,the ,world ,as ,will ,and ,idea ,by ,arthur ,schopenhauer ,translated ,from ,the ,german ,by ,r4 ,b4 ,haldane1 ,m4,a4 ,and ,j4 ,kemp1 ,m4,a4 ,vol4 ,i4 ,containing ,four ,books4 8,ob nicht ,natur zuletzt sich doch ergnde80--,,goethe ,seventh ,edition ,london ,kegan ,paul1 ,trench1 ,trbner ,co4 #aiji ,,contents ,translators' ,preface4 ,preface ,to ,the ,first ,edition4 ,preface ,to ,the ,second ,edition4 ,first ,book4 ,the ,world ,as ,idea4 ,first ,aspect4 ,the ,idea ,subordinated ,to ,the ,principle ,of ,sufficient ,reason3 ,the ,object ,of ,experience ,and ,science4 ,second ,book4 ,the ,world ,as ,will4 ,first ,aspect4 ,the ,objectification ,of ,the ,will4 ,third ,book4 ,the ,world ,as ,idea4 ,second ,aspect4 ,the ,idea ,independent ,of ,the ,principle ,of ,sufficient ,reason3 ,the ,platonic ,idea3 ,the ,object ,of ,art4 ,fourth ,book4 ,the ,world ,as ,will4 ,second ,aspect4 ,the ,assertion ,and ,denial ,of ,the ,will ,to ,live1 ,when ,self-,consciousness ,has ,been ,attained4 ,footnotes ,,translators' ,,preface4 ,the style of 8,die ,welt als ,wille und ,vorstellung0 is sometimes loose and involved1 as is so often the case in ,german philosophical treatises4 ,the translation of the book has consequently been a matter of no little difficulty4 ,it was found that extensive alteration of the long and occasionally involved sentences1 however likely to prove conducive to a satisfactory ,english style1 tended not only to obliterate the form of the original but even to imperil the meaning4 ,where a choice has had to be made1 the alternative of a somewhat slavish adherence to ,schopenhauer's ipsissima verba has accordingly been preferred to that of inaccuracy4 ,the result is a piece of work which leaves much to be desired1 but which has yet consistently sought to reproduce faithfully the spirit as well as the letter of the original4 ,as regards the rendering of the technical terms about which there has been so much controversy1 the equivalents used have only been adopted after careful consideration of their meaning in the theory of knowledge4 ,for example1 8,vorstellung0 has been rendered by 8idea10 in preference to 8representation10 which is neither accurate1 intelligible1 nor elegant4 8,idee10 is translated by the same word1 but spelled with a capital1--8,idea40 ,again1 8,anschauung0 has been rendered according to the context1 either by 8perception0 simply1 or by 8intuition or perception40 ,notwithstanding statements to the contrary in the text1 the book is probably quite intelligible in itself1 apart from the treatise 8,on the ,fourfold ,root of the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason40 ,it has1 however1 been considered desirable to add an abstract of the latter work in an appendix to the third volume of this translation4 ,r4 ,b4 ,h4 ,j4 ,k4 ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,first ,,edition4 ,i propose to point out here how this book must be read in order to be thoroughly understood4 ,by means of it ,i only intend to impart a single thought4 ,yet1 notwithstanding all my endeavours1 ,i could find no shorter way of imparting it than this whole book4 ,i hold this thought to be that which has very long been sought for under the name of philosophy1 and the discovery of which is therefore regarded by those who are familiar with history as quite as impossible as the discovery of the philosopher's stone1 although it was already said by ,pliny3 ,quam multa fieri non posse1 priusquam sint facta1 judicantur8 7,hist4 nat4 #g1 #a47 ,according as we consider the different aspects of this one thought which ,i am about to impart1 it exhibits itself as that which we call metaphysics1 that which we call ethics1 and that which we call sthetics2 and certainly it must be all this if it is what ,i have already acknowledged ,i take it to be4 ,a system of thought must always have an architectonic connection or coherence1 that is1 a connection in which one part always supports the other1 though the latter does not support the former1 in which ultimately the foundation supports all the rest without being supported by it1 and the apex is supported without supporting4 ,on the other hand1 a single thought1 however comprehensive it may be1 must preserve the most perfect unity4 ,if it admits of being broken up into parts to facilitate its communication1 the connection of these parts must yet be organic1 i4e41 it must be a connection in which every part supports the whole just as much as it is supported by it1 a connection in which there is no first and no last1 in which the whole thought gains distinctness through every part1 and even the smallest part cannot be completely understood unless the whole has already been grasped4 ,a book1 however1 must always have a first and a last line1 and in this respect will always remain very unlike an organism1 however like one its content may be3 thus form and matter are here in contradiction4 ,it is self-evident that under these circumstances no other advice can be given as to how one may enter into the thought explained in this work than to read the book twice1 and the first time with great patience1 a patience which is only to be derived from the belief1 voluntarily accorded1 that the beginning presupposes the end almost as much as the end presupposes the beginning1 and that all the earlier parts presuppose the later almost as much as the later presuppose the earlier4 ,i say 8almost20 for this is by no means absolutely the case1 and ,i have honestly and conscientiously done all that was possible to give priority to that which stands least in need of explanation from what follows1 as indeed generally to everything that can help to make the thought as easy to comprehend and as distinct as possible4 ,this might indeed to a certain extent be achieved if it were not that the reader1 as is very natural1 thinks1 as he reads1 not merely of what is actually said1 but also of its possible consequences1 and thus besides the many contradictions actually given of the opinions of the time1 and presumably of the reader1 there may be added as many more which are anticipated and imaginary4 ,that1 then1 which is really only misunderstanding1 must take the form of active disapproval1 and it is all the more difficult to recognise that it is misunderstanding1 because although the laboriously-attained clearness of the explanation and distinctness of the expression never leaves the immediate sense of what is said doubtful1 it cannot at the same time express its relations to all that remains to be said4 ,therefore1 as we have said1 the first perusal demands patience1 founded on confidence that on a second perusal much1 or all1 will appear in an entirely different light4 ,further1 the earnest endeavour to be more completely and even more easily comprehended in the case of a very difficult subject1 must justify occasional repetition4 ,indeed the structure of the whole1 which is organic1 not a mere chain1 makes it necessary sometimes to touch on the same point twice4 ,moreover this construction1 and the very close connection of all the parts1 has not left open to me the division into chapters and paragraphs which ,i should otherwise have regarded as very important1 but has obliged me to rest satisfied with four principal divisions1 as it were four aspects of one thought4 ,in each of these four books it is especially important to guard against losing sight1 in the details which must necessarily be discussed1 of the principal thought to which they belong1 and the progress of the whole exposition4 ,i have thus expressed the first1 and like those which follow1 unavoidable demand upon the reader1 who holds the philosopher in small favour just because he himself is a philosopher4 ,the second demand is this1 that the introduction be read before the book itself1 although it is not contained in the book1 but appeared five years earlier under the title1 8,ueber die vierfache ,wurzel des ,satzes vom zureichenden ,grunde3 eine philosophische ,abhandlung0 7,on the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason3 a philosophical essay74 ,without an acquaintance with this introduction and propadeutic it is absolutely impossible to understand the present work properly1 and the content of that essay will always be presupposed in this work just as if it were given with it4 ,besides1 even if it had not preceded this book by several years1 it would not properly have been placed before it as an introduction1 but would have been incorporated in the first book4 ,as it is1 the first book does not contain what was said in the earlier essay1 and it therefore exhibits a certain incompleteness on account of these deficiencies1 which must always be supplied by reference to it4 ,however1 my disinclination was so great either to quote myself or laboriously to state again in other words what ,i had already said once in an adequate manner1 that ,i preferred this course1 notwithstanding the fact that ,i might now be able to give the content of that essay a somewhat better expression1 chiefly by freeing it from several conceptions which resulted from the excessive influence which the ,kantian philosophy had over me at the time1 such as--categories1 outer and inner sense1 and the like4 ,but even there these conceptions only occur because as yet ,i had never really entered deeply into them1 therefore only by the way and quite out of connection with the principal matter4 ,the correction of such passages in that essay will consequently take place of its own accord in the mind of the reader through his acquaintance with the present work4 ,but only if we have fully recognised by means of that essay what the principle of sufficient reason is and signifies1 what its validity extends to1 and what it does not extend to1 and that that principle is not before all things1 and the whole world merely in consequence of it1 and in conformity to it1 a corollary1 as it were1 of it2 but rather that it is merely the form in which the object1 of whatever kind it may be1 which is always conditioned by the subject1 is invariably known so far as the subject is a knowing individual3 only then will it be possible to enter into the method of philosophy which is here attempted for the first time1 and which is completely different from all previous methods4 ,but the same disinclination to repeat myself word for word1 or to say the same thing a second time in other and worse words1 after ,i have deprived myself of the better1 has occasioned another defect in the first book of this work4 ,for ,i have omitted all that is said in the first chapter of my essay 8,on ,sight and ,colour10 which would otherwise have found its place here1 word for word4 ,therefore the knowledge of this short1 earlier work is also presupposed4 ,finally1 the third demand ,i have to make on the reader might indeed be tacitly assumed1 for it is nothing but an acquaintance with the most important phenomenon that has appeared in philosophy for two thousand years1 and that lies so near us3 ,i mean the principal writings of ,kant4 ,it seems to me1 in fact1 as indeed has already been said by others1 that the effect these writings produce in the mind to which they truly speak is very like that of the operation for cataract on a blind man3 and if we wish to pursue the simile further1 the aim of my own work may be described by saying that ,i have sought to put into the hands of those upon whom that operation has been successfully performed a pair of spectacles suitable to eyes that have recovered their sight--spectacles of whose use that operation is the absolutely necessary condition4 ,starting then1 as ,i do to a large extent1 from what has been accomplished by the great ,kant1 ,i have yet been enabled1 just on account of my earnest study of his writings1 to discover important errors in them4 ,these ,i have been obliged to separate from the rest and prove to be false1 in order that ,i might be able to presuppose and apply what is true and excellent in his doctrine1 pure and freed from error4 ,but not to interrupt and complicate my own exposition by a constant polemic against ,kant1 ,i have relegated this to a special appendix4 ,it follows then1 from what has been said1 that my work presupposes a knowledge of this appendix just as much as it presupposes a knowledge of the philosophy of ,kant2 and in this respect it would therefore be advisable to read the appendix first1 all the more as its content is specially related to the first book of the present work4 ,on the other hand1 it could not be avoided1 from the nature of the case1 that here and there the appendix also should refer to the text of the work2 and the only result of this is1 that the appendix1 as well as the principal part of the work1 must be read twice4 ,the philosophy of ,kant1 then1 is the only philosophy with which a thorough acquaintance is directly presupposed in what we have to say here4 ,but if1 besides this1 the reader has lingered in the school of the divine ,plato1 he will be so much the better prepared to hear me1 and susceptible to what ,i say4 ,and if1 indeed1 in addition to this he is a partaker of the benefit conferred by the ,vedas1 the access to which1 opened to us through the ,upanishads1 is in my eyes the greatest advantage which this still young century enjoys over previous ones1 because ,i believe that the influence of the ,sanscrit literature will penetrate not less deeply than did the revival of ,greek literature in the fifteenth century3 if1 ,i say1 the reader has also already received and assimilated the sacred1 primitive ,indian wisdom1 then is he best of all prepared to hear what ,i have to say to him4 ,my work will not speak to him1 as to many others1 in a strange and even hostile tongue2 for1 if it does not sound too vain1 ,i might express the opinion that each one of the individual and disconnected aphorisms which make up the ,upanishads may be deduced as a consequence from the thought ,i am going to impart1 though the converse1 that my thought is to be found in the ,upanishads1 is by no means the case4 ,but most readers have already grown angry with impatience1 and burst into reproaches with difficulty kept back so long4 ,how can ,i venture to present a book to the public under conditions and demands the first two of which are presumptuous and altogether immodest1 and this at a time when there is such a general wealth of special ideas1 that in ,germany alone they are made common property through the press1 in three thousand valuable1 original1 and absolutely indispensable works every year1 besides innumerable periodicals1 and even daily papers2 at a time when especially there is not the least deficiency of entirely original and profound philosophers1 but in ,germany alone there are more of them alive at the same time1 than several centuries could formerly boast of in succession to each other8 ,how is one ever to come to the end1 asks the indignant reader1 if one must set to work upon a book in such a fashion8 ,as ,i have absolutely nothing to advance against these reproaches1 ,i only hope for some small thanks from such readers for having warned them in time1 so that they may not lose an hour over a book which it would be useless to read without complying with the demands that have been made1 and which should therefore be left alone1 particularly as apart from this we might wager a great deal that it can say nothing to them1 but rather that it will always be only pancorum hominum1 and must therefore quietly and modestly wait for the few whose unusual mode of thought may find it enjoyable4 ,for apart from the difficulties and the effort which it requires from the reader1 what cultured man of this age1 whose knowledge has almost reached the august point at which the paradoxical and the false are all one to it1 could bear to meet thoughts almost on every page that directly contradict that which he has yet himself established once for all as true and undeniable8 ,and then1 how disagreeably disappointed will many a one be if he finds no mention here of what he believes it is precisely here he ought to look for1 because his method of speculation agrees with that of a great living philosopher17#a7 who has certainly written pathetic books1 and who only has the trifling weakness that he takes all he learned and approved before his fifteenth year for inborn ideas of the human mind4 ,who could stand all this8 ,therefore my advice is simply to lay down the book4 ,but ,i fear ,i shall not escape even thus4 ,the reader who has got as far as the preface and been stopped by it1 has bought the book for cash1 and asks how he is to be indemnified4 ,my last refuge is now to remind him that he knows how to make use of a book in several ways1 without exactly reading it4 ,it may fill a gap in his library as well as many another1 where1 neatly bound1 it will certainly look well4 ,or he can lay it on the toilet-table or the tea-table of some learned lady friend4 ,or1 finally1 what certainly is best of all1 and ,i specially advise it1 he can review it4 ,and now that ,i have allowed myself the jest to which in this two-sided life hardly any page can be too serious to grant a place1 ,i part with the book with deep seriousness1 in the sure hope that sooner or later it will reach those to whom alone it can be addressed2 and for the rest1 patiently resigned that the same fate should1 in full measure1 befall it1 that in all ages has1 to some extent1 befallen all knowledge1 and especially the weightiest knowledge of the truth1 to which only a brief triumph is allotted between the two long periods in which it is condemned as paradoxical or disparaged as trivial4 ,the former fate is also wont to befall its author4 ,but life is short1 and truth works far and lives long3 let us speak the truth4 ,written at ,dresden in ,august #ahah4 ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,second ,,edition4 ,not to my contemporaries1 not to my compatriots--to mankind ,i commit my now completed work in the confidence that it will not be without value for them1 even if this should be late recognised1 as is commonly the lot of what is good4 ,for it cannot have been for the passing generation1 engrossed with the delusion of the moment1 that my mind1 almost against my will1 has uninterruptedly stuck to its work through the course of a long life4 ,and while the lapse of time has not been able to make me doubt the worth of my work1 neither has the lack of sympathy2 for ,i constantly saw the false and the bad1 and finally the absurd and senseless17#b7 stand in universal admiration and honour1 and ,i bethought myself that if it were not the case those who are capable of recognising the genuine and right are so rare that we may look for them in vain for some twenty years1 then those who are capable of producing it could not be so few that their works afterwards form an exception to the perishableness of earthly things2 and thus would be lost the reviving prospect of posterity which every one who sets before himself a high aim requires to strengthen him4 ,whoever seriously takes up and pursues an object that does not lead to material advantages1 must not count on the sympathy of his contemporaries4 ,for the most part he will see1 however1 that in the meantime the superficial aspect of that object becomes current in the world1 and enjoys its day2 and this is as it should be4 ,the object itself must be pursued for its own sake1 otherwise it cannot be attained2 for any design or intention is always dangerous to insight4 ,accordingly1 as the whole history of literature proves1 everything of real value required a long time to gain acceptance1 especially if it belonged to the class of instructive1 not entertaining1 works2 and meanwhile the false flourished4 ,for to combine the object with its superficial appearance is difficult1 when it is not impossible4 ,indeed that is just the curse of this world of want and need1 that everything must serve and slave for these2 and therefore it is not so constituted that any noble and sublime effort1 like the endeavour after light and truth1 can prosper unhindered and exist for its own sake4 ,but even if such an endeavour has once succeeded in asserting itself1 and the conception of it has thus been introduced1 material interests and personal aims will immediately take possession of it1 in order to make it their tool or their mask4 ,accordingly1 when ,kant brought philosophy again into repute1 it had soon to become the tool of political aims from above1 and personal aims from below2 although1 strictly speaking1 not philosophy itself1 but its ghost1 that passes for it4 ,this should not really astonish us2 for the incredibly large majority of men are by nature quite incapable of any but material aims1 indeed they can conceive no others4 ,thus the pursuit of truth alone is far too lofty and eccentric an endeavour for us to expect all or many1 or indeed even a few1 faithfully to take part in4 ,if yet we see1 as for example at present in ,germany1 a remarkable activity1 a general moving1 writing1 and talking with reference to philosophical subjects1 we may confidently assume that1 in spite of solemn looks and assurances1 only real1 not ideal aims1 are the actual primum mobile1 the concealed motive of such a movement2 that it is personal1 official1 ecclesiastical1 political1 in short1 material ends that are really kept in view1 and consequently that mere party ends set the pens of so many pretended philosophers in such rapid motion4 ,thus some design or intention1 not the desire of insight1 is the guiding star of these disturbers of the peace1 and truth is certainly the last thing that is thought of in the matter4 ,it finds no partisans2 rather1 it may pursue its way as silently and unheeded through such a philosophical riot as through the winter night of the darkest century bound in the rigid faith of the church1 when it was communicated only to a few alchemists as esoteric learning1 or entrusted it may be only to the parchment4 ,indeed ,i might say that no time can be more unfavourable to philosophy than that in which it is shamefully misused1 on the one hand to further political objects1 on the other as a means of livelihood4 ,or is it believed that somehow1 with such effort and such a turmoil1 the truth1 at which it by no means aims1 will also be brought to light8 ,truth is no prostitute1 that throws herself away upon those who do not desire her2 she is rather so coy a beauty that he who sacrifices everything to her cannot even then be sure of her favour4 ,if ,governments make philosophy a means of furthering political ends1 learned men see in philosophical professorships a trade that nourishes the outer man just like any other2 therefore they crowd after them in the assurance of their good intentions1 that is1 the purpose of subserving these ends4 ,and they keep their word3 not truth1 not clearness1 not ,plato1 not ,aristotle1 but the ends they were appointed to serve are their guiding star1 and become at once the criterion of what is true1 valuable1 and to be respected1 and of the opposites of these4 ,whatever1 therefore1 does not answer these ends1 even if it were the most important and extraordinary things in their department1 is either condemned1 or1 when this seems hazardous1 suppressed by being unanimously ignored4 ,look only at their zeal against pantheism2 will any simpleton believe that it proceeds from conviction8 ,and1 in general1 how is it possible that philosophy1 degraded to the position of a means of making one's bread1 can fail to degenerate into sophistry8 ,just because this is infallibly the case1 and the rule1 8,i sing the song of him whose bread ,i eat10 has always held good1 the making of money by philosophy was regarded by the ancients as the characteristic of the sophists4 ,but we have still to add this1 that since throughout this world nothing is to be expected1 can be demanded1 or is to be had for gold but mediocrity1 we must be contented with it here also4 ,consequently we see in all the ,german universities the cherished mediocrity striving to produce the philosophy which as yet is not there to produce1 at its own expense and indeed in accordance with a predetermined standard and aim1 a spectacle at which it would be almost cruel to mock4 ,while thus philosophy has long been obliged to serve entirely as a means to public ends on the one side and private ends on the other1 ,i have pursued the course of my thought1 undisturbed by them1 for more than thirty years1 and simply because ,i was obliged to do so and could not help myself1 from an instinctive impulse1 which was1 however1 supported by the confidence that anything true one may have thought1 and anything obscure one may have thrown light upon1 will appeal to any thinking mind1 no matter when it comprehends it1 and will rejoice and comfort it4 ,to such an one we speak as those who are like us have spoken to us1 and have so become our comfort in the wilderness of this life4 ,meanwhile the object is pursued on its own account and for its own sake4 ,now it happens curiously enough with philosophical meditations1 that precisely that which one has thought out and investigated for oneself1 is afterwards of benefit to others2 not that1 however1 which was originally intended for others4 ,the former is confessedly nearest in character to perfect honesty2 for a man does not seek to deceive himself1 nor does he offer himself empty husks2 so that all sophistication and all mere talk is omitted1 and consequently every sentence that is written at once repays the trouble of reading it4 ,thus my writings bear the stamp of honesty and openness so distinctly on the face of them1 that by this alone they are a glaring contrast to those of three celebrated sophists of the post-,kantian period4 ,i am always to be found at the standpoint of reflection1 i4e41 rational deliberation and honest statement1 never at that of inspiration1 called intellectual intuition1 or absolute thought2 though1 if it received its proper name1 it would be called empty bombast and charlatanism4 ,working then in this spirit1 and always seeing the false and bad in universal acceptance1 yea1 bombast7#c7 and charlatanism7#d7 in the highest honour1 ,i have long renounced the approbation of my contemporaries4 ,it is impossible that an age which for twenty years has applauded a ,hegel1 that intellectual ,caliban1 as the greatest of the philosophers1 so loudly that it echoes through the whole of ,europe1 could make him who has looked on at that desirous of its approbation4 ,it has no more crowns of honour to bestow2 its applause is prostituted1 and its censure has no significance4 ,that ,i mean what ,i say is attested by the fact that if ,i had in any way sought the approbation of my contemporaries1 ,i would have had to strike out a score of passages which entirely contradict all their opinions1 and indeed must in part be offensive to them4 ,but ,i would count it a crime to sacrifice a single syllable to that approbation4 ,my guiding star has1 in all seriousness1 been truth4 ,following it1 ,i could first aspire only to my own approbation1 entirely averted from an age deeply degraded as regards all higher intellectual efforts1 and a national literature demoralised even to the exceptions1 a literature in which the art of combining lofty words with paltry significance has reached its height4 ,i can certainly never escape from the errors and weaknesses which1 in my case as in every one else's1 necessarily belong to my nature2 but ,i will not increase them by unworthy accommodations4 ,as regards this second edition1 first of all ,i am glad to say that after five and twenty years ,i find nothing to retract2 so that my fundamental convictions have only been confirmed1 as far as concerns myself at least4 ,the alterations in the first volume therefore1 which contains the whole text of the first edition1 nowhere touch what is essential4 ,sometimes they concern things of merely secondary importance1 and more often consist of very short explanatory additions inserted here and there4 ,only the criticism of the ,kantian philosophy has received important corrections and large additions1 for these could not be put into a supplementary book1 such as those which are given in the second volume1 and which correspond to each of the four books that contain the exposition of my own doctrine4 ,in the case of the latter1 ,i have chosen this form of enlarging and improving them1 because the five and twenty years that have passed since they were composed have produced so marked a change in my method of exposition and in my style1 that it would not have done to combine the content of the second volume with that of the first1 as both must have suffered by the fusion4 ,i therefore give both works separately1 and in the earlier exposition1 even in many places where ,i would now express myself quite differently1 ,i have changed nothing1 because ,i desired to guard against spoiling the work of my earlier years through the carping criticism of age4 ,what in this regard might need correction will correct itself in the mind of the reader with the help of the second volume4 ,both volumes have1 in the full sense of the word1 a supplementary relation to each other1 so far as this rests on the fact that one age of human life is1 intellectually1 the supplement of another4 ,it will therefore be found1 not only that each volume contains what the other lacks1 but that the merits of the one consist peculiarly in that which is wanting in the other4 ,thus1 if the first half of my work surpasses the second in what can only be supplied by the fire of youth and the energy of first conceptions1 the second will surpass the first by the ripeness and complete elaboration of the thought which can only belong to the fruit of the labour of a long life4 ,for when ,i had the strength originally to grasp the fundamental thought of my system1 to follow it at once into its four branches1 to return from them to the unity of their origin1 and then to explain the whole distinctly1 ,i could not yet be in a position to work out all the branches of the system with the fulness1 thoroughness1 and elaborateness which is only reached by the meditation of many years--meditation which is required to test and illustrate the system by innumerable facts1 to support it by the most different kinds of proof1 to throw light on it from all sides1 and then to place the different points of view boldly in contrast1 to separate thoroughly the multifarious materials1 and present them in a well-arranged whole4 ,therefore1 although it would1 no doubt1 have been more agreeable to the reader to have my whole work in one piece1 instead of consisting1 as it now does1 of two halves1 which must be combined in using them1 he must reflect that this would have demanded that ,i should accomplish at one period of life what it is only possible to accomplish in two1 for ,i would have had to possess the qualities at one period of life that nature has divided between two quite different ones4 ,hence the necessity of presenting my work in two halves supplementary to each other may be compared to the necessity in consequence of which a chromatic object-glass1 which cannot be made out of one piece1 is produced by joining together a convex lens of flint glass and a concave lens of crown glass1 the combined effect of which is what was sought4 ,yet1 on the other hand1 the reader will find some compensation for the inconvenience of using two volumes at once1 in the variety and the relief which is afforded by the handling of the same subject1 by the same mind1 in the same spirit1 but in very different years4 ,however1 it is very advisable that those who are not yet acquainted with my philosophy should first of all read the first volume without using the supplementary books1 and should make use of these only on a second perusal2 otherwise it would be too difficult for them to grasp the system in its connection4 ,for it is only thus explained in the first volume1 while the second is devoted to a more detailed investigation and a complete development of the individual doctrines4 ,even those who should not make up their minds to a second reading of the first volume had better not read the second volume till after the first1 and then for itself1 in the ordinary sequence of its chapters1 which1 at any rate1 stand in some kind of connection1 though a somewhat looser one1 the gaps of which they will fully supply by the recollection of the first volume1 if they have thoroughly comprehended it4 ,besides1 they will find everywhere the reference to the corresponding passages of the first volume1 the paragraphs of which ,i have numbered in the second edition for this purpose1 though in the first edition they were only divided by lines4 ,i have already explained in the preface to the first edition1 that my philosophy is founded on that of ,kant1 and therefore presupposes a thorough knowledge of it4 ,i repeat this here4 ,for ,kant's teaching produces in the mind of every one who has comprehended it a fundamental change which is so great that it may be regarded as an intellectual new-birth4 ,it alone is able really to remove the inborn realism which proceeds from the original character of the intellect1 which neither ,berkeley nor ,malebranche succeed in doing1 for they remain too much in the universal1 while ,kant goes into the particular1 and indeed in a way that is quite unexampled both before and after him1 and which has quite a peculiar1 and1 we might say1 immediate effect upon the mind in consequence of which it undergoes a complete undeception1 and forthwith looks at all things in another light4 ,only in this way can any one become susceptible to the more positive expositions which ,i have to give4 ,on the other hand1 he who has not mastered the ,kantian philosophy1 whatever else he may have studied1 is1 as it were1 in a state of innocence2 that is to say1 he remains in the grasp of that natural and childish realism in which we are all born1 and which fits us for everything possible1 with the single exception of philosophy4 ,such a man then stands to the man who knows the ,kantian philosophy as a minor to a man of full age4 ,that this truth should nowadays sound paradoxical1 which would not have been the case in the first thirty years after the appearance of the ,critique of ,reason1 is due to the fact that a generation has grown up that does not know ,kant properly1 because it has never heard more of him than a hasty1 impatient lecture1 or an account at second-hand2 and this again is due to the fact that in consequence of bad guidance1 this generation has wasted its time with the philosophemes of vulgar1 uncalled men1 or even of bombastic sophists1 which are unwarrantably commended to it4 ,hence the confusion of fundamental conceptions1 and in general the unspeakable crudeness and awkwardness that appears from under the covering of affectation and pretentiousness in the philosophical attempts of the generation thus brought up4 ,but whoever thinks he can learn ,kant's philosophy from the exposition of others makes a terrible mistake4 ,nay1 rather ,i must earnestly warn against such accounts1 especially the more recent ones2 and indeed in the years just past ,i have met with expositions of the ,kantian philosophy in the writings of the ,hegelians which actually reach the incredible4 ,how should the minds that in the freshness of youth have been strained and ruined by the nonsense of ,hegelism1 be still capable of following ,kant's profound investigations8 ,they are early accustomed to take the hollowest jingle of words for philosophical thoughts1 the most miserable sophisms for acuteness1 and silly conceits for dialectic1 and their minds are disorganised through the admission of mad combinations of words to which the mind torments and exhausts itself in vain to attach some thought4 ,no ,critique of ,reason can avail them1 no philosophy1 they need a medicina mentis1 first as a sort of purgative1 un petit cours de senscommunologie1 and then one must further see whether1 in their case1 there can even be any talk of philosophy4 ,the ,kantian doctrine then will be sought for in vain anywhere else but in ,kant's own works2 but these are throughout instructive1 even where he errs1 even where he fails4 ,in consequence of his originality1 it holds good of him in the highest degree1 as indeed of all true philosophers1 that one can only come to know them from their own works1 not from the accounts of others4 ,for the thoughts of any extraordinary intellect cannot stand being filtered through the vulgar mind4 ,born behind the broad1 high1 finely-arched brow1 from under which shine beaming eyes1 they lose all power and life1 and appear no longer like themselves1 when removed to the narrow lodging and low roofing of the confined1 contracted1 thick-walled skull from which dull glances steal directed to personal ends4 ,indeed we may say that minds of this kind act like an uneven glass1 in which everything is twisted and distorted1 loses the regularity of its beauty1 and becomes a caricature4 ,only from their authors themselves can we receive philosophical thoughts2 therefore whoever feels himself drawn to philosophy must himself seek out its immortal teachers in the still sanctuary of their works4 ,the principal chapters of any one of these true philosophers will afford a thousand times more insight into their doctrines than the heavy and distorted accounts of them that everyday men produce1 who are still for the most part deeply entangled in the fashionable philosophy of the time1 or in the sentiments of their own minds4 ,but it is astonishing how decidedly the public seizes by preference on these expositions at second-hand4 ,it seems really as if elective affinities were at work here1 by virtue of which the common nature is drawn to its like1 and therefore will rather hear what a great man has said from one of its own kind4 ,perhaps this rests on the same principle as that of mutual instruction1 according to which children learn best from children4 ,one word more for the professors of philosophy4 ,i have always been compelled to admire not merely the sagacity1 the true and fine tact with which1 immediately on its appearance1 they recognised my philosophy as something altogether different from and indeed dangerous to their own attempts1 or1 in popular language1 something that would not suit their turn2 but also the sure and astute policy by virtue of which they at once discovered the proper procedure with regard to it1 the complete harmony with which they applied it1 and the persistency with which they have remained faithful to it4 ,this procedure1 which further commended itself by the great ease of carrying it out1 consists1 as is well known1 in altogether ignoring and thus in secreting--according to ,goethe's malicious phrase1 which just means the appropriating of what is of weight and significance4 ,the efficiency of this quiet means is increased by the ,corybantic shouts with which those who are at one reciprocally greet the birth of their own spiritual children--shouts which compel the public to look and note the air of importance with which they congratulate themselves on the event4 ,who can mistake the object of such proceedings8 ,is there then nothing to oppose to the maxim1 primum vivere1 deinde philosophari8 ,these gentlemen desire to live1 and indeed to live by philosophy4 ,to philosophy they are assigned with their wives and children1 and in spite of ,petrarch's povera e nuda vai filosofia1 they have staked everything upon it4 ,now my philosophy is by no means so constituted that any one can live by it4 ,it lacks the first indispensable requisite of a well-paid professional philosophy1 a speculative theology1 which--in spite of the troublesome ,kant with his ,critique of ,reason--should and must1 it is supposed1 be the chief theme of all philosophy1 even if it thus takes on itself the task of talking straight on of that of which it can know absolutely nothing4 ,indeed my philosophy does not permit to the professors the fiction they have so cunningly devised1 and which has become so indispensable to them1 of a reason that knows1 perceives1 or apprehends immediately and absolutely4 ,this is a doctrine which it is only necessary to impose upon the reader at starting1 in order to pass in the most comfortable manner in the world1 as it were in a chariot and four1 into that region beyond the possibility of all experience1 which ,kant has wholly and for ever shut out from our knowledge1 and in which are found immediately revealed and most beautifully arranged the fundamental dogmas of modern1 ,judaising1 optimistic ,christianity4 ,now what in the world has my subtle philosophy1 deficient as it is in these essential requisites1 with no intentional aim1 and unable to afford a means of subsistence1 whose pole star is truth alone the naked1 unrewarded1 unbefriended1 often persecuted truth1 and which steers straight for it without looking to the right hand or the left1--what1 ,i say1 has this to do with that alma mater1 the good1 well-to-do university philosophy which1 burdened with a hundred aims and a thousand motives1 comes on its course cautiously tacking1 while it keeps before its eyes at all times the fear of the ,lord1 the will of the ministry1 the laws of the established church1 the wishes of the publisher1 the attendance of the students1 the goodwill of colleagues1 the course of current politics1 the momentary tendency of the public1 and ,heaven knows what besides8 ,or what has my quiet1 earnest search for truth in common with the noisy scholastic disputations of the chair and the benches1 the inmost motives of which are always personal aims4 ,the two kinds of philosophy are1 indeed1 radically different4 ,thus it is that with me there is no compromise and no fellowship1 that no one reaps any benefit from my works but the man who seeks the truth alone1 and therefore none of the philosophical parties of the day2 for they all follow their own aims1 while ,i have only insight into truth to offer1 which suits none of these aims1 because it is not modelled after any of them4 ,if my philosophy is to become susceptible of professorial exposition1 the times must entirely change4 ,what a pretty thing it would be if a philosophy by which nobody could live were to gain for itself light and air1 not to speak of the general ear6 ,this must be guarded against1 and all must oppose it as one man4 ,but it is not just such an easy game to controvert and refute2 and1 moreover1 these are mistaken means to employ1 because they just direct the attention of the public to the matter1 and its taste for the lucubrations of the professors of philosophy might be destroyed by the perusal of my writings4 ,for whoever has tasted of earnest will not relish jest1 especially when it is tiresome4 ,therefore the silent system1 so unanimously adopted1 is the only right one1 and ,i can only advise them to stick to it and go on with it as long as it will answer1 that is1 until to ignore is taken to imply ignorance2 then there will just be time to turn back4 ,meanwhile it remains open to every one to pluck out a small feather here and there for his own use1 for the superfluity of thoughts at home should not be very oppressive4 ,thus the ignoring and silent system may hold out a good while1 at least the span of time ,i may have yet to live1 whereby much is already won4 ,and if1 in the meantime1 here and there an indiscreet voice has let itself be heard1 it is soon drowned by the loud talking of the professors1 who1 with important airs1 know how to entertain the public with very different things4 ,i advise1 however1 that the unanimity of procedure should be somewhat more strictly observed1 and especially that the young men should be looked after1 for they are sometimes so fearfully indiscreet4 ,for even so ,i cannot guarantee that the commended procedure will last for ever1 and cannot answer for the final issue4 ,it is a nice question as to the steering of the public1 which1 on the whole1 is good and tractable4 ,although we nearly at all times see the ,gorgiases and the ,hippiases uppermost1 although the absurd1 as a rule1 predominates1 and it seems impossible that the voice of the individual can ever penetrate through the chorus of the befooling and the befooled1 there yet remains to the genuine works of every age a quite peculiar1 silent1 slow1 and powerful influence2 and1 as if by a miracle1 we see them rise at last out of the turmoil like a balloon that floats up out of the thick atmosphere of this globe into purer regions1 where1 having once arrived1 it remains at rest1 and no one can draw it down again4 ,written at ,frankfort-on-the-,maine in ,february #ahdd4 ,,first ,,book4 ,,the ,,world ,,as ,,idea4 ,first ,aspect4 ,the ,idea ,subordinated ,to ,the ,principle ,of ,sufficient ,reason3 ,the ,object ,of ,experience ,and ,science4 ,sors de l'enfance1 ami rveille toi6 --,jean ,jacques ,rousseau4 #a4 8,the world is my idea30--this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows1 though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness4 ,if he really does this1 he has attained to philosophical wisdom4 ,it then becomes clear and certain to him that what he knows is not a sun and an earth1 but only an eye that sees a sun1 a hand that feels an earth2 that the world which surrounds him is there only as idea1 i4e41 only in relation to something else1 the consciousness1 which is himself4 ,if any truth can be asserted a priori1 it is this3 for it is the expression of the most general form of all possible and thinkable experience3 a form which is more general than time1 or space1 or causality1 for they all presuppose it2 and each of these1 which we have seen to be just so many modes of the principle of sufficient reason1 is valid only for a particular class of ideas2 whereas the antithesis of object and subject is the common form of all these classes1 is that form under which alone any idea of whatever kind it may be1 abstract or intuitive1 pure or empirical1 is possible and thinkable4 ,no truth therefore is more certain1 more independent of all others1 and less in need of proof than this1 that all that exists for knowledge1 and therefore this whole world1 is only object in relation to subject1 perception of a perceiver1 in a word1 idea4 ,this is obviously true of the past and the future1 as well as of the present1 of what is farthest off1 as of what is near2 for it is true of time and space themselves1 in which alone these distinctions arise4 ,all that in any way belongs or can belong to the world is inevitably thus conditioned through the subject1 and exists only for the subject4 ,the world is idea4 ,this truth is by no means new4 ,it was implicitly involved in the sceptical reflections from which ,descartes started4 ,berkeley1 however1 was the first who distinctly enunciated it1 and by this he has rendered a permanent service to philosophy1 even though the rest of his teaching should not endure4 ,kant's primary mistake was the neglect of this principle1 as is shown in the appendix4 ,how early again this truth was recognised by the wise men of ,india1 appearing indeed as the fundamental tenet of the ,vednta philosophy ascribed to ,vyasa1 is pointed out by ,sir ,william ,jones in the last of his essays3 8,on the philosophy of the ,asiatics0 7,asiatic ,researches1 vol4 iv4 p4 #afd71 where he says1 8,the fundamental tenet of the ,vedanta school consisted not in denying the existence of matter1 that is1 of solidity1 impenetrability1 and extended figure 7to deny which would be lunacy71 but in correcting the popular notion of it1 and in contending that it has no essence independent of mental perception2 that existence and perceptibility are convertible terms40 ,these words adequately express the compatibility of empirical reality and transcendental ideality4 ,in this first book1 then1 we consider the world only from this side1 only so far as it is idea4 ,the inward reluctance with which any one accepts the world as merely his idea1 warns him that this view of it1 however true it may be1 is nevertheless one-sided1 adopted in consequence of some arbitrary abstraction4 ,and yet it is a conception from which he can never free himself4 ,the defectiveness of this view will be corrected in the next book by means of a truth which is not so immediately certain as that from which we start here2 a truth at which we can arrive only by deeper research and more severe abstraction1 by the separation of what is different and the union of what is identical4 ,this truth1 which must be very serious and impressive if not awful to every one1 is that a man can also say and must say1 8the world is my will40 ,in this book1 however1 we must consider separately that aspect of the world from which we start1 its aspect as knowable1 and therefore1 in the meantime1 we must1 without reserve1 regard all presented objects1 even our own bodies 7as we shall presently show more fully71 merely as ideas1 and call them merely ideas4 ,by so doing we always abstract from will 7as we hope to make clear to every one further on71 which by itself constitutes the other aspect of the world4 ,for as the world is in one aspect entirely idea1 so in another it is entirely will4 ,a reality which is neither of these two1 but an object in itself 7into which the thing in itself has unfortunately dwindled in the hands of ,kant71 is the phantom of a dream1 and its acceptance is an ignis fatuus in philosophy4 #b4 ,that which knows all things and is known by none is the subject4 ,thus it is the supporter of the world1 that condition of all phenomena1 of all objects which is always pre-supposed throughout experience2 for all that exists1 exists only for the subject4 ,every one finds himself to be subject1 yet only in so far as he knows1 not in so far as he is an object of knowledge4 ,but his body is object1 and therefore from this point of view we call it idea4 ,for the body is an object among objects1 and is conditioned by the laws of objects1 although it is an immediate object4 ,like all objects of perception1 it lies within the universal forms of knowledge1 time and space1 which are the conditions of multiplicity4 ,the subject1 on the contrary1 which is always the knower1 never the known1 does not come under these forms1 but is presupposed by them2 it has therefore neither multiplicity nor its opposite unity4 ,we never know it1 but it is always the knower wherever there is knowledge4 ,so then the world as idea1 the only aspect in which we consider it at present1 has two fundamental1 necessary1 and inseparable halves4 ,the one half is the object1 the forms of which are space and time1 and through these multiplicity4 ,the other half is the subject1 which is not in space and time1 for it is present1 entire and undivided1 in every percipient being4 ,so that any one percipient being1 with the object1 constitutes the whole world as idea just as fully as the existing millions could do2 but if this one were to disappear1 then the whole world as idea would cease to be4 ,these halves are therefore inseparable even for thought1 for each of the two has meaning and existence only through and for the other1 each appears with the other and vanishes with it4 ,they limit each other immediately2 where the object begins the subject ends4 ,the universality of this limitation is shown by the fact that the essential and hence universal forms of all objects1 space1 time1 and causality1 may1 without knowledge of the object1 be discovered and fully known from a consideration of the subject1 i4e41 in ,kantian language1 they lie a priori in our consciousness4 ,that he discovered this is one of ,kant's principal merits1 and it is a great one4 ,i however go beyond this1 and maintain that the principle of sufficient reason is the general expression for all these forms of the object of which we are a priori conscious2 and that therefore all that we know purely a priori1 is merely the content of that principle and what follows from it2 in it all our certain a priori knowledge is expressed4 ,in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason ,i have shown in detail how every possible object comes under it2 that is1 stands in a necessary relation to other objects1 on the one side as determined1 on the other side as determining3 this is of such wide application1 that the whole existence of all objects1 so far as they are objects1 ideas and nothing more1 may be entirely traced to this their necessary relation to each other1 rests only in it1 is in fact merely relative2 but of this more presently4 ,i have further shown1 that the necessary relation which the principle of sufficient reason expresses generally1 appears in other forms corresponding to the classes into which objects are divided1 according to their possibility2 and again that by these forms the proper division of the classes is tested4 ,i take it for granted that what ,i said in this earlier essay is known and present to the reader1 for if it had not been already said it would necessarily find its place here4 #c4 ,the chief distinction among our ideas is that between ideas of perception and abstract ideas4 ,the latter form just one class of ideas1 namely concepts1 and these are the possession of man alone of all creatures upon earth4 ,the capacity for these1 which distinguishes him from all the lower animals1 has always been called reason47#e7 ,we shall consider these abstract ideas by themselves later1 but1 in the first place1 we shall speak exclusively of the ideas of perception4 ,these comprehend the whole visible world1 or the sum total of experience1 with the conditions of its possibility4 ,we have already observed that it is a highly important discovery of ,kant's1 that these very conditions1 these forms of the visible world1 i4e41 the absolutely universal element in its perception1 the common property of all its phenomena1 space and time1 even when taken by themselves and apart from their content1 can1 not only be thought in the abstract1 but also be directly perceived2 and that this perception or intuition is not some kind of phantasm arising from constant recurrence in experience1 but is so entirely independent of experience that we must rather regard the latter as dependent on it1 inasmuch as the qualities of space and time1 as they are known in a priori perception or intuition1 are valid for all possible experience1 as rules to which it must invariably conform4 ,accordingly1 in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 ,i have treated space and time1 because they are perceived as pure and empty of content1 as a special and independent class of ideas4 ,this quality of the universal forms of intuition1 which was discovered by ,kant1 that they may be perceived in themselves and apart from experience1 and that they may be known as exhibiting those laws on which is founded the infallible science of mathematics1 is certainly very important4 ,not less worthy of remark1 however1 is this other quality of time and space1 that the principle of sufficient reason1 which conditions experience as the law of causation and of motive1 and thought as the law of the basis of judgment1 appears here in quite a special form1 to which ,i have given the name of the ground of being4 ,in time1 this is the succession of its moments1 and in space the position of its parts1 which reciprocally determine each other ad infinitum4 ,any one who has fully understood from the introductory essay the complete identity of the content of the principle of sufficient reason in all its different forms1 must also be convinced of the importance of the knowledge of the simplest of these forms1 as affording him insight into his own inmost nature4 ,this simplest form of the principle we have found to be time4 ,in it each instant is1 only in so far as it has effaced the preceding one1 its generator1 to be itself in turn as quickly effaced4 ,the past and the future 7considered apart from the consequences of their content7 are empty as a dream1 and the present is only the indivisible and unenduring boundary between them4 ,and in all the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason1 we shall find the same emptiness1 and shall see that not time only but also space1 and the whole content of both of them1 i4e41 all that proceeds from causes and motives1 has a merely relative existence1 is only through and for another like to itself1 i4e41 not more enduring4 ,the substance of this doctrine is old3 it appears in ,heraclitus when he laments the eternal flux of things2 in ,plato when he degrades the object to that which is ever becoming1 but never being2 in ,spinoza as the doctrine of the mere accidents of the one substance which is and endures4 ,kant opposes what is thus known as the mere phenomenon to the thing in itself4 ,lastly1 the ancient wisdom of the ,indian philosophers declares1 8,it is ,my1 the veil of deception1 which blinds the eyes of mortals1 and makes them behold a world of which they cannot say either that it is or that it is not3 for it is like a dream2 it is like the sunshine on the sand which the traveller takes from afar for water1 or the stray piece of rope he mistakes for a snake40 7,these similes are repeated in innumerable passages of the ,vedas and the ,puranas47 ,but what all these mean1 and that of which they all speak1 is nothing more than what we have just considered--the world as idea subject to the principle of sufficient reason4 #d4 ,whoever has recognised the form of the principle of sufficient reason1 which appears in pure time as such1 and on which all counting and arithmetical calculation rests1 has completely mastered the nature of time4 ,time is nothing more than that form of the principle of sufficient reason1 and has no further significance4 ,succession is the form of the principle of sufficient reason in time1 and succession is the whole nature of time4 ,further1 whoever has recognised the principle of sufficient reason as it appears in the presentation of pure space1 has exhausted the whole nature of space1 which is absolutely nothing more than that possibility of the reciprocal determination of its parts by each other1 which is called position4 ,the detailed treatment of this1 and the formulation in abstract conceptions of the results which flow from it1 so that they may be more conveniently used1 is the subject of the science of geometry4 ,thus also1 whoever has recognised the law of causation1 the aspect of the principle of sufficient reason which appears in what fills these forms 7space and time7 as objects of perception1 that is to say matter1 has completely mastered the nature of matter as such1 for matter is nothing more than causation1 as any one will see at once if he reflects4 ,its true being is its action1 nor can we possibly conceive it as having any other meaning4 ,only as active does it fill space and time2 its action upon the immediate object 7which is itself matter7 determines that perception in which alone it exists4 ,the consequence of the action of any material object upon any other1 is known only in so far as the latter acts upon the immediate object in a different way from that in which it acted before2 it consists only of this4 ,cause and effect thus constitute the whole nature of matter2 its true being is its action4 7,a fuller treatment of this will be found in the essay on the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason1 #ba1 p4 #gg47 ,the nature of all material things is therefore very appropriately called in ,german ,wirklichkeit17#f7 a word which is far more expressive than ,realitt4 ,again1 that which is acted upon is always matter1 and thus the whole being and essence of matter consists in the orderly change1 which one part of it brings about in another part4 ,the existence of matter is therefore entirely relative1 according to a relation which is valid only within its limits1 as in the case of time and space4 ,but time and space1 each for itself1 can be mentally presented apart from matter1 whereas matter cannot be so presented apart from time and space4 ,the form which is inseparable from it presupposes space1 and the action in which its very existence consists1 always imports some change1 in other words a determination in time4 ,but space and time are not only1 each for itself1 presupposed by matter1 but a union of the two constitutes its essence1 for this1 as we have seen1 consists in action1 i4e41 in causation4 ,all the innumerable conceivable phenomena and conditions of things1 might be coexistent in boundless space1 without limiting each other1 or might be successive in endless time without interfering with each other3 thus a necessary relation of these phenomena to each other1 and a law which should regulate them according to such a relation1 is by no means needful1 would not1 indeed1 be applicable3 it therefore follows that in the case of all co-existence in space and change in time1 so long as each of these forms preserves for itself its condition and its course without any connection with the other1 there can be no causation1 and since causation constitutes the essential nature of matter1 there can be no matter4 ,but the law of causation receives its meaning and necessity only from this1 that the essence of change does not consist simply in the mere variation of things1 but rather in the fact that at the same part of space there is now one thing and then another1 and at one and the same point of time there is here one thing and there another3 only this reciprocal limitation of space and time by each other gives meaning1 and at the same time necessity1 to a law1 according to which change must take place4 ,what is determined by the law of causality is therefore not merely a succession of things in time1 but this succession with reference to a definite space1 and not merely existence of things in a particular place1 but in this place at a different point of time4 ,change1 i4e41 variation which takes place according to the law of causality1 implies always a determined part of space and a determined part of time together and in union4 ,thus causality unites space with time4 ,but we found that the whole essence of matter consisted in action1 i4e41 in causation1 consequently space and time must also be united in matter1 that is to say1 matter must take to itself at once the distinguishing qualities both of space and time1 however much these may be opposed to each other1 and must unite in itself what is impossible for each of these independently1 that is1 the fleeting course of time1 with the rigid unchangeable perduration of space3 infinite divisibility it receives from both4 ,it is for this reason that we find that co-existence1 which could neither be in time alone1 for time has no contiguity1 nor in space alone1 for space has no before1 after1 or now1 is first established through matter4 ,but the co-existence of many things constitutes1 in fact1 the essence of reality1 for through it permanence first becomes possible2 for permanence is only knowable in the change of something which is present along with what is permanent1 while on the other hand it is only because something permanent is present along with what changes1 that the latter gains the special character of change1 i4e41 the mutation of quality and form in the permanence of substance1 that is to say1 in matter47#g7 ,if the world were in space alone1 it would be rigid and immovable1 without succession1 without change1 without action2 but we know that with action1 the idea of matter first appears4 ,again1 if the world were in time alone1 all would be fleeting1 without persistence1 without contiguity1 hence without co-existence1 and consequently without permanence2 so that in this case also there would be no matter4 ,only through the union of space and time do we reach matter1 and matter is the possibility of co-existence1 and1 through that1 of permanence2 through permanence again matter is the possibility of the persistence of substance in the change of its states47#h7 ,as matter consists in the union of space and time1 it bears throughout the stamp of both4 ,it manifests its origin in space1 partly through the form which is inseparable from it1 but especially through its persistence 7substance71 the a priori certainty of which is therefore wholly deducible from that of space7#i7 7for variation belongs to time alone1 but in it alone and for itself nothing is persistent74 ,matter shows that it springs from time by quality 7accidents71 without which it never exists1 and which is plainly always causality1 action upon other matter1 and therefore change 7a time concept74 ,the law of this action1 however1 always depends upon space and time together1 and only thus obtains meaning4 ,the regulative function of causality is confined entirely to the determination of what must occupy this time and this space4 ,the fact that we know a priori the unalterable characteristics of matter1 depends upon this derivation of its essential nature from the forms of our knowledge of which we are conscious a priori4 ,these unalterable characteristics are space-occupation1 i4e41 impenetrability1 i4e41 causal action1 consequently1 extension1 infinite divisibility1 persistence1 i4e41 indestructibility1 and lastly mobility3 weight1 on the other hand1 notwithstanding its universality1 must be attributed to a posteriori knowledge1 although ,kant1 in his 8,metaphysical ,introduction to ,natural ,philosophy10 p4 #ga 7p4 #cgb of ,rosenkranz's edition71 treats it as knowable a priori4 ,but as the object in general is only for the subject1 as its idea1 so every special class of ideas is only for an equally special quality in the subject1 which is called a faculty of perception4 ,this subjective correlative of time and space in themselves as empty forms1 has been named by ,kant pure sensibility2 and we may retain this expression1 as ,kant was the first to treat of the subject1 though it is not exact1 for sensibility presupposes matter4 ,the subjective correlative of matter or of causation1 for these two are the same1 is understanding1 which is nothing more than this4 ,to know causality is its one function1 its only power2 and it is a great one1 embracing much1 of manifold application1 yet of unmistakable identity in all its manifestations4 ,conversely all causation1 that is to say1 all matter1 or the whole of reality1 is only for the understanding1 through the understanding1 and in the understanding4 ,the first1 simplest1 and ever-present example of understanding is the perception of the actual world4 ,this is throughout knowledge of the cause from the effect1 and therefore all perception is intellectual4 ,the understanding could never arrive at this perception1 however1 if some effect did not become known immediately1 and thus serve as a starting-point4 ,but this is the affection of the animal body4 ,so far1 then1 the animal body is the immediate object of the subject2 the perception of all other objects becomes possible through it4 ,the changes which every animal body experiences1 are immediately known1 that is1 felt2 and as these effects are at once referred to their causes1 the perception of the latter as objects arises4 ,this relation is no conclusion in abstract conceptions2 it does not arise from reflection1 nor is it arbitrary1 but immediate1 necessary1 and certain4 ,it is the method of knowing of the pure understanding1 without which there could be no perception2 there would only remain a dull plant-like consciousness of the changes of the immediate object1 which would succeed each other in an utterly unmeaning way1 except in so far as they might have a meaning for the will either as pain or pleasure4 ,but as with the rising of the sun the visible world appears1 so at one stroke1 the understanding1 by means of its one simple function1 changes the dull1 meaningless sensation into perception4 ,what the eye1 the ear1 or the hand feels1 is not perception2 it is merely its data4 ,by the understanding passing from the effect to the cause1 the world first appears as perception extended in space1 varying in respect of form1 persistent through all time in respect of matter2 for the understanding unites space and time in the idea of matter1 that is1 causal action4 ,as the world as idea exists only through the understanding1 so also it exists only for the understanding4 ,in the first chapter of my essay on 8,light and ,colour10 ,i have already explained how the understanding constructs perceptions out of the data supplied by the senses2 how by comparison of the impressions which the various senses receive from the object1 a child arrives at perceptions2 how this alone affords the solution of so many phenomena of the senses2 the single vision of two eyes1 the double vision in the case of a squint1 or when we try to look at once at objects which lie at unequal distances behind each other2 and all illusion which is produced by a sudden alteration in the organs of sense4 ,but ,i have treated this important subject much more fully and thoroughly in the second edition of the essay on 8,the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason10 #ba4 ,all that is said there would find its proper place here1 and would therefore have to be said again2 but as ,i have almost as much disinclination to quote myself as to quote others1 and as ,i am unable to explain the subject better than it is explained there1 ,i refer the reader to it1 instead of quoting it1 and take for granted that it is known4 ,the process by which children1 and persons born blind who have been operated upon1 learn to see1 the single vision of the double sensation of two eyes1 the double vision and double touch which occur when the organs of sense have been displaced from their usual position1 the upright appearance of objects while the picture on the retina is upside down1 the attributing of colour to the outward objects1 whereas it is merely an inner function1 a division through polarisation1 of the activity of the eye1 and lastly the stereoscope1--all these are sure and incontrovertible evidence that perception is not merely of the senses1 but intellectual--that is1 pure knowledge through the understanding of the cause from the effect1 and that1 consequently1 it presupposes the law of causality1 in a knowledge of which all perception--that is to say all experience1 by virtue of its primary and only possibility1 depends4 ,the contrary doctrine that the law of causality results from experience1 which was the scepticism of ,hume1 is first refuted by this4 ,for the independence of the knowledge of causality of all experience1--that is1 its a priori character--can only be deduced from the dependence of all experience upon it2 and this deduction can only be accomplished by proving1 in the manner here indicated1 and explained in the passages referred to above1 that the knowledge of causality is included in perception in general1 to which all experience belongs1 and therefore in respect of experience is completely a priori1 does not presuppose it1 but is presupposed by it as a condition4 ,this1 however1 cannot be deduced in the manner attempted by ,kant1 which ,i have criticised in the essay on 8,the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason10 #bc4 #e4 ,it is needful to guard against the grave error of supposing that because perception arises through the knowledge of causality1 the relation of subject and object is that of cause and effect4 ,for this relation subsists only between the immediate object and objects known indirectly1 thus always between objects alone4 ,it is this false supposition that has given rise to the foolish controversy about the reality of the outer world2 a controversy in which dogmatism and scepticism oppose each other1 and the former appears1 now as realism1 now as idealism4 ,realism treats the object as cause1 and the subject as its effect4 ,the idealism of ,fichte reduces the object to the effect of the subject4 ,since however1 and this cannot be too much emphasised1 there is absolutely no relation according to the principle of sufficient reason between subject and object1 neither of these views could be proved1 and therefore scepticism attacked them both with success4 ,now1 just as the law of causality precedes perception and experience as their condition1 and therefore cannot 7as ,hume thought7 be derived from them1 so object and subject precede all knowledge1 and hence the principle of sufficient reason in general1 as its first condition2 for this principle is merely the form of all objects1 the whole nature and possibility of their existence as phenomena3 but the object always presupposes the subject2 and therefore between these two there can be no relation of reason and consequent4 ,my essay on the principle of sufficient reason accomplishes just this3 it explains the content of that principle as the essential form of every object--that is to say1 as the universal nature of all objective existence1 as something which pertains to the object as such2 but the object as such always presupposes the subject as its necessary correlative2 and therefore the subject remains always outside the province in which the principle of sufficient reason is valid4 ,the controversy as to the reality of the outer world rests upon this false extension of the validity of the principle of sufficient reason to the subject also1 and starting with this mistake it can never understand itself4 ,on the one side realistic dogmatism1 looking upon the idea as the effect of the object1 desires to separate these two1 idea and object1 which are really one1 and to assume a cause quite different from the idea1 an object in itself1 independent of the subject1 a thing which is quite inconceivable2 for even as object it presupposes subject1 and so remains its idea4 ,opposed to this doctrine is scepticism1 which makes the same false presupposition that in the idea we have only the effect1 never the cause1 therefore never real being2 that we always know merely the action of the object4 ,but this object1 it supposes1 may perhaps have no resemblance whatever to its effect1 may indeed have been quite erroneously received as the cause1 for the law of causality is first to be gathered from experience1 and the reality of experience is then made to rest upon it4 ,thus both of these views are open to the correction1 firstly1 that object and idea are the same2 secondly1 that the true being of the object of perception is its action1 that the reality of the thing consists in this1 and the demand for an existence of the object outside the idea of the subject1 and also for an essence of the actual thing different from its action1 has absolutely no meaning1 and is a contradiction3 and that the knowledge of the nature of the effect of any perceived object1 exhausts such an object itself1 so far as it is object1 i4e41 idea1 for beyond this there is nothing more to be known4 ,so far then1 the perceived world in space and time1 which makes itself known as causation alone1 is entirely real1 and is throughout simply what it appears to be1 and it appears wholly and without reserve as idea1 bound together according to the law of causality4 ,this is its empirical reality4 ,on the other hand1 all causality is in the understanding alone1 and for the understanding4 ,the whole actual1 that is1 active world is determined as such through the understanding1 and apart from it is nothing4 ,this1 however1 is not the only reason for altogether denying such a reality of the outer world as is taught by the dogmatist1 who explains its reality as its independence of the subject4 ,we also deny it1 because no object apart from a subject can be conceived without contradiction4 ,the whole world of objects is and remains idea1 and therefore wholly and for ever determined by the subject2 that is to say1 it has transcendental ideality4 ,but it is not therefore illusion or mere appearance2 it presents itself as that which it is1 idea1 and indeed as a series of ideas of which the common bond is the principle of sufficient reason4 ,it is according to its inmost meaning quite comprehensible to the healthy understanding1 and speaks a language quite intelligible to it4 ,to dispute about its reality can only occur to a mind perverted by over-subtilty1 and such discussion always arises from a false application of the principle of sufficient reason1 which binds all ideas together of whatever kind they may be1 but by no means connects them with the subject1 nor yet with a something which is neither subject nor object1 but only the ground of the object2 an absurdity1 for only objects can be and always are the ground of objects4 ,if we examine more closely the source of this question as to the reality of the outer world1 we find that besides the false application of the principle of sufficient reason generally to what lies beyond its province1 a special confusion of its forms is also involved2 for that form which it has only in reference to concepts or abstract ideas1 is applied to perceived ideas1 real objects2 and a ground of knowing is demanded of objects1 whereas they can have nothing but a ground of being4 ,among the abstract ideas1 the concepts united in the judgment1 the principle of sufficient reason appears in such a way that each of these has its worth1 its validity1 and its whole existence1 here called truth1 simply and solely through the relation of the judgment to something outside of it1 its ground of knowledge1 to which there must consequently always be a return4 ,among real objects1 ideas of perception1 on the other hand1 the principle of sufficient reason appears not as the principle of the ground of knowing1 but of being1 as the law of causality3 every real object has paid its debt to it1 inasmuch as it has come to be1 i4e41 has appeared as the effect of a cause4 ,the demand for a ground of knowing has therefore here no application and no meaning1 but belongs to quite another class of things4 ,thus the world of perception raises in the observer no question or doubt so long as he remains in contact with it3 there is here neither error nor truth1 for these are confined to the province of the abstract--the province of reflection4 ,but here the world lies open for sense and understanding2 presents itself with naive truth as that which it really is--ideas of perception which develop themselves according to the law of causality4 ,so far as we have considered the question of the reality of the outer world1 it arises from a confusion which amounts even to a misunderstanding of reason itself1 and therefore thus far1 the question could be answered only by explaining its meaning4 ,after examination of the whole nature of the principle of sufficient reason1 of the relation of subject and object1 and the special conditions of sense perception1 the question itself disappeared because it had no longer any meaning4 ,there is1 however1 one other possible origin of this question1 quite different from the purely speculative one which we have considered1 a specially empirical origin1 though the question is always raised from a speculative point of view1 and in this form it has a much more comprehensible meaning than it had in the first4 ,we have dreams2 may not our whole life be a dream8 or more exactly3 is there a sure criterion of the distinction between dreams and reality8 between phantasms and real objects8 ,the assertion that what is dreamt is less vivid and distinct than what we actually perceive is not to the point1 because no one has ever been able to make a fair comparison of the two2 for we can only compare the recollection of a dream with the present reality4 ,kant answers the question thus3 8,the connection of ideas among themselves1 according to the law of causality1 constitutes the difference between real life and dreams40 ,but in dreams1 as well as in real life1 everything is connected individually at any rate1 in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms1 and this connection is broken only between life and dreams1 or between one dream and another4 ,kant's answer therefore could only run thus3--the long dream 7life7 has throughout complete connection according to the principle of sufficient reason2 it has not this connection1 however1 with short dreams1 although each of these has in itself the same connection3 the bridge is therefore broken between the former and the latter1 and on this account we distinguish them4 ,but to institute an inquiry according to this criterion1 as to whether something was dreamt or seen1 would always be difficult and often impossible4 ,for we are by no means in a position to trace link by link the causal connection between any experienced event and the present moment1 but we do not on that account explain it as dreamt4 ,therefore in real life we do not commonly employ that method of distinguishing between dreams and reality4 ,the only sure criterion by which to distinguish them is in fact the entirely empirical one of awaking1 through which at any rate the causal connection between dreamed events and those of waking life1 is distinctly and sensibly broken off4 ,this is strongly supported by the remark of ,hobbes in the second chapter of ,leviathan1 that we easily mistake dreams for reality if we have unintentionally fallen asleep without taking off our clothes1 and much more so when it also happens that some undertaking or design fills all our thoughts1 and occupies our dreams as well as our waking moments4 ,we then observe the awaking just as little as the falling asleep1 dream and reality run together and become confounded4 ,in such a case there is nothing for it but the application of ,kant's criterion2 but if1 as often happens1 we fail to establish by means of this criterion1 either the existence of causal connection with the present1 or the absence of such connection1 then it must for ever remain uncertain whether an event was dreamt or really happened4 ,here1 in fact1 the intimate relationship between life and dreams is brought out very clearly1 and we need not be ashamed to confess it1 as it has been recognised and spoken of by many great men4 ,the ,vedas and ,puranas have no better simile than a dream for the whole knowledge of the actual world1 which they call the web of ,my1 and they use none more frequently4 ,plato often says that men live only in a dream2 the philosopher alone strives to awake himself4 ,pindar says 7ii4 4 #ace73 7umbr somnium homo71 and ,sophocles3-- 1 1 4--,ajax1 #abe4 7,nos enim1 quicunque vivimus1 nihil aliud esse comperio quam simulacra et levem umbram47 ,beside which most worthily stands ,shakespeare3-- 8,we are such stuff ,as dreams are made on1 and our little life ,is rounded with a sleep40--,tempest1 ,act iv4 ,sc4 #a4 ,lastly1 ,calderon was so deeply impressed with this view of life that he sought to embody it in a kind of metaphysical drama--8,life a ,dream40 ,after these numerous quotations from the poets1 perhaps ,i also may be allowed to express myself by a metaphor4 ,life and dreams are leaves of the same book4 ,the systematic reading of this book is real life1 but when the reading hours 7that is1 the day7 are over1 we often continue idly to turn over the leaves1 and read a page here and there without method or connection3 often one we have read before1 sometimes one that is new to us1 but always in the same book4 ,such an isolated page is indeed out of connection with the systematic study of the book1 but it does not seem so very different when we remember that the whole continuous perusal begins and ends just as abruptly1 and may therefore be regarded as merely a larger single page4 ,thus although individual dreams are distinguished from real life by the fact that they do not fit into that continuity which runs through the whole of experience1 and the act of awaking brings this into consciousness1 yet that very continuity of experience belongs to real life as its form1 and the dream on its part can point to a similar continuity in itself4 ,if1 therefore1 we consider the question from a point of view external to both1 there is no distinct difference in their nature1 and we are forced to concede to the poets that life is a long dream4 ,let us turn back now from this quite independent empirical origin of the question of the reality of the outer world1 to its speculative origin4 ,we found that this consisted1 first1 in the false application of the principle of sufficient reason to the relation of subject and object2 and secondly1 in the confusion of its forms1 inasmuch as the principle of sufficient reason of knowing was extended to a province in which the principle of sufficient reason of being is valid4 ,but the question could hardly have occupied philosophers so constantly if it were entirely devoid of all real content1 and if some true thought and meaning did not lie at its heart as its real source4 ,accordingly1 we must assume that when the element of truth that lies at the bottom of the question first came into reflection and sought its expression1 it became involved in these confused and meaningless forms and problems4 ,this at least is my opinion1 and ,i think that the true expression of that inmost meaning of the question1 which it failed to find1 is this3--,what is this world of perception besides being my idea8 ,is that of which ,i am conscious only as idea1 exactly like my own body1 of which ,i am doubly conscious1 in one aspect as idea1 in another aspect as will8 ,the fuller explanation of this question and its answer in the affirmative1 will form the content of the second book1 and its consequences will occupy the remaining portion of this work4 #f4 ,for the present1 however1 in this first book we consider everything merely as idea1 as object for the subject4 ,and our own body1 which is the starting-point for each of us in our perception of the world1 we consider1 like all other real objects1 from the side of its knowableness1 and in this regard it is simply an idea4 ,now the consciousness of every one is in general opposed to the explanation of objects as mere ideas1 and more especially to the explanation of our bodies as such2 for the thing in itself is known to each of us immediately in so far as it appears as our own body2 but in so far as it objectifies itself in the other objects of perception1 it is known only indirectly4 ,but this abstraction1 this one-sided treatment1 this forcible separation of what is essentially and necessarily united1 is only adopted to meet the demands of our argument2 and therefore the disinclination to it must1 in the meantime1 be suppressed and silenced by the expectation that the subsequent treatment will correct the one-sidedness of the present one1 and complete our knowledge of the nature of the world4 ,at present therefore the body is for us immediate object2 that is to say1 that idea which forms the starting-point of the subject's knowledge2 because the body1 with its immediately known changes1 precedes the application of the law of causality1 and thus supplies it with its first data4 ,the whole nature of matter consists1 as we have seen1 in its causal action4 ,but cause and effect exist only for the understanding1 which is nothing but their subjective correlative4 ,the understanding1 however1 could never come into operation if there were not something else from which it starts4 ,this is simple sensation--the immediate consciousness of the changes of the body1 by virtue of which it is immediate object4 ,thus the possibility of knowing the world of perception depends upon two conditions2 the first1 objectively expressed1 is the power of material things to act upon each other1 to produce changes in each other1 without which common quality of all bodies no perception would be possible1 even by means of the sensibility of the animal body4 ,and if we wish to express this condition subjectively we say3 ,the understanding first makes perception possible2 for the law of causality1 the possibility of effect and cause1 springs only from the understanding1 and is valid only for it1 and therefore the world of perception exists only through and for it4 ,the second condition is the sensibility of animal bodies1 or the quality of being immediate objects of the subject which certain bodies possess4 ,the mere modification which the organs of sense sustain from without through their specific affections1 may here be called ideas1 so far as these affections produce neither pain nor pleasure1 that is1 have no immediate significance for the will1 and are yet perceived1 exist therefore only for knowledge4 ,thus far1 then1 ,i say that the body is immediately known1 is immediate object4 ,but the conception of object is not to be taken here in its fullest sense1 for through this immediate knowledge of the body1 which precedes the operation of the understanding1 and is mere sensation1 our own body does not exist specifically as object1 but first the material things which affect it3 for all knowledge of an object proper1 of an idea perceived in space1 exists only through and for the understanding2 therefore not before1 but only subsequently to its operation4 ,therefore the body as object proper1 that is1 as an idea perceived in space1 is first known indirectly1 like all other objects1 through the application of the law of causality to the action of one of its parts upon another1 as1 for example1 when the eye sees the body or the hand touches it4 ,consequently the form of our body does not become known to us through mere feeling1 but only through knowledge1 only in idea2 that is to say1 only in the brain does our own body first come to appear as extended1 articulate1 organic4 ,a man born blind receives this idea only little by little from the data afforded by touch4 ,a blind man without hands could never come to know his own form2 or at the most could infer and construct it little by little from the effects of other bodies upon him4 ,if1 then1 we call the body an immediate object1 we are to be understood with these reservations4 ,in other respects1 then1 according to what has been said1 all animal bodies are immediate objects2 that is1 starting-points for the subject which always knows and therefore is never known in its perception of the world4 ,thus the distinctive characteristic of animal life is knowledge1 with movement following on motives1 which are determined by knowledge1 just as movement following on stimuli is the distinctive characteristic of plant-life4 ,unorganised matter1 however1 has no movement except such as is produced by causes properly so called1 using the term in its narrowest sense4 ,all this ,i have thoroughly discussed in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 #bj1 in the 8,ethics10 first essay1 iii41 and in my work on ,sight and ,colour1 #a1 to which ,i therefore refer4 ,it follows from what has been said1 that all animals1 even the least developed1 have understanding2 for they all know objects1 and this knowledge determines their movements as motive4 ,understanding is the same in all animals and in all men2 it has everywhere the same simple form2 knowledge of causality1 transition from effect to cause1 and from cause to effect1 nothing more2 but the degree of its acuteness1 and the extension of the sphere of its knowledge varies enormously1 with innumerable gradations from the lowest form1 which is only conscious of the causal connection between the immediate object and objects affecting it--that is to say1 perceives a cause as an object in space by passing to it from the affection which the body feels1 to the higher grades of knowledge of the causal connection among objects known indirectly1 which extends to the understanding of the most complicated system of cause and effect in nature4 ,for even this high degree of knowledge is still the work of the understanding1 not of the reason4 ,the abstract concepts of the reason can only serve to take up the objective connections which are immediately known by the understanding1 to make them permanent for thought1 and to relate them to each other2 but reason never gives us immediate knowledge4 ,every force and law of nature1 every example of such forces and laws1 must first be immediately known by the understanding1 must be apprehended through perception before it can pass into abstract consciousness for reason4 ,hooke's discovery of the law of gravitation1 and the reference of so many important phenomena to this one law1 was the work of immediate apprehension by the understanding2 and such also was the proof of ,newton's calculations1 and ,lavoisier's discovery of acids and their important function in nature1 and also ,goethe's discovery of the origin of physical colours4 ,all these discoveries are nothing more than a correct immediate passage from the effect to the cause1 which is at once followed by the recognition of the ideality of the force of nature which expresses itself in all causes of the same kind2 and this complete insight is just an example of that single function of the understanding1 by which an animal perceives as an object in space the cause which affects its body1 and differs from such a perception only in degree4 ,every one of these great discoveries is therefore1 just like perception1 an operation of the understanding1 an immediate intuition1 and as such the work of an instant1 an apperu1 a flash of insight4 ,they are not the result of a process of abstract reasoning1 which only serves to make the immediate knowledge of the understanding permanent for thought by bringing it under abstract concepts1 i4e41 it makes knowledge distinct1 it puts us in a position to impart it and explain it to others4 ,the keenness of the understanding in apprehending the causal relations of objects which are known indirectly1 does not find its only application in the sphere of natural science 7though all the discoveries in that sphere are due to it71 but it also appears in practical life4 ,it is then called good sense or prudence1 as in its other application it is better called acuteness1 penetration1 sagacity4 ,more exactly1 good sense or prudence signifies exclusively understanding at the command of the will4 ,but the limits of these conceptions must not be too sharply defined1 for it is always that one function of the understanding by means of which all animals perceive objects in space1 which1 in its keenest form1 appears now in the phenomena of nature1 correctly inferring the unknown causes from the given effects1 and providing the material from which the reason frames general rules as laws of nature2 now inventing complicated and ingenious machines by adapting known causes to desired effects2 now in the sphere of motives1 seeing through and frustrating intrigues and machinations1 or fitly disposing the motives and the men who are susceptible to them1 setting them in motion1 as machines are moved by levers and wheels1 and directing them at will to the accomplishment of its ends4 ,deficiency of understanding is called stupidity4 ,it is just dulness in applying the law of causality1 incapacity for the immediate apprehension of the concatenations of causes and effects1 motives and actions4 ,a stupid person has no insight into the connection of natural phenomena1 either when they follow their own course1 or when they are intentionally combined1 i4e41 are applied to machinery4 ,such a man readily believes in magic and miracles4 ,a stupid man does not observe that persons1 who apparently act independently of each other1 are really in collusion2 he is therefore easily mystified1 and outwitted2 he does not discern the hidden motives of proffered advice or expressions of opinion1 c4 ,but it is always just one thing that he lacks--keenness1 rapidity1 ease in applying the law of causality1 i4e41 power of understanding4 ,the greatest1 and1 in this reference1 the most instructive example of stupidity ,i ever met with1 was the case of a totally imbecile boy of about eleven years of age1 in an asylum4 ,he had reason1 because he spoke and comprehended1 but in respect of understanding he was inferior to many of the lower animals4 ,whenever ,i visited him he noticed an eye-glass which ,i wore round my neck1 and in which the window of the room and the tops of the trees beyond were reflected3 on every occasion he was greatly surprised and delighted with this1 and was never tired of looking at it with astonishment1 because he did not understand the immediate causation of reflection4 ,while the difference in degree of the acuteness of the understanding1 is very great between man and man1 it is even greater between one species of animal and another4 ,in all species of animals1 even those which are nearest to plants1 there is at least as much understanding as suffices for the inference from the effect on the immediate object1 to the indirectly known object as its cause1 i4e41 sufficient for perception1 for the apprehension of an object4 ,for it is this that constitutes them animals1 as it gives them the power of movement following on motives1 and thereby the power of seeking for food1 or at least of seizing it2 whereas plants have only movement following on stimuli1 whose direct influence they must await1 or else decay1 for they cannot seek after them nor appropriate them4 ,we marvel at the great sagacity of the most developed species of animals1 such as the dog1 the elephant1 the monkey or the fox1 whose cleverness has been so admirably sketched by ,buffon4 ,from these most sagacious animals1 we can pretty accurately determine how far understanding can go without reason1 i4e41 abstract knowledge embodied in concepts4 ,we could not find this out from ourselves1 for in us understanding and reason always reciprocally support each other4 ,we find that the manifestation of understanding in animals is sometimes above our expectation1 and sometimes below it4 ,on the one hand1 we are surprised at the sagacity of the elephant1 who1 after crossing many bridges during his journey in ,europe1 once refused to go upon one1 because he thought it was not strong enough to bear his weight1 though he saw the rest of the party1 consisting of men and horses1 go upon it as usual4 ,on the other hand1 we wonder that the intelligent ,orang-outangs1 who warm themselves at a fire they have found1 do not keep it alight by throwing wood on it2 a proof that this requires a deliberation which is not possible without abstract concepts4 ,it is clear that the knowledge of cause and effect1 as the universal form of understanding1 belongs to all animals a priori1 because to them as to us it is the prior condition of all perception of the outer world4 ,if any one desires additional proof of this1 let him observe1 for example1 how a young dog is afraid to jump down from a table1 however much he may wish to do so1 because he foresees the effect of the weight of his body1 though he has not been taught this by experience4 ,in judging of the understanding of animals1 we must guard against ascribing to it the manifestations of instinct1 a faculty which is quite distinct both from understanding and reason1 but the action of which is often very analogous to the combined action of the two4 ,we cannot1 however1 discuss this here2 it will find its proper place in the second book1 when we consider the harmony or so-called teleology of nature3 and the #bgth chapter of the supplementary volume is expressly devoted to it4 ,deficiency of understanding we call stupidity3 deficiency in the application of reason to practice we shall recognise later as foolishness3 deficiency of judgment as silliness1 and lastly1 partial or entire deficiency of memory as madness4 ,but each of these will be considered in its own place4 ,that which is correctly known by reason is truth1 that is1 an abstract judgment on sufficient grounds 7,essay on the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason1 #bi and following paragraphs72 that which is correctly known by understanding is reality1 that is correct inference from effect on the immediate object to its cause4 ,error is opposed to truth1 as deception of the reason3 illusion is opposed to reality1 as deception of the understanding4 ,the full discussion of all this will be found in the first chapter of my essay on ,light and ,colour4 ,illusion takes place when the same effect may be attributed to two causes1 of which one occurs very frequently1 the other very seldom2 the understanding having no data to decide which of these two causes operates in any particular case1--for their effects are exactly alike1--always assumes the presence of the commoner cause1 and as the activity of the understanding is not reflective and discursive1 but direct and immediate1 this false cause appears before us as a perceived object1 whereas it is merely illusion4 ,i have explained in the essay referred to1 how in this way double sight and double feeling take place if the organs of sense are brought into an unusual position2 and have thus given an incontrovertible proof that perception exists only through and for the understanding4 ,as additional examples of such illusions or deceptions of the understanding1 we may mention the broken appearance of a stick dipped in water2 the reflections in spherical mirrors1 which1 when the surface is convex appear somewhat behind it1 and when the surface is concave appear a long way in front of it4 ,to this class also belongs the apparently greater extension of the moon at the horizon than at the zenith4 ,this appearance is not optical1 for as the micrometre proves1 the eye receives the image of the moon at the zenith1 at an even greater angle of vision than at the horizon4 ,the mistake is due to the understanding1 which assumes that the cause of the feebler light of the moon and of all stars at the horizon is that they are further off1 thus treating them as earthly objects1 according to the laws of atmospheric perspective1 and therefore it takes the moon to be much larger at the horizon than at the zenith1 and also regards the vault of heaven as more extended or flattened out at the horizon4 ,the same false application of the laws of atmospheric perspective leads us to suppose that very high mountains1 whose summits alone are visible in pure transparent air1 are much nearer than they really are1 and therefore not so high as they are2 for example1 ,mont ,blanc seen from ,salenche4 ,all such illusions are immediately present to us as perceptions1 and cannot be dispelled by any arguments of the reason4 ,reason can only prevent error1 that is1 a judgment on insufficient grounds1 by opposing to it a truth2 as for example1 the abstract knowledge that the cause of the weaker light of the moon and the stars at the horizon is not greater distance1 but the denser atmosphere2 but in all the cases we have referred to1 the illusion remains in spite of every abstract explanation4 ,for the understanding is in itself1 even in the case of man1 irrational1 and is completely and sharply distinguished from the reason1 which is a faculty of knowledge that belongs to man alone4 ,the reason can only know2 perception remains free from its influence and belongs to the understanding alone4 #g4 ,with reference to our exposition up to this point1 it must be observed that we did not start either from the object or the subject1 but from the idea1 which contains and presupposes them both2 for the antithesis of object and subject is its primary1 universal and essential form4 ,we have therefore first considered this form as such2 then 7though in this respect reference has for the most part been made to the introductory essay7 the subordinate forms of time1 space and causality4 ,the latter belong exclusively to the object1 and yet1 as they are essential to the object as such1 and as the object again is essential to the subject as such1 they may be discovered from the subject1 i4e41 they may be known a priori1 and so far they are to be regarded as the common limits of both4 ,but all these forms may be referred to one general expression1 the principle of sufficient reason1 as we have explained in the introductory essay4 ,this procedure distinguishes our philosophical method from that of all former systems4 ,for they all start either from the object or from the subject1 and therefore seek to explain the one from the other1 and this according to the principle of sufficient reason4 ,we1 on the contrary1 deny the validity of this principle with reference to the relation of subject and object1 and confine it to the object4 ,it may be thought that the philosophy of identity1 which has appeared and become generally known in our own day1 does not come under either of the alternatives we have named1 for it does not start either from the subject or from the object1 but from the absolute1 known through 8intellectual intuition10 which is neither object nor subject1 but the identity of the two4 ,i will not venture to speak of this revered identity1 and this absolute1 for ,i find myself entirely devoid of all 8intellectual intuition40 ,but as ,i take my stand merely on those manifestoes of the 8intellectual intuiter0 which are open to all1 even to profane persons like myself1 ,i must yet observe that this philosophy is not to be excepted from the alternative errors mentioned above4 ,for it does not escape these two opposite errors in spite of its identity of subject and object1 which is not thinkable1 but only 8intellectually intuitable10 or to be experienced by a losing of oneself in it4 ,on the contrary1 it combines them both in itself2 for it is divided into two parts1 firstly1 transcendental idealism1 which is just ,fichte's doctrine of the ego1 and therefore teaches that the object is produced by the subject1 or evolved out of it in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason2 secondly1 the philosophy of nature1 which teaches that the subject is produced little by little from the object1 by means of a method called construction1 about which ,i understand very little1 yet enough to know that it is a process according to various forms of the principle of sufficient reason4 ,the deep wisdom itself which that construction contains1 ,i renounce2 for as ,i entirely lack 8intellectual intuition10 all those expositions which presuppose it must for me remain as a book sealed with seven seals4 ,this is so truly the case that1 strange to say1 ,i have always been unable to find anything at all in this doctrine of profound wisdom but atrocious and wearisome bombast4 ,the systems starting from the object had always the whole world of perception and its constitution as their problem2 yet the object which they take as their starting-point is not always this whole world of perception1 nor its fundamental element1 matter4 ,on the contrary1 a division of these systems may be made1 based on the four classes of possible objects set forth in the introductory essay4 ,thus ,thales and the ,ionic school1 ,democritus1 ,epicurus1 ,giordano ,bruno1 and the ,french materialists1 may be said to have started from the first class of objects1 the real world3 ,spinoza 7on account of his conception of substance1 which is purely abstract1 and exists only in his definition7 and1 earlier1 the ,eleatics1 from the second class1 the abstract conception3 the ,pythagoreans and ,chinese philosophy in ,y-,king1 from the third class1 time1 and consequently number3 and1 lastly1 the schoolmen1 who teach a creation out of nothing by the act of will of an extra-mundane personal being1 started from the fourth class of objects1 the act of will directed by knowledge4 ,of all systems of philosophy which start from the object1 the most consistent1 and that which may be carried furthest1 is simple materialism4 ,it regards matter1 and with it time and space1 as existing absolutely1 and ignores the relation to the subject in which alone all this really exists4 ,it then lays hold of the law of causality as a guiding principle or clue1 regarding it as a self-existent order 7or arrangement7 of things1 veritas aeterna1 and so fails to take account of the understanding1 in which and for which alone causality is4 ,it seeks the primary and most simple state of matter1 and then tries to develop all the others from it2 ascending from mere mechanism1 to chemism1 to polarity1 to the vegetable and to the animal kingdom4 ,and if we suppose this to have been done1 the last link in the chain would be animal sensibility--that is knowledge--which would consequently now appear as a mere modification or state of matter produced by causality4 ,now if we had followed materialism thus far with clear ideas1 when we reached its highest point we would suddenly be seized with a fit of the inextinguishable laughter of the ,olympians4 ,as if waking from a dream1 we would all at once become aware that its final result--knowledge1 which it reached so laboriously1 was presupposed as the indispensable condition of its very starting-point1 mere matter2 and when we imagined that we thought matter1 we really thought only the subject that perceives matter2 the eye that sees it1 the hand that feels it1 the understanding that knows it4 ,thus the tremendous petitio principii reveals itself unexpectedly2 for suddenly the last link is seen to be the starting-point1 the chain a circle1 and the materialist is like ,baron ,mnchausen who1 when swimming in water on horseback1 drew the horse into the air with his legs1 and himself also by his cue4 ,the fundamental absurdity of materialism is that it starts from the objective1 and takes as the ultimate ground of explanation something objective1 whether it be matter in the abstract1 simply as it is thought1 or after it has taken form1 is empirically given--that is to say1 is substance1 the chemical element with its primary relations4 ,some such thing it takes1 as existing absolutely and in itself1 in order that it may evolve organic nature and finally the knowing subject from it1 and explain them adequately by means of it2 whereas in truth all that is objective is already determined as such in manifold ways by the knowing subject through its forms of knowing1 and presupposes them2 and consequently it entirely disappears if we think the subject away4 ,thus materialism is the attempt to explain what is immediately given us by what is given us indirectly4 ,all that is objective1 extended1 active--that is to say1 all that is material--is regarded by materialism as affording so solid a basis for its explanation1 that a reduction of everything to this can leave nothing to be desired 7especially if in ultimate analysis this reduction should resolve itself into action and reaction74 ,but we have shown that all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined1 and is therefore merely a relatively present object1 for it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain1 and has thus come under the forms of space1 time and causality1 by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and ever active in time4 ,from such an indirectly given object1 materialism seeks to explain what is immediately given1 the idea 7in which alone the object that materialism starts with exists71 and finally even the will from which all those fundamental forces1 that manifest themselves1 under the guidance of causes1 and therefore according to law1 are in truth to be explained4 ,to the assertion that thought is a modification of matter we may always1 with equal right1 oppose the contrary assertion that all matter is merely the modification of the knowing subject1 as its idea4 ,yet the aim and ideal of all natural science is at bottom a consistent materialism4 ,the recognition here of the obvious impossibility of such a system establishes another truth which will appear in the course of our exposition1 the truth that all science properly so called1 by which ,i understand systematic knowledge under the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason1 can never reach its final goal1 nor give a complete and adequate explanation3 for it is not concerned with the inmost nature of the world1 it cannot get beyond the idea2 indeed1 it really teaches nothing more than the relation of one idea to another4 ,every science must start from two principal data4 ,one of these is always the principle of sufficient reason in some form or another1 as organon2 the other is its special object as problem4 ,thus1 for example1 geometry has space as problem1 and the ground of existence in space as organon4 ,arithmetic has time as problem1 and the ground of existence in time as organon4 ,logic has the combination of concepts as such as problem1 and the ground of knowledge as organon4 ,history has the past acts of men treated as a whole as problem1 and the law of human motives as organon4 ,natural science has matter as problem1 and the law of causality as organon4 ,its end and aim is therefore1 by the guidance of causality1 to refer all possible states of matter to other states1 and ultimately to one single state2 and again to deduce these states from each other1 and ultimately from one single state4 ,thus two states of matter stand over against each other in natural science as extremes3 that state in which matter is furthest from being the immediate object of the subject1 and that state in which it is most completely such an immediate object1 i4e41 the most dead and crude matter1 the primary element1 as the one extreme1 and the human organism as the other4 ,natural science as chemistry seeks for the first1 as physiology for the second4 ,but as yet neither extreme has been reached1 and it is only in the intermediate ground that something has been won4 ,the prospect is indeed somewhat hopeless4 ,the chemists1 under the presupposition that the qualitative division of matter is not1 like quantitative division1 an endless process1 are always trying to decrease the number of the elements1 of which there are still about sixty2 and if they were to succeed in reducing them to two1 they would still try to find the common root of these4 ,for1 on the one hand1 the law of homogeneity leads to the assumption of a primary chemical state of matter1 which alone belongs to matter as such1 and precedes all others which are not essentially matter as such1 but merely contingent forms and qualities4 ,on the other hand1 we cannot understand how this one state could ever experience a chemical change1 if there did not exist a second state to affect it4 ,thus the same difficulty appears in chemistry which ,epicurus met with in mechanics4 ,for he had to show how the first atom departed from the original direction of its motion4 ,indeed this contradiction1 which develops entirely of itself and can neither be escaped nor solved1 might quite properly be set up as a chemical antinomy4 ,thus an antinomy appears in the one extreme of natural science1 and a corresponding one will appear in the other4 ,there is just as little hope of reaching this opposite extreme of natural science1 for we see ever more clearly that what is chemical can never be referred to what is mechanical1 nor what is organic to what is chemical or electrical4 ,those who in our own day are entering anew on this old1 misleading path1 will soon slink back silent and ashamed1 as all their predecessors have done before them4 ,we shall consider this more fully in the second book4 ,natural science encounters the difficulties which we have cursorily mentioned1 in its own province4 ,regarded as philosophy1 it would further be materialism2 but this1 as we have seen1 even at its birth1 has death in its heart1 because it ignores the subject and the forms of knowledge1 which are presupposed1 just as much in the case of the crudest matter1 from which it desires to start1 as in that of the organism1 at which it desires to arrive4 ,for1 8no object without a subject10 is the principle which renders all materialism for ever impossible4 ,suns and planets without an eye that sees them1 and an understanding that knows them1 may indeed be spoken of in words1 but for the idea1 these words are absolutely meaningless4 ,on the other hand1 the law of causality and the treatment and investigation of nature which is based upon it1 lead us necessarily to the conclusion that1 in time1 each more highly organised state of matter has succeeded a cruder state3 so that the lower animals existed before men1 fishes before land animals1 plants before fishes1 and the unorganised before all that is organised2 that1 consequently1 the original mass had to pass through a long series of changes before the first eye could be opened4 ,and yet1 the existence of this whole world remains ever dependent upon the first eye that opened1 even if it were that of an insect4 ,for such an eye is a necessary condition of the possibility of knowledge1 and the whole world exists only in and for knowledge1 and without it is not even thinkable4 ,the world is entirely idea1 and as such demands the knowing subject as the supporter of its existence4 ,this long course of time itself1 filled with innumerable changes1 through which matter rose from form to form till at last the first percipient creature appeared1--this whole time itself is only thinkable in the identity of a consciousness whose succession of ideas1 whose form of knowing it is1 and apart from which1 it loses all meaning and is nothing at all4 ,thus we see1 on the one hand1 the existence of the whole world necessarily dependent upon the first conscious being1 however undeveloped it may be2 on the other hand1 this conscious being just as necessarily entirely dependent upon a long chain of causes and effects which have preceded it1 and in which it itself appears as a small link4 ,these two contradictory points of view1 to each of which we are led with the same necessity1 we might again call an antinomy in our faculty of knowledge1 and set it up as the counterpart of that which we found in the first extreme of natural science4 ,the fourfold antinomy of ,kant will be shown1 in the criticism of his philosophy appended to this volume1 to be a groundless delusion4 ,but the necessary contradiction which at last presents itself to us here1 finds its solution in the fact that1 to use ,kant's phraseology1 time1 space1 and causality do not belong to the thing-in-itself1 but only to its phenomena1 of which they are the form2 which in my language means this3 ,the objective world1 the world as idea1 is not the only side of the world1 but merely its outward side2 and it has an entirely different side--the side of its inmost nature--its kernel--the thing-in-itself4 ,this we shall consider in the second book1 calling it after the most immediate of its objective manifestations--will4 ,but the world as idea1 with which alone we are here concerned1 only appears with the opening of the first eye4 ,without this medium of knowledge it cannot be1 and therefore it was not before it4 ,but without that eye1 that is to say1 outside of knowledge1 there was also no before1 no time4 ,thus time has no beginning1 but all beginning is in time4 ,since1 however1 it is the most universal form of the knowable1 in which all phenomena are united together through causality1 time1 with its infinity of past and future1 is present in the beginning of knowledge4 ,the phenomenon which fills the first present must at once be known as causally bound up with and dependent upon a sequence of phenomena which stretches infinitely into the past1 and this past itself is just as truly conditioned by this first present1 as conversely the present is by the past4 ,accordingly the past out of which the first present arises1 is1 like it1 dependent upon the knowing subject1 without which it is nothing4 ,it necessarily happens1 however1 that this first present does not manifest itself as the first1 that is1 as having no past for its parent1 but as being the beginning of time4 ,it manifests itself rather as the consequence of the past1 according to the principle of existence in time4 ,in the same way1 the phenomena which fill this first present appear as the effects of earlier phenomena which filled the past1 in accordance with the law of causality4 ,those who like mythological interpretations may take the birth of ,kronos 771 the youngest of the ,titans1 as a symbol of the moment here referred to at which time appears1 though1 indeed it has no beginning2 for with him1 since he ate his father1 the crude productions of heaven and earth cease1 and the races of gods and men appear upon the scene4 ,this explanation at which we have arrived by following the most consistent of the philosophical systems which start from the object1 materialism1 has brought out clearly the inseparable and reciprocal dependence of subject and object1 and at the same time the inevitable antithesis between them4 ,and this knowledge leads us to seek for the inner nature of the world1 the thing-in-itself1 not in either of the two elements of the idea1 but in something quite distinct from it1 and which is not encumbered with such a fundamental and insoluble antithesis4 ,opposed to the system we have explained1 which starts from the object in order to derive the subject from it1 is the system which starts from the subject and tries to derive the object from it4 ,the first of these has been of frequent and common occurrence throughout the history of philosophy1 but of the second we find only one example1 and that a very recent one2 the 8philosophy of appearance0 of ,j4 ,g4 ,fichte4 ,in this respect1 therefore1 it must be considered2 little real worth or inner meaning as the doctrine itself had4 ,it was indeed for the most part merely a delusion1 but it was delivered with an air of the deepest earnestness1 with sustained loftiness of tone and zealous ardour1 and was defended with eloquent polemic against weak opponents1 so that it was able to present a brilliant exterior and seemed to be something4 ,but the genuine earnestness which keeps truth always steadfastly before it as its goal1 and is unaffected by any external influences1 was entirely wanting to ,fichte1 as it is to all philosophers who1 like him1 concern themselves with questions of the day4 ,in his case1 indeed1 it could not have been otherwise4 ,a man becomes a philosopher by reason of a certain perplexity1 from which he seeks to free himself4 ,this is ,plato's 1 which he calls a 4 ,but what distinguishes the false philosopher from the true is this3 the perplexity of the latter arises from the contemplation of the world itself1 while that of the former results from some book1 some system of philosophy which is before him4 ,now ,fichte belongs to the class of the false philosophers4 ,he was made a philosopher by ,kant's doctrine of the thing-in-itself1 and if it had not been for this he would probably have pursued entirely different ends1 with far better results1 for he certainly possessed remarkable rhetorical talent4 ,if he had only penetrated somewhat deeply into the meaning of the book that made him a philosopher1 8,the ,critique of ,pure ,reason10 he would have understood that its principal teaching about mind is this4 ,the principle of sufficient reason is not1 as all scholastic philosophy maintains1 a veritas aeterna--that is to say1 it does not possess an unconditioned validity before1 outside of1 and above the world4 ,it is relative and conditioned1 and valid only in the sphere of phenomena1 and thus it may appear as the necessary nexus of space and time1 or as the law of causality1 or as the law of the ground of knowledge4 ,the inner nature of the world1 the thing-in-itself can never be found by the guidance of this principle1 for all that it leads to will be found to be dependent and relative and merely phenomenal1 not the thing-in-itself4 ,further1 it does not concern the subject1 but is only the form of objects1 which are therefore not things-in-themselves4 ,the subject must exist along with the object1 and the object along with the subject1 so that it is impossible that subject and object can stand to each other in a relation of reason and consequent4 ,but ,fichte did not take up the smallest fragment of all this4 ,all that interested him about the matter was that the system started from the subject4 ,now ,kant had chosen this procedure in order to show the fallacy of the prevalent systems1 which started from the object1 and through which the object had come1 to be regarded as a thing-in-itself4 ,fichte1 however1 took this departure from the subject for the really important matter1 and like all imitators1 he imagined that in going further than ,kant he was surpassing him4 ,thus he repeated the fallacy with regard to the subject1 which all the previous dogmatism had perpetrated with regard to the object1 and which had been the occasion of ,kant's 8,critique04 ,fichte then made no material change1 and the fundamental fallacy1 the assumption of a relation of reason and consequent between object and subject1 remained after him as it was before him4 ,the principle of sufficient reason possessed as before an unconditioned validity1 and the only difference was that the thing-in-itself was now placed in the subject instead of1 as formerly1 in the object4 ,the entire relativity of both subject and object1 which proves that the thing-in-itself1 or the inner nature of the world1 is not to be sought in them at all1 but outside of them1 and outside everything else that exists merely relatively1 still remained unknown4 ,just as if ,kant had never existed1 the principle of sufficient reason is to ,fichte precisely what it was to all the schoolmen1 a veritas aeterna4 ,as an eternal fate reigned over the gods of old1 so these aetern veritates1 these metaphysical1 mathematical and metalogical truths1 and in the case of some1 the validity of the moral law also1 reigned over the ,god of the schoolmen4 ,these veritates alone were independent of everything1 and through their necessity both ,god and the world existed4 ,according to the principle of sufficient reason1 as such a veritas aeterna1 the ego is for ,fichte the ground of the world1 or of the non-ego1 the object1 which is just its consequent1 its creation4 ,he has therefore taken good care to avoid examining further or limiting the principle of sufficient reason4 ,if1 however1 it is thought ,i should specify the form of the principle of sufficient reason under the guidance of which ,fichte derives the non-ego from the ego1 as a spider spins its web out of itself1 ,i find that it is the principle of sufficient reason of existence in space3 for it is only as referred to this that some kind of meaning and sense can be attached to the laboured deductions of the way in which the ego produces and fabricates the non-ego from itself1 which form the content of the most senseless1 and consequently the most wearisome book that was ever written4 ,this philosophy of ,fichte1 otherwise not worth mentioning1 is interesting to us only as the tardy expression of the converse of the old materialism4 ,for materialism was the most consistent system starting from the object1 as this is the most consistent system starting from the subject4 ,materialism overlooked the fact that1 with the simplest object1 it assumed the subject also2 and ,fichte overlooked the fact that with the subject 7whatever he may call it7 he assumed the object also1 for no subject is thinkable without an object4 ,besides this he forgot that all a priori deduction1 indeed all demonstration in general1 must rest upon some necessity1 and that all necessity is based on the principle of sufficient reason1 because to be necessary1 and to follow from given grounds are convertible conceptions47#aj7 ,but the principle of sufficient reason is just the universal form of the object as such4 ,thus it is in the object1 but is not valid before and outside of it2 it first produces the object and makes it appear in conformity with its regulative principle4 ,we see then that the system which starts from the subject contains the same fallacy as the system1 explained above1 which starts from the object2 it begins by assuming what it proposes to deduce1 the necessary correlative of its starting-point4 ,the method of our own system is toto genere distinct from these two opposite misconceptions1 for we start neither from the object nor from the subject1 but from the idea1 as the first fact of consciousness4 ,its first essential1 fundamental form is the antithesis of subject and object4 ,the form of the object again is the principle of sufficient reason in its various forms4 ,each of these reigns so absolutely in its own class of ideas that1 as we have seen1 when the special form of the principle of sufficient reason which governs any class of ideas is known1 the nature of the whole class is known also3 for the whole class1 as idea1 is no more than this form of the principle of sufficient reason itself2 so that time itself is nothing but the principle of existence in it1 i4e41 succession2 space is nothing but the principle of existence in it1 i4e41 position2 matter is nothing but causality2 the concept 7as will appear immediately7 is nothing but relation to a ground of knowledge4 ,this thorough and consistent relativity of the world as idea1 both according to its universal form 7subject and object71 and according to the form which is subordinate to this 7the principle of sufficient reason7 warns us1 as we said before1 to seek the inner nature of the world in an aspect of it which is quite different and quite distinct from the idea2 and in the next book we shall find this in a fact which is just as immediate to every living being as the idea4 ,but we must first consider that class of ideas which belongs to man alone4 ,the matter of these is the concept1 and the subjective correlative is reason1 just as the subjective correlative of the ideas we have already considered was understanding and sensibility1 which are also to be attributed to all the lower animals47#aa7 #h4 ,as from the direct light of the sun to the borrowed light of the moon1 we pass from the immediate idea of perception1 which stands by itself and is its own warrant1 to reflection1 to the abstract1 discursive concepts of the reason1 which obtain their whole content from knowledge of perception1 and in relation to it4 ,as long as we continue simply to perceive1 all is clear1 firm1 and certain4 ,there are neither questions nor doubts nor errors2 we desire to go no further1 can go no further2 we find rest in perceiving1 and satisfaction in the present4 ,perception suffices for itself1 and therefore what springs purely from it1 and remains true to it1 for example1 a genuine work of art1 can never be false1 nor can it be discredited through the lapse of time1 for it does not present an opinion but the thing itself4 ,but with abstract knowledge1 with reason1 doubt and error appear in the theoretical1 care and sorrow in the practical4 ,in the idea of perception1 illusion may at moments take the place of the real2 but in the sphere of abstract thought1 error may reign for a thousand years1 impose its yoke upon whole nations1 extend to the noblest impulses of humanity1 and1 by the help of its slaves and its dupes1 may chain and fetter those whom it cannot deceive4 ,it is the enemy against which the wisest men of all times have waged unequal war1 and only what they have won from it has become the possession of mankind4 ,therefore it is well to draw attention to it at once1 as we already tread the ground to which its province belongs4 ,it has often been said that we ought to follow truth even although no utility can be seen in it1 because it may have indirect utility which may appear when it is least expected2 and ,i would add to this1 that we ought to be just as anxious to discover and to root out all error even when no harm is anticipated from it1 because its mischief may be very indirect1 and may suddenly appear when we do not expect it1 for all error has poison at its heart4 ,if it is mind1 if it is knowledge1 that makes man the lord of creation1 there can be no such thing as harmless error1 still less venerable and holy error4 ,and for the consolation of those who in any way and at any time may have devoted strength and life to the noble and hard battle against error1 ,i cannot refrain from adding that1 so long as truth is absent1 error will have free play1 as owls and bats in the night2 but sooner would we expect to see the owls and the bats drive back the sun in the eastern heavens1 than that any truth which has once been known and distinctly and fully expressed1 can ever again be so utterly vanquished and overcome that the old error shall once more reign undisturbed over its wide kingdom4 ,this is the power of truth2 its conquest is slow and laborious1 but if once the victory be gained it can never be wrested back again4 ,besides the ideas we have as yet considered1 which1 according to their construction1 could be referred to time1 space1 and matter1 if we consider them with reference to the object1 or to pure sensibility and understanding 7i4e41 knowledge of causality71 if we consider them with reference to the subject1 another faculty of knowledge has appeared in man alone of all earthly creatures1 an entirely new consciousness1 which1 with very appropriate and significant exactness1 is called reflection4 ,for it is in fact derived from the knowledge of perception1 and is a reflected appearance of it4 ,but it has assumed a nature fundamentally different4 ,the forms of perception do not affect it1 and even the principle of sufficient reason which reigns over all objects has an entirely different aspect with regard to it4 ,it is just this new1 more highly endowed1 consciousness1 this abstract reflex of all that belongs to perception in that conception of the reason which has nothing to do with perception1 that gives to man that thoughtfulness which distinguishes his consciousness so entirely from that of the lower animals1 and through which his whole behaviour upon earth is so different from that of his irrational fellow-creatures4 ,he far surpasses them in power and also in suffering4 ,they live in the present alone1 he lives also in the future and the past4 ,they satisfy the needs of the moment1 he provides by the most ingenious preparations for the future1 yea for days that he shall never see4 ,they are entirely dependent on the impression of the moment1 on the effect of the perceptible motive2 he is determined by abstract conceptions independent of the present4 ,therefore he follows predetermined plans1 he acts from maxims1 without reference to his surroundings or the accidental impression of the moment4 ,thus1 for example1 he can make with composure deliberate preparations for his own death1 he can dissemble past finding out1 and can carry his secret with him to the grave2 lastly1 he has an actual choice between several motives2 for only in the abstract can such motives1 present together in consciousness1 afford the knowledge with regard to themselves1 that the one excludes the other1 and can thus measure themselves against each other with reference to their power over the will4 ,the motive that overcomes1 in that it decides the question at issue1 is the deliberate determinant of the will1 and is a sure indication of its character4 ,the brute1 on the other hand1 is determined by the present impression2 only the fear of present compulsion can constrain its desires1 until at last this fear has become custom1 and as such continues to determine it2 this is called training4 ,the brute feels and perceives2 man1 in addition to this1 thinks and knows3 both will4 ,the brute expresses its feelings and dispositions by gestures and sounds2 man communicates his thought to others1 or1 if he wishes1 he conceals it1 by means of speech4 ,speech is the first production1 and also the necessary organ of his reason4 ,therefore in ,greek and ,italian1 speech and reason are expressed by the same word2 1 il discorso4 ,vernunft is derived from vernehmen1 which is not a synonym for the verb to hear1 but signifies the consciousness of the meaning of thoughts communicated in words4 ,it is by the help of language alone that reason accomplishes its most important achievements1--the united action of several individuals1 the planned co-operation of many thousands1 civilisation1 the state2 also science1 the storing up of experience1 the uniting of common properties in one concept1 the communication of truth1 the spread of error1 thoughts and poems1 dogmas and superstitions4 ,the brute first knows death when it dies1 but man draws consciously nearer to it every hour that he lives2 and this makes life at times a questionable good even to him who has not recognised this character of constant annihilation in the whole of life4 ,principally on this account man has philosophies and religions1 though it is uncertain whether the qualities we admire most in his conduct1 voluntary rectitude and nobility of feeling1 were ever the fruit of either of them4 ,as results which certainly belong only to them1 and as productions of reason in this sphere1 we may refer to the marvellous and monstrous opinions of philosophers of various schools1 and the extraordinary and sometimes cruel customs of the priests of different religions4 ,it is the universal opinion of all times and of all nations that these manifold and far-reaching achievements spring from a common principle1 from that peculiar intellectual power which belongs distinctively to man and which has been called reason1 1 1 1 ratio4 ,besides this1 no one finds any difficulty in recognising the manifestations of this faculty1 and in saying what is rational and what is irrational1 where reason appears as distinguished from the other faculties and qualities of man1 or lastly1 in pointing out what1 on account of the want of reason1 we must never expect even from the most sensible brute4 ,the philosophers of all ages may be said to be on the whole at one about this general knowledge of reason1 and they have also given prominence to several very important manifestations of it2 such as1 the control of the emotions and passions1 the capacity for drawing conclusions and formulating general principles1 even such as are true prior to all experience1 and so forth4 ,still all their explanations of the peculiar nature of reason are wavering1 not clearly defined1 discursive1 without unity and concentration2 now laying stress on one manifestation1 now on another1 and therefore often at variance with each other4 ,besides this1 many start from the opposition between reason and revelation1 a distinction which is unknown to philosophy1 and which only increases confusion4 ,it is very remarkable that up till now no philosopher has referred these manifold expressions of reason to one simple function which would be recognised in them all1 from which they would all be explained1 and which would therefore constitute the real inner nature of reason4 ,it is true that the excellent ,locke in the 8,essay on the ,human ,understanding0 7,book ,,ii41 ch4 xi41 #aj and #aa71 very rightly refers to general concepts as the characteristic which distinguishes man from the brutes1 and ,leibnitz quotes this with full approval in the 8,nouveaux ,essais sur l',entendement ,humaine0 7,book ,,ii41 ch4 xi41 #aj and #aa47 ,but when ,locke 7in ,book ,,iv41 ch4 xvii41 #b and #c7 comes to the special explanation of reason he entirely loses sight of this simple1 primary characteristic1 and he also falls into a wavering1 undetermined1 incomplete account of mangled and derivative manifestations of it4 ,leibnitz also1 in the corresponding part of his work1 behaves in a similar manner1 only with more confusion and indistinctness4 ,in the ,appendix1 ,i have fully considered how ,kant confused and falsified the conception of the nature of reason4 ,but whoever will take the trouble to go through in this reference the mass of philosophical writing which has appeared since ,kant1 will find out1 that just as the faults of princes must be expiated by whole nations1 the errors of great minds extend their influence over whole generations1 and even over centuries2 they grow and propagate themselves1 and finally degenerate into monstrosities4 ,all this arises from the fact that1 as ,berkeley says1 8,few men think2 yet all will have opinions40 ,the understanding has only one function--immediate knowledge of the relation of cause and effect4 ,yet the perception of the real world1 and all common sense1 sagacity1 and inventiveness1 however multifarious their applications may be1 are quite clearly seen to be nothing more than manifestations of that one function4 ,so also the reason has one function2 and from it all the manifestations of reason we have mentioned1 which distinguish the life of man from that of the brutes1 may easily be explained4 ,the application or the non-application of this function is all that is meant by what men have everywhere and always called rational and irrational47#ab7 #i4 ,concepts form a distinct class of ideas1 existing only in the mind of man1 and entirely different from the ideas of perception which we have considered up till now4 ,we can therefore never attain to a sensuous and1 properly speaking1 evident knowledge of their nature1 but only to a knowledge which is abstract and discursive4 ,it would1 therefore1 be absurd to demand that they should be verified in experience1 if by experience is meant the real external world1 which consists of ideas of perception1 or that they should be brought before the eyes or the imagination like objects of perception4 ,they can only be thought1 not perceived1 and only the effects which men accomplish through them are properly objects of experience4 ,such effects are language1 preconceived and planned action and science1 and all that results from these4 ,speech1 as an object of outer experience1 is obviously nothing more than a very complete telegraph1 which communicates arbitrary signs with the greatest rapidity and the finest distinctions of difference4 ,but what do these signs mean8 ,how are they interpreted8 ,when some one speaks1 do we at once translate his words into pictures of the fancy1 which instantaneously flash upon us1 arrange and link themselves together1 and assume form and colour according to the words that are poured forth1 and their grammatical inflections8 ,what a tumult there would be in our brains while we listened to a speech1 or to the reading of a book8 ,but what actually happens is not this at all4 ,the meaning of a speech is1 as a rule1 immediately grasped1 accurately and distinctly taken in1 without the imagination being brought into play4 ,it is reason which speaks to reason1 keeping within its own province4 ,it communicates and receives abstract conceptions1 ideas that cannot be presented in perceptions1 which are framed once for all1 and are relatively few in number1 but which yet encompass1 contain1 and represent all the innumerable objects of the actual world4 ,this itself is sufficient to prove that the lower animals can never learn to speak or comprehend1 although they have the organs of speech and ideas of perception in common with us4 ,but because words represent this perfectly distinct class of ideas1 whose subjective correlative is reason1 they are without sense and meaning for the brutes4 ,thus language1 like every other manifestation which we ascribe to reason1 and like everything which distinguishes man from the brutes1 is to be explained from this as its one simple source--conceptions1 abstract ideas which cannot be presented in perception1 but are general1 and have no individual existence in space and time4 ,only in single cases do we pass from the conception to the perception1 do we construct images as representatives of concepts in perception1 to which1 however1 they are never adequate4 ,these cases are fully discussed in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 #bh1 and therefore ,i shall not repeat my explanation here4 ,it may be compared1 however1 with what is said by ,hume in the twelfth of his 8,philosophical ,essays10 p4 #bdd1 and by ,herder in the 8,metacritik10 pt4 i4 p4 #bgd 7an otherwise worthless book74 ,the ,platonic idea1 the possibility of which depends upon the union of imagination and reason1 is the principal subject of the third book of this work4 ,although concepts are fundamentally different from ideas of perception1 they stand in a necessary relation to them1 without which they would be nothing4 ,this relation therefore constitutes the whole nature and existence of concepts4 ,reflection is the necessary copy or repetition of the originally presented world of perception1 but it is a special kind of copy in an entirely different material4 ,thus concepts may quite properly be called ideas of ideas4 ,the principle of sufficient reason has here also a special form4 ,now we have seen that the form under which the principle of sufficient reason appears in a class of ideas always constitutes and exhausts the whole nature of the class1 so far as it consists of ideas1 so that time is throughout succession1 and nothing more2 space is throughout position1 and nothing more2 matter is throughout causation1 and nothing more4 ,in the same way the whole nature of concepts1 or the class of abstract ideas1 consists simply in the relation which the principle of sufficient reason expresses in them2 and as this is the relation to the ground of knowledge1 the whole nature of the abstract idea is simply and solely its relation to another idea1 which is its ground of knowledge4 ,this1 indeed1 may1 in the first instance1 be a concept1 an abstract idea1 and this again may have only a similar abstract ground of knowledge2 but the chain of grounds of knowledge does not extend ad infinitum2 it must end at last in a concept which has its ground in knowledge of perception2 for the whole world of reflection rests on the world of perception as its ground of knowledge4 ,hence the class of abstract ideas is in this respect distinguished from other classes2 in the latter the principle of sufficient reason always demands merely a relation to another idea of the same class1 but in the case of abstract ideas1 it at last demands a relation to an idea of another class4 ,those concepts which1 as has just been pointed out1 are not immediately related to the world of perception1 but only through the medium of one1 or it may be several other concepts1 have been called by preference abstracta1 and those which have their ground immediately in the world of perception have been called concreta4 ,but this last name is only loosely applicable to the concepts denoted by it1 for they are always merely abstracta1 and not ideas of perception4 ,these names1 which have originated in a very dim consciousness of the distinctions they imply1 may yet1 with this explanation1 be retained4 ,as examples of the first kind of concepts1 i4e41 abstracta in the fullest sense1 we may take 8relation10 8virtue10 8investigation10 8beginning10 and so on4 ,as examples of the second kind1 loosely called concreta1 we may take such concepts as 8man10 8stone10 8horse10 c4 ,if it were not a somewhat too pictorial and therefore absurd simile1 we might very appropriately call the latter the ground floor1 and the former the upper stories of the building of reflection47#ac7 ,it is not1 as is commonly supposed1 an essential characteristic of a concept that it should contain much under it1 that is to say1 that many ideas of perception1 or it may be other abstract ideas1 should stand to it in the relation of its ground of knowledge1 i4e41 be thought through it4 ,this is merely a derived and secondary characteristic1 and1 as a matter of fact1 does not always exist1 though it must always exist potentially4 ,this characteristic arises from the fact that a concept is an idea of an idea1 i4e41 its whole nature consists in its relation to another idea2 but as it is not this idea itself1 which is generally an idea of perception and therefore belongs to quite a different class1 the latter may have temporal1 spacial1 and other determinations1 and in general many relations which are not thought along with it in the concept4 ,thus we see that several ideas which are different in unessential particulars may be thought by means of one concept1 i4e41 may be brought under it4 ,yet this power of embracing several things is not an essential but merely an accidental characteristic of the concept4 ,there may be concepts through which only one real object is thought1 but which are nevertheless abstract and general1 by no means capable of presentation individually and as perceptions4 ,such1 for example1 is the conception which any one may have of a particular town which he only knows from geography2 although only this one town is thought under it1 it might yet be applied to several towns differing in certain respects4 ,we see then that a concept is not general because of being abstracted from several objects2 but conversely1 because generality1 that is to say1 non-determination of the particular1 belongs to the concept as an abstract idea of the reason1 different things can be thought by means of the same one4 ,it follows from what has been said that every concept1 just because it is abstract and incapable of presentation in perception1 and is therefore not a completely determined idea1 has what is called extension or sphere1 even in the case in which only one real object exists that corresponds to it4 ,now we always find that the sphere of one concept has something in common with the sphere of other concepts4 ,that is to say1 part of what is thought under one concept is the same as what is thought under other concepts2 and conversely1 part of what is thought under these concepts is the same as what is thought under the first2 although1 if they are really different concepts1 each of them1 or at least one of them1 contains something which the other does not contain2 this is the relation in which every subject stands to its predicate4 ,the recognition of this relation is called judgment4 ,the representation of these spheres by means of figures in space1 is an exceedingly happy idea4 ,it first occurred to ,gottfried ,plouquet1 who used squares for the purpose4 ,lambert1 although later than him1 used only lines1 which he placed under each other4 ,euler carried out the idea completely with circles4 ,upon what this complete analogy between the relations of concepts1 and those of figures in space1 ultimately rests1 ,i am unable to say4 ,it is1 however1 a very fortunate circumstance for logic that all the relations of concepts1 according to their possibility1 i4e41 a priori1 may be made plain in perception by the use of such figures1 in the following way3-- 7#a47 ,the spheres of two concepts coincide3 for example the concept of necessity and the concept of following from given grounds1 in the same way the concepts of ,ruminantia and ,bisulca 7ruminating and cloven-hoofed animals71 also those of vertebrate and red-blooded animals 7although there might be some doubt about this on account of the annelida73 they are convertible concepts4 ,such concepts are represented by a single circle which stands for either of them4 7#b47 ,the sphere of one concept includes that of the other4 ,illustration3 ,category horse within category animal4 7#c47 ,a sphere includes two or more spheres which exclude each other and fill it4 ,illustration3 ,circle divided into thirds right1 acute1 and obtuse4 7#d47 ,two spheres include each a part of the other4 ,illustration3 ,two overlapping circles1 one flower and one red4 7#e47 ,two spheres lie in a third1 but do not fill it4 ,illustration3 ,a large circle1 matter1 within which are two other circles1 water and earth4 ,this last case applies to all concepts whose spheres have nothing immediately in common1 for there is always a third sphere1 often a much wider one1 which includes both4 ,to these cases all combinations of concepts may be referred1 and from them the entire doctrine of the judgment1 its conversion1 contraposition1 equipollence1 disjunction 7this according to the third figure7 may be deduced4 ,from these also may be derived the properties of the judgment1 upon which ,kant based his pretended categories of the understanding1 with the exception however of the hypothetical form1 which is not a combination of concepts1 but of judgments4 ,a full account is given in the ,appendix of 8,modality10 and indeed of every property of judgments on which the categories are founded4 ,with regard to the possible combinations of concepts which we have given1 it has only further to be remarked that they may also be combined with each other in many ways4 ,for example1 the fourth figure with the second4 ,only if one sphere1 which partly or wholly contains another1 is itself contained in a third sphere1 do these together exemplify the syllogism in the first figure1 i4e41 that combination of judgments1 by means of which it is known that a concept which is partly or wholly contained in another concept1 is also contained in a third concept1 which again contains the first3 and also1 conversely1 the negation2 the pictorial representation of which can1 of course1 only be two connected spheres which do not lie within a third sphere4 ,if many spheres are brought together in this way we get a long train of syllogisms4 ,this schematism of concepts1 which has already been fairly well explained in more than one textbook1 may be used as the foundation of the doctrine of the judgment1 and indeed of the whole syllogistic theory1 and in this way the treatment of both becomes very easy and simple4 ,because1 through it1 all syllogistic rules may be seen in their origin1 and may be deduced and explained4 ,it is not necessary1 however1 to load the memory with these rules1 as logic is never of practical use1 but has only a theoretical interest for philosophy4 ,for although it may be said that logic is related to rational thinking as thorough-bass is to music1 or less exactly1 as ethics is to virtue1 or sthetics to art2 we must yet remember that no one ever became an artist by the study of sthetics2 that a noble character was never formed by the study of ethics2 that long before ,rameau1 men composed correctly and beautifully1 and that we do not need to know thorough-bass in order to detect discords3 and just as little do we need to know logic in order to avoid being misled by fallacies4 ,yet it must be conceded that thorough-bass is of the greatest use in the practice of musical composition1 although it may not be necessary for the understanding of it2 and indeed sthetics and even ethics1 though in a much less degree1 and for the most part negatively1 may be of some use in practice1 so that we cannot deny them all practical worth1 but of logic even this much cannot be conceded4 ,it is nothing more than the knowledge in the abstract of what every one knows in the concrete4 ,therefore we call in the aid of logical rules1 just as little to enable us to construct a correct argument as to prevent us from consenting to a false one1 and the most learned logician lays aside the rules of logic altogether in his actual thought4 ,this may be explained in the following way4 ,every science is a system of general and therefore abstract truths1 laws1 and rules with reference to a special class of objects4 ,the individual case coming under these laws is determined in accordance with this general knowledge1 which is valid once for all2 because such application of the general principle is far easier than the exhaustive investigation of the particular case2 for the general abstract knowledge which has once been obtained is always more within our reach than the empirical investigation of the particular case4 ,with logic1 however1 it is just the other way4 ,it is the general knowledge of the mode of procedure of the reason expressed in the form of rules4 ,it is reached by the introspection of reason1 and by abstraction from all content4 ,but this mode of procedure is necessary and essential to reason1 so that it will never depart from it if left to itself4 ,it is1 therefore1 easier and surer to let it proceed itself according to its nature in each particular case1 than to present to it the knowledge abstracted from this procedure in the form of a foreign and externally given law4 ,it is easier1 because1 while in the case of all other sciences1 the general rule is more within our reach than the investigation of the particular case taken by itself2 with the use of reason1 on the contrary1 its necessary procedure in a given case is always more within our reach than the general rule abstracted from it2 for that which thinks in us is reason itself4 ,it is surer1 because a mistake may more easily occur in such abstract knowledge1 or in its application1 than that a process of reason should take place which would run contrary to its essence and nature4 ,hence arises the remarkable fact1 that while in other sciences the particular case is always proved by the rule1 in logic1 on the contrary1 the rule must always be proved from the particular case2 and even the most practised logician1 if he remark that in some particular case he concludes otherwise than the rule prescribes1 will always expect to find a mistake in the rule rather than in his own conclusion4 ,to desire to make practical use of logic means1 therefore1 to desire to derive with unspeakable trouble1 from general rules1 that which is immediately known with the greatest certainty in the particular case4 ,it is just as if a man were to consult mechanics as to the motion of his body1 and physiology as to his digestion2 and whoever has learnt logic for practical purposes is like him who would teach a beaver to make its own dam4 ,logic is1 therefore1 without practical utility2 but it must nevertheless be retained1 because it has philosophical interest as the special knowledge of the organisation and action of reason4 ,it is rightly regarded as a definite1 self-subsisting1 self-contained1 complete1 and thoroughly safe discipline2 to be treated scientifically for itself alone and independently of everything else1 and therefore to be studied at the universities4 ,but it has its real value1 in relation to philosophy as a whole1 in the inquiry into the nature of knowledge1 and indeed of rational and abstract knowledge4 ,therefore the exposition of logic should not have so much the form of a practical science1 should not contain merely naked arbitrary rules for the correct formation of the judgment1 the syllogism1 c41 but should rather be directed to the knowledge of the nature of reason and the concept1 and to the detailed investigation of the principle of sufficient reason of knowing4 ,for logic is only a paraphrase of this principle1 and1 more exactly1 only of that exemplification of it in which the ground that gives truth to the judgment is neither empirical nor metaphysical1 but logical or metalogical4 ,besides the principle of sufficient reason of knowing1 it is necessary to take account of the three remaining fundamental laws of thought1 or judgments of metalogical truth1 so nearly related to it2 and out of these the whole science of reason grows4 ,the nature of thought proper1 that is to say1 of the judgment and the syllogism1 must be exhibited in the combination of the spheres of concepts1 according to the analogy of the special schema1 in the way shown above2 and from all this the rules of the judgment and the syllogism are to be deduced by construction4 ,the only practical use we can make of logic is in a debate1 when we can convict our antagonist of his intentional fallacies1 rather than of his actual mistakes1 by giving them their technical names4 ,by thus throwing into the background the practical aim of logic1 and bringing out its connection with the whole scheme of philosophy as one of its chapters1 we do not think that we shall make the study of it less prevalent than it is just now4 ,for at the present day every one who does not wish to remain uncultured1 and to be numbered with the ignorant and incompetent multitude1 must study speculative philosophy4 ,for the nineteenth century is a philosophical age1 though by this we do not mean either that it has philosophy1 or that philosophy governs it1 but rather that it is ripe for philosophy1 and1 therefore1 stands in need of it4 ,this is a sign of a high degree of civilisation1 and indeed1 is a definite stage in the culture of the ages47#ad7 ,though logic is of so little practical use1 it cannot be denied that it was invented for practical purposes4 ,it appears to me to have originated in the following way3--,as the love of debating developed among the ,eleatics1 the ,megarics1 and the ,sophists1 and by degrees became almost a passion1 the confusion in which nearly every debate ended must have made them feel the necessity of a method of procedure as a guide2 and for this a scientific dialectic had to be sought4 ,the first thing which would have to be observed would be that both the disputing parties should always be agreed on some one proposition1 to which the disputed points might be referred4 ,the beginning of the methodical procedure consisted in this1 that the propositions admitted on both sides were formally stated to be so1 and placed at the head of the inquiry4 ,but these propositions were at first concerned only with the material of the inquiry4 ,it was soon observed that in the process of going back to the truth admitted on both sides1 and of deducing their assertions from it1 each party followed certain forms and laws about which1 without any express agreement1 there was no difference of opinion4 ,and from this it became evident that these must constitute the peculiar and natural procedure of reason itself1 the form of investigation4 ,although this was not exposed to any doubt or difference of opinion1 some pedantically systematic philosopher hit upon the idea that it would look well1 and be the completion of the method of dialectic1 if this formal part of all discussion1 this regular procedure of reason itself1 were to be expressed in abstract propositions1 just like the substantial propositions admitted on both sides1 and placed at the beginning of every investigation1 as the fixed canon of debate to which reference and appeal must always be made4 ,in this way what had formerly been followed only by tacit agreement1 and instinctively1 would be consciously recognised and formally expressed4 ,by degrees1 more or less perfect expressions were found for the fundamental principles of logic1 such as the principles of contradiction1 sufficient reason1 excluded middle1 the dictum de omni et nullo1 as well as the special rules of the syllogism1 as for example1 ex meris particularibus aut negativis nihil sequitur1 a rationato ad rationem non valet consequentia1 and so on4 ,that all this was only brought about slowly1 and with great pains1 and up till the time of ,aristotle remained very incomplete1 is evident from the awkward and tedious way in which logical truths are brought out in many of the ,platonic dialogues1 and still more from what ,sextus ,empiricus tells us of the controversies of the ,megarics1 about the easiest and simplest logical rules1 and the laborious way in which they were brought into a definite form 7,sext4 ,emp4 adv4 ,math4 l4 #h1 p4 #aab74 ,but ,aristotle collected1 arranged1 and corrected all that had been discovered before his time1 and brought it to an incomparably greater state of perfection4 ,if we thus observe how the course of ,greek culture had prepared the way for1 and led up to the work of ,aristotle1 we shall be little inclined to believe the assertion of the ,persian author1 quoted by ,sir ,william ,jones with much approval1 that ,kallisthenes found a complete system of logic among the ,indians1 and sent it to his uncle ,aristotle 7,asiatic ,researches1 vol4 iv4 p4 #afc74 ,it is easy to understand that in the dreary middle ages the ,aristotelian logic would be very acceptable to the controversial spirit of the schoolmen1 which1 in the absence of all real knowledge1 spent its energy upon mere formulas and words1 and that it would be eagerly adopted even in its mutilated ,arabian form1 and presently established as the centre of all knowledge4 ,though its authority has since declined1 yet up to our own time logic has retained the credit of a self-contained1 practical1 and highly important science4 ,indeed1 in our own day1 the ,kantian philosophy1 the foundation-stone of which is taken from logic1 has excited a new interest in it2 which1 in this respect1 at any rate1 that is1 as the means of the knowledge of the nature of reason1 it deserves4 ,correct and accurate conclusions may be arrived at if we carefully observe the relation of the spheres of concepts1 and only conclude that one sphere is contained in a third sphere1 when we have clearly seen that this first sphere is contained in a second1 which in its turn is contained in the third4 ,on the other hand1 the art of sophistry lies in casting only a superficial glance at the relations of the spheres of the concepts1 and then manipulating these relations to suit our purposes1 generally in the following way3--,when the sphere of an observed concept lies partly within that of another concept1 and partly within a third altogether different sphere1 we treat it as if it lay entirely within the one or the other1 as may suit our purpose4 ,for example1 in speaking of passion1 we may subsume it under the concept of the greatest force1 the mightiest agency in the world1 or under the concept of the irrational1 and this again under the concept of impotency or weakness4 ,we may then repeat the process1 and start anew with each concept to which the argument leads us4 ,a concept has almost always several others1 which partially come under it1 and each of these contains part of the sphere of the first1 but also includes in its own sphere something more1 which is not in the first4 ,but we draw attention only to that one of these latter concepts1 under which we wish to subsume the first1 and let the others remain unobserved1 or keep them concealed4 ,on the possession of this skill depends the whole art of sophistry and all finer fallacies2 for logical fallacies such as mentiens1 velatus1 cornatus1 c41 are clearly too clumsy for actual use4 ,i am not aware that hitherto any one has traced the nature of all sophistry and persuasion back to this last possible ground of its existence1 and referred it to the peculiar character of concepts1 i4e41 to the procedure of reason itself4 ,therefore1 as my exposition has led me to it1 though it is very easily understood1 ,i will illustrate it in the following table by means of a schema4 ,this table is intended to show how the spheres of concepts overlap each other at many points1 and so leave room for a passage from each concept to whichever one we please of several other concepts4 ,i hope1 however1 that no one will be led by this table to attach more importance to this little explanation1 which ,i have merely given in passing1 than ought to belong to it1 from the nature of the subject4 ,i have chosen as an illustration the concept of travelling4 ,its sphere partially includes four others1 to any of which the sophist may pass at will2 these again partly include other spheres1 several of them two or more at once1 and through these the sophist takes whichever way he chooses1 always as if it were the only way1 till at last he reaches1 in good or evil1 whatever end he may have in view4 ,in passing from one sphere to another1 it is only necessary always to follow the direction from the centre 7the given chief concept7 to the circumference1 and never to reverse this process4 ,such a piece of sophistry may be either an unbroken speech1 or it may assume the strict syllogistic form1 according to what is the weak side of the hearer4 ,most scientific arguments1 and especially philosophical demonstrations1 are at bottom not much more than this1 for how else would it be possible1 that so much1 in different ages1 has not only been falsely apprehended 7for error itself has a different source71 but demonstrated and proved1 and has yet afterwards been found to be fundamentally wrong1 for example1 the ,leibnitz-,wolfian ,philosophy1 ,ptolemaic ,astronomy1 ,stahl's ,chemistry1 ,newton's ,theory of ,colours1 c4 c47#ae7 #aj4 ,through all this1 the question presses ever more upon us1 how certainty is to be attained1 how judgments are to be established1 what constitutes rational knowledge1 7wissen71 and science1 which we rank with language and deliberate action as the third great benefit conferred by reason4 ,reason is feminine in nature2 it can only give after it has received4 ,of itself it has nothing but the empty forms of its operation4 ,there is no absolutely pure rational knowledge except the four principles to which ,i have attributed metalogical truth2 the principles of identity1 contradiction1 excluded middle1 and sufficient reason of knowledge4 ,for even the rest of logic is not absolutely pure rational knowledge4 ,it presupposes the relations and the combinations of the spheres of concepts4 ,but concepts in general only exist after experience of ideas of perception1 and as their whole nature consists in their relation to these1 it is clear that they presuppose them4 ,no special content1 however1 is presupposed1 but merely the existence of a content generally1 and so logic as a whole may fairly pass for pure rational science4 ,in all other sciences reason has received its content from ideas of perception2 in mathematics from the relations of space and time1 presented in intuition or perception prior to all experience2 in pure natural science1 that is1 in what we know of the course of nature prior to any experience1 the content of the science proceeds from the pure understanding1 i4e41 from the a priori knowledge of the law of causality and its connection with those pure intuitions or perceptions of space and time4 ,in all other sciences everything that is not derived from the sources we have just referred to belongs to experience4 ,speaking generally1 to know rationally 7wissen7 means to have in the power of the mind1 and capable of being reproduced at will1 such judgments as have their sufficient ground of knowledge in something outside themselves1 i4e41 are true4 ,thus only abstract cognition is rational knowledge 7wissen71 which is therefore the result of reason1 so that we cannot accurately say of the lower animals that they rationally know 7wissen7 anything1 although they have apprehension of what is presented in perception1 and memory of this1 and consequently imagination1 which is further proved by the circumstance that they dream4 ,we attribute consciousness to them1 and therefore although the word 7bewusstsein7 is derived from the verb to know rationally 7wissen71 the conception of consciousness corresponds generally with that of idea of whatever kind it may be4 ,thus we attribute life to plants1 but not consciousness4 ,rational knowledge 7wissen7 is therefore abstract consciousness1 the permanent possession in concepts of the reason1 of what has become known in another way4 #aa4 ,in this regard the direct opposite of rational knowledge is feeling1 and therefore we must insert the explanation of feeling here4 ,the concept which the word feeling denotes has merely a negative content1 which is this1 that something which is present in consciousness1 is not a concept1 is not abstract rational knowledge4 ,except this1 whatever it may be1 it comes under the concept of feeling4 ,thus the immeasurably wide sphere of the concept of feeling includes the most different kinds of objects1 and no one can ever understand how they come together until he has recognised that they all agree in this negative respect1 that they are not abstract concepts4 ,for the most diverse and even antagonistic elements lie quietly side by side in this concept2 for example1 religious feeling1 feeling of sensual pleasure1 moral feeling1 bodily feeling1 as touch1 pain1 sense of colour1 of sounds and their harmonies and discords1 feeling of hate1 of disgust1 of self-satisfaction1 of honour1 of disgrace1 of right1 of wrong1 sense of truth1 sthetic feeling1 feeling of power1 weakness1 health1 friendship1 love1 c4 c4 ,there is absolutely nothing in common among them except the negative quality that they are not abstract rational knowledge4 ,but this diversity becomes more striking when the apprehension of space relations presented a priori in perception1 and also the knowledge of the pure understanding is brought under this concept1 and when we say of all knowledge and all truth1 of which we are first conscious only intuitively1 and have not yet formulated in abstract concepts1 we feel it4 ,i should like1 for the sake of illustration1 to give some examples of this taken from recent books1 as they are striking proofs of my theory4 ,i remember reading in the introduction to a ,german translation of ,euclid1 that we ought to make beginners in geometry draw the figures before proceeding to demonstrate1 for in this way they would already feel geometrical truth before the demonstration brought them complete knowledge4 ,in the same way ,schleiermacher speaks in his 8,critique of ,ethics0 of logical and mathematical feeling 7p4 #cci71 and also of the feeling of the sameness or difference of two formulas 7p4 #cdb74 ,again ,tennemann in his 8,history of ,philosophy0 7vol4 ,i41 p4 #cfa7 says1 8,one felt that the fallacies were not right1 but could not point out the mistakes40 ,now1 so long as we do not regard this concept 8feeling0 from the right point of view1 and do not recognise that one negative characteristic which alone is essential to it1 it must constantly give occasion for misunderstanding and controversy1 on account of the excessive wideness of its sphere1 and its entirely negative and very limited content which is determined in a purely one-sided manner4 ,since then we have in ,german the nearly synonymous word empfindung 7sensation71 it would be convenient to make use of it for bodily feeling1 as a sub-species4 ,this concept 8feeling10 which is quite out of proportion to all others1 doubtless originated in the following manner4 ,all concepts1 and concepts alone1 are denoted by words2 they exist only for the reason1 and proceed from it4 ,with concepts1 therefore1 we are already at a one-sided point of view2 but from such a point of view what is near appears distinct and is set down as positive1 what is farther off becomes mixed up and is soon regarded as merely negative4 ,thus each nation calls all others foreign3 to the ,greek all others are barbarians2 to the ,englishman all that is not ,england or ,english is continent or continental2 to the believer all others are heretics1 or heathens2 to the noble all others are roturiers2 to the student all others are ,philistines1 and so forth4 ,now1 reason itself1 strange as it may seem1 is guilty of the same one-sidedness1 indeed one might say of the same crude ignorance arising from vanity1 for it classes under the one concept1 8feeling10 every modification of consciousness which does not immediately belong to its own mode of apprehension1 that is to say1 which is not an abstract concept4 ,it has had to pay the penalty of this hitherto in misunderstanding and confusion in its own province1 because its own procedure had not become clear to it through thorough self-knowledge1 for a special faculty of feeling has been set up1 and new theories of it are constructed4 #ab4 ,rational knowledge 7wissen7 is then all abstract knowledge1--that is1 the knowledge which is peculiar to the reason as distinguished from the understanding4 ,its contradictory opposite has just been explained to be the concept 8feeling40 ,now1 as reason only reproduces1 for knowledge1 what has been received in another way1 it does not actually extend our knowledge1 but only gives it another form4 ,it enables us to know in the abstract and generally1 what first became known in sense-perception1 in the concrete4 ,but this is much more important than it appears at first sight when so expressed4 ,for it depends entirely upon the fact that knowledge has become rational or abstract knowledge 7wissen71 that it can be safely preserved1 that it is communicable and susceptible of certain and wide-reaching application to practice4 ,knowledge in the form of sense-perception is valid only of the particular case1 extends only to what is nearest1 and ends with it1 for sensibility and understanding can only comprehend one object at a time4 ,every enduring1 arranged1 and planned activity must therefore proceed from principles1--that is1 from abstract knowledge1 and it must be conducted in accordance with them4 ,thus1 for example1 the knowledge of the relation of cause and effect arrived at by the understanding1 is in itself far completer1 deeper and more exhaustive than anything that can be thought about it in the abstract2 the understanding alone knows in perception directly and completely the nature of the effect of a lever1 of a pulley1 or a cog-wheel1 the stability of an arch1 and so forth4 ,but on account of the peculiarity of the knowledge of perception just referred to1 that it only extends to what is immediately present1 the mere understanding can never enable us to construct machines and buildings4 ,here reason must come in2 it must substitute abstract concepts for ideas of perception1 and take them as the guide of action2 and if they are right1 the anticipated result will happen4 ,in the same way we have perfect knowledge in pure perception of the nature and constitution of the parabola1 hyperbola1 and spiral2 but if we are to make trustworthy application of this knowledge to the real1 it must first become abstract knowledge1 and by this it certainly loses its character of intuition or perception1 but on the other hand it gains the certainty and preciseness of abstract knowledge4 ,the differential calculus does not really extend our knowledge of the curve1 it contains nothing that was not already in the mere pure perception of the curve2 but it alters the kind of knowledge1 it changes the intuitive into an abstract knowledge1 which is so valuable for application4 ,but here we must refer to another peculiarity of our faculty of knowledge1 which could not be observed until the distinction between the knowledge of the senses and understanding and abstract knowledge had been made quite clear4 ,it is this1 that relations of space cannot as such be directly translated into abstract knowledge1 but only temporal quantities1--that is1 numbers1 are suitable for this4 ,numbers alone can be expressed in abstract concepts which accurately correspond to them1 not spacial quantities4 ,the concept 8thousand0 is just as different from the concept 8ten10 as both these temporal quantities are in perception4 ,we think of a thousand as a distinct multiple of ten1 into which we can resolve it at pleasure for perception in time1--that is to say1 we can count it4 ,but between the abstract concept of a mile and that of a foot1 apart from any concrete perception of either1 and without the help of number1 there is no accurate distinction corresponding to the quantities themselves4 ,in both we only think of a spacial quantity in general1 and if they must be completely distinguished we are compelled either to call in the assistance of intuition or perception in space1 which would be a departure from abstract knowledge1 or we must think the difference in numbers4 ,if then we wish to have abstract knowledge of space-relations we must first translate them into time-relations1--that is1 into numbers2 therefore only arithmetic1 and not geometry1 is the universal science of quantity1 and geometry must be translated into arithmetic if it is to be communicable1 accurately precise and applicable in practice4 ,it is true that a space-relation as such may also be thought in the abstract2 for example1 8the sine increases as the angle10 but if the quantity of this relation is to be given1 it requires number for its expression4 ,this necessity1 that if we wish to have abstract knowledge of space-relations 7i4e41 rational knowledge1 not mere intuition or perception71 space with its three dimensions must be translated into time which has only one dimension1 this necessity it is1 which makes mathematics so difficult4 ,this becomes very clear if we compare the perception of curves with their analytical calculation1 or the table of logarithms of the trigonometrical functions with the perception of the changing relations of the parts of a triangle1 which are expressed by them4 ,what vast mazes of figures1 what laborious calculations it would require to express in the abstract what perception here apprehends at a glance completely and with perfect accuracy1 namely1 how the co-sine diminishes as the sine increases1 how the co-sine of one angle is the sine of another1 the inverse relation of the increase and decrease of the two angles1 and so forth4 ,how time1 we might say1 must complain1 that with its one dimension it should be compelled to express the three dimensions of space6 ,yet this is necessary if we wish to possess1 for application1 an expression1 in abstract concepts1 of space-relations4 ,they could not be translated directly into abstract concepts1 but only through the medium of the pure temporal quantity1 number1 which alone is directly related to abstract knowledge4 ,yet it is worthy of remark1 that as space adapts itself so well to perception1 and by means of its three dimensions1 even its complicated relations are easily apprehended1 while it eludes the grasp of abstract knowledge2 time1 on the contrary1 passes easily into abstract knowledge1 but gives very little to perception4 ,our perceptions of numbers in their proper element1 mere time1 without the help of space1 scarcely extends as far as ten1 and beyond that we have only abstract concepts of numbers1 no knowledge of them which can be presented in perception4 ,on the other hand1 we connect with every numeral1 and with all algebraical symbols1 accurately defined abstract concepts4 ,we may further remark here that some minds only find full satisfaction in what is known through perception4 ,what they seek is the reason and consequent of being in space1 sensuously expressed2 a demonstration after the manner of ,euclid1 or an arithmetical solution of spacial problems1 does not please them4 ,other minds1 on the contrary1 seek merely the abstract concepts which are needful for applying and communicating knowledge4 ,they have patience and memory for abstract principles1 formulas1 demonstrations in long trains of reasoning1 and calculations1 in which the symbols represent the most complicated abstractions4 ,the latter seek preciseness1 the former sensible perception4 ,the difference is characteristic4 ,the greatest value of rational or abstract knowledge is that it can be communicated and permanently retained4 ,it is principally on this account that it is so inestimably important for practice4 ,any one may have a direct perceptive knowledge through the understanding alone1 of the causal connection1 of the changes and motions of natural bodies1 and he may find entire satisfaction in it2 but he cannot communicate this knowledge to others until it has been made permanent for thought in concepts4 ,knowledge of the first kind is even sufficient for practice1 if a man puts his knowledge into practice himself1 in an action which can be accomplished while the perception is still vivid2 but it is not sufficient if the help of others is required1 or even if the action is his own but must be carried out at different times1 and therefore requires a pre-conceived plan4 ,thus1 for example1 a practised billiard-player may have a perfect knowledge of the laws of the impact of elastic bodies upon each other1 merely in the understanding1 merely for direct perception2 and for him it is quite sufficient2 but on the other hand it is only the man who has studied the science of mechanics1 who has1 properly speaking1 a rational knowledge of these laws1 that is1 a knowledge of them in the abstract4 ,such knowledge of the understanding in perception is sufficient even for the construction of machines1 when the inventor of the machine executes the work himself2 as we often see in the case of talented workmen1 who have no scientific knowledge4 ,but whenever a number of men1 and their united action taking place at different times1 is required for the completion of a mechanical work1 of a machine1 or a building1 then he who conducts it must have thought out the plan in the abstract1 and such co-operative activity is only possible through the assistance of reason4 ,it is1 however1 remarkable that in the first kind of activity1 in which we have supposed that one man alone1 in an uninterrupted course of action1 accomplishes something1 abstract knowledge1 the application of reason or reflection1 may often be a hindrance to him2 for example1 in the case of billiard-playing1 of fighting1 of tuning an instrument1 or in the case of singing4 ,here perceptive knowledge must directly guide action2 its passage through reflection makes it uncertain1 for it divides the attention and confuses the man4 ,thus savages and untaught men1 who are little accustomed to think1 perform certain physical exercises1 fight with beasts1 shoot with bows and arrows and the like1 with a certainty and rapidity which the reflecting ,european never attains to1 just because his deliberation makes him hesitate and delay4 ,for he tries1 for example1 to hit the right position or the right point of time1 by finding out the mean between two false extremes2 while the savage hits it directly without thinking of the false courses open to him4 ,in the same way it is of no use to me to know in the abstract the exact angle1 in degrees and minutes1 at which ,i must apply a razor1 if ,i do not know it intuitively1 that is1 if ,i have not got it in my touch4 ,the knowledge of physiognomy also1 is interfered with by the application of reason4 ,this knowledge must be gained directly through the understanding4 ,we say that the expression1 the meaning of the features1 can only be felt1 that is1 it cannot be put into abstract concepts4 ,every man has his direct intuitive method of physiognomy and pathognomy1 yet one man understands more clearly than another these signatura rerum4 ,but an abstract science of physiognomy to be taught and learned is not possible2 for the distinctions of difference are here so fine that concepts cannot reach them2 therefore abstract knowledge is related to them as a mosaic is to a painting by a ,van der ,werft or a ,denner4 ,in mosaics1 however fine they may be1 the limits of the stones are always there1 and therefore no continuous passage from one colour to another is possible1 and this is also the case with regard to concepts1 with their rigidity and sharp delineation2 however finely we may divide them by exact definition1 they are still incapable of reaching the finer modifications of the perceptible1 and this is just what happens in the example we have taken1 knowledge of physiognomy47#af7 ,this quality of concepts by which they resemble the stones of a mosaic1 and on account of which perception always remains their asymptote1 is also the reason why nothing good is produced in art by their means4 ,if the singer or the virtuoso attempts to guide his execution by reflection he remains silent4 ,and this is equally true of the composer1 the painter1 and the poet4 ,the concept always remains unfruitful in art2 it can only direct the technical part of it1 its sphere is science4 ,we shall consider more fully in the third book1 why all true art proceeds from sensuous knowledge1 never from the concept4 ,indeed1 with regard to behaviour also1 and personal agreeableness in society1 the concept has only a negative value in restraining the grosser manifestations of egotism and brutality2 so that a polished manner is its commendable production4 ,but all that is attractive1 gracious1 charming in behaviour1 all affectionateness and friendliness1 must not proceed from the concepts1 for if it does1 8we feel intention1 and are put out of tune40 ,all dissimulation is the work of reflection2 but it cannot be maintained constantly and without interruption3 8nemo potest personam diu ferre fictum10 says ,seneca in his book de clementia2 and so it is generally found out and loses its effect4 ,reason is needed in the full stress of life1 where quick conclusions1 bold action1 rapid and sure comprehension are required1 but it may easily spoil all if it gains the upper hand1 and by perplexing hinders the intuitive1 direct discovery1 and grasp of the right by simple understanding1 and thus induces irresolution4 ,lastly1 virtue and holiness do not proceed from reflection1 but from the inner depths of the will1 and its relation to knowledge4 ,the exposition of this belongs to another part of our work2 this1 however1 ,i may remark here1 that the dogmas relating to ethics may be the same in the reason of whole nations1 but the action of every individual different2 and the converse also holds good2 action1 we say1 is guided by feelings1--that is1 simply not by concepts1 but as a matter of fact by the ethical character4 ,dogmas occupy the idle reason2 but action in the end pursues its own course independently of them1 generally not according to abstract rules1 but according to unspoken maxims1 the expression of which is the whole man himself4 ,therefore1 however different the religious dogmas of nations may be1 yet in the case of all of them1 a good action is accompanied by unspeakable satisfaction1 and a bad action by endless remorse4 ,no mockery can shake the former2 no priest's absolution can deliver from the latter4 ,notwithstanding this1 we must allow1 that for the pursuit of a virtuous life1 the application of reason is needful2 only it is not its source1 but has the subordinate function of preserving resolutions which have been made1 of providing maxims to withstand the weakness of the moment1 and give consistency to action4 ,it plays the same part ultimately in art also1 where it has just as little to do with the essential matter1 but assists in carrying it out1 for genius is not always at call1 and yet the work must be completed in all its parts and rounded off to a whole47#ag7 #ac4 ,all these discussions of the advantages and disadvantages of the application of reason are intended to show1 that although abstract rational knowledge is the reflex of ideas of perception1 and is founded on them1 it is by no means in such entire congruity with them that it could everywhere take their place3 indeed it never corresponds to them quite accurately4 ,and thus1 as we have seen1 many human actions can only be performed by the help of reason and deliberation1 and yet there are some which are better performed without its assistance4 ,this very incongruity of sensuous and abstract knowledge1 on account of which the latter always merely approximates to the former1 as mosaic approximates to painting1 is the cause of a very remarkable phenomenon which1 like reason itself1 is peculiar to human nature1 and of which the explanations that have ever anew been attempted1 are insufficient3 ,i mean laughter4 ,on account of the source of this phenomenon1 we cannot avoid giving the explanation of it here1 though it again interrupts the course of our work to do so4 ,the cause of laughter in every case is simply the sudden perception of the incongruity between a concept and the real objects which have been thought through it in some relation1 and laughter itself is just the expression of this incongruity4 ,it often occurs in this way3 two or more real objects are thought through one concept1 and the identity of the concept is transferred to the objects2 it then becomes strikingly apparent from the entire difference of the objects in other respects1 that the concept was only applicable to them from a one-sided point of view4 ,it occurs just as often1 however1 that the incongruity between a single real object and the concept under which1 from one point of view1 it has rightly been subsumed1 is suddenly felt4 ,now the more correct the subsumption of such objects under a concept may be from one point of view1 and the greater and more glaring their incongruity with it1 from another point of view1 the greater is the ludicrous effect which is produced by this contrast4 ,all laughter then is occasioned by a paradox1 and therefore by unexpected subsumption1 whether this is expressed in words or in actions4 ,this1 briefly stated1 is the true explanation of the ludicrous4 ,i shall not pause here to relate anecdotes as examples to illustrate my theory2 for it is so simple and comprehensible that it does not require them1 and everything ludicrous which the reader may remember is equally valuable as a proof of it4 ,but the theory is confirmed and illustrated by distinguishing two species into which the ludicrous is divided1 and which result from the theory4 ,either1 we have previously known two or more very different real objects1 ideas of sense-perception1 and have intentionally identified them through the unity of a concept which comprehends them both2 this species of the ludicrous is called wit4 ,or1 conversely1 the concept is first present in knowledge1 and we pass from it to reality1 and to operation upon it1 to action3 objects which in other respects are fundamentally different1 but which are all thought in that one concept1 are now regarded and treated in the same way1 till1 to the surprise and astonishment of the person acting1 the great difference of their other aspects appears3 this species of the ludicrous is called folly4 ,therefore everything ludicrous is either a flash of wit or a foolish action1 according as the procedure has been from the discrepancy of the objects to the identity of the concept1 or the converse2 the former always intentional1 the latter always unintentional1 and from without4 ,to seem to reverse the starting-point1 and to conceal wit with the mask of folly1 is the art of the jester and the clown4 ,being quite aware of the diversity of the objects1 the jester unites them1 with secret wit1 under one concept1 and then starting from this concept he receives from the subsequently discovered diversity of the objects the surprise which he himself prepared4 ,it follows from this short but sufficient theory of the ludicrous1 that1 if we set aside the last case1 that of the jester1 wit must always show itself in words1 folly generally in actions1 though also in words1 when it only expresses an intention and does not actually carry it out1 or when it shows itself merely in judgments and opinions4 ,pedantry is a form of folly4 ,it arises in this way3 a man lacks confidence in his own understanding1 and1 therefore1 does not wish to trust to it1 to recognise what is right directly in the particular case4 ,he1 therefore1 puts it entirely under the control of the reason1 and seeks to be guided by reason in everything2 that is to say1 he tries always to proceed from general concepts1 rules1 and maxims1 and to confine himself strictly to them in life1 in art1 and even in moral conduct4 ,hence that clinging to the form1 to the manner1 to the expression and word which is characteristic of pedantry1 and which with it takes the place of the real nature of the matter4 ,the incongruity then between the concept and reality soon shows itself here1 and it becomes evident that the former never condescends to the particular case1 and that with its generality and rigid definiteness it can never accurately apply to the fine distinctions of difference and innumerable modifications of the actual4 ,therefore1 the pedant1 with his general maxims1 almost always misses the mark in life1 shows himself to be foolish1 awkward1 useless4 ,in art1 in which the concept is unfruitful1 he produces lifeless1 stiff1 abortive mannerisms4 ,even with regard to ethics1 the purpose to act rightly or nobly cannot always be carried out in accordance with abstract maxims2 for in many cases the excessively nice distinctions in the nature of the circumstances necessitate a choice of the right proceeding directly from the character2 for the application of mere abstract maxims sometimes gives false results1 because the maxims only half apply2 and sometimes cannot be carried out1 because they are foreign to the individual character of the actor1 and this never allows itself to be entirely discovered2 therefore1 inconsistencies arise4 ,since then ,kant makes it a condition of the moral worth of an action1 that it shall proceed from pure rational abstract maxims1 without any inclination or momentary emotion1 we cannot entirely absolve him from the reproach of encouraging moral pedantry4 ,this reproach is the significance of ,schiller's epigram1 entitled 8,scruples of ,conscience40 ,when we speak1 especially in connection with politics1 of doctrinaires1 theorists1 savants1 and so forth1 we mean pedants1 that is1 persons who know the things well in the abstract1 but not in the concrete4 ,abstraction consists in thinking away the less general predicates2 but it is precisely upon these that so much depends in practice4 ,to complete our theory it remains for us to mention a spurious kind of wit1 the play upon words1 the calembourg1 the pun1 to which may be added the equivocation1 the double entendre1 the chief use of which is the expression of what is obscene4 ,just as the witticism brings two very different real objects under one concept1 the pun brings two different concepts1 by the assistance of accident1 under one word4 ,the same contrast appears1 only familiar and more superficial1 because it does not spring from the nature of things1 but merely from the accident of nomenclature4 ,in the case of the witticism the identity is in the concept1 the difference in the reality1 but in the case of the pun the difference is in the concepts and the identity in the reality1 for the terminology is here the reality4 ,it would only be a somewhat far-fetched comparison if we were to say that the pun is related to the witticism as the parabola 7sic7 of the upper inverted cone to that of the lower4 ,the misunderstanding of the word or the quid pro quo is the unintentional pun1 and is related to it exactly as folly is to wit4 ,thus the deaf man often affords occasion for laughter1 just as much as the fool1 and inferior writers of comedy often use the former for the latter to raise a laugh4 ,i have treated laughter here only from the psychical side2 with regard to the physical side1 ,i refer to what is said on the subject in the 8,parerga10 vol4 ,,ii4 ch4 vi41 #ih47ah7 #ad4 ,by means of these various discussions it is hoped that both the difference and the relation between the process of knowledge that belongs to the reason1 rational knowledge1 the concept on the one hand1 and the direct knowledge in purely sensuous1 mathematical intuition or perception1 and apprehension by the understanding on the other hand1 has been clearly brought out4 ,this remarkable relation of our kinds of knowledge led us almost inevitably to give1 in passing1 explanations of feeling and of laughter1 but from all this we now turn back to the further consideration of science as the third great benefit which reason confers on man1 the other two being speech and deliberate action4 ,the general discussion of science which now devolves upon us1 will be concerned partly with its form1 partly with the foundation of its judgments1 and lastly with its content4 ,we have seen that1 with the exception of the basis of pure logic1 rational knowledge in general has not its source in the reason itself2 but having been otherwise obtained as knowledge of perception1 it is stored up in the reason1 for through reason it has entirely changed its character1 and has become abstract knowledge4 ,all rational knowledge1 that is1 knowledge that has been raised to consciousness in the abstract1 is related to science strictly so called1 as a fragment to the whole4 ,every one has gained a rational knowledge of many different things through experience1 through consideration of the individual objects presented to him1 but only he who sets himself the task of acquiring a complete knowledge in the abstract of a particular class of objects1 strives after science4 ,this class can only be marked off by means of a concept2 therefore1 at the beginning of every science there stands a concept1 and by means of it the class of objects concerning which this science promises a complete knowledge in the abstract1 is separated in thought from the whole world of things4 ,for example1 the concept of space-relations1 or of the action of unorganised bodies upon each other1 or of the nature of plants1 or of animals1 or of the successive changes of the surface of the globe1 or of the changes of the human race as a whole1 or of the construction of a language1 and so forth4 ,if science sought to obtain the knowledge of its object1 by investigating each individual thing that is thought through the concept1 till by degrees it had learned the whole1 no human memory would be equal to the task1 and no certainty of completeness would be obtainable4 ,therefore1 it makes use of that property of concept-spheres explained above1 that they include each other1 and it concerns itself mainly with the wider spheres which lie within the concept of its object in general4 ,when the relations of these spheres to each other have been determined1 all that is thought in them is also generally determined1 and can now be more and more accurately determined by the separation of smaller and smaller concept-spheres4 ,in this way it is possible for a science to comprehend its object completely4 ,this path which it follows to knowledge1 the path from the general to the particular1 distinguishes it from ordinary rational knowledge2 therefore1 systematic form is an essential and characteristic feature of science4 ,the combination of the most general concept-spheres of every science1 that is1 the knowledge of its first principles1 is the indispensable condition of mastering it2 how far we advance from these to the more special propositions is a matter of choice1 and does not increase the thoroughness but only the extent of our knowledge of the science4 ,the number of the first principles to which all the rest are subordinated1 varies greatly in the different sciences1 so that in some there is more subordination1 in others more co-ordination2 and in this respect1 the former make greater claims upon the judgment1 the latter upon the memory4 ,it was known to the schoolmen17#ai7 that1 as the syllogism requires two premises1 no science can proceed from a single first principle which cannot be the subject of further deduction1 but must have several1 at least two4 ,the specially classifying sciences3 ,zoology1 ,botany1 and also ,physics and ,chemistry1 inasmuch as they refer all inorganic action to a few fundamental forces1 have most subordination2 history1 on the other hand1 has really none at all2 for the general in it consists merely in the survey of the principal periods1 from which1 however1 the particular events cannot be deduced1 and are only subordinated to them according to time1 but according to the concept are co-ordinate with them4 ,therefore1 history1 strictly speaking1 is certainly rational knowledge1 but is not science4 ,in mathematics1 according to ,euclid's treatment1 the axioms alone are indemonstrable first principles1 and all demonstrations are in gradation strictly subordinated to them4 ,but this method of treatment is not essential to mathematics1 and in fact each proposition introduces quite a new space construction1 which in itself is independent of those which precede it1 and indeed can be completely comprehended from itself1 quite independently of them1 in the pure intuition or perception of space1 in which the most complicated construction is just as directly evident as the axiom2 but of this more fully hereafter4 ,meanwhile every mathematical proposition remains always a universal truth1 which is valid for innumerable particular cases2 and a graduated process from the simple to the complicated propositions which are to be deduced from them1 is also essential to mathematics2 therefore1 in every respect mathematics is a science4 ,the completeness of a science as such1 that is1 in respect of form1 consists in there being as much subordination and as little co-ordination of the principles as possible4 ,scientific talent in general is1 therefore1 the faculty of subordinating the concept-spheres according to their different determinations1 so that1 as ,plato repeatedly counsels1 a science shall not be constituted by a general concept and an indefinite multiplicity immediately under it1 but that knowledge shall descend by degrees from the general to the particular1 through intermediate concepts and divisions1 according to closer and closer definitions4 ,in ,kantian language this is called satisfying equally the law of homogeneity and that of specification4 ,it arises from this peculiar nature of scientific completeness1 that the aim of science is not greater certainty--for certainty may be possessed in just as high a degree by the most disconnected particular knowledge--but its aim is rather the facilitating of rational knowledge by means of its form1 and the possibility of the completeness of rational knowledge which this form affords4 ,it is therefore a very prevalent but perverted opinion that the scientific character of knowledge consists in its greater certainty1 and just as false is the conclusion following from this1 that1 strictly speaking1 the only sciences are mathematics and logic1 because only in them1 on account of their purely a priori character1 is there unassailable certainty of knowledge4 ,this advantage cannot be denied them1 but it gives them no special claim to be regarded as sciences2 for the special characteristic of science does not lie in certainty but in the systematic form of knowledge1 based on the gradual descent from the general to the particular4 ,the process of knowledge from the general to the particular1 which is peculiar to the sciences1 involves the necessity that in the sciences much should be established by deduction from preceding propositions1 that is to say1 by demonstration2 and this has given rise to the old mistake that only what has been demonstrated is absolutely true1 and that every truth requires a demonstration2 whereas1 on the contrary1 every demonstration requires an undemonstrated truth1 which ultimately supports it1 or it may be1 its own demonstration4 ,therefore a directly established truth is as much to be preferred to a truth established by demonstration as water from the spring is to water from the aqueduct4 ,perception1 partly pure a priori1 as it forms the basis of mathematics1 partly empirical a posteriori1 as it forms the basis of all the other sciences1 is the source of all truth and the foundation of all science4 7,logic alone is to be excepted1 which is not founded upon perception but yet upon direct knowledge by the reason of its own laws47 ,not the demonstrated judgments nor their demonstrations1 but judgments which are created directly out of perception1 and founded upon it rather than on any demonstrations1 are to science what the sun is to the world2 for all light proceeds from them1 and lighted by their light the others give light also4 ,to establish the truth of such primary judgments directly from perception1 to raise such strongholds of science from the innumerable multitude of real objects1 that is the work of the faculty of judgment1 which consists in the power of rightly and accurately carrying over into abstract consciousness what is known in perception1 and judgment is consequently the mediator between understanding and reason4 ,only extraordinary and exceptional strength of judgment in the individual can actually advance science2 but every one who is possessed of a healthy reason is able to deduce propositions from propositions1 to demonstrate1 to draw conclusions4 ,to lay down and make permanent for reflection1 in suitable concepts1 what is known through perception1 so that1 on the one hand1 what is common to many real objects is thought through one concept1 and1 on the other hand1 their points of difference are each thought through one concept1 so that the different shall be known and thought as different in spite of a partial agreement1 and the identical shall be known and thought as identical in spite of a partial difference1 all in accordance with the end and intention which in each case is in view2 all this is done by the faculty of judgment4 ,deficiency in judgment is silliness4 ,the silly man fails to grasp1 now the partial or relative difference of concepts which in one aspect are identical1 now the identity of concepts which are relatively or partially different4 ,to this explanation of the faculty of judgment1 moreover1 ,kant's division of it into reflecting and subsuming judgment may be applied1 according as it passes from the perceived objects to the concepts1 or from the latter to the former2 in both cases always mediating between empirical knowledge of the understanding and the reflective knowledge of the reason4 ,there can be no truth which could be brought out by means of syllogisms alone2 and the necessity of establishing truth by means of syllogisms is merely relative1 indeed subjective4 ,since all demonstration is syllogistic1 in the case of a new truth we must first seek1 not for a demonstration1 but for direct evidence1 and only in the absence of such evidence is a demonstration to be temporarily made use of4 ,no science is susceptible of demonstration throughout any more than a building can stand in the air2 all its demonstrations must ultimately rest upon what is perceived1 and consequently cannot be demonstrated1 for the whole world of reflection rests upon and is rooted in the world of perception4 ,all primal1 that is1 original1 evidence is a perception1 as the word itself indicates4 ,therefore it is either empirical or founded upon the perception a priori of the conditions of possible experience4 ,in both cases it affords only immanent1 not transcendent knowledge4 ,every concept has its worth and its existence only in its relation1 sometimes very indirect1 to an idea of perception2 what is true of the concepts is also true of the judgments constructed out of them1 and of all science4 ,therefore it must in some way be possible to know directly without demonstrations or syllogisms every truth that is arrived at through syllogisms and communicated by demonstrations4 ,this is most difficult in the case of certain complicated mathematical propositions at which we only arrive by chains of syllogisms2 for example1 the calculation of the chords and tangents to all arcs by deduction from the proposition of ,pythagoras4 ,but even such a truth as this cannot essentially and solely rest upon abstract principles1 and the space-relations which lie at its foundation also must be capable of being so presented a priori in pure intuition or perception that the truth of their abstract expression is directly established4 ,but of mathematical demonstration we shall speak more fully shortly4 ,it is true we often hear men speak in a lofty strain of sciences which rest entirely upon correct conclusions drawn from sure premises1 and which are consequently unassailable4 ,but through pure logical reasoning1 however true the premises may be1 we shall never receive more than an articulate expression and exposition of what lies already complete in the premises2 thus we shall only explicitly expound what was already implicitly understood4 ,the esteemed sciences referred to are1 however1 specially the mathematical sciences1 particularly astronomy4 ,but the certainty of astronomy arises from the fact that it has for its basis the intuition or perception of space1 which is given a priori1 and is therefore infallible4 ,all space-relations1 however1 follow from each other with a necessity 7ground of being7 which affords a priori certainty1 and they can therefore be safely deduced from each other4 ,to these mathematical properties we have only to add one force of nature1 gravity1 which acts precisely in relation to the masses and the square of the distance2 and1 lastly1 the law of inertia1 which follows from the law of causality and is therefore true a priori1 and with it the empirical datum of the motion impressed1 once for all1 upon each of these masses4 ,this is the whole material of astronomy1 which both by its simplicity and its certainty leads to definite results1 which are highly interesting on account of the vastness and importance of the objects4 ,for example1 if ,i know the mass of a planet and the distance of its satellite from it1 ,i can tell with certainty the period of the revolution of the latter according to ,kepler's second law4 ,but the ground of this law is1 that with this distance only this velocity will both chain the satellite to the planet and prevent it from falling into it4 ,thus it is only upon such a geometrical basis1 that is1 by means of an intuition or perception a priori1 and also under the application of a law of nature1 that much can be arrived at by means of syllogisms1 for here they are merely like bridges from one sensuous apprehension to others2 but it is not so with mere pure syllogistic reasoning in the exclusively logical method4 ,the source of the first fundamental truths of astronomy is1 however1 properly induction1 that is1 the comprehension of what is given in many perceptions in one true and directly founded judgment4 ,from this1 hypotheses are afterwards constructed1 and their confirmation by experience1 as induction approaching to completeness1 affords the proof of the first judgment4 ,for example1 the apparent motion of the planets is known empirically2 after many false hypotheses with regard to the spacial connection of this motion 7planetary course7 the right one was at last found1 then the laws which it obeyed 7the laws of ,kepler71 and1 lastly1 the cause of these laws 7universal gravitation71 and the empirically known agreement of all observed cases with the whole of the hypotheses1 and with their consequences1 that is to say1 induction1 established them with complete certainty4 ,the invention of the hypotheses was the work of the judgment1 which rightly comprehended the given facts and expressed them accordingly2 but induction1 that is1 a multitude of perceptions1 confirmed their truth4 ,but their truth could also be known directly1 and by a single empirical perception1 if we could pass freely through space and had telescopic eyes4 ,therefore1 here also syllogisms are not the essential and only source of knowledge1 but really only a makeshift4 ,as a third example taken from a different sphere we may mention that the so-called metaphysical truths1 that is1 such truths as those to which ,kant assigns the position of the metaphysical first principles of natural science1 do not owe their evidence to demonstration4 ,what is a priori certain we know directly2 as the form of all knowledge1 it is known to us with the most complete necessity4 ,for example1 that matter is permanent1 that is1 can neither come into being nor pass away1 we know directly as negative truth2 for our pure intuition or perception of space and time gives the possibility of motion2 in the law of causality the understanding affords us the possibility of change of form and quality1 but we lack powers of the imagination for conceiving the coming into being or passing away of matter4 ,therefore that truth has at all times been evident to all men everywhere1 nor has it ever been seriously doubted2 and this could not be the case if it had no other ground of knowledge than the abstruse and exceedingly subtle proof of ,kant4 ,but besides this1 ,i have found ,kant's proof to be false 7as is explained in the ,appendix71 and have shown above that the permanence of matter is to be deduced1 not from the share which time has in the possibility of experience1 but from the share which belongs to space4 ,the true foundation of all truths which in this sense are called metaphysical1 that is1 abstract expressions of the necessary and universal forms of knowledge1 cannot itself lie in abstract principles2 but only in the immediate consciousness of the forms of the idea communicating itself in apodictic assertions a priori1 and fearing no refutation4 ,but if we yet desire to give a proof of them1 it can only consist in showing that what is to be proved is contained in some truth about which there is no doubt1 either as a part of it or as a presupposition4 ,thus1 for example1 ,i have shown that all empirical perception implies the application of the law of causality1 the knowledge of which is hence a condition of all experience1 and therefore cannot be first given and conditioned through experience as ,hume thought4 ,demonstrations in general are not so much for those who wish to learn as for those who wish to dispute4 ,such persons stubbornly deny directly established insight2 now only the truth can be consistent in all directions1 and therefore we must show such persons that they admit under one form and indirectly1 what they deny under another form and directly2 that is1 the logically necessary connection between what is denied and what is admitted4 ,it is also a consequence of the scientific form1 the subordination of everything particular under a general1 and so on always to what is more general1 that the truth of many propositions is only logically proved1--that is1 through their dependence upon other propositions1 through syllogisms1 which at the same time appear as proofs4 ,but we must never forget that this whole form of science is merely a means of rendering knowledge more easy1 not a means to greater certainty4 ,it is easier to discover the nature of an animal1 by means of the species to which it belongs1 and so on through the genus1 family1 order1 and class1 than to examine on every occasion the animal presented to us3 but the truth of all propositions arrived at syllogistically is always conditioned by and ultimately dependent upon some truth which rests not upon reasoning but upon perception4 ,if this perception were always as much within our reach as a deduction through syllogisms1 then it would be in every respect preferable4 ,for every deduction from concepts is exposed to great danger of error1 on account of the fact we have considered above1 that so many spheres lie partly within each other1 and that their content is often vague or uncertain4 ,this is illustrated by a multitude of demonstrations of false doctrines and sophisms of every kind4 ,syllogisms are indeed perfectly certain as regards form1 but they are very uncertain on account of their matter1 the concepts4 ,for1 on the one hand1 the spheres of these are not sufficiently sharply defined1 and1 on the other hand1 they intersect each other in so many ways that one sphere is in part contained in many others1 and we may pass at will from it to one or another of these1 and from this sphere again to others1 as we have already shown4 ,or1 in other words1 the minor term and also the middle can always be subordinated to different concepts1 from which we may choose at will the major and the middle1 and the nature of the conclusion depends on this choice4 ,consequently immediate evidence is always much to be preferred to reasoned truth1 and the latter is only to be accepted when the former is too remote1 and not when it is as near or indeed nearer than the latter4 ,accordingly we saw above that1 as a matter of fact1 in the case of logic1 in which the immediate knowledge in each individual case lies nearer to hand than deduced scientific knowledge1 we always conduct our thought according to our immediate knowledge of the laws of thought1 and leave logic unused47#bj7 #ae4 ,if now with our conviction that perception is the primary source of all evidence1 and that only direct or indirect connection with it is absolute truth2 and further1 that the shortest way to this is always the surest1 as every interposition of concepts means exposure to many deceptions2 if1 ,i say1 we now turn with this conviction to mathematics1 as it was established as a science by ,euclid1 and has remained as a whole to our own day1 we cannot help regarding the method it adopts1 as strange and indeed perverted4 ,we ask that every logical proof shall be traced back to an origin in perception2 but mathematics1 on the contrary1 is at great pains deliberately to throw away the evidence of perception which is peculiar to it1 and always at hand1 that it may substitute for it a logical demonstration4 ,this must seem to us like the action of a man who cuts off his legs in order to go on crutches1 or like that of the prince in the 8,triumph der ,empfindsamkeit0 who flees from the beautiful reality of nature1 to delight in a stage scene that imitates it4 ,i must here refer to what ,i have said in the sixth chapter of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 and take for granted that it is fresh and present in the memory of the reader2 so that ,i may link my observations on to it without explaining again the difference between the mere ground of knowledge of a mathematical truth1 which can be given logically1 and the ground of being1 which is the immediate connection of the parts of space and time1 known only in perception4 ,it is only insight into the ground of being that secures satisfaction and thorough knowledge4 ,the mere ground of knowledge must always remain superficial2 it can afford us indeed rational knowledge that a thing is as it is1 but it cannot tell why it is so4 ,euclid chose the latter way to the obvious detriment of the science4 ,for just at the beginning1 for example1 when he ought to show once for all how in a triangle the angles and sides reciprocally determine each other1 and stand to each other in the relation of reason and consequent1 in accordance with the form which the principle of sufficient reason has in pure space1 and which there1 as in every other sphere1 always affords the necessity that a thing is as it is1 because something quite different from it1 is as it is2 instead of in this way giving a thorough insight into the nature of the triangle1 he sets up certain disconnected arbitrarily chosen propositions concerning the triangle1 and gives a logical ground of knowledge of them1 through a laborious logical demonstration1 based upon the principle of contradiction4 ,instead of an exhaustive knowledge of these space-relations we therefore receive merely certain results of them1 imparted to us at pleasure1 and in fact we are very much in the position of a man to whom the different effects of an ingenious machine are shown1 but from whom its inner connection and construction are withheld4 ,we are compelled by the principle of contradiction to admit that what ,euclid demonstrates is true1 but we do not comprehend why it is so4 ,we have therefore almost the same uncomfortable feeling that we experience after a juggling trick1 and1 in fact1 most of ,euclid's demonstrations are remarkably like such feats4 ,the truth almost always enters by the back door1 for it manifests itself per accidens through some contingent circumstance4 ,often a reductio ad absurdum shuts all the doors one after another1 until only one is left through which we are therefore compelled to enter4 ,often1 as in the proposition of ,pythagoras1 lines are drawn1 we don't know why1 and it afterwards appears that they were traps which close unexpectedly and take prisoner the assent of the astonished learner1 who must now admit what remains wholly inconceivable in its inner connection1 so much so1 that he may study the whole of ,euclid through and through without gaining a real insight into the laws of space-relations1 but instead of them he only learns by heart certain results which follow from them4 ,this specially empirical and unscientific knowledge is like that of the doctor who knows both the disease and the cure for it1 but does not know the connection between them4 ,but all this is the necessary consequence if we capriciously reject the special kind of proof and evidence of one species of knowledge1 and forcibly introduce in its stead a kind which is quite foreign to its nature4 ,however1 in other respects the manner in which this has been accomplished by ,euclid deserves all the praise which has been bestowed on him through so many centuries1 and which has been carried so far that his method of treating mathematics has been set up as the pattern of all scientific exposition4 ,men tried indeed to model all the sciences after it1 but later they gave up the attempt without quite knowing why4 ,yet in our eyes this method of ,euclid in mathematics can appear only as a very brilliant piece of perversity4 ,but when a great error in life or in science has been intentionally and methodically carried out with universal applause1 it is always possible to discover its source in the philosophy which prevailed at the time4 ,the ,eleatics first brought out the difference1 and indeed often the conflict1 that exists between what is perceived1 17#ba7 and what is thought1 1 and used it in many ways in their philosophical epigrams1 and also in sophisms4 ,they were followed later by the ,megarics1 the ,dialecticians1 the ,sophists1 the ,new-,academy1 and the ,sceptics2 these drew attention to the illusion1 that is to say1 to the deception of the senses1 or rather of the understanding which transforms the data of the senses into perception1 and which often causes us to see things to which the reason unhesitatingly denies reality2 for example1 a stick broken in water1 and such like4 ,it came to be known that sense-perception was not to be trusted unconditionally1 and it was therefore hastily concluded that only rational1 logical thought could establish truth2 although ,plato 7in the ,parmenides71 the ,megarics1 ,pyrrho1 and the ,new-,academy1 showed by examples 7in the manner which was afterwards adopted by ,sextus ,empiricus7 how syllogisms and concepts were also sometimes misleading1 and indeed produced paralogisms and sophisms which arise much more easily and are far harder to explain than the illusion of sense-perception4 ,however1 this rationalism1 which arose in opposition to empiricism1 kept the upper hand1 and ,euclid constructed the science of mathematics in accordance with it4 ,he was compelled by necessity to found the axioms upon evidence of perception 771 but all the rest he based upon reasoning 774 ,his method reigned supreme through all the succeeding centuries1 and it could not but do so as long as pure intuition or perception1 a priori1 was not distinguished from empirical perception4 ,certain passages from the works of ,proclus1 the commentator of ,euclid1 which ,kepler translated into ,latin in his book1 8,de ,harmonia ,mundi10 seem to show that he fully recognised this distinction4 ,but ,proclus did not attach enough importance to the matter2 he merely mentioned it by the way1 so that he remained unnoticed and accomplished nothing4 ,therefore1 not till two thousand years later will the doctrine of ,kant1 which is destined to make such great changes in all the knowledge1 thought1 and action of ,european nations1 produce this change in mathematics also4 ,for it is only after we have learned from this great man that the intuitions or perceptions of space and time are quite different from empirical perceptions1 entirely independent of any impression of the senses1 conditioning it1 not conditioned by it1 i4e41 are a priori1 and therefore are not exposed to the illusions of sense2 only after we have learned this1 ,i say1 can we comprehend that ,euclid's logical method of treating mathematics is a useless precaution1 a crutch for sound legs1 that it is like a wanderer who during the night mistakes a bright1 firm road for water1 and carefully avoiding it1 toils over the broken ground beside it1 content to keep from point to point along the edge of the supposed water4 ,only now can we affirm with certainty that what presents itself to us as necessary in the perception of a figure1 does not come from the figure on the paper1 which is perhaps very defectively drawn1 nor from the abstract concept under which we think it1 but immediately from the form of all knowledge of which we are conscious a priori4 ,this is always the principle of sufficient reason2 here as the form of perception1 i4e41 space1 it is the principle of the ground of being1 the evidence and validity of which is1 however1 just as great and as immediate as that of the principle of the ground of knowing1 i4e41 logical certainty4 ,thus we need not and ought not to leave the peculiar province of mathematics in order to put our trust only in logical proof1 and seek to authenticate mathematics in a sphere which is quite foreign to it1 that of concepts4 ,if we confine ourselves to the ground peculiar to mathematics1 we gain the great advantage that in it the rational knowledge that something is1 is one with the knowledge why it is so1 whereas the method of ,euclid entirely separates these two1 and lets us know only the first1 not the second4 ,aristotle says admirably in the ,analyt41 post4 i4 #bg3 8 1 1 1 0 7,subtilior autem et praestantior ea est scientia1 qu ,,quod aliquid sit1 et ,,cur sit una simulque intelligimus non separatim ,,quod1 et ,,cur sit74 ,in physics we are only satisfied when the knowledge that a thing is as it is is combined with the knowledge why it is so4 ,to know that the mercury in the ,torricellian tube stands thirty inches high is not really rational knowledge if we do not know that it is sustained at this height by the counterbalancing weight of the atmosphere4 ,shall we then be satisfied in mathematics with the qualitas occulta of the circle that the segments of any two intersecting chords always contain equal rectangles8 ,that it is so ,euclid certainly demonstrates in the #ceth ,prop4 of the ,third ,book2 why it is so remains doubtful4 ,in the same way the proposition of ,pythagoras teaches us a qualitas occulta of the right-angled triangle2 the stilted and indeed fallacious demonstration of ,euclid forsakes us at the why1 and a simple figure1 which we already know1 and which is present to us1 gives at a glance far more insight into the matter1 and firm inner conviction of that necessity1 and of the dependence of that quality upon the right angle3-- ,illustration ,in the case of unequal catheti also1 and indeed generally in the case of every possible geometrical truth1 it is quite possible to obtain such a conviction based on perception1 because these truths were always discovered by such an empirically known necessity1 and their demonstration was only thought out afterwards in addition4 ,thus we only require an analysis of the process of thought in the first discovery of a geometrical truth in order to know its necessity empirically4 ,it is the analytical method in general that ,i wish for the exposition of mathematics1 instead of the synthetical method which ,euclid made use of4 ,yet this would have very great1 though not insuperable1 difficulties in the case of complicated mathematical truths4 ,here and there in ,germany men are beginning to alter the exposition of mathematics1 and to proceed more in this analytical way4 ,the greatest effort in this direction has been made by ,herr ,kosack1 teacher of mathematics and physics in the ,gymnasium at ,nordhausen1 who added a thorough attempt to teach geometry according to my principles to the programme of the school examination on the #fth of ,april #aheb4 ,in order to improve the method of mathematics1 it is especially necessary to overcome the prejudice that demonstrated truth has any superiority over what is known through perception1 or that logical truth founded upon the principle of contradiction has any superiority over metaphysical truth1 which is immediately evident1 and to which belongs the pure intuition or perception of space4 ,that which is most certain1 and yet always inexplicable1 is what is involved in the principle of sufficient reason1 for this principle1 in its different aspects1 expresses the universal form of all our ideas and knowledge4 ,all explanation consists of reduction to it1 exemplification in the particular case of the connection of ideas expressed generally through it4 ,it is thus the principle of all explanation1 and therefore it is neither susceptible of an explanation itself1 nor does it stand in need of it2 for every explanation presupposes it1 and only obtains meaning through it4 ,now1 none of its forms are superior to the rest2 it is equally certain and incapable of demonstration as the principle of the ground of being1 or of change1 or of action1 or of knowing4 ,the relation of reason and consequent is a necessity in all its forms1 and indeed it is1 in general1 the source of the concept of necessity1 for necessity has no other meaning4 ,if the reason is given there is no other necessity than that of the consequent1 and there is no reason that does not involve the necessity of the consequent4 ,just as surely then as the consequent expressed in the conclusion follows from the ground of knowledge given in the premises1 does the ground of being in space determine its consequent in space3 if ,i know through perception the relation of these two1 this certainty is just as great as any logical certainty4 ,but every geometrical proposition is just as good an expression of such a relation as one of the twelve axioms2 it is a metaphysical truth1 and as such1 just as certain as the principle of contradiction itself1 which is a metalogical truth1 and the common foundation of all logical demonstration4 ,whoever denies the necessity1 exhibited for intuition or perception1 of the space-relations expressed in any proposition1 may just as well deny the axioms1 or that the conclusion follows from the premises1 or1 indeed1 he may as well deny the principle of contradiction itself1 for all these relations are equally undemonstrable1 immediately evident and known a priori4 ,for any one to wish to derive the necessity of space-relations1 known in intuition or perception1 from the principle of contradiction by means of a logical demonstration is just the same as for the feudal superior of an estate to wish to hold it as the vassal of another4 ,yet this is what ,euclid has done4 ,his axioms only1 he is compelled to leave resting upon immediate evidence2 all the geometrical truths which follow are demonstrated logically1 that is to say1 from the agreement of the assumptions made in the proposition with the axioms which are presupposed1 or with some earlier proposition2 or from the contradiction between the opposite of the proposition and the assumptions made in it1 or the axioms1 or earlier propositions1 or even itself4 ,but the axioms themselves have no more immediate evidence than any other geometrical problem1 but only more simplicity on account of their smaller content4 ,when a criminal is examined1 a procs-verbal is made of his statement in order that we may judge of its truth from its consistency4 ,but this is only a makeshift1 and we are not satisfied with it if it is possible to investigate the truth of each of his answers for itself2 especially as he might lie consistently from the beginning4 ,but ,euclid investigated space according to this first method4 ,he set about it1 indeed1 under the correct assumption that nature must everywhere be consistent1 and that therefore it must also be so in space1 its fundamental form4 ,since then the parts of space stand to each other in a relation of reason and consequent1 no single property of space can be different from what it is without being in contradiction with all the others4 ,but this is a very troublesome1 unsatisfactory1 and roundabout way to follow4 ,it prefers indirect knowledge to direct1 which is just as certain1 and it separates the knowledge that a thing is from the knowledge why it is1 to the great disadvantage of the science2 and lastly1 it entirely withholds from the beginner insight into the laws of space1 and indeed renders him unaccustomed to the special investigation of the ground and inner connection of things1 inclining him to be satisfied with a mere historical knowledge that a thing is as it is4 ,the exercise of acuteness which this method is unceasingly extolled as affording consists merely in this1 that the pupil practises drawing conclusions1 i4e41 he practises applying the principle of contradiction1 but specially he exerts his memory to retain all those data whose agreement is to be tested4 ,moreover1 it is worth noticing that this method of proof was applied only to geometry and not to arithmetic4 ,in arithmetic the truth is really allowed to come home to us through perception alone1 which in it consists simply in counting4 ,as the perception of numbers is in time alone1 and therefore cannot be represented by a sensuous schema like the geometrical figure1 the suspicion that perception is merely empirical1 and possibly illusive1 disappeared in arithmetic1 and the introduction of the logical method of proof into geometry was entirely due to this suspicion4 ,as time has only one dimension1 counting is the only arithmetical operation1 to which all others may be reduced2 and yet counting is just intuition or perception a priori1 to which there is no hesitation in appealing here1 and through which alone everything else1 every sum and every equation1 is ultimately proved4 ,we prove1 for example1 not that 7#g #i #h - #b7_/c #db2 but we refer to the pure perception in time1 counting thus makes each individual problem an axiom4 ,instead of the demonstrations that fill geometry1 the whole content of arithmetic and algebra is thus simply a method of abbreviating counting4 ,we mentioned above that our immediate perception of numbers in time extends only to about ten4 ,beyond this an abstract concept of the numbers1 fixed by a word1 must take the place of the perception2 which does not therefore actually occur any longer1 but is only indicated in a thoroughly definite manner4 ,yet even so1 by the important assistance of the system of figures which enables us to represent all larger numbers by the same small ones1 intuitive or perceptive evidence of every sum is made possible1 even where we make such use of abstraction that not only the numbers1 but indefinite quantities and whole operations are thought only in the abstract and indicated as so thought1 as sqrt7rb7 so that we do not perform them1 but merely symbolise them4 ,we might establish truth in geometry also1 through pure a priori perception1 with the same right and certainty as in arithmetic4 ,it is in fact always this necessity1 known through perception in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason of being1 which gives to geometry its principal evidence1 and upon which in the consciousness of every one1 the certainty of its propositions rests4 ,the stilted logical demonstration is always foreign to the matter1 and is generally soon forgotten1 without weakening our conviction4 ,it might indeed be dispensed with altogether without diminishing the evidence of geometry1 for this is always quite independent of such demonstration1 which never proves anything we are not convinced of already1 through another kind of knowledge4 ,so far then it is like a cowardly soldier1 who adds a wound to an enemy slain by another1 and then boasts that he slew him himself47#bb7 ,after all this we hope there will be no doubt that the evidence of mathematics1 which has become the pattern and symbol of all evidence1 rests essentially not upon demonstration1 but upon immediate perception1 which is thus here1 as everywhere else1 the ultimate ground and source of truth4 ,yet the perception which lies at the basis of mathematics has a great advantage over all other perception1 and therefore over empirical perception4 ,it is a priori1 and therefore independent of experience1 which is always given only in successive parts2 therefore everything is equally near to it1 and we can start either from the reason or from the consequent1 as we please4 ,now this makes it absolutely reliable1 for in it the consequent is known from the reason1 and this is the only kind of knowledge that has necessity2 for example1 the equality of the sides is known as established by the equality of the angles4 ,all empirical perception1 on the other hand1 and the greater part of experience1 proceeds conversely from the consequent to the reason1 and this kind of knowledge is not infallible1 for necessity only attaches to the consequent on account of the reason being given1 and no necessity attaches to the knowledge of the reason from the consequent1 for the same consequent may follow from different reasons4 ,the latter kind of knowledge is simply induction1 i4e41 from many consequents which point to one reason1 the reason is accepted as certain2 but as the cases can never be all before us1 the truth here is not unconditionally certain4 ,but all knowledge through sense-perception1 and the great bulk of experience1 has only this kind of truth4 ,the affection of one of the senses induces the understanding to infer a cause of the effect1 but1 as a conclusion from the consequent to the reason is never certain1 illusion1 which is deception of the senses1 is possible1 and indeed often occurs1 as was pointed out above4 ,only when several of the senses1 or it may be all the five1 receive impressions which point to the same cause1 the possibility of illusion is reduced to a minimum2 but yet it still exists1 for there are cases1 for example1 the case of counterfeit money1 in which all the senses are deceived4 ,all empirical knowledge1 and consequently the whole of natural science1 is in the same position1 except only the pure1 or as ,kant calls it1 metaphysical part of it4 ,here also the causes are known from the effects1 consequently all natural philosophy rests upon hypotheses1 which are often false1 and must then gradually give place to more correct ones4 ,only in the case of purposely arranged experiments1 knowledge proceeds from the cause to the effect1 that is1 it follows the method that affords certainty2 but these experiments themselves are undertaken in consequence of hypotheses4 ,therefore1 no branch of natural science1 such as physics1 or astronomy1 or physiology could be discovered all at once1 as was the case with mathematics and logic1 but required and requires the collected and compared experiences of many centuries4 ,in the first place1 repeated confirmation in experience brings the induction1 upon which the hypothesis rests1 so near completeness that in practice it takes the place of certainty1 and is regarded as diminishing the value of the hypothesis1 its source1 just as little as the incommensurability of straight and curved lines diminishes the value of the application of geometry1 or that perfect exactness of the logarithm1 which is not attainable1 diminishes the value of arithmetic4 ,for as the logarithm1 or the squaring of the circle1 approaches infinitely near to correctness through infinite fractions1 so1 through manifold experience1 the induction1 i4e41 the knowledge of the cause from the effects1 approaches1 not infinitely indeed1 but yet so near mathematical evidence1 i4e41 knowledge of the effects from the cause1 that the possibility of mistake is small enough to be neglected1 but yet the possibility exists2 for example1 a conclusion from an indefinite number of cases to all cases1 i4e41 to the unknown ground on which all depend1 is an induction4 ,what conclusion of this kind seems more certain than that all men have the heart on the left side8 ,yet there are extremely rare and quite isolated exceptions of men who have the heart upon the right side4 ,sense-perception and empirical science have1 therefore1 the same kind of evidence4 ,the advantage which mathematics1 pure natural science1 and logic have over them1 as a priori knowledge1 rests merely upon this1 that the formal element in knowledge upon which all that is a priori is based1 is given as a whole and at once1 and therefore in it we can always proceed from the cause to the effect1 while in the former kind of knowledge we are generally obliged to proceed from the effect to the cause4 ,in other respects1 the law of causality1 or the principle of sufficient reason of change1 which guides empirical knowledge1 is in itself just as certain as the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason which are followed by the a priori sciences referred to above4 ,logical demonstrations from concepts or syllogisms have the advantage of proceeding from the reason to the consequent1 just as much as knowledge through perception a priori1 and therefore in themselves1 i4e41 according to their form1 they are infallible4 ,this has greatly assisted to bring demonstration in general into such esteem4 ,but this infallibility is merely relative2 the demonstration merely subsumes under the first principles of the science1 and it is these which contain the whole material truth of science1 and they must not themselves be demonstrated1 but must be founded on perception4 ,in the few a priori sciences we have named above1 this perception is pure1 but everywhere else it is empirical1 and is only raised to universality through induction4 ,if1 then1 in the empirical sciences also1 the particular is proved from the general1 yet the general1 on the other hand1 has received its truth from the particular2 it is only a store of collected material1 not a self-constituted foundation4 ,so much for the foundation of truth4 ,of the source and possibility of error many explanations have been tried since ,plato's metaphorical solution of the dove-cot where the wrong pigeons are caught1 c4 7,thetetus1 p4 #afg1 et seq47 ,kant's vague1 indefinite explanation of the source of error by means of the diagram of diagonal motion1 will be found in the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 p4 #bid of the first edition1 and p4 #cej of the fifth4 ,as truth is the relation of a judgment to its ground of knowledge1 it is always a problem how the person judging can believe that he has such a ground of knowledge and yet not have it2 that is to say1 how error1 the deception of reason1 is possible4 ,i find this possibility quite analogous to that of illusion1 or the deception of the understanding1 which has been explained above4 ,my opinion is 7and this is what gives this explanation its proper place here7 that every error is an inference from the consequent to the reason1 which indeed is valid when we know that the consequent has that reason and can have no other2 but otherwise is not valid4 ,the person who falls into error1 either attributes to a consequent a reason which it cannot have1 in which case he shows actual deficiency of understanding1 i4e41 deficiency in the capacity for immediate knowledge of the connection between the cause and the effect1 or1 as more frequently happens1 he attributes to the effect a cause which is possible1 but he adds to the major proposition of the syllogism1 in which he infers the cause from the effect1 that this effect always results only from this cause4 ,now he could only be assured of this by a complete induction1 which1 however1 he assumes without having made it4 ,this 8always0 is therefore too wide a concept1 and instead of it he ought to have used 8sometimes0 or 8generally40 ,the conclusion would then be problematical1 and therefore not erroneous4 ,that the man who errs should proceed in this way is due either to haste1 or to insufficient knowledge of what is possible1 on account of which he does not know the necessity of the induction that ought to be made4 ,error then is quite analogous to illusion4 ,both are inferences from the effect to the cause2 the illusion brought about always in accordance with the law of causality1 and by the understanding alone1 thus directly1 in perception itself2 the error in accordance with all the forms of the principle of sufficient reason1 and by the reason1 thus in thought itself2 yet most commonly in accordance with the law of causality1 as will appear from the three following examples1 which may be taken as types or representatives of the three kinds of error4 7#a47 ,the illusion of the senses 7deception of the understanding7 induces error 7deception of the reason72 for example1 if one mistakes a painting for an alto-relief1 and actually takes it for such2 the error results from a conclusion from the following major premise3 8,if dark grey passes regularly through all shades to white2 the cause is always the light1 which strikes differently upon projections and depressions1 ergo--40 7#b47 8,if there is no money in my safe1 the cause is always that my servant has got a key for it3 ergo--40 7#c47 8,if a ray of sunlight1 broken through a prism1 i4e41 bent up or down1 appears as a coloured band instead of round and white as before1 the cause must always be that light consists of homogeneous rays1 differently coloured and refrangible to different degrees1 which1 when forced asunder on account of the difference of their refrangibility1 give an elongated and variously-coloured spectrum3 ergo--bibamus60--,it must be possible to trace every error to such a conclusion1 drawn from a major premise which is often only falsely generalised1 hypothetical1 and founded on the assumption that some particular cause is that of a certain effect4 ,only certain mistakes in counting are to be excepted1 and they are not really errors1 but merely mistakes4 ,the operation prescribed by the concepts of the numbers has not been carried out in pure intuition or perception1 in counting1 but some other operation instead of it4 ,as regards the content of the sciences generally1 it is1 in fact1 always the relation of the phenomena of the world to each other1 according to the principle of sufficient reason1 under the guidance of the why1 which has validity and meaning only through this principle4 ,explanation is the establishment of this relation4 ,therefore explanation can never go further than to show two ideas standing to each other in the relation peculiar to that form of the principle of sufficient reason which reigns in the class to which they belong4 ,if this is done we cannot further be asked the question1 why3 for the relation proved is that one which absolutely cannot be imagined as other than it is1 i4e41 it is the form of all knowledge4 ,therefore we do not ask why #b #b #d2 or why the equality of the angles of a triangle determines the equality of the sides2 or why its effect follows any given cause2 or why the truth of the conclusion is evident from the truth of the premises4 ,every explanation which does not ultimately lead to a relation of which no 8why0 can further be demanded1 stops at an accepted qualitas occulta2 but this is the character of every original force of nature4 ,every explanation in natural science must ultimately end with such a qualitas occulta1 and thus with complete obscurity4 ,it must leave the inner nature of a stone just as much unexplained as that of a human being2 it can give as little account of the weight1 the cohesion1 the chemical qualities1 c41 of the former1 as of the knowing and acting of the latter4 ,thus1 for example1 weight is a qualitas occulta1 for it can be thought away1 and does not proceed as a necessity from the form of knowledge2 which1 on the contrary1 is not the case with the law of inertia1 for it follows from the law of causality1 and is therefore sufficiently explained if it is referred to that law4 ,there are two things which are altogether inexplicable1--that is to say1 do not ultimately lead to the relation which the principle of sufficient reason expresses4 ,these are1 first1 the principle of sufficient reason itself in all its four forms1 because it is the principle of all explanation1 which has meaning only in relation to it2 secondly1 that to which this principle does not extend1 but which is the original source of all phenomena2 the thing-in-itself1 the knowledge of which is not subject to the principle of sufficient reason4 ,we must be content for the present not to understand this thing-in-itself1 for it can only be made intelligible by means of the following book1 in which we shall resume this consideration of the possible achievements of the sciences4 ,but at the point at which natural science1 and indeed every science1 leaves things1 because not only its explanation of them1 but even the principle of this explanation1 the principle of sufficient reason1 does not extend beyond this point2 there philosophy takes them up and treats them after its own method1 which is quite distinct from the method of science4 ,in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 #ea1 ,i have shown how in the different sciences the chief guiding clue is one or other form of that principle2 and1 in fact1 perhaps the most appropriate classification of the sciences might be based upon this circumstance4 ,every explanation arrived at by the help of this clue is1 as we have said1 merely relative2 it explains things in relation to each other1 but something which indeed is presupposed is always left unexplained4 ,in mathematics1 for example1 this is space and time2 in mechanics1 physics1 and chemistry it is matter1 qualities1 original forces and laws of nature2 in botany and zoology it is the difference of species1 and life itself2 in history it is the human race with all its properties of thought and will3 in all it is that form of the principle of sufficient reason which is respectively applicable4 ,it is peculiar to philosophy that it presupposes nothing as known1 but treats everything as equally external and a problem2 not merely the relations of phenomena1 but also the phenomena themselves1 and even the principle of sufficient reason to which the other sciences are content to refer everything4 ,in philosophy nothing would be gained by such a reference1 as one member of the series is just as external to it as another2 and1 moreover1 that kind of connection is just as much a problem for philosophy as what is joined together by it1 and the latter again is just as much a problem after its combination has been explained as before it4 ,for1 as we have said1 just what the sciences presuppose and lay down as the basis and the limits of their explanation1 is precisely and peculiarly the problem of philosophy1 which may therefore be said to begin where science ends4 ,it cannot be founded upon demonstrations1 for they lead from known principles to unknown1 but everything is equally unknown and external to philosophy4 ,there can be no principle in consequence of which the world with all its phenomena first came into existence1 and therefore it is not possible to construct1 as ,spinoza wished1 a philosophy which demonstrates ex firmis principiis4 ,philosophy is the most general rational knowledge1 the first principles of which cannot therefore be derived from another principle still more general4 ,the principle of contradiction establishes merely the agreement of concepts1 but does not itself produce concepts4 ,the principle of sufficient reason explains the connections of phenomena1 but not the phenomena themselves2 therefore philosophy cannot proceed upon these principles to seek a causa efficiens or a causa finalis of the whole world4 ,my philosophy1 at least1 does not by any means seek to know whence or wherefore the world exists1 but merely what the world is4 ,but the why is here subordinated to the what1 for it already belongs to the world1 as it arises and has meaning and validity only through the form of its phenomena1 the principle of sufficient reason4 ,we might indeed say that every one knows what the world is without help1 for he is himself that subject of knowledge of which the world is the idea2 and so far this would be true4 ,but that knowledge is empirical1 is in the concrete2 the task of philosophy is to reproduce this in the abstract to raise to permanent rational knowledge the successive changing perceptions1 and in general1 all that is contained under the wide concept of feeling and merely negatively defined as not abstract1 distinct1 rational knowledge4 ,it must therefore consist of a statement in the abstract1 of the nature of the whole world1 of the whole1 and of all the parts4 ,in order then that it may not lose itself in the endless multitude of particular judgments1 it must make use of abstraction and think everything individual in the universal1 and its differences also in the universal4 ,it must therefore partly separate and partly unite1 in order to present to rational knowledge the whole manifold of the world generally1 according to its nature1 comprehended in a few abstract concepts4 ,through these concepts1 in which it fixes the nature of the world1 the whole individual must be known as well as the universal1 the knowledge of both therefore must be bound together to the minutest point4 ,therefore the capacity for philosophy consists just in that in which ,plato placed it1 the knowledge of the one in the many1 and the many in the one4 ,philosophy will therefore be a sum-total of general judgments1 whose ground of knowledge is immediately the world itself in its entirety1 without excepting anything2 thus all that is to be found in human consciousness2 it will be a complete recapitulation1 as it were1 a reflection1 of the world in abstract concepts1 which is only possible by the union of the essentially identical in one concept and the relegation of the different to another4 ,this task was already prescribed to philosophy by ,bacon of ,verulam when he said3 ea demum vera est philosophia1 quae mundi ipsius voces fidelissime reddit1 et veluti dictante mundo conscripta est1 et nihil aliud est1 quam ejusdem ,,simulacrum ,,et ,,reflectio1 neque addit quidquam de proprio1 sed tantum iterat et resonat 7,de ,augm4 ,scient41 ,l4 #b1 c4 #ac74 ,but we take this in a wider sense than ,bacon could then conceive4 ,the agreement which all the sides and parts of the world have with each other1 just because they belong to a whole1 must also be found in this abstract copy of it4 ,therefore the judgments in this sum-total could to a certain extent be deduced from each other1 and indeed always reciprocally so deduced4 ,yet to make the first judgment possible1 they must all be present1 and thus implied as prior to it in the knowledge of the world in the concrete1 especially as all direct proof is more certain than indirect proof2 their harmony with each other by virtue of which they come together into the unity of one thought1 and which arises from the harmony and unity of the world of perception itself1 which is their common ground of knowledge1 is not therefore to be made use of to establish them1 as that which is prior to them1 but is only added as a confirmation of their truth4 ,this problem itself can only become quite clear in being solved47#bc7 #af4 ,after this full consideration of reason as a special faculty of knowledge belonging to man alone1 and the results and phenomena peculiar to human nature brought about by it1 it still remains for me to speak of reason1 so far as it is the guide of human action1 and in this respect may be called practical4 ,but what there is to say upon this point has found its place elsewhere in the appendix to this work1 where ,i controvert the existence of the so-called practical reason of ,kant1 which he 7certainly very conveniently7 explained as the immediate source of virtue1 and as the seat of an absolute 7i4e41 fallen from heaven7 imperative4 ,the detailed and thorough refutation of this ,kantian principle of morality ,i have given later in the 8,fundamental ,problems of ,ethics40 ,there remains1 therefore1 but little for me to say here about the actual influence of reason1 in the true sense of the word1 upon action4 ,at the commencement of our treatment of reason we remarked1 in general terms1 how much the action and behaviour of men differs from that of brutes1 and that this difference is to be regarded as entirely due to the presence of abstract concepts in consciousness4 ,the influence of these upon our whole existence is so penetrating and significant that1 on account of them1 we are related to the lower animals very much as those animals that see are related to those that have no eyes 7certain larvae1 worms1 and zoophytes74 ,animals without eyes know only by touch what is immediately present to them in space1 what comes into contact with them2 those which see1 on the contrary1 know a wide circle of near and distant objects4 ,in the same way the absence of reason confines the lower animals to the ideas of perception1 i4e41 the real objects which are immediately present to them in time2 we1 on the contrary1 on account of knowledge in the abstract1 comprehend not only the narrow actual present1 but also the whole past and future1 and the wide sphere of the possible2 we view life freely on all its sides1 and go far beyond the present and the actual4 ,thus what the eye is in space and for sensuous knowledge1 reason is1 to a certain extent1 in time and for inner knowledge4 ,but as the visibility of objects has its worth and meaning only in the fact that it informs us of their tangibility1 so the whole worth of abstract knowledge always consists in its relation to what is perceived4 ,therefore men naturally attach far more worth to immediate and perceived knowledge than to abstract concepts1 to that which is merely thought2 they place empirical knowledge before logical4 ,but this is not the opinion of men who live more in words than in deeds1 who have seen more on paper and in books than in actual life1 and who in their greatest degeneracy become pedants and lovers of the mere letter4 ,thus only is it conceivable that ,leibnitz and ,wolf and all their successors could go so far astray as to explain knowledge of perception1 after the example of ,duns ,scotus1 as merely confused abstract knowledge6 ,to the honour of ,spinoza1 ,i must mention that his truer sense led him1 on the contrary1 to explain all general concepts as having arisen from the confusion of that which was known in perception 7,eth4 ,,ii41 prop4 #dj1 ,schol4 #a74 ,it is also a result of perverted opinion that in mathematics the evidence proper to it was rejected1 and logical evidence alone accepted2 that everything in general which was not abstract knowledge was comprehended under the wide name of feeling1 and consequently was little valued2 and lastly that the ,kantian ethics regarded the good will which immediately asserts itself upon knowledge of the circumstances1 and guides to right and good action as mere feeling and emotion1 and consequently as worthless and without merit1 and would only recognise actions which proceed from abstract maxims as having moral worth4 ,the many-sided view of life as a whole which man1 as distinguished from the lower animals1 possesses through reason1 may be compared to a geometrical1 colourless1 abstract1 reduced plan of his actual life4 ,he1 therefore1 stands to the lower animals as the navigator who1 by means of chart1 compass1 and quadrant1 knows accurately his course and his position at any time upon the sea1 stands to the uneducated sailors who see only the waves and the heavens4 ,thus it is worth noticing1 and indeed wonderful1 how1 besides his life in the concrete1 man always lives another life in the abstract4 ,in the former he is given as a prey to all the storms of actual life1 and to the influence of the present2 he must struggle1 suffer1 and die like the brute4 ,but his life in the abstract1 as it lies before his rational consciousness1 is the still reflection of the former1 and of the world in which he lives2 it is just that reduced chart or plan to which we have referred4 ,here in the sphere of quiet deliberation1 what completely possessed him and moved him intensely before1 appears to him cold1 colourless1 and for the moment external to him2 he is merely the spectator1 the observer4 ,in respect of this withdrawal into reflection he may be compared to an actor who has played his part in one scene1 and who takes his place among the audience till it is time for him to go upon the stage again1 and quietly looks on at whatever may happen1 even though it be the preparation for his own death 7in the piece71 but afterwards he again goes on the stage and acts and suffers as he must4 ,from this double life proceeds that quietness peculiar to human beings1 so very different from the thoughtlessness of the brutes1 and with which1 in accordance with previous reflection1 or a formed determination1 or a recognised necessity1 a man suffers or accomplishes in cold blood1 what is of the utmost and often terrible importance to him2 suicide1 execution1 the duel1 enterprises of every kind fraught with danger to life1 and1 in general1 things against which his whole animal nature rebels4 ,under such circumstances we see to what an extent reason has mastered the animal nature1 and we say to the strong3 6 7ferreum certe tibi cor71 ,il4 #bd1 #eba4 ,here we can say truly that reason manifests itself practically1 and thus wherever action is guided by reason1 where the motives are abstract concepts1 wherever we are not determined by particular ideas of perception1 nor by the impression of the moment which guides the brutes1 there practical reason shows itself4 ,but ,i have fully explained in the ,appendix1 and illustrated by examples1 that this is entirely different from and unrelated to the ethical worth of actions2 that rational action and virtuous action are two entirely different things2 that reason may just as well find itself in connection with great evil as with great good1 and by its assistance may give great power to the one as well as to the other2 that it is equally ready and valuable for the methodical and consistent carrying out of the noble and of the bad intention1 of the wise as of the foolish maxim2 which all results from the constitution of its nature1 which is feminine1 receptive1 retentive1 and not spontaneous2 all this ,i have shown in detail in the ,appendix1 and illustrated by examples4 ,what is said there would have been placed here1 but on account of my polemic against ,kant's pretended practical reason ,i have been obliged to relegate it to the ,appendix1 to which ,i therefore refer4 ,the ideal explained in the ,stoical philosophy is the most complete development of practical reason in the true and genuine sense of the word2 it is the highest summit to which man can attain by the mere use of his reason1 and in it his difference from the brutes shows itself most distinctly4 ,for the ethics of ,stoicism are originally and essentially1 not a doctrine of virtue1 but merely a guide to a rational life1 the end and aim of which is happiness through peace of mind4 ,virtuous conduct appears in it as it were merely by accident1 as the means1 not as the end4 ,therefore the ethical theory of ,stoicism is in its whole nature and point of view fundamentally different from the ethical systems which lay stress directly upon virtue1 such as the doctrines of the ,vedas1 of ,plato1 of ,christianity1 and of ,kant4 ,the aim of ,stoical ethics is happiness3 7virtutes omnes finem habere beatitudinem7 it is called in the account of the ,stoa by ,stobus 7,ecl41 ,l4 ii4 c4 #g1 p4 #aad1 and also p4 #ach74 ,yet the ethics of ,stoicism teach that happiness can only be attained with certainty through inward peace and quietness of spirit 771 and that this again can only be reached through virtue2 this is the whole meaning of the saying that virtue is the highest good4 ,but if indeed by degrees the end is lost sight of in the means1 and virtue is inculcated in a way which discloses an interest entirely different from that of one's own happiness1 for it contradicts this too distinctly2 this is just one of those inconsistencies by means of which1 in every system1 the immediately known1 or1 as it is called1 felt truth leads us back to the right way in defiance of syllogistic reasoning2 as1 for example1 we see clearly in the ethical teaching of ,spinoza1 which deduces a pure doctrine of virtue from the egoistical suum utile qurere by means of palpable sophisms4 ,according to this1 as ,i conceive the spirit of the ,stoical ethics1 their source lies in the question whether the great prerogative of man1 reason1 which1 by means of planned action and its results1 relieves life and its burdens so much1 might not also be capable of freeing him at once1 directly1 i4e41 through mere knowledge1 completely1 or nearly so1 of the sorrows and miseries of every kind of which his life is full4 ,they held that it was not in keeping with the prerogative of reason that the nature given with it1 which by means of it comprehends and contemplates an infinity of things and circumstances1 should yet1 through the present1 and the accidents that can be contained in the few years of a life that is short1 fleeting1 and uncertain1 be exposed to such intense pain1 to such great anxiety and suffering1 as arise from the tempestuous strain of the desires and the antipathies2 and they believed that the due application of reason must raise men above them1 and can make them invulnerable4 ,therefore ,antisthenes says3 1 7aut mentem parandam1 aut laqueum4 ,plut4 de stoic4 repugn41 c4 #ad71 i4e41 life is so full of troubles and vexations1 that one must either rise above it by means of corrected thoughts1 or leave it4 ,it was seen that want and suffering did not directly and of necessity spring from not having1 but from desiring to have and not having2 that therefore this desire to have is the necessary condition under which alone it becomes a privation not to have and begets pain4 1 7non paupertas dolorem efficit1 sed cupiditas71 ,epict41 fragm4 #be4 ,men learned also from experience that it is only the hope of what is claimed that begets and nourishes the wish2 therefore neither the many unavoidable evils which are common to all1 nor unattainable blessings1 disquiet or trouble us1 but only the trifling more or less of those things which we can avoid or attain2 indeed1 not only what is absolutely unavoidable or unattainable1 but also what is merely relatively so1 leaves us quite undisturbed2 therefore the ills that have once become joined to our individuality1 or the good things that must of necessity always be denied us1 are treated with indifference1 in accordance with the peculiarity of human nature that every wish soon dies and can no more beget pain if it is not nourished by hope4 ,it followed from all this that happiness always depends upon the proportion between our claims and what we receive4 ,it is all one whether the quantities thus related be great or small1 and the proportion can be established just as well by diminishing the amount of the first as by increasing the amount of the second2 and in the same way it also follows that all suffering proceeds from the want of proportion between what we demand and expect and what we get4 ,now this want of proportion obviously lies only in knowledge1 and it could be entirely abolished through fuller insight47#bd7 ,therefore ,chrysippus says3 7,stob4 ,ecl41 ,l4 ii4 c4 #g1 p4 #acd71 that is1 one ought to live with a due knowledge of the transitory nature of the things of the world4 ,for as often as a man loses self-command1 or is struck down by a misfortune1 or grows angry1 or becomes faint-hearted1 he shows that he finds things different from what he expected1 consequently that he was caught in error1 and did not know the world and life1 did not know that the will of the individual is crossed at every step by the chance of inanimate nature and the antagonism of aims and the wickedness of other individuals3 he has therefore either not made use of his reason in order to arrive at a general knowledge of this characteristic of life1 or he lacks judgment1 in that he does not recognise in the particular what he knows in general1 and is therefore surprised by it and loses his self-command47#be7 ,thus also every keen pleasure is an error and an illusion1 for no attained wish can give lasting satisfaction2 and1 moreover1 every possession and every happiness is but lent by chance for an uncertain time1 and may therefore be demanded back the next hour4 ,all pain rests on the passing away of such an illusion2 thus both arise from defective knowledge2 the wise man therefore holds himself equally aloof from joy and sorrow1 and no event disturbs his 4 ,in accordance with this spirit and aim of the ,stoa1 ,epictetus began and ended with the doctrine as the kernel of his philosophy1 that we should consider well and distinguish what depends upon us and what does not1 and therefore entirely avoid counting upon the latter1 whereby we shall certainly remain free from all pain1 sorrow1 and anxiety4 ,but that which alone is dependent upon us is the will2 and here a transition gradually takes place to a doctrine of virtue1 for it is observed that as the outer world1 which is independent of us1 determines good and bad fortune1 so inner contentment with ourselves1 or the absence of it1 proceeds from the will4 ,but it was then asked whether we ought to apply the words bonum and malum to the two former or to the two latter8 ,this was indeed arbitrary and a matter of choice1 and did not make any real difference1 but yet the ,stoics disputed everlastingly with the ,peripatetics and ,epicureans about it1 and amused themselves with the inadmissible comparison of two entirely incommensurable quantities1 and the antithetical1 paradoxical judgments which proceeded from them1 and which they flung at each other4 ,the ,paradoxa of ,cicero afford us an interesting collection of these from the ,stoical side4 ,zeno1 the founder1 seems originally to have followed a somewhat different path4 ,the starting-point with him was that for the attainment of the highest good1 i4e41 blessedness and spiritual peace1 one must live in harmony with oneself 7 2 4--,consonanter vivere3 hoc est secundum unam rationem et concordem sibi vivere4 ,stob4 ,ecl4 eth4 ,l4 ii41 c4 #g1 p4 #acb4 ,also3 4 ,virtutem esse animi affectiomem secum per totam vitam consentientem1 ibid41 p4 #ajd47 ,now this was only possible for a man if he determined himself entirely rationally1 according to concepts1 not according to changing impressions and moods2 since1 however1 only the maxims of our conduct1 not the consequences nor the outward circumstances1 are in our power1 in order to be always consistent we must set before us as our aim only the maxims and not the consequences and circumstances1 and thus again a doctrine of virtue is introduced4 ,but the ethical principle of ,zeno--to live in harmony with oneself--appeared even to his immediate successors to be too formal and empty4 ,they therefore gave it material content by the addition--8to live in harmony with nature0 7 71 which1 as ,stobus mentions in another place1 was first added by ,kleanthes1 and extended the matter very much on account of the wide sphere of the concept and the vagueness of the expression4 ,for ,kleanthes meant the whole of nature in general1 while ,chrysippus meant human nature in particular 7,diog4 ,laert41 #g1 #hi74 ,it followed that what alone was adapted to the latter was virtue1 just as the satisfaction of animal desires was adapted to animal natures2 and thus ethics had again to be forcibly united to a doctrine of virtue1 and in some way or other established through physics4 ,for the ,stoics always aimed at unity of principle1 as for them ,god and the world were not dissevered4 ,the ethical system of ,stoicism1 regarded as a whole1 is in fact a very valuable and estimable attempt to use the great prerogative of man1 reason1 for an important and salutary end2 to raise him above the suffering and pain to which all life is exposed1 by means of a maxim-- 8,qua ratione queas traducere leniter vum3 ,ne te semper inops agitet vexetque cupido1 ,ne pavor et rerum mediocriter utilium spes10 and thus to make him partake1 in the highest degree1 of the dignity which belongs to him as a rational being1 as distinguished from the brutes2 a dignity of which1 in this sense at any rate1 we can speak1 though not in any other4 ,it is a consequence of my view of the ethical system of ,stoicism that it must be explained at the part of my work at which ,i consider what reason is and what it can do4 ,but although it may to a certain extent be possible to attain that end through the application of reason1 and through a purely rational system of ethics1 and although experience shows that the happiest men are those purely rational characters commonly called practical philosophers1--and rightly so1 because just as the true1 that is1 the theoretical philosopher carries life into the concept1 they carry the concept into life1--yet it is far from the case that perfection can be attained in this way1 and that the reason1 rightly used1 can really free us from the burden and sorrow of life1 and lead us to happiness4 ,rather1 there lies an absolute contradiction in wishing to live without suffering1 and this contradiction is also implied in the commonly used expression1 8blessed life40 ,this will become perfectly clear to whoever comprehends the whole of the following exposition4 ,in this purely rational system of ethics the contradiction reveals itself thus1 the ,stoic is obliged in his doctrine of the way to the blessed life 7for that is what his ethical system always remains7 to insert a recommendation of suicide 7as among the magnificent ornaments and apparel of ,eastern despots there is always a costly vial of poison7 for the case in which the sufferings of the body1 which cannot be philosophised away by any principles or syllogistic reasonings1 