,,philosophies ,,ancient ,,and ,,modern 
,,schopenhauer     ,,note   ,as a       
consequence of the success of the series
 of ,religions ,ancient and ,modern1    
,messrs4 ,,constable have decided to    
issue a set of similar primers1 with    
brief introductions1 lists of dates1 and
 selected authorities1 presenting to the
 wider public the salient features of   
the ,philosophies of ,greece and ,rome  
and of the ,middle ,ages1 as well as of 
modern ,europe4 ,they will appear in the
 same handy ,shilling volumes1 with neat
 cloth bindings and paper envelopes1    
which have proved so attractive in the  
case of the ,religions4 ,the writing in 
each case will be confided to an eminent
 authority1 and one who has already     
proved himself capable of scholarly yet 
popular exposition within a small       
compass4  ,among the first volumes to   
appear will be3--    ,early ,greek      
,philosophy4 ,by ,a4 ,w4 ,,benn1 author 
of ,the ,philosophy     of ,greece1     
,rationalism in the ,nineteenth         

,century4    ,stoicism4 ,by ,professor  
,,st4 ,,george ,,stock1 author of       
,deductive     ,logic1 editor of the    
,apology of ,plato1 etc4    ,plato4 ,by 
,professor ,a4 ,e4 ,,taylor1 ,st4       
,andrews ,university1 author     of ,the
 ,problem of ,conduct4                  
,scholasticism4 ,by ,father ,,rickaby1  
,s4,j4    ,hobbes4 ,by ,professor ,a4   
,e4 ,,taylor4    ,locke4 ,by ,professor 
,,alexander1 of ,owens ,college4        
,comte and ,mill4 ,by ,t4 ,,whittaker1  
author of ,the ,neoplatonists1          
,apollonius of ,tyana and other ,essays4
    ,herbert ,spencer4 ,by ,w4 ,h4      
,,hudson1 author of ,an ,introduction to
     ,spencer's ,philosophy4            
,schopenhauer4 ,by ,t4 ,,whittaker4     
,berkeley4 ,by ,professor ,,campbell    
,,fraser1 ,d4,c4,l41 ,,ll4,d4           
,bergsen4 ,by ,father ,,tyrrell4        
,,schopenhauer   ,by  ,,thomas          
,,whittaker  ,,author ,,of ',,comte     
,,and ,,mill1' ,,etc4   ,,london        
,,archibald ,,constable  ,,co ,,ltd     

#aiji     ,,contents     ,,chap4        
,,page    ,i4   ,,life ,,and ,,writings1
              #a   ,,ii4  ,,theory ,,of 
,,knowledge1           #ae   ,,iii4     
,,metaphysics ,,of ,,the ,,will1        
#bi   ,,iv4  ,,aesthetics1              
#di   ,v4   ,,ethics1                   
#fe   ,,vi4  ,,historical               
,,significance1       #hf               
,,selected ,,works1                #ic  
,,schopenhauer     ,,chapter ,i  ,,life 
,,and ,,writings   ,arthur ,schopenhauer
 may be distinctively described as the  
greatest philosophic writer of his      
century4 ,so evident is this that he has
 sometimes been regarded as having more 
importance in literature than in        
philosophy2 but this is an error4 ,as a 
metaphysician he is second to no one    
since ,kant4 ,others of his age have    
surpassed him in system and in          
comprehensiveness2 but no one has had a 
firmer grasp of the essential and       
fundamental problems of philosophy4 ,on 
the theory of knowledge1 the nature of  

reality1 and the meaning of the         
beautiful and the good1 he has solutions
 to offer that are all results of a     
characteristic and original way of      
thinking4  ,in one respect1 as critics  
have noted1 his spirit is different from
 that of ,european philosophy in        
general4 ,what preoccupies him in a     
special way is the question of evil in  
the world4 ,like the philosophies of the
 ,east1 emerging as they do without     
break from religion1 ,schopenhauer's    
philosophy is in its outcome a doctrine 
of redemption from sin4 ,the name of    
pessimism commonly applied to it is in  
some respects misleading1 though it was 
his own term2 but it is correct if      
understood as he explained it4 ,as he   
was accustomed to insist1 his final     
ethical doctrine coincides with that of 
all the religions that aim1 for their   
adepts or their elect1 at deliverance   
from 'this evil world4' ,but1 as the    
'world-fleeing' religions have their    
mitigations and accommodations1 so also 

has the philosophy of ,schopenhauer4 ,at
 various points indeed it seems as if a 
mere change of accent would turn it into
 optimism4  ,this preoccupation does not
 mean indifference to the theoretical   
problems of philosophy4 ,no one has     
insisted more strongly that the end of  
philosophy is pure truth1 and that only 
the few who care about pure truth have  
any concern with it4 ,but for           
,schopenhauer the desire for speculative
 truth does not by itself suffice to    
explain the impulse of philosophical    
inquiries4 ,on one side of his complex  
character1 he had more resemblance to   
the men who turn from the world to      
religion1 like ,st4 ,augustine1 than to 
the normal type of ,european thinker1   
represented pre-eminently by ,aristotle4
 ,he was a temperamental pessimist1     
feeling from the first the trouble of   
existence2 and here he finds the deepest
 motive for the desire to become clear  
about it4 ,he saw in the world1 what he 
felt in himself1 a vain effort after    

ever new objects of desire which give no
 permanent satisfaction2 and this view1 
becoming predominant1 determined1 not   
indeed all the ideas of his philosophy1 
but its general complexion as a         
'philosophy of redemption4'  ,with his  
pessimism1 personal misfortunes had     
nothing to do4 ,he was1 and always      
recognised that he was1 among the most  
fortunately placed of mankind4 ,he does 
not hesitate to speak sometimes of his  
own happiness in complete freedom from  
the need to apply himself to any        
compulsory occupation4 ,this freedom1 as
 he has put gratefully on record1 he    
owed to his father1 ,heinrich ,floris   
,schopenhauer1 who was a rich merchant  
of ,danzig1 where the philosopher was   
born on the #bbnd of ,february #aghh4   
,both his parents were of ,dutch        
ancestry4 ,his mother1 ,johanna         
,schopenhauer1 won celebrity as a       
novelist2 and his sister1 ,adele1 also  
displayed some literary talent4         
,generalising from his own case1        

,schopenhauer holds that men of         
intelligence derive their character from
 their father and their intellect from  
their mother4 ,with his mother1 however1
 he was not on sympathetic terms1 as may
 be read in the biographies4 ,his father
 intended him for a mercantile career1  
and with this view began to prepare him 
from the first to be a cosmopolitan man 
of the world4 ,the name of ,arthur was  
given to him because it is spelt alike  
in the leading ,european languages4 ,he 
was taken early to ,france1 where he    
resided from #agig to #agii1 learning   
,french so well that on his return he   
had almost forgotten his ,german4       
,portions of the years #ahjc to #ahjd   
were spent in ,england1 ,france1        
,switzerland1 and ,austria4 ,in ,england
 he was three months at a ,wimbledon    
boarding-school kept by a clergyman4    
,this experience he found extremely     
irksome4 ,he afterwards became highly   
proficient in ,english3 was always      
pleased to be taken for an ,englishman1 

and regarded both the ,english character
 and intelligence as on the whole the   
first in ,europe2 but all the more      
deplorable did he find the oppressive   
pietism which was the special form taken
 in the ,england of that period by the  
reaction against the ,french            
,revolution4 ,he is never tired of      
denouncing that phase of 'cold          
superstition1' the dominance of which   
lasted during his lifetime2 for the     
publication of ,mill's ,liberty and of  
,darwin's ,origin of ,species1 which may
 be considered as marking the close of  
it1 came only the year before his death4
  ,the only real break in the conformity
 of ,schopenhauer's circumstances to his
 future career came in #ahje1 when he   
was placed in a merchant's office at    
,hamburg1 whither his father had        
migrated in disgust at the annexation of
 his native ,danzig1 then under a       
republican constitution of its own1 by  
,prussia in #agic4 ,soon afterwards his 
father died2 but out of loyalty he tried

 for some time longer to reconcile      
himself to commercial life4 ,finding    
this at length impossible1 he gained    
permission from his mother1 in #ahjg1 to
 leave the office for the gymnasium4 ,at
 this time he seems to have begun his   
classical studies1 his education having 
hitherto been exclusively modern4 ,they 
were carried on first at ,gotha and then
 at ,weimar4 ,in #ahji he entered the   
university of ,goettingen as a student  
of medicine4 ,this1 however1 was with a 
view only to scientific studies1 not to 
practice2 and he transferred himself to 
the philosophical faculty in #ahaj4     
,generally he was little regardful of   
academical authority4 ,his father's     
deliberately adopted plan of letting him
 mix early with the world had given him 
a certain independence of judgment4 ,at 
,goettingen1 however1 he received an    
important influence from his teacher1   
,g4 ,e4 ,schulze 7known by the revived  
scepticism of his ,a,enesidemus71 who   
advised him to study ,plato and ,kant   

before ,aristotle and ,spinoza4 ,from   
#ahaa to #ahac he was at ,berlin1 where 
he heard ,fichte1 but was not impressed4
 ,in #ahac the degree of ,doctor of     
,philosophy was conferred on him at     
,jena for the dissertation ,on the      
,fourfold ,root of the ,principle of    
,sufficient ,reason 7,ueber die         
vierfache ,wurzel des ,satzes vom       
zureichenden ,grunde1 #bnd ed41 #ahdg74 
,this was the first result of his       
,kantian studies4 ,in the same year he  
began to be acquainted with ,goethe at  
,weimar1 where his mother and sister had
 gone to reside in #ahjf4 ,a consequence
 of this acquaintance was that he took  
up and further developed ,goethe's      
theory of colours4 ,his dissertation    
,ueber das ,sehen und die ,farben was   
published in #ahaf4 ,a second edition   
did not appear till #ahed2 but in the   
meantime he had published a restatement 
of his doctrine in ,latin1 entitled     
,theoria ,colorum ,physiologica 7#ahcj74
 ,this1 however1 was an outlying part of

 his work4 ,he had already been seized  
by the impulse to set forth the system  
of philosophy that took shape in him1 as
 he says1 by some formative process of  
which he could give no conscious        
account4 ,his great work1 ,die ,welt als
 ,wille und ,vorstellung1 was ready for 
publication before the end of #ahah1 and
 was published with the date #ahai4     
,thus he is one of the most precocious  
philosophers on record4 ,for in that    
single volume1 written before he was    
thirty1 the outlines of his whole system
 are fixed4 ,there is some development  
later1 and there are endless new        
applications and essays towards         
confirmation from all sources4 ,his mind
 never rested1 and his literary power   
gained by exercise4 ,still1 it has been 
said with truth1 that there never was a 
greater illusion than when he thought   
that he seldom repeated himself4 ,in    
reality he did little but repeat his    
fundamental positions with infinite     
variations in expression4  ,after       

completing his chief work1 ,schopenhauer
 wrote some verses in which he predicted
 that posterity would erect a monument  
to him4 ,this prediction was fulfilled  
in #ahie2 but1 for the time1 the work   
which he never doubted would be his     
enduring title to fame seemed1 like     
,hume's ,treatise1 to have fallen       
'deadborn from the press4' ,this he     
attributed to the hostility of the      
academical philosophers2 and1 in his    
later works1 attacks on the university  
professors form a characteristic        
feature4 ,the official teachers of the  
,hegelian school1 he declared1 were bent
 only on obtaining positions for        
themselves by an appearance of          
supporting ,christian dogma2 and they   
resented openness on the part of any one
 else4 ,yet on one side he maintained   
that his own pessimism was more truly   
,christian than their optimism4 ,the    
essential spirit of ,christianity is    
that of ,brahmanism and ,buddhism1 the  
great religions that sprang from ,india1

 the first home of our race4 ,he is even
 inclined to see in it traces of ,indian
 influence4 ,what vitiates it in his    
eyes is the ,jewish element1 which finds
 its expression in the flat modern      
',protestant-rationalistic optimism4'   
,as optimistic religions1 he groups     
together ,judaism1 ,islam1 and          
,graeco-,roman ,polytheism4 ,his        
antipathy1 however1 only extends to the 
two former4 ,he was himself in great    
part a child of ,humanism and of the    
eighteenth century1 rejoicing over the  
approaching downfall of all the faiths1 
and holding that a weak religion        
7entirely different from those he       
admires7 is favourable to civilisation4 
,nothing can exceed his scorn for nearly
 everything that characterised the      
,middle ,ages4 ,with ,catholicism as a  
political system he has no sympathy     
whatever2 while on the religious side   
the ,protestant are as sympathetic to   
him as the ,catholic mystics4 ,what is  
common to all priesthoods1 he holds1 is 

to exploit the metaphysical need of     
mankind 7in which he also believes7 for 
the sake of their own power4            
,clericalism1 ',pfaffenthum1' whether   
,catholic or ,protestant1 is the object 
of his unvarying hatred and contempt4   
,if he had cared to appreciate ,hegel1  
he would have found on this point much  
community of spirit2 but of course there
 was a real antithesis between the two  
as philosophers4 ,no 'conspiracy' need  
be invoked to explain the failure of    
,schopenhauer to win early recognition4 
,belief in the ,state and in progress   
was quite alien to him2 and ,germany was
 then full of political hopes1 which    
found nourishment in optimistic         
pantheism4 ,what at length gave his     
philosophy vogue was the collapse of    
this enthusiasm on the failure of the   
revolutionary movement in #ahdh4 ,once  
known1 it contained enough of permanent 
value to secure it from again passing   
out of sight with the next change of    
fashion4  ,the rest of ,schopenhauer's  

life in its external relations may be   
briefly summed up4 ,for a few years1 it 
was diversified by travels in ,italy and
 elsewhere1 and by an unsuccessful      
attempt at academical teaching in       
,berlin4 ,in #ahca he moved to          
,frankfort1 where he finally settled in 
#ahcc4 ,he lived unmarried there till   
his death on the #bast of ,september    
#ahfj4 ,the monument1 already spoken of1
 was unveiled at ,frankfort on the #fth 
of ,june #ahie4  ,the almost unbroken   
silence with which his great work was   
received1 though it had a distempering  
effect on the man1 did not discourage   
the thinker4 ,the whole series of       
,schopenhauer's works1 indeed1 was      
completed before he attained anything   
that could be called fame4 ,constantly  
on the alert as he was to seize upon    
confirmations of his system1 he         
published in #ahcf his short work ,on   
the ,will in ,nature1 pointing out      
verifications of his metaphysics by     
recent science4 ,in #ahci his prize     

