,the ,ethics 7,ethica ,ordine ,geometrico ,demonstrata7 by ,benedict de ,spinoza ,translated from the ,latin by ,r4 ,h4 ,m4 ,elwes ,,part ,i4 ,,concerning ,,god4 ,,definitions4 ,i4 ,by that which is self--caused1 ,i mean that of which the essence involves existence1 or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent4 ,,ii4 ,a thing is called finite after its kind1 when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature2 for instance1 a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body4 ,so1 also1 a thought is limited by another thought1 but a body is not limited by thought1 nor a thought by body4 ,,iii4 ,by substance1 ,i mean that which is in itself1 and is conceived through itself3 in other words1 that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception4 ,,iv4 ,by attribute1 ,i mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance4 ,v4 ,by mode1 ,i mean the modifications#a of substance1 or that which exists in1 and is conceived through1 something other than itself4 #a ,affectiones ,,vi4 ,by ,god1 ,i mean a being absolutely infinite--that is1 a substance consisting in infinite attributes1 of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality4 ,explanation--,i say absolutely infinite1 not infinite after its kind3 for1 of a thing infinite only after its kind1 infinite attributes may be denied2 but that which is absolutely infinite1 contains in its essence whatever expresses reality1 and involves no negation4 ,,vii4 ,that thing is called free1 which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature1 and of which the action is determined by itself alone4 ,on the other hand1 that thing is necessary1 or rather constrained1 which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action4 ,,viii4 ,by eternity1 ,i mean existence itself1 in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal4 ,explanation--,existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth1 like the essence of a thing1 and1 therefore1 cannot be explained by means of continuance or time1 though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end4 ,,axioms4 ,i4 ,everything which exists1 exists either in itself or in something else4 ,,ii4 ,that which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself4 ,,iii4 ,from a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows2 and1 on the other hand1 if no definite cause be granted1 it is impossible that an effect can follow4 ,,iv4 ,the knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause4 ,v4 ,things which have nothing in common cannot be understood1 the one by means of the other2 the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other4 ,,vi4 ,a true idea must correspond with its ideate or object4 ,,vii4 ,if a thing can be conceived as non--existing1 its essence does not involve existence4 ,,propositions4 ,,prop4 ,i4 ,substance is by nature prior to its modifications4 ,proof4--,this is clear from ,deff4 iii4 and v4 ,,prop4 ,,ii4 ,two substances1 whose attributes are different1 have nothing in common4 ,proof4--,also evident from ,def4 iii4 ,for each must exist in itself1 and be conceived through itself2 in other words1 the conception of one does not imply the conception of the other4 ,,prop4 ,,iii4 ,things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other4 ,proof4--,if they have nothing in common1 it follows that one cannot be apprehended by means of the other 7,ax4 v471 and1 therefore1 one cannot be the cause of the other 7,ax4 iv474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,iv4 ,two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other1 either by the difference of the attributes of the substances1 or by the difference of their modifications4 ,proof4--,everything which exists1 exists either in itself or in something else 7,ax4 i471--that is 7by ,deff4 iii4 and v471 nothing is granted in addition to the understanding1 except substance and its modifications4 ,nothing is1 therefore1 given besides the understanding1 by which several things may be distinguished one from the other1 except the substances1 or1 in other words 7see ,ax4 iv471 their attributes and modifications4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,v4 ,there cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute4 ,proof4--,if several distinct substances be granted1 they must be distinguished one from the other1 either by the difference of their attributes1 or by the difference of their modifications 7,prop4 iv474 ,if only by the difference of their attributes1 it will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute4 ,if by the difference of their modifications--as substance is naturally prior to its modifications 7,prop4 i471--it follows that setting the modifications aside1 and considering substance in itself1 that is truly1 7,deff4 iii4 and vi471 there cannot be conceived one substance different from another1--that is 7by ,prop4 iv471 there cannot be granted several substances1 but one substance only4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,vi4 ,one substance cannot be produced by another substance4 ,proof4--,it is impossible that there should be in the universe two substances with an identical attribute1 i4e4 which have anything common to them both 7,prop4 ii471 and1 therefore 7,prop4 iii471 one cannot be the cause of the other1 neither can one be produced by the other4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,hence it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything external to itself4 ,for in the universe nothing is granted1 save substances and their modifications 7as appears from ,ax4 i4 and ,deff4 iii4 and v474 ,now 7by the last ,prop47 substance cannot be produced by another substance1 therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,this is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the contradictory4 ,for1 if substance be produced by an external cause1 the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its cause 7,ax4 iv471 and 7by ,def4 iii47 it would itself not be substance4 ,,prop4 ,,vii4 ,existence belongs to the nature of substances4 ,proof4--,substance cannot be produced by anything external 7,corollary1 ,prop vi471 it must1 therefore1 be its own cause--that is1 its essence necessarily involves existence1 or existence belongs to its nature4 ,,prop4 ,,viii4 ,every substance is necessarily infinite4 ,proof4--,there can only be one substance with an identical attribute1 and existence follows from its nature 7,prop4 vii472 its nature1 therefore1 involves existence1 either as finite or infinite4 ,it does not exist as finite1 for 7by ,def4 ii47 it would then be limited by something else of the same kind1 which would also necessarily exist 7,prop4 vii472 and there would be two substances with an identical attribute1 which is absurd 7,prop4 v474 ,it therefore exists as infinite4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note ,i4--,as finite existence involves a partial negation1 and infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given nature1 it follows 7solely from ,prop4 vii47 that every substance is necessarily infinite4 ,note ,,ii4--,no doubt it will be difficult for those who think about things loosely1 and have not been accustomed to know them by their primary causes1 to comprehend the demonstration of ,prop4 vii43 for such persons make no distinction between the modifications of substances and the substances themselves1 and are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced2 hence they may attribute to substances the beginning which they observe in natural objects4 ,those who are ignorant of true causes1 make complete confusion--think that trees might talk just as well as men--that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed2 and imagine that any form might be changed into any other4 ,so1 also1 those who confuse the two natures1 divine and human1 readily attribute human passions to the deity1 especially so long as they do not know how passions originate in the mind4 ,but1 if people would consider the nature of substance1 they would have no doubt about the truth of ,prop4 vii4 ,in fact1 this proposition would be a universal axiom1 and accounted a truism4 ,for1 by substance1 would be understood that which is in itself1 and is conceived through itself--that is1 something of which the conception requires not the conception of anything else2 whereas modifications exist in something external to themselves1 and a conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the thing in which they exist4 ,therefore1 we may have true ideas of non--existent modifications2 for1 although they may have no actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect1 yet their essence is so involved in something external to themselves that they may through it be conceived4 ,whereas the only truth substances can have1 external to the intellect1 must consist in their existence1 because they are conceived through themselves4 ,therefore1 for a person to say that he has a clear and distinct--that is1 a true--idea of a substance1 but that he is not sure whether such substance exists1 would be the same as if he said that he had a true idea1 but was not sure whether or no it was false 7a little consideration will make this plain72 or if anyone affirmed that substance is created1 it would be the same as saying that a false idea was true--in short1 the height of absurdity4 ,it must1 then1 necessarily be admitted that the existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth4 ,and we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning--that there is but one such substance4 ,i think that this may profitably be done at once2 and1 in order to proceed regularly with the demonstration1 we must premise3---- #a4 ,the true definition of a thing neither involves nor expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined4 ,from this it follows that---- #b4 ,no definition implies or expresses a certain number of individuals1 inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature of the thing defined4 ,for instance1 the definition of a triangle expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle3 it does not imply any fixed number of triangles4 #c4 ,there is necessarily for each individual existent thing a cause why it should exist4 #d4 ,this cause of existence must either be contained in the nature and definition of the thing defined1 or must be postulated apart from such definition4 ,it therefore follows that1 if a given number of individual things exist in nature1 there must be some cause for the existence of exactly that number1 neither more nor less4 ,for example1 if twenty men exist in the universe 7for simplicity's sake1 ,i will suppose them existing simultaneously1 and to have had no predecessors71 and we want to account for the existence of these twenty men1 it will not be enough to show the cause of human existence in general2 we must also show why there are exactly twenty men1 neither more nor less3 for a cause must be assigned for the existence of each individual4 ,now this cause cannot be contained in the actual nature of man1 for the true definition of man does not involve any consideration of the number twenty4 ,consequently1 the cause for the existence of these twenty men1 and1 consequently1 of each of them1 must necessarily be sought externally to each individual4 ,hence we may lay down the absolute rule1 that everything which may consist of several individuals must have an external cause4 ,and1 as it has been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of substance1 existence must necessarily be included in its definition2 and from its definition alone existence must be deducible4 ,but from its definition 7as we have shown1 notes ii41 iii471 we cannot infer the existence of several substances2 therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same nature4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,ix4 ,the more reality or being a thing has1 the greater the number of its attributes 7,def4 iv474 ,,prop4 ,x4 ,each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself4 ,proof4--,an attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substance1 as constituting its essence 7,def4 iv471 and1 therefore1 must be conceived through itself 7,def4 iii474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note--,it is thus evident that1 though two attributes are1 in fact1 conceived as distinct--that is1 one without the help of the other--yet we cannot1 therefore1 conclude that they constitute two entities1 or two different substances4 ,for it is the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself1 inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed simultaneously in it1 and none could be produced by any other2 but each expresses the reality or being of substance4 ,it is1 then1 far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one substance3 for nothing in nature is more clear than that each and every entity must be conceived under some attribute1 and that its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity4 ,consequently it is abundantly clear1 that an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite attributes1 each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence4 ,if anyone now ask1 by what sign shall he be able to distinguish different substances1 let him read the following propositions1 which show that there is but one substance in the universe1 and that it is absolutely infinite1 wherefore such a sign would be sought in vain4 ,,prop4 ,,xi4 ,god1 or substance1 consisting of infinite attributes1 of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality1 necessarily exists4 ,proof4--,if this be denied1 conceive1 if possible1 that ,god does not exist3 then his essence does not involve existence4 ,but this 7,prop4 vii47 is absurd4 ,therefore ,god necessarily exists4 ,another proof4--,of everything whatsoever a cause or reason must be assigned1 either for its existence1 or for its non--existence--e4g4 if a triangle exist1 a reason or cause must be granted for its existence2 if1 on the contrary1 it does not exist1 a cause must also be granted1 which prevents it from existing1 or annuls its existence4 ,this reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing in question1 or be external to it4 ,for instance1 the reason for the non--existence of a square circle is indicated in its nature1 namely1 because it would involve a contradiction4 ,on the other hand1 the existence of substance follows also solely from its nature1 inasmuch as its nature involves existence4 7,see ,prop4 vii47 ,but the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle does not follow from the nature of those figures1 but from the order of universal nature in extension4 ,from the latter it must follow1 either that a triangle necessarily exists1 or that it is impossible that it should exist4 ,so much is self--evident4 ,it follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists1 if no cause or reason be granted which prevents its existence4 ,if1 then1 no cause or reason can be given1 which prevents the existence of ,god1 or which destroys his existence1 we must certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist4 ,if such a reason or cause should be given1 it must either be drawn from the very nature of ,god1 or be external to him--that is1 drawn from another substance of another nature4 ,for if it were of the same nature1 ,god1 by that very fact1 would be admitted to exist4 ,but substance of another nature could have nothing in common with ,god 7by ,prop4 ii471 and therefore would be unable either to cause or to destroy his existence4 ,as1 then1 a reason or cause which would annul the divine existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine nature1 such cause must perforce1 if ,god does not exist1 be drawn from ,god's own nature1 which would involve a contradiction4 ,to make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect is absurd2 therefore1 neither in the nature of ,god1 nor externally to his nature1 can a cause or reason be assigned which would annul his existence4 ,therefore1 ,god necessarily exists4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,another proof4--,the potentiality of non--existence is a negation of power1 and contrariwise the potentiality of existence is a power1 as is obvious4 ,if1 then1 that which necessarily exists is nothing but finite beings1 such finite beings are more powerful than a being absolutely infinite1 which is obviously absurd2 therefore1 either nothing exists1 or else a being absolutely infinite necessarily exists also4 ,now we exist either in ourselves1 or in something else which necessarily exists 7see ,axiom4 i4 and ,prop4 vii474 ,therefore a being absolutely infinite--in other words1 ,god 7,def4 vi47--necessarily exists4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,in this last proof1 ,i have purposely shown ,god's existence posteriori1 so that the proof might be more easily followed1 not because1 from the same premises1 ,god's existence does not follow priori4 ,for1 as the potentiality of existence is a power1 it follows that1 in proportion as reality increases in the nature of a thing1 so also will it increase its strength for existence4 ,therefore a being absolutely infinite1 such as ,god1 has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence1 and hence he does absolutely exist4 ,perhaps there will be many who will be unable to see the force of this proof1 inasmuch as they are accustomed only to consider those things which flow from external causes4 ,of such things1 they see that those which quickly come to pass--that is1 quickly come into existence--quickly also disappear2 whereas they regard as more difficult of accomplishment--that is1 not so easily brought into existence--those things which they conceive as more complicated4 ,however1 to do away with this misconception1 ,i need not here show the measure of truth in the proverb1 ,what comes quickly1 goes quickly1 nor discuss whether1 from the point of view of universal nature1 all things are equally easy1 or otherwise3 ,i need only remark that ,i am not here speaking of things1 which come to pass through causes external to themselves1 but only of substances which 7by ,prop4 vi47 cannot be produced by any external cause4 ,things which are produced by external causes1 whether they consist of many parts or few1 owe whatsoever perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of their external cause2 and therefore their existence arises solely from the perfection of their external cause1 not from their own4 ,contrariwise1 whatsoever perfection is possessed by substance is due to no external cause2 wherefore the existence of substance must arise solely from its own nature1 which is nothing else but its essence4 ,thus1 the perfection of a thing does not annul its existence1 but1 on the contrary1 asserts it4 ,imperfection1 on the other hand1 does annul it2 therefore we cannot be more certain of the existence of anything1 than of the existence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect--that is1 of ,god4 ,for inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection1 and involves absolute perfection1 all cause for doubt concerning his existence is done away1 and the utmost certainty on the question is given4 ,this1 ,i think1 will be evident to every moderately attentive reader4 ,,prop4 ,,xii4 ,no attribute of substance can be conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided4 ,proof4--,the parts into which substance as thus conceived would be divided either will retain the nature of substance1 or they will not4 ,if the former1 then 7by ,prop4 viii47 each part will necessarily be infinite1 and 7by ,prop4 vi47 self--caused1 and 7by ,prop4 v47 will perforce consist of a different attribute1 so that1 in that case1 several substances could be formed out of one substance1 which 7by ,prop4 vi47 is absurd4 ,moreover1 the parts 7by ,prop4 ii47 would have nothing in common with their whole1 and the whole 7by ,def4 iv4 and ,prop4 x47 could both exist and be conceived without its parts1 which everyone will admit to be absurd4 ,if we adopt the second alternative--namely1 that the parts will not retain the nature of substance--then1 if the whole substance were divided into equal parts1 it would lose the nature of substance1 and would cease to exist1 which 7by ,prop4 vii47 is absurd4 ,,prop4 ,,xiii4 ,substance absolutely infinite is indivisible4 ,proof4--,if it could be divided1 the parts into which it was divided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite substance1 or they would not4 ,if the former1 we should have several substances of the same nature1 which 7by ,prop4 v47 is absurd4 ,if the latter1 then 7by ,prop4 vii47 substance absolutely infinite could cease to exist1 which 7by ,prop4 xi47 is also absurd4 ,corollary4--,it follows1 that no substance1 and consequently no extended substance1 in so far as it is substance1 is divisible4 ,note4--,the indivisibility of substance may be more easily understood as follows4 ,the nature of substance can only be conceived as infinite1 and by a part of substance1 nothing else can be understood than finite substance1 which 7by ,prop4 viii7 involves a manifest contradiction4 ,,prop4 ,,xiv4 ,besides ,god no substance can be granted or conceived4 ,proof4--,as ,god is a being absolutely infinite1 of whom no attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied 7by ,def4 vi471 and he necessarily exists 7by ,prop4 xi472 if any substance besides ,god were granted1 it would have to be explained by some attribute of ,god1 and thus two substances with the same attribute would exist1 which 7by ,prop4 v47 is absurd2 therefore1 besides ,god no substance can be granted1 or1 consequently1 be conceived4 ,if it could be conceived1 it would necessarily have to be conceived as existent2 but this 7by the first part of this proof7 is absurd4 ,therefore1 besides ,god no substance can be granted or conceived4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary ,i4--,clearly1 therefore3 #a4 ,god is one1 that is 7by ,def4 vi47 only one substance can be granted in the universe1 and that substance is absolutely infinite1 as we have already indicated 7in the note to ,prop4 x474 ,corollary ,,ii4--,it follows3 #b4 ,that extension and thought are either attributes of ,god or 7by ,ax4 i47 accidents 7affectiones7 of the attributes of ,god4 ,,prop4 ,,xv4 ,whatsoever is1 is in ,god1 and without ,god nothing can be1 or be conceived4 ,proof4--,besides ,god1 no substance is granted or can be conceived 7by ,prop4 xiv471 that is 7by ,def4 iii47 nothing which is in itself and is conceived through itself4 ,but modes 7by ,def4 v47 can neither be1 nor be conceived without substance2 wherefore they can only be in the divine nature1 and can only through it be conceived4 ,but substances and modes form the sum total of existence 7by ,ax4 i471 therefore1 without ,god nothing can be1 or be conceived4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,some assert that ,god1 like a man1 consists of body and mind1 and is susceptible of passions4 ,how far such persons have strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been said4 ,but these ,i pass over4 ,for all who have in anywise reflected on the divine nature deny that ,god has a body4 ,of this they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body a definite quantity1 so long1 so broad1 so deep1 bounded by a certain shape1 and it is the height of absurdity to predicate such a thing of ,god1 a being absolutely infinite4 ,but meanwhile by other reasons with which they try to prove their point1 they show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart from the divine nature1 and say it was created by ,god4 ,wherefrom the divine nature can have been created1 they are wholly ignorant2 thus they clearly show1 that they do not know the meaning of their own words4 ,i myself have proved sufficiently clearly1 at any rate in my own judgment 7,coroll4 ,prop4 vi1 and note #b1 ,prop4 viii471 that no substance can be produced or created by anything other than itself4 ,further1 ,i showed 7in ,prop4 xiv471 that besides ,god no substance can be granted or conceived4 ,hence we drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of ,god4 ,however1 in order to explain more fully1 ,i will refute the arguments of my adversaries1 which all start from the following points3---- ,extended substance1 in so far as it is substance1 consists1 as they think1 in parts1 wherefore they deny that it can be infinite1 or consequently1 that it can appertain to ,god4 ,this they illustrate with many examples1 of which ,i will take one or two4 ,if extended substance1 they say1 is infinite1 let it be conceived to be divided into two parts2 each part will then be either finite or infinite4 ,if the former1 then infinite substance is composed of two finite parts1 which is absurd4 ,if the latter1 then one infinite will be twice as large as another infinite1 which is also absurd4 ,further1 if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths1 it will consist of an infinite number of such parts2 it would equally consist of an infinite number of parts1 if each part measured only an inch3 therefore1 one infinity would be twelve times as great as the other4 ,lastly1 if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn two diverging lines which at first are at a definite distance apart1 but are produced to infinity1 it is certain that the distance between the two lines will be continually increased1 until at length it changes from definite to indefinable4 ,as these absurdities follow1 it is said1 from considering quantity as infinite1 the conclusion is drawn1 that extended substance must necessarily be finite1 and1 consequently1 cannot appertain to the nature of ,god4 ,the second argument is also drawn from ,god's supreme perfection4 ,god1 it is said1 inasmuch as he is a supremely perfect being1 cannot be passive2 but extended substance1 insofar as it is divisible1 is passive4 ,it follows1 therefore1 that extended substance does not appertain to the essence of ,god4 ,such are the arguments ,i find on the subject in writers1 who by them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature1 and cannot possibly appertain thereto4 ,however1 ,i think an attentive reader will see that ,i have already answered their propositions2 for all their arguments are founded on the hypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts1 and such a hypothesis ,i have shown 7,prop4 xii41 and ,coroll4 ,prop4 xiii47 to be absurd4 ,moreover1 anyone who reflects will see that all these absurdities 7if absurdities they be1 which ,i am not now discussing71 from which it is sought to extract the conclusion that extended substance is finite1 do not at all follow from the notion of an infinite quantity1 but merely from the notion that an infinite quantity is measurable1 and composed of finite parts therefore1 the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that3 infinite quantity is not measurable1 and cannot be composed of finite parts4 ,this is exactly what we have already proved 7in ,prop4 xii474 ,wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in reality recoiled upon themselves4 ,if1 from this absurdity of theirs1 they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended substance must be finite1 they will in good sooth be acting like a man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares1 and1 finding himself thereby landed in absurdities1 proceeds to deny that circles have any center1 from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal4 ,for1 taking extended substance1 which can only be conceived as infinite1 one1 and indivisible 7,props4 viii41 v41 xii47 they assert1 in order to prove that it is finite1 that it is composed of finite parts1 and that it can be multiplied and divided4 ,so1 also1 others1 after asserting that a line is composed of points1 can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be infinitely divided4 ,assuredly it is not less absurd to assert that extended substance is made up of bodies or parts1 than it would be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces1 a surface of lines1 and a line of points4 ,this must be admitted by all who know clear reason to be infallible1 and most of all by those who deny the possibility of a vacuum4 ,for if extended substance could be so divided that its parts were really separate1 why should not one part admit of being destroyed1 the others remaining joined together as before8 ,and why should all be so fitted into one another as to leave no vacuum8 ,surely in the case of things1 which are really distinct one from the other1 one can exist without the other1 and can remain in its original condition4 ,as1 then1 there does not exist a vacuum in nature 7of which anon71 but all parts are bound to come together to prevent it1 it follows from this that the parts cannot really be distinguished1 and that extended substance in so far as it is substance cannot be divided4 ,if anyone asks me the further question1 ,why are we naturally so prone to divide quantity8 ,i answer1 that quantity is conceived by us in two ways2 in the abstract and superficially1 as we imagine it2 or as substance1 as we conceive it solely by the intellect4 ,if1 then1 we regard quantity as it is represented in our imagination1 which we often and more easily do1 we shall find that it is finite1 divisible1 and compounded of parts2 but if we regard it as it is represented in our intellect1 and conceive it as substance1 which it is very difficult to do1 we shall then1 as ,i have sufficiently proved1 find that it is infinite1 one1 and indivisible4 ,this will be plain enough to all who make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination1 especially if it be remembered1 that matter is everywhere the same1 that its parts are not distinguishable1 except in so far as we conceive matter as diversely modified1 whence its parts are distinguished1 not really1 but modally4 ,for instance1 water1 in so far as it is water1 we conceive to be divided1 and its parts to be separated one from the other2 but not in so far as it is extended substance2 from this point of view it is neither separated nor divisible4 ,further1 water1 in so far as it is water1 is produced and corrupted2 but1 in so far as it is substance1 it is neither produced nor corrupted4 ,i think ,i have now answered the second argument2 it is1 in fact1 founded on the same assumption as the first--namely1 that matter1 in so far as it is substance1 is divisible1 and composed of parts4 ,even if it were so1 ,i do not know why it should be considered unworthy of the divine nature1 inasmuch as besides ,god 7by ,prop4 xiv47 no substance can be granted1 wherefrom it could receive its modifications4 ,all things1 ,i repeat1 are in ,god1 and all things which come to pass1 come to pass solely through the laws of the infinite nature of ,god1 and follow 7as ,i will shortly show7 from the necessity of his essence4 ,wherefore it can in nowise be said1 that ,god is passive in respect to anything other than himself1 or that extended substance is unworthy of the ,divine nature1 even if it be supposed divisible1 so long as it is granted to be infinite and eternal4 ,but enough of this for the present4 ,,prop4 ,,xvi4 ,from the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways--that is1 all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect4 ,proof4--,this proposition will be clear to everyone1 who remembers that from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers several properties1 which really necessarily follow therefrom 7that is1 from the actual essence of the thing defined72 and it infers more properties in proportion as the definition of the thing expresses more reality1 that is1 in proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more reality4 ,now1 as the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes 7by ,def4 vi471 of which each expresses infinite essence after its kind1 it follows that from the necessity of its nature an infinite number of things 7that is1 everything which can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect7 must necessarily follow4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary ,i4--,hence it follows1 that ,god is the efficient cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect4 ,corollary ,,ii4--,it also follows that ,god is a cause in himself1 and not through an accident of his nature4 ,corollary ,,iii4--,it follows1 thirdly1 that ,god is the absolutely first cause4 ,,prop4 ,,xvii4 ,god acts solely by the laws of his own nature1 and is not constrained by anyone4 ,proof4--,we have just shown 7in ,prop4 xvi471 that solely from the necessity of the divine nature1 or1 what is the same thing1 solely from the laws of his nature1 an infinite number of things absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways2 and we proved 7in ,prop4 xv471 that without ,god nothing can be nor be conceived but that all things are in ,god4 ,wherefore nothing can exist2 outside himself1 whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to act4 ,wherefore ,god acts solely by the laws of his own nature1 and is not constrained by anyone4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary ,i4--,it follows3 #a4 ,that there can be no cause which1 either extrinsically or intrinsically1 besides the perfection of his own nature1 moves ,god to act4 ,corollary ,,ii4--,it follows3 #b4 ,that ,god is the sole free cause4 ,for ,god alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature 7by ,prop4 xi4 and ,prop4 xiv41 ,coroll4 i471 and acts by the sole necessity of his own nature1 wherefore ,god is 7by ,def4 vii47 the sole free cause4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,others think that ,god is a free cause1 because he can1 as they think1 bring it about1 that those things which we have said follow from his nature--that is1 which are in his power1 should not come to pass1 or should not be produced by him4 ,but this is the same as if they said1 that ,god could bring it about1 that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles2 or that from a given cause no effect should follow1 which is absurd4 ,moreover1 ,i will show below1 without the aid of this proposition1 that neither intellect nor will appertain to ,god's nature4 ,i know that there are many who think that they can show1 that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to ,god's nature2 for they say they know of nothing more perfect1 which they can attribute to ,god1 than that which is the highest perfection in ourselves4 ,further1 although they conceive ,god as actually supremely intelligent1 they yet do not believe that he can bring into existence everything which he actually understands1 for they think that they would thus destroy ,god's power4 ,if1 they contend1 ,god had created everything which is in his intellect1 he would not be able to create anything more1 and this1 they think1 would clash with ,god's omnipotence2 therefore1 they prefer to asset that ,god is indifferent to all things1 and that he creates nothing except that which he has decided1 by some absolute exercise of will1 to create4 ,however1 ,i think ,i have shown sufficiently clearly 7by ,prop4 xvi471 that from ,god's supreme power1 or infinite nature1 an infinite number of things--that is1 all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of ways1 or always flow from the same necessity2 in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for eternity1 that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles4 ,wherefore the omnipotence of ,god has been displayed from all eternity1 and will for all eternity remain in the same state of activity4 ,this manner of treating the question attributes to ,god an omnipotence1 in my opinion1 far more perfect4 ,for1 otherwise1 we are compelled to confess that ,god understands an infinite number of creatable things1 which he will never be able to create1 for1 if he created all that he understands1 he would1 according to this showing1 exhaust his omnipotence1 and render himself imperfect4 ,wherefore1 in order to establish that ,god is perfect1 we should be reduced to establishing at the same time1 that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power extends2 this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd1 and most repugnant to ,god's omnipotence4 ,further 7to say a word here concerning the intellect and the will which we attribute to ,god71 if intellect and will appertain to the eternal essence of ,god1 we must take these words in some significance quite different from those they usually bear4 ,for intellect and will1 which should constitute the essence of ,god1 would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human intellect and will1 in fact1 would have nothing in common with them but the name2 there would be about as much correspondence between the two as there is between the ,dog1 the heavenly constellation1 and a dog1 an animal that barks4 ,this ,i will prove as follows4 ,if intellect belongs to the divine nature1 it cannot be in nature1 as ours is generally thought to be1 posterior to1 or simultaneous with the things understood1 inasmuch as ,god is prior to all things by reason of his causality 7,prop4 xvi41 ,coroll4 i474 ,on the contrary1 the truth and formal essence of things is as it is1 because it exists by representation as such in the intellect of ,god4 ,wherefore the intellect of ,god1 in so far as it is conceived to constitute ,god's essence1 is1 in reality1 the cause of things1 both of their essence and of their existence4 ,this seems to have been recognized by those who have asserted1 that ,god's intellect1 ,god's will1 and ,god's power1 are one and the same4 ,as1 therefore1 ,god's intellect is the sole cause of things1 namely1 both of their essence and existence1 it must necessarily differ from them in respect to its essence1 and in respect to its existence4 ,for a cause differs from a thing it causes1 precisely in the quality which the latter gains from the former4 ,for example1 a man is the cause of another man's existence1 but not of his essence 7for the latter is an eternal truth71 and1 therefore1 the two men may be entirely similar in essence1 but must be different in existence2 and hence if the existence of one of them cease1 the existence of the other will not necessarily cease also2 but if the essence of one could be destroyed1 and be made false1 the essence of the other would be destroyed also4 ,wherefore1 a thing which is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of a given effect1 must differ from such effect both in respect to its essence1 and also in respect to its existence4 ,now the intellect of ,god is the cause both of the essence and the existence of our intellect2 therefore1 the intellect of ,god in so far as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence1 differs from our intellect both in respect to essence and in respect to existence1 nor can it in anywise agree therewith save in name1 as we said before4 ,the reasoning would be identical in the case of the will1 as anyone can easily see4 ,,prop4 ,,xviii4 ,god is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things4 ,proof4--,all things which are1 are in ,god1 and must be conceived through ,god 7by ,prop4 xv471 therefore 7by ,prop4 xvi41 ,coroll4 i47 ,god is the cause of those things which are in him4 ,this is our first point4 ,further1 besides ,god there can be no substance 7by ,prop4 xiv471 that is nothing in itself external to ,god4 ,this is our second point4 ,god1 therefore1 is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xix4 ,god1 and all the attributes of ,god1 are eternal4 ,proof4--,god 7by ,def4 vi47 is substance1 which 7by ,prop4 xi47 necessarily exists1 that is 7by ,prop4 vii47 existence appertains to its nature1 or 7what is the same thing7 follows from its definition2 therefore1 ,god is eternal 7by ,def4 viii474 ,further1 by the attributes of ,god we must understand that which 7by ,def4 iv47 expresses the essence of the divine substance--in other words1 that which appertains to substance3 that1 ,i say1 should be involved in the attributes of substance4 ,now eternity appertains to the nature of substance 7as ,i have already shown in ,prop4 vii472 therefore1 eternity must appertain to each of the attributes1 and thus all are eternal4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,this proposition is also evident from the manner in which 7in ,prop4 xi47 ,i demonstrated the existence of ,god2 it is evident1 ,i repeat1 from that proof1 that the existence of ,god1 like his essence1 is an eternal truth4 ,further 7in ,prop4 xix4 of my ,principles of the ,cartesian ,philosophy71 ,i have proved the eternity of ,god1 in another manner1 which ,i need not here repeat4 ,,prop4 ,,xx4 ,the existence of ,god and his essence are one and the same4 ,proof4--,god 7by the last ,prop47 and all his attributes are eternal1 that is 7by ,def4 viii47 each of his attributes expresses existence4 ,therefore the same attributes of ,god which explain his eternal essence1 explain at the same time his eternal existence--in other words1 that which constitutes ,god's essence constitutes at the same time his existence4 ,wherefore ,god's existence and ,god's essence are one and the same4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,coroll4 ,i4--,hence it follows that ,god's existence1 like his essence1 is an eternal truth4 ,coroll4 ,,ii--,secondly1 it follows that ,god1 and all the attributes of ,god1 are unchangeable4 ,for if they could be changed in respect to existence1 they must also be able to be changed in respect to essence--that is1 obviously1 be changed from true to false1 which is absurd4 ,,prop4 ,,xxi4 ,all things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of ,god must always exist and be infinite1 or1 in other words1 are eternal and infinite through the said attribute4 ,proof4--,conceive1 if it be possible 7supposing the proposition to be denied71 that something in some attribute of ,god can follow from the absolute nature of the said attribute1 and that at the same time it is finite1 and has a conditioned existence or duration2 for instance1 the idea of ,god expressed in the attribute thought4 ,now thought1 in so far as it is supposed to be an attribute of ,god1 is necessarily 7by ,prop4 xi47 in its nature infinite4 ,but1 in so far as it possesses the idea of ,god1 it is supposed finite4 ,it cannot1 however1 be conceived as finite1 unless it be limited by thought 7by ,def4 ii472 but it is not limited by thought itself1 in so far as it has constituted the idea of ,god 7for so far it is supposed to be finite72 therefore1 it is limited by thought1 in so far as it has not constituted the idea of ,god1 which nevertheless 7by ,prop4 xi47 must necessarily exist4 ,we have now granted1 therefore1 thought not constituting the idea of ,god1 and1 accordingly1 the idea of ,god does not naturally follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought 7for it is conceived as constituting1 and also as not constituting1 the idea of ,god71 which is against our hypothesis4 ,wherefore1 if the idea of ,god expressed in the attribute thought1 or1 indeed1 anything else in any attribute of ,god 7for we may take any example1 as the proof is of universal application7 follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute1 the said thing must necessarily be infinite1 which was our first point4 ,furthermore1 a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration4 ,for if it can1 suppose a thing1 which follows from the necessity of the nature of some attribute1 to exist in some attribute of ,god1 for instance1 the idea of ,god expressed in the attribute thought1 and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed1 or to be about not to exist4 ,now thought being an attribute of ,god1 must necessarily exist unchanged 7by ,prop4 xi41 and ,prop4 xx41 ,coroll4 ii472 and beyond the limits of the duration of the idea of ,god 7supposing the latter at some time not to have existed1 or not to be going to exist7 thought would perforce have existed without the idea of ,god1 which is contrary to our hypothesis1 for we supposed that1 thought being given1 the idea of ,god necessarily flowed therefrom4 ,therefore the idea of ,god expressed in thought1 or anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of some attribute of ,god1 cannot have a limited duration1 but through the said attribute is eternal1 which is our second point4 ,bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of anything1 which in any attribute necessarily follows from ,god's absolute nature4 ,,prop4 ,,xxii4 ,whatsoever follows from any attribute of ,god1 in so far as it is modified by a modification1 which exists necessarily and as infinite1 through the said attribute1 must also exist necessarily and as infinite4 ,proof4--,the proof of this proposition is similar to that of the preceding one4 ,,prop4 ,,xxiii4 ,every mode1 which exists both necessarily and as infinite1 must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of ,god1 or from an attribute modified by a modification which exists necessarily1 and as infinite4 ,proof4--,a mode exists in something else1 through which it must be conceived 7,def4 v471 that is 7,prop4 xv471 it exists solely in ,god1 and solely through ,god can be conceived4 ,if therefore a mode is conceived as necessarily existing and infinite1 it must necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of ,god1 in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing the infinity and necessity of existence1 in other words 7,def4 viii47 eternity2 that is1 in so far as it is considered absolutely4 ,a mode1 therefore1 which necessarily exists as infinite1 must follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of ,god1 either immediately 7,prop4 xxi47 or through the means of some modification1 which follows from the absolute nature of the said attribute2 that is 7by ,prop4 xxii471 which exists necessarily and as infinite4 ,,prop4 ,,xxiv4 ,the essence of things produced by ,god does not involve existence4 ,proof4--,this proposition is evident from ,def4 i4 ,for that of which the nature 7considered in itself7 involves existence is self--caused1 and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature4 ,corollary4--,hence it follows that ,god is not only the cause of things coming into existence1 but also of their continuing in existence1 that is1 in scholastic phraseology1 ,god is cause of the being of things 7essendi rerum74 ,for whether things exist1 or do not exist1 whenever we contemplate their essence1 we see that it involves neither existence nor duration2 consequently1 it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other4 ,god must be the sole cause1 inasmuch as to him alone does existence appertain4 7,prop4 xiv4 ,coroll4 i47 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxv4 ,god is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things1 but also of their essence4 ,proof4--,if this be denied1 then ,god is not the cause of the essence of things2 and therefore the essence of things can 7by ,ax4 iv47 be conceived without ,god4 ,this 7by ,prop4 xv47 is absurd4 ,therefore1 ,god is the cause of the essence of things4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,this proposition follows more clearly from ,prop4 xvi4 ,for it is evident thereby that1 given the divine nature1 the essence of things must be inferred from it1 no less than their existence--in a word1 ,god must be called the cause of all things1 in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself4 ,this will be made still clearer by the following corollary4 ,corollary4--,individual things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of ,god1 or modes by which the attributes of ,god are expressed in a fixed and definite manner4 ,the proof appears from ,prop4 xv4 and ,def4 v4 ,,prop4 ,,xxvi4 ,a thing which is conditioned to act in a particular manner1 has necessarily been thus conditioned by ,god2 and that which has not been conditioned by ,god cannot condition itself to act4 ,proof4--,that by which things are said to be conditioned to act in a particular manner is necessarily something positive 7this is obvious72 therefore both of its essence and of its existence ,god by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause 7,props4 xxv4 and xvi472 this is our first point4 ,our second point is plainly to be inferred therefrom4 ,for if a thing1 which has not been conditioned by ,god1 could condition itself1 the first part of our proof would be false1 and this1 as we have shown is absurd4 ,,prop4 ,,xxvii4 ,a thing1 which has been conditioned by ,god to act in a particular way1 cannot render itself unconditioned4 ,proof4--,this proposition is evident from the third axiom4 ,,prop4 ,,xxviii4 ,every individual thing1 or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence1 cannot exist or be conditioned to act1 unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause other than itself1 which also is finite1 and has a conditioned existence2 and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist1 or be conditioned to act1 unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause1 which also is finite1 and has a conditioned existence1 and so on to infinity4 ,proof4--,whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act1 has been thus conditioned by ,god 7by ,prop4 xxvi4 and ,prop4 xxiv41 ,coroll474 ,but that which is finite1 and has a conditioned existence1 cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of ,god2 for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of ,god is infinite and eternal 7by ,prop4 xxi474 ,it must1 therefore1 follow from some attribute of ,god1 in so far as the said attribute is considered as in some way modified2 for substance and modes make up the sum total of existence 7by ,ax4 i4 and ,def4 iii41 v471 while modes are merely modifications of the attributes of ,god4 ,but from ,god1 or from any of his attributes1 in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite and eternal1 a conditioned thing cannot follow4 ,wherefore it must follow from1 or be conditioned for1 existence and action by ,god or one of his attributes1 in so far as the latter are modified by some modification which is finite1 and has a conditioned existence4 ,this is our first point4 ,again1 this cause or this modification 7for the reason by which we established the first part of this proof7 must in its turn be conditioned by another cause1 which also is finite1 and has a conditioned existence1 and1 again1 this last by another 7for the same reason72 and so on 7for the same reason7 to infinity4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,as certain things must be produced immediately by ,god1 namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute nature1 through the means of these primary attributes1 which1 nevertheless1 can neither exist nor be conceived without ,god1 it follows3--#a4 ,that ,god is absolutely the proximate cause of those things immediately produced by him4 ,i say absolutely1 not after his kind1 as is usually stated4 ,for the effects of ,god cannot either exist or be conceived without a cause 7,prop4 xv4 and ,prop4 xxiv4 ,coroll474 #b4 ,that ,god cannot properly be styled the remote cause of individual things1 except for the sake of distinguishing these from what he immediately produces1 or rather from what follows from his absolute nature4 ,for1 by a remote cause1 we understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect4 ,but all things which are1 are in ,god1 and so depend on ,god1 that without him they can neither be nor be conceived4 ,,prop4 ,,xxix4 ,nothing in the universe is contingent1 but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature4 ,proof4--,whatsoever is1 is in ,god 7,prop4 xv474 ,but ,god cannot be called a thing contingent4 ,for 7by ,prop4 xi47 he exists necessarily1 and not contingently4 ,further1 the modes of the divine nature follow therefrom necessarily1 and not contingently 7,prop4 xvi472 and they thus follow1 whether we consider the