are paramount and incurable2 thus its one aim1 blessedness1 is rendered vain1 and nothing remains as a mode of escape from suffering except death2 in such a case then death must be voluntarily accepted1 just as we would take any other medicine4 ,here then a marked antagonism is brought out between the ethical system of ,stoicism and all those systems referred to above which make virtue in itself directly1 and accompanied by the most grievous sorrows1 their aim1 and will not allow a man to end his life in order to escape from suffering4 ,not one of them1 however1 was able to give the true reason for the rejection of suicide1 but they laboriously collected illusory explanations from all sides3 the true reason will appear in the ,fourth ,book in the course of the development of our system4 ,but the antagonism referred to reveals and establishes the essential difference in fundamental principle between ,stoicism1 which is just a special form of endmonism1 and those doctrines we have mentioned1 although both are often at one in their results1 and are apparently related4 ,and the inner contradiction referred to above1 with which the ethical system of ,stoicism is affected even in its fundamental thought1 shows itself further in the circumstance that its ideal1 the ,stoic philosopher1 as the system itself represents him1 could never obtain life or inner poetic truth1 but remains a wooden1 stiff lay-figure of which nothing can be made4 ,he cannot himself make use of his wisdom1 and his perfect peace1 contentment1 and blessedness directly contradict the nature of man1 and preclude us from forming any concrete idea of him4 ,when compared with him1 how entirely different appear the overcomers of the world1 and voluntary hermits that ,indian philosophy presents to us1 and has actually produced2 or indeed1 the holy man of ,christianity1 that excellent form full of deep life1 of the greatest poetic truth1 and the highest significance1 which stands before us in perfect virtue1 holiness1 and sublimity1 yet in a state of supreme suffering47#bf7 ,,second ,,book4 ,,the ,,world ,,as ,,will4 ,first ,aspect4 ,the ,objectification ,of ,the ,will4 ,nos habitat1 non tartara1 sed nec sidera coeli3 ,spiritus1 in nobis qui viget1 illa facit4 #ag4 ,in the first book we considered the idea merely as such1 that is1 only according to its general form4 ,it is true that as far as the abstract idea1 the concept1 is concerned1 we obtained a knowledge of it in respect of its content also1 because it has content and meaning only in relation to the idea of perception1 without which it would be worthless and empty4 ,accordingly1 directing our attention exclusively to the idea of perception1 we shall now endeavour to arrive at a knowledge of its content1 its more exact definition1 and the forms which it presents to us4 ,and it will specially interest us to find an explanation of its peculiar significance1 that significance which is otherwise merely felt1 but on account of which it is that these pictures do not pass by us entirely strange and meaningless1 as they must otherwise do1 but speak to us directly1 are understood1 and obtain an interest which concerns our whole nature4 ,we direct our attention to mathematics1 natural science1 and philosophy1 for each of these holds out the hope that it will afford us a part of the explanation we desire4 ,now1 taking philosophy first1 we find that it is like a monster with many heads1 each of which speaks a different language4 ,they are not1 indeed1 all at variance on the point we are here considering1 the significance of the idea of perception4 ,for1 with the exception of the ,sceptics and the ,idealists1 the others1 for the most part1 speak very much in the same way of an object which constitutes the basis of the idea1 and which is indeed different in its whole being and nature from the idea1 but yet is in all points as like it as one egg is to another4 ,but this does not help us1 for we are quite unable to distinguish such an object from the idea2 we find that they are one and the same2 for every object always and for ever presupposes a subject1 and therefore remains idea1 so that we recognised objectivity as belonging to the most universal form of the idea1 which is the division into subject and object4 ,further1 the principle of sufficient reason1 which is referred to in support of this doctrine1 is for us merely the form of the idea1 the orderly combination of one idea with another1 but not the combination of the whole finite or infinite series of ideas with something which is not idea at all1 and which cannot therefore be presented in perception4 ,of the ,sceptics and ,idealists we spoke above1 in examining the controversy about the reality of the outer world4 ,if we turn to mathematics to look for the fuller knowledge we desire of the idea of perception1 which we have1 as yet1 only understood generally1 merely in its form1 we find that mathematics only treats of these ideas so far as they fill time and space1 that is1 so far as they are quantities4 ,it will tell us with the greatest accuracy the how-many and the how-much2 but as this is always merely relative1 that is to say1 merely a comparison of one idea with others1 and a comparison only in the one respect of quantity1 this also is not the information we are principally in search of4 ,lastly1 if we turn to the wide province of natural science1 which is divided into many fields1 we may1 in the first place1 make a general division of it into two parts4 ,it is either the description of forms1 which ,i call ,morphology1 or the explanation of changes1 which ,i call ,etiology4 ,the first treats of the permanent forms1 the second of the changing matter1 according to the laws of its transition from one form to another4 ,the first is the whole extent of what is generally called natural history4 ,it teaches us1 especially in the sciences of botany and zoology1 the various permanent1 organised1 and therefore definitely determined forms in the constant change of individuals2 and these forms constitute a great part of the content of the idea of perception4 ,in natural history they are classified1 separated1 united1 arranged according to natural and artificial systems1 and brought under concepts which make a general view and knowledge of the whole of them possible4 ,further1 an infinitely fine analogy both in the whole and in the parts of these forms1 and running through them all 7unit de plan71 is established1 and thus they may be compared to innumerable variations on a theme which is not given4 ,the passage of matter into these forms1 that is to say1 the origin of individuals1 is not a special part of natural science1 for every individual springs from its like by generation1 which is everywhere equally mysterious1 and has as yet evaded definite knowledge4 ,the little that is known on the subject finds its place in physiology1 which belongs to that part of natural science ,i have called etiology4 ,mineralogy also1 especially where it becomes geology1 inclines towards etiology1 though it principally belongs to morphology4 ,etiology proper comprehends all those branches of natural science in which the chief concern is the knowledge of cause and effect4 ,the sciences teach how1 according to an invariable rule1 one condition of matter is necessarily followed by a certain other condition2 how one change necessarily conditions and brings about a certain other change2 this sort of teaching is called explanation4 ,the principal sciences in this department are mechanics1 physics1 chemistry1 and physiology4 ,if1 however1 we surrender ourselves to its teaching1 we soon become convinced that etiology cannot afford us the information we chiefly desire1 any more than morphology4 ,the latter presents to us innumerable and infinitely varied forms1 which are yet related by an unmistakable family likeness4 ,these are for us ideas1 and when only treated in this way1 they remain always strange to us1 and stand before us like hieroglyphics which we do not understand4 ,etiology1 on the other hand1 teaches us that1 according to the law of cause and effect1 this particular condition of matter brings about that other particular condition1 and thus it has explained it and performed its part4 ,however1 it really does nothing more than indicate the orderly arrangement according to which the states of matter appear in space and time1 and teach in all cases what phenomenon must necessarily appear at a particular time in a particular place4 ,it thus determines the position of phenomena in time and space1 according to a law whose special content is derived from experience1 but whose universal form and necessity is yet known to us independently of experience4 ,but it affords us absolutely no information about the inner nature of any one of these phenomena3 this is called a force of nature1 and it lies outside the province of causal explanation1 which calls the constant uniformity with which manifestations of such a force appear whenever their known conditions are present1 a law of nature4 ,but this law of nature1 these conditions1 and this appearance in a particular place at a particular time1 are all that it knows or ever can know4 ,the force itself which manifests itself1 the inner nature of the phenomena which appear in accordance with these laws1 remains always a secret to it1 something entirely strange and unknown in the case of the simplest as well as of the most complex phenomena4 ,for although as yet etiology has most completely achieved its aim in mechanics1 and least completely in physiology1 still the force on account of which a stone falls to the ground or one body repels another is1 in its inner nature1 not less strange and mysterious than that which produces the movements and the growth of an animal4 ,the science of mechanics presupposes matter1 weight1 impenetrability1 the possibility of communicating motion by impact1 inertia and so forth as ultimate facts1 calls them forces of nature1 and their necessary and orderly appearance under certain conditions a law of nature4 ,only after this does its explanation begin1 and it consists in indicating truly and with mathematical exactness1 how1 where and when each force manifests itself1 and in referring every phenomenon which presents itself to the operation of one of these forces4 ,physics1 chemistry1 and physiology proceed in the same way in their province1 only they presuppose more and accomplish less4 ,consequently the most complete etiological explanation of the whole of nature can never be more than an enumeration of forces which cannot be explained1 and a reliable statement of the rule according to which phenomena appear in time and space1 succeed1 and make way for each other4 ,but the inner nature of the forces which thus appear remains unexplained by such an explanation1 which must confine itself to phenomena and their arrangement1 because the law which it follows does not extend further4 ,in this respect it may be compared to a section of a piece of marble which shows many veins beside each other1 but does not allow us to trace the course of the veins from the interior of the marble to its surface4 ,or1 if ,i may use an absurd but more striking comparison1 the philosophical investigator must always have the same feeling towards the complete etiology of the whole of nature1 as a man who1 without knowing how1 has been brought into a company quite unknown to him1 each member of which in turn presents another to him as his friend and cousin1 and therefore as quite well known1 and yet the man himself1 while at each introduction he expresses himself gratified1 has always the question on his lips3 8,but how the deuce do ,i stand to the whole company80 ,thus we see that1 with regard to those phenomena which we know only as our ideas1 etiology can never give us the desired information that shall carry us beyond this point4 ,for1 after all its explanations1 they still remain quite strange to us1 as mere ideas whose significance we do not understand4 ,the causal connection merely gives us the rule and the relative order of their appearance in space and time1 but affords us no further knowledge of that which so appears4 ,moreover1 the law of causality itself has only validity for ideas1 for objects of a definite class1 and it has meaning only in so far as it presupposes them4 ,thus1 like these objects themselves1 it always exists only in relation to a subject1 that is1 conditionally2 and so it is known just as well if we start from the subject1 i4e41 a priori1 as if we start from the object1 i4e41 a posteriori4 ,kant indeed has taught us this4 ,but what now impels us to inquiry is just that we are not satisfied with knowing that we have ideas1 that they are such and such1 and that they are connected according to certain laws1 the general expression of which is the principle of sufficient reason4 ,we wish to know the significance of these ideas2 we ask whether this world is merely idea2 in which case it would pass by us like an empty dream or a baseless vision1 not worth our notice2 or whether it is also something else1 something more than idea1 and if so1 what4 ,thus much is certain1 that this something we seek for must be completely and in its whole nature different from the idea2 that the forms and laws of the idea must therefore be completely foreign to it2 further1 that we cannot arrive at it from the idea under the guidance of the laws which merely combine objects1 ideas1 among themselves1 and which are the forms of the principle of sufficient reason4 ,thus we see already that we can never arrive at the real nature of things from without4 ,however much we investigate1 we can never reach anything but images and names4 ,we are like a man who goes round a castle seeking in vain for an entrance1 and sometimes sketching the faades4 ,and yet this is the method that has been followed by all philosophers before me4 #ah4 ,in fact1 the meaning for which we seek of that world which is present to us only as our idea1 or the transition from the world as mere idea of the knowing subject to whatever it may be besides this1 would never be found if the investigator himself were nothing more than the pure knowing subject 7a winged cherub without a body74 ,but he is himself rooted in that world2 he finds himself in it as an individual1 that is to say1 his knowledge1 which is the necessary supporter of the whole world as idea1 is yet always given through the medium of a body1 whose affections are1 as we have shown1 the starting-point for the understanding in the perception of that world4 ,his body is1 for the pure knowing subject1 an idea like every other idea1 an object among objects4 ,its movements and actions are so far known to him in precisely the same way as the changes of all other perceived objects1 and would be just as strange and incomprehensible to him if their meaning were not explained for him in an entirely different way4 ,otherwise he would see his actions follow upon given motives with the constancy of a law of nature1 just as the changes of other objects follow upon causes1 stimuli1 or motives4 ,but he would not understand the influence of the motives any more than the connection between every other effect which he sees and its cause4 ,he would then call the inner nature of these manifestations and actions of his body which he did not understand a force1 a quality1 or a character1 as he pleased1 but he would have no further insight into it4 ,but all this is not the case2 indeed the answer to the riddle is given to the subject of knowledge who appears as an individual1 and the answer is will4 ,this and this alone gives him the key to his own existence1 reveals to him the significance1 shows him the inner mechanism of his being1 of his action1 of his movements4 ,the body is given in two entirely different ways to the subject of knowledge1 who becomes an individual only through his identity with it4 ,it is given as an idea in intelligent perception1 as an object among objects and subject to the laws of objects4 ,and it is also given in quite a different way as that which is immediately known to every one1 and is signified by the word will4 ,every true act of his will is also at once and without exception a movement of his body4 ,the act of will and the movement of the body are not two different things objectively known1 which the bond of causality unites2 they do not stand in the relation of cause and effect2 they are one and the same1 but they are given in entirely different ways1--immediately1 and again in perception for the understanding4 ,the action of the body is nothing but the act of the will objectified1 i4e41 passed into perception4 ,it will appear later that this is true of every movement of the body1 not merely those which follow upon motives1 but also involuntary movements which follow upon mere stimuli1 and1 indeed1 that the whole body is nothing but objectified will1 i4e41 will become idea4 ,all this will be proved and made quite clear in the course of this work4 ,in one respect1 therefore1 ,i shall call the body the objectivity of will2 as in the previous book1 and in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 in accordance with the one-sided point of view intentionally adopted there 7that of the idea71 ,i called it the immediate object4 ,thus in a certain sense we may also say that will is the knowledge a priori of the body1 and the body is the knowledge a posteriori of the will4 ,resolutions of the will which relate to the future are merely deliberations of the reason about what we shall will at a particular time1 not real acts of will4 ,only the carrying out of the resolve stamps it as will1 for till then it is never more than an intention that may be changed1 and that exists only in the reason in abstracto4 ,it is only in reflection that to will and to act are different2 in reality they are one4 ,every true1 genuine1 immediate act of will is also1 at once and immediately1 a visible act of the body4 ,and1 corresponding to this1 every impression upon the body is also1 on the other hand1 at once and immediately an impression upon the will4 ,as such it is called pain when it is opposed to the will2 gratification or pleasure when it is in accordance with it4 ,the degrees of both are widely different4 ,it is quite wrong1 however1 to call pain and pleasure ideas1 for they are by no means ideas1 but immediate affections of the will in its manifestation1 the body2 compulsory1 instantaneous willing or not-willing of the impression which the body sustains4 ,there are only a few impressions of the body which do not touch the will1 and it is through these alone that the body is an immediate object of knowledge1 for1 as perceived by the understanding1 it is already an indirect object like all others4 ,these impressions are1 therefore1 to be treated directly as mere ideas1 and excepted from what has been said4 ,the impressions we refer to are the affections of the purely objective senses of sight1 hearing1 and touch1 though only so far as these organs are affected in the way which is specially peculiar to their specific nature4 ,this affection of them is so excessively weak an excitement of the heightened and specifically modified sensibility of these parts that it does not affect the will1 but only furnishes the understanding with the data out of which the perception arises1 undisturbed by any excitement of the will4 ,but every stronger or different kind of affection of these organs of sense is painful1 that is to say1 against the will1 and thus they also belong to its objectivity4 ,weakness of the nerves shows itself in this1 that the impressions which have only such a degree of strength as would usually be sufficient to make them data for the understanding reach the higher degree at which they influence the will1 that is to say1 give pain or pleasure1 though more often pain1 which is1 however1 to some extent deadened and inarticulate1 so that not only particular tones and strong light are painful to us1 but there ensues a generally unhealthy and hypochondriacal disposition which is not distinctly understood4 ,the identity of the body and the will shows itself further1 among other ways1 in the circumstance that every vehement and excessive movement of the will1 i4e41 every emotion1 agitates the body and its inner constitution directly1 and disturbs the course of its vital functions4 ,this is shown in detail in 8,will in ,nature10 p4 #bg of the second edition and p4 #bh of the third4 ,lastly1 the knowledge which ,i have of my will1 though it is immediate1 cannot be separated from that which ,i have of my body4 ,i know my will1 not as a whole1 not as a unity1 not completely1 according to its nature1 but ,i know it only in its particular acts1 and therefore in time1 which is the form of the phenomenal aspect of my body1 as of every object4 ,therefore the body is a condition of the knowledge of my will4 ,thus1 ,i cannot really imagine this will apart from my body4 ,in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 the will1 or rather the subject of willing1 is treated as a special class of ideas or objects4 ,but even there we saw this object become one with the subject2 that is1 we saw it cease to be an object4 ,we there called this union the miracle 1 and the whole of the present work is to a certain extent an explanation of this4 ,so far as ,i know my will specially as object1 ,i know it as body4 ,but then ,i am again at the first class of ideas laid down in that essay1 i4e41 real objects4 ,as we proceed we shall see always more clearly that these ideas of the first class obtain their explanation and solution from those of the fourth class given in the essay1 which could no longer be properly opposed to the subject as object1 and that1 therefore1 we must learn to understand the inner nature of the law of causality which is valid in the first class1 and of all that happens in accordance with it from the law of motivation which governs the fourth class4 ,the identity of the will and the body1 of which we have now given a cursory explanation1 can only be proved in the manner we have adopted here4 ,we have proved this identity for the first time1 and shall do so more and more fully in the course of this work4 ,by 8proved0 we mean raised from the immediate consciousness1 from knowledge in the concrete to abstract knowledge of the reason1 or carried over into abstract knowledge4 ,on the other hand1 from its very nature it can never be demonstrated1 that is1 deduced as indirect knowledge from some other more direct knowledge1 just because it is itself the most direct knowledge2 and if we do not apprehend it and stick to it as such1 we shall expect in vain to receive it again in some indirect way as derivative knowledge4 ,it is knowledge of quite a special kind1 whose truth cannot therefore properly be brought under any of the four rubrics under which ,i have classified all truth in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 #bi1 the logical1 the empirical1 the metaphysical1 and the metalogical1 for it is not1 like all these1 the relation of an abstract idea to another idea1 or to the necessary form of perceptive or of abstract ideation1 but it is the relation of a judgment to the connection which an idea of perception1 the body1 has to that which is not an idea at all1 but something toto genere different1 will4 ,i should like therefore to distinguish this from all other truth1 and call it philosophical truth4 ,we can turn the expression of this truth in different ways and say3 ,my body and my will are one2--or1 ,what as an idea of perception ,i call my body1 ,i call my will1 so far as ,i am conscious of it in an entirely different way which cannot be compared to any other2--or1 ,my body is the objectivity of my will2--or1 ,my body considered apart from the fact that it is my idea is still my will1 and so forth47#bg7 #ai4 ,in the first book we were reluctantly driven to explain the human body as merely idea of the subject which knows it1 like all the other objects of this world of perception4 ,but it has now become clear that what enables us consciously to distinguish our own body from all other objects which in other respects are precisely the same1 is that our body appears in consciousness in quite another way toto genere different from idea1 and this we denote by the word will2 and that it is just this double knowledge which we have of our own body that affords us information about it1 about its action and movement following on motives1 and also about what it experiences by means of external impressions2 in a word1 about what it is1 not as idea1 but as more than idea2 that is to say1 what it is in itself4 ,none of this information have we got directly with regard to the nature1 action1 and experience of other real objects4 ,it is just because of this special relation to one body that the knowing subject is an individual4 ,for regarded apart from this relation1 his body is for him only an idea like all other ideas4 ,but the relation through which the knowing subject is an individual1 is just on that account a relation which subsists only between him and one particular idea of all those which he has4 ,therefore he is conscious of this one idea1 not merely as an idea1 but in quite a different way as a will4 ,if1 however1 he abstracts from that special relation1 from that twofold and completely heterogeneous knowledge of what is one and the same1 then that one1 the body1 is an idea like all other ideas4 ,therefore1 in order to understand the matter1 the individual who knows must either assume that what distinguishes that one idea from others is merely the fact that his knowledge stands in this double relation to it alone2 that insight in two ways at the same time is open to him only in the case of this one object of perception1 and that this is to be explained not by the difference of this object from all others1 but only by the difference between the relation of his knowledge to this one object1 and its relation to all other objects4 ,or else he must assume that this object is essentially different from all others2 that it alone of all objects is at once both will and idea1 while the rest are only ideas1 i4e41 only phantoms4 ,thus he must assume that his body is the only real individual in the world1 i4e41 the only phenomenon of will and the only immediate object of the subject4 ,that other objects1 considered merely as ideas1 are like his body1 that is1 like it1 fill space 7which itself can only be present as idea71 and also1 like it1 are causally active in space1 is indeed demonstrably certain from the law of causality which is a priori valid for ideas1 and which admits of no effect without a cause2 but apart from the fact that we can only reason from an effect to a cause generally1 and not to a similar cause1 we are still in the sphere of mere ideas1 in which alone the law of causality is valid1 and beyond which it can never take us4 ,but whether the objects known to the individual only as ideas are yet1 like his own body1 manifestations of a will1 is1 as was said in the ,first ,book1 the proper meaning of the question as to the reality of the external world4 ,to deny this is theoretical egoism1 which on that account regards all phenomena that are outside its own will as phantoms1 just as in a practical reference exactly the same thing is done by practical egoism4 ,for in it a man regards and treats himself alone as a person1 and all other persons as mere phantoms4 ,theoretical egoism can never be demonstrably refuted1 yet in philosophy it has never been used otherwise than as a sceptical sophism1 i4e41 a pretence4 ,as a serious conviction1 on the other hand1 it could only be found in a madhouse1 and as such it stands in need of a cure rather than a refutation4 ,we do not therefore combat it any further in this regard1 but treat it as merely the last stronghold of scepticism1 which is always polemical4 ,thus our knowledge1 which is always bound to individuality and is limited by this circumstance1 brings with it the necessity that each of us can only be one1 while1 on the other hand1 each of us can know all2 and it is this limitation that creates the need for philosophy4 ,we therefore who1 for this very reason1 are striving to extend the limits of our knowledge through philosophy1 will treat this sceptical argument of theoretical egoism which meets us1 as an army would treat a small frontier fortress4 ,the fortress cannot indeed be taken1 but the garrison can never sally forth from it1 and therefore we pass it by without danger1 and are not afraid to have it in our rear4 ,the double knowledge which each of us has of the nature and activity of his own body1 and which is given in two completely different ways1 has now been clearly brought out4 ,we shall accordingly make further use of it as a key to the nature of every phenomenon in nature1 and shall judge of all objects which are not our own bodies1 and are consequently not given to our consciousness in a double way but only as ideas1 according to the analogy of our own bodies1 and shall therefore assume that as in one aspect they are idea1 just like our bodies1 and in this respect are analogous to them1 so in another aspect1 what remains of objects when we set aside their existence as idea of the subject1 must in its inner nature be the same as that in us which we call will4 ,for what other kind of existence or reality should we attribute to the rest of the material world8 ,whence should we take the elements out of which we construct such a world8 ,besides will and idea nothing is known to us or thinkable4 ,if we wish to attribute the greatest known reality to the material world which exists immediately only in our idea1 we give it the reality which our own body has for each of us2 for that is the most real thing for every one4 ,but if we now analyse the reality of this body and its actions1 beyond the fact that it is idea1 we find nothing in it except the will2 with this its reality is exhausted4 ,therefore we can nowhere find another kind of reality which we can attribute to the material world4 ,thus if we hold that the material world is something more than merely our idea1 we must say that besides being idea1 that is1 in itself and according to its inmost nature1 it is that which we find immediately in ourselves as will4 ,i say according to its inmost nature2 but we must first come to know more accurately this real nature of the will1 in order that we may be able to distinguish from it what does not belong to itself1 but to its manifestation1 which has many grades4 ,such1 for example1 is the circumstance of its being accompanied by knowledge1 and the determination by motives which is conditioned by this knowledge4 ,as we shall see farther on1 this does not belong to the real nature of will1 but merely to its distinct manifestation as an animal or a human being4 ,if1 therefore1 ,i say1--the force which attracts a stone to the earth is according to its nature1 in itself1 and apart from all idea1 will1 ,i shall not be supposed to express in this proposition the insane opinion that the stone moves itself in accordance with a known motive1 merely because this is the way in which will appears in man47#bh7 ,we shall now proceed more clearly and in detail to prove1 establish1 and develop to its full extent what as yet has only been provisionally and generally explained47#bi7 #bj4 ,as we have said1 the will proclaims itself primarily in the voluntary movements of our own body1 as the inmost nature of this body1 as that which it is besides being object of perception1 idea4 ,for these voluntary movements are nothing else than the visible aspect of the individual acts of will1 with which they are directly coincident and identical1 and only distinguished through the form of knowledge into which they have passed1 and in which alone they can be known1 the form of idea4 ,but these acts of will have always a ground or reason outside themselves in motives4 ,yet these motives never determine more than what ,i will at this time1 in this place1 and under these circumstances1 not that ,i will in general1 or what ,i will in general1 that is1 the maxims which characterise my volition generally4 ,therefore the inner nature of my volition cannot be explained from these motives2 but they merely determine its manifestation at a given point of time3 they are merely the occasion of my will showing itself2 but the will itself lies outside the province of the law of motivation1 which determines nothing but its appearance at each point of time4 ,it is only under the presupposition of my empirical character that the motive is a sufficient ground of explanation of my action4 ,but if ,i abstract from my character1 and then ask1 why1 in general1 ,i will this and not that1 no answer is possible1 because it is only the manifestation of the will that is subject to the principle of sufficient reason1 and not the will itself1 which in this respect is to be called groundless4 ,at this point ,i presuppose ,kant's doctrine of the empirical and intelligible character1 and also my own treatment of the subject in 8,the ,fundamental ,problems of ,ethics10 pp4 #dh1 #eh1 and #agh1 et seq41 of first edition 7p4 #agd1 et seq41 of second edition74 ,i shall also have to speak more fully on the question in the ,fourth ,book4 ,for the present1 ,i have only to draw attention to this1 that the fact of one manifestation being established through another1 as here the deed through the motive1 does not at all conflict with the fact that its real nature is will1 which itself has no ground2 for as the principle of sufficient reason in all its aspects is only the form of knowledge1 its validity extends only to the idea1 to the phenomena1 to the visibility of the will1 but not to the will itself1 which becomes visible4 ,if now every action of my body is the manifestation of an act of will in which my will itself in general1 and as a whole1 thus my character1 expresses itself under given motives1 manifestation of the will must be the inevitable condition and presupposition of every action4 ,for the fact of its manifestation cannot depend upon something which does not exist directly and only through it1 which consequently is for it merely accidental1 and through which its manifestation itself would be merely accidental4 ,now that condition is just the whole body itself4 ,thus the body itself must be manifestation of the will1 and it must be related to my will as a whole1 that is1 to my intelligible character1 whose phenomenal appearance in time is my empirical character1 as the particular action of the body is related to the particular act of the will4 ,the whole body1 then1 must be simply my will become visible1 must be my will itself1 so far as this is object of perception1 an idea of the first class4 ,it has already been advanced in confirmation of this that every impression upon my body also affects my will at once and immediately1 and in this respect is called pain or pleasure1 or1 in its lower degrees1 agreeable or disagreeable sensation2 and also1 conversely1 that every violent movement of the will1 every emotion or passion1 convulses the body and disturbs the course of its functions4 ,indeed we can also give an etiological account1 though a very incomplete one1 of the origin of my body1 and a somewhat better account of its development and conservation1 and this is the substance of physiology4 ,but physiology merely explains its theme in precisely the same way as motives explain action4 ,thus the physiological explanation of the functions of the body detracts just as little from the philosophical truth that the whole existence of this body and the sum total of its functions are merely the objectification of that will which appears in its outward actions in accordance with a motive1 as the establishment of the individual action through the motive and the necessary sequence of the action from the motive conflicts with the fact that action in general1 and according to its nature1 is only the manifestation of a will which itself has no ground4 ,if1 however1 physiology tries to refer even these outward actions1 the immediate voluntary movements1 to causes in the organism1--for example1 if it explains the movement of the muscles as resulting from the presence of fluids 78like the contraction of a cord when it is wet10 says ,reil in his 8,archiv fr ,physiologie10 vol4 vi4 p4 #aec71 even supposing it really could give a thorough explanation of this kind1 yet this would never invalidate the immediately certain truth that every voluntary motion 7functiones animales7 is the manifestation of an act of will4 ,now1 just as little can the physiological explanation of vegetative life 7functiones naturales vitales71 however far it may advance1 ever invalidate the truth that the whole animal life which thus develops itself is the manifestation of will4 ,in general1 then1 as we have shown above1 no etiological explanation can ever give us more than the necessarily determined position in time and space of a particular manifestation1 its necessary appearance there1 according to a fixed law2 but the inner nature of everything that appears in this way remains wholly inexplicable1 and is presupposed by every etiological explanation1 and merely indicated by the names1 force1 or law of nature1 or1 if we are speaking of action1 character or will4 ,thus1 although every particular action1 under the presupposition of the definite character1 necessarily follows from the given motive1 and although growth1 the process of nourishment1 and all the changes of the animal body take place according to necessarily acting causes 7stimuli71 yet the whole series of actions1 and consequently every individual act1 and also its condition1 the whole body itself which accomplishes it1 and therefore also the process through which and in which it exists1 are nothing but the manifestation of the will1 the becoming visible1 the objectification of the will4 ,upon this rests the perfect suitableness of the human and animal body to the human and animal will in general1 resembling1 though far surpassing1 the correspondence between an instrument made for a purpose and the will of the maker1 and on this account appearing as design1 i4e41 the teleological explanation of the body4 ,the parts of the body must1 therefore1 completely correspond to the principal desires through which the will manifests itself2 they must be the visible expression of these desires4 ,teeth1 throat1 and bowels are objectified hunger2 the organs of generation are objectified sexual desire2 the grasping hand1 the hurrying feet1 correspond to the more indirect desires of the will which they express4 ,as the human form generally corresponds to the human will generally1 so the individual bodily structure corresponds to the individually modified will1 the character of the individual1 and therefore it is throughout and in all its parts characteristic and full of expression4 ,it is very remarkable that ,parmenides already gave expression to this in the following verses1 quoted by ,aristotle 7,metaph4 iii4 #e73-- 2 1 1 2 4 7,ut enim cuique complexio membrorum flexibilium se habet1 ita mens hominibus adest3 idem namque est1 quod sapit1 membrorum natura hominibus1 et omnibus et omni3 quod enim plus est1 intelligentia est477#cj7 #ba4 ,whoever has now gained from all these expositions a knowledge in abstracto1 and therefore clear and certain1 of what every one knows directly in concreto1 i4e41 as feeling1 a knowledge that his will is the real inner nature of his phenomenal being1 which manifests itself to him as idea1 both in his actions and in their permanent substratum1 his body1 and that his will is that which is most immediate in his consciousness1 though it has not as such completely passed into the form of idea in which object and subject stand over against each other1 but makes itself known to him in a direct manner1 in which he does not quite clearly distinguish subject and object1 yet is not known as a whole to the individual himself1 but only in its particular acts1--whoever1 ,i say1 has with me gained this conviction will find that of itself it affords him the key to the knowledge of the inmost being of the whole of nature2 for he now transfers it to all those phenomena which are not given to him1 like his own phenomenal existence1 both in direct and indirect knowledge1 but only in the latter1 thus merely one-sidedly as idea alone4 ,he will recognise this will of which we are speaking not only in those phenomenal existences which exactly resemble his own1 in men and animals as their inmost nature1 but the course of reflection will lead him to recognise the force which germinates and vegetates in the plant1 and indeed the force through which the crystal is formed1 that by which the magnet turns to the north pole1 the force whose shock he experiences from the contact of two different kinds of metals1 the force which appears in the elective affinities of matter as repulsion and attraction1 decomposition and combination1 and1 lastly1 even gravitation1 which acts so powerfully throughout matter1 draws the stone to the earth and the earth to the sun1--all these1 ,i say1 he will recognise as different only in their phenomenal existence1 but in their inner nature as identical1 as that which is directly known to him so intimately and so much better than anything else1 and which in its most distinct manifestation is called will4 ,it is this application of reflection alone that prevents us from remaining any longer at the phenomenon1 and leads us to the thing in itself4 ,phenomenal existence is idea and nothing more4 ,all idea1 of whatever kind it may be1 all object1 is phenomenal existence1 but the will alone is a thing in itself4 ,as such1 it is throughout not idea1 but toto genere different from it2 it is that of which all idea1 all object1 is the phenomenal appearance1 the visibility1 the objectification4 ,it is the inmost nature1 the kernel1 of every particular thing1 and also of the whole4 ,it appears in every blind force of nature and also in the preconsidered action of man2 and the great difference between these two is merely in the degree of the manifestation1 not in the nature of what manifests itself4 #bb4 ,now1 if we are to think as an object this thing-in-itself 7we wish to retain the ,kantian expression as a standing formula71 which1 as such1 is never object1 because all object is its mere manifestation1 and therefore cannot be it itself1 we must borrow for it the name and concept of an object1 of something in some way objectively given1 consequently of one of its own manifestations4 ,but in order to serve as a clue for the understanding1 this can be no other than the most complete of all its manifestations1 i4e41 the most distinct1 the most developed1 and directly enlightened by knowledge4 ,now this is the human will4 ,it is1 however1 well to observe that here1 at any rate1 we only make use of a denominatio a potiori1 through which1 therefore1 the concept of will receives a greater extension than it has hitherto had4 ,knowledge of the identical in different phenomena1 and of difference in similar phenomena1 is1 as ,plato so often remarks1 a sine qua non of philosophy4 ,but hitherto it was not recognised that every kind of active and operating force in nature is essentially identical with will1 and therefore the multifarious kinds of phenomena were not seen to be merely different species of the same genus1 but were treated as heterogeneous4 ,consequently there could be no word to denote the concept of this genus4 ,i therefore name the genus after its most important species1 the direct knowledge of which lies nearer to us and guides us to the indirect knowledge of all other species4 ,but whoever is incapable of carrying out the required extension of the concept will remain involved in a permanent misunderstanding4 ,for by the word will he understands only that species of it which has hitherto been exclusively denoted by it1 the will which is guided by knowledge1 and whose manifestation follows only upon motives1 and indeed merely abstract motives1 and thus takes place under the guidance of the reason4 ,this1 we have said1 is only the most prominent example of the manifestation of will4 ,we must now distinctly separate in thought the inmost essence of this manifestation which is known to us directly1 and then transfer it to all the weaker1 less distinct manifestations of the same nature1 and thus we shall accomplish the desired extension of the concept of will4 ,from another point of view ,i should be equally misunderstood by any one who should think that it is all the same in the end whether we denote this inner nature of all phenomena by the word will or by any other4 ,this would be the case if the thing-in-itself were something whose existence we merely inferred1 and thus knew indirectly and only in the abstract4 ,then1 indeed1 we might call it what we pleased2 the name would stand merely as the symbol of an unknown quantity4 ,but the word will1 which1 like a magic spell1 discloses to us the inmost being of everything in nature1 is by no means an unknown quantity1 something arrived at only by inference1 but is fully and immediately comprehended1 and is so familiar to us that we know and understand what will is far better than anything else whatever4 ,the concept of will has hitherto commonly been subordinated to that of force1 but ,i reverse the matter entirely1 and desire that every force in nature should be thought as will4 ,it must not be supposed that this is mere verbal quibbling or of no consequence2 rather1 it is of the greatest significance and importance4 ,for at the foundation of the concept of force1 as of all other concepts1 there ultimately lies the knowledge in sense-perception of the objective world1 that is to say1 the phenomenon1 the idea2 and the concept is constructed out of this4 ,it is an abstraction from the province in which cause and effect reign1 i4e41 from ideas of perception1 and means just the causal nature of causes at the point at which this causal nature is no further etiologically explicable1 but is the necessary presupposition of all etiological explanation4 ,the concept will1 on the other hand1 is of all possible concepts the only one which has its source not in the phenomenal1 not in the mere idea of perception1 but comes from within1 and proceeds from the most immediate consciousness of each of us1 in which each of us knows his own individuality1 according to its nature1 immediately1 apart from all form1 even that of subject and object1 and which at the same time is this individuality1 for here the subject and the object of knowledge are one4 ,if1 therefore1 we refer the concept of force to that of will1 we have in fact referred the less known to what is infinitely better known2 indeed1 to the one thing that is really immediately and fully known to us1 and have very greatly extended our knowledge4 ,if1 on the contrary1 we subsume the concept of will under that of force1 as has hitherto always been done1 we renounce the only immediate knowledge which we have of the inner nature of the world1 for we allow it to disappear in a concept which is abstracted from the phenomenal1 and with which we can therefore never go beyond the phenomenal4 #bc4 ,the will as a thing in itself is quite different from its phenomenal appearance1 and entirely free from all the forms of the phenomenal1 into which it first passes when it manifests itself1 and which therefore only concern its objectivity1 and are foreign to the will itself4 ,even the most universal form of all idea1 that of being object for a subject1 does not concern it2 still less the forms which are subordinate to this and which collectively have their common expression in the principle of sufficient reason1 to which we know that time and space belong1 and consequently multiplicity also1 which exists and is possible only through these4 ,in this last regard ,i shall call time and space the principium individuationis1 borrowing an expression from the old schoolmen1 and ,i beg to draw attention to this1 once for all4 ,for it is only through the medium of time and space that what is one and the same1 both according to its nature and to its concept1 yet appears as different1 as a multiplicity of co-existent and successive phenomena4 ,thus time and space are the principium individuationis1 the subject of so many subtleties and disputes among the schoolmen1 which may be found collected in ,suarez 7,disp4 #e1 ,sect4 #c74 ,according to what has been said1 the will as a thing-in-itself lies outside the province of the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms1 and is consequently completely groundless1 although all its manifestations are entirely subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason4 ,further1 it is free from all multiplicity1 although its manifestations in time and space are innumerable4 ,it is itself one1 though not in the sense in which an object is one1 for the unity of an object can only be known in opposition to a possible multiplicity2 nor yet in the sense in which a concept is one1 for the unity of a concept originates only in abstraction from a multiplicity2 but it is one as that which lies outside time and space1 the principium individuationis1 i4e41 the possibility of multiplicity4 ,only when all this has become quite clear to us through the subsequent examination of the phenomena and different manifestations of the will1 shall we fully understand the meaning of the ,kantian doctrine that time1 space and causality do not belong to the thing-in-itself1 but are only forms of knowing4 ,the uncaused nature of will has been actually recognised1 where it manifests itself most distinctly1 as the will of man1 and this has been called free1 independent4 ,but on account of the uncaused nature of the will itself1 the necessity to which its manifestation is everywhere subjected has been overlooked1 and actions are treated as free1 which they are not4 ,for every individual action follows with strict necessity from the effect of the motive upon the character4 ,all necessity is1 as we have already said1 the relation of the consequent to the reason1 and nothing more4 ,the principle of sufficient reason is the universal form of all phenomena1 and man in his action must be subordinated to it like every other phenomenon4 ,but because in self-consciousness the will is known directly and in itself1 in this consciousness lies also the consciousness of freedom4 ,the fact is1 however1 overlooked that the individual1 the person1 is not will as a thing-in-itself1 but is a phenomenon of will1 is already determined as such1 and has come under the form of the phenomenal1 the principle of sufficient reason4 ,hence arises the strange fact that every one believes himself a priori to be perfectly free1 even in his individual actions1 and thinks that at every moment he can commence another manner of life1 which just means that he can become another person4 ,but a posteriori1 through experience1 he finds to his astonishment that he is not free1 but subjected to necessity2 that in spite of all his resolutions and reflections he does not change his conduct1 and that from the beginning of his life to the end of it1 he must carry out the very character which he himself condemns1 and as it were play the part he has undertaken to the end4 ,i cannot pursue this subject further at present1 for it belongs1 as ethical1 to another part of this work4 ,in the meantime1 ,i only wish to point out here that the phenomenon of the will which in itself is uncaused1 is yet as such subordinated to the law of necessity1 that is1 the principle of sufficient reason1 so that in the necessity with which the phenomena of nature follow each other1 we may find nothing to hinder us from recognising in them the manifestations of will4 ,only those changes which have no other ground than a motive1 i4e41 an idea1 have hitherto been regarded as manifestations of will4 ,therefore in nature a will has only been attributed to man1 or at the most to animals2 for knowledge1 the idea1 is of course1 as ,i have said elsewhere1 the true and exclusive characteristic of animal life4 ,but that the will is also active where no knowledge guides it1 we see at once in the instinct and the mechanical skill of animals47#ca7 ,that they have ideas and knowledge is here not to the point1 for the end towards which they strive as definitely as if it were a known motive1 is yet entirely unknown to them4 ,therefore in such cases their action takes place without motive1 is not guided by the idea1 and shows us first and most distinctly how the will may be active entirely without knowledge4 ,the bird of a year old has no idea of the eggs for which it builds a nest2 the young spider has no idea of the prey for which it spins a web2 nor has the ant-lion any idea of the ants for which he digs a trench for the first time4 ,the larva of the stag-beetle makes the hole in the wood1 in which it is to await its metamorphosis1 twice as big if it is going to be a male beetle as if it is going to be a female1 so that if it is a male there may be room for the horns1 of which1 however1 it has no idea4 ,in such actions of these creatures the will is clearly operative as in their other actions1 but it is in blind activity1 which is indeed accompanied by knowledge but not guided by it4 ,if now we have once gained insight into the fact1 that idea as motive is not a necessary and essential condition of the activity of the will1 we shall more easily recognise the activity of will where it is less apparent4 ,for example1 we shall see that the house of the snail is no more made by a will which is foreign to the snail itself1 than the house which we build is produced through another will than our own2 but we shall recognise in both houses the work of a will which objectifies itself in both the phenomena--a will which works in us according to motives1 but in the snail still blindly as formative impulse directed outwards4 ,in us also the same will is in many ways only blindly active3 in all the functions of our body which are not guided by knowledge1 in all its vital and vegetative processes1 digestion1 circulation1 secretion1 growth1 reproduction4 ,not only the actions of the body1 but the whole body itself is1 as we have shown above1 phenomenon of the will1 objectified will1 concrete will4 ,all that goes on in it must therefore proceed through will1 although here this will is not guided by knowledge1 but acts blindly according to causes1 which in this case are called stimuli4 ,i call a cause1 in the narrowest sense of the word1 that state of matter1 which1 while it introduces another state with necessity1 yet suffers just as great a change itself as that which it causes2 which is expressed in the rule1 8action and reaction are equal40 ,further1 in the case of what is properly speaking a cause1 the effect increases directly in proportion to the cause1 and therefore also the reaction4 ,so that1 if once the mode of operation be known1 the degree of the effect may be measured and calculated from the degree of the intensity of the cause2 and conversely the degree of the intensity of the cause may be calculated from the degree of the effect4 ,such causes1 properly so called1 operate in all the phenomena of mechanics1 chemistry1 and so forth2 in short1 in all the changes of unorganised bodies4 ,on the other hand1 ,i call a stimulus1 such a cause as sustains no reaction proportional to its effect1 and the intensity of which does not vary directly in proportion to the intensity of its effect1 so that the effect cannot be measured by it4 ,on the contrary1 a small increase of the stimulus may cause a very great increase of the effect1 or conversely1 it may eliminate the previous effect altogether1 and so forth4 ,all effects upon organised bodies as such are of this kind4 ,all properly organic and vegetative changes of the animal body must therefore be referred to stimuli1 not to mere causes4 ,but the stimulus1 like every cause and motive generally1 never determines more than the point of time and space at which the manifestation of every force is to take place1 and does not determine the inner nature of the force itself which is manifested4 ,this inner nature we know1 from our previous investigation1 is will1 to which therefore we ascribe both the unconscious and the conscious changes of the body4 ,the stimulus holds the mean1 forms the transition between the motive1 which is causality accompanied throughout by knowledge1 and the cause in the narrowest sense4 ,in particular cases it is sometimes nearer a motive1 sometimes nearer a cause1 but yet it can always be distinguished from both4 ,thus1 for example1 the rising of the sap in a plant follows upon stimuli1 and cannot be explained from mere causes1 according to the laws of hydraulics or capillary attraction2 yet it is certainly assisted by these1 and altogether approaches very near to a purely causal change4 ,on the other hand1 the movements of the ,hedysarum gyrans and the ,mimosa pudica1 although still following upon mere stimuli1 are yet very like movements which follow upon motives1 and seem almost to wish to make the transition4 ,the contraction of the pupils of the eyes as the light is increased is due to stimuli1 but it passes into movement which is due to motive2 for it takes place1 because too strong lights would affect the retina painfully1 and to avoid this we contract the pupils4 ,the occasion of an erection is a motive1 because it is an idea1 yet it operates with the necessity of a stimulus1 i4e41 it cannot be resisted1 but we must put the idea away in order to make it cease to affect us4 ,this is also the case with disgusting things1 which excite the desire to vomit4 ,thus we have treated the instinct of animals as an actual link1 of quite a distinct kind1 between movement following upon stimuli1 and action following upon a known motive4 ,now we might be asked to regard breathing as another link of this kind4 ,it has been disputed whether it belongs to the voluntary or the involuntary movements1 that is to say1 whether it follows upon motive or stimulus1 and perhaps it may be explained as something which is between the two4 ,marshall ,hall 78,on the ,diseases of the ,nervous ,system10 #bic sq47 explains it as a mixed function1 for it is partly under the influence of the cerebral 7voluntary71 and partly under that of the spinal 7non-voluntary7 nerves4 ,however1 we are finally obliged to number it with the expressions of will which result from motives4 ,for other motives1 i4e41 mere ideas1 can determine the will to check it or accelerate it1 and1 as is the case with every other voluntary action1 it seems to us that we could give up breathing altogether and voluntarily suffocate4 ,and in fact we could do so if any other motive influenced the will sufficiently strongly to overcome the pressing desire for air4 ,according to some accounts ,diogenes actually put an end to his life in this way 7,diog4 ,laert4 ,,vi4 #gf74 ,certain negroes also are said to have done this 7,f4 ,b4 ,osiander 8,on ,suicide0 #ahac pp4 #agj-ahj74 ,if this be true1 it affords us a good example of the influence of abstract motives1 i4e41 of the victory of distinctively rational over merely animal will4 ,for1 that breathing is at least partially conditioned by cerebral activity is shown by the fact that the primary cause of death from prussic acid is that it paralyses the brain1 and so1 indirectly1 restricts the breathing2 but if the breathing be artificially maintained till the stupefaction of the brain has passed away1 death will not ensue4 ,we may also observe in passing that breathing affords us the most obvious example of the fact that motives act with just as much necessity as stimuli1 or as causes in the narrowest sense of the word1 and their operation can only be neutralised by antagonistic motives1 as action is neutralised by re-action4 ,for1 in the case of breathing1 the illusion that we can stop when we like is much weaker than in the case of other movements which follow upon motives2 because in breathing the motive is very powerful1 very near to us1 and its satisfaction is very easy1 for the muscles which accomplish it are never tired1 nothing1 as a rule1 obstructs it1 and the whole process is supported by the most inveterate habit of the individual4 ,and yet all motives act with the same necessity4 ,the knowledge that necessity is common to movements following upon motives1 and those following upon stimuli1 makes it easier for us to understand that that also which takes place in our bodily organism in accordance with stimuli and in obedience to law1 is yet1 according to its inner nature--will1 which in all its manifestations1 though never in itself1 is subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason1 that is1 to necessity47#cb7 ,accordingly1 we shall not rest contented with recognising that animals1 both in their actions and also in their whole existence1 bodily structure and organisation1 are manifestations of will2 but we shall extend to plants also this immediate knowledge of the essential nature of things which is given to us alone4 ,now all the movements of plants follow upon stimuli2 for the absence of knowledge1 and the movement following upon motives which is conditioned by knowledge1 constitutes the only essential difference between animals and plants4 ,therefore1 what appears for the idea as plant life1 as mere vegetation1 as blindly impelling force1 we shall claim1 according to its inner nature1 for will1 and recognise it as just that which constitutes the basis of our own phenomenal being1 as it expresses itself in our actions1 and also in the whole existence of our body itself4 ,it only remains for us to take the final step1 the extension of our way of looking at things to all those forces which act in nature in accordance with universal1 unchangeable laws1 in conformity with which the movements of all those bodies take place1 which are wholly without organs1 and have therefore no susceptibility for stimuli1 and have no knowledge1 which is the necessary condition of motives4 ,thus we must also apply the key to the understanding of the inner nature of things1 which the immediate knowledge of our own existence alone can give us1 to those phenomena of the unorganised world which are most remote from us4 ,and if we consider them attentively1 if we observe the strong and unceasing impulse with which the waters hurry to the ocean1 the persistency with which the magnet turns ever to the north pole1 the readiness with which iron flies to the magnet1 the eagerness with which the electric poles seek to be re-united1 and which1 just like human desire1 is increased by obstacles2 if we see the crystal quickly and suddenly take form with such wonderful regularity of construction1 which is clearly only a perfectly definite and accurately determined impulse in different directions1 seized and retained by crystallisation2 if we observe the choice with which bodies repel and attract each other1 combine and separate1 when they are set free in a fluid state1 and emancipated from the bonds of rigidness2 lastly1 if we feel directly how a burden which hampers our body by its gravitation towards the earth1 unceasingly presses and strains upon it in pursuit of its one tendency2 if we observe all this1 ,i say1 it will require no great effort of the imagination to recognise1 even at so great a distance1 our own nature4 ,that which in us pursues its ends by the light of knowledge2 but here1 in the weakest of its manifestations1 only strives blindly and dumbly in a one-sided and unchangeable manner1 must yet in both cases come under the name of will1 as it is everywhere one and the same--just as the first dim light of dawn must share the name of sunlight with the rays of the full mid-day4 ,for the name will denotes that which is the inner nature of everything in the world1 and the one kernel of every phenomenon4 ,yet the remoteness1 and indeed the appearance of absolute difference between the phenomena of unorganised nature and the will which we know as the inner reality of our own being1 arises chiefly from the contrast between the completely determined conformity to law of the one species of phenomena1 and the apparently unfettered freedom of the other4 ,for in man1 individuality makes itself powerfully felt4 ,every one has a character of his own2 and therefore the same motive has not the same influence over all1 and a thousand circumstances which exist in the wide sphere of the knowledge of the individual1 but are unknown to others1 modify its effect4 ,therefore action cannot be predetermined from the motive alone1 for the other factor is wanting1 the accurate acquaintance with the individual character1 and with the knowledge which accompanies it4 ,on the other hand1 the phenomena of the forces of nature illustrate the opposite extreme4 ,they act according to universal laws1 without variation1 without individuality in accordance with openly manifest circumstances1 subject to the most exact predetermination2 and the same force of nature appears in its million phenomena in precisely the same way4 ,in order to explain this point and prove the identity of the one indivisible will in all its different phenomena1 in the weakest as in the strongest1 we must first of all consider the relation of the will as thing-in-itself to its phenomena1 that is1 the relation of the world as will to the world as idea2 for this will open to us the best way to a more thorough investigation of the whole subject we are considering in this second book47#cc7 #bd4 ,we have learnt from the great ,kant that time1 space1 and causality1 with their entire constitution1 and the possibility of all their forms1 are present in our consciousness quite independently of the objects which appear in them1 and which constitute their content2 or1 in other words1 they can be arrived at just as well if we start from the subject as if we start from the object4 ,therefore1 with equal accuracy1 we may call them either forms of intuition or perception of the subject1 or qualities of the object as object 7with ,kant1 phenomenon71 i4e41 idea4 ,we may also regard these forms as the irreducible boundary between object and subject4 ,all objects must therefore exist in them1 yet the subject1 independently of the phenomenal object1 possesses and surveys them completely4 ,but if the objects appearing in these forms are not to be empty phantoms1 but are to have a meaning1 they must refer to something1 must be the expression of something which is not1 like themselves1 object1 idea1 a merely relative existence for a subject1 but which exists without such dependence upon something which stands over against it as a condition of its being1 and independent of the forms of such a thing1 i4e41 is not idea1 but a thing-in-itself4 ,consequently it may at least be asked3 ,are these ideas1 these objects1 something more than or apart from the fact that they are ideas1 objects of the subject8 ,and what would they be in this sense8 ,what is that other side of them which is toto genere different from idea8 ,what is the thing-in-itself8 ,the will1 we have answered1 but for the present ,i set that answer aside4 ,whatever the thing-in-itself may be1 ,kant is right in his conclusion that time1 space1 and causality 7which we afterwards found to be forms of the principle of sufficient reason1 the general expression of the forms of the phenomenon7 are not its properties1 but come to it only after1 and so far as1 it has become idea4 ,that is1 they belong only to its phenomenal existence1 not to itself4 ,for since the subject fully understands and constructs them out of itself1 independently of all object1 they must be dependent upon existence as idea as such1 not upon that which becomes idea4 ,they must be the form of the idea as such2 but not qualities of that which has assumed this form4 ,they must be already given with the mere antithesis of subject and object 7not as concepts but as facts71 and consequently they must be only the more exact determination of the form of knowledge in general1 whose most universal determination is that antithesis itself4 ,now1 that in the phenomenon1 in the object1 which is in its turn conditioned by time1 space and causality1 inasmuch as it can only become idea by means of them1 namely multiplicity1 through co-existence and succession1 change and permanence through the law of causality1 matter which can only become idea under the presupposition of causality1 and lastly1 all that becomes idea only by means of these1--all this1 ,i say1 as a whole1 does not in reality belong to that which appears1 to that which has passed into the form of idea1 but belongs merely to this form itself4 ,and conversely1 that in the phenomenon which is not conditioned through time1 space and causality1 and which cannot be referred to them1 nor explained in accordance with them1 is precisely that in which the thing manifested1 the thing-in-itself1 directly reveals itself4 ,it follows from this that the most complete capacity for being known1 that is to say1 the greatest clearness1 distinctness1 and susceptibility of exhaustive explanation1 will necessarily belong to that which pertains to knowledge as such1 and thus to the form of knowledge2 but not to that which in itself is not idea1 not object1 but which has become knowledge only through entering these forms2 in other words1 has become idea1 object4 ,thus only that which depends entirely upon being an object of knowledge1 upon existing as idea in general and as such 7not upon that which becomes known1 and has only become idea71 which therefore belongs without distinction to everything that is known1 and which1 on that account1 is found just as well if we start from the subject as if we start from the object1--this alone can afford us without reserve a sufficient1 exhaustive knowledge1 a knowledge which is clear to the very foundation4 ,but this consists of nothing but those forms of all phenomena of which we are conscious a priori1 and which may be generally expressed as the principle of sufficient reason4 ,now1 the forms of this principle which occur in knowledge of perception 7with which alone we are here concerned7 are time1 space1 and causality4 ,the whole of pure mathematics and pure natural science a priori is based entirely upon these4 ,therefore it is only in these sciences that knowledge finds no obscurity1 does not rest upon what is incomprehensible 7groundless1 i4e41 will71 upon what cannot be further deduced4 ,it is on this account that ,kant wanted1 as we have said1 to apply the name science specially and even exclusively to these branches of knowledge together with logic4 ,but1 on the other hand1 these branches of knowledge show us nothing more than mere connections1 relations of one idea to another1 form devoid of all content4 ,all content which they receive1 every phenomenon which fills these forms1 contains something which is no longer completely knowable in its whole nature1 something which can no longer be entirely explained through something else1 something then which is groundless1 through which consequently the knowledge loses its evidence and ceases to be completely lucid4 ,this that withholds itself from investigation1 however1 is the thing-in-itself1 is that which is essentially not idea1 not object of knowledge1 but has only become knowable by entering that form4 ,the form is originally foreign to it1 and the thing-in-itself can never become entirely one with it1 can never be referred to mere form1 and1 since this form is the principle of sufficient reason1 can never be completely explained4 ,if therefore all mathematics affords us an exhaustive knowledge of that which in the phenomena is quantity1 position1 number1 in a word1 spatial and temporal relations2 if all etiology gives us a complete account of the regular conditions under which phenomena1 with all their determinations1 appear in time and space1 but1 with it all1 teaches us nothing more than why in each case this particular phenomenon must appear just at this time here1 and at this place now2 it is clear that with their assistance we can never penetrate to the inner nature of things4 ,there always remains something which no explanation can venture to attack1 but which it always presupposes2 the forces of nature1 the definite mode of operation of things1 the quality and character of every phenomenon1 that which is without ground1 that which does not depend upon the form of the phenomenal1 the principle of sufficient reason1 but is something to which this form in itself is foreign1 something which has yet entered this form1 and now appears according to its law1 a law1 however1 which only determines the appearance1 not that which appears1 only the how1 not the what1 only the form1 not the content4 ,mechanics1 physics1 and chemistry teach the rules and laws according to which the forces of impenetrability1 gravitation1 rigidity1 fluidity1 cohesion1 elasticity1 heat1 light1 affinity1 magnetism1 electricity1 c41 operate2 that is to say1 the law1 the rule which these forces observe whenever they enter time and space4 ,but do what we will1 the forces themselves remain qualitates occult4 ,for it is just the thing-in-itself1 which1 because it is manifested1 exhibits these phenomena1 which are entirely different from itself4 ,in its manifestation1 indeed1 it is completely subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason as the form of the idea1 but it can never itself be referred to this form1 and therefore cannot be fully explained etiologically1 can never be completely fathomed4 ,it is certainly perfectly comprehensible so far as it has assumed that form1 that is1 so far as it is phenomenon1 but its inner nature is not in the least explained by the fact that it can thus be comprehended4 ,therefore the more necessity any knowledge carries with it1 the more there is in it of that which cannot be otherwise thought or presented in perception--as1 for example1 space-relations--the clearer and more sufficing then it is1 the less pure objective content it has1 or the less reality1 properly so called1 is given in it4 ,and conversely1 the more there is in it which must be conceived as mere chance1 and the more it impresses us as given merely empirically1 the more proper objectivity and true reality is there in such knowledge1 and at the same time1 the more that is inexplicable1 that is1 that cannot be deduced from anything else4 ,it is true that at all times an etiology1 unmindful of its real aim1 has striven to reduce all organised life to chemism or electricity2 all chemism1 that is to say quality1 again to mechanism 7action determined by the shape of the atom71 this again sometimes to the object of phoronomy1 i4e41 the combination of time and space1 which makes motion possible1 sometimes to the object of mere geometry1 i4e41 position in space 7much in the same way as we rightly deduce the diminution of an effect from the square of the distance1 and the theory of the lever in a purely geometrical manner73 geometry may finally be reduced to arithmetic1 which1 on account of its one dimension1 is of all the forms of the principle of sufficient reason1 the most intelligible1 comprehensible1 and completely susceptible of investigation4 ,as instances of the method generally indicated here1 we may refer to the atoms of ,democritus1 the vortex of ,descartes1 the mechanical physics of ,lesage1 which towards the end of last century tried to explain both chemical affinities and gravitation mechanically by impact and pressure1 as may be seen in detail in 8,lucrce ,neutonien20 ,reil's form and combination as the cause of animal life1 also tends in this direction4 ,finally1 the crude materialism which even now in the middle of the nineteenth century has been served up again under the ignorant delusion that it is original1 belongs distinctly to this class4 ,it stupidly denies vital force1 and first of all tries to explain the phenomena of life from physical and chemical forces1 and those again from the mechanical effects of the matter1 position1 form1 and motion of imagined atoms1 and thus seeks to reduce all the forces of nature to action and reaction as its thing-in-itself4 ,according to this teaching1 light is the mechanical vibration or undulation of an imaginary ether1 postulated for this end4 ,this ether1 if it reaches the eye1 beats rapidly upon the retina1 and gives us the knowledge of colour4 ,thus1 for example1 four hundred and eighty-three billion beats in a second give red1 and seven hundred and twenty-seven billion beats in a second give violet4 ,upon this theory1 persons who are colour-blind must be those who are unable to count the beats1 must they not8 ,such crass1 mechanical1 clumsy1 and certainly knotty theories1 which remind one of ,democritus1 are quite worthy of those who1 fifty years after the appearance of ,goethe's doctrine of colour1 still believe in ,newton's homogeneous light1 and are not ashamed to say so4 ,they will find that what is overlooked in the child 7,democritus7 will not be forgiven to the man4 ,they might indeed1 some day1 come to an ignominious end2 but then every one would slink away and pretend that he never had anything to do with them4 ,we shall soon have to speak again of this false reduction of the forces of nature to each other2 so much for the present4 ,supposing this theory were possible1 all would certainly be explained and established and finally reduced to an arithmetical problem1 which would then be the holiest thing in the temple of wisdom1 to which the principle of sufficient reason would at last have happily conducted us4 ,but all content of the phenomenon would have disappeared1 and the mere form would remain4 ,the 8what appears0 would be referred to the 8how it appears10 and this 8how0 would be what is a priori knowable1 therefore entirely dependent on the subject1 therefore only for the subject1 therefore1 lastly1 mere phantom1 idea and form of idea1 through and through3 no thing-in-itself could be demanded4 ,supposing1 then1 that this were possible1 the whole world would be derived from the subject1 and in fact1 that would be accomplished which ,fichte wanted to seem to accomplish by his empty bombast4 ,but it is not possible3 phantasies1 sophisms1 castles in the air1 have been constructed in this way1 but science never4 ,the many and multifarious phenomena in nature have been successfully referred to particular original forces1 and as often as this has been done1 a real advance has been made4 ,several forces and qualities1 which were at first regarded as different1 have been derived from each other1 and thus their number has been curtailed4 7,for example1 magnetism from electricity47 ,etiology will have reached its goal when it has recognised and exhibited as such all the original forces of nature1 and established their mode of operation1 i4e41 the law according to which1 under the guidance of causality1 their phenomena appear in time and space1 and determine their position with regard to each other4 ,but certain original forces will always remain over2 there will always remain as an insoluble residuum a content of phenomena which cannot be referred to their form1 and thus cannot be explained from something else in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason4 ,for in everything in nature there is something of which no ground can ever be assigned1 of which no explanation is possible1 and no ulterior cause is to be sought4 ,this is the specific nature of its action1 i4e41 the nature of its existence1 its being4 ,of each particular effect of the thing a cause may be certainly indicated1 from which it follows that it must act just at this time and in this place2 but no cause can ever be found from which it follows that a thing acts in general1 and precisely in the way it does4 ,if it has no other qualities1 if it is merely a mote in a sunbeam1 it yet exhibits this unfathomable something1 at least as weight and impenetrability4 ,but this1 ,i say1 is to the mote what his will is to a man2 and1 like the human will1 it is1 according to its inner nature1 not subject to explanation2 nay1 more--it is in itself identical with this will4 ,it is true that a motive may be given for every manifestation of will1 for every act of will at a particular time and in a particular place1 upon which it must necessarily follow1 under the presupposition of the character of the man4 ,but no reason can ever be given that the man has this character2 that he wills at all2 that1 of several motives1 just this one and no other1 or indeed that any motive at all1 moves his will4 ,that which in the case of man is the unfathomable character which is presupposed in every explanation of his actions from motives is1 in the case of every unorganised body1 its definitive quality--the mode of its action1 the manifestations of which are occasioned by impressions from without1 while it itself1 on the contrary1 is determined by nothing outside itself1 and thus is also inexplicable4 ,its particular manifestations1 through which alone it becomes visible1 are subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason2 it itself is groundless4 ,this was in substance rightly understood by the schoolmen1 who called it forma substantialis4 7,cf4 ,suarez1 ,disput4 ,metaph41 disp4 xv4 sect4 #a47 ,it is a greater and a commoner error that the phenomena which we best understand are those which are of most frequent occurrence1 and which are most universal and simple2 for1 on the contrary1 these are just the phenomena that we are most accustomed to see about us1 and to be ignorant of4 ,it is just as inexplicable to us that a stone should fall to the earth as that an animal should move itself4 ,it has been supposed1 as we have remarked above1 that1 starting from the most universal forces of nature 7gravitation1 cohesion1 impenetrability71 it was possible to explain from them the rarer forces1 which only operate under a combination of circumstances 7for example1 chemical quality1 electricity1 magnetism71 and1 lastly1 from these to understand the organism and the life of animals1 and even the nature of human knowing and willing4 ,men resigned themselves without a word to starting from mere qualitates occult1 the elucidation of which was entirely given up1 for they intended to build upon them1 not to investigate them4 ,such an intention cannot1 as we have already said1 be carried out4 ,but apart from this1 such structures would always stand in the air4 ,what is the use of explanations which ultimately refer us to something which is quite as unknown as the problem with which we started8 ,do we in the end understand more of the inner nature of these universal natural forces than of the inner nature of an animal8 ,is not the one as much a sealed book to us as the other8 ,unfathomable because it is without ground1 because it is the content1 that which the phenomenon is1 and which can never be referred to the form1 to the how1 to the principle of sufficient reason4 ,but we1 who have in view not etiology but philosophy1 that is1 not relative but unconditioned knowledge of the real nature of the world1 take the opposite course1 and start from that which is immediately and most completely known to us1 and fully and entirely trusted by us--that which lies nearest to us1 in order to understand that which is known to us only at a distance1 one-sidedly and indirectly4 ,from the most powerful1 most significant1 and most distinct phenomenon we seek to arrive at an understanding of those that are less complete and weaker4 ,with the exception of my own body1 all things are known to me only on one side1 that of the idea4 ,their inner nature remains hidden from me and a profound secret1 even if ,i know all the causes from which their changes follow4 ,only by comparison with that which goes on in me if my body performs an action when ,i am influenced by a motive--only by comparison1 ,i say1 with what is the inner nature of my own changes determined by external reasons1 can ,i obtain insight into the way in which these lifeless bodies change under the influence of causes1 and so understand what is their inner nature4 ,for the knowledge of the causes of the manifestation of this inner nature affords me merely the rule of its appearance in time and space1 and nothing more4 ,i can make this comparison because my body is the only object of which ,i know not merely the one side1 that of the idea1 but also the other side which is called will4 ,thus1 instead of believing that ,i would better understand my own organisation1 and then my own knowing and willing1 and my movements following upon motives1 if ,i could only refer them to movements due to electrical1 chemical1 and mechanical causes1 ,i must1 seeing that ,i seek philosophy and not etiology1 learn to understand from my own movements following upon motives the inner nature of the simplest and commonest movements of an unorganised body which ,i see following upon causes4 ,i must recognise the inscrutable forces which manifest themselves in all natural bodies as identical in kind with that which in me is the will1 and as differing from it only in degree4 ,that is to say1 the fourth class of ideas given in the ,essay on the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason must be the key to the knowledge of the inner nature of the first class1 and by means of the law of motivation ,i must come to understand the inner meaning of the law of causation4 ,spinoza 7,epist4 #fb7 says that if a stone which has been projected through the air had consciousness1 it would believe that it was moving of its own will4 ,i add to this only that the stone would be right4 ,the impulse given it is for the stone what the motive is for me1 and what in the case of the stone appears as cohesion1 gravitation1 rigidity1 is in its inner nature the same as that which ,i recognise in myself as will1 and what the stone also1 if knowledge were given to it1 would recognise as will4 ,in the passage referred to1 ,spinoza had in view the necessity with which the stone flies1 and he rightly desires to transfer this necessity to that of the particular act of will of a person4 ,i1 on the other hand1 consider the inner being1 which alone imparts meaning and validity to all real necessity 7i4e41 effect following upon a cause7 as its presupposition4 ,in the case of men this is called character2 in the case of a stone it is called quality1 but it is the same in both4 ,when it is immediately known it is called will4 ,in the stone it has the weakest1 and in man the strongest degree of visibility1 of objectivity4 ,st4 ,augustine recognises1 with a true instinct1 this identity of the tendencies of all things with our own willing1 and ,i cannot refrain from quoting his nave account of the matter3--8,si pecora essemus1 carnalem vitam et quod secundum sensum ejusdem est amaremus1 idque esset sufficiens bonum nostrum1 et secundum hoc si esset nobis bene1 nihil aliud qureremus4 ,item1 si arbores essemus1 nihil quidem sentientes motu amare possemus3 verumtamen id quasi appetere videremur1 quo feracius essemus1 uberiusque fructuos4 ,si essemus lapides1 aut fluctus1 aut ventus1 aut flamma1 vel quid ejusmodi1 sine ullo quidem sensu atque vita1 non tamen nobis deesset quasi quidam nostrorum locorum atque ordinis appetitus4 ,nam velut amores corporum momenta sunt ponderum1 sive deorsum gravitate1 sive sursum levitate nitantur3 ita enim corpus pondere1 sicut animus amore fertur quocunque fertur0 7,de ,civ4 ,dei1 xi4 #bh74 ,it ought further to be mentioned that ,euler saw that the inner nature of gravitation must ultimately be referred to an 8inclination and desire0 7thus will7 peculiar to material bodies 7in the #fhth letter to the ,princess74 ,indeed1 it is just this that makes him averse to the conception of gravitation as it existed for ,newton1 and he is inclined to try a modification of it in accordance with the earlier ,cartesian theory1 and so to derive gravitation from the impact of an ether upon the bodies1 as being 8more rational and more suitable for persons who like clear and intelligible principles40 ,he wishes to banish attraction from physics as a qualitas occulta4 ,this is only in keeping with the dead view of nature which prevailed at ,euler's time as the correlative of the immaterial soul4 ,it is only worth noticing because of its bearing upon the fundamental truth established by me1 which even at that time this fine intellect saw glimmering in the distance4 ,he hastened to turn in time1 and then1 in his anxiety at seeing all the prevalent fundamental views endangered1 he sought safety in the old and already exploded absurdities4 ,we know that multiplicity in general is necessarily conditioned by space and time1 and is only thinkable in them4 ,in this respect they are called the principium individuationis4 ,but we have found that space and time are forms of the principle of sufficient reason4 ,in this principle all our knowledge a priori is expressed1 but1 as we showed above1 this a priori knowledge1 as such1 only applies to the knowableness of things1 not to the things themselves1 i4e41 it is only our form of knowledge1 it is not a property of the thing-in-itself4 ,the thing-in-itself is1 as such1 free from all forms of knowledge1 even the most universal1 that of being an object for the subject4 ,in other words1 the thing-in-itself is something altogether different from the idea4 ,if1 now1 this thing-in-itself is the will1 as ,i believe ,i have fully and convincingly proved it to be1 then1 regarded as such and apart from its manifestation1 it lies outside time and space1 and therefore knows no multiplicity1 and is consequently one4 ,yet1 as ,i have said1 it is not one in the sense in which an individual or a concept is one1 but as something to which the condition of the possibility of multiplicity1 the principium individuationis1 is foreign4 ,the multiplicity of things in space and time1 which collectively constitute the objectification of will1 does not affect the will itself1 which remains indivisible notwithstanding it4 ,it is not the case that1 in some way or other1 a smaller part of will is in the stone and a larger part in the man1 for the relation of part and whole belongs exclusively to space1 and has no longer any meaning when we go beyond this form of intuition or perception4 ,the more and the less have application only to the phenomenon of will1 that is1 its visibility1 its objectification4 ,of this there is a higher grade in the plant than in the stone2 in the animal a higher grade than in the plant3 indeed1 the passage of will into visibility1 its objectification1 has grades as innumerable as exist between the dimmest twilight and the brightest sunshine1 the loudest sound and the faintest echo4 ,we shall return later to the consideration of these grades of visibility which belong to the objectification of the will1 to the reflection of its nature4 ,but as the grades of its objectification do not directly concern the will itself1 still less is it concerned by the multiplicity of the phenomena of these different grades1 i4e41 the multitude of individuals of each form1 or the particular manifestations of each force4 ,for this multiplicity is directly conditioned by time and space1 into which the will itself never enters4 ,the will reveals itself as completely and as much in one oak as in millions4 ,their number and multiplication in space and time has no meaning with regard to it1 but only with regard to the multiplicity of individuals who know in space and time1 and who are themselves multiplied and dispersed in these4 ,the multiplicity of these individuals itself belongs not to the will1 but only to its manifestation4 ,we may therefore say that if1 per impossibile1 a single real existence1 even the most insignificant1 were to be entirely annihilated1 the whole world would necessarily perish with it4 ,the great mystic ,angelus ,silesius feels this when he says-- 8,i know ,god cannot live an instant without me1 ,he must give up the ghost if ,i should cease to be40 ,men have tried in various ways to bring the immeasurable greatness of the material universe nearer to the comprehension of us all1 and then they have seized the opportunity to make edifying remarks4 ,they have referred perhaps to the relative smallness of the earth1 and indeed of man2 or1 on the contrary1 they have pointed out the greatness of the mind of this man who is so insignificant--the mind that can solve1 comprehend1 and even measure the greatness of the universe1 and so forth4 ,now1 all this is very well1 but to me1 when ,i consider the vastness of the world1 the most important point is this1 that the thing-in-itself1 whose manifestation is the world--whatever else it may be--cannot have its true self spread out and dispersed after this fashion in boundless space1 but that this endless extension belongs only to its manifestation4 ,the thing-in-itself1 on the contrary1 is present entire and undivided in every object of nature and in every living being4 ,therefore we lose nothing by standing still beside any single individual thing1 and true wisdom is not to be gained by measuring out the boundless world1 or1 what would be more to the purpose1 by actually traversing endless space4 ,it is rather to be attained by the thorough investigation of any individual thing1 for thus we seek to arrive at a full knowledge and understanding of its true and peculiar nature4 ,the subject which will therefore be fully considered in the next book1 and which has1 doubtless1 already presented itself to the mind of every student of ,plato1 is1 that these different grades of the objectification of will which are manifested in innumerable individuals1 and exist as their unattained types or as the eternal forms of things1 not entering themselves into time and space1 which are the medium of individual things1 but remaining fixed1 subject to no change1 always being1 never becoming1 while the particular things arise and pass away1 always become and never are1--that these grades of the objectification of will are1 ,i say1 simply ,plato's ,ideas4 ,i make this passing reference to the matter here in order that ,i may be able in future to use the word ,idea in this sense4 ,in my writings1 therefore1 the word is always to be understood in its true and original meaning given to it by ,plato1 and has absolutely no reference to those abstract productions of dogmatising scholastic reason1 which ,kant has inaptly and illegitimately used this word to denote1 though ,plato had already appropriated and used it most fitly4 ,by ,idea1 then1 ,i understand every definite and fixed grade of the objectification of will1 so far as it is thing-in-itself1 and therefore has no multiplicity4 ,these grades are related to individual things as their eternal forms or prototypes4 ,the shortest and most concise statement of this famous ,platonic doctrine is given us by ,diogenes ,laertes 7iii4 #ab73 8 1 1 1 1 0--78,plato ideas in natura velut exemplaria dixit subsistere2 cetera his esse similia1 ad istarum similitudinem consistentia074 ,of ,kant's misuse of the word ,i take no further notice2 what it is needful to say about it will be found in the ,appendix4 #bf4 ,the lowest grades of the objectification of will are to be found in those most universal forces of nature which partly appear in all matter without exception1 as gravity and impenetrability1 and partly have shared the given matter among them1 so that certain of them reign in one species of matter and others in another species1 constituting its specific difference1 as rigidity1 fluidity1 elasticity1 electricity1 magnetism1 chemical properties and qualities of every kind4 ,they are in themselves immediate manifestations of will1 just as much as human action2 and as such they are groundless1 like human character4 ,only their particular manifestations are subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason1 like the particular actions of men4 ,they themselves1 on the other hand1 can never be called either effect or cause1 but are the prior and presupposed conditions of all causes and effects through which their real nature unfolds and reveals itself4 ,it is therefore senseless to demand a cause of gravity or electricity1 for they are original forces4 ,their expressions1 indeed1 take place in accordance with the law of cause and effect1 so that every one of their particular manifestations has a cause1 which is itself again just a similar particular manifestation which determines that this force must express itself here1 must appear in space and time2 but the force itself is by no means the effect of a cause1 nor the cause of an effect4 ,it is therefore a mistake to say 8gravity is the cause of a stone falling20 for the cause in this case is rather the nearness of the earth1 because it attracts the stone4 ,take the earth away and the stone will not fall1 although gravity remains4 ,the force itself lies quite outside the chain of causes and effects1 which presupposes time1 because it only has meaning in relation to it2 but the force lies outside time4 ,the individual change always has for its cause another change just as individual as itself1 and not the force of which it is the expression4 ,for that which always gives its efficiency to a cause1 however many times it may appear1 is a force of nature4 ,as such1 it is groundless1 i4e41 it lies outside the chain of causes and outside the province of the principle of sufficient reason in general1 and is philosophically known as the immediate objectivity of will1 which is the 8in-itself0 of the whole of nature2 but in etiology1 which in this reference is physics1 it is set down as an original force1 i4e41 a qualitas occulta4 ,in the higher grades of the objectivity of will we see individuality occupy a prominent position1 especially in the case of man1 where it appears as the great difference of individual characters1 i4e41 as complete personality1 outwardly expressed in strongly marked individual physiognomy1 which influences the whole bodily form4 ,none of the brutes have this individuality in anything like so high a degree1 though the higher species of them have a trace of it2 but the character of the species completely predominates over it1 and therefore they have little individual physiognomy4 ,the farther down we go1 the more completely is every trace of the individual character lost in the common character of the species1 and the physiognomy of the species alone remains4 ,we know the physiological character of the species1 and from that we know exactly what is to be expected from the individual2 while1 on the contrary1 in the human species every individual has to be studied and fathomed for himself1 which1 if we wish to forecast his action with some degree of certainty1 is1 on account of the possibility of concealment that first appears with reason1 a matter of the greatest difficulty4 ,it is probably connected with this difference of the human species from all others1 that the folds and convolutions of the brain1 which are entirely wanting in birds1 and very weakly marked in rodents1 are even in the case of the higher animals far more symmetrical on both sides1 and more constantly the same in each individual1 than in the case of human beings47#cd7 ,it is further to be regarded as a phenomenon of this peculiar individual character which distinguishes men from all the lower animals1 that in the case of the brutes the sexual instinct seeks its satisfaction without observable choice of objects1 while in the case of man this choice is1 in a purely instinctive manner and independent of all reflection1 carried so far that it rises into a powerful passion4 ,while then every man is to be regarded as a specially determined and characterised phenomenon of will1 and indeed to a certain extent as a special ,idea1 in the case of the brutes this individual character as a whole is wanting1 because only the species has a special significance4 ,and the farther we go from man1 the fainter becomes the trace of this individual character1 so that plants have no individual qualities left1 except such as may be fully explained from the favourable or unfavourable external influences of soil1 climate1 and other accidents4 ,finally1 in the inorganic kingdom of nature all individuality disappears4 ,the crystal alone is to be regarded as to a certain extent individual4 ,it is a unity of the tendency in definite directions1 fixed by crystallisation1 which makes the trace of this tendency permanent4 ,it is at the same time a cumulative repetition of its primitive form1 bound into unity by an idea1 just as the tree is an aggregate of the single germinating fibre which shows itself in every rib of the leaves1 in every leaf1 in every branch2 which repeats itself1 and to some extent makes each of these appear as a separate growth1 nourishing itself from the greater as a parasite1 so that the tree1 resembling the crystal1 is a systematic aggregate of small plants1 although only the whole is the complete expression of an individual ,idea1 i4e41 of this particular grade of the objectification of will4 ,but the individuals of the same species of crystal can have no other difference than such as is produced by external accidents2 indeed we can make at pleasure large or small crystals of every species4 ,the individual1 however1 as such1 that is1 with traces of an individual character1 does not exist further in unorganised nature4 ,all its phenomena are expressions of general forces of nature1 i4e41 of those grades of the objectification of will which do not objectify themselves 7as is the case in organised nature71 by means of the difference of the individualities which collectively express the whole of the ,idea1 but show themselves only in the species1 and as a whole1 without any variation in each particular example of it4 ,time1 space1 multiplicity1 and existence conditioned by causes1 do not belong to the will or to the ,idea 7the grade of the objectification of will71 but only to their particular phenomena4 ,therefore such a force of nature as1 for example1 gravity or electricity1 must show itself as such in precisely the same way in all its million phenomena1 and only external circumstances can modify these4 ,this unity of its being in all its phenomena1 this unchangeable constancy of the appearance of these1 whenever1 under the guidance of causality1 the necessary conditions are present1 is called a law of nature4 ,if such a law is once learned from experience1 then the phenomenon of that force of nature1 the character of which is expressed and laid down in it1 may be accurately forecast and counted upon4 ,but it is just this conformity to law of the phenomena of the lower grades of the objectification of will which gives them such a different aspect from the phenomena of the same will in the higher1 i4e41 the more distinct1 grades of its objectification1 in animals1 and in men and their actions1 where the stronger or weaker influence of the individual character and the susceptibility to motives which often remain hidden from the spectator1 because they lie in knowledge1 has had the result that the identity of the inner nature of the two kinds of phenomena has hitherto been entirely overlooked4 ,if we start from the knowledge of the particular1 and not from that of the ,idea1 there is something astonishing1 and sometimes even terrible1 in the absolute uniformity of the laws of nature4 ,it might astonish us that nature never once forgets her laws2 that if1 for example1 it has once been according to a law of nature that where certain materials are brought together under given conditions1 a chemical combination will take place1 or gas will be evolved1 or they will go on fire2 if these conditions are fulfilled1 whether by our interposition or entirely by chance 7and in this case the accuracy is the more astonishing because unexpected71 to-day just as well as a thousand years ago1 the determined phenomenon will take place at once and without delay4 ,we are most vividly impressed with the marvellousness of this fact in the case of rare phenomena1 which only occur under very complex circumstances1 but which we are previously informed will take place if these conditions are fulfilled4 ,for example1 when we are told that if certain metals1 when arranged alternately in fluid with which an acid has been mixed1 are brought into contact1 silver leaf brought between the extremities of this combination will suddenly be consumed in a green flame2 or that under certain conditions the hard diamond turns into carbonic acid4 ,it is the ghostly omnipresence of natural forces that astonishes us in such cases1 and we remark here what in the case of phenomena which happen daily no longer strikes us1 how the connection between cause and effect is really as mysterious as that which is imagined between a magic formula and a spirit that must appear when invoked by it4 ,on the other hand1 if we have attained to the philosophical knowledge that a force of nature is a definite grade of the objectification of will1 that is to say1 a definite grade of that which we recognise as our own inmost nature1 and that this will1 in itself1 and distinguished from its phenomena and their forms1 lies outside time and space1 and that1 therefore1 the multiplicity1 which is conditioned by time and space1 does not belong to it1 nor directly to the grade of its objectification1 i4e41 the ,idea1 but only to the phenomena of the ,idea2 and if we remember that the law of causality has significance only in relation to time and space1 inasmuch as it determines the position of the multitude of phenomena of the different ,ideas in which the will reveals itself1 governing the order in which they must appear2 if1 ,i say1 in this knowledge the inner meaning of the great doctrine of ,kant has been fully grasped1 the doctrine that time1 space1 and causality do not belong to the thing-in-itself1 but merely to the phenomenon1 that they are only the forms of our knowledge1 not qualities of things in themselves2 then we shall understand that this astonishment at the conformity to law and accurate operation of a force of nature1 this astonishment at the complete sameness of all its million phenomena and the infallibility of their occurrence1 is really like that of a child or a savage who looks for the first time through a glass with many facets at a flower1 and marvels at the complete similarity of the innumerable flowers which he sees1 and counts the leaves of each of them separately4 ,thus every universal1 original force of nature is nothing but a low grade of the objectification of will1 and we call every such grade an eternal ,idea in ,plato's sense4 ,but a law of nature is the relation of the ,idea to the form of its manifestation4 ,this form is time1 space1 and causality1 which are necessarily and inseparably connected and related to each other4 ,through time and space the ,idea multiplies itself in innumerable phenomena1 but the order according to which it enters these forms of multiplicity is definitely determined by the law of causality2 this law is as it were the norm of the limit of these phenomena of different ,ideas1 in accordance with which time1 space1 and matter are assigned to them4 ,this norm is therefore necessarily related to the identity of the aggregate of existing matter1 which is the common substratum of all those different phenomena4 ,if all these were not directed to that common matter in the possession of which they must be divided1 there would be no need for such a law to decide their claims4 ,they might all at once and together fill a boundless space throughout an endless time4 ,therefore1 because all these phenomena of the eternal ,ideas are directed to one and the same matter1 must there be a rule for their appearance and disappearance2 for if there were not1 they would not make way for each other4 ,thus the law of causality is essentially bound up with that of the permanence of substance2 they reciprocally derive significance from each other4 ,time and space1 again1 are related to them in the same way4 ,for time is merely the possibility of conflicting states of the same matter1 and space is merely the possibility of the permanence of the same matter under all sorts of conflicting states4 ,accordingly1 in the preceding book we explained matter as the union of space and time1 and this union shows itself as change of the accidents in the permanence of the substance1 of which causality or becoming is the universal possibility4 ,and accordingly1 we said that matter is through and through causality4 ,we explained the understanding as the subjective correlative of causality1 and said matter 7and thus the whole world as idea7 exists only for the understanding2 the understanding is its condition1 its supporter as its necessary correlative4 ,i repeat all this in passing1 merely to call to mind what was demonstrated in the ,first ,book1 for it is necessary for the complete understanding of these two books that their inner agreement should be observed1 since what is inseparably united in the actual world as its two sides1 will and idea1 has1 in order that we might understand each of them more clearly in isolation1 been dissevered in these two books4 ,it may not perhaps be superfluous to elucidate further by an example how the law of causality has meaning only in relation to time and space1 and the matter which consists in the union of the two4 ,for it determines the limits in accordance with which the phenomena of the forces of nature divide themselves in the possession of matter1 while the original forces of nature1 as the immediate objectification of will1 which1 as a thing in itself1 is not subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason1 lie outside these forms1 within which alone all etiological explanation has validity and meaning1 and just on that account can never lead us to the inner reality of nature4 ,for this purpose let us think of some kind of machine constructed according to the laws of mechanics4 ,iron weights begin the motion by their gravity2 copper wheels resist by their rigidity1 affect and raise each other and the lever by their impenetrability1 and so on4 ,here gravity1 rigidity1 and impenetrability are original unexplained forces2 mechanics only gives us the condition under which1 and the manner in which1 they manifest themselves1 appear1 and govern a definite matter1 time1 and place4 ,if1 now1 a strong magnet is made to attract the iron of the weight1 and overcome its gravity1 the movement of the machine stops1 and the matter becomes forthwith the scene of quite a different force of nature--magnetism1 of which etiology again gives no further explanation than the condition under which it appears4 ,or let us suppose that the copper discs of such a machine are laid upon zinc plates1 and an acid solution introduced between them4 ,at once the same matter of the machine has become subject to another original force1 galvanism1 which now governs it according to its own laws1 and reveals itself in it through its phenomena2 and etiology can again tell us nothing about this force except the conditions under which1 and the laws in accordance with which1 it manifests itself4 ,let us now raise the temperature and add pure acid2 the whole machine burns2 that is to say1 once more an entirely different force of nature1 chemical energy1 asserts at this time and in this place irresistible claims to this particular matter1 and reveals itself in it as ,idea1 as a definite grade of the objectification of will4 ,the calcined metal thus produced now unites with an acid1 and a salt is obtained which forms itself into crystals4 ,these are the phenomena of another ,idea1 which in itself is again quite inexplicable1 while the appearance of its phenomena is dependent upon certain conditions which etiology can give us4 ,the crystals dissolve1 mix with other materials1 and vegetation springs up from them--a new phenomenon of will3 and so the same permanent matter may be followed ad infinitum1 to observe how now this and now that natural force obtains a right to it and temporarily takes possession of it1 in order to appear and reveal its own nature4 ,the condition of this right1 the point of time and space at which it becomes valid1 is given by causality1 but the explanation founded upon this law only extends thus far4 ,the force itself is a manifestation of will1 and as such is not subject to the forms of the principle of sufficient reason1 that is1 it is groundless4 ,it lies outside all time1 is omnipresent1 and seems as it were to wait constantly till the circumstances occur under which it can appear and take possession of a definite matter1 supplanting the forces which have reigned in it till then4 ,all time exists only for the phenomena of such a force1 and is without significance for the force itself4 ,through thousands of years chemical forces slumber in matter till the contact with the reagents sets them free2 then they appear2 but time exists only for the phenomena1 not for the forces themselves4 ,for thousands of years galvanism slumbered in copper and zinc1 and they lay quietly beside silver1 which must be consumed in flame as soon as all three are brought together under the required conditions4 ,even in the organic kingdom we see a dry seed preserve the slumbering force through three thousand years1 and when at last the favourable circumstances occur1 grow up as a plant47#ce7 ,if by this exposition the difference between a force of nature and all its phenomena has been made quite distinct2 if we have seen clearly that the former is the will itself at this particular grade of its objectification1 but that multiplicity comes to phenomena only through time and space1 and that the law of causality is nothing but the determination of the position of these phenomena in time and space2 then we shall recognise the complete truth and the deep meaning of ,malebranche's doctrine of occasional causes 7causes occasionelles74 ,it is well worth while comparing this doctrine of his1 as he explains it in the 8,recherches de la ,vrite10 both in the #crd ,chapter of the second part of the #fth ,book1 and in the claircissements appended to this chapter1 with this exposition of mine1 and observing the complete agreement of the two doctrines in the case of such different systems of thought4 ,indeed ,i cannot help admiring how ,malebranche1 though thoroughly involved in the positive dogmas which his age inevitably forced upon him1 yet1 in such bonds and under such a burden1 hit the truth so happily1 so correctly1 and even knew how to combine it with these dogmas1 at all events verbally4 ,for the power of truth is incredibly great and of unspeakable endurance4 ,we find constant traces of it in all1 even the most eccentric and absurd dogmas1 of different times and different lands1--often indeed in strange company1 curiously mixed up with other things1 but still recognisable4 ,it is like a plant that germinates under a heap of great stones1 but still struggles up to the light1 working itself through with many deviations and windings1 disfigured1 worn out1 stunted in its growth1--but yet1 to the light4 ,in any case ,malebranche is right3 every natural cause is only an occasional cause4 ,it only gives opportunity or occasion for the manifestation of the one indivisible will which is the 8in-itself0 of all things1 and whose graduated objectification is the whole visible world4 ,only the appearance1 the becoming visible1 in this place1 at this time1 is brought about by the cause and is so far dependent on it1 but not the whole of the phenomenon1 nor its inner nature4 ,this is the will itself1 to which the principle of sufficient reason has not application1 and which is therefore groundless4 ,nothing in the world has a sufficient cause of its existence generally1 but only a cause of existence just here and just now4 ,that a stone exhibits now gravity1 now rigidity1 now electricity1 now chemical qualities1 depends upon causes1 upon impressions upon it from without1 and is to be explained from these4 ,but these qualities themselves1 and thus the whole inner nature of the stone which consists in them1 and therefore manifests itself in all the ways referred to2 thus1 in general1 that the stone is such as it is1 that it exists generally--all this1 ,i say1 has no ground1 but is the visible appearance of the groundless will4 ,every cause is thus an occasional cause4 ,we have found it to be so in nature1 which is without knowledge1 and it is also precisely the same when motives and not causes or stimuli determine the point at which the phenomena are to appear1 that is to say1 in the actions of animals and human beings4 ,for in both cases it is one and the same will which appears2 very different in the grades of its manifestation1 multiplied in the phenomena of these grades1 and1 in respect of these1 subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason1 but in itself free from all this4 ,motives do not determine the character of man1 but only the phenomena of his character1 that is1 his actions2 the outward fashion of his life1 not its inner meaning and content4 ,these proceed from the character which is the immediate manifestation of the will1 and is therefore groundless4 ,that one man is bad and another good1 does not depend upon motives or outward influences1 such as teaching and preaching1 and is in this sense quite inexplicable4 ,but whether a bad man shows his badness in petty acts of injustice1 cowardly tricks1 and low knavery which he practises in the narrow sphere of his circumstances1 or whether as a conqueror he oppresses nations1 throws a world into lamentation1 and sheds the blood of millions2 this is the outward form of his manifestation1 that which is unessential to it1 and depends upon the circumstances in which fate has placed him1 upon his surroundings1 upon external influences1 upon motives2 but his decision upon these motives can never be explained from them2 it proceeds from the will1 of which this man is a manifestation4 ,of this we shall speak in the ,fourth ,book4 ,the manner in which the character discloses its qualities is quite analogous to the way in which those of every material body in unconscious nature are disclosed4 ,water remains water with its intrinsic qualities1 whether as a still lake it reflects its banks1 or leaps in foam from the cliffs1 or1 artificially confined1 spouts in a long jet into the air4 ,all that depends upon external causes2 the one form is as natural to it as the other1 but it will always show the same form in the same circumstances2 it is equally ready for any1 but in every case true to its character1 and at all times revealing this alone4 ,so will every human character under all circumstances reveal itself1 but the phenomena which proceed from it will always be in accordance with the circumstances4 #bg4 ,if1 from the foregoing consideration of the forces of nature and their phenomena1 we have come to see clearly how far an explanation from causes can go1 and where it must stop if it is not to degenerate into the vain attempt to reduce the content of all phenomena to their mere form1 in which case there would ultimately remain nothing but form1 we shall be able to settle in general terms what is to be demanded of etiology as a whole4 ,it must seek out the causes of all phenomena in nature1 i4e41 the circumstances under which they invariably appear4 ,then it must refer the multitude of phenomena which have various forms in various circumstances to what is active in every phenomenon1 and is presupposed in the cause1--original forces of nature4 ,it must correctly distinguish between a difference of the phenomenon which arises from a difference of the force1 and one which results merely from a difference of the circumstances under which the force expresses itself2 and with equal care it must guard against taking the expressions of one and the same force under different circumstances for the manifestations of different forces1 and conversely against taking for manifestations of one and the same force what originally belongs to different forces4 ,now this is the direct work of the faculty of judgment1 and that is why so few men are capable of increasing our insight in physics1 while all are able to enlarge experience4 ,indolence and ignorance make us disposed to appeal too soon to original forces4 ,this is exemplified with an exaggeration that savours of irony in the entities and quidities of the schoolmen4 ,nothing is further from my desire than to favour their resuscitation4 ,we have just as little right to appeal to the objectification of will1 instead of giving a physical explanation1 as we have to appeal to the creative power of ,god4 ,for physics demands causes1 and the will is never a cause4 ,its whole relation to the phenomenon is not in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason4 ,but that which in itself is the will exists in another aspect as idea2 that is to say1 is phenomenon4 ,as such1 it obeys the laws which constitute the form of the phenomenon4 ,every movement1 for example1 although it is always a manifestation of will1 must yet have a cause from which it is to be explained in relation to a particular time and space2 that is1 not in general in its inner nature1 but as a particular phenomenon4 ,in the case of the stone1 this is a mechanical cause2 in that of the movement of a man1 it is a motive2 but in no case can it be wanting4 ,on the other hand1 the universal common nature of all phenomena of one particular kind1 that which must be presupposed if the explanation from causes is to have any sense and meaning1 is the general force of nature1 which1 in physics1 must remain a qualitas occulta1 because with it the etiological explanation ends and the metaphysical begins4 ,but the chain of causes and effects is never broken by an original force to which it has been necessary to appeal4 ,it does not run back to such a force as if it were its first link1 but the nearest link1 as well as the remotest1 presupposes the original force1 and could otherwise explain nothing4 ,a series of causes and effects may be the manifestation of the most different kinds of forces1 whose successive visible appearances are conducted through it1 as ,i have illustrated above by the example of a metal machine4 ,but the difference of these original forces1 which cannot be referred to each other1 by no means breaks the unity of that chain of causes1 and the connection between all its links4 ,the etiology and the philosophy of nature never do violence to each other1 but go hand in hand1 regarding the same object from different points of view4 ,etiology gives an account of the causes which necessarily produce the particular phenomenon to be explained4 ,it exhibits1 as the foundation of all its explanations1 the universal forces which are active in all these causes and effects4 ,it accurately defines1 enumerates1 and distinguishes these forces1 and then indicates all the different effects in which each force appears1 regulated by the difference of the circumstances1 always in accordance with its own peculiar character1 which it discloses in obedience to an invariable rule1 called a law of nature4 ,when all this has been thoroughly accomplished by physics in every particular1 it will be complete1 and its work will be done4 ,there will then remain no unknown force in unorganised nature1 nor any effect1 which has not been proved to be the manifestation of one of these forces under definite circumstances1 in accordance with a law of nature4 ,yet a law of nature remains merely the observed rule according to which nature invariably proceeds whenever certain definite circumstances occur4 ,therefore a law of nature may be defined as a fact expressed generally--un fait gnralis--and thus a complete enumeration of all the laws of nature would only be a complete register of facts4 ,the consideration of nature as a whole is thus completed in morphology1 which enumerates1 compares1 and arranges all the enduring forms of organised nature4 ,of the causes of the appearance of the individual creature it has little to say1 for in all cases this is procreation 7the theory of which is a separate matter71 and in rare cases the generatio quivoca4 ,but to this last belongs1 strictly speaking1 the manner in which all the lower grades of the objectification of will1 that is to say1 physical and chemical phenomena1 appear as individual1 and it is precisely the task of etiology to point out the conditions of this appearance4 ,philosophy1 on the other hand1 concerns itself only with the universal1 in nature as everywhere else4 ,the original forces themselves are here its object1 and it recognises in them the different grades of the objectivity of will1 which is the inner nature1 the 8in-itself0 of this world2 and when it regards the world apart from will1 it explains it as merely the idea of the subject4 ,but if etiology1 instead of preparing the way for philosophy1 and supplying its doctrines with practical application by means of instances1 supposes that its aim is rather to deny the existence of all original forces1 except perhaps one1 the most general1 for example1 impenetrability1 which it imagines it thoroughly understands1 and consequently seeks forcibly to refer all the others to it--it forsakes its own province and can only give us error instead of truth4 ,the content of nature is supplanted by its form1 everything is ascribed to the circumstances which work from without1 and nothing to the inner nature of the thing4 ,now if it were possible to succeed by this method1 a problem in arithmetic would ultimately1 as we have already remarked1 solve the riddle of the universe4 ,but this is the method adopted by those1 referred to above1 who think that all physiological effects ought to be reduced to form and combination1 this1 perhaps1 to electricity1 and this again to chemism1 and chemism to mechanism4 ,the mistake of ,descartes1 for example1 and of all the ,atomists1 was of this last description4 ,they referred the movements of the globe to the impact of a fluid1 and the qualities of matter to the connection and form of the atoms1 and hence they laboured to explain all the phenomena of nature as merely manifestations of impenetrability and cohesion4 ,although this has been given up1 precisely the same error is committed in our own day by the electrical1 chemical1 and mechanical physiologists1 who obstinately attempt to explain the whole of life and all the functions of the organism from 8form and combination40 ,in ,meckel's 8,archiv fr ,physiologie0 7#ahbj1 vol4 v4 p4 #ahe7 we still find it stated that the aim of physiological explanation is the reduction of organic life to the universal forces with which physics deals4 ,lamarck also1 in his 8,philosophie ,zoologique10 explains life as merely the effect of warmth and electricity3 le calorique et la matire lectrique suffisent parfaitement pour composer ensemble cette cause essentielle de la vie 7p4 #af74 ,according to this1 warmth and electricity would be the 8thing-in-itself10 and the world of animals and plants its phenomenal appearance4 ,the absurdity of this opinion becomes glaringly apparent at the #cjfth and following pages of that work4 ,it is well known that all these opinions1 that have been so often refuted1 have reappeared quite recently with renewed confidence4 ,if we carefully examine the foundation of these views1 we shall find that they ultimately involve the presupposition that the organism is merely an aggregate of phenomena of physical1 chemical1 and mechanical forces1 which have come together here by chance1 and produced the organism as a freak of nature without further significance4 ,the organism of an animal or of a human being would therefore be1 if considered philosophically1 not the exhibition of a special ,idea1 that is1 not itself immediate objectivity of the will at a definite higher grade1 but in it would appear only those ,ideas which objectify the will in electricity1 in chemism1 and in mechanism4 ,thus the organism would be as fortuitously constructed by the concurrence of these forces as the forms of men and beasts in clouds and stalactites1 and would therefore in itself be no more interesting than they are4 ,however1 we shall see immediately how far the application of physical and chemical modes of explanation to the organism may yet1 within certain limits1 be allowable and useful2 for ,i shall explain that the vital force certainly avails itself of and uses the forces of unorganised nature2 yet these forces no more constitute the vital force than a hammer and anvil make a blacksmith4 ,therefore even the most simple example of plant life can never be explained from these forces by any theory of capillary attraction and endosmose1 much less animal life4 ,the following observations will prepare the way for this somewhat difficult discussion4 ,it follows from all that has been said that it is certainly an error on the part of natural science to seek to refer the higher grades of the objectification of will to the lower2 for the failure to recognise1 or the denial of1 original and self-existing forces of nature is just as wrong as the groundless assumption of special forces when what occurs is merely a peculiar kind of manifestation of what is already known4 ,thus ,kant rightly says that it would be absurd to hope for a blade of grass from a ,newton1 that is1 from one who reduced the blade of grass to the manifestations of physical and chemical forces1 of which it was the chance product1 and therefore a mere freak of nature1 in which no special ,idea appeared1 i4e41 the will did not directly reveal itself in it in a higher and specific grade1 but just as in the phenomena of unorganised nature and by chance in this form4 ,the schoolmen1 who certainly would not have allowed such a doctrine1 would rightly have said that it was a complete denial of the forma substantialis1 and a degradation of it to the forma accidentalis4 ,for the forma substantialis of ,aristotle denotes exactly what ,i call the grade of the objectification of will in a thing4 ,on the other hand1 it is not to be overlooked that in all ,ideas1 that is1 in all forces of unorganised1 and all forms of organised nature1 it is one and the same will that reveals itself1 that is to say1 which enters the form of the idea and passes into objectivity4 ,its unity must therefore be also recognisable through an inner relationship between all its phenomena4 ,now this reveals itself in the higher grades of the objectification of will1 where the whole phenomenon is more distinct1 thus in the vegetable and animal kingdoms1 through the universally prevailing analogy of all forms1 the fundamental type which recurs in all phenomena4 ,this has1 therefore1 become the guiding principle of the admirable zoological system which was originated by the ,french in this century1 and it is most completely established in comparative anatomy as l'unit de plan1 l'uniformit de l'lment anatomique4 ,to discover this fundamental type has been the chief concern1 or at any rate the praiseworthy endeavour1 of the natural philosophers of the school of ,schelling1 who have in this respect considerable merit1 although in many cases their hunt after analogies in nature degenerated into mere conceits4 ,they have1 however1 rightly shown that that general relationship and family likeness exists also in the ,ideas of unorganised nature2 for example1 between electricity and magnetism1 the identity of which was afterwards established2 between chemical attraction and gravitation1 and so forth4 ,they specially called attention to the fact that polarity1 that is1 the sundering of a force into two qualitatively different and opposed activities striving after reunion1 which also shows itself for the most part in space as a dispersion in opposite directions1 is a fundamental type of almost all the phenomena of nature1 from the magnet and the crystal to man himself4 ,yet this knowledge has been current in ,china from the earliest times1 in the doctrine of opposition of ,yin and ,yang4 ,indeed1 since all things in the world are the objectification of one and the same will1 and therefore in their inner nature identical1 it must not only be the case that there is that unmistakable analogy between them1 and that in every phenomenon the trace1 intimation1 and plan of the higher phenomenon that lies next to it in point of development shows itself1 but also because all these forms belong to the world as idea1 it is indeed conceivable that even in the most universal forms of the idea1 in that peculiar framework of the phenomenal world space and time1 it may be possible to discern and establish the fundamental type1 intimation1 and plan of what fills the forms4 ,it seems to have been a dim notion of this that was the origin of the ,cabala and all the mathematical philosophy of the ,pythagoreans1 and also of the ,chinese in ,y-king4 ,in the school of ,schelling also1 to which we have already referred1 we find1 among their efforts to bring to light the similarity among the phenomena of nature1 several attempts 7though rather unfortunate ones7 to deduce laws of nature from the laws of pure space and time4 ,however1 one can never tell to what extent a man of genius will realise both endeavours4 ,now1 although the difference between phenomenon and thing-in-itself is never lost sight of1 and therefore the identity of the will which objectifies itself in all ,ideas can never 7because it has different grades of its objectification7 be distorted to mean identity of the particular ,ideas themselves in which it appears1 so that1 for example1 chemical or electrical attraction can never be reduced to the attraction of gravitation1 although this inner analogy is known1 and the former may be regarded as1 so to speak1 higher powers of the latter1 just as little does the similarity of the construction of all animals warrant us in mixing and identifying the species and explaining the more developed as mere variations of the less developed2 and although1 finally1 the physiological functions are never to be reduced to chemical or physical processes1 yet1 in justification of this procedure1 within certain limits1 we may accept the following observations as highly probable4 ,if several of the phenomena of will in the lower grades of its objectification--that is1 in unorganised nature--come into conflict because each of them1 under the guidance of causality1 seeks to possess a given portion of matter1 there arises from the conflict the phenomenon of a higher ,idea which prevails over all the less developed phenomena previously there1 yet in such a way that it allows the essence of these to continue to exist in a subordinate manner1 in that it takes up into itself from them something which is analogous to them4 ,this process is only intelligible from the identity of the will which manifests itself in all the ,ideas1 and which is always striving after higher objectification4 ,we thus see1 for example1 in the hardening of the bones1 an unmistakable analogy to crystallisation1 as the force which originally had possession of the chalk1 although ossification is never to be reduced to crystallisation4 ,the analogy shows itself in a weaker degree in the flesh becoming firm4 ,the combination of humours in the animal body and secretion are also analogous to chemical combination and separation4 ,indeed1 the laws of chemistry are still strongly operative in this case1 but subordinated1 very much modified1 and mastered by a higher ,idea2 therefore mere chemical forces outside the organism will never afford us such humours2 but 8,encheiresin natur nennt es die ,chemie1 ,spottet ihrer selbst und weiss nicht wie40 ,the more developed ,idea resulting from this victory over several lower ,ideas or objectifications of will1 gains an entirely new character by taking up into itself from every ,idea over which it has prevailed a strengthened analogy4 ,the will objectifies itself in a new1 more distinct way4 ,it originally appears in generatio quivoca2 afterwards in assimilation to the given germ1 organic moisture1 plant1 animal1 man4 ,thus from the strife of lower phenomena the higher arise1 swallowing them all up1 but yet realising in the higher grade the tendency of all the lower4 ,here1 then1 already the law applies--,serpens nisi serpentem comederit non fit draco4 ,i wish it had been possible for me to dispel by clearness of explanation the obscurity which clings to the subject of these thoughts2 but ,i see very well that the reader's own consideration of the matter must materially aid me if ,i am not to remain uncomprehended or misunderstood4 ,according to the view ,i have expressed1 the traces of chemical and physical modes of operation will indeed be found in the organism1 but it can never be explained from them2 because it is by no means a phenomenon even accidentally brought about through the united actions of such forces1 but a higher ,idea which has overcome these lower ideas by subduing assimilation2 for the one will which objectifies itself in all ,ideas always seeks the highest possible objectification1 and has therefore in this case given up the lower grades of its manifestation after a conflict1 in order to appear in a higher grade1 and one so much the more powerful4 ,no victory without conflict3 since the higher ,idea or objectification of will can only appear through the conquest of the lower1 it endures the opposition of these lower ,ideas1 which1 although brought into subjection1 still constantly strive to obtain an independent and complete expression of their being4 ,the magnet that has attracted a piece of iron carries on a perpetual conflict with gravitation1 which1 as the lower objectification of will1 has a prior right to the matter of the iron2 and in this constant battle the magnet indeed grows stronger1 for the opposition excites it1 as it were1 to greater effort4 ,in the same way every manifestation of the will1 including that which expresses itself in the human organism1 wages a constant war against the many physical and chemical forces which1 as lower ,ideas1 have a prior right to that matter4 ,thus the arm falls which for a while1 overcoming gravity1 we have held stretched out2 thus the pleasing sensation of health1 which proclaims the victory of the ,idea of the self-conscious organism over the physical and chemical laws1 which originally governed the humours of the body1 is so often interrupted1 and is indeed always accompanied by greater or less discomfort1 which arises from the resistance of