essay1 ,on the ,freedom of the ,human   
,will 7finished in #ahcg71 was crowned  
by the ,royal ,scientific ,society of   
,drontheim in ,norway4 ,this and another
 essay1 ,on the ,basis of ,morality1 not
 crowned by the ,royal ,danish ,society 
of ,copenhagen in #ahdj1 he published in
 #ahda1 with the inclusive title1 ,die  
beiden ,grundprobleme der ,ethik4 ,in   
#ahdd appeared the second edition of his
 principal work1 to which there was     
added1 in the form of a second volume1 a
 series of elucidations and extensions  
larger in bulk than the first4 ,this new
 volume contains much of his best and   
most effective writing4 ,his last work1 
,parerga und ,paralipomena1 which       
appeared in #ahea 7#b vols471 is from   
the literary point of view the most     
brilliant4 ,it was only from this time  
that he began to be well known among the
 general public2 though the philosophic 
'apostolate' of ,julius ,frauenstaedt1  
who afterwards edited his works1 had    
begun in #ahdj4 ,his activity was       

henceforth confined to modifying and    
extending his works for new editions2 an
 employment in which he was always      
assiduous4 ,in consequence of this1 all 
of them1 as they stand1 contain         
references from one to another2 but the 
development of his thinking1 so far as  
there was such a process after #ahah1   
can be easily traced without reference  
to the earlier editions4 ,there is some 
growth2 but1 as has been said1 it does  
not affect many of the chief points4 ,a 
brief exposition of his philosophy can  
on the whole take it as something fixed4
 ,the heads under which it must fall are
 those assigned to the original four    
books of ,die ,welt als ,wille und      
,vorstellung4  ,although ,schopenhauer  
discountenanced the attempt to connect a
 philosophers biography with his work1  
something has to be said about his      
character1 since this has been dwelt on 
to his disadvantage by opponents4 ,there
 is abundant material for a personal    
estimate in the correspondence and      

reminiscences published after his death 
by his disciples ,julius ,frauenstaedt  
and ,wilhelm ,gwinner4 ,the apparent    
contradiction is at once obvious between
 the ascetic consummation of his ethics 
and his unascetic life1 carefully       
occupied in its latter part with rules  
for the preservation of his naturally   
robust health4 ,he was quite aware of   
this1 but holds it absurd to require    
that a moralist should commend only the 
virtues which he possesses4 ,it is as if
 the requirement were set up that a     
sculptor is to be himself a model of    
beauty4 ,a saint need not be a          
philosopher1 nor a philosopher a saint4 
,the science of morals is as theoretical
 as any other branch of philosophy4     
,fundamentally character is             
unmodifiable1 though knowledge1 it is   
allowed1 may change the mode of action  
within the limits of the particular     
character4 ,the passage to the state of 
asceticism cannot be effected by moral  
philosophy1 but depends on a kind of    

'grace4' ,after all1 it might be        
replied1 philosophers1 whether they     
succeed or not1 do usually make at least
 an attempt to live in accordance with  
the moral ideal they set up4 ,the best  
apology in ,schopenhauer's case is that 
the fault may have been as much in his  
ideal as in his failure to conform to   
it4 ,the eloquent pages he has devoted  
to the subject of holiness only make    
manifest the inconsequence 7which he    
admits7 in the passage to it4 ,for1 as  
we shall see1 this has nothing in common
 with the essentially rational          
asceticism of the schools of later      
antiquity2 which was a rule of          
self-limitation in view of the          
philosophic life4 ,he did in a way of   
his own practise something of this2 and1
 on occasion1 he sets forth the theory  
of it2 but he quite clearly sees the    
difference4 ,his own ideal1 which he    
never attempted to practise1 is that of 
the self-torturing ascetics of the      
,christian ,middle ,age4 ,within the    

range of properly human virtue1 he can  
in many respects hold his own1 not only 
as a philosopher but as a man4 ,if his  
egoism and vanity are undeniable1 he    
undoubtedly possessed the virtues of    
rectitude and compassion4 ,what he would
 have especially laid stress on was the 
conscientious devotion to his work4     
,with complete singleness of purpose he 
used for a disinterested end the leisure
 which he regarded as the most fortunate
 of endowments4 ,as he said near the    
close of his life1 his intellectual     
conscience was clear4  ,of              
,schopenhauer's expositions of his      
pessimism it would be true to say1 as   
,spinoza says of the ,book of ,job1 that
 the matter1 like the style1 is not that
 of a man sitting among the ashes1 but  
of one meditating in a library4 ,this of
 course does not prove that they are not
 a genuine1 if one-sided1 rendering of  
human experience4 ,all that can be said 
is that they did not turn him away from 
appreciation of the apparent goods of   

life4 ,his own practical principle was  
furnished by what he regarded as a lower
 point of view2 and this gives its      
direction to the semi-popular philosophy
 of the ,parerga4 ,from what he takes to
 be the higher point of view1 the belief
 that happiness is attainable by man on 
earth is an illusion2 but he holds that1
 by keeping steadily in view a kind of  
tempered happiness as the end1 many     
mistakes may be avoided in the conduct  
of life1 provided that each recognises  
at once the strength and weakness of his
 own character1 and does not attempt    
things that1 with the given limitations1
 are impossible4 ,of the highest truth1 
as he conceived it1 he could therefore  
make no use4 ,only by means of a truth  
that he was bound to hold half-illusory 
could a working scheme be constructed   
for himself and others4 ,this result may
 give us guidance in seeking to learn   
what we can from a thinker who is in    
reality no representative of a          
decadence1 but is fundamentally sane and

 rational1 even in spite of himself4    
,,chapter ,,ii  ,,theory ,,of           
,,knowledge   ,the title of             
,schopenhauer's chief work is rendered  
in the ,english translation1 ,the ,world
 as ,will and ,idea4 ,here the term     
'idea' is used in the sense it had for  
,locke and ,berkeley2 namely1 any object
 of mental activity4 ,thus it includes  
not merely imagery1 but also perception4
 ,since ,hume distinguished ideas' from 
'impressions1' it has tended to be      
specialised in the former sense4 ,the   
,german word1 ,vorstellung1 which it is 
used to render1 conveys the generalised 
meaning of the ,lockian 'idea1' now     
frequently expressed in ,english and    
,french philosophical works by the more 
technical term 'presentation' or        
'representation4' ,by ,schopenhauer     
himself the word ',idea' was used       
exclusively in the sense of the         
,platonic ,idea1 which1 as we shall see1
 plays an important part in his         
philosophy4 ,the distinction is         

preserved in the translation by the use 
of a capital when ,idea has the latter  
meaning2 but in a brief exposition it   
seems convenient to adopt a more        
technical rendering of ,vorstellung2    
and1 from its common employment in      
psychological text-books1 ,i have       
selected 'presentation' as the most     
suitable4  ,the first proposition of    
,schopenhauer's philosophical system is1
 ',the world is my presentation4' ,by   
this he means that it presents itself as
 appearance to the knowing subject4     
,this appearance is in the forms of     
time1 space and causality4 ,under these 
forms every phenomenon necessarily      
appears1 because they are a priori forms
 of the subject4 ,the world as it       
presents itself consists entirely of    
phenomena1 that is1 appearances1 related
 according to these forms4 ,the most    
fundamental form of all is the relation 
between object and subject1 which is    
implied in all of them4 ,without a      
subject there can be no presented       

object4  ,schopenhauer is therefore an  
idealist in the sense in which we call  
,berkeley's theory of the external world
 idealism2 though the expressions used  
are to some extent different4 ,the      
difference proceeds from his following  
of ,kant4 ,his ,kantianism consists in  
the recognition of a priori forms by    
which the subject constructs for itself 
an 'objective' world of appearances4    
,with ,berkeley he agrees as against    
,kant in not admitting any residue      
whatever1 in the object as such1 that is
 not wholly appearance4 ,but while he   
allows that ,berkeley1 as regards the   
general formulation of idealism1 was    
more consistent than ,kant1 he finds    
him1 in working out the principle1      
altogether inadequate4 ,for the modern  
mind there is henceforth no way in      
philosophy except through ,kant1 from   
whom dates the revolution by which      
scholastic dualism was finally          
overthrown4 ,kant's systematic          
construction1 however1 he in effect     

reduces to very little4 ,his is a much  
simplified ',apriorism4' ,while         
accepting the 'forms of sensible        
intuition1' that is1 time and space1    
just as ,kant sets them forth1 he clears
 away nearly all the superimposed       
mechanism4 ,kant's ',transcendental     
,a,esthetic1' he says1 was a real       
discovery in metaphysics2 but on the    
basis of this he for the most part only 
gave free play to his architectonic     
impulse4 ,of the twelve 'categories of  
the understanding1' which he professed  
to derive from the logical forms of     
judgment1 all except causality are mere 
'blind windows4' ,this alone1 therefore1
 ,schopenhauer adopts2 placing it1      
however1 not at a higher level but side 
by side with time and space1 ,kant's    
forms of intuition4 ,these three forms1 
according to ,schopenhauer1 make up the 
understanding of men and animals4 ',all 
intuition is intellectual4' ,it is not  
first mere appearance related in space  
and time1 and waiting for understanding 

to organise it2 but1 in animals as in   
man1 it is put in order at once under   
the three forms that suffice to explain 
the knowledge all have of the phenomenal
 world4  ,to ,reason as distinguished   
from ,understanding1 ,schopenhauer      
assigns no such exalted function as was 
attributed to it in portions of his     
system by ,kant1 and still more by some 
of his successors4 ,the name of         
'reason1' he maintains1 ought on        
etymological grounds to be restricted to
 the faculty of abstract concepts4      
,this1 and not understanding1 is what   
distinguishes man from animals4 ,it     
discovers and invents nothing1 but it   
puts in a generalised and available form
 what the understanding has discovered  
in intuition4  ,for the historical      
estimation of ,schopenhauer1 it is      
necessary to place him in relation to   
,kant1 as he himself always insisted4   
,much also in his chief work is made    
clearer by knowledge of his dissertation
 ,on the ,fourfold ,root of the         

,principle of ,sufficient ,reason1 to   
which he is constantly referring4       
,later1 his manner of exposition became 
more independent2 so that he can be read
 by the general reader with profit      
simply by himself1 and without reference
 to antecedents4 ,still1 it will always 
be advisable for an expositor to follow 
his directions1 at least to the extent  
of giving some short account of the     
dissertation4 ,this ,i proceed to give  
approximately in the place to which he  
has assigned it in his system4  ,the    
name of the principle 7principium       
rationis sufficientis7 he took over from
 ,leibniz and his successor ,wolff1 but 
gave it a new amplitude4 ,with him1 it  
stands as an inclusive term for four    
modes of connection by which the        
thoroughgoing relativity of phenomena to
 one another is constituted for our     
intelligence4 ,the general statement    
adopted is1 ',nothing is without a      
reason why it should be rather than not 
be4' ,its four forms are the principles 

of becoming 7fiendi71 of knowing        
7cognoscendi71 of being 7essendi71 and  
of acting 7agendi74 7#a7 ,under the     
first head come 'causes4' ,these are    
divided into 'cause proper1' for        
inorganic things2 'stimulus1' for the   
vegetative life both of plants and      
animals1 and 'motive1' for animals and  
men4 ,the law of causation is applicable
 only to changes2 not to the forces of  
nature1 to matter1 or to the world as a 
whole1 which are perdurable4 ,cause     
precedes effect in time4 ,not one thing1
 but one state of a thing1 is the cause 
of another4 ,from the law of causation  
there results an infinite series a parte
 ante as well as a parte post4 7#b7 ,the
 principle of sufficient reason of      
knowing is applicable to concepts1 which
 are all derived from intuition1 that   
is1 from percepts4 ,the laws of logic1  
which come under this head1 can yield   
nothing original1 but can only render   
explicit what was in the understanding4 
7#c7 ,under the third head come         

arithmetical and geometrical relations4 
,these are peculiar relations of        
presentations1 distinct from all others1
 and only intelligible in virtue of a   
pure a priori intuition4 ,for geometry  
this is space2 for arithmetic time1 in  
which counting goes on4 ,scientifically1
 arithmetic is fundamental4 7#d7 ,as the
 third form of causality was enumerated 
'motive' for the will2 but in that      
classification it was viewed from       
without1 as belonging to the world of   
objects4 ,through the direct knowledge  
we have of our own will1 we know also   
from within this determination by the   
presentation we call a motive4 ,hence   
emerges the fourth form of the principle
 of sufficient reason4 ,this at a later 
stage makes possible the transition from
 physics to metaphysics4  ,all these    
forms alike are forms of necessary      
determination4 ,necessity has no clear  
and true sense but certainty of the     
consequence when the ground is posited4 
,all necessity therefore is conditional4