divine nature absolutely1 or whether we consider it as in any way conditioned to act 7,prop4 xxvii474 ,further1 ,god is not only the cause of these modes1 in so far as they simply exist 7by ,prop4 xxiv1 ,coroll471 but also in so far as they are considered as conditioned for operating in a particular manner 7,prop4 xxvi474 ,if they be not conditioned by ,god 7,prop4 xxvi471 it is impossible1 and not contingent1 that they should condition themselves2 contrariwise1 if they be conditioned by ,god1 it is impossible1 and not contingent1 that they should render themselves unconditioned4 ,wherefore all things are conditioned by the necessity of the divine nature1 not only to exist1 but also to exist and operate in a particular manner1 and there is nothing that is contingent4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,before going any further1 ,i wish here to explain1 what we should understand by nature viewed as active 7natura naturans71 and nature viewed as passive 7natura naturata74 ,i say to explain1 or rather call attention to it1 for ,i think that1 from what has been said1 it is sufficiently clear1 that by nature viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself1 and is conceived through itself1 or those attributes of substance1 which express eternal and infinite essence1 in other words 7,prop4 xiv41 ,coroll4 i41 and ,prop4 xvii41 ,coroll4 ii7 ,god1 in so far as he is considered as a free cause4 ,by nature viewed as passive ,i understand all that which follows from the necessity of the nature of ,god1 or of any of the attributes of ,god1 that is1 all the modes of the attributes of ,god1 in so far as they are considered as things which are in ,god1 and which without ,god cannot exist or be conceived4 ,,prop4 ,,xxx4 ,intellect1 in function 7actu7 finite1 or in function infinite1 must comprehend the attributes of ,god and the modifications of ,god1 and nothing else4 ,proof4--,a true idea must agree with its object 7,ax4 vi472 in other words 7obviously71 that which is contained in the intellect in representation must necessarily be granted in nature4 ,but in nature 7by ,prop4 xiv41 ,coroll4 i47 there is no substance save ,god1 nor any modifications save those 7,prop4 xv47 which are in ,god1 and cannot without ,god either be or be conceived4 ,therefore the intellect1 in function finite1 or in function infinite1 must comprehend the attributes of ,god and the modifications of ,god1 and nothing else4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxi4 ,the intellect in function1 whether finite or infinite1 as will1 desire1 love1 c41 should be referred to passive nature and not to active nature4 ,proof4--,by the intellect we do not 7obviously7 mean absolute thought1 but only a certain mode of thinking1 differing from other modes1 such as love1 desire1 c41 and therefore 7,def4 v47 requiring to be conceived through absolute thought4 ,it must 7by ,prop4 xv4 and ,def4 vi471 through some attribute of ,god which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought1 be so conceived1 that without such attribute it could neither be nor be conceived4 ,it must therefore be referred to nature passive rather than to nature active1 as must also the other modes of thinking4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,i do not here1 by speaking of intellect in function1 admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality3 but1 wishing to avoid all confusion1 ,i desire to speak only of what is most clearly perceived by us1 namely1 of the very act of understanding1 than which nothing is more clearly perceived4 ,for we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of the act of understanding4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxii4 ,will cannot be called a free cause1 but only a necessary cause4 ,proof4--,will is only a particular mode of thinking1 like intellect2 therefore 7by ,prop4 xxviii47 no volition can exist1 nor be conditioned to act1 unless it be conditioned by some cause other than itself1 which cause is conditioned by a third cause1 and so on to infinity4 ,but if will be supposed infinite1 it must also be conditioned to exist and act by ,god1 not by virtue of his being substance absolutely infinite1 but by virtue of his possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought 7by ,prop4 xxiii474 ,thus1 however it be conceived1 whether as finite or infinite1 it requires a cause by which it should be conditioned to exist and act4 ,thus 7,def4 vii47 it cannot be called a free cause1 but only a necessary or constrained cause4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,coroll4 ,i4--,hence it follows1 first1 that ,god does not act according to freedom of the will4 ,coroll4 ,,ii4--,it follows1 secondly1 that will and intellect stand in the same relation to the nature of ,god as do motion1 and rest1 and absolutely all natural phenomena1 which must be conditioned by ,god 7,prop4 xxix47 to exist and act in a particular manner4 ,for will1 like the rest1 stands in need of a cause1 by which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner4 ,and although1 when will or intellect be granted1 an infinite number of results may follow1 yet ,god cannot on that account be said to act from freedom of the will1 any more than the infinite number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying that motion and rest act by free will4 ,wherefore will no more appertains to ,god than does anything else in nature1 but stands in the same relation to him as motion1 rest1 and the like1 which we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature1 and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular manner4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxiii4 ,things could not have been brought into being by ,god in any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact obtained4 ,proof--,all things necessarily follow from the nature of ,god 7,prop4 xvi471 and by the nature of ,god are conditioned to exist and act in a particular way 7,prop4 xxix474 ,if things1 therefore1 could have been of a different nature1 or have been conditioned to act in a different way1 so that the order of nature would have been different1 ,god's nature would also have been able to be different from what it now is2 and therefore 7by ,prop4 xi47 that different nature also would have perforce existed1 and consequently there would have been able to be two or more ,gods4 ,this 7by ,prop4 xiv41 ,coroll4 i47 is absurd4 ,therefore things could not have been brought into being by ,god in any other manner1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note ,i4--,as ,i have thus shown1 more clearly than the sun at noonday1 that there is nothing to justify us in calling things contingent1 ,i wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall attach to the word contingent2 but ,i will first explain the words necessary and impossible4 ,a thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence or in respect to its cause2 for the existence of a thing necessarily follows1 either from its essence and definition1 or from a given efficient cause4 ,for similar reasons a thing is said to be impossible2 namely1 inasmuch as its essence or definition involves a contradiction1 or because no external cause is granted1 which is conditioned to produce such an effect2 but a thing can in no respect be called contingent1 save in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge4 ,a thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or does not involve a contradiction1 or of which1 knowing that it does not involve a contradiction1 we are still in doubt concerning the existence1 because the order of causes escapes us1--such a thing1 ,i say1 cannot appear to us either necessary or impossible4 ,wherefore we call it contingent or possible4 ,note ,,ii4--,it clearly follows from what we have said1 that things have been brought into being by ,god in the highest perfection1 inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a most perfect nature4 ,nor does this prove any imperfection in ,god1 for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection4 ,from its contrary proposition1 we should clearly gather 7as ,i have just shown71 that ,god is not supremely perfect1 for if things had been brought into being in any other way1 we should have to assign to ,god a nature different from that1 which we are bound to attribute to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being4 ,i do not doubt1 that many will scout this idea as absurd1 and will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it1 simply because they are accustomed to assign to ,god a freedom very different from that which we 7,def4 vii47 have deduced4 ,they assign to him1 in short1 absolute free will4 ,however1 ,i am also convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter1 and duly weigh in their minds our series of propositions1 they will reject such freedom as they now attribute to ,god1 not only as nugatory1 but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge4 ,there is no need for me to repeat what ,i have said in the note to ,prop4 xvii4 ,but1 for the sake of my opponents1 ,i will show further1 that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of ,god1 it nevertheless follows from his perfection1 that things could not have been by him created other than they are1 or in a different order2 this is easily proved1 if we reflect on what our opponents themselves concede1 namely1 that it depends solely on the decree and will of ,god1 that each thing is what it is4 ,if it were otherwise1 ,god would not be the cause of all things4 ,further1 that all the decrees of ,god have been ratified from all eternity by ,god himself4 ,if it were otherwise1 ,god would be convicted of imperfection or change4 ,but in eternity there is no such thing as when1 before1 or after2 hence it follows solely from the perfection of ,god1 that ,god never can decree1 or never could have decreed anything but what is2 that ,god did not exist before his decrees1 and would not exist without them4 ,but1 it is said1 supposing that ,god had made a different universe1 or had ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and her order1 we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in ,god4 ,but persons who say this must admit that ,god can change his decrees4 ,for if ,god had ordained any decrees concerning nature and her order1 different from those which he has ordained--in other words1 if he had willed and conceived something different concerning nature--he would perforce have had a different intellect from that which he has1 and also a different will4 ,but if it were allowable to assign to ,god a different intellect and a different will1 without any change in his essence or his perfection1 what would there be to prevent him changing the decrees which he has made concerning created things1 and nevertheless remaining perfect8 ,for his intellect and will concerning things created and their order are the same1 in respect to his essence and perfection1 however they be conceived4 ,further1 all the philosophers whom ,i have read admit that ,god's intellect is entirely actual1 and not at all potential2 as they also admit that ,god's intellect1 and ,god's will1 and ,god's essence are identical1 it follows that1 if ,god had had a different actual intellect and a different will1 his essence would also have been different2 and thus1 as ,i concluded at first1 if things had been brought into being by ,god in a different way from that which has obtained1 ,god's intellect and will1 that is 7as is admitted7 his essence would perforce have been different1 which is absurd4 ,as these things could not have been brought into being by ,god in any but the actual way and order which has obtained2 and as the truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection of ,god2 we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to believe that ,god did not wish to create all the things which were in his intellect1 and to create them in the same perfection as he had understood them4 ,but1 it will be said1 there is in things no perfection nor imperfection2 that which is in them1 and which causes them to be called perfect or imperfect1 good or bad1 depends solely on the will of ,god4 ,if ,god had so willed1 he might have brought it about that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection1 and vice vers4 ,what is such an assertion1 but an open declaration that ,god1 who necessarily understands that which he wishes1 might bring it about by his will1 that he should understand things differently from the way in which he does understand them8 ,this 7as we have just shown7 is the height of absurdity4 ,wherefore1 ,i may turn the argument against its employers1 as follows3--,all things depend on the power of ,god4 ,in order that things should be different from what they are1 ,god's will would necessarily have to be different4 ,but ,god's will cannot be different 7as we have just most clearly demonstrated7 from ,god's perfection4 ,therefore neither can things be different4 ,i confess1 that the theory which subjects all things to the will of an indifferent deity1 and asserts that they are all dependent on his fiat1 is less far from the truth than the theory of those1 who maintain that ,god acts in all things with a view of promoting what is good4 ,for these latter persons seem to set up something beyond ,god1 which does not depend on ,god1 but which ,god in acting looks to as an exemplar1 or which he aims at as a definite goal4 ,this is only another name for subjecting ,god to the dominion of destiny1 an utter absurdity in respect to ,god1 whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of their existence4 ,i need1 therefore1 spend no time in refuting such wild theories4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxiv4 ,god's power is identical with his essence4 ,proof4--,from the sole necessity of the essence of ,god it follows that ,god is the cause of himself 7,prop4 xi47 and of all things 7,prop4 xvi4 and ,coroll474 ,wherefore the power of ,god1 by which he and all things are and act1 is identical with his essence4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxv4 ,whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of ,god1 necessarily exists4 ,proof4--,whatsoever is in ,god's power1 must 7by the last ,prop47 be comprehended in his essence in such a manner1 that it necessarily follows therefrom1 and therefore necessarily exists4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxvi4 ,there is no cause from whose nature some effect does not follow4 ,proof4--,whatsoever exists expresses ,god's nature or essence in a given conditioned manner 7by ,prop4 xxv41 ,coroll472 that is1 7by ,prop4 xxxiv471 whatsoever exists1 expresses in a given conditioned manner ,god's power1 which is the cause of all things1 therefore an effect must 7by ,prop4 xvi47 necessarily follow4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,appendix3 ,in the foregoing ,i have explained the nature and properties of ,god4 ,i have shown that he necessarily exists1 that he is one3 that he is1 and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature2 that he is the free cause of all things1 and how he is so2 that all things are in ,god1 and so depend on him1 that without him they could neither exist nor be conceived2 lastly1 that all things are predetermined by ,god1 not through his free will or absolute fiat1 but from the very nature of ,god or infinite power4 ,i have further1 where occasion afforded1 taken care to remove the prejudices1 which might impede the comprehension of my demonstrations4 ,yet there still remain misconceptions not a few1 which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things1 as ,i have explained it above4 ,i have therefore thought it worth while to bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason4 ,all such opinions spring from the notion commonly entertained1 that all things in nature act as men themselves act1 namely1 with an end in view4 ,it is accepted as certain1 that ,god himself directs all things to a definite goal 7for it is said that ,god made all things for man1 and man that he might worship him74 ,i will1 therefore1 consider this opinion1 asking first1 why it obtains general credence1 and why all men are naturally so prone to adopt it8 secondly1 ,i will point out its falsity2 and1 lastly1 ,i will show how it has given rise to prejudices about good and bad1 right and wrong1 praise and blame1 order and confusion1 beauty and ugliness1 and the like4 ,however1 this is not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of the human mind3 it will be sufficient here1 if ,i assume as a starting point1 what ought to be universally admitted1 namely1 that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things1 that all have the desire to seek for what is useful to them1 and that they are conscious of such desire4 ,herefrom it follows1 first1 that men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires1 and never even dream1 in their ignorance1 of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire4 ,secondly1 that men do all things for an end1 namely1 for that which is useful to them1 and which they seek4 ,thus it comes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of events1 and when these are learned1 they are content1 as having no cause for further doubt4 ,if they cannot learn such causes from external sources1 they are compelled to turn to considering themselves1 and reflecting what end would have induced them personally to bring about the given event1 and thus they necessarily judge other natures by their own4 ,further1 as they find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist them not a little in the search for what is useful1 for instance1 eyes for seeing1 teeth for chewing1 herbs and animals for yielding food1 the sun for giving light1 the sea for breeding fish1 c41 they come to look on the whole of nature as a means for obtaining such conveniences4 ,now as they are aware1 that they found these conveniences and did not make them1 they think they have cause for believing1 that some other being has made them for their use4 ,as they look upon things as means1 they cannot believe them to be self--created2 but1 judging from the means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves1 they are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe endowed with human freedom1 who have arranged and adapted everything for human use4 ,they are bound to estimate the nature of such rulers 7having no information on the subject7 in accordance with their own nature1 and therefore they assert that the gods ordained everything for the use of man1 in order to bind man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor4 ,hence also it follows1 that everyone thought out for himself1 according to his abilities1 a different way of worshipping ,god1 so that ,god might love him more than his fellows1 and direct the whole course of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice4 ,thus the prejudice developed into superstition1 and took deep root in the human mind2 and for this reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain the final causes of things2 but in their endeavor to show that nature does nothing in vain1 i4e4 nothing which is useless to man1 they only seem to have demonstrated that nature1 the gods1 and men are all mad together4 ,consider1 ,i pray you1 the result3 among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some hindrances1 such as storms1 earthquakes1 diseases1 c43 so they declared that such things happen1 because the gods are angry at some wrong done to them by men1 or at some fault committed in their worship4 ,experience day by day protested and showed by infinite examples1 that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of pious and impious alike2 still they would not abandon their inveterate prejudice1 for it was more easy for them to class such contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were ignorant1 and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of ignorance1 than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning and start afresh4 ,they therefore laid down as an axiom1 that ,god's judgments far transcend human understanding4 ,such a doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the human race for all eternity1 if mathematics had not furnished another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and properties of figures without regard to their final causes4 ,there are other reasons 7which ,i need not mention here7 besides mathematics1 which might have caused men's minds to be directed to these general prejudices1 and have led them to the knowledge of the truth4 ,i have now sufficiently explained my first point4 ,there is no need to show at length1 that nature has no particular goal in view1 and that final causes are mere human figments4 ,this1 ,i think1 is already evident enough1 both from the causes and foundations on which ,i have shown such prejudice to be based1 and also from ,prop4 xvi41 and the ,corollary of ,prop4 xxxii41 and1 in fact1 all those propositions in which ,i have shown1 that everything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity1 and with the utmost perfection4 ,however1 ,i will add a few remarks1 in order to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly4 ,that which is really a cause it considers as an effect1 and vice vers3 it makes that which is by nature first to be last1 and that which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect4 ,passing over the questions of cause and priority as self--evident1 it is plain from ,props4 xxi41 xxii41 xxiii4 that the effect is most perfect which is produced immediately by ,god2 the effect which requires for its production several intermediate causes is1 in that respect1 more imperfect4 ,but if those things which were made immediately by ,god were made to enable him to attain his end1 then the things which come after1 for the sake of which the first were made1 are necessarily the most excellent of all4 ,further1 this doctrine does away with the perfection of ,god3 for1 if ,god acts for an object1 he necessarily desires something which he lacks4 ,certainly1 theologians and metaphysicians draw a distinction between the object of want and the object of assimilation2 still they confess that ,god made all things for the sake of himself1 not for the sake of creation4 ,they are unable to point to anything prior to creation1 except ,god himself1 as an object for which ,god should act1 and are therefore driven to admit 7as they clearly must71 that ,god lacked those things for whose attainment he created means1 and further that he desired them4 ,we must not omit to notice that the followers of this doctrine1 anxious to display their talent in assigning final causes1 have imported a new method of argument in proof of their theory--namely1 a reduction1 not to the impossible1 but to ignorance2 thus showing that they have no other method of exhibiting their doctrine4 ,for example1 if a stone falls from a roof on to someone's head1 and kills him1 they will demonstrate by their new method1 that the stone fell in order to kill the man2 for1 if it had not by ,god's will fallen with that object1 how could so many circumstances 7and there are often many concurrent circumstances7 have all happened together by chance8 ,perhaps you will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was blowing1 and the man was walking that way4 ,but why1 they will insist1 was the wind blowing1 and why was the man at that very time walking that way8 ,if you again answer1 that the wind had then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day before1 the weather being previously calm1 and that the man had been invited by a friend1 they will again insist3 ,but why was the sea agitated1 and why was the man invited at that time8 ,so they will pursue their questions from cause to cause1 till at last you take refuge in the will of ,god--in other words1 the sanctuary of ignorance4 ,so1 again1 when they survey the frame of the human body1 they are amazed2 and being ignorant of the causes of so great a work of art1 conclude that it has been fashioned1 not mechanically1 but by divine and supernatural skill1 and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt another4 ,hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles1 and strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being1 and not to gaze at them like a fool1 is set down and denounced as an impious heretic by those1 whom the masses adore as the interpreters of nature and the gods4 ,such persons know that1 with the removal of ignorance1 the wonder which forms their only available means for proving and preserving their authority would vanish also4 ,but ,i now quit this subject1 and pass on to my third point4 ,after men persuaded themselves1 that everything which is created is created for their sake1 they were bound to consider as the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to themselves1 and to account those things the best of all which have the most beneficial effect on mankind4 ,further1 they were bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature of things1 such as goodness1 badness1 order1 confusion1 warmth1 cold1 beauty1 deformity1 and so on2 and from the belief that they are free agents arose the further notions of praise and blame1 sin and merit4 ,i will speak of these latter hereafter1 when ,i treat of human nature2 the former ,i will briefly explain here4 ,everything which conduces to health and the worship of ,god they have called good1 everything which hinders these objects they have styled bad2 and inasmuch as those who do not understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any way1 but merely imagine them after a fashion1 and mistake their imagination for understanding1 such persons firmly believe that there is an order in things1 being really ignorant both of things and their own nature4 ,when phenomena are of such a kind1 that the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of imagination1 and can consequently be easily remembered1 we say that they are well--ordered2 if the contrary1 that they are ill--ordered or confused4 ,further1 as things which are easily imagined are more pleasing to us1 men prefer order to confusion--as though there were any order in nature1 except in relation to our imagination--and say that ,god has created all things in order2 thus1 without knowing it1 attributing imagination to ,god1 unless1 indeed1 they would have it that ,god foresaw human imagination1 and arranged everything1 so that it should be most easily imagined4 ,if this be their theory1 they would not1 perhaps1 be daunted by the fact that we find an infinite number of phenomena1 far surpassing our imagination1 and very many others which confound its weakness4 ,but enough has been said on this subject4 ,the other abstract notions are nothing but modes of imagining1 in which the imagination is differently affected3 though they are considered by the ignorant as the chief attributes of things1 inasmuch as they believe that everything was created for the sake of themselves2 and1 according as they are affected by it1 style it good or bad1 healthy or rotten and corrupt4 ,for instance1 if the motion which objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health1 the objects causing it are styled beautiful2 if a contrary motion be excited1 they are styled ugly4 ,things which are perceived through our sense of smell are styled fragrant or fetid2 if through our taste1 sweet or bitter1 full--flavored or insipid2 if through our touch1 hard or soft1 rough or smooth1 c4 ,whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise1 sound1 or harmony4 ,in this last case1 there are men lunatic enough to believe1 that even ,god himself takes pleasure in harmony2 and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded themselves1 that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to harmony--all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone judges of things according to the state of his brain1 or rather mistakes for things the forms of his imagination4 ,we need no longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we have witnessed1 and finally skepticism3 for1 although human bodies in many respects agree1 yet in very many others they differ2 so that what seems good to one seems bad to another2 what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another2 what is pleasing to one displeases another1 and so on4 ,i need not further enumerate1 because this is not the place to treat the subject at length1 and also because the fact is sufficiently well known4 ,it is commonly said3 ,so many men1 so many minds2 everyone is wise in his own way2 brains differ as completely as palates4 ,all of which proverbs show1 that men judge of things according to their mental disposition1 and rather imagine than understand3 for1 if they understood phenomena1 they would1 as mathematicians attest1 be convinced1 if not attracted1 by what ,i have urged4 ,we have now perceived1 that all the explanations commonly given of nature are mere modes of imagining1 and do not indicate the true nature of anything1 but only the constitution of the imagination2 and1 although they have names1 as though they were entities1 existing externally to the imagination1 ,i call them entities imaginary rather than real2 and1 therefore1 all arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily rebutted4 ,many argue in this way4 ,if all things follow from a necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of ,god1 why are there so many imperfections in nature8 such1 for instance1 as things corrupt to the point of putridity1 loathsome deformity1 confusion1 evil1 sin1 c4 ,but these reasoners are1 as ,i have said1 easily confuted1 for the perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature and power2 things are not more or less perfect1 according as they delight or offend human senses1 or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to mankind4 ,to those who ask why ,god did not so create all men1 that they should be governed only by reason1 ,i give no answer but this3 because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest to lowest2 or1 more strictly1 because the laws of his nature are so vast1 as to suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite intelligence1 as ,i have shown in ,prop4 xvi4 ,such are the misconceptions ,i have undertaken to note2 if there are any more of the same sort1 everyone may easily dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection4 ,part ,,ii4 ,,on ,,the ,,nature ,,and ,,origin ,,of ,,the ,,mind ,,preface ,i now pass on to explaining the results1 which must necessarily follow from the essence of ,god1 or of the eternal and infinite being2 not1 indeed1 all of them 7for we proved in ,part i41 ,prop4 xvi41 that an infinite number must follow in an infinite number of ways71 but only those which are able to lead us1 as it were by the hand1 to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness4 ,,definitions ,,definition ,i4 ,by body ,i mean a mode which expresses in a certain determinate manner the essence of ,god1 in so far as he is considered as an extended thing4 7,see ,pt4 i41 ,prop4 xxv41 ,coroll47 ,,definition ,,ii4 ,i consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that1 which being given1 the thing is necessarily given also1 and1 which being removed1 the thing is necessarily removed also2 in other words1 that without which the thing1 and which itself without the thing1 can neither be nor be conceived4 ,,definition ,,iii4 ,by idea1 ,i mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a thinking thing4 ,explanation4--,i say conception rather than perception1 because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in respect to the object2 whereas conception seems to express an activity of the mind4 ,,definition ,,iv4 ,by an adequate idea1 ,i mean an idea which1 in so far as it is considered in itself1 without relation to the object1 has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea4 ,explanation4--,i say intrinsic1 in order to exclude that mark which is extrinsic1 namely1 the agreement between the idea and its object 7ideatum74 ,,definition ,v4 ,duration is the indefinite continuance of existing4 ,explanation4--,i say indefinite1 because it cannot be determined through the existence itself of the existing thing1 or by its efficient cause1 which necessarily gives the existence of the thing1 but does not take it away4 ,,definition ,,vi4 ,reality and perfection ,i use as synonymous terms4 ,,definition ,,vii4 ,by particular things1 ,i mean things which are finite and have a conditioned existence2 but if several individual things concur in one action1 so as to be all simultaneously the effect of one cause1 ,i consider them all1 so far1 as one particular thing4 ,,axioms ,i4 ,the essence of man does not involve necessary existence1 that is1 it may1 in the order of nature1 come to pass that this or that man does or does not exist4 ,,ii4 ,man thinks4 ,,iii4 ,modes of thinking1 such as love1 desire1 or any other of the passions1 do not take place1 unless there be in the same individual an idea of the thing loved1 desired1 c4 ,but the idea can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking4 ,,iv4 ,we perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways4 ,v4 ,we feel and perceive no particular things1 save bodies and modes of thought4 ,n4,b4 ,the ,postulates are given after the conclusion of ,prop4 xiii4 ,,propositions ,,prop4 ,i4 ,thought is an attribute of ,god1 or ,god is a thinking thing4 ,proof4--,particular thoughts1 or this and that thought1 are modes which1 in a certain conditioned manner1 express the nature of ,god 7,pt4 i41 ,prop4 xxv41 ,coroll474 ,god therefore possesses the attribute 7,pt4 i41 ,def4 v47 of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts1 which latter are conceived thereby4 ,thought1 therefore1 is one of the infinite attributes of ,god1 which express ,god's eternal and infinite essence 7,pt4 i41 ,def4 vi474 ,in other words1 ,god is a thinking thing4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,this proposition is also evident from the fact1 that we are able to conceive an infinite thinking being4 ,for1 in proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more thoughts1 so is it conceived as containing more reality or perfection4 ,therefore a being1 which can think an infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways1 is1 necessarily1 in respect of thinking1 infinite4 ,as1 therefore1 from the consideration of thought alone1 we conceive an infinite being1 thought is necessarily 7,pt4 i41 ,deff4 iv4 and vi47 one of the infinite attributes of ,god1 as we were desirous of showing4 ,,prop4 ,,ii4 ,extension is an attribute of ,god1 or ,god is an extended thing4 ,proof4--,the proof of this proposition is similar to that of the last4 ,,prop4 ,,iii4 ,in ,god there is necessarily the idea not only of his essence1 but also of all things which necessarily follow from his essence4 ,proof4--,god 7by the first ,prop4 of this ,part7 can think an infinite number of things in infinite ways1 or 7what is the same thing1 by ,prop4 xvi41 ,part i47 can form the idea of his essence1 and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom4 ,now all that is in the power of ,god necessarily is 7,pt4 i41 ,prop4 xxxv474 ,therefore1 such an idea as we are considering necessarily is1 and in ,god alone4 ,q4,e4,d4 7,part i41 ,prop4 xv47 ,note4--,the multitude understand by the power of ,god the free will of ,god1 and the right over all things that exist1 which latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent4 ,for it is said that ,god has the power to destroy all things1 and to reduce them to nothing4 ,further1 the power of ,god is very often likened to the power of kings4 ,but this doctrine we have refuted 7,pt4 i41 ,prop4 xxxii41 ,corolls4 i4 and ii471 and we have shown 7,part i41 ,prop4 xvi47 that ,god acts by the same necessity1 as that by which he understands himself2 in other words1 as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature 7as all admit71 that ,god understands himself1 so also does it follow by the same necessity1 that ,god performs infinite acts in infinite ways4 ,we further showed 7,part i41 ,prop4 xxxiv471 that ,god's power is identical with ,god's essence in action2 therefore it is as impossible for us to conceive ,god as not acting1 as to conceive him as non--existent4 ,if we might pursue the subject further1 ,i could point out1 that the power which is commonly attributed to ,god is not only human 7as showing that ,god is conceived by the multitude as a man1 or in the likeness of a man71 but involves a negation of power4 ,however1 ,i am unwilling to go over the same ground so often4 ,i would only beg the reader again and again1 to turn over frequently in his mind what ,i have said in ,part ,i from ,prop4 xvi4 to the end4 ,no one will be able to follow my meaning1 unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the power of ,god with the human power and right of kings4 ,,prop4 ,,iv4 ,the idea of ,god1 from which an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways1 can only be one4 ,proof4--,infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the attributes of ,god and his modifications 7,part i41 ,prop4 xxx474 ,now ,god is one 7,part i41 ,prop4 xiv41 ,coroll474 ,therefore the idea of ,god1 wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways1 can only be one4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,v4 ,the actual being of ideas owns ,god as its cause1 only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing1 not in so far as he is unfolded in any other attribute2 that is1 the ideas both of the attributes of ,god and of particular things do not own as their efficient cause their objects 7ideata7 or the things perceived1 but ,god himself in so far as he is a thinking thing4 ,proof4--,this proposition is evident from ,prop4 iii4 of this ,part4 ,we there drew the conclusion1 that ,god can form the idea of his essence1 and of all things which follow necessarily therefrom1 solely because he is a thinking thing1 and not because he is the object of his own idea4 ,wherefore the actual being of ideas owns for cause ,god1 in so far as he is a thinking thing4 ,it may be differently proved as follows3 the actual being of ideas is 7obviously7 a mode of thought1 that is 7,part i41 ,prop4 xxv41 ,coroll47 a mode which expresses in a certain manner the nature of ,god1 in so far as he is a thinking thing1 and therefore 7,part i41 ,prop4 x47 involves the conception of no other attribute of ,god1 and consequently 7by ,part i41 ,ax4 iv47 is not the effect of any attribute save thought4 ,therefore the actual being of ideas owns ,god as its cause1 in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,vi4 ,the modes of any given attribute are caused by ,god1 in so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they are modes1 and not in so far as he is considered through any other attribute4 ,proof4--,each attribute is conceived through itself1 without any other 7,part i41 ,prop4 x472 wherefore the modes of each attribute involve the conception of that attribute1 but not of any other4 ,thus 7,part i41 ,ax4 iv47 they are caused by ,god1 only in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes they are1 and not in so far as he is considered through any other4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,hence the actual being of things1 which are not modes of thought1 does not follow from the divine nature1 because that nature has prior knowledge of the things4 ,things represented in ideas follow1 and are derived from their particular attribute1 in the same manner1 and with the same necessity as ideas follow 7according to what we have shown7 from the attribute of thought4 ,,prop4 ,,vii4 ,the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things4 ,proof4--,this proposition is evident from ,part i41 ,ax4 iv4 ,for the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of the cause1 whereof it is an effect4 ,corollary4--,hence ,god's power of thinking is equal to his realized power of action--that is1 whatsoever follows from the infinite nature of ,god in the world of extension 7formaliter71 follows without exception in the same order and connection from the idea of ,god in the world of thought 7objective74 ,note4--,before going any further1 ,i wish to recall to mind what has been pointed out above--namely1 that whatsoever can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance1 belongs altogether only to one substance3 consequently1 substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance1 comprehended now through one attribute1 now through the other4 ,so1 also1 a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing1 though expressed in two ways4 ,this truth seems to have been dimly recognized by those ,jews who maintained that ,god1 ,god's intellect1 and the things understood by ,god are identical4 ,for instance1 a circle existing in nature1 and the idea of a circle existing1 which is also in ,god1 are one and the same thing displayed through different attributes4 ,thus1 whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension1 or under the attribute of thought1 or under any other attribute1 we shall find the same order1 or one and the same chain of causes--that is1 the same things following in either case4 ,i said that ,god is the cause of an idea--for instance1 of the idea of a circle1--in so far as he is a thinking thing2 and of a circle1 in so far as he is an extended thing1 simply because the actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a proximate cause through another mode of thinking1 and that again through another1 and so on to infinity2 so that1 so long as we consider things as modes of thinking1 we must explain the order of the whole of nature1 or the whole chain of causes1 through the attribute of thought only4 ,and1 in so far as we consider things as modes of extension1 we must explain the order of the whole of nature through the attributes of extension only2 and so on1 in the case of the other attributes4 ,wherefore of things as they are in themselves ,god is really the cause1 inasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes4 ,i cannot for the present explain my meaning more clearly4 ,,prop4 ,,viii4 ,the ideas of particular things1 or of modes1 that do not exist1 must be comprehended in the infinite idea of ,god1 in the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes are contained in the attributes of ,god4 ,proof4--,this proposition is evident from the last2 it is understood more clearly from the preceding note4 ,corollary4--,hence1 so long as particular things do not exist1 except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of ,god1 their representations in thought or ideas do not exist1 except in so far as the infinite idea of ,god exists2 and when particular things are said to exist1 not only in so far as they are involved in the attributes of ,god1 but also in so far as they are said to continue1 their ideas will also involve existence1 through which they are said to continue4 ,note4--,if anyone desires an example to throw more light on this question1 ,i shall1 ,i fear1 not be able to give him any1 which adequately explains the thing of which ,i here speak1 inasmuch as it is unique2 however1 ,i will endeavour to illustrate it as far as possible4 ,the nature of a circle is such that if any number of straight lines intersect within it1 the rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another2 thus1 infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle4 ,yet none of these rectangles can be said to exist1 except in so far as the circle exists2 nor can the idea of any of these rectangles be said to exist1 except in so far as they are comprehended in the idea of the circle4 ,let us grant that1 from this infinite number of rectangles1 two only exist4 ,the ideas of these two not only exist1 in so far as they are contained in the idea of the circle1 but also as they involve the existence of those rectangles2 wherefore they are distinguished from the remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles4 ,,prop4 ,,ix4 ,the idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused by ,god1 not in so far as he is infinite1 but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually existing1 of which he is the cause1 in so far as he is affected by a third idea1 and so on to infinity4 ,proof4--,the idea of an individual thing actually existing is an individual mode of thinking1 and is distinct from other modes 7by the ,corollary and note to ,prop4 viii4 of this part72 thus 7by ,prop4 vi4 of this part7 it is caused by ,god1 in so far only as he is a thinking thing4 ,but not 7by ,prop4 xxviii4 of ,part i47 in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely1 only in so far as he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking2 and he is the cause of this latter1 as being affected by a third1 and so on to infinity4 ,now1 the order and connection of ideas is 7by ,prop4 vii4 of this book7 the same as the order and connection of causes4 ,therefore of a given individual idea another individual idea1 or ,god1 in so far as he is considered as modified by that idea1 is the cause2 and of this second idea ,god is the cause1 in so far as he is affected by another idea1 and so on to infinity4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,whatsoever takes place in the individual object of any idea1 the knowledge thereof is in ,god1 in so far only as he has the idea of the object4 ,proof4--,whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea1 its idea is in ,god 7by ,prop4 iii4 of this part71 not in so far as he is infinite1 but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing 7by the last ,prop472 but 7by ,prop4 vii4 of this part7 the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things4 ,the knowledge1 therefore1 of that which takes place in any individual object will be in ,god1 in so far only as he has the idea of that object4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,x4 ,the being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man--in other words1 substance does not constitute the actual being#b of man4 #b ,forma ,proof4--,the being of substance involves necessary existence 7,part i41 ,prop4 vii474 ,if1 therefore1 the being of substance appertains to the essence of man1 substance being granted1 man would necessarily be granted also 7,,ii4 ,def4 ii471 and1 consequently1 man would necessarily exist1 which is absurd 7,,ii4 ,ax4 i474 ,therefore1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,this proposition may also be proved from ,i4v41 in which it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same nature2 for as there may be many men1 the being of substance is not that which constitutes the actual being of man4 ,again1 the proposition is evident from the other properties of substance--namely1 that substance is in its nature infinite1 immutable1 indivisible1 c41 as anyone may see for himself4 ,corollary4--,hence it follows1 that the essence of man is constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of ,god4 ,for 7by the last ,prop47 the being of substance does not belong to the essence of man4 ,that essence therefore 7by i4 #ae7 is something which is in ,god1 and which without ,god can neither be nor be conceived1 whether it be a modification 7i4 #be4 ,coroll471 or a mode which expresses ,god's nature in a certain conditioned manner4 ,note4--,everyone must surely admit1 that nothing can be or be conceived without ,god4 ,all men agree that ,god is the one and only cause of all things1 both of their essence and of their existence2 that is1 ,god is not only the cause of things in respect to their being made 7secundum fieri71 but also in respect to their being 7secundum esse74 ,at the same time many assert1 that that1 without which a thing cannot be nor be conceived1 belongs to the essence of that thing2 wherefore they believe that either the nature of ,god appertains to the essence of created things1 or else that created things can be or be conceived without ,god2 or else1 as is more probably the case1 they hold inconsistent doctrines4 ,i think the cause for such confusion is mainly1 that they do not keep to the proper order of philosophic thinking4 ,the nature of ,god1 which should be reflected on first1 inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of knowledge and the order of nature1 they have taken to be last in the order of knowledge1 and have put into the first place what they call the objects of sensation2 hence1 while they are considering natural phenomena1 they give no attention at all to the divine nature1 and1 when afterwards they apply their mind to the study of the divine nature1 they are quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses1 with which they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena1 inasmuch as such hypotheses are no help towards understanding the divine nature4 ,so that it is hardly to be wondered at1 that these persons contradict themselves freely4 ,however1 ,i pass over this point4 ,my intention here was only to give a reason for not saying1 that that1 without which a thing cannot be or be conceived1 belongs to the essence of that thing3 individual things cannot be or be conceived without ,god1 yet ,god does not appertain to their essence4 ,i said that ,i considered as belonging to the essence of a thing that1 which being given1 the thing is necessarily given also1 and which being removed1 the thing is necessarily removed also2 or that without which the thing1 and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be conceived4 7,,ii4 ,def4 ii47 ,,prop4 ,,xi4 ,the first element1 which constitutes the actual being of the human mind1 is the idea of some particular thing actually existing4 ,proof4--,the essence of man 7by the ,coroll4 of the last ,prop47 is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of ,god1 namely 7by ,,ii4 ,ax4 ii471 by the modes of thinking1 of all which 7by ,,ii4 ,ax4 iii47 the idea is prior in nature1 and1 when the idea is given1 the other modes 7namely1 those of which the idea is prior in nature7 must be in the same individual 7by the same ,axiom74 ,therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human mind4 ,but not the idea of a non--existent thing1 for then 7,,ii4 viii4 ,coroll47 the idea itself cannot be said to exist2 it must therefore be the idea of something actually existing4 ,but not of an infinite thing4 ,for an infinite thing 7,i4 xxi41 xxii471 must always necessarily exist2 this would 7by ,,ii4 ,ax4 i47 involve an absurdity4 ,therefore the first element1 which constitutes the actual being of the human mind1 is the idea of something actually existing4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,hence it follows1 that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of ,god2 thus when we say1 that the human mind perceives this or that1 we make the assertion1 that ,god has this or that idea1 not in so far as he is infinite1 but in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind1 or in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind2 and when we say that ,god has this or that idea1 not only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind1 but also in so far as he1 simultaneously with the human mind1 has the further idea of another thing1 we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in part or inadequately4 ,note4--,here1 ,i doubt not1 readers will come to a stand1 and will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate2 ,i therefore beg them to accompany me slowly1 step by step1 and not to pronounce on my statements1 till they have read to the end4 ,,prop4 ,,xii4 ,whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea1 which constitutes the human mind1 must be perceived by the human mind1 or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the said occurrence4 ,that is1 