,contents ,dedicatory ,preface ,footnotes ,,doctrine ,,of ,,the ,,will4 ,,by ,,rev4 ,a4 ,,mahan1 ,,president ,,of ,,the ,,oberlin ,,collegiate ,,institute4 ,not man alone1 all rationals ,heaven arms ,with an illustrious1 but tremendous power1 ,to counteract its own most gracious ends2 ,and this1 of strict necessity1 not choice2 ,that power denied1 men1 angels1 were no more ,but passive engines void of praise or blame4 ,a nature rational implies the power ,of being blest1 or wretched1 as we please4 ,man falls by man1 if finally he falls2 ,and fall he must1 who learns from death alone1 ,the dreadful secret--,that he lives for ever4 ,,young4 ,,new ,,york3 ,,mark ,h4 ,,newman1 #aii ,,broadway4 ,,oberlin2 ,,ohio3 ,r4 ,e4 ,,gillet4 #ahde4 ,entered according to an ,act of ,congress1 in the year #ahdd1 by ,,asa ,,mahan1 ,in the ,clerk's ,office of the ,district ,court of the ,united ,states1 for the ,southern ,district of ,new ,york4 ,s4 ,w4 ,,benedict ,,co41 ,,ster4 ,,print41 #af ,spruce street4 ,,contents4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,introductory ,,observations4--,importance of the ,subject--,true and false ,methods of ,inquiry--,common ,fault--,proper ,method of ,reasoning from ,revelation to the ,system of ,mental ,philosophy therein pre-supposed--,errors of ,method ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,classification ,,of ,,the ,,mental ,,faculties4--,classification verified ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,liberty ,,and ,,necessity4--,terms defined--,characteristics of the above ,definitions--,motive defined--,liberty as opposed to ,necessity1 the ,characteristic of the ,will--,objections to ,doctrine of ,necessity--,doctrine of ,liberty1 direct ,argument--,objection to an ,appeal to ,consciousness--,doctrine of ,liberty argued from the existence of the idea of ,liberty in all ,minds--,the ,doctrine of ,liberty1 the ,doctrine of the ,bible--,necessity as held by ,necessitarians--,the term ,certainty1 as used by them--,doctrine of ,ability1 according to the ,necessitarian ,scheme--,sinful inclinations--,necessitarian ,doctrine of ,liberty--,ground which ,necessitarians are bound to take in respect to the ,doctrine of ,ability--,doctrine of ,necessity1 as regarded by ,necessitarians of different ,schools ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,extent ,,and ,,limits ,,of ,,the ,,liberty ,,of ,,the ,,will4--,strongest ,motive--,reasoning in a ,circle ,,chapter ,v4 ,,greatest ,,apparent ,,good4--,phrase defined--,its meaning according to ,edwards--,the ,will not always as the ,dictates of the ,intelligence--,not always as the strongest desire--,nor as the ,intelligence and ,sensibility combined--,necessitarian ,argument--,motives cause acts of the ,will1 in what sense--,particular ,volitions1 how accounted for--,facts wrongly accounted for--,choosing between ,objects known to be equal1 how treated by ,necessitarians--,palpable ,mistake ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,doctrine ,,of ,,liberty ,,and ,,the ,,divine ,,prescience4--,dangers to be avoided--,mistake respecting ,divine ,prescience--,inconsistency of ,necessitarians--,necessitarian ,objection ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,doctrine ,,of ,,liberty ,,and ,,the ,,divine ,,purposes ,,and ,,agency4--,god's ,purposes consistent with the ,liberty of ,creatures--,senses in which ,god purposed moral ,good and ,evil--,death of the ,incorrigible preordained1 but not willed--,god not responsible for their ,death--,sin a ,mystery--,conclusion from the above ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,obligation ,,predicable ,,only ,,of ,,the ,,will4--,men not responsible for the ,sin of their progenitors--,constitutional ,ill-desert--,present ,impossibilities not required ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,standard ,,of ,,moral ,,character4--,sincerity1 and not ,intensity1 the true ,standard ,,chapter ,x4 ,,moral ,,acts ,,never ,,of ,a ,,mixed ,,character4--,acts of ,will resulting from a variety of ,motives--,loving with a greater ,intensity at one time than another--,momentary ,revolutions of ,character ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,relations ,,of ,,the ,,will ,,to ,,the ,,intelligence ,,and ,,sensibility1 ,,in ,,states ,,morally ,,right1 ,,or ,,wrong4--,those who are and are not virtuous1 how distinguished--,selfishness and ,benevolence--,common ,mistake--,defective forms of ,virtue--,test of ,conformity to ,moral ,principle--,common ,mistake--,love as required by the ,moral ,law--,identity of ,character among all ,beings morally ,virtuous ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,element ,,of ,,the ,,will ,,in ,,complex ,,phenomena4--,natural ,propensities--,sensation1 ,emotion1 ,desire1 and ,wish defined--,anger1 ,pride1 ,ambition1 c4--,religious ,affections--,repentance--,love--,faith- - ,convictions1 ,feelings and external ,actions1 why required or prohibited-- ,our ,responsibility in respect to such ,phenomena--,feelings how controlled by the ,will--,relation of ,faith to other ,exercises morally right ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,influence ,,of ,,the ,,will ,,in ,,intellectual ,,judgments4--,men often voluntary in their ,opinions--,error not from the ,intelligence1 but ,will--,primary ,faculties cannot err--,so of the secondary ,faculties--,assumptions-- ,pre-judgments--,intellect not deceived in ,pre-judgments--,mind1 how influenced by them--,influences which induce false ,assumptions--,cases in which we are apparently1 though not really1 misled by the ,intelligence ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,liberty ,,and ,,servitude4--,liberty as opposed to moral ,servitude--,mistake of ,german ,metaphysicians--,moral ,servitude of the race ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,liberty ,,and ,,dependence4--,common ,impression--,spirit of ,dependence--,doctrine of ,necessity tends not to induce this ,spirit--,doctrine of ,liberty does--,god controls all ,influences under which ,creatures act--,dependence on account of moral ,servitude ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,formation ,,of ,,character4--,commonly how accounted for--,the voluntary element to be taken into the account--,example in ,illustration-- ,diversities of ,character ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,concluding ,,reflections4--,objection1 ,the ,will has its ,laws--,objection1 ,god dethroned from his ,supremacy if the ,doctrine of ,liberty is true--,great and good ,men have held the doctrine of ,necessity--,last ,resort--,willing and aiming to perform impossibilities--,thought at ,parting ,,dedicatory ,,preface4 ,to one whose aim is1 to serve his generation according to the ,will of ,god1 but two reasons would seem to justify an individual in claiming the attention of the public in the capacity of an author--the existence in the public mind of a want which needs to be met1 and the full belief1 that the ,work which he has produced is adapted to meet that want4 ,under the influence of these two considerations1 the following ,treatise is presented to the public4 ,whether the author has judged rightly or not1 it is not for him to decide4 ,the decision of that question is left with the public1 to whom the ,work is now presented4 ,it is doubtful1 whether any work1 prepared with much thought and pains-taking1 was ever published with the conviction1 on the part of the author1 that it was unworthy of public regard4 ,the community1 however1 may differ from him entirely on the subject2 and1 as a consequence1 a work which he regards as so imperiously demanded by the public interest1 falls dead from the press4 ,many an author1 thus disappointed1 has had occasion to be reminded of the admonition1 ,ye have need of patience4 ,whether the following ,treatise shall succeed in gaining the public ear1 or not1 one consolation will remain with the writer1 the publication of the work has satisfied his sense of duty4 ,to his respected ,associates in the ,institution over which he presides1 ,associates with whose approbation and counsel the work was prepared1 the ,author would take this occasion publicly to express his grateful acknowledgments for the many important suggestions which he received from them1 during the progress of its preparation4 ,having said thus much1 he would simply add1 that1 ,,to ,,the ,,lovers ,,of ,,truth1 ,,the ,,work ,,is ,,now ,,respectfully ,,dedicated1 ,,with ,,the ,,kind ,,regards ,,of ,,the ,,author4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,introductory ,,observations4 ,,importance ,,of ,,the ,,subject4 ,,the doctrine of the ,will is a cardinal doctrine of theology1 as well as of mental philosophy4 ,this doctrine1 to say the least1 is one of the great central points1 from which the various different and conflicting systems of theological1 mental1 and moral science1 take their departure4 ,to determine a man's sentiments in respect to the ,will1 is to determine his position1 in most important respects1 as a theologian1 and mental and moral philosopher4 ,if we turn our thoughts inward1 for the purpose of knowing what we are1 what we ought to do1 and to be1 and what we shall become1 as the result of being and doing what we ought or ought not1 this doctrine presents itself at once1 as one of the great pivots on which the resolution of all these questions turns4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we turn our thoughts from ourselves1 to a study of the character of ,god1 and of the nature and character of the government which ,he exercises over rational beings1 all our apprehensions here1 all our notions in respect to the nature and desert of sin and holiness1 will1 in many fundamental particulars1 be determined by our notions in respect to the ,will4 ,in other words1 our apprehensions of the nature and character of the ,divine government1 must be determined1 in most important respects1 by our conceptions of the nature and powers of the subjects of that government4 ,i have no wish to conceal from the reader the true bearing of our present inquiries4 ,i wish him distinctly to understand1 that in fixing his notions in respect to the doctrine of the ,will1 he is determining a point of observation from which1 and a medium through which1 he shall contemplate his own character and deserts as a moral agent1 and the nature and character of that ,divine government1 under which he must ever live1 and move1 and have his being4 ,,true ,,and ,,false ,,methods ,,of ,,inquiry4 ,such being the bearing of our present inquiries1 an important question arises1 to wit3 ,what should be the influence of such considerations upon our investigations in this department of mental science ,it should not surely induce us1 as appears to be true in the case of many divines and philosophers even1 first to form our system of theology1 and then1 in the light of that1 to determine our theory of the ,will4 ,the true science of the ,will1 as well as that of all ether departments of mental philosophy1 does not come by observation1 but by internal reflection4 ,because our doctrine of the ,will1 whether true or false1 will have a controlling influence in determining the character of our theology1 and the meaning which we shall attach to large portions of the ,bible1 that doctrine does not1 for that reason1 lose its exclusively psychological character4 ,every legitimate question pertaining to it1 still remains purely and exclusively a psychological question4 ,the mind has but one eye by which it can see itself1 and that is the eye of consciousness4 ,this1 then1 is the organ of vision to be exclusively employed in all our inquiries in every department of mental science1 and in none more exclusively than in that of the ,will4 ,we know very well1 for example1 that the science of optics has a fundamental bearing upon that of ,astronomy4 ,what if a philosopher1 for that reason1 should form his theory of optics by looking at the stars8 ,this would be perfectly analogous to the conduct of a divine or philosopher who should determine his theory of the ,will1 not by psychological reflection1 but by a system of theology formed without such reflection4 ,suppose again1 that the science of ,geometry had the same influence in theology1 that that of the ,will now has4 ,this fact would not change at all the nature of that science1 nor the mode proper in conducting our investigations in respect to it4 ,it would still remain a science of demonstration1 with all its principles and rules of investigation unchanged4 ,so with the doctrine of the ,will4 ,whatever its bearings upon other sciences may be1 it still remains no less exclusively a psychological science4 ,it has its own principles and laws of investigation1 principles and laws as independent of systems of theology1 as the principles and laws of the science of optics are of those of ,astronomy4 ,in pursuing our investigations in all other departments of mental science1 we1 for the time being1 cease to be theologians4 ,we become mental philosophers4 ,why should the study of the ,will be an exception8 ,the question now returns--what should be the bearing of the fact1 that our theory of the ,will1 whether right or wrong1 will have an important influence in determining our system of theology8 ,this surely should be its influence4 ,it should induce in us great care and caution in our investigations in this department of mental science4 ,we are laying the foundation of the most important edifice of which it ever entered into the heart of man to conceive--an edifice1 all the parts1 dimensions1 and proportions of which1 we are required most sedulously to conform to the pattern shown us in the mount4 ,under such circumstances1 who should not be admonished1 that he should dig deep1 and lay his foundation upon a rock8 ,i will therefore1 in view of what has been said above1 earnestly bespeak four things of the reader of the following treatise4 #a4 ,that he read it as an honest1 earnest inquirer after truth4 #b4 ,that he give that degree of attention to the work1 that is requisite to an understanding of it4 #c4 ,that when he dissents from any of its fundamental principles1 he will distinctly state to his own mind the reason and ground of that dissent1 and carefully investigate its validity4 ,if these principles are wrong1 such an investigation will render the truth more conspicuous to the mind1 confirm the mind in the truth1 and furnish it with means to overturn the opposite error4 #d4 ,that he pursue his investigations with implicit confidence in the distinct affirmations of his own consciousness in respect to this subject4 ,such a suggestion would appear truly singular1 if made in respect to any other department of mental science but that of the ,will4 ,here it is imperiously called for so long have philosophers and divines been accustomed to look without1 to determine the characteristics of phenomena which appear exclusively within1 and which are revealed to the eye of consciousness only4 ,having been so long under the influence of this pernicious habit1 it will require somewhat of an effort for the mind to turn its organ of self-vision in upon itself1 for the purpose of correctly reporting to itself1 what is really passing in that inner sanctuary4 ,especially will it require an effort to do this1 with a fixed determination to abandon all theories formed from external observation1 and to follow implicitly the results of observations made internally4 ,this method we must adopt1 however1 or there is at once an end of all real science1 not only in respect to the ,will1 but to all other departments of the mind4 ,suppose an individual to commence a treatise on colors1 for example1 with a denial of the validity of all affirmations of the ,intelligence through the eye1 in respect to the phenomena about which he is to treat4 ,what would be thought of such a treatise8 ,the moment we deny the validity of the affirmations of any of our faculties1 in respect to the appropriate objects of those faculties1 all reasoning about those objects becomes the height of absurdity4 ,so in respect to the mind4 ,if we doubt or deny the validity of the affirmations of consciousness in respect to the nature and characteristics of all mental operations1 mental philosophy becomes impossible1 and all reasoning in respect to the mind perfectly absurd4 ,implicit confidence in the distinct affirmations of consciousness1 is a fundamental law of all correct philosophizing in every department of mental science4 ,permit me most earnestly to bespeak this confidence1 as we pursue our investigations in respect to the ,will4 ,,common ,,fault4 ,it may be important here to notice a common fault in the method frequently adopted by philosophers in their investigations in this department of mental science4 ,in the most celebrated treatise that has ever appeared upon this subject1 the writer does not recollect to have met with a single appeal to consciousness1 the only adequate witness in the case4 ,the whole treatise1 almost1 consists of a series of syllogisms1 linked together with apparent perfectness1 syllogisms pertaining to an abstract something called ,will4 ,throughout the whole1 the facts of consciousness are never appealed to4 ,in fact1 in instances not a few1 among writers of the same school1 the right to make such an appeal1 on the ground of the total inadequacy of consciousness to give testimony in the case1 has been formally denied4 ,would it be at all strange1 if it should turn out that all the fundamental results of investigations conducted after such a method1 should be wholly inapplicable to the ,will1 the phenomena of which lie under the eye of consciousness1 or to stand in plain contradiction to the phenomena thus affirmed8 ,what1 from the method adopted1 we see is very likely to take place1 we find1 from experience1 to be actually true of the treatise above referred to4 ,this is noticed by the distinguished author of ,the ,natural ,history of ,enthusiasm1 in an ,essay introductory to ,edwards on the ,will4 ,even the reader1 he says1 who is scarcely at all familiar with abstruse science1 will1 if he follow our author attentively1 be perpetually conscious of a vague dissatisfaction1 or latent suspicion1 that some fallacy has passed into the train of propositions1 although the linking of syllogisms seems perfect4 ,this suspicion will increase in strength as he proceeds1 and will at length condense itself into the form of a protest against certain conclusions1 notwithstanding their apparently necessary connection with the premises4 ,what should we expect from a treatise on mental science1 from which the affirmations of consciousness should be formally excluded1 as grounds of any important conclusions8 ,just what we find to be true1 in fact1 of the above named treatise on the ,will2 to wit3 all its fundamental conclusions positively contradicted by such affirmations4 ,what if the decisions of our courts of justice were based upon data from which the testimony of all material witnesses has been formally excluded8 ,who would look to such decisions as the exponents of truth and justice8 ,yet all the elements in those decisions may be the necessary logical consequents of the data actually assumed4 ,such decisions may be all wrong1 however1 from the fact that the data which ought to be assumed in the case1 were excluded4 ,the same will1 almost of necessity1 be true of all treatises1 in every department of mental science1 which are not based upon the facts of consciousness4 ,,proper ,,method ,,of ,,reasoning ,,from ,,revelation ,,to ,,the ,,system ,,of ,,mental ,,philosophy ,,therein ,,pre-,,supposed4 ,by what has been said1 the reader will not understand me as denying the propriety of comparing our conclusions in mental science with the ,bible4 ,though no system of mental philosophy is directly revealed in the ,bible1 some one system is therein pre-supposed1 and assuming1 as we do1 that the ,scriptures are a revelation from ,god1 we must suppose that the system of mental science assumed in the sacred writings1 is the true system4 ,if we could find the system pre-supposed in the ,bible1 we should have an infallible standard by which to test the validity of any conclusions to which we have arrived1 as the results of psychological investigation4 ,it is therefore a very legitimate1 interesting1 and profitable inquiry--what is the system of mental science assumed as true in the ,bible8 ,we may very properly turn our attention to the solution of such a question4 ,in doing this1 however1 two things should be kept distinctly in mind4 #a4 ,in such inquiries1 we leave the domain of mental philosophy entirely1 and enter that of theology4 ,in the latter we are to be guided by principles entirely distinct from those demanded in the former4 #b4 ,in reasoning from the ,bible to the system of mental philosophy pre-supposed in the ,scriptures1 we are in danger of assuming wrong data as the basis of our conclusions that is1 we are in danger of drawing our inferences from those truths of ,scripture which have no legitimate bearing upon the subject1 and of overlooking those which do have such a bearing4 ,while there are truths of inspiration from which we may properly reason to the theory of the ,will1 pre-supposed in the ,bible1 there are other truths from which we cannot legitimately thus reason4 ,now suppose that we have drawn our conclusions from truths of inspiration which have no legitimate bearing upon the subject1 truths which1 if we do reason from them in the case1 will lead us to wrong conclusions2 suppose that in the light of such conclusions we have explained the facts of consciousness1 assuming that such must be their true character1 else we deny the ,bible4 ,shall we not then have almost inextricably lost ourselves in the labyrinth of error8 ,the following principles may be laid down as universally binding1 if we would reason correctly1 as philosophers and theologians1 on the subject under consideration4 #a4 ,in the domain of philosophy1 we must confine ourselves strictly and exclusively to the laws of psychological investigation1 without reference to any system of theology4 #b4 ,in the domain of theology1 when we would reason from the truths of inspiration to the theory of the ,will pre-supposed in the ,bible1 we should be exceedingly careful to reason from those truths only which have a direct and decisive bearing upon the subject1 and not from those which have no such bearing4 #c4 ,we should carefully compare the conclusions to which we have arrived in each of these domains1 assuming that if they do not harmonize1 we have erred either as philosophers or theologians4 #d4 ,in case of disagreement1 we should renew our independent investigations in each domain1 for the purpose of detecting the error into which we have fallen4 ,in conducting an investigation upon such principles1 we shall1 with almost absolute certainty1 find ourselves in each domain1 following rays of light1 which will converge together in the true theory of the ,will4 ,,errors ,,of ,,method4 ,two errors into which philosophers and divines of a certain class have fallen in their method of treating the department of our subject now under consideration1 here demand a passing notice4 #a4 ,the two methods above referred to1 the psychological and theological1 which should at all times be kept entirely distinct and separate1 have unhappily been mingled together4 ,thus the subject has failed to receive a proper investigation in the domain1 either of theology or of philosophy4 #b4 ,in reasoning from the ,scriptures to the theory of the ,will pre-supposed in the same1 the wrong truth has been adduced as the basis of such reasoning1 to wit3 the fact of the ,divine foreknowledge4 ,as all events yet future are foreknown to ,god1 they are in themselves1 it is said1 alike certain4 ,this certainty necessitates the adoption of a particular theory of the ,will4 ,now before we can draw any such conclusion from the truth before us1 the following things pertaining to it we need to know with absolute certainty1 things which ,god has not revealed1 and which we never can know1 until ,he has revealed them1 to wit3 the mode1 the nature1 and the degree of the ,divine foreknowledge4 ,suppose that ,god should impart to us apprehensions perfectly full and distinct1 of the mode1 nature and degree of ,his foreknowledge of human conduct4 ,how do we know but that we should then see with the most perfect clearness1 that this foreknowledge is just as consistent with the theory of the ,will1 denied by the philosophers and divines under consideration1 as with that which they suppose necessarily to result from the ,divine foreknowledge8 ,this1 then1 is not the truth from which we should reason to the theory of the ,will pre-supposed in the ,bible4 ,there are truths of inspiration1 however1 which appear to me to have a direct and decisive bearing upon this subject1 and upon which we may therefore safely base our conclusions4 ,in the ,scriptures1 man is addressed as a moral agent1 the subject of commands and prohibitions1 of obligation1 of merit and demerit1 and consequently of reward and punishment4 ,now when we have determined the powers which an agent must possess1 to render him a proper subject of command and prohibition1 of obligation1 of merit and demerit1 and consequently of reward and punishment1 we have determined the philosophy of the ,will1 really pre-supposed in the ,scriptures4 ,beneath these truths1 therefore1 and not beneath that of the divine foreknowledge1 that philosophy is to be sought for4 ,this ,i argue-- #a4 ,because the former has a direct1 while the latter has only an indirect bearing upon the subject4 #b4 ,of the former our ideas are perfectly clear and distinct1 while of the mode1 the degree1 and the nature of the ,divine foreknowledge we are profoundly ignorant4 ,to all eternity1 our ideas of the nature of commands and prohibitions1 of obligations1 of merit and demerit1 and of reward and punishment grounded on moral desert1 can never be more clear and distinct than they now are4 ,from such truths1 then1 and not from those that we do not understand1 and which at the utmost have only an indirect bearing upon the subject1 we ought to reason1 if we reason at all1 to the philosophy of the ,will pre-supposed in the ,scriptures4 ,the reader is now put in possession of the method that will be pursued in the following treatise1 and is consequently prepared to enter upon the investigation of the subject before us4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,classification ,,of ,,the ,,mental ,,faculties4 ,,every individual who has reflected with any degree of interest upon the operations of his own mind1 cannot have failed to notice three classes of mental phenomena1 each of which is entirely distinct from either of the others4 ,these phenomena1 which comprehend the entire operations of the mind1 and which may be expressed by the terms thinking1 feeling1 and willing1 clearly indicate in the mind three faculties equally distinct from one another4 ,these faculties are denominated the ,intellect1 the ,sensibility or ,sensitivity1 and the ,will4 ,to the first1 all intellectual operations1 such as perceiving1 thinking1 judging1 knowing1 c41 are referred4 ,to the second1 we refer all sensitive states1 all feelings1 such as sensations1 emotions1 desires1 c4 ,to the ,will1 or the active voluntary faculty1 are referred all mental determinations1 such as purposes1 intentions1 resolutions1 choices and volitions4 ,,classification ,,verified4 #a4 ,the classes of phenomena1 by which this tri-unity of the mental powers is indicated1 differ from one another1 not in degree1 but in kind4 ,thought1 whether clear or obscure1 in all degrees1 remains equally distinct1 in its nature1 from feelings and determinations of every class4 ,so of feelings4 ,sensations1 emotions1 desires1 all the phenomena of the ,sensibility1 in all degrees and modifications1 remain1 in their nature and essential characteristics1 equally distinct from thought on the one hand1 and the action of the ,will on the other4 ,the same holds true of the phenomena of the ,will4 ,a resolution1 for example1 in one degree1 is not a thought in another1 a sensation1 emotion1 or desire and in another a choice1 purpose1 intention1 or volition4 ,in all degrees and modifications1 the phenomena of the ,will1 in their nature and essential characteristics1 remain equally distinct from the operations of the ,intelligence on the one hand1 and of the ,sensibility on the other4 #b4 ,this distinction is recognized by universal consciousness4 ,when1 for example1 one speaks of thinking of any particular object1 then of desiring it1 and subsequently of determining to obtain the object1 for the purpose of gratifying that desire1 all mankind most clearly recognize his meaning in each of the above-named affirmations1 and understand him as speaking of three entirely distinct classes of mental operations4 ,no person1 under such circumstances1 ever confounds one of these states with either of the others4 ,so clearly marked and distinguished is the three-fold classification of mental phenomena under consideration1 in the spontaneous affirmations of universal consciousness4 #c4 ,in all languages1 also1 there are distinct terms appropriated to the expression of these three classes of phenomena1 and of the mental power indicated by the same4 ,in the ,english language1 for example1 we have the terms thinking1 feeling1 and willing1 each of which is applied to one particular class of these mental phenomena1 and never to either of the others4 ,we have also the terms ,intellect1 ,sensibility1 and ,will1 appropriated1 in a similar manner1 to designate the mental powers indicated by these phenomena4 ,in all other languages1 especially among nations of any considerable advancement in mental culture1 we find terms of precisely similar designation4 ,what do such facts indicate8 ,they clearly show1 that in the development of the universal ,intelligence1 the different classes of phenomena under consideration have been distinctly marked1 and distinguished from one another1 together with the three-fold division of the mental powers indicated by the same phenomena4 #d4 ,the clearness and particularity with which the universal intelligence has marked the distinction under consideration1 is strikingly indicated by the fact1 that there are qualifying terms in common use which are applied to each of these classes of phenomena1 and never to either of the others4 ,it is true that there are such terms which are promiscuously applied to all classes of mental phenomena4 ,there are terms1 however1 which are never applied to but one class4 ,thus we speak of clear thoughts1 but never of clear feelings or determinations4 ,we speak of irrepressible feelings and desires1 but never of irrepressible thoughts or resolutions4 ,we also speak of inflexible determinations1 but never of inflexible feelings or conceptions4 ,with what perfect distinctness1 then1 must universal consciousness have marked thoughts1 feelings1 and determinations of the ,will1 as phenomena entirely distinct from one another--phenomena differing not in degree1 but in kind1 and as most clearly indicating the three-fold division of the mental powers under consideration4 #e4 ,so familiar are mankind with this distinction1 so distinctly marked is it in their minds1 that in familiar intercourse1 when no particular theory of the mental powers is in contemplation1 they are accustomed to speak of the ,intellect1 ,sensibility1 and ,will1 and of their respective phenomena1 as entirely distinct from one another4 ,take a single example from ,scripture4 ,what ,i shall choose1 ,i wot not--having a desire to depart4 ,here the ,apostle evidently speaks of desire and choice as phenomena differing in kind1 and not in degree4 ,if you engage his heart his feelings1 says ,lord ,chesterfield1 speaking of a foreign minister1 you have a fair chance of imposing upon his understanding1 and determining his ,will4 ,his ,will1 says another writer1 speaking of the insane1 is no longer restrained by his ,judgment1 but driven madly on by his passions4 ,when wit is overruled by ,will1 ,and ,will is led by fond ,desire1 ,then ,reason may as well be still1 ,as speaking1 kindle greater fire4#a ,in all the above extracts the tri-unity of the mental powers1 as consisting of the ,intellect1 ,sensibility1 and ,will1 is distinctly recognized4 ,yet the writers had1 at the time1 no particular theory of mental philosophy in contemplation4 ,they speak of a distinction of the mental faculties which all understand and recognize as real1 as soon as suggested to their minds4 ,the above considerations are abundantly sufficient to verify the three-fold distinction above made1 of mental phenomena and powers4 ,two suggestions arise here which demand special attention4 #a4 ,to confound either of these distinct powers of the mind with either of the others1 as has been done by several philosophers of eminence1 in respect to the ,will and ,sensibility1 is a capital error in mental science4 ,if one faculty is confounded with another1 the fundamental characteristics of the former will of course be confounded with the same characteristics of the latter4 ,thus the worst forms of error will be introduced not only into philosophy1 but theology1 too1 as far as the latter science is influenced by the former4 ,what would be thought of a treatise on mental science1 in which the ,will should be confounded with the ,intelligence1 and in which thinking and willing would be consequently represented as phenomena identical in kind8 ,this would be an error no more capital1 no more glaring1 no more distinctly contradicted by fundamental phenomena1 than the confounding of the ,will with the ,sensibility4 #b4 ,we are now prepared to contemplate one of the great errors of ,edwards in his immortal work on the ,will--an error which we meet with in the commencement of that work1 and which lays a broad foundation for the false conclusions subsequently found in it4 ,he has confounded the ,will with the ,sensibility4 ,of course1 we should expect to find that he has subsequently confounded the fundamental characteristics of the phenomena of the former faculty1 with the same characteristics of the latter4 ,god has endowed the soul1 he says1 with two faculties3 ,one is that by which it is capable of perception and speculation1 or by which it discerns1 and views1 and judges of things2 which is called the understanding4 ,the other faculty is that by which the soul does not merely perceive and view things1 but is some way inclined to them1 or is disinclined and averse from them2 or is the faculty by which the soul does not behold things as an indifferent1 unaffected spectator2 but either as liking or disliking1 pleased or displeased1 approving or rejecting4 ,this faculty1 as it has respect to the actions that are determined by it1 is called the ,will4 ,from his work on the ,affections1 ,i cite the following to the same import3 ,the ,affections of the soul1 he observes1 are not properly distinguished from the ,will1 as though they were two faculties of the soul4 ,all acts of the ,affections of the soul are1 in some sense1 acts of the ,will1 and all acts of the ,will are acts of the affections4 ,all exercises of the ,will are1 in some degree or other1 exercises of the soul's appetition or aversion2 or which is the same thing1 of its love or hatred4 ,the soul wills one thing rather than another1 or chooses one thing rather than another1 no otherwise than as it loves one thing more than another4 ,the ,affections are only certain modes of the exercise of the ,will4 ,the ,affections are no other than the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul4 ,whether he has or has not subsequently confounded the fundamental characteristics of the phenomena of the ,will with those of the phenomena of the ,sensibility will be seen in the progress of the present treatise4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,liberty ,,and ,,necessity4 ,,we come now to consider the great and fundamental characteristic of the ,will1 that by which it is1 in a special sense1 distinguished from each of the other mental faculties1 to wit3 that of ,liberty4 ,,sec4 ,i4 ,,terms ,,defined4 ,our first inquiry respects the meaning of the term ,liberty as distinguished from that of ,necessity4 ,these terms do not differ1 as expressing genus and species2 that is1 ,liberty does not designate a species of which ,necessity expresses the genus4 ,on the other hand1 they differ by way of opposition4 ,all correct definitions of terms thus related1 will possess these two characteristics4 #a4 ,they will mutually exclude each other that is1 what is affirmed of one1 will1 in reality1 be denied of the other4 #b4 ,they will be so defined as to be universal in their application4 ,the terms right and wrong1 for example1 thus differ from each other4 ,in the light of all correct definitions of these terms1 it will be seen with perfect distinctness1 #ast1 that to affirm of an action that it is right1 is equivalent to an affirmation that it is not wrong2 and to affirm that it is wrong1 is to affirm that it is not right2 #b;d1 that all moral actions1 actual and conceivable1 must be either right or wrong4 ,so of all other terms thus related4 ,the meaning of the terms ,liberty and ,necessity1 as distinguished the one from the other1 may be designated by a reference to two relations perfectly distinct and opposite1 which may be supposed to exist between an antecedent and its consequent4 #a4 ,the antecedent being given1 one1 and only one1 consequent can possibly arise1 and that consequent must arise4 ,this relation we designate by the term ,necessity4 ,i place my finger1 for example1 constituted as my physical system now is1 in the flame of a burning candle1 and hold