 ,in accordance with the four           
expressions of the principle of         
sufficient reason1 it takes the fourfold
 shape of physical1 logical1            
mathematical1 and moral necessity4  ,the
 sharp distinction between logical and  
mathematical truth1 with the assignment 
of the former to conceptual and of the  
latter to intuitive relations1 comes to 
,schopenhauer directly from ,kant4 ,so  
also does his view that the necessary   
form of causation is sequence2 though   
here his points of contact with ,english
 thinkers1 earlier and later1 are very  
marked4 ,only in his statement of the   
'law of motivation' as 'causality seen  
from within' does he hint at his own    
distinctive metaphysical doctrine4      
,meanwhile1 it is evident that he is to 
be numbered with the group of modern    
thinkers who have arrived in one way or 
another at a complete scientific        
phenomenism4 ,expositors have noted that
 in his earlier statements of this he   
tends to lay more stress on the         

character of the visible and tangible   
world as mere appearance4 ,the          
impermanence1 the relativity1 of all    
that exists in time and space1 leads him
 to describe it1 in a favourite term    
borrowed from ,indian philosophy1 as    
,maya1 or illusion4 ,later1 he dwells   
more on the relative reality of things  
as they appear4 ,his position1 however1 
does not essentially alter1 but only    
finds varying expression as he turns    
more to the scientific or to the        
metaphysical side4 ,from ,hume's view on
 causation he differs not by opposing   
its pure phenomenism1 but only by       
recognising1 as ,kant does1 an a priori 
element in the form of its law4 ,german 
critics have seen in his own formulation
 an anticipation of ,mill1 and this is  
certainly striking as regards the       
general conception of the causal order1 
although there is no anticipation of    
,mill's inductive logic4 ,on the same   
side there is a close agreement with    
,malebranche and the ,occasionalists1   

pointed out by ,schopenhauer himself4   
,the causal explanations of science1 he 
is at one with them in insisting1 give  
no ultimate account of anything4 ,all   
its causes are no more than 'occasional 
causes1'--merely instances1 as ,mill    
expressed it afterwards1 of 'invariable 
and unconditional sequence4' ,from ,mill
 of course he differs in holding its    
form to be necessary and a priori1 not  
ultimately derived from a summation of  
experiences2 and1 with the              
,occasionalists1 he goes on to          
metaphysics in its sense of ontology1 as
 ,mill never did4 ,the difference here  
is that he does not clothe his          
metaphysics in a theological dress4  ,in
 the later development of his thought1  
,schopenhauer dealt more expressly with 
the question1 how this kind of          
phenomenism is reconcilable with a      
scientific cosmogony4 ,on one side the  
proposition1 ',no object without        
subject1' makes materialism for ever    
impossible2 for the materialist tries to

 explain from relations among           
presentations what is the condition of  
all presentation4 ,on the other side1 we
 are all compelled to agree with the    
materialists that knowledge of the      
object comes late in a long series of   
material events4 ,inorganic things      
existed in time before life2 vegetative 
life before animal life2 and only with  
animal life does knowledge emerge4      
,reasoned knowledge of the whole series 
comes only at the end of it in the human
 mind4 ,this apparent contradiction he  
solves by leaving a place for           
metaphysics4 ,our representation of the 
world as it existed before the          
appearance of life was indeed           
non-existent at the time to which we    
assign it2 but the real being of the    
world had a manifestation not imaginable
 by us4 ,for this1 we substitute a      
picture of a world such as we should    
have been aware of had our 'subject1'   
with its a priori forms of time1 space1 
and causality1 been then present4 ,what 

the reality is1 is the problem of the   
thing-in-itself 7to use the ,kantian    
term74 ,this problem remains over2 but  
we know that the metaphysical reality   
cannot be matter2 for matter1 with all  
its qualities1 is phenomenal4 ,it exists
 only 'for understanding1 through       
understanding1 in understanding4' ,these
 discriminations made1 ,schopenhauer    
offers us a scientific cosmogony        
beginning with the nebular hypothesis   
and ending with an outline of organic   
evolution4 ,this last differs from the  
,darwinian theory in supposing a        
production of species by definite steps 
instead of by accumulation of small     
individual variations4 ,at a certain    
time1 a form that has all the characters
 of a new species appears among the     
progeny of an existing species4 ,man is 
the last and highest form to be evolved4
 ,from ,schopenhauer's metaphysics1 as  
we shall see1 it follows that no higher 
form of life will ever appear4  ,a word 
may be said here on a                   

materialistic-sounding phrase which is  
very prominent in ,schopenhauer's later 
expositions1 and has been remarked on as
 paradoxical for an idealist4 ,the world
 as presentation1 he often says1 is 'in 
the brain4' ,this1 it must be allowed1  
is not fully defensible from his own    
point of view1 except with the aid of a 
later distinction4 ,the brain as we know
 it is of course only a part of the     
phenomenon of the subject1--a grouping  
of possible perceptions4 ,how then1     
since it is itself only appearance1 can 
it be the bearer of the whole universe  
as appearance8 ,the answer is that      
,schopenhauer meant in reality 'the     
being of the brain1' and not the brain  
as phenomenon4 ,he had a growing sense  
of the importance of physiology for the 
investigation of mind2 and his          
predilection led him to adopt a not     
quite satisfactory shorthand expression 
for the correspondence we know          
scientifically to exist between our     
mental processes and changes capable of 

objective investigation in the matter of
 the brain4  ,in science his distinctive
 bent was to the borderland between     
psychology and physiology4 ,hence came  
the attraction exercised on him by      
,goethe's theory of colours4 ,to his own
 theory1 though1 unlike his             
philosophical system1 it has always     
failed to gain the attention he         
predicted for it1 the merit must be     
allowed of treating the problem as      
essentially one of psychophysics4 ,what 
he does is to attempt to ascertain the  
conditions in the sensibility of the    
retina that account for our actual      
colour-sensations4 ,this problem was    
untouched by the ,newtonian theory2 but 
,schopenhauer followed ,goethe in the   
error of trying to overthrow this on its
 own ground4 ,he had no aptitude for the
 special inquiries of mathematics and   
physics1 though he had gained a clear   
insight into their general nature as    
sciences4 ,on the psycho-physical side  
there is to-day no fully authorised     

theory4 ,the problem indeed has become  
ever more complex4 ,schopenhauer's      
attempt1 by combination of sensibilities
 to 'light' and 'darkness1' to explain  
the phenomena of complementary colours1 
deserves at least a record in the long  
series of essays of which the best known
 are the ',young-,helmholtz theory' and 
that of ,hering4 ,it marks an           
indubitable advance on ,goethe in the   
clear distinction drawn between the     
mixture1 in the ordinary sense1 that can
 only result in dilution to different   
shades of grey1 and the kinds of mixture
 from which1 in their view1 true colours
 arise4  ,a characteristic position in  
,schopenhauer's theory of knowledge1 and
 one that is constantly finding new     
expression in his writings1 is the      
distinction between abstract and        
intuitive knowledge already touched on4 
,intuitive knowledge of the kind that is
 common to men and animals1 as we have  
seen1 makes up1 in his terminology1 the 
'understanding'2 while 'reason' is the  

distinctively human faculty of concepts4
 ,when he depreciates this1 as he often 
does1 in comparison with 'intuition1' it
 must be remembered that he does not    
limit this term to perception of        
particulars1 but ascribes to what he    
calls the ',platonic ,idea' a certain   
kind of union between reason and        
'phantasy1' which gives it an intuitive 
character of its own4 ,thus intuition   
can stand1 though not in every case for 
what is higher1 yet always for that     
which is wider and greater and more     
immediate4 ,whatever may be done with   
reflective reason and its abstractions1 
every effectual process of thought must 
end1 alike for knowledge and art and    
virtue1 in some intuitive presentation4 
,the importance of reason for practice  
is due to its generality4 ,its function 
is subordinate4 ,it does not furnish the
 ground of virtuous action any more than
 aesthetic precepts can enable any one  
to produce a work of art2 but it can    
help to preserve constancy to certain   

maxims1 as also in art a reasoned plan  
is necessary because the inspiration of 
genius is not every moment at command4  
,virtue and artistic genius alike1      
however1 depend ultimately on intuition3
 and so also does every true discovery  
in science4 ,the nature of pedantry is  
to try to be guided everywhere by       
concepts1 and to trust nothing to       
perception in the particular case4      
,philosophy also ,schopenhauer regards  
as depending ultimately on a certain    
intuitive view2 but he allows that it   
has to translate this into abstractions4
 ,its problem is to express the what of 
the world in abstract form3 science     
dealing only with the why of phenomena  
related within the world4 ,this         
character of philosophy as a system of  
abstract concepts deprives it of the    
immediate attractiveness of art2 so     
that1 as he says in one place1 it is    
more fortunate to be a poet than a      
philosopher4     ,,chapter ,,iii        
,,metaphysics ,,of ,,the ,,will   ,we   

have seen that scientific explanation   
does not go beyond presentations ordered
 in space and time4 ,this is just as    
true of the sciences of causation--the  
'aetiological' sciences--as it is of    
mathematical science4 ,all that we learn
 from ,mechanics1 ,physics1 ,chemistry  
and ,physiology1 is 'how1 in accordance 
with an infallible rule1 one determinate
 state of matter necessarily follows    
another3 how a determinate change       
necessarily conditions and brings on    
another determinate change4' ,this      
knowledge does not satisfy us4 ,we wish 
to learn the significance of phenomena2 
but we find that from outside1 while we 
view them as presentations1 their inner 
meaning is for ever inaccessible4  ,the 
starting-point for the metaphysical     
knowledge we seek is given us in our own
 body4 ,the animal body is 'the         
immediate object of the subject'3 in it 
as presentation the 'effects' of        
'causes' in the order of presentations  
external to it are first recognised4    

,now in virtue of his body the          
investigator is not pure knowing subject
 standing apart from that which he      
knows4 ,in the case of the particular   
system of presentations constituting his
 organism1 he knows what these          
presentations signify1 and that is his  
will in a certain modification4 ,the    
subject appears as individual through   
its identity with the body1 and this    
body is given to it in two different    
ways3 on one side as object among       
objects1 and subjected to their laws2 on
 the other side as the will immediately 
known to each4 ,the act of will and the 
movement of the body are not two        
different states related as cause and   
effect2 for the relation of cause and   
effect belongs only to the object1 the  
phenomenon1 the presentation4 ,they are 
one and the same act given in different 
manners3 the will1 immediately to the   
subject2 the movement1 in sensible      
intuition for understanding4 ,the action
 of the body is the objectified act of  

will4 ,called at first the immediate    
object of presentation1 the body may    
now1 from the other side1 be called 'the
 objectivity of the will4'  ,thus1 as   
was said1 the 'law of motivation'       
discloses the inner nature of causality4
 ,in causality in general we know only  
relations of phenomena2 but in the case 
of our own body we know something else  
that those relations express2 namely1   
the act of will determined by motives4  
,now there are in the world as          
presentation other systems like that    
which we call our body4 ,unless all     
these are to be supposed mere phantoms  
without inner reality1 we must infer by 
analogy1 in correspondence with like    
phenomena1 other individual wills       
similar to that which we know in        
ourselves4 ,this inference from analogy1
 universally admitted in the case of    
human and animal bodies1 must be        
extended to the whole corporeal world4  
,the failure to take this step is where 
the purely intellectual forms of        

idealism have come short4 ,kant's       
'thing-in-itself1' which is not subject 
to the forms by which presentations     
become experience1 but which experience 
and its forms indicate as the reality1  
has been wrongly condemned by his       
successors as alien to idealism4 ,it is 
true that ,kant did in some respects    
fail to maintain the idealistic position
 with the clearness of ,berkeley2 but   
his shortcoming was not in affirming a  
thing-in-itself beyond phenomena4 ,here1
 in ,schopenhauer's view1 is the        
metaphysical problem that he left a     
place for but did not solve4 ,the word  
of the riddle has now been pronounced4  
,beyond presentation1 that is1 in itself
 and according to its innermost essence1
 the world is that which we find in     
ourselves immediately as will4 ,by this 
it is not meant that a falling stone1   
for example1 acts from a motive2        
knowledge and the consequent action from
 motives belongs only to the determinate
 form that the will has in animals and  

men2 but the reality in the stone also  
is the same in essence as that to which 
we apply the name of will in ourselves4 
,he who possesses this key to the       
knowledge of nature's innermost being   
will interpret the forces of vegetation1
 of crystallisation1 of magnetism1 of   
chemical affinity1 even of weight       
itself1 as different only in phenomenal 
manifestation but in essence the same2  
namely1 that which is better known to   
each than all else1 and where it emerges
 most clearly is called will4 ,only the 
will is thing-in-itself4 ,it is wholly  
different from presentation1 and is that
 of which presentation is the           
phenomenon1 the visibility1 the         
objectivity4 ,differences affect only   
the degree of the appearing1 not the    
essence of that which appears4  ,while  
the reality everywhere present is not   
will as specifically known in man1 the  
mode of indicating its essence by       
reference to this1 ,schopenhauer        
contends1 is a gain in insight4 ,the    

thing-in-itself ought to receive its    
name from that among all its            
manifestations which is the clearest1   
the most perfect1 the most immediately  
illumined by knowledge2 and this is     
man's will4 ,when we say that every     
force in nature is to be thought of as  
,will1 we are subsuming an unknown under
 a known4 ,for the conception of ,force 
is abstracted from the realm of cause   
and effect1 and indicates the limit of  
scientific explanation4 ,having arrived 
at the forces of nature on the one side 
and the forms of the subject on the     
other1 science can go no further4 ,the  
conception of ,will can make known that 
which was so far concealed1 because it  
proceeds from the most intimate         
consciousness that each has of himself1 
where the knower and the known coincide4
  ,by this consciousness1 in which      
subject and object are not yet set      
apart1 we reach something universal4 ,in
 itself the ,will is not individualised1
 but exists whole and undivided in every

 single thing in nature1 as the ,subject
 of contemplation exists whole and      
undivided in each cognitive being4 ,it  
is entirely free from all forms of the  
phenomenon4 ,what makes plurality       
possible is subjection to the forms of  
time and space1 by which only the       
phenomenon is affected4 ,time and space 
may therefore be called1 in scholastic  
terminology1 the 'principle of          
individuation4' ,while each of its      
phenomena is subject to the law of      
sufficient reason1 which is the law of  
appearance in these forms1 there is for 
the ,will as thing-in-itself no rational
 ground3 it is 'grundlos4' ,it is free  
from all plurality1 although its        
phenomena in space and time are         
innumerable4 ,it is one1 not with the   
unity of an object or of a concept1 but 
as that which lies outside of space and 
time1 beyond the principium             
individuationis1 that is1 the           
possibility of plurality4 ,the          
individual1 the person1 is not will as  

thing-in-itself1 but phenomenon of the  
will1 and as such determined4 ,the will 
is 'free' because there is nothing      
beyond itself to determine it4 ,further1
 it is in itself mere activity without  
end1 a blind striving4 ,knowledge       
appears only as the accompaniment of its
 ascending stages4  ,here we have       
arrived at the thought which1 in its    
various expressions1 constitutes        
,schopenhauer's metaphysics4 ,that this 
cannot be scientifically deduced he     
admits2 but he regards it as furnishing 
such explanation as is possible of      
science itself4 ,for science there is in
 everything an inexplicable element to  
which it runs back1 and which is real1  
not merely phenomenal4 ,from this       
reality we are most remote in pure      
mathematics and in the pure a priori    
science of nature as it was formulated  
by ,kant4 ,these owe their transparent  
clearness precisely to their absence of 
real content1 or to the slightness of   
this4 ,the attempt to reduce organic    