if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be a body1 nothing can take place in that body without being perceived by the mind4 ,proof4--,whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea1 the knowledge thereof is necessarily in ,god 7,,ii4 ix4 ,coroll471 in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said object1 that is 7,,ii4 xi471 in so far as he constitutes the mind of anything4 ,therefore1 whatsoever takes place in the object constituting the idea of the human mind1 the knowledge thereof is necessarily in ,god1 in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind2 that is 7by ,,ii4 xi4 ,coroll47 the knowledge of the said thing will necessarily be in the mind1 in other words the mind perceives it4 ,note4--,this proposition is also evident1 and is more clearly to be understood from ,,ii4 vii41 which see4 ,,prop4 ,,xiii4 ,the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body1 in other words a certain mode of extension which actually exists1 and nothing else4 ,proof4--,if indeed the body were not the object of the human mind1 the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in ,god 7,,ii4 ix4 ,coroll47 in virtue of his constituting our mind1 but in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else2 that is 7,,ii4 xi4 ,coroll47 the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in our mind3 now 7by ,,ii4 ,ax4 iv47 we do possess the idea of the modifications of the body4 ,therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body1 and the body as it actually exists 7,,ii4 xi474 ,further1 if there were any other object of the idea constituting the mind besides body1 then1 as nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow 7,i4 xxxvi47 there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea1 which would be the effect of that other object 7,,ii4 xi472 but 7,i4 ,ax4 v47 there is no such idea4 ,wherefore the object of our mind is the body as it exists1 and nothing else4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,we thus comprehend1 not only that the human mind is united to the body1 but also the nature of the union between mind and body4 ,however1 no one will be able to grasp this adequately or distinctly1 unless he first has adequate knowledge of the nature of our body4 ,the propositions we have advanced hitherto have been entirely general1 applying not more to men than to other individual things1 all of which1 though in different degrees1 are animated4#c ,for of everything there is necessarily an idea in ,god1 of which ,god is the cause1 in the same way as there is an idea of the human body2 thus whatever we have asserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be asserted of the idea of everything else4 ,still1 on the other hand1 we cannot deny that ideas1 like objects1 differ one from the other1 one being more excellent than another and containing more reality1 just as the object of one idea is more excellent than the object of another idea1 and contains more reality4 #c ,animata ,wherefore1 in order to determine1 wherein the human mind differs from other things1 and wherein it surpasses them1 it is necessary for us to know the nature of its object1 that is1 of the human body4 ,what this nature is1 ,i am not able here to explain1 nor is it necessary for the proof of what ,i advance1 that ,i should do so4 ,i will only say generally1 that in proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing many actions or receiving many impressions at once1 so also is the mind1 of which it is the object1 more fitted than others for forming many simultaneous perceptions2 and the more the actions of the body depend on itself alone1 and the fewer other bodies concur with it in action1 the more fitted is the mind of which it is the object for distinct comprehension4 ,we may thus recognize the superiority of one mind over others1 and may further see the cause1 why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body1 and also many kindred questions1 which ,i will1 in the following propositions1 deduce from what has been advanced4 ,wherefore ,i have thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my present statements4 ,in order to do so1 ,i must premise a few propositions concerning the nature of bodies4 ,,axiom ,i4 ,all bodies are either in motion or at rest4 ,,axiom ,,ii4 ,every body is moved sometimes more slowly1 sometimes more quickly4 ,,lemma ,i4 ,bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of motion and rest1 quickness and slowness1 and not in respect of substance4 ,proof4--,the first part of this proposition is1 ,i take it1 self--evident4 ,that bodies are not distinguished in respect of substance1 is plain both from ,i4 v4 and ,i4 viii4 ,it is brought out still more clearly from ,i4 xv1 note4 ,,lemma ,,ii4 ,all bodies agree in certain respects4 ,proof4--,all bodies agree in the fact1 that they involve the conception of one and the same attribute 7,,ii41 ,def4 i474 ,further1 in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly1 and may be absolutely in motion or at rest4 ,,lemma ,,iii4 ,a body in motion or at rest must be determined to motion or rest by another body1 which other body has been determined to motion or rest by a third body1 and that third again by a fourth1 and so on to infinity4 ,proof4--,bodies are individual things 7,,ii41 ,def4 i471 which 7,lemma ,i47 are distinguished one from the other in respect to motion and rest2 thus 7,i4 xxviii47 each must necessarily be determined to motion or rest by another individual thing1 namely 7,,ii4 vi471 by another body1 which other body is also 7,ax4 i47 in motion or at rest4 ,and this body again can only have been set in motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to motion or rest4 ,this third body again by a fourth1 and so on to infinity4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,hence it follows1 that a body in motion keeps in motion1 until it is determined to a state of rest by some other body2 and a body at rest remains so1 until it is determined to a state of motion by some other body4 ,this is indeed self--evident4 ,for when ,i suppose1 for instance1 that a given body1 ,a1 is at rest1 and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion1 ,i cannot affirm anything concerning the body ,a1 except that it is at rest4 ,if it afterwards comes to pass that ,a is in motion1 this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest1 for no other consequence could have been involved than its remaining at rest4 ,if1 on the other hand1 ,a be given in motion1 we shall1 so long as we only consider ,a1 be unable to affirm anything concerning it1 except that it is in motion4 ,if ,a is subsequently found to be at rest1 this rest cannot be the result of ,a's previous motion1 for such motion can only have led to continued motion2 the state of rest therefore must have resulted from something1 which was not in ,a1 namely1 from an external cause determining ,a to a state of rest4 ,axiom ,i4--,all modes1 wherein one body is affected by another body1 follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected and the body affecting2 so that one and the same body may be moved in different modes1 according to the difference in the nature of the bodies moving it2 on the other hand1 different bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body4 ,axiom ,,ii4--,when a body in motion impinges on another body at rest1 which it is unable to move1 it recoils1 in order to continue its motion1 and the angle made by the line of motion in the recoil and the plane of the body at rest1 whereon the moving body has impinged1 will be equal to the angle formed by the line of motion of incidence and the same plane4 ,so far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies1 which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and rest1 quickness and slowness4 ,we now pass on to compound bodies4 ,definition4--,when any given bodies of the same or different magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact1 or if they be moved at the same or different rates of speed1 so that their mutual movements should preserve among themselves a certain fixed relation1 we say that such bodies are in union1 and that together they compose one body or individual1 which is distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union4 ,axiom ,,iii4--,in proportion as the parts of an individual1 or a compound body1 are in contact over a greater or less superficies1 they will with greater or less difficulty admit of being moved from their position2 consequently the individual will1 with greater or less difficulty1 be brought to assume another form4 ,those bodies1 whose parts are in contact over large superficies1 are called hard2 those1 whose parts are in contact over small superficies1 are called soft2 those1 whose parts are in motion among one another1 are called fluid4 ,,lemma ,,iv4 ,if from a body or individual1 compounded of several bodies1 certain bodies be separated1 and if1 at the same time1 an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take their place1 the individual will preserve its nature as before1 without any change in its actuality 7forma74 ,proof4--,bodies 7,lemma i47 are not distinguished in respect of substance3 that which constitutes the actuality 7formam7 of an individual consists 7by the last ,def47 in a union of bodies2 but this union1 although there is a continual change of bodies1 will 7by our hypothesis7 be maintained2 the individual1 therefore1 will retain its nature as before1 both in respect of substance and in respect of mode4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,lemma ,v4 ,if the parts composing an individual become greater or less1 but in such proportion1 that they all preserve the same mutual relations of motion and rest1 the individual will still preserve its original nature1 and its actuality will not be changed4 ,proof4--,the same as for the last ,lemma4 ,,lemma ,,vi4 ,if certain bodies composing an individual be compelled to change the motion1 which they have in one direction1 for motion in another direction1 but in such a manner1 that they be able to continue their motions and their mutual communication in the same relations as before1 the individual will retain its own nature without any change of its actuality4 ,proof4--,this proposition is self--evident1 for the individual is supposed to retain all that1 which1 in its definition1 we spoke of as its actual being4 ,,lemma ,,vii4 ,furthermore1 the individual thus composed preserves its nature1 whether it be1 as a whole1 in motion or at rest1 whether it be moved in this or that direction2 so long as each part retains its motion1 and preserves its communication with other parts as before4 ,proof4--,this proposition is evident from the definition of an individual prefixed to ,lemma iv4 ,note4--,we thus see1 how a composite individual may be affected in many different ways1 and preserve its nature notwithstanding4 ,thus far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodies only distinguished one from the other in respect of motion and rest1 speed and slowness2 that is1 of bodies of the most simple character4 ,if1 however1 we now conceive another individual composed of several individuals of diverse natures1 we shall find that the number of ways in which it can be affected1 without losing its nature1 will be greatly multiplied4 ,each of its parts would consist of several bodies1 and therefore 7by ,lemma vi47 each part would admit1 without change to its nature1 of quicker or slower motion1 and would consequently be able to transmit its motions more quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts4 ,if we further conceive a third kind of individuals composed of individuals of this second kind1 we shall find that they may be affected in a still greater number of ways without changing their actuality4 ,we may easily proceed thus to infinity1 and conceive the whole of nature as one individual1 whose parts1 that is1 all bodies1 vary in infinite ways1 without any change in the individual as a whole4 ,i should feel bound to explain and demonstrate this point at more length1 if ,i were writing a special treatise on body4 ,but ,i have already said that such is not my object2 ,i have only touched on the question1 because it enables me to prove easily that which ,i have in view4 ,,postulates ,i4 ,the human body is composed of a number of individual parts1 of diverse nature1 each one of which is in itself extremely complex4 ,,ii4 ,of the individual parts composing the human body some are fluid1 some soft1 some hard4 ,,iii4 ,the individual parts composing the human body1 and consequently the human body itself1 are affected in a variety of ways by external bodies4 ,,iv4 ,the human body stands in need for its preservation of a number of other bodies1 by which it is continually1 so to speak1 regenerated4 ,v4 ,when the fluid part of the human body is determined by an external body to impinge often on another soft part1 it changes the surface of the latter1 and1 as it were1 leaves the impression thereupon of the external body which impels it4 ,,vi4 ,the human body can move external bodies1 and arrange them in a variety of ways4 ,,prop4 ,,xiv4 ,the human mind is capable of perceiving a great number of things1 and is so in proportion as its body is capable of receiving a great number of impressions4 ,proof4--,the human body 7by ,post4 iii4 and vi47 is affected in very many ways by external bodies1 and is capable in very many ways of affecting external bodies4 ,but 7,,ii4 xii47 the human mind must perceive all that takes place in the human body2 the human mind is1 therefore1 capable of perceiving a great number of things1 and is so in proportion1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xv4 ,the idea1 which constitutes the actual being of the human mind1 is not simple1 but compounded of a great number of ideas4 ,proof4--,the idea constituting the actual being of the human mind is the idea of the body 7,,ii4 xiii471 which 7,post4 i47 is composed of a great number of complex individual parts4 ,but there is necessarily in ,god the idea of each individual part whereof the body is composed 7,,ii4 viii4 ,coroll472 therefore 7,,ii4 vii471 the idea of the human body is composed of these numerous ideas of its component parts4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xvi4 ,the idea of every mode1 in which the human body is affected by external bodies1 must involve the nature of the human body1 and also the nature of the external body4 ,proof4--,all the modes1 in which any given body is affected1 follow from the nature of the body affected1 and also from the nature of the affecting body 7by ,ax4 i41 after the ,coroll4 of ,lemma iii471 wherefore their idea also necessarily 7by ,i4 ,ax4 iv47 involves the nature of both bodies2 therefore1 the idea of every mode1 in which the human body is affected by external bodies1 involves the nature of the human body and of the external body4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary ,i4--,hence it follows1 first1 that the human mind perceives the nature of a variety of bodies1 together with the nature of its own4 ,corollary ,,ii4--,it follows1 secondly1 that the ideas1 which we have of external bodies1 indicate rather the constitution of our own body than the nature of external bodies4 ,i have amply illustrated this in the ,appendix to ,part ,i4 ,,prop4 ,,xvii4 ,if the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body1 the human mind will regard the said external body as actually existing1 or as present to itself1 until the human body be affected in such a way1 as to exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body4 ,proof4--,this proposition is self--evident1 for so long as the human body continues to be thus affected1 so long will the human mind 7,,ii4 xii47 regard this modification of the body--that is 7by the last ,prop471 it will have the idea of the mode as actually existing1 and this idea involves the nature of the external body4 ,in other words1 it will have the idea which does not exclude1 but postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the external body2 therefore the mind 7by ,,ii4 xvi41 ,coroll4 i47 will regard the external body as actually existing1 until it is affected1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,the mind is able to regard as present external bodies1 by which the human body has once been affected1 even though they be no longer in existence or present4 ,proof4--,when external bodies determine the fluid parts of the human body1 so that they often impinge on the softer parts1 they change the surface of the last named 7,post4 v472 hence 7,ax4 ii41 after the ,coroll4 of ,lemma iii47 they are refracted therefrom in a different manner from that which they followed before such change2 and1 further1 when afterwards they impinge on the new surfaces by their own spontaneous movement1 they will be refracted in the same manner1 as though they had been impelled towards those surfaces by external bodies2 consequently1 they will1 while they continue to be thus refracted1 affect the human body in the same manner1 whereof the mind 7,,ii4 xii47 will again take cognizance--that is 7,,ii4 xvii471 the mind will again regard the external body as present1 and will do so1 as often as the fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces by their own spontaneous motion4 ,wherefore1 although the external bodies1 by which the human body has once been affected1 be no longer in existence1 the mind will nevertheless regard them as present1 as often as this action of the body is repeated4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,we thus see how it comes about1 as is often the case1 that we regard as present many things which are not4 ,it is possible that the same result may be brought about by other causes2 but ,i think it suffices for me here to have indicated one possible explanation1 just as well as if ,i had pointed out the true cause4 ,indeed1 ,i do not think ,i am very far from the truth1 for all my assumptions are based on postulates1 which rest1 almost without exception1 on experience1 that cannot be controverted by those who have shown1 as we have1 that the human body1 as we feel it1 exists 7,coroll4 after ,,ii4 xiii474 ,furthermore 7,,ii4 vii4 ,coroll41 ,,ii4 xvi4 ,coroll4 ii471 we clearly understand what is the difference between the idea1 say1 of ,peter1 which constitutes the essence of ,peter's mind1 and the idea of the said ,peter1 which is in another man1 say1 ,paul4 ,the former directly answers to the essence of ,peter's own body1 and only implies existence so long as ,peter exists2 the latter indicates rather the disposition of ,paul's body than the nature of ,peter1 and1 therefore1 while this disposition of ,paul's body lasts1 ,paul's mind will regard ,peter as present to itself1 even though he no longer exists4 ,further1 to retain the usual phraseology1 the modifications of the human body1 of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us1 we will call the images of things1 though they do not recall the figure of things4 ,when the mind regards bodies in this fashion1 we say that it imagines4 ,i will here draw attention to the fact1 in order to indicate where error lies1 that the imaginations of the mind1 looked at in themselves1 do not contain error4 ,the mind does not err in the mere act of imagining1 but only in so far as it is regarded as being without the idea1 which excludes the existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it4 ,if the mind1 while imagining non--existent things as present to it1 is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist1 this power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature1 and not to a fault1 especially if this faculty of imagination depend solely on its own nature--that is 7,i4 ,def4 vii471 if this faculty of imagination be free4 ,,prop4 ,,xviii4 ,if the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time1 when the mind afterwards imagines any of them1 it will straightway remember the others also4 ,proof4--,the mind 7,,ii4 xvii4 ,coroll47 imagines any given body1 because the human body is affected and disposed by the impressions from an external body1 in the same manner as it is affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said external body2 but 7by our hypothesis7 the body was then so disposed1 that the mind imagined two bodies at once2 therefore1 it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once1 and the mind1 when it imagines one1 will straightway remember the other4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,we now clearly see what ,memory is4 ,it is simply a certain association of ideas involving the nature of things outside the human body1 which association arises in the mind according to the order and association of the modifications 7affectiones7 of the human body4 ,i say1 first1 it is an association of those ideas only1 which involve the nature of things outside the human body3 not of ideas which answer to the nature of the said things3 ideas of the modifications of the human body are1 strictly speaking 7,,ii4 xvi471 those which involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies4 ,i say1 secondly1 that this association arises according to the order and association of the modifications of the human body1 in order to distinguish it from that association of ideas1 which arises from the order of the intellect1 whereby the mind perceives things through their primary causes1 and which is in all men the same4 ,and hence we can further clearly understand1 why the mind from the thought of one thing1 should straightway arrive at the thought of another thing1 which has no similarity with the first2 for instance1 from the thought of the word pomum 7an apple71 a ,roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple1 which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question1 nor anything in common with it1 except that the body of the man has often been affected by these two things2 that is1 that the man has often heard the word pomum1 while he was looking at the fruit2 similarly every man will go on from one thought to another1 according as his habit has ordered the images of things in his body4 ,for a soldier1 for instance1 when he sees the tracks of a horse in sand1 will at once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman1 and thence to the thought of war1 c42 while a countryman will proceed from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plough1 a field1 c4 ,thus every man will follow this or that train of thought1 according as he has been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images of things in this or that manner4 ,,prop4 ,,xix4 ,the human mind has no knowledge of the body1 and does not know it to exist1 save through the ideas of the modifications whereby the body is affected4 ,proof4--,the human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body 7,,ii4 xiii471 which 7,,ii4 ix47 is in ,god1 in so far as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing actually existing3 or1 inasmuch as 7,post4 iv47 the human body stands in need of very many bodies whereby it is1 as it were1 continually regenerated2 and the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes 7,,ii4 vii472 this idea will therefore be in ,god1 in so far as he is regarded as affected by the ideas of very many particular things4 ,thus ,god has the idea of the human body1 or knows the human body1 in so far as he is affected by very many other ideas1 and not in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind2 that is 7by ,,ii4 xi4 ,coroll471 the human mind does not know the human body4 ,but the ideas of the modifications of body are in ,god1 in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind1 or the human mind perceives those modifications 7,,ii4 xii471 and consequently 7,,ii4 xvi47 the human body itself1 and as actually existing2 therefore the mind perceives thus far only the human body4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xx4 ,the idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in ,god1 following in ,god in the same manner1 and being referred to ,god in the same manner1 as the idea or knowledge of the human body4 ,proof4--,thought is an attribute of ,god 7,,ii4 i472 therefore 7,,ii4 iii47 there must necessarily be in ,god the idea both of thought itself and of all its modifications1 consequently also of the human mind 7,,ii4 xi474 ,further1 this idea or knowledge of the mind does not follow from ,god1 in so far as he is infinite1 but in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual thing 7,,ii4 ix474 ,but 7,,ii4 vii47 the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes2 therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in ,god and is referred to ,god1 in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the body4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxi4 ,this idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind is united to the body4 ,proof4--,that the mind is united to the body we have shown from the fact1 that the body is the object of the mind 7,,ii4 xii4 and xiii472 and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must be united with its object1 that is1 with the mind in the same manner as the mind is united to the body4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,this proposition is comprehended much more clearly from what we have said in the note to ,,ii4 vii4 ,we there showed that the idea of body and body1 that is1 mind and body 7,,ii4 xiii471 are one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute of thought1 now under the attribute of extension2 wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing1 which is conceived under one and the same attribute1 namely1 thought4 ,the idea of the mind1 ,i repeat1 and the mind itself are in ,god by the same necessity and follow from him from the same power of thinking4 ,strictly speaking1 the idea of the mind1 that is1 the idea of an idea1 is nothing but the distinctive quality 7forma7 of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of thought without reference to the object2 if a man knows anything1 he1 by that very fact1 knows that he knows it1 and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it1 and so on to infinity4 ,but ,i will treat of this hereafter4 ,,prop4 ,,xxii4 ,the human mind perceives not only the modifications of the body1 but also the ideas of such modifications4 ,proof4--,the ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in ,god in the same manner1 and are referred to ,god in the same manner1 as the ideas of the said modifications4 ,this is proved in the same way as ,,ii4 xx4 ,but the ideas of the modifications of the body are in the human mind 7,,ii4 xii471 that is1 in ,god1 in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind2 therefore the ideas of these ideas will be in ,god1 in so far as he has the knowledge or idea of the human mind1 that is 7,,ii4 xxi471 they will be in the human mind itself1 which therefore perceives not only the modifications of the body1 but also the ideas of such modifications4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxiii4 ,the mind does not know itself1 except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body4 ,proof4--,the idea or knowledge of the mind 7,,ii4 xx47 follows in ,god in the same manner1 and is referred to ,god in the same manner1 as the idea or knowledge of the body4 ,but since 7,,ii4 xix47 the human mind does not know the human body itself1 that is 7,,ii4 xi4 ,coroll471 since the knowledge of the human body is not referred to ,god1 in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind2 therefore1 neither is the knowledge of the mind referred to ,god1 in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind2 therefore 7by the same ,coroll4 ,,ii4 xi471 the human mind thus far has no knowledge of itself4 ,further the ideas of the modifications1 whereby the body is affected1 involve the nature of the human body itself 7,,ii4 xvi471 that is 7,,ii4 xiii471 they agree with the nature of the mind2 wherefore the knowledge of these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind2 but 7by the last ,prop47 the knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself2 wherefore the human mind thus far only has knowledge of itself4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxiv4 ,the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body4 ,proof4--,the parts composing the human body do not belong to the essence of that body1 except in so far as they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed relation 7,def4 after ,lemma iii471 not in so far as they can be regarded as individuals without relation to the human body4 ,the parts of the human body are highly complex individuals 7,post4 i471 whose parts 7,lemma iv47 can be separated from the human body without in any way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the latter1 and they can communicate their motions 7,ax4 i41 after ,lemma iii47 to other bodies in another relation2 therefore 7,,ii4 iii47 the idea or knowledge of each part will be in ,god1 inasmuch 7,,ii4 ix47 as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing1 which particular thing is prior in the order of nature to the aforesaid part 7,,ii4 vii474 ,we may affirm the same thing of each part of each individual composing the human body2 therefore1 the knowledge of each part composing the human body is in ,god1 in so far as he is affected by very many ideas of things1 and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only1 in other words1 the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind 7,,ii4 xiii72 therefore 7,,ii4 xi4 ,coroll471 the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxv4 ,the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body4 ,proof4--,we have shown that the idea of a modification of the human body involves the nature of an external body1 in so far as that external body conditions the human body in a given manner4 ,but1 in so far as the external body is an individual1 which has no reference to the human body1 the knowledge or idea thereof is in ,god 7,,ii4 ix471 in so far as ,god is regarded as affected by the idea of a further thing1 which 7,,ii4 vii47 is naturally prior to the said external body4 ,wherefore an adequate knowledge of the external body is not in ,god1 in so far as he has the idea of the modification of the human body2 in other words1 the idea of the modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxvi4 ,the human mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing1 except through the ideas of the modifications of its own body4 ,proof4--,if the human body is in no way affected by a given external body1 then 7,,ii4 vii47 neither is the idea of the human body1 in other words1 the human mind1 affected in any way by the idea of the existence of the said external body1 nor does it in any manner perceive its existence4 ,but1 in so far as the human body is affected in any way by a given external body1 thus far 7,,ii4 xvi4 and ,coroll47 it perceives that external body4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,in so far as the human mind imagines an external body1 it has not an adequate knowledge thereof4 ,proof4--,when the human mind regards external bodies through the ideas of the modifications of its own body1 we say that it imagines 7see ,,ii4 xvii4 note72 now the mind can only imagine external bodies as actually existing4 ,therefore 7by ,,ii4 xxv471 in so far as the mind imagines external bodies1 it has not an adequate knowledge of them4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxvii4 ,the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself4 ,proof4--,every idea of a modification of the human body involves the nature of the human body1 in so far as the human body is regarded as affected in a given manner 7,,ii4 xvi474 ,but1 inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected in many other ways1 the idea of the said modification1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxviii4 ,the ideas of the modifications of the human body1 in so far as they have reference only to the human mind1 are not clear and distinct1 but confused4 ,proof4--,the ideas of the modifications of the human body involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies 7,,ii4 xvi472 they must involve the nature not only of the human body but also of its parts2 for the modifications are modes 7,post4 iii471 whereby the parts of the human body1 and1 consequently1 the human body as a whole are affected4 ,but 7by ,,ii4 xxiv41 xxv47 the adequate knowledge of external bodies1 as also of the parts composing the human body1 is not in ,god1 in so far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind1 but in so far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas4 ,these ideas of modifications1 in so far as they are referred to the human mind alone1 are as consequences without premisses1 in other words1 confused ideas4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind is1 in the same manner1 proved not to be1 when considered in itself alone1 clear and distinct2 as also is the case with the idea of the human mind1 and the ideas of the ideas of the modifications of the human body1 in so far as they are referred to the mind only1 as everyone may easily see4 ,,prop4 ,,xxix4 ,the idea of the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind4 ,proof4--,the idea of a modification of the human body 7,,ii4 xxvii47 does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body1 in other words1 does not adequately express its nature2 that is 7,,ii4 xiii47 it does not agree with the nature of the mind adequately2 therefore 7,i4 ,ax4 vi7 the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human mind1 or does not involve an adequate knowledge thereof4 ,corollary4--,hence it follows that the human mind1 when it perceives things after the common order of nature1 has not an adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself1 of its own body1 and of external bodies4 ,for the mind does not know itself1 except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of body 7,,ii4 xxiii474 ,it only perceives its own body 7,,ii4 xix47 through the ideas of the modifications1 and only perceives external bodies through the same means2 thus1 in so far as it has such ideas of modification1 it has not an adequate knowledge of itself 7,,ii4 xxix471 nor of its own body 7,,ii4 xxvii471 nor of external bodies 7,,ii4 xxv471 but only a fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof 7,,ii4 xxviii4 and note74 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,i say expressly1 that the mind has not an adequate but only a confused knowledge of itself1 its own body1 and of external bodies1 whenever it perceives things after the common order of nature2 that is1 whenever it is determined from without1 namely1 by the fortuitous play of circumstance1 to regard this or that2 not at such times as it is determined from within1 that is1 by the fact of regarding several things at once1 to understand their points of agreement1 difference1 and contrast4 ,whenever it is determined in anywise from within1 it regards things clearly and distinctly1 as ,i will show below4 ,,prop4 ,,xxx4 ,we can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body4 ,proof4--,the duration of our body does not depend on its essence 7,,ii4 ,ax4 i471 nor on the absolute nature of ,god 7,i4 xxi474 ,but 7,i4 xxviii47 it is conditioned to exist and operate by causes1 which in their turn are conditioned to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes1 these last again being conditioned by others1 and so on to infinity4 ,the duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of nature1 or the constitution of things4 ,now1 however a thing may be constituted1 the adequate knowledge of that thing is in ,god1 in so far as he has the ideas of all things1 and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only4 7,,ii4 ix4 ,coroll47 ,wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in ,god very inadequate1 in so far as he is only regarded as constituting the nature of the human mind2 that is 7,,ii4 xi4 ,coroll471 this knowledge is very inadequate to our mind4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxi4 ,we can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of particular things external to ourselves4 ,proof4--,every particular thing1 like the human body1 must be conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation2 this other particular thing must likewise be conditioned by a third1 and so on to infinity4 7,i4 xxviii47 ,as we have shown in the foregoing proposition1 from this common property of particular things1 we have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body2 we must draw a similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular things1 namely1 that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration thereof4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,hence it follows that all particular things are contingent and perishable4 ,for we can have no adequate idea of their duration 7by the last ,prop471 and this is what we must understand by the contingency and perishableness of things4 7,i4 xxxiii41 ,note i47 ,for 7,i4 xxix471 except in this sense1 nothing is contingent4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxii4 ,all ideas1 in so far as they are referred to ,god1 are true4 ,proof4--,all ideas which are in ,god agree in every respect with their objects 7,,ii4 vii4 ,coroll471 therefore 7,i4 ,ax4 vi47 they are all true4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxiii4 ,there is nothing positive in ideas1 which causes them to be called false4 ,proof4--,if this be denied1 conceive1 if possible1 a positive mode of thinking1 which should constitute the distinctive quality of falsehood4 ,such a mode of thinking cannot be in ,god 7,,ii4 xxxii472 external to ,god it cannot be or be conceived 7,i4 xv474 ,therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to be called false4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxiv4 ,every idea1 which in us is absolute or adequate and perfect1 is true4 ,proof4--,when we say that an idea in us is adequate and perfect1 we say1 in other words 7,,ii4 xi4 ,coroll471 that the idea is adequate and perfect in ,god1 in so far as he constitutes the essence of our mind2 consequently 7,,ii4 xxxii471 we say that such an idea is true4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxv4 ,falsity consists in the privation of knowledge1 which inadequate1 fragmentary1 or confused ideas involve4 ,proof4--,there is nothing positive in ideas1 which causes them to be called false 7,,ii4 xxxiii472 but falsity cannot consist in simple privation 7for minds1 not bodies1 are said to err and to be mistaken71 neither can it consist in absolute ignorance1 for ignorance and error are not identical2 wherefore it consists in the privation of knowledge1 which inadequate1 fragmentary1 or confused ideas involve4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,in the note to ,,ii4 xvii4 ,i explained how error consists in the privation of knowledge1 but in order to throw more light on the subject ,i will give an example4 ,for instance1 men are mistaken in thinking themselves free2 their opinion is made up of consciousness of their own actions1 and ignorance of the causes by which they are conditioned4 ,their idea of freedom1 therefore1 is simply their ignorance of any cause for their actions4 ,as for their saying that human actions depend on the will1 this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond thereto4 ,what the will is1 and how it moves the body1 they none of them know2 those who boast of such knowledge1 and feign dwellings and habitations for the soul1 are wont to provoke either laughter or disgust4 ,so1 again1 when we look at the sun1 we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet2 this error does not lie solely in this fancy1 but in the fact that1 while we thus imagine1 we do not know the sun's true distance or the cause of the fancy4 ,for although we afterwards learn1 that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of the earth's diameters1 we none the less shall fancy it to be near2 for we do not imagine the sun as near us1 because we are ignorant of its true distance1 but because the modification of our body involves the essence of the sun1 in so far as our said body is affected thereby4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxvi4 ,inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity1 as adequate or clear and distinct ideas4 ,proof4--,all ideas are in ,god 7,i4 xv471 and in so far as they are referred to ,god are true 7,,ii4 xxxii47 and 7,,ii4 vii4 ,coroll47 adequate2 therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate1 except in respect to a particular mind 7cf4 ,,ii4 xxiv4 and xxviii472 therefore all ideas1 whether adequate or inadequate1 follow by the same necessity 7,,ii4 vi474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxvii4 ,that which is common to all 7cf4 ,lemma ,,ii41 above71 and which is equally in a part and in the whole1 does not constitute the essence of any particular thing4 ,proof4--,if this be denied1 conceive1 if possible1 that it constitutes the essence of some particular thing2 for instance1 the essence of ,b4 ,then 7,,ii4 ,def4 ii47 it cannot without ,b either exist or be conceived2 but this is against our hypothesis4 ,therefore it does not appertain to ,b's essence1 nor does it constitute the essence of any particular thing4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxviii4 ,those things1 which are common to all1 and which are equally in a part and in the whole1 cannot be conceived except adequately4 ,proof4--,let ,a be something1 which is common to all bodies1 and which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the whole4 ,i say ,a cannot be conceived except adequately4 ,for the idea thereof in ,god will necessarily be adequate 7,,ii4 vii4 ,coroll471 both in so far as ,god has the idea of the human body1 and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications of the human body1 which 7,,ii4 xvi41 xxv41 xxvii47 involve in part the nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies2 that is 7,,ii4 xii41 xiii471 the idea in ,god will necessarily be adequate1 both in so far as he constitutes the human mind1 and in so far as he has the ideas1 which are in the human mind4 ,therefore the mind 7,,ii4 xi4 ,coroll47 necessarily perceives ,a adequately1 and has this adequate perception1 both in so far as it perceives itself1 and in so far as it perceives its own or any external body1 nor can ,a be conceived in any other manner4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,hence it follows that there are certain ideas or notions common to all men2 for 7by ,lemma ii47 all bodies agree in certain respects1 which 7by the foregoing ,prop47 must be adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxix4 ,that1 which is common to and a property of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body1 and which is present equally in each part of either1 or in the whole1 will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind4 ,proof4--,if ,a be that1 which is common to and a property of the human body and external bodies1 and equally present in the human body and in the said external bodies1 in each part of each external body and in the whole1 there will be an adequate idea of ,a in ,god 7,,ii4 vii4 ,coroll471 both in so far as he has the idea of the human body1 and in so far as he has the ideas of the given external bodies4 ,let it now be granted1 that the human body is affected by an external body through that1 which it has in common therewith1 namely1 ,a2 the idea of this modification will involve the property ,a 7,,ii4 xvi471 and therefore 7,,ii4 vii4 ,coroll47 the idea of this modification1 in so far as it involves the property ,a1 will be adequate in ,god1 in so far as ,god is affected by the idea of the human body2 that is 7,,ii4 xiii471 in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind2 therefore 7,,ii4 xi4 ,coroll47 this idea is also adequate in the human mind4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,hence it follows that the mind is fitted to perceive adequately more things1 in proportion as its body has more in common with other bodies4 ,,prop4 ,,xl4 ,whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are therein adequate1 are also themselves adequate4 ,proof4--,this proposition is self--evident4 ,for when we say that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are therein adequate1 we say1 in other words 7,,ii4 xi4 ,coroll471 that an idea is in the divine intellect1 whereof ,god is the cause1 not in so far as he is infinite1 nor in so far as he is affected by the ideas of very many particular things1 but only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind4 ,note ,i4--,i have thus set forth the cause of those notions1 which are common to all men1 and which form the basis of our ratiocination4 ,but there are other causes of certain axioms or notions1 which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this method of ours2 for it would thus appear what notions are more useful than others1 and what notions have scarcely any use at all4 ,furthermore1 we should see what notions are common to all men1 and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who are unshackled by prejudice1 and we should detect those which are ill--founded4 ,again we should discern whence the notions called secondary derived their origin1 and consequently the axioms on which they are founded1 and other points of interest connected with these questions4 ,but ,i have decided to pass over the subject here1 partly because ,i have set it aside for another treatise1 partly because ,i am afraid of wearying the reader by too great prolixity4 ,nevertheless1 in order not to omit anything necessary to be known1 ,i will briefly set down the causes1 whence are derived the terms styled transcendental1 such as ,being1 ,thing1 ,something4 ,these terms arose from the fact1 that the human body1 being limited1 is only capable of distinctly forming a certain number of images 7what an image is ,i explained in the ,,ii4 xvii4 note7 within itself at the same time2 if this number be exceeded1 the images will begin to be confused2 if this number of images1 of which the body is capable of forming distinctly within itself1 be largely exceeded1 all will become entirely confused one with another4 ,this being so1 it is evident 7from ,,ii4 ,prop4 xvii4 ,coroll41 and xviii47 that the human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously1 as its body can form images simultaneously4 ,when the images become quite confused in the body1 the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction1 and will comprehend them1 as it were1 under one attribute1 namely1 under the attribute of ,being1 ,thing1 c4 ,the same conclusion can be drawn from the fact that images are not always equally vivid1 and from other analogous causes1 which there is no need to explain here2 for the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to consider one only4 ,all may be reduced to this1 that these terms represent ideas in the highest degree confused4 ,from similar causes arise those notions1 which we call general1 such as man1 horse1 dog1 c4 ,they arise1 to wit1 from the fact that so many images1 for instance1 of men1 are formed simultaneously in the human mind1 that the powers of imagination break down1 not indeed utterly1 but to the extent of the mind losing count of small differences between individuals 7e4g4 colour1 size1 c47 and their definite number1 and only distinctly imagining that1 in which all the individuals1 in so far as the body is affected by them1 agree2 for that is the point1 in which each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body2 this the mind expresses by the name man1 and this it predicates of an infinite number of particular individuals4 ,for1 as we have said1 it is unable to imagine the definite number of individuals4 ,we must1 however1 bear in mind1 that these general notions are not formed by all men in the same way1 but vary in each individual according as the point varies1 whereby the body has been most often affected and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers4 ,for instance1 those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of man1 will by the name of man understand an animal of erect stature2 those who have been accustomed to regard some other attribute1 will form a different general image of man1 for instance1 that man is a laughing animal1 a two--footed animal without feathers1 a rational animal1 and thus1 in other cases1 everyone will form general images of things according to the habit of his body4 ,it is thus not to be wondered at1 that among philosophers1 who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of them1 so many controversies should have arisen4 ,note ,,ii4--,from all that has been said above it is clear1 that we1 in many cases1 perceive and form our general notions3--7#a47 ,from particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily1 confusedly1 and without order through our senses 7,,ii4 xxix4 ,coroll472 ,i have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience4#d #d ,a ,baconian phrase4 ,nov4 ,org4 ,aph4 #ajj4 ,pollock1 p4 #abf1 n4 7#b47 ,from symbols1 e4g41 from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them1 similar to those through which we imagine things 7,,ii4 xviii4 note74 ,i shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind1 opinion1 or imagination4 7#c47 ,from the fact that we have notions common to all men1 and adequate ideas of the properties of things 7,,ii4 xxxviii4 ,coroll41 xxxix4 and ,coroll4 and xl472 this ,i call reason and knowledge of the second kind4 ,besides these two kinds of knowledge1 there is1 as ,i will hereafter show1 a third kind of knowledge1 which we will call intuition4 ,this kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of ,god to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things4 ,i will illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example4 ,three numbers are given for finding a fourth1 which shall be to the third as the second is to the first4 ,tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by the third1 and divide the product by the first2 either because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from a master without any proof1 or because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers1 or by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of ,euclid1 namely1 in virtue of the general property of proportionals4 ,but with very simple numbers there is no need of this4 ,for instance1 one1 two1 three1 being given1 everyone can see that the fourth proportional is six2 and this is much clearer1 because we infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio1 which the first bears to the second4 ,,prop4 ,,xli4 ,knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity1 knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true4 ,proof4--,to knowledge of the first kind we have 7in the foregoing note7 assigned all those ideas1 which are inadequate and confused2 therefore this kind of knowledge is the only source of falsity 7,,ii4 xxxv474 ,furthermore1 we assigned to the second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are adequate2 therefore these kinds are necessarily true 7,,ii4 xxxiv474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xlii4 ,knowledge of the second and third kinds1 not knowledge of the first kind1 teaches us to distinguish the true from the false4 ,proof4--,this proposition is self--evident4 ,he1 who knows how to distinguish between true and false1 must have an adequate idea of true and false4 ,that is 7,,ii4 xl41 note ii471 he must know the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge4 ,,prop4 ,,xliii4 ,he1 who has a true idea1 simultaneously knows that he has a true idea1 