,illustration3 ,cover ,title ,page ,,of ,,the ,cambridge ,edition ,there have been printed seven hundred and fifty sets of which this is copy ,no4 #ccg ,,international ,,congress ,,of ,,arts ,,and ,,science ,illustration3 ,,alma ,,mater ,photogravure of the ,statue by ,daniel ,c4 ,french ,the colossal figure of ,french's ,alma ,mater adorns the fine suite of stone steps leading up to the picturesque library building of ,columbia ,university4 ,it is a bronze statue1 gilded with pure gold4 ,the female figure typifying ,alma ,mater is represented as sitting in a chair of classic shape1 her elbows resting on the arms of the chair4 ,both hands are raised4 ,the right hand holds and is supported by a sceptre4 ,on her head is a classic wreath1 and on her lap lies an open book1 from which her eyes seem to have just been raised in meditation4 ,drapery falls in semi-classic folds from her neck to her sandalled feet1 only the arms and neck being left bare4 ,every ,university man cherishes a kindly feeling for his ,alma ,mater1 and the famous ,american sculptor1 ,daniel ,c4 ,french1 has been most successful in his artistic creation of the ,fostering ,mother spiritualized--the familiar ideal of the mother of minds trained to thought and consecrated to intellectual service4 ,,international ,,congress ,,of ,,arts ,,and ,,science ,,edited ,,by ,,howard ,j4 ,,rogers1 ,a4,m41 ,,ll4,d4 ,,director ,,of ,,congresses ,,volume ,i ,,philosophy ,,and ,,metaphysics ,,comprising ,lectures on ,philosophy in the ,nineteenth ,century1 ,philosophy of ,religion1 ,sciences of the ,ideal1 ,problems of ,metaphysics1 ,the ,theory of ,science1 and ,logic ,illustration3 ,university ,alliance logo ,,university ,,alliance ,,london ,,new ,,york ,,copyright #aijf ,,by ,,houghton1 ,,mifflin ,,co4 ,,all ,,rights ,,reserved ,,copyright #aijh ,,by ,,university ,,alliance ,,illustrations ,,volume ,i ,,facing ,,page ,,alma ,,mater ,frontispiece ,photogravure from the statue by ,daniel ,c4 ,french ,,dr4 ,,howard ,j4 ,,rogers #a ,photogravure from a photograph ,,dr4 ,,simon ,,newcomb #ace ,photogravure from a photograph ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,paris ,,in ,,the ,,nineteenth ,,century #afh ,photogravure from the painting by ,,otto ,,knille ,,table ,,of ,,contents ,,volume ,i ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,the ,,congress #a ,,howard ,j4 ,,rogers1 ,a4,m41 ,,ll4,d4 ,,programme #dg ,,purpose ,,and ,,plan ,,of ,,the ,,congress #ej ,,organization ,,of ,,the ,,congress #eb ,,officers ,,of ,,the ,,congress #ec ,,speakers ,,and ,,chairmen #ed ,,chronological ,,order ,,of ,,proceedings #gg ,,programme ,,of ,,social ,,events #ha ,,list ,,of ,,ten-,,minute ,,speakers #hb ,,the ,,scientific ,,plan ,,of ,,the ,,congress #he ,,hugo ,,muensterberg1 ,,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,,introductory ,,address4 ,the ,evolution of the ,scientific ,investigator #ace ,,simon ,,newcomb1 ,,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,,normative ,,science ,the ,sciences of the ,ideal #aea ,,by ,,prof4 ,,josiah ,,royce1 ,,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,,philosophy4 ,philosophy3 ,its ,fundamental ,conceptions and its ,methods #agc ,,by ,,prof4 ,,george ,,holmes ,,howison1 ,,ll4,d4 ,the ,development of ,philosophy in the ,nineteenth ,century #aid ,,by ,,prof4 ,,george ,,trumbull ,,ladd1 ,d4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,,metaphysics4 ,the ,relations ,between ,metaphysics and the ,other ,sciences #bbg ,,by ,,prof4 ,,alfred ,,edward ,,taylor1 ,m4,a4 ,the ,present ,problems of ,metaphysics #bdf ,,by ,,prof4 ,,alexander ,,thomas ,,ormond1 ,,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,,philosophy ,,of ,,religion4 ,the ,relation of the ,philosophy of ,religion to the ,other ,sciences #bfc ,,by ,,prof4 ,,otto ,,pfleiderer1 ,d4,d4 ,main ,problems of the ,philosophy of ,religion3 ,psychology and ,theory ,of ,knowledge in the ,science of ,religion #bge ,,by ,,prof4 ,,ernst ,,troeltsch1 ,d4,d4 ,some ,roots and ,factors of ,religion #bhi ,,by ,,prof4 ,,alexander ,t4 ,,ormond4 ,,logic4 ,the ,relations of ,logic to ,other ,disciplines #bif ,,by ,,prof4 ,,william ,,alexander ,,hammond1 ,,ph4,d4 ,the ,field of ,logic #cac ,,by ,,prof4 ,,frederick ,j4 ,e4 ,,woodbridge1 ,,ll4,d4 ,,methodology ,,of ,,science4 ,on the ,theory of ,science #ccc ,,by ,,prof4 ,,wilhelm ,,ostwald1 ,,ll4,d4 ,the ,content and ,validity of the ,causal ,law #cec ,,by ,,prof4 ,,benno ,,erdmann1 ,,ph4,d4 ,illustration3 ,,howard ,j4 ,,rogers1 ,a4,m41 ,,ll4,d4 ,howard ,jason ,rogers1 born ,stephentown1 ,rensselaer ,co41 ,n4 ,y41 ,november #af1 #ahfa2 graduated from ,williams ,college1 #ahhd2 admitted to bar1 #ahgg2 ,superintendent ,new ,york ,state ,exhibit ,world's ,columbian ,exposition1 #ahic2 ,deputy ,state ,superintendent ,public ,institution1 #ahie-ahii2 ,republican ,director ,department of ,education and ,social ,economy of ,u4 ,s4 ,commission to ,paris ,exposition #aijj2 ,chief ,department of ,education1 ,st4 ,louis ,exposition1 #aijd2 ,first4 ,asst4 ,commissioner ,state ,department of ,education1 ,n4 ,y41 since #aijd1 when he received degree of ,a4,m4 from ,columbia and degree of ,,ll4,d4 from ,northwestern ,university4 ,he is an officer of the ,legion of ,honor of ,france2 ,chevalier of ,san ,maurice and ,lazare1 ,italy2 ,chevalier de l',etoile ,polaire1 ,sweden2 ,chevalier ,nat4 order of ,leopold1 ,belgium2 and officer of the ,red ,eagle1 ,germany4 ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,the ,,congress ,,by ,,howard ,j4 ,,rogers ,a4,m41 ,,ll4,d4 ,the forces which bring to a common point the thousandfold energies of a universal exposition can best promote an international congress of ideas4 ,under national patronage and under the spur of international competition the best products and the latest inventions of man in science1 in literature1 and in art are grouped together in orderly classification4 ,whether the motive underlying the exhibits be the promotion of commerce and trade1 or whether it be individual ambition1 or whether it be national pride and loyalty1 the resultant is the same4 ,the space within the boundaries of the exposition is a forum of the nations where equal rights are guaranteed to every representative from any quarter of the globe1 and where the sovereignty of each nation is recognized whenever its flag floats over a national pavilion or an exhibit area4 ,the productive genius of every governed people contends in peaceful rivalry for world recognition1 and the exposition becomes an international clearing-house for practical ideas4 ,for the demonstration of the value of these products men thoroughly skilled in their development and use are sent by the various exhibitors4 ,the exposition by the logic of its creation thus gathers to itself the expert representatives of every art and industry4 ,for at least two months in the exposition period there are present the members of the international jury of awards1 selected specially by the different governments for their thorough knowledge1 theoretical and practical1 of the departments to which they are assigned1 and selected further for their ability to impress upon others the correctness of their views4 ,the renown of a universal exposition brings1 as visitors1 students and investigators bent upon the solution of problems and anxious to know the latest contributions to the facts and the theories which underlie every phase of the world's development4 ,the material therefore is ready at hand with which to construct the framework of a conference of parts1 or a congress of the whole of any subject4 ,it was a natural and logical step to accompany the study of the exhibits with a debate on their excellence1 an analysis of their growth1 and an argument for their future4 ,hence the congress4 ,the exposition and the congress are correlative terms4 ,the former concentres the visible products of the brain and hand of man2 the congress is the literary embodiment of its activities4 ,yet it was not till the ,paris ,exposition of #ahhi that the idea of a series of congresses1 international in membership and universal in scope1 was fully developed4 ,the three preceding expositions1 ,paris1 #ahgh1 ,philadelphia1 #ahgf1 and ,vienna1 #ahgc1 had held under their auspices many conferences and congresses1 and indeed the germ of the congress idea may be said to have been the establishment of the ,international ,scientific ,commission in connection with the ,paris ,exposition of #ahfg2 but all of these meetings were unrelated and sometimes almost accidental in their organization1 although many were of great scientific interest and value4 ,the success of the series of seventy congresses in ,paris in #ahhi led the authorities of the ,world's ,columbian ,exposition in #ahic to establish the ,world's ,congress ,auxiliary designed to supplement the exhibit of material progress by the ,exposition1 by a portrayal of the wonderful achievements of the new age in science1 literature1 education1 government1 jurisprudence1 morals1 charity1 religion1 and other departments of human activity1 as the most effective means of increasing the fraternity1 progress1 prosperity1 and peace of mankind4 ,the widespread interest in this series of meetings is a matter easily within recollection1 but they were in no wise interrelated to each other1 nor more than ordinarily comprehensive in their scope4 ,it remained for the ,paris ,exposition of #aijj to bring to a perfect organization this type of congress development4 ,by ministerial decree issued two years prior to the exposition the conduct of the department was set forth to the minutest detail4 ,one hundred twenty-five congresses1 each with its separate secretary and organizing committee1 were authorized and grouped under twelve sections corresponding closely to the exhibit classification4 ,the principal delegate1 ,m4 ,gariel1 reported to a special commission1 which was directly responsible to the government4 ,the department was admirably conducted and reached as high a degree of success as a highly diversified1 ably administered1 but unrelated system of international conferences could4 ,and yet the attendance on a majority of these congresses was disappointing1 and in many there was scarcely any one present outside the immediate circle of those concerned in its development4 ,if this condition could prevail in ,paris1 the home of arts and letters1 in the immediate centre of the great constituency of the ,university and of many scientific circles and learned societies1 and within easy traveling distance of other ,european university and literary centres1 it was fair to presume that the usefulness of this class of congress was decreasing4 ,it certainly was safe to assume1 on the part of the authorities of the ,st4 ,louis ,exposition of #aijd1 that such a series could not be a success in that city1 owing to its geographical position and the limited number of university and scientific circles within a reasonable traveling distance4 ,something more than a repetition of the stereotyped form of conference was admitted to be necessary in order to arouse interest among scholars and to bring credit to the ,exposition4 ,this was the serious problem which confronted the ,exposition of ,st4 ,louis4 ,no exposition was ever better fitted to serve as the groundwork of a congress of ideas than that of ,st4 ,louis4 ,the ideal of the ,exposition1 which was created in time and fixed in place to commemorate a great historic event1 was its educational influence4 ,its appeal to the citizens of the ,united ,states for support1 to the ,federal ,congress for appropriations1 and to foreign governments for coperation1 was made purely on this basis4 ,for the first time in the history of expositions the educational influence was made the dominant factor and the classification and installation of exhibits made contributory to that principle4 ,the main purpose of the ,exposition was to place within reach of the investigator the objective thought of the world1 so classified as to show its relations to all similar phases of human endeavor1 and so arranged as to be practically available for reference and study4 ,as a part of the organic scheme a congress plan was contemplated which should be correlative with the exhibit features of the ,exposition1 and whose published proceedings should stand as a monument to the breadth and enterprise of the ,exposition long after its buildings had disappeared and its commercial achievements grown dim in the minds of men4 ,,development ,,of ,,the ,,congress ,the ,department of ,congresses1 to which was to be intrusted this difficult task1 was not formed until the latter part of #aijb1 although the question was for a year previous the subject of many discussions and conferences between the ,president of the ,exposition1 ,mr4 ,francis2 the ,director of ,exhibits1 ,mr4 ,skiff2 the ,chief of the ,department of ,education1 ,mr4 ,rogers2 ,president ,nicholas ,murray ,butler of ,columbia ,university1 and ,president ,william ,r4 ,harper of ,chicago ,university4 ,to the disinterested and valuable advice of the two last-named gentlemen during the entire history of the ,congress the ,exposition is under heavy obligations4 ,during this period proposals had been made to two men of international reputation to give all their time for two years to the organization of a plan of congresses which should accomplish the ultimate purpose of the ,exposition authorities4 ,neither one1 however1 could arrange to be relieved of the pressure of his regular duties1 and the entire scheme of supervision was consequently changed4 ,the plan adopted was based upon the idea of an advisory board composed of men of high literary and scientific standing who should consider and recommend the kind of congress most worthy of promotion1 and the details of its development4 ,in ,november1 #aijb1 ,howard ,j4 ,rogers1 ,,ll4,d41 was appointed ,director of ,congresses1 and the members of the ,advisory 7afterwards termed ,administrative7 ,board selected as follows3-- ,,chairman3 ,,nicholas ,,murray ,,butler1 ,,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d41 ,president ,columbia ,university4 ,,william ,r4 ,,harper1 ,,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d41 ,president ,university of ,chicago4 ,,honorable ,,frederick ,w4 ,,holls1 ,a4,m41 ,,ll4,b41 ,new ,york4 ,r4 ,h4 ,,jesse1 ,,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d41 ,president ,university of ,missouri4 ,,henry ,s4 ,,pritchett1 ,,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d41 ,president ,massachusetts ,institute of ,technology4 ,,herbert ,,putnam1 ,,litt4,d41 ,,ll4,d41 ,librarian of ,congress4 ,,frederick ,j4 ,v4 ,,skiff1 ,a4,m41 ,director of ,field ,columbian ,museum4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the action of the ,executive ,committee of the ,exposition1 approved by the ,president1 was as follows3-- ,there shall be appointed by the ,president of the ,exposition ,company a ,director of ,congresses who shall report to the ,president of the ,exposition ,company4 ,there shall be appointed by the ,president of the ,exposition ,company an ,advisory ,board of seven persons1 the chairman to be named by the ,president1 who shall meet at the call of the ,director of ,congresses1 or the ,chairman of the ,advisory ,board4 ,the expenses of the members of the ,advisory ,board while on business of the ,exposition shall be a charge against the funds of the ,exposition ,company4 ,the duties of the said ,advisory ,board shall be3 to consider and make recommendations to the ,director of ,congresses on all matters submitted to them2 to determine the number and the extent of the congresses2 the emphasis to be placed upon special features2 the prominent men to be invited to participate2 the character of the programmes2 and the methods for successfully carrying out the enterprise4 ,there shall be set aside from the ,exposition funds for the maintenance of the congresses the sum of two hundred thousand dollars 7#bjj1jjj74 ,the standing ,committee on ,congresses from the ,exposition board of directors was shortly afterwards appointed and was composed of five of the most prominent men in ,st4 ,louis3-- ,,chairman3 ,,hon4 ,,frederick ,w4 ,,lehmann1 ,attorney at ,law4 ,,breckenridge ,,jones1 ,banker4 ,,charles ,w4 ,,knapp1 ,editor of ,the ,st4 ,louis ,republic4 ,,john ,,schroers1 ,manager of the ,westliche ,post4 ,a4 ,f4 ,,shapleigh1 ,merchant4 ,to this committee were referred for consideration by the ,president all matters of policy submitted by the ,director of ,congresses4 ,this committee had jurisdiction over all congress matters1 including not only the ,congress of ,arts and ,science1 but also the many miscellaneous congresses and conventions1 and a great part of the success of the congresses is due to their broad-minded and liberal determination of the questions laid before them4 ,,idea ,,of ,,the ,,congress ,,of ,,arts ,,and ,,science ,it is impossible to ascribe the original idea of the ,congress of ,arts and ,science to any one person4 ,it was a matter of slow growth from the many conferences which had been held for a year by men of many occupations1 and as finally worked out bore little resemblance to the original plans under discussion4 ,the germ of the idea may fairly be said to have been contained in ,director ,skiff's insistence to the ,executive ,committee of the ,exposition that the congress work stand for something more than an unrelated series of independent gatherings1 and that some project be authorized which would at once be distinctive and of real scientific worth4 ,to support this view ,director ,skiff brought the ,executive ,committee to the view of expending #bjj1jjj1 if need be1 to insure the project4 ,starting from this suggestion many plans were brought forward1 but one which seems to belong of right to the late ,honorable ,frederick ,w4 ,holls1 of ,new ,york ,city1 contained perhaps the next recognizable step in advance4 ,this thought was1 briefly1 that a series of lectures on scientific and literary topics by men prominent in their respective fields be delivered at the ,exposition and that the ,exposition pay the speakers for their services4 ,this point was thoroughly discussed by ,mr4 ,holls and ,president ,butler1 and the next step in the evolution of the ,congress was the idea of bringing these lecturers together at the ,exposition at about the same time or all during one month4 ,at this stage ,professor ,hugo ,mnsterberg1 who was the guest of ,mr4 ,holls and an invited participant in the conference1 made the important suggestion that such a series of unrelated lectures1 even though given by most eminent men1 would have little or no scientific value1 but that if some relation1 or underlying thought1 could be introduced into the addresses1 then the best work could be done1 which would be of real value to the scientific world4 ,he further stated that only in this case would scientific leaders be likely to favor the plan of a ,st4 ,louis congress1 as they would feel attracted not so much through the honorariums to be given for their services as through the valuable opportunity of developing such a contribution to scientific thought4 ,subsequently ,professor ,mnsterberg was asked by ,mr4 ,holls to formulate his ideas in a manner to be submitted to the ,exposition authorities4 ,this was done in a communication under date of ,october #bj1 #aijb1 which contained logically presented the foundation of the plan afterwards worked out in detail4 ,at this juncture the ,department of ,congresses was organized1 as has been stated1 the ,director named1 and the ,administrative ,board appointed1 and on ,december #bg1 #aijb1 the first meeting of the ,director with the ,administrative ,board took place in ,new ,york ,city4 ,a thorough canvass of the subject was made at this meeting and as a result the following recommendations were made to the ,exposition authorities3-- 7#a7 ,that the sessions of this ,congress be held within a period of four weeks1 beginning ,september #ae1 #aijd4 7#b7 ,that the various groups of learned men who may come together be asked to discuss their several sciences or professions with reference to some theme of universal human interest1 in order that thereby a certain unity of interest and of action may be had4 ,under such a plan the groups of men who come together would thus form sections of a single ,congress rather than separate congresses4 7#c7 ,as a subject which has universal significance1 and one likely to serve as a connecting thread for all of the discussions of the ,congress1 the theme ,the ,progress of ,man since the ,louisiana ,purchase was considered by the ,administrative ,board fit and suggestive4 ,it is believed that discussions by leaders of thought in the various branches of pure and applied science1 in philosophy1 in politics1 and in religion1 from the standpoint of man's progress in the century which has elapsed1 would be fruitful1 not only in clearing the thoughts of men not trained in science and in government1 but also in preparing the way for new advances4 7#d7 ,the ,administrative ,board further recommends that the ,congress be made up from men of thought and of action1 whose work would probably fall under the following general heads3-- a4 ,the ,natural ,sciences 7such as ,astronomy1 ,biology1 ,mathematics1 etc474 b4 ,the ,historical1 ,sociological1 and ,economic group of studies 7,history1 ,political ,economy1 etc474 c4 ,philosophy and ,religion4 d4 ,medicine and ,surgery4 e4 ,law1 ,politics1 and ,government 7including development and history of the colonies1 their government1 revenue and prosperity1 arbitration1 etc474 f4 ,applied ,science 7including the various branches of engineering74 7#e7 ,the ,administrative ,board recommends further referring to a special committee of seven the problem of indicating in detail the method in which this plan can best be carried out4 ,to this committee is assigned the duty of choosing the general divisions of the ,congress1 the various branches of science and of study in these divisions1 and of recommending to the ,administrative ,board a detailed plan of the sections in which1 in their judgment1 those who come to the ,congress may be most effectively grouped1 with a view not only to bring out the central theme1 but also to represent in a helpful way and in a suggestive manner the present boundary of knowledge in the various lines of study and investigation which the committee may think wise to accept4 ,these recommendations were transmitted by the ,director of ,congresses to the ,committee on ,congresses1 approved by them1 and afterwards approved by the ,executive ,committee and the ,president4 ,the first four recommendations were of a preliminary character1 but the fifth contained a distinct advance in the formation of a ,committee on ,plan and ,scope which should be composed of eminent scientists capable of developing the fundamental idea into a plan which should harmonize with the scientific work in every field4 ,the committee selected were as follows3-- ,,dr4 ,,simon ,,newcomb1 ,,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d41 ,retired ,professor of ,mathematics1 ,u4 ,s4 ,navy4 ,,prof4 ,,hugo ,m,,nsterberg1 ,,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d41 ,professor of ,psychology1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,prof4 ,,john ,,bassett ,,moore1 ,,ll4,d41 ex-assistant ,secretary of ,state1 and ,professor of ,international ,law and ,diplomacy1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,prof4 ,,albion ,w4 ,,small1 ,,ph4,d41 ,professor of ,sociology1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,dr4 ,,william ,h4 ,,welch1 ,m4,d41 ,,ll4,d41 ,professor of ,pathology1 ,johns ,hopkins ,university4 ,,hon4 ,,elihu ,,thomson1 ,consulting ,engineer ,general ,electric ,company4 ,,prof4 ,,george ,f4 ,,moore1 ,d4,d41 ,,ll4,d41 ,professor of ,comparative ,religion1 ,harvard ,university4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in response to a letter from ,president ,butler1 ,chairman of the ,administrative ,board1 giving a complete rsum of the growth of the idea of the ,congress to that time1 all of the members of the committee1 with the exception of ,mr4 ,thomson1 met at the ,hotel ,manhattan on ,january #aj1 #aijc1 for a preliminary discussion4 ,the entire field was canvassed1 using the recommendations of the ,administrative ,board and the aforementioned letter of ,professor ,mnsterberg's to ,mr4 ,holls as a basis1 and an adjournment taken until ,january #ag for the preparation of detailed recommendations4 ,the ,committee on ,plan and ,scope again met1 all members being present1 at the ,hotel ,manhattan on ,january #ag1 and arrived at definite conclusions1 which were embodied in the report to the ,administrative ,board1 a meeting of which had been called at the ,hotel ,manhattan for ,january #ai1 #aijc4 ,the report of the ,committee on ,plan and ,scope is of such historic importance in the development of the ,congress that it is given as follows1 although many points were afterwards materially modified3-- ,,new ,,york1 ,january #ai1 #aijc4 ,president ,nicholas ,murray ,butler1 ,chairman ,administrative ,board of ,world's ,congress at ,the ,louisiana ,purchase ,exposition3 ,dear ,sir1--,the undersigned1 appointed by your ,board a committee on the scope and plan of the proposed ,world's ,congress1 at the ,louisiana ,purchase ,exposition1 have the honor to submit the following report3-- ,the authority under which the ,committee acted is found in a communication addressed to its members by the ,chairman of the ,administrative ,board4 ,a subsequent communication to the ,chairman of the ,committee indicated that the widest scope was allowed to it in preparing its plan4 ,under this authority the ,committee met on ,january #aj1 #aijc1 and again on ,january #ag4 ,the ,committee was1 from the beginning1 unanimous in accepting the general plan of the ,administrative ,board1 that there should be but a single congress1 which1 however1 might be divided and subdivided1 in accord with the general plan1 into divisions1 departments1 and sections1 as its deliberations proceed4 ,,plans ,,of ,,the ,,congress ,as a basis of discussion two plans were drawn up by members of the ,committee and submitted to it4 ,the one1 by ,professor ,mnsterberg1 started from a comprehensive classification and review of human achievement in advancing knowledge1 the other1 by ,professor ,small1 from an equally comprehensive review of the great public questions involved in human progress4 ,professor ,mnsterberg proposed a congress having the definite task of bringing out the unity of knowledge with a view of correlating the scattered theoretical and practical scientific work of our day4 ,this plan proposed that the congress should continue through one week4 ,the first day was to be devoted to the discussion of the most general problem of knowledge in one comprehensive discussion and four general divisions4 ,on the second day the congress was to divide into several groups and on the remaining days into yet more specialized groups1 as set forth in detail in the plan4 ,the plan by ,professor ,small proposed a congress which would exhibit not merely the scholar's interpretation of progress in scholarship1 but rather the scholar's interpretation of progress in civilization in general4 ,the proposal was based on a division of human interests into six great groups3-- ,i4 ,the ,promotion of ,health4 ,,ii4 ,the ,production of ,wealth4 ,,iii4 ,the ,harmonizing of ,human ,relations4 ,,iv4 ,discovery and ,spread of ,knowledge4 ,v4 ,progress in the ,fine ,arts4 ,,vi4 ,progress in ,religion4 ,the plan agreed with the other in beginning with a general discussion and then subdividing the congress into divisions and groups4 ,as a third plan the ,chairman of the ,committee suggested the idea of a congress of publicists and representative men of all nations and of all civilized peoples1 which should discuss relations of each to all the others and throw light on the question of promoting the unity and progress of the race4 ,after due consideration of these plans the ,committee reached the conclusion that the ends aimed at in the second and third plans could be attained by taking the first plan as a basis1 and including in its subdivisions1 so far as was deemed advisable1 the subjects proposed in the second and third plans4 ,they accordingly adopted a resolution that ,mr4 ,mnsterberg's plan be adopted as setting forth the general object of the ,congress and defining the scope of its work1 and that ,mr4 ,small's plan be communicated to the ,general ,committee as containing suggestions as to details1 but without recommending its adoption as a whole4 ,,date ,,of ,,the ,,congress ,your ,committee is of opinion that1 in view of the climatic conditions at ,st4 ,louis during the summer and early autumn1 it is desirable that the meeting of this general ,congress be held during the six days beginning on ,monday1 ,september #ai1 #aijd1 and continuing until the ,saturday following4 ,special associations choosing ,st4 ,louis as their meeting-place may then convene at such other dates as may be deemed fit2 but it is suggested that learned societies whose field is connected with that of the ,congress should meet during the week beginning ,september #bf4 ,the sectional discussions of the ,congress will then be continued by these societies1 the whole forming a continuous discussion of human progress during the last century4 ,,plan ,,of ,,addresses ,the ,committee believe that in order to carry out the proposed plan in the most effective way it is necessary that the addresses be prepared by the highest living authorities in each and every branch4 ,in the last subdivisions1 each section embraces two papers2 one on the history of the subject during the last one hundred years and the other on the problems of to-day4 ,the programme of papers suggested by the ,committee as embraced in ,professor ,mnsterberg's plan may be summarized as follows3-- ,on the first day four papers will be read on the general subject1 and four on each of the four large divisions1 twenty in all4 ,on the second day those four divisions will be divided into twenty groups1 or departments1 each of which will have four papers referring to the divisions and relations of the sciences1 eighty in all4 ,on the last four days1 two papers in each of the #abj sections1 #bdj in all1 thus making a total of #cdj papers4 ,in view of the fact that the men who will make the addresses should not be expected to bear all the expense of their attendance at the ,congress1 it seems advisable that the authorities of the ,fair should provide for the expenses necessarily incurred in the journey1 as well as pay a small honorarium for the addresses4 ,the ,committee suggest1 therefore1 that each ,american invited be offered #ajj for his traveling expenses and each ,european #djj4 ,in addition to this that each receive #aej as an honorarium4 ,assuming that one half of those invited to deliver addresses will be ,americans and one half ,europeans1 this arrangement will involve the expenditure of #acf1jjj4 ,this estimate will be reduced if the same person prepares more than one address4 ,it will also be reduced if more than half of the speakers are ,americans1 and increased in the opposite case4 ,as the ,committee is not advised of the amount which the management of the ,exposition may appropriate for the purpose of the ,congress1 it cannot1 at present1 enter further into details of adjustment1 but it records its opinion that the sum suggested is the least by which the ends sought to be attained by the ,congress can be accomplished4 ,to this must be added the expenses of administration and publication4 ,all addresses paid for by the ,congress should be regarded as its property1 and be printed and published together1 thus constituting a comprehensive work exhibiting the unity1 progress1 and present state of knowledge4 ,this plan does not preclude the delivery of more than one address by a single scholar4 ,the directors of the ,exposition may sometimes find it advisable to ask the same scholar to deliver two addresses1 possibly even three4 ,the ,committee recommends that full liberty be allowed to each section of the ,congress in arranging the general character and programme of its discussions within the field proposed4 ,as an example of how the plan will work in the case of any one section1 the ,committee take the case of a neurologist desiring to profit by those discussions which relate to his branch of medicine4 ,this falls under ,c of the four main divisions as related to the physical sciences4 ,his interest on the first day will therefore be centred in ,division ,c1 where he may hear the general discussion of the physical sciences and the relations to the other sciences4 ,on the second day he will hear four papers in ,group #ah on the ,subjects embraced in the general science of anthropology2 one on its fundamental conceptions2 one on its methods and two on the relation of anthropology to the sciences most closely connected with it4 ,during the remaining four days he will meet with the representatives of medicine and its related subjects1 who will divide into sections1 and listen to four papers in each section4 ,one paper will consider the progress of that section in the last one hundred years1 one paper will be devoted to the problems of to-day1 leaving room for such contributions and discussions as may seem appropriate during the remainder of the day4 ,,co,,peration ,,of ,,learned ,,societies ,,invoked ,in presenting this general plan1 your ,committee wishes to point out the difficulty of deciding in advance what subjects should be included in every section4 ,therefore1 the ,committee deems it of the utmost importance to secure the advice and assistance of learned societies in this country in perfecting the details of the proposed plan1 especially the selection of speakers and the programme of work in each section4 ,it will facilitate the latter purpose if such societies be invited and encouraged to hold meetings at ,st4 ,louis during the week immediately preceding1 or1 preferably1 the week following the ,general ,congress4 ,the selection of speakers should be made as soon as possible1 and1 in any case1 before the end of the present academic year1 in order that formal invitations may be issued and final arrangements made with the speakers a year in advance of the ,congress4 ,,concluding ,,suggestions ,with the view of securing the coperation of the governments and leading scholars of the principal countries of ,western and ,central ,europe in the proposed ,congress1 it seems advisable to send two commissioners to these countries for this purpose4 ,it seems unnecessary to extend the operations of this commission outside the ,european continent or to other than the leading countries4 ,in other cases arrangements can be made by correspondence4 ,it is the opinion of the ,committee that an ,american of world-wide reputation as a scholar should be selected to preside over the ,congress4 ,all which is respectfully submitted4 7,signed7 ,,simon ,,newcomb1 ,chairman2 ,,george ,f4 ,,moore1 ,,john ,b4 ,,moore1 ,,hugo ,m,,nsterberg1 ,,albion ,w4 ,,small1 ,,william ,h4 ,,welch1 ,,elihu ,,thomson1 ,committee4 ,the ,administrative ,board met on ,january #ai to receive the report of the ,committee on ,plan and ,scope which was presented by ,dr4 ,newcomb4 ,professor ,mnsterberg and ,professor ,john ,bassett ,moore were also present by invitation to discuss the details of the scheme4 ,in the afternoon the ,board went into executive session1 and the following recommendations were adopted and transmitted by the ,director of ,congresses to the ,committee on ,congresses of the ,exposition and to the ,president and ,executive ,committee1 who duly approved them4 ,to the ,director of ,congresses3-- ,the ,administrative ,board have the honor to make the following recommendations in reference to the ,department of ,congresses3-- 7#a7 ,that there be held in connection with the ,universal ,exposition of ,st4 ,louis in #aijd1 an ,international ,congress of ,arts and ,science4 7#b7 ,that the plan recommended by the ,committee on ,plan and ,scope for a general congress of ,arts and ,science1 to be held during the six days beginning on ,monday1 ,september #ai1 #aijd1 be approved and adopted1 subject to such revision in point of detail as may be advisable1 preserving its fundamental principles4 7#c7 ,that ,simon ,newcomb1 ,,ll4,d41 of ,washington1 ,d4 ,c41 be named for ,president of the ,international ,congress of ,arts and ,science1 provided for in the foregoing resolution4 7#d7 ,that ,professor ,mnsterberg1 of ,harvard ,university1 and ,professor ,albion ,w4 ,small1 of the ,university of ,chicago1 be invited to act as ,vice-,presidents of the ,congress4 7#e7 ,that the ,directors of the ,world's ,fair be requested to change the name of this ,board from the ,advisory ,board to the ,administrative ,board of the ,international ,congress of ,arts and ,science4 7#f7 ,that the detailed arrangements for the ,congress be intrusted to a committee consisting of the ,president and two ,vice-,presidents already named1 subject to the general oversight and control of the ,administrative ,board1 and that the ,directors of the ,exposition be requested to make appropriate provision for their compensation and necessary expenses4 7#g7 ,that it be recommended to the ,directors of the ,world's ,fair that appropriate provision should be made in the office of the ,department of ,congresses for an executive secretary and such clerical assistance as may be needed4 7#h7 ,that the following payment be recommended to those scholars who accept invitations to participate and do a specified piece of work1 or submit a specified contribution in the ,international ,congress of ,arts and ,science3 ,for traveling expenses for a ,european scholar1 #ejj4 ,for traveling expenses for an ,american scholar1 #aej4 7#i7 ,that provision be made for the publication of the proceedings of the ,congress in suitable form to constitute a permanent memorial of the work of the ,world's ,fair for the promotion of science and art1 under competent editorial supervision4 7#aj7 ,that an appropriation of #bjj1jjj be made to cover expenses of the ,department of ,congresses1 of which sum #acj1jjj be specifically appropriated for an ,international ,congress of ,arts and ,science1 and the remainder to cover all expenses connected with the publication of the proceedings of said ,international ,congress of ,arts and ,science1 and the expenses for promotion of all other congresses4 ,in addition to the foregoing recommendations1 ,professor ,mnsterberg was requested at his earliest convenience to furnish each member with a revised plan of his classification1 which would reduce as far as possible the number of sections into which the ,congress was finally to be divided4 ,with the adjournment of the ,board on ,january #ai the ,congress may be fairly said to have been launched upon its definite course1 and such changes as were thereafter made in the programme did not in any wise affect the principle upon which the ,congress was based1 but were due to the demands of time1 of expediency1 and in some cases to the accidents attending the participation4 ,the organization of the ,congress and the personnel of its officers from this time on remained unchanged1 and the history of the meeting is one of steady and progressive development4 ,the ,committee on ,plan and ,scope were discharged of their duties1 with a vote of thanks for the laborious and painstaking work which they had accomplished and the thoroughly scientific and novel plan for an international congress which they had recommended4 ,it was determined by the ,administrative ,board to keep the services of three of the members of the ,committee on ,plan and ,scope1 who should act as a scientific organizing committee and who should also be the presiding officers of the ,congress4 ,the choice for ,president of the ,congress fell without debate to the dean of ,american scientific circles1 whose eminent services to the ,government of the ,united ,states and whose recognized position in foreign and domestic scientific circles made him particularly fitted to preside over such an international gathering of the leading scientists of the world1 ,dr4 ,simon ,newcomb1 retired ,professor of ,mathematics1 ,united ,states ,navy4 ,professor ,hugo ,mnsterberg1 of ,harvard ,university1 and ,professor ,albion ,w4 ,small1 of the ,university of ,chicago1 were designated as the first and second ,vice-,presidents respectively4 ,the work of the succeeding spring1 with both the ,organizing ,committee and the ,administrative ,board1 was devoted to the perfecting of the programme and the selection of foreign scientists to be invited to participate in the ,congress4 ,the theory of the development of the programme and its logical bases are fully and forcibly treated by ,professor ,mnsterberg in the succeeding chapter1 and therefore will not be touched upon in this record of facts4 ,as an illustration of the growth of the programme1 however1 it is interesting to compare its form1 which was adopted at the next meeting of the ,organizing ,committee on ,february #bc1 #aijc1 in ,new ,york ,city1 with its final form as given in the completed programme presented at ,st4 ,louis in ,september1 #aijd 7pp4 #dg-di74 ,no better illustration can be given of the immense amount of labor and painstaking adjustment1 both to scientific and to physical conditions1 and of the admirable adaptability of the original plan to the exigencies of actual practice4 ,at the meeting of ,february #bc1 #aijc1 which was attended by all of the members of the ,organizing ,committee and by ,president ,butler of the ,administrative ,board1 it was determined that the number of ,departments should be sixteen1 with the following designations3-- ,a4 ,,normative ,,sciences #a4 ,philosophical ,sciences4 #b4 ,mathematical ,sciences4 ,b4 ,,historical ,,sciences #c4 ,political ,sciences4 #d4 ,legal ,sciences4 #e4 ,economic ,sciences4 #f4 ,philological ,sciences4 #g4 ,pedagogical ,sciences4 #h4 sthetic ,sciences4 #i4 ,theological ,sciences4 ,c4 ,,physical ,,sciences #aj4 ,general ,physical ,sciences4 #aa4 ,astronomical ,sciences4 #ab4 ,geological ,sciences4 #ac4 ,biological ,sciences4 #ad4 ,anthropological ,sciences4 ,d4 ,,mental ,,sciences #ae4 ,psychological ,sciences4 #af4 ,sociological ,sciences4 ,,sections #a4 a ,metaphysics4 b ,logic4 c ,ethics4 d sthetics4 #b4 a ,algebra4 b ,geometry4 c ,statistical ,methods4 #c4 a ,classical ,political ,history of ,asia4 b ,classical ,political ,history of ,europe4 c ,medieval ,political ,history of ,europe4 d ,modern ,political ,history of ,europe4 e ,political ,history of ,america4 #d4 a ,history of ,roman ,law4 b ,history of ,common ,law4 aa ,constitutional ,law4 bb ,criminal ,law4 cc ,civil ,law4 dd ,history of ,international ,law4 #e4 a ,history of ,economic ,institutions4 b ,history of ,economic ,theories4 c ,economic ,law4 aa ,finance4 bb ,commerce and ,transportation4 cc ,labor4 #f4 a ,indo-,iranian ,languages4 b ,semitic ,languages4 c ,classical ,languages4 d ,modern ,languages4 #g4 a ,history of ,education4 aa ,educational ,institutions4 #h4 a ,history of ,architecture4 b ,history of ,fine ,arts4 c ,history of ,music4 d ,oriental ,literature4 e ,classical ,literature4 f ,modern ,literature4 aa ,architecture4 bb ,fine ,arts4 cc ,music4 #i4 a ,primitive ,religions4 b ,asiatic ,religions4 c ,semitic ,religions4 d ,christianity4 aa ,religious ,institutions4 #aj4 a ,mechanics and ,sound4 b ,light and ,heat4 c ,electricity4 d ,inorganic ,chemistry4 e ,organic ,chemistry4 f ,physical ,chemistry4 aa ,mechanical ,technology4 bb ,optical ,technology4 cc ,electrical ,technology dd ,chemical ,technology4 #aa4 a ,theoretical ,astronomy4 b ,astrophysics4 #ab4 a ,geodesy4 b ,geology4 c ,mineralogy4 d ,physiography4 e ,meteorology4 aa ,surveying4 bb ,metallurgy4 #ac4 a ,botany4 b ,plant ,physiology4 c ,ecology4 d ,bacteriology4 e ,zology4 f ,embryology4 g ,comparative ,anatomy4 h ,physiology4 aa ,agronomy4 bb ,veterinary ,medicine4 #ad4 ,anthropological ,sciences3 a ,human ,anatomy4 b ,human ,physiology4 c ,neurology4 d ,physical ,chemistry4 e ,pathology4 f ,raceomatology4 aa ,hygiene4 bb ,contagious ,diseases4 cc ,internal ,medicine4 dd ,surgery4 ee ,gynecology4 ff ,ophthalmology4 gg ,therapeutics4 hh ,dentistry4 #ae4 ,psychological ,sciences3 a ,general ,psychology4 b ,experimental ,psychology4 c ,comparative ,psychology4 d ,child ,psychology4 e ,abnormal ,psychology4 #af4 ,sociological ,sciences3 a ,social ,morphology4 b ,social ,psychology4 c ,laws of ,civilization4 d ,laws of ,language and ,myths4 e ,ethnology4 aa ,social ,technology4 ,it was also resolved1 that the discussion of subjects falling under the first four divisions should be held in the forenoon of each of the four days1 from ,wednesday until ,saturday1 and those relating to the three divisions of ,practical ,science in the afternoon of the same days4 ,the programme was thus rearranged by the addition of the following3-- ,e4 ,,utilitarian ,,sciences #ag4 ,medical ,sciences3 a ,hygiene4 b ,sanitation4 c ,contagious ,diseases4 d ,internal ,medicine4 e ,psychiatry4 f ,surgery4 g ,gynecology4 h ,ophthalmology4 i ,otology4 j ,therapeutics4 k ,dentistry4 #ah4 ,practical ,economic ,sciences3 a ,extractive ,productions of ,wealth4 b ,transportation4 c ,commerce4 d ,postal ,service4 e ,money and ,banking4 #ai4 ,technological ,sciences3 a ,mechanical ,technology4 b ,electrical ,technology4 c ,chemical ,technology4 d ,optical ,technology4 e ,surveying4 f ,metallurgy4 g ,agronomy4 h ,veterinary ,medicine4 ,f4 ,,regulative ,,sciences #bj4 ,practical ,political ,sciences3 a ,internal ,practical ,politics4 b ,national ,practical ,politics4 c ,tariff4 d ,taxation4 e ,municipal ,practical ,politics4 f ,colonial ,practical ,politics4 #ba4 ,practical ,legal ,sciences3 a ,international ,law4 b ,constitutional ,law4 c ,criminal ,law4 d ,civil ,law4 #bb4 ,practical ,social ,sciences3 a ,treatment of the ,poor4 b ,treatment of the ,defective4 c ,treatment of the ,dependent4 d ,treatment of ,vice and ,crime4 e ,problems of ,labor4 f ,problems of the ,family4 ,g4 ,,cultural ,,sciences #bc4 ,practical ,educational ,sciences3 a ,kindergarten and ,home4 b ,primary ,education4 c ,universities and ,research--,secondary4 d ,moral ,education4 e sthetic ,education4 f ,manual ,training4 g ,university4 h ,libraries4 i ,museums4 j ,publications4 #bd4 ,practical sthetic ,sciences3 a ,architecture4 b ,fine ,arts4 c ,music4 d ,landscape ,architecture4 #be4 ,practical ,religious ,sciences3 a ,religious ,education4 b ,training for ,religious ,service4 c ,missions4 d ,religious ,influence4 ,the programme was again thoroughly revised at the meeting of the ,organizing ,committee on ,april #i1 #aijc1 at ,hotel ,manhattan1 and as thus amended was submitted to the ,administrative ,board at a meeting held in ,new ,york on ,april #aa4 ,a careful consideration of the programme at this meeting1 and a final revision made at the meeting of the ,administrative ,board at the ,st4 ,louis ,club ,april #cj1 #aijc1 brought it practically into its final shape1 with such minor changes as were found necessary in the latter days of the ,congress due to the unexpected declinations of foreign speakers at the last moment4 ,the continuous and exacting work done in perfecting the programme by each member of the ,organizing ,committee and by the ,chairman of the ,administrative ,board deserves special mention1 and was productive of the best results by its logical appeal to the scientific world4 ,the programme as finally worked out in orderly detail1 shortened in many departments by various exigencies1 may be found on pages #dg to #di of this volume4 ,,participation ,,and ,,support ,the general plan of the ,congress having been determined and the programme practically perfected by ,may #a1 #aijc1 two most important questions demanded the attention of the ,administrative ,board3 first1 the participation in the ,congress1 both foreign and domestic2 second1 the support of the scientific public4 ,at a meeting of the ,board held in ,new ,york ,city ,april #aa1 #aijc1 these points were given full consideration4 ,it was determined that the list of speakers both foreign and domestic should be made up on the advice of men of letters and of scientific thought in this country1 and accordingly there was sent to the officers of the various scientific societies in the ,united ,states1 to heads of university departments and to every prominent exponent of science and art in this country1 a printed announcement and tentative programme of the ,congress1 and a letter asking advice as to the scientists best fitted in view of the object of the ,congress to prepare an address4 ,from the hundreds of replies received in response to this appeal were made up the original lists of invited speakers1 and only those were placed thereon who were the choice of a fair majority of the representatives of the particular science under selection4 ,the ,administrative ,board reserved to itself the full right to reject any of these names or to change them so as to promote the best interests of the ,congress1 but in nearly every instance it would be safe to say that the person selected was highly satisfactory to the great majority of his fellow scientists in this country4 ,many changes were unavoidably made at the last moment to meet the situation caused by withdrawals and declinations1 but the list of second choices was so complete1 and in many cases there was such a delicate balance between the first and second choice1 that there was no difficulty in keeping the standard of the programme to its original high plane4 ,it was early determined that the seven ,division speakers and the forty-eight ,department speakers1 which occupied the first two days of the programme1 should be ,americans1 and that these ,division and ,department addresses should be a contribution of ,american scholarship to the general scientific thought of the world4 ,this decision commended itself to the scientific public both at home and abroad1 and it was so carried out4 ,it was further determined that the ,division and ,department speakers and the foreign speakers should be selected during the summer of #aijc1 and that the ,american participation in the ,section addresses should be determined after it was definitely known what the foreign participation would be4 ,in view of the importance of the ,congress1 it was deemed inadvisable to attempt to interest foreign scientific circles by correspondence1 and it was further decided to pay a special compliment to each invited speaker by sending an invitation at the hands of special delegates4 ,arrangements were therefore made for ,dr4 ,newcomb and ,professors ,mnsterberg and ,small to proceed to ,europe during the summer of #aijc1 and to present in person to the scientific circles of ,europe and to the scientists specially desired to deliver addresses the complete plan and scope of the ,congress and an invitation to participate4 ,,invitations ,,to ,,foreign ,,speakers ,the members of the ,organizing ,committee1 armed with very strong credentials from the ,state ,department to the diplomatic service abroad1 sailed in the early summer of #aijc to present the invitation of the ,exposition to the selected scientists4 ,dr4 ,newcomb sailed ,may #f1 ,professor ,mnsterberg ,may #cj1 and ,professor ,small ,june #f4 ,a general interest in the project had at this time become aroused1 and there was assured a respectful hearing4 ,both the ,president of the ,united ,states and the ,emperor of ,germany expressed their warm interest in the plan1 and the ,state ,department at ,washington gave to the ,congress both on this occasion and on succeeding occasions its effective aid4 ,the ,director of ,congresses wishes to express his obligations both to the late ,secretary ,hay and to ,assistant-,secretary ,loomis for their valuable suggestions and courteous coperation in all matters relating to the foreign participation4 ,strong support was also given the ,committee and the plan of the ,congress by ,commissioner-,general ,lewald of ,germany1 and ,commissioner-,general ,lagrave of ,france4 ,throughout the entire ,congress period1 both of these energetic ,commissioners-,general placed themselves actively at the disposition of the ,department in promoting the attendance of scientists from their respective countries4 ,geographically the division between the three members of the ,organizing ,committee gave to ,dr4 ,newcomb1 ,france2 to ,professor ,mnsterberg1 ,germany1 ,austria1 and ,switzerland2 and to ,professor ,small1 ,england1 ,russia1 ,italy1 and a part of ,austria4 ,it was also agreed that ,dr4 ,newcomb should have special oversight of the departments of ,mathematics1 ,physics1 ,astronomy1 ,biology1 and ,technology2 ,professor ,mnsterberg1 special charge of ,philosophy1 ,philology1 ,art1 ,education1 ,psychology1 and ,medicine2 and that ,professor ,small should look after ,politics1 ,law1 ,economics1 ,theology1 ,sociology1 and ,religion4 ,the ,committee worked independently of each other1 but met once during the summer at ,munich to compare results and to determine their closing movements4 ,the public and even the ,exposition authorities have probably never realized the delicacy and the extremely careful adjustment exercised by the ,organizing ,committee in their summer's campaign4 ,scientists are as a class sensitive1 jealous of their reputations1 and loath to undertake long journeys to a distant country for congress purposes4 ,the amount of labor devolving upon the ,committee to find the scientists scattered over all ,europe2 the careful and painstaking presentation to each of the plan of the ,congress2 the appeal to their scientific pride2 the hearing of a thousand objections1 and the answering of each2 the disappointments incurred2 the substitutions made necessary at the last moment2--all sum up a task of the greatest difficulty and of enormous labor4 ,the remarkable success with which the mission was crowned stands out the more prominently in view of these conditions4 ,when the ,committee returned in the latter part of ,september1 they had visited every important country of ,europe1 delivered more than one hundred fifty personal invitations1 and for the one hundred twenty-eight sections had secured one hundred seventeen acceptances4 ,at a meeting of the ,administrative ,board1 which met with the ,organizing ,committee on ,october #ac1 #aijc1 a full report of the ,european trip was received and ways and means considered for insuring the attendance from abroad4 ,a list of the foreign acceptances was ordered printed at once for general distribution1 and the ,chairman of the ,administrative ,board was requested to address a letter to each of the foreign scientists confirming the action of the special delegates and giving additional information as to the length of addresses1 and rules and details governing the administration of the ,congress4 ,,death ,,of ,,frederick ,w4 ,,holls ,the number of the ,administrative ,board was decreased during the summer by the sudden death of the ,hon4 ,frederick ,w4 ,holls1 on ,july #bc1 #aijc4 ,mr4 ,holls had been intensely interested in the development of the ,congress from its earliest days1 and was very instrumental in determining the form in which it was finally promoted4 ,his great influence abroad as a member of the ,hague ,conference1 and his high standing in legal and literary circles in this country1 rendered him one of the most prominent members of the ,board4 ,a resolution of regret at his untimely death was spread upon the minutes of the ,administrative ,board at the meeting in ,october1 and it was decided that his place upon the ,board should remain unfilled4 ,,domestic ,,participation ,at this same meeting of ,october #ac1 active measures were taken to forward the ,american participation in the ,congress4 ,the necessity was now very evident that our strongest men of science must be induced to take part1 in order to compare favorably with the leading minds which ,europe was sending4 ,the ,organizing ,committee were instructed to consult the ,american scientific societies and associations regarding the selection of ,american speakers1 and also in reference to presiding officials for each section4 ,six weeks was considered sufficient for this task1 and the ,committee were asked to submit to the ,administrative ,board at a meeting in ,new ,york1 on ,december #c and #d1 their recommendations for ,american speakers4 ,an immense amount of detailed labor1 in the way of correspondence1 now devolved upon the ,organizing ,committee as well as upon the ,director of ,congresses1 and a branch office was established in ,washington equipped with clerks and stenographers under the charge of ,dr4 ,newcomb1 who devoted the greater portion of his time for the next six months to the many details connected with the selection of foreign and ,american speakers and chairmen4 ,the meeting of the ,administrative ,board in ,new ,york in ,december1 and a similar meeting with the ,organizing ,committee held at the ,st4 ,louis ,club on ,december #bh1 were given over entirely to perfecting the personnel of the programme4 ,great care was exerted in selecting the chairmen of the departments and sections1 inasmuch as they must be men of international reputation and conceded strength4 ,for the secretaryships younger men of promise and ability were selected1 chiefly from university circles4 ,both the chairmen and secretaries served without compensation4 ,the work of the late winter was a continuance of the perfecting of details1 and at a meeting of the ,administrative ,board held in ,new ,york in ,february1 #aijd1 a final approval was given to the programme and the speakers4 ,the imminent approach of the ,exposition and the work of the college commencement season made it impossible for further general meetings1 and on ,june #a the ,organizing ,committee was constituted a committee with power to fill vacancies in the programme or to amend the programme as circumstances might demand4 ,all suggestions with reference to details were to be made directly to the ,director of ,congresses1 upon whom devolved from this time forward the entire executive control of the ,congress4 ,,assembly ,,halls ,the highly diversified nature of the ,congress and the holding of one hundred twenty-eight section meetings in four days' time rendered necessary a large number of meeting-places centrally located4 ,the ,exposition was fortunate in having the use of the new plant of the ,washington ,university1 nine large buildings of which had been erected4 ,many of these buildings contained lecture halls and assembly rooms1 seating from one hundred fifty to fifteen hundred people4 ,sixteen halls were necessary to accommodate the full number of sections running at any one time1 and of this number twelve were available in the group of ,university ,buildings2 the other four were found in the lecture halls of the ,education ,building1 ,mines and ,metallurgy ,building1 ,agriculture ,building1 and the ,transportation ,building4 ,the opening exercises1 at which the entire ,congress was assembled1 was held in ,festival ,hall1 capable of seating three thousand people4 ,in the assignment of halls care was taken so far as possible to assign the larger halls to the more popular subjects1 but it often happened that a great speaker was of necessity assigned to a smaller hall4 ,two of the halls also proved bad for speaking owing to the traffic of the ,intramural ,railway1 and there was lacking in nearly all of the halls that academic peace and quiet which usually surrounds gatherings of a scientific nature4 ,this1 however1 was to be expected in an exposition atmosphere1 and was readily acquiesced in by the speakers themselves1 and very little objection was heard to the halls as assigned4 ,every one seemed to recognize the fact that the immediate value of the meeting lay in the commingling and fellowship1 and that the addresses1 of which one could hear at most only one in sixteen1 could not be judged in the proper light until their publication4 ,,support ,,of ,,the ,,scientific ,,public ,a strong effort was made by the ,organizing ,committee to secure the attendance of an audience which should not only in its proportions be complimentary to the eminence of the speakers1 but also be thoroughly appreciative of the addresses and conversant with the topic under discussion4 ,letters were therefore sent to all of the prominent scientific societies in the ,united ,states1 asking that wherever possible the meetings of the society be set for the ,congress week in ,st4 ,louis1 and wherever this was not possible that the societies send special delegates to attend the ,congress1 and urge their membership to make an effort to be present4 ,personal letters were also sent to the leading members of the different professions and sciences1 to the faculties of universities and colleges1 urging them to attend1 and pointing out the necessity of the support of the ,american scientific public4 ,special invitations were also sent in the name of the ,organizing ,committee to the leading authorities of the various subjects under discussion in the ,congress1 asking them to contribute a ten-minute paper to any section in which they were particularly interested4 ,the result of this careful campaign1 in addition to the general exploitation which the ,congress received1 was such a flattering attendance of ,american scientists1 as to be both a compliment to the ,european speakers and a benefit to scientific thought4 ,many societies1 such as the ,american ,neurological ,association1 ,american ,philological ,association1 ,american ,mathematical ,society1 ,physical and ,chemical ,societies of ,america1 ,american ,astronomical ,society1 ,germanic ,congress1 ,american ,electro-,therapeutic ,association1 held their annual meetings during the week of the ,congress1 although the date rendered it impossible for the majority of the associations to meet at that time4 ,the eighth ,international ,geographic ,congress adjourned from ,washington to ,st4 ,louis to meet with the ,congress of ,arts and ,science4 ,in response to the special invitations1 two hundred forty-seven ten-minute addresses were promised and one hundred two actually read4 ,,reception ,,of ,,foreign ,,guests ,every effort was made by the ,department of ,congresses to assist the foreign speakers in their traveling arrangements and to make matters as easy and comfortable as possible4 ,a letter of advice was mailed to each speaker prior to his departure1 carefully setting forth the conditions of ,american travel1 routes to be followed1 reception committees to be met1 and other essential details4 ,the official badge of the ,congress was also mailed1 so that those wearing them might be easily identified by the reception committees both in ,new ,york and ,st4 ,louis4 ,nine tenths of the speakers came by the way of ,new ,york1 and in order to facilitate the clearance of their baggage and to provide for their fitting entertainment in ,new ,york1 a special reception committee was formed composed of the following members3-- ,f4 ,p4 ,keppel1 ,columbia ,university1 ,new ,york ,city1 ,chairman4 ,prof4 ,herbert ,v4 ,abbott1 ,new ,york4 ,r4 ,arrowsmith1 ,new ,york4 ,c4 ,william ,beebe1 ,new ,york4 ,george ,bendelari1 ,new ,york4 ,edward ,w4 ,berry1 ,passaic4 ,j4 ,fuller ,berry1 ,old ,forge4 ,rev4 ,h4 ,c4 ,birckhead1 ,new ,york4 ,dr4 ,james ,h4 ,canfield1 ,new ,york4 ,rev4 ,g4 ,a4 ,carstenson1 ,new ,york4 ,prof4 ,h4 ,s4 ,crampton1 ,new ,york4 ,sanford ,l4 ,cutler1 ,new ,york4 ,dr4 ,israel ,davidson1 ,new ,york4 ,william ,h4 ,davis1 ,new ,york4 ,prof4 ,james ,c4 ,egbert1 ,new ,york4 ,dr4 ,haven ,emerson1 ,new ,york4 ,prof4 ,t4 ,s4 ,fiske1 ,new ,york4 ,j4 ,d4 ,fitz-,gerald1 ,,ii1 ,newark4 ,w4 ,d4 ,forbes1 ,hoboken4 ,clyde ,furst1 ,yonkers4 ,william ,k4 ,gregory1 ,new ,york4 ,george ,c4 ,o4 ,haas1 ,new ,york4 ,prof4 ,w4 ,a4 ,hervey1 ,new ,york4 ,carl ,herzog1 ,new ,york4 ,robert ,hoguet1 ,new ,york4 ,dr4 ,percy ,hughes1 ,brooklyn4 ,prof4 ,a4 ,v4 ,w4 ,jackson1 ,new ,york4 ,albert ,j4 ,w4 ,kern1 ,new ,york4 ,prof4 ,charles ,f4 ,kroh1 ,orange4 ,dr4 ,george ,f4 ,kunz1 ,new ,york4 ,prof4 ,l4 ,a4 ,lousseaux1 ,new ,york4 ,frederic ,l4 ,luqueer1 ,brooklyn4 ,r4 ,a4 ,v4 ,minckwitz1 ,new ,york4 ,charles ,a4 ,nelson1 ,new ,york4 ,dr4 ,harry ,b4 ,penhollow1 ,new ,york4 ,prof4 ,e4 ,d4 ,perry1 ,new ,york4 ,john ,pohlman1 ,new ,york4 ,dr4 ,ernest ,richard1 ,new ,york4 ,dr4 ,k4 ,e4 ,richter1 ,new ,york4 ,edward ,russ1 ,hoboken4 ,prof4 ,c4 ,l4 ,speranza1 ,oak ,ridge4 ,prof4 ,francis ,h4 ,stoddard1 ,new ,york4 ,dr4 ,anthony ,spitzka1 ,goodground4 ,harvey ,w4 ,thayer1 ,brooklyn4 ,prof4 ,h4 ,a4 ,todd1 ,new ,york4 ,dr4 ,e4 ,m4 ,wahl1 ,new ,york4 ,prof4 ,f4 ,h4 ,wilkens1 ,new ,york4 ,to each foreign speaker was extended the courtesies of the ,century and the ,university clubs while remaining in ,new ,york ,city4 ,mention should also be made of the assistance of the ,treasury ,department and of the courtesy of ,collector of the ,port1 ,hon4 ,n4 ,n4 ,stranahan1 through whom special privileges of the ,port were extended to the members of the ,congress4 ,the work of the reception committee was most satisfactorily and efficiently performed1 and was highly appreciated by the foreign guests4 ,special acknowledgment is due ,mr4 ,f4 ,p4 ,keppel1 of ,columbia ,university1 for his painstaking and efficient management of the affairs of the committee in ,new ,york4 ,many of the speakers proceeded singly to ,st4 ,louis1 stopping at various places1 but the great majority went directly to the ,university of ,chicago1 where they were entertained during the week preceding the ,congress by ,president ,harper and ,professor ,small1 of the ,university of ,chicago4 ,the arrivals at ,st4 ,louis were made on ,saturday the #agth and ,sunday the #ahth of ,september4 ,many of the participants had arrived at earlier dates1 and fully twenty of the speakers were members of the ,international ,jury of ,awards for their respective countries1 and had been in ,st4 ,louis since ,september #a1 the beginning of the ,jury work4 ,a reception committee similar to that in ,new ,york was also formed at ,st4 ,louis from the members of the ,university ,club1 and their duties were to meet all incoming trains and conduct the members of the ,congress personally to their stopping-places1 and assist them in all matters of detail4 ,this committee was comprised of the following members1 nearly all of the ,university ,club1 who performed their work efficiently and enthusiastically to the great satisfaction of the ,exposition and to the thorough appreciation of the foreign guests3-- ,v4 ,m4 ,porter1 ,chairman1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,e4 ,h4 ,angert1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,gouverneur ,calhoun1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,w4 ,m4 ,chauvenet1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,h4 ,g4 ,cleveland1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,mr4 ,m4 ,b4 ,clopton1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,walter ,fischel1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,w4 ,l4 ,r4 ,gifford1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,e4 ,m4 ,grossman1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,l4 ,w4 ,hagerman1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,louis ,la ,beaume1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,carl ,h4 ,lagenburg1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,sears ,lehmann1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,g4 ,f4 ,paddock1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,t4 ,g4 ,rutledge1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,luther ,ely ,smith1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,j4 ,clarence ,taussig1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,c4 ,e4 ,l4 ,thomas1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,w4 ,m4 ,tompkins1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,g4 ,t4 ,weitzel1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,tyrrell ,williams1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,the itinerary of the foreign speakers after leaving ,st4 ,louis at the end of the ,congress took them on appointed trains to ,washington1 where they were given an official reception by ,president ,roosevelt and a reception by ,dr4 ,simon ,newcomb1 ,president of the ,congress4 ,from here they proceeded to ,harvard ,university1 ,cambridge1 ,mass41 where they were given a reception by ,prof4 ,hugo ,mnsterberg1 and were entertained as guests of ,harvard ,university4 ,thence the great majority of the speakers returned to ,new ,york1 where they were the guests of ,columbia ,university1 and were given a farewell dinner by the ,association of ,old ,german ,students4 ,many of the speakers1 however1 visited other portions of the country before returning to ,europe4 ,the foreign speakers while in ,st4 ,louis were considered the guests of the ,exposition ,company1 and were relieved from all care and expense for rooms and entertainment4 ,those who were accompanied by their wives and daughters were entertained by prominent ,st4 ,louis families1 and those who came singly were quartered in the dormitory of the ,washington ,university1 which was set aside for this purpose during the week of the ,congress4 ,the dormitory arrangement proved a very happy circumstance1 as nearly one hundred foreign and ,american scientists of the highest rank were thrown in contact1 much after the fashion of their student days1 and thoroughly enjoyed the novelty and fellowship of the plan4 ,the dormitory contained ninety-six rooms newly fitted up with much care and with all modern conveniences4 ,light breakfasts were served in the rooms1 and special service provided at the call of the occupants4 ,the situation of the dormitory also in the ,exposition grounds in close proximity to the assembly halls was highly appreciated1 and although at times there were minor matters which did not run so smoothly1 the almost unanimous expression of the guests of the ,exposition was one of delight and appreciation of the arrangements4 ,special mention ought in justice to be made to those residents of ,st4 ,louis who sustained the time-honored name of the city for hospitality and courtesy by entertaining those foreign members of the ,congress who were accompanied by the immediate members of their family4 ,they were as follows3-- ,dr4 ,c4 ,barek ,dr4 ,william ,bartlett ,judge ,w4 ,f4 ,boyle ,mr4 ,robert ,brookings ,mrs4 ,j4 ,t4 ,davis ,dr4 ,samuel ,dodd ,mr4 ,l4 ,d4 ,dozier ,dr4 ,w4 ,e4 ,fischel ,mr4 ,louis ,fusz ,mr4 ,august ,gehner ,dr4 ,m4 ,a4 ,goldstein ,mr4 ,charles ,h4 ,huttig ,dr4 ,ernest ,jonas ,mr4 ,r4 ,mc,kittrick ,jones ,mr4 ,f4 ,w4 ,lehmann ,dr4 ,robert ,luedeking ,mr4 ,edward ,mallinckrodt ,mr4 ,george ,d4 ,markham ,mr4 ,thomas ,mc,kittrick ,mr4 ,theodore ,meier ,dr4 ,s4 ,j4 ,niccolls ,dr4 ,w4 ,f4 ,nolker ,dr4 ,s4 ,j4 ,schwab ,dr4 ,henry ,schwartz ,mr4 ,corwin ,h4 ,spencer ,dr4 ,william ,taussig ,mr4 ,g4 ,h4 ,tenbroek ,dr4 ,herman ,tuholske ,hon4 ,rolla ,wells ,mr4 ,edwards ,whitaker ,mr4 ,charles ,wuelfing ,mr4 ,max ,wuelfing4 ,,detail ,,of ,,the ,,congress ,the immense amount of detail work which devolved upon the ,department in the matter of preparing halls for the meetings1 receiving guests1 providing for their comfort1 issuing the programmes1 managing the detail of the receptions1 banquets1 invitations1 etc41 providing for registration1 payment of honorariums1 and furnishing information on every conceivable topic1 rendered necessary the formation of a special bureau which was placed in charge of ,dr4 ,l4 ,o4 ,howard of ,washington1 ,d4 ,c41 as ,executive ,secretary4 ,dr4 ,howard's long experience as ,secretary of the ,american ,association for the ,advancement of ,science rendered him particularly well qualified to assume this laborious and thankless task4 ,by mutual arrangement the ,director of ,congresses and the ,executive ,secretary divided the field of labor4 ,the ,director had1 in addition to the general oversight of the ,congress1 special supervision of the local reception committee1 the entertainment of the guests1 official banquets and entertainments1 and all financial details4 ,the ,executive ,secretary took entire charge of the programme1 assignment of rooms in the dormitory1 care and supervision of the dormitory1 assignment of halls for speakers1 registration books and bureau of information4 ,dr4 ,howard arrived on ,september #a to begin his duties1 and remained until ,september #cj4 ,,week ,,of ,,the ,,congress ,the opening session of the ,congress was set for ,monday afternoon4 ,september #ai1 at #b4cj o'clock in ,festival ,hall4 ,the main programme of the ,congress began ,tuesday morning4 ,the sessions were held in the mornings and afternoons1 the evenings being left free for social affairs4 ,the list of functions authorized in honor of the ,congress of ,arts and ,science were as follows3-- ,monday evening1 ,september #ai1 grand fte night in honor of the guests of the ,congress1 with special musical programme about the ,grand ,basin and lagoons1 boat rides and lagoon fte2 this function was unfortunately somewhat marred by inclement weather4 ,it was the only evening free in the entire week1 however1 for members of the ,congress to witness the illuminations and decorative evening effects4 ,banquet given by the ,st4 ,louis ,chemical ,society at the ,southern ,hotel to members of the chemical sections of the ,congress4 ,tuesday evening1 ,september #bj1 general reception by the ,board of ,lady ,managers to the officers and speakers of the ,congress and ,officials of the ,exposition4 ,wednesday afternoon1 ,september #ba1 garden fte given to the members of the ,congress at the ,french ,national ,pavilion by the ,commissioner-,general from ,france4 ,the gardens of the miniature ,grand ,trianon were never more beautiful than on this brilliant afternoon1 and the presence of the ,garde ,rpublicaine band and the entire official representation of the ,exposition1 lent a color and spirit to the affair unsurpassed during the ,exposition period4 ,wednesday evening1 reception by the ,imperial ,german ,commissioner-,general to the officers and speakers of the ,congress and the officials of the ,exposition1 at the ,german ,state ,house4 ,the magnificent hospitality which characterized this building during the entire ,exposition period was fairly outdone on this occasion1 and the function stands prominent as one of the brilliant successes of the ,exposition period4 ,thursday evening1 ,september #bb1 ,shaw banquet at the ,buckingham ,club to the foreign delegates and officers of the ,congress4 ,through the courtesy of the trustees of ,shaw's ,garden and of the officers of ,washington ,university1 the annual banquet provided for men of science1 letters1 and affairs1 by the will of ,henry ,b4 ,shaw1 founder of the ,missouri ,botanical ,gardens1 was given during this week as a compliment to the noted foreign scientists who were the guests of the city of ,st4 ,louis4 ,friday evening1 ,september #bc1 official banquet given by the ,exposition to the speakers and officials of the ,congress and the officials of the ,exposition1 in the banquet hall of the ,tyrolean ,alps4 ,saturday evening1 ,september #bd1 banquet at the ,st4 ,louis ,club given by the ,round ,table of ,st4 ,louis1 to the foreign members of the ,congress4 ,the ,round ,table is a literary club which meets at banquet six times annually for discussion of topics of interest to the literary and scientific world4 ,banquet given by the ,imperial ,commissioner-,general from ,japan to the ,japanese delegation to the ,congress and to the ,exposition officials and ,chiefs of ,departments4 ,dinner given by ,commissioner-,general from ,great ,britain to the ,english members of the ,congress4 ,,opening ,,of ,,the ,,congress ,the assembling of the ,congress on the afternoon of ,september #ai1 in the magnificent auditorium of ,festival ,hall which crowned ,cascade ,hill and the ,terrace of ,states1 was marked with simple ceremonies and impressive dignity4 ,the great organ pealed the national hymns of the countries participating and closed with the national anthem of the ,united ,states4 ,in the audience were the members of the ,congress representing the selected talent of the world in their field of scientific endeavor1 and about them were grouped an audience drawn from every part of the ,united ,states to promote by their presence the success of the ,congress and to do honor to the noted personages who were the guests of the ,exposition and of the ,nation4 ,on the stage were seated the officials of the ,congress1 the honorary vice-presidents from foreign nations1 and the officials of the ,exposition4 ,at the appointed hour the ,director of ,congresses1 ,dr4 ,howard ,j4 ,rogers1 called the meeting to order1 and outlined in a few words the object of the ,congress1 welcomed the foreign delegates1 and presented the members1 both foreign and ,american1 to the ,president of the ,exposition1 ,hon4 ,david ,r4 ,francis4 ,the ,president spoke as follows3-- ,what an ambitious undertaking is a universal exposition6 ,but how worthy it is of the highest effort6 ,and1 if successful1 how far-reaching are its results1 how lasting its benefits6 ,who shall pass judgment on that success8 ,on what evidence1 by what standards shall their verdicts be formed8 ,the development of society1 the advancement of civilization1 involve many problems1 encounter many and serious difficulties1 and have met with deplorable reactions which decades and centuries were required to repair4 ,the proper study of mankind is man1 and any progress in science that ignores or loses sight of his welfare and happiness1 however admirable and wonderful such progress may be1 disturbs the equilibrium of society4 ,the tendency of the times toward centralization or unification is1 from an economic standpoint1 a drifting in the right direction1 but the piloting must be done by skillful hands1 under the supervision and control of far-seeing minds1 who will remember that the masses are human beings whose education and expanding intelligence are constantly broadening and emphasizing their individuality4 ,a universal exposition affords to its visitors1 and these who systematically study its exhibits and its phases1 an unequaled opportunity to view the general progress and development of all countries and all races4 ,every line of human endeavor is here represented4 ,the conventions heretofore held on these grounds and many planned to be held--aggregating over three hundred--have been confined in their deliberations to special lines of thought or activity4 ,this international congress of arts and sciences is the most comprehensive in its plan and scope of any ever held1 and is the first of its kind4 ,the lines of its organization1 ,i shall leave the ,director of ,exhibits1 who is also a member of the administrative board of this congress1 to explain4 ,you who are members are already advised as to its scope1 and your almost universal and prompt acceptance of the invitations extended to you to participate1 implies an approval which we appreciate1 and indicates a willingness and a desire to coperate in an effort to bring into intelligent and beneficial correlation all branches of science1 all lines of thought4 ,you need no argument to convince you of the eminent fitness of making such a congress a prominent feature of a universal exposition in which education is the dominant feature4 ,the administrative board and the organizing committee have discharged their onerous and responsible tasks with signal fidelity and ability1 and the success that has rewarded their efforts is a lasting monument to their wisdom4 ,the management of the ,exposition tenders to them1 collectively and individually1 its grateful acknowledgments4 ,the membership in this congress represents the world's elect in research and in thought4 ,the participants were selected after a careful survey of the entire field2 no limitations of national boundaries or racial affiliations have been observed4 ,the ,universal ,exposition of #aijd1 the city of ,st4 ,louis1 the ,louisiana territory whose acquisition we are celebrating1 the entire country1 and all participating in or visiting this ,exposition are grateful for your coming1 and feel honored by your presence4 ,we are proud to welcome you to a scene where are presented the best and highest material products of all countries and of every civilization1 participated in by all peoples1 from the most primitive to the most highly cultured--a marker in the progress of the world1 and of which the ,international ,congress of ,arts and ,science is the crowning feature4 ,may the atmosphere of this universal exposition1 charged as it is with the restless energies of every phase of human activity and permeated by that ineffable sentiment of universal brotherhood engendered by the intelligent sons of ,god1 congregating for the friendly rivalries of peace1 inspire you with even higher thoughts--imbue you with still broader sympathies1 to the end that by your future labors you may be still more helpful to the human race and place your fellow men under yet deeper obligations4 ,director ,frederick ,j4 ,v4 ,skiff was then introduced by the ,president as representing the ,division of ,exhibits1 whose untiring labors had filled the magnificent ,exposition palaces surrounding the ,festival ,hall with the visible products of those sciences and arts1 the theory1 progress1 and problems of which the ,congress was assembled to consider4 ,mr4 ,skiff spoke as follows3-- ,the division of exhibits of the ,universal ,exposition of #aijd has looked forward to this time1 when the work it has performed is to be reviewed and discussed by this distinguished body4 ,i do not1 of course1 intend to convey the idea that the international congress is to inspect or criticise the exhibitions1 but ,i do mean to say that the deliberations of this organization are contemporaneous with and share the responsibility for the accomplishments of which the exhibitions made are the visible evidences4 ,the great educational yield of a universal exposition comes from the intellectual more than from the mechanical processes4 ,it is the material condition of the times4 ,it is as well the duty of the responsible authorities to go yet further and record the thoughts and theories1 the investigations1 experiments1 and observations of which these material things are the tangible results4 ,a congress of arts and science1 whose membership is drawn from all educational as well as geographical zones1 not only accounts for and analyzes the philosophy of conditions1 but points the way for further advance along the lines consistent with demonstration4 ,its contribution to the hour is at once a history and a prophecy4 ,the extent to which the deliberations and utterances of this congress may regulate the development of society or give impulse to succeeding generations1 it is impossible to estimate1 but not unreasonable to anticipate4 ,the plans of the congress matured in the minds of the best scholars2 the classification of its purpose1 the scope1 the selection of its distinguished participants1 gave to the hopes and ambitions of the management of the ,exposition inspiration of a most exalted degree4 ,at first these ambitions were--not without reason--regarded as too high4 ,the plane upon which the congress had been inaugurated1 the aim1 the broad intent1 seemed beyond the merits1 if not beyond the capacity1 of this hitherto not widely recognized intellectual centre4 ,but the courage of the inception1 the loftiness of the purpose1 appealed so profoundly to the toilers for truth and the apostles of fact1 that we find gathered here to-day in the heart of the new ,western continent the great minds whose impress on society has rendered possible the intellectual heights to which this age has ascended and now beckon forward the students of the world to limitless possibilities4 ,while international congresses of literature1 science1 art1 and industry have been accomplished by previous expositions1 yet to classify and select the topics in sympathy with the classification and installation of the exhibits material is a step considerably in advance of the custom4 ,the men who build an exposition must by temperament1 if not by characteristic1 be educators4 ,they must be in sympathy with the welfare of humanity and its higher destiny4 ,the exhibitions at this ,exposition are not the haphazard gatherings of convenient material1 but the outline of a plan to illustrate the productiveness of mankind at this particular time1 carefully digested1 thoroughly thought out1 and conscientiously executed4 ,the exhibit1 therefore1 in each of the departments of the classification1 as well as in the groups of the different departments1 are of such character1 and so arranged as to reflect the best that the world can do along departmental lines1 and the best that different peoples can do along group lines4 ,the congresses accord with the exhibits1 and the exhibits give expression to the congresses4 ,education has been the keynote of this ,exposition4 ,were it not for the educational idea1 the acts of government providing vast sums of money for the up-building of this ,exposition would have been impossible4 ,this congress reflects one idea vastly outstripping others1 and that is1 in the unity of thought in the universal concert of purpose4 ,it is the first time1 ,i believe1 that there has been an international gathering of the authorities of all the sciences1 and in that respect the congress initiates and establishes the universal brotherhood of scholars4 ,a thought uncommunicated is of little value4 ,an unrecorded achievement is not an asset of society4 ,the real lasting value of this congress will consist of the printed record of its proceedings4 ,the delivery of the addresses1 reaching and appealing to1 as must necessarily be the case1 a very limited number of people1 can be considered as only a method of reaching the lasting and perpetual good of civilization4 ,in just the degree that this ,exposition in its various divisions shall make a record of accomplishments1 and lead the way to further advance1 this enterprise has reached the expectations of its contributors and the hopes of its promoters4 ,this congress is the peak of the mountain that this ,exposition has builded on the highway of progress4 ,from its heights we contemplate the past1 record the present1 and gaze into the future4 ,this universal exposition is a world's university4 ,the ,international ,congress of ,arts and ,science constitutes the faculty2 the material on exhibition are the laboratories and the museums2 the students are mankind4 ,that in response to invitation of the splendid committee of patriotic men1 to whom all praise is due for their efforts in this crowning glory of the ,exposition1 so eminent a gathering of the scholars and savants of the world has resulted1 speaks unmistakably for the fraternity of the world1 for the sympathy of its citizenship1 and for the patriotism of its people4 ,in reply to these addresses of the officials of the ,exposition1 the honorary ,vice-,presidents for ,great ,britain1 ,france1 ,germany1 ,russia1 ,austria1 ,italy1 and ,japan made brief responses in behalf of their respective countries4 ,sir ,william ,ramsay of ,london spoke in the place of ,hon4 ,james ,bryce1 extending ,england's thanks for the courtesy which had been shown her representatives and declaring that ,england1 particularly in the scientific field1 looked upon ,america as a relative and not as a foreign country4 ,france was represented by ,professor ,jean ,gaston ,darboux1 ,perpetual ,secretary of the ,academy of ,sciences of ,paris1 who spoke as follows3-- ,,mr4 ,,president1 ,,ladies ,,and ,,gentlemen1--,my first word will be to thank you for the honor which you have been so courteous as to pay my country in reserving for her one of the vice-presidencies of the ,congress4 ,since the time of ,franklin1 who received at the hands of ,france the welcome which justice and his own personal genius and worth demanded1 most affectionate relations have not ceased to unite the scientists of ,france and the scientists of ,america4 ,the distinction which you have here accorded to us will contribute still further to render these relations more intimate and more fraternal4 ,in choosing me among so many of the better fitted delegates sent by my country1 you have without doubt wished to pay special honor to the ,acadmie des ,sciences and to the ,institut de ,france1 which ,i have the honor of representing in the position of ,perpetual ,secretary4 ,permit me therefore to thank you in the name of these great societies1 which are happy to count in the number of their foreign associates and of their correspondents so many of the scholars of ,america4 ,in like manner as the ,institut de ,france1 so the ,congress which opens to-day seeks to unite at the same time letters1 science1 and arts4 ,we shall be happy and proud to take part in this work and contribute to its success4 ,germany was represented by ,professor ,wilhelm ,waldeyer1 of the ,university of ,berlin1 who replied as follows3-- ,,mr4 ,,president1 ,,honored ,,assemblage1--,the esteemed invitation which has been offered to me in this significant hour of the opening of the ,congress of ,arts and ,science to greet the members of this congress1 and particularly my esteemed compatriots1 ,i have had no desire to decline4 ,i have been for a fortnight under the free sky of this mighty city--so ,i must express myself1 since enclosing walls are unknown in the ,united ,states--and this fact1 together with the hospitality offered me in such delightful manner by the ,chairman of the ,committee on ,congresses1 ,mr4 ,frederick ,w4 ,lehmann1 has almost made me a ,st4 ,louis man4 ,therefore ,i may perhaps take it upon myself to greet you here4 ,i confess that ,i arrived here with some misgiving--some doubts as to whether the great task which was here undertaken under most difficult circumstances could be accomplished with even creditable success4 ,these doubts entirely disappeared the first time ,i entered the grounds of the ,world's ,fair and obtained a general view of the method1 beautiful as well as practical1 by which the treasures gathered from the whole world were arranged and displayed4 ,i trust you1 too1 will have a like experience2 and will soon recognize that a most earnest and good work is here accomplished4 ,and ,i must remark at this time that we ,germans may indeed be well satisfied here2 the unanimous and complete recognition which our coperation in this great work has received is almost disconcerting4 ,what can be said of the whole ,exposition with reference to its extent and the order in which everything is arranged1 ,i may well say concerning the departments of science1 especially interesting to us4 ,in this hour in which the ,congress of ,arts and ,science is being opened1 we shall not express any thanks to those who took this part of the work upon their shoulders--a more difficult task indeed than all the others1 for here the problem is not to manage materials1 but heads and minds4 ,and as ,i see here assembled a large number of ,german professors--,i1 too1 belong to the profession--of whom it is said1 ,i know not with how much justice1 that they are hard to lead1 the labors of the ,directors and ,presidents of the ,congress could not have been1 and are not now1 small4 ,neither shall we to-day prophesy into what the ,congress may develop4 ,the greater number of speakers cannot expect to have large audiences1 but even to-day we can safely say this3 the imposing row of volumes in which shall be given to posterity the reviews here to be presented concerning the present condition1 and future problems of the sciences and arts as they appear to the scientific world at the beginning of the twentieth century1 will provide a monumental work of lasting value4 ,this we may confidently expect4 ,the thanks which we to-day do not wish to anticipate in words1 let us show by our actions to our kind ,american hosts1 and especially to the directors of the ,world's ,fair and of this ,congress4 ,with exalted mind1 forgetting all little annoyances which may and will come1 let us go forward courageously to the work1 and let us do our best4 ,let us grasp heartily the open hand honestly extended to us4 ,may this ,congress of ,arts and ,science worthily take part in the great and undisputed success which even to-day we must acknowledge the ,world's ,fair at ,st4 ,louis4 ,for ,austria ,dr4 ,theodore ,escherich1 of the ,university of ,vienna1 responded as follows3-- ,in the name of the many ,austrians present at the ,congress ,i express the thanks of my compatriots to the ,committee which summoned us1 for their invitation and the hospitality so cordially extended4444 ,i congratulate the authorities upon the idea of opening this ,congress4 ,how many world-expositions have already been held without an attempt having been made to exhibit the spirit that has created this world of beautiful and useful things8 ,it was reserved for these to find the form in which the highest results of human thought--,science--presented in the persons of her representatives1 could be incorporated in the compass of the ,world's ,fair4 ,the conception of this ,international ,congress of all ,sciences in its originality and audacity1 in its universality and comprehensive organization1 is truly a child of the young-,american spirit4444 ,after this ,congress has come to a close and the collection of the lectures delivered1 an unparalleled encyclopedia of human knowledge1 both in extent and content1 will have appeared4 ,we may say that this ,fair has become of epochal importance1 not alone for trade and manufactures1 but also for science4 ,these proud palaces will long have disappeared and been forgotten when this work1 a monumentum aere perennius1 shall still testify to future generations the standard of scientific attainment at the beginning of the twentieth century4 ,short acknowledgments were then made for ,russia by ,dr4 ,oscar ,backlund1 of the ,astronomical ,observatory at ,pulkowa1 ,russia1 and for ,japan by ,prof4 ,nobushige ,hozumi1 of the ,imperial ,university at ,tokio1 ,japan4 ,the last of the ,vice-,presidents to respond to the addresses of welcome was ,signor ,attilio ,brunialti1 ,councilor of ,state for ,italy1 who after a few formal words in ,english broke into impassioned eloquence in his native tongue1 and in brilliant diction and graceful periods expressed the deep feeling and profound joy which ,italy1 the mother of arts1 felt in participating in an occasion so historic and so magnificent4 ,signor ,brunialti said in part3 ,i thank you1 gentlemen1 for the honor you have paid both to my country and myself by electing me a ,vice-,president of this great scientific assembly4 ,would that ,i could thank you in words in which vibrate the heart of ,rome1 the scientific spirit of my land1 and all that it has given to the world for the progress of science1 literature1 and art4 ,you know ,italy1 gentlemen1 you admire her1 and therefore it is for this also that my thanks are due to you4 ,what ancient ,rome has contributed to the common patrimony of civilization is also reflected here in a thousand ways1 and a classical education1 held in such honor1 by a young and practical people such as yours1 excites our admiration and also our astonishment4 ,by giant strides you are reviving the activity of ,italy at the epoch of the ,communes1 when all were animated by unwearying activity and our manufactures and arts held the first place in ,europe4 ,i have already praised here the courageous spirit which has suggested the meeting of this ,congress--a ,congress that will remain famous in the annals of science4 ,many things in your country have aroused in me growing surprise1 but nothing has struck me more1 ,i assure you1 than this homage to science which is pushing all the wealthy classes to a noble rivalry for the increase of education and mental cultivation4 ,you have already large libraries and richly endowed universities1 and every kind of school1 where the works of ,greece and ,rome are perhaps even more appreciated and adapted to modern improvements than with us old classical nations4 ,full of energy1 activity1 and wealth1 you have before you perpetual progress1 and what1 up to this1 your youth has not allowed you to give to the world1 you will surely be able to give in the future4 ,use freely all the treasures of civilization1 art1 and science that centuries have accumulated in the old world1 and especially in my beloved ,italy2 fructify them with your youthful initiation and with your powerful energy4 ,by so doing you will contribute to peace1 and then we may say with truth that we have prepared your route by the work of centuries2 and like unto those who from old age are prevented from following the bold young man of ,longfellow in his course1 we will accompany you with our greetings and our alterable affection4 ,by my voice1 the native country of ,columbus1 of ,galileo1 of ,michelangelo and ,raphael1 of ,macchiavelli and ,volta1 salutes and with open arms hails as her hopeful daughter young ,america1--thanking and blessing her for the road she has opened to the sons of ,italy1 workmen and artists1 to civilization1 to science1 and to modern research and thought4 ,the ,chairman of the ,administrative ,board1 ,president ,nicholas ,murray ,butler1 of ,columbia ,university1 was prevented by illness in his family from being present at the ,congress1 and in place of the address to have been delivered by him on the idea and development of the ,congress and the work of the ,administrative ,board1 ,president ,william ,r4 ,harper1 of the ,university of ,chicago1 spoke on the same subject as follows3 ,i have been asked within a few hours by those in authority to present to you on behalf of the ,administrative ,board of this ,international ,congress a statement concerning the origin and purpose of the congress4 ,it is surely a source of great disappointment to all concerned that the chairman of the board1 ,president ,butler1 is prevented from being present4 ,many of us recall the fact that at the ,paris ,exposition of #ahhi the first attempt was made to do something systematic in the way of congresses4 ,this attempt was the natural outcome of the opinion which had come to exist that so splendid an opportunity as was afforded by the coming together of leaders in every department of activity should not be suffered to pass by unimproved4 ,what could be more natural in the stimulating and thought-provoking atmosphere of an exposition than the proposal to make provision for a consideration and discussion of some of the problems so closely related to the interests represented by the exposition8 ,the results achieved at the ,paris ,exposition of #ahhi were so striking as to lead those in charge of the ,world's ,columbian ,exposition in ,chicago1 #ahic1 to organize what was called the ,world's ,congress ,auxiliary1 including a series of congresses1 in which1 to use the language of the original decree1 the best workers in general science1 philosophy1 literature1 art1 agriculture1 trade1 and labor were to meet to present their experiences and results obtained in all those various lines of thought up to the present time4 ,seven years later1 in connection with the ,paris ,exposition of #aijj1 there was held another similar series of international congresses4 ,the general idea had in this way slowly but surely gained recognition4 ,the authorities of the ,universal ,exposition at ,st4 ,louis1 from the first1 recognized the desirability of providing for a congress which should exceed in its scope those that had before been attempted4 ,in the earliest days of the preparation for this ,exposition ,mr4 ,frederick ,j4 ,v4 ,skiff1 the ,director of the ,field ,columbian ,museum1 my nearest neighbor in the city of ,chicago1 took occasion to present this idea1 and particularly to emphasize the specific point that something should be undertaken which not only might add dignity and glory to the great name of the ,exposition1 but also constitute a permanent and valuable contribution to the sum of human knowledge4 ,after a consideration of the whole question1 which extended over many months1 the committee on international congresses resolved to establish an administrative board of seven members1 to which should be committed the responsibility of suggesting a plan in detail for the attainment of the ends desired4 ,this ,board was appointed in ,november1 #aijb1 and consisted of ,president ,nicholas ,murray ,butler1 of ,columbia ,university1 ,new ,york2 ,president ,r4 ,h4 ,jesse1 of the ,university of ,missouri2 ,president ,henry ,s4 ,pritchett1 of the ,massachusetts ,institute of ,technology2 ,dr4 ,herbert ,putnam1 ,librarian of ,congress2 ,mr4 ,frederick ,j4 ,v4 ,skiff1 of the ,field ,columbian ,museum1 ,chicago2 ,frederick ,g4 ,holls1 of ,new ,york ,city1 and the present speaker4 ,this ,board held several meetings for the study of the questions and problems involved in the great undertaking4 ,much valuable counsel was received and considered4 ,the ,board was especially indebted1 however1 to ,prof4 ,hugo ,mnsterberg of ,harvard ,university for specific material which he placed at their disposal--material which1 with modification1 served as the basis of the plans adopted by the ,board1 and recommended to the members of the ,exposition4 ,at the same time the ,administrative ,board recommended the appointment of ,dr4 ,howard ,j4 ,rogers as the ,director of ,congresses1 and nominated ,prof4 ,simon ,newcomb of the ,united ,states ,navy to be ,president of the ,congress1 and ,professors ,hugo ,mnsterberg of ,harvard ,university and ,albion ,w4 ,small of the ,university of ,chicago to be ,vice-,presidents of the ,congress2 the three to constitute the ,organizing ,committee of the ,congress4 ,this ,organizing ,committee was later empowered to visit foreign countries and to extend personal invitations to men distinguished in the arts and sciences to participate in the ,congress4 ,the reception accorded to these1 our representatives1 was most cordial4 ,of the #aej invitations thus extended1 #aag were accepted2 and of the #aag learned savants who accepted the invitation1 #if are here in person this afternoon to testify by their presence the interest they have felt in this great concourse of the world's leaders4 ,i am compelled by necessity this afternoon to omit many points of interest in relation to the origin and history of the undertaking1 all of which will be published in due time4 ,after many months of expectancy we have at last come together from all the nations of the world4 ,but for what purpose8 ,i do not know that to the statement already published in the programme of the ,congress anything can be added which will really improve that statement4 ,the purpose1 as it has seemed to some of us1 is threefold3 ,in the first place1 to secure such a general survey of the various fields of learning1 with all their subdivisions and multiplication of specialties1 as will at the same time set forth their mutual relations and connections1 and likewise constitute an effort toward the unification of knowledge4 ,this idea of unity has perhaps been uppermost in the minds of all concerned with the work of organizing the ,congress4 ,in the second place1 to provide a platform from which might be presented the various problems1 a solution of which will be expected of the scholarship of the future4 ,this includes a recognition of the fundamental principles and conception that underlie these mutual relations1 and therefore serve necessarily as the basis of all such future work4 ,here again the controlling idea is that of unity and law1 in other words1 universal law4 ,in the third place1 to bring together in person and spirit distinguished investigators and scholars from all the countries of the world1 in order that by contact of one with another a mutual sympathy may be promoted1 and a practical coperation may be effected among those whose lifework leads them far apart4 ,here1 still again1 unity of result is sought for4 ,as we now take up the work of this convention1 which already gives sure promise of being notable among the conventions that have called together men of different nations1 let us confidently assure ourselves that the great purpose which has throughout controlled in the different stages of its organization will be realized2 that because the ,congress has been held1 the nations of the earth will find themselves drawn more closely together2 that human thought will possess a more unified organization and human life a more unified expression4 ,following these addresses of welcome and of response came the first paper of the specific programme1 designed to be introductory to the division1 department1 and section addresses of the week4 ,this address1 which will be found in full in its proper place1 on pages #ace to #adg of this volume1 was given by ,dr4 ,simon ,newcomb1 ,president of the ,congress and ,chairman of the ,organizing ,committee1 whose labors for fifteen months were thus brought to a brilliant conclusion4 ,at the close of ,dr4 ,newcomb's address the assembly was dismissed by a few words of ,president ,francis1 in which he placed at the disposition of the members of the ,congress the courtesies and privileges of the ,exposition1 and expressed the hope and belief that their presence and the purpose for which they were assembled1 would be the crowning glory of the ,universal ,exposition of #aijd4 ,on ,tuesday1 ,september #bj1 the seven division addresses and the twenty-four department addresses were given1 all the speakers being ,americans3 ,royce1 in ,normative ,science2 ,wilson1 in ,historical ,science2 ,woodward1 in ,physical ,science2 ,hall1 in ,mental ,science2 ,jordan1 in ,utilitarian ,science2 ,lowell1 in ,social ,regulation2 and ,harris1 in ,social ,culture1 treating the main divisions of science and their applications1 each dwelling particularly on the scope of the great field included in his address and the unification of the work therein4 ,the forty-eight department speakers divided the field of knowledge1 one address in each department giving the fundamental conceptions and methods1 the other the history and development of the work of the department during the last century4 ,with ,wednesday the international participation began1 and in the one hundred twenty-eight sections into which the departments were divided one half of the speakers were drawn1 so far as circumstances permitted1 from foreign scientific circles4 ,with the exception of the last two sections1 ,religious ,influence ,personal1 and ,religious ,influence ,social1 the work of the ,congress closed on ,saturday afternoon4 ,these two sections having four speakers each were placed1 one on ,sunday morning and one on ,sunday afternoon1 in ,festival ,hall1 and passes to the grounds given upon application to any one desiring to attend4 ,large numbers availed themselves of the privilege1 and the closing hours of the ,congress were eminently suitable and worthy of its high success4 ,at the end of the afternoon session in ,festival ,hall1 ,vice-,president of the ,congress1 ,dr4 ,albion ,w4 ,small1 reviewed in a few words the work of the week1 its meaning to science1 its possible effect upon ,american thought1 and then formally announced the ,congress closed4 ,,official ,,banquet ,the official banquet given by the ,exposition to all participants1 members1 and officials of the ,congress1 on ,friday evening1 at the ,tyrolean ,alps banquet hall1 proved a charming conclusion to the labors of the week4 ,no better place could be imagined for holding it1 within the grounds of an exposition1 than the magnificently proportioned music and dining hall of the ,alps4 ,a room #afj feet by #aje feet1 capable of seating fifteen hundred banqueters2 the spacious1 oval1 orchestral stage at the south end2 the galleries and boxes along the sides of the hall done in solid ,german oak2 the beautiful and impressive mural decorations1 the work of the best painters of ,germany2 the excellence of the cuisine1 and the thoroughly drilled corps of waiters1 rendered the physical accessories of a banquet as nearly perfect as possible in a function so extensive4 ,the banquet was the largest held during the ,exposition period1 eight hundred invitations being issued and nearly seven hundred persons present4 ,the music was furnished by the famous ,garde ,rpublicaine ,band of ,france1 as the ,exposition orchestra was obliged to fill its regular weekly assignment at ,festival ,hall4 ,the decorations of the hall1 the lights and flowers1 the musical programme1 the galleries and boxes filled with ladies representing the official and social life of the ,exposition1 and the distinguished body of the ,congress1 formed a picture which appealed to the admiration and enthusiasm of every one alike4 ,no attempt was made to assign seats to the banqueters outside the speakers' table1 and little coteries and clusters of scientists1 many of whom were making acquaintances and intellectual alliances during this week which would endure for a lifetime1 were scattered about the hall1 giving an interest and an animation to the scene quite beyond the powers of description4 ,in one corner were ,harnack1 ,budde1 ,jean ,rville1 and ,cuthbert ,hall1 chatting as animatedly as though their religious theories were not as far apart as the poles2 in another1 ,waldeyer1 ,escherich1 ,jacobi1 ,allbutt1 and ,kitasato formed a medical group1 the counterpart of which would be hard to find unless in another part of this same hall2 still again were ,erdmann1 ,sorley1 ,ladd1 ,royce1 and ,creighton as the centre of a group of philosophers of world renown4 ,so in every part of the picture which met the eye were focused the leaders of thought and action in their respective fields4 ,the tout ensemble of the ,congress was here brought out in its strongest effect1 as1 with the exception of the opening exercises at ,festival ,hall at which time many had not arrived1 it was the only time when the entire membership was together4 ,the banquet coming at the close of the week was also fortunate1 as by this time the acquaintances made1 and the common incidents and anecdotes experienced1 heightened the enjoyment of all4 ,the toastmaster of the banquet and presiding officer1 ,hon4 ,david ,r4 ,francis1 was never in a happier vein than when he assumed the gavel and proposed the health of the ,president of the ,united ,states and the rulers of all nations represented at the board4 ,president ,francis said3-- ,,members ,,of ,,the ,,international ,,congress ,,of ,,arts ,,and ,,science3 ,on the faade at the base of the ,louisiana ,monument1 which is the central feature of this ,exposition picture1 is a group of ,livingston1 ,monroe1 and ,marbois4 ,it represents the signing of the treaty1 which by peaceful negotiation transferred an empire from ,france to the ,united ,states4 ,upon the inscription are the words of ,livingston1 ,we have lived long and accomplished much1 but this is the crowning act of our lives4 ,it is that transfer of an empire which this ,exposition is held to commemorate4 ,and paraphrasing the words of ,livingston1 permit me to say that ,i have presided over many dinners1 but this is the crowning act of my career4 ,in opening the deliberations of the ,international ,congress of ,arts and ,science1 ,i made the statement that a ,universal ,exposition is an ambitious undertaking4 ,i stated also that the ,international ,congress of ,arts and ,science is the crowning feature of this ,exposition4 ,i did not venture the assertion then which ,i have the presumption to make now1 that the most difficult task in connection with this ,universal ,exposition was the assembling of an ,international ,congress of ,arts and ,science4 ,i venture to make the statement now1 because ,i feel that ,i am justified in doing so by the success which up to the present has attended your deliberations4 ,any congregation of the leaders of thought in the world is a memorable occasion4 ,this is the first systematic one that has ever been attempted4 ,whether it proves successful or not1 it will be long remembered in the history of the civilized countries that have participated in it4 ,if it be but the precursor of other like assemblages it will still be long remembered1 and in that event it will be entitled to unspeakable credit if it accomplishes anything toward the realization of the very laudable objects which prompted its assembling4 ,the effort to unify all human knowledge and to establish the inter-relations thereof is a bold conception1 and requires the courage that characterizes the people who live in the western section of the ,united ,states4 ,if it be the last effort of the kind it will still be remembered1 and this ,universal ,exposition1 if it had done nothing else to endear it to cultured people of this and other countries1 will not be forgotten4 ,the savants assembled by the call of this ,exposition have pursued their respective lines of thought and research1 prompted by no desire other than one to find a solution of the problem which confronts humanity4 ,by bringing you together and making an effort to determine and establish the relations between all lines of human knowledge1 we have certainly made an advance in the right direction4 ,if your researches1 if the results of your studies1 can be utilized by the human race1 then we who have been the instruments of that great blessing will be entitled to credit secondary only to the men who are the discoverers of the scientific knowledge whose relations we are endeavoring to establish4 ,the ,management of the ,universal ,exposition of #aijd salutes the ,international ,congress of ,arts and ,science4 ,we drink to the perpetuation of that organization1 and ,i shall call upon its distinguished ,president1 ,professor ,newcomb1 to respond to the ,sentiment4 ,dr4 ,newcomb in a few words thanked the members of the ,congress for their participation1 which had made possible the brilliant success of the enterprise1 portrayed its effect and the influence of its perpetuation1 and then extended to all the invitation from the ,president of the ,united ,states to attend the reception at the ,white ,house on the following ,tuesday4 ,in responding to these toasts the senior ,honorary ,vice-,president1 ,hon4 ,james ,bryce1 of ,great ,britain1 spoke in matchless form and held the attention of the vast hall closely while he portrayed in a few words the chief glories of ,england in the field of science1 and the pride the ,english nation felt in the glorious record made by her eldest daughter1 the ,united ,states4 ,mr4 ,bryce spoke extemporaneously1 and his remarks cannot be given in full4 ,for ,germany1 ,commissioner-,general ,lewald responded in an eloquent address1 in which1 after thanking the ,exposition and the ,american ,government for the high honor done the ,german nation in selecting so large a percentage of the speakers from ,german scientific circles1 he enlarged upon the close relations which had existed between ,german university thought and methods and ,american thought and practice1 due to the vast number of ,american students who had pursued their post-graduate courses in the universities of ,germany4 ,he dwelt upon the pride that ,germany felt in this sincerest form of tribute to ,german supremacy in scientific thought1 and of the satisfaction which the influence in this country of ,german-trained students afforded4 ,he described at length the great exhibit made by ,german universities in the education department of the ,exposition1 and pointed to it as demonstrating the supremacy of ,german scientific thought and accurate methods4 ,dr4 ,lewald closed with a brilliant peroration1 in which he referred to the immense service done for the cause of science in the last fifty years of ,german history and to the patronage and support of the ,emperor1 not only to science in general1 but to this great international gathering of scientific experts1 and drank to the continued cordial relations of ,germany and ,america through its university circles and scientific endeavors4 ,for the response from ,france1 ,prof4 ,gaston ,darboux was delegated by ,commissioner-,general ,gerald1 who was unable to be present on account of sickness4 ,in one of the most beautiful and polished addresses of the evening1 ,professor ,darboux spoke in ,french1 of which the following is a translation3-- ,,gentlemen1--,graciously invited to respond in the name of the delegates of ,france who have accept the invitation of the ,american ,government1 ,i consider it my duty in the first place to thank this great nation for the honor which it has paid to us1 and for the welcome1 which it has extended to us4 ,those of you who are doing me the honor to listen1 know of that disagreeable feeling of isolation which at times the traveler in the midst of a strange people experiences2--that feeling ,i know only from hearsay4 ,we have not had a moment of time to experience it4 ,they are accustomed in ,europe to portray the ,americans as exclusively occupied with business affairs4 ,they throw in our faces the famous proverb1 ',business is ,business1' and give it to us as the rule of conduct for ,americans4 ,we are able to testify entirely to the contrary1 since the inhabitants of this beautiful country are always seeking to extend to strangers a thousand courtesies4 ,above all1 we have encountered no one who has not been anxious to go out of his way to give to us1 even before we had asked it1 such information as it was necessary for us to have4 ,and what shall ,i say of the welcome which we have received here at the hands of our ,american confrres1--,monsieur the ,president of the ,exposition1 ,monsieur the ,director of ,congresses and other worthy co-laborers8 ,the authorities of the ,exposition and the inhabitants of ,st4 ,louis have rivaled each other in making our stay agreeable and our ways pleasant in the heart of this magnificent ,exposition1 of which we shall ever preserve the most enchanting memory4 ,we should have wished to see in a more leisurely manner1 and to make acquaintance with the attractions without number with which the ,exposition literally swarms 7men of letters and men of science love at times to disport themselves7 and to study the exhibits classified in a method so exact in the palaces of an architecture so original and so impressive4 ,but ,monsieur ,newcomb has not permitted this4 ,the ,congress of which he is the illustrious ,president offers so much in the way of attractions1--of a kind a little rigorous it is true1--and so much of work to be accomplished1 that to our very great regret we have had to refuse many invitations which it would have been most agreeable to accept4 ,the ,americans will pardon us for this1 ,i am sure2 they know better than any one else the value of time1 but they know also that human strength has some limits1 especially among us poor ,europeans1 for ,i doubt whether an ,american ever knows the meaning of fatigue4 ,messieurs1 the ,congress which is about to terminate to-morrow has been truly a very great event4 ,it is the first time1 ,i believe1 that there has been seen assembled in one grand international reunion that which our great minister1 ,colbert1 had in mind1 and that which we have realized for the first time in our ,institut de ,france1--the union of letters1 science1 and arts4 ,that this union shall maintain itself in the future is the dearest wish of my heart4 ,science is a unit1 even as the ,universe4 ,the aspects which it presents know neither boundaries of states nor the political divisions established between peoples4 ,in all civilized countries they calculate with the same figures1 they measure with the same instruments1 they employ the same classifications1 they study the same historic facts1 economics1 and morals4 ,if there exists among the different nations some differences in methods1 these difference are slight4 ,they are a benefit at the same time as well as a necessity4 ,for the doing of the immense amount of work of research imposed on that part of humanity which thinks1 it is necessary that the subjects of study should not be identically the same1 or better1 if they are identical1 that the difference between the points of view from which they are considered in the different countries contribute to our better knowledge of their nature1 their results1 and their applications4 ,it is necessary then that each people preserve their distinctive genius1 their particular methods which they use to develop the qualities they have inherited4 ,in exactly the same way that it is important in an orchestra that each instrument play in the most perfect manner1 and with the timbre which accords with its nature1 the part which is given to it1 so in science as in music1 the harmony between the players is a necessary condition1 which each one ought to exert himself to realize4 ,let us endeavor then in scientific research to execute in the most perfect manner that part of the task which fate has devolved upon us1 but let us endeavor also to maintain that accord which is a necessary condition to the harmony which will alone be able in the future to assure the progress of humanity4 ,gentlemen1 in this international reunion it would not be fitting that ,i dwell upon the services which my country has been able to render to science2 and on the other hand it would be difficult for me to say to you exactly what part ,america is called upon to take in this concert of civilized nations2 but ,i am certain that the part will be worthy of the great nation which has given to itself a constitution so liberal and which in so short a space of time has known how to conquer1 and measure in value1 a territory so immense that it extends from ocean to ocean4 ,i lift my glass to the honor of ,american science2 ,i drink to the future of that great nation1 for which we1 as well as all other ,frenchmen1 hold so much of common remembrance1 so much of close and living sympathy1 and so much of profound admiration4 ,i am the more happy to do this in this most beautiful territory of ,louisiana1 which ,france in a former age ceded freely to ,america4 ,perhaps the treat of the evening was the response made in behalf of the ,empire of ,japan by ,professor ,hozumi1 of the ,faculty of ,law of the ,university of ,tokio4 ,unfortunately this response was not preserved in full1 but ,professor ,hozumi dwelt with much feeling on the world-wide significance of the ,congress and the common plane upon which all nations might meet in the pursuit of science and the manifold applications of scientific principles4 ,he paid a beautiful tribute to the educational system of the ,united ,states and to the great debt which ,japan owed to ,american scholars and to ,american teachers for their aid in establishing modern educational principles and methods in the ,empire of ,japan4 ,the impetus given to scientific study in ,japan by the ,japanese students trained in ,american universities was also earnestly dwelt upon1 and the close relations which had always existed between ,japanese and ,american students and instructors feelingly described4 ,in the field of science ,japan was yet young1 but she had shown herself a close and apt pupil1 and her period of initiative and original research was at hand4 ,in bacteriology1 in medicine1 in seismology1 oceanography1 and other fields1 ,japan has made valuable contributions to science and established the right to recognition in an international gathering of this nature4 ,it was with peculiar and grateful pride and pleasure that the ,japanese ,government had sent its delegation to this ,congress of selected experts in response to the invitation of the ,american ,government4 ,near the close of his address ,professor ,hozumi made a gracious and happy allusion1 based upon the conflict with ,russia1 in which he said that of all places where men meet1 and of all places sunned by the light of heaven1 this great ,congress1 built on the high plane of the brotherhood of science and the fellowship of scholars1 was the only place where a ,japanese and a ,russian could meet in mutual accord1 with a common purpose1 and clasp hands in unity of thought4 ,this chivalrous and beautiful idea1 given here so imperfectly from memory1 brought the great assembly to its feet in rounds of cheers4 ,in closing1 ,professor ,hozumi expressed the earnest belief that the benefits of science from a gathering of this nature would quickly be felt1 by a closer coperation in the application of theory and practical principles and a simultaneous advance in all parts of the world4 ,the closing response of the evening for the foreign members was made for ,italy by ,signor ,attilio ,brunialti1 whose brilliant eloquence at many times during the week had won the admiration of the members of the ,congress4 ,under the inspiration of this assemblage he fairly surpassed himself1 and the following translation of his remarks but poorly indicates the grace and brilliant diction of the original3-- ,i have had the good fortune to be present in this wonderful country at three international ,congresses1 that of science1 the peace parliament1 and the geographic4 ,i wish to record the impression they have excited in my mind1 already so favorably inclined by your never-to-be-forgotten and gracious reception4 ,you must1 please1 allow me to address you in my own language1 because the ,latin tongue inspires me1 because ,i wish to affirm more solemnly my nationality1 and also1 because ,i cannot express my feelings well in a language not familiar to me4 ,my country1 the land of ,columbus1 of ,galileo1 the nation that more than all others in ,europe is an element of peace1 is already in itself the synthesis of the three ,congresses4 ,and ,i can call to mind that this land is indebted to geography for the fact of its being made known to the world1 because the immortal ,genoese pointed it out to people fighting in the old world for a small territory1 and opened to mortals new and extensive countries destined to receive the valiant and the audacious of the entire world and to rise like yours to immortal glory4 ,thus the poet can sing1-- ,l'avanza1 l'avanza ,divino straniero1 ,conosci la stanza ,che i fati ti diero2 ,se lutti1 se lagrime ,ancora rinterra ,l'giovin la terra4 ,thus ,columbus of old could point out to men--who run down each other1 disputing even love for fear that man may become a wolf for man--the vast and endless wastes awaiting laborers1 and give to man the treasures of the fruitful land4 ',tis in the name of peace that ,i greet modern science in all its forms1 and ,i say to you chemists3 ,invent new means of destruction2 and to you mechanics and shipbuilders3 ,give us invulnerable men-of-war and such perfect cannons1 that your own progress may contribute to make war rarer in the world4 ,then will men1 amazed at their own destructive progress1 be drawn together by brotherly love1 by the development of common knowledge and sympathy1 and by the study of geography be led to know that there is plenty of room for every one in the world to contribute to progress and civilization4 ,americans6 these sentiments are graven in your country2 in point of fact1 it is a proof of the harmony that reigns in this ,congress between guests come from all parts of the world1 that ,i1 an ,italian1 am allowed to address you in my own language on ,american ground1 near the ,tyrolean ,alps1 greeted by the music of the ,rpublicaine ,french ,garde1 united in eternal bonds of friendship by the two great goddesses of the modern world1--,science and ,peace4 ,the last speaker of the evening was ,hon4 ,frederick ,w4 ,lehmann1 ,chairman of the ,exposition ,committee on ,congresses1 who in eloquent periods set forth the ambition of the city of ,st4 ,louis and the ,exposition of #aijd in creating a ,congress of intellect on the same high plane that had characterized the educational ideals of the ,exposition1 and the intense satisfaction which the officials of the ,congress felt in its brilliant outcome1 and the possibilities which it promised for an unequaled contribution to scientific literature4 ,at the close of these addresses the members of the ,congress and the spectators in the gallery sang1 in full chorus and under the lead of the ,garde ,rpublicaine ,band1 the various national anthems1 closing with ,the ,star ,spangled ,banner4 ,,publication ,,of ,,the ,,report ,in accordance with the recommendation of the ,administrative ,board to the ,committee on ,congresses1 the ,executive ,committee appointed ,dr4 ,howard ,j4 ,rogers1 ,director of ,congresses1 editor of the proceedings of the ,congress of ,arts and ,science4 ,the ,congress records were removed from ,st4 ,louis to ,albany1 ,new ,york1 the home of the ,director1 from which place the publication has been prepared4 ,upon collecting the papers it was found that they could be divided logically1 and with a fair degree of similarity in size1 into eight volumes1 each of which should cover a definite and distinct portion of the programme4 ,these are as follows3-- ,volume #a4 ,history of the ,congress1 ,scientific ,plan of the ,congress1 ,philosophy1 ,mathematics4 ,volume #b4 ,political and ,economic ,history1 ,history of ,law1 ,history of ,religion4 ,volume #c4 ,history of ,language1 ,history of ,literature1 ,history of ,art4 ,volume #d4 ,physics1 ,chemistry1 ,astronomy1 ,sciences of the ,earth4 ,volume #e4 ,biology1 ,anthropology1 ,psychology1 ,sociology4 ,volume #f4 ,medicine1 ,technology4 ,volume #g4 ,economics1 ,politics1 ,jurisprudence1 ,social ,science4 ,volume #h4 ,education1 ,religion4 ,the details and specifications of the volumes were prepared for competitive bids and submitted to twelve of the prominent publishers of the country4 ,the most advantageous bid was received from ,houghton1 ,mifflin ,company of ,boston1 ,mass41 and was accepted by the ,exposition ,company4 ,the ,administrative ,board and the authorities ,of the ,exposition feel deeply pleased at the result1 inasmuch as the imprint of this firm guarantees a work in full accord with the high plane upon which the ,congress has been conducted4 ,it was determined to print the entire proceedings in the ,english language1 inasmuch as the ,congress was held in an ,english-speaking country and the vast majority of the papers were read in that language4 ,the consent of every foreign speaker was obtained for this procedure4 ,it was found1 after collecting1 that the number of addresses to be translated was forty-four4 ,the translators were selected by the editor upon the advice of the members of the ,administrative ,board and ,organizing ,committee1 and great care was taken to find persons not only thoroughly trained in the two languages and possessing a good ,english style1 but also persons who were thoroughly conversant with the subject on which the paper treated4 ,many of the translators were suggested by the foreign speakers themselves4 ,as a result of this careful selection1 the editor feels confident that the original value of the papers has been in no wise detracted from1 and that both in form and content the translations are thoroughly satisfactory4 ,it will be found that some addresses are not closely related to the scheme of the ,congress4 ,either through some misunderstanding of the exact purpose of the ,congress1 or through too close devotion to their own particular phase of investigation1 some half-dozen speakers submitted papers dealing with special lines of work4 ,these1 while valuable and scholarly from their standpoint1 do not accord with a series of papers prepared with a view to general relations and historical perspective4 ,the exceptions are so few1 however1 as not seriously to interfere with the unity of the plan4 ,in the arrangement of the papers the order of the official programme is followed exactly1 with the exception that1 under ,historical ,science1 ,departments #c1 #d1 and #h1 covering ,history of ,politics1 ,law1 and ,religion1 are combined in one volume2 and ,departments #e1 #f1 and #g1 covering ,history of ,language1 ,literature1 and ,art1 are combined in the succeeding volume4 ,in volume one1 the first chapter is devoted to the history of the ,congress1 written by the editor1 in which is set forth the plain narrative of the growth and development of the ,congress1 as much for the benefit of similar undertakings in the future as for the interest of those participating in this ,congress4 ,the second chapter contains the scientific introduction1 written by ,prof4 ,hugo ,mnsterberg of ,harvard ,university1 ,first ,vice-,president of the ,congress and ,member of the ,organizing ,committee4 ,this is written for the purpose of giving in detail the principles upon which the classification was based1 and the relations which the different sections and departments held to each other4 ,each paper is prefaced by a very short biographical note in categorical form1 for the purpose of insuring the identity of the speaker as long in the future as the volumes may exist4 ,appended to the addresses of each