life to chemistry1 this again to        
mechanism1 and at last everything to    
arithmetic1 could it succeed1 would     
leave mere form behind1 from which all  
the content of phenomena would have     
vanished4 ,and the form would in the end
 be form of the subject4 ,but the       
enterprise is vain4 ',for in everything 
in nature there is something of which no
 ground can ever be given1 of which no  
explanation is possible1 no cause       
further is to be sought4' ,what for man 
is his inexplicable character1          
presupposed in every explanation of his 
deeds from motives1 that for every      
inorganic body is its inexplicable      
quality1 the manner of its acting4  ,the
 basis of this too is will1 and         
'groundless1' inexplicable will2 but    
evidently the conception here is not    
identical with that of the ,will that is
 one and all4 ,how do we pass from the  
universal to that which has a particular
 character or quality8 ,for of the ,will
 as thing-in-itself we are told that    

there is not a greater portion in a man 
and a less in a stone4 ,the relation of 
part and whole belongs exclusively to   
space4 ,the more and less touches only  
the phenomenon1 that is1 the visibility1
 the objectivation4 ,a higher degree of 
this is in the plant than in the stone1 
in the animal than in the plant1 and so 
forth2 but the ,will that is the essence
 of all is untouched by degree1 as it is
 beyond plurality1 space and time1 and  
the relation of cause and effect4  ,the 
answer to the question here raised is   
given in ,schopenhauer's interpretation 
of the ,platonic ,ideas4 ,these he      
regards as stages of objectivation of   
the ,will4 ,they are1 as ,plato called  
them1 eternal forms related to          
particular things as models4 ,the lowest
 stage of objectivation of the ,will is 
represented by the forces of inorganic  
nature4 ,some of these1 such as weight  
and impenetrability1 appear in all      
matter4 ,some are divided among its     
different kinds1 as rigidity1 fluidity1 

elasticity1 electricity1 magnetism1     
chemical properties4 ,they are not      
subject to the relation of cause and    
effect1 but are presupposed by it4 ,a   
force is neither cause of an effect nor 
effect of a cause4 ,philosophically1 it 
is immediate objectivity of the will2 in
 aetiology1 qualitas occulta4 ,at the   
lowest stages of objectivation1 there is
 no individuality4 ,this does not appear
 in inorganic things1 nor even in merely
 organic or vegetative life1 but only as
 we ascend the scale of animals4 ,even  
in the higher animals the specific      
enormously predominates over the        
individual character4 ,only in man is   
the ,idea objectified in the individual 
character as such4 ',the character of   
each individual man1 so far as it is    
thoroughly individual and not entirely  
comprehended in that of the species1 may
 be regarded as a particular ,idea1     
corresponding to a peculiar act of      
objectivation of the ,will4'            
,schopenhauer warns us against          

substituting this philosophical         
explanation for scientific aetiology4   
,the chain of causes and effects1 he    
points out1 is not broken by the        
differences of the original1 irreducible
 forces4 ,the aetiology and the         
philosophy of nature go side by side1   
regarding the same object from different
 points of view4 ,yet he also gives us  
in relation to his philosophy much that 
is not unsuggestive scientifically4 ,his
 doctrine is not properly evolutionary1 
since the ,ideas are eternal2 but he has
 guarded incidentally against our       
supposing that all the natural kinds    
that manifest the ,ideas phenomenally   
must be always represented in every     
world4 ,for our particular world1       
comprising the sun and planets of the   
solar system1 he sets forth in the      
,parerga an account of the process by   
which it develops from the nebula to    
man4 ,this was referred to in the       
preceding chapter4 ,in his fundamental  
work he describes a struggle1 present   

through the whole of nature1 in which   
the phenomenal manifestations of the    
higher ,ideas conquer and subjugate     
those of the lower1 though they leave   
them still existent and ever striving to
 get loose4 ,here has been seen an      
adumbration of natural selection3 he    
himself admits the difficulty he has in 
making it clear4 ,we must remember that 
it is pre-,darwinian4  ,knowledge or    
intelligence he seeks to explain as an  
aid to the individual organism in its   
struggle to subsist and to propagate its
 kind4 ,it first appears in animal life4
 ,it is represented by the brain or a   
large ganglion1 as every endeavour of   
the ,will in its self-objectivation is  
represented by some organ2 that is1     
displays itself for presentation as such
 and such an appearance4 ,superinduced  
along with this contrivance for aid in  
the struggle1 the world as presentation1
 with all its forms1 subject and object1
 time1 space1 plurality and causality1  
is all at once there4 ',hitherto only   

will1 it is now at the same time        
presentation1 object of the knowing     
subject4' ,then in man1 as a higher     
power beyond merely intuitive           
intelligence1 appears reason as the     
power of abstract conception4 ,for the  
most part1 rational as well as intuitive
 knowledge1 evolved originally as a mere
 means to higher objectivation of the   
,will1 remains wholly in its service4   
,how1 in exceptional cases1 intellect   
emancipates itself1 will be discussed   
under the heads of ,a,esthetics and     
,ethics4  ,that this view implies a     
teleology ,schopenhauer expressly       
recognises4 ,indeed he is a very decided
 teleologist on lines of his own1 and1  
in physiology1 takes sides strongly with
 'vitalism' as against pure mechanicism4
 ,true1 the ,will is 'endless' blind    
striving1 and is essentially divided    
against itself4 ,everywhere in nature   
there is strife1 and this takes the most
 horrible forms4 ,yet somehow there is  
in each individual manifestation of will

 a principle by which first the organism
 with its vital processes1 and then the 
portion of it called the brain1 in which
 is represented the intellect with its a
 priori forms1 are evolved as aids in   
the strife4 ,and1 adapting all the      
manifestations to one another1 there is 
a teleology of the universe4 ,the whole 
world1 with all its phenomena1 is the   
objectivity of the one and indivisible  
,will2 the ,idea which is related to all
 other ,ideas as the harmony to the     
single voices4 ,the unity of the ,will  
shows itself in the unison of all its   
phenomena as related to one another4    
,man1 its clearest and completest       
objectivation1 is the summit of a       
pyramid1 and could not exist without    
this4 ,inorganic and organic nature1    
then1 were adapted to the future        
appearance of man1 as man is adapted to 
the development that preceded him4 ,but 
in thinking the reality1 time is to be  
abstracted from4 ,the earlier1 we are   
obliged to say1 is fitted to the later1 

as the later is fitted to the earlier2  
but the relation of means to end1 under 
which we cannot help figuring the       
adaptation1 is only appearance for our  
manner of knowledge4 ,and the harmony   
described does not get rid of the       
conflict inherent in all will4  ,in this
 account of ,schopenhauer's metaphysical
 doctrine1 ,i have tried to make the    
exposition as smooth as possible2 but at
 two points the discontinuity can       
scarcely be concealed4 ,first1 the      
relation of the universal ,will to the  
individual will is not made clear2 and1 
secondly1 the emergence of the world of 
presentation1 with the knowledge in     
which it culminates1 is left            
unintelligible because the will is      
conceived as mere blind striving without
 an aim4 ,as regards the first point1   
disciples and expositors have been able 
to show that1 by means of distinctions  
in his later writings1 apparent         
contradictions are to some extent       
cleared away2 and1 moreover1 that he    

came to recognise more reality in the   
individual will4 ,on the second point1  
,i think it will be necessary to admit  
that his system as such breaks down4    
,but both points must be considered in  
their connection4  ,one of the most     
noteworthy features of ,schopenhauer's  
philosophy is1 as he himself thought1   
the acceptance from first to last of    
,kant's distinction between the         
'empirical' and the 'intelligible'      
character of the individual4 ,every act 
of will of every human being follows    
with necessity as phenomenon from its   
phenomenal causes2 so that all the      
events of each person's life are        
determined in accordance with scientific
 law4 ,nevertheless1 the character      
empirically manifested in the phenomenal
 world1 while it is completely          
necessitated1 is the expression of      
something that is free from             
necessitation4 ,this 'intelligible      
character' is out of time1 and1 itself  
undetermined1 manifests itself through  

that which develops in time as a chain  
of necessary causes and effects4 ,that  
this doctrine had been taken up1 without
 any ambiguity as regards the           
determinism1 by ,schelling as well as by
 himself1 he expressly acknowledges2 and
 he finds it1 as he also finds modern   
idealism1 anticipated in various        
passages by the ,neo-,platonists4 ,his  
adaptation of it to his doctrine of the 
,ideas is distinctly ,neo-,platonic in  
so far as he recognises ',ideas of      
individuals'2 but of course to make     
,will the essence belongs to his own    
system4 ',the intelligible character1'  
he says1 'coincides with the ,idea1 or1 
yet more precisely1 with the original   
act of will that manifests itself in it3
 in so far1 not only is the empirical   
character of each man1 but also of each 
animal species1 nay1 of each plant      
species1 and even of each original force
 of inorganic nature1 to be regarded as 
phenomenon of an intelligible character1
 that is1 of an indivisible act of will 

out of time4' ,this is what he called   
the 'aseitas' of the will2 borrowing a  
scholastic term to indicate its         
derivation 7if we may speak of it as    
derived7 from itself 7a se71 and not    
from a supposed creative act4 ,only if  
we adopt this view are we entitled to   
regard actions as worthy of moral       
approval or disapproval4 ,they are such 
not because they are not necessitated1  
but because they necessarily show forth 
the nature of an essence the freedom of 
which consists in being what it is4 ,yet
 he could not but find a difficulty in  
reconciling this with his position that 
the one universal ,will is identical in 
all things1 and in each is              
'individuated' only by space and time4  
,for the ,ideas1 like the               
thing-in-itself1 are eternal1 that is1  
outside of time as well as space2 and   
all the things now enumerated1 forces of
 nature1 plant and animal species1 and  
individual characters of men1 are       
declared to be in themselves ,ideas4    

,he in part meets this difficulty by the
 subtlety that time and space do not1   
strictly speaking1 determine            
individuality1 but arise along with it4 
,the diremption of individualities      
becomes explicit in those forms4 ,yet he
 must have perceived that this is not a 
complete answer1 and various            
modifications can be seen going on4 ,his
 first view clearly was that the        
individual is wholly impermanent1 and at
 death simply disappears2 nothing is    
left but the one ,will and the universal
 ,subject of contemplation identical in 
all4 ,metempsychosis is the best        
mythological rendering of what happens1 
but it is no more4 ,later1 he puts      
forward the not very clearly defined    
theory of a 'palingenesia' by which a   
particular will1 but not the intellect  
that formerly accompanied it1 may       
reappear in the phenomenal world4 ,and  
the hospitality he showed to stories of 
magic1 clairvoyance1 and ghost-seeing1  
is scarcely compatible with the view    

that the individual will is no more than
 a phenomenal differentiation of the    
universal will4 ,a speculation 7not put 
forward as anything more7 on the        
appearance of a special providence in   
the destiny of the individual1 points1  
as ,professor ,volkelt has noted1 to the
 idea of a guidance1 not from without1  
but by a kind of good daemon or genius  
that is the ultimate reality of the     
person4 ,on all this we must not lay too
 much stress2 but there is certainly one
 passage that can only be described as a
 definite concession that the individual
 is real in a sense not at first        
allowed4 ,individuality1 it is said in  
so many words 7,parerga1 ii4 ,sec4      
#aag71 does not rest only on the        
'principle of individuation' 7time and  
space71 and is therefore not through and
 through phenomenon1 but is rooted in   
the thing-in-itself4 ',how deep its     
roots go belongs to the questions which 
,i do not undertake to answer4'#a    #a 
,werke1 ed4 ,frauenstaedt1 vol4 vi4 p4  

#bdc4  ,this tends to modify            
considerably1 but does not overthrow1   
,schopenhauer's original system4 ,in    
very general terms1 he is in the number 
of the 'pantheistic' thinkers2 and it is
 remarkable1 on examination1 how these1 
in ,europe at least1 have nearly always 
recognised in the end some permanent    
reality in the individual4 ,this is     
contrary to first impressions3 but the  
great names may be cited of ,plotinus1  
,john ,scotus ,erigena1 ,giordano       
,bruno1 ,spinoza 7in ,part v4 of the    
,ethics71 and finally of ,schopenhauer's
 special aversion1 ,hegel1 who has been 
supposed most unfavourable of all to any
 recognition of individuality as real4  
,it is more true1 ,hegel maintains1 that
 the individuality determines its world 
than that it is determined by it2 and   
there is no explanation why the         
determination should be such and such   
except that the individuality was       
already what it is4#b ,and1 if          
,schopenhauer's more imaginative        

speculations seek countenance from the  
side of empiricism1 there is nothing in 
them quite so audacious as a speculation
 of ,j4 ,s4 ,mill on disembodied mind1  
thrown out during the time when he was  
writing his ,logic4#c    #b             
,phaenomenologie des ,geistes1          
,jubilaeumsausgabe1 ed4 ,g4 ,lasson1 pp4
   #bja-c4    #c ,letter to ,robert     
,barclay ,fox1 ,may #aj1 #ahdb4 ,printed
 in ,appendix to   ,letters and         
,journals of ,caroline ,fox1 third ed41 
vol4 ii4 pp4 #cca-b4   ',to suppose that
 the eye is necessary to sight1' says   
,mill1 'seems to   me the notion of one 
immersed in matter4 ,what we call our   
bodily   sensations are all in the mind1
 and would not necessarily or probably  
cease1 because the body perishes4'  ,the
 association with pantheism             
,schopenhauer accepts in principle1     
though the name is not congenial to him4
 ,in his system the ,will is one and    
all1 like the ',deus' of ,spinoza4 ,the 
difference is that1 instead of ascribing

 perfection to the universe that is its 
manifestation1 he regards the production
 of a world as a lapse from which       
redemption is to be sought4 ,his        
doctrine has been rightly described1 in 
common with the predominant             
philosophical doctrines of his period1  
as a resultant of the deepened          
subjective analysis brought by ,kant    
into modern philosophy on the one side1 
and of the return to ,spinoza in the    
quest for unity of principle on the     
other4 ,why1 then1 it may be asked1 are 
,fichte1 ,schelling1 and ,hegel the     
constant objects of his attack8 ,the    
true explanation is not the merely      
external one1 that they were his        
successful rivals for public favour1 but
 is to be found in a real antithesis of 
thought4 ,within the limits of the      
idealism they all hold in common1       
,schopenhauer is at the opposite pole4  
,in spite of his attempt to incorporate 
the ,platonic ,ideas1 and in spite of   
his following of ,kant1 whose           