it there for a given time4 ,the two substances in contact is the antecedent4 ,the feeling of intense pain which succeeds is the consequent4 ,now such is universally believed to be the correlation between the nature of these substances1 that under the circumstances supposed1 but one consequent can possibly arise1 and that consequent must arise2 to wit--the feeling of pain referred to4 ,the relation between such an antecedent and its consequent1 therefore1 we1 in all instances1 designate by the term ,necessity4 ,when the relation of ,necessity is pre-supposed1 in the presence of a new consequent1 we affirm absolutely that of a new antecedent4 #b4 ,the second relation is this4 ,the antecedent being given1 either of two or more consequents is equally possible1 and therefore1 when one consequent does arise1 we affirm that either of the others might have arisen in its stead4 ,when this relation is pre-supposed1 from the appearance of a new consequent1 we do not necessarily affirm the presence of a new antecedent4 ,this relation we designate by the term ,liberty4 ,,characteristics ,,of ,,the ,,above ,,definitions4 ,on the above definitions ,i remark3 #a4 ,that they mutually exclude each other4 ,to predicate ,liberty of any phenomenon is to affirm that it is not necessary4 ,to predicate ,necessity of it1 is equivalent to an affirmation that it is not free4 #b4 ,they are strictly and absolutely universal in their application4 ,all antecedents and consequents1 whatever the nature of the subjects thus connected may be1 must fall under one or the other of these relations4 ,as the terms right and wrong1 when correctly defined1 will express the nature of all moral actions1 actual and conceivable1 so the terms ,liberty and ,necessity1 as above defined1 clearly indicate the nature of the relation between all antecedents and consequents1 real and supposable4 ,take any antecedent and consequent we please1 real or conceivable1 and we know absolutely1 that they must sustain to each other one or the other of these relations4 ,either in connection with this antecedent1 but this one consequent is possible1 and this must arise1 or in connection with the same antecedent1 either this1 or one or more different consequents are possible1 and consequently equally so3 for possibility has1 in reality1 no degrees4 #c4 ,all the phenomena of the ,will1 sustaining1 as they do1 the relation of consequents to motives considered as antecedents1 must fall under one or the other of these relations4 ,if we say1 that the relation between motives and acts of ,will is that of certainty1 still this certainty must arise from a necessary relation between the antecedent and its consequent1 or it must be of such a nature as consists with the relation of ,liberty1 in the sense of the term ,liberty as above defined4 #d4 ,the above definitions have this great advantage in our present investigations4 ,they at once free the subject from the obscurity and perplexity in which it is often involved by the definitions of philosophers4 ,they are accustomed1 in many instances1 to speak of moral necessity and physical necessity1 as if these are in reality different kinds of necessity3 whereas the terms moral and physical1 in such connections1 express the nature of the subjects sustaining to each other the relations of antecedents and consequents1 and not at all that of the relation existing between them4 ,this is exclusively expressed by the term ,necessity--a term which designates a relation which is always one and the same1 whatever the nature of the subjects thus related may be4 ,an individual in a treatise on natural science1 might1 if he should choose1 in speaking of the relations of antecedents and consequents among solid1 fluid1 and aeriform substances1 use the words1 solid necessity1 fluid necessity1 and aeriform necessity4 ,he might use as many qualifying terms as there are different subjects sustaining to each other the relation under consideration4 ,in all such instances no error will arise1 if these qualifying terms are distinctly understood to designate1 not the nature of the relation of antecedent and consequent in any given case 7as if there were as many different kinds of necessity as there are qualifying terms used71 but to designate the nature of the subjects sustaining this relation4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the impression should be made1 that each of these qualifying terms designates a necessity of a peculiar kind1 and if1 as a consequence1 the belief should be induced1 that there are in reality so many different kinds of necessity1 errors of the gravest character would arise--errors no more important1 however1 than actually do arise from the impression often induced1 that moral necessity differs in kind from physical necessity4 #e4 ,i mention another very decisive advantage which the above definitions have in our present investigations4 ,in the light of the terms ,liberty and ,necessity1 as above defined1 the two great schools in philosophy and theology are obliged to join issue directly upon the real question in difference between them1 without the possibility on the part of either1 of escaping under a fog of definitions about moral necessity1 physical necessity1 moral certainty1 c41 and then claiming a victory over their opponents4 ,these terms1 as above defined1 stand out with perfect clearness and distinctness to all reflecting minds4 ,every one must see1 that the phenomena of the ,will cannot but fall under the one or the other of the relations designated by these terms inasmuch as no third relation differing in kind from both of these1 is conceivable4 ,the question therefore may be fairly put to every individual1 without the possibility of misapprehension or evasion--,do you believe1 whenever a man puts forth an act of ,will1 that in those circumstances1 this one act only is possible1 and that this act cannot but arise8 ,in all prohibited acts1 for example1 do you believe that an individual1 by the resistless providence of ,god1 is placed in circumstances in which this one act only is possible1 and this cannot but result1 that in these identical circumstances1 another and a different act is required of him1 and that for not putting forth this last act1 he is justly held as infinitely guilty in the sight of ,god1 and of the moral universe8 ,to these questions every one must give an affirmative or negative answer4 ,if he gives the former1 he holds the doctrine of ,necessity1 and must take that doctrine with all its consequences4 ,if he gives the latter1 he holds the doctrine of ,liberty in the sense of the term as above defined4 ,he must hold1 that in the identical circumstances in which a given act of ,will is put forth1 another and different act might have been put forth2 and that for this reason1 in all prohibited acts1 a moral agent is held justly responsible for different and opposite acts4 ,much is gained to the cause of truth1 when1 as in the present instance1 the different schools are obliged to join issue directly upon the real question in difference between them1 and that without the possibility of misapprehension or evasion in respect to the nature of that question4 ,,motive ,,defined4 ,having settled the meaning of the terms ,liberty and ,necessity1 as designating two distinct and opposite relations1 the only relations conceivable between an antecedent and its consequent1 one other term which may not unfrequently be used in the following treatise1 remains to be defined2 to wit--motive--a term which designates that which sustains to the phenomena of the ,will1 the relation of antecedent4 ,volition1 choice1 preference1 intention1 all the phenomena of the ,will1 are considered as the consequent4 ,whatever within the mind itself may be supposed to influence its determinations1 whether called susceptibilities1 biases1 or anything else2 and all influences acting upon it as incentives from without1 are regarded as the antecedent4 ,i use the term motive as synonymous with antecedent as above defined4 ,it designates all the circumstances and influences from within or without the mind1 which operate upon it to produce any given act of ,will4 ,the term antecedent in the case before us1 in strictness of speech1 has this difference of meaning from that of motive as above defined3 ,the former includes all that is designated by the latter1 together with the ,will itself4 ,no difficulty or obscurity1 however1 will result from the use of these terms as synonymous1 in the sense explained4 ,,sec4 ,,ii4 ,,liberty1 ,,as ,,opposed ,,to ,,necessity1 ,,the ,,characteristic ,,of ,,the ,,will4 ,we are now prepared to meet the question1 ,to which of the relations above defined shall we refer the phenomena of the ,will8 ,if these phenomena are subject to the law of necessity1 then1 whenever a particular antecedent 7motive7 is given1 but one consequent 7act of ,will7 is possible1 and that consequent must arise4 ,it cannot possibly but take place4 ,if1 on the other hand1 these phenomena fall under the relation of ,liberty1 whenever any particular motive is present1 either of two or more acts of ,will is equally possible2 and when any particular consequent 7act of ,will7 does arise1 either of the other consequents might have arisen in its stead4 ,before proceeding directly to argue the question before us1 one consideration of a general nature demands a passing notice4 ,it is this4 ,the simple statement of the question1 in the light of the above relations1 settles it1 and must settle it1 in the judgment of all candid1 uncommitted inquirers after the truth4 ,let any individual contemplate the action of his voluntary powers in the light of the relations of ,liberty and ,necessity as above defined1 and he will spontaneously affirm the fact1 that he is a free and not a necessary agent1 and affirm it as absolutely as he affirms his own existence4 ,wherever he is1 while he retains the consciousness of rational being1 this conviction will and must be to him an omnipresent reality4 ,to escape it1 he must transcend the bounds of conscious existence4 ,,objections ,,to ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,necessity4 ,such is the importance of the subject1 however1 that a more extended and particular consideration of it is demanded4 ,in the further prosecution of the argument upon the subject1 we will-- ,i4 ,in the first place1 contemplate the position1 that the phenomena of the ,will are subject to the laws of ,necessity4 ,in taking this position we are at once met with the following palpable and insuperable difficulties4 #a4 ,the conviction above referred to--a conviction which remains proof against all apparent demonstrations to the contrary4 ,we may pile demonstration upon demonstration in favor of the doctrine of ,necessity1 still1 as the mind falls back upon the spontaneous affirmations of its own ,intelligence1 it finds1 in the depths of its inner being1 a higher demonstration of the fact1 that that doctrine is and must be false--that man is not the agent which that doctrine affirms him to be4 ,in the passage already cited1 and which ,i will take occasion here to repeat1 the writer has1 with singular correctness1 mapped out the unvarying experience of the readers of ,edwards on the ,will4 ,even the reader1 he says1 who is scarcely at all familiar with abstruse science1 will1 if he follow our author attentively1 be perpetually conscious of a vague dissatisfaction1 or latent suspicion1 that some fallacy has passed into the train of propositions1 although the linking of syllogisms seems perfect4 ,this suspicion will increase in strength as he proceeds1 and will at length condense itself into the form of a protest against certain conclusions1 notwithstanding their apparently necessary connection with the premises4 ,what higher evidence can we have that that treatise gives a false interpretation of the facts of universal consciousness pertaining to the ,will1 than is here presented8 ,any theory which gives a distinct and true explanation of the facts of consciousness1 will be met by the ,intelligence with the response1 ,that's true2 ,i have found it4 ,any theory apparently supported by adequate evidence1 but which still gives a false interpretation of such facts1 will induce the internal conflict above described--a conflict which1 as the force of apparent demonstration increases1 will1 in the very centre of the ,intelligence1 condense itself into the form of a protest against the conclusions presented1 notwithstanding their apparently necessary connection with the premises4 ,the falsity of the doctrine of ,necessity is a first truth of the universal ,intelligence4 #b4 ,if this doctrine is true1 it is demonstrably evident1 that in no instance1 real or supposable1 have men any power whatever to will or to act differently from what they do4 ,the connection between the determinations of the ,will1 and their consequents1 external and internal1 is absolutely necessary4 ,constituted as ,i now am1 if ,i will1 for example1 a particular motion of my hand or arm1 no other movement1 in these circumstances1 was possible1 and this movement could not but take place4 ,the same holds true of all consequents1 external and internal1 of all acts of ,will4 ,let us now suppose that these acts themselves are the necessary consequents of the circumstances in which they originate4 ,in what conceivable sense have men1 in the circumstances in which ,providence places them1 power either to will or to act differently from what they do8 ,the doctrine of ability to will or to do differently from what we do is1 in every sense1 false1 if the doctrine of ,necessity is true4 ,men1 when they transgress the moral law1 always sin1 without the possibility of doing right4 ,from this position the ,necessitarian cannot escape4 #c4 ,on this theory1 ,god only is responsible for all human volitions together with their effects4 ,the relation between all antecedents and their consequents was established by him4 ,if that relation be in all instances a necessary one1 his ,will surely is the sole responsible antecedent of all consequents4 #d4 ,the idea of obligation1 of merit and demerit1 and of the consequent propriety of reward and punishment1 are chimeras4 ,to conceive of a being deserving praise or blame1 for volitions or actions which occurred under circumstances in which none others were possible1 and in which these could not possibly but happen1 is an absolute impossibility4 ,to conceive him under obligation to have given existence1 under such circumstances1 to different consequents1 is equally impossible4 ,it is to suppose an agent under obligation to perform that to which ,omnipotence is inadequate4 ,for ,omnipotence cannot perform impossibilities4 ,it cannot reverse the law of ,necessity4 ,let any individual conceive of creatures placed by ,divine ,providence in circumstances in which but one act1 or series of acts of ,will1 can arise1 and these cannot but arise--let him1 then1 attempt to conceive of these creatures as under obligation1 in these same circumstances1 to give existence to different and opposite acts1 and as deserving of punishment for not doing so4 ,he will find it as impossible to pass such a judgment as to conceive of the annihilation of space1 or of an event without a cause4 ,to conceive of necessity and obligation as fundamental elements of the same act1 is an absolute impossibility4 ,the human ,intelligence is incapable of affirming such contradictions4 #e4 ,as an additional consideration1 to show the absolute incompatibility of the idea of moral obligation with the doctrine of ,necessity1 permit me to direct the attention of the reader to this striking fact4 ,while no man1 holding the doctrine of ,liberty as above defined1 was ever known to deny moral obligation1 such denial has1 without exception1 in every age and nation1 been avowedly based upon the assumption of the truth of the doctrine of ,necessity4 ,in every age and nation1 in every solitary mind in which the idea of obligation has been denied1 this doctrine has been the great maelstrom in which this idea has been swallowed up and lost4 ,how can the ,necessitarian account for such facts in consistency with his theory8 #f4 ,the commands of ,god addressed to men as sinners and requiring them in all cases of transgression of the moral law1 to choose and to act differently from what they do1 are1 if this doctrine is true1 the perfection of tyranny4 ,in all such cases men are required-- 7#a47 ,to perform absolute impossibilities2 to reverse the law of necessity4 7#b47 ,to do that to which ,omnipotence is inadequate4 ,for ,omnipotence1 as we have seen1 cannot reverse the law of necessity4 ,not only so1 but-- 7#c47 ,men in all such instances are required1 as a matter of fact1 to resist and overcome ,omnipotence4 ,to require us to reverse the relation established by ,omnipotence1 between antecedents and consequents1 is certainly to require us to resist and overcome ,omnipotence1 and that in the absence of all power1 even to attempt the accomplishment of that which we are required to accomplish4 #g4 ,if this doctrine is true1 at the final ,judgment the conscience and intelligence of the universe will and must be on the side of the condemned4 ,suppose that when the conduct of the wicked shall be revealed at that ,day1 another fact shall stand out with equal conspicuousness1 to wit1 that ,god himself had placed these beings where but one course of conduct was possible to them1 and that course they could not but pursue1 to wit1 the course which they did pursue1 and that for having pursued this course1 the only one possible1 they are now to be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of ,god and the glory of his power1 must not the intelligence of the universe pronounce such a sentence unjust8 ,all this must be true1 or the doctrine of ,necessity is false4 ,who can believe1 that the pillars of ,god's eternal government rest upon such a doctrine8 #h4 ,on this supposition1 probation is an infinite absurdity4 ,we might with the same propriety represent the specimens in the laboratory of the chemist1 as on probation1 as men1 if their actions are the necessary result of the circumstances in which ,omnipotence has placed them4 ,what must intelligent beings think of probation for a state of eternal retribution1 probation based on such a principle8 #i4 ,the doctrine of ,necessity is1 in all essential particulars1 identical with ,fatalism in its worst form4 ,all that ,fatalism ever has maintained1 or now maintains1 is1 that men1 by a power which they cannot control nor resist1 are placed in circumstances in which they cannot but pursue the course of conduct which they actually are pursuing4 ,this doctrine has never affirmed1 that1 in the ,necessitarian sense1 men cannot do as they please4 ,all that it maintains is1 that they cannot but please to do as they do4 ,thus this doctrine differs not one jot or tittle1 from ,necessity4 ,no man can show the want of perfect identity between them4 ,fatalists and ,necessitarians may differ in regard to the origin of this ,necessity4 ,in regard to its nature1 the only thing material1 as far as present inquiries are concerned1 they do not differ at all4 #aj4 ,in maintaining the ,necessity of all acts of the ,will of man1 we must maintain1 that the ,will of ,god is subject to the same law4 ,this is universally admitted by ,necessitarians themselves4 ,now in maintaining the necessity of all acts of the ,divine ,will1 the following conclusions force themselves upon us3 7#a47 ,,motives which necessitate the determinations of the ,divine ,will1 are the sole originating and efficient causes in existence4 ,god is not the first cause of anything4 7#b47 ,to motives1 which of course exist independently of the ,divine ,will1 we must ascribe the origin of all created existences4 ,the glory of originating all things visible and invisible1 belongs not to ,him1 but to motives4 7#c47 ,in all cases in which creatures are required to act differently from what they do1 as in all acts of sin1 they are in reality required not only to resist and overcome the omnipotent determinations of the ,divine ,will1 but also the motives by which the action of ,god's ,will is necessitated4 ,we ask ,necessitarians to look these consequences in the face1 and then say1 whether they are prepared to deny1 or to meet them4 #aa4 ,finally1 if the doctrine under consideration is true1 in all instances of the transgression of the moral law1 men are1 in reality1 required to produce an event which1 when it does exist1 shall exist without a cause4 ,in circumstances where but one event is possible1 and that cannot but arise1 if a different event should arise1 it would undeniably be an event without a cause4 ,to require such an event under such circumstances1 is to require an event without a cause1 the most palpable contradiction conceivable4 ,now just such a requirement as this is laid upon men1 in all cases of disobedience of the moral law1 if the doctrine of ,necessity is true4 ,in all such cases1 according to this doctrine men are placed in circumstances in which but one act is possible1 and that must arise1 to wit3 the act of disobedience which is put forth4 ,if1 in these circumstances1 an act of obedience should be put forth1 it would be an event without a cause1 and in opposition also to the action of a necessary cause4 ,in these identical circumstances1 the act of obedience is required1 that is1 an act is required of creatures1 which1 if it should be put forth1 would be an event without a cause4 ,has a ,god of truth and justice ever laid upon men such a requisition as that8 ,how1 ,i ask1 can the doctrine of ,necessity be extricated from such a difficulty8 ,,doctrine ,,of ,,liberty--,,direct ,,argument4 ,,ii4 ,we will now1 as a second general argument1 consider the position1 that the ,will is subject in its determinations to the relation of ,liberty1 in opposition to that of ,necessity4 ,here ,i would remark1 that as the phenomena of the ,will must fall under one or the other of these relations1 and as it has been shown1 that they cannot fall under that of ,necessity1 but one supposition remains4 ,they must fall under that of ,liberty1 as opposed to ,necessity4 ,the intrinsic absurdity of supposing that a being1 all of whose actions are necessary1 is still accountable for such actions1 is sufficient to overthrow the doctrine of ,necessity for ever4 ,a few additional considerations are deemed requisite1 in order to present the evidence in favor of the ,liberty of the ,will4 #a4 ,the first that ,i present is this4 ,as soon as the doctrine of ,liberty1 as above defined1 is distinctly apprehended1 it is spontaneously recognized by every mind1 as the true1 and only true exposition of the facts of its own consciousness pertaining to the phenomena of the ,will4 ,this doctrine is simply an announcement of the spontaneous affirmations of the universal ,intelligence4 ,this is the highest possible evidence of the truth of the doctrine4 #b4 ,the universal conviction of mankind1 that their former course of conduct might have been different from what it was4 ,i will venture to affirm1 that there is not a person on earth1 who has not this conviction resting upon his mind in respect to his own past life4 ,it is important to analyze this conviction1 in order to mark distinctly its bearing upon our present inquiries4 ,this conviction is not the belief1 that if our circumstances had been different1 we might have acted differently from what we did4 ,a man1 for example1 says to himself--,at such a time1 and in such circumstances1 ,i determined upon a particular course of conduct4 ,i might have determined upon a different and opposite course4 ,why did ,i not8 ,these affirmations are not based upon the conviction1 that1 in different circumstances1 we might have done differently4 ,in all such affirmations we take into account nothing but the particular circumstances in which our determinations were formed4 ,it is in view of these circumstances exclusively1 that we affirm that our determinations might have been different from what they were4 ,let the appeal be made to any individual whatever1 whose mind is not at the time under the influence of any particular theory of the ,will4 ,you say1 that at such a time1 and under such circumstances1 you determined upon a particular course1 that you might then have resolved upon a different and opposite course1 and that you blame yourself for not having done so4 ,is not this your real meaning8 ,if my circumstances had been different1 ,i might have resolved upon a different course4 ,no1 he would reply4 ,that is not my meaning4 ,i was not thinking at all of a change of circumstances1 when ,i made this affirmation4 ,what ,i mean is1 that in the circumstances in which ,i was1 ,i might have done differently from what ,i did4 ,this is the reason why ,i blame myself for not having done so4 ,the same conviction1 to wit3 that without any change of circumstances our past course of life might have been different from what it was1 rests upon every mind on earth in which the remembrance of the past dwells4 ,now this universal conviction is totally false1 if the doctrine of ,necessity is true4 ,the doctrine of the ,liberty of the ,will must be true1 or the universal ,intelligence is a perpetual falsehood4 #c4 ,in favor of the doctrine of ,liberty1 ,i next appeal to the direct1 deliberate1 and universal testimony of consciousness4 ,this testimony is given in three ways4 7#a47 ,in the general conviction above referred to1 that without any change of circumstances1 our course of conduct might have been the opposite of what it was4 ,nothing but a universal consciousness of the ,liberty of the ,will1 can account for this conviction4 7#b47 ,whenever any object of choice is submitted to the mind1 consciousness affirms1 directly and positively1 that1 under these identical circumstances1 either of two or more acts of ,will is equally possible4 ,every man in such circumstances is as conscious of such power as he is of his own existence4 ,in confirmation of these affirmations1 let any one make the appeal to his own consciousness1 when about to put forth any act of ,will4 ,he will be just as conscious that either of two or more different determinations is1 in the same circumstances1 equally possible1 as he is of any mental state whatever4 7#c47 ,in reference to all deliberate determinations of ,will in time past1 the remembrance of them is attended with a consciousness the most positive1 that1 in the same identical circumstances1 determinations precisely opposite might have been originated4 ,let any one recall any such determination1 and the consciousness of a power to have determined differently will be just as distinctly recalled as the act itself4 ,he cannot be more sure that he acted at all1 than he will be1 that he might have acted determined differently4 ,all these affirmations of consciousness are false1 if the doctrine of ,liberty is not true4 #d4 ,a fundamental distinction which all mankind make between the phenomena of the ,will1 and those of the other faculties1 the ,sensibility for example1 is a full confirmation of the doctrine of ,liberty1 as a truth of universal consciousness4 ,a man is taken out of a burning furnace1 with his physical system greatly injured by the fire4 ,as a consequence1 he subsequently experiences much suffering and inconvenience4 ,for the injury done him by the fire1 and for the pain subsequently experienced1 he never blames or reproaches himself4 ,with self-reproach he never says1 ,why1 instead of being thus injured1 did ,i not come out of the furnace as the three worthies did from that of ,nebuchadnezzar8 ,why do ,i not now experience pleasure instead of pain1 as a consequence of that injury8 ,suppose1 now1 that his fall into the furnace was the result of a determination formed for the purpose of self-murder4 ,for that determination1 and for not having1 in the same circumstances1 determined differently1 he will ever after reproach himself1 as most guilty in the sight of ,god and man4 ,how shall we account for the absence of self-reproach in the former instance1 and for its presence in the latter8 ,if the appeal should be made to the subject1 his answer would be ready4 ,in respect to the injury and pain1 in the circumstances supposed1 they could not but be experienced4 ,such phenomena1 therefore1 can never be the occasion of self-reproach4 ,in the condition in which the determination referred to was formed1 a different and opposite resolution might have been originated4 ,that particular determination1 therefore1 is the occasion of self-reproach4 ,how shall we account for this distinction1 which all mankind agree in making1 between the phenomena of the ,sensibility on the one hand1 and of the ,will on the other8 ,but one supposition accounts for this fact1 the universal consciousness1 that the former are necessary1 and the latter free that in the circumstances of their occurrence the former may not1 and the latter may1 be different from what they are4 #e4 ,on any other theory than that of ,liberty1 the words1 obligation1 merit and demerit1 c41 are words without meaning4 ,a man is1 we will suppose1 by ,divine ,providence1 placed in circumstances in which he cannot possibly but pursue one given course1 or1 which is the same thing1 put forth given determinations4 ,when it is said that1 in these identical circumstances1 he ought to pursue a different and opposite course1 or to put forth different and opposite determinations1 what conceivable meaning can we attach to the word ought1 here8 ,there is nothing1 in the circumstances supposed1 which the word1 ought1 or obligation1 can represent4 ,if we predicate merit or demerit of an individual thus circumstanced1 we use words equally without meaning4 ,obligation and moral desert1 in such a case1 rest upon airy nothing1 without a local habitation or a name4 ,on the other hand1 if we suppose that the right and the wrong are at all times equally possible to an individual2 that when he chooses the one1 he might1 in the same identical circumstances1 choose the other2 infinite meaning attaches to the words1 ought1 obligation1 merit and demerit1 when it is said that an individual thus circumstanced ought to do the right and avoid the wrong1 and that he merits reward or punishment1 when he does the one1 or does not do the other4 ,the ideas of obligation1 merit and demerit1 reward and punishment1 and probation with reference to a state of moral retribution1 are all chimeras1 on any other supposition than that of the ,liberty of the ,will4 ,with this doctrine1 they all perfectly harmonize4 #f4 ,all moral government1 all laws1 human and ,divine1 have their basis in the doctrine of ,liberty2 and are the perfection of tyranny1 on any other supposition4 ,to place creatures in circumstances which necessitate a given course of conduct1 and render every other course impossible1 and then to require of them1 under the heaviest sanctions1 a different and opposite course--what can be tyranny if this is not8 ,,objection ,,in ,,bar ,,of ,,an ,,appeal ,,to ,,consciousness4 ,an objection which is brought by ,necessitarians1 in perpetual bar of an appeal to consciousness1 to determine the fact whether the phenomena of the ,will fall under the relation of ,liberty or ,necessity1 here demands special attention4 ,consciousness1 it is said1 simply affirms1 that1 in given circumstances1 we do1 in fact1 put forth certain acts of ,will4 ,but whether we can or cannot1 in these circumstances1 put forth other and opposite determinations1 it does not and cannot make any affirmation at all4 ,it does not1 therefore1 fall within the province of ,consciousness to determine whether the phenomena of the ,will are subject to the relation of ,liberty or ,necessity2 and it is unphilosophical to appeal to that faculty to decide such a question4 ,this objection1 if valid1 renders null and void much of what has been said upon this subject2 and as it constitutes a stronghold of the ,necessitarian1 it becomes us to examine it with great care4 ,in reply1 ,i remark1 #a4 ,that if this objection holds in respect to the phenomena of the ,will1 it must hold equally in respect of those of the other faculties the ,intelligence1 for example4 ,we will1 therefore1 bring the objection to a test1 by applying it to certain intellectual phenomena4 ,we will take1 as an example1 the universal and necessary affirmation1 that it is impossible for the same thing1 at the same time1 to be and not to be4 ,every one is conscious1 in certain circumstances1 of making this and other kindred affirmations4 ,now1 if the objection under consideration is valid1 all that we should be conscious of is the fact1 that1 under the circumstances supposed1 we do1 in reality1 make particular affirmations2 while1 in reference to the question1 whether1 in the same circumstances1 we can or cannot make different and opposite affirmations1 we should have no consciousness at all4 ,now1 ,i appeal to every man1 whether1 when he is conscious of making the affirmation1 that it is impossible for the same thing1 at the same time1 to be and not to be1 he is not equally conscious of the fact1 that it is impossible for him to make the opposite affirmation whether1 when he affirms that three and two make five1 he is not conscious that it is impossible for him to affirm that three and two are six8 ,in other words1 when we are conscious of making certain intellectual affirmations1 are we not equally conscious of an impossibility of making different and opposite affirmations8 ,every man is just as conscious of the fact1 that the phenomena of his ,intelligence fall under the relation of ,necessity1 as he is of making any affirmations at all4 ,if this is not so1 we cannot know but that it is possible for us to affirm and believe perceived contradictions4 ,all that we could say is1 that1 as a matter of fact1 we do not do it4 ,but whether we can or cannot do it1 we can never know4 ,do we not know1 however1 as absolutely as we know anything1 that we cannot affirm perceived contradictions8 ,in other words1 we do and can know absolutely1 that our ,intelligence is subject to the law of ,necessity4 ,we do know by consciousness1 with absolute certainty1 that the phenomena of the ,intelligence1 and ,i may add1 of the ,sensibility too1 do fall under the relation of ,necessity4 ,why may we not know1 with equal certainty1 whether the phenomena of the ,will do or do not fall under the relation of ,liberty8 ,what then becomes of the objection under consideration8 #b4 ,but while we are conscious of the fact1 that the ,intellect is under the law of ,necessity1 we are equally conscious that ,will is under that of ,liberty4 ,we make intellectual affirmations2 such1 for example1 as the propositions1 ,things equal to the same things are equal to one another1 ,there can be no event without a cause1 c41 with a consciousness of an utter impossibility of making different and opposite affirmations4 ,we put forth acts of ,will with a consciousness equally distinct and absolute1 of a possibility1 in the same circumstances1 of putting forth different and opposite determinations4 ,even ,necessitarians admit and affirm the validity of the testimony of consciousness in the former instance4 ,why should we doubt or deny it in the latter8 #c4 ,the question1 whether ,consciousness can or cannot give us not only mental phenomena1 but also the fundamental characteristics of such phenomena1 cannot be determined by any pre-formed theory1 in respect to what ,consciousness can or cannot affirm4 ,if we wish to know to what a witness is able to testify1 we must not first determine what he can or cannot say1 and then refuse to hear anything from him1 except in conformity to such decisions4 ,we must first give him a full and attentive hearing1 and then judge of his capabilities4 ,so in respect to ,consciousness4 ,if we wish to know what it does or does not1 what it can or cannot affirm1 we must let it give its full testimony1 untrammelled by any pre-formed theories4 ,now1 when the appeal is thus made1 we find1 that1 in the circumstances in which we do originate given determinations1 it affirms distinctly and absolutely1 that1 in the same identical circumstances1 we might originate different and opposite determinations4 ,from what ,consciousness does affirm1 we ought surely to determine the sphere of its legitimate affirmations4 #d4 ,the universal solicitude of ,necessitarians to take the question under consideration from the bar of ,consciousness is1 in fact1 a most decisive acknowledgment1 on their part1 that at that tribunal the cause will go against them4 ,let us suppose that all men were as conscious that their ,will is subject to the law of ,necessity1 as they are that their ,intelligence is4 ,can we conceive that ,necessitarians would not be as solicitous to carry the question directly to the tribunal of ,consciousness1 as they now are to take it from that tribunal8 ,when all men are as conscious that their ,will is under the law of ,liberty1 as they are that their other faculties are under the relation of ,necessity1 no wonder that ,necessitarians anticipate the ruin of their cause1 when the question is to be submitted to the bar of ,consciousness4 ,no wonder that they so solemnly protest against an appeal to that tribunal4 ,let the reader remember1 however1 that the moment the validity of the affirmations of ,consciousness is denied1 in respect to any question in mental science1 it becomes infinite folly in us to reason at all on the subject2 a folly just as great as it would be for a natural philosopher to reason about colors1 after denying the validity of all affirmations of the eye1 in respect to the phenomena about which he is to reason4 ,,doctrine ,,of ,,liberty ,,argued ,,from ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,liberty ,,in ,,all ,,minds4 ,,iii4 ,i