and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived4 ,proof4--,a true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in ,god1 in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind 7,,ii4 xi4 ,coroll474 ,let us suppose that there is in ,god1 in so far as he is displayed through the human mind1 an adequate idea1 ,a4 ,the idea of this idea must also necessarily be in ,god1 and be referred to him in the same way as the idea ,a 7by ,,ii4 xx41 whereof the proof is of universal application74 ,but the idea ,a is supposed to be referred to ,god1 in so far as he is displayed through the human mind2 therefore1 the idea of the idea ,a must be referred to ,god in the same manner2 that is 7by ,,ii4 xi4 ,coroll471 the adequate idea of the idea ,a will be in the mind1 which has the adequate idea ,a2 therefore he1 who has an adequate idea or knows a thing truly 7,,ii4 xxxiv471 must at the same time have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge2 that is1 obviously1 he must be assured4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,i explained in the note to ,,ii4 xxi4 what is meant by the idea of an idea2 but we may remark that the foregoing proposition is in itself sufficiently plain4 ,no one1 who has a true idea1 is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest certainty4 ,for to have a true idea is only another expression for knowing a thing perfectly1 or as well as possible4 ,no one1 indeed1 can doubt of this1 unless he thinks that an idea is something lifeless1 like a picture on a panel1 and not a mode of thinking--namely1 the very act of understanding4 ,and who1 ,i ask1 can know that he understands anything1 unless he do first understand it8 ,in other words1 who can know that he is sure of a thing1 unless he be first sure of that thing8 ,further1 what can there be more clear1 and more certain1 than a true idea as a standard of truth8 ,even as light displays both itself and darkness1 so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity4 ,i think ,i have thus sufficiently answered these questions--namely1 if a true idea is distinguished from a false idea1 only in so far as it is said to agree with its object1 a true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea 7since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark72 consequently1 neither will a man who has a true idea have any advantage over him who has only false ideas4 ,further1 how comes it that men have false ideas8 ,lastly1 how can anyone be sure1 that he has ideas which agree with their objects8 ,these questions1 ,i repeat1 ,i have1 in my opinion1 sufficiently answered4 ,the difference between a true idea and a false idea is plain3 from what was said in ,,ii4 xxxv41 the former is related to the latter as being is to not--being4 ,the causes of falsity ,i have set forth very clearly in ,,ii4 xix4 and ,,ii4 xxxv4 with the note4 ,from what is there stated1 the difference between a man who has true ideas1 and a man who has only false ideas1 is made apparent4 ,as for the last question--as to how a man can be sure that he has ideas that agree with their objects1 ,i have just pointed out1 with abundant clearness1 that his knowledge arises from the simple fact1 that he has an idea which corresponds with its object--in other words1 that truth is its own standard4 ,we may add that our mind1 in so far as it perceives things truly1 is part of the infinite intellect of ,god 7,,ii4 xi4 ,coroll472 therefore1 the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of ,god4 ,,prop4 ,,xliv4 ,it is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent1 but as necessary4 ,proof4--,it is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly 7,,ii4 xli471 namely 7,i4 ,ax4 vi471 as they are in themselves--that is 7,i4 xxix471 not as contingent1 but as necessary4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary ,i4--,hence it follows1 that it is only through our imagination that we consider things1 whether in respect to the future or the past1 as contingent4 ,note4--,how this way of looking at things arises1 ,i will briefly explain4 ,we have shown above 7,,ii4 xvii4 and ,coroll47 that the mind always regards things as present to itself1 even though they be not in existence1 until some causes arise which exclude their existence and presence4 ,further 7,,ii4 xviii471 we showed that1 if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies simultaneously1 the mind1 when it afterwards imagines one of the said external bodies1 will straightway remember the other--that is1 it will regard both as present to itself1 unless there arise causes which exclude their existence and presence4 ,further1 no one doubts that we imagine time1 from the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than others1 some more quickly1 some at equal speed4 ,thus1 let us suppose that a child yesterday saw ,peter for the first time in the morning1 ,paul at noon1 and ,simon in the evening2 then1 that today he again sees ,peter in the morning4 ,it is evident1 from ,,ii4 ,prop4 xviii41 that1 as soon as he sees the morning light1 he will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky1 as it did when he saw it on the preceding day2 in other words1 he will imagine a complete day1 and1 together with his imagination of the morning1 he will imagine ,peter2 with noon1 he will imagine ,paul2 and with evening1 he will imagine ,simon--that is1 he will imagine the existence of ,paul and ,simon in relation to a future time2 on the other hand1 if he sees ,simon in the evening1 he will refer ,peter and ,paul to a past time1 by imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past time4 ,if it should at any time happen1 that on some other evening the child should see ,james instead of ,simon1 he will1 on the following morning1 associate with his imagination of evening sometimes ,simon1 sometimes ,james1 not both together3 for the child is supposed to have seen1 at evening1 one or other of them1 not both together4 ,his imagination will therefore waver2 and1 with the imagination of future evenings1 he will associate first one1 then the other--that is1 he will imagine them in the future1 neither of them as certain1 but both as contingent4 ,this wavering of the imagination will be the same1 if the imagination be concerned with things which we thus contemplate1 standing in relation to time past or time present3 consequently1 we may imagine things as contingent1 whether they be referred to time present1 past1 or future4 ,corollary ,,ii4--,it is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity 7sub qudam ternitatis specie74 ,proof4--,it is in the nature of reason to regard things1 not as contingent1 but as necessary 7,,ii4 xliv474 ,reason perceives this necessity of things 7,,ii4 xli47 truly--that is 7,i4 ,ax4 vi471 as it is in itself4 ,but 7,i4 xvi47 this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of ,god2 therefore1 it is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity4 ,we may add that the bases of reason are the notions 7,,ii4 xxxviii471 which answer to things common to all1 and which 7,,ii4 xxxvii47 do not answer to the essence of any particular thing3 which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time1 under a certain form of eternity4 ,,prop4 ,,xlv4 ,every idea of every body1 or of every particular thing actually existing1 necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of ,god4 ,proof4--,the idea of a particular thing actually existing necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the said thing 7,,ii4 viii474 ,now particular things cannot be conceived without ,god 7,i4 xv472 but1 inasmuch as 7,,ii4 vi47 they have ,god for their cause1 in so far as he is regarded under the attribute of which the things in question are modes1 their ideas must necessarily involve 7,i4 ,ax4 iv47 the conception of the attributes of those ideas--that is 7,i4 vi471 the eternal and infinite essence of ,god4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,by existence ,i do not here mean duration--that is1 existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly1 and as a certain form of quantity4 ,i am speaking of the very nature of existence1 which is assigned to particular things1 because they follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal necessity of ,god's nature 7,i4 xvi474 ,i am speaking1 ,i repeat1 of the very existence of particular things1 in so far as they are in ,god4 ,for although each particular thing be conditioned by another particular thing to exist in a given way1 yet the force whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of ,god's nature 7cf4 ,i4 xxiv4 ,coroll474 ,,prop4 ,,xlvi4 ,the knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of ,god which every idea involves is adequate and perfect4 ,proof4--,the proof of the last proposition is universal2 and whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole1 the idea thereof1 whether of the whole or of a part 7by the last ,prop471 will involve ,god's eternal and infinite essence4 ,wherefore1 that1 which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of ,god1 is common to all1 and is equally in the part and in the whole2 therefore 7,,ii4 xxxviii47 this knowledge will be adequate4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xlvii4 ,the human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of ,god4 ,proof4--,the human mind has ideas 7,,ii4 xxii471 from which 7,,ii4 xxiii47 it perceives itself and its own body 7,,ii4 xix47 and external bodies 7,,ii4 xvi4 ,coroll4 i4 and ,,ii4 xvii47 as actually existing2 therefore 7,,ii4 xlv4 and xlvi47 it has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of ,god4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,hence we see1 that the infinite essence and the eternity of ,god are known to all4 ,now as all things are in ,god1 and are conceived through ,god1 we can from this knowledge infer many things1 which we may adequately know1 and we may form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to ,,ii4 xl41 and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to speak in ,part ,v4 ,men have not so clear a knowledge of ,god as they have of general notions1 because they are unable to imagine ,god as they do bodies1 and also because they have associated the name ,god with images of things that they are in the habit of seeing1 as indeed they can hardly avoid doing1 being1 as they are1 men1 and continually affected by external bodies4 ,many errors1 in truth1 can be traced to this head1 namely1 that we do not apply names to things rightly4 ,for instance1 when a man says that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its circumference are not equal1 he then1 at all events1 assuredly attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that assigned by mathematicians4 ,so again1 when men make mistakes in calculation1 they have one set of figures in their mind1 and another on the paper4 ,if we could see into their minds1 they do not make a mistake2 they seem to do so1 because we think1 that they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the paper4 ,if this were not so1 we should not believe them to be in error1 any more than ,i thought that a man was in error1 whom ,i lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a neighbour's hen1 for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear4 ,very many controversies have arisen from the fact1 that men do not rightly explain their meaning1 or do not rightly interpret the meaning of others4 ,for1 as a matter of fact1 as they flatly contradict themselves1 they assume now one side1 now another1 of the argument1 so as to oppose the opinions1 which they consider mistaken and absurd in their opponents4 ,,prop4 ,,xlviii4 ,in the mind there is no absolute or free will2 but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause1 which has also been determined by another cause1 and this last by another cause1 and so on to infinity4 ,proof4--,the mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought 7,,ii4 xi471 therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions 7,i4 xvii4 ,coroll4 ii472 in other words1 it cannot have an absolute faculty of positive or negative volition2 but 7by ,i4 xxviii47 it must be determined by a cause1 which has also been determined by another cause1 and this last by another1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,in the same way it is proved1 that there is in the mind no absolute faculty of understanding1 desiring1 loving1 c4 ,whence it follows1 that these and similar faculties are either entirely fictitious1 or are merely abstract and general terms1 such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things4 ,thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to this or that idea1 or this or that volition1 as lapidity to this or that stone1 or as man to ,peter and ,paul4 ,the cause which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in the ,appendix to ,part ,i4 ,but1 before ,i proceed further1 ,i would here remark that1 by the will to affirm and decide1 ,i mean the faculty1 not the desire4 ,i mean1 ,i repeat1 the faculty1 whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true or false1 not the desire1 wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing4 ,after we have proved1 that these faculties of ours are general notions1 which cannot be distinguished from the particular instances on which they are based1 we must inquire whether volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things4 ,we must inquire1 ,i say1 whether there is in the mind any affirmation or negation beyond that1 which the idea1 in so far as it is an idea1 involves4 ,on which subject see the following proposition1 and ,,ii4 ,def4 iii41 lest the idea of pictures should suggest itself4 ,for by ideas ,i do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye1 or in the midst of the brain1 but the conceptions of thought4 ,,prop4 ,,xlix4 ,there is in the mind no volition or affirmation and negation1 save that which an idea1 inasmuch as it is an idea1 involves4 ,proof4--,there is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive or negative volition1 but only particular volitions1 namely1 this or that affirmation1 and this or that negation4 ,now let us conceive a particular volition1 namely1 the mode of thinking whereby the mind affirms1 that the three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles4 ,this affirmation involves the conception or idea of a triangle1 that is1 without the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived4 ,it is the same thing to say1 that the concept ,a must involve the concept ,b1 as it is to say1 that ,a cannot be conceived without ,b4 ,further1 this affirmation cannot be made 7,,ii4 ,ax4 iii47 without the idea of a triangle4 ,therefore1 this affirmation can neither be nor be conceived1 without the idea of a triangle4 ,again1 this idea of a triangle must involve this same affirmation1 namely1 that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles4 ,wherefore1 and vice vers1 this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation1 therefore1 this affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle1 and is nothing besides4 ,what we have said of this volition 7inasmuch as we have selected it at random7 may be said of any other volition1 namely1 that it is nothing but an idea4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,will and understanding are one and the same4 ,proof4--,will and understanding are nothing beyond the individual volitions and ideas 7,,ii4 xlviii4 and note74 ,but a particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same 7by the foregoing ,prop472 therefore1 will and understanding are one and the same4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,we have thus removed the cause which is commonly assigned for error4 ,for we have shown above1 that falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas which are fragmentary and confused4 ,wherefore1 a false idea1 inasmuch as it is false1 does not involve certainty4 ,when we say1 then1 that a man acquiesces in what is false1 and that he has no doubts on the subject1 we do not say that he is certain1 but only that he does not doubt1 or that he acquiesces in what is false1 inasmuch as there are no reasons1 which should cause his imagination to waver 7see ,,ii4 xliv4 note74 ,thus1 although the man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false1 we shall never say that he is certain4 ,for by certainty we mean something positive 7,,ii4 xliii4 and note71 not merely the absence of doubt4 ,however1 in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully explained1 ,i will draw attention to a few additional points1 and ,i will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced against our doctrine4 ,lastly1 in order to remove every scruple1 ,i have thought it worth while to point out some of the advantages1 which follow therefrom4 ,i say some1 for they will be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth part4 ,i begin1 then1 with the first point1 and warn my readers to make an accurate distinction between an idea1 or conception of the mind1 and the images of things which we imagine4 ,it is further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and words1 whereby we signify things4 ,these three--namely1 images1 words1 and ideas--are by many persons either entirely confused together1 or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care1 and hence people are generally in ignorance1 how absolutely necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will1 both for philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life4 ,those who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by contact with external bodies1 persuade themselves that the ideas of those things1 whereof we can form no mental picture1 are not ideas1 but only figments1 which we invent by the free decree of our will2 they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate pictures on a panel1 and1 filled with this misconception1 do not see that an idea1 inasmuch as it is an idea1 involves an affirmation or negation4 ,again1 those who confuse words with ideas1 or with the affirmation which an idea involves1 think that they can wish something contrary to what they feel1 affirm1 or deny4 ,this misconception will easily be laid aside by one1 who reflects on the nature of knowledge1 and seeing that it in no wise involves the conception of extension1 will therefore clearly understand1 that an idea 7being a mode of thinking7 does not consist in the image of anything1 nor in words4 ,the essence of words and images is put together by bodily motions1 which in no wise involve the conception of thought4 ,these few words on this subject will suffice3 ,i will therefore pass on to consider the objections1 which may be raised against our doctrine4 ,of these1 the first is advanced by those1 who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding1 and that therefore it is different therefrom4 ,the reason for their holding the belief1 that the will has wider scope than the understanding1 is that they assert1 that they have no need of an increase in their faculty of assent1 that is of affirmation or negation1 in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do not perceive1 but that they have need of an increase in their faculty of understanding4 ,the will is thus distinguished from the intellect1 the latter being finite and the former infinite4 ,secondly1 it may be objected that experience seems to teach us especially clearly1 that we are able to suspend our judgment before assenting to things which we perceive2 this is confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived1 in so far as he perceives anything1 but only in so far as he assents or dissents4 ,for instance1 he who feigns a winged horse1 does not therefore admit that a winged horse exists2 that is1 he is not deceived1 unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist4 ,nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience1 than that the will or faculty of assent is free and different from the faculty of understanding4 ,thirdly1 it may be objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality than another2 in other words1 that we do not seem to need for affirming1 that what is true is true1 any greater power than for affirming1 that what is false is true4 ,we have1 however1 seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than another1 for as objects are some more excellent than others1 so also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others2 this also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and the will4 ,fourthly1 it may be objected1 if man does not act from free will1 what will happen if the incentives to action are equally balanced1 as in the case of ,buridan's ass8 ,will he perish of hunger and thirst8 ,if ,i say that he would1 ,i shall seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather than an actual man4 ,if ,i say that he would not1 he would then determine his own action1 and would consequently possess the faculty of going and doing whatever he liked4 ,other objections might also be raised1 but1 as ,i am not bound to put in evidence everything that anyone may dream1 ,i will only set myself to the task of refuting those ,i have mentioned1 and that as briefly as possible4 ,to the first objection ,i answer1 that ,i admit that the will has a wider scope than the understanding1 if by the understanding be meant only clear and distinct ideas2 but ,i deny that the will has a wider scope than the perceptions1 and the faculty of forming conceptions2 nor do ,i see why the faculty of volition should be called infinite1 any more than the faculty of feeling3 for1 as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an infinite number of things 7one after the other1 for we cannot affirm an infinite number simultaneously71 so also can we1 by the same faculty of feeling1 feel or perceive 7in succession7 an infinite number of bodies4 ,if it be said that there is an infinite number of things which we cannot perceive1 ,i answer1 that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking1 nor1 consequently1 by any faculty of volition4 ,but1 it may still be urged1 if ,god wished to bring it about that we should perceive them1 he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of perception1 but not a greater faculty of volition than we have already4 ,this is the same as to say that1 if ,god wished to bring it about that we should understand an infinite number of other entities1 it would be necessary for him to give us a greater understanding1 but not a more universal idea of entity than that which we have already1 in order to grasp such infinite entities4 ,we have shown that will is a universal entity or idea1 whereby we explain all particular volitions--in other words1 that which is common to all such volitions4 ,as1 then1 our opponents maintain that this idea1 common or universal to all volitions1 is a faculty1 it is little to be wondered at that they assert1 that such a faculty extends itself into the infinite1 beyond the limits of the understanding3 for what is universal is predicated alike of one1 of many1 and of an infinite number of individuals4 ,to the second objection ,i reply by denying1 that we have a free power of suspending our judgment3 for1 when we say that anyone suspends his judgment1 we merely mean that he sees1 that he does not perceive the matter in question adequately4 ,suspension of judgment is1 therefore1 strictly speaking1 a perception1 and not free will4 ,in order to illustrate the point1 let us suppose a boy imagining a horse1 and perceive nothing else4 ,inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the horse 7,,ii4 xvii4 ,coroll471 and the boy does not perceive anything which would exclude the existence of the horse1 he will necessarily regard the horse as present3 he will not be able to doubt of its existence1 although he be not certain thereof4 ,we have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams2 and ,i do not suppose that there is anyone1 who would maintain that1 while he is dreaming1 he has the free power of suspending his judgment concerning the things in his dream1 and bringing it about that he should not dream those things1 which he dreams that he sees2 yet it happens1 notwithstanding1 that even in dreams we suspend our judgment1 namely1 when we dream that we are dreaming4 ,further1 ,i grant that no one can be deceived1 so far as actual perception extends--that is1 ,i grant that the mind's imaginations1 regarded in themselves1 do not involve error 7,,ii4 xvii4 note72 but ,i deny1 that a man does not1 in the act of perception1 make any affirmation4 ,for what is the perception of a winged horse1 save affirming that a horse has wings8 ,if the mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse1 it would regard the same as present to itself3 it would have no reasons for doubting its existence1 nor any faculty of dissent1 unless the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which precludes the existence of the said horse1 or unless the mind perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is inadequate1 in which case it will either necessarily deny the existence of such a horse1 or will necessarily be in doubt on the subject4 ,i think that ,i have anticipated my answer to the third objection1 namely1 that the will is something universal which is predicated of all ideas1 and that it only signifies that which is common to all ideas1 namely1 an affirmation1 whose adequate essence must1 therefore1 in so far as it is thus conceived in the abstract1 be in every idea1 and be1 in this respect alone1 the same in all1 not in so far as it is considered as constituting the idea's essence3 for1 in this respect1 particular affirmations differ one from the other1 as much as do ideas4 ,for instance1 the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle1 differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle1 as much as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle4 ,further1 ,i absolutely deny1 that we are in need of an equal power of thinking1 to affirm that that which is true is true1 and to affirm that that which is false is true4 ,these two affirmations1 if we regard the mind1 are in the same relation to one another as being and not--being2 for there is nothing positive in ideas1 which constitutes the actual reality of falsehood 7,,ii4 xxxv4 note1 and xlvii4 note74 ,we must therefore conclude1 that we are easily deceived1 when we confuse universals with singulars1 and the entities of reason and abstractions with realities4 ,as for the fourth objection1 ,i am quite ready to admit1 that a man placed in the equilibrium described 7namely1 as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst1 a certain food and a certain drink1 each equally distant from him7 would die of hunger and thirst4 ,if ,i am asked1 whether such an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man2 ,i answer1 that ,i do not know1 neither do ,i know how a man should be considered1 who hangs himself1 or how we should consider children1 fools1 madmen1 c4 ,it remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this doctrine as bearing on conduct1 and this may be easily gathered from what has been said4 ,the doctrine is good1 #a4 ,inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the decree of ,god1 and to be partakers in the ,divine nature1 and so much the more1 as we perform more perfect actions and more and more understand ,god4 ,such a doctrine not only completely tranquilizes our spirit1 but also shows us where our highest happiness or blessedness is1 namely1 solely in the knowledge of ,god1 whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid us4 ,we may thus clearly understand1 how far astray from a true estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by ,god with high rewards for their virtue1 and their best actions1 as for having endured the direst slavery2 as if virtue and the service of ,god were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom4 #b4 ,inasmuch as it teaches us1 how we ought to conduct ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune1 or matters which are not in our power1 and do not follow from our nature4 ,for it shows us1 that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns with an equal mind1 seeing that all things follow from the eternal decree of ,god by the same necessity1 as it follows from the essence of a triangle1 that the three angles are equal to two right angles4 #c4 ,this doctrine raises social life1 inasmuch as it teaches us to hate no man1 neither to despise1 to deride1 to envy1 or to be angry with any4 ,further1 as it tells us that each should be content with his own1 and helpful to his neighbour1 not from any womanish pity1 favour1 or superstition1 but solely by the guidance of reason1 according as the time and occasion demand1 as ,i will show in ,part ,,iii4 #d4 ,lastly1 this doctrine confers no small advantage on the commonwealth2 for it teaches how citizens should be governed and led1 not so as to become slaves1 but so that they may freely do whatsoever things are best4 ,i have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this note1 and ,i thus bring the second part of my treatise to a close4 ,i think ,i have therein explained the nature and properties of the human mind at sufficient length1 and1 considering the difficulty of the subject1 with sufficient clearness4 ,i have laid a foundation1 whereon may be raised many excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary to be known1 as will1 in what follows1 be partly made plain4 ,,part ,,iii4 ,,on ,,the ,,origin ,,and ,,nature ,,of ,,the ,,emotions ,most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature's general laws4 ,they appear to conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom3 for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order1 that he has absolute control over his actions1 and that he is determined solely by himself4 ,they attribute human infirmities and fickleness1 not to the power of nature in general1 but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man1 which accordingly they bemoan1 deride1 despise1 or1 as usually happens1 abuse3 he1 who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows1 is looked upon as a seer4 ,still there has been no lack of very excellent men 7to whose toil and industry ,i confess myself much indebted71 who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way of life1 and have given much sage advice to mankind4 ,but no one1 so far as ,i know1 has defined the nature and strength of the emotions1 and the power of the mind against them for their restraint4 ,i do not forget1 that the illustrious ,descartes1 though he believed1 that the mind has absolute power over its actions1 strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes1 and1 at the same time1 to point out a way1 by which the mind might attain to absolute dominion over them4 ,however1 in my opinion1 he accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own great intellect1 as ,i will show in the proper place4 ,for the present ,i wish to revert to those1 who would rather abuse or deride human emotions than understand them4 ,such persons will1 doubtless think it strange that ,i should attempt to treat of human vice and folly geometrically1 and should wish to set forth with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason1 frivolous1 absurd1 and dreadful4 ,however1 such is my plan4 ,nothing comes to pass in nature1 which can be set down to a flaw therein2 for nature is always the same1 and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action2 that is1 nature's laws and ordinances1 whereby all things come to pass and change from one form to another1 are everywhere and always the same2 so that there should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever1 namely1 through nature's universal laws and rules4 ,thus the passions of hatred1 anger1 envy1 and so on1 considered in themselves1 follow from this same necessity and efficacy of nature2 they answer to certain definite causes1 through which they are understood1 and possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the properties of anything else1 whereof the contemplation in itself affords us delight4 ,i shall1 therefore1 treat of the nature and strength of the emotions according to the same method1 as ,i employed heretofore in my investigations concerning ,god and the mind4 ,i shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the same manner1 as though ,i were concerned with lines1 planes1 and solids4 ,,definitions ,i4 ,by an adequate cause1 ,i mean a cause through which its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived4 ,by an inadequate or partial cause1 ,i mean a cause through which1 by itself1 its effect cannot be understood4 ,,ii4 ,i say that we act when anything takes place1 either within us or externally to us1 whereof we are the adequate cause2 that is 7by the foregoing definition7 when through our nature something takes place within us or externally to us1 which can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood4 ,on the other hand1 ,i say that we are passive as regards something when that something takes place within us1 or follows from our nature externally1 we being only the partial cause4 ,,iii4 ,by emotion ,i mean the modifications of the body1 whereby the active power of the said body is increased or diminished1 aided or constrained1 and also the ideas of such modifications4 ,n4,b4 ,if we can be the adequate cause of any of these modifications1 ,i then call the emotion an activity1 otherwise ,i call it a passion1 or state wherein the mind is passive4 ,,postulates ,i4 ,the human body can be affected in many ways1 whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished1 and also in other ways which do not render its power of activity either greater or less4 ,n4,b4 ,this postulate or axiom rests on ,postulate i4 and ,lemmas v4 and vii41 which see after ,,ii4 xiii4 ,,ii4 ,the human body can undergo many changes1 and1 nevertheless1 retain the impressions or traces of objects 7cf4 ,,ii4 ,post4 v471 and1 consequently1 the same images of things 7see note ,,ii4 xvii474 ,,prop4 ,i4 ,our mind is in certain cases active1 and in certain cases passive4 ,in so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily active1 and in so far as it has inadequate ideas1 it is necessarily passive4 ,proof4--,in every human mind there are some adequate ideas1 and some ideas that are fragmentary and confused 7,,ii4 xl4 note74 ,those ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also in ,god1 inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of the mind 7,,ii4 xl4 ,coroll471 and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise 7by the same ,coroll47 adequate in ,god1 not inasmuch as he contains in himself the essence of the given mind alone1 but as he1 at the same time1 contains the minds of other things4 ,again1 from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow 7,i4 #cf72 of this effect ,god is the adequate cause 7,,iii4 ,def4 i471 not inasmuch as he is infinite1 but inasmuch as he is conceived as affected by the given idea 7,,ii4 ix474 ,but of that effect whereof ,god is the cause1 inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in a given mind1 of that effect1 ,i repeat1 the mind in question is the adequate cause 7,,ii4 xi4 ,coroll474 ,therefore our mind1 in so far as it has adequate ideas 7,,iii4 ,def4 ii471 is in certain cases necessarily active2 this was our first point4 ,again1 whatsoever necessarily follows from the idea which is adequate in ,god1 not by virtue of his possessing in himself the mind of one man only1 but by virtue of his containing1 together with the mind of that one man1 the minds of other things also1 of such an effect 7,,ii4 xi4 ,coroll47 the mind of the given man is not an adequate1 but only a partial cause2 thus 7,,iii4 ,def4 ii47 the mind1 inasmuch as it has inadequate ideas1 is in certain cases necessarily passive2 this was our second point4 ,therefore our mind1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,hence it follows that the mind is more or less liable to be acted upon1 in proportion as it possesses inadequate ideas1 and1 contrariwise1 is more or less active in proportion as it possesses adequate ideas4 ,,prop4 ,,ii4 ,body cannot determine mind to think1 neither can mind determine body to motion or rest or any state different from these1 if such there be4 ,proof4--,all modes of thinking have for their cause ,god1 by virtue of his being a thinking thing1 and not by virtue of his being displayed under any other attribute 7,,ii4 vi474 ,that1 therefore1 which determines the mind to thought is a mode of thought1 and not a mode of extension2 that is 7,,ii4 ,def4 i471 it is not body4 ,this was our first point4 ,again1 the motion and rest of a body must arise from another body1 which has also been determined to a state of motion or rest by a third body1 and absolutely everything which takes place in a body must spring from ,god1 in so far as he is regarded as affected by some mode of extension1 and not by some mode of thought 7,,ii4 vi472 that is1 it cannot spring from the mind1 which is a mode of thought4 ,this was our second point4 ,therefore body cannot determine mind1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,this is made more clear by what was said in the note to ,,ii4 vii41 namely1 that mind and body are one and the same thing1 conceived first under the attribute of thought1 secondly1 under the attribute of extension4 ,thus it follows that the order or concatenation of things is identical1 whether nature be conceived under the one attribute or the other2 consequently the order of states of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of states of activity and passivity in the mind4 ,the same conclusion is evident from the manner in which we proved ,,ii4 xii4 ,nevertheless1 though such is the case1 and though there be no further room for doubt1 ,i can scarcely believe1 until the fact is proved by experience1 that men can be induced to consider the question calmly and fairly1 so firmly are they convinced that it is merely at the bidding of the mind1 that the body is set in motion or at rest1 or performs a variety of actions depending solely on the mind's will or the exercise of thought4 ,however1 no one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the body1 that is1 no one has as yet been taught by experience what the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature1 in so far as she is regarded as extension4 ,no one hitherto has gained such an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism1 that he can explain all its functions2 nor need ,i call attention to the fact that many actions are observed in the lower animals1 which far transcend human sagacity1 and that somnambulists do many things in their sleep1 which they would not venture to do when awake3 these instances are enough to show1 that the body can by the sole laws of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at4 ,again1 no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the body1 nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to the body1 nor how quickly it can move it4 ,thus1 when men say that this or that physical action has its origin in the mind1 which latter has dominion over the body1 they are using words without meaning1 or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are ignorant of the cause of the said action1 and do not wonder at it4 ,but1 they will say1 whether we know or do not know the means whereby the mind acts on the body1 we have1 at any rate1 experience of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit state to think1 the body remains inert4 ,moreover1 we have experience1 that the mind alone can determine whether we speak or are silent1 and a variety of similar states which1 accordingly1 we say depend on the mind's decree4 ,but1 as to the first point1 ,i ask such objectors1 whether experience does not also teach1 that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted for thinking8 ,for when the body is at rest in sleep1 the mind simultaneously is in a state of torpor also1 and has no power of thinking1 such as it possesses when the body is awake4 ,again1 ,i think everyone's experience will confirm the statement1 that the mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given subject1 but according as the body is more or less fitted for being stimulated by the image of this or that object1 so also is the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object4 ,but1 it will be urged1 it is impossible that solely from the laws of nature considered as extended substance1 we should be able to deduce the causes of buildings1 pictures1 and things of that kind1 which are produced only by human art2 nor would the human body1 unless it were determined and led by the mind1 be capable of building a single temple4 ,however1 ,i have just pointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the body's power1 or say what can be concluded from a consideration of its sole nature1 whereas they have experience of many things being accomplished solely by the laws of nature1 which they would never have believed possible except under the direction of mind3 such are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep1 and wondered at by their performers when awake4 ,i would further call attention to the mechanism of the human body1 which far surpasses in complexity all that has been put together by human art1 not to repeat what ,i have already shown1 namely1 that from nature1 under whatever attribute she be considered1 infinite results follow4 ,as for the second objection1 ,i submit that the world would be much happier1 if men were as fully able to keep silence as they are to speak4 ,experience abundantly shows that men can govern anything more easily than their tongues1 and restrain anything more easily than their appetites2 when it comes about that many believe1 that we are only free in respect to objects which we moderately desire1 because our desire for such can easily be controlled by the thought of something else frequently remembered1 but that we are by no means free in respect to what we seek with violent emotion1 for our desire cannot then be allayed with the remembrance of anything else4 ,however1 unless such persons had proved by experience that we do many things which we afterwards repent of1 and again that we often1 when assailed by contrary emotions1 see the better and follow the worse1 there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we are free in all things4 ,thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk1 an angry child believes that it freely desires vengeance1 a timid child believes that it freely desires to run away2 further1 a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision of his mind words which1 when he is sober1 he would willingly have withheld3 thus1 too1 a delirious man1 a garrulous woman1 a child1 and others of like complexion1 believe that they speak from the free decision of their mind1 when they are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk4 ,experience teaches us no less clearly than reason1 that men believe themselves to be free1 simply because they are conscious of their actions1 and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined2 and1 further1 it is plain that the dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites1 and therefore vary according to the varying state of the body4 ,everyone shapes his actions according to his emotion1 those who are assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish2 those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this way or that4 ,all these considerations clearly show that a mental decision and a bodily appetite1 or determined state1 are simultaneous1 or rather are one and the same thing1 which we call decision1 when it is regarded under and explained through the attribute of thought1 and a conditioned state1 when it is regarded under the attribute of extension1 and deduced from the laws of motion and rest4 ,this will appear yet more plainly in the sequel4 ,for the present ,i wish to call attention to another point1 namely1 that we cannot act by the decision of the mind1 unless we have a remembrance of having done so4 ,for instance1 we cannot say a word without remembering that we have done so4 ,again1 it is not within the free power of the mind to remember or forget a thing at will4 ,therefore the freedom of the mind must in any case be limited to the power of uttering or not uttering something which it remembers4 ,but when we dream that we speak1 we believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind1 yet we do not speak1 or1 if we do1 it is by a spontaneous motion of the body4 ,again1 we dream that we are concealing something1 and we seem to act from the same decision of the mind as that1 whereby we keep silence when awake concerning something we know4 ,lastly1 we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something1 which we should not dare to do when awake4 ,now ,i should like to know whether there be in the mind two sorts of decisions1 one sort illusive1 and the other sort free8 ,if our folly does not carry us so far as this1 we must necessarily admit1 that the decision of the mind1 which is believed to be free1 is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory1 and is nothing more than the affirmation1 which an idea1 by virtue of being an idea1 necessarily involves 7,,ii4 xlix474 ,wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity1 as the ideas of things actually existing4 ,therefore those who believe1 that they speak or keep silence or act in any way from the free decision of their mind1 do but dream with their eyes open4 ,,prop4 ,,iii4 ,the activities of the mind arise solely from adequate ideas2 the passive states of the mind depend solely on inadequate ideas4 ,proof4--,the first element1 which constitutes the essence of the mind1 is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent body 7,,ii4 xi4 and xiii471 which 7,,ii4 xv47 is compounded of many other ideas1 whereof some are adequate and some inadequate 7,,ii4 xxix4 ,coroll41 ,,ii4 xxxviii4 ,coroll474 ,whatsoever therefore follows from the nature of mind1 and has mind for its proximate cause1 through which it must be understood1 must necessarily follow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea4 ,but in so far as the mind 7,,iii4 i47 has inadequate ideas1 it is necessarily passive3 wherefore the activities of the mind follow solely from adequate ideas1 and accordingly the mind is only passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,thus we see1 that passive states are not attributed to the mind1 except in so far as it contains something involving negation1 or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature1 which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself without other parts3 ,i could thus show1 that passive states are attributed to individual things in the same way that they are attributed to the mind1 and that they cannot otherwise be perceived1 but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind4 ,,prop4 ,,iv4 ,nothing can be destroyed1 except by a cause external to itself4 ,proof4--,this proposition is self--evident1 for the definition of anything affirms the essence of that thing1 but does not negative it2 in other words1 it postulates the essence of the thing1 but does not take it away4 ,so long therefore as we regard only the thing itself1 without taking into account external causes1 we shall not be able to find in it anything which could destroy it4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,v4 ,things are naturally contrary1 that is1 cannot exist in the same object1 in so far as one is capable of destroying the other4 ,proof4--,if they could agree together or co--exist in the same object1 there would then be in the said object something which could destroy it2 but this1 by the foregoing proposition1 is absurd1 therefore things1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,vi4 ,everything1 in so far as it is in itself1 endeavours to persist in its own being4 ,proof4--,individual things are modes whereby the attributes of ,god are expressed in a given determinate manner 7,i4 xxv4 ,coroll472 that is1 7,i4 xxxiv471 they are things which express in a given determinate manner the power of ,god1 whereby ,god is and acts2 now no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be destroyed1 or which can take away its existence 7,,iii4 iv472 but contrariwise it is opposed to all that could take away its existence 7,,iii4 v474 ,therefore1 in so far as it can1 and in so far as it is in itself1 it endeavours to persist in its own being4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,vii4 ,the endeavour1 wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being1 is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question4 ,proof4--,from the given essence of any thing certain consequences necessarily follow 7,i4 xxxvi471 nor have things any power save such as necessarily follows from their nature as determined 7,i4 xxix472 wherefore the power of any given thing1 or the endeavour whereby1 either alone or with other things1 it acts1 or endeavours to act1 that is 7,,iii4 vi471 the power or endeavour1 wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being1 is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in question4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,viii4 ,the endeavour1 whereby a thing endeavours to persist in its own being1 involves no finite time1 but an indefinite time4 ,proof4--,if it involved a limited time1 which should determine the duration of the thing1 it would then follow solely from that power whereby the thing exists1 that the thing could not exist beyond the limits of that time1 but that it must be destroyed2 but this 7,,iii4 iv47 is absurd4 ,wherefore the endeavour wherewith a thing exists involves no definite time2 but1 contrariwise1 since 7,,iii4 iv47 it will by the same power whereby it already exists always continue to exist1 unless it be destroyed by some external cause1 this endeavour involves an indefinite time4 ,,prop4 ,,ix4 ,the mind1 both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas1 and also in so far as it has confused ideas1 endeavours to persist in its being for an indefinite period1 and of this endeavour it is conscious4 ,proof4--,the essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and inadequate ideas 7,,iii4 iii471 therefore 7,,iii4 vii471 both in so far as it possesses the former1 and in so far as it possesses the latter1 it endeavours to persist in its own being1 and that for an indefinite time 7,,iii4 viii474 ,now as the mind 7,,ii4 xxiii47 is necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the modifications of the body1 the mind is therefore 7,,iii4 vii47 conscious of its own endeavour4 ,note4--,this endeavour1 when referred solely to the mind1 is called will1 when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it is called appetite2 it is1 in fact1 nothing else but man's essence1 from the nature of which necessarily follow all those results which tend to its preservation2 and which man has thus been determined to perform4 ,further1 between appetite and desire there is no difference1 except that the term desire is generally applied to men1 in so far as they are conscious of their appetite1 and may accordingly be thus defined3 ,desire is appetite with consciousness thereof4 ,it is thus plain from what has been said1 that in no case do we strive for1 wish for1 long for1 or desire anything1 because we deem it to be good1 but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good1 because we strive for it1 wish for it1 long for it1 or desire it4 ,,prop4 ,x4 ,an idea1 which excludes the existence of our body1 cannot be postulated in our mind1 but is contrary thereto4 ,proof4--,whatsoever can destroy our body1 cannot be postulated therein 7,,iii4 v474 ,therefore neither can the