'intelligible world' was in essence     
,platonic or neo-,platonic1 he could    
find no place in his system for a       
rational order at the summit4 ,now this 
order was precisely what ,fichte and    
,hegel aimed at demonstrating4 ,if      
,schopenhauer is less unsympathetic in  
his references to ,schelling1 that is   
because ,schelling's world-soul appeared
 to him to prefigure his own attempt to 
discover in nature the manifestation of 
a blindly striving will or feeling      
rather than reason4 ,suspicious as he   
shows himself of possible plagiarisms by
 others1 the charge cannot be retorted  
against himself4 ,the supreme principle 
of ,fichte1 it has been pointed out1 has
 an actively volitional character and   
was formulated before ,schopenhauer's3  
but then it is essentially rational4    
,for ,hegel1 what is supreme is the     
world-reason4 ,hence they are at one    
with ,plato in holding that in some     
sense 'mind is king4' ,for              
,schopenhauer1 on the contrary1 mind1 or

 pure intellect1 is an emancipated      
slave4 ,having reached its highest      
point1 and seen through the work of the 
will1 it does not turn back and organise
 it1 but abolishes it as far as its     
insight extends4  ,yet to say merely    
this is to give a wrong impression of   
,schopenhauer4 ,starting though he does 
with blind will1 and ending with the    
flight of the ascetic from the suffering
 inherent in the world that is the      
manifestation of such a will1 he        
nevertheless1 in the intermediate       
stages1 makes the world a cosmos and not
 a chaos4 ,and the ,platonists on their 
side have to admit that 'the world of   
all of us' does not present itself on   
the surface as a manifestation of pure  
reason1 and that it is a serious task to
 'rationalise' it4 ,where he completely 
fails is where the ,platonic systems    
also fail1 though from the opposite     
starting-point4 ,his attempt to derive  
presentation1 intellect1 knowledge1 from
 blind striving1 is undoubtedly a       

failure4 ,but so also is the attempt of 
the ,platonising thinkers to deduce a   
world of mixture from a principle of    
pure reason without aid from anything   
else empirically assumed4 ,not that in  
either case there is failure to give    
explanations in detail2 but in both     
cases much is taken from experience     
without reduction to the principles of  
the system4 ,what we may say by way of  
comparison is this3 that if             
,schopenhauer had in so many words      
recognised an immanent ,reason as well  
as ,will in the reality of the universe1
 he would have formally renounced his   
pessimism2 while it cannot be said that 
on the other side a more explicit       
empiricism in the account of the        
self-manifestation of ,reason would     
necessarily destroy the optimism4       
,,chapter ,,iv  ,,aesthetics   ,a       
portion of ,schopenhauer's system by    
which its pessimism is considerably     
mitigated is his theory of the          
,beautiful and of ,fine ,art4 ,the      

characteristic of aesthetic             
contemplation is1 he finds1 that        
intellect throws off the yoke and       
subsists purely for itself as clear     
mirror of the world1 free from all      
subjection to practical purposes of the 
will4 ,in this state of freedom1        
temporary painlessness is attained4     
,the theory starts from his adaptation  
of the ,platonic ,ideas4 ,regarded      
purely as an aesthetic theory1 it       
departs from ,plato1 as he notes2 for1  
with the later ,platonists1 who took up 
the defence of poetic myths and of the  
imitative arts as against their master1 
he holds that ,art penetrates to the    
general ,idea through the particular1   
and hence that the work of art is no    
mere 'copy of a copy4' ,the difference  
of the ,idea from the ,concept is that  
it is not merely abstract and general1  
but combines with generality the        
characters of an intuition4  ,the       
,ideas1 as we have seen1 constitute the 
determinate stages of objectivation of  

the ,will4 ,the innumerable individuals 
of which the ,ideas are the patterns are
 subject to the law of sufficient       
reason4 ,they appear1 that is to say1   
under the forms of time1 space1 and     
causality4 ,the ,idea is beyond these   
forms1 and therefore is clear of        
plurality and change4 ,since the law of 
sufficient reason is the common form    
under which stands all the subject's    
knowledge so far as the subject knows as
 individual1 the ,ideas lie outside the 
sphere of knowledge of the individual as
 such4 ,if1 therefore1 the ,ideas are to
 be the object of knowledge1 this can   
only be by annulling individuality in   
the knowing subject4  ,as               
thing-in-itself1 the ,will is exempt    
even from the first of the forms of     
knowledge1 the form of being 'object for
 a subject4' ,the ,platonic ,idea1 on   
the other hand1 is necessarily an       
object1 something known1 a presentation4
 ,it has laid aside1 or rather has not  
taken on1 the subordinate forms2 but it 

has retained the first and most general 
form4 ,it is the immediate and most     
adequate possible objectivity of the    
,will2 whereas particular things are an 
objectivation troubled by the forms of  
which the law of sufficient reason is   
the common expression4  ,when intellect 
breaks loose from the service of the    
will1 for which it was originally       
destined in the teleology of nature1    
then the subject ceases to be merely    
individual and becomes pure will-less   
subject of knowledge4 ,in this state the
 beholder no longer tracks out relations
 in accordance with the principle of    
sufficient reason--which is the mode of 
scientific as well as of common         
knowledge--but rests in fixed           
contemplation of the given object apart 
from its connection with anything else4 
,the contemplator thus 'lost' in the    
object1 it is not the single thing as   
such that is known1 but the ,idea1 the  
eternal form1 the immediate objectivity 
of the ,will at this stage4 ,the        

correlate of this object--the pure      
,subject exempt from the principle of   
sufficient reason--is eternal1 like the 
,idea4  ,the objectivation of the ,will 
appears faintly in inorganic            
things1--clouds1 water1 crystals1--more 
fully in the plant1 yet more fully in   
the animal1 most completely in man4     
,only the essential in these stages of  
objectivation constitutes the ,idea4    
,its development into manifold phenomena
 under the forms of the principle of    
sufficient reason1 is unessential1 lies 
merely in the mode of knowledge for the 
individual1 and has reality only for    
this4 ,it is not otherwise with the     
unfolding of that ,idea which is the    
completest objectivation of the ,will4  
,to the ,idea of ,man1 the occurrences  
of human history are as unessential as  
the shapes they assume to the clouds1 as
 the figures of its whirlpools and      
foam-drift to the stream1 as its        
frost-flowers to the ice4 ,the same     
underlying passions and dispositions    

everlastingly recur in the same modes4  
,it is idle to suppose that anything is 
gained4 ,but also nothing is lost3 so   
the ,earth-spirit might reply to one who
 complained of high endeavours          
frustrated1 faculties wasted1 promises  
of world-enlightenment brought to       
nought2 for there is infinite time to   
dispose of1 and all possibilities are   
for ever renewed4  ,the kind of         
knowledge for which the ,ideas are the  
object of contemplation finds its       
expression in ,art1 the work of genius4 
,art repeats in its various media the   
,ideas grasped by pure contemplation4   
,its only end is the communication of   
these4 ,while ,science1 following the   
stream of events according to their     
determinate relations1 never reaches an 
ultimate end1 ,art is always at the end4
 ',it stops the wheel of time2 relations
 vanish for it3 only the essence1 the   
,idea1 is its object4' ,the             
characteristic of genius is a           
predominant capacity for thus           

contemplating things independently of   
the principle of sufficient reason4     
,since this requires a forgetting of    
one's own person and the relations      
between it and things1 the attitude of  
genius is simply the completest         
'objectivity4' ,the 'subjectivity'      
opposed to this1 in ,schopenhauer's     
phraseology1 is preoccupation with the  
interests of one's own will4 ,it is1 he 
says1 as if there fell to the share of  
genius a measure of intelligence far    
beyond the needs of the individual will3
 and this makes possible the setting    
aside of individual interests1 the      
stripping off of the particular         
personality1 so that the subject becomes
 'pure knowing subject1' 'clear         
world-eye1' in a manner sufficiently    
sustained for that which has been       
grasped to be repeated in the work of   
art4 ,a necessary element in genius is  
therefore ,imagination4 ,for without    
imagination to represent1 in a shape not
 merely abstract1 things that have not  

come within personal experience1 genius 
would remain limited to immediate       
intuition1 and could not make its vision
 apprehensible by others4 ,nor without  
imagination could the particular things 
that express the ,idea be cleared of the
 imperfections by which their limited   
expression of it falls short of what    
nature was aiming at in their           
production4 ',inspiration' is ascribed  
to genius because its characteristic    
attitude is intermittent4 ,the man of   
genius cannot always remain on a height1
 but has to fall back to the level of   
the common man1 who can scarcely at all 
regard things except as they affect his 
interests1--have a relation to his will1
 direct or indirect4  ,this is the      
statement in its first outline of a     
theory that became one of               
,schopenhauer's most fruitful topics4   
,many are the pages he has devoted to   
the contrast between the man of genius  
and 'the wholesale ware of nature1 which
 she turns out daily by thousands4' ,the

 genius is for him primarily the artist4
 ,scientific genius as a distinctive    
thing he does not fully recognise2 and  
he regards men of action1 and especially
 statesmen1 rather as men of highly     
competent ability endowed with an       
exceptionally good physical constitution
 than as men of genius in the proper    
sense4 ,philosophers like himself1 who1 
as he frankly says1 appear about once in
 a hundred years1 he classes in the end 
with the artists2 though this was left  
somewhat indeterminate in his first     
exposition4 ,the weakness of the man of 
genius in dealing with the ordinary     
circumstances of life he allows1 and    
even insists on4 ,genius1 grasping the  
,idea in its perfection1 fails to       
understand individuals4 ,a poet may know
 man profoundly1 and men very ill4 ,he  
admits the proximity of genius to       
madness on one side1 and explains it in 
this way4 ,what marks the stage of      
actual madness1 as distinguished from   
illusion or hallucination1 is complete  

disruption of the memory of past life1  
of the history of the personality as    
something continuous2 so that the       
particular thing is viewed by itself1   
out of relation4 ,this gives a kind of  
resemblance to the attitude of genius1  
for which present intuition excludes    
from view the relations of things to    
each other4 ,or1 as we may perhaps sum  
up his thought in its most general form1
 'alienation' or dissolution of         
personality has the resemblance often   
noted between extremes to the           
impersonality1 or1 as he calls it1      
'objectivity1' that is super-personal4  
,in spite of his contempt for the crowd1
 he has to admit1 of course1 that the   
capacity of genius to recognise the     
,ideas of things and to become          
momentarily impersonal must in some     
measure belong to all men2 otherwise1   
they could not even enjoy a work of art 
when produced4 ,genius has the advantage
 only in the much higher degree and the 
greater prolongation of the insight4    

,since1 then1 the actual achievement of 
the artist is to make us look into the  
world through his eyes1 the feelings for
 the beautiful and the sublime may be   
treated irrespectively of the question  
whether they are aroused by nature and  
human life directly or by means of art4 
,a,esthetic pleasure in contemplation of
 the beautiful proceeds partly from     
recognition of the individual object not
 as one particular thing but as         
,platonic ,idea1 that is1 as the        
enduring form of this whole kind of     
things2 partly from the consciousness   
the knower has of himself not as        
individual1 but as pure1 will-less      
,subject of ,knowledge4 ,all volition   
springs out of need1 therefore out of   
want1 therefore out of suffering4 ,no   
attained object of will can give        
permanent satisfaction4 ,thus1 there can
 be no durable happiness or rest for us 
as long as we are subjects of will4     
',the ,subject of ,will lies continually
 on the turning wheel of ,ixion1 draws  

ever in the sieve of the ,danaides1 is  
the eternally thirsting ,tantalus4 ,but 
in the moment of pure objective         
contemplation1 free from all interest of
 the particular subjectivity1 we enter a
 painless state3 the wheel of ,ixion    
stands still4 ,the ,flemish painters    
produce this aesthetic effect by the    
sense of disinterested contemplation    
conveyed in their treatment of          
insignificant objects4 ,there are       
certain natural scenes that have power  
in themselves1 apart from artistic      
treatment1 to put us in this state2 but 
the slightest obtrusion of individual   
interest destroys the magic4 ,past and  
distant objects1 through their apparent 
detachment1 have the same power4 ,the   
essential thing aesthetically1 whether  
we contemplate the present or the past1 
the near or the distant1 is that only   
the world of presentation remains2 the  
world as will has vanished4  ,the       
difference between the feelings of the  
,beautiful and of the ,sublime is this4 

,in the feeling of the beautiful1 pure  
intelligence gains the victory without a
 struggle1 leaving in consciousness only
 the pure subject of knowledge1 so that 
no reminiscence of the will remains4 ,in
 the feeling of the sublime1 on the     
other hand1 the state of pure           
intelligence has to be won by a         
conscious breaking loose from relations 
in the object that suggest something    
threatening to the will2 though there   
must not be actual danger2 for in that  
case the individual will itself would   
come into play1 and aesthetic detachment
 would cease4 ,elevation above the sense
 of terror has not only to be           
consciously won but consciously         
maintained1 and involves a continuous   
reminiscence1 not indeed of any         
individual will1 but of the will of man 
in general1 so far as it is expressed   
through its objectivity1 the human body1
 confronted by forces hostile to it4    
,pre-eminently this feeling arises from 
contrast between the immensities of     

space and time and the apparent         
insignificance of man4 ,it means in the 
last resort that the beholder is upheld 
by the consciousness that as pure       
subject of knowledge 7not as individual 
subject7 he himself bears within him all
 the worlds and all the ages1 and is    
eternal as the forces that vainly seem  
to threaten him with annihilation4  ,on 
the objective side1 and apart from the  
subjective distinction just set forth1  
the sublime and the beautiful are not   
essentially different4 ,in both cases   
alike1 the object of aesthetic          
contemplation is not the single thing1  
but the ,idea that is striving towards  
manifestation in it4 ,whatever is viewed
 aesthetically is viewed out of relation
 to time and space3 'along with the law 
of sufficient reason the single thing   
and the knowing individual are taken    
away1 and nothing remains over but the  
,idea and the pure ,subject of          
,knowledge1 which together make up the  
adequate objectivity of the ,will at    

this stage4' ,there is thus a sense in  
which everything is beautiful2 since the
 ,will appears in everything at some    
stage of objectivity1 and this means    
that it is the expression of some ,idea4
 ,but one thing can be more beautiful   
than another by facilitating aesthetic  
contemplation4 ,this facilitation       
proceeds either from the greater        
clearness and perfection with which the 
particular thing shows forth the ,idea  
of its kind1 or from the higher stage of
 objectivation to which that ,idea      
corresponds4 ,man being the highest     
stage of objectivation of the ,will1 the
 revelation of his essence is the       
highest aim of art4 ,in aesthetic       
contemplation of inorganic nature and   
vegetative life1 whether in the reality 
or through the medium of art1 and in    
appreciation of architecture1 the       
subjective aspect1 that is to say1 the  
enjoyment of pure will-less knowledge1  
is predominant2 the ,ideas themselves   
being here lower stages of objectivity4 