these forces1 and on account of which the vegetative part of our life is constantly attended by slight pain4 ,thus also digestion weakens all the animal functions1 because it requires the whole vital force to overcome the chemical forces of nature by assimilation4 ,hence also in general the burden of physical life1 the necessity of sleep1 and1 finally1 of death2 for at last these subdued forces of nature1 assisted by circumstances1 win back from the organism1 wearied even by the constant victory1 the matter it took from them1 and attain to an unimpeded expression of their being4 ,we may therefore say that every organism expresses the ,idea of which it is the image1 only after we have subtracted the part of its force which is expended in subduing the lower ,ideas that strive with it for matter4 ,this seems to have been running in the mind of ,jacob ,bhm when he says somewhere that all the bodies of men and animals1 and even all plants1 are really half dead4 ,according as the subjection in the organism of these forces of nature1 which express the lower grades of the objectification of will1 is more or less successful1 the more or the less completely does it attain to the expression of its ,idea2 that is to say1 the nearer it is to the ideal or the further from it--the ideal of beauty in its species4 ,thus everywhere in nature we see strife1 conflict1 and alternation of victory1 and in it we shall come to recognise more distinctly that variance with itself which is essential to the will4 ,every grade of the objectification of will fights for the matter1 the space1 and the time of the others4 ,the permanent matter must constantly change its form2 for under the guidance of causality1 mechanical1 physical1 chemical1 and organic phenomena1 eagerly striving to appear1 wrest the matter from each other1 for each desires to reveal its own ,idea4 ,this strife may be followed through the whole of nature2 indeed nature exists only through it3 1 1 2 7nam si non inesset in rebus contentio1 unum omnia essent1 ut ait ,empedocles4 ,aris4 ,metaph41 ,b4 #e74 ,yet this strife itself is only the revelation of that variance with itself which is essential to the will4 ,this universal conflict becomes most distinctly visible in the animal kingdom4 ,for animals have the whole of the vegetable kingdom for their food1 and even within the animal kingdom every beast is the prey and the food of another2 that is1 the matter in which its ,idea expresses itself must yield itself to the expression of another ,idea1 for each animal can only maintain its existence by the constant destruction of some other4 ,thus the will to live everywhere preys upon itself1 and in different forms is its own nourishment1 till finally the human race1 because it subdues all the others1 regards nature as a manufactory for its use4 ,yet even the human race1 as we shall see in the ,fourth ,book1 reveals in itself with most terrible distinctness this conflict1 this variance with itself of the will1 and we find homo homini lupus4 ,meanwhile we can recognise this strife1 this subjugation1 just as well in the lower grades of the objectification of will4 ,many insects 7especially ichneumon-flies7 lay their eggs on the skin1 and even in the body of the larv of other insects1 whose slow destruction is the first work of the newly hatched brood4 ,the young hydra1 which grows like a bud out of the old one1 and afterwards separates itself from it1 fights while it is still joined to the old one for the prey that offers itself1 so that the one snatches it out of the mouth of the other 7,trembley1 ,polypod41 ii4 p4 #aaj1 and iii4 p4 #afe74 ,but the bulldog-ant of ,australia affords us the most extraordinary example of this kind2 for if it is cut in two1 a battle begins between the head and the tail4 ,the head seizes the tail with its teeth1 and the tail defends itself bravely by stinging the head3 the battle may last for half an hour1 until they die or are dragged away by other ants4 ,this contest takes place every time the experiment is tried4 7,from a letter by ,howitt in the ,w4 ,journal1 reprinted in ,galignani's ,messenger1 #agth ,november #ahee47 ,on the banks of the ,missouri one sometimes sees a mighty oak the stem and branches of which are so encircled1 fettered1 and interlaced by a gigantic wild vine1 that it withers as if choked4 ,the same thing shows itself in the lowest grades2 for example1 when water and carbon are changed into vegetable sap1 or vegetables or bread into blood by organic assimilation2 and so also in every case in which animal secretion takes place1 along with the restriction of chemical forces to a subordinate mode of activity4 ,this also occurs in unorganised nature1 when1 for example1 crystals in process of formation meet1 cross1 and mutually disturb each other to such an extent that they are unable to assume the pure crystalline form1 so that almost every cluster of crystals is an image of such a conflict of will at this low grade of its objectification2 or again1 when a magnet forces its magnetism upon iron1 in order to express its ,idea in it2 or when galvanism overcomes chemical affinity1 decomposes the closest combinations1 and so entirely suspends the laws of chemistry that the acid of a decomposed salt at the negative pole must pass to the positive pole without combining with the alkalies through which it goes on its way1 or turning red the litmus paper that touches it4 ,on a large scale it shows itself in the relation between the central body and the planet1 for although the planet is in absolute dependence1 yet it always resists1 just like the chemical forces in the organism2 hence arises the constant tension between centripetal and centrifugal force1 which keeps the globe in motion1 and is itself an example of that universal essential conflict of the manifestation of will which we are considering4 ,for as every body must be regarded as the manifestation of a will1 and as will necessarily expresses itself as a struggle1 the original condition of every world that is formed into a globe cannot be rest1 but motion1 a striving forward in boundless space without rest and without end4 ,neither the law of inertia nor that of causality is opposed to this3 for as1 according to the former1 matter as such is alike indifferent to rest and motion1 its original condition may just as well be the one as the other1 therefore if we first find it in motion1 we have just as little right to assume that this was preceded by a condition of rest1 and to inquire into the cause of the origin of the motion1 as1 conversely1 if we found it at rest1 we would have to assume a previous motion and inquire into the cause of its suspension4 ,it is1 therefore1 not needful to seek for a first impulse for centrifugal force1 for1 according to the hypothesis of ,kant and ,laplace1 it is1 in the case of the planets1 the residue of the original rotation of the central body1 from which the planets have separated themselves as it contracted4 ,but to this central body itself motion is essential2 it always continues its rotation1 and at the same time rushes forward in endless space1 or perhaps circulates round a greater central body invisible to us4 ,this view entirely agrees with the conjecture of astronomers that there is a central sun1 and also with the observed advance of our whole solar system1 and perhaps of the whole stellar system to which our sun belongs4 ,from this we are finally led to assume a general advance of fixed stars1 together with the central sun1 and this certainly loses all meaning in boundless space 7for motion in absolute space cannot be distinguished from rest71 and becomes1 as is already the case from its striving and aimless flight1 an expression of that nothingness1 that failure of all aim1 which1 at the close of this book1 we shall be obliged to recognise in the striving of will in all its phenomena4 ,thus boundless space and endless time must be the most universal and essential forms of the collective phenomena of will1 which exist for the expression of its whole being4 ,lastly1 we can recognise that conflict which we are considering of all phenomena of will against each other in simple matter regarded as such2 for the real characteristic of matter is correctly expressed by ,kant as repulsive and attractive force2 so that even crude matter has its existence only in the strife of conflicting forces4 ,if we abstract from all chemical differences in matter1 or go so far back in the chain of causes and effects that as yet there is no chemical difference1 there remains mere matter1--the world rounded to a globe1 whose life1 i4e41 objectification of will1 is now constituted by the conflict between attractive and repulsive forces1 the former as gravitation pressing from all sides towards the centre1 the latter as impenetrability always opposing the former either as rigidity or elasticity2 and this constant pressure and resistance may be regarded as the objectivity of will in its very lowest grade1 and even there it expresses its character4 ,we should see the will express itself here in the lowest grade as blind striving1 an obscure1 inarticulate impulse1 far from susceptible of being directly known4 ,it is the simplest and the weakest mode of its objectification4 ,but it appears as this blind and unconscious striving in the whole of unorganised nature1 in all those original forces of which it is the work of physics and chemistry to discover and to study the laws1 and each of which manifests itself to us in millions of phenomena which are exactly similar and regular1 and show no trace of individual character1 but are mere multiplicity through space and time1 i4e41 through the principium individuationis1 as a picture is multiplied through the facets of a glass4 ,from grade to grade objectifying itself more distinctly1 yet still completely without consciousness as an obscure striving force1 the will acts in the vegetable kingdom also1 in which the bond of its phenomena consists no longer properly of causes1 but of stimuli2 and1 finally1 also in the vegetative part of the animal phenomenon1 in the production and maturing of the animal1 and in sustaining its inner economy1 in which the manifestation of will is still always necessarily determined by stimuli4 ,the ever-ascending grades of the objectification of will bring us at last to the point at which the individual that expresses the ,idea could no longer receive food for its assimilation through mere movement following upon stimuli4 ,for such a stimulus must be waited for1 but the food has now come to be of a more special and definite kind1 and with the ever-increasing multiplicity of the individual phenomena1 the crowd and confusion has become so great that they interfere with each other1 and the chance of the individual that is moved merely by stimuli and must wait for its food would be too unfavourable4 ,from the point1 therefore1 at which the animal has delivered itself from the egg or the womb in which it vegetated without consciousness1 its food must be sought out and selected4 ,for this purpose movement following upon motives1 and therefore consciousness1 becomes necessary1 and consequently it appears as an agent1 1 called in at this stage of the objectification of will for the conservation of the individual and the propagation of the species4 ,it appears represented by the brain or a large ganglion1 just as every other effort or determination of the will which objectifies itself is represented by an organ1 that is to say1 manifests itself for the idea as an organ47#cf7 ,but with this means of assistance1 this 1 the world as idea comes into existence at a stroke1 with all its forms1 object and subject1 time1 space1 multiplicity1 and causality4 ,the world now shows its second side4 ,till now mere will1 it becomes also idea1 object of the knowing subject4 ,the will1 which up to this point followed its tendency in the dark with unerring certainty1 has at this grade kindled for itself a light as a means which became necessary for getting rid of the disadvantage which arose from the throng and the complicated nature of its manifestations1 and which would have accrued precisely to the most perfect of them4 ,the hitherto infallible certainty and regularity with which it worked in unorganised and merely vegetative nature1 rested upon the fact that it alone was active in its original nature1 as blind impulse1 will1 without assistance1 and also without interruption1 from a second and entirely different world1 the world as idea1 which is indeed only the image of its own inner being1 but is yet of quite another nature1 and now encroaches on the connected whole of its phenomena4 ,hence its infallible certainty comes to an end4 ,animals are already exposed to illusion1 to deception4 ,they have1 however1 merely ideas of perception1 no conceptions1 no reflection1 and they are therefore bound to the present2 they cannot have regard for the future4 ,it seems as if this knowledge without reason was not in all cases sufficient for its end1 and at times required1 as it were1 some assistance4 ,for the very remarkable phenomenon presents itself1 that the blind working of the will and the activity enlightened by knowledge encroach in a most astonishing manner upon each other's spheres in two kinds of phenomena4 ,in the one case we find in the very midst of those actions of animals which are guided by perceptive knowledge and its motives one kind of action which is accomplished apart from these1 and thus through the necessity of the blindly acting will4 ,i refer to those mechanical instincts which are guided by no motive or knowledge1 and which yet have the appearance of performing their work from abstract rational motives4 ,the other case1 which is opposed to this1 is that in which1 on the contrary1 the light of knowledge penetrates into the workshop of the blindly active will1 and illuminates the vegetative functions of the human organism4 ,i mean clairvoyance4 ,finally1 when the will has attained to the highest grade of its objectification1 that knowledge of the understanding given to brutes to which the senses supply the data1 out of which there arises mere perception confined to what is immediately present1 does not suffice4 ,that complicated1 many-sided1 imaginative being1 man1 with his many needs1 and exposed as he is to innumerable dangers1 must1 in order to exist1 be lighted by a double knowledge2 a higher power1 as it were1 of perceptive knowledge must be given him1 and also reason1 as the faculty of framing abstract conceptions4 ,with this there has appeared reflection1 surveying the future and the past1 and1 as a consequence1 deliberation1 care1 the power of premeditated action independent of the present1 and finally1 the full and distinct consciousness of one's own deliberate volition as such4 ,now if with mere knowledge of perception there arose the possibility of illusion and deception1 by which the previous infallibility of the blind striving of will was done away with1 so that mechanical and other instincts1 as expressions of unconscious will1 had to lend their help in the midst of those that were conscious1 with the entrance of reason that certainty and infallibility of the expressions of will 7which at the other extreme in unorganised nature appeared as strict conformity to law7 is almost entirely lost2 instinct disappears altogether2 deliberation1 which is supposed to take the place of everything else1 begets 7as was shown in the ,first ,book7 irresolution and uncertainty2 then error becomes possible1 and in many cases obstructs the adequate objectification of the will in action4 ,for although in the character the will has already taken its definite and unchangeable bent or direction1 in accordance with which volition1 when occasioned by the presence of a motive1 invariably takes place1 yet error can falsify its expressions1 for it introduces illusive motives that take the place of the real ones which they resemble27#cg7 as1 for example1 when superstition forces on a man imaginary motives which impel him to a course of action directly opposed to the way in which the will would otherwise express itself in the given circumstances4 ,agamemnon slays his daughter2 a miser dispenses alms1 out of pure egotism1 in the hope that he will some day receive an hundred-fold2 and so on4 ,thus knowledge generally1 rational as well as merely sensuous1 proceeds originally from the will itself1 belongs to the inner being of the higher grades of its objectification as a mere 1 a means of supporting the individual and the species1 just like any organ of the body4 ,originally destined for the service of the will for the accomplishment of its aims1 it remains almost throughout entirely subjected to its service3 it is so in all brutes and in almost all men4 ,yet we shall see in the ,third ,book how in certain individual men knowledge can deliver itself from this bondage1 throw off its yoke1 and1 free from all the aims of will1 exist purely for itself1 simply as a clear mirror of the world1 which is the source of art4 ,finally1 in the ,fourth ,book1 we shall see how1 if this kind of knowledge reacts on the will1 it can bring about self-surrender1 i4e41 resignation1 which is the final goal1 and indeed the inmost nature of all virtue and holiness1 and is deliverance from the world4 #bh4 ,we have considered the great multiplicity and diversity of the phenomena in which the will objectifies itself1 and we have seen their endless and implacable strife with each other4 ,yet1 according to the whole discussion up to this point1 the will itself1 as thing-in-itself1 is by no means included in that multiplicity and change4 ,the diversity of the 7,platonic7 ,ideas1 i4e41 grades of objectification1 the multitude of individuals in which each of these expresses itself1 the struggle of forms for matter1--all this does not concern it1 but is only the manner of its objectification1 and only through this has an indirect relation to it1 by virtue of which it belongs to the expression of the nature of will for the idea4 ,as the magic-lantern shows many different pictures1 which are all made visible by one and the same light1 so in all the multifarious phenomena which fill the world together or throng after each other as events1 only one will manifests itself1 of which everything is the visibility1 the objectivity1 and which remains unmoved in the midst of this change2 it alone is thing-in-itself2 all objects are manifestations1 or1 to speak the language of ,kant1 phenomena4 ,although in man1 as 7,platonic7 ,idea1 the will finds its clearest and fullest objectification1 yet man alone could not express its being4 ,in order to manifest the full significance of the will1 the ,idea of man would need to appear1 not alone and sundered from everything else1 but accompanied by the whole series of grades1 down through all the forms of animals1 through the vegetable kingdom to unorganised nature4 ,all these supplement each other in the complete objectification of will2 they are as much presupposed by the ,idea of man as the blossoms of a tree presuppose leaves1 branches1 stem1 and root2 they form a pyramid1 of which man is the apex4 ,if fond of similes1 one might also say that their manifestations accompany that of man as necessarily as the full daylight is accompanied by all the gradations of twilight1 through which1 little by little1 it loses itself in darkness2 or one might call them the echo of man1 and say3 ,animal and plant are the descending fifth and third of man1 the inorganic kingdom is the lower octave4 ,the full truth of this last comparison will only become clear to us when1 in the following book1 we attempt to fathom the deep significance of music1 and see how a connected1 progressive melody1 made up of high1 quick notes1 may be regarded as in some sense expressing the life and efforts of man connected by reflection1 while the unconnected complemental notes and the slow bass1 which make up the harmony necessary to perfect the music1 represent the rest of the animal kingdom and the whole of nature that is without knowledge4 ,but of this in its own place1 where it will not sound so paradoxical4 ,we find1 however1 that the inner necessity of the gradation of its manifestations1 which is inseparable from the adequate objectification of the will1 is expressed by an outer necessity in the whole of these manifestations themselves1 by reason of which man has need of the beasts for his support1 the beasts in their grades have need of each other as well as of plants1 which in their turn require the ground1 water1 chemical elements and their combinations1 the planet1 the sun1 rotation and motion round the sun1 the curve of the ellipse1 c41 c4 ,at bottom this results from the fact that the will must live on itself1 for there exists nothing beside it1 and it is a hungry will4 ,hence arise eager pursuit1 anxiety1 and suffering4 ,it is only the knowledge of the unity of will as thing-in-itself1 in the endless diversity and multiplicity of the phenomena1 that can afford us the true explanation of that wonderful1 unmistakable analogy of all the productions of nature1 that family likeness on account of which we may regard them as variations on the same ungiven theme4 ,so in like measure1 through the distinct and thoroughly comprehended knowledge of that harmony1 that essential connection of all the parts of the world1 that necessity of their gradation which we have just been considering1 we shall obtain a true and sufficient insight into the inner nature and meaning of the undeniable teleology of all organised productions of nature1 which1 indeed1 we presupposed a priori1 when considering and investigating them4 ,this teleology is of a twofold description2 sometimes an inner teleology1 that is1 an agreement of all the parts of a particular organism1 so ordered that the sustenance of the individual and the species results from it1 and therefore presents itself as the end of that disposition or arrangement4 ,sometimes1 however1 there is an outward teleology1 a relation of unorganised to organised nature in general1 or of particular parts of organised nature to each other1 which makes the maintenance of the whole of organised nature1 or of the particular animal species1 possible1 and therefore presents itself to our judgment as the means to this end4 ,inner teleology is connected with the scheme of our work in the following way4 ,if1 in accordance with what has been said1 all variations of form in nature1 and all multiplicity of individuals1 belong not to the will itself1 but merely to its objectivity and the form of this objectivity1 it necessarily follows that the will is indivisible and is present as a whole in every manifestation1 although the grades of its objectification1 the 7,platonic7 ,ideas1 are very different from each other4 ,we may1 for the sake of simplicity1 regard these different ,ideas as in themselves individual and simple acts of the will1 in which it expresses its nature more or less4 ,individuals1 however1 are again manifestations of the ,ideas1 thus of these acts1 in time1 space1 and multiplicity4 ,now1 in the lowest grades of objectivity1 such an act 7or an ,idea7 retains its unity in the manifestation2 while1 in order to appear in higher grades1 it requires a whole series of conditions and developments in time1 which only collectively express its nature completely4 ,thus1 for example the ,idea that reveals itself in any general force of nature has always one single expression1 although it presents itself differently according to the external relations that are present3 otherwise its identity could not be proved1 for this is done by abstracting the diversity that arises merely from external relations4 ,in the same way the crystal has only one manifestation of life1 crystallisation1 which afterwards has its fully adequate and exhaustive expression in the rigid form1 the corpse of that momentary life4 ,the plant1 however1 does not express the ,idea1 whose phenomenon it is1 at once and through a single manifestation1 but in a succession of developments of its organs in time4 ,the animal not only develops its organism in the same manner1 in a succession of forms which are often very different 7metamorphosis71 but this form itself1 although it is already objectivity of will at this grade1 does not attain to a full expression of its ,idea4 ,this expression must be completed through the actions of the animal1 in which its empirical character1 common to the whole species1 manifests itself1 and only then does it become the full revelation of the ,idea1 a revelation which presupposes the particular organism as its first condition4 ,in the case of man1 the empirical character is peculiar to every individual 7indeed1 as we shall see in the ,fourth ,book1 even to the extent of supplanting entirely the character of the species1 through the self-surrender of the whole will74 ,that which is known as the empirical character1 through the necessary development in time1 and the division into particular actions that is conditioned by it1 is1 when we abstract from this temporal form of the manifestation the intelligible character1 according to the expression of ,kant1 who shows his undying merit especially in establishing this distinction and explaining the relation between freedom and necessity1 i4e41 between the will as thing-in-itself and its manifestations in time47#ch7 ,thus the intelligible character coincides with the ,idea1 or1 more accurately1 with the original act of will which reveals itself in it4 ,so far then1 not only the empirical character of every man1 but also that of every species of animal and plant1 and even of every original force of unorganised nature1 is to be regarded as the manifestation of an intelligible character1 that is1 of a timeless1 indivisible act of will4 ,i should like here to draw attention in passing to the navet with which every plant expresses and lays open its whole character in its mere form1 reveals its whole being and will4 ,this is why the physiognomy of plants is so interesting2 while in order to know an animal in its ,idea1 it is necessary to observe the course of its action4 ,as for man1 he must be fully investigated and tested1 for reason makes him capable of a high degree of dissimulation4 ,the beast is as much more nave than the man as the plant is more nave than the beast4 ,in the beast we see the will to live more naked1 as it were1 than in the man1 in whom it is clothed with so much knowledge1 and is1 moreover1 so veiled through the capacity for dissimulation1 that it is almost only by chance1 and here and there1 that its true nature becomes apparent4 ,in the plant it shows itself quite naked1 but also much weaker1 as mere blind striving for existence without end or aim4 ,for the plant reveals its whole being at the first glance1 and with complete innocence1 which does not suffer from the fact that it carries its organs of generation exposed to view on its upper surface1 though in all animals they have been assigned to the most hidden part4 ,this innocence of the plant results from its complete want of knowledge4 ,guilt does not lie in willing1 but in willing with knowledge4 ,every plant speaks to us first of all of its home1 of the climate1 and the nature of the ground in which it has grown4 ,therefore1 even those who have had little practice easily tell whether an exotic plant belongs to the tropical or the temperate zone1 and whether it grows in water1 in marshes1 on mountain1 or on moorland4 ,besides this1 however1 every plant expresses the special will of its species1 and says something that cannot be uttered in any other tongue4 ,but we must now apply what has been said to the teleological consideration of the organism1 so far as it concerns its inner design4 ,if in unorganised nature the ,idea1 which is everywhere to be regarded as a single act of will1 reveals itself also in a single manifestation which is always the same1 and thus one may say that here the empirical character directly partakes of the unity of the intelligible1 coincides1 as it were1 with it1 so that no inner design can show itself here2 if1 on the contrary1 all organisms express their ,ideas through a series of successive developments1 conditioned by a multiplicity of co-existing parts1 and thus only the sum of the manifestations of the empirical character collectively constitute the expression of the intelligible character2 this necessary co-existence of the parts and succession of the stages of development does not destroy the unity of the appearing ,idea1 the act of will which expresses itself2 nay1 rather this unity finds its expression in the necessary relation and connection of the parts and stages of development with each other1 in accordance with the law of causality4 ,since it is the will which is one1 indivisible1 and therefore entirely in harmony with itself1 that reveals itself in the whole ,idea as in act1 its manifestation1 although broken up into a number of different parts and conditions1 must yet show this unity again in the thorough agreement of all of these4 ,this is effected by a necessary relation and dependence of all the parts upon each other1 by means of which the unity of the ,idea is re-established in the manifestation4 ,in accordance with this1 we now recognise these different parts and functions of the organism as related to each other reciprocally as means and end1 but the organism itself as the final end of all4 ,consequently1 neither the breaking up of the ,idea1 which in itself is simple1 into the multiplicity of the parts and conditions of the organism1 on the one hand1 nor1 on the other hand1 the re-establishment of its unity through the necessary connection of the parts and functions which arises from the fact that they are the cause and effect1 the means and end1 of each other1 is peculiar and essential to the appearing will as such1 to the thing-in-itself1 but only to its manifestation in space1 time1 and causality 7mere modes of the principle of sufficient reason1 the form of the phenomenon74 ,they belong to the world as idea1 not to the world as will2 they belong to the way in which the will becomes object1 i4e41 idea at this grade of its objectivity4 ,every one who has grasped the meaning of this discussion--a discussion which is perhaps somewhat difficult--will now fully understand the doctrine of ,kant1 which follows from it1 that both the design of organised and the conformity to law of unorganised nature are only introduced by our understanding1 and therefore both belong only to the phenomenon1 not to the thing-in-itself4 ,the surprise1 which was referred to above1 at the infallible constancy of the conformity to law of unorganised nature1 is essentially the same as the surprise that is excited by design in organised nature2 for in both cases what we wonder at is only the sight of the original unity of the ,idea1 which1 for the phenomenon1 has assumed the form of multiplicity and diversity47#ci7 ,as regards the second kind of teleology1 according to the division made above1 the outer design1 which shows itself1 not in the inner economy of the organisms1 but in the support and assistance they receive from without1 both from unorganised nature and from each other2 its general explanation is to be found in the exposition we have just given4 ,for the whole world1 with all its phenomena1 is the objectivity of the one indivisible will1 the ,idea1 which is related to all other ,ideas as harmony is related to the single voice4 ,therefore that unity of the will must show itself also in the agreement of all its manifestations4 ,but we can very much increase the clearness of this insight if we go somewhat more closely into the manifestations of that outer teleology and agreement of the different parts of nature with each other1 an inquiry which will also throw some light on the foregoing exposition4 ,we shall best attain this end by considering the following analogy4 ,the character of each individual man1 so far as it is thoroughly individual1 and not entirely included in that of the species1 may be regarded as a special ,idea1 corresponding to a special act of the objectification of will4 ,this act itself would then be his intelligible character1 and his empirical character would be the manifestation of it4 ,the empirical character is entirely determined through the intelligible1 which is without ground1 i4e41 as thing-in-itself is not subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason 7the form of the phenomenon74 ,the empirical character must in the course of life afford us the express image of the intelligible1 and can only become what the nature of the latter demands4 ,but this property extends only to the essential1 not to the unessential in the course of life to which it applies4 ,to this unessential belong the detailed events and actions which are the material in which the empirical character shows itself4 ,these are determined by outward circumstances1 which present the motives upon which the character reacts according to its nature2 and as they may be very different1 the outward form of the manifestation of the empirical character1 that is1 the definite actual or historical form of the course of life1 will have to accommodate itself to their influence4 ,now this form may be very different1 although what is essential to the manifestation1 its content1 remains the same4 ,thus1 for example it is immaterial whether a man plays for nuts or for crowns2 but whether a man cheats or plays fairly1 that is the real matter2 the latter is determined by the intelligible character1 the former by outward circumstances4 ,as the same theme may be expressed in a hundred different variations1 so the same character may be expressed in a hundred very different lives4 ,but various as the outward influence may be1 the empirical character which expresses itself in the course of life must yet1 whatever form it takes1 accurately objectify the intelligible character1 for the latter adapts its objectification to the given material of actual circumstances4 ,we have now to assume something analogous to the influence of outward circumstances upon the life that is determined in essential matters by the character1 if we desire to understand how the will1 in the original act of its objectification1 determines the various ,ideas in which it objectifies itself1 that is1 the different forms of natural existence of every kind1 among which it distributes its objectification1 and which must therefore necessarily have a relation to each other in the manifestation4 ,we must assume that between all these manifestations of the one will there existed a universal and reciprocal adaptation and accommodation of themselves to each other1 by which1 however1 as we shall soon see more clearly1 all time-determination is to be excluded1 for the ,idea lies outside time4 ,in accordance with this1 every manifestation must have adapted itself to the surroundings into which it entered1 and these again must have adapted themselves to it1 although it occupied a much later position in time2 and we see this consensus natur everywhere4 ,every plant is therefore adapted to its soil and climate1 every animal to its element and the prey that will be its food1 and is also in some way protected1 to a certain extent1 against its natural enemy3 the eye is adapted to the light and its refrangibility1 the lungs and the blood to the air1 the air-bladder of fish to water1 the eye of the seal to the change of the medium in which it must see1 the water-pouch in the stomach of the camel to the drought of the ,african deserts1 the sail of the nautilus to the wind that is to drive its little bark1 and so on down to the most special and astonishing outward adaptations47#dj7 ,we must abstract however here from all temporal relations1 for these can only concern the manifestation of the ,idea1 not the ,idea itself4 ,accordingly this kind of explanation must also be used retrospectively1 and we must not merely admit that every species accommodated itself to the given environment1 but also that this environment itself1 which preceded it in time1 had just as much regard for the being that would some time come into it4 ,for it is one and the same will that objectifies itself in the whole world2 it knows no time1 for this form of the principle of sufficient reason does not belong to it1 nor to its original objectivity1 the ,ideas1 but only to the way in which these are known by the individuals who themselves are transitory1 i4e41 to the manifestation of the ,ideas4 ,thus1 time has no significance for our present examination of the manner in which the objectification of the will distributes itself among the ,ideas1 and the ,ideas whose manifestations entered into the course of time earlier1 according to the law of causality1 to which as phenomena they are subject1 have no advantage over those whose manifestation entered later2 nay rather1 these last are the completest objectifications of the will1 to which the earlier manifestations must adapt themselves just as much as they must adapt themselves to the earlier4 ,thus the course of the planets1 the tendency to the ellipse1 the rotation of the earth1 the division of land and sea1 the atmosphere1 light1 warmth1 and all such phenomena1 which are in nature what bass is in harmony1 adapted themselves in anticipation of the coming species of living creatures of which they were to become the supporter and sustainer4 ,in the same way the ground adapted itself to the nutrition of plants1 plants adapted themselves to the nutrition of animals1 animals to that of other animals1 and conversely they all adapted themselves to the nutrition of the ground4 ,all the parts of nature correspond to each other1 for it is one will that appears in them all1 but the course of time is quite foreign to its original and only adequate objectification 7this expression will be explained in the following book71 the ,ideas4 ,even now1 when the species have only to sustain themselves1 no longer to come into existence1 we see here and there some such forethought of nature extending to the future1 and abstracting as it were from the process of time1 a self-adaptation of what is to what is yet to come4 ,the bird builds the nest for the young which it does not yet know2 the beaver constructs a dam the object of which is unknown to it2 ants1 marmots1 and bees lay in provision for the winter they have never experienced2 the spider and the ant-lion make snares1 as if with deliberate cunning1 for future unknown prey2 insects deposit their eggs where the coming brood finds future nourishment4 ,in the spring-time the female flower of the dician valisneria unwinds the spirals of its stalk1 by which till now it was held at the bottom of the water1 and thus rises to the surface4 ,just then the male flower1 which grows on a short stalk from the bottom1 breaks away1 and so1 at the sacrifice of its life1 reaches the surface1 where it swims about in search of the female4 ,the latter is fructified1 and then draws itself down again to the bottom by contracting its spirals1 and there the fruit grows47#da7 ,i must again refer here to the larva of the male stag-beetle1 which makes the hole in the wood for its metamorphosis as big again as the female does1 in order to have room for its future horns4 ,the instinct of animals in general gives us the best illustration of what remains of teleology in nature4 ,for as instinct is an action1 like that which is guided by the conception of an end1 and yet is entirely without this2 so all construction of nature resembles that which is guided by the conception of an end1 and yet is entirely without it4 ,for in the outer as in the inner teleology of nature1 what we are obliged to think as means and end is1 in every case1 the manifestation of the unity of the one will so thoroughly agreeing with itself1 which has assumed multiplicity in space and time for our manner of knowing4 ,the reciprocal adaptation and self-accommodation of phenomena that springs from this unity cannot1 however1 annul the inner contradiction which appears in the universal conflict of nature described above1 and which is essential to the will4 ,that harmony goes only so far as to render possible the duration of the world and the different kinds of existences in it1 which without it would long since have perished4 ,therefore it only extends to the continuance of the species1 and the general conditions of life1 but not to that of the individual4 ,if1 then1 by reason of that harmony and accommodation1 the species in organised nature and the universal forces in unorganised nature continue to exist beside each other1 and indeed support each other reciprocally1 on the other hand1 the inner contradiction of the will which objectifies itself in all these ideas shows itself in the ceaseless internecine war of the individuals of these species1 and in the constant struggle of the manifestations of these natural forces with each other1 as we pointed out above4 ,the scene and the object of this conflict is matter1 which they try to wrest from each other1 and also space and time1 the combination of which through the form of causality is1 in fact1 matter1 as was explained in the ,first ,book47#db7 #bi4 ,i here conclude the second principal division of my exposition1 in the hope that1 so far as is possible in the case of an entirely new thought1 which cannot be quite free from traces of the individuality in which it originated1 ,i have succeeded in conveying to the reader the complete certainty that this world in which we live and have our being is in its whole nature through and through will1 and at the same time through and through idea3 that this idea1 as such1 already presupposes a form1 object and subject1 is therefore relative2 and if we ask what remains if we take away this form1 and all those forms which are subordinate to it1 and which express the principle of sufficient reason1 the answer must be that as something toto genere different from idea1 this can be nothing but will1 which is thus properly the thing-in-itself4 ,every one finds that he himself is this will1 in which the real nature of the world consists1 and he also finds that he is the knowing subject1 whose idea the whole world is1 the world which exists only in relation to his consciousness1 as its necessary supporter4 ,every one is thus himself in a double aspect the whole world1 the microcosm2 finds both sides whole and complete in himself4 ,and what he thus recognises as his own real being also exhausts the being of the whole world--the macrocosm2 thus the world1 like man1 is through and through will1 and through and through idea1 and nothing more than this4 ,so we see the philosophy of ,thales1 which concerned the macrocosm1 unite at this point with that of ,socrates1 which dealt with the microcosm1 for the object of both is found to be the same4 ,but all the knowledge that has been communicated in the two first books will gain greater completeness1 and consequently greater certainty1 from the two following books1 in which ,i hope that several questions that have more or less distinctly arisen in the course of our work will also be sufficiently answered4 ,in the meantime one such question may be more particularly considered1 for it can only properly arise so long as one has not fully penetrated the meaning of the foregoing exposition1 and may so far serve as an illustration of it4 ,it is this3 ,every will is a will towards something1 has an object1 an end of its willing2 what then is the final end1 or towards what is that will striving that is exhibited to us as the being-in-itself of the world8 ,this question rests1 like so many others1 upon the confusion of the thing-in-itself with the manifestation4 ,the principle of sufficient reason1 of which the law of motivation is also a form1 extends only to the latter1 not to the former4 ,it is only of phenomena1 of individual things1 that a ground can be given1 never of the will itself1 nor of the ,idea in which it adequately objectifies itself4 ,so then of every particular movement or change of any kind in nature1 a cause is to be sought1 that is1 a condition that of necessity produced it1 but never of the natural force itself which is revealed in this and innumerable similar phenomena2 and it is therefore simple misunderstanding1 arising from want of consideration1 to ask for a cause of gravity1 electricity1 and so on4 ,only if one had somehow shown that gravity and electricity were not original special forces of nature1 but only the manifestations of a more general force already known1 would it be allowable to ask for the cause which made this force produce the phenomena of gravity or of electricity here4 ,all this has been explained at length above4 ,in the same way every particular act of will of a knowing individual 7which is itself only a manifestation of will as the thing-in-itself7 has necessarily a motive without which that act would never have occurred2 but just as material causes contain merely the determination that at this time1 in this place1 and in this matter1 a manifestation of this or that natural force must take place1 so the motive determines only the act of will of a knowing being1 at this time1 in this place1 and under these circumstances1 as a particular act1 but by no means determines that that being wills in general or wills in this manner2 this is the expression of his intelligible character1 which1 as will itself1 the thing-in-itself1 is without ground1 for it lies outside the province of the principle of sufficient reason4 ,therefore every man has permanent aims and motives by which he guides his conduct1 and he can always give an account of his particular actions2 but if he were asked why he wills at all1 or why in general he wills to exist1 he would have no answer1 and the question would indeed seem to him meaningless2 and this would be just the expression of his consciousness that he himself is nothing but will1 whose willing stands by itself and requires more particular determination by motives only in its individual acts at each point of time4 ,in fact1 freedom from all aim1 from all limits1 belongs to the nature of the will1 which is an endless striving4 ,this was already touched on above in the reference to centrifugal force4 ,it also discloses itself in its simplest form in the lowest grade of the objectification of will1 in gravitation1 which we see constantly exerting itself1 though a final goal is obviously impossible for it4 ,for if1 according to its will1 all existing matter were collected in one mass1 yet within this mass gravity1 ever striving towards the centre1 would still wage war with impenetrability as rigidity or elasticity4 ,the tendency of matter can therefore only be confined1 never completed or appeased4 ,but this is precisely the case with all tendencies of all phenomena of will4 ,every attained end is also the beginning of a new course1 and so on ad infinitum4 ,the plant raises its manifestation from the seed through the stem and the leaf to the blossom and the fruit1 which again is the beginning of a new seed1 a new individual1 that runs through the old course1 and so on through endless time4 ,such also is the life of the animal2 procreation is its highest point1 and after attaining to it1 the life of the first individual quickly or slowly sinks1 while a new life ensures to nature the endurance of the species and repeats the same phenomena4 ,indeed1 the constant renewal of the matter of every organism is also to be regarded as merely the manifestation of this continual pressure and change1 and physiologists are now ceasing to hold that it is the necessary reparation of the matter wasted in motion1 for the possible wearing out of the machine can by no means be equivalent to the support it is constantly receiving through nourishment4 ,eternal becoming1 endless flux1 characterises the revelation of the inner nature of will4 ,finally1 the same thing shows itself in human endeavours and desires1 which always delude us by presenting their satisfaction as the final end of will4 ,as soon as we attain to them they no longer appear the same1 and therefore they soon grow stale1 are forgotten1 and though not openly disowned1 are yet always thrown aside as vanished illusions4 ,we are fortunate enough if there still remains something to wish for and to strive after1 that the game may be kept up of constant transition from desire to satisfaction1 and from satisfaction to a new desire1 the rapid course of which is called happiness1 and the slow course sorrow1 and does not sink into that stagnation that shows itself in fearful ennui that paralyses life1 vain yearning without a definite object1 deadening languor4 ,according to all this1 when the will is enlightened by knowledge1 it always knows what it wills now and here1 never what it wills in general2 every particular act of will has its end1 the whole will has none2 just as every particular phenomenon of nature is determined by a sufficient cause so far as concerns its appearance in this place at this time1 but the force which manifests itself in it has no general cause1 for it belongs to the thing-in-itself1 to the groundless will4 ,the single example of self-knowledge of the will as a whole is the idea as a whole1 the whole world of perception4 ,it is the objectification1 the revelation1 the mirror of the will4 ,what the will expresses in it will be the subject of our further consideration47#dc7 ,,third ,,book4 ,,the ,,world ,,as ,,idea4 ,second ,aspect4 ,the ,idea ,independent ,of ,the ,principle ,of ,sufficient ,reason3 ,the ,platonic ,idea3 ,the ,object ,of ,art4 1 2 1 4----4 #cj4 ,in the ,first ,book the world was explained as mere idea1 object for a subject4 ,in the ,second ,book we considered it from its other side1 and found that in this aspect it is will1 which proved to be simply that which this world is besides being idea4 ,in accordance with this knowledge we called the world as idea1 both as a whole and in its parts1 the objectification of will1 which therefore means the will become object1 i4e41 idea4 ,further1 we remember that this objectification of will was found to have many definite grades1 in which1 with gradually increasing distinctness and completeness1 the nature of will appears in the idea1 that is to say1 presents itself as object4 ,in these grades we already recognised the ,platonic ,ideas1 for the grades are just the determined species1 or the original unchanging forms and qualities of all natural bodies1 both organised and unorganised1 and also the general forces which reveal themselves according to natural laws4 ,these ,ideas1 then1 as a whole express themselves in innumerable individuals and particulars1 and are related to these as archetypes to their copies4 ,the multiplicity of such individuals is only conceivable through time and space1 their appearing and passing away through causality1 and in all these forms we recognise merely the different modes of the principle of sufficient reason1 which is the ultimate principle of all that is finite1 of all individual existence1 and the universal form of the idea as it appears in the knowledge of the individual as such4 ,the ,platonic ,idea1 on the other hand1 does not come under this principle1 and has therefore neither multiplicity nor change4 ,while the individuals in which it expresses itself are innumerable1 and unceasingly come into being and pass away1 it remains unchanged as one and the same1 and the principle of sufficient reason has for it no meaning4 ,as1 however1 this is the form under which all knowledge of the subject comes1 so far as the subject knows as an individual1 the ,ideas lie quite outside the sphere of its knowledge4 ,if1 therefore1 the ,ideas are to become objects of knowledge1 this can only happen by transcending the individuality of the knowing subject4 ,the more exact and detailed explanation of this is what will now occupy our attention4 #ca4 ,first1 however1 the following very essential remark4 ,i hope that in the preceding book ,i have succeeded in producing the conviction that what is called in the ,kantian philosophy the thing-in-itself1 and appears there as so significant1 and yet so obscure and paradoxical a doctrine1 and especially on account of the manner in which ,kant introduced it as an inference from the caused to the cause1 was considered a stumbling-stone1 and1 in fact1 the weak side of his philosophy1--that this1 ,i say1 if it is reached by the entirely different way by which we have arrived at it1 is nothing but the will when the sphere of that conception is extended and defined in the way ,i have shown4 ,i hope1 further1 that after what has been said there will be no hesitation in recognising the definite grades of the objectification of the will1 which is the inner reality of the world1 to be what ,plato called the eternal ,ideas or unchangeable forms 772 a doctrine which is regarded as the principal1 but at the same time the most obscure and paradoxical dogma of his system1 and has been the subject of reflection and controversy of ridicule and of reverence to so many and such differently endowed minds in the course of many centuries4 ,if now the will is for us the thing-in-itself1 and the ,idea is the immediate objectivity of that will at a definite grade1 we find that ,kant's thing-in-itself1 and ,plato's ,idea1 which to him is the only 1 these two great obscure paradoxes of the two greatest philosophers of the ,west are not indeed identical1 but yet very closely related1 and only distinguished by a single circumstance4 ,the purport of these two great paradoxes1 with all inner harmony and relationship1 is yet so very different on account of the remarkable diversity of the individuality of their authors1 that they are the best commentary on each other1 for they are like two entirely different roads that conduct us to the same goal4 ,this is easily made clear4 ,what ,kant says is in substance this3--8,time1 space1 and causality are not determinations of the thing-in-itself1 but belong only to its phenomenal existence1 for they are nothing but the forms of our knowledge4 ,since1 however1 all multiplicity1 and all coming into being and passing away1 are only possible through time1 space1 and causality1 it follows that they also belong only to the phenomenon1 not to the thing-in-itself4 ,but as our knowledge is conditioned by these forms1 the whole of experience is only knowledge of the phenomenon1 not of the thing-in-itself2 therefore its laws cannot be made valid for the thing-in-itself4 ,this extends even to our own ego1 and we know it only as phenomenon1 and not according to what it may be in itself40 ,this is the meaning and content of the doctrine of ,kant in the important respect we are considering4 ,what ,plato says is this3--8,the things of this world which our senses perceive have no true being2 they always become1 they never are3 they have only a relative being2 they all exist merely in and through their relations to each other2 their whole being may1 therefore1 quite as well be called a non-being4 ,they are consequently not objects of a true knowledge 771 for such a knowledge can only be of what exists for itself1 and always in the same way2 they1 on the contrary1 are only the objects of an opinion based on sensation 7 74 ,so long as we are confined to the perception of these1 we are like men who sit in a dark cave1 bound so fast that they cannot turn their heads1 and who see nothing but the shadows of real things which pass between them and a fire burning behind them1 the light of which casts the shadows on the wall opposite them2 and even of themselves and of each other they see only the shadows on the wall4 ,their wisdom would thus consist in predicting the order of the shadows learned from experience4 ,the real archetypes1 on the other hand1 to which these shadows correspond1 the eternal ,ideas1 the original forms of all things1 can alone be said to have true being 7 71 because they always are1 but never become nor pass away4 ,to them belongs no multiplicity2 for each of them is according to its nature only one1 for it is the archetype itself1 of which all particular transitory things of the same kind which are named after it are copies or shadows4 ,they have also no coming into being nor passing away1 for they are truly being1 never becoming nor vanishing1 like their fleeting shadows4 7,it is necessarily presupposed1 however1 in these two negative definitions1 that time1 space1 and causality have no significance or validity for these ,ideas1 and that they do not exist in them47 ,of these only can there be true knowledge1 for the object of such knowledge can only be that which always and in every respect 7thus in-itself7 is2 not that which is and again is not1 according as we look at it40 ,this is ,plato's doctrine4 ,it is clear1 and requires no further proof that the inner meaning of both doctrines is entirely the same2 that both explain the visible world as a manifestation1 which in itself is nothing1 and which only has meaning and a borrowed reality through that which expresses itself in it 7in the one case the thing-in-itself1 in the other the ,idea74 ,to this last1 which has true being1 all the forms of that phenomenal existence1 even the most universal and essential1 are1 according to both doctrines1 entirely foreign4 ,in order to disown these forms ,kant has directly expressed them even in abstract terms1 and distinctly refused time1 space1 and causality as mere forms of the phenomenon to the thing-in-itself4 ,plato1 on the other hand1 did not attain to the fullest expression1 and has only distinctly refused these forms to his ,ideas in that he denies of the ,ideas what is only possible through these forms1 multiplicity of similar things1 coming into being and passing away4 ,though it is perhaps superfluous1 ,i should like to illustrate this remarkable and important agreement by an example4 ,there stands before us1 let us suppose1 an animal in the full activity of life4 ,plato would say1 8,this animal has no true existence1 but merely an apparent existence1 a constant becoming1 a relative existence which may just as well be called non-being as being4 ,only the ,idea which expresses itself in that animal is truly #8being1' or the animal in-itself 7 71 which is dependent upon nothing1 but is in and for itself 7 1 72 it has not become1 it will not end1 but always is in the same way 7 1 74 ,if now we recognise its ,idea in this animal1 it is all one and of no importance whether we have this animal now before us or its progenitor of a thousand years ago1 whether it is here or in a distant land1 whether it presents itself in this or that manner1 position1 or action2 whether1 lastly1 it is this or any other individual of the same species2 all this is nothing1 and only concerns the phenomenon2 the ,idea of the animal alone has true being1 and is the object of real knowledge40 ,so ,plato2 ,kant would say something of this kind1 8,this animal is a phenomenon in time1 space1 and causality1 which are collectively the conditions a priori of the possibility of experience1 lying in our faculty of knowledge1 not determinations of the thing-in-itself4 ,therefore this animal as we perceive it at this definite point of time1 in this particular place1 as an individual in the connection of experience 7i4e41 in the chain of causes and effects71 which has come into being1 and will just as necessarily pass away1 is not a thing-in-itself1 but a phenomenon which only exists in relation to our knowledge4 ,to know it as what it may be in itself1 that is to say1 independent of all the determinations which lie in time1 space1 and causality1 would demand another kind of knowledge than that which is possible for us through the senses and the understanding40 ,in order to bring ,kant's mode of expression nearer the ,platonic1 we might say3 ,time1 space1 and causality are that arrangement of our intellect by virtue of which the one being of each kind which alone really is1 manifests itself to us as a multiplicity of similar beings1 constantly appearing and disappearing in endless succession4 ,the apprehension of things by means of and in accordance with this arrangement is immanent knowledge2 that1 on the other hand1 which is conscious of the true state of the case1 is transcendental knowledge4 ,the latter is obtained in abstracto through the criticism of pure reason1 but in exceptional cases it may also appear intuitively4 ,this last is an addition of my own1 which ,i am endeavouring in this ,third ,book to explain4 ,if the doctrine of ,kant had ever been properly understood and grasped1 and since ,kant's time that of ,plato1 if men had truly and earnestly reflected on the inner meaning and content of the teaching of these two great masters1 instead of involving themselves in the technicalities of the one and writing parodies of the style of the other1 they could not have failed to discern long ago to what an extent these two great philosophers agree1 and that the true meaning1 the aim of both systems1 is the same4 ,not only would they have refrained from constantly comparing ,plato to ,leibnitz1 on whom his spirit certainly did not rest1 or indeed to a well-known gentleman who is still alive17#dd7 as if they wanted to mock the manes of the great thinker of the past2 but they would have advanced much farther in general1 or rather they would not have fallen so disgracefully far behind as they have in the last forty years4 ,they would not have let themselves be led by the nose1 to-day by one vain boaster and to-morrow by another1 nor would they have opened the nineteenth century1 which promised so much in ,germany1 with the philosophical farces that were performed over the grave of ,kant 7as the ancients sometimes did at the funeral obsequies of their dead71 and which deservedly called forth the derision of other nations1 for such things least become the earnest and strait-laced ,german4 ,but so small is the chosen public of true philosophers1 that even students who understand are but scantily brought them by the centuries-- 1 7,thyrsigeri quidem multi1 ,baachi vero pauci74 1 2 1 7,eam ob rem philosophia in infamiam incidit1 quad non pro dignitate ipsam attingunt3 neque enim a spuriis1 sad a legitimis erat attrectanda74--,plato4 ,men followed the words1--such words as 8a priori ideas10 8forms of perception and thought existing in consciousness independently of experience10 8fundamental conceptions of the pure understanding10 c41 c41--and asked whether ,plato's ,ideas1 which were also original conceptions1 and besides this were supposed to be reminiscences of a perception before life of the truly real things1 were in some way the same as ,kant's forms of perception and thought1 which lie a priori in our consciousness4 ,on account of some slight resemblance in the expression of these two entirely different doctrines1 the ,kantian doctrine of the forms which limit the knowledge of the individual to the phenomenon1 and the ,platonic doctrine of ,ideas1 the knowledge of which these very forms expressly deny1 these so far diametrically opposed doctrines were carefully compared1 and men deliberated and disputed as to whether they were identical1 found at last that they were not the same1 and concluded that ,plato's doctrine of ,ideas and ,kant's 8,critique of ,reason0 had nothing in common4 ,but enough of this47#de7 #cb4 ,it follows from our consideration of the subject1 that1 for us1 ,idea and thing-in-itself are not entirely one and the same1 in spite of the inner agreement between ,kant and ,plato1 and the identity of the aim they had before them1 or the conception of the world which roused them and led them to philosophise4 ,the ,idea is for us rather the direct1 and therefore adequate1 objectivity of the thing-in-itself1 which is1 however1 itself the will--the will as not yet objectified1 not yet become idea4 ,for the thing-in-itself must1 even according to ,kant1 be free from all the forms connected with knowing as such2 and it is merely an error on his part 7as is shown in the ,appendix7 that he did not count among these forms1 before all others1 that of being object for a subject1 for it is the first and most universal form of all phenomena1 i4e41 of all idea2 he should therefore have distinctly denied objective existence to his thing-in-itself1 which would have saved him from a great inconsistency that was soon discovered4 ,the ,platonic ,idea1 on the other hand1 is necessarily object1 something known1 an idea1 and in that respect is different from the thing-in-itself1 but in that respect only4 ,it has merely laid aside the subordinate forms of the phenomenon1 all of which we include in the principle of sufficient reason1 or rather it has not yet assumed them2 but it has retained the first and most universal form1 that of the idea in general1 the form of being object for a subject4 ,it is the forms which are subordinate to this 7whose general expression is the principle of sufficient reason7 that multiply the ,idea in particular transitory individuals1 whose number is a matter of complete indifference to the ,idea4 ,the principle of sufficient reason is thus again the form into which the ,idea enters when it appears in the knowledge of the subject as individual4 ,the particular thing that manifests itself in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason is thus only an indirect objectification of the thing-in-itself 7which is the will71 for between it and the thing-in-itself stands the ,idea as the only direct objectivity of the will1 because it has assumed none of the special forms of knowledge as such1 except that of the idea in general1 i4e41 the form of being object for a subject4 ,therefore it alone is the most adequate objectivity of the will or thing-in-itself which is possible2 indeed it is the whole thing-in-itself1 only under the form of the idea2 and here lies the ground of the great agreement between ,plato and ,kant1 although1 in strict accuracy1 that of which they speak is not the same4 ,but the particular things are no really adequate objectivity of the will1 for in them it is obscured by those forms whose general expression is the principle of sufficient reason1 but which are conditions of the knowledge which belongs to the individual as such4 ,if it is allowable to draw conclusions from an impossible presupposition1 we would1 in fact1 no longer know particular things1 nor events1 nor change1 nor multiplicity1 but would comprehend only ,ideas1--only the grades of the objectification of that one will1 of the thing-in-itself1 in pure unclouded knowledge4 ,consequently our world would be a nunc stans1 if it were not that1 as knowing subjects1 we are also individuals1 i4e41 our perceptions come to us through the medium of a body1 from the affections of which they proceed1 and which is itself only concrete willing1 objectivity of the will1 and thus is an object among objects1 and as such comes into the knowing consciousness in the only way in which an object can1 through the forms of the principle of sufficient reason1 and consequently already presupposes1 and therefore brings in1 time1 and all other forms which that principle expresses4 ,time is only the broken and piecemeal view which the individual being has of the ,ideas1 which are outside time1 and consequently eternal4 ,therefore ,plato says time is the moving picture of eternity3 47#df7 #cc4 ,since now1 as individuals1 we have no other knowledge than that which is subject to the principle of sufficient reason1 and this form of knowledge excludes the ,ideas1 it is certain that if it is possible for us to raise ourselves from the knowledge of particular things to that of the ,ideas1 this can only happen by an alteration taking place in the subject which is analogous and corresponds to the great change of the whole nature of the object1 and by virtue of which the subject1 so far as it knows an ,idea1 is no more individual4 ,it will be remembered from the preceding book that knowledge in general belongs to the objectification of will at its higher grades1 and sensibility1 nerves1 and brain1 just like the other parts of the organised being1 are the expression of the will at this stage of its objectivity1 and therefore the idea which appears through them is also in the same way bound to the service of will as a means 77 for the attainment of its now complicated 77 aims for sustaining a being of manifold requirements4 ,thus originally and according to its nature1 knowledge is completely subject to the will1 and1 like the immediate object1 which1 by means of the application of the law of causality1 is its starting-point1 all knowledge which proceeds in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason remains in a closer or more distant relation to the will4 ,for the individual finds his body as an object among objects1 to all of which it is related and connected according to the principle of sufficient reason4 ,thus all investigations of these relations and connections lead back to his body1 and consequently to his will4 ,since it is the principle of sufficient reason which places the objects in this relation to the body1 and1 through it1 to the will1 the one endeavour of the knowledge which is subject to this principle will be to find out the relations in which objects are placed to each other through this principle1 and thus to trace their innumerable connections in space1 time1 and causality4 ,for only through these is the object interesting to the individual1 i4e41 related to the will4 ,therefore the knowledge which is subject to the will knows nothing further of objects than their relations1 knows the objects only so far as they exist at this time1 in this place1 under these circumstances1 from these causes1 and with these effects--in a word1 as particular things2 and if all these relations were to be taken away1 the objects would also have disappeared for it1 because it knew nothing more about them4 ,we must not disguise the fact that what the sciences consider in things is also in reality nothing more than this2 their relations1 the connections of time and space1 the causes of natural changes1 the resemblance of forms1 the motives of actions1--thus merely relations4 ,what distinguishes science from ordinary knowledge is merely its systematic form1 the facilitating of knowledge by the comprehension of all particulars in the universal1 by means of the subordination of concepts1 and the completeness of knowledge which is thereby attained4 ,all relation has itself only a relative existence2 for example1 all being in time is also non-being2 for time is only that by means of which opposite determinations can belong to the same thing2 therefore every phenomenon which is in time again is not1 for what separates its beginning from its end is only time1 which is essentially a fleeting1 inconstant1 and relative thing1 here called duration4 ,but time is the most universal form of all objects of the knowledge which is subject to the will1 and the prototype of its other forms4 ,knowledge now1 as a rule1 remains always subordinate to the service of the will1 as indeed it originated for this service1 and grew1 so to speak1 to the will1 as the head to the body4 ,in the case of the brutes this subjection of knowledge to the will can never be abolished4 ,in the case of men it can be abolished only in exceptional cases1 which we shall presently consider more closely4 ,this distinction between man and brute is outwardly expressed by the difference of the relation of the head to the body4 ,in the case of the lower brutes both are deformed3 in all brutes the head is directed towards the earth1 where the objects of its will lie2 even in the higher species the head and the body are still far more one than in the case of man1 whose head seems freely set upon his body1 as if only carried by and not serving it4 ,this human excellence is exhibited in the highest degree by the ,apollo of ,belvedere2 the head of the god of the ,muses1 with eyes fixed on the far distance1 stands so freely on his shoulders that it seems wholly delivered from the body1 and no more subject to its cares4 #cd4 ,the transition which we have referred to as possible1 but yet to be regarded as only exceptional1 from the common knowledge of particular things to the knowledge of the ,idea1 takes place suddenly2 for knowledge breaks free from the service of the will1 by the subject ceasing to be merely individual1 and thus becoming the pure will-less subject of knowledge1 which no longer traces relations in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason1 but rests in fixed contemplation of the object presented to it1 out of its connection with all others1 and rises into it4 ,a full explanation is necessary to make this clear1 and the reader must suspend his surprise for a while1 till he has grasped the whole thought expressed in this work1 and then it will vanish of itself4 ,if1 raised by the power of the mind1 a man relinquishes the common way of looking at things1 gives up tracing1 under the guidance of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason1 their relations to each other1 the final goal of which is always a relation to his own will2 if he thus ceases to consider the where1 the when1 the why1 and the whither of things1 and looks simply and solely at the what2 if1 further1 he does not allow abstract thought1 the concepts of the reason1 to take possession of his consciousness1 but1 instead of all this1 gives the whole power of his mind to perception1 sinks himself entirely in this1 and lets his whole consciousness be filled with the quiet contemplation of the natural object actually present1 whether a landscape1 a tree1 a mountain1 a building1 or whatever it may be2 inasmuch as he loses himself in this object 7to use a pregnant ,german idiom71 i4e41 forgets even his individuality1 his will1 and only continues to exist as the pure subject1 the clear mirror of the object1 so that it is as if the object alone were there1 without any one to perceive it1 and he can no longer separate the perceiver from the perception1 but both have become one1 because the whole consciousness is filled and occupied with one single sensuous picture2 if thus the object has to such an extent passed out of all relation to something outside it1 and the subject out of all relation to the will1 then that which is so known is no longer the particular thing as such2 but it is the ,idea1 the eternal form1 the immediate objectivity of the will at this grade2 and1 therefore1 he who is sunk in this perception is no longer individual1 for in such perception the individual has lost himself2 but he is pure1 will-less1 painless1 timeless subject of knowledge4 ,this1 which in itself is so remarkable 7which ,i well know confirms the saying that originated with ,thomas ,paine1 ,du sublime au ridicule il n'y a qu'un pas71 will by degrees become clearer and less surprising from what follows4 ,it was this that was running in ,spinoza's mind when he wrote3 ,meus terna est1 quatenus res sub ternitatis specie concipit 7,eth4 ,v4 pr4 #ca1 ,schol477#dg7 ,in such contemplation the particular thing becomes at once the ,idea of its species1 and the perceiving individual becomes pure subject of knowledge4 ,the individual1 as such1 knows only particular things2 the pure subject of knowledge knows only ,ideas4 ,for the individual is the subject of knowledge in its relation to a definite particular manifestation of will1 and in subjection to this4 ,this particular manifestation of will is1 as such1 subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms2 therefore1 all knowledge which relates itself to it also follows the principle of sufficient reason1 and no other kind of knowledge is fitted to be of use to the will but this1 which always consists merely of relations to the object4 ,the knowing individual as such1 and the particular things known by him1 are always in some place1 at some time1 and are links in the chain of causes and effects4 ,the pure subject of knowledge and his correlative1 the ,idea1 have passed out of all these forms of the principle of sufficient reason3 time1 place1 the individual that knows1 and the individual that is known1 have for them no meaning4 ,when an individual knower has raised himself in the manner described to be pure subject of knowledge1 and at the same time has raised the observed object to the ,platonic ,idea1 the world as idea appears complete and pure1 and the full objectification of the will takes place1 for the ,platonic ,idea alone is its adequate objectivity4 ,the ,idea includes object and subject in like manner in itself1 for they are its one form2 but in it they are absolutely of equal importance2 for as the object is here1 as elsewhere1 simply the idea of the subject1 the subject1 which passes entirely into the perceived object has thus become this object itself1 for the whole consciousness is nothing but its perfectly distinct picture4 ,now this consciousness constitutes the whole world as idea1 for one imagines the whole of the ,platonic ,ideas1 or grades of the objectivity of will1 in their series passing through it4 ,the particular things of all time and space are nothing but ,ideas multiplied through the principle of sufficient reason 7the form of the knowledge of the individual as such71 and thus obscured as regards their pure objectivity4 ,when the ,platonic ,idea appears1 in it subject and object are no longer to be distinguished1 for the ,platonic ,idea1 the adequate objectivity of will1 the true world as idea1 arises only when the subject and object reciprocally fill and penetrate each other completely2 and in the same way the knowing and the known individuals1 as things in themselves1 are not to be distinguished4 ,for if we look entirely away from the true world as idea1 there remains nothing but the world as will4 ,the will is the 8in-itself0 of the ,platonic ,idea1 which fully objectifies it2 it is also the 8in-itself0 of the particular thing and of the individual that knows it1 which objectify it incompletely4 ,as will1 outside the idea and all its forms1 it is one and the same in the object contemplated and in the individual1 who soars aloft in this contemplation1 and becomes conscious of himself as pure subject4 ,these two are1 therefore1 in themselves not different1 for in themselves they are will1 which here knows itself2 and multiplicity and difference exist only as the way in which this knowledge comes to the will1 i4e41 only in the phenomenon1 on account of its form1 the principle of sufficient reason4 ,now the known thing1 without me as the subject of knowledge1 is just as little an object1 and not mere will1 blind effort1 as without the object1 without the idea1 ,i am a knowing subject and not mere blind will4 ,this will is in itself1 i4e41 outside the idea1 one and the same with mine3 only in the world as idea1 whose form is always at least that of subject and object1 we are separated as the known and the knowing individual4 ,as soon as knowledge1 the world as idea1 is abolished1 there remains nothing but mere will1 blind effort4 ,that it should receive objectivity1 become idea1 supposes at once both subject and object2 but that this should be pure1 complete1 and adequate objectivity of the will1 supposes the object as ,platonic ,idea1 free from the forms of the principle of sufficient reason1 and the subject as the pure subject of knowledge1 free from individuality and subjection to the will4 ,whoever now1 has1 after the manner referred to1 become so absorbed and lost in the perception of nature that he only continues to exist as the pure knowing subject1 becomes in this way directly conscious that1 as such1 he is the condition1 that is1 the supporter1 of the world and all objective existence2 for this now shows itself as dependent upon his existence4 ,thus he draws nature into himself1 so that he sees it to be merely an accident of his own being4 ,in this sense ,byron says-- 8,are not the mountains1 waves1 and skies1 a part ,of me and of my soul1 as ,i of them80 ,but how shall he who feels this1 regard himself as absolutely transitory1 in contrast to imperishable nature8 ,such a man will rather be filled with the consciousness1 which the ,upanishad of the ,veda expresses3 ,h omnes creatur in totum ego sum1 et prter me aliud ens non est 7,oupnek'hat1 i4 #abb747dh7 #ce4 ,in order to gain a deeper insight into the nature of the world1 it is absolutely necessary that we should learn to distinguish the will as thing-in-itself from its adequate objectivity1 and also the different grades in which this appears more and more distinctly and fully1 i4e41 the ,ideas themselves1 from the merely phenomenal existence of these ,ideas in the forms of the principle of sufficient reason1 the restricted method of knowledge of the individual4 ,we shall then agree with ,plato when he attributes actual being only to the ,ideas1 and allows only an illusive1 dream-like existence to things in space and time1 the real world for the individual4 ,then we shall understand how one and the same ,idea reveals itself in so many phenomena1 and presents its nature only bit by bit to the individual1 one side after another4 ,then we shall also distinguish the ,idea itself from the way in which its manifestation appears in the observation of the individual1 and recognise the former as essential and the latter as unessential4 ,let us consider this with the help of examples taken from the most insignificant things1 and also from the greatest4 ,when the clouds move1 the figures which they form are not essential1 but indifferent to them2 but that as elastic vapour they are pressed together1 drifted along1 spread out1 or torn asunder by the force of the wind3 this is their nature1 the essence of the forces which objectify themselves in them1 the ,idea2 their actual forms are only for the individual observer4 ,to the brook that flows over stones1 the eddies1 the waves1 the foam-flakes which it forms are indifferent and unessential2 but that it follows the attraction of gravity1 and behaves as inelastic1 perfectly mobile1 formless1 transparent fluid3 this is its nature2 this1 if known through perception1 is its ,idea2 these accidental forms are only for us so long as we know as individuals4 ,the ice on the window-pane forms itself into crystals according to the laws of crystallisation1 which reveal the essence of the force of nature that appears here1 exhibit the ,idea2 but the trees and flowers which it traces on the pane are unessential1 and are only there for us4 ,what appears in the clouds1 the brook1 and the crystal is the weakest echo of that will which appears more fully in the plant1 more fully still in the beast1 and most fully in man4 ,but only the essential in all these grades of its objectification constitutes the ,idea2 on the other hand1 its unfolding or development1 because broken up in the forms of the principle of sufficient reason into a multiplicity of many-sided phenomena1 is unessential to the ,idea1 lies merely in the kind of knowledge that belongs to the individual and has reality only for this4 ,the same thing necessarily holds good of the unfolding of that ,idea which is the completest objectivity of will4 ,therefore1 the history of the human race1 the throng of events1 the change of times1 the multifarious forms of human life in different lands and countries1 all this is only the accidental form of the manifestation of the ,idea1 does not belong to the ,idea itself1 in which alone lies the adequate objectivity of the will1 but only to the phenomenon which appears in the knowledge of the individual1 and is just as foreign1 unessential1 and indifferent to the ,idea itself as the figures which they assume are to the clouds1 the form of its eddies and foam-flakes to the brook1 or its trees and flowers to the ice4 ,to him who has thoroughly grasped this1 and can distinguish between the will and the ,idea1 and between the ,idea and its manifestation1 the events of the world will have significance only so far as they are the letters out of which we may read the ,idea of man1 but not in and for themselves4 ,he will not believe with the vulgar that time may produce something actually new and significant2 that through it1 or in it1 something absolutely real may attain to existence1 or indeed that it itself as a whole has beginning and end1 plan and development1 and in some way has for its final aim the highest perfection 7according to their conception7 of the last generation of man1 whose life is a brief thirty years4 ,therefore he will just as little1 with ,homer1 people a whole ,olympus with gods to guide the events of time1 as1 with ,ossian1 he will take the forms of the clouds for individual beings2 for1 as we have said1 both have just as much meaning as regards the ,idea which appears in them4 ,in the manifold forms of human life and in the unceasing change of events1 he will regard the ,idea only as the abiding and essential1 in which the will to live has its fullest objectivity1 and which shows its different sides in the capacities1 the passions1 the errors and the excellences of the human race2 in self-interest1 hatred1 love1 fear1 boldness1 frivolity1 stupidity1 slyness1 wit1 genius1 and so forth1 all of which crowding together and combining in thousands of forms 7individuals71 continually create the history of the great and the little world1 in which it is all the same whether they are set in motion by nuts or by crowns4 ,finally1 he will find that in the world it is the same as in the dramas of ,gozzi1 in all of which the same persons appear1 with like intention1 and with a like fate2 the motives and incidents are certainly different in each piece1 but the spirit of the incidents is the same2 the actors in one piece know nothing of the incidents of another1 although they performed in it themselves2 therefore1 after all experience of former pieces1 ,pantaloon has become no more agile or generous1 ,tartaglia no more conscientious1 ,brighella no more courageous1 and ,columbine no more modest4 ,suppose we were allowed for once a clearer glance into the kingdom of the possible1 and over the whole chain of causes and effects2 if the earth-spirit appeared and showed us in a picture all the greatest men1 enlighteners of the world1 and heroes1 that chance destroyed before they were ripe for their work2 then the great events that would have changed the history of the world and brought in periods of the highest culture and enlightenment1 but which the blindest chance1 the most insignificant accident1 hindered at the outset2 lastly1 the splendid powers of great men1 that would have enriched whole ages of the world1 but which1 either misled by error or passion1 or compelled by necessity1 they squandered uselessly on unworthy or unfruitful objects1 or even wasted in play4 ,if we saw all this1 we would shudder and lament at the thought of the lost treasures of whole periods of the world4 ,but the earth-spirit would smile and say1 8,the source from which the individuals and their powers proceed is inexhaustible and unending as time and space2 for1 like these forms of all phenomena1 they also are only phenomena1 visibility of the will4 ,no finite measure can exhaust that infinite source2 therefore an undiminished eternity is always open for the return of any event or work that was nipped in the bud4 ,in this world of phenomena true loss is just as little possible as true gain4 ,the will alone is2 it is the thing in-itself1 and the source of all these phenomena4 ,its self-knowledge and its assertion or denial1 which is then decided upon1 is the only event in-itself407#di7 #cf4 ,history follows the thread of events2 it is pragmatic so far as it deduces them in accordance with the law of motivation1 a law that determines the self-manifesting will wherever it is enlightened by knowledge4 ,at the lowest grades of its objectivity1 where it still acts without knowledge1 natural science1 in the form of etiology1 treats of the laws of the changes of its phenomena1 and1 in the form of morphology1 of what is permanent in them4 ,this almost endless task is lightened by the aid of concepts1 which comprehend what is general in order that we may deduce what is particular from it4 ,lastly1 mathematics treats of the mere forms1 time and space1 in which the ,ideas1 broken up into multiplicity1 appear for the knowledge of the subject as individual4 ,all these1 of which the common name is science1 proceed according to the principle of sufficient reason in its different forms1 and their theme is always the phenomenon1 its laws1 connections1 and the relations which result from them4 ,but what kind of knowledge is concerned with that which is outside and independent of all relations1 that which alone is really essential to the world1 the true content of its phenomena1 that which is subject to no change1 and therefore is known with equal truth for all time1 in a word1 the ,ideas1 which are the direct and adequate objectivity of the thing in-itself1 the will8 ,we answer1 ,art1 the work of genius4 ,it repeats or reproduces the eternal ,ideas grasped through pure contemplation1 the essential and abiding in all the phenomena of the world2 and according to what the material is in which it reproduces1 it is sculpture or painting1 poetry or music4 ,its one source is the knowledge of ,ideas2 its one aim the communication of this knowledge4 ,while science1 following the unresting and inconstant stream of the fourfold forms of reason and consequent1 with each end attained sees further1 and can never reach a final goal nor attain full satisfaction1 any more than by running we can reach the place where the clouds touch the horizon2 art1 on the contrary1 is everywhere at its goal4 ,for it plucks the object of its contemplation out of the stream of the world's course1 and has it isolated before it4 ,and this particular thing1 which in that stream was a small perishing part1 becomes to art the representative of the whole1 an equivalent of the endless multitude in space and time4 ,it therefore pauses at this particular thing2 the course of time stops2 the relations vanish for it2 only the essential1 the ,idea1 is its object4 ,we may1 therefore1 accurately define it as the way of viewing things independent of the principle of sufficient reason1 in opposition to the way of viewing them which proceeds in accordance with that principle1 and which is the method of experience and of science4 ,this last method of considering things may be compared to a line infinitely extended in a horizontal direction1 and the former to a vertical line which cuts it at any point4 ,the method of viewing things which proceeds in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason is the rational method1 and it alone is valid and of use in practical life and in science4 ,the method which looks away from the content of this principle is the method of genius1 which is only valid and of use in art4 ,the first is the method of ,aristotle2 the second is1 on the whole1 that of ,plato4 ,the first is like the mighty storm1 that rushes along without beginning and without aim1 bending1 agitating1 and carrying away everything before it2 the second is like the silent sunbeam1 that pierces through the storm quite unaffected by it4 ,the first is like the innumerable showering drops of the waterfall1 which1 constantly changing1 never rest for an instant2 the second is like the rainbow1 quietly resting on this raging torrent4 ,only through the pure contemplation described above1 which ends entirely in the object1 can ,ideas be comprehended2 and the nature of genius consists in pre-eminent capacity for such contemplation4 ,now1 as this requires that a man should entirely forget himself and the relations in which he stands1 genius is simply the completest objectivity1 i4e41 the objective tendency of the mind1 as opposed to the subjective1 which is directed to one's own self--in other words1 to the will4 ,thus genius is the faculty of continuing in the state of pure perception1 of losing oneself in perception1 and of enlisting in this service the knowledge which originally existed only for the service of the will2 that is to say1 genius is the power of leaving one's own interests1 wishes1 and aims entirely out of sight1 thus of entirely renouncing one's own personality for a time1 so as to remain pure knowing subject1 clear vision of the world2 and this not merely at moments1 but for a sufficient length of time1 and with sufficient consciousness1 to enable one to reproduce by deliberate art what has thus been apprehended1 and 8to fix in lasting thoughts the wavering images that float before the mind40 ,it is as if1 when genius appears in an individual1 a far larger measure of the power of knowledge falls to his lot than is necessary for the service of an individual will2 and this superfluity of knowledge1 being free1 now becomes subject purified from will1 a clear mirror of the inner nature of the world4 ,this explains the activity1 amounting even to disquietude1 of men of genius1 for the present can seldom satisfy them1 because it does not fill their consciousness4 ,this gives them that restless aspiration1 that unceasing desire for new things1 and for the contemplation of lofty things1 and also that longing that is hardly ever satisfied1 for men of similar nature and of like stature1 to whom they might communicate themselves2 whilst the common mortal1 entirely filled and satisfied by the common present1 ends in it1 and finding everywhere his like1 enjoys that peculiar satisfaction in daily life that is denied to genius4 ,imagination has rightly been recognised as an essential element of genius2 it has sometimes even been regarded as identical with it2 but this is a mistake4 ,as the objects of genius are the eternal ,ideas1 the permanent1 essential forms of the world and all its phenomena1 and as the knowledge of the ,idea is necessarily knowledge through perception1 is not abstract1 the knowledge of the genius would be limited to the ,ideas of the objects actually present to his person1 and dependent upon the chain of circumstances that brought these objects to him1 if his imagination did not extend his horizon far beyond the limits of his actual personal existence1 and thus enable him to construct the whole out of the little that comes into his own actual apperception1 and so to let almost all possible scenes of life pass before him in his own consciousness4 ,further1 the actual objects are almost always very imperfect copies of the ,ideas expressed in them2 therefore the man of genius requires imagination in order to see in things1 not that which ,nature has actually made1 but that which she endeavoured to make1 yet could not because of that conflict of her forms among themselves which we referred to in the last book4 ,we shall return to this farther on in treating of sculpture4 ,the imagination then extends the intellectual horizon of the man of genius beyond the objects which actually present themselves to him1 both as regards quality and quantity4 ,therefore extraordinary strength of imagination accompanies1 and is indeed a necessary condition of genius4 ,but the converse does not hold1 for strength of imagination does not indicate genius2 on the contrary1 men who have no touch of genius may have much imagination4 ,for as it is possible to consider a real object in two opposite ways1 purely objectively1 the way of genius grasping its ,idea1 or in the common way1 merely in the relations in which it stands to other objects and to one's own will1 in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason1 it is also possible to perceive an imaginary object in both of these ways4 ,regarded in the first way1 it is a means to the knowledge of the ,idea1 the communication of which is the work of art2 in the second case1 the imaginary object is used to build castles in the air congenial to egotism and the individual humour1 and which for the moment delude and gratify2 thus only the relations of the phantasies so linked together are known4 ,the man who indulges in such an amusement is a dreamer2 he will easily mingle those fancies that delight his solitude with reality1 and so unfit himself for real life3 perhaps he will write them down1 and then we shall have the ordinary novel of every description1 which entertains those who are like him and the public at large1 for the readers imagine themselves in the place of the hero1 and then find the story very agreeable4 ,the common mortal1 that manufacture of ,nature which she produces by the thousand every day1 is1 as we have said1 not capable1 at least not continuously so1 of observation that in every sense is wholly disinterested1 as sensuous contemplation1 strictly so called1 is4 ,he can turn his attention to things only so far as they have some relation to his will1 however indirect it may be4 ,since in this respect1 which never demands anything but the knowledge of relations1 the abstract conception of the thing is sufficient1 and for the most part even better adapted for use2 the ordinary man does not linger long over the mere perception1 does not fix his attention long on one object1 but in all that is presented to him hastily seeks merely the concept under which it is to be brought1 as the lazy man seeks a chair1 and then it interests him no further4 ,this is why he is so soon done with everything1 with works of art1 objects of natural beauty1 and indeed everywhere with the truly significant contemplation of all the scenes of life4 ,he does not linger2 only seeks to know his own way in life1 together with all that might at any time become his way4 ,thus he makes topographical notes in the widest sense2 over the consideration of life itself as such he wastes no time4 ,the man of genius1 on the other hand1 whose excessive power of knowledge frees it at times from the service of will1 dwells on the consideration of life itself1 strives to comprehend the ,idea of each thing1 not its relations to other things2 and in doing this he often forgets to consider his own path in life1 and therefore for the most part pursues it awkwardly enough4 ,while to the ordinary man his faculty of knowledge is a lamp to lighten his path1 to the man of genius it is the sun which reveals the world4 ,this great diversity in their way of looking at life soon becomes visible in the outward appearance both of the man of genius and of the ordinary mortal4 ,the man in whom genius lives and works is easily distinguished by his glance1 which is both keen and steady1 and bears the stamp of perception1 of contemplation4 ,this is easily seen from the likenesses of the few men of genius whom ,nature has produced here and there among countless millions4 ,on the other hand1 in the case of an ordinary man1 the true object of his contemplation1 what he is prying into1 can be easily seen from his glance1 if indeed it is not quite stupid and vacant1 as is generally the case4 ,therefore the expression of genius in a face consists in this1 that in it a decided predominance of knowledge over will is visible1 and consequently there also shows itself in it a knowledge that is entirely devoid of relation to will1 i4e41 pure knowing4 ,on the contrary1 in ordinary countenances there is a predominant expression of will2 and we see that knowledge only comes into activity under the impulse of will1 and thus is directed merely by motives4 ,since the knowledge that pertains to genius1 or the knowledge of ,ideas1 is that knowledge which does not follow the principle of sufficient reason1 so1 on the other hand1 the knowledge which does follow that principle is that which gives us prudence and rationality in life1 and which creates the sciences4 ,thus men of genius are affected with the deficiencies entailed in the neglect of this latter kind of knowledge4 ,yet what ,i say in this regard is subject to the limitation that it only concerns them in so far as and while they are actually engaged in that kind of knowledge which is peculiar to genius2 and this is by no means at every moment of their lives1 for the great though spontaneous exertion which is demanded for the comprehension of ,ideas free from will must necessarily relax1 and there are long intervals during which men of genius are placed in very much the same position as ordinary mortals1 both as regards advantages and deficiencies4 ,on this account the action of genius has always been regarded as an inspiration1 as indeed the name indicates1 as the action of a superhuman being distinct from the individual himself1 and which takes possession of him only periodically4 ,the disinclination of men of genius to direct their attention to the content of the principle of sufficient reason will first show itself1 with regard to the ground of being1 as dislike of mathematics2 for its procedure is based upon the most universal forms of the phenomenon space and time1 which are themselves merely modes of the principle of sufficient reason1 and is consequently precisely the opposite of that method of thought which seeks merely the content of the phenomenon1 the ,idea which expresses itself in it apart from all relations4 ,the logical method of mathematics is also antagonistic to genius1 for it does not satisfy but obstructs true insight1 and presents merely a chain of conclusions in accordance with the principle of the ground of knowing4 ,the mental faculty upon which it makes the greatest claim is memory1 for it is necessary to recollect all the earlier propositions which are referred to4 ,experience has also proved that men of great artistic genius have no faculty for mathematics2 no man was ever very distinguished for both4 ,alfieri relates that he was never able to understand the fourth proposition of ,euclid4 ,goethe was constantly reproached with his want of mathematical knowledge by the ignorant opponents of his theory of colours4 ,here certainly1 where it was not a question of calculation and measurement upon hypothetical data1 but of direct knowledge by the understanding of causes and effects1 this reproach was so utterly absurd and inappropriate1 that by making it they have exposed their entire want of judgment1 just as much as by the rest of their ridiculous arguments4 ,the fact that up to the present day1 nearly half a century after the appearance of ,goethe's theory of colours1 even in ,germany the ,newtonian fallacies still have undisturbed possession of the professorial chair1 and men continue to speak quite seriously of the seven homogeneous rays of light and their different refrangibility1 will some day be numbered among the great intellectual peculiarities of men generally1 and especially of ,germans4 ,from the same cause as we have referred to above1 may be explained the equally well-known fact that1 conversely1 admirable mathematicians have very little susceptibility for works of fine art4 ,this is very navely expressed in the well-known anecdote of the ,french mathematician1 who1 after having read ,racine's 8,iphigenia10 shrugged his shoulders and asked1 8,qu'est ce que cela prouve80 ,further1 as quick comprehension of relations in accordance with the laws of causality and motivation is what specially constitutes prudence or sagacity1 a prudent man1 so far as and while he is so1 will not be a genius1 and a man of genius1 so far as and while he is so1 will not be a prudent man4 ,lastly1 perceptive knowledge generally1 in the province of which the ,idea always lies1 is directly opposed to rational or abstract knowledge1 which is guided by the principle of the ground of knowing4 ,it is also well known that we seldom find great genius united with pre-eminent reasonableness2 on the contrary1 persons of genius are often subject to violent emotions and irrational passions4 ,but the ground of this is not weakness of reason1 but partly unwonted energy of that whole phenomenon of will--the man of genius--which expresses itself through the violence of all his acts of will1 and partly preponderance of the knowledge of perception through the senses and understanding over abstract knowledge1 producing a decided tendency to the perceptible1 the exceedingly lively impressions of which so far outshine colourless concepts1 that they take their place in the guidance of action1 which consequently becomes irrational4 ,accordingly the impression of the present moment is very strong with such persons1 and carries them away into unconsidered action1 violent emotions and passions4 ,moreover1 since1 in general1 the knowledge of persons of genius has to some extent freed itself from the service of will1 they will not in conversation think so much of the person they are addressing as of the thing they are speaking about1 which is vividly present to them2 and therefore they are likely to judge or narrate things too objectively for their own interests2 they will not pass over in silence what would more prudently be concealed1 and so forth4 ,finally1 they are given to soliloquising1 and in general may exhibit certain weaknesses which are actually akin to madness4 ,it has often been remarked that there is a side at which genius and madness touch1 and even pass over into each other1 and indeed poetical inspiration has been called a kind of madness3 amabilis insania1 ,horace calls it 7,od4 iii4 #d71 and ,wieland in the introduction to 8,oberon0 speaks of it as 8amiable madness40 ,even ,aristotle1 as quoted by ,seneca 7,de ,tranq4 ,animi1 #ae1 #af71 is reported to have said3 ,nullum magnum ingenium sine mixtura dementi fuit4 ,plato expresses it in the figure of the dark cave1 referred to above 7,de ,rep4 #g71 when he says3 8,those who1 outside the cave1 have seen the true sunlight and the things that have true being 7,ideas71 cannot afterwards see properly down in the cave1 because their eyes are not accustomed to the darkness2 they cannot distinguish the shadows1 and are jeered at for their mistakes by those who have never left the cave and its shadows40 ,in the 8,phdrus0 also 7p4 #cag71 he distinctly says that there can be no true poet without a certain madness2 in fact1 7p4 #cbg71 that every one appears mad who recognises the eternal ,ideas in fleeting things4 ,cicero also quotes3 ,negat enim sine furore1 ,democritus1 quemquam poetam magnum esse posse2 quod idem dicit ,plato 7,de ,divin41 i4 #cg74 ,and1 lastly1 ,pope says-- 8,great wits to madness sure are near allied1 ,and thin partitions do their bounds divide40 ,especially instructive in this respect is ,goethe's 8,torquato ,tasso10 in which he shows us not only the suffering1 the martyrdom of genius as such1 but also how it constantly passes into madness4 ,finally1 the fact of the direct connection of genius and madness is established by the biographies of great men of genius1 such as ,rousseau1 ,byron1 and ,alfieri1 and by anecdotes from the lives of others4 ,on the other hand1 ,i must mention that1 by a diligent search in lunatic asylums1 ,i have found individual cases of patients who were unquestionably endowed with great talents1 and whose genius distinctly appeared through their madness1 which1 however1 had completely gained the upper hand4 ,now this cannot be ascribed to chance1 for on the one hand the number of mad persons is relatively very small1 and on the other hand a person of genius is a phenomenon which is rare beyond all ordinary estimation1 and only appears in nature as the greatest exception4 ,it will be sufficient to convince us of this if we compare the number of really great men of genius that the whole of civilised ,europe has produced1 both in ancient and modern times1 with the two hundred and fifty millions who are always living in ,europe1 and who change entirely every thirty years4 ,in estimating the number of men of outstanding genius1 we must of course only count those who have produced works which have retained through all time an enduring value for mankind4 ,i shall not refrain from mentioning1 that ,i have known some persons of decided1 though not remarkable1 mental superiority1 who also showed a slight trace of insanity4 ,it might seem from this that every advance of intellect beyond the ordinary measure1 as an abnormal development1 disposes to madness4 ,in the meantime1 however1 ,i will explain as briefly as possible my view of the purely intellectual ground of the relation between genius and madness1 for this will certainly assist the explanation of the real nature of genius1 that is to say1 of that mental endowment which alone can produce genuine works of art4 ,but this necessitates a brief explanation of madness itself47#ej7 ,a clear and complete insight into the nature of madness1 a correct and distinct conception of what constitutes the difference between the sane and the insane1 has1 as far as ,i know1 not as yet been found4 ,neither reason nor understanding can be denied to madmen1 for they talk and understand1 and often draw very accurate conclusions2 they also1 as a rule1 perceive what is present quite correctly1 and apprehend the connection between cause and effect4 ,visions1 like the phantasies of delirium1 are no ordinary symptom of madness3 delirium falsifies perception1 madness the thoughts4 ,for the most part1 madmen do not err in the knowledge of what is immediately present2 their raving always relates to what is absent and past1 and only through these to their connection with what is present4 ,therefore it seems to me that their malady specially concerns the memory2 not indeed that memory fails them entirely1 for many of them know a great deal by heart1 and sometimes recognise persons whom they have not seen for a long time2 but rather that the thread of memory is broken1 the continuity of its connection destroyed1 and no uniformly connected recollection of the past is possible4 ,particular scenes of the past are known correctly1 just like the particular present2 but there are gaps in their recollection which they fill up with fictions1 and these are either always the same1 in which case they become fixed ideas1 and the madness that results is called monomania or melancholy2 or they are always different1 momentary fancies1 and then it is called folly1 fatuitas4 ,this is why it is so difficult to find out their former life from lunatics when they enter an asylum4 ,the true and the false are always mixed up in their memory4 ,although the immediate present is correctly known1 it becomes falsified through its fictitious connection with an imaginary past2 they therefore regard themselves and others as identical with persons who exist only in their imaginary past2 they do not recognise some of their acquaintances at all1 and thus while they perceive correctly what is actually present1 they have only false conceptions of its relations to what is absent4 ,if the madness reaches a high degree1 there is complete absence of memory1 so that the madman is quite incapable of any reference to what is absent or past1 and is only determined by the caprice of the moment in connection with the fictions which1 in his mind1 fill the past4 ,in such a case1 we are never for a moment safe from violence or murder1 unless we constantly make the madman aware of the presence of superior force4 ,the knowledge of the madman has this in common with that of the brute1 both are confined to the present4 ,what distinguishes them is that the brute has really no idea of the past as such1 though the past acts upon it through the medium of custom1 so that1 for example1 the dog recognises its former master even after years1 that is to say1 it receives the wonted impression at the sight of him2 but of the time that has passed since it saw him it has no recollection4 ,the madman1 on the other hand1 always carries about in his reason an abstract past1 but it is a false past1 which exists only for him1 and that either constantly1 or only for the moment4 ,the influence of this false past prevents the use of the true knowledge of the present which the brute is able to make4 ,the fact that violent mental suffering or unexpected and terrible calamities should often produce madness1 ,i explain in the following manner4 ,all such suffering is as an actual event confined to the present4 ,it is thus merely transitory1 and is consequently never excessively heavy2 it only becomes unendurably great when it is lasting pain2 but as such it exists only in thought1 and therefore lies in the memory4 ,if now such a sorrow1 such painful knowledge or reflection1 is so bitter that it becomes altogether unbearable1 and the individual is prostrated under it1 then1 terrified ,nature seizes upon madness as the last resource of life2 the mind so fearfully tortured at once destroys the thread of its memory1 fills up the gaps with fictions1 and thus seeks refuge in madness from the mental suffering that exceeds its strength1 just as we cut off a mortified limb and replace it with a wooden one4 ,the distracted ,ajax1 ,king ,lear1 and ,ophelia may be taken as examples2 for the creations of true genius1 to which alone we can refer here1 as universally known1 are equal in truth to real persons2 besides1 in this case1 frequent actual experience shows the same thing4 ,a faint analogy of this kind of transition from pain to madness is to be found in the way in which all of us often seek1 as it were mechanically1 to drive away a painful thought that suddenly occurs to us by some loud exclamation or quick movement--to turn ourselves from it1 to distract our minds by force4 ,we see1 from what has been said1 that the madman has a true knowledge of what is actually present1 and also of certain particulars of the past1 but that he mistakes the connection1 the relations1 and therefore falls into error and talks nonsense4 ,now this is exactly the point at which he comes into contact with the man of genius2 for he also leaves out of sight the knowledge of the connection of things1 since he neglects that knowledge of relations which conforms to the principle of sufficient reason1 in order to see in things only their ,ideas1 and to seek to comprehend their true nature1 which manifests itself to perception1 and in regard to which one thing represents its whole species1 in which way1 as ,goethe says1 one case is valid for a thousand4 ,the particular object of his contemplation1 or the present which is perceived by him with extraordinary vividness1 appear in so strong a light that the other links of the chain to which they belong are at once thrown into the shade1 and this gives rise to phenomena which have long been recognised as resembling those of madness4 ,that which in particular given things exists only incompletely and weakened by modifications1 is raised by the man of genius1 through his way of contemplating it1 to the ,idea of the thing1 to completeness3 he therefore sees everywhere extremes1 and therefore his own action tends to extremes2 he cannot hit the mean1 he lacks soberness1 and the result is what we have said4 ,he knows the ,ideas completely but not the individuals4 ,therefore it has been said that a poet may know mankind deeply and thoroughly1 and may yet have a very imperfect knowledge of men4 ,he is easily deceived1 and is a tool in the hands of the crafty4 #cg4 ,genius1 then1 consists1 according to our explanation1 in the capacity for knowing1 independently of the principle of sufficient reason1 not individual things1 which have their existence only in their relations1 but the ,ideas of such things1 and of being oneself the correlative of the ,idea1 and thus no longer an individual1 but the pure subject of knowledge4 ,yet this faculty must exist in all men in a smaller and different degree2 for if not1 they would be just as incapable of enjoying works of art as of producing them2 they would have no susceptibility for the beautiful or the sublime2 indeed1 these words could have no meaning for them4 ,we must therefore assume that there exists in all men this power of knowing the ,ideas in things1 and consequently of transcending their personality for the moment1 unless indeed there are some men who are capable of no sthetic pleasure at all4 ,the man of genius excels ordinary men only by possessing this kind of knowledge in a far higher degree and more continuously4 ,thus1 while under its influence he retains the presence of mind which is necessary to enable him to repeat in a voluntary and intentional work what he has learned in this manner2 and this repetition is the work of art4 ,through this he communicates to others the ,idea he has grasped4 ,this ,idea remains unchanged and the same1 so that sthetic pleasure is one and the same whether it is called forth by a work of art or directly by the contemplation of nature and life4 ,the work of art is only a means of facilitating the knowledge in which this pleasure consists4 ,that the ,idea comes to us more easily from the work of art than directly from nature and the real world1 arises from the fact that the artist1 who knew only the ,idea1 no longer the actual1 has reproduced in his work the pure ,idea1 has abstracted it from the actual1 omitting all disturbing accidents4 ,the artist lets us see the world through his eyes4 ,that he has these eyes1 that he knows the inner nature of things apart from all their relations1 is the gift of genius1 is inborn2 but that he is able to lend us this gift1 to let us see with his eyes1 is acquired1 and is the technical side of art4 ,therefore1 after the account which ,i have given in the preceding pages of the inner nature of sthetical knowledge in its most general outlines1 the following more exact philosophical treatment of the beautiful and the sublime will explain them both1 in nature and in art1 without separating them further4 ,first of all we shall consider what takes place in a man when he is affected by the beautiful and the sublime2 whether he derives this emotion directly from nature1 from life1 or partakes of it only through the medium of art1 does not make any essential1 but merely an external1 difference4 #ch4 ,in the sthetical mode of contemplation we have found two inseparable constituent parts--the knowledge of the object1 not as individual thing but as ,platonic ,idea1 that is1 as the enduring form of this whole species of things2 and the self-consciousness of the knowing person1 not as individual1 but as pure will-less subject of knowledge4 ,the condition under which both these constituent parts appear always united was found to be the abandonment of the method of knowing which is bound to the principle of sufficient reason1 and which1 on the other hand1 is the only kind of knowledge that is of value for the service of the will and also for science4 ,moreover1 we shall see that the pleasure which is produced by the contemplation of the beautiful arises from these two constituent parts1 sometimes more from the one1 sometimes more from the other1 according to what the object of the sthetical contemplation may be4 ,all willing arises from want1 therefore from deficiency1 and therefore from suffering4 ,the satisfaction of a wish ends it2 yet for one wish that is satisfied there remain at least ten which are denied4 ,further1 the desire lasts long1 the demands are infinite2 the satisfaction is short and scantily measured out4 ,but even the final satisfaction is itself only apparent2 every satisfied wish at once makes room for a new one2 both are illusions2 the one is known to be so1 the other not yet4 ,no attained object of desire can give lasting satisfaction1 but merely a fleeting gratification2 it is like the alms thrown to the beggar1 that keeps him alive to-day that his misery may be prolonged till the morrow4 ,therefore1 so long as our consciousness is filled by our will1 so long as we are given up to the throng of desires with their constant hopes and fears1 so long as we are the subject of willing1 we can never have lasting happiness nor peace4 ,it is essentially all the same whether we pursue or flee1 fear injury or seek enjoyment2 the care for the constant demands of the will1 in whatever form it may be1 continually occupies and sways the consciousness2 but without peace no true well-being is possible4 ,the subject of willing is thus constantly stretched on the revolving wheel of ,ixion1 pours water into the sieve of the ,danaids1 is the ever-longing ,tantalus4 ,but when some external cause or inward disposition lifts us suddenly out of the endless stream of willing1 delivers knowledge from the slavery of the will1 the attention is no longer directed to the motives of willing1 but comprehends things free from their relation to the will1 and thus observes them without personal interest1 without subjectivity1 purely objectively1 gives itself entirely up to them so far as they are ideas1 but not in so far as they are motives4 ,then all at once the peace which we were always seeking1 but which always fled from us on the former path of the desires1 comes to us of its own accord1 and it is well with us4 ,it is the painless state which ,epicurus prized as the highest good and as the state of the gods2 for we are for the moment set free from the miserable striving of the will2 we keep the ,sabbath of the penal servitude of willing2 the wheel of ,ixion stands still4 ,but this is just the state which ,i described above as necessary for the knowledge of the ,idea1 as pure contemplation1 as sinking oneself in perception1 losing oneself in the object1 forgetting all individuality1 surrendering that kind of knowledge which follows the principle of sufficient reason1 and comprehends only relations2 the state by means of which at once and inseparably the perceived particular thing is raised to the ,idea of its whole species1 and the knowing individual to the pure subject of will-less knowledge1 and as such they are both taken out of the stream of time and all other relations4 ,it is then all one whether we see the sun set from the prison or from the palace4 ,inward disposition1 the predominance of knowing over willing1 can produce this state under any circumstances4 ,this is shown by those admirable ,dutch artists who directed this purely objective perception to the most insignificant objects1 and established a lasting monument of their objectivity and spiritual peace in their pictures of still life1 which the sthetic beholder does not look on without emotion2 for they present to him the peaceful1 still1 frame of mind of the artist1 free from will1 which was needed to contemplate such insignificant things so objectively1 to observe them so attentively1 and to repeat this perception so intelligently2 and as the picture enables the onlooker to participate in this state1 his emotion is often increased by the contrast between it and the unquiet frame of mind1 disturbed by vehement willing1 in which he finds himself4 ,in the same spirit1 landscape-painters1 and particularly ,ruisdael1 have often painted very insignificant country scenes1 which produce the same effect even more agreeably4 ,all this is accomplished by the inner power of an artistic nature alone2 but that purely objective disposition is facilitated and assisted from without by suitable objects1 by the abundance of natural beauty which invites contemplation1 and even presses itself upon us4 ,whenever it discloses itself suddenly to our view1 it almost always succeeds in delivering us1 though it may be only for a moment1 from subjectivity1 from the slavery of the will1 and in raising us to the state of pure knowing4 ,this is why the man who is tormented by passion1 or want1 or care1 is so suddenly revived1 cheered1 and restored by a single free glance into nature3 the storm of passion1 the pressure of desire and fear1 and all the miseries of willing are then at once1 and in a marvellous manner1 calmed and appeased4 ,for at the moment at which1 freed from the will1 we give ourselves up to pure will-less knowing1 we pass into a world from which everything is absent that influenced our will and moved us so violently through it4 ,this freeing of knowledge lifts us as wholly and entirely away from all that1 as do sleep and dreams2 happiness and unhappiness have disappeared2 we are no longer individual2 the individual is forgotten2 we are only pure subject of knowledge2 we are only that one eye of the world which looks out from all knowing creatures1 but which can become perfectly free from the service of will in man alone4 ,thus all difference of individuality so entirely disappears1 that it is all the same whether the perceiving eye belongs to a mighty king or to a wretched beggar2 for neither joy nor complaining can pass that boundary with us4 ,so near us always lies a sphere in which we escape from all our misery2 but who has the strength to continue long in it8 ,as soon as any single relation to our will1 to our person1 even of these objects of our pure contemplation1 comes again into consciousness1 the magic is at an end2 we fall back into the knowledge which is governed by the principle of sufficient reason2 we know no longer the ,idea1 but the particular thing1 the link of a chain to which we also belong1 and we are again abandoned to all our woe4 ,most men remain almost always at this standpoint because they entirely lack objectivity1 i4e41 genius4 ,therefore they have no pleasure in being alone with nature2 they need company1 or at least a book4 ,for their knowledge remains subject to their will2 they seek1 therefore1 in objects1 only some relation to their will1 and whenever they see anything that has no such relation1 there sounds within them1 like a ground bass in music1 the constant inconsolable cry1 8,it is of no use to me20 thus in solitude the most beautiful surroundings have for them a desolate1 dark1 strange1 and hostile appearance4 ,lastly1 it is this blessedness of will-less perception which casts an enchanting glamour over the past and distant1 and presents them to us in so fair a light by means of self-deception4 ,for as we think of days long gone by1 days in which we lived in a distant place1 it is only the objects which our fancy recalls1 not the subject of will1 which bore about with it then its incurable sorrows just as it bears them now2 but they are forgotten1 because since then they have often given place to others4 ,now1 objective perception acts with regard to what is remembered just as it would in what is present1 if we let it have influence over us1 if we surrendered ourselves to it free from will4 ,hence it arises that1 especially when we are more than ordinarily disturbed by some want1 the remembrance of past and distant scenes suddenly flits across our minds like a lost paradise4 ,the fancy recalls only what was objective1 not what was individually subjective1 and we imagine that that objective stood before us then just as pure and undisturbed by any relation to the will as its image stands in our fancy now2 while in reality the relation of the objects to our will gave us pain then just as it does now4 ,we can deliver ourselves from all suffering just as well through present objects as through distant ones whenever we raise ourselves to a purely objective contemplation of them1 and so are able to bring about the illusion that only the objects are present and not we ourselves4 ,then1 as the pure subject of knowledge1 freed from the miserable self1 we become entirely one with these objects1 and1 for the moment1 our wants are as foreign to us as they are to them4 ,the world as idea alone remains1 and the world as will has disappeared4 ,in all these reflections it has been my object to bring out clearly the nature and the scope of the subjective element in sthetic pleasure2 the deliverance of knowledge from the service of the will1 the forgetting of self as an individual1 and the raising of the consciousness to the pure will-less1 timeless1 subject of knowledge1 independent of all relations4 ,with this subjective side of sthetic contemplation1 there must always appear as its necessary correlative the objective side1 the intuitive comprehension of the ,platonic ,idea4 ,but before we turn to the closer consideration of this1 and to the achievements of art in relation to it1 it is better that we should pause for a little at the subjective side of sthetic pleasure1 in order to complete our treatment of this by explaining the impression of the sublime which depends altogether upon it1 and arises from a modification of it4 ,after that we shall complete our investigation of sthetic pleasure by considering its objective side4 ,but we must first add the following remarks to what has been said4 ,light is the pleasantest and most gladdening of things2 it has become the symbol of all that is good and salutary4 ,in all religions it symbolises salvation1 while darkness symbolises damnation4 ,ormuzd dwells in the purest light1 ,ahrimines in eternal night4 ,dante's ,paradise would look very much like ,vauxhall in ,london1 for all the blessed spirits appear as points of light and arrange themselves in regular figures4 ,the very absence of light makes us sad2 its return cheers us4 ,colours excite directly a keen delight1 which reaches its highest degree when they are transparent4 ,all this depends entirely upon the fact that light is the correlative and condition of the most perfect kind of knowledge of perception1 the only knowledge which does not in any way affect the will4 ,for sight1 unlike the affections of the other senses1 cannot1 in itself1 directly and through its sensuous effect1 make the sensation of the special organ agreeable or disagreeable2 that is1 it has no immediate connection with the will4 ,such a quality can only belong to the perception which arises in the understanding1 and then it lies in the relation of the object to the will4 ,in the case of hearing this is to some extent otherwise2 sounds can give pain directly1 and they may also be sensuously agreeable1 directly and without regard to harmony or melody4 ,touch1 as one with the feeling of the whole body1 is still more subordinated to this direct influence upon the will2 and yet there is such a thing as a sensation of touch which is neither painful nor pleasant4 ,but smells are always either agreeable or disagreeable1 and tastes still more so4 ,thus the last two senses are most closely related to the will1 and therefore they are always the most ignoble1 and have been called by ,kant the subjective senses4 ,the pleasure which we experience from light is in fact only the pleasure which arises from the objective possibility of the purest and fullest perceptive knowledge1 and as such it may be traced to the fact that pure knowledge1 freed and delivered from all will1 is in the highest degree pleasant1 and of itself constitutes a large part of sthetic enjoyment4 ,again1 we must refer to this view of light the incredible beauty which we associate with the reflection of objects in water4 ,that lightest1 quickest1 finest species of the action of bodies upon each other1 that to which we owe by far the completest and purest of our perceptions1 the action of reflected rays of light1 is here brought clearly before our eyes1 distinct and perfect1 in cause and in effect1 and indeed in its entirety1 hence the sthetic delight it gives us1 which1 in the most important aspect1 is entirely based on the subjective ground of sthetic pleasure1 and is delight in pure knowing and its method4 #ci4 ,all these reflections are intended to bring out the subjective part of sthetic pleasure2 that is to say1 that pleasure so far as it consists simply of delight in perceptive knowledge as such1 in opposition to will4 ,and as directly connected with this1 there naturally follows the explanation of that disposition or frame of mind which has been called the sense of the sublime4 ,we have already remarked above that the transition to the state of pure perception takes place most easily when the objects bend themselves to it1 that is1 when by their manifold and yet definite and distinct form they easily become representatives of their ,ideas1 in which beauty1 in the objective sense1 consists4 ,this quality belongs pre-eminently to natural beauty1 which thus affords even to the most insensible at least a fleeting sthetic satisfaction3 indeed it is so remarkable how especially the vegetable world invites sthetic observation1 and1 as it were1 presses itself upon it1 that one might say1 that these advances are connected with the fact that these organisms1 unlike the bodies of animals1 are not themselves immediate objects of knowledge1 and therefore require the assistance of a foreign intelligent individual in order to rise out of the world of blind will and enter the world of idea1 and that thus they long1 as it were1 for this entrance1 that they may attain at least indirectly what is denied them directly4 ,but ,i leave this suggestion which ,i have hazarded1 and which borders perhaps upon extravagance1 entirely undecided1 for only a very intimate and devoted consideration of nature can raise or justify it47#ea7 ,as long as that which raises us from the knowledge of mere relations subject to the will1 to sthetic contemplation1 and thereby exalts us to the position of the subject of knowledge free from will1 is this fittingness of nature1 this significance and distinctness of its forms1 on account of which the ,ideas individualised in them readily present themselves to us2 so long is it merely beauty that affects us and the sense of the beautiful that is excited4 ,but if these very objects whose significant forms invite us to pure contemplation1 have a hostile relation to the human will in general1 as it exhibits itself in its objectivity1 the human body1 if they are opposed to it1 so that it is menaced by the irresistible predominance of their power1 or sinks into insignificance before their immeasurable greatness2 if1 nevertheless1 the beholder does not direct his attention to this eminently hostile relation to his will1 but1 although perceiving and recognising it1 turns consciously away from it1 forcibly detaches himself from his will and its relations1 and1 giving himself up entirely to knowledge1 quietly contemplates those very objects that are so terrible to the will1 comprehends only their ,idea1 which is foreign to all relation1 so that he lingers gladly over its contemplation1 and is thereby raised above himself1 his person1 his will1 and all will3--in that case he is filled with the sense of the sublime1 he is in the state of spiritual exaltation1 and therefore the object producing such a state is called sublime4 ,thus what distinguishes the sense of the sublime from that of the beautiful is this3 in the case of the beautiful1 pure knowledge has gained the upper hand without a struggle1 for the beauty of the object1 i4e41 that property which facilitates the knowledge of its ,idea1 has removed from consciousness without resistance1 and therefore imperceptibly1 the will and the knowledge of relations which is subject to it1 so that what is left is the pure subject of knowledge without even a remembrance of will4 ,on the other hand1 in the case of the sublime that state of pure knowledge is only attained by a conscious and forcible breaking away from the relations of the same object to the will1 which are recognised as unfavourable1 by a free and conscious transcending of the will and the knowledge related to it4 ,this exaltation must not only be consciously won1 but also consciously retained1 and it is therefore accompanied by a constant remembrance of will2 yet not of a single particular volition1 such as fear or desire1 but of human volition in general1 so far as it is universally expressed in its objectivity the human body4 ,if a single real act of will were to come into consciousness1 through actual personal pressure and danger from the object1 then the individual will thus actually influenced would at once gain the upper hand1 the peace of contemplation would become impossible1 the impression of the sublime would be lost1 because it yields to the anxiety1 in which the effort of the individual to right itself has sunk every other thought4 ,a few examples will help very much to elucidate this theory of the sthetic sublime and remove all doubt with regard to it2 at the same time they will bring out the different degrees of this sense of the sublime4 ,it is in the main identical with that of the beautiful1 with pure will-less knowing1 and the knowledge1 that necessarily accompanies it of ,ideas out of all relation determined by the principle of sufficient reason1 and it is distinguished from the sense of the beautiful only by the additional quality that it rises above the known hostile relation of the object contemplated to the will in general4 ,thus there come to be various degrees of the sublime1 and transitions from the beautiful to the sublime1 according as this additional quality is strong1 bold1 urgent1 near1 or weak1 distant1 and merely indicated4 ,i think it is more in keeping with the plan of my treatise1 first to give examples of these transitions1 and of the weaker degrees of the impression of the sublime1 although persons whose sthetical susceptibility in general is not very great1 and whose imagination is not very lively1 will only understand the examples given later of the higher and more distinct grades of that impression2 and they should therefore confine themselves to these1 and pass over the examples of the very weak degrees of the sublime that are to be given first4 ,as man is at once impetuous and blind striving of will 7whose pole or focus lies in the genital organs71 and eternal1 free1 serene subject of pure knowing 7whose pole is the brain72 so1 corresponding to this antithesis1 the sun is both the source of light1 the condition of the most perfect kind of knowledge1 and therefore of the most delightful of things--and the source of warmth1 the first condition of life1 i4e41 of all phenomena of will in its higher grades4 ,therefore1 what warmth is for the will1 light is for knowledge4 ,light is the largest gem in the crown of beauty1 and has the most marked influence on the knowledge of every beautiful object4 ,its presence is an indispensable condition of beauty2 its favourable disposition increases the beauty of the most beautiful4 ,architectural beauty more than any other object is enhanced by favourable light1 though even the most insignificant things become through its influence most beautiful4 ,if1 in the dead of winter1 when all nature is frozen and stiff1 we see the rays of the setting sun reflected by masses of stone1 illuminating without warming1 and thus favourable only to the purest kind of knowledge1 not to the will2 the contemplation of the beautiful effect of the light upon these masses lifts us1 as does all beauty1 into a state of pure knowing4 ,but1 in this case1 a certain transcending of the interests of the will is needed to enable