department is a short bibliography1 which is essential for a general study of the subject in question4 ,these are in no wise exhaustive or complete1 but are rather designed to be a small1 valuable1 working reference library for students4 ,the bibliographies have been prepared by eminent experts in the departments of the ,congress1 but are necessarily somewhat uneven1 as some of the writers have gone into the subject more thoroughly than others4 ,the general arrangement of the bibliographies is3 #a4 ,historical books and standard works dealing with the subject4 #b4 ,general books for the whole department4 #c4 ,books for sections of departments4 ,appended also to the addresses of each department and sections are rsums of the ten-minute addresses delivered by invitation at the meeting of the department or section4 ,many of these papers are of high value2 but inasmuch as very few of them were written in accord with the plan of the ,congress1 and with the main thought to be developed by the ,congress1 but deal rather with some interesting and detached phase of the subject1 it has been deemed best not to print them in full1 but to indicate in brief the subject and the treatment given it by the writer4 ,those which do accord with the plan of the ,congress are given more extensive treatment4 ,,conclusion ,what the results of the ,congress will be2 what influence it may have2 was it worth the work and cost1 are questions often fairly asked4 ,the lasting results and influences are of course problematical4 ,they depend upon the character and soundness of the addresses1 and whether the uniform strength of the publication will make the work as a whole1 what it undoubtedly is in parts1 a source-book for the future on the bases of scientific theory at the beginning of the twentieth century1 and a reliable sketch of the growth of science during the nineteenth century4 ,critical study of the addresses will alone determine this1 but from the favorable reception of those already published in reviews1 and from editorial acquaintance with the others1 it seems assured4 ,that portion of the section addresses which deals with the inter-relations of science and demonstrates both its unity and variety of processes is new and authoritative thought1 and will be the basis of much discussion and remodeling of theories in the future4 ,the immediate results of the ,congress are highly satisfactory1 and fully repay the work and the cost both from a scientific and an exposition standpoint4 ,as an acknowledgment of the prominence of scientific methods1 as a public recognition of the work of scientists1 as the means of bringing to one place the most noted assemblage of thinkers the world has ever seen1 as an opportunity for scholars to meet and know each other better1 the ,congress was an unqualified success and of enduring reputation4 ,from the ,exposition point of view1 it was equally a success2 not financially1 nor was there ever a thought that it would be4 ,probably not more than seven thousand persons outside of ,st4 ,louis came primarily to attend the ,congress1 and their admission fees were a bagatelle2 the revenue derived from the sale of the ,proceedings will not meet the cost of printing4 ,there has been no money value sought for in the ,congress1--none received4 ,its value to the ,exposition lies solely in the fact that it is the final argument to the world of the initial claims of the officials of the ,exposition that its purpose was purely educational4 ,cordinate with the material exhibits1 sought1 classified1 and installed on a rigidly scientific classification1 the ,congress1 which relates1 illumines1 and defends the principles upon which the material portion was founded1 has triumphantly vindicated the good faith1 the wisdom1 and the foresight of the ,universal ,exposition of #aijd4 ,this printed record of its proceedings will be a monument not only to the spirit of ,science1 but to the spirit of the ,exposition1 which will endure as long as the records of man are preserved4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in conclusion1 the editor wishes to express his obligations to the many speakers and officers of the ,congress1 who have evinced great interest in the publication and assisted by valuable suggestions and advice4 ,in particular1 he acknowledges the help of ,president ,butler of ,columbia ,university1 ,professor ,mnsterberg of ,harvard ,university1 and ,professor ,small of the ,university of ,chicago4 ,acknowledgments are with justice and pleasure made to the ,committee on ,congresses of the ,exposition1 and the able chairman1 ,hon4 ,frederick ,w4 ,lehmann1 for their unwavering and prompt support on all matters of policy and detail1 without which the full measure of success could not have been achieved4 ,to the efficient secretary of the ,department of ,congresses1 ,mr4 ,james ,green ,cotchett1 an expression of obligation is due for his indefatigable labors during the ,congress period1 and for his able and painstaking work in compiling the detailed records of this publication4 ,at a meeting of the ,executive ,committee of the ,exposition on ,january #c1 #aije1 there was unanimously voted the following resolution1 recommended by the ,administrative ,board and approved by the ,committee on ,congresses3-- ,,moved3 that a vote of thanks and an expression of deepest obligation be tendered to ,dr4 ,simon ,newcomb1 ,president of the ,congress1 ,prof4 ,hugo ,mnsterberg1 vice-president of the ,congress1 and ,prof4 ,albion ,w4 ,small1 vice-president of the ,congress1 for their efficient1 thorough1 and comprehensive work in connection with the programme of the ,congress1 the selection and invitation of speakers1 and the attention to detail in its execution4 ,that1 in view of the enormous amount of labor devolving upon these three gentlemen for the past eighteen months1 to the exclusion of all opportunities for literary and other work outside their college departments1 an honorarium of twenty-five hundred dollars be tendered to each of them4 ,at a subsequent meeting the following resolution was also passed3-- ,,moved3 that the ,directors of the ,louisiana ,purchase ,exposition ,company place upon the record an expression of their appreciation of the invaluable aid so freely given by the ,administrative ,board of the ,congress of ,arts and ,science4 ,in organization1 guidance1 and results the ,congress was the most notable of its kind in history4 ,for the important part performed wisely and zealously by the ,administrative ,board the ,exposition ,management extends this acknowledgment4 ,,summary ,,of ,,expenses ,,of ,,the ,,congress ,office expenses #g1jbe #hb ,travel #c1hdg #bd ,exploitation1 ,organizing ,committee abroad #h1ffc #af ,traveling expenses1 ,american ,speakers #ca1cej ,traveling expenses1 ,foreign ,speakers #di1jjj ,honorariums #g1ejj ,banquet #c1ejj ,expenses for editing proceedings #e1hge ,estimated cost of printing proceedings #bb1jjj #ach1gfa #bb ,,international ,,congress ,,of ,,arts ,,and ,,science ,,universal ,,exposition ,,st4 ,,louis ,,september #ai-be #aijd 99 99 99 99 99 ,,programme ,,and ,,list ,,of ,,speakers ,,programme ,purpose and ,plan of the ,congress ,organization of the ,congress ,speakers and ,chairmen ,chronological ,order of ,proceedings ,programme of ,social ,events ,list of ,ten-minute ,speakers ,list of ,chairmen and ,principal ,speakers ,,index ,,subjects ,division ,a4 ,normative ,science ,department #a4 ,philosophy ,sec4 ,a4 ,metaphysics ,b4 ,philosophy of ,religion ,c4 ,logic ,d4 ,methodology of ,science ,e4 ,ethics ,f4 sthetics ,department #b4 ,mathematics ,sec4 ,a4 ,algebra and ,analysis ,b4 ,geometry ,c4 ,applied ,mathematics ,division ,b4 ,historical ,science ,department #c4 ,political and ,economic ,history ,sec4 ,a4 ,history of ,asia ,b4 ,history of ,greece and ,rome ,c4 ,medival ,history ,d4 ,modern ,history of ,europe ,e4 ,history of ,america ,f4 ,history of ,economic ,institutions ,department #d4 ,history of ,law ,sec4 ,a4 ,history of ,roman ,law ,b4 ,history of ,common ,law ,c4 ,comparative ,law ,department #e4 ,history of ,language ,sec4 ,a4 ,comparative ,language ,b4 ,semitic ,language ,c4 ,indo-,iranian ,languages ,d4 ,greek ,language ,e4 ,latin ,language ,f4 ,english ,language ,g4 ,romance ,languages ,h4 ,germanic ,languages ,department #f4 ,history of ,literature ,sec4 ,a4 ,indo-,iranian ,literature ,b4 ,classical ,literature ,c4 ,english ,literature ,d4 ,romance ,literature ,e4 ,germanic ,literature ,f4 ,slavic ,literature ,g4 ,belles-,lettres ,department #g4 ,history of ,art ,sec4 ,a4 ,classical ,art ,b4 ,modern ,architecture ,c4 ,modern ,painting ,department #h4 ,history of ,religion ,sec4 ,a4 ,brahminism and ,buddhism ,b4 ,mohammedism ,c4 ,old ,testament ,d4 ,new ,testament ,e4 ,history of the ,christian ,church ,division ,c4 ,physical ,science ,department #i4 ,physics ,sec4 ,a4 ,physics of ,matter ,b4 ,physics of ,ether ,c4 ,physics of the ,electron ,department #aj4 ,chemistry ,sec4 ,a4 ,inorganic ,chemistry ,b4 ,organic ,chemistry ,c4 ,physical ,chemistry ,d4 ,physiological ,chemistry ,department #aa4 ,astronomy ,sec4 ,a4 ,astrometry ,b4 ,astrophysics ,department #ab4 ,sciences of the ,earth ,sec4 ,a4 ,geophysics ,b4 ,geology ,c4 ,palontology ,d4 ,petrology and ,mineralogy ,e4 ,physiography ,f4 ,geography ,g4 ,oceanography ,h4 ,cosmical ,physics ,department #ac4 ,biology ,sec4 ,a4 ,phylogeny ,b4 ,plant ,morphology ,c4 ,plant ,physiology ,d4 ,plant ,pathology ,e4 ,ecology ,f4 ,bacteriology ,g4 ,animal ,morphology ,h4 ,embryology ,i4 ,comparative ,anatomy ,j4 ,human ,anatomy ,k4 ,physiology ,department #ad4 ,anthropology ,sec4 ,a4 ,somatology ,b4 ,archology ,c4 ,ethnology ,division ,d4 ,mental ,science ,department #ae4 ,psychology ,sec4 ,a4 ,general ,psychology ,b4 ,experimental ,psychology ,c4 ,comparative and ,genetic ,psychology ,d4 ,abnormal ,psychology ,department #af4 ,sociology ,sec4 ,a4 ,social ,structure ,b4 ,social ,psychology ,division ,e4 ,utilitarian ,sciences ,department #ag4 ,medicine ,sec4 ,a4 ,public ,health ,b4 ,preventive ,medicine ,c4 ,pathology ,d4 ,therapeutics and ,pharmacology ,e4 ,internal ,medicine ,f4 ,neurology ,g4 ,psychiatry ,h4 ,surgery ,i4 ,gynecology ,j4 ,ophthalmology ,k4 ,otology and ,laryngology ,l4 ,pediatrics ,department #ah4 ,technology ,sec4 ,a4 ,civil ,engineering ,b4 ,mechanical ,engineering ,c4 ,electrical ,engineering ,d4 ,mining ,engineering ,e4 ,technical ,chemistry ,f4 ,agriculture ,department #ai4 ,economic ,sec4 ,a4 ,economic ,theory ,b4 ,transportation ,c4 ,commerce and ,exchange ,d4 ,money and ,credit ,e4 ,public ,finance ,f4 ,insurance ,division ,f4 ,social ,regulation ,department #bj4 ,politics ,sec4 ,a4 ,political ,theory ,b4 ,diplomacy ,c4 ,national ,administration ,d4 ,colonial ,administration ,e4 ,municipal ,administration ,department #ba4 ,jurisprudence ,sec4 ,a4 ,international ,law ,b4 ,constitutional ,law ,c4 ,private ,law ,department #bb4 ,social ,science ,sec4 ,a4 ,the ,family ,b4 ,the ,rural ,community ,c4 ,the ,urban ,community ,d4 ,the ,industrial ,group ,e4 ,the ,dependent ,group ,f4 ,the ,criminal ,group ,division ,g4 ,social ,culture ,department #bc4 ,education ,sec4 ,a4 ,educational ,theory ,b4 ,the ,school ,c4 ,the ,college ,d4 ,the ,university ,e4 ,the ,library ,department #bd4 ,religion ,sec4 ,a4 ,general ,religious ,education ,b4 ,professional ,religious ,education ,c4 ,religious ,agencies ,d4 ,religious ,work ,e4 ,religious ,influence3 ,personal ,f4 ,religious ,influence3 ,social ,,purpose ,,and ,,plan ,,of ,,the ,,congress ,the idea of the ,congress grows out of the thought that the subdivision and multiplication of specialties in science has reached a stage at which investigators and scholars may derive both inspiration and profit from a general survey of the various fields of learning1 planned with a view of bringing the scattered sciences into closer mutual relations4 ,the central purpose is the unification of knowledge1 an effort toward which seems appropriate on an occasion when the nations bring together an exhibit of their arts and industries4 ,an assemblage is therefore to be convened at which leading representatives of theoretical and applied sciences shall set forth those general principles and fundamental conceptions which connect groups of sciences1 review the historical development of special sciences1 show their mutual relations and discuss their present problems4 ,the speakers to treat the various themes are selected in advance from the ,european and ,american continents4 ,the discussions will be arranged on the following general plan3-- ,after the opening of the ,congress on ,monday afternoon1 ,september #ai1 will follow1 on ,tuesday forenoon1 addresses on main divisions of science and its applications1 the general theme being the unification of each of the fields treated4 ,these will be followed by two addresses on each of the twenty-four great departments of knowledge4 ,the theme of one address in each case will be the ,fundamental ,conceptions and ,methods1 while the other will set forth the progress during the last century4 ,the preceding addresses will be delivered by ,americans1 making the work of the first two days the contribution of ,american scholars4 ,on the third day1 with the opening of the sections1 the international work will begin4 ,one hundred twenty-eight sectional meetings will be held on the four remaining days of the ,congress1 at each of which two papers will be read1 the theme of one being suggested by the relations of the special branch treated to other branches2 the other by its present problems4 ,three hours will be devoted to each sectional meeting1 thus enabling each hearer to attend eight such meetings1 if he so desires4 ,the programme is so arranged that related subjects will be treated1 as far as possible1 at different times4 ,the length of the principal addresses being limited to forty-five minutes each1 there will remain at least one hour for five or six brief communications in each section4 ,the addresses in each department will be collected and published in a special volume4 ,it is hoped that the living influence of this meeting will be yet more important than the formal addresses1 and that the scholars whose names are announced in the following programme of speakers and chairmen will form only a nucleus for the gathering of thousands who feel in sympathy with the efforts to bring unity into the world of knowledge4 ,,organization ,,of ,,the ,,congress 99 99 99 99 99 ,,president ,,of ,,the ,,exposition3 ,,hon4 ,,david ,r4 ,,francis1 ,a4,m41 ,,ll4,d4 ,,director ,,of ,,congresses1 ,,howard ,j4 ,,rogers1 ,a4,m41 ,,ll4,d4 ,universal ,exposition1 #aijd4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,administrative ,,board ,,nicholas ,,murray ,,butler1 ,,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,president of ,columbia ,university1 ,chairman4 ,,william ,r4 ,,harper1 ,,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,president of the ,university of ,chicago4 ,r4 ,h4 ,,jesse1 ,,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,president of the ,university of ,missouri4 ,,henry ,s4 ,,pritchett1 ,,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,president of the ,massachusetts ,institute of ,technology4 ,,herbert ,,putnam1 ,,litt4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,librarian of ,congress4 ,,frederick ,j4 ,v4 ,,skiff1 ,a4,m4 ,director of the ,field ,columbian ,museum4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,officers ,,of ,,the ,,congress ,,president3 ,,simon ,,newcomb1 ,,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,retired ,professor ,u4 ,s4 ,n4 ,,vice-,,presidents3 ,,hugo ,m,,nsterberg1 ,,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,professor of ,psychology in ,harvard ,university4 ,,albion ,w4 ,,small1 ,,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,professor of ,sociology in ,the ,university of ,chicago4 ,,honorary ,,vice-,,presidents3 ,,right ,,honorable ,,james ,,bryce1 ,m4,p4 ,,great ,,britain4 ,m4 ,,gaston ,,darboux1 ,,france4 ,,professor ,,wilhelm ,,waldeyer1 ,,germany4 ,,dr4 ,,oskar ,,backlund1 ,,russia4 ,,professor ,,theodore ,,escherich1 ,,austria4 ,,signor ,,attilio ,,brunialti1 ,,italy4 ,,professor ,n4 ,,hozumi1 ,,japan4 ,,executive ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,l4 ,o4 ,,howard1 ,permanent ,secretary ,american ,association for the ,advancement of ,science4 ,,speakers ,,and ,,chairmen 99 99 99 99 99 ,,division ,a--,,normative ,,science ,,speaker3 ,,professor ,,josiah ,,royce1 ,harvard ,university4 7,hall #f1 ,september #bj1 #aj a4 m47 99 99 99 99 99 ,,department #a--,,philosophy 7,hall #f1 ,september #bj1 #aa4ae a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,borden ,p4 ,,bowne1 ,boston ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,george ,h4 ,,howison1 ,university of ,california4 ,,professor ,,george ,t4 ,,ladd1 ,yale ,university4 ,,section ,a4 ,,metaphysics4 7,hall #f1 ,september #ba1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,a4 ,c4 ,,armstrong1 ,wesleyan ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,a4 ,e4 ,,taylor1 ,mc,gill ,university1 ,montreal4 ,,professor ,,alexander ,t4 ,,ormond1 ,princeton ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,a4 ,o4 ,,lovejoy1 ,washington ,university1 ,,section ,b4 ,,philosophy ,,of ,,religion4 7,hall #a1 ,september #ba1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,thomas ,c4 ,,hall1 ,union ,theological ,seminary1 ,n4 ,y4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,otto ,,pfleiderer1 ,university of ,berlin4 ,,professor ,,ernst ,,troeltsch1 ,university of ,heidelberg4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,w4 ,p4 ,,montague1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,section ,c4 ,,logic4 7,hall #f1 ,september #bb1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,george ,m4 ,,duncan1 ,yale ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,william ,a4 ,,hammond1 ,cornell ,university4 ,,professor ,,frederick ,j4 ,e4 ,,woodbridge1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,w4 ,h4 ,,sheldon1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,section ,d4 ,,methodology ,,of ,,science4 7,hall #f1 ,september #bb1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,james ,e4 ,,creighton1 ,cornell ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,wilhelm ,,ostwald1 ,university of ,leipzig4 ,,professor ,,benno ,,erdmann1 ,university of ,bonn4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,r4 ,b4 ,,perry1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,section ,e4 ,,ethics4 7,hall #f1 ,september #bc1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,george ,h4 ,,palmer1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,william ,r4 ,,sorley1 ,university of ,cambridge4 ,,professor ,,paul ,,hensel1 ,university of ,erlangen4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,f4 ,c4 ,,sharp1 ,university of ,wisconsin4 ,,section ,f4 ,,aesthetics4 7,hall #d1 ,september #bc1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,james ,h4 ,,tufts1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,speakers3 ,,dr4 ,,henry ,,rutgers ,,marshall1 ,new ,york ,city4 ,,professor ,,max ,,dessoir1 ,university of ,berlin4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,max ,,meyer1 ,university of ,missouri4 ,,department #b--,,mathematics 7,hall #g1 ,september #bj1 #aa4ae a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,henry ,s4 ,,white1 ,northwestern ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,maxime ,,bocher1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,professor ,,james ,p4 ,,pierpont1 ,yale ,university4 ,,section ,a4 ,,algebra ,,and ,,analysis4 7,hall #i1 ,september #bb1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,e4 ,h4 ,,moore1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,emile ,,picard1 the ,sorbonne2 ,member of the ,institute of ,france4 ,,professor ,,heinrich ,,maschke1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,g4 ,a4 ,,bliss1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,section ,b4 ,,geometry4 7,hall #i1 ,september #bd1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,m4 ,w4 ,,haskell1 ,university of ,california4 ,,speakers3 ,m4 ,,gaston ,,darboux1 ,perpetual ,secretary of ,the ,academy of ,sciences1 ,paris4 ,,dr4 ,,edward ,,kasner1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,thomas ,j4 ,,holgate1 ,northwestern ,university4 ,,section ,c4 ,,applied ,,mathematics4 7,hall #g1 ,september #bd1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,arthur ,g4 ,,webster1 ,clark ,university1 ,worcester1 ,mass4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,ludwig ,,boltzmann1 ,university of ,vienna4 ,,professor ,,henri ,,poincar1 the ,sorbonne2 ,member of the ,institute of ,france4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,henry ,t4 ,,eddy1 ,university of ,minnesota4 ,,division ,b--,,historical ,,science 7,hall #c1 ,september #bj1 #aj a4 m47 ,,speaker3 ,,president ,,woodrow ,,wilson1 ,princeton ,university4 ,,department #c--,,political ,,and ,,economic ,,history 7,hall #d1 ,september #bj1 #aa4ae a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,william ,m4 ,,sloane1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,professor ,,james ,h4 ,,robinson1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,sections ,a ,,and ,b4 ,,history ,,of ,,greece1 ,,rome1 ,,and ,,asia4 7,hall #c1 ,september #ba1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,thomas ,d4 ,,seymour1 ,yale ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,john ,p4 ,,mahaffy1 ,university of ,dublin4 ,,professor ,,ettore ,,pais1 ,university of ,naples4 ,director of the ,national ,museum of ,antiquities1 ,naples4 ,,professor ,,henri ,,cordier1 ,ecole ,des ,langues ,vivantes ,orientales1 ,paris4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,edward ,,capps1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,section ,c4 ,,mediaeval ,,history4 7,hall #f1 ,september #ba1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,charles ,h4 ,,haskins1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,karl ,,lamprecht1 ,university of ,leipzig4 ,,professor ,,george ,b4 ,,adams1 ,yale ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,earle ,w4 ,,dow1 ,university of ,michigan4 ,,section ,d4 ,,modern ,,history ,,of ,,europe4 7,hall #c1 ,september #bb1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,honorable ,,james ,b4 ,,perkins1 ,rochester1 ,n4 ,y4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,j4 ,b4 ,,bury1 ,university of ,cambridge4 ,,professor ,,charles ,w4 ,,colby1 ,mcgill ,university1 ,montreal4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,ferdinand ,,schwill1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,section ,e4 ,,history ,,of ,,america4 7,hall #a1 ,september #bd1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,dr4 ,,james ,,schouler1 ,boston4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,frederic ,j4 ,,turner1 ,university of ,wisconsin4 ,,professor ,,edward ,g4 ,,bourne1 ,yale ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,evarts ,b4 ,,greene1 ,university of ,illinois4 ,,section ,f4 ,,history ,,of ,,economic ,,institutions4 7,hall #b1 ,september #bc1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,frank ,a4 ,,fetter1 ,cornell ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,j4 ,e4 ,,conrad1 ,university of ,halle4 ,,professor ,,simon ,n4 ,,patten1 ,university of ,pennsylvania4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,j4 ,,pease ,,norton1 ,yale ,university4 ,,department #d--;,,history ,,of ,,law 7,hall #e1 ,september #bj1 #aa4ae a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,honorable ,,david ,j4 ,,brewer1 ,associate ,justice of the ,supreme ,court of the ,united ,states4 ,,speakers3 ,,honorable ,,emlin ,,mcclain1 ,judge of the ,supreme ,court of ,iowa1 ,iowa ,city4 ,,professor ,,nathan ,,abbott1 ,leland ,stanford ,jr4 ,university4 ,,section ,a4 ,,history ,,of ,,roman ,,law4 7,hall #aa1 ,september #ba1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,mr4 ,w4 ,h4 ,,buckler1 ,baltimore1 ,md4 ,,professor ,,munroe ,,smith1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,section ,b4 ,,history ,,of ,,common ,,law4 7,hall #aa1 ,september #ba1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,john ,d4 ,,lawson1 ,university of ,missouri4 ,,speakers3 ,,honorable ,,simeon ,e4 ,,baldwin1 ,judge of the ,supreme ,court of ,errors1 ,new ,haven1 ,conn4 ,,professor ,,john ,h4 ,,wigmore1 ,northwestern ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,c4 ,h4 ,,huberich1 ,university of ,texas4 ,,section ,c4 ,,comparative ,,law4 7,hall #ad1 ,september #bd1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,honorable ,,jacob ,m4 ,,dickinson1 ,chicago4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,nobushige ,,hozumi1 ,university of ,tokio4 ,,professor ,,alfred ,,nerincx1 ,university of ,louvain4 ,,secretary3 ,,department #e--;,,history ,,of ,,language 7,hall #d1 ,september #bj1 #b p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,george ,,hempl1 ,university of ,michigan4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,t4 ,r4 ,,lounsbury1 ,yale ,university4 ,,president ,,benjamin ,,ide ,,wheeler1 ,university of ,california4 ,,section ,a4 ,,comparative ,,language4 7,hall #d1 ,september #ba1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,francis ,a4 ,,march1 ,lafayette ,college4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,carl ,d4 ,,buck1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,professor ,,hans ,,oertel1 ,yale ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,e4 ,w4 ,,fay1 ,university of ,texas1 ,austin1 ,texas4 ,,section ,b4 ,,semitic ,,languages4 7,hall #d1 ,september #ba1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,g4 ,f4 ,,moore1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,james ,a4 ,,craig1 ,university of ,michigan4 ,,professor ,,crawford ,h4 ,,toy1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,c4 ,,indo-,,iranian ,,languages4 7,hall #h1 ,september #bb1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,sylvain ,l,,vi1 ,collge de ,france1 ,paris4 ,,professor ,,arthur ,a4 ,,macdonell1 ,university of ,oxford4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,d4 ,,greek ,,language4 7,hall #c1 ,september #bb1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,martin ,l4 ,d',,ooge1 ,university of ,michigan4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,herbert ,w4 ,,smyth1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,professor ,,milton ,w4 ,,humphreys1 ,university of ,virginia4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,j4 ,e4 ,,harry1 ,university of ,cincinnati4 ,,section ,e4 ,,latin ,,language4 7,hall #i1 ,september #bc1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,maurice ,,hutton1 ,university of ,toronto4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,e4 ,a4 ,,sonnenschein1 ,university of ,birmingham4 ,,professor ,,william ,g4 ,,hale1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,f4 ,w4 ,,shipley1 ,washington ,university4 ,,section ,f4 ,,english ,,language4 7,hall #c1 ,september #bc1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,charles ,m4 ,,gayley1 ,university of ,california4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,otto ,,jespersen1 ,university of ,copenhagen4 ,,professor ,,george ,l4 ,,kittredge1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,g4 ,,romance ,,languages4 7,hall #e1 ,september #bd1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,paul ,,meyer1 ,collge de ,france1 ,paris4 ,,professor ,,henry ,a4 ,,todd1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,e4 ,e4 ,,brandon1 ,miami ,university4 ,,section ,h4 ,,germanic ,,languages4 7,hall #c1 ,september #bd1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,gustaf ,e4 ,,karsten1 ,cornell ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,eduard ,,sievers1 ,university of ,leipzig4 ,,professor ,,herman ,,collitz1 ,bryn ,mawr ,college4 ,,secretary3 ,,department #f--;,,history ,,of ,,literature 7,hall #f1 ,september #bj1 #d4ae p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,james ,a4 ,,harrison1 ,university of ,virginia4 ,,professor ,,charles ,m4 ,,gayley1 ,university of ,california4 ,,section ,a4 ,,indo-,,iranian ,,literature4 7,hall #h1 ,september #bd1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,maurice ,,bloomfield1 ,johns ,hopkins ,university4 ,,speaker3 ,,professor ,a4 ,v4 ,w4 ,,jackson1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,b4 ,,classical ,,literature4 7,hall #c1 ,september #ba1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,andrew ,f4 ,,west1 ,princeton ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,paul ,,shorey1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,professor ,,john ,h4 ,,wright1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,f4 ,g4 ,,moore1 ,dartmouth ,college4 ,,section ,c4 ,,english ,,literature4 7,hall #a1 ,september #bb1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,francis ,b4 ,,gummere1 ,haverford ,college4 ,,professor ,,john ,,hoops1 ,university of ,heidelberg4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,d4 ,,romance ,,literature4 7,hall #h1 ,september #bb1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,adolphe ,,cohn1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,pio ,,rajna1 ,institute of ,higher ,studies1 ,florence1 ,italy4 ,,professor ,,alc,e ,,fortier1 ,tulane ,university1 ,new ,orleans4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,,comfort1 ,haverford ,college4 ,,section ,e4 ,,germanic ,,literature4 7,hall #c1 ,september #bc1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,kuno ,,francke1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,august ,,sauer1 ,university of ,prague4 ,,professor ,j4 ,,minor1 ,university of ,vienna4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,d4 ,k4 ,,jessen1 ,bryn ,mawr ,college4 ,,section ,f4 ,,slavic ,,literature4 7,hall #h1 ,september #ba1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,mr4 ,,charles ,r4 ,,crane1 ,chicago4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,leo ,,wiener1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,professor ,,paul ,,boyer1 ,ecole ,des ,langues ,vivantes ,orientales1 ,paris4 ,,secretary3 ,,mr4 ,s4 ,n4 ,,harper1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,section ,g4 ,,belles-,,lettres4 7,hall #c1 ,september #bd1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,robert ,,herrick1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,henry ,,schofield1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,professor ,,brander ,,matthews1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,department #g--;,,history ,,of ,,art 7,hall #h1 ,september #bj1 #aa4ae a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,halsey ,c4 ,,ives1 ,washington ,university1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,rufus ,b4 ,,richardson1 ,new ,york1 ,n4 ,y4 ,,professor ,,john ,c4 ,,van ,,dyke1 ,rutgers ,college4 ,,section ,a4 ,,classical ,,art4 7,hall #ab1 ,september #bb1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,rufus ,b4 ,,richardson1 ,new ,york ,city4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,adolph ,,furtwangler1 ,university ,of ,munich4 ,,professor ,,frank ,b4 ,,tarbell1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,p4 ,,baur1 ,yale ,university4 ,,section ,b4 ,,modern ,,architecture4 7,hall #g1 ,september #bb1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,mr4 ,,charles ,f4 ,,mckim1 ,new ,york ,city4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,c4 ,,enlart1 ,university of ,paris4 ,,professor ,,alfred ,d4 ,f4 ,,hamlin1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,mr4 ,,guy ,,lowell1 ,boston1 ,mass4 ,,section ,c4 ,,modern ,,painting4 7,hall #d1 ,september #bd1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,richard ,,muther1 ,university of ,breslau4 ,,mr4 ,,okakura ,,kakuzo1 ,japan4 ,,secretary3 ,,department #h--;,,history ,,of ,,religion 7,hall #e1 ,september #bj1 #b p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,rev4 ,,wm4 ,,eliot ,,griffis1 ,ithaca1 ,n4 ,y4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,george ,f4 ,,moore1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,professor ,,nathaniel ,,schmidt1 ,cornell ,university4 ,,section ,a4 ,,brahmanism ,,and ,,buddhism4 7,hall #h1 ,september #bc1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,hermann ,,oldenberg1 ,university of ,kiel4 ,,professor ,,maurice ,,bloomfield1 ,johns ,hopkins ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,,reginald ,c4 ,,robbins1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,section ,b4 ,,mohammedism4 7,hall #h1 ,september #bc1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,james ,r4 ,,jewett1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,ignaz ,,goldziher1 ,university of ,budapest4 ,,professor ,,duncan ,b4 ,,macdonald1 ,hartford ,theological ,seminary4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,c4 ,,old ,,testament4 7,hall #d1 ,september #bb1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,a4 ,s4 ,,carrier1 ,mc,cormick ,theological ,seminary4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,james ,f4 ,,mccurdy1 ,university ,college of ,toronto4 ,,professor ,,karl ,,budde1 ,university of ,marburg4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,james ,a4 ,,kelso1 ,western ,theological ,seminary1 ,allegheny1 ,pa4 ,,section ,d4 ,,new ,,testament4 7,hall #a1 ,september #bc1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,andrew ,c4 ,,zenos1 ,mc,cormick ,theological ,seminary4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,benjamin ,w4 ,,bacon1 ,yale ,university4 ,,professor ,,ernest ,d4 ,,burton1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,clyde ,w4 ,,votaw1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,section ,e4 ,,history ,,of ,,the ,,christian ,,church4 7,hall #b1 ,september #bd1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,dr4 ,,eri ,,baker ,,hulbert1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,adolf ,,harnack1 ,university of ,berlin4 ,,professor ,,jean ,r,,ville1 ,faculty of ,protestant ,theology1 ,paris4 ,,secretary3 ,,division ,c--,,physical ,,science 7,hall #d1 ,september #bj1 #aj a4 m47 ,,speaker3 ,,professor ,,robert ,s4 ,,woodward1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,department #i--,,physics 7,hall #f1 ,september #bj1 #b p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,henry ,,crew1 ,northwestern ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,edward ,l4 ,,nichols1 ,cornell ,university4 ,,professor ,,carl ,,barus1 ,brown ,university4 ,,section ,a4 ,,physics ,,of ,,matter4 7,hall #aa1 ,september #bc1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,samuel ,w4 ,,stratton1 ,director of ,the ,national ,bureau of ,standards1 ,washington4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,arthur ,l4 ,,kimball1 ,amherst ,college4 ,,professor ,,francis ,e4 ,,nipher1 ,washington ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,r4 ,a4 ,,milliken1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,section ,b4 ,,physics ,,of ,,ether4 7,hall #aa1 ,september #bc1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,henry ,,crew1 ,northwestern ,university4 ,,speaker3 ,,professor ,,dewitt ,b4 ,,brace1 ,university of ,nebraska4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,augustus ,,trowbridge1 ,university of ,wisconsin4 ,,section ,c4 ,,physics ,,of ,,the ,,electron4 7,hall #e1 ,september #bb1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,a4 ,g4 ,w,e,b,s,t,e,rr1 ,clark ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,p4 ,,langevin1 ,collge de ,france4 ,,professor ,,ernest ,,rutherfurd1 ,mc,gill ,university1 ,montreal4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,w4 ,j4 ,,humphreys1 ,university of ,virginia4 ,,department #aj--;,,chemistry 7,hall #e1 ,september #bj1 #d4ae p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,james ,m4 ,,crafts1 ,massachusetts ,institute of ,technology4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,john ,u4 ,,nef1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,professor ,,frank ,w4 ,,clarke1 ,chief ,chemist1 ,u4 ,s4 ,geological ,survey4 ,,section ,a4 ,,inorganic ,,chemistry4 7,hall #af1 ,september #ba1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,john ,w4 ,,mallet1 ,university of ,virginia4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,henri ,,moissan1 the ,sorbonne2 ,member of the ,institute of ,france4 ,,sir ,,william ,,ramsay1 ,k4,c4,b41 ,royal ,institution1 ,london4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,william ,l4 ,,dudley1 ,vanderbilt ,university4 ,,section ,b4 ,,organic ,,chemistry4 7,hall #af1 ,september #ba1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,albert ,b4 ,,prescott1 ,university of ,michigan4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,julius ,,stieglitz1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,professor ,,william ,a4 ,,noyes1 ,national ,bureau of ,standards4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,c4 ,,physical ,,chemistry4 7,hall #af1 ,september #bb1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,wilder ,d4 ,,bancroft1 ,cornell ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,j4 ,h4 ,,van ,t',,hoff1 ,university of ,berlin4 ,,professor ,,arthur ,a4 ,,noyes1 ,massachusetts ,institute of ,technology4 ,,secretary3 ,,mr4 ,w4 ,r4 ,,whitney1 ,schenectady1 ,n4 ,y4 ,,section ,d4 ,,physiological ,,chemistry4 7,hall #af1 ,september #bb1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,wilder ,o4 ,,atwater1 ,wesleyan ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,o4 ,,cohnheim1 ,university of ,heidelberg4 ,,professor ,,russell ,h4 ,,chittenden1 ,yale ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,c4 ,l4 ,,alsberg1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,department #aa--;,,astronomy 7,hall #h1 ,september #bj1 #d4ae p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,george ,c4 ,,comstock1 ,director of the ,observatory1 ,madison1 ,wisconsin4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,lewis ,,boss1 ,director of ,dudley ,observatory4 ,,professor ,,edward ,c4 ,,pickering1 ,director of ,harvard ,observatory4 ,,section ,a4 ,,astrometry4 7,hall #i1 ,september #ba1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,ormond ,,stone1 ,university of ,virginia4 ,,speakers3 ,,dr4 ,,oskar ,,backlund1 ,director of the ,observatory1 ,pulkowa1 ,russia4 ,,professor ,,john ,c4 ,,kapteyn1 ,university of ,groningen1 ,holland4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,w4 ,s4 ,,eichelberger1 ,u4 ,s4 ,naval ,observatory4 ,,section ,b4 ,,astrophysics4 7,hall #i1 ,september #ba1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,george ,e4 ,,hale1 ,director of the ,yerkes ,observatory4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,herbert ,h4 ,,turner1 ,f4,r4,s41 ,university of ,oxford4 ,,professor ,,william ,w4 ,,campbell1 ,director of ,the ,lick ,observatory1 ,mt4 ,hamilton1 ,california4 ,,secretary3 ,,mr4 ,w4 ,s4 ,,adams1 ,yerkes ,observatory4 ,,department #ab--,,sciences ,,of ,,the ,,earth 7,hall #c1 ,september #bj1 #aa4ae a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,dr4 ,g4 ,k4 ,,gilbert1 ,u4 ,s4 ,geological ,survey4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,thomas ,c4 ,,chamberlin1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,professor ,,william ,m4 ,,davis1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,section ,a4 ,,geophysics4 7,hall #ad1 ,september #ba1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,christopher ,w4 ,,hall1 ,university of ,minnesota4 ,,speaker3 ,,dr4 ,,george ,f4 ,,becker1 ,geologist1 ,u4 ,s4 ,geological ,survey4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,e4 ,m4 ,,lehnerts1 ,minnesota ,state ,normal ,school4 ,,section ,b4 ,,geology4 7,hall #ad1 ,september #ba1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,t4 ,c4 ,,chamberlin1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,speakers3 ,,president ,,charles ,r4 ,,van ,,hise1 ,university of ,wisconsin4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,r4 ,d4 ,,salisbury1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,section ,c4 ,,palaeontology4 7,hall #aa1 ,september #bb1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,william ,b4 ,,scott1 ,princeton ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,dr4 ,a4 ,s4 ,,woodward1 ,f4,r4,s41 ,british ,museum ,of ,natural ,history1 ,london4 ,,professor ,,henry ,f4 ,,osborn1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,,john ,m4 ,,clarke1 ,albany1 ,n4 ,y4 ,,section ,d4 ,,petrology ,,and ,,mineralogy4 7,hall #i1 ,september #bb1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,dr4 ,,oliver ,c4 ,,farrington1 ,field ,columbian ,museum1 ,chicago4 ,,speaker3 ,,professor ,f4 ,,zirkel1 ,university of ,leipzig4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,e4 ,,physiography4 7,hall #ab1 ,september #ba1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,mr4 ,,henry ,,gannett1 ,united ,states ,geological ,survey4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,albrecht ,,penck1 ,university of ,vienna4 ,,professor ,,israel ,c4 ,,russell1 ,university of ,michigan4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,,john ,m4 ,,clarke1 ,albany1 ,n4 ,y4 ,,section ,f4 ,,geography4 7,hall #aa1 ,september #bb1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,israel ,c4 ,,russell1 ,university of ,michigan4 ,,speakers3 ,,dr4 ,,hugh ,r4 ,,mill1 ,director ,british ,rainfall ,organization1 ,london4 ,,professor ,h4 ,,yule ,,oldham1 ,cambridge1 ,england4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,r4 ,d4 ,,salisbury1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,section ,g4 ,,oceanography4 7,hall #h1 ,september #ba1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,rear-,,admiral ,,john ,r4 ,,bartlett1 ,united ,states ,navy4 ,,speakers3 ,,sir ,,john ,,murray1 ,k4,c4,b41 ,f4,r4,s41 ,edinburgh4 ,,professor ,k4 ,,mitsukuri1 ,university of ,tokio4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,h4 ,,cosmical ,,physics4 7,hall #aj1 ,september #bb1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,francis ,e4 ,,nipher1 ,washington ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,svante ,,arrhenius1 ,university of ,stockholm1 ,stockholm4 ,,dr4 ,,abbott ,l4 ,,rotch1 ,blue ,hill ,observatory4 ,,dr4 ,l4 ,a4 ,,bauer1 ,washington1 ,d4 ,c4 ,,secretary3 ,,department #ac--;,,biology 7,hall #b1 ,september #bj1 #aa4ae a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,william ,g4 ,,farlow1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,john ,m4 ,,coulter1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,professor ,,jacques ,,loeb1 ,university of ,california4 ,,section ,a4 ,,phylogeny4 7,hall #b1 ,september #ba1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,t4 ,h4 ,,morgan1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,hugo ,,de ,,vries1 ,university of ,amsterdam4 ,,professor ,,charles ,o4 ,,whitman1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,b4 ,,plant ,,morphology4 7,hall #b1 ,september #bb1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,william ,,trelease1 ,washington ,university1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,frederick ,o4 ,,bower1 ,university of ,glasgow4 ,,professor ,,karl ,f4 ,,goebel1 ,university of ,munich4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,f4 ,e4 ,,lloyd1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,section ,c4 ,,plant ,,physiology4 7,hall #d1 ,september #bb1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,charles ,r4 ,,barnes1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,julius ,,wiesner1 ,university of ,vienna4 ,,professor ,,benjamin ,m4 ,,duggar1 ,university of ,missouri4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,f4 ,c4 ,,newcomb1 ,university of ,michigan4 ,,section ,d4 ,,plant ,,pathology4 7,hall #g1 ,september #bc1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,chas4 ,e4 ,,bessey1 ,university of ,nebraska4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,joseph ,c4 ,,arthur1 ,purdue ,university4 ,,merton ,b4 ,,waite1 ,u4 ,s4 ,department of ,agriculture4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,c4 ,s4 ,,shear1 ,u4 ,s4 ,department of ,agriculture4 ,,section ,e4 ,,ecology4 7,hall #g1 ,september #bc1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,oskar ,,drude1 ,kn4 ,technische ,hochschule1 ,dresden4 ,,professor ,,benjamin ,,robinson1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,f4 ,e4 ,,clements1 ,university of ,nebraska4 ,,section ,f4 ,,bacteriology4 7,hall #ae1 ,september #bd1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,harold ,c4 ,,ernst1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,edwin ,o4 ,,jordan1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,professor ,,theobald ,,smith1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,p4 ,h4 ,,hiss1 ,,jr41 ,columbia ,university4 ,,section ,g4 ,,animal ,,morphology4 7,hall #b1 ,september #ba1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,dr4 ,,leland ,o4 ,,howard1 ,department of ,agriculture1 ,washington1 ,d4 ,c4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,charles ,b4 ,,davenport1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,professor ,,alfred ,,giard1 the ,sorbonne2 ,member of the ,institute of ,france4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,c4 ,h4 ,,herrick1 ,dennison ,university4 ,,section ,h4 ,,embryology4 7,hall #i1 ,september #bc1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,simon ,h4 ,,gage1 ,cornell ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,oskar ,,hertwig1 ,university of ,berlin4 ,,professor ,,william ,k4 ,,brooks1 ,johns ,hopkins ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,t4 ,g4 ,,lee1 ,university of ,minnesota4 ,,section ,i4 ,,comparative ,,anatomy4 7,hall #b1 ,september #bd1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,james ,p4 ,,mcmurrich1 ,university of ,michigan4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,william ,e4 ,,ritter1 ,university of ,california4 ,,professor ,,yves ,,delage1 the ,sorbonne2 ,member of the ,institute of ,france4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,henry ,b4 ,,ward1 ,university of ,nebraska4 ,,section ,j4 ,,human ,,anatomy4 7,hall #b1 ,september #bb1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,george ,a4 ,,piersol1 ,university of ,pennsylvania4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,wilhelm ,,waldeyer1 ,university of ,berlin4 ,,professor ,h4 ,h4 ,,donaldson1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,r4 ,j4 ,,terry1 ,washington ,university4 ,,section ,k4 ,,physiology4 7,hall #d1 ,september #bc1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,dr4 ,s4 ,j4 ,,meltzer1 ,new ,york4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,max ,,verworn1 ,university of ,gttingen4 ,,professor ,,william ,h4 ,,howell1 ,johns ,hopkins ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,,reid ,,hunt1 ,washington4 ,,department #ad--;,,anthropology 7,hall #h1 ,september #bj1 #b p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,frederic ,w4 ,,putnam1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,dr4 ,w4 ,j4 ,,mcgee1 ,president ,american ,anthropological ,association1 ,washington1 ,d4 ,c4 ,,professor ,,franz ,,boas1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,section ,a4 ,,somatology4 7,hall #af1 ,september #bc1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,dr4 ,,edward ,c4 ,,spitzka1 ,new ,york ,city4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,l4 ,,manouvrier1 ,school of ,anthropology1 ,paris4 ,,dr4 ,,george ,a4 ,,dorsey1 ,field ,columbian ,museum1 ,chicago4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,e4 ,a4 ,,spitzka1 ,new ,york ,city4 ,,section ,b4 ,,archaeology4 7,hall #af1 ,september #bd1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,mr4 ,m4 ,h4 ,,saville1 ,american ,museum of ,natural ,history1 ,new ,york4 ,,speakers3 ,,se,,or ,,alfredo ,,chavero1 ,inspector of the ,national ,museum1 ,mexico4 ,,professor ,,edouard ,,seler1 ,university of ,berlin4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,william ,c4 ,,mills1 ,ohio ,state ,university4 ,,section ,c4 ,,ethnology4 7,hall #af1 ,september #bd1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,miss ,,alice ,c4 ,,fletcher1 ,president of the ,washington ,anthropological ,society4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,frederick ,,starr1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,professor ,a4 ,c4 ,,haddon1 ,university of ,cambridge4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,f4 ,w4 ,,shipley1 ,washington ,university4 ,,division ,d--,,mental ,,science 7,hall #g1 ,september #bj1 #aj a4 m47 ,,speaker3 ,,president ,g4 ,,stanley ,,hall1 ,clark ,university1 ,worcester1 ,mass4 ,,department #ae--,,psychology 7,hall #g1 ,september #bj1 #b p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,james ,,mck4 ,,cattell1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,professor ,j4 ,,mark ,,baldwin1 ,johns ,hopkins ,university4 ,,section ,a4 ,,general ,,psychology4 7,hall #f1 ,september #bc1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,jos4 ,,royce1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,harald ,,hoeffding1 ,university of ,copenhagen4 ,,professor ,,james ,,ward1 ,university of ,cambridge1 ,england4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,w4 ,h4 ,,davis1 ,lehigh ,university4 ,,section ,b4 ,,experimental ,,psychology4 7,hall #b1 ,september #bc1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,edward ,a4 ,,pace1 ,catholic ,university of ,america4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,robert ,,macdougal1 ,new ,york ,university4 ,,professor ,,edward ,b4 ,,titchener1 ,cornell ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,r4 ,s4 ,,woodworth1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,section ,c4 ,,comparative ,,and ,,genetic ,,psychology4 7,hall #f1 ,september #bd1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,edmund ,c4 ,,sanford1 ,clark ,university1 ,worcester1 ,mass4 ,,speakers3 ,,principal ,c4 ,,lloyd ,,morgan1 ,university ,college1 ,bristol4 ,,professor ,,mary ,w4 ,,calkins1 ,wellesley ,college4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,r4 ,m4 ,,yerkes1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,section ,d4 ,,abnormal ,,psychology4 7,hall #f1 ,september #bd1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,dr4 ,,edward ,,cowles1 ,waverley1 ,mass4 ,,speakers3 ,,dr4 ,,pierre ,,janet1 ,collge de ,france1 ,paris4 ,,dr4 ,,morton ,,prince1 ,boston4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,,adolph ,,meyer1 ,new ,york ,city4 ,,department #af--,,sociology 7,hall #g1 ,september #bj1 #d4ae p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,frank ,w4 ,,blackmar1 ,university of ,kansas4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,franklin ,h4 ,,giddings1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,professor ,,george ,e4 ,,vincent1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,section ,a4 ,,social ,,structure4 7,hall #ae1 ,september #ba1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,frederick ,w4 ,,moore1 ,vanderbilt ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,field ,,marshal ,,gustav ,,ratzenhofer1 ,vienna4 ,,professor ,f4 ,,toennies1 ,university of ,kiel4 ,,professor ,,lester ,f4 ,,ward1 ,u4 ,s4 ,national ,museum4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,jerome ,,dowd1 ,university of ,wisconsin4 ,,section ,b4 ,,social ,,psychology4 7,hall #ae1 ,september #bc1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,charles ,a4 ,,ellwood1 ,university of ,missouri4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,wm4 ,i4 ,,thomas1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,professor ,,edward ,a4 ,,ross1 ,university of ,nebraska4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,e4 ,c4 ,,hayes1 ,miami ,university4 ,,division ,e--,,utilitarian ,,sciences 7,hall #a1 ,september #bj1 #aj a4 m47 ,,speaker3 ,,president ,,david ,,starr ,,jordan1 ,leland ,stanford ,jr4 ,university4 ,,department #ag--,,medicine 7,hall #a1 ,september #bj1 #d4ae p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,dr4 ,,william ,,osler1 ,johns ,hopkins ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,dr4 ,,william ,t4 ,,councilman1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,dr4 ,,frank ,,billings1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,section ,a4 ,,public ,,health4 7,hall #ac1 ,september #ba1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,dr4 ,,walter ,,wyman1 ,surgeon-,general of the ,u4 ,s4 ,marine ,hospital ,service4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,william ,t4 ,,sedgwick1 ,massachusetts ,institute of ,technology4 ,,dr4 ,,ernst ,j4 ,,lederle1 ,former ,commissioner of ,health1 ,new ,york ,city4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,h4 ,m4 ,,bracken1 ,st4 ,paul1 ,minn4 ,,section ,b4 ,,preventive ,,medicine4 7,hall #ac1 ,september #ba1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,dr4 ,,joseph ,m4 ,,mathews1 ,president of the ,state ,board of ,health1 ,louisville1 ,ky4 ,,speaker3 ,,professor ,,ronald ,,ross1 ,f4,r4,s41 ,school of ,tropical ,medicine1 ,university ,college1 ,liverpool4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,j4 ,n4 ,,hurty1 ,indianapolis1 ,ind4 ,,section ,c4 ,,pathology4 7,hall #ac1 ,september #bb1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,simon ,,flexner1 ,director of the ,rockefeller ,institute4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,ludwig ,,hektoen1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,professor ,,johannes ,,orth1 ,university of ,berlin4 ,,professor ,,shibasaburo ,,kitasato1 ,university of ,tokio4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,w4 ,,mcn4 ,,miller1 ,university of ,missouri4 ,,section ,d4 ,,therapeutics ,,and ,,pharmacology4 7,hall #ac1 ,september #bd1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,dr4 ,,hobart ,a4 ,,hare1 ,jefferson ,medical ,college4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,oscar ,,liebreich1 ,university of ,berlin4 ,,sir ,,lauder ,,brunton1 ,f4,r4,s41 ,london4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,h4 ,b4 ,,favill1 ,chicago1 ,ill4 ,,section ,e4 ,,internal ,,medicine4 7,hall #ac1 ,september #bc1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,frederick ,c4 ,,shattuck1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,t4 ,,clifford ,,allbutt1 ,f4,r4,s41 ,university of ,cambridge4 ,,professor ,,william ,s4 ,,thayer1 ,johns ,hopkins ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,r4 ,c4 ,,cabot1 ,boston1 ,mass4 ,,section ,f4 ,,neurology4 7,hall #ac1 ,september #bb1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,lewellyn ,f4 ,,barker1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,speaker3 ,,professor ,,james ,j4 ,,putnam1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,g4 ,,psychiatry4 7,hall #g1 ,september #bb1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,dr4 ,,charles ,l4 ,,dana1 ,cornell ,university1 ,new ,york4 ,,dr4 ,,edward ,,cowles1 ,boston4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,c4 ,g4 ,,chadddock1 ,st4 ,louis1 ,mo4 ,,section ,h4 ,,surgery4 7,hall #ac1 ,september #bc1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,carl ,,beck1 ,post-,graduate ,medical ,school1 ,new ,york4 ,,speakers3 ,,dr4 ,,frederic ,s4 ,,dennis1 ,f4,r4,c4,s41 ,cornell ,medical ,college1 ,new ,york ,city4 ,,professor ,,johannes ,,orth1 ,university of ,berlin4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,j4 ,f4 ,,binnie1 ,kansas ,city1 ,mo4 ,,section ,i4 ,,gynecology4 7,hall #ac1 ,september #bd1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,howard ,a4 ,,kelly1 ,johns ,hopkins ,university4 ,,speaker3 ,,professor ,j4 ,,clarence ,,webster1 ,rush ,medical ,college1 ,chicago4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,g4 ,h4 ,,noble1 ,atlanta1 ,ga4 ,,section ,j4 ,,ophthalmology4 7,hall #g1 ,september #bd1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,dr4 ,,george ,c4 ,,harlan1 ,philadelphia1 ,pa4 ,,speakers3 ,,dr4 ,,edward ,,jackson1 ,denver1 ,col4 ,,dr4 ,,george ,m4 ,,gould1 ,philadelphia1 ,pa4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,,wm4 ,m4 ,,sweet1 ,jefferson ,medical ,college1 ,philadelphia1 ,pa4 ,,section ,k4 ,,otology ,,and ,,laryngology4 7,hall #g1 ,september #ba1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,william ,c4 ,,glasgow1 ,washington ,university1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,,speaker3 ,,sir ,,felix ,,semon1 ,c4,v4,o41 ,physician ,extraordinary to ,his ,majesty1 the ,king1 ,london4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,s4 ,,spencer1 ,allenhurst1 ,n4 ,j4 ,,section ,l4 ,,pediatrics4 7,hall #g1 ,september #ba1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,thomas ,m4 ,,rotch1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,theodore ,,escherich1 ,university of ,vienna4 ,,professor ,,abraham ,,jacobi1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,,samuel ,s4 ,,adams1 ,washington1 ,d4 ,c4 ,,department #ah--,,technology4 7,hall #c1 ,september #bj1 #b p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,chancellor ,,winfield ,s4 ,,chaplin1 ,washington ,university1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,,speaker3 ,,professor ,,henry ,t4 ,,bovey1 ,f4,r4,s41 ,mc,gill ,university1 ,montreal4 ,,section ,a4 ,,civil ,,engineering4 7,hall #aj1 ,september #ba1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,william ,h4 ,,burr1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,dr4 ,j4 ,a4 ,l4 ,,waddell1 ,consulting ,engineer1 ,kansas ,city4 ,,mr4 ,,lewis ,m4 ,,haupt1 ,consulting ,engineer1 ,philadelphia4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,b4 ,,mechanical ,,engineering4 7,hall #aj1 ,september #bc1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,james ,e4 ,,denton1 ,stevens ,institute of ,technology4 ,,speaker3 ,,professor ,,albert ,w4 ,,smith1 ,leland ,stanford ,jr4 ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,mr4 ,,george ,,dinkel1 ,,jr41 ,jersey ,city4 ,,section ,c4 ,,electrical ,,engineering4 7,hall #aj1 ,september #bb1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,arthur ,e4 ,,kennelly1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,professor ,,michael ,i4 ,,pupin1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,mr4 ,,carl ,,hering1 ,philadelphia1 ,pa4 ,,section ,d4 ,,mining ,,engineering4 7,hall #aa1 ,september #bd1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,mr4 ,,john ,,hays ,,hammond1 ,new ,york ,city4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,robert ,h4 ,,richards1 ,massachusetts ,institute of ,technology4 ,,professor ,,samuel ,b4 ,,christy1 ,university of ,california4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,,joseph ,,struthers1 ,new ,york ,city4 ,,section ,e4 ,,technical ,,chemistry4 7,hall #af1 ,september #bc1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,dr4 ,h4 ,w4 ,,wiley1 ,department of ,agriculture4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,charles ,e4 ,,munroe1 ,george ,washington ,university4 ,,professor ,,william ,h4 ,,walker1 ,massachusetts ,institute of ,technology4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,,marcus ,,benjamin1 ,u4 ,s4 ,national ,museum4 ,,section ,f4 ,,agriculture4 7,hall #aj1 ,september #bd1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,h4 ,j4 ,,wheeler1 ,kingston1 ,r4 ,i4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,charles ,w4 ,,dabney1 ,,jr41 ,university of ,cincinnati4 ,,professor ,,liberty ,h4 ,,bailey1 ,cornell ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,william ,,hill1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,department #ai--;,,economics 7,hall #a1 ,september #bj1 #aa4ae a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,emory ,r4 ,,johnson1 ,university of ,pennsylvania4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,frank ,a4 ,,fetter1 ,cornell ,university4 ,,professor ,,adolph ,c4 ,,miller1 ,university of ,california4 ,,section ,a4 ,,economic ,,theory4 7,hall #ae1 ,september #bb1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,john ,b4 ,,clark1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,professor ,,jacob ,h4 ,,hollander1 ,johns ,hopkins ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,jesse ,e4 ,,pope1 ,university of ,missouri4 ,,section ,b4 ,,transportation4 7,hall #aj1 ,september #bc1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,j4 ,,lawrence ,,laughlin1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,eugene ,,von ,,philippovich1 ,university of ,vienna4 ,,professor ,,william ,z4 ,,ripley1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,mr4 ,,george ,g4 ,,tunell1 ,chicago4 ,,section ,c4 ,,commerce ,,and ,,exchange4 7,hall #aj1 ,september #bd1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,e4 ,d4 ,,jones1 ,university of ,michigan4 ,,professor ,,carl ,,plehn1 ,university of ,california4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,d4 ,,money ,,and ,,credit4 7,hall #e1 ,september #bd1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,mr4 ,b4 ,e4 ,,walker1 ,canadian ,bank of ,commerce1 ,toronto4 ,,speakers3 ,,mr4 ,,horace ,,white1 ,new ,york ,city4 ,,professor ,j4 ,,lawrence ,,laughlin1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,john ,,cummings1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,section ,e4 ,,public ,,finance4 7,hall #a1 ,september #ba1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,henry ,c4 ,,adams1 ,university of ,michigan4 ,,professor ,,edwin ,r4 ,a4 ,,seligman1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,f4 ,,insurance4 7,hall #aj1 ,september #ba1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,dr4 ,,emory ,,mcclintock1 ,actuary1 ,mutual ,life ,insurance ,company1 ,new ,york4 ,,speakers3 ,,mr4 ,,frederick ,l4 ,,hoffman1 ,statistician1 ,prudential ,insurance ,company1 ,newark4 ,,professor ,,balthasar ,h4 ,,meyer1 ,university of ,wisconsin4 ,,secretary3 ,,division ,f--,,social ,,regulation 7,hall #b1 ,september #bj1 #aj a4 m47 ,,speaker3 ,,professor ,,abbott ,l4 ,,lowell1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,department #bj--,,politics 7,hall #b1 ,september #bj1 #b p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,william ,a4 ,,dunning1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,chancellor ,e4 ,,benjamin ,,andrews1 ,university of ,nebraska4 ,,sections ,a ,,and ,c4 ,,political ,,theory ,,and ,,national ,,administration4 7,hall #ae1 ,september #bb1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,w4 ,w4 ,,willoughby1 ,johns ,hopkins ,university4 ,,professor ,,george ,g4 ,,wilson1 ,brown ,university4 ,,right ,,hon4 ,,james ,,bryce1 ,london1 ,england4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,,charles ,e4 ,,merriam1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,section ,b4 ,,diplomacy4 7,hall #a1 ,september #bc1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,honorable ,,john ,w4 ,,foster1 ,ex-,secretary of ,state4 ,,honorable ,,david ,,jayne ,,hill1 ,minister of the ,united ,states to ,switzerland4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,d4 ,,colonial ,,administration4 7,hall #d1 ,september #bd1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,harry ,p4 ,,judson1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,bernard ,j4 ,,moses1 ,university of ,california4 ,,professor ,,paul ,s4 ,,reinsch1 ,university of ,wisconsin4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,e4 ,,municipal ,,administration4 7,hall #ae1 ,september #bd1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,mr4 ,,albert ,,shaw1 ,editor ,american ,monthly ,review of ,reviews4 ,,miss ,,jane ,,addams1 ,hull ,house1 ,chicago4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,john ,a4 ,,fairlie1 ,university of ,michigan4 ,,department #ba--;,,jurisprudence 7,hall #c1 ,september #bj1 #d4ae p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,george ,w4 ,,kirchwey1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,president ,,charles ,w4 ,,needham1 ,columbian ,university1 ,washington4 ,,professor ,,joseph ,h4 ,,beale1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,section ,a4 ,,international ,,law4 7,hall #ad1 ,september #bb1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,james ,b4 ,,scott1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,h4 ,,lafontaine1 ,member of the ,senate1 ,brussels1 ,belgium4 ,,professor ,,charles ,,noble ,,gregory1 ,university of ,iowa4 ,,count ,,albert ,,apponyi1 ,hungary4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,w4 ,c4 ,,dennis1 ,leland ,stanford ,jr4 ,university4 ,,section ,b4 ,,constitutional ,,law4 7,hall #ad1 ,september #bd1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,henry ,,st4 ,,george ,,tucker1 ,george ,washington ,university1 ,washington4 ,,speakers3 ,,signor ,,attilio ,,brunialti1 ,councilor of ,state1 ,rome4 ,,professor ,,john ,w4 ,,burgess1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,professor ,,ferdinand ,,larnaude1 ,university of ,paris4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,c4 ,,private ,,law4 7,hall #ad1 ,september #bc1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,james ,b4 ,,ames1 ,dean1 ,harvard ,law ,school4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,ernst ,,freund1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,honorable ,,edward ,b4 ,,whitney1 ,new ,york4 ,,secretary3 ,,dean ,,william ,,draper ,,lewis1 ,university of ,pennsylvania4 ,,department #bb--,,social ,,science 7,hall #a1 ,september #bj1 #b p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,mr4 ,,walter ,l4 ,,sheldon1 ,ethical ,society1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,felix ,,adler1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,professor ,,graham ,,taylor1 ,chicago ,theological ,seminary4 ,,section ,a4 ,,the ,,family4 7,hall #e1 ,september #ba1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,samuel ,g4 ,,smith1 ,university of ,minnesota4 ,,speakers3 ,,dr4 ,,samuel ,w4 ,,dike1 ,auburndale1 ,mass4 ,,professor ,,george ,,elliott ,,howard1 ,university of ,nebraska4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,b4 ,,the ,,rural ,,community4 7,hall #e1 ,september #ba1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,hon4 ,,aaron ,,jones1 ,master of ,national ,grange1 ,south ,bend1 ,ind4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,max ,,weber1 ,university of ,heidelberg4 ,,president ,,kenyon ,l4 ,,butterfield1 ,rhode ,island ,state ,agricultural ,college4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,william ,,hill1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,section ,c4 ,,the ,,urban ,,community4 7,hall #e1 ,september #bb1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,t4 ,,jastrow1 ,university of ,berlin4 ,,professor ,,louis ,,wuarin1 ,university of ,geneva4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,d4 ,,the ,,industrial ,,group4 7,hall #ad1 ,september #bb1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,werner ,,sombart1 ,university of ,breslau4 ,,professor ,,richard ,t4 ,,ely1 ,university of ,wisconsin4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,thomas ,s4 ,,adams1 ,madison1 ,wis4 ,,section ,e4 ,,the ,,dependent ,,group4 7,hall #e1 ,september #bc1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,mr4 ,,robert ,w4 ,,deforest1 ,new ,york ,city4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,charles ,r4 ,,henderson1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,dr4 ,,emil ,m,,nsterberg1 ,president ,city ,charities1 ,berlin4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,f4 ,,the ,,criminal ,,group4 7,hall #e1 ,september #bc1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speaker3 ,,mr4 ,,frederick ,h4 ,,wines1 ,secretary ,state ,charities ,aid ,association1 ,upper ,montclair1 ,n4 ,j4 ,,secretary3 ,,division ,g--,,social ,,culture 7,hall #e1 ,september #bj1 #aj a4 m47 ,,speaker3 ,,honorable ,,william ,t4 ,,harris1 ,united ,states ,commissioner of ,education4 ,,department #bc--;,,education 7,hall #b1 ,september #bj1 #d4ae p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,president ,,arthur ,t4 ,,hadley1 ,yale ,university4 ,,the ,,right ,,rev4 ,,john ,l4 ,,spalding1 ,bishop of ,peoria4 ,,section ,a4 ,,educational ,,theory4 7,hall #ab1 ,september #bd1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,charles ,,degarmo1 ,cornell ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,wilhelm ,,rein1 ,university of ,jena4 ,,professor ,,elmer ,e4 ,,brown1 ,university of ,california4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,g4 ,m4 ,,whittle1 ,cornell ,university4 ,,section ,b4 ,,the ,,school4 7,hall #ab1 ,september #bc1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,dr4 ,f4 ,,louis ,,soldan1 ,superintendent ,public ,schools1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,,speakers3 ,,dr4 ,,michael ,e4 ,,sadler1 ,university of ,manchester4 ,,dr4 ,,william ,h4 ,,maxwell1 ,superintendent ,public ,schools1 ,new ,york ,city4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,a4 ,s4 ,,langsdorf1 ,washington ,university4 ,,section ,c4 ,,the ,,college4 7,hall #ab1 ,september #bc1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,president ,w4 ,s4 ,,chaplin1 ,washington ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,president ,,william ,,dewitt ,,hyde1 ,bowdoin ,college4 ,,president ,m4 ,,carey ,,thomas1 ,bryn ,mawr ,college4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,h4 ,h4 ,,horne1 ,dartmouth ,college4 ,,section ,d4 ,,the ,,university4 7,hall #ab1 ,september #bd1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,c4 ,,chabot1 ,university of ,lyons4 ,,professor ,,edward ,,delavan ,,perry1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,e4 ,,the ,,library4 7,hall #ab1 ,september #bb1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,mr4 ,,frederick ,m4 ,,crunden1 ,librarian ,st4 ,louis ,public ,library4 ,,speakers3 ,,mr4 ,,william ,a4 ,e4 ,,axon1 ,manchester1 ,england4 ,,professor ,,guido ,,biagi1 ,royal ,librarian1 ,florence4 ,,secretary3 ,,mr4 ,c4 ,p4 ,,pettus1 ,washington ,university4 ,,department #bd--,,religion 7,hall #d1 ,september #bj1 #d4ae p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,bishop ,,john ,h4 ,,vincent1 ,chautauqua1 ,n4 ,y4 ,,speakers3 ,,president ,,henry ,c4 ,,king1 ,oberlin ,college4 ,,professor ,,francis ,g4 ,,peabody1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,section ,a4 ,,general ,,religious ,,education4 7,hall #aa1 ,september #bd1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,edwin ,d4 ,,starbuck1 ,earlham ,college1 ,richmond1 ,ind4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,george ,a4 ,,coe1 ,northwestern ,university4 ,,dr4 ,,walter ,l4 ,,hervey1 ,examiner ,board of ,education1 ,new ,york ,city4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,b4 ,,professional ,,religious ,,education4 7,hall #a1 ,september #bb1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,speakers3 ,,president ,,charles ,,cuthbert ,,hall1 ,union ,theological ,seminary4 ,,professor ,,frank ,k4 ,,sanders1 ,yale ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,herbert ,l4 ,,willett1 ,disciples ,divinity ,house1 ,chicago1 ,ill4 ,,section ,c4 ,,religious ,,agencies4 7,hall #ae1 ,september #bc1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,president ,,edgar ,c4 ,,mullins1 ,southern ,baptist ,theological ,seminary1 ,louisville1 ,ky4 ,,speakers3 ,,rev4 ,,washington ,,gladden1 ,columbus1 ,ohio4 ,,rev4 ,,james ,m4 ,,buckley1 ,editor ,the ,christian ,advocate1 ,new ,york4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,,ira ,,landrith1 ,general ,secretary ,religious ,education ,association1 ,chicago1 ,ill4 ,,section ,d4 ,,religious ,,work4 7,hall #a1 ,september #bd1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,rt4 ,,rev4 ,,thomas ,f4 ,,gailor1 ,memphis4 ,,speakers3 ,,rev4 ,,floyd ,w4 ,,tomkins1 ,church of the ,holy ,trinity1 ,philadelphia4 ,,rev4 ,,henry ,c4 ,,mabie1 ,corresponding ,secretary1 ,american ,baptist ,missionary ,union4 ,,secretary3 ,,section ,e4 ,,religious ,,influence3 ,,personal4 7,festival ,hall1 ,september #be1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,chancellor ,j4 ,h4 ,,kirkland1 ,vanderbilt ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,rev4 ,,hugh ,,black1 ,edinburgh1 ,scotland4 ,,professor ,,john ,e4 ,,mcfadyen1 ,knox ,college4 ,,rev4 ,,samuel ,,eliot1 ,boston1 ,mass4 ,,rev4 ,,edward ,b4 ,,pollard1 ,georgetown1 ,ky4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,clyde ,w4 ,,votaw1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,section ,f4 ,,religious ,,influence3 ,,social4 7,festival ,hall1 ,september #be1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,dr4 ,j4 ,h4 ,,garrison1 ,st4 ,louis4 ,,speakers3 ,,president ,,joseph ,,swain1 ,swarthmore ,college4 ,,dr4 ,,emil ,g4 ,,hirsch1 ,chicago1 ,ill4 ,,professor ,,edward ,c4 ,,moore1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,dr4 ,,josiah ,,strong1 ,league for ,social ,service1 ,new ,york4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,,clyde ,w4 ,,votaw1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,chronological ,,order ,,of ,,proceedings 99 99 99 99 99 ,,monday1 ,,september #ai4 #c ,p4 ,m4 ,opening exercises of the ,congress4 ,festival ,hall 7,hall #ag74 ,the ,congress will be called to order by the ,director of ,congresses1 who will introduce the ,president of the ,exposition4 ,welcoming addresses will be delivered by the ,president of the ,exposition and other officials4 ,a reply to these addresses of welcome will be made on behalf of the ,congress by the ,honorary ,vice-,president for ,great ,britain4 ,the ,chairman of the ,administrative ,board will give an account of the origin and purpose of the ,congress4 ,the ,president of the ,congress will then be introduced and will deliver an introductory address1 after which adjournment will follow4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,tuesday1 ,,september #bj4 #aj4jj ,a4 ,m4 ,meetings of the seven ,divisions4 ,the ,divisional addresses will be given as follows3-- ,hall #a1 ,utilitarian ,sciences4 ,hall #b1 ,social ,regulation4 ,hall #c1 ,historical ,science4 ,hall #d1 ,physical ,science4 ,hall #e1 ,social ,culture4 ,hall #f1 ,normative ,science4 ,hall #g1 ,mental ,science4 #aa4ae to #f4jj ,p4 ,m4 ,meetings of the ,departments1 with addresses3-- ,meeting at #aa4ae ,a4 ,m4 ,,departments4 ,hall #a1 ,economics4 ,hall #b1 ,biology4 ,hall #c1 ,sciences of the ,earth4 ,hall #d1 ,political ,history4 ,hall #e1 ,history of ,law4 ,hall #f1 ,philosophy4 ,hall #g1 ,mathematics4 ,hall #h1 ,history of ,art4 ,adjournment at #a ,p4 ,m4 ,meeting at #b ,p4 ,m4 ,,departments4 ,hall #a1 ,social ,science4 ,hall #b1 ,politics4 ,hall #c1 ,technology4 ,hall #d1 ,history of ,language4 ,hall #e1 ,history of ,religion4 ,hall #f1 ,physics4 ,hall #g1 ,psychology4 ,hall #h1 ,anthropology4 ,adjournment at #c4de ,p4 ,m4 ,meeting at #d4ae ,p4 ,m4 ,,departments4 ,hall #a1 ,medicine4 ,hall #b1 ,education4 ,hall #c1 ,jurisprudence4 ,hall #d1 ,religion4 ,hall #e1 ,chemistry4 ,hall #f1 ,history of ,literature4 ,hall #g1 ,sociology4 ,hall #h1 ,astronomy4 ,adjournment at #f4 ,p4 ,m4 ,on the four days following1 the ,sectional meetings will be held4 ,the duration of each session will be three hours4 ,the morning sessions will extend from #aj ,a4 ,m4 until #a ,p4 ,m42 the afternoon sessions from #c ,p4 ,m4 to #f ,p4 ,m4 ,the meetings of some of the religious sections will be held on ,sunday1 ,september #be1 in ,festival ,hall4 ,further announcements concerning these ,sunday ,meetings will be made in ,registration ,hall1 in the daily press of ,st4 ,louis1 and in the ,world's ,fair ,official ,programme4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,wednesday1 ,,september #ba4 ,meeting at #aj ,a4 ,m4 ,hall #a1 ,public ,finance4 ,hall #b1 ,animal ,morphology4 ,hall #c1 ,history of ,greece1 ,rome1 and ,asia4 ,hall #d1 ,comparative ,language4 ,hall #e1 ,the ,family4 ,hall #f1 ,metaphysics4 ,hall #g1 ,otology and ,laryngology4 ,hall #h1 ,slavic ,literature4 ,hall #i1 ,astrometry4 ,hall #aj1 ,civil ,engineering4 ,hall #aa1 ,history of ,common ,law4 ,hall #ab1 ,physiography4 ,hall #ac1 ,public ,health4 ,hall #ad1 ,geophysics4 ,hall #ae1 ,social ,structure4 ,hall #af1 ,inorganic ,chemistry4 ,adjournment at #a ,p4 ,m4 ,meeting at #c ,p4 ,m4 ,hall #a1 ,philosophy of ,religion4 ,hall #b1 ,phylogeny4 ,hall #c1 ,classical ,literature4 ,hall #d1 ,semitic ,languages4 ,hall #e1 ,the ,rural ,community4 ,hall #f1 ,medieval ,history4 ,hall #g1 ,pediatrics4 ,hall #h1 ,oceanography4 ,hall #i1 ,astrophysics4 ,hall #aj1 ,insurance4 ,hall #aa1 ,history of ,roman ,law4 ,hall #ac1 ,preventive ,medicine4 ,hall #ad1 ,geology4 ,hall #af1 ,organic ,chemistry4 ,adjournment at #f ,p4 ,m4 99 99 99 99 99 ,immediately following the ,section of ,geophysics in the morning1 and the ,section of ,geology in the afternoon1 in ,room #ad1 the ,eighth ,international ,geographic ,congress will hold sessions in the same room1 ,hall #ad1 ,mines and ,metallurgy ,building4 ,,thursday1 ,,september #bb4 ,meeting at #aj ,a4 ,m4 ,hall #a1 ,english ,literature4 ,hall #b1 ,plant ,morphology4 ,hall #c1 ,modern ,history of ,europe4 ,hall #d1 ,old ,testament4 ,hall #e1 ,the ,urban ,community4 ,hall #f1 ,logic4 ,hall #g1 ,psychiatry4 ,hall #h1 ,indo-,iranian ,languages4 ,hall #i1 ,algebra and ,analysis4 ,hall #aj1 ,cosmical ,physics4 ,hall #aa1 ,palontology4 ,hall #ab1 ,classical ,art4 ,hall #ac1 ,pathology4 ,hall #ad1 ,international ,law4 ,hall #ae1 ,economic ,theory4 ,hall #af1 ,physical ,chemistry4 ,adjournment at #a ,p4 ,m4 ,meeting at #c ,p4 ,m4 ,hall #a1 ,professional ,religious ,education4 ,hall #b1 ,human ,anatomy4 ,hall #c1 ,greek ,language4 ,hall #d1 ,plant ,physiology4 ,hall #e1 ,physics of the ,electron4 ,hall #f1 ,methodology of ,science4 ,hall #g1 ,modern ,architecture4 ,hall #h1 ,romance ,literature4 ,hall #i1 ,petrology and ,mineralogy4 ,hall #aj1 ,electrical ,engineering4 ,hall #aa1 ,geography4 ,hall #ab1 ,the ,library4 ,hall #ac1 ,neurology4 ,hall #ad1 ,the ,industrial ,group4 ,hall #ae1 ,political ,theory and ,national ,administration4 ,hall #af1 ,physiological ,chemistry4 ,adjournment at #f ,p4 ,m4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,friday1 ,,september #bc4 ,meeting at #aj ,a4 ,m4 ,hall #a1 ,new ,testament4 ,hall #b1 ,experimental ,psychology4 ,hall #c1 ,germanic ,literature4 ,hall #d1 ,physiology4 ,hall #e1 ,the ,dependent ,group4 ,hall #f1 ,ethics4 ,hall #g1 ,plant ,pathology4 ,hall #h1 ,brahmanism and ,buddhism4 ,hall #i1 ,latin ,language4 ,hall #aj1 ,transportation4 ,hall #aa1 ,physics of ,matter4 ,hall #ab1 ,the ,school4 ,hall #ac1 ,surgery4 ,hall #ae1 ,social ,psychology4 ,hall #af1 ,technical ,chemistry4 ,adjournment at #a ,p4 ,m4 ,meeting at #c ,p4 ,m4 ,hall #a1 ,diplomacy4 ,hall #b1 ,history of ,economic ,institutions4 ,hall #c1 ,english ,language4 ,hall #d1 sthetics4 ,hall #e1 ,the ,criminal ,group4 ,hall #f1 ,general ,psychology4 ,hall #g1 ,ecology4 ,hall #h1 ,mohammedism4 ,hall #i1 ,embryology4 ,hall #aj1 ,mechanical ,engineering4 ,hall #aa1 ,physics of ,ether4 ,hall #ab1 ,the ,college4 ,hall #ac1 ,internal ,medicine4 ,hall #ad1 ,private ,law4 ,hall #ae1 ,religious ,agencies4 ,hall #af1 ,somatology4 ,adjournment at #f ,p4 ,m4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,saturday4 ,,september #bd4 ,meeting at #aj ,a4 ,m4 ,hall #a1 ,history of ,america4 ,hall #b1 ,history of the ,christian ,church4 ,hall #c1 ,belles-,lettres4 ,hall #d1 ,colonial ,administration4 ,hall #e1 ,romance ,languages4 ,hall #f1 ,comparative and ,genetic ,psychology4 ,hall #g1 ,ophthalmology4 ,hall #h1 ,history of ,asia4 ,hall #i1 ,geometry4 ,hall #aj1 ,commerce and ,exchange4 ,hall #aa1 ,mining ,engineering4 ,hall #ab1 ,the ,university4 ,hall #ac1 ,gynecology4 ,hall #ad1 ,constitutional ,law4 ,hall #ae1 ,bacteriology4 ,hall #af1 ,archology4 ,adjournment at #a ,p4 ,m4 ,meeting at #c ,p4 ,m4 ,hall #a1 ,religious ,work4 ,hall #b1 ,comparative ,anatomy4 ,hall #c1 ,germanic ,languages4 ,hall #d1 ,modern ,painting4 ,hall #e1 ,money and ,credit4 ,hall #f1 ,abnormal ,psychology4 ,hall #g1 ,applied ,mathematics4 ,hall #h1 ,indo-,iranian ,literature4 ,hall #aj1 ,agriculture4 ,hall #aa1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ,hall #ab1 ,educational ,theory4 ,hall #ac1 ,therapeutics and ,pharmacology4 ,hall #ad1 ,comparative ,law4 ,hall #ae1 ,municipal ,administration4 ,hall #af1 ,ethnology4 ,adjournment at #f ,p4 ,m4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,sunday1 ,,september #be4 ,festival ,hall4 ,meeting at #aj ,a4 ,m4 ,religious ,influence3 ,personal4 ,meeting at #c ,p4 ,m4 ,religious ,influence3 ,social4 ,,programme ,,of ,,social ,,events 99 99 99 99 99 ,,monday ,,evening1 ,,september #ai4--;,grand ,fte night in honor of the ,congress of ,arts and ,science4 ,special illuminations about the ,grand ,basin4 ,lagoon fte4 ,banquet by the ,st4 ,louis ,chemical ,society1 at the ,southern ,hotel1 to the members of the ,chemical ,sections4 ,,tuesday ,,evening1 ,,september #bj4--;,general ,reception by ,board of ,lady ,managers to the officers and speakers of the ,congress and officials of the ,exposition4 ,,wednesday ,,afternoon1 ,,september #ba4--;,garden fte to be given to the members of the ,congress of ,arts and ,science1 at the ,french ,pavilion1 by the ,commissioner-,general from ,france4 ,,wednesday ,,evening1 ,,september #ba4--;,general reception by the ,german ,imperial ,commissioner-,general to the members of the ,congress of ,arts and ,science1 at the ,german ,state ,house4 ,,thursday ,,evening4--,shaw banquet at the ,buckingham ,club to the foreign delegates4 ,,friday ,,evening1 ,,september #bc4--;,general banquet to the speakers and officials of the ,congress of ,arts and ,science in the banquet hall of the ,tyrolean ,alps4 #h ,p4 ,m4 ,,saturday ,,evening1 ,,september #bd4--;,banquet at ,st4 ,louis ,club by ,round ,table of ,st4 ,louis1 to the foreign members of the ,congress4 ,banquet given by ,imperial ,commissioner-,general from ,japan to the ,japanese delegation to the ,congress and ,exposition officials4 ,dinner given by ,commissioner-,general from ,great ,britain to the ,english members of the ,congress4 ,,alphabetical ,,list ,,of ,,members ,,who ,,made #aj-,,minute ,,addresses 99 99 99 99 99 ,the following list differs from the original programme1 in that it contains the names only of those who actually read addresses4 ,it was planned that each ,section should meet for three hours4 ,when authors of ten-minute papers were not present1 and where not enough of these shorter papers were offered to fill out the time1 the ,chairmen invited discussions from the floor until the time was filled4 ,professor ,r4 ,g4 ,aitken ,lick ,observatory ,astronomy ,james ,w4 ,alexander1 ,esq4 ,new ,york ,city ,insurance ,frederick ,almy ,buffalo1 ,n4 ,y4 ,social ,science ,professor ,s4 ,g4 ,ashmore ,union ,college ,latin ,language ,professor ,l4 ,a4 ,bauer ,carnegie ,institute ,cosmical ,physics ,dr4 ,marcus ,benjamin ,national ,museum ,technical ,chemistry ,professor ,h4 ,t4 ,blickfeldt ,leland ,stanford ,univ4 ,geometry ,professor ,ernest ,w4 ,brown ,haverford ,college ,lunar ,theory ,dr4 ,henry ,dickson ,bruns ,new ,orleans ,municipal ,administration ,dr4 ,f4 ,k4 ,cameron ,dep't of ,agriculture ,physical ,chemistry ,rear-,admiral ,c4 ,m4 ,chester1 ,united ,states ,naval ,astronomy ,u4 ,s4 ,n4 ,observatory ,h4 ,h4 ,clayton1 ,esq4 ,blue ,hill ,observatory ,cosmical ,physics ,professor ,charles ,a4 ,coffin ,new ,york ,city ,modern ,painting ,dr4 ,george ,coronilas ,athens1 ,greece ,tuberculosis ,professor ,j4 ,e4 ,denton ,stevens ,institute ,mechanical ,engineering ,professor ,l4 ,w4 ,dowling ,univ4 of ,wisconsin ,geometry ,professor ,h4 ,c4 ,elmer ,cornell ,univ4 ,latin ,language ,professor ,a4 ,emch ,univ4 of ,colorado ,geometry ,professor ,h4 ,r4 ,fanclough ,leland ,stanford ,univ4 ,classical ,literature ,professor ,w4 ,s4 ,ferguson ,univ4 of ,california ,history of ,greece1 ,rome1 and ,asia ,dr4 ,carlos ,finley ,havana ,pathology ,dr4 ,c4 ,e4 ,fisk ,centralia1 ,ill4 ,history of ,america ,homer ,folks1 ,esq4 ,new ,york ,city ,social ,science ,professor ,f4 ,c4 ,french ,univ4 of ,nebraska ,philosophy of ,religion ,h4 ,l4 ,gannt1 ,esq4 ,schenectady1 ,n4 ,y4 ,mechanical ,engineering ,dr4 ,f4 ,p4 ,gorham ,brown ,univ4 ,bacteriology ,professor ,evarts ,b4 ,greene ,univ4 of ,illinois ,history of ,america ,stansbury ,hagar1 ,esq4 ,brooklyn1 ,n4,y4 ,ethnology ,j4 ,d4 ,hague1 ,esq4 ,new ,york ,city ,mining ,engineering ,professor ,g4 ,b4 ,halstead ,kenyon ,college ,geometry ,professor ,a4 ,d4 ,f4 ,hamlin ,columbia ,univ4 sthetics ,professor ,h4 ,hancock ,univ4 of ,cincinnati ,geometry ,professor ,j4 ,a4 ,harris ,st4 ,louis1 ,mo4 ,plant ,morphology ,professor ,m4 ,w4 ,haskell ,univ4 of ,california ,algebra and ,analysis ,professor ,j4 ,t4 ,hatfield ,northwestern ,univ4 ,germanic ,language ,professor ,e4 ,c4 ,hayes ,miami ,univ4 ,social ,psychology ,professor ,w4 ,e4 ,heidel ,iowa ,college ,greek ,language ,dr4 ,c4 ,l4 ,herrick ,granville1 ,ohio ,neurology ,dr4 ,c4 ,judson ,herrick ,granville1 ,ohio ,animal ,morphology ,professor ,w4 ,h4 ,hobbs ,univ4 of ,wisconsin ,petrology and ,mineralogy ,professor ,a4 ,r4 ,hohlfeld ,univ4 of ,wisconsin ,germanic ,literature ,professor ,h4 ,h4 ,horne ,dartmouth ,college ,educational ,theory ,dr4 ,e4 ,v4 ,huntington ,harvard ,univ4 ,algebra and ,analysis ,dr4 ,reid ,hunt ,u4 ,s4 ,marine ,hospital ,alcohol1 etc4 ,dr4 ,j4 ,n4 ,hurty ,indianapolis1 ,ind4 ,public ,health ,professor ,j4 ,j4 ,hutchinson ,cornell ,univ4 ,algebra and ,analysis ,rev4 ,thomas ,e4 ,judge ,catholic ,review of ,general ,religious ,reviews ,education ,professor ,l4 ,kahlenburg ,univ4 of ,wisconsin ,physical ,chemistry ,professor ,albert ,g4 ,keller ,yale ,university ,municipal ,administration ,professor ,george ,lefevre ,univ4 of ,missouri ,comparative ,anatomy ,president ,henry ,c4 ,king ,oberlin ,college ,education1 ,the ,college ,dr4 ,ira ,landrith ,belmont ,college ,religious ,agencies ,professor ,m4 ,d4 ,learned ,univ4 of ,pennsylvania ,germanic ,literature ,professor ,a4 ,o4 ,leuschner ,univ4 of ,california ,astronomy ,dr4 ,e4 ,p4 ,lyon ,st4 ,louis ,univ4 ,physiology ,dr4 ,duncan ,b4 ,macdonald ,hartford ,theological ,semitic ,languages ,seminary ,professor ,a4 ,mac,farlane ,chatham1 ,ontario ,applied ,mathematics ,professor ,james ,mc,mahon ,cornell ,univ4 ,applied ,mathematics ,mr4 ,edward ,mallinckrodt ,st4 ,louis1 ,mo4 ,chemistry ,professor ,h4 ,p4 ,manning ,brown ,univ4 ,geometry ,professor ,g4 ,a4 ,miller ,leland ,stanford ,univ4 ,algebra and ,analysis4 ,dr4 ,w4 ,c4 ,mills ,ohio ,state ,univ4 ,archology ,professor ,w4 ,s4 ,milner ,univ4 of ,toronto ,classical ,literature ,professor ,f4 ,g4 ,moore ,dartmouth ,college ,classical ,literature ,dr4 ,w4 ,p4 ,montague ,columbia ,univ4 ,metaphysics ,clarence ,b4 ,moore1 ,esq4 ,philadelphia ,archology4 ,professor ,f4 ,r4 ,moulton ,univ4 of ,chicago ,astronomy4 ,dr4 ,j4 ,g4 ,needham ,lake ,forest ,univ4 ,animal ,morphology ,professor ,alex4 ,t4 ,ormond ,princeton ,univ4 ,philosophy of ,religion ,professor ,frederic ,l4 ,paxton ,univ4 of ,colorado ,history of ,america ,dr4 ,carl ,pfister ,st4 ,mark's ,hospital1 ,surgery ,new ,york ,city ,professor ,m4 ,b4 ,porter ,univ4 of ,texas ,algebra and ,analysis ,dr4 ,a4 ,j4 ,reynolds ,chicago ,public ,health ,professor ,s4 ,p4 ,sadtler ,philadelphia ,college ,technical ,chemistry of ,pharmacy ,dr4 ,john ,a4 ,sampson ,albany1 ,n4 ,y4 ,gyncology ,oswald ,schreiner1 ,esq4 ,u4 ,s4 ,dep't of ,chemistry ,agriculture ,rev4 ,frank ,sewall ,washington1 ,d4 ,c4 ,social ,science1 ,the ,family ,professor ,h4 ,c4 ,sheldon ,boston ,univ4 ,history of the ,christian ,church ,professor ,frank ,c4 ,sharp ,univ4 of ,wisconsin ,ethics ,professor ,j4 ,b4 ,shaw ,milliken ,univ4 ,algebra and ,analysis ,professor ,w4 ,b4 ,smith ,tulane ,univ4 ,new ,testament ,professor ,marshall ,s4 ,snow ,washington ,univ ,history of ,america ,professor ,henry ,snyder ,univ4 of ,minnesota ,social ,science ,professor ,edwain ,d4 ,starbuck ,earlham ,college ,general ,religious ,professor ,george ,b4 ,stewart ,auburn ,theological ,professional ,seminary ,religious ,education ,john ,m4 ,stahl ,quincy1 ,ill4 ,the ,rural ,community ,professor ,j4 ,stieglitz ,univ4 of ,chicago ,chemistry ,professor ,robert ,stein ,u4 ,s4 ,geological ,survey ,comparative ,language ,mr4 ,teitaro ,suzuki ,la ,salle1 ,ill4 ,brahmanism and ,buddhism ,col4 ,t4 ,w4 ,symonds1 ,u4 ,s4 ,a4 ,washington1 ,d4 ,c4 ,civil ,engineering ,professor ,teissier ,lyons1 ,france ,pathology ,judge ,w4 ,h4 ,thomas ,montgomery1 ,ala4 ,private ,law ,professor ,o4 ,h4 ,tittmann ,u4 ,s4 ,c4 and ,g4 ,survey ,astronomy ,professor ,alfred ,m4 ,tozzer ,peabody ,museum ,anthropology ,dr4 ,benjamin ,f4 ,trueblood ,univ4 of ,missouri ,medieval ,history ,professor ,clyde ,w4 ,votaw ,univ4 of ,chicago ,new ,testament ,professor ,john ,b4 ,watson ,univ4 of ,chicago ,psychology ,professor ,h4 ,l4 ,willett ,disciples ,divinity ,professional ,house1 ,chicago ,religious ,education ,president ,mary ,e4 ,woolley ,mt4 ,holyoke ,college ,education1 ,the ,college ,h4 ,zwaarddemaker ,utrecht ,otology and ,laryngology ,,the ,,scientific ,,plan ,,of ,,the ,,congress ,,by ,,prof4 ,,hugo ,m,,nsterberg ,i ,,the ,,purpose ,,of ,,the ,,congress #a4 ,the ,centralization of the ,congress ,the history of the ,congress has been told4 ,it remains to set forth the principles which controlled the work of the ,congress week1 and thus scientifically to introduce the scholarly undertaking1 the results of which are to speak for themselves in the eight volumes of this publication4 ,yet in a certain way this scientific introduction has once more to use the language of history4 ,it does not deal with the external development of the ,congress1 and the story which it has to tell is thus not one of dates and names and events4 ,but the principles which shaped the whole undertaking have themselves a claim to historical treatment2 they do not lie before us simply as the subject for a logical disputation or as a plea for a future work4 ,that was the situation of three years ago4 ,at that time various ideas and opposing principles entered into the arena of discussion2 but now1 since the work is completed1 the question can be only of what principles1 right or wrong1 have really determined the programme4 ,we have thus to interpret that state of mind out of which the purposes and the scientific arrangement of the ,congress resulted2 and no after-thought of to-day would be a desirable addition4 ,whatever possible improvements of the plan may suggest themselves in the retrospect can be given only a closing word4 ,it was certainly easy to learn from experience1 but first the experience had to be passed through4 ,we have here to interpret the view from that standpoint from which the experience of the ,congress was still a matter of the future1 and of an uncertain future indeed1 full of doubts and fears1 and yet full of hopes and possibilities4 ,the ,st4 ,louis ,world's ,fair promised1 through the vast extent of its grounds1 through the beautiful plans of the buildings1 through the eagerness of the ,united ,states1 through the participation of all countries on earth1 and through the gigantic outlines of the internal plans1 to become the most monumental expression of the energies with which the twentieth century entered on its course4 ,commerce and industry1 art and social work1 politics and education1 war and peace1 country and city4 ,orient and ,occident1 were all to be focussed for a few summer months in the ivory city of the ,mississippi ,valley4 ,it seemed most natural that science and productive scholarship should also find its characteristic place among the factors of our modern civilization4 ,of course the scientist had his word to say on almost every square foot of the ,exposition4 ,whether the building was devoted to electricity or to chemistry1 to anthropology or to metallurgy1 to civic administration or to medicine1 to transportation or to industrial arts1 it was everywhere the work of the scientist which was to win the triumph2 and the ,palace of ,education1 the first in any universal exposition1 was to combine under its roof not only the school work of all countries1 but the visible record of the world's universities and technical schools as well4 ,and yet it seemed not enough to gather the products and records of science and to make science serve with its tools and inventions4 ,modern art1 too1 was to reign over every hall and to beautify every palace1 and yet demanded its own unfolding in the gallery of paintings and sculptures4 ,in the same way it was not enough for science to penetrate a hundred exhibitions and turn the wheels in every hall1 but it must also seek to concentrate all its energies in one spot and show the cross-section of human knowledge in our time1 and1 above all1 its own methods4 ,an exhibition of scholarship cannot be arranged for the eyes4 ,the great work which grows day by day in quiet libraries and laboratories1 and on a thousand university platforms1 can express itself only through words4 ,yet heaped up printed volumes would be dead to a ,world's ,fair spectator2 how to make such words living was the problem4 ,above all1 scholarship does not really exhibit its methods1 if it does not show itself in production4 ,it is no longer scholarship which speaks of a truth-seeking that has been performed instead of going on with the search for further truth4 ,if the world's science was to be exhibited1 a form had to be sought in which the scholarly work on the spot would serve the ideals of knowledge1 would add to the storehouse of truth1 and would thus work in the service of human progress at the same moment in which it contributed to the completeness of the exhibition4 ,the effort was not without precedent4 ,scholarly production had been connected with earlier expositions1 and the large gatherings of scholars at the ,paris ,exposition were still in vivid memory4 ,a large number of scientific congresses of specialists had been held there1 and many hundred scholarly papers had been read4 ,yet the results hardly suggested the repetition of such an experiment4 ,every one felt too strongly that the outcome of such disconnected congresses of specialists is hardly comparable with the glorious showing which the arts and industries have made and were to make again4 ,in every other department of the ,world's ,fair the most careful preparation secured an harmonious effect4 ,the scholarly meetings alone failed even to aim at harmony and unity4 ,not only did the congresses themselves stand apart without any inner relation1 grouped together by calendar dates or by their alphabetical order from ,anthropology to ,zology2 but in every congress1 again1 the papers read and the manuscripts presented were disconnected pieces without any programme or correlation4 ,worse than that1 they could not even be expected in their isolatedness to add anything which would not have been worked out and communicated to the world just as well without any congress4 ,the speaker at such a meeting is asked to contribute anything he has at hand1 and he accepts the invitation because he has by chance a completed paper or a research ready for publication4 ,in the best case it would have appeared in the next number of the specialistic magazine1 in not infrequent cases it has appeared already in the last number4 ,such a congress is then only an accident and does not itself serve the progress of knowledge4 ,even that would be acceptable if at least the best scholars would come out with their latest investigations1 or1 still more delightful1 if they would enter into an important discussion4 ,but experience has too often shown that the conditions are most favorable for the opposite outcome4 ,the leading scholars stay away partly to give beginners the chance to be heard1 partly not to be grouped with those who habitually have the floor at such gatherings4 ,these are either the men whose day has gone by or those whose day has not yet come2 and both groups tyrannize alike an unwilling audience4 ,yet it may be said that in scientific meetings of specialists the reading of papers is non-essential and no harm is done even if they do not contribute anything to the status of scholarship2 their great value lies in the personal contact of fellow workers and in the discussions and informal exchange of opinions4 ,all that is true1 and completely justifies the yearly meetings of scholarly associations4 ,but these advantages are much diminished whenever such gatherings take on an international character1 and thus introduce the confusion of tongues4 ,and hardly any one can doubt that the turmoil of a world's fair is about the worst possible background for such exchange of thought1 which demands repose and quietude4 ,yet even with the certainty of all these disadvantages the city of ,paris1 with its large body of scholars1 with its venerable scholarly traditions1 and with its incomparable attractions1 could overcome every resistance1 and its convenient location made it natural that in vacation time1 in an exposition summer1 the scholars should gather there1 not on account of1 but in spite of1 the hundred congresses4 ,with this the city of ,st4 ,louis could make no claim to rivalry4 ,its recent growth1 its minimum of scholarly tradition1 its great distance from the old centres of knowledge even in the ,new ,world1 the apathy of the ,east and the climatic fears of ,europe1 all together made it clear that a mere repetition of unrelated congresses would be not only useless1 but a disastrous failure4 ,these very fears1 however1 themselves suggested the remedy4 ,if the scholarly work of our time was to be represented at ,st4 ,louis1 something had to be attempted which should be not simply an imitation of the branch-congresses which every scientific specialty in every country is calling every year4 ,scholarship was to be asked to show itself really in process1 and to produce for the ,world's ,fair meeting something which without it would remain undone4 ,to invite the scholars of the world for their leisurely enjoyment and reposeful discussion of work done elsewhere is one thing2 to call them together for work which they would not do otherwise1 and which ought to be done1 is a very different thing4 ,the first had in ,st4 ,louis all odds against it2 it seemed worth while to try the second4 ,and it seemed not only worth while in the interest of scholarship1 it seemed1 above all1 the only way to give to the scholarship of our time a chance for the complete demonstration of its productive energies4 ,the plan of unrelated congresses1 with chance combinations of papers prepared at random1 was therefore definitively replaced by the plan of only one representative gathering1 bound together by one underlying thought1 given thus the unity of one scholarly aim1 whose fulfillment is demanded by the scientific needs of our time1 and is hardly to be reached by other methods4 ,every arbitrary and individual choice was then to be eliminated and every effort was to be controlled by the one central purpose2 the work thus to be organized and prepared with the same carefulness of adjustment and elaboration which was doubtless to be applied in the admirable exhibitions of the ,united ,states ,government or in the art exhibition4 ,the open question was1 of course1 what topic could fulfill these various demands most completely2 wherein lay the greatest scholarly need of our time2 what task could be least realized by the casual efforts of scholarship at random2 where was the unity of a world organization most needed8 ,one thought was very naturally suggested by the external circumstances4 ,st4 ,louis had asked the nations of the world to a celebration of the ,louisiana ,purchase4 ,historical thoughts thus gave meaning and importance to the whole undertaking4 ,the pride of one century's development had stimulated the gigantic work from its inception4 ,an immense territory had been transformed from a half wilderness into a land with a rich civilization1 and with a central city in which eight thousand factories are at work4 ,no thought lay nearer than to ask how far this century was of similar importance for the changes in the world of thought4 ,how have the sciences developed themselves since the days of the ,louisiana ,purchase8 ,that is a topic which with complete uniformity might be asked from every special science1 and which might thus offer a certain unity of aim to scholars of all scientific denominations4 ,there was indeed no doubt that such an historical question would have to be raised if we were to live up to the commemorative idea of the whole ,fair4 ,and yet it seemed still more certain that the retrospective problem did not justify itself as a central topic for a ,world's ,congress4 ,there were sciences for which the story of the last hundred years was merely the last chapter of a history of three thousand years and other sciences whose life history did not begin until one or two decades ago4 ,it would thus be a very external uniformity2 the question would have a very different meaning for the various branches of knowledge1 and the treatment would be of very unequal interest and importance4 ,more than that1 it would not abolish the unrelated character of the endeavors2 while the same topic might be given everywhere1 yet every science would remain isolated2 there would be no internal unity1 and thus no inner reason for bringing together the best workers of all spheres4 ,and finally the mere retrospective attitude brings with it the depressing mood of perfunctory activity4 ,certainly to look back on the advance of a century can be most suggestive for a better understanding of the way which lies before us2 and we felt indeed that the occasion for such a backward glance ought not to be missed4 ,yet there would be something lifeless if the whole meeting were devoted to the consideration of work that had been completed2 a kind of necrological sentiment would pervade the whole ceremony1 while our chief aim was to serve the progress of knowledge and thus to stimulate living interests4 ,this language of life spoke indeed in the programme of another plan which seemed also to be suggested by the character of the ,exposition4 ,the ,st4 ,louis ,fair desired not merely to look backward and to revive the historical interest in the ,louisiana purchase1 but its first aim seemed to be to bring into sharp relief the factors which serve to-day the practical welfare and the achievements of human society4 ,if all the scholars of all sciences were to convene under one flag1 would it not thus seem most harmonious with the occasion1 if1 as the one controlling topic1 the question were proposed1 ,what does your science contribute to the practical progress of mankind8 ,no one can deny that such a formulation would fit in well with the lingering thoughts of every ,world's ,fair visitor4 ,whoever wanders through the aisles of exhibition palaces and sees amassed the marvelous achievements of industry and commerce1 and the thousand practical arts of modern society1 may indeed turn most naturally to a gathering of scholars with the question1 ,what have you to offer of similar import8 ,all your thinking and speaking and writing1 are they merely words on words1 or do you also turn the wheels of this gigantic civilization8 ,such a question would give a noble opening indeed to almost every science4 ,who would say that the opportunity is confined to the man of technical science8 ,does not the biologist also prepare the achievements of modern medicine1 does not the mathematician play his most important rle in our mastery over stubborn nature1 do we not need language for our social intercourse1 and law and religion for our practical social improvement8 ,yes1 is there any science which has not directly or indirectly something to contribute to the practical development of the modern man and his civilization8 ,all this is true1 and yet the perspective of this truth1 too1 appears at once utterly distorted if we take the standpoint of science itself4 ,the one end of knowledge is to reach the truth4 ,the belief in the absolute value of truth gives to it meaning and significance4 ,this value remains the controlling influence even where the problem to be solved is itself a practical one1 and the spirit of science remains thus essentially theoretical even in the so-called applied sciences4 ,but incomparably more intense in that respect is the spirit of all theoretical disciplines4 ,philosophy and mathematics1 history and philology1 chemistry and biology1 astronomy and geology1 may be and ought to be helpful to practical civilization everywhere2 and every step forward which they take will be an advance for man's practical life too4 ,and yet their real meaning never lies in their technical by-product4 ,it is not the scholar who peers in the direction of practical use who is most loyal to the deepest demand of scholarship1 and every relation to practical achievement is more or less accidental or even artificial for the real life interests of productive scholarship4 ,but if the contrast between his real intention and his social technical successes may not appear striking to the physicist or chemist1 it would appear at least embarrassing to the scholars in many other departments and directly bewildering to not a few4 ,perhaps two thirds of the sciences to which the best thinkers of our time are faithfully devoted would then be grouped together and relegated to a distant corner1 their only practical technical function would be to contribute material to the education of the cultured man4 ,for what else do we study ,sanscrit or medieval history or epistemology8 ,and finally even the uniform topic of practical use would not have brought the different sciences nearer to each other2 the ,congress would still have remained a budget of disconnected records of scholarship4 ,if the practical side of the ,exposition was to suggest anything1 it should then not be more than an appeal not to overlook the importance of the applied sciences which too often play the rle of a mere appendix to the system of knowledge4 ,the logical one-sidedness which considers practical needs as below the dignity of pure science was indeed to be excluded1 but to choose practical service as the one controlling topic would be far more anti-scientific4 #b4 ,the ,unity of ,knowledge ,there was another side of the ,exposition plan which suggested a stronger topic4 ,the ,world's ,fair was not only an historical memorial work1 and was not only a show of the practical tools of technical civilization2 its deepest aim was after all the effort to bring the energies of our time into inner relation4 ,the peoples of the whole globe1 separated by oceans and mountains1 by language and custom1 by politics and prejudice1 were here to come in contact and to be brought into correlation by better mutual understanding of the best features of their respective cultures4 ,the various industries and arts1 the most antagonistic efforts of commerce and production1 separated by the rivalry of the market and by the diversity of economic interests were here to be brought together in harmony1 were to be correlated for the eye of the spectator4 ,it was a near-lying thought to choose correlation as the controlling thought of a scientific ,world's ,congress too4 ,that was the topic which was finally agreed upon3 the inner relation of the sciences of our day4 ,the fitness and the external advantages of such a scheme are evident4 ,first of all1 the danger of disconnectedness now disappears completely4 ,if the sciences are to examine what binds them together1 their usual isolation must be given up for the time being and a concerted effort must control the day4 ,the bringing together of scholars of all scientific specialties is then no longer a doubtful accidental feature1 but becomes a condition of the whole undertaking4 ,more than that1 such a topic1 with all that it involves1 makes it a matter of course that the call goes out to the really leading scholars of the time4 ,to aim at a correlation of sciences means to seek for the fundamental principles in each territory of knowledge and to look with far-seeing eye beyond the limits of its field2 but just this excludes from the outset those who like to be the self-appointed speakers in routine gatherings4 ,it excludes from the first the narrow specialist who does not care for anything but for his latest research1 and ought to exclude not less the vague spirits who generalize about facts of which they have no concrete substantial knowledge1 as their suggestions towards correlation would lack inner productiveness and outer authority4 ,such a plan has room only for those men who stand high enough to see the whole field and who have yet the full authority of the specialistic investigator2 they must combine the concentration on specialized productive work with the inspiration that comes from looking over vast regions4 ,with such a topic the usual question does not come up whether one or another strong man would feel attracted to take part in the gathering1 but it would be justified and necessary to confine the active participation from the outset to those who are leaders1 and thus to guarantee from the beginning a representation of science equal in dignity to the best efforts of the exhibiting countries in all other departments4 ,in this way such a plan had the advantage of justifying through its topic the administrative desire to bring all sciences to the same spot1 and at the same time of excluding all participants but the best scholars3 with isolated gatherings or with second-rate men1 this subject would have been simply impossible4 ,yet all these halfway external advantages count little compared with the significance and importance of the topic for the inner life of scientific thought of our time4 ,we all felt it was the one topic which the beginning of the twentieth century demanded and which could not be dealt with otherwise than by the combined labors of all nations and of all sciences4 ,the ,world's ,fair was the one great opportunity to make a first effort in this direction2 we had no right to miss this opportunity4 ,thus it was decided to have a congress with the definite purpose of working towards the unity of human knowledge1 and with the one mission1 in this time of scattered specializing work1 of bringing to the consciousness of the world the too much neglected idea of the unity of truth4 ,to quote from our first tentative programme3 ,let the rush of the world's work stop for one moment for us to consider what are the underlying principles1 what are their relations to one another and to the whole1 what are their values and purposes2 in short1 let us for once give to the world's sciences a holiday4 ,the workaday functions are much better fulfilled in separation1 when each scholar works in his own laboratory or in his library2 but this holiday task of bringing out the underlying unity1 this synthetic work1 this demands really the coperation of all1 this demands that once at least all sciences come together in one place at one time4 ,yet if our work stands for the unity of knowledge1 aims to consider the fundamental conceptions which bind together all the specialistic results1 and seeks to inquire into the methods which are common to various fields1 all this is after all merely a symptom of the whole spirit of our times4 ,a reaction against the narrowness of mere fact-diggers has set in4 ,a mere heaping up of disconnected1 unshaped facts begins to disappoint the world2 it is felt too vividly that a mere dictionary of phenomena1 of events and laws1 makes our knowledge larger but not deeper1 makes our life more complex but not more valuable1 makes our science more difficult but not more harmonious4 ,our time longs for a new synthesis and looks towards science no longer merely with a desire for technical prescriptions and new inventions in the interest of comfort and exchange4 ,it waits for knowledge to fulfill its higher mission1 it waits for science to satisfy our higher needs for a view of the world which shall give unity to our scattered experience4 ,the indications of this change are visible to every one who observes the gradual turning to philosophical discussion in the most different fields of scientific life4 ,when after the first third of the nineteenth century the great philosophic movement which found its climax in ,hegelianism came to disaster in consequence of its absurd neglect of hard solid facts1 the era of naturalism began its triumph with contempt for all philosophy and for all deeper unity4 ,idealism and philosophy were stigmatized as the enemies of true science and natural science had its great day4 ,the rapid progress of physics and chemistry fascinated the world and produced modern technique2 the sciences of life1 physiology1 biology1 medicine1 followed2 and the scientific method was carried over from body to mind1 and gave us at the end of the nineteenth century modern psychology and sociology4 ,the lifeless and the living1 the physical and the mental1 the individual and the social1 all had been conquered by analytical methods4 ,but just when the climax was reached and all had been analyzed and explained1 the time was ripe for disillusion1 and the lack of deeper unity began to be felt with alarm in every quarter4 ,for seventy years there had been nowhere so much philosophizing going on as suddenly sprung up among the scientists of the last decade4 ,the physicists and the mathematicians1 the chemists and the biologists1 the geologists and the astronomers1 and1 on the other side1 the historians and the economists1 the psychologists and the sociologists1 the jurists and the theologians--all suddenly found themselves again in the midst of discussions on fundamental principles and methods1 on general categories and conditions of knowledge1 in short1 in the midst of the despised philosophy4 ,and with those discussions has come the demand for correlation4 ,everywhere have arisen leaders who have brought unconnected sciences together and emphasized the unity of large divisions4 ,the time seems to have come again when the wave of naturalism and realism is ebbing1 and a new idealistic philosophical tide is swelling1 just as they have always alternated in the civilization of two thousand years4 ,no one dreams1 of course1 that the great synthetic apperception1 for which our modern time seems ripe1 will come through the delivery of some hundred addresses1 or the discussions of some hundred audiences4 ,an ultimate unity demands the gigantic thought of a single genius1 and the work of the many can1 after all1 be merely the preparation for the final work of the one4 ,and yet history shows that the one will never come if the many have not done their share4 ,what is needed is to fill the sciences of our time with the growing consciousness of belonging together1 with the longing for fundamental principles1 with the conviction that the desire for correlation is not the fancy of dreamers1 but the immediate need of the leaders of thought4 ,and in this preparatory work the ,st4 ,louis ,congress of ,arts and ,science seemed indeed called for an important part when it was committed to this topic of correlation4 ,to call the scholars of the world together for concerted action towards the correlation of knowledge meant1 of course1 first of all1 to work out a detailed programme1 and to select the best authorities for every special part of the whole scheme4 ,nothing could be left to chance methods and to casual contributions4 ,the preparation needed the same administrative strictness which would be demanded for an encyclopedia1 and the same scholarly thoroughness which would be demanded for the most scientific research4 ,a plan was to be devised in which every possible striving for truth would find its place1 and in which every section would have its definite position in the system4 ,and such a ground-plan given1 topics were to be assigned to every department and sub-department1 the treatment of which would bring out the fundamental principles and the inner relations in such a way that the papers would finally form a close-woven intellectual fabric4 ,there would be plenty of room for a retrospective glance at the historical development of the sciences and plenty of room for emphasis on their practical achievements2 but the central place would always belong to the effort towards unity and internal harmonization4 ,we thus divided human knowledge into large parts1 and the parts into divisions1 and the divisions into departments1 and the departments into sections4 ,as the topic of the general divisions--we proposed seven of them--it was decided to discuss the ,unity of the whole field4 ,as topic for the departments--we had twenty-four of them--the addresses were to discuss the fundamental ,conceptions and ,methods and the ,progress during the last century2 and in the sections1 finally--our plan provided for one hundred and twenty-eight of them--the topics were in every one the ,relation of the special branch to other branches1 and those most important ,present ,problems which are essential for the deeper principles of the special field4 ,in this way the ground-plan itself suggested the unity of the practically separated sciences2 and1 moreover1 our plan provided from the first that this logical relation should express itself externally in the time order of the work4 ,we were to begin with the meetings of the large divisions1 the meetings of the departments were to follow1 and the meetings of the sections and their ramifications would follow the departmental gatherings4 #c4 ,the ,objections to the ,plan ,it was evident that even the most modest success of that gigantic undertaking depended upon the right choice of speakers1 upon the value of the ground-plan1 and upon many external conditions2 thus no one was in doubt as to the difficulty in realizing such a scheme4 ,yet there were from the scholarly side itself objections to the principles involved1 objections which might hold even if those other conditions were successfully met4 ,the most immediate reason for reluctance lies in the specializing tendencies of our time4 ,those who devote all their working energy as loyal sons of our analyzing period of science to the minute detail of research come easily into the habit of a nervous fear with regard to any wider general outlook4 ,the man of research sees too often how ignorance hides itself behind generalities4 ,he knows too well how much easier it is to formulate vague generalities than to contribute a new fact to human knowledge1 and how often untrained youngsters succeed with popular text-books which are rightly forgotten the next day4 ,methodical science must thus almost encourage this aversion to any deviation from the path of painstaking specialistic labor4 ,then1 of course1 it seems almost a scientific duty to declare war against an undertaking which explicitly asks everywhere for the wide perspectives and the last principles1 and does not aim at adding at this moment to the mere treasury of information4 ,but such a view is utterly one-sided1 and to fight against such one-sidedness and to overcome the specializing narrowness of the scattered sciences was the one central idea of the plan4 ,if there existed no scholars who despise the philosophizing connection1 there would have hardly been any need for this whole undertaking2 but to yield to such philosophy-phobia means to declare the analytic movement of science permanent1 and to postpone a synthetic movement indefinitely4 ,our time has just to emphasize1 and the leaders of thought daily emphasize it more1 that a mere heaping up of information can be merely a preparation for knowledge1 and that the final aim is a ,weltanschauung1 a unified view of the whole of reality4 ,all that our ,congress had to secure was thus merely that the generalizing discussion of principles should not be left to men who generalized because they lacked the substantial knowledge which is necessary to specialize4 ,the thinkers we needed were those who through specialistic work were themselves led to a point where the discussion of general principles becomes unavoidable4 ,our plan was by no means antagonistic to the patient labors of analysis2 the aim was merely to overcome its one-sidedness and to stimulate the synthesis as a necessary supplement4 ,but the objections against a generalizing plan were not confined to the mistaken fear that we sought to antagonize the productive work of the specialist4 ,they not seldom took the form of a general aversion to the logical side of the ground-plan4 ,it was often said that such a scheme has after all interest only for the logician1 for whom science as such is an object of study1 and who must thus indeed classify the sciences and determine their logical relation4 ,the real scientist1 it was said1 does not care for such methodological operations1 and should be suspicious from the first of such philosophical high-handedness4 ,the scientist cannot forget how often in the history of civilization science was the loser when it trusted its problems to the metaphysical thinker who substituted his lofty speculations for the hard work of the investigator4 ,the true scholar will thus not only object to generalizing commonplaces as against solid information1 but he will object as well to logical demarcation lines and systematization as against the practical scientific work which does not want to be hampered by such philosophical subtleties4 ,yet all these fears and suspicions were still more mistaken4 ,nothing was further from our intentions than a substitution of metaphysics for concrete science4 ,it was not by chance that we took such pains to find the best specialists for every section4 ,no one was invited to enter into logical discussions and to consider the relations of science merely from a dialectic point of view4 ,the topic was everywhere the whole living manifoldness of actual relations1 and the logician had nothing else to do than to prepare the programme4 ,the outlines of the programme demanded1 of course1 a certain logical scheme4 ,if hundreds of sciences are to take part1 they have to be grouped somehow1 if a merely alphabetical order is not adopted2 and even if we were to proceed alphabetically1 we should have to decide beforehand what part of knowledge is to be recognized as a special science4 ,but the logical order of the ground-plan refers1 of course1 merely to the simple relation of cordination1 subordination1 and superordination1 and the logician is satisfied with such a classification4 ,but the endless variety of internal relations is no longer to be dealt with from the point of view of mere logic4 ,we may work out the ground-plan in such a way that we understand that logically zology is cordinated to botany and subordinated to mechanics and superordinated to ichthyology2 but this minimum of determination gives1 of course1 not even a hint of that world of relations which exists from the standpoint of the biologist between the science of zology and the science of botany1 or between the biological and the mechanical studies4 ,to discuss these relations of real scientific life is the work of the biologist and not at all of the logician4 ,the foregoing answers also at once an objection which might seem more justified at the first glance4 ,it has been said that we were undertaking the work of bringing about a synthesis of scientific endeavors1 and that we yet had that synthesis already completed in the programme on which the work was to be based4 ,the scholars to be invited would be bound by the programme1 and would therefore have no other possibility than to say with more words what the programme had settled beforehand4 ,the whole effort would then seem determined from the start by the arbitrariness of the proposed ground-plan4 ,now it cannot be denied indeed that a certain factor of arbitrariness has to enter into a programme4 ,we have already referred to the fact that some one must decide beforehand what fraction of science is to be acknowledged as a self-dependent discipline4 ,if a biologist were to work out the scheme1 he might decide that the whole of philosophy was just one science2 while the philosopher might claim a large number of sections for logic and ethics and philosophy of religion1 and so on4 ,and the philosopher1 on the other hand1 might treat the whole of medicine as one part in itself1 while the physician might hold that even otology has to be separated from rhinology4 ,a certain subjectivity of standpoint is unavoidable1 and we know very well that instead of the one hundred and twenty-eight sections of our programme we might have been satisfied with half that number or might have indulged in double that number4 ,and yet there was no possible plan which would have allowed us to invite the speakers without defining beforehand the sectional field which each was to represent4 ,a certain courage of opinion was then necessary1 and sometimes also a certain adjustment to external conditions4 ,quite similar was the question of classification4 ,just as we had to take the responsibility for the staking-out of every section1 we had also to decide in favor of a certain grouping1 if we desired to organize the ,congress and not simply to bring out haphazard results4 ,the principles which are sufficient for a mere directory would never allow the shaping of a programme which can be the basis for synthetic work4 ,even a university catalogue begins with a certain classification1 and yet no one fancies that such catalogue grouping inhibits the freedom of the university lecturer4 ,it is easy to say1 as has been said1 that the essential trait of the scientific life of to-day is its live-and-let-live character4 ,certainly it is4 ,in the regular work in our libraries and laboratories the year round1 everything depends upon this democratic freedom in which every one goes his own way1 hardly asking what his neighbor is doing4 ,it is that which has made the specialistic sciences of our day as strong as they are4 ,but it has brought about at the same time this extreme tendency to unrelated specialization with its discouraging lack of unity2 this heaping up of information without an outer harmonious view of the world2 and if we were really at least once to satisfy the desire for unity1 then we had not the right to yield fully to this live-and-let-live tendency4 ,therefore some principle of grouping had to be accepted1 and whatever principle had been chosen1 it would certainly have been open to the criticism that it was a product of arbitrary decision1 inasmuch as other principles might have been possible4 ,a classification which in itself expresses all the practical relations in which sciences stand to each other is1 of course1 absolutely impossible4 ,a programme which should try to arrange the place of a special discipline in such a way that it would become the neighbor of all those other sciences with which it has internal relation is unthinkable4 ,on the other hand1 only if we had tried to construct a scheme of such exaggerated ambitions should we have been really guilty of anticipating a part of that which the specialistic scholars were to tell us4 ,the ,congress had to leave it to the invited participants to discuss the totality of relations which practically exist between their fields and others1 and the organizers confined themselves to that minimum of classification which just indicates the pure logical relations1 a minimum which every editor of encyclopedic work would be asked to initiate without awakening suspicions of interference with the ideas of his contributors4 ,the only justified demand which could be met was that a system of division and classification should be proposed which should give fair play to every existing scientific tendency4 ,the minimum of classification was to be combined with the maximum of freedom1 and to secure that a careful consideration of principles was indeed necessary4 ,to bring logical order into the sciences which stand out clearly with traditional rights is not difficult2 but the chances are too great that certain tendencies of thought might fail to find recognition or might be suppressed by scientific prejudice4 ,any serious omission would indeed have necessarily inhibited the freedom of expression4 ,to secure thus the greatest inner fullness of the programme1 seemed indeed the most important task in the elaboration of the ground-plan4 ,the fears that we might offer empty generalization instead of scholarly facts1 or that we might simply heap up encyclopedic information instead of gaining wide perspectives1 or that we might interfere with the living connections of sciences by the logical demarcation lines1 or that we might disturb the scholar in his freedom by determining beforehand his place in the classification1--all these fears and objections1 which were repeatedly raised when the plan was first proposed1 seemed indeed unimportant compared with the fear that the programme might be unable to include all scientific tendencies of the time4 ,that would have been1 indeed1 the one fundamental mistake1 as the whole ,congress work was planned in the service of the great synthetic movement which pervades the intellectual life of to-day4 ,the undertaking would be useless and even hindering if it were not just the newer and deeper tendencies that came to most complete expression in it4 ,everything depended1 therefore1 upon the fullest possible representation of scientific endeavors in the plan4 ,but no one can become aware of this manifoldness and of the logical relations who does not go back to the ultimate principles of the human search for truth4 ,we have1 therefore1 to enter now into a full discussion of the principles which have controlled the classification and subdivision of the whole work4 ,the discussion is necessarily in its essence a philosophical one1 as it was earlier made plain that philosophy must lay out the plan1 while in the realization of the plan through concrete work the scientist alone1 and not the logician1 has to speak4 ,yet here again it may be said that while our discussion of principles in its essence is logical1 in another respect it is a merely historical account4 ,the question is not what principles of classification are to be acknowledged as valuable now that the work of the ,congress lies behind us1 but what principles were accepted and really led to the organization of the work in that form in which it presents itself in the records of the following volumes4 ,,ii ,,the ,,classification ,,of ,,the ,,sciences #a4 ,the ,development of ,classification ,the problem of dividing and subdividing the whole of human knowledge and of thus bringing order into the manifoldness of scientific efforts has fascinated the leading thinkers of all ages4 ,it may often be difficult to say how far the new principles of classification themselves open the way for new scientific progress and how far the great forward movements of thought in the special sciences have in turn influenced the principles of classification4 ,in any case every productive age has demanded the expression of its deepest energy in a new ordering of human science4 ,the history of these efforts leads from ,plato and ,aristotle to ,bacon and ,locke1 to ,bentham and ,ampre1 to ,kant and ,hegel1 to ,comte and ,spencer1 to ,wundt and ,windelband4 ,and yet we can hardly speak of a real historical continuity4 ,in a certain way every period took up the problem anew1 and the new aspects resulted not only from the development of the sciences themselves which were to be classified1 but still more from the differences of logical interest4 ,sometimes the classification referred to the material1 sometimes to the method of treatment1 sometimes to the mental energies involved1 and sometimes to the ends to be reached4 ,the reference to the mental faculties was certainly the earliest method of bringing order into human knowledge1 for the distinction of the ,platonic philosophy between dialectics1 physics1 and ethics pointed to the threefold character of the mind1 to reason1 perception1 and desire2 and it was on the threshold of the modern time1 again1 when ,bacon divided the intellectual globe into three large parts according to three fundamental psychical faculties3 memory1 imagination1 and reason4 ,the memory gives us history2 the imagination1 poetry2 the reason1 philosophy1 or the sciences4 ,history was further divided into natural and civil history2 natural history into normal1 abnormal1 and artificial phenomena2 civil history into political1 literary1 and ecclesiastical history4 ,the field of reason was subdivided into man1 nature1 and ,god2 the domain of man gives1 first1 civil philosophy1 parted off into intercourse1 business1 and government1 and secondly1 the philosophy of humanity1 divided into that of body and of soul1 wherein medicine and athletics belong to the body1 logic and ethics