,on the other hand1 when animals and men
 are the object of aesthetic            
contemplation or representation1 the    
enjoyment consists more in the objective
 apprehension of those ,ideas in which  
the essence of the ,will is most clearly
 and fully manifested4  ,of all         
,schopenhauer's work1 its aesthetic part
 has met with the most general          
appreciation4 ,here especially he       
abounds in observations drawn directly1 
in his own phrase1 from intuition4 ,to  
make a selection of these1 however1 is  
not appropriate to a brief sketch like  
the present4 ,i pass on1 therefore1 to  
those portions of his theory of ,art by 
which he makes the transition1 in terms 
of his system1 to ,morality4  ,from     
,architecture onward the arts are       
obliged to represent the ,will as       
divided4 ,here1 at the first stage1 its 
division subsists only in a conflict of 
inorganic forces which have to be       
brought to equilibrium4 ,the conflict   
between weight and rigidity is in truth 

the only aesthetic material of          
architecture as a fine art4 ,when we    
come to animal and lastly to human life1
 which1 in the ,plastic ,arts and in    
,poetry1 as form1 individualised        
expression1 and action1 is the highest  
object of aesthetic representation1 the 
vehemence of divided will is fully      
revealed2 and here too is revealed the  
essential identity of every will with   
our own4 ,in the words of the ,indian   
wisdom1 ',tat twam asi'2 'that thou     
art4' ,under the head of ,ethics it will
 be shown expressly that by this        
insight1 when it reacts on the will1 the
 will can deny itself4 ,for the         
temporary release from its striving1    
given in aesthetic contemplation1 is    
then substituted permanent release4 ,to 
this 'resignation1' the innermost       
essence of all virtue and holiness1 and 
the final redemption from the world1    
,art itself1 at its highest stages1     
points the way4  ,the summits of        
pictorial and poetic art ,schopenhauer  

finds in the great ,italian painters so 
far as they represent the ethical spirit
 of ,christianity1 and in the tragic    
poets1 ancient and modern4 ,it is true  
that the poverty of their sacred history
 or mythology puts the ,christian       
artists at a disadvantage2 but events   
are merely the accidents of their art4  
,not in these1 as related according to  
the law of sufficient reason1 is the    
essence1 but in the spirit we divine    
through the forms portrayed4 ,in their  
representation of men full of that      
spirit1 and especially in the eyes1 we  
see mirrored the knowledge that has     
seized the whole essence of the world   
and of life1 and that has reacted on the
 will1 not so as to give it motives1 but
 as a 'quietive'2 whence proceeds       
complete resignation1 and with it the   
annulling of the will and of the whole  
essence of this world4 ,of tragedy1 the 
subject-matter is the conflict of the   
will with itself at its highest stage of
 objectivity4 ,here also the end is the 

resignation brought on by complete      
knowledge of the essence of the world4  
,the hero1 on whom at last this         
knowledge has acted as a quietive1 gives
 up1 not merely life1 but the whole will
 to live4 ',the true meaning of tragedy 
is the deeper insight1 that what the    
hero expiates is not his particular     
sins1 but original sin1 that is1 the    
guilt of existence itself4' ,to         
illustrate this position ,schopenhauer  
is fond of quoting a passage from       
,calderon which declares that the       
greatest sin of man is to have been     
born4  ,it seems strange that1 after    
deriding as he does the popular notion  
of 'poetic justice' so detached a       
thinker should imagine an at least      
equally one-sided view to receive its   
final confirmation from the ,spanish    
dramatist's poetic phrasing of a        
,christian dogma4 ,the great tragic     
poets1 for ,schopenhauer also1 are      
,a,eschylus1 ,sophocles and             
,shakespeare4 ,now it is safe to say    

that by none of these was any such      
general doctrine held either in         
conceptual or in intuitive form4 ,the   
whole effect of any kind of art1 of     
course he would admit1 cannot be packed 
into a formula2 but if we seek one as an
 aid to understanding1 some adaptation  
of his own theory of the sublime would  
probably serve much better as applied to
 tragedy than his direct theory of the  
drama4 ,in the case of pictorial art1   
all that is proved by what he says about
 the representation of ascetic          
saintliness1 is that this1 like many    
other things1 can be so brought within  
the scope of art as to make us          
momentarily identify ourselves with its 
,idea in the impersonal manner he has   
himself described4 ,his purely aesthetic
 theory is quite adequate to the case1  
without any assumption that this is the 
representation of what is best4 ,art1   
pictorial or poetic1 can no more prove  
pessimism than optimism4 ,we pick out   
expressions of one or the other for     

quotation according to our moods or     
subjective preferences2 but1 if we have 
the feeling for art itself1 our sense of
 actual aesthetic value ought to be     
independent of these4  ,schopenhauer's  
aesthetic theory1 however1 does not end 
here4 ,there follows the part of it by  
which he has had an influence on artists
 themselves4 ,for him1 a position       
separate from all the other arts is held
 by music4 ,while the rest objectify the
 ,will mediately1 that is to say1 by    
means of the ,ideas1 ,music is as       
immediate an objectivation of the whole 
,will as the world itself1 or as the    
,ideas1 of which the pluralised         
phenomenon constitutes the sum of       
particular things4 ,the other arts speak
 of the shadow1 music of the substance4 
,there is indeed a parallelism1 an      
analogy1 between ,music and the ,ideas2 
yet ,music never expresses the          
phenomenon in which these are           
manifested1 but only the inner essence  
behind the appearance1 the ,will itself4

 ,in a sense it renders not feeling in  
its particularity1 but feeling in       
abstracto2 joy1 sorrow1 not a joy1 a    
sorrow4 ,the phenomenal world and music 
are to be regarded as two different     
expressions of the same thing4 ,the     
world might be called embodied ,music as
 well as embodied ,will4 ',melodies are 
to a certain extent like general        
concepts1 an abstract of reality4' ,a   
complete explanation of music1 that is1 
a detailed repetition of it in concepts1
 were this possible1 would be a complete
 explanation of the world 7since both   
express the same thing7 and therefore a 
true and final philosophy4 ,as music    
only reaches its perfection in the full 
harmony1 'so the one ,will out of time  
finds its perfect objectivation only in 
complete union of all the stages which  
in innumerable degrees of heightened    
distinctness reveal its essence4' ,but  
here1 too1 ,schopenhauer adds1 the ,will
 is felt1 and can be proved1 to be a    
divided will2 and the deliverance       

wrought by this supreme art1 as by all  
the others1 is only temporary4          
,,chapter ,v  ,,ethics   ,permanent     
redemption from the suffering of the    
world is to be found only in the        
holiness of the ascetic2 but to this    
there are many stages1 constituting the 
generally accepted human virtues4 ,of   
these ,schopenhauer has a rational      
account to give in terms of his         
philosophy2 and if the last stage does  
not seem to follow by logical sequence  
from the others1 this is only what is to
 be expected2 for it is reached1 in his 
view1 by a sort of miracle4 ,to the     
highest kind of intuitive knowledge1    
from which the ascetic denial of the    
will proceeds1 artistic contemplation   
ought to prepare the way2 and so also1  
on his principles1 ought the practice of
 justice and goodness4 ,yet he is       
obliged to admit that few thus reach the
 goal4 ,of those that do reach it1 the  
most arrive through personal suffering1 
which may be deserved4 ,a true miracle  

is often worked in the repentant        
criminal1 by which final deliverance is 
achieved4 ,though the 'intelligible     
character' is unalterable1 and the      
empirical character can only be the     
unfolding of this1 as every great       
dramatist intuitively recognises1 yet   
the 'convertites1' like ,duke ,frederick
 in ,as ,you ,like ,it1 are not to be   
regarded as hypocrites4 ,the 'second    
voyage' to the harbour1 that of the     
disappointed egoist1 on condition of    
this miracle1 brings the passenger to it
 as surely as the first1 that of the    
true saints1 which is only for the few4 
,and in these equally a miraculous      
conversion of the will has to be finally
 worked4  ,at the entrance to his       
distinctive theory of ethics1           
,schopenhauer places a restatement of   
his metaphysics as the possible basis of
 a mode of contemplating life which1 he 
admits1 has some community with an      
optimistic pantheism4 ,the ,will1       
through the presentation and the        

accompanying intelligence developed in  
its service1 becomes conscious that that
 which it wills is precisely the world1 
life as it is4 ,to call it 'the will to 
live' is therefore a pleonasm4 ',will'  
and 'will to live' are equivalent4 ,for 
this will1 life is everlastingly a      
certainty4 ',neither the will1 the      
thing-in-itself in all phenomena1 nor   
the subject of knowledge1 the spectator 
of all phenomena1 is ever touched by    
birth and death4' ,it is true that the  
individual appears and disappears2 but  
individuality is illusory4 ,past and    
future exist only in conceptual thought4
 ',the form of life is a present without
 end1 howsoever the individuals1        
phenomena of the ,idea1 come into       
existence and vanish in time1 like      
fugitive dreams4' ,only as phenomenon is
 each man different from the other      
things of the world3 as thing-in-itself 
he is the ,will1 which appears in all1  
and death takes away the illusion that  
divides his consciousness from the rest4

 ',death is a sleep in which the        
individuality is forgotten3 everything  
else wakes again1 or rather has remained
 awake4' ,it is1 in the expression      
adopted by ,schopenhauer later1 an      
awakening from the dream of life3 though
 this bears with it somewhat different  
implications2 and1 as has been said1 his
 theory of individuality became         
modified4  ,with the doctrine of the    
eternal life of the ,will are connected 
,schopenhauer's theories1 developed     
later1 of the immortality of the species
 and of individualised sexual love4 ,the
 latter is by itself a remarkable       
achievement1 and constitutes the one    
distinctly new development brought to   
completion in his later years2 for the  
modifications in his theory of          
individuality are only tentative4 ,his  
theory of love has a determinate        
conclusion1 of great value for science1 
and not really compatible1 it seems to  
me1 with his pessimism4 ,in its relation
 to ethics1 on which he insisted1 it is 

rightly placed in the position it       
occupies1 between the generalised       
statement of his metaphysics just now   
set forth on the one side1 and his      
theory of human virtue on the other4    
,the teleology that manifests itself in 
individualised love is1 in his view1 not
 related in reality to the interests of 
the individual life1 but to those of the
 species4 ,that this is immortal follows
 from the eternity of the ,idea it      
unfolds4#d ,the end sought is aimed at  
unconsciously by the person4            
,fundamentally1 for ,schopenhauer1      
teleology must of course be unconscious1
 since the will is blind1 and will1 not 
intelligence1 is primordial4 ,its       
typical case is the instinct of animals2
 but the 'instinctive' character belongs
 also to the accomplishment of the      
highest aims1 as in art and virtue4     
,what characterises individualised love 
internally is the aim1 attributed to    
'nature' or 'the species1' at a certain 
typical beauty or perfection of the     

offspring4 ,the lover is therefore      
deluded in thinking that he is seeking  
his own happiness4 ,what looks through  
the eyes of lovers is the genius of the 
race1 meditating on the composition of  
the next generation4 ,it may1 in the    
complexity of circumstances1 be         
thwarted4 ,when it reaches its end1     
often personal happiness is sacrificed4 
,marriages dictated by interest tend to 
be happier than love-matches4 ,yet1     
though the sacrifice of the individual  
to the race is involuntary in these1    
egoism is after all overcome2 hence they
 are quite rightly the object of a      
certain admiration and sympathy1 while  
the prudential ones are looked upon with
 a tinge of contempt4 ,for here too that
 element appears which alone gives      
nobility to the life either of intellect
 or of art or of moral virtue1 namely1  
the rising above a subjective interest  
of the individual will4    #d ,the      
disappearance of species in time raises 
difficulties in more   than one way for 

his philosophy2 but he formally escapes 
refutation by   the suggestion1 already 
noted1 that the ,idea need not always be
   manifested phenomenally in the same  
world4 ,this1 however1 he did not   work
 out4  ,no doubt there are touches of   
pessimism in this statement2 but the    
general theory does not seem            
reconcilable finally with pessimism as  
,schopenhauer understands it4 ,for it is
 a definitely stated position of his    
that nature keeps up the process of the 
world by yielding just enough to prevent
 discontinuance of the striving for an  
illusory end4 ,yet he admits here in the
 result something beyond bare           
continuance of life2 for this is already
 secured without the particular         
modification of feeling described4 ,what
 the feeling is brought in to secure is 
a better realisation of the type in     
actual individuals2 and such realisation
 is certainly more than bare subsistence
 with the least possible expenditure of 
nature's resources4  ,as the immediate  

preliminary to his ethics proper1       
,schopenhauer restates his doctrine on  
the intelligible and the empirical      
character in man1 and lays down a       
generalised psychological position      
regarding the suffering inherent in     
life4 ,everything as phenomenon1 we have
 seen already1 is determined because it 
is subject to the law of sufficient     
reason4 ,on the other hand1 everything  
as thing-in-itself is free2 for         
'freedom' means only non-subjection to  
that law4 ,the intelligible character of
 each man is an indivisible1 unalterable
 act of will out of time2 the developed 
and explicit phenomenon of this in time 
and space is the empirical character4   
,man is his own work1 not in the light  
of knowledge1 but before all knowledge2 
this is secondary and an instrument4    
,ultimately1 freedom is a mystery1 and  
takes us beyond even will as the name   
for the thing-in-itself4 ,in reality1   
that which is 'will to live' need not   
have been such 7though we cannot see how

