to have such4 ,there were fewer cases of the man1 unattached or faintly attached to any definite profession--moving about in worlds half realised--who has grown so common in a more developed civilisation4 ,the ideals of the ,greek were clearly descried3 each man had his definite function or work to perform3 and to do it better than the average1 or than he himself habitually had done1 that was perfection1 excellence1 virtue4 ,for virtue to the ,greek is essentially ability and respectability3 promise of excellent performance3 capacity to do better than others4 ,virtue is praiseworthy or meritorious character and quality3 it is achievement at a higher rate1 as set against one's past and against others' average4 ,the ,greek moralists sometimes distinguish and sometimes combine moral virtue and wisdom1 and 3 capacity to perform1 and wisdom to guide that capacity4 ,to the ordinary ,greek perhaps the emphasis fell on the former1 on the attainment of all recognised good quality which became a man1 all that was beautiful and honourable1 all that was appropriate1 glorious1 and fame-giving2 and that not for any special reference to its utilitarian qualities4 ,useful1 of course1 such qualities were3 but that was not in question at the time4 ,in the more liberal commonwealths of ancient ,greece there was little or no anxious care to control the education of its citizens1 so as to get direct service1 overt contribution to the public good4 ,a suspicious ,spartan legislation might claim to do that4 ,but in the free air of ,athens all that was required was loyalty1 good-will----to the common weal2 it might be even a sentiment of human kindliness1 of fraternity of spirit and purpose4 ,everything beyond and upon that basis was left to free development4 ,let each carry out to the full the development of his powers in the line which national estimation points out4 ,he is--nature and history alike emphasise that fact beyond the reach of doubt1 for all except the outlaw and the casual stranger--a member of a community1 and as such has a governing instinct and ideal which animates him4 ,but he is also a self-centered individual1 with special endowments of nature1 in his own person and in the material objects which are his4 ,a purely individualist or selfish use of them is not--to the normal ,greek--even dreamed of4 ,he is too deeply rooted in the substance of his community for that3 or it is on the ground and in the atmosphere of an assured community that his individuality is to be made to flourish4 ,nature has secured that his individuality shall rest securely in the presupposition of his citizenship4 ,it seems1 therefore1 as if he were left free and independent in his personal search for perfection1 for distinction4 ,his place is fixed for him3 ,spartam nactus es2 hanc orna3 his duty is his virtue4 ,that duty1 as ,plato expresses it1 is to do his own deeds--and not meddle with others4 ,nature and history have arranged that others1 in other posts1 shall do theirs3 that all severally shall energise their function4 ,the very word 8duty0 seems out of place2 if1 at least1 duty suggests external obligation1 an order imposed and a debt to be discharged4 ,if there be a task-master and a creditor1 it is the inflexible order of nature and history3--or1 to be more accurate1 of nature1 the indwelling and permanent reality of things4 ,but the obligation to follow nature is scarcely felt as a yoke of constraint4 ,a man's virtue is to perform his work and to perform it well3 to do what he is specially capable of doing1 and therefore specially charged to do4 ,nowhere has this character of ,greek ethics received more classical expression than in the ,republic of ,plato4 ,in the prelude to his subject--which is the nature of ,right and ,morality--,plato has touched briefly on certain popular and inadequate views4 ,there is the view that ,right has its province in performance of certain single and external acts--in business honesty and commercial straightforwardness4 ,there is the view that it is rendering to each what is due to him2 that it consists in the proper reciprocity of services1 in the balance of social give and take4 ,there is the critical or hyper-critical view which1 from seeing so much that is called justice to be in harmony with the interest of the predominant social order1 bluntly identifies mere force or strength as the ground of right4 ,and there are views which regard it as due to social conventions and artifices1 to the influence of education1 to political arrangements and the operation of irrational prejudices4 ,to all these views ,plato objects3 not because they are false--for they are all in part1 often in large part1 true--but because they are inadequate and do not go to the root of the matter4 ,the foundations of right lie1 he says1 not in external act1 but in the inner man3 not in convention1 but in nature3 not in relation to others1 but in the constitution of the soul itself4 ,that ethical idea--the idea of right--which seems most obviously to have its centre outside the individual1 to live and grow only in the relations between individuals1 ,plato selects in order to show the independent royalty of the single human soul4 ,the world1 as ,hume afterwards1 called justice artificial3 ,plato will prove it natural4 ,in a way he joins company with those who bid us drive out the spectre of duty1 of obligation coming upon the soul from social authority1 from traditional idea1 from religious sanctions4 ,he preaches--or he is about to preach--the autonomy of the will4 ,the four cardinal virtues of ,plato's list are the qualities which go to make a healthy1 normal1 natural human soul1 fit for all activity1 equipped with all arms for the battle of life4 ,they tell us what such a soul is1 not what it does4 ,they are the qualities which unless a soul has1 and has them each perfect1 yet all co-operant1 its mere outward and single acts have no virtue or merit1 but are only lucky accidents at the best4 ,on the other hand1 if a man has these constitutive qualities1 he will act in the social world1 and act well4 ,plato has said scornful things of mere outward and verbal truthfulness1 and has set at the very lowest pitch of degradation the 8lie in the soul40 ,his 8temperance0 or 8self-restraint10 if it be far from breathing any suggestion of self-suppression or self-assertion1 is still farther from any suspicion of asceticism1 or war against the flesh4 ,it is the noble harmony of the ruling and the ruled1 which makes the latter a partner of the sovereign1 and takes from the dictates of the ruler any touch of coercion4 ,it is literally sanity of soul1 integrity and purity of spirit2 it is what has been sometimes called the beautiful soul--the indiscerptible unity of reason and impulse4 ,plato's bravery1 again1 is fortitude and consistency of soul1 the full-blooded heart which is fixed in reason1 the zeal which is according to knowledge1 unflinching loyalty to the idea1 the spirit which burns in the martyrs to truth and humanity3 yet withal with gentleness and courtesy and noble urbanity in its immediate train4 ,and his truthfulness is that inner lucidity which cannot be self-deceived1 the spirit which is a safeguard against fanaticism and hypocrisy1 the sunlike warmth of intelligence without which the heart is a darkness full of unclean things4 ,the full development and crowning grace of such a manly nature ,aristotle has tried to present in the character of the ,great-souled man--him whom ,plato has called the true king by divine right1 or the autocrat by the patent of nature4 ,like all such attempts to delineate a type in the terms necessarily single and successive of abstract analysis1 it tends occasionally to run into caricature1 and to give partial aspects an absurd prominency4 ,only the greatest of artists could cope with such a task1 though that artist may be found perhaps classed among the historians4 ,yet it is possible to form some conception of the ideal which ,aristotle would set before us4 ,the ,great-souled man is great1 and he dare not deny the witness of his spirit4 ,he is one who does not quail before the anger and seek the applause of popular opinion3 he holds his head as his own1 and as high as his undimmed self-consciousness shows it is worth4 ,there has been said to him by the reason within him the word that ,virgil erewhile addressed to ,dante3 8,libero1 dritto1 e sano il tuo arbitrio ,e fallo fora non fare a suo cenno2 ,per ch' io te sopra te corono e mitrio40 ,he is his own ,emperor and his own ,pope4 ,he is the perfected man1 in whom is no darkness1 whose soul is utter clearness1 and complete harmony4 ,calm in self-possessed majesty1 he stands1 if need be1 contra mundum3 but rather1 with the world beneath his feet4 ,the chatter of personality has no interest for him4 ,bent upon the best1 lesser competitions for distinction have no attraction for him4 ,to the vulgar he will seem cold1 self-confined3 in his apartness and distinction they will see the signs of a 8prig40 ,his look will be that of one who pities men--rather than loves them3 and should he speak ill of a foe1 it is rather out of pride of heart and unbroken spirit than because these things touch him4 ,such an one1 in many ways1 was the ,florentine poet himself4 ,if the ,greek world in general thus conceived as the full bloom of manly excellence 7we all know how slightly--witness the remarks in the ,periclean oration--,greeks1 in their public and official utterances1 rated womanliness71 the philosophers had a further point to emphasise4 ,that was what they variously called knowledge1 prudence1 reason1 insight1 intelligence1 wisdom1 truth4 ,from ,socrates to ,aristotle1 from ,aristotle to the ,stoics and ,epicureans1 and from the ,stoics to the ,neo-,platonists1 this is the common theme3 the supremacy of knowledge1 its central and essential relation to virtue4 ,they may differ--perhaps not so widely as current prejudice would suppose--as to how this knowledge is to be defined1 what kind of knowledge it is1 how acquired and maintained1 and so on4 ,but in essentials they are at one4 ,none of them1 of course1 mean that in order to right conduct nothing more is needed than to learn and remember what is right1 the precepts and commandments of ordinary morality4 ,memory is not knowledge1 especially when it is out of mind4 ,even an ancient philosopher was not wholly devoid of common sense4 ,they held--what they supposed was a fact of observation and reflection--that all action was prompted by feelings of the values of things1 by a desire of something good or pleasing to self1 and aimed at self-satisfaction and self-realisation1 but that there was great mistake in what thus afforded satisfaction4 ,people chose to act wrongly or erroneously1 because they were1 first1 mistaken about themselves and what they wanted1 and1 secondly1 mistaken in the means which would give them satisfaction4 ,but this second point was secondary4 ,the main thing was to know yourself1 what you really were2 in ,plato's words1 to 8see the soul as it is1 and know whether it have one form only or many1 or what its nature is2 to look upon it with the eye of reason in its original purity40 ,self-deception1 confusion1 that worst ignorance which is unaware of itself1 false estimation--these are the radical evils of the natural man4 ,to these critics the testimony of consciousness was worthless1 unless corroborated4 ,to cure this mental confusion1 this blindness of will and judgment1 is the task set for philosophy3 to give inward light1 to teach true self-measurement4 ,in one passage1 much misunderstood1 ,plato has called this philosophic art the due measurement of pleasures and pains4 ,it should scarcely have been possible to mistake the meaning4 ,but1 with the catchwords of ,utilitarianism ringing in their ears1 the commentators ran straight contrary to the true teaching of the ,protagoras1 consentient as it is with that of the ,phaedo and the ,philebus4 ,to measure1 one must have a standard3 and if ,plato has one lesson always for us1 it is that a sure standard the multitude have not1 but only confusion4 ,the so-called pleasures and pains of the world's experiences are so entitled for different reasons1 for contrary aims1 and with no unity or harmony of judgment4 ,they are--not a fact to be accepted1 but--a problem for investigation3 their reality is in question1 their genuineness1 solidity and purity3 and till you have settled that1 you cannot measure1 for you may be measuring vacuity under the idea that there is substance4 ,you have still to get at the unit--i4e4 the reality of pleasure4 ,it was not ,plato's view that pleasure was a separate and independent entity3 that it was exactly as it was felt4 ,each pleasure is dependent for its pleasurable quality on the consciousness it belongs to1 and has only a relative truth and reality4 ,bentham has written about computing the value of a 8lot0 of pleasures and pains4 ,but ,plato had his mind on an earlier and more fundamental problem1 what is the truth and reality of pleasure2 and his fullest but not his only essay towards determining the value or estimating the meaning of pleasure in the scale of being is that given in the ,philebus4 ,this then is the knowledge which ,greek philosophy meant3 not mere intellect--though1 of course1 there is always a danger of theoretical inquiry degenerating into abstract and formal dogma4 ,but of the meaning there can be no serious doubt4 ,it is a knowledge1 says ,plato1 to which the method of mathematical science--the most perfect he can find acknowledged--is only an ouverture1 or perhaps1 only the preliminary tuning of the strings4 ,it is a knowledge not eternally hypothetical--a system of sequences which have no sure foundation4 ,it is a knowledge which rests upon the conviction and belief of the 8idea of good03 a kind of knowledge which does not come by direct teaching1 which is not mere theory1 but implies a lively conviction1 a personal apprehension1 a crisis which is a kind of 8conversion10 or 8inspiration40 ,it is as it were the prize of a great contest1 in which the sword that conquers is the sword of dialectic3 a sword whereof the property is1 like that of ,ithuriel's spear1 to lay bare all deceptions and illusions of life4 ,or1 to vary the metaphor3 the son of man is like the prince in the fairy tale who goes forth to win the true queen2 but there are many false pretenders decked out to deceive his unwary eyes and foolish heart4 ,yet in himself there is a power of discernment3 there is something kindred with the truth3--the witness of the ,spirit--and all that education and discipline can do is to remove obstacles1 especially the obstacles within the self which perturb the sight and mislead the judgment4 ,were not the soul originally possessed of and dominated by the idea of good1 it could never discern it elsewhere4 ,on this original kindred depends all the process of education2 the influence of which therefore is primarily negative or auxiliary4 ,thus the process of history and experience1--which the work of education only reproduces in an accelerated tempo--serves but to bring out the implicit reason within into explicit conformity with the rationality of the world4 ,knowledge1 then1 in this ethical sphere means the harmony of will1 emotion1 intellect3 it means the clear light which has no illusions and no deceptions4 ,and to those who feel that much of their life and of the common life is founded on prejudice and illusion1 such white light will occasionally seem hard and steely4 ,at its approach they fear the loss of the charm of that twilight hour ere the day has yet begun1 or before the darkness has fully settled down4 ,thus the heart and feelings look upon the intellect as an enemy of sentiment4 ,and ,plato himself is not without anticipations of such an issue4 ,yet perhaps we may add that the danger is in part an imaginary one1 and only arises because intelligence takes its task too lightly1 and encroaches beyond its proper ground4 ,philosophy1 in other words1 mistakes its place when it sets itself up as a dogmatic system of life4 ,its function is to comprehend1 and from comprehension to criticise1 and through criticising to unify4 ,it has no positive and additional teaching of its own3 no addition to the burden of life and experience4 ,and experience it must respect4 ,its work is to maintain the organic or super-organic interconnexion between all the spheres of life and all the forms of reality4 ,it has to prevent stagnation and absorption of departments--to keep each in its proper place1 but not more than its place1 and yet to show how each is not independent of the others4 ,and this is what the philosopher or ancient sage would be4 ,if he is passionless1 it is not that he has no passions1 but that they no longer perturb and mislead4 ,if his controlling spirit be reason1 it is not the reason of the so-called 8rationalist10 but the reason which seeks in patience to comprehend1 and to be at home in1 a world it at first finds strange4 ,and if he is critical of others1 he is still more critical of himself3 critical however not for criticism's sake 7which is but a poor thing71 but because through criticism the faith of reason may be more fully justified4 ,to the last1 if he is true to his mission and faithful to his loyalty to reality1 he will have the simplicity of the child4 ,whether therefore we agree or not with ,plato's reduction of ,right and ,duty to self-actualisation1 we may at least admit that in the idea of perfection or excellence1 combined with the idea of knowledge or inward lucidity1 he has got the fundamental ideas on which further ethical development must build4 ,self-control1 self-knowledge1 internal harmony1 are good3 and so are the development of our several faculties and of the totality of them to the fullest pitch of excellence4 ,but their value does not lie entirely in themselves1 or rather there is implicit in them a reference to something beyond themselves4 ,they take for granted something which1 because it is so taken1 may also be ignored and neglected1 just because it seems so obvious4 ,and that implication is the social humanity in which they are the spirits of light and leading4 ,to lay the stress on or excellence tends to leave out of sight the force of duty2 and to emphasise knowledge is allowed to disparage the heart and feelings4 ,the mind--even of a philosopher--finds a difficulty in holding very different points of view in one1 and where it is forced from one to another1 tends to forget the earlier altogether4 ,thus when the ethical philosopher1 presupposing as an absolute or unquestionable fact that man the individual was rooted in the community1 proceeded to discuss the problem of the best and completest individual estate1 he was easily led to lose sight of the fundamental and governing condition altogether4 ,from the moment that ,aristotle lays down the thesis that man is naturally social1 to the moment when he asks how the bare ideal of excellence in character and life can become an actuality1 the community in which man lives has retired out of sight away into the background4 ,and it only comes in1 as it first appears1 as the paedagogue to bring us to morality4 ,and ,plato1 though professedly he is speaking of the community1 and is well aware that the individual can only be saved by the salvation of the community1 is constantly falling back into another problem--the development of an individual soul4 ,he feels the strength of the egoistic effort after perfection1 and his essay in the end tends to lose sight altogether of its second theme4 ,instead of a man he gives us a mere philosopher1 a man1 that is1 not living with his country's life1 instinct with the heart and feeling of humanity1 inspired by art and religion1 but a being set apart and exalted above his fellows1--charged no doubt in theory with the duty of saving them1 of acting vicariously as the mediator between them and the absolute truth--but really tending more and more to seclude himself on the edita templa of the world1 on the high-towers of speculation4 ,and what ,plato and ,aristotle did1 so to speak1 against their express purpose and effort1 yet did1 because the force of contemporary tendency was irresistible--that the ,stoa and ,epicurus did more openly and professedly4 ,with a difference in theory1 it is true1 owing to the difference in the surroundings4 ,virtue in the older day of the free and glorious commonwealth had meant physical and intellectual achievement1 acts done in the public eye1 and of course for the public good--a good with which the agent was identified at least in heart and soul1 if not in his explicit consciousness4 ,in later and worse days1 when the political world1 with the world divine1 had withdrawn from actual identity with the central heart of the individual1 and stood over-against him as a strange power and little better than a nuisance1 virtue came to be counted as endurance1 indifference1 negative independence against a cold and a perplexing world4 ,but even still1 virtue is excellence3 it is to rise above the ignoble level3 to assert self-liberty against accident and circumstance--to attain self-controlled1 self-satisfying independence--and to become ,god-like in its seclusion4 ,yet in two directions even it had to acknowledge something beyond the individual4 ,the ,epicurean--following out a suggestion of ,aristotle--recognised the help which the free society of friends gave to the full development of the single seeker after a self-satisfying and complete life4 ,the ,stoic1 not altogether refusing such help1 tended rather to rest his single self on a fellowship of ideal sort1 on the great city of gods and men1 the civitas ,dei4 ,thus1 in separate halves1 the two schools1 into which ,greek ethics was divided1 gave expression to the sense that a new and higher community was needed--to the sense that the visible actual community no longer realised its latent idea4 ,the ,stoic emphasised the all-embracing necessity1 the absolute comprehensiveness of the moral kingdom4 ,the ,epicurean saw more clearly that1 if the everlasting city came from heaven1 it could only visibly arise by initiation upon the earth4 ,christianity--in its best work--was a conjunction of the liberty with the necessity1 of the human with the divine4 ,more interesting1 perhaps1 it is to note the misconception of reason and knowledge which grew up4 ,knowledge came more and more to be identified with the reflective and critical consciousness1 which is outside reality and life1 and judges it from a standpoint of its own4 ,it came to be esteemed only in its formal and abstract shape1 and at the expense of the heart and feelings4 ,the antithesis of philosophy 7or knowledge strictly so called7 according to ,plato was mere opinion1 accidental and imperfect knowledge4 ,the knowledge which is truly valuable is a knowledge which presupposes the full reality of life1 and is the more and more completely articulated theory of it as a whole4 ,it is--abstractly taken--a mere form of unity which has no value except in uniting3 it is--taken concretely--the matter1 we may say1 in complete unity4 ,it is ideal and perfect harmony of thought1 appetite1 and emotion3 or putting it otherwise1 the philosopher is one who is not merely a creature of appetite and production1 not merely a creature of feeling and practical energy1 but a creature1 who to both of these superadds an intelligence which sets eyes in the blind forehead of these other powers1 and thus1 far from superseding them altogether1 only raises them into completeness1 and realises all that is worthy in their implicit natures4 ,always these two impulsive tendencies of our nature are guided by some sort of ideas and intelligence1 by beliefs and opinions4 ,but they1 like their guides1 are sporadically emergent1 unconnected1 and therefore apt to be contradictory4 ,it is to such erratic and occasional ideas1 half-truths and deceptions1 that philosophy is opposed4 ,unfortunately for all parties1 the antithesis is carried farther4 ,philosophy and the philosopher are further set in opposition to the faith of the heart1 the intimacy and intensity of feeling1 the depth of love and trust1 which in practice often go along with imperfect ideas4 ,the philosopher is made one who has emancipated himself from the heart and feelings1--a pure intelligence1 who is set above all creeds1 contemplating all1 and holding none4 ,consistency and clearness become his idol1 to be worshipped at any cost1 save one sacrifice3 and that one sacrifice is the sacrifice of his own self-conceit4 ,for consistency generally means that all is made to harmonise with one assumed standpoint1 and that whatever presents discrepancies with this alleged standard is ruthlessly thrown away4 ,such a philosophy mistakes its function1 which is not1 as ,heine scoffs1 to make an intelligible system by rejecting the discordant fragments of life1 but to follow reverently1 if slowly1 in the wake of experience4 ,such a 8perfect sage10 with his parade of reasonableness1 may often assume the post of a dictator4 ,and1 above all1 intelligence is only half itself when it is not also will4 ,and both are more than mere consciousness4 ,plato--whom we refer to1 because he is the coryphaeus of all the diverse host of ,greek philosophy--seems to overestimate or rather to misconceive the place of knowledge4 ,that it is the supreme and crowning grace of the soul1 he sees4 ,but he tends to identify it with the supreme or higher soul3--as ,aristotle did after him1 to be followed by the ,stoics and ,neo-,platonists4 ,for them the supreme1 or almost supreme reality is the intelligence or reason3 the soul is only on a second grade of reality1 on the borders of the natural or physical world4 ,when ,plato takes that line1 he turns towards the path of asceticism1 and treats the philosophic life as a preparation for that truer life when intelligence shall be all in all1 for that better land where 8divine dialogues0 shall form the staple and substance of spiritual existence4 ,aristotle1--who less often treads these solitudes1--still extols the theoretic life1 when the body and its needs trouble no more1 when the activity of reason--the theory of theory--is attained at least as entirely as mortal conditions allow man to be deified4 ,of the 8apathy0 and the reasonable conformity of the ,stoics1 or of the purely negative character of ,epicurean happiness 7the excision of all that pained7 we need not here speak4 ,and in ,plotinus and ,proclus the deification of mere reason is at any rate the dominant note2 whatever protests the larger ,greek nature in the former may from time to time offer4 ,the truth which philosophy should have taught was that ,mind or intelligence was the element where the inner life culminated and expanded and flourished3 the error which it often tended to spread was that intelligence was the higher life of which all other was a degenerate shortcoming1 and something valuable on its own account4 ,it may be that thus to interpret ,plato is to do him an injustice4 ,it has been sometimes said that his division of parts or kinds of soul--or his distinction between its fighting horses--tends to destroy the unity of mental life4 ,but perhaps this was exactly what he wanted to convey4 ,there are--we may paraphrase his meaning--three kinds of human being1 three types of human life4 ,there is the man or the life of appetite and the flesh3 there is the man of noble emotion and energetic depth of soul3 there is the life of reasonable pursuits and organised principle4 ,or1 we may take his meaning to be that there are three elements or provinces of mental life1 which in all except a few are but imperfectly coherent and do not reach a true or complete unity4 ,some unity there always is3 but in the life of mere appetite and impulse1 even when these impulses are our nobler sentiments of love and hatred1 the unity falls very far short4 ,or1 as he puts the theme elsewhere1 the soul has a passion for self-completion1 a love of beauty1 which in most is but a misleading lust4 ,it is the business of the philosophic life to re-create or to foster this unity3 or philosophy is the persistent search of the soul for its lost unity1 the search to see that unity which is always its animating principle1 its inner faith4 ,when the soul has reached this ideal--if it can be supposed to attain it 7and of this the strong-souled ancient philosophers feel no doubt71--then a change must take place4 ,the love of beauty is not suppressed2 it is only made self-assured and its object freed from all imperfection4 ,it is not that passion has ceased2 but its nature is so transfigured1 that it seems worthy of a nobler name1 which yet we cannot give4 ,to such a life1 where battle and conflict are as such unknown1 we cannot longer give the title of life3 and we say that philosophy is in life a rehearsal of death7#gj74 ,and yet if there be no battle1 there is not for that reason mere inaction4 ,hence1 as the ,republic concludes1 the true philosopher is the complete man4 ,he is the truth and reality which the appetitive and emotional man were seeking after and failed to realise4 ,it is true they at first will not see this4 ,but the whole long process of philosophy is the means to induce this conviction4 ,and for ,plato it remains clear that through experience1 through wisdom1 and through abstract deduction1 the philosopher will justify his claim to him who hath ears to hear and heart to understand4 ,if that be so1 the asceticism of ,plato is not a mere war upon flesh and sense as such1 but upon flesh and sense as imperfect truth1 fragmentary reality1 which suppose themselves complete1 though they are again and again confuted by experience1 by wisdom1 and by mere calculation1--a war against their blindness and shortsightedness4 ,essay ,,iv4 ,psycho-,genesis4 8,the key10 says ,carus1 8for the ascertainment of the nature of the conscious psychical life lies in the region of the unconscious7#ga740 ,the view which these words take is at least as old as the days of ,leibniz4 ,it means that the mental world does not abruptly emerge a full-grown intelligence1 but has a genesis1 and follows a law of development3 that its life may be described as the differentiation 7with integration7 of a simple or indifferentiated mass4 ,the terms conscious and unconscious1 indeed1 with their lax popular uses1 leave the door wide open for misconception4 ,but they may serve to mark that the mind is to be understood only in a certain relation 7partly of antithesis7 to nature1 and the soul only in reference to the body4 ,the so-called 8superior faculties0--specially characteristic of humanity--are founded upon1 and do not abruptly supersede1 the lower powers which are supposed to be specially obvious in the animals7#gb74 ,the individual and specific phenomena of consciousness1 which the psychologist is generally supposed to study1 rest upon a deeper1 less explicated1 more indefinite1 life of sensibility1 which in its turn fades away by immeasurable gradations into something irresponsive to the ordinary tests for sensation and life4 ,and yet the moment we attempt to leave the daylight of consciousness for the darker sides of sub-conscious life1 the risks of misinterpretation multiply4 ,the problem is to some extent the same as confronts the student of the ideas and principles of primitive races4 ,there1 the temptation of seeing things through the 8spectacles of civilisation0 is almost irresistible4 ,so in psychology we are apt to import into the life of sensation and feeling the distinctions and relations of subsequent intellection4 ,nor is the difficulty lessened by ,hegel's method which deals with soul1 sentiency1 and consciousness as grades or general characteristics in a developmental advance4 ,he borrows his illustrations from many quarters1 from morbid and anomalous states of consciousness1--less from the cases of savages1 children and animals4 ,these illustrations may be called a loose induction4 ,but it requires a much more powerful instrument than mere induction to build up a scientific system2 a framework of general principle or theory is the only basis on which to build theory by the allegation of facts1 however numerous4 ,yet in philosophic science1 which is systematised knowledge1 all facts strictly so described will find their place and be estimated at their proper value4 7i47 ,primitive ,sensibility4 ,psychology 7with ,hegel7 takes up the work of science from biology4 ,the mind comes before it as the supreme product of the natural world1 the finest flower of organic life1 the 8truth0 of the physical process4 ,as such it is called by the time-honoured name of ,soul4 ,if we further go on to say that the soul is the principle of life1 we must not understand this vital principle to be something over and above the life of which it is the principle4 ,such a locally-separable principle is an addition which is due to the analogy of mechanical movement1 where a detached agent sets in motion and directs the machinery4 ,but in the organism the principle is not thus detachable as a thing or agent4 ,by calling ,soul the principle of life we rather mean that in the vital organism1 so far as it lives1 all the real variety1 separation1 and discontinuity of parts must be reduced to unity and identity1 or as ,hegel would say1 to ideality4 ,to live is thus to keep all differences fluid and permeable in the fire of the life-process4 ,or to use a familiar term of logic1 the ,soul is the concept or intelligible unity of the organic body4 ,but to call it a concept might suggest that it is only the conception through which we represent to ourselves the variety in unity of the organism4 ,the soul1 however1 is more than a mere concept3 and life is more than a mere mode of description for a group of movements forming an objective unity4 ,it is a unity1 subjective and objective4 ,the organism is one life1 controlling difference3 and it is also one by our effort to comprehend it4 ,the ,soul therefore is in ,hegelian language described as the ,idea rather than the concept of the organic body4 ,life is the generic title for this subject-object3 but the life may be merely physical1 or it may be intellectual and practical1 or it may be absolute1 i4e4 will and know all that it is1 and be all that it knows and wills4 ,up to this point the world is what is called an external1 which is here taken to mean 7not a world external to the individual1 but7 a self-externalised world4 ,that is to say1 it is the observer who has hitherto by his interpretation of his perceptions supplied the 8,spirit in ,nature40 ,in itself the external world has no inside1 no centre3 it is we who read into it the conception of a life-history4 ,we are led to believe that a principle of unity is always at work throughout the physical world--even in the mathematical laws of natural operation4 ,it is only intelligible and credible to us as a system1 a continuous and regular development4 ,but that system is only a hypothetical idea1 though it is held to be a conclusion to which all the evidence seems unequivocally to point4 ,and1 even in organic life1 the unity1 though more perfect and palpable than in the mechanical and inorganic world1 is only a perception1 a vision1--a necessary mode of realising the unity of the facts4 ,the phenomenon of life reveals as in a picture and an ocular demonstration the conformity of inward and outward1 the identity of whole and parts1 of power and utterance4 ,but it is still outside the observer4 ,in the function of sensibility and sentiency1 however1 we stand as it were on the border-line between biology and psychology4 ,at one step we have been brought within the harmony1 and are no longer mere observers and reflecters4 ,the sentient not merely is1 but is aware that it is4 ,hitherto as life1 it only is the unity in diversity1 and diversity in unity1 for the outsider1 i4e4 only implicitly3 now it is so for itself1 or consciously4 ,and in the first stage it does not know1 but feels or is sentient4 ,here1 for the first time1 is created the distinction of inward and outward4 ,loosely indeed we may1 like ,mr4 ,spencer1 speak of outward and inward in physiology3 but strictly speaking1 what ,goethe says is true1 ,natur hat weder ,kern noch ,schaale7#gc74 ,nature in the narrower sense knows no distinction of the inward and outward in its phenomena3 it is a purely superficial order and succession of appearance and event4 ,the ,idea which has been visible to an intelligent percipient in the types and laws of the natural world1 now is1 actually is--is in and for itself--but at first in a minimum of content1 a mere point of light1 or rather the dawn which has yet to expand into the full day4 ,spinoza has asserted that 8all individual bodies are animate1 though in different degrees7#gd740 ,now it is to a great extent this diversity of degree on which the main interest turns4 ,yet it is well to remember that the abrupt and trenchant separations which popular practice loves are overridden to a deeper view by an essential unity of idea1 reducing them to indifference4 ,if1 that is1 we take seriously the ,spinozist unity of ,substance1 and the continual correlation 7to call it no more7 of extension and consciousness therein1 we cannot avoid the conclusion which even ,bacon would admit of something describable as attraction and perception1 something subduing diversity to unity4 ,but whether it be well to name this soul or life is a different matter4 ,it may indeed only be taken to mean that all true being must be looked on as a real unity and individuality1 must1 that is1 be conceived as manifesting itself in organisation1 must be referred to a self-centred and self-developing activity4 ,but this--which is the fundamental thesis of idealism--is hardly all that is meant4 ,rather ,spinoza would imply that all things which form a real unity must have life--must have inner principle and unifying reality3 and what he teaches is closely akin to the ,leibnitian doctrine that every substantial existence reposes upon a monad1 a unity which is at once both a force and a cognition1 a 8representation0 and an appetite or nisus to act4 ,when ,fechner in a series of works7#ge7 expounds and defends the hypothesis that plants and planets are not destitute of soul1 any more than man and animals1 he only gives a more pronounced expression to this idealisation or spiritualisation of the natural world4 ,but for the moment the point to be noted is that all of this idealistic doctrine is an inference1 or a development which finds its point d'appui in the fact of sensation4 ,and the problem of the ,philosophy of ,mind is just to trace the process whereby a mere shock of sensation has grown into a conception and a faith in the goodness1 beauty and intelligence of the world4 ,schopenhauer has put the point with his usual picturesqueness4 ,outward nature presents nothing but a play of forces4 ,at first1 however1 this force shows merely the mechanical phenomena of pressure and impact1 and its theory is sufficiently described by mathematical physics4 ,but in the process of nature force assumes higher types1 types where it loses a certain amount of its externality7#gf71 till in the organic world it acquires a peculiar phase which ,schopenhauer calls ,will1 meaning by that1 however1 an organising and controlling power1 a tendency or nisus to be and live1 which is persistent and potent1 but without consciousness4 ,this blind force1 which however has a certain coherence and purposiveness1 is in the animal organism endowed with a new character1 in consequence of the emergence of a new organ4 ,this organ1 the brain and nervous system1 causes the evolution into clear day of an element which has been growing more and more urgent4 ,the gathering tendency of force to return into itself is now complete3 the cycle of operation is formed3 and the junction of the two currents issues in the spark of sensation4 ,the blind force now becomes seeing4 ,but at first--and this is the point we have to emphasise--its powers of vision are limited4 ,sensibility is either a local and restricted phenomenon3 or1 in so far as it is not local1 it is vague and indefinite1 and hardly entitled to the name of sensibility4 ,either it is a dim1 but far-reaching1 sympathy with environing existence1 and in that case only so-called blind will or feeling3 or if it is clear1 is locally confined1 and at first within very narrow limits4 ,neither of these points must be lost sight of4 ,on the one hand feeling has to be regarded as the dull and confused stirring of an almost infinite sympathy with the world--a pulse which has come from the far-distant movements of the universe1 and bears with it1 if but as a possibility1 the wealth of an infinite message4 ,on the other hand1 feeling at first only becomes real1 in this boundless ideality to which its possibilities extend1 by restricting itself to one little point and from several points organising itself to a unity of bodily feeling1 till it can go on from thence to embrace the universe in distinct and articulate comprehension4 ,soul1 says ,hegel1 is not a separate and additional something over and above the rest of nature3 it is rather nature's 8'universal immaterialism1 and simple ideal life7#gg740 ,there were ancient philosophers who spoke of the soul as a self-adjusting number1--as a harmony1 or equilibrium7#gh7--;and the moderns have added considerably to the list of these analogical definitions4 ,as definitions they obviously fall short4 ,yet these things give1 as it were1 by anticipation1 an image of soul1 as the 8ideality10 which reduces the manifold to unity4 ,the adhesions and cohesions of matter1 its gravitating attractions1 its chemical affinities and electrical polarities1 the intricate out-and-in of organic structure1 are all preludes to the true incorporating unity which is the ever-immanent supersession of the endless self-externalism and successionalism of physical reality4 ,but in sentiency1 feeling1 or sensibility1 the unity which all of these imply without reaching1 is explicitly present4 ,it is implicitly an all-embracing unity3 an infinite1--which has no doors and no windows1 for the good reason that it needs none1 because it has nothing outside it1 because it 8expresses0 and 8envelopes0 7however confusedly at first7 the whole universe4 ,thus1 even if1 with localising phraseology1 we may describe mind1 where it appears emerging in the natural world1 as a mere feeble and incidental outburst1--a rebellion breaking out as in some petty province or isolated region against the great law of the physical realm--we are in so speaking taking only an external standpoint4 ,but with the rise of mind in nature the bond of externalism is implicitly overcome4 ,to it1 and where it really is1 there is nothing outside1 nothing transcendent4 ,everything which is said to be outside mind is only outside a localised and limited mind--outside a mind which is imperfectly and abstractly realised--not outside mind absolutely4 ,mind is the absolute negation of externality3 not a mere relative negative1 as the organism may be biologically described as inner in respect of the environment4 ,to accomplish this negation in actuality1 to bring the multiplicity and externality of things into the unity and identity of one ,idea1 is the process of development of mind from animal sensibility to philosophic knowledge1 from appetite to art1--the process of culture through the social state under the influence of religion4 ,sentiency or psychic matter 7mind-stuff71 to begin with1 is in some respects like the tabula rasa of the empiricists4 ,it is the possibility--but the real possibility--of intelligence rather than intelligence itself4 ,it is the monotonous undifferentiated inwardness--a faint self-awareness and self-realisation of the material world1 but at first a mere vague psychical protoplasm and without defined nucleus1 without perceptible organisation or separation of structures4 ,if there is self-awareness1 it is not yet discriminated into a distinct and unified self1 not yet differentiated and integrated1--soul in the condition of a mere 8,is10 which1 however1 is nothing determinate4 ,it is very much in the situation of ,condillac's statue-man--une statue organise intrieurement comme nous1 et anime d'un esprit priv de toute espce d'ides3 alike at least so far that the rigid uniformity of the latter's envelope prevents all articulated organisation of its faculties4 ,the foundation under all the diversity and individuality in the concrete intelligent and volitional life is a common feeling1--a sensus communis--a general and indeterminate susceptibility to influence1 a sympathy responsive1 but responsive vaguely and equivocally1 to all the stimuli of the physical environment4 ,there was once a time1 according to primitive legend1 when man understood the language of beast and bird1 and even surprised the secret converse of trees and flowers4 ,such fancies are but the exaggeration of a solidarity of conscious life which seems to spread far in the sub-conscious realm1 and to narrow the individual's soul into limited channels as it rises into clear self-perception1 8,as thro' the frame that binds him in ,his isolation grows defined40 ,it may be a mere dream that1 as ,goethe feigns of ,makaria in his romance7#gi71 there are men and women in sympathy with the vicissitudes of the starry regions3 and hypotheses of lunar influence1 or dogmas of astrological destiny1 may count to the present guardians of the sciences as visionary superstitions4 ,yet science in these regions has no reason to be dogmatic2 her function hitherto can only be critical2 and even for that1 her data are scanty and her principles extremely general4 ,the influences on the mental mood and faculty1 produced by climate and seasons1 by local environment and national type1 by individual peculiarities1 by the differences of age and sex1 and by the alternation of night and day1 of sleep and waking1 are less questionable4 ,it is easy no doubt to ignore or forget them3 easy to remark how indefinable and incalculable they are4 ,but that does not lessen their radical and inevitable impress in the determination of the whole character4 8,the sum of our existence1 divided by reason1 never comes out exact1 but always leaves a marvellous remainder7#hj740 ,irrational this residue is1 in the sense that it is inexplicable1 and incommensurable with the well-known quantities of conscious and voluntarily organised life4 ,but a scientific psychology1 which is adequate to the real and concrete mind1 should never lose sight of the fact that every one of its propositions in regard to the more advanced phases of intellectual development is thoroughly and in indefinable ways modified by these preconditions4 ,when that is remembered1 it will be obvious how complicated is the problem of adapting psychology for the application to education1 and how dependent the solution of that problem is upon an experiential familiarity with the data of individual and national temperament and character4 ,the first stage in mental development is the establishment of regular and uniform relations between soul and body3 it is the differentiation of organs and the integration of function3 the balance between sensation and movement1 between the afferent and efferent processes of sensitivity4 ,given a potential soul1 the problem is to make it actual in an individual body4 ,it is the business of a physical psychology to describe in detail the steps by which the body we are attached to is made inward as our idea through the several organs and their nervous appurtenances3 whereas a psychical physiology would conversely explain the corresponding processes for the expression of the emotions and for the objectification of the volitions4 ,thus soul inwardises 7erinnert7 or envelops body3 which body 8expresses0 or develops soul4 ,the actual soul is the unity of both1 is the percipient individual4 ,the solidarity or 8communion0 of body and soul is here the dominant fact3 the soul sentient of changes in its peripheral organs1 and transmitting emotion and volition into physical effect4 ,it is on this psychical unity1--the unity which is the soul of the diversity of body--that all the subsequent developments of mind rest4 ,sensation is thus the prius--or basis--of all mental life3 the organisation of soul in body and of body in soul4 ,it is the process which historically has been prepared in the evolution of animal life from those undifferentiated forms where specialised organs are yet unknown1 and which each individual has further to realise and complete for himself1 by learning to see and hear1 and use his limbs4 ,at first1 moreover1 it begins from many separate centres and only through much collision and mutual compliance arrives at comparative uniformity and centralisation4 ,the common basis of united sensibility supplied by the one organism has to be made real and effective1 and it is so at first by sporadic and comparatively independent developments4 ,if self-hood means reference to self of what is prima facie not self1 and projection of self therein1 there is in primitive sensibility only the germ or possibility of self-hood4 ,in the early phases of psychic development the centre is fluctuating and ill-defined1 and it takes time and trouble to co-ordinate or unify the various starting-points of sensibility7#ha74 ,this consolidation of inward life may be looked at either formally or concretely4 ,under the first head1 it means the growth of a central unity of apperception4 ,in the second case1 it means a peculiar aggregate of ideas and sentiments4 ,there is growing up within him what we may call the individuality of the individual1--an irrational1 i4e4 not consciously intelligent1 nether-self or inner soul1 a firm aggregation of hopes and wishes1 of views and feelings1 or rather of tendencies and temperament1 of character hereditary and acquired4 ,it is the law of the natural will or character which from an inaccessible background dominates our action1--which1 because it is not realised and formulated in consciousness1 behaves like a guardian spirit1 or genius1 or destiny within us4 ,this genius is the sub-conscious unity of the sensitive life--the manner of man which unknown to ourselves we are1--and which influences us against our nominal or formal purposes4 ,so far as this predominates1 our ends1 rough hew them how we will1 are given by a force which is not really1 i4e4 with full consciousness1 ours3 by a mass of ingrained prejudice and unreasoned sympathies1 of instincts and passions1 of fancies and feelings1 which have condensed and organised themselves into a natural power4 ,as the child in the mother's womb is responsive to her psychic influences1 so the development of a man's psychic life is guided by feelings centred in objects and agents external to him1 who form the genius presiding over his development4 ,his soul1 to that extent1 is really in another3 he himself is selfless1 and when his stay is removed the principle of his life is gone7#hb74 ,he is but a bundle of impressions1 held together by influences and ties which in years before consciousness proper began made him what he is4 ,such is the involuntary adaptation to example and environment1 which establishes in the depths below personality a self which becomes hereafter the determinant of action4 ,early years1 in which the human being is naturally susceptible1 build up by imitation1 by pliant obedience1 an image1 a system1 reproducing the immediate surroundings4 ,the soul1 as yet selfless1 and ready to accept any imprint1 readily moulds itself into the likeness of an authoritative influence4 ,the step by which the universality or unity of the self is realised in the variety of its sensation is ,habit4 ,habit gives us a definite standing-ground in the flux of single impressions3 it is the identification of ourselves with what is most customary and familiar3 an identification which takes place by practice and repetition4 ,if it circumscribes us to one little province of being1 it on the other frees us from the vague indeterminateness where we are at the mercy of every passing mood4 ,it makes thus much of our potential selves our very own1 our acquisition and permanent possession4 ,it1 above all1 makes us free and at one with our bodily part1 so that henceforth we start as a subjective unit of body and soul4 ,we have now as the result of the anthropological process a self or ego1 an individual consciousness able to reflect and compare1 setting itself on one side 7a soul in bodily organisation71 and on the other setting an object of consciousness1 or external world1 a world of other things4 ,all this presupposes that the soul has actualised itself by appropriating and acquiring as its expression and organ the physical sensibility which is its body4 ,by restricting and establishing itself1 it has gained a fixed standpoint4 ,no doubt it has localised and confined itself1 but it is no longer at the disposal of externals and accident3 it has laid the foundation for higher developments4 7ii47 ,anomalies of ,psychical ,life4 ,psychology1 as we have seen1 goes for information regarding the earlier stages of mental growth to the child and the animal1--perhaps also to the savage4 ,so too sociology founds certain conclusions upon the observations of savage customs and institutions1 or on the earlier records of the race4 ,in both cases with a limitation caused by the externality and fragmentariness of the facts and the need of interpreting them through our own conscious experiences4 ,there is however another direction in which corresponding inquiries may be pursued2 and where the danger of the conclusions arrived at1 though not perhaps less real1 is certainly of a different kind4 ,in sociology we can observe--and almost experiment upon--the phenomena of the lapsed1 degenerate and criminal classes4 ,the advantage of such observation is that the object of study can be made to throw greater light on his own inner states4 ,he is a little of the child and a little of the savage1 but these aspects co-exist with other features which put him more on a level with the intelligent observer4 ,similar pathological regions are open to us in the case of psychology4 ,there the anomalous and morbid conditions of mind co-exist with a certain amount of mature consciousness4 ,so presented1 they are thrown out into relief4 ,they form the negative instances which serve to corroborate our positive inductions4 ,the regularly concatenated and solid structure of normal mind is under abnormal and deranged conditions thrown into disorder1 and its constituents are presented in their several isolation4 ,such phenomena are relapses into more rudimentary grades3 but with the difference that they are set in the midst of a more advanced phase of intellectual life4 ,even amongst candid and honest-minded students of psychology there is a certain reluctance to dabble in researches into the night-side of the mental range4 ,herbart is an instance of this shrinking4 ,the region of the ,unconscious seemed--and to many still seems--a region in which the charlatan and the dupe can and must play into each other's hands4 ,once in the whirl of spiritualist and crypto-psychical inquiry you could not tell how far you might be carried4 ,the facts moreover were of a peculiar type4 ,dependent as they seemed to be on the frame of mind of observers and observed1 they defied the ordinary criteria of detached and abstract observation4 ,you can only observe them1 it is urged1 when you believe2 scepticism destroys them4 ,now there is a widespread natural impatience against what ,bacon has called 8monodical0 phenomena1 phenomena i4e4 which claim to come under a special law of their own1 or to have a private and privileged sphere4 ,and this impatience cuts the ,gordian knot by a determination to treat all instances which oppose its hitherto ascertained laws as due to deception and fraud1 or1 at the best1 to incompetent observation1 confusions of memory1 and superstitions of ignorance4 ,above all1 great interests of religion and personality seemed to connect themselves with these revelations--interests1 at any rate1 to which our common humanity thrills2 it seemed as if1 in this region beyond the customary range of the conscious and the seen1 one might learn something of the deeper realities which lie in the unseen4 ,but to feel that so much was at stake was naturally unfavourable to purely dispassionate observation4 ,the philosophers were found--as might have been expected--amongst those most strongly attracted by these problems4 ,even ,kant had been fascinated by the spiritualism of ,swedenborg1 though he finally turned away sceptical4 ,at least as early as #ahjf ,schelling had been interested by ,ritter's researches into the question of telepathy1 or the power of the human will to produce without mechanical means of conveyance an effect at a distance4 ,he was looking forward to the rise of a ,physica coelestis1 or ,new ,celestial ,physics1 which should justify the old magic4 ,about the same date his brother ,karl published an essay on ,animal ,magnetism4 ,the novel phenomena of galvanism and its congeners suggested vast possibilities in the range of the physical powers1 especially of the physical powers of the human psyche as a natural agent4 ,the divining-rod was revived4 ,clairvoyance and somnambulism were carefully studied1 and the curative powers of animal magnetism found many advocates7#hc74 ,interest in these questions went naturally with the new conception of the place of ,man in ,nature1 and of ,nature as the matrix of mind7#hd74 ,but it had been acutely stimulated by the performances and professions of ,mesmer at ,vienna and ,paris in the last quarter of the eighteenth century4 ,these--though by no means really novel--had forced the artificial world of science and fashion to discuss the claim advanced for a new force which1 amongst other things1 could cure ailments that baffled the ordinary practitioner4 ,this new force--mainly because of the recent interest in the remarkable advances of magnetic and electrical research--was conceived as a fluid1 and called ,animal ,magnetism4 ,at one time indeed ,mesmer actually employed a magnet in the manipulation by which he induced the peculiar condition in his patients4 ,the accompaniments of his procedure were in many respects those of the quack-doctor2 and with the quack indeed he was often classed4 ,a ,french commission of inquiry appointed to examine into his performances reported in #aghd that1 while there was no doubt as to the reality of many of the phenomena1 and even of the cures1 there was no evidence for the alleged new physical force1 and declared the effects to be mainly attributable to the influence of imagination4 ,and with the mention of this familiar phrase1 further explanation was supposed to be rendered superfluous4 ,in ,france political excitement allowed the mesmeric theory and practice to drop out of notice till the fall of the first ,empire4 ,but in ,germany there was a considerable amount of investigations and hypotheses into these mystical phenomena1 though rarely by the ordinary routine workers in the scientific field4 ,the phenomena where they were discussed were studied and interpreted in two directions4 ,some theorists1 like ,jung-,stilling1 ,eschenmayer1 ,schubert1 and ,kerner1 took the more metaphysicist and spiritualistic view3 they saw in them the witness to a higher truth1 to the presence and operation in this lower world of a higher and spiritual matter1 a so-called ether4 ,thus ,animal ,magnetism supplied a sort of physical theory of the other world and the other life4 ,jung-,stilling1 e4g4 in his 8,theory of ,spirit-lore40 7#ahjh71 regarded the spiritualistic phenomena as a justification