idea of such a thing occur in ,god1 in so far as he has the idea of our body 7,,ii4 ix4 ,coroll472 that is 7,,ii4 xi41 xiii471 the idea of that thing cannot be postulated as in our mind1 but contrariwise1 since 7,,ii4 xi41 xiii47 the first element1 that constitutes the essence of the mind1 is the idea of the human body as actually existing1 it follows that the first and chief endeavour of our mind is the endeavour to affirm the existence of our body3 thus1 an idea1 which negatives the existence of our body1 is contrary to our mind1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xi4 ,whatsoever increases or diminishes1 helps or hinders the power of activity in our body1 the idea thereof increases or diminishes1 helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind4 ,proof4--,this proposition is evident from ,,ii4 vii4 or from ,,ii4 xiv4 ,note4--,thus we see1 that the mind can undergo many changes1 and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection1 sometimes to a state of lesser perfection4 ,these passive states of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain4 ,by pleasure therefore in the following propositions ,i shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection4 ,by pain ,i shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection4 ,further1 the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and mind together ,i shall call stimulation 7titillatio7 or merriment 7hilaritas71 the emotion of pain in the same relation ,i shall call suffering or melancholy4 ,but we must bear in mind1 that stimulation and suffering are attributed to man1 when one part of his nature is more affected than the rest1 merriment and melancholy1 when all parts are alike affected4 ,what ,i mean by desire ,i have explained in the note to ,prop4 ix4 of this part2 beyond these three ,i recognize no other primary emotion2 ,i will show as ,i proceed1 that all other emotions arise from these three4 ,but1 before ,i go further1 ,i should like here to explain at greater length ,prop4 x of this part1 in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is contrary to another4 ,in the note to ,,ii4 xvii4 we showed that the idea1 which constitutes the essence of mind1 involves the existence of body1 so long as the body itself exists4 ,again1 it follows from what we pointed out in the ,corollary to ,,ii4 viii41 that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the fact1 that the mind involves the actual existence of the body4 ,lastly1 we showed 7,,ii4 xvii41 xviii4 and note7 that the power of the mind1 whereby it imagines and remembers things1 also depends on the fact1 that it involves the actual existence of the body4 ,whence it follows1 that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed1 as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body4 ,now the cause1 why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body1 cannot be the mind itself 7,,iii4 iv471 nor again the fact that the body ceases to exist4 ,for 7by ,,ii4 vi47 the cause1 why the mind affirms the existence of the body1 is not that the body began to exist2 therefore1 for the same reason1 it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body1 because the body ceases to exist2 but 7,,ii4 xvii47 this result follows from another idea1 which excludes the present existence of our body and1 consequently1 of our mind1 and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the essence of our mind4 ,,prop4 ,,xii4 ,the mind1 as far as it can1 endeavours to conceive those things1 which increase or help the power of activity in the body4 ,proof4--,so long as the human body is affected in a mode1 which involves the nature of any external body1 the human mind will regard that external body as present 7,,ii4 xvii471 and consequently 7,,ii4 vii471 so long as the human mind regards an external body as present1 that is 7,,ii4 xvii4 note71 conceives it1 the human body is affected in a mode1 which involves the nature of the said external body2 thus so long as the mind conceives things1 which increase or help the power of activity in our body1 the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of activity 7,,iii4 ,post4 i472 consequently 7,,iii4 xi47 the mind's power of thinking is for that period increased or helped4 ,thus 7,,iii4 vi41 ix47 the mind1 as far as it can1 endeavours to imagine such things4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xiii4 ,when the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the body's power of activity1 it endeavours1 as far as possible1 to remember things which exclude the existence of the first--named things4 ,proof4--,so long as the mind conceives anything of the kind alluded to1 the power of the mind and body is diminished or constrained 7cf4 ,,iii4 xii4 ,proof72 nevertheless it will continue to conceive it1 until the mind conceives something else1 which excludes the present existence thereof 7,,ii4 xvii472 that is 7as ,i have just shown71 the power of the mind and of the body is diminished1 or constrained1 until the mind conceives something else1 which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived3 therefore the mind 7,,iii4 ix471 as far as it can1 will endeavour to conceive or remember the latter4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,hence it follows that the mind shrinks from conceiving those things1 which diminish or constrain the power of itself and of the body4 ,note4--,from what has been said we may clearly understand the nature of ,love and ,hate4 ,love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause3 ,hate is nothing else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause4 ,we further see1 that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have1 and to keep present to him1 the object of his love2 while he who hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred4 ,but ,i will treat of these matters at more length hereafter4 ,,prop4 ,,xiv4 ,if the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time1 it will1 whenever it is afterwards affected by one of these two1 be also affected by the other4 ,proof4--,if the human body has once been affected by two bodies at once1 whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them1 it will straightway remember the other also 7,,ii4 xviii474 ,but the mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than the nature of external bodies 7,,ii4 xvi4 ,coroll4 ii472 therefore1 if the body1 and consequently the mind 7,,iii4 ,def4 iii47 has been once affected by two emotions at the same time1 it will1 whenever it is afterwards affected by one of the two1 be also affected by the other4 ,,prop4 ,,xv4 ,anything can1 accidentally1 be the cause of pleasure1 pain1 or desire4 ,proof4--,let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously affected by two emotions1 of which one neither increases nor diminishes its power of activity1 and the other does either increase or diminish the said power 7,,iii4 ,post4 i474 ,from the foregoing proposition it is evident that1 whenever the mind is afterwards affected by the former1 through its true cause1 which 7by hypothesis7 neither increases nor diminishes its power of action1 it will be at the same time affected by the latter1 which does increase or diminish its power of activity1 that is 7,,iii4 xi4 note7 it will be affected with pleasure or pain4 ,thus the former of the two emotions will1 not through itself1 but accidentally1 be the cause of pleasure or pain4 ,in the same way also it can be easily shown1 that a thing may be accidentally the cause of desire4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing with the emotion of pleasure or pain1 though that thing be not the efficient cause of the emotion1 we can either love or hate it4 ,proof4--,for from this fact alone it arises 7,,iii4 xiv471 that the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with the emotion of pleasure or pain1 that is 7,,iii4 xi4 note71 according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or diminished1 c42 and consequently 7,,iii4 xii471 according as the mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it 7,,iii4 xiii4 ,coroll471 in other words 7,,iii4 xiii4 note71 according as it may love or hate the same4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,hence we understand how it may happen1 that we love or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us2 merely1 as a phrase is1 from sympathy or antipathy4 ,we should refer to the same category those objects1 which affect us pleasurably or painfully1 simply because they resemble other objects which affect us in the same way4 ,this ,i will show in the next ,prop4 ,i am aware that certain authors1 who were the first to introduce these terms sympathy and antipathy1 wished to signify thereby some occult qualities in things2 nevertheless ,i think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known or manifest qualities4 ,,prop4 ,,xvi4 ,simply from the fact that we conceive1 that a given object has some point of resemblance with another object which is wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully1 although the point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions1 we shall still regard the first--named object with love or hate4 ,proof4--,the point of resemblance was in the object 7by hypothesis71 when we regarded it with pleasure or pain1 thus 7,,iii4 xiv471 when the mind is affected by the image thereof1 it will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion1 and consequently the thing1 which we perceive to have the same point of resemblance1 will be accidentally 7,,iii4 xv47 a cause of pleasure or pain4 ,thus 7by the foregoing ,corollary71 although the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not the efficient cause of the emotion1 we shall still regard the first--named object with love or hate4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xvii4 ,if we conceive that a thing1 which is wont to affect us painfully1 has any point of resemblance with another thing which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure1 we shall hate the first--named thing1 and at the same time we shall love it4 ,proof4--,the given thing is 7by hypothesis7 in itself a cause of pain1 and 7,,iii4 xiii4 note71 in so far as we imagine it with this emotion1 we shall hate it3 further1 inasmuch as we conceive that it has some point of resemblance to something else1 which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure1 we shall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it 7,,iii4 xvi472 thus we shall both hate and love the same thing4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,this disposition of the mind1 which arises from two contrary emotions1 is called vacillation2 it stands to the emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination 7,,ii4 xliv4 note72 vacillation and doubt do not differ one from the other1 except as greater differs from less4 ,but we must bear in mind that ,i have deduced this vacillation from causes1 which give rise through themselves to one of the emotions1 and to the other accidentally4 ,i have done this1 in order that they might be more easily deduced from what went before2 but ,i do not deny that vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an object1 which is the efficient cause of both emotions4 ,the human body is composed 7,,ii4 ,post4 i47 of a variety of individual parts of different nature1 and may therefore 7,ax4i4 after ,lemma iii4 after ,,ii4 xiii47 be affected in a variety of different ways by one and the same body2 and contrariwise1 as one and the same thing can be affected in many ways1 it can also in many different ways affect one and the same part of the body4 ,hence we can easily conceive1 that one and the same object may be the cause of many and conflicting emotions4 ,,prop4 ,,xviii4 ,a man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing present4 ,proof4--,so long as a man is affected by the image of anything1 he will regard that thing as present1 even though it be non--existent 7,,ii4 xvii4 and ,coroll471 he will not conceive it as past or future1 except in so far as its image is joined to the image of time past or future 7,,ii4 xliv4 note74 ,wherefore the image of a thing1 regarded in itself alone1 is identical1 whether it be referred to time past1 time future1 or time present2 that is 7,,ii4 xvi4 ,coroll471 the disposition or emotion of the body is identical1 whether the image be of a thing past1 future1 or present4 ,thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same1 whether the image be of a thing past or future4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note ,i4--,i call a thing past or future1 according as we either have been or shall be affected thereby4 ,for instance1 according as we have seen it1 or are about to see it1 according as it has recreated us1 or will recreate us1 according as it has harmed us1 or will harm us4 ,for1 as we thus conceive it1 we affirm its existence2 that is1 the body is affected by no emotion which excludes the existence of the thing1 and therefore 7,,ii4 xvii47 the body is affected by the image of the thing1 in the same way as if the thing were actually present4 ,however1 as it generally happens that those1 who have had many experiences1 vacillate1 so long as they regard a thing as future or past1 and are usually in doubt about its issue 7,,ii4 xliv4 note72 it follows that the emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so constant1 but are generally disturbed by the images of other things1 until men become assured of the issue4 ,note ,,ii4--,from what has just been said1 we understand what is meant by the terms ,hope1 ,fear1 ,confidence1 ,despair1 ,joy1 and ,disappointment4#e ,hope is nothing else but an inconstant pleasure1 arising from the image of something future or past1 whereof we do not yet know the issue4 ,fear1 on the other hand1 is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something concerning which we are in doubt4 ,if the element of doubt be removed from these emotions1 hope becomes ,confidence and fear becomes ,despair4 ,in other words1 ,pleasure or ,pain arising from the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared4 ,again1 ,joy is ,pleasure arising from the image of something past whereof we have doubted the issue4 ,disappointment is the ,pain opposed to ,joy4 #e ,conscienti morsus--thus rendered by ,mr4 ,pollock4 ,,prop4 ,,xix4 ,he who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain2 if he conceives that it is preserved he will feel pleasure4 ,proof4--,the mind1 as far as possible1 endeavours to conceive those things which increase or help the body's power of activity 7,,iii4 xii472 in other words 7,,iii4 xii4 note71 those things which it loves4 ,but conception is helped by those things which postulate the existence of a thing1 and contrariwise is hindered by those which exclude the existence of a thing 7,,ii4 xvii472 therefore the images of things1 which postulate the existence of an object of love1 help the mind's endeavour to conceive the object of love1 in other words 7,,iii4 xi4 note71 affect the mind pleasurably2 contrariwise those things1 which exclude the existence of an object of love1 hinder the aforesaid mental endeavour2 in other words1 affect the mind painfully4 ,he1 therefore1 who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xx4 ,he who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will also feel pleasure4 ,proof4--,the mind 7,,iii4 xiii47 endeavours to conceive those things1 which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or constrained2 that is 7,,iii4 xiii4 note71 it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the existence of what it hates2 therefore the image of a thing1 which excludes the existence of what the mind hates1 helps the aforesaid mental effort1 in other words 7,,iii4 xi4 note71 affects the mind pleasurably4 ,thus he who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxi4 ,he who conceives1 that the object of his love is affected pleasurably or painfully1 will himself be affected pleasurably or painfully2 and the one or the other emotion will be greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or less in the thing loved4 ,proof4--,the images of things 7as we showed in ,,iii4 xix47 which postulate the existence of the object of love1 help the mind's endeavour to conceive the said object4 ,but pleasure postulates the existence of something feeling pleasure1 so much the more in proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater2 for it is 7,,iii4 xi4 note7 a transition to a greater perfection2 therefore the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental endeavour of the lover2 that is1 it affects the lover pleasurably1 and so much the more1 in proportion as this emotion may have been greater in the object of love4 ,this was our first point4 ,further1 in so far as a thing is affected with pain1 it is to that extent destroyed1 the extent being in proportion to the amount of pain 7,,iii4 xi4 note72 therefore 7,,iii4 xix47 he who conceives1 that the object of his love is affected painfully1 will himself be affected painfully1 in proportion as the said emotion is greater or less in the object of love4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxii4 ,if we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some object of our love1 we shall be affected with love towards that thing4 ,contrariwise1 if we conceive that it affects an object of our love painfully1 we shall be affected with hatred towards it4 ,proof4--,he1 who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of our love1 affects us also pleasurably or painfully--that is1 if we conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or pain 7,,iii4 xxi474 ,but this pleasure or pain is postulated to come to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause2 therefore 7,,iii4 xiii4 note71 if we conceive that anyone affects an object of our love pleasurably or painfully1 we shall be affected with love or hatred towards him4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,prop4 xxi4 explains to us the nature of ,pity1 which we may define as pain arising from another's hurt4 ,what term we can use for pleasure arising from another's gain1 ,i know not4 ,we will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on another1 ,approval2 and the hatred towards him who injures another1 we will call ,indignation4 ,we must further remark1 that we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved 7as shown in ,,iii4 xxi471 but also for a thing which we have hitherto regarded without emotion1 provided that we deem that it resembles ourselves 7as ,i will show presently74 ,thus1 we bestow approval on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves1 and1 contrariwise1 are indignant with him who has done it an injury4 ,,prop4 ,,xxiii4 ,he who conceives1 that an object of his hatred is painfully affected1 will feel pleasure4 ,contrariwise1 if he thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected1 he will feel pain4 ,each of these emotions will be greater or less1 according as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred4 ,proof4--,in so far as an object of hatred is painfully affected1 it is destroyed1 to an extent proportioned to the strength of the pain 7,,iii4 xi4 note74 ,therefore1 he 7,,iii4 xx47 who conceives1 that some object of his hatred is painfully affected1 will feel pleasure1 to an extent proportioned to the amount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred4 ,this was our first point4 ,again1 pleasure postulates the existence of the pleasurably affected thing 7,,iii4 xi4 note71 in proportion as the pleasure is greater or less4 ,if anyone imagines that an object of his hatred is pleasurably affected1 this conception 7,,iii4 xiii47 will hinder his own endeavour to persist2 in other words 7,,iii4 xi4 note71 he who hates will be painfully affected4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,this pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed1 and without any mental conflict4 ,for 7as ,i am about to show in ,prop4 xxvii471 in so far as a man conceives that something similar to himself is affected by pain1 he will himself be affected in like manner2 and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary circumstances4 ,but here we are regarding hatred only4 ,,prop4 ,,xxiv4 ,if we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object of our hate1 we shall feel hatred towards him also4 ,if we conceive that he painfully affects that said object1 we shall feel love towards him4 ,proof4--,this proposition is proved in the same way as ,,iii4 xxii41 which see4 ,note4--,these and similar emotions of hatred are attributable to envy1 which1 accordingly1 is nothing else but hatred1 in so far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's hurt1 and to grieve at another's advantage4 ,,prop4 ,,xxv4 ,we endeavour to affirm1 concerning ourselves1 and concerning what we love1 everything that we can conceive to affect pleasurably ourselves1 or the loved object4 ,contrariwise1 we endeavour to negative everything1 which we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object4 ,proof4--,that1 which we conceive to affect an object of our love pleasurably or painfully1 affects us also pleasurably or painfully 7,,iii4 xxi474 ,but the mind 7,,iii4 xii47 endeavours1 as far as possible1 to conceive those things which affect us pleasurably2 in other words 7,,ii4 xvii4 and ,coroll471 it endeavours to regard them as present4 ,and1 contrariwise 7,,iii4 xiii471 it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as affect us painfully2 therefore1 we endeavour to affirm concerning ourselves1 and concerning the loved object1 whatever we conceive to affect ourselves1 or the love object pleasurably4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxvi4 ,we endeavour to affirm1 concerning that which we hate1 everything which we conceive to affect it painfully2 and1 contrariwise1 we endeavour to deny1 concerning it1 everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably4 ,proof4--,this proposition follows from ,,iii4 xxiii41 as the foregoing proposition followed from ,,iii4 xxi4 ,note4--,thus we see that it may readily happen1 that a man may easily think too highly of himself1 or a loved object1 and1 contrariwise1 too meanly of a hated object4 ,this feeling is called pride1 in reference to the man who thinks too highly of himself1 and is a species of madness1 wherein a man dreams with his eyes open1 thinking that he can accomplish all things that fall within the scope of his conception1 and thereupon accounting them real1 and exulting in them1 so long as he is unable to conceive anything which excludes their existence1 and determines his own power of action4 ,pride1 therefore1 is pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself4 ,again1 the pleasure which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called over--esteem4 ,whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man is called disdain4 ,,prop4 ,,xxvii4 ,by the very fact that we conceive a thing1 which is like ourselves1 and which we have not regarded with any emotion1 to be affected with any emotion1 we are ourselves affected with a like emotion 7affectus74 ,proof4--,the images of things are modifications of the human body1 whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to us 7,,ii4 xvii472 in other words 7,,ii4 x471 whereof the ideas involve the nature of our body1 and1 at the same time1 the nature of the external bodies as present4 ,if1 therefore1 the nature of the external body be similar to the nature of our body1 then the idea which we form of the external body will involve a modification of our own body similar to the modification of the external body4 ,consequently1 if we conceive anyone similar to ourselves as affected by any emotion1 this conception will express a modification of our body similar to that emotion4 ,thus1 from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be affected with any emotion1 we are ourselves affected with a like emotion4 ,if1 however1 we hate the said thing like ourselves1 we shall1 to that extent1 be affected by a contrary1 and not similar1 emotion4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note ,i4--,this imitation of emotions1 when it is referred to pain1 is called compassion 7cf4 ,,iii4 xxii4 note72 when it is referred to desire1 it is called emulation1 which is nothing else but the desire of anything1 engendered in us by the fact that we conceive that others have the like desire4 ,corollary ,i4--,if we conceive that anyone1 whom we have hitherto regarded with no emotion1 pleasurably affects something similar to ourselves1 we shall be affected with love towards him4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we conceive that he painfully affects the same1 we shall be affected with hatred towards him4 ,proof4--,this is proved from the last proposition in the same manner as ,,iii4 xxii4 is proved from ,,iii4 xxi4 ,corollary ,,ii4--,we cannot hate a thing which we pity1 because its misery affects us painfully4 ,proof4--,if we could hate it for this reason1 we should rejoice in its pain1 which is contrary to the hypothesis4 ,corollary ,,iii4--,we seek to free from misery1 as far as we can1 a thing which we pity4 ,proof4--,that1 which painfully affects the object of our pity1 affects us also with similar pain 7by the foregoing proposition72 therefore1 we shall endeavour to recall everything which removes its existence1 or which destroys it 7cf4 ,,iii4 xiii472 in other words 7,,iii4 ix4 note71 we shall desire to destroy it1 or we shall be determined for its destruction2 thus1 we shall endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note ,,ii4--,this will or appetite for doing good1 which arises from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit1 is called benevolence1 and is nothing else but desire arising from compassion4 ,concerning love or hate towards him who has done good or harm to something1 which we conceive to be like ourselves1 see ,,iii4 xxii4 note4 ,,prop4 ,,xxviii4 ,we endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive to conduce to pleasure2 but we endeavour to remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto1 or to conduce to pain4 ,proof4--,we endeavour1 as far as possible1 to conceive that which we imagine to conduce to pleasure 7,,iii4 xii472 in other words 7,,ii4 xvii47 we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as possible as present or actually existing4 ,but the endeavour of the mind1 or the mind's power of thought1 is equal to1 and simultaneous with1 the endeavour of the body1 or the body's power of action4 7,this is clear from ,,ii4 vii4 ,coroll4 and ,,ii4 xi4 ,coroll474 ,therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its existence1 in other words 7which by ,,iii4 ix4 note1 come to the same thing7 we desire and strive for it2 this was our first point4 ,again1 if we conceive that something1 which we believed to be the cause of pain1 that is 7,,iii4 xiii4 note71 which we hate1 is destroyed1 we shall rejoice 7,,iii4 xx474 ,we shall1 therefore 7by the first part of this proof71 endeavour to destroy the same1 or 7,,iii4 xiii47 to remove it from us1 so that we may not regard it as present2 this was our second point4 ,wherefore whatsoever conduces to pleasure1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxix4 ,we shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men#f to regard with pleasure1 and contrariwise we shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from4 #f ,by men in this and the following propositions1 ,i mean men whom we regard without any particular emotion4 ,proof4--,from the fact of imagining1 that men love or hate anything1 we shall love or hate the same thing 7,,iii4 xxvii474 ,that is 7,,iii4 xiii4 note71 from this mere fact we shall feel pleasure or pain at the thing's presence4 ,and so we shall endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with pleasure1 etc4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,this endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone1 solely in order to please men1 we call ambition1 especially when we so eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar1 that we do or omit certain things to our own or another's hurt3 in other cases it is generally called kindliness4 ,furthermore ,i give the name of praise to the pleasure1 with which we conceive the action of another1 whereby he has endeavoured to please us2 but of blame to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action4 ,,prop4 ,,xxx4 ,if anyone has done something which he conceives as affecting other men pleasurably1 he will be affected by pleasure1 accompanied by the idea of himself as cause2 in other words1 he will regard himself with pleasure4 ,on the other hand1 if he has done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully1 he will regard himself with pain4 ,proof4--,he who conceives1 that he affects others with pleasure or pain1 will1 by that very fact1 himself be affected with pleasure or pain 7,,iii4 xxvii471 but1 as a man 7,,ii4 xix4 and xxiii47 is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby he is determined to action1 it follows that he who conceives1 that he affects others pleasurably1 will be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause2 in other words1 he will regard himself with pleasure4 ,and so mutatis mutandis in the case of pain4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,as love 7,,iii4 xiii47 is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause1 and hatred is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause2 the pleasure and pain in question will be a species of love and hatred4 ,but1 as the terms love and hatred are used in reference to external objects1 we will employ other names for the emotions now under discussion3 pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause#g we will style ,honour1 and the emotion contrary thereto we will style ,shame3 ,i mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man's belief1 that he is being praised or blamed3 otherwise pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause#h is called self--complacency1 and its contrary pain is called repentance4 ,again1 as it may happen 7,,ii4 xvii4 ,coroll47 that the pleasure1 wherewith a man conceives that he affects others1 may exist solely in his own imagination1 and as 7,,iii4 xxv47 everyone endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives will affect him with pleasure1 it may easily come to pass that a vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all1 when in reality he may be an annoyance to all4 #g ,so ,van ,vloten and ,bruder4 ,the ,dutch version and ,camerer read1 an internal cause4 ,honor ,gloria4 #h ,see previous endnote4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxi4 ,if we conceive that anyone loves1 desires1 or hates anything which we ourselves love1 desire1 or hate1 we shall thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love1 c4 ,on the contrary1 if we think that anyone shrinks from something that we love1 we shall undergo vacillations of soul4 ,proof4--,from the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves anything we shall ourselves love that thing 7,,iii4 xxvii473 but we are assumed to love it already2 there is1 therefore1 a new cause of love1 whereby our former emotion is fostered2 hence we shall thereupon love it more steadfastly4 ,again1 from the mere fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from anything1 we shall ourselves shrink from that thing 7,,iii4 xxvii474 ,if we assume that we at the same time love it1 we shall then simultaneously love it and shrink from it2 in other words1 we shall be subject to vacillation 7,,iii4 xvii4 note74 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,from the foregoing1 and also from ,,iii4 xxviii4 it follows that everyone endeavours1 as far as possible1 to cause others to love what he himself loves1 and to hate what he himself hates3 as the poet says3 ,as lovers let us share every hope and every fear3 ironhearted were he who should love what the other leaves4#i #i ,ovid1 ,amores1 ,,ii4 xix4 #d1e4 ,spinoza transposes the verses4 ,speremus pariter1 pariter metuamus amantes2 ,ferreus est1 si quis1 quod sinit alter1 amat4 ,note4--,this endeavour to bring it about1 that our own likes and dislikes should meet with universal approval1 is really ambition 7see ,,iii4 xxix4 note72 wherefore we see that everyone by nature desires 7appetere71 that the rest of mankind should live according to his own individual disposition3 when such a desire is equally present in all1 everyone stands in everyone else's way1 and in wishing to be loved or praised by all1 all become mutually hateful4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxii4 ,if we conceive that anyone takes delight in something1 which only one person can possess1 we shall endeavour to bring it about that the man in question shall not gain possession thereof4 ,proof4--,from the mere fact of our conceiving that another person takes delight in a thing 7,,iii4 xxvii4 and ,coroll47 we shall ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight therein4 ,but we assumed that the pleasure in question would be prevented by another's delight in its object2 we shall1 therefore1 endeavour to prevent his possession thereof 7,,iii4 xxviii474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,we thus see that man's nature is generally so constituted1 that he takes pity on those who fare ill1 and envies those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his own love for the goods in their possession4 ,further1 we see that from the same property of human nature1 whence it follows that men are merciful1 it follows also that they are envious and ambitious4 ,lastly1 if we make appeal to ,experience1 we shall find that she entirely confirms what we have said2 more especially if we turn our attention to the first years of our life4 ,we find that children1 whose body is continually1 as it were1 in equilibrium1 laugh or cry simply because they see others laughing or crying2 moreover1 they desire forthwith to imitate whatever they see others doing1 and to possess themselves of whatever they conceive as delighting others3 inasmuch as the images of things are1 as we have said1 modifications of the human body1 or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by external causes to act in this or that manner4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxiii4 ,when we love a thing similar to ourselves we endeavour1 as far as we can1 to bring about that it should love us in return4 ,proof4--,that which we love we endeavour1 as far as we can1 to conceive in preference to anything else 7,,iii4 xii474 ,if the thing be similar to ourselves1 we shall endeavour to affect it pleasurably in preference to anything else 7,,iii4 xxix474 ,in other words1 we shall endeavour1 as far as we can1 to bring it about1 that the thing should be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourselves1 that is 7,,iii4 xiii4 note71 that it should love us in return4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxiv4 ,the greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected towards us1 the greater will be our complacency4 ,proof4--,we endeavour 7,,iii4 xxxiii471 as far as we can1 to bring about1 that what we love should love us in return3 in other words1 that what we love should be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourself as cause4 ,therefore1 in proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected because of us1 our endeavour will be assisted4--that is 7,,iii4 xi4 and note7 the greater will be our pleasure4 ,but when we take pleasure in the fact1 that we pleasurably affect something similar to ourselves1 we regard ourselves with pleasure 7,,iii4 #cj72 therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxv4 ,if anyone conceives1 that an object of his love joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself has attained to1 he will be affected with hatred towards the loved object and with envy towards his rival4 ,proof4--,in proportion as a man thinks1 that a loved object is well affected towards him1 will be the strength of his self--approval 7by the last ,prop471 that is 7,,iii4 xxx4 note71 of his pleasure2 he will1 therefore 7,,iii4 xxviii471 endeavour1 as far as he can1 to imagine the loved object as most closely bound to him3 this endeavour or desire will be increased1 if he thinks that someone else has a similar desire 7,,iii4 xxxi474 ,but this endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the loved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the loved object has joined to itself2 therefore 7,,iii4 xi4 note7 he will for that reason be affected with pain1 accompanied by the idea of the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his rival2 that is1 he will be 7,,iii4 xiii47 affected with hatred towards the loved object and also towards his rival 7,,iii4 xv4 ,coroll471 which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved object4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,this hatred towards an object of love joined with envy is called ,jealousy1 which accordingly is nothing else but a wavering of the disposition arising from combined love and hatred1 accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied4 ,further1 this hatred towards the object of love will be greater1 in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont to derive from the reciprocated love of the said object2 and also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained towards his rival4 ,if he had hated him1 he will forthwith hate the object of his love1 because he conceives it is pleasurably affected by one whom he himself hates3 and also because he is compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image of him whom he hates4 ,this condition generally comes into play in the case of love for a woman3 for he who thinks1 that a woman whom he loves prostitutes herself to another1 will feel pain1 not only because his own desire is restrained1 but also because1 being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the parts of shame and the excreta of another1 he therefore shrinks from her4 ,we must add1 that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved with the same joyful countenance as before1 and this also gives him pain as a lover1 as ,i will now show4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxvi4 ,he who remembers a thing1 in which he has once taken delight1 desires to possess it under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein4 ,proof4--,everything1 which a man has seen in conjunction with the object of his love1 will be to him accidentally a cause of pleasure 7,,iii4 xv472 he will1 therefore1 desire to possess it1 in conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight2 in other words1 he will desire to possess the object of his love under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,a lover will1 therefore1 feel pain if one of the aforesaid attendant circumstances be missing4 ,proof4--,for1 in so far as he finds some circumstance to be missing1 he conceives something which excludes its existence4 ,as he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing or circumstance 7by the last ,prop471 he will1 in so far as he conceives it to be missing1 feel pain 7,,iii4 xix474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,this pain1 in so far as it has reference to the absence of the object of love1 is called ,regret4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxvii4 ,desire arising through pain or pleasure1 hatred or love1 is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater4 ,proof4--,pain diminishes or constrains a man's power of activity 7,,iii4 xi4 note71 in other words 7,,iii4 vii471 diminishes or constrains the effort1 wherewith he endeavours to persist in his own being2 therefore 7,,iii4 v47 it is contrary to the said endeavour3 thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are directed to removing that pain4 ,but 7by the definition of pain71 in proportion as the pain is greater1 so also is it necessarily opposed to a greater part of man's power of activity2 therefore the greater the pain1 the greater the power of activity employed to remove it2 that is1 the greater will be the desire or appetite in endeavouring to remove it4 ,again1 since pleasure 7,,iii4 xi4 note7 increases or aids a man's power of activity1 it may easily be shown in like manner1 that a man affected by pleasure has no desire further than to preserve it1 and his desire will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure4 ,lastly1 since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain and pleasure1 it follows in like manner that the endeavour1 appetite1 or desire1 which arises through hatred or love1 will be greater in proportion to the hatred or love4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxviii4 ,if a man has begun to hate an object of his love1 so that love is thoroughly destroyed1 he will1 causes being equal1 regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it1 and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love4 ,proof4--,if a man begins to hate that which he had loved1 more of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never loved it4 ,for love is a pleasure 7,,iii4 xiii4 note7 which a man endeavours as far as he can to render permanent 7,,iii4 xxviii472 he does so by regarding the object of his love as present1 and by affecting it as far as he can pleasurably2 this endeavour is greater in proportion as the love is greater1 and so also is the endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his affection 7,,iii4 xxxiii474 ,now these endeavours are constrained by hatred towards the object of love 7,,iii4 xiii4 ,coroll4 and ,,iii4 xxiii472 wherefore the lover 7,,iii4 xi4 note7 will for this cause also be affected with pain1 the more so in proportion as his love has been greater2 that is1 in addition to the pain caused by hatred1 there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the object2 wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater pain1 or in other words1 will hate it more than if he had never loved it1 and with the more intensity in proportion as his former love was greater4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxix4 ,he who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an injury1 unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue to himself2 on the other hand1 he who loves anyone will1 by the same law1 seek to benefit him4 ,proof4--,to hate a man is 7,,iii4 xiii4 note7 to conceive him as a cause of pain2 therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to remove or destroy him4 ,but if anything more painful1 or1 in other words1 a greater evil1 should accrue to the hater thereby--and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not carrying out the injury1 which he planned against the object of his hate--he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury 7,,iii4 xxviii471 and the strength of his endeavour 7,,iii4 xxxvii47 will be greater than his former endeavour to do injury1 and will therefore prevail over it1 as we asserted4 ,the second part of this proof proceeds in the same manner4 ,wherefore he who hates another1 etc4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,by good ,i here mean every kind of pleasure1 and all that conduces thereto1 especially that which satisfies our longings1 whatsoever they may be4 ,by evil1 ,i mean every kind of pain1 especially that which frustrates our longings4 ,for ,i have shown 7,,iii4 ix4 note7 that we in no case desire a thing because we deem it good1 but1 contrariwise1 we deem a thing good because we desire it3 consequently we deem evil that which we shrink from2 everyone1 therefore1 according to his particular emotions1 judges or estimates what is good1 what is bad1 what is better1 what is worse1 lastly1 what is best1 and what is worst4 ,thus a miser thinks that abundance of money is the best1 and want of money the worst2 an ambitious man desires nothing so much as glory1 and fears nothing so much as shame4 ,to an envious man nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune1 and nothing more painful than another's success4 ,so every man1 according to his emotions1 judges a thing to be good or bad1 useful or useless4 ,the emotion1 which induces a man to turn from that which he wishes1 or to wish for that which he turns from1 is called timidity1 which may accordingly be defined as the fear whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as future by encountering a lesser evil 7,,iii4 xxviii474 ,but if the evil which he fears be shame1 timidity becomes bashfulness4 ,lastly1 if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the fear of another evil1 so that the man knows not which to choose1 fear becomes consternation1 especially if both the evils feared be very great4 ,,prop4 ,,xl4 ,he1 who conceives himself to be hated by another1 and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred1 will hate that other in return4 ,proof4--,he who conceives another as affected with hatred1 will thereupon be affected himself with hatred 7,,iii4 xxvii471 that is1 with pain1 accompanied by the idea of an external cause4 ,but1 by the hypothesis1 he conceives no cause for this pain except him who is his enemy2 therefore1 from conceiving that he is hated by some one1 he will be affected with pain1 accompanied by the idea of his enemy2 in other words1 he will hate his enemy in return4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,he who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred will 7,,iii4 xxx4 and note7 be affected with shame2 but this case 7,,iii4 xxv47 rarely happens4 ,this reciprocation of hatred may also arise from the hatred1 which follows an endeavour to injure the object of our hate 7,,iii4 xxxix474 ,he therefore who conceives that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause of some evil or pain2 thus he will be affected with pain or fear1 accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause2 in other words1 he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy1 as ,i said above4 ,corollary ,i4--,he who conceives1 that one whom he loves hates him1 will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love4 ,for1 in so far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred1 he is determined to hate his enemy in return4 ,but1 by the hypothesis1 he nevertheless loves him3 wherefore he will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love4 ,corollary ,,ii4--,if a man conceives that one1 whom he has hitherto regarded without emotion1 has done him any injury from motives of hatred1 he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in kind4 ,proof4--,he who conceives1 that another hates him1 will 7by the last proposition7 hate his enemy in return1 and 7,,iii4 xxvi47 will endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully2 he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury 7,,iii4 xxxix474 ,now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury done to himself2 he will1 therefore1 forthwith endeavour to repay it in kind4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,the endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called ,anger2 the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves is called ,revenge4 ,,prop4 ,,xli4 ,if anyone conceives that he is loved by another1 and believes that he has given no cause for such love1 he will love that other in return4 7,cf4 ,,iii4 xv4 ,coroll41 and ,,iii4 xvi47 ,proof4--,this proposition is proved in the same way as the preceding one4 ,see also the note appended thereto4 ,note4--,if he believes that he has given just cause for the love1 he will take pride therein 7,,iii4 xxx4 and note72 this is what most often happens 7,,iii4 xxv471 and we said that its contrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated by another4 7,see note to preceding proposition47 ,this reciprocal love1 and consequently the desire of benefiting him who loves us 7,,iii4 xxxix471 and who endeavours to benefit us1 is called gratitude or thankfulness4 ,it thus appears that men are much more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits4 ,corollary4--,he who imagines that he is loved by one whom he hates1 will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love4 ,this is proved in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding proposition4 ,note4--,if hatred be the prevailing emotion1 he will endeavour to injure him who loves him2 this emotion is called cruelty1 especially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary cause for hatred4 ,,prop4 ,,xlii4 ,he who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives of love or honour will feel pain1 if he sees that the benefit is received without gratitude4 ,proof4--,when a man loves something similar to himself1 he endeavours1 as far as he can1 to bring it about that he should be loved thereby in return 7,,iii4 xxxiii474 ,therefore he who has conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire1 which he feels of being loved in return2 that is 7,,iii4 xxxiv47 from the hope of honour or 7,,iii4 xxx4 note7 pleasure2 hence he will endeavour1 as far as he can1 to conceive this cause of honour1 or to regard it as actually existing4 ,but1 by the hypothesis1 he conceives something else1 which excludes the existence of the said cause of honour3 wherefore he will thereat feel pain 7,,iii4 xix474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xliii4 ,hatred is increased by being reciprocated1 and can on the other hand be destroyed by love4 ,proof4--,he who conceives1 that an object of his hatred hates him in return1 will thereupon feel a new hatred1 while the former hatred 7by hypothesis7 still remains 7,,iii4 xl474 ,but if1 on the other hand1 he conceives that the object of hate loves him1 he will to this extent 7,,iii4 xxxviii47 regard himself with pleasure1 and 7,,iii4 xxix47 will endeavour to please the cause of his emotion4 ,in other words1 he will endeavour not to hate him 7,,iii4 xli471 and not to affect him painfully2 this endeavour 7,,iii4 xxxvii47 will be greater or less in proportion to the emotion from which it arises4 ,therefore1 if it be greater than that which arises from hatred1 and through which the man endeavours to affect painfully the thing which he hates1 it will get the better of it and banish the hatred from his mind4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xliv4 ,hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes into love3 and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not preceded it4 ,proof4--,the proof proceeds in the same way as ,prop4 xxxviii4 of this ,part3 for he who begins to love a thing1 which he was wont to hate or regard with pain1 from the very fact of loving feels pleasure4 ,to this pleasure involved in love is added the pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove the pain involved in hatred 7,,iii4 xxxvii471 accompanied by the idea of the former object of hatred as cause4 ,note4--,though this be so1 no one will endeavour to hate anything1 or to be affected with pain1 for the sake of enjoying this greater pleasure2 that is1 no one will desire that he should be injured1 in the hope of recovering from the injury1 nor long to be ill for the sake of getting well4 ,for everyone will always endeavour to persist in his being1 and to ward off pain as far as he can4 ,if the contrary is conceivable1 namely1 that a man should desire to hate someone1 in order that he might love him the more thereafter1 he will always desire to hate him4 ,for the strength of love is in proportion to the strength of the hatred1 wherefore the man would desire1 that the hatred be continually increased more and more1 and1 for a similar reason1 he would desire to become more and more ill1 in order that he might take a greater pleasure in being restored to health3 in such a case he would always endeavour to be ill1 which 