 this is so71 but has become such from  
itself and from nothing else4 ,this is  
its 'aseitas4' ,hence it is in its power
 to deny itself as will to live4 ,when  
it does this1 the redemption 7like the  
fall7 comes from itself4 ,this denial   
does not mean annihilation1 except      
relatively to all that we know under the
 forms of our understanding4 ,for the   
will1 though the nearest we can get to  
the thing-in-itself1 is in truth a      
partially phenomenalised expression of  
this4 ,as the will to live expresses    
itself phenomenally1 so also does the   
denial of the will to live1 when this1  
by special 'grace1' is achieved4 ,only  
in man does the freedom thus attained   
find phenomenal expression4 ,that man   
can attain to it proves that in him the 
will has reached its highest possible   
stage of objectivation2 for1 after it   
has turned back and denied itself1 there
 is evidently nothing more that we can  
call existence1 that is to say1         
phenomenal existence1 beyond4 ,what     

there is beyond in the truth of being is
 something that the mystics know--or    
rather1 possess1 for it is beyond       
knowledge--but cannot communicate4  ,the
 psychological reason that can be       
assigned for the ascetic flight from the
 world is that all pleasure1 happiness1 
satisfaction1 is merely negative4 ,the  
will is a striving that has no ultimate 
aim4 ,it is sustained only by           
hindrances4 ,hindrance means suffering2 
and every satisfaction attained is only 
temporary1 a mere liberation from need1 
want1 pain1 which is positive4          
,suffering increases with the degree of 
consciousness4 ,the life of civilised   
man is an alternation between pain and  
ennui1 which can itself become as       
intolerable a suffering as anything4    
,the problem of moral philosophy1 then1 
is ultimately how redemption from such a
 world is to be attained1 but only so   
far as this is a matter of conceptual   
knowledge4 ,for philosophy1 being from  
beginning to end theoretical1 cannot    

work the practical miracle by which the 
will denies itself4  ,the intuitive1 as 
distinguished from merely conceptual1   
knowledge by which the return is made1  
consists essentially in a clear insight 
into the identity of the suffering will 
in all things and the necessity of its  
suffering as long as it is will to live4
 ,this1 then1 is the true foundation of 
morality4 ,the universe as metaphysical 
thing-in-itself1 as noumenon1 has an    
ethical meaning4 ,all its stages of     
objectivation1 though in the process    
what seems to be aimed at is            
preservation of the will as manifested1 
have in truth for their ultimate aim its
 redemption by suppression of the       
phenomenal world in which it manifests  
itself4  ,affirmation of the will is    
affirmation of the body1 which is the   
objectivity of the will4 ,the sexual    
impulse1 since it affirms life beyond   
the death of the individual1 is the     
strongest of self-affirmations4 ,in it  
is found the meaning of the mythical    

representation that has taken shape in  
the theological dogma of original sin4  
,for by this affirmation going beyond   
the individual body1 suffering and      
death1 as the necessary accompaniment of
 the phenomenon of life1 are reaffirmed1
 and the possibility of redemption this 
time declared fruitless4 ,but through   
the whole process there runs eternal    
justice4 ,the justification of suffering
 is that the will affirms itself2 and   
the self-affirmation is justified by    
payment of the penalty4  ,before the    
final redemption--which is not for the  
world but for the individual--there are 
many stages of ethical progress4 ,these 
consist in the gradual overcoming of    
egoism by sympathy4 ,and here           
,schopenhauer proceeds to set forth a   
practical scheme for the social life of 
man1 differing from ordinary            
utilitarianism only by reducing all     
sympathy to pity1 in accordance with his
 view that there can be no such thing as
 positive happiness4  ,he begins with a 

theory of justice1 legal and moral1 very
 much on the lines of ,hobbes1 except   
that he regards it as up to a certain   
point a priori4 ,here he is consistent  
throughout4 ,as in his philosophical    
account of mathematics and physics1 so  
also in his aesthetics and ethics1 he   
retained1 side by side with a strong    
empirical tendency1 belief in certain   
irreducible a priori forms without which
 our knowledge cannot be constituted4   
,the pure ethical theory of justice1 he 
says1 bears to the political theory the 
relation of pure to applied mathematics4
 ,injustice he holds to be the positive 
conception4 ,it means the breaking into 
the sphere of another person's will to  
live4 ,the self-affirmation of the will 
that appears in one individual body is  
extended to denial of the will that     
appears in other bodies4 ,justice       
consists in non-encroachment4 ,there is 
a 'natural right1' or 'moral right1' of 
resistance to injustice by infliction of
 what1 apart from the attempted         

encroachment1 would be wrong4 ,either   
force or deception may be used2 as      
either may be the instrument of         
injustice4 ,the purely ethical doctrine 
of justice applies only to action2 since
 only the not doing of injustice depends
 on us4 ,with the ,state and its laws1  
the relation is reversed4 ,the object of
 these is to prevent the suffering of   
injustice4 ,the ,state is not directed  
against egoism1 but has sprung out of a 
rationalised collective egoism4 ,it has 
for its purpose only to avoid the       
inconvenient consequences of individual 
aggressions on others4 ,outside of the  
,state1 there is a right of self-defence
 against injustice1 but no right of     
punishment4 ,the punishment threatened  
by the ,state is essentially a motive   
against committing wrong1 intended to   
supply the place of ethical motives for 
those who are insufficiently accessible 
to them4 ,actual infliction of it is the
 carrying out of the threat when it has 
failed1 so that in general the          

expectation of the penalty may be       
certain4 ,revenge1 which has a view to  
the past1 cannot be justified ethically3
 punishment is directed only to the     
future4 ,there is no right in any one to
 set himself up as a moral judge and    
inflict pain2 but man has a right to do 
what is needful for social security4    
,the criminal's acts are of course      
necessitated2 but he cannot justly      
complain of being punished for them1    
since it is ultimately from himself1    
from what he is1 that they sprang4      
,with the doctrine of 'eternal justice1'
 touched on above1 we pass into a       
different region of thought4 ,what is   
responsible for the guilt in the world  
is the ,will by which everything exists1
 and the suffering everlastingly falls  
where the guilt is4 ,take the case of   
apparently unpunished injustice 7from   
the human point of view7 expressing     
itself in the extreme form of deliberate
 cruelty4 ,through this also1 eternal   
justice1 from which there is no escape1 

is fulfilled4 ',the torturer and the    
tortured are one4 ,the former errs in   
thinking he has no share in the torture2
 the latter in thinking he has no share 
in the guilt4' ,for all the pain of the 
world is the expiation of the sin       
involved in the self-affirmation of     
will1 and the ,will as thing-in-itself  
is one and the same in all4  ,if this   
could satisfy any one1 there would be no
 need to go further4 ,the whole being as
 it ought to be1 why try to rectify     
details that are absolutely indifferent8
 ,but of course the implication is that 
individuality is simply illusory2 and   
this1 as has been said1 was a position  
that ,schopenhauer neither could nor did
 consistently maintain4 ,indeed1        
immediately after setting forth this    
theory of 'eternal justice1' he goes on 
to a relative justification of those    
acts of disinterested vengeance by which
 a person knowingly sacrifices his own  
life for the sake of retribution on some
 extraordinary criminal4 ,this1 he says1

 is a form of punishment1 not mere      
revenge1 although it involves an error  
concerning the nature of eternal        
justice4 ,suicide involves a similar    
error1 in so far as it supposes that the
 real being of the individual can be    
assailed through its phenomenal         
manifestation4 ,it is not a denial of   
the will to live1 but a strong          
affirmation of it1 only not in the given
 circumstances3 different circumstances 
are desired with such intensity that the
 present cannot be borne4 ,therefore the
 individual manifestation of the will is
 not suppressed4 ,yet1 one might reply1 
if individuality is an illusion attached
 to the appearance in time and space of 
a particular organism1 it would seem    
that1 with the disappearance of this1   
all that distinguishes the individual   
must disappear also4  ,schopenhauer had 
no will thus to escape from life2 nor   
did he afterwards devote himself to     
expounding further his theory of eternal
 justice4 ,what he wrote later1 either  

positively or as mere speculation1      
implies both greater reality in the     
individual and more of cosmic equity to 
correspond4 ,his next step1 even at his 
first stage1 is to continue the         
exposition of a practicable ethics for  
human life4 ,his procedure consists in  
adding beneficence to justice1 with the 
proviso already mentioned1 which is     
required by his psychology1 that all    
beneficence can consist only in the     
relief of pain4 ,for ,schopenhauer1 as  
for ,comte1 what is to be overcome is   
'egoism1' an excessive degree of which  
is the mark of the character we call    
'bad4' ,the 'good' is what ,comte and   
,spencer call the 'altruistic'          
character4 ,this difference between     
characters ,schopenhauer goes on to     
explain in terms of his metaphysics4    
,the egoist is so deluded by the        
principle of individuation that he      
supposes an absolute cleft between his  
own person and all others4 ,the remorse 
of conscience from which he suffers     

proceeds in part from an obscure        
perception that the principle of        
individuation is illusory4 ,genuine     
virtue springs out of the intuitive 7not
 merely abstract7 knowledge that        
recognises in another individuality the 
same essence as in one's own4 ,the      
characteristic of the good man is that  
he makes less difference than is        
customary between himself and others4   
,justice is an intermediate stage       
between the encroaching egoism of the   
bad and positive goodness4 ,in the      
renunciation of rights of property1 and 
provision for all personal needs without
 aid from others1 practised by some     
religious and philosophical ascetics1 it
 is passing over into something more4   
,there is1 however1 a certain           
misunderstanding involved in so         
interpreting strict justice2 for there  
are many ways in which the rich and     
powerful can be positively beneficent4  
,at the other extreme1 when they simply 
live on their inherited wealth1 without 

doing anything in return1 their mode of 
life is morally1 though not legally1    
unjust4 ,rights of property             
,schopenhauer derived from labour spent 
on the things appropriated4 ,the        
injustice1 in many ways1 of the present 
social order he quite recognises4 ,if he
 has no sympathy with revolutions1 it is
 because he has no belief in the        
realisation of an ideal state4 ,this    
follows from his view of history4 ,human
 life1 it is his conviction1 never has  
been and never will be different as a   
whole4 ,redemption from evil can be     
attained only by the individual4 ,all   
that the ,state can do is to provide    
certain very general conditions of      
security under which there will be no   
hindrance to those who desire to live in
 accordance with a moral ideal4  ,yet   
there are qualifications to make4 ,many 
passages in ,schopenhauer's writings    
prove his firm belief in the future     
triumph of reason over superstition4 ,it
 is to the honour of humanity1 he says1 

that so detestable a form of evil as    
organised religious persecution has     
appeared only in one section of history4
 ,and1 in his own personal case1 he has 
the most complete confidence that the   
truths he has put forth cannot fail     
sometime to gain a hearing4 ,in all     
cases1 error is only temporary1 and     
truth will prevail4 ,his language on    
this subject1 and indeed often on       
others1 is indistinguishable from that  
of an optimist4  ,in the last resort1   
his pessimism entrenches itself behind  
the psychological proposition that every
 satisfaction is negative1 being only   
the removal of a pain4 ,if this is      
unsustainable1 there is nothing finally 
in his ,metaphysics of ,will to         
necessitate the pessimistic conclusion  
drawn4 ,the mode of deduction by which  
he proceeds is to argue first to the    
position already noticed3 that all that 
love of others on which morality is     
based is fundamentally pity4 ,true      
benevolence can only be the desire to   

relieve others' pain1 springing from the
 identification of this with our own4   
,for that reason1 moral virtue must     
finally pass over into asceticism--the  
denial of the will to live4 ,in others1 
if we are able to see through the       
principle of individuation1 we recognise
 the same essence as in ourselves1 and  
we perceive that as long as this wills  
it must necessarily suffer4 ,the end    
then is to destroy the will to live4    
,this is to be done by askesis1         
self-mortification4 ,the first step is  
complete chastity4 ,if1 says            
,schopenhauer1 the highest phenomenon of
 will1 that is1 man1 were to disappear  
through a general refusal to affirm life
 beyond the individual body1 man's      
weaker reflexion in the animal world    
would disappear also1 and the           
consciousness of the whole would cease4 
,knowledge being taken away1 the rest   
would vanish into nothingness1 since    
there is 'no object without subject4'   
,that this will come to pass1 however1  

he certainly did not believe4 ,he has no
 cosmogony1 like that of ,hartmann1     
ending in a general redemption of the   
universe by such a collective act4 ,nor 
did he hold1 like his later successor   
,mainlaender1 that through the conflict 
and gradual extinction of               
individualities1 'this great world shall
 so wear out to nought4' ,the world for 
him is without beginning and without    
end4 ,but the exceptional individual can
 redeem himself4 ,what he does when he  
has reached the height of holiness is by
 voluntary poverty and all other        
privations1 inflicted for their own     
sake1 to break and kill the will1 which 
he recognises as the source of his own  
and of the world's suffering existence4 
,in his case not merely the phenomenon  
ends at death1 as with others1 but the  
being is taken away4 ,to be a           
'world-overcomer' in this sense 7as     
opposed to a 'world-conqueror'7 is the  
essence of sanctity when cleared of all 
the superstitious dogmas by which the   

saints try to explain their mode of life
 to themselves4  ,the absolutely pure   
expression of this truth is to be found 
only in philosophy2 but of the religions
 ,buddhism comes nearest to expressing  
it without admixture4 ,for the ,buddhist
 saint asks aid from no god4 ,true      
,christianity1 however1--the            
,christianity of the ,new ,testament and
 of the ,christian mystics1--agrees both
 with ,buddhism and with ,brahmanism in 
ultimate aim4 ,what spoils it for       
,schopenhauer is the ,judaic element4   
,this1 on one side1 infects it with the 
optimism of the ,biblical story of      
creation1 in which ,god 'saw everything 
that he had made1 and1 behold1 it was   
very good4' ,on the other side1 it      
contaminates the myth of original sin1  
which bears in itself a profound        
philosophical truth1 by this same       
doctrine of a creative ,god2 from which 
follows all the injustice and           
irrationality necessarily involved in   
the ,augustinian theology1 and not to be