of--what he believed to be--the ,kantian doctrine that in the truly real and persistent world space and time are no more4 ,the other direction of inquiry kept more to the physical field4 ,ritter 7whose researches interested both ,schelling and ,hegel7 supposed he had detected the new force underlying mesmerism and the like1 and gave to it the name of ,siderism 7#ahjh72 while ,amoretti of ,milan named the object of his experiments ,animal ,electrometry 7#ahaf74 ,kieser7#he71 again 7#ahbf7 spoke of ,tellurism1 and connected animal magnetism with the play of general terrestrial forces in the human being4 ,at a later date 7#aheg7 ,schindler1 in his 8,magical ,spirit-life10 expounded a theory of mental polarity4 ,the psychical life has two poles or centres1--its day-pole1 around which revolves our ordinary and superficial current of ideas1 and its night-pole1 round which gathers the sub-conscious and deeper group of beliefs and sentiments4 ,either life has a memory1 a consciousness1 a world of its own3 and they flourish to a large extent inversely to each other4 ,the day-world has for its organs of receiving information the ordinary senses4 ,but the magical or night-world of the soul has its feelers also1 which set men directly in telepathic rapport with influences1 however distant1 exerted by the whole world3 and through this 8inner sense0 which serves to concentrate in itself all the telluric forces 7--a sense which in its various aspects we name instinct1 presentiment1 conscience7 is constructed the fabric of our sub-conscious system4 ,through it man is a sort of rsum of all the cosmic life1 in secret affinity and sympathy with all natural processes2 and by the will which stands in response therewith he can exercise a directly creative action on external nature4 ,in normal and healthy conditions the two currents of psychic life run on harmonious but independent4 ,but in the phenomena of somnambulism1 clairvoyance1 and delirium1 the magic region becomes preponderant1 and comes into collision with the other4 ,the dark-world emerges into the realm of day as a portentous power3 and there is the feeling of a double personality1 or of an indwelling genius1 familiar spirit1 or demon4 ,to the ordinary physicist the so-called ,actio in distans was a hopeless stumbling-block4 ,if he did not comprehend the transmission 7as it is called7 of force where there was immediate contact1 he was at least perfectly familiar with the outer aspect of it as a condition of his limited experience4 ,it needed one beyond the mere hodman of science to say with ,laplace3 8,we are so far from knowing all the agents of nature1 that it would be very unphilosophical to deny the existence of phenomena solely because they are inexplicable in the present state of our knowledge40 ,accordingly mesmerism and its allied manifestations were generally abandoned to the bohemians of science1 and to investigators with dogmatic bias4 ,it was still employed as a treatment for certain ailments3 and philosophers1 as different as ,fichte and ,schopenhauer7#hf71 watched its fate with attention4 ,but the herd of professional scientists fought shy of it4 ,the experiments of ,braid at ,manchester in #ahda gradually helped to give research into the subject a new character4 ,under the name of ,hypnotism 7or1 rather at first ,neuro-hypnotism7 he described the phenomena of the magnetic sleep 7induced through prolonged staring at a bright object71 such as abnormal rigidity of body1 perverted sensibility1 and the remarkable obedience of the subject to the command or suggestions of the operator4 ,thirty years afterwards1 the matter became an object of considerable experimental and theoretic work in ,france1 at the rival schools of ,paris and ,nancy2 and the question1 mainly under the title of hypnotism1 though the older name is still occasionally heard1 has been for several years brought prominently under public notice4 ,it cannot be said that the net results of these observations and hypotheses are of a very definitive character4 ,while a large amount of controversy has been waged on the comparative importance of the several methods and instruments by which the hypnotic or mesmeric trance may be induced1 and a scarcely less wide range of divergence prevails with regard to the physiological and pathological conditions in connexion with which it has been most conspicuously manifested1 there has been less anxiety shown to determine its precise psychical nature1 or its significance in mental development4 ,and yet the better understanding of these aspects may throw light on several points connected with primitive religion and the history of early civilisation1 indeed over the whole range of what is called ,vlkerpsychologie4 ,indeed this is one of the points which may be said to emerge out of the confusion of dispute4 ,phenomena at least analogous to those styled hypnotic have a wide range in the anthropological sphere7#hg73 and the proper characters which belong to them will only be caught by an observer who examines them in the widest variety of examples4 ,another feature which has been put in prominence is what has been called 8psychological automatism40 ,and in this name two points seem to deserve note4 ,the first is the spontaneous and as it were mechanical consecution of mental states in the soul whence the interfering effect of voluntary consciousness has been removed4 ,and the second is the unfailing or accurate regularity1 so contrary to the hesitating and uncertain procedure of our conscious and reasoned action1 which so often is seen in the unreflecting and unreasoned movements4 ,to this invariable sequence of psychical movement the superior control and direction by the intelligent self has to adapt itself1 just as it respects the order of physical laws4 ,but1 perhaps1 the chief conclusion to be derived from hypnotic experience is the value of suggestion or suggestibility4 ,even cool thinkers like ,kant have recognised how much mere mental control has to do with bodily state1--how each of us1 in this way1 is often for good or for ill his own physician4 ,an idea is a force1 and is only inactive in so far as it is held in check by other ideas4 8,there is no such thing as hypnotism10 says one3 8there are only different degrees of suggestibility40 ,this may be to exaggerate3 yet it serves to impress the comparatively secondary character of many of the circumstances on which the specially mesmeric or hypnotic experimentalist is apt to lay exclusive stress4 ,the methods may probably vary according to circumstances4 ,but the essence of them all is to get the patient out of the general frame and system of ideas and perceptions in which his ordinary individuality is encased4 ,considering how for all of us the reality of concrete life is bound up with our visual perceptions1 how largely our sanity depends upon the spatial idea1 and how that depends on free ocular range1 we can understand that darkness and temporary loss of vision are powerful auxiliaries in the hypnotic process1 as in magical and superstitious rites4 ,but a great deal short of this may serve to establish influence4 ,the mind of the majority of human beings1 but especially of the young1 may be compared to a vacant seat waiting for some one to fill it4 ,in ,hegel's view hypnotic phenomena produce a kind of temporary and artificial atavism4 ,mechanical or chemical means1 or morbid conditions of body1 may cause even for the intelligent adult a relapse into states of mind closely resembling those exhibited by the primitive or the infantile sensibility4 ,the intelligent personality1 where powers are bound up with limitations and operate through a chain of means and ends1 is reduced to its primitively undifferentiated condition4 ,not that it is restored to its infantile simplicity2 but that all subsequent acquirements operate only as a concentrated individuality1 or mass of will and character1 released from the control of the self-possessed mind1 and invested 7by the latter's withdrawal7 with a new quasi-personality of their own4 ,with the loss of the world of outward things1 there may go1 it is supposed1 a clearer perception of the inward and particularly of the organic life4 ,the ,soul contains the form of unity which other experiences had impressed upon it3 but this form avails in its subterranean existence where it creates a sort of inner self4 ,and this inner self is no longer1 like the embodied self of ordinary consciousness1 an intelligence served by organs1 and proceeding by induction and inference4 ,its knowledge is not mediated or carried along specific channels3 it does not build up1 piecemeal1 by successive steps of synthesis and analysis1 by gradual idealisation1 the organised totality of its intellectual world4 ,the somnambulist and the clairvoyant see without eyes1 and carry their vision directly into regions where the waking consciousness of orderly intelligence cannot enter4 ,but that region is not the world of our higher ideas1--of art1 religion1 and philosophy4 ,it is still the sensitivity--that realm of sensitivity which is ordinarily covered by unconsciousness4 ,such sensitive clairvoyants may1 as it were1 hear themselves growing2 they may discern the hidden quivers and pulses of blood and tissue1 the seats of secret pain and all the unrevealed workings in the dark chambers of the flesh4 ,but always their vision seems confined to that region1 and will fall short of the world of light and ideal truth4 ,it is towards the nature-bond of sensitive solidarity with earth1 and flowers1 and trees1 the life that 8rolls through all things10 not towards the spiritual unity which broods over the world and 8impels all thinking things10 that these immersions in the selfless universe lead us4 ,what ,hegel chiefly sees in these phenomena is their indication1 even on the natural side of man1 of that ideality of the material1 which it is the work of intelligence to produce in the more spiritual life1 in the fully-developed mind4 ,the latter is the supreme over-soul1 that ,absolute ,mind which in our highest moods1 aesthetic and religious1 we approximate to4 ,but mind1 as it tends towards the higher end to 8merge itself in light10 to identify itself yet not wholly lost1 but retained1 in the fullness of undivided intellectual being1 so at the lower end it springs from a natural and underlying unity1 the immense solidarity of nether-soul1 the great ,soul of ,nature--the 8,substance0 which is to be raised into the 8,subject0 which is true divinity4 ,between these two unities1 the nature-given nether-soul and the spirit-won over-soul1 lies the conscious life of man3 a process of differentiation which narrows and of redintegration which enlarges1--which alternately builds up an isolated personality and dissolves it in a common intelligence and sympathy4 ,it is because mental or tacit 8suggestion07#hh7 7i4e4 will-influence exercised without word or sign1 or other sensible mode of connexion71 thought-transference1 or thought-reading 7which is more than dexterous apprehension of delicate muscular signs71 exteriorisation or transposition of sensibility into objects primarily non-sensitive1 clairvoyance 7i4e4 the power of describing1 as if from direct perception1 objects or events removed in space beyond the recognised limits of sensation71 and somnambulism1 so far as it implies lucid vision with sealed eyes1--it is because these things seem to show the essential ideality of matter1 that ,hegel is interested in them4 ,the ordinary conditions of consciousness and even of practical life in society are a derivative and secondary state2 a product of processes of individualism1 which however are never completed1 and leave a large margin for idealising intelligence to fulfil4 ,from a state which is not yet personality to a state which is more than can be described as personality--lies the mental movement4 ,so ,fichte1 too1 had regarded the power of the somnambulist as laying open a world underlying the development of egoity and self-consciousness7#hi73 8the merely sensuous man is still in somnambulism10 only a somnambulism of waking hours3 8the true waking is the life in ,god1 to be free in him1 all else is sleep and dream40 8,egoity10 he adds1 8is a merely formal principle1 utterly1 and never qualitative 7i4e4 the essence and universal force740 ,for ,schopenhauer1 too1 the experiences of animal magnetism had seemed to prove the absolute supernatural power of the radical will in its superiority to the intellectual categories of space1 time1 and causal sequence3 to prove the reality of the metaphysical which is at the basis of all conscious divisions4 7iii47 ,the ,development of ,inner ,freedom4 ,the result of the first range in the process of psycho-genesis was to make the body a sign and utterance of the ,soul1 with a fixed and determinate type4 ,the 8anthropological process0 has defined and settled the mere general sentiency of soul into an individualised shape1 a localised and limited self1 a bundle of habits4 ,it has made the soul an ,ego or self3 a power which looks out upon the world as a spectator1 lifted above immanence in the general tide of being1 but only so lifted because it has made itself one in the world of objects1 a thing among things4 ,the ,mind has reached the point of view of reflection4 ,instead of a general identifiability with all nature1 it has encased itself in a limited range1 from which it looks forth on what is now other than itself4 ,if previously it was mere inward sensibility1 it is now sense1 perceptive of an object here and now1 of an external world4 ,the step has involved some price3 and that price is1 that it has attained independence and self-hood at the cost of surrendering the content it had hitherto held in one with itself4 ,it is now a blank receptivity1 open to the impressions of an outside world3 and the changes which take place in its process of apprehension seem to it to be given from outside4 ,the world it perceives is a world of isolated and independent objects3 and it takes them as they are given4 ,but a closer insistance on the perception develops the implicit intelligence1 which makes it possible4 ,the percipient mind is no mere recipiency or susceptibility with its forms of time and space3 it is spontaneously active1 it is the source of categories1 or is an apperceptive power1--an understanding4 ,consciousness1 thus discovered to be a creative or constructive faculty1 is strictly speaking self-consciousness7#ij74 ,self-consciousness appears at first in the selfish or narrowly egoistic form of appetite and impulse4 ,the intelligence which claims to mould and construe the world of objects--which1 in ,kant's phrase1 professes to give us nature--is implicitly the lord of that world4 ,and that supremacy it carries out as appetite--as destruction4 ,the self is but a bundle of wants--its supremacy over things is really subjection to them3 the satisfaction of appetite is baffled by a new desire which leaves it as it was before4 ,the development of self-consciousness to a more adequate shape is represented by ,hegel as taking place through the social struggle for existence4 ,human beings1 too1 are in the first instance to the uninstructed appetite or the primitive self-consciousness 7which is simply a succession of individual desires for satisfaction of natural want7 only things1--adjectival to that self's individual existence4 ,to them1 too1 his primary relation is to appropriate and master them4 ,might precedes right4 ,but the social struggle for existence forces him to recognise something other which is kindred to himself1--a limiting principle1 another self which has to form an element in his calculations1 not to be neglected4 ,and gradually1 we may suppose1 the result is the division of humanity into two levels1 a ruling lordly class1 and a class of slaves1--a state of inequality in which each knows that his appetite is in some measure checked by a more or less permanent other4 ,lastly1 perhaps soonest in the inferior order1 there is fashioned the perception that its self-seeking in its isolated appetites is subject to an abiding authority1 a continuing consciousness4 ,there grows up a social self--a sense of general humanity and solidarity with other beings--a larger self with which each identifies himself1 a common ground4 ,understanding was selfish intelligence3 practical in the egoistic sense4 ,in the altruistic or universal sense practical1 a principle social and unifying character1 intelligence is ,reason4 ,thus1 ,man1 beginning as a percipient consciousness1 apprehending single objects in space and time1 and as an appetitive self bent upon single gratifications1 has ended as a rational being1--a consciousness purged of its selfishness and isolation1 looking forward openly and impartially on the universe of things and beings4 ,he has ceased to be a mere animal1 swallowed up in the moment and the individual1 using his intelligence only in selfish satisfactions4 ,he is no longer bound down by the struggle for existence1 looking on everything as a mere thing1 a mere means4 ,he has erected himself above himself and above his environment1 but that because he occupies a point of view at which he and his environment are no longer purely antithetical and exclusive7#ia74 ,he has reached what is really the moral standpoint3 the point i4e4 at which he is inspired by a universal self-consciousness1 and lives in that peaceful world where the antitheses of individualities and of outward and inward have ceased to trouble4 8,the natural man10 says ,hegel7#ib71 8sees in the woman flesh of his flesh3 the moral and spiritual man sees spirit of his spirit in the moral and spiritual being and by its means40 ,hitherto we have been dealing with something falling below the full truth of mind3 the region of immediate sensibility with its thorough immersion of mind in body1 first of all1 and secondly its gradual progress to a general standpoint4 ,it is only in the third part of ,subjective mind that we are dealing with the psychology of a being who in the human sense knows and wills1 i4e4 apprehends general truth1 and carries out ideal purposes4 ,thus1 for the third time1 but now on a higher plane1 that of intelligence and rationality1 is traced the process of development or realisation by which reason becomes reasoned knowledge and rational will1 a free or autonomous intelligence4 ,and1 as before1 the starting-point1 alike in theoretical and practical mind1 is feeling--or immediate knowledge and immediate sense of ,ought4 ,the basis of thought is an immediate perception--a sensuous affection or given something1 and the basis of the idea of a general satisfaction is the natural claim to determine the outward existence conformably to individual feeling4 ,in intelligent perception or intuition the important factor is attention1 which raises it above mere passive acceptance and awareness of a given fact4 ,attention thus involves on one hand the externality of its object1 and on the other affirms its dependence on the act of the subject3 it sets the objects before and out of itself1 in space and time1 but yet in so doing it shows itself master of the objects4 ,if perception presuppose attention1 in short1 they cease to be wholly outward3 we make them ours1 and the space and time they fill are projected by us4 ,so attended to1 they are appropriated1 inwardised and recollected3 they take their place in a mental place and mental time3 they receive a general or de-individualised character in the memory-image4 ,these are retained as mental property1 but retained actually only in so far they are revivable and revived4 ,such revival is the work of imagination working by the so-called laws of association4 ,but the possession of its ideas thus inwardised and recollected by the mind is largely a matter of chance4 ,the mind is not really fully master of them until it has been able to give them a certain objectivity1 by replacing the mental image by a vocal1 i4e4 a sensible sign4 ,by means of words1 intelligence turns its ideas or representations into quasi-realities3 it creates a sort of superior sense-world1 the world of language1 where ideas live a potential1 which is also an actual1 life4 ,words are sensibles1 but they are sensibles which completely lose themselves in their meaning4 ,as sensibles1 they render possible that verbal memory which is the handmaid of thought3 but which also as merely mechanical can leave thought altogether out of account4 ,it is through words that thought is made possible3 for it alone permits the movement through ideas without being distracted through a multitude of associations4 ,in them thought has an instrument completely at its own level1 but still only a machine1 and in memory the working of that machine4 ,we think in names1 not in general images1 but in terms which only serve as vehicles for mental synthesis and analysis4 ,it is as such a thinking being--a being who can use language1 and manipulate general concepts or take comprehensive views1 that man is a rational will4 ,a concept of something to be done--a feeling even of some end more or less comprehensive in its quality1 is the implication of what can be called will4 ,at first indeed its material may be found as immediately given and all its volitionality may lie in the circumstance that the intelligent being sets this forward as a governing and controlling ,ought4 ,its vehicle1 in short1 may be mere impulse1 or inclination1 and even passion3 but it is the choice and the purposive adoption of means to the given end4 ,gradually it attains to the idea of a general satisfaction1 or of happiness4 ,and this end seems positive and definite4 ,it soon turns out however to be little but a prudent and self-denying superiority to particular passions and inclinations in the interest of a comprehensive ideal4 ,the free will or intelligence has so far only a negative and formal value3 it is the perfection of an autonomous and freely self-developing mind4 ,such a mind1 which in language has acquired the means of realising an intellectual system of things superior to the restrictions of sense1 and which has emancipated reason from the position of slave to inclination1 is endued with the formal conditions of moral conduct4 ,such a mind will transform its own primarily physical dependence into an image of the law of reason and create the ethical life3 and in the strength of that establishment will go forth to conquer the world into a more and more adequate realisation of the eternal ,idea4 ,essay ,v4 ,ethics ,and ,politics4 8,in dealing10 says ,hegel1 8with the ,idea of the ,state1 we must not have before our eyes a particular state1 or a particular institution3 we must rather study the ,idea1 this actual ,god1 on his own account4 ,every ,state1 however bad we may find it according to our principles1 however defective we may discover this or that feature to be1 still contains1 particularly if it belongs to the mature states of our time1 all the essential factors of its existence4 ,but as it is easier to discover faults than to comprehend the affirmative1 people easily fall into the mistake of letting individual aspects obscure the intrinsic organism of the ,state itself4 ,the ,state is no ideal work of art3 it stands in the everyday world1 in the sphere1 that is1 of arbitrary act1 accident1 and error1 and a variety of faults may mar the regularity of its traits4 ,but the ugliest man1 the criminal1 a sick man and a cripple1 is after all a living man2 the affirmative1 ,life1 subsists in spite of the defect3 and this affirmative is here the theme7#ic740 8,it is the theme of philosophy10 he adds1 8to ascertain the substance which is immanent in the show of the temporal and transient1 and the eternal which is present40 7i47 ,hegel as a ,political ,critic4 ,but if this is true1 it is also to be remembered that the philosopher is1 like other men1 the son of his age1 and estimates the value of reality from preconceptions and aspirations due to his generation4 ,the historical circumstances of his nation as well as the personal experiences of his life help to determine his horizon1 even in the effort to discover the hidden pulse and movement of the social organism4 ,this is specially obvious in political philosophy4 ,the conception of ethics and politics which is presented in the ,encyclopaedia was in #ahbj produced with more detail as the ,grundlinien der ,philosophie des ,rechts4 ,appearing1 as it did1 two years after his appointment to a professorship at ,berlin1 and in the midst of a political struggle between the various revolutionary and conservative powers and parties of ,germany1 the book became1 and long remained1 a target for embittered criticism4 ,the so-called ,war of ,liberation or national movement to shake off the ,french yoke was due to a coalition of parties1 and had naturally been in part supported by tendencies and aims which went far beyond the ostensive purpose either of leaders or of combatants4 ,aspirations after a freer state were entwined with radical and socialistic designs to reform the political hierarchy of the ,fatherland3 high ideals and low vulgarities were closely intermixed3 and the noble enthusiasm of youth was occasionally played on by criminal and anarchic intriguers4 ,in a strong and wise and united ,germany some of these schemes might have been tolerated4 ,but strength1 wisdom1 and unity were absent4 ,in the existing tension between ,austria and ,prussia for the leadership1 in the ill-adapted and effete constitutions of the several principalities which were yet expected to realise the advance which had taken place in society and ideas during the last thirty years1 the outlook on every hand seemed darker and more threatening than it might have otherwise done4 ,governments1 which had lost touch with their peoples1 suspected conspiracy and treason3 and a party in the nation credited their rulers with gratuitous designs against private liberty and rights4 ,there was a vast but ill-defined enthusiasm in the breasts of the younger world1 and it was shared by many of their teachers4 ,it seemed to their immense aspirations that the war of liberation had failed of its true object and left things much as they were4 ,the volunteers had not fought for the political systems of ,austria or ,prussia1 or for the three-and-thirty princes of ,germany3 but for ideas1 vague1 beautiful1 stimulating4 ,to such a mood the continuance of the old system was felt as a cruel deception and a reaction4 ,the governments on their part had not realised the full importance of the spirit that had been aroused1 and could not at a moment's notice set their house in order1 even had there been a clearer outlook for reform than was offered4 ,they too had suffered1 and had realised their insecurity3 and were hardly in a mood to open their gates to the enemy4 ,coming on such a situation of affairs1 ,hegel's book would have been likely in any case to provoke criticism4 ,for it took up a line of political theory which was little in accord with the temper of the age4 ,the conception of the state which it expounded is not far removed in essentials from the conception which now dominates the political life of the chief ,european nations4 ,but in his own time it came upon ears which were naturally disposed to misconceive it4 ,it was unacceptable to the adherents of the ancien rgime1 as much as to the liberals4 ,it was declared by one party to be a glorification of the ,prussian state3 by another to rationalise the sanctities of authority4 ,it was pointed out that the new professor was a favourite of the leading minister1 that his influence was dominant in scholastic appointments1 and that occasional gratuities from the crown proved his acceptability4 ,a contemporary professor1 ,fries1 remarked that ,hegel's theory of the state had grown 8not in the gardens of science but on the dung-hill of servility40 ,hegel himself was aware that he had planted a blow in the face of a 8shallow and pretentious sect10 and that his book had 8given great offence to the demagogic folk40 ,alike in religious and political life he was impatient of sentimentalism1 of rhetorical feeling1 of wordy enthusiasm4 ,a positive storm of scorn burst from him at much-promising and little-containing declamation that appealed to the pathos of ideas1 without sense of the complex work of construction and the system of principles which were needed to give them reality4 ,his impatience of demagogic gush led him 7in the preface7 into a tactless attack on ,fries1 who was at the moment in disgrace for his participation in the demonstration at the ,wartburg4 ,it led him to an attack on the bumptiousness of those who held that conscientious conviction was ample justification for any proceeding3--an attack which opponents were not unwilling to represent as directed against the principle of conscience itself4 ,yet ,hegel's views on the nature of political unity were not new4 ,their nucleus had been formed nearly twenty years before4 ,in the years that immediately followed the ,french revolution he had gone through the usual anarchic stage of intelligent youth4 ,he had wondered whether humanity might not have had a nobler destiny1 had fate given supremacy to some heresy rather than the orthodox creed of ,christendom4 ,he had seen religion in the past 8teaching what despotism wished1--contempt of the human race1 its incapacity for anything good7#id740 ,but his earliest reflections on political power belong to a later date1 and are inspired1 not so much by the vague ideals of humanitarianism1 as by the spirit of national patriotism4 ,they are found in a 8,criticism of the ,german ,constitution0 apparently dating from the year #ahjb7ie74 ,it is written after the peace of ,lunville had sealed for ,germany the loss of her provinces west of the ,rhine1 and subsequent to the disasters of the ,german arms at ,hohenlinden and ,marengo4 ,it is almost contemporaneous with the measures of #ahjc and #ahjd1 which affirmed the dissolution of the 8,holy ,roman ,empire0 of ,german name4 ,the writer of this unpublished pamphlet sees his country in a situation almost identical with that which ,macchiavelli saw around him in ,italy4 ,it is abused by petty despots1 distracted by mean particularist ambitions1 at the mercy of every foreign power4 ,it was such a scene which1 as ,hegel recalls1 had prompted and justified the drastic measures proposed in the ,prince1--measures which have been ill-judged by the closet moralist1 but evince the high statesmanship of the ,florentine4 ,in the ,prince1 an intelligent reader can see 8the enthusiasm of patriotism underlying the cold and dispassionate doctrines40 ,macchiavelli dared to declare that ,italy must become a state1 and to assert that 8there is no higher duty for a state than to maintain itself1 and to punish relentlessly every author of anarchy1--the supreme1 and perhaps sole political crime40 ,and like teaching1 ,hegel adds1 is needed for ,germany4 ,only1 he concludes1 no mere demonstration of the insanity of utter separation of the particular from his kin will ever succeed in converting the particularists from their conviction of the absoluteness of personal and private rights4 8,insight and intelligence always excite so much distrust that force alone avails to justify them2 then man yields them obedience7#if740 8,the ,german political edifice10 says the writer1 8is nothing else but the sum of the rights which the single parts have withdrawn from the whole2 and this justice1 which is ever on the watch to prevent the state having any power left1 is the essence of the constitution40 ,the ,peace of ,westphalia had but served to constitute or stereotype anarchy3 the ,german empire had by that instrument divested itself of all rights of political unity1 and thrown itself on the goodwill of its members4 ,what then1 it may be asked1 is1 in ,hegel's view1 the indispensable minimum essential to a state8 ,and the answer will be1 organised strength1--a central and united force4 8,the strength of a country lies neither in the multitude of its inhabitants and fighting men1 nor in its fertility1 nor in its size1 but solely in the way its parts are by reasonable combination made a single political force enabling everything to be used for the common defence40 ,hegel speaks scornfully of 8the philanthropists and moralists who decry politics as an endeavour and an art to seek private utility at the cost of right03 he tells them that 8it is foolish to oppose the interest or 7as it is expressed by the more morally-obnoxious word7 the utility of the state to its right03 that the 8rights of a state are the utility of the state as established and recognised by compacts03 and that 8war0 7which they would fain abolish or moralise7 8has to decide not which of the rights asserted by either party is the true right 7--for both parties have a true right71 but which right has to give way to the other40 ,it is evident from these propositions that ,hegel takes that view of political supremacy which has been associated with the name of ,hobbes4 ,but his views also reproduce the ,platonic king of men1 8who can rule and dare not lie40 8,all states10 he declares1 8are founded by the sublime force of great men1 not by physical strength4 ,the great man has something in his features which others would gladly call their lord4 ,they obey him against their will4 ,their immediate will is his will1 but their conscious will is otherwise4444 ,this is the prerogative of the great man to ascertain and to express the absolute will4 ,all gather round his banner4 ,he is their ,god40 8,the state10 he says again1 8is the self-certain absolute mind which recognises no definite authority but its own3 which acknowledges no abstract rules of good and bad1 shameful and mean1 craft and deception40 ,so also ,hobbes describes the prerogatives of the sovereign ,leviathan4 ,but the ,hegelian ,god immanent in the state is a higher power than ,hobbes knows3 he is no mortal1 but in his truth an immortal ,god4 ,he speaks by 7what in this early essay is called7 the ,absolute ,government7#ig73 the government of the ,law--the true impersonal sovereign1--distinct alike from the single ruler and the multitude of the ruled4 8,it is absolutely only universality as against particular4 ,as this absolute1 ideal1 universal1 compared to which everything else is a particular1 it is the phenomenon of ,god4 ,its words are his decision1 and it can appear and exist under no other form4444 ,the ,absolute government is divine1 self-sanctioned and not made7#ih740 ,the real strength--the real connecting-mean which gives life to sovereign and to subject--is intelligence free and entire1 independent both of what individuals feel and believe and of the quality of the ruler4 8,the spiritual bond10 he says in a lower form of speech1 8is public opinion3 it is the true legislative body1 national assembly1 declaration of the universal will which lives in the execution of all commands40 ,this still small voice of public opinion is the true and real parliament3 not literally making laws1 but revealing them4 ,if we ask1 where does this public opinion appear and how does it disengage itself from the masses of partisan judgment8 ,hegel answers1--and to the surprise of those who have not entered into the spirit of his age7#ii7--;it is embodied in the ,aged and the ,priests4 ,both of these have ceased to live in the real world3 they are by nature and function disengaged from the struggles of particular existence1 have risen above the divergencies of social classes4 ,they breathe the ether of pure contemplation4 8,the sunset of life gives them mystical lore10 or at least removes from old age the distraction of selfishness3 while the priest is by function set apart from the divisions of human interest4 ,understood in a large sense1 ,hegel's view is that the real voice of experience is elicited through those who have attained indifference to the distorting influence of human parties1 and who see life steadily and whole4 ,if this utterance shows the little belief ,hegel had in the ordinary methods of legislation through 8representative0 bodies1 and hints that the real substance of political life is deeper than the overt machinery of political operation1 it is evident that this theory of 8divine right0 is of a different stamp from what used to go under that name4 ,and1 again1 though the power of the central state is indispensable1 he is far from agreeing with the so-called bureaucratic view that 8a state is a machine with a single spring which sets in motion all the rest of the machinery40 8,everything10 he says1 8which is not directly required to organise and maintain the force for giving security without and within must be left by the central government to the freedom of the citizens4 ,nothing ought to be so sacred in the eyes of a government as to leave alone and to protect1 without regard to utilities1 the free action of the citizens in such matters as do not affect its fundamental aim3 for this freedom is itself sacred7#ajj740 ,he is no friend of paternal bureaucracy4 8,the pedantic craving to settle every detail1 the mean jealousy against estates and corporations administrating and directing their own affairs1 the base fault-finding with all independent action on the part of the citizens1 even when it has no immediate bearing on the main political interest1 has been decked out with reasons to show that no penny of public expenditure1 made for a country of twenty or thirty millions' population1 can be laid out1 without first being1 not permitted1 but commanded1 controlled and revised by the supreme government40 ,you can see1 he remarks1 in the first village after you enter ,prussian territory the lifeless and wooden routine which prevails4 ,the whole country suffers also from the way religion has been mixed up with political rights1 and a particular creed pronounced by law indispensable both for sovereign and full-privileged subject4 ,in a word1 the unity and vigour of the state is quite compatible with considerable latitude and divergence in laws and judicature1 in the imposition and levying of taxes1 in language1 manners1 civilisation and religion4 ,equality in all these points is desirable for social unity3 but it is not indispensable for political strength4 ,this decided preference for the unity of the state against the system of checks and counterchecks1 which sometimes goes by the name of a constitution1 came out clearly in ,hegel's attitude in discussing the dispute between the ,wrtembergers and their sovereign in #ahae-af4 ,wrtemberg1 with its complicated aggregation of local laws1 had always been a paradise of lawyers1 and the feudal rights or privileges of the local oligarchies--the so-called 8good old law0--were the boast of the country4 ,all this had however been aggravated by the increase of territory received in #ahje3 and the king1 following the examples set by ,france and even by ,bavaria1 promulgated of his own grace a 8constitution0 remodelling the electoral system of the country4 ,immediately an outcry burst out against the attempt to destroy the ancient liberties4 ,uhland tuned his lyre to the popular cry3 ,rckert sang on the king's side4 ,to ,hegel the contest presented itself as a struggle between the attachment to traditional rights1 merely because they are old1 and the resolution to carry out reasonable reform whether it be agreeable to the reformed or not3 or rather he saw in it resistance of particularism1 of separation1 clinging to use and wont1 and basing itself on formal pettifogging objections1 against the spirit of organisation4 ,anything more he declined to see4 ,and probably he was right in ascribing a large part of the opposition to inertia1 to vanity and self-interest1 combined with the want of political perception of the needs of ,wrtemberg and ,germany4 ,but on the other hand1 he failed to remember the insecurity and danger of such 8gifts of the ,danai03 he forgot the sense of free-born men that a constitution is not something to be granted 7octroy7 as a grace1 but something that must come by the spontaneous act of the innermost self of the community4 ,he dealt rather with the formal arguments which were used to refuse progress1 than with the underlying spirit which prompted the opposition7#aja74 ,the philosopher lives 7as ,plato has well reminded us7 too exclusively within the ideal4 ,bent on the essential nucleus of institutions1 he attaches but slight importance to the variety of externals1 and fails to realise the practice of the law-courts4 ,he forgets that what weighs lightly in logic1 may turn the scale in real life and experience4 ,for feeling and sentiment he has but scant respect3 he is brusque and uncompromising3 and cannot realise all the difficulties and dangers that beset the ,idea in the mazes of the world1 and may ultimately quite alter a plan which at first seemed independent of petty details4 ,better than other men perhaps he recognises in theory how the mere universal only exists complete in an individual shape3 but more than other men he forgets these truths of insight1 when the business of life calls for action or for judgment4 ,he cannot at a moment's notice remember that he is1 if not1 as ,cicero says1 in faece ,romuli1 the member of a degenerate commonwealth1 at least living in a world where good and evil are not1 as logic presupposes1 sharply divided but intricately intertwined4 7ii47 ,the ,ethics and ,religion of the ,state4 ,this idealism of political theory is illustrated by the sketch of the ,ethical ,life which he drew up about #ahjb4 ,under the name of 8,ethical ,system0 it presents in concentrated or undeveloped shape the doctrine which subsequently swelled into the 8,philosophy of ,mind40 ,at a later date he worked out more carefully as introduction the psychological genesis of moral and intelligent man1 and he separated out more distinctly as a sequel the universal powers which give to social life its higher characters4 ,in the earlier sketch the ,ethical ,part stands by itself1 with the consequence that ,ethics bears a meaning far exceeding all that had been lately called moral4 ,the word 8moral0 itself he avoids7#ajb74 ,it savours of excessive subjectivity1 of struggle1 of duty and conscience4 ,it has an ascetic ring about it--an aspect of negation1 which seeks for abstract holiness1 and turns its back on human nature4 ,kant's words opposing duty to inclination1 and implying that moral goodness involves a struggle1 an antagonism1 a victory1 seem to him 7and to his time7 one-sided4 ,that aspect of negation accordingly which ,kant certainly began with1 and which ,schopenhauer magnified until it became the all-in-all of ,ethics1 ,hegel entirely subordinates4 ,equally little does he like the emphasis on the supremacy of insight1 intention1 conscience3 they lead1 he thinks1 to a view which holds the mere fact of conviction to be all-important1 as if it mattered not what we thought and believed and did1 so long as we were sincere in our belief4 ,all this emphasis on the good-will1 on the imperative of duty1 on the rights of conscience1 has1 he admits1 its justification in certain circumstances1 as against mere legality1 or mere natural instinctive goodness2 but it has been overdone4 ,above all1 it errs by an excess of individualism4 ,it springs from an attitude of reflection1--in which the individual1 isolated in his conscious and superficial individuality1 yet tries--but probably tries in vain--to get somewhat in touch with a universal which he has allowed to slip outside him1 forgetting that it is the heart and substance of his life4 ,kant1 indeed1 hardly falls under this condemnation4 ,for he aims at showing that the rational will inevitably creates as rational a law or universal2 that the individual act becomes self-regulative1 and takes its part in constituting a system or realm of duty4 ,still1 on the whole1 8morality0 in this narrower sense belongs to an age of reflection1 and is formal or nominal goodness rather than the genuine and full reality4 ,it is the protest against mere instinctive or customary virtue1 which is but compliance with traditional authority1 and compliance with it as if it were a sort of quasi-natural law4 ,moralising reflection is the awakening of subjectivity and of a deeper personality4 ,the age which thus precedes morality is not an age in which kindness1 or love1 or generosity is unknown4 ,and if ,hegel says that 8,morality10 strictly so called1 began with ,socrates1 he does not thereby accuse the pre-,socratic ,greeks of inhumanity4 ,but what he does say is that such ethical life as existed was in the main a thing of custom and law3 of law1 moreover1 which was not set objectively forward1 but left still in the stage of uncontradicted usage1 a custom which was a second nature1 part of the essential and quasi-physical ordinance of life4 ,the individual had not yet learned to set his self-consciousness against these usages and ask for their justification4 ,these are like the so-called law of the ,medes and ,persians which alters not3 customs of immemorial antiquity and unquestionable sway4 ,they are part of a system of things with which for good or evil the individual is utterly identified1 bound as it were hand and foot4 ,these are1 as a traveller says7#ajc71 8oral and unwritten traditions which teach that certain rules of conduct are to be observed under certain penalties2 and without the aid of fixed records1 or the intervention of a succession of authorised depositaries and expounders1 these laws have been transmitted to father and son1 through unknown generations1 and are fixed in the minds of the people as sacred and unalterable40 ,the antithesis then in ,hegel1 as in ,kant1 is between ,law and ,morality1 or rather ,legality and ,morality1--two abstractions to which human development is alternately prone to attach supreme importance4 ,the first stage in the objectivation of intelligence or in the evolution of personality is the constitution of mere1 abstract1 or strict right4 ,it is the creation of institutions and uniformities1 i4e4 of laws1 or rights1 which express definite and stereotyped modes of behaviour4 ,or1 if we look at it from the individual's standpoint1 we may say his consciousness awakes to find the world parcelled out under certain rules and divisions1 which have objective validity1 and govern him with the same absolute authority as do the circumstances of physical nature4 ,under their influence every rank and individual is alike forced to bow3 to each his place and function is assigned by an order or system which claims an inviolable and eternal supremacy4 ,it is not the same place and function for each3 but for each the position and duties are predetermined in this metaphysically-physical order4 ,the situation and its duties have been created by super-human and natural ordinance4 ,as the ,platonic myth puts it1 each order in the social hierarchy has been framed underground by powers that turned out men of gold1 and silver1 and baser metal3 or as the ,norse legend tells1 they are the successive offspring of the white ,god1 ,heimdal1 in his dealings with womankind4 ,the central idea of the earlier social world is the supremacy of rights--but not of right4 ,the sum 7for it cannot be properly called a system7 of rights is a self-subsistent world1 to which man is but a servant2 and a second peculiarity of it is its inequality4 ,if all are equal before the laws1 this only means here that the laws1 with their absolute and thorough inequality1 are indifferent to the real and personal diversities of individuals4 ,even the so-called equality of primitive law is of the 8,eye-for-eye1 ,tooth-for-tooth0 kind2 it takes no note of special circumstances2 it looks abstractly and rudely at facts1 and maintains a hard and fast uniformity1 which seems the height of unfairness4 ,rule stands by rule1 usage beside usage1--a mere aggregate or multitude of petty tyrants1 reduced to no unity or system1 and each pressing with all the weight of an absolute mandate4 ,the pettiest bit of ceremonial law is here of equal dignity with the most far-reaching principle of political obligation4 ,in the essay already referred to1 ,hegel has designated something analogous to this as ,natural or ,physical ,ethics1 or as ,ethics in its relative or comparative stage4 ,here ,man first shows his superiority to nature1 or enters on his properly ethical function1 by transforming the physical world into his possession4 ,he makes himself the lord of natural objects--stamping them as his1 and not their own1 making them his permanent property1 his tools1 his instruments of exchange and production4 ,the fundamental ethical act is appropriation by labour1 and the first ethical world is the creation of an economic system1 the institution of property4 ,for property1 or at least possession and appropriation1 is the dominant idea1 with its collateral and sequent principles4 ,and at first1 even human beings are treated on the same method as other things3 as objects in a world of objects or aggregate of things3 as things to be used and acquired1 as means and instruments1--not in any sense as ends in themselves4 ,it is a world in which the relation of master and slave is dominant1--where owner and employer is set in antithesis against his tools and chattels4 ,but the ,nemesis of his act issues in making the individual the servant of his so-called property4 ,he has become an objective power by submitting himself to objectivity3 he has literally put himself into the object he has wrought1 and is now a thing among things3 for what he owns1 what he has appropriated1 determines what he is4 ,the real powers in the world thus established are the laws of possession-holding3 the laws dominate man3 and he is only freed from dependence on casual externals1 by making himself thoroughly the servant of his possessions4 ,the only salvation1 and it is but imperfect1 that can be reached on this stage is by the family union4 ,the sexual tie1 is at first entirely on a level with the other arrangements of the sphere4 ,the man or woman is but a chattel and a tool2 a casual appropriation which gradually is transformed into a permanent possession and a permanent bond7#ajd74 ,but1 as the family constituted itself1 it helped to afford a promise of better things4 ,an ideal interest--the religion of the household--extending beyond the individual1 and beyond the moment1--binding past and present1 and parents to offspring1 gave a new character to the relation of property4 ,parents and children form a unity1 which overrides and essentially permeates their 8difference0 from each other3 there is no exchange1 no contract1 nor1 in the stricter sense1 property between the members4 ,in the property-idea they are lifted out of their isolation1 and in the continuity of family life there is a certain analogue of immortality4 ,but1 says ,hegel1 8though the family be the highest totality of which ,nature is capable1 the absolute identity is in it still inward1 and is not instituted in absolute form2 and hence1 too1 the reproduction of the totality is an appearance1 the appearance of the children7#aje740 8,the power and the intelligence1 the #8difference' of the parents1 stands in inverse proportion to the youth and vigour of the child3 and these two sides of life flee from and are sequent on each other1 and are reciprocally external7#ajf740 ,or1 as we may put it1 the god of the family is a departed ancestor1 a ghost in the land of the dead3 it has not really a continuous and unified life4 ,in such a state of society--a state of nature--and in its supreme form1 the family1 there is no adequate principle which though real shall still give ideality and unity to the self-isolating aspects of life4 ,there is wanted something which shall give expression to its 8indifference10 which shall control the tendency of this partial moralisation to sink at every moment into individuality1 and lift it from its immersion in nature4 ,family life and economic groups 7--for these two1 which ,hegel subsequently separates1 are here kept close together7 need an ampler and wider life to keep them from stagnating in their several selfishnesses4 ,this freshening and corrective influence they get in the first instance from deeds of violence and crime4 ,here is the 8negative unsettling0 of the narrow fixities1 of the determinate conditions or relationships into which the preceding processes of labour and acquisition have tended to stereotype life4 ,the harsh restriction brings about its own undoing4 ,man may subject natural objects to his formative power1 but the wild rage of senseless devastation again and again bursts forth to restore the original formlessness4 ,he may build up his own pile of wealth1 store up his private goods1 but the thief and the robber with the instincts of barbarian socialism tread on his steps3 and every stage of appropriation has for its sequel a crop of acts of dispossession4 ,he may secure by accumulation his future life2 but the murderer for gain's sake cuts it short4 ,and out of all this as a necessary consequence stands avenging justice4 ,and in the natural world of ethics--where true moral life has not yet arisen--this is mere retaliation or the lex talionis2--the beginning of an endless series of vengeance and counter-vengeance1 the blood-feud4 ,punishment1 in the stricter sense of the term1--which looks both to antecedents and effects in character--cannot yet come into existence2 for to punish there must be something superior to individualities1 an ethical idea embodied in an institution1 to which the injurer and the injured alike belong4 ,but as yet punishment is only vengeance1 the personal and natural equivalent1 the physical reaction against injury1 perhaps regulated and formulated by custom and usage1 but not essentially altered from its purely retaliatory character4 ,these crimes--or transgressions--are thus by ,hegel quaintly conceived as storms which clear the air--which shake the individualist out of his slumber4 ,the scene in which transgression thus acts is that of the so-called state of nature1 where particularism was rampant3 where moral right was not1 but only the right of nature1 of pre-occupation1 of the stronger1 of the first maker and discoverer4 ,crime is thus the 8dialectic0 which shakes the fixity of practical arrangements1 and calls for something in which the idea of a higher unity1 a permanent substance of life1 shall find realisation4 ,the 8positive supersession7#ajg70 of individualism and naturalism in ethics is by ,hegel called 8,absolute ,ethics40 ,under this title he describes the ethics and religion of the state--a religion which is immanent in the community1 and an ethics which rises superior to particularity4 ,the picture he draws is a romance fashioned upon the model of the ,greek commonwealth as that had been idealised by ,greek literature and by the longings of later ages for a freer life4 ,it is but one of the many modes in which ,helena--to quote ,goethe--has fascinated the ,german ,faust4 ,he dreams himself away from the prosaic worldliness of a ,german municipality to the unfading splendour of the ,greek city with its imagined coincidence of individual will with universal purpose4 ,there is in such a commonwealth no pain of surrender and of sacrifice1 and no subsequent compensation3 for1 at the very moment of resigning self-will to common aims1 he enjoys it retained with the added zest of self-expansion4 ,he is not so left to himself as to feel from beyond the restraint of a law which controls--even if it wisely and well controls--individual effort4 ,there is for his happy circumstances no possibility of doing otherwise4 ,or1 it may be1 ,hegel has reminiscences from the ideals of other nations than the ,greek4 ,he recalls the ,israelite depicted by the ,law-adoring psalmist1 whose delight is to do the will of the ,lord1 whom the zeal of ,god's house has consumed1 whose whole being runs on in one pellucid stream with the universal and eternal stream of divine commandment4 ,such a frame of spirit1 where the empirical consciousness with all its soul and strength and mind identifies its mission into conformity with the absolute order1 is the mood of absolute ,ethics4 ,it is what some have spoken of as the ,true life1 as the ,eternal life2 in it1 says ,hegel1 the individual exists auf ewige ,weise7#ajh71 as it were sub specie aeternitatis3 his life is hid with his fellows in the common life of his people4 ,his every act1 and thought1 and will1 get their being and significance from a reality which is established in him as a permanent spirit4 ,it is there that he1 in the fuller sense1 attains 1 or finds himself no longer a mere part1 but an ideal totality4 ,this totality is realised under the particular form of a ,nation 7,volk71 which in the visible sphere represents 7or rather is1 as a particular7 the absolute and infinite4 ,such a unity is neither the mere sum of isolated individuals1 nor a mere majority ruling by numbers3 but the fraternal and organic commonwealth which brings all classes and all rights from their particularistic independence into an ideal identity and indifference7#aji74 ,here all are not merely equal before the laws3 but the law itself is a living and organic unity1 self-correcting1 subordinating and organising1 and no longer merely defining individual privileges and so-called liberties4 8,in such conjunction of the universal with the particularity lies the divinity of a nation3 or1 if we give this universal a separate place in our ideas1 it is the ,god of the nation40 ,but in this complete accordance between concept and intuition1 between visible and invisible1 where symbol and significate are one1 religion and ethics are indistinguishable4 ,it is the old conception 7and in its highest sense7 of ,theocracy7#aaj74 ,god is the national head and the national life3 and in him all individuals have their 8difference0 rendered 8indifferent40 8,such an ethical life is absolute truth1 for untruth is only in the fixture of a single mode3 but in the everlasting being of the nation all singleness is superseded4 ,it is absolute culture2 for in the eternal is the real and empirical annihilation and prescription of all limited modality4 ,it is absolute disinterestedness3 for in the eternal there is nothing private and personal4 ,it1 and each of its movements1 is the highest beauty3 for beauty is but the eternal made actual and given concrete shape4 ,it is without pain1 and blessed3 for in it all difference and all pain is superseded4 ,it is the divine1 absolute1 real1 existing and being1 under no veil2 nor need one first raise it up into the ideality of divinity1 and extract it from the appearance and empirical intuition2 but it is1 and immediately1 absolute intuition7#aaa740 ,if we compare this language with the statement of the ,encyclopaedia we can see how for the moment ,hegel's eye is engrossed with the glory of the ideal nation4 ,in it1 the moral life embraces and is co-extensive with religion1 art and science3 practice and theory are at one3 life in the idea knows none of those differences which1 in the un-ideal world1 make art and morality often antithetical1 and set religion at variance with science4 ,it is1 as we have said1 a memory of ,greek and perhaps ,hebrew ideals4 ,or rather it is by the help of such memories the affirmation of the essential unity of life--the true1 complete1 many-sided life--which is the presupposition and idea that culture and morals rest upon and from which they get their supreme sanction1 i4e4 their constitutive principle and unity4 ,even in the ,encyclopaedia7#aab7 ,hegel endeavours to guard against the severance of morality and art and philosophy which may be rashly inferred in consequence of his serial order of treatment4 8,religion10 he remarks1 