us to rise into the state of pure knowing1 because there is a faint recollection of the lack of warmth from these rays1 that is1 an absence of the principle of life2 there is a slight challenge to persist in pure knowing1 and to refrain from all willing1 and therefore it is an example of a transition from the sense of the beautiful to that of the sublime4 ,it is the faintest trace of the sublime in the beautiful2 and beauty itself is indeed present only in a slight degree4 ,the following is almost as weak an example4 ,let us imagine ourselves transported to a very lonely place1 with unbroken horizon1 under a cloudless sky1 trees and plants in the perfectly motionless air1 no animals1 no men1 no running water1 the deepest silence4 ,such surroundings are1 as it were1 a call to seriousness and contemplation1 apart from all will and its cravings2 but this is just what imparts to such a scene of desolate stillness a touch of the sublime4 ,for1 because it affords no object1 either favourable or unfavourable1 for the will which is constantly in need of striving and attaining1 there only remains the state of pure contemplation1 and whoever is incapable of this1 is ignominiously abandoned to the vacancy of unoccupied will1 and the misery of ennui4 ,so far it is a test of our intellectual worth1 of which1 generally speaking1 the degree of our power of enduring solitude1 or our love of it1 is a good criterion4 ,the scene we have sketched affords us1 then1 an example of the sublime in a low degree1 for in it1 with the state of pure knowing in its peace and all-sufficiency1 there is mingled1 by way of contrast1 the recollection of the dependence and poverty of the will which stands in need of constant action4 ,this is the species of the sublime for which the sight of the boundless prairies of the interior of ,north ,america is celebrated4 ,but let us suppose such a scene1 stripped also of vegetation1 and showing only naked rocks2 then from the entire absence of that organic life which is necessary for existence1 the will at once becomes uneasy1 the desert assumes a terrible aspect1 our mood becomes more tragic2 the elevation to the sphere of pure knowing takes place with a more decided tearing of ourselves away from the interests of the will2 and because we persist in continuing in the state of pure knowing1 the sense of the sublime distinctly appears4 ,the following situation may occasion this feeling in a still higher degree3 ,nature convulsed by a storm2 the sky darkened by black threatening thunder-clouds2 stupendous1 naked1 overhanging cliffs1 completely shutting out the view2 rushing1 foaming torrents2 absolute desert2 the wail of the wind sweeping through the clefts of the rocks4 ,our dependence1 our strife with hostile nature1 our will broken in the conflict1 now appears visibly before our eyes4 ,yet1 so long as the personal pressure does not gain the upper hand1 but we continue in sthetic contemplation1 the pure subject of knowing gazes unshaken and unconcerned through that strife of nature1 through that picture of the broken will1 and quietly comprehends the ,ideas even of those objects which are threatening and terrible to the will4 ,in this contrast lies the sense of the sublime4 ,but the impression becomes still stronger1 if1 when we have before our eyes1 on a large scale1 the battle of the raging elements1 in such a scene we are prevented from hearing the sound of our own voice by the noise of a falling stream2 or1 if we are abroad in the storm of tempestuous seas1 where the mountainous waves rise and fall1 dash themselves furiously against steep cliffs1 and toss their spray high into the air2 the storm howls1 the sea boils1 the lightning flashes from black clouds1 and the peals of thunder drown the voice of storm and sea4 ,then1 in the undismayed beholder1 the two-fold nature of his consciousness reaches the highest degree of distinctness4 ,he perceives himself1 on the one hand1 as an individual1 as the frail phenomenon of will1 which the slightest touch of these forces can utterly destroy1 helpless against powerful nature1 dependent1 the victim of chance1 a vanishing nothing in the presence of stupendous might2 and1 on the other hand1 as the eternal1 peaceful1 knowing subject1 the condition of the object1 and1 therefore1 the supporter of this whole world2 the terrific strife of nature only his idea2 the subject itself free and apart from all desires and necessities1 in the quiet comprehension of the ,ideas4 ,this is the complete impression of the sublime4 ,here he obtains a glimpse of a power beyond all comparison superior to the individual1 threatening it with annihilation4 ,the impression of the sublime may be produced in quite another way1 by presenting a mere immensity in space and time2 its immeasurable greatness dwindles the individual to nothing4 ,adhering to ,kant's nomenclature and his accurate division1 we may call the first kind the dynamical1 and the second the mathematical sublime1 although we entirely dissent from his explanation of the inner nature of the impression1 and can allow no share in it either to moral reflections1 or to hypostases from scholastic philosophy4 ,if we lose ourselves in the contemplation of the infinite greatness of the universe in space and time1 meditate on the thousands of years that are past or to come1 or if the heavens at night actually bring before our eyes innumerable worlds and so force upon our consciousness the immensity of the universe1 we feel ourselves dwindle to nothing2 as individuals1 as living bodies1 as transient phenomena of will1 we feel ourselves pass away and vanish into nothing like drops in the ocean4 ,but at once there rises against this ghost of our own nothingness1 against such lying impossibility1 the immediate consciousness that all these worlds exist only as our idea1 only as modifications of the eternal subject of pure knowing1 which we find ourselves to be as soon as we forget our individuality1 and which is the necessary supporter of all worlds and all times the condition of their possibility4 ,the vastness of the world which disquieted us before1 rests now in us2 our dependence upon it is annulled by its dependence upon us4 ,all this1 however1 does not come at once into reflection1 but shows itself merely as the felt consciousness that in some sense or other 7which philosophy alone can explain7 we are one with the world1 and therefore not oppressed1 but exalted by its immensity4 ,it is the felt consciousness of this that the ,upanishads of the ,vedas repeatedly express in such a multitude of different ways2 very admirably in the saying already quoted3 ,h omnes creatur in totum ego sum1 et prter me aliud ens non est 7,oupnek'hat1 vol4 i4 p4 #abb47 ,it is the transcending of our own individuality1 the sense of the sublime4 ,we receive this impression of the mathematical-sublime1 quite directly1 by means of a space which is small indeed as compared with the world1 but which has become directly perceptible to us1 and affects us with its whole extent in all its three dimensions1 so as to make our own body seem almost infinitely small4 ,an empty space can never be thus perceived1 and therefore never an open space1 but only space that is directly perceptible in all its dimensions by means of the limits which enclose it2 thus for example a very high1 vast dome1 like that of ,st4 ,peter's at ,rome1 or ,st4 ,paul's in ,london4 ,the sense of the sublime here arises through the consciousness of the vanishing nothingness of our own body in the presence of a vastness which1 from another point of view1 itself exists only in our idea1 and of which we are as knowing subject1 the supporter4 ,thus here as everywhere it arises from the contrast between the insignificance and dependence of ourselves as individuals1 as phenomena of will1 and the consciousness of ourselves as pure subject of knowing4 ,even the vault of the starry heaven produces this if it is contemplated without reflection2 but just in the same way as the vault of stone1 and only by its apparent1 not its real extent4 ,some objects of our perception excite in us the feeling of the sublime because1 not only on account of their spatial vastness1 but also of their great age1 that is1 their temporal duration1 we feel ourselves dwarfed to insignificance in their presence1 and yet revel in the pleasure of contemplating them3 of this kind are very high mountains1 the ,egyptian pyramids1 and colossal ruins of great antiquity4 ,our explanation of the sublime applies also to the ethical1 to what is called the sublime character4 ,such a character arises from this1 that the will is not excited by objects which are well calculated to excite it1 but that knowledge retains the upper hand in their presence4 ,a man of sublime character will accordingly consider men in a purely objective way1 and not with reference to the relations which they might have to his will2 he will1 for example1 observe their faults1 even their hatred and injustice to himself1 without being himself excited to hatred2 he will behold their happiness without envy2 he will recognise their good qualities without desiring any closer relations with them2 he will perceive the beauty of women1 but he will not desire them4 ,his personal happiness or unhappiness will not greatly affect him1 he will rather be as ,hamlet describes ,horatio3-- 8444 for thou hast been1 ,as one1 in suffering all1 that suffers nothing2 ,a man that fortune's buffets and rewards ,hast ta'en with equal thanks10 c4 7,a4 #c4 ,sc4 #b47 ,for in the course of his own life and its misfortunes1 he will consider less his individual lot than that of humanity in general1 and will therefore conduct himself in its regard1 rather as knowing than as suffering4 #dj4 ,opposites throw light upon each other1 and therefore the remark may be in place here1 that the proper opposite of the sublime is something which would not at the first glance be recognised1 as such3 the charming or attractive4 ,by this1 however1 ,i understand1 that which excites the will by presenting to it directly its fulfilment1 its satisfaction4 ,we saw that the feeling of the sublime arises from the fact1 that something entirely unfavourable to the will1 becomes the object of pure contemplation1 so that such contemplation can only be maintained by persistently turning away from the will1 and transcending its interests2 this constitutes the sublimity of the character4 ,the charming or attractive1 on the contrary1 draws the beholder away from the pure contemplation which is demanded by all apprehension of the beautiful1 because it necessarily excites this will1 by objects which directly appeal to it1 and thus he no longer remains pure subject of knowing1 but becomes the needy and dependent subject of will4 ,that every beautiful thing which is bright or cheering should be called charming1 is the result of a too general concept1 which arises from a want of accurate discrimination1 and which ,i must entirely set aside1 and indeed condemn4 ,but in the sense of the word which has been given and explained1 ,i find only two species of the charming or attractive in the province of art1 and both of them are unworthy of it4 ,the one species1 a very low one1 is found in ,dutch paintings of still life1 when they err by representing articles of food1 which by their deceptive likeness necessarily excite the appetite for the things they represent1 and this is just an excitement of the will1 which puts an end to all sthetic contemplation of the object4 ,painted fruit is yet admissible1 because we may regard it as the further development of the flower1 and as a beautiful product of nature in form and colour1 without being obliged to think of it as eatable2 but unfortunately we often find1 represented with deceptive naturalness1 prepared and served dishes1 oysters1 herrings1 crabs1 bread and butter1 beer1 wine1 and so forth1 which is altogether to be condemned4 ,in historical painting and in sculpture the charming consists in naked figures1 whose position1 drapery1 and general treatment are calculated to excite the passions of the beholder1 and thus pure sthetical contemplation is at once annihilated1 and the aim of art is defeated4 ,this mistake corresponds exactly to that which we have just censured in the ,dutch paintings4 ,the ancients are almost always free from this fault in their representations of beauty and complete nakedness of form1 because the artist himself created them in a purely objective spirit1 filled with ideal beauty1 not in the spirit of subjective1 and base sensuality4 ,the charming is thus everywhere to be avoided in art4 ,there is also a negative species of the charming or exciting which is even more reprehensible than the positive form which has been discussed2 this is the disgusting or the loathsome4 ,it arouses the will of the beholder1 just as what is properly speaking charming1 and therefore disturbs pure sthetic contemplation4 ,but it is an active aversion and opposition which is excited by it2 it arouses the will by presenting to it objects which it abhors4 ,therefore it has always been recognised that it is altogether inadmissible in art1 where even what is ugly1 when it is not disgusting1 is allowable in its proper place1 as we shall see later4 #da4 ,the course of the discussion has made it necessary to insert at this point the treatment of the sublime1 though we have only half done with the beautiful1 as we have considered its subjective side only4 ,for it was merely a special modification of this subjective side that distinguished the beautiful from the sublime4 ,this difference was found to depend upon whether the state of pure will-less knowing1 which is presupposed and demanded by all sthetic contemplation1 was reached without opposition1 by the mere disappearance of the will from consciousness1 because the object invited and drew us towards it2 or whether it was only attained through the free1 conscious transcending of the will1 to which the object contemplated had an unfavourable and even hostile relation1 which would destroy contemplation altogether1 if we were to give ourselves up to it4 ,this is the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime4 ,in the object they are not essentially different1 for in every case the object of sthetical contemplation is not the individual thing1 but the ,idea in it which is striving to reveal itself2 that is to say1 adequate objectivity of will at a particular grade4 ,its necessary correlative1 independent1 like itself of the principle of sufficient reason1 is the pure subject of knowing2 just as the correlative of the particular thing is the knowing individual1 both of which lie within the province of the principle of sufficient reason4 ,when we say that a thing is beautiful1 we thereby assert that it is an object of our sthetic contemplation1 and this has a double meaning2 on the one hand it means that the sight of the thing makes us objective1 that is to say1 that in contemplating it we are no longer conscious of ourselves as individuals1 but as pure will-less subjects of knowledge2 and on the other hand it means that we recognise in the object1 not the particular thing1 but an ,idea2 and this can only happen1 so far as our contemplation of it is not subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason1 does not follow the relation of the object to anything outside it 7which is always ultimately connected with relations to our own will71 but rests in the object itself4 ,for the ,idea and the pure subject of knowledge always appear at once in consciousness as necessary correlatives1 and on their appearance all distinction of time vanishes1 for they are both entirely foreign to the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms1 and lie outside the relations which are imposed by it2 they may be compared to the rainbow and the sun1 which have no part in the constant movement and succession of the falling drops4 ,therefore1 if1 for example1 ,i contemplate a tree sthetically1 i4e41 with artistic eyes1 and thus recognise1 not it1 but its ,idea1 it becomes at once of no consequence whether it is this tree or its predecessor which flourished a thousand years ago1 and whether the observer is this individual or any other that lived anywhere and at any time2 the particular thing and the knowing individual are abolished with the principle of sufficient reason1 and there remains nothing but the ,idea and the pure subject of knowing1 which together constitute the adequate objectivity of will at this grade4 ,and the ,idea dispenses not only with time1 but also with space1 for the ,idea proper is not this special form which appears before me but its expression1 its pure significance1 its inner being1 which discloses itself to me and appeals to me1 and which may be quite the same though the spatial relations of its form be very different4 ,since1 on the one hand1 every given thing may be observed in a4 purely objective manner and apart from all relations2 and since1 on the other hand1 the will manifests itself in everything at some grade of its objectivity1 so that everything is the expression of an ,idea2 it follows that everything is also beautiful4 ,that even the most insignificant things admit of pure objective and will-less contemplation1 and thus prove that they are beautiful1 is shown by what was said above in this reference about the ,dutch pictures of still-life 7 #ch74 ,but one thing is more beautiful than another1 because it makes this pure objective contemplation easier1 it lends itself to it1 and1 so to speak1 even compels it1 and then we call it very beautiful4 ,this is the case sometimes because1 as an individual thing1 it expresses in its purity the ,idea of its species by the very distinct1 clearly defined1 and significant relation of its parts1 and also fully reveals that ,idea through the completeness of all the possible expressions of its species united in it1 so that it makes the transition from the individual thing to the ,idea1 and therefore also the condition of pure contemplation1 very easy for the beholder4 ,sometimes this possession of special beauty in an object lies in the fact that the ,idea itself which appeals to us in it is a high grade of the objectivity of will1 and therefore very significant and expressive4 ,therefore it is that man is more beautiful than all other objects1 and the revelation of his nature is the highest aim of art4 ,human form and expression are the most important objects of plastic art1 and human action the most important object of poetry4 ,yet each thing has its own peculiar beauty1 not only every organism which expresses itself in the unity of an individual being1 but also everything unorganised and formless1 and even every manufactured article4 ,for all these reveal the ,ideas through which the will objectifies itself at its lowest grades1 they give1 as it were1 the deepest resounding bass-notes of nature4 ,gravity1 rigidity1 fluidity1 light1 and so forth1 are the ,ideas which express themselves in rocks1 in buildings1 in waters4 ,landscape-gardening or architecture can do no more than assist them to unfold their qualities distinctly1 fully1 and variously2 they can only give them the opportunity of expressing themselves purely1 so that they lend themselves to sthetic contemplation and make it easier4 ,inferior buildings or ill-favoured localities1 on the contrary1 which nature has neglected or art has spoiled1 perform this task in a very slight degree or not at all2 yet even from them these universal1 fundamental ,ideas of nature cannot altogether disappear4 ,to the careful observer they present themselves here also1 and even bad buildings and the like are capable of being sthetically considered2 the ,ideas of the most universal properties of their materials are still recognisable in them1 only the artificial form which has been given them does not assist but hinders sthetic contemplation4 ,manufactured articles also serve to express ,ideas1 only it is not the ,idea of the manufactured article which speaks in them1 but the ,idea of the material to which this artificial form has been given4 ,this may be very conveniently expressed in two words1 in the language of the schoolmen1 thus1--the manufactured article expresses the ,idea of its forma substantialis1 but not that of its forma accidentalis2 the latter leads to no ,idea1 but only to a human conception of which it is the result4 ,it is needless to say that by manufactured article no work of plastic art is meant4 ,the schoolmen understand1 in fact1 by forma substantialis that which ,i call the grade of the objectification of will in a thing4 ,we shall return immediately1 when we treat of architecture1 to the ,idea of the material4 ,our view1 then1 cannot be reconciled with that of ,plato if he is of opinion that a table or a chair express the ,idea of a table or a chair 7,de ,rep41 x41 pp4 #bhd1 #bhe1 et ,parmen41 p4 #gi1 ed4 ,bip471 but we say that they express the ,ideas which are already expressed in their mere material as such4 ,according to ,aristotle 7,metap4 xi41 chap4 #c71 however1 ,plato himself only maintained ,ideas of natural objects3 1 7,plato dixit1 quod ide eorum sunt1 qu natura sunt71 and in chap4 #e he says that1 according to the ,platonists1 there are no ,ideas of house and ring4 ,in any case1 ,plato's earliest disciples1 as ,alcinous informs us 7,introductio in ,platonicam ,philosophiam1 chap4 #i71 denied that there were any ideas of manufactured articles4 ,he says3 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 7,definiunt autem ,,ideam exemplar ternum eorum1 qu secundum naturam existunt4 ,nam plurimis ex iis1 qui ,platonem secuti sunt1 minime placuit1 arte factorum ideas esse1 ut clypei atque lyr2 neque rursus eorum1 qu prtor naturam1 ut febris et choler1 neque particularium1 ceu ,socratis et ,platonis2 neque etiam rerum vilium1 veluti sordium et festuc2 neque relationum1 ut majoris et excedentis3 esse namque ideas intellectiones dei ternas1 ac seipsis perfectas74 ,we may take this opportunity of mentioning another point in which our doctrine of ,ideas differs very much from that of ,plato4 ,he teaches 7,de ,rep41 x41 p4 #bhh7 that the object which art tries to express1 the ideal of painting and poetry1 is not the ,idea but the particular thing4 ,our whole exposition hitherto has maintained exactly the opposite1 and ,plato's opinion is the less likely to lead us astray1 inasmuch as it is the source of one of the greatest and best known errors of this great man1 his depreciation and rejection of art1 and especially poetry2 he directly connects his false judgment in reference to this with the passage quoted4 #db4 ,i return to the exposition of the sthetic impression4 ,the knowledge of the beautiful always supposes at once and inseparably the pure knowing subject and the known ,idea as object4 ,yet the source of sthetic satisfaction will sometimes lie more in the comprehension of the known ,idea1 sometimes more in the blessedness and spiritual peace of the pure knowing subject freed from all willing1 and therefore from all individuality1 and the pain that proceeds from it4 ,and1 indeed1 this predominance of one or the other constituent part of sthetic feeling will depend upon whether the intuitively grasped ,idea is a higher or a lower grade of the objectivity of will4 ,thus in sthetic contemplation 7in the real1 or through the medium of art7 of the beauty of nature in the inorganic and vegetable worlds1 or in works of architecture1 the pleasure of pure will-less knowing will predominate1 because the ,ideas which are here apprehended are only low grades of the objectivity of will1 and are therefore not manifestations of deep significance and rich content4 ,on the other hand1 if animals and man are the objects of sthetic contemplation or representation1 the pleasure will consist rather in the comprehension of these ,ideas1 which are the most distinct revelation of will2 for they exhibit the greatest multiplicity of forms1 the greatest richness and deep significance of phenomena1 and reveal to us most completely the nature of will1 whether in its violence1 its terribleness1 its satisfaction or its aberration 7the latter in tragic situations71 or finally in its change and self-surrender1 which is the peculiar theme of christian painting2 as the ,idea of the will enlightened by full knowledge is the object of historical painting in general1 and of the drama4 ,we shall now go through the fine arts one by one1 and this will give completeness and distinctness to the theory of the beautiful which we have advanced4 #dc4 ,matter as such cannot be the expression of an ,idea4 ,for1 as we found in the first book1 it is throughout nothing but causality3 its being consists in its casual action4 ,but causality is a form of the principle of sufficient reason2 knowledge of the ,idea1 on the other hand1 absolutely excludes the content of that principle4 ,we also found1 in the second book1 that matter is the common substratum of all particular phenomena of the ,ideas1 and consequently is the connecting link between the ,idea and the phenomenon1 or the particular thing4 ,accordingly for both of these reasons it is impossible that matter can for itself express any ,idea4 ,this is confirmed a posteriori by the fact that it is impossible to have a perceptible idea of matter as such1 but only an abstract conception2 in the former1 i4e41 in perceptible ideas are exhibited only the forms and qualities of which matter is the supporter1 and in all of which ,ideas reveal themselves4 ,this corresponds also with the fact1 that causality 7the whole essence of matter7 cannot for itself be presented perceptibly1 but is merely a definite casual connection4 ,on the other hand1 every phenomenon of an ,idea1 because as such it has entered the form of the principle of sufficient reason1 or the principium individuationis1 must exhibit itself in matter1 as one of its qualities4 ,so far then matter is1 as we have said1 the connecting link between the ,idea and the principium individuationis1 which is the form of knowledge of the individual1 or the principle of sufficient reason4 ,plato is therefore perfectly right in his enumeration1 for after the ,idea and the phenomenon1 which include all other things in the world1 he gives matter only1 as a third thing which is different from both 7,timaus1 p4 #cde74 ,the individual1 as a phenomenon of the ,idea1 is always matter4 ,every quality of matter is also the phenomenon of an ,idea1 and as such it may always be an object of sthetic contemplation1 i4e41 the ,idea expressed in it may always be recognised4 ,this holds good of even the most universal qualities of matter1 without which it never appears1 and which are the weakest objectivity of will4 ,such are gravity1 cohesion1 rigidity1 fluidity1 sensitiveness to light1 and so forth4 ,if now we consider architecture simply as a fine art and apart from its application to useful ends1 in which it serves the will and not pure knowledge1 and therefore ceases to be art in our sense2 we can assign to it no other aim than that of bringing to greater distinctness some of those ideas1 which are the lowest grades of the objectivity of will2 such as gravity1 cohesion1 rigidity1 hardness1 those universal qualities of stone1 those first1 simplest1 most inarticulate manifestations of will2 the bass notes of nature2 and after these light1 which in many respects is their opposite4 ,even at these low grades of the objectivity of will we see its nature revealing itself in discord2 for properly speaking the conflict between gravity and rigidity is the sole sthetic material of architecture2 its problem is to make this conflict appear with perfect distinctness in a multitude of different ways4 ,it solves it by depriving these indestructible forces of the shortest way to their satisfaction1 and conducting them to it by a circuitous route1 so that the conflict is lengthened and the inexhaustible efforts of both forces become visible in many different ways4 ,the whole mass of the building1 if left to its original tendency1 would exhibit a mere heap or clump1 bound as closely as possible to the earth1 to which gravity1 the form in which the will appears here1 continually presses1 while rigidity1 also objectivity of will1 resists4 ,but this very tendency1 this effort1 is hindered by architecture from obtaining direct satisfaction1 and only allowed to reach it indirectly and by roundabout ways4 ,the roof1 for example1 can only press the earth through columns1 the arch must support itself1 and can only satisfy its tendency towards the earth through the medium of the pillars1 and so forth4 ,but just by these enforced digressions1 just by these restrictions1 the forces which reside in the crude mass of stone unfold themselves in the most distinct and multifarious ways2 and the purely sthetic aim of architecture can go no further than this4 ,therefore the beauty1 at any rate1 of a building lies in the obvious adaptation of every part1 not to the outward arbitrary end of man 7so far the work belongs to practical architecture71 but directly to the stability of the whole1 to which the position1 dimensions1 and form of every part must have so necessary a relation that1 where it is possible1 if any one part were taken away1 the whole would fall to pieces4 ,for just because each part bears just as much as it conveniently can1 and each is supported just where it requires to be and just to the necessary extent1 this opposition unfolds itself1 this conflict between rigidity and gravity1 which constitutes the life1 the manifestation of will1 in the stone1 becomes completely visible1 and these lowest grades of the objectivity of will reveal themselves distinctly4 ,in the same way the form of each part must not be determined arbitrarily1 but by its end1 and its relation to the whole4 ,the column is the simplest form of support1 determined simply by its end3 the twisted column is tasteless2 the four-cornered pillar is in fact not so simple as the round column1 though it happens that it is easier to make it4 ,the forms also of frieze1 rafter1 roof1 and dome are entirely determined by their immediate end1 and explain themselves from it4 ,the decoration of capitals1 c41 belongs to sculpture1 not to architecture1 which admits it merely as extraneous ornament1 and could dispense with it4 ,according to what has been said1 it is absolutely necessary1 in order to understand the sthetic satisfaction afforded by a work of architecture1 to have immediate knowledge through perception of its matter as regards its weight1 rigidity1 and cohesion1 and our pleasure in such a work would suddenly be very much diminished by the discovery that the material used was pumice-stone2 for then it would appear to us as a kind of sham building4 ,we would be affected in almost the same way if we were told that it was made of wood1 when we had supposed it to be of stone1 just because this alters and destroys the relation between rigidity and gravity1 and consequently the significance and necessity of all the parts1 for these natural forces reveal themselves in a far weaker degree in a wooden building4 ,therefore no real work of architecture as a fine art can be made of wood1 although it assumes all forms so easily2 this can only be explained by our theory4 ,if we were distinctly told that a building1 the sight of which gave us pleasure1 was made of different kinds of material of very unequal weight and consistency1 but not distinguishable to the eye1 the whole building would become as utterly incapable of affording us pleasure as a poem in an unknown language4 ,all this proves that architecture does not affect us mathematically1 but also dynamically1 and that what speaks to us through it1 is not mere form and symmetry1 but rather those fundamental forces of nature1 those first ,ideas1 those lowest grades of the objectivity of will4 ,the regularity of the building and its parts is partly produced by the direct adaptation of each member to the stability of the whole1 partly it serves to facilitate the survey and comprehension of the whole1 and finally1 regular figures to some extent enhance the beauty because they reveal the constitution of space as such4 ,but all this is of subordinate value and necessity1 and by no means the chief concern2 indeed1 symmetry is not invariably demanded1 as ruins are still beautiful4 ,works of architecture have further quite a special relation to light2 they gain a double beauty in the full sunshine1 with the blue sky as a background1 and again they have quite a different effect by moonlight4 ,therefore1 when a beautiful work of architecture is to be erected1 special attention is always paid to the effects of the light and to the climate4 ,the reason of all this is1 indeed1 principally that all the parts and their relations are only made clearly visible by a bright1 strong light2 but besides this ,i am of opinion that it is the function of architecture to reveal the nature of light just as it reveals that of things so opposite to it as gravity and rigidity4 ,for the light is intercepted1 confined1 and reflected by the great opaque1 sharply outlined1 and variously formed masses of stone1 and thus it unfolds its nature and qualities in the purest and clearest way1 to the great pleasure of the beholders1 for light is the most joy-giving of things1 as the condition and the objective correlative of the most perfect kind of knowledge of perception4 ,now1 because the ,ideas which architecture brings to clear perception1 are the lowest grades of the objectivity of will1 and consequently their objective significance1 which architecture reveals to us1 is comparatively small2 the sthetic pleasure of looking at a beautiful building in a good light will lie1 not so much in the comprehension of the ,idea1 as in the subjective correlative which accompanies this comprehension2 it will consist pre-eminently in the fact that the beholder1 set free from the kind of knowledge that belongs to the individual1 and which serves the will and follows the principle of sufficient reason1 is raised to that of the pure subject of knowing free from will4 ,it will consist then principally in pure contemplation itself1 free from all the suffering of will and of individuality4 ,in this respect the opposite of architecture1 and the other extreme of the series of the fine arts1 is the drama1 which brings to knowledge the most significant ,ideas4 ,therefore in the sthetic pleasure afforded by the drama the objective side is throughout predominant4 ,architecture has this distinction from plastic art and poetry3 it does not give us a copy but the thing itself4 ,it does not repeat1 as they do1 the known ,idea1 so that the artist lends his eyes to the beholder1 but in it the artist merely presents the object to the beholder1 and facilitates for him the comprehension of the ,idea by bringing the actual1 individual object to a distinct and complete expression of its nature4 ,unlike the works of the other arts1 those of architecture are very seldom executed for purely sthetic ends4 ,these are generally subordinated to other useful ends which are foreign to art itself4 ,thus the great merit of the architect consists in achieving and attaining the pure sthetic ends1 in spite of their subordination to other ends which are foreign to them4 ,this he does by cleverly adapting them in a variety of ways to the arbitrary ends in view1 and by rightly judging which form of sthetical architectonic beauty is compatible and may be associated with a temple1 which with a palace1 which with a prison1 and so forth4 ,the more a harsh climate increases these demands of necessity and utility1 determines them definitely1 and prescribes them more inevitably1 the less free play has beauty in architecture4 ,in the mild climate of ,india1 ,egypt1 ,greece1 and ,rome1 where the demands of necessity were fewer and less definite1 architecture could follow its sthetic ends with the greatest freedom4 ,but under a northern sky this was sorely hindered4 ,here1 when caissons1 pointed roofs and towers were what was demanded1 architecture could only unfold its own beauty within very narrow limits1 and therefore it was obliged to make amends by resorting all the more to the borrowed ornaments of sculpture1 as is seen in ,gothic architecture4 ,we thus see that architecture is greatly restricted by the demands of necessity and utility2 but on the other hand it has in them a very powerful support1 for1 on account of the magnitude and costliness of its works1 and the narrow sphere of its sthetic effect1 it could not continue to exist merely as a fine art1 if it had not also1 as a useful and necessary profession1 a firm and honourable place among the occupations of men4 ,it is the want of this that prevents another art from taking its place beside architecture as a sister art1 although in an sthetical point of view it is quite properly to be classed along with it as its counterpart2 ,i mean artistic arrangements of water4 ,for what architecture accomplishes for the ,idea of gravity when it appears in connection with that of rigidity1 hydraulics accomplishes for the same ,idea1 when it is connected with fluidity1 i4e41 formlessness1 the greatest mobility and transparency4 ,leaping waterfalls foaming and tumbling over rocks1 cataracts dispersed into floating spray1 springs gushing up as high columns of water1 and clear reflecting lakes1 reveal the ,ideas of fluid and heavy matter1 in precisely the same way as the works of architecture unfold the ,ideas of rigid matter4 ,artistic hydraulics1 however1 obtains no support from practical hydraulics1 for1 as a rule1 their ends cannot be combined2 yet1 in exceptional cases1 this happens2 for example1 in the ,cascata di ,trevi at ,rome47#eb7 #dd4 ,what the two arts we have spoken of accomplish for these lowest grades of the objectivity of will1 is performed for the higher grades of vegetable nature by artistic horticulture4 ,the landscape beauty of a scene consists1 for the most part1 in the multiplicity of natural objects which are present in it1 and then in the fact that they are clearly separated1 appear distinctly1 and yet exhibit a fitting connection and alternation4 ,these two conditions are assisted and promoted by landscape-gardening1 but it has by no means such a mastery over its material as architecture1 and therefore its effect is limited4 ,the beauty with which it is concerned belongs almost exclusively to nature2 it has done little for it2 and1 on the other hand1 it can do little against unfavourable nature1 and when nature works1 not for it1 but against it1 its achievements are small4 ,the vegetable world offers itself everywhere for sthetic enjoyment without the medium of art2 but so far as it is an object of art1 it belongs principally to landscape-painting2 to the province of which all the rest of unconscious nature also belongs4 ,in paintings of still life1 and of mere architecture1 ruins1 interiors of churches1 c41 the subjective side of sthetic pleasure is predominant1 i4e41 our satisfaction does not lie principally in the direct comprehension of the represented ,ideas1 but rather in the subjective correlative of this comprehension1 pure1 will-less knowing4 ,for1 because the painter lets us see these things through his eyes1 we at once receive a sympathetic and reflected sense of the deep spiritual peace and absolute silence of the will1 which were necessary in order to enter with knowledge so entirely into these lifeless objects1 and comprehend them with such love1 i4e41 in this case with such a degree of objectivity4 ,the effect of landscape-painting proper is indeed1 as a whole1 of this kind2 but because the ,ideas expressed are more distinct and significant1 as higher grades of the objectivity of will1 the objective side of sthetic pleasure already comes more to the front and assumes as much importance as the subjective side4 ,pure knowing as such is no longer the paramount consideration1 for we are equally affected by the known ,platonic ,idea1 the world as idea at an important grade of the objectification of will4 ,but a far higher grade is revealed by animal painting and sculpture4 ,of the latter we have some important antique remains2 for example1 horses at ,venice1 on ,monte ,cavallo1 and on the ,elgin ,marbles1 also at ,florence in bronze and marble2 the ancient boar1 howling wolves1 the lions in the arsenal at ,venice1 also in the ,vatican a whole room almost filled with ancient animals1 c4 ,in these representations the objective side of sthetic pleasure obtains a marked predominance over the subjective4 ,the peace of the subject which knows these ,ideas1 which has silenced its own will1 is indeed present1 as it is in all sthetic contemplation2 but its effect is not felt1 for we are occupied with the restlessness and impetuosity of the will represented4 ,it is that very will1 which constitutes our own nature1 that here appears to us in forms1 in which its manifestation is not1 as in us1 controlled and tempered by intellect1 but exhibits itself in stronger traits1 and with a distinctness that borders on the grotesque and monstrous4 ,for this very reason there is no concealment2 it is free1 nave1 open as the day1 and this is the cause of our interest in animals4 ,the characteristics of species appeared already in the representation of plants1 but showed itself only in the forms2 here it becomes much more distinct1 and expresses itself not only in the form1 but in the action1 position1 and mien1 yet always merely as the character of the species1 not of the individual4 ,this knowledge of the ,ideas of higher grades1 which in painting we receive through extraneous means1 we may gain directly by the pure contemplative perception of plants1 and observation of beasts1 and indeed of the latter in their free1 natural1 and unrestrained state4 ,the objective contemplation of their manifold and marvellous forms1 and of their actions and behaviour1 is an instructive lesson from the great book of nature1 it is a deciphering of the true signatura rerum47#ec7 ,we see in them the manifold grades and modes of the manifestation of will1 which in all beings of one and the same grade1 wills always in the same way1 which objectifies itself as life1 as existence in such endless variety1 and such different forms1 which are all adaptations to the different external circumstances1 and may be compared to many variations on the same theme4 ,but if we had to communicate to the observer1 for reflection1 and in a word1 the explanation of their inner nature1 it would be best to make use of that ,sanscrit formula which occurs so often in the sacred books of the ,hindoos1 and is called ,mahavakya1 i4e41 the great word3 8,tat twam asi10 which means1 8this living thing art thou40 #de4 ,the great problem of historical painting and sculpture is to express directly and for perception the ,idea in which the will reaches the highest grade of its objectification4 ,the objective side of the pleasure afforded by the beautiful is here always predominant1 and the subjective side has retired into the background4 ,it is further to be observed that at the next grade below this1 animal painting1 the characteristic is entirely one with the beautiful2 the most characteristic lion1 wolf1 horse1 sheep1 or ox1 was always the most beautiful also4 ,the reason of this is that animals have only the character of their species1 no individual character4 ,in the representation of men the character of the species is separated from that of the individual2 the former is now called beauty 7entirely in the objective sense71 but the latter retains the name1 character1 or expression1 and the new difficulty arises of representing both1 at once and completely1 in the same individual4 ,human beauty is an objective expression1 which means the fullest objectification of will at the highest grade at which it is knowable1 the ,idea of man in general1 completely expressed in the sensible form4 ,but however much the objective side of the beautiful appears here1 the subjective side still always accompanies it4 ,and just because no object transports us so quickly into pure sthetic contemplation1 as the most beautiful human countenance and form1 at the sight of which we are instantly filled with unspeakable satisfaction1 and raised above ourselves and all that troubles us2 this is only possible because this most distinct and purest knowledge of will raises us most easily and quickly to the state of pure knowing1 in which our personality1 our will with its constant pain1 disappears1 so long as the pure sthetic pleasure lasts4 ,therefore it is that ,goethe says3 8,no evil can touch him who looks on human beauty2 he feels himself at one with himself and with the world40 ,that a beautiful human form is produced by nature must be explained in this way4 ,at this its highest grade the will objectifies itself in an individual2 and therefore through circumstances and its own power it completely overcomes all the hindrances and opposition which the phenomena of the lower grades present to it4 ,such are the forces of nature1 from which the will must always first extort and win back the matter that belongs to all its manifestations4 ,further1 the phenomenon of will at its higher grades always has multiplicity in its form4 ,even the tree is only a systematic aggregate of innumerably repeated sprouting fibres4 ,this combination assumes greater complexity in higher forms1 and the human body is an exceedingly complex system of different parts1 each of which has a peculiar life of its own1 vita propria1 subordinate to the whole4 ,now that all these parts are in the proper fashion subordinate to the whole1 and co-ordinate to each other1 that they all work together harmoniously for the expression of the whole1 nothing superfluous1 nothing restricted2 all these are the rare conditions1 whose result is beauty1 the completely expressed character of the species4 ,so is it in nature4 ,but how in art8 ,one would suppose that art achieved the beautiful by imitating nature4 ,but how is the artist to recognise the perfect work which is to be imitated1 and distinguish it from the failures1 if he does not anticipate the beautiful before experience8 ,and besides this1 has nature ever produced a human being perfectly beautiful in all his parts8 ,it has accordingly been thought that the artist must seek out the beautiful parts1 distributed among a number of different human beings1 and out of them construct a beautiful whole2 a perverse and foolish opinion4 ,for it will be asked1 how is he to know that just these forms and not others are beautiful8 ,we also see what kind of success attended the efforts of the old ,german painters to achieve the beautiful by imitating nature4 ,observe their naked figures4 ,no knowledge of the beautiful is possible purely a posteriori1 and from mere experience2 it is always1 at least in part1 a priori1 although quite different in kind1 from the forms of the principle of sufficient reason1 of which we are conscious a priori4 ,these concern the universal form of phenomena as such1 as it constitutes the possibility of knowledge in general1 the universal how of all phenomena1 and from this knowledge proceed mathematics and pure natural science4 ,but this other kind of knowledge a priori1 which makes it possible to express the beautiful1 concerns1 not the form but the content of phenomena1 not the how but the what of the phenomenon4 ,that we all recognise human beauty when we see it1 but that in the true artist this takes place with such clearness that he shows it as he has never seen it1 and surpasses nature in his representation2 this is only possible because we ourselves are the will whose adequate objectification at its highest grade is here to be judged and discovered4 ,thus alone have we in fact an anticipation of that which nature 7which is just the will that constitutes our own being7 strives to express4 ,and in the true genius this anticipation is accompanied by so great a degree of intelligence that he recognises the ,idea in the particular thing1 and thus1 as it were1 understands the half-uttered speech of nature1 and articulates clearly what she only stammered forth4 ,he expresses in the hard marble that beauty of form which in a thousand attempts she failed to produce1 he presents it to nature1 saying1 as it were1 to her1 8,that is what you wanted to say60 ,and whoever is able to judge replies1 8,yes1 that is it40 ,only in this way was it possible for the genius of the ,greeks to find the type of human beauty and establish it as a canon for the school of sculpture2 and only by virtue of such an anticipation is it possible for all of us to recognise beauty1 when it has actually been achieved by nature in the particular case4 ,this anticipation is the ,ideal4 ,it is the ,idea so far as it is known a priori1 at least half1 and it becomes practical for art1 because it corresponds to and completes what is given a posteriori through nature4 ,the possibility of such an anticipation of the beautiful a priori in the artist1 and of its recognition a posteriori by the critic1 lies in the fact that the artist and the critic are themselves the 8in-itself0 of nature1 the will which objectifies itself4 ,for1 as ,empedocles said1 like can only be known by like3 only nature can understand itself3 only nature can fathom itself3 but only spirit also can understand spirit47#ed7 ,the opinion1 which is absurd1 although expressed by the ,socrates of ,xenophon 7,stobi ,floril1 vol4 ii4 p4 #chd7 that the ,greeks discovered the established ideal of human beauty empirically1 by collecting particular beautiful parts1 uncovering and noting here a knee1 there an arm1 has an exact parallel in the art of poetry4 ,the view is entertained1 that ,shakespeare1 for example1 observed1 and then gave forth from his own experience of life1 the innumerable variety of the characters in his dramas1 so true1 so sustained1 so profoundly worked out4 ,the impossibility and absurdity of such an assumption need not be dwelt upon4 ,it is obvious that the man of genius produces the works of poetic art by means of an anticipation of what is characteristic1 just as he produces the works of plastic and pictorial art by means of a prophetic anticipation of the beautiful2 yet both require experience as a pattern or model1 for thus alone can that which is dimly known a priori be called into clear consciousness1 and an intelligent representation of it becomes possible4 ,human beauty was explained above as the fullest objectification of will at the highest grade at which it is knowable4 ,it expresses itself through the form2 and this lies in space alone1 and has no necessary connection with time1 as1 for example1 motion has4 ,thus far then we may say3 the adequate objectification of will through a merely spatial phenomenon is beauty1 in the objective sense4 ,a plant is nothing but such a merely spatial phenomenon of will2 for no motion1 and consequently no relation to time 7regarded apart from its development71 belongs to the expression of its nature2 its mere form expresses its whole being and displays it openly4 ,but brutes and men require1 further1 for the full revelation of the will which is manifested in them1 a series of actions1 and thus the manifestation in them takes on a direct relation to time4 ,all this has already been explained in the preceding book2 it is related to what we are considering at present in the following way4 ,as the merely spatial manifestation of will can objectify it fully or defectively at each definite grade1--and it is this which constitutes beauty or ugliness1--so the temporal objectification of will1 i4e41 the action1 and indeed the direct action1 the movement1 may correspond to the will1 which objectifies itself in it1 purely and fully without foreign admixture1 without superfluity1 without defect1 only expressing exactly the act of will determined in each case2--or the converse of all this may occur4 ,in the first case the movement is made with grace1 in the second case without it4 ,thus as beauty is the adequate representation of will generally1 through its merely spatial manifestation2 grace is the adequate representation of will through its temporal manifestation1 that is to say1 the perfectly accurate and fitting expression of each act of will1 through the movement and position which objectify it4 ,since movement and position presuppose the body1 ,winckelmann's expression is very true and suitable1 when he says1 8,grace is the proper relation of the acting person to the action0 7,works1 vol4 i4 p4 #beh74 ,it is thus evident that beauty may be attributed to a plant1 but no grace1 unless in a figurative sense2 but to brutes and men1 both beauty and grace4 ,grace consists1 according to what has been said1 in every movement being performed1 and every position assumed1 in the easiest1 most appropriate and convenient way1 and therefore being the pure1 adequate expression of its intention1 or of the act of will1 without any superfluity1 which exhibits itself as aimless1 meaningless bustle1 or as wooden stiffness4 ,grace presupposes as its condition a true proportion of all the limbs1 and a symmetrical1 harmonious figure2 for complete ease and evident appropriateness of all positions and movements are only possible by means of these4 ,grace is therefore never without a certain degree of beauty of person4 ,the two1 complete and united1 are the most distinct manifestation of will at the highest grade of its objectification4 ,it was mentioned above that in order rightly to portray man1 it is necessary to separate the character of the species from that of the individual1 so that to a certain extent every man expresses an ,idea peculiar to himself1 as was said in the last book4 ,therefore the arts whose aim is the representation of the ,idea of man1 have as their problem1 not only beauty1 the character of the species1 but also the character of the individual1 which is called1 par excellence1 character4 ,but this is only the case in so far as this character is to be regarded1 not as something accidental and quite peculiar to the man as a single individual1 but as a side of the ,idea of humanity which is specially apparent in this individual1 and the representation of which is therefore of assistance in revealing this ,idea4 ,thus the character1 although as such it is individual1 must yet be ,ideal1 that is1 its significance in relation to the ,idea of humanity generally 7the objectifying of which it assists in its own way7 must be comprehended and expressed with special prominence4 ,apart from this the representation is a portrait1 a copy of the individual as such1 with all his accidental qualities4 ,and even the portrait ought to be1 as ,winckelmann says1 the ideal of the individual4 ,that character which is to be ideally comprehended1 as the prominence of a special side of the ,idea of humanity1 expresses itself visibly1 partly through permanent physiognomy and bodily form1 partly through passing emotion and passion1 the reciprocal modification of knowing and willing by each other1 which is all exhibited in the mien and movements4 ,since the individual always belongs to humanity1 and1 on the other hand1 humanity always reveals itself in the individual with what is indeed peculiar ideal significance1 beauty must not be destroyed by character nor character by beauty4 ,for if the character of the species is annulled by that of the individual1 the result is caricature2 and if the character of the individual is annulled by that of the species1 the result is an absence of meaning4 ,therefore the representation which aims at beauty1 as sculpture principally does1 will yet always modify this 7the character of the species71 in some respect1 by the individual character1 and will always express the ,idea of man in a definite individual manner1 giving prominence to a special side of it4 ,for the human individual as such has to a certain extent the dignity of a special ,idea1 and it is essential to the ,idea of man that it should express itself in individuals of special significance4 ,therefore we find in the works of the ancients1 that the beauty distinctly comprehended by them1 is not expressed in one form1 but in many forms of different character4 ,it is always apprehended1 as it were1 from a different side1 and expressed in one way in ,apollo1 in another way in ,bacchus1 in another in ,hercules1 in another in ,antinous2 indeed the characteristic may limit the beautiful1 and finally extend even to hideousness1 in the drunken ,silenus1 in the ,faun1 c4 ,if the characteristic goes so far as actually to annul the character of the species1 if it extends to the unnatural1 it becomes caricature4 ,but we can far less afford to allow grace to be interfered with by what is characteristic than even beauty1 for graceful position and movement are demanded for the expression of the character also2 but yet it must be achieved in the way which is most fitting1 appropriate1 and easy for the person4 ,this will be observed1 not only by the sculptor and the painter1 but also by every good actor2 otherwise caricature will appear here also as grimace or distortion4 ,in sculpture1 beauty and grace are the principal concern4 ,the special character of the mind1 appearing in emotion1 passion1 alternations of knowing and willing1 which can only be represented by the expression of the countenance and the gestures1 is the peculiar sphere of painting4 ,for although eyes and colour1 which lie outside the province of sculpture1 contribute much to beauty1 they are yet far more essential to character4 ,further1 beauty unfolds itself more completely when it is contemplated from various points of view2 but the expression1 the character1 can only be completely comprehended from one point of view4 ,because beauty is obviously the chief aim of sculpture1 ,lessing tried to explain the fact that the ,laocoon does not cry out1 by saying that crying out is incompatible with beauty4 ,the ,laocoon formed for ,lessing the theme1 or at least the text of a work of his own1 and both before and after him a great deal has been written on the subject4 ,i may therefore be allowed to express my views about it in passing1 although so special a discussion does not properly belong to the scheme of this work1 which is throughout concerned with what is general4 #df4 ,that ,laocoon1 in the celebrated group1 does not cry out is obvious1 and the universal and ever-renewed surprise at this must be occasioned by the fact that any of us would cry out if we were in his place4 ,and nature demands that it should be so2 for in the case of the acutest physical pain1 and the sudden seizure by the greatest bodily fear1 all reflection1 that might have inculcated silent endurance1 is entirely expelled from consciousness1 and nature relieves itself by crying out1 thus expressing both the pain and the fear1 summoning the deliverer and terrifying the assailer4 ,thus ,winckelmann missed the expression of crying out2 but as he wished to justify the artist he turned ,laocoon into a ,stoic1 who considered it beneath his dignity to cry out secundum naturam1 but added to his pain the useless constraint of suppressing all utterance of it4 ,winckelmann therefore sees in him 8the tried spirit of a great man1 who writhes in agony1 and yet seeks to suppress the utterance of his feeling1 and to lock it up in himself4 ,he does not break forth into loud cries1 as in ,virgil1 but only anxious sighs escape him10 c4 7,works1 vol4 vii4 p4 #ih1 and at greater length in vol4 vi4 p4 #ajd74 ,now ,lessing criticised this opinion of ,winckelmann's in his ,laocoon1 and improved it in the way mentioned above4 ,in place of the psychological he gave the purely sthetic reason that beauty1 the principle of ancient art1 does not admit of the expression of crying out4 ,another argument which he added to this1 that a merely passing state incapable of duration ought not to be represented in motionless works of art1 has a hundred examples of most excellent figures against it1 which are fixed in merely transitory movements1 dancing1 wrestling1 catching1 c4 ,indeed ,goethe1 in the essay on the ,laocoon1 which opens the ,propylaen 7p4 #h71 holds that the choice of such a merely fleeting movement is absolutely necessary4 ,in our own day ,hirt 7,horen1 #agig1 tenth ,st47 finally decided the point1 deducing everything from the highest truth of expression1 that ,laocoon does not cry out1 because he can no longer do so1 as he is at the point of death from choking4 ,lastly1 ,fernow 78,rmische ,studien10 vol4 i4 p4 #bdf7 expounded and weighed all these opinions2 he added1 however1 no new one of his own1 but combined these three eclectically4 ,i cannot but wonder that such thoughtful and acute men should laboriously bring far-fetched and insufficient reasons1 should resort to psychological and physiological arguments1 to explain a matter the reason of which lies so near at hand1 and is obvious at once to the unprejudiced2 and especially ,i wonder that ,lessing1 who came so near the true explanation1 should yet have entirely missed the real point4 ,before all psychological and physiological inquiries as to whether ,laocoon would cry out in his position or not 7and ,i certainly affirm that he would71 it must be decided as regards the group in question1 that crying out ought not to be expressed in it1 for the simple reason that its expression lies quite outside the province of sculpture4 ,a shrieking ,laocoon could not be produced in marble1 but only a figure with the mouth open vainly endeavouring to shriek2 a ,laocoon whose voice has stuck in his throat1 vox faucibus haesit4 ,the essence of shrieking1 and consequently its effect upon the onlooker1 lies entirely in sound2 not in the distortion of the mouth4 ,this phenomenon1 which necessarily accompanies shrieking1 derives motive and justification only from the sound produced by means of it2 then it is permissible and indeed necessary1 as characteristic of the action1 even though it interferes with beauty4 ,but in plastic art1 to which the representation of shrieking is quite foreign and impossible1 it would be actual folly to represent the medium of violent shrieking1 the distorted mouth1 which would disturb all the features and the remainder of the expression2 for thus at the sacrifice of many other things the means would be represented1 while its end1 the shrieking itself1 and its effect upon our feelings1 would be left out4 ,nay more1 there would be produced the spectacle of a continuous effort without effect1 which is always ridiculous1 and may really be compared to what happened when some one for a joke stopped the horn of a night watchman with wax while he was asleep1 and then awoke him with the cry of fire1 and amused himself by watching his vain endeavours to blow the horn4 ,when1 on the other hand1 the expression of shrieking lies in the province of poetic or histrionic art1 it is quite admissible1 because it helps to express the truth1 i4e41 the complete expression of the ,idea4 ,thus it is with poetry1 which claims the assistance of the imagination of the reader1 in order to enable it to represent things perceptibly4 ,therefore ,virgil makes ,laocoon cry out like the bellowing of an ox that has broken loose after being struck by the axe2 and ,homer 7,il4 xx4 #dh-ec7 makes ,mars and ,minerva shriek horribly1 without derogating from their divine dignity or beauty4 ,the same with acting2 ,laocoon on the stage would certainly have to shriek4 ,sophocles makes ,philoctetus cry out1 and1 on the ancient stage at any rate1 he must actually have done so4 ,as a case in point1 ,i remember having seen in ,london the great actor ,kemble play in a piece called ,pizarro1 translated from the ,german4 ,he took the part of the ,american1 a half-savage1 but of very noble character4 ,when he was wounded he cried out loudly and wildly1 which had a great and admirable effect1 for it was exceedingly characteristic and therefore assisted the truth of the representation very much4 ,on the other hand1 a painted or sculptured model of a man shrieking1 would be much more absurd than the painted music which is censured in ,goethe's ,propylaen4 ,for shrieking does far more injury to the expression and beauty of the whole than music1 which at the most only occupies the hands and arms1 and is to be looked upon as an occupation characteristic of the person2 indeed thus far it may quite rightly be painted1 as long as it demands no violent movement of the body1 or distortion of the mouth3 for example1 ,st4 ,cecilia at the organ1 ,raphael's violin-player in the ,sciarra ,gallery at ,rome1 and others4 ,since then1 on account of the limits of the art1 the pain of ,laocoon must not be expressed by shrieking1 the artist was obliged to employ every other expression of pain2 this he has done in the most perfect manner1 as is ably described by ,winckelmann 7,works1 vol4 vi4 p4 #ajd71 whose admirable account thus retains its full value and truth1 as soon as we abstract from the stoical view which underlies it47#ee7 #dg4 ,because beauty accompanied with grace is the principal object of sculpture1 it loves nakedness1 and allows clothing only so far as it does not conceal the form4 ,it makes use of drapery1 not as a covering1 but as a means of exhibiting the form1 a method of exposition that gives much exercise to the understanding1 for it can only arrive at a perception of the cause1 the form of the body1 through the only directly given effect1 the drapery4 ,thus to a certain extent drapery is in sculpture what fore-shortening is in painting4 ,both are suggestions1 yet not symbolical1 but such that1 if they are successful1 they force the understanding directly to perceive what is suggested1 just as if it were actually given4 ,i may be allowed1 in passing1 to insert here a comparison that is very pertinent to the arts we are discussing4 ,it is this3 as the beautiful bodily form is seen to the greatest advantage when clothed in the lightest way1 or indeed without any clothing at all1 and therefore a very handsome man1 if he had also taste and the courage to follow it1 would go about almost naked1 clothed only after the manner of the ancients2 so every one who possesses a beautiful and rich mind will always express himself in the most natural1 direct1 and simple way1 concerned1 if it be possible1 to communicate his thoughts to others1 and thus relieve the loneliness that he must feel in such a world as this4 ,and conversely1 poverty of mind1 confusion1 and perversity of thought1 will clothe itself in the most far-fetched expressions and the obscurest forms of speech1 in order to wrap up in difficult and pompous phraseology small1 trifling1 insipid1 or commonplace thoughts2 like a man who has lost the majesty of beauty1 and trying to make up for the deficiency by means of clothing1 seeks to hide the insignificance or ugliness of his person under barbaric finery1 tinsel1 feathers1 ruffles1 cuffs1 and mantles4 ,many an author1 if compelled to translate his pompous and obscure book into its little clear content1 would be as utterly spoilt as this man if he had to go naked4 #dh4 ,historical painting has for its principal object1 besides beauty and grace1 character4 ,by character we mean generally1 the representation of will at the highest grade of its objectification1 when the individual1 as giving prominence to a particular side of the ,idea of humanity1 has special significance1 and shows this not merely by his form1 but makes it visible in his bearing and occupation1 by action of every kind1 and the modifications of knowing and willing that occasion and accompany it4 ,the ,idea of man must be exhibited in these circumstances1 and therefore the unfolding of its many-sidedness must be brought before our eyes by means of representative individuals1 and these individuals can only be made visible in their significance through various scenes1 events1 and actions4 ,this is the endless problem of the historical painter1 and he solves it by placing before us scenes of life of every kind1 of greater or less significance4 ,no individual and no action can be without significance2 in all and through all the ,idea of man unfolds itself more and more4 ,therefore no event of human life is excluded from the sphere of painting4 ,it is thus a great injustice to the excellent painters of the ,dutch school1 to prize merely their technical skill1 and to look down upon them in other respects1 because1 for the most part1 they represent objects of common life1 whereas it is assumed that only the events of the history of the world1 or the incidents of biblical story1 have significance4 ,we ought first to bethink ourselves that the inward significance of an action is quite different from its outward significance1 and that these are often separated from each other4 ,the outward significance is the importance of an action in relation to its result for and in the actual world2 thus according to the principle of sufficient reason4 ,the inward significance is the depth of the insight into the ,idea of man which it reveals1 in that it brings to light sides of that ,idea which rarely appear1 by making individuals who assert themselves distinctly and decidedly1 disclose their peculiar characteristics by means of appropriately arranged circumstances4 ,only the inward significance concerns art2 the outward belongs to history4 ,they are both completely independent of each other2 they may appear together1 but may each appear alone4 ,an action which is of the highest significance for history may in inward significance be a very ordinary and common one2 and conversely1 a scene of ordinary daily life may be of great inward significance1 if human individuals1 and the inmost recesses of human action and will1 appear in it in a clear and distinct light4 ,further1 the outward and the inward significance of a scene may be equal and yet very different4 ,thus1 for example1 it is all the same1 as far as inward significance is concerned1 whether ministers discuss the fate of countries and nations over a map1 or boors wrangle in a beer-house over cards and dice1 just as it is all the same whether we play chess with golden or wooden pieces4 ,but apart from this1 the scenes and events that make up the life of so many millions of men1 their actions1 their sorrows1 their joys1 are on that account important enough to be the object of art1 and by their rich variety they must afford material enough for unfolding the many-sided ,idea of man4 ,indeed the very transitoriness of the moment which art has fixed in such a picture 7now called genre-painting7 excites a slight and peculiar sensation2 for to fix the fleeting1 ever-changing world in the enduring picture of a single event1 which yet represents the whole1 is an achievement of the art of painting by which it seems to bring time itself to a standstill1 for it raises the individual to the ,idea of its species4 ,finally1 the historical and outwardly significant subjects of painting have often the disadvantage that just what is significant in them cannot be presented to perception1 but must be arrived at by thought4 ,in this respect the nominal significance of the picture must be distinguished from its real significance4 ,the former is the outward significance1 which1 however1 can only be reached as a conception2 the latter is that side of the ,idea of man which is made visible to the onlooker in the picture4 ,for example1 ,moses found by the ,egyptian princess is the nominal significance of a painting2 it represents a moment of the greatest importance in history2 the real significance1 on the other hand1 that which is really given to the onlooker1 is a foundling child rescued from its floating cradle by a great lady1 an incident which may have happened more than once4 ,the costume alone can here indicate the particular historical case to the learned2 but the costume is only of importance to the nominal significance1 and is a matter of indifference to the real significance2 for the latter knows only the human being as such1 not the arbitrary forms4 ,subjects taken from history have no advantage over those which are taken from mere possibility1 and which are therefore to be called1 not individual1 but merely general4 ,for what is peculiarly significant in the former is not the individual1 not the particular event as such1 but the universal in it1 the side of the ,idea of humanity which expresses itself through it4 ,but1 on the other hand1 definite historical subjects are not on this account to be rejected1 only the really artistic view of such subjects1 both in the painter and in the beholder1 is never directed to the individual particulars in them1 which properly constitute the historical1 but to the universal which expresses itself in them1 to the ,idea4 ,and only those historical subjects are to be chosen the chief point of which can actually be represented1 and not merely arrived at by thought1 otherwise the nominal significance is too remote from the real2 what is merely thought in connection with the picture becomes of most importance1 and interferes with what is perceived4 ,if even on the stage it is not right that the chief incident of the plot should take place behind the scenes 7as in ,french tragedies71 it is clearly a far greater fault in a picture4 ,historical subjects are distinctly disadvantageous only when they confine the painter to a field which has not been chosen for artistic but for other reasons1 and especially when this field is poor in picturesque and significant objects--if1 for example1 it is the history of a small1 isolated1 capricious1 hierarchical 7i4e41 ruled by error71 obscure people1 like the ,jews1 despised by the great contemporary nations of the ,east and the ,west4 ,since the wandering of the tribes lies between us and all ancient nations1 as the change of the bed of the ocean lies between the earth's surface as it is to-day and as it was when those organisations existed which we only know from fossil remains1 it is to be regarded generally as a great misfortune that the people whose culture was to be the principal basis of our own were not the ,indians or the ,greeks1 or even the ,romans1 but these very ,jews4 ,but it was especially a great misfortune for the ,italian painters of genius in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that1 in the narrow sphere to which they were arbitrarily driven for the choice of subjects1 they were obliged to have recourse to miserable beings of every kind4 ,for the ,new ,testament1 as regards its historical part1 is almost more unsuitable for painting than the ,old1 and the subsequent history of martyrs and doctors of the church is a very unfortunate subject4 ,yet of the pictures1 whose subject is the history or mythology of ,judaism and ,christianity1 we must carefully distinguish those in which the peculiar1 i4e41 the ethical spirit of ,christianity is revealed for perception1 by the representation of men who are full of this spirit4 ,these representations are in fact the highest and most admirable achievements of the art of painting2 and only the greatest masters of this art succeeded in this1 particularly ,raphael and ,correggio1 and especially in their earlier pictures4 ,pictures of this kind are not properly to be classed as historical3 for1 as a rule1 they represent no event1 no action2 but are merely groups of saints1 with the ,saviour himself1 often still a child1 with ,his mother1 angels1 c4 ,in their countenances1 and especially in the eyes1 we see the expression1 the reflection1 of the completest knowledge1 that which is not directed to particular things1 but has fully grasped the ,ideas1 and thus the whole nature of the world and life4 ,and this knowledge in them1 reacting upon the will1 does not1 like other knowledge1 convey motives to it1 but on the contrary has become a quieter of all will1 from which proceeded the complete resignation1 which is the innermost spirit of ,christianity1 as of the ,indian philosophy2 the surrender of all volition1 conversion1 the suppression of will1 and with it of the whole inner being of this world1 that is to say1 salvation4 ,thus these masters of art1 worthy of eternal praise1 expressed perceptibly in their works the highest wisdom4 ,and this is the summit of all art4 ,it has followed the will in its adequate objectivity1 the ,ideas1 through all its grades1 in which it is affected and its nature unfolded in so many ways1 first by causes1 then by stimuli1 and finally by motives4 ,and now art ends with the representation of the free self-suppression of will1 by means of the great peace which it gains from the perfect knowledge of its own nature47#ef7 #di4 ,the truth which lies at the foundation of all that we have hitherto said about art1 is that the object of art1 the representation of which is the aim of the artist1 and the knowledge of which must therefore precede his work as its germ and source1 is an ,idea in ,plato's sense1 and never anything else2 not the particular thing1 the object of common apprehension1 and not the concept1 the object of rational thought and of science4 ,although the ,idea and the concept have something in common1 because both represent as unity a multiplicity of real things2 yet the great difference between them has no doubt been made clear and evident enough by what we have said about concepts in the first book1 and about ,ideas in this book4 ,i by no means wish to assert1 however1 that ,plato really distinctly comprehended this difference2 indeed many of his examples of ,ideas1 and his discussions of them1 are applicable only to concepts4 ,meanwhile we leave this question alone and go on our own way1 glad when we come upon traces of any great and noble mind1 yet not following his footsteps but our own aim4 ,the concept is abstract1 discursive1 undetermined within its own sphere1 only determined by its limits1 attainable and comprehensible by him who has only reason1 communicable by words without any other assistance1 entirely exhausted by its definition4 ,the ,idea on the contrary1 although defined as the adequate representative of the concept1 is always object of perception1 and although representing an infinite number of particular things1 is yet thoroughly determined4 ,it is never known by the individual as such1 but only by him who has raised himself above all willing and all individuality to the pure subject of knowing4 ,thus it is only attainable by the man of genius1 and by him who1 for the most part through the assistance of the works of genius1 has reached an exalted frame of mind1 by increasing his power of pure knowing4 ,it is therefore not absolutely but only conditionally communicable1 because the ,idea1 comprehended and repeated in the work of art1 appeals to every one only according to the measure of his own intellectual worth4 ,so that just the most excellent works of every art1 the noblest productions of genius1 must always remain sealed books to the dull majority of men1 inaccessible to them1 separated from them by a wide gulf1 just as the society of princes is inaccessible to the common people4 ,it is true that even the dullest of them accept on authority recognisedly great works1 lest otherwise they should argue their own incompetence2 but they wait in silence1 always ready to express their condemnation1 as soon as they are allowed to hope that they may do so without being left to stand alone2 and then their long-restrained hatred against all that is great and beautiful1 and against the authors of it1 gladly relieves itself2 for such things never appealed to them1 and for that very reason were humiliating to them4 ,for as a rule a man must have worth in himself in order to recognise it and believe in it willingly and freely in others4 ,on this rests the necessity of modesty in all merit1 and the disproportionately loud praise of this virtue1 which alone of all its sisters is always included in the eulogy of every one who ventures to praise any distinguished man1 in order to appease and quiet the wrath of the unworthy4 ,what then is modesty but hypocritical humility1 by means of which1 in a world swelling with base envy1 a man seeks to obtain pardon for excellences and merits from those who have none8 ,for whoever attributes to himself no merits1 because he actually has none1 is not modest but merely honest4 ,the ,idea is the unity that falls into multiplicity on account of the temporal and spatial form of our intuitive apprehension2 the concept1 on the contrary1 is the unity reconstructed out of multiplicity by the abstraction of our reason2 the latter may be defined as unitas post rem1 the former as unitas ante rem4 ,finally1 we may express the distinction between the ,idea and the concept1 by a comparison1 thus3 the concept is like a dead receptacle1 in which1 whatever has been put1 actually lies side by side1 but out of which no more can be taken 7by analytical judgment7 than was put in 7by synthetical reflection72 the 7,platonic7 ,idea1 on the other hand1 develops1 in him who has comprehended it1 ideas which are new as regards the concept of the same name2 it resembles a living organism1 developing itself and possessed of the power of reproduction1 which brings forth what was not put into it4 ,it follows from all that has been said1 that the concept1 useful as it is in life1 and serviceable1 necessary and productive as it is in science1 is yet always barren and unfruitful in art4 ,the comprehended ,idea1 on the contrary1 is the true and only source of every work of art4 ,in its powerful originality it is only derived from life itself1 from nature1 from the world1 and that only by the true genius1 or by him whose momentary inspiration reaches the point of genius4 ,genuine and immortal works of art spring only from such direct apprehension4 ,just because the ,idea is and remains object of perception1 the artist is not conscious in the abstract of the intention and aim of his work2 not a concept1 but an ,idea floats before his mind2 therefore he can give no justification of what he does4 ,he works1 as people say1 from pure feeling1 and unconsciously1 indeed instinctively4 ,on the contrary1 imitators1 mannerists1 imitatores1 servum pecus1 start1 in art1 from the concept2 they observe what pleases and affects us in true works of art2 understand it clearly1 fix it in a concept1 and thus abstractly1 and then imitate it1 openly or disguisedly1 with dexterity and intentionally4 ,they suck their nourishment1 like parasite plants1 from the works of others1 and like polypi1 they become the colour of their food4 ,we might carry comparison further1 and say that they are like machines which mince fine and mingle together whatever is put into them1 but can never digest it1 so that the different constituent parts may always be found again if they are sought out and separated from the mixture2 the man of genius alone resembles the organised1 assimilating1 transforming and reproducing body4 ,for he is indeed educated and cultured by his predecessors and their works2 but he is really fructified only by life and the world directly1 through the impression of what he perceives2 therefore the highest culture never interferes with his originality4 ,all imitators1 all mannerists1 apprehend in concepts the nature of representative works of art2 but concepts can never impart inner life to a work4 ,the age1 i4e41 the dull multitude of every time1 knows only concepts1 and sticks to them1 and therefore receives mannered works of art with ready and loud applause3 but after a few years these works become insipid1 because the spirit of the age1 i4e41 the prevailing concepts1 in which alone they could take root1 have changed4 ,only true works of art1 which are drawn directly from nature and life1 have eternal youth and enduring power1 like nature and life themselves4 ,for they belong to no age1 but to humanity1 and as on that account they are coldly received by their own age1 to which they disdain to link themselves closely1 and because indirectly and negatively they expose the existing errors1 they are slowly and unwillingly recognised2 on the other hand1 they cannot grow old1 but appear to us ever fresh and new down to the latest ages4 ,then they are no longer exposed to neglect and ignorance1 for they are crowned and sanctioned by the praise of the few men capable of judging1 who appear singly and rarely in the course of ages17#eg7 and give in their votes1 whose slowly growing number constitutes the authority1 which alone is the judgment-seat we mean when we appeal to posterity4 ,it is these successively appearing individuals1 for the mass of posterity will always be and remain just as perverse and dull as the mass of contemporaries always was and always is4 ,we read the complaints of great men in every century about the customs of their age4 ,they always sound as if they referred to our own age1 for the race is always the same4 ,at every time and in every art1 mannerisms have taken the place of the spirit1 which was always the possession of a few individuals1 but mannerisms are just the old cast-off garments of the last manifestation of the spirit that existed and was recognised4 ,from all this it appears that1 as a rule1 the praise of posterity can only be gained at the cost of the praise of one's contemporaries1 and vice versa47#eh7 #ej4 ,if the aim of all art is the communication of the comprehended ,idea1 which through the mind of the artist appears in such a form that it is purged and isolated from all that is foreign to it1 and may now be grasped by the man of weaker comprehension and no productive faculty2 if further1 it is forbidden in art to start from the concept1 we shall not be able to consent to the intentional and avowed employment of a work of art for the expression of a concept2 this is the case in the ,allegory4 ,an allegory is a work of art which means something different from what it represents4 ,but the object of perception1 and consequently also the ,idea1 expresses itself directly and completely1 and does not require the medium of something else which implies or indicates it4 ,thus1 that which in this way is indicated and represented by something entirely different1 because it cannot itself be made object of perception1 is always a concept4 ,therefore through the allegory a conception has always to be signified1 and consequently the mind of the beholder has to be drawn away from the expressed perceptible idea to one which is entirely different1 abstract and not perceptible1 and which lies quite outside the work of art4 ,the picture or statue is intended to accomplish here what is accomplished far more fully by a book4 ,now1 what we hold is the end of art1 representation of a perceivable1 comprehensible ,idea1 is not here the end4 ,no great completeness in the work of art is demanded for what is aimed at here4 ,it is only necessary that we should see what the thing is meant to be1 for1 as soon as this has been discovered1 the end is reached1 and the mind is now led away to quite a different kind of idea to an abstract conception1 which is the end that was in view4 ,allegories in plastic and pictorial art are1 therefore1 nothing but hieroglyphics2 the artistic value which they may have as perceptible representations1 belongs to them not as allegories1 but otherwise4 ,that the 8,night0 of ,correggio1 the 8,genius of ,fame0 of ,hannibal ,caracci1 and the 8,hours0 of ,poussin1 are very beautiful pictures1 is to be separated altogether from the fact that they are allegories4 ,as allegories they do not accomplish more than a legend1 indeed rather less4 ,we are here again reminded of the distinction drawn above between the real and the nominal significance of a picture4 ,the nominal is here the allegorical as such1 for example1 the 8,genius of ,fame40 ,the real is what is actually represented1 in this case a beautiful winged youth1 surrounded by beautiful boys2 this expresses an ,idea4 ,but this real significance affects us only so long as we forget the nominal1 allegorical significance2 if we think of the latter1 we forsake the perception1 and the mind is occupied with an abstract conception2 but the transition from the ,idea to the conception is always a fall4 ,indeed1 that nominal significance1 that allegorical intention1 often injures the real significance1 the perceptible truth4 ,for example1 the unnatural light in the 8,night0 of ,correggio1 which1 though beautifully executed1 has yet a merely allegorical motive1 and is really impossible4 ,if then an allegorical picture has artistic value1 it is quite separate from and independent of what it accomplishes as allegory4 ,such a work of art serves two ends at once1 the expression of a conception and the expression of an ,idea4 ,only the latter can be an end of art2 the other is a foreign end1 the trifling amusement of making a picture also do service as a legend1 as a hieroglyphic1 invented for the pleasure of those to whom the true nature of art can never appeal4 ,it is the same thing as when a work of art is also a useful implement of some kind1 in which case it also serves two ends2 for example1 a statue which is at the same time a candelabrum or a caryatide2 or a bas-relief1 which is also the shield of ,achilles4 ,true lovers of art will allow neither the one nor the other4 ,it is true that an allegorical picture may1 because of this quality1 produce a vivid impression upon the feelings2 but when this is the case1 a legend would under the same circumstances produce the same effect4 ,for example1 if the desire of fame were firmly and lastingly rooted in the heart of a man1 because he regarded it as his rightful possession1 which is only withheld from him so long as he has not produced the charter of his ownership2 and if the ,genius of ,fame1 with his laurel crown1 were to appear to such a man1 his whole mind would be excited1 and his powers called into activity2 but the same effect would be produced if he were suddenly to see the word 8fame10 in large distinct letters on the wall4 ,or if a man has made known a truth1 which is of importance either as a maxim for practical life1 or as insight for science1 but it has not been believed2 an allegorical picture representing time as it lifts the veil1 and discloses the naked figure of ,truth1 will affect him powerfully2 but the same effect would be produced by the legend3 8,le temps dcouvre la vrit40 ,for what really produces the effect here is the abstract thought1 not the object of perception4 ,if then1 in accordance with what has been said1 allegory in plastic and pictorial art is a mistaken effort1 serving an end which is entirely foreign to art1 it becomes quite unbearable when it leads so far astray that the representation of forced and violently introduced subtilties degenerates into absurdity4 ,such1 for example1 is a tortoise1 to represent feminine seclusion2 the downward glance of ,nemesis into the drapery of her bosom1 signifying that she can see into what is hidden2 the explanation of ,bellori that ,hannibal ,carracci represents voluptuousness clothed in a yellow robe1 because he wishes to indicate that her lovers soon fade and become yellow as straw4 ,if there is absolutely no connection between the representation and the conception signified by it1 founded on subsumption under the concept1 or association of ,ideas2 but the signs and the things signified are combined in a purely conventional manner1 by positive1 accidentally introduced laws2 then ,i call this degenerate kind of allegory ,symbolism4 ,thus the rose is the symbol of secrecy1 the laurel is the symbol of fame1 the palm is the symbol of peace1 the scallop-shell is the symbol of pilgrimage1 the cross is the symbol of the ,christian religion4 ,to this class also belongs all significance of mere colour1 as yellow is the colour of falseness1 and blue is the colour of fidelity4 ,such symbols may often be of use in life1 but their value is foreign to art4 ,they are simply to be regarded as hieroglyphics1 or like ,chinese word-writing1 and really belong to the same class as armorial bearings1 the bush that indicates a public-house1 the key of the chamberlain1 or the leather of the mountaineer4 ,if1 finally1 certain historical or mythical persons1 or personified conceptions1 are represented by certain fixed symbols1 these are properly called emblems4 ,such are the beasts of the ,evangelist1 the owl of ,minerva1 the apple of ,paris1 the ,anchor of ,hope1 c4 ,for the most part1 however1 we understand by emblems those simple allegorical representations explained by a motto1 which are meant to express a moral truth1 and of which large collections have been made by ,j4 ,camerarius1 ,alciatus1 and others4 ,they form the transition to poetical allegory1 of which we shall have more to say later4 ,greek sculpture devotes itself to the perception1 and therefore it is sthetical2 ,indian sculpture devotes itself to the conception1 and therefore it is merely symbolical4 ,this conclusion in regard to allegory1 which is founded on our consideration of the nature of art and quite consistent with it1 is directly opposed to the opinion of ,winckelmann1 who1 far from explaining allegory1 as we do1 as something quite foreign to the end of art1 and often interfering with it1 always speaks in favour of it1 and indeed 7,works1 vol4 i4 p4 #ee7 places the highest aim of art in the 8representation of universal conceptions1 and non-sensuous things40 ,we leave it to every one to adhere to whichever view he pleases4 ,only the truth became very clear to me from these and similar views of ,winckelmann connected with his peculiar metaphysic of the beautiful1 that one may have the greatest susceptibility for artistic beauty1 and the soundest judgment in regard to it1 without being able to give an abstract and strictly philosophical justification of the nature of the beautiful2 just as one may be very noble and virtuous1 and may have a tender conscience1 which decides with perfect accuracy in particular cases1 without on that account being in a position to investigate and explain in the abstract the ethical significance of action4 ,allegory has an entirely different relation to poetry from that which it has to plastic and pictorial art1 and although it is to be rejected in the latter1 it is not only permissible1 but very serviceable to the former4 ,for in plastic and pictorial art it leads away from what is perceptibly given1 the proper object of all art1 to abstract thoughts2 but in poetry the relation is reversed2 for here what is directly given in words is the concept1 and the first aim is to lead from this to the object of perception1 the representation of which must be undertaken by the imagination of the hearer4 ,if in plastic and pictorial art we are led from what is immediately given to something else1 this must always be a conception1 because here only the abstract cannot be given directly2 but a conception must never be the source1 and its communication must never be the end of a work of art4 ,in poetry1 on the contrary1 the conception is the material1 the immediately given1 and therefore we may very well leave it1 in order to call up perceptions which are quite different1 and in which the end is reached4 ,many a conception or abstract thought may be quite indispensable to the connection of a poem1 which is yet1 in itself and directly1 quite incapable of being perceived2 and then it is often made perceptible by means of some example which is subsumed under it4 ,this takes place in every trope1 every metaphor1 simile1 parable1 and allegory1 all of which differ only in the length and completeness of their expression4 ,therefore1 in the arts which employ language as their medium1 similes and allegories are of striking effect4 ,how beautifully ,cervantes says of sleep in order to express the fact that it frees us from all spiritual and bodily suffering1 8,it is a mantle that covers all mankind40 ,how beautifully ,kleist expresses allegorically the thought that philosophers and men of science enlighten mankind1 in the line1 8,those whose midnight lamp lights the world40 ,how strongly and sensuously ,homer describes the harmful ,ate when he says3 8,she has tender feet1 for she walks not on the hard earth1 but treads on the heads of men0 7,il4 xix4 #ia47 ,how forcibly we are struck by ,menenius ,agrippa's fable of the belly and the limbs1 addressed to the people of ,rome when they seceded4 ,how beautifully ,plato's figure of the ,cave1 at the beginning of the seventh book of the 8,republic0 to which we have already referred1 expresses a very abstract philosophical dogma4 ,the fable of ,persephone is also to be regarded as a deeply significant allegory of philosophical tendency1 for she became subject to the nether world by tasting a pomegranate4 ,this becomes peculiarly enlightening from ,goethe's treatment of the fable1 as an episode in the ,triumph der ,empfindsamkeit1 which is beyond all praise4 ,three detailed allegorical works are known to me1 one1 open and avowed1 is the incomparable 8,criticon0 of ,balthasar ,gracian4 ,it consists of a great rich web of connected and highly ingenious allegories1 that serve here as the fair clothing of moral truths1 to which he thus imparts the most perceptible form1 and astonishes us by the richness of his invention4 ,the two others are concealed allegories1 8,don ,quixote0 and 8,gulliver's ,travels40 ,the first is an allegory of the life of every man1 who will not1 like others1 be careful1 merely for his own welfare1 but follows some objective1 ideal end1 which has taken possession of his thoughts and will2 and certainly1 in this world1 he has then a strange appearance4 ,in the case of ,gulliver we have only to take everything physical as spiritual or intellectual1 in order to see what the 8satirical rogue10 as ,hamlet would call him1 meant by it4 ,such1 then1 in the poetical allegory1 the conception is always the given1 which it tries to make perceptible by means of a picture2 it may sometimes be expressed or assisted by a painted picture4 ,such a picture will not be regarded as a work of art1 but only as a significant symbol1 and it makes no claim to pictorial1 but only to poetical worth4 ,such is that beautiful allegorical vignette of ,lavater's1 which must be so heartening to every defender of truth3 a hand holding a light is stung by a wasp1 while gnats are burning themselves in the flame above2 underneath is the motto3 8,and although it singes the wings of the gnats1 ,destroys their heads and all their little brains1 ,light is still light2 ,and although ,i am stung by the angriest wasp1 ,i will not let it go40 ,to this class also belongs the gravestone with the burnt-out1 smoking candle1 and the inscription-- 8,when it is out1 it becomes clear ,whether the candle was tallow or wax40 ,finally1 of this kind is an old ,german genealogical tree1 in which the last representative of a very ancient family thus expresses his determination to live his life to the end in abstinence and perfect chastity1 and therefore to let his race die out2 he represents himself at the root of the high-branching tree cutting it over himself with shears4 ,in general all those symbols referred to above1 commonly called emblems1 which might also be defined as short painted fables with obvious morals1 belong to this class4 ,allegories of this kind are always to be regarded as belonging to poetry1 not to painting1 and as justified thereby2 moreover1 the pictorial execution is here always a matter of secondary importance1 and no more is demanded of it than that it shall represent the thing so that we can recognise it4 ,but in poetry1 as in plastic art1 the allegory passes into the symbol if there is merely an arbitrary connection between what it presented to perception and the abstract significance of it4 ,for as all symbolism rests1 at bottom1 on an agreement1 the symbol has this among other disadvantages1 that in time its meaning is forgotten1 and then it is dumb4 ,who would guess why the fish is a symbol of ,christianity if he did not know8 ,only a ,champollion2 for it is entirely a phonetic hieroglyphic4 ,therefore1 as a poetical allegory1 the ,revelation of ,john stands much in the same position as the reliefs with ,magnus ,deus sol ,mithra1 which are still constantly being explained4 #ea4 ,if now1 with the exposition which has been given of art in general1 we turn from plastic and pictorial art to poetry1 we shall have no doubt that its aim also is the revelation of the ,ideas1 the grades of the objectification of will1 and the communication of them to the hearer with the distinctness and vividness with which the poetical sense comprehends them4 ,ideas are essentially perceptible2 if1 therefore1 in poetry only abstract conceptions are directly communicated through words1 it is yet clearly the intention to make the hearer perceive the ,ideas of life in the representatives of these conceptions1 and this can only take place through the assistance of his own imagination4 ,but in order to set the imagination to work for the accomplishment of this end1 the abstract conceptions1 which are the immediate material of poetry as of dry prose1 must be so arranged that their spheres intersect each other in such a way that none of them can remain in its abstract universality2 but1 instead of it1 a perceptible representative appears to the imagination2 and this is always further modified by the words of the poet according to what his intention may be4 ,as the chemist obtains solid precipitates by combining perfectly clear and transparent fluids2 the poet understands how to precipitate1 as it were1 the concrete1 the individual1 the perceptible idea1 out of the abstract and transparent universality of the concepts by the manner in which he combines them4 ,for the ,idea can only be known by perception2 and knowledge of the ,idea is the end of art4 ,the skill of a master1 in poetry as in chemistry1 enables us always to obtain the precise precipitate we intended4 ,this end is assisted by the numerous epithets in poetry1 by means of which the universality of every concept is narrowed more and more till we reach the perceptible4 ,homer attaches to almost every substantive an adjective1 whose concept intersects and considerably diminishes the sphere of the concept of the substantive1 which is thus brought so much the nearer to perception3 for example-- 8 1 40 78,occidit vero in ,oceanum splendidum lumen solis1 ,trahens noctem nigram super almam terram407 ,and-- 8,where gentle winds from the blue heavens sigh1 ,there stand the myrtles still1 the laurel high10-- calls up before the imagination by means of a few concepts the whole delight of a southern clime4 ,rhythm and rhyme are quite peculiar aids to poetry4 ,i can give no other explanation of their incredibly powerful effect than that our faculties of perception have received from time1 to which they are essentially bound1 some quality on account of which we inwardly follow1 and1 as it were1 consent to each regularly recurring sound4 ,in this way rhythm and rhyme are partly a means of holding our attention1 because we willingly follow the poem read1 and partly they produce in us a blind consent to what is read prior to any judgment1 and this gives the poem a certain emphatic power of convincing independent of all reasons4 ,from the general nature of the material1 that is1 the concepts1 which poetry uses to communicate the ,ideas1 the extent of its province is very great4 ,the whole of nature1 the ,ideas of all grades1 can be represented by means of it1 for it proceeds according to the ,idea it has to impart1 so that its representations are sometimes descriptive1 sometimes narrative1 and sometimes directly dramatic4 ,if1 in the representation of the lower grades of the objectivity of will1 plastic and pictorial art generally surpass it1 because lifeless nature1 and even brute nature1 reveals almost its whole being in a single well-chosen moment2 man1 on the contrary1 so far as he does not express himself by the mere form and expression of his person1 but through a series of actions and the accompanying thoughts and emotions1 is the principal object of poetry1 in which no other art can compete with it1 for here the progress or movement which cannot be represented in plastic or pictorial art just suits its purpose4 ,the revelation of the ,idea1 which is the highest grade of the objectivity of will1 the representation of man in the connected series of his efforts and actions1 is thus the great problem of poetry4 ,it is true that both experience and history teach us to know man2 yet oftener men than man1 i4e41 they give us empirical notes of the behaviour of men to each other1 from which we may frame rules for our own conduct1 oftener than they afford us deep glimpses of the inner nature of man4 ,the latter function1 however1 is by no means entirely denied them2 but as often as it is the nature of mankind itself that discloses itself to us in history or in our own experience1 we have comprehended our experience1 and the historian has comprehended history1 with artistic eyes1 poetically1 i4e41 according to the ,idea1 not the phenomenon1 in its inner nature1 not in its relations4 ,our own experience is the indispensable condition of understanding poetry as of understanding history2 for it is1 so to speak1 the dictionary of the language that both speak4 ,but history is related to poetry as portrait-painting is related to historical painting2 the one gives us the true in the individual1 the other the true in the universal2 the one has the truth of the phenomenon1 and can therefore verify it from the phenomenal1 the other has the truth of the ,idea1 which can be found in no particular phenomenon1 but yet speaks to us from them all4 ,the poet from deliberate choice represents significant characters in significant situations2 the historian takes both as they come4 ,indeed1 he must regard and select the circumstances and the persons1 not with reference to their inward and true significance1 which expresses the ,idea1 but according to the outward1 apparent1 and relatively important significance with regard to the connection and the consequences4 ,he must consider nothing in and for itself in its essential character and expression1 but must look at everything in its relations1 in its connection1 in its influence upon what follows1 and especially upon its own age4 ,therefore he will not overlook an action of a king1 though of little significance1 and in itself quite common1 because it has results and influence4 ,and1 on the other hand1 actions of the highest significance of particular and very eminent individuals are not to be recorded by him if they have no consequences4 ,for his treatment follows the principle of sufficient reason1 and apprehends the phenomenon1 of which this principle is the form4 ,but the poet comprehends the ,idea1 the inner nature of man apart from all relations1 outside all time1 the adequate objectivity of the thing-in-itself1 at its highest grade4 ,even in that method of treatment which is necessary for the historian1 the inner nature and significance of the phenomena1 the kernel of all these shells1 can never be entirely lost4 ,he who seeks for it1 at any rate1 may find it and recognise it4 ,yet that which is significant in itself1 not in its relations1 the real unfolding of the ,idea1 will be found far more accurately and distinctly in poetry than in history1 and1 therefore1 however paradoxical it may sound1 far more really genuine inner truth is to be attributed to poetry than to history4 ,for the historian must accurately follow the particular event according to life1 as it develops itself in time in the manifold tangled chains of causes and effects4 ,it is1 however1 impossible that he can have all the data for this2 he cannot have seen all and discovered all4 ,he is forsaken at every moment by the original of his picture1 or a false one substitutes itself for it1 and this so constantly that ,i think ,i may assume that in all history the false outweighs the true4 ,the poet1 on the contrary1 has comprehended the ,idea of man from some definite side which is to be represented2 thus it is the nature of his own self that objectifies itself in it for him4 ,his knowledge1 as we explained above when speaking of sculpture1 is half a priori2 his ideal stands before his mind firm1 distinct1 brightly illuminated1 and cannot forsake him2 therefore he shows us1 in the mirror of his mind1 the ,idea pure and distinct1 and his delineation of it down to the minutest particular is true as life itself47#ei7 ,the great ancient historians are1 therefore1 in those particulars in which their data fail them1 for example1 in the speeches of their heroes--poets2 indeed their whole manner of handling their material approaches to the epic4 ,but this gives their representations unity1 and enables them to retain inner truth1 even when outward truth was not accessible1 or indeed was falsified4 ,and as we compared history to portrait-painting1 in contradistinction to poetry1 which corresponds to historical painting1 we find that ,winckelmann's maxim1 that the portrait ought to be the ideal of the individual1 was followed by the ancient historians1 for they represent the individual in such a way as to bring out that side of the ,idea of man which is expressed in it4 ,modern historians1 on the contrary1 with few exceptions1 give us in general only 8a dust-bin and a lumber-room1 and at the most a chronicle of the principal political events40 ,therefore1 whoever desires to know man in his inner nature1 identical in all its phenomena and developments1 to know him according to the ,idea1 will find that the works of the great1 immortal poet present a far truer1 more distinct picture1 than the historians can ever give4 ,for even the best of the historians are1 as poets1 far from the first2 and moreover their hands are tied4 ,in this aspect the relation between the historian and the poet may be illustrated by the following comparison4 ,the mere1 pure historian1 who works only according to data1 is like a man1 who without any knowledge of mathematics1 has investigated the relations of certain figures1 which he has accidentally found1 by measuring them2 and the problem thus empirically solved is affected of course by all the errors of the drawn figure4 ,the poet1 on the other hand1 is like the mathematician1 who constructs these relations a priori in pure perception1 and expresses them not as they actually are in the drawn figure1 but as they are in the ,idea1 which the drawing is intended to render for the senses4 ,therefore ,schiller says3-- 8,what has never anywhere come to pass1 ,that alone never grows old40 ,indeed ,i must attribute greater value to biographies1 and especially to autobiographies1 in relation to the knowledge of the nature of man1 than to history proper1 at least as it is commonly handled4 ,partly because in the former the data can be collected more accurately and completely than in the latter2 partly1 because in history proper1 it is not so much men as nations and heroes that act1 and the individuals who do appear1 seem so far off1 surrounded with such pomp and circumstance1 clothed in the stiff robes of state1 or heavy1 inflexible armour1 that it is really hard through all this to recognise the human movements4 ,on the other hand1 the life of the individual when described with truth1 in a narrow sphere1 shows the conduct of men in all its forms and subtilties1 the excellence1 the virtue1 and even holiness of a few1 the perversity1 meanness1 and knavery of most1 the dissolute profligacy of some4 ,besides1 in the only aspect we are considering here1 that of the inner significance of the phenomenal1 it is quite the same whether the objects with which the action is concerned1 are1 relatively considered1 trifling or important1 farm-houses or kingdoms3 for all these things in themselves are without significance1 and obtain it only in so far as the will is moved by them4 ,the motive has significance only through its relation to the will1 while the relation which it has as a thing to other things like itself1 does not concern us here4 ,as a circle of one inch in diameter1 and a circle of forty million miles in diameter1 have precisely the same geometrical properties1 so are the events and the history of a village and a kingdom essentially the same2 and we may study and learn to know mankind as well in the one as in the other4 ,it is also a mistake to suppose that autobiographies are full of deceit and dissimulation4 ,on the contrary1 lying 7though always possible7 is perhaps more difficult there than elsewhere4 ,dissimulation is easiest in mere conversation2 indeed1 though it may sound paradoxical1 it is really more difficult even in a letter4 ,for in the case of a letter the writer is alone1 and looks into himself1 and not out on the world1 so that what is strange and distant does not easily approach him2 and he has not the test of the impression made upon another before his eyes4 ,but the receiver of the letter peruses it quietly in a mood unknown to the writer1 reads it repeatedly and at different times1 and thus easily finds out the concealed intention4 ,we also get to know an author as a man most easily from his books1 because all these circumstances act here still more strongly and permanently4 ,and in an autobiography it is so difficult to dissimulate1 that perhaps there does not exist a single one that is not1 as a whole1 more true1 than any history that ever was written4 ,the man who writes his own life surveys it as a whole1 the particular becomes small1 the near becomes distant1 the distant becomes near again1 the motives that influenced him shrink2 he seats himself at the confessional1 and has done so of his own free will2 the spirit of lying does not so easily take hold of him here1 for there is also in every man an inclination to truth which has first to be overcome whenever he lies1 and which here has taken up a specially strong position4 ,the relation between biography and the history of nations may be made clear for perception by means of the following comparison3 ,history shows us mankind as a view from a high mountain shows us nature2 we see much at a time1 wide stretches1 great masses1 but nothing is distinct nor recognisable in all the details of its own peculiar nature4 ,on the other hand1 the representation of the life of the individual shows us the man1 as we see nature if we go about among her trees1 plants1 rocks1 and waters4 ,but in landscape-painting1 in which the artist lets us look at nature with his eyes1 the knowledge of the ,ideas1 and the condition of pure will-less knowing1 which is demanded by these1 is made much easier for us2 and1 in the same way1 poetry is far superior both to history and biography1 in the representation of the ,ideas which may be looked for in all three4 ,for here also genius holds up to us the magic glass1 in which all that is essential and significant appears before us collected and placed in the clearest light1 and what is accidental and foreign is left out47#fj7 ,the representation of the ,idea of man1 which is the work of the poet1 may be performed1 so that what is represented is also the representer4 ,this is the case in lyrical poetry1 in songs1 properly so called1 in which the poet only perceives vividly his own state and describes it4 ,thus a certain subjectivity is essential to this kind of poetry from the nature of its object4 ,again1 what is to be represented may be entirely different from him who represents it1 as is the case in all other kinds of poetry1 in which the poet more or less conceals himself behind his representation1 and at last disappears altogether4 ,in the ballad the poet still expresses to some extent his own state through the tone and proportion of the whole2 therefore1 though much more objective than the lyric1 it has yet something subjective4 ,this becomes less in the idyll1 still less in the romantic poem1 almost entirely disappears in the true epic1 and even to the last vestige in the drama1 which is the most objective and1 in more than one respect1 the completest and most difficult form of poetry4 ,the lyrical form of poetry is consequently the easiest1 and although art1 as a whole1 belongs only to the true man of genius1 who so rarely appears1 even a man who is not in general very remarkable may produce a beautiful song if1 by actual strong excitement from without1 some inspiration raises his mental powers2 for all that is required for this is a lively perception of his own state at a moment of emotional excitement4 ,this is proved by the existence of many single songs by individuals who have otherwise remained unknown2 especially the ,german national songs1 of which we have an exquisite collection in the 8,wunderhorn20 and also by innumerable love-songs and other songs of the people in all languages2--for to seize the mood of a moment and embody it in a song is the whole achievement of this kind of poetry4 ,yet in the lyrics of true poets the inner nature of all mankind is reflected1 and all that millions of past1 present1 and future men have found1 or will find1 in the same situations1 which are constantly recurring1 finds its exact expression in them4 ,and because these situations1 by constant recurrence1 are permanent as man himself and always call up the same sensations1 the lyrical productions of genuine poets remain through thousands of years true1 powerful1 and fresh4 ,but if the poet is always the universal man1 then all that has ever moved a human heart1 all that human nature in any situation has ever produced from itself1 all that dwells and broods in any human breast--is his theme and his material1 and also all the rest of nature4 ,therefore the poet may just as well sing of voluptuousness as of mysticism1 be ,anacreon or ,angelus ,silesius1 write tragedies or comedies1 represent the sublime or the common mind--according to humour or vocation4 ,and no one has the right to prescribe to the poet what he ought to be--noble and sublime1 moral1 pious1 ,christian1 one thing or another1 still less to reproach him because he is one thing and not another4 ,he is the mirror of mankind1 and brings to its consciousness what it feels and does4 ,if we now consider more closely the nature of the lyric proper1 and select as examples exquisite and pure models1 not those that approach in any way to some other form of poetry1 such as the ballad1 the elegy1 the hymn1 the epigram1 c41 we shall find that the peculiar nature of the lyric1 in the narrowest sense1 is this3 ,it is the subject of will1 i4e41 his own volition1 which the consciousness of the singer feels2 often as a released and satisfied desire 7joy71 but still oftener as a restricted desire 7grief71 always as an emotion1 a passion1 a moved frame of mind4 ,besides this1 however1 and along with it1 by the sight of surrounding nature1 the singer becomes conscious of himself as the subject of pure1 will-less knowing1 whose unbroken blissful peace now appears1 in contrast to the stress of desire which is always restricted and always needy4 ,the feeling of this contrast1 this alternation1 is really what the lyric as a whole expresses1 and what principally constitutes the lyrical state of mind4 ,in it pure knowing comes to us1 as it were1 to deliver us from desire and its stain2 we follow1 but only for an instant2 desire1 the remembrance of our own personal ends1 tears us anew from peaceful contemplation2 yet ever again the next beautiful surrounding in which the pure will-less knowledge presents itself to us1 allures us away from desire4 ,therefore1 in the lyric and the lyrical mood1 desire 7the personal interest of the ends71 and pure perception of the surrounding presented1 are wonderfully mingled with each other2 connections between them are sought for and imagined2 the subjective disposition1 the affection of the will1 imparts its own hue to the perceived surrounding1 and conversely1 the surroundings communicate the reflex of their colour to the will4 ,the true lyric is the expression of the whole of this mingled and divided state of mind4 ,in order to make clear by examples this abstract analysis of a frame of mind that is very far from all abstraction1 any of the immortal songs of ,goethe may be taken4 ,as specially adapted for this end ,i shall recommend only a few3 8,the ,shepherd's ,lament10 8,welcome and ,farewell10 8,to the ,moon10 8,on the ,lake10 8,autumn20 also the songs in the 8,wunderhorn0 are excellent examples2 particularly the one which begins1 8,o ,bremen1 ,i must now leave thee40 ,as a comical and happy parody of the lyrical character a song of ,voss strikes me as remarkable4 ,it describes the feeling of a drunk plumber falling from a tower1 who observes in passing that the clock on the tower is at half-past eleven1 a remark which is quite foreign to his condition1 and thus belongs to knowledge free from will4 ,whoever accepts the view that has been expressed of the lyrical frame of mind1 will also allow1 that it is the sensuous and poetical knowledge of the principle which ,i established in my essay on the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason1 and have also referred to in this work1 that the identity of the subject of knowing with that of willing may be called the miracle 2 so that the poetical effect of the lyric rests finally on the truth of that principle4 ,in the course of life these two subjects1 or1 in popular language1 head and heart1 are ever becoming further apart2 men are always separating more between their subjective feeling and their objective knowledge4 ,in the child the two are still entirely blended together2 it scarcely knows how to distinguish itself from its surroundings1 it is at one with them4 ,in the young man all perception chiefly affects feeling and mood1 and even mingles with it1 as ,byron very beautifully expresses-- 8,i live not in myself1 but ,i become ,portion of that around me2 and to me ,high mountains are a feeling40 ,this is why the youth clings so closely to the perceptible and outward side of things2 this is why he is only fit for lyrical poetry1 and only the full-grown man is capable of the drama4 ,the old man we can think of as at the most an epic poet1 like ,ossian1 and ,homer1 for narration is characteristic of old age4 ,in the more objective kinds of poetry1 especially in the romance1 the epic1 and the drama1 the end1 the revelation of the ,idea of man1 is principally attained by two means1 by true and profound representation of significant characters1 and by the invention of pregnant situations in which they disclose themselves4 ,for as it is incumbent upon the chemist not only to exhibit the simple elements1 pure and genuine1 and their principal compounds1 but also to expose them to the influence of such reagents as will clearly and strikingly bring out their peculiar qualities1 so is it incumbent on the poet not only to present to us significant characters truly and faithfully as nature itself2 but1 in order that we may get to know them1 he must place them in those situations in which their peculiar qualities will fully unfold themselves1 and appear distinctly in sharp outline2 situations which are therefore called significant4 ,in real life1 and in history1 situations of this kind are rarely brought about by chance1 and they stand alone1 lost and concealed in the multitude of those which are insignificant4 ,the complete significance of the situations ought to distinguish the romance1 the epic1 and the drama from real life as completely as the arrangement and selection of significant characters4 ,in both1 however1 absolute truth is a necessary condition of their effect1 and want of unity in the characters1 contradiction either of themselves or of the nature of humanity in general1 as well as impossibility1 or very great improbability in the events1 even in mere accessories1 offend just as much in poetry as badly drawn figures1 false perspective1 or wrong lighting in painting4 ,for both in poetry and painting we demand the faithful mirror of life1 of man1 of the world1 only made more clear by the representation1 and more significant by the arrangement4 ,for there is only one end of all the arts1 the representation of the ,ideas2 and their essential difference lies simply in the different grades of the objectification of will to which the ,ideas that are to be represented belong4 ,this also determines the material of the representation4 ,thus the arts which are most widely separated may yet throw light on each other4 ,for example1 in order to comprehend fully the ,ideas of water it is not sufficient to see it in the quiet pond or in the evenly-flowing stream2 but these ,ideas disclose themselves fully only when the water appears under all circumstances and exposed to all kinds of obstacles4 ,the effects of the varied circumstances and obstacles give it the opportunity of fully exhibiting all its qualities4 ,this is why we find it beautiful when it tumbles1 rushes1 and foams1 or leaps into the air1 or falls in a cataract of spray2 or1 lastly1 if artificially confined it springs up in a fountain4 ,thus showing itself different under different circumstances1 it yet always faithfully asserts its character2 it is just as natural to it to spout up as to lie in glassy stillness2 it is as ready for the one as for the other as soon as the circumstances appear4 ,now1 what the engineer achieves with the fluid matter of water1 the architect achieves with the rigid matter of stone1 and just this the epic or dramatic poet achieves with the ,idea of man4 ,unfolding and rendering distinct the ,idea expressing itself in the object of every art1 the ,idea of the will which objectifies itself at each grade1 is the common end of all the arts4 ,the life of man1 as it shows itself for the most part in the real world1 is like the water1 as it is generally seen in the pond and the river2 but in the epic1 the romance1 the tragedy1 selected characters are placed in those circumstances in which all their special qualities unfold themselves1 the depths of the human heart are revealed1 and become visible in extraordinary and very significant actions4 ,thus poetry objectifies the ,idea of man1 an ,idea which has the peculiarity of expressing itself in highly individual characters4 ,tragedy is to be regarded1 and is recognised as the summit of poetical art1 both on account of the greatness of its effect and the difficulty of its achievement4 ,it is very significant for our whole system1 and well worthy of observation1 that the end of this highest poetical achievement is the representation of the terrible side of life4 ,the unspeakable pain1 the wail of humanity1 the triumph of evil1 the scornful mastery of chance1 and the irretrievable fall of the just and innocent1 is here presented to us2 and in this lies a significant hint of the nature of the world and of existence4 ,it is the strife of will with itself1 which here1 completely unfolded at the highest grade of its objectivity1 comes into fearful prominence4 ,it becomes visible in the suffering of men1 which is now introduced1 partly through chance and error1 which appear as the rulers of the world1 personified as fate1 on account of their insidiousness1 which even reaches the appearance of design2 partly it proceeds from man himself1 through the self-mortifying efforts of a few1 through the wickedness and perversity of most4 ,it is one and the same will that lives and appears in them all1 but whose phenomena fight against each other and destroy each other4 ,in one individual it appears powerfully1 in another more weakly2 in one more subject to reason1 and softened by the light of knowledge1 in another less so1 till at last1 in some single case1 this knowledge1 purified and heightened by suffering itself1 reaches the point at which the phenomenon1 the veil of ,mya1 no longer deceives it4 ,it sees through the form of the phenomenon1 the principium individuationis4 ,the egoism which rests on this perishes with it1 so that now the motives that were so powerful before have lost their might1 and instead of them the complete knowledge of the nature of the world1 which has a quieting effect on the will1 produces resignation1 the surrender not merely of life1 but of the very will to live4 ,thus we see in tragedies the noblest men1 after long conflict and suffering1 at last renounce the ends they have so keenly followed1 and all the pleasures of life for ever1 or else freely and joyfully surrender life itself4 ,so is it with the steadfast prince of ,calderon2 with ,gretchen in 8,faust20 with ,hamlet1 whom his friend ,horatio would willingly follow1 but is bade remain a while1 and in this harsh world draw his breath in pain1 to tell the story of ,hamlet1 and clear his memory2 so also is it with the ,maid of ,orleans1 the ,bride of ,messina2 they all die purified by suffering1 i4e41 after the will to live which was formerly in them is dead4 ,in the 8,mohammed0 of ,voltaire this is actually expressed in the concluding words which the dying ,palmira addresses to ,mohammad3 8,the world is for tyrants3 live60 ,on the other hand1 the demand for so-called poetical justice rests on entire misconception of the nature of tragedy1 and1 indeed1 of the nature of the world itself4 ,it boldly appears in all its dulness in the criticisms which ,dr4 ,samuel ,johnson made on particular plays of ,shakespeare1 for he very navely laments its entire absence4 ,and its absence is certainly obvious1 for in what has ,ophelia1 ,desdemona1 or ,cordelia offended8 ,but only the dull1 optimistic1 ,protestant-rationalistic1 or peculiarly ,jewish view of life will make the demand for poetical justice1 and find satisfaction in it4 ,the true sense of tragedy is the deeper insight1 that it is not his own individual sins that the hero atones for1 but original sin1 i4e41 the crime of existence itself3 8,pues el delito mayor ,del hombre es haber nacido20 78,for the greatest crime of man ,is that he was born207 as ,calderon exactly expresses it4 ,i shall allow myself only one remark1 more closely concerning the treatment of tragedy4 ,the representation of a great misfortune is alone essential to tragedy4 ,but the many different ways in which this is introduced by the poet may be brought under three specific conceptions4 ,it may happen by means of a character of extraordinary wickedness1 touching the utmost limits of possibility1 who becomes the author of the misfortune2 examples of this kind are ,richard ,,iii41 ,iago in 8,othello10 ,shylock in 8,the ,merchant of ,venice10 ,franz ,moor1 ,phdra of ,euripides1 ,creon in the 8,antigone10 c41 c4 ,secondly1 it may happen through blind fate1 i4e41 chance and error2 a true pattern of this kind is the dipus ,rex of ,sophocles1 the 8,trachini0 also2 and in general most of the tragedies of the ancients belong to this class4 ,among modern tragedies1 8,romeo and ,juliet10 8,tancred0 by ,voltaire1 and 8,the ,bride of ,messina10 are examples4 ,lastly1 the misfortune may be brought about by the mere position of the dramatis person with regard to each other1 through their relations2 so that there is no need either for a tremendous error or an unheard-of accident1 nor yet for a character whose wickedness reaches the limits of human possibility2 but characters of ordinary morality1 under circumstances such as often occur1 are so situated with regard to each other that their position compels them1 knowingly and with their eyes open1 to do each other the greatest injury1 without any one of them being entirely in the wrong4 ,this last kind of tragedy seems to me far to surpass the other two1 for it shows us the greatest misfortune1 not as an exception1 not as something occasioned by rare circumstances or monstrous characters1 but as arising easily and of itself out of the actions and characters of men1 indeed almost as essential to them1 and thus brings it terribly near to us4 ,in the other two kinds we may look on the prodigious fate and the horrible wickedness as terrible powers which certainly threaten us1 but only from afar1 which we may very well escape without taking refuge in renunciation4 ,but in the last kind of tragedy we see that those powers which destroy happiness and life are such that their path to us also is open at every moment2 we see the greatest sufferings brought about by entanglements that our fate might also partake of1 and through actions that perhaps we also are capable of performing1 and so could not complain of injustice2 then shuddering we feel ourselves already in the midst of hell4 ,this last kind of tragedy is also the most difficult of achievement2 for the greatest effect has to be produced in it with the least use of means and causes of movement1 merely through the position and distribution of the characters2 therefore even in many of the best tragedies this difficulty is evaded4 ,yet one tragedy may be referred to as a perfect model of this kind1 a tragedy which in other respects is far surpassed by more than one work of the same great master2 it is 8,clavigo40 8,hamlet0 belongs to a certain extent to this class1 as far as the relation of ,hamlet to ,laertes and ,ophelia is concerned4 8,wallenstein0 has also this excellence4 8,faust0 belongs entirely to this class1 if we regard the events connected with ,gretchen and her brother as the principal action2 also the 8,cid0 of ,corneille1 only that it lacks the tragic conclusion1 while on the contrary the analogous relation of ,max to ,thecla has it47#fa7 #eb4 ,now that we have considered all the fine arts in the general way that is suitable to our point of view1 beginning with architecture1 the peculiar end of which is to elucidate the objectification of will at the lowest grades of its visibility1 in which it shows itself as the dumb unconscious tendency of the mass in accordance with laws1 and yet already reveals a breach of the unity of will with itself in a conflict between gravity and rigidity--and ending with the consideration of tragedy1 which presents to us at the highest grades of the objectification of will this very conflict with itself in terrible magnitude and distinctness2 we find that there is still another fine art which has been excluded from our consideration1 and had to be excluded1 for in the systematic connection of our exposition there was no fitting place for it--,i mean music4 ,it stands alone1 quite cut off from all the other arts4 ,in it we do not recognise the copy or repetition of any ,idea of existence in the world4 ,yet it is such a great and exceedingly noble art1 its effect on the inmost nature of man is so powerful1 and it is so entirely and deeply understood by him in his inmost consciousness as a perfectly universal language1 the distinctness of which surpasses even that of the perceptible world itself1 that we certainly have more to look for in it than an exercitum arithmetic occultum nescientis se numerare animi17#fb7 which ,leibnitz called it4 ,yet he was perfectly right1 as he considered only its immediate external significance1 its form4 ,but if it were nothing more1 the satisfaction which it affords would be like that which we feel when a sum in arithmetic comes out right1 and could not be that intense pleasure with which we see the deepest recesses of our nature find utterance4 ,from our standpoint1 therefore1 at which the sthetic effect is the criterion1 we must attribute to music a far more serious and deep significance1 connected with the inmost nature of the world and our own self1 and in reference to which the arithmetical proportions1 to which it may be reduced1 are related1 not as the thing signified1 but merely as the sign4 ,that in some sense music must be related to the world as the representation to the thing represented1 as the copy to the original1 we may conclude from the analogy of the other arts1 all of which possess this character1 and affect us on the whole in the same way as it does1 only that the effect of music is stronger1 quicker1 more necessary and infallible4 ,further1 its representative relation to the world must be very deep1 absolutely true1 and strikingly accurate1 because it is instantly understood by every one1 and has the appearance of a certain infallibility1 because its form may be reduced to perfectly definite rules expressed in numbers1 from which it cannot free itself without entirely ceasing to be music4 ,yet the point of comparison between music and the world1 the respect in which it stands to the world in the relation of a copy or repetition1 is very obscure4 ,men have practised music in all ages without being able to account for this2 content to understand it directly1 they renounce all claim to an abstract conception of this direct understanding itself4 ,i gave my mind entirely up to the impression of music in all its forms1 and then returned to reflection and the system of thought expressed in the present work1 and thus ,i arrived at an explanation of the inner nature of music and of the nature of its imitative relation to the world--which from analogy had necessarily to be presupposed--an explanation which is quite sufficient for myself1 and satisfactory to my investigation1 and which will doubtless be equally evident to any one who has followed me thus far and has agreed with my view of the world4 ,yet ,i recognise the fact that it is essentially impossible to prove this explanation1 for it assumes and establishes a relation of music1 as idea1 to that which from its nature can never be idea1 and music will have to be regarded as the copy of an original which can never itself be directly presented as idea4 ,i can therefore do no more than state here1 at the conclusion of this third book1 which has been principally devoted to the consideration of the arts1 the explanation of the marvellous art of music which satisfies myself1 and ,i must leave the acceptance or denial of my view to the effect produced upon each of my readers both by music itself and by the whole system of thought communicated in this work4 ,moreover1 ,i regard it as necessary1 in order to be able to assent with full conviction to the exposition of the significance of music ,i am about to give1 that one should often listen to music with constant reflection upon my theory concerning it1 and for this again it is necessary to be very familiar with the whole of my system of thought4 ,the 7,platonic7 ,ideas are the adequate objectification of will4 ,to excite or suggest the knowledge of these by means of the representation of particular things 7for works of art themselves are always representations of particular things7 is the end of all the other arts1 which can only be attained by a corresponding change in the knowing subject4 ,thus all these arts objectify the will indirectly only by