will present a third general argument in favor of the doctrine of ,liberty2 an argument1 which1 to my mind1 is perfectly conclusive1 but which differs somewhat from either of the forms of argumentation above presented4 ,i argue the ,liberty of the ,will from the existence of the idea of ,liberty in the human mind1 in the form in which it is there found4 ,if the ,will is not free1 the idea of ,liberty is wholly inapplicable to any phenomenon in existence whatever4 ,yet this idea is in the mind4 ,the action of the ,will in conformity to it is just as conceivable as its action in conformity to the idea of ,necessity4 ,it remains with the ,necessitarian to account for the existence of this idea in the human mind1 in consistency with his own theory4 ,here the following considerations present themselves demanding special attention4 #a4 ,the idea of ,liberty1 like that of ,necessity1 is a simple1 and not a complex idea4 ,this all will admit4 #b4 ,it could not have come into the mind from observation or reflection because all phenomena1 external and internal1 all the objects of observation and reflection1 are1 according to the doctrine of ,necessity1 not free1 but necessary4 #c4 ,it could not have originated1 as necessary ideas do1 as the logical antecedents of the truths given by observation and reflection4 ,for example1 the idea of space1 time1 substance1 and cause1 are given in the ,intelligence1 as the logical antecedents of the ideas of body1 succession1 phenomena1 and events1 all of which are truths derived from observation or reflection4 ,now the idea of ,liberty1 if the doctrine of ,necessity is true1 cannot have arisen in this way because all the objects of observation and reflection are1 according to this doctrine1 necessary1 and therefore their logical antecedents must be4 ,how shall we account1 in consistency with this theory1 for the existence of this idea in the mind8 ,it came not from perception external1 nor internal1 nor as the logical antecedent or consequent of any truth thus perceived4 ,now if we admit the doctrine of ,liberty as a truth of universal consciousness1 we can give a philosophical account of the existence of the idea of ,liberty in all minds4 ,if we deny this doctrine1 and consequently affirm that of ,necessity1 we may safely challenge any theologian or philosopher to give such an account of the existence of that idea in the mind4 ,for all ideas1 in the mind1 do and must come from observation or reflection1 or as the logical antecedents or consequents of ideas thus obtained4 ,we have here an event without a cause1 if the doctrine of ,necessity is true4 #d4 ,all simple ideas1 with the exception of that of ,liberty1 have realities within or around us1 corresponding to them4 ,if the doctrine of ,necessity is true1 we have one solitary idea of this character1 that of ,liberty1 to which no reality corresponds4 ,whence this solitary intruder in the human mind8 ,the existence of this idea in the mind is proof demonstrative1 that a reality corresponding to it does and must exist1 and as this reality is found nowhere but in the ,will1 there it must be found4 ,almost all ,necessitarians are1 in philosophy1 the disciples of ,locke4 ,with him1 they maintain1 that all ideas in the mind come from observation and reflection4 ,yet they maintain that there is in the mind one idea1 that of ,liberty1 which never could thus have originated2 because1 according to their theory1 no objects corresponding do or can exist1 either as realities1 or as the objects of observation or reflection4 ,we have again an event without a cause1 if the doctrine of ,liberty is not true4 #e4 ,the relation of the ideas of ,liberty and ,necessity to those of obligation1 merit and demerit1 c41 next demand our attention4 ,if the doctrine of ,necessity is true1 the idea of ,liberty is1 as we have seen1 a chimera4 ,with it the idea of obligation can have no connection or alliance2 but must rest exclusively upon that of ,necessity4 ,now1 how happens it1 that no man holding the doctrine of ,liberty was ever known to deny that of obligation1 or of merit and demerit8 ,how happens it1 that the validity of neither of these ideas has ever1 in any age or nation1 been denied1 except on the avowed authority of the doctrine of ,necessity8 ,sceptics of the class who deny moral obligation1 are universally avowed ,necessitarians4 ,we may safely challenge the world to produce a single exception to this statement4 ,we may challenge the world to produce an individual in ancient or modern times who holds the doctrine of ,liberty1 and denies moral obligation1 or an individual who denies moral obligation on any other ground than that of ,necessity4 ,now1 how can this fact be accounted for1 that the ideas of obligation1 merit and demerit1 c41 universally attach themselves to a chimera1 the idea of ,liberty1 and stand in such irreconcilable hostility to the only idea by which1 as ,necessitarians will have it1 their validity is affirmed8 #f4 ,finally1 ,if the doctrine of ,necessity is true1 the phenomena of the ,intelligence1 ,sensibility1 and the ,will1 are given in ,consciousness as alike necessary4 ,the idea of ,liberty1 then1 if it does exist in the mind1 would not be likely to attach itself to either of these classes of phenomena2 and if to either1 it would be just as likely to attach itself to one class as to another4 ,now1 how shall we account for the fact1 that this idea always attaches itself to one of these classes of phenomena1 those of the ,will1 and never to either of the others8 ,how is it that all men agree in holding1 that1 in the circumstances of their occurrence1 the phenomena of the ,intelligence and ,sensibility cannot but be what they are1 while those of the ,will may be otherwise than they are8 ,why1 if this chimera1 the idea of ,liberty1 attaches itself to either of these classes1 does it not sometimes attach itself to the phenomena of the ,intelligence or ,sensibility1 as well as to those of the ,will8 ,here1 once again1 we have an event without a cause1 a distinction without a difference1 if the doctrine of ,necessity is true4 ,the facts before us can be accounted for only on the supposition1 that the phenomena of the ,intelligence and ,sensibility are given in ,consciousness as necessary1 while those of the ,will are given as free4 ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,liberty1 ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,the ,,bible4 ,,iv4 ,we will now1 in the fourth place1 raise the inquiry1 an inquiry very appropriate in its place1 and having an important bearing upon our present investigations1 whether the doctrine of the ,will1 above established1 is the doctrine pre-supposed in the ,bible8 ,the following considerations will enable us to give a decisive answer to this inquiry4 #a4 ,if the doctrine of the ,will here maintained is not1 and consequently that of ,necessity is1 the doctrine pre-supposed in the ,scriptures1 then we have two revelations from ,god1 the external and internal1 in palpable contradiction to each other4 ,as the works of ,god 7see ,rom4 #a3 #ai1 #bj7 are as real a revelation from him as the ,bible1 so are the necessary affirmations of our ,intelligence4 ,now1 in our inner being1 in the depths of our ,intelligence1 the fact is perpetually revealed and affirmed--a fact which we cannot disbelieve1 if we would--that we are not necessary but free agents4 ,suppose that1 in the external revelation1 the ,scriptures1 the fact is revealed and affirmed that we are not free but necessary agents4 ,has not ,god himself affirmed in one revelation what he has denied in another8 ,of what use can the internal revelation be1 but to render us necessarily sceptical in respect to the external8 ,has the ,most ,high given two such revelations as this8 #b4 ,in the ,scriptures1 man is presented as the subject1 and1 of course1 as possessing those powers which render him the proper subject of command and prohibition1 of obligation1 of merit and demerit1 and consequently of reward and punishment4 ,let us suppose that ,god has imparted to a being a certain constitution1 and then placed him in a condition in which1 in consequence of the necessary correlation between his constitution and circumstances1 but one series of determinations are possible to him1 and that series cannot but result4 ,can we conceive it proper in the ,most ,high to prohibit that creature from pursuing the course which ,god himself has rendered it impossible for him not to pursue1 and require him1 under the heaviest sanctions1 to pursue1 under these identical circumstances1 a different and opposite course--a course which the ,creator has rendered it impossible for him to pursue8 ,is this the philosophy pre-supposed in the ,bible8 ,does the ,bible imply a system of mental philosophy which renders the terms1 obligation1 merit and demerit1 void of all conceivable meaning1 and which lays no other foundation for moral retributions but injustice and tyranny8 #c4 ,let us now contemplate the doings of the ,great ,day revealed in the ,scriptures1 in the light of these two opposite theories4 ,let us suppose that1 as the righteous and the wicked stand in distinct and separate masses before the ,eternal ,one1 the ,most ,high says to the one class1 ,you1 ,i myself placed in circumstances in which nothing but obedience was possible1 and that you could not but render2 and you1 ,i placed in a condition in which nothing but disobedience was possible to you1 and that you could not but perpetrate4 ,in consequence of these distinct and opposite courses1 each of which ,i myself rendered unavoidable1 you deserve and shall receive my eternal smiles2 and you as richly deserve and shall therefore endure my eternal frowns4 ,what would be the response of an assembled universe to a division based upon such a principle8 ,is this the principle on which the decisions of that ,day are based8 ,it must be so1 if the doctrine of ,liberty is not1 and that of ,necessity is1 the doctrine of the ,bible8 #d4 ,we will now contemplate another class of passages which have a bearing equally decisive upon our present inquiries4 ,i refer to that class in which ,god expresses the deepest regret at the course which transgressors have pursued1 and are still pursuing1 and the most decisive unwillingness that they should pursue that course and perish4 ,he takes a solemn oath1 that he is not willing that they should take the course of disobedience and death1 but that they should pursue a different and opposite course4 ,god expresses no regret that they are in the circumstances in which they are1 but that in those circumstances they should take the path of disobedience1 and not that of obedience4 ,now1 can we suppose1 what must be true1 if the doctrine of ,necessity is the doctrine pre-supposed in the ,bible1 that ,god places his creatures in circumstances in which obedience is to them an impossibility1 and in which they cannot but disobey1 and then takes a solemn oath that he is not willing that they should disobey and perish1 but that they should turn from their evil way and live8 ,what is the meaning of the exclamation1 ,o that thou hadst hearkened to my commandment1 if ,god himself had so conditioned the sinner as to render obedience an impossibility to him8 ,is this the philosophy of the ,will pre-supposed in the ,bible8 ,on the other hand1 how perfectly in place are all the passages under consideration1 on the supposition that the doctrine of ,liberty is the doctrine therein pre-supposed1 and that consequently the obedience which ,god affirms ,himself desirous that sinners should render1 and his regret that they do not render1 is always possible to them6 ,one of the seven pillars of the ,gospel is this very doctrine4 ,take it from the ,bible1 and we have another ,gospel4 #e4 ,one other class of passages claims special attention here4 ,in the ,scriptures1 the ,most ,high expresses the greatest astonishment that men should sin under the influences to which he has subjected them4 ,he calls upon heaven and earth to unite with him in astonishment at the conduct of men under those influences4 ,hear1 ,o heavens1 and give ear1 ,o earth1 he exclaims1 for the ,lord hath spoken2 ,i have nourished and brought up children1 and they have rebelled against me4 ,now1 let us suppose1 as the doctrine of ,necessity affirms1 that ,god has placed sinners under influences under which they cannot but sin4 ,what must we think of his conduct in calling upon the universe to unite with him in astonishment1 that under these influences they should sin--that is1 take the only course possible to them1 the course which they cannot but take8 ,with the same propriety1 he might place a mass of water on an inclined plane1 and then call upon heaven and earth to unite with him in astonishment at the downward flow of the fluid4 ,is this the philosophy pre-supposed in the ,bible8 ,,sec4 #c4 ,,views ,,of ,,necessitarians4 ,we are now prepared for a consideration of certain miscellaneous questions which have an important bearing upon our present inquiries4 ,,necessity ,,as ,,held ,,by ,,necessitarians4 ,i4 ,the first inquiry that presents itself is this3 ,do ,necessitarians hold the doctrine of ,necessity as defined in this chapter8 ,do they really hold1 in respect to every act of will1 that1 in the circumstances of its occurrence1 that one act only is possible1 and that cannot but arise8 ,is this1 for example1 the doctrine of ,edwards8 ,is it the doctrine really held by those who professedly agree with him8 ,i argue that it is3 #a4 ,because they unanimously repudiate the doctrine of ,liberty as here defined4 ,they must1 therefore1 hold that of ,necessity2 inasmuch as no third relation is even conceivable or possible4 ,if they deny that the phenomena of the ,will fall under either of these relations1 and still call themselves ,necessitarians1 they most hold to an inconceivable something1 which themselves even do not understand and cannot define1 and which has and can have no real existence4 #b4 ,edwards has confounded the phenomena of the ,will with those of the ,sensibility which are necessary in the sense here defined4 ,he must1 therefore1 hold that the characteristics of the latter class belong to those of the former4 #c4 ,edwards represents the relation between motives and acts of ,will1 as being the same in kind as that which exists between causes and effects among external material substances4 ,the former relation he designates by the words moral necessity2 the latter1 by that of natural1 or philosophical1 or physical necessity4 ,yet he says himself1 that the difference expressed by these words does not lie so much in the nature of the connection as in the two terms connected4 ,the qualifying terms used1 then1 designate merely the nature of the antecedents and consequents1 while the nature of the connection between them is1 in all instances1 the same1 that of naked necessity4 #d4 ,edwards himself represents moral necessity as just as absolute as physical1 or natural necessity4 ,moral necessity may be1 he says1 as absolute as natural necessity4 ,that is1 the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause4 #e4 ,necessitarians represent the relation between motives and acts of ,will as that of cause and effect2 and for this reason necessary4 ,if1 says ,edwards1 every act of ,will is excited by some motive1 then that motive is the cause of that act of ,will4 ,and if volitions are properly the effects of their motives1 then they are necessarily connected with their motives4 ,now as the relation of cause and effect is necessary1 in the sense of the term ,necessity as above defined1 ,edwards must hold1 and design to teach1 that all acts of ,will are necessary in this sense4 #f4 ,necessitarians represent the connection between motives and acts of ,will as being1 in all instances1 the same in kind as that which exists between volitions and external actions4 ,as external actions1 says ,president ,day1 are directed by the ,will1 so the ,will itself is directed by influence4 ,now all admit1 that the connection between volitions and external actions is necessary in this sense1 that when we will such action it cannot but take place4 ,no other act is1 in the circumstances1 possible4 ,in the same sense1 according to ,necessitarians1 is every act of ,will necessarily connected with influence1 or motives4 ,we do ,necessitarians no wrong1 therefore1 when we impute to them the doctrine of ,necessity as here defined4 ,in all cases of sin1 they hold1 that an individual is in circumstances in which none but sinful acts of ,will are possible1 and these he cannot but put forth2 and that in these identical circumstances the sinner is under obligation infinite to put forth different and opposite acts4 ,,the ,,term1 ,,certainty1 ,,as ,,used ,,by ,,necessitarians4 ,,ii4 ,we are prepared for another important inquiry1 to wit3 whether the words1 certainty1 moral certainty1 c41 as used by ,necessitarians1 are identical in their meaning with that of ,necessity as above defined8 ,the doctrine of ,necessity would never be received by the public at all1 but for the language in which it is clothed1 language which prevents the public seeing it as it is4 ,at one time it is called ,moral1 in distinction from ,natural ,necessity4 ,at another1 it is said to be nothing but ,certainty1 or moral ,certainty1 c4 ,now the question arises1 what is this ,certainty8 ,is it or is it not1 real ,necessity1 and nothing else8 ,that it is1 ,i argue1 #a4 ,from the fact1 as shown above1 that there can possibly be no ,certainty1 which does not fall either under the relation of ,liberty or ,necessity as above defined4 ,the ,certainty of ,necessitarians does not1 according to their own showing1 fall under the former relation3 it must1 therefore1 fall under the latter4 ,it must be naked ,necessity1 and nothing else4 #b4 ,while they have defined the term ,necessity1 and have not that of ,certainty1 they use the latter term as avowedly synonymous with the former4 ,the latter1 therefore1 must be explained by the former1 and not the former by the latter4 #c4 ,the ,certainty which they hold is a certainty which avowedly excludes the possibility of different and opposite acts of ,will under the influences1 or motives1 under which particular acts are put forth4 ,the ,certainty under consideration1 therefore1 is not necessity of a particular kind1 a necessity consistent with liberty and moral obligation4 ,it is the ,necessity above defined1 in all its naked deformity4 ,,iii4 ,we are now prepared for a distinct statement of the doctrine of ,ability1 according to the ,necessitarian scheme4 ,even the ,necessitarians1 with very few exceptions1 admit1 that in the absence of all power to do right or wrong1 we can be under no obligation to do the one or avoid the other4 ,a man1 says ,pres4 ,day1 is not responsible for remaining in his place if he has no power to move4 ,he is not culpable for omitting to walk1 if he has no strength to walk4 ,he is not under obligation to do anything for which he has not what ,edwards calls natural power4 ,it is very important for us to understand the nature of this ability1 which lies at the foundation of moral obligation2 to understand1 ,i repeat1 what this ,ability is1 according to the theory under consideration4 ,this ,ability1 according to the doctrine of ,liberty1 has been well stated by ,cousin1 to wit3 ,the moment we take the resolution to do an action1 we take it with a consciousness of being able to take a contrary resolution2 and by ,dr4 ,dwight1 who says of a man's sin1 that it is chosen by him unnecessarily1 while possessed of a power to choose otherwise4 ,the nature of this ,ability1 according to the ,necessitarian scheme1 has been stated with equal distinctness in the ,christian ,spectator4 ,if we take this term ,ability or ,power in the absolute sense1 as including all the antecedents to a given volition1 there is plainly no such thing as power to the contrary2 for in this sense of the term1 as ,president ,day states1 a man never has power to do anything but what he actually performs4 ,in this comprehensive1 though rather unusual sense of the word1 says ,president ,day1 a man has not power to do anything which he does not do4 ,the meaning of the above extracts cannot be mistaken4 ,nor can any one deny that they contain a true exposition of the doctrine of ,necessity1 to wit3 that under the influences under which men do will1 and consequently act1 it is absolutely impossible for them to will and act differently from what they do4 ,in what sense1 then1 have they power to will and act differently according to this doctrine8 ,to this question ,president ,day has given a correct and definite answer4 ,the man who wills in a particular way1 under the influence of particular feelings1 might will differently under a different influence4 ,now1 what is the doctrine of ,ability1 according to this scheme8 ,a man1 for example1 commits an act of sin4 ,he ought1 in the stead of that act1 to have put forth an act of obedience4 ,without the power to render this obedience1 as ,president ,day admits1 there can be no obligation to do it4 ,when the ,necessitarian says1 that the creature1 when he sins1 has power to obey1 he means1 not that under the influence under which the act of sin is committed1 the creature has power to obey2 but that under a different influence he might obey4 ,but mark1 it is under the identical influence under which a man does sin1 and under which1 according to the doctrine of ,necessity1 he cannot but sin1 that he is required not to sin4 ,now how can a man's ability1 and obligation not to sin under a given influence1 grow out of the fact1 that1 under a different influence1 an influence under which he cannot but do right1 he might not sin8 ,this is all the ability and ground of obligation as far as ,ability1 ,natural ,ability as it is called1 is concerned1 which the doctrine of ,necessity admits4 ,a man is1 by a power absolutely irresistible1 placed in circumstances in which he cannot possibly but sin4 ,in these circumstances1 it is said1 that he has natural ability not to sin1 and consequently ought not to do it4 ,why8 ,because1 to his acting differently1 no change in his nature or powers is required4 ,these are perfect and entire1 wanting nothing4 ,all that is required is1 that his circumstances be changed1 and then he might not sin4 ,in what sense1 asks ,president ,day1 is it true1 that a man has power to will the contrary of what he actually wills8 ,he has such power that1 with a sufficient inducement1 he will make an opposite choice4 ,is not this the strangest idea of ,natural ,ability as constituting the foundation of obligation1 of which the human mind ever tried to conceive8 ,in illustration1 let us suppose that a man1 placed in the city of ,new ,york1 cannot but sin2 placed in that of ,boston1 he cannot but be holy1 and that the fact whether he is in the one or the other city depends upon the irresistible providence of ,god4 ,he is placed in ,new ,york where he cannot but sin4 ,he is told that he ought not to do it1 and that he is highly guilty for not being perfectly holy4 ,it is also asserted that he has all the powers of moral agency1 all the ability requisite to lay the foundation for the highest conceivable obligation to be holy4 ,what is the evidence8 he asks4 ,is it possible for me1 in my present circumstances1 to avoid sin8 and in my present circumstances1 you know1 ,i cannot but be4 ,i acknowledge1 the ,necessitarian says1 that under present influences1 you cannot but sin1 and that you cannot but be subject to these influences4 ,still1 ,i affirm1 that you have all the powers of moral agency1 all the natural ability requisite to obedience1 and to the highest conceivable obligation to obedience4 ,because1 in the first place1 even in ,new ,york1 you could obey if you chose4 ,you have1 therefore1 natural1 though not moral1 power to obey4 ,but stop1 friend1 right here4 ,when you say that ,i might obey1 if ,i chose1 ,i would ask1 if choosing1 as in the command1 choose life1 is not the very thing required of me8 ,when1 therefore1 you affirm that ,i might obey1 if ,i chose1 does it not mean1 in reality1 that ,i might choose1 if ,i should choose8 ,is not your ,natural ,ability this1 that ,i might obey if ,i did obey8#b ,i cannot deny1 the ,necessitarian replies1 that you have correctly stated this doctrine4 ,permit me to proceed in argument1 however4 ,in the next place1 all that you need in order to be holy as required1 is a change1 not of your powers1 but of the influences which control the action of those powers4 ,with no change in your constitution or powers1 you need only to be placed in ,boston instead of ,new ,york1 and there you cannot but be holy4 ,is it not as clear as light1 therefore1 that you have now all the powers of moral agency1 all the ability requisite to the highest conceivable obligation to be holy instead of sinful8 ,i fully understand you1 the sinner replies4 ,but remember1 that it is not in ,boston1 where1 as you acknowledge1 ,i cannot be1 that ,i am required not to sin2 but here1 in ,new ,york1 where ,i cannot but be1 and cannot possibly but sin4 ,it is here1 and not somewhere else1 that ,i am required not to sin4 ,how can the fact1 that if ,i were in ,boston1 where ,i could not but be holy1 ,i might not sin1 prove1 that here1 in ,new ,york1 ,i have any ability1 either natural or moral--am under any obligation whatever--not to sin8 ,these are the difficulties which press upon me4 ,how do you remove them according to your theory8 ,i can give no other answer1 the ,necessitarian replies1 than that already given4 ,if that does not silence for ever every excuse for sin in your mind1 it is wholly owing to the perverseness of your heart1 to its bitter hostility to the truth4 ,i may safely appeal to the ,necessitarian himself1 whether ,i have not here given an uncaricatured expose of his theory4 ,,sinful ,,inclinations4 ,,iv4 ,when pressed with such appalling difficulties as these1 the ,necessitarian falls back1 in self-justification1 upon the reason why the sinner cannot be holy4 ,the only reason1 it is said1 why the sinner does not do as he ought is1 not the want of power1 but the strength of his sinful inclinations4 ,shall he plead these in excuse for sin8 ,by no means4 ,they constitute the very essence of the sinner's guilt4 ,let it be borne in mind1 that1 according to the doctrine of ,necessity1 such is the connection between the nature1 or constitution of the sinner's mind--a nature which ,god has given him1 and the influences under which he is placed by ,divine ,providence--that none but these very inclinations are possible to him1 and these cannot but exist4 ,from these inclinations1 sinful acts of ,will cannot but arise4 ,how is the matter helped1 as far as ability and obligation1 on the part of the sinner1 are concerned1 by throwing the guilt back from acts of ,will upon inclinations equally necessary8 ,,necessarian ,,doctrine ,,of ,,liberty4 ,the real liberty of the ,will1 according to the ,necessitarian scheme1 next demands our attention4 ,all admit that ,liberty is an essential condition of moral obligation4 ,in what sense1 then1 is or is not1 man free1 according to the doctrine of ,necessity8 ,the plain and obvious meaning of the words ,freedom and ,liberty1 says ,president ,edwards1 is power1 opportunity1 or advantage1 that any one has to do as he pleases4 ,or1 in other words1 his being free from hinderance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any respect as he wills4 ,and the contrary to ,liberty1 whatever name we please to call that by1 is a person's being hindered1 or unable to conduct as he will1 or being necessitated to do otherwise4 ,the only idea1 indeed1 that we can form of free-agency1 or of freedom of ,will1 says ,abercrombie1 is1 that it consists in a man's being able to do what he wills1 or to abstain from doing what he will not4 ,necessary agency1 on the other hand1 would consist in a man's being compelled1 by a force from without1 to do what he will not1 or prevented from doing what he wills4 ,with these definitions all ,necessitarians agree4 ,this is all the ,liberty known1 or conceivable1 according to their theory4 ,liberty does not consist in the power to choose in one or the other of two or more different and opposite directions1 under the same influence4 ,it is found wholly and exclusively in the connection between the act of ,will1 considered as the antecedent1 and the effort1 external or internal1 considered as the consequent4 ,on this definition ,i remark1 #a4 ,that it presents the idea of ,liberty as distinguished from ,servitude1 rather than ,liberty as distinguished from ,necessity4 ,a man is free1 in the first sense of the term1 when no external restraints hinder the carrying out of the choice within4 ,this1 however1 has nothing to do with ,liberty1 as distinguished from ,necessity4 #b4 ,if this is the only sense in which a man is free1 then1 in the language of a very distinguished philosopher1 if you cut off a man's little finger1 you thereby annihilate so much of his free agency2 because1 in that case1 you abridge so much his power to do as he chooses4 ,is this ,liberty1 the only liberty of man1 a liberty which may be destroyed by chains1 bolts1 and bars8 ,is this ,liberty as distinguished from ,necessity the liberty which lays the foundation of moral obligation8 #c4 ,if this is the only sense in which man is free1 then dire ,necessity reigns throughout the entire domain of human agency4 ,if all acts of ,will are the necessary consequents of the influences to which the mind is at the time subjected1 much more must a like necessity exist between all acts of ,will and their consequents1 external and internal4 ,this has been already shown4 ,the mind1 then1 with all its acts and states1 exists in a chain of antecedents and consequents1 causes and effects1 linked together in every part and department by a dire necessity4 ,this is all the ,liberty that this doctrine knows or allows us2 a ,liberty to choose as influences necessitate us to choose1 and to have such acts of ,will followed by certain necessary consequents1 external and internal4 ,in this scheme1 the idea of ,liberty1 which all admit must have a location somewhere1 or obligation1 is a chimera2 this idea1 ,i say1 after wandering through dry places1 seeking rest and finding none1 at length is driven to a location where it finds its grave1 and not a living habitation4 #d4 ,it is to me a very strange thing1 that ,liberty1 as the foundation of moral obligation1 should be located here4 ,because that acts of ,will are followed by certain corresponding necessary consequents external and internal1 therefore we are bound to put forth given acts of ,will1 whatever the influences acting upon us may be1 and however impossible it may be to put forth those acts under those influences6 ,did ever a greater absurdity dance in the brain of a philosopher or theologian8 #e4 ,the public are entirely deceived by this definition1 and because they are deceived as to the theory intended by it1 do they admit it as true8 ,suppose any man in the common walks of life were asked what he means1 when he says1 he can do as he pleases1 act as he chooses1 c4 ,does this express your meaning8 ,when you will to walk1 rather than sit1 for example1 no other volition is at the time possible1 and this you must put forth1 and that when you have put forth this volition1 you cannot but walk4 ,is this your idea1 when you say1 you can do as you please8 ,no1 he would say4 ,that is not my idea at all4 ,if that is true1 man is not a free agent at all4 ,what men in general really mean when they say1 they can do as they please1 and are therefore free1 is1 that when they put forth a given act of ,will1 and for this reason conduct in a given manner1 they may in the same circumstances put forth different and opposite determinations1 and consequently act in a different and opposite manner from what they do4 ,,vi4 ,the argument of ,necessitarians in respect to the practical tendencies of their doctrine demands a passing notice4 ,all acts of the ,will1 they say1 are indeed necessary under the circumstances in which they occur2 but then we should learn the practical lesson not to place ourselves in the circumstances where we shall be liable to act wrong4 ,to this ,i reply3 #a4 ,that on the hypothesis before us1 our being in the circumstances which originate a given choice1 is as necessary as the choice itself4 ,for ,i am in those circumstances either by an overruling ,providence over which ,i have no control1 or by previous acts of the ,will rendered necessary by such ,providence4 ,hence the difficulty remains in all its force4 #b4 ,the solution assumes the very principle denied1 that is1 that our being in circumstances which originate particular acts of choice is not necessary4 ,else why tell an individual he is to blame for being in such circumstances1 and not to place himself there again8 ,,ground ,,which ,,necessitarians ,,are ,,bound ,,to ,,take ,,in ,,respect ,,to ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,ability4 ,,vii4 ,we are now fully prepared to state the ground which ,necessitarians of every school are bound to take in respect to the doctrine of ,ability4 ,it is to deny that doctrine wholly1 to take the open and broad ground1 that1 according to any appropriate signification of the words1 it is absolutely impossible for men to will1 and consequently to act1 differently from what they do2 that when they do wrong1 they always do it1 with the absolute impossibility of doing right2 and that when they do right1 there is always an equal impossibility of their doing wrong4 ,if men have not power to will differently from what they do1 it is undeniably evident that they have no power whatever to act differently3 because there is an absolutely necessary connection between volitions and their consequents1 external actions4 ,the doctrine of ,necessity takes away wholly all ability from the creature to will differently from what he does4 ,it therefore totally annihilates his ability to act differently4 ,what1 then1 according to the theory of ,necessity1 becomes of the doctrine of ,ability8 ,it is annihilated4 ,it is impossible for us to find for it a local habitation or a name4 ,as honest men1 ,necessitarians are bound to proclaim the fact4 ,they are bound to proclaim the doctrine1 that1 in requiring men to be holy1 under influences under which they do sin1 and cannot but sin 7as it is true of all sinful acts according to their theory71 ,god requires of them absolute impossibilities1 and then dooms them to perdition for not performing such impossibilities4 ,the subterfuge to which ,necessitarians resort here1 will not avail them at all1 to wit3 that men are to blame for not doing right1 because1 they might do it if they chose4 ,to will right is the thing1 and the only thing really required of them4 ,the above maxim therefore amounts1 as we have already seen1 to this3 ,men are bound to do1 that is1 to will1 what is right1 because if they should will what is right1 they would will what is right4 ,,doctrine ,,of ,,necessity1 ,,as ,,regarded ,,by ,,necessitarians ,,of ,,different ,,schools4 ,,viii4 ,two schools divide the advocates of ,necessity4 ,according to one class1 ,god produces in men all their volitions and acts1 both sinful and holy1 by the direct exertion of his own omnipotence4 ,without the ,divine agency1 men1 they hold1 are wholly incapable of all volitions and actions of every kind4 ,with it1 none but those which ,god produces can arise1 and these cannot but arise4 ,this is the scheme of ,divine efficiency1 as advocated by ,dr4 ,emmons and others4 ,according to the other school1 ,god does not1 in all instances1 produce volitions and actions by his own direct agency1 but by creating in creatures a certain nature or constitution1 and then subjecting them to influences from which none but particular volitions and acts which they do put forth can result1 and these must result4 ,according to a large portion of this school1 ,god1 either by his own direct agency1 or by sustaining their laws of natural generation1 produces in men the peculiar nature which they do possess1 and then imputes to them infinite guilt1 not only for this nature1 but for its necessary results1 sinful feelings1 volitions1 and actions4 ,such are these two schemes4 ,in the two following particulars1 they perfectly harmonize4 #a4 ,all acts of ,will1 together with their effects1 external and internal1 in the circumstances of their occurrence1 cannot but be what they are4 #b4 ,the ground of this necessity is the agency of ,god1 in the one instance producing these effects directly and immediately1 and in the other producing the same results1 mediately1 by giving existence to a constitution and influences from which such results cannot but arise4 ,they differ only in respect to the immediate ground of this necessity1 the power of ,god1 according to the former1 producing the effects directly1 and according to the latter1 indirectly4 ,according to both1 all our actions sustain the same essential relation to the ,divine ,will1 that of ,necessity4 ,now while these two theories so perfectly harmonize1 in all essential particulars1 strange to tell1 the advocates of one regard the other as involving the most monstrous absurdities conceivable4 ,for ,god to produce1 through the energies of his own omnipotence1 human volitions1 and then to impute infinite guilt to men for what he himself has produced in them1 what a horrid sentiment that is1 exclaims the advocate of constitutional depravity4 ,for ,god to create in men a sinful nature1 and then impute to them infinite guilt for what he has himself created1 together with its unavoidable results1 what horrid tyranny such a sentiment imputes to the ,most ,high1 exclaims the advocate of ,divine efficiency1 in his turn4 ,the impartial1 