8is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state4444 ,the ethical life is the divine spirit indwelling in consciousness1 as it is actually present in a nation and its individual members40 ,yet1 as we see1 there is a distinction4 ,the process of history carries out a judgment on nation after nation1 and reveals the divine as not only immanent in the ethical life but as ever expanding the limited national spirit till it become a spirit of universal humanity4 ,still--and this is perhaps for each time always the more important--the national unity--not indeed as a multitude1 nor as a majority--is the supreme real appearance of the ,eternal and ,absolute4 ,having thus described the nation as an organic totality1 he goes on to point out that the political constitution shows this character by forming a triplicity of political orders4 ,in one of these there is but a silent1 practical identity1 in faith and trust1 with the totality3 in the second there is a thorough disruption of interest into particularity3 and in the third1 there is a living and intellectual identity or indifference1 which combines the widest range of individual development with the completest unity of political loyalty4 ,this last order is that which lives in conscious identification of private with public duty3 all that it does has a universal and public function4 ,such a body is the ideal ,nobility--the nobility which is the servus servorum ,dei1 the supreme servant of humanity4 ,its function is to maintain general interests1 to give the other orders 7peasantry and industrials7 security1--receiving in return from these others the means of subsistence4 ,noblesse oblige gives the death-blow to particular interests1 and imposes the duty of exhibiting1 in the clearest form1 the supreme reality of absolute morality1 and of being to the rest an unperturbed ideal of aesthetic1 ethical1 religious1 and philosophical completeness4 ,it is here alone1 in this estate which is absolutely disinterested1 that the virtues appear in their true light4 ,to the ordinary moralising standpoint they seem severally to be1 in their separation1 charged with independent value4 ,but from the higher point of view the existence1 and still more the accentuation of single virtues1 is a mark of incompleteness4 ,even quality1 it has been said1 involves its defects3 it can only shine by eclipsing or reflecting something else4 ,the completely moral is not the sum of the several virtues1 but the reduction of them to indifference4 ,it is thus that when ,plato tries to get at the unity of virtue1 their aspect of difference tends to be subordinated4 8,the movement of absolute morality runs through all the virtues1 but settles fixedly in none40 ,it is more than love to fatherland1 and nation1 and laws3--that still implies a relation to something and involves a difference4 ,for love--the mortal passion1 where 8self is not annulled0--is the process of approximation1 while unity is not yet attained1 but wished and aimed at3 and when it is complete--and become 8such love as spirits know7#aac70--;it gives place to a calmer rest and an active immanence4 ,the absolute morality is life in the fatherland and for the nation4 ,in the individual however it is the process upward and inward that we see1 not the consummation4 ,then the identity appears as an ideal1 as a tendency not yet accomplished to its end1 a possibility not yet made fully actual4 ,at bottom--in the divine substance in which the individual inheres--the identity is present3 but in the appearance1 we have only the passage from possible to actual1 a passage which has the aspect of a struggle4 ,hence the moral act appears as a virtue1 with merit or desert4 ,it is accordingly the very characteristic of virtue to signalise its own incompleteness3 it emerges into actuality only through antagonism1 and with a taint of imperfection clinging to it4 ,thus1 in the field of absolute morality1 if the virtues appear1 it is only in their transiency4 ,if they were undisputedly real in morality1 they would not separately show4 ,to feel that you have done well implies that you have not done wholly well3 self-gratulation in meritorious deed is the re-action from the shudder at feeling that the self was not wholly good4 ,the essential unity of virtue--its negative character as regards all the empirical variety of virtues--is seen in the excellences required by the needs of war4 ,these military requirements demonstrate the mere relativity and therefore non-virtuousness of the special virtues4 ,they equally protest against the common beliefs in the supreme dignity of labour and its utilities4 ,but if bravery or soldierlike virtue be essentially a virtue of virtues1 it is only a negative virtue after all4 ,it is the blast of the universal sweeping away all the habitations and fixed structures of particularist life4 ,if it is a unity of virtue1 it is only a negative unity--an indifference4 ,if it avoid the parcelling of virtue into a number of imperfect and sometimes contradictory parts1 it does so only to present a bare negation4 ,the soldier1 therefore1 if in potentiality the unity of all the virtues1 may tend in practice to represent the ability to do without any of them7#aad74 ,the home of these 8relative0 virtues--of morality in the ordinary sense--is the life of the second order in the commonwealth3 the order of industry and commerce4 ,in this sphere the idea of the universal is gradually lost to view3 it becomes1 says ,hegel1 only a thought or a creature of the mind1 which does not affect practice4 ,the materialistic worker of civilisation does not see further than the empirical existence of individuals3 his horizon is limited by the family1 and his final ideal is a competency of comfort in possessions and revenues4 ,the supreme universal to which he attains as the climax of his evolution is only money4 ,but it is only with the vaster development of commerce that this terrible consequence ensues4 ,at first as a mere individual1 he has higher aims1 though not the highest4 ,he has a limited ideal determined by his special sphere of work4 ,to win respect--the character for a limited truthfulness and honesty and skilful work--is his ambition4 ,he lives in a conceit of his performance--his utility--the esteem of his special circle4 ,to his commercial soul the military order is a scarecrow and a nuisance3 military honour is but trash4 ,yet if his range of idea is narrow and engrossing in details1 his aim is to get worship1 to be recognised as the best in his little sphere4 ,but with the growth of the trading spirit his character changes3 he becomes the mere capitalist1 is denationalised1 has no definite work and can claim no individualised function4 ,money now measures all things3 it is the sole ultimate reality4 ,it transforms everything into a relation of contract3 even vengeance is equated in terms of money4 ,its motto is1 ,the ,exchanges must be honoured1 though honour and morality may go to the dogs4 ,so far as it is concerned1 there is no nation1 but a federation of shopkeepers4 ,such an one is the bourgeois 7the ,brger1 as distinct from the peasant or ,bauer and the ,adel74 ,as an artisan--i4e4 a mere industrial1 he knows no country1 but at best the reputation and interest of his own guild-union with its partial object4 ,he is narrow1 but honest and respectable4 ,as a mere commercial agent1 he knows no country3 his field is the world1 but the world not in its concreteness and variety1 but in the abstract aspect of a money-bag and an exchange4 ,the larger totality is indeed not altogether out of sight4 ,but if he contribute to the needy1 either his sacrifice is lifeless in proportion as it becomes general1 or loses generality as it becomes lively4 ,as regards his general services to the great life of his national state7#aae71 they are unintelligently and perhaps grudgingly rendered4 ,of the peasant order ,hegel has less to say4 ,on one side the 8country0 as opposed to the 8town0 has a closer natural sympathy with the common and general interest3 and the peasantry is the undifferentiated1 solid and sound1 basis of the national life4 ,it forms the submerged mass1 out of which the best soldiers are made1 and which out of the depths of earth brings forward nourishment as well as all the materials of elementary necessity4 ,faithfulness and loyalty are its virtues3 but it is personal allegiance to a commanding superior1--not to a law or a general view--for the peasant is weak in comprehensive intelligence1 though shrewd in detailed observation4 ,of the purely political function of the state ,hegel in this sketch says almost nothing4 ,but under the head of the general government of the state he deals with its social functions4 ,for a moment he refers to the well-known distinction of the legislative1 judicial and executive powers4 ,but it is only to remark that 8in every governmental act all three are conjoined4 ,they are abstractions1 none of which can get a reality of its own1--which1 in other words1 cannot be constituted and organised as powers4 ,legislation1 judicature1 and executive are something completely formal1 empty1 and contentless4444 ,whether the others are or are not bare abstractions1 empty activities1 depends entirely on the executive power2 and this is absolutely the government7#aaf740 ,treating government as the organic movement by which the universal and the particular in the commonwealth come into relations1 he finds that it presents three forms1 or gives rise to three systems4 ,the highest and last of these is the 8educational0 system4 ,by this he understands all that activity by which the intelligence of the state tries directly to mould and guide the character and fortunes of its members3 all the means of culture and discipline1 whether in general or for individuals1 all training to public function1 to truthfulness1 to good manners4 ,under the same head come conquest and colonisation as state agencies4 ,the second system is the judicial1 which instead of1 like the former1 aiming at the formation or reformation of its members is satisfied by subjecting individual transgression to a process of rectification by the general principle4 ,with regard to the system of judicature1 ,hegel argues for a variety of procedure to suit different ranks1 and for a corresponding modification of penalties4 8,formal rigid equality is just what does not spare the character4 ,the same penalty which in one estate brings no infamy causes in another a deep and irremediable hurt40 ,and with regard to the after life of the transgressor who has borne his penalty3 8,punishment is the reconciliation of the law with itself4 ,no further reproach for his crime can be addressed to the person who has undergone his punishment4 ,he is restored to membership of his estate7#aag740 ,in the first of the three systems1 the economic system1 or 8,system of wants10 the state seems at first hardly to appear in its universal and controlling function at all4 ,here the individual depends for the satisfaction of his physical needs on a blind1 unconscious destiny1 on the obscure and incalculable properties of supply and demand in the whole interconnexion of commodities4 ,but even this is not all4 ,with the accumulation of wealth in inequality1 and the growth of vast capitals1 there is substituted for the dependence of the individual on the general resultant of a vast number of agencies a dependence on one enormously rich individual1 who can control the physical destinies of a nation4 ,but a nation1 truly speaking1 is there no more4 ,the industrial order has parted into a mere abstract workman on one hand1 and the grande richesse on the other4 8,it has lost its capacity of an organic absolute intuition and of respect for the divine--external though its divinity be3 and there sets in the bestiality of contempt for all that is noble4 ,the mere wisdomless universal1 the mass of wealth1 is the essential3 and the ethical principle1 the absolute bond of the nation1 is vanished2 and the nation is dissolved7#aah740 ,it would be a long and complicated task to sift1 in these ill-digested but profound suggestions1 the real meaning from the formal statement4 ,they are1 like ,utopia1 beyond the range of practical politics4 ,the modern reader1 whose political conceptions are limited by contemporary circumstance1 may find them archaic1 medieval1 quixotic4 ,but for those who behind the words and forms can see the substance and the idea1 they will perhaps come nearer the conception of ideal commonwealth than many reforming programmes4 ,compared with the maturer statements of the ,philosophy of ,law1 they have the faults of the ,romantic age to which their inception belongs4 ,yet even in that later exposition there is upheld the doctrine of the supremacy of the eternal ,state against everything particular1 class-like1 and temporary2 a doctrine which has made ,hegel--as it made ,fichte--a voice in that 8professorial socialism0 which is at least as old as ,plato4 ,,introduction4 #cgg4 ,the knowledge of ,mind is the highest and hardest1 just because it is the most 8concrete0 of sciences4 ,the significance of that 8absolute0 commandment1 ,know thyself--whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance--is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities1 character1 propensities1 and foibles of the single self4 ,the knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality--of what is essentially and ultimately true and real--of mind as the true and essential being4 ,equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called knowledge of men--the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities1 passions1 and foibles of other men1 and lay bare what are called the recesses of the human heart4 ,information of this kind is1 for one thing1 meaningless1 unless on the assumption that we know the universal--man as man1 and1 that always must be1 as mind4 ,and for another1 being only engaged with casual1 insignificant and untrue aspects of mental life1 it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all--the mind itself4 #cgh4 ,pneumatology1 or1 as it was also called1 ,rational ,psychology1 has been already alluded to in the ,introduction to the ,logic as an abstract and generalising metaphysic of the subject4 ,empirical 7or inductive7 psychology1 on the other hand1 deals with the 8concrete0 mind3 and1 after the revival of the sciences1 when observation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality1 such psychology was worked on the same lines as other sciences4 ,in this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the inductive science1 and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detail3 whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional common-sense metaphysic1 with its analysis into forces1 various activities1 c41 and rejected any attempt at a 8speculative0 treatment4 ,the books of ,aristotle on the ,soul1 along with his discussions on its special aspects and states1 are for this reason still by far the most admirable1 perhaps even the sole1 work of philosophical value on this topic4 ,the main aim of a philosophy of mind can only be to re-introduce unity of idea and principle into the theory of mind1 and so re-interpret the lesson of those ,aristotelian books4 #cgi4 ,even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any attempt to break it up into different faculties1 forces1 or1 what comes to the same thing1 activities1 conceived as independent of each other4 ,but the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated1 as we soon come across distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism1 antitheses between free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it1 whilst we equally note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other4 ,in modern times especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given1 even in experience1 a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul1 and of the power of its 8ideality40 ,before these facts1 the rigid distinctions of practical common sense were struck with confusion2 and the necessity of a 8speculative0 examination with a view to the removal of difficulties was more directly forced upon the student4 #chj4 ,the 8concrete0 nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficulty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible unity in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting its more advanced aspects4 ,it is otherwise in external nature4 ,there1 matter and movement1 for example1 have a manifestation all their own--it is the solar system2 and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier existence in the properties of bodies1 and still more independently in the four elements4 ,the species and grades of mental evolution1 on the contrary1 lose their separate existence and become factors1 states and features in the higher grades of development4 ,as a consequence of this1 a lower and more abstract aspect of mind betrays the presence in it1 even to experience1 of a higher grade4 ,under the guise of sensation1 e4g41 we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment4 ,and so sensation1 which is but a mere form and vehicle1 may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and1 as it were1 the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged2 and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatment as species of sensation4 ,but at the same time1 when lower grades of mental life are under examination1 it becomes necessary1 if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience1 to direct attention to more advanced grades for which they are mere forms4 ,in this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development 7e4g4 in dealing with natural awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness1 or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect74 ,what ,mind 7or ,spirit7 is4 #cha4 ,from our point of view ,mind has for its presupposition ,nature1 of which it is the truth1 and for that reason its absolute prius4 ,in this its truth ,nature is vanished1 and mind has resulted as the 8,idea0 entered on possession of itself4 ,here the subject and object of the ,idea are one--either is the intelligent unity1 the notion4 ,this identity is absolute negativity--for whereas in ,nature the intelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalised1 this self-externalisation has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself4 ,thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a return out of nature4 #chb4 ,for this reason the essential1 but formally essential1 feature of mind is ,liberty3 i4e4 it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity4 ,considered as this formal aspect1 it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality1 its very existence2 it can thus submit to infinite pain1 the negation of its individual immediacy3 in other words1 it can keep itself affirmative in this negativity and possess its own identity4 ,all this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality4 #chc4 ,this universality is also its determinate sphere of being4 ,having a being of its own1 the universal is self-particularising1 whilst it still remains self-identical4 ,hence the special mode of mental being is 8manifestation40 ,the spirit is not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a form distinct from itself3 it does not manifest or reveal something1 but its very mode and meaning is this revelation4 ,and thus in its mere possibility ,mind is at the same moment an infinite1 8absolute10 actuality4 #chd4 ,revelation1 taken to mean the revelation of the abstract ,idea1 is an unmediated transition to ,nature which comes to be4 ,as ,mind is free1 its manifestation is to set forth ,nature as its world2 but because it is reflection1 it1 in thus setting forth its world1 at the same time presupposes the world as a nature independently existing4 ,in the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being--a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom4 ,the ,absolute is ,mind 7,spirit7--this is the supreme definition of the ,absolute4 ,to find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burthen was1 we may say1 the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy3 it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science3 and it is this impulse that must explain the history of the world4 ,the word 8,mind0 7,spirit7--and some glimpse of its meaning--was found at an early period3 and the spirituality of ,god is the lesson of ,christianity4 ,it remains for philosophy in its own element of intelligible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image1 and what implicitly is the ultimate reality3 and that problem is not genuinely1 and by rational methods1 solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme and the soul of philosophy4 ,subdivision4 #che4 ,the development of ,mind 7,spirit7 is in three stages3-- 7#a7 ,in the form of self-relation3 within it it has the ideal totality of the ,idea--i4e4 it has before it all that its notion contains3 its being is to be self-contained and free4 ,this is ,mind ,subjective4 7#b7 ,in the form of reality3 realised1 i4e4 in a world produced and to be produced by it3 in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity4 ,this is ,mind ,objective4 7#c7 ,in that unity of mind as objectivity and1 of mind as ideality and concept1 which essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself1 mind in its absolute truth4 ,this is ,mind ,absolute4 #chf4 ,the two first parts of the doctrine of ,mind embrace the finite mind4 ,mind is the infinite ,idea2 thus finitude here means the disproportion between the concept and the reality--but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the mind's own light--a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barrier to itself1 in order1 by its removal1 actually to realise and become conscious of freedom as its very being1 i4e4 to be fully manifested4 ,the several steps of this activity1 on each of which1 with their semblance of being1 it is the function of the finite mind to linger1 and through which it has to pass1 are steps in its liberation4 ,in the full truth of that liberation is given the identification of the three stages--finding a world presupposed before us1 generating a world as our own creation1 and gaining freedom from it and in it4 ,to the infinite form of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it4 ,a rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chiefly seen in dealing with ,mind and reason3 it is held not a mere matter of strict logic1 but treated also as a moral and religious concern1 to adhere to the point of view of finitude1 and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity1 if not of insanity1 of thought4 ,whereas in fact such a modesty of thought1 as treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute1 is the worst of virtues2 and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most unsound sort of theory4 ,the category of finitude was at a much earlier period elucidated and explained at its place in the ,logic3 an elucidation which1 as in logic for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude1 so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms1 has merely to show that the finite is not1 i4e4 is not the truth1 but merely a transition and an emergence to something higher4 ,this finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that makes a thing have its cessation by another and in another3 but ,spirit1 the intelligent unity and the implicit ,eternal1 is itself just the consummation of that internal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain4 ,and so1 the modesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity--the finite--in opposition to the true3 it is itself therefore vanity4 ,in the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mind has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central contradiction4 ,,section ,i4 ,,mind ,,subjective4 #chg4 ,mind1 on the ideal stage of its development1 is mind as cognitive3 ,cognition1 however1 being taken here not as a merely logical category of the ,idea 7 #bbc71 but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind4 ,subjective mind is3-- 7,a7 ,immediate or implicit3 a soul--the ,spirit in ,nature--the object treated by ,anthropology4 7,b7 ,mediate or explicit3 still as identical reflection into itself and into other things3 mind in correlation or particularisation3 consciousness--the object treated by the ,phenomenology of ,mind4 7,c7 ,mind defining itself in itself1 as an independent subject--the object treated by ,psychology4 ,in the ,soul is the awaking of ,consciousness3 ,consciousness sets itself up as ,reason1 awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality3 and this ,reason by its activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intelligent unity4 ,for an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it presents is an advance of development3 and so in mind every character under which it appears is a stage in a process of specification and development1 a step forward towards its goal1 in order to make itself into1 and to realise in itself1 what it implicitly is4 ,each step1 again1 is itself such a process1 and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning 7and so for the observer7 it is for itself--for the special form1 viz4 which the mind has in that step4 ,the ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is1 what happens to it1 what it does4 ,the soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent1 which displays such features as its acts and utterances1 from which we can learn what it is1 what sort of faculties and powers it possesses--all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that character in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explicitly had before4 ,we must1 however1 distinguish and keep apart from the progress here studied what we call education and instruction4 ,the sphere of education is the individual's only3 and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them4 ,but in the philosophic theory of mind1 mind is studied as self-instruction and self-education in very essence2 and its acts and utterances are stages in the process which brings it forward to itself1 links it in unity with itself1 and so makes it actual mind4 ,sub-,section ,a4 ,anthropology4 ,the ,soul4 #chh4 ,spirit 7,mind7 came into being as the truth of ,nature4 ,but not merely is it1 as such a result1 to be held the true and real first of what went before3 this becoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of 8free judgment40 ,mind1 thus come into being1 means therefore that ,nature in its own self realises its untruth and sets itself aside3 it means that ,mind presupposes itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is always self-externalised1 but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple4 ,at such a stage it is not yet mind1 but soul4 #chi4 ,the soul is no separate immaterial entity4 ,wherever there is ,nature1 the soul is its universal immaterialism1 its simple 8ideal0 life4 ,soul is the substance or 8absolute0 basis of all the particularising and individualising of mind3 it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought1 and the soul remains the pervading1 identical ideality of it all4 ,but as it is still conceived thus abstractly1 the soul is only the sleep of mind--the passive of ,aristotle1 which is potentially all things4 ,the question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest1 except where1 on the one hand1 matter is regarded as something true1 and mind conceived as a thing1 on the other4 ,but in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands3 they have come upon imponderable matters1 like heat1 light1 c41 to which they might perhaps add space and time4 ,these 8imponderables10 which have lost the property 7peculiar to matter7 of gravity and1 in a sense1 even the capacity of offering resistance1 have still1 however1 a sensible existence and outness of part to part2 whereas the 8vital0 matter1 which may also be found enumerated among them1 not merely lacks gravity1 but even every other aspect of existence which might lead us to treat it as material4 ,the fact is that in the ,idea of ,life the self-externalism of nature is implicitly at an end3 subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life--with this proviso1 however1 that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the sway of self-externalism4 ,it is otherwise with ,mind4 ,there1 in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom1 as absolute negativity1 and not as the immediate or natural individual1 the object or the reality of the intelligible unity is the unity itself2 and so the self-externalism1 which is the fundamental feature of matter1 has been completely dissipated and transmuted into universality1 or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity4 ,mind is the existent truth of matter--the truth that matter itself has no truth4 ,a cognate question is that of the community of soul and body4 ,this community 7interdependence7 was assumed as a fact1 and the only problem was how to comprehend it4 ,the usual answer1 perhaps1 was to call it an incomprehensible mystery2 and1 indeed1 if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independent1 they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another1 each being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other1 i4e4 where the other is not3 whence ,epicurus1 when attributing to the gods a residence in the pores1 was consistent in not imposing on them any connexion with the world4 ,a somewhat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed4 ,descartes1 ,malebranche1 ,spinoza1 and ,leibnitz have all indicated ,god as this nexus4 ,they meant that the finitude of soul and matter were only ideal and unreal distinctions2 and1 so holding1 these philosophers took ,god1 not1 as so often is done1 merely as another word for the incomprehensible1 but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter4 ,but either this identity1 as in the case of ,spinoza1 is too abstract1 or1 as in the case of ,leibnitz1 though his ,monad of monads brings things into being1 it does so only by an act of judgment or choice4 ,hence1 with ,leibnitz1 the result is a distinction between soul and the corporeal 7or material71 and the identity is only like the copula of a judgment1 and does not rise or develop into system1 into the absolute syllogism4 #cij4 ,the ,soul is at first-- 7a7 ,in its immediate natural mode--the natural soul1 which only is4 7b7 ,secondly1 it is a soul which feels1 as individualised1 enters into correlation with its immediate being1 and1 in the modes of that being1 retains an abstract independence4 7c7 ,thirdly1 its immediate being--or corporeity--is moulded into it1 and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul4 7a7 ,the ,physical ,soul7#aai74 #cia4 ,the soul universal1 described1 it may be1 as an anima mundi1 a world-soul1 must not be fixed on that account as a single subject2 it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects4 ,thus1 when it presents itself as a single soul1 it is a single soul which is merely3 its only modes are modes of natural life4 ,these have1 so to speak1 behind its ideality a free existence3 i4e4 they are natural objects for consciousness1 but objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external4 ,these features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed4 77 ,physical ,qualities7#abj74 #cib4 ,while still a 8substance0 7i4e4 a physical soul7 the mind 7#a7 takes part in the general planetary life1 feels the difference of climates1 the changes of the seasons and the periods of the day1 c4 ,this life of nature for the main shows itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone4 ,in recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical1 sidereal1 and telluric life of man4 ,in such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live3 their specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend1 in many cases completely1 and always more or less1 upon it4 ,in the case of man these points of dependence lose importance1 just in proportion to his civilisation1 and the more his whole frame of soul is based upon a substructure of mental freedom4 ,the history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system1 any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets4 ,the difference of climate has a more solid and vigorous influence4 ,but the response to the changes of the seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint changes of mood1 which come expressly to the fore only in morbid states 7including insanity7 and at periods when the self-conscious life suffers depression4 ,in nations less intellectually emancipated1 which therefore live more in harmony with nature1 we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a few real cases of such sympathy1 and on that foundation what seems to be marvellous prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom4 ,but as mental freedom gets a deeper hold1 even these few and slight susceptibilities1 based upon participation in the common life of nature1 disappear4 ,animals and plants1 on the contrary1 remain for ever subject to such influences4 #cic4 7#b7 ,according to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe1 the general planetary life of the nature-governed mind specialises itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which1 on the whole1 give expression to the nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race4 ,the contrast between the earth's poles1 the land towards the north pole being more aggregated and preponderant over sea1 whereas in the southern hemisphere it runs out in sharp points1 widely distant from each other1 introduces into the differences of continents a further modification which ,treviranus 7,biology1 ,part ,,ii7 has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna4 #cid4 ,this diversity descends into specialities1 that may be termed local minds--shown in the outward modes of life and occupation1 bodily structure and disposition1 but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and moral character of the several peoples4 ,back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own4 #cie4 7#c7 ,the soul is further de-universalised into the individualised subject4 ,but this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling out of the modes which nature gives2 we find it as the special temperament1 talent1 character1 physiognomy1 or other disposition and idiosyncrasy1 of families or single individuals4 77 ,physical ,alterations4 #cif4 ,taking the soul as an individual1 we find its diversities1 as alterations in it1 the one permanent subject1 and as stages in its development4 ,as they are at once physical and mental diversities1 a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matured mind4 ,the 7#a7 first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life4 ,he begins with ,childhood--mind wrapt up in itself4 ,his next step is the fully-developed antithesis1 the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjective 7as seen in ideals1 fancies1 hopes1 ambitions7 against his immediate individuality4 ,and that individuality marks both the world which1 as it exists1 fails to meet his ideal requirements1 and the position of the individual himself1 who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play 7,youth74 ,thirdly1 we see man in his true relation to his environment1 recognising the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it1--a world no longer incomplete1 but able in the work which it collectively achieves to afford the individual a place and a security for his performance4 ,by his share in this collective work he first is really somebody1 gaining an effective existence and an objective value 7,manhood74 ,last of all comes the finishing touch to this unity with objectivity3 a unity which1 while on its realist side it passes into the inertia of deadening habit1 on its idealist side gains freedom from the limited interests and entanglements of the outward present 7,old ,age74 #cig4 7#b7 ,next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis1 leading it to seek and find itself in another individual4 ,this--the sexual relation--on a physical basis1 shows1 on its one side1 subjectivity remaining in an instinctive and emotional harmony of moral life and love1 and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase1 in purposes political1 scientific or artistic2 and on the other1 shows an active half1 where the individual is the vehicle of a struggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions 7both of his own existence and of that of the external world71 carrying out these universal principles into a unity with the world which is his own work4 ,the sexual tie acquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family4 #cih4 7#c7 ,when the individuality1 or self-centralised being1 distinguishes itself from its mere being1 this immediate judgment is the waking of the soul1 which confronts its self-absorbed natural life1 in the first instance1 as one natural quality and state confronts another state1 viz4 sleep4--,the waking is not merely for the observer1 or externally distinct from the sleep3 it is itself the judgment 7primary partition7 of the individual soul--which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence1 distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality4 ,the waking state includes generally all self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realises its own distinct self4--,sleep is an invigoration of this activity--not as a merely negative rest from it1 but as a return back from the world of specialisation1 from dispersion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff1--a return into the general nature of subjectivity1 which is the substance of those specialised energies and their absolute master4 ,the distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers1 as they may be called1 which are often addressed to philosophy3--,napoleon1 e4g41 on a visit to the ,university of ,pavia1 put this question to the class of ideology4 ,the characterisation given in the section is abstract2 it primarily treats waking merely as a natural fact1 containing the mental element implicite but not yet as invested with a special being of its own4 ,if we are to speak more concretely of this distinction 7in fundamentals it remains the same71 we must take the self-existence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the ,ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind4 ,the difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises1 only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams1 as well as the mental representations in the sober waking consciousness1 under one and the same title of mental representations4 ,thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide1 because we have lost sight of the difference2 and in the case of any assignable distinction of waking consciousness1 we can always return to the trivial remark that all this is nothing more than mental idea4 ,but the concrete theory of the waking soul in its realised being views it as consciousness and intellect3 and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture of mere ideas and images4 ,the latter are in the main only externally conjoined1 in an unintelligent way1 by the laws of the so-called ,association of ,ideas2 though here and there of course logical principles may also be operative4 ,but in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego1 an intelligence3 and because of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete totality of features in which each member1 each point1 takes up its place as at the same time determined through and with all the rest4 ,thus the facts embodied in his sensation are authenticated1 not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person1 but by virtue of the concrete interconnexion in which each part stands with all parts of this complex4 ,the waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corroboration of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as perceived4 ,the consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and distinct4 ,still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self4--,in order to see the difference of dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the ,kantian distinction between subjectivity and objectivity of mental representation 7the latter depending upon determination through categories73 remembering1 as already noted1 that what is actually present in mind need not be therefore explicitly realised in consciousness1 just as little as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to ,god need stand before consciousness in the shape of proofs of ,god's existence1 although1 as before explained1 these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling4 77 ,sensibility7#aba74 #cii4 ,sleep and waking are1 primarily1 it is true1 not mere alterations1 but alternating conditions 7a progression in infinitum74 ,this is their formal and negative relationship3 but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved4 ,in the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 8ideal0 factor3 the features which make up its sleeping nature1 where they are implicitly as in their substance1 are found by the waking soul1 in its own self1 and1 be it noted1 for itself4 ,the fact that these particulars1 though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self-identity of our self-centred being1 are yet simply contained in its simplicity1 is what we call sensibility4 #djj4 ,sensibility 7feeling7 is the form of the dull stirring1 the inarticulate breathing1 of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality1 where every definite feature is still 8immediate10--neither specially developed in its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject1 but treated as belonging to its most special1 its natural peculiarity4 ,the content of sensation is thus limited and transient1 belonging as it does to natural1 immediate being1--to what is therefore qualitative and finite4 ,everything is in sensation 7feeling73 if you will1 everything that emerges in conscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation2 for source and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears4 ,let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head3 they must also be in the heart1 in the feeling4 ,what we merely have in the head is in consciousness1 in a general way3 the facts of it are objective--set over against consciousness1 so that as it is put in me 7my abstract ego7 it can also be kept away and apart from me 7from my concrete subjectivity74 ,but if put in the feeling1 the fact is a mode of my individuality1 however crude that individuality be in such a form3 it is thus treated as my very own4 ,my own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self3 and this immediate unity of the soul with its underlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability2 which however yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness1 and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life4 ,it is with a quite different intensity and permanency that the will1 the conscience1 and the character1 are our very own1 than can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings 7the heart73 and this we need no philosophy to tell us4 ,no doubt it is correct to say that above everything the heart must be good4 ,but feeling and heart is not the form by which anything is legitimated as religious1 moral1 true1 just1 c41 and an appeal to heart and feeling either means nothing or means something bad4 ,this should hardly need enforcing4 ,can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts are also bad1 evil1 godless1 mean1 c48 ,that the heart is the source only of such feelings is stated in the words3 8,from the heart proceed evil thoughts1 murder1 adultery1 fornication1 blasphemy1 c40 ,in such times when 8scientific0 theology and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good1 moral1 and religious1 it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences2 just as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic property by which man is distinguished from the beasts1 and that he has feeling in common with them4 #dja4 ,what the sentient soul finds within it is1 on one hand1 the naturally immediate1 as 8ideally0 in it and made its own4 ,on the other hand and conversely1 what originally belongs to the central individuality 7which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind7 get the features of the natural corporeity1 and is so felt4 ,in this way we have two spheres of feeling4 ,one1 where what at first is a corporeal affection 7e4g4 of the eye or of any bodily part whatever7 is made feeling 7sensation7 by being driven inward1 memorised in the soul's self-centred part4 ,another1 where affections originating in the mind and belonging to it1 are in order to be felt1 and to be as if found1 invested with corporeity4 ,thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject3 it is felt in the soul4 ,the detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen in the system of the senses4 ,but the other or inwardly originated modes of feeling no less necessarily systematise themselves2 and their corporisation1 as put in the living and concretely developed natural being1 works itself out1 following the special character of the mental mode1 in a special system of bodily organs4 ,sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the life of its bodily part4 ,the senses form the simple system of corporeity specified4 7a7 ,the 8ideal0 side of physical things breaks up into two--because in it1 as immediate and not yet subjective ideality1 distinction appears as mere variety--the senses of definite light1 #bhg--;and of sound1 #cjj4 ,the 8real0 aspect similarly is with its difference double3 7b7 the senses of smell and taste1 #cba1 #cbb2 7c7 the sense of solid reality1 of heavy matter1 of heat and shape4 ,around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arrange themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeity4 ,the system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science--a psychical physiology4 ,somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility 7the pleasant and unpleasant73 as also in the distinct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations1 e4g4 of colours1 tones1 smells4 ,but the most interesting side of a psychical physiology would lie in studying not the mere sympathy1 but more definitely the bodily form adopted by certain mental modifications1 especially the passions or emotions4 ,we should have1 e4g41 to explain the line of connexion by which anger and courage are felt in the breast1 the blood1 the 8irritable0 system1 just as thinking and mental occupation are felt in the head1 the centre of the 'sensible' system4 ,we should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familiar connexions by which tears1 and voice in general1 with its varieties of language1 laughter1 sighs1 with many other specialisations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy1 are formed from their mental source4 ,in physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism2 but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression of mental states1 and in this way they get quite another interpretation4 #djb4 ,sensations1 just because they are immediate and are found existing1 are single and transient aspects of psychic life1--alterations in the substantiality of the soul1 set in its self-centred life1 with which that substance is one4 ,but this self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation3 the soul is virtually a reflected totality of sensations--it feels in itself the total substantiality which it virtually is--it is a soul which feels4 ,in the usage of ordinary language1 sensation and feeling are not clearly distinguished3 still we do not speak of the sensation1--but of the feeling 7sense7 of right1 of self2 sentimentality 7sensibility7 is connected with sensation3 we may therefore say sensation emphasises rather the side of passivity--the fact that we find ourselves feeling1 i4e4 the immediacy of mode in feeling--whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel4 7b7 ,the ,feeling ,soul4--7,soul as ,sentiency477#abb7 #djc4 ,the feeling or sentient individual is the simple 8ideality0 or subjective side of sensation4 ,what it has to do1 therefore1 is to raise its substantiality1 its merely virtual filling-up1 to the character of subjectivity1 to take possession of it1 to realise its mastery over its own4 ,as sentient1 the soul is no longer a mere natural1 but an inward1 individuality3 the individuality which in the merely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made independent4 ,nowhere so much as in the case of the soul 7and still more of the mind7 if we are to understand it1 must that feature of 8ideality0 be kept in view1 which represents it as the negation of the real1 but a negation1 where the real is put past1 virtually retained1 although it does not exist4 ,the feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory4 ,every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations1 ideas1 acquired lore1 thoughts1 c42 and yet the ego is one and uncompounded1 a deep featureless characterless mine1 in which all this is stored up1 without existing4 ,it is only when ,i call to mind an idea1 that ,i bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness4 ,sometimes1 in sickness1 ideas and information1 supposed to have been forgotten years ago1 because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness1 once more come to light4 ,they were not in our possession1 nor by such reproduction as occurs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession2 and yet they were in us and continue to be in us still4 ,thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him1 should he have once forgotten them3 they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such1 but only to his implicit self4 ,and under all the superstructure of specialised and instrumental consciousness that may subsequently be added to it1 the individuality always remains this single-souled inner life4 ,at the present stage this singleness is1 primarily1 to be defined as one of feeling--as embracing the corporeal in itself3 thus denying the view that this body is something material1 with parts outside parts and outside the soul4 ,just as the number and variety of mental representations is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego2 so the 8real0 outness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul4 ,as sentient1 the soul is characterised as immediate1 and so as natural and corporeal3 but the outness of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul 7as it counts for the intelligible unity7 not as anything real1 and therefore not as a barrier3 the soul is this intelligible unity in existence1--the existent speculative principle4 ,thus in the body it is one simple1 omnipresent unity4 ,as to the representative faculty the body is but one representation1 and the infinite variety of its material structure and organisation is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception3 so in the sentient soul1 the corporeity1 and all that outness of parts to parts which belongs to it1 is reduced to ideality 7the truth of the natural multiplicity74 ,the soul is virtually the totality of nature3 as an individual soul it is a monad3 it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world1--that world being included in it and filling it up2 and to that world it stands but as to itself4 #djd4 ,as individual1 the soul is exclusive and always exclusive3 any difference there is1 it brings within itself4 ,what is differentiated from it is as yet no external object 7as in consciousness71 but only the aspects of its own sentient totality1 c4 ,in this partition 7judgment7 of itself it is always subject3 its object is its substance1 which is at the same time its predicate4 ,this substance is still the content of its natural life1 but turned into the content of the individual sensation-laden soul2 yet as the soul is in that content still particular1 the content is its particular world1 so far as that is1 in an implicit mode1 included in the ideality of the subject4 ,by itself1 this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness3 its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content3 so far it is formal and only formal4 ,it acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind 7 #cej71 to which the soul1 which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence1 may again sink down4 ,but when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one1 it implies a want of adaptation1 which is disease4 ,in the present stage we must treat1 first1 of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves1 secondly1 as morbid states of mind3 the latter being only explicable by means of the former4 77 ,the ,feeling ,soul in its ,immediacy4 #dje4 77 ,though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual1 it is because immediate1 not yet as its self not a true subject reflected into itself1 and is therefore passive4 ,hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it--a subject which may even exist as another individual4 ,by the self-hood of the latter it--a substance1 which is only a non-independent predicate--is then set in vibration and controlled without the least resistance on its part4 ,this other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius4 ,in the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mother's womb3--a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental1 but psychical--a correlation of soul to soul4 ,here are two individuals1 yet in undivided psychic unity3 the one as yet no self1 as yet nothing impenetrable1 incapable of resistance3 the other is its actuating subject1 the single self of the two4 ,the mother is the genius of the child2 for by genius we commonly mean the total mental self-hood1 as it has existence of its own1 and constitutes the subjective substantiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence4 ,the underlying essence of the genius is the sum total of existence1 of life1 and of character1 not as a mere possibility1 or capacity1 or virtuality1 but as efficiency and realised activity1 as concrete subjectivity4 ,if we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments1 and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord1 placenta1 c41 all that is presented to the senses and reflection are certain anatomical and physiological facts--externalities and instrumentalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the main point1 the psychical relationship4 ,what ought to be noted as regards this psychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions1 injuries1 c4 of the mother1 but the whole psychical judgment 7partition7 of the underlying nature1 by which the female 7like the monocotyledons among vegetables7 can suffer disruption in twain1 so that the child has not merely got communicated to it1 but has originally received morbid dispositions as well as other pre-dispositions of shape1 temper1 character1 talent1 idiosyncrasies1 c4 ,sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life1 say between friends1 especially female friends with delicate nerves 7a tie which may go so far as to show 8magnetic0 phenomena71 between husband and wife and between members of the same family4 ,the total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity1 which1 in the case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature1 is visibly present as another and a different individual4 ,but this sensitive totality is meant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same individual3 which is then its indwelling consciousness1 self-possessed1 intelligent1 and reasonable4 ,for such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material2 and the self-possessed subjectivity is the rational1 self-conscious1 controlling genius thereof4 ,but this sensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious1 congenital disposition and temperament1 but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retains also 7in habit1 as to which see later7 all further ties and essential relationships1 fortunes1 principles--everything in short belonging to the character1 and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated4 ,the sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed4 ,the total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing and actual play of his consciousness1 his secular ideas1 developed interests1 inclinations1 c4 ,as contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius1 whose decision is ultimate whatever may be the show of reasons1 intentions1 means1 of which the more public consciousness is so liberal4 ,this concentrated individuality also reveals itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling4 ,a man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possession and acts according to his permanent purposes1 be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests3 a good-hearted man1 on the other hand1 means rather one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment1 even when it is of narrow range and is wholly made up of particularities4 ,of such good nature or goodness of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio4 #djf4 77 ,the sensitive life1 when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscious1 educated1 self-possessed human being is a disease4 ,the individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self1 whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal order of things apart as a distinct state of mind4 ,this morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states4 ,in this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism--to show1 in other words1 that it is in harmony with the facts4 ,to that end the phenomena1 so complex in their nature and so very different one from another1 would have first of all to be brought under their general points of view4 ,the facts1 it might seem1 first of all call for verification4 ,but such a verification would1 it must be added1 be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for3 for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives--infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses--to be mere deception and imposture4 ,the a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimony can avail against them1 and they have even denied what they had seen with their own eyes4 ,in order to believe in this department even what one sees with these eyes1 and still more to understand it1 the first requisite is not to be in bondage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect4 ,the chief points on which the discussion turns may here be given3 77 ,to the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of his fundamental interests1 both the essential and the particular empirical ties which connect him with other men and the world at large4 ,this totality forms his actuality1 in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him2 it has already been called his genius4 ,this genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks3 the form of sensitivity1 in which the individual here appears immersed1 is1 on the contrary1 a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence4 ,the first conclusion