to the soul4 ,nature1 on the other hand1 was divided into speculative and applied science1--the speculative containing both physics and metaphysics2 the applied1 mechanics and magic4 ,all this was full of artificial constructions1 and yet still more marked by deep insight into the needs of ,bacon's time1 and not every modification of later classifiers was logically a step forward4 ,yet modern efforts had to seek quite different methods1 and the energies which have been most effective for the ordering of knowledge in the last decades spring unquestionably from the system of ,comte and his successors4 ,he did not aim at a system of ramifications2 his problem was to show how the fundamental sciences depend on each other4 ,a series was to be constructed in which each member should presuppose the foregoing4 ,the result was a simplicity which is certainly tempting1 but this simplicity was reached only by an artificial emphasis which corresponded completely to the one-sidedness of naturalistic thought4 ,it was a philosophy of positivism1 the background for the gigantic work of natural science and technique in the last two thirds of the nineteenth century4 ,comte's fundamental thought is that the science of ,morals1 in which we study human nature for the government of human life1 is dependent on sociology4 ,sociology1 however1 depends on biology2 this on chemistry2 this on physics2 this on astronomy2 and this finally on mathematics4 ,in this way1 all mental and moral sciences1 history and philology1 jurisprudence and theology1 economics and politics1 are considered as sociological phenomena1 as dealing with functions of the human being4 ,but as man is a living organism1 and thus certainly falls under biology1 all the branches of knowledge from history to ethics1 from jurisprudence to sthetics1 can be nothing but subdivisions of biology4 ,the living organism1 on the other hand1 is merely one type of the physical bodies on earth1 and biology is thus itself merely a department of physics4 ,but as the earthly bodies are merely a part of the cosmic totality1 physics is thus a part of astronomy2 and as the whole universe is controlled by mathematical laws1 mathematics must be superordinated to all sciences4 ,but there followed a time which overcame this thinly disguised example of materialism4 ,it was a time when the categories of the physiologist lost slightly in credit and the categories of the psychologist won repute4 ,this newer movement held that it is artificial to consider ethical and logical life1 historic and legal action1 literary and religious emotions1 merely as physiological functions of the living organism4 ,the mental life1 however necessarily connected with brain processes1 has a positive reality of its own4 ,the psychical facts represent a world of phenomena which in its nature is absolutely different from that of material phenomena1 and1 while it is true that every ethical action and every logical thought can1 from the standpoint of the biologist1 be considered as a property of matter1 it is not less true that the sciences of mental phenomena1 considered impartially1 form a sphere of knowledge closed in itself1 and must thus be cordinated1 not subordinated1 to the knowledge of the physical world4 ,we should say thus3 all knowledge falls into two classes1 the physical sciences and the mental sciences4 ,in the circle of physical sciences we have the general sciences1 like physics and chemistry1 the particular sciences of special objects1 like astronomy1 geology1 mineralogy1 biology1 and the formal sciences1 like mathematics4 ,in the circle of mental sciences we have correspondingly1 as a general science1 psychology1 and as the particular sciences all those special mental and moral sciences which deal with man's inner life1 like history or jurisprudence1 logic or ethics1 and all the rest4 ,such a classification1 which had its philosophical defenders about twenty years ago1 penetrated the popular thought as fully as the positivism of the foregoing generation1 and was certainly superior to its materialistic forerunner4 ,of course it was not the first time in the history of civilization that materialism was replaced by dualism1 that biologism was replaced by psychologism2 and it was also not the first time that the development of civilization led again beyond this point3 that is1 led beyond the psychologizing period4 ,there is no doubt that our time presses on1 with all its powerful internal energies1 away from this ,weltanschauung of yesterday4 ,the materialism was anti-philosophic1 the psychological dualism was unphilosophic4 ,to-day the philosophical movement has set in4 ,the one-sidedness of the nineteenth century creed is felt in the deeper thought all over the world3 popular movements and scholarly efforts alike show the signs of a coming idealism1 which has something better and deeper to say than merely that our life is a series of causal phenomena4 ,our time longs for a new interpretation of reality2 from the depths of every science wherein for decades philosophizing was despised1 the best scholars turn again to a discussion of fundamental conceptions and general principles4 ,historical thinking begins again to take the leadership which for half a century belonged to naturalistic thinking2 specialistic research demands increasingly from day to day the readjustment toward higher unities1 and the technical progress which charmed the world becomes more and more simply a factor in an ideal progress4 ,the appearance of this unifying congress itself is merely one of a thousand symptoms of this change appearing in our public life1 and if the scientific philosophy is producing to-day book upon book to prove that the world of phenomena must be supplemented by the world of values1 that description must yield to interpretation1 and that explanation must be harmonized with appreciation3 it is but echoing in technical terms the one great emotion of our time4 ,this certainly does not mean that any step of the gigantic materialistic1 technical1 and psychological development will be reversed1 or that progress in any one of these directions ought to cease4 ,on the contrary1 no time was ever more ready to put its immense energies into the service of naturalistic work2 but it does mean that our time recognizes the one-sidedness of these movements1 recognizes that they belong only to one aspect of reality1 and that another aspect is possible2 yes1 that the other aspect is that of our immediate life1 with its purposes and its ideals1 its historical relations and its logical aims4 ,the claim of materialism1 that all psychical facts are merely functions of the organism1 was no argument against psychology1 because1 though the biological view was possible1 yet the other aspect is certainly a necessary supplement4 ,in the same way it is no argument against the newer view that all purposes and ideals1 all historical actions and logical thoughts1 can be considered as psychological phenomena4 ,of course we can consider them as such1 and we must go on doing so in the service of the psychological and sociological sciences2 but we ought not to imagine that we have expressed and understood the real character of our historical or moral1 our logical or religious life when we have described and explained it as a series of phenomena4 ,its immediate reality expresses itself above all in the fact that it has a meaning1 that it is a purpose which we want to understand1 not by considering its causes and effects1 but by interpreting its aims and appreciating its ideals4 ,we should say1 therefore1 to-day that it is most interesting and important for the scientist to consider human life with all its strivings and creations from a biological1 psychological1 sociological point of view2 that is1 to consider it as a system of causal phenomena2 and many problems worthy of the highest energies have still to be solved in these sciences4 ,but that which the jurist or the theologian1 the student of art or of history1 of literature or of politics1 of education or of morality1 is dealing with1 refers to the other aspect in which inner life is not a phenomenon but a system of purposes1 not to be explained but to be interpreted1 to be approached not by causal but by teleological methods4 ,in this case the historical sciences are no longer sub-sections of psychological or of sociological sciences2 the conception of science is no longer identical with the conception of the science of phenomena4 ,there exist sciences which do not deal with the description or explanation of phenomena at all1 but with the internal relation and connection1 the interpretation and appreciation of purpose4 ,in this way modern thought demands that sciences of purpose be cordinated with sciences of phenomena4 ,only if all these tendencies of our time are fully acknowledged can the outer framework of our classification offer a fair field to every scientific thought1 while a positivistic system would cripple the most promising tendencies of the twentieth century4 #b4 ,the ,four ,theoretical ,divisions ,we have first to determine the underlying structure of the classification1 that is1 we have to seek the chief ,divisions1 of which our plan shows seven2 four theoretical and three practical ones4 ,it will be a secondary task to subdivide them later into the #bd ,departments and #abh ,sections4 ,we desire to divide the whole of knowledge in a fundamental way1 and we must therefore start with the question of principle3--what is knowledge8 ,this question belongs to epistemology1 and thus falls1 indeed1 into the domain of philosophy4 ,the positivist is easily inclined to substitute for the philosophical problem the empirical question3 how did that which we call knowledge grow and develop itself in our individual mind1 or in the mind of the nations8 ,the question becomes1 then1 of course1 one which must be answered by psychology1 by sociology1 and perhaps by biology4 ,such genetic inquiries are certainly very important1 and the problem of how the processes of judging and conceiving and thinking are produced in the individual or social consciousness1 and how they are to be explained through physical and psychical causes1 deserves fullest attention4 ,but its solution cannot even help us as regards the fundamental problem1 what we mean by knowledge1 and what the ultimate value of knowledge may be1 and why we seek it4 ,this deeper logical inquiry must be answered somehow before those genetic studies of the psychological and the sociological positivists can claim any truth at all1 and thus any value1 for their outcome4 ,to explain our present knowledge genetically from its foregoing causes means merely to connect the present experience1 which we know1 with a past experience1 which we remember1 or with earlier phenomena which we construct on the basis of theories and hypotheses2 but in any case with facts which we value as parts of our knowledge and which thus presuppose the acknowledgment of the value of knowledge4 ,we cannot determine by linking one part of knowledge with another part of knowledge whether we have a right to speak of knowledge at all and to rely on it4 ,we can thus not start from the childhood of man1 or from the beginning of humanity1 or from any other object of knowledge1 but we must begin with the state which logically precedes all knowledge2 that is1 with our immediate experience of real life4 ,here1 in the nave experience in which we do not know ourselves as objects which we perceive1 but where we feel ourselves in our subjective attitudes as agents of will1 as personalities1 here we find the original reality not yet shaped and remoulded by scientific conceptions and by the demands of knowledge4 ,and from this basis of primary1 nave reality we must ask ourselves what we mean by seeking knowledge1 and how this demand of ours is different from the other activities in which we work out the meaning and the ideals of our life4 ,one thing is certain1 we cannot go back to the old dogmatic standpoint1 whether rationalistic or sensualistic4 ,in both cases dogmatism took for granted that there is a real world of things which exist in themselves independent of our subjective attitudes1 and that our knowledge has to give us a mirror picture of that self-dependent world4 ,sensualism averred that we get this knowledge through our perceptions2 rationalism1 that we get it by reasoning4 ,the one asserted that experience gives us the data which mere abstract reasoning can never supply2 the other asserted that our knowledge speaks of necessity which no mere perception can find out4 ,our modern time has gone through the school of philosophical criticism1 and the dogmatic ideas have lost for us their meaning4 ,we know that the world which we think as independent cannot be independent of the forms of our thinking1 and that no science has reference to any other world than the world which is determined by the categories of our apperception4 ,there cannot be anything more real than the immediate pure experience1 and if we seek the truth of knowledge1 we do not set out to discover something which is hidden behind our experience1 but we set out simply to make something out of our experience which satisfies certain demands4 ,our immediate experience does not contain an objective thing and a subjective picture of it1 but they are completely one and the same piece of experience4 ,we have the object of our immediate knowledge not in the double form of an outer object independent of ourselves and an idea in us1 but we have it as our object there in the practical world before science for its special purposes has broken up that bit of reality into the physical material thing and the psychical content of consciousness4 ,and if this doubleness does not hold for the immediate reality of pure experience1 it cannot enter through that reshaping and reconstructing and connecting and interpreting of pure experience which we call our knowledge4 ,all that science gives to us is just such an endlessly enlarged experience1 of which every particle remains objective and independent1 inasmuch as it is not in us as psychical individuals1 while yet completely dependent upon the forms of our subjective experience4 ,the ideal of truth is thus not to gain by reason or by observation ideas in ourselves which correspond as well as possible to absolute things1 but to reconstruct the given experience in the service of certain purposes4 ,everything which completely fulfills the purposes of this intentional reconstruction is true4 ,what are these purposes8 ,one thing is clear from the first3 ,there cannot be a purpose where there is not a will4 ,if we come from pure experience to knowledge by a purposive transformation1 we must acknowledge the reality of will in ourselves1 or rather1 we must find ourselves as will in the midst of pure experience before we reach any knowledge4 ,and so it is indeed4 ,we can abstract from all those reconstructions which the sciences suggest to us and go back to the most immediate nave experience2 but we can never reach an experience which does not contain the doubleness of subject and object1 of will and world4 ,that doubleness has nothing whatever to do with the difference of physical and psychical2 both the physical thing and the psychical idea are objects4 ,the antithesis is not that between two kinds of objects1 since we have seen that in the immediate experience the objects are not at all split up into the two groups of material and mental things2 it is rather the antithesis between the object in its undifferentiated state on the one side and the subject in its will-attitude on the other side4 ,yes1 even if we speak of the subject which stands as a unity behind the will-attitudes1 we are already reconstructing the real experience in the interest of the purposes of knowledge4 ,in the immediate experience1 we have the will-attitudes themselves1 and not a subject which wills them4 ,if we ask ourselves finally what is then the ultimate difference between those two elements of our pure experience1 between the object and the will-attitude1 we stand before the ultimate data3 we call that element which exists merely through a reference to its opposite1 the object1 and we call that element of our experience which is complete in itself1 the attitude of the will4 ,if we experienced liking or disliking1 affirming or denying1 approving or disapproving in the same way in which we experience the red and the green1 the sweet and the sour1 the rock and the tree and the moon1 we should know objects only4 ,but we do experience them in quite a different way4 ,the rock and the tree do not point to anything else1 but the approval has no reality if it does not point to its opposition in disapproval1 and the denial has no meaning if it is not meant in relation to the affirmative4 ,this doubleness of our primary experience1 this having of objects and of antagonistic attitudes must be acknowledged wherever we speak of experience at all4 ,we know no object without attitude1 and no attitude without object4 ,the two are one state2 object and attitude form a unity which we resolve by the different way in which we experience these two features of the one state3 we find the object and we live through the attitude4 ,it is a different kind of awareness1 the having of the object and the taking of the attitude4 ,in real life our will is never an object which we simply perceive4 ,the psychologist may treat the will as such1 but in the immediate experience of real life1 we are certain of our action by doing it and not by perceiving our doing2 and this our performing and rejecting is really our self which we posit as absolute reality1 not by knowing it1 but by willing it4 ,this corner-stone of the ,fichtean philosophy was forgotten throughout the uncritical and unphilosophical decades of a mere naturalistic age4 ,but our time has finally come to give attention to it again4 ,our pure experience thus contains will-attitudes and objects of will1 and the different attitudes of the will give the fundamental classes of human activity4 ,we can easily recognize four different types of will-relation towards the world4 ,our will submits itself to the world2 our will approves the world as it is2 our will approves the changes in the world2 our will transcends the world4 ,yet we must make at once one more most important discrimination4 ,we have up to this point simplified our pure experience too much4 ,it is not true that we experience only objects and our own will-attitudes4 ,our will reaches out not only to objects1 but also to other subjects4 ,in our most immediate experience1 not reshaped at all by theoretical science1 our will is in agreement or disagreement with other wills2 tries to influence them1 and receives influences and suggestions from them4 ,the pseudo-philosophy of naturalism must say of course that the will does not stand in any direct relation to another will1 but that the other persons are for us simply material objects which we perceive1 like other objects1 and into which we project mental phenomena like those which we find in ourselves by the mere conclusion of analogy4 ,but the complex reconstructions of physiological psychology are therein substituted for the primary experience4 ,if we have to express the agreement or disagreement of wills in the terms of causal science1 we may indeed be obliged to transform the real experience into such artificial constructions2 but in our immediate consciousness1 and thus at the starting-point of our theory of knowledge1 we have certainly to acknowledge that we understand the other person1 accept or do not accept his suggestion1 agree or disagree with him1 before we know anything of a difference between physical and mental objects4 ,we cannot agree with an object4 ,we agree directly with a will1 which does not come to us as a foreign phenomenon1 but as a proposition which we accept or decline4 ,in our immediate experience will thus reaches will1 and we are aware of the difference between our will-attitude as merely individual and our will-attitude as act of agreement with the will-attitude of other individuals4 ,we can go still further4 ,the circle of other individuals whose will we express in our own will-act may be narrow or wide1 may be our friends or the nation1 and this relation clearly constitutes the historical significance of our attitude4 ,in the one case our act is a merely personal choice for personal purposes without any general meaning2 in the other case it is the expression of general tendencies and historical movements4 ,yet our will-decisions can have connections still wider than those with our social community or our nation1 or even with all living men of to-day4 ,it can seek a relation to the totality of those whom we aim to acknowledge as real subjects4 ,it thus becomes independent of the chance experience of this or that man1 or this or that movement1 which appeals to us1 but involves in an independent way the reference to every one who is to be acknowledged as a subject at all4 ,such reference1 which is no longer bound to any special group of historical individuals1 thus becomes strictly over-individual4 ,we can then discriminate three stages3 our merely individual will2 secondly1 our will as bound by other historical individuals2 and thirdly1 our over-individual will1 which is not influenced by any special individual1 but by the general demands for the idea of a personality4 ,each of those four great types of will-attitude which we insisted on--that is1 of submitting1 of approving the given1 of approving change1 and of transcending--can be carried out on these three stages1 that is1 as individual act1 as historical act1 and as over-individual act4 ,and we may say at once that only if we submit and approve and change and transcend in an over-individual act1 do we have ,truth and ,beauty and ,morality and ,conviction4 ,if we approve1 for instance1 a given experience in an individual will-act1 we have simply personal enjoyment and its object is simply agreeable2 if we approve it in harmony with other individuals1 we reach a higher attitude1 yet one which cannot claim absolute value1 as it is dependent on historical considerations and on the tastes and desires of a special group or a school or a nation or an age4 ,but if we approve the given object just as it is in an over-individual will-act1 then we have before us a thing of beauty1 whose value is not dependent upon our personal enjoyment as individuals1 but is demanded as a joy forever1 by every one whom we acknowledge at all as a complete subject4 ,in exactly the same way1 we may approve a change in the world from any individual point of view3 we have then to do with technical1 practical achievements2 or we may approve it in agreement with others3 we then enter into the historical interests of our time4 ,or we may approve it1 finally1 in an over-individual way1 without any reference to any special personality3 then only is it valuable for all time1 then only is it morally good4 ,and if our will is transcending experience in an individual way1 it can again claim no more than a subjective satisfaction furnished by any superstition or hope4 ,but if the transcending will is over-individual1 it reaches the absolute values of religion and metaphysics4 ,exactly the same differences1 finally1 must occur when our will submits itself to experience4 ,this submission may be1 again1 an individual decision for individual purposes2 no absolute value belongs to it4 ,or it may be again a yielding to the suggestions of other individuals2 or it may1 finally1 again be an over-individual submission1 which seeks no longer a personal interest4 ,this submission is not to the authority of others1 and is without reference to any individual2 we assume that every one who is to share with us our world of experience has to share this submission too4 ,that alone is a submission to truth1 and experience1 considered in so far as we submit ourselves to it over-individually1 constitutes our knowledge4 ,the system of knowledge is thus the system of experience with all that is involved in it in so far as it demands submission from our over-individual will1 and the classification which we are seeking must be thus a division and subdivision of our over-individual submissions4 ,but the submission itself can be of very different characters and these various types must give the deepest logical principles of scientific classification4 ,to point at once to the fundamental differences3 our will acknowledges the demands of other wills and of objects4 ,we cannot live our life--and this is not meant in a biological sense1 but1 first of all1 in a teleological sense--our life becomes meaningless1 if our will does not respect the reality of will-demands and of objects of will4 ,now we have seen that the will which demands our decision may be either the individual will of other subjects or the over-individual will1 which belongs to every subject as such and is independent of any individuality4 ,we can say at once that in the same way we are led to acknowledge that the object has partly an over-individual character1 that is1 necessarily belongs to the world of objects of every possible subject1 and partly an individual character1 as our personal object4 ,we have thus four large groups of experiences to which we submit ourselves3 over-individual will-acts1 individual will-acts1 over-individual objects1 individual objects4 ,they constitute the first four large divisions of our system4 ,the over-individual will-acts1 which are as such teleologically binding for every subject and therefore norms for his will1 give us the ,normative ,sciences4 ,the individual will-acts in the world of historical manifoldness give us the ,historical ,sciences4 ,the objects1 in so far as they belong to every individual1 make up the physical world1 and thus give us the ,physical ,sciences2 and finally the objects1 in so far as they belong to the individual1 are the contents of consciousness1 and thus give us the ,mental ,sciences4 ,we have then the demarcation lines of our first four large divisions3 the ,normative1 the ,historical1 the ,physical1 and the ,mental ,sciences4 ,yet their meaning and method and difference must be characterized more fully4 ,we must understand why we have here to deal with four absolutely different types of scientific systems1 why the over-individual objects lead us to general laws and to the determination of the future1 while the study of the individual will-acts1 for instance1 gives us the system of history1 which turns merely to the past and does not seek natural laws2 and why the study of the norms gives us another kind of system in which neither a causal nor an historical1 but a purely logical connection prevails4 ,yet all these methodological differences result necessarily from the material with which these four different groups of sciences are working4 ,let us start again from the consideration of our original logical purpose4 ,we feel ourselves bound and limited in our will by physical things1 by psychical contents1 by the demands of other subjects1 and by norms4 ,the purpose of all our knowledge is to develop completely all that is involved in this bondage4 ,we want to develop in an over-individual way all the obligations for our submission which are necessarily included in the given objects and the given demands of subjects4 ,we start of course everywhere and in every direction from the actual experience1 but we expand the experience by seeking those objects and those demands to which1 as necessarily following from the immediately given experience1 we must also submit4 ,and in thus developing the whole system of submissions1 the interpretation of the experience itself becomes transformed3 the physicist may perhaps substitute imperceptible atoms for the physical object and the psychologist may substitute sensations for the real idea1 and the historian may substitute combinations of influences for the real personality1 and the student of norms may substitute combinations of conflicting demands for the one complete duty2 yet in every case the substitution is logically necessary and furnishes us what we call truth inasmuch as it is needed to develop the concrete system of our submissions and thus to express our confidence in the order-lines of reality4 ,and each of these substitutions and supplementations becomes1 as material of knowledge1 itself a part of the world of experience4 #c4 ,the ,physical and the ,mental ,sciences ,the physicist1 we said1 speaks of the world of objects in so far as they belong to every possible subject1 and are material for a merely passive spectator4 ,of course the pure experience does not offer us anything of that kind4 ,we insisted that the objects of our real life are objects of our will and of our attitudes1 and are at the same time undifferentiated into the physical things outside of us and the psychical ideas in us4 ,to reach the abstraction of the physicist1 we have thus to cut loose the objects from our will and to separate the over-individual elements from the individual elements4 ,both transformations are clearly demanded by our logical aims4 ,as to the cutting loose from our will1 it means considering the object as if it existed for itself1 as if it were a mere passively given material and not a material of our personal interests4 ,but just that is needed4 ,we want to find out how far we have to submit ourselves to the object4 ,if we want to live our life1 we must adjust our attitudes to things1 and1 as we know our will1 we must seek to understand the other factor in the complex experience1 the object of our will1 and we must find out what it involves in itself4 ,but we do not understand the object and the submission which it demands if we do not completely understand its relation to our desires4 ,our total submission to the thing thus involves our acknowledgment of all that we have to expect from it4 ,and although the real experience is a unity of will and thing1 we have thus the most immediate interest in considering what we have to expect from the thing in itself1 without reference to our will4 ,that means finding out the effects of the given object with a subject as the passive spectator4 ,we eliminate artificially1 therefore1 the activity of the subject and construct as presupposition for this circle of knowledge a nowhere existing subject without activity1 for which the thing exists merely as a cause of the effects which it produces4 ,the first step towards natural science is1 therefore1 to dissolve the real experience into thing and personality2 that is1 into object and active subject1 and to eliminate in an artificial abstraction the activity of the subject1 making the object material of merely passive awareness1 and related no longer to the will but merely to other objects4 ,it may be more difficult to understand the second step which naturalism has to take before a natural science is possible4 ,it must dissolve the object of will into an over-individual and an individual part and must eliminate the individual4 ,that part of my objects which belongs to me alone is their psychical side2 that which belongs to all of us and is the object of ever new experience is the physical object4 ,as a physicist1 in the widest sense of the word1 ,i have to ignore the objects in so far as they are my ideas and have to consider the stones and the stars1 the inorganic and the organic objects1 as they are outside of me1 material for every one4 ,the logical purpose of this second abstraction may be perhaps formulated in the following way4 ,we have seen that the purpose of the study of the objects is to find out what we have to expect from them2 that is1 to what effects of the given thing we have to submit ourselves in anticipation4 ,the ideal aim is thus to understand completely how present objects and future objects--that is1 how causes and effects--are connected4 ,the first stage in such knowledge of causal connections is1 of course1 the observation of empirical consequences4 ,our feeling of expectation grows with the regularity of observed succession2 yet the ideal aim can never be fulfilled in that way4 ,the mere observation of regularities can help us to reduce a particular case to a frequently observed type1 but what we seek to understand is the necessity of the process4 ,of course we have to formulate laws1 and as soon as we acknowledge a special law to be expressive of a necessity1 the subsumption of the particular case under the law will satisfy us even if the necessity of the connection is not recognized in the particular case4 ,we are satisfied because the acknowledgment of the law involved all possible cases4 ,but we do not at all feel that we have furnished a real explanation if the law means to us merely a generalization of routine experiences1 and if thus no absolute validity is attached to the law4 ,this necessity between cause and effect must thus have its ultimate reason in our own understanding4 ,we must be logically obliged to connect the objects in such a way1 and wherever observation seems to contradict that which is logically necessary1 we must reshape our idea of the object till the demands of reason are fulfilled4 ,that is1 we must substitute for the given object an abstraction which serves the purpose of a logically necessary connection4 ,that demand is clearly not satisfied if we simply group the totality of such causal judgments under the single name1 ,causality1 and designate thus all these judgments as results of a special disposition of the understanding4 ,we never understand why just this cause demands just this effect so long as we rely on such vague and mystical power of our reason to link the world by causality4 ,but the situation changes at once if we go still further back in the categories of our understanding4 ,while a mere demand for causality never explains what cause is to be linked with what effect1 the vagueness disappears when we understand this demand for causality itself as the product of a more fundamental demand for identity4 ,that an object remains identical with itself does not need for us any further interpretation4 ,that is the ultimate presupposition of our thought1 and where a complete identity is found nothing demands further explanation4 ,all scientific effort aims at so rethinking different experiences that they can be regarded as partially identical1 and every discovery of necessary connection is ultimately a demonstration of identity4 ,if we seek connections with the final aim to understand them as necessary1 we must conceive the world of our objects in such a way that it is possible to consider the successive experiences as parts of a self-identical world2 that is1 as parts of a world in which no substance and no energy can disappear or appear anew4 ,to reach this end it is obviously needed that we eliminate from the world of objects all that cannot be conceived as identically returning in a new experience2 that is1 all that belongs to the present experience only4 ,we do eliminate this by taking it up conceptually into the subject and calling it psychical1 and thus leaving to the object merely that which is conceived as belonging to the world of everybody's experience1 that is1 of over-individual experience4 ,the whole history of natural science is first of all the gigantic development of this transformation1 resolution1 and reconstruction4 ,the objects of experience are re-thought till everything is eliminated which cannot be conceived as identical with itself in the experiences of all individuals and thus as belonging to the over-individual world4 ,all the substitutions of atoms for the real thing1 and of energies for the real changes1 are merely conceptional schemes to satisfy this demand4 ,the logically primary step is thus not the separation of the physical and the psychical things plus the secondary demand to connect the physical things causally2 the order is exactly opposite4 ,the primary desire is to connect the real objects and to understand them as causes and effects4 ,this understanding demands not only empirical observation1 but insight into the necessary connection4 ,necessary connection1 on the other hand1 exists merely for identical objects and identical qualities4 ,but in the various experiences only that is identical which is independent of the momentary individual experiences1 and therefore we need as the ultimate aim a reconstruction of the object into the two parts1 the one perceptional1 which refers to our individual experience2 and the other conceptional1 which expresses that which can be conceived as identical in every new experience4 ,the ideal of this constructed world is the mechanical universe in which every atom moves by causal necessity because there is nothing in that universe1 no element of substance and no element of energy1 which will not remain identical in all changes of the universe which are possibly to be expected4 ,it becomes completely determinable by anticipation and the system of our submissions to the object can be completely constructed4 ,the totality of intellectual efforts to reconstruct such a causally connected over-individual world of objects clearly represents a unity of its own4 ,it is the system of physical sciences4 ,the physical universe is thus not the totality of our objects4 ,it is a substitution for our real objects1 constructed by eliminating the individual parts of our objects of experience4 ,these individual parts are the psychical aspects of our objective experience1 and they clearly awake our scientific interest too4 ,the physical sciences need thus as counterpart a division of mental sciences4 ,their aim must be the same4 ,we want to foresee the psychical results and to understand causally the psychical experience4 ,yet it is clear that the plan of the mental sciences must be quite different in principle from that of the sciences of nature4 ,the causal connection of the physical universe was ultimately anchored in the identity of the object through various experiences2 while the object of experience was psychical for us just in so far as it could never be conceived as identical in different phases of reality4 ,the psychical object is an ever new creation2 my idea can never be your idea4 ,their meaning may be identical1 but the psychical stuff1 the content of my consciousness1 can never be object for any one else1 and even in myself the idea of to-day is never the idea of yesterday or to-morrow4 ,but if there cannot be identity in different psychical experiences1 it is logically impossible to connect them directly by necessity4 ,if we yet want to master their successive appearance1 we must substitute an indirect connection for the direct one1 and must describe and explain the psychical phenomena through reference to the physical world4 ,it is in this way that modern psychology has substituted elementary sensations for the real contents of consciousness and has constructed relations between these elementary mental states on the basis of processes in the organism1 especially brain processes4 ,here1 again1 reality is left behind and a mere conceptional construction is put in its place4 ,but this construction fulfills its purpose and thus gives us truth2 and if the basis is once given1 the psychological sciences can build up a causal system of the conscious processes in the individual man and in society4 #d4 ,the ,historical and the ,normative ,sciences ,the two divisions of the physical and mental sciences represent our systematized submission to objects4 ,but we saw from the first that it is an artificial abstraction to consider in our real experience the object alone4 ,we saw clearly that we1 as acting personalities1 in our will and in our attitudes1 do not feel ourselves in relation to objects1 merely1 but to will-acts2 and that these will-acts were the individual ones of other subjects or the over-individual ones which come to us in our consciousness of norms4 ,the sciences which deal with our submissions to the individual will-acts of others are the ,historical ,sciences4 ,their starting-point is the same as that of the object sciences1 the immediate experience4 ,but the other subjects reach our individuality from the start in a different way from the objects4 ,the wills of other subjects come to us as propositions with which we have to agree or disagree2 as suggestions1 which we are to imitate or to resist2 and they carry in themselves that reference to an opposite which1 as we saw1 characterizes all will-activity4 ,the rock or the tree in our surroundings may stimulate our reactions1 but does not claim to be in itself a decision with an alternative4 ,but the political or legal or artistic or social or religious will of my neighbors not only demands my agreement or disagreement1 but presents itself to me in its own meaning as a free decision which rejects the opposite1 and its whole meaning is destroyed if ,i consider it like the tree or the rock as a mere phenomenon1 as an object in the world of objects4 ,whoever has clearly understood that politics and religion and knowledge and art and law come to me from the first quite differently from objects1 can never doubt that their systematic connection must be most sharply separated from all the sciences which connect impressions of objects1 and is falsified if the historical disciplines are treated simply as parts of the sciences of phenomena--for instance1 as parts of sociology1 the science of society as a psycho-physical object4 ,just as natural science transcends the immediately experienced object and works out the whole system of our necessary submissions to the world of objects1 so the historical sciences transcend the social will-acts which approach us in our immediate experience1 and again seek to find what we are really submitting to if we accept the suggestions of our social surroundings4 ,and yet this similar demand has most dissimilar consequences4 ,we submit to an object and want to find out what we are really submitting to4 ,that cannot mean anything else1 as we have seen1 than to seek the effects of the object and thus to look forward to what we have to expect from the object4 ,on the other hand1 if we want to find out what we are really submitting to if we agree with the decision of our neighbor1 the only meaning of the question can be to ask what our neighbor really is deciding on1 what is contained in his decision2 and as his decision must mean an agreement or disagreement with the will-act of another subject1 we cannot understand the suggestion which comes to us without understanding in respect to what propositions of others it takes a stand4 ,our interest is in this case thus led from those subjects of will which enter into our immediate experience to other subjects whose purposes stand in the relation of suggestion and demand to the present ones4 ,and if we try to develop the system of these relations1 we come to an endless chain of will-relations1 in which one individual will always points back in its decisions to another individual will with which it agrees or disagrees1 which it imitates or overcomes by a new attitude of will2 and the whole network of these will-relations is the political or religious or artistic or social history of mankind4 ,this system of history as a system of teleologically connected will-attitudes is elaborated from the will-propositions which reach us in immediate experience1 with the same necessity with which the mechanical universe of natural science is worked out from the objects of our immediate experience4 ,the historical system of will-connections is similar to the system of object-connections1 not only in its starting in the immediate experience1 but further in its also seeking identities4 ,without this feature history would not offer to our understanding real connections4 ,we must link the will-attitudes of men by showing the identity of the alternatives4 ,just as the physical thing is substituted by a large number of atoms which remain identical in the causal changes1 in the same way the personality is substituted by an endless manifoldness of decisions and becomes linked with the historical community by the thought that each of these partial decisions refers to an alternative which is identical with that of other persons4 ,and yet there remains a most essential difference between the historical and the causal connection4 ,in a world of things the mere identical continuity is sufficient to determine the phenomena of any given moment4 ,in a world of will the identity of alternatives cannot determine beforehand the actual decision2 that belongs to the free activity of the subject4 ,if this factor of freedom were left out1 man would be made an object and history a mere appendix of natural science4 ,the connection of the historian can therefore never be a necessary one1 however much we may observe empirical regularities4 ,if there were no identities1 our reason could not find connection in history2 but if the historical connections were necessary1 like the causal ones1 it would not be history4 ,the historian is1 therefore1 unable and without the ambition to look into the future like the naturalist2 his domain is the past4 ,yet will-attitudes and will-acts can also be brought into necessary connection2 that is1 we can conceive will-acts as teleologically identical with each other and exempt from the freedom of the individual4 ,that is clearly possible only if they are conceived as beyond the freedom of individual decision and related to the over-individual subject4 ,the question is then no longer how this special man wills and decides1 but how far a certain will-decision binds every possible individual who performs this act if he is to share our common world of will and meaning4 ,such an over-individual connection of will-acts is what we call the logical connection4 ,it shares with all other connections the dependence upon the category of identity4 ,the logical connection shows how far one act or combination of acts involves1 and thus is partially identical with1 a new combination4 ,this logical connection has1 in common with the causal connection1 necessity2 and in common with the historical connection1 teleological character4 ,any individual will-act of historical life may be treated for certain purposes as such a starting-point of over-individual relations2 it would then lead to that scientific treatment which gives us an interpretation1 for instance1 of law4 ,such interpretative sciences belong to the system of history in the widest sense of the word4 ,the chief interest1 however1 must belong to the logical connections of those will-acts which themselves have over-individual character4 ,a merely individual proposition can lead to necessary logical connection1 but cannot claim that scientific importance which belongs to the logical connection of those propositions which are necessary for the constitution of every real experience3 the science of chess cannot stand on the same level with the science of geometry1 the science of local legal statutes not on the same level with the system of ethics4 ,the logical connections of the over-individual attitudes thus constitute the fourth large division besides the physical1 the mental1 and the historical sciences4 ,it must thus comprise the systems of all those propositions which are presuppositions of our common reality1 independent of the free individual decision4 ,here belong the acts of approval--the ethical approval of changes and achievements1 as well as the sthetic approval of the given world2 the acts of conviction--the religious convictions of a superstructure of the world as well as the metaphysical convictions of a substructure2 and above all1 the acts of affirmation and submission1 the logical as well as the mathematical4 ,but to be consistent we must really demand that merely the over-individual logical connections are treated in this division4 ,if we deal1 for instance1 with the sthetical or ethical acts as psychological experiences1 or as historical propositions1 they belong to the psychical or historical division4 ,only the philosophical system of ethics or sthetics finds its place in this division4 ,it is difficult to find a suitable name for this whole system of logical connections of over-individual attitudes4 ,perhaps it would be most correct to call it the ,sciences of ,values1 inasmuch as every one of these over-individual decisions constitutes a value in our world which our individual will finds as an absolute datum like the objects of experience4 ,seen from another point of view1 these values appear as norms which bind our practical will inasmuch as these absolute values demand of our will to realize them1 and it may thus be permitted to designate this whole group of sciences as a ,division of ,normative ,sciences4 ,our logical explanation of the meaning of these four divisions naturally began with the interpretation of that science which usually takes precedence in popular thought--with the science of nature1 that is1 and passed then to those groups whose methodological situation is seen rather vaguely by our positivistic age4 ,but as soon as we have once defined and worked out the boundary lines of each of these four divisions1 it would appear more logical to change their order and to begin with that division whose material is those over-individual will-acts on which all possible knowledge must depend1 and then to turn to those individual will-acts which determine the formulation of our present-day knowledge1 and then only to go to the objects of knowledge1 the over-individual and the individual ones4 ,in short1 we must begin with the normative sciences1 consider in the second place the historical sciences1 in the third place the physical sciences1 and in the fourth place the psychical sciences4 ,there cannot be a scientific judgment which must not find its place somewhere in one of these four groups4 ,and yet can we really say that these four great divisions complete the totality of scientific efforts8 ,the plan of our ,congress contains three important divisions besides these4 #e4 ,the ,three ,divisions of ,practical ,sciences ,the three divisions which still lie before us represent ,practical ,knowledge4 ,have we a logical right to put them on an equal level with the four large divisions which we have considered so far8 ,might it not rather be said that all that is knowledge in those practical sciences must find its place somewhere in the theoretical field1 and that everything outside of it is not knowledge1 but art8 ,it cannot be denied indeed that the logical position of the practical sciences presents serious problems4 ,that the function of the engineer or of the physician1 of the lawyer or of the minister1 of the diplomat or of the teacher1 contains elements of an art cannot be doubted4 ,they all need not only knowledge1 but a certain instinct and power and skill1 and their schooling thus demands a training and discipline through imitation which cannot be substituted by mere learning4 ,yet when it comes to the classification of sciences1 it seems very doubtful whether practical sciences have to be acknowledged as special divisions1 inasmuch as the factor of art must have been eliminated at the moment they are presented as sciences4 ,the auscultation of the physician certainly demands skill and training1 yet this practical activity itself does not enter into the science of medicine as presented in medical writings4 ,as soon as the physician begins to deal with it scientifically1 he needs1 as does any scholar1 not the stethoscope1 but the pen4 ,he must formulate judgments2 and as soon as he simply describes and analyzes and explains and interprets his stethoscopic experiences1 his statements become a system of theoretical ideas4 ,we can say in general that the science of medicine or of engineering1 of jurisprudence or of education1 contains1 as science1 no element of art1 but merely theoretical judgments which1 as such1 can find their place somewhere in the complete systems of the theoretical sciences4 ,if the physician describes a disease1 its symptoms1 the means of examining them1 the remedies1 their therapeutical effects1 and the prophylaxis1 in short1 everything which the physician needs for his art1 he does not record anything which would not belong to an ideally complete description and explanation of the processes in the human body4 ,in the same way it can be said that if the engineer characterizes the conditions under which an iron bridge will be safe1 it is evident that he cannot introduce any facts which would not find their logical place in an ideally complete description of the properties of inorganic nature2 and finally1 the same is true for the statements of the politician1 the jurist1 the pedagogue1 or the minister4 ,whatever is said about their art is a theoretical judgment which connects facts of the ideally complete system of theoretical science2 in their case the facts of course belong in first line to the realm of the psychological1 historical1 and normative sciences4 ,there never has been or can be practical advice in the form of words1 which is not in principle a statement of facts which belong to the absolute totality of theoretical knowledge4 ,seen from this point of view1 it is evident that all our knowledge is fundamentally theoretical1 and that the conception of practical knowledge is logically unprecise4 ,but the opposite point of view might also be taken4 ,it might be said that after all every kind of knowledge is practical1 and our own deduction of the meaning of science might be said to suggest such interpretation4 ,we acknowledged at the outset that the so-called theoretical knowledge is by no means a passive mirror picture of an independent outside world2 but that in every judgment real experience is remoulded and reshaped in the service of certain purposes of will4 ,here lies the true core of that growing popular philosophy of to-day which1 under the name of pragmatism1 or under other titles1 mingles the purposive character of our knowledge and the evolutionary theories of modern biology in the vague notion that men created knowledge because the biological struggle for existence led to such views of the world2 and that we call true that correlation of our experiences which has approved itself through its harmony with the phylogenetic development4 ,certainly we must reject such circle philosophies4 ,we must see clearly that the whole conception of a biological development and of a struggle of organisms is itself only a part of our construction of causal knowledge4 ,we must have knowledge to conceive ourselves as products of a phylogenetic history1 and thus cannot deduce from it the fact1 and1 still less1 the justification of knowledge4 ,yet one element of this theory remains valuable3 knowledge is indeed a purposive activity1 a reconstruction of the world in the service of ideals of the will4 ,we have thus from one side the suggestion that all knowledge is merely theoretical1 from the other side the claim that all knowledge is practical activity4 ,it seems as if both sides might agree that it is superfluous and unjustified to make a demarcation line through the field of knowledge and to separate two sorts of knowledge1 theoretical and practical4 ,for both theories demand that all knowledge be of one kind1 and they disagree only as to whether we ought to call it all theoretical or all practical4 ,yet the true situation is not characterized by such an antithesis4 ,if we say that all knowledge is ultimately practical1 we are speaking from an epistemological point of view1 inasmuch as we take it then as a reconstruction of the world through the purposive activity of the over-individual subject4 ,on the other hand it is an empirical point of view from which ultimately all knowledge1 that of the physician and engineer and lawyer1 as well as that of the astronomer1 appears theoretical4 ,but this antithesis can1 therefore1 not decide the further empirical question1 whether or not in the midst of theoretical knowledge two kinds of sciences may be discriminated1 of which the one refers to empirical practical purposes and the other not4 ,such an inquiry would have nothing to do with the epistemological problem of pragmatism2 it would be strictly non-philosophical1 just as the separation of chemistry into organic and inorganic chemistry4 ,this empirical question is indeed to be answered in the affirmative4 ,if we ask what causes bring about a certain effect1 for the sake of a practical purpose of ours1--for instance1 the curing a patient of disease1--no one can state facts which are not in principle to be included in the complete system of physical causes and effects and thus in the system of physical sciences4 ,and yet it may well be that the physical sciences1 as such1 have not the slightest reason to mention the effect of that special drug on that special pathological alteration of the tissues of the organism4 ,the descriptions and explanations of science are not a mere heaping up of material1 but a steady selection in the interest of the special aim of the science4 ,no physical science describes every special pebble on the beach2 no historical science deals with the chance happenings in the daily life of any member of the crowd4 ,and we already well know the point of view from which the selection is to be performed4 ,we want to know in the physical and psychical sciences whatever is involved in the object of our experience1 and in the historical and normative sciences whatever is involved in the demands which reach our will4 ,but whether we have to do with the objects or with the demands1 in both cases we have systems before us which are determined only by the objects or demands themselves1 without any relation to our individual will and our own practical activity4 ,theoretically1 of course1 our will1 our activity1 our organism1 our personality is included in the complete system2 and if we knew absolutely everything of the empirical effects of the object or of the consequences of these demands1 we should find among them their relation to our individual interests2 but that relation would be but one chance case among innumerable others1 and the sciences would not have the slightest interest in giving any attention to that particular case4 ,thus if our knowledge of chemical substances were complete1 we should certainly have to know theoretically that a few grains of antipyrine introduced into the organism have an influence on those brain centres which regulate the temperature of the human body4 ,yet if the chemist does not share the interest of the physician who wants to fight a fever1 he would have hardly any reason for examining this particular relation1 as it hardly throws light on the chemical constitution as such4 ,in this way we might say in general that the relation of the world to us as acting individuals is in principle contained in the total system of the relations of our world of experience1 but has a strictly accidental place there and can never be in itself a centre around which the scientific data are clustered1 and science will hardly have an interest in giving any attention to its details4 ,this relation of the world1 the physical1 the psychical1 the historical1 and the normative world1 to our individual1 practical purposes can1 however1 indeed become the centre of scientific interest1 and it is evident that the whole inquiry receives thereupon a perfectly new direction which demands not only a completely new grouping of facts and relations1 but also a very different shading in elaboration4 ,as long as the purpose was to understand the world without relation to our individual aims1 science had to gather endless details which are for us now quite indifferent1 as they do not touch our aims2 and in other respects science was satisfied with broad generalizations and abstractions where we have now to examine the most minute details4 ,in short1 the shifting of the centre of gravity creates perfectly new sciences which must be distinguished2 and if we call them again theoretical and practical sciences1 it is clear that this difference has then no longer anything to do with the philosophical problems from which we started4 ,the term practical may be preferable to the other term which is sometimes used3 ,applied ,science4 ,if we construct the antithesis of theoretical and applied science1 the underlying idea is clearly that we have to do on the practical side with a discipline which teaches how to apply a science which logically exists as such beforehand4 ,engineering1 for instance1 is an applied science because it applies the science of physics2 but this is not really our deepest meaning here4 ,our practical sciences are not meant as mere applications of theoretical sciences4 ,they are logically somewhat degraded if they are treated in such a way4 ,their real logical meaning comes out only if they are acknowledged as self-dependent sciences whose material is differentiated from that of the theoretical sciences by the different point of view and purpose4 ,they are methodologically perfectly independent1 and the fact that a large part or theoretically even everything of their teaching overlaps the teaching of certain theoretical sciences ought not to have any influence on their logical standing4 ,the practical sciences could be conceived as completely self-dependent1 without the existence of any so-called theoretical sciences2 that is1 the relations of the world of experience to our individual aims might be brought into complete systems without working out in principle the system of independent experience4 ,we might have a science of engineering without acknowledging an independent science of theoretical physics besides it4 ,to be sure1 such a science of engineering would finally develop itself into a system which would contain very much that might just as well be called theoretical physics2 yet all would be held together by the point of view of the engineer1 and that part of theoretical physics which the engineer applies might just as well be considered as depracticalized engineering4 ,if this logical self-dependence of the practical science holds true even for such technological disciplines1 it is still more evident that it would cripple the meaning and independent character of jurisprudence and social science1 or of pedagogy and theology1 to treat them simply as applied sciences1 that is1 as applications of theoretical science4 ,this point of view determines1 also1 of course1 the classification of the ,practical ,sciences4 ,if they were really merely applied sciences it would be most natural to group them according to the classification of the theoretical sciences which are to be applied4 ,we should then have applied physical sciences1 applied psychological sciences1 applied historical sciences1 and applied normative sciences4 ,yet even from the standpoint of practice1 we should come at once into difficulties1 and indeed much of the superficiality of practical sciences to-day results from the hasty tendency to consider them as applied sciences only1 and thus to be determined by the points of view of the theoretical discipline which is to be applied4 ,then1 for instance1 pedagogy becomes simply applied psychology1 and the psychological point of view is substituted for the educational one4 ,pedagogy then becomes simply a selection of those chapters in psychology which deal with the mental functions of the child4 ,yet as soon as we really take the teachers' point of view1 we understand at once that it is utterly artificial to substitute the categories of the psychologist for those of immediate practical will-relations and to consider the child in the class-room as a causal system of psycho-physical elements instead of a personality which is teleologically to be interpreted1 and whose aims are not to be connected with causal effects but with over-individual attitudes4 ,in this way the historical relation and the normative relation have to play at least as important a rle in the pedagogical system as the psycho-physical relation1 and we might quite as well call education applied history and applied ethics4 ,almost every practical science can be shown in this way to apply a number of theoretical sciences2 it synthesizes them to a new unity4 ,but better1 we ought to say1 that it is a unity in itself from the start1 and that it only overlaps with a number of theoretical sciences4 ,if we want to classify the practical sciences1 we have thus only the one logical principle at our disposal3 we must classify them in accordance with the group of human individual aims which control those different disciplines4 ,if all practical sciences deal with the relation of the world of experience to our individual practical ends1 the classes of those ends are the classes of our practical sciences1 whatever combinations of applied theoretical sciences may enter into the group4 ,of course a special classification of these aims must remain somewhat arbitrary2 yet it may seem most natural to separate three large divisions4 ,we called them the ,utilitarian ,sciences1 the ,sciences of ,social ,regulation1 and the ,sciences of ,social ,culture4 ,utilitarian we may call those sciences in which our practical aim refers to the world of things2 it may be the technical mastery of nature or the treatment of the body1 or the production1 distribution1 and consumption of the means of support4 ,the second division contains everything in which our aim does not refer to the thing1 but to the other subjects2 here naturally belong the sciences which deal with the political1 legal1 and social purposes4 ,and finally the sciences of culture refer to those aims in which not the individual relations to things or to other subjects are in the foreground1 but the purposes of the teleological development of the subject himself2 education1 art1 and religion here find their place4 ,it is1 of course1 evident that the material of these sciences frequently allows the emphasis of different aspects4 ,for instance1 education1 which aims primarily at self-development1 might quite well be considered also from the point of view of social regulation2 and still more naturally could the utilitarian sciences of the economic distribution of the means of support be considered from this point of view4 ,yet a classification of sciences nowhere suggests by its boundary lines that there are no relations and connections between the different parts2 on the contrary1 it is just the manifoldness of these given connections which makes it so desirable to become conscious of the principles involved1 and thus to emphasize logical demarcation lines1 which of course must be obliterated as soon as any material is to be treated from every possible point of view4 ,it may thus well be that1 for instance1 a certain industrial problem could be treated in the ,normative ,sciences from the point of view of ethics2 in the ,historical ,sciences1 from the point of view of the history of economic institutions2 in the ,physical ,sciences1 from the point of view of physics or chemistry2 in the ,mental ,sciences1 from the point of view of sociology2 in the ,utilitarian ,sciences1 from the point of view of medicine or of engineering1 or of commerce and transportation2 and finally in the ,regulative ,sciences1 from the point of view of political administration1 or in the ,social ,sciences1 from the standpoint of the urban community1 and so on4 ,the more complex the relations are1 the more necessary is it to make clean distinctions between the different logical purposes with which the scientific inquiries start4 ,practical life may demand a combination of historical1 sociological1 psychological1 economical1 social1 and ethical considerations2 but not one of these sciences can contribute its best if the consciousness of these differences is lost and the deliberate combination is replaced by a vague mixture of the problems4 #f4 ,the ,subdivisions ,we have now before us the ground-plan of the scheme1 the four theoretical divisions1 and the three practical divisions2 every additional comment on the classification must be of secondary importance1 as it has to refer to the smaller subdivisions1 which cannot change the principles of the plan1 and which have not seldom1 indeed1 been a result of practical considerations4 ,if1 for instance1 our ,division of ,cultural ,sciences shows in the final plan merely the departments of ,education and of ,religion1 while the originally planned ,department of ,art is left out1 there was no logical reason for it1 but merely the practical ground that it seemed difficult to bring such a practical art section to a desirable scientific level2 we confine art1 therefore1 to the normative sthetic and historical points of view4 ,or1 to choose another illustration1 if it happened that the normative sciences were finally organized without a section for the philosophy of law1 this resulted from the fact that the ,american jurists1 in contrast with their ,continental ,european colleagues1 showed a general lack of appreciation for such a section4 ,a few sections had to be left out even for the chance reason that the leading speakers were obliged to withdraw at a time when it was too late to ask substitutes to work up addresses4 ,and almost everywhere there had to be something arbitrary in the limitation of the special sections4 ,though ,otology and ,laryngology were brought together into one section1 they might just as well have been placed in two2 and ,rhinology1 which was left out1 might have been added as a third in that company4 ,as to this subtler ramification1 the plan has been changed several times during the period of the practical preparation of the plan1 and much is the result of adjustment to questions of personalities4 ,no one claims1 thus1 any special logical value for the final formulation of the sectional details1 for which our chief aim was not to go beyond eight times sixteen1 that is #abh1 sections1 inasmuch as it was planned to have the meetings at eight different time-periods in sixteen different halls4 ,if we had fulfilled all the wishes which were expressed by specialists1 the number would have been quickly doubled4 ,yet a few remarks may be devoted to the branching off within the seven divisions1 as a short discussion of some of these details may throw additional light on the general principles of the whole plan4 ,if we thus begin with the ,normative ,sciences1 we stand at once before one feature of the plan which has been in an especially high degree a matter of both approval and criticism3 the fact that ,mathematics is grouped with ,philosophy4 ,the ,division was to contain1 as we have seen1 the systems of logically connected will-acts of the over-individual subject4 ,that ,ethics or ,logic or sthetics or ,philosophy of ,religion deals with such over-individual attitudes cannot be doubted2 but have we a right to cordinate the mathematical sciences with these philosophical sciences8 ,has ,mathematics not a more natural place among the physical sciences cordinated with and introductory to ,mechanics1 ,physics1 and ,astronomy8 ,the mathematicians themselves would often be inclined to accept without hesitation this neighborhood of the physical sciences4 ,they would say that the mathematical objects are independent realities whose properties we study like those of nature1 whose relations we observe1 whose existence we discover1 and in which we are interested because they belong to the real world4 ,all this is true1 and yet the objects of the mathematician are objects made by the logical will only1 and thus different from all phenomena into which sensation enters4 ,the mathematician1 of course1 does not reflect on the purely logical origin of the objects which he studies1 but the system of knowledge must give to the study of the mathematical objects its place in the group where the functions and products of the over-individual attitudes are classified4 ,the mathematical object is a free creation1 and a creation not only as to the combination of elements--that would be the case with many laboratory substances of the chemist too--but a creation as to the elements themselves1 and the value of that creation1 its mathematical interest1 is to be judged by ideals of thought2 that is1 by logical purposes4 ,no doubt this logical purpose is its application in the world of objects and the mathematical concepts must thus fit the objective world so absolutely that mathematics can be conceived as a description of the world after abstracting not only from the will-relations1 as physics does1 but also from the content4 ,mathematics would1 then1 be the phenomenalistic science of the form and order of the world4 ,in this way1 mathematics has indeed a claim to places in both divisions3 among the physical sciences if we emphasize its applicability to the world1 and among the teleological sciences if we emphasize the free creation of the objects by the logical will4 ,but if we really go back to epistemological principles1 our system has to prefer the latter emphasis2 that is1 we must cordinate mathematics with logic and not with physics4 ,as to the subdivision of philosophy1 it is most essential for us to point to the negative fact that of course psychology cannot have a place in the philosophical department1 as part of the ,normative ,division4 ,there is perhaps no science whose position in the system of knowledge offers so many methodological difficulties as psychology4 ,historical tradition of course links it with philosophy2 throughout a great part of its present endeavors it is1 on the other hand1 linked with physiology4 ,thus we find it sometimes cordinated with logic and ethics1 and sometimes1 especially in the classical positivistic systems1 cordinated with the sciences of the organic functions4 ,we have seen why a really logical treatment has to disregard those historical and practical relations and has to separate the psychological sciences from the philosophical and the biological sciences4 ,yet even this does not complete the list of problems which must be settled1 inasmuch as modern thinkers have frequently insisted that psychology itself allows a twofold aspect4 ,we can have a psychology which describes and explains the mental life by analyzing it into its elements and by connecting these elements through causality4 ,but there may be another psychology which treats inner life in that immediate unity in which we experience it and seeks to interpret it as the free function of personality4 ,this latter kind of psychology has been called voluntaristic psychology as against the phenomenalistic psychology which seeks description and explanation4 ,such voluntaristic psychology would clearly belong again to a different division4 ,it would be a theory of individual life as a function of will1 and would thus be introductory to the historical sciences and to the normative sciences too4 ,yet we left out this teleological psychology from our programme1 as such a science is as yet a programme only4 ,wherever an effort is made to realize it1 it becomes an odd mixture of an inconsistent phenomenalistic psychology on the one side1 and philosophy of history1 logic1 ethics1 and sthetics on the other side4 ,the only science which really has a right to call itself psychology is the one which seeks to describe and to explain inner life and treats it therefore as a system of psychical objects1 that is1 as contents of consciousness1 that is1 as phenomena4 ,psychology belongs1 then1 in the general division of psychical sciences as over against physical sciences1 and both deal with objects as over against philosophy and history1 which deal with subjects of will4 ,the subdivision of the ,historical ,sciences offers no methodological difficulty as soon as those epistemological arguments are acknowledged by which we sharply distinguish history from the ,physical and ,mental ,sciences4 ,if history is a system of will-relations which is in teleological connection with the will-demands that surround us1 then political history loses its predominant rle1 and the history of law and of literature1 of language and of economy1 of art and religion1 become cordinated with political development1 while the mere anthropological aspect of man is relegated to the physical sciences4 ,the more complete original scheme was here again finally condensed for practical reasons2 for instance1 the planned departments on the ,history of ,education1 on the ,history of ,science1 and on the ,history of ,philosophy were sacrificed1 and the department of ,economic ,history was joined to that of ,political ,history4 ,in the same way we felt obliged to omit in the end many important sections in the departments2 we had1 for instance1 in the ,history of ,language at first a section on ,slavic ,languages2 yet the number of scholars interested was too small to justify its existence beside a section on ,slavic ,literature4 ,also the ,history of ,music was omitted from the ,history of ,art2 and the ,history of ,law was planned at first with a fuller ramification4 ,the division of ,physical ,sciences naturally suggested that kind of subdivision which the positivistic classification presents as a complete system of sciences4 ,considering physics and chemistry as the two fundamental sciences of general laws1 we turn first to astronomy1 then from the science of the whole universe to the one planet1 to the sciences of the earth2 thence to the living organisms on the earth2 and from biology to the still narrower circle of anthropology4 ,the special classification of physics offers a certain difficulty4 ,to divide it in text-book fashion into sound1 light1 electricity1 etc41 seems hardly in harmony with the effort to seek logical principles in the other parts of the classification4 ,the three groups which we finally formed1 ,physics of ,matter1 ,physics of ,ether1 and ,physics of ,electron1 may appear somewhat too much influenced by the latest theories of to-day1 yet it seemed preferable to other principles4 ,in the biological department1 criticism seems justified in view of the fact that we constructed a special section1 ,human ,anatomy4 ,a strictly logical scheme might have acknowledged that human anatomy is to-day not a separate science1 and that it has resolved itself into comparative anatomy4 ,sections of ,invertebrate and ,vertebrate ,anatomy might have been more satisfactory4 ,the final arrangement was a concession to the practical interests of the physicians1 who have naturally to emphasize the anatomy of the human organism4 ,in the division of ,mental ,sciences1 we have the ,department of ,sociology4 ,we were1 of course1 aware that the sociological interest includes not only the psychological1 but also the physiological life of society1 and that it thus has relations to the physical sciences too4 ,yet these relations are logically not more fundamental than those of the individual mental life to the functions of the individual organism4 ,much of the physiological side was further to be handed over to the ,department of ,anthropology1 and thus we felt justified in grouping sociology with psychology under the ,mental ,sciences1 as the psychology of the social organism4 ,here1 too1 a larger number of sections was intended and only the two most essential ones1 ,social ,structure and ,social ,psychology1 were finally admitted4 ,the ramifications of the practical sciences had to follow the general principle that their character is determined by purpose and not by material4 ,the difficulty was here merely in the extreme specialization of the practical disciplines1 which suggests on the whole the forming of very small units1 while our plan was to provide for fifty practical sections only4 ,it seemed1 therefore1 incongruous to have the whole of ,internal ,medicine or the whole of ,private ,law condensed into one section4 ,yet as the purpose of the scheme was a theoretical and not a practical one1 even where the theory of practical sciences was in question1 we felt justified in constructing cordinated sections1 even where the practical importance was very unequal4 ,on the other hand1 some glaring defects just here are due merely to chance circumstances4 ,that there were1 for instance1 no sections on ,criminal ,law or ,ecclesiastical ,law in the ,department of ,jurisprudence1 nor on ,legal ,procedure1 resulted from the unfortunate accident that in these cases the speakers who were to come from ,europe were withheld by illness or public duties4 ,the absence of the ,department of ,art in the ,division of ,social ,culture1 and thus of the ,sections on the theory and practice of the different arts1 has been explained before4 ,it is evident that also in the ,economical ,department the practical development has interfered with the original symmetrical arrangement of the sections4 ,this is not true of the ,religious ,department1 whose six sections express the tendencies of the original plan4 ,the frequently expressed criticism that the different religions and their denominations ought to have found place there shows a misconception of our purpose2 a ,parliament of ,religion did not belong to this plan4 ,,iii ,,the ,,results ,,of ,,the ,,congress ,the programme of the ,congress1 as outlined in the previous pages1 was in this case somewhat more than a mere programme4 ,it not only invited to do a piece of work1 but it sought to contribute to the work itself4 ,yet the chief work had to be done by others1 and their part needed careful preparation4 ,yet very little of the preparation showed itself to the eyes of the larger public1 and few were fully aware what a complex organization was growing up and how many persons of mark were coperating4 ,it was essential to find for every address the best man4 ,specialists only could suggest to the committees where to find him4 ,it has been told before how our invitations were brought to the foreigners first till the desired number of foreign participants was secured1 and how the ,americans followed4 ,as could not be otherwise expected1 interferences of all kinds disturbed the ideal configuration of the first list of acceptances2 substitutes had sometimes to be relied on2 and yet1 when on the nineteenth of ,september ,president ,francis welcomed the ,congress of ,arts and ,science in the gigantic ,festival ,hall of the ,st4 ,louis ,exposition1 the ,committee knew that almost four hundred speakers had completed their manuscripts1 and that it was a galaxy which far surpassed in importance that of any previous international congress4 ,and the list of those who stood for the success of the work was not confined to the official speakers4 ,each ,department and each ,section had its own honorary ,president1 who was also chosen by the consent of leading specialists and whose introductory remarks were to give additional importance to the gathering4 ,at their side stood the hundred and thirty ,secretaries1 carefully chosen from among the productive scholars of the younger generation4 ,and a large number of informal1 yet officially invited contributors1 had announced valuable discussions and addresses for almost every ,section4 ,invitations to membership finally had been sent to the universities and scholarly societies of all countries4 ,that the turmoil of a world's fair is out of harmony with the scholar's longing for repose and quietude is a natural presupposition1 which has not been disproved by the experience of ,st4 ,louis4 ,when ,professor ,newcomb1 our ,president1 spoke to the opening assembly on the dignity of scholarship1 the scholar's peaceful address was accentuated by the thunder of the cannons with which ,boer and ,british forces were playing at war near by4 ,the roaring of the ,pike overpowered many a quiet session1 and the patient speaker had not seldom to fight heroically with a brass band on the next lawn4 ,the trains were delayed1 trunks were mixed up1 and the sultry ,st4 ,louis weather stirred much secret longing for the seashore and the mountains1 which most had to leave too early for that pilgrimage to the ,mississippi ,valley4 ,yet all this could have been easily foreseen1 and every one knew that all this would soon be forgotten4 ,these slight discomforts were many times made up for by the overwhelming beauty of that ivory city in which the civilization of the world was focused by the united energy of the nations1 and it seemed well worth while to cross the ocean for the delight of that enchantment which came with every evening's myriad illumination4 ,and every day brought interesting festivities4 ,no one will forget the receptions of the foreign commissioners1 or the charming hospitality of the leading citizens of ,st4 ,louis1 or the enthusiastic banquet which brought one thousand speakers and presidents and official members of the ,congress together as guests of the master mind of the ,exposition1 ,president ,francis4 ,while the discomfort of external shortcomings was thus easily balanced1 it is more doubtful whether the internal shortcomings of the work can be considered as fully compensated for4 ,it would be impossible to overlook these defects in the realization of our plans1 even if it may be acknowledged that they were unavoidable under the given conditions4 ,the principal difficulty has been that many speakers have not really treated the topic for the discussion of which they were invited4 ,this deviation from the plan took various forms4 ,there was in some cases a fundamental attitude taken which did not harmonize with those logical principles which had led to the classification2 for instance1 we had sharply separated1 for reasons fully stated above1 the ,division of ,history from the ,division of ,mental ,sciences1 including sociology2 yet some papers for the ,division of ,history clearly indicated sympathy with the traditional positivistic view1 according to which history becomes simply a part of sociology4 ,and similar variations of the general plan occur in almost every division4 ,but there cannot be any objection to this secondary variety as long as the whole framework gives the primary uniformity4 ,certainly no one of the contributors is to be blamed for it2 no one was pledged to the philosophy of the general plan1 and probably few would have agreed if any one had had the idea of demanding from every contributor an identical background of general convictions4 ,such monotony would have been even harmful1 as the work would have become inexpressive of the richness of tendencies in the scholarly life of our time4 ,this was not an occasion where educated clerks were to work up in a secondhand way a report whose general trend was determined beforehand2 the work demanded original thinkers1 with whom every word grows out of a rich individual view of the totality4 ,if every paper had been meant merely as a detailed amplification of the logical principles on which the whole plan was based1 it would have been wiser to set young ,doctor candidates to work1 who might have elaborated the hint of the general scheme4 ,to invite the leaders of knowledge meant to give them complete freedom and to confine the demands of the plan to a most general direction4 ,the same freedom1 which every one was to have as to the general standpoint1 was intended also for all with regard to the arrangement and limitation of the topic4 ,all the sectional addresses were supposed to deal either with relations or with fundamental problems of to-day4 ,it would have been absurd to demand that in every case the totality of relations or of problems should be covered or even touched4 ,the result would have become perfunctory and insignificant4 ,no one intended to produce a cyclopedia4 ,it was essential everywhere to select that which was most characteristic of the tendencies of the age and most promising for the science of the twentieth century4 ,those problems were to be emphasized whose solution is most demanded for the immediate progress of knowledge1 and those relations had to be selected through which new connections1 new synthetic thoughts prepare themselves to-day4 ,that this selection had to be left to the speaker was a matter of course4 ,yet it may be said that in all these directions1 with reference to the general standpoint and with reference to problems and relations1 the ,organizing ,committee had somewhat prepared the choice through the selection of the speakers themselves4 ,as the standpoints of the leading speakers were well known1 it was not difficult to invite as far as possible for every place a scholar whose general views would be least out of harmony with the principles of the plan4 ,for instance1 when we had the task before us of selecting the divisional speakers for the ,normative and for the ,mental ,sciences1 it was only natural to invite for the first a philosopher of idealistic type and for the latter a philosopher of positivistic stamp1 inasmuch as the whole scheme gave to the mental sciences the same place which they would have had in a positivistic scheme1 while the normative sciences would have lost the meaning which they had in our plan if a positivist had simply psychologized them4 ,in the same way we gave preference as far as possible1 for the addresses on relations1 to those scholars whose previous work was concerned with new synthetic movements1 and as speakers on problems those were invited who were in any case engaged in the solution of those problems which seemed central in the present state of science4 ,thus it was that on the whole the expectation was justified that the most characteristic relations and the most characteristic problems would be selected if every invited speaker spoke essentially on those relations and on those problems with which his own special work was engaged4 ,yet there is no doubt that this expectation was sometimes fulfilled beyond our anticipation1 in an amount of specialization which was no longer entirely in harmony with the general character of the undertaking4 ,the general problem has become sometimes only the starting-point or almost the pretext for speaking on some relation or problem so detailed that it can hardly stand as a representative symbol of the whole movement in that sectional field4 ,especially in the practical sciences more room was sometimes taken for particular hobbies and chance aspects than in the eyes of the originators the occasion may have called for4 ,yet on the whole this was the exception4 ,the overwhelming majority of the addresses fulfilled nobly the high hopes of the ,boards1 and even in those exceptional cases where the speaker went his own way1 it was usually such an original and stimulating expression of a strong personality that no one would care to miss this tone in the symphony of science4 ,even now of course1 though the ,congress days have passed1 and only typewritten manuscripts are left from all those ,september meetings1 it would be easy to provide1 by editorial efforts1 for a greater uniformity and a smoother harmonization4 ,most of the authors would have been quite willing to retouch their addresses in the interest of greater objective uniformity and to accept the hint of an editorial committee in elaborating more fully some points and in condensing or eliminating others4 ,much was written in the desire to bring a certain thought for discussion before such an eminent audience1 while the speaker would be ready to substitute other features of the subject for the permanent form of the printed volume4 ,yet such editorial supervision and transformation would be not only immodest but dangerous4 ,we might risk gaining some external uniformity1 but only to lose much of the freshness and immediacy and brilliancy of the first presentation4 ,and who would dare to play the critical judge when the international contributors are the leaders of thought8 ,there was therefore not the slightest effort made to suggest revision of the manuscripts1 for which the whole responsibility must thus fall to the particular author4 ,the reduction to a uniform language seemed1 on the other hand1 most natural1 and those who had delivered their addresses in ,french1 ,german1 or ,italian themselves welcomed the idea that their papers should be translated into ,english by competent specialists4 ,the short bibliographies1 selected mostly through the chairman of the departments1 and the very full index with references may add to the general usefulness of the eight volumes in which the work is to be presented4 ,but the significance of the ,congress of ,arts and ,science ought not to be measured and valued only by reference to this printed result4 ,its less visible side-effects seem in no way less important for scholarship1 and they are fourfold4 ,there was1 first1 the personal contact between the scholarly public and the leaders of thought2 there was1 secondly1 the first academic alliance between the ,united ,states and ,europe2 there was1 thirdly1 the first demonstration of a world congress crystallized about one problem2 there was1 fourthly1 the unique accentuation of the thought of unity in all human science2 and each of these four movements will be continued and reinforced by the publication of these proceedings4 ,the first of these four features1 the contact of the scholarly public with the best thinkers of our time1 had1 to be sure1 its limitations4 ,it was not sought to create a really popular congress4 ,neither the level of the addresses1 nor the size of the halls1 nor the number of invitations sent out1 nor the general conditions of a world's fair at which the expense of living is high and the distractions thousandfold1 favored the attendance of crowds4 ,it was planned from the first that on the whole scholars and specialists should attend and that the army should be made up essentially of officers4 ,if in an astronomical section perhaps thirty men were present1 among whom practically every one was among the best known directors of observatories or professors of mathematics1 astronomy1 or physics1 from all countries of the globe1 much more was gained than if three thousand had been in the audience1 brought together by an interest of curiosity in moon and stars4 ,for the most part there must have been between a hundred and two hundred in each of the #abh sectional meetings1 and that was more than the organizers expected4 ,this direct influence on the interested public is now to be expanded a thousandfold by the mission work of these volumes4 ,the concentration of these hundreds of addresses into a few days made it in any case impossible to listen to more than to a small fraction2 these volumes will bring at last all speakers to cordinated effectiveness2 and while one hall suffered from bad acoustics1 another from bad ventilation1 and a third from the passing of the intermural trains1 here at least is an audience in which nothing will disturb the sensitive nerves of the willing follower4 ,but much more emphasis is due to the second feature4 ,the ,congress was an epoch-making event for the international world of scholarship from the fact that it was the first great undertaking in which the ,old and the ,new ,worlds stood on equal levels and in which ,europe really became acquainted with the scientific life of these ,united ,states4 ,the contact of scholarship between ,america and ,europe has1 indeed1 grown in importance through many decades4 ,many ,american students had studied in ,european and especially in ,german universities and had come back to fill the professorial chairs of the leading academic institutions4 ,the spirit of the ,graduate ,school and the work towards the ,doctor's degree1 yes1 the whole productive scholarship of recent decades had been influenced by ,european ideals1 and the results were no longer ignored at the seats of learning throughout the whole world4 ,european scholars had here and there come as visiting lecturers or as assimilated instructors1 and a few ,american scholars belonged to the leading ,european ,academies4 ,yet1 whoever knew the real development of ,american post-graduate university life1 the rapid advance of genuine ,american scholarship1 the incomparable progress of the scientific institutions of the ,new ,world1 of their libraries and laboratories1 museums and associations1 was well aware that ,europe had hardly noticed and certainly not fully understood the gigantic strides of the country which seemed a rival only on commercial and industrial ground4 ,europe was satisfied with the traditional ideas of ,america's scientific standing which reflected the situation of thirty years ago1 and did not understand that the changes of a few lustres mean in the ,new ,world more than under the firmer traditions of ,europe4 ,american scientific literature was still neglected2 ,american universities treated in a condescending and patronizing spirit and with hardly any awareness of the fundamental differences in the institutions of the two sides4 ,those ,european scholars who crossed the ocean did it with missionary1 or perhaps with less unselfish1 intentions1 and the ,americans who attended ,european congresses were mostly treated with the friendliness which the self-satisfied teacher shows to a promising pupil4 ,the time had really come when the contrast between the real situation and the traditional construction became a danger for the scientific life of the time4 ,both sides had to suffer from it4 ,the ,americans felt that their serious and important achievements did not come to their fullest effectiveness through the insistent neglect of those who by the tradition of centuries had become the habitual guardians of scientific thought4 ,a kind of feeling of dependency as it usually develops in weak colonies too often depressed the conscientious scholarship on ,american soil as the result of this undue condescension4 ,yet the greater harm was to the other side4 ,once before ,europe had had the experience of surprise when ,american successes presented themselves where nothing of that kind was anticipated in the ,old ,world4 ,it was in the field of economic life that ,europe looked down patronizingly on ,america's industrial efforts1 and yet before she was fully aware how the change resulted1 suddenly the warning signal of the ,american danger was heard everywhere4 ,the surprise in the intellectual field will not be less4 ,the unpreparedness was certainly the same4 ,of course1 there cannot be any danger of rivalry in the scientific field1 inasmuch as science knows no competition but only coperation4 ,and yet it cannot be without danger for ,european science if it willfully neglects and recklessly ignores this eager working of the modern ,america4 ,for both sides a change in the situation was thus not only desirable1 but necessary2 and to prepare this change1 to substitute knowledge for ignorance1 nothing could have been more effective than this ,congress of ,arts and ,science4 ,even if we abstract from the not inconsiderable number of those ,european scholars who followed naturally in the path of the invited guests1 and if we consider merely the function of these invited participants1 the importance of the procedure is evident4 ,more than a hundred leading scholars from all ,european countries came under conditions where academic fellowship on an equal footing was a necessary part of the work4 ,there was not the slightest premium held out which might have attracted them had not real inter-academic interest brought them over the ocean1 and no missionary spirit was appealed to1 as everything was equally divided between ,american and foreign contributors4 ,it was a real feast of international scholarship1 in which the importance and the number of foreigners stamped it as the first significant alliance of the spirit of learning in the ,new and the ,old ,worlds4 ,and it was essentially for this purpose that the week of personal intermingling in ,st4 ,louis itself was preceded and followed by happy weeks of visits to leading universities4 ,almost every one of those one hundred ,european scholars visited ,harvard and ,yale1 ,chicago and ,johns ,hopkins1 ,columbia and ,pennsylvania1 saw the treasures of ,washington and examined the exhibitions of ,american scholarship in the ,world's ,fair itself4 ,the change of opinion1 the disappearance of prejudice1 the growth of confidence1 the personal intercollegiate ties which resulted from all that1 have been evident since those days all over ,europe4 ,and it is not surprising that it is just the most famous and most important of the visitors1 famous and important through their width and depth of view1 whose expression of appreciation and admiration for the new achievements has been loudest4 ,we insisted that the effectiveness of the ,congress showed itself in two other directions still3 on the one side1 there was at last a congress with a unified programme1 a congress which stood for a definite thought1 and which brought all its efforts to bear on the solution of one problem4 ,there seemed a far-reaching agreement of opinion that this new principle of congress administration had successfully withstood the test of practical realization4 ,mere conglomerations of unconnected meetings with casual programmes and unrelated papers cannot claim any longer to represent the only possible form of international gatherings of scholars4 ,more than that1 their superfluous and disheartening character will be felt in future more strongly than before4 ,no congress will appear fully justified whose printed proceedings do not show a real plan in its programme4 ,and the consciousness of this mission of the ,congress will certainly be again reinforced by the publication of these volumes1 inasmuch as it is evident that they represent a substantial contribution to the knowledge of our time which would not have been made without the special stimulating occasion of the ,congress4 ,and1 finally1 whether such a congress is held again or not1 the impulse of this one cannot be lost on account of the special end to which all its efforts have been directed3 the unity of scientific knowledge4 ,we had emphasized from the first that here was the centre of our purposes in a time whose scientific specialization necessarily involves a scattering of scholarly work and which yet in its deepest meaning strives for a new synthesis1 for a new unity1 which is to give to all this scattered labor a real dignity and significance2 truly nothing was more needed than an intense accentuation of the internal harmony of all human knowledge4 ,but for that it is not enough that the masses feel instinctively the deep need of such unifying movements1 nor is it enough that the philosophers point with logical arguments towards the new synthesis4 ,the philosopher can only stand by and point the way2 the specialists themselves must go the way4 ,and here at last they have done so4 ,leaders of thought have interrupted their specialistic work and have left their detailed inquiries to seek the fundamental conceptions and methods and principles which bind all knowledge together1 and thus to work towards that unity from which all special work derives its meaning4 ,whether or not their coperation has produced anything which is final is a question almost insignificant compared with the fundamental fact that they coperated at all for this ideal synthetic purpose4 ,this fact can never lose its influence on the scholarly effort of our age1 and will certainly find its strongest reinforcement in this unified publication4 ,it has fulfilled its noblest purpose if it adds strength to the deepest movement of our time1 the movement towards unity of meaning in the scattered manifoldness of scientific endeavor with which the twentieth century has opened4 ,illustration3 ,simon ,newcomb1 ,ph4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,dr4 ,newcomb1 the famous ,astronomer1 is conceded to be the ,dean of ,american scientists4 ,his eminent services to the ,government of the ,united ,states1 and his recognized position in foreign and domestic scientific circles1 made him peculiarly fitted to deliver the introductory address1 and to officiate as ,president of an ,international ,congress of the leading scientists of the world4 ,he has been the recipient of honorary degrees from six ,american and ten ,european ,universities1 and he is a member of almost every important ,academy of ,science in ,europe and ,america4 ,he is an officer of the ,legion of ,honour1 and is the only native ,american besides ,benjamin ,franklin who has been elected an ,associate of the ,institute de ,france4 ,from #ahfa to #ahig he was ,professor of ,mathematics in the ,united ,states ,navy4 ,he also lectured on ,mathematics and ,astronomy at ,johns ,hopkins1 and is now a ,professor ,emeritus in the ,faculty of ,arts of that university4 ,dr4 ,newcomb is the author of numerous works on ,astronomy and other scientific subjects4 ,,proceedings ,,of ,,the ,,congress ,,introductory ,,address ,,delivered ,,at ,,the ,,opening ,,exercises ,,at ,,festival ,,hall ,,by ,,professor ,,simon ,,newcomb1 ,,president ,,of ,,the ,,congress ,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,the ,,scientific ,,investigator ,as we look at the assemblage gathered in this hall1 comprising so many names of widest renown in every branch of learning1--we might almost say in every field of human endeavor1--the first inquiry suggested must be after the object of our meeting4 ,the answer is1 that our purpose corresponds to the eminence of the assemblage4 ,we aim at nothing less than a survey of the realm of knowledge1 as comprehensive as is permitted by the limitations of time and space4 ,the organizers of our ,congress have honored me with the charge of presenting such preliminary view of its field as may make clear the spirit of our undertaking4 ,certain tendencies characteristic of the science of our day clearly suggest the direction of our thoughts most appropriate to the occasion4 ,among the strongest of these is one toward laying greater stress on questions of the beginning of things1 and regarding a knowledge of the laws of development of any object of study as necessary to the understanding of its present form4 ,it may be conceded that the principle here involved is as applicable in the broad field before us as in a special research into the properties of the minutest organism4 ,it therefore seems meet that we should begin by inquiring what agency has brought about the remarkable development of science to which the world of to-day bears witness4 ,this view is recognized in the plan of our proceedings1 by providing for each great department of knowledge a review of its progress during the century that has elapsed since the great event commemorated by the scenes outside this hall4 ,but such reviews do not make up that general survey of science at large which is necessary to the development of our theme1 and which must include the action of causes that had their origin long before our time4 ,the movement which culminated in making the nineteenth century ever memorable in history is the outcome of a long series of causes1 acting through many centuries1 which are worthy of especial attention on such an occasion as this4 ,in setting them forth we should avoid laying stress on those visible manifestations which1 striking the eye of every beholder1 are in no danger of being overlooked1 and search rather for those agencies whose activities underlie the whole visible scene1 but which are liable to be blotted out of sight by the very brilliancy of the results to which they have given rise4 ,it is easy to draw attention to the wonderful qualities of the oak2 but from that very fact1 it may be needful to point out that the real wonder lies concealed in the acorn from which it grew4 ,our inquiry into the logical order of the causes which have made our civilization what it is to-day will be facilitated by bringing to mind certain elementary considerations--ideas so familiar that setting them forth may seem like citing a body of truisms--and yet so frequently overlooked1 not only individually1 but in their relation to each other1 that the conclusion to which they lead may be lost to sight4 ,one of these propositions is that psychical rather than material causes are those which we should regard as fundamental in directing the development of the social organism4 ,the human intellect is the really active agent in every branch of endeavor1--the primum mobile of civilization1--and all those material manifestations to which our attention is so often directed are to be regarded as secondary to this first agency4 ,if it be true that in the world is nothing great but man2 in man is nothing great but mind1 then should the keynote of our discourse be the recognition of this first and greatest of powers4 ,another well-known fact is that those applications of the forces of nature to the promotion of human welfare which have made our age what it is1 are of such comparatively recent origin that we need go back only a single century to antedate their most important features1 and scarcely more than four centuries to find their beginning4 ,it follows that the subject of our inquiry should be the commencement1 not many centuries ago1 of a certain new form of intellectual activity4 ,having gained this point of view1 our next inquiry will be into the nature of that activity1 and its relation to the stages of progress which preceded and followed its beginning4 ,the superficial observer1 who sees the oak but forgets the acorn1 might tell us that the special qualities which have brought out such great results are expert scientific knowledge and rare ingenuity1 directed to the application of the powers of steam and electricity4 ,from this point of view the great inventors and the great captains of industry were the first agents in bringing about the modern era4 ,but the more careful inquirer will see that the work of these men was possible only through a knowledge of the laws of nature1 which had been gained by men whose work took precedence of theirs in logical order1 and that success in invention has been measured by completeness in such knowledge4 ,while giving all due honor to the great inventors1 let us remember that the first place is that of the great investigators1 whose forceful intellects opened the way to secrets previously hidden from men4 ,let it be an honor and not a reproach to these men1 that they were not actuated by the love of gain1 and did not keep utilitarian ends in view in the pursuit of their researches4 ,if it seems that in neglecting such ends they were leaving undone the most important part of their work1 let us remember that nature turns a forbidding face to those who pay her court with the hope of gain1 and is responsive only to those suitors whose love for her is pure and undefiled4 ,not only is the special genius required in the investigator not that generally best adapted to applying the discoveries which he makes1 but the result of his having sordid ends in view would be to narrow the field of his efforts1 and exercise a depressing effect upon his activities4 ,the true man of science has no such expression in his vocabulary as useful knowledge4 ,his domain is as wide as nature itself1 and he best fulfills his mission when he leaves to others the task of applying the knowledge he gives to the world4 ,we have here the explanation of the well-known fact that the functions of the investigator of the laws of nature1 and of the inventor who applies these laws to utilitarian purposes1 are rarely united in the same person4 ,if the one conspicuous exception which the past century presents to this rule is not unique1 we should probably have to go back to ,watt to find another4 ,from this viewpoint it is clear that the primary agent in the movement which has elevated man to the masterful position he now occupies1 is the scientific investigator4 ,he it is whose work has deprived plague and pestilence of their terrors1 alleviated human suffering1 girdled the earth with the electric wire1 bound the continent with the iron way1 and made neighbors of the most distant nations4 ,as the first agent which has made possible this meeting of his representatives1 let his evolution be this day our worthy theme4 ,as we follow the evolution of an organism by studying the stages of its growth1 so we have to show how the work of the scientific investigator is related to the ineffectual efforts of his predecessors4 ,in our time we think of the process of development in nature as one going continuously forward through the combination of the opposite processes of evolution and dissolution4 ,the tendency of our thought has been in the direction of banishing cataclysms to the theological limbo1 and viewing nature as a sleepless plodder1 endowed with infinite patience1 waiting through long ages for results4 ,i do not contest the truth of the principle of continuity on which this view is based4 ,but it fails to make known to us the whole truth4 ,the building of a ship from the time that her keel is laid until she is making her way across the ocean is a slow and gradual process2 yet there is a cataclysmic epoch opening up a new era in her history4 ,it is the moment when1 after lying for months or years a dead1 inert1 immovable mass1 she is suddenly endowed with the power of motion1 and1 as if imbued with life1 glides into the stream1 eager to begin the career for which she was designed4 ,i think it is thus in the development of humanity4 ,long ages may pass during which a race1 to all external observation1 appears to be making no real progress4 ,additions may be made to learning1 and the records of history may constantly grow1 but there is nothing in its sphere of thought1 or in the features of its life1 that can be called essentially new4 ,yet1 nature may have been all along slowly working in a way which evades our scrutiny until the result of her operations suddenly appears in a new and revolutionary movement1 carrying the race to a higher plane of civilization4 ,it is not difficult to point out such epochs in human progress4 ,the greatest of all1 because it was the first1 is one of which we find no record either in written or geological history4 ,it was the epoch when our progenitors first took conscious thought of the morrow1 first used the crude weapons which nature had placed within their reach to kill their prey1 first built a fire to warm their bodies and cook their food4 ,i love to fancy that there was some one first man1 the ,adam of evolution1 who did all this1 and who used the power thus acquired to show his fellows how they might profit by his example4 ,when the members of the tribe or community which he gathered around him began to conceive of life as a whole1--to include yesterday1 to-day1 and to-morrow in the same mental grasp--to think how they might apply the gifts of nature to their own uses1--a movement was begun which should ultimately lead to civilization4 ,long indeed must have been the ages required for the development of this rudest primitive community into the civilization revealed to us by the most ancient tablets of ,egypt and ,assyria4 ,after spoken language was developed1 and after the rude representation of ideas by visible marks drawn to resemble them had long been practiced1 some ,cadmus must have invented an alphabet4 ,when the use of written language was thus introduced1 the word of command ceased to be confined to the range of the human voice1 and it became possible for master minds to extend their influence as far as a written message could be carried4 ,then were communities gathered into provinces2 provinces into kingdoms2 kingdoms into the great empires of antiquity4 ,then arose a stage of civilization which we find pictured in the most ancient records1--a stage in which men were governed by laws that were perhaps as wisely adapted to their conditions as our laws are to ours1--in which the phenomena of nature were rudely observed1 and striking occurrences in the earth or in the heavens recorded in the annals of the nation4 ,vast was the progress of knowledge during the interval between these empires and the century in which modern science began4 ,yet1 if ,i am right in making a distinction between the slow and regular steps of progress1 each growing naturally out of that which preceded it1 and the entrance of the mind at some fairly definite epoch into an entirely new sphere of activity1 it would appear that there was only one such epoch during the entire interval4 ,this was when abstract geometrical reasoning commenced1 and astronomical observations aiming at precision were recorded1 compared1 and discussed4 ,closely associated with it must have been the construction of the forms of logic4 ,the radical difference between the demonstration of a theorem of geometry and the reasoning of every-day life which the masses of men must have practiced from the beginning1 and which few even to-day ever get beyond1 is so evident at a glance that ,i need not dwell upon it4 ,the principal feature of this advance is that1 by one of those antinomies of the human intellect of which examples are not wanting even in our own time1 the development of abstract ideas preceded the concrete knowledge of natural phenomena4 ,when we reflect that in the geometry of ,euclid the science of space was brought to such logical perfection that even to-day its teachers are not agreed as to the practicability of any great improvement upon it1 we cannot avoid the feeling that a very slight change in the direction of the intellectual activity of the ,greeks would have led to the beginning of natural science4 ,but it would seem that the very purity and perfection which was aimed at in their system of geometry stood in the way of any extension or application of its methods and spirit to the field of nature4 ,one example of this is worthy of attention4 ,in modern teaching the idea of magnitude as generated by motion is freely introduced4 ,a line is described by a moving point2 a plane by a moving line2 a solid by a moving plane4 ,it may1 at first sight1 seem singular that this conception finds no place in the ,euclidian system4 ,but we may regard the omission as a mark of logical purity and rigor4 ,had the real or supposed advantages of introducing motion into geometrical conceptions been suggested to ,euclid1 we may suppose him to have replied that the theorems of space are independent of time2 that the idea of motion necessarily implies time1 and that1 in consequence1 to avail ourselves of it would be to introduce an extraneous element into geometry4 ,it is quite possible that the contempt of the ancient philosophers for the practical application of their science1 which has continued in some form to our own time1 and which is not altogether unwholesome1 was a powerful factor in the same direction4 ,the result was that1 in keeping geometry pure from ideas which did not belong to it1 it failed to form what might otherwise have been the basis of physical science4 ,its founders missed the discovery that methods similar to those of geometric demonstration could be extended into other and wider fields than that of space4 ,thus not only the development of applied geometry1 but the reduction of other conceptions to a rigorous mathematical form was indefinitely postponed4 ,astronomy is necessarily a science of observation pure and simple1 in which experiment can have no place except as an auxiliary4 ,the vague accounts of striking celestial phenomena handed down by the priests and astrologers of antiquity were followed in the time of the ,greeks by observations having1 in form at least1 a rude approach to precision1 though nothing like the degree of precision that the astronomer of to-day would reach with the naked eye1 aided by such instruments as he could fashion from the tools at the command of the ancients4 ,the rude observations commenced by the ,babylonians were continued with gradually improving instruments1--first by the ,greeks and afterward by the ,arabs1--but the results failed to afford any insight into the true relation of the earth to the heavens4 ,what was most remarkable in this failure is that1 to take a first step forward which would have led on to success1 no more was necessary than a course of abstract thinking vastly easier than that required for working out the problems of geometry4 ,that space is infinite is an unexpressed axiom1 tacitly assumed by ,euclid and his successors4 ,combining this with the most elementary consideration of the properties of the triangle1 it would be seen that a body of any given size could be placed at such a distance in space as to appear to us like a point4 ,hence a body as large as our earth1 which was known to be a globe from the time that the ancient ,phoenicians navigated the ,mediterranean1 if placed in the heavens at a sufficient distance1 would look like a star4 ,the obvious conclusion that the stars might be bodies like our globe1 shining either by their own light or by that of the sun1 would have been a first step to the understanding of the true system of the world4 ,there is historic evidence that this deduction did not wholly escape the ,greek thinkers4 ,it is true that the critical student will assign little weight to the current belief that the vague theory of ,pythagoras--that fire was at the centre of all things--implies a conception of the heliocentric theory of the solar system4 ,but the testimony of ,archimedes1 confused though it is in form1 leaves no serious doubt that ,aristarchus of ,samos not only propounded the view that the earth revolves both on its own axis and around the sun1 but that he correctly removed the great stumbling-block in the way of this theory by adding that the distance of the fixed stars was infinitely greater than the dimensions of the earth's orbit4 ,even the world of philosophy was not yet ready for this conception1 and1 so far from seeing the reasonableness of the explanation1 we find ,ptolemy arguing against the rotation of the earth on grounds which careful observations of the phenomena around him would have shown to be ill-founded4 ,physical science1 if we can apply that term to an uncordinated body of facts1 was successfully cultivated from the earliest times4 ,something must have been known of the properties of metals1 and the art of extracting them from their ores must have been practiced1 from the time that coins and medals were first stamped4 ,the properties of the most common compounds were discovered by alchemists in their vain search for the philosopher's stone1 but no actual progress worthy of the name rewarded the practitioners of the black art4 ,perhaps the first approach to a correct method was that of ,archimedes1 who by much thinking worked out the law of the lever1 reached the conception of the centre of gravity1 and demonstrated the first principles of hydrostatics4 ,it is remarkable that he did not extend his researches into the phenomena of motion1 whether spontaneous or produced by force4 ,the stationary condition of the human intellect is most strikingly illustrated by the fact that not until the time of ,leonardo was any substantial advance made on his discovery4 ,to sum up in one sentence the most characteristic feature of ancient and medieval science1 we see a notable contrast between the precision of thought implied in the construction and demonstration of geometrical theorems and the vague indefinite character of the ideas of natural phenomena generally1 a contrast which did not disappear until the foundations of modern science began to be laid4 ,we should miss the most essential point of the difference between medieval and modern learning if we looked upon it as mainly a difference either in the precision or the amount of knowledge4 ,the development of both of these qualities would1 under any circumstances1 have been slow and gradual1 but sure4 ,we can hardly suppose that any one generation1 or even any one century1 would have seen the complete substitution of exact for inexact ideas4 ,slowness of growth is as inevitable in the case of knowledge as in that of a growing organism4 ,the most essential point of difference is one of those seemingly slight ones1 the importance of which we are too apt to overlook4 ,it was like the drop of blood in the wrong place1 which some one has told us makes all the difference between a philosopher and a maniac4 ,it was all the difference between a living tree and a dead one1 between an inert mass and a growing organism4 ,the transition of knowledge from the dead to the living form must1 in any complete review of the subject1 be looked upon as the really great event of modern times4 ,before this event the intellect was bound down by a scholasticism which regarded knowledge as a rounded whole1 the parts of which were written in books and carried in the minds of learned men4 ,the student was taught from the beginning of his work to look upon authority as the foundation of his beliefs4 ,the older the authority the greater the weight it carried4 ,so effective was this teaching that it seems never to have occurred to individual men that they had all the opportunities ever enjoyed by ,aristotle of discovering truth1 with the added advantage of all his knowledge to begin with4 ,advanced as was the development of formal logic1 that practical logic was wanting which could see that the last of a series of authorities1 every one of which rested on those which preceded it1 could never form a surer foundation for any doctrine than that supplied by its original propounder4 ,the result of this view of knowledge was that1 although during the fifteen centuries following the death of the geometer of ,syracuse great universities were founded at which generations of professors expounded all the learning of their time1 neither professor nor student ever suspected what latent possibilities of good were concealed in the most familiar operations of nature4 ,every one felt the wind blow1 saw water boil1 and heard the thunder crash1 but never thought of investigating the forces here at play4 ,up to the middle of the fifteenth century the most acute observer could scarcely have seen the dawn of a new era4 ,in view of this state of things1 it must be regarded as one of the most remarkable facts in evolutionary history that four or five men1 whose mental constitution was either typical of the new order of things or who were powerful agents in bringing it about1 were all born during the fifteenth century1 four of them at least at so nearly the same time as to be contemporaries4 ,leonardo da ,vinci1 whose artistic genius has charmed succeeding generations1 was also the first practical engineer of his time1 and the first man after ,archimedes to make a substantial advance in developing the laws of motion4 ,that the world was not prepared to make use of his scientific discoveries does not detract from the significance which must attach to the period of his birth4 ,shortly after him was born the great navigator whose bold spirit was to make known a new world1 thus giving to commercial enterprise that impetus which was so powerful an agent in bringing about a revolution in the thoughts of men4 ,the birth of ,columbus was soon followed by that of ,copernicus1 the first after ,aristarchus to demonstrate the true system of the world4 ,in him more than in any of his contemporaries do we see the struggle between the old forms of thought and the new4 ,it seems almost pathetic and is certainly most suggestive of the general view of knowledge taken at that time that1 instead of claiming credit for bringing to light great truths before unknown1 he made a labored attempt to show that1 after all1 there was nothing really new in his system1 which he claimed to date from ,pythagoras and ,philolaus4 ,in this connection it is curious that he makes no mention of ,aristarchus1 who ,i think will be regarded by conservative historians as his only demonstrated predecessor4 ,to the hold of the older ideas upon his mind we must attribute the fact that in constructing his system he took great pains to make as little change as possible in ancient conceptions4 ,luther1 the greatest thought-stirrer of them all1 practically of the same generation with ,copernicus1 ,leonardo1 and ,columbus1 does not come in as a scientific investigator1 but as the great loosener of chains which had so fettered the intellect of men that they dared not think otherwise than as the authorities thought4 ,almost coeval with the advent of these intellects was the invention of printing with movable type4 ,gutenberg was born during the first decade of the century1 and his associates and others credited with the invention not many years afterward4 ,if we accept the principle on which ,i am basing my argument1 that we should assign the first place to the birth of those psychic agencies which started men on new lines of thought1 then surely was the fifteenth the wonderful century4 ,let us not forget that1 in assigning the actors then born to their places1 we are not narrating history1 but studying a special phase of evolution4 ,it matters not for us that no university invited ,leonardo to its halls1 and that his science was valued by his contemporaries only as an adjunct to the art of engineering4 ,the great fact still is that he was the first of mankind to propound laws of motion4 ,it is not for anything in ,luther's doctrines that he finds a place in our scheme4 ,no matter for us whether they were sound or not4 ,what he did toward the evolution of the scientific investigator was to show by his example that a man might question the best-established and most venerable authority and still live--still preserve his intellectual integrity--still command a hearing from nations and their rulers4 ,it matters not for us whether ,columbus ever knew that he had discovered a new continent4 ,his work was to teach that neither hydra1 chimera1 nor abyss--neither divine injunction nor infernal machination--was in the way of men visiting every part of the globe1 and that the problem of conquering the world reduced itself to one of sails and rigging1 hull and compass4 ,the better part of ,copernicus was to direct man to a viewpoint whence he should see that the heavens were of like matter with the earth4 ,all this done1 the acorn was planted from which the oak of our civilization should spring4 ,the mad quest for gold which followed the discovery of ,columbus1 the questionings which absorbed the attention of the learned1 the indignation excited by the seeming vagaries of a ,paracelsus1 the fear and trembling lest the strange doctrine of ,copernicus should undermine the faith of centuries1 were all helps to the germination of the seed--stimuli to thought which urged it on to explore the new fields opened up to its occupation4 ,this given1 all that has since followed came out in regular order of development1 and need be here considered only in those phases having a special relation to the purpose of our present meeting4 ,so slow was the growth at first that the sixteenth century may scarcely have recognized the inauguration of a new era4 ,torricelli and ,benedetti were of the third generation after ,leonardo1 and ,galileo1 the first to make a substantial advance upon his theory1 was born more than a century after him4 ,only two or three men appeared in a generation who1 working alone1 could make real progress in discovery1 and even these could do little in leavening the minds of their fellow men with the new ideas4 ,up to the middle of the seventeenth century an agent which all experience since that time shows to be necessary to the most productive intellectual activity was wanting4 ,this was the attraction of like minds1 making suggestions to each other1 criticising1 comparing1 and reasoning4 ,this element was introduced by the organization of the ,royal ,society of ,london and the ,academy of ,sciences of ,paris4 ,the members of these two bodies seem like ingenious youth suddenly thrown into a new world of interesting objects1 the purposes and relations of which they had to discover4 ,the novelty of the situation is strikingly shown in the questions which occupied the minds of the incipient investigators4 ,one natural result of ,british maritime enterprise was that the aspirations of the ,fellows of the ,royal ,society were not confined to any continent or hemisphere4 ,inquiries were sent all the way to ,batavia to know whether there be a hill in ,sumatra which burneth continually1 and a fountain which runneth pure balsam4 ,the astronomical precision with which it seemed possible that physiological operations might go on was evinced by the inquiry whether the ,indians can so prepare that stupefying herb ,datura that they make it lie several days1 months1 years1 according as they will1 in a man's body without doing him any harm1 and at the end kill him without missing an hour's time4 ,of this continent one of the inquiries was whether there be a tree in ,mexico that yields water1 wine1 vinegar1 milk1 honey1 wax1 thread1 and needles4 ,among the problems before the ,paris ,academy of ,sciences those of physiology and biology took a prominent place4 ,the distillation of compounds had long been practiced1 and the fact that the more spirituous elements of certain substances were thus separated naturally led to the question whether the essential essences of life might not be discoverable in the same way4 ,in order that all might participate in the experiments1 they were conducted in open session of the ,academy1 thus guarding against