,,cornell ,,studies ,,in ,,philosophy ,no4 #aa ,,john ,,dewey',s ,,logical ,,theory ,,by ,,delton ,,thomas ,,howard1 ,a4,m4 ,,formerly ,,fellow ,,in ,,the ,,sage ,,school ,,of ,,philosophy ,a ,,thesis ,,presented ,,to ,,the ,,faculty ,,of ,,the ,,graduate ,,school ,,of ,,cornell ,,university ,,in ,,partial ,,fulfilment ,,of ,,the ,,requirements ,,for ,,the ,,degree ,,of ,,doctor ,,of ,,philosophy ,,new ,,york ,,longmans1 ,,green1 ,,co4 #aiai ,,press ,,of ,,the ,,new ,,era ,,printing ,,company ,,lancaster1 ,,pa4 ,,preface ,it seems unnecessary to offer an apology for an historical treatment of ,professor ,dewey's logical theories1 since functionalism glories in the genetic method4 ,to be sure1 certain more extreme radicals are opposed to a genetic interpretation of the history of human thought1 but this is inconsistent4 ,at any rate1 the historical method employed in the following study may escape censure by reason of its simple character1 for it is little more than a critical review of ,professor ,dewey's writings in their historical order1 with no discussion of influences and connections1 and with little insistence upon rigid lines of development4 ,it is proposed to follow the lead of the subject-matter as far as possible2 to discover what topics interested ,professor ,dewey1 how he dealt with them1 and what conclusions he arrived at4 ,this plan has an especial advantage when applied to a body of doctrine which1 like ,professor ,dewey's1 does not possess a systematic form of its own1 since it avoids the distortion which a more rigid method would be apt to produce4 ,it has not been possible1 within the limits of the present study1 to take note of all of ,professor ,dewey's writings1 and no reference has been made to some which are of undoubted interest and importance4 ,among these may be mentioned especially his books and papers on educational topics and a number of his ethical writings4 ,attention has been devoted almost exclusively to those writings which have some important bearing upon his logical theory4 ,the division into chapters is partly arbitrary1 although the periods indicated are quite clearly marked by the different directions which ,professor ,dewey's interests took from time to time4 ,it will be seen that there is considerable chance for error in distinguishing between the important and the unimportant1 and in selecting the essays which lie in the natural line of the author's development4 ,but1 valeat quantum1 as ,william ,james would say4 ,the criticisms and comments which have been made from time to time1 as seemed appropriate1 may be considered pertinent or irrelevant according to the views of the reader4 ,it is hoped that they are not entirely aside from the mark1 and that they do not interfere with a fair presentation of the author's views4 ,the last chapter is devoted to a direct criticism of ,professor ,dewey's functionalism1 with some comments on the general nature of philosophical method4 ,since this thesis was written1 ,professor ,dewey has published two or three books and numerous articles1 which are perhaps more important than any of his previous writings4 ,the volume of ,essays in ,experimental ,logic 7#aiaf7 is a distinct advance upon ,the ,influence of ,darwin on ,philosophy and ,other ,essays1 published six years earlier4 ,most of these essays1 however1 are considered here in their original form1 and the new material1 while interesting1 presents no vital change of standpoint4 ,it might be well to call attention to the excellent introductory essay which ,professor ,dewey has provided for this new volume4 ,some mention might also be made of the volume of essays by eight representative pragmatists1 which appeared last year 7#aiag7 under the title1 ,creative ,intelligence4 ,my comments on ,professor ,dewey's contribution to the volume have been printed elsewhere4#a ,it has not seemed necessary1 in the absence of significant developments1 to extend the thesis beyond its original limits1 and it goes to press1 therefore1 substantially as written two years ago4 ,i wish to express my gratitude to the members of the faculty of the ,sage ,school of ,philosophy for many valuable suggestions and kindly encouragement in the course of my work4 ,i am most deeply indebted to ,professor ,ernest ,albee for his patient guidance and helpful criticism4 ,many of his suggestions1 both as to plan and detail1 have been adopted and embodied in the thesis1 and these have contributed materially to such logical coherence and technical accuracy as it may possess4 ,the particular views expressed are1 of course1 my own4 ,i wish also to thank ,professor ,j4 ,e4 ,creighton especially for his friendly interest and for many suggestions which assisted the progress of my work1 as well as for his kindness in looking over the proofs4 ,d4 ,t4 ,,howard4 ,,evanston1 ,,illinois1 ,june1 #aiah4 ,,footnote3 #a ,the ,pragmatic ,method1 ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1 #aiah1 ,vol4 ,,xv1 pp4 #adi-aef4 ,,contents ,,chapter ,,page ,i4 ,psychology as ,philosophic ,method #a ,,ii4 ,the ,development of the ,psychological ,standpoint #ae ,,iii4 ,moral ,theory and ,practice #cc ,,iv4 ,functional ,psychology #dg ,v4 ,the ,evolutionary ,standpoint #ei ,,vi4 ,studies in ,logical ,theory #gb ,,vii4 ,the ,polemical ,period #hh ,,viii4 ,later ,developments #aje ,,ix4 ,conclusions #aai ,,chapter ,i ,,psychology ,,as ,,philosophic ,,method ,dewey's earliest standpoint in philosophy is presented in two articles published in ,mind in #ahhf3 ,the ,psychological ,standpoint1 and ,psychology as ,philosophic ,method4#b ,these articles appear to have been written in connection with his ,psychology1 which was published in the same year1 and which represents the same general point of view as applied to the study of mental phenomena4 ,for the purposes of the present study attention may be confined to the two articles in ,mind4 ,dewey begins his argument1 in ,the ,psychological ,standpoint1 with a reference to ,professor ,green's remark that the psychological standpoint is what marks the difference between transcendentalism and ,british empiricism4 ,dewey takes exception to this view1 and asserts that the two schools hold this standpoint in common1 and1 furthermore1 that the psychological standpoint has been the strength of ,british empiricism and desertion of that standpoint its weakness4 ,shadworth ,hodgson's comment on this proposal testifies to its audacity4 ,in a review of ,dewey's article1 he says3 ,if for instance we are told by a competent writer1 that ,absolute ,idealism is not only a truth of experience but one attained directly by the method of experiential psychology1 we should not allow our astonishment to prevent our examining the arguments1 by virtue of which ,english psychology attains the results of ,german transcendentalism without quitting the ground of experience4#c ,dewey defines his psychological standpoint as follows3 ,we are not to determine the nature of reality or of any object of philosophical inquiry by examining it as it is in itself1 but only as it is an element in our knowledge1 in our experience1 only as it is related to our mind1 or is an 'idea'4444 ,or1 in the ordinary way of putting it1 the nature of all objects of philosophical inquiry is to be fixed by finding out what experience says about them4#d ,the implications of this definition do not appear at first sight1 but they become clearer as the discussion proceeds4 ,locke1 ,dewey continues1 deserted the psychological standpoint because he did not1 as he proposed1 explain the nature of such things as matter and mind by reference to experience4 ,on the contrary1 he explained experience through the assumption of the two unknowable substances1 matter and mind4 ,berkeley also deserted the psychological standpoint1 in effect1 by having recourse to a purely transcendent ,spirit4 ,even ,hume deserted it by assuming as the only reals certain unrelated sensations1 and by trying to explain the origin of experience and knowledge by their combination4 ,these reals were supposed to exist in independence of an organized experience1 and to constitute it by their association4 ,it might be argued that ,hume's sensations are found in experience by analysis1 and this would probably be true4 ,but the sensations are nothing apart from the consciousness in which they are found4 ,such a sensation1 ,dewey says1 a sensation which exists only within and for experience1 is not one which can be used to account for experience4 ,it is but one element in an organic whole1 and can no more account for the whole1 than a given digestive act can account for the existence of a living body4#e ,so far ,dewey is merely restating the criticism of ,english empiricism that had been made by ,green and his followers4 ,reality1 as experienced1 is a whole of organically related parts1 not a mechanical compound of elements4 ,whatever is to be explained must be taken as a fact of experience1 and its meaning will be revealed in terms of its position and function within the whole4 ,but while ,dewey employs the language of idealism1 it is doubtful whether he has grasped the full significance of the concrete universal of the ,hegelian school4 ,the following passage illustrates the difficulty3 ,the psychological standpoint as it has developed itself is this3 all that is1 is for consciousness or knowledge4 ,the business of the psychologist is to give a genetic account of the various elements within this consciousness1 and thereby fix their place1 determine their validity1 and at the same time show definitely what the real and eternal nature of this consciousness is4#f ,consciousness 7used here as identical with 'experience'7 is apparently interpreted as a structure made up of elements related in a determinable order1 and having1 consequently1 a 'real and eternal nature4' ,the result is a 'structural' view of reality1 and the type of idealism for which ,dewey stands may fittingly be called 'structural' idealism4 ,this type of idealism does1 in fact1 hold a position intermediate between ,english empiricism and ,german transcendentalism4 ,but it would not commonly be considered a synthesis of the best characteristics of the two schools4 ',structural' idealism is1 historically considered1 a reversion to ,kant which retains the mechanical elements of the ,critique1 but fails to reckon with the truly organic mode of interpretation in which it culminates4 ,as experience1 from ,kant's undeveloped position1 is a structure of sensations and forms1 so ,dewey's 'consciousness' is a compound of separate elements or existences related in a 'real and eternal' order4 ,dewey illustrates his method1 in the discussion which follows1 by employing it1 or showing how it should be employed1 in the definition of certain typical objects of philosophical inquiry4 ,the first to be considered are subject and object4 ,in dealing with the relation of subject to object1 the psychological method will attempt to show how consciousness differentiates itself1 or 'specifies' itself1 into subject and object4 ,these terms will be viewed as related terms within the whole of 'consciousness1' rather than as elements existing prior to or in independence of the whole in which they are found4 ,there is a type of realism which illustrates the opposite or ontological method4 ,it is led1 through a study of the dependence of the mind upon the organism1 to a position in which subject and object fall apart1 out of relation to each other4 ,the separation of the two leads to the positing of a third term1 an unknown x1 which is supposed to unite them4 ,the psychological method would hold that the two objects have their union1 not in an unknown 'real1' but in the 'consciousness' in which they appear4 ,the individual consciousness as subject1 and the objects over against it1 are elements at once distinguished and related within the whole4 ,all the terms are facts of experience1 and none are to be assumed as ontological reals4 ,subjective idealism1 ,dewey continues1 makes a similar error in failing to discriminate between the ego1 or individual consciousness1 and the ,absolute ,consciousness within which ego and object are differentiated elements4 ,it fails to see that subject and object are complements1 and inexplicable except as related elements in a larger whole4 ,the individual consciousness1 again1 and the universal ',consciousness1' are to be defined by reference to experience4 ,it is not to be assumed at the start1 as the subjective idealists assume1 that the nature of the individual consciousness is known4 ,the ego is to be defined1 not assumed1 and this is the essence of the psychological method4 ,so far1 two factors in ,dewey's standpoint are clearly discernible4 ,in the first place1 all noumena and transcendent reals are to be rejected as means of explanation1 and definition is to be wholly in terms of experienced elements1 as experienced4 ,in the second place1 experience is to be regarded as a rational system of related elements1 while explanation is to consist in tracing out the relations which any element bears to the whole4 ,the universal ',consciousness' is the whole1 and the individual mind1 again1 is an element within the whole1 to be explained by tracing out the relations which it bears to other elements and to the whole system4 ,it is not easy to avoid the conclusion that ,dewey conceives of 'consciousness' as a construct of existentially distinct terms4 ,dewey does not actually treat subject and object1 individual and universal consciousness1 in the empirical manner for which he contends4 ,he merely outlines a method2 and1 while this has a negative bearing as against transcendent modes of explanation1 it has little content of its own4 ,but in spite of ,dewey's lack of explicitness1 it is evident that he tends to view his 'objects of philosophical inquiry' as so many concrete particular existences or things4 ,the idea that they can be empirically marked out and investigated seems to imply this4 ,but subject1 object1 individual1 and universal are certainly not reducible to particular sensations1 even though it must be admitted that they have a reference to particulars4 ,these abstract concepts had been a source of difficulty to the empiricists1 because they had not been able to reduce them to particular impressions1 and ,dewey's proposed method appears to involve the same difficulty4 ,in his second article1 on ,psychology as ,philosophic ,method1 ,dewey proposes to show that his standpoint is practically identical with that of transcendental idealism4 ,this is made possible1 he believes1 through the fact that1 since experience or consciousness is the only reality1 psychology1 as the scientific account of this reality1 becomes identical with philosophy4 ,in maintaining his position1 ,dewey finds it necessary to criticise the tendency1 found in certain idealists1 to treat psychology merely as a special science4 ,this view of psychology is attained1 ,dewey observes1 by regarding man under two arbitrarily determined aspects4 ,taken as a finite being acting amid finite things1 a knowing1 willing1 feeling phenomenon1 man is said to be the object of a special science1 psychology4 ,but in another aspect man is infinite1 the universal self-consciousness1 and as such is the object of philosophy4 ,this distinction between the two aspects of man's nature1 ,dewey believes1 cannot be maintained4 ,as a distinction1 it must arise within consciousness1 and it must therefore be a psychological distinction4 ,psychology cannot limit itself to anything less than the whole of experience1 and cannot1 therefore1 be a special science dependent1 like others1 upon philosophy for its working concepts4 ,on the contrary1 the method of psychology must be the method of philosophy4 ,dewey reaches this result quite easily1 because he makes psychology the science of reality to begin with4 ,the universe1 he says1 except as realized in an individual1 has no existence4444 ,self-consciousness means simply an individualized universe2 and if this universe has not been realized in man1 if man be not self-conscious1 then no philosophy whatever is possible4 ,if it has been realized1 it is in and through psychological experience that this realization has occurred4 ,psychology is the scientific account of this realization1 of this individualized universe1 of this self-consciousness4#g ,it is difficult to understand exactly what these expressions meant for ,dewey4 ,granting that the human mind is both individual and universal1 what objection could be raised against the study of its individual or finite aspects as the special subject-matter of a particular science8 ,all the sciences1 as ,dewey was aware1 are abstract in method4 ,dewey's position appears to be that the universal and individual aspects of consciousness are nothing apart from each other1 and must be studied together4 ,but 'consciousness' in ,dewey's view is1 in fact1 two consciousnesses4 ,reality as a whole is a ,consciousness1 and the individual mind is another consciousness4 ,a problem arises1 therefore1 as to their connection4 ,dewey affirms that1 unless they are united1 unless the universal is given in the individual consciousness1 there can be no science of the whole1 and therefore no philosophy4 ,the epistemological problem of the relation of the mind to reality becomes1 accordingly1 the raison d'etre of his method4 ,the problem was an inheritance from subjective idealism4 ,it may be pointed out that there is some similarity between ,dewey's standpoint and ,berkeley's4 ,both conceive of consciousness as a construct of elements1 and ,dewey's ',consciousness in general' holds much the same relation to the finite consciousness that the ,divine ,mind holds to the individual consciousness in ,berkeley's system4 ,the similarity between the two standpoints must not be overemphasized1 but it is none the less suggestive and interesting4 ,in attempting to determine the proper status of psychology as a science1 ,dewey is led into a more detailed exposition of his standpoint4 ,his position in general is well indicated in the following passage3 ,in short1 the real esse of things is neither their percipi1 nor their intelligi alone2 it is their experiri4#h ,the science of the intelligi is logic1 and of the percipi1 philosophy of nature4 ,but these are abstractions from the experiri1 the science of which is psychology4 ,if it be denied that the experiri1 self-consciousness in its wholeness1 can be the subject-matter of psychology1 then the possibility of philosophy is also denied4 ,if man1 as matter of fact1 does not realise the nature of the eternal and the universal within himself1 as the essence of his own being2 if he does not at one stage of his experience consciously1 and in all stages implicitly1 lay hold of this universal and eternal1 then it is mere matter of words to say that he can give no account of things as they universally and eternally are4 ,to deny1 therefore1 that self-consciousness is a matter of psychological experience is to deny the possibility of any philosophy4#i ,dewey assures us again that his method alone will solve the epistemological problem4 ,self-consciousness1 as that within which things exist sub specie aeternitatis and in ordine ad universum1 must be the object of psychology4 ,the refusal to take self-consciousness as an experienced fact1 ,dewey says1 results in such failures as are seen in ,kant1 ,hegel1 and even ,green and ,caird1 to give any adequate account of the nature of the ,absolute4 ,kant1 for purely logical reasons1 denied that self-consciousness could be an object of experience1 although he admitted conceptions and perceptions as matters of experience4 ,as a result of his attitude1 conception and perception were never brought into organic connection2 the self-conscious1 eternal order of the world was referred to something back of experience4 ,dewey attributes ,kant's failure to his logical method1 which led him away from the psychological standpoint in which he would have found self-consciousness as a directly presented fact4 ,this criticism of ,kant's 'logical method' fails to take account of the transitional nature of ,kant's standpoint4 ,looking backward1 it is easy enough to ask why ,kant did not begin with the organic view of experience at which he finally arrived4 ,but the answer must be that the organic standpoint did not exist until ,kant1 by his 'logical method1' had brought it to light4 ,the ,kantian interpretation of experience1 in which1 as ,dewey asserts1 conception and perception were never brought into organic relation1 is a half-way stage between mechanism and organism4 ,but how does ,dewey propose to improve upon ,kant's position8 ,he will first of all put ,kant's noumenal self back into experience1 as a fact in consciousness4 ,but how will this help to bring perception and conception into closer union8 ,there seems to be no answer4 ,dewey's view appears to be that organic relations are achieved whenever an object is made a part of experience and so brought into connection with other experienced facts4 ',organic relation' is interpreted as equivalent to 'mental relation4' ,but mental relations are not organic because they are mental4 ,it would be as easy to assert that they are mechanical4 ,the test lies in the nature of the relations which are actually found in the mental sphere and the fitness of the organic categories to express them4 ,dewey's 'consciousness1' as has been said before1 appears to be a structure1 not an organism4 ,its parts are external to each other1 however closely they may be related4 ,an organic view of experience would begin with a denial of the actuality of bare facts or sensations1 and would not waver in maintaining that standpoint to the end4 ,hegel's advance upon ,kant1 ,dewey continues1 consisted essentially in showing that ,kant's logical standard was erroneous1 and that1 as a matter of logic1 the only true criterion or standard was the organic notion1 or ,begriff1 which is a systematic totality1 and accordingly able to explain both itself and also the simpler processes and principles4#aj ,the logical reformation which ,hegel accomplished was most important1 but the work of ,kant still needed to be completed by showing self-consciousness as a fact of experience1 as well as perception through organic forms and thinking through organic principles4#aa ,this element is latent in ,hegel1 ,dewey believes1 but needs to be brought out4 ,t4 ,h4 ,green comes under the same criticism4 ,he followed ,kant's logical method1 and as a consequence arrived at the same negative results4 ,the nature of self-consciousness remains unknown to ,green2 he can affirm its existence1 but cannot describe its nature4 ,dewey quotes that passage from the ,prolegomena to ,ethics in which ,green says3#ab ,as to what that consciousness in itself or in its completeness is1 we can only make negative statements4 ,that there is such a consciousness is implied in the existence of the world2 but what it is we only know through its so far acting in us as to enable us1 however partially and interruptedly1 to have knowledge of a world or an intelligent experience4 ,if1 ,dewey observes1 ,green had begun with the latter point of view1 and had taken self-consciousness as at least partially realized in finite minds1 he would have been able to make some positive statements about it4 ,dewey1 however1 has not given the most adequate interpretation of ,green's ',spiritual ,principle in ,nature4' ,this was evidently1 for ,green1 a symbol of the intelligibility of the world as organically conceived1 an order which could not be comprehended by the mechanical categories1 but which was nevertheless real4 ,as ,green tended to hypostatize the organic conception1 so ,dewey would make it a concrete reality1 with the further specification that it must be something given to psychological observation4 ,the chief point of ,dewey's criticism of the idealists is that they fail to establish self-consciousness as an experienced fact2 and1 ,dewey maintains1 it must be so established if it is to be anything real and genuine4 ,if it is anything that can be discussed at all1 it must be an element in experience2 and if it is in experience1 it must be the subject-matter of psychology4 ,it is inevitable1 from ,dewey's standpoint1 that transcendentalism should adopt his psychological method4 ,in the further development of his standpoint1 ,dewey considers 7#a7 the relations of psychology to the special sciences1 and 7#b7 the relation of psychology to logic4 ,dewey's conception of the relation of psychology to the special sciences is well illustrated in the following passage3 ,mathematics1 physics1 biology exist1 because conscious experience reveals itself to be of such a nature1 that one may make virtual abstraction from the whole1 and consider a part by itself1 without damage1 so long as the treatment is purely scientific1 that is1 so long as the implicit connection with the whole is left undisturbed1 and the attempt is not made to present this partial science as metaphysic1 or as an explanation of the whole1 as is the usual fashion of our uncritical so-called 'scientific philosophies4' ,nay more1 this abstraction of some one sphere is itself a living function of the psychologic experience4 ,it is not merely something which it allows3 it is something which it does4 ,it is the analytic aspect of its own activity1 whereby it deepens and renders explicit1 realizes its own nature4444 ,the analytic movement constitutes the special sciences2 the synthetic constitutes the philosophy of nature2 the self-developing activity itself1 as psychology1 constitutes philosophy4#ac ,the special sciences are regarded as abstractions from the central or psychological point of view1 but they are legitimate abstractions1 constituted by a proper analytic movement of the total self-consciousness1 which specifies itself into the special branches of knowledge4 ,if we begin with any special science1 and drive it back to its fundamentals1 it reveals its abstractness1 and thought is led forward into other sciences1 and finally into philosophy1 as the science of the whole4 ,but philosophy1 first appearing as a special science1 turns out to be science2 it is presupposed in all the special sciences1 and is their basis4 ,but where does psychology stand in this classification8 ,at first sight psychology appears to be a special science1 abstract like the others4 ,as to systematic observation1 experiment1 conclusion and verification1 it can differ in no essential way from any one of them4#ad ,but psychology1 like philosophy1 turns out to be a science of the whole4 ,each special science investigates a special sphere of conscious experience4 ,from one science to another we go1 asking for some explanation of conscious experience1 until we come to psychology4444 ,but the very process that has made necessary this new science reveals also that each of the former sciences existed only in abstraction from it4 ,each dealt with some one phase of conscious experience1 and for that very reason could not deal with the totality which gave it its being1 consciousness4#ae ,philosophy and psychology therefore mainly coincide1 and the method of psychology1 properly developed1 becomes the method of philosophy4 ,if psychology is to be identified with philosophy in this fashion1 the mere change of name would seem to be superfluous4 ,there would be no reason for maintaining psychology as a separate discipline4 ,perhaps ,dewey did not intend that it should be maintained separately4 ,in that case1 the total effect of his argument would be to prescribe certain methods for philosophy4 ,it seems necessary to suppose that ,dewey proposed to merge philosophy in psychology1 and make it an exact science while retaining its universality4 ,science1 he argued1 is the systematic account1 or reason of fact2 ,psychology is the completed systematic account of the ultimate fact1 which1 as fact1 reveals itself as reason4444#af ,self-consciousness in its ultimate nature is conceived of as a special fact1 over and above what it includes in the way of particulars4 ,psychology1 as the science of this ultimate fact1 must at the same time be philosophy4 ,the identification of the two disciplines depends upon taking the 'wholeness' of reality as a 'fact1' which can be brought under observation4 ,this is a natural conclusion from ,dewey's structural view of reality4 ,in taking up the subject of the relation of psychology to logic1 ,dewey remarks that in philosophy matter and form cannot be separated4 ,self-consciousness is the final truth1 and in self-consciousness the form as organic system and the content as organized system are exactly equal to each other4#ag ,logic abstracts from the whole1 gives us only the form1 or intelligi of reality1 and is therefore only one moment in philosophy4 ,since logic is an abstraction from ,nature1 we cannot get from logic back to ,nature1 by means of logic4 ,we do1 as a matter of fact1 make the transition in philosophy1 because the facts force us back to ,nature4 ,just as in ,hegel's logic1 the category of quality1 when pressed1 reveals itself as inadequate to express the facts1 and is compelled to pass into the category of quantity1 so does logic as a whole1 when pressed1 reveal its inadequacy to express the whole of reality4 ,the transition from category to category in the ,hegelian logic is not an unfolding of the forms as forms1 but results from a compulsion exerted by the facts1 when the categories are used to explain them4 ,logic is1 and must remain1 abstract in all its processes1 and its outcome 7with ,hegel1 ,geist7 may assert the abstract necessity of one self-conscious whole1 but cannot give the reality4 ,logic cannot reach1 however much it may point to1 an actual individual4 ,the gathering up of the universe into one self-conscious individuality it may assert as necessary1 it cannot give it as reality4#ah ,taken as an abstract method1 logic is apt to result in a pantheism1 where the only real is the ,idee1 and where all its factors and moments1 including spirit and nature1 are real only at different stages or phases of the ,idee1 but vanish as imperfect ways of looking at things 444 when we reach the ,idee4#ai ,dewey has in mind logic as a science of the forms of reality taken in abstraction from their content4 ,in reality1 however1 there can be no logic of concepts apart from their concrete application4 ,hegel certainly never believed that it was possible to abstract the logical forms from reality and study them in their isolation4 ,as against a purely formal logic1 if such a thing were possible1 ,dewey's criticism would be valid1 but the transcendental logic of his time was not formal in this sense4 ,the psychological method which ,dewey offers as a substitute for the logical method escapes1 he believes1 the difficulties of the latter method4 ,at the same time it preserves1 in his opinion1 the essential spirit of the ,hegelian method4 ,dewey's comments show that he conceives his method to be a restatement1 in improved form1 of the doctrine of the 'concrete universal4' ,but the 'psychological method' and the method of idealism are1 if anything1 antithetical4 ,an excellent summary of ,dewey's theory is afforded by the following passage3 ,only a living actual ,fact can preserve within its unity that organic system of differences in virtue of which it lives and moves and has its being4 ,it is with this fact1 conscious experience in its entirety1 that psychology as method begins4 ,it thus brings to clear light of day the presupposition implicit in every philosophy1 and thereby affords logic1 as well as the philosophy of nature1 its basis1 ideal and surety4 ,if we have determined the nature of reality1 by a process whose content equals its form1 we can show the meaning1 worth and limits of any one moment of this reality4#bj ,it would be useless to speculate upon the various possible interpretations that might be given of ,dewey's psychological method4 ,the most critical examination of the text will not dispel its vagueness1 nor afford an answer to the many questions that arise4 ,it does1 however1 throw an interesting light on certain tendencies in ,dewey's own thinking4 ,dewey's attempt to show that ,english empiricism and transcendentalism have a common psychological basis must be regarded as a failure4 ,that the nature of the attempt reveals a misunderstanding1 or fatal lack of appreciation1 on the part of ,dewey1 of the critical philosophy and the later development of idealism by ,hegel1 has already been suggested4 ,he does not appear to have grasped the significance of the movement from ,kant to ,hegel4 ,kant1 of course1 believed that the a priori forms of experience could be determined by a process of critical analysis1 which would reveal them in their purity4 ,the constitutive relations of experience were supposed by him to be limited to the pure forms of sensibility1 space and time1 and the twelve categories of the understanding1 which1 being imposed upon the manifold of sensations1 as organized by the productive imagination1 determined once and for all the order of the phenomenal world4 ,his logic1 therefore1 as an account of the forms of experience1 would represent logic of the type which ,dewey criticized4 ,but with the rejection of ,kant's noumenal world1 the critical method assumed a different import4 ,it was no longer to be supposed that reality1 as knowable1 was organized under the forms of a determinate number of categories1 which could be separated out and classified4 ,kant's idea that experience was an intelligible system was retained1 but its intelligibility was not supposed to be wholly comprised in man's methods of knowing it4 ,the instrumental character of the categories was recognized4 ,criticism was directed upon the categories1 with the object of determining their validity1 spheres of relevance1 and proper place in the system of knowledge4 ,such a criticism1 in the nature of things1 could not deal with the forms of thought in abstraction from their application4 ,direct reference to experience1 therefore1 became a necessary element in idealism4 ,at the same time1 philosophy became a 'criticism of categories4' ,the method is empirical1 but never psychological4 ,dewey recognized the need of an empirical method in philosophy1 but failed to show specifically how psychology could deal with philosophical problems4 ,he appears to have conceived that sensation and meaning1 facts and forms1 were present in experience or ',consciousness1' as if this were some total understanding which retained the elements in a fixed union and order4 ,while1 according to his method1 the forms of this universal consciousness could not be considered apart from the particulars in which they inhered1 they might be studied by a survey of experience1 a direct appeal to consciousness1 in which 'form and content are equal4' ,he seems to have held that truth is given in immediate experience4 ,a study of reality as immediately given1 therefore1 to psychological observation1 would provide an account of the eternal nature of things1 as they stand in the universal mind4 ,dewey did not attempt a criticism of the categories and methods which psychology must employ in such a task4 ,had he done so1 the advantages of a critical method might have occurred to him4 ,,footnotes3 #b ,vol4 ,,xi1 pp4 #a-ai2 pp4 #aec-agc4 #c ,illusory ,psychology1 ,mind1 ,vol4 ,,xi1 #ahhf1 p4 #dgh4 #d ,the ,psychological ,standpoint1 ,mind1 #ahhf1 ,vol4 ,,xi1 p4 #b4 #e ,ibid41 p4 #g4 #f ,op4 cit41 p4 #h f4 #g ,psychology as ,philosophic ,method1 ,mind1 #ahhf1 ,vol4 ,,xi1 p4 #aeg4 #h ,ibid41 p4 #afj4 7,observe that this is a direct reference to ,berkeley47 #i ,op4 cit4 #aj ,op4 cit41 p4 #afa4 #aa ,ibid4 #ab ,third ,edition1 p4 #ed4 #ac ,mind1 ,vol4 ,,xi1 p4 #aff f4 #ad ,ibid41 p4 #aff4 #ae ,ibid4 #af ,op4 cit41 p4 #agj4 #ag ,ibid4 #ah ,op4 cit41 p4 #agb4 #ai ,ibid4 #bj ,op4 cit4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,development ,,of ,,the ,,psychological ,,standpoint ,the psychological method1 as so far presented1 is an outline which must be developed in detail before its philosophical import is revealed4 ,for several years following the publication of his first articles in ,mind ,dewey was occupied with the task of working out his method in greater detail1 and giving it more concrete form4 ,his thought during this period follows a fairly regular order of development1 which is to be sketched in the present chapter4 ,in #ahhg ,dewey published in ,mind an article entitled ,knowledge as ,idealisation4#ba ,this article is1 in effect1 a consideration of one of the special problems of the psychological method4 ,if reality is an eternal and all-inclusive consciousness1 in which sensations and meanings are ordered according to a rational system1 what must be the nature of the finite thought-process which apprehends this reality8 ,in his previous articles ,dewey had proposed the psychological method as an actual mode of investigation1 and questions concerning the nature of the human thought-process naturally forced themselves upon his attention4 ,the thought-process is1 to begin with1 a relating activity which gives meaning to experience4 ,says ,dewey3 ,when ,psychology recognizes that the relating activity of mind is one not exercised upon sensations1 but one which supplies relations and thereby makes meaning 7makes experience1 as ,kant said71 ,psychology will be in a position to explain1 and thus to become ,philosophy4#bb ,this statement raises the more specific question1 what is meaning8 ,every idea1 ,dewey remarks1 has two aspects3 existence and meaning4 ,recognizing that every psychical