means of the ,ideas2 and since our world is nothing but the manifestation of the ,ideas in multiplicity1 though their entrance into the principium individuationis 7the form of the knowledge possible for the individual as such71 music also1 since it passes over the ,ideas1 is entirely independent of the phenomenal world1 ignores it altogether1 could to a certain extent exist if there was no world at all1 which cannot be said of the other arts4 ,music is as direct an objectification and copy of the whole will as the world itself1 nay1 even as the ,ideas1 whose multiplied manifestation constitutes the world of individual things4 ,music is thus by no means like the other arts1 the copy of the ,ideas1 but the copy of the will itself1 whose objectivity the ,ideas are4 ,this is why the effect of music is so much more powerful and penetrating than that of the other arts1 for they speak only of shadows1 but it speaks of the thing itself4 ,since1 however1 it is the same will which objectifies itself both in the ,ideas and in music1 though in quite different ways1 there must be1 not indeed a direct likeness1 but yet a parallel1 an analogy1 between music and the ,ideas whose manifestation in multiplicity and incompleteness is the visible world4 ,the establishing of this analogy will facilitate1 as an illustration1 the understanding of this exposition1 which is so difficult on account of the obscurity of the subject4 ,i recognise in the deepest tones of harmony1 in the bass1 the lowest grades of the objectification of will1 unorganised nature1 the mass of the planet4 ,it is well known that all the high notes which are easily sounded1 and die away more quickly1 are produced by the vibration in their vicinity of the deep bass-notes4 ,when1 also1 the low notes sound1 the high notes always sound faintly1 and it is a law of harmony that only those high notes may accompany a bass-note which actually already sound along with it of themselves 7its sons harmoniques7 on account of its vibration4 ,this is analogous to the fact that the whole of the bodies and organisations of nature must be regarded as having come into existence through gradual development out of the mass of the planet2 this is both their supporter and their source1 and the same relation subsists between the high notes and the bass4 ,there is a limit of depth1 below which no sound is audible4 ,this corresponds to the fact that no matter can be perceived without form and quality1 i4e41 without the manifestation of a force which cannot be further explained1 in which an ,idea expresses itself1 and1 more generally1 that no matter can be entirely without will4 ,thus1 as a certain pitch is inseparable from the note as such1 so a certain grade of the manifestation of will is inseparable from matter4 ,bass is thus1 for us1 in harmony what unorganised nature1 the crudest mass1 upon which all rests1 and from which everything originates and develops1 is in the world4 ,now1 further1 in the whole of the complemental parts which make up the harmony between the bass and the leading voice singing the melody1 ,i recognise the whole gradation of the ,ideas in which the will objectifies itself4 ,those nearer to the bass are the lower of these grades1 the still unorganised1 but yet manifold phenomenal things2 the higher represent to me the world of plants and beasts4 ,the definite intervals of the scale are parallel to the definite grades of the objectification of will1 the definite species in nature4 ,the departure from the arithmetical correctness of the intervals1 through some temperament1 or produced by the key selected1 is analogous to the departure of the individual from the type of the species4 ,indeed1 even the impure discords1 which give no definite interval1 may be compared to the monstrous abortions produced by beasts of two species1 or by man and beast4 ,but to all these bass and complemental parts which make up the harmony there is wanting that connected progress which belongs only to the high voice singing the melody1 and it alone moves quickly and lightly in modulations and runs1 while all these others have only a slower movement without a connection in each part for itself4 ,the deep bass moves most slowly1 the representative of the crudest mass4 ,its rising and falling occurs only by large intervals1 in thirds1 fourths1 fifths1 never by one tone1 unless it is a base inverted by double counterpoint4 ,this slow movement is also physically essential to it2 a quick run or shake in the low notes cannot even be imagined4 ,the higher complemental parts1 which are parallel to animal life1 move more quickly1 but yet without melodious connection and significant progress4 ,the disconnected course of all the complemental parts1 and their regulation by definite laws1 is analogous to the fact that in the whole irrational world1 from the crystal to the most perfect animal1 no being has a connected consciousness of its own which would make its life into a significant whole1 and none experiences a succession of mental developments1 none perfects itself by culture1 but everything exists always in the same way according to its kind1 determined by fixed law4 ,lastly1 in the melody1 in the high1 singing1 principal voice leading the whole and progressing with unrestrained freedom1 in the unbroken significant connection of one thought from beginning to end representing a whole1 ,i recognise the highest grade of the objectification of will1 the intellectual life and effort of man4 ,as he alone1 because endowed with reason1 constantly looks before and after on the path of his actual life and its innumerable possibilities1 and so achieves a course of life which is intellectual1 and therefore connected as a whole2 corresponding to this1 ,i say1 the melody has significant intentional connection from beginning to end4 ,it records1 therefore1 the history of the intellectually enlightened will4 ,this will expresses itself in the actual world as the series of its deeds2 but melody says more1 it records the most secret history of this intellectually-enlightened will1 pictures every excitement1 every effort1 every movement of it1 all that which the reason collects under the wide and negative concept of feeling1 and which it cannot apprehend further through its abstract concepts4 ,therefore it has always been said that music is the language of feeling and of passion1 as words are the language of reason4 ,plato explains it as 1 7melodiarum motus1 animi affectus imitans71 ,de ,leg4 vii42 and also ,aristotle says3 1 1 7cur numeri musici et modi1 qui voces sunt1 moribus similes sese exhibent873 ,probl4 c4 #ai4 ,now the nature of man consists in this1 that his will strives1 is satisfied and strives anew1 and so on for ever4 ,indeed1 his happiness and well-being consist simply in the quick transition from wish to satisfaction1 and from satisfaction to a new wish4 ,for the absence of satisfaction is suffering1 the empty longing for a new wish1 languor1 ennui4 ,and corresponding to this the nature of melody is a constant digression and deviation from the key-note in a thousand ways1 not only to the harmonious intervals to the third and dominant1 but to every tone1 to the dissonant sevenths and to the superfluous degrees2 yet there always follows a constant return to the key-note4 ,in all these deviations melody expresses the multifarious efforts of will1 but always its satisfaction also by the final return to an harmonious interval1 and still more1 to the key-note4 ,the composition of melody1 the disclosure in it of all the deepest secrets of human willing and feeling1 is the work of genius1 whose action1 which is more apparent here than anywhere else1 lies far from all reflection and conscious intention1 and may be called an inspiration4 ,the conception is here1 as everywhere in art1 unfruitful4 ,the composer reveals the inner nature of the world1 and expresses the deepest wisdom in a language which his reason does not understand2 as a person under the influence of mesmerism tells things of which he has no conception when he awakes4 ,therefore in the composer1 more than in any other artist1 the man is entirely separated and distinct from the artist4 ,even in the explanation of this wonderful art1 the concept shows its poverty and limitation4 ,i shall try1 however1 to complete our analogy4 ,as quick transition from wish to satisfaction1 and from satisfaction to a new wish1 is happiness and well-being1 so quick melodies without great deviations are cheerful2 slow melodies1 striking painful discords1 and only winding back through many bars to the keynote are1 as analogous to the delayed and hardly won satisfaction1 sad4 ,the delay of the new excitement of will1 languor1 could have no other expression than the sustained keynote1 the effect of which would soon be unbearable2 very monotonous and unmeaning melodies approach this effect4 ,the short intelligible subjects of quick dance-music seem to speak only of easily attained common pleasure4 ,on the other hand1 the ,allegro maestoso1 in elaborate movements1 long passages1 and wide deviations1 signifies a greater1 nobler effort towards a more distant end1 and its final attainment4 ,the ,adagio speaks of the pain of a great and noble effort which despises all trifling happiness4 ,but how wonderful is the effect of the minor and major6 ,how astounding that the change of half a tone1 the entrance of a minor third instead of a major1 at once and inevitably forces upon us an anxious painful feeling1 from which again we are just as instantaneously delivered by the major4 ,the ,adagio lengthens in the minor the expression of the keenest pain1 and becomes even a convulsive wail4 ,dance-music in the minor seems to indicate the failure of that trifling happiness which we ought rather to despise1 seems to speak of the attainment of a lower end with toil and trouble4 ,the inexhaustibleness of possible melodies corresponds to the inexhaustibleness of ,nature in difference of individuals1 physiognomies1 and courses of life4 ,the transition from one key to an entirely different one1 since it altogether breaks the connection with what went before1 is like death1 for the individual ends in it2 but the will which appeared in this individual lives after him as before him1 appearing in other individuals1 whose consciousness1 however1 has no connection with his4 ,but it must never be forgotten1 in the investigation of all these analogies ,i have pointed out1 that music has no direct1 but merely an indirect relation to them1 for it never expresses the phenomenon1 but only the inner nature1 the in-itself of all phenomena1 the will itself4 ,it does not therefore express this or that particular and definite joy1 this or that sorrow1 or pain1 or horror1 or delight1 or merriment1 or peace of mind2 but joy1 sorrow1 pain1 horror1 delight1 merriment1 peace of mind themselves1 to a certain extent in the abstract1 their essential nature1 without accessories1 and therefore without their motives4 ,yet we completely understand them in this extracted quintessence4 ,hence it arises that our imagination is so easily excited by music1 and now seeks to give form to that invisible yet actively moved spirit-world which speaks to us directly1 and clothe it with flesh and blood1 i4e41 to embody it in an analogous example4 ,this is the origin of the song with words1 and finally of the opera1 the text of which should therefore never forsake that subordinate position in order to make itself the chief thing and the music a mere means of expressing it1 which is a great misconception and a piece of utter perversity2 for music always expresses only the quintessence of life and its events1 never these themselves1 and therefore their differences do not always affect it4 ,it is precisely this universality1 which belongs exclusively to it1 together with the greatest determinateness1 that gives music the high worth which it has as the panacea for all our woes4 ,thus1 if music is too closely united to the words1 and tries to form itself according to the events1 it is striving to speak a language which is not its own4 ,no one has kept so free from this mistake as ,rossini2 therefore his music speaks its own language so distinctly and purely that it requires no words1 and produces its full effect when rendered by instruments alone4 ,according to all this1 we may regard the phenomenal world1 or nature1 and music as two different expressions of the same thing1 which is therefore itself the only medium of their analogy1 so that a knowledge of it is demanded in order to understand that analogy4 ,music1 therefore1 if regarded as an expression of the world1 is in the highest degree a universal language1 which is related indeed to the universality of concepts1 much as they are related to the particular things4 ,its universality1 however1 is by no means that empty universality of abstraction1 but quite of a different kind1 and is united with thorough and distinct definiteness4 ,in this respect it resembles geometrical figures and numbers1 which are the universal forms of all possible objects of experience and applicable to them all a priori1 and yet are not abstract but perceptible and thoroughly determined4 ,all possible efforts1 excitements1 and manifestations of will1 all that goes on in the heart of man and that reason includes in the wide1 negative concept of feeling1 may be expressed by the infinite number of possible melodies1 but always in the universal1 in the mere form1 without the material1 always according to the thing-in-itself1 not the phenomenon1 the inmost soul1 as it were1 of the phenomenon1 without the body4 ,this deep relation which music has to the true nature of all things also explains the fact that suitable music played to any scene1 action1 event1 or surrounding seems to disclose to us its most secret meaning1 and appears as the most accurate and distinct commentary upon it4 ,this is so truly the case1 that whoever gives himself up entirely to the impression of a symphony1 seems to see all the possible events of life and the world take place in himself1 yet if he reflects1 he can find no likeness between the music and the things that passed before his mind4 ,for1 as we have said1 music is distinguished from all the other arts by the fact that it is not a copy of the phenomenon1 or1 more accurately1 the adequate objectivity of will1 but is the direct copy of the will itself1 and therefore exhibits itself as the metaphysical to everything physical in the world1 and as the thing-in-itself to every phenomenon4 ,we might1 therefore1 just as well call the world embodied music as embodied will2 and this is the reason why music makes every picture1 and indeed every scene of real life and of the world1 at once appear with higher significance1 certainly all the more in proportion as its melody is analogous to the inner spirit of the given phenomenon4 ,it rests upon this that we are able to set a poem to music as a song1 or a perceptible representation as a pantomime1 or both as an opera4 ,such particular pictures of human life1 set to the universal language of music1 are never bound to it or correspond to it with stringent necessity2 but they stand to it only in the relation of an example chosen at will to a general concept4 ,in the determinateness of the real1 they represent that which music expresses in the universality of mere form4 ,for melodies are to a certain extent1 like general concepts1 an abstraction from the actual4 ,this actual world1 then1 the world of particular things1 affords the object of perception1 the special and individual1 the particular case1 both to the universality of the concepts and to the universality of the melodies4 ,but these two universalities are in a certain respect opposed to each other2 for the concepts contain particulars only as the first forms abstracted from perception1 as it were1 the separated shell of things2 thus they are1 strictly speaking1 abstracta2 music1 on the other hand1 gives the inmost kernel which precedes all forms1 or the heart of things4 ,this relation may be very well expressed in the language of the schoolmen by saying the concepts are the universalia post rem1 but music gives the universalia ante rem1 and the real world the universalia in re4 ,to the universal significance of a melody to which a poem has been set1 it is quite possible to set other equally arbitrarily selected examples of the universal expressed in this poem corresponding to the significance of the melody in the same degree4 ,this is why the same composition is suitable to many verses2 and this is also what makes the vaudeville possible4 ,but that in general a relation is possible between a composition and a perceptible representation rests1 as we have said1 upon the fact that both are simply different expressions of the same inner being of the world4 ,when now1 in the particular case1 such a relation is actually given1 that is to say1 when the composer has been able to express in the universal language of music the emotions of will which constitute the heart of an event1 then the melody of the song1 the music of the opera1 is expressive4 ,but the analogy discovered by the composer between the two must have proceeded from the direct knowledge of the nature of the world unknown to his reason1 and must not be an imitation produced with conscious intention by means of conceptions1 otherwise the music does not express the inner nature of the will itself1 but merely gives an inadequate imitation of its phenomenon4 ,all specially imitative music does this2 for example1 8,the ,seasons10 by ,haydn2 also many passages of his 8,creation10 in which phenomena of the external world are directly imitated2 also all battle-pieces4 ,such music is entirely to be rejected4 ,the unutterable depth of all music by virtue of which it floats through our consciousness as the vision of a paradise firmly believed in yet ever distant from us1 and by which also it is so fully understood and yet so inexplicable1 rests on the fact that it restores to us all the emotions of our inmost nature1 but entirely without reality and far removed from their pain4 ,so also the seriousness which is essential to it1 which excludes the absurd from its direct and peculiar province1 is to be explained by the fact that its object is not the idea1 with reference to which alone deception and absurdity are possible2 but its object is directly the will1 and this is essentially the most serious of all things1 for it is that on which all depends4 ,how rich in content and full of significance the language of music is1 we see from the repetitions1 as well as the ,da capo1 the like of which would be unbearable in works composed in a language of words1 but in music are very appropriate and beneficial1 for1 in order to comprehend it fully1 we must hear it twice4 ,in the whole of this exposition of music ,i have been trying to bring out clearly that it expresses in a perfectly universal language1 in a homogeneous material1 mere tones1 and with the greatest determinateness and truth1 the inner nature1 the in-itself of the world1 which we think under the concept of will1 because will is its most distinct manifestation4 ,further1 according to my view and contention1 philosophy is nothing but a complete and accurate repetition or expression of the nature of the world in very general concepts1 for only in such is it possible to get a view of that whole nature which will everywhere be adequate and applicable4 ,thus1 whoever has followed me and entered into my mode of thought1 will not think it so very paradoxical if ,i say1 that supposing it were possible to give a perfectly accurate1 complete explanation of music1 extending even to particulars1 that is to say1 a detailed repetition in concepts of what it expresses1 this would also be a sufficient repetition and explanation of the world in concepts1 or at least entirely parallel to such an explanation1 and thus it would be the true philosophy4 ,consequently the saying of ,leibnitz quoted above1 which is quite accurate from a lower standpoint1 may be parodied in the following way to suit our higher view of music3 ,musica est exercitium metaphysices occultum nescientis se philosophari animi2 for scire1 to know1 always means to have fixed in abstract concepts4 ,but further1 on account of the truth of the saying of ,leibnitz1 which is confirmed in various ways1 music1 regarded apart from its sthetic or inner significance1 and looked at merely externally and purely empirically1 is simply the means of comprehending directly and in the concrete large numbers and complex relations of numbers1 which otherwise we could only know indirectly by fixing them in concepts4 ,therefore by the union of these two very different but correct views of music we may arrive at a conception of the possibility of a philosophy of number1 such as that of ,pythagoras and of the ,chinese in ,y-,king1 and then interpret in this sense the saying of the ,pythagoreans which ,sextus ,empiricus quotes 7adv4 ,math41 ,l4 vii473 7numero cuncta assimilantur74 ,and if1 finally1 we apply this view to the interpretation of harmony and melody given above1 we shall find that a mere moral philosophy without an explanation of ,nature1 such as ,socrates wanted to introduce1 is precisely analogous to a mere melody without harmony1 which ,rousseau exclusively desired2 and1 in opposition to this mere physics and metaphysics without ethics1 will correspond to mere harmony without melody4 ,allow me to add to these cursory observations a few more remarks concerning the analogy of music with the phenomenal world4 ,we found in the second book that the highest grade of the objectification of will1 man1 could not appear alone and isolated1 but presupposed the grades below him1 as these again presupposed the grades lower still4 ,in the same way music1 which directly objectifies the will1 just as the world does1 is complete only in full harmony4 ,in order to achieve its full effect1 the high leading voice of the melody requires the accompaniment of all the other voices1 even to the lowest bass1 which is to be regarded as the origin of all4 ,the melody itself enters as an integral part into the harmony1 as the harmony enters into it1 and only thus1 in the full harmonious whole1 music expresses what it aims at expressing4 ,thus also the one will outside of time finds its full objectification only in the complete union of all the steps which reveal its nature in the innumerable ascending grades of distinctness4 ,the following analogy is also very remarkable4 ,we have seen in the preceding book that notwithstanding the self-adaptation of all the phenomena of will to each other as regards their species1 which constitutes their teleological aspect1 there yet remains an unceasing conflict between those phenomena as individuals1 which is visible at every grade1 and makes the world a constant battle-field of all those manifestations of one and the same will1 whose inner contradiction with itself becomes visible through it4 ,in music also there is something corresponding to this4 ,a complete1 pure1 harmonious system of tones is not only physically but arithmetically impossible4 ,the numbers themselves by which the tones are expressed have inextricable irrationality4 ,there is no scale in which1 when it is counted1 every fifth will be related to the keynote as #b to #c1 every major third as #d to #e1 every minor third as #e to #f1 and so on4 ,for if they are correctly related to the keynote1 they can no longer be so to each other2 because1 for example1 the fifth must be the minor third to the third1 c4 ,for the notes of the scale may be compared to actors who must play now one part1 now another4 ,therefore a perfectly accurate system of music cannot even be thought1 far less worked out2 and on this account all possible music deviates from perfect purity2 it can only conceal the discords essential to it by dividing them among all the notes1 i4e41 by temperament4 ,on this see ,chladni's 8,akustik10 #cj1 and his 8,kurze ,uebersicht der ,schall- und ,klanglehre407#fc7 ,i might still have something to say about the way in which music is perceived1 namely1 in and through time alone1 with absolute exclusion of space1 and also apart from the influence of the knowledge of causality1 thus without understanding2 for the tones make the sthetic impression as effect1 and without obliging us to go back to their causes1 as in the case of perception4 ,i do not wish1 however1 to lengthen this discussion1 as ,i have perhaps already gone too much into detail with regard to some things in this ,third ,book1 or have dwelt too much on particulars4 ,but my aim made it necessary1 and it will be the less disapproved if the importance and high worth of art1 which is seldom sufficiently recognised1 be kept in mind4 ,for if1 according to our view1 the whole visible world is just the objectification1 the mirror1 of the will1 conducting it to knowledge of itself1 and1 indeed1 as we shall soon see1 to the possibility of its deliverance2 and if1 at the same time1 the world as idea1 if we regard it in isolation1 and1 freeing ourselves from all volition1 allow it alone to take possession of our consciousness1 is the most joy-giving and the only innocent side of life2 we must regard art as the higher ascent1 the more complete development of all this1 for it achieves essentially just what is achieved by the visible world itself1 only with greater concentration1 more perfectly1 with intention and intelligence1 and therefore may be called1 in the full significance of the word1 the flower of life4 ,if the whole world as idea is only the visibility of will1 the work of art is to render this visibility more distinct4 ,it is the camera obscura which shows the objects more purely1 and enables us to survey them and comprehend them better4 ,it is the play within the play1 the stage upon the stage in 8,hamlet40 ,the pleasure we receive from all beauty1 the consolation which art affords1 the enthusiasm of the artist1 which enables him to forget the cares of life1--the latter an advantage of the man of genius over other men1 which alone repays him for the suffering that increases in proportion to the clearness of consciousness1 and for the desert loneliness among men of a different race1--all this rests on the fact that the in-itself of life1 the will1 existence itself1 is1 as we shall see farther on1 a constant sorrow1 partly miserable1 partly terrible2 while1 on the contrary1 as idea alone1 purely contemplated1 or copied by art1 free from pain1 it presents to us a drama full of significance4 ,this purely knowable side of the world1 and the copy of it in any art1 is the element of the artist4 ,he is chained to the contemplation of the play1 the objectification of will2 he remains beside it1 does not get tired of contemplating it and representing it in copies2 and meanwhile he bears himself the cost of the production of that play1 i4e41 he himself is the will which objectifies itself1 and remains in constant suffering4 ,that pure1 true1 and deep knowledge of the inner nature of the world becomes now for him an end in itself3 he stops there4 ,therefore it does not become to him a quieter of the will1 as1 we shall see in the next book1 it does in the case of the saint who has attained to resignation2 it does not deliver him for ever from life1 but only at moments1 and is therefore not for him a path out of life1 but only an occasional consolation in it1 till his power1 increased by this contemplation and at last tired of the play1 lays hold on the real4 ,the ,st4 ,cecilia of ,raphael may be regarded as a representation of this transition4 ,to the real1 then1 we now turn in the following book4 ,,fourth ,,book4 ,,the ,,world ,,as ,,will4 ,second ,aspect4 ,the ,assertion ,and ,denial ,of ,the ,will ,to ,live1 ,when ,self-,consciousness ,has ,been ,attained4 ,tempore quo cognitio simul advenit1 amor e medio supersurrexit4--,oupnek'hat1 ,studio ,anquetil ,duperron1 vol4 ii4 p4 #baf4 #ec4 ,the last part of our work presents itself as the most serious1 for it relates to the action of men1 the matter which concerns every one directly and can be foreign or indifferent to none4 ,it is indeed so characteristic of the nature of man to relate everything else to action1 that in every systematic investigation he will always treat the part that has to do with action as the result or outcome of the whole work1 so far1 at least1 as it interests him1 and will therefore give his most serious attention to this part1 even if to no other4 ,in this respect the following part of our work would1 in ordinary language1 be called practical philosophy1 in opposition to the theoretical1 which has occupied us hitherto4 ,but1 in my opinion1 all philosophy is theoretical1 because it is essential to it that it should retain a purely contemplative attitude1 and should investigate1 not prescribe4 ,to become1 on the contrary1 practical1 to guide conduct1 to transform character1 are old claims1 which with fuller insight it ought finally to give up4 ,for here1 where the worth or worthlessness of an existence1 where salvation or damnation are in question1 the dead conceptions of philosophy do not decide the matter1 but the inmost nature of man himself1 the ,dmon that guides him and that has not chosen him1 but been chosen by him1 as ,plato would say2 his intelligible character1 as ,kant expresses himself4 ,virtue cannot be taught any more than genius2 indeed1 for it the concept is just as unfruitful as it is in art1 and in both cases can only be used as an instrument4 ,it would1 therefore1 be just as absurd to expect that our moral systems and ethics will produce virtuous1 noble1 and holy men1 as that our sthetics will produce poets1 painters1 and musicians4 ,philosophy can never do more than interpret and explain what is given4 ,it can only bring to distinct abstract knowledge of the reason the nature of the world which in the concrete1 that is1 as feeling1 expresses itself comprehensibly to every one4 ,this1 however1 it does in every possible reference and from every point of view4 ,now1 as this attempt has been made from other points of view in the three preceding books with the generality that is proper to philosophy1 in this book the action of men will be considered in the same way2 and this side of the world might1 indeed1 be considered the most important of all1 not only subjectively1 as ,i remarked above1 but also objectively4 ,in considering it ,i shall faithfully adhere to the method ,i have hitherto followed1 and shall support myself by presupposing all that has already been advanced4 ,there is1 indeed1 just one thought which forms the content of this whole work4 ,i have endeavoured to work it out in all other spheres1 and ,i shall now do so with regard to human action4 ,i shall then have done all that is in my power to communicate it as fully as possible4 ,the given point of view1 and the method of treatment announced1 are themselves sufficient to indicate that in this ethical book no precepts1 no doctrine of duty must be looked for2 still less will a general moral principle be given1 an universal receipt1 as it were1 for the production of all the virtues4 ,neither shall we talk of an 8absolute ought10 for this contains a contradiction1 as is explained in the ,appendix2 nor yet of a 8law of freedom10 which is in the same position4 ,in general1 we shall not speak at all of 8ought10 for this is how one speaks to children and to nations still in their childhood1 but not to those who have appropriated all the culture of a full-grown age4 ,it is a palpable contradiction to call the will free1 and yet to prescribe laws for it according to which it ought to will4 8,ought to will60--wooden iron6 ,but it follows from the point of view of our system that the will is not only free1 but almighty4 ,from it proceeds not only its action1 but also its world2 and as the will is1 so does its action and its world become4 ,both are the self-knowledge of the will and nothing more4 ,the will determines itself1 and at the same time both its action and its world2 for besides it there is nothing1 and these are the will itself4 ,only thus is the will truly autonomous1 and from every other point of view it is heteronomous4 ,our philosophical endeavours can only extend to exhibiting and explaining the action of men in its inner nature and content1 the various and even opposite maxims1 whose living expression it is4 ,this we shall do in connection with the preceding portion of our work1 and in precisely the same way as we have hitherto explained the other phenomena of the world1 and have sought to bring their inmost nature to distinct abstract knowledge4 ,our philosophy will maintain the same immanency in the case of action1 as in all that we have hitherto considered4 ,notwithstanding ,kant's great doctrine1 it will not attempt to use the forms of the phenomenon1 the universal expression of which is the principle of sufficient reason1 as a leaping-pole to jump over the phenomenon itself1 which alone gives meaning to these forms1 and land in the boundless sphere of empty fictions4 ,but this actual world of experience1 in which we are1 and which is in us1 remains both the material and the limits of our consideration3 a world which is so rich in content that even the most searching investigation of which the human mind is capable could not exhaust it4 ,since then the real world of experience will never fail to afford material and reality to our ethical investigations1 any more than to those we have already conducted1 nothing will be less needful than to take refuge in negative conceptions void of content1 and then somehow or other make even ourselves believe that we are saying something when we speak with lifted eyebrows of 8absolutes10 8infinites10 8supersensibles10 and whatever other mere negations of this sort there may be 7 1 1 --nihil est1 nisi negationis nomen1 cum obscura notione4--,jul4 or4 #e71 instead of which it would be shorter to say at once cloud-cuckoo-town 773 we shall not require to serve up covered empty dishes of this kind4 ,finally1 we shall not in this book1 any more than in those which have preceded it1 narrate histories and give them out as philosophy4 ,for we are of opinion that whoever supposes that the inner nature of the world can in any way1 however plausibly disguised1 be historically comprehended1 is infinitely far from a philosophical knowledge of the world4 ,yet this is what is supposed whenever a 8becoming10 or a 8having become10 or an 8about to become0 enters into a theory of the nature of the world1 whenever an earlier or a later has the least place in it2 and in this way a beginning and an end of the world1 and the path it pursues between them1 is1 either openly or disguisedly1 both sought for and found1 and the individual who philosophises even recognises his own position on that path4 ,such historical philosophising in most cases produces a cosmogony which admits of many varieties1 or else a system of emanations1 a doctrine of successive disengagements from one being2 or1 finally1 driven in despair from fruitless efforts upon these paths to the last path of all1 it takes refuge in the converse doctrine of a constant becoming1 springing up1 arising1 coming to light out of darkness1 out of the hidden ground source or groundlessness1 or whatever other nonsense of this sort there may be1 which is most shortly disposed of with the remark that at the present moment a whole eternity1 i4e41 an endless time1 has already passed1 so that everything that can or ought to become must have already done so4 ,for all such historical philosophy1 whatever airs it may give itself1 regards time just as if ,kant had never lived1 as a quality of the thing-in-itself1 and thus stops at that which ,kant calls the phenomenon in opposition to the thing-in-itself2 which ,plato calls the becoming and never being1 in opposition to the being and never becoming2 and which1 finally1 is called in the ,indian philosophy the web of ,mya4 ,it is just the knowledge which belongs to the principle of sufficient reason1 with which no one can penetrate to the inner nature of things1 but endlessly pursues phenomena1 moving without end or aim1 like a squirrel in its wheel1 till1 tired out at last1 he stops at some point or other arbitrarily chosen1 and now desires to extort respect for it from others also4 ,the genuine philosophical consideration of the world1 i4e41 the consideration that affords us a knowledge of its inner nature1 and so leads us beyond the phenomenon1 is precisely that method which does not concern itself with the whence1 the whither1 and the why of the world1 but always and everywhere demands only the what2 the method which considers things not according to any relation1 not as becoming and passing away1 in short1 not according to one of the four forms of the principle of sufficient reason2 but1 on the contrary1 just that which remains when all that belongs to the form of knowledge proper to that principle has been abstracted1 the inner nature of the world1 which always appears unchanged in all the relations1 but is itself never subject to them1 and has the ,ideas of the world as its object or material4 ,from such knowledge as this proceeds philosophy1 like art1 and also1 as we shall see in this book1 that disposition of mind which alone leads to true holiness and to deliverance from the world4 #ed4 ,the first three books will1 it is hoped1 have conveyed the distinct and certain knowledge that the world as idea is the complete mirror of the will1 in which it knows itself in ascending grades of distinctness and completeness1 the highest of which is man1 whose nature1 however1 receives its complete expression only through the whole connected series of his actions4 ,the self-conscious connection of these actions is made possible by reason1 which enables a man constantly to survey the whole in the abstract4 ,the will1 which1 considered purely in itself1 is without knowledge1 and is merely a blind incessant impulse1 as we see it appear in unorganised and vegetable nature and their laws1 and also in the vegetative part of our own life1 receives through the addition of the world as idea1 which is developed in subjection to it1 the knowledge of its own willing and of what it is that it wills4 ,and this is nothing else than the world as idea1 life1 precisely as it exists4 ,therefore we called the phenomenal world the mirror of the will1 its objectivity4 ,and since what the will wills is always life1 just because life is nothing but the representation of that willing for the idea1 it is all one and a mere pleonism if1 instead of simply saying 8the will10 we say 8the will to live40 ,will is the thing-in-itself1 the inner content1 the essence of the world4 ,life1 the visible world1 the phenomenon1 is only the mirror of the will4 ,therefore life accompanies the will as inseparably as the shadow accompanies the body2 and if will exists1 so will life1 the world1 exist4 ,life is1 therefore1 assured to the will to live2 and so long as we are filled with the will to live we need have no fear for our existence1 even in the presence of death4 ,it is true we see the individual come into being and pass away2 but the individual is only phenomenal1 exists only for the knowledge which is bound to the principle of sufficient reason1 to the principio individuationis4 ,certainly1 for this kind of knowledge1 the individual receives his life as a gift1 rises out of nothing1 then suffers the loss of this gift through death1 and returns again to nothing4 ,but we desire to consider life philosophically1 i4e41 according to its ,ideas1 and in this sphere we shall find that neither the will1 the thing-in-itself in all phenomena1 nor the subject of knowing1 that which perceives all phenomena1 is affected at all by birth or by death4 ,birth and death belong merely to the phenomenon of will1 thus to life2 and it is essential to this to exhibit itself in individuals which come into being and pass away1 as fleeting phenomena appearing in the form of time--phenomena of that which in itself knows no time1 but must exhibit itself precisely in the way we have said1 in order to objectify its peculiar nature4 ,birth and death belong in like manner to life1 and hold the balance as reciprocal conditions of each other1 or1 if one likes the expression1 as poles of the whole phenomenon of life4 ,the wisest of all mythologies1 the ,indian1 expresses this by giving to the very god that symbolises destruction1 death 7as ,brahma1 the most sinful and the lowest god of the ,trimurti1 symbolises generation1 coming into being1 and ,vishnu maintaining or preserving71 by giving1 ,i say1 to ,siva as an attribute not only the necklace of skulls1 but also the lingam1 the symbol of generation1 which appears here as the counterpart of death1 thus signifying that generation and death are essentially correlatives1 which reciprocally neutralise and annul each other4 ,it was precisely the same sentiment that led the ,greeks and ,romans to adorn their costly sarcophagi1 just as we see them now1 with feasts1 dances1 marriages1 the chase1 fights of wild beasts1 bacchanalians1 c42 thus with representations of the full ardour of life1 which they place before us not only in such revels and sports1 but also in sensual groups1 and even go so far as to represent the sexual intercourse of satyrs and goats4 ,clearly the aim was to point in the most impressive manner away from the death of the mourned individual to the immortal life of nature1 and thus to indicate1 though without abstract knowledge1 that the whole of nature is the phenomenon and also the fulfilment of the will to live4 ,the form of this phenomenon is time1 space1 and causality1 and by means of these individuation1 which carries with it that the individual must come into being and pass away4 ,but this no more affects the will to live1 of whose manifestation the individual is1 as it were1 only a particular example or specimen1 than the death of an individual injures the whole of nature4 ,for it is not the individual1 but only the species that ,nature cares for1 and for the preservation of which she so earnestly strives1 providing for it with the utmost prodigality through the vast surplus of the seed and the great strength of the fructifying impulse4 ,the individual1 on the contrary1 neither has nor can have any value for ,nature1 for her kingdom is infinite time and infinite space1 and in these infinite multiplicity of possible individuals4 ,therefore she is always ready to let the individual fall1 and hence it is not only exposed to destruction in a thousand ways by the most insignificant accident1 but originally destined for it1 and conducted towards it by ,nature herself from the moment it has served its end of maintaining the species4 ,thus ,nature navely expresses the great truth that only the ,ideas1 not the individuals1 have1 properly speaking1 reality1 i4e41 are complete objectivity of the will4 ,now1 since man is ,nature itself1 and indeed ,nature at the highest grade of its self-consciousness1 but ,nature is only the objectified will to live1 the man who has comprehended and retained this point of view may well console himself1 when contemplating his own death and that of his friends1 by turning his eyes to the immortal life of ,nature1 which he himself is4 ,this is the significance of ,siva with the lingam1 and of those ancient sarcophagi with their pictures of glowing life1 which say to the mourning beholder1 ,natura non contristatur4 ,that generation and death are to be regarded as something belonging to life1 and essential to this phenomenon of the will1 arises also from the fact that they both exhibit themselves merely as higher powers of the expression of that in which all the rest of life consists4 ,this is through and through nothing else than the constant change of matter in the fixed permanence of form2 and this is what constitutes the transitoriness of the individual and the permanence of the species4 ,constant nourishment and renewal differ from generation only in degree1 and constant excretion differs only in degree from death4 ,the first shows itself most simply and distinctly in the plant4 ,the plant is throughout a constant recurrence of the same impulse of its simplest fibre1 which groups itself into leaf and branch4 ,it is a systematic aggregate of similar plants supporting each other1 whose constant reproduction is its single impulse4 ,it ascends to the full satisfaction of this tendency through the grades of its metamorphosis1 finally to the blossom and fruit1 that compendium of its existence and effort in which it now attains1 by a short way1 to that which is its single aim1 and at a stroke produces a thousand-fold what1 up till then1 it effected only in the particular case--the repetition of itself4 ,its earlier growth and development stands in the same relation to its fruit as writing stands to printing4 ,with the animal it is clearly quite the same4 ,the process of nourishing is a constant reproduction2 the process of reproduction is a higher power of nourishing4 ,the pleasure which accompanies the act of procreation is a higher power of the agreeableness of the sense of life4 ,on the other hand1 excretion1 the constant exhalation and throwing off of matter1 is the same as that which1 at a higher power1 death1 is the contrary of generation4 ,and if here we are always content to retain the form without lamenting the discarded matter1 we ought to bear ourselves in the same way if in death the same thing happens1 in a higher degree and to the whole1 as takes place daily and hourly in a partial manner in excretion3 if we are indifferent to the one1 we ought not to shrink from the other4 ,therefore1 from this point of view1 it appears just as perverse to desire the continuance of an individuality which will be replaced by other individuals as to desire the permanence of matter which will be replaced by other matter4 ,it appears just as foolish to embalm the body as it would be carefully to preserve its excrement4 ,as to the individual consciousness which is bound to the individual body1 it is absolutely interrupted every day by sleep4 ,deep sleep is1 while it lasts1 in no way different from death1 into which1 in fact1 it often passes continuously1 as in the case of freezing to death4 ,it differs only with regard to the future1 the awaking4 ,death is a sleep in which individuality is forgotten2 everything else wakes again1 or rather never slept47#fd7 ,above all things1 we must distinctly recognise that the form of the phenomenon of will1 the form of life or reality1 is really only the present1 not the future nor the past4 ,the latter are only in the conception1 exist only in the connection of knowledge1 so far as it follows the principle of sufficient reason4 ,no man has ever lived in the past1 and none will live in the future2 the present alone is the form of all life1 and is its sure possession which can never be taken from it4 ,the present always exists1 together with its content4 ,both remain fixed without wavering1 like the rainbow on the waterfall4 ,for life is firm and certain in the will1 and the present is firm and certain in life4 ,certainly1 if we reflect on the thousands of years that are past1 of the millions of men who lived in them1 we ask1 ,what were they8 what has become of them8 ,but1 on the other hand1 we need only recall our own past life and renew its scenes vividly in our imagination1 and then ask again1 ,what was all this8 what has become of it8 ,as it is with it1 so is it with the life of those millions4 ,or should we suppose that the past could receive a new existence because it has been sealed by death8 ,our own past1 the most recent part of it1 and even yesterday1 is now no more than an empty dream of the fancy1 and such is the past of all those millions4 ,what was8 ,what is8 ,the will1 of which life is the mirror1 and knowledge free from will1 which beholds it clearly in that mirror4 ,whoever has not yet recognised this1 or will not recognise it1 must add to the question asked above as to the fate of past generations of men this question also3 ,why he1 the questioner1 is so fortunate as to be conscious of this costly1 fleeting1 and only real present1 while those hundreds of generations of men1 even the heroes and philosophers of those ages1 have sunk into the night of the past1 and have thus become nothing2 but he1 his insignificant ego1 actually exists8 or more shortly1 though somewhat strangely3 ,why this now1 his now1 is just now and was not long ago8 ,since he asks such strange questions1 he regards his existence and his time as independent of each other1 and the former as projected into the latter4 ,he assumes indeed two nows--one which belongs to the object1 the other which belongs to the subject1 and marvels at the happy accident of their coincidence4 ,but in truth1 only the point of contact of the object1 the form of which is time1 with the subject1 which has no mode of the principle of sufficient reason as its form1 constitutes the present1 as is shown in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason4 ,now all object is the will so far as it has become idea1 and the subject is the necessary correlative of the object4 ,but real objects are only in the present2 the past and the future contain only conceptions and fancies1 therefore the present is the essential form of the phenomenon of the will1 and inseparable from it4 ,the present alone is that which always exists and remains immovable4 ,that which1 empirically apprehended1 is the most transitory of all1 presents itself to the metaphysical vision1 which sees beyond the forms of empirical perception1 as that which alone endures1 the nunc stans of the schoolmen4 ,the source and the supporter of its content is the will to live or the thing-in-itself1--which we are4 ,that which constantly becomes and passes away1 in that it has either already been or is still to be1 belongs to the phenomenon as such on account of its forms1 which make coming into being and passing away possible4 ,accordingly1 we must think3--,quid fuit8--,quod est4 ,quid erit8--,quod fuit2 and take it in the strict meaning of the words2 thus understand not simile but idem4 ,for life is certain to the will1 and the present is certain to life4 ,thus it is that every one can say1 8,i am once for all lord of the present1 and through all eternity it will accompany me as my shadow3 therefore ,i do not wonder where it has come from1 and how it happens that it is exactly now40 ,we might compare time to a constantly revolving sphere2 the half that was always sinking would be the past1 that which was always rising would be the future2 but the indivisible point at the top1 where the tangent touches1 would be the extensionless present4 ,as the tangent does not revolve with the sphere1 neither does the present1 the point of contact of the object1 the form of which is time1 with the subject1 which has no form1 because it does not belong to the knowable1 but is the condition of all that is knowable4 ,or1 time is like an unceasing stream1 and the present a rock on which the stream breaks itself1 but does not carry away with it4 ,the will1 as thing-in-itself1 is just as little subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason as the subject of knowledge1 which1 finally1 in a certain regard is the will itself or its expression4 ,and as life1 its own phenomenon1 is assured to the will1 so is the present1 the single form of real life4 ,therefore we have not to investigate the past before life1 nor the future after death3 we have rather to know the present1 the one form in which the will manifests itself47#fe7 ,it will not escape from the will1 but neither will the will escape from it4 ,if1 therefore1 life as it is satisfies1 whoever affirms it in every way may regard it with confidence as endless1 and banish the fear of death as an illusion that inspires him with the foolish dread that he can ever be robbed of the present1 and foreshadows a time in which there is no present2 an illusion with regard to time analogous to the illusion with regard to space through which every one imagines the position on the globe he happens to occupy as above1 and all other places as below4 ,in the same way every one links the present to his own individuality1 and imagines that all present is extinguished with it2 that then past and future might be without a present4 ,but as on the surface of the globe every place is above1 so the form of all life is the present1 and to fear death because it robs us of the present1 is just as foolish as to fear that we may slip down from the round globe upon which we have now the good fortune to occupy the upper surface4 ,the present is the form essential to the objectification of the will4 ,it cuts time1 which extends infinitely in both directions1 as a mathematical point1 and stands immovably fixed1 like an everlasting mid-day with no cool evening1 as the actual sun burns without intermission1 while it only seems to sink into the bosom of night4 ,therefore1 if a man fears death as his annihilation1 it is just as if he were to think that the sun cries out at evening1 8,woe is me6 for ,i go down into eternal night407#ff7 ,and conversely1 whoever is oppressed with the burden of life1 whoever desires life and affirms it1 but abhors its torments1 and especially can no longer endure the hard lot that has fallen to himself1 such a man has no deliverance to hope for from death1 and cannot right himself by suicide4 ,the cool shades of ,orcus allure him only with the false appearance of a haven of rest4 ,the earth rolls from day into night1 the individual dies1 but the sun itself shines without intermission1 an eternal noon4 ,life is assured to the will to live2 the form of life is an endless present1 no matter how the individuals1 the phenomena of the ,idea1 arise and pass away in time1 like fleeting dreams4 ,thus even already suicide appears to us as a vain and therefore a foolish action2 when we have carried our investigation further it will appear to us in a still less favourable light4 ,dogmas change and our knowledge is deceptive2 but ,nature never errs1 her procedure is sure1 and she never conceals it4 ,everything is entirely in ,nature1 and ,nature is entire in everything4 ,she has her centre in every brute4 ,it has surely found its way into existence1 and it will surely find its way out of it4 ,in the meantime it lives1 fearless and without care1 in the presence of annihilation1 supported by the consciousness that it is ,nature herself1 and imperishable as she is4 ,man alone carries about with him1 in abstract conceptions1 the certainty of his death2 yet this can only trouble him very rarely1 when for a single moment some occasion calls it up to his imagination4 ,against the mighty voice of ,nature reflection can do little4 ,in man1 as in the brute which does not think1 the certainty that springs from his inmost consciousness that he himself is ,nature1 the world1 predominates as a lasting frame of mind2 and on account of this no man is observably disturbed by the thought of certain and never-distant death1 but lives as if he would live for ever4 ,indeed this is carried so far that we may say that no one has really a lively conviction of the certainty of his death1 otherwise there would be no great difference between his frame of mind and that of a condemned criminal4 ,every one recognises that certainty in the abstract and theoretically1 but lays it aside like other theoretical truths which are not applicable to practice1 without really receiving it into his living consciousness4 ,whoever carefully considers this peculiarity of human character will see that the psychological explanations of it1 from habit and acquiescence in the inevitable1 are by no means sufficient1 and that its true explanation lies in the deeper ground we have given4 ,the same fact explains the circumstance that at all times and among all peoples dogmas of some kind or other relating to the continued existence of the individual after death arise1 and are believed in1 although the evidence in support of them must always be very insufficient1 and the evidence against them forcible and varied4 ,but1 in truth1 this really requires no proof1 but is recognised by the healthy understanding as a fact1 and confirmed by the confidence that ,nature never lies any more than she errs1 but openly exhibits and navely expresses her action and her nature1 while only we ourselves obscure it by our folly1 in order to establish what is agreeable to our limited point of view4 ,but this that we have brought to clearest consciousness1 that although the particular phenomenon of the will has a temporal beginning and end1 the will itself as thing-in-itself is not affected by it1 nor yet the correlative of all object1 the knowing but never known subject1 and that life is always assured to the will to live--this is not to be numbered with the doctrines of immortality4 ,for permanence has no more to do with the will or with the pure subject of knowing1 the eternal eye of the world1 than transitoriness1 for both are predicates that are only valid in time1 and the will and the pure subject of knowing lie outside time4 ,therefore the egoism of the individual 7this particular phenomenon of will enlightened by the subject of knowing7 can extract as little nourishment and consolation for his wish to endure through endless time from the view we have expressed1 as he could from the knowledge that after his death the rest of the eternal world would continue to exist1 which is just the expression of the same view considered objectively1 and therefore temporally4 ,for every individual is transitory only as phenomenon1 but as thing-in-itself is timeless1 and therefore endless4 ,but it is also only as phenomenon that an individual is distinguished from the other things of the world2 as thing-in-itself he is the will which appears in all1 and death destroys the illusion which separates his consciousness from that of the rest3 this is immortality4 ,his exemption from death1 which belongs to him only as thing-in-itself1 is for the phenomenon one with the immortality of the rest of the external world47#fg7 ,hence also1 it arises that although the inward and merely felt consciousness of that which we have raised to distinct knowledge is indeed1 as we have said1 sufficient to prevent the thought of death from poisoning the life of the rational being1 because this consciousness is the basis of that love of life which maintains everything living1 and enables it to live on at ease as if there were no such thing as death1 so long as it is face to face with life1 and turns its attention to it1 yet it will not prevent the individual from being seized with the fear of death1 and trying in every way to escape from it1 when it presents itself to him in some particular real case1 or even only in his imagination1 and he is compelled to contemplate it4 ,for just as1 so long as his knowledge was directed to life as such1 he was obliged to recognise immortality in it1 so when death is brought before his eyes1 he is obliged to recognise it as that which it is1 the temporal end of the particular temporal phenomenon4 ,what we fear in death is by no means the pain1 for it lies clearly on this side of death1 and1 moreover1 we often take refuge in death from pain1 just as1 on the contrary1 we sometimes endure the most fearful suffering merely to escape death for a while1 although it would be quick and easy4 ,thus we distinguish pain and death as two entirely different evils4 ,what we fear in death is the end of the individual1 which it openly professes itself to be1 and since the individual is a particular objectification of the will to live itself1 its whole nature struggles against death4 ,now when feeling thus exposes us helpless1 reason can yet step in and for the most part overcome its adverse influence1 for it places us upon a higher standpoint1 from which we no longer contemplate the particular but the whole4 ,therefore a philosophical knowledge of the nature of the world1 which extended to the point we have now reached in this work but went no farther1 could even at this point of view overcome the terror of death in the measure in which reflection had power over direct feeling in the given individual4 ,a man who had thoroughly assimilated the truths we have already advanced1 but had not come to know1 either from his own experience or from a deeper insight1 that constant suffering is essential to life1 who found satisfaction and all that he wished in life1 and could calmly and deliberately desire that his life1 as he had hitherto known it1 should endure for ever or repeat itself ever anew1 and whose love of life was so great that he willingly and gladly accepted all the hardships and miseries to which it is exposed for the sake of its pleasures1--such a man would stand 8with firm-knit bones on the well-rounded1 enduring earth10 and would have nothing to fear4 ,armed with the knowledge we have given him1 he would await with indifference the death that hastens towards him on the wings of time4 ,he would regard it as a false illusion1 an impotent spectre1 which frightens the weak but has no power over him who knows that he is himself the will of which the whole world is the objectification or copy1 and that therefore he is always certain of life1 and also of the present1 the peculiar and only form of the phenomenon of the will4 ,he could not be terrified by an endless past or future in which he would not be1 for this he would regard as the empty delusion of the web of ,mya4 ,thus he would no more fear death than the sun fears the night4 ,in the 8,bhagavad-,gita0 ,krishna thus raises the mind of his young pupil ,arjuna1 when1 seized with compunction at the sight of the arrayed hosts 7somewhat as ,xerxes was71 he loses heart and desires to give up the battle in order to avert the death of so many thousands4 ,krishna leads him to this point of view1 and the death of those thousands can no longer restrain him2 he gives the sign for battle4 ,this point of view is also expressed by ,goethe's ,prometheus1 especially when he says-- 8,here sit ,i1 form mankind ,in my own image1 ,a race like to myself1 ,to suffer and to weep1 ,rejoice1 enjoy1 ,and heed thee not1 ,as ,i40 ,the philosophy of ,bruno and that of ,spinoza might also lead any one to this point of view whose conviction was not shaken and weakened by their errors and imperfections4 ,that of ,bruno has properly no ethical theory at all1 and the theory contained in the philosophy of ,spinoza does not really proceed from the inner nature of his doctrine1 but is merely tacked on to it by means of weak and palpable sophisms1 though in itself it is praiseworthy and beautiful4 ,finally1 there are many men who would occupy this point of view if their knowledge kept pace with their will1 i4e41 if1 free from all illusion1 they were in a position to become clearly and distinctly themselves4 ,for this is1 for knowledge1 the point of view of the complete assertion of the will to live4 ,that the will asserts itself means1 that while in its objectivity1 i4e41 in the world and life1 its own nature is completely and distinctly given it as idea1 this knowledge does not by any means check its volition2 but this very life1 so known1 is willed as such by the will with knowledge1 consciously and deliberately1 just as up to this point it willed it as blind effort without knowledge4 ,the opposite of this1 the denial of the will to live1 shows itself if1 when that knowledge is attained1 volition ends1 because the particular known phenomena no longer act as motives for willing1 but the whole knowledge of the nature of the world1 the mirror of the will1 which has grown up through the comprehension of the ,ideas1 becomes a quieter of the will2 and thus free1 the will suppresses itself4 ,these quite unfamiliar conceptions are difficult to understand when expressed in this general way1 but it is hoped they will become clear through the exposition we shall give presently1 with special reference to action1 of the phenomena in which1 on the one hand1 the assertion in its different grades1 and1 on the other hand1 the denial1 expresses itself4 ,for both proceed from knowledge1 yet not from abstract knowledge1 which is expressed in words1 but from living knowledge1 which is expressed in action and behaviour alone1 and is independent of the dogmas which at the same time occupy the reason as abstract knowledge4 ,to exhibit them both1 and bring them to distinct knowledge of the reason1 can alone be my aim1 and not to prescribe or recommend the one or the other1 which would be as foolish as it would be useless2 for the will in itself is absolutely free and entirely self-determining1 and for it there is no law4 ,but before we go on to the exposition referred to1 we must first explain and more exactly define this freedom and its relation to necessity4 ,and also1 with regard to the life1 the assertion and denial of which is our problem1 we must insert a few general remarks connected with the will and its objects4 ,through all this we shall facilitate the apprehension of the inmost nature of the knowledge we are aiming at1 of the ethical significance of methods of action4 ,since1 as has been said1 this whole work is only the unfolding of a single thought1 it follows that all its parts have the most intimate connection with each other4 ,not merely that each part stands in a necessary relation to what immediately precedes it1 and only presupposes a recollection of that by the reader1 as is the case with all philosophies which consist merely of a series of inferences1 but that every part of the whole work is related to every other part and presupposes it4 ,it is1 therefore1 necessary that the reader should remember not only what has just been said1 but all the earlier parts of the work1 so that he may be able to connect them with what he is reading1 however much may have intervened4 ,plato also makes this demand upon his readers through the intricate digressions of his dialogues1 in which he only returns to the leading thought after long episodes1 which illustrate and explain it4 ,in our case this demand is necessary2 for the breaking up of our one single thought into its many aspects is indeed the only means of imparting it1 though not essential to the thought itself1 but merely an artificial form4 ,the division of four principal points of view into four books1 and the most careful bringing together of all that is related and homogeneous1 assists the exposition and its comprehension2 yet the material absolutely does not admit of an advance in a straight line1 such as the progress of history1 but necessitates a more complicated exposition4 ,this again makes a repeated study of the book necessary1 for thus alone does the connection of all the parts with each other become distinct1 and only then do they all mutually throw light upon each other and become quite clear47#fh7 #ee4 ,that the will as such is free1 follows from the fact that1 according to our view1 it is the thing-in-itself1 the content of all phenomena4 ,the phenomena1 on the other hand1 we recognise as absolutely subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason in its four forms4 ,and since we know that necessity is throughout identical with following from given grounds1 and that these are convertible conceptions1 all that belongs to the phenomenon1 i4e41 all that is object for the knowing subject as individual1 is in one aspect reason1 and in another aspect consequent2 and in this last capacity is determined with absolute necessity1 and can1 therefore1 in no respect be other than it is4 ,the whole content of ,nature1 the collective sum of its phenomena1 is thus throughout necessary1 and the necessity of every part1 of every phenomenon1 of every event1 can always be proved1 because it must be possible to find the reason from which it follows as a consequent4 ,this admits of no exception3 it follows from the unrestricted validity of the principle of sufficient reason4 ,in another aspect1 however1 the same world is for us1 in all its phenomena1 objectivity of will4 ,and the will1 since it is not phenomenon1 is not idea or object1 but thing-in-itself1 and is not subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason1 the form of all object2 thus is not determined as a consequent through any reason1 knows no necessity1 i4e41 is free4 ,the concept of freedom is thus properly a negative concept1 for its content is merely the denial of necessity1 i4e41 the relation of consequent to its reason1 according to the principle of sufficient reason4 ,now here lies before us in its most distinct form the solution of that great contradiction1 the union of freedom with necessity1 which has so often been discussed in recent times1 yet1 so far as ,i know1 never clearly and adequately4 ,everything is as phenomenon1 as object1 absolutely necessary3 in itself it is will1 which is perfectly free to all eternity4 ,the phenomenon1 the object1 is necessarily and unalterably determined in that chain of causes and effects which admits of no interruption4 ,but the existence in general of this object1 and its specific nature1 i4e41 the ,idea which reveals itself in it1 or1 in other words1 its character1 is a direct manifestation of will4 ,thus1 in conformity with the freedom of this will1 the object might not be at all1 or it might be originally and essentially something quite different from what it is1 in which case1 however1 the whole chain of which it is a link1 and which is itself a manifestation of the same will1 would be quite different also4 ,but once there and existing1 it has entered the chain of causes and effects1 is always necessarily determined in it1 and can1 therefore1 neither become something else1 i4e41 change itself1 nor yet escape from the chain1 i4e41 vanish4 ,man1 like every other part of ,nature1 is objectivity of the will2 therefore all that has been said holds good of him4 ,as everything in ,nature has its forces and qualities1 which react in a definite way when definitely affected1 and constitute its character1 man also has his character1 from which the motives call forth his actions with necessity4 ,in this manner of conduct his empirical character reveals itself1 but in this again his intelligible character1 the will in itself1 whose determined phenomenon he is4 ,but man is the most complete phenomenon of will1 and1 as we explained in the ,second ,book1 he had to be enlightened with so high a degree of knowledge in order to maintain himself in existence1 that in it a perfectly adequate copy or repetition of the nature of the world under the form of the idea became possible3 this is the comprehension of the ,ideas1 the pure mirror of the world1 as we learnt in the ,third ,book4 ,thus in man the will can attain to full self-consciousness1 to distinct and exhaustive knowledge of its own nature1 as it mirrors itself in the whole world4 ,we saw in the preceding book that art springs from the actual presence of this degree of knowledge2 and at the end of our whole work it will further appear that1 through the same knowledge1 in that the will relates it to itself1 a suppression and self-denial of the will in its most perfect manifestation is possible4 ,so that the freedom which otherwise1 as belonging to the thing-in-itself1 can never show itself in the phenomenon1 in such a case does also appear in it1 and1 by abolishing the nature which lies at the foundation of the phenomenon1 while the latter itself still continues to exist in time1 it brings about a contradiction of the phenomenon with itself1 and in this way exhibits the phenomena of holiness and self-renunciation4 ,but all this can only be fully understood at the end of this book4 ,what has just been said merely affords a preliminary and general indication of how man is distinguished from all the other phenomena of will by the fact that freedom1 i4e41 independence of the principle of sufficient reason1 which only belongs to the will as thing-in-itself1 and contradicts the phenomenon1 may yet possibly1 in his case1 appear in the phenomenon also1 where1 however1 it necessarily exhibits itself as a contradiction of the phenomenon with itself4 ,in this sense1 not only the will in itself1 but man also may certainly be called free1 and thus distinguished from all other beings4 ,but how this is to be understood can only become clear through all that is to follow1 and for the present we must turn away from it altogether4 ,for1 in the first place1 we must beware of the error that the action of the individual definite man is subject to no necessity1 i4e41 that the power of the motive is less certain than the power of the cause1 or the following of the conclusion from the premises4 ,the freedom of the will as thing-in-itself1 if1 as has been said1 we abstract from the entirely exceptional case mentioned above1 by no means extends directly to its phenomenon1 not even in the case in which this reaches the highest made of its visibility1 and thus does not extend to the rational animal endowed with individual character1 i4e41 the person4 ,the person is never free although he is the phenomenon of a free will2 for he is already the determined phenomenon of the free volition of this will1 and1 because he enters the form of every object1 the principle of sufficient reason1 he develops indeed the unity of that will in a multiplicity of actions1 but on account of the timeless unity of that volition in itself1 this multiplicity exhibits in itself the regular conformity to law of a force of ,nature4 ,since1 however1 it is that free volition that becomes visible in the person and the whole of his conduct1 relating itself to him as the concept to the definition1 every individual action of the person is to be ascribed to the free will1 and directly proclaims itself as such in consciousness4 ,therefore1 as was said in the ,second ,book1 every one regards himself a priori 7i4e41 here in this original feeling7 as free in his individual actions1 in the sense that in every given case every action is possible for him1 and he only recognises a posteriori from experience and reflection upon experience that his actions take place with absolute necessity from the coincidence of his character with his motives4 ,hence it arises that every uncultured man1 following his feeling1 ardently defends complete freedom in particular actions1 while the great thinkers of all ages1 and indeed the more profound systems of religion1 have denied it4 ,but whoever has come to see clearly that the whole nature of man is will1 and he himself only a phenomenon of this will1 and that such a phenomenon has1 even from the subject itself1 the principle of sufficient reason as its necessary form1 which here appears as the law of motivation1--such a man will regard it as just as absurd to doubt the inevitable nature of an action when the motive is presented to a given character1 as to doubt that the three angles of any triangle are together equal to two right angles4 ,priestley has very sufficiently proved the necessity of the individual action in his 8,doctrine of ,philosophical ,necessity20 but ,kant1 whose merit in this respect is specially great1 first proved the coexistence of this necessity with the freedom of the will in itself1 i4e41 apart from the phenomenon17#fi7 by establishing the distinction between the intelligible and the empirical character4 ,i entirely adhere to this distinction1 for the former is the will as thing-in-itself so far as it appears in a definite individual in a definite grade1 and the latter is this phenomenon itself as it exhibits itself in time in the mode of action1 and in space in the physical structure4 ,in order to make the relation of the two comprehensible1 the best expression is that which ,i have already used in the introductory essay1 that the intelligible character of every man is to be regarded as an act of will outside time1 and therefore indivisible and unchangeable1 and the manifestation of this act of will developed and broken up in time and space and all the forms of the principle of sufficient reason is the empirical character as it exhibits itself for experience in the whole conduct and life of this man4 ,as the whole tree is only the constantly repeated manifestation of one and the same tendency1 which exhibits itself in its simplest form in the fibre1 and recurs and is easily recognised in the construction of the leaf1 shoot1 branch1 and trunk1 so all a man's deeds are merely the constantly repeated expression1 somewhat varied in form1 of his intelligible character1 and the induction based on the sum of all these expressions gives us his empirical character4 ,for the rest1 ,i shall not at this point repeat in my own words ,kant's masterly exposition1 but presuppose it as known4 ,in the year #ahdj ,i dealt with the important chapter on the freedom of the will1 thoroughly and in detail1 in my crowned prize-essay upon the subject1 and exposed the reason of the delusion which led men to imagine that they found an empirically given absolute freedom of the will1 that is to say1 a liberum arbitrium indifferenti1 as a fact in self-consciousness2 for the question propounded for the essay was with great insight directed to this point4 ,therefore1 as ,i refer the reader to that work1 and also to the tenth paragraph of the prize-essay on the basis of morals1 which was published along with it under the title 8,the ,two ,fundamental ,problems of ,ethics10 ,i now omit the incomplete exposition of the necessity of the act of will1 which was given at this place in the first edition4 ,instead of it ,i shall explain the delusion mentioned above in a brief discussion which is presupposed in the nineteenth chapter of the supplement to the present work1 and therefore could not be given in the prize-essay referred to4 ,apart from the fact that the will as the true thing-in-itself is actually original and independent1 and that the feeling of its originality and absoluteness must accompany its acts in self-consciousness1 though here they are already determined1 there arises the illusion of an empirical freedom of the will 7instead of the transcendental freedom which alone is to be attributed to it71 and thus a freedom of its particular actions1 from that attitude of the intellect towards the will which is explained1 separated1 and subordinated in the nineteenth chapter of the supplement1 especially under ,no4 #c4 ,the intellect knows the conclusions of the will only a posteriori and empirically2 therefore when a choice is presented1 it has no data as to how the will is to decide4 ,for the intelligible character1 by virtue of which1 when motives are given1 only one decision is possible and is therefore necessary1 does not come within the knowledge of the intellect1 but merely the empirical character is known to it through the succession of its particular acts4 ,therefore it seems to the intellect that in a given case two opposite decisions are possible for the will4 ,but this is just the same thing as if we were to say of a perpendicular beam that has lost its balance1 and is hesitating which way to fall1 8,it can fall either to the right hand or the left40 ,this can has merely a subjective significance1 and really means 8as far as the data known to us are concerned40 ,objectively1 the direction of the fall is necessarily determined as soon as the equilibrium is lost4 ,accordingly1 the decision of one's own will is undetermined only to the beholder1 one's own intellect1 and thus merely relatively and subjectively for the subject of knowing4 ,in itself and objectively1 on the other hand1 in every choice presented to it1 its decision is at once determined and necessary4 ,but this determination only comes into consciousness through the decision that follows upon it4 ,indeed1 we receive an empirical proof of this when any difficult and important choice lies before us1 but only under a condition which is not yet present1 but merely hoped for1 so that in the meanwhile we can do nothing1 but must remain passive4 ,now we consider how we shall decide when the circumstances occur that will give us a free activity and choice4 ,generally the foresight of rational deliberation recommends one decision1 while direct inclination leans rather to the other4 ,so long as we are compelled to remain passive1 the side of reason seems to wish to keep the upper hand2 but we see beforehand how strongly the other side will influence us when the opportunity for action arises4 ,till then we are eagerly concerned to place the motives on both sides in the clearest light1 by calm meditation on the pro et contra1 so that every motive may exert its full influence upon the will when the time arrives1 and it may not be misled by a mistake on the part of the intellect to decide otherwise than it would have done if all the motives had their due influence upon it4 ,but this distinct unfolding of the motives on both sides is all that the intellect can do to assist the choice4 ,it awaits the real decision just as passively and with the same intense curiosity as if it were that of a foreign will4 ,therefore from its point of view both decisions must seem to it equally possible2 and this is just the illusion of the empirical freedom of the will4 ,certainly the decision enters the sphere of the intellect altogether empirically1 as the final conclusion of the matter2 but yet it proceeded from the inner nature1 the intelligible character1 of the individual will in its conflict with given motives1 and therefore with complete necessity4 ,the intellect can do nothing more than bring out clearly and fully the nature of the motives2 it cannot determine the will itself2 for the will is quite inaccessible to it1 and1 as we have seen1 cannot be investigated4 ,if1 under the same circumstances1 a man could act now one way and now another1 it would be necessary that his will itself should have changed in the meantime1 and thus that it should lie in time1 for change is only possible in time2 but then either the will would be a mere phenomenon1 or time would be a condition of the thing-in-itself4 ,accordingly the dispute as to the freedom of the particular action1 the liberum arbitrium indifferenti1 really turns on the question whether the will lies in time or not4 ,if1 as both ,kant's doctrine and the whole of my system necessitates1 the will is the thing-in-itself outside time and outside every form of the principle of sufficient reason1 not only must the individual act in the same way in the same circumstances1 and not only must every bad action be the sure warrant of innumerable others1 which the individual must perform and cannot leave1 but1 as ,kant said1 if only the empirical character and the motives were completely given1 it would be possible to calculate the future conduct of a man just as we can calculate an eclipse of the sun or moon4 ,as ,nature is consistent1 so is the character2 every action must take place in accordance with it1 just as every phenomenon takes place according to a law of ,nature3 the causes in the latter case and the motives in the former are merely the occasional causes1 as was shown in the ,second ,book4 ,the will1 whose phenomenon is the whole being and life of man1 cannot deny itself in the particular case1 and what the man wills on the whole1 that will he also will in the particular case4 ,the assertion of an empirical freedom of the will1 a liberum arbitrium indifferenti1 agrees precisely with the doctrine that places the inner nature of man in a soul1 which is originally a knowing1 and indeed really an abstract thinking nature1 and only in consequence of this a willing nature--a doctrine which thus regards the will as of a secondary or derivative nature1 instead of knowledge which is really so4 ,the will indeed came to be regarded as an act of thought1 and to be identified with the judgment1 especially by ,descartes and ,spinoza4 ,according to this doctrine every man must become what he is only through his knowledge2 he must enter the world as a moral cipher come to know the things in it1 and thereupon determine to be this or that1 to act thus or thus1 and may also through new knowledge achieve a new course of action1 that is to say1 become another person4 ,further1 he must first know a thing to be good1 and in consequence of this will it1 instead of first willing it1 and in consequence of this calling it good4 ,according to my fundamental point of view1 all this is a reversal of the true relation4 ,will is first and original2 knowledge is merely added to it as an instrument belonging to the phenomenon of will4 ,therefore every man is what he is through his will1 and his character is original1 for willing is the basis of his nature4 ,through the knowledge which is added to it he comes to know in the course of experience what he is1 i4e41 he learns his character4 ,thus he knows himself in consequence of and in accordance with the nature of his will1 instead of willing in consequence of and in accordance with his knowing4 ,according to the latter view1 he would only require to consider how he would like best to be1 and he would be it2 that is its doctrine of the freedom of the will4 ,thus it consists really in this1 that a man is his own work guided by the light of knowledge4 ,i1 on the contrary1 say that he is his own work before all knowledge1 and knowledge is merely added to it to enlighten it4 ,therefore he cannot resolve to be this or that1 nor can he become other than he is2 but he is once for all1 and he knows in the course of experience what he is4 ,according to one doctrine he wills what he knows1 and according to the other he knows what he wills4 ,the ,greeks called the character 1 and its expression1 i4e41 morals1 4 ,but this word comes from 1 custom2 they chose it in order to express metaphorically the constancy of character through the constancy of custom4 4 7a voce 1 i4e41 consuetudo est appellatum3 ethica ergo dicta est 1 sivi ab assuescendo7 says ,aristotle 7,eth4 ,magna1 i4 #f1 p4 #aahf1 and ,eth4 ,eud41 p4 #abbj1 and ,eth4 ,nic41 p4 #aajc1 ed4 ,ber47 ,stobus quotes3 2 7,stoici autem1 ,zenonis castra sequentes1 metaphorice ethos definiunt vit fontem1 e quo singul manant actiones71 ii4 ch4 #g4 ,in ,christian theology we find the dogma of predestination in consequence of election and non-election 7,rom4 ix4 #aa-bd71 clearly originating from the knowledge that man does not change himself1 but his life and conduct1 i4e41 his empirical character1 is only the unfolding of his intelligible character1 the development of decided and unchangeable natural dispositions recognisable even in the child2 therefore1 as it were1 even at his birth his conduct is firmly determined1 and remains essentially the same to the end4 ,this we entirely agree with2 but certainly the consequences which followed from the union of this perfectly correct insight with the dogmas that already existed in ,jewish theology1 and which now gave rise to the great difficulty1 the ,gordian knot upon which most of the controversies of the ,church turned1 ,i do not undertake to defend1 for even the ,apostle ,paul scarcely succeeded in doing so by means of his simile of the potter's vessels which he invented for the purpose1 for the result he finally arrived at was nothing else than this3-- 8,let mankind ,fear the gods6 ,they hold the power ,in everlasting hands3 ,and they can use it ,as seems good to them40 ,such considerations1 however1 are really foreign to our subject4 ,some explanation as to the relation between the character and the knowledge in which all its motives lie1 will now be more to the point4 ,the motives which determine the manifestation of the character or conduct influence it through the medium of knowledge4 ,but knowledge is changeable1 and often vacillates between truth and error1 yet1 as a rule1 is rectified more and more in the course of life1 though certainly in very different degrees4 ,therefore the conduct of a man may be observably altered without justifying us in concluding that his character has been changed4 ,what the man really and in general wills1 the striving of his inmost nature1 and the end he pursues in accordance with it1 this we can never change by influence upon him from without by instruction1 otherwise we could transform him4 ,seneca says admirably1 velle non discitur2 whereby he preferred truth to his ,stoic philosophers1 who taught 7doceri posse virtutem74 ,from without the will can only be affected by motives4 ,but these can never change the will itself2 for they have power over it only under the presupposition that it is precisely such as it is4 ,all that they can do is thus to alter the direction of its effort1 i4e41 bring it about that it shall seek in another way than it has hitherto done that which it invariably seeks4 ,therefore instruction1 improved knowledge1 in other words1 influence from without1 may indeed teach the will that it erred in the means it employed1 and can therefore bring it about that the end after which it strives once for all according to its inner nature shall be pursued on an entirely different path and in an entirely different object from what has hitherto been the case4 ,but it can never bring about that the will shall will something actually different from what it has hitherto willed2 this remains unchangeable1 for the will is simply this willing itself1 which would have to be abolished4 ,the former1 however1 the possible modification of knowledge1 and through knowledge of conduct1 extends so far that the will seeks to attain its unalterable end1 for example1 ,mohammed's paradise1 at one time in the real world1 at another time in a world of imagination1 adapting the means to each1 and thus in the first case applying prudence1 might1 and fraud1 and in the second case1 abstinence1 justice1 alms1 and pilgrimages to ,mecca4 ,but its effort itself has not therefore changed1 still less the will itself4 ,thus1 although its action certainly shows itself very different at different times1 its willing has yet remained precisely the same4 ,velle non discitur4 ,for motives to act1 it is necessary not only that they should be present1 but that they should be known2 for1 according to a very good expression of the schoolmen1 which we referred to once before1 causa finalis movet non secundum suum esse reale2 sed secundum esse cognitum4 ,for example1 in order that the relation may appear that exists in a given man between egoism and sympathy1 it is not sufficient that he should possess wealth and see others in want1 but he must also know what he can do with his wealth1 both for himself and for others3 not only must the suffering of others be presented to him1 but he must know both what suffering and also what pleasure is4 ,perhaps1 on a first occasion1 he did not know all this so well as on a second2 and if1 on a similar occasion1 he acts differently1 this arises simply from the fact that the circumstances were really different1 as regards the part of them that depends on his knowing them1 although they seem to be the same4 ,as ignorance of actually existing circumstances robs them of their influence1 so1 on the other hand1 entirely imaginary circumstances may act as if they were real1 not only in the case of a particular deception1 but also in general and continuously4 ,for example1 if a man is firmly persuaded that every good action will be repaid him a hundredfold in a future life1 such a conviction affects him in precisely the same way as a good bill of exchange at a very long date1 and he can give from mere egoism1 as from another point of view he would take from egoism4 ,he has not changed himself3 velle non discitur4 ,it is on account of this great influence of knowledge upon action1 while the will remains unchangeable1 that the character develops and its different features appear only little by little4 ,therefore it shows itself different at every period of life1 and an impetuous1 wild youth may be succeeded by a staid1 sober1 manly age4 ,especially what is bad in the character will always come out more strongly with time1 yet sometimes it occurs that passions which a man gave way to in his youth are afterwards voluntarily restrained1 simply because the motives opposed to them have only then come into knowledge4 ,hence1 also1 we are all innocent to begin with1 and this merely means that neither we nor others know the evil of our own nature2 it only appears with the motives1 and only in time do the motives appear in knowledge4 ,finally we come to know ourselves as quite different from what a priori we supposed ourselves to be1 and then we are often terrified at ourselves4 ,repentance never proceeds from a change of the will 7which is impossible71 but from a change of knowledge4 ,the essential and peculiar in what ,i have always willed ,i must still continue to will2 for ,i myself am this will which lies outside time and change4 ,i can therefore never repent of what ,i have willed1 though ,i can repent of what ,i have done2 because1 led by false conceptions1 ,i did something that was not in conformity with my will4 ,the discovery of this through fuller knowledge is repentance4 ,this extends not merely to worldly wisdom1 to the choice of the means1 and the judgment of the appropriateness of the end to my own will1 but also to what is properly ethical4 ,for example1 ,i may have acted more egotistically than is in accordance with my character1 led astray by exaggerated ideas of the need in which ,i myself stood1 or of the craft1 falseness1 and wickedness of others1 or because ,i hurried too much1 i4e41 acted without deliberation1 determined not by motives distinctly known in abstracto1 but by merely perceived motives1 by the present and the emotion which it excited1 and which was so strong that ,i had not properly the use of my reason2 but the return of reflection is thus here also merely corrected knowledge1 and from this repentance may proceed1 which always proclaims itself by making amends for the past1 as far as is possible4 ,yet it must be observed that1 in order to deceive themselves1 men prearrange what seem to be hasty errors1 but are really secretly considered actions4 ,for we deceive and flatter no one through such fine devices as ourselves4 ,the converse of the case we have given may also occur4 ,i may be misled by too good an opinion of others1 or want of knowledge of the relative value of the good things of life1 or some abstract dogma in which ,i have since lost faith1 and thus ,i may act less egotistically than is in keeping with my character1 and lay up for myself repentance of another kind4 ,thus repentance is always corrected knowledge of the relation of an act to its special intention4 ,when the will reveals its ,ideas in space alone1 i4e41 through mere form1 the matter in which other ,ideas--in this case natural forces--already reign1 resists the will1 and seldom allows the form that is striving after visibility to appear in perfect purity and distinctness1 i4e41 in perfect beauty4 ,and there is an analogous hindrance to the will as it reveals itself in time alone1 i4e41 through actions1 in the knowledge which seldom gives it the data quite correctly1 so that the action which takes place does not accurately correspond to the will1 and leads to repentance4 ,repentance thus always proceeds from corrected knowledge1 not from the change of the will1 which is impossible4 ,anguish of conscience for past deeds is anything but repentance4 ,it is pain at the knowledge of oneself in one's inmost nature1 i4e41 as will4 ,it rests precisely on the certainty that we have still the same will4 ,if the will were changed1 and therefore the anguish of conscience mere repentance1 it would cease to exist4 ,the past could then no longer give us pain1 for it exhibited the expressions of a will which is no longer that of him who has repented4 ,we shall explain the significance of anguish of conscience in detail farther on4 ,the influence which knowledge1 as the medium of motives1 exerts1 not indeed upon the will itself1 but upon its appearance in actions1 is also the source of the principal distinction between the action of men and that of brutes1 for their methods of knowledge are different4 ,the brute has only knowledge of perception1 the man1 through reason1 has also abstract ideas1 conceptions4 ,now1 although man and brute are with equal necessity determined by their motives1 yet man1 as distinguished from the brute1 has a complete choice1 which has often been regarded as a freedom of the will in particular actions1 although it is nothing but the possibility of a thoroughly-fought-out battle between several motives1 the strongest of which then determines it with necessity4 ,for this the motives must have assumed the form of abstract thoughts1 because it is really only by means of these that deliberation1 i4e41 a weighing of opposite reasons for action1 is possible4 ,in the case of the brute there can only be a choice between perceptible motives presented to it1 so that the choice is limited to the narrow sphere of its present sensuous perception4 ,therefore the necessity of the determination of the will by the motive1 which is like that of the effect by the cause1 can be exhibited perceptibly and directly only in the case of the brutes1 because here the spectator has the motives just as directly before his eyes as their effect2 while in the case of man the motives are almost always abstract ideas1 which are not communicated to the spectator1 and even for the actor himself the necessity of their effect is hidden behind their conflict4 ,for only in abstracto can several ideas1 as judgments and chains of conclusions1 lie beside each other in consciousness1 and then1 free from all determination of time1 work against each other till the stronger overcomes the rest and determines the will4 ,this is the complete choice or power of deliberation which man has as distinguished from the brutes1 and on account of which freedom of the will has been attributed to him1 in the belief that his willing is a mere result of the operations of his intellect1 without a definite tendency which serves as its basis2 while1 in truth1 the motives only work on the foundation and under the presupposition of his definite tendency1 which in his case is individual1 i4e41 a character4 ,a fuller exposition of this power of deliberation1 and the difference between human and brute choice which is introduced by it1 will be found in the 8,two ,fundamental ,problems of ,ethics0 7#ast edition1 p4 #ce1 et seq42 #b;d edition1 p4 #cd1 et seq471 to which ,i therefore refer4 ,for the rest1 this power of deliberation which man possesses is one of those things that makes his existence so much more miserable than that of the brute4 ,for in general our greatest sufferings do not lie in the present as ideas of perception or as immediate feelings2 but in the reason1 as abstract conceptions1 painful thoughts1 from which the brute1 which lives only in the present1 and therefore in enviable carelessness1 is entirely free4 ,it seems to have been the dependence1 which we have shown1 of the human power of deliberation upon the faculty of abstract thinking1 and thus also of judging and drawing conclusions also1 that led both ,descartes and ,spinoza to identify the decisions of the will with the faculty of asserting and denying 7the faculty of judgment74 ,from this ,descartes deduced the doctrine that the will1 which1 according to him1 is indifferently free1 is the source of sin1 and also of all theoretical error4 ,and ,spinoza1 on the other hand1 concluded that the will is necessarily determined by the motives1 as the judgment is by the reasons47#gj7 ,the latter doctrine is in a sense true1 but it appears as a true conclusion from false premises4 ,the distinction we have established between the ways in which the brutes and man are respectively moved by motives exerts a very wide influence upon the nature of both1 and has most to do with the complete and obvious differences of their existence4 ,while an idea of perception is in every case the motive which determines the brute1 the man strives to exclude this kind of motivation altogether1 and to determine himself entirely by abstract ideas4 ,thus he uses his prerogative of reason to the greatest possible advantage4 ,independent of the present1 he neither chooses nor avoids the passing pleasure or pain1 but reflects on the consequences of both4 ,in most cases1 setting aside quite insignificant actions1 we are determined by abstract1 thought motives1 not present impressions4 ,therefore all particular privation for the moment is for us comparatively light1 but all renunciation is terribly hard2 for the former only concerns the fleeting present1 but the latter concerns the future1 and includes in itself innumerable privations1 of which it is the equivalent4 ,the causes of our pain1 as of our pleasure1 lie for the most part1 not in the real present1 but merely in abstract thoughts4 ,it is these which are often unbearable to us--inflict torments in comparison with which all the sufferings of the animal world are very small2 for even our own physical pain is not felt at all when they are present4 ,indeed1 in the case of keen mental suffering1 we even inflict physical suffering on ourselves merely to distract our attention from the former to the latter4 ,this is why1 in great mental anguish1 men tear their hair1 beat their breasts1 lacerate their faces1 or roll on the floor1 for all these are in reality only violent means of diverting the mind from an unbearable thought4 ,just because mental pain1 being much greater1 makes us insensible to physical pain1 suicide is very easy to the person who is in despair1 or who is consumed by morbid depression1 even though formerly1 in comfortable circumstances1 he recoiled at the thought of it4 ,in the same way care and passion 7thus the play of thought7 wear out the body oftener and more than physical hardships4 ,and in accordance with this ,epictetus rightly says3 1 7,perturbant homines non res ips1 sed de rebus decreta7 7,v472 and ,seneca3 ,plura sunt qu nos terrent1 quam qu premunt1 et spius opinione quam re laboramus 7,ep4 #e74 ,eulenspiegel also admirably bantered human nature1 for going uphill he laughed1 and going downhill he wept4 ,indeed1 children who have hurt themselves often cry1 not at the pain1 but at the thought of the pain which is awakened when some one condoles with them4 ,such great differences in conduct and in life arise from the diversity between the methods of knowledge of the brutes and man4 ,further1 the appearance of the distinct and decided individual character1 the principal distinction between man and the brute1 which has scarcely more than the character of the species1 is conditioned by the choice between several motives1 which is only possible through abstract conceptions4 ,for only after a choice has been made are the resolutions1 which vary in different individuals1 an indication of the individual character which is different in each2 while the action of the brute depends only upon the presence or absence of the impression1 supposing this impression to be in general a motive for its species4 ,and1 finally1 in the case of man1 only the resolve1 and not the mere wish1 is a valid indication of his character both for himself and for others2 but the resolve becomes for himself1 as for others1 a certain fact only through the deed4 ,the wish is merely the necessary consequence of the present impression1 whether of the outward stimulus1 or the inward passing mood2 and is therefore as immediately necessary and devoid of consideration as the action of the brutes4 ,therefore1 like the action of the brutes1 it merely expresses the character of the species1 not that of the individual1 i4e41 it indicates merely what man in general1 not what the individual who experiences the wish1 is capable of doing4 ,the deed alone1--because as human action it always requires a certain deliberation1 and because as a rule a man has command of his reason1 is considerate1 i4e41 decides in accordance with considered and abstract motives1--is the expression of the intelligible maxims of his conduct1 the result of his inmost willing1 and is related as a letter to the word that stands for his empirical character1 itself merely the temporal expression of his intelligible character4 ,in a healthy mind1 therefore1 only deeds oppress the conscience1 not wishes and thoughts2 for it is only our deeds that hold up to us the mirror of our will4 ,the deed referred to above1 that is entirely unconsidered and is really committed in blind passion1 is to a certain extent an intermediate thing between the mere wish and the resolve4 ,therefore1 by true repentance1 which1 however1 shows itself as action also1 it can be obliterated1 as a falsely drawn line1 from that picture of our will which our course of life is4 ,i may insert the remark here1 as a very good comparison1 that the relation between wish and deed has a purely accidental but accurate analogy with that between the accumulation and discharge of electricity4 ,as the result of the whole of this discussion of the freedom of the will and what relates to it1 we find that although the will may1 in itself and apart from the phenomenon1 be called free and even omnipotent1 yet in its particular phenomena enlightened by knowledge1 as in men and brutes1 it is determined by motives to which the special character regularly and necessarily responds1 and always in the same way4 ,we see that because of the possession on his part of abstract or rational knowledge1 man1 as distinguished from the brutes1 has a choice1 which only makes him the scene of the conflict of his motives1 without withdrawing him from their control4 ,this choice is therefore certainly the condition of the possibility of the complete expression of the individual character1 but is by no means to be regarded as freedom of the particular volition1 i4e41 independence of the law of causality1 the necessity of which extends to man as to every other phenomenon4 ,thus the difference between human volition and that of the brutes1 which is introduced by reason or knowledge through concepts1 extends to the point we have indicated1 and no farther4 ,but1 what is quite a different thing1 there may arise a phenomenon of the human will which is quite impossible in the brute creation1 if man altogether lays aside the knowledge of particular things as such which is subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason1 and by means of his knowledge of the ,ideas sees through the principium individuationis4 ,then an actual appearance of the real freedom of the will as a thing-in-itself is possible1 by which the phenomenon comes into a sort of contradiction with itself1 as is indicated by the word self-renunciation2 and1 finally1 the 8in-itself0 of its nature suppresses itself4 ,but this1 the one1 real1 and direct expression of the freedom of the will in itself in the phenomenon1 cannot be distinctly explained here1 but will form the subject of the concluding part of our work4 ,now that we have shown clearly in these pages the unalterable nature of the empirical character1 which is just the unfolding of the intelligible character that lies outside time1 together with the necessity with which actions follow upon its contact with motives1 we hasten to anticipate an argument which may very easily be drawn from this in the interest of bad dispositions4 ,our character is to be regarded as the temporal unfolding of an extra-temporal1 and therefore indivisible and unalterable1 act of will1 or an intelligible character4 ,this necessarily determines all that is essential in our conduct in life1 i4e41 its ethical content1 which must express itself in accordance with it in its phenomenal appearance1 the empirical character2 while only what is unessential in this1 the outward form of our course of life1 depends upon the forms in which the motives present themselves4 ,it might1 therefore1 be inferred that it is a waste of trouble to endeavour to improve one's character1 and that it is wiser to submit to the inevitable1 and gratify every inclination at once1 even if it is bad4 ,but this is precisely the same thing as the theory of an inevitable fate which is called 1 and in more recent times ,turkish faith4 ,its true refutation1 as it is supposed to have been given by ,chrysippus1 is explained by ,cicero in his book ,de ,fato1 ch4 #ab1 #ac4 ,though everything may be regarded as irrevocably predetermined by fate1 yet it is so only through the medium of the chain of causes2 therefore in no case can it be determined that an effect shall appear without its cause4 ,thus it is not simply the event that is predetermined1 but the event as the consequence of preceding causes2 so that fate does not decide the consequence alone1 but also the means as the consequence of which it is destined to appear4 ,accordingly1 if some means is not present1 it is certain that the consequence also will not be present3 each is always present in accordance with the determination of fate1 but this is never known to us till afterwards4 ,as events always take place according to fate1 i4e41 according to the infinite concatenation of causes1 so our actions always take place according to our intelligible character4 ,but just as we do not know the former beforehand1 so no a priori insight is given us into the latter1 but we only come to know ourselves as we come to know other persons a posteriori through experience4 ,if the intelligible character involved that we could only form a good resolution after a long conflict with a bad disposition1 this conflict would have to come first and be waited for4 ,reflection on the unalterable nature of the character1 on the unity of the source from which all our actions flow1 must not mislead us into claiming the decision of the character in favour of one side or the other2 it is in the resolve that follows that we shall see what manner of men we are1 and mirror ourselves in our actions4 ,this is the explanation of the satisfaction or the anguish of soul with which we look back on the course of our past life4 ,both are experienced1 not because these past deeds have still an existence2 they are past1 they have been1 and now are no more2 but their great importance for us lies in their significance1 lies in the fact that these deeds are the expression of the character1 the mirror of the will1 in which we look and recognise our inmost self1 the kernel of our will4 ,because we experience this not before1 but only after1 it behoves us to strive and fight in time1 in order that the picture we produce by our deeds may be such that the contemplation of it may calm us as much as possible1 instead of harassing us4 ,the significance of this consolation or anguish of soul will1 as we have said1 be inquired into farther on2 but to this place there belongs the inquiry which follows1 and which stands by itself4 ,besides the intelligible and the empirical character1 we must mention a third which is different from them both1 the acquired character1 which one only receives in life through contact with the world1 and which is referred to when one is praised as a man of character or censured as being without character4 ,certainly one might suppose that1 since the empirical character1 as the phenomenon of the intelligible1 is unalterable1 and1 like every natural phenomenon1 is consistent with itself1 man would always have to appear like himself and consistent1 and would therefore have no need to acquire a character artificially by experience and reflection4 ,but the case is otherwise1 and although a man is always the same1 yet he does not always understand himself1 but often mistakes himself1 till he has in some degree acquired real self-knowledge4 ,the empirical character1 as a mere natural tendency1 is in itself irrational2 nay1 more1 its expressions are disturbed by reason1 all the more so the more intellect and power of thought the man has2 for these always keep before him what becomes man in general as the character of the species1 and what is possible for him both in will and in deed4 ,this makes it the more difficult for him to see how much his individuality enables him to will and to accomplish4 ,he finds in himself the germs of all the various human pursuits and powers1 but the difference of degree in which they exist in his individuality is not clear to him in the absence of experience2 and if he now applies himself to the pursuits which alone correspond to his character1 he yet feels1 especially at particular moments and in particular moods1 the inclination to directly opposite pursuits which cannot be combined with them1 but must be entirely suppressed if he desires to follow the former undisturbed4 ,for as our physical path upon earth is always merely a line1 not an extended surface1 so in life1 if we desire to grasp and possess one thing1 we must renounce and leave innumerable others on the right hand and on the left4 ,if we cannot make up our minds to this1 but1 like children at the fair1 snatch at everything that attracts us in passing1 we are making the perverse endeavour to change the line of our path into an extended surface2 we run in a zigzag1 skip about like a will o' the wisp1 and attain to nothing4 ,or1 to use another comparison1 as1 according to ,hobbes' philosophy of law1 every one has an original right to everything but an exclusive right to nothing1 yet can obtain an exclusive right to particular things by renouncing his right to all the rest1 while others1 on their part1 do likewise with regard to what he has chosen2 so is it in life1 in which some definite pursuit1 whether it be pleasure1 honour1 wealth1 science1 art1 or virtue1 can only be followed with seriousness and success when all claims that are foreign to it are given up1 when everything else is renounced4 ,accordingly1 the mere will and the mere ability are not sufficient1 but a man must also know what he wills1 and know what he can do2 only then will he show character1 and only then can he accomplish something right4 ,until he attains to that1 notwithstanding the natural consistency of the empirical character1 he is without character4 ,and although1 on the whole1 he must remain true to himself1 and fulfil his course1 led by his dmon1 yet his path will not be a straight line1 but wavering and uneven4 ,he will hesitate1 deviate1 turn back1 lay up for himself repentance and pain4 ,and all this is because1 in great and small1 he sees before him all that is possible and attainable for man in general1 but does not know what part of all this is alone suitable for him1 can be accomplished by him1 and is alone enjoyable by him4 ,he will1 therefore1 envy many men on account of a position and circumstances which are yet only suitable to their characters and not to his1 and in which he would feel unhappy1 if indeed he found them endurable at all4 ,for as a fish is only at home in water1 a bird in the air1 a mole in the earth1 so every man is only at home in the atmosphere suitable to him4 ,for example1 not all men can breathe the air of court life4 ,from deficiency of proper insight into all this1 many a man will make all kinds of abortive attempts1 will do violence to his character in particulars1 and yet1 on the whole1 will have to yield to it again2 and what he thus painfully attains will give him no pleasure2 what he thus learns will remain dead2 even in an ethical regard1 a deed that is too noble for his character1 that has not sprung from pure1 direct impulse1 but from a concept1 a dogma1 will lose all merit1 even in his own eyes1 through subsequent egoistical repentance4 ,velle non discitur4 ,we only become conscious of the inflexibility of another person's character through experience1 and till then we childishly believe that it is possible1 by means of rational ideas1 by prayers and entreaties1 by example and noble-mindedness1 ever to persuade any one to leave his own way1 to change his course of conduct1 to depart from his mode of thinking1 or even to extend his capacities3 so is it also with ourselves4 ,we must first learn from experience what we desire and what we can do4 ,till then we know it not1 we are without character1 and must often be driven back to our own way by hard blows from without4 ,but if we have finally learnt it1 then we have attained to what in the world is called character1 the acquired character4 ,this is accordingly nothing but the most perfect knowledge possible of our own individuality4 ,it is the abstract1 and consequently distinct1 knowledge of the unalterable qualities of our own empirical character1 and of the measure and direction of our mental and physical powers1 and thus of the whole strength and weakness of our own individuality4 ,this places us in a position to carry out deliberately and methodically the rle which belongs to our own person1 and to fill up the gaps which caprices or weaknesses produce in it1 under the guidance of fixed conceptions4 ,this rle is in itself unchangeably determined once for all1 but hitherto we have allowed it to follow its natural course without any rule4 ,we have now brought to distinct conscious maxims which are always present to us the form of conduct which is necessarily determined by our own individual nature1 and now we conduct it in accordance with them as deliberately as if we had learned it2 without ever falling into error through the passing influence of the mood or the impression of the present1 without being checked by the bitterness or sweetness of some particular thing we meet with on our path1 without delay1 without hesitation1 without inconsistency4 ,we shall now no longer1 as novices1 wait1 attempt1 and grope about in order to see what we really desire and are able to do1 but we know this once for all1 and in every choice we have only to apply general principles to particular cases1 and arrive at once at a decision4 ,we know our will in general1 and do not allow ourselves to be led by the passing mood or by solicitations from without to resolve in particular cases what is contrary to it as a whole4 ,we know in the same way the nature and the measure of our strength and our weakness1 and thereby are spared much suffering4 ,for we experience no real pleasure except in the use and feeling of our own powers1 and the greatest pain is the conscious deficiency of our powers where we need them4 ,if1 now1 we have discovered where our strength and our weakness lie1 we will endeavour to cultivate1 employ1 and in every way make use of those talents which are naturally prominent in us4 ,we will always turn to those occupations in which they are valuable and to the purpose1 and entirely avoid1 even with self-renunciation1 those pursuits for which we have naturally little aptitude2 we will beware of attempting that in which we have no chance of succeeding4 ,only he who has attained to this will constantly and with full consciousness be completely himself1 and will never fail himself at the critical moment1 because he will always have known what he could expect from himself4 ,he will often enjoy the satisfaction of feeling his strength1 and seldom experience the pain of being reminded of his weakness4 ,the latter is mortification1 which causes perhaps the greatest of mental sufferings2 therefore it is far more endurable to have our misfortune brought clearly before us than our incapacity4 ,and1 further1 if we are thus fully acquainted with our strength and our weakness1 we will not attempt to make a show of powers which we do not possess2 we will not play with base coin1 for all such dissimulation misses the mark in the end4 ,for since the whole man is only the phenomenon of his will1 nothing can be more perverse than to try1 by means of reflection1 to become something else than one is1 for this is a direct contradiction of the will with itself4 ,the imitation of the qualities and idiosyncrasies of others is much more shameful than to dress in other people's clothes2 for it is the judgment of our own worthlessness pronounced by ourselves4 ,knowledge of our own mind and its capacities of every kind1 and their unalterable limits1 is in this respect the surest way to the attainment of the greatest possible contentment with ourselves4 ,for it holds good of inward as of outward circumstances that there is for us no consolation so effective as the complete certainty of unalterable necessity4 ,no evil that befalls us pains us so much as the thought of the circumstances by which it might have been warded off4 ,therefore nothing comforts us so effectually as the consideration of what has happened from the standpoint of necessity1 from which all accidents appear as tools in the hand of an overruling fate1 and we therefore recognise the evil that has come to us as inevitably produced by the conflict of inner and outer circumstances2 in other words1 fatalism4 ,we really only complain and storm so long as we hope either to affect others or to excite ourselves to unheard-of efforts4 ,but children and grown-up people know very well to yield contentedly as soon as they clearly see that it absolutely cannot be otherwise3-- 7,animo in pectoribus nostro domito necessitate74 ,we are like the entrapped elephants1 that rage and struggle for many days1 till they see that it is useless1 and then suddenly offer their necks quietly to the yoke1 tamed for ever4 ,we are like ,king ,david1 who1 as long as his son still lived1 unceasingly importuned ,jehovah with prayers1 and behaved himself as if in despair2 but as soon as his son was dead1 thought no longer about it4 ,hence it arises that innumerable permanent ills1 such as lameness1 poverty1 low estate1 ugliness1 a disagreeable dwelling-place1 are borne with indifference by innumerable persons1 and are no longer felt1 like healed wounds1 just because these persons know that inward or outward necessity renders it impossible that any change can take place in these things2 while those who are more fortunate cannot understand how such misfortunes can be borne4 ,now as with outward necessity1 so also with inward2 nothing reconciles so thoroughly as a distinct knowledge of it4 ,if we have once for all distinctly recognised not only our good qualities and our strength1 but also our defects and weakness1 established our aim accordingly1 and rest satisfied concerning what cannot be attained1 we thus escape in the surest way1 as far as our individuality permits1 the bitterest of all sorrows1 discontentment with ourselves1 which is the inevitable result of ignorance of our own individuality1 of false conceit and the audacity that proceeds from it4 ,to the bitter chapter of the self-knowledge here recommended the lines of ,ovid admit of excellent application-- 8,optimus ille animi vindex ldentia pectus1 ,vincula qui rupit1 dedoluitque semel40 ,so much with regard to the acquired character1 which1 indeed1 is not of so much importance for ethics proper as for life in the world4 ,but its investigation was related as that of a third species to the investigation of the intelligible and the empirical character1 in regard to which we were obliged to enter upon a somewhat detailed inquiry in order to bring out clearly how in all its phenomena the will is subject to necessity1 while yet in itself it may be called free and even omnipotent4 #ef4 ,this freedom1 this omnipotence1 as the expression of which the whole visible world exists and progressively develops in accordance with the laws which belong to the form of knowledge1 can now1 at the point at which in its most perfect manifestation it has attained to the completely adequate knowledge of its own nature1 express itself anew in two ways4 ,either it wills here1 at the summit of mental endowment and self-consciousness1 simply what it willed before blindly and unconsciously1 and if so1 knowledge always remains its motive in the whole as in the particular case4 ,or1 conversely1 this knowledge becomes for it a quieter1 which appeases and suppresses all willing4 ,this is that assertion and denial of the will to live which was stated above in general terms4 ,as1 in the reference of individual conduct1 a general1 not a particular manifestation of will1 it does not disturb and modify the development of the character1 nor does it find its expression in particular actions2 but1 either by an ever more marked appearance of the whole method of action it has followed hitherto1 or conversely by the entire suppression of it1 it expresses in a living form the maxims which the will has freely adopted in accordance with the knowledge it has now attained to4 ,by the explanations we have just given of freedom1 necessity1 and character1 we have somewhat facilitated and prepared the way for the clearer development of all this1 which is the principal subject of this last book4 ,but we shall have done so still more when we have turned our attention to life itself1 the willing or not willing of which is the great question1 and have endeavoured to find out generally what the will itself1 which is everywhere the inmost nature of this life1 will really attain by its assertion--in what way and to what extent this assertion satisfies or can satisfy the will2 in short1 what is generally and mainly to be regarded as its position in this its own world1 which in every relation belongs to it4 ,first of all1 ,i wish the reader to recall the passage with which we closed the ,second ,book1--a passage occasioned by the question1 which met us then1 as to the end and aim of the will4 ,instead of the answer to this question1 it appeared clearly before us how1 in all the grades of its manifestation1 from the lowest to the highest1 the will dispenses altogether with a final goal and aim4 ,it always strives1 for striving is its sole nature1 which no attained goal can put an end to4 ,therefore it is not susceptible of any final satisfaction1 but can only be restrained by hindrances1 while in itself it goes on for ever4 ,we see this in the simplest of all natural phenomena1 gravity1 which does not cease to strive and press towards a mathematical centre to reach which would be the annihilation both of itself and matter1 and would not cease even if the whole universe were already rolled into one ball4 ,we see it in the other simple natural phenomena4 ,a solid tends towards fluidity either by melting or dissolving1 for only so will its chemical forces be free2 rigidity is the imprisonment in which it is held by cold4 ,the fluid tends towards the gaseous state1 into which it passes at once as soon as all pressure is removed from it4 ,no body is without relationship1 i4e41 without tendency or without desire and longing1 as ,jacob ,bhme would say4 ,electricity transmits its inner self-repulsion to infinity1 though the mass of the earth absorbs the effect4 ,galvanism is certainly1 so long as the pile is working1 an aimless1 unceasingly repeated act of repulsion and attraction4 ,the existence of the plant is just such a restless1 never satisfied striving1 a ceaseless tendency through ever-ascending forms1 till the end1 the seed1 becomes a new starting-point2 and this repeated ad infinitum--nowhere an end1 nowhere a final satisfaction1 nowhere a resting-place4 ,it will also be remembered1 from the ,second ,book1 that the multitude of natural forces and organised forms everywhere strive with each other for the matter in which they desire to appear1 for each of them only possesses what it has wrested from the others2 and thus a constant internecine war is waged1 from which1 for the most part1 arises the resistance through which that striving1 which constitutes the inner nature of everything1 is at all points hindered2 struggles in vain1 yet1 from its nature1 cannot leave off2 toils on laboriously till this phenomenon dies1 when others eagerly seize its place and its matter4 ,we have long since recognised this striving1 which constitutes the kernel and in-itself of everything1 as identical with that which in us1 where it manifests itself most distinctly in the light of the fullest consciousness1 is called will4 ,its hindrance through an obstacle which places itself between it and its temporary aim we call suffering1 and1 on the other hand1 its attainment of the end satisfaction1 wellbeing1 happiness4 ,we may also transfer this terminology to the phenomena of the unconscious world1 for though weaker in degree1 they are identical in nature4 ,then we see them involved in constant suffering1 and without any continuing happiness4 ,for all effort springs from defect--from discontent with one's estate--is thus suffering so long as it is not satisfied2 but no satisfaction is lasting1 rather it is always merely the starting-point of a new effort4 ,the striving we see everywhere hindered in many ways1 everywhere in conflict1 and therefore always under the form of suffering4 ,thus1 if there is no final end of striving1 there is no measure and end of suffering4 ,but what we only discover in unconscious ,nature by sharpened observation1 and with an effort1 presents itself distinctly to us in the intelligent world in the life of animals1 whose constant suffering is easily proved4 ,but without lingering over these intermediate grades1 we shall turn to the life of man1 in which all this appears with the greatest distinctness1 illuminated by the clearest knowledge2 for as the phenomenon of will becomes more complete1 the suffering also becomes more and more apparent4 ,in the plant there is as yet no sensibility1 and therefore no pain4 ,a certain very small degree of suffering is experienced by the lowest species of animal life--infusoria and radiata2 even in insects the capacity to feel and suffer is still limited4 ,it first appears in a high degree with the complete nervous system of vertebrate animals1 and always in a higher degree the more intelligence develops4 ,thus1 in proportion as knowledge attains to distinctness1 as consciousness ascends1 pain also increases1 and therefore reaches its highest degree in man4 ,and then1 again1 the more distinctly a man knows1 the more intelligent he is1 the more pain he has2 the man who is gifted with genius suffers most of all4 ,in this sense1 that is1 with reference to the degree of knowledge in general1 not mere abstract rational knowledge1 ,i understand and use here that saying of the ,preacher3 ,qui auget scientiam1 auget at dolorem4 ,that philosophical painter or painting philosopher1 ,tischbein1 has very beautifully expressed the accurate relation between the degree of consciousness and that of suffering by exhibiting it in a visible and clear form in a drawing4 ,the upper half of his drawing represents women whose children have been stolen1 and who in different groups and attitudes1 express in many ways deep maternal pain1 anguish1 and despair4 ,the lower half of the drawing represents sheep whose lambs have been taken away4 ,they are arranged and grouped in precisely the same way2 so that every human head1 every human attitude of the upper half1 has below a brute head and attitude corresponding to it4 ,thus we see distinctly how the pain which is possible in the dull brute consciousness is related to the violent grief1 which only becomes possible through distinctness of knowledge and clearness of consciousness4 ,we desire to consider in this way1 in human existence1 the inner and essential destiny of will4 ,every one will easily recognise that same destiny expressed in various degrees in the life of the brutes1 only more weakly1 and may also convince himself to his own satisfaction1 from the suffering animal world1 how essential to all life is suffering4 #eg4 ,at every grade that is enlightened by knowledge1 the will appears as an individual4 ,the human individual finds himself as finite in infinite space and time1 and consequently as a vanishing quantity compared with them4 ,he is projected into them1 and1 on account of their unlimited nature1 he has always a merely relative1 never absolute when and where of his existence2 for his place and duration are finite parts of what is infinite and boundless4 ,his real existence is only in the present1 whose unchecked flight into the past is a constant transition into death1 a constant dying4 ,for his past life1 apart from its possible consequences for the present1 and the testimony regarding the will that is expressed in it1 is now entirely done with1 dead1 and no longer anything2 and1 therefore1 it must be1 as a matter of reason1 indifferent to him whether the content of that past was pain or pleasure4 ,but the present is always passing through his hands into the past2 the future is quite uncertain and always short4 ,thus his existence1 even when we consider only its formal side1 is a constant hurrying of the present into the dead past1 a constant dying4 ,but if we look at it from the physical side2 it is clear that1 as our walking is admittedly merely a constantly prevented falling1 the life of our body is only a constantly prevented dying1 an ever-postponed death3 finally1 in the same way1 the activity of our mind is a constantly deferred ennui4 ,every breath we draw wards off the death that is constantly intruding upon us4 ,in this way we fight with it every moment1 and again1 at longer intervals1 through every meal we eat1 every sleep we take1 every time we warm ourselves1 c4 ,in the end1 death must conquer1 for we became subject to him through birth1 and he only plays for a little while with his prey before he swallows it up4 ,we pursue our life1 however1 with great interest and much solicitude as long as possible1 as we blow out a soap-bubble as long and as large as possible1 although we know perfectly well that it will burst4 ,we saw that the inner being of unconscious nature is a constant striving without end and without rest4 ,and this appears to us much more distinctly when we consider the nature of brutes and man4 ,willing and striving is its whole being1 which may be very well compared to an unquenchable thirst4 ,but the basis of all willing is need1 deficiency1 and thus pain4 ,consequently1 the nature of brutes and man is subject to pain originally and through its very being4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it lacks objects of desire1 because it is at once deprived of them by a too easy satisfaction1 a terrible void and ennui comes over it1 i4e41 its being and existence itself becomes an unbearable burden to it4 ,thus its life swings like a pendulum backwards and forwards between pain and ennui4 ,this has also had to express itself very oddly in this way2 after man had transferred all pain and torments to hell1 there then remained nothing over for heaven but ennui4 ,but the constant striving which constitutes the inner nature of every manifestation of will obtains its primary and most general foundation at the higher grades of objectification1 from the fact that here the will manifests itself as a living body1 with the iron command to nourish it2 and what gives strength to this command is just that this body is nothing but the objectified will to live itself4 ,man1 as the most complete objectification of that will1 is in like measure also the most necessitous of all beings3 he is through and through concrete willing and needing2 he is a concretion of a thousand necessities4 ,with these he stands upon the earth1 left to himself1 uncertain about everything except his own need and misery4 ,consequently the care for the maintenance of that existence under exacting demands1 which are renewed every day1 occupies1 as a rule1 the whole of human life4 ,to this is directly related the second claim1 that of the propagation of the species4 ,at the same time he is threatened from all sides by the most different kinds of dangers1 from which it requires constant watchfulness to escape4 ,with cautious steps and casting anxious glances round him he pursues his path1 for a thousand accidents and a thousand enemies lie in wait for him4 ,thus he went while yet a savage1 thus he goes in civilised life2 there is no security for him4 8,qualibus in tenebris vit1 quantisque periclis ,degitur hocc' vi1 quodcunque est60--,,lucr4 ii4 #ae4 ,the life of the great majority is only a constant struggle for this existence itself1 with the certainty of losing it at last4 ,but what enables them to endure this wearisome battle is not so much the love of life as the fear of death1 which yet stands in the background as inevitable1 and may come upon them at any moment4 ,life itself is a sea1 full of rocks and whirlpools1 which man avoids with the greatest care and solicitude1 although he knows that even if he succeeds in getting through with all his efforts and skill1 he yet by doing so comes nearer at every step to the greatest1 the total1 inevitable1 and irremediable shipwreck1 death2 nay1 even steers right upon it3 this is the final goal of the laborious voyage1 and worse for him than all the rocks from which he has escaped4 ,now it is well worth observing that1 on the one hand1 the suffering and misery of life may easily increase to such an extent that death itself1 in the flight from which the whole of life consists1 becomes desirable1 and we hasten towards it voluntarily2 and again1 on the other hand1 that as soon as want and suffering permit rest to a man1 ennui is at once so near that he necessarily requires diversion4 ,the striving after existence is what occupies all living things and maintains them in motion4 ,but when existence is assured1 then they know not what to do with it2 thus the second thing that sets them in motion is the effort to get free from the burden of existence1 to make it cease to be felt1 8to kill time10 i4e41 to escape from ennui4 ,accordingly we see that almost all men who are secure from want and care1 now that at last they have thrown off all other burdens1 become a burden to themselves1 and regard as a gain every hour they succeed in getting through2 and thus every diminution of the very life which1 till then1 they have employed all their powers to maintain as long as possible4 ,ennui is by no means an evil to be lightly esteemed2 in the end it depicts on the countenance real despair4 ,it makes beings who love each other so little as men do1 seek each other eagerly1 and thus becomes the source of social intercourse4 ,moreover1 even from motives of policy1 public precautions are everywhere taken against it1 as against other universal calamities4 ,for this evil may drive men to the greatest excesses1 just as much as its opposite extreme1 famine3 the people require panem et circenses4 ,the strict penitentiary system of ,philadelphia makes use of ennui alone as a means of punishment1 through solitary confinement and idleness1 and it is found so terrible that it has even led