7,,iii4 vi47 is absurd4 ,,prop4 ,,xlv4 ,if a man conceives1 that anyone similar to himself hates anything also similar to himself1 which he loves1 he will hate that person4 ,proof4--,the beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him who hates it 7,,iii4 xl472 therefore the lover1 in conceiving that anyone hates the beloved object1 conceives the beloved thing as affected by hatred1 in other words 7,,iii4 xiii471 by pain2 consequently he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the idea of the hater of the beloved thing as cause2 that is1 he will hate him who hates anything which he himself loves 7,,iii4 xiii4 note74 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xlvi4 ,if a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by anyone1 of a class or nation different from his own1 and if the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said stranger as cause1 under the general category of the class or nation3 the man will feel love or hatred1 not only to the individual stranger1 but also to the whole class or nation whereto he belongs4 ,proof4--,this is evident from ,,iii4 xvi4 ,,prop4 ,,xlvii4 ,joy arising from the fact1 that anything we hate is destroyed1 or suffers other injury1 is never unaccompanied by a certain pain in us4 ,proof4--,this is evident from ,,iii4 xxvii4 ,for in so far as we conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain1 we ourselves feel pain4 ,note4--,this proposition can also be proved from the ,corollary to ,,ii4 xvii4 ,whenever we remember anything1 even if it does not actually exist1 we regard it only as present1 and the body is affected in the same manner2 wherefore1 in so far as the remembrance of the thing is strong1 a man is determined to regard it with pain2 this determination1 while the image of the thing in question lasts1 is indeed checked by the remembrance of other things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing1 but is not destroyed3 hence1 a man only feels pleasure in so far as the said determination is checked3 for this reason the joy arising from the injury done to what we hate is repeated1 every time we remember that object of hatred4 ,for1 as we have said1 when the image of the thing in question1 is aroused1 inasmuch as it involves the thing's existence1 it determines the man to regard the thing with the same pain as he was wont to do1 when it actually did exist4 ,however1 since he has joined to the image of the thing other images1 which exclude its existence1 this determination to pain is forthwith checked1 and the man rejoices afresh as often as the repetition takes place4 ,this is the cause of men's pleasure in recalling past evils1 and delight in narrating dangers from which they have escaped4 ,for when men conceive a danger1 they conceive it as still future1 and are determined to fear it2 this determination is checked afresh by the idea of freedom1 which became associated with the idea of the danger when they escaped therefrom3 this renders them secure afresh3 therefore they rejoice afresh4 ,,prop4 ,,xlviii4 ,love or hatred towards1 for instance1 ,peter is destroyed1 if the pleasure involved in the former1 or the pain involved in the latter emotion1 be associated with the idea of another cause3 and will be diminished in proportion as we conceive ,peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion4 ,proof4--,this ,prop4 is evident from the mere definition of love and hatred 7,,iii4 xiii4 note74 ,for pleasure is called love towards ,peter1 and pain is called hatred towards ,peter1 simply in so far as ,peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the other4 ,when this condition of causality is either wholly or partly removed1 the emotion towards ,peter also wholly or in part vanishes4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xlix4 ,love or hatred towards a thing1 which we conceive to be free1 must1 other conditions being similar1 be greater than if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity4 ,proof4--,a thing which we conceive as free must 7,i4 ,def4 vii47 be perceived through itself without anything else4 ,if1 therefore1 we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain1 we shall therefore 7,,iii4 xiii4 note7 love it or hate it1 and shall do so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from the given emotion4 ,but if the thing which causes the emotion be conceived as acting by necessity1 we shall then 7by the same ,def4 vii4 ,part ,i47 conceive it not as the sole cause1 but as one of the causes of the emotion1 and therefore our love or hatred towards it will be less4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,hence it follows1 that men1 thinking themselves to be free1 feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards anything else3 to this consideration we must add the imitation of emotions treated of in ,,iii4 xxvii41 xxxiv41 xl4 and xliii4 ,,prop4 ,l4 ,anything whatever can be1 accidentally1 a cause of hope or fear4 ,proof4--,this proposition is proved in the same way as ,,iii4 xv41 which see1 together with the note to ,,iii4 xviii4 ,note4--,things which are accidentally the causes of hope or fear are called good or evil omens4 ,now1 in so far as such omens are the cause of hope or fear1 they are 7by the definitions of hope and fear given in ,,iii4 xviii4 note7 the causes also of pleasure and pain2 consequently we1 to this extent1 regard them with love or hatred1 and endeavour either to invoke them as means towards that which we hope for1 or to remove them as obstacles1 or causes of that which we fear4 ,it follows1 further1 from ,,iii4 xxv41 that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily in that which we hope for1 and with difficulty in that which we fear2 moreover1 we are apt to estimate such objects above or below their true value4 ,hence there have arisen superstitions1 whereby men are everywhere assailed4 ,however1 ,i do not think it worth while to point out here the vacillations springing from hope and fear2 it follows from the definition of these emotions1 that there can be no hope without fear1 and no fear without hope1 as ,i will duly explain in the proper place4 ,further1 in so far as we hope for or fear anything1 we regard it with love or hatred2 thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we have said concerning love and hatred4 ,,prop4 ,,li4 ,different men may be differently affected by the same object1 and the same man may be differently affected at different times by the same object4 ,proof4--,the human body is affected by external bodies in a variety of ways 7,,ii4 ,post4 iii474 ,two men may therefore be differently affected at the same time1 and therefore 7by ,ax4 i4 after ,lemma iii4 after ,,ii4 xiii47 may be differently affected by one and the same object4 ,further 7by the same ,post47 the human body can be affected sometimes in one way1 sometimes in another2 consequently 7by the same ,axiom7 it may be differently affected at different times by one and the same object4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,we thus see that it is possible1 that what one man loves another may hate1 and that what one man fears another may not fear2 or1 again1 that one and the same man may love what he once hated1 or may be bold where he once was timid1 and so on4 ,again1 as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good1 what bad1 what better1 and what worse 7,,iii4 xxxix4 note71 it follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their emotions#aj1 hence when we compare some with others1 we distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions1 and style some intrepid1 others timid1 others by some other epithet4 ,for instance1 ,i shall call a man intrepid1 if he despises an evil which ,i am accustomed to fear2 if ,i further take into consideration1 that1 in his desire to injure his enemies and to benefit those whom he loves1 he is not restrained by the fear of an evil which is sufficient to restrain me1 ,i shall call him daring4 ,again1 a man will appear timid to me1 if he fears an evil which ,i am accustomed to despise2 and if ,i further take into consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of an evil1 which is not sufficient to restrain me1 ,i shall say that he is cowardly2 and in like manner will everyone pass judgment4 #aj ,this is possible1 though the human mind is part of the divine intellect1 as ,i have shown in ,,ii4 xiii4 note4 ,lastly1 from this inconstancy in the nature of human judgment1 inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his emotions1 and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause pleasure or pain1 and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent1 are often purely imaginary1 not to speak of the uncertainty of things alluded to in ,,iii4 xxviii42 we may readily conceive that a man may be at one time affected with pleasure1 and at another with pain1 accompanied by the idea of himself as cause4 ,thus we can easily understand what are ,repentance and ,self--complacency4 ,repentance is pain1 accompanied by the idea of one's self as cause2 ,self--complacency is pleasure1 accompanied by the idea of one's self as cause1 and these emotions are most intense because men believe themselves to be free 7,,iii4 xlix474 ,,prop4 ,,lii4 ,an object which we have formerly seen in conjunction with others1 and which we do not conceive to have any property that is not common to many1 will not be regarded by us for so long1 as an object which we conceive to have some property peculiar to itself4 ,proof4--,as soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in conjunction with others1 we at once remember those others 7,,ii4 xviii4 and note71 and thus we pass forthwith from the contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another object4 ,and this is the case with the object1 which we conceive to have no property that is not common to many4 ,for we thereupon assume that we are regarding therein nothing1 which we have not before seen in conjunction with other objects4 ,but when we suppose that we conceive an object something special1 which we have never seen before1 we must needs say that the mind1 while regarding that object1 has in itself nothing which it can fall to regarding instead thereof2 therefore it is determined to the contemplation of that object only4 ,therefore an object1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,this mental modification1 or imagination of a particular thing1 in so far as it is alone in the mind1 is called ,wonder2 but if it be excited by an object of fear1 it is called ,consternation1 because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed in the simple contemplation thereof1 that he has no power to think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil4 ,if1 however1 the object of wonder be a man's prudence1 industry1 or anything of that sort1 inasmuch as the said man1 is thereby regarded as far surpassing ourselves1 wonder is called ,veneration2 otherwise1 if a man's anger1 envy1 c41 be what we wonder at1 the emotion is called ,horror4 ,again1 if it be the prudence1 industry1 or what not1 of a man we love1 that we wonder at1 our love will on this account be the greater 7,,iii4 xii471 and when joined to wonder or veneration is called ,devotion4 ,we may in like manner conceive hatred1 hope1 confidence1 and the other emotions1 as associated with wonder2 and we should thus be able to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in ordinary speech4 ,whence it is evident1 that the names of the emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their nature4 ,to wonder is opposed ,contempt1 which generally arises from the fact that1 because we see someone wondering at1 loving1 or fearing something1 or because something1 at first sight1 appears to be like things1 which we ourselves wonder at1 love1 fear1 c41 we are1 in consequence 7,,iii4 xv4 ,coroll4 and ,,iii4 xxvii471 determined to wonder at1 love1 or fear that thing4 ,but if from the presence1 or more accurate contemplation of the said thing1 we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause of wonder1 love1 fear1 c41 the mind then1 by the presence of the thing1 remains determined to think rather of those qualities which are not in it1 than of those which are in it2 whereas1 on the other hand1 the presence of the object would cause it more particularly to regard that which is therein4 ,as devotion springs from wonder at a thing which we love1 so does ,derision spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear1 and ,scorn from contempt of folly1 as veneration from wonder at prudence4 ,lastly1 we can conceive the emotions of love1 hope1 honour1 c41 in association with contempt1 and can thence deduce other emotions1 which are not distinguished one from another by any recognized name4 ,,prop4 ,,liii4 ,when the mind regards itself and its own power of activity1 it feels pleasure3 and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power of activity4 ,proof4--,a man does not know himself except through the modifications of his body1 and the ideas thereof 7,,ii4 xix4 and xxiii474 ,when1 therefore1 the mind is able to contemplate itself1 it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection1 or 7,,iii4 xi4 note7 to feel pleasure2 and the pleasure will be greater in proportion to the distinctness1 wherewith it is able to conceive itself and its own power of activity4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,this pleasure is fostered more and more1 in proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others4 ,for the more he conceives himself as praised by others1 the more he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure1 accompanied by the idea of himself 7,,iii4 xxix4 note72 thus he is 7,,iii4 xxvii47 himself affected with greater pleasure1 accompanied by the idea of himself4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,liv4 ,the mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity4 ,proof4--,the endeavour or power of the mind is the actual essence thereof 7,,iii4 vii472 but the essence of the mind obviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do2 not that which it neither is nor can do2 therefore the mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assert or affirm its power of activity4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,lv4 ,when the mind contemplates its own weakness1 it feels pain thereat4 ,proof4--,the essence of the mind only affirms that which the mind is1 or can do2 in other words1 it is the mind's nature to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity 7last ,prop474 ,thus1 when we say that the mind contemplates its own weakness1 we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting to conceive something which asserts its power of activity1 it is checked in its endeavour----in other words 7,,iii4 xi4 note71 it feels pain4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,this pain is more and more fostered1 if a man conceives that he is blamed by others2 this may be proved in the same way as the corollary to ,,iii4 liii4 ,note4--,this pain1 accompanied by the idea of our own weakness1 is called humility2 the pleasure1 which springs from the contemplation of ourselves1 is called self--love or self--complacency4 ,and inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as often as a man contemplates his own virtues1 or his own power of activity1 it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own exploits1 and displaying the force both of his body and mind1 and also that1 for this reason1 men are troublesome to one another4 ,again1 it follows that men are naturally envious 7,,iii4 xxiv4 note1 and ,,iii4 xxxii4 note71 rejoicing in the shortcomings of their equals1 and feeling pain at their virtues4 ,for whenever a man conceives his own actions1 he is affected with pleasure 7,,iii4 liii471 in proportion as his actions display more perfection1 and he conceives them more distinctly--that is 7,,ii4 xl4 note71 in proportion as he can distinguish them from others1 and regard them as something special4 ,therefore1 a man will take most pleasure in contemplating himself1 when he contemplates some quality which he denies to others4 ,but1 if that which he affirms of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in general1 he will not be so greatly pleased3 he will1 on the contrary1 feel pain1 if he conceives that his own actions fall short when compared with those of others4 ,this pain 7,,iii4 xxviii47 he will endeavour to remove1 by putting a wrong construction on the actions of his equals1 or by1 as far as he can1 embellishing his own4 ,it is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred and envy1 which latter is fostered by their education4 ,for parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely by the spur of honour and envy4 ,but1 perhaps1 some will scruple to assent to what ,i have said1 because we not seldom admire men's virtues1 and venerate their possessors4 ,in order to remove such doubts1 ,i append the following corollary4 ,corollary4--,no one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his equal4 ,proof4--,envy is a species of hatred 7,,iii4 xxiv4 note7 or 7,,iii4 xiii4 note7 pain1 that is 7,,iii4 xi4 note71 a modification whereby a man's power of activity1 or endeavour towards activity1 is checked4 ,but a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything1 which cannot follow from his nature as it is given2 therefore a man will not desire any power of activity or virtue 7which is the same thing7 to be attributed to him1 that is appropriate to another's nature and foreign to his own2 hence his desire cannot be checked1 nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue in some one unlike himself1 consequently he cannot envy such an one4 ,but he can envy his equal1 who is assumed to have the same nature as himself4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,when1 therefore1 as we said in the note to ,,iii4 lii41 we venerate a man1 through wonder at his prudence1 fortitude1 c41 we do so1 because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar to him1 and not as common to our nature2 we1 therefore1 no more envy their possessor1 than we envy trees for being tall1 or lions for being courageous4 ,,prop4 ,,lvi4 ,there are as many kinds of pleasure1 of pain1 of desire1 and of every emotion compounded of these1 such as vacillations of spirit1 or derived from these1 such as love1 hatred1 hope1 fear1 c41 as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected4 ,proof4--,pleasure and pain1 and consequently the emotions compounded thereof1 or derived therefrom1 are passions1 or passive states 7,,iii4 xi4 note72 now we are necessarily passive 7,,iii4 i471 in so far as we have inadequate ideas2 and only in so far as we have such ideas are we passive 7,,iii4 iii472 that is1 we are only necessarily passive 7,,ii4 xl4 note71 in so far as we conceive1 or 7,,ii4 xvii4 and note7 in so far as we are affected by an emotion1 which involves the nature of our own body1 and the nature of an external body4 ,wherefore the nature of every passive state must necessarily be so explained1 that the nature of the object whereby we are affected be expressed4 ,namely1 the pleasure1 which arises from1 say1 the object ,a1 involves the nature of that object ,a1 and the pleasure1 which arises from the object ,b1 involves the nature of the object ,b2 wherefore these two pleasurable emotions are by nature different1 inasmuch as the causes whence they arise are by nature different4 ,so again the emotion of pain1 which arises from one object1 is by nature different from the pain arising from another object1 and1 similarly1 in the case of love1 hatred1 hope1 fear1 vacillation1 c4 ,thus1 there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure1 pain1 love1 hatred1 c41 as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected4 ,now desire is each man's essence or nature1 in so far as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any given modification of itself 7,,iii4 ix4 note72 therefore1 according as a man is affected through external causes by this or that kind of pleasure1 pain1 love1 hatred1 c41 in other words1 according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner1 so will his desire be of one kind or another1 and the nature of one desire must necessarily differ from the nature of another desire1 as widely as the emotions differ1 wherefrom each desire arose4 ,thus there are as many kinds of desire1 as there are kinds of pleasure1 pain1 love1 c41 consequently 7by what has been shown7 there are as many kinds of desire1 as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,among the kinds of emotions1 which1 by the last proposition1 must be very numerous1 the chief are luxury1 drunkenness1 lust1 avarice1 and ambition1 being merely species of love or desire1 displaying the nature of those emotions in a manner varying according to the object1 with which they are concerned4 ,for by luxury1 drunkenness1 lust1 avarice1 ambition1 c41 we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting1 drinking1 venery1 riches1 and fame4 ,furthermore1 these emotions1 in so far as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects wherewith they are concerned1 have no contraries4 ,for temperance1 sobriety1 and chastity1 which we are wont to oppose to luxury1 drunkenness1 and lust1 are not emotions or passive states1 but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the last--named emotions4 ,however1 ,i cannot here explain the remaining kinds of emotions 7seeing that they are as numerous as the kinds of objects71 nor1 if ,i could1 would it be necessary4 ,it is sufficient for our purpose1 namely1 to determine the strength of the emotions1 and the mind's power over them1 to have a general definition of each emotion4 ,it is sufficient1 ,i repeat1 to understand the general properties of the emotions and the mind1 to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the mind's power in moderating and checking the emotions4 ,thus1 though there is a great difference between various emotions of love1 hatred1 or desire1 for instance between love felt towards children1 and love felt towards a wife1 there is no need for us to take cognizance of such differences1 or to track out further the nature and origin of the emotions4 ,,prop4 ,,lvii4 ,any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion of another individual1 only in so far as the essence of the one individual differs from the essence of the other4 ,proof4--,this proposition is evident from ,ax4 i4 7which see after ,lemma iii4 ,prop4 xiii41 ,part ,,ii474 ,nevertheless1 we will prove it from the nature of the three primary emotions4 ,all emotions are attributable to desire1 pleasure1 or pain1 as their definitions above given show4 ,but desire is each man's nature or essence 7,,iii4 ix4 note72 therefore desire in one individual differs from desire in another individual1 only in so far as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature or essence of the other4 ,again1 pleasure and pain are passive states or passions1 whereby every man's power or endeavour to persist in his being is increased or diminished1 helped or hindered 7,,iii4 xi4 and note74 ,but by the endeavour to persist in its being1 in so far as it is attributable to mind and body in conjunction1 we mean appetite and desire 7,,iii4 ix4 note72 therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or appetite1 in so far as by external causes they are increased or diminished1 helped or hindered1 in other words1 they are every man's nature2 wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man1 only in so far as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the essence of the other2 consequently1 any emotion of one individual only differs1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,hence it follows1 that the emotions of the animals which are called irrational 7for after learning the origin of mind we cannot doubt that brutes feel7 only differ from man's emotions1 to the extent that brute nature differs from human nature4 ,horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of procreation2 but the desire of the former is equine1 the desire of the latter is human4 ,so also the lusts and appetites of insects1 fishes1 and birds must needs vary according to the several natures4 ,thus1 although each individual lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his being1 yet the life1 wherein each is content and rejoices1 is nothing else but the idea1 or soul1 of the said individual1 and hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of another1 to the extent that the essence of one differs from the essence of another4 ,lastly1 it follows from the foregoing proposition1 that there is no small difference between the joy which actuates1 say1 a drunkard1 and the joy possessed by a philosopher1 as ,i just mention here by the way4 ,thus far ,i have treated of the emotions attributable to man1 in so far as he is passive4 ,it remains to add a few words on those attributable to him in so far as he is active4 ,,prop4 ,,lviii4 ,besides pleasure and desire1 which are passivities or passions1 there are other emotions derived from pleasure and desire1 which are attributable to us in so far as we are active4 ,proof4--,when the mind conceives itself and its power of activity1 it feels pleasure 7,,iii4 liii473 now the mind necessarily contemplates itself1 when it conceives a true or adequate idea 7,,ii4 xliii474 ,but the mind does conceive certain adequate ideas 7,,ii4 xl4 note #b474 ,therefore it feels pleasure in so far as it conceives adequate ideas2 that is1 in so far as it is active 7,,iii4 i474 ,again1 the mind1 both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas1 and in so far as it has confused ideas1 endeavours to persist in its own being 7,,iii4 ix472 but by such an endeavour we mean desire 7by the note to the same ,prop472 therefore1 desire is also attributable to us1 in so far as we understand1 or 7,,iii4 i47 in so far as we are active4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,lix4 ,among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active1 there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or desire4 ,proof4--,all emotions can be referred to desire1 pleasure1 or pain1 as their definitions1 already given1 show4 ,now by pain we mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or checked 7,,iii4 xi4 and note72 therefore1 in so far as the mind feels pain1 its power of understanding1 that is1 of activity1 is diminished or checked 7,,iii4 i472 therefore1 no painful emotions can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active1 but only emotions of pleasure and desire1 which 7by the last ,prop47 are attributable to the mind in that condition4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,all actions following from emotion1 which are attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding1 ,i set down to strength of character 7fortitudo71 which ,i divide into courage 7animositas7 and highmindedness 7generositas74 ,by courage ,i mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason4 ,by highmindedness ,i mean the desire whereby every man endeavours1 solely under the dictates of reason1 to aid other men and to unite them to himself in friendship4 ,those actions1 therefore1 which have regard solely to the good of the agent ,i set down to courage1 those which aim at the good of others ,i set down to highmindedness4 ,thus temperance1 sobriety1 and presence of mind in danger1 c41 are varieties of courage2 courtesy1 mercy1 c41 are varieties of highmindedness4 ,i think ,i have thus explained1 and displayed through their primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit1 which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions1 to wit1 desire1 pleasure1 and pain4 ,it is evident from what ,i have said1 that we are in many ways driven about by external causes1 and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate4 ,but ,i have said1 that ,i have only set forth the chief conflicting emotions1 not all that might be given4 ,for1 by proceeding in the same way as above1 we can easily show that love is united to repentance1 scorn1 shame1 c4 ,i think everyone will agree from what has been said1 that the emotions may be compounded one with another in so many ways1 and so many variations may arise therefrom1 as to exceed all possibility of computation4 ,however1 for my purpose1 it is enough to have enumerated the most important2 to reckon up the rest which ,i have omitted would be more curious than profitable4 ,it remains to remark concerning love1 that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a thing which we longed for1 the body1 from the act of enjoyment1 acquires a new disposition1 whereby it is determined in another way1 other images of things are aroused in it1 and the mind begins to conceive and desire something fresh4 ,for example1 when we conceive something which generally delights us with its flavour1 we desire to enjoy1 that is1 to eat it4 ,but whilst we are thus enjoying it1 the stomach is filled and the body is otherwise disposed4 ,if1 therefore1 when the body is thus otherwise disposed1 the image of the food which is present be stimulated1 and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be stimulated also1 the new disposition of the body will feel repugnance to the desire or attempt1 and consequently the presence of the food which we formerly longed for will become odious4 ,this revulsion of feeling is called satiety or weariness4 ,for the rest1 ,i have neglected the outward modifications of the body observable in emotions1 such1 for instance1 as trembling1 pallor1 sobbing1 laughter1 c41 for these are attributable to the body only1 without any reference to the mind4 ,lastly1 the definitions of the emotions require to be supplemented in a few points2 ,i will therefore repeat them1 interpolating such observations as ,i think should here and there be added4 ,,definitions ,,of ,,the ,,emotions ,i4 ,desire is the actual essence of man1 in so far as it is conceived1 as determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself4 ,explanation4--,we have said above1 in the note to ,prop4 ix4 of this part1 that desire is appetite1 with consciousness thereof2 further1 that appetite is the essence of man1 in so far as it is determined to act in a way tending to promote its own persistence4 ,but1 in the same note1 ,i also remarked that1 strictly speaking1 ,i recognize no distinction between appetite and desire4 ,for whether a man be conscious of his appetite or not1 it remains one and the same appetite4 ,thus1 in order to avoid the appearance of tautology1 ,i have refrained from explaining desire by appetite2 but ,i have take care to define it in such a manner1 as to comprehend1 under one head1 all those endeavours of human nature1 which we distinguish by the terms appetite1 will1 desire1 or impulse4 ,i might1 indeed1 have said1 that desire is the essence of man1 in so far as it is conceived as determined to a particular activity2 but from such a definition 7cf4 ,,ii4 xxiii47 it would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire or appetite4 ,therefore1 in order to imply the cause of such consciousness1 it was necessary to add1 in so far as it is determined by some given modification1 c4 ,for1 by a modification of man's essence1 we understand every disposition of the said essence1 whether such disposition be innate1 or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of thought1 or solely under the attribute of extension1 or whether1 lastly1 it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes4 ,by the term desire1 then1 ,i here mean all man's endeavours1 impulses1 appetites1 and volitions1 which vary according to each man's disposition1 and are1 therefore1 not seldom opposed one to another1 according as a man is drawn in different directions1 and knows not where to turn4 ,,ii4 ,pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection4 ,,iii4 ,pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection4 ,explanation--,i say transition3 for pleasure is not perfection itself4 ,for1 if man were born with the perfection to which he passes1 he would possess the same1 without the emotion of pleasure4 ,this appears more clearly from the consideration of the contrary emotion1 pain4 ,no one can deny1 that pain consists in the transition to a less perfection1 and not in the less perfection itself3 for a man cannot be pained1 in so far as he partakes of perfection of any degree4 ,neither can we say1 that pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection4 ,for absence is nothing1 whereas the emotion of pain is an activity2 wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition from a greater to a less perfection--in other words1 it is an activity whereby a man's power of action is lessened or constrained 7cf4 ,,iii4 xi4 note74 ,i pass over the definitions of merriment1 stimulation1 melancholy1 and grief1 because these terms are generally used in reference to the body1 and are merely kinds of pleasure or pain4 ,,iv4 ,wonder is the conception 7imaginatio7 of anything1 wherein the mind comes to a stand1 because the particular concept in question has no connection with other concepts 7cf4 ,,iii4 lii4 and note74 ,explanation--,in the note to ,,ii4 xviii4 we showed the reason1 why the mind1 from the contemplation of one thing1 straightway falls to the contemplation of another thing1 namely1 because the images of the two things are so associated and arranged1 that one follows the other4 ,this state of association is impossible1 if the image of the thing be new2 the mind will then be at a stand in the contemplation thereof1 until it is determined by other causes to think of something else4 ,thus the conception of a new object1 considered in itself1 is of the same nature as other conceptions2 hence1 ,i do not include wonder among the emotions1 nor do ,i see why ,i should so include it1 inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects1 but merely from the absence of a cause1 which should determine the mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another4 ,i1 therefore1 recognize only three primitive or primary emotions 7as ,i said in the note to ,,iii4 xi471 namely1 pleasure1 pain1 and desire4 ,i have spoken of wonder simply because it is customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three primitive ones by different names1 when they are referred to the objects of our wonder4 ,i am led by the same motive to add a definition of contempt4 ,v4 ,contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind so little1 that its presence leads the mind to imagine those qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it 7cf4 ,,iii4 lii4 note74 ,the definitions of veneration and scorn ,i here pass over1 for ,i am not aware that any emotions are named after them4 ,,vi4 ,love is pleasure1 accompanied by the idea of an external cause4 ,explanation--,this definition explains sufficiently clearly the essence of love2 the definition given by those authors who say that love is the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved object expresses a property1 but not the essence of love2 and1 as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence1 they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its properties1 accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted to be very obscure4 ,it must1 however1 be noted1 that when ,i say that it is a property of love1 that the lover should wish to unite himself to the beloved object1 ,i do not here mean by wish consent1 or conclusion1 or a free decision of the mind 7for ,i have shown such1 in ,,ii4 xlviii41 to be fictitious72 neither do ,i mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is absent1 or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand2 for love can be conceived without either of these desires2 but by wish ,i mean the contentment1 which is in the lover1 on account of the presence of the beloved object1 whereby the pleasure of the lover is strengthened1 or at least maintained4 ,,vii4 ,hatred is pain1 accompanied by the idea of an external cause4 ,explanation--,these observations are easily grasped after what has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition 7cf4 also ,,iii4 xiii4 note74 ,,viii4 ,inclination is pleasure1 accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure4 ,,ix4 ,aversion is pain1 accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally the cause of pain 7cf4 ,,iii4 xv4 note74 ,x4 ,devotion is love towards one whom we admire4 ,explanation--,wonder 7admiratio7 arises 7as we have shown1 ,,iii4 lii47 from the novelty of a thing4 ,if1 therefore1 it happens that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us1 we shall cease to wonder at it2 thus we see1 that the emotion of devotion readily degenerates into simple love4 ,,xi4 ,derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the presence of a quality1 which we despise1 in an object which we hate4 ,explanation--,in so far as we despise a thing which we hate1 we deny existence thereof 7,,iii4 lii4 note71 and to that extent rejoice 7,,iii4 xx474 ,but since we assume that man hates that which he derides1 it follows that the pleasure in question is not without alloy 7cf4 ,,iii4 xlvii4 note74 ,,xii4 ,hope is an inconstant pleasure1 arising from the idea of something past or future1 whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue4 ,,xiii4 ,fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of something past or future1 whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue 7cf4 ,,iii4 xviii4 note74 ,explanation--,from these definitions it follows1 that there is no hope unmingled with fear1 and no fear unmingled with hope4 ,for he1 who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of anything1 is assumed to conceive something1 which excludes the existence of the said thing in the future2 therefore he1 to this extent1 feels pain 7cf4 ,,iii4 xix472 consequently1 while dependent on hope1 he fears for the issue4 ,contrariwise he1 who fears1 in other words doubts1 concerning the issue of something which he hates1 also conceives something which excludes the existence of the thing in question2 to this extent he feels pleasure1 and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will turn out as he desires 7,,iii4 xx474 ,,xiv4 ,confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something past or future1 wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed4 ,,xv4 ,despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or future1 wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed4 ,explanation--,thus confidence springs from hope1 and despair from fear1 when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event has been removed3 this comes to pass1 because man conceives something past or future as present and regards it as such1 or else because he conceives other things1 which exclude the existence of the causes of his doubt4 ,for1 although we can never be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event 7,,ii4 xxxi4 ,coroll471 it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt concerning it4 ,for we have shown1 that to feel no doubt concerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it 7,,ii4 xlix4 note74 ,thus it may happen that we are affected by the same emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or future1 as concerning the conception of a thing present2 this ,i have already shown in ,,iii4 xviii41 to which1 with its note1 ,i refer the reader4 ,,xvi4 ,joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past1 which has had an issue beyond our hope4 ,,xvii4 ,disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of something past1 which has had an issue contrary to our hope4 ,,xviii4 ,pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil1 which has befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves 7cf4 ,,iii4 xxii4 note1 and ,,iii4 xxvii4 note74 ,explanation--,between pity and sympathy 7misericordia7 there seems to be no difference1 unless perhaps that the former term is used in reference to a particular action1 and the latter in reference to a disposition4 ,,xix4 ,approval is love towards one who has done good to another4 ,,xx4 ,indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to another4 ,explanation--,i am aware that these terms are employed in senses somewhat different from those usually assigned4 ,but my purpose is to explain1 not the meaning of words1 but the nature of things4 ,i therefore make use of such terms1 as may convey my meaning without any violent departure from their ordinary signification4 ,one statement of my method will suffice4 ,as for the cause of the above--named emotions see ,,iii4 xxvii4 ,coroll4 i41 and ,,iii4 xxii4 note4 ,,xxi4 ,partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the love we bear him4 ,,xxii4 ,disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone because we hate him4 ,explanation--,thus partiality is an effect of love1 and disparagement an effect of hatred3 so that partiality may also be defined as love1 in so far as it induces a man to think too highly of a beloved object4 ,contrariwise1 disparagement may be defined as hatred1 in so far as it induces a man to think too meanly of a hated object4 ,cf4 ,,iii4 xxvi4 note4 ,,xxiii4 ,envy is hatred1 in so far as it induces a man to be pained by another's good fortune1 and to rejoice in another's evil fortune4 ,explanation--,envy is generally opposed to sympathy1 which1 by doing some violence to the meaning of the word1 may therefore be thus defined3 ,,xxiv4 ,sympathy 7misericordia7 is love1 in so far as it induces a man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune1 and pain at another's evil fortune4 ,explanation--,concerning envy see the notes to ,,iii4 xxiv4 and xxxii4 ,these emotions also arise from pleasure or pain accompanied by the idea of something external1 as cause either in itself or accidentally4 ,i now pass on to other emotions1 which are accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause4 ,,xxv4 ,self--approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action4 ,,xxvi4 ,humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own weakness of body or mind4 ,explanation--,self--complacency is opposed to humility1 in so far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of our own power of action2 but1 in so far as we mean thereby pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind1 it is opposed to repentance1 which we may thus define3 ,,xxvii4 ,repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some action1 which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind4 ,explanation--,the causes of these emotions we have set forth in ,,iii4 li4 note1 and in ,,iii4 liii41 liv41 lv4 and note4 ,concerning the free decision of the mind see ,,ii4 xxxv4 note4 ,this is perhaps the place to call attention to the fact1 that it is nothing wonderful that all those actions1 which are commonly called wrong1 are followed by pain1 and all those1 which are called right1 are followed by pleasure4 ,we can easily gather from what has been said1 that this depends in great measure on education4 ,parents1 by reprobating the former class of actions1 and by frequently chiding their children because of them1 and also by persuading to and praising the latter class1 have brought it about1 that the former should be associated with pain and the latter with pleasure4 ,this is confirmed by experience4 ,for custom and religion are not the same among all men1 but that which some consider sacred others consider profane1 and what some consider honourable others consider disgraceful4 ,according as each man has been educated1 he feels repentance for a given action or glories therein4 ,,xxviii4 ,pride is thinking too highly of one's self from self--love4 ,explanation--,thus pride is different from partiality1 for the latter term is used in reference to an external object1 but pride is used of a man thinking too highly of himself4 ,however1 as partiality is the effect of love1 so is pride the effect or property of self--love1 which may therefore be thus defined1 love of self or self--approval1 in so far as it leads a man to think too highly of himself4 ,to this emotion there is no contrary4 ,for no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self--hatred2 ,i say that no one thinks too meanly of himself1 in so far as he conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that4 ,for whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing1 he imagines this of necessity1 and by that notion he is so disposed1 that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot do4 ,for1 so long as he conceives that he cannot do it1 so long is he not determined to do it1 and consequently so long is it impossible for him to do it4 ,however1 if we consider such matters as only depend on opinion1 we shall find it conceivable that a man may think too meanly of himself2 for it may happen1 that a man1 sorrowfully regarding his own weakness1 should imagine that he is despised by all men1 while the rest of the world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him4 ,again1 a man may think too meanly of himself1 if he deny of himself in the present something in relation to a future time of which he is uncertain4 ,as1 for instance1 if he should say that he is unable to form any clear conceptions1 or that he can desire and do nothing but what is wicked and base1 c4 ,we may also say1 that a man thinks too meanly of himself1 when we see him from excessive fear of shame refusing to do things which others1 his equals1 venture4 ,we can1 therefore1 set down as a contrary to pride an emotion which ,i will call self--abasement1 for as from self--complacency springs pride1 so from humility springs self--abasement1 which ,i will accordingly thus define3 ,,xxix4 ,self--abasement is thinking too meanly of one's self by reason of pain4 ,explanation--,we are nevertheless generally accustomed to oppose pride to humility1 but in that case we pay more attention to the effect of either emotion than to its nature4 ,we are wont to call proud the man who boasts too much 7,,iii4 xxx4 note71 who talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people's faults1 who wishes to be first2 and lastly who goes through life with a style and pomp suitable to those far above him in station4 ,on the other hand1 we call humble the man who too often blushes1 who confesses his faults1 who sets forth other men's virtues1 and who1 lastly1 walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire4 ,however1 these emotions1 humility and self--abasement1 are extremely rare4 ,for human nature1 considered in itself1 strives against them as much as it can 7see ,,iii4 xiii41 liv472 hence those1 who are believed to be most self--abased and humble1 are generally in reality the most ambitious and envious4 ,,xxx4 ,honour#aa is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own1 which we believe to be praised by others4 #aa ,gloria4 ,,xxxi4 ,shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our own1 which we believe to be blamed by others4 ,explanation--,on this subject see the note to ,,iii4 xxx4 ,but we should here remark the difference which exists between shame and modesty4 ,shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are ashamed4 ,modesty is the fear or dread of shame1 which restrains a man from committing a base action4 ,modesty is usually opposed to shamelessness1 but the latter is not an emotion1 as ,i will duly show2 however1 the names of the emotions 7as ,i have remarked already7 have regard rather to their exercise than to their nature4 ,i have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions arising from pleasure and pain4 ,i therefore proceed to treat of those which ,i refer to desire4 ,,xxxii4 ,regret is the desire or appetite to possess something1 kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing1 and at the same time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude the existence of it4 ,explanation--,when we remember a thing1 we are by that very fact1 as ,i have already said more than once1 disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something present2 but this disposition or endeavour1 while we are awake1 is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the existence of that which we remember4 ,thus when we remember something which affected us with a certain pleasure1 we by that very fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of pleasure as though it were present1 but this endeavour is at once checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence of the thing in question4 ,wherefore regret is1 strictly speaking1 a pain opposed to that of pleasure1 which arises from the absence of something we hate 7cf4 ,,iii4 xlvii4 note74 ,but1 as the name regret seems to refer to desire1 ,i set this emotion down1 among the emotions springing from desire4 ,,xxxiii4 ,emulation is the desire of something1 engendered in us by our conception that others have the same desire4 ,explanation--,he who runs away1 because he sees others running away1 or he who fears1 because he sees others in fear2 or again1 he who1 on seeing that another man has burnt his hand1 draws towards him his own hand1 and moves his body as though his own were burnt2 such an one can be said to imitate another's emotion1 but not to emulate him2 not because the causes of emulation and imitation are different1 but because it has become customary to speak of emulation only in him1 who imitates that which we deem to be honourable1 useful1 or pleasant4 ,as to the cause of emulation1 cf4 ,,iii4 xxvii4 and note4 ,the reason why this emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from ,,iii4 xxxii4 and note4 ,,xxxiv4 ,thankfulness or ,gratitude is the desire or zeal springing from love1 whereby we endeavour to benefit him1 who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us4 ,cf4 ,,iii4 xxxix4 note and xl4 ,,xxxv4 ,benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity4 ,cf4 ,,iii4 xxvii4 note4 ,,xxxvi4 ,anger is the desire1 whereby through hatred we are induced to injure one whom we hate1 ,,iii4 xxxix4 ,,xxxvii4 ,revenge is the desire whereby we are induced1 through mutual hatred1 to injure one who1 with similar feelings1 has injured us4 7,see ,,iii4 xl4 ,coroll4 ii and note47 ,,xxxviii4 ,cruelty or savageness is the desire1 whereby a man is impelled to injure one whom we love or pity4 ,explanation--,to cruelty is opposed clemency1 which is not a passive state of the mind1 but a power whereby man restrains his anger and revenge4 ,,xxxix4 ,timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil1 which we dread1 by undergoing a lesser evil4 ,cf4 ,,iii4 xxxix4 note4 ,,xl4 ,daring is the desire1 whereby a man is set on to do something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt4 ,,xli4 ,cowardice is attributed to one1 whose desire is checked by the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter4 ,explanation--,cowardice is1 therefore1 nothing else but the fear of some evil1 which most men are wont not to fear2 hence ,i do not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire4 ,nevertheless1 ,i have chosen to explain it here1 because1 in so far as we look to the desire1 it is truly opposed to the emotion of daring4 ,,xlii4 ,consternation is attributed to one1 whose desire of avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears4 ,explanation--,consternation is1 therefore1 a species of cowardice4 ,but1 inasmuch as consternation arises from a double fear1 it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a man so bewildered and wavering1 that he is not able to remove the evil4 ,i say bewildered1 in so far as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be constrained by his amazement4 ,i say wavering1 in so far as we understand the said desire to be constrained by the fear of another evil1 which equally torments him3 whence it comes to pass that he knows not1 which he may avert of the two4 ,on this