fact does have these two aspects1 we shall1 for the present1 confine ourselves to asking the nature1 function and origin of the aspect of meaning or significance--the content of the idea as opposed to its existence4#bc ,the meaning aspect of the idea cannot be reduced to the centrally excited image existences which form a part of the existence-aspect of the idea4 ,i repeat1 as existence1 we have only a clustering of sensuous feelings1 stronger and weaker4#bd ,but the thing is not perceived as a clustering of feelings2 the sensations are immediately interpreted as a significant object4 ,perceiving1 to restate a psychological commonplace1 is interpreting4 ,the content of the perception is what is signified4#be ,dewey's treatment of sensations1 at this point1 is somewhat uncertain4 ,if it be a manifold that is given to the act of interpretation1 ,kant's difficulty is again presented4 ,the bare sensations taken by themselves mean nothing1 and yet everything does mean something in being apprehended4 ,the conclusion should be that there is no such thing as mere existence4 ,dewey's judgment is undecided on this issue4 ,it is true enough1 he says1 that without the idea as existence there would be no experience2 the sensuous clustering is a condition sine qua non of all1 even the highest spiritual1 consciousness4 ,but it is none the less true that if we could strip any psychical existence of all its qualities except bare existence1 there would be nothing left1 not even existence1 for our intelligence4444 ,if we take out of an experience all that it means1 as distinguished from what it is--a particular occurrence at a certain time1 there is no psychical experience4 ,the barest fragment of consciousness that can be hit upon has meaning as well as being4#bf ,an interpretation of reality as truly organic would treat mechanical sensation as a pure fiction4 ,but ,dewey clings to 'existence' as a necessary 'aspect' of the psychical fact4 ,the terms and relations never entirely fuse1 although they are indispensable to each other4 ,there is danger that the resulting view of experience will be somewhat angular and structural4 ,at one point1 indeed1 ,dewey asserts that there is no such thing as a merely immediate psychical fact1 at least for our experience4 ,so far is it from being true that we know only what is immediately present in consciousness1 that it should rather be said that what is immediately present is never known4#bg ,but in the next paragraph ,dewey remarks3 ,that which is immediately present is the sensuous existence2 that which is known is the content conveyed by this existence4#bh ,the sensation is not known1 and therefore probably not experienced4 ,in this case ,dewey is departing from his own principles1 by introducing non-experienced factors into his interpretation of experience4 ,the language is ambiguous4 ,if nothing is immediately given1 then the sensuous content is not so given4 ,the 'sensuous existences' assumed by ,dewey are the ghosts of ,kant's 'manifold of sensation4' ,the difficulty comes out clearly in the following passage3 ,it is indifferent to the sensation whether it is interpreted as a cloud or as a mountain2 a danger signal1 or a signal of open passage4 ,the auditory sensation remains unchanged whether it is interpreted as an evil spirit urging one to murder1 or as intra-organic1 due to disordered blood-pressure4444 ,it is not the sensation in and of itself that means this or that object2 it is the sensation as associated1 composed1 identified1 or discriminated with other experiences2 the sensation1 in short1 as mediated4 ,the whole worth of the sensation for intelligence is the meaning it has by virtue of its relation to the rest of experience4#bi ,there is an obvious parallel between this view of experience and ,kant's4 ,kant1 indeed1 transcended the notion that experience is a structure of sensations set in a frame-work of thought forms2 but the first ,critique undoubtedly leaves the average reader with such a conception of experience4 ,it is unjust to ,kant1 however1 to take the mechanical aspect of his thought as its most important phase4 ,he stands1 in the opinion of modern critics1 at a half-way stage between the mechanism of the eighteenth century and the organic logic of the nineteenth1 and his works point the way from the lower to the higher point of view4 ,this was recognized by ,hegel and by his followers in ,england4 ,how does it happen1 then1 that ,dewey1 who was well-read in the philosophical literature of the day1 should have persisted in a view of experience which appears to assume the externally organized manifold of the ,critique of ,pure ,reason8 ,or1 to put the question more explicitly1 why did he retain as a fundamental assumption ,kant's 'manifold of sensations'8 ,so far1 ,dewey has been concerned with the nature of meaning4 ,he now turns to knowledge1 and the knowing process as that which gives meaning to experience4 ,knowledge1 or science1 he says1 is a process of following out the ideal element in experience4 ,the idealisation of science is simply a further development of this ideal element4 ,it is1 in short1 only rendering explicit and definite the meaning1 the idea1 already contained in perception4#cj ,but if perception is already organized by thought1 the sensations must have been related in a 'productive imagination4' ,dewey1 however1 does not recognize such a necessity4 ,the factor of meaning is ideal1 he continues1 because it is not present as so much immediate content1 but is present as symbolized or mediated4 ,but the question may be asked1 ,whence come the ideal elements which give to experience its meaning8 ,no answer can be given except by psychology1 as an inquiry into the facts1 as contrasted with the logical necessity of experience4 ,sensations acquire meaning through being identified with and discriminated from other sensations to which they are related4 ,but it is not as mere existences that they are compared and related1 but as already ideas or meanings4 ,the identification is of the meaning of the present sensation with some meaning previously experienced1 but which1 although previously experienced1 still exists because it is meaning1 and not occurrence4#ca ,the existences to which meanings attach come and go1 and are new for every new appearance of the idea in consciousness2 but the meanings remain4 ,the experience1 as an existence at a given time1 has forever vanished4 ,its meaning1 as an ideal quality1 remains as long as the mind does4 ,indeed1 its remaining is the remaining of the mind2 the conservation of the ideal quality of experience is what makes the mind a permanence4#cb ,it is not possible1 ,dewey says1 to imagine a primitive state in which unmeaning sensations existed alone4 ,meaning cannot arise out of that which has no meaning4 ,sensations cannot revive each other except as members of one whole of meaning2 and even if they could1 we should have no beginning of significant experience4 ,significance1 meaning1 must be already there4 ,intelligence1 in short1 is the one indispensable condition of intelligent experience4#cc ,thinking is an act which idealizes experience by transforming sensations into an intelligible whole4 ,it works by seizing upon the ideal element which is already there1 conserving it1 and developing it4 ,it produces knowledge by supplying relations to experience4 ,dewey realizes that his act of intelligence is similar to ,kant's 'apperceptive unity4' ,he says3 ,the mention of ,kant's name suggests that both his strength and his weakness lie in the line just mentioned4 ,it is his strength that he recognizes that an apperceptive unity interpreting sensations through categories which constitute the synthetic content of self-consciousness is indispensable to experience4 ,it is his weakness that he conceives this content as purely logical1 and hence as formal4#cd ,kant's error was to treat the self as formal and held apart from its material4 ,the self does not work with a priori forms upon an a posteriori material1 but intelligence as ideal 7or a priori7 constitutes experience 7or the a posteriori7 as having meaning4#ce ,dewey's standpoint here seems to be similar to that of ,green4 ,but as ,kant's unity of apperception became for ,green merely a symbol of the world's inherent intelligibility1 the latter did not regard it as an actual process of synthesis4 ,dewey fails to make a distinction1 which might have been useful to him1 between ,kant's unity of apperception and his productive imagination4 ,it is the latter which ,dewey retains1 and he tends to identify it with the empirical process of the understanding4 ,knowing1 psychologically considered1 is a synthetic process4 ,and this is to say that experience grows as intelligence adds out of its own ideal content ideal quality4444 ,the growth of the power of comparison implies not a formal growth1 but a synthetic internal growth4#cf ,dewey1 of course1 views understanding as an integral part of reality's processes rather than as a process apart1 but it is for him a very special activity1 which builds up the meaning of experience4 ,knowledge might be indifferently described1 therefore1 as a process of idealisation of experience1 or of realisation of intelligence4 ,it is each through the other4 ,ultimately the growth of experience must consist in the development out of itself by intelligence of its own implicit ideal content upon occasion of the solicitation of sensation4#cg ,the difficulties of ,dewey's original position are numerous4 ,the relation of the self1 as a synthetic activity1 to the ,eternal ,consciousness1 in which meaning already exists in a completed form1 is especially perplexing4 ,does the self merely trace out the meaning already present in reality1 or is it a factor in the creation of meaning8 ,it is clear that if the thinking process is a genuinely synthetic activity1 imposing meaning on sensations1 it literally 'makes the world' of our experience4 ,but1 on the other hand1 if meaning is given to thought1 as a part of its data1 the self merely reproduces in a subjective experience the thought which exists objectively in the eternal mind4 ,the dilemma arises as a result of ,dewey's initial conception of reality as a structure of sensations and meanings4 ,this conception of reality must be given up1 if the notion of thought as a process of idealization is to be retained4 ,in #ahhh1 ,dewey's ,leibniz's ,new ,essays ,concerning the ,human ,understanding appeared1 and during the two years following he appears to have become interested in ethical theory1 the results of his study beginning to appear in #ahij4 ,dewey's ethical theories have so important a bearing upon his logical theory as to demand special attention4 ,they will be reserved1 therefore1 for a separate chapter1 and attention will be given here to the more strictly logical studies of the period4 ,the three years which intervened between the publication of the essay on ,knowledge as ,idealisation and the appearance of an article ,on ,some ,current ,conceptions of the term ',self1' in ,mind 7#ahij71ch did not serve to divert ,dewey's attention from the inquiries in which he had previously been interested4 ,on the contrary1 the later article shows how persistently his mind must have dwelt upon the problems connected with the notion of the self as a synthetic activity in experience4 ,the immediate occasion for the article on the ,self was the appearance of ,professor ,andrew ,seth's work1 ,hegelianism and ,personality 7#ahhi74 ,dewey appears to have been influenced by ,seth at an even earlier period1#ci and he now found the lectures on ,hegel stimulating in connection with his own problems about thought and reality4 ,it will not be necessary to go into the details of ,dewey's criticism of the three ideas of the self presented by ,seth4 ,since it is ,dewey's own position that is in question1 it is better to begin with his account of the historical origin of these definitions1 chiefly as found in ,kant1 incidentally in ,hegel as related to ,kant4#dj ,dewey turns to the ',transcendental ,deduction1' and follows ,kant's description of the synthetic unity of apperception4 ,its gist1 he says1 in the second edition of the ,k4d4r4,v41 is the proof that the identity of self-consciousness involves the synthesis of the manifold of feelings through rules or principles which render this manifold objective1 and that1 therefore1 the analytic identity of self-consciousness involves an objective synthetic unity of consciousness4#da ,to say that self-consciousness is identical is a merely analytical proposition1 and1 as it stands1 unfruitful4 ,but if we ask how we know this sameness or identity of consciousness1 the barren principle becomes wonderfully fruitful4#db ,in order to know reality as mine1 not only must the consciousness that it is mine accompany each particular impression1 but each must be known as an element in one consciousness4 ,the sole way of accounting for this analytic identity of consciousness is through the activity of consciousness in connecting or 'putting together' the manifold of sense4#dc ,in the ',deduction' of the first ,critique1 ,dewey continues1 ,kant begins with the consciousness of objects1 rather than with the identity of self-consciousness4 ,here also consciousness implies a unity1 which is not merely formal1 but one which actually connects the manifold of sense by an act4 ,whether1 then1 we inquire what is involved in mere sameness of consciousness1 or what is involved in an objective world1 we get the same answer3 a consciousness which is not formal or analytic1 but which is synthetic of sense1 and which acts universally 7according to principles7 in this synthesis4#dd ,the term ',self1' as thus employed by ,kant1 ,dewey says1 is the correlative of the intelligible world4 ,it is the transcendental self looked at as 'there1' as a product1 instead of as an activity or process4#de ,this1 however1 by no means exhausts what ,kant means by the self1 for while he proceeds in the ',deduction' as if the manifold of sense and the synthetic unity of the self were strictly correlative1 he assumes a different attitude elsewhere4 ,the manifold of sense is something in relation to the thing-in-itself1 and the forms of thought have a reference beyond their mere application to the manifold4 ,in the other connections the self appears as something purely formal2 something apart from its manifestation in experience4 ,in view of the wider meaning of the self1 ,dewey asks1 ,can the result of the transcendental deduction stand without further interpretation8 ,it would appear that the content of the self is not the same as the content of the known world4 ,the self is too great to exhaust itself in relation to sensation4 ,sense is1 as it were1 inadequate to the relations which constitute self-consciousness1 and thus there must also remain a surplusage in the self1 not entering into the make-up of the known world4#df ,this follows from the fact that1 while the self is unconditioned1 the manifold of sensation is conditioned1 as given1 by the forms of space and time4 ,experience can never be complete enough to have a content equal to that of self-consciousness1 for experience can never escape its limitation through space and time4 ,self-consciousness is real1 and not merely logical2 it is the ground of the reality of experience2 it is wider than experience1 and yet is unknown except so far as it is reflected through its own determinations in experience1--this is the result of our analysis of ,kant1 the ,ding-an-,sich being eliminated but the ,kantian method and all presuppositions not involved in the notion of the ,ding-an-,sich being retained4#dg ,dewey's interpretation of ,kant's doctrine as presented in the ',deductions' is no doubt essentially correct4 ,but granting that ,kant found it necessary to introduce a synthesis in imagination to account for the unity of experience and justify our knowledge of its relations1 it must not be forgotten that this necessity followed from the nature of his presuppositions4 ,if the primal reality is a 'manifold of sensations1' proceeding from a noumenal source1 and lacking meaning and relations1 it follows that the manifold must be gathered up into a unity before the experience which we actually apprehend can be accounted for4 ,but if reality is experience1 possessing order and coherence in its own nature1 the productive imagination is rendered superfluous4 ,dewey1 however1 clings to the notion that thought is a synthetic activity which makes experience1 and draws support from ,kant for his doctrine4 ,dewey now inquires what relation this revised ,kantian conception of the self bears to the view advanced by ,seth1 viz41 that the idea of self-consciousness is the highest category of thought and explanation4 ,kant had tried to discover the different forms of synthesis1 by a method somewhat artificial to be sure1 and had found twelve of them4 ,while ,hegel's independent derivation and independent placing of the categories must be accepted1 it does not follow that the idea of self-consciousness can be included in the list1 even if it be considered the highest category4 ,for it is impossible as long as we retain ,kant's fundamental presupposition--the idea of the partial determination of sensation by relation to perception1 apart from its relation to conception--to employ self-consciousness as a principle of explaining any fact of experience4#dh ,it cannot be said of the self of ,kant that it is simply an hypostatized category4 ,it is more1 because the self of ,kant 444 is more than any category3 it is a real activity or being4#di ,hegel1 ,dewey continues1 develops only one aspect of ,kant's ,critique1 that is1 the logical aspect1 and consequently does not fulfil ,kant's entire purpose4 ,this is1 ,i repeat1 not an immanent 'criticism of categories' but an analysis of experience into its aspects and really constituent elements4#ej ,dewey1 as usual1 shows his opposition to a 'merely logical' method in philosophy4 ,he plainly indicates his dissatisfaction with the ,hegelian development of ,kant's standpoint4 ,he is unfair to ,hegel1 however1 in attributing to him a 'merely logical' method4 ,kant's self was1 as ,dewey asserts1 something more than a category of thought1 but it is scarcely illuminating to say of ,kant that his purpose was the analysis of experience into its 'constituent elements4' ,kant did1 indeed1 analyze experience1 but this analysis must be regarded as incidental to a larger purpose4 ,no criticism need be made of ,dewey's preference for the psychological1 as opposed to the logical aspects of ,kant's work4 ,the only comment to be made is that this attitude is not in line with the modern development of idealism4 ,the question which finally emerges1 as the result of ,dewey's inquiry1 is this3 ,what is the nature of this self-activity which is more than the mere category of self-consciousness8 ,as long as sensation was regarded as given by a thing-in-itself1 it was possible to form a conception of the self which did not identify it with the world4 ,but when sense is regarded as having meaning only because it is 'there' as determined by thought1 just as thought is 'there' only as determining sense1 it would seem either that the self is just their synthetic unity 7thus equalling the world7 or that it must be thrust back of experience1 and become a thing-in-itself4 ,the activity of the self can hardly be a third something distinct from thought and from sense1 and it cannot be their synthetic union4 ,what1 then1 is it8#ea ,green1 ,dewey says1 attempted to solve the difficulty by his idea of a completely realized self making an animal organism the vehicle of its own reproduction in time4#eb ,this attempt was at least in the right direction1 acknowledging as it did the fact that the self is something more than the highest category of thought4 ,dewey admits his difficulties in a way that makes extended comment unnecessary4 ,he does not challenge the validity of the ,hegelian development of the ,kantian categories1 but proposes to make more of the self than the ,hegelians ordinarily do4 ,this synthetic self-activity must reveal itself as a concrete process2 that is one of the demands of his psychological standpoint4 ,it is impossible to foresee what this process would be as an actual fact of experience4 ,although the next article which is to be considered does not offer a direct answer to the problems which have so far been raised1 it nevertheless indicates the general direction which ,dewey's thought is to take4 ,this article1 on ,the ,present ,position of ,logical ,theory1 was published in the ,monist in #ahia4ec ,dewey appears at this time as the champion of the transcendental1 or ,hegelian logic1 in opposition to formal and inductive logic4 ,his attitude toward ,hegel undergoes a marked change at this period4 ,dewey's general objection to formal logic is well expressed in the following passage3 ,it is assumed1 in fine1 that thought has a nature of its own independent of facts or subject-matter2 that this thought1 per se1 has certain forms1 and that these forms are not forms which the facts themselves take1 varying with the facts1 but are rigid frames1 into which the facts are to be set4 ,now all of this conception--the notion that the mind has a faculty of thought apart from things1 the notion that this faculty is constructed1 in and of itself1 with a fixed framework1 the notion that thinking is the imposing of this fixed framework on some unyielding matter called particular objects1 or facts--all of this conception appears to me as highly scholastic4#ed ,the inductive logic1 ,dewey says1 still clings to the notion of thought as a faculty apart from its material1 operating with bare forms upon sensations4 ,kant had been guilty of this separation and never overcame it successfully4 ,because formal logic views thought as a process apart from the matter with which it has to deal1 it can never be the logic of science4 ,for if science means anything1 it is that our ideas1 our judgments may in some degree reflect and report the fact itself4 ,science means1 on one hand1 that thought is free to attack and get hold of its subject-matter1 and1 on the other1 that fact is free to break through into thought2 free to impress itself--or rather to express itself--in intelligence without vitiation or deflection4 ,scientific men are true to the instinct of the scientific spirit in fighting shy of a distinct a priori factor supplied to fact from the mind4 ,apriorism of this sort must seem like an effort to cramp the freedom of intelligence and of fact1 to bring them under the yoke of fixed1 external forms4#ee ,in opposition to this formal1 and1 as he calls it1 subjective standpoint in logic1 ,dewey stands for the transcendental logic1 which supposes that there is some kind of vital connection between thought and fact2 that thinking1 in short1 is nothing but the fact in its process of translation from brute impression to lucent meaning4#ef ,hegel holds this view of logic4 ,this1 then1 is why ,i conceive ,hegel--entirely apart from the value of any special results--to represent the quintessence of the scientific spirit4 ,he denies not only the possibility of getting truth out of a formal1 apart thought1 but he denies the existence of any faculty of thought which is other than the expression of fact itself4#eg ,at another place ,dewey expresses his view of ,hegel as follows3 ,relations of thought are1 to ,hegel1 the typical forms of meaning which the subject-matter takes in its various progressive stages of being understood4#eh ,dewey's defence of the transcendental logic is vigorous4 ,he maintains that the disrespect into which the transcendental logic had fallen1 was due to the fact that the popular comprehension of the transcendental movement had been arrested at ,kant1 and had never gone on to ,hegel4 ,the objection made to ,kant's standpoint is that it treated thought as a process over against experience1 imposing its forms upon it from without4 ,kant never dreams1 for a moment1 of questioning the existence of a special faculty of thought with its own peculiar and fixed forms4 ,he states and restates that thought in itself exists apart from fact and occupies itself with fact given to it from without4#ei ,while ,kant gave the death blow to a merely formal conception of thought1 indirectly1 and opened up the way for an organic interpretation1 he did not achieve the higher standpoint himself4 ,remaining at the standpoint of ,kant1 therefore1 the critic of the transcendental logic has much to complain of4 ,scientific men deal with facts1 look to them for guidance1 and must suppose that thought and fact pass into each other directly1 and without vitiation or deflection4 ,they are correct in opposing a conception which would interpose conditions between thought on the one hand and the facts on the other4 ,but ,hegel is true to the scientific spirit4 ,when ,hegel calls thought objective he means just what he says3 that there is no special1 apart faculty of thought belonging to and operated by a mind existing separate from the outer world4 ,what ,hegel means by objective thought is the meaning1 the significance of the fact itself2 and by methods of thought he understands simply the processes in which this meaning of fact is evolved4#fj ,if ,hegel is true to the scientific spirit2 if his logic presupposes that there is an intrinsic connection of thought and fact1 and views science simply as the progressive realization of the world's ideality1 then the only questions to be asked about his logic are questions of fact concerning his treatment of the categories4 ,is the world such a connected system as he holds it to be8 ,and1 if a system1 does it1 in particular1 present such phases 7such relations1 categories7 as ,hegel shows forth8#fa ,these questions are wholly objective4 ,such a logic as ,hegel's could scarcely make headway when it was first produced1 because the significance of the world1 its ideal character1 had not been brought to light through the sciences4 ,we are now reaching a stage1 however1 where science has brought the ideality of the world into the foreground1 where it may become as real and objective a material of study as molecules and vibrations4 ,this appreciation of ,hegel would seem to indicate that ,dewey has finally grasped the significance of ,hegel's development of the ,kantian standpoint4 ,a close reading of the article1 however1 dispels this impression4 ,dewey believes that he has found in ,hegel a support for his own psychological method in philosophy4 ,it is scarcely necessary to say that ,hegel's standpoint was anything but psychological4 ,dewey has already given up ,kant2 he will presently desert ,hegel4 ,a psychological interpretation of the thought-process in its relations to reality is not compatible with the critical method in philosophy4 ,in the next article to be examined1 ,the ,superstition of ,necessity1 in the ,monist 7#ahic71fb ,dewey begins to attain the psychological description of thought at which he had been aiming4 ,this article was suggested1 as ,dewey indicates in a foot-note1 by ,mr4 ,c4 ,s4 ,pierce's article1 ,the ,doctrine of ,necessity ,examined1 in the ,monist 7#ahib74fc ,although ,dewey acknowledges his indebtedness to ,pierce for certain suggestions1 the two articles have little in common4 ,dewey had consistently maintained that thought is a synthetic activity through which reality is idealized or takes on meaning4 ,it is from this standpoint that he approaches the subject of necessity4 ,the following passage reveals the connection between his former position and the one that he is now approaching3 ,the whole1 although first in the order of reality1 is last in the order of knowledge4 ,the complete statement of the whole is the goal1 not the beginning of wisdom4 ,we begin1 therefore1 with fragments1 which are taken for wholes2 and it is only by piecing together these fragments1 and by the transformation of them involved in this combination1 that we arrive at the real fact4 ,there comes a stage at which the recognition of the unity begins to dawn upon us1 and yet1 the tradition of the many distinct wholes survives2 judgment has to combine these two contradictory conceptions2 it does so by the theory that the dawning unity is an effect necessarily produced by the interaction of the former wholes4 ,only as the consciousness of the unity grows still more is it seen that instead of a group of independent facts1 held together by 'necessary' ties1 there is one reality1 of which we have been apprehending various fragments in succession and attributing to them a spurious wholeness and independence4 ,we learn 7but only at the end7 that instead of discovering and then connecting together a number of separate realities1 we have been engaged in the progressive definition of one fact4#fd ,dewey adds to his idea that our knowledge of reality is a progressive development of its implicit ideality through a synthetic thought-process1 the specification that the process of idealization occurs in connection with particular crises and situations4 ,there comes a stage1 he says1 when unity begins to dawn and meaning emerges4 ,necessity is a term used in connection with these transitions from partial to greater realization of the world's total meaning4 ,necessity is a middle term1 or go-between4 ,it marks a critical stage in the development of knowledge4 ,no necessity attaches to a whole1 as such4 ,qua whole1 the fact simply is what it is2 while the parts1 instead of being necessitated either by one another or by the whole1 are the analyzed factors constituting1 in their complete circuit1 the whole4#fe ,but when the original whole breaks up1 through its inability to comprehend new facts under its unity1 a process of judgment occurs which aims at the establishment of a new unity4 ,the judgment of necessity1 in other words1 is exactly and solely the transition in our knowledge from unconnected judgments to a more comprehensive synthesis4 ,its value is just the value of this transition2 as negating the old partial and isolated judgments--in its backward look--necessity has meaning2 in its forward look--with reference to the resulting completely organized subject-matter--it is itself as false as the isolated judgments which it replaces4#ff ,we say that things must be so1 when we do not know that they are so2 that is1 while we are in course of determining what they are4 ,necessity has its value exclusively in this transition4 ,dewey attempts to show1 in a discussion which need not be followed in detail1 that there is nothing radical in his view1 and that it finds support among the idealists and empiricists alike4 ,thinkers of both schools 7he quotes ,caird and ,venn7 admit that the process of judgment involves a change in objects1 at least as they are for us4 ,there is a transformation of their value and meaning4 ,this point being held in common1 both schools must agree that the progress of judgment is equivalent to a change in the value of objects--that objects as they are for us1 as known1 change with the development of our judgments4#fg ,dewey proposes to give a more specific description of this process of transformation1 and especially1 to show how the idea of necessity is involved in it4 ,the process of transformation is occasioned by practical necessity4 ,men have a tendency to take objects as just so much and no more2 to attach to a given subject-matter these predicates1 and no others4 ,there is a principle of inertia1 or economy1 in the mind1 which leads it to maintain objects in their status quo as long as possible4 ,there is no doubt that the reluctance of the mind to give up an object once made lies deep in its economies4444 ,i wish here to call attention to the fact that the forming of a number of distinct objects has its origin in practical needs of our nature4 ,the analysis and synthesis which is first made is that of most practical importance4444#fh ,we tend to retain such objects as we have1 and it is not until the original subject-matter has been overloaded with various and opposing predicates that we think of doubting the correctness of our first judgments1 of putting our first objects under suspicion4#fi ,once the ,ptolemaic system is well established1 cycles and epicycles are added without number1 rather than reconstruct the original object4 ,when1 finally1 we are compelled to make some change1 we tend to invent some new object to which the predicates can attach4 ,when qualities arise so incompatible with the object already formed that they cannot be referred to that object1 it is easier to form a new object on their basis than it is to doubt the correctness of the old4444#gj ,let us suppose1 then1 that under stress of practical need1 we refer the new predicates to some new object1 and have1 as a consequence1 two objects4 7,dewey illustrates this situation by specific examples47 ,this separation of the two objects cannot continue long1 before we begin to discover that the two objects are related elements in a larger whole4 ,the wall of partition between the two separate 'objects' cannot be broken at one attack2 they have to be worn away by the attrition arising from their slow movement into one another4 ,it is the 'necessary' influence which one exerts upon the other that finally rubs away the separateness and leaves them revealed as elements of one unified whole4#ga ,the concept of necessity has its validity in such a movement of judgment as has been described4 ,necessity1 as the middle term1 is the mid-wife which1 from the dying isolation of judgments1 delivers the unified judgment just coming into life--it being understood that the separateness of the original judgments is not as yet quite negated1 nor the unity of the coming judgment quite attained4#gb ,the judgment of necessity connects itself with certain facts in the situation which are immediately concerned with our practical activities4 ,these are facts which1 before the crisis arises1 have been neglected2 they are elements in the situation which have been regarded as unessential1 as not yet making up a part of the original object4 ,although after our desire has been met they have been eliminated as accidental1 as irrelevant1 yet when the experience is again desired their integral membership in the real fact has to be recognized4 ,this is done under the guise of considering them as means which are necessary to bring about the end4#gc ,we have the if so1 then so situation4 ,if we are to reach an end we must take certain means2 while so far as we want an undefined end1 an end in general1 conditions which accompany it are mere accidents4#gd ,the end of this process of judgment in which necessity appears as a half-way stage1 is the unity of reality2 a whole into which the formerly discordant factors can be gathered together4 ,only a detailed study of the original text1 with its careful illustrations1 can furnish a thorough understanding of ,dewey's position4 ,enough has been said1 however1 to show that this psychological account of the judgment process is a natural outgrowth of his former views1 and that1 as it stands1 it is still in conformity with his original idealism4 ,the article as a whole marks a half-way stage in ,dewey's philosophical development4 ,looking backward1 it is a partial fulfilment of the demands of ,the ,psychological ,standpoint4 ,it is a psychological description of the processes whereby self-consciousness specifies itself into parts which are still related to the whole4 ,looking forward1 it forecasts the functional theory of knowledge4 ,we have1 to begin with1 objects given as familiar or known experiences4 ,so long as these are not put under suspicion or examined1 they simply are themselves1 or are non-cognitionally experienced4 ,but on the occasion of a conflict in experience between opposed facts and their meanings1 a process of judgment arises1 whose function is to restore unity4 ,it is in this process of judgment as an operation in the interests of the unity of experience1 that the concepts1 necessity and contingency1 have their valid application and use4 ,they are instruments for effecting a transformation of experience4 ,this is the root idea of functional instrumentalism4 ,it is apparent1 therefore1 that ,dewey's later functionalism resulted from the natural growth and development of the psychological standpoint which he adopted at the beginning of his philosophical career4 ,,footnotes3 #ba ,vol4 ,,xii1 pp4 #chb-cif4 #bb ,ibid41 p4 #cid4 #bc ,op4 cit41 p4 #chc4 #bd ,ibid4 #be ,ibid41 p4 #chd4 #bf ,ibid4 #bg ,op4 cit41 p4 #che4 #bh ,ibid4 #bi ,ibid41 p4 #chh4 #cj ,op4 cit41 p4 #cij4 #ca ,ibid41 p4 #cib4 #cb ,op4 cit4 #cc ,ibid41 p4 #cic4 #cd ,ibid41 p4 #cid4 #ce ,ibid41 p4 #cie4 #cf ,op4 cit4 #cg ,ibid41 p4 #cif4 7,the last sentence forecasts ,dewey's later contention that knowing is a specific act operating upon the occasion of need47 #ch ,vol4 ,,xv1 pp4 #eh-gd4 #ci ,see ,mind1 ,vol4 ,,xi1 #ahhf1 p4 #agj4 #dj ,ibid41 p4 #fc4 #da ,ibid4 #db ,ibid41 p4 #fd4 #dc ,op4 cit4 #dd ,ibid41 p4 #fe4 #de ,ibid4 #df ,op4 cit41 p4 #fg4 #dg ,ibid41 p4 #fh4 #dh ,op4 cit41 p4 #gj4 #di ,ibid41 p4 #ga4 #ej ,ibid4 #ea ,op4 cit41 p4 #gc4 #eb ,ibid4 #ec ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #a-ag4 #ed ,op4 cit41 p4 #d4 #ee ,ibid41 p4 #ab4 #ef ,ibid41 p4 #c4 #eg ,ibid41 p4 #ad4 #eh ,ibid41 p4 #ac4 #ei ,op4 cit41 p4 #aa4 #fj ,ibid41 p4 #ab f4 #fa ,op4 cit41 p4 #ad4 #fb ,vol4 ,,iii1 pp4 #cfb-cgi4 #fc ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #cba-ccg4 #fd ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 #ahic1 p4 #cfd4 #fe ,ibid41 p4 #cfc4 #ff ,op4 cit4 #fg ,ibid41 p4 #cfd f4 #fh ,ibid41 p4 #cfg4 #fi ,ibid41 p4 #cff4 #gj ,op4 cit41 p4 #cfg4 #ga ,ibid41 p4 #cfh4 #gb ,ibid41 p4 #cfc4 #gc ,op4 cit41 p4 #cgb4 #gd ,ibid4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,moral ,,theory ,,and ,,practice ,dewey's ethical theory1 as has already been indicated1 stands in close relation to his general theory of knowledge4 ,since it has been found expedient to treat the ethical theory separately1 it will be necessary to go back some two years and trace it from its beginnings4 ,the order of arrangement that has been chosen is fortunate in this respect1 since it brings into close connection two articles which are really companion pieces1 in spite of the two-year interval which separates them4 ,these are ,the ,superstition of ,necessity1 which was considered at the close of the last chapter1 and ,moral ,theory and ,practice1 an article published in ,the ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 in ,january1 #ahia4ge ,this latter article1 now to be examined1 is one of ,dewey's first serious undertakings in the field of ethical theory1 and probably represents some of the results of his study in connection with his text-book1 ,outlines of a ,critical ,theory of ,ethics1 published in the same year 7#ahia74 ,the immediate occasion for the article is explained by ,dewey in his introductory remarks3 ,in the first number of this journal four writers touch upon the same question1--the relation of moral theory to moral practice4#gf ,the four writers mentioned were ,sidgwick1 ,adler1 ,bosanquet1 and ,salter4 ,none of them1 according to ,dewey1 had directly discussed the relation of moral theory to practice4 ,but1 he says1 finding the subject touched upon 444 in so many ways1 ,i was led to attempt to clear up my own ideas4#gg ,there seems to exist1 ,dewey continues1 the idea that moral theory is something other than1 or something beyond1 an analysis of conduct1--the idea that it is not simply and wholly 'the theory of practice4'#gh ,it is often defined1 for instance1 as an inquiry into the metaphysics of morals1 which has nothing to do with practice4 ,but1 ,dewey believes1 there must be some intrinsic connection between the theory of morals and moral practice4 ,such intrinsic connection may be denied on the ground that practice existed long before theory made its appearance4 ,codes of morality were in existence before ,plato1 ,kant1 or ,spencer rose to speculate upon them4 ,this raises the question1 ,what is theory8 ,moral theory is nothing more than a proposed act in idea4 ,it is insight1 or perception of the relations and bearings of the contemplated act4 ,it is all one with moral insight1 and moral insight is the recognition of the relationships in hand4 ,this is a very tame and prosaic conception4 ,it makes moral insight1 and therefore moral theory1 consist simply in the everyday workings of the same ordinary intelligence that measures drygoods1 drives nails1 sells wheat1 and invents the telephone4#gi ,the nature of theory as idea is more definitely described4 ,it is the construction of the act in thought against its outward construction4 ,it is1 therefore1 the doing1--the act itself1 in its emerging4#hj ,theory is practice in idea1 or as foreseen2 it is the perception of what ought to be done4 ,this1 at least1 is what moral theory is4 ,dewey's demand that fact and theory must have some intrinsic connection1 unsatisfied in the articles reviewed in the previous chapter1 is met here by discovering a connecting link in action4 ,theory is the doing1--the act itself in its emerging4 ,the reduction of thought to terms of action1 here implied1 is a serious step4 ,it marks a new tendency in ,dewey's speculation4 ,dewey does not claim1 in the present article1 that his remarks hold good for all theory4 ,physical science1 he remarks1 does deal with abstractions1 with hypothesis4 ,it says1 ',if this1 then that4' ,it deals with the relations of conditions and not with facts1 or individuals1 at all4 ,it says1 ',i have nothing to do with your concrete falling stone1 but ,i can tell you this1 that it is a law of falling bodies that1 etc4'#ha ,but moral theory is compelled to deal with concrete situations4 ,it must be a theory which can be applied directly to the particular case4 ,moral theory cannot exist simply in a book4 ,since1 moreover1 there is no such thing as theory in the abstract1 there can be no abstract theory of morals4 ,there can be no difficulty1 ,dewey believes1 in understanding moral theory as action in idea4 ,all action that is intelligent1 all conduct1 that is1 involves theory4 ,for any act 7as distinct from mere impulse7 there must be 'theory1' and the wider the act1 the greater its import1 the more exigent the demand for theory4#hb ,this does not1 however1 answer the question how any particular moral theory1 the ,kantian1 the ,hedonistic1 or the ,hegelian1 is related to action4 ,these systems present1 not 'moral ideas' as explained above1 but 'ideas about morality4' ,what relation have ideas about morality to specific moral conduct8 ,the answer to this question is to be obtained through an understanding of the nature of the moral situation4 ,if an act is moral1 it must be intelligent2 as moral conduct1 it implies insight into the situation at hand4 ,this insight is obtained by an examination and analysis of the concrete situation4 ,this is evidently a work of analysis4 ,like every analysis1 it requires that the one making it be in possession of certain working tools4 ,i cannot resolve this practical situation which faces me by merely looking at it4 ,i must attack it with such instruments of analysis as ,i have at hand4 ,what we call moral rules are precisely such tools of analysis4#hc ,the ,golden ,rule is such an instrument of analysis4 ,taken by itself1 it offers no direct information as to what is to be done4 ,the rule is a counsel of perfection2 it is a warning that in my analysis of the moral situation 7that is1 of the conditions of practice7 ,i be impartial as to the effects on me and thee4'#hd ,every rule which is of any use at all is employed in a similar fashion4 ,but this is not1 so far1 a statement of the nature of moral theory1 since only particular rules have been considered4 ,ethical theory1 in its wider significance1 is a reflective process in which1 as one might say1 the 'tools of analysis' are shaped and adapted to their work4 ,these rules are not fixed things1 made once and for all1 but of such a nature that they preserve their effectiveness only as they are constantly renewed and reshaped4 ,ethical theory brings the ,golden ,rule together with other general ideas1 conforms them to each other1 and in this way gives the moral rule a great scope in practice4 ,all moral theory1 therefore1 is finally linked up with practice4 ,it bears much the same relation to the particular rule as this to the special case4 ,it is a tool for the analysis of its meaning1 and thereby a tool for giving it greater effect4#he ,in ethical theory we find moral rules in the making4 ,ideas about morals are simply moral ideas in the course of being formed4 ,dewey presents here an instrumental theory of knowledge and concepts4 ,but it differs widely from the instrumentalism of the ,neo-,hegelian school both in its form and derivation4 ,dewey reaches his instrumentalism through a psychological analysis of the judgment process4 ,he finds that theory is related to fact through action1 and since he had been unable to give a concrete account of this relationship at a previous time1 the conclusion may be regarded as a discovery of considerable moment for his philosophical method4 ,dewey's instrumentalism rests upon a very special psychological interpretation1 which puts action first and thought second4 ,unable to discover an overt connection between fact and thought1 he delves underground for it1 and finds it in the activities of the nervous organism4 ,this discovery1 he believes1 solves once and for all the ancient riddle of the relation of thought to reality4 ,in the concluding part of the article ,dewey takes up the consideration of moral obligation4 ,what is the relation of knowledge1 of theory1 to that ,ought which seems to be the very essence of moral conduct8#hf ,the answer anticipates in some measure the position which was taken later1 as has been seen1 in regard to necessity4 ,the concept of obligation1 like that of necessity1 ,dewey believes1 has relevance only for the judgment situation4 ,but1 ,dewey says1 limiting the question as best ,i can1 ,i should say 7first7 that the 'ought' always rises from and falls back into the 'is1' and 7secondly7 that the 'ought' is itself an 'is1'--the 'is' of action4#hg ,obligation is not something added to the conclusion of a judgment1 something which gives a moral aspect to what had been a coldly intellectual matter4 ,the 'ought' finds an integral place in the judgment process4 ,the difference between saying1 'this act is the one to be done1 444' and saying1 ',the act ought to be done1' is merely verbal4 ,the analysis of action is from the first an analysis of what is to be done2 how1 then1 should it come out excepting with a 'this should be done'8#hh ,the peculiarity of the 'ought' is that it applies to conduct or action1 whereas the 'is' applies to the facts4 ,it has reference to doing1 or acting1 as the situation demands4 ,this1 then1 is the relation of moral theory and practice4 ,theory is the cross-section of the given state of action in order to know the conduct that should be2 practice is the realization of the idea thus gained3 in is theory in action4#hi ,the parallel between this article and ,the ,superstition of ,necessity is too obvious to require formulation1 and the same criticism that applies to the one is applicable to the other4 ,the ,superstition of ,necessity is more detailed and concrete in its treatment of the judgment process than this earlier article1 as might be expected1 but the fundamental position is essentially the same4 ,the synthetic activity of the self1 the thought-process1 finally appears as the servant of action1 or1 more exactly1 as itself a special mode of organic activity in general4 ,from the basis of the standpoint which he had now attained ,dewey attempted a criticism of ,green's moral theory1 in two articles in the ,philosophical ,review1 in #ahib and #ahic4 ,the first of these1 entitled ,green's ,theory of the ,moral ,motive1#ij appeared almost two years after the article on ,moral ,theory and ,practice4 ,the continuity of ,dewey's thought during the intervening period1 however1 is indicated by the fact that the first four pages of the article to be considered are given over to an introductory discussion which repeats in almost identical terms the position taken in ,moral ,theory and ,practice4 ,dewey himself calls attention to this fact in a foot-note4 ,there must be1 ,dewey again asserts1 some vital connection of theory with practice4 ,ethical theory must be a general statement of the reality involved in every moral situation4 ,it must be action stated in its more generic terms1 terms so generic that every individual action will fall within the outlines it sets forth4 ,if the theory agrees with these requirements1 then we have for use in any special case a tool for analyzing that case2 a method for attacking and reducing it1 for laying it open so that the action called for in order to meet1 to satisfy it1 may readily appear4#ia ,dewey argues that moral theory cannot possibly give directions for every concrete case1 but that it by no means follows that theory can stand aside from the specific case and say3 ,what have ,i to do with thee8 ,thou art empirical1 and ,i am the metaphysics of conduct4 ,dewey's preliminary remarks are introductory to a consideration of ,green's ethical theory4 ,his theory would1 ,i think1 ,dewey says1 be commonly regarded as the best of the modern attempts to form a metaphysic of ethic4 ,i wish1 using this as type1 to point out the inadequacy of such metaphysical theories1 on the ground that they fail to meet the demand just made of truly ethical theory1 that it lend itself to translation into concrete terms1 and thereby to the guidance1 the direction of actual conduct4#ib ,dewey recognizes that ,green is better than his theory1 but says that the theory1 taken in logical strictness1 cannot meet individual needs4 ,dewey makes a special demand of ,green's theory4 ,he demands1 that is1 that it supply a body of rules1 or guides to action which can be employed by the moral agent as tools of analysis in cases requiring moral judgment4 ,it is evident in advance that ,green's theory was built upon a different plan1 and can not meet the conditions which ,dewey prescribes4 ,the general nature of ,green's inquiry is well stated in the following summary by ,professor ,thilly3 ,the truth in ,green's thought is this3 the purpose of all social devotion and reform is1 after all1 the perfection of man on the spiritual side1 the development of men of character and ideals4444 ,the final purpose of all moral endeavor must be the realization of an attitude of the human soul1 of some form of noble consciousness in human personalities4444 ,it is well enough to feed and house human bodies1 but the paramount question will always be3 ,what kinds of souls are to dwell in these bodies8#ic ,to put the matter in more technical terms1 ,green is concerned with ends and values4 ,his question is not1 ,what is the best means of accomplishing a given purpose1 but1 ,what end is worth attaining8 ,such an inquiry has no immediate relation to action4 ,it may lead to conclusions which become determining factors in action1 but the process of inquiry has no direct reference to conduct4 ,dewey1 having reduced thought to a function of activity1 must proceed1 by logical necessity1 to carry the same reduction into the field of theory in general4 ,this he does in thorough style4 ,his demand that moral theory shall concern itself with concrete and 'specific' situations is a result of the same tendency4 ,since action can only be described as response to a 'situation1' thought1 as a function of activity1 must likewise be directed upon a 'situation4' ,conduct in general and values in general become impossible under his system1 because there is no such thing as an activity-in-general of the organism4 ,ends1 in other words1 exist only for thought1 when thought is interpreted as transcending action1 and being1 in some sense1 self-contained4 ,when thought is interpreted as a kind of 'indirect activity1' its capacity for metaphysical inquiry vanishes along with its independence4 ,it would have been more in keeping with sound criticism had ,dewey himself taken note of the important divergence in aim and intent between his work and ,green's4 ,as a consequence of his failure to do so1 he fails1 necessarily1 to do justice to ,green's standpoint4 ,the criticism which he directs against ,green's moral theory may be briefly summed up as follows4 ,green tends to repeat the ,kantian separation of the self as reason from the self as want or desire4 ,the dualism between reason and sense is given up1 indeed1 but only to be replaced by a dualism between the end which would satisfy the self as a unity or whole1 and that which satisfies it in the particular circumstances of actual conduct4#id ,as a consequence of the separation of the ideal from the actual1 no action can satisfy the whole self1 and thus no action can be truly moral4 ,no thorough-going theory of total depravity ever made righteousness more impossible to the natural man than ,green makes it to a human being by the very constitution of his being4444#ie ,dewey traces this separation of the self as reason from the self as desire through those passages in which ,green describes the moral agent as one who distinguishes himself from his desires 7,book ,,ii1 ,prolegomena to ,ethics74 ,the process of moral experience involves1 therefore1 a process in which the self1 in becoming conscious of its want1 objectifies that want by setting it over against itself2 distinguishing the want from self and self from want4444 ,now this theory so far might be developed in either of two directions4#if ,in the first place1 the self-distinguishing process may be an activity by means of which the self specifies its own activity and satisfaction4 ,the particular desires and ends would be the modes in which the self relieved itself of its abstractness1 its undeveloped character1 and assumed concrete existence4444 ,the unity of the self would stand in no opposition to the particularity of the special desire2 on the contrary1 the unity of the self and the manifold of definite desires would be the synthetic and analytic aspects of one and the same reality1 neither having any advantage metaphysical or ethical over the other6#ig ,but ,green1 unfortunately1 does not develop his theory in this concrete direction4 ,the self does not specify itself in the particulars1 but remains apart from them4 ,the objectification is not of the self in the special end2 but the self remains behind setting the special object over against itself as not adequate to itself4444 ,the unity of the self sets up an ideal of satisfaction for itself as it withdraws from the special want1 and this ideal set up through negation of the particular desire and its satisfaction constitutes the moral ideal4 ,it is forever unrealizable1 because it forever negates the special activities through which alone it might1 after all1 realize itself4#ih ,in completing this argument ,dewey refers to certain well-known passages in the ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 in which ,green states that the moral ideal is never completely attainable4 ,green's abstract conception of the self as that which forever sets itself over against its desires is1 ,dewey argues1 not only useless as an ideal for action1 but positively opposed to moral striving4 ,it supervenes1 not as a power active in its own satisfaction1 but to make us realize the unsatisfactoriness of such seeming satisfactions as we may happen to get1 and to keep us striving for something which we can never get6#ii ,the most that can be made of ,green's moral ideal is to conceive it as the bare form of unity in conduct4 ,employed as a tool of analysis1 as a moral rule1 it might tell us1 ,whatever the situation1 seek for its unity4 ,but it can scarcely go even as far as this in the direction of concreteness1 for it says3 ,no unity can be found in the situation because the situation is particular1 and therefore set over against the unity4#ajj ,most students of ,green would undoubtedly say that this account of his moral theory is entirely one-sided1 and fails to reckon with certain elements which should properly be taken into account4 ,in the first place1 ,green is defining the moral agent as he finds him1 and is reporting what seems to him a fact when he says that the moral ideal is too high to be realized in this life4 ,having a spiritual nature1 man fails to find satisfaction in the goods of natural life4 ,dewey should address himself to the facts in refuting ,green's analysis of human nature4 ,in the second place1 with respect to ,green's separation of the self as unity from the self as a manifold of desires1 ,dewey's criticism may be flatly rejected4 ,green raises the question himself3 ',do you mean1' it may be asked1 'to assert the existence of a mysterious abstract entity which you call the self of a man1 apart from all his particular feelings1 desires1 and thoughts--all the experience of his inner life8'#aja ,green takes time to state his position as clearly as possible4 ,he repudiates the idea of an abstract self apart from desire4 ,the following passage is typical of his remarks3 ,just as we hold that our desires1 feelings1 and thoughts would not be what they are--would not be those of a man--if not related to a subject which distinguishes itself from each and all of them2 so we hold that this subject would not be what it is1 if it were not related to the particular feelings1 desires1 and thoughts1 which it thus distinguishes from and presents to itself4#ajb ,it will be remembered also1 that in moral action the agent identifies himself with his desires1 or adopts them as his own1 and the ability to do this is the chief mark of human intelligence4 ,but man could not identify himself with his desires1 or 'specify himself in them1' as ,dewey says1 did he not at the same time have the capacity to differentiate himself from them4 ,dewey's further remarks on ,green's ideal need not be followed in detail1 since they rest upon a misapprehension of ,green's purpose1 and add little to what he has already said4 ,taking the moral ideal as something that can never be realized in this life1 ,dewey inquires what use can be made of it4 ,he considers three modes in which ,green might have given content to the ideal1 as a working principle1 and finds that it cannot be made1 in any of these ways1 to serve as a tool of analysis4 ,green was not prepared to meet these 'pragmatic' requirements4 ,he did not propose his ideal as a principle of conduct1 in ,dewey's sense2 he stated that1 as a matter of fact1 man is more than natural1 and that1 as such a being1 his ideals can never be completely met by natural objects4 ,how man is to act1 in view of his spiritual nature1 is a further question3 but the realization which the individual has of his own spiritual nature must of necessity be a large factor in the determination of his conduct4 ,the ',spiritual ,nature1' in ,green's terminology1 meant a 'not-natural' nature1 and 'not-natural' in turn meant a nature that is not definable in mechanical or biological terms4 ,dewey's criticism1 therefore1 went wide of the mark4 ,in ,november1 #ahic1 ,dewey followed his criticism of ,green's moral motive by a second article in the ,philosophical ,review on ,self-realization as the ,moral ,ideal4#ajc ,it continues the criticism which has already been made of ,green1 but from a different point of departure4 ,the idea of self-realization in ethics1 ,dewey begins1 may be helpful or harmful according to the way in which the ideas of the self and its realization are worked out in the concrete4 ,the mere idea of a self to be realized is1 of course1 abstract2 it is merely the statement of a problem1 which needs to be worked out and given content4 ,by way of introducing his own idea of self-realization1 ,dewey proposes to criticize a certain conception of the self which he finds in current discussion4 ,the notion which ,i wish to criticize1 he says1 is that of the self as a presupposed fixed schema or outline1 while realization consists in the filling up of this schema4 ,the notion which ,i would suggest as substitute is that of the self as always a concrete specific activity2 and1 therefore1 7to anticipate7 of the identity of self and realization4#ajd ,such a presupposed fixed self is to be found in ,green's ,eternally complete ,consciousness4 ,the idea of self-realization implies capacities or possibilities4 ,to translate capacity into actuality1 as the conception of the fixed self seems to do1 is to vitiate the whole idea of possibility4 ,there must1 then1 be some conception of unrealized powers which will meet this difficulty4 ,the way to a valid conception is through the realization that capacities are always specific4 ,the capacities of a child1 for example1 are not simply of a child1 not of a man1 but of this child1 not of any other4#aje ,whatever else capacity may be1 whether infinite or not1 it must be an element in an actual situation4 ,as specific things1 moreover1 capacities reside in activities1 which are now going on4 ,the capacity of a child to become a musician consists in this fact3 ,even now he has a certain quickness1 vividness1 and plasticity of vision1 a certain deftness of hand1 and a certain motor coordination by which his hand is stimulated to work in harmony with his eye4#ajf ,how do these specific1 actual activities come to be called capacities8 ,there is a peculiar psychological reason for this which ,james has pointed out1 in his statement that essence is that which is so important for my interests that1 comparatively1 other properties may be omitted4#ajg ,when we pay attention to any activity1 there is a natural tendency to select only that portion of it that is of immediate interest1 and to exclude the rest as irrelevant4 ,in the act of vision1 for example1 ,dewey tells us1 the thing that seems nearest us1 that which claims continuously our attention1 is the eye itself4 ,we thus come to abstract the eye from all special acts of seeing2 we make the eye the essential thing in sight1 and conceive of the circumstances of vision as indeed circumstances2 as more or less accidental concomitants of the permanent eye4#ajh ,there is no eye in general2 the eye is always given along with other circumstances which in their totality make up a concrete seeing situation4 ,nevertheless1 we abstract the eye from other circumstances and set it up as the essence of seeing4 ,but we cannot retain the eye in absolute abstraction1 because the concrete circumstances of vision force themselves upon the attention4 ,so we lump these together on the other side as a new object1 and take as their essence the vibrations of ether4 ,the eye now becomes the capacity of seeing2 the vibrations of ether1 conditions required for the exercise of the capacity4#aji ,we keep the two abstractions1 but try to restore the unity of the situation through taking one as capacity and the other as the condition of the exercise of capacity4 ,but we cannot stop even with this double abstraction4 ,the eye in general and the vibrations in general do not1 even in their unity1 constitute the act of vision4 ,a multitude of other factors are included4#aaj ,preserving the original 'core' as capacity1 we tend to treat all the attendant circumstances which occur frequently enough to require taking account of1 as conditions which help realize the abstracted reality called capacity4 ,the discussion here is very much like that in ,the ,superstition of ,necessity 7published in the same year71 which was reviewed in the last chapter4 ,dewey calls attention to this connection in a foot-note1 remarking that he has already developed at greater length the idea that necessity and possibility are simply the two correlative abstractions into which the one reality falls apart during the process of our conscious apprehension of it4#aaa ,the danger1 ,dewey says1 is that the merely relative character of a given capacity may be overlooked1 and that it may be ontologized into a fixed entity4 ,this is the error1 he thinks1 into which ,green fell4 ,the ideal self1 as that which capacity may realize1 is ontologized into an already existent fact4 ,then we get a separation between the present self1 as capacity1 and the ideal self which is to be realized4 ,the self already realized is opposed to the self as yet ideal4 ,this 'realized self' is no reality by itself2 it is simply our partial conception of the self erected into an entity4 ,recognizing its incomplete character1 we bring in what we have left out and call it the 'ideal self4' ,then by way of dealing with the fact that we have not two selves here at all1 but simply a less and a more adequate insight into the same self1 we insert the idea of one of these selves realizing the other4#aab ,it is in this manner that error arises4 ,but what is the correct attitude toward the self8 ,first of all1 the self must be conceived as a working1 practical self1 carrying within the rhythm of its own process both 'realized' and 'ideal' self4 ,the current ethics of the self 444 are too apt to stop with a metaphysical definition1 which seems to solve problems in general1 but at the expense of the practical problems which alone really demand or admit solution4#aac ,the first point of the argument is that the self activity is individual1 concrete1 and specific1 here and now1 and the second point is that if the self is to be talked of in an intelligent way it must be taken as something empirically given4 ,the whole point is expressed when we say that no possible future activities or conditions have anything to do with the present action except as they enable us to take deeper account of the present activity1 to get beyond the mere superficies of the act1 to see it in its totality4#aad ,the phrase1 'realize yourself1' is a direction for knowledge2 it means1 see the wider consequences of your act1 realize its wider bearings4 ,dewey says3 ,the fixed ideal is as distinctly the bane of ethical science today as the fixed universe of mediaevalism was the bane of the natural science of the ,renascence4#aae ,this is a strong statement1 which indicates how wide was the gulf which now separated ,dewey from ,green1 whom he formerly acknowledged as his master4 ,dewey's interpretation of ,green's ideal self is far from satisfactory1 largely because of its lack of insight and appreciation4 ,the reduction of thought to a 'form of activity' renders a purely theoretical inquiry impossible4 ,the 'present activity1' the biological situation1 becomes the measure of all things1 even of thought4 ,ideals1 in his own words1 have nothing to do with present action1 except as they enable us to take deeper account of the present activity4 ,dewey's self and ,green's are incommensurable4 ,the former is the biological organism1 with a capacity for indirect activity called thinking2 the latter is a not-natural being1 whose reality escapes the logic of descriptive science1 because of the fulness of its content4 ,dewey's failure to understand this difference is significant4 ,his acquaintance with ,green seems to have been formal from the beginning1 never intimate1 and the articles just reviewed mark the end of ,dewey's idealistic discipleship4 ,his psychological idealism1 in fact1 was fundamentally antithetical to the ,neo-,hegelianism which he had sought to espouse1 and the development of his own standpoint brought out the vital differences which had been hidden from his earlier understanding4 ,the idealism which seeks to view reality together and as a whole is forever incompatible with a method which seeks to interpret the whole in terms of one of its parts4 ,,footnotes3 #ge ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #ahf-bjc4 #gf ,ibid41 p4 #ahf4 #gg ,ibid4 #gh ,op4 cit41 p4 #ahg4 #gi ,ibid41 p4 #ahh4 #hj ,ibid4 #ha ,ibid41 p4 #aia f4 #hb ,op4 cit41 p4 #ahi4 #hc ,ibid41 p4 #aid4 ,author's ,italics4 #hd ,ibid4 #he ,op4 cit41 p4 #aie4 #hf ,ibid41 p4 #aih4 #hg ,op4 cit4 #hh ,ibid41 p4 #bjb4 #hi ,ibid41 p4 #bjc4 #ij ,philosophical ,review1 ,vol4 ,i1 #ahib1 pp4 #eic-fab4 #ia ,op4 cit41 p4 #eif4 #ib ,ibid41 p4 #eig4 #ic ,history of ,philosophy1 p4 #eee4 #id ,philosophical ,review1 ,vol4 ,i1 #ahib1 p4 #eih4 #ie ,ibid4 #if ,ibid41 p4 #eii4 #ig ,ibid4 ,compare with the passage in ,psychology as ,philosophic ,method1 ,mind1 ,vol4 ,,xi1 p4 #i4 #ih ,op4 cit41 p4 #fjj4 #ii ,ibid41 p4 #fja4 #ajj ,ibid41 p4 #fjb4 #aja ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 third ed41 p4 #ajc4 #ajb ,ibid41 p4 #ajd4 #ajc ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #feb-ffd4 #ajd ,ibid41 p4 #fec4 #aje ,ibid41 p4 #fee4 #ajf ,op4 cit41 p4 #fef4 #ajg ,ibid41 p4 #feg4 #ajh ,ibid4 #aji ,ibid41 p4 #feh4 ,author's italics4 #aaj ,ibid4 #aaa ,op4 cit41 note4 #aab ,ibid41 p4 #ffc4 #aac ,ibid4 #aad ,op4 cit41 p4 #fei4 #aae ,ibid41 p4 #ffd4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,functional ,,psychology ,it now becomes necessary to review that period of ,dewey's philosophical career which is marked by the definite abandonment of the idealistic standpoint1 and the adoption of the method of instrumental pragmatism4 ,it has already been seen that there is a close connection between the functionalism which now begins to appear1 and the ,psychological ,standpoint set forth in the preceding pages of this review4 ,it is not possible1 however1 to account for all the elements which contribute to this development4 ,dewey was active in many fields and received suggestions from many sources4 ,it seems best1 in dealing with this period1 to follow the lead of the subject-matter and avoid a priori speculation on the factors which determined the precise form of ,dewey's mature standpoint in philosophy4 ,dewey had always kept in mind the idea that the synthetic activity whereby self-consciousness evolves the ideality of the world must operate through the human organism4 ,he had frequently referred to ,green's saying that the ,eternal ,self-,consciousness reproduces itself in man1 and to similar notions in ,caird and ,kant2 but he had never considered1 in a detailed way1 how the organism might serve as the vehicle for such a process4 ,his ethical theory1 with its analysis of individuality into capacity and environment1 tended to bring the body-world relationship into the foreground1 and the idea that theory is relative to action tended to emphasize still more the relation of thought to the bodily processes4 ,dewey finally discovers the basis upon which the synthetic activity of the self1 the thought process1 may be described empirically and concretely4 ,organism-in-relation-to-environment becomes the key-stone of his theory of knowledge4 ,thought is interpreted as a function of the organism1 biologically considered1 and the biological psychology which results from this mode of interpretation is commonly known as 'functional psychology4' ,the functional psychology is presented in a series of articles in the ,philosophical ,review and the ,psychological ,review1 published between #ahid and #ahih4 ,the most important of these is ,the ,reflex ,arc ,concept in ,psychology1 published in the ,psychological ,review in #ahif4aaf ,since it is the only article in the series which gives a complete view of the theory1 it will be made the basis for the discussion of the functional theory of psychology4 ,the reflex arc concept in psychology1 ,dewey says1 recognizes that the sensory-motor arc is to be taken as the unit of nerve structure1 and the type of nerve function4 ,but psychologists do not avail themselves of the full value of this conception1 because they still retain in connection with it certain distinctions which were used in the older psychology4 ,the older dualism between sensation and idea is repeated in the current dualism of peripheral and central structures and functions2 the older dualism of body and soul finds a distinct echo in the current dualism of stimulus and response4#aag ,these rigid distinctions must be set aside1 and the separated elements must be viewed as elements in one sensory-motor coordination4 ,each is to be defined1 not as something existing by itself1 but as an element functioning in a concrete whole of activity4 ,thus1 if we are to study vision1 we must first take vision as a sensory-motor coordination1 the act of seeing1 and within the whole we may then be able to distinguish certain elements1 sensations1 or movements1 and define them according to their function in the total act of seeing4 ,the reflex arc idea1 as commonly employed1 takes sensation as stimulus1 and movement as response1 as if they were actually separate existences1 apart from a coordination4 ,response is said to follow sensation1 but it is forgotten that the sensation which preceded was correlated with a response1 and that the response which follows is also correlated with sensation4 ,sound1 for instance1 is not a mere sensation in itself1 apart from sensory-motor coordination4 ,hearing is an act1 and while sound may1 for purposes of study1 be abstracted from the total1 it is not1 in itself1 independent of the total act of hearing4 ,but1 in spite of all this1 it will be urged1 there is a distinction between stimulus and response1 between sensation and motion4 ,precisely2 but we ought now to be in a condition to ask of what nature is the distinction1 instead of taking it for granted as a distinction somehow lying in the existence of the facts themselves4#aah ,the distinction which is to be made between them must be made on a teleological basis4 ,the fact is that stimulus and response are not distinctions of existence1 but teleological distinctions1 that is1 distinctions of function1 or part played1 with reference to reaching or maintaining an end4#aai ,there are two kinds of teleological distinction that can be made between stimulus and response1 or rather1 the teleological interpretation has two phases4 ,in the first place1 it may be assumed that all of man's activity furthers some general end1 as1 for instance1 the maintenance of life4 ,then man's activity may be viewed as a sequence of acts1 which tend to further this end1 and on this basis we may separate out stimulus and response4 ,it is only when we regard the sequence of acts as if they were adapted to reach some end that it occurs to us to speak of one as stimulus and the other as response4 ,otherwise1 we look at them as a mere series4#abj ,in these cases the stimulus is as truly an act as the response1 and what we have is a series of sensory-motor coordinations4 ,looking1 for instance1 is a sensory-motor coordination which is the stimulus or antecedent of another coordinated act1 running away4 ,the first coordination passes into the second1 and the second may be viewed as a modification or reconstitution of the first4 ,but this external teleological distinction between sensation and response is not so important as the distinction now to be made4 ,so far only fixed coordinations1 habitual modes of action1 have been considered4 ,but there are situations in which habitual responses and fixed modes of action fail3 situations in which new habits are formed4 ,in these situations there arises a special distinction between stimulus