uncommitted spectator1 on the other hand1 perceives most distinctly the same identical absurdities in both these theories4 ,he knows perfectly1 that it can make no essential difference1 whether ,god produces a result directly1 or by giving existence to a constitution and influences from which it cannot but arise4 ,if one theory involves injustice and tyranny1 the other must involve the same4 ,let me here add1 that the reprobation with which each of the classes above named regards the sentiments of the other1 is a sentence of reprobation passed 7unconsciously to be sure7 upon the doctrine of ,necessity itself which is common to both4 ,for if this one element is taken out of either theory1 there is nothing left to render it abhorrent to any mind4 ,it is thus that ,necessitarians themselves1 without exception1 pass sentence of condemnation upon their own theory1 by condemning it1 in every system in which they meet with it except their own4 ,there is not a man on earth1 that has not in some form or other passed sentence of reprobation upon this system4 ,let any man1 whatever1 contemplate any theory but the one he has himself adopted1 any theory that involves this element1 and he will instantly fasten upon this one feature as the characteristic which vitiates the whole theory1 and renders it deserving of universal reprobation4 ,it is thus that unsophisticated ,nature expresses her universal horror at a system which ,binding nature fast in fate1 ,enslaves the human ,will4 ,unsophisticated ,nature abhors this doctrine infinitely more than she was ever conceived to abhor a vacuum4 ,can a theory which the universal ,intelligence thus agrees in reprobating1 as involving the most horrid absurdity and tyranny conceivable1 be the only true one8 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,extent ,,and ,,limits ,,of ,,the ,,liberty ,,of ,,the ,,will4 ,,while it is maintained1 that1 in the sense defined in the preceding chapter1 the ,will is free1 it is also affirmed that1 in other respects1 it is not free at all4 ,it should be borne distinctly in mind1 that1 in the respects in which the ,will is subject to the law of ,liberty1 its liberty is absolute4 ,it is in no sense subject to the law of ,necessity4 ,so far1 also1 as it is subject to the law of ,necessity1 it is in no sense free4 ,what then are the extent and limits of the ,liberty of the ,will8 #a4 ,in the absence of ,motives1 the ,will cannot act at all4 ,to suppose the opposite would involve a contradiction4 ,it would suppose the action of the ,will in the direction of some object1 in the absence of all objects towards which such action can be directed4 #b4 ,the ,will is not free in regard to what the ,motives presented shall be1 in view of which its determinations shall be formed4 ,motives exist wholly independent of the ,will4 ,nor does it depend at all upon the ,will1 what ,motives shall be presented for its election4 ,it is free only in respect to the particular determinations it shall put forth1 in reference to the ,motives actually presented4 #c4 ,whenever a ,motive1 or object of choice1 is presented to the mind1 the ,will is necessitated1 by the presentation of the object1 to act in some direction4 ,it must yield or refuse to yield to the ,motive4 ,but such refusal is itself a positive act4 ,so far1 therefore1 the ,will is wholly subject to the law of ,necessity4 ,it is free1 not in respect to whether it shall1 or shall not1 choose at all when a ,motive is presented2 but in respect to what it shall choose4 ,i1 for example1 offer a merchant a certain sum1 for a piece of goods4 ,now while it is equally possible for him to receive or reject the offer1 one or the other determination he must form4 ,in the first respect1 he is wholly free4 ,in the latter1 he is not free in any sense whatever4 ,the same holds true in respect to all objects of choice presented to the mind4 ,motive necessitates the ,will to act in some direction2 while1 in all deliberate ,moral ,acts at least1 it leaves either of two or more different and opposite determinations equally possible to the mind4 #d4 ,certain particular volitions may be rendered necessary by other1 and what may be termed general1 determinations4 ,for example1 a determination to pursue a particular course of conduct1 may render necessary all particular volitions requisite to carry this general purpose into accomplishment4 ,it renders them necessary in this sense1 that if the former does exist1 the latter must exist4 ,a man1 for example1 determines to pass from ,boston to ,new ,york with all possible expedition4 ,this determination remaining unchanged1 all the particular volitions requisite to its accomplishment cannot but exist4 ,the general and controlling determination1 however1 may1 at any moment1 be suspended4 ,to perpetuate or suspend it1 is always in the power of the ,will4 #e4 ,i will here state a conjecture1 viz43 that there are in the primitive developments of mind1 as well as in all primary acts of attention1 certain necessary spontaneities of the ,will1 as well as of other powers of the mind4 ,is it not in consequence of such actions1 that the mind becomes first conscious of the power of volition1 and is it not now necessary for us under certain circumstances to give a certain degree of attention to phenomena which appear within and around us8 ,my own convictions are1 that such circumstances often do occur4 ,nor is such a supposition inconsistent with the great principle maintained in this ,treatise4 ,this principle is1 that ,liberty and ,accountability1 in other words1 ,free1 and ,moral ,agency1 are co-extensive4 #f4 ,nor does ,liberty1 as here defined1 imply1 that the mind1 antecedently to all acts of ,will1 shall be in a state of indifference1 unimpelled by feeling1 or the affirmations of the ,intelligence1 more strongly in one direction than another4 ,the ,will exists in a tri-unity with the ,intelligence and ,sensibility4 ,its determinations may be in harmony with the ,sensibility1 in opposition to ,intelligence1 or with the ,intelligence in opposition to the ,sensibility4 ,but while it follows either in distinction from the other1 under the same identical influences1 different and opposite determinations are equally possible4 ,however the ,will may be influenced1 whether its determinations are in the direction of the strongest impulse1 or opposed to it1 it never1 in deliberate moral determination1 puts forth particular acts1 because1 that in these circumstances1 no others are possible4 ,in instances comparatively few1 can we suppose that the mind1 antecedently to acts of ,will1 is in a state of indifference1 unimpelled in one direction in distinction from others1 or equally impelled in the direction of different and opposite determinations4 ,indifference is in no such sense an essential or material condition of ,liberty4 ,how ever strongly the ,will may be impelled in the direction of particular determinations1 it is still in the possession of the highest conceivable freedom1 if it is not thereby necessitated to act in one direction in distinction from all others4 #g4 ,i now refer to one other fixed law under the influence of which the ,will is always necessitated to act4 ,it is the law of habit4 ,action in any one direction always generates a tendency to subsequent action in the same direction under similar influences4 ,this tendency may be increased1 till it becomes so strong as to render action in the same direction in all future time really1 although contingently1 certain4 ,the certainty thus granted will always be of such a nature as consists fully with the relation of ,liberty4 ,it can never1 while moral agency continues1 come under the relation of ,necessity4 ,still the certainty is real4 ,thus the mind1 by a continued course of well or ill doing1 may generate such fixed habits1 as to render subsequent action in the same direction perfectly certain1 during the entire progress of its future being4 ,every man1 while conscious of freedom1 should be fully aware of the existence of this law1 and it should surely lead him to walk thoughtfully along the borders of the undiscovered country1 his location in which he is determining by the habits of thought1 feeling1 and action1 he is now generating4 ,,strongest ,,motive--,,reasoning ,,in ,a ,,circle4 ,a singular instance of reasoning in a circle on the part of ,necessitarians1 in respect to what they call the strongest ,motive1 demands a passing notice here4 ,one of their main arguments in support of their doctrine is based upon the assumption1 that the action of the ,will is always in the direction of the strongest ,motive4 ,when1 however1 we ask them1 which is the strongest ,motive1 their reply in reality is1 that it is the ,motive in the direction of which the ,will does act4 ,the strength of a ,motive1 says ,president ,day1 is not its prevailing1 but the power by which it prevails4 ,yet we may very properly measure this power by the actual result4 ,again1 ,we may measure the comparative strength of ,motives of different kinds1 from the results to which they lead2 just as we learn the power of different causes1 from the effects which they produce3 that is1 we are not to determine1 a priori1 nor by an appeal to consciousness1 which of two or more ,motives presented is the strongest4 ,we are to wait till the ,will does act1 and then assume that the ,motive1 in the direction of which it acts1 is the strongest4 ,from the action of the ,will in the direction of that particular ,motive1 we are finally to infer the truth of the doctrine of ,necessity4 ,the strongest ,motive1 according to the above definition1 is the motive to which the ,will does yield4 ,the argument based upon the truism1 that the ,will always acts in the direction of this ,motive1 that is1 the ,motive towards which it does act1 the argument1 ,i say1 put into a logical form1 would stand thus4 ,if the action of the ,will is always in the direction of the strongest ,motive1 that is1 if it always follows the ,motive it does follow1 it is governed by the law of ,necessity4 ,its action is always in the direction of this ,motive1 that is1 it always follows the ,motive it does follow4 ,the ,will is therefore governed by the law of ,necessity4 ,how many philosophers and theologians have become rooted and grounded in the belief of this doctrine1 under the influence of this sophism1 a sophism which1 in the first instance1 assumes the doctrine as true1 and then moves round in a vicious circle to demonstrate its truth4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,the ,,greatest ,,apparent ,,good4 ,,section ,i4 ,,we now come to a consideration of one of the great questions bearing upon our personal investigations--the proposition maintained by ,necessitarians1 as a chief pillar of their theory1 that the ,will always is as the greatest apparent good4 ,,phrase ,,defined4 ,the first inquiry which naturally arises here is ,what is the proper meaning of this proposition8 ,in reply1 ,i answer1 that it must mean one of these three things4 #a4 ,that the ,will is always1 in all its determinations1 conformed to the dictates of the ,intelligence1 choosing those things only which the ,intelligence affirms to be best4 ,or1 #b4 ,that the determinations of the ,will are always in conformity to the impulse of the ,sensibility1 that is1 that its action is always in the direction of the strongest feeling4 ,or1 #c4 ,in conformity to the dictates of the ,intelligence1 and the impulse of the ,sensibility combined1 that is that the ,will never acts at all1 except when impelled by the ,intelligence and ,sensibility both in the same direction4 ,,meaning ,,of ,,this ,,phrase ,,according ,,to ,,edwards4 ,the following passage leaves no room for doubt in respect to the meaning which ,edwards attaches to the phrase1 the greatest apparent good4 ,i have chosen1 he says1 rather to express myself thus1 that the ,will always is as the greatest apparent good1 or as what appears most agreeable1 than to say1 that the ,will is determined by the greatest apparent good1 or by what seems most agreeable2 because an appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind1 and the mind's preferring and choosing1 seem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct4 ,here undeniably1 the words1 choosing1 preferring1 appearing most agreeable or pleasing1 and the greatest apparent good1 are defined as identical in their meaning4 ,hence in another place1 he adds1 ,if strict propriety of speech be insisted on1 it may more properly be said1 that the voluntary action which is the immediate consequence and fruit of the mind's volition and choice1 is determined by that which appears most agreeable1 than by the preference or choice itself4 ,the reason is obvious4 ,appearing most agreeable or pleasing1 and preference or choice1 had been defined as synonymous in their meaning4 ,to say1 therefore1 that preference or choice is determined by what appears most agreeable or pleasing1 would be equivalent to the affirmation1 that choice determines choice4 ,the act of volition itself1 he adds1 is always determined by that in or about the mind's view of an object1 which causes it to appear most agreeable1 or what is by definition the same thing1 causes it to be chosen4 ,the phrases1 the greatest apparent good1 and appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind1 and the words1 choosing1 preferring1 c41 are therefore1 according to ,edwards1 identical in their meaning4 ,the proposition1 the ,will is always as the greatest apparent good1 really means nothing more nor less than this1 that ,will always chooses as it chooses4 ,the famous argument based upon this proposition in favor of the doctrine of ,necessity may be thus expressed4 ,if the ,will always is as the greatest apparent good1 that is1 if the ,will always chooses as it chooses1 it is governed by the law of ,necessity4 ,the ,will is as the greatest apparent good1 that is1 it always chooses as it chooses4 ,therefore it is governed by this law4 ,by this very syllogism1 multitudes have supposed that the doctrine of ,necessity has been established with all the distinctness and force of demonstration4 ,the question now returns1 ,is the ,will always as the greatest apparent good1 in either of the senses of the phrase as above defined8 ,,the ,,will ,,not ,,always ,,as ,,the ,,dictates ,,of ,,the ,,intelligence4 ,i4 ,is the ,will then as the greatest apparent good in this sense1 that all its determinations are in conformity to the dictates of the ,intelligence4 ,does the ,will never harmonize with the ,sensibility in opposition to the ,intelligence8 ,has no intelligent being1 whether sinful or holy1 ever done that which his ,intellect affirmed at the time1 that he ought not to do1 and that it was best for him not to do8 ,i answer1 #a4 ,every man who has ever violated moral obligation knows1 that he has followed the impulse of desire1 in opposition to the dictates of his ,intelligence4 ,what individual that has ever perpetrated such deeds has not said1 and cannot say with truth1 ,i know the good1 and approve it2 yet follow the bad8 ,take a matter of fact4 ,a ,spanish nobleman during the early progress of the ,reformation1 became fully convinced1 that the faith of the ,reformers was true1 and his own false1 and that his salvation depended upon his embracing the one and rejecting the other4 ,yet martyrdom would be the result of such a change4 ,while balancing this question1 in the depths of his own mind1 he trembled with the greatest agitation4 ,his sovereign who was present1 asked the cause4 ,the reply was1 the martyr's crown is before me1 and ,i have not ,christian fortitude enough to take it4 ,he died a few weeks subsequent1 without confessing the truth4 ,did he obey his ,intelligence1 or ,sensibility there8 ,was not the conflict between the two1 and did not the latter prevail8 ,in ,john #ab3 #db1 #dc1 we have a fact revealed1 in which men were convinced of the truth1 and yet1 because they loved the praise of men more than the praise of ,god1 they did not confess1 but denied the truth1 a case therefore in which they followed the impulse of desire1 in opposition to the dictates of the ,intelligence4 ,the ,will then is not always as the greatest apparent good1 in this sense1 that its action is always in the direction of the dictates of the ,intelligence4 #b4 ,if this is so1 sin1 in all instances1 is a mere blunder1 a necessary result of a necessary misjudgment of the ,intelligence8 ,is it so8 ,can the ,intelligence affirm that a state of moral impurity is better than a state of moral rectitude8 ,how easy it would be1 in every instance1 to convert a sinner from the error of his way1 if all that is requisite is to carry his ,intellect in favor of truth and righteousness8 ,who does not know1 that the great difficulty lies in the enslavement of the ,will to a depraved ,sensibility8 #c4 ,if the ,will of all ,intelligents is always in harmony with the ,intellect1 then ,i affirm that there is not1 and never has been1 any such thing as sin1 or ill desert1 in the universe4 ,what more can be said of ,god1 or of any being ever so pure1 than that he has always done what his ,intellect affirmed to be best8 ,what if the devil1 and all creatures called sinners1 had always done the same thing8 ,where is the conceivable ground for the imputation of moral guilt to them8 #d4 ,if all acts of ,will are always in perfect harmony with the ,intelligence1 and in this sense1 as the greatest apparent good1 then1 when the ,intellect affirms absolutely that there can be no ground of preference between two objects1 there can be no choice between them4 ,but we are1 in fact1 putting forth every day just such acts of ,will1 selecting one object in distinction from another1 when the ,intellect affirms their perfect equality1 or affirms absolutely1 that there is and can be no perceived ground of preference between them4 ,i receive a letter1 ,i will suppose1 from a friend1 informing me that he has just taken from a bank two notes1 perfectly new and of the same value1 that one now lies in the east and the other in the west corner of his drawer1 that ,i may have one and only one of them1 the one that ,i shall name by return of mail1 and that ,i must designate one or the other1 or have neither4 ,here are present to my ,intelligence two objects absolutely equal4 ,their location is a matter of indifference1 equally absolute4 ,now if as the proposition the ,will is always as the greatest apparent good1 affirms1 ,i cannot select one object in distinction from another1 without a perceived ground for such selection1 ,i could not possibly1 in the case supposed1 say which bill ,i would have4 ,yet ,i make the selection without the least conceivable embarrassment4 ,i might mention numberless cases1 of daily occurrence1 of a nature precisely similar4 ,every child that ever played at odd or even1 knows perfectly the possibility of selecting between objects which are1 to the ,intelligence1 absolutely equal4 ,i will now select a case about which there can possibly be no mistake4 ,space we know perfectly to be absolutely infinite4 ,space in itself is in all parts alike4 ,so must it appear to the mind of ,god4 ,now when ,god determined to create the universe1 he must have resolved to locate its centre in some one point of space in distinction from all others4 ,at that moment1 there was present to the ,divine ,intelligence an infinite number of points1 all and each absolutely equally eligible4 ,neither point could have been selected1 because it was better than any other3 for all were equal4 ,so they must have appeared to ,god4 ,now if the ,will is always as the greatest apparent good1 in the sense under consideration1 ,god could not in this case make the selection1 and consequently could not create the universe4 ,he did make the selection1 and did create4 ,the ,will1 therefore1 is not1 in this sense1 always as the greatest apparent good4 ,,the ,,will ,,not ,,always ,,as ,,the ,,strongest ,,desire4 ,,ii4 ,is the ,will always as the greatest apparent good in this sense1 that it is always as the strongest desire1 or as the strongest impulse of the ,sensibility8 ,does the ,will never harmonize with the ,intelligence1 in opposition to the ,sensibility1 as well as with the ,sensibility in opposition to the ,intelligence8 ,if this is not so1 then-- #a4 ,it would be difficult to define self-denial according to the ordinary acceptation of the term4 ,what is self-denial but placing the ,will with the ,intelligence1 in opposition to the ,sensibility8 ,how often in moral reformations do we find almost nothing else but this1 an inflexible purpose placed directly before an almost crushing and overwhelming tide of feeling and desire8 #b4 ,when the ,will is impelled in different directions1 by conflicting feelings1 it could not for a moment be in a state of indecision1 unless we suppose these conflicting feelings to be absolutely equal in strength up to the moment of decision4 ,who believes that8 ,who believes that his feelings are in all instances in a state of perfect equilibrium up to the moment of fixed determination between two distinct and opposite courses8 ,this must be the case1 if the action of the ,will is always as the strongest feeling1 and in this sense as the greatest apparent good4 ,how can ,necessitarians meet this argument8 ,will they pretend that1 in all instances1 up to the moment of decisive action1 the feelings impelling the ,will in different directions are always absolutely equal in strength8 ,this must be1 if the ,will is always as the strongest feeling4 #c4 ,when the feelings are in a state of perfect equilibrium1 there can possibly1 on this supposition1 be no choice at all4 ,the feelings often are1 and must be1 in this state1 even when we are necessitated to act in some direction4 ,the case of the bank notes above referred to1 presents an example of this kind4 ,as the objects are in the mind's eye absolutely equal1 to suppose that the feelings should1 in such a case1 impel the ,will more strongly in the direction of the one than the other1 is to suppose an event without a cause1 inasmuch as the ,sensibility is governed by the law of ,necessity4 ,if ,a and ,b are to the ,intelligence1 in all respects1 absolutely equal1 how can the ,sensibility impel the ,will towards ,a instead of ,b8 ,what is an event without a cause1 if this is not8 ,contemplate the case in respect to the location of the universe above supposed4 ,each point of space was equally present to ,god1 and was in itself1 and was perceived and affirmed to be1 equally eligible with all the others4 ,how could a stronger feeling arise in the direction of one point in distinction from others1 unless we suppose that ,god's ,sensibility is not subject to the law of ,necessity1 a position which none will assume1 or that here was an event without a cause8 ,when1 therefore1 ,god did select this one point in distinction from all the others1 that determination could not have been either in the direction of what the ,intelligence affirmed to be best1 nor of the strongest feeling4 ,the proposition1 therefore1 that the ,will always is as the greatest apparent good1 is in both the senses above defined demonstrably false4 #d4 ,of the truth of this every one is aware when he appeals to his own ,consciousness4 ,in the amputation of a limb1 for example1 who does not know that if an individual1 at the moment when the operation commences1 should yield to the strongest feeling1 he would refuse to endure it8 ,he can pass through the scene1 only by placing an inflexible purpose directly across the current of feeling4 ,how often do we hear individuals affirm1 ,if ,i should follow my feelings1 ,i should do this2 if ,i should follow my judgment1 ,i should do that4 ,in all such instances1 we have the direct testimony of consciousness1 that the action of the ,will is not always in the direction of the strongest feeling3 because its action is sometimes consciously in the direction of the ,intelligence1 in opposition to such feelings2 and at others1 in the conscious presence of such feelings1 the ,will remains1 for periods longer or shorter1 undecided in respect to the particular course which shall be pursued4 ,,the ,,will ,,not ,,always ,,as ,,the ,,intelligence ,,and ,,sensibility ,,combined4 ,,iii4 ,is not the ,will always as the greatest apparent good in this sense1 that its determinations are always as the affirmations of the ,intelligence and the impulse of the ,sensibility combined8 ,that it is not1 ,i argue for two reasons4 #a4 ,if this was the case1 when the ,intelligence and ,sensibility are opposed to each other--a fact of very frequent occurrence1--there could be no acts of ,will in either direction4 ,the ,will must remain in a state of absolute inaction1 till these belligerent powers settle their differences1 and unite in impelling the ,will in some particular direction4 ,but we know that the ,will can1 and often does1 act in the direction of the ,intelligence or ,sensibility1 when the affirmations of one and the impulses of the other are in direct opposition to each other4 #b4 ,when both the ,intellect and ,sensibility1 as in the cases above cited1 are alike indifferent1 there can be1 on the present hypothesis1 no acts of ,will whatever4 ,under these identical circumstances1 however1 the ,will does act4 ,the hypothesis1 therefore1 falls to the ground4 ,i conclude1 then1 that the proposition1 the ,will is always as the greatest apparent good1 is either a mere truism1 having no bearing at all upon our present inquiries1 or that it is false4 ,in the discussion of the above propositions1 the doctrine of ,liberty has received a full and distinct illustration4 ,the action of the ,will is sometimes in the direction of the ,intelligence1 in opposition to the ,sensibility1 and sometimes in the direction of the ,sensibility1 in opposition to the ,intelligence1 and never in the direction of either1 because it must be4 ,sometimes it acts where the ,sensibility and ,intelligence both harmonize1 or are alike indifferent4 ,when also the ,will acts in the direction of the ,intelligence or ,sensibility1 it is not necessitated to follow1 in all instances1 the highest affirmation1 nor the strongest desire4 ,,sec4 ,,ii--,,miscllaneous ,,topics4 ,,necessitarian ,,argument4 ,i4 ,we are now prepared to appreciate the ,necessitarian argument1 based upon the assumption1 that the ,will always is as the greatest apparent good4 ,this assumption is the great pillar on which that doctrine rests4 ,yet the whole argument based upon it is a perpetual reasoning in a circle4 ,ask the ,necessitarian to give the grand argument in favor of his doctrine4 ,his answer is1 because the ,will always is as the greatest apparent good4 ,cite now such facts as those stated above in contradiction of his assumption1 and his answer is ready4 ,there must be1 in all such cases1 some perceived or felt ground of preference1 or there could be no act of ,will in the case4 ,there must have been1 for example1 some point in space more eligible than any other for the location of the universe1 and this must have been the reason why ,god selected the one he did4 ,ask him why he makes this declaration8 ,his reply is1 because the ,will is always as the greatest apparent good4 ,thus this assumption becomes premise or conclusion1 just as the exigence of the theory based upon it demands4 ,nothing is so convenient and serviceable as such an assumption1 when one has a very difficult and false position to sustain4 ,but who does not see1 that it is a most vicious reasoning in a circle8 ,to assume the proposition1 the ,will always is as the greatest apparent good1 in the first instance1 as the basis of a universal theory1 and then to assume the truth of that proposition as the basis of the explanation of particular facts1 which contradict that theory1 what is reasoning in a circle if this is not8 ,no one has a right to assume this proposition as true at all1 until he has first shown that it is affirmed by all the phenomena of the ,will4 ,on its authority he has no right to explain a solitary phenomenon4 ,to do it is not only to reason in a circle1 but to beg the question at issue4 ,,motives ,,cause ,,acts ,,of ,,will1 ,,in ,,what ,,sense4 ,,ii4 ,we are also prepared to notice another assumption of ,president ,edwards1 which1 if admitted in the sense in which he assumes it as true1 necessitates the admission of the ,necessitarian scheme1 to wit3 that the determination of the ,will is always caused by the ,motive present to the mind for putting forth that determination4 ,it is that motive1 he says1 which1 as it stands in the view of the mind1 is the strongest which determines the ,will4 ,again1 that every act of the ,will has some cause1 and consequently 7by what has been already proved7 has a necessary connection with its cause1 and so is necessary by a necessity of connection and consequence1 is evident by this1 that every act of ,will1 whatsoever1 is excited by some motive4 ,but if every act of the ,will is excited by some motive1 then that motive is the cause of that act of the ,will4 ,and if volitions are properly the effects of their motives1 then they are necessarily connected with their motives4 ,if we grant the principle here assumed1 the conclusion follows of necessity4 ,but let us inquire in what sense motive and volition sustain to each other the relation of cause and effect4 ,the presence and action of one power causes the action of another1 so far1 and so far only1 as it necessitates such action2 and causes its action in a particular direction1 so far only as it necessitates its action in that direction1 in opposition to every other4 ,now the action of one power may cause the action of another1 in one or both these ways4 #a4 ,it may necessitate its action1 and necessitate it in one direction in opposition to any and every other4 ,in this sense1 fire causes the sensation of pain4 ,it necessitates the action of the ,sensibility1 and in that one direction4 ,or1 #b4 ,one power may necessitate the action of another power1 but not necessitate its action in one direction in opposition to any or all others4 ,we have seen1 in a former chapter1 that the ,motive causes the action of the ,will in this sense only1 that it necessitates the ,will to act in some direction1 but not in one direction in distinction from another4 ,now the error of ,president ,edwards lies in confounding these two senses of the word cause4 ,he assumes that when one power causes the action of another in any sense1 it must in every sense4 ,it is readily admitted1 that in one sense the ,motive causes the action of the ,will4 ,but when we ask for the reason or cause of any one particular choice in distinction from another1 we find it1 not in the motive1 but in the power of willing itself4 ,,objection--,,particular ,,volition1 ,,how ,,accounted ,,for4 ,,iii4 ,we are also prepared to notice the great objection of ,necessitarians to the doctrine of ,liberty as here maintained4 ,how1 it is asked1 shall we account1 on this theory1 for particular volitions8 ,the power to will only accounts for acts of ,will in some direction1 but not for one act in distinction from another4 ,this distinction must be accounted for1 or we have an event without a cause4 ,to this argument ,i reply1 #a4 ,it assumes the position in debate1 to wit3 that there cannot be consequents which are not necessarily connected with particular antecedents1 which antecedents necessitate these particular consequents in distinction from all others4 #b4 ,to account for any effect1 all that can properly be required is1 to assign the existence and operation of a cause adequate to the production of such effects4 ,free-agency itself is such a cause in the case now under consideration4 ,we have here given the existence and operation of a cause which must produce one of two effects1 and is equally capable1 under the circumstances1 of producing either4 ,such a cause accounts for the existence of such an effect1 just as much as the assignment of an antecedent necessarily producing certain consequents1 accounts for those consequents4 #c4 ,if1 as this objection affirms1 an act of ,will1 when there is no perceived or felt reason for that act in distinction from every other1 is equivalent to an event without a cause2 then it would be as impossible for us to conceive of the former as of the latter4 ,we cannot even conceive of an event without a cause4 ,but we can conceive of an act of ,will when no reason1 but the power of willing1 exists for that particular act in distinction from others4 ,we cannot conceive of an event without a cause4 ,but we can conceive of the mind's selecting odd1 for example1 instead of even1 without the ,intellect or ,sensibility impelling the ,will to that act in distinction from others4 ,such act1 therefore1 is not equivalent to an event without a cause4 ,the objection under consideration is consequently wholly baseless4 ,,facts ,,like ,,the ,,above ,,wrongly ,,accounted ,,for4 ,,iv4 ,the manner in which ,necessitarians sometimes endeavor to account for acts of ,will in which a selection is made between objects perceived and felt to be perfectly equal1 requires attention4 ,suppose that ,a and ,b are before the mind4 ,one or the other is to be selected1 or no selection at all is to be made4 ,these objects are present to the mind as perfectly equal4 ,the ,intelligence and ,sensibility are in a state of entire equilibrium between them4 ,now when one of these objects is selected in distinction from the other1 this act of ,will is to be accounted for1 it is said1 by referring back to the determination to make the selection instead of not making it4 ,the ,will does not choose between ,a and ,b1 at all4 ,the choice is between choosing and not choosing4 ,but mark3 ,to determine to select ,a or ,b is one thing4 ,to select one in distinction from the other1 is quite another4 ,the former act does not determine the ,will towards either in distinction from the other4 ,this last act remains to be accounted for4 ,when we attempt to account for it1 we cannot do it1 by referring to the ,intelligence or ,sensibility for these are in a state of perfect equilibrium between the objects4 ,we can account for it only by falling back upon the power of willing itself1 and admitting that the ,will is free1 and not subject to the law of ,necessity4 ,,choosing ,,between ,,objects ,,known ,,to ,,be ,,equal--,,how ,,treated ,,by ,,necessitarians4 ,v4 ,the manner in which ,necessitarians treat facts of this kind1 to wit1 choosing between things perceived and felt to be equal1 also demands a passing notice4 ,such facts are of very little importance1 one way or the other1 they say1 in mental science4 ,it is the height of folly to appeal to them to determine questions of such moment as the doctrine of ,liberty and ,necessity4 ,i answer3 ,such facts are just as important in mental science1 as the fall of a piece of gold and a feather1 in an exhausted receiver1 is in ,natural ,philosophy4 ,the latter reveals with perfect clearness the great law of attraction in the material universe4 ,the former reveals with equal conspicuousness the great law of ,liberty in the realm of mind4 ,the ,necessitarian affirms1 that no act of ,will is possible1 only in the direction of the dictates of the ,intelligence1 or of the strongest impulse of the ,sensibility4 ,facts are adduced in which1 from the necessity of the case1 both ,faculties must be in a state of perfect equilibrium4 ,neither can impel the ,will in one direction1 in distinction from the other4 ,in such circumstances1 if the doctrine of ,necessity is true1 no acts of ,will are possible4 ,in precisely these circumstances acts of ,will do arise4 ,the doctrine of ,necessity therefore is overthrown1 and the truth of that ,liberty is demonstrated4 ,so important are those facts which ,necessitarians affect to despise4 ,true philosophy1 it should be remembered1 never looks contemptuously upon facts of any kind4 ,,palpable ,,mistake4 ,,vi4 ,we are prepared to notice a palpable mistake into which ,necessitarians have fallen in respect to the use which the advocates of the doctrine of ,liberty design to make of the fact1 that the ,will can and does select between objects perceived and felt to be equal4 ,the reason why some metaphysical writers1 says ,president ,day1 have laid so much stress upon this apparently insignificant point1 is probably the inference which they propose to draw from the position which they assume4 ,if it be conceded that the mind decides one way or the other indifferently1 when the motives on each side are perfectly equal1 they infer that this may be the fact1 in all other cases1 even though the motives to opposite choices may be ever so unequal4 ,but on what ground is this conclusion warranted8 ,if a man is entirely indifferent which of two barley-corns to take1 does it follow that he will be indifferent whether to accept of a guinea or a farthing2 whether to possess an estate or a trinket8 ,the advocates of the doctrine of ,liberty design to make1 and do make1 no such use of the facts under consideration1 as is here attributed to them4 ,they never argue that1 because the ,will can select between ,a and ,b1 when they are perceived and felt to be equal1 therefore1 when the ,will acts in one direction1 in distinction from another1 it is always1 up to the moment of such action1 impelled in different directions by feelings and judgments equally strong4 ,what they do argue from such facts is1 that the ,will is subject to the law of ,liberty and not to that of ,necessity4 ,if the ,will is subject to the latter1 then1 when impelled in different directions by ,motives equally strong 7as in the cases above cited71 it could no more act in the direction of one in distinction from the other1 than a heavy body can move east instead of west1 when drawn in each direction by forces perfectly