to which these considerations lead1 with reference to the contents of consciousness in the somnambulist stage1 is that it is only the range of his individually moulded world 7of his private interests and narrow relationships7 which appear there4 ,scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths require a different soil1--require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarticulate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness4 ,it is foolish therefore to expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state4 77 ,where a human being's senses and intellect are sound1 he is fully and intelligently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individuality3 but he is awake to it in the form of interconnexion between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world1 and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnexions of a practically intelligible kind4 ,in his subjective ideas and plans he has also before him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the series of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the objective existences1 which are also means and ends to each other4 ,at the same time1 this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that it is these threads which make him what he really is3 he too would become extinct if these externalities were to disappear1 unless by the aid of religion1 subjective reason1 and character1 he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and independent of them4 ,but1 then1 in the latter case he is less susceptible of the psychical state here spoken of4--,as an illustration of that identity with the surroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives1 friends1 c4 on those left behind1 so that the one dies or pines away with the loss of the other4 7,thus ,cato1 after the downfall of the ,roman republic1 could live no longer3 his inner reality was neither wider than higher than it47 ,compare home-sickness1 and the like4 77 ,but when all that occupies the waking consciousness1 the world outside it and its relationship to that world is under a veil1 and the soul is thus sunk in sleep 7in magnetic sleep1 in catalepsy1 and other diseases1 e4g4 those connected with female development1 or at the approach of death1 c471 then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as before1 but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consciousness4 ,and because it is the adult1 formed1 and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity1 it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood1 a formal vision and awareness1 which however does not go so far as the conscious judgment or discernment by which its contents1 when it is healthy and awake1 exist for it as an outward objectivity4 ,the individual is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality--a genius which beholds itself4 ,the characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same facts 7which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality1 and to know which1 in its sober moods1 it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion7 are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence4 ,this perception is a sort of clairvoyance2 for it is a consciousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius1 and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnexion1 and so can dispense with the series of conditions1 external one to another1 which lead up to the result1--conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the limits of its own individual externality4 ,but such clairvoyance--just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnexion--is for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling and fancy1 c4--not to mention that foreign suggestions 7see later7 intrude into its vision4 ,it is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants really see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in4--,but it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state1 capable of conveying general truths7#abc74 77 ,an essential feature of this sensitivity1 with its absence of intelligent and volitional personality1 is this1 that it is a state of passivity1 like that of the child in the womb4 ,the patient in this condition is accordingly made1 and continues to be1 subject to the power of another person1 the magnetiser2 so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport1 the selfless individual1 not really a 8person10 has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other4 ,this latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former1 and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas4 ,that the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in the person with whom he stands en rapport1 and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own1 shows the substantial identity which the soul 7which even in its concreteness is also truly immaterial7 is capable of holding with another4 ,when the substance of both is thus made one1 there is only one subjectivity of consciousness3 the patient has a sort of individuality1 but it is empty1 not on the spot1 not actual3 and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations and ideas of the other1 in whom it sees1 smells1 tastes1 reads1 and hears4 ,it is further to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapport with two genii and a twofold set of ideas1 his own and that of the magnetiser4 ,but it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he1 in this nominal perception1 receives1 beholds and brings to knowledge from his own inward self1 and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stands in relation4 ,this uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions1 and accounts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among somnambulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different education1 as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure1 or medicines for them1 as well as on scientific and intellectual topics4 77 ,as in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objectivity1 so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sensation have disappeared1 and hence1 when the activity of the sense-organs is asleep1 the 8common sense10 or 8general feeling0 specifies itself to several functions2 one sees and hears with the fingers1 and especially with the pit of the stomach1 c4 ,to comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other existence on which it depends1--to discover what is called the ordinary course of nature1 in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect1 e4g4 causality1 reasons1 c4 ,the purely sensitive life1 on the contrary1 even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness1 as in the morbid state alluded to1 is just this form of immediacy1 without any distinctions between subjective and objective1 between intelligent personality and objective world1 and without the aforementioned finite ties between them4 ,hence to understand this intimate conjunction1 which1 though all-embracing1 is without any definite points of attachment1 is impossible1 so long as we assume independent personalities1 independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content--so long as we assume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to another4 77 ,self-feeling 7,sense of ,self77#abd74 #djg4 77 ,the sensitive totality is1 in its capacity of individual1 essentially the tendency to distinguish itself in itself1 and to wake up to the judgment in itself1 in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself4 ,the subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself4 ,in these private and personal sensations it is immersed1 and at the same time1 because of the 8ideality0 of the particulars1 it combines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit4 ,in this way it is self-feeling1 and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling4 #djh4 77 ,in consequence of the immediacy1 which still marks the self-feeling1 i4e4 in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life1 and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form1 it follows that although the subject has been brought to acquire intelligent consciousness1 it is still susceptible of disease1 so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling1 unable to refine it to 8ideality0 and get the better of it4 ,the fully-furnished self of intelligent consciousness is a conscious subject1 which is consistent in itself according to an order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connexion with the external world1 which is no less a world of law4 ,but when it is engrossed with a single phase of feeling1 it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a conscious subject is4 ,in this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between the totality systematised in its consciousness1 and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank4 ,this is ,insanity or mental ,derangement4 ,in considering insanity we must1 as in other cases1 anticipate the full-grown and intelligent conscious subject1 which is at the same time the natural self of self-feeling4 ,in such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which1 instead of being 8idealised0 in the former1 remains as a fixed element in self-feeling4 ,mind as such is free1 and therefore not susceptible of this malady4 ,but in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul1 as a thing2 and it is only as a thing1 i4e4 as something natural and existent1 that it is liable to insanity--the settled fixture of some finite element in it4 ,insanity is therefore a psychical disease1 i4e4 a disease of body and mind alike3 the commencement may appear to start from one more than other1 and so also may the cure4 ,the self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness of the ordered whole of his individual world1 into the system of which he subsumes each special content of sensation1 idea1 desire1 inclination1 c41 as it arises1 so as to insert them in their proper place4 ,he is the dominant genius over these particularities4 ,between this and insanity the difference is like that between waking and dreaming3 only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits1 and so makes part of the actual self-feeling4 ,error and that sort of thing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective interconnexion of things4 ,in the concrete1 however1 it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement4 ,a violent1 but groundless and senseless outburst of hatred1 c41 may1 in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character1 make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy4 ,but the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fixed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming the concrete consciousness4 ,the mind which is in a condition of mere being1 and where such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness1 is diseased4 ,the contents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking affections of the heart1 such as vanity1 pride1 and the rest of the passions--fancies and hopes--merely personal love and hatred4 ,when the influence of self-possession and of general principles1 moral and theoretical1 is relaxed1 and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key1 the earthly elements are set free--that evil which is always latent in the heart1 because the heart as immediate is natural and selfish4 ,it is the evil genius of man which gains the upper hand in insanity1 but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more intelligent part1 which is there also4 ,hence this state is mental derangement and distress4 ,the right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that insanity is not an abstract loss of reason 7neither in the point of intelligence nor of will and its responsibility71 but only derangement1 only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason2--just as physical disease is not an abstract1 i4e4 mere and total1 loss of health 7if it were that1 it would be death71 but a contradiction in it4 ,this humane treatment1 no less benevolent than reasonable 7the services of ,pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgment71 presupposes the patient's rationality1 and in that assumption has the sound basis for dealing with him on this side--just as in the case of bodily disease the physician bases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health4 77 ,habit7#abe74 #dji4 ,self-feeling1 immersed in the detail of the feelings 7in simple sensations1 and also desires1 instincts1 passions1 and their gratification71 is undistinguished from them4 ,but in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of ideality1 a nominal universality 7which is the truth of these details73 and as so universal1 the self is to be stamped upon1 and made appear in1 this life of feeling1 yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details1 and be a realised universality4 ,but this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the specific feelings and desires2 what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account4 ,and so too the particularity is1 as now regarded1 equally formal2 it counts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realisation4 ,this particular being of the soul is the factor of its corporeity2 here we have it breaking with this corporeity1 distinguishing it from itself1--itself a simple being1--and becoming the 8ideal10 subjective substantiality of it1--just as in its latent notion 7 #cei7 it was the substance1 and the mere substance1 of it4 ,but this abstract realisation of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet the self--not the existence of the universal which is for the universal4 ,it is the corporeity reduced to its mere ideality2 and so far only does corporeity belong to the soul as such4 ,that is to say1 as space and time--the abstract one-outside-another1 as1 in short1 empty space and empty time--are only subjective form--pure act of intuition2 so that pure being 7which through the supersession in it of the particularity of the corporeity1 or of the immediate corporeity as such has realised itself7 is mere intuition and no more1 lacking consciousness1 but the basis of consciousness4 ,and consciousness it becomes1 when the corporeity1 of which it is the subjective substance1 and which still continues to exist1 and that as a barrier for it1 has been absorbed by it1 and it has been invested with the character of self-centred subject4 #daj4 ,the soul's making itself an abstract universal being1 and reducing the particulars of feelings 7and of consciousness7 to a mere feature of its being is ,habit4 ,in this manner the soul has the contents in possession1 and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient1 nor does it stand in relationship with them as distinguishing itself from them1 nor is absorbed in them1 but has them and moves in them1 without feeling or consciousness of the fact4 ,the soul is freed from them1 so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them3 and whilst existing in these forms as its possession1 it is at the same time open to be otherwise occupied and engaged--say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general4 ,this process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them1 and the generation of habit as practice4 ,for1 this being of the soul1 if in respect of the natural particular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is transmuted1 is a reflexive universality 7 #age72 i4e4 the one and the same1 that recurs in a series of units of sensation1 is reduced to unity1 and this abstract unity expressly stated4 ,habit1 like memory1 is a difficult point in mental organisation3 habit is the mechanism of self-feeling1 as memory is the mechanism of intelligence4 ,the natural qualities and alterations of age1 sleep and waking1 are 8immediately0 natural3 habit1 on the contrary1 is the mode of feeling 7as well as intelligence1 will1 c41 so far as they belong to self-feeling7 made into a natural and mechanical existence4 ,habit is rightly called a second nature2 nature1 because it is an immediate being of the soul2 a second nature1 because it is an immediacy created by the soul1 impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form 7 #dja74 ,in habit the human being's mode of existence is 8natural10 and for that reason not free2 but still free1 so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by habit reduced to a mere being of his1 and he is no longer involuntarily attracted or repelled by it1 and so no longer interested1 occupied1 or dependent in regard to it4 ,the want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal1 as habit merely attaches to the being of the soul2 partly only relative1 so far as it strictly speaking arises only in the case of bad habits1 or so far as a habit is opposed by another purpose3 whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of liberty4 ,the main point about ,habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from the feelings1 even in being affected by them4 ,the different forms of this may be described as follows3 77 ,the immediate feeling is negated and treated as indifferent4 ,one who gets inured against external sensations 7frost1 heat1 weariness of the limbs1 c41 sweet tastes1 c471 and who hardens the heart against misfortune1 acquires a strength which consists in this1 that although the frost1 c4--or the misfortune--is felt1 the affection is deposed to a mere externality and immediacy2 the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it1 and the self-feeling as such1 consciousness1 reflection1 and any other purposes and activity1 are no longer bothered with it4 77 ,there is indifference towards the satisfaction3 the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisfaction deadened4 ,this is the rational liberation from them2 whereas monastic renunciation and forcible interference do not free from them1 nor are they in conception rational4 ,of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept as the finite modes they naturally are1 and that they1 like their satisfaction1 are subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will4 77 ,in habit regarded as aptitude1 or skill1 not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept intact per se1 but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim1 to be made a power in the bodily part1 which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it4 ,conceived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it1 the body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier4 ,thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self-concentration1 and its earlier naturalness and immediacy2 it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature1 and as external has first to be reduced to that position4 ,specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way 7 #dja72 and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific aim 7a particular aspect of its differentiated structure1 a particular organ of its organic system74 ,to mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 8ideality0 which is implicit in matter always1 and especially so in the specific bodily part1 and thus to enable the soul1 under its volitional and conceptual characters1 to exist as substance in its corporeity4 ,in this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious1 made into an instrument1 so that when the conception 7e4g4 a series of musical notes7 is in me1 then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance4 ,the form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action4 ,the most external of them1 i4e4 the spatial direction of an individual1 viz4 his upright posture1 has been by will made a habit--a position taken without adjustment and without consciousness--which continues to be an affair of his persistent will2 for the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand1 and only so long as he wills it without consciousness4 ,similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which1 without an express adjustment1 combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation1 consciousness1 intuition1 intelligence1 c41 which make it up4 ,thinking1 too1 however free and active in its own pure element it becomes1 no less requires habit and familiarity 7this impromptuity or form of immediacy71 by which it is the property of my single self where ,i can freely and in all directions range4 ,it is through this habit that ,i come to realise my existence as a thinking being4 ,even here1 in this spontaneity of self-centred thought1 there is a partnership of soul and body 7hence1 want of habit and too-long-continued thinking cause headache72 habit diminishes this feeling1 by making the natural function an immediacy of the soul4 ,habit on an ampler scale1 and carried out in the strictly intellectual range1 is recollection and memory1 whereof we shall speak later4 ,habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless1 casual and particular4 ,and it is true that the form of habit1 like any other1 is open to anything we chance to put into it2 and it is habit of living which brings on death1 or1 if quite abstract1 is death itself3 and yet habit is indispensable for the existence of all intellectual life in the individual1 enabling the subject to be a concrete immediacy1 an 8ideality0 of soul--enabling the matter of consciousness1 religious1 moral1 c41 to be his as this self1 this soul1 and no other1 and be neither a mere latent possibility1 nor a transient emotion or idea1 nor an abstract inwardness1 cut off from action and reality1 but part and parcel of his being4 ,in scientific studies of the soul and the mind1 habit is usually passed over--either as something contemptible--or rather for the further reason that it is one of the most difficult questions of psychology4 7c7 ,the ,actual ,soul47#abf7 #daa4 ,the ,soul1 when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own1 finds itself there a single subject2 and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate1 in being related to which1 it is related to itself4 ,this externality1 in other words1 represents not itself1 but the soul1 of which it is the sign4 ,in this identity of interior and exterior1 the latter subject to the former1 the soul is actual3 in its corporeity it has its free shape1 in which it feels itself and makes itself felt1 and which as the ,soul's work of art has human pathognomic and physiognomic expression4 ,under the head of human expression are included1 e4g41 the upright figure in general1 and the formation of the limbs1 especially the hand1 as the absolute instrument1 of the mouth--laughter1 weeping1 c41 and the note of mentality diffused over the whole1 which at once announces the body at the externality of a higher nature4 ,this note is so slight1 indefinite1 and inexpressible a modification1 because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural1 and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind1 unable to represent it in its actual universality4 ,seen from the animal world1 the human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance4 ,but for the mind it is only its first appearance1 while language is its perfect expression4 ,and the human figure1 though its proximate phase of existence1 is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent to it4 ,to try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy 7phrenology7 to the rank of sciences1 was therefore one of the vainest fancies1 still vainer than a signatura rerum1 which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue4 #dab4 ,implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter2 for the soul1 in its concentrated self1 cuts itself off from its immediate being1 placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence4 ,the soul1 thus setting in opposition its being to its 7conscious7 self1 absorbing it1 and making it its own1 has lost the meaning of mere soul1 or the 8immediacy0 of mind4 ,the actual soul with its sensation and its concrete self-feeling turned into habit1 has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of its qualities2 in this externality it has recollected and inwardised itself1 and is infinite self-relation4 ,this free universality thus made explicit shows the soul awaking to the higher stage of the ego1 or abstract universality in so far as it is for the abstract universality4 ,in this way it gains the position of thinker and subject--specially a subject of the judgment in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object1 a world external to it1--but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediately reflected into itself4 ,thus soul rises to become ,consciousness4 ,sub-,section ,b4 ,phenomenology ,of ,mind4 ,consciousness4 #dac4 ,consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind3 the grade of mind as appearance4 ,ego is infinite self-relation of mind1 but as subjective or as self-certainty4 ,the immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 8ideal0 self-identity2 and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object4 ,the pure abstract freedom of mind lets go from it its specific qualities1--the soul's natural life--to an equal freedom as an independent object4 ,it is of this latter1 as external to it1 that the ego is in the first instance aware 7conscious71 and as such it is ,consciousness4 ,ego1 as this absolute negativity1 is implicitly the identity in the otherness3 the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object 7as if that object were implicitly cancelled7--it is one side of the relationship and the whole relationship--the light1 which manifests itself and something else too4 #dad4 ,the self-identity of the mind1 thus first made explicit as the ,ego1 is only its abstract formal identity4 ,as soul it was under the phase of substantial universality2 now1 as subjective reflection in itself1 it is referred to this substantiality as to its negative1 something dark and beyond it4 ,hence consciousness1 like reciprocal dependence in general1 is the contradiction between the independence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one4 ,the mind as ego is essence2 but since reality1 in the sphere of essence1 is represented as in immediate being and at the same time as 8ideal10 it is as consciousness only the appearance 7phenomenon7 of mind4 #dae4 ,as the ego is by itself only a formal identity1 the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity1 i4e4 the successive steps in further specification of consciousness1 does not to it seem to be its own activity1 but is implicit1 and to the ego it seems an alteration of the object4 ,consciousness consequently appears differently modified according to the difference of the given object2 and the gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the characteristics of its objects4 ,ego1 the subject of consciousness1 is thinking3 the logical process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object1 their absolute interdependence1 what makes the object the subject's own4 ,the ,kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the mind as consciousness1 and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology 7not of a philosophy7 of mind4 ,the ,ego ,kant regards as reference to something away and beyond 7which in its abstract description is termed the thing-at-itself72 and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will4 ,though in the notion of a power of reflective judgment he touches upon the ,idea of mind--a subject-objectivity1 an intuitive intellect1 c41 and even the ,idea of ,nature1 still this ,idea is again deposed to an appearance1 i4e4 to a subjective maxim 7 #eh74 ,reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly appreciated ,kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness 7under the name of 8faculty of ideation074 ,fichte kept to the same point of view3 his non-ego is only something set over against the ego1 only defined as in consciousness3 it is made no more than an infinite 8shock10 i4e4 a thing-in-itself4 ,both systems therefore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually and essentially is1 but only as it is in reference to something else4 ,as against ,spinozism1 again1 it is to be noted that the mind in the judgment by which it 8constitutes0 itself an ego 7a free subject contrasted with its qualitative affection7 has emerged from substance1 and that the philosophy1 which gives this judgment as the absolute characteristic of mind1 has emerged from ,spinozism4 #daf4 ,the aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essence1 to raise its self-certainty to truth4 ,the existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite1 because it is merely a nominal self-relation1 or mere certainty4 ,the object is only abstractly characterised as its2 in other words1 in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself3 hence its existence there has still a content1 which is not as its own4 #dag4 ,the grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number3 first 7a7 consciousness in general1 with an object set against it2 7b7 self-consciousness1 for which ego is the object2 7c7 unity of consciousness and self-consciousness1 where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as implicitly and explicitly determinate1 as ,reason1 the notion of mind4 7a7 ,consciousness ,proper7#abg74 77 ,sensuous consciousness4 #dah4 ,consciousness is1 first1 immediate consciousness1 and its reference to the object accordingly the simple and underived certainty of it4 ,the object similarly1 being immediate1 an existent1 reflected in itself1 is further characterised as immediately singular4 ,this is sense-consciousness4 ,consciousness--as a case of correlation--comprises only the categories belonging to the abstract ego or formal thinking2 and these it treats as features of the object 7 #dae74 ,sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an existent1 a something1 an existing thing1 a singular1 and so on4 ,it appears as wealthiest in matter1 but as poorest in thought4 ,that wealth of matter is made out of sensations3 they are the material of consciousness 7 #dad71 the substantial and qualitative1 what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself4 ,this material the ego 7the reflection of the soul in itself7 separates from itself1 and puts it first under the category of being4 ,spatial and temporal ,singularness1 here and now 7the terms by which in the ,phenomenology of the ,mind 7,w4 ,,ii4 p4 #gc71 ,i described the object of sense-consciousness7 strictly belongs to intuition4 ,at present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation to consciousness1 i4e4 a something external to it1 and not yet as external on its own part1 or as being beside and out of itself4 #dai4 ,the sensible as somewhat becomes an other3 the reflection in itself of this somewhat1 the thing1 has many properties2 and as a single 7thing7 in its immediacy has several predicates4 ,the muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a breadth--a variety of relations1 reflectional attributes1 and universalities4 ,these are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle1 i4e4 in this case by the ,ego1 to describe the sensible4 ,but the ,ego as itself apparent sees in all this characterisation a change in the object2 and self-consciousness1 so construing the object1 is sense-perception4 77 ,sense-perception7#abh74 #dbj4 ,consciousness1 having passed beyond the sensibility1 wants to take the object in its truth1 not as merely immediate1 but as mediated1 reflected in itself1 and universal4 ,such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connexions4 ,hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 8,i am sure0 to the definite identity of 8,i know1 and am aware40 ,the particular grade of consciousness on which ,kantism conceives the mind is perception3 which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness1 and more or less by the sciences4 ,the sensuous certitudes of single apperceptions or observations form the starting-point3 these are supposed to be elevated to truth1 by being regarded in their bearings1 reflected upon1 and on the lines of definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and universal1 viz4 experiences4 #dba4 ,this conjunction of individual and universal is admixture--the individual remains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal1 to which however it is related4 ,it is therefore a tissue of contradictions--between the single things of sense apperception1 which form the alleged ground of general experience1 and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground--between the individuality of a thing which1 taken in its concrete content1 constitutes its independence and the various properties which1 free from this negative link and from one another1 are independent universal matters 7 #abc74 ,this contradiction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns out most concrete1 when the somewhat is defined as object 7 #aid seqq474 77 ,the ,intellect7#abi74 #dbb4 ,the proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appearance1 and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsistent inward and universal4 ,the consciousness of such an object is intellect4 ,this inward1 as we called it1 of the thing is on one hand the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible1 and1 in that manner1 an abstract identity3 on the other hand1 however1 it also for that reason contains the multiplicity1 but as an interior 8simple0 difference1 which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance4 ,this simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena--a copy of the phenomenon1 but brought to rest and universality4 #dbc4 ,the law1 at first stating the mutual dependence of universal1 permanent terms1 has1 in so far as its distinction is the inward one1 its necessity on its own part2 the one of the terms1 as not externally different from the other1 lies immediately in the other4 ,but in this manner the interior distinction is1 what it is in truth1 the distinction on its own part1 or the distinction which is none4 ,with this new form-characteristic1 on the whole1 consciousness implicitly vanishes3 for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object4 ,the ego in its judgment has an object which is not distinct from it1--it has itself4 ,consciousness has passed into self-consciousness4 7b7 ,self-consciousness7#acj74 #dbd4 ,self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness3 the latter is a consequence of the former1 all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness4 ,the object is my idea3 ,i am aware of the object as mine2 and thus in it ,i am aware of me4 ,the formula of self-consciousness is ,i ,i3--abstract freedom1 pure 8ideality40 ,in so far it lacks 8reality03 for as it is its own object1 there is strictly speaking no object1 because there is no distinction between it and the object4 #dbe4 ,abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness1 and for that reason it is burdened with an external object1 or1 nominally1 with the negation of it4 ,thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage1 consciousness3 it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness4 ,but the latter aspect and the negation in general is in ,i ,i potentially suppressed2 and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to realise its implicit nature1 by giving its abstract self-awareness content and objectivity1 and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness1 to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself4 ,the two processes are one and the same1 the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness4 77 ,appetite or ,instinctive ,desire7#aca74 #dbf4 ,self-consciousness1 in its immediacy1 is a singular1 and a desire 7appetite71--the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective1--or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subjective4 ,the certitude of one's self1 which issues from the suppression of mere consciousness1 pronounces the object null3 and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciousness as null4 #dbg4 ,self-consciousness1 therefore1 knows itself implicit in the object1 which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite4 ,in the negation of the two one-sided moments by the ego's own activity1 this identity comes to be for the ego4 ,to this activity the object1 which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-less1 can make no resistance3 the dialectic1 implicit in it1 towards self-suppression exists in this case as that activity of the ego4 ,thus while the given object is rendered subjective1 the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness and becomes objective to itself4 #dbh4 ,the product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself1 its satisfaction realised1 and itself made actual4 ,on the external side it continues1 in this return upon itself1 primarily describable as an individual1 and maintains itself as such2 because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative1 the latter1 therefore1 being merely consumed4 ,thus appetite in its satisfaction is always destructive1 and in its content selfish3 and as the satisfaction has only happened in the individual 7and that is transient7 the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction4 #dbi4 ,but on the inner side1 or implicitly1 the sense of self which the ego gets in the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere individuality2 on the contrary1--as negation of immediacy and individuality the result involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousness with its object4 ,the judgment or diremption of this self-consciousness is the consciousness of a 8free0 object1 in which ego is aware of itself as an ego1 which however is also still outside it4 77 ,self-consciousness ,recognitive7#acb74 #dcj4 ,here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness1 at first immediately as one of two things for another4 ,in that other as ego ,i behold myself1 and yet also an immediately existing object1 another ego absolutely independent of me and opposed to me4 7,the suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression1 and it merely led to the characterisation of it as particular47 ,this contradiction gives either self-consciousness the impulse to show itself as a free self1 and to exist as such for the other3--the process of recognition4 #dca4 ,the process is a battle4 ,i cannot be aware of me as myself in another individual1 so long as ,i see in that other an other and an immediate existence3 and ,i am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his4 ,but in like measure ,i cannot be recognised as immediate1 except so far as ,i overcome the mere immediacy on my own part1 and thus give existence to my freedom4 ,but this immediacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness1 in which as in its sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self1 and its being for others1 and the means for entering into relation with them4 #dcb4 ,the fight of recognition is a life and death struggle3 either self-consciousness imperils the other's like1 and incurs a like peril for its own--but only peril1 for either is no less bent on maintaining his life1 as the existence of his freedom4 ,thus the death of one1 though by the abstract1 therefore rude1 negation of immediacy1 it1 from one point of view1 solves the contradiction1 is yet1 from the essential point of view 7i4e4 the outward and visible recognition71 a new contradiction 7for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death7 and a greater than the other4 #dcc4 ,but because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution1 the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality4 ,while the one combatant prefers life1 retains his single self-consciousness1 but surrenders his claim for recognition1 the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recognised by the former as his superior4 ,thus arises the status of master and slave4 ,in the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master1 we see1 on their phenomenal side1 the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of political union4 ,force1 which is the basis of this phenomenon1 is not on that account a basis of right1 but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passage from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation into the state of universal self-consciousness4 ,force1 then1 is the external or phenomenal commencement of states1 not their underlying and essential principle4 #dcd4 ,this status1 in the first place1 implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction1--for the means of mastery1 the slave1 must likewise be kept in life4 ,in place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition1 preservation1 and formation of it1 as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together4 ,the form of universality thus arising in satisfying the want1 creates a permanent means and a provision which takes care for and secures the future4 #dce4 ,but secondly1 when we look to the distinction of the two1 the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood1 and that by the suppression of immediate self-hood1 a suppression1 however1 which falls on another4 ,this other1 the slave1 however1 in the service of the master1 works off his individualist self-will1 overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite1 and in this divestment of self and in 8the fear of his lord0 makes 8the beginning of wisdom0--the passage to universal self-consciousness4 77 ,universal ,self-consciousness4 #dcf4 ,universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an other self3 each self as a free individuality has his own 8absolute0 independence1 yet in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other4 ,each is thus universal self-conscious and objective2 each has 8real0 universality in the shape of reciprocity1 so far as each knows itself recognised in the other freeman1 and is aware of this in so far as it recognises the other and knows him to be free4 ,this universal re-appearance of self-consciousness--the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal--is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all true mental or spiritual life--in family1 fatherland1 state1 and of all virtues1 love1 friendship1 valour1 honour1 fame4 ,but this appearance of the underlying essence may be severed from that essential1 and be maintained apart in worthless honour1 idle fame1 c4 #dcg4 ,this unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first instance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other4 ,but the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity--or rather it is a difference which is none4 ,hence its truth is the fully and really existent universality and objectivity of self-consciousness1--which is ,reason4 ,reason1 as the ,idea 7 #bac7 as it here appears1 is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness1 and the object subsisting external and opposed to it4 7c7 ,reason7#acc74 #dch4 ,the essential and actual truth which reason is1 lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion1 with its objectivity and universality4 ,the universality of reason1 therefore1 whilst it signifies that the object1 which was only given in consciousness qu consciousness1 is now itself universal1 permeating and encompassing the ego1 also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form which overlaps the object1 and encompasses it without it4 #dci4 ,self-consciousness1 thus certified that its determinations are no less objective1 or determinations of the very being of things1 than they are its own thoughts1 is ,reason1 which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance1 but the truth that knows it4 ,for truth here has1 as its peculiar mode and immanent form1 the self-centred pure notion1 ego1 the certitude of self as infinite universality4 ,truth1 aware of what it is1 is mind 7spirit74 ,sub-,section ,c4 ,psychology4 ,mind7#acd74 #ddj4 ,mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness1--the former a simple immediate totality1 the latter now an infinite form which is not1 like consciousness1 restricted by that content1 and does not stand in mere correlation to it as to its object1 but is an awareness of this substantial totality1 neither subjective nor objective4 ,mind1 therefore1 starts only from its own being and is in correlation only with its own features4 ,psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qu mental--mental vision1 ideation1 remembering1 c41 desires1 c4--apart both from the content1 which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideation1 in thinking also and in desire and will1 and from the two forms in which these modes exist1 viz4 in the soul as a physical mode1 and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness4 ,this1 however1 is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist4 ,mind is just this elevation above nature and physical modes1 and above the complication with an external object--in one word1 above the material1 as its concept has just shown4 ,all it has now to do is to realise this notion of its freedom1 and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins4 ,the content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations3 it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representations1 and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts1 c4 #dda4 ,the soul is finite1 so far as its features are immediate or con-natural4 ,consciousness is finite1 in so far as it has an object4 ,mind is finite1 in so far as1 though it no longer has an object1 it has a mode in its knowledge2 i4e41 it is finite by means of its immediacy1 or1 what is the same thing1 by being subjective or only a notion4 ,and it is a matter of no consequence1 which is defined as its notion1 and which as the reality of that notion4 ,say that its notion is the utterly infinite objective reason1 then its reality is knowledge or intelligence3 say that knowledge is its notion1 then its reality is that reason1 and the realisation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason4 ,hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the 7temporary7 failure of knowledge to get hold of the full reality of its reason1 or1 equally1 in the 7temporary7 failure of reason to attain full manifestation in knowledge4 ,reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 8absolute0 freedom2 so far1 that is1 as presupposing itself for its knowledge to work upon1 it thereby reduces itself to finitude1 and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy1 of comprehending itself1 and being a rational knowledge4 #ddb4 ,the progress of mind is development1 in so far as its existent phase1 viz4 knowledge1 involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete autonomy which is rationality2 in which case the action of translating this purpose into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation1 and is even there a return into itself4 ,so far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal1 the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment1 and thus at the same time produce its freedom4 ,the development here meant is not that of the individual 7which has a certain anthropological character71 where faculties and forces are regarded as successively emerging and presenting themselves in external existence--a series of steps1 on the ascertainment on which there was for a long time great stress laid 7by the system of ,condillac71 as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the origin of these faculties and explain them4 ,in ,condillac's method there is an unmistakable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity1 and to exhibit their necessary interconnexion4 ,but the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched sort4 ,their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken 7and with justice7 as the prius or the initial basis1 but that the later phases that follow this starting-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner1 and the negative aspect of mental activity1 by which this material is transmuted into mind and destroyed as a sensible1 is misconceived and overlooked4 ,as the theory of ,condillac states it1 the sensible is not merely the empirical first1 but is left as if it were the true and essential foundation4 ,similarly1 if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations1 forces1 perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest of head or heart1 there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole business4 ,that can only be the intelligible unity of mind1 and its activity can only have itself as aim2 i4e4 its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity1 to reach and get hold of itself1 and to liberate itself to itself4 ,in this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation4 ,and this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities4 #ddc4 ,as consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it1 viz4 the natural soul 7 #dac71 so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object3 i4e4 whereas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other 7 #dae71 the mind realises that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only knows4 ,its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent1 and are the mind's own1 in freedom4 ,thus1 if we consider the initial aspect of mind1 that aspect is twofold--as being and as its own3 by the one1 the mind finds in itself something which is1 by the other it affirms it to be only its own4 ,the way of mind is therefore 7a7 to be theoretical3 it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own3 or it has to free knowledge from its pre-supposedness and therefore from its abstractness1 and make the affection subjective4 ,when the affection has been rendered its own1 and the knowledge consequently characterised as free intelligence1 i4e4 as having its full and free characterisation in itself1 it is 7b7 ,will3 practical mind1 which in the first place is likewise formal--i4e4 its content is at first only its own1 and is immediately willed2 and it proceeds next to liberate its volition from its subjectivity1 which is the one-sided form of its contents1 so that it 7c7 confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-sidedness4 #ddd4 ,the theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general range of ,mind ,subjective4 ,they are not to be distinguished as active and passive4 ,subjective mind is productive3 but it is a merely nominal productivity4 ,inwards1 the theoretical mind produces only its 8ideal0 world1 and gains abstract autonomy within2 while the practical1 while it has to do with autonomous products1 with a material which is its own1 has a material which is only nominally such1 and therefore a restricted content1 for which it gains the form of universality4 ,outwards1 the subjective mind 7which as a unity of soul and consciousness1 is thus also a reality1--a reality at once anthropological and conformable to consciousness7 has for its products1 in the theoretical range1 the word1 and in the practical 7not yet deed and action1 but7 enjoyment4 ,psychology1 like logic1 is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper conception of reason4 ,it is still extremely ill off4 ,the turn which the ,kantian philosophy has taken has given it greater importance3 it has1 and that in its empirical condition1 been claimed as the basis of metaphysics1 which is to consist of nothing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consciousness1 merely as facts1 just as they are given4 ,this position of psychology1 mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthropology1 has led to no improvement in its own condition3 but it has had the further effect that1 both for the mind as such1 and for metaphysics and philosophy generally1 all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality1 to get at the notion and the truth4 7a7 ,theoretical mind4 #dde4 ,intelligence7#ace7 finds itself determined3 this is its apparent aspect from which in its immediacy it starts4 ,but as knowledge1 intelligence consists in treating what is found as its own4 ,its activity has to do with the empty form--the pretence of finding reason3 and its aim is to realise its concept or to be reason actual1 along with which the content is realised as rational4 ,this activity is cognition4 ,the nominal knowledge1 which is only certitude1 elevates itself1 as reason is concrete1 to definite and conceptual knowledge4 ,the course of this elevation is itself rational1 and consists in a necessary passage 7governed by the concept7 of one grade or term of intelligent activity 7a so-called faculty of mind7 into another4 ,the refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found1 starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence in its capability of rational knowledge1 and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason1 which it and the content virtually is4 ,the distinction of ,intelligence from ,will is often incorrectly taken to mean that each has a fixed and separate existence of its own1 as if volition could be without intelligence1 or the activity of intelligence could be without will4 ,the possibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched1 as it is said1 and of the heart without the intellect--of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect1 and heartless intellects--only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur4 ,but it is not philosophy which should take such untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth--take the worthless for the essential nature4 ,a host of other phrases used of intelligence1 e4g4 that it receives and accepts impressions from outside1 that ideas arise through the causal operations of external things upon it1 c41 belong to a point of view utterly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study4 ,a favourite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul1 intelligence1 or mind4 ,faculty1 like power or force1 is the fixed quality of any object of thought1 conceived as reflected into self4 ,force 7 #acf7 is no doubt the infinity of form--of the inward and the outward3 but its essential finitude involves the indifference of content to form 7ib4 note74 ,in this lies the want of organic unity which by this reflectional form1 treating mind as a 8lot0 of forces1 is brought into mind1 as it is by the same method brought into nature4 ,any aspect which can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity1 and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection4 ,it makes absolutely no difference if we substitute the expression 8activities0 for powers and faculties4 ,isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate1 and treat their essential correlation as an external incident4 ,the action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition 7knowledge74 ,yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows1--besides which it also intuites1 conceives1 remembers1 imagines1 c4 ,to take up such a position is in the first instance part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured2 but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times1 as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible1--which1 if answered in the negative1 must lead to abandoning the effort4 ,the numerous aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place3 the more external the attitude of understanding in the question1 the more diffuse it makes a simple object4 ,at the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts the quite general assumption taken up by the question1 viz4 the assumption that the possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute1 and the assumption that it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition4 ,the concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself1 as the certitude of reason3 the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence4 ,it follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligence and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not4 ,but cognition is genuine1 just so far as it realises itself1 or makes the concept its own4 ,this nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it4 ,the stages of its realising activity are intuition1 conception1 memory1 c43 these activities have no other immanent meaning3 their aim is solely the concept of cognition 7 #dde note74 ,if they are isolated1 however1 then an impression is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition1 or that they severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own2 and that leads to a glorification of the delights of intuition1 remembrance1 imagination4 ,it is true that even as isolated 7i4e4 as non-intelligent71 intuition1 imagination1 c4 can afford a certain satisfaction3 what physical nature succeeds in doing by its fundamental quality--its out-of-selfness1--exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other1--that the intelligence can do by voluntary act1 but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only natural and untrained4 ,but the true satisfaction1 it is admitted1 is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind1 by rational conception1 by products of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas--in a word1 by cognitive intuition1 cognitive conception1 c4 ,the truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this1 that intuition1 conception1 c4 are not isolated1 and exist only as 8moments0 in the totality of cognition itself4 77 ,intuition 7,intelligent ,perception77#acf74 #ddf4 ,the mind which as soul is physically conditioned1--which as consciousness stands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object1--but which as intelligence finds itself so characterised--is 7#a7 an inarticulate embryonic life1 in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of its knowledge4 ,in consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally1 it is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity4 ,it thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling4 ,if feeling formerly turned up 7 #cii7 as a mode of the soul's existence1 the finding of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a congenital or corporeal condition2 whereas at present it is only to be taken abstractly in the general sense of immediacy4 #ddg4 ,the characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 8affection10 this mode is simple4 ,hence feeling1 even should its import be most sterling and true1 has the form of casual particularity1--not to mention that its import may also be the most scanty and most untrue4 ,it is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its ideas1 but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of that which it has here4 ,in contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rather to assume that the primary mental phase is judgment generally1 or the distinction of consciousness into subject and object2 and the special quality of sensation is derived from an independent object1 external or internal4 ,with us1 in the truth of mind1 the mere consciousness point of view1 as opposed to true mental 8idealism10 is swallowed up1 and the matter of feeling has rather been supposed already as immanent in the mind4--,it is commonly