 expelled except with its theism4       
,nevertheless1 the story of the ,fall of
 ,man1 of which that theology1 in its   
fundamentally true part1 is a reasoned  
expression1 is the one thing1           
,schopenhauer avows1 that reconciles him
 to the ,old ,testament4 ,the truth that
 it clothes he finds also among the     
,greeks2 ,empedocles1 after the ,orphics
 and ,pythagoreans1 having taught that  
the soul had been doomed to wander      
because of some antenatal sin4 ,and the 
mysticism that accompanies all these    
more or less pure expressions of one    
metaphysical truth he finds represented 
by the ,sufis even in optimistic ,islam2
 so that he can claim for his philosophy
 a world-wide consent4  ,religion1 if we
 take this to include mysticism1 at once
 rises above philosophy and falls below 
it4 ,as 'metaphysics of the people1' it 
is a mythological expression of         
philosophical truth3 as mysticism1 it is
 a kind of 'epi-philosophy4' ,beyond    
pure philosophy ,schopenhauer does not  

profess to go2 but he accepts what the  
mystics say as the description of a     
positive experience which becomes       
accessible when supreme insight is      
attained intuitively4 ,for the          
philosopher as such1 insight into that  
which is beyond the forms of our        
knowledge and even beyond the will      
itself1 remains only conceptual2 though 
it is within the province of philosophy 
to mark out the place for this4 ,the    
'something else' that is left when the  
will has been denied1 is indicated by   
the 'ecstasy1' 'illumination1' 'union   
with ,god1' spoken of by the mystics4   
,paradoxically1 some of the mystics     
themselves even have identified it with 
'nothing'2 but the result of the denial 
of the will to live is to be called     
nothing only in relation to the world as
 we know it4 ',on the other hand1 to    
those in whom the will has turned back  
and denied itself1 this so very real    
world of ours with all its suns and     
milky ways is--nothing4'  ,in this      

terminus of his philosophy1             
,schopenhauer recognised his kinship    
with ,indian thought1 of which he was a 
lifelong student4 ,to call his doctrine 
a kind of ,buddhism is1 however1 in some
 ways a misapprehension4 ,undoubtedly he
 accepts as his ideal the ethical       
attitude that he finds to be common to  
,buddhism and the ,christianity of the  
,new ,testament2 but metaphysical       
differences mark him off from both4 ,we 
have seen that he rejects the           
extra-mundane ,god of ,semitic          
derivation1 adopted by historical       
,christianity4 ,indeed he is one of the 
most pronounced anti-,jehovists of all  
literature4 ,but equally his belief in a
 positive metaphysical doctrine marks   
him off from ,buddhism1 according to the
 account given of it by its most recent 
students1 who regard it either as       
ultimately nihilistic or as having no   
metaphysics at all1 but only a          
psychology and ethics4 ,nor can he be   
precisely identified with the           

,vedantists of orthodox ,hinduism4      
,their ultimate reality1 if we are to   
find an analogue for it in ,european    
metaphysics1 seems to resemble the      
hypostasised ego of ,fichte1 or the     
,kantian 'transcendental unity of       
apperception'1 much more than it        
resembles ,schopenhauer's blindly       
striving will as thing-in-itself4 ,even 
in practical ethics1 he does not follow 
the ,indian systems at all closely4     
,philosophical doctrines of justice are 
of course purely ,european2 and         
,schopenhauer himself points out the    
sources of his own theory4 ,in his      
extension of ethics to animals1 on which
 he lays much stress1 he cites the      
teachings of ,eastern non-,semitic      
religions as superior to the rest2 but  
he does not follow the ,indians1 nor    
even the ,pythagoreans1 so far as to    
make abstinence from flesh part of the  
ideal4 ,he condemns vivisection on the  
ground that animals have rights3 certain
 ways of treating them are unjust1 not  

simply uncompassionate4 ,the discussion 
here again is of course wholly within   
,european thought4 ,thus1 in trying to  
determine his significance for modern   
philosophy1 we may consider his system  
in its immediate environment1 leaving it
 to more special students to determine  
how far it received a peculiar colouring
 from the ,oriental philosophies1 of    
which1 in his time1 the more exact      
knowledge was just beginning to         
penetrate to the ,west4     ,,chapter   
,,vi  ,,historical ,,significance       
,schopenhauer is not one of the         
philosophers who have founded a school1 
though he has had many disciples and    
enthusiastic admirers4 ,the pessimism   
that was for a time a watchword with    
certain literary groups has passed as a 
mode1 and his true significance must be 
sought elsewhere4 ,of the thinkers who  
have followed him in his pessimism1 two 
indeed stand out as the architects of   
distinct systems1 ,eduard von ,hartmann 
and ,philipp ,mainlaender 7both already 

incidentally referred to72 but while    
they are to be classed unquestionably as
 philosophers1 their systems contain an 
element that their master would have    
regarded as mythological4 ,schopenhauer 
declared as clearly as any of the       
,greeks that the phenomenal world is    
without beginning and without end4      
,kant's positing of an 'antinomy' on    
this point he regarded as wholly without
 rational justification4 ,what ,kant    
calls the 'antithesis1' namely1 the     
infinite series1 can be logically proved
 for phenomena4 ,the 'thesis1' which    
asserts a beginning in time1 is defended
 by mere fallacies4 ,now ,hartmann and  
,mainlaender both hold1 though in       
different fashions1 that there is a     
world-process from a beginning to an    
end1 namely1 the extinction of          
consciousness4 ,this is the redemption  
of the world4 ,their affinity1          
therefore1 seems to be with the         
,christian ,gnostics rather than with   
the pure philosophers of the ,greek     

tradition1 continued in modern times by 
,bruno1 ,spinoza1 and ,schopenhauer4    
,whatever may be thought of the         
pessimism by which ,schopenhauer's mood 
is distinguished from that of his       
precursors1 few will fail to recognise  
that special doctrines of his system    
contain at least a large portion of     
truth4 ,his theories of ,art1 of        
,genius1 and of ,love are enough to     
found an enduring reputation for any    
thinker1 even if there were nothing else
 of value in his writings4 ,but there is
 much else1 both in systematic          
construction and in the illumination of 
detail4 ,i have been inclined to put    
forward first of all the translation    
into idealistic terms of the universal  
sentiency held by the ,ionian thinkers  
to be inherent in the primordial        
elements of nature4 ,while they viewed  
the world as an objective thing having  
psychological qualities1 ,schopenhauer1 
after the long intermediate process of  
thought1 could treat it as phenomenal   

object with a psychological or          
subjective essence4 ,for both doctrines 
alike1 however1 mind or soul is         
immanent4 ,still1 it must be allowed    
that a difference remains by which      
,schopenhauer was even more remote than 
they were from the later ,greek         
idealism4 ,as they were not             
materialists1 so they did not exclude   
reason from the psychical properties of 
their substances4 ,schopenhauer1 while  
he rejected the materialism of their    
ancient and modern successors alike1    
took the step of formally               
derationalising the elements of mind4   
,this1 no doubt1 is unsustainable       
ultimately1 if reason is ever to emerge 
from them4 ,yet the one-sidedness of the
 position has had a peculiar value in   
combating an equally one-sided          
rationalistic idealism4 ,this is        
recognised by clear-sighted opponents4  
,and ,schopenhauer's calling the        
non-rational or anti-rational element in
 the world 'will' helps to make plainer 

the real problem of evil4 ,there is     
truth in the ,hegelian paradox that     
'pessimism is an excellent basis for    
optimism4' ,an optimist like ,plotinus  
saw that1 even if good comes of evil1   
the case of the optimist must fail      
unless evil can be shown to be a        
necessary constituent of the world4 ,the
 ,platonic and ,neo-,platonic 'matter1' 
a principle of diremption or            
individuation1 like time and space for  
,schopenhauer1 was an attempt to solve  
this problem2 but something more        
positive seemed to be needed as the     
source of the stronger manifestations of
 evil4 ,to the strength of these ,plato 
drew attention in a passage 7,republic1 
x4 #faje7 where it is acknowledged that 
injustice confers a character of        
vitality and sleeplessness upon its     
possessor4 ,in the notion of a blind and
 vehement striving1 ,schopenhauer       
supplies something adequate2 only1 to   
maintain a rational optimism1 it must be
 regarded as a necessary element in a   

mixture1 not as the spring of the whole4
    #e ,cited in one of the introductory
 essays to ,jowett and ,campbell's      
edition1 vol4 ii4  ,much might be said  
on the teleology by which he tries to   
educe intelligence from the primordial  
strife4 ,against his view1 that it is   
evolved as a mere instrument for        
preserving races in a struggle1 another 
may be set that is ready to hand in a   
dialogue of ,plutarch4#f ,the struggle  
among animals1 it is there incidentally 
argued1 has for its end to sharpen their
 intelligence4 ,both these theories are 
on the surface compatible with          
evolution4 ,if1 leaving aside the       
problem of mechanism1 we try to verify  
them by the test of results1 the latter 
undoubtedly seems the more plausible4   
,for if the struggle was a means to the 
improvement of intelligence1 nature has 
succeeded more and more2 whereas1 if her
 intention was to preserve races1 she   
has continually failed4 ,this argument  
is at any rate perfectly valid against  

,schopenhauer himself2 for he holds in  
common with the optimistic teleologists 
that 'nature does nothing in vain4'     
#f ,de ,sollertia ,animalium1 #bg4  ,i  
will conclude with a few detached       
criticisms on the ethical doctrine which
 he regarded as the culmination of his  
system4 ,the antithesis1 it may first be
 noted1 between the temporary release   
from the vehemence of the will that is  
gained through art1 and the permanent   
release through asceticism1 is not      
consistently maintained4 ,schopenhauer  
admits that the knowledge which for the 
ascetic is the 'quietive' of the will   
has to be won anew in a perpetual       
conflict4 ',no one can have enduring    
rest on earth4' ,again1 revision of his 
doctrine concerning the reality of the  
individual would1 ,i think1 necessitate 
revision also of the position that not  
only asceticism but 'all true and pure  
love1 nay1 even freely rendered justice1
 proceeds from seeing through the       
principium individuationis4' ,if the    

individual is in some sense ultimately  
real1 then love must be to a certain    
extent literally altruism4 ,we are      
brought down to the elementary fact1 in 
terms of the metaphysics of ethics1 that
 the object of love is a real being that
 is itself and not ourselves1 though    
having some resemblance to us and united
 in a larger whole4 ,an objection not   
merely verbal might indeed be taken to  
,schopenhauer's metaphysics of ethics   
strictly on his own ground4 ,if it is   
purely and simply the essence of        
ourselves that we recognise in          
everything1 does not this reduce all    
love finally to a well-understood       
egoism8 ,the genuine fact of sympathy   
seems to escape his mode of formulation4
 ,and1 in the end1 we shall perhaps not 
find the ascetic to be the supreme      
ethical type4 ,of the self-tormenting   
kind of asceticism1 it is not enough to 
say with ,schopenhauer that1 since it is
 a world-wide phenomenon of human       
nature1 it calls for some account from  

philosophy4 ,the account may be         
sufficiently rendered by historical     
psychology2 the result being to class it
 as an aberration born of the illusions 
incident to a certain type of mind at a 
certain stage4 ,indeed1 that seems to be
 the conclusion of the ,buddhists1 who  
claim to have transcended it by finding 
it superfluous for the end it aims at4  
,let us then take1 as our example of the
 completed type1 not the monks of the   
,thebaid1 but the mild ascetics of the  
,buddhist communities4 ,does not this   
type1 even in its most attractive form1 
represent a 'second best'8 ,is not the  
final judgment that of ,plato1 that to  
save oneself is something1 but that     
there is no full achievement unless for 
the life of the ,state also the ideal   
has been brought nearer realisation8    
,when there is nothing in the world but 
irredeemable tyranny or anarchy1 flight 
from it may be the greatest success     
possible as far as the individual life  
is concerned2 but this is not the normal

 condition of humanity4 ,finally1 may   
not some actual achievement1 either     
practical or1 like that of              
,schopenhauer1 speculative1 even if     
accompanied by real imperfections of    
character1 possess a higher human value 
than the sanctity that rests always in  
itself8     ,,selected ,,works          
,english ,translations    ,the ,world as
 ,will and ,idea4 ,translated by ,r4 ,b4
 ,,haldane and ,j4 ,,kemp4 #c     vols4 
#ahhc-f4    ,two ,essays3 ,i4 ,on the   
,fourfold ,root of the ,principle of    
,sufficient     ,reason4 ,,ii4 ,on the  
,will in ,nature4 ,bohn's ,philosophical
 ,library1     #ahhi4    ,religion3 ,a  
,dialogue1 and other ,essays4 ,selected 
and translated by ,t4     ,,bailey      
,,saunders4 #crd ed41 #ahia4 ,a series  
of other volumes of     selections      
excellently translated by ,mr4 ,saunders
 has followed4    ,selected ,essays of  
,arthur ,schopenhauer4 ,with a          
,biographical     ,introduction and     
,sketch of his ,philosophy4 ,by ,e4     

,,belfort ,,bax4 #ahia4    ,the ,basis  
of ,morality4 ,translated with          
,introduction and ,notes by ,a4 ,b4     
,,bullock4 #aijc4   ,biographical and   
,expository    ,arthur ,schopenhauer3   
,his ,life and ,philosophy4 ,by ,,helen 
,,zimmern4 #ahgf4    ,life of ,arthur   
,schopenhauer4 ,by ,professor ,w4       
,,wallace4 #ahij4    ,la ,philosophie de
 ,schopenhauer4 ,par ,,th4 ,,ribot4 #bnd
 ed41 #ahhe4    ,arthur ,schopenhauer4  
,seine ,persoenlichkeit1 seine ,lehre1  
sein ,glaube4     ,von ,,johannaes      
,,volkelt4 #crd ed41 #aijg4             
,schopenhauer-,lexikon4 ,von ,,julius   
,f,r,a,d,e,n,s,t,ae,d,t4 #b vols41      
#ahga4   ,printed by ,t4 and ,a4        
,,constable1 ,printers to ,his ,majesty 
at the ,edinburgh ,university ,press