prisoners to commit suicide4 ,as want is the constant scourge of the people1 so ennui is that of the fashionable world4 ,in middle-class life ennui is represented by the ,sunday1 and want by the six week-days4 ,thus between desiring and attaining all human life flows on throughout4 ,the wish is1 in its nature1 pain2 the attainment soon begets satiety3 the end was only apparent2 possession takes away the charm2 the wish1 the need1 presents itself under a new form2 when it does not1 then follows desolateness1 emptiness1 ennui1 against which the conflict is just as painful as against want4 ,that wish and satisfaction should follow each other neither too quickly nor too slowly reduces the suffering1 which both occasion to the smallest amount1 and constitutes the happiest life4 ,for that which we might otherwise call the most beautiful part of life1 its purest joy1 if it were only because it lifts us out of real existence and transforms us into disinterested spectators of it--that is1 pure knowledge1 which is foreign to all willing1 the pleasure of the beautiful1 the true delight in art--this is granted only to a very few1 because it demands rare talents1 and to these few only as a passing dream4 ,and then1 even these few1 on account of their higher intellectual power1 are made susceptible of far greater suffering than duller minds can ever feel1 and are also placed in lonely isolation by a nature which is obviously different from that of others2 thus here also accounts are squared4 ,but to the great majority of men purely intellectual pleasures are not accessible4 ,they are almost quite incapable of the joys which lie in pure knowledge4 ,they are entirely given up to willing4 ,if1 therefore1 anything is to win their sympathy1 to be interesting to them1 it must 7as is implied in the meaning of the word7 in some way excite their will1 even if it is only through a distant and merely problematical relation to it2 the will must not be left altogether out of the question1 for their existence lies far more in willing than in knowing1--action and reaction is their one element4 ,we may find in trifles and everyday occurrences the nave expressions of this quality4 ,thus1 for example1 at any place worth seeing they may visit1 they write their names1 in order thus to react1 to affect the place since it does not affect them4 ,again1 when they see a strange rare animal1 they cannot easily confine themselves to merely observing it2 they must rouse it1 tease it1 play with it1 merely to experience action and reaction2 but this need for excitement of the will manifests itself very specially in the discovery and support of card-playing1 which is quite peculiarly the expression of the miserable side of humanity4 ,but whatever nature and fortune may have done1 whoever a man be and whatever he may possess1 the pain which is essential to life cannot be thrown off3-- 1 7,pelides autem ejulavit1 intuitus in clum latum74 ,and again3-- 1 7,jovis quidem filius eram ,saturnii2 verum rumnam habebam infinitam74 ,the ceaseless efforts to banish suffering accomplish no more than to make it change its form4 ,it is essentially deficiency1 want1 care for the maintenance of life4 ,if we succeed1 which is very difficult1 in removing pain in this form1 it immediately assumes a thousand others1 varying according to age and circumstances1 such as lust1 passionate love1 jealousy1 envy1 hatred1 anxiety1 ambition1 covetousness1 sickness1 c41 c4 ,if at last it can find entrance in no other form1 it comes in the sad1 grey garments of tediousness and ennui1 against which we then strive in various ways4 ,if finally we succeed in driving this away1 we shall hardly do so without letting pain enter in one of its earlier forms1 and the dance begin again from the beginning2 for all human life is tossed backwards and forwards between pain and ennui4 ,depressing as this view of life is1 ,i will draw attention1 by the way1 to an aspect of it from which consolation may be drawn1 and perhaps even a stoical indifference to one's own present ills may be attained4 ,for our impatience at these arises for the most part from the fact that we regard them as brought about by a chain of causes which might easily be different4 ,we do not generally grieve over ills which are directly necessary and quite universal2 for example1 the necessity of age and of death1 and many daily inconveniences4 ,it is rather the consideration of the accidental nature of the circumstances that brought some sorrow just to us1 that gives it its sting4 ,but if we have recognised that pain1 as such1 is inevitable and essential to life1 and that nothing depends upon chance but its mere fashion1 the form under which it presents itself1 that thus our present sorrow fills a place that1 without it1 would at once be occupied by another which now is excluded by it1 and that therefore fate can affect us little in what is essential2 such a reflection1 if it were to become a living conviction1 might produce a considerable degree of stoical equanimity1 and very much lessen the anxious care for our own well-being4 ,but1 in fact1 such a powerful control of reason over directly felt suffering seldom or never occurs4 ,besides1 through this view of the inevitableness of pain1 of the supplanting of one pain by another1 and the introduction of a new pain through the passing away of that which preceded it1 one might be led to the paradoxical but not absurd hypothesis1 that in every individual the measure of the pain essential to him was determined once for all by his nature1 a measure which could neither remain empty1 nor be more than filled1 however much the form of the suffering might change4 ,thus his suffering and well-being would by no means be determined from without1 but only through that measure1 that natural disposition1 which indeed might experience certain additions and diminutions from the physical condition at different times1 but yet1 on the whole1 would remain the same1 and would just be what is called the temperament1 or1 more accurately1 the degree in which he might be or 1 as ,plato expresses it in the ,first ,book of the ,republic1 i4e41 in an easy or difficult mood4 ,this hypothesis is supported not only by the well-known experience that great suffering makes all lesser ills cease to be felt1 and conversely that freedom from great suffering makes even the most trifling inconveniences torment us and put us out of humour2 but experience also teaches that if a great misfortune1 at the mere thought of which we shuddered1 actually befalls us1 as soon as we have overcome the first pain of it1 our disposition remains for the most part unchanged2 and1 conversely1 that after the attainment of some happiness we have long desired1 we do not feel ourselves on the whole and permanently very much better off and agreeably situated than before4 ,only the moment at which these changes occur affects us with unusual strength1 as deep sorrow or exulting joy1 but both soon pass away1 for they are based upon illusion4 ,for they do not spring from the immediately present pleasure or pain1 but only from the opening up of a new future which is anticipated in them4 ,only by borrowing from the future could pain or pleasure be heightened so abnormally1 and consequently not enduringly4 ,it would follow1 from the hypothesis advanced1 that a large part of the feeling of suffering and of well-being would be subjective and determined a priori1 as is the case with knowing2 and we may add the following remarks as evidence in favour of it4 ,human cheerfulness or dejection are manifestly not determined by external circumstances1 such as wealth and position1 for we see at least as many glad faces among the poor as among the rich4 ,further1 the motives which induce suicide are so very different1 that we can assign no motive that is so great as to bring it about1 even with great probability1 in every character1 and few that would be so small that the like of them had never caused it4 ,now although the degree of our serenity or sadness is not at all times the same1 yet1 in consequence of this view1 we shall not attribute it to the change of outward circumstances1 but to that of the inner condition1 the physical state4 ,for when an actual1 though only temporary1 increase of our serenity1 even to the extent of joyfulness1 takes place1 it usually appears without any external occasion4 ,it is true that we often see our pain arise only from some definite external relation1 and are visibly oppressed and saddened by this only4 ,then we believe that if only this were taken away1 the greatest contentment would necessarily ensue4 ,but this is illusion4 ,the measure of our pain and our happiness is on the whole1 according to our hypothesis1 subjectively determined for each point of time1 and the motive for sadness is related to that1 just as a blister which draws to a head all the bad humours otherwise distributed is related to the body4 ,the pain which is at that period of time essential to our nature1 and therefore cannot be shaken off1 would1 without the definite external cause of our suffering1 be divided at a hundred points1 and appear in the form of a hundred little annoyances and cares about things which we now entirely overlook1 because our capacity for pain is already filled by that chief evil which has concentrated in a point all the suffering otherwise dispersed4 ,this corresponds also to the observation that if a great and pressing care is lifted from our breast by its fortunate issue1 another immediately takes its place1 the whole material of which was already there before1 yet could not come into consciousness as care because there was no capacity left for it1 and therefore this material of care remained indistinct and unobserved in a cloudy form on the farthest horizon of consciousness4 ,but now that there is room1 this prepared material at once comes forward and occupies the throne of the reigning care of the day 774 ,and if it is very much lighter in its matter than the material of the care which has vanished1 it knows how to blow itself out so as apparently to equal it in size1 and thus1 as the chief care of the day1 completely fills the throne4 ,excessive joy and very keen suffering always occur in the same person1 for they condition each other reciprocally1 and are also in common conditioned by great activity of the mind4 ,both are produced1 as we have just seen1 not by what is really present1 but by the anticipation of the future4 ,but since pain is essential to life1 and its degree is also determined by the nature of the subject1 sudden changes1 because they are always external1 cannot really alter its degree4 ,thus an error and delusion always lies at the foundation of immoderate joy or grief1 and consequently both these excessive strainings of the mind can be avoided by knowledge4 ,every immoderate joy 7exultatio1 insolens ltitia7 always rests on the delusion that one has found in life what can never be found there--lasting satisfaction of the harassing desires and cares1 which are constantly breeding new ones4 ,from every particular delusion of this kind one must inevitably be brought back later1 and then when it vanishes must pay for it with pain as bitter as the joy its entrance caused was keen4 ,so far1 then1 it is precisely like a height from which one can come down only by a fall4 ,therefore one ought to avoid them2 and every sudden excessive grief is just a fall from some such height1 the vanishing of such a delusion1 and so conditioned by it4 ,consequently we might avoid them both if we had sufficient control over ourselves to survey things always with perfect clearness as a whole and in their connection1 and steadfastly to guard against really lending them the colours which we wish they had4 ,the principal effort of the ,stoical ethics was to free the mind from all such delusion and its consequences1 and to give it instead an equanimity that could not be disturbed4 ,it is this insight that inspires ,horace in the well-known ode-- 8quam memento rebus in arduiis ,servare mentem1 non secus in bonis ,ab insolenti temperatam ,ltitia40 ,for the most part1 however1 we close our minds against the knowledge1 which may be compared to a bitter medicine1 that suffering is essential to life1 and therefore does not flow in upon us from without1 but that every one carries about with him its perennial source in his own heart4 ,we rather seek constantly for an external particular cause1 as it were1 a pretext for the pain which never leaves us1 just as the free man makes himself an idol1 in order to have a master4 ,for we unweariedly strive from wish to wish2 and although every satisfaction1 however much it promised1 when attained fails to satisfy us1 but for the most part comes presently to be an error of which we are ashamed1 yet we do not see that we draw water with the sieve of the ,danaides1 but ever hasten to new desires4 8,sed1 dum abest quod avemus1 id exsuperare videtur ,ctera2 post aliud1 quum contigit illud1 avemus2 ,et sitis qua tenet vitai semper hiantes40--,,lucr4 iii4 #ajie4 ,thus it either goes on for ever1 or1 what is more rare and presupposes a certain strength of character1 till we reach a wish which is not satisfied and yet cannot be given up4 ,in that case we have1 as it were1 found what we sought1 something that we can always blame1 instead of our own nature1 as the source of our suffering4 ,and thus1 although we are now at variance with our fate1 we are reconciled to our existence1 for the knowledge is again put far from us that suffering is essential to this existence itself1 and true satisfaction impossible4 ,the result of this form of development is a somewhat melancholy disposition1 the constant endurance of a single great pain1 and the contempt for all lesser sorrows or joys that proceeds from it2 consequently an already nobler phenomenon than that constant seizing upon ever-new forms of illusion1 which is much more common4 #eh4 ,all satisfaction1 or what is commonly called happiness1 is always really and essentially only negative1 and never positive4 ,it is not an original gratification coming to us of itself1 but must always be the satisfaction of a wish4 ,the wish1 i4e41 some want1 is the condition which precedes every pleasure4 ,but with the satisfaction the wish and therefore the pleasure cease4 ,thus the satisfaction or the pleasing can never be more than the deliverance from a pain1 from a want2 for such is not only every actual1 open sorrow1 but every desire1 the importunity of which disturbs our peace1 and1 indeed1 the deadening ennui also that makes life a burden to us4 ,it is1 however1 so hard to attain or achieve anything2 difficulties and troubles without end are opposed to every purpose1 and at every step hindrances accumulate4 ,but when finally everything is overcome and attained1 nothing can ever be gained but deliverance from some sorrow or desire1 so that we find ourselves just in the same position as we occupied before this sorrow or desire appeared4 ,all that is even directly given us is merely the want1 i4e41 the pain4 ,the satisfaction and the pleasure we can only know indirectly through the remembrance of the preceding suffering and want1 which ceases with its appearance4 ,hence it arises that we are not properly conscious of the blessings and advantages we actually possess1 nor do we prize them1 but think of them merely as a matter of course1 for they gratify us only negatively by restraining suffering4 ,only when we have lost them do we become sensible of their value2 for the want1 the privation1 the sorrow1 is the positive1 communicating itself directly to us4 ,thus also we are pleased by the remembrance of past need1 sickness1 want1 and such like1 because this is the only means of enjoying the present blessings4 ,and1 further1 it cannot be denied that in this respect1 and from this standpoint of egoism1 which is the form of the will to live1 the sight or the description of the sufferings of others affords us satisfaction and pleasure in precisely the way ,lucretius beautifully and frankly expresses it in the beginning of the ,second ,book-- 8,suave1 mari magno1 turbantibus quora ventis1 ,e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem3 ,non1 quia vexari quemquam est jucunda voluptas2 ,sed1 quibus ipse malis careas1 quia cernere suave est40 ,yet we shall see farther on that this kind of pleasure1 through knowledge of our own well-being obtained in this way1 lies very near the source of real1 positive wickedness4 ,that all happiness is only of a negative not a positive nature1 that just on this account it cannot be lasting satisfaction and gratification1 but merely delivers us from some pain or want which must be followed either by a new pain1 or by languor1 empty longing1 and ennui2 this finds support in art1 that true mirror of the world and life1 and especially in poetry4 ,every epic and dramatic poem can only represent a struggle1 an effort1 and fight for happiness1 never enduring and complete happiness itself4 ,it conducts its heroes through a thousand difficulties and dangers to the goal2 as soon as this is reached1 it hastens to let the curtain fall2 for now there would remain nothing for it to do but to show that the glittering goal in which the hero expected to find happiness had only disappointed him1 and that after its attainment he was no better off than before4 ,because a genuine enduring happiness is not possible1 it cannot be the subject of art4 ,certainly the aim of the idyll is the description of such a happiness1 but one also sees that the idyll as such cannot continue4 ,the poet always finds that it either becomes epical in his hands1 and in this case it is a very insignificant epic1 made up of trifling sorrows1 trifling delights1 and trifling efforts--this is the commonest case--or else it becomes a merely descriptive poem1 describing the beauty of nature1 i4e41 pure knowing free from will1 which certainly1 as a matter of fact1 is the only pure happiness1 which is neither preceded by suffering or want1 nor necessarily followed by repentance1 sorrow1 emptiness1 or satiety2 but this happiness cannot fill the whole life1 but is only possible at moments4 ,what we see in poetry we find again in music2 in the melodies of which we have recognised the universal expression of the inmost history of the self-conscious will1 the most secret life1 longing1 suffering1 and delight2 the ebb and flow of the human heart4 ,melody is always a deviation from the keynote through a thousand capricious wanderings1 even to the most painful discord1 and then a final return to the keynote which expresses the satisfaction and appeasing of the will1 but with which nothing more can then be done1 and the continuance of which any longer would only be a wearisome and unmeaning monotony corresponding to ennui4 ,all that we intend to bring out clearly through these investigations1 the impossibility of attaining lasting satisfaction and the negative nature of all happiness1 finds its explanation in what is shown at the conclusion of the ,second ,book3 that the will1 of which human life1 like every phenomenon1 is the objectification1 is a striving without aim or end4 ,we find the stamp of this endlessness imprinted upon all the parts of its whole manifestation1 from its most universal form1 endless time and space1 up to the most perfect of all phenomena1 the life and efforts of man4 ,we may theoretically assume three extremes of human life1 and treat them as elements of actual human life4 ,first1 the powerful will1 the strong passions 7,radscha-,guna74 ,it appears in great historical characters2 it is described in the epic and the drama4 ,but it can also show itself in the little world1 for the size of the objects is measured here by the degree in which they influence the will1 not according to their external relations4 ,secondly1 pure knowing1 the comprehension of the ,ideas1 conditioned by the freeing of knowledge from the service of will3 the life of genius 7,satwa-,guna74 ,thirdly and lastly1 the greatest lethargy of the will1 and also of the knowledge attaching to it1 empty longing1 life-benumbing languor 7,tama-,guna74 ,the life of the individual1 far from becoming permanently fixed in one of these extremes1 seldom touches any of them1 and is for the most part only a weak and wavering approach to one or the other side1 a needy desiring of trifling objects1 constantly recurring1 and so escaping ennui4 ,it is really incredible how meaningless and void of significance when looked at from without1 how dull and unenlightened by intellect when felt from within1 is the course of the life of the great majority of men4 ,it is a weary longing and complaining1 a dream-like staggering through the four ages of life to death1 accompanied by a series of trivial thoughts4 ,such men are like clockwork1 which is wound up1 and goes it knows not why2 and every time a man is begotten and born1 the clock of human life is wound up anew1 to repeat the same old piece it has played innumerable times before1 passage after passage1 measure after measure1 with insignificant variations4 ,every individual1 every human being and his course of life1 is but another short dream of the endless spirit of nature1 of the persistent will to live2 is only another fleeting form1 which it carelessly sketches on its infinite page1 space and time2 allows to remain for a time so short that it vanishes into nothing in comparison with these1 and then obliterates to make new room4 ,and yet1 and here lies the serious side of life1 every one of these fleeting forms1 these empty fancies1 must be paid for by the whole will to live1 in all its activity1 with many and deep sufferings1 and finally with a bitter death1 long feared and coming at last4 ,this is why the sight of a corpse makes us suddenly so serious4 ,the life of every individual1 if we survey it as a whole and in general1 and only lay stress upon its most significant features1 is really always a tragedy1 but gone through in detail1 it has the character of a comedy4 ,for the deeds and vexations of the day1 the restless irritation of the moment1 the desires and fears of the week1 the mishaps of every hour1 are all through chance1 which is ever bent upon some jest1 scenes of a comedy4 ,but the never-satisfied wishes1 the frustrated efforts1 the hopes unmercifully crushed by fate1 the unfortunate errors of the whole life1 with increasing suffering and death at the end1 are always a tragedy4 ,thus1 as if fate would add derision to the misery of our existence1 our life must contain all the woes of tragedy1 and yet we cannot even assert the dignity of tragic characters1 but in the broad detail of life must inevitably be the foolish characters of a comedy4 ,but however much great and small trials may fill human life1 they are not able to conceal its insufficiency to satisfy the spirit2 they cannot hide the emptiness and superficiality of existence1 nor exclude ennui1 which is always ready to fill up every pause that care may allow4 ,hence it arises that the human mind1 not content with the cares1 anxieties1 and occupations which the actual world lays upon it1 creates for itself an imaginary world also in the form of a thousand different superstitions1 then finds all manner of employment with this1 and wastes time and strength upon it1 as soon as the real world is willing to grant it the rest which it is quite incapable of enjoying4 ,this is accordingly most markedly the case with nations for which life is made easy by the congenial nature of the climate and the soil1 most of all with the ,hindus1 then with the ,greeks1 the ,romans1 and later with the ,italians1 the ,spaniards1 c4 ,demons1 gods1 and saints man creates in his own image2 and to them he must then unceasingly bring offerings1 prayers1 temple decorations1 vows and their fulfilment1 pilgrimages1 salutations1 ornaments for their images1 c4 ,their service mingles everywhere with the real1 and1 indeed1 obscures it4 ,every event of life is regarded as the work of these beings2 the intercourse with them occupies half the time of life1 constantly sustains hope1 and by the charm of illusion often becomes more interesting than intercourse with real beings4 ,it is the expression and symptom of the actual need of mankind1 partly for help and support1 partly for occupation and diversion2 and if it often works in direct opposition to the first need1 because when accidents and dangers arise valuable time and strength1 instead of being directed to warding them off1 are uselessly wasted on prayers and offerings2 it serves the second end all the better by this imaginary converse with a visionary spirit world2 and this is the by no means contemptible gain of all superstitions4 #ei4 ,if we have so far convinced ourselves a priori1 by the most general consideration1 by investigation of the primary and elemental features of human life1 that in its whole plan it is capable of no true blessedness1 but is in its very nature suffering in various forms1 and throughout a state of misery1 we might now awaken this conviction much more vividly within us if1 proceeding more a posteriori1 we were to turn to more definite instances1 call up pictures to the fancy1 and illustrate by examples the unspeakable misery which experience and history present1 wherever one may look and in whatever direction one may seek4 ,but the chapter would have no end1 and would carry us far from the standpoint of the universal1 which is essential to philosophy2 and1 moreover1 such a description might easily be taken for a mere declamation on human misery1 such as has often been given1 and1 as such1 might be charged with one-sidedness1 because it started from particular facts4 ,from such a reproach and suspicion our perfectly cold and philosophical investigation of the inevitable suffering which is founded in the nature of life is free1 for it starts from the universal and is conducted a priori4 ,but confirmation a posteriori is everywhere easily obtained4 ,every one who has awakened from the first dream of youth1 who has considered his own experience and that of others1 who has studied himself in life1 in the history of the past and of his own time1 and finally in the works of the great poets1 will1 if his judgment is not paralysed by some indelibly imprinted prejudice1 certainly arrive at the conclusion that this human world is the kingdom of chance and error1 which rule without mercy in great things and in small1 and along with which folly and wickedness also wield the scourge4 ,hence it arises that everything better only struggles through with difficulty2 what is noble and wise seldom attains to expression1 becomes effective and claims attention1 but the absurd and the perverse in the sphere of thought1 the dull and tasteless in the sphere of art1 the wicked and deceitful in the sphere of action1 really assert a supremacy1 only disturbed by short interruptions4 ,on the other hand1 everything that is excellent is always a mere exception1 one case in millions1 and therefore1 if it presents itself in a lasting work1 this1 when it has outlived the enmity of its contemporaries1 exists in isolation1 is preserved like a meteoric stone1 sprung from an order of things different from that which prevails here4 ,but as far as the life of the individual is concerned1 every biography is the history of suffering1 for every life is1 as a rule1 a continual series of great and small misfortunes1 which each one conceals as much as possible1 because he knows that others can seldom feel sympathy or compassion1 but almost always satisfaction at the sight of the woes from which they are themselves for the moment exempt4 ,but perhaps at the end of life1 if a man is sincere and in full possession of his faculties1 he will never wish to have it to live over again1 but rather than this1 he will much prefer absolute annihilation4 ,the essential content of the famous soliloquy in 8,hamlet0 is briefly this3 ,our state is so wretched that absolute annihilation would be decidedly preferable4 ,if suicide really offered us this1 so that the alternative 8to be or not to be10 in the full sense of the word1 was placed before us1 then it would be unconditionally to be chosen as 8a consummation devoutly to be wished40 ,but there is something in us which tells us that this is not the case3 suicide is not the end2 death is not absolute annihilation4 ,in like manner1 what was said by the father of history7#ga7 has not since him been contradicted1 that no man has ever lived who has not wished more than once that he had not to live the following day4 ,according to this1 the brevity of life1 which is so constantly lamented1 may be the best quality it possesses4 ,if1 finally1 we should bring clearly to a man's sight the terrible sufferings and miseries to which his life is constantly exposed1 he would be seized with horror2 and if we were to conduct the confirmed optimist through the hospitals1 infirmaries1 and surgical operating-rooms1 through the prisons1 torture-chambers1 and slave-kennels1 over battle-fields and places of execution2 if we were to open to him all the dark abodes of misery1 where it hides itself from the glance of cold curiosity1 and1 finally1 allow him to glance into the starving dungeon of ,ugolino1 he1 too1 would understand at last the nature of this 8best of possible worlds40 ,for whence did ,dante take the materials for his hell but from this our actual world8 ,and yet he made a very proper hell of it4 ,and when1 on the other hand1 he came to the task of describing heaven and its delights1 he had an insurmountable difficulty before him1 for our world affords no materials at all for this4 ,therefore there remained nothing for him to do but1 instead of describing the joys of paradise1 to repeat to us the instruction given him there by his ancestor1 by ,beatrice1 and by various saints4 ,but from this it is sufficiently clear what manner of world it is4 ,certainly human life1 like all bad ware1 is covered over with a false lustre3 what suffers always conceals itself2 on the other hand1 whatever pomp or splendour any one can get1 he makes a show of openly1 and the more inner contentment deserts him1 the more he desires to exist as fortunate in the opinion of others3 to such an extent does folly go1 and the opinion of others is a chief aim of the efforts of every one1 although the utter nothingness of it is expressed in the fact that in almost all languages vanity1 vanitas1 originally signifies emptiness and nothingness4 ,but under all this false show1 the miseries of life can so increase--and this happens every day--that the death which hitherto has been feared above all things is eagerly seized upon4 ,indeed1 if fate will show its whole malice1 even this refuge is denied to the sufferer1 and1 in the hands of enraged enemies1 he may remain exposed to terrible and slow tortures without remedy4 ,in vain the sufferer then calls on his gods for help2 he remains exposed to his fate without grace4 ,but this irremediableness is only the mirror of the invincible nature of his will1 of which his person is the objectivity4 ,as little as an external power can change or suppress this will1 so little can a foreign power deliver it from the miseries which proceed from the life which is the phenomenal appearance of that will4 ,in the principal matter1 as in everything else1 a man is always thrown back upon himself4 ,in vain does he make to himself gods in order to get from them by prayers and flattery what can only be accomplished by his own will-power4 ,the ,old ,testament made the world and man the work of a god1 but the ,new ,testament saw that1 in order to teach that holiness and salvation from the sorrows of this world can only come from the world itself1 it was necessary that this god should become man4 ,it is and remains the will of man upon which everything depends for him4 ,fanatics1 martyrs1 saints of every faith and name1 have voluntarily and gladly endured every torture1 because in them the will to live had suppressed itself2 and then even the slow destruction of its phenomenon was welcome to them4 ,but ,i do not wish to anticipate the later exposition4 ,for the rest1 ,i cannot here avoid the statement that1 to me1 optimism1 when it is not merely the thoughtless talk of such as harbour nothing but words under their low foreheads1 appears not merely as an absurd1 but also as a really wicked way of thinking1 as a bitter mockery of the unspeakable suffering of humanity4 ,let no one think that ,christianity is favourable to optimism2 for1 on the contrary1 in the ,gospels world and evil are used as almost synonymous47#gb7 #fj4 ,we have now completed the two expositions it was necessary to insert2 the exposition of the freedom of the will in itself together with the necessity of its phenomenon1 and the exposition of its lot in the world which reflects its own nature1 and upon the knowledge of which it has to assert or deny itself4 ,therefore we can now proceed to bring out more clearly the nature of this assertion and denial itself1 which was referred to and explained in a merely general way above4 ,this we shall do by exhibiting the conduct in which alone it finds its expression1 and considering it in its inner significance4 ,the assertion of the will is the continuous willing itself1 undisturbed by any knowledge1 as it fills the life of man in general4 ,for even the body of a man is the objectivity of the will1 as it appears at this grade and in this individual4 ,and thus his willing which develops itself in time is1 as it were1 a paraphrase of his body1 an elucidation of the significance of the whole and its parts2 it is another way of exhibiting the same thing-in-itself1 of which the body is already the phenomenon4 ,therefore1 instead of saying assertion of the will1 we may say assertion of the body4 ,the fundamental theme or subject of all the multifarious acts of will is the satisfaction of the wants which are inseparable from the existence of the body in health1 they already have their expression in it1 and may be referred to the maintenance of the individual and the propagation of the species4 ,but indirectly the most different kinds of motives obtain in this way power over the will1 and bring about the most multifarious acts of will4 ,each of these is only an example1 an instance1 of the will which here manifests itself generally4 ,of what nature this example may be1 what form the motive may have and impart to it1 is not essential2 the important point here is that something is willed in general and the degree of intensity with which it is so willed4 ,the will can only become visible in the motives1 as the eye only manifests its power of seeing in the light4 ,the motive in general stands before the will in protean forms4 ,it constantly promises complete satisfaction1 the quenching of the thirst of will4 ,but whenever it is attained it at once appears in another form1 and thus influences the will anew1 always according to the degree of the intensity of this will1 and its relation to knowledge which are revealed as empirical character1 in these very examples and instances4 ,from the first appearance of consciousness1 a man finds himself a willing being1 and as a rule1 his knowledge remains in constant relation to his will4 ,he first seeks to know thoroughly the objects of his desire1 and then the means of attaining them4 ,now he knows what he has to do1 and1 as a rule1 he does not strive after other knowledge4 ,he moves and acts2 his consciousness keeps him always working directly and actively towards the aims of his will2 his thought is concerned with the choice of motives4 ,such is life for almost all men2 they wish1 they know what they wish1 and they strive after it1 with sufficient success to keep them from despair1 and sufficient failure to keep them from ennui and its consequences4 ,from this proceeds a certain serenity1 or at least indifference1 which cannot be affected by wealth or poverty2 for the rich and the poor do not enjoy what they have1 for this1 as we have shown1 acts in a purely negative way1 but what they hope to attain to by their efforts4 ,they press forward with much earnestness1 and indeed with an air of importance2 thus children also pursue their play4 ,it is always an exception if such a life suffers interruption from the fact that either the sthetic demand for contemplation or the ethical demand for renunciation proceed from a knowledge which is independent of the service of the will1 and directed to the nature of the world in general4 ,most men are pursued by want all through life1 without ever being allowed to come to their senses4 ,on the other hand1 the will is often inflamed to a degree that far transcends the assertion of the body1 and then violent emotions and powerful passions show themselves1 in which the individual not only asserts his own existence1 but denies and seeks to suppress that of others when it stands in his way4 ,the maintenance of the body through its own powers is so small a degree of the assertion of will1 that if it voluntarily remains at this degree1 we might assume that1 with the death of this body1 the will also which appeared in it would be extinguished4 ,but even the satisfaction of the sexual passions goes beyond the assertion of one's own existence1 which fills so short a time1 and asserts life for an indefinite time after the death of the individual4 ,nature1 always true and consistent1 here even nave1 exhibits to us openly the inner significance of the act of generation4 ,our own consciousness1 the intensity of the impulse1 teaches us that in this act the most decided assertion of the will to live expresses itself1 pure and without further addition 7any denial of other individuals72 and now1 as the consequence of this act1 a new life appears in time and the causal series1 i4e41 in nature2 the begotten appears before the begetter1 different as regards the phenomenon1 but in himself1 i4e41 according to the ,idea1 identical with him4 ,therefore it is this act through which every species of living creature binds itself to a whole and is perpetuated4 ,generation is1 with reference to the begetter1 only the expression1 the symptom1 of his decided assertion of the will to live3 with reference to the begotten1 it is not the cause of the will which appears in him1 for the will in itself knows neither cause nor effect1 but1 like all causes1 it is merely the occasional cause of the phenomenal appearance of this will at this time in this place4 ,as thing-in-itself1 the will of the begetter and that of the begotten are not different1 for only the phenomenon1 not the thing-in-itself1 is subordinate to the principim individuationis4 ,with that assertion beyond our own body and extending to the production of a new body1 suffering and death1 as belonging to the phenomenon of life1 have also been asserted anew1 and the possibility of salvation1 introduced by the completest capability of knowledge1 has for this time been shown to be fruitless4 ,here lies the profound reason of the shame connected with the process of generation4 ,this view is mythically expressed in the dogma of ,christian theology that we are all partakers in ,adam's first transgression 7which is clearly just the satisfaction of sexual passion71 and through it are guilty of suffering and death4 ,in this theology goes beyond the consideration of things according to the principle of sufficient reason1 and recognises the ,idea of man1 the unity of which is re-established out of its dispersion into innumerable individuals through the bond of generation which holds them all together4 ,accordingly it regards every individual as on one side identical with ,adam1 the representative of the assertion of life1 and1 so far1 as subject to sin 7original sin71 suffering1 and death2 on the other side1 the knowledge of the ,idea of man enables it to regard every individual as identical with the saviour1 the representative of the denial of the will to live1 and1 so far as a partaker of his sacrifice of himself1 saved through his merits1 and delivered from the bands of sin and death1 i4e41 the world 7,rom4 v4 #ab-ba74 ,another mythical exposition of our view of sexual pleasure as the assertion of the will to live beyond the individual life1 as an attainment to life which is brought about for the first time by this means1 or as it were a renewed assignment of life1 is the ,greek myth of ,proserpine1 who might return from the lower world so long as she had not tasted its fruit1 but who became subject to it altogether through eating the pomegranate4 ,this meaning appears very clearly in ,goethe's incomparable presentation of this myth1 especially when1 as soon as she has tasted the pomegranate1 the invisible chorus of the ,fates-- 8,thou art ours6 ,fasting shouldest thou return3 ,and the bite of the apple makes thee ours60 ,it is worth noticing that ,clement of ,alexandria 7,strom4 iii4 c4 #ae7 illustrates the matter with the same image and the same expression3 1 1 1 1 2 7,qui se castrarunt ab omni peccato propter regnum clorum1 ii sunt beati1 a mundo jejunantes74 ,the sexual impulse also proves itself the decided and strongest assertion of life by the fact that to man in a state of nature1 as to the brutes1 it is the final end1 the highest goal of life4 ,self-maintenance is his first effort1 and as soon as he has made provision for that1 he only strives after the propagation of the species3 as a merely natural being he can attempt no more4 ,nature also1 the inner being of which is the will to live itself1 impels with all her power both man and the brute towards propagation4 ,then it has attained its end with the individual1 and is quite indifferent to its death1 for1 as the will to live1 it cares only for the preservation of the species1 the individual is nothing to it4 ,because the will to live expresses itself most strongly in the sexual impulse1 the inner being of nature1 the old poets and philosophers--,hesiod and ,parmenides--said very significantly that ,eros is the first1 the creator1 the principle from which all things proceed4 7,cf4 ,arist4 ,metaph41 i4 #d47 ,pherecydes said3 1 7,jovem1 cum mundum fabricare vellet1 in cupidinem sese transformasse74 ,proclus ad ,plat4 ,tim41 l4 iii4 ,a complete treatment of this subject we have recently received from ,g4 ,f4 ,schmann1 8,de ,cupidine ,cosmogonico10 #aheb4 ,the ,mya of the ,hindus1 whose work and web is the whole world of illusion1 is also symbolised by love4 ,the genital organs are1 far more than any other external member of the body1 subject merely to the will1 and not at all to knowledge4 ,indeed1 the will shows itself here almost as independent of knowledge1 as in those parts which1 acting merely in consequence of stimuli1 are subservient to vegetative life and reproduction1 in which the will works blindly as in unconscious nature4 ,for generation is only reproduction passing over to a new individual1 as it were reproduction at the second power1 as death is only excretion at the second power4 ,according to all this1 the genitals are properly the focus of will1 and consequently the opposite pole of the brain1 the representative of knowledge1 i4e41 the other side of the world1 the world as idea4 ,the former are the life-sustaining principle ensuring endless life to time4 ,in this respect they were worshipped by the ,greeks in the phallus1 and by the ,hindus in the lingam1 which are thus the symbol of the assertion of the will4 ,knowledge1 on the other hand1 affords the possibility of the suppression of willing1 of salvation through freedom1 of conquest and annihilation of the world4 ,we already considered fully at the beginning of this ,fourth ,book how the will to live in its assertion must regard its relation to death4 ,we saw that death does not trouble it1 because it exists as something included in life itself and belonging to it4 ,its opposite1 generation1 completely counterbalances it2 and1 in spite of the death of the individual1 ensures and guarantees life to the will to live through all time4 ,to express this the ,hindus made the lingam an attribute of ,siva1 the god of death4 ,we also fully explained there how he who with full consciousness occupies the standpoint of the decided assertion of life awaits death without fear4 ,we shall therefore say nothing more about this here4 ,without clear consciousness most men occupy this standpoint and continually assert life4 ,the world exists as the mirror of this assertion1 with innumerable individuals in infinite time and space1 in infinite suffering1 between generation and death without end4 ,yet from no side is a complaint to be further raised about this2 for the will conducts the great tragedy and comedy at its own expense1 and is also its own spectator4 ,the world is just what it is because the will1 whose manifestation it is1 is what it is1 because it so wills4 ,the justification of suffering is1 that in this phenomenon also the will asserts itself2 and this assertion is justified and balanced by the fact that the will bears the suffering4 ,here we get a glimpse of eternal justice in the whole3 we shall recognise it later more definitely and distinctly1 and also in the particular4 ,but first we must consider temporal or human justice47#gc7 #fa4 ,it may be remembered from the ,second ,book that in the whole of nature1 at all the grades of the objectification of will1 there was a necessary and constant conflict between the individuals of all species2 and in this way was expressed the inner contradiction of the will to live with itself4 ,at the highest grade of the objectification1 this phenomenon1 like all others1 will exhibit itself with greater distinctness1 and will therefore be more easily explained4 ,with this aim we shall next attempt to trace the source of egoism as the starting-point of all conflict4 ,we have called time and space the principium individuationis1 because only through them and in them is multiplicity of the homogeneous possible4 ,they are the essential forms of natural knowledge1 i4e41 knowledge springing from the will4 ,therefore the will everywhere manifests itself in the multiplicity of individuals4 ,but this multiplicity does not concern the will as thing-in-itself1 but only its phenomena4 ,the will itself is present1 whole and undivided1 in every one of these1 and beholds around it the innumerably repeated image of its own nature2 but this nature itself1 the actually real1 it finds directly only in its inner self4 ,therefore every one desires everything for himself1 desires to possess1 or at least to control1 everything1 and whatever opposes it it would like to destroy4 ,to this is added1 in the case of such beings as have knowledge1 that the individual is the supporter of the knowing subject1 and the knowing subject is the supporter of the world1 i4e41 that the whole of ,nature outside the knowing subject1 and thus also all other individuals1 exist only in its idea2 it is only conscious of them as its idea1 thus merely indirectly as something which is dependent on its own nature and existence2 for with its consciousness the world necessarily disappears for it1 i4e41 its being and non-being become synonymous and indistinguishable4 ,every knowing individual is thus in truth1 and finds itself as the whole will to live1 or the inner being of the world itself1 and also as the complemental condition of the world as idea1 consequently as a microcosm which is of equal value with the macrocosm4 ,nature itself1 which is everywhere and always truthful1 gives him this knowledge1 originally and independently of all reflection1 with simple and direct certainty4 ,now from these two necessary properties we have given the fact may be explained that every individual1 though vanishing altogether and diminished to nothing in the boundless world1 yet makes itself the centre of the world1 has regard for its own existence and well-being before everything else2 indeed1 from the natural standpoint1 is ready to sacrifice everything else for this--is ready to annihilate the world in order to maintain its own self1 this drop in the ocean1 a little longer4 ,this disposition is egoism1 which is essential to everything in ,nature4 ,yet it is just through egoism that the inner conflict of the will with itself attains to such a terrible revelation2 for this egoism has its continuance and being in that opposition of the microcosm and macrocosm1 or in the fact that the objectification of will has the principium individuationis for its form1 through which the will manifests itself in the same way in innumerable individuals1 and indeed entire and completely in both aspects 7will and idea7 in each4 ,thus1 while each individual is given to itself directly as the whole will and the whole subject of ideas1 other individuals are only given it as ideas4 ,therefore its own being1 and the maintenance of it1 is of more importance to it than that of all others together4 ,every one looks upon his own death as upon the end of the world1 while he accepts the death of his acquaintances as a matter of comparative indifference1 if he is not in some way affected by it4 ,in the consciousness that has reached the highest grade1 that of man1 egoism1 as well as knowledge1 pain and pleasure1 must have reached its highest grade also1 and the conflict of individuals which is conditioned by it must appear in its most terrible form4 ,and indeed we see this everywhere before our eyes1 in small things as in great4 ,now we see its terrible side in the lives of great tyrants and miscreants1 and in world-desolating wars2 now its absurd side1 in which it is the theme of comedy1 and very specially appears as self-conceit and vanity4 ,rochefoucault understood this better than any one else1 and presented it in the abstract4 ,we see it both in the history of the world and in our own experience4 ,but it appears most distinctly of all when any mob of men is set free from all law and order2 then there shows itself at once in the distinctest form the bellum omnium contra omnes1 which ,hobbes has so admirably described in the first chapter ,de ,cive4 ,we see not only how every one tries to seize from the other what he wants himself1 but how often one will destroy the whole happiness or life of another for the sake of an insignificant addition to his own happiness4 ,this is the highest expression of egoism1 the manifestations of which in this regard are only surpassed by those of actual wickedness1 which seeks1 quite disinterestedly1 the hurt and suffering of others1 without any advantage to itself4 ,of this we shall speak soon4 ,with this exhibition of the source of egoism the reader should compare the presentation of it in my prize-essay on the basis of morals1 #ad4 ,a chief source of that suffering which we found above to be essential and inevitable to all life is1 when it really appears in a definite form1 that ,eris1 the conflict of all individuals1 the expression of the contradiction1 with which the will to live is affected in its inner self1 and which attains a visible form through the principium individuationis4 ,wild-beast fights are the most cruel means of showing this directly and vividly4 ,in this original discord lies an unquenchable source of suffering1 in spite of the precautions that have been taken against it1 and which we shall now consider more closely4 #fb4 ,it has already been explained that the first and simplest assertion of the will to live is only the assertion of one's own body1 i4e41 the exhibition of the will through acts in time1 so far as the body1 in its form and design1 exhibits the same will in space1 and no further4 ,this assertion shows itself as maintenance of the body1 by means of the application of its own powers4 ,to it is directly related the satisfaction of the sexual impulse2 indeed this belongs to it1 because the genitals belong to the body4 ,therefore voluntary renunciation of the satisfaction of that impulse1 based upon no motive1 is already a denial of the will to live1 is a voluntary self-suppression of it1 upon the entrance of knowledge which acts as a quieter4 ,accordingly such denial of one's own body exhibits itself as a contradiction by the will of its own phenomenon4 ,for although here also the body objectifies in the genitals the will to perpetuate the species1 yet this is not willed4 ,just on this account1 because it is a denial or suppression of the will to live1 such a renunciation is a hard and painful self-conquest2 but of this later4 ,but since the will exhibits that self-assertion of one's own body in innumerable individuals beside each other1 it very easily extends in one individual1 on account of the egoism peculiar to them all1 beyond this assertion to the denial of the same will appearing in another individual4 ,the will of the first breaks through the limits of the assertion of will of another1 because the individual either destroys or injures this other body itself1 or else because it compels the powers of the other body to serve its own will1 instead of the will which manifests itself in that other body4 ,thus if1 from the will manifesting itself as another body1 it withdraws the powers of this body1 and so increases the power serving its own will beyond that of its own body1 it consequently asserts its own will beyond its own body by means of the negation of the will appearing in another body4 ,this breaking through the limits of the assertion of will of another has always been distinctly recognised1 and its concept denoted by the word wrong4 ,for both sides recognise the fact instantly1 not1 indeed1 as we do here in distinct abstraction1 but as feeling4 ,he who suffers wrong feels the transgression into the sphere of the assertion of his own body1 through the denial of it by another individual1 as a direct and mental pain which is entirely separated and different from the accompanying physical suffering experienced from the act or the vexation at the loss4 ,to the doer of wrong1 on the other hand1 the knowledge presents itself that he is in himself the same will which appears in that body also1 and which asserts itself with such vehemence2 the one phenomenon that1 transgressing the limits of its own body and its powers1 it extends to the denial of this very will in another phenomenon1 and so1 regarded as will in itself1 it strives against itself by this vehemence and rends itself4 ,moreover1 this knowledge presents itself to him instantly1 not in abstracto1 but as an obscure feeling2 and this is called remorse1 or1 more accurately in this case1 the feeling of wrong committed4 ,wrong1 the conception of which we have thus analysed in its most general and abstract form1 expresses itself in the concrete most completely1 peculiarly1 and palpably in cannibalism4 ,this is its most distinct and evident type1 the terrible picture of the greatest conflict of the will with itself at the highest grade of its objectification1 which is man4 ,next to this1 it expresses itself most distinctly in murder2 and therefore the committal of murder is followed instantly and with fearful distinctness by remorse1 the abstract and dry significance of which we have just given1 which inflicts a wound on our peace of mind that a lifetime cannot heal4 ,for our horror at the murder committed1 as also our shrinking from the committal of it1 corresponds to that infinite clinging to life with which everything living1 as phenomenon of the will to live1 is penetrated4 7,we shall analyse this feeling which accompanies the doing of wrong and evil1 in other words1 the pangs of conscience1 more fully later on1 and raise its concept to distinctness47 ,mutilation1 or mere injury of another body1 indeed every blow1 is to be regarded as in its nature the same as murder1 and differing from it only in degree4 ,further1 wrong shows itself in the subjugation of another individual1 in forcing him into slavery1 and1 finally1 in the seizure of another's goods1 which1 so far as these goods are regarded as the fruit of his labour1 is just the same thing as making him a slave1 and is related to this as mere injury is to murder4 ,for property1 which is not taken from a man without wrong1 can1 according to our explanation of wrong1 only be that which has been produced by his own powers4 ,therefore by taking this we really take the powers of his body from the will objectified in it1 to make them subject to the will objectified in another body4 ,for only so does the wrong-doer1 by seizing1 not the body of another1 but a lifeless thing quite different from it1 break into the sphere of the assertion of will of another person1 because the powers1 the work of this other body1 are1 as it were1 incorporated and identified with this thing4 ,it follows from this that all true1 i4e41 moral1 right of property is based simply and solely on work1 as was pretty generally assumed before ,kant1 and is distinctly and beautifully expressed in the oldest of all codes of law3 8,wise men who know the past explain that a cultured field is the property of him who cut down the wood and cleared and ploughed it1 as an antelope belongs to the first hunter who mortally wounds it0 7,laws of ,manu1 ix4 #dd74 ,kant's philosophy of law is an extraordinary concatenation of errors all leading to each other1 and he bases the right of property upon first occupation4 ,to me this is only explicable on the supposition that his powers were failing through old age4 ,for how should the mere avowal of my will to exclude others from the use of a thing at once give me a right to it8 ,clearly such an avowal itself requires a foundation of right1 instead of being one1 as ,kant assumes4 ,and how would he act unjustly in se1 i4e41 morally1 who does not respect that claim to the sole possession of a thing which is based upon nothing but its own avowal8 ,how should his conscience trouble him about it8 ,for it is so clear and easy to understand that there can be absolutely no such thing as a just seizure of anything1 but only a just conversion or acquired possession of it1 by spending our own original powers upon it4 ,when1 by any foreign labour1 however little1 a thing has been cultivated1 improved1 kept from harm or preserved1 even if this labour were only the plucking or picking up from the ground of fruit that has grown wild2 the person who forcibly seizes such a thing clearly deprives the other of the result of his labour expended upon it1 makes the body of this other serve his will instead of its own1 asserts his will beyond its own phenomenon to the denial of that of the other1 i4e41 does injustice or wrong47#gd7 ,on the other hand1 the mere enjoyment of a thing1 without any cultivation or preservation of it from destruction1 gives just as little right to it as the mere avowal of our desire for its sole possession4 ,therefore1 though one family has hunted a district alone1 even for a hundred years1 but has done nothing for its improvement2 if a stranger comes and desires to hunt there1 it cannot prevent him from doing so without moral injustice4 ,thus the so-called right of preoccupation1 according to which1 for the mere past enjoyment of a thing1 there is demanded the further recompense of the exclusive right to its future enjoyment1 is morally entirely without foundation4 ,a new-comer might with far better right reply to him who was depending upon such a right1 8,just because you have so long enjoyed1 it is right that others should now enjoy also40 ,no moral right can be established to the sole possession of anything upon which labour cannot be expended1 either in improving it or in preserving it from harm1 unless it be through a voluntary surrender on the part of others1 as a reward for other services4 ,this1 however1 already presupposes a community regulated by agreement--the ,state4 ,the morally established right of property1 as we have deduced it above1 gives1 from its nature1 to the owner of a thing1 the same unlimited power over it which he has over his own body2 and hence it follows that he can part with his possessions to others either in exchange or as a gift1 and they then possess them with the same moral right as he did4 ,as regards the doing of wrong generally1 it occurs either through violence or through craft2 it matters not which as far as what is morally essential is concerned4 ,first1 in the case of murder1 it is a matter of indifference whether ,i make use of a dagger or of poison2 and the case of every bodily injury is analogous4 ,other cases of wrong can all be reduced to the fact that ,i1 as the doer of wrong1 compel another individual to serve my will instead of his own1 to act according to my will instead of according to his own4 ,on the path of violence ,i attain this end through physical causality1 but on the path of craft by means of motivation1 i4e41 by means of causality through knowledge2 for ,i present to his will illusive motives1 on account of which he follows my will1 while he believes he is following his own4 ,since the medium in which the motives lie is knowledge1 ,i can only accomplish this by falsifying his knowledge1 and this is the lie4 ,the lie always aims at influencing another's will1 not merely his knowledge1 for itself and as such1 but only as a means1 so far as it determines his will4 ,for my lying itself1 inasmuch as it proceeds from my will1 requires a motive2 and only the will of another can be such a motive1 not his knowledge in and for itself2 for as such it can never have an influence upon my will1 therefore it can never move it1 can never be a motive of its aim4 ,but only the willing and doing of another can be this1 and his knowledge indirectly through it4 ,this holds good not only of all lies that have manifestly sprung from self-interest1 but also of those which proceed from pure wickedness1 which seeks enjoyment in the painful consequences of the error into which it has led another4 ,indeed1 mere empty boasting aims at influencing the will and action of others more or less1 by increasing their respect or improving their opinion of the boaster4 ,the mere refusal of a truth1 i4e41 of an assertion generally1 is in itself no wrong1 but every imposing of a lie is certainly a wrong4 ,he who refuses to show the strayed traveller the right road does him no wrong1 but he who directs him to a false road certainly does4 ,it follows from what has been said1 that every lie1 like every act of violence1 is as such wrong1 because as such it has for its aim the extension of the authority of my will to other individuals1 and so the assertion of my will through the denial of theirs1 just as much as violence has4 ,but the most complete lie is the broken contract1 because here all the conditions mentioned are completely and distinctly present together4 ,for when ,i enter into a contract1 the promised performance of the other individual is directly and confessedly the motive for my reciprocal performance4 ,the promises were deliberately and formally exchanged4 ,the fulfilment of the declarations made is1 it is assumed1 in the power of each4 ,if the other breaks the covenant1 he has deceived me1 and by introducing merely illusory motives into my knowledge1 he has bent my will according to his intention2 he has extended the control of his will to another individual1 and thus has committed a distinct wrong4 ,on this is founded the moral lawfulness and validity of the contract4 ,wrong through violence is not so shameful to the doer of it as wrong through craft2 for the former arises from physical power1 which under all circumstances impresses mankind2 while the latter1 by the use of subterfuge1 betrays weakness1 and lowers man at once as a physical and moral being4 ,this is further the case because lying and deception can only succeed if he who employs them expresses at the same time horror and contempt of them in order to win confidence1 and his victory rests on the fact that men credit him with honesty which he does not possess4 ,the deep horror which is always excited by cunning1 faithlessness1 and treachery rests on the fact that good faith and honesty are the bond which externally binds into a unity the will which has been broken up into the multiplicity of individuals1 and thereby limits the consequences of the egoism which results from that dispersion4 ,faithlessness and treachery break this outward bond asunder1 and thus give boundless scope to the consequences of egoism4 ,in the connection of our system we have found that the content of the concept of wrong is that quality of the conduct of an individual in which he extends the assertion of the will appearing in his own body so far that it becomes the denial of the will appearing in the bodies of others4 ,we have also laid down1 by means of very general examples1 the limits at which the province of wrong begins2 for we have at once defined its gradations1 from the highest degree to the lowest1 by means of a few leading conceptions4 ,according to this1 the concept of wrong is the original and positive1 and the concept of right1 which is opposed to it1 is the derivative and negative2 for we must keep to the concepts1 and not to the words4 ,as a matter of fact1 there would be no talk of right if there were no such thing as wrong4 ,the concept right contains merely the negation of wrong1 and every action is subsumed under it which does not transgress the limit laid down above1 i4e41 is not a denial of the will of another for the stronger assertion of our own4 ,that limit1 therefore1 divides1 as regards a purely moral definition1 the whole province of possible actions into such as are wrong or right4 ,whenever an action does not encroach1 in the way explained above1 on the sphere of the assertion of will of another1 denying it1 it is not wrong4 ,therefore1 for example1 the refusal of help to another in great need1 the quiet contemplation of the death of another from starvation while we ourselves have more than enough1 is certainly cruel and fiendish1 but it is not wrong2 only it can be affirmed with certainty that whoever is capable of carrying unkindness and hardness to such a degree will certainly also commit every wrong whenever his wishes demand it and no compulsion prevents it4 ,but the conception of right as the negation of wrong finds its principal application1 and no doubt its origin1 in cases in which an attempted wrong by violence is warded off4 ,this warding off cannot itself be wrong1 and consequently is right1 although the violence it requires1 regarded in itself and in isolation1 would be wrong1 and is here only justified by the motive1 i4e41 becomes right4 ,if an individual goes so far in the assertion of his own will that he encroaches upon the assertion of will which is essential to my person as such1 and denies it1 then my warding off of that encroachment is only the denial of that denial1 and thus from my side is nothing more than the assertion of the will which essentially and originally appears in my body1 and is already implicitly expressed by the mere appearance of this body2 consequently is not wrong1 but right4 ,that is to say3 ,i have then a right to deny that denial of another with the force necessary to overcome it1 and it is easy to see that this may extend to the killing of the other individual1 whose encroachment as external violence pressing upon me may be warded off by a somewhat stronger counteraction1 entirely without wrong1 consequently with right4 ,for all that happens from my side lies always within the sphere of the assertion of will essential to my person as such1 and already expressed by it 7which is the scene of the conflict71 and does not encroach on that of the other1 consequently is only negation of the negation1 and thus affirmation1 not itself negation4 ,thus if the will of another denies my will1 as this appears in my body and the use of its powers for its maintenance1 without denial of any foreign will which observes a like limitation1 ,i can without wrong compel it to desist from such denial1 i4e41 ,i have so far a right of compulsion4 ,in all cases in which ,i have a right of compulsion1 a complete right to use violence against another1 ,i may1 according to the circumstances1 just as well oppose the violence of the other with craft without doing any wrong1 and accordingly ,i have an actual right to lie precisely so far as ,i have a right of compulsion4 ,therefore a man acts with perfect right who assures a highway robber who is searching him that he has nothing more upon him2 or1 if a burglar has broken into his house by night1 induces him by a lie to enter a cellar and then locks him in4 ,a man who has been captured and carried off by robbers1 for example by pirates1 has the right to kill them not only by violence but also by craft1 in order to regain his freedom4 ,thus1 also1 a promise is certainly not binding when it has been extorted by direct bodily violence1 because he who suffers such compulsion may with full right free himself by killing1 and1 a fortiori1 by deceiving his oppressor4 ,whoever cannot recover through force the property which has been stolen from him1 commits no wrong if he can accomplish it through craft4 ,indeed1 if some one plays with me for money he has stolen from me1 ,i have the right to use false dice against him1 because all that ,i win from him already belongs to me4 ,whoever would deny this must still more deny the justifiableness of stratagem in war1 which is just an acted lie1 and is a proof of the saying of ,queen ,christina of ,sweden1 8,the words of men are to be esteemed as nothing2 scarcely are their deeds to be trusted40 ,so sharply does the limit of right border upon that of wrong4 ,for the rest1 ,i regard it as superfluous to show that all this completely agrees with what was said above about the unlawfulness of the lie and of violence4 ,it may also serve to explain the peculiar theory of the lie told under pressure47#ge7 ,in accordance with what has been said1 wrong and right are merely moral determinations1 i4e41 such as are valid with regard to the consideration of human action as such1 and in relation to the inner significance of this action in itself4 ,this asserts itself directly in consciousness through the fact that the doing of wrong is accompanied by an inward pain1 which is the merely felt consciousness of the wrong-doer of the excessive strength of the assertion of will in itself1 which extends even to the denial of the manifestation of the will of another1 and also the consciousness that although he is different from the person suffering wrong as far as the manifestation is concerned1 yet in himself he is identical with him4 ,the further explanation of this inner significance of all pain of conscience cannot be given till later4 ,he who suffers wrong is1 on the other hand1 painfully conscious of the denial of his will1 as it is expressed through the body and its natural requirements1 for the satisfaction of which nature refers him to the powers of his body2 and at the same time he is conscious that without doing wrong he might ward off that denial by every means unless he lacks the power4 ,this purely moral significance is the only one which right and wrong have for men as men1 not as members of the ,state1 and which consequently remains even when man is in a state of nature without any positive law4 ,it constitutes the basis and the content of all that has on this account been named natural law1 though it is better called moral law1 for its validity does not extend to suffering1 to the external reality1 but only to the action of man and the self-knowledge of his individual will which grows up in him from his action1 and which is called conscience4 ,it cannot1 however1 in a state of nature1 assert itself in all cases1 and outwardly upon other individuals1 and prevent might from reigning instead of right4 ,in a state of nature it depends upon every one merely to see that in every case he does no wrong1 but by no means to see that in every case he suffers no wrong1 for this depends on the accident of his outward power4 ,therefore the concepts right and wrong1 even in a state of nature1 are certainly valid and by no means conventional1 but there they are valid merely as moral concepts1 for the self-knowledge of one's own will in each4 ,they are a fixed point in the scale of the very different degrees of strength with which the will to live asserts itself in human individuals1 like the freezing-point on the thermometer2 the point at which the assertion of one's own will becomes the denial of the will of another1 i4e41 specifies through wrong-doing the degree of its intensity1 combined with the degree in which knowledge is involved in the principium individuationis 7which is the form of all knowledge that is subject to the will74 ,but whoever wants to set aside the purely moral consideration of human action1 or denies it1 and wishes to regard conduct merely in its outward effects and their consequences1 may certainly1 with ,hobbes1 explain right and wrong as conventional definitions arbitrarily assumed1 and therefore not existing outside positive law1 and we can never show him through external experience what does not belong to such experience4 ,hobbes himself characterises his completely empirical method of thought very remarkably by the fact that in his book 8,de ,principiis ,geometrarum0 he denies all pure mathematics properly so called1 and obstinately maintains that the point has extension and the line has breadth1 and we can never show him a point without extension or a line without breadth4 ,thus we can just as little impart to him the a priori nature of mathematics as the a priori nature of right1 because he shuts himself out from all knowledge which is not empirical4 ,the pure doctrine of right is thus a chapter of ethics1 and is directly related only to action1 not to suffering2 for only the former is the expression of will1 and this alone is considered by ethics4 ,suffering is mere occurrence4 ,ethics can only have regard to suffering indirectly1 merely to show that what takes place merely to avoid suffering wrong is itself no infliction of wrong4 ,the working out of this chapter of ethics would contain the precise definition of the limits to which an individual may go in the assertion of the will already objectified in his body without denying the same will as it appears in another individual2 and also the actions which transgress these limits1 which consequently are wrong1 and therefore in their turn may be warded off without wrong4 ,thus our own action always remains the point of view of the investigation4 ,but the suffering of wrong appears as an event in outward experience1 and in it is manifested1 as we have said1 more distinctly than anywhere else1 the phenomenon of the conflict of the will to live with itself1 arising from the multiplicity of individuals and from egoism1 both of which are conditioned through the principium individuationis1 which is the form of the world as idea for the knowledge of the individual4 ,we also saw above that a very large part of the suffering essential to human life has its perennial source in that conflict of individuals4 ,the reason1 however1 which is common to all these individuals1 and which enables them to know not merely the particular case1 as the brutes do1 but also the whole abstractly in its connection1 has also taught them to discern the source of that suffering1 and induced them to consider the means of diminishing it1 or1 when possible1 of suppressing it by a common sacrifice1 which is1 however1 more than counterbalanced by the common advantage that proceeds from it4 ,however agreeable it is to the egoism of the individual to inflict wrong in particular cases1 this has yet a necessary correlative in the suffering of wrong of another individual1 to whom it is a great pain4 ,and because the reason which surveys the whole left the one-sided point of view of the individual to which it belongs1 and freed itself for the moment from its dependence upon it1 it saw the pleasure of an individual in inflicting wrong always outweighed by the relatively greater pain of the other who suffered the wrong2 and it found further1 that because here everything was left to chance1 every one had to fear that the pleasure of conveniently inflicting wrong would far more rarely fall to his lot than the pain of enduring it4 ,from this reason recognised that both in order to diminish the suffering which is everywhere disseminated1 and as far as possible to divide it equally1 the best and only means was to spare all the pain of suffering wrong by renouncing all the pleasure to be obtained by inflicting it4 ,this means is the contract of the state or law4 ,it is easily conceived1 and little by little carried out by the egoism1 which1 through the use of reason1 proceeds methodically and forsakes its one-sided point of view4 ,this origin of the state and of law ,i have indicated was already exhibited as such by ,plato in the 8,republic40 ,in fact1 it is the essential and only origin1 determined by the nature of the matter4 ,moreover1 in no land can the state have ever had a different origin1 because it is just this mode of originating this aim that makes it a state4 ,but it is a matter of indifference whether1 in each particular nation1 the condition which preceded it was that of a horde of savages independent of each other 7anarchy71 or that of a horde of slaves ruled at will by the stronger 7despotism74 ,in both cases there existed as yet no state2 it first arose through that common agreement2 and according as that agreement is more or less free from anarchy or despotism1 the state is more or less perfect4 ,republics tend to anarchy1 monarchies to despotism1 and the mean of constitutional monarchy1 which was therefore devised1 tends to government by factions4 ,in order to found a perfect state1 we must begin by providing beings whose nature allows them always to sacrifice their own to the public good4 ,till then1 however1 something may be attained through the existence of one family whose good is quite inseparable from that of the country2 so that1 at least in matters of importance1 it can never advance the one without the other4 ,on this rests the power and the advantage of the hereditary monarchy4 ,now as ethics was concerned exclusively with right and wrong doing1 and could accurately point out the limits of his action to whoever was resolved to do no wrong2 politics1 on the contrary1 the theory of legislation1 is exclusively concerned with the suffering of wrong1 and would never trouble itself with wrong-doing at all if it were not on account of its ever-necessary correlative1 the suffering of wrong1 which it always keeps in view as the enemy it opposes4 ,indeed1 if it were possible to conceive an infliction of wrong with which no suffering of wrong on the part of another was connected1 the state would1 consistently1 by no means prohibit it4 ,and because in ethics the will1 the disposition1 is the object of consideration1 and the only real thing1 the firm will to do wrong1 which is only restrained and rendered ineffective by external might1 and the actually committed wrong1 are to it quite the same1 and it condemns him who so wills as unjust at its tribunal4 ,on the other hand1 will and disposition1 merely as such1 do not concern the state at all1 but only the deed 7whether it is merely attempted or carried out71 on account of its correlative1 the suffering on the part of another4 ,thus for the state the deed1 the event1 is the only real2 the disposition1 the intention1 is only investigated so far as the significance of the deed becomes known through it4 ,therefore the state will forbid no one to carry about in his thought murder and poison against another1 so long as it knows certainly that the fear of the sword and the wheel will always restrain the effects of that will4 ,the state has also by no means to eradicate the foolish purpose1 the inclination to wrong-doing1 the wicked disposition2 but merely always to place beside every possible motive for doing a wrong a more powerful motive for leaving it undone in the inevitable punishment that will ensue4 ,therefore the criminal code is as complete a register as possible of motives against every criminal action that can possibly be imagined--both in abstracto1 in order to make any case that occurs an application in concreto4 ,politics or legislation will therefore for this end borrow from that chapter of ethics which is the doctrine of right1 and which1 besides the inner significance of right and wrong1 determines the exact limits between them4 ,yet it will only do so for the purpose of making use of its reverse side1 and regarding all the limits which ethics lays down as not to be transgressed1 if we are to avoid doing wrong1 from the other side1 as the limits which we must not allow others to transgress if we do not wish to suffer wrong1 and from which we have therefore a right to drive others back4 ,therefore these limits are1 as much as possible1 from the passive side1 barricaded by laws4 ,it is evident that as an historian has very wittily been called an inverted prophet1 the professor of law is an inverted moralist1 and therefore law itself1 in its proper sense1 i4e41 the doctrine of the right1 which we ought to maintain1 is inverted ethics in that chapter of it in which the rights are laid down which we ought not to violate4 ,the concept of wrong and its negation1 that of right1 which is originally ethical1 becomes juridical by the transference of the starting-point from the active to the passive side1 and thus by inversion4 ,this1 as well as ,kant's theory of law1 which very falsely deduces the institution of the state as a moral duty from his categorical imperative1 has1 even in the most recent times1 repeatedly occasioned the very extraordinary error that the state is an institution for furthering morality2 that it arises from the endeavour after this1 and is1 consequently1 directed against egoism4 ,as if the inward disposition1 to which alone morality or immorality belongs1 the externally free will1 would allow itself to be modified from without and changed by influences exerted upon it6 ,still more perverse is the theory that the state is the condition of freedom in the moral sense1 and in this way the condition of morality2 for freedom lies beyond the phenomenon1 and indeed beyond human arrangements4 ,the state is1 as we have said1 so little directed against egoism in general and as such1 that1 on the contrary1 it has sprung from egoism and exists only in its service--an egoism that well understands itself1 proceeds methodically and forsakes the one-sided for the universal point of view1 and so by addition is the common egoism of all4 ,the state is thus instituted under the correct presupposition that pure morality1 i4e41 right action from moral grounds1 is not to be expected2 if this were not the case1 it would itself be superfluous4 ,thus the state1 which aims at well-being1 is by no means directed against egoism1 but only against the disadvantageous consequences which arise from the multiplicity of egoistic individuals1 and reciprocally affect them all and disturb their well-being4 ,therefore it was already said by ,aristotle 7,de4 ,rep4 iii473 2 7,finis civitatis est bene vivere1 hoc autem est beate et pulchre vivere74 ,hobbes also has accurately and excellently expounded this origin and end of the state2 and that old first principle of all state policy1 salus publica prima lex esto1 indicates the same thing4 ,if the state completely attains its end1 it will produce the same outward result as if perfect justice of disposition prevailed everywhere4 ,but the inner nature and origin of both phenomena will be the converse4 ,thus in the second case it would be that no one wished to do wrong1 and in the first that no one wished to suffer wrong1 and the means appropriate to this end had been fully employed4 ,thus the same line may be drawn from opposite directions1 and a beast of prey with a muzzle is as harmless as a graminivorous animal4 ,but beyond this point the state cannot go4 ,it cannot exhibit a phenomenon such as would spring from universal mutual well-wishing and love4 ,for just as we found that from its nature it would not forbid the doing of a wrong which involved no corresponding suffering of wrong on the part of another1 and prohibits all wrong-doing only because this is impossible2 so conversely1 in accordance with its tendency towards the well-being of all1 it would very gladly take care that every benevolent action and work of human love should be experienced1 if it were not that these also have an inevitable correlative in the performance of acts of benevolence and works of love1 and every member of the state would wish to assume the passive and none the active rle1 and there would be no reason for exacting the latter from one member of the state rather than from another4 ,accordingly only the negative1 which is just the right1 not the positive1 which has been comprehended under the name of obligations of love1 or1 less completely1 duties1 can be exacted by force4 ,legislation1 as we have said1 borrows the pure philosophy of right1 or the doctrine of the nature and limits of right and wrong1 from ethics1 in order to apply it from the reverse side to its own ends1 which are different from those of ethics1 and to institute positive legislation and the means of supporting it1 i4e41 the state1 in accordance with it4 ,positive legislation is thus the inverted application of the purely moral doctrine of right4 ,this application may be made with reference to the peculiar relations and circumstances of a particular people4 ,but only if the positive legislation is1 in essential matters1 throughout determined in accordance with the guidance of the pure theory of right1 and for each of its propositions a ground can be established in the pure theory of right1 is the legislation which has arisen a positive right and the state a community based upon right1 a state in the proper meaning of the word1 a morally permissible1 not immoral institution4 ,otherwise the positive legislation is1 on the contrary1 the establishment of a positive wrong2 it is itself an openly avowed enforced wrong4 ,such is every despotism1 the constitution of most ,mohammedan kingdoms2 and indeed various parts of many constitutions are also of this kind2 for example1 serfdom1 vassalage1 and many such institutions4 ,the pure theory of right or natural right--better1 moral right--though always reversed1 lies at the foundation of every just positive legislation1 as pure mathematics lies at the foundation of every branch of applied mathematics4 ,the most important points of the doctrine of right1 as philosophy has to supply it for that end to legislation1 are the following3 #a4 ,the explanation of the inner and real significance both of the origin of the conceptions of wrong and right1 and of their application and position in ethics4 #b4 ,the deduction of the law of property4 #c4 ,the deduction of the moral validity of contracts2 for this is the moral basis of the contract of the state4 #d4 ,the explanation of the origin and the aim of the state1 of the relation of this aim to ethics1 and of the intentional transference of the ethical doctrine of right1 by reversing it1 to legislation1 in consequence of this relation4 #e4 ,the deduction of the right of punishment4 ,the remaining content of the doctrine of right is mere application of these principles1 mere accurate definition of the limits of right and wrong for all possible relations of life1 which are consequently united and distributed under certain points of view and titles4 ,in these special doctrines the books which treat of pure law are fairly at one2 it is only in the principles that they differ much1 for these are always connected with some philosophical system4 ,in connection with our system1 we have explained the first four of these principal points shortly and generally1 yet definitely and distinctly1 and it remains for us to speak in the same way of the right of punishment4 ,kant makes the fundamentally false assertion that apart from the state there would be no complete right of property4 ,it follows from our deduction1 as given above1 that even in a state of nature there is property with complete natural1 i4e41 moral right1 which cannot be injured without wrong1 but may without wrong be defended to the uttermost4 ,on the other hand1 it is certain that apart from the state there is no right of punishment4 ,all right to punish is based upon the positive law alone1 which before the offence has determined a punishment for it1 the threat of which1 as a counter-motive1 is intended to outweigh all possible motives for the offence4 ,this positive law is to be regarded as sanctioned and recognised by all the members of the state4 ,it is thus based upon a common contract which the members of the state are in duty bound to fulfil1 and thus1 on the one hand1 to inflict the punishment1 and1 on the other hand1 to endure it2 thus the endurance of the punishment may with right be enforced4 ,consequently the immediate end of punishment is1 in the particular case1 the fulfilment of the law as a contract4 ,but the one end of the law is deterrence from the infringement of the rights of others4 ,for1 in order that every one may be protected from suffering wrong1 men have combined to form a state1 have renounced the doing of wrong1 and assumed the task of maintaining the state4 ,thus the law and the fulfilment of it1 the punishment1 are essentially directed to the future1 not to the past4 ,this distinguishes punishment from revenge2 for the motives which instigate the latter are solely concerned with what has happened1 and thus with the past as such4 ,all requital of wrong by the infliction of pain1 without any aim for the future1 is revenge1 and can have no other end than consolation for the suffering one has borne by the sight of the suffering one has inflicted upon another4 ,this is wickedness and cruelty1 and cannot be morally justified4 ,wrong which some one has inflicted upon me by no means entitles me to inflict wrong upon him4 ,the requital of evil with evil without further intention is neither morally nor otherwise through any rational ground to be justified1 and the jus talionis set up as the absolute1 final principle of the right of punishment1 is meaningless4 ,therefore ,kant's theory of punishment as mere requital for requital's sake is a completely groundless and perverse view4 ,yet it is always appearing in the writings of many jurists1 under all kinds of lofty phrases1 which amount to nothing but empty words1 as3 ,through the punishment the crime is expiated or neutralised and abolished1 and many such4 ,but no man has the right to set himself up as a purely moral judge and requiter1 and punish the misdeeds of another with pains which he inflicts upon him1 and so to impose penance upon him for his sins4 ,nay1 this would rather be the most presumptuous arrogance2 and therefore the ,bible says1 8,vengeance is mine2 ,i will repay1 saith the ,lord40 ,but man has the right to care for the safety of society2 and this can only be done by interdicting all actions which are denoted by the word 8criminal10 in order to prevent them by means of counter-motives1 which are the threatened punishments4 ,and this threat can only be made effective by carrying it out when a case occurs in spite of it4 ,accordingly that the end of punishment1 or more accurately of penal law1 is the deterrence from crime1 is a truth so generally recognised and indeed self-evident1 that in ,england it is expressed in the very old form of indictment which is still served by the counsel for the ,crown in criminal actions1 for it concludes with the words1 8,if this be proved1 you1 the said ,n4 ,n41 ought to be punished with pains of law1 to deter others from the like crimes in all time coming40 ,if a prince desires to extend mercy to a criminal who has justly been condemned1 his ,ministers will represent to him that1 if he does1 this crime will soon be repeated4 ,an end for the future distinguishes punishment from revenge1 and punishment only has this end when it is inflicted in fulfilment of a law4 ,it thus announces itself as inevitable in every future case1 and thus the law obtains the power to deter1 in which its end really consists4 ,now here a ,kantian would inevitably reply that certainly according to this view the punished criminal would be used 8merely as a means40 ,this proposition1 so unweariedly repeated by all the ,kantians1 8,man must always be treated as an end1 never as a means10 certainly sounds significant1 and is therefore a very suitable proposition for those who like to have a formula which saves them all further thought2 but looked at in the light1 it is an exceedingly vague1 indefinite assertion1 which reaches its aim quite indirectly1 requires to be explained1 defined1 and modified in every case of its application1 and1 if taken generally1 is insufficient1 meagre1 and moreover problematical4 ,the murderer who has been condemned to the punishment of death according to law must now1 at any rate1 and with complete right1 be used as a mere means4 ,for public security1 the chief end of the state1 is disturbed by him2 indeed it is abolished if the law is not carried out4 ,the murderer1 his life1 his person1 must now be the means of fulfilling the law1 and thereby of re-establishing the public security4 ,and he is made such a means with perfect right1 in fulfilment of the contract of the state1 which was entered into by him because he was a citizen1 and in accordance with which1 in order to enjoy security for his life1 freedom1 and property1 he has pledged his life1 his freedom1 and his property for the security of all1 which pledge has now been forfeited4 ,this theory of punishment which we have established1 the theory which is directly supported by sound reason1 is certainly in the main no new thought2 but it is a thought which was almost supplanted by new errors1 and therefore it was necessary to exhibit it as distinctly as possible4 ,the same thing is in its essence contained in what ,puffendorf says on the subject1 8,de ,officio ,hominis et ,civis0 7,bk4 ii4 chap4 #ab74 ,hobbes also agrees with it1 8,leviathan0 7chaps4 #ae-bh74 ,in our own day ,feurbach is well known to have maintained it4 ,indeed1 it occurs even in the utterances of the ancient philosophers4 ,plato expresses it clearly in the 8,protagoras0 7p4 #aad1 edit4 ,bip471 also in the 8,gorgias0 7p4 #afh71 and lastly in the eleventh book of the 8,laws0 7p4 #afe74 ,seneca expresses ,plato's opinion and the theory of all punishment in the short sentence1 8,nemo prudens punit1 quia peccatum est2 sed ne peccetur0 7,de ,ira1 i4 #af74 ,thus we have come to recognise in the state the means by which egoism endowed with reason seeks to escape from its own evil consequences which turn against itself1 and now each promotes the well-being of all because he sees that his own well-being is involved in it4 ,if the state attained its end completely1 then to a certain extent something approaching to an ,utopia might finally1 by the removal of all kinds of evil1 be brought about4 ,for by the human powers united in it1 it is able to make the rest of nature more and more serviceable4 ,but as yet the state has always remained very far from this goal4 ,and even if it attained to it1 innumerable evils essential to all life would still keep it in suffering2 and finally1 if they were all removed1 ennui would at once occupy every place they left4 ,and besides1 the strife of individuals is never completely abolished by the state1 for it vexes in trifles when it is prohibited in greater things4 ,finally1 ,eris1 happily expelled from within1 turns to what is without2 as the conflict of individuals1 she is banished by the institution of the state2 but she reappears from without as the war of nations1 and now demands in bulk and at once1 as an accumulated debt1 the bloody sacrifice which by wise precautions has been denied her in the particular4 ,and even supposing that all this were finally overcome and removed1 by wisdom founded on the experience of thousands of years1 at the end the result would be the actual over-population of the whole planet1 the terrible evil of which only a bold imagination can now realise47#gf7 #fc4 ,we have recognised temporal justice1 which has its seat in the state1 as requiting and punishing1 and have seen that this only becomes justice through a reference to the future4 ,for without this reference all punishing and requiting would be an outrage without justification1 and indeed merely the addition of another evil to that which has already occurred1 without meaning or significance4 ,but it is quite otherwise with eternal justice1 which was referred to before1 and which rules not the state but the world1 is not dependent upon human institutions1 is not subject to chance and deception1 is not uncertain1 wavering1 and erring1 but infallible1 fixed1 and sure4 ,the conception of requital implies that of time2 therefore eternal justice cannot be requital4 ,thus it cannot1 like temporal justice1 admit of respite and delay1 and require time in order to triumph1 equalising the evil deed by the evil consequences only by means of time4 ,the punishment must here be so bound up with the offence that both are one4 1 1 8 1 1 1 2 1 4 ,eurip4 ap4 ,stob4 ,ecl41 i4 c4 #d4 78,volare pennis scelera ad therias domus ,putatis1 illic in ,jovis tabularia ,scripto referri2 tum ,jovem lectis super ,sententiam proferre8--sed mortalium ,facinora cli1 quantaquanta est1 regia ,nequit tenere3 nec legendis ,juppiter ,et puniendis par est4 ,est tamen ultio1 ,et1 si intuemur1 illa nos habitat prope407 ,now that such an eternal justice really lies in the nature of the world will soon become completely evident to whoever has grasped the whole of the thought which we have hitherto been developing4 ,the world1 in all the multiplicity of its parts and forms1 is the manifestation1 the objectivity1 of the one will to live4 ,existence itself1 and the kind of existence1 both as a collective whole and in every part1 proceeds from the will alone4 ,the will is free1 the will is almighty4 ,the will appears in everything1 just as it determines itself in itself and outside time4 ,the world is only the mirror of this willing2 and all finitude1 all suffering1 all miseries1 which it contains1 belong to the expression of that which the will wills1 are as they are because the will so wills4 ,accordingly with perfect right every being supports existence in general1 and also the existence of its species and its peculiar individuality1 entirely as it is and in circumstances as they are1 in a world such as it is1 swayed by chance and error1 transient1 ephemeral1 and constantly suffering2 and in all that it experiences1 or indeed can experience1 it always gets its due4 ,for the will belongs to it2 and as the will is1 so is the world4 ,only this world itself can bear the responsibility of its own existence and nature--no other2 for by what means could another have assumed it8 ,do we desire to know what men1 morally considered1 are worth as a whole and in general1 we have only to consider their fate as a whole and in general4 ,this is want1 wretchedness1 affliction1 misery1 and death4 ,eternal justice reigns2 if they were not1 as a whole1 worthless1 their fate1 as a whole1 would not be so sad4 ,in this sense we may say1 the world itself is the judgment of the world4 ,if we could lay all the misery of the world in one scale of the balance1 and all the guilt of the world in the other1 the needle would certainly point to the centre4 ,certainly1 however1 the world does not exhibit itself to the knowledge of the individual as such1 developed for the service of the will1 as it finally reveals itself to the inquirer as the objectivity of the one and only will to live1 which he himself is4 ,but the sight of the uncultured individual is clouded1 as the ,hindus say1 by the veil of ,my4 ,he sees not the thing-in-itself but the phenomenon in time and space1 the principium individuationis1 and in the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason4 ,and in this form of his limited knowledge he sees not the inner nature of things1 which is one1 but its phenomena as separated1 disunited1 innumerable1 very different1 and indeed opposed4 ,for to him pleasure appears as one thing and pain as quite another thing3 one man as a tormentor and a murderer1 another as a martyr and a victim2 wickedness as one thing and evil as another4 ,he sees one man live in joy1 abundance1 and pleasure1 and even at his door another die miserably of want and cold4 ,then he asks1 ,where is the retribution8 ,and he himself1 in the vehement1 pressure of will which is his origin and his nature1 seizes upon the pleasures and enjoyments of life1 firmly embraces them1 and knows not that by this very act of his will he seizes and hugs all those pains and sorrows at the sight of which he shudders4 ,he sees the ills and he sees the wickedness in the world1 but far from knowing that both of these are but different sides of the manifestation of the one will to live1 he regards them as very different1 and indeed quite opposed1 and often seeks to escape by wickedness1 i4e41 by causing the suffering of another1 from ills1 from the suffering of his own individuality1 for he is involved in the principium individuationis1 deluded by the veil of ,my4 ,just as a sailor sits in a boat trusting to his frail barque in a stormy sea1 unbounded in every direction1 rising and falling with the howling mountainous waves2 so in the midst of a world of sorrows the individual man sits quietly1 supported by and trusting to the principium individuationis1 or the way in which the individual knows things as phenomena4 ,the boundless world1 everywhere full of suffering in the infinite past1 in the infinite future1 is strange to him1 indeed is to him but a fable2 his ephemeral person1 his extensionless present1 his momentary satisfaction1 this alone has reality for him2 and he does all to maintain this1 so long as his eyes are not opened by a better knowledge4 ,till then1 there lives only in the inmost depths of his consciousness a very obscure presentiment that all that is after all not really so strange to him1 but has a connection with him1 from which the principium individuationis cannot protect him4 ,from this presentiment arises that ineradicable awe common to all men 7and indeed perhaps even to the most sensible of the brutes7 which suddenly seizes them if by any chance they become puzzled about the principium individuationis1 because the principle of sufficient reason in some one of its forms seems to admit of an exception4 ,for example1 if it seems as if some change took place without a cause1 or some one who is dead appears again1 or if in any other way the past or the future becomes present or the distant becomes near4 ,the fearful terror at anything of the kind is founded on the fact that they suddenly become puzzled about the forms of knowledge of the phenomenon1 which alone separate their own individuality from the rest of the world4 ,but even this separation lies only in the phenomenon1 and not in the thing-in-itself2 and on this rests eternal justice4 ,in fact1 all temporal happiness stands1 and all prudence proceeds1 upon ground that is undermined4 ,they defend the person from accidents and supply its pleasures2 but the person is merely phenomenon1 and its difference from other individuals1 and exemption from the sufferings which they endure1 rests merely in the form of the phenomenon1 the principium individuationis4 ,according to the true nature of things1 every one has all the suffering of the world as his own1 and indeed has to regard all merely possible suffering as for him actual1 so long as he is the fixed will to live1 i4e41 asserts life with all his power4 ,for the knowledge that sees through the principium individuationis1 a happy life in time1 the gift of chance or won by prudence1 amid the sorrows of innumerable others1 is only the dream of a beggar in which he is a king1 but from which he must awake and learn from experience that only a fleeting illusion had separated him from the suffering of his life4 ,eternal justice withdraws itself from the vision that is involved in the knowledge which follows the principle of sufficient reason in the principium individuationis2 such vision misses it altogether unless it vindicates it in some way by fictions4 ,it sees the bad1 after misdeeds and cruelties of every kind1 live in happiness and leave the world unpunished4 ,it sees the oppressed drag out a life full of suffering to the end without an avenger1 a requiter appearing4 ,but that man only will grasp and comprehend eternal justice who raises himself above the knowledge that proceeds under the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason1 bound to the particular thing1 and recognises the ,ideas1 sees through the principium individuationis1 and becomes conscious that the forms of the phenomenon do not apply to the thing-in-itself4 ,moreover1 he alone1 by virtue of the same knowledge1 can understand the true nature of virtue1 as it will soon disclose itself to us in connection with the present inquiry1 although for the practice of virtue this knowledge in the abstract is by no means demanded4 ,thus it becomes clear to whoever has attained to the knowledge referred to1 that because the will is the in-itself of all phenomena1 the misery which is awarded to others and that which he experiences himself1 the bad and the evil1 always concerns only that one inner being which is everywhere the same1 although the phenomena in which the one and the other exhibits itself exist as quite different individuals1 and are widely separated by time and space4 ,he sees that the difference between him who inflicts the suffering and him who must bear it is only the phenomenon1 and does not concern the thing-in-itself1 for this is the will living in both1 which here1 deceived by the knowledge which is bound to its service1 does not recognise itself1 and seeking an increased happiness in one of its phenomena1 produces great suffering in another1 and thus1 in the pressure of excitement1 buries its teeth in its own flesh1 not knowing that it always injures only itself1 revealing in this form1 through the medium of individuality1 the conflict with itself which it bears in its inner nature4 ,the inflicter of suffering and the sufferer are one4 ,the former errs in that he believes he is not a partaker in the suffering2 the latter1 in that he believes he is not a partaker in the guilt4 ,if the eyes of both were opened1 the inflicter of suffering would see that he lives in all that suffers pain in the wide world1 and which1 if endowed with reason1 in vain asks why it was called into existence for such great suffering1 its desert of which it does not understand4 ,and the sufferer would see that all the wickedness which is or ever was committed in the world proceeds from that will which constitutes his own nature also1 appears also in him1 and that through this phenomenon and its assertion he has taken upon himself all the sufferings which proceed from such a will and bears them as his due1 so long as he is this will4 ,from this knowledge speaks the profound poet ,calderon in 8,life a ,dream0-- 8,pues el delito mayor ,del hombre es haber nacido40 78,for the greatest crime of man ,is that he ever was born407 ,why should it not be a crime1 since1 according to an eternal law1 death follows upon it8 ,calderon has merely expressed in these lines the ,christian dogma of original sin4 ,the living knowledge of eternal justice1 of the balance that inseparably binds together the malum culp with the malum pn1 demands the complete transcending of individuality and the principle of its possibility4 ,therefore it will always remain unattainable to the majority of men1 as will also be the case with the pure and distinct knowledge of the nature of all virtue1 which is akin to it1 and which we are about to explain4 ,accordingly the wise ancestors of the ,hindu people have directly expressed it in the ,vedas1 which are only allowed to the three regenerate castes1 or in their esoteric teaching1 so far at any rate as conception and language comprehend it1 and their method of exposition1 which always remains pictorial and even rhapsodical1 admits2 but in the religion of the people1 or exoteric teaching1 they only communicate it by means of myths4 ,the direct exposition we find in the ,vedas1 the fruit of the highest human knowledge and wisdom1 the kernel of which has at last reached us in the ,upanishads as the greatest gift of this century4 ,it is expressed in various ways1 but especially by making all the beings in the world1 living and lifeless1 pass successively before the view of the student1 and pronouncing over every one of them that word which has become a formula1 and as such has been called the ,mahavakya3 ,tatoumes1--more correctly1 ,tat twam asi1--which means1 8,this thou art407#gg7 ,but for the people1 that great truth1 so far as in their limited condition they could comprehend it1 was translated into the form of knowledge which follows the principle of sufficient reason4 ,this form of knowledge is indeed1 from its nature1 quite incapable of apprehending that truth pure and in itself1 and even stands in contradiction to it1 yet in the form of a myth it received a substitute for it which was sufficient as a guide for conduct4 ,for the myth enables the method of knowledge1 in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason1 to comprehend by figurative representation the ethical significance of conduct1 which itself is ever foreign to it4 ,this is the aim of all systems of religion1 for as a whole they are the mythical clothing of the truth which is unattainable to the uncultured human intellect4 ,in this sense this myth might1 in ,kant's language1 be called a postulate of the practical reason2 but regarded as such1 it has the great advantage that it contains absolutely no elements but such as lie before our eyes in the course of actual experience1 and can therefore support all its conceptions with perceptions4 ,what is here referred to is the myth of the transmigration of souls4 ,it teaches that all sufferings which in life one inflicts upon other beings must be expiated in a subsequent life in this world1 through precisely the same sufferings2 and this extends so far1 that he who only kills a brute must1 some time in endless time1 be born as the same kind of brute and suffer the same death4 ,it teaches that wicked conduct involves a future life in this world in suffering and despised creatures1 and1 accordingly1 that one will then be born again in lower castes1 or as a woman1 or as a brute1 as ,pariah or ,tschandala1 as a leper1 or as a crocodile1 and so forth4 ,all the pains which the myth threatens it supports with perceptions from actual life1 through suffering creatures which do not know how they have merited their misery1 and it does not require to call in the assistance of any other hell4 ,as a reward1 on the other hand1 it promises re-birth in better1 nobler forms1 as ,brahmans1 wise men1 or saints4 ,the highest reward1 which awaits the noblest deeds and the completest resignation1 which is also given to the woman who in seven successive lives has voluntarily died on the funeral pile of her husband1 and not less to the man whose pure mouth has never uttered a single lie1--this reward the myth can only express negatively in the language of this world by the promise1 which is so often repeated1 that they shall never be born again1 ,non adsumes iterum existentiam apparentem2 or1 as the ,buddhists1 who recognise neither ,vedas nor castes1 express it1 8,thou shalt attain to ,nirvna10 i4e41 to a state in which four things no longer exist--birth1 age1 sickness1 and death4 ,never has a myth entered1 and never will one enter1 more closely into the philosophical truth which is attainable to so few than this primitive doctrine of the noblest and most ancient nation4 ,broken up as this nation now is into many parts1 this myth yet reigns as the universal belief of the people1 and has the most decided influence upon life to-day1 as four thousand years ago4 ,therefore ,pythagoras and ,plato have seized with admiration on that ne plus ultra of mythical representation1 received it from ,india or ,egypt1 honoured it1 made use of it1 and1 we know not how far1 even believed it4 ,we1 on the contrary1 now send the ,brahmans ,english clergymen and evangelical linen-weavers to set them right out of sympathy1 and to show them that they are created out of nothing1 and ought thankfully to rejoice in the fact4 ,but it is just the same as if we fired a bullet against a cliff4 ,in ,india our religions will never take root4 ,the ancient wisdom of the human race will not be displaced by what happened in ,galilee4 ,on the contrary1 ,indian philosophy streams back to ,europe1 and will produce a fundamental change in our knowledge and thought4 #fd4 ,from our exposition of eternal justice1 which is not mythical but philosophical1 we will now proceed to the kindred investigation of the ethical significance of conduct and of conscience1 which is the merely felt knowledge of that significance4 ,but first ,i wish at this point to draw attention to two peculiarities of human nature1 that might help to make clear how the nature of that eternal justice1 and the unity and identity of the will in all its phenomena upon which it rests1 is known to every one1 at least as an obscure feeling4 ,when a bad deed has been done1 it affords satisfaction not only to the sufferer1 who for the most part feels the desire of revenge1 but also to the perfectly indifferent spectator1 to see that he who caused another pain suffers himself a like measure of pain2 and this quite independently of the end which we have shown the state has in view in punishment1 and which is the foundation of penal law4 ,it seems to me that what expresses itself here is nothing but the consciousness of that eternal justice1 which is1 nevertheless1 at once misunderstood and falsified by the unenlightened mind1 for1 involved in the principium individuationis1 it produces an amphiboly of the concepts and demands from the phenomenon what only belongs to the thing in itself4 ,it does not see how far in themselves the offender and the offended are one1 and that it is the same being which1 not recognising itself in its own manifestation1 bears both the pain and the guilt1 but it desires rather to see the pain also in the particular individual to whom the guilt belongs4 ,therefore1 most persons would demand that a man who had a very high degree of wickedness which might yet occur in many others1 only not matched with other qualities such as are found in him1 a man who also far surpassed others by extraordinary intellectual powers1 and who inflicted unspeakable sufferings upon millions of others--for example1 as a conqueror1--most persons1 ,i say1 would demand that such a man should at some time and in some place expiate all these sufferings by a like amount of pain2 for they do not recognise how in themselves the inflicter of suffering and the sufferers are one1 and that it is the same will through which the latter exist and live which also appears in the former1 and just through him attains to a distinct revelation of its nature1 and which likewise suffers both in the oppressed and the oppressor2 and indeed in the latter in a greater measure1 as the consciousness has attained a higher degree of clearness and distinctness and the will has greater vehemence4 ,but that the deeper knowledge1 which is no longer involved in the principium individuationis1 from which all virtue and nobleness proceed1 no longer retains the disposition which demands requital1 is shown by the ,christian ethics1 which absolutely forbids all requital of evil with evil1 and allows eternal justice to proceed in the sphere of the thing-in-itself1 which is different from that of the phenomenon4 78,vengeance is mine2 ,i will repay1 saith the ,lord10--,rom4 xii4 #ai47 ,a much more striking1 but also a much rarer1 characteristic of human nature1 which expresses that desire to draw eternal justice into the province of experience1 i4e41 of individuality1 and at the same time indicates a felt consciousness that1 as ,i have expressed it above1 the will to live conducts at its own cost the great tragedy and comedy1 and that the same one will lives in all manifestations1--such a characteristic1 ,i say1 is the following4 ,we sometimes see a man so deeply moved by a great injury which he has experienced1 or1 it may be1 only witnessed1 that he deliberately and irretrievably stakes his own life in order to take vengeance on the perpetrator of that wrong4 ,we see him seek for some mighty oppressor through long years1 murder him at last1 and then himself die on the scaffold1 as he had foreseen1 and often1 it may be1 did not seek to avoid1 for his life had value for him only as a means of vengeance4 ,we find examples of this especially among the ,spaniards47#gh7 ,if1 now1 we consider the spirit of that desire for retribution carefully1 we find that it is very different from common revenge1 which seeks to mitigate the suffering1 endured by the sight of the suffering inflicted2 indeed1 we find that what it aims at deserves to be called1 not so much revenge as punishment4 ,for in it there really lies the intention of an effect upon the future through the example1 and that without any selfish aim1 either for the avenging person1 for it costs him his life1 or for a society which secures its own safety by laws4 ,for that punishment is carried out by individuals1 not by the state1 nor is it in fulfilment of a law1 but1 on the contrary1 always concerns a deed which the state either would not or could not punish1 and the punishment of which it condemns4 ,it seems to me that the indignation which carries such a man so far beyond the limits of all self-love springs from the deepest consciousness that he himself is the whole will to live1 which appears in all beings through all time1 and that therefore the most distant future belongs to him just as the present1 and cannot be indifferent to him4 ,asserting this will1 he yet desires that in the drama which represents its nature no such fearful wrong shall ever appear again1 and wishes to frighten ever future wrong-doer by the example of a vengeance against which there is no means of defence1 since the avenger is not deterred by the fear of death4 ,the will to live1 though still asserting itself1 does not here depend any longer upon the particular phenomenon1 the individual1 but comprehends the ,idea of man1 and wishes to keep its manifestation pure from such a fearful and shocking wrong4 ,it is a rare1 very significant1 and even sublime trait of character through which the individual sacrifices himself by striving to make himself the arm of eternal justice1 of the true nature of which he is yet ignorant4 #fe4 ,in all the preceding investigations of human action1 we have been leading up to the final investigation1 and have to a considerable extent lightened the task of raising to abstract and philosophical clearness1 and exhibiting as a branch of our central thought that special ethical significance of action which in life is with perfect understanding denoted by the words good and bad4 ,first1 however1 ,i wish to trace back to their real meaning those conceptions of good and bad which have been treated by the philosophical writers of the day1 very extraordinarily1 as simple conceptions1 and thus incapable of analysis2 so that the reader may not remain involved in the senseless delusion that they contain more than is actually the case1 and express in and for themselves all that is here necessary4 ,i am in a position to do this because in ethics ,i am no more disposed to take refuge behind the word good than formerly behind the words beautiful and true1 in order that by the adding a 8ness10 which at the present day is supposed to have a special 1 and therefore to be of assistance in various cases1 and by assuming an air of solemnity1 ,i might induce the belief that by uttering three such words ,i had done more than denote three very wide and abstract1 and consequently empty conceptions1 of very different origin and significance4 ,who is there1 indeed1 who has made himself acquainted with the books of our own day to whom these three words1 admirable as are the things to which they originally refer1 have not become an aversion after he has seen for the thousandth time how those who are least capable of thinking believe that they have only to utter these three words with open mouth and the air of an intelligent sheep1 in order to have spoken the greatest wisdom8 ,the explanation of the concept true has already been given in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 chap4 v4 #bi et seq4 ,the content of the concept beautiful found for the first time its proper explanation through the whole of the ,third ,book of the present work4 ,we now wish to discover the significance of the concept good1 which can be done with very little trouble4 ,this concept is essentially relative1 and signifies the conformity of an object to any definite effort of the will4 ,accordingly everything that corresponds to the will in any of its expressions and fulfils its end is thought through the concept good1 however different such things may be in other respects4 ,thus we speak of good eating1 good roads1 good weather1 good weapons1 good omens1 and so on2 in short1 we call everything good that is just as we wish it to be2 and therefore that may be good in the eyes of one man which is just the reverse in those of another4 ,the conception of the good divides itself into two sub-species--that of the direct and present satisfaction of any volition1 and that of its indirect satisfaction which has reference to the future1 i4e41 the agreeable and the useful4 ,the conception of the opposite1 so long as we are speaking of unconscious existence1 is expressed by the word bad1 more rarely and abstractly by the word evil1 which thus denotes everything that does not correspond to any effort of the will4 ,like all other things that can come into relation to the will1 men who are favourable to the ends which happen to be desired1 who further and befriend them1 are called good1 in the same sense1 and always with that relative limitation1 which shows itself1 for example1 in the expression1 8,i find this good1 but you don't40 ,those1 however1 who are naturally disposed not to hinder the endeavours of others1 but rather to assist them1 and who are thus consistently helpful1 benevolent1 friendly1 and charitable1 are called good men1 on account of this relation of their conduct to the will of others in general4 ,in the case of conscious beings 7brutes and men7 the contrary conception is denoted in ,german1 and1 within the last hundred years or so1 in ,french also1 by a different word from that which is used in speaking of unconscious existence2 in ,german1 bse2 in ,french1 mchant2 while in almost all other languages this distinction does not exist2 and 1 malus1 cattivo1 bad1 are used of men1 as of lifeless things1 which are opposed to the ends of a definite individual will4 ,thus1 having started entirely from the passive element in the good1 the inquiry could only proceed later to the active element1 and investigate the conduct of the man who is called good1 no longer with reference to others1 but to himself2 specially setting itself the task of explaining both the purely objective respect which such conduct produces in others1 and the peculiar contentment with himself which it clearly produces in the man himself1 since he purchases it with sacrifices of another kind2 and also1 on the other hand1 the inner pain which accompanies the bad disposition1 whatever outward advantages it brings to him who entertains it4 ,it was from this source that the ethical systems1 both the philosophical and those which are supported by systems of religion1 took their rise4 ,both seek constantly in some way or other to connect happiness with virtue1 the former either by means of the principle of contradiction or that of sufficient reason1 and thus to make happiness either identical with or the consequence of virtue1 always sophistically2 the latter1 by asserting the existence of other worlds than that which alone can be known to experience47#gi7 ,in our system1 on the contrary1 virtue will show itself1 not as a striving after happiness1 that is1 well-being and life1 but as an effort in quite an opposite direction4 ,it follows from what has been said above1 that the good is1 according to its concept1 2 thus every good is essentially relative1 for its being consists in its relation to a desiring will4 ,absolute good is1 therefore1 a contradiction in terms2 highest good1 summum bonum1 really signifies the same thing--a final satisfaction of the will1 after which no new desire could arise1--a last motive1 the attainment of which would afford enduring satisfaction of the will4 ,but1 according to the investigations which have already been conducted in this ,fourth ,book1 such a consummation is not even thinkable4 ,the will can just as little cease from willing altogether on account of some particular satisfaction1 as time can end or begin2 for it there is no such thing as a permanent fulfilment which shall completely and for ever satisfy its craving4 ,it is the vessel of the ,danaides2 for it there is no highest good1 no absolute good1 but always a merely temporary good4 ,if1 however1 we wish to give an honorary position1 as it were emeritus1 to an old expression1 which from custom we do not like to discard altogether1 we may1 metaphorically and figuratively1 call the complete self-effacement and denial of the will1 the true absence of will1 which alone for ever stills and silences its struggle1 alone gives that contentment which can never again be disturbed1 alone redeems the world1 and which we shall now soon consider at the close of our whole investigation--the absolute good1 the summum bonum--and regard it as the only radical cure of the disease of which all other means are only palliations or anodynes4 ,in this sense the ,greek and also finis bonorum correspond to the thing still better4 ,so much for the words good and bad2 now for the thing itself4 ,if a man is always disposed to do wrong whenever the opportunity presents itself1 and there is no external power to restrain him1 we call him bad4 ,according to our doctrine of wrong1 this means that such a man does not merely assert the will to live as it appears in his own body1 but in this assertion goes so far that he denies the will which appears in other individuals4 ,this is shown by the fact that he desires their powers for the service of his own will1 and seeks to destroy their existence when they stand in the way of its efforts4 ,the ultimate source of this is a high degree of egoism1 the nature of which has been already explained4 ,two things are here apparent4 ,in the first place1 that in such a man an excessively vehement will to live expresses itself1 extending far beyond the assertion of his own body2 and1 in the second place1 that his knowledge1 entirely given up to the principle of sufficient reason and involved in the principium individuationis1 cannot get beyond the difference which this latter principle establishes between his own person and every one else4 ,therefore he seeks his own well-being alone1 completely indifferent to that of all others1 whose existence is to him altogether foreign and divided from his own by a wide gulf1 and who are indeed regarded by him as mere masks with no reality behind them4 ,and these two qualities are the constituent elements of the bad character4 ,this great intensity of will is in itself and directly a constant source of suffering4 ,in the first place1 because all volition as such arises from want2 that is1 suffering4 7,therefore1 as will be remembered1 from the ,third ,book1 the momentary cessation of all volition1 which takes place whenever we give ourselves up to sthetic contemplation1 as pure will-less subject of knowledge1 the correlative of the ,idea1 is one of the principal elements in our pleasure in the beautiful47 ,secondly1 because1 through the causal connection of things1 most of our desires must remain unfulfilled1 and the will is oftener crossed than satisfied1 and therefore much intense volition carries with it much intense suffering4 ,for all suffering is simply unfulfilled and crossed volition2 and even the pain of the body when it is injured or destroyed is as such only possible through the fact that the body is nothing but the will itself become object4 ,now on this account1 because much intense suffering is inseparable from much intense volition1 very bad men bear the stamp of inward suffering in the very expression of the countenance2 even when they have attained every external happiness1 they always look unhappy so long as they are not transported by some momentary ecstasy and are not dissembling4 ,from this inward torment1 which is absolutely and directly essential to them1 there finally proceeds that delight in the suffering of others which does not spring from mere egoism1 but is disinterested1 and which constitutes wickedness proper1 rising to the pitch of cruelty4 ,for this the suffering of others is not a means for the attainment of the ends of its own will1 but an end in itself4 ,the more definite explanation of this phenomenon is as follows3--,since man is a manifestation of will illuminated by the clearest knowledge1 he is always contrasting the actual and felt satisfaction of his will with the merely possible satisfaction of it which knowledge presents to him4 ,hence arises envy3 every privation is infinitely increased by the enjoyment of others1 and relieved by the knowledge that others also suffer the same privation4 ,those ills which are common to all and inseparable from human life trouble us little1 just as those which belong to the climate1 to the whole country4 ,the recollection of greater sufferings than our own stills our pain2 the sight of the sufferings of others soothes our own4 ,if1 now1 a man is filled with an exceptionally intense pressure of will1--if with burning eagerness he seeks to accumulate everything to slake the thirst of his egoism1 and thus experiences1 as he inevitably must1 that all satisfaction is merely apparent1 that the attained end never fulfils the promise of the desired object1 the final appeasing of the fierce pressure of will1 but that when fulfilled the wish only changes its form1 and now torments him in a new one2 and indeed that if at last all wishes are exhausted1 the pressure of will itself remains without any conscious motive1 and makes itself known to him with fearful pain as a feeling of terrible desolation and emptiness2 if from all this1 which in the case of the ordinary degrees of volition is only felt in a small measure1 and only produces the ordinary degree of melancholy1 in the case of him who is a manifestation of will reaching the point of extraordinary wickedness1 there necessarily springs an excessive inward misery1 an eternal unrest1 an incurable pain2 he seeks indirectly the alleviation which directly is denied him1--seeks to mitigate his own suffering by the sight of the suffering of others1 which at the same time he recognises as an expression of his power4 ,the suffering of others now becomes for him an end in itself1 and is a spectacle in which he delights2 and thus arises the phenomenon of pure cruelty1 blood-thirstiness1 which history exhibits so often in the ,neros and ,domitians1 in the ,african ,deis1 in ,robespierre1 and the like4 ,the desire of revenge is closely related to wickedness4 ,it recompenses evil with evil1 not with reference to the future1 which is the character of punishment1 but merely on account of what has happened1 what is past1 as such1 thus disinterestedly1 not as a means1 but as an end1 in order to revel in the torment which the avenger himself has inflicted on the offender4 ,what distinguishes revenge from pure wickedness1 and to some extent excuses it1 is an appearance of justice4 ,for if the same act1 which is now revenge1 were to be done legally1 that is1 according to a previously determined and known rule1 and in a society which had sanctioned this rule1 it would be punishment1 and thus justice4 ,besides the suffering which has been described1 and which is inseparable from wickedness1 because it springs from the same root1 excessive vehemence of will1 another specific pain quite different from this is connected with wickedness1 which is felt in the case of every bad action1 whether it be merely injustice proceeding from egoism or pure wickedness1 and according to the length of its duration is called the sting of conscience or remorse4 ,now1 whoever remembers and has present in his mind the content of the preceding portion of this ,fourth ,book1 and especially the truth explained at the beginning of it1 that life itself is always assured to the will to live1 as its mere copy or mirror1 and also the exposition of eternal justice1 will find that the sting of conscience can have no other meaning than the following1 i4e41 its content1 abstractly expressed1 is what follows1 in which two parts are distinguished1 which again1 however1 entirely coincide1 and must be thought as completely united4 ,however closely the veil of ,my may envelop the mind of the bad man1 i4e41 however firmly he may be involved in the principium individuationis1 according to which he regards his person as absolutely different and separated by a wide gulf from all others1 a knowledge to which he clings with all his might1 as it alone suits and supports his egoism1 so that knowledge is almost always corrupted by will1 yet there arises in the inmost depths of his consciousness the secret presentiment that such an order of things is only phenomenal1 and that their real constitution is quite different4 ,he has a dim foreboding that1 however much time and space may separate him from other individuals and the innumerable miseries which they suffer1 and even suffer through him1 and may represent them as quite foreign to him1 yet in themselves1 and apart from the idea and its forms1 it is the one will to live appearing in them all1 which here failing to recognise itself1 turns its weapons against itself1 and1 by seeking increased happiness in one of its phenomena1 imposes the greatest suffering upon another4 ,he dimly sees that he1 the bad man1 is himself this whole will2 that consequently he is not only the inflicter of pain but also the endurer of it1 from whose suffering he is only separated and exempted by an illusive dream1 the form of which is space and time1 which1 however1 vanishes away2 that he must in reality pay for the pleasure with the pain1 and that all suffering which he only knows as possible really concerns him as the will to live1 inasmuch as the possible and actual1 the near and the distant in time and space1 are only different for the knowledge of the individual1 only by means of the principium individuationis1 not in themselves4 ,this is the truth which mythically1 i4e41 adapted to the principle of sufficient reason1 and so translated into the form of the phenomenal1 is expressed in the transmigration of souls4 ,yet it has its purest expression1 free from all foreign admixture1 in that obscurely felt yet inconsolable misery called remorse4 ,but this springs also from a second immediate knowledge1 which is closely bound to the first--the knowledge of the strength with which the will to live asserts itself in the wicked individual1 which extends far beyond his own individual phenomenon1 to the absolute denial of the same will appearing in other individuals4 ,consequently the inward horror of the wicked man at his own deed1 which he himself tries to conceal1 contains1 besides that presentment of the nothingness1 the mere illusiveness of the principium individuationis1 and of the distinction established by it between him and others2 also the knowledge of the vehemence of his own will1 the intensity with which he has seized upon life and attached himself closely to it1 even that life whose terrible side he sees before him in the misery of those who are oppressed by him1 and with which he is yet so firmly united1 that just on this account the greatest atrocity proceeds from him himself1 as a means for the fuller assertion of his own will4 ,he recognises himself as the concentrated manifestation of the will to live1 feels to what degree he is given up to life1 and with it also to innumerable sufferings which are essential to it1 for it has infinite time and infinite space to abolish the distinction between the possible and the actual1 and to change all the sufferings which as yet are merely known to him into sufferings he has experienced4 ,the millions of years of constant rebirth certainly exist1 like the whole past and future1 only in conception2 occupied time1 the form of the phenomenon of the will1 is only the present1 and for the individual time is ever new3 it seems to him always as if he had newly come into being4 ,for life is inseparable from the will to live1 and the only form of life is the present4 ,death 7the repetition of the comparison must be excused7 is like the setting of the sun1 which is only apparently swallowed up by the night1 but in reality1 itself the source of all light1 burns without intermission1 brings new days to new worlds1 is always rising and always setting4 ,beginning and end only concern the individual through time1 the form of the phenomenon for the idea4 ,outside time lies only the will1 ,kant's thing-in-itself1 and its adequate objectification1 the ,idea of ,plato4 ,therefore suicide affords no escape2 what every one in his inmost consciousness wills1 that must he be2 and what every one is1 that he wills4 ,thus1 besides the merely felt knowledge of the illusiveness and nothingness of the forms of the idea which separate individuals1 it is the self-knowledge of one's own will and its degree that gives the sting to conscience4 ,the course of life draws the image of the empirical character1 whose original is the intelligible character1 and horrifies the wicked man by this image4 ,he is horrified all the same whether the image is depicted in large characters1 so that the world shares his horror1 or in such small ones that he alone sees it1 for it only concerns him directly4 ,the past would be a matter of indifference1 and could not pain the conscience if the character did not feel itself free from all time and unalterable by it1 so long as it does not deny itself4 ,therefore things which are long past still weigh on