the danger of any one member obtaining for his exclusive personal use a possible elixir of life4 ,a wide range of the animal and vegetable kingdom1 including cats1 dogs1 and birds of various species1 were thus analyzed4 ,the practice of dissection was introduced on a large scale4 ,that of the cadaver of an elephant occupied several sessions1 and was of such interest that the monarch himself was a spectator4 ,to the same epoch with the formation and first work of these two bodies belongs the invention of a mathematical method which in its importance to the advance of exact science may be classed with the invention of the alphabet in its relation to the progress of society at large4 ,the use of algebraic symbols to represent quantities had its origin before the commencement of the new era1 and gradually grew into a highly developed form during the first two centuries of that era4 ,but this method could represent quantities only as fixed4 ,it is true that the elasticity inherent in the use of such symbols permitted of their being applied to any and every quantity2 yet1 in any one application1 the quantity was considered as fixed and definite4 ,but most of the magnitudes of nature are in a state of continual variation2 indeed1 since all motion is variation1 the latter is a universal characteristic of all phenomena4 ,no serious advance could be made in the application of algebraic language to the expression of physical phenomena until it could be so extended as to express variation in quantities1 as well as the quantities themselves4 ,this extension1 worked out independently by ,newton and ,leibnitz1 may be classed as the most fruitful of conceptions in exact science4 ,with it the way was opened for the unimpeded and continually accelerated progress of the last two centuries4 ,the feature of this period which has the closest relation to the purpose of our coming together is the seemingly unending subdivision of knowledge into specialties1 many of which are becoming so minute and so isolated that they seem to have no interest for any but their few pursuers4 ,happily science itself has afforded a corrective for its own tendency in this direction4 ,the careful thinker will see that in these seemingly diverging branches common elements and common principles are coming more and more to light4 ,there is an increasing recognition of methods of research1 and of deduction1 which are common to large branches1 or to the whole of science4 ,we are more and more recognizing the principle that progress in knowledge implies its reduction to more exact forms1 and the expression of its ideas in language more or less mathematical4 ,the problem before the organizers of this ,congress was1 therefore1 to bring the sciences together1 and seek for the unity which we believe underlies their infinite diversity4 ,the assembling of such a body as now fills this hall was scarcely possible in any preceding generation1 and is made possible now only through the agency of science itself4 ,it differs from all preceding international meetings by the universality of its scope1 which aims to include the whole of knowledge4 ,it is also unique in that none but leaders have been sought out as members4 ,it is unique in that so many lands have delegated their choicest intellects to carry on its work4 ,they come from the country to which our republic is indebted for a third of its territory1 including the ground on which we stand2 from the land which has taught us that the most scholarly devotion to the languages and learning of the cloistered past is compatible with leadership in the practical application of modern science to the arts of life2 from the island whose language and literature have found a new field and a vigorous growth in this region2 from the last seat of the holy ,roman ,empire2 from the country which1 remembering a monarch who made an astronomical observation at the ,greenwich ,observatory1 has enthroned science in one of the highest places in its government2 from the peninsula so learned that we have invited one of its scholars to come and tell us of our own language2 from the land which gave birth to ,leonardo1 ,galileo1 ,torricelli1 ,columbus1 ,volta--what an array of immortal names6--from the little republic of glorious history which1 breeding men rugged as its eternal snow-peaks1 has yet been the seat of scientific investigation since the day of the ,bernoullis2 from the land whose heroic dwellers did not hesitate to use the ocean itself to protect it against invaders1 and which now makes us marvel at the amount of erudition compressed within its little area2 from the nation across the ,pacific1 which1 by half a century of unequaled progress in the arts of life1 has made an important contribution to evolutionary science through demonstrating the falsity of the theory that the most ancient races are doomed to be left in the rear of the advancing age--in a word1 from every great centre of intellectual activity on the globe ,i see before me eminent representatives of that world-advance in knowledge which we have met to celebrate4 ,may we not confidently hope that the discussions of such an assemblage will prove pregnant of a future for science which shall outshine even its brilliant past8 ,gentlemen and scholars all6 ,you do not visit our shores to find great collections in which centuries of humanity have given expression on canvas and in marble to their hopes1 fears1 and aspirations4 ,nor do you expect institutions and buildings hoary with age4 ,but as you feel the vigor latent in the fresh air of these expansive prairies1 which has collected the products of human genius by which we are here surrounded1 and1 ,i may add1 brought us together2 as you study the institutions which we have founded for the benefit1 not only of our own people1 but of humanity at large2 as you meet the men who1 in the short space of one century1 have transformed this valley from a savage wilderness into what it is to-day--then may you find compensation for the want of a past like yours by seeing with prophetic eye a future world-power of which this region shall be the seat4 ,if such is to be the outcome of the institutions which we are now building up1 then may your present visit be a blessing both to your posterity and ours by making that power one for good to all mankind4 ,your deliberations will help to demonstrate to us and to the world at large that the reign of law must supplant that of brute force in the relations of the nations1 just as it has supplanted it in the relations of individuals4 ,you will help to show that the war which science is now waging against the sources of diseases1 pain1 and misery offers an even nobler field for the exercise of heroic qualities than can that of battle4 ,we hope that when1 after your all too fleeting sojourn in our midst1 you return to your own shores1 you will long feel the influence of the new air you have breathed in an infusion of increased vigor in pursuing your varied labors4 ,and if a new impetus is thus given to the great intellectual movement of the past century1 resulting not only in promoting the unification of knowledge1 but in widening its field through new combinations of effort on the part of its votaries1 the projectors1 organizers1 and supporters of this ,congress of ,arts and ,science will be justified of their labors4 ,,division ,a--,,normative ,,science ,,division ,a--,,normative ,,science ,,speaker3 ,,professor ,,josiah ,,royce1 ,harvard ,university 7,hall #f1 ,september #bj1 #aj a4 m47 ,,the ,,sciences ,,of ,,the ,,ideal ,,by ,,josiah ,,royce ,josiah ,royce1 ,professor of ,history of ,philosophy1 ,harvard ,university1 since #ahib4 b4 ,grass ,valley1 ,nevada ,county1 ,california1 ,november #bj1 #ahee4 ,a4,b4 ,university of ,california1 #ahge2 ,ph4,d4 ,johns ,hopkins #ahgh2 ,,ll4,d4 ,university of ,aberdeen1 ,scotland2 ,,ll4,d4 ,johns ,hopkins4 ,instructor in ,english ,literature and ,logic1 ,university of ,california1 #ahgh-hb4 ,instructor and ,assistant ,professor1 ,harvard ,university1 #ahhb-ib4 ,author of ,religious ,aspect of ,philosophy2 ,history of ,california2 ,the ,feud of ,oakfield ,creek2 ,the ,spirit of ,modern ,philosophy2 ,studies of ,good and ,evil2 ,the ,world and the ,individual2 ,gifford ,lectures2 and numerous other works and memoirs4 ,i shall not attempt1 in this address1 either to justify or to criticise the name1 normative science1 under which the doctrines which constitute this division are grouped4 ,it is enough for my purpose to recognize at the outset that ,i am required1 by the plans of this ,congress1 to explain what scientific interests seem to me to be common to the work of the philosophers and of the mathematicians4 ,the task is one which makes severe demands upon the indulgence of the listener1 and upon the expository powers of the speaker1 but it is a task for which the present age has well prepared the way4 ,the spirit which ,descartes and ,leibnitz illustrated seems likely soon to become1 in a new and higher sense1 prominent in science4 ,the mathematicians are becoming more and more philosophical4 ,the philosophers1 in the near future1 will become1 ,i believe1 more and more mathematical4 ,it is my office to indicate1 as well as the brief time and my poor powers may permit1 why this ought to be so4 ,to this end ,i shall first point out what is that most general community of interest which unites all the sciences that belong to our division4 ,then ,i shall indicate what type of recent and special scientific work most obviously bears upon the tasks of all of us alike4 ,thirdly1 ,i shall state some results and problems to which this type of scientific work has given rise1 and shall try to show what promise we have of an early increase of insight regarding our common interests4 ,i ,the most general community of interest which unites the various scientific activities that belong to our division is this3 ,we are all concerned with what may be called ideal truth1 as distinct from physical truth4 ,some of us also have a strong interest in physical truth2 but none of us lack a notable and scientific concern for the realm of ideas1 viewed as ideas4 ,let me explain what ,i mean by these terms4 ,whoever studies physical truth 7taking that term in its most general sense7 seeks to observe1 to collate1 and1 in the end1 to control1 facts which he regards as external to his own thought4 ,but instead of thus looking mainly without1 it is possible for a man chiefly to take account1 let us say1 of the consequences of his own hypothetical assumptions--assumptions which may possess but a very remote relation to the physical world4 ,or again1 it is possible for such a student to be mainly devoted to reflecting upon the formal validity of his own inferences1 or upon the meaning of his own presuppositions1 or upon the value and the interrelation of human ideals4 ,any such scientific work1 reflective1 considerate principally of the thinker's own constructions and purposes1 or of the constructions and purposes of humanity in general1 is a pursuit of ideal truth4 ,the searcher who is mainly devoted to the inquiry into what he regards as external facts1 is indeed active2 but his activity is moulded by an order of existence which he conceives as complete apart from his activity4 ,he is thoughtful2 but a power not himself assigns to him the problems about which he thinks4 ,he is guided by ideals2 but his principal ideal takes the form of an acceptance of the world as it is1 independently of his ideals4 ,his dealings are with nature4 ,his aim is the conquest of a foreign realm4 ,but the student of what may be called1 in general terms1 ideal truth1 while he is devoted as his fellow1 the observer of outer nature1 to the general purpose of being faithful to the verity as he finds it1 is still aware that his own way of finding1 or his own creative activity as an inventor of hypotheses1 or his own powers of inference1 or his conscious ideals1 constitute in the main the object into which he is inquiring1 and so form an essential aspect of the sort of verity which he is endeavoring to discover4 ,the guide1 then1 of such a student is1 in a peculiar sense1 his own reason4 ,his goal is the comprehension of his own meaning1 the conscious and thoughtful conquest of himself4 ,his great enemy is not the mystery of outer nature1 but the imperfection of his reflective powers4 ,he is1 indeed1 as unwilling as is any scientific worker to trust private caprices4 ,he feels as little as does the observer of outer facts1 that he is merely noting down1 as they pass1 the chance products of his arbitrary fantasy4 ,for him1 as for any scientific student1 truth is indeed objective2 and the standards to which he conforms are eternal4 ,but his method is that of an inner considerateness rather than of a curiosity about external phenomena4 ,his objective world is at the same time an essentially ideal world1 and the eternal verity in whose light he seeks to live has1 throughout his undertakings1 a peculiarly intimate relation to the purposes of his own constructive will4 ,one may then sum up the difference of attitude which is here in question by saying that1 while the student of outer nature is explicitly conforming his plans of action1 his ideas1 his ideals1 to an order of truth which he takes to be foreign to himself--the student of the other sort of truth1 here especially in question1 is attempting to understand his own plans of action1 that is1 to develop his ideas1 or to define his ideals1 or else to do both these things4 ,now it is not hard to see that this search for some sort of ideal truth is indeed characteristic of every one of the investigations which have been grouped together in our division of the normative sciences4 ,pure mathematics shares in common with philosophy this type of scientific interest in ideal1 as distinct from physical or phenomenal truth4 ,there is1 to be sure1 a marked contrast between the ways in which the mathematician and the philosopher approach1 select1 and elaborate their respective sorts of problems4 ,but there is also a close relation between the two types of investigation in question4 ,let us next consider both the contrast and the analogy in some of their other most general features4 ,pure mathematics is concerned with the investigation of the logical consequences of certain exactly stateable postulates or hypotheses--such1 for instance1 as the postulates upon which arithmetic and analysis are founded1 or such as the postulates that lie at the basis of any type of geometry4 ,for the pure mathematician1 the truth of these hypotheses or postulates depends1 not upon the fact that physical nature contains phenomena answering to the postulates1 but solely upon the fact that the mathematician is able1 with rational consistency1 to state these assumed first principles1 and to develop their consequences4 ,dedekind1 in his famous essay1 ,was ,sind und ,was ,sollen die ,zahlen1 called the whole numbers freie ,schpfungen des ,menschlichen ,geistes2 and1 in fact1 we need not enter into any discussion of the psychology of our number concept in order to be able to assert that1 however we men first came by our conception of the whole numbers1 for the mathematician the theory of numerical truth must appear simply as the logical development of the consequences of a few fundamental first principles1 such as those which ,dedekind himself1 or ,peano1 or other recent writers upon this topic1 have1 in various forms1 stated4 ,a similar formal freedom marks the development of any other theory in the realm of pure mathematics4 ,pure geometry1 from the modern point of view1 is neither a doctrine forced upon the human mind by the constitution of any primal form of intuition1 nor yet a branch of physical science1 limited to describing the spatial arrangement of phenomena in the external world4 ,pure geometry is the theory of the consequences of certain postulates which the geometer is at liberty consistently to make2 so that there are as many types of geometry as there are consistent systems of postulates of that generic type of which the geometer takes account4 ,as is also now well known1 it has long been impossible to define pure mathematics as the science of quantity1 or to limit the range of the exactly stateable hypotheses or postulates with which the mathematician deals to the world of those objects which1 ideally speaking1 can be viewed as measurable4 ,for the ideally defined measurable objects are by no means the only ones whose properties can be stated in the form of exact postulates or hypotheses2 and the possible range of pure mathematics1 if taken in the abstract1 and viewed apart from any question as to the value of given lines of research1 appears to be identical with the whole realm of the consequences of exactly stateable ideal hypotheses of every type4 ,one limitation must1 however1 be mentioned1 to which the assertion just made is1 in practice1 obviously subject4 ,and this is1 indeed1 a momentous limitation4 ,the exactly stated ideal hypotheses whose consequences the mathematician develops must possess1 as is sometimes said1 sufficient intrinsic importance to be worthy of scientific treatment4 ,they must not be trivial hypotheses4 ,the mathematician is not1 like the solver of chess problems1 merely displaying his skill in dealing with the arbitrary fictions of an ideal game4 ,his truth is1 indeed1 ideal2 his world is1 indeed1 treated by his science as if this world were the creation of his postulates a freie ,schpfung4 ,but he does not thus create for mere sport4 ,on the contrary1 he reports a significant order of truth4 ,as a fact1 the ideal systems of the pure mathematician are customarily defined with an obvious1 even though often highly abstract and remote1 relation to the structure of our ordinary empirical world4 ,thus the various algebras which have been actually developed have1 in the main1 definite relations to the structure of the space world of our physical experience4 ,the different systems of ideal geometry1 even in all their ideality1 still cluster1 so to speak1 about the suggestions which our daily experience of space and of matter give us4 ,yet ,i suppose that no mathematician would be disposed1 at the present time1 to accept any brief definition of the degree of closeness or remoteness of relation to ordinary experience which shall serve to distinguish a trivial from a genuinely significant branch of mathematical theory4 ,in general1 a mathematician who is devoted to the theory of functions1 or to group theory1 appears to spend little time in attempting to show why the development of the consequences of his postulates is a significant enterprise4 ,the concrete mathematical interest of his inquiry sustains him in his labors1 and wins for him the sympathy of his fellows4 ,to the questions1 ,why consider the ideal structure of just this system of object at all8 ,why study various sorts of numbers1 or the properties of functions1 or of groups1 or the system of points in projective geometry8--the pure mathematician in general1 cares to reply only1 that the topic of his special investigation appears to him to possess sufficient mathematical interest4 ,the freedom of his science thus justifies his enterprise4 ,yet1 as ,i just pointed out1 this freedom is never mere caprice4 ,this ideal interest is not without a general relation to the concerns even of common sense4 ,in brief1 as it seems at once fair to say1 the pure mathematician is working under the influence of more or less clearly conscious philosophical motives4 ,he does not usually attempt to define what distinguishes a significant from a trivial system of postulates1 or what constitutes a problem worth attacking from the point of view of pure mathematics4 ,but he practically recognizes such a distinction between the trivial and the significant regions of the world of ideal truth1 and since philosophy is concerned with the significance of ideas1 this recognition brings the mathematician near in spirit to the philosopher4 ,such1 then1 is the position of the pure mathematician4 ,what1 by way of contrast1 is that of the philosopher8 ,we may reply that to state the formal consequences of exact assumptions is one thing2 to reflect upon the mutual relations1 and the whole significance of such assumptions1 does indeed involve other interests2 and these other interests are the ones which directly carry us over to the realm of philosophy4 ,if the theory of numbers belongs to pure mathematics1 the study of the place of the number concept in the system of human ideas belongs to philosophy4 ,like the mathematician1 the philosopher deals directly with a realm of ideal truth4 ,but to unify our knowledge1 to comprehend its sources1 its meaning1 and its relations to the whole of human life1 these aims constitute the proper goal of the philosopher4 ,in order1 however1 to accomplish his aims1 the philosopher must1 indeed1 take account of the results of the special physical science2 but he must also turn from the world of outer phenomena to an ideal world4 ,for the unity of things is never1 for us mortals1 anything that we find given in our experience4 ,you cannot see the unity of knowledge2 you cannot describe it as a phenomenon4 ,it is for us now1 an ideal4 ,and precisely so1 the meaning of things1 the relation of knowledge to life1 the significance of our ideals1 their bearing upon one another--these are never1 for us men1 phenomenally present data4 ,hence the philosopher1 however much he ought1 as indeed he ought1 to take account of phenomena1 and of the results of the special physical sciences1 is quite as deeply interested in his own way1 as the mathematician is interested in his way1 in the consideration of an ideal realm4 ,only1 unlike the mathematician1 the philosopher does not first abstract from the empirical suggestions upon which his exact ideas are actually based1 and then content himself merely with developing the logical consequences of these ideas4 ,on the contrary1 his main interest is not in any idea or fact in so far as it is viewed by itself1 but rather in the interrelations1 in the common significance1 in the unity1 of all fundamental ideas1 and in their relations both to the phenomenal facts and to life6 ,on the whole1 he1 therefore1 neither consents1 like the student of a special science of experience1 to seek his freedom solely through conformity to the phenomena which are to be described2 nor is he content1 like the pure mathematician1 to win his truth solely through the exact definition of the formal consequences of his freely defined hypotheses4 ,he is making an effort to discover the sense and the unity of the business of his own life4 ,it is no part of my purpose to attempt to show here how this general philosophical interest differentiates into the various interests of metaphysics1 of the philosophy of religion1 of ethics1 of sthetics1 of logic4 ,enough--,i have tried to illustrate how1 while both the philosopher and the mathematician have an interest in the meaning of ideas rather than in the description of external facts1 still there is a contrast which does1 indeed1 keep their work in large measure asunder1 namely1 the contrast due to the fact that the mathematician is directly concerned with developing the consequences of certain freely assumed systems of postulates or hypotheses2 while the philosopher is interested in the significance1 in the unity1 and in the relation to life1 of all the fundamental ideals and postulates of the human mind4 ,yet not even thus do we sufficiently state how closely related the two tasks are4 ,for this very contrast1 as we have also suggested1 is1 even within its own limits1 no final or perfectly sharp contrast4 ,there is a deep analogy between the two tasks4 ,for the mathematician1 as we have just seen1 is not evenly interested in developing the consequences of any and every system of freely assumed postulates4 ,he is no mere solver of arbitrary ideal puzzles in general4 ,his systems of postulates are so chosen as to be not trivial1 but significant4 ,they are1 therefore1 in fact1 but abstractly defined aspects of the very system of eternal truth whose expression is the universe4 ,in this sense the mathematician is as genuinely interested as is the philosopher in the significant use of his scientific freedom4 ,on the other hand1 the philosopher1 in reflecting upon the significance and the unity of fundamental ideas1 can only do so with success in case he makes due inquiry into the logical consequences of given ideas4 ,and this he can accomplish only if1 upon occasion1 he employs the exact methods of the mathematician1 and develops his systems of ideal truth with the precision of which only mathematical research is capable4 ,as a fact1 then1 the mathematician and the philosopher deal with ideal truth in ways which are not only contrasted1 but profoundly interconnected4 ,the mathematician1 in so far as he consciously distinguishes significant from trivial problems1 and ideal systems1 is a philosopher4 ,the philosopher1 in so far as he seeks exactness of logical method1 in his reflection1 must meanwhile aim to be1 within his own limits1 a mathematician4 ,he1 indeed1 will not in future1 like ,spinoza1 seek to reduce philosophy to the mere development1 in mathematical form1 of the consequences of certain arbitrary hypotheses4 ,he will distinguish between a reflection upon the unity of the system of truth and an abstract development of this or that selected aspect of the system4 ,but he will see more and more that1 in so far as he undertakes to be exact1 he must aim to become1 in his own way1 and with due regard to his own purposes1 mathematical2 and thus the union of mathematical and philosophical inquiries1 in the future1 will tend to become closer and closer4 ,,ii ,so far1 then1 ,i have dwelt upon extremely general considerations relating to the unity and the contrast of mathematical and philosophical inquiries4 ,i can well conceive1 however1 that the individual worker in any one of the numerous branches of investigation which are represented by the body of students whom ,i am privileged to address1 may at this point mentally interpose the objection that all these considerations are1 indeed1 far too general to be of practical interest to any of us4 ,of course1 all we who study these so-called normative sciences are1 indeed1 interested in ideas1 for their own sakes--in ideas so distinct from1 although of course also somehow related to1 phenomena4 ,of course1 some of us are rather devoted to the development of the consequences of exactly stated ideal hypotheses1 and others to reflecting as we can upon what certain ideas and ideals are good for1 and upon what the unity is of all ideas and ideals4 ,of course1 if we are wise enough to do so1 we have much to learn from one another4 ,but1 you will say1 the assertion of all these things is a commonplace4 ,the expression of the desire for further mutual coperation is a pious wish4 ,you will insist upon asking further3 ,is there just now any concrete instance in a modern type of research which furnishes results such as are of interest to all of us8 ,are we actually doing any productive work in common8 ,are the philosophers contributing anything to human knowledge which has a genuine bearing upon the interests of mathematical science8 ,are the mathematicians contributing anything to philosophy8 ,these questions are perfectly fair4 ,moreover1 as it happens1 they can be distinctly answered in the affirmative4 ,the present age is one of a rapid advance in the actual unification of the fields of investigation which are included within the scope of this present division4 ,what little time remains to me must be devoted to indicating1 as well as ,i can1 in what sense this is true4 ,i shall have still to deal in very broad generalities4 ,i shall try to make these generalities definite enough to be not wholly unfruitful4 ,we have already emphasized one question which may be said to interest1 in a very direct way1 both the mathematician and the philosopher4 ,the ideal postulates1 whose consequences mathematical science undertakes to develop1 must be1 we have said1 significant postulates1 involving ideas whose exact definition and exposition repay the labor of scientific scrutiny4 ,number1 space1 continuity1 functional correspondence or dependence1 group-structure--these are examples of such significant ideas2 the postulates or ideal assumptions upon which the theory of such ideas depends are significant postulates1 and are not the mere conventions of an arbitrary game4 ,but now what constitutes the significance of an idea1 or of an abstract mathematical theory8 ,what gives an idea a worthy place in the whole scheme of human ideas8 ,is it the possibility of finding a physical application for a mathematical theory which for us decides what is the value of the theory8 ,no1 the theory of functions1 the theory of numbers1 group theory1 have a significance which no mathematician would consent to measure in terms of the present applicability or non-applicability of these theories in physical science8 ,in vain1 then1 does one attempt to use the test of applied mathematics as the main criticism of the value of a theory of pure mathematics4 ,the value of an idea1 for the sciences which constitute our division1 is dependent upon the place which this idea occupies in the whole organized scheme or system of human ideas4 ,the idea of number1 for instance1 familiar as its applications are1 does not derive its main value from the fact that eggs and dollars and star-clusters can be counted1 but rather from the fact that the idea of numbers has those relations to other fundamental ideas which recent logical theory has made prominent--relations1 for instance1 to the concept of order1 to the theory of classes or collections of objects viewed in general1 and to the metaphysical concept of the self4 ,relations of this sort1 which the discussions of the number concept by ,dedekind1 ,cantor1 ,peano1 and ,russell have recently brought to light--such relations1 ,i say1 constitute what truly justified ,gauss in calling the theory of numbers a divine science4 ,as against such deeper relations1 the countless applications of the number concept in ordinary life1 and in science1 are1 from the truly philosophical point of view1 of comparatively small moment4 ,what we want1 in the work of our division of the sciences1 is to bring to light the unity of truth1 either1 as in mathematics1 by developing systems of truth which are significant by virtue of their actual relations to this unity1 or1 as in philosophy1 by explicitly seeking the central idea about which all the many ideas cluster4 ,now1 an ancient and fundamental problem for the philosophers is that which has been called the problem of the categories4 ,this problem of the categories is simply the more formal aspect of the whole philosophical problem just defined4 ,the philosopher aims to comprehend the unity of the system of human ideas and ideals4 ,well1 then1 what are the primal ideas8 ,upon what group of concepts do the other concepts of human science logically depend8 ,about what central interests is the system of human ideals clustered8 ,in ancient thought ,aristotle already approached this problem in one way4 ,kant1 in the eighteenth century1 dealt with it in another4 ,we students of philosophy are accustomed to regret what we call the excessive formalism of ,kant1 to lament that ,kant was so much the slave of his own relatively superficial and accidental table of categories1 and that he made the treatment of every sort of philosophical problem turn upon his own schematism4 ,yet we cannot doubt that ,kant was right in maintaining that philosophy needs1 for the successful development of every one of its departments1 a well-devised and substantially complete system of categories4 ,our objection to ,kant's over-confidence in the virtues of his own schematism is due to the fact that we do not now accept his table of categories as an adequate view of the fundamental concepts4 ,the efforts of philosophers since ,kant have been repeatedly devoted to the task of replacing his scheme of categories by a more adequate one4 ,i am far from regarding these purely philosophical efforts made since ,kant as fruitless1 but they have remained1 so far1 very incomplete1 and they have been held back from their due fullness of success by the lack of a sufficiently careful survey and analysis of the processes of thought as these have come to be embodied in the living sciences4 ,such concepts as number1 quantity1 space1 time1 cause1 continuity1 have been dealt with by the pure philosophers far too summarily and superficially4 ,a more thoroughgoing analysis has been needed4 ,but now1 in comparatively recent times1 there has developed a region of inquiry which one may call by the general name of modern logic4 ,to the constitution of this new region of inquiry men have principally contributed who began as mathematicians1 but who1 in the course of their work1 have been led to become more and more philosophers4 ,of late1 however1 various philosophers1 who were originally in no sense mathematicians1 becoming aware of the importance of the new type of research1 are in their turn attempting both to assimilate and to supplement the undertakings which were begun from the mathematical side4 ,as a result1 the logical problem of the categories has to-day become almost equally a problem for the logicians of mathematics and for those students of philosophy who take any serious interest in exactness of method in their own branch of work4 ,the result of this actual coperation of men from both sides is that1 as ,i think1 we are to-day1 for the first time1 in sight of what is still1 as ,i freely admit1 a somewhat distant goal1 namely1 the relatively complete rational analysis and tabulation of the fundamental categories of human thought4 ,that the student of ethics is as much interested in such an investigation as is the metaphysician1 that the philosopher of religion needs a well-completed table of categories quite as much as does the pure logician1 every competent student of such topics ought to admit4 ,and that the enterprise in question keenly interests the mathematicians is shown by the prominent part which some of them have taken in the researches in question4 ,here1 then1 is the type of recent scientific work whose results most obviously bear upon the tasks of all of us alike4 ,a catalogue of the names of the workers in this wide field of modern logic would be out of place here4 ,yet one must1 indeed1 indicate what lines of research are especially in question4 ,from the purely mathematical side1 the investigations of the type to which ,i now refer may be viewed 7somewhat arbitrarily7 as beginning with that famous examination into one of the postulates of ,euclid's geometry which gave rise to the so-called non-,euclidean geometry4 ,the question here originally at issue was one of a comparatively limited scope1 namely1 the question whether ,euclid's parallel-line postulate was a logical consequence of the other geometrical principles4 ,but the investigation rapidly develops into a general study of the foundations of geometry--a study to which contributions are still almost constantly appearing4 ,somewhat independently of this line of inquiry there grew up1 during the latter half of the nineteenth century1 that rexamination of the bases of arithmetic and analysis which is associated with the names of ,dedekind1 ,weierstrass1 and ,george ,cantor4 ,at the present time1 the labors of a number of other inquirers 7amongst whom we may mention the school of ,peano and ,pieri in ,italy1 and men such as ,poincar and ,couturat in ,france1 ,hilbert in ,germany1 ,bertrand ,russell and ,whitehead in ,england1 and an energetic group of our ,american mathematicians--men such as ,professor ,moore1 ,professor ,halsted1 ,dr4 ,huntington1 ,dr4 ,veblen1 and a considerable number of others7 have been added to the earlier researches4 ,the result is that we have recently come for the first time to be able to see1 with some completeness1 what the assumed first principles of pure mathematics actually are4 ,as was to be expected1 these principles are capable of more than one formulation1 according as they are approached from one side or from another4 ,as was also to be expected1 the entire edifice of pure mathematics1 so far as it has yet been erected1 actually rests upon a very few fundamental concepts and postulates1 however you may formulate them4 ,what was not observed1 however1 by the earlier1 and especially by the philosophical1 students of the categories1 is the form which these postulates tend to assume when they are rigidly analyzed4 ,this form depends upon the precise definition and classification of certain types of relations4 ,the whole of geometry1 for instance1 including metrical geometry1 can be developed from a set of postulates which demand the existence of points that stand in certain ordinal relationships4 ,the ordinal relationships can be reduced1 according as the series of points considered is open or closed1 either to the well-known relationship in which three points stand when one is between the other two upon a right line1 or else to the ordinal relationship in which four points stand when they are separated by pairs2 and these two ordinal relationships1 by means of various logical devices1 can be regarded as variations of a single fundamental form4 ,cayley and ,klein founded the logical theory of geometry here in question4 ,russell1 and in another way ,dr4 ,veblen1 have given it its most recent expressions4 ,in the same way1 the theory of whole numbers can be reduced to sets of principles which demand the existence of certain ideal objects in certain simple ordinal relations4 ,dedekind and ,peano have worked out such ordinal theories of the number concept4 ,in another development of the theory of the cardinal whole numbers1 which ,russell and ,whitehead have worked out1 ordinal concepts are introduced only secondarily1 and the theory depends upon the fundamental relation of the equivalence or nonequivalence of collections of objects4 ,but here also a certain simple type of relation determines the definitions and the development of the whole theory4 ,two results follow from such a fashion of logically analyzing the first principles of mathematical science4 ,in the first place1 as just pointed out1 we learn how few and simple are the conceptions and postulates upon which the actual edifice of exact science rests4 ,pure mathematics1 we have said1 is free to assume what it chooses4 ,yet the assumptions whose presence as the foundation principles of the actually existent pure mathematics an exhaustive examination thus reveals1 show by their fewness that the ideal freedom of the mathematician to assume and to construct what he pleases1 is indeed1 in practice1 a very decidedly limited freedom4 ,the limitation is1 as we have already seen1 a limitation which has to do with the essential significance of the fundamental concepts in question4 ,and so the result of this analysis of the bases of the actually developed and significant branches of mathematics1 constitutes a sort of empirical revelation of what categories the exact sciences have practically found to be of such significance as to be worthy of exhaustive treatment4 ,thus the instinctive sense for significant truth1 which has all along been guiding the development of mathematics1 comes at least to a clear and philosophical consciousness4 ,and meanwhile the essential categories of thought are seen in a new light4 ,the second result still more directly concerns a philosophical logic4 ,it is this3 ,since the few types of relations which this sort of analysis reveals as the fundamental ones in exact science are of such importance1 the logic of the present day is especially required to face the questions3 ,what is the nature of our concept of relations8 ,what are the various possible types of relations8 ,upon what does the variety of these types depend8 ,what unity lies beneath the variety8 ,as a fact1 logic1 in its modern forms1 namely1 first that symbolic logic which ,boole first formulated1 which ,mr4 ,charles ,s4 ,peirce and his pupils have in this country already so highly developed1 and which ,schroeder in ,germany1 ,peano's school in ,italy1 and a number of recent ,english writers have so effectively furthered--and secondly1 the logic of scientific method1 which is now so actively pursued1 in ,france1 in ,germany1 and in the ,english-speaking countries--this whole movement in modern logic1 as ,i hold1 is rapidly approaching new solutions of the problem of the fundamental nature and the logic of relations4 ,the problem is one in which we are all equally interested4 ,to ,de ,morgan in ,england1 in an earlier generation1 and1 in our time1 to ,charles ,peirce in this country1 very important stages in the growth of these problems are due4 ,russell1 in his work on the ,principles of ,mathematics has very lately undertaken to sum up the results of the logic of relations1 as thus far developed1 and to add his own interpretations4 ,yet ,i think that ,russell has failed to get as near to the foundations of the theory of relations as the present state of the discussion permits4 ,for ,russell has failed to take account of what ,i hold to be the most fundamentally important generalization yet reached in the general theory of relations4 ,this is the generalization set forth as early as #ahij1 by ,mr4 ,a4 ,b4 ,kempe1 of ,london1 in a pair of wonderful but too much neglected1 papers1 entitled1 respectively1 ,the ,theory of ,mathematical ,form1 and ,the ,analogy between the ,logical ,theory of ,classes and the ,geometrical ,theory of ,points4 ,a mere hint first as to the more precise formulation of the problem at issue1 and then later as to ,kempe's special contribution to that problem1 may be in order here1 despite the impossibility of any adequate statement4 ,,iii ,the two most obviously and universally important kinds of relations known to the exact sciences1 as these sciences at present exist1 are3 7#a7 ,the relations of the type of equality or equivalence2 and 7#b7 the relations of the type of before and after1 or greater and less4 ,the first of these two classes of relations1 namely1 the class represented1 although by no means exhausted1 by the various relations actually called1 in different branches of science by the one name equality1 this class ,i say1 might well be named1 as ,i myself have proposed1 the leveling relations4 ,a collection of objects between any two of which some one relation of this type holds1 may be said to be a collection whose members1 in some defined sense or other1 are on the same level4 ,the second of these two classes of relations1 namely1 those of the type of before and after1 or greater and less--this class of relations1 ,i say1 consists of what are nowadays often called the serial relations4 ,and a collection of objects such that1 if any pair of these objects be chosen1 a determinate one of this pair stands to the other one of the same pair in some determinate relation of this second type1 and in a relation which remains constant for all the pairs that can be thus formed out of the members of this collection--any such collection1 ,i say1 constitutes a one-dimensional open series4 ,thus1 in case of a file of men1 if you choose any pair of men belonging to the file1 a determinate one of them is1 in the file1 before the other4 ,in the number series1 of any two numbers1 a determinate one is greater than the other4 ,wherever such a state of affairs exists1 one has a series4 ,now these two classes of relations1 the leveling relations and the serial relations1 agree with one another1 and differ from one another in very momentous ways4 ,they agree with one another in that both the leveling and the serial relations are what is technically called transitive2 that is1 both classes conform to what ,professor ,james has called the law of skipped intermediaries4 ,thus1 if ,a is equal to ,b1 and ,b is equal to ,c1 it follows that ,a is equal to ,c4 ,if ,a is before ,b1 and ,b is before ,c1 then ,a is before ,c4 ,and this property1 which enables you in your reasonings about these relations to skip middle terms1 and so to perform some operation of elimination1 is the property which is meant when one calls relations of this type transitive4 ,but1 on the other hand1 these two classes of relations differ from each other in that the leveling relations are1 while the serial relations are not1 symmetrical or reciprocal4 ,thus1 if ,a is equal to ,b1 ,b is equal to ,a4 ,but if ,x is greater than ,y1 then ,y is not greater than ,x1 but less than ,x4 ,so the leveling relations are symmetrical transitive relations4 ,but the serial relations are transitive relations which are not symmetrical4 ,all this is now well known4 ,it is notable1 however1 that nearly all the processes of our exact sciences1 as at present developed1 can be said to be essentially such as lead either to the placing of sets or classes of objects on the same level1 by means of the use of symmetrical transitive relations1 or else to the arranging of objects in orderly rows or series1 by means of the use of transitive relations which are not symmetrical4 ,this holds also of all the applications of the exact sciences4 ,whatever else you do in science 7or1 for that matter1 in art71 you always lead1 in the end1 either to the arranging of objects1 or of ideas1 or of acts1 or of movements1 in rows or series1 or else to the placing of objects or ideas of some sort on the same level1 by virtue of some equivalence1 or of some invariant character4 ,thus numbers1 functions1 lines in geometry1 give you examples of serial relations4 ,equations in mathematics are classic instances of leveling relations4 ,so1 of course1 are invariants4 ,thus1 again1 the whole modern theory of energy consists of two parts1 one of which has to do with levels of energy1 in so far as the quantity of energy of a closed system remains invariant through all the transformations of the system1 while the other part has to do with the irreversible serial order of the transformations of energy themselves1 which follow a set of unsymmetrical relations1 in so far as energy tends to fall from higher to lower levels of intensity within the same system4 ,the entire conceivable universe then1 and all of our present exact science1 can be viewed1 if you choose1 as a collection of objects or of ideas that1 whatever other types of relations may exist1 are at least largely characterized either by the leveling relations1 or by the serial relations1 or by complexes of both sorts of relations4 ,here1 then1 we are plainly dealing with very fundamental categories4 ,the between relations of geometry can of course be defined1 if you choose1 in terms of transitive relations that are not symmetrical4 ,there are1 to be sure1 some other relations present in exact science1 but the two types1 the serial and leveling relations1 are especially notable4 ,so far the modern logicians have for some time been in substantial agreement4 ,russell's brilliant book is a development of the logic of mathematics very largely in terms of the two types of relations which1 in my own way1 ,i have just characterized2 although ,russell gives due regard1 of course1 to certain other types of relations4 ,but hereupon the question arises1 ,are these two types of relations what ,russell holds them to be1 namely1 ultimate and irreducible logical facts1 unanalyzable categories--mere data for the thinker8 ,or can we reduce them still further1 and thus simplify yet again our view of the categories8 ,here is where ,kempe's generalization begins to come into sight4 ,these two categories1 in at least one very fundamental realm of exact thought1 can be reduced to one4 ,there is1 namely1 a world of ideal objects which especially interest the logician4 ,it is the world of a totality of possible logical classes1 or again1 it is the ideal world1 equivalent in formal structure to the foregoing1 but composed of a totality of possible statements1 or thirdly1 it is the world1 equivalent once more1 in formal structure1 to the foregoing1 but consisting of a totality of possible acts of will1 of possible decisions4 ,when we proceed to consider the relational structure of such a world1 taken merely in the abstract as such a structure1 a relation comes into sight which at once appears to be peculiarly general in its nature4 ,it is the so-called illative relation1 the relation which obtains between two classes when one is subsumed under the other1 or between two statements1 or two decisions1 when one implies or entails the other4 ,this relation is transitive1 but may be either symmetrical or not symmetrical2 so that1 according as it is symmetrical or not1 it may be used either to establish levels or to generate series4 ,in the order system of the logician's world1 the relational structure is thus1 in any case1 a highly general and fundamental one4 ,but this is not all4 ,in this the logician's world of classes1 or of statements1 or of decisions1 there is also another relation observable4 ,this is the relation of exclusion or mutual opposition4 ,this is a purely symmetrical or reciprocal relation4 ,it has two forms--obverse or contradictory opposition1 that is1 negation proper1 and contrary opposition4 ,but both these forms are purely symmetrical4 ,and by proper devices each of them can be stated in terms of the other1 or reduced to the other4 ,and further1 as ,kempe incidentally shows1 and as ,mrs4 ,ladd ,franklin has also substantially shown in her important theory of the syllogism1 it is possible to state every proposition1 or complex of propositions involving the illative relation1 in terms of this purely symmetrical relation of opposition4 ,hence1 so far as mere relational form is concerned1 the illative relation itself may be wholly reduced to the symmetrical relation of opposition4 ,this is our first result as to the relational structure of the realm of pure logic1 that is1 the realm of classes1 of statements1 or of decisions4 ,it follows that1 in describing the logician's world of possible classes or of possible decisions1 all unsymmetrical1 and so all serial1 relations can be stated solely in terms of symmetrical relations1 and can be entirely reduced to such relations4 ,moreover1 as ,kempe has also very prettily shown1 the relation of opposition1 in its two forms1 just mentioned1 need not be interpreted as obtaining merely between pairs of objects4 ,it may and does obtain between triads1 tetrads1 n-ads of logical entities2 and so all that is true of the relations of logical classes may consequently be stated merely by ascribing certain perfectly symmetrical and homogeneous predicates to pairs1 triads1 tetrads1 n-ads of logical objects4 ,the essential contrast between symmetrical and unsymmetrical relations thus1 in this ideal realm of the logician1 simply vanishes4 ,the categories of the logician's world of classes1 of statements1 or of decisions1 are marvelously simple4 ,all the relations present may be viewed as variations of the mere conception of opposition as distinct from non-opposition4 ,all this holds1 of course1 so far1 merely for the logician's world of classes or of decisions4 ,there1 at least1 all serial order can actually be derived from wholly symmetrical relations4 ,but ,kempe now very beautifully shows 7and here lies his great and original contribution to our topic7--he shows1 ,i say1 that the ordinal relations of geometry1 as well as of the number system1 can all be regarded as indistinguishable from mere variations of those relations which1 in pure logic1 one finds to be the symmetrical relations obtaining within pairs or triads of classes or of statements4 ,the formal identity of the geometrical relation called between with a purely logical relation which one can define as existing or as not existing amongst the members of a given triad of logical classes1 or of logical statements1 is shown by ,kempe in a fashion that ,i cannot here attempt to expound4 ,but ,kempe's result thus enables one1 as ,i believe1 to simplify the theory of relations far beyond the point which ,russell in his brilliant book has reached4 ,for ,kempe's triadic relation in question can be stated1 in what he calls its obverse form1 in perfectly symmetrical terms4 ,and he proves very exactly that the resulting logical relation is precisely identical1 in all its properties1 with the fundamental ordinal relation of geometry4 ,thus the order-systems of geometry and analysis appear simply as special cases of the more general order-system of pure logic4 ,the whole1 both of analysis and of geometry1 can be regarded as a description of certain selected groups of entities1 which are chosen1 according to special rules1 from a single ideal world4 ,this general and inclusive ideal world consists simply of all the objects which can stand to one another in those symmetrical relations wherein the pure logician finds various statements1 or various decisions inevitably standing4 ,let me1 says in substance ,kempe1 choose from the logician's ideal world of classes or decisions1 what entities ,i will2 and ,i will show you a collection of objects that are in their relational structure1 precisely identical with the points of a geometer's space of n dimensions4 ,in other words1 all of the geometer's figures and relations can be precisely pictured by the relational structure of a selected system of classes or of statements1 whose relations are wholly and explicitly logical relations1 such as opposition1 and whose relations may all be regarded1 accordingly1 as reducible to a single type of purely symmetrical relation4 ,thus1 for all exact science1 and not merely for the logician's special realm1 the contrast between symmetrical and unsymmetrical relations proves to be1 after all1 superficial and derived4 ,the purely logical categories1 such as opposition1 and such as hold within the calculus of statements1 are1 apparently1 the basal categories of all the exact science that has yet been developed4 ,series and levels are relational structures that1 sharply as they are contrasted1 can be derived from a single root4 ,i have restated ,kempe's generalization in my own way4 ,i think it the most promising step towards new light as to the categories that we have made for some generations4 ,in the field of modern logic1 ,i say1 then1 work is doing which is rapidly tending towards the unification of the tasks of our entire division4 ,for this problem of the categories1 in all its abstractness1 is still a common problem for all of us4 ,do you ask1 however1 what such researches can do to furnish more special aid to the workers in metaphysics1 in the philosophy of religion1 in ethics1 or in sthetics1 beyond merely helping towards the formulation of a table of categories--then ,i reply that we are already not without evidence that such general researches1 abstract though they may seem1 are bearing fruits which have much more than a merely special interest4 ,apart from its most general problems1 that analysis of mathematical concepts to which ,i have referred has in any case revealed numerous unexpected connections between departments of thought which had seemed to be very widely sundered4 ,one instance of such a connection ,i myself have elsewhere discussed at length1 in its general metaphysical bearings4 ,i refer to the logical identity which ,dedekind first pointed out between the mathematical concept of the ordinal number of series and the philosophical concept of the formal structure of an ideally completed self4 ,i have maintained that this formal identity throws light upon problems which have as genuine an interest for the student of the philosophy of religion as for the logician of arithmetic4 ,in the same connection it may be remarked that1 as ,couturat and ,russell1 amongst other writers1 have very clearly and beautifully shown1 the argument of the ,kantian mathematical antinomies needs to be explicitly and totally revised in the light of ,cantor's modern theory of infinite collections4 ,to pass at once to another1 and a very different instance3 ,the modern mathematical conceptions of what is called group theory have already received very wide and significant applications1 and promise to bring into unity regions of research which1 until recently1 appeared to have little or nothing to do with one another4 ,quite lately1 however1 there are signs that group theory will soon prove to be of importance for the definition of some of the fundamental concepts of that most refractory branch of philosophical inquiry1 sthetics4 ,dr4 ,emch1 in an important paper in the ,monist1 called attention1 some time since1 to the symmetry groups to which certain sthetically pleasing forms belong1 and endeavored to point out the empirical relations between these groups and the sthetic effects in question4 ,the grounds for such a connection between the groups in question and the observed sthetic effects1 seemed1 in the paper of ,dr4 ,emch to be left largely in the dark4 ,but certain papers recently published in the country by ,miss ,ethel ,puffer1 bearing upon the psychology of the beautiful 7although the author has approached the subject without being in the least consciously influenced1 as ,i understand1 by the conceptions of the mathematical group theory71 still actually lead1 if ,i correctly grasp the writer's meaning1 to the doctrine that the sthetic object1 viewed as a psychological whole1 must possess a structure closely1 if not precisely1 equivalent to the ideal structure of what the mathematician calls a group4 ,i myself have no authority regarding sthetic concepts1 and speak subject to correction4 ,but the unexpected1 and in case of ,miss ,puffer's research1 quite unintended1 appearance of group theory in recent sthetic analysis is to me an impressive instance of the use of relatively new mathematical conceptions in philosophical regions which seem1 at first sight1 very remote from mathematics4 ,that both the group concept and the concept of the self just suggested are sure to have also a wide application in the ethics of the future1 ,i am myself well convinced4 ,in fact1 no branch of philosophy is without close relations to all such studies of fundamental categories4 ,these are but hints and examples4 ,they suffice1 ,i hope1 to show that the workers in this division have deep common interests1 and will do well1 in future1 to study the arts of coperation1 and to regard one another's progress with a watchful and cordial sympathy4 ,in a word3 ,our common problem is the theory of the categories4 ,that problem can be solved only by the coperation of the mathematicians and of the philosophers4 ,illustration3 ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,paris ,,in ,,the ,,thirteenth ,,century ,hand-painted ,photogravure from a ,painting by ,otto ,knille4 ,reproduced from a ,photograph of the ,painting by permission of the ,berlin ,photograph ,co4 ,this famous painting is now in the ,university of ,berlin4 ,thomas ,aquinas1 one of the greatest of the scholastic philosophers1 surnamed the ,angelic ,doctor1 is delivering a learned discourse before ,king ,louis ,,ix4 ,to the right of the ,king stands ,joinville1 the ,french chronicler4 ,the ,dominican monk with his hand to his face is ,guillaume de ,saint ,amour1 and ,vincent de ,beauvais1 and another ,dominican are seated with their backs to the platform desk from which ,thomas ,aquinas is making his animated address4 ,the picture is thoroughly characteristic of a ,university disputation at the close of the ,middle ,ages4 ,,department ,i--,,philosophy ,,department ,i--,,philosophy 7,hall #f1 ,september #bj1 #aa4ae a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,borden ,p4 ,,bowne1 ,boston ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,george ,h4 ,,howison1 ,university of ,california4 ,,professor ,,george ,t4 ,,ladd1 ,yale ,university4 ,in opening the ,department of ,philosophy1 the ,chairman1 ,professor ,borden ,p4 ,bowne1 ,,ll4,d41 of ,boston ,university1 made an interesting address on the ,philosophical ,outlook4 ,professor ,bowne said in part3-- ,i congratulate the members of the ,philosophical ,section on the improved outlook in philosophy4 ,in the generation just passed1 philosophy was somewhat at a discount4 ,the great and rapid development of physical science and invention1 together with the profound changes in biological thought1 produced for a time a kind of chaos4 ,new facts were showered upon us in great abundance1 and we had no adequate philosophical preparation for dealing with them4 ,such a condition is always disturbing4 ,the old mental equilibrium is overthrown and readjustment is a slow process4 ,besides1 the shallow sense philosophy of that time readily lent itself to mechanical and materialistic interpretations1 and for a while it seemed as if all the higher faiths of humanity were permanently discredited4 ,all this has passed away4 ,philosophical criticism began its work and the nave dogmatism of materialistic naturalism was soon disposed of4 ,it quickly appeared that our trouble was not due to the new facts1 but to the superficial philosophy by which they had been interpreted4 ,now that we have a better philosophy1 we have come to live in perfect peace with the facts once thought disturbing1 and even to welcome them as valuable additions to knowledge4444 ,the brief naturalistic episode was not without instruction for us4 ,it showed conclusively the great practical importance of philosophy4 ,had we had thirty years ago the current philosophical insight1 the great development of the physical and biological sciences would have made no disturbance whatever4 ,but being interpreted by a crude scheme of thought1 it produced somewhat of a storm4 ,philosophy may not contribute much of positive value1 but it certainly has an important negative function in the way of suppressing pretentious dogmatism and fictitious knowledge1 which often lead men astray4 ,it is these things which produce conflicts of science and religion or which find in evolution the solvent of all mysteries and the source of all knowledge4 ,concerning the partition of territory between science and philosophy1 there are two distinct questions respecting the facts of experience4 ,first1 we need to know the facts in their temporal and spatial order1 and the way they hang together in a system of law4 ,to get this knowledge is the function of science1 and in this work science has inalienable rights and a most important practical function4 ,this work cannot be done by speculation nor interfered with by authority of any kind4 ,it is not surprising1 then1 that scientists in their sense of contact with reality should be indignant with1 or feel contempt for1 any who seek to limit or proscribe their research4 ,but supposing this work all done1 there remains another question respecting the causality and interpretation of the facts4 ,this question belongs to philosophy4 ,science describes and registers the facts with their temporal and spatial laws2 philosophy studies their causality and significance4 ,and while the scientist justly ignores the philosopher who interferes with his inquiries1 so the philosopher may justly reproach the scientist who fails to see that the scientific question does not touch the philosophic one4444 ,in the field of metaphysics proper ,i note a strong tendency toward personal idealism1 or as it might be called1 ,personalism2 that is1 the doctrine that substantial reality can be conceived only under the personal form and that all else is phenomenal4 ,this is quite distinct from the traditional idealisms of mere conceptionism4 ,it holds the essential fact to be a community of persons with a ,supreme ,person at their head while the phenomenal world is only expression and means of communication4 ,and to this view we are led by the failure of philosophizing on the impersonal plane1 which is sure to lose itself in contradiction and impossibility4 ,under the form of mechanical naturalism1 with its tendencies to materialism and atheism1 impersonalism has once more been judged and found wanting4 ,we are not likely to have a recurrence of this view unless there be a return to philosophical barbarism4 ,but impersonalism at the opposite pole in the form of abstract categories of being1 causality1 unity1 identity1 continuity1 sufficient reason1 etc41 is equally untenable4 ,criticism shows that these categories when abstractly and impersonally taken cancel themselves4 ,on the impersonal plane we can never reach unity from plurality1 or plurality from unity2 and we can never find change in identity1 or identity in change4 ,continuity in time becomes mere succession without the notion of potentiality1 and this in turn is empty4 ,existence itself is dispersed into nothingness through the infinite divisibility of space and time1 while the law of the sufficient reason loses itself in barren tautology and the infinite regress4 ,the necessary logical equivalence of cause and effect in any impersonal scheme makes all real explanation and progress impossible1 and shuts us up to an unintelligible oscillation between potentiality and actuality1 to which there is no corresponding thought4444 ,philosophy is still militant and has much work before it1 but the omens are auspicious1 the problems are better understood1 and we are coming to a synthesis of the results of past generations of thinking which will be a very distinct progress4 ,philosophy has already done good service1 and never better than in recent times1 by destroying pretended knowledge and making room for the higher faiths of humanity4 ,it has also done good service in helping these faiths to better rational form1 and thus securing them against the defilements of superstition and the cavilings of hostile critics4 ,with all its aberrations and shortcomings1 philosophy deserves well of humanity4 ,,philosophy3 ,,its ,,fundamental ,,conceptions ,,and ,,its ,,methods ,,by ,,george ,,holmes ,,howison ,george ,holmes ,howison1 ,mills ,professor of ,intellectual and ,moral ,philosophy and ,civil ,polity1 ,university of ,california4 b4 ,montgomery ,county1 ,maryland1 #ahcd4 ,a4,b4 ,marietta ,college1 #aheb2 ,m4,a4 #ahee2 ,,ll4,d4 ibid4 #ahhc4 ,post-graduate1 ,lane ,theological ,seminary1 ,university of ,berlin1 and ,oxford4 ,headmaster ,high ,school1 ,salem1 ,mass41 #ahfb-fd2 ,assistant ,professor of ,mathematics1 ,washington ,university1 ,st4 ,louis1 #ahfd-ff2 ,tileston ,professor of ,political ,economy1 ibid4 #ahff-fi2 ,professor of ,logic and the ,philosophy of ,science1 ,massachusetts ,institute of ,technology1 #ahga-gi2 ,lecturer on ,ethics1 ,harvard ,university1 #ahgi-hj2 ,lecturer on ,logic and ,speculative ,philosophy1 ,university of ,michigan1 #ahhc-hd4 ,member and vice-president ,st4 ,louis ,philosophical ,society2 member ,california ,historical ,society2 ,american ,historical ,association2 ,american ,association for the ,advancement of ,science2 ,national ,geographic ,society1 etc4 ,author of ,treatise on ,analytic ,geometry1 #ahfi2 ,the ,limits of ,evolution1 #aija1 #b;d edition1 #aijd2 joint author and editor of ,the ,conception of ,god1 #ahig1 etc4 ,editor ,philosophical ,publications of ,university of ,california2 ,american ,editorial ,representative ,hibbert ,journal1 ,london4 ,the duty has been assigned me1 honored colleagues1 of addressing you on the ,fundamental ,conceptions and the ,methods of our common pursuit--philosophy4 ,in endeavoring to deal with the subject in a way not unworthy of its depth and its extent1 ,i have found it impossible to bring the essential material within less compass than would occupy1 in reading1 at least four times the period granted by our programme4 ,i have therefore complied with the rule of the ,congress which directs that1 if a more extended writing be left with the authorities for publication1 the reading must be restricted to such a portion of it as will not exceed the allotted time4 ,i will accordingly read to you1 first1 a brief summary of my entire discussion1 by way of introduction1 and then an excerpt from the larger document1 which may serve for a specimen1 as our scholastic predecessors used to say1 of the whole inquiry ,i have carried out4 ,the impression will1 of course1 be fragmentary1 and ,i must ask beforehand for your most benevolent allowances1 to prevent a judgment too unfavorable4 ,the discussion naturally falls into two main parts3 the first dealing with the ,fundamental ,conceptions2 and the second1 with the ,methods4 ,in the former1 after presenting the conception of philosophy itself1 as the consideration of things in the light of the whole1 ,i take up the involved ,fundamental ,concepts in the following order3-- ,i4 ,whole and ,part2 ,,ii4 ,subject and ,object 7,knowing and ,being1 ,mind and ,matter2 ,dualism1 ,materialism1 ,idealism72 ,,iii4 ,reality and ,appearance 7,noumenon and ,phenomenon72 ,,iv4 ,cause and ,effect 7,ground and ,consequence2 ,causal ,system72 ,v4 ,one and ,many 7,number ,system2 ,monism and ,pluralism72 ,,vi4 ,time and ,space 7their relation to ,number2 their ,origin and ,real ,meaning72 ,,vii4 ,unconditioned and ,conditioned 7,soul1 ,world1 ,god2 their ,reinterpretation in terms of ,pluralism72 ,,viii4 ,the ,true1 the ,beautiful1 the ,good 7their relation to the question between ,monism and ,pluralism74 ,these are successively dealt with as they rise one out of the other in the process of interpreting them and applying them in the actual creation of philosophy1 as this goes on in the historic schools4 ,the theoretic progress of philosophy is in this way explained by them1 in its movement from natural dualism1 or realism1 through the successive forms of monism1 materialistic1 agnostic1 and idealistic1 until it reaches the issue1 now coming so strongly forward within the school of idealism1 between the adherents of monism and those of pluralism4 ,the importance of the ,fundamental ,concepts is shown to increase as we pass along the list1 till on reaching ,cause and ,effect1 and entering upon its full interpretation into the complete ,system of ,causes1 we arrive at the very significant conception of the ,,reciprocity ,,of ,,first ,,causes1 and through it come to the ,,primacy ,,of ,,final ,,cause1 and the derivative position of the other forms of cause1 ,material1 ,formal1 ,efficient4 ,the philosophic strength of idealism1 but especially of idealistic pluralism1 comes into clear light as the result of this stage of the inquiry4 ,but it appears yet more decidedly when ,one and ,many1 ,time and ,space1 and their interrelations1 are subjected to analysis4 ,so the discussion next passes to the higher conceptions1 ,soul1 ,world1 ,god1 by the pathway of the correlation ,unconditioned and ,conditioned1 and its kindred contrasts ,absolute and ,relative1 ,necessary and ,contingent1 ,infinite and ,finite1 corroborating and reinforcing the import of idealism1 and1 still more decidedly1 that of its plural form4 ,finally1 the strong and favorable bearing of this last on the dissolution of agnosticism and the habilitation of the ideals1 the ,true1 the ,beautiful1 and the ,good1 in a heightened meaning1 is brought out4 ,this carries the inquiry to the second part of it1 that of the ,philosophical ,methods4 ,here ,i recount these in a series of six3 the ,dogmatic1 the ,skeptical1 the ,critical1 the ,pragmatic1 the ,genetic1 the ,dialectic4 ,these1 ,i show1 in spite of the tendency of the earlier members in the series to over-emphasis1 all have their place and function in the development of a complete philosophy1 and in fact form an ascending series in methodic effectiveness1 all that precede the last being taken up into the comprehensive ,critical ,rationalism of the last4 ,methodology thus passes upward1 over the ascending and widening roadways of 7#a7 ,intuition and ,deduction2 7#b7 ,experience and ,induction2 7#c7 ,intuition and ,experience adjusted by ,critical ,limits2 7#d7 ,skepticism reinforced and made quasi-affirmative by ,desire and ,will2 7#e7 ,empiricism enlarged by substitution of cosmic and psychic history for subjective consciousness2 7#f7 ,enlightened return to a ,rationalism critically established by the inclusion of the preceding elements1 and by the sifting and the grading of the ,fundamental ,concepts through their behavior when tested by the effort to make them universal4 ,in this way1 the methods fall into a ,system1 the organic principle of which is this principle of ,dialectic1 which proves itself alone able to establish necessary truths2 that is1 truths indeed1--judgments that are seen to exclude their opposites1 because1 in the attempt to substitute the opposite1 the place of it is still filled by the judgment which it aims to dislodge4 ,and now1 with your favoring leave1 ,i will read the excerpt from my larger text4 ,the task to which1 in an especial sense1 the cultivators of philosophy are summoned by the plans of the present ,congress of ,arts and ,science1 is certainly such as to stir an ambition to achieve it4 ,at the same time1 it tempers eagerness by its vast difficulty1 and the apprehension lest this may prove insuperable4 ,the task1 the officers of the ,congress tell us1 is no less than to promote the unification of all human knowledge4 ,it requires1 then1 the reduction of the enormous detail in our present miscellany of sciences and arts1 which to a general glance1 or even to a more intimate view1 presents a confusion of differences that seems overwhelming1 to a system nevertheless clearly harmonious1--founded1 that is to say1 upon universal principles which control all differences by explaining them1 and which therefore1 in the last resort1 themselves flow lucidly from a single supreme principle4 ,simply to state this meaning of the task set us1 is enough to awaken the doubt of its practicability4 ,this doubt1 we are bound to confess1 has more and more impressed itself upon the general mind1 the farther this has advanced in the experience of scientific discovery4 ,the very increase in the multiplicity and complexity of facts and their causal groupings increases the feeling that at the root of things there is a final inexplicability--total reality seems1 more and more1 too vast1 too profound1 for us to grasp or to fathom4 ,and yet1 strangely enough1 this increasing sense of mysterious vastness has not in the least prevented the modern mind from more and more asserting1 with a steadily increasing insistence1 the essential and unchangeable unity of that whole of things which to our ordinary experience1 and even to all our sciences1 appears such an endless and impenetrable complex of differences1--yes1 of contradictions4 ,in fact1 this assertion of the unity of all things1 under the favorite name of the ,unity of ,nature1 is the pet dogma of modern science2 or1 rather1 to speak with right accuracy1 it is the stock-in-trade of a philosophy of science1 current among many of the leaders of modern science2 for every such assertion1 covering1 as it tacitly and unavoidably does1 a view about the absolute whole1 is an assertion belonging to the province of philosophy1 before whose tribunal it must come for the assessment of its value4 ,the presuppositions of all the special sciences1 and1 above all1 this presupposition of the ,unity and ,uniformity of ,nature1 common to all of them1 must thus come back for justification and requisite definition to philosophy--that uppermost and all-inclusive form of cognition which addresses itself to the whole as whole4 ,in their common assertion of the ,unity of ,nature1 the exponents of modern science come unawares out of their own province into quite another and a higher2 and in doing so they show how unawares they come1 by presenting in most instances the curious spectacle of proclaiming at once their increasing belief in the unity of things1 and their increasing disbelief in its penetrability by our intelligence3-- ,in's ,innere der ,natur1 ,dringt kein erschaffner ,geist1 is their chosen poet's expression of their philosophic mood4 ,curious we have the right to call this state of the scientific mind1 because it is to critical reflection so certainly self-contradictory4 ,how can there be a real unity belonging to what is inscrutable8--what evidence of unity can there be1 except in intelligible and explanatory continuity8 ,but1 at all events1 this very mood of agnostic self-contradiction1 into which the development of the sciences casts such a multitude of minds1 brings them1--brings all of us1--as already indicated1 into that court of philosophy where alone such issues lawfully belong1 and where alone they can be adjudicated4 ,if the unification of the sciences can be made out to be real by making out its sole sufficient condition1 namely1 that there is a genuine1 and not a merely nominal1 unity in the whole of reality itself1--a unity that explains because it is itself1 not simply intelligible1 but the only completely intelligible of things1--this desirable result must be the work of philosophy4 ,however difficult the task may be1 it is rightly put upon us who belong to the ,department listed first among the twenty-four in the programme of this representative ,congress4 ,i cannot but express my own satisfaction1 as a member of this ,department1 nor fail to extend my congratulations to you who are my colleagues in it1 that the ,congress1 in its programme1 takes openly the affirmative on this question of the possible unification of knowledge4 ,the ,congress has thus declared beforehand for the practicability of the task it sets4 ,it has even declared for its not distant accomplishment2 indeed1 not impossibly1 its accomplishment through the transactions of the ,congress itself2 and it indicates1 by no uncertain signs1 the leading1 the determining part that philosophy must have in the achievement4 ,in fact1 the authorities of the ,congress themselves suggest a solution of their own for their problem4 ,in their programme we see a renewed ,hierarchy of the ,sciences1 and at the summit of this appears now again1 after so long a period of humiliating obscuration1 the figure of ,philosophy1 raised anew to that supremacy1 as ,queen of the ,sciences1 which had been hers from the days of ,plato to those of ,copernicus1 but which she began to lose when modern physical and historical research entered upon its course of sudden development1 and which1 until recently1 she has continued more and more to lose as the sciences have advanced in their career of discoveries1--ever more unexpected1 more astonishing1 yet more convincing and more helpful to the welfare of mankind4 ,may this sign of her recovered empire not fail6 ,if we rejoice at the token1 the ,congress has made it our part to see that the title is vindicated4 ,it is ours to show this normative function of philosophy1 this power to reign as the unifying discipline in the entire realm of our possible knowledge2 to show it by showing that the very nature of philosophy--its elemental concepts and its directing ideals1 its methods taken in their systematic succession--is such as must result in a view of universal reality that will supply the principle at once giving rise to all the sciences and connecting them all into one harmonious whole4 ,such1 and so grave1 my honored colleagues1 is the duty assigned to this hour4 ,sincerely can ,i say1 ,would it had fallen to stronger hands than mine6 ,but since to mine it has been committed1 ,i will undertake it in no disheartened spirit2 rather1 in that temper of animated hope in which the whole ,congress has been conceived and planned4 ,and ,i draw encouragement from the place1 and its associations1 where we are assembled--from its historic connections not only with the external expansion of our country1 but with its growth in culture1 and especially with its growth in the cultivation of philosophy4 ,for your speaker1 at least1 can never forget that here in ,st4 ,louis1 the metropolis of the region by which our national domain was in the ,louisiana ,purchase so enlarged1--here was the centre of a movement in philosophic study that has proved to be of national import4 ,it is fitting that we all1 here to-day1 near to the scene itself1 commemorate the public service done by our present ,national ,commissioner of ,education and his group of enthusiastic associates1 in beginning here1 in the middle years of the preceding century1 those studies of ,kant and his great idealistic successors that unexpectedly became the nucleus of a wider and more penetrating study of philosophy in all parts of our country4 ,it is with quickened memories belonging to the spot where1 more than five-and-thirty years ago1 it was my happy fortune to take some part with ,dr4 ,harris and his companions1 that ,i begin the task assigned me4 ,the undertaking seems less hopeless when ,i can here recall the names and the congenial labors of ,harris1 of ,davidson1 of ,brockmeyer1 of ,snider1 of ,watters1 of ,jones1--half of them now gone from life4 ,they builded better than they knew2 and1 humbly as they may themselves have estimated their ingenuous efforts to gain acquaintance with the greatest thoughts1 history will not fail to take note of what they did1 as marking one of the turning-points in the culture of our nation4 ,the publication of the ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy1 granting all the subtractions claimed by its critics on the score of defects 7of which its conductors were perhaps only too sensible71 was an influence that told in all our circles of philosophical study1 and thence in the whole of our social as well as our academic life4 99 99 99 99 99 ,here ,i enter upon the discussion of the subject proper1 beginning1 as above indicated1 with the ,fundamental ,conceptions4 ,having followed these through the contrasts ,whole and ,part1 ,subject and ,object1 ,reality and ,appearance 7or ,noumenon and ,phenomenon71 and developed the bearing of these on the procedure of thought from the dualism of natural realism to materialism and thence to idealism1 with the issue now coming on1 in this last1 between monism and pluralism1 ,i strike into the contrast ,cause and ,effect1 and1 noting its unfolding into the more comprehensive form of ,ground and ,consequence1 go on thence as follows3 99 99 99 99 99 ,it is plain that the contrast ,ground and ,consequence will enable us to state the new issue with closer precision and pertinence than ,reality and ,appearance1 ,noumenon and ,phenomenon1 can supply2 while1 at the same time1 ,ground and ,consequence exhibits ,cause and ,effect as presenting a contrast that only fulfills what ,noumenon and ,phenomenon foretold and strove towards2 in fact1 what was more remotely1 but not less surely1 also indicated by ,whole and ,part1 ,knowing and ,being1 ,subject and ,object4 ,for in penetrating to the coherent meaning of these conceptions1 the philosophic movement1 as we saw1 advanced steadily to the fuller and fuller translating of each of them into the reality that unifies by explanation1 instead of pretending to explain by merely unifying2 and this1 of course1 will now be put forward explicitly1 in the clarified category of ,cause and ,effect1 transfigured from a physical into a purely logical relation4 ,what idealism now says1 in terms of this1 is that the ,cause 7or1 as we now read it1 the ,ground7 of all that exists is the ,subject2 is ,mind1 the intelligently ,self-conscious2 and that all things else1 the mere objects1 material things1 are its ,consequence1 its ,outcome1--in that sense its ,effect4 ,and what the new pluralistic idealism says1 is that the assemblage of individual minds--intelligence being essentially personal and individual1 and never merely universal and collective--is the true total ,cause of all1 and that every mind thus belongs to the order of ,first ,causes2 nevertheless1 that part1 and the most significant part1 of the nature of every mind1 essential to its personality and its reason1 is its recognition of other minds in the very act of its own self-definition4 ,that is to say1 a mind by its spontaneous nature as intelligence1 by its intrinsic rational or logical genius1 puts itself as member of a system of minds2 all minds are put by each other as ,ends--completely standard and sacred ,objects1 as much parts of the system of true ,causes as each is1 in its capacity of ,subject2 and we have a noumenal ,reality that is properly to be described as the eternal ,federal ,republic of ,spirits4 ,consequently1 the relation of ,cause and ,effect now expands and heightens into a system of the ,,reciprocity ,,of ,,first ,,causes2 causes1 that is1 which1 while all coefficients in the existence and explanation of that natural world of experience which forms their passive effect1 their objects of mere perception1 are themselves related only in the higher way of ,final ,causes--that is1 ,defining-,bases and ,ends--of each other1 making them the logical ,complements1 and the ,objects of conduct1 all for each1 and each for all4 ,hence1 the system of causation undergoes a signal transformation1 and proves to be organized by ,final ,cause as its basis and root1 instead of by ,efficient ,cause1 or ,originating ,ground1 as the earlier stages of thinking had always assumed4 ,the causal relation between the absolute or primary realities being purely ,final1 or ,defining and ,purposive2 that is to say1 the uncoercive influence of recognition and ideality2 all the other forms of cause1 as grouped by ,aristotle1--,material1 ,formal1 and ,efficient1--are seen to be the derivatives of ,final ,cause1 as being supplied by the action of the minds that1 as absolute or underived realities1 exist only in the relation of mutual ,complements and ,ends4 ,accordingly1 ,efficient ,cause operates only from minds1 as noumena1 to matter1 as their phenomenon1 their presented contents of experience2 or1 in a secondary and derivative sense1 from one phenomenon to another1 or from one group of phenomena to another group1 these playing the part of transmitters1 or 7as some logicians would say7 ,instrumental ,causes1 or ,means4 ,cause1 as ,material1 is hence defined as the elementary phenomenon1 and the combinations of this2 and therefore1 strictly taken1 is merely ,effect 7or ,outcome7 of the self-active consciousness1 whose spontaneous forms of conception and perception become the ,formal ,cause that organizes the sum of phenomena into cosmic harmony or unity4 ,here1 accordingly1 comes into view the further and in some respects deeper conceptual pair1 ,many and ,one4 ,the history of philosophic thought proves that this antithesis is darkly obscure and deeply ambiguous2 for about it have centred a large part of the conflicts of doctrine4 ,this pair has already been used1 implicitly1 in exhibiting the development of the preceding group1 ,cause and ,effect2 and in so using it we have supplied ourselves with a partial clarification of it1 and with one possible solution of its ambiguity4 ,we have seen1 namely1 how our strong natural persuasion that philosophy guided by the fundamental concept ,cause must become the search for the ,one amid the wilderness of the ,many1 and that this search cannot be satisfied and ended except in an all-inclusive ,unit1 in which the ,many is embraced as the integral and originated parts1 completely determined1 subjected1 and controlled1 may give way to another and less oppressive conception of unity2 a conception of it as the harmony among many free and independent primary realities1 a harmony founded on their intelligent and reasonable mutual recognition4 ,this conception casts at least some clearing light upon the long and dreary disputes over the ,many and the ,one2 for it exposes1 plainly1 the main source of them4 ,they have arisen out of two chief ambiguities1--the ambiguity of the concept ,one1 and the ambiguity of the concept ,cause in its supreme meaning4 ,the normal contrast between the ,one and the ,many is a clear and simple contrast3 the ,one is the single unit1 and the ,many is the repetition of the unit1 or is the collection of the several units4 ,but if we go on to suppose that there is a collection or sum of all possible units1 and call this the ,whole1 then1 since there can be no second such1 we call it also one 7or the ,one1 by way of preminence71 overlooking the fact that it differs from the simple one1 or unit1 in genere2 that it is in fact not a unit at all1 not an elementary member of a series1 but the annulment of all series2 that our name one has profoundly changed its meaning1 and now stands for the ,sole1 the ,only4 ,thus1 by our forgetfulness of differences1 we fall into deep water1 and1 with the confused illusions of the drowning1 dream of the ,one and ,all as the single punctum originationis of all things1 the ,source and ,begetter of the very units of which it is in reality only the resultant and the derivative4 ,or1 from another point of view1 and in another mood1 we rightly enough take the ,one to mean the coherent1 the intelligible1 the consistent1 the harmonious2 and putting the ,many1 on the misleading hint of its contrast to the unit1 in antithesis to this ,one of harmony1 we fall into the belief that the ,many cannot be harmonious1 is intrinsically a cluster of repulsions or of collisions1 incapable of giving rise to accord2 indeed1 essentially hostile to it4 ,so1 as accord is the aim and the essence of our reason1 we are caught in the snare of monism1 pluralism having apparently become the equivalent of chaos1 and thus the bte noir of rational metaphysics4 ,nay1 in the opposed camp itself1 some of the most ardent adherents of pluralism1 the liveliest of wit1 the most exuberant in literary resources1 are the abjectest believers in the hopeless disjunction and capriciousness of the plural1 and hold there is a rift in the texture of reality that no intelligence1 even though you dub it 'the ,absolute1' can mend or reach across4 ,yet surely there is nothing in the ,many1 as a sum of units1 the least at war with the ,one as a system of harmony4 ,on the contrary1 even in the pure form of the ,number ,series1 the ,many is impossible except on the principle of harmony1--the units can be collected and summed 7that is1 constitute the ,many71 only if they cohere in a community of intrinsic kindred4 ,consequently the whole question of the chaotic or the harmonic nature of a plural world turns on the nature of the genus which we find characteristic of the absolutely 7i4 e41 the unreservedly7 real1 and which is to be taken as the common denomination enabling us to count them and to sum them4 ,when minds are seen to be necessarily the primary realities1 but also necessarily federal as well as individual1 the illusion about the essential disjunction and non-coherence of the plurally real dissolves away1 and a primordial world of manifold persons is seen to involve no fundamental or hopeless anarchy of individualism1 irreducible in caprice1 but an indwelling principle of harmony1 rather1 that from the springs of individual being intends the control and composure of all the disorders that mark the world of experiential appearance1 and so must tend perpetually to effect this4 ,the other main source of our confusions over the ,many and the ,one is the variety of meaning hidden in the concept ,cause1 and our propensity to take its most obvious but least significant sense for its supreme intent4 ,closest at hand1 in experience1 is our productive causation of changes in our sense-world1 and hence most obvious is that reading of ,cause which takes it as the producer of changes and1 with a deeper comprehension of it1 of the inalterable linkage between changes1 whereby one follows regularly and surely upon another4 ,thus what we have in philosophy agreed to call ,efficient ,cause comes to be mistaken for the profoundest and the supreme form of cause1 and all the other modes of cause1 the ,material 7or ,stuff71 the ,form 7or ,conception71 and the ,end 7or ,purpose71 its consequent and derivative auxiliaries4 ,under the influence of this strong impression1 we either assume total reality to be ,one ,whole1 all-embracing and all-producing of its manifold modes1 or else view it as a duality1 consisting of ,one ,creator and his manifold creatures4 ,so it has come about that metaphysics has hitherto been chiefly a contention between pantheism and monotheism1 or1 as the latter should for greater accuracy be called1 monarchotheism2 and1 it must be acknowledged1 this struggle has been attended by a continued 7though not continual7 decline of this later dualistic theory before the steadfast front and unyielding advance of the older monism4 ,thus persistent has been the assumption that harmony can only be assured by the unity given in some single productive causation3 the only serious uncertainty has been about the most rational way of conceiving the operation of this ,sole ,cause2 and this doubt has thus far1 on the whole1 declined in favor of the ,elder ,oriental or monistic conception1 as against the ,hebraic conception of extraneous creation by fiat4 ,the frankly confessed mystery of the latter1 its open appeal to miracle1 places it at a fatal disadvantage with the ,elder ,orientalism1 when the appeal is to reason and intelligibility4 ,it is therefore no occasion for wonder that1 especially since the rise of the scientific doctrine of ,evolution1 with its postulate of a universal unity1 self-varying yet self-fulfilling1 even the leaders of theology are more and more falling into the monistic line and swelling the ever-growing ranks of pantheism4 ,if it be asked here1 ,and why not8--where is the harm of it8--is not the whole question simply of what is true8 the answer is1 ,the mortal harm of the destruction of personality1 which lives or dies with the preservation or destruction of individual responsibility2 while the completer truth is1 that there are other and profounder 7or1 if you please1 higher7 truths than this of explanation by ,efficient ,cause4 ,in fact1 there is a higher conception of ,cause itself than this of production1 or efficiency2 for1 of course1 as we well might say1 that alone can be the supreme conception of ,cause which can subsist between absolute or unreserved realities1 and such must exclude their production or their necessitating control by others4 ,so that we ought long since to have realized that ,final ,cause1 the recognized presence to each other as unconditioned realities1 or ,defining ,auxiliaries and ,ends1 is the sole causal relation that can hold among primary realities2 though among such it can hold1 and in fact must4 ,for the absolute reality of personal intelligences1 at once individual and universally recognizant of others1 is called for by other conceptions fundamental to philosophy4 ,these other fundamental concepts can no more be counted out or ignored than those we have hitherto considered2 and when we take them up1 we shall see how vastly more significant they are4 ,they alone will prove supreme1 truly organizing1 normative2 they alone can introduce gradation in truths1 for they alone introduce the judgment of worth1 of valuation2 they alone can give us counsels of perfection1 for they alone rise from those elements in our being which deal with ideals and with veritable ,ideas4 ,so let us proceed to them4 99 99 99 99 99 ,our path into their presence1 however1 is through another pair1 not so plainly antithetic as those we have thus far considered4 ,this pair that ,i now mean is ,time and ,space1 which1 though not obviously antinomic1 yet owes its existence1 as can now be shown1 to that profoundest of concept-contrasts which we earlier considered under the head of ,subject and ,object1 when the ,object takes on its only adequate form of ,other ,subject4 ,but in passing from the contrast ,one and ,many towards its rational transformation into the moral society of ,mind and ,companion ,minds1 we break into this pair of ,time and ,space1 and must make our way through it by taking in its full meaning4 ,time and ,space play an enormous part in all our empirical thinking1 our actual use of thought in our sense-perceptive life4 ,and no wonder2 for1 in coperation1 they form the postulate and condition of all our possible sensuous consciousness4 ,only on them as backgrounds can thought take on the peculiar clearness of an image or a picture2 only on the screens which they supply can we literally depict an object4 ,and this clarity of outline and boundary is so dear to our ordinary consciousness1 that we are prone to say there is no sufficient1 no real clearness1 unless we can clarify by the bounds either of place or of date1 or of both4 ,in this mood1 we are led to deny the reality and validity of thought altogether1 when it cannot be defined in the metes and bounds afforded by ,time or by ,space3 that which has no date nor place1 we say1--no extent and no duration1--cannot be real2 it is but a pseudo-thought1 a pretense and a delusion4 ,here is the extremely plausible foundation of the philosophy known as sensationism1 the refined or second-thought form of materialism1 in which it begins its euthanasia into idealism4 ,without delaying here to criticise this1 let us notice the part that ,time and ,space play in reference to the conceptual pair we last considered1 the ,one and the ,many2 for not otherwise shall we find our way beyond them to the still more fundamental conceptions which we are now aiming to reach4 ,indeed1 it is through our surface-apprehension of the pair ,one and ,many1 as this illumines experience1 that we most naturally come at the pair ,time and ,space2 so that these are at first taken for mere generalizations and abstractions1 the purely nominal representatives of the actual distinctions between the members of the ,many by our sense perception of this from that1 of here from there1 of now from then4 ,it is not till our reflective attention is fixed on the fact that there and here1 now and then1 are peculiar distinctions1 wholly different from other contrasts of this with that1--which may be made in all sorts of ways1 by difference of quality1 or of quantity1 or of relations quite other than place and date1--it is not till we realize this peculiar character of the ,time-contrast and the ,space-contrast1 that we see these singular differential qualia cannot be derived from others1 not even from the contrast ,one and ,many1 but are independent1 are themselves underived and spontaneous utterances of our intelligent1 our percipient nature4 ,but when ,kant first helped mankind to the realization of this spontaneous 7or a priori7 character of this pair of perceptive conditions1 or ,sense-,forms1 he fell into the persuasion1 and led the philosophic world into it1 that though ,time and ,space are not derivatives of the ,one and the ,many read as the numerical aspect of our perceptive experiences1 yet there is between the two pairs a connection of dependence as intimate as that first supposed1 but in exactly the opposite sense2 namely1 that the ,one and the ,many are conditioned by ,time and ,space1 or1 when it comes to the last resort1 are at any rate completely dependent upon ,time4 ,by a series of units1 this view means1 we really understand a set of items discriminated and related either as points or as instants3 in the last analysis1 as instants3 that is1 it is impossible to apprehend a unit1 or to count and sum units1 unless the unit is taken as an instant1 and the units as so many instants4 ,numbers1 ,kant holds1 are no doubt pure 7or quite unsensuous7 percepts1--discerned particulars1--therefore spontaneous products of the mind a priori1 but made possible only by the primary pure percept ,time1 or1 again1 through the mediation of this1 by the conjoined pure percept ,space2 so that the numbers1 in their own pure character1 are simply the instants in their series4 ,as the instants1 and therefore the numbers1 are pure percepts1--particulars discerned without the help of sense1--so pure percepts1 in a primal and comprehensive sense1 argues ,kant1 must their conditioning postulates ,time and ,space be1 to supply the element1 or medium1 that will render such pure percepts possible4 ,this doctrine of ,kant's is certainly plausible2 indeed1 it is impressively so2 and it has taken a vast hold in the world of science1 and has reinforced the popular belief in the unreality of thought apart from ,time and ,space2 an unreality which it is an essential part of ,kant's system to establish critically4 ,but as a graver result1 it has certainly tended to discredit the belief in personal identity as an abiding and immutable reality1 enthroned over the mutations of things in ,time and ,space2 since all that is in these is numbered and is mutable1 and is rather many than one1 yet nothing is believed real except as it falls under them1 at any rate under ,time4 ,and with this decline of the belief in a changeless self1 has declined1 almost as rapidly and extensively1 the belief in immortality4 ,or1 rather1 the permanence and the identity of the person has faded into a question regarded as unanswerable2 though none the less does this agnostic state of belief tend to take personality1 in any responsible sense of the word1 out of the region of practical concern4 ,with what is unknowable1 even if existing1 we can have no active traffic2 't is for our conduct as if it were not4 ,so it behooves us to search if this prevalent view about the relation of ,one and ,many to ,time and ,space is trustworthy and exact4 ,what place and function in philosophy must ,space and ,time be given8--for they certainly have a place and function2 they certainly are among the inexpugnable conceptions with which thought has to concern itself when it undertakes to gain a view of the whole4 ,but it may be easy to give them a larger place and function than belong to them by right4 ,is it true1 then1 that the ,one and the ,many--that the system of ,numbers1 in short--are unthinkable except as in ,space and ,time1 or1 at any rate1 in ,time8 ,or1 to put the question more exactly1 as well as more gravely and more pertinently1 ,are ,space and ,time the true principia individui1 and is ,time preminently the ultimate principium individuationis8 ,is there accordingly no individuality1 and no society1 no associative assemblage1 except in the fleeting world of phenomena1 dated and placed8 ,simply to ask the question1 and thus bring out the full drift of this ,kantian doctrine1 is almost to expose the absurdity of it4 ,such a doctrine1 though it may be wisely refusing to confound personality1 true individuality1 with the mere logical singular2 nay1 worse1 with a limited and special illustration of the singular1 the one here or the one there1 the one now or the one then2 nevertheless1 by confining numerability to things material and sensible1 makes personal identity something unmeaning or impossible1 and destroys part of the foundation for the relations of moral responsibility4 ,though the vital trait of the person1 his genuine individuality1 doubtless lies1 not in his being exactly numerable1 but in his being aboriginal and originative2 in a word1 in his self-activity1 in his being a centre of autonomous social recognition2 yet exactly numerable he indeed is1 and must be1 not confusable with any other1 else his professed autonomy1 his claim of rights and his sense of duty1 can have no significance1 must vanish in the universal confusion belonging to the indefinite4 ,nor1 on the other hand1 is it at all true that a number has to be a point or an instant1 nor that things when numbered and counted are implicitly pinned upon points or1 at all events1 upon instants4 ,it may well enough be the fact that in our empirical use of number we have to employ ,time1 or even ,space1 but it is a gaping non sequitur to conclude that we therefore can count nothing but the placed and the dated4 ,certainly we count whenever we distinguish1--by whatever means1 on whatever ground4 ,to think is1 in general1 at least to distinguish the things that differ2 but this will not avail except we keep account of the differences2 hence the ,one and the ,many lie in the very bosom of intelligence1 and this fundamental and spontaneous contrast can not only rive ,time and ,space into expressions of it1 in instants and in points1 but travels with thought from its start to its goal1 and as organic factor in mathematical science does indeed1 as ,plato in the ,republic said1 deal with absolute being1 if yet dreamwise2 so that ,one and ,many1 and ,many as the sum of the ones1 makes part of the measure of that primally real world which the world of minds alone can be4 ,if the contrast ,one and ,many can pass the bounds of the merely phenomenal1 by passing the temporal and the spatial2 if it applies to universal being1 to the noumenal as well as to the phenomenal2 then the absolutely real world1 so far as concerns this essential condition1 can be a world of genuine individuals1 identifiable1 free1 abiding1 responsible1 and there can be a real moral order2 if not1 then there can be no such moral world1 and the deeper thought-conceptions to which we now approach must be regarded1 at the best1 as fair illusions1 bare ideals1 which the serious devotee of truth must shun1 except in such moments of vacancy and leisure as he may venture to surrender1 at intervals1 to purely hedonic uses4 ,but if the ,one and the ,many are not dependent on ,time and ,space1 their universal validity is possible2 and it has already been shown that they are not so dependent1 are not thus restricted4 ,and now it remains to show their actual universality1 by exhibiting their place in the structure of the absolutely real2 since nobody calls in question their pertinence to the world of phenomena4 ,but their noumenal applicability follows from their essential implication with all and every difference3 no difference1 no distinction1 that does not carry counting2 and this is quite as true as that there can be no counting without difference4 ,the ,one and the ,many thus root in ,identity and ,difference1 pass up into fuller expression in ,universal and ,particular1 hold forward into ,cause and ,effect1 attain their commanding presentation in the ,reciprocity of ,first ,causes1 and so keep record of the contrast between ,necessity and ,contingency4 ,in short1 they are founded in1 and in their turn help 7indispensably7 to express1 all the categories1--,quality1 ,quantity1 ,relation1 ,modality4 ,nor do they suffer arrest there2 they hold in the ideals1 the ,true1 the ,beautiful1 the ,good1 and in the primary ,ideas1 the ,self1 the ,world1 and ,god4 ,for all of these differ1 however close their logical linkage may be2 and in so far as they differ1 each of them is a counted unit1 and so they are many4 ,and1 most profoundly of all1 ,one and ,many take footing in absolute reality so soon as we realize that nothing short of intelligent being can be primordially real1 underived1 and truly causal1 and that intelligence is1 by its idea1 at once an ,i-thinking and a universal recognizant outlook upon others that think ,i4 ,hence ,number1 so far from being the derivative of ,time and ,space1 founds1 at the bottom1 in the self-definition and social recognition of intelligent beings1 and so finds a priori a valid expression in ,time and in ,space1 as well as in every other primitive and spontaneous form in which intelligence utters itself4 ,the ,pythagorean doctrine of the rank of ,number in the scale of realities is only one remove from the truth3 though the numbers are indeed not the ,prime ,beings1 they do enter into the essential nature of the ,prime ,beings2 are1 so to speak1 the organ of their definite reality and identity1 and for that reason go forward into the entire defining procedure by which these intelligences organize their world of experiences4 ,and the popular impression that ,time and ,space are derivatives from ,number1 is in one aspect the truth1 rather than the doctrine of ,kant is2 for though they are not mere generalizations and abstractions from numbered dates and durations1 places and extents1 they do exist as relating-principles which minds simply put1 as the conditions of perceptive experiences2 which by the nature of intelligence they must number in order to have and to master2 while ,number itself1 the contrast of ,one and ,many1 enters into the very being of minds1 and therefore still holds in ,time and in ,space1 which are the organs1 or media1 not of the whole being of the mind1 but only of that region of it constituted by sensation1--the material1 the disjunct1 the empirical4 ,besides1 the logical priority of ,number is implied in the fact that minds in putting ,time and ,space a priori must count them as two1 since they discriminate them with complete clearness1 so that it is impossible to work up ,space out of ,time 7as ,berkeley and ,stuart ,mill so adroitly1 but so vainly1 attempted to do71 or ,time out of ,space 7as ,hegel1 with so little adroitness and such patent failure1 attempted to do74 ,no2 there ,time and ,space stand1 fixed and inconfusable1 incapable of mutual transmutation1 and thus the ground of an abiding difference between the inner or psychic sense-world and the outer or physical1 between the subjective and the 7sensibly7 objective4 ,by means of them1 the world of minds discerns and bounds securely between the privacy of each and the publicity1 the life out of doors1 which is common to all2 between the cohering isolation of the individual and the communicating action of the society4 ,indeed1 as from this attained point of view we can now clearly see1 the real ground of the difference between ,time and ,space1 and hence between subjective perception and the objective existence of physical things1 is in the fact that a mind1 in being such1--in its very act of self-definition1--correlates itself with a society of minds1 and so1 to fulfill its nature1 in so far as this includes a world of experiences1 must form its experience socially as well as privately1 and hence will put forth a condition of sensuous communication1 as well as a condition of inner sensation4 ,thus the dualization of the sense-world into inner and outer1 psychic and physical1 subjective and objective1 rests at last on the intrinsically social nature of conscious being2 rests on the twofold structure1 logically dichotomous1 of the self-defining act2 and we get the explanation1 from the nature of intelligence as such1 why the ,sense-,forms are necessarily two1 and only two4 ,it is no accident that we experience all things sensible in ,time or in ,space1 or in both together2 it is the natural expression of our primally intelligent being1 concerned as that is1 directly and only1 with our self and its logically necessary complement1 the other selves2 and so the natural order1 in its two discriminated but complemental portions1 the inner and the outer1 is founded in that moral order which is given in the fundamental act of our intelligence4 ,it is this resting of ,space upon our veritable ,objects1 the ,other ,subjects1 that imparts to it its externalizing quality1 so that things in it are referred to the testing of all minds1 not to ours only1 and are reckoned external because measured by that which is alone indeed other than we4 ,in this way we may burst the restricting limit which so much of philosophy1 and so much more of ordinary opinion1 has drawn about our mental powers in view of this contrast ,time and ,space1 especially with reference to the ,one and the ,many1 and to the persuasion that plural distinctions1 at any rate1 cannot belong in the region of absolute reality4 ,ordinary opinion either inclines to support a philosophy that is skeptical of either ,unity or ,plurality being pertinent beyond ,time and ,space1 and thus to hold by agnosticism1 or1 if it affects affirmative metaphysics1 tends to prefer monism to pluralism1 when the number-category is carried up into immutable regions3 to represent the absolutely real as ,one1 somehow seems less contradictory of the fitness of things than to represent it as ,many2 moreover1 carrying the ,many into that supreme region1 by implying the belonging there of mortals such as we1 seems shocking to customary piety1 and full of extravagant presumption4 ,still1 nothing short of this can really satisfy our deep demand for a moral order1 a personal responsibility1 nay1 an adequate logical fulfillment of our conception of a self as an intelligence2 while the clarification which a rational pluralism supplies for such ingrained puzzles in the theory of knowledge as that of the source and finality of the contrast ,time and ,space1 to mention no others1 should afford a strong corroborative evidence in its behalf4 ,and1 as already said1 this view enables us to pass the limit which ,time and ,space are so often supposed to put1 hopelessly1 upon our concepts of the ideal grade1 the springs of all our aspiration4 ,to these1 then1 we may now pass4 99 99 99 99 99 ,we reach them through the doorways of the ,necessary vs4 the ,contingent1 the ,unconditioned vs4 the ,conditioned1 the ,infinite vs4 the ,finite1 the ,absolute vs4 the ,relative2 and we recognize them as our profoundest foundation-concepts1 alone deserving1 as ,kant so pertinently said1 the name of ,,ideas1--the ,soul1 the ,world1 and ,god4 ,associated with them are what we may call our three ,forms of the ,ideal1--the ,true1 the ,beautiful1 the ,good4 ,these ,ideas and their affiliated ideals have the highest directive and settling function in the organization of philosophy2 they determine its schools and its history1 by forming the centre of all its controlling problems2 they prescribe its great subdivisions1 breaking it up into ,metaphysics1 sthetics1 and ,ethics1 and ,metaphysics1 again1 into ,psychology ,cosmology1 and ,ontology1--or ,theology in the classic sense1 which1 in the modern sense1 becomes the ,philosophy of ,religion2 they call into existence1 as essential preparatory and auxiliary disciplines1 ,logic and the ,theory of ,knowledge1 or ,epistemology4 ,they thus provide the true distinctions between philosophy and the sciences of experience1 and present these sciences as the carrying out1 upon experiential details1 of the methodological principles which philosophy alone can supply2 hence they lead us to view all the sciences as in fact the applied branches1 the completing organs of philosophy1 instead of its hostile competitors4 ,as for the controlling questions which they start1 these are such as follow3 ,are the ideals but bare ideals1 serving only to cast a light that never was1 on land or sea8--are the ,ideas only bare ideas1 without any objective being of their own1 without any footing in the real1 serving only to enhance the dull facts of experience with auroral illusions8 ,the philosophic thinker answers affirmatively1 or with complete skeptical dubiety1 or with a convinced and uplifting negative1 according to his less or greater penetration into the real meaning of these deepest concepts1 and depending on his view into the nature and thought-effect of the ,necessary and the ,contingent1 the ,unconditioned and the ,conditioned1 the ,infinite and the ,finite1 the ,absolute and the ,relative4 ,and what1 now1 are the accurate1 the adequate meanings of the three ,ideas8--what does our profoundest thought intend by the ,soul1 by the ,world1 by ,god8 ,we know how ,kant construed them1 in consequence of the course by which he came critically 7as he supposed7 upon them1--as respectively the paramount ,subject of experiences2 the paramount ,object of experiences1 or the ,causal ,unity of the possible series of sensible objects2 and the complete ,totality of ,conditions for experience and its objects1 itself therefore the ,unconditioned4 ,it is worth our notice1 that especially by his construing the idea of ,god in this way1 thus rehabilitating the classical and scholastic conception of ,god as the ,sum of all ,realities1 he laid the foundation for that very transfiguration of mysticism1 that idealistic monism1 which he himself repudiated1 but which his three noted successors in their several ways so ardently accepted1 and which has since so pervaded the philosophic world4 ,but suppose ,kant's alleged critical analysis of the three ,ideas and their logical basis is in fact far from critical1 far from exactly discriminative1--and ,i believe there is the clearest warrant for declaring that it is1--then the assumed undeniable critical basis for idealistic monism will be dislodged1 and it will be open to us to interpret the ,ideas with accuracy and consistency--an interpretation which may prove to establish1 not at all any monism1 but a rational pluralism4 ,and this will also reveal to us1 ,i think1 that our prevalent construing of the ,unconditioned and the ,conditioned1 the ,necessary and the ,contingent1 the ,infinite and the ,finite1 the ,absolute and the ,relative1 suffers from an equal inaccuracy of analysis1 and precisely for this reason gives a plausible but in fact untrustworthy support to the monistic interpretation of ,god1 and ,soul1 and ,world2 or1 as ,hegel and his chief adherents prefer to name them1 ,god1 ,mind1 and ,nature4 ,if the ,kantian analysis stands1 then it seems to follow1 clearly enough1 that ,god is the ,inclusive ,unit which at once embraces ,mind and ,nature1 ,soul and ,world1 expresses itself in them1 and imparts to them their meaning2 and the plain dictate then is1 that ,kant's personal prejudice1 and the personal prejudices of others like him1 in favor of a transcendent ,god1 must give way to that conception of the ,divine1 as immanent and inclusive1 which is alone consistent with its being indeed the ,totality of ,conditions1--the ,necessary ,postulate1 and the ,sufficient ,reason1 for both ,subject and ,object4 ,but will ,kant's analysis stand8 ,have we not here another of his few but fatal slips1--like his doctrine of the dependence of ,number upon ,time and ,space1 and its consequent subjection to them8 ,it surely seems so4 ,if the veritable postulate of categorical syllogizing be1 as ,kant thinks it is1 merely the ,subject1 the self as experiencer of presented phenomena1 in contrast to the ,object1 the causally united sum of possible phenomena2 and if the true postulate of conditional syllogizing is this cosmic ,object1 as contrasted with the correlate ,subject1 then it would seem we cannot avoid certain pertinent questions4 ,is such a postulate ,subject any fit and adequate account of the whole ,self1 of the ,soul8--is there not a vital difference between this subject-self and the ,self as ,person8--does not ,kant himself imply so1 in his doctrine of the primacy of the ,practical ,reason8 ,again3 ,is not the ,world1 as explained in ,kant's analysis1 and as afterwards made by him the solution of the ,cosmological ,antinomies1 simply the supplemental factor necessarily correlate to the subjective aspect of the conscious life1 and reduced from its uncritical rle of thing-in-itself to the intelligible subordination required by ,kant's theory of ,transcendental ,idealism8--and can this be any adequate account of the ,idea that is to stand in sufficing contrast to the whole ,self1 the ,person8--what less than the ,society of ,persons can meet the ,world-,idea for that8 ,further3 ,if with ,kant we take the ,world to mean no more than this object-factor in self-consciousness1 must not the ,soul1 the total ,self1 from which1 according to ,kant's ,transcendental ,idealism1 both ,space and ,time issue1 supplying the basis for the immutable contrast between the experiencing subject and the really experienced objects1--must not this whole ,self be the real meaning of the ,totality of ,conditions1 itself unconditioned1 which comes into view as simply the postulate of disjunctive syllogizing8 ,how in the world can disjunctive syllogizing1 the confessed act of the ,i-thinking intelligence1 really postulate anything as ,totality of ,conditions1 in any other sense than the total of conditions for such syllogizing8--namely1 the conditioning ,i that organizes and does the reasoning8 ,there is surely no warrant for calling this total1 which simply transcends and conditions the subject and the object of sensible experiences1 by any loftier name than that which ,kant had already given it in the ,deduction of the ,categories1 when he designated it the originally synthetic unity of apperception 7self-consciousness71 or the ,i-thinking 7das ich-denke7 that must accompany all my mental presentations1--that is to say1 the whole ,self1 or thinking ,person1 idealistically interpreted4 ,the use of the name ,god in this connection1 where ,kant is in fact only seeking the roots of the three orders of the syllogism when reasoning has by supposition been restricted to the subject-matter of experience1 is assuredly without warrant2 yes1 without excuse4 ,in fact1 it is because ,kant sees that the third ,idea1 as reached through his analysis1 is intrinsically immanent1--resident in the self that syllogizes disjunctively1 and1 because so resident1 incapable of passing the bounds of possible experience1--while he also sees that the idea of ,god should mean a ,being transcendent of every other thinker1 himself a distinct individual consciousness1 though not an empirically limited one1--it is1 ,i say1 precisely because he sees all this1 that he pronounces the ,idea1 though named with the name of ,god1 utterly without pertinence to indicate ,god's existence1 and so enters upon that part of his ,transcendental ,dialectic which is1 in chief1 directed to exposing the transcendental illusion involved in the celebrated ,ontological ,proof4 ,consistently1 ,kant in this famous analytic of the syllogism should be talking1 not of the ,soul1 the ,world1 and ,god1 but of the ,subject 7as uniting-principle of its sense-perceptions71 the ,object 7as uniting-principle of all possible sense-percepts71 and the ,self 7the whole ,i presiding over experience in both its aspects1 as these are discriminated in ,time and ,space74 ,by what rational title--even granting for the sake of argument that they are the genuine postulates of categorical and of conditional syllogizing--can this ,subject and this ,object1 these correlate factors in the ,self1 rank as ,ideas with the ,idea of their conditioning ,whole--the ,self1 that in its still unaltered identity fulfills1 in ,practical ,reason1 the high rle of ,person8 ,if this no more than meets the standard of ,idea1 how can they meet it8 ,how can two somethings1 neither of which is the ,totality of ,conditions1 and both of which are therefore in fact conditioned1 deserve the same title with that which is intrinsically the ,totality of ,conditions1 and1 as such1 unconditioned8 ,to call the conditioned and the unconditioned alike ,ideas is a confounding of dignities that ,pure ,reason should not tolerate1 whether the procedure be read as a leveling down or a leveling up4 ,distributing the titles conferred by ,pure ,reason in this democratic fashion reminds us too much1 unhappily for ,kant1 of the ,cartesian performances with ,substance2 whereby ,god1 mind1 and matter became alike substances1 though only ,god could in truth be said to require nothing for his existence save himself1 while mind and matter1 though absolutely dependent on ,god1 and derivative from him1 were still to be called substances in the modified and ,pickwickian sense of being underived from each other4 ,but if ,kant's naming his third syllogistic postulate the ,idea of ,god is inconsequent upon his analysis2 or if1 when the analysis is made consequent by taking the third ,idea to mean the whole ,self1 the first and second postulates sink in conceptual rank1 so that they cannot with any pertinence be called ,ideas1 unless we are willing to keep the same name when its meaning must be changed in genere1--a procedure that can only encumber philosophy instead of clearing its way1--these difficulties do not close the account2 we shall find other curious things in this noted passage1 upon which part of the characteristic outcome of ,kant's philosophizing so much depends4 ,besides the misnaming of the third ,idea1 we have already had to question1 in view of the path by which he reaches it1 the fitness of his calling the first by the title of the ,soul2 and likewise1 though for other and higher reasons1 of his calling the second by the name of the ,world4 ,in fact1 it comes home to us that all of the ,ideas are1 in one way or another1 misnomers2 ,kant's whole procedure with them1 in fine1 has already appeared inexact1 inconsistent1 and therefore uncritical4 ,but now we shall become aware of certain other inconsistencies4 ,in coming to the ,subject1 as the postulate of categorical syllogizing1 ,kant1 you remember1 does so by the path of the relation ,subject and ,predicate1 arguing that the chain of categorical prosyllogisms has for its limiting concept and logical motor the notion of an absolute subject that cannot be a predicate2 and as no subject of a judgment can of itself give assurance of fulfilling this condition1 he concludes this motor-limit of judgment-subjects to be identical with the ,subject as thinker1 upon whom1 at the last1 all judgments depend1 and who1 therefore1 and who alone1 can never be a predicate merely4 ,in similar fashion1 he finds as the motor-limit of the series of conditional prosyllogisms1 which is governed by the relation ,cause and ,effect1 the notion of an absolute cause--a cause1 that is1 incapable of being an effect2 and this1 as undiscoverable in the chain of phenomenal causes1 which are all in turn effects1 he concludes is a pure ,idea1 the reason's native conception of a necessary linkage among all changes in ,space1 or of a ,cosmic ,unity among physical phenomena4 ,in both conceptions1 then1 whether of the unity of the ,subject or of the ,world1 we seem to have a case of the unconditioned1 as each1 surely1 is a totality of conditions3 the one1 for all possible syllogisms by ,subject and ,predicate2 the other1 for all possible syllogisms from ,cause and ,effect4 ,until it can be shown that the syllogisms of the first sort and the syllogisms of the second are both conditioned by the system of disjunctive syllogisms1 so that the ,idea alleged to be the totality of conditions for this system becomes the conditioning principle for both the others1 there appears to be no ground for contrasting the totality of conditions presented in it with those presented in the others1 as if it were the absolute ,totality of all ,conditions1 while the two others are only relative totalities1--which would be as much as to say they were only pseudo-totalities1 both being conditioned instead of being unconditioned4 ,but there seems to be no evidence1 not even an indication1 that disjunctive reasoning conditions categorical or conditional--that it constitutes the whole kingdom1 in which the other two orders of reasoning form dependent provinces1 or that for final validation these must appeal to the disjunctive series and the ,idea that controls it4 ,on the contrary1 any such relation seems disproved by the fact that the three types of syllogism apply alike in all subject-matter1 psychic or physical1 subjective or objective1 concerning the ,self or concerning the ,world1--yes1 concerning other ,selves or even concerning ,god2 whereas1 if the relation were a fact1 it would require that only disjunctive reasoning can deal with the ,unconditioned1 and that conditional must confine itself to cosmic material1 while categorical pertains only to the things of inner sense4 ,such considerations cannot but shake our confidence in the inquisition to which ,kant has submitted the ,ideas of ,reason1 both as regards what they really mean and how they are to be correlated4 ,at all events1 the analysis of logical procedure and connection on which his account of them is based is full of the confusions and oversights that have now been pointed out1 and justifies us in saying that his case is not established4 ,hence we are not bound to follow when his three successors1 or their later adherents1 proceed in acceptance of his results1 and advance into various forms of idealism1 all of the monistic type1 as if the general relation between the three ,ideas had been demonstrably settled by ,kant in the monist sense1 despite his not knowing this1 and that all we have to do is to disregard his recorded protests1 and render his results consistent1 and our idealism absolute1 by casting out from his doctrine the distinction between the ,theoretical and the ,practical ,reason1 with the primacy of the latter1 through making an end of his assumed world of ,dinge an sich1 or things in themselves4 ,this movement1 ,i repeat1 we are not bound to follow3 a rectification of view as to the meaning of the three ,ideas becomes possible as soon as we are freed from ,kant's entangled method of discovering and defining them2 and when this rectification is effected1 we shall find that the question between monism and rational or harmonic pluralism is at least open1 to say no more4 ,nay1 we are not to forget that by the results of our analysis of the concepts ,one and ,many1 ,time and ,space1 and the real relation between them1 plural metaphysics has already won a precedence in this contest4 ,,the ,,development ,,of ,,philosophy ,,in ,,the ,,nineteenth ,,century ,,by ,,george ,,trumbull ,,ladd ,george ,trumbull ,ladd1 ,professor of ,philosophy1 ,yale ,university4 b4 ,january #ai1 #ahdb1 ,painesville1 ,ohio4 ,b4,a4 ,western ,reserve ,college1 #ahfd2 ,b4,d4 ,andover ,theological ,seminary1 #ahfi2 ,d4,d4 ,western ,reserve1 #ahgi2 ,m4,a4 ,yale1 #ahha2 ,,ll4,d4 ,western ,reserve1 #ahie2 ,,ll4,d4 ,princeton1 #ahif4 ,decorated with the #c;d ,degree of the ,order of the ,rising ,sun of ,japan1 #ahii2 ,pastor1 ,edinburg1 ,ohio1 #ahfi-ga2 ibid41 ,milwaukee1 ,wis41 #ahga-gi2 ,professor of ,philosophy1 ,bowdoin ,college1 #ahgi-ha2 ibid41 ,yale ,university1 #ahha--2 ,lecturer1 ,harvard1 ,tokio1 ,bombay1 etc41 #ahhe--1 ,member ,american ,psychological ,association1 ,american ,society of ,naturalists1 ,american ,philosophical ,association1 ,american ,oriental ,society1 ,imperial ,educational ,society of ,japan1 ,connecticut ,academy4 ,author of ,elements of ,physiological ,psychology2 ,philosophy of ,knowledge2 ,philosophy of ,mind2 ,a ,theory of ,reality2 and many other noted scientific works and papers4 ,the history of man's critical and reflective thought upon the more ultimate problems of nature and of his own life has1 indeed1 its period of quickened progress1 relative stagnation1 and apparent decline4 ,great thinkers are born and die1 schools of philosophy1 so-called1 arise1 flourish1 and become discredited2 and tendencies of various characteristics mark the national or more general ,zeitgeist of the particular centuries4 ,and always1 a certain deep undercurrent1 or powerful stream of the rational evolution of humanity1 flows silently onward4 ,but these periods of philosophical development do not correspond to those which have been marked off for man by the rhythmic motion of the heavenly bodies1 or by himself for purposes of greater convenience in practical affairs4 ,the proposal1 therefore1 to treat any century of philosophical development as though it could be taken out of1 and considered apart from1 this constant unfolding of man's rational life is1 of necessity1 doomed to failure4 ,and1 indeed1 the nineteenth century is no exception to the general truth4 ,there is1 however1 one important and historical fact which makes more definite1 and more feasible1 the attempt to present in outline the history of the philosophical development of the nineteenth century4 ,this fact is the death of ,immanuel ,kant1 ,february #ab1 #ahjd4 ,in a very unusual way this event marks the close of the development of philosophy in the eighteenth century4 ,in a yet more unusual way the same event defines the beginning of the philosophical development of the nineteenth century4 ,the proposal is1 therefore1 not artificial1 but in accordance with the truth of history1 if we consider the problems1 movements1 results1 and present condition of this development1 so far as the fulfillment of our general purpose is concerned1 in the light of the critical philosophy of ,kant4 ,this purpose may then be further defined in the following way3 to trace the history of the evolution of critical and reflective thought over the more ultimate problems of ,nature and of human life1 in the ,western ,world during the last hundred years1 and from the standpoint of the conclusions1 both negative and positive1 which are best embodied in the works of the philosopher of ,knigsberg4 ,this purpose we shall try to fulfill in these four divisions of our theme3 7#a7 ,a statement of the problems of philosophy as they were given over to the nineteenth century by the ,kantian ,critique2 7#b7 a brief description of the lines of movement along which the attempts at the improved solution of these problems have proceeded1 and of the principal influences contributing to these attempts2 7#c7 a summary of the principal results of these movements--the items1 so to say1 of progress in philosophy which may be credited to the last century2 and finally1 7#d7 a survey of the present state of these problems as they are now to be handed down by the nineteenth to the twentieth century4 ,truly an immensely difficult1 if not an impossible task1 is involved in this purpose6 ,i4 ,the problems which