taken for granted that as regards content there is more in feeling than in thought3 this being specially affirmed of moral and religious feelings4 ,now the material1 which the mind as it feels is to itself1 is here the result and the mature result of a fully organised reason3 hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever4 ,but the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have--one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle1 but rather as subjective and private1 in content and value entirely contingent4 ,trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things1 of their essential relationships and real characters2 and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form4 ,feeling is the immediate1 as it were the closest1 contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content4 ,against that content the subject re-acts first of all with its particular self-feeling1 which though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a onesided intellectual standpoint1 may just as likely be narrow and poor2 and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective4 ,if a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing1 or at least to reasons--to the generalities of common sense--but to his feeling1 the only thing to do is to let him alone1 because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common rationality1 and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity--his private and particular self4 #ddh4 7#b7 ,as this immediate finding is broken up into elements1 we have the one factor in ,attention--the abstract identical direction of mind 7in feeling1 as also in all other more advanced developments of it7--an active self-collection--the factor of fixing it as our own1 but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of intelligence4 ,apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind4 ,the other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling1 as contrasted with this inwardness of mind1 with the character of something existent1 but as a negative or as the abstract otherness of itself4 ,intelligence thus defines the content of sensation as something that is out of itself1 projects it into time and space1 which are the forms in which it is intuitive4 ,to the view of consciousness the material is only an object of consciousness1 a relative other3 from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other 7 #adg1 #bed74 #ddi4 7#c7 ,when intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors1 that is to say1 when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material1 and yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness1 it is ,intuition or ,mental ,vision4 #dej4 ,at and towards this its own out-of-selfness1 intelligence no less essentially directs its attention4 ,in this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself1 a recollection of itself4 ,thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with the intelligence1 which makes it its own1 so that it no longer needs this immediacy1 no longer needs to find the content4 77 ,representation 7or ,mental ,idea77#acg74 #dea4 ,representation is this recollected or inwardised intuition1 and as such is the middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately subject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom1 or1 as thought4 ,the representation is the property of intelligence2 with a preponderating subjectivity1 however1 as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy1 and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be4 ,the path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward1 to invest itself with intuitive action in itself1 and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness1 and inwardly divest itself of it2 so as to be in itself in an externality of its own4 ,but as representation begins from intuition and the ready-found material of intuition1 the intuitional contrast still continues to affect its activity1 and makes its concrete products still 8syntheses10 which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reach the stage of thought4 77 ,recollection7#ach74 #deb4 ,intelligence1 as it at first recollects the intuition1 places the content of feeling in its own inwardness--in a space and a time of its own4 ,in this way that content is 7#a7 an image or picture1 liberated from its original immediacy and abstract singleness amongst other things1 and received into the universality of the ego4 ,the image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition1 and is arbitrary or contingent1 isolated1 we may say1 from the external place1 time1 and immediate context in which the intuition stood4 #dec4 7#b7 ,the image is of itself transient1 and intelligence itself is as attention its time and also its place1 its when and where4 ,but intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence1 but qu intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specialisations4 ,the image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent1 but stored up out of consciousness4 ,to grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations1 yet without being in consciousness1 is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete1 in the way we treat e4g4 the germ as affirmatively containing1 in virtual possibility1 all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree4 ,inability to grasp a universal like this1 which1 though intrinsically concrete1 still continues simple1 is what has led people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular ideas4 ,it was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a local habitation peculiar to itself4 ,but whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specialisations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence takes place only in another germ1--the germ of the fruit2 intelligence qu intelligence shows the potential coming to free existence in its development1 and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness4 ,hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this sub-conscious mine1 i4e4 as the existent universal in which the different has not yet been realised in its separations4 ,and it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation4 #ded4 7#c7 ,an image thus abstractly treasured up needs1 if it is to exist1 an actual intuition3 and what is strictly called ,remembrance is the reference of the image to an intuition1--and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition 7impression7 under what is in point of form universal1 under the representation 7idea7 with the same content4 ,thus intelligence recognises the specific sensation and the intuition of it as what is already its own1--in them it is still within itself3 at the same time it is aware that what is only its 7primarily7 internal image is also an immediate object of intuition1 by which it is authenticated4 ,the image1 which in the mine of intelligence was only its property1 now that it has been endued with externality1 comes actually into its possession4 ,and so the image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable from the blank night in which it was originally submerged4 ,intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property1 and dispense with external intuition for its existence in it4 ,this 8synthesis0 of the internal image with the recollected existence is representation proper3 by this synthesis the internal now has the qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have its existence in it4 77 ,imagination7#aci74 #dee4 7#a7 ,the intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination1 where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego1 which is now the power over them4 ,the images are in the first instance referred to this external1 immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them4 ,but it is solely in the conscious subject1 where it is treasured up1 that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined3 whereas their original concretion1 i4e4 at first only in space and time1 as a unit of intuition1 has been broken up4 ,the content reproduced1 belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence1 and an out-put from its universal mine1 has a general idea 7representation7 to supply the link of association for the images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete ideas4 ,the so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest1 especially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy4 ,in the first place1 it is not ,ideas 7properly so called7 which are associated4 ,secondly1 these modes of relation are not laws1 just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing1 as to suggest a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law4 ,it is a matter of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial1 or an intellectual category1 such as likeness and contrast1 reason and consequence4 ,the train of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacant-minded ideation1 where1 though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal universality1 the matter is entirely pictorial4--,image and idea1 if we leave out of account the more precise definition of those forms given above1 present also a distinction in content4 ,the former is the more consciously-concrete idea1 whereas the idea 7representation71 whatever be its content 7from image1 notion1 or idea71 has always the peculiarity1 though belonging to intelligence1 of being in respect of its content given and immediate4 ,it is still true of this idea or representation1 as of all intelligence1 that it finds its material1 as a matter of fact1 to be so and so2 and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract4 ,mental representation is the mean in the syllogism of the elevation of intelligence1 the link between the two significations of self-relatedness--viz4 being and universality1 which in consciousness receive the title of object and subject4 ,intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality1 and the internal and its own by the attribution of being1 but a being of its own institution4 7,on the distinction of representations and thoughts1 see ,introd4 to the ,logic1 #bj note47 ,abstraction1 which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced 7and ideas qu ideas virtually have the form of generality71 is frequently explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is supposed to be thus made intelligible4 ,if this super-imposing is to be no mere accident and without principle1 a force of attraction in like images must be assumed1 or something of the sort1 which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other4 ,this force is really intelligence itself1--the self-identical ego which by its internalising recollection gives the images ipso facto generality1 and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalised image 7 #dec74 #def4 ,thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal1 which forms their connecting link4 ,but here intelligence is more than merely a general form3 its inwardness is an internally definite1 concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own1 derived from some interest1 some latent concept or ,ideal principle1 so far as we may by anticipation speak of such4 ,intelligence is the power which wields the stores of images and ideas belonging to it1 and which thus 7#b7 freely combines and subsumes these stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor4 ,such is creative imagination7#adj7--symbolic1 allegoric1 or poetical imagination--where the intelligence gets a definite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone4 ,these more or less concrete1 individualised creations are still 8syntheses03 for the material1 in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pictorial existence1 is derived from the data of intuition4 #deg4 ,in creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no helps for intuition4 ,its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence4 ,this pictorial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective--still lacks the side of existence4 ,but as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of materialisation1 intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical self-relation and to immediacy4 ,as reason1 its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself 7 #dde1 #dee71 i4e4 to universalise it2 and now its action as reason 7 #deh7 is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition4 ,in other words1 it aims at making itself be and be a fact4 ,acting on this view1 it is self-uttering1 intuition-producing3 the imagination which creates signs4 ,productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being1 one's own and what is picked up1 internal and external1 are completely welded into one4 ,the preceding 8syntheses0 of intuition1 recollection1 c41 are unifications of the same factors1 but they are 8syntheses02 it is not till creative imagination that intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal1 and becomes an individuality1 a concrete subjectivity1 in which the self-reference is defined both to being and to universality4 ,the creations of imagination are on all hands recognised as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of intuition2 what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments4 ,for the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects4--,imagination1 when regarded as the agency of this unification1 is reason1 but only a nominal reason1 because the matter or theme it embodies is to imagination qu imagination a matter of indifference2 whilst reason qu reason also insists upon the truth of its content4 ,another point calling for special notice is that1 when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition1 and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent1 the phrase must not seem surprising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing2 for its ideal import is itself1 and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it4 ,the image produced by imagination of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition3 in the sign or symbol it adds intuitability proper2 and in mechanical memory it completes1 so far as it is concerned1 this form of being4 #deh4 ,in this unity 7initiated by intelligence7 of an independent representation with an intuition1 the matter of the latter is1 in the first instance1 something accepted1 somewhat immediate or given 7e4g4 the colour of the cockade1 c474 ,but in the fusion of the two elements1 the intuition does not count positively or as representing itself1 but as representative of something else4 ,it is an image1 which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental representation4 ,this intuition is the ,sign4 ,the sign is some immediate intuition1 representing a totally different import from what naturally belongs to it2 it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed1 and where it is conserved4 ,the sign is different from the symbol3 for in the symbol the original characters 7in essence and conception7 of the visible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbol2 whereas in the sign1 strictly so-called1 the natural attributes of the intuition1 and the connotation of which it is a sign1 have nothing to do with each other4 ,intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in the use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory 7significative7 rather than as symbolical4 ,in logic and psychology1 signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix1 without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and systematic place in the economy of intelligence4 ,the right place for the sign is that just given3 where intelligence--which as intuiting generates the form of time and space1 but is apparently recipient of sensible matter1 out of which it forms ideas--now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself1 treating the intuition 7or time and space as filled full7 as its own property1 deleting the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it1 and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import4 ,this sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 8productive0 ,memory 7the primarily abstract 8,mnemosyne072 since memory1 which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synonymous with remembrance 7recollection71 and even with conception and imagination1 has always to do with signs only4 #dei4 ,the intuition--in its natural phase a something given and given in space--acquires1 when employed as a sign1 the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated4 ,such is the negativity of intelligence2 and thus the truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time 7but its existence vanishes in the moment of being71 and if we consider the rest of its external psychical quality1 its institution by intelligence1 but an institution growing out of its 7anthropological7 own naturalness4 ,this institution of the natural is the vocal note1 where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utterance4 ,the vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas--speech and1 its system1 language--gives to sensations1 intuitions1 conceptions1 a second and higher existence than they naturally possess1--invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm4 ,language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium4 ,if language had to be treated in its concrete nature1 it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psycho-physiological point of view 7 #dja71 and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of analytic understanding4 ,with regard to the elementary material of language1 while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared1 on the other the principle of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers--that of vocal objects4 ,yet one may still hear the ,german language praised for its wealth--that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds--,rauschen1 ,sausen1 ,knarren1 c42--there have been collected more than a hundred such words1 perhaps3 the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases4 ,such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothing to form the real wealth of a cultivated language4 ,the strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referring to external objects2 it depends1 i4e4 on anthropological articulation1 as it were the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance4 ,for each vowel and consonant accordingly1 as well as for their more abstract elements 7the posture of lips1 palate1 tongue in each7 and for their combinations1 people have tried to find the appropriate signification4 ,but these dull sub-conscious beginnings are deprived of their original importance and prominence by new influences1 it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilisation4 ,having been originally sensuous intuitions1 they are reduced to signs1 and thus have only traces left of their original meaning1 if it be not altogether extinguished4 ,as to the formal element1 again1 it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories3 it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar4 ,the study of languages still in their original state1 which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times1 has shown on this point that they contain a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilised nations4 ,it seems as if the language of the most civilised nations has the most imperfect grammar1 and that the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more uncivilised state than when it reaches a higher civilisation4 7,cf4 ,w4 von ,humboldt's ,essay on the ,dual47 ,in speaking of vocal 7which is the original7 language1 we may touch1 only in passing1 upon written language1--a further development in the particular sphere of language which borrows the help of an externally practical activity4 ,it is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs 7 #ded74 ,in particular1 hieroglyphics uses spatial figures to designate ideas2 alphabetical writing1 on the other hand1 uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs4 ,alphabetical writing thus consists of signs of signs1--the words or concrete signs of vocal language being analysed into their simple elements1 which severally receive designation4--,leibnitz's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete written language1 formed on the hieroglyphic method 7and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing1 as in our signs for the numbers1 the planets1 the chemical elements1 c471 would have as a universal language for the intercourse of nations and especially of scholars4 ,but we may be sure that it was rather the intercourse of nations 7as was probably the case in ,phoenicia1 and still takes place in ,canton--see ,macartney's ,travels by ,staunton7 which occasioned the need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation4 ,at any rate a comprehensive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable4 ,sensible objects no doubt admit of permanent signs2 but1 as regards signs for mental objects1 the progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature2 and this would involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation4 ,even in the case of sense-objects it happens that their names1 i4e4 their signs in vocal language1 are frequently changed1 as e4g4 in chemistry and mineralogy4 ,now that it has been forgotten what names properly are1 viz4 externalities which of themselves have no sense1 and only get signification as signs1 and now that1 instead of names proper1 people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition1 which is frequently changed capriciously and fortuitously1 the denomination1 i4e4 the composite name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteristic properties1 is altered in accordance with the differences of view with regard to the genus or other supposed specific property4 ,it is only a stationary civilisation1 like the ,chinese1 which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that nation2 and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture4--,the progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing2 by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation4 ,the imperfection of the ,chinese vocal language is notorious3 numbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings1 as many as ten and twenty1 so that1 in speaking1 the distinction is made perceptible merely by accent and intensity1 by speaking low and soft or crying out4 ,the ,european1 learning to speak ,chinese1 falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mastered these absurd refinements of accentuation4 ,perfection here consists in the opposite of that parler sans accent which in ,europe is justly required of an educated speaker4 ,the hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the ,chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphabetic writing4 ,alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent3 in it the word--the mode1 peculiar to the intellect1 of uttering its ideas most worthily--is brought to consciousness and made an object of reflection4 ,engaging the attention of intelligence1 as it does1 it is analysed2 the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements 7the primary postures of articulation7 in which the sense-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality1 at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity4 ,thus alphabetic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language1 that the ideas have names strictly so called3 the name is the simple sign for the exact idea1 i4e4 the simple plain idea1 not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them4 ,hieroglyphics1 instead of springing from the direct analysis of sensible signs1 like alphabetic writing1 arise from an antecedent analysis of ideas4 ,thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements1 or simple logical terms1 so that from the elementary signs chosen to express these 7as1 in the case of the ,chinese ,koua1 the simple straight stroke1 and the stroke broken into two parts7 a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their composition4 ,this feature of hieroglyphic--the analytical designations of ideas--which misled ,leibnitz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language1--the name4 ,to want a name means that for the immediate idea 7which1 however ample a connotation it may include1 is still for the mind simple in the name71 we require a simple immediate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything1 and has for its sole function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such4 ,it is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the simplicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into which they have been analysed3 thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought the concrete connotation which it 8resumes0 and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it4 ,both alike require such signs1 simple in respect of their meaning3 signs1 which though consisting of several letters or syllables and even decomposed into such1 yet do not exhibit a combination of several ideas4--,what has been stated is the principle for settling the value of these written languages4 ,it also follows that in hieroglyphics the relations of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perplexed1 and that the analysis of these 7and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed7 appears to be possible in the most various and divergent ways4 ,every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name2 just as in modern times 7as already noted1 even in the region of sense7 muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name4 ,a hieroglyphic written language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilisation of the ,chinese4 ,what has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educational value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character4 ,it leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements1 and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life4 ,acquired habit subsequently effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears1 in the interest of vision1 as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility2 it makes them a sort of hieroglyphic to us1 so that in using them we need not consciously realise them by means of tones1 whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound4 ,thus1 while 7with the faculty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics7 the capacity of abstraction gained by the first practice remains1 hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing4 ,it is true that the audible 7which is in time7 and the visible 7which is in space71 each have their own basis1 one no less authoritative than the other4 ,but in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis3 the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other3 the visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign1 and intelligence expresses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking4--,the instrumental function of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought4 #dfj4 ,the name1 combining the intuition 7an intellectual production7 with its signification1 is primarily a single transient product2 and conjunction of the idea 7which is inward7 with the intuition 7which is outward7 is itself outward4 ,the reduction of this outwardness to inwardness is 7verbal7 ,memory4 77 ,memory7#ada74 #dfa4 ,under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardising 7recollecting7 functions1 as regards the intuition of the word1 as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition 7 #dea74 7#a7 ,making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign1 intelligence1 by this inwardising 7memorising7 elevates the single synthesis to a universal1 i4e4 permanent1 synthesis1 in which name and meaning are for it objectively united1 and renders the intuition 7which the name originally is7 a representation4 ,thus the import 7connotation7 and sign1 being identified1 form one representation3 the representation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its import3 all this being the work of memory which retains names 7retentive ,memory74 #dfb4 ,the name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm4 7#b7 ,in the name1 ,reproductive memory has and recognises the thing1 and with the thing it has the name1 apart from intuition and image4 ,the name1 as giving an existence to the content in intelligence1 is the externality of intelligence to itself2 and the inwardising or recollection of the name1 i4e4 of an intuition of intellectual origin1 is at the same time a self-externalisation to which intelligence reduces itself on its own ground4 ,the association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive1 representative1 or cogitant1--series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels1 represents1 or thinks4 ,given the name lion1 we need neither the actual vision of the animal1 nor its image even3 the name alone1 if we understand it1 is the unimaged simple representation4 ,we think in names4 ,the recent attempts--already1 as they deserved1 forgotten--to rehabilitate the ,mnemonic of the ancients1 consist in transforming names into images1 and thus again deposing memory to the level of imagination4 ,the place of the power of memory is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images1 fixed in the imagination1 to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote4 ,considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images1 and the speed with which the attachment has to be made1 the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow1 silly1 and utterly accidental links4 ,not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff1 but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten1 seeing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ideas1 and so those previously attached to it are effaced4 ,what is mnemonically impressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart1 i4e4 strictly produced from within outwards1 from the deep pit of the ego1 and thus recited1 but is1 so to speak1 read off the tableau of fancy4--,mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory1 in comparison with fancy and imagination2 as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory4 ,on the contrary1 memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition1--the immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence2 it has rather to do with an object which is the product of intelligence itself1--such a without book7#adb7 as remains locked up in the within-book7#adc7 of intelligence1 and is1 within intelligence1 only its outward and existing side4 #dfc4 7#c7 ,as the interconnexion of the names lies in the meaning1 the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an 7external7 synthesis2 and intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self4 ,but intelligence is the universal1--the single plain truth of its particular self-divestments2 and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes that distinction between meaning and name4 ,this extreme inwardising of representation is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence1 in which it renders itself the mere being1 the universal space of names as such1 i4e4 of meaningless words4 ,the ego1 which is this abstract being1 is1 because subjectivity1 at the same time the power over the different names1--the link which1 having nothing in itself1 fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order4 ,so far as they merely are1 and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs1 its power is a merely abstract subjectivity1--memory2 which1 on account of the complete externality in which the members of such series stand to one another1 and because it is itself this externality 7subjective though that be71 is called mechanical 7 #aie74 ,a composition is1 as we know1 not thoroughly conned by rote1 until one attaches no meaning to the words4 ,the recitation of what has been thus got by heart is therefore of course accentless4 ,the correct accent1 if it is introduced1 suggests the meaning3 but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter4 ,the faculty of conning by rote series of words1 with no principle governing their succession1 or which are separately meaningless1 e4g4 a series of proper names1 is so supremely marvellous1 because it is the very essence of mind to have its wits about it2 whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself1 and its action is like machinery4 ,but it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it4 ,whereas in the case before us1 after it has in intuition been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready-made1 and in representation inwardises or recollects this datum and makes it its own1--it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself1 so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found4 ,thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought1 viz4 objectivity1 is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it4--,it is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical--the act implying no intelligence--in which case it is only justified by its uses1 its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind4 ,but by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind4 #dfd4 ,if it is to be the fact and true objectivity1 the mere name as an existent requires something else1--to be interpreted by the representing intellect4 ,now in the shape of mechanical memory1 intelligence is at once that external objectivity and the meaning4 ,in this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity1 i4e4 it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly4 ,memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thought1 which no longer has a meaning1 i4e4 its objectivity is no longer severed from the subjective1 and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existence4 ,the ,german language has etymologically assigned memory 7,gedchtni71 of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously1 the high position of direct kindred with thought 7,gedanke74--,it is not matter of chance that the young have a better memory than the old1 nor is their memory solely exercised for the sake of utility4 ,the young have a good memory because they have not yet reached the stage of reflection2 their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in which the fact1 the implicit content1 may reign and unfold itself with no antithesis to a subjective inwardness4 ,genuine ability is in youth generally combined with a good memory4 ,but empirical statements of this sort help little towards a knowledge of what memory intrinsically is4 ,to comprehend the position and meaning of memory and to understand its organic interconnexion with thought is one of the hardest points1 and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind4 ,memory qu memory is itself the merely external mode1 or merely existential aspect of thought1 and thus needs a complementary element4 ,the passage from it to thought is to our view and implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode3 an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject1 and as the function of that subject4 ,thus active reason is ,thinking4 77 ,thinking7#add74 #dfe4 ,intelligence is recognitive3 it cognises an intuition1 but only because that intuition is already its own 7 #ded72 and in the name it re-discovers the fact 7 #dfb73 but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such1 and of the universal as immediate or as being1--finds i4e4 the genuine universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other1 viz4 being4 ,thus intelligence is explicitly1 and on its own part cognitive3 virtually it is the universal1--its product 7the thought7 is the thing3 it is a plain identity of subjective and objective4 ,it knows that what is thought1 is1 and that what is1 only is in so far as it is a thought 7 #eba72 the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts3 these are as its content and object4 #dff4 ,but cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal3 the universality and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence4 ,the thoughts therefore are not yet fully and freely determinate1 and the representations which have been inwardised to thoughts are so far still the given content4 #dfg4 ,as dealing with this given content1 thought is 77 understanding with its formal identity1 working up the representations1 that have been memorised1 into species1 genera1 laws1 forces1 c41 in short into categories1--thus indicating that the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-forms4 ,as intrinsically infinite negativity1 thought is 77 essentially an act of partition1--judgment1 which however does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being1 but distinguishes on the lines supplied by the interconnexions peculiar to the concept4 ,thirdly 771 thought supersedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences1--thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding4 ,intelligence1 as the act of thought1 cognises4 ,and 77 understanding out of its generalities 7the categories7 explains the individual1 and is then said to comprehend or understand itself3 77 in the judgment it explains the individual to be an universal 7species1 genus74 ,in these forms the content appears as given3 77 but in inference 7syllogism7 it characterises a content from itself1 by superseding that form-difference4 ,with the perception of the necessity1 the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished4 ,in ,logic there was thought1 but in its implicitness1 and as reason develops itself in this distinction-lacking medium4 ,so in consciousness thought occurs as a stage 7 #dcg note74 ,here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction1 as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits4 ,thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy1 because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antithesis they imply2 while thought is this one and the same centre1 to which as to their truth the antithesis return4 #dfh4 ,intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being1 is1 now that it has completed taking possession1 in its own property3 the last negation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself determine its content4 ,thus thought1 as free notion1 is now also free in point of content4 ,but when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content1 which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being1 it is ,will4 7b7 ,mind ,practical7#ade74 #dfi4 ,as will1 the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions1 the origin of its self-fulfilment4 ,thus fulfilled1 this independency or individuality form the side of existence or of reality for the ,idea of mind4 ,as will1 the mind steps into actuality2 whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional generality4 ,supplying its own content1 the will is self-possessed1 and in the widest sense free3 this is its characteristic trait4 ,its finitude lies in the formalism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness1 not yet identified with matured reason4 ,it is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will1 and it is therefore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature1 i4e4 to make liberty its pervading character1 content1 and aim1 as well as its sphere of existence4 ,the essential freedom of will is1 and must always be1 a thought3 hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a thinking will1--to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks itself4 ,true liberty1 in the shape of moral life1 consists in the will finding its purpose in a universal content1 not in subjective or selfish interests4 ,but such a content is only possible in thought and through thought3 it is nothing short of absurd to seek to banish thought from the moral1 religious1 and law-abiding life4 #dgj4 ,practical mind1 considered at first as formal or immediate will1 contains a double ought--7#a7 in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and condition1--an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external objects4 7#b7 ,that first self-determination1 being itself immediate1 is not at once elevated into a thinking universality3 the latter1 therefore1 virtually constitutes an obligation on the former in point of form1 as it may also constitute it in point of matter2--a distinction which only exists for the observer4 77 ,practical ,sense or ,feeling7#adf74 #dga4 ,the autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore formal1 i4e4 it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature4 ,it is thus 8practical feeling10 or instinct of action4 ,in this phase1 as it is at bottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason1 it has no doubt a rational content1 but a content which as it stands is individual1 and for that reason also natural1 contingent and subjective1--a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion1 c41 and by the subjectivity which selfishly sets itself against the universal1 as it may be virtually in conformity with reason4 ,an appeal is sometimes made to the sense 7feeling7 of right and morality1 as well as of religion1 which man is alleged to possess1--to his benevolent dispositions1--and even to his heart generally1--i4e4 to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined4 ,so far as this appeal implies 7#a7 that these ideas are immanent in his own self1 and 7#b7 that when feeling is opposed to the logical understanding1 it1 and not the partial abstractions of the latter1 may be the totality--the appeal has a legitimate meaning4 ,but on the other hand feeling too may be onesided1 unessential and bad4 ,the rational1 which exists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought1 is the same content as the good practical feeling has1 but presented in its universality and necessity1 in its objectivity and truth4 ,thus it is on the one hand silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling to law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence2 it is this passage which lets feeling first reach its truth4 ,it is equally silly to consider intellect as superfluous or even harmful to feeling1 heart1 and will2 the truth and1 what is the same thing1 the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect1 and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling4 ,if feelings are of the right sort1 it is because of their quality or content1--which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its source in the thinking mind4 ,the difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several faculties of feeling and thinking mind1 and coming to see that in the human being there is only one reason1 in feeling1 volition1 and thought4 ,another difficulty connected with this is found in the fact that the ,ideas which are the special property of the thinking mind1 viz4 ,god1 law and morality1 can also be felt4 ,but feeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subject1 in which these facts1 like any other objective facts 7which consciousness also sets over against itself71 may be placed4 ,on the other hand1 it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law1 right and duty2 because all that the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice4 ,for the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form1 and to discuss their content2 for the latter1 when thought1 is precisely what constitutes1 in their universality and necessity1 the rights and duties which are the true works of mental autonomy4 ,so long as we study practical feelings and dispositions specially1 we have only to deal with the selfish1 bad1 and evil2 it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal3 their content is the reverse of rights and duties1 and precisely in that way do they--but only in antithesis to the latter--retain a speciality of their own4 #dgb4 ,the 8,ought0 of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to control some existing mode of fact--which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim4 ,but as both1 in their immediacy1 lack objective determination1 this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjective and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant4 ,delight1 joy1 grief1 c41 shame1 repentance1 contentment1 c41 are partly only modifications of the formal 8practical feeling0 in general1 but are partly different in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 8,ought40 ,the celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world1 so far at least as evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely1 arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling4 ,evil is nothing but the incompatibility between what is and what ought to be4 8,ought0 is an ambiguous term1--indeed infinitely so1 considering that casual aims may also come under the form of ,ought4 ,but where the objects sought are thus casual1 evil only executes what is rightfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning3 for they themselves were radically evil4 ,the finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgment3 the contrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them1 and thus they are the contradiction called evil4 ,in the dead there is neither evil nor pain3 for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity 7concept7 does not confront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject4 ,whereas in life1 and still more in mind1 we have this immanent distinction present3 hence arises the ,ought3 and this negativity1 subjectivity1 ego1 freedom are the principles of evil and pain4 ,jacob ,bhme viewed egoity 7selfhood7 as pain and torment1 and as the fountain of nature and of spirit4 77 ,the ,impulses and ,choice7#adg74 #dgc4 ,the practical ought is a 8real0 judgment4 ,will1 which is essentially self-determination1 finds in the conformity--as immediate and merely found to hand--of the existing mode to its requirement a negation1 and something inappropriate to it4 ,if the will is to satisfy itself1 if the implicit unity of the universality and the special mode is to be realised1 the conformity of its inner requirement and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution4 ,the will1 as regards the form of its content1 is at first still a natural will1 directly identical with its specific mode3--natural impulse and inclination4 ,should1 however1 the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse1 each being always in conflict to another1 it is passion4 #dgd4 ,inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practical feeling4 ,thus1 while on one hand they are based on the rational nature of the mind2 they on the other1 as part and parcel of the still subjective and single will1 are infected with contingency1 and appear as particular to stand to the individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity which creates bondage4 ,the special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition1 in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged1 be the value of that mode what it may4 ,in consequence of this formalism1 passion is neither good nor bad2 the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul1--his interests of intellect1 talent1 character1 enjoyment1--on one aim and object4 ,nothing great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion4 ,it is only a dead1 too often1 indeed1 a hypocritical moralising which inveighs against the form of passion as such4 ,but with regard to the inclinations1 the question is directly raised1 ,which are good and bad8--,up to what degree the good continue good2--and 7as there are many1 each with its private range7 ,in what way have they1 being all in one subject and hardly all1 as experience shows1 admitting of gratification1 to suffer at least reciprocal restriction8 ,and1 first of all1 as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities1 the case is much the same as with the psychical powers1 whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical1--an aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses4 ,the nominal rationality of impulse and propensity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely1 but to get realised1 overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency4 ,their genuine rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pre-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts1 and therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them4 ,but the immanent 8reflection0 of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy1 and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity1 in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation1 as rights and duties4 ,it is this objectification which evinces their real value1 their mutual connexions1 and their truth4 ,and thus it was a true perception when ,plato 7especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right7 showed that the full reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice1 viz4 in the construction of the ,state as the ethical life4 ,the answer to the question1 therefore1 ,what are the good and rational propensities1 and how they are to be co-ordinated with each other8 resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when developing itself as objective mind--a development in which the content of autonomous action loses its contingency and optionality4 ,the discussion of the true intrinsic worth of the impulses1 inclinations1 and passions is thus essentially the theory of legal1 moral1 and social duties4 #dge4 ,the subject is the act of satisfying impulses1 an act of 7at least7 formal rationality1 as it translates them from the subjectivity of content 7which so far is purpose7 into objectivity1 where the subject is made to close with itself4 ,if the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out1 and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action1 this is what is called the interest4 ,nothing therefore is brought about without interest4 ,an action is an aim of the subject1 and it is his agency too which executes this aim3 unless the subject were in this way in the most disinterested action1 i4e4 unless he had an interest in it1 there would be no action at all4--,the impulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the baseless chimera of a happiness1 the free gift of nature1 where wants are supposed to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a conformity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements4 ,they are sometimes contrasted1 on the whole to their disadvantage1 with the morality of duty for duty's sake4 ,but impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action3 they are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof4 ,the morality concerns the content of the aim1 which as such is the universal1 an inactive thing1 that finds its actualising in the agent2 and finds it only when the aim is immanent in the agent1 is his interest and--should it claim to engross his whole efficient subjectivity--his passion4 #dgf4 ,the will1 as thinking and implicitly free1 distinguishes itself from the particularity of the impulses1 and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content4 ,it is thus 8reflecting0 will4 #dgg4 ,such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum3 the reflective will now sees it as its own1 because it closes with it and thus gives itself specific individuality and actuality4 ,it is now on the standpoint of choosing between inclinations1 and is option or choice4 #dgh4 ,will as choice claims to be free1 reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy4 ,however1 as the content1 in which its former universality concludes itself to actuality1 is nothing but the content of the impulses and appetites1 it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will4 ,it realises itself in a particularity1 which it regards at the same time as a nullity1 and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from4 ,as thus contradictory1 it is the process of distracting and suspending one desire or enjoyment by another1--and one satisfaction1 which is just as much no satisfaction1 by another1 without end4 ,but the truth of the particular satisfactions is the universal1 which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim4 77 ,happiness7#adh74 #dgi4 ,in this idea1 which reflection and comparison have educed1 of a universal satisfaction1 the impulses1 so far as their particularity goes1 are reduced to a mere negative2 and it is held that in part they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof that aim1 partly sacrificed to that aim directly1 either altogether or in part4 ,their mutual limitation1 on one hand1 proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations3 on the other hand1 as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action1 it is on them that the decision turns1 and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which must have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed4 #dhj4 ,happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things desired1--a universality which only ought to be4 ,but the particularity of the satisfaction which just as much is as it is abolished1 and the abstract singleness1 the option which gives or does not give itself 7as it pleases7 an aim in happiness1 find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will1 i4e4 its very autonomy or freedom4 ,in this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity1 which is pure and concrete at once1 by having for its contents and aim only that infinite mode of being--freedom itself4 ,in this truth of its autonomy1 where concept and object are one1 the will is an actually free will4 ,free ,mind7#adi74 #dha4 ,actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind3 a free will1 which realises its own freedom of will now that the formalism1 fortuitousness1 and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superseded4 ,by superseding the adjustments of means therein contained1 the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted1--an individuality1 however1 also purified of all that interferes with its universalism1 i4e4 with freedom itself4 ,this universalism the will has as its object and aim1 only so far as it thinks itself1 knows this its concept1 and is will as free intelligence4 #dhb4 ,the mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object1 i4e4 which has its true being for characteristic and aim1 is in the first instance the rational will in general1 or implicit ,idea1 and because implicit only the notion of absolute mind4 ,as abstract ,idea again1 it is existent only in the immediate will--it is the existential side of reason1--the single will as aware of this its universality constituting its contents and aim1 and of which it is only the formal activity4 ,if the will1 therefore1 in which the ,idea thus appears is only finite1 that will is also the act of developing the ,idea1 and of investing its self-unfolding content with an existence which1 as realising the idea1 is actuality4 ,it is thus 8,objective0 ,mind4 ,no ,idea is so generally recognised as indefinite1 ambiguous1 and open to the greatest misconceptions 7to which therefore it actually falls a victim7 as the idea of ,liberty3 none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning4 ,remembering that free mind is actual mind1 we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice4 ,when individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty1 there is nothing like it in its uncontrollable strength1 just because it is the very essence of mind1 and that as its very actuality4 ,whole continents1 ,africa and the ,east1 have never had this idea1 and are without it still4 ,the ,greeks and ,romans1 ,plato and ,aristotle1 even the ,stoics1 did not have it4 ,on the contrary1 they saw that it is only by birth 7as e4g4 an ,athenian or ,spartan citizen71 or by strength of character1 education1 or philosophy 7--the sage is free even as a slave and in chains7 that the human being is actually free4 ,it was through ,christianity that this idea came into the world4 ,according to ,christianity1 the individual as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love1 destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with ,god himself1 and have ,god's mind dwelling in him3 i4e4 man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom4 ,if1 in religion as such1 man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being1 he has also1 even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence1 the divine mind present with him1 as the substance of the state of the family1 c4 ,these institutions are due to the guidance of that spirit1 and are constituted after its measure2 whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in the individual1 so that in this sphere of particular existence1 of present sensation and volition1 he is actually free4 ,if to be aware of the idea--to be aware1 i4e4 that men are aware of freedom as their essence1 aim1 and object--is matter of speculation1 still this very idea itself is the actuality of men--not something which they have1 as men1 but which they are4 ,christianity in its adherents has realised an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves2 if they are made slaves1 if the decision as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will1 not with laws or courts of justice1 they would find the very substance of their life outraged4 ,this will to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction1 but the permanent character--the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive nature4 ,but this freedom1 which the content and aim of freedom has1 is itself only a notion--a principle of the mind and heart1 intended to develope into an objective phase1 into legal1 moral1 religious1 and not less into scientific actuality4 ,,section ,,ii4 ,,mind ,,objective4 #dhc4 ,the objective ,mind is the absolute ,idea1 but only existing in posse3 and as it is thus on the territory of finitude1 its actual rationality retains the aspect of external apparency4 ,the free will finds itself immediately confronted by differences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function and aim1 and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity1 which splits up into different heads3 viz4 anthropological data 7i4e4 private and personal needs71 external things of nature which exist for consciousness1 and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own diversity and particularity4 ,these aspects constitute the external material for the embodiment of the will4 #dhd4 ,but the purposive action of this will is to realise its concept1 ,liberty1 in these externally-objective aspects1 making the latter a world moulded by the former1 which in it is thus at home with itself1 locked together with it3 the concept accordingly perfected to the ,idea4 ,liberty1 shaped into the actuality of a world1 receives the form of ,necessity the deeper substantial nexus of which is the system or organisation of the principles of liberty1 whilst its phenomenal nexus is power or authority1 and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousness4 #dhe4 ,this unity of the rational will with