and response1 for in these formative situations the stimuli and responses are consciously present in experience as such4 ,the circle is a coordination1 some of whose members have come into conflict with each other4 ,it is the temporary disintegration and need of reconstitution which occasions1 which affords the genesis of1 the conscious distinction into sensory stimulus on one side and motor response on the other4#aba ,the distinction which arises between stimulus and response is a distinction of function within the problematical situation4 ,suppose that a sound is heard1 the character of which is uncertain1 and which1 as a coordination1 does not readily pass into its following coordination1 or habitual response4 ,the sound is puzzling1 and moves into the center of attention4 ,it is fixed upon1 abstracted1 studied on its own account4 ,in that event1 the sound may be spoken of as a sensation4 ,as a sensation1 it is the datum of a reflective process of thought1 or conscious inference1 whose aim is to constitute the sound a stimulus1 or1 in other words1 to find what response belongs to it4 ,when this response is determined the problem is done with and sensory-motor unity is achieved4 ,the stimulus1 in these cases1 is simply that phase of activity requiring to be defined in order that a coordination may be completed4#abb ,it is not any particular existence1 and is not to be taken as an element apart from others1 having an independent existence4 ,but the conscious process of attending to the sensation and finding a response to it arises only when coordination is disturbed by conflicting factors1 and the separation of stimulus from response arises only as a means for bringing unity into the coordination4 ,the sensation1 then1 is that element which is to be attended to2 upon which further response depends4 ,this phase of the teleological interpretation defines each element by the part which it plays in the reflective process4 ,if this brief summary of the article is difficult to comprehend1 a reading of the original text will do little towards making it more intelligible4 ,the doctrine presented there1 however1 is simple and coherent enough when its bearings and purpose are once understood1 and1 at the risk of being over-elaborate1 it seems advisable to attempt some remarks on the general bearing and applications of the theory4 ,it must be remembered that ,dewey is seeking an interpretation of the thought process which shall reveal it as an actual fact of experience4 ,a thought which is apart from experience and not in it1 which is shut up to the contemplation of its own mental states is1 by its definition1 non-experienced4 ,it is1 like ,kant's 'productive imagination1' formative of experience1 but not a part of it4 ,dewey holds to the belief that experience must be explained in terms of itself2 he would do away with all transcendental factors in the explanation of reality4 ,but modern psychological theory1 ,dewey believes1 tends to shut thought in to the contemplation of its own subjective states1 and thus gives it an extra-experiential status4 ,a stimulus is said to strike upon an end organ1 which sends an impulse to the cortex and there gives rise to a sensation which1 as the effect of a stimulus1 is representative of the real1 but not real in itself4 ,thought1 again1 interprets the sensation1 and sends out a motor impulse appropriate to the situation4 ,these mental states and the thought which interprets them are1 in ,dewey's mind1 wholly fictitious4 ,the problem1 then1 is to give an account of the perceptual processes which shall eliminate the artificial states of mind and present mental operations as natural processes4 ,the difficulty with customary psychological explanation is that it breaks the reflex arc of the nervous system into three parts whose relations are successive and causal rather than simultaneous and organic4 ,there is not first a stimulus1 then perception1 then response2 these processes are supplementary1 not separate4 ,or1 from another point of view1 psychological explanation must begin with a whole process which1 when analyzed1 is seen to contain the three moments or phases3 stimulus1 sensation1 and response4 ,the whole process is primary and actual1 the abstracted phases are secondary and derivative4 ,with the disappearance of the mechanical interpretation of the perceptual process1 mental states vanish4 ,representative perceptionism is thus done away with1 together with all the problems which it generates4 ,the position of conscious1 or reflective thought1 in ,dewey's scheme1 is especially interesting4 ,this mode of thought is not constantly operative1 but arises only in situations of stress and strain1 when habitual modes of response break down4 ,a dualism is established between reflective thought and the habitual life processes4 ,dewey does not take the ground that these processes are supplementary1 as he had done in the case of stimulus1 sensation1 and response4 ,it will be remembered that ,dewey had defined judgment1 in his logical and ethical writings of an earlier period1 as a special activity operating in critical situations4 ,this conception of judgment is now carried over into his psychology1 and given a biological basis4 ,it is worth noting that this view of judgment was worked out in logical terms before it was reinforced by biological data4 ,nevertheless1 it is through biology that ,dewey is able to give his interpretation of the thought process that empirical concreteness which he demanded from the beginning1 but achieved very slowly4 ,the value of the functional psychology1 considered merely as psychology1 is undeniable4 ,it is1 in fact1 a natural and almost inevitable step in the development of psychological theory4 ,dewey's achievement consists in the establishment of an organic mode of interpretation in psychology1 intended to displace the mechanical interpretation4 ,the mechanical causal series is displaced by an organic system of internally related parts4 ,dewey1 however1 does not display any interest in the logical aspects of his doctrine4 ,he takes the biological situation literally1 as a fact empirically given1 and to be accepted without criticism4 ,a discussion of the period now under consideration would not be complete without reference to certain articles which supplement the essay discussed above4 ,the first of these is an article on ,the ,psychology of ,effort1 published in the ,philosophical ,review in #ahig4abc ,it is not proposed to follow the argument of this article in detail1 but to center attention upon those parts of it1 especially the concluding pages1 which have a special interest in connection with the subject under discussion4 ,dewey returns1 in this article1 to the situation of effort at adjustment2 to the situation in which an effort is made to determine the proper response to a stimulus4 ,the opening pages are devoted1 in the first place1 to a discussion of the distinction between conscious effort and the mere expenditure of energy or effort as it appears to an outsider1 and1 in the second place1 to maintaining1 by means of examples1 the proposition that the sense of effort is sensationally mediated4 ,how then does1 say1 a case of perception with effort differ from a case of 'easy' or effortless perception8 ,the difference1 ,i repeat1 shall be wholly in sensory quale2 but in what sensory quale8#abd ,the conscious sense of effort arises1 ,dewey answers1 when there is a rivalry or conflict between two sensational elements in experience4 ,in the case of felt effort1 certain sensory quales1 usually fused1 fall apart in consciousness1 and there is an alternation1 an oscillation1 between them1 accompanied by a disagreeable tone when they are apart1 and an agreeable tone when they become fused again4#abe ,these two sets of sensory elements have each a significance in terms of adjustment2 one of them is a correlate of a habit1 or fixed mode of response1 and the other is an intruder which resists absorption into1 or fusion with1 the dominant images of the current habit or purpose4 ,the same idea of a natural tendency to persist in a habitual mode of regarding things was met with in the last two chapters1 and is qualified here by the addition of the idea that each sensory element represents a typical mode of response on the part of the organism4 ,dewey illustrates his notion by the case of learning to ride a bicycle4 ,before one mounts one has perhaps a pretty definite visual image of himself in balance and in motion4 ,this image persists as a desirability4 ,on the other hand1 there comes into play at once the consciousness of the familiar motor adjustments1--for the most part1 related to walking4 ,the two sets of sensations refuse to coincide1 and the result is an amount of stress and strain relevant to the most serious problems of the universe4#abf ,in another passage1 which brings out even more clearly the rivalry of the two sets of sensations1 he says3 ,it means that the activity already going on 7and1 therefore1 reporting itself sensationally7 resists displacement1 or transformation1 by or into another activity which is beginning1 and thus making its sensational report4#abg ,the sense of effort1 then1 reduces itself to an awareness of conflict between two sensational elements and their motor correlates4 ,practically stated1 this means that effort is nothing more1 and also nothing less1 than tension between means and ends in action1 and that the sense of effort is the awareness of this conflict4#abh ,the important aspect of ,dewey's argument1 for the present discussion1 is that awareness reduces to these sensational elements and their attributes4 ,throughout the article ,dewey is opposing his sensational view of the sense of effort to what he calls the 'spiritual' or non-sensational view1 which supposes that the sense of effort is something purely psychical1 which accompanies the expenditure of physical energy4 ,the consciousness of effort1 ,dewey says1 is not something added to the effort1 but is itself a certain condition existing in the sensory quales4 ,this provision would make it necessary to identify consciousness1 and1 therefore1 conscious inference1 with the tensional situation which has been described4 ,this being granted1 all that pertains to conscious inference1 all the methods and categories of science1 would be applicable only in such situations of stress and strain2 they would appear simply as instruments for effecting a readjustment2 they would be employed exclusively in the interests of action4 ,this is the direction in which ,dewey is tending4 ,no criticism of this treatment of judgment need be made at this time1 beyond pointing out that it presents itself1 at first sight1 as an awkward and indirect mode of describing the relations between organic activity and intelligence1 and between psychology and logic4 ,nothing has so far been said of the historical sources of ,dewey's theory1 and these may be briefly considered4 ,there are at least two sources which must be taken into account3 the ,james-,lange theory of the emotions1 and the ,neo-,hegelian ethical theory4 ,the latter has already been considered to some extent1 as it manifests itself in ,dewey's own ethical theory1 but its relation to his psychology has not been indicated4 ,in his text-book1 the ,outlines of a ,critical ,theory of ,ethics 7#ahia71 ,dewey advanced certain ideas for which he claimed originality1 at least in treatment4 ,among these was the analysis of individuality into function including capacity and environment4#abi ,bradley appears to have been the first among ,english philosophers to introduce that synthesis of the internal and external1 of the intuitional and utilitarian modes of judging conduct1 which became characteristic of ,neo-,hegelian ethics4 ,the synthesis1 of course1 is ,hegelian in temper1 and the ,ethical ,studies are much more suggestive1 in general method1 of the ,philosophie des ,rechts than of any previous ,english work4 ,utilitarianism tended to judge the moral act by its external1 de facto results2 intuitionism1 on the contrary1 attributed morality to the will of the agent4 ,the former found morality to consist in a certain state of affairs1 the latter in a certain internal attitude4 ,according to the synthetic point of view1 these opposed ethical systems are one-sided representations of the moral situation1 each being true in its own way4 ,to state the matter in another form1 the moral act has a content as well as a purpose4 ,let us explain1 says ,bradley4 ,the moral world1 as we said1 is a whole1 and has two sides4 ,there is an outer side1 systems and institutions1 from the family to the nation2 this we may call the body of the moral world4 ,and there must also be a soul1 or else the body goes to pieces2 every one knows that institutions without the spirit of them are dead4444 ,we must never let this out of our sight1 that1 where the moral world exists1 you have and you must have these two sides4#acj ,dewey expresses the same idea in a more detailed fashion4 ,what do we mean by individuality8 ,we may distinguish two factors--or better two aspects1 two sides--in individuality4 ,on one side it means special disposition1 temperament1 gifts1 bent1 or inclination2 on the other side it means special station1 situation1 limitations1 surroundings1 opportunities1 etc4 ,or1 let us say1 it means specific capacity and specific environment4 ,each of these elements apart from the other1 is a bare abstraction1 and without reality4 ,nor is it strictly correct to say that individuality is contributed by these two factors together4 ,it is1 rather1 as intimated above1 that each is individuality looked at from a certain point of view1 from within and from without4#aca ,it is a fact1 empirically demonstrable1 according to ,dewey1 that body and object1 intention and foreseen consequence1 interest and environment1 attitude and objectivity1 are parts of one another and of the whole moral situation4 ,each is relative to the other4 ,it is not1 then1 the environment as physical of which we are speaking1 but as it appears to consciousness1 as it is affected by the make-up of the agent4 ,this is the practical or moral environment4#acb ,when this relation of the inner to the outer is taken literally and universally1 we have the essence of the functional psychology4 ,organism-in-relation-to-environment becomes the catch-word of instrumental pragmatism4 ,the other source of ,dewey's psychology1 which is now to be considered1 is the ,james-,lange theory of the emotions4 ,the connection here is more obvious1 but perhaps not so vital1 as in the case of the ethical theory4 ,from the numerous references which ,dewey made to ,james's ,principles of ,psychology 7#ahij71 it is evident that he was much impressed with this work4 ,the theory of emotion there presented seems to have had a special interest for him2 so much so that he made it the subject of two articles in the ,psychological ,review1 in #ahid and #ahie1 under the general title1 ,the ,theory of ,emotion4#acc ,these studies bear a very close relation to the article on ,the ,reflex ,arc ,concept in ,psychology 7#ahif71 the standpoint being essentially the same1 although developed in reference to a technical problem4 ,some indications may be given here of the relationships which they bear to the ,james-,lange theory on the one side1 and functional psychology on the other4 ,the ,james-,lange theory is itself concerned with order and connection between emotional states1 perceptions1 and responses4 ,james says3 ,our natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion1 and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression4 ,my theory1 on the contrary1 is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact1 and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur ,,is the emotion4#acd ,it is all a question1 ,james says1 of the order and sequence of these elements1 and his contention is that the bodily changes should be interposed between the two mental states4 ,this is the question with which ,dewey's functional psychology is also concerned1 the relation of response to stimulus1 and the manner in which a stimulus is determined by a reaction 'into it4' ,dewey's theory rises so naturally out of ,james's theory of the emotions as to seem but little more than its universal application4 ,this connection is revealed in several passages in ,dewey's study of the emotions4 ,it is said1 for instance1 that the emotional situation must be taken as a whole1 as a state1 for instance1 of 'being angry4' ,the several constituents of the state of anger1 idea or object1 affect or emotion1 and mode of expression or behavior1 are not to be taken separately1 but all together as elements in one whole4#ace ,another characteristic doctrine appears in the affirmation that the emotional attitude is to be distinguished from other attitudes by certain special features which it possesses4 ,particularly1 it involves a special relation of stimulus to response4#acf ,again1 there is a tendency to translate meaning in terms of projected activity4 ,the consciousness of our mode of behavior as affording data for other possible actions constitutes an objective or ideal content4#acg ,it is enough1 perhaps1 to reveal these two sources as probable factors in the development of ,dewey's psychological method4 ,no speculation upon them is necessary4 ,at most1 they were merely contributory to ,dewey's thought1 and by fitting in with his previous ideas enabled him to give a more concrete presentation of his psychological theory than would otherwise have been possible4 ,,footnotes3 #aaf ,vol4 ,,iii1 pp4 #ceg-cgj4 #aag ,ibid41 p4 #ceg4 #aah ,op4 cit41 p4 #cfe4 #aai ,ibid4 #abj ,ibid41 p4 #cff1 note4 #aba ,op4 cit41 p4 #cgj4 #abb ,ibid41 p4 #cfh4 #abc ,vol4 ,,vi1 pp4 #dc-ef4 #abd ,op4 cit41 p4 #df4 #abe ,ibid41 p4 #dh4 #abf ,op4 cit41 p4 #ej4 #abg ,ibid41 p4 #eb4 #abh ,ibid41 p4 #ea4 #abi ,op4 cit41 p4 viii4 #acj ,ethical ,studies1 p4 #afj f4 #aca ,outlines of ,ethics1 p4 #ig4 #acb ,ibid41 p4 #ii4 #acc ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #eec-efi2 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #ac-cb4 #acd ,principles of ,psychology1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #ddi4 #ace ,psy4 ,rev41 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #ae f4 #acf ,ibid41 p4 #bd f4 #acg ,ibid41 p4 #bd4 ,,chapter ,v ,,the ,,evolutionary ,,standpoint ,dewey's psychology is linked up with his logical theory1 as has already been suggested1 through the interpretation of the thought-process as a mode of adjustment involving inference4 ,this conception of thought implies1 of course1 that thought is an instrument of adaptation1 and this in turn suggests that the organ of reflection is a product of evolutionary forces operating on the individual and on the race4 ,in the period now to be reviewed ,dewey1 for the first time in his career1 displays an active and intense interest in evolutionary theory1 especially as applied in the fields of ethics and psychology4 ,an article published in the ,monist1 in #ahih1 on ,evolution and ,ethics1#ach deserves special attention4 ,the central thought of the article is to be found in the following passage3 ,the belief that natural selection has ceased to operate in the human sphere rests upon the assumption that there is only one form of such selection3 that where improvement is indirectly effected by the failure of species of a certain type to continue to reproduce2 carrying with it as its correlative that certain variations continue to multiply1 and finally come to possess the land4 ,this ordeal by death is an extremely important phase of natural selection1 so called4444 ,however1 to identify this procedure absolutely with selection1 seems to me to indicate a somewhat gross and narrow vision4 ,not only is one form of life as a whole selected at the expense of other forms1 but one mode of action in the same individual is constantly selected at the expense of others4 ,there is not only the trial by death1 but there is the trial by the success or failure of special acts--the counterpart1 ,i suppose1 of physiological selection so called4#aci ,we have here a refinement upon the doctrine of natural selection4 ,the keynote of ,dewey's new psychology is a process of selection constantly occurring within the individual organism4 ,he points out that1 in dealing with man1 we have a highly adaptable1 not merely a highly adapted animal4 ,it is certainly implied in the idea of natural selection that the most effective modes of variation should themselves be finally selected4#adj ,the capacity to vary1 or adapt1 is highly developed in man4 ,through these variations1 the organism is able to react against the environment1 changing its character quite completely4 ,the environment of the modern human is tremendously complicated by his reaction upon it4 ,the growth of science1 its application in invention to industrial life1 the multiplication and acceleration of means of transportation and intercommunication1 have created a peculiarly unstable environment4#ada ,under these conditions1 the ability of the individual to adapt himself to changing circumstances is largely determined by his degree of flexibility in the selection of right acts and responses4 ,in the present environment1 flexibility of function1 the enlargement of the range of uses to which one and the same organ1 grossly considered1 may be put1 is a great1 almost the supreme1 condition of success4#adb ,the human mind is to be interpreted as a highly developed organ whose special function is to make adaptation more flexible and response more varied and discriminating4 ,that which was 'tendency to vary' in the animal is conscious foresight in man4 ,that which was unconscious adaptation and survival in the animal1 taking place by the 'cut and try' method until it worked itself out1 is with man conscious deliberation and experimentation4#adc ,this view of consciousness is worked out on the basis of an evolutionary metaphysics4 ,man is viewed as an organism1 placed amid the changing whirl of things1 stimulated into action by his needs and wants1 adapting himself to conditions1 making the situation over1 or meeting it habitually where he can and suffering the consequences where he cannot make the necessary adjustment4 ,if this be taken1 as would seem1 for the ultimate truth about reality and man's place in it1 it must be called a metaphysics4 ,against this background ,dewey's logical theory is developed4 ,the most important result1 from the standpoint of the student of mind and spirit1 is the reduction of self-conscious reflection to the position of a nervous function of the organism4 ,the purely theoretical evidence by which this position is sustained should be subjected to closer scrutiny than can be undertaken in this limited space4 ,the purpose of reflection1 then1 is to enable man to adapt himself to his environment1 understanding by the environment the whole of the reality which surrounds him4 ,the test of the mind and its newly projected modes of response ideas lies in its ability to meet the demands of the situation4 ,the capacities and limits of mind are determined by the purpose for which it was evolved2 it can enable a man to deal more effectively with his environment2 it can do nothing else4 ,it cannot speculate on the nature of reality as such1 nor voyage on long journeys in search of truth6 ,its business is practical1 here and now4 ,its problems are always set for it by circumstances1 and these circumstances are concrete and specific4 ,there is no such thing as adaptation at large or in general4 ,the business of mind is to have1 and to continually reconstruct1 useful habits4 ,so ,dewey assures the ,american ,psychological ,association in #ahii1 in an address on ,psychology and ,social ,practice4#add ,we must recognize1 he says1 that the existing order is determined neither by fate nor by chance1 but is based on law and order1 on a system of existing stimuli and modes of reaction1 through knowledge of which we can modify the practical outcome4#ade ,psychology uninterpreted1 he says1 will never provide ready-made materials and prescriptions for the ethical life4 ,but science1 both physical and psychological1 makes known the conditions upon which certain results depend1 and therefore puts at the disposal of life a certain method of controlling them4#adf ,these statements show the extent to which ,dewey's view of knowledge has come to be controlled by biological conceptions4 ,the evolutionary method is investigated in considerable detail in the next article to be considered1 which was published in two parts in the ,philosophical ,review1 #aijb1 under the title1 ,the ,evolutionary ,method as ,applied to ,morality4#adg ,the fact that some philosophers deny the importance of the evolutionary method for ethics1 holding that morality is purely a matter of value1 and that the evolutionary method tends only to obscure differences of value1 makes it necessary to inquire into the import and nature of this method4 ,anyway1 ,dewey says1 before we either abuse or recommend genetic method we ought to have some answers to these questions3 ,just what is it8 ,just what is to come of it and how8#adh ,the experimental method in science has at least some of the traits of a genetic method4 ,the nature of water1 for instance1 cannot be determined by simply observing it4 ,but experiment brings to light the exact conditions under which it came into being and therefore explains it4 ,through generating water we single out the precise and sole conditions which have to be fulfilled that water may present itself as an experienced fact4 ,if this case be typical1 then the experimental method is entitled to rank as genetic method2 it is concerned with the manner or process by which anything comes into experienced existence4#adi ,some would deny this1 on the ground that a genuinely historical event occupies a particular place in a historical series1 from which it is inseparable1 while in experimental science the sets or pairs of terms are not limited to any particular place in a historical series1 but occur and recur4 ,water is made over and over again1 and1 so to speak1 at any date in the cosmic series4 ,this deprives any account of it of genuinely historic quality4#aej ,again1 it might be said in opposition to treating the experimental method as a genetic method1 that it is interested in individual cases not as such1 but as samples or instances4 ,the particular case is only an illustration of the general relation which is being sought4 ,it will turn out in the course of the discussion1 ,dewey says1 that1 although science deals with origins1 it is not1 in strictness1 a historical discipline4 ,the distinction between the historical and other sciences is based on an abstraction1 which has been introduced for the sake of more adequate control4 ,it is only by abstraction that we get the pairs of facts that may show up at any time1 and by abstraction we attribute to them a generalized character4 ,the facts1 in themselves1 are historic4 ,there is no such thing as water in general1 but water is just this water1 at this time1 in this place1 and it never shows itself twice1 never recurs4 ,the scientist must deal1 therefore1 with particular historic cases of water1 and with their specific origins4 ,experiment has to do with the conditions of production of a specific amount of water1 at a specific time and place1 under specific circumstances3 in a word1 it must deal with just this water4 ,the conditions which define its origin must be stated with equal definiteness and circumstantiality4#aea ,the instance has as definite a place in an historical series as has ,julius ,caesar4 ,but the difference in treatment of the water and ,caesar is due to the difference in interest4 ,julius ,caesar served a purpose which no other individual1 at any other time1 could have served4 ,there is a peculiar flavor of human meaning and accomplishment about him which has no substitute or equivalent4 ,not so with water4 ,while each portion is absolutely unique in its occurrence1 yet one lot will serve our intellectual or practical needs just as well as any other4#aeb ,for this reason the specific case of water is not dealt with on its own account1 but only as giving insight into the processes of its generation in general4 ,in this way the difference arises between the generalized statements of physical science and the individualized form demanded in historical science4 ,the abstract character of the physical result is recognized by the hypothetical form of judgment in modern logic2 if certain conditions1 then certain consequences4 ,but the counterpart of this must not be forgotten1 that every categorical proposition applies to an individual4 ,experimental propositions1 therefore1 have an historical value4 ,they take their rise in1 and they find their application to1 a world of unique and changing things3 an evolutionary universe4#aec ,the recognition of the historical character of experimental science does not in any way derogate from its value1 but1 properly understood1 gives a deeper insight into its significance4 ,it should be observed that here also ,dewey treats thought1 hypothesis1 as coming 'after something1 and for the sake of something4' ,this attempt to justify the historical method by showing that it is implied in physical experiment is of dubious value4 ,its net result would seem to be the conclusion that every fact may be dealt with either as a historical fact or as a datum for physical science4 ,even here1 however1 ,dewey slurs over certain difficulties which demand close scrutiny4 ,the treatment of individuality is most unsatisfactory4 ,while each portion or instance of water is itself1 and has its own unquestionable uniqueness1 no case is a mere particular1 but each is a true individual1 which means that it is1 as it occurs1 an instance of a general phenomenon4 ,while the scientist must deal with specific cases of water1 he has no regard for their particularity1 but chooses them as instances1 and is from first to last occupied with their typical characteristics4 ,the historian1 also1 selects relevant and representative instances1 in so far as his history is interpretative and not mere narrative4 ,a merely factual account of a series of events is not science1 and never could be4 ,dewey now turns to the ethical field1 with the purpose of showing that the historical method in ethics does for this science precisely what the experimental method does for other sciences4 ,history offers to us the only available substitute for the isolation and for the cumulative recombination of experiment4 ,the early periods present us in their relative crudeness and simplicity with a substitute for the artificial operation of an experiment3 following the phenomenon into the more complicated and refined form which it assumes later1 is a substitute for the synthesis of the experiment4#aed ,hydrogen and oxygen are the historical antecedents of water1 whose synthesis the scientist observes1 and so the more primitive forms of conduct are the elements which the moralist traces in their process of becoming fused into the present social fabric4 ,primitive social practices cannot be artificially isolated1 like the physical elements1 but they can be traced to their historical origins1 and their interweaving towards present complex conditions can be observed4 ,the historical method is subject to two misunderstandings1 ,dewey says1 one by the empiricists and materialists1 the other by the idealists4 ,the former1 having isolated the primitive facts1 suppose them to have a superior logical and existential value4 ,the earlier is regarded as somehow more 'real' than the later1 or as furnishing the quality in terms of which the reality of all the later must be stated4#aee ,the later is looked upon as simply a recombination of the earlier existences4 ,writers who ought to know better tell us that if we only had an adequate knowledge of the 'primitive' state of the world1 if we only had some general formula by which to circumscribe it1 we could deduce down to its last detail the entire existing constitution of the world1 life1 and society4#aef ,the primitive elements1 however1 take on new qualities on entering into new combinations4 ,water is more than hydrogen and oxygen4 ,there is a similar process intervening between the earlier and the later in the moral field1 of which the primitive state and the present are merely end terms4 ,actual study must take account of the whole process4 ,the idealistic fallacy is of the opposite nature4 ,it takes the final term of the process to be exclusively real4 ,the later reality is1 therefore1 to him the persistent reality in contrast with which the first forms are1 if not illusions1 at least poor excuses for being4444 ,it is enough for present purposes to note that we have here simply a particular case of the general fallacy just discussed--the emphasis of a particular term of the series at the expense of the process operative in reference to all terms4#aeg ,the true reality is the whole process1 which is represented in empiricism only by the primitive terms1 and in idealism only by the end terms4 ,only a historical method can deal with it in its entirety4 ,in summing up the advantages of the historical method1 ,dewey says that it gives a complete account of the origin and development of ethical ideas1 opinions1 beliefs1 and practices4 ,it is concerned with the origin and development of these customs and ideas2 and with the question of their mode of operation after they have arisen4 ,the described facts--yes2 but among the facts described is precisely certain conditions under which various norms1 ideals1 and rules of action have originated and functioned4#aeh ,dewey finds it irritating that the facts thus singled out should be treated as mere facts1 apart from their significance4 ,the historical method employs description1 to be sure1 but it also aims at interpretation4 ,the historic method is a method1 first1 for determining how specific moral values 7whether in the way of customs1 expectations1 conceived ends1 or rules7 came to be2 and second1 for determining their significance as indicated in their career4#aei ,it is true1 as ,dewey holds1 that the historical method may furnish a basis for interpretation1 as well as description4 ,but the mere scrutiny of what has happened will not reveal the elements1 nor determine their significance4 ,the historian must approach his material with something more than his eyes4 ,but there are many historical methods4 ,which shall be used in dealing with the development of morals8#afj ,chemistry1 for instance1 in interpreting the fusion of hydrogen and oxygen into water1 employs a system of atoms related to each other in a mathematical order1 and something similarly definite must underlie the study of morals4 ,the historical method1 in general1 needs no defence1 but since it takes many forms1 great care must be exercised in its application4 ,dewey seems to ignore these difficulties4 ,dewey's argument now leads him to a comparison of the evolutionary methods with the intuitional and empirical methods in ethics4 ,in making the comparison1 he does not propose to raise the question of fact concerning the existence of intuitions4 ,the question to be confronted is rather a logical one1 concerning the validity of beliefs4 ,under what conditions alone1 and in what measure or degree1 are we justified in arguing from the existence of moral intuitions as mental states and acts to facts taken to correspond to them8#afa ,the answer is that the existence of a belief argues nothing as to its validity4 ,the intuitionist takes his belief as a brute fact1 unrelated to objective conditions4 ,the 'inexpugnable' character of the belief cannot establish its validity1 because the life of a single individual occupies but a brief span in the continuity of the social life in which the belief is embedded4 ,beliefs last for generations1 and then very often disappear4 ,what guarantee have we that our present 'intuitions' have more validity than hundreds of past ideas that have shown themselves by passing away to be empty opinion or indurated prejudice8#afb ,intuitionism has no way of guaranteeing its beliefs4 ,the evolutionary method1 on the other hand1 is able to determine the validity of beliefs4 ,the worth of the intuition depends upon genetic considerations4 ,in so far as we can state the intuition in terms of the conditions of its origin1 development1 and later career1 in so far we have some criterion for passing judgment upon its pretensions to validity4444 ,but if we cannot find such historic origin and functioning1 the intuition remains a mere state of consciousness1 a hallucination1 an illusion1 which is not made more worthy by simply multiplying the number of people who have participated in it4#afc ,certain savage races1 for instance1 possessed moral intuitions which made the practice of infanticide an obligation4 ,but the fact that it was universally held does not establish its validity4 ,it must be condemned or justified by the results to which it led4 ,dewey's criticism of intuitionism scarcely does justice to that method1 whatever may be its inherent weakness4 ,there doubtless have been thinkers who held that truth is revealed to the reason of man in its naked purity1 in the shape of apodictic intellectual principles4 ,but even in the case of so extreme a position as that of ,kant1 there are important qualifying considerations to be taken into account4 ,there is no reason to suppose that moral judgment1 as ,kant conceived it1 was excluded from the consideration of relevant data1 such