the critical philosophy undertook definitively to solve may be divided into three classes4 ,the first is the epistemological problem1 or the problem offered by human knowledge--its essential nature1 its fixed limitations1 if such there be1 and its ontological validity4 ,it was this problem which ,kant brought to the front in such a manner that certain subsequent writers on philosophy have claimed it to be1 not only the primary and most important branch of philosophical discipline1 but to comprise the sum-total of what human reflection and critical thought can successfully compass4 ,we call philosophy self-knowledge1 says one of these writers4 ,the theory of knowledge is the true prima philosophia1 says another4 ,kant himself regarded it as the most imperative demand of reason to establish a science that shall determine a priori the possibility1 the principles1 and the extent of all cognitions4 ,the burden of the epistemological problem has pressed heavily upon the thought of the nineteenth century2 the different attitudes toward this problem1 and its different alleged solutions1 have been most influential factors in determining the philosophical discussions1 divisions1 schools1 and permanent or transitory achievements of the century4 ,in the epistemological problem as offered by the ,kantian philosophy of cognition there is involved the subordinate but highly important question as to the proper method of philosophy4 ,is the method of criticism1 as that method was employed in the three ,critiques of ,kant1 the exclusive1 the sole appropriate and productive way of advancing human philosophical thought8 ,i do not think that the experience of the nineteenth century warrants an affirmative answer to this question of method4 ,this experience has certainly1 however1 resulted in demonstrating the need of a more thorough1 consistent1 and fundamental use of the critical method than that in which it was employed by ,kant4 ,and this improved use of the critical method has induced a more profound study of the psychology of cognition1 and of the historical development of philosophy in the branch of epistemology4 ,more especially1 however1 it has led to the reinstatement of the value-judgments1 as means of cognition1 in their right relations of harmony with the judgments of fact and of law4 ,the second of the greater problems which the critical philosophy of the eighteenth handed on to the nineteenth century is the ontological problem4 ,this problem1 even far more than the epistemological1 has excited the intensest interest1 and called for the profoundest thought1 of reflective minds during the last hundred years4 ,this problem engages in the inquiry as to what ,reality is2 for to define philosophy from the ontological point of view renders it the rational science of reality2 or1 at least1 the science of the supreme and most important realities4 ,in spite of the fact that the period immediately following the conclusion of the ,kantian criticism was the age when the people were singing ,da die ,metaphysik vor ,kurzem unbeerbt abging1 ,werden die ,dinge an sich jetzo sub hasta verkauft1 the cultivation of the ontological problem1 and the growth of systematic metaphysics in the nineteenth century1 had never previously been surpassed4 ,in spite of1 or rather because of1 the fact that ,kant left the ancient body of metaphysics so dismembered and discredited1 and his own ontological structure1 in such hopeless confusion1 all the several buildings both of ,idealism and of ,realism either rose quickly or were erected upon the foundations made bare by the critical philosophy4 ,but especially unsatisfactory to the thought of the first quarter of the nineteenth century was the ,kantian position with reference to the problem in which1 after all1 both the few who cultivate philosophy and the multitude who share in its fruits are always most truly interested2 and this is the ethico-religious problem4 ,in the judgment of the generation which followed him1 ,kant had achieved for those who accepted his points of view1 his method of philosophizing1 and his results1 much greater success in removing knowledge than in finding room for faith4 ,for he seemed to have left the positive truths of ,ethics so involved in the negative positions of his critique of knowledge as greatly to endanger them2 and to have entangled the conceptions of religion with those of morality in a manner to throw doubt upon them both4 ,the breach between the human cognitive faculties and the ontological doctrines and conceptions on which morality and religion had been supposed to rest firmly1 the elaborately argued distrust and skepticism which had been aimed against the ability of human reason to reach reality1 and the consequent danger which threatened the most precious judgments of worth and the ontological value of ethical and sthetical sentiments1 could not remain unnoticed1 or fail to promote ceaseless and earnest efforts to heal it4 ,the hitherto accepted solutions of the problems of cognition1 of being1 and of man's ethico-religious experience1 could not survive the critical philosophy4 ,but the solutions which the critical philosophy itself offered could not fail to excite opposition and to stimulate further criticism4 ,moreover1 certain factors in human nature1 certain interests in human social life1 and certain needs of humanity1 not fully recognized and indeed scarcely noticed by criticism1 could not fail to revive and to enforce their ancient1 perennial1 and valid claims4 ,in a word1 ,kant left the main problems of philosophy involved in numerous contradictions4 ,the result of his penetrating but excessive analysis was unwarrantably to contrast sense with understanding2 to divide reason as constitutive from reason as regulative2 to divorce the moral law from our concrete experience of the results of good and bad conduct1 true morality from many of the noblest desires and sentiments1 and to set in opposition phenomena and noumena1 order and freedom1 knowledge and faith1 science and religion4 ,now the highest aim of philosophy is reconciliation4 ,what wonder1 then1 that the beginning of the last century felt the stimulus of the unreconciled condition of the problems of philosophy at the end of the preceding century6 ,the greatest1 most stimulating inheritance of the philosophy of the nineteenth century from the philosophy of the eighteenth century was the post-,kantian problems4 ,,ii4 ,the lines of the movement of philosophical thought and the principal contributory influences which belong to the nineteenth century may be roughly divided into two classes2 namely1 7#a7 those which tended in the direction of carrying to the utmost extreme the negative and destructive criticism of ,kant1 and 7#b7 those which1 either mainly favoring or mainly antagonizing the conclusions of the ,kantian criticism1 endeavored to place the positive answer to all three of these great problems of philosophy upon more comprehensive1 scientifically defensible1 and permanently sure foundations4 ,the one class so far completed the attempt to remove the knowledge at which philosophy aims as1 by the end of the first half of the century1 to have left no rational ground for any kind of faith4 ,the other class had not1 even by the end of the second half of the century1 as yet agreed upon any one scheme for harmonizing the various theories of knowledge1 of reality1 and of the ground of morality and religion4 ,there appeared1 however1--especially during the last two decades of the century1--certain signs of convergence upon positions1 to occupy which is favorable for agreement upon such a scheme1 and which now promise a new constructive era for philosophy4 ,the terminus of the destructive movement has been reached in our present-day positivism and philosophical skepticism4 ,for this movement there would appear to be no more beyond in the same direction4 ,the terminus of the other movement can only be somewhat dimly descried4 ,it may perhaps be predicted with a reasonable degree of confidence as some form of ontological ,idealism 7if we may use such a phrase7 that shall be at once more thoroughly grounded in man's total experience1 as interpreted by modern science1 and also more satisfactory to human ethical1 sthetical1 and religious ideals1 than any form of systematic philosophy has hitherto been4 ,but to say even this much is perhaps unduly to anticipate4 ,if we attempt to fathom and estimate the force of the various streams of influence which have shaped the history of the philosophical development of the nineteenth century1 ,i think there can be no doubt that the profoundest and the most powerful is the one influence which must be recognized and reckoned with in all the centuries4 ,this influence is humanity's undying interest in its moral1 civil1 and religious ideals1 and in the civil and religious institutions which give a faithful but temporary expression to these ideals4 ,in the long run1 every fragmentary or systematic attempt at the solution of the problem of philosophy must sustain the test of an ability to contribute something of value to the realization of these ideals4 ,the test which the past century has proposed for its own thinkers1 and for its various schools of philosophy1 is by far the severest which has ever been proposed4 ,for the most part unostentatiously and in large measure silently1 the thoughtful few and the comparatively thoughtless multitude have been contributing1 either destructively or constructively1 to the effort at satisfaction for the rising spiritual life of man4 ,and if in some vague but impressive manner we speak of this thirst for spiritual satisfaction as characteristic of any period of human history1 we may say1 ,i believe1 that it has been peculiarly characteristic and especially powerful as an influence during the last hundred years4 ,the opinions1 sentiments1 and ideals which shape the development of the institutions of the church and state1 and the freer activities of the same opinions1 sentiments1 and ideals1 have been in this century1 as they have been in every century1 the principal factors in determining the character of its philosophical development4 ,but a more definite and visible kind of influence has constantly proceeded from the centres of the higher education4 ,the universities--especially of ,germany1 next1 perhaps of ,scotland1 but also of ,england and the ,united ,states1 and even in less degree of ,france and ,italy--have both fostered and shaped the evolution of critical and reflective thought1 and of its product as philosophy4 ,in ,germany during the eighteenth century the greater universities had been emancipating themselves from the stricter forms of political and court favoritism and of ecclesiastical protection and control4 ,this emancipation had already operated at the beginning of the nineteenth century1 and it continued more and more to operate throughout this century1 for participation in that free thought whose spirit is absolutely essential to the flourishing of true philosophy4 ,all the other colleges and universities can scarcely repay the debt which modern philosophy owes to the universities of ,germany4 ,the institutions of the higher education which are moulded after this spirit1 and which have a generous share of this spirit1 have everywhere been schools of thought as well as schools of learning and research4 ,without the increasing numbers and growing encouragement of such centres for the cultivation of the discipline of critical and reflective thinking1 it is difficult to conjecture how much the philosophical development of the nineteenth century would have lost4 ,libertas docendi and ,academische ,freiheit--without these philosophy has one of its wings fatally wounded or severely clipped4 ,not all the philosophy of the last century1 however1 was born and developed in academical centres and under academical influences4 ,in ,germany1 ,great ,britain1 and ,france1 the various so-called ,academies or other unacademical associations of men of scientific interests and attainments--notably1 the ,berlin ,academy1 which has been called the seat of an anti-scholastic popular philosophy--were during the first half of the nineteenth century contributing by their conspicuous failures as well as by their less conspicuous successes1 important factors to the constructive new thought of the latter half of the nineteenth century4 ,in general1 although these men decried system and were themselves inadequately prepared to treat the problems of philosophy1 whether from the historical or the speculative and critical point of view1 they cannot be wholly neglected in estimating its development4 ,clever reasoning1 and witty and epigrammatic writing on scientific or other allied subjects1 cannot indeed be called philosophy in the stricter meaning of the word4 ,but this so-called popular philosophy has greatly helped in a way to free thought from its too close bondage to scholastic tradition4 ,and even the despite of philosophy1 and sneering references to its barrenness1 which formerly characterized the meetings and the writings of this class of its critics1 but which now are happily much less frequent1 have been on the whole both a valuable check and a stimulus to her devotees4 ,he would be too narrow and sour a disciple of scholastic metaphysics and systematic philosophy1 who1 because of the levity or scorning of outsiders1 should refuse them all credit4 ,indeed1 the lesson of the close of the nineteenth century may well enough be the motto for the beginning of the twentieth century3 ,in philosophy--since to philosophize is natural and inevitable for all rational beings--there really are no outsiders4 ,in this connection it is most interesting to notice how men of the type just referred to1 were at the end of the eighteenth century found grouped around such thinkers as ,mendelssohn1 ,lessing1 ,f4 ,nicolai1--representing a somewhat decided reaction from the ,french realism to the ,german idealism4 ,the work of the ,academicians in the criticism of ,kant was carried forward by ,jacobi1 who1 at the time of his death1 was the pensioned president of the ,academy at ,munich4 ,some of these same critics of the ,kantian philosophy showed a rather decided preference for the commonsense philosophy of the ,scottish ,school4 ,but both inside and outside of the ,universities and ,academies the scientific spirit and acquisitions of the nineteenth century have most profoundly1 and on the whole favorably1 affected the development of its philosophy4 ,in the wider meaning of the word1 science1--the meaning1 namely1 in which science ,wissenschaft1--philosophy aims to be scientific2 and science can never be indifferent to philosophy4 ,in their common aim at a rational and unitary system of principles1 which shall explain and give its due significance to the totality of human experience1 science and philosophy can never remain long in antagonism2 they ought never even temporarily to be divided in interests1 or in the spirit which leads each generously to recognize the importance of the other4 ,the early part of the last century was1 indeed1 too much under the influence of that almost exclusively speculative ,natur-philosophie1 of which ,schelling and ,hegel were the most prominent exponents4 ,on the other hand1 the conception of nature as a vast interconnected and unitary system of a rational order1 unfolding itself in accordance with teleological principles1--however manifold and obscure1--is a noble conception and not destined to pass away4 ,on the continent--at least in ,france1 where it had attained its highest development--the scientific spirit was1 at the close of the eighteenth century1 on the whole opposed to systematization4 ,the impulse to both science and philosophy during both the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries1 over the entire continent of ,europe1 was chiefly due to the epoch-making work of that greatest of all titles in the modern scientific development of the ,western ,world1 the ,principia of ,newton4 ,in mathematics and the physical sciences1 during the early third or half of the last century1 ,great ,britain also has a roll of distinguished names which compares most favorably with that of either ,france or ,germany4 ,but in ,england1 ,france1 and the ,united ,states1 during the whole century1 science has lacked the breadth and philosophic spirit which it had in ,germany during the first three quarters of this period4 ,during all that time the ,german man of science was1 as a rule1 a scholar1 an investigator1 a teacher1 and a philosopher4 ,science and philosophy thrived better1 however1 in ,scotland than elsewhere outside of ,germany1 so far as their relations in interdependence were concerned4 ,into the ,scottish universities ,playfair introduced some of the continental suggestions toward the end of the eighteenth century1 so that there was less of exclusiveness and unfriendly rivalry between science and philosophy2 and both profited thereby4 ,in the ,united ,states1 during the first half or more of the century1 so dominant were the theological and practical interests and influences that there was little free development of either science or philosophy1--if we interpret the one as the equivalent of ,wissenschaft and understand the other in the stricter meaning of the word4 ,the history of the development of the scientific spirit and of the achievements of the particular sciences is not the theme of this paper4 ,to trace in detail1 or even in its large outlines1 the reciprocal influence of science and philosophy during the past hundred years1 would itself require far more than the space allotted to me4 ,it must suffice to say that the various advances in the efforts of the particular sciences to enlarge and to define the conceptions and principles employed to portray the ,being of the ,world in its totality1 have somewhat steadily grown more and more completely metaphysical1 and more and more of positive importance for the reconstruction of systematic philosophy4 ,the latter has not simply been disciplined by science1 compelled to improve its method1 and to examine all its previous claims4 ,but philosophy has also been greatly enriched by science with respect to its material awaiting synthesis1 and it has been not a little profited by the unsuccessful attempts of the current scientific theories to give themselves a truly satisfactory account of that ,ultimate ,reality which1 to understand the better1 is no unworthy aim of their combined efforts4 ,during the nineteenth century science has seen many important additions to that ,ideal of ,nature and her processes1 to form which in a unitary and harmonizing but comprehensive way is the philosophical goal of science4 ,the gross mechanical conception of nature which prevailed in the earlier part of the eighteenth century has long since been abandoned1 as quite inadequate to our experience with her facts1 forces1 and laws4 ,the kinetic view1 which began with ,huygens1 ,euler1 and ,ampre1 and which was so amplified by ,lord ,kelvin and ,clerk-,maxwell in ,england1 and by ,helmholtz and others in ,germany1 on account of its success in explaining the phenomena of light1 of gases1 etc41 very naturally led to the attempt to develop a kinetic theory1 a doctrine of energetics1 which should explain all phenomena4 ,but the conception of that which moves1 the experience of important and persistent qualitative differentiae1 and the need of assuming ends and purposes served by the movement1 are troublesome obstacles in the way of giving such a completeness to this theory of the ,being of the ,world4 ,yet again the amazing success which the theory of evolution has shown in explaining the phenomena with which the various biological sciences concern themselves1 has lent favor during the latter half of the century to the vitalistic and genetic view of nature4 ,for all our most elaborate and advanced kinetic theories seem utterly to fail us as explanatory when we1 through the higher powers of the microscope1 stand wondering and face to face with the evolution of a single living cell4 ,but from such a view of the essential ,being of the ,world as evolution suggests to the psycho-physical theory of nature is not an impassable gulf4 ,and thus1 under its growing wealth of knowledge1 science may be leading up to an ,ideal of the ,ultimate ,reality1 in which philosophy will gratefully and gladly coincide4 ,at any rate1 the modern conception of nature and the modern conception of ,god are not so far apart from each other1 as either of these conceptions is now removed from the conceptions covered by the same terms1 some centuries gone by4 ,there is one of the positive sciences1 however1 with which the development of philosophy during the last century has been particularly allied4 ,this science is psychology4 ,to speak of its history is not the theme of this paper4 ,but it should be noted in passing how the development of psychology has brought into connection with the physical and biological sciences the development of philosophy4 ,this union1 whether it be for better or for worse1--and1 on the whole1 ,i believe it to be for better rather than for worse1--has been in a very special way the result of the last century4 ,in tracing its details we should have to speak of the dependence of certain branches of psychology on physiology1 and upon ,sir ,charles ,bell's discovery of the difference between the sensory and the motor nerves4 ,this discovery was the contribution of the beginning of the century to an entire line of discoveries1 which have ended at the close of the century with putting the localization of cerebral function upon a firm experimental basis4 ,of scarcely less importance has been the cellular theory as applied 7#ahch7 by ,matthias ,schleiden1 a pupil of ,fries in philosophy1 to plants1 and by ,theodor ,schwann about the same time to animal organisms4 ,to these must be added the researches of ,johannes ,mller 7#ahja-aheh71 the great biologist1 a listener to ,hegel's lectures1 whose law of specific energies brings him into connection with psychology and1 through psychology1 to philosophy4 ,even more true is this of ,helmholtz1 whose ,lehre von den ,tonempfindungen 7#ahfb7 and ,physiologische ,optik 7#ahfg7 placed him in even closer1 though still mediate1 relations to philosophy4 ,but perhaps especially ,gustav ,theodor ,fechner 7#ahja-ahhg71 whose researches in psycho-physics laid the foundations of whatever1 either as psychology or as philosophy1 goes under this name2 and whether the doctrine have reference to the relation of man's mind and body1 or to the wider relations of spirit and matter4 ,in my judgment it cannot be affirmed that the attempts of the latter half of the nineteenth century to develop an experimental science of psychology in independence of philosophical criticism and metaphysical assumption1 or the claims of this science to have thrown any wholly new light upon the statement1 or upon the solution of philosophical problems1 have been largely successful4 ,but certain more definitely psychological questions have been to a commendable degree better analyzed and elucidated2 the new experimental methods1 where confined within their legitimate sphere1 have been amply justified2 and certain quasi-metaphysical views respecting the nature of the human mind1 and even1 if you will1 the nature of the ,spirit in general--have been placed in a more favorable and scientifically engaging attitude toward speculative philosophy4 ,this seems to me to be especially true with respect to two problems in which both empirical psychology and philosophy have a common and profound interest4 ,these are 7#a7 the complex synthesis of mental functions involved in every act of true cognition1 together with the bearing which the psychology of cognition has upon epistemological problems2 and 7#b7 the yet more complex and profound analysis1 from the psychological point of view1 of what it is to be a self-conscious and self-determining ,will1 a true ,self1 together with the bearing which the psychology of selfhood has upon all the problems of ethics1 sthetics1 and religion4 ,the more obvious and easily traceable influences which have operated to incite and direct the philosophical development of the nineteenth century are1 of course1 dependent upon the teachings and writings of philosophers1 and the schools of philosophy which they have founded4 ,to speak of these influences even in outline would be to write a manual of the history of philosophy during that hundred of years1 which has been of all others by far the most fruitful in material results1 whatever estimate may be put upon the separate or combined values of the individual thinkers and their so-called schools4 ,no fewer than seven or eight relatively independent or partially antagonistic movements1 which may be traced back either directly or more indirectly to the critical philosophy1 and to the form in which the problems of philosophy were left by ,kant1 sprung up during the century4 ,in ,germany chiefly1 there arose the ,faith-philosophy1 the ,romantic ,school1 and ,rational ,idealism2 in ,france1 ,eclecticism and ,positivism 7if1 indeed1 the latter can be called a philosophy72 in ,scotland1 a nave and crude form of ,realism1 which served well for the time as an antagonist of a skeptical idealism1 but which itself contributed to an improved form of ,idealism2 and in the ,united ,states1 or rather in ,new ,england1 a peculiar kind of ,transcendentalism of the sentimental type4 ,but all these movements of thought1 and others lying somewhere midway between1 in a pair composed of any two1 together with a steadfast remainder of almost every sort of ,dogmatism1 and all degrees and kinds of ,skepticism1 have been intermixed and contending with one another1 in all these countries4 ,such has been the varied1 undefinable1 and yet intensely stimulating and interesting character of the development of systematic and scholastic philosophy1 during the nineteenth century4 ,the early opposition to ,kant in ,germany was1 in the main1 twofold3--both to his peculiar extreme analysis with its philosophical conclusions1 and also to all systematic as distinguished from a more popular and literary form of philosophizing4 ,toward the close of the eighteenth century a group of men had been writing upon philosophical questions in a spirit and method quite foreign to that held in respect by the critical philosophy4 ,it is not wholly without significance that ,lessing1 whose aim had been to use common sense and literary skill in clearing up obscure ideas and improving and illumining the life of man1 died in the very year of the appearance of ,kant's ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft4 ,of this class of men an historian dealing with this period has said1 ,there is hardly one who does not quote somewhere or other ,pope's saying1 ',the proper study of mankind is man4' ,to this class belong ,hamann 7#agcj-aghh71 the inspirer of ,herder and ,jacobi4 ,the former1 who was essentially a poet and a friend of ,goethe1 controverted ,kant with regard to his doctrine of reason1 his antithesis between the individual and the race1 and his schism between things as empirically known and the known unity in the ,ground of their being and becoming4 ,herder's path to truth was highly colored with flowers of rhetoric2 but the promise was that he would lead men back to the heavenly city4 ,jacobi1 too1 with due allowance made for the injury wrought by his divorce of the two philosophies1--that of faith and that of science1--and his excessive estimate of the value-judgments which repose in the mist of a feeling-faith1 added something of worth by way of exposing the barrenness of the ,kantian doctrine of an unknowable ,thing-in-itself4 ,from men like ,fr4 ,schlegel 7#aggb-ahbi71 whose valid protest against the sharp separation of speculative philosophy from the sthetical1 social1 and ethical life1 assumed the standpoint of irony1 little real result in the discovery of truth could be expected4 ,but ,schleiermacher 7#agfh-ahcd71 in spite of that mixture of unfused elements which has made his philosophy a rendezvous for the most diverse systems1 contributed valuable factors to the century's philosophical development1 both of a negative and of a positive character4 ,this thinker was peculiarly fortunate in the enrichment of the conception of experience as warranting a justifiable confidence in the ontological value of ethical1 sthetical1 and religious sentiment and ideas2 but he was most unfortunate in reviving and perpetuating the unjustifiable ,kantian distinction between cognition and faith in the field of experience4 ,on the whole1 therefore1 the ,faith-philosophy and the ,romantic ,school can easily be said to have contributed more than a negative and modifying influence to the development of the philosophy of the nineteenth century4 ,its more modern revival toward the close of the same century1 and its continued hold upon certain minds of the present day1 are evidences of the positive but partial truth which its tenets1 however vaguely and unsystematically1 continue to maintain in an sthetically and practically attractive way4 ,the admirers of ,kant strove earnestly and with varied success to remedy the defects of his system4 ,among the earlier1 less celebrated and yet important members of this group1 were ,k4 ,g4 ,reinhold 7#ageh-ahbc71 and ,maimon 7died1 #ahjj74 ,the former1 like ,descartes1 in that he was educated by the ,jesuits1 began the attempt1 after rejecting some of the arbitrary distinctions of ,kant and his barren and self-contradictory ,thing-in-itself1 to unify the critical philosophy by reducing it to some one principle4 ,the latter really transcended ,kant in his philosophical skepticism1 and anticipated the ,hamiltonian form of the so-called principle of relativity4 ,fries 7#aggc-ahdc71 and ,hermes 7#agge-ahca7--the latter of whom saw in empirical psychology the only true propdeutic to philosophy--should be mentioned in this connection4 ,in the same group was another1 both mathematician and philosopher1 who strove more successfully than others of this group to accept the critical standpoint of ,kant and yet to transcend his negative conclusions with regard to a theory of knowledge4 ,i refer to ,bolzano 7,prague1 #agha-ahdh71 who stands in the same line of succession with ,fries and ,hermes1 and whose works on the ,science of ,religion 7#d vols4 #ahcd7 and his ,science of ,knowledge 7#d vols4 #ahcg7 are noteworthy contributions to epistemological doctrine4 ,in the latter we have developed at great length the important thought that the illative character of propositional judgments implies an objective relation2 and that in all truths the subject-idea must be objective4 ,in the work on religion there is found as thoroughly dispassionate and rational a defense of ,catholic doctrine as exists anywhere in philosophical literature4 ,the limited influence of these works1 due in part to their bulk and their technical character1 is on the whole1 ,i think1 sincerely to be regretted4 ,it was1 however1 chiefly that remarkable series of philosophers which may be grouped under the rubric of a rational ,idealism1 who filled so full and made so rich the philosophical life of ,germany during the first half of the last century2 whose philosophical thoughts and systems have spread over the entire ,western ,world1 and who are most potent influences in shaping the development of philosophy down to the present hour4 ,of these we need do little more than that we can do--mention their names4 ,at their head1 in time1 stands ,fichte1 who--although ,kant is reported to have complained of this disciple because he lied about him so much--really divined a truth which seems to be hovering in the clouds above the master's head1 but which1 if the critical philosophy truly meant to teach it1 needed helpful deliverance in order to appear in perfectly clear light4 ,fichte1 although he divined this truth1 did not1 however1 free it from internal confusion and self-contradiction4 ,it is his truth1 nevertheless1 that in the ,self1 as a self-positing and self-determining activity1 must somehow be found the ,ground of all experience and of all ,reality4 ,the important note which ,schelling sounded was the demand that philosophy should recognize ,nature as belonging to the sphere of ,reality1 and as requiring a measure of reflective thought which should in some sort put it on equal terms with the ,ego1 for the construction of our conception of the ,being of the ,world4 ,to ,schelling it seemed impossible to deduce1 as ,fichte had done1 all the rich concrete development of the world of things from the subjective needs and constitutional forms of functioning which belong to the finite ,self4 ,and1 indeed1 the doctrine which limits the origin1 existence1 and value of all that is known about this sphere of experience to these needs1 and which finds the sufficient account of all experience with nature in these forms of functioning1 must always seem inadequate and even grotesque in the sight of the natural sciences4 ,both ,nature and ,spirit1 thought ,schelling1 must be allowed to claim actual existence and equally real value2 while at the same time philosophy must reconcile the seeming opposition of their claims and unite them in an harmonious and self-explanatory way4 ,in some common substratum1 in which1 to adopt ,hegel's sarcastic criticism1 as in the darkness of the night all cows are black1--that is in the ,absolute1 as an ,identical ,basis of ,differences1--the reconciliation was to be accomplished4 ,but the constructive idealistic movement1 in which ,fichte and ,schelling bore so important a part1 could not be satisfied with the positions reached by either of these two philosophers4 ,neither the physical and psychological sciences1 nor the speculative interests of religion1 ethics1 art1 and social life1 permitted this movement to stop at this point4 ,in all the subsequent developments of philosophy during the first half or three quarters of the nineteenth century1 undoubtedly the influence of ,hegel was greatest of all individual thinkers4 ,his motif and plan are revealed in his letter of ,november #b1 #ahjj1 to ,schelling1 namely1 to transform what had hitherto been an ideal into a thoroughly elaborate system4 ,and in spite of his obvious obscurities of thought and style1 there is real ground for his claim to be the champion of the common consciousness4 ,it is undoubtedly in ,hegel's ,phnomenologie des ,geistes 7#ahjg71 that the distinctive features of the philosophy of the first half of the last century most clearly define themselves4 ,the forces of reflection now abandon the abstract analytic method and positions of the ,kantian ,critique1 and concentrate themselves upon the study of man's spiritual life as an historical evolution1 in a more concrete1 face-to-face manner4 ,two important and1 in the main1 valid assumptions underlie and guide this reflective study3 7#a7 ,the ,ultimate ,reality1 or principle of all realities1 is ,mind or ,spirit1 which is to be recognized and known in its essence1 not by analysis into its formal elements 7the categories71 but as a living development2 7#b7 those formal elements1 or categories to which ,kant gave validity merely as constitutional forms of the functioning of the human understanding1 represent1 the rather1 the essential structure of ,reality4 ,in spite of these true thoughts1 fault was justly found by the particular sciences with both the speculative method of ,hegel1 which consists in the smooth1 harmonious1 and systematic arrangement of conceptions in logical or ideal relations to one another2 and also with the result1 which reduces the ,being of the ,world to terms of thought and dialectical processes merely1 and neglects or overlooks the other aspects of racial experience4 ,therefore1 the idealistic movement could not remain satisfied with the ,hegelian dialectic4 ,especially did both the religious and the philosophical party revolt against the important thought underlying ,hegel's philosophy of religion2 namely1 that the more philosophy approximates to a complete development1 the more it exhibits the same need1 the same interest1 and the same content1 as religion itself4 ,this1 as they interpreted it1 meant the absorption of religion in philosophy4 ,next after ,hegel1 among the great names of this period1 stand the names of ,herbart and ,schopenhauer4 ,the former contributes in an important way to the proper conception of the task and the method of philosophy1 and influences greatly the development of psychology1 both as a science that is pedagogic to philosophy1 and as laying the basis for pedagogical principles and practice4 ,but ,herbart commits again the ancient fallacy1 under the spell of which so much of the ,kantian criticism was bound2 and which identifies contradictions that belong to the imperfect or illusory conceptions of individual thinkers with insoluble antinomies inherent in reason itself4 ,in spite of the little worth and misleading character of his view of perception1 and the quite complete inadequacy of the method by which1 at a single leap1 he reaches the one all-explanatory principle of his philosophy1 ,schopenhauer made a most important contribution to the reflective thought of the century4 ,it is true1 as ,kuno ,fischer has said1 that it seems to have occurred to ,schopenhauer only twenty-five years after he had propounded his theory1 that will1 as it appears in consciousness1 is as truly phenomenal as is intellect4 ,it is also true that his theory of knowledge and his conception of ,reality1 as measured by their power to satisfy and explain our total experience1 are inflicted with irreconcilable contradictions4 ,neither can we accord firm confidence or high praise to the ,way of ,salvation which somehow ,will can attain to follow by sthetic contemplation and ascetic self-denial4 ,yet the philosophy of ,schopenhauer rightly insists upon our ,idealistic construction of ,reality having regard to aspects of experience which his predecessors had quite too much neglected2 and even its spiteful and exaggerated reminders of the facts which contradict the tendency of all ,idealism to construct a smooth1 regular1 and altogether pleasing conception of the ,being of the ,world1 have been of great benefit to the development of the latter half of the nineteenth century4 ,in estimating the thoughts and the products of modern ,idealism we ought not to forget the larger multitude of thoughtful men1 both in ,germany and elsewhere1 who have contributed toward shaping the course of reflection in the attempt to answer the problems which the critical philosophy left to the nineteenth century4 ,it is a singular comment upon the caprices of fame that1 in philosophy as in science1 politics1 and art1 some of those who have really reasoned most soundly and acutely1 if not also effectively upon these problems1 are little known even by name in the history of the philosophical development of the century4 ,among the earlier members of this group1 did space permit1 we should wish to mention ,berger1 ,solger1 ,steffens1 and others1 who strove to reconcile the positions of a subjective idealism with a realistic but pantheistic conception of the ,being of the ,world4 ,there are others1 who like ,weisse1 ,i4 ,h4 ,fichte1 ,c4 ,p4 ,fischer1 and ,braniss1 more or less bitterly or moderately and reasonably1 opposed the method and the conclusions of the ,hegelian dialectic4 ,still another group earned for themselves the supposedly opprobrious but decidedly vague title of ,dualists1 by rejecting what they conceived to be the pantheism of ,hegel4 ,still others1 like ,fries and ,beneke and their successors1 strove to parallel philosophy with the particular sciences by grounding it in an empirical but scientific psychology2 and thus they instituted a line of closely connected development1 to which reference has already been made4 ,hegel himself believed that he had permanently effected that reconciliation of the orthodox creed with the cognition of ,ultimate ,reality at which his dialectic aimed4 ,in all such attempts at reconciliation three great questions are chiefly concerned3 7#a7 the ,being of ,god2 7#b7 the nature of man2 7#c7 the actual and the ideally satisfactory relations between the two4 ,but1 as might have been expected1 a period of wild1 irregular1 and confused contention met the attempt to establish this claim4 ,in this conflict of more or less noisy and popular as well as of thoughtful and scholastic philosophy1 ,hegelians of various degrees of fidelity1 anti-,hegelians of various degrees of hostility1 and ultra-,hegelians of various degrees of eccentricity1 all took a valiant and conspicuous part4 ,we cannot follow its history2 but we can learn its lesson4 ,polemical philosophy1 as distinguished from quiet1 reflective1 and critical but constructive philosophy involves a most uneconomical use of mental force4 ,yet out of this period of conflict1 and in a measure as its result1 there came a period of improved relations between science and philosophy and between philosophy and theology1 which was the dawn1 toward the close of the nineteenth century1 of that better illumined day into the middle of which we hope that we are proceeding4 ,before leaving this idealistic movement in ,germany1 and elsewhere as influenced largely by ,german philosophy1 one other name deserves mention4 ,this name is that of ,lotze1 who combined elements from many previous thinkers with those derived from his own studies and thoughts1--the conceptions of mechanism as applied to physical existences and to psychical life1 with the search for some monistic ,principle that shall satisfy the sthetical and ethical1 as well as the scientific demands of the human mind4 ,this variety of interests and of culture led to the result of his making important contributions to psychology1 logic1 metaphysics1 and sthetics4 ,if we find his system of thinking--as ,i think we must--lacking in certain important elements of consistency and obscured in places by doubts as to his real meaning1 this does not prevent us from assigning to ,lotze a position which1 for versatility of interests1 genial quality of reflection and criticism1 suggestiveness of thought and charm of style1 is second to no other in the history of nineteenth century philosophical development4 ,in ,france and in ,england the first quarter of the last century was far from being productive of great thinkers or great thoughts in the sphere of philosophy4 ,de ,biran 7#agff-ahbd71 in several important respects the forerunner of modern psychology1 after revolting from his earlier complacent acceptance of the vagaries of ,condillac and ,cabanis1 made the discovery that the immediate consciousness of self-activity is the primitive and fundamental principle of human cognition4 ,meantime it was only a little group of ,academicians who were being introduced1 in a somewhat superficial way1 to the thoughts of the ,scottish and the ,german idealistic ,schools by ,royer-,collard1 ,jouffroy1 ,cousin1 and others4 ,a more independent and characteristic movement was that inaugurated by ,auguste ,comte 7#agih-aheg71 who1 having felt the marked influence of ,saint-,simon when he was only a boy of twenty1 in a letter to his friend ,valat1 in the year #ahbd1 declares3 ,i shall devote my whole life and all my powers to the founding of positive philosophy4 ,in spite of the impossibility of harmonizing with this point of view the vague and mystical elements which characterize the later thought of ,comte1 or with its carrying into effect the not altogether intelligent recognition of the synthetic activity of the mind 7tout se rduit toujours lier7 and certain hints as to first principles2 and in spite of the small positive contribution to philosophy which ,comtism could claim to have made2 it has in a way represented the value of two ideas4 ,these are 7#a7 the necessity for philosophy of studying the actual historical forces which have been at work and which are displayed in the facts of history2 and 7#b7 the determination not to go by mere unsupported speculation beyond experience in order to discover knowable ,reality4 ,there is1 however1 a kind of subtle irony in the fact that the word ,positivism should have come to stand so largely for negative conclusions1 in the very spheres of philosophy1 morals1 and religion where affirmative conclusions are so much desired and sought4 ,that philosophy in ,great ,britain was in a nearly complete condition of decadence during the first half or three quarters of the nineteenth century was the combined testimony of writers from such different points of view as ,carlyle1 ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 and ,john ,stuart ,mill4 ,and yet these very names are also witnesses to the fact that this decadence was not quite complete4 ,in the first quarter of the century ,coleridge1 although he had failed1 on account of weakness both of mind and of character1 in his attempt to reconcile religion to the thought of his own age1 on the basis of the ,kantian distinction between reason and the intellect1 had sowed certain seed-thoughts which became fertile in the soil of minds more vigorous1 logical1 and practical than his own4 ,this was1 perhaps1 especially true in ,america1 where inquirers after truth were seeking for something more satisfactory than the ,french skepticism of the revolutionary and following period4 ,carlyle's mocking sarcasm was also not without wholesome effect4 ,but it was ,sir ,william ,hamilton and ,john ,stuart ,mill whose thoughts exercised a more powerful formative influence over the minds of the younger men4 ,the one was the flower of the ,scottish ,realism1 the other of the movement started by ,bentham and the elder ,mill4 ,that the ,scottish ,realism should end by such a combination with the skepticism of the critical philosophy as is implied in ,hamilton's law of the relativity of all knowledge1 is one of the most curious and interesting turns in the history of modern philosophy4 ,and when this law was so interpreted by ,dean ,mansel in its application to the fundamental cognitions of religion as to lay the foundations upon which the most imposing structure of agnosticism was built by ,herbert ,spencer1 surely the entire swing around the circle1 from ,kant to ,kant again1 has been made complete4 ,the attempt of ,hamilton failed1 as every similar attempt must always fail4 ,neither speculative philosophy nor religious faith is satisfied with an abstract conception1 about the correlate of which in ,reality nothing is known or ever can be known4 ,but every important attempt of this sort serves the double purpose of stimulating other efforts to reconstruct the answer to the problem of philosophy1 on a basis of positive experience of an enlarged type2 and also of acting as a real1 if only temporary practical support to certain value-judgments which the faiths of morality1 art1 and religion both implicate and1 in a measure1 validate4 ,the influence of ,john ,stuart ,mill1 as it was exerted not only in his conduct of life while a servant of the ,east ,india ,company1 but also in his writings on ,logic1 ,politics1 and ,philosophy1 was1 on the whole1 a valuable contribution to his generation4 ,in the additions which he made to the ,utilitarianism of ,bentham we have done1 ,i believe1 all that ever can be done in defense of this principle of ethics4 ,and his posthumous confessions of faith in the ontological value of certain great conceptions of religion are the more valuable because of the nature of the man1 and of the experience which is their source4 ,perhaps the most permanent contribution which ,mill made to the development of philosophy proper1 outside of the sphere of logic1 ethics1 and politics1 was his vigorous polemical criticism of ,hamilton's claim for the necessity of faith in an ,unconditioned whose conception is only a fasciculus of negations of the ,conditioned in its opposite extremes1 and bound together merely by the aid of language and their common character of incomprehensibility4 ,the history of the development of philosophy in ,america during the nineteenth century1 as during the preceding century1 has been characterized in the main by three principal tendencies4 ,these may be called the theological1 the social1 and the eclectic4 ,from the beginning down to the present time the religious influence and the interest in political and social problems have been dominant4 ,and yet withal1 the student of these problems in the atmosphere of this country likes1 in a way1 to do his own thinking and to make his own choices of the thoughts that seem to him true and best fitted for the best form of life4 ,in spite of the fact that the different streams of ,european thought have flowed in upon us somewhat freely1 there has been comparatively little either of the adherence to schools of ,european philosophy or of the attempt to develop a national school4 ,doubtless the influence of ,english and ,scottish thinking upon the academical circles of ,america was greatest for more than one hundred and fifty years after the gift in #agad by ,governor ,yale of a copy of ,locke's ,essay to the college which bore his name1--and especially upon the reflections and published works of ,jonathan ,edwards touching the fundamental problems of epistemology1 ethics1 and religion4 ,during the early part of this century these views awakened antagonism from such writers as ,dana1 ,whedon1 ,hazard1 ,nathaniel ,taylor1 ,jeremiah ,day1 ,henry ,p4 ,tappan1 and other opponents of the ,edwardean theology1 and also from such advocates of so-called free-thinking1 as had derived their motifs and their views from ,english deistical writers like ,shaftesbury1 or from the skepticism of ,hume4 ,a more definite philosophical movement1 however1 which had established itself somewhat firmly in scholastic centres by the year #ahbe1 and which maintained itself for more than half a century1 went back to the arrival in this country of ,john ,witherspoon1 in #agfh1 to be the president of ,princeton1 bringing with him a library of three hundred books4 ,it was the appeal of the ,scottish ,school to the plain man's consciousness and to so-called common sense1 which was relied upon to controvert all forms of philosophy which seemed to threaten the foundations of religion and of the ethics of politics and sociology4 ,but even during this period1 which was characterized by relatively little independent thinking in scholastic circles1 a more pronounced productivity was shown by such writers as ,francis ,wayland1 and others2 but1 perhaps1 especially by ,laurens ,p4 ,hickok1 whose works on psychology and cosmology deserve especial recognition3 while in psychology1 as related to philosophical problems1 the principal names of this period are undoubtedly the presidents of ,yale and ,princeton1--,noah ,porter and ,james ,mc,cosh1--both of whom 7but especially the former7 had their views modified by the more scientific psychology of ,europe and the profounder thinking of ,germany4 ,it was ,germany's influence1 however1 both directly and indirectly through ,coleridge and a few other ,english writers1 that caused a ferment of impressions and ideas which1 in their effort to work themselves clear1 resulted in what is known as ,new ,england ,transcendentalism4 ,in ,america this movement can scarcely be called definitely philosophical2 much less can it be said to have resulted in a system1 or even in a school1 of philosophy4 ,it must also be said to have been inspired but not borrowed from abroad4 ,its principal1 if not sole1 literary survival is to be found in the works of ,emerson4 ,as expounded by him1 it is not precisely ,pantheism--certainly not a consistent and critical development of the pantheistic theory of the ,being of the ,world2 it is1 rather1 a vague1 poetical1 and pantheistical ,idealism of a decidedly mystical type4 ,the introduction of ,german philosophy proper1 in its nature form1 and essential being1 to the few interested seriously in critical and reflective thinking upon the ultimate problems of nature and of human life1 began with the founding of the ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy1 in #ahfg1 under the direction of ,william ,t4 ,harris1 then ,superintendent of ,schools in this city4 ,with the work of ,darwin1 and his predecessors and successors1 there began a mighty movement of thought which1 although it is primarily scientific and more definitely available in biological science1 has already exercised1 and is doubtless destined to exercise in the future1 an enormous influence upon philosophy4 ,indeed1 we are already in the midst of the preliminary confusions and contentions1 but most fruitful considerations and discoveries belonging to a so-called philosophy of evolution4 ,this development has1 in the sphere of systematic philosophy1 reached its highest expression in the voluminous works produced through the latter half of the nineteenth century by ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer1 whose recent death seems to mark the close of the period we have under consideration4 ,the metaphysical assumptions and ontological value of the system of ,spencer1 as he wished it to be understood and interpreted1 have perhaps1 though not unnaturally1 been quite too much submerged in the more obvious expressions of its agnostic positivism4 ,in its psychology1 however1 the assumption of some underlying substance in contrast to all changing forms1 distinguishes it from a pure positivism in a very radical way4 ,but more especially in philosophy1 the metaphysical postulate of a mysterious ,unity of ,force that somehow manages to reveal itself1 and the law of its operations1 to the developed cognition of the nineteenth century philosopher1 however much it seems to involve the system in internal contradictions1 certainly forbids that we should identify it with the positivism of ,auguste ,comte4 ,in our judgment1 however1 it is in his ethical good sense and integrity of judgment1--a good sense and integrity which commits to ethics rather than to sociology the task of determining the highest type of human life1--and in basing the conditions for the prevalence and the development of the highest type of life upon ethical principles and upon the adherence to ethical ideas1 that ,herbert ,spencer will be found most clearly entitled to a lasting honor4 ,,iii4 ,the third number of our difficult tasks is to summarize the principal results1 to inventory the net profits1 as it were1 of the development of philosophy during the nineteenth century4 ,this task is made the more difficult by the heterogeneous nature and as yet unclassified condition of the development4 ,with the quickening and diversifying of all kinds and means of intercourse1 there has come the breaking down of national schools and idiosyncrasies of method and of thought4 ,in philosophy1 ,germany1 ,france1 ,great ,britain1 and indeed1 ,italy1 have come to intermingle their streams of influence2 and from all these countries these streams have been flowing in upon ,america4 ,in psychology1 especially1 as well as in all the other sciences1 but also to some degree in philosophy1 returning streams of influence from ,america have1 during the last decade or two1 been felt in ,europe itself4 ,it must also be admitted that the attempts at a reconstruction of systematic philosophy which have followed the rapid disintegration of the ,hegelian system1 and the enormous accumulations of new material due to the extension of historical studies and of the particular sciences1--including especially the so-called new psychology1--have not as yet been fruitful of large results4 ,in philosophy1 as in art1 politics1 and even scientific theory1 the spirit and the opportunity of the time are more favorable to the gathering of material and to the projecting of a bewildering variety of new opinions1 or old opinions put forth under new names1 than to that candid1 patient1 and prolonged reflection and balancing of judgment which a worthy system-building inexorably requires4 ,the age of breaking up the old1 without assimilating the new1 has not yet passed away4 ,and whatever is new1 startling1 large1 even monstrous1 has in many quarters the seeming preference1 in philosophy's building as in other architecture4 ,to the confusion which reigns even in scholastic circles1 contributions have been arriving from the outside1 from philosophers like ,nietzsche1 and from men great in literature like ,tolstoi4 ,nor has the matter been helped by the more recent extreme developments of positivism and skepticism1 which often enough1 without any consciousness of their origin and without the respect for morality and religion which ,kant always evinced1 really go back to the critical philosophy4 ,in spite of all this1 however1 the last two decades or more have shown certain hopeful tendencies and notable achievements1 looking toward the reconstruction of systematic philosophy4 ,in this attempt to bring order out of confusion1 to enable calm1 prolonged1 and reflective thinking to build into its structure the riches of the new material which the evolution of the race has secured1 a place of honor ought to be given to ,france1 where so much has been done of late to blend with clearness of style and independence of thought that calm reflective and critical judgment which looks all sides of human experience sympathetically but bravely in the face4 ,in psychology ,ribot1 and in philosophy1 ,fouille1 ,renouvier1 ,secrtan1 and others1 deserve grateful recognition4 ,no friend of philosophy can1 ,i think1 fail to recognize the probable benefits to be derived from that movement with which such names as ,mach and ,ostwald in ,germany are connected1 and which is sounding the call to the men of science to clear up the really distressing obscurity and confusion which has so long clung to their fundamental conceptions2 and to examine anew the significance of their assumptions1 with a view to the construction of a new and improved doctrine of the ,being of the ,world4 ,and if to these names we add those of the numerous distinguished investigators of psychology as pedagogic to philosophy1 and1 in philosophy1 of ,deussen1 ,eucken1 von ,hartmann1 ,riehl1 ,wundt1 and others1 we may well affirm that new light will continue to break forth from that country which so powerfully aroused the whole ,western ,world at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries4 ,in ,great ,britain the name and works of ,thomas ,hill ,green have influenced the attempts at a reconstruction of systematic philosophy in a manner to satisfy at one and the same time both the facts and laws of science and the sthetical1 ethical1 and religious ideals of the age1 in a very considerable degree4 ,and in this attempt1 both as it expresses itself in theoretical psychology and in the various branches of philosophical discipline1 writers like ,bradley1 ,fraser1 ,flint1 ,hodgson1 ,seth1 ,stout1 ,ward1 and others1 have taken a conspicuous part4 ,nor are there wanting in ,holland1 ,italy1 and even in ,sweden and ,russia1 thinkers equally worthy of recognition1 and recognized1 in however limited and unworthy fashion1 in their own land4 ,the names of those in ,america who have labored most faithfully1 and succeeded best1 in this enormous task of reconstructing philosophy in a systematic way1 and upon a basis of history and of modern science1 ,i do not need to mention2 they are known1 or they surely ought to be known1 to us all4 ,in attempting to summarize the gains of philosophy during the last hundred years1 we should remind ourselves that progress in philosophy does not consist in the final settlement1 and so in the solving of any of its great problems4 ,indeed1 the relations of philosophy to its grounds in experience1 and the nature of its method and of its ideal1 are such that its progress can never be expected to put an end to itself4 ,but the content of the total experience of humanity has been greatly enriched during the last century2 and the critical and reflective thought of trained minds has been led toward a more profound and comprehensive theory of ,reality1 and toward a doctrine of values that shall be more available for the improvement of man's political1 social1 and religious life4 ,in view of this truth respecting the limitations of systematic philosophy1 ,i think we may hold that certain negative results1 which are customarily adduced as unfavorable to the claims of philosophical progress1 are really signs of improvement during the latter half of the nineteenth century4 ,one is an increased spirit of reserve and caution1 and an increased modesty of claims4 ,this result is perhaps significant of riper wisdom and more trustworthy maturity4 ,kant believed himself to have established for philosophy a system of apodeictic conclusions1 which were as completely forever to have displaced the old dogmatism as ,copernicus had displaced the ,ptolemaic astronomy4 ,but the steady pressure of historical and scientific studies has made it increasingly difficult for any sane thinker to claim for any system of thinking such demonstrable validity4 ,may we not hope that the students of the particular sciences1 to whom philosophy owes so much of its enforced sanity and sane modesty1 will themselves soon share freely of the philosophic spirit with regard to their own metaphysics and ethical and religious standpoints1 touching the ,ultimate ,reality8 ,even when the recoil from the overweening self-satisfaction and crass complacency of the earlier part of the last century takes the form of melancholy1 or of acute sadness1 or even of a mild despair of philosophy1 ,i am not sure that the last state of that man is not better than the first4 ,in connection with this improvement in spirit1 we may also note an improvement in the method of philosophy4 ,the purely speculative method1 with its intensely interesting but indefensible disregard of concrete facts1 and of the conclusions of the particular sciences1 is no longer in favor even among the most ardent devotees and advocates of the superiority of philosophy to those sciences4 ,at the same time1 philosophy may quite properly continue to maintain its position of independent critic1 as well as of docile pupil1 toward the particular sciences4 ,in the same connection must be mentioned the hopeful fact that the last two or three decades have shown a decided improvement in the relations of philosophy toward the positive sciences4 ,there are plain signs of late that the attitude of antagonism1 or of neglect1 which prevailed so largely during the second and third quarters of the nineteenth century1 is to be replaced by one of friendship and mutual helpfulness4 ,and1 indeed1 science and philosophy cannot long or greatly flourish without reciprocal aid1 if by science we mean a true ,wissenschaft and if we also mean to base philosophy upon our total experience4 ,for science and philosophy are really engaged upon the same task1--to understand and to appreciate the totality of man's experience4 ,they1 therefore1 have essential and permanent relations of dependence for material1 for inspiration and correction1 and for other forms of helpfulness4 ,while1 then1 their respective spheres have been more clearly delimited during the last century1 their interdependence has been more forcefully exhibited4 ,both of them have been developing a systematic exposition of the universe4 ,both of them desire to enlarge and deepen the conception of the ,being of the ,world1 as made known to the totality of human experience1 in its ,unity of nature and significance4 ,we cannot believe that the end of the nineteenth century would sustain the charge which ,fontenelle made in the closing years of the seventeenth century3 ,l',acadmie des ,sciences ne prend la nature que par petites parcelles4 ,science itself now bids us regard the ,universe as a dynamical ,unity1 teleologically conceived1 because in a process of evolution under the control of immanent ideas4 ,philosophy assumes the same point of view1 rather at the beginning than at the end of defining its purpose2 and so feels a certain glad leap at its heart-strings1 and an impulse to hold out the hand to science1 when it hears such an utterance as that of ,poincar3 ,ce n'est pas le mchanisme le vrai1 le seul but2 c'est l'unit4 ,shall we not say1 then1 that this double-faced but wholly true lesson has been learned3 namely1 that the so-called philosophy of nature has no sound foundation and no safeguard against vagaries of every sort1 unless it follows the lead of the positive sciences of nature2 but that the sciences themselves can never afford a full satisfaction to the legitimate aspirations of human reason unless they1 too1 contribute to the philosophy of nature--writ large and conceived of as a real-ideal ,unity4 ,that nature1 as known and knowable by man1 is a great artist1 and that man's sthetical consciousness may be trusted as having a certain ontological value1 is the postulate properly derived from the considerations advanced in the latest1 and in some respects the most satisfactory1 of the three ,critiques of ,kant4 ,the ideal way of looking at natural phenomena which so delighted the mind of ,goethe has now been placed on broad and sound foundations by the fruitful industries of many workmen1--such as ,karl ,ernst von ,baer and ,charles ,darwin1--whose morphological and evolutionary conceptions of the universe have transformed the current conceptions of cosmic processes4 ,but the world of physical and natural phenomena has thereby been rendered not less1 but more1 of a ,cosmos1 an orderly totality4 ,in addition to these more general but somewhat vague evaluations of the progress of philosophy during the nineteenth century1 we are certainly called upon to face the question whether1 after all1 any advance has been made toward the more satisfactory solution of the definite problems which the ,kantian criticism left unsolved4 ,to this question ,i believe an affirmative answer may be given in accordance with the facts of history4 ,it will be remembered that the first of these problems was the epistemological4 ,certainly no little improvement has been made in the psychology of cognition4 ,we can no longer repeat the mistakes of ,kant1 either with respect to the uncritical assumptions he makes regarding the origin of knowledge in the so-called faculties of the human mind or regarding the analysis of those faculties and their interdependent relations4 ,it is not the ,scottish philosophy alone which has led to the conclusion that1 in the word of the late ,professor ,adamson1 ,what are called acts or states of consciousness are not rightly conceived of as having for their objects their own modes of existence as ways in which a subject is modified4 ,and in the larger manner both science and philosophy1 in their negations and their affirmations1 and even in their points of view1 have better grounds for the faith of human reason in its power progressively to master the knowledge of ,reality than was the case a hundred years ago4 ,nor has the skepticism of the same era1 whether by shallow scoffing at repeated failures1 or by pious sighs over the limitations of human reason1 or by critical analysis of the cognitive faculties according to well-established principles1 succeeded in limiting our speculative pretensions to the sphere of possible experience1--in the ,kantian meaning both of principles and of experience4 ,but what both science and philosophy are compelled to agree upon as a common underlying principle is this3 ,the proof of the most fundamental presuppositions1 as well as of the latest more scientifically established conclusions1 of both science and philosophy1 is the assistance they afford in the satisfactory explanation of the totality of racial experience4 ,in the evolution of the ontological problem1 as compared with the form in which it was left by the critical philosophy1 the past century has also made some notable advances4 ,to deny this would be to discredit the development of human knowledge so far as to say that we know no more about what nature is1 and man is1 than was known a hundred years ago4 ,to say this1 however1 would not be to speak truth of fact4 ,and here we may not unnaturally grow somewhat impatient with that metaphysical fallacy which places an impassable gulf between ,reality and ,experience4 ,no reality is1 of course1 cognizable or believable by man which does not somehow show its presence in his total experience4 ,but no growth of experience is possible without involving increase of knowledge representing ,reality4 ,for ,reality is no absent and dead1 or statical1 ,ding-an-,sich4 ,cognition itself is a commerce of realities4 ,and are there not plain signs that the more thoughtful men of science are becoming less averse to the recognition of the truth of ontological philosophy2 namely1 that the deeper meaning of their own studies is grasped only when they recognize that they are ever face to face with what they call ,energy and we call ,will1 and with what they call laws and we call ,mind as significant of the progressive realization of immanent ideas4 ,this ,ultimate ,reality is so profound that neither science nor philosophy will ever sound all its depths1 and so comprehensive as more than to justify all the categories of both4 ,probably1 on the whole1 there has been less progress made toward a satisfactory solution of the problems offered by the value-judgments of ethics and religion1 in the form in which these problems were left by the critical philosophy4 ,the century has illustrated the truth of ,falckenberg's statement3 ,in periods which have given birth to a skeptical philosophy1 one never looks in vain for the complementary phenomenon of mysticism4 ,twice during the century the so-called faith-philosophy1 or philosophy of feeling1 has been borne to the front1 to raise a bulwark against the advancing hosts of agnostics--occasioned in the first period by the negations of the ,kantian criticism1 and in the second by the positive conclusions of the physical and biological sciences4 ,this form of protesting against the neglect or disparagement of important factors which belong to man's sthetical1 ethical1 and religious experience1 is reasonable and must be heard4 ,but the extravagances with which these neglected factors have been posited and appraised1 to the neglect of the more definitively scientific and strictly logical1 is to be deplored4 ,the great work before the philosophy of the present age is the reconciliation of the historical and scientific conceptions of the ,universe with the legitimate sentiments and ideals of art1 morality1 and religion4 ,but surely neither rationalism nor faith-philosophy is justified in pouring out the living child with the muddy water of the bath4 ,,iv4 ,the attempt to survey the present situation of philosophy1 and to predict its immediate future1 is embarrassed by the fact that we are all immersed in it1 are a part of its spirit and present form4 ,but if nearness has its embarrassments1 it has also its benefits4 ,those who are amidst the tides of life may know better1 in a way1 how these tides are tending and what is their present strength1 than do those who survey them from distant1 cool1 and exalted heights4 ,fr jeden einzelnen bildet der ,vater und der ,sohn eine greifbare ,kette von ,lebensereignungen und ,erfahrungen4 ,the very intensely vital and formative but unformed condition of systematic philosophy--its protoplasmic character--contains promises of a new life4 ,if we may believe the view of ,hegel that the systematizing of the thought of any age marks the time when the peculiar living thought of that age is passing into a period of decay1 we may certainly claim for our present age the prospect of a prolonged vitality4 ,the nineteenth century has left us with a vast widening of the horizon1--outward into space1 backward in time1 inward toward the secrets of life1 and downward into the depths of ,reality4 ,with this there has been an increase in the profundity of the conviction of the spiritual unity of the race4 ,in the consideration of all of its problems in the immediate future and in the coming century--so far as we can see forward into this century--philosophy will have to reckon with certain marked characteristics of the human spirit which form at the same time inspiring stimuli and limiting conditions of its endeavors and achievements4 ,chief among these are the greater and more firmly established principles of the positive sciences1 and the prevalence of the historical spirit and method in the investigation of all manner of problems4 ,these influences have given shape to the conception which1 although it is as yet by no means in its final or even in thoroughly self-consistent form1 is destined powerfully to affect our philosophical as well as our scientific theories4 ,this conception is that of ,development4 ,but philosophy1 considered as the product of critical and reflective thinking over the more ultimate problems of nature and of human life1 is itself a development4 ,and it is now1 more than ever before1 a development interdependently connected with all the other great developments4 ,philosophy1 in order to adapt itself to the spirit of the age1 must welcome and cultivate the freest critical inquiry into its own methods and results1 and must cheerfully submit itself to the demand for evidences which has its roots in the common and essential experience of the race4 ,moreover1 the growth of the spirit of democracy1 which1 on the one hand1 is distinctly unfavorable to any system of philosophy whose tenets and formulas seem to have only an academic validity or a merely esoteric value1 and which1 on the other hand1 requires for its satisfaction a more tenable1 helpful1 and universally applicable theory of life and reality1 cannot fail1 in my judgment1 to influence favorably the development of philosophy4 ,in the union of the speculative and the practical2 in the harmonizing of the interests of the positive sciences1 with their judgments of fact and law1 and the interests of art1 morality1 and religion1 with their value-judgments and ideals2 in the synthesis of the truths of ,realism and ,idealism1 as they have existed hitherto and now exist in separateness or antagonism2 in a union that is not accomplished by a shallow eclecticism1 but by a sincere attempt to base philosophy upon the totality of human experience2--in such a union as this must we look for the real progress of philosophy in the coming century4 ,just now there seem to be two somewhat heterogeneous and not altogether well-defined tendencies toward the reconstruction of systematic philosophy1 both of which are powerful and represent real truths conquered by ages of intellectual industry and conflict4 ,these two1 however1 need to be internally harmonized1 in order to obtain a satisfactory statement of the development of the last century4 ,they may be called the evolutionary and the idealistic4 ,the one tendency lays emphasis on mechanism1 the other on spirit4 ,yet it is most interesting to notice how many of the early workmen in the investigation of the principle of the conservation and correlation of energy took their point of departure from distinctly teleological and spiritual conceptions4 ,i was led1 said ,colding1--to take an extreme case1--at the ,natural ,science ,congress at ,innsbruck1 #ahfi1 to the idea of the constancy of national forces by the religious conception of life4 ,and even ,moleschott1 in his ,autobiography1 posthumously published1 declares3 ,i myself was well aware that the whole conception might be converted2 for since all matter is a bearer of force1 endowed with force or penetrated with spirit1 it would be just as correct to call it a spiritualistic conception4 ,on the other hand1 the modern1 better instructed ,idealism is much inclined1 both from the psychological and from the more purely philosophical points of view1 to regard with duly profound respect all the facts and laws of that mechanism of ,reality1 which certainly is not merely the dependent construction of the human mind functioning according to a constitution that excludes it from ,reality1 but is rather the ever increasingly more trustworthy revealer of ,reality4 ,this tendency to a union of the claims of both ,realism and ,idealism is profoundly influencing the solution of each one of these problems which the ,kantian criticism left to the philosophy of the nineteenth century4 ,in respect of the epistemological problem1 philosophy--as ,i have already said--is not likely again to repeat the mistakes either of ,kant or of the dogmatism which his criticism so effectually overthrew4 ,it was a wise remark of the physician ,johann ,benjamin ,erhard1 in a letter dated ,may #ai1 #agid1 propos of ,fichte3 ,the philosophy which proceeds from a single fundamental principle1 and pretends to deduce everything from it1 is and always will remain a piece of artificial sophistry3 only that philosophy which ascends to the highest principle and exhibits everything else in perfect harmony with it1 is the true one4 ,this at least ought--one would say--to have been made clear by the century of discussion over the epistemological problem1 since ,kant4 ,you cannot deduce the ,idea from the ,reality1 or the ,reality from the ,idea4 ,the problem of knowledge is not1 as ,fichte held in the form of a fundamental assumption1 an alternative of this sort4 ,the ,idea and ,reality are1 the rather already there1 and to be recognized as in a living unity1 in every cognitive experience4 ,psychology is constantly adding something toward the problem of cognition as a problem in synthesis2 and is then in a way contributing to the better scientific understanding of the philosophical postulate which is the confidence of human reason in its ability1 by the harmonious use of all its powers1 progressively to reach a better and fuller knowledge of ,reality4 ,the ontological problem will necessarily always remain the unsolved1 in the sense of the very incompletely solved problem of philosophy4 ,but as long as human experience develops1 and as long as philosophy bestows upon experience the earnest and candid efforts of reflecting minds1 the solution of the ontological problem will be approached1 but never fully reached4 ,that ,being of the ,world which ,kant1 in the negative and critical part of his work1 left as an ,x1 unknown and unknowable1 the last century has filled with a new and far richer content than it ever had before4 ,especially has this century changed the conception of the ,unity of the ,universe in such manner that it can never return again to its ancient form4 ,on the one hand1 this ,unity cannot be made comprehensible in terms of any one scientific or philosophical principle or law4 ,science and philosophy are both moving farther and farther away from the hope of comprehending the variety and infinite manifoldness of the ,absolute in terms of any one side or aspect of man's complex experience4 ,but1 on the other hand1 the confidence in this essential ,unity is not diminished1 but is the rather confirmed4 ,as humanity itself develops1 as the ,selfhood of man grows in the experience of the world which is its own environment1 and of the world within which it is its own true ,self1 humanity may reasonably hope to win an increased1 and increasingly valid1 cognition of the ,being of the ,world as the ,absolute ,self4 ,closely connected1 and in a way essentially identical with the ontological problem1 is that of the origin1 validity1 and rational value of the ideas of humanity4 ,may it not be said that the nineteenth century transfers to the twentieth an increased interest in and a heightened appreciation of the so-called practical problems of philosophy4 ,science and philosophy certainly ought to combine--and are they not ready to combine8--in the effort to secure a more nearly satisfactory understanding and solution of the problems afforded by the sthetical1 ethical1 and religious sentiments and ideals of the race4 ,to philosophy this combination means that it shall be more fruitful than ever before in promoting the uplift and betterment of mankind4 ,the fulfillment of the practical mission of philosophy involves the application of its conceptions and principles to education1 politics1 morals1 as a matter of law and of custom1 and to religion as matter both of rational faith and of the conduct of life4 ,how1 then1 can this brief and imperfect sketch of the outline of the development of philosophy in the nineteenth century better come to a close than by words of encouragement and of exhortation as well4 ,there are1 in my judgment1 the plainest signs that the somewhat too destructive and even nihilistic tendencies of the second and third quarters of the nineteenth century have reached their limit2 that the strife of science and philosophy1 and of both with religion1 is lessening1 and is being rapidly displaced by the spirit of mutual fairness and reciprocal helpfulness2 and that reasonable hopes of a new and a splendid era of reconstruction in philosophy may be entertained4 ,for ,i cannot agree with the dictum of a recent writer on the subject1 that the sciences are coming less and less to admit of a synthesis1 and not at all of a synthetic philosopher4 ,on the contrary1 ,i hold that1 with an increased confidence in the capacity of human reason to discover and validate the most secret and profound1 as well as the most comprehensive1 of truths1 philosophy may well put aside some of its shyness and hesitancy1 and may resume more of that audacity of imagination1 sustained by ontological convictions1 which characterized its work during the first half of the nineteenth century4 ,and if the latter half of the twentieth century does for the constructions of the first half of the same century1 what the latter half of the nineteenth century did for the first half of that century1 this new criticism will only be to illustrate the way in which the human spirit makes every form of its progress4 ,therefore1 a summons of all helpers1 in critical but fraternal spirit1 to this work of reconstruction1 for which two generations of enormous advance in the positive sciences has gathered new material1 and for the better accomplishment of which both the successes and the failures of the philosophy of the nineteenth century have prepared the men of the twentieth century1 is the winsome and imperative voice of the hour4 ,,section ,a--,,metaphysics ,,section ,a--,,metaphysics 7,hall #f1 ,september #ba1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,a4 ,c4 ,,armstrong1 ,wesleyan ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,a4 ,e4 ,,taylor1 ,mc,gill ,university1 ,montreal4 ,,professor ,,alexander ,t4 ,,ormond1 ,princeton ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,professor ,a4 ,o4 ,,lovejoy1 ,washington ,university4 ,the ,chairman of the ,section1 ,professor ,a4 ,c4 ,armstrong1 of ,wesleyan ,university1 in opening the meeting referred to the continued vitality of metaphysics as shown by its repeated revivals after the many destructive attacks upon it in the later modern times3 he congratulated the ,section on the fact that the principal speakers were scholars who had made notable contributions to metaphysical theory4 ,,the ,,relations ,,between ,,metaphysics ,,and ,,the ,,other ,,sciences ,,by ,,professor ,,alfred ,,edward ,,taylor ,alfred ,edward ,taylor1 ,frothingham ,professor of ,philosophy1 ,mc,gill ,university1 ,montreal1 ,canada4 b4 ,oundle1 ,england1 ,december #bb1 #ahfi4 ,m4,a4 ,oxford4 ,fellow1 ,merton ,college1 ,oxford1 #ahia-ih1 #aijb-2 ,lecturer in ,greek and ,philosophy1 ,owens ,college1 ,manchester1 #ahif-aijc2 ,assistant ,examiner to ,university of ,wales1 #ahii-aijc2 ,green ,moral ,philosophy ,prizeman1 ,oxford1 #ahii2 ,frothingham ,professor of ,philosophy1 ,mc,gill ,university1 #aijc-2 ,member ,philosophical ,society1 ,owens ,college1 ,american ,philosophical ,association4 ,author of ,the ,problem of ,conduct2 ,elements of ,metaphysics4 ,when we seek to determine the place of metaphysics in the general scheme of human knowledge1 we are at once confronted by an initial difficulty of some magnitude4 ,there seems1 in fact1 to be no one universally accepted definition of our study1 and even no very general consensus among its votaries as to the problems with which the metaphysician ought to concern himself4 ,this difficulty1 serious as it is1 does not1 however1 justify the suspicion that our science is1 like alchemy or astrology1 an illusion1 and its high-sounding title a mere idol of the market-place1 one of those nomina rerum quae non sunt against which the ,chancellor ,bacon has so eloquently warned mankind4 ,if it is hard to determine precisely the scope of metaphysics1 it is no less difficult to do the same thing for the undoubtedly legitimate sciences of logic and mathematics4 ,and in all three cases the absence of definition merely shows that we are dealing with branches of knowledge which are1 so to say1 still in the making4 ,it is not until the first principles of science are already firmly laid beyond the possibility of cavil that we must look for general agreement as to its boundary lines1 though excellent work may be done1 long before this point has been reached1 in the establishment of individual principles and deduction of consequences from them4 ,to revert to the parallel cases ,i have just cited1 many mathematical principles of the highest importance are formulated in the ,elements of ,euclid1 and many logical principles in the ,organon of ,aristotle2 yet it is only in our own time that it has become possible to offer a general definition either of logic or of mathematics1 and even now it would probably be true to say that the majority of logicians and mathematicians trouble themselves very little about the precise definition of their respective studies4 ,the state of our science then compels me to begin this address with a more or less arbitrary1 because provisional1 definition of the term metaphysics1 for which ,i claim no more than that it may serve to indicate with approximate accuracy the class of problems which ,i shall have in view in my subsequent use of the word4 ,by metaphysics1 then1 ,i propose to understand the inquiry which used formerly to be known as ontology1 that is1 the investigation into the general character which belongs to real ,being as such1 the science1 in ,aristotelian phraseology1 of onta h onta4 ,or1 if the term real be objected against as ambiguous1 ,i would suggest as an alternative account the statement that metaphysics is the inquiry into the general character by which the content of true assertions is distinguished from that of false assertions4 ,the two definitions here offered will1 ,i think1 be found equivalent when it is borne in mind that what the second of them speaks of is exclusively the content which is asserted as true in a true proposition1 not the process of true assertion1 which1 like all other processes in the highest cerebral centres1 falls under the consideration of the vastly different sciences of psychology and cerebral physiology4 ,of the two equivalent forms of statement1 the former has perhaps the advantage of making it most clear that it is ultimately upon the objective distinction between the reality and the unreality of that which is asserted for truth1 and not upon any psychological peculiarity in the process of assertion itself that the distinction between true and untrue rests1 while the second may be useful in guarding against misconceptions that might be suggested by too narrow an interpretation of the term reality1 such as1 e4 g41 the identification of the real with what is revealed by sensuous perception4 ,from the acceptance of such a definition two important consequences would follow4 7#a7 ,the first is that metaphysics is at once sharply discriminated from any study of the psychical process of knowledge1 if indeed1 there can be any such study distinct from the psychology of conception and belief1 which is clearly not itself the science we have in view4 ,for the psychological laws of the formation of concepts and beliefs are exemplified equally in the discovery and propagation of truth and of error4 ,and thus it is in vain to look to them for any explanation of the difference between the two4 ,nor does the otherwise promising extension of ,darwinian conceptions of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest to the field of opinions and convictions appear to affect this conclusion4 ,such considerations may indeed assist us to understand how true convictions in virtue of their usefulness gradually come to be established and extended1 but they require to presume the truth of these convictions as an antecedent condition of their usefulness and consequent establishment4 ,i should infer1 then1 that it is a mistake in principle to seek to replace ontology by a theory of knowledge1 and should even be inclined to question the very possibility of such a theory as distinct from metaphysics on the one hand and empirical psychology on the other4 7#b7 ,the second consequence is of even greater importance4 ,the inquiry into the general character by which the contents of true assertions are discriminated from the contents of false assertions must be carefully distinguished from any investigation into the truth or falsehood of special assertions4 ,to ask how in the end truth differs from falsehood is to raise an entirely different problem from that created by asking whether a given statement is to be regarded as true or false4 ,the distinction becomes particularly important when we have to deal with what ,locke would call assertions of real existence1 i4 e41 assertions as to the occurrence of particular events in the temporal order4 ,all such assertions depend1 in part at least1 upon the admission of what we may style empirical evidence1 the immediate unanalyzed witness of simple apprehension to the occurrence of an alleged matter of fact4 ,thus it would follow from our proposed conception of metaphysics that metaphysics is in principle incapable either of establishing or refuting any assertion as to the details of our immediate experience of empirical fact1 though it may have important bearings upon any theory of the general nature of true ,being which we may seek to found upon our alleged experiences4 ,in a word1 if our conception be the correct one1 the functions of a science of metaphysics in respect of our knowledge of the temporal sequence of events psychical and physical must be purely critical1 never constructive1--a point to which ,i shall presently have to recur4 ,one more general reflection1 and we may pass to the consideration of the relation of metaphysics to the various alreadyorganized branches of human knowledge more in detail4 ,the admission that there is1 or may be1 such a study as we have described1 seems of itself to involve the recognition that definite knowledge about the character of what really is1 is attainable1 and thus to commit us to a position of sharp opposition both to consistent and thorough-going agnosticism and also to the latent agnosticism of ,kantian and neo-,kantian critical philosophy4 ,in recognizing ontology as a legitimate investigation1 we revert in principle to the dogmatist position common1 e4 g41 to ,plato1 to ,spinoza and to ,leibniz1 that there is genuine truth which can be known1 and that this genuine truth is not confined to statements about the process of knowing itself4 ,in fact1 the critical view that the only certain truth is truth about the process of knowing seems to be inherently self-contradictory4 ,for the knowledge that such a proposition as1 e4 g41 ,i know only the laws of my own apprehending activity1 is true1 would itself be knowledge not about the process of knowing but about the content known4 ,thus metaphysics1 conceived as the science of the general character which distinguishes truth from falsehood1 presupposes throughout all knowledge the presence of what we may call a transcendent object1 that is1 a content which is never identical with the process by which it is apprehended1 though it may no doubt be maintained that the two1 the process and its content1 if distinct1 are yet not ultimately separable4 ,that they are in point of fact not ultimately separable would seem to be the doctrine which1 under various forms of statement1 is common to and characteristic of all the idealistic systems of metaphysics4 ,so much then in defense of a metaphysical point of view which seems to be closely akin to that of ,mr4 ,bradley and of ,professor ,royce1 to mention only two names of contemporary philosophers1 and which might1 ,i think1 for the purpose of putting it in sharp opposition to the neo-,kantian view1 not unfairly be called1 if it is held to need a name1 neo-,leibnizian4 ,in passing on to discuss in brief the nature of the boundary lines which divide metaphysics from other branches of study1 it seems necessary to start with a clear distinction between the pure or formal and the applied or empirical sciences1 the more so as in the loose current employment of language the name science is frequently given exclusively to the latter4 ,in every-day life1 when we are told that a certain person is a man of science1 or as the detestable jargon of our time likes to say1 a scientist1 we expect to find that he is1 e4 g41 a geologist1 a chemist1 a biologist1 or an electrician4 ,we should be a little surprised to find on inquiry that our man of science was a pure mathematician1 and probably more than a little to learn that he was a formal logician4 ,the distinction between the pure and the empirical sciences may be roughly indicated by saying that the latter class comprises all those sciences which yield information about the particular details of the temporal order of events physical and psychical1 whereas the pure sciences deal solely with the general characteristics either of all truths1 or of all truths of some well-defined class4 ,more exactly we may say that the marks by which an empirical is distinguished from a pure science are two4 7#a7 ,the empirical sciences one and all imply the presence among their premises of empirical propositions1 that is1 propositions which assert the actual occurrence of some temporal fact1 and depend upon the witness of immediate apprehension1 either in the form of sense perception or in that of what is commonly called self-consciousness4 ,in the vague language made current by ,kant1 they involve an appeal to some form of unanalyzed intuition4 ,the pure sciences1 on the other hand1 contain no empirical propositions either among their premises or their conclusions4 ,the principles which form their premises are self-evidently true propositions1 containing no reference to the actual occurrence of any event in the temporal order1 and thus involving no appeal to any form of intuition4 ,and the conclusions established in a pure science are all rigidly logical deductions from such self-evident premises4 ,that the universality of this distinction is still often overlooked even by professed writers on scientific method seems explicable by two simple considerations4 ,on the one hand1 it is easy to overlook the important distinction between a principle which is self-evident1 that is1 which cannot be denied without explicit falsehood1 and a proposition affirmed on the warrant of the senses1 because1 though its denial cannot be seen to be obviously false1 the senses appear on each fresh appeal to substantiate the assertion4 ,thus the ,euclidean postulate about parallels was long falsely supposed to possess exactly the same kind of self-evidence as the dictum de omni and the principle of identity which are part of the foundations of all logic4 ,and further ,kant1 writing under the influence of this very confusion1 has given wide popularity to the view that the best known of the pure sciences1 that of mathematics1 depends upon the admission of empirical premises in the form of an appeal to intuition of the kind just described4 ,fortunately the recent developments of arithmetic at the hands of such men as ,weierstrass1 ,cantor1 and ,dedekind seem to have definitely refuted the ,kantian view as far as general arithmetic1 the pure science of number1 is concerned1 by proving that one and all of its propositions are analytic in the strict sense of the word1 that is1 that they are capable of rigid deduction from self-evident premises1 so that1 in what regards arithmetic1 we may say with ,schrder that the famous ,kantian question how are synthetic judgments a priori possible8 is now known to be meaningless4 ,as regards geometry1 the case appears to a non-mathematician like myself more doubtful4 ,those who hold with ,schrder that geometry essentially involves1 as ,kant thought it did1 an appeal to principles not self-evident and dependent upon an appeal to sensuous intuition1 are logically bound to conclude with him that geometry is an empirical1 or as ,w4 ,k4 ,clifford called it1 a physical science1 different in no way from mechanics except in the relative paucity of the empirical premises presupposed1 and to class it with the applied sciences4 ,on the other hand1 if ,mr4 ,bertrand ,russell should be successful in his promised demonstration that all the principles of geometry are deducible from a few premises which include nothing of the nature of an appeal to sensuous diagrams1 geometry too would take its place among the pure sciences1 but only on condition of our recognizing that its truths1 like those of arithmetic1 are one and all1 as ,leibniz held1 strictly analytical4 ,thus we obtain as a first distinction between the pure and the empirical sciences the principle that the propositions of the former class are all analytical1 those of the latter all synthetic4 ,it is not the least of the services which ,france is now rendering to the study of philosophy that we are at last being placed by the labors of ,m4 ,couturat in a position to appreciate at their full worth the views of the first and greatest of ,german philosophers on this distinction1 and to understand how marvelously they have been confirmed by the subsequent history of mathematics and of logic4 7#b7 ,a consequence of this distinction is that only the pure or formal sciences can be matter of rigid logical demonstration4 ,since the empirical or applied sciences one and all contain empirical premises1 i4 e41 premises which we admit as true only because they have always appeared to be confirmed by the appeal to intuition1 and not because the denial of them can be shown to lead to falsehood1 the conclusions to which they conduct us must one and all depend1 in part at least1 upon induction from actual observation of particular temporal sequences4 ,this is as much as to say that all propositions in the applied sciences involve somewhere in the course of the reasoning by which they are established the appeal to the calculus of ,probabilities1 which is our one method of eliciting general results from the statistics supplied by observation or experiment4 ,that this is the case with the more concrete among such applied sciences has long been universally acknowledged4 ,that it is no less true of sciences of such wide range as mechanics may be said1 ,i think1 to have been definitely established in our own day by the work of such eminent physicists as ,kirchhoff and ,mach4 ,in fact1 the recent developments of the science of pure number1 to which reference has been made in a preceding paragraph1 combined with the creation of the descriptive theory of mechanics1 may fairly be said to have finally vindicated the distinction drawn by ,leibniz long ago between the truths of reason and the truths of empirical fact1 a distinction which the ,kantian trend of philosophical speculation tended during the greater part of the nineteenth century to obscure1 while it was absolutely ignored by the empiricist opponents of metaphysics both in ,england and in ,germany4 ,the philosophical consequences of a revival of the distinction are1 ,i conceive1 of far-reaching importance4 ,on the one side1 recognition of the empirical and contingent character of all general propositions established by induction appears absolutely fatal to the current mechanistic conception of the universe as a realm of purposeless sequences unequivocally determined by unalterable laws of nature1 a result which has in recent years been admirably illustrated for the ,english-speaking world by ,professor ,ward's well-known ,gifford lectures on ,naturalism and ,agnosticism4 ,laws of physical nature1 on the empiristic view of applied science1 can mean no more than observed regularities1 obtained by the application of the doctrine of chances1--regularities which we are indeed justified in accepting with confidence as the basis for calculation of the future course of temporal sequence1 but which we have no logical warrant for treating as ultimate truths about the final constitution of things4 ,thus1 for example1 take the common assumption that our physical environment is composed of a multitude of particles each in every respect the exact counterpart of every other4 ,reflection upon the nature of the evidence by which this conclusion1 if supported at all1 has to be supported1 should convince us that at most all that the statement ought to mean is that individual differences between the elementary constituents of the physical world need not be allowed for in devising practical formulae for the intelligent anticipation of events4 ,when the proposition is put forward as an absolute truth and treated as a reason for denying the ultimate spirituality of the world1 we are well within our rights in declining the consequence on the logical ground that conclusions from an empirical premise must in their own nature be themselves empirical and contingent4 ,on the other hand1 the extreme empiricism which treats all knowledge whatsoever as merely relative to the total psychical state of the knower1 and therefore in the end problematic1 must1 ,i apprehend1 go down before any serious investigation into the nature of the analytic truths of arithmetic1 a consequence which seems to be of some relevance in connection with the philosophic view popularly known as ,pragmatism4 ,thus ,i should look to the coming regeneration of metaphysics1 of which there are so many signs at the moment1 on the one hand1 for emphatic insistence on the right1 e4 g41 of physics and biology and psychology to be treated as purely empirical sciences1 and as such freed from the last vestiges of any domination by metaphysical presuppositions and foregone conclusions1 and on the other1 for an equally salutary purgation of formal studies like logic and arithmetic from the taint of corruption by the irrelevant intrusion of considerations of empirical psychology4 ,we cannot too persistently bear in mind that there is1 corresponding to the logical distinction between the analytic and the synthetic proposition1 a deep and broad general difference between the wants of our nature ministered to by the formal and the applied sciences respectively4 ,the formal sciences1 incapable of adding anything to our detailed knowledge of the course of events1 as we have seen1 enlighten us solely as to the general laws of interconnection by which all conceivable systems of true assertions are permeated and bound together4 ,in a different connection it would be interesting to develop further the reflection that the necessity of appealing to such formal principles in all reasoning about empirical matters of fact contains the explanation of the famous ,platonic assertion that the ,idea of ,good or supreme principle of organization and order in the universe1 is itself not an existent1 but something eti epekeina ts ousias1 transcending even existence1 and the very similar declaration of ,hegel that the question whether ,god--in the sense of such a supreme principle--exists is frivolous1 inasmuch as existence 7,dasein7 is a category entirely inadequate to express the ,divine nature4 ,for my present purpose it is enough to remark that the need to which the formal sciences minister is the demand for that purely speculative satisfaction which arises from insight into the order of interconnection between the various truths which compose the totality of true knowledge4 ,hence it seems a mistake to say1 as some theorists have done1 that were we born with a complete knowledge of the course of temporal sequences throughout the universe1 and a faultless memory1 we should have no need of logic or metaphysics1 or in fact of inference4 ,for even a mind already in possession of all true propositions concerning the course of events1 would still lack one of the requisites for complete intellectual satisfaction unless it were also aware1 not only of the individual truths1 but of the order of their interdependence4 ,what ,aristotle said long ago with reference to a particular instance may be equally said universally of all our empirical knowledge2 even if we stood on the moon and saw the earth intercepting the light of the sun1 we should still have to ask for the reason why4 ,the purposes ministered to by the empirical sciences1 on the other hand1 always include some reference to the actual manipulation in advance by human agency of the stream of events4 ,we study mechanics1 for instance1 not merely that we may perceive the interdependence of truths1 but that we may learn how to maintain a system of bodies in equilibrium1 or how to move masses in a given direction with a given momentum4 ,hence it is true of applied science1 though untrue of science as a whole1 that it would become useless if the whole past and future course of events were from the first familiar to us4 ,and1 incidentally it may be observed1 it is for the same reason untrue of inference1 though true of inductive inference1 that it is essentially a passage from the known to the unknown4 ,in dealing with the relation of metaphysics to the formal sciences generally1 the great difficulty which confronts us is that of determining exactly the boundaries which separate one from another4 ,among such pure sciences we have by universal admission to include at least two1 pure formal logic and pure mathematics1 as distinguished from the special applications of logic and mathematics to an empirical material4 ,whether we ought also to recognize ethics and sthetics1 in the sense of the general determination of the nature of the good and the beautiful1 as non-empirical sciences1 seems to be a more difficult question4 ,it seems clear1 for instance1 that ethical discussions1 such as bulk so largely in our contemporary literature1 as to what is the right course of conduct under various conditions1 are concerned throughout with an empirical material1 namely1 the existing peculiarities of human nature as we find it1 and must therefore be regarded as capable only of an empirical and therefore problematic solution4 ,accordingly ,i was at one time myself tempted to regard ethics as a purely empirical science1 and even published a lengthy treatise in defense of that point of view and in opposition to the whole ,kantian conception of the possibility of a constructive ,metaphysik der ,sitten4 ,it seems1 however1 possible to hold that in the question ,what do we mean by good8 as distinguished from the question ,what in particular is it right to do8 there is no more of a reference to the empirical facts of human psychology than in the question ,what do we mean by truth8 and that there must therefore be a non-empirical answer to the problem4 ,the same would of course hold equally true of the question ,what is beauty8 ,if there are1 however1 such a pure science of ethics and again of sthetics1 it must at least be allowed that for the most part these sciences are still undiscovered1 and that the ethical and sthetical results hitherto established are in the main of an empirical nature1 and this must be my excuse for confining the remarks of the next two paragraphs to the two great pure sciences of which the general principles may be taken to be now in large measure known4 ,that metaphysics and logic should sometimes have been absolutely identified1 as for instance by ,hegel1 will not surprise us when we consider how hard it becomes on the view here defended to draw any hard and fast boundary line between them4 ,for metaphysics1 according to this conception of its scope1 deals with the formulation of the self-evident principles implied1 in there being such a thing as truth and the deductions which these principles warrant us in drawing4 ,thus it might be fairly said to be the supreme science of order1 and it would not be hard to show that all the special questions commonly included in its range1 as to the nature of space1 time1 causation1 continuity1 and so forth1 are all branches of the general question1 how many types of order among concepts are there1 and what is their nature4 ,a completed metaphysics would thus appear as the realization of ,plato's splendid conception of dialectic as the ultimate reduction of the contents of knowledge to order by their continuous deduction from a supreme principle 7or1 we may add1 principles74 ,now such a view seems to make it almost impossible to draw any ultimate distinction between logic and metaphysics4 ,for logic is strictly the science of the mutual implication of propositions1 as we see as soon as we carefully exclude from it all psychological accretions4 ,in the question what are the conditions under which one proposition or group of propositions imply another1 we exhaust the whole scope of logic pure and proper1 as distinguished from its various empirical applications4 ,this is the important point which is so commonly forgotten when logic is defined as being in some way a study of psychical processes1 or when the reference to the presence of minds in which propositions exist1 is intended into logical science4 ,we cannot too strongly insist that for logic the question so constantly raised in a multitude of text-books1 what processes actually take place when we pass from the assertion of the premises to the assertion of the conclusion1 is an irrelevant one1 and that the only logical problem raised by inference is whether the assertion of the premises as true warrants the further assertion of the conclusion1 supposing it to be made4 7,at the risk of a little digression ,i cannot help pointing out that the confusion between a logical and a psychological problem is committed whenever we attempt1 as is so often done1 to make the self-evidence of a principle identical with our psychological inability to believe the contradictory4 ,from the strictly logical point of view1 all that is to be said about the two sides of such an ultimate contradiction is that the one is true and the other is false4 ,whether it is or is not possible1 as a matter of psychical fact for me to affirm with equal conviction1 both sides of a contradiction1 knowing that ,i am doing so1 is a question of empirical psychology which is possibly insoluble1 and at any rate seems not to have received from the psychologists the attention it deserves4 ,but the logician1 so far as ,i can see1 has no interest as a logician in its solution4 ,for him it would still be the case even though all mankind should actually and consciously affirm both sides of a given contradiction1 that one of the affirmations would be true1 and the other untrue47 ,logic thus seems to become either the whole or an integral part of the science of order1 and there remain only two possible ways of distinguishing it from metaphysics4 ,it might be suggested that logical order1 the order of implication between truths1 is only one species of a wider genus1 order in general by the side1 for example1 of spatial1 temporal1 and numerical order1 and thus that logic is one subordinate branch of the wider science of metaphysics4 ,such a view1 of course1 implies that there are a plurality of ultimately independent forms of order irreducible to a single type4 ,whether this is the case1 ,i must confess myself at present incompetent to decide1 though the signal success with which the principles of number have already been deduced from the fundamental definitions and axioms of symbolic logic1 and number itself defined1 as by ,mr4 ,russell1 in terms of the purely logical concept of class-relation1 seems to afford some presumption to the contrary4 ,or it may be held that the difference is purely one of the degree of completeness with which the inquiry into order is pursued4 ,thus the ordinary symbolic logic of what ,schrder has called the identical calculus1 or calculus of domains1 consists of a series of deductions from the fundamental concepts of class and number1 identical equality1 totality or the logical #a1 zero or the null-class1 and the three principles of identity1 subsumption1 and negation4 ,the moment you cease to accept these data in their totality as the given material for your science1 and to inquire into their mutual coherence1 by asking for instance whether any one of them could be denied1 and yet a body of consistent results deduced from the rest1 your inquiry1 it might be said1 becomes metaphysics4 ,so1 again1 the discussion of the well-known contradictions which arise when we try to apply these principles in their entirety and without modification to classes of classes instead of classes of individuals1 or of the problem raised by ,peano and ,russell1 whether the assertions ,socrates is a man and the ,greeks are men affirm the same or a different relation between their subject and predicate 7which seems indeed to be the same question differently stated71 would generally be allowed to be metaphysical4 ,and the same thing seems to be equally true of the introduction of time relations into the interpretation of our symbols for predication employed by ,boole in his treatment of hypotheticals1 and subsequently adopted by his successors as the foundation of the calculus of equivalent statements4 ,however we may decide such questions1 we seem at least driven by their existence to the recognition of two important conclusions4 7#a7 ,the relation between logical and metaphysical problems is so close that you cannot in consistency deny the possibility of a science of metaphysics unless you are prepared with the absolute skeptic to go the length of denying the possibility of logic also1 and reducing the first principles of inference to the level of formulae which have happened hitherto to prove useful but are1 for all we know1 just as likely to fail us in future application as not4 7,any appeal to the doctrine of chances would be out of place here1 as that doctrine is itself based on the very principles at stake47 7#b7 ,the existence of fundamental problems of this kind which remained almost or wholly unsuspected until revealed in our own time by the creation of a science of symbolic logic should console us if ever we are tempted to suspect that metaphysics is at any rate a science in which all the main constructive work has already been accomplished by the great thinkers of the past4 ,to me it appears1 on the contrary1 that the recent enormous developments in the purely formal sciences of logic and mathematics1 with the host of fundamental problems they open up1 give promise of an approaching era of fresh speculative construction which bids fair to be no less rich in results than any of the great golden periods in the past history of our science4 ,indeed1 but that ,i would avoid the slightest suspicion of a desire to advertise personal friends1 ,i fancy ,i might even venture to name some of those to whom we may reasonably look for the work to be done4 ,of the relation of metaphysics to pure mathematics it would be impertinent for any but a trained mathematician to say very much4 ,i must therefore be content to point out that the same difficulty in drawing boundary lines meets us here as in the case of logic4 ,not so long ago this difficulty might have been ignored1 as it still is by too many writers on the philosophy of science4 ,until recently mathematics would have been thought to be adequately defined as the science of numerical and quantitative relations1 and adequately distinguished from metaphysics by the non-quantitative and non-numerical character of the latter1 though it would probably have been admitted that the problem of the definition of quantity and number themselves is a metaphysical one4 ,but in the present state of our knowledge such an account seems doubly unsatisfactory4 ,on the one hand1 we have to recognize the existence of branches of mathematics1 such as the so-called descriptive geometry1 which are neither quantitative nor numerical1 and1 on the other1 quantity as distinct from number appears to play no part in mathematical science1 while number itself1 thanks to the labors of such men as ,cantor and ,dedekind1 seems1 as ,i have said before1 to be known now to be only a special type of order in a series4 ,thus there appears to be ground for regarding serial order as the fundamental category of mathematics1 and we are thrown back once more upon the difficult task of deciding how many ultimately irreducible types of order there may be before we can undertake any precise discrimination between mathematical and metaphysical science4 ,however we may regard the problem1 it is at least certain that the recent researches of mathematicians into the meaning of such concepts as continuity and infinity have1 besides opening up new metaphysical problems1 done much to transfigure the familiar ones1 as all readers of ,professor ,royce must be aware4 ,for instance ,i imagine all of us here present1 even the youngest1 were brought up on the ,aristotelian doctrine that there is and can be no such thing as an actually existing infinite collection1 but which of us would care to defend that time-honored position to-day8 ,similarly with continuity all of us were probably once on a time instructed that whereas quantity is continuous1 number is essentially discrete1 and is indeed the typical instance of what we mean by the non-continuous4 ,to-day we know that it is in the number series that we have our one certain and familiar instance of a perfect continuum4 ,still a third illustration of the transforming light which is thrown upon old standing metaphysical puzzles by the increasing formal development of mathematics may be found in the difficulties attendant upon the conception of the infinitely little1 once regarded as the logical foundation of the so-called ,differential ,calculus4 ,with the demonstration1 which maybe found in ,mr4 ,russell's important work1 that infinitesimal1 unlike infinite1 is a purely relative term1 and that there are no infinitesimal real numbers1 the supposed logical significance of the concept seems simply to disappear4 ,instances of this kind could easily be multiplied almost indefinitely1 but those already cited should be sufficient to show how important are the metaphysical results which may be anticipated from contemporary mathematical research1 and how grave a mistake it would be to regard existing metaphysical construction1 e4 g41 that of the ,hegelian system1 as adequate in principle to the present state of our organized knowledge4 ,in fact1 all the materials for a new ,kategorienlehre1 which may be to the knowledge of our day what ,hegel's ,logic was to that of eighty years ago1 appear to lie ready to hand when it may please ,providence to send us the metaphysician who knows how to avail himself of them4 ,the proof1 given since this address was delivered1 by ,e4 ,zermelo1 that every assemblage can be well ordered1 is an even more startling illustration of the remarks in the text4 ,it remains to say something of the relation of metaphysical speculation to the various sciences which make use of empirical premises4 ,on this topic ,i maybe allowed to be all the more brief1 as ,i have quite recently expressed my views at fair length in an extended treatise 7,elements of ,metaphysics1 ,bks4 #c and #d71 and have nothing of consequence to add to what has been there said4 ,the empirical sciences1 as previously defined1 appear to fall into two main classes1 distinguished by a difference which corresponds to that often taken in the past as the criterion by which science is to be separated from philosophy4 ,we may study the facts of temporal sequence either with a view to the actual control of future sequences or with a view to detecting under the sequence some coherent purpose4 ,it is in the former way that we deal with facts in mechanics1 for instance1 or in chemistry1 in the latter that we treat them when we study history for the purpose of gaining insight into national aims and character4 ,we may1 if we please1 with ,professor ,royce1 distinguish the two attitudes toward fact as the attitude respectively of description and of appreciation or evaluation4 ,now as regards the descriptive sciences1 the position to which1 as ,i believe1 metaphysicians are more and more tending is that here metaphysics has1 strictly speaking1 no right at all to interfere4 ,just because of the absence from metaphysics itself of all empirical premises1 it can be no business of the metaphysician to determine what the course of events will be or to prescribe to the sciences what methods and hypotheses they shall employ in the work of such determination4 ,within these sciences any and every hypothesis is sufficiently justified1 whatever its nature1 so long as it enables us more efficiently than any other to perform the actual task of calculation and prediction4 ,and it was owing to neglect of this caution that the ,naturphilosophie of the early nineteenth century speedily fell into a disrepute fully merited by its ignorant presumption4 ,as regards the physical sciences1 the metaphysician has indeed by this time probably learned his lesson4 ,we are not likely to-day to repeat the mistake of supposing that it is for us as metaphysicians to dictate what shall be the physicist's or chemist's definition of matter or mass or elementary substance or energy1 or how he shall formulate the laws of motion or of chemical composition4 ,here1 at any rate1 we can see that the metaphysician's work is done when his analysis has made it clear that we are dealing with no self-evident truths such as the laws of number1 but with inductive1 and therefore problematic and provisional results of empirical assumptions as to the course of facts1 assumptions made not because of their inherent necessity1 but because of their practical utility for the special task of calculation4 ,it is only when such empirical assumptions are treated as self-evident axioms1 in fact when mechanical science gives itself out as a mechanistic philosophy1 that the metaphysician obtains a right to speak1 and then only for the purpose of showing by analysis that the presence of the empirical postulates which is characteristic of the natural sciences of itself excludes their erection into a philosophy of first principles4 ,what is important in this connection is that we should recognize quite clearly that psychology stands in this respect on precisely the same logical footing as physics or chemistry4 ,it is tempting to suppose that in psychology1 at any rate1 we are dealing throughout with absolute certainties1 realities which consciousness apprehends just as they are without any of that artificial selection and construction which1 as we are beginning to see1 is imposed upon the study of physical nature by the limitations of our purpose of submitting the course of events to calculation and manipulation4 ,and it is a natural consequence of this point of view to infer that since psychology deals directly with realities1 it must be taken as the foundation of the metaphysical constructions which aim at understanding the general character of the real as such4 ,the consequence1 indeed1 disappears at once if the views maintained in this address as to the intimate relation of metaphysics and logic1 and the radical expulsion from logic of all discussion of mental processes as such1 be admitted4 ,but it is still important to note that the premises from which the conclusion in question was drawn are themselves false4 ,we must never allow ourselves to forget that1 as the ever-increasing domination of psychology by the highly artificial methods of observation and experiment introduced by ,fechner and ,wundt is daily making more apparent1 psychology itself1 like physics1 deals not directly with the concrete realities of individual experience1 but with an abstract selected from that experience1 or rather a set of artificial symbols only partially corresponding with the realities symbolized1 and devised for the special object of submitting the realm of mental sequences to mathematical calculation4 ,we might1 in fact1 have based this inference upon the single reflection that every psychological law is obtained1 like physical laws1 by the statistical method of elimination of individual peculiarities1 and the taking of an average from an extended series of measurements4 ,for this very reason1 no psychological law can possibly describe the unique realities of individual experience4 ,we have in psychology1 as in the physical sciences1 the duty of suspecting exact correspondence between the single case and the general law to be of itself proof of error somewhere in the course of our computation4 ,these views1 which ,i suppose ,i learned in the first instance from ,mr4 ,f4 ,h4 ,bradley's paper called ,a ,defence of ,phenomenalism in ,psychology1 may now1 ,i think1 be taken as finally established beyond doubt by the exhaustive analysis of ,professor ,mnsterberg's ,grundzge der ,psychologie4 ,they possess the double advantage of freeing the psychologist once for all from any interference by the metaphysician in the prosecution of his proper study1 and delivering metaphysics from the danger of having assumptions whose sole justification lies in their utility for the purpose of statistical computation thrust upon it as self-evident principles4 ,for their full discussion ,i may perhaps be allowed to refer to the first three chapters of the concluding book of my ,elements of ,metaphysics4 ,when we turn to the sciences which aim at the appreciation or evaluation of empirical fact1 the case seems rather different4 ,it may fairly be regarded as incumbent on the metaphysician to consider how far the general conception he has formed of the character of reality can be substantiated and filled in by our empirical knowledge of the actual course of temporal sequence4 ,and thus the way seems to lie open to the construction of what may fairly be called a ,philosophy of ,nature and ,history4 ,for instance1 a metaphysician who has rightly or wrongly convinced himself that the universe can only be coherently conceived as a society of souls or wills may reasonably go on to ask what views seem best in accord with our knowledge of human character and animal intelligence as to the varying degrees of organized intelligence manifested by the members of such a hierarchy of souls1 and the nature and amount of mutual intercourse between them4 ,and again1 he may fairly ask what general way of conceiving what we loosely call the inanimate world would at once be true to fundamental metaphysical principles and free from disagreement with the actual state of our physical hypotheses4 ,only he will need to bear in mind that since conclusions on these points involve appeal to the present results of the inductive sciences1 and thus to purely empirical postulates1 any views he may adopt must of necessity share in the problematic and provisional character of the empirical sciences themselves1 and can have no claim to be regarded as definitely demonstrated in respect of their details4 ,i will here only indicate very briefly two lines of inquiry to which these reflections appear applicable4 ,the growth of evolutionary science1 with the new light it has thrown upon the processes by which useful variations may be established without the need for presupposing conscious prexisting design1 naturally gives rise to the question whether such unconscious factors are of themselves sufficient to account for the actual course of development so far as it can be traced1 or whether the actual history of the world offers instances of results which1 so far as we can see1 can only have issued from deliberate design4 ,and thus we seem justified in regarding the problem of the presence of ends in ,nature as an intelligible and legitimate one for the philosophy of the future4 ,i would only suggest that such an inquiry must be prosecuted throughout by the same empirical methods1 and with the same consciousness of the provisional character of any conclusions we may reach which would be recognized as in place if we were called on to decide whether some peculiar characteristic of an animal group or some singular social practice in a recently discovered tribe does or does not indicate definite purpose on the part of breeders or legislators4 ,the same remarks1 in my opinion1 apply to the familiar problems of ,natural ,theology relative to the existence and activity of such non-human intelligences as are commonly understood by the names ,god or gods4 ,hume and ,kant1 as it seems to me1 have definitely shown between them that the old-fashioned attempts to demonstrate from self-evident principles the existence of a supreme personal intelligence as a condition of the very being of truth all involve unavoidable logical paralogisms4 ,i should myself1 indeed1 be prepared to go further1 and to say that the conception of a single personality as the ground of truth and reality can be demonstrated to involve contradiction1 but this ,i know is a question upon which some philosophers for whom ,i entertain the profoundest respect hold a contrary opinion4 ,the more modest question1 however1 whether the actual course of human history affords probable ground for believing in the activity of one or more non-human personalities as agents in the development of our species ,i cannot but think a perfectly proper subject for empirical investigation1 if only it be borne in mind that any conclusion upon such a point is inevitably affected by the provisional character of our information as to empirical facts themselves1 and can claim in consequence nothing more than a certain grade of probability4 ,with this proviso1 ,i cannot but regard the question as to the existence of a ,god or of gods as one upon which we may reasonably hope for greater certainty as our knowledge of the empirical facts of the world's history increases4 ,and ,i should be inclined only to object to any attempt to foreclose examination by forcing a conclusion either in the theistic or in the atheistic sense on alleged grounds of a priori metaphysics4 ,in a word1 ,i would maintain not only with ,kant that the physico-theological argument is specially deserving of our regard1 but with ,boole that it is with it that ,natural ,theology must stand or fall4 ,,note ,,on ,,extension ,,and ,,intension ,,of ,,terms ,among the numerous difficulties which beset the teaching of the elements of formal logic to beginners1 one of the earliest is that of deciding whether all names shall be considered to have meaning both in extension and intension4 ,as we all know1 the problem arises in connection with two classes of names1 7#a7 proper names of individuals1 7#b7 abstract terms4 ,i should like to indicate what seems to me the true solution of the difficulty1 though ,i do not remember to have seen it advocated anywhere in just the form ,i should prefer4 7#a7 ,as to proper names4 ,it seems clear that those who regard the true proper name as a meaningless label are nearer the truth than those who assert with ,jevons that a proper name has for its intension all the predicates which can be truly ascribed to the object named4 ,as has often been observed1 it is a sufficient proof that1 for example1 ,john does not mean a human being of the male sex1 to note that he who names his daughter1 his dog1 or his canoe ,john1 makes no false assertion1 though he may commit a solecism4 ,so far the followers of ,mill seem to have a satisfactory answer to ,jevons1 when they say1 for example1 that he confuses the intension of a term with its accidental or acquired associations4 7,so1 again1 we can see that ,socrates cannot mean the wisest of the ,greek philosophers1 by considering that ,i may perfectly well understand the statement there goes ,socrates without being aware that ,socrates is wise or a ,greek or a philosopher47 ,and if we objected that no proper name actually in use is ever without some associations which in part determine its meaning by restricting its applicability1 it would be a valid rejoinder that in pure logic we have to consider not the actual usages of language1 but those that would prevail in an ideal language purged of all elements of irrelevancy4 ,in such an ideal scientific language1 it might be said1 the proper name would be reduced to the level of a mere mark serviceable for identification1 but conveying no implication whatever as to the special nature of the thing identified4 ,thus it would be indifferent what mark we attach to any particular individual1 just as in mathematics it is indifferent what alphabetical symbol we appropriate to stand