the single will 7this being the peculiar and immediate medium in which the former is actualised7 constitutes the simple actuality of liberty4 ,as it 7and its content7 belongs to thought1 and is the virtual universal1 the content has its right and true character only in the form of universality4 ,when invested with this character for the intelligent consciousness1 or instituted as an authoritative power1 it is a ,law7#aej74 ,when1 on the other hand1 the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness1 attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse1 and is set and grafted in the individual will1 not in the form of impulse1 but in its universality1 so as to become its habit1 temper and character1 it exists as manner and custom1 or ,usage7#aea74 #dhf4 ,this 8reality10 in general1 where free will has existence1 is the ,law 7,right71--the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juristic law1 but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom4 ,these conditions1 in relation to the subjective will1 where they1 being universal1 ought to have and can only have their existence1 are its ,duties2 whereas as its temper and habit they are ,manners4 ,what is a right is also a duty1 and what is a duty1 is also a right4 ,for a mode of existence is a right1 only as a consequence of the free substantial will3 and the same content of fact1 when referred to the will distinguished as subjective and individual1 is a duty4 ,it is the same content which the subjective consciousness recognises as a duty1 and brings into existence in these several wills4 ,the finitude of the objective will thus creates the semblance of a distinction between rights and duties4 ,in the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata1 at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in some one else4 ,but1 in the light of the concept1 my right to a thing is not merely possession1 but as possession by a person it is property1 or legal possession1 and it is a duty to possess things as property1 i4e4 to be as a person4 ,translated into the phenomenal relationship1 viz4 relation to another person--this grows into the duty of some one else to respect my right4 ,in the morality of the conscience1 duty in general is in me--a free subject--at the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition4 ,but in this individualist moral sphere1 there arises the division between what is only inward purpose 7disposition or intention71 which only has its being in me and is merely subjective duty1 and the actualisation of that purpose3 and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality4 ,in social ethics these two parts have reached their truth1 their absolute unity2 although even right and duty return to one another and combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity4 ,the rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them2 just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood4 ,the penal judicature of a government1 its rights of administration1 c41 are no less its duties to punish1 to administer1 c42 as the services of the members of the ,state in dues1 military services1 c41 are duties and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the general substantial life in which they have their root4 ,all the aims of society and the ,state are the private aim of the individuals4 ,but the set of adjustments1 by which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right1 produces an appearance of diversity3 and this diversity is increased by the variety of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange1 though it remains intrinsically the same4 ,still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no rights has no duties and vice versa4 ,distribution4 #dhg4 ,the free will is ,a4 itself at first immediate1 and hence as a single being--the person3 the existence which the person gives to its liberty is property4 ,the ,right as right 7law7 is formal1 abstract right4 ,b4 ,when the will is reflected into self1 so as to have its existence inside it1 and to be thus at the same time characterised as a particular1 it is the right of the subjective will1 morality of the individual conscience4 ,c4 ,when the free will is the substantial will1 made actual in the subject and conformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity1--it is the ethics of actual life in family1 civil society1 and state4 ,sub-,section ,a4 ,law47#aeb7 7a7 ,property4 #dhh4 ,mind1 in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty1 is an individual1 but one that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will3 it is a person1 in whom the inward sense of this freedom1 as in itself still abstract and empty1 has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part1 but on an external thing4 ,this thing1 as something devoid of will1 has no rights against the subjectivity of intelligence and volition1 and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it1 the external sphere of its liberty2--possession4 #dhi4 ,by the judgment of possession1 at first in the outward appropriation1 the thing acquires the predicate of 8mine40 ,but this predicate1 on its own account merely 8practical10 has here the signification that ,i import my personal will into the thing4 ,as so characterised1 possession is property1 which as possession is a means1 but as existence of the personality is an end4 #dij4 ,in his property the person is brought into union with itself4 ,but the thing is an abstractly external thing1 and the ,i in it is abstractly external4 ,the concrete return of me into me in the externality is that ,i1 the infinite self-relation1 am as a person the repulsion of me from myself1 and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons1 in my relation to them and in my recognition by them1 which is thus mutual4 #dia4 ,the thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one4 ,these extremes are the persons who1 in the knowledge of their identity as free1 are simultaneously mutually independent4 ,for them my will has its definite recognisable existence in the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession1 or by the formation of the thing or1 it may be1 by mere designation of it4 #dib4 ,the casual aspect of property is that ,i place my will in this thing3 so far my will is arbitrary1 ,i can just as well put it in it as not1--just as well withdraw it as not4 ,but so far as my will lies in a thing1 it is only ,i who can withdraw it3 it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another1 whose property it similarly becomes only with his will3--,contract4 7b7 ,contract4 #dic4 ,the two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state of mind different from its realisation in the performance4 ,the comparatively 8ideal0 utterance 7of contract7 in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one1 its changing hands1 and its acceptance by the other will4 ,the contract is thus thoroughly binding3 it does not need the performance of the one or the other to become so--otherwise we should have an infinite regress or infinite division of thing1 labour1 and time4 ,the utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive4 ,the inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation1 and in that realm the word is deed and thing 7 #dfb7--the full and complete deed1 since here the conscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration 7as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception71 and the will refers only to the external thing4 #did4 ,thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standing out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance1 which is brought down to a mere sequel4 ,in this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value1 meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative feature has been translated4 ,one piece of property is thus made comparable with another1 and may be made equivalent to a thing which is 7in quality7 wholly heterogeneous4 ,it is thus treated in general as an abstract1 universal thing or commodity4 #die4 ,the contract1 as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity1 involves at the same time the giving to this 8accidental0 will a positive fixity4 ,this will may just as well not be conformable to law 7right71 and1 in that case1 produces a wrong3 by which however the absolute law 7right7 is not superseded1 but only a relationship originated of right to wrong4 7c7 ,right versus ,wrong4 #dif4 ,law 7right7 considered as the realisation of liberty in externals1 breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons 7 #dia1 #dic seqq474 ,in this way there are 7#a7 several titles or grounds at law1 of which 7seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual7 only one is the right1 but which1 because they face each other1 each and all are invested with a show of right1 against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right4 #dig4 ,now so long as 7compared against this show7 the one intrinsically right1 still presumed identical with the several titles1 is affirmed1 willed1 and recognised1 the only diversity lies in this1 that the special thing is subsumed under the one law or right by the particular will of these several persons4 ,this is nave1 non-malicious wrong4 ,such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgment1 expressing the civil suit4 ,to settle it there is required a third judgment1 which1 as the judgment of the intrinsically right1 is disinterested1 and a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance4 #dih4 ,but 7#b7 if the semblance of right is willed as such against right intrinsical by the particular will1 which thus becomes wicked1 then the external recognition of right is separated from the right's true value2 and while the former only is respected1 the latter is violated4 ,this gives the wrong of fraud--the infinite judgment as identical 7 #agc71--where the nominal relation is retained1 but the sterling value is let slip4 #dii4 7#c7 ,finally1 the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance4 ,here there is a negatively infinite judgment 7 #agc7 in which there is denied the class as a whole1 and not merely the particular mode--in this case the apparent recognition4 ,thus the will is violently wicked1 and commits a crime4 #ejj4 ,as an outrage on right1 such an action is essentially and actually null4 ,in it the agent1 as a volitional and intelligent being1 sets up a law--a law however which is nominal and recognised by him only--a universal which holds good for him1 and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action4 ,to display the nullity of such an act1 to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right1 in the first instance by means of a subjective individual will1 is the work of ,revenge4 ,but1 revenge1 starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality1 is at the same time only a new outrage2 and so on without end4 ,this progression1 like the last1 abolishes itself in a third judgment1 which is disinterested--punishment4 #eja4 ,the instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is 77 that a particular will1 that of the judge1 being conformable to the right1 has an interest to turn against the crime 7--which in the first instance1 in revenge1 is a matter of chance71 and 77 that an executive power 7also in the first instance casual7 negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal4 ,this negation of right has its existence in the will of the criminal2 and consequently revenge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the criminal and exercises coercion upon him4 ,it is in this legal sphere that coercion in general has possible scope1--compulsion against the thing1 in seizing and maintaining it against another's seizure3 for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such1 or in corporeity1 and can be seized only in this quarter4 ,but more than possible compulsion is not1 so long as ,i can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence1 even from the range of all existence1 i4e4 from life4 ,it is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsion4 #ejb4 ,a distinction has thus emerged between the law 7right7 and the subjective will4 ,the 8reality0 of right1 which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise1 is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjective will1--whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential right1 so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it4 ,conversely1 the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the law of right is null and empty of itself3 it gets truth and reality essentially only so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will4 ,as such it is morality7#aec7 proper4 ,the phrase 8,law of ,nature10 or ,natural ,right7#aed71 in use for the philosophy of law involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing ready-formed in nature1 or right as governed by the nature of things1 i4e4 by the notion4 ,the former used to be the common meaning1 accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature1 in which the law of nature should hold sway2 whereas the social and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights4 ,the real fact is that the whole law and its every article are based on free personality alone1--on self-determination or autonomy1 which is the very contrary of determination by nature4 ,the law of nature--strictly so called--is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the reign of force1 and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong1 of which nothing truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it4 ,the social state1 on the other hand1 is the condition in which alone right has its actuality3 what is to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the state of nature4 ,sub-,section ,b4 ,the ,morality ,of ,conscience7#aee74 #ejc4 ,the free individual1 who1 in mere law1 counts only as a person1 is now characterised as a subject1 a will reflected into itself so that1 be its affection what it may1 it is distinguished 7as existing in it7 as its own from the existence of freedom in an external thing4 ,because the affection of the will is thus inwardised1 the will is at the same time made a particular1 and there arise further particularisations of it and relations of these to one another4 ,this affection is partly the essential and implicit will1 the reason of the will1 the essential basis of law and moral life3 partly it is the existent volition1 which is before us and throws itself into actual deeds1 and thus comes into relationship with the former4 ,the subjective will is morally free1 so far as these features are its inward institution1 its own1 and willed by it4 ,its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action1 in the externality of which it only admits as its own1 and allows to be imputed to it1 so much as it has consciously willed4 ,this subjective or 8moral0 freedom is what a ,european especially calls freedom4 ,in virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the distinction between good and evil in general3 ethical and religious principles shall not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed1 but have their assent1 recognition1 or even justification in his heart1 sentiment1 conscience1 intelligence1 c4 ,the subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it4 ,the 8moral0 must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the morally good merely4 ,in ,french le moral is opposed to le physique1 and means the mental or intellectual in general4 ,but here the moral signifies volitional mode1 so far as it is in the interior of the will in general2 it thus includes purpose and intention1--and also moral wickedness4 a4 ,purpose7#aef74 #ejd4 ,so far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence1 my part in it is to this extent formal1 that external existence is also independent of the agent4 ,this externality can pervert his action and bring to light something else than lay in it4 ,now1 though any alteration as such1 which is set on foot by the subject's action1 is its deed7#aeg71 still the subject does not for that reason recognise it as its action7#aeh71 but only admits as its own that existence in the deed which lay in its knowledge and will1 which was its purpose4 ,only for that does it hold itself responsible4 b4 ,intention and ,welfare7#aei74 #eje4 ,as regards its empirically concrete content 7#a7 the action has a variety of particular aspects and connexions4 ,in point of form1 the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature1 embracing these individual points4 ,this is the right of intention4 ,while purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence1 intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof4 7#b7 ,the agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the action1 in point of its matter1 is not something external to him1 but is a particularity of his own1--that it contains his needs1 interests1 and aims4 ,these aims1 when similarly comprehended in a single aim1 as in happiness 7 #dgi71 constitute his well-being4 ,this is the right to well-being4 ,happiness 7good fortune7 is distinguished from well-being only in this1 that happiness implies no more than some sort of immediate existence1 whereas well-being regards it as also justified as regards morality4 #ejf4 ,but the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality4 ,reflection can put in this form this and that particular aspect in the empirically-concrete action1 thus making it essential to the intention or restricting the intention to it4 ,in this way the supposed essentiality of the intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the greatest contradiction--e4g4 a good intention in case of a crime4 ,similarly well-being is abstract and may be set on this or that3 as appertaining to this single agent1 it is always something particular4 c4 ,goodness and ,wickedness7#afj74 #ejg4 ,the truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal1 essential and actual1 will1--the law and underlying essence of every phase of volition1 the essential and actual good4 ,it is thus the absolute final aim of the world1 and duty for the agent who ought to have insight into the good1 make it his intention and bring it about by his activity4 #ejh4 ,but though the good is the universal of will--a universal determined in itself1--and thus including in it particularity1--still so far as this particularity is in the first instance still abstract1 there is no principle at hand to determine it4 ,such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal2 and as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its own1 there awakes here the deepest contradiction4 77 ,in consequence of the indeterminate determinism of the good1 there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties1 the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision4 ,at the same time because good is one1 they ought to stand in harmony2 and yet each of them1 though it is a particular duty1 is as good and as duty absolute4 ,it falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which1 superseding this absolute claim of each1 concludes such a combination of them as excludes the rest4 #eji4 77 ,to the agent1 who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a particular1 his interest and welfare must1 on account of that existent sphere of liberty1 be essentially an aim and therefore a duty4 ,but at the same time in aiming at the good1 which is the not-particular but only universal of the will1 the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive4 ,on account of this independency of the two principles of action1 it is likewise an accident whether they harmonise4 ,and yet they ought to harmonise1 because the agent1 as individual and universal1 is always fundamentally one identity4 77 ,but the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence2 it is also a form of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty1 an abstract reflection of freedom into himself4 ,he is thus distinct from the reason in the will1 and capable of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance4 ,the good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 8may happen0 for the agent1 who can therefore resolve itself to somewhat opposite to the good1 can be wicked4 #eaj4 77 ,the external objectivity1 following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will 7 #ejc71 constitutes a peculiar world of its own1--another extreme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination4 ,it is thus a matter of chance1 whether it harmonises with the subjective aims1 whether the good is realised1 and the wicked1 an aim essentially and actually null1 nullified in it3 it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his well-being1 and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the wicked unhappy4 ,but at the same time the world ought to allow the good action1 the essential thing1 to be carried out in it2 it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest1 and refuse it to the wicked2 just as it ought also to make the wicked itself null and void4 #eaa4 ,the all-round contradiction1 expressed by this repeated ought1 with its absoluteness which yet at the same time is not--contains the most abstract 'analysis' of the mind in itself1 its deepest descent into itself4 ,the only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self2 and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will1 good1 right1 and duty1 no more exist than not4 ,the subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding4 ,this pure self-certitude1 rising to its pitch1 appears in the two directly inter-changing forms--of ,conscience and ,wickedness4 ,the former is the will of goodness2 but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is the non-objective1 non-universal1 the unutterable2 and over which the agent is conscious that he in his individuality has the decision4 ,wickedness is the same awareness that the single self possesses the decision1 so far as the single self does not merely remain in this abstraction1 but takes up the content of a subjective interest contrary to the good4 #eab4 ,this supreme pitch of the 8phenomenon0 of will1--sublimating itself to this absolute vanity--to a goodness1 which has no objectivity1 but is only sure of itself1 and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal--collapses by its own force4 ,wickedness1 as the most intimate reflection of subjectivity itself1 in opposition to the objective and universal1 7which it treats as mere sham17 is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness1 which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof3--the utterly abstract semblance1 the bare perversion and annihilation of itself4 ,the result1 the truth of this semblance1 is1 on its negative side1 the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good1 and of the good1 which would only be abstract4 ,on the affirmative side1 in the notion1 this semblance thus collapsing is the same simple universality of the will1 which is the good4 ,the subjectivity1 in this its identity with the good1 is only the infinite form1 which actualises and developes it4 ,in this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides1--the standpoint of the ought1 is abandoned1 and we have passed into the field of ethical life4 ,sub-,section ,c4 ,the ,moral ,life1 ,or ,social ,ethics7#afa74 #eac4 ,the moral life is the perfection of spirit objective--the truth of the subjective and objective spirit itself4 ,the failure of the latter consists--partly in having its freedom immediately in reality1 in something external therefore1 in a thing1--partly in the abstract universality of its goodness4 ,the failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this1 that it is1 as against the universal1 abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality4 ,when these two imperfections are suppressed1 subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will1 which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in the consciousness of the individual subject1 whilst its practical operation and immediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage1 manner and custom1--where self-conscious liberty has become nature4 #ead4 ,the consciously free substance1 in which the absolute 8ought0 is no less an 8is10 has actuality as the spirit of a nation4 ,the abstract disruption of this spirit singles it out into persons1 whose independence it however controls and entirely dominates from within4 ,but the person1 as an intelligent being1 feels that underlying essence to be his own very being--ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it--looks upon it as his absolute final aim4 ,in its actuality he sees not less an achieved present1 than somewhat he brings it about by his action1--yet somewhat which without all question is4 ,thus1 without any selective reflection1 the person performs its duty as his own and as something which is2 and in this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom4 #eae4 ,because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universality of freedom1 it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to keep and to take care of his own being1 while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists1 is on the other a transition into a universal product4--,the social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance1 and of the identity of all their interests with the total2 and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity1 is confidence 7trust7--the genuine ethical temper4 #eaf4 ,the relations between individuals in the several situations to which the substance is particularised form their ethical duties4 ,the ethical personality1 i4e4 the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life1 is virtue4 ,in relation to the bare facts of external being1 to destiny1 virtue does not treat them as a mere negation1 and is thus a quiet repose in itself3 in relation to substantial objectivity1 to the total of ethical actuality1 it exists as confidence1 as deliberate work for the community1 and the capacity of sacrificing self thereto2 whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance1 it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence4 ,in the latter sphere1 and in its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity1 the individuality expresses its special character1 temperament1 c4 as personal virtues4 #eag4 ,the ethical substance is ,,aa4 as 8immediate0 or natural mind1--the ,family4 ,,bb4 ,the 8relative0 totality of the 8relative0 relations of the individuals as independent persons to one another in a formal universality--,civil ,society4 ,,cc4 ,the self-conscious substance1 as the mind developed to an organic actuality--the ,political ,constitution4 ,,aa4 ,the ,family4 #eah4 ,the ethical spirit1 in its immediacy1 contains the natural factor that the individual has its substantial existence in its natural universal1 i4e4 in its kind4 ,this is the sexual tie1 elevated however to a spiritual significance1--the unanimity of love and the temper of trust4 ,in the shape of the family1 mind appears as feeling4 #eai4 7#a7 ,the physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a difference of intellectual and moral type4 ,with their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person3 the subjective union of hearts1 becoming a 8substantial0 unity1 makes this union an ethical tie--,marriage4 ,the 'substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond--monogamic marriage3 the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment4 ,a further sequel is community of personal and private interests4 #ebj4 7#b7 ,by the community in which the various members constituting the family stand in reference to property1 that property of the one person 7representing the family7 acquires an ethical interest1 as do also its industry1 labour1 and care for the future4 #eba4 ,the ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children1 and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union1 is actually realised in the second or spiritual birth of the children1--in educating them to independent personality4 #ebb4 7#c7 ,the children1 thus invested with independence1 leave the concrete life and action of the family to which they primarily belong1 acquire an existence of their own1 destined however to found anew such an actual family4 ,marriage is of course broken up by the natural element contained in it1 the death of husband and wife3 but even their union of hearts1 as it is a mere 8substantiality0 of feeling1 contains the germ of liability to chance and decay4 ,in virtue of such fortuitousness1 the members of the family take up to each other the status of persons2 and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time the element1 originally foreign to it1 of legal regulation4 ,,bb4 ,civil ,society7#afb74 #ebc4 ,as the substance1 being an intelligent substance1 particularises itself abstractly into many persons 7the family is only a single person71 into families or individuals1 who exist independent and free1 as private persons1 it loses its ethical character3 for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as their aim not the absolute unity1 but their own petty selves and particular interests4 ,thus arises the system of atomistic3 by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their particular interests4 ,the developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society1 or state external4 a4 ,the ,system of ,wants7#afc74 #ebd4 77 ,the particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wants4 ,the possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric1 the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction4 ,in the condition of things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realised1 immediate seizure 7 #dhh7 of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all3 the objects are already property4 ,to acquire them is only possible by the intervention1 on one hand1 of the possessors' will1 which as particular has in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests2 while on the other hand it is conditioned by the ever continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour4 ,this instrument1 by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants1 constitutes the general stock4 #ebe4 77 ,the glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is found in the way intellect creates differences in them1 and thus causes an indefinite multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases4 ,both are thus rendered more and more abstract4 ,this 8morcellement0 of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour4 ,the habit of this abstraction in enjoyment1 information1 feeling and demeanour1 constitutes training in this sphere1 or nominal culture in general4 #ebf4 ,the labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniformity to make labour easier and to increase production1--on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill1 and thus produce more unconditional dependence on the social system4 ,the skill itself becomes in this way mechanical1 and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour4 #ebg4 77 ,but the concrete division of the general stock--which is also a general business 7of the whole society7--into particular masses determined by the factors of the notion1--masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence1 and a corresponding mode of labour1 of needs1 and of means for satisfying them1 besides of aims and interests1 as well as of mental culture and habit--constitutes the difference of ,estates 7orders or ranks74 ,individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent1 skill1 option and accident4 ,as belonging to such a definite and stable sphere1 they have their actual existence1 which as existence is essentially a particular2 and in it they have their social morality1 which is honesty1 their recognition and their honour4 ,where civil society1 and with it the ,state1 exists1 there arise the several estates in their difference3 for the universal substance1 as vital1 exists only so far as it organically particularises itself4 ,the history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates1 of the legal relationships of individuals to them1 and of these estates to one another and to their centre4 #ebh4 ,to the 8substantial10 natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a natural and stable capital2 its action gets direction and content through natural features1 and its moral life is founded on faith and trust4 ,the second1 the 8reflected0 estate has as its allotment the social capital1 the medium created by the action of middlemen1 of mere agents1 and an ensemble of contingencies1 where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill1 talent1 intelligence and industry4 ,the third1 8thinking0 estate has for its business the general interests2 like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill1 and like the first a certain subsistence1 certain however because guaranteed through the whole society4 b4 ,administration of ,justice7#afd74 #ebi4 ,when matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a system of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity1 the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty requires in the shape of formal right4 7#a7 ,the actualisation which right gets in this sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal1 that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority--the ,law7#afe74 ,the positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority--which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and external way4 ,their content per se may be reasonable--or it may be unreasonable and so wrong4 ,but when right1 in the course of definite manifestation1 is developed in detail1 and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness1 this analysis1 because of the finitude of its materials1 falls into the falsely infinite progress3 the final definiteness1 which is absolutely essential and causes a break in this progress of unreality1 can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness4 ,thus whether three years1 ten thalers1 or only #b-a_/b1 #b-c_/d1 #b-d_/e years1 and so on ad infinitum1 be the right and just thing1 can by no means be decided on intelligible principles1--and yet it should be decided4 ,hence1 though of course only at the final points of deciding1 on the side of external existence1 the 8positive0 principle naturally enters law as contingency and arbitrariness4 ,this happens and has from of old happened in all legislations3 the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it1 and not be misled by the talk and the pretence as if the ideal of law were1 or could be1 to be1 at every point1 determined through reason or legal intelligence1 on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds4 ,it is a futile perfectionism to have such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite4 ,there are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity1 and who regard governing and being governed from natural love1 hereditary1 divinity or nobility1 by faith and trust1 as the genuine order of life1 while the reign of law is held an order of corruption and injustice4 ,these people forget that the stars--and the cattle too--are governed and well governed too by laws2--laws however which are only internally in these objects1 not for them1 not as laws set to them3--whereas it is man's privilege to know his law4 ,they forget therefore that he can truly obey only such known law1--even as his law can only be a just law1 as it is a known law2--though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice1 or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements4 ,the same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis--viz4 to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable4 ,in this case there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal provisions in one class with the particular detail4 ,the finite material is definable on and on to the false infinite3 but this advance is not1 as in the mental images of space1 a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them1 but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality by the acumen of the analytic intellect1 which discovers new distinctions1 which again make new decisions necessary4 ,to provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws2 but in proportion to the gradual advance in specialisation the interest and value of these provisions declines4 ,they fall within the already subsisting 8substantial10 general laws1 like improvements on a floor or a door1 within the house--which though something new1 are not a new house4 ,but there is a contrary case4 ,if the legislation of a rude age began with single provisos1 which go on by their very nature always increasing their number1 there arises1 with the advance in multitude1 the need of a simpler code1--the need i4e4 of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features4 ,to find and be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilised nation4 ,such a gathering up of single rules into general forms1 first really deserving the name of laws1 has lately been begun in some directions by the ,english ,minister ,peel1 who has by so doing gained the gratitude1 even the admiration1 of his countrymen4 #ecj4 7#b7 ,the positive form of ,laws--to be promulgated and made known as laws--is a condition of the external obligation to obey them2 inasmuch as1 being laws of strict right1 they touch only the abstract will1--itself at bottom external--not the moral or ethical will4 ,the subjectivity to which the will has in this direction a right is here only publicity4 ,this subjective existence is as existence of the essential and developed truth in this sphere of ,right at the same time an externally objective existence1 as universal authority and necessity4 ,the legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith--in consideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated1 recognised1 and thus become authoritative--gets its universal guarantee through formalities4 #eca4 7#c7 ,legal forms get the necessity1 to which objective existence determines itself1 in the judicial system4 ,abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court--to the individualised right--as proven3--a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right4 ,the court takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such1 deprives the existence of right of its contingency1 and in particular transforms this existence1--as this exists as revenge--into punishment 7 #ejj74 ,the comparison of the two species1 or rather two elements in the judicial conviction1 bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused1--7#a7 according as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's witness alone1--or 7#b7 in addition requires the confession of the accused1 constitutes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts4 ,it is an essential point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance1 the judgment as to the state of the fact1 and the judgment as application of the law to it1 should1 as at bottom different sides1 be exercised as different functions4 ,by the said institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified1--from the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excluded4 ,to carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations3 the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions4--,it is a more important point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a condition of penal judgment4 ,the institution of the jury-court loses sight of this condition4 ,the point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparable from truth3 but the confession is to be regarded as the very acm of certainty-giving which in its nature is subjective4 ,the final decision therefore lies with the confession4 ,to this therefore the accused has an absolute right1 if the proof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced4 ,no doubt this factor is incomplete1 because it is only one factor2 but still more incomplete is the other when no less abstractly taken1--viz4 mere circumstantial evidence4 ,the jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgment4 ,in so far1 then1 as all they have to go on are such objective proofs1 whilst at the same time their defect of certainty 7incomplete in so far as it is only in them7 is admitted1 the jury-court shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between objective proofs and subjective or so-called 8moral0 conviction4--,it is easy to call extraordinary punishments an absurdity2 but the fault lies rather with the shallowness which takes offence at a mere name4 ,materially the principle involves the difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the factor of absolute certification which lies in confession4 #ecb4 ,the function of judicial administration is only to actualise to necessity the abstract side of personal liberty in civil society4 ,but this actualisation rests at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge1 since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract4 ,conversely1 the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousness of the universal1 and worked from that period of view4 c4 ,police and ,corporation7#aff74 #ecc4 ,judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions and interests as belongs only to particularity1 and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal4 ,in civil society the sole end is to satisfy want--and that1 because it is man's want1 in a uniform general way1 so as to secure this satisfaction4 ,but the machinery of social necessity leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction4 ,this is due to the variability of the wants themselves1 in which opinion and subjective good-pleasure play a great part4 ,it results also from circumstances of locality1 from the connexions between nation and nation1 from errors and deceptions which can be foisted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it1--as also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock4 ,the onward march of this necessity also sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about1 and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals4 ,so far as concerns them1 it may be far from beneficial3 yet here the individuals are the morally-justifiable end4 #ecd4 ,to keep in view this general end1 to ascertain the way in which the powers composing that social necessity act1 and their variable ingredients1 and to maintain that end in them and against them1 is the work of an institution which assumes on one hand1 to the concrete of civil society1 the position of an external universality4 ,such an order acts with the power of an external state1 which1 in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state1 appears as state 8police40 ,on the other hand1 in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricted to the business of particular branches and interests4 ,thus we have the corporation1 in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock1 whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest1 and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end1 just as in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality4 ,,cc4 ,the ,state4 #ece4 ,the ,state is the self-conscious ethical substance1 the unification of the family principle with that of civil society4 ,the same unity1 which is in the family as a feeling of love1 is its essence1 receiving however at the same time through the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the form of conscious universality4 ,this universal principle1 with all its evolution in detail1 is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject1 which thus identifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness4 #ecf4 ,the state is 77 its inward structure as a self-relating development--constitutional 7inner-state7 law3 77 a particular individual1 and therefore in connexion with other particular individuals1--international 7outer-state7 law2 77 but these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality3 universal history4 4 ,constitutional ,law7#afg74 #ecg4 ,the essence of the state is the universal1 self-originated and self-developed1--the reasonable spirit of will2 but1 as self-knowing and self-actualising1 sheer subjectivity1 and--as an actuality--one individual4 ,its work generally--in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals--consists in a double function4 ,first it maintains them as persons1 thus making right a necessary actuality1 then it promotes their welfare1 which each originally takes care of for himself1 but which has a thoroughly general side2 it protects the family and guides civil society4 ,secondly1 it carries back both1 and the whole disposition and action of the individual--whose tendency is to become a centre of his own--into the life of the universal substance2 and1 in this direction1 as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and retains them in substantial immanence4 #ech4 ,the laws express the special provisions for objective freedom4 ,first1 to the immediate agent1 his independent self-will and particular interest1 they are restrictions4 ,but1 secondly1 they are an absolute final end and the universal work3 hence they are a product of the 8functions0 of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularising1 and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals4 ,thirdly1 they are the substance of the volition of individuals--which volition is thereby free--and of their disposition3 being as such exhibited as current usage4 #eci4 ,as a living mind1 the state only is as an organised whole1 differentiated into particular agencies1 which1 proceeding from the one notion 7though not known as notion7 of the reasonable will1 continually produce it as their result4 ,the constitution is this articulation or organisation of state-power4 ,it provides for the reasonable will1--in so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will1--coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and being found2 also for that will being put in actuality1 through the action of the government and its several branches1 and not left to perish1 but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals4 ,the constitution is existent justice1--the actuality of liberty in the development all its reasonable provisions4 ,liberty and ,equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrated what should form the fundamental principle1 the final aim and result of the constitution4 ,however true this is1 the defect of these terms is their utter abstractness3 if stuck to in this abstract form1 they are principles which either prevent the rise of the concreteness of the state1 i4e4 its articulation into a constitution and a government in general1 or destroy them4 ,with the state there arises inequality1 the difference of governing powers and of governed1 magistracies1 authorities1 directories1 c4 ,the principle of equality1 logically carried out1 rejects all differences1 and thus allows no sort of political condition to exist4 ,liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state1 but as the most abstract also the most superficial1 and for that very reason naturally the most familiar4 ,it is important therefore to study them closer4 ,as regards1 first1 ,equality1 the familiar proposition1 ,all men are by nature equal1 blunders by confusing the 8natural0 with the 8notion40 ,it ought rather to read3 ,by nature men are only unequal4 ,but the notion of liberty1 as it exists as such1 without further specification and development1 is abstract subjectivity1 as a person capable of property 7 #dhh74 ,this single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings4 ,but that this freedom should exist1 that it should be man 7and not as in ,greece1 ,rome1 c4 some men7 that is recognised and legally regarded as a person1 is so little by nature1 that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle of mind1 and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness4 ,that the citizens are equal before the law contains a great truth1 but which so expressed is a tautology3 it only states that the legal status in general exists1 that the laws rule4 ,but1 as regards the concrete1 the citizens--besides their personality--are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law4 ,only that equality which 7in whatever way it be7 they1 as it happens1 otherwise have in property1 age1 physical strength1 talent1 skill1 c4--or even in crime1 can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law3--only it can make them--as regards taxation1 military service1 eligibility to office1 c4--punishment1 c4--equal in the concrete4 ,the laws themselves1 except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality1 presuppose unequal conditions1 and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom4 ,as regards ,liberty1 it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against arbitrary intolerance and lawless treatment1 partly in the affirmative sense of subjective freedom2 but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends1 and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs4 ,formerly the legally defined rights1 private as well as public rights of a nation1 town1 c4 were called its 8liberties40 ,really1 every genuine law is a liberty3 it contains a reasonable principle of objective mind2 in other words1 it embodies a liberty4 ,nothing has become1 on the contrary1 more familiar than the idea that each must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others3 that the state is a condition of such reciprocal restriction1 and that the laws are restrictions4 ,to such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good-pleasure and self-will4 ,hence it has also been said that 8modern0 nations are only susceptible of equality1 or of equality more than liberty3 and that for no other reason than that1 with an assumed definition of liberty 7chiefly the participation of all in political affairs and actions71 it was impossible to make ends meet in actuality--which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presuppositions4 ,on the contrary1 it should be said that it is just the great development and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete inequality of individuals in actuality3 while1 through the deeper reasonableness of laws and the greater stability of the legal state1 it gives rise to greater and more stable liberty1 which it can without incompatibility allow4 ,even the superficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that the former tends to inequality3 whereas1 on the contrary1 the current notions of liberty only carry us back to equality4 ,but the more we fortify liberty1--as security of property1 as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his talents and good qualities1 the more it gets taken for granted3 and then the sense and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction4 ,by this is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side1 and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests1 the removal of all checks on the individual particularity1 as well as the inward liberty in which the subject has principles1 has an insight and conviction of his own1 and thus gains moral independence4 ,but this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education2 and on another it only grows up under conditions of that objective liberty1 and is and could grow to such height only in modern states4 ,if1 with this development of particularity1 there be simultaneous and endless increase of the number of wants1 and of the difficulty of satisfying them1 of the lust of argument and the fancy of detecting faults1 with its insatiate vanity1 it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sphere which generates all possible complications1 and must deal with them as it can4 ,such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions1 because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing1 and has therefore to restrict itself3 and that1 not merely with regard to the naturalness1 self-will and self-conceit1 of others1 but especially and essentially with regard to reasonable liberty4 ,the term political liberty1 however1 is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of civil society4 ,and it has in part become usual to give the title constitution only to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individuals in general affairs1 and to regard a state1 in which this is not formally done1 as a state without a constitution4 ,on this use of the term1 the only thing to remark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights1 i4e4 of liberties in general1 and the organisation of the actualisation of them2 and that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a part of it4 ,of it the following paragraphs will speak4 #edj4 ,the guarantee of a constitution 7i4e4 the necessity that the laws be reasonable1 and their actualisation secured7 lies in the collective spirit of the nation1--especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason4 7,religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality47 ,but the guarantee lies also at the same time in the actual organisation or development of that principle in suitable institutions4 ,the constitution presupposes that consciousness of the collective spirit1 and conversely that spirit presupposes the constitution3 for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its principles1 in so far as it has them actually existent before it4 ,the question--,to whom 7to what authority and how organised7 belongs the power to make a constitution8 is the same as the question1 ,who has to make the spirit of a nation8 ,separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spirit1 as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution1 and your fancy only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spirit in its self-consciousness and in its actuality4 ,what is thus called 8making0 a 8constitution10 is--just because of this inseparability--a thing that has never happened in history1 just as little as the making of a code of laws4 ,a constitution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development1 and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept4 ,it is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation 7and1 be it added1 the history is only that spirit's history7 by which constitutions have been and are made4 #eda4 ,the really living totality1--that which preserves1 in other words continually produces the state in general and its constitution1 is the government4 ,the organisation which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society4 ,the government is the universal part of the constitution1 i4e4 the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts1 but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole which rise above the function of the family and of civil society4 ,the organisation of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers1 as their peculiarities have a basis in principle2 yet without that difference losing touch with the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity4 ,as the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and individuality and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under universal1 it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superior1 and to subdivide the latter again into administrative 7government7 power and judicial power1 according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs4 ,the division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equilibrium1 meaning by division their independence one of another in existence1--subject always however to the above-mentioned subsumption of the powers of the individual under the power of the general4 ,the theory of such 8division0 unmistakably implies the elements of the notion1 but so combined by 8understanding0 as to result in an absurd collocation1 instead of the self-redintegration of the living spirit4 ,the one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give every business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organisation wherever they are essentially distinct4 ,such real division must be3 for liberty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differences manifested in existence4 ,but to make the business of legislation an independent power--to make it the first power1 with the further proviso that all citizens shall have part therein1 and the government be merely executive and dependent1 presupposes ignorance that the true idea1 and therefore the living and spiritual actuality1 is the self-redintegrating notion1 in other words1 the subjectivity which contains in it universality as only one of its moments4 7,a mistake still greater1 if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental laws were still one day to make1--in a state of society1 which includes an already existing development of differences47 ,individuality is the first and supreme principle which makes itself fall through the state's organisation4 ,only through the government1 and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses 7including the abstract legislative business1 which taken apart is also particular71 is the state one4 ,these1 as always1 are the terms on which the different elements essentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 8reason10 as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding1' which never gets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal4 ,what disorganises the unity of logical reason1 equally disorganises actuality4 #edb4 ,in the government--regarded as organic totality--the sovereign power 7principate7 is 7a7 subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its development2--the all-sustaining1 all-decreeing will of the state1 its highest peak and all-pervasive unity4 ,in the perfect form of the state1 in which each and every element of the notion has reached free existence1 this subjectivity is not a so-called 8moral person10 or a decree issuing from a majority 7forms in which the unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence71 but an actual individual1--the will of a decreeing individual1--monarchy4 ,the monarchical constitution is therefore the constitution of developed reason3 all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realisation of reason4 ,the unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence1 as in the patriarchal society1--or1 as in a democratic constitution1 the participation of all in all affairs--impugns the principle of the division of powers1 i4e4 the developed liberty of the constituent factors of the ,idea4 ,but no whit less must the division 7the working out of these factors each to a free totality7 be reduced to 8ideal0 unity1 i4e4 to subjectivity4 ,the mature differentiation or realisation of the ,idea means1 essentially1 that this subjectivity should grow to be a real 8moment10 an actual existence2 and this actuality is not otherwise than as the individuality of the monarch--the subjectivity of abstract and final decision existent in one person4 ,all those forms of collective decreeing and willing1--a common will which shall be the sum and the resultant 7on aristocratical or democratical principles7 of the