as the knowledge of actual effects produced by given courses of conduct4 ,his position seems to have been1 not that moral judgment lacked specific content1 but that reason took something with it to the moral situation4 ,the intuitionists may have over-estimated the original endowment of the mind1 but it must be admitted with them that the mind which approaches the moral situation empty of concepts cannot make moral decisions4 ,if man is to hold no beliefs except those proved valid by experience1 how can there be any to validate8 ,intelligence must have the capacity to frame beliefs in the light of its past knowledge1 and its acts of judgment1 consequently1 presuppose a test of the validity of ideas which belongs to intelligence as such1 and not to history taken abstractly4 ,beliefs are adapted to their objects in the making1 and on this account are usually found to have had some justification1 even where set aside4 ',a principle that is suitable for universal legislation already presupposes a content4' ,dewey next considers the relation of the evolutionary methods to empiricism4 ,empiricism1 he says1 is no more historic in character than is intuitionalism4 ,empiricism is concerned with the moral idea or belief as a grouping or association of various elementary feelings4 ,it regards the idea simply as a complex state which is to be explained by resolving it into its elementary constituents4 ,by its logic1 both the complex and the elements are isolated from an historic context4444 ,the empirical and the genetic methods thus imply a very different relationship between the moral state1 idea1 or belief1 and objective reality4444 ,the empirical theory holds that the idea arises as a reflex of some existing object or fact4 ,hence the test of its objectivity is the faithfulness with which it reproduces that object as copy4 ,the genetic theory holds that the idea arises as a response1 and that the test of its validity is found in its later career as manifested with reference to the needs of the situation that evoked it4#afd ,only a method that takes the world as a changing1 historical thing1 can deal with the adaptation of morality to new conditions4 ,both empiricism and intuitionalism1 though in very different ways1 deny the continuity of the moralizing process4 ,they set up timeless1 and hence absolute and disconnected1 ultimates2 thereby they sever the problems and movements of the present from the past1 rob the past1 the sole object of calm1 impartial1 and genuinely objective study1 of all instructing power1 and leave our experience to form undirected1 at the mercy of circumstance and arbitrariness1 whether that of dogmatism or scepticism4#afe ,in evaluating the article as a whole1 it must be said that ,dewey's study is not productive of definite results4 ,the history of the past can undoubtedly offer to the student a mass of data that is interesting and instructive4 ,the importance of this or that belief1 or its value1 can be gauged by the results which it is known to have produced4 ,but when1 in this day and age1 the moralist sets out to find the principles which shall guide his own conduct1 the history of morals is of no more importance than the observations of every day life1 which reveal the consequences of conduct in the lives of men about him4 ,but more particularly1 it should be added1 an estimate of present moral action depends1 not upon truth uttered by the past1 but upon truth discovered and interpreted by an intelligence which surveys the past and makes it meaningful4 ,the past in itself is nothing2 thought alone can create real history4 ,another article1 published by ,dewey in the ,philosophical ,review in #aijj1 ,some ,stages of ,logical ,thought1 illustrates the employment of the genetic method in a more specific way4#aff ,in his introductory remarks1 ,dewey says3 ,i wish to show how a variety of modes of thinking1 easily recognizable in the progress of both the race and the individual1 may be identified and arranged as successive species of the relationship which doubting bears to assurance2 as various ratios1 so to speak1 which the vigor of doubting bears to mere acquiescence4 ,the presumption is that the function of questioning is one which has continually grown in intensity and range1 that doubt is continually chased back1 and1 being cornered1 fights more desperately1 and thus clears the ground more thoroughly4#afg ,dewey finds four stages of relationship between questioning and dogmatism3 dogmatism1 discussion1 proof1 and empirical science2 and he seeks to show how each stage involves a higher degree of free inquiry4 ,modern scientific procedure1 as just set forth1 seems to define the ideal or limit of this process4 ,it is inquiry emancipated1 universalized1 whose sole aim and criterion is discovery1 and hence it makes the terminus of our description4 ,it is idle to conceal from ourselves1 however1 that this scientific procedure1 as a practical undertaking1 has not as yet reflected itself into any coherent and generally accepted theory of thinking4444#afh ,it is not necessary to comment on ,dewey's stages of thought4 ,the similarity of this division to ,comte's theological1 metaphysical and scientific stages of explanation will be apparent4 ,dewey's remarks on the logic of the scientific stage1 however1 are interesting4 ,the simple fact of the case is1 he says1 that there are at least three rival theories on the ground1 each claiming to furnish the sole proper interpretation of the actual procedure of thought4#afi ,there is the ,aristotelian logic1 with its fixed forms2 the empirical logic1 which holds that only particular facts are self-supporting1 and that the authority allowed to general principles is derivative and second hand2#agj and finally there is the transcendental logic1 which claims1 by analysis of science and experience1 to justify the conclusion that the universe itself is a construction of thought1 giving evidence throughout of the pervasive and constitutive action of reason2 and holds1 consequently1 that our logical processes are simply the reading off or coming to consciousness of the inherently rational structure already possessed by the universe in virtue of the presence within it of this pervasive and constitutive action of thought4#aga ,none of these logics1 ,dewey finds1 is capable of dealing with the actual procedure of science1 because none of them treats thought as a doubt-inquiry process1 but rather as something fixed and limited by conditions which determine its operations in advance4 ,dewey asks3 ,does not an account or theory of thinking1 basing itself on modern scientific procedure1 demand a statement in which all the distinctions and terms of thought--judgment1 concept1 inference1 subject1 predicate and copula of judgment1 etc4 ad indefinitum--shall be interpreted simply and entirely as distinctive functions or divisions of labor within the doubt-inquiry process8#agb ,seven years before1 ,dewey had been an ardent champion of the transcendental logic1 on the ground that it was progressive1 and he contrasted it most favorably with the formal logics which treat thought as a self-contained process4 ,now1 however1 he has a new insight4 ,logic must be reinterpreted in the light of the evolutionary or biological method4 ,we shall see how this is accomplished in the next chapter4 ,to the student of the history of philosophy1 ,dewey's treatment of the genetic and historical methods must seem seriously inadequate4 ,the idealist1 moreover1 will feel that ,dewey should have taken note1 in his criticism of the idealistic standpoint1 of the fact that ,hegelianism was from first to last a historical method2 that the ,german idealists gave the impulse to modern historical research1 and provoked a study of the historical method whose results are still felt4 ,but in turning away from idealism1 ,dewey has no word of appreciation for this aspect of the ,hegelian philosophy4 ,when the truth is boiled down1 it appears that ,dewey's historical method1 in so far as he had one1 was based on biological evolutionism4 ,he had no interest in any other form of historical interpretation4 ,,footnotes3 #ach ,vol4 ,,viii1 pp4 #cba-cda4 ,the article is a criticism of ,huxley's essay with the same title4 #aci ,ibid41 p4 #ccg4 ,italics mine4 #adj ,op4 cit41 p4 #cch4 #ada ,ibid41 p4 #cdj4 #adb ,ibid4 #adc ,ibid4 ,it should be observed that this conclusion is reached on a purely theoretical basis4 #add ,printed in the ,psychological ,review1 ,vol4 ,,vii1 #aijj1 pp4 #aje-abd4 #ade ,ibid41 p4 #abc4 #adf ,ibid41 p4 #abd4 #adg ,vol4 ,,xi1 pp4 #ajg-abd2 #cec-cga4 #adh ,ibid41 p4 #ajh4 #adi ,ibid41 p4 #aji4 #aej ,ibid4 #aea ,op4 cit41 p4 #aaj4 #aeb ,ibid41 p4 #aaa4 #aec ,op4 cit41 p4 #aab4 #aed ,ibid41 p4 #aac4 #aee ,op4 cit41 p4 #aad4 #aef ,ibid41 p4 #aaf4 #aeg ,ibid41 p4 #aah4 #aeh ,op4 cit41 p4 #cee4 #aei ,ibid41 p4 #cef4 #afj ,see ,bosanquet's ,logic1 second edition1 ,chapter ,,vii1 and especially page #bdj4 #afa ,philosophical ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xi1 p4 #ceg4 #afb ,ibid41 p4 #cfj4 #afc ,ibid41 p4 #ceh4 #afd ,op4 cit41 p4 #cfd f4 #afe ,op4 cit41 p4 #cgj4 #aff ,vol4 ,,ix1 pp4 #dfe-dhi4 #afg ,op4 cit41 p4 #dfe4 #afh ,ibid41 p4 #dhf f4 #afi ,ibid41 p4 #dhg4 #agj ,ibid4 #aga ,ibid4 #agb ,op4 cit41 p4 #dhi4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,studies ,,in ,,logical ,,theory ,in #aijc a volume entitled ,studies in ,logical ,theory1 consisting of essays on logical topics by ,dewey and his colleagues and pupils1 was published under the auspices of the ,university of ,chicago4 ,in a review of this volume1 ,professor ,pringle-,pattison remarks3 ,it is1 indeed1 most unusual to find a series of philosophical papers by different writers in which 7without repetition or duplication7 there is so much unity in the point of view and harmony in results4 ,that this is so is a striking evidence of the moulding influence of ,professor ,dewey upon his pupils and coadjutors in the ,chicago ,school of ,philosophy4#agc ,it would be a needless task to review the whole volume1 and attention will be confined to the essays which constitute ,dewey's special contribution to the undertaking4 ,these constitute the first four chapters of the volume1 and are devoted to a critical examination of ,lotze's logic4#agd ,here1 for the first time1 ,dewey presents in complete form the logical theory which stands as the goal of his previous endeavors1 and marks the beginning of his career as a pragmatist4#age ,the first chapter of the ,studies is devoted to a general consideration of the nature of logical theory4 ,dewey begins his discussion with an account of the naive view of thought1 the view of the man of affairs or of the scientist1 who employs ideas and reflection but has never become critical of his mental processes2 who has never reflected upon reflection4 ,if we were to ask1 he says1 the thinking of naive life to present1 with a minimum of theoretical elaboration1 its conception of its own practice1 we should get an answer running not unlike this3 ,thinking is a kind of activity which we perform at specific need1 just as at other need we engage in other sorts of activity4#agf ,while the standpoint of the naive man is usually hard to determine1 there appears to be considerable justification for ,dewey's statement4 ,the common man does tend to view thinking as a special kind of activity1 performed by an organ which can be 'trained1' and he is inclined to speak of education as a process of 'training the mind4'#agg ,dewey finds a large measure of truth in this naive view of thought4 ,thought appears to be derivative and secondary4 ,it comes after something and out of something1 and for the sake of something4#agh ,it is employed at need1 and ceases to operate when not needed4 ,taking some part of the universe of action1 of affection1 of social construction1 under its special charge1 and having busied itself therewith sufficiently to meet the special difficulty presented1 thought releases that topic and enters upon further more direct experience4#agi ,there is a rhythm of practice and thought2 man acts1 thinks1 and acts again4 ,the business of thought is to solve practical difficulties1 such as arise in connection with the conduct of life4 ,the purpose for which thought intervenes is to enable action to get ahead by discovering a way out of the given difficulty4 ,ordinarily1 the transition from thought to action and the reverse is accomplished without break or difficulty4 ,occasions arise1 however1 when thought is balked by a situation with which it is unable to deal1 after repeated attempts4 ,critical reflection is then directed upon thought itself1 and logical theory is the result4 ,the general theory of reflection1 as over against its concrete exercise1 appears when occasions for reflection are so overwhelming and so mutually conflicting that specific adequate response in thought is blocked4#ahj ,the purpose of logical theory is therefore a practical one1 and logical theory1 like ordinary reflection1 is directed toward the removal of difficulties which stand in the way of the achievement of practical ends4 ,this description of thought and of the nature of logical theory invites suspicion by its very simplicity4 ,nobody would deny that thought is linked up with practice1 that the processes of life link up into one whole organic process1 and that it would be a mistake to treat the cognitive processes as if they were separate from the whole4 ,but ,dewey's account of thought seems to fall into the very abstractness which he is so anxious to avoid4 ,experience is represented as a series of acts1 attitudes1 or functions1 which follow one another in succession4 ,thinking follows1 we will say1 striving1 and doing follows thinking4 ,each in the fulfilment of its own function inevitably calls out its successor4#aha ,the functions are distinct1 but are united to each other1 end to end1 like links in a chain4 ,they pass into and out of one another1 but are not simultaneous4 ,this description gives rise1 as ,bosanquet observes1#ahb to a kind of dualism between thinking and the other processes of life1 which is made deeper because thinking is regarded as a very special activity1 which passes judgment upon both the processes and contents of other functions1 and whose aim and work is distinctively reconstructive or transformatory4#ahc ,dewey's description of the processes of experience is undoubtedly plausible1 but should not be accepted without close scrutiny of the facts4 ,it has been held1 in opposition to such a view1 that the cognitive processes are so bound up with perception1 feeling1 willing1 and doing1 that they cannot be separated from the complex4#ahd ,or it might be held that thinking and doing are simultaneous and complementary processes1 rather than successive and supplementary4 ,dewey does not concern himself with these possibilities1 seeming to take it for granted that his interpretation is the 'natural' one4 ,it must be said1 however1 that ,dewey's description of thought as a process is by no means obvious and simple2 thought is not easy to describe4 ,when we turn to logical theory1 ,dewey says1 there are two directions which may be taken4 ,the general features of logical theory are indicated by its origin4 ,when ordinary thinking is impeded1 an examination of the thinking function is undertaken1 with the purpose of discovering its business and its mode of operation4 ,the object of the examination is practical2 to enable thinking to be carried on more effectively4 ,if these conditions are kept in mind1 logical theory will be guided into its proper channels3 it will be assumed that every process of reflection arises with reference to some specific situation1 and has to subserve a specific purpose dependent upon the occasion which calls it forth4 ,logical theory will determine the conditions which arouse thought1 the mode of its operation1 and the testing of its results4 ,such a logic1 being true to the problems set for it by practical needs1 is in no danger of being lost in generalities4 ,but there is another direction which logical theory sometimes takes1 unmindful of the conditions imposed by its origin4 ,this is the epistemological direction4 ,epistemological logic concerns itself with the relation of thought at large to reality at large4 ,it assumes that thought is a self-contained activity1 having no vital connection with the world which is to be known4 ,such a logic can never be fruitful1 for it has lost sight of its purpose in the formulation of its problem4 ,dewey is quite right in opposing a conception of thought which makes it a self-contained activity1 having no vital connection with other life processes4 ,few recent thinkers have been guilty of that error4 ,lotze1 to be sure1 made the mistake of separating thought from the reality to be known1 and therefore serves as a ready foil for ,dewey's criticism4 ,but ,lotze's age is past and gone4 ,when the abstract conception of thought is set aside1 and it is agreed that thought must be treated as a process among the processes of experience1 there is still room for divergence of opinion as to the exact manner in which thought is related to other functions4 ,dewey's logical theory1 as outlined above1 depends upon a very special interpretation of the place which thought occupies in experience4 ,for this reason he considers logic to be inseparable from psychology4 ,psychology 444 is indispensable to logical evaluation1 the moment we treat logical theory as an account of thinking as a mode of adaptation to its own generating conditions1 and judge its validity by reference to its efficiency in meeting its problems4#ahe ,psychology1 in other words1 must substantiate ,dewey's account of thought1 else his 'logic' has no foundation4 ,but if it were held that the cognitive processes cannot be separated 7except by abstraction for psychological purposes7 from other processes1 there could manifestly be no such logical problem as ,dewey has posited4 ,logic would be freed from reliance upon psychology4 ,in this case1 logical inquiry would be directed to the study of concepts1 forms of judgment1 and methods of knowledge1 with the purpose of determining their relations1 proper applications1 and spheres of relevance4 ,logic would be a 'criticism of categories' rather than a criticism of the function of thinking4 ,dewey recognizes that such a study of method might be useful1 but holds that it would be subsidiary to the larger problems of logic4 ,the distinctions and classifications that have been accumulated in 'formal' logic are relevant data2 but they demand interpretation from the standpoint of use as organs of adjustment to material antecedents and stimuli4#ahf ,it will be seen that the treatment of the forms of thought as organs of adjustment makes logic subsidiary to psychology1 necessarily and completely4 ,all follows1 however1 from the original assumption that thought is a special activity1 clearly distinguishable from other experienced processes1 and possessing a special function of its own4 ,in his further analysis of logical theory1 ,dewey states that it has two phases1 one general and one specific4 ,the general problem concerns the relations of the various functions of experience to one another2 how they give rise to each other1 and what is their order of succession4 ,this wider logic is identified with philosophy in general4#ahg ,the specific phase of logic1 logic proper1 concerns itself with the function of knowing as such1 inquiring into its typical behavior1 occasion of operation1 divisions of labor1 content1 and successful employment4 ,dewey indicates the danger of identifying logic with either of these to the exclusion of the other1 or of supposing that they can be finally isolated from one another4 ,it is necessary to work back and forth between the larger and the narrower fields4#ahh ,why is it necessary to make such a distinction at all8 ,and why necessary to move back and forth between the two provisional standpoints8 ,dewey might answer by the following analogy3 ,the thought function may be studied1 first of all1 as a special organ1 as an anatomist might study the structure of any special organ of the body2 but in order to understand the part played by this member in the organism as a whole1 it would be necessary to adopt a wider view1 so that its place in the system could be determined4 ,this is probably what ,dewey means by his two standpoints4 ,he says3 ,we keep our paths straight because we do not confuse the sequential1 efficient1 and functional relationship of types of experience with the contemporaneous1 correlative1 and structural distinctions of elements within a given function4#ahi ,the first objection to be made to this treatment of thought is that it makes knowing the activity of a special organ1 like liver or lungs4 ,if this objection is surmounted1 there remains another from the side of general method4 ,the biologist not only studies the particular organs as to their structure and their relationships within the body1 but he has a view of the body as a whole1 of its general end and purpose4 ,his study of the particular organ is in part determined by his knowledge of the relations between body and environment4 ,but experience as a whole cannot be treated like a body1 because it has no environment4 ,the analogy between body and its processes and experience and its processes breaks down1 therefore1 at a vital point4 ,dewey's genetic interpretation gains in plausibility when the human body1 and not the whole of experience1 is taken as the ground upon which the 'functions' are to be explained1 for the body has an environment and purposes in relation to that environment4 ,experience as a whole possesses no such external reference4 ,it will be seen that ,dewey's interpretation of the function of knowing is not as empirical as it proposes to be4 ,its underlying conceptions are biological in character1 and these conceptions are brought ready-made to the study of thought4 ,logical theory does not arise naturally and spontaneously from a study of the facts of mind1 but the facts are aligned and interpreted in terms of categories selected in advance4 ,empiricism develops its theories in connection with facts1 but rationalism 7in the bad sense of the word7 fits the facts into prepared theories4 ,dewey's treatment of thought is1 after all1 more rationalistic than empirical4 ,to sum up ,dewey's conclusions so far3 ,logic is the study of the function of knowing in relation to the other functions of experience4 ,the wider logic distinguishes the function of knowing from other activities1 and discovers its general purpose2 the narrower logic examines the function of knowing in itself1 with the object of determining its structure and operation4 ,the aim of logic as a whole is to understand the operations of the concrete activity called knowing1 with the purpose of rendering it more efficient4 ,this concrete treatment of thought contrasts sharply with the 'epistemological' method1 which sets thought over against the concrete processes of experience1 and thus generates the false problem of the relation of thought in general to reality in general4 ,having stated his position1 we might expect ,dewey1 in the course of the next three chapters1 to enter upon a consideration of one phase or other of his logic4 ,on the contrary1 he proposes to take up some of the considerations that lie on the borderland between the larger and the narrower conceptions of logical theory4#aij ,first1 he will consider the antecedent conditions and cues of the thought-process2 the conditions which lead up to and into the function of knowing4 ,these conditions lie between the thought-process and the preceding function 7in order of time71 and are therefore on the borderland between the wider and narrower spheres of logic4 ,in defining the conditions which precede and evoke thought1 ,dewey says3 ,there is always as antecedent to thought an experience of some subject-matter of the physical or social world1 or organized intellectual world1 whose parts are actively at war with each other--so much so that they threaten to disrupt the entire experience1 which accordingly for its own maintenance requires deliberate re-definition and re-relation of its tensional parts4#aia ,thought is always called into action by the whole concrete situation in which it occurs1 not by any particular sensation1 idea1 or feeling4 ,the opposite interpretation of the nature of the antecedents of thought is furnished by ,lotze1 who makes them consist in bare impressions1 'moods of ourselves1' mere states of consciousness4 ,dewey is quite right in calling these bare impressions purely fictitious1 though the observation is by no means original4 ,from the manner in which he approaches the study of the antecedents of thought it appears1 however1 that ,dewey has something in common with ,lotze4 ,the functional theory1 that is1 allows a certain initial detachment of thought from reality1 which must be bridged over by an empirical demonstration of its natural connection with preceding processes4 ,dewey is wholly justified1 again1 in maintaining that thought is not a faculty set apart from reality1 and that what is 'given' to thought is a coherent world1 not a mass of unmeaning sensations4 ,he recognizes his substantial agreement with the modern idealists in these matters4#aib ,but the idealists1 he believes1 hold a constitutive conception of thought which is in conflict with the empirical description of thinking as a concrete activity in time4 ,reality1 according to this conception1 is a vast system of sensations brought into a rational order by logical forms1 and finite thought1 in its operations1 simply apprehends or discovers the infinite order of the cosmos4 ,how does it happen1 ,dewey asks1 that the absolute constitutive and intuitive ,thought does such a poor and bungling job that it requires a finite discursive activity to patch up its products8#aic ,against ,lotze1 such an indictment has considerable force1 but its applicability to modern idealism is not so obvious4 ,modern idealism has insisted upon an empirical treatment of thought1 and has definitely surrendered the abstract sensations of the older psychologies4 ,nor does idealism tend to treat finite thought as a process which merely 'copies' an eternally present nature4 ,the issue between ,dewey and the idealists is this3 ,does functionalism render an accurate empirical account of the nature of thought as a concrete process8 ,in his third chapter ,dewey discusses ,thought and its ,subject-matter3 ,the ,datum of ,thinking4 ,the tensional situation passes into a thought situation1 and reflection enters upon its work of restoring the equilibrium of experience4 ,certain characteristic processes attend the operation of thought4 ,the conflicting situation inevitably polarizes or dichotomizes itself4 ,there is somewhat which is untouched in the contention of incompatibles4 ,there is something which remains secure1 unquestioned4 ,on the other hand1 there are elements which are rendered doubtful and precarious4#aid ,the unquestioned element is the datum2 the uncertain element1 the ideatum4 ,ideas are impressions1 suggestions1 guesses1 theories1 estimates1 etc41 the facts are crude1 raw1 unorganized1 brute4#aie ,there is an approximation to bare meaning on the one hand1 and bare existence on the other4 ,the first dichotomy passes into a second4 ,once more1 and briefly1 both datum and ideatum may 444 break up1 each for itself1 into physical and psychical4#aif ,the datum1 or sense material1 is all1 somehow1 matter and real1 but one part of it turns out to have a psychical1 another a physical form4 ,similarly1 the ideatum divides into what is mere fancy1 the psychical1 and what is objectively valid1 the physical4 ,these distinctions are divisions of labor within the thought-process4 ,all the distinctions of the thought-function1 of conception as over against sense-perception1 of judgment in its various modes and forms1 of inference in its vast diversity of operation--all these distinctions come within the thought situation as growing out of a characteristic antecedent typical formation of experience4444#aig ,great confusion results in logical theory1 ,dewey believes1 when it is forgotten that these distinctions are valid only within the thought process4 ,their order of occurrence within the thought process must also be observed1 if confusion is to be prevented4 ,datum and ideatum come first1 psychical and physical next in order4 ,thus the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is not one between meaning as such and datum as such4 ,it is a specification that emerges1 correspondently1 in both datum and ideatum1 as affairs of the direction of logical movement4 ,that which is left behind in the evolution of accepted meaning is characterized as real1 but only in a psychical sense2 that which is moved toward is regarded as real in an objective1 cosmic sense4#aih ,dewey does well to call attention to the limitations of these categories1 which cannot1 indeed1 be treated as absolute without serious error4 ,it may be questioned1 however1 whether their limitations are of the precise nature which he describes4 ,all depends upon the initial conception of the nature of thought4 ,from ,dewey's standpoint1 these categories are 'tools of analysis' which function only within the thinking process2 but his description of the function of knowing may be questioned1 in which case his instrumental view of the concepts is rendered meaningless4 ,a logical1 as distinct from a psychological1 treatment of the concepts mentioned1 would show that their validity is limited to a certain 'sphere of relevance2' that they are applicable within a certain context and to a particular subject-matter4 ,the danger of indiscriminate use of the categories would be avoided by the logical criticism even better1 perhaps1 than by ,dewey's method4 ,the discussion in ,dewey's fourth and last chapter1 concerning ,the ,content and ,object of ,thought1 hinges upon a detailed criticism of ,lotze's position1 which cannot be presented here4 ,the general bearing of the discussion1 however1 may be indicated4 ,to regard1 says ,dewey1 the thought-forms of conception1 judgment1 and inference as qualifications of 'pure thought1 apart from any difference in objects1' instead of as successive dispositions in the progressive organization of the material 7or objects7 is the fallacy of rationalism4#aii ,pure thought1 of course1 cannot be defended4 ,at the same time1 ,dewey1 like ,lotze1 tends to regard thought as a special function with a 'content' of its own4 ,if thought is regarded as a special kind of process1 having its own content in the way of instrumental concepts1 the question inevitably arises3 ,how shall these forms be employed to reach truth8 ,how apply them correctly to the matter in hand8 ,dewey answers that the forms and hypotheses of thought1 like the tools and scaffoldings for its operations1 are especially designed for the labor which they have to perform4 ,there is no miracle in the fact that tool and material are adapted to each other in the process of reaching a valid conclusion4444 ,each has been slowly evolved with reference to its fit employ in the entire function2 and this evolution has been checked at every point by reference to its own correspondent4#bjj ,it is no doubt true that established conceptions1 no less than temporary hypotheses1 have been evolved in connection with1 as a feature or part of1 the subject-matter to which they pertain4 ,but it is quite another thing to say that these evolved forms belong to thought1 if by thought be meant the functional activity of ,dewey's description4 ,dewey stresses the relevance of these forms to the thought-process1 rather than their relevance to a particular sphere of discourse4 ,his purpose is to show that distinctions which are valid within the process of knowing are not valid elsewhere1 and the net result is to limit the faculty of thought as a whole1 as well as the forms of thought4 ,this result reveals itself most clearly in his discussion of the test of truth4 ,in that sense the test of reality is beyond thought1 as thought1 just as at the other limit thought originates out of a situation which is not reflectional in character4 ,interpret this before and beyond in a historic sense1 as an affair of the place occupied and role played by thinking as a function in experience in relation to other functions1 and the intermediate and instrumental character of thought1 its dependence upon unreflective antecedents for its existence1 and upon a consequent experience for its test of final validity1 becomes significant and necessary4#bja ,this notion that the test of thought must be external to thought depends directly upon the doctrine that thought is a special activity of the kind heretofore described4 ,it results from the occasionalism attributed by ,dewey to the thinking process4 ,if the truth or falsity of an idea is not discovered by thought1 then by what faculty might it be discovered8 ,perhaps by experience as a whole or in general4 ,dewey1 on occasion1 speaks as follows3 ,experience is continually integrating itself into a wholeness of coherent meaning deepened in significance by passing through an inner distraction in which by means of conflict certain contents are rendered partial and hence objectively conscious4#bjb ,perhaps ,dewey means to say that truth is determined by this cosmic automatism4 ,it is confusing1 however1 to be told in one moment that thought transforms experience1 and in another that experience transforms itself4 ,experience1 not reflection1 is1 then1 the test of truth and thought4 ,such a statement would not be possible1 except in connection with a psychology which deliberately sets experience over against reflection1 making the latter a peculiar1 although dependent1 process4 ,lotze1 indeed1 makes the separation of thought from experience quite complete4 ,dewey attempts to bring them together by his psychological method1 but does not completely succeed4 ,in the meantime modern idealism has suggested that thought and experience are merely parts of one general process1 constantly operating in conjunction4 ,to one who believes that the various processes or 'functions' of experience constitute a single organ of life1 the proposition that experience1 rather than reflection1 is the judge of truth1 becomes meaningless4 ,in an essay on ,the ,logical ,conditions of a ,scientific ,treatment of ,morality in another volume of the ,chicago ,publications of #aijc1bjc ,dewey presents a positive statement of his logical theory which is an excellent supplement to the critical study of ,lotze4 ,science1 ,dewey remarks in introducing this essay1 is a systematized body of knowledge4 ,knowledge may be taken either as a body of facts or as a process of arranging a body of facts2 as results or the acquiring of results4 ,the latter phase of science is the more important4 ,as used in this article1 'scientific' means regular methods of controlling the formation of judgments regarding some subject-matter4#bjd ,in the scientific attitude1 beliefs are looked upon as conclusions1 and as conclusions they look in two directions4 ,they look backward towards the ground from which they are empirically derived1 and which renders them valid1 and they look forward1 as meaning1 to being the ground from which further conclusions can be deduced4 ,so far as we engage in this procedure1 we look at our respective acts of judging not as independent and detached1 but as an interrelated system1 within which every assertion entitles us to other assertions 7which must be carefully deduced since they constitute its meaning7 and to which we are entitled only through other assertions 7so that they must be carefully searched for74 ',scientific' as used in this article thus means the possibility of establishing an order of judgments such that each one when made is of use in determining other judgments1 thereby securing control of their formation4#bje ,this view of science as an order of judgments requires a special treatment of the generic ideas1 the 'conclusions1' or universals of science4 ,the individual judgment1 ',this1 ,a1 is ,b1' expresses an identity4 ,but it is much better expressed in hypothetical form4 ,identification1 in other words1 is secure only when it can be made through 7#a7 breaking up the analyzed4 ,this of naive judgment into determinate traits1 7#b7 breaking up the predicate into a similar combination of elements1 and 7#c7 establishing uniform connection between some of the elements in the subject and some in the predicate4#bjf ,identity exists amid relevant differences1 and the more intimately the system of differents is understood1 the more positive is the determination of identity4 ,this will be recognized as the 'concrete universal' of the ,hegelian logicians4 ,but1 ,dewey says1 modern logicians tend to disregard judgment as act1 and pay attention to it only as content4 ,the generic ideas are studied in independence of their applications1 as if this were a matter of no concern in logic4 ,in truth1 there is no such thing as control of one content by mere reference to another content as such4 ,to recognize this impossibility is to recognize that the control of the formation of the judgment is always through the medium of an act by which the respective contents of both the individual judgment and of the universal proposition are selected and brought into relationship to each other4#bjg ,the individual act of judgment is necessary to logical theory1 because the act of the individual forms the connecting link between the generic idea and the specific