for a given class or number4 ,i think1 however1 that even in such an ideal scientific language the proper name would have a certain intension4 ,in the first place1 the use of proper name seems to inform us that the thing named is not unique1 is not the only member of a class4 ,to a monotheist1 for instance1 the name ,god is no true proper name1 nor can he consistently give a proper name to his ,deity4 ,it is only where one member of a class has to be distinguished from others that the bestowal of a proper name has a meaning4 ,and1 further1 to give a thing a proper name seems to imply that the thing is itself not a class4 ,in logic we have1 of course1 occasion to form the concept of classes which have other classes for their individual members4 ,but the classes which compose such classes of classes could not themselves be identified by means of proper names4 ,thus the employment of a proper name seems to indicate that the thing named is not the only member of its class1 and further that it is not itself a class of individuals4 ,beyond this it seems to be a mere question of linguistic convention what information the use of a proper name shall convey4 ,hence it ought to be said1 not that the proper name has no intension1 but that it represents a limiting case in which intension is at a minimum4 7#b7 ,as to abstract terms4 ,ought we to say1 with so many ,english formal logicians1 that an abstract term is always singular and non-intensional8 ,the case for asserting that such terms are all singular1 ,i own1 seems unanswerable4 ,for it is clear that if the name of an attribute or relation is equally the name of another attribute or relation1 it is ambiguous and thus not properly one term at all4 ,to say1 for example1 that whiteness means two or more distinct qualities seems to amount to saying that it has no one definite meaning4 ,of course1 it is true that milk is white1 paper is white1 and snow is white1 and yet the color-tones of the three are distinct4 ,but what we assert here is1 not that there are different whitenesses1 but only that there are different degrees of approximation to a single ideal standard or type of whiteness4 ,it is just because the whiteness we have in view is one and not many that we can intelligibly assert1 for example1 that newly fallen snow is whiter than any paper4 ,all the instances produced by ,mill to show that abstract terms may be general seem to me either to involve confusion between difference of kind and difference in degree of approximation to type1 or else to depend upon treating as abstract a term which is really concrete4 ,thus when we say red1 blue1 green1 are different kinds of color1 surely what we mean is different kinds of colored surface4 ,qu colored1 they are not different2 ,i mean just as much and no more when ,i say a red thing is colored1 or has color1 as when ,i say a green thing is colored4 ,if ,mill were right1 the proposition red is a color ought to mean exactly the same as red is red4 ,or1 to put it in another way1 it would become impossible to form in thought any concept of a single class of colored things4 ,but need we infer because abstract terms are singular that therefore they have no intension and are mere meaningless marks8 ,commonly as this inference is made1 it seems to me clearly mistaken4 ,it seems1 in fact1 to rest upon the vague and ill-defined principle that an attribute can have no attributes of its own4 ,that it is false is shown1 ,i think1 by the simple reflection that scientific definitions are one and all statements as to the meaning of abstract names of attributes and relations4 ,for example1 the definition of a circle is a statement as to the meaning of circularity1 the legal definition of responsible persons a statement as to the meaning of the abstraction responsibility1 and so on4 7,we only evade the point if we argue that abstract terms when used as the subjects of propositions are really being employed concretely4 ,for cruelty is odious1 for instance1 does not merely mean that cruel acts are odious acts1 but that they are odious because they are cruel47 ,in fact1 the doctrine that abstract terms have no intension would seem1 if thought out1 to lead to the view that there are only classes of individuals1 but no classes of classes4 ,thus to say cruel acts are odious because cruel implies1 not only that ,i can form the concept of a class of cruel acts1 but also that of classes of odious acts of which the class of cruel acts in its turn is a member4 ,and to admit as much as this is to admit that the class of cruel acts1 considered as a member of the class of odious acts1 shares the common predicate of odiousness with the other classes of acts composing the higher class4 ,hence the true account of abstract terms seems to me to be that we have in them another limiting case1 a case in which the extension and the intension are coincident4 ,incidentally1 by illustrating the ambiguity of the principle that attributes have no attributes of their own1 our discussion seems to indicate the advantage of taking the purely extensional view is opposed to the predicative view of the import of propositions as the basis of an elementary treatment of logical doctrine4 ,,the ,,present ,,problems ,,of ,,metaphysics ,,by ,,alexander ,t4 ,,ormond ,alexander ,thomas ,ormond1 ,mc,cosh ,professor of ,philosophy1 ,princeton ,university1 since #ahig4 b4 #ahdg1 ,punxsutawney1 ,pennsylvania4 ,mental ,science ,fellow1 ,princeton1 #ahgg-gh2 ,post-grad4 ,bonn and ,berlin1 #ahhd-he2 ,ph4,d4 ,princeton1 #ahhj2 ,a4,b4 ibid4 #ahgg2 ,,ll4,d4 ,miami1 #ahii4 ,professor of ,philosophy and ,history1 ,university of ,minnesota1 #ahhj-hc2 ,professor of ,mental ,science and ,logic1 ,princeton ,university1 #ahhc-ig4 ,member ,american ,philosophical ,association1 ,american ,psychological ,association4 ,i ,,the ,,preliminary ,,question ,the living problems of any science arise out of two sources3 7#a7 out of what men may think of it1 in view of its nature and claims1 and 7#b7 the problems that at any period are vital to it1 and in the solution of which it realizes the purpose of its existence4 ,now if we distinguish the body of the sciences which deal with aspects of the world's phenomena--and here ,i would include both the psychic and the physical--from metaphysics1 which professes to go behind the phenomenon and determine the world in terms of its inner1 and1 therefore1 ultimate reality1 it may be truly said of the body of the sciences that they are in a position to disregard in a great measure questions that arise out of the first source1 inasmuch as the data from which they make their departure are obvious to common observation4 ,our world is all around us1 and its phenomena either press upon us or are patent to our observation4 ,lying thus within the field of observation1 it does not occur to the average mind to question either the legitimacy or the possibility of that effort of reflection which is devoted to their investigation and interpretation4 ,metaphysics1 however1 enjoys no such immunity as this1 but its claims are liable to be met with skepticism or denial at the outset1 and this is due partly to the nature of its initial claims1 and partly to the fact that its real data are less open to observation than are those of the sciences4 ,i say partly to the nature of the initial claims of metaphysics1 for it is characteristic of metaphysics that it refuses to regard the distinction between phenomena and ground or inner nature1 on which the sciences rest1 as final1 and is committed from the outset to the claim that the real is in its inner nature one and to be interpreted in the light of1 or in terms of1 its inner unity2 whereas1 science has so indoctrinated the modern mind with the supposition that only the outer movements of things are open to knowledge1 while their inner and real nature must forever remain inaccessible to our powers2 ,i say that the modern mind has been so imbued with this pretension as to have almost completely forgotten the fact that the distinction of phenomenon and ground is one of science's own making4 ,neither the plain man nor the cultured man1 if he happens not to be tinctured with science1 finds his world a duality4 ,the things he deals with are the realities1 and it is only when his nave realism begins to break down before the complex demands of his growing life1 that the thought occurs to him that his world may be more complex than he has dreamed4 ,it is clear1 then1 that the distinction of our world into phenomena and ground1 on which science so largely rests1 is a first product of reflection1 and not a fact of observation at all4 ,if this be the case1 it may be possible and even necessary for reflection at some stage to transcend this distinction4 ,at least1 there can be no reason except an arbitrary one for taking this first step of reflection to be a finality4 ,and there would be the same justification for a second step that would transcend this dualism1 as for the initial step out of which the distinction arose2 provided1 it should be found that the initial distinction does not supply an adequate basis for a rational interpretation of the world that can be taken as final4 ,now1 it is precisely because the dualistic distinction of the sciences does fail in this regard1 that a further demand for a reflective transformation of the data arises4 ,let us bear in mind that the data of the sciences are not the simple facts of observation1 but rather those facts transformed by an act of reflection by virtue of which they become phenomena distinguished from a more fundamental nature on which they depend and which itself is not open to observation4 ,the real data of science are found only when the world of observation has been thus transformed by an act of reflection4 ,if then at some stage in our effort to interpret our world it should become clear that the sciences of phenomena1 whatever value their results may possess1 are not giving us an interpretation in terms that can be taken as final1 and that in order to ground such an interpretation a further transformation of our data becomes necessary1 ,i do not see why any of the sciences should feel that they have cause to demur4 ,in truth1 it is out of just such a situation as this that the metaphysical interpretation arises 7as ,i propose very briefly here to show71 a situation that supplies a genuine demand in the light of which the effort of metaphysics to understand its world seems to possess as high a claim to legitimacy as that of the sciences of phenomena4 ,let us take our stand with the plain man or the child1 within the world of unmodified observation4 ,the things of observation1 in this world1 are the realities1 and at first we may suppose have undergone little reflective transformation4 ,the first reflective effort to change this world in any way will1 no doubt1 be an effort to number or count the things that present themselves to observation1 and out of this effort will arise the transformation of the world that results from considering it under the concepts and categories of number4 ,in short1 to mathematical reflection of this simple sort1 the things of observation will resolve themselves into a plurality of countable things1 which the numbering reflection becoming explicit in its ordinal and cardinal moments will translate into a system that will be regarded as a whole made up of the sum of its parts4 ,the very first step1 then1 in the reflective transformation of things resolves them into a dual system1 the world conceived as a cardinal whole that is made up of its ordinal parts1 and exactly equal to them4 ,this mathematical conception is moreover purely quantitative2 involving the exact and stable equivalence of its parts or units and that of the sum of the parts with the whole4 ,now it is with this purely quantitative transformation that mathematics and the mathematical sciences begin4 ,we may ask1 then1 why should there be any other than mathematical science1#a and what ground can non-mathematical science point to as substantiating its claims8 ,i confess ,i can see no other final reason than this1 that mathematical science does not meet the whole demand we feel obliged to make on our world4 ,if mathematics were asked to vindicate itself1 it no doubt would do so by claiming that things present quantitative aspects on which it founds its procedure4 ,in like manner non-mathematical1 or1 as we may call it1 physical or natural science1 will seek to substantiate its claims by pointing to certain ultra-quantitative or qualitative aspects of things4 ,it is true that1 so far as things are merely numerable1 they are purely quantitative2 but mathematics abstracts from the content and character of its units and aggregates1 which may and do change1 so that a relation of stable equivalence is not maintained among them4 ,in fact1 the basis of these sciences is found in the tendency of things to be always changing and becoming different from what they were before4 ,the problem of these sciences is how to ground a rational scheme of knowledge in connection with a fickle world like that of qualitative change4 ,it is here that reflection finds its problem1 and noticing that the tendency of this world of change is for a to pass into b and thus to lose its own identity1 the act of reflection that rationalizes the situation is one that connects a and b by relating them to a common ground x of which they stand as successive manifestations or symbols4 ,x thus supplies the thread of identity that binds the two changes a and b into a relation to which the name causation may be applied4 ,and just as quantitative equivalence is the principle of relationship among the parts of the simple mathematical world1 so here in the world of the dynamic or natural sciences1 the principle of relation is natural causation4#b ,we find1 then1 that the non-mathematical sciences rest on a basis that is constituted by a second act of reflection2 one that translates our world into a system of phenomena causally inter-related and connected with their underlying grounds4 ,footnote #a3 ,i do not raise the question of qualitative mathematics at all4 ,it is clear that the first mathematical reflection will be quantitative4 ,footnote #b3 ,by natural causation ,i mean such a relationship between a and b in a phenomenal system as enables a through its connection with its ground to determine b4 ,we have now reached a point where it will be possible in a few sentences to indicate the rise of the metaphysical reflection and the ground on which it rests4 ,if we consider both the mathematical and the physical ways of looking at things1 we will find that they possess this feature in common1--they are purely external1 having nothing to say respecting the inner and1 therefore1 real nature of the things with which they deal4 ,or1 if we concede the latest claims of some of the physical speculators and agree that the aim of physics is an ultimate physical explanation of reality1 it will still be true that the whole standpoint of this explanation will be external4 ,let me explain briefly what ,i mean substantially by the term external as ,i use it here4 ,every interpretation of a world is a function of some knowing consciousness1 and consequently of some knowing self4 ,this is too obvious to need proof4 ,a system will be external to such a knower just to the extent that the knower finds it dominated and determined by categories that are different from those of its own determination4 ,a world physically interpreted is one that is brought completely under the rubrics of physics and mathematics2 whose movements yield themselves completely1 therefore1 to a mechanical calculus that gives rise to purely descriptive formul2 or to the control of a dynamic principle2 that of natural causation1 by virtue of which everything is determined without thought of its own1 by the impulse of another1 which impulse itself is not directly traceable to any thought or purpose4 ,now1 the occasion for the metaphysical reflection arises when this situation that brings us face to face1 with1 nay1 makes us part and parcel of1 an alien system of things1 becomes intolerable1 and the knower begins to demand a closer kinship with his world4 ,the knower finds the categories of his own central and characteristic activity in experience4 ,here he is conscious of being an agent going out in forms of activity for the realization of his world4 ,the determining categories of the activity he is most fully conscious of1 are interest1 idea1 prevision1 purpose1 and that selective activity which goes to its termination in some achieved end4 ,the metaphysical interpretation arises out of the demand that the world shall be brought into bonds of kinship with the knower4 ,and this is effected by generalizing the categories of consciousness and applying them as principles of interpretation to the world4 ,the act of reflection on which the metaphysical interpretation proceeds is one1 then1 in which the world of science is further transformed by bringing the inner nature of things out of its isolation and translating the world-movements into process the terms of which are no longer phenomena and hidden ground1 but rather inception and realization1 or1 more specifically1 ,idea and ,reality4 ,and the point to be noted here is the fact that these metaphysical categories are led up to positivity by an act of reflection that has for its guiding aim an interpretation of the world that will be more ultimately satisfactory to the knower than that of the physical or natural sciences2 while negatively1 it is led up to by the refusal of the knowing consciousness to rest in a world alien to its own nature and in which it is subordinated to the physical and made a mere epiphenomenon4 ,,ii ,,questions ,,of ,,point ,,of ,,view1 ,,principle ,,and ,,method ,,of ,,metaphysics ,it is clear from what has been said that the metaphysical interpretation proceeds on a presupposition radically different from that of mathematical and physical science4 ,the presumption of these sciences is that the world is physical1 that the physical categories supply the norms of reality1 and that consciousness and the psychic1 in general1 are subordinate and phenomenal to the physical4 ,on the contrary1 metaphysics arises out of a revolt from these presumptions toward the opposite presumption1 namely1 that consciousness itself is the great reality1 and that the norms of an ultimate interpretation of things are to be sought in its categories4 ,this is the great transformation that conditions the possibility and value of all metaphysics4 ,it is the ,copernican revolution which the mind must pass through1 a revolution in which matter and the physical world yields the primacy to mind2 a revolution in which consciousness becomes central1 its categories and analogies supplying the principles of final world-interpretation4 ,let us consider then1 in the light of this great ,copernican revolution1 the questions of the point of view1 principle1 and method of metaphysics4 ,and here the utmost brevity must be observed4 ,if consciousness be the great reality1 then its own central activity1 that effort by which it realizes its world1 will determine for us the point of view or departure of which we are in quest4 ,this will be inner rather than outer2 it will be motived by interest1 will shape itself into interest-directed effort4 ,this effort will be cognitive2 dominated by an idea which will be an anticipation of the goal of the effort4 ,it will1 therefore1 become directive1 selective1 and will stand as the end or aim of the completed effort4 ,the whole movement will thus take the form1 genetically1 of a developing purpose informed by an idea1 or teleologically1 of a purpose going on to its fulfillment in some aim which is also its motive4 ,now1 metaphysics determines its point of view in the following reasoning3 if in consciousness we find the type of the inner nature of things1 then the point of view for the interpretation of this inner nature will be to seek by generalizing the standpoint of consciously determined effort and asserting that this is the true point of view from which the meaning of the world is to be sought4 ,having determined the metaphysical point of view1 the next question of vital importance is that of its principle4 ,and we may cut matters short here by saying at once that the principle we are seeking is that of sufficient reason1 and we may say that a reason will be sufficient when it adequately expresses the world-view or concept under which an investigation is being prosecuted4 ,let us suppose that this world-view is that of simple mathematics1 the principle of sufficient reason here will be that of quantitative equivalence of parts2 or1 from the standpoint of the whole1 that of infinite divisibility4 ,whereas1 if we take the world of the ultra-mathematical science1 which is determined by the notion of phenomena depending on underlying ground1 we will find that the sufficient reason in this sphere takes the form of adequate cause or condition4 ,the determining condition or causes of any physical phenomenon supply1 from that point of view1 the ratio sufficiens of its existence4 ,we have seen that the sufficiency of a reason in the above cases has been determined in view of that notion which defines the kind of world the investigation is dealing with4 ,let us apply this insight to the problem of the principle of metaphysics1 and we will soon conclude that no reason can be metaphysically sufficient that does not satisfy the requirements of a world conceived under the notion of inception and realization2 or1 more specifically1 idea and reality4 ,in short1 the reason of metaphysics will refuse to regard its world as a mechanism that is devoid of thought and intention2 that lacks1 in short1 the motives of internal determination and movement1 and will in all cases insist that an explanation or interpretation can be metaphysically adequate only when its ultimate reference is to an idea that is in the process of purposive fulfillment4 ,such an explanation we call teleological or rational1 rather than merely mechanical1 and such a principle is alone adequate to embody the ratio sufficiens of metaphysics4 ,having determined the point of view and principle of metaphysics1 the question of metaphysical method will be divested of some of its greatest difficulties4 ,it will be clear to any one who reflects that the very first problem in regard to the method of metaphysics will be that of its starting-point and the kind of results it is to look for4 ,and little can be accomplished here until it has been settled that consciousness is to have the primacy1 and that its prerogative is to supply both standpoint and principle of the investigation4 ,we have gone a long way toward mastering our method when we have settled these points3 7#a7 that the metaphysical world is a world of consciousness2 7#b7 that the conscious form of effort rather than the mechanical is the species of activity or movement with which we have to deal2 and1 7#c7 that the world it is seeking to interpret is ultimately one of idea and reality in which the processes take the purposive form4 ,in view of this1 the important steps of method 7and we use the term method here in the most fundamental sense7 will be 7#a7 the question of the form of metaphysical activity or agency as contrasted with that of the physical sciences4 ,this may be brought out in the contrast of the two terms finality and mere efficiency1 in which by mere efficiency is meant an agency that is presumed to be thoughtless and purposeless1 and consequently without foresight4 ,all this is embodied in the term force or physical energy1 and less explicitly in that of natural causation4 ,contrasted with this1 finality is a term that involves the forward impulse of idea1 prevision1 and purpose4 ,anything that is capable of any sort of foretaste has in it a principle of prevision1 selection1 choice1 and purpose4 ,the impulse that motives and runs it1 that also stands out as the end of its fulfillment1 is a foretaste1 an ,ahnung1 an anticipation1 and the whole process or movement1 as well as every part of it1 will take on this character4 7#b7 ,the second question of method will be that of the nature of this category of which finality is the form4 ,what is its content1 pure idea or pure will1 or a synthesis that includes both8 ,we have here the three alternatives of pure rationalism1 voluntarism1 and a doctrine hard to characterize in a single word2 that rests on a synthesis of the norms of both rationalism and voluntarism4 ,without debating these alternatives1 ,i propose here briefly to characterize the synthetic concept as supplying what ,i conceive to be the most satisfactory doctrine4 ,the principle of pure rationalism is one of insight but is lacking in practical energy1 whereas1 that of voluntarism supplies practical energy1 but is lacking in insight4 ,pure voluntarism is blind1 while pure rationalism is powerless4 ,but the synthesis of idea and will1 provided we go a step further 7as ,i think we must7 and presuppose also a germ of feeling as interest1 supplies both insight and energy4 ,so that the spring out of which our world is to arise may be described as either the idea informed with purposive energy1 or purpose or will informed and guided by the idea4 ,it makes no difference which form of conception we use4 ,in either case if we include feeling as interest we are able to conceive movements originating in some species of apprehension1 taking the dynamic form of purpose1 and motived and selected1 so to speak1 by interest2 and in describing such activity we are simply describing these normal movements of consciousness with which our experience makes us most familiar4 7#c7 ,the third question of method involves the relation or correlation of the metaphysical interpretation with that of the natural or physical science4 ,two points are fundamental here4 ,in the first place1 it must be borne in mind that it is the same world with which the plain man1 the man of science1 and the metaphysician are concerned4 ,we cannot partition off the external world to the plain man1 the atoms and ethers to the man of science1 leaving the metaphysician in exclusive and solitary possession of the world of consciousness4 ,it is the same world for all4 ,the metaphysician cannot shift the physical world1 with its oceans and icebergs1 its vast planetary systems and milky ways1 on to the shoulders of the physicist4 ,this is the metaphysician's own recalcitrant world1 which will doubtless task all his resources to explain4 ,in the second place1 though it is the same world that is clamoring for interpretation1 it is a world that passes through successive transformations1 in order to adapt itself to progressive modes of interpretation4 ,the plain man is called to pass through a species of ,copernican revolution that subordinates the phenomenon to its ground1 before he can become a man of science4 ,in turn1 the man of science must go through the ,copernican process1 and learn to subordinate his atoms and ethers to consciousness before he can become a metaphysician4 ,and it is this transformation that marks one of the most fundamental steps in the method of metaphysics4 ,the world must experience this transformation1 and it must become habitual to the thinker to subordinate the physical to the mental before the metaphysical point of view can be other than foreign to him4 ,if1 then1 it be the same content with which the sciences and metaphysics are called on to deal1 it is clear that we have on our hands another problem on the answer to which the fate of metaphysics vitally depends2 the question of the correlation of its method with that of the sciences so that it may stand vindicated as the final interpretation of things4 ,,iii ,,question ,,of ,,the ,,correlation ,,of ,,metaphysics ,,with ,,the ,,sciences ,we have reached two conclusions that are vital here3 7#a7 that the metaphysical way of looking at the world involves a transformation of the world of physical science2 7#b7 that it is the same world that lies open to both science and metaphysics4 ,out of this arises the problem of the correlation of the two views2 the two interpretations of the world4 ,if science be right in conceiving the world under such categories as quantity and natural causation2 if science be right in seeking a mechanical explanation of phenomena 7that is1 one that excludes prevision1 purpose1 and aim72 and if metaphysics be right in refusing to accept this explanation as final and in insisting that the principle of ultimate interpretation is teleological1 that it falls under the categories of prevision1 purpose1 and aim2 then it is clear that the problem of correlation is on our hands4 ,in dealing with this problem1 it will be convenient to separate it into two questions3 7#a7 that of the fact2 7#b7 that of its rationale4 ,the fact of the correlation is a thing of common experience4 ,we have but to consider the way in which this ,congress of ,science has been brought about in order to have an exhibition of the method of correlation4 ,originating first in the sphere of thought and purpose1 the design has been actualized through the operation of mechanical agencies which it has somehow contributed to liberate4 ,on the scale of individual experience we have the classic instance of the arm moving through space in obedience to a hidden will4 ,there can be no question as to the fact and the great difficulty of metaphysics does not arise in the task of generalizing the fact and conceiving the world as a system of thought-purposes working out into forms of the actual through mechanical agencies4 ,this generalization somehow lies at the foundation of all metaphysical faith1 and1 this being the case1 the real task here1 aside from the profounder question of the rationale1 is that of exhibiting the actual points of correlation2 those points in the various stages of the sciences from physics to ethics and religion1 at which the last category or result of science is found to hold as its immediate implication some first term of the more ultimate construction of metaphysics4 ,the working out of this task is of the utmost importance1 inasmuch as it makes clear to both the man of science and the metaphysician the intrinsic necessity of the correlation4 ,it is a task analogous to the ,kantian deduction of the categories4 ,,iv ,,questions ,,of ,,the ,,ultimate ,,nature ,,of ,,reality ,we come1 then1 to the question of the rationale of this correlation1 and it is clear here that we are dealing with a phase of the problem of the ultimate nature of reality4 ,for the question of the correlation now is how it is possible that our thoughts should affect things so that they move in response2 how mind influences body or the reverse1 how1 when we will1 the arm moves through space4 ,and without going into details of discussion here1 let us say at once1 that whatever the situation may be for any science1--and it may be that some form of dualism is a necessary presupposition of science1--for metaphysics it is clear that no dualism of substances or orders can be regarded as final4 ,the life of metaphysics depends on finding the one for the many2 the one that when found will also ground the many4 ,if1 then1 the phenomenon of mind and body presents the appearance of a correspondence of two different and1 so far as can be determined1 mutually exclusive agencies1 the problem of metaphysics is the reduction of these agencies to one species4 ,here we come upon the issue between materialism and immaterialism4 ,but inasmuch as the notion of metaphysics itself seems to exclude materialism1 the vital alternative is that of immaterialism4 ,again1 if psycho-physics presents as its basal category a parallelism between two orders of phenomena1 psychic and physical1 it is the business of metaphysics to seek the explanation of this dualism in some more ultimate and unitary conception4 ,now1 since the very notion of metaphysics again excludes the physical alternative from the category of finality1 we are left with the psychic term as the one that1 by virtue of the fact that it embodies a form of conscious activity1 promises to be most fruitful for metaphysics4 ,from one point of view1 then1 we have reduced our world to immaterialism2 from another1 to some form or analogue of the psychic4 ,now it is not necessary here to carry the inquiry further in this direction4 ,for what metaphysics is interested in1 specially1 is the fact that the world must be reduced to one kind of being and one type of agency4 ,if this be done1 it is clear that the dualism of body and mind and the parallel orders of psycho-physics cannot be regarded as final1 but must take their places as phenomena that are relative and reducible to a more fundamental unity4 ,the metaphysician will say that the arm moves through space in response to the will1 and that everywhere the correlation between mechanical and teleological agency takes place because in the last analysis there is only one type of agency2 an agency that finds its initiative in interest1 thought1 purpose1 design1 and thus works out its results in the fields of space and mechanical activities4 ,furthermore1 on the question to which these considerations lead up2 that of the ultimate interpretation we are to put on the reality of the world1 the issue is not so indeterminate as it might seem from some points of view4 ,taking it that the very notion of metaphysics excludes the material and the physical as ultimate types of the real1 we are left with the notions of the immaterial and the psychic2 and while the former is indefinite1 it is a fact that in the psychic and especially in the form of it which man realizes in his own experience1 he finds an intelligible type and the only one that is available to him for the definition of the immaterial4 ,he has his choice1 then1 either to regard the world as absolutely opaque1 showing nothing but its phenomenal dress which ceases to have any meaning2 or to apply to the world's inner nature the intelligible types and analogies of his own form of being4 ,that this is the alternative that is embodied in the existence of metaphysics is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the metaphysical interpretation embodies itself in the categories of reason1 design1 purpose1 and aim4 ,whatever difficulties we may encounter1 then1 in the use and application of the psychic analogy in determining the nature of the real1 it is clear that its employment is inevitable and indispensable4 ,let us1 then1 employ the term rational to that characterization of the nature of things which to metaphysics is thus inevitable and indispensable4 ,the world must in the last analysis be rational in its constitution1 and its agencies and forms of being must be construed as rational in their type4 ,and here we come upon the last question in this field1 that of the ultimate being of the world4 ,we have already concluded that the real is in the last analysis rational4 ,but we have not answered the question whether there shall be one rational or many4 ,now it has become clear that with metaphysics unity is a cardinal interest2 that1 therefore1 the world must be one in thought1 purpose1 aim4 ,and it is on this insight that the metaphysical doctrine of the absolute rests4 ,there must be one being whose thought and purpose are all-inclusive1 in order that the world may be one and that it may have meaning as a whole4 ,but the world presents itself as a plurality of finite existents which our metaphysics requires us to reduce in the last analysis to the psychic type4 ,what of this plurality of psychic existents8 ,it is on this basis that metaphysics constructs its doctrine of individuality4 ,allowing for latitude of opinion here1 the trend of metaphysical reflection sets strongly toward a doctrine of reality that grounds the world in an ,absolute whose all-comprehending thought and purpose utters or realizes itself in the plurality of finite individuals that constitutes the world2 the degree of reality that shall be ascribed to the plurality of individuals being a point in debate1 giving rise to the contemporary form of the issue between idealism and realism4 ,allowing for minor differences1 however1 there is among metaphysicians a fair degree of assent to the doctrine that in order to be completely rational the world of individual plurality must be regarded as implying an ,absolute1 which1 whether it is to be conceived as an individual or not1 is the author and bearer of the thought and design of the world as a whole4 ,v ,,questions ,,of ,,metaphysical ,,knowledge ,,and ,,ultimate ,,criteria ,,of ,,truth ,we have only time to speak very briefly1 in conclusion1 of two vital problems in metaphysics3 7#a7 that of the nature and limits of metaphysical knowledge2 7#b7 that of the ultimate criteria of truth4 ,in regard to the question of knowledge1 we may either identify thought with reality1 or we may regard thought as wholly inadequate to represent the real2 in one case we will be gnostic1 in the other agnostic4 ,now whatever may be urged in favor of the gnostic alternative1 it remains true that our thought1 in order to follow along intelligible lines1 must be guided by the categories and analogies of our own experience4 ,this fixes a limit1 so that the thought of man is never in a position to grasp the real completely4 ,again1 whatever may be urged in behalf of the agnostic alternative1 it is to be borne in mind that our experience does supply us with intelligible types and categories2 and that under the impulse of the infinite and absolute1 or the transcendent1 to which our thought responds 7to put it no stronger71 a dialectical activity arises2 on the one hand1 the application of the experience-analogies to determine the real2 on the other1 the incessant removal of limits by the impulse of transcendence 7as we may call it74 ,thus arises a movement of approximation which while it never completely compasses its goal1 yet proceeds along intelligent lines2 constitutes the mind's effort to know2 and results in an approximating series of intelligible and relatively adequate conceptions4 ,metaphysically1 we are ever approximating to ultimate knowledge2 though it can never be said that we have attained it4 ,the type of metaphysical knowledge cannot be characterized1 therefore1 as either gnostic or agnostic4 ,as to the question of ultimate criteria1 it is clear that we are here touching one of the living issues of our present-day thought4 ,shall the judgment of truth1 on which certitude must found1 exclude practical considerations of value1 or shall the consideration of value have weight in the balance of certitude8 ,on this issue we have at the opposite extremes 7#a7 the pure rationalist who insists on the rigid exclusion from the epistemological scale of every consideration except that of pure logic4 ,the truth of a thing1 he urges1 is always a purely logical consideration4 ,on the other hand1 we have 7#b7 the pure pragmatist1 who insists on the will to believe as a legitimate datum or factor in the determination of certitude4 ,the pragmatic platform has two planks3 7#a7 the ontological--we select our world that we call real at the behest of our interests2 7#b7 the ethical--in such a world practical interest has the right of way in determining what we are to accept as true as well as what we are to choose as good4 ,it is my purpose in thus outlining the extremes of doctrine to close with a suggestion or two toward less ultra-conclusions4 ,it is a sufficient criticism on the pure rationalist's position to point out the fact that his separation of practical and theoretic interests is a pure fiction that is never realized anywhere4 ,the motives of science and the motives of practice are so blended that interest in the conclusion always enters as a factor in the process4 ,a conclusion reached by the pure rationalist's method would be one that would only interest the pure rationalist in so far as he could divest himself of all motives except the bare love of fact for its own sake4 ,the pure pragmatist is1 ,i think1 still more vulnerable4 ,he must1 to start with1 be a pure subjective idealist1 otherwise he would find his world at many points recalcitrant to his ontology4 ,furthermore1 the mere will to believe is arbitrary and involves the suppression of reason4 ,in order that the will to believe may work real conviction1 the point believed must at least amount to a postulate of the practical reason2 it must become somehow evident that the refusal to believe would create a situation that would be theoretically unsound or irrational2 as1 for instance1 if we assume that the immortality of the soul is a real postulate of practical reason1 it must be so because the negative of it would involve the irrationality of our world2 and therefore a degree of theoretic imperfection or confusion4 ,personally ,i believe the lines here converge in such a way that the ideal of truth will always be found to have practical value2 and conversely1 as to practical ideals1 that a sound practical postulate will have weight in the theoretic scales4 ,and it is doubtless true1 as ,professor ,royce urges in his presidential address on ,the ,eternal and ,the ,practical1 that all judgments must find their final warrant at the ,court of the ,eternal where1 so far as we can see1 the theoretical and practical coalesce into one4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at the close of the work of this ,section and upon the invitation of ,dr4 ,armstrong1 a number of distinguished members in attendance joined freely in the discussion1 to the great pleasure of the many specialists who were present4 ,among those participating were ,professor ,boltzmann of ,vienna1 ,professor ,hoeffding of ,copenhagen1 ,professor ,calkins of ,wellesley1 and ,professor ,french of the ,university of ,nebraska1 to whom replies were made by the principal speakers1 ,messrs4 ,taylor and ,ormond4 ,,short ,,papers ,a short paper was contributed to the work of the ,section by ,professor ,w4 ,p4 ,montague of ,columbia ,university1 on the ,physical ,reality of ,secondary ,qualities4 ,the speaker said that from the beginning of modern philosophy there has existed a strong tendency among all schools of thought--monists of the idealistic or materialistic types1 as well as outspoken dualists--to treat the distinction between primary and secondary qualities as coincident1 so far as it goes1 with the distinction between physical and psychical4 ,colors1 sounds1 odors1 etc41 are regarded as purely subjective or mental in their nature1 and as having no true membership in the physical order2 while correlatively all special forms and relations have been in their turn extruded from the field of the psychical4 ,let it be noted that introspection offers little or nothing in support of this view4 ,there is nothing1 for example1 about the color red that would make it appear more distinctively psychical or subjective than a figure or a motion4 ,the perception of a square or a triangle is not a square or triangular perception2 but neither is the perception of red or blue a red or blue perception4 ,now with the affective or emotional contents of experience the case is quite different4 ,a feeling of pain is a painful feeling1 a consciousness of anger is an angry consciousness4 ,pains are more and less painful1 according as we are more and less aware of them4 ,with feelings and volitions esse is indeed percipi4 ,colors and other secondary qualities1 however1 do not seem thus to increase or diminish in their reality concomitantly with our perceptions of them4 ,red is red1 neither more nor less1 regardless of the amount to which we attend to it4 ,and yet it remains true that1 notwithstanding this seeming objectivity1 the secondary qualities have long been contrasted with the primary1 and classed along with the affective and volitional states as purely subjective facts4 ,it has always seemed curious that a view so important as this in its consequences1 and so radically at variance1 not only with ,pre-,cartesian philosophy1 but also with our instinctive beliefs1 should have won its way to the position of an accepted dogma2 and the purpose of this paper was first to examine the grounds upon which this belief rests1 and second to show that the problem of the independent reality of the physical world and the problem of the relation of physical and psychical appear in a clearer and more hopeful light when disentangled from the quite different problem of the relation of primary and secondary qualities4 ,there were two reasons why the older or ,pre-,cartesian view of this question should give place to the modern doctrine4 ,first1 because of the rediscovery of the idea of mechanism1 without which predictive science had been virtually impossible4 ,the second reason for reducing the secondary qualities to a merely subjective status lay in the fact that they are much more dependent than the primary qualities upon the bodily organism of the one who perceives them4 ,in closing ,professor ,montague said3-- ,i wish in closing to point out two consequences of the view which ,i have been opposing4 ,first1 the present paradoxical status of the eternal world2 second1 the equally paradoxical status of the relation of that world to the world of mind4 ,berkeley was the first thinker clearly to perceive the unsubstantial nature of a world made up solely of primary qualities4 ,indeed1 in the last analysis1 a world of primary qualities1 and nothing else1 is a world of relations without terms1 a geometrical fiction1 the objective 7or1 for that matter1 the subjective7 existence of which the idealist would be right in denying4 ,in ,biology we have abandoned obscurantist methods1 and no longer attribute the distinctive vital functions of growth and reproduction to a vital force or vital substance1 but solely to the peculiar configuration of the material elements of a cell4 ,why may we not in psychology with equal propriety attribute the distinctively psychical functions of subjectivity or consciousness1 not to the action of a hyper-psychical soul-substance1 nor to the presence of a transcendental ego1 but simply to that peculiar configuration of sensory elements which constitutes a what we call psychosis8 ,,section ,b--,,philosophy ,,of ,,religion ,,section ,b ,,philosophy ,,of ,,religion 7,hall #a1 ,september #ba1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,thomas ,c4 ,,hall1 ,union ,theological ,seminary1 ,n4 ,y4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,otto ,,pfleiderer1 ,university of ,berlin4 ,,professor ,,ernst ,,troeltsch1 ,university of ,heidelberg4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,w4 ,p4 ,,montague1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,the ,,relation ,,of ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,religion ,,to ,,the ,,other ,,sciences ,,by ,,professor ,,otto ,,pfleiderer ,d4 ,otto ,pfleiderer1 ,professor of ,theology1 ,university of ,berlin since #ahge4 b4 ,september #a1 #ahci1 ,stetten1 ,wrtemberg4 ,grad4 ,tbingen1 #aheg-fa4 ,post-grad4 ibid4 #ahfd-fh4 ,city ,professor1 ,heilbronn1 #ahfh-fi2 ,superintendent1 ,jena1 #ahfi-gj2 ,professor of ,theology1 ,jena1 #ahgj-ge4 ,author of ,religion and its ,essential ,characteristics2 ,religious ,philosophy upon ,historical ,foundation2 and many other works and papers on ,theology4 ,in order to answer this question1 we need to consider a preliminary question1 namely1 whether religion can be regarded as the object of scientific knowledge in the same manner as other processes of the intellectual life of the race1 such as law1 history1 and art4 ,it is well known that this question has not always received an affirmative answer1 and indeed it can never be answered in the affirmative so long as the position is maintained that the only religion is that of the ,christian ,church1 whose doctrines and teachings rest upon an immediate divine revelation1 and that these must be accepted by men in blind belief4 ,under the position of an authoritative ecclesiastical faith there can indeed exist a theoretical consideration of the doctrines of faith1 as it was the case with the scholastic theology of the ,middle ,ages1 which with great earnestness sought to harmonize faith and knowledge2 nevertheless1 no one of the present day would give to the scholastic theology the name of science with the modern meaning of the term science4 ,the scholastic theology used great formal acuteness and skill in the work of defining and defending ecclesiastical traditions1 still there was lacking that which for us is the essential condition of scientific knowledge1 the free examination of tradition according to the laws of human thought and the analogy of the general experience of humanity4 ,the great hindrance to the progress of the knowledge of religion was the accepted position that the truth of the ecclesiastical doctrines was beyond human reason and outside of human examination1 since their truth rested upon an immediate divine revelation4 ,whether this supernatural authority was ascribed to the ,church or the ,bible makes very little difference1 for in either case the assumption of such an authority is a hindrance to the free examination of that which claims to be the divine revealed truth4 ,but is this assumption really justifiable in the nature of the case8 ,do the doctrines of the ,church rest upon a supernatural divine revelation8 ,so soon as this question was really earnestly considered1 and the thinking mind could not always avoid the consideration1 then there was revealed the inadequacy of the assumption4 ,two ways of examination led to a common critical result1 the philosophical analysis of the religious consciousness and the historical comparison of various religions4 ,the first to enter upon these ways and at the same time to become the founder of the modern science of religion was the keen ,scotch thinker ,david ,hume4 ,truly the thought of ,hume was still a one-sided1 disorganizing skepticism2 even as his theory of knowledge disturbed the truth of all our previous commonsense opinions and conceptions1 so also his philosophy of religion sought to demonstrate that all religion cannot be proved and is full of doubt1 and that the origin of religion was neither to be found in divine revelation nor in the reason of man1 but in the passions of the heart and in the illusions of imagination4 ,as unsatisfactory as this result was1 nevertheless it gave an important advance to the rational study of religion in two directions1 in that of religion being an experience of the inner life of the soul and in that of religion being a fact of human history4 ,kant added the positive criticism of reason to the negative skepticism of ,hume2 that is1 ,kant showed that the human intellect moved independently in the formation of theoretical and practical judgments1 and that the various materials of thought1 desire1 and feelings were regulated by the intellect according to innate original ideas of the true and good and beautiful4 ,thus as a natural result there came the conception that the doctrines of belief arose not as complete truths1 given by divine revelation1 but1 like every other form of conscious knowledge1 these came to us through the activity of our own mind1 and that therefore these doctrines cannot be regarded as of absolute authority for all time1 but that we are to seek to understand their origin in historical and psychical motives4 ,so far as one looked at the ceremonial forms of positive religion1 these motives indeed were found according to ,kant in irrational conceptions1 but as far as the essence of religion was concerned they were rather found to be rooted in the moral nature of man4 ,this is the consciousness of obligation of the practical reason or of the conscience1 which raises man to a faith in the moral government of the world1 in immortality and ,god4 ,with the reduction of religion from all external forms1 doctrines1 and ceremonies and the finding of the real essence of religion in the human mind and spirit1 the way was opened to a knowledge of religion free from all external authority4 ,those philosophers who came after ,kant followed essentially this course1 though here and there they may separate in their opinions according to their thought of the psychological function of religion4 ,when ,kant had emphasized the close connection between religion and the moral obligation1 then came ,schleiermacher1 who emphasized the feeling of our dependence upon the ,eternal1 and who sought to find the explanation of all religious thoughts and conceptions in the many relations of the feeling to religious experience4 ,hegel on the other hand sought the truth of religion in the thought of the absolute spirit as found in the finite spirit4 ,thus ,hegel made religion a sort of popular philosophy4 ,at present all agree that all sides of the soul-life have part in religion2 now one side may be the more prominent1 now another1 according to the peculiarity of certain religions or the individual temperaments4 ,the philosophy of religion has1 in common with scientific psychology1 the question of the relation of feeling to the intellect and the will1 and as yet there may be many views of this question4 ,altogether the philosophy of religion is looking for important solutions to many of its problems from the realm of the present scientific psychology4 ,experiences1 such as religious conversions1 appear under this point of view as ethical changes in which the aim of a personal life is changed from a carnal and selfish end to that of a spiritual and altruistic purpose4 ,these are extraordinary and seemingly supernatural processes2 nevertheless in them there can still be found a certain development of the soul-life according to law4 ,modern psychology especially has thrown light upon the abnormal conditions of consciousness which have so often been made manifest in the religious experience of all times4 ,that which religious history records concerning inspiration1 visions1 ecstasy1 and revelation1 we now classify with the well-known appearances of hypnotism1 the induction of conceptions and motives of the will through foreign suggestion or through self-suggestion1 of the division of consciousness in different egos1 and in the union of several consciousnesses into one common mediumistic fusion of thought and will4 ,the explanation of these experiences may not yet be satisfactory1 but nevertheless we do not doubt the possibility of a future explanation from the general laws controlling the life of the soul4 ,the fact that we can through psychological experiments produce such abnormal conditions of consciousness justifies us in taking the position1 that certain psychical laws are at the foundation of these conditions which in their kind are as natural and regular in their functions as the physical laws which we observe in physical experiments4 ,these solutions which modern psychology so far has given1 and hopes still further to give1 are of great importance to the philosophy of religion4 ,they are an indorsement of the general principle which one hundred years ago had been advanced by critical speculation1 namely1 that in all experiences of the religious life the same principles which control the human mind in all other intellectual and emotional fields shall hold sway4 ,nothing therefore should hinder us in scientific research from following the well-defined maxims of thought1 and unreservedly applying the same methods of scientific analysis in theology as is done generally in the other sciences4 ,the claim of the ,church to infallibility and divine inspiration of its dogmas is weakened under this view of the work of the philosophy of religion4 ,prophetical inspiration and ecstasy1 which usually were thought to be supernatural revelations1 are now declared by the present psychology to come under the category of other analogous experiences1 such as the action of mental powers which1 under definite conditions of individual gifts and on historical occasions1 have manifested themselves in extraordinary forms of consciousness4 ,however1 these enthusiastic forms of prophetical consciousness cannot be accepted for a higher form of knowledge or even as of divine origin and as an infallible proclamation of the truth2 on the contrary1 these forms are to be judged as pathological appearances1 which may be more harmful than beneficent for the ethical value of the prophetical intuition4 ,at least1 it has come to pass that all forms of revelation must come under the examination of a psychological analysis and of an analogical judgment4 ,hence their traditional nimbus of unique1 supernatural1 and absolute authority is for all time destroyed4 ,we are carried to the same result by the comparative study of the history of religions4 ,the study shows us that the ,christian ,church1 with its dogma of the divine inspiration of the ,bible1 does not stand alone2 that before and after ,christianity other religions made exactly the same claims for their sacred scriptures4 ,by the pious ,brahman the ,veda is regarded as infallible and eternal2 he believes the hymns of the old seers were not composed by the seers themselves1 but were taken from an original copy in heaven4 ,the ,buddhist sees in the sayings of his sacred book ,dhammapadam the exact inheritance of the infallible words of his omniscient teacher ,buddha4 ,for the confessor of ,ahuramazda the ,zendavesta contains the scriptural revelation of the good spirit unto the prophet ,zarathustra2 according to the rabbis the laws revealed unto ,moses on ,mount ,sinai were even before the creation of the world the object of the observation of ,god2 for the faithful ,mohammedan the ,koran is the copy of an ever-present original in heaven1 the contents of which were dictated word for word to ,mohammed by the angel ,gabriel4 ,whoever ponders the similar claims of all these religions for the infallibility of their sacred books1 to him it becomes difficult to hold the dogma of the ,christian ,church concerning the inspiration and infallibility of the ,bible as alone true and the similar dogmas of other religions as being false4 ,rather he will accept the view that in all these examples there are found the same motives of the religious mind1 that here is given an expression to the same need common to all seeking for an absolute and abiding basis for their faith4 ,the study of the comparison of religions has discovered in religions other than that of ,christianity many very striking parallels to many narratives and teachings of the ,bible4 ,it may be well to recall very briefly some of the important points4 ,owing to the fact that the ,assyrian cuneiform writings have now been deciphered1 there has been found a story of the creation which has many characteristics in common with those of the ,bible4 ,there is found a story of a flood1 which in its very details can be regarded as the forerunner of the story of the flood in the ,bible4 ,there have been found ,assyrian penitential psalms1 which1 in consciousness of guilt and in earnestness of prayer for forgiveness1 can well be compared with many psalms of the ,bible4 ,recently the ,code of the ,assyrian ,king ,hammurabi1 who reigned two thousand three hundred years before ,christ1 has been discovered4 ,the similarity of this ,code with many of the early ,mosaic ,laws has called general attention to this fact4 ,in the ,persian religion there are found teachings of the ,kingdom of ,god1 of the good spirits who surround the throne of ,god1 of the ,spirit hostile to ,god and of an army of his demons1 of the judgment of each soul after death1 of a heaven with eternal light and of the dark abyss of hell1 of the future struggle of the multitudes of good and bad spirits and the victory over the bad through a divine hero and saviour1 of the general resurrection of the dead1 of the awful destruction of the world and the creation of a new and better world1--teachings which are also found in the later ,jewish theology and apocalypse1 so that the acceptance of a dependence of ,jewish upon corresponding ,persian teaching can hardly be avoided4 ,also ,grecian influence is observed in later ,jewish literature1 in proverbs1 in the wisdom of ,solomon and the ,son of ,sirach2 especially in the ,alexandrian ,jewish theology are found ,platonic thoughts of an eternal1 ideal world1 of the heavenly home of the soul1 and the ,stoic conception of a world-ruling divine ,logos4 ,it is from this source that the ,logos to which ,philo had already ascribed the meaning of the ,son of ,god and the ,bringer of a divine revelation crossed over into ,christian theology and became the foundation of the dogma of the ,church concerning the person of ,christ4 ,of still greater importance than even all this was the opening of the ,indian and especially the ,buddhistic religious writings4 ,in these we have1 five hundred years before ,christianity1 the revelation of redemptive religion1 resting upon the ethical foundation of the abnegation of self and the withdrawal from the world4 ,in the centre of this religion is ,gautama ,buddha1 the ideal teacher of redeeming truth1 whose human life was adorned by the faith of his followers with a crown of wonderful legends2 from an abode in heaven1 out of mercy to the world1 he descended into the world1 conceived and born of a virgin mother1 greeted and entertained by heavenly spirits1 recognized beforehand by a pious seer as the future redeemer of the world2 as a youth he manifested a wisdom beyond that of his teachers4 ,then after the reception of an illuminating revelation1 he victoriously overcomes the temptation of the devil1 who would cause him to become faithless to his call to redemption4 ,then he begins to preach of the coming of the ,kingdom of ,justice1 and sends forth his disciples1 two by two1 as messengers of his gospel to all people4 ,although he declares that it is not his calling to perform miracles1 nevertheless the legends indeed tell how many sick were healed1 how with the contents of a small basket hundreds were fed1 how possessed of all knowledge he reveals hidden things2 how overcoming the limitations of space and time1 swaying in the air1 being transfigured in a heavenly light1 he reveals himself to his disciples just before his death4 ,and at last1 in the faith of his followers1 having passed from the position of a human teacher to that of an eternal heavenly spirit and lord of the world1 he is exalted as the object of prayer and reverence1 to many millions of the human race in ,southern and ,eastern ,asia4 ,it is hardly possible that the knowledge of this parallel from ,india to the ,new ,testament1 and of the ,babylonian and ,persian parallel to the ,old ,testament1 can be without influence upon the religious thought of ,christian people4 ,although we may be ever so much convinced concerning the essential superiority of our religion over all other religions1 nevertheless the dogmatic contrast between absolute truth on the one side and complete falsity on the other can no more be maintained4 ,in place of this view there must enter the view of a relative grade of differences between the higher and lower stages of development4 ,no longer can we see in other religions only mistakes and fiction1 but under the husk of their legends many precious kernels of truth must be seen1 expressions of inner religious feelings and of noble ethical sentiments4 ,one should therefore accept the position not to object to the same discrimination between husk and kernel in the matter of one's own religion1 and to recognize in its inherited traditions and dogmas legendary elements1 the explanation of which is to be found in psychical motives and in historical surroundings1 even as they are found in the corresponding parts of religions other than the ,christian religion4 ,therefore the historical comparison of religions takes us away from an absolute dogmatic positivism to a relative evolutionary manner of study1 placing all religions without exception under the laws of time progression and under the causal connection of the law of cause and effect4 ,the isolation of religion therefore is no more4 ,it is regarded as being a part of other human historical affairs1 and must yield to the test of a thorough unhindered research4 ,the value of the ,christian religion can never suffer in the view of a reasonable man1 when it is not accepted in blind faith1 but as the result of discriminating comparison4 ,as the evolutionary philosophy of religion uses the method of science without exception in the case of all historical religions1 so also it does not shrink from taking up the question of the beginning of religion1 but believes that here also is found the key in the analytical1 critical1 and comparative method4 ,and here is found the assistance of the comparative study of languages1 ethnology1 and paleontology4 ,the celebrated ,sanscrit scholar1 ,max ,mller1 sought in the comparative study of mythology to prove the etymological relation of many of the ,grecian gods and heroes with those of the mythology of ,india and to trace the common origin of all these mythical beings and legends in the personification of the movements of the heavenly bodies1 the thunder and lightning1 the tempest and the rain4 ,all mythical belief in gods of the ,indo-,germanic peoples seems to have arisen out of a poetical view and dramatic personification of the powers of nature4 ,suggestive as this hypothesis is1 it is not by any means sufficient to give us a complete explanation of the subject4 ,in fact1 others have shown that primitive religion does not altogether consist in mythical conceptions1 but mainly in reverential actions1 sacrifices1 sacraments1 vows1 and other similar cults1 which have very little to do with the atmospherical powers of nature1 but rather with the social life of primitive people4 ,and when once the sight was clearly directed to the social meaning of the religious rites1 it was then observed that even the earliest legends concerning the gods were connected far more closely with the habits and customs of early society than with the facts of nature4 ,tyler's celebrated book concerning ,primitive ,civilization is written from this standpoint1 an epoch-making book1 showing the original close connection of religion with the entire civilization of humanity1 with the views of life and death1 the social customs1 the forms of law1 their strivings in art and science2 a book with a large amount of information1 brought together from observation on all sides4 ,in this channel are found all the researches which to-day are classified under the name of ,folklore2 seeking to gather the still existing characteristic customs and forms1 legends1 stories1 and sayings1 in order to compose these and to discover the survivals of earliest religion1 poetry1 and civilization of humanity4 ,the gain of this study pursued with so great diligence is not to be underrated4 ,these studies show that all that1 which at one time existed as faith in the spirit of humanity1 possessed within its very nature the strongest power of continuance1 so that in new and strange conditions and in other forms it continued to remain4 ,under all changes and progress of history there is still found an unbroken connection of constant development4 ,as important1 however1 as the possession of a general knowledge of historical forms of development is to the philosophy of religion1 nevertheless the possession of this knowledge is not wholly a fulfillment of the purpose of the philosophy of religion4 ,to understand a development means not merely to know how one thing follows as the result of the other1 but also to understand the law which lies at the foundation of all empirical changes and at the same time controls the end of the development4 ,if this principle holds good in the understanding of the development in the processes of nature1 much more does the principle hold good in understanding the processes of intellectual development of humanity1 which have for us not only a theoretical1 but at the same time an eminently practical interest4 ,the philosopher of religion sees in religious history not merely the coming together of similar forms1 but an advance from the lowest stage of childlike ignorance to an ever purer and richer realization of the idea of religion1 a divinely ordained progress for the education of humanity from the slavery of nature to the freedom of the spirit4 ,the question now arises3 where do we find the principle and law of this ever-rising development8 ,where do we find the measure of judgment for the relative value of religious appearances8 ,it is clear that the general principle of the complete development cannot be found in a single fact which is only one of the many manifestations of the general principle1 and it is just as clear that the absolute norm of judgment is not found in a single fact always relative1 presenting to us the object of judgment and therefore being impossible to stand as the norm of judgment4 ,therefore the principle of religious development and the norm of its judgment can only be found in the inner being of the spirit of humanity1 namely1 in the necessary striving of the mind into an harmonious arrangement of all our conceptions1 or the idea of the truth1 and into the complete order of all our purposes1 or the idea of the good4 ,these ideas unite in the highest unity1 in the ,idea of ,god4 ,therefore the consciousness of ,god is the revelation of the original innate longing of reason after complete unity as a principle of universal harmony and consistence in all our thinking and willing4 ,hence1 in the first place1 arises the result that the development of the consciousness of ,god in the history of religion is always dependent upon the existing conditions of the two united sides1 the theoretical perception of the truth and the moral standard of life4 ,in the second place the result arises that the judgment of the value of all appearances in the history of religion depends as to whether and how far these appearances agree with the idea of the true and the good1 and correspond with the demands of reason and conscience4 ,that science which is engaged with the idea of the good we name ,ethics2 that which is engaged with the last principles of the perception of truth1 using the expression of ,aristotle1 we may name ,metaphysics1 or following ,plato--,dialectic4 ,recognizing then in the idea of ,god the synthesis of the idea of the true and the good1 the philosophy of religion is closely related with both1 ,ethics and ,metaphysics4 ,at present the relation of religion to morality is an object of much controversy4 ,there are many who hold that morality without religion is not only possible but also very desirable2 since they are of the opinion that moral strength is weakened1 the will is without freedom1 and its motives corrupted on account of religious conceptions4 ,on the other hand1 the ,church1 considering the experience of history1 finds that religion has ever proved itself to be the strongest and most necessary aid to morality4 ,in this contest the philosophy of religion occupies the position of a judge who is called upon to adjust the relative rights of the parties4 ,the philosophy of religion brings to light the historical fact that from the very beginnings of human civilization1 social life and morality were closely connected with religious conceptions and usages1 and indeed always so interchangeable in their influence that the position of social civilization on the one side corresponded with the position of religious civilization on the other1 just as the water-level in two communicating pipes4 ,therefore it follows that it is unjust and not historical to blame religion on account of the defects of a national and temporal morality2 for these defects of morality1 with the corresponding errors of religion1 find a common ground in a low stage of development of the entire civilization of the people of the time and age4 ,further1 it becomes the task of the philosophy of religion to examine whether this correspondence of religion and morality1 recognized in history1 is also found in the very nature of morality and religion4 ,this question in the main is answered without doubt in the affirmative1 for it is clear that the religious feeling of dependence upon one all-ruling power is well adapted not only to make keen the moral consciousness of obligation and to deepen the feeling of responsibility1 but also to endow moral courage with power and to strengthen the hope of the solution of moral purposes4 ,the clearer religious faith comprehends the relation of man to ,god1 so much the more will that faith prove itself as a strong motive and a great incentive of the moral life4 ,such a conception will not make the moral will unfree but truly free1 not in the sense of a selfish choice1 but in the sense of a love that serves1 knowing itself as an instrument of the divine will1 who binds us all into a social organism1 the kingdom of ,god4 ,and1 on the other hand1 the more ideal the moral view of life1 the higher and greater its aims1 the more it recognizes its great task to care for the welfare not only of the individual but of all1 to coperate in the welfare and development of all forms of society1 the more earnestly the moral mind will need a sincere faith that this is ,god's world1 that above all the changes of time an eternal will is on the throne1 whose all-wise guidance causes everything to be for the best unto those who love him4 ,a like middle position of arbitration falls to the philosophy of religion in the matter of the relation of religion to science4 ,the first demand of science is freedom of thought1 according to its own logical laws1 and its fundamental assumption is the possibility of the knowledge of the world on the basis of the unchangeable laws of all existence and events4 ,with this fundamental demand science places itself in opposition to the formal character of ecclesiastical doctrine so far as the doctrine claims infallible authority resting upon a divine revelation4 ,and the fundamental assumption of the regular law of the course of the world is in opposition to the contents of ecclesiastical doctrine concerning the miraculous interposition in the course of nature and of history4 ,to the superficial observer there appears therefore to exist an irreconcilable conflict between science and religion4 ,here is the work of the philosophy of religion1 to take away the appearance of an irreconcilable opposition between science and religion1 in that the philosophy of religion teaches first of all to distinguish between the essence of religion and the ecclesiastical doctrines of a certain religion1 and to comprehend the historical origin of these doctrines in the forms of thought of past times4 ,to this purpose the method of psychological analysis and of historical comparison mentioned above is of service4 ,when1 then1 by this critical process religion is traced to its real essence in the emotional consciousness of ,god1 to which the dogmatic doctrines stand as secondary products and varied symbols1 then it remains to show that between the essence of religion and that which science demands and presupposes1 there exists not conflict but harmony4 ,when the idea of ,god is recognized as the synthesis of the ideas of the true and the good1 so then must all truth as sought by science1 even as the highest good1 which the system of ethics places as the purpose of all action--these must be recognized as the revelation of ,god in his eternal reason and goodness4 ,the laws of our rational thinking then cannot be in conflict with divine revelation in history1 and the laws of the natural order of the world can no more stand in conflict with the world-governing ,omnipotence2 but both1 the laws of our thinking and those of the real world1 reveal themselves as the harmonious revelations of the creative reason of ,god1 which1 according to ,plato's fitting word1 is the efficient ground of being as well as of knowing4 ,it is therefore not merely a demand of religious belief that there is real truth in our ,god-consciousness1 that there should be an activity and revelation of ,god himself in the human mind2 it is also in the same manner a demand of science considering its last principles1 that the world1 in order to be known by us as a rational1 regulated order1 must have for its principle an eternal creative reason4 ,long ago the old master of thinking1 ,aristotle1 recognized this fact clearly1 when he said that order in the world without a principle of order could be as little thinkable as the order of an army without a commanding general4 ,but while it is true that science1 as the ground of the possibility of its knowledge of the truth1 must presuppose the same general principle of intellectual knowledge which religion has as the object of its practical belief1 then by principle the apprehension is excluded that any possible progress on the part of science in its knowledge of the world can ever destroy religion4 ,we are rather the more justified in the hope that all true knowledge of science will be a help to religion1 and will serve as the means of purifying religion from the dross of superstition4 ,truly it can easily be shown that a divine government of the world breaking through1 and now and then suspending the regular order of nature through miraculous intervention1 would not be more majestic1 but far more limited and human1 than such a government which reveals itself as everywhere and always the same in and through its own ordained laws in the world4 ,and again1 that a revelation prescribing secret and incomprehensible doctrines and rites1 demanding from humanity a blind faith1 would far less be in harmony with the guiding wisdom and love of ,god1 and far less could work for the intellectual liberty and perfection of humanity1 than such a revelation which is working in and through the reason and conscience of humanity1 and is realizing its purpose in the progressive development of our intellectual and moral capacities and powers4 ,when therefore science raises critical misgivings against the supernatural and irrational doctrines of positive religion1 then the real and rightly understood interests of religion are not harmed but rather advanced2 for this criticism serves religion in helping it to become free from the unintellectual inheritance of its early days1 in helping religion to consider its true intellectual and moral essence1 and to bring to a full display all the blessed powers which are concealed within its nature1 to press through the narrow walls of an ecclesiasticism out into the full life of humanity1 and to work as leaven for the ennoblement of humanity4 ,not in conflict with science and moral culture1 but only in harmony with these1 can religion come nearer to the attainment of its ideal1 which consists in the worship of ,god in spirit and in truth4 ,even though they may not be conscious of their purpose1 but nevertheless in fact all honest work of science and all the endeavors of social and ethical humanity have part in the attainment of this ideal4 ,it is the work of the philosophy of religion to make clear that all work of the thinking and striving spirit of humanity1 in its deepest meaning1 is a work in the kingdom of ,god1 as service to ,god1 who is truth and goodness4 ,it is the work of the philosophy of religion to explain various misunderstandings1 to bring together opposing sides1 and so to prepare the way for a more harmonious coperation of all1 and for an always hopeful progress of all on the road to the high aims of a humanity fraternally united in the divine spirit4 ,,main ,,problems ,,of ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,religion3 ,,psychology ,,and ,,theory ,,of ,,knowledge ,,in ,,the ,,science ,,of ,,religion ,,by ,,professor ,,ernst ,,troeltsch 7,translated from the ,german by ,dr4 ,j4 ,h4 ,woods1 ,harvard ,university47 ,ernst ,troeltsch1 ,professor of ,systematic ,theology1 ,university of ,heidelberg1 since #ahid4 b4 ,february #ag #ahfe1 ,augsburg1 ,bavaria4 ,doctor of ,theology4 ,professor ,university of ,bonn1 #ahib-id4 ,author of ,john ,gerhard and ,melanchthon2 ,richard ,rubbe2 ,the ,scientific ,attitude and its ,demands on ,theology2 ,the ,absoluteness of ,christianity1 and of the ,history of ,religion2 ,political ,ethics and ,christianity2 ,the ,historic ,element in ,kant's ,religious ,philosophy4 ,the philosophy of religion of to-day is philosophy of religion so far only1 and in such a sense1 as this word means science of religion or philosophy with reference to religion4 ,the science of religion of former days was first dogmatic theology1 deriving its dogmas from the ,bible and from ,church tradition1 expounding them apologetically with the metaphysical speculation of the later period of antiquity1 and regarding the non-,christian religions as sinful derangements and obscure fragments of the primitive revelation4 ,this lasted sixteen centuries1 and is confined to-day to strictly ecclesiastical circles4 ,next1 science of religion became natural theology1 which proved the existence of ,god by the nature of thought and by the constitution of reality1 and also the immortality of the soul by the concept of the soul and by moral demands1 thus constructing natural or rational dogmas and putting these dogmas into more or less friendly relations with traditional ,christianity4 ,this lasted about two centuries1 and is to-day of the not strictly ecclesiastical or pietistic circles1 which still wish to hold fast to religion4 ,both kinds of science of religion exist no longer for the strict science4 ,the first was1 in reality1 supernaturalistic dogmatics1 the second was1 in reality1 a substitution of philosophy for religion4 ,the first was demolished by the criticism of miracles in the eighteenth century1 the second by the criticism of knowledge in the nineteenth century1 which1 in its turn1 rests upon ,hume and ,kant4 ,the science of religion of to-day keeps in touch with that which without doubt factually exists and is an object of actual experience1 the subjective religious consciousness4 ,the distrust of ecclesiastical and rationalistic dogmas has made1 in the thought of the present1 every other treatment impossible4 ,so the spirit of empiricism has here as at other points completely prevailed4 ,but empiricism in this field means psychological analysis4 ,this analysis is pursued by the present to the widest extent3 on the one side by anthropologists and archologists1 who investigate the life of the soul in primitive peoples and thus indicate the particular function and condition of religion in these states2 on the other side1 by the modern experimental psychologists and psychological empiricists1 who1 by self-observation1 and especially by the collection of observations by others and of personal testimony1 study religion1 and then1 from the point of view of the concepts of experimental psychology1 examine the main phenomena thus found4 ,now1 such an empirical psychology of religion has been constructed with considerable success4 ,in this ,german literature1 it is true1 has coperated to a slight degree only4 ,the ,german theologians have held to the older statements of the psychology of ,kant1 of ,schleiermacher1 of ,hegel1 and of ,fries1 alone1 which1 in principle1 were on the right path1 but which combined the purely psychological with metaphysical and epistemological problems to such a degree that it was impossible to reach a really unprejudiced attitude4 ,german psychologists remain1 furthermore1 under the spell of psycho-physiology and of quantitative statements of measure1 and have1 consequently1 not liked to advance into this field1 which is inaccessible to such statements4 ,more productive than the ,german psychology for this subject is the ,french1 which has attacked the complex facts far more courageously4 ,here1 however1 under the predominance of positivism1 there prevails1 on the whole1 the tendency to regard religion1 in its essence1 anthropologically or medically and pathologically in connection with bodily conditions4 ,this is the confusion of conditions and origins with the essence of the thing itself1 which can be determined only by the thing1 and is1 by no means1 bound exclusively to these conditions4 ,notwithstanding1 the works of ,marillier1 ,murisier1 and ,flournoy have considerably aided the problem4 ,more impartially than all of these1 the ,english and ,american psychology has investigated our subject4 ,here we have a masterpiece in the ,gifford ,lectures of ,william ,james1 which collects into a single reservoir similar investigations such as have been carried on by ,coe and ,starbuck4 ,there is here no tendency to a mechanism of consciousness1 or to the dogma of the causal and necessary structure of consciousness4 ,and to just this is due the freshness and impartiality of the analyses which ,james gives out of his enviable knowledge of characteristic cases4 ,james rightly emphasizes the endlessly different intensity of religious experiences1 and the great number of points of view and of judgments which thereby results4 ,he also rightly emphasizes the connection of this different intensity with irreducible typical constitutions of the soul's life1 with the optimistic and the melancholy disposition2 hence there arise constantly1 even within the same religion1 essentially different types of religiousness4 ,limiting himself1 then1 to the most intense experiences1 he decides that the characteristic of religious states is the sense of presence of the divine1 which one might perhaps describe in other terms1 but which still continues the specifically divine1 with the opposed emotional effects of a solemn sense of contrast and of enthusiastic exaltation4 ,he pictures these senses of presence1 and illustrates them by visionary and hallucinatory representations of the abstract4 ,with this are connected impulsive and inhibitive conditions for the appearance of these senses of presence and of reality1 descriptions of the effects upon the emotional life and action1 and1 above all1 the analysis of the event usually called conversion1 in which the religious experience out of subconscious antecedents becomes1 in various ways1 the centre of the soul's life4 ,all this is description1 but it is based upon a mass of examples and explained by general psychological categories which1 by the occurrence of the religious event only1 receive a thoroughly specific coloring4 ,it is a description after the manner of ,kirchhoff's mechanics2 permanent and similar types1 and1 likewise1 similar conditions for their relations to the rest of the soul's life are sought out everywhere1 without maintaining to have proven at the same time1 in this way1 an intellectual necessity for the connection4 ,but the characteristic peculiarity of religious phenomena is thus conceived as in no other previous analysis4 ,all this is still1 however1 nothing more than psychologic4 ,for the science of religion it accomplishes nothing more than the psychological determination of the peculiarity of the phenomenon1 of its environment1 its relations and consequences4 ,it is evident that the phenomenon occurs in an indefinite number of varieties2 and the chosen point of departure1 in unusual and excessive cases1 frequently diffuses over religion itself the character of the bizarre and abnormal4 ,consequently nothing whatever is said about the amount of truth or of reality in these cases4 ,this1 by the very principles of such a psychology1 is impossible4 ,it analyzes1 produces types and categories1 points out comparatively constant connections and interactions4 ,but this cannot be the last word for the science of religion4 ,it demands1 above all1 empirical knowledge of the phenomenon2 but it demands this only in order1 on the basis of this knowledge1 to be able to answer the question of the amount of truth4 ,but this leads to an entirely different problem1 that of the theory of knowledge1 which has its own conditions of solution4 ,it is impossible to stop at a merely empirical psychology4 ,the question is not merely of given facts1 but of the amount of knowledge in these facts4 ,but pure empiricism will not succeed in answering this question4 ,the question with regard to the amount of truth is always a question of validity4 ,the question with regard to validity can1 however1 be decided only by logical and by general1 conceptual investigations4 ,thus we pass over from the ground of empiricism to that of rationalism1 and the question is1 what the theory of knowledge or rationalism signifies for the science of religion4 ,such a synthesis of the rational and irrational1 of the psychological and the theory of knowledge1 is the main problem raised by the teaching of ,kant1 and the significance of ,kant is that he clearly and once for all raised the problem in this way4 ,he had the same strong mind for the empirical and actual as for the rational and conceptual elements of human knowledge1 and constructed science as a balance between the two4 7,he destroyed forever the a priori speculative rationalism of the necessary ideas of thought1 and the analytical deductions from them1 which undertakes to call reality out of the necessity of thought as such4 ,he restricted regressive rationalism to metaphysical hypotheses and probabilities1 the evidence for which rests upon the inevitability of the logical operations which leads to them1 which1 however1 apply general concepts without reference to experience1 and therefore become empty1 and thus afford no real knowledge47 ,on the other hand1 he proclaimed the formal1 immanent rationalism of experience1 in attempting to unite ,hume's truth with the truth of ,leibnitz and of ,plato4 ,in this way he succeeded in grasping the great problem of thought by the root1 and in putting attempts at solutions on the right basis4 ,so it is not a mere national custom of ,german philosophizing1 if we take our bearings1 for the most part1 from this greatest of ,german thinkers1 but it is1 absolutely1 the most fruitful and keenest way of putting the problem4 ,it is true1 the solutions which ,kant made1 and which are closely connected with the classical mechanics of that time1 with the undeveloped condition of the psychology of that time1 and with the incompleteness of historical thinking then just beginning1 have been1 meantime1 more than once given up again4 ,a simple return to him is therefore impossible4 ,but the problem was put by him in a fundamental way1 and his solutions need nothing more than modification and completion4 ,now all this is especially true in the case of the science of religion4 ,here also ,kant took the same course1 which seemed to me right for the theoretical knowledge of the natural sciences and for anthropology4 ,in practical philosophy also1 to which he rightly counts philosophy of religion1 he seeks laws of the practical reason analogous to the laws of theoretical reason1 axioms of the ethical1 sthetic1 and religious consciousness which are already contained a priori in the elementary appearances in these fields1 and1 in application to concrete reality1 produce just these activities of the reason4 ,here also one should grasp reason only as contained in life itself1 the a priori law itself already effective in the diversity of the appearances should make one's self clear-sighted and so competent for a criticism of the stream of the soul's appearances4 ,seizing upon itself in the practical reality1 the practical reason criticises the psychological complex1 rejects as illusion and error that which cannot be comprehended in an a priori law1 selects that part of the same which needs basis and centre and requires only clearness with regard to itself1 clears the way for revelations of a life consciousness of its own legality and becomes capable of the development of critically purified experience4 ,if this is1 in principle1 valid1 the ,kantian thought1 in the further detail1 is maintained in principle only and as a whole4 ,the elaboration itself will have to be quite different from that of his own4 ,even by ,kant himself1 on this very point1 the synthesis of empiricism and rationalism is far from being elaborated with the necessary rigor and consistency4 ,and to-day we have a quite differently developed psychology of religion1 in contrast with which that presupposed by ,kant is bare and thin4 ,finally1 there remain in the whole method of the critical system unsolved problems2 by failure to solve these1 or by too hasty solution1 science of religion1 especially1 is affected4 ,to make clear the present condition of the problem1 one ought1 above all1 to indicate the modifications to which the ,kantian theory of religion must submit1--must submit1 especially1 by reason of a more delicate psychology1 such as we have1 with remarkable richness1 in ,james and the ,american psychologists connected with him4 ,there are four points with regard to this question4 ,the first is the question of the relation of psychology and theory of knowledge in the very establishment of the laws of the theory of knowledge4 ,are not the search for and discovery of the laws of the theory of knowledge themselves possible only by way of psychological ascertainment of facts1 itself then a psychological undertaking and consequently dependent upon all its conditions8 ,it is the much discussed question of the circle which itself lies at the outset of the critical system4 ,the answer to this is that this circle lies in the very being of all knowledge1 and must therefore be resolutely committed4 ,it signifies nothing more than the presupposition of all thought1 the trust in a reason which establishes itself only by making use of itself4 ,the unmistakable elements of the logical assert themselves as logical in distinction from the psychological1 and from this point on reason must be trusted in all its confusions and entanglements to recognize itself within the psychological4 ,it is the courage of thought1 as ,hegel says1 which may presuppose that the self-knowledge of reason may trust itself1 presuppose that reason is contained within the psychological2 or it is the ethical and teleological presupposition of all thought1 as ,lotze says1 which believes in knowledge and the validity of its laws for the sake of a connected meaning for reality1 and which1 therefore1 trusts to recognize itself out of the psychological mass4 ,the establishment1 therefore1 of the laws of the theory of knowledge is not itself a psychological analysis1 but a knowledge of self by the logical by virtue of which it extricates itself out of the psychological mass4 ,theory of knowledge1 like every rationalism1 includes1 it is true1 very real presuppositions with regard to the significant1 rational1 and teleologically connective character of reality1 and without this presupposition it is untenable2 in it lies its root4 ,it is insight of former days1 the importance of which1 however1 must constantly be emphasized anew1 that discusses the validity of the rational as opposed to the merely empirical4 ,but still more important than this thesis are several inferences which are given with it4 ,the establishment of the laws of consciousness1 in which we produce experience1 is a selection of the laws out of experience itself1 a knowledge of itself by the reason contained in the very experience by way of the analysis which extracts it4 ,it is then an endless task1 completed by constantly renewed attacks1 and always only approximately solvable4 ,the complete separation of the merely psychological and actual and of the logical and necessary will never be completely accomplished1 but will always be open to doubt2 one can only attempt always to limit more vigorously the field of what is doubtful4 ,and with this something further is connected4 ,the inexhaustible production of life becomes constantly1 in the latent amount of reason1 richer than the analysis discerns1 or1 in other words1 the laws which are brought into the light of logic will always be less the amount of reason not brought into consciousness1 and conscious logic will always be obliged to correct itself and enrich itself out of the unartificial logical operations arising in contact with the object4 ,so a finished system of a priori principles1 but this system will always be in growth1 will be obliged unceasingly to correct itself1 and to contain open spaces4 ,finally1 and above all1 in case of this separation1 there remains within the psychologically conditioned appearance1 a residuum1 which is either not conceived1 but is later reduced to law and thereby a conceived phenomenon1 or which never can be so1 and is therefore illusion and error4 ,if the psychological and the theoretical for knowledge are to be separated1 then that can occur1 not merely to show that both must always be together1 and form real experience only when together1 but there must also be a rejection of that which is merely psychological and not rational since it is illusion and error4 ,the distinction between the apparent and the real was the point of departure which made the whole theory necessary1 and1 accordingly1 the merely psychological must remain appearance and error side by side with that which is psychological and1 at the same time1 theoretical for knowledge4 ,there always remains in consciousness a residuum of the inconceivable1 that is1 inconceivable since it is illusion and error4 ,this amounts to saying that reality is never fully rational1 but is engaged in a struggle between the rational and anti-rational4 ,the anti-rational or irrational1 in the sense of psychological illusion and error1 belongs also to the real1 and strives against the rational4 ,the true and rational reality to be attained by thought is always in conjunction with the untrue reality1 the psychological1 that containing illusion and error4 ,all this signifies that the rationalism of the theory of knowledge must be conditional1 partly owing to the corrective and enriching fecundation by primitive and nave thought1 partly owing to never quite separable admixture of illusion and error4 ,so1 long ago1 the system of categorical forms1 as ,kant constructed it for theoretical and practical reason1 began to change1 and can never again acquire the rigidity which ,kant's rationalism intended to give it forevermore4 ,and thus the critical system's rational reality of law produced by reason always contains below itself and beside itself the merely psychological reality of the factual1 to which also illusion and error belong1--a reality which can never be rationalized1 but only set aside4 ,this1 too1 is also true for the philosophy of religion3 the rational reduction of the psychological facts of religion to the general laws of consciousness which prevail among them is a task constantly to be resumed anew by the study of reality1 and follows the movements of primitive religion in order to find there first the rational basis2 the reduction is1 however1 always approximate1 can comprehend the main points only1 and must leave much open1 the rational ground for which is not or not yet evident2 finally it has unceasingly to reckon with the irrational as illusion and error1 which attaches to the rational1 and yet is not explainable by it4 ,the two realities1 which the critical system must recognize at its very foundation1 continue in strife with each other1 and this strife as the strife of divine truth with human illusion is for the science of religion of still more importance4 ,the second correction of the ,kantian teaching is only a further consequence from this state of things4 ,if the attitude of psychology and theory of knowledge requires a strict separation1 it requires it only for the purpose of more correct relation4 ,the laws of the theory of knowledge are separated from the merely psychological actuality1 but still can be produced only out of it4 ,thus1 as a matter of fact1 psychological analysis is always the presupposition for the correct conception of all these laws4 ,psychology is the entrance gate to theory of knowledge4 ,this is true for theoretical logic as well as for the practical logic of the moral1 the sthetical1 and the religious4 ,but just at this point the present1 on the basis of its psychological investigation1 presses far beyond the original form of the ,kantian teaching4 ,this is not the place to describe this1 more closely1 with reference to the first of the subjects just mentioned4 ,but it is important to insist that this is especially true with respect to the ,kantian doctrine of religion4 ,the ,kantian doctrine of religion is founded on the moral and religious psychology of ,deism1 which had made the connection1 frequent in experience1 of moral feelings with religious emotion the sole basis of the philosophy of religion1 and had1 in the manner of the psychology of the eighteenth century1 immediately changed this connection into intellectual reflections1 in accord with which the moral law demands its originator and guarantee4 ,kant accepted this psychology of religion without proof and built upon it his main law of the religious consciousness1 in accordance with which a synthetic judgment a priori is operative in religion 7arising in the moral experience of freedom71 which requires that the world be regarded as subject to the purposes of freedom4 ,it is1 however1 extremely one-sided1 to give religion its place just between the elements1 and a rather violent translation of the religious constitution into reflection4 ,the error of this psychology of religion had been discovered and corrected already by ,schleiermacher4 ,but ,schleiermacher1 for his part too1 also failed to deny himself an altogether too sudden metaphysical interpretation of the religious a priori which he had demonstrated1 since he not only described the a priori judgment of things1 from the point of view of absolute dependence upon ,god1 as a vague feeling1 but raised this feeling1 by reason of the supposed lack of difference1 in it1 between thought and will1 reason and being1 to a world-principle1 and interpreted the idea of ,god contained in this feeling in the terms of his ,spinozism1 the lack of difference between ,god and ,nature within the ,absolute4 ,a real theory of knowledge of religion must keep itself much more independent of all metaphysical presuppositions and inferences1 and must admit that the essence of the religious a priori is extorted from a thoroughly impartial psychological analysis4 ,and this is always the place where works1 such as those of ,james1 come into play4 ,religion as a special category or form of psychical constitution1 the result of a more or less vague presence of the divine in the soul1 the feeling of presence and reality with reference to the superhuman or infinite1 that is without any doubt a much more correct point of departure for the analysis of the rational a priori of religion1 and it remains to make this new psychology fruitful for the theory of knowledge of religion4 ,that will be one of the chief tasks of the future4 ,the third change relates to the distinction of the empirical and intelligible ,ego1 which ,kant connected closely1 almost indissolubly with his main epistemological thought of the formal rationalisms immanent in experience4 ,kant rationalized the whole outer and inner experience1 by means of a priori laws1 into a totality1 conforming to law1 appearing in intuitive forms of space and time1 causally and necessarily rigidly connected4 ,the freedom autonomously determining itself out of the logical idea1 and contrasting itself with the psychological stream1 produces out of the confused psycholican reality this scientific formation of the true reality4 ,the product of thought1 however1 swallows its own maker4 ,for the same acts of freedom1 which autonomously produced the formation of the reality of law1 remain themselves in the temporal sequence of psychical events1 and1 therefore1 themselves1 with that formation1 lapse into the sequence which is under mechanical law4 ,the intelligible ,ego creates the world of law1 and finds itself therein1 with its activity1 as empirical ,ego1 that is1 as product of the great world-mechanism and of its causal sequence4 ,it is an intolerable1 violent contradiction1 and it is no solution of this contradiction to refer the empirical ,ego to appearance1 and the intelligible ,ego to actuality existing in itself1 if the operations of the intelligible ,ego1 also a constituent part of what takes place in the soul1 occur in time and so relapse irrecoverably into phenomenality and its mechanism4 ,all the ingenuity of modern interpretation of ,kant has not succeeded in making this circle more tolerable1 all shifting of one and the same thing to different points of view has only enriched scientific terminology with masterpieces of parenthetical caution1 but not removed the objection that two different points of view do not1 as a matter of fact1 exist side by side1 but conflict within the same object4 ,this circle is especially intolerable for the psychology of religion and its application to the theory of knowledge4 ,the psychology of religion certainly shows us that the deeper feeling of all religion is not a product of the mechanical sequence1 but an effect of the supersensuous itself as it is felt there2 it believes that it arises in the intelligible ,ego by way of some kind of connection with the supersensuous world4 ,this1 however1 becomes completely impossible for the ,kantian theory of the empirical ,ego1 and all distinctions of a double point of view in no wise change the fact that these points of view are mutually absolutely exclusive4 ,here we have the results of psychology which the expression of religious emotion confirms1 in that religion can be causally reduced to nothing else1 totally opposed to the consequences of such a theory of knowledge4 ,kant had himself often enough practically felt this1 and spoke then of freedom as an experience of communion with the supersensuous as a possible but unprovable affair1 while all that1 in case of a strict adherence to the phenomenality of time and of the theory of the empirical ,ego1 which is a consequence of it1 is completely impossible4 ,nothing can be of any assistance here except a decisive renunciation of those epistemological positions which contradict the results of psychology1 and which are themselves only doctrinaire consequences from other positions4 ,nothing else is possible but the modification of the phenomenality of time1 in such a way that by no means everything which belongs to time belongs also as a matter of course to phenomenality1 but that the autonomous rational acts which occur in the time series of consciousness possess their own intelligible time-form4 ,at the same time the concept of causality closely connected with the concept of time is to be modified so that there should be not only an immanent and phenomenal causal connection1 but also a regular interaction between phenomenal and intelligible1 psychological and rational1 conscious reality4 ,at the same time the conclusion is also given up1 that the ,ego submits unconditionally and directly to phenomenality and to causal necessity1 while the same ,ego1 once more1 in the same way1 as a whole1 from another point of view1 is subordinate to freedom and autonomy1 that is1 self-constitutive through ideas4 ,the two ,egos must lie not side by side1 but in and over one another4 ,it must be possible that1 within the phenomenal ,ego by a creative act of the intelligible ,ego in it1 the personality should be formed and developed as a realization of the autonomous reason1 so that the intelligible issues from the phenomenal1 the rational from the psychological1 the former elaborates and shapes the latter1 and between both a relation of regular interaction1 but not of causal constraint1 takes place4 ,this rather deep1 incisive modification is1 in its turn1 an approach of the ,kantian teaching to empiricism1 but still at the same time1 in the destruction and subordination of the phenomenal and intelligible world1 in the emphasis upon the single personality issuing from the act of reason1 an adherence to rationalism4 ,but since the distinction and the interrelation between the rational and the empirical forms the point of departure for the critical system1 and this point of departure requires at the same time the moulding and shaping of the empirical by the rational and the rejection of the psychological appearance2 a mere parallelism is altogether impossible1 but an interrelation is included1 and a task set for the effort and labor which constantly makes the rational penetrate the empirical4 ,at the very outset we have the exclusion of the parallelism and the assertion of the interrelation4 ,the interrelation1 by its very nature1 asserts the interruption of the causal necessity and the penetration of autonomous reason in this sequence1 without being itself produced by this sequence1 although it can be stimulated and helped or inhibited and weakened by it4 ,thus1 in such a case as this1 the irrational is recognized by the side of and in the rational4 ,in this case the irrational of the event without causal compulsion by some antecedent1 or of the self-determination by the autonomous idea alone1 is the irrational of freedom4 ,it is the irrational of the creative procedure which constitutes the idea out of itself and produces the consequences of the reason out of the constituted idea4 ,but this irrational plays everywhere in the whole life of the soul an essential part1 and is not less than decisive in the case of religion1 which must be quite different from what it is if it did not have the right to maintain that which it declares to be true of itself1 namely1 that it is an act of freedom and a gift of grace1 an effect of the supersensuous permeating the natural phenomenal life of the soul and an act of free devotion the natural motivation4 ,the fourth problem arises1 when we examine the rational law of the religious nature or of the having of religion which lies in the being and organization of the reason4 ,the having of religion may be demonstrated as a law of the normal consciousness from the immanent feeling of necessity and obligation which properly belongs to religion1 and from its organic place in the economy of consciousness1 which receives its concentration and its relation to an objective world-reason only from religion4 ,but precisely because religion is reduced to this1 it is clear that this is only a reduction which abstracts from the empirical actuality just as the categories of pure reason do4 ,this abstraction1 then1 should under no circumstances itself be regarded as the real religion4 ,it is only the rational a priori of the psychical appearances1 but not the replacement of appearances by the truth free from confusion4 ,the psychical reality in which alone the truth is effective should never be forgotten out of regard for the truth4 ,this is1 however1 the fact in the ,kantian theory of religion in two directions4 ,it is always noticeable that the a priori of the practical reason is treated by ,kant quite differently from the theoretical4 ,in case of the latter the main idea of the synthesis1 immanent in experience1 of rationalism and empiricism1 is retained1 and the a priori of the pure forms of intuition and of the pure categories is nothing without the contents of concrete reality which become shaped in it4 ,it may be very difficult actually to grasp the coperation of the a priori and the empirical in the single case1 and ,kant's theory of the categories may have to be entirely reshaped and approximated to a priori hypotheses requiring verification1 but the principle itself is always the disposition of the real and genuine problem of all knowledge4 ,in case of the practical a priori ,kant did1 it is true1 firmly emphasize the formal character of the ethical1 sthetical1 and religious law1 but1 in doing this1 does not lose quite out of sight the psychical reality4 ,they appear not as empty forms which attain to their reality only when filled with the concrete ethical tasks1 the artistic creations1 and the religious states1 but as abstract truths of reason1 which have to take the place of the intricacies of usual consciousness4 ,at this point one has always been right in feeling a relapse on the part of ,kant into the abstract1 analytical1 conceptual1 rationalism1 and for this very reason ,kant's statements about these things are of great sublimity and rigor of principle1 but scanty in content4 ,it is more important in case also of this a priori of the practical reason to keep in mind that it is a purely formal a priori and in reality must constantly be in relation with the psychical content1 in order to give this content the firm core of the real and the principle of the critical regulation of self4 ,so the a priori of morals is not to be represented abstractly merely by itself1 but it is to be conceived in its relation to all the tasks which we feel as obligatory1 and it extends itself from that point outwards over the total expanse of the activity of reason4 ,likewise the a priori of art is not to be denoted in the abstract idea of the unity of freedom and necessity1 but to be shown in the whole expanse which is present to the soul as artistic form or conception4 ,thus1 in especial degree1 religion is not to be reduced to the belief of reason in a moral world-order1 and simply contrasted with all supposed religion of any other kind1 but the religious a priori should only serve in order to establish the essential in the empirical appearance1 but without stripping off this appearance altogether1 and from this point of the essential to correct the intricacies and narrowness1 the errors and false combinations of the psychical situation4 ,kant1 by his original thought of the a priori1 was urged in different ways to such a view1 and construed epistemologically the empirical psychological religion as imaginary illustrations of the a priori4 ,but that is occasional only and does not dominate ,kant's real view of religion4 ,this is and still remains only a translation of the usual moral and theological rationalism from the formula of ,locke and ,wolff into the formula of the critical philosophy4 ,the same revision occurs in quite a different direction4 ,if religion is an a priori of reason1 it is1 once for all1 established together with reason1 and all religion is everywhere and always religious in the same proposition as it is in any way realized4 ,schleiermacher expressly stated this in his development of the ,kantian theory1 and1 in so far as the practical reason is always penetrated with freedom1 and consequently religion itself is established with the act of moral freedom1 this was also asserted by ,kant himself4 ,such an assertion1 however1 contradicts every psychological observation whatsoever4 ,it is true such observation can prove that religious emotions adjust themselves easily to all activities of reason1 but it must sharply distinguish what is nothing more than the religiousness of vague feeling of supersensual regulations1 which usually are joined with art and morals1 from real and characteristic religiousness1 in which1 each single time1 a purely personal relation of presence to the supersensuous takes place4 ,but this whole problem signifies nothing else than the actualizing of the religious a priori1 which actualizing always occurs in quite specific and1 in spite of all difference1 essentially similar psychical experiences and states4 ,this problem of the actualizing of the religious a priori and of its connection with concrete individual psychical phenomena1 ,kant completely overlooked in his abstract concept of religion1 or rather1 deliberately ignored1 because1 as he wrote to ,jacobi1 he saw all the dangers of mysticism lurking in it4 ,this fear was justified2 for1 as a matter of fact1 all the specific occurrences of mysticism1 from conversion1 prayer1 and contemplation to enthusiasm1 vision1 and ecstasy1 do lurk in it4 ,but without this mysticism there is no real religion1 and the psychology of religion shows most clearly how the real pulse of religion beats in the mystical experiences4 ,a religion without it is only a preliminary step1 or a reverberation of real and actual religion4 ,moreover1 the states are easily conceived in a theory of knowledge1 if one sees in them the actualizing of the religious a priori1 the production of actual religion in the fusion of the rational law with the concrete individual psychical fact4 ,the mysticism recognized as essential by the psychology of religion must find its place in the theory of knowledge1 and it finds it as the psychological actualizing of the religious a priori1 in which alone that interlacing of the necessary1 the rational1 the conformable to law1 and the factual occurs1 which characterizes real religion4 ,the dangers of such a mysticism1 which are recognized a thousandfold in experience1 cannot be dispelled altogether by the displacement of mysticism1 for that would mean to displace religion itself4 ,it would be the same1 if one should try to avoid the dangers of illusion and error1 by keeping to the pure categories alone1 and ceasing to employ them in the actual thinking of experience4 ,rather1 they can be dispelled only in that the actualizing of the rational a priori is recognized in the mystical occurrences1 and thus the intricacies and one-sidedness of the mere psychological stream of religiousness be avoided4 ,the psychological reality of religion must always remember the rational substance of religion1 and always bring religion as central in the system of consciousness into fruitful and adjusted contact with the total life of the reason4 ,thus the psychological reality corrects and purifies itself out of its own a priori1 without1 however1 destroying itself2 or rather1 the actual religion in the psychical category of the mystical occurrences will subside to a more or less degree4 ,thus we have the irrational prevailing here in its third form1 which like the two others was contained in the very outset of the critical system1 in the form of the once-occurring1 factual1 and individual1 which1 of course1 has a rational basis or a rational element in itself1 but is besides a pure fact and reality4 ,just this is the excellence of the rationalism immanent in experience 7the critical system71 that it makes room for this feature beside the general and conceptual rationality4 ,it did not make room for it to the extent really required1 and it especially left no space for it in its abstract philosophy of religion4 ,this space must again be opened by the theory of the actualizing of the religious a priori1 and there again lies another improvement of the critical system under the influence of modern psychology4 ,if we summarize all this1 we have a quantity of concessions by the formal epistemological rationalism to the irrationality of the psychological facts and a repeated breaking down of the over-rigorous ,kantian rationalism4 ,contrariwise1 however1 the pure psychological investigation is also compelled to withdraw from the unlimited quantity and the absolute irrationality of the multifarious 7and of the confusion of appearance and truth7 to a rational criterium1 which can be found in the rational a priori of the reason only1 and in the organic position of this a priori in the system of consciousness in general4 ,by this rationalism alone may the true validity of religion be founded1 and by this alone the uncultivated psychical life may be critically regulated4 ,religion will be conceived in its concrete vitality and not mutilated2 it will constantly be brought out of the jumble of its distortions1 blendings1 one-sidedness1 narrowness1 and exuberance back again to its original content1 and to its organic relations to the totality of the life of reason1 to the scientific moral and artistic accomplishments4 ,that is everything that science can do for it1 but is not this service great enough and indispensable enough to justify the work of such a science8 ,we do not stop with nothing more than varieties of religious experience which is the result of ,james's method2 but neither do we stop with nothing more than a rational idea of religion1 which overpowers experience1 as was still so in the case of ,kant4 ,but we must learn how intimately to combine the empirical and psychological with the critical and normative4 ,the ideas of ,hume and of ,leibnitz must once more be brought into relation with the continuations of ,kant's work1 and the combination of the ,anglo-,saxon sense for reality with the ,german spirit of speculation is still the task for the new century as well as for the century past4 ,,short ,,papers ,a short paper was contributed to this ,section by ,professor ,alexander ,t4 ,ormond1 of ,princeton ,university1 on ,some ,roots and ,factors of ,religion4 ,the speaker said that religion1 like everything else human1 has its rise in man's experience4 ,it has also doubtless had a history that will present the outlines of a development1 if but the course of that development can be traced4 ,but in the case of religion our theory of development will be largely qualified by our judgment as to its origin2 while1 regarding origin itself1 we have to depend on hypotheses constructed from our more or less imperfect acquaintance with the races1 and especially the savage races1 of the present4 ,the primitive pre-religious man is a construction from present data1 and will always remain more or less hypothetical4 ,this will partially explain1 and at the same time partially excuse1 what we will agree is the unsatisfactory character of the anthropological theories as accounts of the origin of religion4 ,but there are other reasons for this partial failure that are less excusable4 ,one of these is the rather singular failure of the leading anthropologists1 in dealing with the origin of religion1 to distinguish between fundamental and merely tributary causes4 ,for instance1 if we suppose that man has in some way come into possession of a germ of religiousness1 many things will become genuine tributaries to its development that when urged as explanations of the germ itself would be obviously futile4 ,there must be a cause for the pretty general failure to note this distinction which is vital to religious theory1 and ,i am convinced that the principal cause is a certain lack of psychological insight and of philosophical grasp in dealing with the problem of the first data and primary roots of religion in man's nature4 ,in the first place1 it is needful in dealing with the religion of the hypothetical man that we should have some idea of what constitutes religion in the actual man4 ,now1 back of all the outward manifestations of religion1 will stand the religious consciousness of the man and the community1 and it will be this that will determine the idea of religion in its most essential form4 ,the developed idea of religion1 therefore1 arising out of this germinal impression1 would take the form of a sense 7we may now call it concept7 of relatedness to some being akin to man himself1 and yet transcending him in some real though undetermined respects4 ,anything short of this would1 ,i think1 leave religion in some respects unaccounted for2 while anything more would perhaps exclude some genuine manifestations of religion4 ,if the idea of religion arises out of an impression1 then it will not be possible to deny to it an intellectual root4 ,i make this statement with some diffidence1 because if ,i do not misinterpret them1 some recent psychologists have practically denied the intellectual root in their doctrine that religion can have no original intellectual content4 ,if ,i am not further misled1 however1 these writers would admit that a content is achieved by the symbolic use of experience4 ,this is perhaps all ,i need argue for here2 since our epistemology is teaching us that the distinction between symbolism and perception is only that between the direct and the indirect2 while here it is clear that its use in developing the significance of the religious impression would have all the directness and1 therefore1 all the cogency of an immediate inference4 ,let us now restore the intellectual and emotional elements of religion to their place in a synthesis2 we will then have a concrete religious experience out of which may be analyzed at least two fundamental factors4 ,the first of these is what we may call the personal factor in religion4 ,we are treading in the footsteps of the anthropologists when we find among the most undeveloped savages a tendency to personify the objects of their worship4 ,when it comes to the question of determining the rle that this personalizing tendency has actually played in the development of religion1 the anthropologists divide into two camps1 one of these1 led by ,max ,mller1 regarding it as a symbolic interpretation put upon the impression of some great natural or cosmic object or phenomenon2 while others1 including ,herbert ,spencer and ,mr4 ,tylor1 prefer to seek the originals of religion in ancestral dream-images and ghostly apparitions4 ,these writers thus start with completely anthropomorphic terms1 and their problem is to de-anthropomorphize the elements to the extent necessary to constitute them data of religion4 ,the second factor standing over against the personal1 as its opposite1 is that of transcendence4 ,by transcendence ,i mean that deifying1 infinitating process that is ever working contra to the anthropomorphic influence in the sphere of religious conceptions4 ,the ,school of ,spencer regard this as the only legitimate tendency in religion4 ,we do not argue this point here1 but agree that it is as legitimate and real a factor as that of personality4 ,the root of this factor1 if our diagnosis of the idea of religion be correct1 is to be sought in the original impression of religion1 and it no doubt has its origin in man's feeling-reaction from that impression4 ,we have pointed to submission as one of the religious emotions4 ,now submission rests on some deeper feeling-attitude1 which some have translated into the feeling or sense of dependence4 ,this1 however1 is not adequate1 since men have the sense of social dependence on finite beings1 and we have it with reference to the floor we are standing on4 ,rather1 it seems to me1 we must translate it into the stronger and more unconditional feeling of helplessness4 ,one real ground of our religious consciousness is the sense or feeling of helplessness toward ,god2 the sense that we have no standing in being as against the ,deity4 ,this radical feeling utters itself in every note of the religious scale1 from the lowest superstitious terror to the highest mystical self-annihilation4 ,these two factors1 the forces of personalization and transcendence1 are inseparable4 ,they constitute the terms of a dialectic within the religious consciousness1 by virtue of which in one phase our religious conceptions are becoming ever more adequate and satisfying1 while from another point of view their insufficiency grows more and more apparent4 ,and1 on the broader field of religious history1 they embody themselves in a law of tendency1 which ,spencer has only half-expressed1 by virtue of which the objects of religion are on one hand becoming ever more intelligible2 on the other1 ever more transcendent of our conceptions4 99 99 99 99 99 ,a short paper was read by ,professor ,f4 ,c4 ,french1 ,professor of ,philosophy in the ,university of ,nebraska1 on ,the ,bearing of ,certain ,aspects of the ,newer ,psychology on the ,philosophy of ,religion4 ,the speaker said in part3 ,the relation of science to religion has received1 to be sure1 much study1 but to most minds hitherto this has meant the relation of only the physical sciences to religion4 ,the older psychology was largely speculative and metaphysical in character4 ,there were1 of course1 some who employed the empirical method in psychology1 but they were so far from comprehending the full scope of mental phenomena that1 at best1 their work gave the promise of a science rather than a science itself4 ,it is not the fact that the newer psychology takes account of the physiological conditions of mental life2 it is not the fact that the subject is now pursued in laboratories with instruments of precision1 that gives it its full standing as a science3 it is much more the fact that the psychology of to-day has found a place in the natural system of mental things for those strange and relatively unusual phenomena of consciousness which to the scientifically minded seemed totally unreal and to the superstitious manifestations of the supernatural4444 ,in showing that the abnormal can be explained in terms of the normal1 psychology does now for the phenomena of mind what the physical sciences have long done for the phenomena of nature4444 ,psychology as a science postulates the reign of natural law in the subjective sphere just as rigorously as physics postulates the reign of law in the objective sphere4444 ,it is not in the unusual and the abnormal that the reflective mind is to see ,god4 ,it is not through gaps in nature that we are to get glimpses of the supernatural4 ,rather is it in the very nature of nature1 rational1 harmonious1 law-conforming1 subject to scientific interpretation1 that we have the best evidence that the world is made mind-wise1 that it is the work of an intelligent mind1 that there is a rational spirit at the care of the universe4 ,for science the transcendent does not enter into the perceptual realm external or internal4 ,it is1 indeed1 hard for the religious mind to admit this fact in all its fullness4 ,until it does1 however1 religion must always stand more or less in fear of science4 ,once give up the perceptual1 in all its bearings1 to science1 and religion will find that it has lost a weak support only to gain a stronger one4 ,ultimately1 ,i believe1 we shall find that the full acceptance of science in the mental domain as well as in the physical will strengthen the rational grounds of theistic belief4 ,,section ,c--,,logic ,,section ,c--,,logic 7,hall #f1 ,september #bb1 #aj a4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,george ,m4 ,,duncan1 ,yale ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,william ,a4 ,,hammond1 ,cornell ,university4 ,,professor ,,fredrick ,j4 ,e4 ,,woodbridge1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,w4 ,h4 ,,sheldon1 ,columbia ,university4 ,the ,chairman of this ,section1 ,professor ,george ,m4 ,duncan1 ,professor of ,logic and ,mathematics at ,yale ,university1 in introducing the speakers spoke briefly of the scope and importance of the subject assigned to the ,section2 expressed1 on behalf of those in attendance1 regret at the inability of ,professor ,wilhelm ,windelband to be present and take part in the work of the ,section1 as had been expected2 congratulated the ,section on the papers to be presented and the speakers who were to present them2 and announced the final programme of the ,section4 ,,the ,,relations ,,of ,,logic ,,to ,,other ,,disciplines ,,by ,,professor ,,william ,a4 ,,hammond ,william ,alexander ,hammond1 ,assistant ,professor of ,ancient and ,medieval ,philosophy and sthetics1 ,cornell ,university4 b4 ,may #bj1 #ahfa1 ,new ,athens1 ,ohio4 ,a4,b4 ,harvard1 #ahhe2 ,ph4,d4 ,leipzig1 #ahia4 ,lecturer on ,classics1 ,king's ,college1 ,windsor1 ,n4 ,s41 #ahhe-hh2 ,secretary of the ,university ,faculty1 ,cornell2 ,member ,american ,psychological ,association1 ,american ,philosophical ,association4 ,author of ,the ,characters of ,theophrastus1 translated with ,introduction2 ,aristotle's ,psychology1 translated with ,introduction4 ,in #aghg1 in the preface to the second edition of the ,kr4 d4 r4 ,v41 ,kant wrote the following words3 ,that logic1 from the earliest times1 has followed that secure method 7namely1 the secure method of a science witnessed by the unanimity of its workers and the stability of its results7 may be seen from the fact that since ,aristotle it has not had to retrace a single step1 unless we choose to consider as improvements the removal of some unnecessary subtleties1 or the clearer definition of its matter1 both of which refer to the elegance rather than to the solidity of the science4 ,it is remarkable1 also1 that to the present day1 it has not been able to make one step in advance1 so that to all appearances it may be considered as completed and perfect4 ,if some modern philosophers thought to enlarge it1 by introducing psychological chapters on the different faculties of knowledge 7faculty of imagination1 wit1 etc471 or metaphysical chapters on the origin of knowledge or different degrees of certainty according to the difference of objects 7idealism1 skepticism1 etc471 or1 lastly1 anthropological chapters on prejudices1 their causes and remedies1 this could only arise from their ignorance of the peculiar nature of logical science4 ,we do not enlarge1 but we only disfigure the sciences1 if we allow their respective limits to be confounded2 and the limits of logic are definitely fixed by the fact that it is a science which has nothing to do but fully to exhibit and strictly to prove the formal rules of all thought 7whether it be a priori or empirical1 whatever be its origin or its object1 and whatever be the impediments1 accidental or natural1 which it