equal4 ,if the ,will is subject to the law of ,necessity1 then1 in all instances of selection between objects known and felt to be equal1 we have an event without a cause4 ,even the ,necessitarians1 many of them at least1 dare not deny that1 under these very circumstances1 selection does take place4 ,they must1 therefore1 abandon their theory1 or admit the dogma1 of events without causes4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,connection ,,of ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,liberty ,,with ,,the ,,divine ,,prescience4 ,,the argument on which ,necessitarians chiefly rely1 against the doctrine of ,liberty1 and in support of that of ,necessity1 is based upon the ,divine prescience of human conduct4 ,the argument runs thus3 all acts of the ,will1 however remote in the distant future1 are foreknown to ,god4 ,this fact necessitates the conclusion1 that such acts are in themselves certain1 and1 consequently1 not free1 but necessary4 ,either ,god cannot foreknow acts of ,will1 or they are necessary4 ,the reply to this argument has already been anticipated in the ,introduction4 ,the ,divine prescience is not the truth to which the appeal should be made1 to determine the philosophy of the ,will pre-supposed in the ,bible4 ,this ,i argue1 for the obvious reason1 that of the mode1 nature1 and degree1 of the ,divine prescience of human conduct we are profoundly ignorant4 ,these we must know with perfect clearness1 before we can affirm1 with any certainty1 whether this prescience is or is not consistent with the doctrine of ,liberty4 ,the ,divine prescience is a truth of inspiration1 and therefore a fact4 ,the doctrine of ,liberty is1 as we have seen1 a truth of inspiration1 and therefore a fact4 ,it is also a fact1 as affirmed by the universal consciousness of man4 ,how do we know that these two facts are not perfectly consistent with each other8 ,how do we know but that1 if we understood the mode1 to say nothing of the nature and degree of the ,divine prescience1 we should not perceive with the utmost clearness1 that this truth consists as perfectly with the doctrine of ,liberty1 as with that of ,necessity4 ,if ,god foresees events1 he foreknows them as they are1 and not as they are not4 ,if they are free and not necessary1 as free and not necessary he foresees them4 ,having ascertained by consciousness that the acts of the ,will are free1 and having1 from reason and revelation1 determined1 that ,god foreknows such acts1 the great truth stands revealed to our mind1 that ,god does and can foreknow human conduct1 and yet man in such conduct be free2 and that the mode1 nature1 and degree1 of the former are such as most perfectly to consist with the latter4 ,i know with perfect distinctness1 that ,i am now putting forth certain acts of ,will4 ,with equal distinctness ,i know1 that such acts are not necessary1 but free4 ,my present knowledge is perfectly consistent with present freedom4 ,how do ,i know but that ,god's foreknowledge of future acts is equally consistent with the most perfect freedom of such acts4 ,perhaps a better presentation of this whole subject cannot be found than in the following extract from ,jouffroy's ,introduction to ,ethics4 ,the extract1 though somewhat lengthy1 will well repay a most attentive perusal4 ,,danger ,,in ,,reasoning ,,from ,,the ,,manner ,,in ,,which ,,we ,,foreknow ,,events ,,to ,,that ,,of ,,divine ,,prescience4 ,to begin1 then1 with a very simple remark3 if we conceive that foreknowledge in the ,divine ,being acts as it does in us1 we run the risk of forming a most incorrect notion of it1 and consequently1 of seeing a contradiction between it and liberty1 that would disappear altogether had we a truer notion4 ,let us consider that we have not the same faculty for foreseeing the future as we have of reviewing the past2 and even in cases where we do anticipate it1 it is by an induction from the past4 ,this induction may amount either to certainty1 or merely to probability4 ,it will amount to certainty when we are perfectly acquainted with necessary causes1 and their law of operation4 ,the effects of such causes in given circumstances having been determined by experience1 we can predict the return of similar effects under similar circumstances with entire certainty1 so long at least as the present laws of nature remain in force4 ,it is in this way that we foresee1 in most cases1 the physical occurrences1 whose law of operation is known to us2 and such foresight would extend much further1 were it not for unexpected circumstances which come in to modify the result4 ,this induction can never go beyond probability1 however1 when we consider the acts of free causes2 and for the very reason that they are free1 and that the effects which arise from such causes are not of necessary occurrence1 and do not invariably follow the same antecedent circumstances4 ,where the question is1 then1 as to the acts of any free cause1 we are never able to foresee it with certainty1 and induction is limited to conjectures of probability4 ,such is the operation1 and such are the limits of human foresight4 ,our minds foresee the future by induction from the past2 this foresight can never attain certainty except in the case of causes and effects connected by necessary dependence2 when the effects of free causes are to be anticipated1 as all such effects are contingent1 our foresight must be merely conjecture4 ,,mistake ,,respecting ,,the ,,divine ,,prescience4 ,if1 now1 we attempt to attribute to the ,deity the same mode of foresight of which human beings are capable1 it will follow1 as a strict consequence1 that1 as ,god must know exactly and completely the laws to which all the necessary causes in nature are subject--laws which change only according to his will1--he can foresee with absolute certainty all events which will take place in future4 ,the certain foresight of effects1 therefore1 which is to us possible only in particular cases1 and which1 even then1 is always liable to the limitation that the actual laws of nature are not modified1--this foresight1 which1 even when most sure1 is limited and contingent1 must be complete and absolute certainty in ,god1 supposing his foreknowledge to be of like kind with ours4 ,but it is evident that1 according to this hypothesis1 the ,deity cannot foresee with certainty the volitions of free causes any more than we can2 for1 as his foresight is founded1 as ours is1 upon the knowledge of the laws which govern causes1 and as the law of free causes is precisely this1 that their volitions are not necessary1 ,god cannot calculate1 any more than a human being can1 the influence of motives1 which1 in any given case1 may act upon such causes4 ,even his intelligence can lead no further than to conjectures1 more probable1 indeed1 than ours1 but never amounting to certainty4 ,according to this hypothesis1 we must1 therefore1 say either that ,god can foresee1 certainly1 the future volitions of men1 and that man1 therefore1 is not a free being1 or that man is free1 and that ,god1 therefore1 cannot1 any more than we can1 foresee his volitions with certainty2 and thus ,divine prescience and human free-will are brought into direct contradiction4 ,but1 gentlemen1 why must there be this contradiction8 ,merely because we suppose that ,god foresees the future in the same way in which we foresee it2 that his foreknowledge operates like our own4 ,now1 is this1 ,i ask1 such an idea as we ought to form of ,divine prescience1 or such an idea as even the partisans of this system1 which ,i am opposing1 form8 ,have we any reason for thus imposing upon the ,deity the limitation of our own feebleness8 ,i think not4 ,unendowed as we are1 with any faculty of foreseeing the future1 it may be difficult for us to conceive of such a faculty in ,god4 ,but yet can we not from analogy form such an idea8 ,we have now two faculties of perception--of the past by memory1 of the present by observation2 can we not imagine a third to exist in ,god--the faculty of perceiving the future1 as we perceive the past8 ,what would be the consequence8 ,this3 that ,god1 instead of conjecturing1 by induction1 the acts of human beings from the laws of the causes operating upon them1 would see them simply as the results of the free determinations of the will4 ,such perception of future acts no more implies the necessity of those actions1 than the perception of similar acts in the past4 ,to see that effects arise from certain causes is not to force causes to produce them2 neither is it to compel these effects to follow4 ,it matters not whether such a perception refers to the past1 present1 or future2 it is merely a perception2 and1 therefore1 far from producing the effect perceived1 it even presupposes this effect already produced4 ,i do not pretend that this vision of what is to be is an operation of which our minds easily conceive4 ,it is difficult to form an image of what we have never experienced2 but ,i do assert1 that the power of seeing what no longer exists is full as remarkable as that of seeing what has as yet no being1 and that the reason of our readily conceiving of the former is only the fact that we are endowed with such a power3 to my reason1 the mystery is the same4 ,but whatever may or may not be in reality the mode of ,divine foreknowledge1 or however exact may be the image which we attempt to form of it1 it always1 ,i say1--and this is the only point ,i am desirous of proving1--it always remains a matter of uncertainty1 which cannot be removed1 whether the ,divine foreknowledge is of a kind like our own1 or not2 and as1 in the one case1 there would not be the same contradiction that there is in the other1 between our belief in ,divine foreknowledge and human freedom1 it is proved true1 ,i think1 that no one has a right to assert the existence of such a contradiction1 and the necessity that human reason should choose between them4 ,,singular ,,inconsistency ,,of ,,necessitarians4 ,there is no class of men who dwell with more frequency and apparent reverence1 upon the truth1 that secret things belong to ,god1 and those and those only1 that are revealed to us2 that none by searching can find out ,god2 that as the heavens are high above the earth1 so are ,his ways above our ways1 and ,his thoughts above our thoughts2 and that it is the height of presumption in us1 to pretend to understand ,god's mode of knowing and acting4 ,none are more ready to talk of mysteries in religion than they4 ,yet1 strange as it may appear1 it is nevertheless true1 that their whole argument1 drawn from the ,divine foreknowledge1 against the doctrine of ,liberty1 and in favor of that of ,necessity1 is based entirely upon the assumption that they have found out and fully understand the mode of the ,divine prescience of human conduct2 that they have so measured and determined the ways and thoughts of ,god1 that they know that he cannot foresee any but necessary events2 that among many events1 all in themselves equally possible1 and none of them necessary in distinction from others1 he cannot foreknow which1 in fact1 will arise4 ,we may properly ask the ,necessitarian whence he obtained this knowledge1 so vast and deep2 whence he has thus found out the ,almighty to perfection8 ,to me1 the pretension to such knowledge appears more like presumption than that deep self-distrust and humiliation which becomes the ,finite in the presence of the ,infinite4 ,this knowledge has not been obtained from revelation4 ,god has never told us that ,he can foresee none but necessary events4 ,whether ,he can or cannot foresee events free as well as necessary1 is certainly one of the secret things which ,god has not revealed4 ,if we admit ourselves ignorant of the mode of ,god's fore-knowledge of future events 7and who will dare deny the existence of such ignorance in his own case871 the entire argument of the ,necessitarian1 based upon that fore-knowledge1 in favor of his doctrine1 falls to the ground at once4 ,,necessitarian ,,objection ,,to ,,the ,,above ,,argument4 ,to all that has been said above1 the ,necessitarian brings an objection which he deems perfectly unanswerable4 ,it is this3 ,if actions are free in the sense maintained in this treatise1 then in themselves they are uncertain4 ,if they are still certainly known to ,god1 they are both certain and uncertain1 at the same time4 ,true1 ,i answer1 but not in the same sense4 ,as far as the powers of the agent are concerned1 the action may be uncertain1 while ,god at the same time may know certainly how he will exert his powers4 ,in reference merely to the powers of the agent1 the event is uncertain4 ,in reference to the mind of ,god1 who knows instinctively how he will exert these powers1 the event is certain4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,bearing ,,of ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,liberty ,,upon ,,the ,,purposes ,,and ,,agency ,,of ,,god1 ,,in ,,respect ,,to ,,human ,,conduct4 ,,all truth is in harmony with itself4 ,every particular truth is1 and must be1 in harmony with every other truth4 ,if the doctrine of ,necessity be assumed as true1 we must take one view of the relation of ,god's purposes and agency in respect to the conduct of moral agents4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we assume as true the doctrine of ,liberty1 quite another and a different view1 in respect to this whole subject1 must be taken4 ,in the remarks which ,i have to make upon this subject1 ,i shall assume the truth of the doctrine of ,liberty1 together with those of the perfect ,divine ,omniscience1 ,wisdom1 and ,benevolence4 ,the question now arises1 in the light of all these great truths1 ,what relation do the ,divine purposes and agency sustain to human action8 ,in what sense does ,god purpose1 preordain1 and bring to pass1 the voluntary conduct of moral agents8 ,to this question but one answer can be given1 in the light of the truths before us4 ,god purposes human action in this sense only3 ,he determines himself to act in a given manner1 because it is wisest and best for him to act in that manner1 and in that manner only4 ,he determines this1 knowing how intelligent beings will act under the influence brought to bear upon them by the ,divine conduct4 ,he purposes and brings about1 or causes human action in this sense only1 that in the counsels of eternity1 ,he1 in the exercise of infinite wisdom and goodness1 preordains1 and at the time appointed1 gives existence to the motives and influences under which moral agents do act1 and in the light of which they voluntarily determine their own character and conduct4 ,,conclusions ,,from ,,the ,,above4 ,,gods ,,purposes ,,consistent ,,with ,,the ,,liberty ,,of ,,creatures4 #a4 ,we perceive the perfect consistency of ,god's purposes and agency with human liberty4 ,if the motives and influences in view of which men do act1 do not destroy their free agency1--a fact which must be true from the nature of the ,will1--then ,god's purposes to give existence1 and his agency in giving existence1 to these motives and influences1 cannot in any sense destroy1 or interfere with such agency4 ,this is a self-evident truth4 ,,senses ,,in ,,which ,,god ,,purposed ,,moral ,,good ,,and ,,evil4 #b4 ,we also perceive the senses in which ,god purposed the existence of moral good and evil1 in the universe4 ,he purposed the existence of the motives1 in view of which ,he knew that a part of ,his subjects would render themselves holy1 and a part would render themselves sinful4 ,but when we contemplate all the holiness and consequent happiness which do exist1 we then perceive the reason why ,god gave existence to these motives4 ,the sin consequent1 in the sense above explained1 constitutes no part of the reason for their existence1 but was always1 in the ,divine ,mind1 a reason against their existence2 which reason1 however1 was overpowered by infinitely more important reasons on the other side4 ,the good which results from creation and providence is the great and exclusive object of creation and providence4 ,the evil1 ,god always regretted1 and would have prevented1 if possible1 i4 e4 if compatible with the existence of the best possible system4 ,,death ,,of ,,the ,,incorrigible ,,preordained ,,but ,,not ,,willed4 #c4 ,we also perceive the perfect consistency of those ,scriptures which represent ,god as1 on the whole1 purposing the death of incorrigible transgressors1 and yet as not willing it1 but as willing the opposite4 ,the purpose to destroy is based upon the foreseen incorrigibleness of the transgressor1--a purpose demanded by perfect wisdom and benevolence1 in view of that foreseen incorrigibleness4 ,the incorrigibleness itself1 however1 and the perdition consequent1 are evils1 the existence of which ,god never willed2 but are the opposite of what he willed1 are evils which a being of perfect wisdom and goodness never could1 and never can will4 ,it is with perfect consistency1 therefore1 that the ,scriptures represent ,god1 in view of incorrigibleness foreseen1 as purposing the death of the transgressor1 and at the same time1 in view of the fact that such incorrigibleness is the opposite of what ,he wills the creature to do1 as affirming1 that ,he is not willing that any should perish1 but that all should come to a knowledge of the truth4 ,,god ,,not ,,responsible ,,for ,,the ,,death ,,of ,,the ,,incorrigible4 #d4 ,we see1 also1 how it is1 that1 while ,god does that1 and eternally purposed to do that1 in view of which he eternally knew that certain of his creatures would for ever destroy themselves1 none but themselves are in fault for such destruction4 ,the reasons are these3 7#a47 ,god never did anything in view of which men ought to act thus1 nor which did not lay them under obligations infinite1 to act differently1 and which was not best adapted to secure that end4 7#b47 ,their destruction constituted no part of the object of ,god in creation and providence1 the opposite of this being true4 7#c47 ,the great object of ,god in creation and providence was and is1 to produce the greatest possible amount of holiness and consequent happiness1 and to prevent1 in every possible way consistent with this end1 the existence of sin1 and consequently of misery4--,now if creatures perish under such an influence1 they perish by their own fault4 ,,sin ,a ,,mystery4 #e4 ,i have a single remark to make upon those phenomena of the ,will1 in which evil is chosen instead of good1 or sin instead of holiness4 ,that all intelligent beings possess the power to make such a choice1 is a fact affirmed by universal consciousness4 ,but that any being1 under any circumstances1 should make such a choice1 and that he should for ever refuse to return to the paths of virtue1 notwithstanding his experience of the consequences of sin1 is an abuse of human liberty1 which must for ever remain an inexplicable mystery4 ,when a being assigns the real reason in view of which right is chosen1 we are always satisfied with such reason4 ,but we are never satisfied with the reason for the opposite course4 ,,conclusion ,,from ,,the ,,above4 ,one conclusion forces itself upon us1 from that view of the ,divine government which consists with the doctrine of ,liberty4 ,the aspect of that government which results from this view of the subject commends itself to the reason and conscience of the intelligent universe4 ,mysteries we do and must find in it2 but absurdities and contradictions1 never4 ,under such a ,government1 no being is condemned for what he cannot avoid1 nor rewarded for what he could but do4 ,while ,god sits on no precarious throne1 ,nor borrows leave to be1 the destiny of the creature turns upon his own deserts1 his own choice of good or evil4 ,the elucidation of the principles of such a government commends itself to every man's conscience in the sight of ,god4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,obligation ,,predicable ,,only ,,of ,,the ,,will4 ,,section ,i4 ,,the ,will1 as ,i have already said1 exists in a trinity with the ,intelligence and ,sensibility4 ,in respect to the operations of the different departments of our mental being1 ,i lay down the two following propositions3 #a4 ,obligation1 moral desert1 c41 are directly predicable only of the action of the ,will4 #b4 ,for the operations of the other faculties we are accountable so far forth only as the existence and character of such operations depend upon the ,will4 ,in other words1 it is for voluntary acts and states only that we are accountable4 ,this ,i argue because1 #a4 ,obligation1 as we have seen1 consists only with ,liberty4 ,all the phenomena of the ,intelligence and ,sensibility1 in the circumstances of their occurrence1 are not free1 but necessary4 ,accountability1 therefore1 cannot be predicated of such phenomena4 ,we may be1 and are1 accountable for such phenomena1 so far forth as their existence and character depend upon the ,will3 in other words1 so far forth as they are voluntary1 and not involuntary1 states of mind4 #b4 ,the truth of the above proposition1 and of that only1 really corresponds with the universal conviction of the race4 ,this conviction is expressed in two ways4 7#a47 ,when blame is affirmed of the operations of the ,intelligence or ,sensibility1 it is invariably thus affirmed3 ,you have no right to entertain such thoughts or sentiments4 ,you have no right indulge such feeling's4 ,in other words1 praise or blame is never directly predicated of these operations themselves1 but of the action of the ,will relatively to them4 7#b47 ,all men agree1 that the moral character of all actions1 of all states of mind whatever2 depends upon intention4 ,in no point is there a more universal harmony among moral philosophers than in respect to this4 ,but intention is undeniably a phenomenon of the ,will1 and of that exclusively4 ,we must therefore admit1 that moral obligation is predicable of the ,will only1 or deny the fundamental convictions of the race4 #c4 ,the truth of the above propositions is intuitively evident1 the moment the mind apprehends their real import4 ,a man1 as he steps out of a warm room1 amid the external frosts of winter1 feels an involuntary chill over his whole system4 ,we might with the same propriety attribute blame to him for such feelings1 as for any other feelings1 thoughts1 or perceptions which exist alike independent of his ,will1 and especially in opposition to its determinations4 #d4 ,if we suppose all the voluntary acts and states of a moral agent to be1 and always to have been1 in perfect conformity to moral rectitude1 it is impossible for us to impute moral guilt to him for any feelings or thoughts which may have risen in his mind independently of his ,will4 ,we can no more conceive him to have incurred ill desert1 than we can conceive of the annihilation of space4 ,we may safely put it to the consciousness of every man whether this is not the case4 ,this renders demonstrably evident the truth1 that moral obligation is predicable only of the ,will4 #e4 ,with the above perfectly harmonize the positive teachings of ,inspiration4 ,for example4 ,lust1 when it is conceived1 bringeth forth sin4 ,the involuntary feeling does not constitute the sin1 but the action of the ,will in harmony with that feeling4 #f4 ,a single supposition will place this whole subject in a light perfectly conspicuous before the mind4 ,we can readily conceive that the ,will1 or voluntary states of the mind1 are in perfect harmony with the moral law1 while the ,sensibility1 or involuntary states1 are opposed to it4 ,we can also with equal readiness make the opposite supposition1 to wit1 that the ,sensibility1 or involuntary states1 are in harmony with the law1 while the determinations of the ,will are all opposed to it4 ,what shall we think of these two states8 ,let us suppose a case of no unfrequent occurrence1 that the feelings1 or involuntary state of the mind1 are in perfect harmony with the law1 while the action of this ,will1 or the voluntary states1 are in determined opposition to the law1 the individual being inflexibly determined to quench such feelings1 and act in opposition to them4 ,is there any virtue at all in such a state of mind8 ,who would dare to say that there is8 ,is not the guilt of the individual aggravated in proportion to the depth and intensity of the feeling which he is endeavoring to suppress8 ,now if1 as all will admit1 there is no virtue at all1 when the states of the ,sensibility are in harmony with the law1 and the determinations of the ,will1 or voluntary states of the mind1 are opposed to it1 how can there be guilt when the ,will1 or voluntary states1 are in perfect harmony with the law1 and the ,sensibility or involuntary states1 opposed to it8 ,this renders it demonstrably evident that obligation and moral desert of praise or blame are predicable only of the ,will1 or voluntary states of mind4 #g4 ,we will make another supposition2 one1 if possible1 still more to the point4 ,the tiger1 we well know1 has received from his ,maker1 either directly or through the laws of natural generation sustained by the ,most ,high1 a ferocious nature4 ,why do we not blame the animal for this nature8 ,the answer1 perhaps1 would be1 that he is not a rational being1 and is therefore not responsible for anything4 ,let us suppose1 then1 that with this nature1 ,god had associated ,intelligence and ,free-,will1 such as man possesses4 ,why should the animal now be held responsible for the bare existence of this nature1 any more than in the first instance1 when the effect1 in both instances1 exists1 alike independent of his knowledge1 choice1 and agency8 ,a greater absurdity than this never lay upon the brain of a ,theologian1 that the mere existence of rationality renders the subject properly responsible for what ,god himself produces in connection with that rationality1 and produces wholly independent of the knowledge1 choice1 and agency of that subject4 ,let us suppose1 further1 that the animal under consideration1 as soon as he becomes aware of the existence and tendencies of this nature1 holds all its impulses in perfect subjection to the law of love1 and never suffers them1 in a single instance1 to induce a voluntary act contrary to that law4 ,is it in the power of the ,intelligence to affirm guilt of that creature8 ,do we not necessarily affirm his virtue to be great in proportion to the strength of the propensity thus perfectly subjected to the ,moral law8 ,the above illustration renders two conclusions demonstrably evident3 #a4 ,for the mere existence of any constitutional propensity whatever1 the creature is not and cannot be responsible4 #b4 ,when all the actions of the ,will1 or voluntary power1 are in perfect harmony with the moral law1 and all the propensities are held in full subjection to that law1 the creature stands perfect and complete in the discharge of his duty to ,god and ,man4 ,for the involuntary and necessary actings of those propensities1 he cannot be responsible4 ,it is no part of my object to prove that men have not derived from their progenitors1 propensities which impel and induce them to sin2 but that1 for the mere existence of these propensities1 together with their necessary involuntary action1 they are not guilty4 ,,sec4 ,,ii4 ,,dogmas ,,in ,,theology4 ,certain dogmas in ,theology connected with the subject above illustrated here claim our attention4 ,,men ,,not ,,responsible ,,for ,,the ,,sin ,,of ,,their ,,progenitors4 ,i4 ,the first that ,i notice is the position1 that creatures are now held responsible1 even as deserving ,god's wrath and curse1 not only in this life1 but in that which is to come1 not merely for their own voluntary acts of disobedience1 nor for their involuntary exercises1 but for the act of a progenitor1 performed when they had no existence4 ,if ,god holds creatures responsible for such an act1 we may safely affirm that it is absolutely impossible for them to conceive of the justice of such a principle2 and that ,god has so constituted them1 as to render it impossible for them to form such a conception4 ,can a being who is not a moral agent sin8 ,is not existence necessary to moral agency8 ,how then can creatures sin in and through another six thousand years before their own existence commenced8 ,we cannot conceive of creatures as guilty for the involuntary and necessary exercises of their own minds4 ,how can we conceive of them as guilty for the act of another being1--an act of which they had1 and could have1 no knowledge1 choice1 or agency whatever8 ,how can intelligent beings hold such a dogma1 and hold it as a revelation from ,him who has declared with an oath1 that the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father1 but that every man shall die for his own sins8 ,,constitutional ,,ill-,,desert4 ,,ii4 ,the next dogma deserving attention is the position1 that mankind derive from our first progenitor a corrupt nature1 which renders obedience to the commands of ,god impossible1 and disobedience necessary1 and that for the mere existence of this nature1 men deserve ,god's wrath and curse1 not only in this world1 but in that which is to come4 ,if the above dogma is true1 it is demonstrably evident1 that this corrupt nature comes into existence without the knowledge1 choice1 or agency of the creature1 who1 for its existence1 is pronounced deserving of1 and bound over to the wrath of ,god4 ,equally evident is it1 that this corrupt nature exists as the result of the direct agency of ,god4 ,he proclaims himself the ,maker of every soul of man4 ,as its ,maker1 ,he must have imparted to that soul the constitution or nature which it actually possesses4 ,it does not help the matter at all1 to say1 that this nature is derived from our progenitor3 for the laws of generation1 by which this corrupt nature is derived from that progenitor1 are sustained and continued by ,god himself4 ,it is a truth of reason as well as of revelation1 that1 even in respect to plants1 derived by ordinary generation from the seed of those previously existing1 it is ,,god who giveth them a body as it hath pleased him1 and to every seed its own body4 ,if this is true of plants1 much more must it be so of the soul of man4 ,if1 then1 the above dogma is true1 man1 in the first place1 is held as deserving of eternal punishment for that which exists wholly independent of his knowledge1 choice1 or agency1 in any sense1 direct or indirect4 ,he is also held responsible for the result1 not of his own agency1 but for that which results from the agency of ,god4 ,on this dogma1 ,i remark1 #a4 ,it is impossible for the ,intelligence to affirm1 or even to conceive it to be true1 that a creature deserves eternal punishment for that which exists wholly independent of his knowledge1 choice1 or agency2 for that which results1 not from his own agency1 but from that of another4 ,the ,intelligence can no more affirm the truth of such propositions1 than it can conceive of an event without a cause4 #b4 ,this dogma is opposed to the intuitive convictions of the race4 ,present the proposition to any mind1 that1 under the ,divine government1 the creature is held responsible for his own voluntary acts and states of minds only1 and such a principle commends itself to every man's conscience in the sight of ,god4 ,present the dogma1 on the other hand1 that for a nature which renders actual obedience impossible1 a nature which exists as the exclusive result of the agency of ,god himself1 independently of the knowledge1 choice1 or agency of the creature1 such creature is justly bound over to the wrath of ,god1 and curse of the law1 and so made subject to death1 with all miseries1 spiritual1 temporal1 and eternal1 and there is not a conscience in the universe which will not reprobate with perfect horror such a principle4 ,the intuitive convictions of the race are irreconcilably opposed to it4 #c4 ,if mankind1 as this dogma affirms1 have a nature from which voluntary acts of a given character necessarily result1 to talk of real growth or confirmation in holiness or sin1 is to use words without meaning4 ,all that influence1 or voluntary acts1 can do in such a case1 is to develope the nature already in existence4 ,they can do nothing to confirm the soul in its tendencies1 one way or the other4 ,what should we think of the proposition1 that a certain tree had formed and confirmed the habit of bearing particular kinds of fruits1 when it commenced bearing1 with the necessity of bearing this kind only1 and with the absolute impossibility of bearing any other8 ,so the soul1 according to this dogma1 commences action with the absolute impossibility of any but sinful acts1 and with the equal necessity of putting forth sinful ones4 ,now1 ,necessity and ,impossibility know and can know no degrees4 ,how then can a mind1 thus constituted1 generate and confirm the habit of sinning8 ,what1 on this supposition1 is the meaning of the declaration1 ,how can ye1 who are accustomed to do evil1 learn to do well8 ,all such declarations are without meaning1 if this dogma is true4 #d4 ,if ,god imputes guilt to the creature1 for the existence of the nature under consideration1 he must have required the creature to prevent its existence4 ,for it is a positive truth of reason and inspiration both1 that as sin is a transgression of the law2 that where there is no law1 there is no transgression2 and that sin is not imputed where there is no law1 that is1 where nothing is required1 no obligation does or can exist1 and consequently no guilt is imputed4 ,the existence of the nature under consideration1 then1 is not and cannot be sin to the creature1 unless it is a transgression of the law2 and it cannot be a transgression of the law1 unless the law required the creature to prevent its existence1 and prevent it when that existence was the exclusive result of ,god's agency1 and when the creature could have no knowledge1 choice1 or agency1 in respect to what ,god was to produce4 ,can we conceive of a greater absurdity than that8 ,god is about to produce a certain nature by his own creative act1 or by sustaining the laws of natural generation4 ,he imputes infinite guilt to the creature for not preventing the result of that act1 and inducing a result precisely opposite1 and that in the absence of all knowledge of what was required of him1 and of the possibility of any agency in respect to it4 ,is this a true exposition of the ,government of ,god8 ,,present ,,impossibilities ,,required4 ,,iii4 ,the last dogma that ,i notice is the position1 that the ,moral law demands of us1 as sinners1 not what is now possible to us on the ground of natural powers and proffered grace1 but what would be possible1 had we never sinned4 ,it is admitted by all1 that we have not now a capacity for that degree of virtue which would be possible to us1 had we always developed our moral powers in harmony with the ,divine law4 ,still it is maintained1 that this degree of virtue1 notwithstanding our present total incapacity to exercise it1 is demanded of us4 ,for not rendering it1 we are justly bound over to the wrath and curse of ,god4 ,in reply1 ,i remark3 #a4 ,that this dogma1 which is professedly founded on the express teachings of ,inspiration1 has not even the shadow of a foundation in any direct or implied affirmation of the ,bible4 ,i may safely challenge the world to adduce a single passage of ,holy ,writ1 that either directly or indirectly asserts any such thing4 #b4 ,this dogma is opposed not only to the spirit1 but to the letter of the law4 ,the law1 addressing men1 enfeebled as their powers now are1 in consequence of sin previously committed1 requires them to love ,god with all their mind and strength1 that is1 not with the power they would have possessed1 had they never sinned1 but with the power they now actually possess4 ,on what authority does any ,theologian affirm1 when the law expressly makes one demand upon men1 that it1 in reality1 makes another1 and different demand8 ,in such an assertion1 is he not wise1 not only above1 but against what is written8 #c4 ,this dogma is opposed to the express and positive teachings of ,inspiration4 ,the ,scriptures expressly affirm1 ,rom4 xiii4 #h1 that every one that exercises love1 hath fulfilled the law1 hath done all that the law requires of him4 ,this would not be true1 did the law require a degree of love not now practicable to the creature4 ,again1 in ,deut4 x4 #ab1 it is positively affirmed1 that ,god requires nothing of his creatures but to love him with all the heart and with all the soul1 that is1 with all the powers they actually possess4 ,this could not be true1 if the dogma under consideration is true4 #d4 ,if we conceive an individual to yield a voluntary conformity to moral obligations of every kind1 to the full extent of his present capacities1 it is impossible for us to conceive that he is not now doing all that he really ought to do4 ,no person would ever think of exhorting him to do more1 nor of charging him with guilt for not doing it4 ,we may properly blame him for the past1 but as far as the present is concerned1 he stands guiltless in the eye of reason and revelation both4 #e4 ,let us suppose that an individual continues for fifty years in sin4 ,he is then truly converted1 and immediately after dies4 ,all admit that he enters heaven in a state of perfect holiness4 ,yet no one supposes that he now exercises1 or has the capacity to exercise1 as high a degree of holiness1 as he would1 had he spent those fifty years in obedience1 instead of disobedience to ,god4 ,this shows that even those who theoretically hold the dogma under consideration do not practically believe it themselves4 ,the conclusion to which our inquiries lead us is this3 ,holiness is a voluntary conformity to all perceivable obligation4 ,sin is a similar violation of such obligation4 ,nothing else is or can be holiness4 ,nothing else is or