subject1 see ,,iii4 xxxix4 note1 and ,,iii4 lii4 note4 ,concerning cowardice and daring1 see ,,iii4 li4 note4 ,,xliii4 ,courtesy1 or deference 7,humanitas seu modestia71 is the desire of acting in a way that should please men1 and refraining from that which should displease them4 ,,xliv4 ,ambition is the immoderate desire of power4 ,explanation--,ambition is the desire1 whereby all the emotions 7cf4 ,,iii4 xxvii4 and xxxi47 are fostered and strengthened2 therefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome4 ,for1 so long as a man is bound by any desire1 he is at the same time necessarily bound by this4 ,the best men1 says ,cicero1 are especially led by honour4 ,even philosophers1 when they write a book contemning honour1 sign their names thereto1 and so on4 ,,xlv4 ,luxury is excessive desire1 or even love of living sumptuously4 ,,xlvi4 ,intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking4 ,,xlvii4 ,avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches4 ,,xlviii4 ,lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual intercourse4 ,explanation--,whether this desire be excessive or not1 it is still called lust4 ,these last five emotions 7as ,i have shown in ,,iii4 lvi47 have on contraries4 ,for deference is a species of ambition4 ,cf4 ,,iii4 xxix4 note4 ,again1 ,i have already pointed out1 that temperance1 sobriety1 and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the mind4 ,it may1 nevertheless1 happen1 that an avaricious1 an ambitious1 or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating1 drinking1 or sexual indulgence1 yet avarice1 ambition1 and fear are not contraries to luxury1 drunkenness1 and debauchery4 ,for an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and drink at another man's expense4 ,an ambitious man will restrain himself in nothing1 so long as he thinks his indulgences are secret2 and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees1 he will1 from the mere fact of being ambitious1 be more prone to those vices4 ,lastly1 a timid man does that which he would not4 ,for though an avaricious man should1 for the sake of avoiding death1 cast his riches into the sea1 he will none the less remain avaricious2 so1 also1 if a lustful man is downcast1 because he cannot follow his bent1 he does not1 on the ground of abstention1 cease to be lustful4 ,in fact1 these emotions are not so much concerned with the actual feasting1 drinking1 c41 as with the appetite and love of such4 ,nothing1 therefore1 can be opposed to these emotions1 but high--mindedness and valour1 whereof ,i will speak presently4 ,the definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind ,i pass over in silence1 first1 because they arise from the compounding of the emotions already described2 secondly1 because many of them have no distinctive names1 which shows that it is sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general knowledge of them4 ,however1 it is established from the definitions of the emotions1 which we have set forth1 that they all spring from desire1 pleasure1 or pain1 or1 rather1 that there is nothing besides these three2 wherefore each is wont to be called by a variety of names in accordance with its various relations and extrinsic tokens4 ,if we now direct our attention to these primitive emotions1 and to what has been said concerning the nature of the mind1 we shall be able thus to define the emotions1 in so far as they are referred to the mind only4 ,,general ,,definition ,,of ,,the ,,emotions ,emotion1 which is called a passivity of the soul1 is a confused idea1 whereby the mind affirms concerning its body1 or any part thereof1 a force for existence 7existendi vis7 greater or less than before1 and by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another4 ,explanation--,i say1 first1 that emotion or passion of the soul is a confused idea4 ,for we have shown that the mind is only passive1 in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas4 7,,iii4 iii47 ,i say1 further1 whereby the mind affirms concerning its body or any part thereof a force for existence greater than before4 ,for all the ideas of bodies1 which we possess1 denote rather the actual disposition of our own body 7,,ii4 xvi4 ,coroll4 ii47 than the nature of an external body4 ,but the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the disposition of the body1 or of some part thereof1 because its power of action or force for existence is increased or diminished1 helped or hindered4 ,but it must be noted that1 when ,i say a greater or less force for existence than before1 ,i do not mean that the mind compares the present with the past disposition of the body1 but that the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion affirms something of the body1 which1 in fact1 involves more or less of reality than before4 ,and inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact 7,,ii4 xi41 xiii471 that it affirms the actual existence of its own body1 and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very essence of a thing1 it follows that the mind passes to greater or less perfection1 when it happens to affirm concerning its own body1 or any part thereof1 something involving more or less reality than before4 ,when1 therefore1 ,i said above that the power of the mind is increased or diminished1 ,i merely meant that the mind had formed of its own body1 or of some part thereof1 an idea involving more or less of reality1 than it had already affirmed concerning its own body4 ,for the excellence of ideas1 and the actual power of thinking are measured by the excellence of the object4 ,lastly1 ,i have added by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another1 so that1 besides the nature of pleasure and pain1 which the first part of the definition explains1 ,i might also express the nature of desire4 ,,part ,,iv3 ,of ,human ,bondage1 or the ,strength of the ,emotions ,,preface ,human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions ,i name bondage3 for1 when a man is a prey to his emotions1 he is not his own master1 but lies at the mercy of fortune3 so much so1 that he is often compelled1 while seeing that which is better for him1 to follow that which is worse4 ,why this is so1 and what is good or evil in the emotions1 ,i propose to show in this part of my treatise4 ,but1 before ,i begin1 it would be well to make a few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection1 good and evil4 ,when a man has purposed to make a given thing1 and has brought it to perfection1 his work will be pronounced perfect1 not only by himself1 but by everyone who rightly knows1 or thinks that he knows1 the intention and aim of its author4 ,for instance1 suppose anyone sees a work 7which ,i assume to be not yet completed71 and knows that the aim of the author of that work is to build a house1 he will call the work imperfect2 he will1 on the other hand1 call it perfect1 as soon as he sees that it is carried through to the end1 which its author had purposed for it4 ,but if a man sees a work1 the like whereof he has never seen before1 and if he knows not the intention of the artificer1 he plainly cannot know1 whether that work be perfect or imperfect4 ,such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms4 ,but1 after men began to form general ideas1 to think out types of houses1 buildings1 towers1 c41 and to prefer certain types to others1 it came about1 that each man called perfect that which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the thing in question1 and called imperfect that which he saw agree less with his own preconceived type1 even though it had evidently been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer4 ,this seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena1 which1 indeed1 are not made with human hands1 perfect or imperfect3 for men are wont to form general ideas of things natural1 no less than of things artificial1 and such ideas they hold as types1 believing that ,nature 7who they think does nothing without an object7 has them in view1 and has set them as types before herself4 ,therefore1 when they behold something in ,nature1 which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they have formed of the thing in question1 they say that ,nature has fallen short or has blundered1 and has left her work incomplete4 ,thus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect or imperfect rather from their own prejudices1 than from true knowledge of what they pronounce upon4 ,now we showed in the ,appendix to ,part ,i41 that ,nature does not work with an end in view4 ,for the eternal and infinite ,being1 which we call ,god or ,nature1 acts by the same necessity as that whereby it exists4 ,for we have shown1 that by the same necessity of its nature1 whereby it exists1 it likewise works 7,i4 xvi474 ,the reason or cause why ,god or ,nature exists1 and the reason why he acts1 are one and the same4 ,therefore1 as he does not exist for the sake of an end1 so neither does he act for the sake of an end2 of his existence and of his action there is neither origin nor end4 ,wherefore1 a cause which is called final is nothing else but human desire1 in so far as it is considered as the origin or cause of anything4 ,for example1 when we say that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house1 we mean nothing more than that a man1 conceiving the conveniences of household life1 had a desire to build a house4 ,wherefore1 the being inhabited1 in so far as it is regarded as a final cause1 is nothing else but this particular desire1 which is really the efficient cause2 it is regarded as the primary cause1 because men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires4 ,they are1 as ,i have often said already1 conscious of their own actions and appetites1 but ignorant of the causes whereby they are determined to any particular desire4 ,therefore1 the common saying that ,nature sometimes falls short1 or blunders1 and produces things which are imperfect1 ,i set down among the glosses treated of in the ,appendix to ,part ,i4 ,perfection and imperfection1 then1 are in reality merely modes of thinking1 or notions which we form from a comparison among one another of individuals of the same species2 hence ,i said above 7,,ii4 ,def4 vi471 that by reality and perfection ,i mean the same thing4 ,for we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one genus1 which is called the highest genus1 namely1 to the category of ,being1 whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong4 ,thus1 in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this category1 and comparing them one with another1 find that some possess more of being or reality than others1 we1 to this extent1 say that some are more perfect than others4 ,again1 in so far as we attribute to them anything implying negation--as term1 end1 infirmity1 etc41 we1 to this extent1 call them imperfect1 because they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call perfect1 not because they have any intrinsic deficiency1 or because ,nature has blundered4 ,for nothing lies within the scope of a thing's nature1 save that which follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause1 and whatsoever follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily comes to pass4 ,as for the terms good and bad1 they indicate no positive quality in things regarded in themselves1 but are merely modes of thinking1 or notions which we form from the comparison of things one with another4 ,thus one and the same thing can be at the same time good1 bad1 and indifferent4 ,for instance1 music is good for him that is melancholy1 bad for him that mourns2 for him that is deaf1 it is neither good nor bad4 ,nevertheless1 though this be so1 the terms should still be retained4 ,for1 inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a type of human nature which we may hold in view1 it will be useful for us to retain the terms in question1 in the sense ,i have indicated4 ,in what follows1 then1 ,i shall mean by1 good that1 which we certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the type of human nature1 which we have set before ourselves2 by bad1 that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in approaching the said type4 ,again1 we shall that men are more perfect1 or more imperfect1 in proportion as they approach more or less nearly to the said type4 ,for it must be specially remarked that1 when ,i say that a man passes from a lesser to a greater perfection1 or vice vers1 ,i do not mean that he is changed from one essence or reality to another2 for instance1 a horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a man1 as by being changed into an insect4 ,what ,i mean is1 that we conceive the thing's power of action1 in so far as this is understood by its nature1 to be increased or diminished4 ,lastly1 by perfection in general ,i shall1 as ,i have said1 mean reality--in other words1 each thing's essence1 in so far as it exists1 and operates in a particular manner1 and without paying any regard to its duration4 ,for no given thing can be said to be more perfect1 because it has passed a longer time in existence4 ,the duration of things cannot be determined by their essence1 for the essence of things involves no fixed and definite period of existence2 but everything1 whether it be more perfect or less perfect1 will always be able to persist in existence with the same force wherewith it began to exist2 wherefore1 in this respect1 all things are equal4 ,,definitions4 ,i4 ,by good ,i mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us4 ,,ii4 ,by evil ,i mean that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in the attainment of any good4 7,concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the end47 ,,iii4 ,particular things ,i call contingent in so far as1 while regarding their essence only1 we find nothing therein1 which necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it4 ,,iv4 ,particular things ,i call possible in so far as1 while regarding the causes whereby they must be produced1 we know not1 whether such causes be determined for producing them4 7,in ,i4 xxxiii4 note4 i41 ,i drew no distinction between possible and contingent1 because there was in that place no need to distinguish them accurately47 ,v4 ,by conflicting emotions ,i mean those which draw a man in different directions1 though they are of the same kind1 such as luxury and avarice1 which are both species of love1 and are contraries1 not by nature1 but by accident4 ,,vi4 ,what ,i mean by emotion felt towards a thing1 future1 present1 and past1 ,i explained in ,,iii4 xviii41 notes4 i4 and ii41 which see4 7,but ,i should here also remark1 that we can only distinctly conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit2 that is1 all objects distant from us more than two hundred feet1 or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive1 seem to be an equal distance from us1 and all in the same plane2 so also objects1 whose time of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer interval than we can distinctly conceive1 seem to be all equally distant from the present1 and are set down1 as it were1 to the same moment of time47 ,,vii4 ,by an end1 for the sake of which we do something1 ,i mean a desire4 ,,viii4 ,by virtue 7virtus7 and power ,i mean the same thing2 that is 7,,iii4 vii71 virtue1 in so far as it is referred to man1 is a man's nature or essence1 in so far as it has the power of effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature4 ,,axiom4 ,there is no individual thing in nature1 than which there is not another more powerful and strong4 ,whatsoever thing be given1 there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed4 ,,propositions4 ,,prop4 ,i4 ,no positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed by the presence of what is true1 in virtue of its being true4 ,proof4--,falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas involve 7,,ii4 xxxv471 nor have they any positive quality on account of which they are called false 7,,ii4 xxxiii472 contrariwise1 in so far as they are referred to ,god1 they are true 7,,ii4 xxxii474 ,wherefore1 if the positive quality possessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is true1 in virtue of its being true1 a true idea would then be removed by itself1 which 7,,iv4 iii47 is absurd4 ,therefore1 no positive quality possessed by a false idea1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,this proposition is more clearly understood from ,,ii4 xvi4 ,coroll4 ii4 ,for imagination is an idea1 which indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external body2 not indeed distinctly1 but confusedly2 whence it comes to pass1 that the mind is said to err4 ,for instance1 when we look at the sun1 we conceive that it is distant from us about two hundred feet2 in this judgment we err1 so long as we are in ignorance of its true distance2 when its true distance is known1 the error is removed1 but not the imagination2 or1 in other words1 the idea of the sun1 which only explains tho nature of that luminary1 in so far as the body is affected thereby3 wherefore1 though we know the real distance1 we shall still nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us4 ,for1 as we said in ,,ii4 xxxv4 note1 we do not imagine the sun to be so near us1 because we are ignorant of its true distance1 but because the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the body is affected thereby4 ,thus1 when the rays of the sun falling on the surface of water are reflected into our eyes1 we imagine the sun as if it were in the water1 though we are aware of its real position2 and similarly other imaginations1 wherein the mind is deceived1 whether they indicate the natural disposition of the body1 or that its power of activity is increased or diminished1 are not contrary to the truth1 and do not vanish at its presence4 ,it happens indeed that1 when we mistakenly fear an evil1 the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings2 but the contrary also happens1 namely1 that we fear an evil which will certainly come1 and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings2 thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth1 in virtue of its being true1 but because other imaginations1 stronger than the first1 supervene and exclude the present existence of that which we imagined1 as ,i have shown in ,,ii4 xvii4 ,,prop4 ,,ii4 ,we are only passive1 in so far as we are apart of ,nature1 which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts4 ,proof4--,we are said to be passive1 when something arises in us1 whereof we are only a partial cause 7,,iii4 ,def4 ii471 that is 7,,iii4 ,def4 i471 something which cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature4 ,we are passive therefore1 in so far as we are a part of ,nature1 which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,iii4 ,the force whereby a man persists in existing is limited1 and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes4 ,proof4--,this is evident from the axiom of this part4 ,for1 when man is given1 there is something else--say ,a--more powerful2 when ,a is given1 there is something else--say ,b--more powerful than ,a1 and so on to infinity2 thus the power of man is limited by the power of some other thing1 and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,iv4 ,it is impossible1 that man should not be a part of ,nature1 or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes1 save such as can be understood through his nature only as their adequate cause4 ,proof4--,the power1 whereby each particular thing1 and consequently man1 preserves his being1 is the power of ,god or of ,nature 7,i4 xxiv4 ,coroll472 not in so far as it is infinite1 but in so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence 7,,iii4 vii474 ,thus the power of man1 in so far as it is explained through his own actual essence1 is a part of the infinite power of ,god or ,nature1 in other words1 of the essence thereof 7,i4 xxxiv474 ,this was our first point4 ,again1 if it were possible1 that man should undergo no changes save such as can be understood solely through the nature of man1 it would follow that he would not be able to die1 but would always necessarily exist2 this would be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was either finite or infinite2 namely1 either of man's power only1 inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself all changes which could spring from external causes2 or of the infinite power of ,nature1 whereby all individual things would be so ordered1 that man should be incapable of undergoing any changes save such as tended towards his own preservation4 ,but the first alternative is absurd 7by the last ,prop41 the proof of which is universal1 and can be applied to all individual things74 ,therefore1 if it be possible1 that man should not be capable of undergoing any changes1 save such as can be explained solely through his own nature1 and consequently that he must always 7as we have shown7 necessarily exist2 such a result must follow from the infinite power of ,god1 and consequently 7,i4 xvi47 from the necessity of the divine nature1 in so far as it is regarded as affected by the idea of any given man1 the whole order of nature as conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must be deducible4 ,it would therefore follow 7,i4 xxi47 that man is infinite1 which 7by the first part of this proof7 is absurd4 ,it is1 therefore1 impossible1 that man should not undergo any changes save those whereof he is the adequate cause4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,hence it follows1 that man is necessarily always a prey to his passions1 that he follows and obeys the general order of nature1 and that he accommodates himself thereto1 as much as the nature of things demands4 ,,prop4 ,v4 ,the power and increase of every passion1 and its persistence in existing are not defined by the power1 whereby we ourselves endeavour to persist in existing1 but by the power of an external cause compared with our own4 ,proof4--,the essence of a passion cannot be explained through our essence alone 7,,iii4 ,deff4 i4 and ii471 that is 7,,iii4 vii471 the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power1 whereby we ourselves endeavour to persist in existing1 but 7as is shown in ,,ii4 xvi47 must necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,vi4 ,the force of any passion or emotion can overcome the rest of a man's activities or power1 so that the emotion becomes obstinately fixed to him4 ,proof4--,the force and increase of any passion and its persistence in existing are defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own 7by the foregoing ,prop472 therefore 7,,iv4 iii47 it can overcome a man's power1 e4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,vii4 ,an emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by another emotion contrary thereto1 and with more power for controlling emotion4 ,proof4--,emotion1 in so far as it is referred to the mind1 is an idea1 whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existence than before 7cf4 the general ,definition of the ,emotions at the end of ,part ,,iii474 ,when1 therefore1 the mind is assailed by any emotion1 the body is at the same time affected with a modification whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished4 ,now this modification of the body 7,,iv4 v47 receives from its cause the force for persistence in its being2 which force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause 7,,ii4 vi471 in virtue of the body being affected with a modification contrary to 7,,iii4 v47 and stronger than itself 7,,iv4 ,ax472 wherefore 7,,ii4 xii47 the mind is affected by the idea of a modification contrary to1 and stronger than the former modification1 in other words1 7by the general definition of the emotions7 the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and stronger than the former emotion1 which will exclude or destroy the existence of the former emotion2 thus an emotion cannot be destroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and stronger emotion4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,an emotion1 in so far as it is referred to the mind1 can only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a modification of the body contrary to1 and stronger than1 that which we are undergoing4 ,for the emotion which we undergo can only be checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to1 and stronger than1 itself1 in other words1 7by the general ,definition of the ,emotions7 only by an idea of a modification of the body contrary to1 and stronger than1 the modification which we undergo4 ,,prop4 ,,viii4 ,the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotions of pleasure or pain1 in so far as we are conscious thereof4 ,proof4--,we call a thing good or evil1 when it is of service or the reverse in preserving our being 7,,iv4 ,deff4 i4 and ii471 that is 7,,iii4 vii471 when it increases or diminishes1 helps or hinders1 our power of activity4 ,thus1 in so far as we perceive that a thing affects us with pleasure or pain1 we call it good or evil2 wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the idea of the pleasure or pain1 which necessarily follows from that pleasurable or painful emotion 7,,ii4 xxii474 ,but this idea is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united to body 7,,ii4 xxi472 that is1 there is no real distinction between this idea and the emotion or idea of the modification of the body1 save in conception only4 ,therefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotion1 in so far as we are conscious thereof4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,ix4 ,an emotion1 whereof we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time1 is stronger than if we did not conceive the cause to be with us4 ,proof4--,imagination or conception is the idea1 by which the mind regards a thing as present 7,,ii4 xvii4 note71 but which indicates the disposition of the mind rather than the nature of the external thing 7,,ii4 xvi4 ,coroll4 ii474 ,an emotion is therefore a conception1 in so far as it indicates the disposition of the body4 ,but a conception 7by ,,ii4 xvii47 is stronger1 so long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence of the external object2 wherefore an emotion is also stronger or more intense1 when we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time1 than when we do not conceive the cause to be with us4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,when ,i said above in ,,iii4 xviii4 that we are affected by the image of what is past or future with the same emotion as if the thing conceived were present1 ,i expressly stated1 that this is only true in so far as we look solely to the image of the thing in question itself2 for the thing's nature is unchanged1 whether we have conceived it or not2 ,i did not deny that the image becomes weaker1 when we regard as present to us other things which exclude the present existence of the future object3 ,i did not expressly call attention to the fact1 because ,i purposed to treat of the strength of the emotions in this part of my work4 ,corollary4--,the image of something past or future1 that is1 of a thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time future1 to the exclusion of time present1 is1 when other conditions are equal1 weaker than the image of something present2 consequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future is less intense1 other conditions being equal1 than an emotion felt towards something present4 ,,prop4 ,x4 ,towards something future1 which we conceive as close at hand1 we are affected more intensely1 than if we conceive that its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer interval2 so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have not long passed away we are affected more intensely1 than if we conceive that it has long passed away4 ,proof4--,in so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand1 or not long passed away1 we conceive that which excludes the presence of the object less1 than if its period of future existence were more distant from the present1 or if it had long passed away 7this is obvious7 therefore 7by the foregoing ,prop47 we are1 so far1 more intensely affected towards it4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,from the remarks made in ,def4 vi4 of this part it follows that1 if objects are separated from the present by a longer period than we can define in conception1 though their dates of occurrence be widely separated one from the other1 they all affect us equally faintly4 ,,prop4 ,,xi4 ,an emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary is1 when other conditions are equal1 more intense than an emotion towards that which possible1 or contingent1 or non--necessary4 ,proof4--,in so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary1 we1 to that extent1 affirm its existence2 on the other hand we deny a thing's existence1 in so far as we conceive it not to be necessary 7,i4 xxxiii4 note4 i472 wherefore 7,,iv4 ix47 an emotion towards that which is necessary is1 other conditions being equal1 more intense than an emotion that which is non--necessary4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xii4 ,an emotion towards a thing1 which we know not to exist at the present time1 and which we conceive as possible1 is more intense1 other conditions being equal1 than an emotion towards a thing contingent4 ,proof4--,in so far as we conceive a thing as contingent1 we are affected by the conception of some further thing1 which would assert the existence of the former 7,,iv4 ,def4 iii472 but1 on the other hand1 we 7by hypothesis7 conceive certain things1 which exclude its present existence4 ,but1 in so far as we conceive a thing to be possible in the future1 we there by conceive things which assert its existence 7,,iv4 iv471 that is 7,,iii4 xviii471 things which promote hope or fear3 wherefore an emotion towards something possible is more vehement4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,an emotion towards a thing1 which we know not to exist in the present1 and which we conceive as contingent1 is far fainter1 than if we conceive the thing to be present with us4 ,proof4--,emotion towards a thing1 which we conceive to exist1 is more intense than it would be1 if we conceived the thing as future 7,,iv4 ix4 ,coroll471 and is much more vehement1 than if the future time be conceived as far distant from the present 7,,iv4 x474 ,therefore an emotion towards a thing1 whose period of existence we conceive to be far distant from the present1 is far fainter1 than if we conceive the thing as present2 it is1 nevertheless1 more intense1 than if we conceived the thing as contingent1 wherefore an emotion towards a thing1 which we regard as contingent1 will be far fainter1 than if we conceived the thing to be present with us4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xiii4 ,emotion towards a thing contingent1 which we know not to exist in the present1 is1 other conditions being equal1 fainter than an emotion towards a thing past4 ,proof4--,in so far as we conceive a thing as contingent1 we are not affected by the image of any other thing1 which asserts the existence of the said thing 7,,iv4 ,def4 iii471 but1 on the other hand 7by hypothesis71 we conceive certain things excluding its present existence4 ,but1 in so far as we conceive it in relation to time past1 we are assumed to conceive something1 which recalls the thing to memory1 or excites the image thereof 7,,ii4 xviii4 and note71 which is so far the same as regarding it as present 7,,ii4 xvii4 ,coroll474 ,therefore 7,,iv4 ix47 an emotion towards a thing contingent1 which we know does not exist in the present1 is fainter1 other conditions being equal1 than an emotion towards a thing past4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xiv4 ,a true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true1 but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion4 ,proof4--,an emotion is an idea1 whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existing than before 7by the general ,definition of the ,emotions72 therefore it has no positive quality1 which can be destroyed by the presence of what is true2 consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot1 by virtue of being true1 restrain any emotion4 ,but1 in so far as such knowledge is an emotion 7,,iv4 viii47 if it have more strength for restraining emotion1 it will to that extent be able to restrain the given emotion4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xv4 ,desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can be quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed4 ,proof4--,from the true knowledge of good and evil1 in so far as it is an emotion1 necessarily arises desire 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 i471 the strength of which is proportioned to the strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises 7,,iii4 xxxvii474 ,but1 inasmuch as this desire arises 7by hypothesis7 from the fact of our truly understanding anything1 it follows that it is also present with us1 in so far as we are active 7,,iii4 i471 and must therefore be understood through our essence only 7,,iii4 ,def4 ii472 consequently 7,,iii4 vii47 its force and increase can be defined solely by human power4 ,again1 the desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger1 in proportion as the said emotions are more vehement2 wherefore their force and increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes1 which1 when compared with our own power1 indefinitely surpass it 7,,iv4 iii472 hence the desires arising from like emotions may be more vehement1 than the desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil1 and may1 consequently1 control or quench it4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xvi4 ,desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil1 in so far as such knowledge regards what is future1 may be more easily controlled or quenched1 than the desire for what is agreeable at the present moment4 ,proof4--,emotion towards a thing1 which we conceive as future1 is fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present 7,,iv4 ix4 ,coroll474 ,but desire1 which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil1 though it be concerned with things which are good at the moment1 can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong desire 7by the last ,prop41 the proof whereof is of universal application74 ,wherefore desire arising from such knowledge1 when concerned with the future1 can be more easily controlled or quenched1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xvii4 ,desire arising from the true knowledge of good and evil1 in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is contingent1 can be controlled far more easily still1 than desire for things that are present4 ,proof4--,this ,prop4 is proved in the same way as the last ,prop4 from ,,iv4 xii4 ,coroll4 ,note4--,i think ,i have now shown the reason1 why men are moved by opinion more readily than by true reason1 why it is that the true knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul1 and often yields to every kind of passion4 ,this state of things gave rise to the exclamation of the poet3#ab---- ,the better path ,i gaze at and approve1 ,the worse--,i follow4 #ab ,ov4 ,met4 vii4#bj1 ,video meliora proboque1 ,deteriora sequor4 ,ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind1 when he says1 ,he who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow4 ,i have not written the above with the object of drawing the conclusion1 that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge1 or that a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his emotions1 but because it is necessary to know the power and the infirmity of our nature1 before we can determine what reason can do in restraining the emotions1 and what is beyond her power4 ,i have said1 that in the present part ,i shall merely treat of human infirmity4 ,the power of reason over the emotions ,i have settled to treat separately4 ,,prop4 ,,xviii4 ,desire arising from pleasure is1 other conditions being equal1 stronger than desire arising from pain4 ,proof4--,desire is the essence of a man 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 i471 that is1 the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist in his own being4 ,wherefore desire arising from pleasure is1 by the fact of pleasure being felt1 increased or helped2 on the contrary1 desire arising from pain is1 by the fact of pain being felt1 diminished or hindered2 hence the force of desire arising from pleasure must be defined by human power together with the power of an external cause1 whereas desire arising from pain must be defined by human power only4 ,thus the former is the stronger of the two4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,in these few remarks ,i have explained the causes of human infirmity and inconstancy1 and shown why men do not abide by the precepts of reason4 ,it now remains for me to show what course is marked out for us by reason1 which of the emotions are in harmony with the rules of human reason1 and which of them are contrary thereto4 ,but1 before ,i begin to prove my ,propositions in detailed geometrical fashion1 it is advisable to sketch them briefly in advance1 so that everyone may more readily grasp my meaning4 ,as reason makes no demands contrary to nature1 it demands1 that every man should love himself1 should seek that which is useful to him--,i mean1 that which is really useful to him1 should desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection1 and should1 each for himself1 endeavour as far as he can to preserve his own being4 ,this is as necessarily true1 as that a whole is greater than its part4 7,cf4 ,,iii4 iv47 ,again1 as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance with the laws of one's own nature 7,,iv4 ,def4 viii471 and as no one endeavours to preserve his own being1 except in accordance with the laws of his own nature1 it follows1 first1 that the foundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one's own being1 and that happiness consists in man's power of preserving his own being2 secondly1 that virtue is to be desired for its own sake1 and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful to us1 for the sake of which we should desire it2 thirdly and lastly1 that suicides are weak--minded1 and are overcome by external causes repugnant to their nature4 ,further1 it follows from ,postulate iv41 ,part ,,ii41 that we can never arrive at doing without all external things for the preservation of our being or living1 so as to have no relations with things which are outside ourselves4 ,again1 if we consider our mind1 we see that our intellect would be more imperfect1 if mind were alone1 and could understand nothing besides itself4 ,there are1 then1 many things outside ourselves1 which are useful to us1 and are1 therefore1 to be desired4 ,of such none can be discerned more excellent1 than those which are in entire agreement with our nature4 ,for if1 for example1 two individuals of entirely the same nature are united1 they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them singly4 ,therefore1 to man there is nothing more useful than man--nothing1 ,i repeat1 more excellent for preserving their being can be wished for by men1 than that all should so in all points agree1 that the minds and bodies of all should form1 as it were1 one single mind and one single body1 and that all should1 with one consent1 as far as they are able1 endeavour to preserve their being1 and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all4 ,hence1 men who are governed by reason--that is1 who seek what is useful to them in accordance with reason1 desire for themselves nothing1 which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind1 and1 consequently1 are just1 faithful1 and honourable in their conduct4 ,such are the dictates of reason1 which ,i purposed thus briefly to indicate1 before beginning to prove them in greater detail4 ,i have taken this course1 in order1 if possible1 to gain the attention of those who believe1 that the principle that every man is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation of impiety1 rather than of piety and virtue4 ,therefore1 after briefly showing that the contrary is the case1 ,i go on to prove it by the same method1 as that whereby ,i have hitherto proceeded4 ,,prop4 ,,xix4 ,every man1 by the laws of his nature1 necessarily desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad4 ,proof4--,the knowledge of good and evil is 7,,iv4 viii47 the emotion of pleasure or pain1 in so far as we are conscious thereof2 therefore1 every man necessarily desires what he thinks good1 and shrinks from what he thinks bad4 ,now this appetite is nothing else but man's nature or essence 7,cf4 the ,definition of ,appetite1 ,,iii4 ix4 note1 and ,def4 of the ,emotions1 i474 ,therefore1 every man1 solely by the laws of his nature1 desires the one1 and shrinks from the other1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xx4 ,the more every man endeavours1 and is able to seek what is useful to him--in other words1 to preserve his own being--the more is he endowed with virtue2 on the contrary1 in proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him1 that is1 to preserve his own being1 he is wanting in power4 ,proof4--,virtue is human power1 which is defined solely by man's essence 7,,iv4 ,def4 viii471 that is1 which is defined solely by the endeavour made by man to persist in his own being4 ,wherefore1 the more a man endeavours1 and is able to preserve his own being1 the more is he endowed with virtue1 and1 consequently 7,,iii4 iv4 and vi471 in so far as a man neglects to preserve his own being1 he is wanting in power4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,no one1 therefore1 neglects seeking his own good1 or preserving his own being1 unless he be overcome by causes external and foreign to his nature4 ,no one1 ,i say1 from the necessity of his own nature1 or otherwise than under compulsion from external causes1 shrinks from food1 or kills himself3 which latter may be done in a variety of ways4 ,a man1 for instance1 kills himself under the compulsion of another man1 who twists round his right hand1 wherewith he happened to have taken up a sword1 and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart2 or1 again1 he may be compelled1 like ,seneca1 by a tyrant's command1 to open his own veins--that is1 to escape a greater evil by incurring1 a lesser2 or1 lastly1 latent external causes may so disorder his imagination1 and so affect his body1 that it may assume a nature contrary to its former one1 and whereof the idea cannot exist in the mind 7,,iii4 x47 ,but that a man1 from the necessity of his own nature1 should endeavour to become non--existent1 is as impossible as that something should be made out of nothing1 as everyone will see for himself1 after a little reflection4 ,,prop4 ,,xxi4 ,no one can desire to be blessed1 to act rightly1 and to live rightly1 without at the same time wishing to be1 act1 and to live--in other words1 to actually exist4 ,proof4--,the proof of this proposition1 or rather the proposition itself1 is self--evident1 and is also plain from the definition of desire4 ,for the desire of living1 acting1 c41 blessedly or rightly1 is 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 i47 the essence of man--that is 7,,iii4 vii471 the endeavour made by everyone to preserve his own being4 ,therefore1 no one can desire1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxii4 ,no virtue can be conceived as prior to this endeavour to preserve one's own being4 ,proof4--,the effort for self--preservation is the essence of a thing 7,,iii4 vii472 therefore1 if any virtue could be conceived as prior thereto1 the essence of a thing would have to be conceived as prior to itself1 which is obviously absurd4 ,therefore no virtue1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,the effort for self--preservation is the first and only foundation of virtue4 ,for prior to this principle nothing can be conceived1 and without it no virtue can be conceived4 ,,prop4 ,,xxiii4 ,man1 in so far as he is determined to a particular action because he has inadequate ideas1 cannot be absolutely said to act in obedience to virtue2 he can only be so described1 in so far as he is determined for the action because he understands4 ,proof4--,in so far as a man is determined to an action through having inadequate ideas1 he is passive 7,,iii4 i471 that is 7,,iii4 ,deff4 i41 and iii471 he does something1 which cannot be perceived solely through his essence1 that is 7by ,,iv4 ,def4 viii471 which does not follow from his virtue4 ,but1 in so far as he is determined for an action because he understands1 he is active2 that is1 he does something1 which is perceived through his essence alone1 or which adequately follows from his virtue4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxiv4 ,to act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us the same thing as to act1 to live1 or to preserve one's being 7these three terms are identical in meaning7 in accordance with the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to one's self4 ,proof4--,to act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else but to act according to the laws of one's own nature4 ,but we only act1 in so far as we understand 7,,iii4 iii473 therefore to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act1 to live1 or to preserve one's being in obedience to reason1 and that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us 7,,iv4 xxii4 ,coroll474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxv4 ,no one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of anything else4 ,proof4--,the endeavour1 wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its being1 is defined solely by the essence of the thing itself 7,,iii4 vii472 from this alone1 and not from the essence of anything else1 it necessarily follows 7,,iii4 vi47 that everyone endeavours to preserve his being4 ,moreover1 this proposition is plain from ,,iv4 xxii4 ,coroll41 for if a man should endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else1 the last--named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue1 which1 by the foregoing corollary1 is absurd4 ,therefore no one1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxvi4 ,whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is nothing further than to understand2 neither does the mind1 in so far as it makes use of reason1 judge anything to be useful to it1 save such things as are conducive to understanding4 ,proof4--,the effort for self--preservation is nothing else but the essence of the thing in question 7,,iii4 vii471 which1 in so far as it exists such as it is1 is conceived to have force for continuing in existence 7,,iii4 vi47 and doing such things as necessarily follow from its given nature 7see the ,def4 of ,appetite1 ,,iii4 ix4 note74 ,but the essence of reason is nought else but our mind1 in so far as it clearly and distinctly understands 7see the definition in ,,ii4 xl4 note4 ii472 therefore 7,,ii4 xl47 whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is nothing else but to understand4 ,again1 since this effort of the mind wherewith the mind endeavours1 in so far as it reasons1 to preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding2 this effort at understanding is 7,,iv4 xxii4 ,coroll47 the first and single basis of virtue1 nor shall we endeavour to understand things for the sake of any ulterior object 7,,iv4 xxv472 on the other hand1 the mind1 in so far as it reasons1 will not be able to conceive any good for itself1 save such things as are conducive to understanding4 ,,prop4 ,,xxvii4 ,we know nothing to be certainly good or evil1 save such things as really conduce to understanding1 or such as are able to hinder us from understanding4 ,proof4--,the mind1 in so far as it reasons1 desires nothing beyond understanding1 and judges nothing to be useful to itself1 save such things as conduce to understanding 7by the foregoing ,prop474 ,but the mind 7,,ii4 xli41 xliii4 and note7 cannot possess certainty concerning anything1 except in so far as it has adequate ideas1 or 7what by ,,ii4 xl4 note1 is the same thing7 in so far as it reasons4 ,therefore we know nothing to be good or evil save such things as really conduce1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxviii4 ,the mind's highest good is the knowledge of ,god1 and the mind's highest virtue is to know ,god4 ,proof4--,the mind is not capable of understanding anything higher than ,god1 that is 7,i4 ,def4 vi471 than a ,being absolutely infinite1 and without which 7,i4 xv47 nothing can either be or be conceived2 therefore 7,,iv4 xxvi4 and xxvii471 the mind's highest utility or 7,,iv4 ,def4 i47 good is the knowledge of ,god4 ,again1 the mind is active1 only in so far as it understands1 and only to the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously4 ,the mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand4 ,now1 as we have already shown1 the highest that the mind can understand is ,god2 therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand or to know ,god4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxix4 ,no individual thing1 which is entirely different from our own nature1 can help or check our power of activity1 and absolutely nothing can do us good or harm1 unless it has something in common with our nature4 ,proof4--,the power of every individual thing1 and consequently the power of man1 whereby he exists and operates1 can only be determined by an individual thing 7,i4 xxviii471 whose nature 7,,ii4 vi47 must be understood through the same nature as that1 through which human nature is conceived4 ,therefore our power of activity1 however it be conceived1 can be determined and consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other individual thing1 which has something in common with us1 but not by the power of anything1 of which the nature is entirely different from our own2 and since we call good or evil that which is the cause of pleasure or pain 7,,iv4 viii471 that is 7,,iii4 xi4 note71 which increases or diminishes1 helps or hinders1 our power of activity2 therefore1 that which is entirely different from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxx4 ,a thing cannot be bad for us through the quality which it has in common with our nature1 but it is bad for us in so far as it is contrary to our nature4 ,proof4--,we call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain 7,,iv4 viii471 that is 7by the ,def41 which see in ,,iii4 xi4 note71 when it diminishes or checks our power of action4 ,therefore1 if anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in common with our nature1 it would be able itself to diminish or check that which it has in common with our nature1 which 7,,iii4 iv47 is absurd4 ,wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that quality which it has in common with us1 but1 on the other hand1 in so far as it is bad for us1 that is 7as we have just shown71 in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action1 it is contrary to our nature4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxi4 ,in so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature1 it is necessarily good4 ,proof4--,in so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature1 it cannot be bad for it4 ,it will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent4 ,if it be assumed that it be neither good nor bad1 nothing will follow from its nature 7,,iv4 ,def4 i471 which tends to the preservation of our nature1 that is 7by the hypothesis71 which tends to the preservation of the thing itself2 but this 7,,iii4 vi47 is absurd2 therefore1 in so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature1 it is necessarily good4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,hence it follows1 that1 in proportion