has to encounter in the human mind74--,translated by ,max ,mller4 ,scarcely more than half a century after the publication of this statement of ,kant's1 ,john ,stuart ,mill 7,introduction to ,system of ,logic7 wrote3 ,there is as great diversity among authors in the modes which they have adopted of defining logic1 as in their treatment of the details of it4 ,this is what might naturally be expected on any subject on which writers have availed themselves of the same language as a means of delivering different ideas4444 ,this diversity is not so much an evil to be complained of1 as an inevitable1 and in some degree a proper result of the imperfect state of those sciences 7that is1 of logic1 jurisprudence1 and ethics74 ,it is not to be expected that there should be agreement about the definition of anything1 until there is agreement about the thing itself4 ,this remarkable disparity of opinion is due partly to the changes in the treatment of logic from ,kant to ,mill1 and partly to the fact that both statements are extreme4 ,that the science of logic was completed and perfect in the time of ,kant could only with any degree of accuracy be said of the treatment of syllogistic proof or the deductive logic of ,aristotle4 ,that the diversity was so great as pictured by ,mill is not historically exact1 but could be said only of the new epistemological and psychological treatment of logic and not of the traditional formal logic4 ,the confusion in logic is no doubt largely due to disagreement in the delimitation of its proper territory and to the consequent variety of opinions as to its relations to other disciplines4 ,the rise of inductive logic1 coincident with the rise and growth of physical science and empiricism1 forced the consideration of the question as to the relation of formal thought to reality1 and the consequent entanglement of logic in a triple alliance of logic1 psychology1 and metaphysics4 ,how logic can maintain friendly relations with both of these and yet avoid endangering its territorial integrity has not been made clear by logicians or psychologists or metaphysicians1 and that1 too1 in spite of persistent attempts justly to settle the issue as to their respective spheres of influence4 ,until modern logic definitely settles the question of its aims and legitimate problems1 it is difficult to see how any agreement can be reached as to its relation to the other disciplines4 ,the situation as it confronts one in the discussion of the relations of logic to allied subjects may be analyzed as follows3 #a4 ,the relation of logic as science to logic as art4 #b4 ,the relation of logic to psychology4 #c4 ,the relation of logic to metaphysics4 ,the development of nineteenth century logic has made an answer to the last two of the foregoing problems exceedingly difficult4 ,indeed1 one may say that the evolution of modern epistemology has had a centrifugal influence on logic1 and instead of growth towards unity of conception we have a chaos of diverse and discordant theories4 ,the apple of discord has been the theory of knowledge4 ,a score of years ago when ,adamson wrote his admirable article in the ,encyclopdia ,britannica 7article ,logic1 #ahhb71 he found the conditions much the same as ,i now find them4 ,looking to the chaotic state of logical text-books at the present time1 one would be inclined to say that there does not exist anywhere a recognized currently received body of speculations to which the title logic can be unambiguously assigned1 and that we must therefore resign the hope of attaining by any empirical consideration of the received doctrine a precise determination of the nature and limits of logical theory4 ,i do not1 however1 take quite so despondent a view of the logical chaos as the late ,professor ,adamson2 rather1 ,i believe with ,professor ,stratton 7,psy4 ,rev4 vol4 ,,iii7 that something is to be gained for unity and consistency by more exact delimitation of the subject-matter of the philosophical disciplines and their interrelations1 which precision1 if secured1 would assist in bringing into clear relief the real problems of the several departments of inquiry1 and facilitate the proper classification of the disciplines themselves4 ,the attempt to delimit the spheres of the disciplines1 to state their interrelations and classify them1 was made early in the history of philosophy1 at the very beginning of the development of logic as a science by ,aristotle4 ,in ,plato's philosophy1 logic is not separated from epistemology and metaphysics4 ,the key to his metaphysics is given essentially in his theory of the reality of the concept1 which offers an interesting analogy to the position of logic in modern idealism4 ,before ,plato there was no formulation of logical theory1 and in his dialogues it is only contained in solution4 ,the nearest approach to any formulation is to be found in an applied logic set forth in the precepts and rules of the rhetoricians and sophists4 ,properly speaking1 ,aristotle made the first attempt to define the subject of logic and to determine its relations to the other sciences4 ,in a certain sense logic for ,aristotle is not a science at all4 ,for science is concerned with some ens1 some branch of reality1 while logic is concerned with the methodology of knowing1 with the formal processes of thought whereby an ens or a reality is ascertained and appropriated to knowledge4 ,in the sense of a method whereby all scientific knowledge is secured1 logic is a propdeutic to the sciences4 ,in the idealism of the ,eleatics and ,plato1 thought and being are ultimately identical1 and the laws of thought are the laws of being4 ,in ,aristotle's conception1 while the processes of thought furnish a knowledge of reality or being1 their formal operation constitutes the technique of investigation1 and their systematic explanation and description constitute logic4 ,logic and metaphysics are distinguished as the science of being and the doctrine of the thought processes whereby being is known4 ,logic is the doctrine of the organon of science1 and when applied is the organon of science4 ,the logic of ,aristotle is not a purely formal logic4 ,he is not interested in the merely schematic character of the thought processes1 but in their function as mediators of apodictic truth4 ,he begins with the assumption that in the conjunction and disjunction of correctly formed judgments the conjunction or disjunction of reality is mirrored4 ,aristotle does not here examine into the powers of the mind as a whole2 that is done1 though fragmentarily1 in the ,de ,anima and ,parva ,naturalia1 where the mental powers are regarded as phases of the processes of nature without reference to normation2 but in his logic he inquires only into those forms and laws of thinking which mediate proof4 ,scientific proof1 in his conception1 is furnished in the form of the syllogism1 whose component elements are terms and propositions4 ,in the little tract ,on ,interpretation 7i4 e4 on the judgment as interpreter of thought71 if it is genuine1 the proposition is considered in its logical bearing4 ,the treatise on the ,categories1 which discusses the nature of the most general terms1 forms a connecting link between logic and metaphysics4 ,the categories are the most general concepts or universal modes under which we have knowledge of the world4 ,they are not simply logical relations2 they are existential forms1 being not only the modes under which thought regards being1 but the modes under which being exists4 ,aristotle's theory of the methodology of science is intimately connected with his view of knowledge4 ,scientific knowledge in his opinion refers to the essence of things2 for example1 to those universal aspects of reality which are given in particulars1 but which remain self-identical amidst the variation and passing of particulars4 ,the universal1 however1 is known only through and after particulars4 ,there is no such thing as innate knowledge or ,platonic reminiscence4 ,knowledge1 if not entirely empirical1 has its basis in empirical reality4 ,causes are known only through effects4 ,the universals have no existence apart from things1 although they exist realiter in things4 ,empirical knowledge of particulars must1 therefore1 precede in time the conceptual or scientific knowledge of universals4 ,in the evolution of scientific knowledge in the individual mind1 the body of particulars or of sense-experience is to its conceptual transformation as potentiality is to actuality1 matter to form1 the completed end of the former being realized in the latter4 ,only in the sense of this power to transform and conceptualize1 does the mind have knowledge within itself4 ,the genetic content is experiential2 the developed concept1 judgment1 or inference is in form notic4 ,knowledge is1 therefore1 not a mere precipitate of experience1 nor is ,aristotle a complete empiricist4 ,the conceptual form of knowledge is not immediately given in things experienced1 but is a product of notic discrimination and combination4 ,of a sensible object as such there is no concept2 the object of a concept is the generic essence of a thing2 and the concept itself is the thought of this generic essence4 ,the individual is generalized2 every concept does or can embrace several individuals4 ,it is an aggregate of distinguishing marks1 and is expressed in a definition4 ,the concept as such is neither true nor false4 ,truth first arises in the form of a judgment or proposition1 wherein a subject is coupled with a predicate1 and something is said about something4 ,a judgment is true when the thought 7whose inward process is the judgment and the expression in vocal symbols is the proposition7 regards as conjoined or divided that which is conjoined or divided in actuality2 in other words1 when the thought is congruous with the real4 ,while ,aristotle does not ignore induction as a scientific method1 7how could he when he regards the self-subsistent individual as the only real87 yet he says that1 as a method1 it labors under the defect of being only proximate2 a complete induction from all particulars is not possible1 and therefore cannot furnish demonstration4 ,only the deductive process proceeding syllogistically from the universal 7or essential truth7 to the particular is scientifically cogent or apodictic4 ,consequently ,aristotle developed the science of logic mainly as a syllogistic technique or instrument of demonstration4 ,from this brief sketch of ,aristotle's logical views it will be seen that the epistemological and metaphysical relations of logic which involve its greatest difficulty and cause the greatest diversity in its modern exponents1 were present in undeveloped form to the mind of the first logician4 ,it would require a mighty optimism to suppose that this difficulty and diversity1 which has increased rather than diminished in the progress of historical philosophy1 should suddenly be made to vanish by some magic of restatement of subject-matter1 or theoretical delimitation of the discipline4 ,as ,fichte said of philosophy1 ,the sort of a philosophy that a man has1 depends on the kind of man he is2 so one might almost say of logic1 ,the sort of logic that a man has1 depends on the kind of philosopher he is4 ,if the blight of discord is ever removed from epistemology1 we may expect agreement as to the relations of logic to metaphysics4 ,meanwhile logic has the great body of scientific results deposited in the physical sciences on which to build and test1 with some assurance1 its doctrine of methodology2 and as philosophy moves forward persistently to the final solution of its problems1 logic may justly expect to be a beneficiary in its established theories4 ,after ,aristotle's death logic lapsed into a formalism more and more removed from any vital connection with reality and oblivious to the profound epistemological and methodological questions that ,aristotle had at least raised4 ,in the ,middle ,ages it became a highly developed exercise in inference applied to the traditional dogmas of theology and science as premises1 with mainly apologetic or polemical functions4 ,its chief importance is found in its application to the problem of realism and nominalism1 the question as to the nature of universals4 ,at the height of scholasticism realism gained its victory by syllogistically showing the congruity of its premises with certain fundamental dogmas of the ,church1 especially with the dogma of the unity and reality of the ,godhead4 ,the heretical conclusion involved in nominalism is equivalent 7the accepted dogma of the ,church being axiomatic7 to reductio ad absurdum4 ,a use of logic such as this1 tending to conserve rather than to increase the body of knowledge1 was bound to meet with attack on the awakening of post-renaissance interest in the physical world1 and the acquirement of a body of truth to which the scholastic formal logic had no relation4 ,the anti-scholastic movement in logic was inaugurated by ,francis ,bacon1 who sought in his ,novum ,organum to give science a real content through the application of induction to experience and the discovery of universal truths from particular instances4 ,the syllogism is rejected as a scientific instrument1 because it does not lead to principles1 but proceeds only from principles1 and is therefore not useful for discovery4 ,it permits at most only refinements on knowledge already possessed1 but cannot be regarded as creative or productive4 ,the ,baconian theory of induction regarded the accumulation of facts and the derivation of general principles and laws from them as the true and fruitful method of science4 ,in ,england this empirical view of logic has been altogether dominant1 and the most illustrious ,english exponents of logical theory1 ,herschel1 ,whewell1 and ,mill1 have stood on that ground4 ,since the introduction of ,german idealism in the last half century a new logic has grown up whose chief business is with the theory of knowledge4 ,kant's departure in logic is based on an epistemological examination of the nature of judgment1 and on the answer to his own question1 ,how are synthetic judgments a priori possible8 ,the a priori elements in knowledge make knowledge of the real nature of things impossible4 ,human knowledge extends to the phenomenal world1 which is seen under the a priori forms of the understanding4 ,logic for ,kant is the science of the formal and necessary laws of thought1 apart from any reference to objects4 ,pure or universal logic aims to understand the forms of thought without regard to metaphysical or psychological relations1 and this position of ,kant is the historical beginning of the subjective formal logic4 ,in the metaphysical logic of ,hegel1 which rests on a panlogistic basis1 being and thought1 form and content1 are identical4 ,logical necessity is the measure and criterion of objective reality4 ,the body of reality is developed through the dialectic self-movement of the idea4 ,in such an idealistic monism1 formal and real logic are by the metaphysical postulate coincident4 ,schleiermacher in his dialectic regards logic from the standpoint of epistemological realism1 in which the real deliverances of the senses are conceptually transformed by the spontaneous activity of reason4 ,this spirit of realism is similar to that of ,aristotle1 in which the one-sided a priori view of knowledge is controverted4 ,space and time are forms of the existence of things1 and not merely a priori forms of knowing4 ,logic he divides into dialectic and technical logic4 ,the former regards the idea of knowledge as such2 the formal or technical regards knowledge in the process of becoming or the idea of knowledge in motion4 ,the forms of this process are induction and deduction4 ,the ,hegelian theory of the generation of knowledge out of the processes of pure thought is emphatically rejected4 ,lotze1 who is undoubtedly one of the most influential and fruitful writers on logic in the last century1 attempts to bring logic into closer relations with contemporary science1 and is an antagonist of one-sided formal logics4 ,for him logic falls into the three parts of 7#a7 pure logic or the logic of thought2 7#b7 applied logic or the logic of investigation2 7#c7 the logic of knowledge or methodology2 and this classification of the matter and problems of logic has had an important influence on subsequent treatises on the discipline4 ,his logic is formal1 as he describes it himself1 in the sense of setting forth the modes of the operation of thought and its logical structure2 it is real in the sense that these forms are dependent on the nature of things and not something independently given in the mind4 ,while he aims to maintain the distinct separation of logic and metaphysics1 he says 7in the discussion of the relations between formal and real logical meaning7 the question of meaning naturally raises a metaphysical problem3 ,ich thue besser der ,metaphysik die weitere ,errterung dieses wichtigen ,punktes zu berlassen4 7,log4 #b;d ed4 p4 #ega47 ,how could it be otherwise when his whole view of the relations and validity of knowledge is inseparable from his realism or teleological idealism1 as he himself characterizes his own standpoint8 ,drobisch1 a follower of ,herbart1 is one of the most thoroughgoing formalists in modern logical theory4 ,he attempts to maintain strictly the distinction between thought and knowledge4 ,logic is the science of thought4 ,he holds that there may be formal truth1 for example1 logically valid truth1 which is materially false4 ,logic1 in other words1 is purely formal2 material truth is matter for metaphysics or science4 ,drobisch holds1 therefore1 that the falsity of the judgment expressed in the premise from which a formally correct syllogism may be deduced1 is not subject-matter for logic4 ,the sphere of logic is limited to the region of inference and forms of procedure1 his view of the nature and function of logic being determined largely by the bias of his mathematical standpoint4 ,the congruity of thought with itself1 judgments1 conclusions1 analyses1 etc41 is the sole logical truth1 as against ,trendelenburg1 who took the ,aristotelian position that logical truth is the agreement of thought with the object of thought4 ,sigwart looks at logic mainly from the standpoint of the technology of science1 in which1 however1 he discovers the implications of a teleological metaphysic4 ,between the processes of consciousness and external changes he finds a causal relation and not parallelism4 ,inasmuch as thought sometimes misses its aim1 as is shown by the fact that error and dispute exist1 there is need of a discipline whose purpose is to show us how to attain and establish truth and avoid error4 ,this is the practical aim of logic1 as distinguished from the psychological treatment of thought1 where the distinction between true and false has no more place than the distinction between good and bad4 ,logic presupposes the impulse to discover truth1 and it therefore sets forth the criteria of true thinking1 and endeavors to describe those normative operations whose aim is validity of judgment4 ,consequently logic falls into the two parts of 7#a7 critical1 7#b7 technical1 the former having meaning only in reference to the latter2 the main value of logic is to be sought in its function as art4 ,methodology1 therefore1 which is generally made to take a subordinate place1 should be regarded as the special1 final1 and chief aim of our science4 7,logic1 vol4 i1 p4 #ba1 ,eng4 ,tr47 ,as an art1 logic undertakes to determine under what conditions and prescriptions judgments are valid1 but does not undertake to pass upon the validity of the content of given judgments4 ,its prescriptions have regard only to formal correctness and not to the material truth of results4 ,logic is1 therefore1 a formal discipline4 ,its business is with the due procedure of thought1 and it attempts to show no more than how we may advance in the reasoning process in such way that each step is valid and necessary4 ,if logic were to tell us what to think or give us the content of thought1 it would be commensurate with the whole of science4 ,sigwart1 however1 does not mean by formal thought independence of content1 for it is not possible to disregard the particular manner in which the materials and content of thought are delivered through sensation and formed into ideas4 ,further1 logic having for its chief business the methodology of science1 the development of knowledge from empirical data1 it ought to include a theory of knowledge1 but it should not so far depart from its subjective limits as to include within its province the discussion of metaphysical implications or a theory of being4 ,for this reason1 ,sigwart relegates to a postscript his discussion of teleology1 but he gives an elaborate treatment of epistemology extending through vol4 ,i and develops his account of methodology in vol4 ,,ii4 ,the question regarding the relation between necessity1 the element in which logical thought moves1 and freedom1 the postulate of the will1 carries one beyond the confines of logic and is1 in his opinion1 the profoundest problem of metaphysics1 whose function is to deal with the ultimate relation between subject and object1 the world and the individual1 and this is not only basal for logic and all science1 but is the crown and end of them all4 ,wundt's psychological and methodological treatment of logic stands midway between the purely formal treatises on the one hand1 and the metaphysical treatises on the other hand4 ,the general standpoint of ,wundt is similar to that of ,sigwart1 in that he discovers the function of logic in the exposition of the formation and methods of scientific knowledge2 for example1 in epistemology and methodology4 ,logic must conform to the conditions under which scientific inquiry is actually carried on2 the forms of thought1 therefore1 cannot be separate from or indifferent to the content of knowledge2 for it is a fundamental principle of science that its particular methods are determined by the nature of its particular subject-matter4 ,scientific logic must reject the theory that identifies thought and being 7,hegel7 and the theory of parallelism between thought and reality 7,schleiermacher1 ,trendelenburg1 and ,ueberweg71 in which the ultimate identity of the two is only concealed4 ,both of these theories base logic on a metaphysics1 which makes it necessary to construe the real in terms of thought1 and logic1 so divorced from empirical reality1 is powerless to explain the methods of scientific procedure4 ,one cannot1 however1 avoid the acceptance of thought as a competent organ for the interpretation of reality1 unless one abandons all question of validity and accepts agnosticism or skepticism4 ,this interpretative power of thought or congruity with reality is translated by metaphysical logic into identity4 ,metaphysical logic concerns itself fundamentally with the content of knowledge1 not with its evidential or formal logical aspects1 but with being and the laws of being4 ,it is the business of metaphysics to construct its notions and theories of reality out of the deliverances of the special sciences and inferences derived therefrom4 ,the aim of metaphysics is the development of a world-view free from internal contradictions1 a view that shall unite all particular and plural knowledges into a whole4 ,logic stands in more intimate relation to the special sciences1 for here the relations are reciprocal and immediate2 for example1 from actual scientific procedure logic abstracts its general laws and results1 and these in turn it delivers to the sciences as their formulated methodology4 ,in the history of science the winning of knowledge precedes the formulation of the rules employed1 that is1 precedes any scientific methodology4 ,logic1 as methodology1 is not an a priori construction1 but has its genesis in the growth of science itself and in the discovery of those tests and criteria of truth which are found to possess an actual heuristic or evidential value4 ,it is not practicable to separate epistemology and logic1 for such concepts as causality1 analogy1 validity1 etc41 are fundamental in logical method1 and yet they belong to the territory of epistemology1 are epistemological in nature1 as one may indeed say of all the general laws of thought4 ,a formal logic that is merely propdeutic1 a logic that aims to free itself from the quarrels of epistemology1 is scientifically useless4 ,its norms are valueless1 in so far as they can only teach the arrangement of knowledge already possessed1 and teach nothing as to how to secure it or test its real validity4 ,while formal logic aims to put itself outside of philosophy1 metaphysical logic would usurp the place of philosophy4 ,formal logic is inadequate1 because it neither shows how the laws of thought originate1 why they are valid1 nor in what sense they are applicable to concrete investigation4 ,wundt1 therefore1 develops a logic which one may call epistemological methodological1 and which stands between the extremes of formal logic and metaphysical logic4 ,the laws of logic must be derived from the processes of psychic experience and the procedure of the sciences4 ,logic therefore needs1 as he says1 epistemology for its foundation and the doctrine of methods for its completion4 ,lipps takes the view outright that logic is a branch of psychology2 ,husserl in his latest book goes to the other extreme of a purely formal and technical logic1 and devotes almost his entire first volume to the complete sundering of psychology and logic4 ,bradley bases his logic on the theory of the judgment4 ,the logical judgment is entirely different from the psychological4 ,the logical judgment is a qualification of reality by means of an idea4 ,the predicate is an adjective or attribute which in the judgment is ascribed to reality4 ,the aim of truth is to qualify reality by general notions4 ,but inasmuch as reality is individual and self-existent1 whereas truth is universal1 truth and reality are not coincident4 ,bradley's metaphysical solution of the disparity between thought and reality is put forward in his theory of the unitary ,absolute1 whose concrete content is the totality of experience4 ,but as thought is not the whole of experience1 judgments cannot compass the whole of reality4 ,bosanquet objects to this1 and maintains that reality must not be regarded as an ideal construction4 ,the real world is the world to which our concepts and judgments refer4 ,in the former we have a world of isolated individuals of definite content2 in the latter1 we have a world of definitely systematized and organized content4 ,under the title of the ,morphology of ,knowledge ,bosanquet considers the evolution of judgment and inference in their varied forms4 ,logic starts from the individual mind1 as that within which we have the actual facts of intelligence1 which we are attempting to interpret into a system 7,logic1 vol4 i1 p4 #bdg74 ,the real world for every individual is his world4 ,the work of intellectually constituting that totality which we call the real world is the work of knowledge4 ,the work of analyzing the process of this constitution or determination is the work of logic1 which might be described 444 as the reflection of knowledge upon itself 7,logic1 vol4 i1 p4 #c74 ,the relation of logic to truth consists in examining the characteristics by which the various phases of the one intellectual function are fitted for their place in the intellectual totality which constitutes knowledge 7ibid474 ,the real world is the intelligible world2 reality is something to which we attain by a constructive process4 ,we have here a type of logic which is essentially a metaphysic4 ,indeed1 ,bosanquet says in the course of his first volume3 ,i entertain no doubt that in content logic is one with metaphysics1 and differs1 if at all1 simply in mode of treatment--in tracing the evolution of knowledge in the light of its value and import1 instead of attempting to summarize its value and import apart from the details of its evolution 7,logic1 vol4 i1 #bdg74 ,dewey 7,studies in ,logical ,theory1 p4 #e7 describes the essential function of logic as the inquiry into the relations of thought as such to reality as such4 ,although such an inquiry may involve the investigation of psychological processes and of the concrete methods of science and verification1 a description and analysis of the forms of thought1 conception1 judgment1 and inference1 yet its concern with these is subordinate to its main concern1 namely1 the relation of thought at large to reality at large4 ,logic is not reflection on thought1 either on its nature as such or on its forms1 but on its relations to the real4 ,in ,dewey's philosophy1 logical theory is a description of thought as a mode of adaptation to its own conditions1 and validity is judged in terms of the efficiency of thought in the solution of its own problems and difficulties4 ,the problem of logic is more than epistemological4 ,wherever there is striving there are obstacles2 and wherever there is thinking there is a material-in-question4 ,dewey's logic is a theory of reflective experience regarded functionally1 or a pragmatic view of the discipline4 ,this logic of experience aims to evaluate the significance of social research1 psychology1 fine and industrial art1 and religious aspiration in the form of scientific statement1 and to accomplish for social values in general what the physical sciences have done for the physical world4 ,in ,dewey's teleological pragmatic logic the judgment is essentially instrumental1 the whole of thinking is functional1 and the meaning of things is identical with valid meaning 7,studies in ,logical ,theory1 cf4 pp4 #dh1 #hb1 #abh74 ,the real world is not a self-existent world outside of knowledge1 but simply the totality of experience2 and experience is a complex of strains1 tensions1 checks1 and attitudes4 ,the function of logic is the redintegration of this experience4 ,thinking is adaptation to an end through the adjustment of particular objective contents 7ibid4 p4 #ha74 ,logic here becomes a large part1 if not the whole1 of a metaphysics of experience2 its nature and function are entirely determined by the theory of reality4 ,in this brief and fragmentary rsum are exhibited certain characteristic movements in the development of logical theory1 the construction put upon its subject-matter and its relation to other disciplines4 ,the rsum has had in view only the making of the diversity of opinion on these questions historically salient4 ,there are three distinct types of logic noticed here3 7#a7 formal1 whose concern is merely with the structural aspect of inferential thought1 and its validity in terms of internal congruity2 7#b7 metaphysical logic whose concern is with the functional aspect of thought1 its validity in terms of objective reference1 and its relation to reality2 7#c7 epistemological and methodological logic1 whose concern is with the genesis1 nature1 and laws of logical thinking as forms of scientific knowledge1 and with their technological application to the sciences as methodology4 ,i am not at present concerned with a criticism of these various viewpoints1 excepting in so far as they affect the problem of the interrelationship of logic and the allied disciplines4 ,for my present purpose ,i reject the extreme metaphysical and formal positions1 and assume that logic is a discipline whose business is to describe and systematize the formal processes of inferential thought and to apply them as practical principles to the body of real knowledge4 ,i wish now to take up seriatim the several questions touching the various relations of logic enumerated above1 and first of all the question of the relation of logic as science to logic as art4 ,i4 ,logic as science and logic as art4 ,it seems true that the founder of logic1 ,aristotle1 regarded logic not as a science1 but rather as propdeutic to science1 and not as an end in itself1 but rather technically and heuristically as an instrument4 ,in other words1 logic was conceived by him rather in its application or as an art1 than as a science1 and so it continued to be regarded until the close of the ,middle ,ages1 being characterized indeed as the ars artium2 for even the logica docens of the ,scholastics was merely the formulation of that body of precepts which are of practical service in the syllogistic arrangement of premises1 and the ,port ,royal ,logic aims to furnish l'art de penser4 ,this technical aspect of the science has clung to it down to the present day1 and is no doubt a legitimate description of a part of its function4 ,but no one would now say that logic is an art2 rather it is a body of theory which may be technically applied4 ,mill1 in his examination of ,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,philosophy 7p4 #cia71 says of logic that it is the art of thinking1 which means of correct thinking1 and the science of the conditions of correct thinking1 and indeed1 he goes so far as to say 7,system of ,logic1 ,introd4 #g73 ,the extension of logic as a science is determined by its necessities as an art4 ,strictly speaking1 logic as a science is purely theoretical1 for the function of science as such is merely to know4 ,it is an organized system of knowledge1 namely1 an organized system of the principles and conditions of correct thinking4 ,but because correct thinking is an art1 it does not follow that a knowledge of the methods and conditions of correct thinking is art1 which would be a glaring case of metabasis eis allo genos4 ,the art-bearings of the science are given in the normative character of its subject-matter4 ,as a science logic is descriptive and explanatory1 that is1 it describes and formulates the norms of valid thought1 although as science it is not normative1 save in the sense that the principles formulated in it may be normatively or regulatively applied1 in which case they become precepts4 ,what is principle in science becomes precept in application1 and it is only when technically applied that principles assume a mandatory character4 ,validity is not created by logic4 ,logic merely investigates and states the conditions and criteria of validity1 being in this reference a science of evidence4 ,in the very fact1 however1 that logic is normative in the sense of describing and explaining the norms of correct thinking1 its practical or applied character is given4 ,its principles as known are science2 its principles as applied are art4 ,there is1 therefore1 no reason to sunder these two things or to call logic an art merely or a science merely2 for it is both when regarded from different viewpoints1 although one must insist on the fact that the rules for practical guidance are1 so far as the science is concerned1 quite ab extra4 ,logic1 ethics1 and sthetics are all commonly 7and rightly7 called normative disciplines3 they are all concerned with values and standards2 logic with validity and evidence1 or values for cognition2 ethics with motives and moral quality in conduct1 or values for volition2 sthetics with the standards of beauty1 or values for appreciation and feeling4 ,yet none of them is or can be merely normative1 or indeed as science normative at all2 if that were so1 they would not be bodies of organized knowledge1 but bodies of rules4 ,they might be well-arranged codes of legislation on conduct1 fine art1 and evidence1 but not sciences4 ,strictly regarded1 it is the descriptive and explanatory aspect of logic that constitutes its scientific character1 while it is the specific normative aspect that constitutes its logical character4 ,values1 whether ethical or logical1 without an examination and formulation of their ground1 relations1 origin1 and interconnection1 would be merely rules of thumb1 popular phrases1 or pastoral precepts4 ,the actual methodology of the sciences or applied logic is logic as art4 ,,ii4 ,relation of logic to psychology4 ,the differentiation of logic and psychology in such way as to be of practical value in the discussion of the disciplines has always been a difficult matter4 ,john ,stuart ,mill was disposed to merge logic in psychology1 and ,hobhouse1 his latest notable apologete1 draws no fixed distinction between psychology and logic1 merely saying that they have different centres of interest1 and that their provinces overlap4 ,lipps1 in his ,grundzge der ,logik 7p4 #b71 goes the length of saying that ,logic is a psychological discipline1 as certainly as knowledge occurs only in the ,psyche1 and thought1 which is developed in knowledge1 is a psychical event4 ,now1 if we were to take such extreme ground as this1 their ethics1 sthetics1 and pure mathematics would become at once branches of psychology and not cordinate disciplines with it1 for volitions1 the feelings of appreciation1 and the reasoning of pure mathematics are psychical events4 ,such a theory plainly carries us too far and would involve us in confusion4 ,that the demarcation between the two disciplines is not a chasmic cleavage1 but a line1 and that1 too1 an historically shifting line1 is apparent from the foregoing historical rsum4 ,the four main phases of logical theory include3 7#a7 the concept 7although some logicians begin with the judgment as temporally prior in the evolution of language71 7#b7 judgment1 7#c7 inference1 7#d7 the methodology of the sciences4 ,the entire concern of logic is1 indeed1 with psychical processes1 but with psychical processes regarded from a specific standpoint1 a standpoint different from that of psychology4 ,in the first place psychology in a certain sense is much wider than logic1 being concerned with the whole of psychosis as such1 including the feelings and will and the entire structure of cognition1 whereas logic is concerned with the particular cognitive processes enumerated above 7concept1 judgment1 inference71 and that1 too1 merely from the point of view of validity and the grounds of validity4 ,in another sense psychology is narrower than logic1 being concerned purely with the description and explanation of a particular field of phenomena1 whereas logic is concerned with the procedure of all the sciences and is practically related to them as their formulated method4 ,the compass and aims of the two disciplines are different2 for while psychology is in different references both wider and narrower than logic1 it is also different in the problems it sets itself1 its aim being to describe and explain the phenomena of mind in the spirit of empirical science1 whereas the aim of logic is only to explain and establish the laws of evidence and standards of validity4 ,logic is1 therefore1 selective and particular in the treatment of mental phenomena1 whereas psychology is universal1 that is1 it covers the entire range of mental processes as a phenomenalistic science2 logic dealing with definite elements as a normative science4 ,by this it is not meant that the territory of judgment and inference should be delivered from the psychologist into the care of the logician2 through such a division of labor both disciplines would suffer4 ,the two disciplines handle to some extent the same subjects1 so far as names are concerned2 but the essence of the logical problem is not touched by psychology1 and should not be mixed up with it1 to the confusion and detriment of both disciplines4 ,the field of psychology1 as we have said1 is the whole of psychical phenomena2 the aim of individual psychology in the investigation of its field is3 7#a7 to give a genetic account of cognition1 feeling1 and will1 or whatever be the elements into which consciousness is analyzed2 7#b7 to explain their interconnections causally2 7#c7 as a chemistry of mental life to analyze its complexes into their simplest elements2 7#d7 to explain the totality structurally 7or functionally7 out of the elements2 7#e7 to carry on its investigation and set forth its results as a purely empirical science2 7#f7 psychology makes no attempt to evaluate the processes of mind either in terms of false and true1 or good and bad4 ,from this description of the field and function of psychology1 based on the expressions of its modern exponents1 it will be found impossible to shelter logic under it as a subordinate discipline4 ,if one were to enlarge the scope of psychology to mean rational psychology1 in the sense which ,professor ,howison advocates 7,psychological ,review1 vol4 iii1 p4 #feb71 such a subordination might be possible1 but it would entail the loss of all that the new psychology has gained by the sharper delimitation of its sphere and problems1 and would carry us back to the position of ,mill1 who appears to identify psychology with philosophy at large and with metaphysics4 ,in contradistinction to the aims of psychology as described in the foregoing1 the sphere and problems of logic may be summarily characterized as follows3 7#a7 ,all concepts and judgments are psychological complexes and processes and may be genetically and structurally described2 that is the business of psychology4 ,they also have a meaning value1 or objective reference1 that is1 they may be correct or incorrect1 congruous or incongruous with reality4 ,the meaning1 aspect of thought1 or its content as truth is the business of logic4 ,this subject-matter is got by regarding a single aspect in the total psychological complex4 7#b7 ,its aim is not to describe factual thought or the whole of thought1 or the natural processes of thought1 but only certain ideals of thinking1 namely1 the norms of correct thinking4 ,its object is not a datum1 but an ideal4 7#c7 ,while psychology is concerned with the natural history of reasoning1 logic is concerned with the warrants of inferential reasoning4 ,in the terminology of ,hamilton it is the nomology of discursive thought4 ,to use an often employed analogy1 psychology is the physics of thought1 logic an ethics of thought4 7#d7 ,logic implies an epistemology or theory of cognition in so far as epistemology discusses the concept and judgment and their relations to the real world1 and here is to be found its closest connection with psychology4 ,a purely formal logic1 which is concerned merely with the internal order of knowledge and does not undertake to show how the laws of thought originate1 why they hold good as the measures of evidence1 or in what way they are applicable to concrete reality1 would be as barren as scholasticism4 7#e7 ,while logic thus goes back to epistemology for its bases and for the theoretical determination of the interrelation of knowledge and truth1 it goes forward in its application to the practical service of the sciences as their methodology4 ,apart of its subject-matter is therefore the actual procedure of the sciences1 which it attempts to organize into systematic statements as principles and formul4 ,this body of rules given implicitly or explicitly in the workings and structure of the special sciences1 consisting in classification1 analysis1 experiment1 induction1 deduction1 nomenclature1 etc41 logic regards as a concrete deposit of inferential experience4 ,it abstracts these principles from the content and method of the sciences1 describes and explains them1 erects them into a systematic methodology1 and so creates the practical branch of real logic4 ,formal logic1 therefore1 according to the foregoing account1 would embrace the questions of the internal congruity and self-consistency of thought and the schematic arrangement of judgments to insure formally valid conclusions2 real logic would embrace the epistemological questions of how knowledge is related to reality1 and how it is built up out of experience1 on the one hand1 and the methodological procedure of science1 on the other4 ,the importance of mathematical logic seems to be mainly in the facilitation of logical expression through symbols4 ,it is rather with the machinery of the science than with its content and real problem that the logical algorithm or calculus is concerned4 ,in these condensed paragraphs sufficient has been said1 ,i think1 to show that logic and psychology should be regarded as cordinate disciplines2 for their aims and subject-matter differ too widely to subordinate the former under the latter without confusion to both4 ,i wish now to add a brief note on the relation of logic to another discipline4 ,,iii4 ,relation of logic to metaphysics4 ,as currently expounded1 logic either abuts immediately on the territory of metaphysics at certain points or is entirely absorbed in it as an integral part of the metaphysical subject-matter4 ,i regard the former view as not only the more tenable theoretically1 but as practically advantageous for working purposes1 and necessary for an intelligible classification of the philosophical disciplines4 ,the business of metaphysics1 as ,i understand it1 is with the nature of reality2 logic is concerned with the nature of validity1 or with the relations of the elements of thought within themselves 7self-consistency7 and with the relations of thought to its object 7real truth71 but not with the nature of the objective world or reality as such4 ,further1 metaphysics is concerned with the unification of the totality of knowledge in the form of a scientific cosmology2 logic is concerned merely with the inferential and methodological processes whereby this result is reached4 ,the former is a science of content2 the latter is a science of procedure and relations4 ,now1 inasmuch as procedure and relations apply to some reality and differ with different forms of reality1 logic necessitates in its implications a theory of being1 but such implications are in no wise to be identified with its subject-matter or with its own proper problems4 ,their consideration falls within the sphere of metaphysics or a broadly conceived epistemology1 whose business it is to solve the ultimate questions of subject and object1 thought and thing1 mind and matter1 that are implied and pointed to rather than formulated by logic4 ,inasmuch as the logical judgment says something about something1 the scientific impulse drives us to investigate what the latter something ultimately is2 but this is not necessary for logic1 nor is it one of logic's legitimate problems1 any more than it is the proper business of the physicist to investigate the mental implications of his scientific judgments and hypotheses or the ultimate nature of the theorizing and perceiving mind1 or of causality to his world of matter and motion1 although a general scientific interest may drive him to seek a solution of these ultimate metaphysical problems4 ,scientifically the end of logic and of every discipline is in itself2 it is a territorial unity1 and its government is administered with a unitary aim4 ,logic is purely a science of evidential values1 not a science of content 7in the meaning of particular reality1 as in the special sciences1 or of ultimate reality1 as in metaphysics72 its sole aim and purpose1 as ,i conceive it1 is to formulate the laws and grounds of evidence1 the principles of method1 and the conditions and forms of inferential thinking4 ,when it has done this1 it has1 as a single science1 done its whole work4 ,when one looks at the present tendencies of logical theory1 one is inclined to believe that the discipline is in danger of becoming an ,allerleiwissenschaft1 whose vast undefined territory is the land of ,weissnichtwo4 ,the strict delimitation of the field and problems of science is demanded in the interest of a serviceable division of scientific labor and in the interest of an intelligible classification of the accumulated products of research4 ,,the ,,field ,,of ,,logic ,,by ,,frederick ,j4 ,e4 ,,woodbridge ,frederick ,j4 ,e4 ,woodbridge1 ,johnsonian ,professor of ,philosophy in ,columbia ,university1 ,new ,york1 ,n4 ,y41 since #aijb4 b4 ,windsor1 ,ontario1 ,canada1 ,march #bf1 #ahfg4 ,a4,b4 ,amherst ,college1 #ahhi2 ,union ,theological ,seminary1 #ahib2 ,a4,m4 #ahih1 ,,ll4,d4 #aijc1 ,amherst ,college4 ,post-grad4 ,berlin ,university4 ,instructor in ,philosophy1 ,university of ,minnesota1 #ahid-ie2 ,professor of ,philosophy and head of department1 #ahie-aijb4 ,member of ,american ,association for the ,advancement of ,science1 ,american ,philosophical ,association1 ,american ,psychological ,association4 ,editor of the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods4 ,current tendencies in logical theory make a determination of the field of logic fundamental to any statement of the general problems of the science4 ,in view of this fact1 ,i propose in this paper to attempt such a determination by a general discussion of the relation of logic to mathematics1 psychology1 and biology1 especially noting in connection with biology the tendency known as pragmatism4 ,in conclusion1 ,i shall indicate what the resulting general problems appear to be4 ,i ,there may appear1 at first1 little to distinguish mathematics in its most abstract1 formal1 and symbolic type from logic4 ,indeed1 mathematics as the universal method of all knowledge has been the ideal of many philosophers1 and its right to be such has been claimed of late with renewed force4 ,the recent notable advances in the science have done much to make this claim plausible4 ,a logician1 a non-mathematical one1 might be tempted to say that1 in so far as mathematics is the method of thought in general1 it has ceased to be mathematics2 but1 ,i suppose1 one ought not to quarrel too much with a definition1 but should let mathematics mean knowledge simply1 if the mathematicians wish it4 ,i shall not1 therefore1 enter the controversy regarding the proper limits of mathematical inquiry4 ,i wish to note1 however1 a tendency in the identification of logic and mathematics which seems to me to be inconsistent with the real significance of knowledge4 ,i refer to the exaltation of the freedom of thought in the construction of conceptions1 definitions1 and hypotheses4 ,the assertion that mathematics is a pure science is often taken to mean that it is in no way dependent on experience in the construction of its basal concepts4 ,the space with which geometry deals may be ,euclidean or not1 as we please2 it may be the real space of experience or not2 the properties of it and the conclusions reached about it may hold in the real world or they may not2 for the mind is free to construct its conception and definition of space in accordance with its own aims4 ,whether geometry is to be ultimately a science of this type must be left1 ,i suppose1 for the mathematicians to decide4 ,a logician may suggest1 however1 that the propriety of calling all these conceptions space is not as clear as it ought to be4 ,still further1 there seems to underlie all arbitrary spaces1 as their foundation1 a good deal of the solid material of empirical knowledge1 gained by human beings through contact with an environing world1 the environing character of which seems to be quite independent of the freedom of their thought4 ,however that may be1 it is evident1 ,i think1 that the generalization of the principle involved in this idea of the freedom of thought in framing its conception of space1 would1 if extended to logic1 give us a science of knowledge which would have no necessary relation to the real things of experience1 although these are the things with which all concrete knowledge is most evidently concerned4 ,it would inform us about the conclusions which necessarily follow from accepted conceptions1 but it could not inform us in any way about the real truth of these conclusions4 ,it would1 thus1 always leave a gap between our knowledge and its objects which logic itself would be quite impotent to close4 ,truth would thus become an entirely extra-logical matter4 ,so far as the science of knowledge is concerned1 it would be an accident if knowledge fitted the world to which it refers4 ,such a conception of the science of knowledge is not the property of a few mathematicians exclusively1 although they have1 perhaps1 done more than others to give it its present revived vitality4 ,it is the classic doctrine that logic is the science of thought as thought1 meaning thereby thought in independence of any specific object whatever4 ,in regard to this doctrine1 ,i would not even admit that such a science of knowledge is possible4 ,you cannot1 by a process of generalization or free construction1 rid thought of connection with objects2 and there is no such thing as a general content or as content-in-general4 ,generalization simply reduces the richness of content and1 consequently1 of implication4 ,it deals with concrete subject-matter as much and as directly as if the content were individual and specialized4 ,things equal to the same thing are equal to each other1 is a truth1 not about thought1 but about things4 ,the conclusions about a fourth dimension follow1 not from the fact that we have thought of one1 but from the conception about it which we have framed4 ,neither generalization nor free construction can reveal the operations of thought in transcendental independence4 ,it may be urged1 however1 that nothing of this sort was ever claimed4 ,the bondage of thought to content must be admitted1 but generalization and free construction1 just because they give us the power to vary conditions as we please1 give us thinking in a relative independence of content1 and thus show us how thought operates irrespective of1 although not independent of1 its content4 ,the binomial theorem operates irrespective of the values substituted for its symbols4 ,but ,i can find no gain in this restatement of the position4 ,it is true1 in a sense1 that we may determine the way thought operates irrespective of any specific content by the processes of generalization and free construction2 but it is important to know in what sense4 ,can we claim that such irrespective operation means that we have discovered certain logical constants1 which now stand out as the distinctive tools of thought8 ,or does it rather mean that this process of varying the content of thought as we please reveals certain real constants1 certain ultimate characters of reality1 which no amount of generalization or free construction can possibly alter8 ,the second alternative seems to me to be the correct one4 ,whether it is or not may be left here undecided4 ,what ,i wish to emphasize is the fact that the decision is one of the things of vital interest for logic1 and properly belongs in that science4 ,clearly1 we can never know the significance of ultimate constants for our thinking until we know what their real character is4 ,to determine that character we must most certainly pass out of the realm of generalization and free construction2 logic must become other than simply mathematical or symbolic4 ,there is another sense in which the determination of the operations of thought irrespective of its specific content is interpreted in connection with the exaltation of generalization and free construction4 ,knowledge1 it is said1 is solely a matter of implication1 and logic1 therefore1 is the science of implication simply4 ,if this is so1 it would appear possible to develop the whole doctrine of implication by the use of symbols1 and thus free the doctrine from dependence on the question as to how far these symbols are themselves related to the real things of the world4 ,if1 for instance1 a implies b1 then1 if a is true1 b is true1 and this quite irrespective of the real truth of a or b4 ,it is to be urged1 however1 in opposition to this view1 that knowledge is concerned ultimately only with the real truth of a and b1 and that the implication is of no significance whatever apart from this truth4 ,there is no virtue in the mere implication4 ,still further1 the supposition that there can be a doctrine of implication1 simply1 seems to be based on a misconception4 ,for even so-called formal implication gets its significance only on the supposed truth of the terms with which it deals4 ,we suppose that a does imply b1 and that a is true4 ,in other words1 we can state this law of implication only as we first have valid instances of it given in specific1 concrete cases4 ,the law is a generalization and nothing more4 ,the formal statement gives only an apparent freedom from experience4 ,moreover1 there is no reason for saying that a implies b unless it does so either really or by supposition4 ,if a really implies b1 then the implication is clearly not a matter of thinking it2 and to suppose the implication is to feign a reality1 the implications of which are equally free from the processes by which they are thought4 ,ultimately1 therefore1 logic must take account of real implications4 ,we cannot avoid this through the use of a symbolism which virtually implies them4 ,implication can have a logical character only because it has first a metaphysical one4 ,the supposition underlying the conception of logic ,i have been examining is1 itself1 open to doubt and seriously questioned4 ,that supposition was the so-called freedom of thought4 ,the argument has already shown that there is certainly a very definite limit to this freedom1 even when logic is conceived in a very abstract and formal way4 ,the processes of knowledge are bound up with their contents1 and have their character largely determined thereby4 ,when1 moreover1 we view knowledge in its genesis1 when we take into consideration the contributions which psychology and biology have made to our general view of what knowledge is1 we seem forced to conclude that the conceptions which we frame are very far from being our own free creations4 ,they have1 on the contrary1 been laboriously worked out through the same processes of successful adaptation which have resulted in other products4 ,knowledge has grown up in connection with the unfolding processes of reality1 and has1 by no means1 freely played over its surface4 ,that is why even the most abstract of all mathematics is yet grounded in the evolution of human experience4 ,in the remaining parts of this paper1 ,i shall discuss further the claims of psychology and biology4 ,the conclusion ,i would draw here is that the field of logic cannot be restricted to a realm where the operations of thought are supposed to move freely1 independent or irrespective of their contents and the objects of a real world2 and that mathematics1 instead of giving us any support for the supposition that it can1 carries us1 by the processes of symbolization and formal implication1 to recognize that logic must ultimately find its field where implications are real1 independent of the processes by which they are thought1 and irrespective of the conceptions we choose to frame4 ,,ii ,the processes involved in the acquisition and systematization of knowledge may1 undoubtedly1 be regarded as mental processes and fall thus within the province of psychology4 ,it may be claimed1 therefore1 that every logical process is also a psychological one4 ,the important question is1 however1 is it nothing more8 ,do its logical and psychological characters simply coincide8 ,or1 to put the question in still another form1 as a psychological process simply1 does it also serve as a logical one8 ,the answers to these questions can be determined only by first noting what psychology can say about it as a mental process4 ,in the first place1 psychology can analyze it1 and so determine its elements and their connections4 ,it can thus distinguish it from all other mental processes by pointing out its unique elements or their unique and characteristic connection4 ,no one will deny that a judgment is different from an emotion1 or that an act of reasoning is different from a volition2 and no one will claim that these differences are entirely beyond the psychologist's power to ascertain accurately and precisely4 ,still further1 it appears possible for him to determine with the same accuracy and precision the distinction in content and connection between processes which are true and those which are false4 ,for1 as mental processes1 it is natural to suppose that they contain distinct differences of character which are ascertainable4 ,the states of mind called belief1 certainty1 conviction1 correctness1 truth1 are thus1 doubtless1 all distinguishable as mental states4 ,it may be admitted1 therefore1 that there can be a thoroughgoing psychology of logical processes4 ,yet it is quite evident to me that the characterization of a mental process as logical is not a psychological characterization4 ,in fact1 ,i think it may be claimed that the characterization of any mental process in a specific way1 say as an emotion1 is extra-psychological4 ,judgments and inferences are1 in short1 not judgments and inferences because they admit of psychological analysis and explanation1 any more than space is space because the perception of it can be worked out by genetic psychology4 ,in other words1 knowledge is first knowledge1 and only later a set of processes for psychological analysis4 ,that is why1 as it seems to me1 all psychological logicians1 from ,locke to our own day1 have signally failed in dealing with the problem of knowledge4 ,the attempt to construct knowledge out of mental states1 the relations between ideas1 and the relation of ideas to things1 has been1 as ,i read the history1 decidedly without profit4 ,confusion and divergent opinion have resulted instead of agreement and confidence4 ,on precisely the same psychological foundation1 we have such divergent views of knowledge as idealism1 phenomenalism1 and agnosticism1 with many other strange mixtures of logic1 psychology1 and metaphysics4 ,the lesson of these perplexing theories seems to be that logic1 as logic1 must be divorced from psychology4 ,it is also of importance to note1 in this connection1 that the determination of a process as mental and as thus falling within the domain of psychology strictly1 has by no means been worked out to the general satisfaction of psychologists themselves4 ,recent literature abounds in elaborate discussion of the distinction between what is a mental fact and what not1 with a prevailing tendency to draw the remarkable conclusion that all facts are somehow mental or experienced facts4 ,the situation would be worse for psychology than it is1 if that vigorous science had not learned from other sciences the valuable knack of isolating concrete problems and attacking them directly1 without the burden of previous logical or metaphysical speculation4 ,thus knowledge1 which is the peculiar province of logic1 is increased1 while we wait for the acceptable definition of a mental fact4 ,but definitions1 be it remembered1 are themselves logical matters4 ,indeed1 some psychologists have gone so far as to claim that the distinction of a fact as mental is a purely logical distinction4 ,this is significant as indicating that the time has not yet come for the identification of logic and psychology4 ,in refreshingly sharp contrast to the vagueness and uncertainty which beset the definition of a mental fact are the palpable concreteness and definiteness of knowledge itself4 ,every science1 even history and philosophy1 are instances of it4 ,what constitutes a knowledge ought to be as definite and precise a question as could be asked4 ,that logic has made no more progress than it has in the answer to it appears to be due to the fact that it has not sufficiently grasped the significance of its own simplicity4 ,knowledge has been the important business of thinking man1 and he ought to be able to tell what he does in order to know1 as readily as he tells what he does in order to build a house4 ,and that is why the ,aristotelian logic has held its own so long4 ,in that logic1 the master of them that know simply rehearsed the way he had systematized his own stores of knowledge4 ,naturally we1 so far as we have followed his methods1 have had practically nothing to add4 ,in our efforts to improve on him1 we have too often left the right way and followed the impossible method inaugurated by ,locke4 ,had we examined with greater persistence our own methods of making science1 we should have profited more4 ,the introduction of psychology1 instead of helping the situation1 only confuses it4 ,let it be granted1 however1 in spite of the vagueness of what is meant by a mental fact1 that logical processes are also mental processes4 ,this fact has1 as ,i have already suggested1 an important bearing on their genesis1 and sets very definite limits to the freedom of thought in creating4 ,it is not1 however1 as mental processes that they have the value of knowledge4 ,a mental process which is knowledge purports to be connected with something other than itself1 something which may not be a mental process at all4 ,this connection should be investigated1 but the investigation of it belongs1 not to psychology1 but to logic4 ,i am well aware that this conclusion runs counter to some metaphysical doctrines1 and especially to idealism in all its forms1 with the epistemologies based thereon4 ,it is1 of course1 impossible here to defend my position by an elaborate analysis of these metaphysical systems4 ,but ,i will say this4 ,i am in entire agreement with idealism in its claim that questions of knowledge and of the nature of reality cannot ultimately be separated1 because we can know reality only as we know it4 ,but the general question as to how we know reality can still be raised4 ,by this ,i do not mean the question1 how is it possible for us to have knowledge at all1 or how it is possible for reality to be known at all1 but how1 as a matter of fact1 we actually do know it8 ,that we really do know it1 ,i would most emphatically claim4 ,still further1 ,i would claim that what we know about it is determined1 not by the fact that we can know in general1 but by the way reality1 as distinct from our knowledge1 has determined4 ,these ways appear to me to be ascertainable1 and form1 thus1 undoubtedly1 a section of metaphysics4 ,but the metaphysics will naturally be realistic rather than idealistic4 ,,iii ,just as logical processes may be regarded as1 at the same time1 psychological processes1 so they may be regarded1 with equal right1 as vital processes1 coming thus under the categories of evolution4 ,the tendency so to regard them is very marked at the present day1 especially in ,france and in this country4 ,in ,france1 the movement has perhaps received the clearer definition4 ,in ,america the union of logic and biology is complicated--and at times even lost sight of--by emphasis on the idea of evolution generally4 ,it is not my intention to trace the history of this movement1 but ,i should like to call attention to its historic motive in order to get it in a clear light4 ,that the theory of evolution1 even ,darwinism itself1 has radically transformed our historical1 scientific1 and philosophical methods1 is quite evident4 ,add to this the influence of the ,hegelian philosophy1 with its own doctrine of development1 and one finds the causes of the rather striking unanimity which is discoverable in many ways between ,hegelian idealists1 on the one hand1 and philosophers of evolution of ,spencer's type1 on the other4 ,although two men would1 perhaps1 not appear more radically different at first sight than ,hegel and ,spencer1 ,i am inclined to believe that we shall come to recognize more and more in them an identity of philosophical conception4 ,the pragmatism of the day is a striking confirmation of this opinion1 for it is often the expression of ,hegelian ideas in ,darwinian and ,spencerian terminology4 ,the claims of idealism and of evolutionary science and philosophy have thus sought reconciliation4 ,logic has been1 naturally1 the last of the sciences to yield to evolutionary and genetic treatment4 ,it could not escape long1 especially when the idea of evolution had been so successful in its handling of ethics4 ,if morality can be brought under the categories of evolution1 why not thinking also8 ,in answer to that question we have the theory that thinking is an adaptation1 judgment is instrumental4 ,but ,i would not leave the impression that this is true of pragmatism alone1 or that it has been developed only through pragmatic tendencies4 ,it is naturally the result also of the extension of biological philosophy4 ,in the biological conception of logic1 we have1 then1 an interesting coincidence in the results of tendencies differing widely in their genesis4 ,it would be hazardous to deny1 without any qualifications1 the importance of genetic considerations4 ,indeed1 the fact that evolution in the hands of a thinker like ,huxley1 for instance1 should make consciousness and thinking apparently useless epiphenomena1 in a developing world1 has seemed like a most contradictory evolutionary philosophy4 ,it was difficult to make consciousness a real function in development so long as it was regarded as only cognitive in character4 ,evolutionary philosophy1 coupled with physics1 had built up a sort of closed system with which consciousness could not interfere1 but which it could know1 and know with all the assurance of a traditional logic4 ,if1 however1 we were to be consistent evolutionists1 we could not abide by such a remarkable result4 ,the whole process of thinking must be brought within evolution1 so that knowledge1 even the knowledge of the evolutionary hypothesis itself1 must appear as an instance of adaptation4 ,in order to do this1 however1 consciousness must not be conceived as only cognitive4 ,judgment1 the core of logical processes1 must be regarded as an instrument and as a mode of adaptation4 ,the desire for completeness and consistency in an evolutionary philosophy is not the only thing which makes the denial of genetic considerations hazardous4 ,strictly biological considerations furnish reasons of equal weight for caution4 ,for instance1 one will hardly deny that the whole sensory apparatus is a striking instance of adaptation4 ,our perceptions of the world would thus appear to be determined by this adaptation1 to be instances of adjustment4 ,they might conceivably have been different1 and in the case of many other creatures1 the perceptions of the world are undoubtedly different4 ,all our logical processes1 referring ultimately as they do to our perceptions1 would thus appear finally to depend on the adaptation exhibited in the development of our sensory apparatus4 ,so-called laws of thought would seem to be but abstract statements or formulations of the results of this adjustment4 ,it would be absurd to suppose that a man thinks in a sense radically different from that in which he digests1 or a flower blossoms1 or that two and two are four in a sense radically different from that in which a flower has a given number of petals4 ,thinking1 like digesting and blossoming1 is an effect1 a product1 possibly a structure4 ,i am not at all interested in denying the force of these considerations4 ,they have1 to my mind1 the greatest importance1 and due weight has1 as yet1 not been given to them4 ,to one at all committed to a unitary and evolutionary view of the world1 it must indeed seem strange if thinking itself should not be the result of evolution1 or that1 in thinking1 parts of the world had not become adjusted in a new way4 ,but while ,i am ready to admit this1 ,i am by no means ready to admit some of the conclusions for logic and metaphysics which are often drawn from the admission4 ,just because thought1 as a product of evolution1 is functional and judgment instrumental1 it by no means follows that logic is but a branch of biology1 or that knowledge of the world is but a temporary adjustment1 which1 as knowledge1 might have been radically different4 ,in these conclusions1 often drawn with ,protagorean assurance1 two considerations of crucial importance seem to be overlooked1 first1 that adaptation is itself metaphysical in character1 and secondly1 that while knowledge may be functional and judgment instrumental1 the character of the functioning has the character of knowledge1 which sets it off sharply from all other functions4 ,it seems strange to me that the admission that knowledge is a matter of adaptation1 and thus a relative matter1 should1 in these days1 be regarded as in any way destroying the claims of knowledge to metaphysical certainty4 ,yet1 somehow1 the opinion widely prevails that the doctrine of relativity necessarily involves the surrender of anything like absolute truth4 ,all our knowledge is relative1 and1 therefore1 only partial1 incomplete1 and but practically trustworthy1 is a statement repeatedly made4 ,the fact that1 if our development had been different1 our knowledge would have been different1 is taken to involve the conclusion that our knowledge cannot possibly disclose the real constitution of things1 that it is essentially conditional1 that it is only a mental device for getting results1 that any other system of knowledge which would get results equally well would be equally true2 in short1 that there can be no such thing as metaphysical or epistemological truth4 ,these conclusions do indeed seem strange1 and especially strange on the basis of evolution4 ,for while the evolutionary process might1 conceivably1 have been different1 its results are1 in any case1 the results of the process4 ,they are not arbitrary4 ,we might have digested without stomachs1 but the fact that we use stomachs in this important process ought not to free us from metaphysical respect for the organ4 ,as ,m4 ,rey suggests1 in the ,revue ,philosophique for ,june1 #aijd1 a creature without the sense of smell would have no geometry1 but that does not make geometry essentially hypothetical1 a mere mental construction2 for we have geometry because of the working out of nature's laws4 ,indeed1 instead of issuing in a relativistic metaphysics of knowledge1 the doctrine of relativity should issue in the recognition of the finality of knowledge in every case of ascertainably complete adaptation4 ,in other words1 adaptation is itself metaphysical in character4 ,adjustment is always adjustment between things1 and yields only what it does yield4 ,the things or elements get into the state which is their adjustment1 and this adjustment purports to be their actual and unequivocal ordering in relation to one another4 ,different conditions might have produced a different ordering1 but1 again1 this ordering would be equally actual and unequivocal1 equally the one ordering to issue from them4 ,to suppose or admit that the course of events might have been and might be different is not at all to suppose or admit that it was or is different2 it is1 rather1 to suppose and admit that we have real knowledge of what that course really was and is4 ,this seems to be very obvious4 ,yet the evolutionist often thinks that he is not a metaphysician1 even when he brings all his conceptions systematically under the conception of evolution4 ,this must be due to some temporary lack of clearness4 ,if evolution is not a metaphysical doctrine when extended to apply to all science1 all morality1 all logic1 in short1 all things1 then it is quite meaningless for evolutionists to pronounce a metaphysical sentence on logical processes4 ,but if evolution is a metaphysics1 then its sentence is metaphysical1 and in every case of adjustment or adaptation we have a revelation of the nature of reality in a definite and unequivocal form4 ,this conclusion applies to logical processes as well as to others4 ,the recognition that they are vital processes can1 therefore1 have little significance for these processes in their distinctive character as logical4 ,they are like all other vital processes in that they are vital and subject to evolution4 ,they are unlike all others in that thought is unlike digestion or breathing4 ,to regard logical processes as vital processes does not in any way1 therefore1 invalidate them as logical processes or make it superfluous to consider their claim to give us real knowledge of a real world4 ,indeed1 it makes such a consideration more necessary and important4 ,a second consideration overlooked by the ,protagorean tendencies of the day is that judgment1 even if it is instrumental1 purports to give us knowledge1 that is1 it claims to reveal what is independent of the judging process4 ,perhaps ,i ought not to say that this consideration is overlooked1 but rather that it is denied significance4 ,it is even denied to be essential to judgment4 ,it is claimed that1 instead of revealing anything independent of the judging process1 judgment is just the adjustment and no more4 ,it is a reorganization of experience1 an attempt at control4 ,all this looks to me like a misstatement of the facts4 ,judgment claims to be no such thing4 ,it does not function as such a thing4 ,when ,i make any judgment1 even the simplest1 ,i may make it as the result of tension1 because of a demand for reorganization1 in order to secure control of experience2 but the judgment means for me something quite different4 ,it means decidedly and unequivocally that in reality1 apart from the judging process1 things exist and operate just as the judgment declares4 ,if it is claimed that this meaning is illusory1 ,i eagerly desire to know on what solid ground its illusoriness can be established4 ,when the conclusion was reached that gravitation varies directly as the mass and inversely as the square of the distance1 it was doubtless reached in an evolutionary and pragmatic way2 but it claimed to disclose a fact which prevailed before the conclusion was reached1 and in spite of the conclusion4 ,knowledge has been born of the travail of living1 but it has been born as knowledge4 ,when the knowledge character of judgment is insisted on1 it seems almost incredible that any one would think of denying or overlooking it4 ,indeed1 current discussions are far from clear on the subject4 ,pragmatists are constantly denying that they hold the conclusions that their critics almost unanimously draw4 ,there is1 therefore1 a good deal of confusion of thought yet to be dispelled4 ,yet there seems to be current a pronounced determination to banish the epistemological problem from logic4 ,this is1 to my mind1 suspicious1 even when epistemology is defined in a way which most epistemologists would not approve4 ,it is suspicious just because we must always ask eventually that most epistemological and metaphysical question3 ,is knowledge true8 ,to answer1 it is true when it functions in a way to satisfy the needs which generated its activity1 is1 no doubt1 correct1 but it is by no means adequate4 ,the same answer can be made to the inquiry after the efficiency of any vital process whatever1 and is1 therefore1 not distinctive4 ,we have still to inquire into the specific character of the needs which originate judgments and of the consequent satisfaction4 ,just here is where the uniqueness of the logical problem is disclosed4 ,with conscious beings1 the success of the things they do has become increasingly dependent on their ability to discover what takes place in independence of the knowing process4 ,that is the need which generates judgment4 ,the satisfaction is1 of course1 the attainment of the discovery4 ,now to make the judgment itself and not the consequent action the instrumental factor seems to me to misstate the facts of the case4 ,nothing is clearer than that there is no necessity for knowledge to issue in adjustment4 ,and it is clear to me that increased control of experience1 while resulting from knowledge1 does not give to it its character4 ,omniscience could idly view the transformations of reality and yet remain omniscient4 ,knowledge works1 but it is not1 therefore1 knowledge4 ,these considerations have peculiar force when applied to that branch of knowledge which is knowledge itself4 ,is the biological account of knowledge correct8 ,that question we must evidently ask1 especially when we are urged to accept the account4 ,can we1 to put the question in its most general form1 accept as an adequate account of the logical process a theory which is bound up with some other specific department of human knowledge8 ,it seems to me that we cannot4 ,here we must be epistemologists and metaphysicians1 or give up the problem entirely4 ,this by no means involves the attempt to conceive pure thought set over against pure reality--the kind of epistemology and metaphysics justly ridiculed by the pragmatist--for knowledge1 as already stated1 is given to us in concrete instances4 ,how knowledge in general is possible is1 therefore1 as useless and meaningless a question as how reality in general is possible4 ,the knowledge is given as a fact of life1 and what we have to determine is not its non-logical antecedents or its practical consequences1 but its constitution as knowledge and its validity4 ,it may be admitted that the question of validity is settled pragmatically4 ,no knowledge is true unless it yields results which can be verified1 unless it can issue in increased control of experience4 ,but ,i insist again that that fact is not sufficient for an account of what knowledge claims to be4 ,it claims to issue in control because it is true in independence of the control4 ,and it is just this assurance that is needed to distinguish knowledge from what is not knowledge4 ,it is the necessity of exhibiting this assurance which makes it impossible to subordinate logical problems1 and forces us at last to questions of epistemology and metaphysics4 ,as ,i am interested here primarily in determining the field of logic1 it is somewhat outside my province to consider the details of logical theory4 ,yet the point just raised is of so much importance in connection with the main question that ,i venture the following general considerations4 ,this is1 perhaps1 the more necessary because the pragmatic doctrine finds in the concession made regarding the test of validity one of its strongest defenses4 ,of course a judgment is not true simply because it is a judgment4 ,it may be false4 ,the only way to settle its validity is to discover whether experience actually provides what the judgment promises1 that is1 whether the conclusions drawn from it really enable us to control experience4 ,no mere speculation will yield the desired result1 no matter with how much formal validity the conclusions may be drawn4 ,that merely formal validity is not the essential thing1 ,i have pointed out in discussing the relation of logic to mathematics4 ,the test of truth is pragmatic4 ,it is apparent1 therefore1 that the formal validity does not determine the actual validity4 ,what is this but the statement that the process of judgment is not itself the determining factor in its real validity8 ,it is1 in short1 only valid judgments that can really give us control of experience4 ,the implications taken up in the judgment must1 therefore1 be real implications which1 as such1 have nothing to do with the judging process1 and which1 most certainly1 are not brought about by it4 ,and what is this but the claim that judgment as such is never instrumental8 ,in other words1 a judgment which effected its own content would only by the merest accident function as valid knowledge4 ,we have valid knowledge1 then1 only when the implications of the judgment are found to be independent of the judging process4 ,we have knowledge only at the risk of error4 ,the pragmatic test of validity1 instead of proving the instrumental character of judgment1 would thus appear to prove just the reverse4 ,valid knowledge has1 therefore1 for its content a system of real1 not judged or hypothetical implications4 ,the central problem of logic which results from this fact is not how a knowledge of real implications is then possible1 but what are the ascertainable types of real implications4 ,but1 it may be urged1 we need some criterion to determine what a real implication is4 ,i venture to reply that we need none1 if by such is meant anything else than the facts with which we are dealing4 ,i need no other criterion than the circle to determine whether its diameters are really equal4 ,and1 in general1 ,i need no other criterion than the facts dealt with to determine whether they really imply what ,i judge them to imply4 ,logic appears to me to be really as simple as this4 ,yet there can be profound problems involved in the working out of this simple procedure4 ,there is the problem already stated of the most general types of real implication1 or1 in other words1 the time-honored doctrine of categories4 ,whether there are categories or basal types of existence seems to me to be ascertainable4 ,when ascertained1 it is also possible to discover the types of inference or implication which they afford4 ,this is by no means the whole of logic1 but it appears to me to be its central problem4 ,these considerations will1 ,i hope1 throw light on the statement that while knowledge works1 it is not therefore knowledge4 ,it works because its content existed before its discovery by the knowledge process1 and because its content was not effected or brought about by that process4 ,judgment was the instrument of its discovery1 not the instrument which fashioned it4 ,while1 therefore1 willing to admit that logical processes are vital processes1 ,i am not willing to admit that the problem of logic is radically changed thereby in its formulation or solution1 for the vital processes in question have the unique character of knowledge1 the content of which is what it claims to be1 a system of real implications which existed prior to its discovery4 ,in the psychological and biological tendencies in logic1 there is1 however1 ,i think1 a distinct gain for logical theory4 ,the insistence that logical processes are both mental and vital has done much to take them out of the transcendental aloofness from reality in which they have often been placed1 especially since ,kant4 ,so long as thought and object were so separated that they could never be brought together1 and so long as logical processes were conceived wholly in terms of ideas set over against objects1 there was no hope of escape from the realm of pure hypothesis and conjecture4 ,locke's axiom that the mind1 in all its thoughts and reasonings1 hath no other immediate object but its own ideas1 an axiom which ,kant did so much to sanctify1 and which has been the basal principle of the greater part of modern logic and metaphysics1 is most certainly subversive of logical theory4 ,the transition from ideas to anything else is rendered impossible by it4 ,now it is just this axiom which the biological tendencies in logic have done so much to destroy4 ,they have insisted1 with the greatest right1 that logical processes are not set over against their content as idea against object1 as appearance against reality1 but are processes of reality itself4 ,just as reality can and does function in a physical or a physiological way1 so also it functions in a logical way4 ,the state we call knowledge becomes1 thus1 as much a part of the system of things as the state we call chemical combination4 ,the problem how thought can know anything becomes1 therefore1 as irrelevant as the problem how elements can combine at all4 ,the recognition of this is a great gain1 and the promise of it most fruitful for both logic and metaphysics4 ,but1 as ,i have tried to point out1 all this surrendering of pure thought as opposed to pure reality1 does not at all necessitate our regarding judgment as a process which makes reality different from what it was before4 ,of course there is one difference1 namely1 the logical one2 for reality prior to logical processes is unknown4 ,as a result of these processes it becomes known4 ,these processes are1 therefore1 responsible for a known as distinct from an unknown reality4 ,but what is the transformation which reality undergoes in becoming known8 ,when it becomes known that water seeks its own level1 what change has taken place in the water8 ,it would appear that we must answer1 none4 ,the water which seeks its own level has not been transformed into ideas or even into a human experience4 ,it appears to remain1 as water1 precisely what it was before4 ,the transformation which takes place1 takes place in the one who knows1 a transformation from ignorance to knowledge4 ,psychology and biology can afford us the natural history of this transformation1 but they cannot inform us in the least as to why it should have its specific character4 ,that is given and not deduced4 ,the attempts to deduce it have1 without exception1 been futile4 ,that is why we are forced to take it as ultimate in the same way we take as ultimate the specific character of any definite transformation4 ,to my mind1 there is needed a fuller and more cordial recognition of this fact4 ,the conditions under which we1 as individuals1 know are certainly discoverable1 just as much as the conditions under which we breathe or digest4 ,and what happens to things when we know them is also as discoverable as what happens to them when we breathe them or digest them4 ,but here the idealist may interpose that we can never know what happens to things when we know them1 because we can never know them before they become known4 ,i suppose ,i ought to wrestle with this objection4 ,it is an obvious one1 but1 to my mind1 it is without force4 ,the objection1 if pursued1 can carry us only in a circle4 ,the problem of knowledge is still on our hands1 and every logician of whatever school1 the offerer of this objection also1 has1 nevertheless1 attempted to show what the transformation is that thought works1 for all admit that it works some4 ,are we1 therefore1 engaged in a hopeless task8 ,or have we failed to grasp the significance of our problem8 ,i think the latter4 ,we fail to recognize that1 in one way or other1 we do solve the problem1 and that our attempts to solve it show quite clearly that the objection under consideration is without force4 ,take1 for instance1 any concrete case of knowledge1 the water seeking its own level1 again4 ,follow the process of knowledge to the fullest extent1 we never find a single problem which is not solvable by reference to the concrete things with which we are dealing1 nor a single solution which is not forced upon us by these things rather than by the fact that we deal with them4 ,the transformation wrought is thus discovered1 in the progress of knowledge itself1 to be wrought solely in the inquiring individual1 and wrought by repeated contact with the things with which he deals4 ,in other words1 all knowledge discloses the fact that its content is not created by itself1 but by the things with which it is concerned4 ,it is quite possible1 therefore1 that knowledge should be what we call transcendent and yet not involve us in a transcendental logic4 ,that we should be able to know without altering the things we know is no more and no less remarkable and mysterious than that we should be able to digest by altering the things we digest4 ,in other words1 the fact that digestion alters the things is no reason that knowledge should alter them1 even if we admit that logical processes are vital and subject to evolution4 ,indeed1 if evolution teaches us anything on this point1 it is that knowledge processes are real just as they exist1 as real as growth and digestion1 and must have their character described in accordance with what they are4 ,the recognition that knowledge can be transcendent and yet its processes vital seems to throw light on the difficulty evolution has encountered in accounting for consciousness and knowledge4 ,all the reactions of the individual seem to be expressible in terms of chemistry and physics without calling in consciousness as an operating factor4 ,what is this but the recognition of its transcendence1 especially when the conditions of conscious activity are quite likely expressible in chemical and physical terms8 ,while1 therefore1 biological considerations result in the great gain of giving concrete reality to the processes of knowledge1 the gain is lost1 if knowledge itself is denied the transcendence which it so evidently discloses4 ,,iv ,the argument advanced in this discussion has had the aim of emphasizing the fact that in knowledge we have actually given1 as content1 reality as it is in independence of the act of knowing1 that the real world is self-existent1 independent of the judgments we make about it4 ,this fact has been emphasized in order to confine the field of logic to the field of knowledge as thus understood4 ,in the course of the argument1 ,i have occasionally indicated what some of the resulting problems of logic are4 ,these ,i wish now to state in a somewhat more systematic way4 ,the basal problem of logic becomes1 undoubtedly1 the metaphysics of knowledge1 the determination of the nature of knowledge and its relation to reality4 ,it is quite evident that this is just the problem which the current tendencies criticised have sought1 not to solve1 but to avoid or set aside4 ,their motives for so doing have been mainly the difficulties which have arisen from the ,kantian philosophy in its development into transcendentalism1 and the desire to extend the category of evolution to embrace the whole of reality1 knowledge included4 ,i confess to feeling the force of these motives as strongly as any advocate of the criticised opinions4 ,but ,i do not see my way clear to satisfying them by denying or explaining away the evident character of knowledge itself4 ,it appears far better to admit that a metaphysics of knowledge is as yet hopeless1 rather than so to transform knowledge as to get rid of the problem2 for we must ultimately ask after the truth of the transformation4 ,but ,i am far from believing that a metaphysics of knowledge is hopeless4 ,the biological tendencies themselves seem to furnish us with much material for at least the beginnings of one4 ,reality known is to be set over against reality unknown or independent of knowledge1 not as image to original1 idea to thing1 phenomena to noumena1 appearance to reality2 but reality as known is a new stage in the development of reality itself4 ,it is not an external mind which knows reality by means of its own ideas1 but reality itself becomes known through its own expanding and readjusting processes4 ,so far ,i am in entire agreement with the tendencies ,i have criticised4 ,but what change is effected by this expansion and readjustment8 ,i can find no other answer than this simple one3 the change to knowledge4 ,and by this ,i mean to assert unequivocally that the addition of knowledge to a reality hitherto without it is simply an addition to it and not a transformation of it4 ,such a view may appear to make knowledge a wholly useless addition1 but ,i see no inherent necessity in such a conclusion4 ,nor do ,i see any inherent necessity of supposing that knowledge must be a useful addition4 ,yet ,i would not be so foolish as to deny the usefulness of knowledge4 ,we have1 of course1 the most palpable evidences of its use4 ,as we examine them1 ,i think we find1 without exception1 that knowledge is useful just in proportion as we find that reality is not transformed by being known4 ,if it really were transformed in that process1 could anything else than confusion result from the multitude of knowing individuals8 ,to me1 therefore1 the metaphysics of the situation resolves itself into the realistic position that a developing reality develops1 under ascertainable conditions1 into a known reality without undergoing any other transformation1 and that this new stage marks an advance in the efficiency of reality in its adaptations4 ,my confidence steadily grows that this whole process can be scientifically worked out4 ,it is impossible here to justify my confidence in detail1 and ,i must leave the matter with the following suggestion4 ,the point from which knowledge starts and to which it ultimately returns is always some portion of reality where there is consciousness1 the things1 namely1 which1 we are wont to say1 are in consciousness4 ,these things are not ideas representing other things outside of consciousness1 but real things1 which1 by being in consciousness1 have the capacity of representing each other1 of standing for or implying each other4 ,knowledge is not the creation of these implications1 but their successful systematization4 ,it will be found1 ,i think1 that this general statement is true of every concrete case of knowledge which we possess4 ,its detailed working out would be a metaphysics of knowledge1 an epistemology4 ,since knowledge is the successful systematization of the implications which are disclosed in things by virtue of consciousness1 a second logical problem of fundamental importance is the determination of the most general types of implication with the categories which underlie them4 ,the execution of this problem would naturally involve1 as subsidiary1 the greater part of formal and symbolic logic4 ,indeed1 vital doctrines of the syllogism1 of definition1 of formal inference1 of the calculus of classes and propositions1 of the logic of relations1 appear to be bound up ultimately with a doctrine of categories2 for it is only a recognition of basal types of existence with their implications that can save these doctrines from mere formalism4 ,these types of existence or categories are not to be regarded as free creations or as the contributions of the mind to experience4 ,there is no deduction of them possible4 ,they must be discovered in the actual progress of knowledge itself1 and ,i see no reason to suppose that their number is necessarily fixed1 or that we should necessarily be in possession of all of them4 ,it is requisite1 however1 that in every case categories should be incapable of reduction to each other4 ,a doctrine of categories seems to me to be of the greatest importance in the systematization of knowledge1 for no problem of relation is even stateable correctly before the type of existence to which its terms belong has been first determined4 ,i submit one illustration to reinforce this general statement1 namely1 the relation of mind to body4 ,if mind and body belong to the same type of existence1 we have one set of problems on our hands2 but if they do not1 we have an entirely different set4 ,yet volumes of discussion written on this subject have abounded in confusion1 simply because they have regarded mind and body as belonging to radically different types of existence and yet related in terms of the type to which one of them belongs4 ,the doctrine of parallelism is1 perhaps1 the epitome of this confusion4 ,the doctrine of categories will involve not only the greater part of formal and symbolic logic1 but will undoubtedly carry the logician into the doctrine of method4 ,here it is to be hoped that recent tendencies will result in effectively breaking down the artificial distinctions which have prevailed between deduction and induction4 ,differences in method do not result from differences in points of departure1 or between the universal and the particular1 but from the categories1 again1 which give the method direction and aim1 and result in different types of synthesis4 ,in this direction1 the logician may hope for an approximately correct classification of the various departments of knowledge4 ,such a classification is1 perhaps1 the ideal of logical theory4 ,,section ,d--,,methodology ,,of ,,science ,,section ,d--,,methodology ,,of ,,science 7,hall #f1 ,september #bb1 #c p4 m47 ,,chairman3 ,,professor ,,james ,e4 ,,creighton1 ,cornell ,university4 ,,speakers3 ,,professor ,,wilhelm ,,ostwald1 ,university of ,leipzig4 ,,professor ,,benno ,,erdmann1 ,university of ,bonn4 ,,secretary3 ,,dr4 ,r4 ,b4 ,,perry1 ,harvard ,university4 ,,on ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,science ,,by ,,wilhelm ,,ostwald 7,translated from the ,german by ,dr4 ,r4 ,m4 ,yerkes1 ,harvard ,university7 ,wilhelm ,ostwald1 ,professor of ,physical ,chemistry1 ,university of ,leipzig1 since #ahhg4 b4 ,september #b1 #ahec1 ,riga1 ,russia4 ,grad4 ,candidate ,chemistry1 #ahgg2 ,master ,chemistry1 #ahgh2 ,doctor ,chemistry1 ,dorpat4 ,dr4 ,hon4 ,halle and ,cambridge2 ,privy ,councilor2 ,assistant1 ,dorpat1 #ahge-ha2 ,regular ,professor1 ,riga #ahha-hg4 ,member various learned and scientific societies4 ,author of ,manual of ,general ,chemistry2 ,electro ,chemistry2 ,foundation of ,inorganic ,chemistry2 ,lectures on ,philosophy of ,nature2 ,artist's ,letters2 ,essays and ,lectures2 and many other noted works and papers on ,chemistry and ,philosophy4 ,one of the few points on which the philosophy of to-day is united is the knowledge that the only thing completely certain and undoubted for each one is the content of his own consciousness2 and here the certainty is to be ascribed not to the content of consciousness in general1 but only to the momentary content4 ,this momentary content we divide into two large groups1 which we refer to the inner and outer world4 ,if we call any kind of content of consciousness an experience1 then we ascribe to the outer world such experiences as arise without the activity of our will and cannot be called forth by its activity alone4 ,such experiences never arise without the activity of certain parts of our body1 which we call sense organs4 ,in other words1 the outer world is that which reaches our consciousness through the senses4 ,on the other hand1 we ascribe to our inner world all experiences which arise without the immediate assistance of a sense organ4 ,here1 first of all1 belong all experiences which we call remembering and thinking4 ,an exact and complete differentiation of the two territories is not intended here1 for our purpose does not demand that this task be undertaken4 ,for this purpose the general orientation in which every one recognizes familiar facts of his consciousness is sufficient4 ,each experience has the characteristic of uniqueness4 ,none of us doubts that the expression of the poet ,everything is only repeated in life is really just the opposite of the truth1 and that in fact nothing is repeated in life4 ,but to express such a judgment we must be in position to compare different experiences with each other1 and this possibility rests upon a fundamental phenomenon of our consciousness1 memory4 ,memory alone enables us to put various experiences in relation to each other1 so that the question as to their likeness or difference can be asked4 ,we find the simpler relations here in the inner experiences4 ,a certain thought1 such as twice two is four1 ,i can bring up in my consciousness as often as ,i wish1 and in addition to the content of the thought ,i experience the further consciousness that ,i have already had this thought before1 that it is familiar to me4 ,a similar but somewhat more complex phenomenon appears in the experiences in which the outer world takes part4 ,after ,i have eaten an apple1 ,i can repeat the experience in two ways4 ,first1 as an inner experience1 ,i can remember that ,i have eaten the apple and by an effort of my will ,i can re-create in myself1 although with diminished strength and intensity1 a part of the former experience--the part which belonged to my inner world4 ,another part1 the sense impression which belonged to that experience1 ,i cannot re-create by an effort of my will1 but ,i must again eat an apple in order to have a similar experience of this sort4 ,this is a complete repetition of the experience to which the external world also contributes4 ,such a repetition does not depend altogether on my own powers1 for it is necessary that ,i have an apple1 that is1 that certain conditions which are independent of me and belong to the outer world be fulfilled4 ,whether the outer world takes part in the repetition of an experience or not has no influence upon the possibility of the content of consciousness which we call memory4 ,from this it follows that this content depends upon the inner experience alone1 and that we remember an external event only by means of its inner constituents4 ,the mere repetition of corresponding sense impressions is not sufficient for this1 for we can see the same person repeatedly without recognizing him1 if the inner accompanying phenomena were so insignificant1 as a result of lack of interest1 that their repetition does not produce the content of consciousness known as memory4 ,if we see him quite frequently1 the frequent repetition of the external impression finally causes the memory of the corresponding inner experience4 ,from this it results that for the memory-reaction a certain intensity of the inner experience is necessary4 ,this threshold can be attained either at once or by continued repetition4 ,the repetitions are the more effective the more rapidly they follow each other4 ,from this we may conclude that the memory-value of an experience1 or its capacity for calling forth the memory-reaction by repetition1 decreases with the lapse of time4 ,further1 we must consider the fact mentioned above1 that an experience is never exactly repeated1 and that therefore the memory-reaction occurs even where there is only resemblance or partial agreement in place of complete agreement4 ,here1 too1 there are different degrees2 memory takes place more easily the more perfectly the two experiences agree1 and vice versa4 ,if we look at these phenomena from the physiological side1 we may say we have two kinds of apparatus or organs1 one of which does not depend upon our will1 whereas the other does4 ,the former are the sense organs4 ,the latter constitutes the organ of thought4 ,only the activities of the latter constitute our experiences or the content of our consciousness4 ,the activities of the former may call forth the corresponding processes of the latter1 but this is not always necessary4 ,our sense organs can be influenced without our noticing it1 that is1 without the thinking apparatus being involved4 ,an especially important reaction of the thinking apparatus is memory1 that is1 the consciousness that an experience which we have just had possesses more or less agreement with former experiences4 ,with reference to the organ of thought1 it is the expression of the general physiological fact that every process influences the organ in such a way that it has a different relation to the repetition of this process1 from the first time1 and moreover that the repetition is rendered easier4 ,this influence decreases with time4 ,it is chiefly upon these phenomena that experience rests4 ,experience results from the fact that all events consist of a complete series of simultaneous and successive components4 ,when a connection between some of those parts has become familiar to us by the repetition of similar occurrences 7for instance1 the succession of day and night71 we do not feel such an occurrence as something completely new1 but as something partially familiar1 and the single parts or phases of it do not surprise us1 but rather we anticipate their coming or expect them4 ,from expectation to prediction is only a short step1 and so experience enables us to prophesy the future from the past and present4 ,now this is also the road to science3 for science is nothing but systematized experience1 that is1 experience reduced to its simplest and clearest forms4 ,its purposes to predict from a part of a phenomenon which is known another part which is not yet known4 ,here it may be a question of spatial as well as of temporal phenomena4 ,thus the scientific zologist knows how to determine1 that is1 to tell1 from the skull of an animal1 the nature of the other parts of the animal to which the skull belongs2 likewise the astronomer is able to indicate the future1 situation of a planet from a few observations of its present situation2 and the more exact the first observations were1 the more distant the future for which he can predict4 ,all such scientific predictions are limited1 therefore1 with reference to their number and their accuracy4 ,if the skull shown to the zologist is that of a chicken1 then he will probably be able to indicate the general characteristics of chickens1 and also perhaps whether the chicken had a top-knot or not2 but not its color1 and only uncertainly its age and its size4 ,both facts1 the possibility of prediction and its limitation in content and amount1 are an expression for the two fundamental facts1 that among our experiences there is similarity1 but not complete agreement4 ,the foregoing considerations deserve to be discussed and extended in several directions4 ,first1 the objection will be made that a chicken or a planet is not an experience2 we call them rather by the most general name of thing4 ,but our knowledge of the chicken begins with the experiencing of certain visual impressions1 to which are added1 perhaps1 certain impressions of hearing and touch4 ,the sight impressions 7to discuss these first7 by no means completely agree4 ,we see the chicken large or small1 according to the distance2 and according to its position and movement its outline is very different4 ,as we have seen1 however1 these differences are continually grading into one other and do not reach beyond certain limits2 we neglect to observe them and rest contented with the fact that certain other peculiarities 7legs1 wings1 eyes1 bill1 comb1 etc47 remain and do not change4 ,the constant properties we group together as a thing1 and the changing ones we call the states of this thing4 ,among the changing properties1 we distinguish further those which depend upon us 7for example1 the distance7 and those upon which we have no immediate influence 7for instance1 the position or motion73 the first is called the subjective changeable part of our experience1 while the second is called the objective mutability of the thing4 ,this omission of both the subjectively and objectively changeable portion of the experience in connection with the retention of the constant portion and the gathering together of the latter into a unity is one of the most important operations which we perform with our experiences4 ,we call it the process of abstraction1 and its product1 the permanent unity1 we call a concept4 ,plainly this procedure contains arbitrary as well as necessary factors4 ,arbitrary or accidental is the circumstance that quite different phases of a given experience come to consciousness according to our attention1 the amount of practice we have had1 indeed according to our whole intellectual nature4 ,we may overlook constant factors and attend to changeable ones4 ,the objective factors1 however1 become necessary as soon as we have noticed them2 after we have seen that the chicken is black1 it is not in our power to see it red4 ,accordingly1 in general1 our knowledge of that which agrees must be less than it actually could be1 since we have not been able to observe every agreement1 and our concept is always poorer in constituents at any given time than it might be4 ,to seek out such elements of concepts as have been overlooked1 and to prove that they are necessary factors of the corresponding experiences1 is one of the never-ending tasks of science4 ,the other case1 namely1 that elements have been received in the concept which do not prove to be constant1 also happens1 and leads to another task4 ,one can then leave that element out of the concept1 if further experiences show that the other elements are found in them1 or one can form a new concept which contains the former elements1 leaving out those that have been recognized as unessential4 ,for a long time the white color belonged to the concept swan4 ,when the ,dutch black swans became known1 it was possible either to drop the element white from the concept swan 7as actually happened71 or to make a new concept for the bird which is similar to the swan but black4 ,which choice is made in a given case is largely arbitrary1 and is determined by considerations of expediency4 ,into the formation of concepts1 therefore1 two factors are operative1 an objective empirical factor1 and a subjective or purposive factor4 ,the fitness of a concept is seen in relation to its purpose1 which we shall now consider4 ,the purpose of a concept is its use for prediction4 ,the old logic set up the syllogism as the type of thought-activity1 and its simplest example is the well-known ,all men are mortal1 ,caius is a man1 ,therefore ,caius is mortal4 ,in general1 the scheme runs ,to the concept ,m belongs the element ,b1 ,c belongs under the concept ,m1 ,therefore the element ,b is found in ,c4 ,one can say that this method of reasoning is in regular use even to this day4 ,it must be added1 however1 that this use is of a quite different nature from that of the ancients4 ,whereas formerly the setting up of the first proposition or the major premise was considered the most important thing1 and the establishment of the second proposition or minor premise was thought to be a rather trifling matter1 now the relation is reversed4 ,the major premise contains the description of a concept1 the minor makes the assertion that a certain thing belongs under this concept4 ,what right exists for such an assertion8 ,the most palpable reply would be1 since all the elements of the concept ,m 7including ,b7 are found in ,c1 ,c belongs under the concept ,m4 ,such a conclusion would indeed be binding1 but at the same time quite worthless1 for it only repeats the minor premise4 ,actually the method of reasoning is essentially different1 for the minor premise is not obtained by showing that all the elements of the concept ,m are found in ,c1 but only some of them4 ,the conclusion is not necessary1 but only probable1 and the whole process of reasoning runs3 ,certain elements are frequently found together1 therefore they are united in the concept ,m4 ,certain of these elements are recognized in the thing ,c1 therefore probably the other elements of the concept ,m will be found in ,c4 ,the old logic1 also1 was familiar with this kind of conclusion4 ,it was branded1 however1 as the worst of all1 by the name of incomplete induction1 since the absolute certainty demanded of the syllogism did not belong to its results4 ,one must admit1 however1 that the whole of modern science makes use of no other form of reasoning than incomplete induction1 for it alone admits of a prediction1 that is1 an indication of relations which have not been immediately observed4 ,how does science get along with the defective certainty of this process of reasoning8 ,the answer is1 that the probability of the conclusion can run through all degrees from mere conjecture to the maximum probability1 which is practically indistinguishable from certainty4 ,the probability is the greater the more frequently an incomplete induction of this kind has proven correct in later experience4 ,accordingly we have at our command a number of expressions which in their simplest and most general form have the appearance3 ,if an element ,a is met within a thing1 then the element ,b is also found in it 7in spatial or temporal relationship74 ,if the relation is temporal1 this general statement is known by some such name as the law of causality4 ,if it is spatial1 one talks of the idea 7in the ,platonic sense71 or the type of the thing1 of substance1 etc4 ,from the considerations here presented we get an easy answer to many questions which are frequently discussed in very different senses4 ,first1 the question concerning the general validity of the law of causality4 ,all attempts to prove such a validity have failed1 and there has remained only the indication that without this law we should feel an unbearable uncertainty in reference to the world4 ,from this1 however1 we see very plainly that here it is merely a question of expediency4 ,from the continuous flux of our experiences we hunt out those groups which can always be found again1 in order to be able to conclude that if the element ,a is given1 the element ,b will be present4 ,we do not find this relationship as given1 but we put it into our experiences1 in that we consider the parts which correspond to the relationship as belonging together4 ,the very same thing may be said of spatial complexes4 ,such factors as are always1 or at any rate often1 found together are taken by us as belonging together1 and out of them a concept is formed which embraces these factors4 ,a question as to the why has here1 as with the temporal complexes1 no definite meaning4 ,there are countless things that happen together once to which we pay no attention because they happen only once or but seldom4 ,the knowledge of the fact that such a single concurrence exists amounts to nothing1 since from the presence of one factor it does not lead to a conclusion as to the presence of another1 and therefore does not make possible prediction4 ,of all the possible1 and even actual combinations1 only those interest us which are repeated1 and this arbitrary but expedient selection produces the impression that the world consists only of combinations that can be repeated2 that1 in other words1 the law of causality or of the type is a general one4 ,however general or limited application those laws have1 is more a question of our skill in finding the constant combinations among those that are present than a question of objective natural fact4 ,thus we see the development and pursuit of all sciences going on in such a way that on the one hand more and more constant combinations are discovered1 and on the other hand more inclusive relations of this kind are found out1 by means of which elements are united with each other which before no one had even tried to bring together4 ,so sciences are increasing both in the sense of an increasing complication and in an increasing unification4 ,if we consider from this standpoint the development and procedure of the various sciences1 we find a rational division of the sum total of science in the question as to the scope and multiplicity of the combinations or groups treated of in them4 ,these two properties are in a certain sense antithetical4 ,the simpler a complex is1 that is1 the fewer elements brought together in it1 the more frequently it is met with1 and vice versa4 ,one can therefore arrange all the sciences in such a way that one begins with the least multiplicity and the greatest scope1 and ends with the greatest multiplicity and the least scope4 ,the first science will be the most general1 and will therefore contain the most general and therefore the most barren concepts2 the last will contain the most specific and therefore the richest4 ,what are these limiting concepts8 ,the most general is the concept of thing1 that is1 any piece of experience1 seized arbitrarily from the flux of our experiences1 which can be repeated4 ,the most specific and richest is the concept of human intercourse4 ,between the science of things and the science of human intercourse1 all the other sciences are found arranged in regular gradation4 ,if one follows out the scheme the following outline results3 #a4 ,theory of order4 #b4 ,theory of numbers1 or arithmetic4 ,mathematics4 #c4 ,theory of time4 #d4 ,theory of space1 or geometry4 #e4 ,mechanics4 #f4 ,physics4 ,energetics4 #g4 ,chemistry4 #h4 ,physiology4 #i4 ,psychology4 ,biology4 #aj4 ,sociology4 ,this table is arbitrary in so far as the grades assumed can be increased or diminished according to need4 ,for example1 mechanics and physics could be taken together2 or between physics and chemistry1 physical chemistry could be inserted4 ,likewise between physiology and psychology1 anthropology might find a place2 or the first five sciences might be united under mathematics4 ,how one makes these divisions is entirely a practical question1 which will be answered at any time in accordance with the purposes of division2 and dispute concerning the matter is almost useless4 ,i should like1 however1 to call attention to the three great groups of mathematics1 energetics1 and biology 7in the wider sense74 ,they represent the decisive regulative thought which humanity has evolved1 contributed up to this time1 toward the scientific mastery of its experiences4 ,arrangement is the fundamental thought of mathematics4 ,from mechanics to chemistry the concept of energy is the most important2 and for the last three sciences it is the concept of life4 ,mathematics1 energetics1 and biology1 therefore1 embrace the totality of the sciences4 ,before we enter upon the closer consideration of these sciences1 it will be well to anticipate another objection which can be raised on the basis of the following fact4 ,besides the sciences named 7and those which lie between them7 there are many others1 as geology1 history1 medicine1 philology1 which we find difficulty in arranging in the above scheme1 which must1 however1 be taken into consideration in some way or other4 ,they are often characterized by the fact that they stand in relation with several of the sciences named1 but even more by the following circumstance4 ,their task is not1 as is true of the pure sciences above named1 the discovery of general relationships1 but they relate rather to existing complex objects whose origin1 scope1 extent1 etc41 in short1 whose temporal and spatial relationships they have to discover or to explain4 ,for this purpose they make use of relations which are placed at their disposal by the first-named pure sciences4 ,these sciences1 therefore1 had better be called applied sciences4 ,however1 in this connection we should not think only or even chiefly of technical applications2 rather the expression is used to indicate that the reciprocal relations of the parts of an object are to be called to mind by the application of the general rules found in pure science4 ,while in such a task the abstraction process of pure science is not applicable 7for the omission of certain parts and the concentration upon others which is characteristic of these is excluded by the nature of the task71 yet in a given case usually the necessity of bringing in various pure sciences for the purpose of explanation is evident4 ,astronomy is one of these applied sciences4 ,primarily it rests upon mechanics1 and in its instrumental portion1 upon optics2 in its present development on the spectroscopic side1 however1 it borrows considerably of chemistry4 ,in like manner history is applied sociology and psychology4 ,medicine makes use of all the sciences before mentioned1 up to psychology1 etc4 ,it is important to get clearly in mind the nature of these sciences1 since1 on account of their compound nature1 they resist arrangement amongst the pure sciences1 while1 on account of their practical significance1 they still demand consideration4 ,the latter fact gives them also a sort of arbitrary or accidental character1 since their development is largely conditioned by the special needs of the time4 ,their number1 speaking in general1 is very large1 since each pure science may be turned into an applied science in various ways2 and since in addition we have combinations of two1 three1 or more sciences4 ,moreover1 the method of procedure in the applied sciences is fundamentally different from that in the pure sciences4 ,in the first it is a question of the greatest possible analysis of a single given complex into its scientifically comprehensible parts2 while pure science1 on the other hand1 considers many complexes together in order to separate out from them their common element1 but expressly disclaims the complete analysis of a single complex4 ,in scientific work1 as it appears in practice1 pure and applied science are by no means sharply separated4 ,on the one hand the auxiliaries of investigations1 such as apparatus1 books1 etc41 demand of the pure investigator knowledge and application in applied science2 and1 on the other hand1 the applied scientist is frequently unable to accomplish his task unless he himself becomes for the time being a pure investigator and ascertains or discovers the missing general relationships which he needs for his task4 ,a separation and differentiation of the two forms of science was necessary1 however1 since the method and the aim of each present essential differences4 ,in order to consider the method of procedure of pure science more carefully1 let us turn back to the table on pages #cci1 #cdj1 and attend to the single sciences separately4 ,the theory of arrangement was mentioned first1 although this place is usually assigned to mathematics4 ,however1 mathematics has to do with the concepts of number and magnitude as fundamentals1 while the theory of arrangement does not make use of these4 ,here the fundamental concept is rather the thing or object of which nothing more is demanded or considered than that it is a fragment of our experience which can be isolated and will remain so4 ,it must not be an arbitrary combination2 such a thing would have only momentary duration1 and the task of science1 to learn the unknown from the given1 could not find application4 ,rather must this element have such a nature that it can be characterized and recognized again1 that is1 it must already have a conceptual nature4 ,therefore only parts of our experience which can be repeated 7which alone can be objects of science7 can be characterized as things or objects4 ,but in saying this we have said all that was demanded of them4 ,in other respects they may be just as different as is conceivable4 ,if the question is asked1 ,what can be said scientifically about indefinite things of this sort8 it is especially the relations of arrangement and association which yield an answer4 ,if we call any definite combination of such things a group1 we can arrange such a group in different ways1 that is1 we can determine for each thing the relation in which it is to stand to the neighboring thing4 ,from every such arrangement result not only the relationships indicated1 but a great number of new ones1 and it appears that when the first relationships are given the others always follow in like manner4 ,this1 however1 is the type of the scientific proposition or natural law 7page #cce74 ,from the presence of certain relations of arrangement we can deduce the presence of others which we have not yet demonstrated4 ,to illustrate this fact by an example1 let us think of the things arranged in a simple row1 while we choose one thing as a first member and associate another with it as following it2 with the latter another is associated1 etc4 ,thereby the position of each thing in the row is determined only in relation to the immediately preceding thing4 ,nevertheless1 the position of every member in the whole row1 and therefore its relation to every other member1 is determined by this4 ,this is seen in a number of special laws4 ,if we differentiate former and latter members we can formulate the proposition1 among others1 if ,b is a later member with reference to ,a1 and ,c with reference to ,b1 then ,c is also a later member with reference to ,a4 ,the correctness and validity of this proposition seems to us beyond all doubt4 ,but this is only a result of the fact that we are able to demonstrate it very easily in countless single cases1 and have so demonstrated it4 ,we know only cases which correspond to the proposition1 and have never experienced a contradictory case4 ,to call such a proposition1 however1 a necessity of thinking1 does not appear to me correct4 ,for the expression necessity of thinking can only rest upon the fact that every time the proposition is thought1 that is1 every time one remembers its demonstration1 its confirmation always arises4 ,but every sort of false proposition is also thinkable4 ,an undeniable proof of this is the fact that so much which is false is actually thought4 ,but to base the proof for the correctness of a proposition upon the impossibility of thinking its opposite is an impossible undertaking1 because every sort of nonsense can be thought3 where the proof was thought to have been given1 there has always been a confusion of thought and intuition1 proof or inspection4 ,with this one proposition of course the theory of order is not exhausted1 for here it is not a question of the development of this theory1 but of an example of the nature of the problems of science4 ,of the further questions we shall briefly discuss the problem of association4 ,if we have two groups ,a and ,b given1 one can associate with every member of ,a one of ,b2 that is1 we determine that certain operations which can be carried on with the members of ,a are also to be carried on with those of ,b4 ,now we can begin by simply carrying out the association1 member for member4 ,then we shall have one of three results3 ,a will be exhausted while there are still members of ,b left1 or ,b will be exhausted first1 or finally ,a and ,b will be exhausted at the same time4 ,in the first case we call ,a poorer than ,b2 in the second ,b poorer than ,a2 in the third both quantities are alike4 ,here for the first time we come upon the scientific concept of equality1 which calls for discussion4 ,there can be no question of a complete identity of the two groups which have been denominated equal1 for we have made the assumption that the members of both groups can be of any nature whatever4 ,they can then be as different as possible1 considered singly1 but they are alike as groups4 ,however ,i may arrange the members of ,a1 ,i can make a similar arrangement of the members of ,b1 since every member of ,a has one of ,b associated with it2 and with reference to the property of arrangement there is no difference to be observed between ,a and ,b4 ,if1 however1 ,a is poorer or richer than ,b1 this possibility ceases1 for then one of the groups has members to which none of the members in the other group corresponds2 so that the operations carried out with these members cannot be carried out with those of the other group4 ,equality in the scientific sense1 therefore1 means equivalence1 or the possibility of substitution in quite definite operations or for quite definite relations4 ,beyond this the things which are called like may show any differences whatever4 ,the general scientific process of abstraction is again easily seen in this special case4 ,on the basis of the definitions just given1 we can establish further propositions4 ,if group ,a equals ,b1 and ,b equals ,c1 then ,a also equals ,c4 ,the proof of this is that we can relate every member of ,a to a corresponding member of ,b and by hypothesis no member will be left4 ,then ,c is arranged with reference to ,b1 and here also no member is left4 ,by this process every member of ,a1 through the connecting link of a member of ,b1 is associated with a member of ,c1 and this association is preserved even if we cut out the group ,b4 ,therefore ,a and ,c are equal4 ,the same process of reasoning can be carried out for any number of groups4 ,likewise it can be demonstrated that if ,a is poorer than ,b and ,b poorer than ,c1 then ,a is also poorer than ,c4 ,for in the association of ,b with ,a some members of ,b are left over by hypothesis1 and likewise some members of ,c are left over if one associates ,c with ,b4 ,therefore in the association of ,c with ,a1 not only those members are left over which could not be associated with ,b1 but also those members of ,c which extend beyond ,b4 ,this proposition can be extended to any number of groups1 and permits the arrangement of a number of different groups in a simple series by beginning with the poorest and choosing each following so that it is richer than the preceding but poorer than the following4 ,from the proposition just established1 it follows that every group is so arranged with reference to all other groups that it is richer than all the preceding and poorer than all the following4#c ,footnote #c3 ,equal groups cannot be distinguished here1 and therefore represent only a group4 ,in this derivation of scientific proposition or laws of the simplest kinds1 the process of derivation and the nature of the result becomes particularly clear4 ,we arrive at such a proposition by performing an operation and expressing the result of it4 ,this expression enables us to avoid the repetition of the operation in the future1 since in accordance with the law we can indicate the result immediately4 ,thus an abbreviation and therefore1 a facilitation of the problem is attained which is the more considerable the larger the number of operations saved4 ,if we have a number of equal groups1 we know by the process of association that all of the operations with reference to arrangement which we can perform with one of them can be performed with all the others4 ,it is sufficient1 therefore1 to determine the properties of arrangement of one of these groups in order to know forthwith the properties of all the others4 ,this is an extremely important proposition1 which is continually employed for the most various purposes4 ,all speaking1 writing1 and reading rests upon the association of thoughts with sounds and symbols1 and by arranging the signs in accordance with our thoughts we bring it to pass that our hearers or readers think like thoughts in like order4 ,in a similar fashion we make use of various systems of formul in the different sciences1 especially in the simpler sciences2 and these formul we correlate with phenomena and use in place of the phenomena themselves1 and can therefore derive from them certain characteristics of phenomena without being compelled to use the latter4 ,the force of this process appears very strikingly in astronomy where1 by the use of definite formul associated with the different heavenly bodies1 we can foretell the future positions of these bodies with a high degree of