can be sin4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,the ,,standard ,,by ,,which ,,the ,,moral ,,character ,,of ,,voluntary ,,states ,,of ,,mind1 ,,or ,,acts ,,of ,,will1 ,,should ,,be ,,determined4 ,,in the remarks which ,i have to make in elucidation of this subject1 ,i shall1 on the authority of evidence already presented1 take two positions for granted3 #a4 ,moral obligation and moral desert are predicable only of acts of ,will4 #b4 ,it is only of those acts of ,will denominated ,intentions1 and of course ultimate intentions1 that obligation1 merit and demerit1 are predicable4 ,in this last position1 as ,i have already said1 there is a universal agreement among moral philosophers4 ,we may also safely assume the same as a first truth of the universal ,intelligence4 ,the child1 the philosopher1 the peasant1 men of all classes1 ages1 and conditions1 agree in predicating obligation and moral desert of intention1 and of ultimate intention only4 ,by ultimate intention1 ,i1 of course1 refer to those acts1 choices1 or determinations of the ,will1 to which all other mental determinations are subordinate1 and by which they are controlled4 ,thus1 when an individual chooses1 on the one hand1 the ,divine glory1 and the highest good of universal being1 as the end of his existence2 or1 on the other1 his own personal gratification2 and subordinates to one or the other of these acts of choice all the law of his being1 here we find his ultimate intention4 ,in this exclusively all mankind agree in finding the moral character of all mental acts and states4 ,now an important question arises1 ,by what standard shall we judge of the moral character of intentions8 ,of course1 they are to be placed in the light of the two great precepts of the ,moral law by which we are required to love ,god with all our powers1 and our neighbor as ourselves4 ,but two distinct and opposite explanations have been given of the above precepts1 presenting entirely different standards of moral judgment4 ,according to one1 the precept requiring us to love ,god with all our heart and strength1 requires a certain degree of intensity of intention and feeling4 ,on no other condition1 it is said1 do we love ,god with all the heart4 ,according to the other explanation1 the precept requiring us to love ,god with all the heart1 c41 means1 that we devote our entire powers and interests to the glory of ,god and the good of his creatures1 with the sincere intention to employ these powers and interests for the accomplishment of these objects in the best possible manner4 ,when all our powers are under the exclusive control of such an intention as this1 we then1 it is affirmed1 love ,god according to the letter and spirit of the above precept1 with all our heart1 and with all our strength4 ,,sincerity1 ,,and ,,not ,,intensity1 ,,the ,,true ,,standard4 ,my object now is to show1 that this last is the right exposition1 and presents the only true standard by which to judge of all moral acts and states of mind4 ,this ,i argue from the following considerations4 #a4 ,if intensity be fixed upon as the standard1 no one can define it1 so as to tell us what he means4 ,the command requiring us to love with all the heart1 if understood as requiring a certain degree of intensity of intention1 may mean the highest degree of tension of which our nature is susceptible4 ,or it may mean the highest possible degree1 consistent with our existence in this body2 or the highest degree consistent with the most perfect health2 or some inconceivable indefinable degree1 nobody knows what4 ,it cannot include all1 and may and must mean some one of the above-named dogmas4 ,yet no one would dare to tell us which4 ,has ,god given1 or does our own reason give us1 a standard of moral judgment of which no one can form a conception1 or give us a definition8 #b4 ,no one could practically apply this standard1 if he could define it1 as a test of moral action4 ,the reason is obvious4 ,no one1 but ,omniscience1 can possibly know what degree of tensity our nature is capable of2 nor precisely what degree is compatible with life1 or with the most perfect health4 ,if intensity1 then1 is the standard by which we are required to determine definitely the character of moral actions1 we are in reality required to fix definitely the value of an unknown quantity1 to wit3 moral action1 by a standard of which we are1 and of necessity must be1 most profoundly ignorant4 ,we are required to find the definite by means of the indefinite2 the plain by means of the palpable obscure4 ,has ,god1 or our own reason1 placed us in such a predicament as this1 in respect to the most momentous of all questions1 the determination of our true moral character and deserts8 #c4 ,while the standard under consideration is1 and must be1 unknown to us1 it is perpetually varying1 and never fixed4 ,the degree of intensity of mental effort of which we are capable at one moment1 differs from that which is possible to us at another4 ,the same holds equally of that which is compatible with life and health4 ,can we believe that the judge of all the earth requires us to conform1 and holds us responsible for not conforming to a standard located we cannot possibly know where1 and which is always movable1 and never for a moment remaining fixed8 #d4 ,the absurdity of attempting to act in conformity to this principle1 in reference to particular duties1 will show clearly that it cannot be the standard of moral obligations in any instance4 ,suppose an individual becomes convinced that it is his duty1 that is1 that ,god requires him to walk or travel a given distance1 or for a time to compose himself for the purpose of sleeping4 ,now he must will with all his heart to perform the duty before him4 ,what if he should judge himself bound to will to sleep1 for example1 and to will it with all possible intensity1 or with as great an intensity as consists with his health8 ,how long would it take him to compose himself to sleep in this manner8 ,what if he should with all possible intensity will to walk8 ,what if1 when with all sincerity1 he had intended to perform1 in the best manner1 the duty devolved upon him1 he should inquire whether the intention possessed the requisite intensity8 ,it would be just as rational to apply this standard in the instances under consideration1 as in any other4 #e4 ,that ,sincerity1 and not intensity of intention1 presents the true standard of moral judgment1 is evident from the fact1 that the former commends itself to every man's conscience as perfectly intelligible1 of ready definition in itself1 and of consequently ready application1 in determining the character and moral desert of all moral actions4 ,we can readily conceive what it is to yield all our powers and interests to the ,will of ,god1 and to do it with the sincere intention of employing them in the wisest and best manner for the accomplishment of the highest good4 ,we can conceive1 too1 what it is to employ our powers and interests under the control of such an intention4 ,we can also perceive with perfect distinctness our obligation to live and act under the supreme control of such an intention4 ,if we are bound to yield to ,god at all1 we are bound to yield our entire being to his supreme control4 ,if we are bound to will and employ our powers and resources to produce any good at all1 we are bound to will and aim to produce the highest good4 ,this principle also is equally applicable in1 determining the character and deserts of all moral actions4 ,every honest mind can readily determine the fact1 whether it is or is not acting under the supreme control of the intention under consideration4 ,if we adopt this principle1 as expressing the meaning of the command requiring us to love with all the heart1 perfect sunlight rests upon the ,divine law4 ,if we adopt any other standard1 perfect midnight hangs over that law4 #f4 ,if we conceive a moral agent really to live and act in full harmony with the intention under consideration1 it is impossible for us to conceive1 or affirm1 that he has not done his entire duty4 ,what more ought a moral agent to intend than the highest good he can accomplish8 ,should it be said1 that he ought to intend this with a certain degree of intensity1 the reply is1 that ,sincerity implies an intention to will and act1 at all times1 with that degree of intensity best adapted to the end to be accomplished4 ,what more can properly or wisely be demanded8 ,is not this loving with all the heart8 #g4 ,on this principle1 a much greater degree of intensity1 and consequent energy of action1 will be secured1 than on the other principle4 ,nothing tends more effectually to palsy the energies of the mind1 than the attempt always to act with the greatest intensity4 ,it is precisely like the attempt of some orators1 to speak1 on all subjects alike1 with the greatest possible pathos and sublimity4 ,on the other hand1 let an individual throw his whole being under the control of the grand principle of doing all the good he can1 and his powers will energize with the greatest freedom1 intensity1 and effect4 ,if1 therefore1 the standard of moral obligation and moral desert has been wisely fixed1 ,sincerity1 and nothing else1 is that standard4 #h4 ,i remark1 once more1 that ,sincerity is the standard fixed in the ,scriptures of truth4 ,in ,jer4 iii4 #af1 the ,jews are accused of not turning to the ,lord with the whole heart1 but feignedly1 that is1 with insincerity4 ,if they had turned sincerely1 they would1 according to this passage1 have done it with the whole heart4 ,the whole heart1 then1 according to the express teachings of the ,bible1 is synonymous with ,sincerity and ,sincerity according to the above definition of the term4 ,this is the true standard1 according to revelation as well as reason4 ,i have other arguments1 equally conclusive as the above1 to present1 but these are sufficient4 ,the importance of the subject1 together with its decisive bearing upon the momentous question to be discussed in the next ,chapter1 is my apology for dwelling thus long upon it4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,intuitions1 ,,or ,,moral ,,acts1 ,,never ,,of ,a ,,mixed ,,character2 ,,that ,,is1 ,,partly ,,right ,,and ,,partly ,,wrong4 ,,we are now prepared to consider the question1 whether each moral act1 or exercise1 is not always of a character purely unmixed8 ,in other words1 whether every such act1 or intention1 is not always perfectly right or perfectly wrong ,i would here be understood to speak of single acts1 or intuitions1 in distinction from a series1 which continues through some definite period1 as an hour or a day4 ,such series of acts may1 of course1 be of a mixed character2 that is1 it may be made up of individual acts1 some of which are right and some wrong4 ,but the question is1 can distinct1 opposite1 and contradictory elements1 such as sin and holiness1 right and wrong1 selfishness and benevolence1 enter into one and the same act ,no one will pretend that an individual is virtuous at all1 unless he intends obedience to the moral law4 ,the question is1 can an individual intend to obey and to disobey the law1 in one and the same act8 ,on this question ,i remark1 #a4 ,that the principle established in the last ,chapter really settles the question4 ,no one1 to my knowledge1 pretends1 that1 as far as sincerity is concerned1 the same moral act can be of a mixed character4 ,very few1 if any1 will be guilty of the folly of maintaining1 that an individual can sincerely intend to obey and to disobey the law at one and the same time4 ,when such act is contemplated in this point of light1 it is almost universally admitted that it cannot be of a mixed character4 ,but then another test is applied--that of intensity4 ,it is conceivable1 at least1 it is said1 that the intention might possess a higher degree of intensity than it does possess4 ,it is1 therefore1 pronounced defective4 ,on the same supposition1 every moral act in existence might be pronounced defective4 ,for we can1 at least1 conceive1 that it might possess a higher degree of intensity4 ,it has been abundantly established in the last ,chapter1 however1 that there is no such test of moral actions as this1 a test authorized either by reason or revelation4 ,sincerity is the only standard by which to determine the character and deserts of all moral acts and states4 ,in the light of this standard1 it is intuitively evident1 that no one act can combine such contradictory and opposite elements as sin and holiness1 right and wrong1 an intention to obey and to disobey the moral law4 #b4 ,the opinions and reasonings of distinguished philosophers and theologians on the subject may be adduced in confirmation of the doctrine under consideration4 ,let it be borne in mind1 that if the same act embraces such contradictory and opposite elements as sin and holiness1 it must be1 in reality1 opposed to itself1 one element constituting the act1 being in harmony with the law1 and in opposition to the other element which is opposed to the law4 ,now the remark of ,edwards upon this subject demands our special attention4 ,it is absurd1 he says1 to suppose the same individual ,will to oppose itself in its present act2 or the present choice to be opposite to and resisting present choice2 as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time4 ,does not the common sense of the race affirm the truth of this statement ,sin and holiness cannot enter into the same act1 unless it embraces a serious intention to obey and not to obey the moral law at the same time4 ,is not this1 in the language of ,edwards1 as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time4 ,equally conclusive is the argument of ,kant upon the same subject4 ,having shown that mankind are divided into two classes1 the morally good and the morally evil2 that the distinguishing characteristic of the former is1 that they have adopted the ,moral law as their maxim1 that is1 that it is their serious intention to comply with all the claims of the law2 and of the latter1 that they have not adopted the law as their maxim2 he adds1 ,the sentiment of mankind is1 therefore1 never indifferent relatively to the law1 and he never can be neither good nor evil4 ,then follows the paragraph to which special attention is invited4 ,in like manner1 mankind cannot be1 in some points of character1 morally good1 while he is1 at the same time1 in others evil2 for1 is he in any point good1 then the moral law is his maxim 7that is1 it is his serious intention to obey the law in the length and breadth of its claims72 but is he likewise1 at the same time1 in some points bad1 then quoad as to these1 the ,moral law is not his maxim1 7that is1 in these particulars1 it is his intention not to obey the law74 ,but since the law is one and universal1 and as it commands in one act of life1 so in all1 then the maxim referring to it would be1 at the same time universal and particular1 which is a contradiction2 7that is1 it would be his intention to obey the law universally1 and at the same time1 not to obey it in certain particulars1 one of the most palpable contradictions conceivable47 ,to my mind the above argument has all the force of demonstration4 ,let it be borne in mind1 that no man is morally good at all1 unless it is his intention to obey the ,moral law universally4 ,this being his intention1 the law has no higher claims upon him4 ,its full demands are1 and must be1 met in that intention4 ,for what can the law require more1 than that the voluntary powers shall be in full harmony with its demands1 which is always true1 when there is a sincere intention to obey the law universally4 ,now1 with this intention1 there can be nothing in the individual morally evil2 unless there is1 at the same time1 an intention not to obey the law in certain particulars2 that is1 not to obey it universally4 ,a mixed moral act1 or intention1 therefore1 is possible1 only on this condition1 that it shall embrace these two contradictory elements--a serious determination to obey the law universally1 and a determination equally decisive1 at the same time1 to disobey it in certain particulars2 that is1 not to obey it universally4 ,i leave it with the advocates of the doctrine of ,mixed ,moral ,action to dispose of this difficulty as they can4 #c4 ,if we could conceive of a moral act of a mixed character1 the ,moral law could not recognize it as holy at all4 ,it presents but one scale by which to determine the character of moral acts1 the command requiring us to love with all the heart4 ,it knows such acts only as conformed1 or not conformed1 to this command4 ,the mixed action1 if it could exist1 would1 in the light of the ,moral law1 be placed among the not-conformed1 just as much as those which are exclusively sinful4 ,the ,moral law does not present two scales1 according to one of which actions are classed as conformed or not-conformed1 and according to the other1 as partly conformed and partly not-conformed4 ,such a scale as this last is unknown in the circle of revealed truth4 ,the ,moral law presents us but one scale4 ,those acts which are in full conformity to its demands1 it puts down as holy4 ,those not thus conformed1 it puts down as sinful2 as holy or sinful is the only light in which actions stand according to the law4 #d4 ,mixed actions1 if they could exist1 are as positively prohibited by the law1 and must therefore be placed under the category of total disobedience1 just as much as those which are in themselves entirely sinful4 ,while the law requires us to love with all the heart1 it positively prohibits everything short of this4 ,the individual1 therefore1 who puts forth an act of a mixed character1 puts forth an act as totally and positively prohibited as the man who puts forth a totally sinful one4 ,both alike must be placed under the category of total disobedience4 ,a father requires his two sons to go to the distance of ten rods1 and positively prohibits their stopping short of the distance required4 ,one determines to go nine rods1 and there to stop4 ,the other determines not to move at all4 ,one has put forth an act of total disobedience just as much as the other4 ,so of all moral acts which stop short of loving with all the heart4 #e4 ,a moral act of a mixed character cannot possibly proceed from that regard to moral obligation which is an essential condition of the existence of any degree of virtue at all4 ,virtue1 in no degree1 can exist1 except from a sacred regard to moral obligation4 ,the individual who thus regards moral obligation in one degree1 will regard it equally in all degrees4 ,the individual1 therefore1 who1 from such regard1 yields to the claims of the law at all1 will and must conform to the full measure of its demands4 ,he cannot be in voluntary opposition to any one demand of that law4 ,a mixed moral act1 then1 cannot possibly proceed from that regard to moral obligation which is the essential condition of holiness in any degree4 ,this leads me to remark1 #f4 ,that a moral act of a mixed character1 if it could exist1 could arise from none other than the most purely selfish and wicked intention conceivable4 ,three positions1 we will suppose1 are before the mind--a state of perfect conformity to the law1 a state of total disobedience1 and a third state combining the elements of obedience and disobedience4 ,by a voluntary act of moral election1 an individual places himself in the last state1 in distinction from each of the others4 ,what must have been his intention in so doing8 ,he cannot have acted from a regard to moral rectitude4 ,in that case1 he would have elected the state of total obedience4 ,his intention must have been to secure1 at the same time1 the reward of holiness and the pleasures of sin--a most selfish and wicked state surely4 ,the supposition of a moral act1 that is1 intention combining the elements of holiness and sin--is as great an absurdity as the supposition1 that a circle has become a square1 without losing any of its properties as a circle4 #g4 ,i remark again that the doctrine of mixed moral action is contradicted by the express teachings of inspiration4 ,whosoever cometh after me1 says ,christ1 and forsaketh not all that he hath1 he cannot be my disciple4 ,the ,bible knows men only as the disciples1 or not disciples1 of ,christ4 ,all who really comply with the condition above named are ,his disciples4 ,all others1 however near their compliance1 are not ,his disciples1 any more than those who have not conformed in any degree4 ,if an individual has really conformed to this condition1 he has surely done his entire duty4 ,he has loved with all his heart4 ,what other meaning can we attach to the phrase1 forsaketh all that he hath8 ,all persons who have not complied with this principle are declared to be wholly without the circle of discipleship4 ,what is this1 but a positive assertion1 that a moral action of a mixed character is an impossibility8 ,again4 ,no man can serve two masters4 ,ye cannot serve ,god and mammon4 ,let us suppose that we can put forth intentions of a mixed character--intentions partly sinful and partly holy4 ,so far as they are in harmony with the law1 we serve ,god4 ,so far as they are not in harmony with the law1 we serve ,mammon4 ,now1 if all our moral exercises can be of a mixed character1 then it is true that1 at every period of our lives1 we can serve ,god and ,mammon4 ,the service which we can render also to each1 may be in every conceivable degree4 ,we may render1 for example1 ninety-nine degrees of service to ,god and one to ,mammon1 or ninety-nine to ,mammon and one to ,god4 ,or our service may be equally divided between the two4 ,can we conceive of a greater absurdity than this8 ,what also is the meaning of such declarations as this1 no fountain can send forth both sweet water and bitter1 if the heart of man may exercise intentions combining such elements as sin and holiness8 ,declarations of a similar kind abound in the ,bible4 ,they are surely without meaning1 if the doctrine of ,mixed ,moral ,actions is true4 #h4 ,finally4 ,it may be questioned whether the whole range of error presents a dogma of more pernicious tendency than the doctrine of ,mixed ,moral ,actions4 ,it teaches moral agents that they may be selfish in all their moral exercises1 and yet have enough of moral purity mingled with them to secure acceptance with the ,judge of all the earth4 ,a man who has adopted such a principle will almost never1 whatever his course of life may be1 seem to himself to be destitute of real virtue4 ,he will always seem to himself to possess enough of it1 to render his acceptance with ,god certain4 ,the kind of virtue which can mingle itself with selfishness and sin in individual intentions or moral acts1 may be possessed1 in different degrees1 by the worst men on earth4 ,if this be assumed as real holiness--that holiness which will stand the ordeal of eternity1 who will1 who should conceive himself destitute of a title to heaven8 ,here is the fatal rock on which myriads of minds are wrecked for ever4 ,let it ever be borne in mind1 that the same fountain cannot1 at the same time and place1 send forth both sweet water and bitter4 ,ye cannot serve ,god and ,mammon4 ,,objections4 ,two or three objections to the doctrine above established demand a passing notice here4 ,,an ,,act ,,of ,,will ,,may ,,result ,,from ,a ,,variety ,,of ,,motives4 #a4 ,it is said that the mind may act under the influence of a great variety of motives at one and the same time4 ,the same intention1 therefore1 may be the result of different and opposite motives1 and as a consequence1 combine the elements of good and evil4 ,in reply1 ,i remark1 that when the ,will is in harmony with the ,moral law1 it respects the good and rejects the bad1 alike in all the motives presented4 ,the opposite is true when it is not in harmony with the law4 ,the same regard or disregard for moral obligation which will induce an individual to reject the evil and choose the good1 or to make an opposite choice1 in respect to one motive1 will induce the same in respect to all other motives present at the same time4 ,a mixed moral act can no more result from a combination of motives1 than different and opposite motions can result in the same body at the same time1 from forces acting upon it from different directions4 ,,loving ,,with ,,greater ,,intensity ,,at ,,one ,,time ,,than ,,another4 #b4 ,it is said that we are conscious of loving our friends1 and serving ,god1 with greater strength and intensity at one time than at another4 ,yet our love1 in all such instances1 is real4 ,love1 therefore1 may be real1 and yet be greatly defective--that is1 it may be real1 and embrace elements morally wrong4 ,it is true1 that love may exist in different degrees1 as far as the action of the ,sensibility is concerned4 ,it is not so1 however1 with love in the form of intention--intention in harmony with moral obligation1 the only form of love demanded by the moral law4 ,such intention1 in view of the same degrees of light1 and under the same identical influences1 cannot possess different degrees of intensity4 ,the ,will always yields1 when it really does yield at all to moral obligation1 with all the intensity it is1 for the time being1 capable of1 or the nature of the case demands4 ,,momentary ,,revolutions ,,of ,,character4 #c4 ,on this theory1 it is said1 an individual may become perfectly good and perfectly bad1 for any indefinite number of instances1 in any definite period of time4 ,this consequence1 to say nothing of what is likely to take place in fact1 does1 as far as possibility is concerned1 follow from this theory4 ,but let us contemplate it1 for a moment1 in the light of an example or two4 ,an individual1 from regard to moral obligation1 maintains perfect integrity of character1 up to a given period of time4 ,then1 under the influence of temptation1 he tells a deliberate falsehood4 ,did his previous integrity so fuse itself into that lie1 as to make it partly good and partly bad8--as to make it anything else than a total falsehood8 ,did the prior goodness of ,david make his acts of adultery and murder partly good and partly bad8 ,let the advocate of mixed moral action extract the elements of moral goodness from these acts if he can4 ,he can just as well find these elements here1 as in any other acts of disobedience to the ,moral law4 ,the righteousness of the righteous cannot save him from total sinfulness1 any more than from condemnation in the day of his transgression4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,relation ,,of ,,the ,,will ,,to ,,the ,,intelligence ,,and ,,sensibility1 ,,in ,,all ,,acts ,,or ,,states1 ,,morally ,,right ,,or ,,wrong4 ,,the ,will1 sustaining the relation it does to the ,intelligence and ,sensibility1 must yield itself to the control of one or the other of these departments of our nature4 ,in all acts and states morally right1 the ,will is in harmony with the ,intelligence1 from respect to moral obligation or duty2 and all the desires and propensities1 all the impulses of the ,sensibility1 are held in strict subordination4 ,in all acts morally wrong1 the ,will is controlled by the ,sensibility1 irrespective of the dictates of the ,intelligence4 ,impulse1 and not a regard to the just1 the right1 the true and the good1 is the law of its action4 ,in all such cases1 as the impulses which control the ,will are various1 the external forms through which the internal acts1 or intentions1 will manifest themselves1 will be equally diversified4 ,yet the spring of action is in all instances one and the same1 impulse instead of a regard to duty4 ,virtue does not consist in being controlled by amiable1 instead of dissocial and malign impulses1 and in a consequent exterior of a corresponding beauty and loveliness4 ,it consists in a voluntary harmony of intention with the just1 the right1 the true and the good from a sacred respect to moral obligation1 instead of being controlled by mere impulse of any kind whatever4 ,on the principle above illustrated1 ,i remark3 ,,those ,,who ,,are ,,or ,,are ,,not ,,truly ,,virtuous1 ,,how ,,distinguished4 #a4 ,that the real distinction between those who are truly virtuous1 and those who are not1 now becomes apparent4 ,it does not consist1 in all instances1 in the mere exterior form of action1 but in the spring or intention from which all such action proceeds4 ,in most persons1 and in all1 at different periods1 the amiable and social propensities predominate over the dissocial and malign4 ,hence much of the exterior will be characterized by much that is truly beautiful and lovely4 ,in many1 also1 the impulsive power of conscience--that department of the ,sensibility which is correlated to the idea of right and wrong1 and impels to obedience to the ,moral law--is strongly developed1 and may consequently take its turn in controlling the ,will4 ,in all such instances1 there will be the external forms of real virtue4 ,it is one thing1 however1 to put on the exterior of virtue from mere impulse1 and quite another1 to do the same thing from an internal respect and sacred regard for duty4 ,how many individuals1 who may be now wearing the fairest forms of virtue1 will find within them1 as soon as present impulses are supplanted by the strong action of others1 in opposition to rectitude1 no maxims of ,will1 in harmony with the law of goodness1 to resist and subject such impulses4 ,their conduct is in conformity to the requirements of virtue1 not from any internal intention to be in universal harmony with moral obligation1 but simply because1 for the time being1 the strongest impulse happens to be in that direction4 ,no individual1 it should ever be kept in mind1 makes any approach to real virtue1 whatever impulses he may be controlled by1 till1 by a sealing act of moral election1 the ,will is placed in harmony with the universal law of duty1 and all external action of a moral character proceeds from this internal1 all-controlling intention4 ,here we find the broad and fundamental distinction between those who are truly virtuous1 and those who are not4 ,,selfishness ,,and ,,benevolence4 #b4 ,we are also prepared to explain the real difference between ,selfishness and ,benevolence4 ,the latter expresses and comprehends all the forms of real virtue of every kind and degree4 ,the former comprehends and expresses the forms of vice or sin4 ,benevolence consists in the full harmony of the ,will or intention with the just1 the right1 the true1 and the good1 from a regard to moral obligation4 ,selfishness consists in voluntary subjection to impulse1 irrespective of such obligation4 ,whenever self-gratification is the law of action1 there is pure selfishness1 whatever the character or direction of the impulse may be4 ,selfishness has sometimes been very incorrectly defined1 as a supreme regard to our own interest or happiness4 ,if this is a correct definition1 the drunkard is not selfish at all2 for he sacrifices his present and future happiness1 to gratify a beastly appetite1 and destroys present peace in the act of self-gratification4 ,if selfishness1 however1 consists in mere subjection to impulse1 how supreme his selfishness at once appears6 ,a mother who does not act from moral obligation1 when under the strong influence of maternal affection1 appears most distinguished in her assiduous care of her offspring4 ,now let this affection be crossed by some plain question of duty1 so that she must violate the latter1 or subject the former1 and how soon will selfishness manifest itself1 in the triumph of impulse over duty6 ,a gift is not more effectual in blinding the eyes1 than natural affection uncontrolled by a regard to moral obligation4 ,men are just as selfish1 that is1 as perfectly subject to the law of self-gratification1 when under the influence of the social and amiable propensities1 as when under that of the dissocial and malign1 when1 in both instances alike1 impulse is the law of action4 ,moral agents were made1 and are required to be1 social and amiable1 from higher principles than mere impulse4 ,,common ,,mistake4 #c4 ,i notice a mistake of fundamental importance into which many appear to have fallen1 in judging of the moral character of individuals4 ,as we have seen1 when the ,will is wholly controlled by the ,sensibility irrespective of moral obligation1 the impulsive department of conscience takes its turn1 among the other propensities1 in controlling the action of the voluntary power4 ,now because1 in all such instances1 there are the exterior forms of virtue1 together with an apparently sincere internal regard for the same1 the presence of real virtue is consequently inferred4 ,now before such a conclusion can be authorized1 one question needs to be determined1 the spring from which such apparent virtues originate4 ,they may arise from that regard to moral obligation which constitutes real virtue4 ,or they may be the result purely of excited ,sensibility1 which1 in such instances happens to be in the direction of the forms of virtue4 ,,defective ,,forms ,,of ,,virtue4 #d4 ,another very frequent mistake bearing upon moral character deserves a passing notice here4 ,men sometimes manifest1 and doubtless with a consciousness of inward sincerity1 a very high regard for some one or more particular principles of virtue1 while they manifest an equal disregard of all other principles4 ,every real reform1 for example1 has its basis in some great principle of morality4 ,men often advocate1 with great zeal1 such reforms1 together with the principle on which they rest4 ,they talk of virtue1 when called to defend that principle1 of a regard to moral obligation1 together with the necessity of self-sacrifice at the shrine of duty1 as if respect for universal rectitude commanded the entire powers of their being4 ,yet but a slight observation will most clearly evince1 that their regard for the right1 the true1 and the good1 is wholly circumscribed by this one principle4 ,still1 such persons are very likely to regard themselves as virtuous in a very high degree4 ,in reality1 however1 they have not made the first approach to real virtue4 ,their respect for this one principle1 together with its specific applications1 has its spring in some other department of their nature1 than a regard for what is right in itself4 ,otherwise their respect for what is right1 would be co-extensive with the entire range of moral obligation4 ,,sec4 ,,ii4 ,,test ,,of ,,conformity ,,to ,,moral ,,principle4 ,in preceding chapters1 the great truth has been fully established1 that the ,moral law addresses its commands and prohibitions to the ,will only1 and that moral obligation is predicable only of the action of the voluntary power1 other states being required1 only as their existence and character are conditioned on the right exercise of that power4 ,from this1 it undeniably follows1 that the ,moral law1 in all the length and breadth of its requirements1 finds its entire fulfilment within the sphere of the ,will4 ,a question of great importance here presents itself3 ,by what test shall we determine whether the ,will is1 or is not1 in full harmony with the law8 ,in the investigation of this question1 we may perhaps be thought to be intruding somewhat into the domain of ,moral ,philosophy4 ,reasons of great importance1 in the judgment of the writer1 however1 demand its introduction here4 ,the ,moral law is presented to us through two comprehensive precepts4 ,yet1 a moment's reflection will convince us that both these precepts have their basis in one common principle1 and are1 in reality1 the enunciation of that one principle4 ,the identical reason why we are bound to love ,god with all the heart1 requires us to love our neighbors as ourselves4 ,so the subject is presented by our ,saviour himself4 ,after speaking of the first and great commandment1 ,he adds1 the second is like unto it1 that is1 it rests upon the same principle as the first4 ,now the question is1 ,what is this great principle1 obedience to which implies a full discharge of all obligation1 actual and conceivable2 the principle which comprehends all other principles of the ,moral law1 and of which each particular precept is only the enunciation of this one common principle in its endlessly diversified applications8 ,this principle has been announced in forms somewhat different1 by different philosophers4 ,i will present two or three of these forms4 ,the first that ,i notice is this4 ,it shall be the serious intention of all moral agents to esteem and treat all persons1 interests1 and objects according to their perceived intrinsic and relative importance1 and out of respect for their intrinsic worth1 or in obedience to the idea of duty1 or moral obligation4 ,every one will readily apprehend1 that the above is a correct enunciation of the principle under consideration4 ,it expresses the fundamental reason why obedience to each and every moral principle is binding upon us4 ,the reason and only reason why we are bound to love ,god with all the heart1 is the intrinsic and relative importance of the object presented to the mind in the contemplation of the ,infinite and ,perfect4 ,the reason why we are bound to love our neighbor as ourselves1 is the fact1 that his rights and interests are apprehended1 as of the same value and sacredness as our own4 ,in the intention under consideration1 all obligation1 actual and conceivable1 is really met4 ,god will occupy his appropriate place in the heart1 and the creature his4 ,no real right or interest will be dis-esteemed1 and each will intentionally command that attention and regard which its intrinsic and relative importance demands4 ,every moral agent is under obligation infinite ever to be under the supreme control of such an intention1 and no such agent can be under obligation to be or to do anything more than this4 ,the same principle has