atomistic of single wills1 have on them the mark of the unreality of an abstraction4 ,two points only are all-important1 first to see the necessity of each of the notional factors1 and secondly the form in which it is actualised4 ,it is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give light on the matter4 ,that subjectivity--being the 8moment0 which emphasises the need of abstract deciding in general--partly leads on to the proviso that the name of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is done in the government2--partly1 being simple self-relation1 has attached to it the characteristic of immediacy1 and then of nature--whereby the destination of individuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance4 #edc4 7b7 ,in the particular government-power there emerges1 first1 the division of state-business into its branches 7otherwise defined71 legislative power1 administration of justice or judicial power1 administration and police1 and its consequent distribution between particular boards or offices1 which having their business appointed by law1 to that end and for that reason1 possess independence of action1 without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision4 ,secondly1 too1 there arises the participation of several in state-business1 who together constitute the 8general order0 7 #ebh7 in so far as they take on themselves the charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life2--the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training1 aptitude1 and skill for such ends4 #edd4 ,the estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all such as belong to civil society in general1 and are to that degree private persons1 participate in the governmental power1 especially in legislation--viz4 such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not1 like peace and war1 involve the1 as it were1 personal interference and action of the ,state as one man1 and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power4 ,by virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit1 with their general opinion1 can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something4 ,the division of constitutions into democracy1 aristocracy and monarchy1 is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty4 ,they must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of development1--in short1 in the history of the ,state4 ,hence it is superficial and absurd to represent them as an object of choice4 ,the pure forms--necessary to the process of evolution--are1 in so far as they are finite and in course of change1 conjoined both with forms of their degeneration1--such as ochlocracy1 c41 and with earlier transition-forms4 ,these two forms are not to be confused with those legitimate structures4 ,thus1 it may be--if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state--oriental despotism is included under the vague name monarchy1--as also feudal monarchy1 to which indeed even the favourite name of 8constitutional monarchy0 cannot be refused4 ,the true difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of those principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarantee in the state-power4 ,these principles are those expounded earlier1 liberty of property1 and above all personal liberty1 civil society1 with its industry and its communities1 and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subordination to the laws4 ,the question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the participation of private persons in state affairs4 ,for it is as private persons that the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken1 be they treated as mere individuals1 or as representatives of a number of people or of the nation4 ,the aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation3 but as such an aggregate it is vulgus1 not populus3 and in this direction1 it is the one sole aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence1 to power and action1 as such an aggregate4 ,such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawlessness1 demoralisation1 brutishness3 in it the nation would only be a shapeless1 wild1 blind force1 like that of the stormy1 elemental sea1 which however is not self-destructive1 as the nation--a spiritual element--would be4 ,yet such a condition may be often heard described as that of true freedom4 ,if there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private persons in public affairs1 it is not a brutish mass1 but an already organised nation--one in which a governmental power exists--which should be presupposed4 ,the desirability of such participation however is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence1 which private persons are supposed to have over state officials--the contrary may be the case--nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best4 ,the members of civil society as such are rather people who find their nearest duty in their private interest and 7as especially in the feudal society7 in the interest of their privileged corporation4 ,take the case of ,england which1 because private persons have a predominant share in public affairs1 has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions4 ,experience shows that that country--as compared with the other civilised states of ,europe--is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation1 in the law and liberty of property1 in arrangements for art and science1 and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private interest2 and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions supposed to be dedicated to religion4 ,the desirability of private persons taking part in public affairs is partly to be put in their concrete1 and therefore more urgent1 sense of general wants4 ,but the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will1 acting with orderly and express efficacy for the public concerns4 ,by this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened1 and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials2 who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to enforce duties but also to have regard to rights4 ,private citizens are in the state the incomparably greater number1 and form the multitude of such as are recognised as persons4 ,hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a preponderating majority of freemen1 or in its 8reflectional0 universality1 which has its actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty4 ,but it has already been noted as a 8moment0 of civil society 7 #ebg1 #ecd7 that the individuals rise from external into substantial universality1 and form a particular kind1--the ,estates3 and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such 7after the democratic fashion of election71 but as organic factors1 as estates1 that they enter upon that participation4 ,in the state a power or agency must never appear and act as a formless1 inorganic shape1 i4e4 basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers4 ,assemblies of ,estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power1 so far as they form only one branch of that power1--a branch in which the special government-officials have an ex officio share1 while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision4 ,in a civilised state moreover legislation can only be a further modification of existing law1 and so-called new laws can only deal with minutiae of detail and particularities 7cf4 #ebi1 note71 the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts4 ,the so-called financial law1 in so far as it requires the assent of the estates1 is really a government affair3 it is only improperly called a law1 in the general sense of embracing a wide1 indeed the whole1 range of the external means of government4 ,the finances deal with what in their nature are only particular needs1 ever newly recurring1 even if they touch on the sum total of such needs4 ,if the main part of the requirement were--as it very likely is--regarded as permanent1 the provision for it would have more the nature of a law3 but to be a law1 it would have to be made once for all1 and not be made yearly1 or every few years1 afresh4 ,the part which varies according to time and circumstances concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount1 and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law3 and yet it is and may be only this slight variable part which is matter of dispute1 and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate4 ,it is this last then which falsely bears the high-sounding name of the 8,grant0 of the ,budget1 i4e4 of the whole of the finances4 ,a law for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd3 for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal1 as content of a true law1 from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many4 ,to give the name of a law to the annual fixing of financial requirements only serves--with the presupposed separation of legislative from executive--to keep up the illusion of that separation having real existence1 and to conceal the fact that the legislative power1 when it makes a decree about finance1 is really engaged with strict executive business4 ,but the importance attached to the power of from time to time granting 8supply10 on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government1 and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence1--this importance is in one way rather plausible than real4 ,the financial measures necessary for the state's subsistence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances1 nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt4 ,it would be a parallel absurdity if the government were e4g4 to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a limited time merely2 and thus1 by the threat of suspending the activity of such an institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage1 reserve for itself a means of coercing private individuals4 ,then again1 the pictures of a condition of affairs1 in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion1 are partly based on the false conception of a contract between rulers and ruled1 and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in spirit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite out of the question4 ,if we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence1 such help would rather be the derangement and dissolution of the state1 in which there would no longer be a government1 but only parties1 and the violence and oppression of one party would only be helped away by the other4 ,to fit together the several parts of the state into a constitution after the fashion of mere understanding--i4e4 to adjust within it the machinery of a balance of powers external to each other--is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is4 #ede4 ,the final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a single nation marked by physical conditions4 ,as a single individual it is exclusive against other like individuals4 ,in their mutual relations1 waywardness and chance have a place2 for each person in the aggregate is autonomous3 the universal of law is only postulated between them1 and not actually existent4 ,this independence of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violence1 a state of war1 to meet which the general estate in the community assumes the particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other states1 and becomes the estate of bravery4 #edf4 ,this state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality--an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity4 ,country and fatherland then appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity1--as the power which procures the maintenance of the general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence1--so making nugatory the nugatoriness that confronts it4 4 ,external ,public ,law7#afh74 #edg4 ,in the game of war the independence of ,states is at stake4 ,in one case the result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities 7 #dcj73 and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever1 both this general recognition1 and the special claims of nations on one another1 are settled and fixed4 ,external state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties1 but to that extent contain only rights falling short of true actuality 7 #ede73 partly on so-called international law1 the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the several ,states4 ,it thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one another in such a way that the possibility of peace is left2 and distinguishes individuals as private persons 7non-belligerents7 from the state4 ,in general1 international law rests on social usage4 4 ,universal ,history7#afi74 #edh4 ,as the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural conditions1 it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and climatic qualities4 ,it is in time2 and as regards its range and scope1 has essentially a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality4 ,it has1 in short1 a history of its own4 ,but as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary2 it passes into universal world-history1 the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the several national minds1--the judgment of the world4 #edi4 ,this movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance1 the deed by which the absolute final aim of the world is realised in it1 and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness4 ,it is thus the revelation and actuality of its essential and completed essence1 whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit--a world-mind4 ,as this development is in time and in real existence1 as it is a history1 its several stages and steps are the national minds1 each of which1 as single and endued by nature with a specific character1 is appointed to occupy only one grade1 and accomplish one task in the whole deed4 ,the presupposition that history has an essential and actual end1 from the principles of which certain characteristic results logically flow1 is called an a priori view of it1 and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing4 ,on this point1 and on history-writing in general1 this note must go into further detail4 ,that history1 and above all universal history1 is founded on an essential and actual aim1 which actually is and will be realised in it--the plan of ,providence2 that1 in short1 there is ,reason in history1 must be decided on strictly philosophical ground1 and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary4 ,to presuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts are arbitrarily adopted1 and when a determined attempt is made to force events and actions into conformity with such conceptions4 ,for such a priori methods of treatment at the present day1 however1 those are chiefly to blame who profess to be purely historical1 and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to raise their voice against the habit of philosophising1 first in general1 and then in history4 ,philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour3 for it is an enemy of all arbitrariness and hasty suggestions4 ,such a priori history-writing has sometimes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected it1 especially on the philological side1 and in ,germany more than in ,france and ,england1 where the art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firmer and maturer character4 ,fictions1 like that of a primitive age and its primitive people1 possessed from the first of the true knowledge of ,god and all the sciences1--of sacerdotal races1--and1 when we come to minutiae1 of a ,roman epic1 supposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of ancient ,rome1 c41 have taken the place of the pragmatising which detected psychological motives and associations4 ,there is a wide circle of persons who seem to consider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the original sources to concoct such baseless fancies1 and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts1 in defiance of the best-accredited history4 ,setting aside this subjective treatment of history1 we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose4 ,this is after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand that the historian should proceed with impartiality4 ,this is a requirement often and especially made on the history of philosophy3 where it is insisted there should be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion1 just as a judge should have no special sympathy for one of the contending parties4 ,in the case of the judge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and foolishly1 if he had not an interest1 and an exclusive interest in justice1 if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim1 or if he declined to judge at all4 ,this requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for justice2 and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective partiality4 ,but in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian1 this self-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear1 and rejects both kinds of interest4 ,it demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out1 state and criticise events1 but shall narrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them1 in their incoherent and unintelligent particularity4 ,now it is at least admitted that a history must have an object1 e4g4 ,rome and its fortunes1 or the ,decline of the grandeur of the ,roman empire4 ,but little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presupposed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves1 as of the critical examination into their comparative importance1 i4e4 their nearer or more remote relation to it4 ,a history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbecile mental divagation1 not as good as a fairy tale1 for even children expect a motif in their stories1 a purpose at least dimly surmiseable with which events and actions are put in relation4 ,in the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve itself as such4 ,a nation with no state formation1 7a mere nation71 has strictly speaking no history1--like the nations which existed before the rise of states and others which still exist in a condition of savagery4 ,what happens to a nation1 and takes place within it1 has its essential significance in relation to the state3 whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distance from the true object of history4 ,it is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals1 and even their particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours4 ,ay1 even such singularities as a petty occurrence1 a word1 express not a subjective particularity1 but an age1 a nation1 a civilisation1 in striking portraiture and brevity2 and to select such trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius4 ,but1 on the other hand1 the main mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass1 by the painstaking accumulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscured4 ,the essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained in the great events4 ,it was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portraiture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits1 into the ,novel 7as in the celebrated romances of ,walter ,scott1 c474 ,where the picture presents an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it with an unessential material1 such as the romance takes from private events and subjective passions4 ,but to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the persons in it1 and1 in the interest of so-called truth1 weave them into the picture of general interests1 is not only against taste and judgment1 but violates the principles of objective truth4 ,the only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence1 and not the trivialities of external existence and contingency4 ,it is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificancies are duly vouched for by documents1 or1 as in the romance1 invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances4 ,the point of interest of ,biography--to say a word on that here--appears to run directly counter to any universal scope and aim4 ,but biography too has for its background the historical world1 with which the individual is intimately bound up3 even purely personal originality1 the freak of humour1 c4 suggests by allusion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion4 ,the mere play of sentiment1 on the contrary1 has another ground and interest than history4 ,the requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy 7and also1 we may add1 to the history of religion1 first in general1 and secondly1 to church history7 generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition of any objective aim4 ,as the ,state was already called the point to which in political history criticism had to refer all events1 so here the 8,truth0 must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be referred4 ,what is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition4 ,histories with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only subjective aims for their theme1 i4e4 only opinions and mere ideas1 not an essential and realised object like the truth4 ,and that with the mere excuse that there is no truth4 ,on this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a partiality of the usual sort1 a partiality for opinion and mere ideas1 which all alike have no stuff in them1 and are all treated as indifferent4 ,in that way historical truth means but correctness--an accurate report of externals1 without critical treatment save as regards this correctness--admitting1 in this case1 only qualitative and quantitative judgments1 no judgments of necessity or notion 7cf4 notes to #agb and #age74 ,but1 really1 if ,rome or the ,german empire1 c4 are an actual and genuine object of political history1 and the aim to which the phenomena are to be related and by which they are to be judged2 then in universal history the genuine spirit1 the consciousness of it and of its essence1 is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme1 and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient4 ,only therefore through their relationship to it1 i4e4 through the judgment in which they are subsumed under it1 while it inheres in them1 have they their value and even their existence4 ,it is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters1 but lives in it and is alone its principle of movement3 and in the path of that spirit1 liberty1 i4e4 a development determined by the notion of spirit1 is the guiding principle and only its notion its final aim1 i4e4 truth4 ,for ,spirit is consciousness4 ,such a doctrine--or in other words that ,reason is in history--will be partly at least a plausible faith1 partly it is a cognition of philosophy4 #eej4 ,this liberation of mind1 in which it proceeds to come to itself and to realise its truth1 and the business of so doing1 is the supreme right1 the absolute ,law4 ,the self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contemporary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence3 it is the objective actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will4 ,against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights3 that nation dominates the world3 but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being1 as over a special grade1 and then delivers it over to its chance and doom4 #eea4 ,to such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action1 and therefore as a work of individuals1 these individuals1 as regards the substantial issue of their labour1 are instruments1 and their subjectivity1 which is what is peculiar to them1 is the empty form of activity4 ,what they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business 7prepared and appointed independently of them7 is a formal universality or subjective mental idea--,fame1 which is their reward4 #eeb4 ,the national spirit contains nature-necessity1 and stands in external existence 7 #dbc73 the ethical substance1 potentially infinite1 is actually a particular and limited substance 7 #edi1 #eej72 on its subjective side it labours under contingency1 in the shape of its unreflective natural usages1 and its content is presented to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and external world4 ,the spirit1 however1 7which thinks in this moral organism7 overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests1 in the system of laws and usages4 ,it rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality4 ,such apprehension1 however1 still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit4 ,but the spirit which thinks in universal history1 stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions1 lays hold of its concrete universality1 and rises to apprehend the absolute mind1 as the eternally actual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom1 while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour4 ,the strictly technical aspects of the ,mind's elevation to ,god have been spoken of in the ,introduction to the ,logic 7cf4 especially #ea1 note74 ,as regards the starting-point of that elevation1 ,kant has on the whole adopted the most correct1 when he treats belief in ,god as proceeding from the practical ,reason4 ,for that starting-point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of ,god4 ,but the true concrete material is neither ,being 7as in the cosmological7 nor mere action by design 7as in the physico-theological proof7 but the ,mind1 the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason1 i4e4 the self-determining and self-realising notion itself1--,liberty4 ,that the elevation of subjective mind to ,god which these considerations give is by ,kant again deposed to a postulate--a mere 8ought0--is the peculiar perversity1 formerly noticed1 of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antithesis of finitude1 the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that elevation4 ,as regards the 8mediation0 which1 as it has been already shown 7 #aib1 cf4 #bjd note71 that elevation to ,god really involves1 the point specially calling for note is the 8moment0 of negation through which the essential content of the starting-point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free4 ,this factor1 abstract in the formal treatment of logic1 now gets its most concrete interpretation4 ,the finite1 from which the start is now made1 is the real ethical self-consciousness4 ,the negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its truth1 is the purification1 actually accomplished in the ethical world1 whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishness of desire4 ,genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life3 religion is that life rising to think1 i4e4 becoming aware of the free universality of its concrete essence4 ,only from the moral life and by the moral life is the ,idea of ,god seen to be free spirit3 outside the ethical spirit therefore it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity4 ,but--as is the case with all speculative process--this development of one thing out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by1 and what is here in mind known as its truth4 ,here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between the state and religion1 and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is familiar and current on the topic4 ,it is evident and apparent from what has preceded that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance1 while the state is the organisation and actualisation of moral life2 and that religion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state4 ,at this rate1 the state rests on the ethical sentiment1 and that on the religious4 ,if religion then is the consciousness of 8absolute0 truth1 then whatever is to rank as right and justice1 as law and duty1 i4e4 as true in the world of free will1 can be so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth1 as it is subsumed under it and is its sequel4 ,but if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion1 then perforce religion must have the genuine content2 i4e4 the idea of ,god it knows must be the true and real4 ,the ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelling in self-consciousness1 as it is actually present in a nation and its individual members4 ,this self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical actuality and bringing its truth to consciousness1 has in its faith and in its conscience only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality4 ,the two are inseparable3 there cannot be two kinds of conscience1 one religious and another ethical1 differing from the former in body and value of truth4 ,but in point of form1 i4e4 for thought and knowledge--7and religion and ethical life belong to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing7--the body of religious truth1 as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth1 exercises a sanction over the moral life which lies in empirical actuality4 ,thus for self-consciousness religion is the 8basis0 of moral life and of the state4 ,it has been the monstrous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable from one another1 and even as mutually indifferent4 ,the view taken of the relationship of religion and the state has been that1 whereas the state had an independent existence of its own1 springing from some force and power1 religion was a later addition1 something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks1 but purely subjective in individuals3--or it may be1 religion is treated as something without effect on the moral life of the state1 i4e4 its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own4 ,as the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated1 it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion4 ,it is primarily a point of form3 the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth4 ,so long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of self-consciousness in its actuality1 then self-consciousness in this content has the certainty of itself and is free4 ,but if this present self-consciousness is lacking1 then there may be created1 in point of form1 a condition of spiritual slavery1 even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit4 ,this great difference 7to cite a specific case7 comes out within the ,christian religion itself1 even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of ,god is embodied1 and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its central dogma and sole theme of a ,god who is known in spirit and in truth4 ,and yet in ,catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit4 ,and1 first of all1 ,god is in the 8host0 presented to religious adoration as an external thing4 7,in the ,lutheran ,church1 on the contrary1 the host as such is not at first consecrated1 but in the moment of enjoyment1 i4e4 in the annihilation of its externality1 and in the act of faith1 i4e4 in the free self-certain spirit3 only then is it consecrated and exalted to be present ,god47 ,from that first and supreme status of externalisation flows every other phase of externality1--of bondage1 non-spirituality1 and superstition4 ,it leads to a laity1 receiving its knowledge of divine truth1 as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order--which order again does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only1 but to that end essentially requires an external consecration4 ,it leads to the non-spiritual style of praying--partly as mere moving of the lips1 partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing ,god1 and prays others to pray--addressing his devotion to miracle-working images1 even to bones1 and expecting miracles from them4 ,it leads1 generally1 to justification by external works1 a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts1 and even to be capable of being transferred to others4 ,all this binds the spirit under an externalism by which the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source1 and law and justice1 morality and conscience1 responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root4 ,along with this principle of spiritual bondage1 and these applications of it in the religious life1 there can only go in the legislative and constitutional system a legal and moral bondage1 and a state of lawlessness and immorality in political life4 ,catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised--logically enough--as the one religion which secures the stability of governments4 ,but in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with institutions founded on the bondage of the spirit 7of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty71 i4e4 with institutions that embody injustice and with a morally corrupt and barbaric state of society4 ,but these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power1 which does not rise in hostility against them1 only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality4 ,but in mind there is a very different power available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false religion4 ,mind collects itself into its inward free actuality4 ,philosophy awakes in the spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially and actually right and reasonable in the real world4 ,it was well to call these products of thought1 and in a special sense ,philosophy1 the wisdom of the world7#agj72 for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present1 leads it into the real world1 and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self4 ,thus set free1 the content of religion assumes quite another shape4 ,so long as the form1 i4e4 our consciousness and subjectivity1 lacked liberty1 it followed necessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical principles which religion embodies1 and these principles were set at such a distance as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness4 ,in this unreality ethical content gets the name of ,holiness4 ,but once the divine spirit introduces itself into actuality1 and actuality emancipates itself to spirit1 then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the actuality of moral life4 ,instead of the vow of chastity1 marriage now ranks as the ethical relation2 and1 therefore1 as the highest on this side of humanity stands the family4 ,instead of the vow of poverty 7muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor1 i4e4 whosoever enriches them7 is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligence and industry1--of honesty in commercial dealing1 and in the use of property1--in short moral life in the socio-economic sphere4 ,and instead of the vow of obedience1 true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state--an obedience which is itself the true freedom1 because the state is a self-possessed1 self-realising reason--in short1 moral life in the state4 ,thus1 and thus only1 can law and morality exist4 ,the precept of religion1 8,give to ,caesar what is ,caesar's and to ,god what is ,god's0 is not enough3 the question is to settle what is ,caesar's1 what belongs to the secular authority3 and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authority have claimed almost everything as their own4 ,the divine spirit must interpenetrate the entire secular life3 whereby wisdom is concrete within it1 and it carries the terms of its own justification4 ,but that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organisations4 ,it is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order2--the morality of economic and industrial action against the sanctity of poverty and its indolence2--the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved4 ,with the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty1 there sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom4 ,it is no use to organise political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason1 so long as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned4 ,a free state and a slavish religion are incompatible4 ,it is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres1 under the impression that their diverse natures will maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contradiction and battle4 ,principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superficial1 and political institutions deduced from them must be1 if taken alone1 untenable1 so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as not to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and supreme sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 8absolute0 truth4 ,let us suppose even that1 no matter how1 a code of law should arise1 so to speak a priori1 founded on principles of reason1 but in contradiction with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom2 still1 as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government1 and of the various classes of the administrative personnel1 it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the individuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law1 and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obligation lies4 ,opposed to what religion pronounces holy1 the laws appear something made by human hands3 even though backed by penalties and externally introduced1 they could offer no lasting resistance to the contradiction and attacks of the religious spirit4 ,such laws1 however sound their provisions may be1 thus founder on the conscience1 whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and refuses to sanction them4 ,it is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrupt moral organisation by altering its political constitution and code of laws without changing the religion1--to make a revolution without having made a reformation1 to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities1 and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees1 e4g4 so-called 8chambers10 and the power given them to fix the budget1 c4 7cf4 #edd note74 ,at best it is only a temporary expedient--when it is obviously too great a task to descend into the depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth--to seek to separate law and justice from religion4 ,those guarantees are but rotten bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws--among which laws these guarantees are included4 ,it is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code the religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane4 ,the perception had dawned upon ,plato with great clearness of the gulf which in his day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political constitution1 on one hand1 from those deeper requirements which1 on the other hand1 were made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognise its inner life4 ,plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sound political life have their deeper foundation on the ,idea1--on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness4 ,now to see and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of philosophy4 ,it is from this point of view that ,plato breaks out into the celebrated or notorious passage where he makes ,socrates emphatically state that philosophy and political power must coincide1 that the ,idea must be regent1 if the distress of nations is to see its end4 ,what ,plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the ,idea--which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought--could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought2 that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal1 and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form4 ,to compare the ,platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of view from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded1 the notional differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind4 ,the first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject3 further that this subjective existence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets1 when specially set in relief as genus1 or1 to put it simply1 as the universal in a mental concept or idea4 ,this additional 8individuality0--the soil on which the universal and underlying principle freely and expressly exists1--is the intellectual and thinking self4 ,in the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the form of universality and essentiality through themselves1 and their 8individuality0 is not itself the form3 the form is only found in subjective thinking1 which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own4 ,in man's case it is otherwise3 his truth and reality is the free mind itself1 and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness4 ,this absolute nucleus of man--mind intrinsically concrete--is just this--to have the form 7to have thinking7 itself for a content4 ,to the height of the thinking consciousness of this principle ,aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought1 7which is 71 thus surmounting the ,platonic ,idea 7the genus1 or essential being74 ,but thought always--and that on account of this very principle--contains the immediate self-subsistence of subjectivity no less than it contains universality2 the genuine ,idea of the intrinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms 7subjective consciousness7 as under the other 7universality73 and in the one as in the other it is the same substantial content4 ,under the subjective form1 however1 fall feeling1 intuition1 pictorial representation3 and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute ,idea should be first reached and apprehended in this form3 in other words1 it must exist in its immediate reality as religion1 earlier than it does as philosophy4 ,philosophy is a later development from this basis 7just as ,greek philosophy itself is later than ,greek religion71 and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests itself in religion4 ,but ,greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to ,greek religion3 the unity of thought and the substantiality of the ,idea could take up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism1 and to the gladsome and frivolous humours of its poetic creations4 ,the form in its infinite truth1 the subjectivity of mind1 broke forth at first only as a subjective free thinking1 which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself1--and thus this underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind4 ,thus religion might appear as first purified only through philosophy1--through pure self-existent thought3 but the form pervading this underlying principle--the form which philosophy attacked--was that creative imagination4 ,political power1 which is developed similarly1 but earlier than philosophy1 from religion1 exhibits the onesidedness1 which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true ,idea1 as demoralisation4 ,plato1 in common with all his thinking contemporaries1 perceived this demoralisation of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle2 he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state1 but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjectivity1 which still escaped his intelligence4 ,his state is therefore1 on its own showing1 wanting in subjective liberty 7 #ejc note1 #eac1 c474 ,the truth which should be immanent in the state1 should knit it together and control it1 he1 for these reasons1 got hold of only the form of thought-out truth1 of philosophy2 and hence he makes that utterance that 8so long as philosophers do not rule in the states1 or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and comprehensively philosophise1 so long neither the state nor the race of men can be liberated from evils1--so long will the idea of the political constitution fall short of possibility and not see the light of the sun40 ,it was not vouchsafed to ,plato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold sway in political life1 so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality4 ,but so long too this principle could not emerge even in thought1 nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state1--the idea of the substantial moral life1 with which is identical the liberty of an independent self-consciousness4 ,only in the principle of mind1 which is aware of its own essence1 is implicitly in absolute liberty1 and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation1 does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power1 religion1 and the principles of philosophy coinciding in one1 and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mind1 of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness4 ,self-realising subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality4 ,hence religion as such1 and the state as such1--both as forms in which the principle exists--each contain the absolute truth3 so that the truth1 in its philosophic phase1 is after all only in one of its forms4 ,but even religion1 as it grows and expands1 lets other aspects of the ,idea of humanity grow and expand also 7 #ejj sqq474 ,as it is left therefore behind1 in its first immediate1 and so also one-sided phase1 ,religion may1 or rather must1 appear in its existence degraded to sensuous externality1 and thus in the sequel become an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life4 ,still the principle has in it the infinite 8elasticity0 of the 8absolute0 form1 so as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination 7and of the content by these means71 and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself4 ,thus ultimately1 in the ,protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of the ethical conscience come to be one and the same3 the free spirit learning to see itself in its reasonableness and truth4 ,in the ,protestant state1 the constitution and the code1 as well as their several applications1 embody the principle and the development of the moral life1 which proceeds and can only proceed from the truth of religion1 when reinstated in its original principle and in that way as such first become actual4 ,the moral life of the state and the religious spirituality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength4 ,,section ,,iii4 ,,absolute ,,mind7#aga74 #eec4 ,the notion of mind has its reality in the mind4 ,if this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute ,idea1 then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality liberated to its notion1 if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it4 ,the subjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity4 #eed4 ,the absolute mind1 while it is self-centred identity1 is always also identity returning and ever returned into itself3 if it is the one and universal substance it is so as a spirit1 discerning itself into a self and a consciousness1 for which it is as substance4 ,religion1 as this supreme sphere may be in general designated1 if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and having its home in the subject1 must no less be regarded as objectively issuing from the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community4 ,that here1 as always1 belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowledge1 but rather to a sort of knowledge1 and that belief is only a particular form of the latter1 has been remarked already 7 #fc note74 ,if nowadays there is so little consciousness of ,god1 and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon1 while people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion1 i4e4 of ,god's indwelling in us1 and if that and not the truth as such is called for1--in this there is at least the correct principle that ,god must be apprehended as spirit in his community4 #eee4 ,the subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intrinsically a process1 the immediate and substantial unity of which is the ,belief in the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth4 ,belief1 at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these different terms1 has in devotion--the implicit or more explicit act of worship 7cultus7--passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation1 the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation1 and of gaining its concrete determination1 viz4 reconciliation1 the actuality of the spirit4 ,sub-,section ,a4 ,art4 #eef4 ,as this consciousness of the ,absolute first takes shape1 its immediacy produces the factor of finitude in ,art4 ,on one hand that is1 it breaks up into a work of external common existence1 into the subject which produces that work1 and the subject which contemplates and worships it4 ,but1 on the other hand1 it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the ,ideal4 ,in this ideal1 or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit1 its natural immediacy1 which is only a sign of the ,idea1 is so transfigured by the informing spirit in order to express the ,idea1 that the figure shows it and it alone3--the shape or form of ,beauty4 #eeg4 ,the sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful1--the form of immediacy as such1--at the same time qualifies what it embodies3 and the ,god 7of art7 has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium or natural phase of existence--,he contains the so-called unity of nature and spirit--i4e4 the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form--hence not the spiritual unity1 in which the natural would be put only as 8ideal10 as superseded in spirit1 and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation4 ,it is not the absolute spirit which enters this consciousness4 ,on the subjective side the community has of course an ethical life1 aware1 as it is1 of the spirituality of its essence3 and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to substantial liberty4 ,but with the stigma of immediacy upon it1 the subject's liberty is only a manner of life1 without the infinite self-reflection and the subjective inwardness of conscience4 ,these considerations govern in their further developments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art4 #eeh4 ,for the objects of contemplation it has to produce1 ,art requires not only an external given material--7under which are also included subjective images and ideas71 but--for the expression of spiritual truth--must use the given forms of nature with a significance which art must divine and possess 7cf4 #daa74 ,of all such forms the human is the highest and the true1 because only in it can the spirit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression4 ,this disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art3 a point on which it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract1--in other words1 so long as the natural is only taken in its externality1 not as the 8characteristic0 meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit4 #eei4 ,in such single shapes the 8absolute0 mind cannot be made explicit3 in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universality1 when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail1 breaks up into an indeterminate polytheism4 ,with the essential restrictedness of its content1 ,beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spiritual principle1--something formal1 so that the thought embodied1 or the idea1 can1 like the material which it uses to work in1 be of the most diverse and unessential kind1 and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art4 #efj4 ,the one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the ,ideal involves the opposite one-sidedness 7 #eef7 that it is something made by the artist4 ,the subject or agent is the mere technical activity3 and the work of art is only then an expression of the ,god1 when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it1 and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world1 without admixture and unspotted from its contingency4 ,but as liberty only goes as far as there is thought1 the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling power1 the artist's enthusiasm1 is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive2 the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy1 it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist1--and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalities4 ,the work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option1 and the artist is the master of the ,god4 #efa4 ,in work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial stage that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness1 which is thus self-confident and of good cheer1 without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence4 ,on the further side of the perfection 7which is reached in such reconciliation1 in the beauty of classical art7 lies the art of sublimity1--symbolic art1 in which the figuration suitable to the ,idea is not yet found1 and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it1 and yet all the while toiling to work itself into it4 ,the meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reached the infinite form1 is not yet known1 not yet conscious of itself1 as free spirit4 ,the artist's theme only is as the abstract ,god of pure thought1 or an effort towards him1--a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal4 #efb4 ,in another way the ,idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatible2 and that is where the infinite form1 subjectivity1 is not as in the first extreme a mere superficial personality1 but its inmost depth1 and ,god is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form1 but as only finding himself in himself1 and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone4 ,romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty3 it presents him as only condescending to appearance1 and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself4 ,thus the external can here appear as contingent towards its significance4 ,the ,philosophy of ,religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the ,being1 known as the ,absolute1 assumes fuller and firmer features2 it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds1--and then to see how the secular self-consciousness1 the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man1--in short how the nature of a nation's moral life1 the principle of its law1 of its actual liberty1 and of its constitution1 as well as of its art and science1 corresponds to the principle which constitutes the substance of a religion4 ,that all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality1 that one spirit creates and informs them1 is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with the world-history4 ,as regards the close connexion of art with the various religions it may be specially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the spiritual principle1 though concrete and intrinsically free1 is not yet absolute4 ,in religions where the ,idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free character1 though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visibility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being1 and though art is the sole organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content1--a mixture from natural and spiritual sources1--can try to bring itself to consciousness2--still this art is defective2 its form is defective because its subject-matter and theme is so1--for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being immanent in it4 ,the representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity--for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull1 and hence has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape4 ,beautiful art1 on the contrary1 has for its condition the self-consciousness of the free spirit1--the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sensuous has no standing of its own3 it makes the natural wholly into the mere expression of spirit1 which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alone4 ,but with a further and deeper study1 we see that the advent of art1 in a religion still in the bonds of sensuous externality1 shows that such religion is on the decline4 ,at the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification1 expression and brilliancy1 it has lifted the religion away over its limitation4 ,in the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the spectator find themselves at home1 with their personal sense and feeling1 satisfied and liberated3 to them the vision and the consciousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained4 ,beautiful art1 from its side1 has thus performed the same service as philosophy3 it has purified the spirit from its thraldom4 ,the older religion in which the need of fine art1 and just for that reason1 is first generated1 looks up in its principle to an other-world which is sensuous and unmeaning3 the images adored by its devotees are hideous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans1 which point to the unspiritual objectivity of that other world1--and bones perform a similar or even a better service than such images4 ,but even fine art is only a grade of liberation1 not the supreme liberation itself4--,the genuine objectivity1 which is only in the medium of thought1--the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit1 and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence1--is still absent in the sensuous beauty of the work of art1 still more in that external1 unbeautiful sensuousness4 #efc4 ,beautiful ,art1 like the religion peculiar to it1 has its future in true religion4 ,the restricted value of the ,idea passes utterly and naturally into the universality identical with the infinite form2--the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge1 into an existence which is itself knowledge1--into revelation4 ,thus the principle which gives the ,idea its content is that it embody free intelligence1 and as 8absolute0 spirit it is for the spirit4 ,sub-,section ,b4 ,revealed ,religion7#agb74 #efd4 ,it lies essentially in the notion of religion1--the religion i4e4 whose content is absolute mind--that it be revealed1 and1 what is more1 revealed by ,god4 ,knowledge 7the principle by which the substance is mind7 is a self-determining principle1 as infinite self-realising form1--it therefore is manifestation out and out4 ,the spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit1 and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract elements of its being but itself4 ,the old conception--due to a one-sided survey of human life--of ,nemesis1 which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power1 dashing to pieces everything high and great1--was confronted by ,plato and ,aristotle with the doctrine that ,god is not envious4 ,the same answer may be given to the modern assertions that man cannot ascertain ,god4 ,these assertions 7and more than assertions they are not7 are the more illogical1 because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed2 for according to them it would rather be the religion in which nothing of ,god was revealed1 in which he had not revealed himself1 and those belonging to it would be the heathen 8who know not ,god40 ,if the word of ,god is taken in earnest in religion at all1 it is from ,him1 the theme and centre of religion1 that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin3 and if self-revelation is refused ,him1 then the only thing left to constitute ,his nature would