details of the situation4 ,there must be some means whereby the instrumental concept is brought to bear upon its appropriate material4 ,the logical process includes1 as an organic part of itself1 the selection and reference of that particular one of the system which is relevant to the particular case4 ,this individualized selection and adaptation is an integral portion of the logic of the situation4 ,and such selection and adjustment is clearly in the nature of an act4#bjh ,this problem of the relation of the categories to their subject-matter is an acute one for ,dewey1 because of limitations placed upon thought4 ,he decides that the idea must be1 in some fashion1 self-selective1 must signify its own fitness to a given subject-matter4 ,but it can only be self-selective by being itself in the nature of an act4 ,it turns out that the generic idea has been evolved in connection with acts of judgment1 and its own applicability is born in it4 ,the activity which selects and employs is logical1 not extra-logical1 just because the tool selected and employed has been invented and developed precisely for the sake of just such future selection and use4#bji ,the logic and system of science must be embodied in the individual4 ,he must be a good logical medium1 his acts must be orderly and consecutive1 and generic ideas must have a good motor basis in his organism1 if he is to think successfully4 ,this is the essence of ,dewey's argument in the essay under discussion4 ,the inference seems to be that logic cannot be separated from biology and psychology1 since the act of knowing and the ideas which it employs have a physiological basis4 ,it is difficult to see1 however1 how such a standpoint could prove useful in the practical study of logic4 ,certainly little headway could be made toward a study of the proper use and limitations of the categories by an investigation of the human nervous system4 ,and to what extent would physiology illuminate the problem of the relation of the generic ideas to their appropriate objects8 ,although ,dewey decides that the relationship must have its ground in the motor activities of the organism1 his conclusion has little empirical evidence to support it4 ,a practical1 workable conception of the relations between generic ideas and their objects must be based on considerations less obscure4 ,why not be content to verify1 by criticism1 the truth that experience and thoughts about experience develop together1 with the result that each theory1 hypothesis1 or method is applicable within the sphere where it was born8 ,why wait upon psychology for confirmation of a truth so obvious and important8 ,bosanquet remarks3 ,either one may speak as if reality were relative to the individual mind1 a ridiculous idea 4441 or one may become interested in tracing the germination and growth of ideas in the individual mind as typical facts indeed1 but only as one animal's habits are typical of those of others1 and we may slur over the primary basis of logic1 which is its relation to reality4 ,for mental facts unrelated to reality are no knowledge1 and therefore have no place in logic4#baj ,bosanquet emphasizes an important truth neglected by ,dewey4 ,logic is not concerned with ideas as things existing in individuals1 nor with conceptions as individual modes of response4 ,truth has little to do with the individual as such1 though the individual might well concern himself about truth4 ,truth is objective1 super-individual1 and logic is the study of the objective verity of thought4 ,the proposition1 ',all life is from the living1' finds no premises in the nerve tissues of the scientist who accepts it4 ,how does the proposition square up with reality or experience8 ,that is the question1 and it can only be answered by turning away from psychology to empirical verification1 involving a critical test of the applicability of the thought to reality4 ,in the strictly ethical part of the essay1 ,dewey tries to show that moral judgments1 at least1 involve the character of the agent and his specific acts as data4 ,intellectual judgments1 on the other hand1 may disregard the acts of the individual2 they are left out of account1 when they are so uniform in their exercise that they make no difference with respect to the particular object or content judged4#baa ,it will be seen that the distinction between moral and intellectual judgments is made on the basis of their content4 ,but ,dewey is committed to the doctrine that judgments are to be differentiated as acts1 on a psychological basis4 ,in any case1 if the character and acts of a man are to be judged1 they must be treated objectively1 and the relevance of the judge's ideas to the man's actual character cannot be decided by a psychological analysis of the judge's mind4 ,right and wrong1 whether moral or intellectual1 are not attributes of the individual nervous system4 ,,footnotes3 #agc ,the ,philosophical ,radicals1 ,dewey's ,studies in ,logical ,theory1 p4 #agi4 ,the essay was originally printed as a critical notice in the ,philosophical ,review1 ,november1 #aijd4 #agd ,since this was written 7#aiae-af71 ,dewey's chapters have been reprinted in a volume entitled ,essays in ,experimental ,logic1 published by the ,university of ,chicago ,press 7,june1 #aiaf74 ,they are preceded1 in this new setting1 by a special introductory chapter1 and numerous alterations have been made which do not1 however1 affect the fundamental standpoint4 #age ,see ,james's review1 ,the ,chicago ,school1 ,psychological ,bulletin1 ,vol4 ,i1 #aijd1 pp4 #a-e4 #agf ,studies in ,logical ,theory1 p4 #b4 #agg ,compare ,dewey1 ,how ,we ,think 7#aiaj71 ,chapter ,,ii1 ,the ,need for ,training ,thought4 #agh ,studies in ,logical ,theory1 p4 #a4 #agi ,ibid41 p4 #b4 #ahj ,op4 cit41 p4 #c f4 #aha ,ibid41 p4 #af4 #ahb ,logic1 second ed41 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #bgj4 #ahc ,studies in ,logical ,theory1 p4 x4 #ahd ,thinking or rationality is not limited to the process of abstract cognition1 but it includes feeling and will1 and in the course of its development carries these along with it4 ,there is1 of course1 such a thing as what we have called abstract cognition2 but the different moments are all united in the concrete experience which we may name the life of thought4 ,creighton1 ,experience and ,thought1 ,philosophical ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xv1 #aijf1 p4 #dhg f4 #ahe ,op4 cit41 p4 #ae4 #ahf ,ibid41 p4 #h4 #ahg ,op4 cit41 pp4 #ah-ai4 #ahh ,ibid41 p4 #bc4 #ahi ,ibid41 p4 #ag4 #aij ,op4 cit41 p4 #bc4 #aia ,op4 cit41 p4 #ci f4 ,bradley suggests a similar idea of the 'tensional situation4' ,see1 for instance1 ,ethical ,studies1 p4 #fe1 where he remarks3 ,we have conflicting desires1 say ,a and ,b2 we feel two tensions1 two drawings 7so to speak7 but we can not actually affirm ourselves in both4 ,a more complete statement of the 'tensional situation' will be found on page #bci of the same work and in various other passages4 #aib ,ibid41 pp4 #dc-dd4 #aic ,op4 cit41 p4 #de4 #aid ,ibid41 p4 #ej4 #aie ,ibid41 p4 #eb4 #aif ,op4 cit4 #aig ,ibid41 p4 #dg4 #aih ,ibid41 p4 #ec4 #aii ,op4 cit41 p4 #fa f4 #bjj ,ibid41 p4 #hj4 #bja ,op4 cit41 p4 #he4 #bjb ,ibid4 #bjc ,decennial ,publications of the ,university of ,chicago1 ,first ,series1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 pp4 #aae-aci4 #bjd ,ibid41 p4 #aae4 #bje ,ibid41 p4 #aaf4 #bjf ,op4 cit41 p4 #abj4 #bjg ,ibid41 p4 #aba4 #bjh ,ibid41 p4 #abb4 #bji ,op4 cit4 #baj ,logic1 second ed41 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #bcb4 #baa ,decennial ,publication of the ,university of ,chicago1 ,first ,series1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 p4 #abg4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,the ,,polemical ,,period ,after the publication of the ,studies in ,logical ,theory1 ,dewey entered upon what may be called the polemical period of his career4 ,he joined forces with ,james and ,schiller in the promotion of the new movement called ',pragmatism4' ,the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1 instituted at ,columbia ,university in #aijd1 the same year in which ,dewey accepted a professorship in that institution1 became a convenient medium for the expression of his views1 and every volume of this periodical will be found to contain notes1 discussions1 and articles by ,dewey and his followers1 bearing on current controversy4 ,he also published many articles in other journals1 technical and popular4 ,in #aiaj1 the most important of these essays were collected into a volume1 published under the title1 ,the ,influence of ,darwin on ,philosophy1 and ,other ,essays4 ,for purposes of discussion1 these essays may be divided into two classes3 those of a more constructive character1 setting forth ,dewey's own standpoint1 and those which are mainly polemical1 directed against opposing standpoints1 chiefly the idealistic4 ,the constructive writings will be given first consideration4 ,the essay on ,the ,postulate of ,immediate ,empiricism1 first published in the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1 in ,july1 #aije1 and later reprinted in the volume of collected essays1 offers a convenient point of departure4 ,dewey observes that many of the difficulties in current controversy can be traced to presuppositions tacitly held by thinkers as to what experience means4 ,dewey attempts to make his own presuppositions explicit1 with the object of clearing up this confusion4 ,immediate empiricism1 he says1 postulates that things--anything1 everything1 in the ordinary or non-technical use of the term 'thing'--are what they are experienced as4 ,hence1 if one wishes to describe anything truly1 his task is to tell what it is experienced as being4#bab ,the idealists1 on the contrary1 hold that things 7or1 ultimately1 ,reality1 ,being7 are only and just what they are known to be or that things are1 or ,reality is1 what it is for a conscious knower--whether the knower be conceived primarily as a perceiver or as a thinker being a further1 and secondary1 question4 ,this is the root-paralogism of all idealisms1 whether subjective or objective1 psychological or epistemological4#bac ,knowing is merely one mode of experiencing1 and things may be experienced in other ways1 as1 for instance1 aesthetically1 morally1 technologically1 or economically4 ,this follows ,dewey's familiar division of the processes of experience into separate 'functions' or activities4 ,it becomes the duty of the philosopher1 following this scheme1 to find out what sort of an experience knowing is--or1 concretely how things are experienced when they are experienced as known things4#bad ,dewey fails1 in this essay1 to draw a distinction which is highly important1 between knowledge as awareness and knowledge as reflection4 ,this results in some confusion4 ,for the present1 he is concerned with knowledge as awareness4 ,he employs an illustration to make his meaning clear2 the experience of fright at a noise1 which turns out1 when examined and known1 to be the tapping of a window shade4 ,what is originally experienced is a frightful noise4 ,if1 after examination1 the 'frightfulness' is classified as 'psychical1' while the 'real' fact is said to be harmless1 there is no warrant for reading this distinction back into the original experience4 ,the argument is directed against that mode of explaining the difference between the psychical and the physical which employs a subjective mind or 'knower' as the container of the merely subjective aspects of reality4 ,dewey would hold that mind1 used in this sense1 is a fiction1 having a small explanatory value1 and creating more problems than it solves4 ,the difference between psychical and physical is relative1 not absolute4 ,the frightful noise first heard was neither psychical nor physical2 it was what it was experienced as1 and the experience contained no such distinction1 nor did it contain a 'knower4' ,the noise as known1 after the intervention of an act of judgment1 contained these elements 7except the 'knower'71 but the thing is not merely what it is known as4 ,there is no warrant for reading the distinctions made by judgment back into a situation where judgment was not operative4 ,the original fact was precisely what it was experienced as4 ,dewey's purpose1 though not well stated1 seems to be the complete rejection of the notion of knowledge as awareness1 or of the subjective knower4 ,he discovers at the same time an opportunity to substantiate his own descriptive account of knowing 7or reflection7 as an occasional function4 ,the two enterprises1 however1 should be kept distinct4 ,granting that the subjective knower of the older epistemology should be dismissed from philosophy1 it does not follow that ,dewey's special interpretation of the function of reflection is the only substitute4 ,the principle of immediate empiricism1 ,dewey says1 furnishes no positive truth4 ,it is simply a method4 ,not a single philosophical proposition can be deduced from it4 ,the application of the method is indicated in the following proposition3 ,if you wish to find out what subjective1 objective1 physical1 mental1 cosmic1 psychic1 cause1 substance1 purpose1 activity1 evil1 being1 quality--any philosophic term1 in short--means1 go to experience and see what the thing is experienced as4#bae ,this recipe cannot be taken literally4 ,dewey probably means that each concept has1 or should have1 a positive empirical reference1 and is significant only in that reference4 ,he is a firm believer1 however1 in the descriptive method4 ,in a note1 he remarks that he would employ in philosophy the direct descriptive method that has now made its way in all the natural sciences1 with such modifications1 of course1 as the subject itself entails4#baf ,this remark calls for closer examination than can be made here4 ,it may be said in passing1 however1 that 'scientific description' is by no means so simple a method of procedure as ,dewey would seem to indicate4 ',scientific description1' as actually employed1 is a highly elaborated and specialized method of dealing with experience4 ,the whole subject1 indeed1 is involved1 and requires cautious treatment4 ,dewey's somewhat ingenuous hope1 that the identification of his method with the methods of science will add to its impressiveness1 is in danger1 unfortunately1 of being vitiated through the suspicion that he is1 after all1 not in close touch with the methods of science4 ,dewey employs the descriptive method chiefly as a means for substantiating his special interpretation of the judgment process4 ,his use of the method in this connection is well illustrated by an article called ,the ,experimental ,theory of ,knowledge#bag 7#aijf71 in which he attempts to find out what sort of an experience knowing is through an appeal to immediate experience4 ,it should be possible1 he says1 to discern and describe a knowing as one identifies any object1 concern1 or event4444 ,what we want is just something which takes itself as knowledge1 rightly or wrongly4#bah ,the difficulty lies not in finding a case of knowing1 but in describing it when found4 ,dewey selects a case to be described1 and1 as usual1 chooses a simple one4 ,this means1 he says1 a specific case1 a sample4444 ,our recourse is to an example so simple1 so much on its face as to be as innocent as may be of assumptions4444 ,let us suppose a smell1 just a floating odor4#bai ,the level at which this illustration is taken is significant4 ,is it possible to suppose that anything so complex1 varied1 myriad-sided as that something we call knowledge1 can be discovered and described within the limits of so simple an instance8 ,dewey employs the smell in three situations1 the first representing the 'non-cognitional1' the second the 'cognitive1' and the third the genuinely 'cognitional' situation4 ,the first1 or 'non-cognitional' situation is described as follows3 ,but1 let us say1 the smell is not the smell of the rose2 the resulting change of the organism is not a sense of walking and reaching2 the delicious finale is not the fulfilment of the movement1 and1 through that1 of the original smell2 'is not1' in each case meaning is 'not experienced as' such4 ,we may take1 in short1 these experiences in a brutely serial fashion4 ,the smell1 ,s1 is replaced 7and displaced7 by a felt movement1 ,k1 this is replaced by the gratification1 ,g4 ,viewed from without1 as we are now regarding it1 there is ,s-,k-,g4 ,but from within1 for itself1 it is now ,s1 now ,k1 now ,g1 and so on to the end of the chapter4 ,nowhere is there looking before and after2 memory and anticipation are not born4 ,such an experience neither is1 in whole or in part1 a knowledge1 nor does it exercise a cognitive function4#bbj ,it will be seen at once that this is not a description of an actual human experience1 but a schematic story designed to illustrate a comparatively simple point4 ,in this situation the person concerned does not deliberately and consciously recognize the smell as the smell of a rose2 he is not aware of any symbolic character in the smell1 it does not enter as a middle term into a process of inference4 ,in such a situation1 ,dewey believes1 it would be wrong to read into the smell a cognitive property which it does not1 as experienced1 possess4 ,in the second1 or 'cognitive' situation1 the smell as originally experienced does not involve the function of knowing1 but turns out after the event1 as reflected upon1 to have had a significance4 ,in saying that the smell is finally experienced as meaning gratification 444 we retrospectively attribute intellectual force and function to the smell--and this is what is signified by 'cognitive4' ,yet the smell is not cognitional1 because it did not knowingly intend to mean this2 but is found1 after the event1 to have meant it4#bba ,the moral is1 as usual1 that the findings of reflection must not be read back into the former unreflective experience4 ,in the truly 'cognitional' experience the smell is then and there experienced as meaning or symbolizing the rose4 ,an experience is a knowledge1 if in its quale there is an experienced distinction and connection of two elements of the following sort3 one means or intends the presence of the other in the same fashion in which itself is already present1 while the other is that which1 while not present in the same fashion1 must become so present if the meaning or intention of its companion or yoke-fellow is to be fulfilled through the operation it sets up4#bbb ,in the 'cognitional' situation1 the smell is then and there experienced as signifying the presence of a rose in the vicinity1 and the rose must be experienced as a present fact1 before the meaning of the smell is completely fulfilled and verified4 ,it will be seen at once that this description of knowing follows the lines laid down by ,james in his chapter on ,reasoning in the ,principles of ,psychology4 ,in the process of reasoning the situation is analyzed2 some particular feature of it is abstracted and made the middle term in an inference4 ,the smell1 as thus abstracted1 is said to have the function of knowing1 or meaning1 the rose whose reality it evidences4 ,dewey's treatment of knowledge1 however1 is far too simple4 ,the function of meaning1 symbolizing1 or 'pointing' does not reside in the abstracted element as such2 for the context in which the judgment occurs determines the choosing of the 'middle term1' as well as the direction in which it shall point4 ,the situation as a whole has a rationality which resides in the distinctions1 identities1 phases of emphasis1 and discriminations of the total experience4 ,rationality expresses itself in the organized system of experience1 not in particular elements and their 'pointings4' ,taken in this sense1 rationality is present in all experience4 ,the smell1 in ,dewey's first situation1 is not 'cognitional' because the situation as a whole does not permit it to be1 if such an expression may be used4 ,the intellectual drift of the moment drives the smell away from the centre of attention at one time1 just as at another it selects it to serve as an element in judgment4 ,it is only with reference to a system of some kind that things can be regarded as symbols at all4 ,things do not represent one another at haphazard1 but definitely and concretely2 they imply an organization of elements having mutual implications4 ,one thing implies another because both are elements in a whole which determines their mutual reference4 ,this organization is present in all experience1 not in the form of 'established habits1' but in the form of will and purpose4 ,in the course of his further discussion1 which need not be followed in detail1 ,dewey passes on to a consideration of truth4 ,truth is concerned with the worth or validity of ideas4 ,but1 before their validity can be determined1 there must be a 'cognitional' experience of the type described above4 ,before the category of confirmation or refutation can be introduced1 there must be something which means to mean something and which therefore can be guaranteed or nullified by the issue4#bbc ,ideas1 or meanings1 as directly experienced1 are neither true nor false1 but are made so by the results in which they issue4 ,even then1 the outcome must be reflected upon1 before they can be designated true or false4 ,truth and falsity present themselves as significant facts only in situations in which specific meanings and their already experienced fulfilments and non-fulfilments are intentionally compared and contrasted with reference to the question of the worth1 as to reliability of meaning1 of the given meaning or class of meanings4#bbd ,this makes the whole problem of truth a relatively simple affair4 ,the symbol and its 'pointing' are taken as a single1 objective fact1 to be tested1 and1 if verified1 labelled 'true4' ,meanings1 after all1 are not so simple as this scheme would imply4 ,as the intellectual life of man is more subtle and universal than ,dewey represents it to be1 so is truth1 as that which thought seeks to establish1 something deeper-lying and more comprehensive4 ,ideas are not simple and isolated facts2 their truth is not strictly their own1 but is reflected into them from the objective order to which they pertain4 ,the possibility of making observations and experiments1 and of having ideas1 rests upon the presence in and through experience of that directing influence which we call valid knowledge1 or truth4 ,an idea1 to be true1 must fit in with this general body of truth4 ,not correspondence with its single object1 but correspondence with the whole organized body of knowledge1 is the test of the truth of an idea4 ,the attempt to describe knowledge as a particular occurrence1 fact1 or function1 is foredoomed to failure4 ,it should be noted also that ,dewey's 'description1' throughout this essay1 is anything but a direct1 empirical examination of thought4 ,he presents a schematized picture of reality which1 like an engineer's diagram1 leaves out the cloying details of the object it is supposed to represent4 ,the sceptical and positivistic results of ,dewey's treatment of knowledge are set forth in an article entitled ,some ,implications of ,anti-,intellectualism1 published in the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1 in #aiaj4bbe ,this was not included in the volume of collected essays published in the same year1 but may be regarded as of some importance4 ,after some comments on current anti-intellectualistic tendencies1 ,dewey proceeds to distinguish his own anti-intellectualism from that of others4 ,this type starts from acts1 functions1 as primary data1 functions both biological and social in character2 from organic responses1 readjustments4 ,it treats the knowledge standpoint1 in all its patterns1 structures1 and purposes1 as evolving out of1 and operating in the interests of1 the guidance and enrichment of these primary functions4 ,the vice of intellectualism from this standpoint is not in making of logical relations and functions in and for knowledge1 but in a false abstraction of knowledge 7and the logical7 from its working context4#bbf ,the manner in which this exaltation of the primary functions at the expense of knowledge affects philosophy is indicated in the following passage3 ,philosophy is itself a mode of knowing1 and of knowing wherein reflective thinking is much in play4444 ,as a mode of knowledge1 it arises1 like any intellectual undertaking1 out of certain typical perplexities and conflicts of behavior1 and its purpose is to help straighten these out4 ,philosophy may indeed render things more intelligible or give greater insight into existence2 but these considerations are subject to the final criterion of what it means to acquire insight and to make things intelligible1 i4 e41 namely1 service of special purposes in behavior1 and limit by the special problems in which the need of insight arises4 ,this is not to say that instrumentalism is merely a methodology or an epistemology preliminary to more ultimate philosophic or metaphysical inquiries1 for it involves the doctrine that the origin1 structure1 and purpose of knowing are such as to render nugatory any wholesale inquiries into the nature of ,being4#bbg ,in the last analysis1 this appears to be a confession1 rather than an argument4 ,it is the inevitable outcome of the functional analysis of intelligence4 ,thought is this organ1 with these functions1 and is capable of so much and no more4 ,the limit to its capacity is set by the description of its nature4 ,the nature of the functionalistic limitation of thought is well expressed in the words 'special' and 'specific4' ,since thought is the servant of the 'primary' modes of experience1 it can only deal with the problems set for it by preceding non-reflective processes4 ,these problems are 'specific' because they are concrete problems of action1 and are concerned with particular aspects of the environment4 ,dewey's formidable positivism would vanish at once1 however1 if his special psychology of the thought-process should be found untenable4 ,thought is limited1 according to ,dewey1 because it is a very special form of activity1 operating occasionally in the interest of the direct modes of experiencing4 ,probably every philosopher recognizes that speculation cannot be allowed to run wild4 ,some problems are worth while1 others are artificial and trivial1 and some means must be found for separating the sound and substantial from the tawdry and sentimental4 ,the question is1 however1 whether ,dewey's psychology furnishes a ground for such distinctions4 ,again1 it should be noted that1 in spite of the limitations placed upon thought by its very nature1 as described by ,dewey1 certain philosophers1 by his own confession1 are guilty of wholesale inquiries into the nature of ,being4 ,if thought can deal only with specific problems1 then there can be no question as to whether philosophy ought to be metaphysical4 ,it is a repetition of the case of psychological versus ethical hedonism4 ,modern idealists would resent the imputation that there is any inclination on their part to deny the need for a critical attitude toward the problems and methods of philosophy4 ,kant's criticism of the 'dogmatists' for their undiscriminating employment of the categories in the interpretation of reality1 established an attitude which has been steadily maintained by his philosophical descendants4 ,the idealist1 in fact1 has accused ,dewey of laxity in the criticism of his own methods and presuppositions4 ,the categories of description and natural selection by means of which his functionalism is established1 it is argued1 are of little service in the sphere of mind4 ,and while ,dewey accepts an evolutionary view of reality in general1 the idealist has found evolutionism1 at least in its biological form1 too limited in scope to serve the extensive interests of philosophy4 ,dewey is right in opposing false problems and fanciful solutions in philosophy2 but these evils are to be corrected1 not by functional psychology1 but by an empirical criticism of each method and each problem as it arises4 ,it has been seen that1 even in these more constructive essays1 ,dewey's position is largely defined in negatives4 ,what might be expected1 then1 of the essays which are primarily critical8 ,perhaps the best answer will be afforded by a close analysis of one or more of them4 ,idealism1 as has been said1 receives most of ,dewey's attention4 ,there are three essays in ,the ,influence of ,darwin on ,philosophy1 which bear directly against idealism4 ,one1 ,the ,intellectualist ,criterion of ,truth1 is directed against ,bradley2 another1 ,experience and ,objective ,idealism1 is a historical discussion of idealistic views4 ,the third1 which is broadest in scope1 is entitled ,beliefs and ,existences4 ,this was originally delivered as the presidential address at the meeting of the ,american ,philosophical ,association in ,december1 #aije1 and was printed in the ,philosophical ,review in ,march1 #aijf1 under the title1 ,beliefs and ,realities4 ,dewey begins with a discussion of the personal and human character of beliefs4 ,beliefs1 he says1 look both ways1 towards persons and towards things4444 ,they form or judge--justify or condemn--the agents who entertain them and who insist upon them4444 ,to believe is to ascribe value1 impute meaning1 assign import4#bbh ,beliefs are entertained by persons2 by men as individuals and not as professional beings4 ,because they are essentially human1 beliefs issue in action1 and have their import in conduct4 ,that believed better is held to1 asserted1 affirmed1 acted upon4444 ,that believed worse is fled1 resisted1 transformed into an instrument for the better4#bbi ,beliefs1 then1 have a human side2 they belong to people1 and have a character which is expressed in the conduct to which they lead4 ,on the other hand1 beliefs look towards things4 ',reality' naturally instigates belief4 ,it appraises itself and through this self-appraisal manages its affairs4444 ,it is interpretation2 not merely existence aware of itself as fact1 but existence discerning1 judging itself1 approving and disapproving4#bcj ,the vital connection between belief as personal1 and as directed upon things1 cannot be disregarded4 ,we cannot keep connection on one side and throw it away on the other4 ,we cannot preserve significance and decline the personal attitude in which it is inscribed and operative4444#bca ,to take the world as something existing by itself1 is to overlook the fact that it is always somebody's world1 and you shall not have completed your metaphysics till you have told whose world is meant and how and what for--in what bias and to what effect4#bcb ,but philosophers have been guilty of error here4 ,they have thrown aside all consideration of belief as a personal fact in reality1 and have taken an oath of allegiance to ,reality1 objective1 universal1 complete2 made perhaps of atoms1 perhaps of sensations1 perhaps of logical meanings4#bcc ,this ,reality leaves no place for belief2 for belief1 as having to do with human adventures1 can have no place in a cut and dried cosmos4 ,the search for a world which is eternally fixed in eternal meanings has developed the present wondrous and formidable technique of philosophy4 ,the attempt to exclude the human element from belief has resulted in philosophical errors4 ,philosophers have divided reality into two parts1 one of which shall alone be good and true ',reality1' 444 while the other part1 that which is excluded1 shall be referred exclusively to belief and treated as mere appearance4444#bcd ,to cap the climax1 this division of the world into two parts must be made by some philosopher who1 being human1 employs his own beliefs1 and classifies things on the basis of his own experience4 ,can it be done8 ,we are today in the presence of a revolt against such tendencies1 ,dewey says2 and he proposes to give some sketch1 7#a7 of the historical tendencies which have shaped the situation in which a ,stoic theory of knowledge claims metaphysical monopoly1 and 7#b7 of the tendencies that have furnished the despised principle of belief opportunity and means of reassertion4#bce ,throughout this introduction ,dewey speaks with considerable feeling1 as if the question were a moral one1 rather than a disquisition concerning the best method of dealing with the personal aspects of thought4 ,his meaning1 however1 is far from being apparent4 ,what does it mean to say that a ,stoic theory of knowledge holds a monopoly in modern philosophy8 ,in what sense has the philosophy of the past been misanthropic8 ,is ,humanism a product of the twentieth century8 ,dewey's assertions are broad and sweeping2 too broad even for a popular discourse1 let alone a philosophical address4 ,perhaps his attitude will be more fully expressed in the historical inquiry which follows4 ,dewey begins this inquiry with the period of the rise of ,christianity1 which1 because it emphasized faith and the personal attitude1 seemed in a fair way to do justice to human belief4 ,that the ultimate principle of conduct is affectional and volitional2 that ,god is love2 that access to the principle is by faith1 a personal attitude2 that belief1 surpassing logical basis and warrant1 works out through its own operation its own fulfilling evidence3 such was the implied moral metaphysic of ,christianity4#bcf ,but these implications had to be worked out into a theory1 and the only logical or metaphysical systems which offered themselves as a basis for organization were those ,stoic systems which identified true existence with the proper object of logical reason4 ,aristotle alone among the ancients gave practical thought its due attention1 but he1 unfortunately1 failed to assimilate his idea of theoretical to his notion of practical knowledge4#bcg ,in the ,greek systems generally1 desiring reason culminating in beliefs relating to imperfect existence1 stands forever in contrast with passionless reason functioning in pure knowledge1 logically complete1 of perfect being4#bch ,dewey's discussion moves too rapidly here to be convincing4 ,he does not take time1 for instance1 to make a very important distinction between the ,greek and ,hellenistic philosophies4 ,he does not do justice to the purpose which animated the ,greeks in their attempt to put thought on a 'theoretical' basis4 ,his confusion of ,platonism with ,neo-,platonism is especially annoying4 ,and1 most assuredly1 his estimate of primitive ,christianity needs corroboration4 ,probably ,christianity1 in its primitive form1 did lay great stress upon individual beliefs and persuasions1 but it was expected1 nevertheless1 that the ,holy ,spirit working in men would produce uniform results in the way of belief4 ,when the uniformity failed to materialize1 ,christianity was forced1 in the interests of union1 to fall back upon some objective standard by which belief could be tested4 ,after this was established1 an end was made of individual inspiration4 ,from the earliest times1 therefore1 it may be said1 ,christianity sought means for the suppression of free inquiry and belief1 a proceeding utterly opposed to the spirit of ancient ,greece4 ,i need not remind you1 ,dewey continues1 how through ,neo-,platonism1 ,st4 ,augustine1 and the ,scholastic renaissance1 these conceptions became imbedded in ,christian philosophy2 and what a reversal occurred of the original practical principle of ,christianity4 ,belief is henceforth important because it is the mere antecedent in a finite and fallen world1 a temporal and phenomenal world infected with non-being1 of true knowledge to be achieved only in a world of completed ,being4#bci ,through the hundreds of years that intervened before the world's awakening1 the ',stoic dogma1' enforced by authority1 held the world in thrall4 ,and still ,dewey finds the mediaeval ,absolutism in many respects more merciful than the ,absolutism of modern philosophy4 ,for my part1 ,i can but think that mediaeval absolutism1 with its provision for authoritative supernatural assistance in this world and assertion of supernatural realization in the next1 was more logical1 as well as more humane1 then the modern absolutism1 that1 with the same logical premises1 bids man find adequate consolation and support in the fact that1 after all1 his strivings are already eternally fulfilled1 his errors already eternally transcended1 his partial beliefs already eternally comprehended4#bdj ,dewey takes no note of the fact that philosophy1 as involving really free inquiry1 was dead during the whole period of mediaeval predominance4 ,the modern age1 ,dewey continues1 brought intelligence back to earth again1 but only partially4 ,fixed being was still supposed to be the object of thought4 ,the principle of the inherent relation of thought to being was preserved intact1 but its practical locus was moved down from the next world to this4#bda ,aristotle's mode of dealing with the ,platonic ideas was followed1 and ,spinoza was the great exponent of the strict correlation of the attribute of matter with the attribute of thought4 ,but1 again1 the modern conception of knowledge failed to do justice to belief1 in spite of the compromise that gave the natural world to intelligence1 and the spiritual world to faith4 ,this compromise could not endure1 for ,science encroached upon the field of religious belief1 and invaded the sphere of the personal and emotional4 ,knowledge1 in its general theory1 as philosophy1 went the same way4 ,it was pre-committed to the old notion3 the absolutely real is the object of knowledge1 and hence is something universal and impersonal4 ,so1 whether