been announced in a form somewhat different by ,kant1 to wit3 ,so act that thy maxim of ,will 7intention7 might become law in a system of universal moral obligation--that is1 let your controlling intention be always such1 that all ,intelligents may properly be required ever to be under the supreme control of the same intention4 ,by ,cousin1 the same principle is thus announced3 ,the moral principle being universal1 the sign1 the external type by which a resolution may be recognized as conformed to this principle1 is the impossibility of not erecting the immediate motive 7intention7 of the particular act or resolution1 into a maxim of universal legislation--that is1 we cannot but affirm that every moral agent in existence is bound to act from the same motive or intention4 ,it will readily be perceived1 that each of these forms is really identical with that above announced and illustrated4 ,it is only when we are conscious of the supreme control of the intention1 to esteem and treat all persons and interests according to their intrinsic and relative importance1 from respect to the idea of duty1 that1 in conformity with the principle as announced by ,kant1 our maxim of ,will might become law in a system of universal legislation4 ,when we are conscious of the control of such an intention1 it is impossible for us not to affirm1 according to the principle1 as announced by ,cousin1 that all ,intelligents are bound always to be under the control of the same intention4 ,two or three suggestions will close what ,i have to say on this point4 ,,common ,,mistake4 #a4 ,we notice the fundamental mistake of many philosophers and divines in treating of moral exercises1 or states of mind4 ,such exercises are very commonly represented as consisting wholly in excited states of the ,sensibility4 ,thus ,dr4 ,brown represents all moral exercises and states as consisting in emotions of a given character4 ,one of the most distinguished ,professors of ,theology in this country laid down this proposition1 as the basis of a course of lectures on ,moral ,philosophy1 that everything right or wrong in a moral agent1 consists exclusively of right or wrong feelings--feelings as distinguished from volitions as phenomena of ,will4 ,now precisely the reverse of the above proposition is true1 to wit3 that nothing right or wrong1 in a moral agent1 consists in any states of the ,sensibility irrespective of the action of the ,will4 ,who would dare to say1 when he has particular emotions1 desires1 or involuntary feelings1 that the ,moral law has no further claim upon him1 that all its demands are fully met in those feelings8 ,who would dare to affirm1 when he has any particular emotions1 that all moral agents in existence are bound to have those identical feelings8 ,if the demands of the ,moral law are fully met in any states of the ,sensibility--which would be true1 if everything right or wrong1 in moral agents1 consists of right or wrong feelings--then all moral agents1 at all times1 and under all circumstances1 are bound to have these same feelings4 ,for what the law demands1 at one time1 it demands at all times4 ,all the foundations of moral obligation are swept away by the theory under consideration4 ,,love ,,as ,,required ,,by ,,the ,,moral ,,law4 #b4 ,we are now prepared to state distinctly the nature of that love which is the fulfilling of the law4 ,it does not1 as all admit1 consist in the mere external act4 ,nor does it consist1 for reasons equally obvious and universally admitted1 in any mere convictions of the ,intelligence4 ,for reasons above assigned1 it does not consist in any states of the ,sensibility4 ,no man1 when he is conscious of such feelings1 can affirm that all ,intelligents are bound1 under all circumstances1 to have the same feelings that he now has4 ,this would be true1 if the love under consideration consists of such feelings4 ,but when1 from1 a regard to the idea of duty1 the whole being is voluntarily consecrated to the promotion1 in the highest degree1 of universal good and when1 in the pursuit of this end1 there is a serious intention to esteem and treat all beings and interests according to their intrinsic and relative importance2 here is the love which is the fulfilling of the law4 ,here is the intention by which all intelligents1 in reference to all interests and objects1 are1 at all times1 bound to be controlled1 and which must be imposed1 as universal law1 upon such ,intelligents in every system of righteous moral legislation4 ,here is the intention1 in the exercise of which all obligation is fully met4 ,here1 consequently1 is that love which is the fulfilling of the law4 ,in a subsequent ,chapter1 my design is to show that this is the view of the subject presented in the ,scriptures of truth4 ,i now present it merely as a necessary truth of the universal ,intelligence4 ,,identity ,,of ,,character ,,among ,,all ,,beings ,,morally ,,virtuous4 #c4 ,we now perceive clearly in what consists the real identity of moral character1 in all ,intelligents of true moral rectitude4 ,their occupations1 forms of external deportment1 and their internal convictions and feelings1 may be endlessly diversified4 ,yet one omnipresent1 all-controlling intention1 an intention which is ever one and identical1 directs all their moral movements4 ,it is the intention1 in the promotion of the highest good of universal being1 to esteem and treat all persons and interests according to their intrinsic and relative importance1 from regard to moral obligation4 ,thus moral virtue1 in all ,intelligents possessed of it1 is perfectly one and identical4 ,in this sense only are all moral agents capable of perfect identity of character4 ,they cannot all have1 at all times1 or perhaps at any time1 precisely the same thoughts and feelings4 ,but they can all have1 at all times1 one and the same intention4 ,the omnipresent influence and control of the intention above illustrated1 constitutes a perfect identity of character in ,god and all beings morally pure in existence4 ,for this reason1 the supreme control of this intention implies1 in all moral agents alike1 a perfect fulfilment of the law1 a full discharge of all obligation of every kind4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,the ,,element ,,of ,,the ,,will ,,in ,,complex ,,phenomena4 ,,section ,i4 ,,every perception1 every judgment1 every thought1 which appears within the entire sphere of the ,intelligence2 every sensation1 every emotion1 every desire1 all the states of the ,sensibility1 present objects for the action of the ,will in one direction or another4 ,the sphere of the ,will's activity1 therefore1 is as extensive as the vast and almost boundless range of the ,intelligence and ,sensibility both4 ,now while all the phenomena of these two last named faculties are1 in themselves1 wholly destitute of moral character1 the action of the ,will1 in the direction of such phenomena1 constitutes complex states of mind1 which have a positive moral character4 ,in all instances1 the moral and voluntary elements are one and identical4 ,as the distinction under consideration has been overlooked by the great mass of philosophers and theologians1 and as very great errors have thereby arisen1 not only in philosophy1 but in theology and morals both1 ,i will dwell at more length upon the subject than ,i otherwise should have done4 ,my remarks will be confined to the action of the ,will in the direction of the natural propensities and religious affections4 ,,action ,,of ,,the ,,will ,,in ,,the ,,direction ,,of ,,the ,,natural ,,propensities4--,,emotion1 ,,desire1 ,,and ,,wish ,,defined4 #a4 ,in respect to the action of the ,will in the direction of the natural propensities1 such as the appetites1 the love of esteem1 of power1 c41 ,i would remark1 that the complex states thence resulting1 are commonly explained as simple feelings or states of the ,sensibility4 ,in presenting this subject in a proper light1 the following explanations are deemed necessary4 ,when any physical power operates upon any of the organs of sense1 or when any thought is present in the ,intelligence1 the state of the ,sensibility immediately and necessarily resulting is called a sensation or emotion4 ,when any feeling arises impelling the ,will to seek or avoid the object of that sensation or emotion1 this impulsive state of the ,sensibility is called a desire4 ,when the ,will concurs with the desire1 a complex state of mind results1 called a wish4 ,wish is distinguished from ,desire in this1 that in the former1 the desire is cherished and perpetuated by the concurrence of the ,will with the desire4 ,when the ,desire impels the ,will towards a prohibited object1 the action of the ,will1 in concurrence with the desire1 constitutes a wish morally wrong4 ,when the ,desire impels the ,will in a required direction1 and the ,will1 from a respect to the idea of duty1 concurs with the desire1 a wish arises which is morally virtuous4 ,this principle holds true in regard to the action of all the propensities4 ,the excitement of the propensity1 as a state of the ,sensibility1 constitutes desire--a feeling in itself destitute of all moral qualities4 ,the action of the ,will in concurrence with1 or opposition to1 this feeling1 constitutes a complex state of mind morally right or wrong4 ,,anger1 ,,pride1 ,,ambition1 c4 ,anger1 for example1 as prohibited by the moral law1 is not a mere feeling of displeasure awakened by some injury1 real or supposed1 perpetrated by another4 ,this state1 on the other hand1 consists in the surrendering of the ,will to the control of that feeling1 and thus acting from malign impulse4 ,pride also is not the mere desire of esteem4 ,it consists in voluntary subjection to that propensity1 seeking esteem and admiration as the great end of existence4 ,ambition1 too1 is not mere desire of power1 but the voluntary surrendering of our being to the control of that propensity4 ,the same1 ,i repeat1 holds true in respect to all the propensities4 ,no mere excitement of the ,sensibility1 irrespective of the action of the ,will1 has any moral character4 ,in the action of the ,will in respect to such states--action which must arise in some direction under such circumstances--moral guilt1 or praiseworthiness1 arises4 ,i might here adduce other cases in illustration of the same principle2 as1 for example1 the fact that intemperance in food and drink does not consist1 as a moral act or state1 in the mere strength of the appetite--that is1 in the degree in which it is excited in the presence of its appropriate objects4 ,nor does it consist in mere excess in the quantity partaken of--excess considered as an external act4 ,it consists1 on the other hand1 in the surrendering of the voluntary power to the control of the appetite4 ,the excess referred to is the consequent and index of such voluntary subjection4 ,the above examples1 however1 are abundantly sufficient to illustrate the principle4 ,,religious ,,affections4 #b4 ,we will now contemplate the element of the ,will in those complex phenomena denominated religious affections4 ,the position which ,i here assume is this1 that whatever in such affections is morally right and praiseworthy1 that which is directly referred to1 where such affections are required of us1 is the voluntary element to be found in them4 ,the voluntary element is directly required4 ,other elements are required only on the ground that their existence is conditioned upon1 and necessarily results from1 that of the voluntary element4 ,this must be admitted1 or we must deny the position established in the last ,chapter1 to wit3 that all the requirements of the ,moral law are fully met in the right action of the ,will4 ,,scripture ,,testimony4 ,my object now is to show1 that this is the light in which the subject is really presented in the ,scriptures4 ,i will cite1 as examples1 the three cardinal virtues of ,christianity1 ,repentance1 ,love1 and ,faith4 ,the question is1 ,are these virtues or affections1 presented in the ,bible as mere convictions of the ,intelligence1 or states of the ,sensibility8 ,are they not1 on the other hand1 presented as voluntary states of mind1 or as acts of ,will8 ,are not the commands requiring them fully met in such acts8 ,,repentance4 ,in regard to ,repentance1 ,i would remark1 that the term is scarcely used at all in the ,old ,testament4 ,other terms and phrases are there employed to express the same thing2 as for example1 ,turn ye2 ,let the wicked forsake his way2 ,let him turn unto the ,lord2 ,he that confesseth and forsaketh his sins shall find mercy1 c4 ,in all such passages repentance is most clearly presented as consisting exclusively of voluntary acts or intentions4 ,the commands requiring it are1 therefore1 fully met in such acts4 ,in the ,new ,testament this virtue is distinguished from ,godly ,sorrow1 the state of the ,sensibility which accompanies its exercise4 ,as distinguished from the action of the ,sensibility1 what can it be1 but a voluntary state1 as presented in the ,old ,testament8 ,when the mind places itself in voluntary harmony with those convictions and feelings which attend a consciousness of sin as committed against ,god and man1 this is the repentance recognized and required as such in the ,bible4 ,it does not consist in the mere conviction of sin2 for then the worst of men1 and even devils1 would be truly repentant4 ,nor does it consist in the states of the ,sensibility which attend such convictions2 else ,repentance would be ,godly ,sorrow1 from which the ,bible1 as stated above1 definitely distinguishes it4 ,it must consist in a voluntary act1 in which1 in accordance with those convictions and feelings1 the mind turns from sin to holiness1 from selfishness to benevolence1 from the paths of disobedience to the service of ,god4 ,,love4 ,a single passage will distinctly set before us the nature of ,love as required in the ,bible--that love which comprehends all other virtues1 and the exercise of which is the fulfilling of the law4 ,hereby1 says the sacred writer1 we perceive the love of ,god4 ,the phrase of ,god is not found in the original4 ,the passage1 as it there stands1 reads thus3 ,by this we know love2 that is1 we know the nature of the love which the ,scriptures require1 when they affirm1 that love is the fulfilling of the law4 ,what is that in which1 according to the express teaching of inspiration1 we learn the nature of this love8 ,because he laid down his life for us3 and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren4 ,in the act of laying down his life for us1 we are here told1 that the love required of us is embodied and revealed4 ,what is the nature of this love8 ,i answer1 #a4 ,it is not a conviction of the ,intelligence1 nor any excited state of the ,sensibility4 ,no such thing is here referred to4 #b4 ,it does and must consist exclusively in a voluntary act1 or intention4 ,he laid down his life for us4 ,what is this but a voluntary act8 ,yet this is love1 the love which is the fulfilling of the law4 #c4 ,as an act of ,will1 love must consist exclusively in a voluntary devotion of our entire powers to one end1 the highest good of universal being1 from a regard to the idea of duty4 ,he laid down his life for us4 ,we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren4 ,in each particular here presented1 a universal principle is expressed and revealed4 ,christ laid down his life for us1 because he was in a state of voluntary consecration to the good of universal being4 ,the particular act was put forth1 as a means to this end4 ,in a voluntary consecration to the same end1 and as a means to this end1 it is declared1 that we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren4 ,when1 therefore1 the ,scriptures require love of us1 they do not demand the existence of particular convictions of the ,intelligence1 nor certain states of the ,sensibility4 ,they require the voluntary consecration of our entire being and interests to the great end of universal good4 ,in this act of consecration1 and in the employment of all our powers and interests1 under the control of this one intention1 we fulfil the ,law4 ,we fully discharge all obligations1 actual and conceivable1 that are devolved upon us4 ,the exercise of love1 like that of repentance1 is attended with particular convictions and feelings4 ,these feelings are indirectly required in the precepts demanding love1 and required1 because when the latter does exist1 the former will of course exist4 ,,of ,,faith4 ,but little need be said in explanation of the nature of ,faith4 ,it is everywhere presented in the ,bible1 as synonymous with trust1 reposing confidence1 committing our interests to ,god as to a faithful ,creator4 ,now ,trust is undeniably a voluntary state of mind4 ,i know1 says ,paul1 in whom ,i have believed1 that is1 exercised faith1 that he is able to keep that which ,i have committed to him against that day4 ,here the act of committing to the care of another1 which can be nothing else than an act of ,will1 is presented as synonymous with ,faith4 ,faith1 then1 does not consist in conviction1 nor in any excited feelings4 ,it is a voluntary act1 entrusting our interests to ,god as to a faithful ,creator4 ,the principle above established must apply to all religious affections of every kind4 ,,sec4 ,,ii4 ,,general ,,topics ,,suggested ,,by ,,the ,,truth ,,illustrated ,,in ,,the ,,preceding ,,section4 ,few truths are of greater practical moment than that illustrated in the preceding section4 ,my object1 now1 is to apply it to the elucidation of certain important questions which require elucidation4 ,,convictions1 ,,feelings ,,and ,,external ,,actions--,,why ,,required1 ,,or ,,prohibited4 #a4 ,we see why it is1 that1 while no mere external action1 no state of the ,intelligence or ,sensibility1 has any moral character in itself1 irrespective of the action of the ,will1 still such acts and states are specifically and formally required or prohibited in the ,bible4 ,in such precepts the effect is put for the cause4 ,these acts and states are required1 or prohibited1 as the natural and necessary results of right or wrong intentions4 ,the thing really referred to1 in such commands and prohibitions1 is not the acts or states specified1 but the cause of such acts and states1 to wit3 the right or wrong action of the ,will4 ,suppose1 that a certain loathsome disease of the body would necessarily result from certain intentions1 or acts of ,will4 ,now ,god might prohibit the intention which causes that disease1 in either of two ways4 ,he might specify the intention and directly prohibit that2 or he might prohibit the same thing1 in such a form as this3 ,thou shalt not have this disease4 ,every one will perceive that1 in both prohibitions1 the same thing1 precisely1 would be referred to and intended1 to wit3 the intention which sustains to the evil designed to be prevented1 the relation of a cause4 ,the same principle1 precisely1 holds true in respect to all external actions and states of the ,intelligence and ,sensibility1 which are specifically required or prohibited4 ,,our ,,responsibility ,,in ,,respect ,,to ,,such ,,phenomena4 #b4 ,we also distinctly perceive the ground of our responsibility for the existence of external actions1 and internal convictions and feelings4 ,whatever effects1 external or internal1 necessarily result1 and are or may be known to result1 from the right or wrong action of the ,will1 we may properly be held responsible for4 ,now1 all external actions and internal convictions and feelings which are required of or prohibited to us1 sustain precisely this relation to the right or wrong action of the ,will4 ,the intention being given1 the effect follows as a consequence4 ,for this reason we are held responsible for the effect4 ,,feelings ,,how ,,controlled ,,by ,,the ,,will4 #c4 ,we now notice the power of control which the ,will has over the feelings4 7#a47 ,in one respect its control is unlimited4 ,it may yield itself to the control of the feelings1 or wholly withhold its concurrence4 7#b47 ,in respect to all feelings1 especially those which impel to violent or unlawful action1 the ,will may exert a direct influence which will either greatly modify1 or totally suppress the feeling4 ,for example1 when there is an inflexible purpose of ,will not to yield to angry feelings1 if they should arise1 and to suppress them1 as soon as they appear1 feelings of a violent character will not result to any great extent1 whatever provocations the mind may be subject to4 ,the same holds true of almost all feelings of every kind4 ,whenever they appear1 if they are directly and strongly willed down1 they will either be greatly modified1 or totally disappear4 7#c47 ,over the action and states of the ,sensibility the ,will may exert an indirect influence which is all-powerful4 ,if1 for example1 the ,will is in full harmony with the infinite1 the eternal1 the just1 the right1 the true and the good1 the ,intelligence will1 of course1 be occupied with whatsoever things are true1 honest1 just1 pure1 lovely and of good report1 and the ,sensibility1 continually acted upon by such objects1 will mirror forth1 in pure emotions and desires1 the pure thoughts of the ,intelligence1 and the hallowed purposes of the ,will4 ,the ,sensibility will be wholly isolated from all feelings gross and sensual4 ,on the other hand1 let the ,will be yielded to the control of impure and sensual impulse1 and how gross and impure the thoughts and feelings will become4 ,in yielding1 or refusing to yield1 to the supreme control of the law of ,goodness1 the ,will really1 though indirectly1 determines the action of the ,intelligence and ,sensibility both4 7#d47 ,to present the whole subject in a proper light1 a fixed law of the affections demands special attention4 ,a husband1 for example1 has pledged to his wife1 not only kind intentions1 but the exclusive control of those peculiar affections which constitute the basis of the marriage union4 ,let him cherish a proper regard for the sacredness of that pledge1 and the wife will so completely and exclusively fill and command her appropriate sphere in the affections1 that1 under no circumstances whatever1 will there be a tendency towards any other individual4 ,the same holds true of every department of the affections1 not only in respect to those which connect us with the creature1 but also with the ,creator4 ,the affections the ,will may control by a fixed and changeless law4 ,such being the relation of the ,will to the ,sensibility1 while it is true that there is nothing right or wrong in any feelings1 irrespective of the action of the ,will1 still the presence of feelings impure and sensual1 may be a certain indication of the wrong action of the voluntary power4 ,in such a light their presence should always be regarded4 ,,relation ,,of ,,faith ,,to ,,other ,,exercises ,,morally ,,right4 #d4 ,in the preceding ,section it has been fully shown1 that love1 repentance1 faith1 and all other religious exercises1 are1 in their fundamental and characteristic elements1 phenomena of the ,will4 ,we will now1 for a few moments1 contemplate the relations of these different exercises to one another1 especially the relation of ,faith to other exercises of a kindred character4 ,while it is true1 as has been demonstrated in a preceding ,chapter1 that the ,will cannot at the same time put forth intentions of a contradictory character1 such as sin and holiness1 it is equally true1 that it may simultaneously put forth acts of a homogeneous character4 ,in view of our obligations to yield implicit obedience to ,god1 we may purpose such obedience4 ,in view of the fact1 that1 in the ,gospel1 grace is proffered to perfect us in our obedience1 at the same time that we purpose obedience with all the heart1 we may exercise implicit trust1 or faith for grace whereby we may serve ,god acceptably with reverence and godly fear4 ,now1 such is our condition as sinners1 that without a revelation of this grace1 we should never purpose obedience in the first instance4 ,without the continued influence of that grace1 this purpose would not subsequently be perfected and perpetuated4 ,the purpose is first formed in reliance upon ,divine grace2 and but for this grace and consequent reliance1 would never have been formed4 ,in consequence of the influence of this grace relied upon1 and received by faith1 this same purpose is afterwards perfected and perpetuated4 ,thus1 we see1 that the purpose of obedience is really conditioned for its existence and perpetuity upon the act of reliance upon ,divine grace4 ,the same holds true of the relation of ,faith to all acts or intentions morally right or holy4 ,one act of ,will1 in itself perfectly pure1 is really conditioned upon another in itself equally pure4 ,this is the doctrine of ,moral ,purification1 or ,sanctification by faith1 a doctrine which is no less true1 as a fact in philosophy1 than as a revealed truth of inspiration4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,influence ,,of ,,the ,,will ,,in ,,intellectual ,,judgments4 ,,men ,,often ,,voluntary ,,in ,,their ,,opinions4 ,,it is an old maxim1 that the ,will governs the understanding4 ,it becomes a very important inquiry with us1 ,to what extent1 and in what sense1 is this maxim true8 ,it is undeniable1 that1 in many important respects1 mankind are voluntary in their opinions and judgments1 and therefore1 responsible for them4 ,we often hear the declaration1 ,you ought1 or ought not1 to entertain such and such opinions1 to form such and such judgments4 ,you are bound to admit1 or have no right to admit1 such and such things as true4 ,men often speak1 also1 of pre-judging particular cases1 and thus incurring guilt4 ,a question may very properly be asked here1 what are these opinions1 judgments1 admissions1 pre-judgments1 c48 ,are they real affirmations of the ,intelligence1 or are they exclusively phenomena of the ,will8 ,,error ,,not ,,from ,,the ,,intelligence1 ,,but ,,the ,,will4 ,the proposition which ,i lay down is this1 that the ,intelligence1 in its appropriate exercise1 can seldom if ever1 make wrong affirmations2 that wrong opinions1 admissions1 pre-judgments1 c41 are in most1 if not all instances1 nothing else than phenomena1 or assumptions of ,will4 ,if the ,intelligence can make wrong affirmations1 it is important to determine in what department of its action such affirmations may be found4 ,,primary ,,faculties ,,cannot ,,err4 ,let us first contemplate the action of the primary intellectual faculties--,sense1 or the faculty of external perception2 ,consciousness1 the faculty of internal observation2 and ,reason1 the faculty which gives us necessary and universal truths4 ,the two former faculties give us phenomena external and internal4 ,the latter gives us the logical antecedents of phenomena1 thus perceived and affirmed1 to wit3 the ideas of substance1 cause1 space1 time1 c4 ,in the action of these faculties1 surely1 real error is impossible4 ,,so ,,of ,,the ,,secondary ,,faculties4 ,let us now contemplate the action of the secondary faculties1 the ,understanding and ,judgment4 ,the former unites the elements given by the three primary faculties into notions of particular objects4 ,the latter classifies these notions according to qualities perceived4 ,here1 also1 we find no place for wrong affirmations4 ,the understanding can only combine the elements actually given by the primary faculties4 ,the ,judgment can classify only according to qualities actually perceived4 ,thus ,i might go over the entire range of the ,intelligence1 and show1 that seldom1 if ever1 in its appropriate action1 it can make wrong affirmations4 ,,error1 ,,where ,,found4--,,assumption4 ,where then is the place for error1 for wrong opinions1 and pre-judgments8 ,let us suppose1 that a number of individuals are observing some object at a distance from them4 ,no qualities are given but those common to a variety of objects1 such as a man1 horse1 ox1 c4 ,the perceptive faculty has deceived no one in this case4 ,it has given nothing but real qualities4 ,the ,understanding can only form a notion of it1 as an object possessing these particular qualities4 ,the ,judgment can only affirm1 that the qualities perceived are common to different classes of objects1 and consequently1 that no affirmations can be made as to what class the object perceived does belong4 ,the ,intelligence1 therefore1 makes no false affirmations4 ,still the inquiry goes round4 ,what is it8 ,one answers1 ,it is a man4 ,that is my opinion4 ,another3 ,it is a horse4 ,that is my judgment4 ,another still says1 ,i differ from you all4 ,it is an ox4 ,that is my notion4 ,now1 what are these opinions1 judgments1 and notions8 ,are they real affirmations of the ,intelligence8 ,by no means4 ,the ,intelligence cannot affirm at all1 under such circumstances4 ,they are nothing in reality1 but mere assumptions of the ,will4 ,a vast majority of the so called opinions1 beliefs1 judgments1 and notions among men1 and all where error is found1 are nothing but assumptions of the ,will4 ,assumptions are sometimes based upon real affirmations of the ,intelligence1 and sometimes not4 ,suppose the individuals above referred to approach the object1 till qualities are given which are peculiar to the horse4 ,the ,judgment at once classifies the object accordingly4 ,as soon as this takes place1 they all exclaim1 well1 it is a horse4 ,here are assumptions again1 but assumptions based upon real affirmations of the ,intelligence4 ,in the former instance we had assumptions based upon no such affirmations4 ,false assumptions do not always imply moral guilt4 ,much of the necessary business of life has no other basis than prudent or imprudent guessing4 ,when the farmer1 for example1 casts any particular seed into the ground1 it is only by balance of probabilities that he often determines1 as far as he does or can determine1 what is best2 and not unfrequently is he necessitated to assume and act1 when all probabilities are so perfectly balanced1 that he can find no reasons at all for taking one course in distinction from another4 ,yet no moral guilt is incurred when one is necessitated to act in some direction1 and when all available light has been sought and employed to determine the direction which is best4 ,as false assumptions1 however1 often involve very great moral guilt1 it may be important to develope some of the distinguishing characteristics of assumptions of this class4 #a4 ,all assumptions involve moral guilt1 which are in opposition to the real and positive affirmations of the ,intelligence4 ,as the ,will may assume in the absence of such affirmations1 and in the direction of them1 so it may in opposition to them4 ,when you have carried a man's ,intellect in favor of a given proposition1 it is by no means certain that you have gained his assent to its truth4 ,he may still assume1 that all the evidence presented is inadequate1 and consequently refuse to admit its truth4 ,when the ,will thus divorces itself from the ,intelligence1 guilt of no ordinary character is incurred4 ,men often express their convictions of the guilt thus incurred1 by saying to individuals1 ,you are bound to admit that fact or proposition as true4 ,you are already convinced4 ,what excuse have you for not yielding to that conviction8 ,yet individuals will often do fatal violence to their intellectual and moral nature1 by holding on to assumptions1 in reality known to be false4 #b4 ,assumptions involve moral guilt which are formed without availing ourselves of all the light within our reach as the basis of our assumptions4 ,for us to assume any proposition1 or statement1 to be true or false1 in the absence of affirmations of the ,intelligence1 as the basis of such assumptions1 when adequate light is available1 involves the same criminality1 as assumptions in opposition to the ,intelligence4 ,hence we often have the expression in common life1 ,you had no right to form a judgment under such circumstances4 ,you were bound1 before doing it1 to avail yourself of all the light within your reach4 #c4 ,positive assumptions1 without intellectual affirmations as their basis1 equally positive1 involve moral guilt of no ordinary character4 ,as remarked above1 we are often placed in circumstances in which we are necessitated to act in some direction1 and to select some particular course without any perceived reasons in favor of that one course in distinction from another4 ,now while action is proper in such a condition1 it is not proper to make a positive assumption that the course selected is the best4 ,suppose1 that all the facts before my mind bearing upon the character of a neighbor1 are equally consistent with the possession1 on his part1 of a character either good or bad4 ,i do violence to my intellectual and moral nature1 if1 under such circumstances1 ,i make the assumption that his character is either the one or the other1 and especially1 that it is the latter instead of the former4 ,how often do flagrant transgressions of moral rectitude occur in such instances6 ,,pre-,,judgments4 ,a few remarks are deemed requisite on this topic4 ,a pre-judgment is an assumption1 that a proposition or statement is true or false1 before the facts1 bearing upon the case1 have been heard4 ,such assumptions are generally classed under the term prejudice4 ,thus it is said of individuals1 that they are prejudiced in favor or against certain persons1 sentiments1 or causes4 ,the real meaning of such statements is1 that individuals have made assumptions in one direction or another1 prior to a hearing of the facts of the case1 and irrespective of such facts4 ,,intellect ,,not ,,deceived ,,in ,,pre-,,judgments4 ,it is commonly said1 that such prejudices1 or pre-judgments1 blind the mind to facts of one class1 and render it quick to discern those of the other1 and thus lead to a real mis-direction of the ,intelligence4 ,this ,i think is not a correct statement of the case4 ,pre-judgments may1 and often do1 prevent all proper investigation of a subject4 ,in this case1 the ,intelligence is not deceived at all4 ,in the absence of real data1 it can make no positive affirmations whatever4 ,so far also as pre-judgments direct attention from facts bearing upon one side of a question1 and to those bearing upon the other1 the ,intelligence is not thereby deceived4 ,all that it can affirm is the true bearing of the facts actually presented4 ,in respect to those not presented1 and consequently in respect to the real merits of the whole case1 it makes no affirmations4 ,if an individual forms an opinion from a partial hearing1 that opinion is a mere assumption of ,will1 and nothing else4 ,,the ,,mind ,,how ,,influenced ,,by ,,pre-,,judgments4 ,but the manner in which pre-judgments chiefly affect the mind in the hearing of a cause1 still remains to be stated4 ,in such pre-judgments1 or assumptions1 an assumption of this kind is almost invariably included1 to wit3 that all facts of whatever character bearing upon one side of the question1 are wholly indecisive1 while all others bearing upon the other side are equally decisive4 ,in pre-judging1 individuals do not merely pre-judge the real merits of the case1 but the character of all the facts bearing upon it4 ,they enter upon the investigation of a given subject1 with an inflexible determination to treat all the facts and arguments they shall meet with1 according to previous assumptions4 ,let the clearest light poured upon one side of the question1 and the reply is1 ,after all1 ,i am not convinced1 while the most trivial circumstances conceivable bearing upon the other side1 will be seized upon as perfectly decisive4 ,in all this1 we do not meet with the operations of a deceived ,intelligence1 but of a deceived heart1 that is1 of a depraved ,will1 stubbornly bent upon verifying its own unauthorized1 pre-formed assumptions4 ,such assumptions can withstand any degree of evidence whatever4 ,the ,intelligence did not give them existence1 and it cannot annihilate them4 ,they are exclusively creatures of ,will1 and by an act of ,will1 they must be dissolved1 or they will remain proof against all the evidence which the tide of time can roll against them4 ,,influences ,,which ,,induce ,,false ,,assumptions4 ,the influences which induce false and unauthorized assumptions1 are found in the strong action of the ,sensibility1 in the direction of the appetites1 natural affections1 and the different propensities1 as the love of gain1 ambition1 party spirit1 pride of character1 of opinion1 c4 ,when the ,will has long been habituated to act in the direction of a particular propensity1 how difficult it is to induce the admission1 or assumption1 that action in that direction is wrong6 ,the difficulty1 in such cases1 does not1 in most instances1 lie in convincing the ,intelligence1 but in inducing the ,will to admit as true what the ,intelligence really affirms4 ,,cases ,,in ,,which ,,we ,,are ,,apparently1 ,,though ,,not ,,really1 ,,misled ,,by ,,the ,,intelligence4 ,as there are cases of this kind1 it is important to mark some of their characteristics4 ,among these ,i cite the following3 #a4 ,the qualities of a particular object1 actually perceived1 as in the case above cited1 may be common to a variety of classes which we know1 and also to others which we do not know4 ,on the perception of such qualities1 the ,intelligence will suggest those classes only which we know1 while the particular object perceived may belong to a class unknown4 ,if1 in such circumstances1 a positive assumption1 as to what class it does belong1 is made1 a wrong assumption must of necessity be made4 ,the ,intelligence in this case is not deceived4 ,it places the ,will1 however1 in such a relation to the object1 that if a positive assumption is made1 it must necessarily be a wrong one4 ,in this manner1 multitudes of wrong assumptions