the conscience4 ,the prayer1 8,lead me not into temptation10 means1 8,let me not see what manner of person ,i am40 ,in the might with which the bad man asserts life1 and which exhibits itself to him in the sufferings which he inflicts on others1 he measures how far he is from the surrender and denial of that will1 the only possible deliverance from the world and its miseries4 ,he sees how far he belongs to it1 and how firmly he is bound to it2 the known suffering of others has no power to move him2 he is given up to life and felt suffering4 ,it remains hidden whether this will ever break and overcome the vehemence of his will4 ,this exposition of the significance and inner nature of the bad1 which as mere feeling1 i4e41 not as distinct1 abstract knowledge1 is the content of remorse1 will gain distinctness and completeness by the similar consideration of the good as a quality of human will1 and finally of absolute resignation and holiness1 which proceeds from it when it has attained its highest grade4 ,for opposites always throw light upon each other1 and the day at once reveals both itself and the night1 as ,spinoza admirably remarks4 #ff4 ,a theory of morals without proof1 that is1 mere moralising1 can effect nothing1 because it does not act as a motive4 ,a theory of morals which does act as a motive can do so only by working on self-love4 ,but what springs from this source has no moral worth4 ,it follows from this that no genuine virtue can be produced through moral theory or abstract knowledge in general1 but that such virtue must spring from that intuitive knowledge which recognises in the individuality of others the same nature as in our own4 ,for virtue certainly proceeds from knowledge1 but not from the abstract knowledge that can be communicated through words4 ,if it were so1 virtue could be taught1 and by here expressing in abstract language its nature and the knowledge which lies at its foundation1 we should make every one who comprehends this even ethically better4 ,but this is by no means the case4 ,on the contrary1 ethical discourses and preaching will just as little produce a virtuous man as all the systems of sthetics from ,aristotle downwards have succeeded in producing a poet4 ,for the real inner nature of virtue the concept is unfruitful1 just as it is in art1 and it is only in a completely subordinate position that it can be of use as a tool in the elaboration and preserving of what has been ascertained and inferred by other means4 ,velle non discitur4 ,abstract dogmas are1 in fact1 without influence upon virtue1 i4e41 upon the goodness of the disposition4 ,false dogmas do not disturb it2 true ones will scarcely assist it4 ,it would1 in fact1 be a bad look-out if the cardinal fact in the life of man1 his ethical worth1 that worth which counts for eternity1 were dependent upon anything the attainment of which is so much a matter of chance as is the case with dogmas1 religious doctrines1 and philosophical theories4 ,for morality dogmas have this value only3 ,the man who has become virtuous from knowledge of another kind1 which is presently to be considered1 possesses in them a scheme or formula according to which he accounts to his own reason1 for the most part fictitiously1 for his non-egoistical action1 the nature of which it1 i4e41 he himself1 does not comprehend1 and with which account he has accustomed it to be content4 ,upon conduct1 outward action1 dogmas may certainly exercise a powerful influence1 as also custom and example 7the last because the ordinary man does not trust his judgment1 of the weakness of which he is conscious1 but only follows his own or some one else's experience71 but the disposition is not altered in this way47#hj7 ,all abstract knowledge gives only motives2 but1 as was shown above1 motives can only alter the direction of the will1 not the will itself4 ,all communicable knowledge1 however1 can only affect the will as a motive4 ,thus when dogmas lead it1 what the man really and in general wills remains still the same4 ,he has only received different thoughts as to the ways in which it is to be attained1 and imaginary motives guide him just like real ones4 ,therefore1 for example1 it is all one1 as regards his ethical worth1 whether he gives large gifts to the poor1 firmly persuaded that he will receive everything tenfold in a future life1 or expends the same sum on the improvement of an estate which will yield interest1 certainly late1 but all the more surely and largely4 ,and he who for the sake of orthodoxy commits the heretic to the flames is as much a murderer as the bandit who does it for gain2 and indeed1 as regards inward circumstances1 so also was he who slaughtered the ,turks in the ,holy ,land1 if1 like the burner of heretics1 he really did so because he thought that he would thereby gain a place in heaven4 ,for these are careful only for themselves1 for their own egoism1 just like the bandit1 from whom they are only distinguished by the absurdity of their means4 ,from without1 as has been said1 the will can only be reached through motives1 and these only alter the way in which it expresses itself1 never the will itself4 ,velle non discitur4 ,in the case of good deeds1 however1 the doer of which appeals to dogmas1 we must always distinguish whether these dogmas really are the motives which lead to the good deeds1 or whether1 as was said above1 they are merely the illusive account of them with which he seeks to satisfy his own reason with regard to a good deed which really flows from quite a different source1 a deed which he does because he is good1 though he does not understand how to explain it rightly1 and yet wishes to think something with regard to it4 ,but this distinction is very hard to make1 because it lies in the heart of a man4 ,therefore we can scarcely ever pass a correct moral judgment on the action of others1 and very seldom on our own4 ,the deeds and conduct of an individual and of a nation may be very much modified through dogmas1 example1 and custom4 ,but in themselves all deeds 7opera operata7 are merely empty forms1 and only the disposition which leads to them gives them moral significance4 ,this disposition1 however1 may be quite the same when its outward manifestation is very different4 ,with an equal degree of wickedness1 one man may die on the wheel1 and another in the bosom of his family4 ,it may be the same grade of wickedness which expresses itself in one nation in the coarse characteristics of murder and cannibalism1 and in another finely and softly in miniature1 in court intrigues1 oppressions1 and delicate plots of every kind2 the inner nature remains the same4 ,it is conceivable that a perfect state1 or perhaps indeed a complete and firmly believed doctrine of rewards and punishments after death1 might prevent every crime2 politically much would be gained thereby2 morally1 nothing2 only the expression of the will in life would be restricted4 ,thus genuine goodness of disposition1 disinterested virtue1 and pure nobility do not proceed from abstract knowledge4 ,yet they do proceed from knowledge2 but it is a direct intuitive knowledge1 which can neither be reasoned away1 nor arrived at by reasoning1 a knowledge which1 just because it is not abstract1 cannot be communicated1 but must arise in each for himself1 which therefore finds its real and adequate expression not in words1 but only in deeds1 in conduct1 in the course of the life of man4 ,we who here seek the theory of virtue1 and have therefore also to express abstractly the nature of the knowledge which lies at its foundation1 will yet be unable to convey that knowledge itself in this expression4 ,we can only give the concept of this knowledge1 and thus always start from action in which alone it becomes visible1 and refer to action as its only adequate expression4 ,we can only explain and interpret action1 i4e41 express abstractly what really takes place in it4 ,before we speak of the good proper1 in opposition to the bad1 which has been explained1 we must touch on an intermediate grade1 the mere negation of the bad3 this is justice4 ,the nature of right and wrong has been fully explained above2 therefore we may briefly say here1 that he who voluntarily recognises and observes those merely moral limits between wrong and right1 even where this is not secured by the state or any other external power1 thus he who1 according to our explanation1 never carries the assertion of his own will so far as to deny the will appearing in another individual1 is just4 ,thus1 in order to increase his own well-being1 he will not inflict suffering upon others1 i4e41 he will commit no crime1 he will respect the rights and the property of others4 ,we see that for such a just man the principium individuationis is no longer1 as in the case of the bad man1 an absolute wall of partition4 ,we see that he does not1 like the bad man1 merely assert his own manifestation of will and deny all others2 that other persons are not for him mere masks1 whose nature is quite different from his own2 but he shows in his conduct that he also recognises his own nature--the will to live as a thing-in-itself1 in the foreign manifestation which is only given to him as idea4 ,thus he finds himself again in that other manifestation1 up to a certain point1 that of doing no wrong1 i4e41 abstaining from injury4 ,to this extent1 therefore1 he sees through the principium individuationis1 the veil of ,my2 so far he sets the being external to him on a level with his own--he does it no injury4 ,if we examine the inmost nature of this justice1 there already lies in it the resolution not to go so far in the assertion of one's own will as to deny the manifestations of will of others1 by compelling them to serve one's own4 ,one will therefore wish to render to others as much as one receives from them4 ,the highest degree of this justice of disposition1 which is1 however1 always united with goodness proper1 whose character is no longer merely negative1 extends so far that a man doubts his right to inherited property1 wishes to support his body only by his own powers1 mental and physical1 feels every service of others and every luxury a reproach1 and finally embraces voluntary poverty4 ,thus we see how ,pascal1 when he became an ascetic1 would no longer permit any services to be rendered him1 although he had servants enough2 in spite of his constant bad health he made his bed himself1 brought his own food from the kitchen1 c4 78,vie de ,pascal1 par sa ,sur10 p4 #ai74 ,quite in keeping with this1 it is reported that many ,hindus1 even ,rajas with great wealth1 expend it merely on the maintenance of their position1 their court and attendants1 and themselves observe with the greatest scrupulousness the maxim that a man should eat nothing that he has not himself both sowed and reaped4 ,yet a certain misunderstanding lies at the bottom of this2 for one man1 just because he is rich and powerful1 can render such signal services to the whole of human society that they counterbalance the wealth he has inherited1 for the secure possession of which he is indebted to society4 ,in reality that excessive justice of such ,hindus is already more than justice2 it is actual renunciation1 denial of the will to live1--asceticism1 of which we shall speak last4 ,on the other hand1 pure idleness and living through the exertions of others1 in the case of inherited wealth1 without accomplishing anything1 may be regarded as morally wrong1 even if it must remain right according to positive laws4 ,we have found that voluntary justice has its inmost source in a certain degree of penetration of the principium individuationis1 while the unjust remain entirely involved in this principle4 ,this penetration may exist not only in the degree which is required for justice1 but also in the higher degree which leads to benevolence and well-doing1 to love of mankind4 ,and this may take place however strong and energetic in itself the will which appears in such an individual may be4 ,knowledge can always counterbalance it in him1 teach him to resist the tendency to wrong1 and even produce in him every degree of goodness1 and indeed of resignation4 ,thus the good man is by no means to be regarded as originally a weaker manifestation of will than the bad man1 but it is knowledge which in him masters the blind striving of will4 ,there are certainly individuals who merely seem to have a good disposition on account of the weakness of the will appearing in them1 but what they are soon appears from the fact that they are not capable of any remarkable self-conquest in order to perform a just or good deed4 ,if1 however1 as a rare exception1 we meet a man who possesses a considerable income1 but uses very little of it for himself and gives all the rest to the poor1 while he denies himself many pleasures and comforts1 and we seek to explain the action of this man1 we shall find1 apart altogether from the dogmas through which he tries to make his action intelligible to his reason1 that the simplest general expression and the essential character of his conduct is that he makes less distinction than is usually made between himself and others4 ,this distinction is so great in the eyes of many that the suffering of others is a direct pleasure to the wicked and a welcome means of happiness to the unjust4 ,the merely just man is content not to cause it2 and1 in general1 most men know and are acquainted with innumerable sufferings of others in their vicinity1 but do not determine to mitigate them1 because to do so would involve some self-denial on their part4 ,thus1 in each of all these a strong distinction seems to prevail between his own ego and that of others2 on the other hand1 to the noble man we have imagined1 this distinction is not so significant4 ,the principium individuationis1 the form of the phenomenon1 no longer holds him so tightly in its grasp1 but the suffering which he sees in others touches him almost as closely as his own4 ,he therefore tries to strike a balance between them1 denies himself pleasures1 practises renunciation1 in order to mitigate the sufferings of others4 ,he sees that the distinction between himself and others1 which to the bad man is so great a gulf1 only belongs to a fleeting and illusive phenomenon4 ,he recognises directly and without reasoning that the in-itself of his own manifestation is also that of others1 the will to live1 which constitutes the inner nature of everything and lives in all2 indeed1 that this applies also to the brutes and the whole of nature1 and therefore he will not cause suffering even to a brute47#ha7 ,he is now just as little likely to allow others to starve1 while he himself has enough and to spare1 as any one would be to suffer hunger one day in order to have more the next day than he could enjoy4 ,for to him who does works of love the veil of ,my has become transparent1 the illusion of the principium individuationis has left him4 ,he recognises himself1 his will1 in every being1 and consequently also in the sufferer4 ,he is now free from the perversity with which the will to live1 not recognising itself1 here in one individual enjoys a fleeting and precarious pleasure1 and there in another pays for it with suffering and starvation1 and thus both inflicts and endures misery1 not knowing that1 like ,thyestes1 it eagerly devours its own flesh2 and then1 on the one hand1 laments its undeserved suffering1 and on the other hand transgresses without fear of ,nemesis1 always merely because1 involved in the principium individuationis1 thus generally in the kind of knowledge which is governed by the principle of sufficient reason1 it does not recognise itself in the foreign phenomenon1 and therefore does not perceive eternal justice4 ,to be cured of this illusion and deception of ,my1 and to do works of love1 are one and the same4 ,but the latter is the necessary and inevitable symptom of that knowledge4 ,the opposite of the sting of conscience1 the origin and significance of which is explained above1 is the good conscience1 the satisfaction which we experience after every disinterested deed4 ,it arises from the fact that such a deed1 as it proceeds from the direct recognition of our own inner being in the phenomenon of another1 affords us also the verification of this knowledge1 the knowledge that our true self exists not only in our own person1 this particular manifestation1 but in everything that lives4 ,by this the heart feels itself enlarged1 as by egoism it is contracted4 ,for as the latter concentrates our interest upon the particular manifestation of our own individuality1 upon which knowledge always presents to us the innumerable dangers which constantly threaten this manifestation1 and anxiety and care becomes the key-note of our disposition2 the knowledge that everything living is just as much our own inner nature1 as is our own person1 extends our interest to everything living2 and in this way the heart is enlarged4 ,thus through the diminished interest in our own self1 the anxious care for the self is attacked at its very root and limited2 hence the peace1 the unbroken serenity1 which a virtuous disposition and a good conscience affords1 and the more distinct appearance of this with every good deed1 for it proves to ourselves the depth of that disposition4 ,the egoist feels himself surrounded by strange and hostile individuals1 and all his hope is centred in his own good4 ,the good man lives in a world of friendly individuals1 the well-being of any of whom he regards as his own4 ,therefore1 although the knowledge of the lot of mankind generally does not make his disposition a joyful one1 yet the permanent knowledge of his own nature in all living beings1 gives him a certain evenness1 and even serenity of disposition4 ,for the interest which is extended to innumerable manifestations cannot cause such anxiety as that which is concentrated upon one4 ,the accidents which concern individuals collectively1 equalise themselves1 while those which happen to the particular individual constitute good or bad fortune4 ,thus1 though others have set up moral principles which they give out as prescriptions for virtue1 and laws which it was necessary to follow1 ,i1 as has already been said1 cannot do this because ,i have no 8ought0 or law to prescribe to the eternally free-will4 ,yet on the other hand1 in the connection of my system1 what to a certain extent corresponds and is analogous to that undertaking is the purely theoretical truth1 of which my whole exposition may be regarded as merely an elaboration1 that the will is the in-itself of every phenomenon but itself1 as such1 is free from the forms of the phenomenal1 and consequently from multiplicity2 a truth1 which1 with reference to action1 ,i do not know how to express better than by the formula of the ,vedas already quoted3 8,tat twam asi60 7,this thou art67 ,whoever is able to say this to himself1 with regard to every being with whom he comes in contact1 with clear knowledge and firm inward conviction1 is certain of all virtue and blessedness1 and is on the direct road to salvation4 ,but before ,i go further1 and1 as the conclusion of my exposition1 show how love1 the origin and nature of which we recognised as the penetration of the principium individuationis1 leads to salvation1 to the entire surrender of the will to live1 i4e41 of all volition1 and also how another path1 less soft but more frequented1 leads men to the same goal1 a paradoxical proposition must first be stated and explained2 not because it is paradoxical1 but because it is true1 and is necessary to the completeness of the thought ,i have present4 ,it is this3 8,all love 71 caritas7 is sympathy40 #fg4 ,we have seen how justice proceeds from the penetration of the principium individuationis in a less degree1 and how from its penetration in a higher degree there arises goodness of disposition proper1 which shows itself as pure1 i4e41 disinterested love towards others4 ,when now the latter becomes perfect1 it places other individuals and their fate completely on a level with itself and its own fate4 ,further than this it cannot go1 for there exists no reason for preferring the individuality of another to its own4 ,yet the number of other individuals whose whole happiness or life is in danger may outweigh the regard for one's own particular well-being4 ,in such a case1 the character that has attained to the highest goodness and perfect nobility will entirely sacrifice its own well-being1 and even its life1 for the well-being of many others4 ,so died ,codrus1 and ,leonidas1 and ,regulus1 and ,decius ,mus1 and ,arnold von ,winkelried2 so dies every one who voluntarily and consciously faces certain death for his friends or his country4 ,and they also stand on the same level who voluntarily submit to suffering and death for maintaining what conduces and rightly belongs to the welfare of all mankind2 that is1 for maintaining universal and important truths and destroying great errors4 ,so died ,socrates and ,giordano ,bruno1 and so many a hero of the truth suffered death at the stake at the hands of the priests4 ,now1 however1 ,i must remind the reader1 with reference to the paradox stated above1 that we found before that suffering is essential to life as a whole1 and inseparable from it4 ,and that we saw that every wish proceeds from a need1 from a want1 from suffering1 and that therefore every satisfaction is only the removal of a pain1 and brings no positive happiness2 that the joys certainly lie to the wish1 presenting themselves as a positive good1 but in truth they have only a negative nature1 and are only the end of an evil4 ,therefore what goodness1 love1 and nobleness do for others1 is always merely an alleviation of their suffering1 and consequently all that can influence them to good deeds and works of love1 is simply the knowledge of the suffering of others1 which is directly understood from their own suffering and placed on a level with it4 ,but it follows from this that pure love 71 caritas7 is in its nature sympathy2 whether the suffering it mitigates1 to which every unsatisfied wish belongs1 be great or small4 ,therefore we shall have no hesitation1 in direct contradiction to ,kant1 who will only recognise all true goodness and all virtue to be such1 if it has proceeded from abstract reflection1 and indeed from the conception of duty and of the categorical imperative1 and explains felt sympathy as weakness1 and by no means virtue1 we shall have no hesitation1 ,i say1 in direct contradiction to ,kant1 in saying3 the mere concept is for genuine virtue just as unfruitful as it is for genuine art3 all true and pure love is sympathy1 and all love which is not sympathy is selfishness4 is selfishness1 is sympathy4 ,combinations of the two frequently occur4 ,indeed genuine friendship is always a mixture of selfishness and sympathy2 the former lies in the pleasure experienced in the presence of the friend1 whose individuality corresponds to our own1 and this almost always constitutes the greatest part2 sympathy shows itself in the sincere participation in his joy and grief1 and the disinterested sacrifices made in respect of the latter4 ,thus ,spinoza says3 ,benevolentia nihil aliud est1 quam cupiditas ex commiseratione orta 7,eth4 iii4 pr4 #bg1 cor4 #c1 schol47 ,as a confirmation of our paradoxical proposition it may be observed that the tone and words of the language and caresses of pure love1 entirely coincide with the tones of sympathy2 and we may also remark in passing that in ,italian sympathy and true love are denoted by the same word piet4 ,this is also the place to explain one of the most striking peculiarities of human nature1 weeping1 which1 like laughter1 belongs to those qualities which distinguish man from the brutes4 ,weeping is by no means a direct expression of pain1 for it occurs where there is very little pain4 ,in my opinion1 indeed1 we never weep directly on account of the pain we experience1 but always merely on account of its repetition in reflection4 ,we pass from the felt pain1 even when it is physical1 to a mere idea of it1 and then find our own state so deserving of sympathy that we are firmly and sincerely convinced that if another were the sufferer1 we would be full of sympathy1 and love to relieve him4 ,but now we ourselves are the object of our own sympathy2 with the most benevolent disposition we are ourselves most in need of help2 we feel that we suffer more than we could see another suffer2 and in this very complex frame of mind1 in which the directly felt suffering only comes to perception by a doubly circuitous route1 imagined as the suffering of another1 sympathised with as such1 and then suddenly perceived again as directly our own1--in this complex frame of mind1 ,i say1 ,nature relieves itself through that remarkable physical conflict4 ,weeping is accordingly sympathy with our own selves1 or sympathy directed back on its source4 ,it is therefore conditional upon the capacity for love and sympathy1 and also upon imagination4 ,therefore men who are either hard-hearted or unimaginative do not weep easily1 and weeping is even always regarded as a sign of a certain degree of goodness of character1 and disarms anger1 because it is felt that whoever can still weep1 must necessarily always be capable of love1 i4e41 sympathy towards others1 for this enters in the manner described into the disposition that leads to weeping4 ,the description which ,petrarch gives of the rising of his own tears1 navely and truly expressing his feeling1 entirely agrees with the explanation we have given-- 8,i vo pensando3 e nel pensar m' assale ,una piet si forte di me stesso1 ,che mi conduce spesso1 ,ad alto lagrimar1 ch'i non soleva407#hb7 ,what has been said is also confirmed by the fact that children who have been hurt generally do not cry till some one commiserates them2 thus not on account of the pain1 but on account of the idea of it4 ,when we are moved to tears1 not through our own suffering but through that of another1 this happens as follows4 ,either we vividly put ourselves in the place of the sufferer by imagination1 or see in his fate the lot of humanity as a whole1 and consequently1 first of all1 our own lot2 and thus1 in a very roundabout way1 it is yet always about ourselves that we weep1 sympathy with ourselves which we feel4 ,this seems to be the principal reason of the universal1 and thus natural1 weeping in the case of death4 ,the mourner does not weep for his loss2 he would be ashamed of such egotistical tears1 instead of which he is sometimes ashamed of not weeping4 ,first of all he certainly weeps for the fate of the dead1 but he also weeps when1 after long1 heavy1 and incurable suffering1 death was to this man a wished-for deliverance4 ,thus1 principally1 he is seized with sympathy for the lot of all mankind1 which is necessarily finite1 so that every life1 however aspiring1 and often rich in deeds1 must be extinguished and become nothing4 ,but in this lot of mankind the mourner sees first of all his own1 and this all the more1 the more closely he is related to him who has died1 thus most of all if it is his father4 ,although to his father his life was misery through age and sickness1 and though his helplessness was a heavy burden to his son1 yet that son weeps bitterly over the death of his father for the reason which has been given47#hc7 #fh4 ,after this digression about the identity of pure love and sympathy1 the final return of which upon our own individuality has1 as its symptom1 the phenomenon of weeping1 ,i now take up the thread of our discussion of the ethical significance of action1 in order to show how1 from the same source from which all goodness1 love1 virtue1 and nobility of character spring1 there finally arises that which ,i call the denial of the will to live4 ,we saw before that hatred and wickedness are conditioned by egoism1 and egoism rests on the entanglement of knowledge in the principium individuationis4 ,thus we found that the penetration of that principium individuationis is the source and the nature of justice1 and when it is carried further1 even to its fullest extent1 it is the source and nature of love and nobility of character4 ,for this penetration alone1 by abolishing the distinction between our own individuality and that of others1 renders possible and explains perfect goodness of disposition1 extending to disinterested love and the most generous self-sacrifice for others4 ,if1 however1 this penetration of the principium individuationis1 this direct knowledge of the identity of will in all its manifestations1 is present in a high degree of distinctness1 it will at once show an influence upon the will which extends still further4 ,if that veil of ,my1 the principium individuationis1 is lifted from the eyes of a man to such an extent that he no longer makes the egotistical distinction between his person and that of others1 but takes as much interest in the sufferings of other individuals as in his own1 and therefore is not only benevolent in the highest degree1 but even ready to sacrifice his own individuality whenever such a sacrifice will save a number of other persons1 then it clearly follows that such a man1 who recognises in all beings his own inmost and true self1 must also regard the infinite suffering of all suffering beings as his own1 and take on himself the pain of the whole world4 ,no suffering is any longer strange to him4 ,all the miseries of others which he sees and is so seldom able to alleviate1 all the miseries he knows directly1 and even those which he only knows as possible1 work upon his mind like his own4 ,it is no longer the changing joy and sorrow of his own person that he has in view1 as is the case with him who is still involved in egoism2 but1 since he sees through the principium individuationis1 all lies equally near him4 ,he knows the whole1 comprehends its nature1 and finds that it consists in a constant passing away1 vain striving1 inward conflict1 and continual suffering4 ,he sees wherever he looks suffering humanity1 the suffering brute creation1 and a world that passes away4 ,but all this now lies as near him as his own person lies to the egoist4 ,why should he now1 with such knowledge of the world1 assert this very life through constant acts of will1 and thereby bind himself ever more closely to it1 press it ever more firmly to himself8 ,thus he who is still involved in the principium individuationis1 in egoism1 only knows particular things and their relation to his own person1 and these constantly become new motives of his volition4 ,but1 on the other hand1 that knowledge of the whole1 of the nature of the thing-in-itself which has been described1 becomes a quieter of all and every volition4 ,the will now turns away from life2 it now shudders at the pleasures in which it recognises the assertion of life4 ,man now attains to the state of voluntary renunciation1 resignation1 true indifference1 and perfect will-lessness4 ,if at times1 in the hard experience of our own suffering1 or in the vivid recognition of that of others1 the knowledge of the vanity and bitterness of life draws nigh to us also who are still wrapt in the veil of ,my1 and we would like to destroy the sting of the desires1 close the entrance against all suffering1 and purify and sanctify ourselves by complete and final renunciation2 yet the illusion of the phenomenon soon entangles us again1 and its motives influence the will anew2 we cannot tear ourselves free4 ,the allurement of hope1 the flattery of the present1 the sweetness of pleasure1 the well-being which falls to our lot1 amid the lamentations of a suffering world governed by chance and error1 draws us back to it and rivets our bonds anew4 ,therefore ,jesus says3 8,it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle1 than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of ,god40 ,if we compare life to a course or path through which we must unceasingly run--a path of red-hot coals1 with a few cool places here and there2 then he who is entangled in delusion is consoled by the cool places1 on which he now stands1 or which he sees near him1 and sets out to run through the course4 ,but he who sees through the principium individuationis1 and recognises the real nature of the thing-in-itself1 and thus the whole1 is no longer susceptible of such consolation2 he sees himself in all places at once1 and withdraws4 ,his will turns round1 no longer asserts its own nature1 which is reflected in the phenomenon1 but denies it4 ,the phenomenon by which this change is marked1 is the transition from virtue to asceticism4 ,that is to say1 it no longer suffices for such a man to love others as himself1 and to do as much for them as for himself2 but there arises within him a horror of the nature of which his own phenomenal existence is an expression1 the will to live1 the kernel and inner nature of that world which is recognised as full of misery4 ,he therefore disowns this nature which appears in him1 and is already expressed through his body1 and his action gives the lie to his phenomenal existence1 and appears in open contradiction to it4 ,essentially nothing else but a manifestation of will1 he ceases to will anything1 guards against attaching his will to anything1 and seeks to confirm in himself the greatest indifference to everything4 ,his body1 healthy and strong1 expresses through the genitals1 the sexual impulse2 but he denies the will and gives the lie to the body2 he desires no sensual gratification under any condition4 ,voluntary and complete chastity is the first step in asceticism or the denial of the will to live4 ,it thereby denies the assertion of the will which extends beyond the individual life1 and gives the assurance that with the life of this body1 the will1 whose manifestation it is1 ceases4 ,nature1 always true and nave1 declares that if this maxim became universal1 the human race would die out2 and ,i think ,i may assume1 in accordance with what was said in the ,second ,book about the connection of all manifestations of will1 that with its highest manifestation1 the weaker reflection of it would also pass away1 as the twilight vanishes along with the full light4 ,with the entire abolition of knowledge1 the rest of the world would of itself vanish into nothing2 for without a subject there is no object4 ,i should like here to refer to a passage in the ,vedas1 where it is said3 8,as in this world hungry infants press round their mother2 so do all beings await the holy oblation40 7,asiatic ,researches1 vol4 viii42 ,colebrooke1 ,on the ,vedas1 ,abstract of the ,sama-,veda2 also in ,colebrooke's ,miscellaneous ,essays1 vol4 i4 p4 #gi47 ,sacrifice means resignation generally1 and the rest of nature must look for its salvation to man who is at once the priest and the sacrifice4 ,indeed it deserves to be noticed as very remarkable1 that this thought has also been expressed by the admirable and unfathomably profound ,angelus ,silesius1 in the little poem entitled1 8,man brings all to ,god20 it runs1 8,man6 all loves thee2 around thee great is the throng4 ,all things flee to thee that they may attain to ,god40 ,but a yet greater mystic1 ,meister ,eckhard1 whose wonderful writings are at last accessible 7#aheg7 through the edition of ,franz ,pfeiffer1 says the same thing 7p4 #dei7 quite in the sense explained here3 8,i bear witness to the saying of ,christ4 ,i1 if ,i be lifted up from the earth1 will draw all things unto me 7,john xii4 #cb74 ,so shall the good man draw all things up to ,god1 to the source whence they first came4 ,the ,masters certify to us that all creatures are made for the sake of man4 ,this is proved in all created things1 by the fact that the one makes the use of the other2 the ox makes use of the grass1 the fish of the water1 the bird of the air1 the wild beast of the forest4 ,thus1 all created things become of use to the good man4 ,a good man brings to ,god the one created thing in the other40 ,he means to say1 that man makes use of the brutes in this life because1 in and with himself1 he saves them also4 ,it also seems to me that that difficult passage in the ,bible1 ,rom4 viii4 #ba-bd1 must be interpreted in this sense4 ,in ,buddhism also1 there is no lack of expressions of this truth4 ,for example1 when ,buddha1 still as ,bodisatwa1 has his horse saddled for the last time1 for his flight into the wilderness from his father's house1 he says these lines to the horse3 8,long hast thou existed in life and in death1 but now thou shalt cease from carrying and drawing4 ,bear me but this once more1 ,o ,kantakana1 away from here1 and when ,i have attained to the ,law 7have become ,buddha7 ,i will not forget thee0 7,foe ,koue ,ki1 trad4 p4 ,abel ,rmusat1 p4 #bcc74 ,asceticism then shows itself further in voluntary and intentional poverty1 which not only arises per accidens1 because the possessions are given away to mitigate the sufferings of others1 but is here an end in itself1 is meant to serve as a constant mortification of will1 so that the satisfaction of the wishes1 the sweet of life1 shall not again arouse the will1 against which self-knowledge has conceived a horror4 ,he who has attained to this point1 still always feels1 as a living body1 as concrete manifestation of will1 the natural disposition for every kind of volition2 but he intentionally suppresses it1 for he compels himself to refrain from doing all that he would like to do1 and to do all that he would like not to do1 even if this has no further end than that of serving as a mortification of will4 ,since he himself denies the will which appears in his own person1 he will not resist if another does the same1 i4e41 inflicts wrongs upon him4 ,therefore every suffering coming to him from without1 through chance or the wickedness of others1 is welcome to him1 every injury1 ignominy1 and insult2 he receives them gladly as the opportunity of learning with certainty that he no longer asserts the will1 but gladly sides with every enemy of the manifestation of will which is his own person4 ,therefore he bears such ignominy and suffering with inexhaustible patience and meekness1 returns good for evil without ostentation1 and allows the fire of anger to rise within him just as little as that of the desires4 ,and he mortifies not only the will itself1 but also its visible form1 its objectivity1 the body4 ,he nourishes it sparingly1 lest its excessive vigour and prosperity should animate and excite more strongly the will1 of which it is merely the expression and the mirror4 ,so he practises fasting1 and even resorts to chastisement and self-inflicted torture1 in order that1 by constant privation and suffering1 he may more and more break down and destroy the will1 which he recognises and abhors as the source of his own suffering existence and that of the world4 ,if at last death comes1 which puts an end to this manifestation of that will1 whose existence here has long since perished through free-denial of itself1 with the exception of the weak residue of it which appears as the life of this body2 it is most welcome1 and is gladly received as a longed-for deliverance4 ,here it is not1 as in the case of others1 merely the manifestation which ends with death2 but the inner nature itself is abolished1 which here existed only in the manifestation1 and that in a very weak degree27#hd7 this last slight bond is now broken4 ,for him who thus ends1 the world has ended also4 ,and what ,i have here described with feeble tongue and only in general terms1 is no philosophical fable1 invented by myself1 and only of to-day2 no1 it was the enviable life of so many saints and beautiful souls among ,christians1 and still more among ,hindus and ,buddhists1 and also among the believers of other religions4 ,however different were the dogmas impressed on their reason1 the same inward1 direct1 intuitive knowledge1 from which alone all virtue and holiness proceed1 expressed itself in precisely the same way in the conduct of life4 ,for here also the great distinction between intuitive and abstract knowledge shows itself2 a distinction which is of such importance and universal application in our whole investigation1 and which has hitherto been too little attended to4 ,there is a wide gulf between the two1 which can only be crossed by the aid of philosophy1 as regards the knowledge of the nature of the world4 ,intuitively or in concreto1 every man is really conscious of all philosophical truths1 but to bring them to abstract knowledge1 to reflection1 is the work of philosophy1 which neither ought nor is able to do more than this4 ,thus it may be that the inner nature of holiness1 self-renunciation1 mortification of our own will1 asceticism1 is here for the first time expressed abstractly1 and free from all mythical elements1 as denial of the will to live1 appearing after the complete knowledge of its own nature has become a quieter of all volition4 ,on the other hand1 it has been known directly and realised in practice by saints and ascetics1 who had all the same inward knowledge1 though they used very different language with regard to it1 according to the dogmas which their reason had accepted1 and in consequence of which an ,indian1 a ,christian1 or a ,lama saint must each give a very different account of his conduct1 which is1 however1 of no importance as regards the fact4 ,a saint may be full of the absurdest superstition1 or1 on the contrary1 he may be a philosopher1 it is all the same4 ,his conduct alone certifies that he is a saint1 for1 in a moral regard1 it proceeds from knowledge of the world and its nature1 which is not abstractly but intuitively and directly apprehended1 and is only expressed by him in any dogma for the satisfaction of his reason4 ,it is therefore just as little needful that a saint should be a philosopher as that a philosopher should be a saint2 just as it is not necessary that a perfectly beautiful man should be a great sculptor1 or that a great sculptor should himself be a beautiful man4 ,in general1 it is a strange demand upon a moralist that he should teach no other virtue than that which he himself possesses4 ,to repeat the whole nature of the world abstractly1 universally1 and distinctly in concepts1 and thus to store up1 as it were1 a reflected image of it in permanent concepts always at the command of the reason2 this and nothing else is philosophy4 ,i refer the reader to the passage quoted from ,bacon in the ,first ,book4 ,but the description ,i have given above of the denial of the will to live1 of the conduct of a beautiful soul1 of a resigned and voluntarily expiating saint1 is merely abstract and general1 and therefore cold4 ,as the knowledge from which the denial of the will proceeds is intuitive and not abstract1 it finds its most perfect expression1 not in abstract conceptions1 but in deeds and conduct4 ,therefore1 in order to understand fully what we philosophically express as denial of the will to live1 one must come to know examples of it in experience and actual life4 ,certainly they are not to be met with in daily experience3 ,nam omnia prclara tam difficilia quam rara sunt1 ,spinoza admirably says4 ,therefore1 unless by a specially happy fate we are made eye-witnesses1 we have to content ourselves with descriptions of the lives of such men4 ,indian literature1 as we see from the little that we as yet know through translations1 is very rich in descriptions of the lives of saints1 penitents1 ,samanas or ascetics1 ,sannysis or mendicants1 and whatever else they may be called4 ,even the well-known 8,mythologie des ,indous1 par ,mad4 de ,polier10 though by no means to be commended in every respect1 contains many excellent examples of this kind 7especially in ch4 #ac1 vol4 ii47 ,among ,christians also there is no lack of examples which afford us the illustrations we desire4 ,see the biographies1 for the most part badly written1 of those persons who are sometimes called saintly souls1 sometimes pietists1 quietists1 devout enthusiasts1 and so forth4 ,collections of such biographies have been made at various times1 such as ,tersteegen's 8,leben heiliger ,seelen10 ,reiz's 8,geschichte der ,wiedergeborennen10 in our own day1 a collection by ,kanne1 which1 with much that is bad1 yet contains some good1 and especially the 8,leben der ,beata ,sturmin40 ,to this category very properly belongs the life of ,st4 ,francis of ,assisi1 that true personification of the ascetic1 and prototype of all mendicant friars4 ,his life1 described by his younger contemporary1 ,st4 ,bonaventura1 also famous as a scholastic1 has recently been republished4 8,vita ,s4 ,francisci a ,s4 ,bonaventura concinnata0 7,soest1 #ahdg71 though shortly before a painstaking and detailed biography1 making use of all sources of information1 appeared in ,france1 8,histoire de ,s4 ,franois d',assise1 par ,chavin de ,mallan0 7#ahde74 ,as an ,oriental parallel of these monastic writings we have the very valuable work of ,spence ,hardy1 8,eastern ,monachism2 an ,account of the ,order of ,mendicants founded by ,gotama ,budha0 7#ahej74 ,it shows us the same thing in another dress4 ,we also see what a matter of indifference it is whether it proceeds from a theistical or an atheistical religion4 ,but as a special and exceedingly full example and practical illustration of the conceptions ,i have established1 ,i can thoroughly recommend the 8,autobiography of ,madame de ,guion40 ,to become acquainted with this great and beautiful soul1 the very thought of whom always fills me with reverence1 and to do justice to the excellence of her disposition while making allowance for the superstition of her reason1 must be just as delightful to every man of the better sort as with vulgar thinkers1 i4e41 the majority1 that book will always stand in bad repute4 ,for it is the case with regard to everything1 that each man can only prize that which to a certain extent is analogous to him and for which he has at least a slight inclination4 ,this holds good of ethical concerns as well as of intellectual4 ,we might to a certain extent regard the well-known ,french biography of ,spinoza as a case in point1 if we used as a key to it that noble introduction to his very insufficient essay1 8,de ,emendatione ,intellectus10 a passage which ,i can also recommend as the most effectual means ,i know of stilling the storm of the passions4 ,finally1 even the great ,goethe1 ,greek as he is1 did not think it below his dignity to show us this most beautiful side of humanity in the magic mirror of poetic art1 for he represented the life of ,frulein ,klettenberg in an idealised form in his 8,confessions of a ,beautiful ,soul10 and later1 in his own biography1 gave us also an historical account of it4 ,besides this1 he twice told the story of the life of ,st4 ,philippo ,neri4 ,the history of the world1 will1 and indeed must1 keep silence about the men whose conduct is the best and only adequate illustration of this important point of our investigation1 for the material of the history of the world is quite different1 and indeed opposed to this4 ,it is not the denial of the will to live1 but its assertion and its manifestation in innumerable individuals in which its conflict with itself at the highest grade of its objectification appears with perfect distinctness1 and brings before our eyes1 now the ascendancy of the individual through prudence1 now the might of the many through their mass1 now the might of chance personified as fate1 always the vanity and emptiness of the whole effort4 ,we1 however1 do not follow here the course of phenomena in time1 but1 as philosophers1 we seek to investigate the ethical significance of action1 and take this as the only criterion of what for us is significant and important4 ,thus we will not be withheld by any fear of the constant numerical superiority of vulgarity and dulness from acknowledging that the greatest1 most important1 and most significant phenomenon that the world can show is not the conqueror of the world1 but the subduer of it2 is nothing but the quiet1 unobserved life of a man who has attained to the knowledge in consequence of which he surrenders and denies that will to live which fills everything and strives and strains in all1 and which first gains freedom here in him alone1 so that his conduct becomes the exact opposite of that of other men4 ,in this respect1 therefore1 for the philosopher1 these accounts of the lives of holy1 self-denying men1 badly as they are generally written1 and mixed as they are with superstition and nonsense1 are1 because of the significance of the material1 immeasurably more instructive and important than even ,plutarch and ,livy4 ,it will further assist us much in obtaining a more definite and full knowledge of what we have expressed abstractly and generally1 according to our method of exposition1 as the denial of the will to live1 if we consider the moral teaching that has been imparted with this intention1 and by men who were full of this spirit2 and this will also show how old our view is1 though the pure philosophical expression of it may be quite new4 ,the teaching of this kind which lies nearest to hand is ,christianity1 the ethics of which are entirely in the spirit indicated1 and lead not only to the highest degrees of human love1 but also to renunciation4 ,the germ of this last side of it is certainly distinctly present in the writings of the ,apostles1 but it was only fully developed and expressed later4 ,we find the ,apostles enjoining the love of our neighbour as ourselves1 benevolence1 the requital of hatred with love and well-doing1 patience1 meekness1 the endurance of all possible injuries without resistance1 abstemiousness in nourishment to keep down lust1 resistance to sensual desire1 if possible1 altogether4 ,we already see here the first degrees of asceticism1 or denial of the will proper4 ,this last expression denotes that which in the ,gospels is called denying ourselves and taking up the cross 7,matt4 xvi4 #bd1 #be2 ,mark viii4 #cd1 #ce2 ,luke ix4 #bc1 #bd1 xiv4 #bf1 #bg1 #cc74 ,this tendency soon developed itself more and more1 and was the origin of hermits1 anchorites1 and monasticism--an origin which in itself was pure and holy1 but for that very reason unsuitable for the great majority of men2 therefore what developed out of it could only be hypocrisy and wickedness1 for abusus optimi pessimus4 ,in more developed ,christianity1 we see that seed of asceticism unfold into the full flower in the writings of the ,christian saints and mystics4 ,these preach1 besides the purest love1 complete resignation1 voluntary and absolute poverty1 genuine calmness1 perfect indifference to all worldly things1 dying to our own will and being born again in ,god1 entire forgetting of our own person1 and sinking ourselves in the contemplation of ,god4 ,a full exposition of this will be found in ,fnlon's 8,explication des ,maximes des ,saints sur la ,vie ,interieure40 ,but the spirit of this development of ,christianity is certainly nowhere so fully and powerfully expressed as in the writings of the ,german mystics1 in the works of ,meister ,eckhard1 and in that justly famous book 8,die ,deutsche ,theologie10 of which ,luther says in the introduction to it which he wrote1 that with the exception of the ,bible and ,st4 ,augustine1 he had learnt more from it of what ,god1 ,christ1 and man are than from any other book4 ,yet we only got the genuine and correct text of it in the year #ahea1 in the ,stuttgart edition by ,pfeiffer4 ,the precepts and doctrines which are laid down there are the most perfect exposition1 sprung from deep inward conviction of what ,i have presented as the denial of the will4 ,it should therefore be studied more closely in that form before it is dogmatised about with ,jewish-,protestant assurance4 ,tauler's 8,nachfolgung des armen ,leben ,christi10 and also his 8,medulla ,anim10 are written in the same admirable spirit1 though not quite equal in value to that work4 ,in my opinion the teaching of these genuine ,christian mystics1 when compared with the teaching of the ,new ,testament1 is as alcohol to wine1 or what becomes visible in the ,new ,testament as through a veil and mist appears to us in the works of the mystics without cloak or disguise1 in full clearness and distinctness4 ,finally1 the ,new ,testament might be regarded as the first initiation1 the mystics as the second1-- 4 ,we find1 however1 that which we have called the denial of the will to live more fully developed1 more variously expressed1 and more vividly represented in the ancient ,sanscrit writings than could be the case in the ,christian ,church and the ,western world4 ,that this important ethical view of life could here attain to a fuller development and a more distinct expression is perhaps principally to be ascribed to the fact that it was not confined by an element quite foreign to it1 as ,christianity is by the ,jewish theology1 to which its sublime author had necessarily to adopt and accommodate it1 partly consciously1 partly1 it may be1 unconsciously4 ,thus ,christianity is made up of two very different constituent parts1 and ,i should like to call the purely ethical part especially and indeed exclusively ,christian1 and distinguish it from the ,jewish dogmatism with which it is combined4 ,if1 as has often been feared1 and especially at the present time1 that excellent and salutary religion should altogether decline1 ,i should look for the reason of this simply in the fact that it does not consist of one single element1 but of two originally different elements1 which have only been combined through the accident of history4 ,in such a case dissolution had to follow through the separation of these elements1 arising from their different relationship to and reaction against the progressive spirit of the age4 ,but even after this dissolution the purely ethical part must always remain uninjured1 because it is indestructible4 ,our knowledge of ,hindu literature is still very imperfect4 ,yet1 as we find their ethical teaching variously and powerfully expressed in the ,vedas1 ,puranas1 poems1 myths1 legends of their saints1 maxims and precepts17#he7 we see that it inculcates love of our neighbour with complete renunciation of self-love2 love generally1 not confined to mankind1 but including all living creatures2 benevolence1 even to the giving away of the hard-won wages of daily toil2 unlimited patience towards all who injure us2 the requital of all wickedness1 however base1 with goodness and love2 voluntary and glad endurance of all ignominy2 abstinence from all animal food2 perfect chastity and renunciation of all sensual pleasure for him who strives after true holiness2 the surrender of all possessions1 the forsaking of every dwelling-place and of all relatives2 deep unbroken solitude1 spent in silent contemplation1 with voluntary penance and terrible slow self-torture for the absolute mortification of the will1 torture which extends to voluntary death by starvation1 or by men giving themselves up to crocodiles1 or flinging themselves over the sacred precipice in the ,himalayas1 or being buried alive1 or1 finally1 by flinging themselves under the wheels of the huge car of an idol drawn along amid the singing1 shouting1 and dancing of bayaderes4 ,and even yet these precepts1 whose origin reaches back more than four thousand years1 are carried out in practice1 in some cases even to the utmost extreme17#hf7 and this notwithstanding the fact that the ,hindu nation has been broken up into so many parts4 ,a religion which demands the greatest sacrifices1 and which has yet remained so long in practice in a nation that embraces so many millions of persons1 cannot be an arbitrarily invented superstition1 but must have its foundation in the nature of man4 ,but besides this1 if we read the life of a ,christian penitent or saint1 and also that of a ,hindu saint1 we cannot sufficiently wonder at the harmony we find between them4 ,in the case of such radically different dogmas1 customs1 and circumstances1 the inward life and effort of both is the same4 ,and the same harmony prevails in the maxims prescribed for both of them4 ,for example1 ,tauler speaks of the absolute poverty which one ought to seek1 and which consists in giving away and divesting oneself completely of everything from which one might draw comfort or worldly pleasure1 clearly because all this constantly affords new nourishment to the will1 which it is intended to destroy entirely4 ,and as an ,indian counterpart of this1 we find in the precepts of ,fo that the ,saniassi1 who ought to be without a dwelling and entirely without property1 is further finally enjoined not to lay himself down often under the same tree1 lest he should acquire a preference or inclination for it above other trees4 ,the ,christian mystic and the teacher of the ,vedanta philosophy agree in this respect also1 they both regard all outward works and religious exercises as superfluous for him who has attained to perfection4 ,so much agreement in the case of such different ages and nations is a practical proof that what is expressed here is not1 as optimistic dulness likes to assert1 an eccentricity and perversity of the mind1 but an essential side of human nature1 which only appears so rarely because of its excellence4 ,i have now indicated the sources from which there may be obtained a direct knowledge1 drawn from life itself1 of the phenomena in which the denial of the will to live exhibits itself4 ,in some respects this is the most important point of our whole work2 yet ,i have only explained it quite generally1 for it is better to refer to those who speak from direct experience1 than to increase the size of this book unduly by weak repetitions of what is said by them4 ,i only wish to add a little to the general indication of the nature of this state4 ,we saw above that the wicked man1 by the vehemence of his volition1 suffers constant1 consuming1 inward pain1 and finally1 if all objects of volition are exhausted1 quenches the fiery thirst of his self-will by the sight of the suffering of others4 ,he1 on the contrary1 who has attained to the denial of the will to live1 however poor1 joyless1 and full of privation his condition may appear when looked at externally1 is yet filled with inward joy and the true peace of heaven4 ,it is not the restless strain of life1 the jubilant delight which has keen suffering as its preceding or succeeding condition1 in the experience of the man who loves life2 but it is a peace that cannot be shaken1 a deep rest and inward serenity1 a state which we cannot behold without the greatest longing when it is brought before our eyes or our imagination1 because we at once recognise it as that which alone is right1 infinitely surpassing everything else1 upon which our better self cries within us the great sapere aude4 ,then we feel that every gratification of our wishes won from the world is merely like the alms which the beggar receives from life to-day that he may hunger again on the morrow2 resignation1 on the contrary1 is like an inherited estate1 it frees the owner for ever from all care4 ,it will be remembered from the ,third ,book that the sthetic pleasure in the beautiful consists in great measure in the fact that in entering the state of pure contemplation we are lifted for the moment above all willing1 i4e41 all wishes and cares2 we become1 as it were1 freed from ourselves4 ,we are no longer the individual whose knowledge is subordinated to the service of its constant willing1 the correlative of the particular thing to which objects are motives1 but the eternal subject of knowing purified from will1 the correlative of the ,platonic ,idea4 ,and we know that these moments in which1 delivered from the ardent strain of will1 we seem to rise out of the heavy atmosphere of earth1 are the happiest which we experience4 ,from this we can understand how blessed the life of a man must be whose will is silenced1 not merely for a moment1 as in the enjoyment of the beautiful1 but for ever1 indeed altogether extinguished1 except as regards the last glimmering spark that retains the body in life1 and will be extinguished with its death4 ,such a man1 who1 after many bitter struggles with his own nature1 has finally conquered entirely1 continues to exist only as a pure1 knowing being1 the undimmed mirror of the world4 ,nothing can trouble him more1 nothing can move him1 for he has cut all the thousand cords of will which hold us bound to the world1 and1 as desire1 fear1 envy1 anger1 drag us hither and thither in constant pain4 ,he now looks back smiling and at rest on the delusions of this world1 which once were able to move and agonise his spirit also1 but which now stand before him as utterly indifferent to him1 as the chess-men when the game is ended1 or as1 in the morning1 the cast-off masquerading dress which worried and disquieted us in a night in ,carnival4 ,life and its forms now pass before him as a fleeting illusion1 as a light morning dream before half-waking eyes1 the real world already shining through it so that it can no longer deceive2 and like this morning dream1 they finally vanish altogether without any violent transition4 ,from this we can understand the meaning of ,madame ,guion when towards the end of her autobiography she often expresses herself thus3 8,everything is alike to me2 ,i cannot will anything more3 often ,i know not whether ,i exist or not40 ,in order to express how1 after the extinction of the will1 the death of the body 7which is indeed only the manifestation of the will1 and therefore loses all significance when the will is abolished7 can no longer have any bitterness1 but is very welcome1 ,i may be allowed to quote the words of that holy penitent1 although they are not very elegantly turned3 8,midi de la gloire2 jour o il n'y a plus de nuit2 vie qui ne craint plus la mort1 dans la mort mme3 parceque la mort a vaincu la mort1 et que celui qui a souffert la premire mort1 ne goutera plus la seconde mort0 7,vie de ,mad4 de ,guion1 vol4 ii4 p4 #ac74 ,we must not1 however1 suppose that when1 by means of the knowledge which acts as a quieter of will1 the denial of the will to live has once appeared1 it never wavers or vacillates1 and that we can rest upon it as on an assured possession4 ,rather1 it must ever anew be attained by a constant battle4 ,for since the body is the will itself only in the form of objectivity or as manifestation in the world as idea1 so long as the body lives1 the whole will to live exists potentially1 and constantly strives to become actual1 and to burn again with all its ardour4 ,therefore that peace and blessedness in the life of holy men which we have described is only found as the flower which proceeds from the constant victory over the will1 and the ground in which it grows is the constant battle with the will to live1 for no one can have lasting peace upon earth4 ,we therefore see the histories of the inner life of saints full of spiritual conflicts1 temptations1 and absence of grace1 i4e41 the kind of knowledge which makes all motives ineffectual1 and as an universal quieter silences all volition1 gives the deepest peace and opens the door of freedom4 ,therefore also we see those who have once attained to the denial of the will to live strive with all their might to keep upon this path1 by enforced renunciation of every kind1 by penance and severity of life1 and by selecting whatever is disagreeable to them1 all in order to suppress the will1 which is constantly springing up anew4 ,hence1 finally1 because they already know the value of salvation1 their anxious carefulness to retain the hard-won blessing1 their scruples of conscience about every innocent pleasure1 or about every little excitement of their vanity1 which here also dies last1 the most immovable1 the most active1 and the most foolish of all the inclinations of man4 ,by the term asceticism1 which ,i have used so often1 ,i mean in its narrower sense this intentional breaking of the will by the refusal of what is agreeable and the selection of what is disagreeable1 the voluntarily chosen life of penance and self-chastisement for the continual mortification of the will4 ,we see this practised by him who has attained to the denial of the will in order to enable him to persist in it2 but suffering in general1 as it is inflicted by fate1 is a second way 7 7#hg77 of attaining to that denial4 ,indeed1 we may assume that most men only attain to it in this way1 and that it is the suffering which is personally experienced1 not that which is merely known1 which most frequently produces complete resignation1 often only at the approach of death4 ,for only in the case of a few is the mere knowledge which1 seeing through the principium individuationis1 first produces perfect goodness of disposition and universal love of humanity1 and finally enables them to regard all the suffering of the world as their own2 only in the case of a few1 ,i say1 is this knowledge sufficient to bring about the denial of the will4 ,even with him who approaches this point1 it is almost invariably the case that the tolerable condition of his own body1 the flattery of the moment1 the delusion of hope1 and the satisfaction of the will1 which is ever presenting itself anew1 i4e41 lust1 is a constant hindrance to the denial of the will1 and a constant temptation to the renewed assertion of it4 ,therefore in this respect all these illusions have been personified as the devil4 ,thus in most cases the will must be broken by great personal suffering before its self-conquest appears4 ,then we see the man who has passed through all the increasing degrees of affliction with the most vehement resistance1 and is finally brought to the verge of despair1 suddenly retire into himself1 know himself and the world1 change his whole nature1 rise above himself and all suffering1 as if purified and sanctified by it1 in inviolable peace1 blessedness1 and sublimity1 willingly renounce everything he previously desired with all his might1 and joyfully embrace death4 ,it is the refined silver of the denial of the will to live that suddenly comes forth from the purifying flame of suffering4 ,it is salvation4 ,sometimes we see even those who were very wicked purified to this degree by great grief2 they have become new beings and are completely changed4 ,therefore their former misdeeds trouble their consciences no more1 yet they willingly atone for them by death1 and gladly see the end of the manifestation of that will which is now foreign to them and abhorred by them4 ,the great ,goethe has given us a distinct and visible representation of this denial of the will1 brought about by great misfortunes and despair of all deliverance1 in his immortal masterpiece 8,faust10 in the story of the sufferings of ,gretchen4 ,i know no parallel to this in poetry4 ,it is a perfect example of the second path that leads to the denial of the will1 not1 as the first1 through the mere knowledge of the sufferings of a whole world which one has voluntarily acquired1 but through excessive suffering experienced in one's own person4 ,many tragedies certainly end by conducting their strong-willed heroes to the point of entire resignation1 and then generally the will to live and its manifestation end together1 but no representation that is known to me brings what is essential to that change so distinctly before us1 free from all that is extraneous1 as the part of 8,faust0 ,i have referred to4 ,in actual life we see that those unfortunate persons who have to drink to the dregs the greatest cup of suffering1 since when all hope is taken from them they have to face with full consciousness a shameful1 violent1 and often painful death on the scaffold1 are very frequently changed in this way4 ,we must not indeed assume that there is so great a difference between their character and that of most men as their fate would seem to indicate1 but must attribute the latter for the most part to circumstances2 yet they are guilty and to a considerable degree bad4 ,we see1 however1 many of them1 when they have entirely lost hope1 changed in the way referred to4 ,they now show actual goodness and purity of disposition1 true abhorrence of doing any act in the least degree bad or unkind4 ,they forgive their enemies1 even if it is through them that they innocently suffer2 and not with words merely and a sort of hypocritical fear of the judges of the lower world1 but in reality and with inward earnestness and no desire for revenge4 ,indeed1 their sufferings and death at last becomes dear to them1 for the denial of the will to live has appeared2 they often decline the deliverance when it is offered1 and die gladly1 peacefully1 and happily4 ,to them the last secret of life has revealed itself in their excessive pain2 the secret that misery and wickedness1 sorrow and hate1 the sufferer and the inflicter of suffering1 however different they may appear to the knowledge which follows the principle of sufficient reason1 are in themselves one1 the manifestation of that one will to live which objectifies its conflict with itself by means of the principium individuationis4 ,they have learned to know both sides in full measure1 the badness and the misery2 and since at last they see the identity of the two1 they reject them both at once2 they deny the will to live4 ,in what myths and dogmas they account to their reason for this intuitive and direct knowledge and for their own change is1 as has been said1 a matter of no importance4 ,matthias ,claudius must without doubt have witnessed a change of mind of this description when he wrote the remarkable essay in the 8,wandsbecker ,boten0 7pt4 i4 p4 #aae7 with the title 8,bekehrungsgeschichte des 9999990 78,history of the ,conversion of 999999071 which concludes thus3 8,man's way of thinking may pass from one point of the periphery to the opposite point1 and again back to the former point1 if circumstances mark out for him the path4 ,and these changes in a man are really nothing great or interesting1 but that remarkable1 catholic1 transcendental change in which the whole circle is irreparably broken up and all the laws of psychology become vain and empty when the coat is stripped from the shoulders1 or at least turned outside in1 and as it were scales fall from a man's eyes1 is such that every one who has breath in his nostrils forsakes father and mother if he can hear or experience something certain about it40 ,the approach of death and hopelessness are in other respects not absolutely necessary for such a purification through suffering4 ,even without them the knowledge of the contradiction of the will to live with itself can1 through great misfortune and pain1 force an entrance1 and the vanity of all striving become recognised4 ,hence it has often happened that men who have led a very restless life in the full strain of the passions1 kings1 heroes1 and adventurers1 suddenly change1 betake themselves to resignation and penance1 become hermits or monks4 ,to this class belong all true accounts of conversions2 for example1 that of ,raymond ,lully1 who had long wooed a fair lady1 and was at last admitted to her chamber1 anticipating the fulfilment of all his wishes1 when she1 opening her bodice1 showed him her bosom frightfully eaten with cancer4 ,from that moment1 as if he had looked into hell1 he was changed2 he forsook the court of the king of ,majorca1 and went into the desert to do penance47#hh7 ,this conversion is very like that of the ,abb ,ranc1 which ,i have briefly related in the #dhth chapter of the ,supplement4 ,if we consider how in both cases the transition from the pleasure to the horror of life was the occasion of it1 this throws some light upon the remarkable fact that it is among the ,french1 the most cheerful1 gay1 sensuous1 and frivolous nation in ,europe1 that by far the strictest of all monastic orders1 the ,trappists1 arose1 was re-established by ,ranc after its fall1 and has maintained itself to the present day in all its purity and strictness1 in spite of revolutions1 ,church reformations1 and encroachments of infidelity4 ,but a knowledge such as that referred to above of the nature of this existence may leave us again along with the occasion of it and the will to live1 and with it the previous character may reappear4 ,thus we see that the passionate ,benvenuto ,cellini was changed in this way1 once when he was in prison1 and again when very ill2 but when the suffering passed over1 he fell back again into his old state4 ,in general1 the denial of the will to live by no means proceeds from suffering with the necessity of an effect from its cause1 but the will remains free2 for this is indeed the one point at which its freedom appears directly in the phenomenon2 hence the astonishment which ,asmus expresses so strongly at the 8transcendental change40 ,in the case of every suffering1 it is always possible to conceive a will which exceeds it in intensity and is therefore unconquered by it4 ,thus ,plato speaks in the 8,phdon0 of men who up to the moment of their execution feast1 drink1 and indulge in sensuous pleasure1 asserting life even to the death4 ,shakespeare shows us in ,cardinal ,beaufort the fearful end of a profligate1 who dies full of despair1 for no suffering or death can break his will1 which is vehement to the extreme of wickedness47#hi7 ,the more intense the will is1 the more glaring is the conflict of its manifestation1 and thus the greater is the suffering4 ,a world which was the manifestation of a far more intense will to live than this world manifests would produce so much the greater suffering2 would thus be a hell4 ,all suffering1 since it is a mortification and a call to resignation1 has potentially a sanctifying power4 ,this is the explanation of the fact that every great misfortune or deep pain inspires a certain awe4 ,but the sufferer only really becomes an object of reverence when1 surveying the course of his life as a chain of sorrows1 or mourning some great and incurable misfortune1 he does not really look at the special combination of circumstances which has plunged his own life into suffering1 nor stops at the single great misfortune that has befallen him2 for in so doing his knowledge still follows the principle of sufficient reason1 and clings to the particular phenomenon2 he still wills life only not under the conditions which have happened to him2 but only then1 ,i say1 he is truly worthy of reverence when he raises his glance from the particular to the universal1 when he regards his suffering as merely an example of the whole1 and for him1 since in a moral regard he partakes of genius1 one case stands for a thousand1 so that the whole of life conceived as essentially suffering brings him to resignation4 ,therefore it inspires reverence when in ,goethe's 8,torquato ,tasso0 the princess speaks of how her own life and that of her relations has always been sad and joyless1 and yet regards the matter from an entirely universal point of view4 ,a very noble character we always imagine with a certain trace of quiet sadness1 which is anything but a constant fretfulness at daily annoyances 7this would be an ignoble trait1 and lead us to fear a bad disposition71 but is a consciousness derived from knowledge of the vanity of all possessions1 of the suffering of all life1 not merely of his own4 ,but such knowledge may primarily be awakened by the personal experience of suffering1 especially some one great sorrow1 as a single unfulfilled wish brought ,petrarch to that state of resigned sadness concerning the whole of life which appeals to us so pathetically in his works2 for the ,daphne he pursued had to flee from his hands in order to leave him1 instead of herself1 the immortal laurel4 ,when through some such great and irrevocable denial of fate the will is to some extent broken1 almost nothing else is desired1 and the character shows itself mild1 just1 noble1 and resigned4 ,when1 finally1 grief has no definite object1 but extends itself over the whole of life1 then it is to a certain extent a going into itself1 a withdrawal1 a gradual disappearance of the will1 whose visible manifestation1 the body1 it imperceptibly but surely undermines1 so that a man feels a certain loosening of his bonds1 a mild foretaste of that death which promises to be the abolition at once of the body and of the will4 ,therefore a secret pleasure accompanies this grief1 and it is this1 as ,i believe1 which the most melancholy of all nations has called 8the joy of grief40 ,but here also lies the danger of sentimentality1 both in life itself and in the representation of it in poetry2 when a man is always mourning and lamenting without courageously rising to resignation4 ,in this way we lose both earth and heaven1 and retain merely a watery sentimentality4 ,only if suffering assumes the form of pure knowledge1 and this1 acting as a quieter of the will1 brings about resignation1 is it worthy of reverence4 ,in this regard1 however1 we feel a certain respect at the sight of every great sufferer which is akin to the feeling excited by virtue and nobility of character1 and also seems like a reproach of our own happy condition4 ,we cannot help regarding every sorrow1 both our own and those of others1 as at least a potential advance towards virtue and holiness1 and1 on the contrary1 pleasures and worldly satisfactions as a retrogression from them4 ,this goes so far1 that every man who endures a great bodily or mental suffering1 indeed every one who merely performs some physical labour which demands the greatest exertion1 in the sweat of his brow and with evident exhaustion1 yet with patience and without murmuring1 every such man1 ,i say1 if we consider him with close attention1 appears to us like a sick man who tries a painful cure1 and who willingly1 and even with satisfaction1 endures the suffering it causes him1 because he knows that the more he suffers the more the cause of his disease is affected1 and that therefore the present suffering is the measure of his cure4 ,according to what has been said1 the denial of the will to live1 which is just what is called absolute1 entire resignation1 or holiness1 always proceeds from that quieter of the will which the knowledge of its inner conflict and essential vanity1 expressing themselves in the suffering of all living things1 becomes4 ,the difference1 which we have represented as two paths1 consists in whether that knowledge is called up by suffering which is merely and purely known1 and is freely appropriated by means of the penetration of the principium individuationis1 or by suffering which is directly felt by a man himself4 ,true salvation1 deliverance from life and suffering1 cannot even be imagined without complete denial of the will4 ,till then1 every one is simply this will itself1 whose manifestation is an ephemeral existence1 a constantly vain and empty striving1 and the world full of suffering we have represented1 to which all irrevocably and in like manner belong4 ,for we found above that life is always assured to the will to live1 and its one real form is the present1 from which they can never escape1 since birth and death reign in the phenomenal world4 ,the ,indian mythus expresses this by saying 8they are born again40 ,the great ethical difference of character means this1 that the bad man is infinitely far from the attainment of the knowledge from which the denial of the will proceeds1 and therefore he is in truth actually exposed to all the miseries which appear in life as possible2 for even the present fortunate condition of his personality is merely a phenomenon produced by the principium individuationis1 and a delusion of ,my1 the happy dream of a beggar4 ,the sufferings which in the vehemence and ardour of his will he inflicts upon others are the measure of the suffering1 the experience of which in his own person cannot break his will1 and plainly lead it to the denial of itself4 ,all true and pure love1 on the other hand1 and even all free justice1 proceed from the penetration of the principium individuationis1 which1 if it appears with its full power1 results in perfect sanctification and salvation1 the phenomenon of which is the state of resignation described above1 the unbroken peace which accompanies it1 and the greatest delight in death47#ij7 #fi4 ,suicide1 the actual doing away with the individual manifestation of will1 differs most widely from the denial of the will to live1 which is the single outstanding act of free-will in the manifestation1 and is therefore1 as ,asmus calls it1 the transcendental change4 ,this last has been fully considered in the course of our work4 ,far from being denial of the will1 suicide is a phenomenon of strong assertion of will2 for the essence of negation lies in this1 that the joys of life are shunned1 not its sorrows4 ,the suicide wills life1 and is only dissatisfied with the conditions under which it has presented itself to him4 ,he therefore by no means surrenders the will to live1 but only life1 in that he destroys the individual manifestation4 ,he wills life--wills the unrestricted existence and assertion of the body2 but the complication of circumstances does not allow this1 and there results for him great suffering4 ,the very will to live finds itself so much hampered in this particular manifestation that it cannot put forth its energies4 ,it therefore comes to such a determination as is in conformity with its own nature1 which lies outside the conditions of the principle of sufficient reason1 and to which1 therefore1 all particular manifestations are alike indifferent1 inasmuch as it itself remains unaffected by all appearing and passing away1 and is the inner life of all things2 for that firm inward assurance by reason of which we all live free from the constant dread of death1 the assurance that a phenomenal existence can never be wanting to the will1 supports our action even in the case of suicide4 ,thus the will to live appears just as much in suicide 7,siva7 as in the satisfaction of self-preservation 7,vishnu7 and in the sensual pleasure of procreation 7,brahma74 ,this is the inner meaning of the unity of the ,trimurtis1 which is embodied in its entirety in every human being1 though in time it raises now one1 now another1 of its three heads4 ,suicide stands in the same relation to the denial of the will as the individual thing does to the ,idea4 ,the suicide denies only the individual1 not the species4 ,we have already seen that as life is always assured to the will to live1 and as sorrow is inseparable from life1 suicide1 the wilful destruction of the single phenomenal existence1 is a vain and foolish act2 for the thing-in-itself remains unaffected by it1 even as the rainbow endures however fast the drops which support it for the moment may change4 ,but1 more than this1 it is also the masterpiece of ,my1 as the most flagrant example of the contradiction of the will to live with itself4 ,as we found this contradiction in the case of the lowest manifestations of will1 in the permanent struggle of all the forces of nature1 and of all organic individuals for matter and time and space2 and as we saw this antagonism come ever more to the front with terrible distinctness in the ascending grades of the objectification of the will1 so at last in the highest grade1 the ,idea of man1 it reaches the point at which1 not only the individuals which express the same ,idea extirpate each other1 but even the same individual declares war against itself4 ,the vehemence with which it wills life1 and revolts against what hinders it1 namely1 suffering1 brings it to the point of destroying itself2 so that the individual will1 by its own act1 puts an end to that body which is merely its particular visible expression1 rather than permit suffering to break the will4 ,just because the suicide cannot give up willing1 he gives up living4 ,the will asserts itself here even in putting an end to its own manifestation1 because it can no longer assert itself otherwise4 ,as1 however1 it was just the suffering which it so shuns that was able1 as mortification of the will1 to bring it to the denial of itself1 and hence to freedom1 so in this respect the suicide is like a sick man1 who1 after a painful operation which would entirely cure him has been begun1 will not allow it to be completed1 but prefers to retain his disease4 ,suffering approaches and reveals itself as the possibility of the denial of will2 but the will rejects it1 in that it destroys the body1 the manifestation of itself1 in order that it may remain unbroken4 ,this is the reason why almost all ethical teachers1 whether philosophical or religious1 condemn suicide1 although they themselves can only give far-fetched sophistical reasons for their opinion4 ,but if a human being was ever restrained from committing suicide by purely moral motives1 the inmost meaning of this self-conquest 7in whatever ideas his reason may have clothed it7 was this3 8,i will not shun suffering1 in order that it may help to put an end to the will to live1 whose manifestation is so wretched1 by so strengthening the knowledge of the real nature of the world which is already beginning to dawn upon me1 that it may become the final quieter of my will1 and may free me for ever40 ,it is well known that from time to time cases occur in which the act of suicide extends to the children4 ,the father first kills the children he loves1 and then himself4 ,now1 if we consider that conscience1 religion1 and all influencing ideas teach him to look upon murder as the greatest of crimes1 and that1 in spite of this1 he yet commits it1 in the hour of his own death1 and when he is altogether uninfluenced by any egotistical motive1 such a deed can only be explained in the following manner3 in this case1 the will of the individual1 the father1 recognises itself immediately in the children1 though involved in the delusion of mistaking the appearance for the true nature2 and as he is at the same time deeply impressed with the knowledge of the misery of all life1 he now thinks to put an end to the inner nature itself1 along with the appearance1 and thus seeks to deliver from existence and its misery both himself and his children1 in whom he discerns himself as living again4 ,it would be an error precisely analogous to this to suppose that one may reach the same end as is attained through voluntary chastity by frustrating the aim of nature in fecundation2 or indeed if1 in consideration of the unendurable suffering of life1 parents were to use means for the destruction of their new-born children1 instead of doing everything possible to ensure life to that which is struggling into it4 ,for if the will to live is there1 as it is the only metaphysical reality1 or the thing-in-itself1 no physical force can break it1 but can only destroy its manifestation at this place and time4 ,it itself can never be transcended except through knowledge4 ,thus the only way of salvation is1 that the will shall manifest itself unrestrictedly1 in order that in this individual manifestation it may come to apprehend its own nature4 ,only as the result of this knowledge can the will transcend itself1 and thereby end the suffering which is inseparable from its manifestation4 ,it is quite impossible to accomplish this end by physical force1 as by destroying the germ1 or by killing the new-born child1 or by committing suicide4 ,nature guides the will to the light1 just because it is only in the light that it can work out its salvation4 ,therefore the aims of ,nature are to be promoted in every way as soon as the will to live1 which is its inner being1 has determined itself4 ,there is a species of suicide which seems to be quite distinct from the common kind1 though its occurrence has perhaps not yet been fully established4 ,it is starvation1 voluntarily chosen on the ground of extreme asceticism4 ,all instances of it1 however1 have been accompanied and obscured by much religious fanaticism1 and even superstition4 ,yet it seems that the absolute denial of will may reach the point at which the will shall be wanting to take the necessary nourishment for the support of the natural life4 ,this kind of suicide is so far from being the result of the will to live1 that such a completely resigned ascetic only ceases to live because he has already altogether ceased to will4 ,no other death than that by starvation is in this case conceivable 7unless it were the result of some special superstition72 for the intention to cut short the torment would itself be a stage in the assertion of will4 ,the dogmas which satisfy the reason of such a penitent delude him with the idea that a being of a higher nature has inculcated the fasting to which his own inner tendency drives him4 ,old examples of this may be found in the 8,breslauer ,sammlung von ,natur- und ,medicin-,geschichten10 ,september #agii1 p4 #cfc2 in ,bayle's 8,nouvelles de la ,rpublique des ,lettres10 ,february #afhe1 p4 #ahi2 in ,zimmermann1 8,ueber die ,einsamkeit10 vol4 i4 p4 #ahb2 in the 8,histoire de l',acadmie des ,sciences0 for #agfd1 an account by ,houttuyn1 which is quoted in the 8,sammlung fr praktische ,aerzte10 vol4 i4 p4 #fi4 ,more recent accounts may be found in ,hufeland's 8,journal fr praktische ,heilkunde10 vol4 x4 p4 #aha1 and vol4 xlviii4 p4 #ie2 also in ,nasse's 8,zeitschrift fr psychische ,aerzte10 #ahai1 part iii4 p4 #dfj2 and in the 8,edinburgh ,medical and ,surgical ,journal10 #ahji1 vol4 v4 p4 #cai4 ,in the year #ahcc all the papers announced that the ,english historian1 ,dr4 ,lingard1 had died in ,january at ,dover of voluntary starvation2 according to later accounts1 it was not he himself1 but a relation of his who died4 ,still in these accounts the persons were generally described as insane1 and it is no longer possible to find out how far this was the case4 ,but ,i will give here a more recent case of this kind1 if it were only to ensure the preservation of one of the rare instances of this striking and extraordinary phenomenon of human nature1 which1 to all appearance at any rate1 belongs to the category to which ,i wish to assign it and could hardly be explained in any other way4 ,this case is reported in the 8,nrnberger ,correspondenten0 of the #bith ,july #ahac1 in these words3--8,we hear from ,bern that in a thick wood near ,thurnen a hut has been discovered in which was lying the body of a man who had been dead about a month4 ,his clothes gave little or no clue to his social position4 ,two very fine shirts lay beside him4 ,the most important article1 however1 was a ,bible interleaved with white paper1 part of which had been written upon by the deceased4 ,in this writing he gives the date of his departure from home 7but does not mention where his home was74 ,he then says that he was driven by the ,spirit of ,god into the wilderness to pray and fast4 ,during his journey he had fasted seven days and then he had again taken food4 ,after this he had begun again to fast1 and continued to do so for the same number of days as before4 ,from this point we find each day marked with a stroke1 and of these there are five1 at the expiration of which the pilgrim presumably died4 ,there was further found a letter to a clergyman about a sermon which the deceased heard him preach1 but the letter was not addressed40 ,between this voluntary death arising from extreme asceticism and the common suicide resulting from despair there may be various intermediate species and combinations1 though this is hard to find out4 ,but human nature has depths1 obscurities1 and perplexities1 the analysis and elucidation of which is a matter of the very greatest difficulty4 #gj4 ,it might be supposed that the entire exposition 7now terminated7 of that which ,i call the denial of the will is irreconcilable with the earlier explanation of necessity1 which belongs just as much to motivation as to every other form of the principle of sufficient reason1 and according to which1 motives1 like all causes1 are only occasional causes1 upon which the character unfolds its nature and reveals it with the necessity of a natural law1 on account of which we absolutely denied freedom as liberum arbitrium indifferenti4 ,but far from suppressing this here1 ,i would call it to mind4 ,in truth1 real freedom1 i4e41 independence of the principle of sufficient reason1 belongs to the will only as a thing-in-itself1 not to its manifestation1 whose essential form is everywhere the principle of sufficient reason1 the element or sphere of necessity4 ,but the one case in which that freedom can become directly visible in the manifestation is that in which it makes an end of what manifests itself1 and because the mere manifestation1 as a link in the chain of causes1 the living body in time1 which contains only phenomena1 still continues to exist1 the will which manifests itself through this phenomenon then stands in contradiction to it1 for it denies what the phenomenon expresses4 ,in such a case the organs of generation1 for example1 as the visible form of the sexual impulse1 are there and in health2 but yet1 in the inmost consciousness1 no sensual gratification is desired2 and although the whole body is only the visible expression of the will to live1 yet the motives which correspond to this will no longer act2 indeed1 the dissolution of the body1 the end of the individual1 and in this way the greatest check to the natural will1 is welcome and desired4 ,now1 the contradiction between our assertions of the necessity of the determination of the will by motives1 in accordance with the character1 on the one hand1 and of the possibility of the entire suppression of the will whereby the motives become powerless1 on the other hand1 is only the repetition in the reflection of philosophy of this real contradiction which arises from the direct encroachment of the freedom of the will-in-itself1 which knows no necessity1 into the sphere of the necessity of its manifestation4 ,but the key to the solution of these contradictions lies in the fact that the state in which the character is withdrawn from the power of motives does not proceed directly from the will1 but from a changed form of knowledge4 ,so long as the knowledge is merely that which is involved in the principium individuationis and exclusively follows the principle of sufficient reason1 the strength of the motives is irresistible4 ,but when the principium individuationis is seen through1 when the ,ideas1 and indeed the inner nature of the thing-in-itself1 as the same will in all1 are directly recognised1 and from this knowledge an universal quieter of volition arises1 then the particular motives become ineffective1 because the kind of knowledge which corresponds to them is obscured and thrown into the background by quite another kind4 ,therefore the character can never partially change1 but must1 with the consistency of a law of ,nature1 carry out in the particular the will which it manifests as a whole4 ,but this whole1 the character itself1 may be completely suppressed or abolished through the change of knowledge referred to above4 ,it is this suppression or abolition which ,asmus1 as quoted above1 marvels at and denotes the 8catholic1 transcendental change20 and in the ,christian ,church it has very aptly been called the new birth1 and the knowledge from which it springs1 the work of grace4 ,therefore it is not a question of a change1 but of an entire suppression of the character2 and hence it arises that1 however different the characters which experience the suppression may have been before it1 after it they show a great similarity in their conduct1 though every one still speaks very differently according to his conceptions and dogmas4 ,in this sense1 then1 the old philosophical doctrine of the freedom of the will1 which has constantly been contested and constantly maintained1 is not without ground1 and the dogma of the ,church of the work of grace and the new birth is not without meaning and significance4 ,but we now unexpectedly see both united in one1 and we can also now understand in what sense the excellent ,malebranche could say1 8,la libert est un mystre10 and was right4 ,for precisely what the ,christian mystics call the work of grace and the new birth1 is for us the single direct expression of the freedom of the will4 ,it only appears if the will1 having attained to a knowledge of its own real nature1 receives from this a quieter1 by means of which the motives are deprived of their effect1 which belongs to the province of another kind of knowledge1 the objects of which are merely phenomena4 ,the possibility of the freedom which thus expresses itself is the greatest prerogative of man1 which is for ever wanting to the brute1 because the condition of it is the deliberation of reason1 which enables him to survey the whole of life independent of the impression of the present4 ,the brute is entirely without the possibility of freedom1 as1 indeed1 it is without the possibility of a proper or deliberate choice following upon a completed conflict of motives1 which for this purpose would have to be abstract ideas4 ,therefore with the same necessity with which the stone falls to the earth1 the hungry wolf buries its fangs in the flesh of its prey1 without the possibility of the knowledge that it is itself the destroyed as well as the destroyer4 ,necessity is the kingdom of nature2 freedom is the kingdom of grace4 ,now because1 as we have seen1 that self-suppression of the will proceeds from knowledge1 and all knowledge is involuntary1 that denial of will also1 that entrance into freedom1 cannot be forcibly attained to by intention or design1 but proceeds from the inmost relation of knowing and volition in the man1 and therefore comes suddenly1 as if spontaneously from without4 ,this is why the ,church has called it the work of grace2 and that it still regards it as independent of the acceptance of grace corresponds to the fact that the effect of the quieter is finally a free act of will4 ,and because1 in consequence of such a work of grace1 the whole nature of man is changed and reversed from its foundation1 so that he no longer wills anything of all that he previously willed so intensely1 so that it is as if a new man actually took the place of the old1 the ,church has called this consequence of the work of grace the new birth4 ,for what it calls the natural man1 to which it denies all capacity for good1 is just the will to live1 which must be denied if deliverance from an existence such as ours is to be attained4 ,behind our existence lies something else1 which is only accessible to us if we have shaken off this world4 ,having regard1 not to the individuals according to the principle of sufficient reason1 but to the ,idea of man in its unity1 ,christian theology symbolises nature1 the assertion of the will to live in ,adam1 whose sin1 inherited by us1 i4e41 our unity with him in the ,idea1 which is represented in time by the bond of procreation1 makes us all partakers of suffering and eternal death4 ,on the other hand1 it symbolises grace1 the denial of the will1 salvation1 in the incarnate ,god1 who1 as free from all sin1 that is1 from all willing of life1 cannot1 like us1 have proceeded from the most pronounced assertion of the will1 nor can he1 like us1 have a body which is through and through simply concrete will1 manifestation of the will2 but born of a pure virgin1 he has only a phantom body4 ,this last is the doctrine of the ,docet1 i4e41 certain ,church ,fathers1 who in this respect are very consistent4 ,it is especially taught by ,apelles1 against whom and his followers ,tertullian wrote4 ,but even ,augustine comments thus on the passage1 ,rom4 viii4 #c1 8,god sent his ,son in the likeness of sinful flesh30 8,non enim caro peccati erat1 qu non de carnali delectatione nata erat3 sed tamen inerat ei similitudo carnis peccati1 quia mortalis caro erat0 7,liber #hc1 qust4 qu4 #ff74 ,he also teaches in his work entitled 8,opus ,imperfectum10 i4 #dg1 that inherited sin is both sin and punishment at once4 ,it is already present in new-born children1 but only shows itself if they grow up4 ,yet the origin of this sin is to be referred to the will of the sinner4 ,this sinner was ,adam1 but we all existed in him2 ,adam became miserable1 and in him we have all become miserable4 ,certainly the doctrine of original sin 7assertion of the will7 and of salvation 7denial of the will7 is the great truth which constitutes the essence of ,christianity1 while most of what remains is only the clothing of it1 the husk or accessories4 ,therefore ,jesus ,christ ought always to be conceived in the universal1 as the symbol or personification of the denial of the will to live1 but never as an individual1 whether according to his mythical history given in the ,gospels1 or according to the probably true history which lies at the foundation of this4 ,for neither the one nor the other will easily satisfy us entirely4 ,it is merely the vehicle of that conception for the people1 who always demand something actual4 ,that in recent times ,christianity has forgotten its true significance1 and degenerated into dull optimism1 does not concern us here4 ,it is further an original and evangelical doctrine of ,christianity--which ,augustine1 with the consent of the leaders of the ,church1 defended against the platitudes of the ,pelagians1 and which it was the principal aim of ,luther's endeavour to purify from error and re-establish1 as he expressly declares in his book1 8,de ,servo ,arbitrio10--the doctrine that the will is not free1 but originally subject to the inclination to evil4 ,therefore according to this doctrine the deeds of the will are always sinful and imperfect1 and can never fully satisfy justice2 and1 finally1 these works can never save us1 but faith alone1 a faith which itself does not spring from resolution and free will1 but from the work of grace1 without our co-operation1 comes to us as from without4 ,not only the dogmas referred to before1 but also this last genuine evangelical dogma belongs to those which at the present day an ignorant and dull opinion rejects as absurd or hides4 ,for1 in spite of ,augustine and ,luther1 it adheres to the vulgar ,pelagianism1 which the rationalism of the day really is1 and treats as antiquated those deeply significant dogmas which are peculiar and essential to ,christianity in the strictest sense2 while1 on the other hand1 it holds fast and regards as the principal matter only the dogma that originates in ,judaism1 and has been retained from it1 and is merely historically connected with ,christianity47#ia7 ,we1 however1 recognise in the doctrine referred to above the truth completely agreeing with the result of our own investigations4 ,we see that true virtue and holiness of disposition have their origin not in deliberate choice 7works71 but in knowledge 7faith72 just as we have in like manner developed it from our leading thought4 ,if it were works1 which spring from motives and deliberate intention1 that led to salvation1 then1 however one may turn it1 virtue would always be a prudent1 methodical1 far-seeing egoism4 ,but the faith to which the ,christian ,church promises salvation is this3 that as through the fall of the first man we are all partakers of sin and subject to death and perdition1 through the divine substitute1 through grace and the taking upon himself of our fearful guilt1 we are all saved1 without any merit of our own 7of the person72 since that which can proceed from the intentional 7determined by motives7 action of the person1 works1 can never justify us1 from its very nature1 just because it is intentional1 action induced by motives1 opus operatum4 ,thus in this faith there is implied1 first of all1 that our condition is originally and essentially an incurable one1 from which we need salvation2 then1 that we ourselves essentially belong to evil1 and are so firmly bound to it that our works according to law and precept1 i4e41 according to motives1 can never satisfy justice nor save us2 but salvation is only obtained through faith1 i4e41 through a changed mode of knowing1 and this faith can only come through grace1 thus as from without4 ,this means that the salvation is one which is quite foreign to our person1 and points to a denial and surrender of this person necessary to salvation4 ,works1 the result of the law as such1 can never justify1 because they are always action following upon motives4 ,luther demands 7in his book 8,de ,libertate ,christiana07 that after the entrance of faith the good works shall proceed from it entirely of themselves1 as symptoms1 as fruits of it2 yet by no means as constituting in themselves a claim to merit1 justification1 or reward1 but taking place quite voluntarily and gratuitously4 ,so we also hold that from the ever-clearer penetration of the principium individuationis proceeds1 first1 merely free justice1 then love1 extending to the complete abolition of egoism1 and finally resignation or denial of the will4 ,i have here introduced these dogmas of ,christian theology1 which in themselves are foreign to philosophy1 merely for the purpose of showing that the ethical doctrine which proceeds from our whole investigation1 and is in complete agreement and connection with all its parts1 although new and unprecedented in its expression1 is by no means so in its real nature1 but fully agrees with the ,christian dogmas properly so called1 and indeed1 as regards its essence1 was contained and present in them4 ,it also agrees quite as accurately with the doctrines and ethical teachings of the sacred books of ,india1 which in their turn are presented in quite different forms4 ,at the same time the calling to mind of the dogmas of the ,christian ,church serves to explain and illustrate the apparent contradiction between the necessity of all expressions of character when motives are presented 7the kingdom of ,nature7 on the one hand1 and the freedom of the will in itself1 to deny itself1 and abolish the character with all the necessity of the motives based upon it 7the kingdom of grace7 on the other hand4 #ga4 ,i now end the general account of ethics1 and with it the whole development of that one thought which it has been my object to impart2 and ,i by no means desire to conceal here an objection which concerns this last part of my exposition1 but rather to point out that it lies in the nature of the question1 and that it is quite impossible to remove it4 ,it is this1 that after our investigation has brought us to the point at which we have before our eyes perfect holiness1 the denial and surrender of all volition1 and thus the deliverance from a world whose whole existence we have found to be suffering1 this appears to us as a passing away into empty nothingness4 ,on this ,i must first remark1 that the conception of nothing is essentially relative1 and always refers to a definite something which it negatives4 ,this quality has been attributed 7by ,kant7 merely to the nihil privativum1 which is indicated by - as opposed to 1 which -1 from an opposite point of view1 might become 1 and in opposition to this nihil privativum the nihil negativum has been set up1 which would in every reference be nothing1 and as an example of this the logical contradiction which does away with itself has been given4 ,but more closely considered1 no absolute nothing1 no proper nihil negativum is even thinkable2 but everything of this kind1 when considered from a higher standpoint or subsumed under a wider concept1 is always merely a nihil privativum4 ,every nothing is thought as such only in relation to something1 and presupposes this relation1 and thus also this something4 ,even a logical contradiction is only a relative nothing4 ,it is no thought of the reason1 but it is not on that account an absolute nothing2 for it is a combination of words2 it is an example of the unthinkable1 which is necessary in logic in order to prove the laws of thought4 ,therefore if for this end such an example is sought1 we will stick to the nonsense as the positive which we are in search of1 and pass over the sense as the negative4 ,thus every nihil negativum1 if subordinated to a higher concept1 will appear as a mere nihil privativum or relative nothing1 which can1 moreover1 always exchange signs with what it negatives1 so that that would then be thought as negation1 and it itself as assertion4 ,this also agrees with the result of the difficult dialectical investigation of the meaning of nothing which ,plato gives in the 8,sophist0 7pp4 #bgg-bhg73 1 1 1 1 7,cum enim ostenderemus1 alterius ipsius naturam esse perque omnia entia divisam atque dispersam in vicem2 tunc partem ejus oppositam ei1 quod cujusque ens est1 esse ipsum revera non ens asseruimus74 ,that which is generally received as positive1 which we call the real1 and the negation of which the concept nothing in its most general significance expresses1 is just the world as idea1 which ,i have shown to be the objectivity and mirror of the will4 ,moreover1 we ourselves are just this will and this world1 and to them belongs the idea in general1 as one aspect of them4 ,the form of the idea is space and time1 therefore for this point of view all that is real must be in some place and at some time4 ,denial1 abolition1 conversion of the will1 is also the abolition and the vanishing of the world1 its mirror4 ,if we no longer perceive it in this mirror1 we ask in vain where it has gone1 and then1 because it has no longer any where and when1 complain that it has vanished into nothing4 ,a reversed point of view1 if it were possible for us1 would reverse the signs and show the real for us as nothing1 and that nothing as the real4 ,but as long as we ourselves are the will to live1 this last--nothing as the real--can only be known and signified by us negatively1 because the old saying of ,empedocles1 that like can only be known by like1 deprives us here of all knowledge1 as1 conversely1 upon it finally rests the possibility of all our actual knowledge1 i4e41 the world as idea2 for the world is the self-knowledge of the will4 ,if1 however1 it should be absolutely insisted upon that in some way or other a positive knowledge should be attained of that which philosophy can only express negatively as the denial of the will1 there would be nothing for it but to refer to that state which all those who have attained to complete denial of the will have experienced1 and which has been variously denoted by the names ecstasy1 rapture1 illumination1 union with ,god1 and so forth2 a state1 however1 which cannot properly be called knowledge1 because it has not the form of subject and object1 and is1 moreover1 only attainable in one's own experience and cannot be further communicated4 ,we1 however1 who consistently occupy the standpoint of philosophy1 must be satisfied here with negative knowledge1 content to have reached the utmost limit of the positive4 ,we have recognised the inmost nature of the world as will1 and all its phenomena as only the objectivity of will2 and we have followed this objectivity from the unconscious working of obscure forces of ,nature up to the completely conscious action of man4 ,therefore we shall by no means evade the consequence1 that with the free denial1 the surrender of the will1 all those phenomena are also abolished2 that constant strain and effort without end and without rest at all the grades of objectivity1 in which and through which the world consists2 the multifarious forms succeeding each other in gradation2 the whole manifestation of the will2 and1 finally1 also the universal forms of this manifestation1 time and space1 and also its last fundamental form1 subject and object2 all are abolished4 ,no will3 no idea1 no world4 ,before us there is certainly only nothingness4 ,but that which resists this passing into nothing1 our nature1 is indeed just the will to live1 which we ourselves are as it is our world4 ,that we abhor annihilation so greatly1 is simply another expression of the fact that we so strenuously will life1 and are nothing but this will1 and know nothing besides it4 ,but if we turn our glance from our own needy and embarrassed condition to those who have overcome the world1 in whom the will1 having attained to perfect self-knowledge1 found itself again in all1 and then freely denied itself1 and who then merely wait to see the last trace of it vanish with the body which it animates2 then1 instead of the restless striving and effort1 instead of the constant transition from wish to fruition1 and from joy to sorrow1 instead of the never-satisfied and never-dying hope which constitutes the life of the man who wills1 we shall see that peace which is above all reason1 that perfect calm of the spirit1 that deep rest1 that inviolable confidence and serenity1 the mere reflection of which in the countenance1 as ,raphael and ,correggio have represented it1 is an entire and certain gospel2 only knowledge remains1 the will has vanished4 ,we look with deep and painful longing upon this state1 beside which the misery and wretchedness of our own is brought out clearly by the contrast4 ,yet this is the only consideration which can afford us lasting consolation1 when1 on the one hand1 we have recognised incurable suffering and endless misery as essential to the manifestation of will1 the world2 and1 on the other hand1 see the world pass away with the abolition of will1 and retain before us only empty nothingness4 ,thus1 in this way1 by contemplation of the life and conduct of saints1 whom it is certainly rarely granted us to meet with in our own experience1 but who are brought before our eyes by their written history1 and1 with the stamp of inner truth1 by art1 we must banish the dark impression of that nothingness which we discern behind all virtue and holiness as their final goal1 and which we fear as children fear the dark2 we must not even evade it like the ,indians1 through myths and meaningless words1 such as reabsorption in ,brahma or the ,nirvana of the ,buddhists4 ,rather do we freely acknowledge that what remains after the entire abolition of will is for all those who are still full of will certainly nothing2 but1 conversely1 to those in whom the will has turned and has denied itself1 this our world1 which is so real1 with all its suns and milky-ways--is nothing47#ib7 ,,footnotes #a ,f4 ,h4 ,jacobi4 #b ,the ,hegelian ,philosophy4 #c ,fichte and ,schelling4 #d ,hegel4 #e ,kant is the only writer who has confused this idea of reason1 and in this connection ,i refer the reader to the ,appendix1 and also to my 8,grundprobleme der ,ethik03 ,grundl4 dd4 ,moral4 #f1 pp4 #adh-aed1 first and second editions4 #f ,mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est1 et consuetudo sermonis antiqui qudam efficacissimis notis signat4 ,seneca1 epist4 #ha4 #g ,it is shown in the ,appendix that matter and substance are one4 #h ,this shows the ground of the ,kantian explanation of matter1 that it is 8that which is movable in space10 for motion consists simply in the union of space and time4 #i ,not1 as ,kant holds1 from the knowledge of time1 as will be explained in the ,appendix4 #aj ,on this see 8,the ,fourfold ,root of the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason10 #di4 #aa ,the first four chapters of the first of the supplementary books belong to these seven paragraphs4 #ab ,compare with this paragraph #bf and #bg of the third edition of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason4 #ac ,cf4 ,ch4 #e and #f of the ,supplement4 #ad ,cf4 ,ch4 #i and #aj of the ,supplement4 #ae ,cf4 ,ch4 #aa of ,supplement4 #af ,i am therefore of opinion that a science of physiognomy cannot1 with certainty1 go further than to lay down a few quite general rules4 ,for example1 the intellectual qualities are to be read in the forehead and the eyes2 the moral qualities1 the expression of will1 in the mouth and lower part of the face4 ,the forehead and the eyes interpret each other2 either of them seen alone can only be half understood4 ,genius is never without a high1 broad1 finely-arched brow2 but such a brow often occurs where there is no genius4 ,a clever-looking person may the more certainly be judged to be so the uglier the face is2 and a stupid-looking person may the more certainly be judged to be stupid the more beautiful the face is2 for beauty1 as the approximation to the type of humanity1 carries in and for itself the expression of mental clearness2 the opposite is the case with ugliness1 and so forth4 #ag ,cf4 ,ch4 #g of the ,supplement4 #ah ,cf4 ,ch4 #h of ,supplement4 #ai ,suarez1 ,disput4 ,metaphysic1 disp4 iii4 sect4 #c1 tit4 #c4 #bj ,cf4 ,ch4 #ab of ,supplement4 #ba ,the reader must not think here of ,kant's misuse of these ,greek terms1 which is condemned in the ,appendix4 #bb ,spinoza1 who always boasts that he proceeds more geometrico1 has actually done so more than he himself was aware4 ,for what he knew with certainty and decision from the immediate1 perceptive apprehension of the nature of the world1 he seeks to demonstrate logically without reference to this knowledge4 ,he only arrives at the intended and predetermined result by starting from arbitrary concepts framed by himself 7substantia causa sui1 c471 and in the demonstrations he allows himself all the freedom of choice for which the nature of the wide concept-spheres afford such convenient opportunity4 ,that his doctrine is true and excellent is therefore in his case1 as in that of geometry1 quite independent of the demonstrations of it4 ,cf4 ch4 #ac of supplementary volume4 #bc ,cf4 ,ch4 #ag of ,supplement4 #bd ,omnes perturbationes judicio censent fieri et opinione4 ,cic4 ,tusc41 #d1 #f4 1 7,perturbant homines non res ips1 sed de rebus opiniones74 ,epictet41 c4 v4 #be 1 7,hc est causa mortalibus omnium malorum1 non posse communes notiones aptare singularibus74 ,epict4 dissert41 ii41 #bf4 #bf ,cf4 ,ch4 #af of ,supplement4 #bg ,cf4 ,ch4 xviii4 of the ,supplement4 #bh ,we can thus by no means agree with ,bacon if he 7,de ,augm4 ,scient41 ,l4 iv4 in fine47 thinks that all mechanical and physical movement of bodies has always been preceded by perception in these bodies2 though a glimmering of truth lies at the bottom of this false proposition4 ,this is also the case with ,kepler's opinion1 expressed in his essay ,de ,planeta ,martis1 that the planets must have knowledge in order to keep their elliptical courses so correctly1 and to regulate the velocity of their motion so that the triangle of the plane of their course always remains proportional to the time in which they pass through its base4 #bi ,cf4 ,ch4 xix4 of the ,supplement4 #cj ,cf4 ,ch4 xx4 of the ,supplement1 and also in my work1 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 the chapters on ,physiology and ,comparative ,anatomy1 where the subject ,i have only touched upon here is fully discussed4 #ca ,this is specially treated in the #bgth ,ch4 of the ,supplement4 #cb ,this subject is fully worked out in my prize essay on the freedom of the will1 in which therefore 7pp4 #bi-dd of the 8,grundprobleme der ,ethik07 the relation of cause1 stimulus1 and motive has also been fully explained4 #cc ,cf4 ,ch4 xxiii4 of the ,supplement1 and also the ,ch4 on the physiology of plants in my work 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 and the ,ch4 on physical astronomy1 which is of great importance with regard to the kernel of my metaphysic4 #cd ,wenzel1 ,de ,structura ,cerebri ,hominis et ,brutorum1 #ahab1 ch4 iii42 ,cuvier1 ,leons d',anat41 comp4 leon #i1 arts4 #d and #e2 ,vic4 d',azyr1 ,hist4 de l',acad4 de ,sc4 de ,paris1 #aghc1 pp4 #dgj and #dhc4 #ce ,on the #afth of ,september #ahdj1 at a lecture upon ,egyptian ,archology delivered by ,mr4 ,pettigrew at the ,literary and ,scientific ,institute of ,london1 he showed some corns of wheat which ,sir ,g4 ,wilkinson had found in a grave at ,thebes1 in which they must have lain for three thousand years4 ,they were found in an hermetically sealed vase4 ,mr4 ,pettigrew had sowed twelve grains1 and obtained a plant which grew five feet high1 and the seeds of which were now quite ripe4--,times1 #bast ,september #ahdj4 ,in the same way in #ahcj ,mr4 ,haulton produced in the ,medical ,botanical ,society of ,london a bulbous root which was found in the hand of an ,egyptian mummy1 in which it was probably put in observance of some religious rite1 and which must have been at least two thousand years old4 ,he had planted it in a flower-pot1 in which it grew up and flourished4 ,this is quoted from the ,medical ,journal of #ahcj in the ,journal of the ,royal ,institute of ,great ,britain1 ,october #ahcj1 p4 #aif4--8;,in the garden of ,mr4 ,grimstone of the ,herbarium1 ,highgate1 ,london1 is a pea in full fruit1 which has sprung from a pea that ,mr4 ,pettigrew and the officials of the ,british ,museum took out of a vase which had been found in an ,egyptian sarcophagus1 where it must have lain #bhdd years40--,times1 #afth ,august #ahdd4 ,indeed1 the living toads found in limestone lead to the conclusion that even animal life is capable of such a suspension for thousands of years1 if this is begun in the dormant period and maintained by special circumstances4 #cf ,cf4 ,chap4 xxii4 of the ,supplement1 and also my work 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 p4 #ed et seq41 and pp4 #gj-gi of the first edition1 or p4 #df et seq41 and pp4 #fc-gb of the second1 or p4 #dh et seq41 and pp4 #fi-gg of the third edition4 #cg ,the ,scholastics therefore said very truly3 ,causa finalis movet non secundum suum esse reale1 sed secundum esse cognitum4 ,cf4 ,suarez1 ,disp4 ,metaph4 disp4 xxiii41 sec4 #g and #h4 #ch ,cf4 8,critique of ,pure ,reason4 ,solution of the ,cosmological ,ideas of the ,totality of the ,deduction of the ,events in the ,universe10 pp4 #efj-ehf of the fifth1 and p4 #ecb and following of first edition2 and 8,critique of ,practical ,reason10 fourth edition1 pp4 #afi-agi2 ,rosenkranz' edition1 p4 #bbd and following4 ,cf4 my ,essay on the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason1 #dc4 #ci ,cf4 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 at the end of the section on ,comparative ,anatomy4 #dj ,cf4 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 the section on ,comparative ,anatomy4 #da ,chatin1 ,sur la ,valisneria ,spiralis1 in the ,comptes ,rendus de l',acad4 de ,sc41 ,no4 #ac1 #ahee4 #db ,cf4 ,chaps4 xxvi4 and xxvii4 of the ,supplement4 #dc ,cf4 ,chap4 xxviii4 of the ,supplement4 #dd ,f4 ,h4 ,jacobi4 #de ,see for example1 8,immanuel ,kant1 a ,reminiscence1 by ,fr4 ,bouterweck10 pg4 #di1 and ,buhle's 8,history of ,philosophy10 vol4 vi4 pp4 #hjb-hae and #hbc4 #df ,cf4 ,chap4 xxix4 of ,supplement4 #dg ,i also recommend the perusal of what ,spinoza says in his ,ethics 7,book ,,ii41 ,prop4 #dj1 ,schol4 #b1 and ,book ,v41 ,props4 #be-ch71 concerning the cognitio tertii generis1 sive intuitiva1 in illustration of the kind of knowledge we are considering1 and very specially ,prop4 #bi1 ,schol42 prop4 #cf1 ,schol41 and ,prop4 #ch1 ,demonst4 et ,schol4 #dh ,cf4 ,chap4 xxx4 of the ,supplement4 #di ,this last sentence cannot be understood without some acquaintance with the next book4 #ej ,cf4 ,chap4 xxxi4 of the ,supplement4 #ea ,i am all the more delighted and astonished1 forty years after ,i so timidly and hesitatingly advanced this thought1 to discover that it has already been expressed by ,st4 ,augustine3 ,arbusta formas suas varias1 quibus mundi hujus visibilis structura formosa est1 sentiendas sensibus praebent2 ut1 pro eo quod ,,nosse non possunt1 quasi ,,innotescere velle videantur4--,de civ4 ,dei1 xi4 #bg4 #eb ,cf4 ,chap4 #ce of ,supplement4 #ec ,jakob ,bhm in his book1 8de ,signatura ,rerum10 ch4 i41 #ac-ae1 says1 8,there is nothing in nature that does not manifest its internal form externally2 for the internal continually labours to manifest itself4444 ,everything has its language by which to reveal itself4444 ,and this is the language of nature when everything speaks out of its own property1 and continually manifests and declares itself1 444 for each thing reveals its mother1 which thus gives the essence and the will to the form40 #ed ,the last sentence is the ,german of the il n'y a que l'esprit qui sente l'esprit1 of ,helvetius4 ,in the first edition there was no occasion to point this out1 but since then the age has become so degraded and ignorant through the stupefying influence of the ,hegelian sophistry1 that some might quite likely say that an antithesis was intended here between 8spirit and nature40 ,i am therefore obliged to guard myself in express terms against the suspicion of such vulgar sophisms4 #ee ,this digression is worked out more fully in the #cfth ,chapter of the ,supplement4 #ef ,in order to understand this passage it is necessary to have read the whole of the next book4 #eg ,apparent rari1 nantes in gurgite vasto4 #eh ,cf4 ,ch4 xxxiv4 of ,supplement4 #ei ,it is scarcely necessary to say that wherever ,i speak of poets ,i refer exclusively to that rare phenomenon the great true poet4 ,i mean no one else2 least of all that dull insipid tribe1 the mediocre poets1 rhymsters1 and inventors of fables1 that flourishes so luxuriantly at the present day in ,germany4 ,they ought rather to have the words shouted in their ears unceasingly from all sides-- ,mediocribus esse potis ,non homines1 non ,d1 non concessere column4 ,it is worthy of serious consideration what an amount of time--both their own and other people's--and paper is lost by this swarm of mediocre poets1 and how injurious is their influence4 ,for the public always seizes on what is new1 and has naturally a greater proneness to what is perverse and dull as akin to itself4 ,therefore these works of the mediocre poets draw it away and hold it back from the true masterpieces and the education they afford1 and thus working in direct antagonism to the benign influence of genius1 they ruin taste more and more1 and retard the progress of the age4 ,such poets should therefore be scourged with criticism and satire without indulgence or sympathy till they are induced1 for their own good1 to apply their muse rather to reading what is good than to writing what is bad4 ,for if the bungling of the incompetent so raised the wrath of the gentle ,apollo that he could flay ,marsyas1 ,i do not see on what the mediocre poets will base their claim to tolerance4 #fj ,cf4 ,ch4 xxxviii4 of ,supplement4 #fa ,cf4 ,ch4 xxxvii4 of the ,supplement4 #fb ,leibnitii epistol1 collectio ,kortholti1 ep4 #aed4 #fc ,cf4 ,ch4 xxxix4 of ,supplement4 #fd ,the following remark may assist those for whom it is not too subtle to understand clearly that the individual is only the phenomenon1 not the thing in itself4 ,every individual is1 on the one hand1 the subject of knowing1 i4e41 the complemental condition of the possibility of the whole objective world1 and1 on the other hand1 a particular phenomenon of will1 the same will which objectifies itself in everything4 ,but this double nature of our being does not rest upon a self-existing unity1 otherwise it would be possible for us to be conscious of ourselves in ourselves1 and independent of the objects of knowledge and will4 ,now this is by no means possible1 for as soon as we turn into ourselves to make the attempt1 and seek for once to know ourselves fully by means of introspective reflection1 we are lost in a bottomless void2 we find ourselves like the hollow glass globe1 from out of which a voice speaks whose cause is not to be found in it1 and whereas we desired to comprehend ourselves1 we find1 with a shudder1 nothing but a vanishing spectre4 #fe 8,scholastici docuerunt1 quod ternitas non sit temporis sine fine aut principio successio2 sed ,nunc stans1 i4e41 idem nobis ,nunc esse1 quod erat ,nunc ,adamo1 i4e41 inter nunc et tunc nullam esse differentiam40--,hobbes1 ,leviathan1 c4 #df4 #ff ,in ,eckermann's 8,conversations of ,goethe0 7vol4 i4 p4 #afa71 ,goethe says3 8,our spirit is a being of a nature quite indestructible1 and its activity continues from eternity to eternity4 ,it is like the sun1 which seems to set only to our earthly eyes1 but which1 in reality1 never sets1 but shines on unceasingly40 ,goethe has taken the simile from me2 not ,i from him4 ,without doubt he used it in this conversation1 which was held in #ahbd1 in consequence of a 7possibly unconscious7 reminiscence of the above passage1 for it occurs in the first edition1 p4 #dja1 in exactly the same words1 and it is also repeated at p4 #ebh of that edition1 as at the close of #fe of the present work4 ,the first edition was sent to him in ,december #ahah1 and in ,march #ahai1 when ,i was at ,naples1 he sent me his congratulations by letter1 through my sister1 and enclosed a piece of paper upon which he had noted the places of certain passages which had specially pleased him4 ,thus he had read my book4 #fg ,this is expressed in the ,veda by saying1 that when a man dies his sight becomes one with the sun1 his smell with the earth1 his taste with water1 his hearing with the air1 his speech with fire1 c41 c4 7,oupnek'hat1 vol4 i4 p4 #bdi et seq47 ,and also by the fact that1 in a special ceremony1 the dying man gives over his senses and all his faculties singly to his son1 in whom they are now supposed to live on 7,oupnek'hat1 vol4 ii4 p4 #hb et seq47 #fh ,cf4 ,chap4 xli4-xliv4 of ,supplement4 #fi 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 first edition1 pp4 #ecb-eeh2 fifth edition1 pp4 #efj-ehf2 and 8,critique of ,practical ,reason10 fourth edition1 pp4 #afi-agi2 ,rosenkranz's edition1 pp4 #bbd-bca4 #gj ,cart4 ,medit4 #d4--,spin4 ,eth41 pt4 ii4 prop4 #dh et #di1 ct4 #ga ,herodot4 vii4 #df4 #gb ,cf4 ,ch4 xlvi4 of ,supplement4 #gc ,cf4 ,ch4 xlv4 of the ,supplement4 #gd ,thus the basis of natural right of property does not require the assumption of two grounds of right beside each other1 that based on detention and that based on formation2 but the latter is itself sufficient4 ,only the name formation is not very suitable1 for the spending of any labour upon a thing does not need to be a forming or fashioning of it4 #ge ,the further exposition of the philosophy of law here laid down will be found in my prize-essay1 8,ueber das ,fundament der ,moral10 #ag1 pp4 #bba-bcj of #ast ed41 pp4 #baf-bbf of #b;d ed4 #gf ,cf4 ,ch4 xlvii4 of ,supplement4 #gg ,oupnek'hat1 vol4 i4 p4 #fj et seq4 #gh ,that ,spanish bishop who1 in the last war1 poisoned both himself and the ,french generals at his own table1 is an instance of this2 and also various incidents in that war4 ,examples are also to be found in ,montaigne1 ,bk4 ii4 ch4 #ab4 #gi ,observe1 in passing1 that what gives every positive system of religion its great strength1 the point of contact through which it takes possession of the soul1 is entirely its ethical side4 ,not1 however1 the ethical side directly as such1 but as it appears firmly united and interwoven with the element of mythical dogma which is present in every system of religion1 and as intelligible only by means of this4 ,so much is this the case1 that although the ethical significance of action cannot be explained in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason1 yet since every mythus follows this principle1 believers regard the ethical significance of action as quite inseparable1 and indeed as absolutely identical1 and regard every attack upon the mythus as an attack upon right and virtue4 ,this goes so far that among monotheistic nations atheism or godlessness has become synonymous with the absence of all morality4 ,to the priests such confusions of conceptions are welcome1 and only in consequence of them could that horrible monstrosity fanaticism arise and govern1 not merely single individuals who happen to be specially perverse and bad1 but whole nations1 and finally embody itself in the ,western world as the ,inquisition 7to the honour of mankind be it said that this only happened once in their history71 which1 according to the latest and most authentic accounts1 in ,madrid alone 7in the rest of ,spain there were many more such ecclesiastical dens of murderers7 in #cjj years put #cjj1jjj human beings to a painful death at the stake on theological grounds--a fact of which every zealot ought to be reminded whenever he begins to make himself heard4 #hj ,the ,church would say that these are merely opera operata1 which do not avail unless grace gives the faith which leads to the new birth4 ,but of this farther on4 #ha ,the right of man over the life and powers of the brutes rests on the fact that1 because with the growing clearness of consciousness suffering increases in like measure2 the pain which the brute suffers through death or work is not so great as man would suffer by merely denying himself the flesh1 or the powers of the brutes4 ,therefore man may carry the assertion of his existence to the extent of denying the existence of the brute1 and the will to live as a whole endures less suffering in this way than if the opposite course were adopted4 ,this at once determines the extent of the use man may make of the powers of the brutes without wrong2 a limit1 however1 which is often transgressed1 especially in the case of beasts of burden and dogs used in the chase2 to which the activity of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals is principally devoted4 ,in my opinion1 that right does not extend to vivisection1 particularly of the higher animals4 ,on the other hand1 the insect does not suffer so much through its death as a man suffers from its sting4 ,the ,hindus do not understand this4 #hb ,as ,i wander sunk in thought1 so strong a sympathy with myself comes over me that ,i must often weep aloud1 which otherwise ,i am not wont to do4 #hc ,cf4 ,ch4 xlvii4 of ,supplement4 ,it is scarcely necessary to remind the reader that the whole ethical doctrine given in outline in #fa-fg has been explained fully and in detail in my prize-essay on the foundation of morals4 #hd ,this thought is expressed by a beautiful simile in the ancient philosophical ,sanscrit writing1 8,sankhya ,karica30 8,yet the soul remains a while invested with body2 as the potter's wheel continues whirling after the pot has been fashioned1 by force of the impulse previously given to it4 ,when separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place and nature in respect of it ceases1 then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished40 ,colebrooke1 8,on the ,philosophy of the ,hindus3 ,miscellaneous ,essays10 vol i4 p4 #bga4 ,also in the 8,sankhya ,karica by ,horace ,wilson10 #fg1 p4 #ahd4 #he ,see1 for example1 8,oupnek'hat1 studio ,anquetil du ,perron10 vol4 ii41 ,nos4 #ach1 #add1 #ade1 #adf4 8,mythologie des ,indous10 par ,mad4 de ,polier1 vol4 ii41 ch4 #ac1 #ad1 #ae1 #af1 #ag4 8,asiatisches ,magazin10 by ,klaproth3 in the first volume1 8,ueber die ,fo-,religion10 also 8,baghnat ,geeta0 or 8,gesprche zwischen ,krishna und ,arjoon20 in the second volume1 8,moha-,mudgava40 ,also1 8,institutes of ,hindu ,law1 or the ,ordinances of ,manu10 from the ,sanscrit1 by ,sir ,william ,jones 7,german by ,httner1 #agig71 especially the sixth and twelfth chapters4 ,finally1 many passages in the 8,asiatic ,researches40 7,in the last forty years ,indian literature has grown so much in ,europe1 that if ,i were now to complete this note to the first edition1 it would occupy several pages47 #hf ,at the procession of ,jagganath in ,june #ahdj1 eleven ,hindus threw themselves under the wheels1 and were instantly killed4 7,letter of an ,east ,indian proprietor in the ,times of #cjth ,december #ahdj47 #hg ,on cf4 ,stob4 ,floril41 vol4 ii4 p4 #cgd4 #hh ,bruckeri ,hist4 ,philos41 tomi iv4 pars4 i4 p4 #aj4 #hi ,henry ,,vi41 ,part ii4 act #c1 sc4 #c4 #ij ,cf4 ,ch4 xlviii4 of the ,supplement4 #ia ,how truly this is the case may be seen from the fact that all the contradictions and inconceivabilities contained in the ,christian dogmatics1 consistently systematised by ,augustine1 which have led to the ,pelagian insipidity which is opposed to them1 vanish as soon as we abstract from the fundamental ,jewish dogma1 and recognize that man is not the work of another1 but of his own will4 ,then all is at once clear and correct3 then there is no need of freedom in the operari1 for it lies in the esse2 and there also lies the sin as original sin4 ,the work of grace is1 however1 our own4 ,to the rationalistic point of view of the day1 on the contrary1 many doctrines of the ,augustinian dogmatics1 founded on the ,new ,testament1 appear quite untenable1 and indeed revolting2 for example1 predestination4 ,accordingly ,christianity proper is rejected1 and a return is made to crude ,judaism4 ,but the miscalculation or the original weakness of ,christian dogmatics lies--where it is never sought--precisely in that which is withdrawn from all investigation as established and certain4 ,take this away and the whole of dogmatics is rational2 for this dogma destroys theology as it does all other sciences4 ,if any one studies the ,augustinian theology in the books 8,de ,civitate ,dei0 7especially in the ,fourteenth ,book71 he experiences something analogous to the feeling of one who tries to make a body stand whose centre of gravity falls outside it2 however he may turn it and place it1 it always tumbles over again4 ,so here1 in spite of all the efforts and sophisms of ,augustine1 the guilt and misery of the world always falls back on ,god1 who made everything and everything that is in everything1 and also knew how all things would go4 ,that ,augustine himself was conscious of the difficulty1 and puzzled by it1 ,i have already shown in my prize-essay on the ,freedom of the ,will 7ch4 iv4 pp4 #ff-fh of the first and second editions74 ,in the same way1 the contradiction between the goodness of ,god and the misery of the world1 and also between the freedom of the will and the foreknowledge of ,god1 is the inexhaustible theme of a controversy which lasted nearly a hundred years between the ,cartesians1 ,malebranche1 ,leibnitz1 ,bayle1 ,clarke1 ,arnauld1 and many others4 ,the only dogma which was regarded as fixed by all parties was the existence and attributes of ,god1 and they all unceasingly move in a circle1 because they seek to bring these things into harmony1 i4e41 to solve a sum that will not come right1 but always shows a remainder at some new place whenever we have concealed it elsewhere4 ,but it does not occur to any one to seek for the source of the difficulty in the fundamental assumption1 although it palpably obtrudes itself4 ,bayle alone shows that he saw this4 #ib ,this is also just the ,prajna--,paramita of the ,buddhists1 the 8beyond all knowledge10 i4e41 the point at which subject and object are no more4 7,cf4 ,j4 ,j4 ,schmidt1 8,ueber das ,mahajana und ,pratschna-,paramita407