by the road of sensationalism or rationalism1 by the path of mechanicalism or objective idealism1 it came about that concrete selves1 specific feeling and willing beings1 were relegated with the beliefs in which they declare themselves to the 'phenomenal4'#bdb ,feeling1 volition1 desiring thought have never received the justice due them in the whole course of philosophy4 ,this is ,dewey's conclusion4 ,little can be said in praise of his historical survey4 ,there is scarcely a statement to which exception could not be taken1 for the history of philosophy is not amenable to generalized treatment of this character4 ,the reader turns more hopefully toward the third part of the essay1 in which he is promised a positive statement of the new theory which does full justice to belief4 ,first1 then1 the very use of the knowledge standpoint1 the very expression of the knowledge preoccupation1 has produced methods and tests that1 when formulated1 intimate a radically different conception of knowledge1 and of its relation to existence and belief1 than the orthodox one4#bdc ,but after this not unpromising introduction1 ,dewey falls into the polemical strain again4 ,the argument need not be followed in detail1 since it consists largely in a reassertion of the validity of belief as an element in knowledge4 ,the general conclusion is that modern scientific investigation reveals itself1 when examined1 as nothing more that the rendering into a systematic technique1 into an art deliberately and delightfully pursued1 the rougher and cruder means by which practical human beings have in all ages worked out the implications of their beliefs1 tested them1 and endeavored in the interests of economy1 efficiency1 and freedom1 to render them coherent with one another4#bdd ,this is presumably true4 ,if no more is implied than is definitely asserted in this passage1 the reader is apt to wonder who would deny it4 ,dewey again claims for his theory the support of modern science4 ,biology1 psychology1 and the social sciences proffer an imposing body of concrete facts that also point to the rehabilitation of belief4444#bde ,psychology has revised its notions in terms of beliefs4 ',motor' is writ large on the face of sensation1 perception1 conception1 cognition in general4 ,biology shows that the organic instruments of the intellectual life were evolved for specifically practical purposes4 ,the historical sciences show that knowledge is a social instrument for the purpose of meeting social needs4 ,this testimony is not philosophy1 ,dewey says1 but it has a bearing on philosophy4 ,the new sciences have at least as much importance as mathematics and physics4 ,such being the case1 the reasons for ruling psychology and sociology and allied sciences out of competency to give philosophic testimony have more significance than the bare denial of jurisdiction4#bdf ,the idealists1 apparently1 have been the worst offenders in this connection4 ,one would be almost justified in construing idealism as a ,pickwickian scheme1 so willing is it to idealize the principle of intelligence at the expense of its specific undertakings1 were it not that this reluctance is the necessary outcome of the ,stoic basis and tenor of idealism--its preoccupation with logical contents and relations in abstraction from their situs and function in conscious living beings4#bdg ,in conclusion1 ,dewey warns against certain possible misunderstandings4 ,the pragmatic philosopher1 he says1 is not opposed to objective realities1 and logical and universal thinking4 ,again1 it is not to be supposed that science is any the less exact by reason of being instrumental to human beliefs4 ,because reason is a scheme of working out the meanings of convictions in terms of one another and of the consequences they import in further experience1 convictions are the more1 not the less1 amenable and responsible to the full exercise of reason4#bdh ,and finally1 ,dewey assures the reader that the outcome of his discussion is not a solution1 but a problem4 ,nobody is apt to dispute that statement4 ,this very unsatisfactory essay is1 nevertheless1 a fair specimen of the polemical literature which was produced by ,dewey and others during these years4 ,pragmatism was trying to make converts1 and the argumentum ad hominem was freely employed4 ,if the opposition was painted a good deal blacker than was necessary1 the end was supposed to justify the evident exaggeration4 ,and so1 in this essay1 after accusing his contemporaries of adherence to tenets that they would have indignantly repudiated1 after a wholesale and indiscriminate condemnation of idealism1 ,dewey concludes with--a problem4 ,this period of propaganda is now quite definitely a thing of the past4 ,philosophical discussion1 especially since the beginning of the great war1 has entered upon a new epoch of sanity1 and1 perhaps1 of constructive effort4 ,,footnotes3 #bab ,the ,influence of ,darwin on ,philosophy1 p4 #bbg4 #bac ,ibid41 p4 #bbh4 ,in connection with the discussion which follows see ,bradley ,on ,our ,knowledge of ,immediate ,experience1 in ,essays on ,truth and ,reality1 ,chapter ,,vi4 #bad ,ibid41 p4 #bbi4 #bae ,op4 cit41 p4 #bci4 #baf ,ibid41 p4 #bdj4 #bag ,the ,influence of ,darwin on ,philosophy1 pp4 #gg-aaa4 #bah ,ibid41 p4 #gg4 #bai ,ibid41 p4 #gh4 #bbj ,op4 cit4 #bba ,ibid41 p4 #hd4 #bbb ,op4 cit41 p4 #ij4 ,author's italics4 #bbc ,op4 cit41 p4 #hg4 #bbd ,ibid41 p4 #ie4 ,author's italics4 #bbe ,vol4 ,,vii4 pp4 #dgg-dha4 #bbf ,ibid41 p4 #dgh4 #bbg ,op4 cit41 p4 #dgi4 #bbh ,influence of ,darwin on ,philosophy1 p4 #afi4 #bbi ,ibid41 p4 #agj4 #bcj ,ibid41 p4 #aga4 #bca ,ibid4 #bcb ,ibid4 #bcc ,ibid41 p4 #agb4 #bcd ,op4 cit41 p4 #age4 #bce ,ibid41 p4 #agg4 #bcf ,ibid41 p4 #ag84 #bcg ,op4 cit41 p4 #agi4 #bch ,ibid4 #bci ,op4 cit4 #bdj ,ibid41 p4 #ahj4 #bda ,ibid41 p4 #aha4 #bdb ,op4 cit41 p4 #ahc4 #bdc ,ibid41 p4 #ahd4 #bdd ,ibid41 p4 #ahg4 #bde ,ibid41 p4 #ahi4 #bdf ,op4 cit41 p4 #aij4 #bdg ,ibid41 p4 #aia f4 #bdh ,ibid41 p4 #aid4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,later ,,developments ,neo-realism began to flourish in this country after #aijj1 its rise being nearly contemporary with the spread of pragmatism4 ,many neo-realists1 indeed1 consider themselves followers of ,james4 ,dewey views the new realism1 along with pragmatism and 'naturalistic idealism1' as part and parcel of a general movement of intellectual reconstruction4#bdi ,the neo-realists1 like the pragmatists1 have been active in the field of controversy1 and the pages of the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods are filled with exchanges between the representatives of the two schools1 in the form of notes1 articles1 discussions1 agreements1 and disclaimers4 ,dewey has more sympathy for realism than for idealism4 ,he finds among the writers of this school1 however1 a tendency toward the epistemological interpretation of thought which he so strongly opposes4 ,an excellent statement of his estimate of realism is furnished by his ,brief ,studies in ,realism1 published in the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1 in #aiaa4bej ,in beginning these studies ,dewey observes that certain idealistic writers 7not named7 have been employing in support of their idealism certain facts which have an obvious physical nature and explanation4 ,such illusions as that of the bent stick in the water1 the converging railway tracks1 and the double image that occurs when the eye-ball is pressed1 have1 as the realists have well proved1 a physical explanation which is entirely adequate4 ,why is it that the idealists remain unimpressed by this demonstration8 ,there is a certain element in the realistic explanation which undoubtedly explains the reluctance of the idealists to be convinced4 ,many realists1 in offering the type of explanation adduced above1 have treated the cases of seen light1 doubled imagery1 as perception in a way that ascribes to perception an inherent cognitive status4 ,they have treated the perceptions as cases of knowledge1 instead of as simply natural events4444#bea ,dewey draws a distinction1 at this point1 between naive and presentative realism1 employing1 by way of illustration1 the 'star' illusion1 which turns upon the peculiar fact that a star may be seen upon the earth long after it has ceased to exist4 ,the naive realist remains in the sphere of natural explanation4 ,he accounts for the star illusion in physical terms4 ,the astronomical star and the perceived star are two physical events within a continuous physical order or process4 ,but the presentative realist maintains that1 since the two stars are numerically separate1 the astronomical star must be the 'real' star1 while the perceived star is merely mental2 the real star exists in independence of a knowing subject1 while the perceived star is related to a mind4 ,the naive realist has no need of the hypothesis of a knower1 since he can furnish an adequate physical account of the numerical duplicity of the star4 ,dewey favors the naive standpoint1 and affirms that presentative realism is tainted by an epistemological subjectivism4 ,once depart1 he says1 from this thorough naivete1 and substitute for it the psychological theory that perception is a cognitive presentation of an object to a mind1 and the first step is taken on the road which ends in an idealistic system4#beb ,the presentative realist1 ,dewey continues1 finds himself possessed of two kinds of knowledge1 when he comes to take account of inference2 for inference is in the field as an obvious and undisputed case of knowledge4 ,there is the knowledge of perception by a knower1 and the inferential knowledge which passes beyond perception4 ,all reality1 consequently1 is related1 directly or indirectly1 to the knowing subject1 and idealism is triumphant4 ,but the real difficulty of the realist's position is that1 if perception is a mode of knowing1 it stands in unfavorable contrast with knowledge by inference4 ,how can the inferred reality of the star be established1 considering the subjectivity of all perception8 ,dewey is alert to the dangers which result from subjectivism1 but does not distinguish1 as carefully as he might1 between knowledge as inference1 and knowledge as perceptual awareness4 ,thus1 while it might be granted that the subjective mind is a vicious abstraction1 it does not follow that ,dewey's particular interpretation of the function of inference is correct4 ,and1 although the unwinking1 unremitting eye of the subjective knower might make experience merely a mental affair1 there is no reason to believe that the operation of inference in perception would lead to the same result1 for inference and awareness are quite distinct1 in historical meaning and function4 ,it is1 in fact1 a mere accident that inference and awareness 7in the subjective sense7 should both be called knowledge4 ,in opposition to presentative realism1 ,dewey offers his 'naturalistic' interpretation of knowledge4#bec ,he finds that the function of inference1 although embodying the logical relation1 is itself a natural and specifically detectable process among natural things--it is not a non-natural or epistemological relation1 that is1 a relation to a mind or knower not in the natural series4444#bed ,as has been observed1 ,dewey is safe in maintaining that inference is not an operation performed by a subjective knower1 but it does not follow from this that his interpretation of inference is correct4 ,in fact1 a discussion of inference is irrelevant to the matters which ,dewey is here considering4 ,in the second part of the essay1 the discussion passes into a keen and rather clever recital of the difficulties that result from taking the knowledge relation to be 'ubiquitous4'#bee ,since this relation is a constant factor in experience1 it would seem as if it might be eliminated from philosophical calculations4 ,the realist would be glad to eliminate it1 but the idealist is not so willing2 for1 since the point at issue is precisely the statement of the most universally defining trait of existence as existence1 the invitation deliberately to disregard the most universal trait is nothing more or less than an invitation to philosophic suicide4#bef ,it is1 ,dewey says1 as if two philosophers should set out to ascertain the relation which holds between an organism as 'eater' and the environment as 'food1' and one should find the essential thing to be the food1 the other the eating4 ,the 'foodists' would represent the realists1 the 'eaterists' the idealists4 ,no advance1 he believes1 can be made on this basis4 ,in opposition to the epistemologists1 ,dewey would consider the knowledge relation not ubiquitous1 but specific and occasional4 ,as man bears other relations to his environment than that of eater1 so is he also something more than a knower4 ,if the one who is knower is1 in relation to objects1 something else and more than their knower1 and if objects are1 in relation to the one who knows them1 something else and other than things in a knowledge relation1 there is somewhat to define and discuss4444#b ,dewey proposes to advance certain facts to support his contention that knowing is a relation to things which depends upon other and more primary connections between a self and things2 a relation which grows out of these more fundamental connections and which operates in their interests at specifiable crises4#beg ,this brings the discussion back to familiar ground again1 and nothing is added to his previous statements of the functional conception of knowledge4 ,while the realist 7explicitly or implicitly7 conceives the knowledge relation as obtaining between a subject knower and the external world1 ,dewey interprets the knowledge relation in terms of organism and environment4 ,the 'ubiquity' of the knowledge relation is disposed of1 as has been seen1 by conceiving knowledge from an entirely different standpoint2 by reducing all knowledge to inference1 and abolishing the knowing subject4 ,dewey is plainly under the impression that the only alternative to the ubiquitous knower is his naturalistic1 biological interpretation of the processes of inference4 ,in support of his naturalistic logic1 ,dewey argues as follows3 7#a7 ,all perception involves reference to an organism4 ,we might about as well talk of the production of a specimen case of water as a presentation of water to hydrogen as talk in the way we are only too accustomed to talk about perceptions and the organism4#beh 7#b7 ,awareness is only a single phase of experience4 ,we 'know' only a small part of the causes which affect us as agents4 ,this means1 of course1 that things1 the things that come to be known1 are primarily not objects of awareness1 but causes of weal and woe1 things to get and things to avoid1 means and obstacles1 tools and results4#bei 7#c7 ,knowing is only a special phase of the behaver-enjoyer-sufferer situation1 but very important as having to do with means for the practical and scientific control of the environment4 ,in the final analysis1 it will be seen that ,dewey refutes the realist by substituting inference for what the realist calls 'consciousness1' and settling the issue by this triumph in the field of dialectics1 rather than by an appeal to the facts4 ,nowhere does ,dewey do justice to those concrete situations which1 to the realist1 seem to necessitate a definition of consciousness as awareness4 ,his attitude toward the realists may be summed up in the statement that he finds in most realistic systems the fault to which his logical theory is especially opposed3 the tendency to define the problem of logic as that of the relation of thought at large to reality at large1 and to distinguish the content of mind from the content of the world on an existential rather than on a functional basis4 ,one of ,dewey's more recent studies1 ,the ,logic of ,judgments of ,practise1#bfj seems to add something positive to his interpretation of knowledge4 ,a practical judgment1 ,dewey explains at the outset of this study1 is differentiated from others1 not by having a separate organ and source1 but by having a specific sort of subject-matter4 ,it is concerned with things to be done or situations demanding action4 ,he had better consult a physician1 and ,it would be well for you to invest in these bonds1 are examples of the practical judgment4 ,these propositions1 as will be seen1 are not cast in what the logician calls logical form1 with regular terms and copula4 ,when put in that form1 they seem to lose the direct reference to action which1 ,dewey says1 differentiates them from the 'descriptive' judgment of the form ,s is ,p4#bfa ,this apparently trivial matter is really important4 ,although every statement embodies judgment1 some statements do not reflect the ground upon which they are asserted4 ,in this condition they may be viewed as opinions1 suggestions1 or guesses1 looking towards judgment rather than reflecting its results4 ,true judgment is occupied with reasons1 proofs1 and grounds1 and does not concern itself with action as action4 ,only when taken as the expression of an individual's attitude1 do ,dewey's practical judgments 7or assertions7 possess the direct reference to action which he selects as their chief characteristic4 ,the statement1 ,you ought to invest in these bonds1 does1 indeed1 suggest a specific action1 but in so doing it loses its character as a judgment4 ,put in more logical form1 ,you are one of those who should invest in these bonds1 the proposition is more clearly the expression of a judgment1 and leads back to its premises4 ,attention turns from specific action as such to action as a typical or universal fact4 ,in short1 ,dewey's practical judgment is not a true judgment2 it will be seen that it is studied1 not as a logical1 but as a psychological phenomenon4 ,in pursuance of his psychological method1 ,dewey discovers several interesting facts about judgments of practice47#a7 ,these judgments imply an incomplete situation1--concretely and specifically incomplete2 they express a need4 7#b7 ,the judgment is itself a factor in assisting toward the completion of the situation1 since it directs an action necessary to the fulfilment of the need4 7#c7 ,the subject-matter of the judgment expresses the fact that one outcome is to be preferred to another4 ,the element of preference is peculiar to the practical judgment1 for it is not found in merely descriptive judgments1 or those 'confined to the given4' 7#d7 ,a practical judgment implies both means and end1 the act that completes1 and the completeness4 ,it is in this respect 'binary4' 7#e7 ,the judgment of what is to be done demands an accurate statement of the course of action to be pursued and the means to be employed1 and these are to be determined relatively to the end in view4 7#f7 ,it finally appears that what is true of the practical judgment may be true of all judgments of fact2 it may be held that all judgments of fact have reference to a determination of courses of action to be tried and the discovery of means for their attempted realization4#bfb ,this ingenious reading of functionalism out of the practical judgment is1 after all1 merely a drawing forth of the psychological implications previously placed in it4 ,that judgment is an instrument for completing a situation2 that it is linked up with action through desire and preference2 that it seeks to determine the means for effecting a practical outcome1--these typically instrumental notions are of one piece with the system of belief that led ,dewey to hit upon the practical judgment as the embodiment of a direction to action4 ,it is important to distinguish between the logical and the psychological aspects of these propositions4 ,action as psychological is one thing2 as the subject-matter of judgment1 it is another4 ,in coming to a decision as to how to act1 the agent sets his proposed action over against himself1 and considers it in its universal and typical character4 ,his motor tendencies1 his feelings1 his desires factor in the situation psychologically considered2 but they do not enter judgment as psychological facts1 but rather1 if at all1 as data which have a significance beyond their mere particularity4 ,dewey remains at the psychological standpoint1 giving no attention to the genuinely logical aspects of his 'judgments of practice4' ,from the study of the practical judgment1 ,dewey passes on to a consideration of judgments of value1 proposing to maintain that value judgments are a species of practical judgments4#bfc ,there will be a distinct gain for moral and economic theory1 he believes1 in treating value as concerned with acts necessary to complete a given need-situation4 ,there is no obvious reason why ,dewey should pass to the pragmatic theory of value through the medium of the practical judgment1 since it could be directly considered on its own account4 ,at any rate1 the discussion of value judgments which follows must stand on its own merits2 it has no vital relation to what precedes4 ,it is1 as usual1 the psychological characteristics of the value judgment that attract ,dewey's attention4 ,any process of judgment1 according to his analysis1 deals with a specific subject-matter1 not from the standpoint of any objective quality it may possess1 but with reference to its functional capacity4 ,relative1 or comparative1 durability1 cheapness1 suitability1 style1 esthetic attractiveness e4 g41 in a suit of clothes constitute value traits4 ,they are traits of objects not per se1 but as entering into a possible and foreseen completing of the situation4 ,their value is their force in precisely this function4#bfd ,attention should not be distracted from this interpretation of value1 ,dewey warns1 through confusing the value sought with the price or market value of the goods4 ,price values1 like the qualities and patterns of the goods1 are data which must be considered in making the judgment1 but they are not the values which the judgment seeks4 ,the value to be determined is here1 is specific1 and must be established by reference to the specific or psychological situation as it presents itself4 ,it is true1 as ,dewey says1 that in judgment a value is being established which has not been determined previously4 ,but it must be insisted that this value is not estimated by reference to the specific situation in its limited aspects4 ,the weight of the past bears against the moment2 the act of judgment bases itself upon knowledge objective and substantial2 the test of the value of the thing is its place and function1 not in the here and now1 but in the whole system of experience4 ,dewey has excluded the reference of the thing to objective1 organized reality1 by specifying that its value shall be decided upon with reference to a specific situation4 ,this limitation of the judgment situation is imposed upon it from without1 and from a special point of view1--that of functional psychology4 ,every object and every situation has its quality of uniqueness and particularity2 but the judgment1 as judgment1 is not concerned with this aspect of things4 ,judgment seizes upon the generic aspect of objects2 this kind of a suit of clothes is the kind that is appropriate to this type of situation4 ,the movement of judgment is objective and universal1 not subjective and psychological4 ,dewey finds one alternative especially opposed to his 'specific' judgment of value2 that is1 the proposition that evaluation involves a comparison of the present object with some fixed standard4 ,when the fixed standard is investigated1 it is found to depend on something else1 and this on something else again in an infinite regress4 ,finally1 the ,summum ,bonum1 as the absolute end term of such a regressus1 turns out to be a fiction4 ,dewey is quite right in maintaining that value is not something eternally fixed4 ,this does not1 however1 remove the possibility of 'real' value1 as opposed to mere expediency4 ,value as established1 ,dewey continues1 must be taken into consideration in making a value judgment4 ,at the same time1 it will not do to accept the established value from mere force of habit4 ,ultimately1 he finds1 all genuine valuation implies a degree of revaluation4 ,to many1 he observes1 it will appear to be a survival of an idealistic epistemology1#bfe presumably because it implies a real change in reality1 as opposed to a fixed and rigid order of external reality4 ,but practical judgments1 ,dewey says1 as having reference to proposed acts1 necessarily look toward some proposed change which the act is to effect4 ,it is not in an epistemological1 but in a practical sense1 that judgment involves a change in values4 ,the outcome of the discussion so far1 ,dewey believes1 is to show1 first of all1 that the passage of a proposition into action is not a miracle1 but the realization of its own character--its own meaning as logical1#bff and1 in the second place1 to suggest that all judgments1 not merely practical ones1 may have their import in reference to some difference to be brought about through action4 ,in the third part of the essay1 ,dewey's discussion leads him back to sense perceptions as forms of practical judgment4 ,there is no doubt1 in his mind1 that many perceptions do have an import for action4 ,not merely sign-posts1 and familiar symbols of the kind1 but many perceptions lacking this obvious reference1 have a significance for conduct4 ,it must not1 of course1 be supposed that all perception1 at any one time1 has cognitive properties2 for some of the perceptions have esthetic1 and other non-cognitive properties4 ,only certain elements of a situation have the function of cognition4 ,dewey goes on to say that care must be taken in the use made of these sign-functions in connection with inference4 ,there is a great difference between saying that the perception of a shape affords an indication of how to act and saying that the perception of shape is itself an inference4#bfg ,no judgment1 ,dewey seems to imply1 is involved in responding to the motor cue furnished by a familiar object4 ,again1 the common idea that present perception consists of sensations as immediate1 plus inferred images1 implies that every perception involves inference4 ,but the merging of sensations and images in perception can be explained naturally1 by the fusion of nervous processes1 and no supplementary 7transcendental7 act of mind is needed to explain the integrity of experience4 ,the tendency to take perception as the object of knowledge1 ,dewey continues1 instead of as simply cognitive1 a term in knowledge1 is due to two chief causes4 ,the first is that in practical judgments the pointing of the thing towards action is so universal a trait as to be overlooked1 and the second is that signs1 because of their importance1 become objects of study on their own account1 and in this condition cease to function directly as cognitive4 ,dewey means1 apparently1 that because the cognitive aspect of things is never attended to except when they are 'known1' or treated as objects of judgment1 there is a tendency to suppose that they always have the character that pertains to them as 'known' things4 ,again1 ,dewey says1 perception may be translated as the effect of a cause that produced it4 ,but the cause does not ordinarily appear in experience1 and the perceptions1 as effects1 remain isolated from the system of things4 ,truth and error then become matters of the relation of the perception to its cause4 ,the difficulties attendant upon this view can be avoided by taking sense perceptions as terms in practical judgments4 ,here the 'other term' which is sought is the action proposed by the perception4 ,to borrow an illustration of ,professor ,woodbridge's3 ,a certain sound indicates to the mother that her baby needs attention4 ,if there is error it is not because the sound ought to mean so many vibrations of the air1 while as matter of fact it doesn't even suggest air vibrations1 but because there is wrong inference as to the act to be performed4#bfh ,the idea is tested1 not by its correspondence with some formal reality1 but by its ability to lead up to the experience to which it points4 ,from the consideration of error as cognitive1 ,dewey passes on to consider its status as primitive sense data4 ,he draws a distinction between sensation as psychological and as logical4 ,ordinary sensation1 just as it comes1 is often too confused to serve as a basis for inference4 ,it has often been pointed out that sense qualities being just what they are1 it is illegitimate to introduce such notions as obscurity or confusion into them3 a slightly illuminated color is just as irretrievably what it is1 as clearly itself1 as an object in the broad glare of noon-day4#bfi ,but when a confused object is made a datum for inference1 its confusion is just the thing to be got rid of4 ,it is broken up by analysis into simple elements1 and the psychologist's sensations are logical products1 not psychological facts4 ,locke writes a mythology of the history of knowledge1 starting from clear and distinct meanings1 each simple1 well-defined1 sharply and unambiguously just what it is on its face1 without concealments and complications1 and proceeds by 'natural' compoundings up to the store of complex ideas1 and the perception of simple relations of agreement among ideas3 a perception always certain if the ideas are simple1 and always controllable in the case of the complex ideas if we consider the simple ideas and connections by which they are reached4 ,thus he established the habit of taking logical discriminations as historical or psychological primitives--as 'sources' of beliefs and knowledge instead of as checks upon inference4#bgj ,this way of treating perception found its way into psychology and into empirical logic4 ,the acceptance of the doctrine that all sense involves knowledge1 ,dewey believes1 leads to an epistemological logic2 but all perception must involve thought if the 'given' is the simple sensation4 ,there is nothing especially new in this critique of sensationalism4 ,historically1 sensationalism had been displaced by idealism1 and the idea that reality is a construct of ideas held together by logical relations was given up long before functionalism arrived on the scene4 ,but if inference1 or rationality1 is not present in all experience as the combiner of simple into complex ideas1 it may be present in some other form1 even more vital4 ,dewey1 however1 does not consider such possibilities4 ,finally1 in an article of slightly earlier date than the studies which have just been considered1 ,dewey returns to a consideration of metaphysics1 and the possibility of a metaphysical standpoint in philosophy4 ,this article1 entitled ,the ,subject-,matter of ,metaphysical ,inquiry1#bga deserves careful notice4 ,the comments of a number of mechanistic biologists on vitalism furnish the point of departure for ,dewey's discussion4 ,these scientists hold that1 if the organism is considered simply as a part of external nature1 as an existing system1 it can be satisfactorily analyzed by the methods of physico-chemical science4 ,but if the question of ultimate origins is raised1 if it be asked why nature exhibits certain innate potentialities for producing life1 science can give no answer4 ,these questions belong to metaphysics1 and vitalistic or biocentric conceptions may be valid in the metaphysical sphere4 ,this raises the question of the nature of metaphysical inquiry4 ,dewey says that the ultimate traits or tendencies which give rise to life need not necessarily be considered ultimate in a temporal sense4 ,on the contrary1 they may be viewed as permanent1 'irreducible traits1' which are ultimate in the sense of being always present in reality4 ,the inquiry and search for these ultimate traits is what constitutes valid metaphysics4 ,they are found equally and indifferently whether a subject-matter in question be dated #aiae or ten million years ,b4 ,c4 ,accordingly1 they would seem to deserve the name of ultimate1 or irreducible1 traits4 ,as such they may be made the object of a kind of inquiry differing from that which deals with the genesis of a particular group of existences1 a kind of inquiry to which the name metaphysical may be given4#bgb ,the irreducible traits which ,dewey finds are1 in the physical sciences1 plurality1 interaction1 and change4 ,these traits have to be begged or taken in any case1 for wherever and whenever we take the world1 we must explain it as a plurality of diverse interacting and changing existences4#bgc ,the evolutionary sciences add another trait2 that is1 evolution1 or development in a direction4 ,for evolution appears to be just one of the irreducible traits4 ,in other words1 it is a fact to be reckoned with in considering the traits of diversity1 interaction1 and change which have been enumerated as among the traits taken for granted in all scientific subject-matter4#bgd ,the doctrine that plurality1 interaction1 change1 and evolution are permanent traits of reality gains in clearness when contrasted with the opposed theories which involve creation1 absolute origins1 or temporal ultimates4 ,the term 'ultimate origins' may be taken in a merely relative sense which is valid4 ,the ,french language has an origin in the ,latin tongues1 which is an ultimate origin for ,french1 but this is not an absolutely ultimate origin1 since the ,latin tongues1 in their turn1 have origins4 ,it is1 for instance1 meaningless to inquire into the ultimate origin of the world as a whole2 and it is equally futile to trace any part of the world back to an absolute origin4 ,that scientific inquiry does not itself deal with any question of ultimate origins1 except in the purely relative sense already indicated1 is1 of course1 recognized4 ,but it also seems to follow from what has been said that scientific inquiry does not generate1 or leave over1 such a question for some other discipline1 such as metaphysics1 to deal with4#bge ,theories like that of ,laplace1 for instance1 trace the world back to an origin in some undifferentiated universe2 or1 in ,spencer's terms1 some state of homogeneity4 ,from this original state the world is said to evolve4 ,but the undifferentiated mass lacks the plurality1 interaction1 and change which are presupposed in all scientific explanation4 ,these traits must be present before development can occur4 ,to get change we have to assume other structures which interact with it1 existences not covered by the formula4#bgf ,in short1 although ,dewey only implies this1 all scientific explanation presupposes a system of interacting parts2 nothing can be explained by reference to an undifferentiated world which lacks such traits4 ,dewey is particularly interested in the origin of mind or intelligence4 ,in dealing with mind1 he says1 we must begin with the present1 and in the present we find that the world has an organization1 in spots1 of the kind we call intelligence4 ,this existing intelligence cannot be explained by any theory which reduces it to something inferior4 ,the attempt to give an account of any occurrence involves the genuine and irreducible existence of the thing dealt with4#bgg ,mind cannot be explained by being explained away1 nor can it be explained as a development out of an original source in which the potentiality1 or direction of change towards mind1 was lacking4 ,the evolution of things1 ,dewey says1 is a real fact1 and is to be reckoned with4 ,moreover1 if everything that exists changes1 then the evolution of life and mind surely have a bearing on the nature of physico-chemical things4 ,they must have in them the trait of direction of change towards life and mind4 ,to say1 accordingly1 that the existence of vital1 intellectual1 and social organization makes impossible a purely mechanistic metaphysics is to say something which the situation calls for4#bgh ,in other words1 the world1 metaphysically considered1 must have evolution1 as well as the physico-chemical traits4 ,without a doctrine of evolution we might be able to say1 not that matter caused life1 but that matter under certain conditions of highly complicated and intensified interaction is living4 ,with the doctrine of evolution1 we can add to this statement that the interactions and changes of matter are themselves of a kind to bring about that complex and intensified interaction which is life4#bgi ,dewey holds that evolution rests upon the reality of time3 time itself1 or genuine change in a specific direction1 is itself one of the ultimate traits of the world irrespective of date4#bhj ,this article presents on the whole a distinct advance over the position taken in the earlier essay1 ,some ,implications of ,anti-,intellectualism1 which was reviewed in the last chapter4 ,dewey is not now1 to be sure1 instituting a wholesale inquiry into the nature of being1 but he betrays an interest in the general1 as opposed to the specific traits of reality4 ,he inquires into the real nature of the world1 and believes that he discovers its ultimate traits4 ,this essay1 of course1 is incomplete1 and consequently indefinite in certain important respects4 ,it may be said1 nevertheless1 to give an accurate view of the metaphysical back-ground against which all of ,dewey's theories are projected4 ,his metaphysics1 as would be expected1 are evolutionary throughout1 and evolution is conceived1 where he is at all definite1 in biological terms4 ,,footnotes3 #bdi ,influence of ,darwin on ,philosophy1 ,introduction1 p4 iv4 #bej ,vol4 ,,viii3 ,i4 ,naive ,realism vs4 ,presentative ,realism1 pp4 #cic-djj4 ,,ii4 ,epistemological ,realism3 ,the ,alleged ,ubiquity of the ,knowledge ,relation1 pp4 #edf-eed4 #bea ,op4 cit41 p4 #cie4 #beb ,ibid41 p4 #cig4 #bec ,in this connection ,dewey's disagreements with ,professor ,mc,gilvary are of especial interest4 ,see especially ,mc,gilvary's article1 ,pure ,experience and ,reality 7,philosophical ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xvi1 #aijg1 pp4 #bff-bhd7 and ,dewey's reply1 together with ,mc,gilvary's rejoinder 7,ibid41 pp4 #dai-dbd74 ,mc,gilvary failed to understand that ,dewey's argument was conducted on a purely 'naturalistic' basis1 an almost inevitable error1 in view of ,dewey's practical identification of psychology1 biology1 and logic4 #bed ,ibid41 p4 #cii4 #bee ,dewey is here dealing with the 'epistemological' realists1 among whom he includes such writers as ,bertrand ,russell4 ,in an article entitled ,the ,existence of the ,world as a ,problem 7,philosophical ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xxiv1 #aiae1 pp4 #ceg-cgj71 ,dewey argues that ,russell1 in making a problem of the existence of the external world1 implies its existence in his formulation of the problem4 ,dewey argues that1 since the existence of the world is presupposed in every such formulation1 it cannot be called in question4 ,this is like disposing of ,zeno's paradox on the ground that arrows fly anyway4 #bef ,op4 cit41 p4 #edh4 #beg ,ibid4 #beh ,op4 cit4 #bei ,ibid41 p4 #eec4 #bfj ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1 ,vol4 ,,xii1 #aiae4 ,parts ,i and ,,ii1 pp4 #eje-ebc2 ,part ,,iii1 pp4 #ecc-edc4 #bfa ,ibid41 p4 #ejf4 #bfb ,op4 cit41 p4 #eaa4 #bfc ,op4 cit41 p4 #ead4 #bfd ,ibid41 p4 #eae4 #bfe ,op4 cit41 p4 #eba4 #bff ,op4 cit41 p4 #ebb f4 #bfg ,ibid41 p4 #ecf4 #bfh ,op4 cit41 p4 #ech4 #bfi ,ibid41 p4 #edj4 #bgj ,op4 cit41 p4 #eda4 #bga ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1 ,vol4 ,,xii1 #aiae1 pp4 #ccg-cde4 #bgb ,op4 cit41 p4 #cdj4 #bgc ,ibid4 #bgd ,ibid41 p4 #cde4 #bge ,op4 cit41 p4 #cci4 #bgf ,ibid41 p4 #cdc4 #bgg ,ibid41 p4 #cdd4 #bgh ,op4 cit41 p4 #cde4 #bgi ,ibid4 #bhj ,ibid4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,conclusions ,dewey's interest as a philosopher centres1 from first to last1 upon knowledge and the knowing process4 ,all that is vital in his ethical1 social1 and educational theories depends ultimately upon the special interpretation of the function of knowledge which constitutes his chief claim to philosophical distinction4 ,dewey's logical theory1 as has been seen1 was the natural and inevitable outcome of his demand for an empirical and 'psychological' description of thought as a 'transformatory' process working actual changes in reality4 ,if in the beginning of his career he found the problem of the nature of knowledge all-important for his own interests1 he came in the end to regard it as the problem of problems for all philosophers4 ,there is no mistaking ,dewey's conviction that the special interpretation of knowledge which he advocates opens the door to important advances in philosophical speculation1 while it ends all discussion of those pseudo-problems which result from a false1 epistemological formulation of the function of knowledge4 ,the history of the development of ,dewey's thought1 set forth in the preceding chapters1 does not pretend to furnish an adequate estimate of his philosophical system4 ,the two questions1 of origin and worth1 are1 after all1 distinct4 ,the genetic account of ,dewey's theory of knowledge may serve to make its bearings and implications better understood1 may reveal its deeper meaning and import1 but the final estimate of its value as a philosophical hypothesis depends on other considerations4 ,in this final chapter1 it is proposed to deal with the question of the positive value of functionalism as a working hypothesis4 ,this criticism may also serve to gather together the threads of criticism and comment which run through the previous chapters1 and reveal the general ground upon which the writer's opposition to ,dewey's theory is based4 ,there can be no question that ,dewey's theory of knowledge rests1 finally1 upon the doctrine of 'immediate empiricism2' upon his belief in the necessity of employing in philosophy the direct descriptive method that has now made its way in all the natural sciences4444#bha ,this doctrine is clearly stated in the first essay reviewed in this study1 ,the ,psychological ,standpoint 7#ahhf74 ,to quote again from that essay3 ,the psychological standpoint as it has developed itself is this3 all that is1 is for consciousness or knowledge4 ,the business of the psychologist is to give a genetic account of the various elements within this consciousness1 and thereby fix their place1 determine their validity1 and at the same time show definitely what the real and eternal nature of this consciousness is4#bhb ,the descriptive method here advocated does not differ1 as an actual mode of procedure1 from that of ,dewey's later empiricism4 ,it lies at the basis of all his speculation1 earlier as well as later1 and is undoubtedly the most important single element in his philosophical system4 ,in ,the ,psychological ,standpoint ,dewey ascribes the failure of the earlier empiricists to their desertion of the direct descriptive method 7a criticism repeated frequently in later essays74 ,locke1 for instance1 instead of describing experience as it actually occurs1 interprets it in terms of certain assumed simple sensations1 the products of reflection4 ,these non-experienced elements1 ,dewey believes1 have no place in a purely empirical philosophy4 ,but the empiricist must deal in some manner with the products of reflection4 ,the atoms of chemistry and the elements of the psychologist are not experienced facts1 but still they play a valuable1 indispensable role in the technique of the sciences4 ,what is to be done with them8 ,it must be made to appear that they are valid within knowledge1 but invalid elsewhere4 ,this leads to a separation of knowing from other modes of experiencing1 and the descriptive method is depended upon to maintain the empirical validity of the separation4 ,it has been seen how ,dewey's attempt to interpret knowledge led gradually to a distinction between the 'cognitional' and the 'non-cognitional' processes of experience4 ,the completed theory of knowledge depends for its validity upon the distinction thus established between knowing 7as reflective thought7 and the practical attitudes of life4 ,the concepts1 elements1 and other apparatus of reflection are employed1 it is said1 only when there is thinking1--and this is only occasionally4 ,theory is an instrument to be used in connection with that special activity1 reflective thought1 the general aim of which is the furtherance of the practical ends of life4 ,one fairly obvious difficulty with this separation of reflection from the other life activities is that the 'direct descriptive method1' as here employed1 is itself reflective4 ,how does it come1 then1 that this particular method achieves such an effective hegemony over the other modes of reflection8 ,the 'descriptive method1' as the method of pure experience1 is made to determine or supplant all other methods4 ,it defines the limits and aims of conceptual systems2 it marks out the limits1 aims1 and tests of reflective thought in general4 ,how1 it may be asked1 does the 'direct descriptive method' escape the limitations which it imposes upon the other forms of reflective thought8 ,it has been seen that in ,dewey's view logic is subsidiary to psychology4 ,but psychology 7his psychology7 results from the application of the 'descriptive method' to experience4 ,the 'descriptive method1' it may be inferred from this1 is not subject to logical criticism4 ,on the contrary1 it is the basis of all logic4 ,logic1 as the criticism of categories1 is confined to the study of the instrumental concepts as functioning within the knowledge experience1 and its limits are set by descriptive psychology4 ,there is1 apparently1 no means by which the 'direct descriptive method' can itself be brought under criticism4 ,dewey says3 ,by our postulate1 things are what they are experienced to be2 and1 unless knowing is the sole and only genuine mode of experiencing1 it is fallacious to say that ,reality is just and exclusively what it is or would be to an all-competent all-knower2 or even that it is1 relatively and piece-meal1 what it is to a finite and partial knower4#bhc ,reality is not simply what it is known as1 for it is experienced in other ways than by being known4 ,but ,i venture to repeat that 444 the inferential factor must exist1 or must occur1 and that all existence is direct and vital1 so that philosophy can pass upon its nature--as upon the nature of all of the rest of its subject-matter--only by first ascertaining what it exists or occurs as4#bhd ,reflection1 then1 is not designed to furnish an insight into the nature of things4 ,acquaintance with reality must be obtained1 not by reflecting upon it1 but by describing it as it occurs4 ,whatever else this may mean1 it certainly aims at demonstrating the superiority of description to the supposedly less effective modes of thought4 ,it cannot be conceded1 however1 that 'description1' as employed by ,dewey1 is non-reflective1 or super-reflective4 ,if things are not what they are known as1 then they are not what they are known as to a describer4 ,the point of this objection will be obvious if it is remembered that it is the method of 'direct description' which enables ,dewey to distinguish between the 'cognitional' and the 'non-cognitional' activities of life1 and make thought the servant of action4 ,if ,dewey's descriptive method is not reflective1 then there is no such thing as reflection4 ,passing for the moment from this criticism1 which is not apt to be convincing in such abstract form1 it may be well to consider for a time the psychology upon which ,dewey's logical theory is grounded3 the psychology which is established by the 'direct descriptive method4' ,from the standpoint of the nervous correlates of experience1 ,dewey's theory involves two postulates3 first1 that customary conduct is carried on by an habitual set of nervous adjustments1 and1 second1 that reflection is a process whereby new reactions are established when habitual modes of response fail to meet a critical situation4 ,it must be clearly recognized that1 so far as the nervous system is concerned1 the scheme is highly speculative4 ,the advance made by physiology towards an analysis and understanding of the minute and specialized parts of the nervous organism has necessarily been slow and uncertain4 ,whatever plausibility ,dewey's theory possesses must depend1 not upon the technical results of neurology1 but upon the external evidence which seems to justify some such scheme of nervous organization4 ,an examination of this evidence shows that it falls under two main heads3 7#a7 facts drawn from the observation of the outward behavior of the organism1 and 7#b7 facts derived from an introspective analysis of the thought-process4 ,the study of behavior shows that man thinks only now and then4 ,most of his conduct is1 literally1 thoughtless4 ,it is said that thought is outwardly manifested by a characteristic attitude1 marked by hesitation and an obvious effort at adjustment4 ,the introspective analysis of the thought-process shows that it alone1 among experiences1 is accompanied by analysis1 abstraction1 and mediation4 ,again1 both the internal and external evidence show that a puzzling situation 7whose nervous correlate is a conflict of impulses7 is the stimulus which awakens thought4 ,these are important items in the list of evidence which supports the functional theory4 ,it would be a tedious and unnecessary task to subject each of these bits of evidence to empirical criticism4 ,it will be better to deal with them by showing that they do not necessarily imply functionalism1 since they are compatible with a psychology directly opposed to the fundamental assumptions of ,dewey's theory4 ,it is doubtless true that men think only occasionally and with some reluctance4 ,this is a common observation4 ,what is to be made of this intermittance of thought8 ,the evidence merely shows that man is more wide awake1 energetic1 and alert at some times than at others4 ,on these occasions every faculty of the organism is in operation1 higher as well as lower centres are pitched to a high degree of responsiveness1 not at hap-hazard1 to be sure1 but apropos--tuned to the situation4 ,in saying that men think only now and then nothing more is necessarily implied than that men are for the most part sluggish and indifferent1 and the periods of high intensification of the normal processes contrast sharply with the habitual lethargy of conduct4 ,against ,dewey1 it will be maintained here that thought cannot be defined as a special kind of activity considered from the side of the organism4 ,the life processes are constantly welded into a single unified activity1 which may1 as a whole1 be directed upon different objects4 ,thus1 from the side of its objects1 this life activity may be called eating1 running1 reading1 and whatever else one chooses4 ,thinking1 from this standpoint1 may be defined as the direction of effort upon symbols and abstract terms4 ,but thinking in this case would be identified on the basis of its content1 not in terms of special nervous activities in the organism4 ,whether1 therefore1 thinking signifies that intense periodical activity which has been noted1 or preoccupation with a certain kind of subject-matter1 it in no case implies the operation of a special organic faculty of the type described by ,dewey4 ,but1 again1 it is said that true reflection is marked by a certain characteristic bodily attitude1 which bespeaks inner conflict and a search for adjustment4 ,this contention seems to have little ground in fact4 ,the puzzled1 hesitating1 undecided expression that is usually supposed to betray deep cogitation may in fact mean simply hesitation and bewilderment1--the need for thought1 rather than its presence4 ,the expression reveals a certain degree of incompetence and sluggishness in the individual concerned1 and signifies a lack of wide-awakeness and responsiveness4 ,a student puzzling over his algebra1 a speaker extemporizing an argument1 a ball-player using all his resources to defeat the enemy1 have attitudes so unlike that no analysis could discover in them a common form of expression4 ,and yet it would be madness to deny that thinking attends their various performances4 ,there is1 in short1 no evidence from the side of bodily expression to indicate the presence in man of a special nervous faculty called reflection4 ,consider next the contention that the cue to thought is a puzzling situation1 involving a problem4 ,no problem1 no thought2 no thought1 no problem4 ,this may mean either that a man finding himself in a difficult situation uses all his energy and resource to escape from it1 or1 that he never concerns himself with abstract symbols except under the spur of necessity4 ,the former meaning contains some truth1 but the latter is what ,dewey would call a 'dark saying4' ,if by 'thought' be meant that period of high activity of all the faculties which is only occasional1 it is doubtless true enough that a problem is frequently needed to awaken it4 ,man is content to let life glide along with a minimum of effort2 he cannot1 if he would1 long maintain the state of high activity here called 'thinking4' ,as a consequence of not thinking when he should1 man frequently finds himself involved in situations requiring the exercise of all the energy and resource he possesses4 ,but the really efficient 'thinker' is the man who keeps his eyes open1 who sees ahead4 ,he is not efficient merely because of the excellence of his established modes of response1 but1 more particularly1 because he is alive and alert4 ,his thinking is effective in preventing difficult situations1 as well as in getting out of them4 ,defining 'thought1' however1 as the direction of activity upon symbols and conceptions1 there seems to be little warrant for asserting that it functions only on the occasion of a concrete1 specific problem4 ,one would say1 on the contrary1 that this would be an unfavorable occasion for the study of fundamental principles1 whether scientific or practical4 ,summing up the external evidence1 then1 one would say that it accords as well with the hypothesis that the life processes constitute a single activity directed upon various objects1 as with the hypothesis that thought is a very special organic activity1 having a special biological function4 ,at least1 the evidence for the existence of such a special faculty is dubious and uncertain4 ,what does the internal evidence prove8 ,the analysis of thought contained in ,james's chapter on ,reasoning in the ,principles of ,psychology has been the guide for ,dewey and other pragmatists in this connection4#bhe ,james undertakes to show that reasoning is marked off from other processes by the employment of analysis1 abstraction1 and the use of mediating terms4 ,it must be urged here1 not only against ,james1 but against a considerable modern tradition1 that this account of thinking is misleading and inaccurate4 ,the question to be faced1 of course1 is whether the processes of thought differ radically from the non-reflective processes in kind1 or whether they are simply the intensification of processes which attend all conscious life4 ,it should be noted that no concession is made to the notion that thinking is a special kind of process2 only its subject-matter is special1 or else thought is simply a period of wide-awakeness and alertness4 ,in the latter sense1 thought involves an intensification of the powers of observation1 an awakening of memory1 a general stimulation of all the faculties4 ,it calls for the fullest possible apprehension1 demands the most complete insight into the nature of the situation that the capacities can provide4 ,the contrast between the adequate view of reality achieved in this manner and the common and inadequate apprehension of ordinary life is very great1 and might easily lead to the supposition that thinking 7so understood7 contains elements which are added through the activities of a special nerve process4 ,but is it only in such moments that we deliberately resolve a situation into its elements1 and abstract an 'essence' to serve as a middle term in inference8 ,it is certain that at such moments these processes are more distinct than at other times2 but the whole situation1 for that matter1 stands out more clearly and distinctly4 ,perception is keener1 memory more definite1 feeling more intense4 ,in less degree1 however1 all attention involves analysis and abstraction4 ,experience has always a focus and a margin2 there is a constant selecting and analyzing out of important elements1 which in turn lead to further conclusions and acts1 through associations by contiguity and similarity4 ,this process appears in an intensified form in the high moments of life4 ,in short1 thought and passive perception are differentiated1 not by the elements which compose them1 but by the degree of energy that goes into perception1 memory1 feeling1 and discrimination4 ,there is nothing in the evidence to show that thinking is a special kind of activity1 which operates now and then4 ,on the contrary1 there is every reason to hold to the position that the life processes are one and inseparable1 operating continually in conjunction4 ,what shall be said1 then1 with reference to the assertion that thought operates in the interests of the non-cognitive life processes8 ,that it comes 'after something and for the sake of something1' namely1 'direct' experience8 ,since the separation of the activities into various 'functions' cannot be allowed1 by occasional thought must then be meant those moments of energetic aliveness described above4 ,translating1 ,dewey's theory would read something like this3 ,man employs his faculties to the fullest extent only when he is compelled to do so4 ,he gets along habitually1 that is1 with a minimum of effort1 as long as he can1 but rouses himself and makes an earnest effort to comprehend the world only when his environment presents him with difficulties which demand solution4 ,the test of man's thinking consists in its efficiency in getting him out of trouble1 and enabling him to return to his habitual modes of sub-conscious conduct with a minimum of annoyance4 ,in short1 thinking is an instrument which subserves man's natural laziness1 and its test is the efficiency with which it promotes an easy1 or1 at any rate1 a satisfactory mode of existence4 ,no doubt some men1 perhaps many men1 do follow such a programme2 but it would not be kind to ,nature to assert that she planned it so4 ,this separation of the activities of life into several distinct processes having each a special function looks like a survival of the old faculty psychology1 against which modern thought has protested as much as against anything whatever4 ,the conception of the organic processes as separate in action has all the faults of a merely mechanical representation of consciousness4 ,doubtless some advantage is to be obtained1 for purposes of investigation1 by treating thought1 appreciation1 and affection separately2 but it is a serious error to take this provisional distinction as real4 ,it is a curious fact that ,dewey1 with all his opposition to such modes of procedure1 himself falls into this abstract way of treating the 'functions' of experience1 seeing not the beam that is in his own eye4 ,it is this very form of treatment1 strangely enough1 which enables ,dewey to call biology to the support of his interpretation of the function of knowledge4 ,according to the ,darwinian theory1 survival of the species is dependent upon the development of special structures and capacities which enable the organism to adjust itself to its environment4 ,dewey finds1 following a familiar argument1 that the lower animals are adapted to their environment by special habits of reaction which are relatively fixed and inelastic4 ,man1 on the contrary1 has an exceedingly plastic nervous system1 which enables him to meet changing conditions4 ,man is not only highly adapted1 but highly adaptable4 ,this trait of plasticity1 or adaptability1 ,dewey believes1 is a product of natural selection1 and1 of course1 in the final analysis1 this high degree of plasticity is the thought function4 ,it is scarcely necessary to say that this treatment of thought is highly speculative4 ,dewey offers little concrete evidence to support his position2 indeed1 it would require the labor of a ,darwin to supply the needed evidence4 ,instead of grounding his theories upon the results of science1 ,dewey adapts the ever elastic 'evolutionary method' 7not really that of biological evolution1 however indeterminate7 to his own scheme of things4 ,it would be hard to discover in philosophical literature a method more purely theoretical and even dialectical than that whereby ,dewey gives his logical theory the support of evolutionary theory4 ,the ultimately mechanical tendencies of his argument are conspicuous1 in spite of all disclaimers4 ,the effect of his analysis is to set plasticity or adaptability off by itself1 as a special trait or feature of the nervous system4 ,the lower forms of life are governed1 we are told1 by fixed reflexes1 and the trait of adaptability appears at some higher stage in the process as a superadded capacity of the nervous system1 correlated1 no doubt1 with special nervous structures4 ,evolutionism would not serve ,dewey so well1 had he not previously made this separation between the organic functions and their correlated structures2 but1 given this abstract treatment of the life processes1 he is able to make the doctrine of selection contribute to its support4 ,in opposition to ,dewey's argument1 it would be reasonable to contend that plasticity is inherent in all nervous substance4 ,the higher organisms are more adaptable1 because there is more to be modified in them1--more nerves and synapses1 more pliability4 ,there is no sound empirical reason for accepting ,dewey's biological conclusions4 ,taking ,dewey's theory at its face value1--and it would be presumptuous to search for hidden meanings1--its net result is to place the function of knowing in an embarrassing situation with respect to its capacity for giving a correct report of reality4 ,dewey expressly denies1 indeed1 that the purpose of knowing is to give an account of the nature of things4 ,reality1 he asserts1 is whatever it is 'experienced as being1' and it is normally experienced in other ways than by being known4 ,the nature of reality is not hidden behind a veil1 to be searched out2 but is here and now1 as it comes and goes in the form of passing experience4 ,knowing is designed to transform experience1 not to bring it within the survey of consciousness4 ,how does it stand1 then1 with ,dewey's own account of the knowledge process8 ,he has reflected upon experience1 and claims to have given a correct account of its nature4 ,dewey's conception of the processes of experience is genuinely conceptual1 a thought product1 designed to furnish a solid basis for belief and calculation4 ,but reflection1 by his own account1 is shut in to its own moment1 cannot apprehend the true nature of 'non-cognitional' experiences1 and cannot1 therefore1 deal adequately with any problems except such as are furnished it by other 'functions4' ,no wonder that 'anti-intellectualism' should result from such a conception of knowledge4 ,philosophers have always held that the purpose of reflection 7whatever reflection may be1 psychologically7 is the attainment of a reliable insight into the nature of the world4 ,practical considerations compel this view4 ,ordinary1 casual observation is superficial and unsystematic2 it never penetrates beneath the surface4 ,doubtless reality is1 in some degree1 what it is in unreflective moments2 but it is frequently something more1 as man learns to his sorrow4 ,reflection displaces the casual1 haphazard attitude1 in the attempt to get at the real nature of the world4 ,the results of reflection1 moreover1 are cumulative4 ,it tends to build up1 by gradual accretions1 a conceptual view of reality which may serve as a relatively stable basis for conduct and calculation4 ,thought does1 indeed1 possess a transforming function4 ,the reasoned knowledge of things is gradually extended beyond the occasional moments of inquiring thought1 supplanting the casual view with a more penetrating insight2 reality becomes more and better known1 and less merely experienced4 ,dewey reverses this view in a curious manner4 ,it is 'experience' that is built up by the action of thought1 not knowledge itself4 ,this play on terms might be innocuous1 if it were not accompanied by his separation of the knowing function from others4 ,dewey makes 'knowing' the servant of 'direct experience' by giving it the function of reconstructing the habits of the organism1 in order that unreflective experience may be maintained with a minimum of effort4 ,the non-reflective experience becomes the valuable experience1 and knowledge is made to minister unto it4 ,this is truly a 'transvaluation of values4' ,dewey asks3 ,what is it that makes us live alternately in a concrete world of experience in which thought as such finds not satisfaction1 and in a world of ordered thought which is yet only abstract and ideal8#bhf ,this sharp separation of thought from action is vigorously maintained4 ,following are some of the terms by means of which the difference between direct and reflective experience is expressed3 'direct practice1' 'derived theory2' 'primary construction1' 'secondary criticism2' 'living appreciation1' 'abstract description2' 'active endeavor1' 'pale reflection4'#bhg ,this casual1 easy distinction escapes criticism because it seems harmless and unimportant4 ,the distinction1 however1 is not real4 ,it does not correspond to the simple facts of life4 ,thinking1 far from being 'pale reflection1' is often a strenuous and energetic 'activity4' ,reflection1 not 'direct experience1' is often1 at least1 at the high moment of life4 ,experience becomes unmeaning on any other basis4 ',living appreciation' and 'primary construction' involve thought in a high degree2 'pale reflection' is lazy contemplation1 lacking the spark of life that characterizes true thought4 ,there is no escape from ,dewey's needlessly alarming conclusions1 except by maintaining that thought accompanies all conscious life1 in greater or less degree1 and that the moment of real1 earnest thinking is at the high tide of life1 when all the powers are awake and operating4 ,thought must be made integral with all other activities1 a feature of the total life organization1 rather than an isolated phenomenon4 ,man is a thinking organism1 not an organism with a thinker4 ,it is not to be supposed for a moment that by 'thought' is here meant the activity of a merely subjective knower4 ,dewey does1 indeed1 deal effectively with the subjective ego1 and with representative perceptionism4 ,but by 'thought' is here meant reflection1 judgment1 inference2 and in this sense thought is said to be present in all experience4 ,there can be no question of the relation of thought1 so understood1 to reality2 for the reason that it has been so integrated with experience as to be inseparable from it4 ,setting aside knowing as the awareness of a conscious subject1 there remains an issue with ,dewey concerning the actual place of thought1 as an empirical process1 in experience1 and the issue must be settled on definite and really empirical grounds4 ,so much1 then1 for 'functionalism' and its psychology4 ,something should be said1 before closing this discussion1 concerning philosophical methods in general1 since ,dewey's psychological approach to the problems of philosophy must be held responsible for his anti-intellectualistic results1 with their sceptical implications4 ,in the beginning of his career1 as has been seen1 ,dewey adopted the 'psychological method1' and he has adhered to it consistently ever since4 ,this initial attitude1 although he was not aware of it for many years1 cut him off from the community of understanding that exists among modern idealists concerning the proper aims and purposes of philosophical inquiry4 ,although at first a professed follower of ,green and ,caird1 ,dewey's method was not reconcilable with idealistic procedure1 and in a very real sense he never was an idealist4 ,the virulence of his later attacks on 'intellectualism' may be explained in terms of his reaction against a philosophical method which interfered with the development of his own 'naturalistic' tendencies4 ,the method of idealism1 or speculative philosophy1 is logical2 but it may perfectly well be empirical at the same time4 ,to the anti-intellectualist empirical logic is an anomaly1 a red blue-bird1 so to speak4 ,the philosophical logician is represented as one who evolves reality out of his own consciousness2 who labors with the concepts which have their abode in the mental sphere1 and1 by means of the principle of contradiction1 forces them into harmony until they provide a perfectly consistent representation of the external world which1 because of its perfect rationality1 must somehow correspond with the cosmic reality4 ,in spite of the fact that no man possesses1 at least in a sane condition1 the mental equipment requisite for such a performance1 certain critics have not hesitated to impute this kind of logical procedure to the idealists4 ,to quote from ,dewey himself3 ,for modern philosophy is1 as every college senior recites1 epistemology2 and epistemology1 as perhaps our books and lectures sometimes forget to tell the senior1 has absorbed ,stoic dogma4 ,passionless imperturbability1 absolute detachment1 complete subjection to a ready-made and finished reality 444 is its professed ideal4444 ,philosophy has dreamed the dream of a knowledge which is other than the propitious outgrowth of beliefs that shall develop aforetime their ulterior implications in order to recast them 4441 the dream of a knowledge that has to do with objects having no nature save to be known4#bhh ,this charge against modern idealism has little foundation4 ,speculative philosophy repudiated1 long ago1 the 'epistemological standpoint' as defined by ,dewey4 ,idealists have not fostered the conception of a knowing subject shut in to its own states1 seeking information about an impersonal reality over against itself4 ,note1 for example1 this comment of ,pringle-,pattison on ,kant1 made over thirty-five years ago3 ,the distinction between mind and the world1 which is valid only from a certain point of view1 he took as an absolute separation4 ,he took it1 to use a current phrase1 abstractly--that is to say1 as a mere fact1 a fact standing by itself and true in any reference4 ,and of course when two things are completely separate1 they can only be brought together by a bond which is mechanical1 external1 and accidental to the real nature of both4#bhi ,dewey himself never condemned 'epistemology' more effectively4 ,but it is useless to cite instances1 for any serious student familiar with the literature of modern philosophy ought to know that 'idealism' has never really been 'epistemological' in the sense meant by ,dewey and his disciples4 ,subjectivism is not idealism1--the stolid dogmatism of neo-realism to the contrary notwithstanding4 ,idealism holds1 speaking more positively1 that philosophers must submit the conceptions and methods which they employ to a preliminary immanent criticism1 in order to determine the limits within which they may be validly applied4 ,every genuine category or method is valid within a certain sphere of relevance1 and the business of criticism is to determine by empirical investigation or by 'ideal experiment' 7which means much the same thing7 what concrete significance the conception is capable of bearing4 ,dewey1 from the standpoint of idealism1 is guilty of a somewhat uncritical use of the categories of 'description' and 'evolution4' ,are the categories of biology fitted to explain mind and spirit8 ,instead of instituting an inquiry designed to answer that question1 ,dewey accepts 'evolutionism' as final1 and attempts to force all phenomena into conformity with his resulting logical scheme4 ,he misses the valuable checks upon thought which are furnished by the 'critical method1' and is none too sensitive to the technical results of the special sciences4 ,the logical approach to philosophy strictly involves certain implications which have been overlooked by many of its critics4 ,it may well be admitted that our real categories are not fixed and final1 but are perpetually in process of reconstruction4 ,the process of criticism inevitably makes manifest the human and empirical character of the particular forms of reflective thought4 ,it recognizes the fact of development1 both in knowledge and in reality1 and by this very recognition the value of knowledge is enhanced4 ,it is forced1 by the very nature of its method1 to recognize the concrete and practical bearings of thought4 ,indeed1 there is a sense in which idealism would declare that there is no thought--when thought1 that is1 is taken to mean an isolated fact out of relation to the world4 ,it is not possible to make this retort upon the critics of idealism without recognizing that there has been a vast misjudgment1 amounting almost to misrepresentation1 of the intellectual ideals of modern speculative philosophy4 ,to conclude1 it is neither by abstract logical processes1 nor yet by the dogmatic employment of scientific categories1 that philosophy makes progress1 but by an empirical process which unites criticism and experiment4 ,in speaking of the development of modern idealism1 ,bosanquet says3 ,all difficulties about the general possibility--the possibility in principle--of apprehending reality in knowledge and preception were flung aside as antiquated lumber4 ,what was undertaken was the direct adventure of knowing2 of shaping a view of the universe which should include and express reality in its completeness4 ,the test and criterion were not any speculative assumption of any kind whatever4 ,they were the direct work of the function of knowledge in exhibiting what could and what could not maintain itself when all the facts were confronted and set in the order they themselves demanded4 ,the method of inquiry was ideal experiment4#bij ,when all has been said1 this method remains the natural and normal one4 ,dewey's 'psychological method1' by contrast1 seems strained and far-fetched1 an artificial and externally motived attempt to guide the intellect1 which only by depending upon its own resources and its own increasing insight can hope to attain the distant and difficult1 but never really foreign goal4 ,,footnotes3 #bha ,the ,influence of ,darwin on ,philosophy1 p4 #bdj4 #bhb ,op4 cit41 ,mind1 ,vol4 ,,xi1 p4 #h f4 #bhc ,the ,experimental ,method1 ,influence of ,darwin on ,philosophy1 p4 #bbh4 #bhd ,the ,experimental ,method1 ,influence of ,darwin on ,philosophy1 p4 #bdj4 #bhe ,see the review of ,dewey's essay1 ,the ,experimental ,method1 in ,chapter ,,vii of this study1 p4 #ia ff4 #bhf ,studies in ,logical ,theory1 p4 #d4 #bhg ,ibid41 p4 #b4 #bhh ,beliefs and ,existences1 ,the ,influence of ,darwin on ,philosophy1 p4 #agb f4 #bhi ,the ,philosophical ,radicals1 p4 #big4 ,the essay in which it occurs1 ,philosophy as a ,criticism of ,categories1 was first published in #ahhc1 in the volume ,essays on ,philosophical ,criticism4 #bij ,realism and ,metaphysics1 ,philosophical ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xxvi1 #aiag1 p4 #h4