arise4 #b4 ,when facts are before the mind1 an explanation of them is often desired4 ,in such circumstances1 the ,intelligence may suggest1 in explanation1 a number of hypotheses1 which hypotheses may be all alike false4 ,if a positive assumption is made in such a case1 it must of necessity be a false one2 because it must be in the direction of some one hypothesis before the mind at the time4 ,here1 also1 the ,intelligence necessitates a wrong assumption1 if any is made4 ,yet it is not itself deceived2 because it gives no positive affirmations as the basis of positive assumptions4 ,in such circumstances1 error very frequently arises4 #c4 ,experience often occasions wrong assumptions1 which are attributed incorrectly to real affirmations of the ,intelligence4 ,a friend1 for example1 saw an object which presented the external appearance of the apple4 ,he had never before seen those qualities1 except in connection with that class of objects4 ,he assumed1 at once1 that it was a real apple2 but subsequently found that it was an artificial1 and not a real one4 ,was the ,intelligence deceived in this instance8 ,by no means4 ,that faculty had never affirmed1 that those qualities which the apple presents to the eye1 never exist in connection with any other object1 and consequently1 that the apple must have been present in the instance given4 ,experience1 and not a positive affirmation of the ,intelligence1 led to the wrong assumption in this instance4 ,the same principle holds true1 in respect to a vast number of instances that might be named4 #d4 ,finally1 the ,intelligence may not only make positive affirmations in the presence of qualities perceived1 but it may affirm hypothetically1 that is1 when a given proposition is assumed as true1 the ,intelligence may and will present the logical antecedents and consequents of that assumption4 ,if the assumption is false1 such will be the character of the antecedents and consequents following from it4 ,an individual1 in tracing out these antecedents and consequents1 however1 may mistake the hypothetical1 for the real1 affirmations of the ,intelligence4 ,one wrong assumption in theology or philosophy1 for example1 may give an entire system1 all of the leading principles of which are likewise false4 ,in tracing out1 and perfecting that system1 how natural the assumption1 that one is following the real1 and not the hypothetical1 affirmations of the ,intelligence6 ,from this one source an infinity of error exists among men4 ,in an enlarged ,treatise on mental science1 the subject of the present chapter should receive a much more extensive elucidation than could be given to it in this connection4 ,few subjects would throw more clear light over the domains of truth and error than this1 if fully and distinctly elucidated4 ,in conclusion1 ,i would simply remark1 that one of the highest attainments in virtue which we can conceive an intelligent being to make1 consists in a continued and vigorous employment of the ,intelligence in search of the right1 the just1 the true1 and the good1 in all departments of human investigation2 and in a rigid discipline of the ,will1 to receive and treat1 as true and sacred1 whatever the ,intelligence may present1 as possessed of such characteristics1 to the full subjection of all impulses in the direction of unauthorized assumptions4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,liberty ,,and ,,servitude4 ,,liberty ,,of ,,will ,,as ,,opposed ,,to ,,moral ,,servitude4 ,,there are1 among others1 two senses of the term ,liberty1 which ought to be carefully distinguished from each other4 ,in the first sense1 it stands opposed to ,necessity2 in the second1 to what is called ,moral ,servitude4 ,it is in the last sense that ,i propose to consider the subject in the present ,chapter4 ,what1 then1 is ,liberty as opposed to ,moral ,servitude8 ,it is that state in which the action of ,will is in harmony with the ,moral ,law1 with the idea of the right1 the just1 the true1 and the good1 while all the propensities are held in perfect subordination--a state in which the mind may purpose obedience to the law of right with the rational hope of carrying that determination into accomplishment4 ,this state all mankind agree in calling a state of moral freedom4 ,the individual who has attained to it1 is not in servitude to any propensity whatever4 ,he rules his own spirit4 ,he is the master of himself4 ,he purposes the good1 and performs it4 ,he resolves against the evil1 and avoids it4 ,greater1 says the maxim of ancient wisdom1 is such a man than he that taketh a city4 ,moral ,servitude1 on the other hand1 is a state in which the ,will is so ensnared by the ,sensibility1 so habituated to subjection to the propensities1 that it has so lost the prerogative of self-control1 that it cannot resolve upon action in the direction of the law of right1 with any rational expectation of keeping that resolution4 ,the individual in this condition knows the good1 and approves of it1 yet follows the bad4 ,the good that he would 7purposes to do71 he does not1 but the evil that he would not 7purposes not to do71 that he does4 ,all men agree in denominating this a state of ,moral ,servitude4 ,whenever an individual is manifestly governed by appetite1 or any other propensity1 by common consent1 he is said to be a slave in respect to his propensities4 ,the reason why the former state is denominated ,liberty1 and the latter ,servitude1 is obvious4 ,liberty1 as opposed to ,servitude1 is universally regarded as a good in itself4 ,as such1 it is desired and chosen4 ,servitude1 on the other hand1 may be submitted to1 as the least of two evils4 ,yet it can never be desired and chosen1 as a good in itself4 ,every man who is in a state of servitude1 is there1 in an important sense1 against his ,will4 ,the state in which he is1 is regarded as in itself the greatest of evils1 excepting those which would arise from a vain attempt at a vindication of personal freedom4 ,the same principle holds true in respect to ,moral ,liberty and ,servitude4 ,when any individual contemplates the idea of the voluntary power rising to full dominion over impulse of every kind1 and acting in sublime harmony with the pure and perfect law of rectitude1 as revealed in the ,intelligence1 every one regards this as a state1 of all others1 the most to be desired and chosen as a good in itself4 ,to enter upon this state1 and to continue in it1 is therefore regarded as a realization of the idea of ,liberty in the highest and best sense of the term4 ,subjection to impulse1 in opposition to the pure dictates of the ,intelligence1 to the loss of the high prerogative of ruling our own spirits1 on the other hand1 is regarded by all men as in itself a state the most abject1 and least to be desired conceivable4 ,the individual that is there1 cannot but despise his own image4 ,he1 of necessity1 loathes and abhors himself4 ,yet he submits to self-degradation rather than endure the pain and effort of self-emancipation4 ,no term but ,servitude1 together with others of a kindred import1 expresses the true conception of this state4 ,no man is in a state of ,moral ,servitude from choice--that is1 from choice of the state as a good in itself4 ,the state he regards as an evil in itself4 ,yet1 in the exercise of free choice1 he is there1 because he submits to self-degradation rather than vindicate his right to freedom4 ,,remarks4 ,,mistake ,,of ,,german ,,metaphysicians4 #a4 ,we notice a prominent and important mistake common to metaphysicians1 especially of the ,german school1 in their ,treatises on the ,will4 ,liberty of ,will with them is ,liberty as distinguished from ,moral ,servitude1 and not as distinguished from ,necessity4 ,hence1 in all their works1 very little light is thrown upon the great idea of ,liberty1 which lies at the foundation of moral obligation1 to wit3 ,liberty as distinguished from ,necessity4 ,a free ,will1 says ,kant1 and a ,will subjected to the ,moral ,law1 are one and identical4 ,a more capital error in philosophy is not often met with than this4 ,,moral ,,servitude ,,of ,,the ,,race4 #b4 ,in the state of ,moral ,servitude above described1 the ,bible affirms all men to be1 until they are emancipated by the influence of the ,remedial ,system therein revealed--a truth affirmed by what every man experiences in himself1 and by the entire mass of facts which the history of the race presents4 ,where is the individual that1 unaided by an influence out of himself1 has ever attained to a dominion over his own spirit8 ,where is the individual that1 without such an influence1 can resolve upon acting in harmony with the law of pure benevolence1 with any rational hope of success8 ,to meet this great want of human nature2 to provide an influence adequate to its redemption1 from what the ,scriptures1 with great propriety1 call the bondage of corruption1 is a fundamental design of the ,remedial ,system4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,liberty ,,and ,,dependence4 ,,common ,,impression4 ,a ,,very common impression exists1--an impression universal among those who hold the doctrine of ,necessity1--that the doctrine of ,liberty1 as maintained in this ,treatise1 renders man1 really1 in most important respects1 independent of his ,creator1 and therefore1 tends to induce in the mind1 that spirit of haughty independence which is totally opposite and antagonistic to that spirit of humility and dependence which lies at the basis of all true piety and virtue4 ,if this is the real tendency of this doctrine1 it certainly constitutes an important objection against it4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we find in the nature of this doctrine1 essential elements totally destructive of the spirit of pride and self-confidence1 and tending most strongly to induce the opposite spirit1--a spirit of humility and dependence upon the grace proffered in the ,remedial ,system2 if we find1 also1 that the doctrine of ,necessity1 in many fundamental particulars1 lacks these benign tendencies1 we have1 in such a case1 the strongest evidence in favor of the former doctrine1 and against the latter4 ,the object of the present ,chapter1 therefore1 is to elucidate the tendency of the doctrine of ,liberty to destroy the spirit of pride1 haughtiness1 and self-dependence1 and to induce the spirit of humility and dependence upon ,divine ,grace4 ,,spirit ,,of ,,dependence ,,defined4 ,before proceeding directly to argue this question1 we need to settle definitely the meaning of the phrase spirit of dependence4 ,the conviction of our dependence is one thing4 ,the spirit of dependence is quite another4 ,what is this spirit8 ,in its exercise1 the mind rests in voluntary dependence upon the grace of ,god4 ,the heart is fully set upon doing the right1 and avoiding the wrong1 while the mind is in the voluntary exercise of trust in ,god for grace whereby we may serve ,him acceptably4 ,the spirit of dependence1 then1 implies obedience actually commenced4 ,the question is1 does the belief of the doctrine of ,liberty tend intrinsically to induce the exercise of this spirit8 ,in this respect1 has it altogether a superiority over the doctrine of ,necessity8 ,,doctrine ,,of ,,necessity ,,tends ,,not ,,to ,,induce ,,the ,,spirit ,,of ,,dependence4 #a4 ,in accomplishing my object1 ,i will first consider the tendency1 in this one respect1 of the doctrine of ,necessity4 ,an individual1 we will suppose1 finds himself under influences which induce him to sin1 and which consequently1 if this doctrine is true1 render it impossible for him1 without the interposition of ,divine power1 not to sin4 ,a consideration of his condition tends to convince him1 that is1 to induce the intellectual conviction1 of his entire dependence upon ,divine grace4 ,but the intellectual conviction of our dependence1 as above shown1 is one thing4 ,the spirit of dependence1 which1 as there stated1 consists in actually trusting the ,most ,high for grace to do what he requires1 and implies actual obedience already commenced1 is quite another thing4 ,now the doctrine of ,necessity has a tendency to produce this conviction1 but none to induce the spirit of dependence3 inasmuch as with this conviction1 it produces another equally strong1 to wit3 that the creature1 without a ,divine interposition1 will not1 and cannot1 exercise the spirit of dependence4 ,in thus producing the conviction1 that1 under present influences1 the subject does not1 and cannot exercise that spirit1 this doctrine tends exclusively to the annihilation of that ,spirit4 ,when an individual is in a state of actual obedience1 the tendency of this doctrine upon him is no better2 since it produces the conviction1 that while a ,divine influence1 independently of ourselves1 produces in us a spirit of dependence1 we shall and must exercise it2 and that while it does not produce that spirit1 we do not and cannot exercise it4 ,where is the tendency to induce a spirit of dependence1 in such a conviction8 ,according to the doctrine of ,necessity1 nothing but the actual interposition of ,divine grace has any tendency to induce a spirit of dependence4 ,the belief of this doctrine has no such tendency whatever4 ,the grand mistake of the ,necessitarian here1 consists in the assumption1 that1 because his doctrine has a manifest tendency to produce the ,,conviction of dependence1 it has a tendency equally manifest to induce the ,,spirit of dependence2 when1 in fact1 it has no such tendency whatever4 #b4 ,we will now contemplate the intrinsic tendencies of the doctrine of ,liberty to induce the spirit of humility and dependence4 ,every one will see1 at once1 that the consciousness of ,liberty cannot itself be a ground of dependence1 in respect to action1 in favor of the right and in opposition to the wrong3 for the possession of such ,liberty1 as far as the power itself is concerned1 leaves us1 at all times1 equally liable to do the one as the other4 ,how can an equal liability to two distinct and opposite courses1 be a ground of assurance1 that we shall choose the one1 and avoid the other8 ,thus the consciousness of ,liberty tends directly and intrinsically to a total annihilation of the spirit of self-dependence4 ,let us now contemplate our relation to the ,most ,high4 ,he knows perfectly in what direction we shall1 in our self-determination1 exert our powers under any influence and system of influences brought to bear upon us4 ,it is also in ,his power to subject us to any system of influences he pleases4 ,he has revealed to us the great truth1 that if1 in the exercise of the spirit of dependence1 we will trust ,him for grace to do the good and avoid the evil which ,he requires us to do and avoid1 ,he will subject us to a ,divine influence1 which shall for ever secure us in the one1 and against the other4 ,the conviction1 therefore1 rises with full and perfect distinctness in the mind1 that1 in the exercise of the spirit of dependence1 action in all future time1 in the direction of purity and bliss1 is secure2 and that1 in the absence of this spirit1 action1 in the opposite direction1 is equally certain4 ,in the belief of the doctrine of ,liberty1 another truth becomes an omnipresent reality to our minds1 that the exercise of this spirit1 thus rendering our calling and election sure1 is1 at all times1 practicable to us4 ,what then is the exclusive tendency of this doctrine8 ,to destroy the spirit of self-dependence1 on the one hand1 and to induce the exercise of the opposite spirit1 on the other4 ,the doctrine of ,necessity reveals the fact of dependence1 but destroys the spirit1 by the production of the annihilating conviction1 that we neither shall nor can exercise that spirit1 till ,god1 in his sovereign dispensations1 shall subject us to an influence which renders it impossible for us not to exercise it4 ,the doctrine of ,liberty reveals1 with equal distinctness1 the fact of dependence2 and then1 while it produces the hallowed conviction of the perfect practicability of the exercise of the spirit of dependence1 presents motives infinitely strong1 not only to induce its exercise1 but to empty the mind wholly of everything opposed to it4 ,,god ,,controls ,,all ,,influences ,,under ,,which ,,creatures ,,do ,,act4 #c4 ,while the existence and continuance of our powers of moral agency depend wholly upon the ,divine ,will1 and while the ,most ,high knows1 with entire certainty1 in what direction we shall exert our powers1 under all influences1 and systems of influences1 brought to bear upon us1 all these influences are entirely at his disposal4 ,what tendency have such convictions1 together with the consciousness of ,liberty1 and ability to exercise1 or not to exercise1 the spirit of dependence1 but to induce us1 in the exercise of that spirit1 to throw our whole being into the petition1 ,lead us not into temptation1 but deliver us from evil8 ,if ,god knows perfectly under what influences action in us shall be in the direction of the right1 or the wrong1 and holds all such influences at his own control1 what attitude becomes us in the presence of the ,high and lofty ,one1 but dependence and prayer8 ,,dependence ,,on ,,account ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,servitude ,,of ,,the ,,will4 #d4 ,finally1 a consciousness of a state of ,moral ,servitude1 together with the conviction1 that in the exercise of the spirit of dependence1 we can rise to the ,glorious ,liberty of the ,sons of ,god2 that in the absence of this spirit1 our ,moral ,servitude is perfectly certain2 all these1 together with the conviction which the belief of the doctrine of ,liberty induces 7to wit3 that the exercise of the spirit of dependence is always practicable to us71 tends only to one result1 to induce the exercise of that spirit1 and to the total annihilation of the opposite spirit4 ,while1 therefore1 the doctrine of ,liberty sanctifies1 in the mind1 the feeling of obligation to do the right and avoid the wrong1 a feeling which the doctrine of ,necessity tends to annihilate1 the former 7an effect which the latter cannot produce7 tends only to the annihilation of the spirit of pride and self-confidence1 and to induce that spirit of filial dependence which cries ,abba1 ,father6 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,formation ,,of ,,character4 ,,element ,,of ,,will ,,in ,,formation ,,of ,,character4 ,,character ,,commonly ,,how ,,accounted ,,for4 ,,in accounting for the existence and formation of peculiarities of character1 individual1 social1 and national1 two elements only are commonly taken into consideration1 the natural propensities1 and the circumstances and influences under which those propensities are developed and controlled4 ,the doctrine of ,necessity permits us to take nothing else into the account4 ,undoubtedly1 these elements have very great efficacy in determining character4 ,in many instances1 little else need to be taken into consideration1 in accounting for peculiarities of character1 as they exist around us1 in individuals1 communities1 and nations4 ,,the ,,voluntary ,,element ,,to ,,be ,,taken ,,into ,,the ,,account4 ,in a vast majority of cases1 however1 another1 and altogether a different element1 that of the ,will1 or voluntary element1 must be taken into the reckoning1 or we shall find ourselves wholly unable to account for peculiarities of mental and moral development1 everywhere visible around us4 ,it is an old maxim1 that every man is the arbiter of his own destiny4 ,as character determines destiny1 so the ,will determines character2 and man is the arbiter of his own destiny1 only as he is the arbiter of his own character4 ,the element of ,free ,will1 therefore1 must be taken into the reckoning1 if we would adequately account for the peculiarities of character which the individual1 social1 and national history of the race presents4 ,even where mental and moral developments are as the propensities and external influences1 still the voluntary element must be reckoned in1 if we would account for facts as they exist4 ,in a majority of instances1 however1 if the two elements under consideration1 and these only1 are taken into the account1 we shall find our conclusions very wide from the truth4 ,,an ,,example ,,in ,,illustration4 ,i will take1 in illustration of the above remarks1 a single example--a case with which ,i became so familiarly acquainted1 that ,i feel perfectly safe in vouching for the truth of the statements which ,i am about to make4 ,i knew a boy who1 up to the age of ten or twelve years1 was under the influence of a most ungovernable temper--a temper easily and quickly excited1 and which1 when excited1 rendered him perfectly desperate4 ,seldom1 if ever1 was he known to yield in a conflict1 however superior in strength his antagonist might be4 ,death was always deliberately preferred to submission4 ,during this period1 he often reflected upon his condition1 and frequently wished that it was otherwise4 ,still1 with melancholy deliberation1 he as often said to himself1 ,i never can and never shall subdue this temper4 ,at the close of this period1 as he was reflecting upon the subject again1 he made up his mind1 with perfect fixedness of purpose1 that1 to the control of that temper1 he would never more yield4 ,the ,will rose up in the majesty of its power1 and assumed the reins of self-government1 in the respect under consideration4 ,from that moment1 that temper almost never1 even under the highest provocations1 obtained the control of the child4 ,a total revolution of mental developments resulted4 ,he afterwards became as distinguished for natural amiability and self-control1 in respect to his temper1 as before he had been for the opposite spirit4 ,this total revolution took place from mere prudential considerations1 without any respect whatever to moral obligation4 ,now suppose we attempt to account for these distinct and opposite developments of character--developments exhibited by the same individual1 in these two periods--by an exclusive reference to natural propensities and external influences4 ,what a totally inadequate and false account should we give of the facts presented6 ,that individual is just as conscious1 that it was the element of ,free ,will that produced this revolution1 and that when he formed the determination which resulted in that revolution1 he might have determined differently1 as he is1 or ever has been1 of any mental states whatever4 ,all the facts1 also1 as they lie out before us1 clearly indicate1 that if we leave out of the account the voluntary element1 those facts must remain wholly unexplained1 or a totally wrong explanation of them must be given4 ,the same principle holds true in all other instances4 ,though natural propensities and external influences greatly modify mental developments1 still1 the distinguishing peculiarities of character1 in all instances1 receive their form and coloring from the action of the voluntary power4 ,this is true1 of the peculiarities of character exhibited1 not only by individuals1 but communities and nations4 ,we can never account for facts as they are1 until we contemplate man1 not only as possessed of ,intelligence and ,sensibility1 but also of ,free ,will4 ,all the powers and susceptibilities must be taken into the account1 if men would know man as he is4 ,,diversities ,,of ,,character4 ,a few important definitions will close this ,chapter4 ,a decisive character exists1 where the ,will acts in harmony with propensities strongly developed4 ,when a number of propensities of this kind exist1 action1 and consequently character1 may be changeable1 and yet decisive4 ,unity and decision of character result1 when the ,will steadily acts in harmony with some one over-shadowing propensity4 ,character is fluctuating and changeable1 when the ,will surrenders itself to the control of different propensities1 each easily and highly excited in the presence of its appropriate objects1 and yet the excitement but temporary4 ,thus1 different propensities1 in rapid succession1 take their turn in controlling the ,will4 ,indecision and feebleness of character result1 when the ,will uniformly acts under the influence of the principle of fear and caution4 ,to such a mind1 in all important enterprises especially1 there is always a lion in the way4 ,such a mind1 therefore1 is continually in a state of distressing indecision when energetic action is necessary to success4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,concluding ,,reflections4 ,a ,,few reflections of a general nature will conclude this ,treatise4 ,,objection4 ,,the ,,will ,,has ,,its ,,laws4 #a4 ,an objection1 often adduced1 to the entire view of the subject presented in this ,treatise1 demands a passing notice here4 ,all things in existence1 it is said1 and the ,will among the rest1 are governed by ,laws4 ,it is readily admitted1 that all things have their laws1 and that the ,will is not without law4 ,it is jumping a very long distance to a conclusion1 however1 to infer from such a fact1 that ,necessity is the only law throughout the entire domain of existence1 physical and mental4 ,what if1 from the fact1 that the ,will has its law1 it should be assumed that ,liberty is that law8 ,this assumption would be just as legitimate as the one under consideration4 ,,objection4 ,,god ,,dethroned ,,from ,,his ,,supremacy1 ,,if ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,liberty ,,is ,,true4 #b4 ,another objection of a general nature1 is the assumption1 that the doctrine of ,liberty destroys the ,divine supremacy in the realm of mind4 ,if man1 says ,dr4 ,chalmers1 is not a necessary agent1 ,god is a degraded sovereign4 ,a sentiment more dishonorable to ,god1 more fraught with fatal error1 more revolting to a virtuous mind1 when unperverted by a false theory1 could scarcely be uttered4 ,let us1 for a moment1 contemplate the question1 whether the doctrine of ,liberty admits a ,divine government in the realm of mind4 ,the existence and perpetuity1 as stated in a former ,chapter1 of free and moral agency in creatures1 depend wholly upon the ,divine ,will4 ,with a perfect knowledge of the direction in which they will exert their powers1 under every kind and degree of influence to which they may be subjected1 ,he holds all these influences at his sovereign disposal4 ,with such knowledge and resources1 can ,god exercise no government1 but that of a degraded sovereignty in the realm of mind8 ,can ,he not exercise the very sovereignty which infinite wisdom and love desire8 ,who would dare affirm the contrary8 ,if the doctrine of ,liberty is true1 ,god certainly does not sit upon the throne of iron destiny1 swaying the sceptre of stern fate over myriads of subjects1 miscalled moral agents2 subjects1 all of whom are commanded1 under infinite sanctions1 to do the right and avoid the wrong1 while subjected to influences by the ,most ,high himself1 which render obedience in some1 and disobedience in others1 absolute impossibilities4 ,still1 in the light of this doctrine1 ,god has a government in the domain of mind1 a government wisely adapted to the nature of moral agents--agents capable of incurring the desert of praise or blame2 a government which all approve1 and under the benign influence of which1 all who have not forfeited its protection by crime1 may find quietness and assurance for ever4 ,,objection4 ,,great ,,and ,,good ,,men ,,have ,,held ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,necessity4 #c4 ,in reply to what has been said in respect to the tendencies of the doctrine of ,necessity1 the fact will doubtless be adduced1 that the greatest and best of men have held this doctrine1 without a development of these tendencies in their experience4 ,my answer is1 that the goodness of such men1 their sense of moral obligation1 c41 did not result from their theory1 but existed in spite of its intrinsic tendencies4 ,they held this doctrine in theory1 and yet1 from a consciousness of ,liberty1 they practically adopted the opposite doctrine4 ,here1 we have the source of the deep feeling of obligation in their minds1 while the intrinsic and exclusive tendency of their ,theory1 even in them1 was to weaken and annihilate this hallowed feeling4 ,the difference between such men and sceptics is this3 ,the piety of the former prevents their carrying out their theory to its legitimate results2 while the impiety of the latter leads them to march boldly up to those results--a fearless denial of moral obligation in every form4 ,,last ,,resort4 #d4 ,the final resort of certain ,necessitarians1 who may feel themselves wholly unable to meet the arguments adduced against their own and in favor of the opposite theory1 and are determined to remain fixed in their opinions1 may be readily anticipated4 ,it is an assumption which may be expressed in language somewhat like the following3 ,after all1 the immortal work of ,edwards still lives1 and will live1 when those of his opponents will be lost in oblivion4 ,that work still remains unanswered4 ,a sweeping assumption is a very easy and summary way of disposing of a difficulty1 which we might not otherwise know what to do with4 ,let us for a moment contemplate some of the facts which have been undeniably established in reference to this immortal work4 7#a47 ,at the outset1 ,edwards stands convicted of a fundamental error in philosophy1 an error which gives form and character to his whole work--the confounding of the ,will with the ,sensibility1 and thus confounding the characteristics of the phenomena of the former faculty with those of the phenomena of the latter4 7#b47 ,his whole work is constructed without an appeal to ,consciousness1 the only proper and authoritative tribunal of appeal in the case4 ,thus his reasonings have only an accidental bearing upon his subject4 7#c47 ,all his fundamental conclusions have been shown to stand in direct contradiction to the plainest and most positive testimony of universal ,consciousness4 7#d47 ,his main arguments have been shown to be nothing else but reasoning in a circle4 ,he defines1 for example1 the phrase ,greatest apparent good1 as synonymous with choosing1 and then argues1 from the fact that the ,will always is as the greatest apparent good1 that is1 that it always chooses as it chooses1 that it is subject to the law of ,necessity4 ,so in respect to the argument from the ,strongest ,motive1 which1 by definition1 is fixed upon as the ,motive in the direction of which the ,will1 in each particular instance1 acts4 ,from the fact that the action of the ,will is always in the direction of this ,motive1 that is1 in the direction of the ,motive towards which it does act1 the conclusion is gravely drawn1 that the ,will is and must be subject1 in all its determinations1 to the law of ,necessity4 ,i find my mind acted upon by two opposite ,motives4 ,i cannot tell which is the strongest1 from a contemplation of what is intrinsic in the ,motives themselves1 nor from their effects upon my ,intelligence or ,sensibility4 ,i must wait till my ,will has acted4 ,from the fact of its action in the direction of one ,motive1 in distinction from the other1 ,i must then draw two important conclusions4 #a4 ,the ,motive1 in the direction of which my ,will did act1 is the strongest4 ,the evidence is1 the fact of its action in that direction4 #b4 ,the ,will must be subject to the law of ,necessity4 ,the proof is1 the action of the ,will in the direction of the ,strongest ,motive1 that is1 the ,motive in the direction of which it did act4 ,sage argument to be regarded by ,philosophers and ,theologians of the #aith century1 as possessing the elements of immortality6 7#e47 ,his argument from the ,divine fore-knowledge has been shown to be wholly based upon an assumption unauthorized by reason1 or revelation either1 to wit3 that he understands the mode of that ,fore-knowledge1-- an assumption which cannot be made except through ignorance1 as was true in his case1 without the greatest impiety and presumption4 7#f47 ,the theory which ,edwards opposes has been shown to render sacred1 in all minds that hold it1 the great idea of duty1 of moral obligation2 while the validity of that idea has never1 in any age or nation1 been denied1 excepting on the avowed authority of his ,theory4 7#g47 ,all the arguments in proof of the doctrine of ,necessity1 with the single exception of that from the ,divine ,fore-knowledge--an argument resting1 as we have seen1 upon an assumption equally baseless1--involve a begging of the question at issue4 ,take any argument we please1 with this one exception1 and it will be seen at once that it has no force at all1 unless the truth of the doctrine designed to be established by it1 be assumed as the basis of that argument4 ,shall we pretend that a ,theory1 that has been fully demonstrated to involve1 fundamentally1 the errors1 absurdities1 and contradictions above named1 has not been answered8 ,,willing1 ,,and ,,aiming ,,to ,,perform ,,impossibilities4 #e4 ,we are now prepared to answer a question about which philosophers have been somewhat divided in opinion--the question1 whether the ,will can act in the direction of perceived and affirmed impossibilities8 ,the true answer to this question1 doubtless is1 that the ,mind may will the occurrence of a known impossibility1 but it can never aim to produce such an occurrence4 ,the ,mind1 for example1 while it regards the non-existence of ,god as that which cannot possibly occur1 may come into such a relation to the ,most ,high1 that the desire shall arise that ,god were not4 ,with this desire1 the ,will may concur1 in the wish1 that there were no ,god4 ,here the ,mind wills a known impossibility4 ,in a similar manner1 the ,mind may will its own non-existence1 while it regards its occurrence1 on account of its relation to the ,divine ,will1 as impossible4 ,but while the ,mind may thus will the occurrence of an impossibility1 it never can1 nor will aim1 that is1 intend1 to produce what it regards as an impossibility4 ,a creature may will the non-existence of ,god2 but even a fallen ,spirit1 regarding the occurrence as an absolute impossibility1 never did1 nor will aim to annihilate the ,most ,high4 ,to suppose the ,will to set itself to produce an occurrence regarded as impossible1 involves a contradiction4 ,for the same reason1 the ,will will never set itself upon the accomplishment of that which it is perfectly assured it never shall accomplish1 however sincere its efforts towards the result may be4 ,all such results are1 to the ,mind1 practical impossibilities4 ,extinguish totally in the ,mind the hope of obtaining the ,divine favor1 and the ,divine favor will never be sought4 ,produce in the ,mind the conviction1 that should it aim at the attainment of a certain end1 there is an infallible certainty that it will not attain it1 and the subject of that conviction will no more aim to attain that end1 than he will aim to cause the same thing1 at the same time1 to be and not to be4 ,in reply1 it is sometimes said1 that men often aim at what they regard even as an impossible attainment4 ,the painter1 for example1 aims to produce a perfect picture1 while he knows well that he cannot produce one4 ,i answer1 the painter is really aiming at no such thing4 ,he is not aiming to produce a perfect picture1 which he knows he cannot1 and will not produce1 but to produce one as nearly perfect as he can4 ,this is what he is really aiming at4 ,question the individual critically1 and he will confirm what is here affirmed4 ,remind him of the fact1 that he cannot produce a perfect picture4 ,i know that1 he replies4 ,i am determined1 however1 to produce one as nearly perfect as possible4 ,here his real aim stands revealed4 ,the same principle holds true in all other instances4 ,,thought ,,at ,,parting4 #f4 ,in taking leave of the reader1 ,i would simply say1 that if he has distinctly apprehended the great doctrine designed to be established in this ,work1 and has happily come to an agreement with the author in respect to it1 the following hallowed impression has been left very distinctly upon his mind4 ,while he finds himself in a state of profound and most pleasing dependence upon the ,author of his being1 in the ,holy of ,holies of the inner sanctuary of his mind1 one idea1 the great over-shadowing idea of the human ,intelligence1 has been fully sanctified--the idea of duty1 of moral obligation4 ,with the consciousness of ,liberty1 that idea must be to the mind an omnipresent reality4 ,from it we can never escape and in all states1 and in all worlds1 it must and will be to us1 as a guardian angel1 or an avenging fiend4 ,but one thing remains1 and that is1 through the grace proffered in the ,remedial ,system1 to live and move1 and have our being1 in harmony with that idea1 thus securing everlasting quietness and assurance in the sanctuary of our minds1 and ever enduring peace and protection under1 the over-shadowing perfections of the ,author of our existence1 and amid all the arrangements and movements of his eternal government4 ,,footnotes #a ,see ,upham on the ,will1 pp4 #cb-ce4 #b ,the above is a perfectly correct statement of the famous distinction between natural and moral ability made by ,necessitarians4 ,the sinner is under obligation to do right1 they say1 because he might do what is required of him1 if he chose to do it4 ,he has1 therefore1 natural but not moral power to obedience4 ,but the choice which the sinner wants1 the absence of which constitutes his moral inability1 is the very thing required of him4 ,when1 therefore1 the ,necessitarian says1 that the sinner is under obligation to obey1 because he might obey if he chose to do it1 the real meaning is1 that the sinner is under obligation to obedience1 because if he should choose to obey he would choose to obey4 ,in other words he is under obligation to obedience1 because1 if he did obey1 he would obey4