approximation4 ,from the theory of order we come to the theory of number or arithmetic by the systematic arrangement or development of an operation just indicated 7page #cdc74 ,we can arrange any number of groups in such a way that a richer always follows a poorer4 ,but the complex obtained in this manner is always accidental with reference to the number and the richness of its members4 ,a regular and complete structure of all possible groups is evidently obtained only if we start from a group of one member or from a simple thing1 and by the addition of one member at a time make further groups out of those that we have4 ,thus we obtain different groups arranged according to an increasing richness1 and since we have advanced one member at a time1 that is1 made the smallest step which is possible1 we are certain that we have left out no possible group which is poorer than the richest to which the operation has been carried4 ,this whole process is familiar2 it gives the series of the positive whole numbers1 that is1 the cardinal numbers4 ,it is to be noted that the concept of quantity has not yet been considered2 what we have gained is the concept of number4 ,the single things or members in this number are quite arbitrary1 and especially they do not need to be alike in any manner4 ,every number forms a group-type1 and arithmetic or the science of numbers has the task of investigating the properties of these different types with reference to their division and combination4 ,if this is done in general form1 without attention to the special amount of the number1 the corresponding science is called algebra4 ,on the other hand1 by the application of formal rules of formation1 the number system has had one extension after another beyond the territory of its original validity4 ,thus counting backward led to zero and to the negative numbers2 the inversion of involution to the imaginary numbers4 ,for the group-type of the positive whole numbers is the simplest but by no means the only possible one1 and for the purpose of representing other manifolds than those which are met with in experience1 these new types have proved themselves very useful4 ,at the same time the number series gives us an extremely useful type of arrangement4 ,in the process of arising it is already ordered1 and we make use of it for the purpose of arranging other groups4 ,thus1 we are accustomed to furnish the pages in a book1 the seats in a theatre1 and countless other groups which we wish to make use of in any kind of order with the signs of the number series1 and thereby we make the tacit assumption that the use of that corresponding group shall take place in the same order as the natural numbers follow each other4 ,the ordinal numbers arising therefrom do not represent quantities1 nor do they represent the only possible type of arrangement1 but they are again the simplest of all4 ,we come to the concept of magnitude only in the theory of time and space4 ,the theory of time has not been developed as a special science2 on the contrary1 what we have to say about time first appears in mechanics4 ,meantime we can present the fundamental concepts1 which arise in this connection1 with reference to such well-known characteristics of time that the lack of a special science of time is no disadvantage4 ,the first and most important characteristic of time 7and of space1 too7 is that it is a continuous manifold2 that is1 every portion of time chosen can be divided at any place whatever4 ,in the number series this is not the case2 it can be divided only between the single numbers4 ,the series one to ten has only nine places of division and no more4 ,a minute1 or a second1 on the other hand1 has an unlimited number of places of division4 ,in other words1 there is nothing in the lapse of any time which hinders us from separating or distinguishing in thought at any given instant the time which has elapsed till then from the following time4 ,it is just the same with space1 except that time is a simple manifold and space a threefold1 continuous manifold4 ,nevertheless1 when we measure them1 we are accustomed to indicate times and spaces with numbers4 ,if we first examine1 for example1 the process of measuring a length1 it consists in our applying to the distance to be measured a length conceived as unchangeable1 the unit of measure1 until we have passed over the distance4 ,the number of these applications gives us the measure or magnitude of the distance4 ,the result is that by the indication of arbitrarily chosen points upon the continuous distance1 we place upon it an artificial discontinuity which enables us to associate it with the discontinuous number series4 ,a still further assumption1 however1 belongs to the concept of measuring1 namely1 that the parts of the distance cut off by the unit used as a measure be equal1 and it is taken for granted that this requirement will be fulfilled to whatever place the unit of measure is shifted4 ,as may be seen1 this is a definition of equality carried further than the former1 for one cannot actually replace a part of the distance by another in order to convince one's self that it has not changed4 ,just as little can one assert or prove that the unit of measure in changing its place in space remains of the same length2 we can only say that such distances as are determined by the unit of measure in different places are declared or defined as equal4 ,actually1 for our eye1 the unit of measure becomes smaller in perspective the farther away from it we find ourselves4 ,from this example we see again the great contribution which arbitrariness or free choice has made to all our structure of science4 ,we could develop a geometry in which distances which seem subjectively equal to our eye are called equal1 and upon this assumption we would be able to develop a self-consistent system or science4 ,such a geometry1 however1 would have an extremely complex and impractical structure for objective purposes 7as1 for example1 land measurement71 and so we strive to develop a science as free as possible from subjective factors4 ,historically1 we have before us a process of this sort in the astronomy of ,ptolemy and that of ,copernicus4 ,the former corresponded to the subjective appearances in the assumption that all heavenly bodies revolved around the earth1 but proved to be very complicated when confronted with the task of mastering these movements with figures4 ,the latter gave up the subjective standpoint of the observer1 who looked upon himself as the centre1 and attained a tremendous simplification by placing the centre of revolution in the sun4 ,a few words are to be said here about the application of arithmetic and algebra to geometry4 ,it is well known that under definite assumptions 7cordinates71 geometrical figures can be represented by means of algebraic formul1 so that the geometrical properties of the figure can be deduced from the arithmetical properties of the formul1 and vice versa4 ,the question must be asked how such a close and univocal relationship is possible between things of such different nature4 ,the answer is1 that here is an especially clear case of association4 ,the manifold of numbers is much greater than that of surface or space1 for while the latter are determined by two or three independent measurements1 one can have any number of independent number series working together4 ,therefore the manifold of numbers is arbitrarily limited to two or three independent series1 and in so far determines their mutual relations 7by means of the laws of cosine7 that there results a manifold1 corresponding to the spatial1 which can be completely associated with the spatial manifold4 ,then we have two manifolds of the same manifold character1 and all characteristics of arrangement and size of the one find their likeness in the other4 ,this again characterizes an extremely important scientific procedure which consists1 namely1 in constructing a formal manifold for the content of experience of a certain field1 to which one attributes the same manifold character which the former possesses4 ,every science reaches by this means a sort of formal language of corresponding completeness1 which depends upon how accurately the manifold character of the object is recognized and how judiciously the formul have been chosen4 ,while in arithmetic and algebra this task has been performed fairly well 7though by no means absolutely perfectly71 the chemical formul1 for instance1 express only a relatively small part of the manifold to be represented2 and in biology as far as sociology1 scarcely the first attempts have been made in the accomplishment of this task4 ,language especially serves as such a universal manifold to represent the manifolds of experience4 ,as a result of its development from a time of less culture1 it has by no means sufficient regularity and completeness to accomplish its purpose adequately and conveniently4 ,rather1 it is just as unsystematic as the events in the lives of single peoples have been1 and the necessity of expressing the endlessly different particulars of daily life has only allowed it to develop so that the correspondence between word and concept is kept rather indefinite and changeable1 according to need within somewhat wide limits4 ,thus all work in those sciences which must make vital use of these means1 as especially psychology and sociology1 or philosophy in general1 is made extremely difficult by the ceaseless struggle with the indefiniteness and ambiguity of language4 ,an improvement of this condition can be effected only by introducing signs in place of words for the representation of concepts1 as the progress of science allows it1 and equipping these signs with the manifold which from experience belongs to the concept4 ,an intermediate position in this respect is taken by the sciences which were indicated above as parts of energetics4 ,in this realm there is added to the concepts order1 number1 size1 space1 and time1 a new concept1 that of energy1 which finds application to every single phenomenon in this whole field1 just as do those more general concepts4 ,this is due to the fact that a certain quantity1 which is known to us most familiarly as mechanical work1 on account of its qualitative transformability and quantitative constancy1 can be shown to be a constituent of every physical phenomenon1 that is1 every phenomenon which belongs to the field of mechanics1 physics1 and chemistry4 ,in other words1 one can perfectly characterize every physical event by indicating what amounts and kinds of energy have been present in it and into what energies they have been transformed4 ,accordingly1 it is logical to designate the so-called physical phenomena as energetical4 ,that such a conception is possible is now generally admitted4 ,on the other hand1 its expediency is frequently questioned1 and there is at present so much the more reason for this because a thorough presentation of the physical sciences in the energetical sense has not yet been made4 ,if one applies to this question the criterion of the scientific system given above1 the completeness of the correspondence between the representing manifold and that to be represented1 there is no doubt that all previous systematizations in the form of hypotheses which have been tried in these sciences are defective in this respect4 ,formerly1 for the purpose of representing experiences1 manifolds whose character corresponded to the character of the manifold to be represented only in certain salient points without consideration of any rigid agreement1 indeed1 even without definite question as to such an agreement1 have been employed4 ,the energetical conception admits of that definiteness of representation which the condition of science demands and renders possible4 ,for each special manifold character of the field a special kind of energy presents itself3 science has long distinguished mechanical1 electric1 thermal1 chemical1 etc41 energies4 ,all of these different kinds hold together by the law of transformation with the maintenance of the quantitative amount1 and in so far are united4 ,on the other hand1 it has been possible to fix upon the corresponding energetical expression for every empirically discovered manifold4 ,as a future system of united energetics1 we have then a table of possible manifolds of which energy is capable4 ,in this we must keep in mind the fact that1 in accordance with the law of the conservation1 energy is a necessarily positive quantity which also is furnished with the property of unlimited possibility of addition2 therefore1 every particular kind of energy must have this character4 ,the very small manifold which seems to lack this condition is much widened by the fact that every kind of energy can be separated into two factors1 which are only subject to the limitation that their product1 the energy1 fulfills the conditions mentioned while they themselves are much freer4 ,for example1 one factor of a kind of enemy can become negative as well as positive2 it is only necessary that at the same time the other factor should become negative1 viz41 positive4 ,thus it seems possible to make a table of all possible forms of energy1 by attributing all thinkable manifold characteristics to the factors of the energy and then combining them by pairs and cutting out those products which do not fulfill the above-mentioned conditions4 ,for a number of years ,i have tried from time to time to carry out this programme1 but ,i have not yet got far enough to justify publication of the results obtained4 ,if we turn to the biological sciences1 in them the phenomenon of life appears to us as new4 ,if we stick to the observed facts1 keeping ourselves free from all hypotheses1 we observe as the general characteristics of the phenomena of life the continuous stream of energy which courses through a relatively constant structure4 ,change of substance is only a part1 although a very important part1 of this stream4 ,especially in plants we can observe at first hand the great importance of energy in its most incorporeal form1 the sun's rays4 ,along with this1 self-preservation and development and reproduction1 the begetting of offspring of like nature1 are characteristic4 ,all of these properties must be present in order that an organism may come into existence2 they must also be present if the reflecting man is to be able by repeated experience to form a concept of any definite organism1 whether of a lion or of a mushroom4 ,other organisms are met with which do not fulfill these conditions2 on account of their rarity1 however1 they do not lead to a species concept1 but are excluded from scientific consideration 7except for special purposes7 as deformities or monsters4 ,while organisms usually work with kinds of energy which we know well from the inorganic world1 organs are found in the higher forms which without doubt cause or assist transfers of energy1 but we cannot yet say definitely what particular kind of energy is active in them4 ,these organs are called nerves1 and their function is regularly that1 after certain forms of energy have acted upon one end of them1 they should act at the other end and release the energies stored up there which then act in their special manner4 ,that energetical transformations also take place in the nerve during the process of nervous transmission can be looked upon as demonstrated4 ,we shall thus be justified in speaking of a nerve energy1 while leaving it undecided whether there is here an energy of a particular kind1 or perhaps chemical energy1 or finally a combination of several energies4 ,while these processes can be shown objectively by the stimulation of the nerve and its corresponding releasing reaction in the end apparatus 7for instance1 a muscle71 we find in ourselves1 connected with certain nervous processes1 a phenomenon of a new sort which we call self-consciousness4 ,from the agreement of our reactions with those of other people we conclude with scientific probability that they also have self-consciousness2 and we are justified in making the same conclusion with regard to some higher animals4 ,how far down something similar to this is present cannot be determined by the means at hand1 since the analogy of organization and of behavior diminishes very quickly2 but the line is probably not very long1 in view of the great leap from man to animal4 ,moreover1 there are many reasons for the view that the gray cortical substance in the brain1 with its characteristic pyramidal cell1 is the anatomical substratum of this kind of nervous activity4 ,the study of the processes of self-consciousness constitutes the chief task of psychology4 ,to this science belong those fields which are generally allotted to philosophy1 especially logic and epistemology1 while sthetics1 and still more ethics1 are to be reckoned with the social sciences4 ,the latter have to do with living beings in so far as they can be united in groups with common functions4 ,here in place of the individual mind appears a collective mind1 which owing to the adjustment of the differences of the members of society shows simpler conditions than that4 ,from this comes especially the task of the historical sciences4 ,the happenings in the world accessible to us are conditioned partly by physical1 partly by psychological factors1 and both show a temporal mutability in one direction4 ,thus arises on the one hand a history of heaven and earth1 on the other hand a history of organisms up to man4 ,all history has primarily the task of fixing past events through the effects which have remained from them4 ,where such are not accessible1 only analogy is left1 a very doubtful means for gaining a conception of those events4 ,but it must be kept in mind that an event which has left no evident traces has no sort of interest for us1 for our interest is directly proportional to the amount of change which that event has caused in what we have before us4 ,the task of historical science is just as little exhausted1 however1 with the fixing of former events as1 for instance1 the task of physics with the establishment of a single fact1 as the temperature of a given place at a given time4 ,rather the individual facts must serve to bring out the general characteristics of the collective mind1 and the much discussed historical laws are laws of collective psychology4 ,just as physical and chemical laws are deduced in order with their help to predict the course of future physical events 7to be called forth either experimentally or technically71 so should the historical laws contribute to the formation and control of social and political development4 ,we see that the great statesmen of all time have eagerly studied history for this purpose1 and from that we derive the assurance that there are historical laws in spite of the objections of numerous scholars4 ,after this brief survey1 if we look back over the road we have come1 we observe the following general facts4 ,in every case the development of a science consists in the formation of concepts by certain abstractions from experience1 and setting of these concepts in relation with each other so that a systematical control of certain sides of our experience is made possible4 ,these relations1 according to their generality and reliability1 are called rules or laws4 ,a law is the more important the more it definitely expresses concerning the greatest possible number of things1 and the more accurately1 therefore1 it enables us to predict the future4 ,every law rests upon an incomplete induction1 and is therefore subject to modification by experience4 ,from this there results a double process in the development of science4 ,first1 the actual conditions are investigated to find out whether1 besides those already known1 new rules or laws1 that is1 constant relations between individual peculiarities1 cannot be discovered between them4 ,this is the inductive process1 and the induction is always an incomplete one on account of the limitlessness of all possible experience4 ,immediately the relationship found inductively is applied to cases which have not yet been investigated4 ,especially such cases are investigated as result from a combination of several inductive laws4 ,if these are perfectly certain1 and the combination is also properly made1 the result has claim to unconditional validity4 ,this is the limit which all sciences are striving to reach4 ,it has almost been reached in the simpler sciences3 in mathematics and in certain parts of mechanics4 ,this is called the deductive process4 ,in the actual working of every science the two methods of investigation are continually changing4 ,the best means of finding new successful inductions is in the making of a deduction on a very insufficient basis1 perhaps1 and subsequently testing it in experience4 ,sometimes the elements of his deductions do not come into the investigator's consciousness2 in such cases we speak of scientific instinct4 ,on the other hand we have much evidence from great mathematicians that they were accustomed to find their general laws by the method of induction1 by trying and considering single cases2 and that the deductive derivation from other known laws is an independent operation which sometimes does not succeed until much later4 ,indeed there is to-day a number of mathematical propositions which have not yet reached the second stage and therefore have at present a purely inductive empirical character4 ,the proportion of such laws in science increases very quickly with the rise in the scale 7page #cci74 ,another peculiarity which may be mentioned here is that in the scale all previous sciences have the character of applied sciences 7page #cda7 with reference to those which follow1 since they are everywhere necessary in the technique of the latter1 yet do not serve to increase their own field but are merely auxiliaries to the latter4 ,if we ask finally what influence upon the shaping of the future such investigations as those which have been sketched in outline above can have1 the following can be said4 ,up till now it has been considered a completely uncontrollable event whether and where a great and influential man of science has developed4 ,it is obvious that such a man is among the most costly treasures which a people 7and1 indeed1 humanity7 can possess4 ,the conscious and regular breeding of such rarities has not been considered possible4 ,while this is still the case for the very exceptional genius1 we see in the countries of the older civilization1 especially in ,germany at present1 a system of education in vogue in the universities by which a regular harvest of young scientific men is gained who not only have a mastery of knowledge handed down1 but also of the technique of discovery4 ,thereby the growth of science is made certain and regular1 and its pursuit is raised to a higher plane4 ,these results were formerly attained chiefly by empirically and oftentimes by accidental processes4 ,it is a task of scientific theory to make this activity also regular and systematic1 so that success is no more dependent solely upon a special capacity for the founding of a school but can also be attained by less original minds4 ,by the mastery of methods the way to considerably higher performances than he could otherwise attain will be open for the exceptionally gifted4 ,,the ,,content ,,and ,,validity ,,of ,,the ,,causal ,,law ,,by ,,benno ,,erdmann 7,translated from the ,german by ,professor ,walter ,t4 ,marvin1 ,western ,reserve ,university7 ,benno ,erdmann1 ,professor of ,philosophy1 ,university of ,bonn1 since #ahih4 b4 ,october #e1 #ahea1 ,glogau in ,schlesien1 ,germany4 ,ph4,d42 ,privy ,councilor4 ,academical ,lecturer1 ,berlin1 #ahgf- 2 ,special ,professor1 ,kiel1 #ahgh-gi2 ,regular ,professor1 ibid4 #ahgi-hd2 ibid4 ,breslau1 #ahhd-ij2 ibid4 ,halle1 #ahij-ih4 ,member various scientific and learned societies4 ,author of ,the ,axioms of ,geometry2 ,kant's ,criticism2 ,logic2 ,psychological ,researches on ,reading 7together with ,prof4 ,ramon ,dodge72 ,the ,psychology of the ,child and the ,school2 ,historical ,researches an ,kant's ,prolegomena1 and many other works and papers in ,philosophy4 ,we have learned to regard the real1 which we endeavor to apprehend scientifically in universally valid judgments1 as a whole that is connected continuously in time and in space and by causation1 and that is accordingly continuously self-evolving4 ,this continuity of connection has the following result1 namely1 every attempt to classify the sum total of the sciences on the basis of the difference of their objects leads merely to representative types1 that is1 to species which glide into one another4 ,we find no gaps by means of which we can separate sharply physics and chemistry1 botany and zology1 political and economic history and the histories of art and religion1 or1 again1 history1 philology1 and the study of the prehistoric4 ,as are the objects1 so also are the methods of science4 ,they are separable one from another only through a division into representative types2 for the variety of these methods is dependent upon the variety of the objects of our knowledge1 and is1 at the same time1 determined by the difference between the manifold forms of our thought1 itself a part of the real1 with its elements also gliding into ,one another4#d ,footnote #d3 ,cf4 the author's ,theorie der ,typeneinteilungen1 ,philosophische ,monatshefte1 vol4 xxx1 ,berlin1 #ahid4 ,the threads which join the general methodology of scientific thought with neighboring fields of knowledge run in two main directions4 ,in the one direction they make up a closely packed cable1 whereas in the other their course diverges into all the dimensions of scientific thought4 ,that is to say1 first1 methodology has its roots in logic1 in the narrower sense1 namely1 in the science of the elementary forms of our thought which enter into the make-up of all scientific methods4 ,secondly1 methodology has its source in the methods themselves which actually1 and therefore technically1 develop in the various fields of our knowledge out of the problems peculiar to those fields4 ,it is the office of scientific thought to interpret validly the objects that are presented to us in outer and inner perception1 and that can be derived from both these sources4 ,we accomplish this interpretation entirely through judgments and combinations of judgments of manifold sorts4 ,the concepts1 which the older logic regarded as the true elementary forms of our thinking1 are only certain selected types of judgment1 such stereotyped judgments as those which make up definitions and classifications1 and which appear independent and fundamental because their subject-matter1 that is1 their intension or extension1 is connected through the act of naming with certain words4 ,scientific methods1 then1 are the ways and means by which our thought can accomplish and set forth1 in accordance with its ideal1 this universally valid interpretation4 ,there belongs1 accordingly1 to methodology a list of problems which we can divide1 to be sure only in abstracto1 into three separate groups4 ,first1 methodology has to analyze the methods which have been technically developed in the different fields of knowledge into the elementary forms of our thinking from which they have been built up4 ,next to this work of analyzing1 there comes a second task which may be called a normative one2 for it follows that we must set forth and deduce systematically from their sources the nature of these manifold elements1 their resulting connection1 and their validity4 ,to these two offices must be added a third that we may call a potiori a synthetic one2 for finally we must reconstruct out of the elements of our thinking1 as revealed by analysis1 the methods belonging to the different fields of knowledge and also determine their different scope and validity4 ,the beginning of another conception of the office of methodology can be found in those thoughts which have become significant1 especially in ,leibnitz's fragments and drafts of a calculus ratiocinator or a spcieuse gnrale4 ,the foregoing discussion has set aside all hope that these beginnings and their recent development may give1 of the possibility of constructing the manifold possible methods a priori1 that is1 before or independent of experience4 ,however1 it remains entirely undecided1 as it should in this our preliminary account of the office of general methodology1 whether or not all methods of our scientific thought will prove to be ultimately but branches of one and the same universal method1 a thought contained in the undertakings just referred to4 ,although modern empiricism1 affiliated as it is with natural science1 tends to answer this question in the affirmative even more definitely and dogmatically than any type of the older rationalism1 still the question is one that can be decided only in the course of methodological research4 ,the conception of a methodology of scientific thought can be said to be almost as old as scientific thought itself2 for it is already contained essentially1 though undifferentiated1 in the ,socratic challenge of knowledge4 ,none the less1 the history of methodology1 as the history of every other science1 went through the course of which ,kant has given a classical description4 ,no one attempts to construct a science unless he can base it on some idea2 but in the elaboration of it the schema1 nay1 even the definition which he gives in the beginning of his science1 corresponds very seldom to his idea1 which1 like a germ1 lies hidden in the reason1 and all the parts of which are still enveloped and hardly distinguishable even under microscopical observation4#e ,footnote #e3 ,kant1 ,kr4 d4 r4 ,v41 #b;d ed41 p4 #hfb4 ,we are indebted to the ,greek1 and especially to the ,platonic-,aristotelian philosophy for important contributions to the understanding of the deductive method of mathematical thought4 ,it was precisely this trend of philosophic endeavor which1 though furnishing for the most part the foundation of methodological doctrine well on into the seventeenth century1 offered no means of differentiating the methods that are authoritative for our knowledge of facts4 ,what ,socrates was perhaps the first to call induction1 is essentially different1 as regards its source and aim1 from the inductive methods that direct our research in natural and mental science4 ,for it is into these two fields that we have to divide the totality of the sciences of facts1 the material sciences1 let us call them1 in opposition to the formal or mathematical sciences1--that is1 if we are to do justice to the difference between sense and self perception1 or outer and inner perception4 ,two closely connected forces especially led astray the methodological opinions regarding the material sciences till the end of the eighteenth century1 and in part until the beginning of the nineteenth century4 ,we refer1 in the first place1 to that direction of thought which gives us the right to characterize the ,platonic-,aristotelian philosophy as a concept philosophy2 namely1 the circumstance that ,aristotelian logic caused the concept to be set before the judgment4 ,in short1 we refer to that tendency in thought which directs the attention not to the permanent in the world's occurrences1 the uniform connections of events1 but rather to the seemingly permanent in the things1 their essential attributes or essences4 ,thus the concept philosophy1 as a result of its tendency to hypostasize1 finds in the abstract general concepts of things1 the ideas1 the eternal absolute reality that constitutes the foundation of things and is contained in them beside the accidental and changing properties4#f ,here we have at once the second force which inspired the ancient methodology4 ,these ideas1 like the fundamentally real1 constitute that which ultimately alone acts in all the coming into existence and the going out of existence of the manifold things4 ,in the ,aristotelian theory of causation1 this thought is made a principle2 and we formulate only what is contained in it1 when we say that1 according to it1 the efficient and at the same time final causes can be deduced through mere analysis from the essential content of the effects2 that1 in fact1 the possible effects of every cause can be deduced from the content of its definition4 ,the conceptual determination of the causal relation1 and with it in principle the sum total of the methods in the material sciences1 becomes a logical1 analytical1 and deductive one4 ,these sciences remain entirely independent of the particular content of experience as this broadens1 and so do also the methods under discussion4 ,footnote #f3 ,according to ,plato1 it is true1 the ideas are separated from the sensible things2 they must be thought in a conceptual place1 for the space of sense perception is to be understood as non-being1 matter4 ,the things revealed to sense1 however1 occupy a middle position between being and non-being1 so that they partake of the ideas4 ,in this sense1 the statement made above holds also of the older view of the concept philosophy4 ,as a consequence1 every essential difference between mathematical thought and the science of causes is done away with in favor of a rationalistic construction of the methods of material science4 ,accordingly1 throughout the seventeenth century1 the ideal of all scientific method becomes1 not the inductive method that founded the new epoch of the science of to-day1 but the deductive mathematical method applied to natural scientific research4 ,the flourish of trumpets with which ,francis ,bacon hailed the onslaught of the inductive methods in the natural science of the time1 helped in no way2 for he failed to remodel the traditional1 ,aristotelian-,scholastic conception of cause1 and1 accordingly1 failed to understand both the problem of induction and the meaning of the inductive methods of the day4#g ,descartes1 ,hobbes1 ,spinoza1 and related thinkers develop their mathesis universalis after the pattern of geometrical thinking4 ,leibnitz tries to adapt his spcieuse gnrale to the thought of mathematical analysis4 ,the old methodological conviction gains its clear-cut expression in ,spinoza's doctrine3 ,aliquid efficitur ab aliqua re means aliquid sequitur ex ejus definitione4 ,footnote #g3 ,cf4 the articles on ,francis ,bacon by ,chr4 ,sigwart in the ,preussische ,jahrbcher1 xii1 #ahfc1 and xiii1 #ahfd4 ,the logically straight path is seldom the one taken in the course of the history of thought4 ,the new formulation and solution of problems influence us first through their evident significance and consequences1 not through the traditional presuppositions upon which they are founded4 ,thus1 in the middle of the seventeenth century1 when insight into the precise difference between mental and physical events gave rise to pressing need for its definite formulation1 no question arose concerning the dogmatic presupposition of a purely logical 7analytisch7 relationship between cause and effect2 but1 on the contrary1 this presupposition was then for the first time brought clearly before consciousness4 ,it was necessary to take the roundabout way through occasionalism and the prestablished harmony1 including the latter's retreat to the omnipotence of ,god1 before it was possible to miss the question of the validity of the presupposition that the connection between cause and effect is analytic and rational4 ,among the leading thinkers of the period this problem was recognized as the cardinal problem of contemporaneous philosophy4 ,it is further evidence how thoroughly established this problem must have been among the more deeply conceived problems of the time in the middle of the eighteenth century1 that ,hume and ,kant were forced to face it1 led on1 seemingly independently of each other1 and surely from quite different presuppositions and along entirely different ways4 ,the historical evolution of that which from the beginning has seemed to philosophy the solving of her true problem has come to pass in a way not essentially different from that of the historical evolution in all other departments of human knowledge4 ,thus1 in the last third of the seventeenth century1 ,newton and ,leibnitz succeeded in setting forth the elements of the infinitesimal calculus2 and1 in the fifth decade of the nineteenth century1 ,robert ,mayer1 ,helmholtz1 and perhaps ,joule1 formulated the law of the conservation of energy4 ,in one essential respect ,hume and ,kant are agreed in the solution of the new1 and hence contemporaneously misunderstood1 problem4 ,both realized that the connection between the various causes and effects is not a rational analytic1 but an empirical synthetic one4 ,however1 the difference in their presuppositions as well as method caused this common result to make its appearance in very different light and surroundings4 ,in ,hume's empiricism the connection between cause and effect appears as the mere empirical result of association2 whereas in ,kant's rationalism this general relation between cause and effect becomes the fundamental condition of all possible experience1 and is1 as a consequence1 independent of all experience4 ,it rests1 as a means of connecting our ideas1 upon an inborn uniformity of our thought4 ,thus the way was opened for a fundamental separation of the inductive material scientific from the deductive mathematical method4 ,for ,hume mathematics becomes the science of the relations of ideas1 as opposed to the sciences of facts4 ,for ,kant philosophical knowledge is the knowledge of the reason arising from concepts1 whereas the mathematical is that arising from the construction of concepts4 ,the former1 therefore1 studies the particular only in the universal2 the latter1 the universal in the particular1 nay1 rather in the individual4 ,both solutions of the new problem which in the eighteenth century supplant the old and seemingly self-evident presupposition1 appear accordingly embedded in the opposition between the rationalistic and empiristic interpretation of the origin and validity of our knowledge1 the same opposition that from antiquity runs through the historical development of philosophy in ever new digressions4 ,even to-day the question regarding the meaning and the validity of the causal connection stands between these contrary directions of epistemological research2 and the ways leading to its answer separate more sharply than ever before4 ,it is therefore more pressing in our day than it was in earlier times to find a basis upon which we may build further epistemologically and therefore methodologically4 ,the purpose of the present paper is to seek such a basis for the different methods employed in the sciences of facts4 99 99 99 99 99 ,as has already been said1 the contents of our consciousness1 which are given us immediately in outer and inner perception1 constitute the raw material of the sciences of facts4 ,from these various facts of perception we derive the judgments through which we predict1 guide1 and shape our future perception in the course of possible experience4 ,these judgments exist in the form of reproductive ideational processes1 which1 if logically explicit1 become inductive inferences in the broader sense4 ,these inferences may be said to be of two sorts1 though fundamentally only two sides of one and the same process of thought2 they are in part analogical inferences and in part inductive inferences in the narrower sense4 ,the former infers from the particular in a present perception1 which in previous perceptions was uniformly connected with other particular contents of perception1 to a particular that resembles those other contents of perception4 ,in short1 they are inferences from a particular to a particular4 ,after the manner of such inferences we logically formulate1 for example1 the reproductive processes1 whose conclusions run3 ,this man whom ,i see before me1 is attentive1 feels pain1 will die2 this meteor will prove to have a chemical composition similar to known meteors1 and also to have corresponding changes on its surface as the result of its rapid passage through our atmosphere4 ,the inductive inferences in the narrower sense argue1 on the contrary1 from the perceptions of a series of uniform phenomena to a universal1 which includes the given and likewise all possible cases1 in which a member of the particular content of the earlier perceptions is presupposed as given4 ,in short1 they are conclusions from a particular to a universal that is more extensive than the sum of the given particulars4 ,for example3 ,all men have minds1 will die2 all meteoric stones will prove to have this chemical composition and those changes of surface4 ,there is no controversy regarding the inner similarity of both these types of inference or regarding their outward structure2 or1 again1 regarding their outward difference from the deductive inferences1 which proceed not from a particular to a particular or general1 but from a general to a particular4 ,there is1 however1 difference of opinion regarding their inner structure and their inner relation to the deductive inferences4 ,both questions depend upon the decision regarding the meaning and validity of the causal relation4 ,the contending parties are recruited essentially from the positions of traditional empiricism and rationalism and from their modern offshoots4 ,we maintain first of all3 #a4 ,the presupposition of all inductive inferences1 from now on to be taken in their more general sense1 is1 that the contents of perception are given to us uniformly in repeated perceptions1 that is1 in uniform components and uniform relations4 #b4 ,the condition of the validity of the inductive inferences lies in the thoughts that the same causes will be present in the unobserved realities as in the observed ones1 and that these same causes will bring forth the same effects4 #c4 ,the conclusions of all inductive inferences have1 logically speaking1 purely problematic validity1 that is1 their contradictory opposite remains equally thinkable4 ,they are1 accurately expressed1 merely hypotheses1 whose validity needs verification through future experience4 ,the first-mentioned presupposition of inductive inference must not be misunderstood4 ,the paradox that nothing really repeats itself1 that each stage in nature's process comes but once1 is just as much and just as little justified as the assertion1 everything has already existed4 ,it does not deny the fact that we can discriminate in the contents of our perceptions the uniformities of their components and relations1 in short1 that similar elements are present in these ever new complexes4 ,this fact makes it possible that our manifold perceptions combine to make up one continuous experience4 ,even our paradox presupposes that the different contents of our perceptions are comparable with one another1 and reveal accordingly some sort of common nature4 ,all this is not only a matter of course for empiricism1 which founds the whole constitution of our knowledge upon habits1 but must also be granted by every rationalistic interpretation of the structure of knowledge4 ,every one that is well informed knows that what we ordinarily refer to as facts already includes a theory regarding them4 ,kant judges in this matter precisely as ,hume did before him and ,stuart ,mill after him4 ,if cinnabar were sometimes red and sometimes black1 sometimes light and sometimes heavy1 if a man could be changed now into this1 now into another animal shape1 if on the longest day the fields were sometimes covered with fruit1 sometimes with ice and snow1 the faculty of my empirical imagination would never be in a position1 when representing red color1 to think of heavy cinnabar4#h ,footnote #h3 ,kant1 ,kr4 d4 r4 ,v41 #ast ed41 pp4 #ajj f4 ,the assumption that in recurring perceptions similar elements of content1 as well as of relation1 are given1 is a necessary condition of the possibility of experience itself1 and accordingly of all those processes of thought which lead us1 under the guidance of previous perceptions1 from the contents of one given perception to the contents of possible perceptions4 ,a tradition from ,hume down has accustomed us to associate the relation of cause and effect not so much with the uniformity of coexistence as with the uniformity of sequence4 ,let us for the present keep to this tradition4 ,its first corollary is that the relation of cause and effect is to be sought in the uninterrupted flow and connection of events and changes4 ,the cause becomes the uniformly preceding event1 the constant antecedens1 the effect the uniformly following1 the constant consequens1 in the course of the changes that are presented to consciousness as a result of foregoing changes in our sensorium4 ,according to this tradition that we have taken as our point of departure1 the uniformity of the sequence of events is a necessary presupposition of the relation between cause and effect4 ,this uniformity is given us as an element of our experience2 for we actually find uniform successions in the course of the changing contents of perception4 ,further1 as all our perceptions are in the first instance sense perceptions1 we may call them the sensory presupposition of the possibility of the causal relation4 ,in this presupposition1 however1 there is much more involved than the name just chosen would indicate4 ,the uniformity of sequence lies1 as we saw1 not in the contents of perception as such1 which are immediately given to us4 ,it arises rather through the fact that1 in the course of repeated perceptions1 we apprehend through abstraction the uniformities of their temporal relation4 ,moreover1 there lie in the repeated perceptions not only uniformities of sequence1 but also uniformities of the qualitative content of the successive events themselves1 and these uniformities also must be apprehended through abstraction4 ,thus these uniform contents of perception make up series of the following form3 a#a -- b#a a#b -- b#b an -- bn ,the presupposition of the possibility of the causal relations includes1 therefore1 more than mere perceptive elements4 ,it involves the relation of different1 if you will1 of peculiar contents of perception1 by virtue of which we recognize a#b -- b#b 444 an -- bn as events that resemble one another and the event a#a -- b#a qualitatively as well as in their sequence4 ,there are accordingly involved in our presupposition reproductive elements which indicate the action of memory4 ,in order that ,i may in the act of perceiving a#c -- b#c apprehend the uniformity of this present content with that of a#b -- b#b and a#a -- b#a1 these earlier perceptions must in some way1 perhaps through memory1#i be revived with the present perception4 ,footnote #i3 ,it is not our present concern to ascertain how this actually happens4 ,the psychological presuppositions of the present paper are contained in the theory of reproduction that ,i have worked out in connection with the psychology of speech in the articles on ,die psychologischen ,grundlagen der ,beziehungen zwischen ,sprechen und ,denken1 ,archiv fr systematische ,philosophie1 ,,ii1 ,,iii1 und ,,vii2 cf4 note #a1 page #aea4 ,in this reproduction there is still a further element1 which can be separated1 to be sure only in abstracto1 from the one just pointed out4 ,the present revived content1 even if it is given in memory as an independent mental state1 is essentially different from the original perception4 ,it differs in all the modifications in which the memory of lightning and thunder could differ from the perception of their successive occurrence1 or1 again1 the memory of a pain and the resulting disturbance of attention could differ from the corresponding original experience4 ,however1 as memory1 the revived experience presents itself as a picture of that which has been previously perceived4 ,especially is this the case in memory properly so called1 where the peculiar space and time relations individualize the revived experience4 ,if we give to this identifying element in the associative process a logical expression1 we shall have to say that there is involved in revival1 and especially in memory1 an awareness that the present ideas recall the same content that was previously given us in perception4 ,to be sure1 the revival of the content of previous perceptions does not have to produce ideas1 let alone memories4 ,rapid1 transitory1 or habitual revivals1 stimulated by associative processes1 can remain unconscious1 that is1 they need not appear as ideas or states of consciousness4 ,stimulation takes place1 but consciousness does not arise1 provided we mean by the term consciousness the genus of our thoughts1 feelings1 and volitions4 ,none the less it must not be forgotten that this awareness of the essential identity of the present revived content with that of the previous perception can be brought about in every such case of reproduction4 ,how all this takes place is not our present problem4 ,we can apply to this second element in the reproductive process1 which we have found to be essential to the causal relation1 a ,kantian term1 ,recognition4 ,this term1 however1 is to be taken only in the sense called for by the foregoing statements2 for the rationalistic presuppositions and consequences which mark ,kant's ,synthesis of ,recognition are far removed from the present line of thought4 ,we may1 then1 sum up our results as follows3 ,in the presupposition of a uniform sequence of events1 which we have accepted from tradition as the necessary condition of the possibility of the causal relation1 there lies the thought that the contents of perception given us through repeated sense stimulation are related to one another through a reproductive recognition4 ,the assumption of such reproductive recognition is not justified merely in the cases so far considered4 ,it is already necessary in the course of the individual perceptions a and b1 and hence in the apprehension of an occurrence4 ,it makes the sequence itself in which a and b are joined possible2 for in order to apprehend b as following upon a1 in case the perception of a has not persisted in its original form1 a must be as far revived and recognized upon b's entrance into the field of perception as it has itself passed out of that field4 ,otherwise1 instead of b following upon a and being related to a1 there would be only the relationless change from a to b4 ,this holds generally and not merely in the cases where the perception of a has disappeared before that of b begins1 for example1 in the case of lightning and thunder1 or where it has in part disappeared1 for example1 in the throwing of a stone4 ,we have represented a as an event or change1 in order that uniform sequences of events may alone come into consideration as the presupposition of the causal relation4 ,but every event has its course in time1 and is accordingly divisible into many1 ultimately into infinitely many1 shorter events4 ,now if b comes only an infinitely short interval later than a1 and by hypothesis it must come later than a1 then a corresponding part of a must have disappeared by the time b appears4 ,but the infinitesimal part of a perception is just as much out of all consideration as would be an infinitely long perception2 all which only goes to show that we have to substitute intervals of finite length in place of this purely conceptual analysis of a continuous time interval4 ,this leaves the foregoing discussion as it stands4 ,if b follows a after a perceptible finite interval1 then the flow or development of a by the time of b's appearance must have covered a course corresponding to that interval2 and all this is true even though the earlier stages of a remain unchanged throughout the interval preceding b's appearance4 ,the present instant of flow is distinct from the one that has passed1 even though it takes place in precisely the same way4 ,the former1 not the latter1 gives the basis of relation which is here required1 and therefore the former must be reproduced and recognized4 ,this thought also is included in the foregoing summary of what critical analysis shows to be involved in the presupposition of a uniform sequence4 ,in all this we have already abandoned the field of mere perception which gave us the point of departure for our analysis of uniform sequence4 ,we may call the changing course of perception only in the narrower meaning the sensory presupposition of the causal relation4 ,in order that these changing contents of perception may be known as like one another1 as following one another1 and as following one another uniformly1 they must be related to one another through a recognitive reproduction4 ,our critical analysis of uniform sequence is1 however1 not yet complete4 ,to relate to one another the contents of two ideas always requires a process at once of identifying and of differentiating1 which makes these contents members of the relation1 and which accordingly presupposes that our attention has been directed to each of the two members as well as to the relation itself--in the present case1 to the sequence4 ,here we come to another essential point4 ,we should apply the name thought to every ideational process in which attention is directed to the elements of the mental content and which leads us to identify with one another1 or to differentiate from one another1 the members of this content4#aj ,the act of relating1 which knows two events as similar1 as following one another1 indeed1 as following one another uniformly1 is therefore so far from being a sensation that it must be claimed to be an act of thinking4 ,the uniformity of sequence of a and b is therefore an act of relating on the part of our thought1 so far as this becomes possible solely through the fact that we at one and the same time identify with one another and differentiate from one another a as cause and b as effect4 ,we say at one and the same time1 because the terms identifying and differentiating are correlatives which denote two different and opposing sides of one and the same ideational process viewed logically4 ,accordingly1 there is here on need of emphasizing that the act of relating1 which enables us to think a as cause and b as effect1 is an act of thought also1 because it presupposes on our part an act of naming which raises it to being a component of our formulated and discursive thought4 ,we therefore think a as cause and b as effect in that we apprehend the former as uniform antecedens and the latter as uniform consequens4 ,footnote #aj3 ,cf4 the author's ,umrisse zur ,psychologie des ,denkens1 in ,philosophische ,abhandlungen ,chr4 ,sigwart 444 gewidmet1 ,tbingen1 #aijj4 99 99 99 99 99 ,have we not the right1 after the foregoing analysis1 to interpret the uniform sequence of events solely as the necessary presupposition of the causal relation8 ,is it not at the same time the adequate presupposition8 ,yes1 is it not the causal relation itself8 ,as we know1 empiricism since ,hume has answered the last question in the affirmative1 and rationalism since ,kant has answered it in the negative4 ,we1 too1 have seemingly followed in our discussion the course of empiricism4 ,at least1 ,i find nothing in that discussion which a consistent empiricist might not be willing to concede2 that is1 if he is ready to set aside the psychological investigation of the actual processes which we here presuppose and make room for a critical analysis of the content of the relation of cause and effect4#aa ,however1 the decision of the question1 whether or not empiricism can determine exhaustively the content that we think in the causal relation1 depends upon other considerations than those which we have until now been called upon to undertake4 ,we have so far only made clear what every critical analysis of the causal relation has to concede to empiricism4 ,in reality the empiristic hypothesis is inadequate4 ,to be sure1 the proof of this inadequacy is not to be taken from the obvious argument which ,reid raised against the empiricism of ,hume1 and which compelled ,stuart ,mill in his criticism of that attack#ab to abandon his empiristic position at this point4 ,no doubt the conclusion to which we also have come for the time being1 goes much too far1 the conclusion that the cause is nothing but the uniform antecedens and the effect merely the uniform consequens4 ,were it true1 as we have hitherto assumed1 that every uniformly preceding event is to be regarded as cause and every uniformly following event as effect1 then day must be looked upon as cause of night and night as cause of day4 ,footnote #aa3 ,the difference between the two points of view can be made clearer by an illustration4 ,the case that we shall analyze is the dread of coming into contact with fire4 ,the psychological analysis of this case has to make clear the mental content of the dread and its causes4 ,such dread becomes possible only when we are aware of the burning that results from contact with fire4 ,we could have learned to be aware of this either immediately through our own experience1 or mediately through the communication of others' experience4 ,in both cases it is a matter of one or repeated experiences4 ,in all cases the effects of earlier experiences equal association and recall1 which1 in turn1 result in recognition4 ,the recognition explaining the case under discussion arises thus4 ,the present stimuli of visual perception arouse the retained impressions of previous visual perceptions of fire and give rise to the present perception 7apperception7 by fusing with them4 ,by a process of interweaving1 associations are joined to this perception4 ,the apperceptively revived elements which lie at the basis of the content of the perception are interwoven by association with memory elements that retain the additional contents of previous perceptions of fire1 viz41 the burning1 or1 again1 are interwoven with the memory elements of the communications regarding such burning4 ,by means of this interweaving1 the stimulation of the apperceptive element transmits itself to the remaining elements of the association complex4 ,the character of the association is different under different conditions4 ,if it be founded only upon one experience1 then there can arise a memory or a recall1 in the wider sense1 of the foregoing content of the perception and feeling at the time of the burning1 or1 again1 there can arise a revival wherein the stimulated elements of retention remain unconscious4 ,again1 the words of the mother tongue that denote the previous mental content1 and which likewise belong to the association complex 7the apperceiving mass1 in the wider sense71 can be excited in one of these three forms and in addition as abstract verbal ideas4 ,each one of these forms of verbal discharge can lead to the innervations of the muscles involved in speech1 which bring about some sort of oral expression of judgment4 ,each of these verbal reproductions can be connected with each of the foregoing sensory 7sachlichen7 revivals4 ,secondly1 if the association be founded upon repeated perceptions on the part of the person himself1 then all the afore-mentioned possibilities of reproduction become more complicated1 and1 in addition1 the mental revivals contain1 more or less1 only the common elements of the previous perceptions1 i4 e41 reappear in the form of abstract ideas or their corresponding unconscious modifications4 ,in the third case the association is founded upon a communication of others' experience4 ,for the sake of simplicity1 let this case be confined to the following instance4 ,the communication consisted in the assertion3 ,all fire will burn upon contact4 ,moreover1 this judgment was expressed upon occasion of imminent danger of burning4 ,there can then arise1 as is perhaps evident1 all the possibilities mentioned in the second case1 only that here there will be a stronger tendency toward verbal reproduction and the sensory reproduction will be less fixed4 ,in the first two cases there was connected with the perception of the burning an intense feeling of pain4 ,in the third the idea of such pain added itself to the visual perception of the moment4 ,the associated elements of the earlier mental contents belong likewise to the apperceiving mass excited at the moment1 in fact to that part of it excited by means of association processes1 or1 as we can again say1 depending upon the point from which we take our view1 the associative or apperceptive completion of the content of present perception4 ,if these pain elements are revived as memories1 i4 e41 as elements in consciousness1 they give rise to a new disagreeable feeling1 which is referred to the possible coming sensation of burning4 ,if the mental modifications corresponding to these pain elements remain unconscious1 as is often possible1 there arises none the less the same result as regards our feeling1 only with less intensity4 ,this feeling tone we call the dread4 ,as a result of the sum total of the revivals actual and possible1 there is finally produced1 according to the particular circumstances1 either a motor reaction or an inhibitant of such reaction4 ,both innervations can take place involuntarily or voluntarily4 ,the critical analysis of the fact that we dread contact with fire1 even has another purpose and accordingly proceeds on other lines4 ,it must make clear under what presuppositions the foresight that lies at the basis of such dread is valid for future experience4 ,it must then formulate the actual process of revival that constitutes the foundation of this feeling as a series of judgments1 from which the meaning and interconnection of the several judgments will become clear4 ,thus the critical analysis must give a logical presentation of the apperceptive and associative processes of revival4 ,for this purpose the three cases of the psychological analysis reduce themselves to two3 viz41 first1 to the case in which an immediate experience forms the basis1 and secondly1 to that in which a variety of similar mediately or immediately communicated experiences form such basis4 ,in the first of these logically differentiated cases1 the transformation into the speech of formulated thought leads to the following inference from analogy3 ,fire ,a burned4 ,fire ,b is similar to fire ,a4 ---------------------------- ,fire ,b will burn4 ,in the second case there arises a syllogism of some such form as3 ,all fire causes burning upon contact4 ,this present phenomenon is fire4 ---------------------------------------- ---------------- ,this present phenomenon will cause burning upon contact4 ,both premises of this syllogism are inductive inferences1 whose implicit meaning becomes clear when we formulate as follows3 ,all heretofore investigated instances of fire have burned1 therefore all fire burns4 ,the present phenomenon manifests some properties of fire1 will consequently have all the properties thereof4 ---------------------------------------- ----------------- ,the present phenomenon will1 in case of contact1 cause burning4 ,the first syllogism goes from the particular to the particular4 ,the second proves itself to be 7contrary to the analysis of ,stuart ,mill7 an inference that leads from the general to the particular4 ,for the conclusion is the particular of the second parts of the major and minor premises2 and these second parts of the premises are inferred from their first parts in the two possible ways of inductive inference4 ,the latter do not contain the case referred to in the conclusion1 but set forth the conditions of carrying a result of previous experience over to a new case with inductive probability1 in other words1 the conditions of making past experience a means of foreseeing future experience4 ,it would be superfluous to give here the symbols of the two forms of inductive inference4 ,we remain within the bounds of logical analysis1 if we state under what conditions conclusions follow necessarily from their premises1 viz41 the conclusions of arguments from analogy and of syllogisms in the narrower sense1 as well as those of the foregoing inductive arguments4 ,for the inference from analogy and the two forms of inductive inference1 these conditions are the presuppositions already set forth in the text of the present paper1 that in the as yet unobserved portion of reality the like causes will be found and they will give rise to like effects4 ,for the syllogism they are the thought that the predicate of a predicate is the 7mediate7 predicate of the subject4 ,only the further analysis of these presuppositions1 which is undertaken in the text1 leads to critical considerations in the narrower sense4 ,footnote #ab3 ,a ,system of ,logic1 ,ratiocinative and ,inductive1 bk4 ,,iii1 ch4 v1 #f4 ,empiricism can1 however1 meet this objection without giving up its position2 in fact1 it can employ the objection as an argument in its favor2 for this objection affects only the manifestly imperfect formulation of the doctrine1 not the essential arguments4 ,it should have been pointed out again and again in the foregoing exposition that only in the first indiscriminating view of things may we regard the events given us in perception as the basis of our concepts of cause and effect4 ,all these events are intricately mixed1 those that are given in self perception as well as those given in sense perception4 ,the events of both groups flow along continuously4 ,consequently1 as regards time1 they permit a division into parts1 which division proceeds1 not indeed for our perception1 but for our scientific thought1 in short1 conceptually1 into infinity4 ,the events of sense perception permit also conceptually of infinite division in their spatial relations4 ,it is sufficient for our present purpose1 if we turn our attention to the question of divisibility in time4 ,this fact of divisibility shows that the events of our perception1 which alone we have until now brought under consideration1 must be regarded as systems of events4 ,we are therefore called upon to apportion the causal relations among the members of these systems4 ,only for the indiscriminating view of our practical ,weltanschauung is the perceived event a the cause of the perceived event b4 ,the more exact analysis of our theoretical apprehension of the world compels us to dissect the events a and b into the parts aalpha 1 abeta1 agamma--balpha1 bbeta1 bgamma1 and1 where occasion calls for it1 to continue the same process in turn for these and further components4 ,we have accordingly to relate those parts to one another as causes and effects which1 from the present standpoint of analysis1 follow one another uniformly and immediately1 viz41 follow one another so that from this standpoint no other intervening event must be presupposed4 ,in this way we come to have a well-ordered experience4 ,the dispositions to such experience which reveal themselves within the field of practical thought taught man long before the beginning of scientific methods not to connect causally day and night with one another1 but the rising and setting of the sun with day and night4 ,the theoretical analysis1 indeed1 goes farther4 ,it teaches that in what is here summed up as rising of the sun and yonder as day1 there lie again intricate elements requiring special attention1 in our own day extending perhaps to the lines of thought contained in the electro-dynamic theory of light and of electrons4 ,still the ways of thought remain the same1 on all the levels of penetrating analysis4 ,we have throughout to relate to one another as cause and effect those events which1 in a well-ordered experience1 must be regarded as following one another immediately4 ,the cause is then the immediate uniform antecedens1 the effect the immediate uniform consequens4 ,otherwise stated1 the perceived events that we are accustomed1 from the standpoint of the practical ,weltanschauung1 to regard as causes and effects1 e4 g41 lightning and thunder1 from the theoretical apprehension of the world prove to be infinitely involved collections of events1 whose elements must be related to one another as causes and effects in as far as they can be regarded as following one another immediately4 ,no exception is formed by expressions of our rough way of viewing and describing which lead us without hesitation to regard as cause one out of the very many causes of an event1 and this1 too1 not necessarily the immediate uniformly preceding event4 ,all this lies rather in the nature of such a hasty view4 ,the present limitation of uniform sequence to cases of immediate sequence sets aside1 then1 the objection from which we started1 in that it adopts as its own the essential point in question4 ,moreover1 the way that leads us to this necessary limitation goes farther3 it leads to a strengthening of the empiristic position4 ,it brings us to a point where we see that the most advanced analysis of intricate systems of events immediately given to us in perception as real nowhere reveals more than the simple fact of uniform sequence4 ,again where we come to regard the intervals between the events that follow one another immediately as very short1 there the uniformity of the time relation makes1 it would seem1 the events for us merely causes and effects2 and as often as we have occasion to proceed to the smaller time differences of a higher order1 the same process repeats itself2 for we dissect the events that make up our point of departure into ever more complex systems of component events1 and the coarser relations of uniform sequence into ever finer immediate ones4 ,nowhere1 seemingly1 do we get beyond the field of events in uniform sequence1 which finally have their foundation in the facts of perception from which they are drawn4 ,thus there follows from this conceptual refinement of the point of departure only the truth that nothing connects the events as causes and effects except the immediate uniformity of sequence4 ,none the less1 we have to think the empiristic doctrine to the bottom1 if we desire to determine whether or not the hypothesis which it offers is really sufficient to enable us to deduce the causal relation4 ,for this purpose let us remind ourselves that the question at issue is1 whether or not this relation is merely a temporal connection of events that are given to us in perception or that can be derived from the data of perception4 ,besides1 let us grant that this relation is as thoroughly valid for the content of our experience as empiricism has always1 and rationalism nearly always1 maintained4 ,we presuppose1 therefore1 as granted1 that every event is to be regarded as cause1 and hence1 in the opposite time relation1 as effect1 mental events that are given to us in self perception no less than the physical whose source is our sense perception4 ,in other words1 we assume that the totality of events in our possible experience presents a closed system of causal series1 that is1 that every member within each of the contemporary series is connected with the subsequent ones1 as well as with the subsequent members of all the other series1 backward and forward as cause and effect2 and therefore1 finally1 that every member of every series stands in causal relationship with every member of every other series4 ,we do not then1 for the present purpose1 burden ourselves with the hypothesis which was touched upon above1 that this connection is to be thought of as a continuous one1 namely1 that other members can be inserted ad infinitum between any two members of the series4 ,we maintain at the same time that there is no justification for separating from one another the concepts1 causality and interaction4 ,this separation is only to be justified through the metaphysical hypothesis that reality consists in a multitude of independently existing substances inherently subject to change1 and that their mutual interconnection is conditioned by a common dependence upon a first infinite cause4#ac ,every connection between cause and effect is mutual1 if we assume with ,newton that to every action there is an equal opposing reaction4 ,footnote #ac3 ,this doctrine began in the theological evolution of the ,christian concept of ,god4 ,it was first fundamentally formulated by ,leibnitz4 ,it is retained in ,kant's doctrine of the harmonia generaliter stabilita and the latter's consequences for the critical doctrine of the mundus intelligibilis4 ,hence it permeates the metaphysical doctrines of the systems of the nineteenth century in various ways4 ,in that we bring the totality of knowable reality1 as far as it is analyzable into events1 under the causal relation1 we may regard the statement that every event requires us to seek among uniformly preceding events for the sufficient causes of its own reality1 namely1 the general causal law1 as the principle of all material sciences4 ,for all individual instances of conformity to law which we can discover in the course of experience are from this point of view only special cases of the general universal conformity to law which we have just formulated4 ,for the empiristic interpretation1 the 7general7 causal law is only the highest genus of the individual cases of empirically synthetic relations of uniform sequence4 ,starting from these presuppositions1 it cannot be other than a generalization from experience1 that is1 a carrying over of observed relations of uniform1 or1 as we may now also say1 constant sequence to those which have not been or cannot be objects of observation1 as well as to those which we expect to appear in the future4 ,psychologically regarded1 it is merely the most general expression of an expectation1 conditioned through associative reproduction1 of uniform sequence4 ,it is1 therefore1--to bring ,hume's doctrine to a conclusion that the father of modern empiricism himself did not draw1--a species of temporal contiguity4 ,the general validity which we ascribe to the causal law is accordingly a merely empirical one4 ,it can never attain apodeictic or even assertorical validity1 but purely that type of problematic validity which we may call real in contradistinction to the other type of problematic validity attained in judgments of objective as well as of subjective and hypothetical possibility4#ad ,no possible progress of experience can win for the empiristically interpreted causal law any other than this real problematic validity2 for experience can never become complete a parte post1 nor has it ever been complete a parte ante4 ,the causal law is valid assertorically only in so far as it sums up1 purely in the way of an inventory1 the preceding experiences4 ,we call such assumptions1 drawn from well-ordered experience and of inductive origin1 hypotheses1 whether they rest upon generalizing inductive inferences in the narrower sense1 or upon specializing inferences from analogy4 ,they1 and at the same time the empiristically interpreted causal law1 are not hypotheses in the sense in which ,newton rightly rejected all formation of hypotheses1#ae but are such as are necessarily part of all methods in the sciences of facts in so far as the paths of research lead out beyond the content given immediately in perception to objects of only possible experience4 ,footnote #ad3 ,cf4 the author's ,logik1 bd4 ,i1 #fa4 ,footnote #ae3 ,rationem vero harum gravitatis proprietatum ex phaenomenis nondum potui deducere1 et hypotheses non fingo4 ,quicquid enim ex phaenomenis non deducitur1 hypothesis vocanda est2 et hypotheses seu metaphysicae1 seu physicae1 seu qualitatum occultarum1 seu mechanicae1 in philosophia experimentali locum non habent4 ,in hac philosophia propositiones deducuntur ex phaenomenis1 et redduntur generales per inductionem4 ,newton1 at the end of his chief work4 ,the assertion of ,stuart ,mill1 in opposition to this conclusion1 that the cause must be thought of as the invariable antecedent and1 correspondingly1 the effect is the invariable consequent1#af does all honor to the genius of the thinker2 but it agrees by no means with the empiristic presuppositions which serve as the basis for his conclusions4 ,for1 starting from these presuppositions1 the invariable sequence can only mean one that is uniform and constant according to past experience1 and that we henceforth carry over to not yet observed events as far as these prove in conformity with it1 and in this way verify the anticipation contained in our general assertion4 ,the same holds of the assertion through which ,mill endeavors to meet the above-mentioned objection of ,reid1 namely1 that the unchanging sequence must at the same time be demonstrably an unconditional one4 ,the language in which experience speaks to us knows the term the unconditioned as little as the term the unchangeable1 even though this have1 as ,mill explains1 the meaning that the effect will be1 whatever supposition we may make in regard to all other things1 or that the sequence will be subject to no other than negative conditions4 ,for in these determinations there does not lie exclusively1 according to ,mill1 a probable prediction of the future4 ,it is necessary to our using the word cause1 that we should believe not only that the antecedent always has been followed by the consequent1 but that as long as the present constitution of things endures1 it always will be so4 ,likewise1 ,mill1 the man of research1 not the empiristic logician1 asserts that there belongs to the causal law1 besides this generality referring to all possible events of uniform sequence1 also an undoubted assurance2 although he could have here referred to a casual remark of ,hume4#ag ,such an undoubted assurance1 that for every event 444 there is a law to be found1 if we only know where to find it1 evidently does not know of a knowledge referred exclusively to experience4 ,footnote #af3 ,logik1 bk4 ,,iii1 ch4 v1 #b4 ,footnote #ag3 ,logic1 bk4 ,,iii1 ch4 v1 #f1 and end of #b4 ,hume says in a note to section ,,vi of his ,enquiry ,concerning ,human ,understanding3 ,we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations1 proofs1 and probabilities4 ,by proofs ,meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition4 ,the note stands in evident contrast to the well-known remarks at the beginning of section ,,iv1 pt4 ,i4 ,hence1 if the causal law is1 as empiricism to be consistent must maintain1 only a general hypothesis which is necessarily subject to verification as experience progresses1 then it is not impossible that in the course of experience events will appear that are not preceded or followed uniformly by others1 and that accordingly cannot be regarded as causes or effects4 ,according to this interpretation of the causal law1 such exceptional events1 whether in individual or in repeated cases of perception1 must be just as possible as those which in the course of preceding experience have proved themselves to be members of series of constant sequence4 ,on the basis of previous experience1 we should only have the right to say that such exceptional cases are less probable2 and we might from the same ground expect that1 if they could be surely determined1 they would only have to be regarded as exceptions to the rule and not1 possibly1 as signs of a misunderstood universal non-uniformity of occurrence4 ,no one wants to maintain an empirical necessity1 that is1 a statement that so comprehends a present experience or an hypothesis developed on the basis of present experience that its contradictory is rationally impossible4 ,an event preceded by no other immediately and uniformly as cause would1 according to traditional usage1 arise out of nothing4 ,an event that was followed immediately and constantly by no other would accordingly be an event that remained without effect1 and1 did it pass away1 it must disappear into nothing4 ,the old thought1 well known in its scholastic formulation1 ex nihilo nihil fit1 in nihilum nihil potest reverti1 is only another expression for the causal law as we have interpreted it above4 ,the contradictories to each of the clauses of the thought just formulated1 that something can arise out of nothing and pass into nothing1 remain therefore1 as a consequence of empiricism1 an improbable thought1 to be sure1 but none the less a thought to which a real possibility must be ascribed4 ,it was in all probability this that ,stuart ,mill wished to convey in the much-debated passage3 ,i am convinced that anyone accustomed to abstraction and analysis1 who will fairly exert his faculties for the purpose1 will1 when his imagination has once learnt to entertain the notion1 find no difficulty in conceiving that in some one1 for instance1 of the many firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now divides the universe1 events may succeed one another at random without any fixed law2 nor can anything in our experience1 or in our mental nature1 constitute a sufficient1 or indeed any1 reason for believing that this is nowhere the case4 ,for ,mill immediately calls our attention to the following3 ,were we to suppose 7what it is perfectly possible to imagine7 that the present order of the universe were brought to an end1 and that a chaos succeeded in which there was no fixed succession of events1 and the past gave no assurance of the future2 if a human being were miraculously kept alive to witness this change1 he surely would soon cease to believe in any uniformity1 the uniformity itself no longer existing4#ah ,footnote #ah3 ,logic1 bk4 ,,iii1 ch4 xxi1 #a4 ,we can throw light from another side upon the thought that lies in this outcome of the empiristic interpretation of the causal law4 ,if we still desire to give the name effect to an event that is preceded uniformly by no other1 and that we therefore have to regard as arising out of nothing1 then we must say that it is the effect of itself1 that is1 its cause lies in its own reality1 in short1 that it is causa sui4 ,therefore the assumption that a causa sui has just as much real possibility as have the causes of our experience which are followed uniformly by another event1 is a necessary consequence of the empiristic view of causation4 ,this much only remains sure1 there is nothing contained in our previous experience that in any way assures us of the validity of this possible theory4 ,the empiristic doctrine of causation requires1 however1 still further conclusions4 ,our scientific1 no less than our practical thought has always been accustomed to regard the relation between cause and effect not as a matter of mere sequence1 not therefore as a mere formal temporal one4 ,rather it has always1 in both forms of our thought1 stood for a real relation1 that is1 for a relation of dynamic dependence of effect upon cause4 ,accordingly1 the effect arises out of the cause1 is engendered through it1 or brought forth by it4 ,the historical development of this dynamic conception of cause is well known4 ,the old anthropopathic interpretation1 which interpolates anthropomorphic and yet superhuman intervention between the events that follow one another uniformly1 has maintained itself on into the modern metaphysical hypotheses4 ,it remains standing wherever ,god is assumed as the first cause for the interaction between parts of reality4 ,it is made obscure1 but not eliminated1 when1 in other conceptions of the world1 impersonal nature1 fate1 necessity1 the absolute identity1 or an abstraction related to these1 appears in the place of ,god4 ,on the other hand1 it comes out clearly wherever these two tendencies of thought unite themselves in an anthropopathic pantheism4 ,that is1 it rests only upon a difference in strength between the governing religious and scientific interests1 whether or not the ,all-,one which unfolds itself in the interconnection and content of reality is thought of more as the immanent ,god1 or more as substance4 ,finally1 we do not change our position1 if the absolute1 self-active being 7in all these theories a first cause is presupposed as causa sui7 is degraded to a non-intellectual will4 ,however1 the dynamic interpretation of cause has not remained confined to the field of these general speculations1 just because it commanded that field so early4 ,there is a second branch1 likewise early evolved from the stem of the anthropopathic interpretation1 the doctrine that the causal relations of dependence are effected through forces4 ,these forces adhere to1 or dwell in1 the ultimate physical elements which are thought of as masses4 ,again1 as spiritual forces they belong to the soul1 which in turn is thought of as a substance4 ,in the modern contrast between attractive and repulsive forces1 there lies a remnant of the ,empedoklean opposition between ,love and ,hate4 ,in the various old and new hylozoistic tendencies1 the concepts of force and its correlate1 mass1 are eclectically united4 ,in consistent materialism as well as spiritualism1 and in the abstract dynamism of energetics1 the one member is robbed of its independence or even rejected in favor of the other4#ai ,footnote #ai3 ,alongside of these dynamic theories1 there are to be found mechanical ones that arose just as early and from the same source1 viz41 the practical ,weltanschauung4 ,it is not part of our purpose to discuss them4 ,their first scientific expression is to be found in the doctrine of effluences and pores in ,empedokles and in ,atomism4 ,it is evident in what light all these dynamic conceptions appear1 when looked at from the standpoint of consistent extreme empiricism4 ,these forces1 to consider here only this one of the dynamic hypotheses1 help to explain nothing4 ,the physical forces1 or those which give rise to movement1 are evidently not given to us as contents of sense perception1 and at the most they can be deduced as non-sensuous foundations1 not as contents of possible sense perception4 ,the often and variously expressed belief that self perception reveals to us here what our senses leave hidden has proved itself to be in all its forms a delusion4 ,the forces whose existence we assume have then an intuitable content only in so far as they get it through the uniformities present in repeated perceptions1 which uniformities are to be explained through them4 ,but right here their assumption proves itself to be not only superfluous but even misleading2 for it makes us believe that we have offered an explanation1 whereas in reality we have simply duplicated the given by means of a fiction1 quite after the fashion of the ,platonic doctrine of ideas4 ,this endeavor to give the formal temporal relations between events1 which we interpret as causes and effects1 a dynamic real substructure1 shows itself thus to be worthless in its contributions to our thought4 ,the same holds true of every other dynamic hypothesis4 ,the critique called forth by these contributions establishes therefore only the validity of the empiristic interpretation4 ,if1 however1 we have once come so far1 we may not hold ourselves back from the final step4 ,empiricism has long ago taken this step1 and the most consistent among its modern ,german representatives has aroused anew the impulses that make it necessary4 ,indeed1 if we start from the empiristic presuppositions1 we must recognize that there lies not only in the assumption of forces1 but even in the habit of speaking of causes and effects1 a clear trace of fetishism4 ,we are not then surprised when the statement is made3 ,the natural science of the future1 and accordingly science in general1 will1 it is to be hoped1 set aside these concepts also on account of their formal obscurity4 ,for1 so it is explained1 repetitions of like cases in which a is always connected with b1 namely1 in which like results are found under like circumstances1 in short1 the essence of the connection of cause and effect1 exists only in the abstraction that is necessary to enable us to repicture the facts4 ,in nature itself there are no causes and effects4 ,die ,natur ist nur einmal da4 ,it is1 again1 ,stuart ,mill1 the man of research1 not the empiricist1 that opposes this conclusion1 and indeed opposes it in the form that ,auguste ,comte had given it in connection with thoughts that can be read into ,hume's doctrine4 ,comte's objection to the word cause is a mere matter of nomenclature1 in which1 as a matter of nomenclature1 ,i consider him to be entirely wrong4444 ,by rejecting this form of expression1 ,m4 ,comte leaves himself without any term for marking a distinction which1 however incorrectly expressed1 is not only real1 but is one of the fundamental distinctions in science4#bj ,footnote #bj3 ,logic1 bk4 ,,iii1 ch4 v1 #f4 ,for my own part1 the right seems to be on the side of ,comte and his recent followers in showing the old nomenclature to be worn out1 if viewed from the standpoint of empiricism4 ,if the relation between cause and effect consists alone in the uniformity of sequence which is hypothetically warranted by experience1 then it can be only misleading to employ words for the members of this purely formal relation that necessarily have a strong tang of real dynamic dependence4 ,in fact1 they give the connection in question a peculiarity that1 according to consistent empiricism1 it does not possess4 ,the question at issue in the empiristically interpreted causal relation is a formal functional one1 which is not essentially different1 as ,ernst ,mach incidentally acknowledges1 from the interdependence of the sides and angles of a triangle4 ,here two extremes meet4 ,spinoza1 the most consistent of the dogmatic rationalists1 finds himself compelled in his formulation of the analytic interpretation of the causal relation handed down to him to transform it into a mathematical one4 ,mach1 the most consistent of recent ,german empiricists1 finds himself compelled to recognize that the empirically synthetic relation between cause and effect includes no other form of dependence than that which is present in the functional mathematical relations4 7,in ,germany empiricism steeped in natural science has supplanted the nave materialism saturated with natural science47 ,that the mathematical relations must likewise be subjected to a purely empirical interpretation1 which even ,hume denied them1 is a matter of course4 ,however1 this agreement of two opposing views is no proof that empiricism is on the right road4 ,the empiristic conclusions to which we have given our attention do not succeed in defining adequately the specific nature of the causal relation2 on the contrary1 they compel us to deny such a relation4 ,thus they cast aside the concept that we have endeavored to define1 that is1 the judgment in which we have to comprehend whatever is peculiar to the causal connection4 ,but one does not untie a knot by denying that it exists4 ,it follows from this self-destruction of the empiristic causal hypothesis that an additional element of thought must be contained in the relation of cause and effect besides the elements of reproductive recognition and those of identification and discrimination1 all of which are involved in the abstract comprehension of uniform sequence4 ,the characteristics of the causal connection revealed by our previous analysis constitute the necessary and perhaps adequate conditions for combining the several factual perceptions into the abstract registering idea of uniform sequence4 ,we may1 therefore1 expect to find that the element sought for lies in the tendency to extend the demand for causal connections over the entire field of possible experience2 and perhaps we may at the same time arrive at the condition which led ,hume and ,mill to recognize the complete universality of the causal law in spite of the exclusively empirical content that they had ascribed to it4 ,in this further analysis also we have to draw from the nature of our thought itself the means of guiding our investigation4 ,in the first place1 all thought has a formal necessity which reveals itself in the general causal law no less than in every individual thought process1 that is1 in every valid judgment4 ,the meaning of this formal necessity of thought is easily determined4 ,if we presuppose1 for example1 that ,i recognize a surface which lies before me as green1 then the perception judgment1 ,this surface is green1 that is1 the apprehension of the present perceptive content in the fundamental form of discursive thought1 repeats with predicative necessity that which is presented to me in the content of perception4 ,the necessity of thought contained in this perception judgment1 as mutatis mutandis in every affirmative judgment meeting the logical conditions1 is recognizable through the fact that the contradictory judgment1 ,this surface is not green1 is impossible for our thought under the presupposition of the given content of perception and of our nomenclature4 ,it contradicts itself4 ,i can express the contradictory proposition1 for instance1 in order to deceive2 but ,i cannot really pass the judgment that is contained in it4 ,it lies in the very nature of our thought that the predicate of an assertive judgment call contain only whatever belongs as an element of some sort 7characteristic1 attribute1 state1 relation7 to the subject content in the wider sense4 ,the same formal necessity of thought1 to give a further instance1 is present in the thought process of mediate syllogistic predication4 ,the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises1 for example1 the judgment1 ,all bodies are divisible1 from the propositions1 ,all bodies are extended1 and1 ,whatever is extended is divisible4 ,these elementary remarks are not superfluous2 for they make clear that the casually expressed assertion of modern natural scientific empiricism1 declaring in effect that there is no such thing as necessity of thought1 goes altogether too far4 ,such necessity can have an admissible meaning only in so far as it denotes that in predicting or recounting the content of possible experience every hypothesis is possible for thought4 ,of course it is1 but that is not the subject under discussion4 ,the recognition of the formal necessity of thought that must be presupposed helps us to define our present question2 for it needs no proof that this formal necessity of thought1 being valid for every affirmative judgment1 is valid also for each particular induction1 and again for the general causal law4 ,if in the course of our perceptions we meet uniform sequences1 then the judgment1 ,these sequences are uniform1 comprehends the common content of many judgments with formal necessity of thought4 ,empiricism1 too1 does not seriously doubt that the hypothesis of a general functional1 even though only temporal1 relation between cause and effect is deduced as an expectation of possible experience with necessity from our real experience4 ,it questions only the doctrine that the relation between the events regarded as cause and effect has any other than a purely empirical import4 ,the reality of an event that is preceded and followed uniformly by no other remains for this view1 as we have seen1 a possibility of thought4 ,in opposition to empiricism1 we now formulate the thesis to be established3 ,wherever two events a and b are known to follow one another uniformly and immediately1 there we must require with formal necessity that some element in the preceding a be thought of as fundamental1 which will determine sufficiently b's appearance or make that appearance necessary4 ,the necessity of the relation between the events regarded as cause and effect is1 therefore1 the question at issue4 ,we must keep in mind from the very start that less is asserted in this formulation than we are apt to read into it4 ,it states merely that something in a must be thought of as fundamental1 which makes b necessary4 ,on the other hand1 it says nothing as to what this fundamental something is1 or how it is constituted4 ,it leaves entirely undecided whether or not this something that our thought must necessarily postulate is a possible content of perception or can become such1 accordingly whether or not it can become an object of our knowledge1 or whether or not it lies beyond the bounds of all our possible experience and hence all our possible knowledge4 ,it contains nothing whatsoever that tells us how the determination of b takes place through a4 ,the word fundamental is intended to express all this absence of determination4 ,thus we hope to show a necessity of thought peculiar to the relation between cause and effect4 ,this is the same as saying that our proof will establish the logical impossibility of the contradictory assertion2 for the logical impossibility of the contradictory assertion is the only criterion of logical necessity4 ,thus the proof that we seek can be given only indirectly4 ,in the course of this proof1 we can disregard the immediacy of the constant sequence and confine our attention to the uniformity of the sequence1 not only for the sake of brevity1 but also because1 as we have seen1 we have the right to speak of near and remote causes4 ,we may then proceed as follows4 ,if there is not something fundamental in a constant antecedent event a1 which determines necessarily the constant subsequent appearance of one and the same b1--that is1 if there is nothing fundamental which makes this appearance necessary1--then we must assume that also c or d 4441 in short1 any event you will1 we dare not say follows upon1 but appears after a in irregular alternation with b4 ,this assumption1 however1 is impossible for our thought1 because it is in contradiction with our experience1 on the basis of which our causal thought has been developed4 ,therefore the assumption of a something that is fundamental in a1 and that determines sufficiently and necessarily the appearance of b1 is a necessity for our thought4 ,the assertion of this logical impossibility 7,denkunmglichkeit7 will at once appear thoroughly paradoxical4 ,the reader1 merely recalling the results of the empiristic interpretation given above1 will immediately say3 ,the assumption that a b does not follow constantly upon an a1 but that sometimes b1 sometimes c1 sometimes d 444 irregularly appears1 is in contradiction only with all our previous experience1 but it is not on this account a logical impossibility4 ,it is merely improbable4 ,the reader will appeal especially to the discussion of ,stuart ,mill1 already quoted1 in which ,mill pictures in concreto such an improbable logical impossibility1 and therefore at the same time establishes it in fact4 ,again1 the reader may bring forward the words in which ,helmholtz introduces intellectual beings of only two dimensions4 ,by the much misused expression1 'to be able to imagine to one's self1' or1 'to think how something happens1' ,i understand 7and ,i do not see how anybody can understand anything else thereby without robbing the expression of all meaning7 that one can picture to one's self the series of sense impressions which one would have if such a thing actually took place in an individual case4#ba ,footnote #ba3 ,vortrge und ,reden1 bd4 ,,ii1 ber den ,ursprung und die ,bedeutung der geometrischen ,axiome4 ,nevertheless1 pertinent as are these and similar objections1 they are not able to stand the test4 ,we ask3 ,is in fact a world1 or even a portion of our world1 possible for thought that displays through an absolutely irregular alternation of events a chaos in the full sense2 or is the attempt to picture such a chaos only a mere play of words to which not even our imagination1 not to mention our thought1 can give a possible meaning8 ,perhaps we shall reach a conclusion by the easiest way1 if we subject ,mill's description to a test4 ,if we reduce it to the several propositions it contains1 we get the following3 7#a7 ,every one is able to picture to himself in his imagination a reality in which events follow one another without rule1 that is1 so that after an event a now b appears1 now c1 etc41 in complete irregularity4 7#b7 ,the idea of such a chaos accordingly contradicts neither the nature of our mind nor our experience4 7#c7 ,neither the former nor the latter gives us sufficient reason to believe that such an irregular alternation does not actually exist somewhere in the observable world4 7#d7 ,if such a chaos should be presented to us as fact1 that is1 if we were in a position to outlive such an alternation1 then the belief in the uniformity of time relations would soon cease4 ,every one would subscribe to the last of these four theses1 immediately upon such a chaos being admitted to be a possibility of thought2 that is1 he would unless he shared the rationalistic conviction that our thought constitutes an activity absolutely independent of all experience4 ,we must simply accept this conclusion on the ground of the previous discussion and of a point still to be brought forward4 ,if we grant this conclusion1 however1 then it follows1 on the ground of our previous demonstration of the reproductive and recognitive1 as well as thought elements involved in the uniform sequence1 that the irregularity in the appearance of the events1 assumed in such a chaos1 can bring about an absolutely relationless alternation of impressions for the subject that we should presuppose to be doing the perceiving4 ,if we still wish to call it perception1 it would remain only a perception in which no component of its content could be related to the others1 a perception1 therefore1 in which not even the synthesis of the several perception contents could be apprehended as such4 ,that is1 every combination of the different perception contents1 by which they become components of one and the same perception1 presupposes1 as we have seen1 those reproductive and recognitive acts in revival which are possible only where uniformities of succession 7and of coexistence7 exist4 ,again1 every act of attention involved in identifying and discriminating1 which likewise we have seen to be possible only if we presuppose uniformities in the given contents of perception1 must necessarily disappear when we presuppose the chaotic content2 and yet they remain essential to the very idea of such a chaos4 ,a relationless chaos is after all nothing else than a system of relations thought of without relations6 ,that the same contradiction obtains also in the mere mental picturing of a manifold of chaotic impressions needs no discussion2 for the productive imagination as well as the reproductive is no less dependent than is our perceptive knowledge upon the reproductive recognition and upon the processes of identifying and discriminating4 ,thus the mental image of a chaos could be formed only through an extended process of ideation1 which itself presupposes as active in it all that must be denied through the very nature of the image4 ,a relationless knowledge1 a relationless abstraction1 a relationless reproduction or recognition1 a relationless identification or discrimination1 in short1 a relationless thought1 are1 as phrases1 one and all mere contradictions4 ,we cannot picture through our relating thought1 to use ,helmholtz's expression1 nor even in our imagination1 the sense impressions that we should have if our thought were relationless1 that is1 were nullified in its very components and presuppositions4 ,in the case of ,helmholtz's two dimensional beings1 the question at issue was not regarding the setting aside of the conditions of our thought and the substituting conditions contradictory to them1 but regarding the setting aside of a part of the content of our sense intuition1 meanwhile retaining the conditions and forms peculiar to our thought4 ,in this case1 therefore1 we have a permissible fiction1 whereas in ,mill's chaos we have an unthinkable thought4 ,again1 the sense impressions that must be presupposed in an inherently relationless chaos have no possible relation to the world of our perception1 whose components are universally related to each other through the uniformities of their coexistences and sequences4 ,accordingly1 the remark with which ,helmholtz concludes the passage above quoted holds1 mutatis mutandis1 here also4 ,if there is no sense impression known that stands in relation to an event which has never been observed 7by us71 as would be the case for us were there a motion toward a fourth dimension1 and for those two dimensional beings were there a motion toward our third dimension2 then it follows that such an 'idea' is impossible1 as much so as that a man completely blind from childhood should be able to 'imagine' the colors1 if we could give him too a conceptual description of them4 ,hence the first of the theses in which we summed up ,stuart ,mill's assumptions must be rejected4 ,with it go also the second and third4 ,in this case we need not answer the question3 ,in how far do these theses correspond to ,mill's own statements regarding the absolute surety and universality of the causal law8 ,we have now found what we sought1 in order to establish as a valid assertion the seeming paradox in the proof of the necessity that we ascribe to the relation between cause and effect4 ,we have proved that the assumption of a completely irregular and therefore relationless alternation of impressions contradicts not only our experience1 but even the conditions of our thought2 for these presuppose the uniformities of the impressions1 and consequently our ability to relate them1 all which was eliminated from our hypothetical chaos4 ,hence we have also established that a necessary relation is implied in the thought of a constant sequence of events1 which makes the uniformly following b really dependent upon the uniformly preceding a4 99 99 99 99 99 ,from still another side1 we can make clear the necessity asserted in the relation of cause and effect4 ,we found that the connection between each definite cause and its effect is an empirically synthetic one and has as its warrant merely experience4 ,we saw further that the necessity inherent in the causal connection contains merely the demand that there shall be something fundamental in the constantly preceding a which makes the appearance of b necessary2 not1 however1 that it informs us what this efficacy really is1 and hence also not that it informs us how this efficacy brings about its effect4 ,finally1 we had to urge that every induction1 the most general no less than the most particular1 depends upon the presupposition that the same causes will be given in the reality not yet observed as in that already observed4 ,this expectation is warranted by no necessity of thought1 not even by that involved in the relation of cause and effect2 for this relation begins for future experience only when the presupposition that the same causes will be found in it is assumed as fulfilled4#bb ,this expectation is then dependent solely upon previous experience1 whose servants we are1 whose lords we can never be4 ,therefore1 every induction is an hypothesis requiring the verification of a broader experience1 since1 in its work of widening and completing our knowledge1 it leads us beyond the given experience to a possible one4 ,in this respect we can call all inductive thought empirical1 that is1 thought that begins with experience1 is directed to experience1 and in its results is referred to experience4 ,the office of this progressing empirical thought is accordingly to form hypotheses from which the data of perception can be regressively deduced1 and by means of which they can be exhibited as cases of known relations of our well-ordered experience1 and thus can be explained4 ,footnote #bb3 ,the only empiricism which can maintain that the same causes would1 in conformity with the causal law1 be given in the unobserved reality1 is one which puts all events that can be regarded as causes in the immediately given content of perception as its members4 ,such a view is not to be found in ,mill2 and it stands so completely in the way of all further analysis required of us by every perception of events that no attention has been paid in the text to this extreme of extremes4 ,the way of forming hypotheses can be divided logically into different sections which can readily be made clear by an example4 ,the police magistrate finds a human corpse under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of accident1 natural death1 or suicide2 in short1 that indicate an act of violence on the part of another man4 ,the general hypothesis that he has here to do with a crime against life forms the guide of his investigation4 ,the result of the circumstantial evidence1 which we presuppose as necessary1 furnishes then a special hypothesis as following from the general hypothesis4 ,it is clear that this division holds for all cases of forming hypotheses4 ,a general hypothesis serves every special hypothesis as a heuristic principle4 ,in the former we comprehend the causal explanation indicated immediately by the facts revealed to our perception in the special case4 ,it contains1 as we might also express it1 the genus to the specific limitations of the more exact investigation4 ,but each of these general hypotheses is a modification of the most general form of building hypotheses1 which we have already come to know as the condition of the validity of all inductive inferences1 that is1 as the condition for the necessity of their deduction1 and1 consequently1 as the condition for the thought that like causes will be given in the reality not yet observed as in that already observed4 ,we have further noticed that in this most general form of building hypotheses there lie two distinct and different valid assumptions3 beside the empirical statement that like causes will be given1 which gives the inductive conclusion the hypothetical form1 there stands the judgment that like causes bring forth like effects1 a corollary of the causal law4 ,the real dependence of the effect upon the cause1 presupposed by this second proposition and the underlying causal law1 is not1 as was the other assumption1 an hypothesis1 but a necessary requirement or postulate of our thought4 ,its necessity arises out of our thought1 because our experience reveals uniformity in the sequence of events4 ,from this point of view1 therefore1 the causal law appears as a postulate of our thought1 grounded upon the uniformity in the sequence of events4 ,it underlies every special case of constructing hypotheses as well as the expectation that like causes will be given in the reality not yet observed4 ,mill's logic of induction contains the same fault as that already present in ,hume's psychological theory of cause4 ,hume makes merely the causal law itself responsible for our inductive inferences1 and accordingly 7as ,mill likewise wrongly assumes7 for our inferences in general4 ,but we recognize how rightly ,mill came to assert1 in contradiction to his empiristic presuppositions1 that the causal law offers an undoubted assurance of an invariable1 universal1 and unconditional1 that is1 necessary1 sequence of events1 from which no seeming irregularity of occurrence and no gap in our experience can lead us astray1 as long as experience offers uniformities of sequence4 ,rationalism is thus in the right1 when it regards the necessary connection as an essential characteristic of the relation between cause and effect1 that is1 recognizes in it a relation of real dependence4 ,at this point ,kant and ,schopenhauer have had a profounder insight than ,hume and ,stuart ,mill4 ,especially am ,i glad to be in agreement with ,lotze on a point which he reached by a different route and from essentially different presuppositions4 ,lotze distinguishes in pure logic between postulates1 hypotheses1 and fictions4 ,he does not refer the term postulate exclusively to the causal law which governs our entire empirical thought in its formation of hypotheses1 but gives the term a wider meaning4 ,postulates are only corollaries from the inductive fundamental form of all hypothesis construction1 and correspond essentially to what we have called general or heuristic hypotheses4 ,his determination of the validity of these postulates1 however1 implies the position to be assigned to the causal law and therefore not to those heuristic hypotheses4 ,the postulate is not an assumption that we can make or refrain from making1 or1 again1 in whose place we can substitute another4 ,it is rather an 7absolutely7 necessary assumption without which the content of the view at issue would contradict the laws of our thought4#bc ,footnote #bc3 ,logic1 #ahgd1 buch ,,ii1 kap4 viii4 ,still the decision that we have reached is not on this account in favor of rationalism1 as this is represented for instance by ,kant and his successors down to our own time1 and professed by ,lotze in the passage quoted1 when he speaks of an absolute necessity for thought4 ,we found that the causal law requires a necessary connection between events given us in constant sequence4 ,it is not1 however1 on that account a law of our thought or of a pure understanding which would be absolutely independent of all experience4 ,when we take into consideration the evolution of the organic world of which we are members1 then we must say that our intellect1 that is1 our ideation and with it our sense perception1 has evolved in us in accordance with the influences to which we have been subjected4 ,the common elements in the different contents of perception which have arisen out of other psychical elements1 seemingly first in the brute world1 are not only an occasion1 but also an efficient cause1 for the evolution of our processes of reproduction1 in which our memory and imagination as well as our knowledge and thought1 psychologically considered1 come to pass4 ,the causal law1 which the critical analysis of the material scientific methods shows to be a fundamental condition of empirical thought1 in its requirement that the events stand as causes and effects in necessary connection1 or real dependence1 comprehends these uniform contents of perception only in the way peculiar to our thought4 ,doubtless our thought gives a connection to experience through this its requirement which experience of itself could not offer4 ,the necessary connection of effect with cause1 or the real dependence of the former upon the latter1 is not a component of possible perception4 ,this requirement of our thought does not1 however1 become thereby independent of the perceptive elements in the presuppositions involved in the uniformity of sequence4 ,the a priori in the sense of innate ideas1 denoting either these themselves or an absolutely a priori conformity to law that underlies them1 for instance1 our spontaneity1 presupposes in principle that our soul is an independently existing substance in the traditional metaphysical sense down to the time of ,locke4 ,kant's rationalistic successors1 for the most part1 lost sight of the fact that ,kant had retained these old metaphysical assumptions in his interpretation of the transcendental conditions of empirical interaction and in his cosmological doctrine of freedom4 ,the common root of the sensibility and of the understanding as the higher faculty of knowledge remains for ,kant the substantial force of the soul1 which expresses itself 7just as in ,leibnitz7 as vis passiva and vis activa4 ,the modern doctrine of evolution has entirely removed the foundation from this rationalism which had been undermined ever since ,locke's criticism of the traditional concept of substance4 ,to refer again briefly to a second point in which the foregoing results differ from the ,kantian rationalism as well as from empiricism since ,hume3 ,the postulate of a necessary connection between cause and effect1 as we have seen1 in no way implies the consequence that the several inductions lose the character of hypotheses4 ,this does not follow merely from the fact that all inductions besides the causal law include the hypothetical thought that the same causes will be given in the reality not yet observed as appear in that already observed4 ,the hypothetical character of all inductive inferences is rather revealed through the circumstance that in the causal postulate absolutely nothing is contained regarding what the efficacy in the causes is1 and how this efficacy arises4 99 99 99 99 99 ,only such consequences of the foregoing interpretation of the causal law and of its position as one of the bases of all scientific construction of hypotheses may be pointed out1 in conclusion1 as will help to make easier the understanding of the interpretation itself4 ,the requirement of a necessary connection1 or dependence1 is added by our thought to the reproductive and recognitive presuppositions that are contained in the uniformity of the sequence of events4 ,if this necessary connection be taken objectively1 then it reveals as its correlate the requirement of a real dependence of effect upon cause4 ,we come not only upon often and variously used rationalistic thoughts1 but also upon old and unchangeable components of all empirical scientific thought1 when we give the name force to the efficacy that underlies causes4 ,the old postulate of a dynamic intermediary between the events that follow one another constantly retains for us1 therefore1 its proper meaning4 ,we admit without hesitation that the word force suggests fetishism more than do the words cause and effect2 but we do not see how this can to any degree be used as a counter-argument4 ,all words that were coined in the olden time to express thoughts of the practical ,weltanschauung have an archaic tang4 ,likewise all of our science and the greater part of our nomenclature have arisen out of the sphere of thought contained in the practical ,weltanschauung1 which centred early in fetishism and related thoughts4 ,if1 then1 we try to free our scientific terminology from such words1 we must seek refuge in the ,utopia of a lingua universalis1 in short1 we must endeavor to speak a language which would make science a secret of the few4 ,or will any one seriously maintain that a thought which belongs to an ancient sphere of mental life must be false for the very reason that it is ancient8 ,in any case1 it is fitting that we define more closely the sense in which we are to regard forces as the dynamic intermediaries of uniform occurrence4 ,force cannot be given as a content of perception either through our senses or through our consciousness of self2 in the case of the former1 not in our kinesthetic sensations1 in the case of the latter1 not in our consciousness of volition4 ,volition would not include a consciousness of force1 even though we were justified in regarding it as a simple primitive psychosis1 and were not compelled rather to regard it as an intricate collection of feelings and sensations as far as these elementary forms of consciousness are connected in thought with the phenomena of reaction4 ,again1 forces cannot be taken as objects that are derived as possible perceptions or after the analogy of possible perceptions4 ,the postulate of our thought through which these forces are derived from the facts of the uniform sequence of events1 reveals them as limiting notions 7,grenzbegriffe71 as specializations of the necessary connection between cause and effect1 or of the real dependence of the former upon the latter2 for the manner of their causal intermediation is in no way given1 rather they can be thought of only as underlying our perceptions4 ,they are then in fact qualitates occultae2 but they are such only because the concept of quality is taken from the contents of our sense and self perception1 which of course do not contain the necessary connection required by our thought4 ,whoever1 therefore1 requires from the introduction of forces new contents of perception1 for instance1 new and fuller mechanical pictures1 expects the impossible4 ,the contempt with which the assumption of forces meets1 on the part of those who make this demand1 is accordingly easily understood1 and still more easily is it understood1 if one takes into consideration what confusion of concepts has arisen through the use of the term force and what obstacles the assumption of forces has put in the way of the material sciences4 ,it must be frankly admitted that this concept delayed for centuries both in the natural and moral sciences the necessary analysis of the complicated phenomena forming our data4 ,under the influence of the concept philosophy it caused1 over and over again1 the setting aside of the problems of this analytical empirical thought as soon as their solution had been begun4 ,this misuse cannot but make suspicious from the very start every new form of maintaining that forces underlie causation4 ,however1 misuse proves as little here against a proper use as it does in other cases4 ,moreover1 the scruples that we found arising from the standpoint of empiricism against the assumption of forces are not to the point4 ,in assuming a dynamic intermediary between cause and effect1 we are not doubling the problems whose solution is incumbent upon the sciences of facts1 and still less is it true that our assumption must lead to a logical circle4 ,that is1 a comparison with the ideas of the old concept philosophy1 which even in the ,aristotelian doctrine contain such a duplication1 is not to the point4 ,those ideas are hypostasized abstractions which are taken from the uniformly coexisting characteristics of objects4 ,forces1 on the other hand1 are the imperceivable relations of dependence which we must presuppose between events that follow one another uniformly1 if the uniformity of this sequence is to become for us either thinkable or conceivable4 ,the problems of material scientific research are not doubled by this presupposition of a real dynamic dependence1 because it introduces an element not contained in the data of perception which give these problems their point of departure4 ,this presupposition does not renew the thought of an analytic rational connection between cause and effect which the concept philosophy involves2 on the contrary1 it remains true to the principle made practical by ,hume and ,kant1 that the real connection between causes and their effects is determinable only through experience1 that is1 empirically and synthetically through the actual indication of the events of uniform sequence4 ,how these forces are constituted and work1 we cannot know1 since our knowledge is confined to the material of perception from which as a basis presentation has developed into thought4 ,the insight that we have won from the limiting notion of force helps us rather to avoid the misuse which has been made of the concept of force4 ,a fatal circle first arises1 when we use the unknowable forces and not the knowable events for the purpose of explanation1 that is1 when we cut off short the empirical analysis which leads ad infinitum4 ,to explain does not mean to deduce the known from the unknown1 but the particular from the general4 ,it was therefore no arbitrary judgment1 but an impulse conditioned by the very nature of our experience and of our thought1 that made man early regard the causal connection as a dynamic one1 even though his conception was of course indistinct and mixed with confusing additions4 ,the concept of force remains indispensable also for natural scientific thought4 ,it is involved with the causal law in every attempt to form an hypothesis1 and accordingly it is already present in every description of facts which goes by means of memory or abstraction beyond the immediately given content of present perception4 ,in introducing it we have in mind1 moreover1 that the foundations of every possible interpretation of nature possess a dynamic character1 just because all empirical thought1 in this field as well1 is subordinate to the causal law4 ,this must be admitted by any one who assumes as indispensable aids of natural science the mechanical figures through which we reduce the events of sense perception to the motion of mass particles1 that is1 through which we associate these events with the elements of our visual and tactual perception4 ,all formulations of the concept of mass1 even when they are made so formal as in the definition given by ,heinrich ,hertz1 indicate dynamic interpretations4 ,whether the impelling forces are to be thought of in particular as forces acting at a distance or as forces acting through collision depends upon the answer to the question whether we have to assume the dynamic mass particles as filling space discontinuously or continuously4 ,the dynamic basis of our interpretation of nature will be seen at once by any one who is of the opinion that we can make the connection of events intelligible without the aid of mechanical figures1 for instance1 in terms of energy4 ,thus it results that we interpret the events following one another immediately and uniformly as causes and effects1 by presupposing as fundamental to them forces that are the necessary means of their uniformity of connection4 ,what we call laws are the judgments in which we formulate these causal connections4 ,a second and a third consequence need only be mentioned here4 ,the hypothesis that interprets the mutual connection of psychical and physical vital phenomena as causal one is as old as it is natural4 ,it is natural1 because even simple observations assure us that the mental content of perception follows uniformly the instigating physical stimulus and the muscular movement the instigating mental content which we apprehend as will4 ,we know1 however1 that the physical events which1 in raising the biological problem1 we have to set beside the psychical1 do not take place in the periphery of our nervous system and in our muscles1 but in the central nervous system4 ,but we must assume1 in accordance with all the psycho-physiological data which at the present time are at our disposal1 that these events in our central nervous system do not follow the corresponding psychical events1 but that both series have their course simultaneously4 ,we have here1 therefore1 instead of the real relation of dependence involved in constant sequence1 a real dependence of the simultaneity or correlative series of events4 ,this would not1 of course1 as should be at once remarked1 tell as such against a causal connection between the two separate causal series4 ,but the contested parallelistic interpretation of this dependence is made far more probable through other grounds4 ,these are in part corollaries of the law of the conservation of energy1 rightly interpreted1 and in part epistemological considerations4 ,still it is not advisable to burden methodological study1 for instance1 the theory of induction1 with these remote problems2 and on that account it is better for our present investigation to subordinate the psychological interdependences1 to the causal ones in the narrower sense4 ,the final consequence1 too1 that forces itself upon our attention is close at hand in the preceding discussion4 ,the tradition prevailing since ,hume1 together with its inherent opposition to the interpretation of causal connection given by the concept philosophy1 permitted us to make the uniform sequences of events the basis of our discussion4 ,in so doing1 however1 our attention had to be called repeatedly to one reservation4 ,in fact1 only a moment ago1 in alluding to the psychological interdependences1 we had to emphasize the uniform sequence4 ,elsewhere the arguments depended upon the uniformity that characterizes this sequence2 and rightly1 for the reduction of the causal relation to the fundamental relation of the sequence of events is merely a convenient one and not the only possible one4 ,as soon as we regard the causal connection1 along with the opposed and equal reaction1 as an interconnection1 then cause and effect become1 is a matter of principle1 simultaneous4 ,the separation of interaction from causation is not justifiable4 ,in other ways also we can so transform every causal relation that cause and effect must be regarded as simultaneous4 ,every stage1 for instance1 of the warming of a stone by the heat of the sun1 or of the treaty conferences of two states1 presents an effect that is simultaneous with the totality of the acting causes4 ,the analysis of a cause that was at first grasped as a whole into the multiplicity of its constituent causes and the comprehension of the constituent causes into a whole1 which then presents itself as the effect1 is a necessary condition of such a type of investigation4 ,this conception1 which is present already in ,hobbes1 but especially in ,herbart's method of relations1 deserves preference always where the purpose in view is not the shortest possible argumentation but the most exact analysis4 ,if we turn our attention to this way of viewing the problem1--not1 however1 in the form of ,herbart's speculative method1--we shall find that the results which we have gained will in no respect be altered4 ,we do1 however1 get a view beyond4 ,from it we can find the way to subordinate not only the uniform sequence of events1 but also the persistent characteristics and states with their mutual relations1 under the extended causal law4 ,in so doing1 we do not fall back again into the intellectual world of the concept philosophy4 ,we come only to regard the persisting coexistences--in the physical field1 the bodies1 in the psychical1 the subjects of consciousness--as systems or modes of activity4 ,the thoughts to which such a doctrine leads are accordingly not new or unheard of4 ,the substances have always been regarded as sources of modes of activity4 ,we have here merely new modifications of thoughts that have been variously developed1 not only from the side of empiricism1 but also from that of rationalism4 ,they carry with them methodologically the implication that it is possible to grasp the totality of reality1 as far as it reveals uniformities1 as a causally connected whole1 as a cosmos4 ,they give the research of the special sciences the conceptual bases for the wider prospects that the sciences of facts have through hard labor won for themselves4 ,the subject of consciousness is unitary as far as the processes of memory extend1 but it is not simple4 ,on the contrary1 it is most intricately put together out of psychical complexes1 themselves intricate and out of their relations2 all of which impress upon us1 psychologically and1 in their mechanical correlates1 physiologically1 an ever-recurring need for further empirical analysis4 ,among the mechanical images of physical reality that form the foundation of our interpretation of nature1 there can finally be but one that meets all the requirements of a general hypothesis of the continuity of kinetic connections4 ,with this must be universally cordinated the persistent properties or sensible modes of action belonging to bodies4 ,the mechanical constitution of the compound bodies1 no matter at what stage of combination and formation1 must be derivable from the mechanical constitution of the elements of this combination4 ,thus our causal thought compels us to trace back the persistent coexistences of the so-called elements to combinations whose analysis1 as yet hardly begun1 leads us on likewise to indefinitely manifold problems4 ,epistemologically we come finally to a universal phenomenological dynamism as the fundamental basis of all theoretical interpretation of the world1 at least fundamental for our scientific thought1 and we are here concerned with no other4 ,,addenda ,,pages ,,for ,,lecture ,,notes ,,and ,,memoranda ,,of ,,collateral ,,reading ,transcriber's ,notes3 ,in the original book1 ten blank pages follow the last text entry4 ,on the title page1 the copy number 7#ccg7 is written in by hand4 ,in the chronological order of proceedings for ,september #bd1 there is no listing for ,hall #i at #c p4m4 ,alterations3 ,punctuation was standardized4 ,footnotes were moved directly after the paragraph to which they pertain and are indented4 ,greek phrases were transliterated4 ,stand-alone ,greek letters were spelled out1 i4e41 'alpha1' 'beta1' 'gamma4' ,hyphens removed for consistency with remaining text3 444 banquet hall of the ,tyrolean ,alps 444 444 breaking down of national ,schools 444 444 analysis of the material scientific methods 444 444 is by no means a passive mirror picture of an 444 444 and the much discussed historical laws are 444 444 it is in the number series that we have 444 444 as well as of the number system1 can all be 444 444 by our sense perception of this 444 444 in the form of sense perception 444 444 for the space of sense perception is to 444 444 are in the first instance sense perceptions1444 444 doctrine of the thought processes1444 444 character of the thought processes1444 444 introduction of time relations into the 444 444 the too much neglected idea of the 444 444 in the main1 twofold3 444 444 sense and self perception1444 ,hyphen added for consistency with remaining text3 444 of those will-acts which themselves have 444 ,changed3 'colaborers' to 'co-laborers' 444 and other worthy co-laborers8444 'pyscho' to 'psycho' 444 psycho-physical elements 444 'interacademic' to 'inter-academic' 444 inter-academic interest 444 'organzied' to 'organized' 444 already organized branches 444 ',pyschological' to ',psychological' 444 ,psychological ,association4444 ',b' to ',a' and ',c' to ',b' in the ,programme1 ,department #af4 ,sociology ,capitalized ',admiral' 444 ,rear-,admiral ,john ,r4 ,bartlett 444 ,added period to ',,ll4,d4' 444 ,putnam1 ,litt4,d41 ,,ll4,d41 444