be to ascribe envy to ,him4 ,but clearly if the word ,mind is to have a meaning1 it implies the revelation of ,him4 ,if we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine ,mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought1--at first only 8rationalising0 reflection1 but afterwards1 as in duty bound1 to speculative comprehension1 it may almost create surprise that so many1 and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these ,ideas1 have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof4 ,and nothing serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of ,god4 ,to know what ,god as spirit is--to apprehend this accurately and distinctly in thoughts--requires careful and thorough speculation4 ,it includes1 in its fore-front1 the propositions3 ,god is ,god only so far as he knows himself3 his self-knowledge is1 further1 his self-consciousness in man1 and man's knowledge of ,god1 which proceeds to man's self-knowledge in ,god4--,see the profound elucidation of these propositions in the work from which they are taken3 ,aphorisms on ,knowing and ,not-knowing1 c41 by ,c4 ,f4 ,g--l43 ,berlin #ahbi4 #efe4 ,when the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded1 ,god is1 in point of content1 the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit1 while in point of form he is1 first of all1 presented to consciousness as a mental representation4 ,this quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content1 on one hand1 a separate being1 making them presuppositions towards each other1 and phenomena which succeed each other2 their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories4 ,but1 on the other hand1 such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realises one spirit and in the devotion of worship4 #eff4 ,in this separating1 the form parts from the content3 and in the form the different functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media1 in each of which the absolute spirit exhibits itself2 77 as eternal content1 abiding self-centred1 even in its manifestation2 77 as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation1 which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world into which the content enters2 77 as infinite return1 and reconciliation with the eternal being1 of the world it gave away--the withdrawal of the eternal from the phenomenal into the unity of its fullness4 #efg4 77 ,under the 8moment0 of ,universality1--the sphere of pure thought or the abstract medium of essence1--it is therefore the absolute spirit1 which is at first the presupposed principle1 not however staying aloof and inert1 but 7as underlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality7 creator of heaven and earth3 but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himself as his son1 with whom1 though different1 he still remains in original identity1--just as1 again1 this differentiation of him from the universal essence eternally supersedes itself1 and1 though this mediating of a self-superseding mediation1 the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivity1--is the ,spirit4 #efh4 77 ,under the 8moment0 of particularity1 or of judgment1 it is this concrete eternal being which is presupposed3 its movement is the creation of the phenomenal world4 ,the eternal 8moment0 of mediation--of the only ,son--divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds4 ,on one hand is heaven and earth1 the elemental and the concrete nature1--on the other hand1 standing in action and reaction with such nature1 the spirit1 which therefore is finite4 ,that spirit1 as the extreme of inherent negativity1 completes its independence till it becomes wickedness1 and is that extreme through its connexion with a confronting nature and through its own naturalness thereby investing it4 ,yet1 amid that naturalness1 it is1 when it thinks1 directed towards the ,eternal1 though1 for that reason1 only standing to it in an external connexion4 #efi4 77 ,under the 8moment0 of individuality as such1--of subjectivity and the notion itself1 in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its identical ground1 the place of presupposition 7#a7 is taken by the universal substance1 as actualised out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness4 ,this individual1 who as such is identified with the essence1--7in the ,eternal sphere he is called the ,son7--is transplanted into the world of time1 and in him wickedness is implicitly overcome4 ,further1 this immediate1 and thus sensuous1 existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judgment and expiring in the pain of negativity1 in which he1 as infinite subjectivity1 keeps himself unchanged1 and thus1 as absolute return from that negativity and as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality1 has realised his being as the ,idea of the spirit1 eternal1 but alive and present in the world4 #egj4 7#b7 ,this objective totality of the divine man who is the ,idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject4 ,for such subject therefore it is at first an ,other1 an object of contemplating vision1--but the vision of implicit truth1 through which witness of the spirit in him1 he1 on account of his immediate nature1 at first characterised himself as nought and wicked4 ,but1 secondly1 after the example of his truth1 by means of the faith on the unity 7in that example implicitly accomplished7 of universal and individual essence1 he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy1 his natural man and self-will1 to close himself in unity with that example 7who is his implicit life7 in the pain of negativity1 and thus to know himself made one with the essential ,being4 ,thus the ,being of ,beings 7#c7 through this mediation brings about its own indwelling in self-consciousness1 and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all4 #ega4 ,these three syllogisms1 constituting the one syllogism of the absolute self-mediation of spirit1 are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought4 ,from this its separation into parts1 with a temporal and external sequence1 the unfolding of the mediation contracts itself in the result1--where the spirit closes in unity with itself1--not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling1 but even to thought4 ,in the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion1 yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal1 simple1 and eternal spirit in itself4 ,in this form of truth1 truth is the object of philosophy4 ,if the result--the realised ,spirit in which all meditation has superseded itself--is taken in a merely formal1 contentless sense1 so that the spirit is not also at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding2--then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness1 knowing itself in itself as absolute1--,irony4 ,irony1 which can make every objective reality nought and vain1 is itself the emptiness and vanity1 which from itself1 and therefore by chance and its own good pleasure1 gives itself direction and content1 remains master over it1 is not bound by it1--and1 with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy1 falls rather back into the vanity of wilfulness4 ,it is only in proportion as the pure infinite form1 the self-centred manifestation1 throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in which it is the vanity of thought1 that it is the free thought which has its infinite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content1 and has that content as an object in which it is also free4 ,thinking1 so far1 is only the formal aspect of the absolute content4 ,sub-,section ,c4 ,philosophy4 #egb4 ,this science is the unity of ,art and ,religion4 ,whereas the vision-method of ,art1 external in point of form1 is but subjective production and shivers the substantial content into many separate shapes1 and whereas ,religion1 with its separation into parts1 opens it out in mental picture1 and mediates what is thus opened out2 ,philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a total1 but even unifies them into the simple spiritual vision1 and then in that raises them to self-conscious thought4 ,such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity 7cognised by thought7 of art and religion1 in which the diverse elements in the content are cognised as necessary1 and this necessary as free4 #egc4 ,philosophy thus characterises itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea1 as also of the necessity in the two forms--on one hand1 immediate vision and its poetry1 and the objective and external revelation presupposed by representation1--on the other hand1 first the subjective retreat inwards1 then the subjective movement of faith and its final identification with the presupposed object4 ,this cognition is thus the recognition of this content and its form2 it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms1 elevation of them into the absolute form1 which determines itself to content1 remains identical with it1 and is in that the cognition of that essential and actual necessity4 ,this movement1 which philosophy is1 finds itself already accomplished1 when at the close it seizes its own notion1--i4e4 only looks back on its knowledge4 ,here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the reciprocal relations of philosophy and religion4 ,the whole question turns entirely on the difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental representation and 8reflecting0 intellect4 ,but it is the whole cycle of philosophy1 and of logic in particular1 which has not merely taught and made known this difference1 but also criticised it1 or rather has let its nature develop and judge itself by these very categories4 ,it is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained1 that the content of religion and philosophy is the same1--leaving out1 of course1 the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion4 ,but religion is the truth for all men3 faith rests on the witness of the spirit1 which as witnessing is the spirit in man4 ,this witness--the underlying essence in all humanity--takes1 when driven to expound itself1 its first definite form under those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intellect otherwise employs4 ,in this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and conditions of finitude in general4 ,this does not prevent the spirit1 even in employing sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought1 from retaining its content 7which as religion is essentially speculative17 with a tenacity which does violence to them1 and acts inconsistently towards them4 ,by this inconsistency it corrects their defects4 ,nothing easier therefore for the 8,rationalist0 than to point out contradictions in the exposition of the faith1 and then to prepare triumphs for its principle of formal identity4 ,if the spirit yields to this finite reflection1 which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy--78,rationalism07--it strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought4 ,religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies4 ,but it is another thing when religion sets herself against comprehending reason1 and against philosophy in general1 and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative1 and so religious4 ,such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the difference indicated and the value of spiritual form in general1 and particularly of the logical form2 or1 to be more precise1 still from failure to note the distinction of the content--which may be in both the same--from these forms4 ,it is on the ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religious party2 just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same charges upon it from a self-styled philosophy--and from a pithless orthodoxy4 ,it had too little of ,god in it for the former2 too much for the latter4 ,the charge of ,atheism1 which used often to be brought against philosophy 7that it has too little of ,god71 has grown rare3 the more wide-spread grows the charge of ,pantheism1 that it has too much of him3--so much so1 that it is treated not so much as an imputation1 but as a proved fact1 or a sheer fact which needs no proof4 ,piety1 in particular1 which with its pious airs of superiority fancies itself free to dispense with proof1 goes hand in hand with empty rationalism--7which means to be so much opposed to it1 though both repose really on the same habit of mind7--in the wanton assertion1 almost as if it merely mentioned a notorious fact1 that ,philosophy is the ,all-one doctrine1 or ,pantheism4 ,it must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philosophical system 7e4g4 ,spinozism7 of ,atheism than of ,pantheism1 though the former imputation at the first glance looks more cruel and insidious 7cf4 #ga note74 ,the imputation of ,atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real ,god1 and arises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the peculiar form to which it is attached4 ,philosophy indeed can recognise its own forms in the categories of religious consciousness1 and even its own teaching in the doctrine of religion--which therefore it does not disparage4 ,but the converse is not true3 the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of thought to itself1 does not comprehend itself1 and is therefore1 as it stands1 exclusive4 ,to impute ,pantheism instead of ,atheism to ,philosophy is part of the modern habit of mind--of the new piety and new theology4 ,for them philosophy has too much of ,god3--so much so1 that1 if we believe them1 it asserts that ,god is everything and everything is ,god4 ,this new theology1 which makes religion only a subjective feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature1 thus retains nothing more than a ,god in general without objective characteristics4 ,without interest of its own for the concrete1 fulfilled notion of ,god1 it treats it only as an interest which others once had1 and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of ,god's concrete nature as something merely historical4 ,the indeterminate ,god is to be found in all religions2 every kind of piety 7 #gb7--that of the ,hindoo to asses1 cows1--or to dalai-lamas1--that of the ,egyptians to the ox--is always adoration of an object which1 with all its absurdities1 also contains the generic abstract1 ,god in ,general4 ,if this theory needs no more than such a ,god1 so as to find ,god in everything called religion1 it must at least find such a ,god recognised even in philosophy1 and can no longer accuse it of ,atheism4 ,the mitigation of the reproach of ,atheism into that of ,pantheism has its ground therefore in the superficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied ,god4 ,as that popular idea clings to its abstract universality1 from which all definite quality is excluded1 all such definiteness is only the non-divine1 the secularity of things1 thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality4 ,on such a presupposition1 even after philosophy has maintained ,god's absolute universality1 and the consequent untruth of the being of external things1 the hearer clings as he did before to his belief that secular things still keep their being1 and form all that is definite in the divine universality4 ,he thus changes that universality into what he calls the pantheistic3--,everything is--7empirical things1 without distinction1 whether higher or lower in the scale1 are7--all possess substantiality2 and so--thus he understands philosophy--each and every secular thing is ,god4 ,it is only his own stupidity1 and the falsifications due to such misconception1 which generate the imagination and the allegation of such pantheism4 ,but if those who give out that a certain philosophy is ,pantheism1 are unable and unwilling to see this--for it is just to see the notion that they refuse--they should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosopher1 or any one man1 had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent reality to all things and regarded them as ,god3--that such an idea had ever come into the hand of any body but themselves4 ,this allegation ,i will further elucidate in this exoteric discussion3 and the only way to do so is to set down the evidence4 ,if we want to take so-called ,pantheism in its most poetical1 most sublime1 or if you will1 its grossest shape1 we must1 as is well known1 consult the oriental poets3 and the most copious delineations of it are found in ,hindoo literature4 ,amongst the abundant resources open to our disposal on this topic1 ,i select--as the most authentic statement accessible--the ,bhagavat-,gita1 and amongst its effusions1 prolix and reiterative ad nauseam1 some of the most telling passages4 ,in the #ajth ,lesson 7in ,schlegel1 p4 #afb7 ,krishna says of himself7#agc73--8;,i am the self1 seated in the hearts of all beings4 ,i am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings 444 ,i am the beaming sun amongst the shining ones1 and the moon among the lunar mansions4444 ,amongst the ,vedas ,i am the ,sma-,veda3 ,i am mind amongst the senses3 ,i am consciousness in living beings4 ,and ,i am ,sankara 7,siva7 among the ,rudras1 444 ,meru among the high-topped mountains1 444 the ,himalaya among the firmly-fixed 7mountains74444 ,among beasts ,i am the lord of beasts4444 ,among letters ,i am the letter ,a4444 ,i am the spring among the seasons4444 ,i am also that which is the seed of all things3 there is nothing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me40 ,even in these totally sensuous delineations1 ,krishna 7and we must not suppose there is1 besides ,krishna1 still ,god1 or a ,god besides2 as he said before he was ,siva1 or ,indra1 so it is afterwards said that ,brahma too is in him7 makes himself out to be--not everything1 but only--the most excellent of everything4 ,everywhere there is a distinction drawn between external1 unessential existences1 and one essential amongst them1 which he is4 ,even when1 at the beginning of the passage1 he is said to be the beginning1 middle1 and end of living things1 this totality is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences4 ,even such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be called pantheism3 we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical world1 everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences1 to a polytheism4 ,but even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally-existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be named ,gods2 even ,siva1 ,indra1 c4 melt into the one ,krishna4 ,this reduction is more expressly made in the following scene 7#gth ,lesson1 p4 #g sqq474 ,krishna says3 8,i am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe4 ,there is nothing else higher than myself2 all this is woven upon me1 like numbers of pearls upon a thread4 ,i am the taste in water2444 ,i am the light of the sun and the moon2 ,i am #8,om' in all the ,vedas4444 ,i am life in all beings4444 ,i am the discernment of the discerning ones4444 ,i am also the strength of the strong40 ,then he adds3 8,the whole universe deluded by these three states of mind developed from the qualities sc4 goodness1 passion1 darkness does not know me who am beyond them and inexhaustible3 for this delusion of mine10 even the ,maya is his1 nothing independent1 8developed from the qualities is divine and difficult to transcend4 ,those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone40 ,then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression3 8,at the end of many lives1 the man possessed of knowledge approaches me1 7believing7 that ,vasudeva is everything4 ,such a high-souled mind is very hard to find4 ,those who are deprived of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities444 ,whichever form of deity one worships with faith1 from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me4 ,but the fruit thus obtained by those of little judgment is perishable4444 ,the undiscerning ones1 not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence1 than which there is nothing higher1 think me who am unperceived to have become perceptible40 ,this 8,all10 which ,krishna calls himself1 is not1 any more than the ,eleatic ,one1 and the ,spinozan ,substance1 the ,every-thing4 ,this every-thing1 rather1 the infinitely-manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures1 but defined as the 8accidental10 without essential being of its very own1 but having its truth in the substance1 the ,one which1 as different from that accidental1 is alone the divine and ,god4 ,hindooism however has the higher conception of ,brahma1 the pure unity of thought in itself1 where the empirical everything of the world1 as also those proximate substantialities1 called ,gods1 vanish4 ,on that account ,colebrooke and many others have described the ,hindoo religion as at bottom a ,monotheism4 ,that this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citations4 ,but so little concrete is this divine unity--spiritual as its idea of ,god is--so powerless its grip1 so to speak--that ,hindooism1 with a monstrous inconsistency1 is also the maddest of polytheisms4 ,but the idolatry of the wretched ,hindoo1 when he adores the ape1 or other creature1 is still a long way from that wretched fancy of a ,pantheism1 to which everything is ,god1 and ,god everything4 ,hindoo monotheism moreover is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheism1 if the ,idea of ,god is not deeply determinate in itself4 ,for that unity1 if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty1 tends of itself to let whatever is concrete1 outside it--be it as a lot of ,gods or as secular1 empirical individuals--keep its independence4 ,that pantheism indeed--on the shallow conception of it--might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism3 for if ,god1 as it says1 is identical with the world1 then as there is only one world there would be in that pantheism only one ,god4 ,perhaps the empty numerical unity must be predicated of the world3 but such abstract predication of it has no further special interest2 on the contrary1 a mere numerical unity just means that its content is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes4 ,but it is that delusion with the empty unity1 which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pantheism4 ,it is only the picture--floating in the indefinite blue--of the world as one thing1 the all1 that could ever be considered capable of combining with ,god3 only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that ,god is the world3 for if the world were taken as it is1 as everything1 as the endless lot of empirical existence1 then it would hardly have been even held possible to suppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is ,god4 ,but to go back again to the question of fact4 ,if we want to see the consciousness of the ,one--not as with the ,hindoos split between the featureless unity of abstract thought1 on one hand1 and on the other1 the long-winded weary story of its particular detail1 but--in its finest purity and sublimity1 we must consult the ,mohammedans4 ,if e4g4 in the excellent ,jelaleddin-,rumi in particular1 we find the unity of the soul with the ,one set forth1 and that unity described as love1 this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar1 a transfiguration of the natural and the spiritual1 in which the externalism and transitoriness of immediate nature1 and of empirical secular spirit1 is discarded and absorbed7#agd74 ,i refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic conceptions which it is customary to call pantheistic4 ,of the philosophies to which that name is given1 the ,eleatic1 or ,spinozist1 it has been remarked earlier 7 #ej1 note7 that so far are they from identifying ,god with the world and making him finite1 that in these systems this 8everything0 has no truth1 and that we should rather call them monotheistic1 or1 in relation to the popular idea of the world1 acosmical4 ,they are most accurately called systems which apprehend the ,absolute only as substance4 ,of the oriental1 especially the ,mohammedan1 modes of envisaging ,god1 we may rather say that they represent the ,absolute as the utterly universal genus which dwells in the species or existences1 but dwells so potently that these existences have no actual reality4 ,the fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind4 ,these systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need common to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of ,god1 and1 secondly1 of the relationship of ,god and the world4 7,in philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of ,god's nature determines his relations with the world47 ,the 8reflective0 understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes of conception1 which1 whether they spring from heart1 imagination or speculation1 express the interconnexion of ,god and the world3 and in order to have ,god pure in faith or consciousness1 he is as essence parted from appearance1 as infinite from the finite4 ,but1 after this partition1 the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence1 the finite to the infinite1 and so on3 and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation4 ,it is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies1 and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic4 ,the close of philosophy is not the place1 even in a general exoteric discussion1 to waste a word on what a 8notion0 means4 ,but as the view taken of this relation is closely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all imputations against it1 we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly has to do with unity in general1 it is not however with abstract unity1 mere identity1 and the empty absolute1 but with concrete unity 7the notion71 and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else2--that each step in its advance is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity1 and that the deepest and last expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself4 ,would-be judges and critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarise themselves with these phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them1 at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many1 and that amongst them there is great variety4 ,but they show so little acquaintance with them--and still less take trouble about it--that1 when they hear of unity--and relation ipso facto implies unity--they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity1 and lose sight of the chief point of interest--the special mode in which the unity is qualified4 ,hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry identity is its principle and result1 and that it is the system of identity4 ,sticking fast to the undigested thought of identity1 they have laid hands on1 not the concrete unity1 the notion and content of philosophy1 but rather its reverse4 ,in the philosophical field they proceed1 as in the physical field the physicist2 who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties and matters--or usually matters alone1 7for the properties get transformed into matters also for the physicist7--and that these matters 7elements7 also stand in relation to one another4 ,but the question is1 ,of what kind is this relation8 ,every peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things1 inorganic and living1 depend solely on the different modes of this unity4 ,but instead of ascertaining these different modes1 the ordinary physicist 7chemist included7 takes up only one1 the most external and the worst1 viz4 composition1 applies only it in the whole range of natural structures1 which he thus renders for ever inexplicable4 ,the aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallow identity4 ,all that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse philosophy gather from the study of ,god's relation to the world is that the one1 but only the one factor of this category of relation--and that the factor of indeterminateness--is identity4 ,thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception1 and assert--falsely as a fact--that philosophy teaches the identity of ,god and the world4 ,and as in their judgment either of the two1--the world as much as ,god--has the same solid substantiality as the other1 they infer that in the philosophic ,idea ,god is composed of ,god and the world4 ,such then is the idea they form of pantheism1 and which they ascribe to philosophy4 ,unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories1 they import them into philosophy1 where they are utterly unknown2 they thus infect it with the disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry4 ,if any difficulty emerge in comprehending ,god's relation to the world1 they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable contradiction2 and that hence1 they must stop at the vague conception of such relation1 perhaps under the more familiar names of1 e4g4 omnipresence1 providence1 c4 ,faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conception1 or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem4 ,that men and classes of untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness1 is what one expects2 but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfied1 in matters admitted to be of superior1 if not even of supreme interest1 with indefinite ideas1 it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject4 ,but if those who cling to this crude 8rationalism0 were in earnest1 e4g4 with ,god's omnipresence1 so far as to realise their faith thereon in a definite mental idea1 in what difficulties would they be involved by their belief in the true reality of the things of sense6 ,they would hardly like1 as ,epicurus does1 to let ,god dwell in the interspaces of things1 i4e4 in the pores of the physicists1--said pores being the negative1 something supposed to exist beside the material reality4 ,this very 8,beside0 would give their pantheism its spatiality1--their everything1 conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space4 ,but in ascribing to ,god1 in his relation to the world1 an action on and in the space thus filled on the world and in it1 they would endlessly split up the divine actuality into infinite materiality4 ,they would really thus have the misconception they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine1 only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of ,god and the world4 ,but to put that sort of thing1 this stale gossip of oneness or identity1 on the shoulders of philosophy1 shows such recklessness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficulty of getting into the head thoughts and notions1 i4e4 not abstract unity1 but the many-shaped modes specified4 ,if statements as to facts are put forward1 and the facts in question are thoughts and notions1 it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning4 ,but even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous1 now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism1 a system of identity1 an ,all-one doctrine1 and that the person therefore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a matter of common notoriety1 or as prevaricating for a purpose4 ,on account of this chorus of assertions1 then1 ,i have believed myself obliged to speak at more length and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact3 for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external apprehension of notions as mere facts1--by which notions are perverted into their opposite4 ,the esoteric study of ,god and identity1 as of cognitions and notions1 is philosophy itself4 #egd4 ,this notion of philosophy is the self-thinking ,idea1 the truth aware of itself 7 #bcf71--the logical system1 but with the signification that it is universality approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality4 ,in this way the science has gone back to its beginning3 its result is the logical system but as a spiritual principle3 out of the presupposing judgment1 in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate1--and thus out of the appearance which it had there--it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into its proper medium4 #ege4 ,it is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further development4 ,the first appearance is formed by the syllogism1 which is based on the ,logical system as starting-point1 with ,nature for the middle term which couples the ,mind with it4 ,the ,logical principle turns to ,nature and ,nature to ,mind4 ,nature1 standing between the ,mind and its essence1 sunders itself1 not indeed to extremes of finite abstraction1 nor itself to something away from them and independent1--which1 as other than they1 only serves as a link between them3 for the syllogism is in the ,idea and ,nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor1 and as implicitly the ,idea4 ,still the mediation of the notion has the external form of transition1 and the science of ,nature presents itself as the course of necessity1 so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation4 #egf4 ,in the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded1 that that syllogism is the standpoint of the ,mind itself1 which--as the mediating agent in the process--presupposes ,nature and couples it with the ,logical principle4 ,it is the syllogism where ,mind reflects on itself in the ,idea3 philosophy appears as a subjective cognition1 of which liberty is the aim1 and which is itself the way to produce it4 #egg4 ,the third syllogism is the ,idea of philosophy1 which has self-knowing reason1 the absolutely-universal1 for its middle term3 a middle1 which divides itself into ,mind and ,nature1 making the former its presupposition1 as process of the ,idea's subjective activity1 and the latter its universal extreme1 as process of the objectively and implicitly existing ,idea4 ,the self-judging of the ,idea into its two appearances 7 #ege1 #egf7 characterises both as its 7the self-knowing reason's7 manifestations3 and in it there is a unification of the two aspects3--it is the nature of the fact1 the notion1 which causes the movement and development1 yet this same movement is equally the action of cognition4 ,the eternal ,idea1 in full fruition of its essence1 eternally sets itself to work1 engenders and enjoys itself as absolute ,mind4 1 4 1 4 4 4 1 4 1 1 1 2 1 4 4 2 1 2 4 1 2 4 7,,arist4 ,met4 ,,xi4 #g47 ,,index4 ,absolute 7the71 xlviii1 #g4 ,abstraction1 #gd4 ,accent1 #ha1 #hg4 ,ages of man1 #ag4 ,alphabets1 #ha4 ,altruism1 #eg4 ,animal magnetism1 clxi1 #e1 #bi seqq4 ,anthropology1 xxv1 lxxxviii1 #ab seqq4 ,appetite1 #ec4 ,aristotle1 liii1 cxxxiii1 #d1 #fc1 #afc4 ,art1 xxxix seqq41 #afi seqq4 ,asceticism1 cxv1 cxliii1 clxxxvii1 #aei4 ,association of ideas1 #gc4 ,atheism1 #ahc4 ,athens1 cxxx4 ,attention1 clxxiii1 #fi4 ,automatism 7psychological71 clxv4 ,bacon 7,fr471 xxi1 lii1 lix1 clx4 ,bain 7,a471 cxxi4 ,beauty1 #afi4 ,bhagavat-,gita1 #ahf seqq4 ,biography1 #aea4 ,body and ,soul 7relations of71 lxxxii1 cxvi1 clvi1 #ac4 ,bothius1 l4 ,bhme 7,j471 #ie4 ,braid 7,j471 clxiv4 ,bravery1 cxcix4 ,budget1 #add4 ,capitalism1 cci seqq4 ,cardinal virtues1 cxxxii4 ,categories1 lx4 ,catholicism1 #aeg4 ,children1 lxxxvii1 cii4 ,chinese language1 #ha seqq4 ,choice1 #ih4 ,christianity1 xliv1 cxli1 clxxix1 #g1 #aja1 #aeg4 ,clairvoyance1 clviii1 clxi1 #cc4 ,cognition1 #fd4 ,commercial morality1 cci4 ,comte 7,c471 xcix4 ,condillac1 lxxviii1 #fa4 ,conscience1 xxx1 cxxii1 clxxxvii1 #aag1 #aef1 #afa4 ,consciousness1 xxv1 xcix1 #dg seqq4 ,constitution of the ,state1 #acb4 ,contract1 #ajh4 ,corporation1 #acj4 ,crime1 cxciii1 #aji4 ,criticism1 xvi1 cxxxviii1 #adi4 ,custom1 clxxxix1 #ajd4 ,dante1 cxxxiv4 ,deduction 7,kantian and ,fichtean71 cx seqq4 ,democracy1 #ada4 ,development1 #fj4 ,disease 7mental71 #bg1 #cg4 ,duty1 cxiv1 cxix1 cxxi seqq41 cxxxi1 cxxxix1 #ig1 #ajd1 #aaf4 ,economics1 #abb4 ,education1 xcii1 cxxxvii1 #aa4 ,ego 7the71 lxiv seqq41 #dg seqq4 ,egoism1 #ee4 ,eleaticism1 #aij4 ,england1 #adc4 ,epicureanism1 cxli1 #aie4 ,epistemology1 ciii4 ,equality 7political and social71 cxc1 #acc4 ,equity1 xxxi4 ,estates1 #abc4 ,ethics1 xv1 xix1 xxx seqq41 xcv1 cxiii seqq41 cxc seqq41 #aac seqq4 ,experience1 #ea4 ,experimental psychology1 lxxxi seqq41 c4 ,expression 7mental71 #bc1 #de4 ,faculties of ,mind1 lxxiii seqq41 xcvii1 cxxvi1 #eh1 #fe4 ,faith1 cvii4 ,faith-cure1 clxi1 #ce4 ,fame1 #aec4 ,family1 xxxii1 cxcii1 #aba4 ,fechner 7,g4 ,t471 cli4 ,feeling1 #bb1 #fh1 #ib4 ,fichte 7,j4 ,g471 cvi1 cix seqq41 clxiv1 clxix1 #di4 ,finance1 #add4 ,finitude1 #h4 ,fraud1 #aaj4 ,freedom1 cxxv seqq41 clxxv1 #f1 #ii1 #aac1 #acc seqq4 ,fries1 clxxix4 ,genius 7the71 clvii1 #bh4 ,german language1 #gh1 #hh3 politics1 clxxvii2 empire1 clxxxi4 ,god1 xxxiv1 xli1 cxxii1 #bj1 #aed1 #agf4 ,goethe1 cliv1 clxix4 ,goodness1 #aae4 ,government1 #acg2 forms of1 #ada4 ,greek ethics1 cxxix seqq41 cxciv2 religion1 #afd4 ,habit1 clviii1 #ci4 ,happiness1 #ii4 ,herbart1 lxii seqq41 lxxxv1 cxxvii4 ,hieroglyphics1 #hj4 ,history1 xxxiv1 xlvii1 xci1 #adg seqq4 ,hobbes1 lxxvi1 clxxxii4 ,holiness1 #aei4 ,honour1 #abd4 ,humboldt 7,w4 v471 #gi4 ,hume1 lxxi1 cxx4 ,hypnotism1 clxiv seqq41 #ca seqq4 ,idea 7,platonic71 #afc4 ,idealism1 civ2 political1 clxxxvi4 ,ideality1 clxviii1 #be4 ,ideas1 lxix seqq41 ci seqq4 ,imagination1 #gb4 ,immaterialism1 clii1 #ab1 #de4 ,impulse1 #ie4 ,individualist ethics1 cxx seqq4 ,individuality in the ,state1 #aci4 ,industrialism1 cc1 #abc4 ,insanity1 #cg4 ,intention1 #aad4 ,international ,law1 #adg4 ,intuition1 #fg4 ,irony1 #agi4 ,jelaleddin-,rumi1 #ahi4 ,judgment1 #hi4 ,judicial system1 #abg4 ,jung-,stilling1 clxii4 ,juries1 #abh4 ,kant 7,i471 xv1 lxiv1 lxxi1 xcvi1 cvii1 cxxviii1 clxxxviii1 #bj1 #dh1 #ea1 #fc1 #aed4 ,kieser1 clxiii4 ,knowledge1 cv1 cxxxv1 cxli1 #fd4 ,krishna1 #ahf seqq4 ,labour1 #abc4 ,language1 clxxiv1 #gi seqq4 ,laplace1 clxiv4 ,law1 xxix1 xcvi1 cxc1 #ajd1 #abe4 ,legality1 xxx1 clxxxix4 ,legislation1 #abe4 ,leibniz1 lxxii1 lxxvii1 cxlvi1 #ad1 #hj1 #hb4 ,liberty1 see ,freedom4 ,life1 #ac4 ,logic1 xiv1 xvii1 lxi1 xcv1 #aif4 ,lutheranism1 #aeg4 ,macchiavelli1 clxxx4 ,magic1 clxi1 #bi4 ,manifestation1 #g4 ,manners1 #ajd4 ,marriage1 #aba1 #aei4 ,master and slave1 #ef4 ,mathematics in psychology1 lxviii4 ,medium1 #cd4 ,memory1 clxxiv1 #gj1 #hd4 ,mesmer1 clxi4 ,metaphysic1 lviii seqq4 ,mill 7,james71 lxxix4 ,mind 7 ,spirit71 xlix seqq41 #eh1 #aif4 ,mnemonics1 #he4 ,monarchy1 #aci4 ,monasticism1 #aei4 ,monotheism1 #ahh4 ,morality1 xxx1 xxxviii1 cxxi1 clxxxviii seqq41 cxcviii1 #aac seqq4 ,mnsterberg 7,h471 lxxxiii4 ,napoleon1 #ai4 ,nationality1 #adb1 #aej1 #aed1 cxcv4 ,natural ,philosophy1 xv1 xvii1 xxii4 ,natural rights1 #aab4 ,nature1 cxx1 cxxiv1 #ab1 #acc1 #aif4 ,nemesis1 #agd4 ,nietzsche 7,f471 cxxviii4 ,nobility1 cxcvii4 ,observation1 lxxxix4 ,orders 7social71 cxcvii seqq41 #abd4 ,ought1 clxxv1 #id1 #aaf4 ,pain1 #f1 #id4 ,pantheism1 #ahd1 #aid4 ,parliament1 #adb4 ,passion1 #ie4 ,peasantry1 cci4 ,peel 7,sir ,r471 #abg4 ,perception1 #fg4 ,perfection1 cxxvii1 cxxix4 ,person1 #ajg1 #aai4 ,personality1 lxiv1 clxvii4 ,philosophy1 xiv1 cxvii1 cxxxviii1 #aei seqq41 #agi seqq4 ,phrenology1 #ce4 ,physiology1 lxxxi1 c4 ,pinel1 #ci4 ,plato1 xcviii1 cxxxi1 cxxxv1 #cc1 #ig1 #ajb1 #afb4 ,pleasure1 cxxxvi1 #id4 ,plotinus1 cxliv4 ,police1 #acj4 ,porphyry1 xx4 ,positivity of laws1 #abe4 ,powers 7political71 ccii1 #ach4 ,practice1 #ib4 ,property1 xxix1 cxcii1 #ajg4 ,protestantism1 #aff4 ,prussia1 clxxviii1 clxxxiv4 ,psychiatry1 #cc4 ,psychology1 xxii1 xxiv1 lii seqq41 lxiii1 lxxxvi1 xcv1 cxvii1 #d1 #eh1 #fc4 ,psycho-physics1 clvi1 #bc4 ,punishment1 cxciii1 cciii1 #aaa4 ,purpose1 #ig1 #aad4 ,races1 #af4 ,rationalism1 clxv1 #ahc4 ,reason1 cxv1 cxliii1 clxxii1 #eh4 ,recollection1 #gj4 ,reinhold1 #di4 ,religion1 xxxvii seqq41 cxcvi1 #aee seqq41 #afg seqq4 ,representation1 cxi1 #gj2 political1 clxxxiii1 #adb4 ,responsibility1 #aad4 ,revelation1 #g1 #age4 ,right1 xxix1 #ajd 7see ,law74 ,ritter1 clxi1 clxiii4 ,romances1 #aea3 romantic art1 #agb4 ,savages1 lxxxvii1 cii4 ,schelling1 clxi4 ,schindler1 clxiii4 ,schopenhauer1 cvi1 cxvi1 cli1 clxiv1 clxix1 clxxxvii4 ,science1 xviii4 ,scott 7,sir ,w471 #aea4 ,self-consciousness1 clxxi1 #ec seqq4 ,sensibility and sensation1 #bj1 #ej4 ,sex1 #ah4 ,siderism1 clxiii1 #ae4 ,signs 7in language71 #gf4 ,skill 7acquired71 #db4 ,slavery1 #ef1 #aja4 ,sleep1 #ah4 ,society1 xxxii1 #ef4 ,sociology1 xxiii4 ,somnambulism1 #cj4 ,soul1 liv1 lxix1 lxxv1 #bf4 ,spencer 7,h471 xxi seqq41 cxi1 cxxiii1 cxliv4 ,spinoza1 lxxvi1 ci1 cxix1 cl1 #ad1 #di1 #ahh4 ,spiritualism1 clxii4 ,state1 xxxii seqq41 clxxvi1 clxxxiii1 #aca seqq4 ,stoicism1 cxix1 cxxiv1 cxi1 cxliii4 ,suggestion1 clxv seqq41 #cc4 ,superstition1 #aeh4 ,syllogism1 #ij4 ,symbol1 #gg1 #aga4 ,sympathy1 clv4 ,telepathy1 clxi1 #cd4 ,tellurism1 clxiii1 #ae4 ,theology1 #aee4 ,thinking1 clxxiv1 #hi4 ,tholuck1 #aia4 ,trinity1 #agg seqq4 ,truth1 cv1 #ahb4 ,unconscious 7the71 cxlvi4 ,understanding1 #eb1 #hi4 ,universalising1 cxxviii4 ,utilitarianism1 cxxxvi4 ,value1 #aji4 ,virtues1 cxxxi1 cxcviii1 #abj4 ,war1 cxcix1 #adf4 ,wartburg1 clxxix4 ,welfare1 #aad4 ,wickedness1 #i1 #id1 #aag4 ,will1 xxviii1 cxxv1 clxxv1 #fb1 #ij4 ,wolff1 lxxiii4 ,words1 clxxiv1 #gi4 ,wordsworth1 li1 clxviii4 ,written language1 #ha seqq4 ,wrong1 #aji4 ,wrtemberg1 clxxxv4 ,,footnotes #a ,plato1 ,rep4 #ebg4 #b ,the prospectus of the ,system of ,synthetic ,philosophy is dated #ahfj4 ,darwin's ,origin of ,species is #ahei4 ,but such ideas1 both in ,mr4 ,spencer and others1 are earlier than ,darwin's book4 #c ,hegel's ,verhltniss1 the supreme category of what is called actuality3 where object is necessitated by outside object4 #d ,cf4 ,herbart1 ,werke 7ed4 ,kehrbach71 iv4 #cgb4 ,this consciousness proper is what ,leibniz called ,apperception1 la connaissance rflexive de l'tat intrieur 7,nouveaux ,essais74 #e ,herbart1 ,werke1 vi4 #ee 7ed4 ,kehrbach74 #f p4 #ei 7 #ddj74 #g p4 #fc 7 #ddj74 #h ,these remarks refer to four out of the five ,herbartian ethical ideas4 ,see also ,leibniz1 who 7in #afic1 ,de ,notionibus juris et justitiae7 had given the following definitions3 8,caritas est benevolentia universalis4 ,justitia est caritas sapientis4 ,sapientia est scientia felicitatis40 ,the jus naturae has three grades3 the lowest1 jus strictum2 the second1 aequitas 7or caritas1 in the narrower sense72 and the highest1 pietas1 which is honeste1 i4e4 pie vivere4 #i ,to which the ,greek 1 the ,latin civitas or respublica1 were only approximations4 ,hegel is not writing a history4 ,if he were1 it would be necessary for him to point out how far the individual instance1 e4g4 ,rome1 or ,prussia1 corresponded to its ,idea4 #aj ,shakespeare's phrase1 as in ,othello1 iii4 #b2 ,lover's ,complaint1 v4 #bd4 #aa ,iliad1 xii4 #bdc4 #ab ,see ,hegel's ,logic1 pp4 #beg seq4 #ac ,see p4 #aec 7 #eej74 #ad ,cf4 ,prolegomena to the ,study of ,hegel1 chaps4 xviii1 xxvi4 #ae ,as stated in p4 #afg 7,encycl4 #eed74 ,cf4 ,phenom4 d4 ,geistes1 cap4 vii1 which includes the ,religion of ,art1 and the same point of view is explicit in the first edition of the ,encyclopaedia4 #af ,philosophie der ,religion 7,werke1 xi4 #e74 #ag ,hegel1 ,phenomenologie des ,geistes 7,werke1 ii4 #ede74 ,the meeting-ground of the ,greek spirit1 as it passed through ,rome1 with ,christianity4 #ah ,ib41 p4 #ehd4 #ai ,phenomenologie des ,geistes 7,werke1 ii4 #egb74 ,thus ,hegelian idealism claims to be the philosophical counterpart of the central dogma of ,christianity4 #bj ,from the old ,provenal ,lay of ,bothius4 #ba ,it is the doctrine of the intellectus agens1 or in actu2 the actus purus of the ,schoolmen4 #bb ,einleitung in die ,philosophie1 #a1 #b4 #bc ,psychologie als ,wissenschaft1 ,vorrede4 #bd ,einleitung in die ,philosophie1 #aa1 #ab4 #be ,einleitung in die ,philosophie1 #ah3 cf4 ,werke1 ed4 ,kehrbach1 v4 #ajh4 #bf ,cf4 ,plato's remarks on the problem in the word ,self-control4 ,republ4 #dcj-a4 #bg ,lehrbuch der ,psychologie1 #bjb1 #bjc4 #bh ,allgemeine ,metaphysik1 ,vorrede4 #bi ,hauptpunkte der ,metaphysik 7#ahjf71 #ac4 #cj ,werke1 ed4 ,kehrbach 7,ueber die ,mglichkeit1 c71 v4 #if4 #ca ,ibid41 p4 #ajj4 #cb ,one might almost fancy ,herbart was translating into a general philosophic thesis the words in which ,goethe has described how he overcame a real trouble by transmuting it into an ideal shape1 e4g4 ,wahrheit und ,dichtung1 cap4 xii4 #cc ,herbart's language is almost identical with ,hegel's3 ,encycl4 #chi 7p4 #ab74 ,cf4 ,spencer1 ,psychology1 i4 #aib4 8,feelings are in all cases the materials out of which the superior tracts of consciousness and intellect are evolved40 #cd ,prolegomena to the ,study of ,hegel1 ch4 xvii4 #ce ,psychologia ,empirica1 #bi4 #cf ,as is also the case with ,herbart's metaphysical reality of the ,soul4 #cg ,human ,nature1 vii4 #b4 8,pleasure1 ,love1 and appetite1 which is also called desire1 are divers names for divers considerations of the same thing44440 ,deliberation is 7ch4 xii4 #a7 the 8alternate succession of appetite and fears40 #ch ,eth4 ii4 #dh ,schol4 #ci ,eth4 ii4 #dc ,schol43 cf4 #di ,schol4 #dj ,this wide scope of thinking 7cogitatio1 penser7 is at least as old as the ,cartesian school3 and should be kept in view1 as against a tendency to narrow its range to the mere intellect4 #da e4g4 ,analysis of the ,human ,mind1 ch4 xxiv4 8,attention is but another name for the interesting character of the idea20 ch4 xix4 8,desire and the idea of a pleasurable sensation are convertible terms40 #db ,as ,mr4 ,spencer says 7,psychology1 i4 #ada71 8,objective psychology can have no existence as such without borrowing its data from subjective psychology40 #dc ,the same failure to note that experiment is valuable only where general points of view are defined1 is a common fault in biology4 #dd ,mnsterberg1 ,aufgaben und ,methoden der ,psychologie1 p4 #add4 #de ,lehrbuch der ,psychologie1 #ed 7#bnd ed471 or #aa 7#ast ed474 #df ,see p4 #aa 7 #chg74 #dg ,cf4 ,nietzsche1 ,also sprach ,zarathustra1 i4 #dc4 8,there is more reason in thy body than in thy best wisdom40 #dh ,this language is very characteristic of the physicists who dabble in psychology and imagine they are treading in the steps of ,kant1 if not even verifying what they call his guesswork3 cf4 ,ziehen1 ,physiol4 ,psychologie1 #bnd ed4 p4 #bab4 8,in every case there is given us only the psychical series of sensations and their memory-images1 and it is only a universal hypothesis if we assume beside this psychical series a material series standing in causal relation to it4444 ,the material series is not given equally originally with the psychical40 #di ,it is the same radical feature of consciousness which is thus noted by ,mr4 ,spencer1 ,psychology1 i4 #dge4 8,perception and sensation are ever tending to exclude each other but never succeed40 8,cognition and feeling are antithetical and inseparable40 8,consciousness continues only in virtue of this conflict40 ,cf4 ,plato's resolution in the ,philebus of the contest between intelligence and feeling 7pleasure74 #ej ,it is the quasi-,aristotelian 1 defined as the step from one proposition to another1 the knowledge of which will set the first proposition in a full light4 #ea ,grundlage des ,naturrechts1 #e4 #eb ,system der ,sittenlehre1 #h1 iv4 #ec ,even though religion 7according to ,kant7 conceive them as divine commands4 #ed ,cf4 ,hegel's ,werke1 vii4 #b1 p4 #bcf 7,lecture-note on #daj74 8,we must treat as utterly empty the fancy of those who suppose that properly man should have no organic body10 c42 and see p4 #aei of the present work4 #ee ,criticism of ,pure ,reason1 ,architectonic4 #ef ,spencer1 ,psychology1 i4 #bia3 8,mind can be understood only by observing how mind is evolved40 #eg ,cf4 ,spencer1 ,principles of ,ethics1 i4 #cci3 8,the ethical sentiment proper is1 in the great mass of cases1 scarcely discernible40 #eh ,prolegomena to the ,study of ,hegel1 p4 #adc4 #ei ,windelband 7,w471 ,prludien 7#ahhd71 p4 #bhh4 #fj ,cf4 ,plato1 ,republic1 p4 #dhf4 #fa ,human ,nature3 ,morals1 ,part ,,iii4 #fb ,emotion and ,will1 ch4 xv4 #bc4 #fc ,it is characteristic of the ,kantian doctrine to absolutise the conception of ,duty and make it express the essence of the whole ethical idea4 #fd ,which are still1 as the ,socialist ,fourier says1 states of social incoherence1 specially favourable to falsehood4 #fe ,rechtsphilosophie1 #d4 #ff ,cf4 ,schelling1 ii4 #ab3 8,there are no born sons of freedom40 #fg ,simmel 7,g471 ,einleitung in die ,moralwissenschaft1 i4 #ahd4 #fh ,jenseits von ,gut und ,bse1 p4 #bbe4 #fi ,aristot4 ,polit4 i4 #f4 #gj ,plato1 ,phaedo4 #ga ,carus1 ,psyche1 p4 #a4 #gb ,see ,arist41 ,anal4 ,post4 ii4 #ai 7ed4 ,berl4 #ajj1 a4 #aj74 #gc ,cf4 ,the ,logic of ,hegel1 notes c41 p4 #dba4 #gd 8,omnia individua corpora quamvis diversis gradibus animata sunt40 ,eth4 ii4 #ac4 schol4 #ge ,nanna 7#ahdh73 ,zendavesta 7#ahea73 ,ueber die ,seelenfrage 7#ahfa74 #gf ,described by ,s4 as the rise from mere physical cause to physiological stimulus 7,reiz71 to psychical motive4 #gg ,infra1 p4 #ab4 #gh ,aristot41 ,de ,anima1 i4 c4 #d1 #e4 #gi ,wilhelm ,meister's ,wanderjahre1 i4 #aj4 #hj ,wilhelm ,meister's ,wanderjahre1 iv4 #ah4 #ha ,works like ,preyer's ,seele des ,kindes illustrate this aspect of mental evolution2 its acquirement of definite and correlated functions4 #hb ,cf4 the end of ,caleb ,balderstone 7in ,the ,bride of ,lammermoor73 8,with a fidelity sometimes displayed by the canine race1 but seldom by human beings1 he pined and died40 #hc ,see ,windischmann's letters in ,briefe von und an ,hegel4 #hd ,cf4 ,prolegomena to the ,study of ,hegel1 chaps4 xii-xiv4 #he ,kieser's ,tellurismus is1 according to ,schopenhauer1 8the fullest and most thorough text-book of ,animal ,magnetism40 #hf ,cf4 ,fichte1 ,nachgelassene ,werke1 iii4 #bie 7,tagebuch ber den animalischen ,magnetismus1 #ahac71 and ,schopenhauer1 ,der ,wille in der ,natur4 #hg ,bernheim3 ,la suggestion domine toute l'histoire de l'humanit4 #hh ,an instance from an unexpected quarter1 in ,eckermann's conversations with ,goethe3 8,in my young days ,i have experienced cases enough1 where on lonely walks there came over me a powerful yearning for a beloved girl1 and ,i thought of her so long till she actually came to meet me40 7,conversation of ,oct4 #g1 #ahbg47 #hi ,gleichsam in einer ,vorwelt1 einer diese ,welt schaffenden ,welt 7,nachgelassene ,werke1 iii4 #cba74 #ij ,selbst-bewusstsein is not self-consciousness1 in the vulgar sense of brooding over feelings and self3 but consciousness which is active and outgoing1 rather than receptive and passive4 ,it is practical1 as opposed to theoretical4 #ia ,the more detailed exposition of this ,phenomenology of ,mind is given in the book with that title3 ,hegel's ,werke1 ii4 pp4 #ga-caf4 #ib ,system der ,sittlichkeit1 p4 #ae 7see ,essay ,v74 #ic ,hegel's ,werke1 viii4 #cac1 and cf4 the passage quoted in my ,logic of ,hegel1 notes1 pp4 #chd1 #che4 #id ,hegel's ,briefe1 i4 #ae4 #ie ,kritik der ,verfassung ,deutschlands1 edited by ,g4 ,mollat 7#ahic74 ,parts of this were already given by ,haym and ,rosenkranz4 ,the same editor has also in this year published1 though not quite in full1 ,hegel's ,system der ,sittlichkeit1 to which reference is made in what follows4 #if ,in which some may find a prophecy of the effects of 8blood and iron0 in #ahff4 #ig ,die ,absolute ,regierung3 in the ,system der ,sittlichkeit1 p4 #cb3 cf4 p4 #ee4 ,hegel himself compares it to ,fichte's ,ephorate4 #ih ,die ,absolute ,regierung1 l4c4 pp4 #cg1 #ch4 #ii ,some idea of his meaning may perhaps be gathered by comparison with passages in ,wilhelm ,meister's ,wanderjahre1 ii4 #a1 #b4 #ajj ,kritik der ,verfassung1 p4 #bj4 #aja ,in some respects ,bacon's attitude in the struggle between royalty and parliament may be compared4 #ajb ,just as ,schopenhauer1 on the contrary1 always says moralisch--never sittlich4 #ajc ,grey 7,g471 ,journals of two ,expeditions of ,discovery in ,north-,west and ,western ,australia1 ii4 #bbj4 #ajd ,with some variation of ownership1 perhaps1 according to the prevalence of so-called matriarchal or patriarchal households4 #aje ,cf4 the custom in certain tribes which names the father after his child3 as if the son first gave his father legitimate position in society4 #ajf ,system der ,sittlichkeit1 p4 #h4 #ajg ,aufhebung 7positive7 as given in absolute ,sittlichkeit4 #ajh ,system der ,sittlichkeit1 p4 #ae4 #aji ,this phraseology shows the influence of ,schelling1 with whom he was at this epoch associated4 ,see ,prolegomena to the ,study of ,hegel1 ch4 xiv4 #aaj ,cf4 the intermediate function assigned 7see above1 p4 clxxxiii7 to the priests and the aged4 #aaa ,system der ,sittlichkeit1 p4 #ai4 #aab ,see infra1 p4 #aef4 #aac ,wordsworth's ,laodamia4 #aad 8,for it's ,tommy this1 an' ,tommy that1 an' #8,chuck him out1 the brute6' ,but it's #8,saviour of 'is country' when the guns begin to shoot40 #aae 8,i can assure you10 said ,werner 7the merchant71 8that ,i never reflected on the ,state in my life4 ,my tolls1 charges and dues ,i have paid for no other reason than that it was established usage40 7,wilh4 ,meisters ,lehrjahre1 viii4 #b47 #aaf ,system der ,sittlichkeit1 p4 #dj4 #aag ,system der ,sittlichkeit1 p4 #fe4 #aah ,ibid4 p4 #df4 #aai ,natrliche ,seele4 #abj ,natrliche ,qualitten4 #aba ,empfindung4 #abb ,die fhlende ,seele4 #abc ,plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns1 who supposed that the ,platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorised their belief in the sublimity of the revelations of somnambulistic vision4 ,plato says in the ,timaeus 7p4 #ga71 8,the author of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measure of truth1 and in the liver placed their oracle 7the power of divination by dreams74 ,and herein is a proof that ,god has given the art of divination1 not to the wisdom1 but1 to the foolishness of man2 for no man when in his wits attains prophetic truth and inspiration2 but when he receives the inspired word1 either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep1 or he is demented by some distemper or possession 7enthusiasm740 ,plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily conditions on which such visionary knowledge depends1 and the possibility of the truth of the dreams1 but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind4 #abd ,selbstgefhl4 #abe ,gewohnheit4 #abf ,die wirkliche ,seele4 #abg ,das ,bewutsein als solches3 7a7 ,das sinnliche ,bewutsein4 #abh ,wahrnehmung4 #abi ,der ,verstand4 #acj ,selbstbewutsein4 #aca ,die ,begierde4 #acb ,das anerkennende ,selbstbewutsein4 #acc ,die ,vernunft4 #acd ,der ,geist4 #ace ,die ,intelligenz4 #acf ,anschauung4 #acg ,vorstellung4 #ach ,die ,erinnerung4 #aci ,die ,einbildungskraft4 #adj ,phantasie4 #ada ,gedchtni4 #adb ,auswendiges4 #adc ,inwendiges4 #add ,das ,denken4 #ade ,der praktische ,geist4 #adf ,der praktische ,gefhl4 #adg ,der ,triebe und die ,willkhr4 #adh ,die ,glckseligkeit4 #adi ,der freie ,geist4 #aej ,gesess4 #aea ,sitte4 #aeb ,das ,recht4 #aec ,moralitt4 #aed ,naturrecht4 #aee ,moralitt4 #aef ,der ,vorsatz4 #aeg ,that4 #aeh ,handlung4 #aei ,die ,absicht und das ,wohl4 #afj ,das ,gute und das ,bse4 #afa ,die ,sittlichkeit4 #afb ,die brgerliche ,gesellschaft4 #afc ,das ,system der ,bedrfnisse4 #afd ,die ,rechtspflege4 #afe ,gese4 #aff ,die ,polizei und die ,corporation4 #afg ,inneres ,staatsrecht4 #afh ,das uere ,staatsrecht4 #afi ,die ,weltgeschichte4 #agj ,weltweisheit4 #aga ,der absolute ,geist4 #agb ,die geoffenbarte ,religion4 #agc ,the citation given by ,hegel from ,schlegel's translation is here replaced by the version 7in one or two points different7 in the ,sacred ,books of the ,east1 vol4 viii4 #agd ,in order to give a clearer impression of it1 ,i cannot refrain from quoting a few passages1 which may at the same time give some indication of the marvellous skill of ,rckert1 from whom they are taken1 as a translator4 ,for ,rckert's verses a version is here substituted in which ,i have been kindly helped by ,miss ,may ,kendall4 ,,iii4 ,i saw but ,one through all heaven's starry spaces gleaming3 ,i saw but ,one in all sea billows wildly streaming4 ,i looked into the heart1 a waste of worlds1 a sea1-- ,i saw a thousand dreams1--yet ,one amid all dreaming4 ,and earth1 air1 water1 fire1 when thy decree is given1 ,are molten into ,one3 against thee none hath striven4 ,there is no living heart but beats unfailingly ,in the one song of praise to thee1 from earth and heaven4 ,v4 ,as one ray of thy light appears the noonday sun1 ,but yet thy light and mine eternally are one4 ,as dust beneath thy feet the heaven that rolls on high3 ,yet only one1 and one for ever1 thou and ,i4 ,the dust may turn to heaven1 and heaven to dust decay2 ,yet art thou one with me1 and shalt be one for aye4 ,how may the words of life that fill heaven's utmost part ,rest in the narrow casket of one poor human heart8 ,how can the sun's own rays1 a fairer gleam to fling1 ,hide in a lowly husk1 the jewel's covering8 ,how may the rose-grove all its glorious bloom unfold1 ,drinking in mire and slime1 and feeding on the mould8 ,how can the darksome shell that sips the salt sea stream ,fashion a shining pearl1 the sunlight's joyous beam8 ,oh1 heart6 should warm winds fan thee1 should'st thou floods endure1 ,one element are wind and flood2 but be thou pure4 ,,ix4 ,i'll tell thee how from out the dust ,god moulded man1-- ,because the breath of ,love ,he breathed into his clay3 ,i'll tell thee why the spheres their whirling paths began1-- ,they mirror to ,god's throne ,love's glory day by day3 ,i'll tell thee why the morning winds blow o'er the grove1-- ,it is to bid ,love's roses bloom abundantly3 ,i'll tell thee why the night broods deep the earth above1-- ,love's bridal tent to deck with sacred canopy3 ,all riddles of the earth dost thou desire to prove8-- ,to every earthly riddle is ,love alone the key4 ,,xv4 ,life shrinks from ,death in woe and fear1 ,though ,death ends well ,life's bitter need3 ,so shrinks the heart when ,love draws near1 ,as though 'twere ,death in very deed3 ,for wheresoever ,love finds room1 ,there ,self1 the sullen tyrant1 dies4 ,so let him perish in the gloom1-- ,thou to the dawn of freedom rise4 ,in this poetry1 which soars over all that is external and sensuous1 who would recognise the prosaic ideas current about so-called pantheism--ideas which let the divine sink to the external and the sensuous8 ,the copious extracts which ,tholuck1 in his work ,anthology from the ,eastern ,mystics1 gives us from the poems of ,jelaleddin and others1 are made from the very point of view now under discussion4 ,in his ,introduction1 ,herr ,tholuck proves how profoundly his soul has caught the note of mysticism2 and there1 too1 he points out the characteristic traits of its oriental phase1 in distinction from that of the ,west and ,christendom4 ,with all their divergence1 however1 they have in common the mystical character4 ,the conjunction of ,mysticism with so-called ,pantheism1 as he says 7p4 #ec71 implies that inward quickening of soul and spirit which inevitably tends to annihilate that external ,everything1 which ,pantheism is usually held to adore4 ,but beyond that1 ,herr ,tholuck leaves matters standing at the usual indistinct conception of ,pantheism2 a profounder discussion of it would have had1 for the author's emotional ,christianity1 no direct interest2 but we see that personally he is carried away by remarkable enthusiasm for a mysticism which1 in the ordinary phrase1 entirely deserves the epithet ,pantheistic4 ,where1 however1 he tries philosophising 7p4 #ab71 he does not get beyond the standpoint of the 8rationalist0 metaphysic with its uncritical categories4