as a thing is in harmony with our nature1 so is it more useful or better for us1 and vice vers1 in proportion as a thing is more useful for us1 so is it more in harmony with our nature4 ,for1 in so far as it is not in harmony with our nature1 it will necessarily be different therefrom or contrary thereto4 ,if different1 it can neither be good nor bad 7,,iv4 xxix472 if contrary1 it will be contrary to that which is in harmony with our nature1 that is1 contrary to what is good--in short1 bad4 ,nothing1 therefore1 can be good1 except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature2 and hence a thing is useful1 in proportion as it is in harmony with our nature1 and vice vers4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxii4 ,in so far as men are a prey to passion1 they cannot1 in that respect1 be said to be naturally in harmony4 ,proof4--,things1 which are said to be in harmony naturally1 are understood to agree in power 7,,iii4 vii471 not in want of power or negation1 and consequently not in passion 7,,iii4 iii4 note72 wherefore men1 in so far as they are a prey to their passions1 cannot be said to be naturally in harmony4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,this is also self--evident2 for1 if we say that white and black only agree in the fact that neither is red1 we absolutely affirm that the do not agree in any respect4 ,so1 if we say that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that both are finite--wanting in power1 not existing by the necessity of their own nature1 or1 lastly1 indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causes--we should certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in no respect alike2 therefore1 things which agree only in negation1 or in qualities which neither possess1 really agree in no respect4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxiii4 ,men can differ in nature1 in so far as they are assailed by those emotions1 which are passions1 or passive states2 and to this extent one and the same man is variable and inconstant4 ,proof4--,the nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely through our essence or nature 7,,iii4 ,deff4 i41 ii471 but it must be defined by the power1 that is 7,,iii4 vii471 by the nature of external causes in comparison with our own2 hence it follows1 that there are as many kinds of each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected 7,,iii4 lvi471 and that men may be differently affected by one and the same object 7,,iii4 li471 and to this extent differ in nature2 lastly1 that one and the same man may be differently affected towards the same object1 and may therefore be variable and inconstant4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxiv4 ,in so far as men are assailed by emotions which are passions1 they can be contrary one to another4 ,proof4--,a man1 for instance ,peter1 can be the cause of ,paul's feeling pain1 because he 7,peter7 possesses something similar to that which ,paul hates 7,,iii4 xvi471 or because ,peter has sole possession of a thing which ,paul also loves 7,,iii4 xxxii4 and note71 or for other causes 7of which the chief are enumerated in ,,iii4 lv4 note72 it may therefore happen that ,paul should hate ,peter 7,def4 of ,emotions1 vii471 consequently it may easily happen also1 that ,peter should hate ,paul in return1 and that each should endeavour to do the other an injury1 7,,iii4 xxxix471 that is 7,,iv4 xxx471 that they should be contrary one to another4 ,but the emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state 7,,iii4 lix472 hence men1 in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are passions1 can be contrary one to another4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,i said that ,paul may hate ,peter1 because he conceives that ,peter possesses something which he 7,paul7 also loves2 from this it seems1 at first sight1 to follow1 that these two men1 through both loving the same thing1 and1 consequently1 through agreement of their respective natures1 stand in one another's way2 if this were so1 ,props4 xxx4 and xxxi4 of this part would be untrue4 ,but if we give the matter our unbiased attention1 we shall see that the discrepancy vanishes4 ,for the two men are not in one another's way in virtue of the agreement of their natures1 that is1 through both loving the same thing1 but in virtue of one differing from the other4 ,for1 in so far as each loves the same thing1 the love of each is fostered thereby 7,,iii4 xxxi471 that is 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 vi47 the pleasure of each is fostered thereby4 ,wherefore it is far from being the case1 that they are at variance through both loving the same thing1 and through the agreement in their natures4 ,the cause for their opposition lies1 as ,i have said1 solely in the fact that they are assumed to differ4 ,for we assume that ,peter has the idea of the loved object as already in his possession1 while ,paul has the idea of the loved object as lost4 ,hence the one man will be affected with pleasure1 the other will be affected with pain1 and thus they will be at variance one with another4 ,we can easily show in like manner1 that all other causes of hatred depend solely on differences1 and not on the agreement between men's natures4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxv4 ,in so far only as men live in obedience to reason1 do they always necessarily agree in nature4 ,proof4--,in so far as men are assailed by emotions that are passions1 they can be different in nature 7,,iv4 xxxiii471 and at variance one with another4 ,but men are only said to be active1 in so far as they act in obedience to reason 7,,iii4 iii472 therefore1 what so ever follows from human nature in so far as it is defined by reason must 7,,iii4 ,def4 ii47 be understood solely through human nature as its proximate cause4 ,but1 since every man by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good1 and endeavours to remove that which he deems bad 7,,iv4 xix472 and further1 since that which we1 in accordance with reason1 deem good or bad1 necessarily is good or bad 7,,ii4 xli472 it follows that men1 in so far as they live in obedience to reason1 necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human nature1 and consequently for each individual man 7,,iv4 xxxi4 ,coroll472 in other words1 such things as are in harmony with each man's nature4 ,therefore1 men in so far as they live in obedience to reason1 necessarily live always in harmony one with another4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary ,i4--,there is no individual thing in nature1 which is more useful to man1 than a man who lives in obedience to reason4 ,for that thing is to man most useful1 which is most in harmony with his nature 7,,iv4 xxxi4 ,coroll472 that is1 obviously1 man4 ,but man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature1 when he lives in obedience to reason 7,,iii4 ,def4 ii471 and to this extent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of another man 7by the last ,prop472 wherefore among individual things nothing is more useful to man1 than a man who lives in obedience to reason4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary ,,ii4--,as every man seeks most that which is useful to him1 so are men most useful one to another4 ,for the more a man seeks what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself1 the more is he endowed with virtue 7,,iv4 xx471 or1 what is the same thing 7,,iv4 ,def4 viii471 the more is he endowed with power to act according to the laws of his own nature1 that is to live in obedience to reason4 ,but men are most in natural harmony1 when they live in obedience to reason 7by the last ,prop472 therefore 7by the foregoing ,coroll47 men will be most useful one to another1 when each seeks most that which is useful to him4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,what we have just shown is attested by experience so conspicuously1 that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone3 ,man is to man a ,god4 ,yet it rarely happens that men live in obedience to reason1 for things are so ordered among them1 that they are generally envious and troublesome one to another4 ,nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life1 so that the definition of man as a social animal has met with general assent2 in fact1 men do derive from social life much more convenience than injury4 ,let satirists then laugh their fill at human affairs1 let theologians rail1 and let misanthropes praise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity1 let them heap contempt on men and praises on beasts2 when all is said1 they will find that men can provide for their wants much more easily by mutual help1 and that only by uniting their forces can they escape from the dangers that on every side beset them3 not to say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is1 to study the actions of men than the actions of beasts4 ,but ,i will treat of this more at length elsewhere4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxvi4 ,the highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all1 and therefore all can equally rejoice therein4 ,proof4--,to act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason 7,,iv4 xxiv471 and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to reason is to understand 7,,iv4 xxvi472 therefore 7,,iv4 xxviii47 the highest good for those who follow after virtue is to know ,god2 that is 7,,ii4 xlvii4 and note7 a good which is common to all and can be possessed by all men equally1 in so far as they are of the same nature4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,someone may ask how it would be1 if the highest good of those who follow after virtue were not common to all8 ,would it not then follow1 as above 7,,iv4 xxxiv471 that men living in obedience to reason1 that is 7,,iv4 xxxv471 men in so far as they agree in nature1 would be at variance one with another8 ,to such an inquiry1 ,i make answer1 that it follows not accidentally but from the very nature of reason1 that main's highest good is common to all1 inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of man1 in so far as defined by reason2 and that a man could neither be1 nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure in this highest good4 ,for it belongs to the essence of the human mind 7,,ii4 xlvii471 to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of ,god4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxvii4 ,the good which every man1 who follows after virtue1 desires for himself he will also desire for other men1 and so much the more1 in proportion as he has a greater knowledge of ,god4 ,proof4--,men1 in so far as they live in obedience to reason1 are most useful to their fellow men 7,,iv4 xxxv2 ,coroll4 i472 therefore 7,,iv4 xix471 we shall in obedience to reason necessarily endeavour to bring about that men should live in obedience to reason4 ,but the good which every man1 in so far as he is guided by reason1 or1 in other words1 follows after virtue1 desires for himself1 is to understand 7,,iv4 xxvi472 wherefore the good1 which each follower of virtue seeks for himself1 he will desire also for others4 ,again1 desire1 in so far as it is referred to the mind1 is the very essence of the mind 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 i472 now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge 7,,ii4 xi471 which involves the knowledge of ,god 7,,ii4 xlvii471 and without it 7,i4 xv471 can neither be1 nor be conceived2 therefore1 in proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge of ,god1 so also will be greater the desire of the follower of virtue1 that other men should possess that which he seeks as good for himself4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,another ,proof4--,the good1 which a man desires for himself and loves1 he will love more constantly1 if he sees that others love it also 7,,iii4 xxxi472 he will therefore endeavour that others should love it also2 and as the good in question is common to all1 and therefore all can rejoice therein1 he will endeavour1 for the same reason1 to bring about that all should rejoice therein1 and this he will do the more 7,,iii4 xxxvii471 in proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater4 ,note ,i4--,he who1 guided by emotion only1 endeavours to cause others to love what he loves himself1 and to make the rest of the world live according to his own fancy1 acts solely by impulse1 and is1 therefore1 hateful1 especially1 to those who take delight in something different1 and accordingly study and1 by similar impulse1 endeavour1 to make men live in accordance with what pleases themselves4 ,again1 as the highest good sought by men under the guidance of emotion is often such1 that it can only be possessed by a single individual1 it follows that those who love it are not consistent in their intentions1 but1 while they delight to sing its praises1 fear to be believed4 ,but he1 who endeavours to lead men by reason1 does not act by impulse but courteously and kindly1 and his intention is always consistent4 ,again1 whatsoever we desire and do1 whereof we are the cause in so far as we possess the idea of ,god1 or know ,god1 ,i set down to ,religion4 ,the desire of well--doing1 which is engendered by a life according to reason1 ,i call piety4 ,further1 the desire1 whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate others with himself in friendship1 ,i call honour#ac2 by honourable ,i mean that which is praised by men living according to reason1 and by base ,i mean that which is repugnant to the gaining of friendship4 ,i have also shown in addition what are the foundations of a state2 and the difference between true virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what ,i have said2 namely1 that true virtue is nothing else but living in accordance with reason2 while infirmity is nothing else but man's allowing himself to be led by things which are external to himself1 and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded by the general disposition of things rather than by his own nature considered solely in itself4 #ac ,honestas ,such are the matters which ,i engaged to prove in ,prop4 xviii4 of this ,part1 whereby it is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason4 ,the rational quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellow men1 but not with beasts1 or things1 whose nature is different from our own2 we have the same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us4 ,nay1 as everyone's right is defined by his virtue1 or power1 men have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men4 ,still ,i do not deny that beasts feel3 what ,i deny is1 that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please1 treating them in the way which best suits us2 for their nature is not like ours1 and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions 7,,iii4 lvii4 note74 ,it remains for me to explain what ,i mean by just and unjust1 sin and merit4 ,on these points see the following note4 ,note ,,ii4--,in the ,appendix to ,part ,i4 ,i undertook to explain praise and blame1 merit and sin1 justice and injustice4 ,concerning praise and blame ,i have spoken in ,,iii4 xxix4 note3 the time has now come to treat of the remaining terms4 ,but ,i must first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature and in society4 ,every man exists by sovereign natural right1 and1 consequently1 by sovereign natural right performs those actions which follow from the necessity of his own nature2 therefore by sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is bad1 takes care of his own advantage according to his own disposition 7,,iv4 xix4 and ,,iv4 xx471 avenges the wrongs done to him 7,,iii4 xl4 ,coroll4 ii471 and endeavours to preserve that which he loves and to destroy that which he hates 7,,iii4 xxviii474 ,now1 if men lived under the guidance of reason1 everyone would remain in possession of this his right1 without any injury being done to his neighbour 7,,iv4 xxxv4 ,coroll4 i474 ,but seeing that they are a prey to their emotions1 which far surpass human power or virtue 7,,iv4 vi471 they are often drawn in different directions1 and being at variance one with another 7,,iv4 xxxiii4 xxxiv471 stand in need of mutual help 7,,iv4 xxxv4 note74 ,wherefore1 in order that men may live together in harmony1 and may aid one another1 it is necessary that they should forego their natural right1 and1 for the sake of security1 refrain from all actions which can injure their fellow--men4 ,the way in which this end can be obtained1 so that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions 7,,iv4 iv4 ,coroll471 inconstant1 and diverse1 should be able to render each other mutually secure1 and feel mutual trust1 is evident from ,,iv4 vii4 and ,,iii4 xxxix4 ,it is there shown1 that an emotion can only be restrained by an emotion stronger than1 and contrary to itself1 and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of incurring a greater injury themselves4 ,on this law society can be established1 so long as it keeps in its own hand the right1 possessed by everyone1 of avenging injury1 and pronouncing on good and evil2 and provided it also possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct1 and to pass laws sanctioned1 not by reason1 which is powerless in restraining emotion1 but by threats 7,,iv4 xvii4 note74 ,such a society established with laws and the power of preserving itself is called a ,state1 while those who live under its protection are called citizens4 ,we may readily understand that there is in the state of nature nothing1 which by universal consent is pronounced good or bad2 for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely of his own advantage1 and according to his disposition1 with reference only to his individual advantage1 decides what is good or bad1 being bound by no law to anyone besides himself4 ,in the state of nature1 therefore1 sin is inconceivable2 it can only exist in a state1 where good and evil are pronounced on by common consent1 and where everyone is bound to obey the ,state authority4 ,sin1 then1 is nothing else but disobedience1 which is therefore punished by the right of the ,state only4 ,obedience1 on the other hand1 is set down as merit1 inasmuch as a man is thought worthy of merit1 if he takes delight in the advantages which a ,state provides4 ,again1 in the state of nature1 no one is by common consent master of anything1 nor is there anything in nature1 which can be said to belong to one man rather than another3 all things are common to all4 ,hence1 in the state of nature1 we can conceive no wish to render to every man his own1 or to deprive a man of that which belongs to him2 in other words1 there is nothing in the state of nature answering to justice and injustice4 ,such ideas are only possible in a social state1 when it is decreed by common consent what belongs to one man and what to another4 ,from all these considerations it is evident1 that justice and injustice1 sin and merit1 are extrinsic ideas1 and not attributes which display the nature of the mind4 ,but ,i have said enough4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxviii4 ,whatsoever disposes the human body1 so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways1 or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways1 is useful to man2 and is so1 in proportion as the body is thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting other bodies in an increased number of ways2 contrariwise1 whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is hurtful to man4 ,proof4--,whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body increases also the mind's capability of perception 7,,ii4 xiv472 therefore1 whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders it capable1 is necessarily good or useful 7,,iv4 xxvi4 xxvii472 and is so in proportion to the extent to which it can render the body capable2 contrariwise 7,,ii4 xiv41 ,,iv4 xxvi4 xxvii471 it is hurtful1 if it renders the body in this respect less capable4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxix4 ,whatsoever brings about the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest1 which the parts of the human body mutually possess1 is good2 contrariwise1 whatsoever causes a change in such proportion is bad4 ,proof4--,the human body needs many other bodies for its preservation 7,,ii4 ,post4 iv474 ,but that which constitutes the specific reality 7forma7 of a human body is1 that its parts communicate their several motions one to another in a certain fixed proportion 7,def4 before ,lemma iv4 after ,,ii4 xiii474 ,therefore1 whatsoever brings about the preservation of the proportion between motion and rest1 which the parts of the human body mutually possess1 preserves the specific reality of the human body1 and consequently renders the human body capable of being affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies in many ways2 consequently it is good 7by the last ,prop474 ,again1 whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid proportion causes the human body to assume another specific character1 in other words 7see ,preface to this ,part towards the end1 though the point is indeed self--evident71 to be destroyed1 and consequently totally incapable of being affected in an increased numbers of ways2 therefore it is bad4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,the extent to which such causes can injure or be of service to the mind will be explained in the ,fifth ,part4 ,but ,i would here remark that ,i consider that a body undergoes death1 when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually among its several parts is changed4 ,for ,i do not venture to deny that a human body1 while keeping the circulation of the blood and other properties1 wherein the life of a body is thought to consist1 may none the less be changed into another nature totally different from its own4 ,there is no reason1 which compels me to maintain that a body does not die1 unless it becomes a corpse2 nay1 experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion4 ,it sometimes happens1 that a man undergoes such changes1 that ,i should hardly call him the same4 ,as ,i have heard tell of a certain ,spanish poet1 who had been seized with sickness1 and though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his past life1 that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he had written to be his own3 indeed1 he might have been taken for a grown--up child1 if he had also forgotten his native tongue4 ,if this instance seems incredible1 what shall we say of infants8 ,a man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own1 that he can only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy of other men4 ,however1 ,i prefer to leave such questions undiscussed1 lest ,i should give ground to the superstitious for raising new issues4 ,,prop4 ,,xl4 ,whatsoever conduces to man's social life1 or causes men to live together in harmony1 is useful1 whereas whatsoever brings discord into a ,state is bad4 ,proof4--,for whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony also causes them to live according to reason 7,,iv4 xxxv471 and is therefore 7,,iv4 xxvi4 xxvii47 good1 and 7for the same reason7 whatsoever brings about discord is bad4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xli4 ,pleasure in itself is not bad but good3 contrariwise1 pain in itself is bad4 ,proof4--,pleasure 7,,iii4 xi4 and note7 is emotion1 whereby the body's power of activity is increased or helped2 pain is emotion1 whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or checked2 therefore 7,,iv4 xxxviii47 pleasure in itself is good1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xlii4 ,mirth cannot be excessive1 but is always good2 contrariwise1 ,melancholy is always bad4 ,proof4--,mirth 7see its ,def4 in ,,iii4 xi4 note7 is pleasure1 which1 in so far as it is referred to the body1 consists in all parts of the body being affected equally3 that is 7,,iii4 xi471 the body's power of activity is increased or aided in such a manner1 that the several parts maintain their former proportion of motion and rest2 therefore ,mirth is always good 7,,iv4 xxxix471 and cannot be excessive4 ,but ,melancholy 7see its ,def4 in the same note to ,,iii4 xi47 is pain1 which1 in so far as it is referred to the body1 consists in the absolute decrease or hindrance of the body's power of activity2 therefore 7,,iv4 xxxviii47 it is always bad4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xliii4 ,stimulation may be excessive and bad2 on the other hand1 grief may be good1 in so far as stimulation or pleasure is bad4 ,proof4--,localized pleasure or stimulation 7titillatio7 is pleasure1 which1 in so far as it is referred to the body1 consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the rest 7see its ,definition1 ,,iii4 xi4 note72 the power of this emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body 7,,iv4 vi471 and may remain obstinately fixed therein1 thus rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other ways3 therefore 7,,iv4 xxxviii47 it may be bad4 ,again1 grief1 which is pain1 cannot as such be good 7,,iv4 xli474 ,but1 as its force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own 7,,iv4 v471 we can conceive infinite degrees and modes of strength in this emotion 7,,iv4 iii472 we can1 therefore1 conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation1 and preventing its becoming excessive1 and hindering the body's capabilities2 thus1 to this extent1 it will be good4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xliv4 ,love and desire may be excessive4 ,proof4--,love is pleasure1 accompanied by the idea of an external cause 7,def4 of ,emotions1 vi472 therefore stimulation1 accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love 7,,iii4 xi4 note72 hence love maybe excessive4 ,again1 the strength of desire varies in proportion to the emotion from which it arises 7,,iii4 xxxvii474 ,now emotion may overcome all the rest of men's actions 7,,iv4 vi472 so1 therefore1 can desire1 which arises from the same emotion1 overcome all other desires1 and become excessive1 as we showed in the last proposition concerning stimulation4 ,note4--,mirth1 which ,i have stated to be good1 can be conceived more easily than it can be observed4 ,for the emotions1 whereby we are daily assailed1 are generally referred to some part of the body which is affected more than the rest2 hence the emotions are generally excessive1 and so fix the mind in the contemplation of one object1 that it is unable to think of others2 and although men1 as a rule1 are a prey to many emotions--and very few are found who are always assailed by one and the same--yet there are cases1 where one and the same emotion remains obstinately fixed4 ,we sometimes see men so absorbed in one object1 that1 although it be not present1 they think they have it before them2 when this is the case with a man who is not asleep1 we say he is delirious or mad2 nor are those persons who are inflamed with love1 and who dream all night and all day about nothing but their mistress1 or some woman1 considered as less mad1 for they are made objects of ridicule4 ,but when a miser thinks of nothing but gain or money1 or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but glory1 they are not reckoned to be mad1 because they are generally harmful1 and are thought worthy of being hated4 ,but1 in reality1 ,avarice1 ,ambition1 ,lust1 c41 are species of madness1 though they may not be reckoned among diseases4 ,,prop4 ,,xlv4 ,hatred can never be good4 ,proof4--,when we hate a man1 we endeavour to destroy him 7,,iii4 xxxix471 that is 7,,iv4 xxxvii471 we endeavour to do something that is bad4 ,therefore1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,n4,b4 ,here1 and in what follows1 ,i mean by hatred only hatred towards men4 ,corollary ,i4--,envy1 derision1 contempt1 anger1 revenge1 and other emotions attributable to hatred1 or arising therefrom1 are bad2 this is evident from ,,iii4 xxxix4 and ,,iv4 xxxvii4 ,corollary ,,ii4--,whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is base1 and in a ,state unjust4 ,this also is evident from ,,iii4 xxxix41 and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in ,,iv4 xxxvii4 note4 ,note4--,between derision 7which ,i have in ,coroll4 ,i4 stated to be bad7 and laughter ,i recognize a great difference4 ,for laughter1 as also jocularity1 is merely pleasure2 therefore1 so long as it be not excessive1 it is in itself good 7,,iv4 xli474 ,assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself1 save grim and gloomy superstition4 ,for why is it more lawful to satiate one's hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy8 ,i reason1 and have convinced myself as follows3 ,no deity1 nor anyone else1 save the envious1 takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort1 nor sets down to my virtue the tears1 sobs1 fear1 and the like1 which axe signs of infirmity of spirit2 on the contrary1 the greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected1 the greater the perfection whereto we pass2 in other words1 the more must we necessarily partake of the divine nature4 ,therefore1 to make use of what comes in our way1 and to enjoy it as much as possible 7not to the point of satiety1 for that would not be enjoyment7 is the part of a wise man4 ,i say it is the part of a wise man to refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink1 and also with perfumes1 with the soft beauty of growing plants1 with dress1 with music1 with many sports1 with theatres1 and the like1 such as every man may make use of without injury to his neighbour4 ,for the human body is composed of very numerous parts1 of diverse nature1 which continually stand in need of fresh and varied nourishment1 so that the whole body may be equally capable of performing all the actions1 which follow from the necessity of its own nature2 and1 consequently1 so that the mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things simultaneously4 ,this way of life1 then1 agrees best with our principles1 and also with general practice2 therefore1 if there be any question of another plan1 the plan we have mentioned is the best1 and in every way to be commended4 ,there is no need for me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail4 ,,prop4 ,,xlvi4 ,he1 who lives under the guidance of reason1 endeavours1 as far as possible1 to render back love1 or kindness1 for other men's hatred1 anger1 contempt1 c41 towards him4 ,proof4--,all emotions of hatred are bad 7,,iv4 xlv4 ,coroll4 i472 therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour1 as far as possible1 to avoid being assailed by such emotions 7,,iv4 xix472 consequently1 he will also endeavour to prevent others being so assailed 7,,iv4 xxxvii474 ,but hatred is increased by being reciprocated1 and can be quenched by love 7,,iii4 xliii471 so that hatred may pass into love 7,,iii4 xliv472 therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour to repay hatred with love1 that is1 with kindness4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,he who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is assuredly wretched4 ,but he1 who strives to conquer hatred with love1 fights his battle in joy and confidence2 he withstands many as easily as one1 and has very little need of fortune's aid4 ,those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully1 not through failure1 but through increase in their powers2 all these consequences follow so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding1 that ,i have no need to prove them in detail4 ,,prop4 ,,xlvii4 ,emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves good4 ,proof4--,emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain4 ,for fear is pain 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 xiii471 and hope 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 ,explanation xii4 and xiii47 cannot exist without fear2 therefore 7,,iv4 xli47 these emotions cannot be good in themselves1 but only in so far as they can restrain excessive pleasure 7,,iv4 xliii474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,we may add1 that these emotions show defective knowledge and an absence of power in the mind2 for the same reason confidence1 despair1 joy1 and disappointment are signs of a want of mental power4 ,for although confidence and joy are pleasurable emotions1 they nevertheless imply a preceding pain1 namely1 hope and fear4 ,wherefore the more we endeavour to be guided by reason1 the less do we depend on hope2 we endeavour to free ourselves from fear1 and1 as far as we can1 to dominate fortune1 directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom4 ,,prop4 ,,xlviii4 ,the emotions of over--esteem and disparagement are always bad4 ,proof4--,these emotions 7see ,def4 of the ,emotions1 xxi4 xxii47 are repugnant to reason2 and are therefore 7,,iv4 xxvi4 xxvii47 bad4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xlix4 ,over--esteem is apt to render its object proud4 ,proof4--,if we see that any one rates us too highly1 for love's sake1 we are apt to become elated 7,,iii4 xli471 or to be pleasurably affected 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 xxx472 the good which we hear of ourselves we readily believe 7,,iii4 xxv472 and therefore1 for love's sake1 rate ourselves too highly2 in other words1 we are apt to become proud4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,l4 ,pity1 in a man who lives under the guidance of reason1 is in itself bad and useless4 ,proof4--,pity 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 xviii47 is a pain1 and therefore 7,,iv4 xli47 is in itself bad4 ,the good effect which follows1 namely1 our endeavour to free the object of our pity from misery1 is an action which we desire to do solely at the dictation of reason 7,,iv4 xxxvii472 only at the dictation of reason are we able to perform any action1 which we know for certain to be good 7,,iv4 xxvii472 thus1 in a man who lives under the guidance of reason1 pity in itself is useless and bad4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,he who rightly realizes1 that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature1 and come to pass in accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature1 will not find anything worthy of hatred1 derision1 or contempt1 nor will he bestow pity on anything1 but to the utmost extent of human virtue he will endeavour to do well1 as the saying is1 and to rejoice4 ,we may add1 that he1 who is easily touched with compassion1 and is moved by another's sorrow or tears1 often does something which he afterwards regrets2 partly because we can never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good1 partly because we are easily deceived by false tears4 ,i am in this place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of reason4 ,he who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by compassion1 is rightly styled inhuman1 for 7,,iii4 xxvii47 he seems unlike a man4 ,,prop4 ,,li4 ,approval is not repugnant to reason1 but can agree therewith and arise therefrom4 ,proof4--,approval is love towards one who has done good to another 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 xix472 therefore it may be referred to the mind1 in so far as the latter is active 7,,iii4 lix471 that is 7,,iii4 iii471 in so far as it understands2 therefore1 it is in agreement with reason1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,another ,proof4--,he1 who lives under the guidance of reason1 desires for others the good which he seeks for himself 7,,iv4 xxxvii472 wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow his own endeavour to do good is aided2 in other words1 he will feel pleasure 7,,iii4 xi4 note7 accompanied by the idea of the benefactor4 ,therefore he approves of him4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,indignation as we defined it 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 xx47 is necessarily evil 7,,iv4 xlv472 we may1 however1 remark that1 when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace punishes a citizen who has injured another1 it should not be said to be indignant with the criminal1 for it is not incited by hatred to ruin him1 it is led by a sense of duty to punish him4 ,,prop4 ,,lii4 ,self--approval may arise from reason1 and that which arises from reason is the highest possible4 ,proof4--,self--approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 xxv474 ,but a man's true power of action or virtue is reason herself 7,,iii4 iii471 as the said man clearly and distinctly contemplates her 7,,ii4 xl4 xliii472 therefore self--approval arises from reason4 ,again1 when a man is contemplating himself1 he only perceived clearly and distinctly or adequately1 such things as follow from his power of action 7,,iii4 ,def4 ii471 that is 7,,iii4 iii471 from his power of understanding2 therefore in such contemplation alone does the highest possible self--approval arise4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,self--approval is in reality the highest object for which we can hope4 ,for 7as we showed in ,,iv4 xxv47 no one endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior object1 and1 as this approval is more and more fostered and strengthened by praise 7,,iii4 liii4 ,coroll471 and on the contrary 7,,iii4 lv4 ,coroll47 is more and more disturbed by blame1 fame becomes the most powerful of incitements to action1 and life under disgrace is almost unendurable4 ,,prop4 ,,liii4 ,humility is not a virtue1 or does not arise from reason4 ,proof4--,humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own infirmities 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 xxvi474 ,but1 in so far as a man knows himself by true reason1 he is assumed to understand his essence1 that is1 his power 7,,iii4 vii474 ,wherefore1 if a man in self--contemplation perceives any infirmity in himself1 it is not by virtue of his understanding himself1 but 7,,iii4 lv47 by virtue of his power of activity being checked4 ,but1 if we assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by virtue of understanding something stronger than himself1 by the knowledge of which he determines his own power of activity1 this is the same as saying that we conceive that a man understands himself distinctly 7,,iv4 xxvi471 because#ad his power of activity is aided4 ,wherefore humility1 or the pain which arises from a man's contemplation of his own infirmity1 does not arise from the contemplation or reason1 and is not a virtue but a passion4 ,q4,e4,d4 #ad ,land reads3 ,quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur--which ,i have translated above4 ,he suggests as alternative readings to 'quod'1 'quo' 7 whereby7 and 'quodque' 7 and that74 ,,prop4 ,,liv4 ,repentance is not a virtue1 or does not arise from reason2 but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm4 ,proof4--,the first part of this proposition is proved like the foregoing one4 ,the second part is proved from the mere definition of the emotion in question 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 xxvii474 ,for the man allows himself to be overcome1 first1 by evil desires2 secondly1 by pain4 ,note4--,as men seldom live under the guidance of reason1 these two emotions1 namely1 ,humility and ,repentance1 as also ,hope and ,fear1 bring more good than harm2 hence1 as we must sin1 we had better sin in that direction4 ,for1 if all men who are a prey to emotion were all equally proud1 they would shrink from nothing1 and would fear nothing2 how then could they be joined and linked together in bonds of union8 ,the crowd plays the tyrant1 when it is not in fear2 hence we need not wonder that the prophets1 who consulted the good1 not of a few1 but of all1 so strenuously commended ,humility1 ,repentance1 and ,reverence4 ,indeed those who are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than others to live under the guidance of reason1 that is1 to become free and to enjoy the life of the blessed4 ,,prop4 ,,lv4 ,extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance of self4 ,proof4--,this is evident from ,def4 of the ,emotions1 xxviii4 and xxix4 ,,prop4 ,,lvi4 ,extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit4 ,proof4--,the first foundation of virtue is self--preservation 7,,iv4 xxii4 ,coroll47 under the guidance of reason 7,,iv4 xxiv474 ,he1 therefore1 who is ignorant of himself1 is ignorant of the foundation of all virtues1 and consequently of all virtues4 ,again1 to act virtuously is merely to act under the guidance of reason 7,,iv4 xxiv473 now he1 that acts under the guidance of reason1 must necessarily know that he so acts 7,,ii4 xliii474 ,therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself1 and consequently of all virtues1 acts least in obedience to virtue2 in other words 7,,iv4 ,def4 viii471 is most infirm of spirit4 ,thus extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,hence it most clearly follows1 that the proud and the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions4 ,note4--,yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride2 for the latter being a pleasurable emotion1 and the former a painful emotion1 the pleasurable is stronger than the painful 7,,iv4 xviii474 ,,prop4 ,,lvii4 ,the proud man delights in the company of flatterers and parasites1 but hates the company of the high--minded4 ,proof4--,pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimation of himself 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 xxviii4 and vi472 this estimation the proud man will endeavour to foster by all the means in his power 7,,iii4 xiii4 note72 he will therefore delight in the company of flatterers and parasites 7whose character is too well known to need definition here71 and will avoid the company of high--minded men1 who value him according to his deserts4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,it would be too long a task to enumerate here all the evil results of pride1 inasmuch as the proud are a prey to all the emotions1 though to none of them less than to love and pity4 ,i cannot1 however1 pass over in silence the fact1 that a man may be called proud from his underestimation of other people2 and1 therefore1 pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising from the false opinion1 whereby a man may consider himself superior to his fellows4 ,the dejection1 which is the opposite quality to this sort of pride1 may be defined as pain arising from the false opinion1 whereby a man may think himself inferior to his fellows4 ,such being the ease1 we can easily see that a proud man is necessarily envious 7,,iii4 xli4 note71 and only takes pleasure in the company1 who fool his weak mind to the top of his bent1 and make him insane instead of merely foolish4 ,though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride1 yet is the dejected man very near akin to the proud man4 ,for1 inasmuch as his pain arises from a comparison between his own infirmity and other men's power or virtue1 it will be removed1 or1 in other words1 he will feel pleasure1 if his imagination be occupied in contemplating other men's faults2 whence arises the proverb1 ,the unhappy are comforted by finding fellow--sufferers4 ,contrariwise1 he will be the more pained in proportion as he thinks himself inferior to others2 hence none are so prone to envy as the dejected1 they are specially keen in observing men's actions1 with a view to fault--finding rather than correction1 in order to reserve their praises for dejection1 and to glory therein1 though all the time with a dejected air4 ,these effects follow as necessarily from the said emotion1 as it follows from the nature of a triangle1 that the three angles are equal to two right angles4 ,i have already said that ,i call these and similar emotions bad1 solely in respect to what is useful to man4 ,the laws of nature have regard to nature's general order1 whereof man is but a part4 ,i mention this1 in passing1 lest any should think that ,i have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds of men rather than the nature and properties of things4 ,for1 as ,i said in the preface to the third ,part1 ,i regard human emotions and their properties as on the same footing with other natural phenomena4 ,assuredly human emotions indicate the power and ingenuity1 of nature1 if not of human nature1 quite as fully as other things which we admire1 and which we delight to contemplate4 ,but ,i pass on to note those qualities in the emotions1 which bring advantage to man1 or inflict injury upon him4 ,,prop4 ,,lviii4 ,honour 7gloria7 is not repugnant to reason1 but may arise therefrom4 ,proof4--,this is evident from ,def4 of the ,emotions1 xxx41 and also from the definition of an honourable man 7,,iv4 xxxvii4 note4 i474 ,note--,empty honour1 as it is styled1 is self--approval1 fostered only by the good opinion of the populace2 when this good opinion ceases there ceases also the self--approval1 in other words1 the highest object of each man's love 7,,iv4 lii4 note72 consequently1 he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must1 day by day1 anxiously strive1 act1 and scheme in order to retain his reputation4 ,for the populace is variable and inconstant1 so that1 if a reputation be not kept up1 it quickly withers away4 ,everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself1 and readily represses the fame of others4 ,the object of the strife being estimated as the greatest of all goods1 each combatant is seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every possible way1 till he who at last comes out victorious is more proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to himself4 ,this sort of honour1 then1 is really empty1 being nothing4 ,the points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance4 ,i will only add that shame1 like compassion1 though not a virtue1 is yet good1 in so far as it shows1 that the feeler of shame is really imbued with the desire to live honourably2 in the same way as suffering is good1 as showing that the injured part is not mortified4 ,therefore1 though a man who feels shame is sorrowful1 he is yet more perfect than he1 who is shameless1 and has no desire to live honourably4 ,such are the points which ,i undertook to remark upon concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain2 as for the desires1 they are good or bad according as they spring from good or evil emotions4 ,but all1 in so far as they are engendered in us by emotions wherein the mind is passive1 are blind 7as is evident from what was said in ,,iv4 xliv4 note71 and would be useless1 if men could easily1 be induced to live by the guidance of reason only1 as ,i will now briefly1 show4 ,,prop4 ,,lix4 ,to all the actions1 whereto we are determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive2 we can be determined without emotion by reason4 ,proof4--,to act rationally1 is nothing else 7,,iii4 iii4 and ,def4 ii47 but to perform those actions1 which follow from the necessity1 of our nature considered in itself alone4 ,but pain is bad1 in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action 7,,iv4 xli472 wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any action1 which we should be unable to perform under the guidance of reason4 ,again1 pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action 7,,iv4 xli4 xliii472 therefore to this extent we could not be determined by it to any action1 which we could not perform under the guidance of reason4 ,lastly1 pleasure1 in so far as it is good1 is in harmony with reason 7for it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is increased or aided72 nor is the mind passive therein1 except in so far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his actions 7,,iii4 iii41 and note74 ,wherefore1 if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to such a state of perfection1 that he gains an adequate conception of himself and his own actions1 he will be equally1 nay more1 capable of those actions1 to which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive4 ,but all emotions are attributable to pleasure1 to pain1 or to desire 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 iv4 explanation72 and desire 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 i47 is nothing else but the attempt to act2 therefore1 to all actions1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,another ,proof4--,a given action is called bad1 in so far as it arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion4 ,but no action1 considered in itself alone1 is either good or bad 7as we pointed out in the preface to ,pt4 ,,iv471 one and the same action being sometimes good1 sometimes bad2 wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad1 or arises from some evil emotion1 we may be led by reason 7,,iv4 xix474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,an example will put this point in a clearer light4 ,the action of striking1 in so far as it is considered physically1 and in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm1 clenches his fist1 and moves his whole arm violently downwards1 is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body4 ,if1 then1 a man1 moved by anger or hatred1 is led to clench his fist or to move his arm1 this result takes place 7as we showed in ,pt4 ,,ii471 because one and the same action can be associated with various mental images of things2 therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same action by confused ideas1 or by clear and distinct ideas4 ,hence it is evident that every desire which springs from emotion1 wherein the mind is passive1 would become useless1 if men could be guided by reason4 ,let us now see why desire which arises from emotion1 wherein the mind is passive1 is called by us blind4 ,,prop4 ,,lx4 ,desire arising from a pleasure or pain1 that is not attributable to the whole body1 but only to one or certain parts thereof1 is without utility in respect to a man as a whole4 ,proof4--,let it be assumed1 for instance1 that ,a1 a part of a body1 is so strengthened by some external cause1 that it prevails over the remaining parts 7,,iv4 vi474 ,this part will not endeavour to do away with its own powers1 in order that the other parts of the body may perform its office2 for this it would be necessary for it to have a force or power of doing away with its own powers1 which 7,,iii4 vi47 is absurd4 ,the said part1 and1 consequently1 the mind also1 will endeavour to preserve its condition4 ,wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind aforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as a whole4 ,if it be assumed1 on the other hand1 that the part1 ,a1 be checked so that the remaining parts prevail1 it may be proved in the same manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to a man as a whole4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,as pleasure is generally 7,,iv4 xliv4 note7 attributed to one part of the body1 we generally desire to preserve our being with out taking into consideration our health as a whole3 to which it may be added1 that the desires which have most hold over us 7,,iv4 ix47 take account of the present and not of the future4 ,,prop4 ,,lxi4 ,desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive4 ,proof4--,desire 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 i47 considered absolutely is the actual essence of man1 in so far as it is conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself4 ,hence desire1 which arises from reason1 that is 7,,iii4 iii471 which is engendered in us in so far as we act1 is the actual essence or nature of man1 in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are adequately conceived through man's essence only 7,,iii4 ,def4 ii474 ,now1 if such desire could be excessive1 human nature considered in itself alone would be able to exceed itself1 or would be able to do more than it can1 a manifest contradiction4 ,therefore1 such desire cannot be excessive4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,lxii4 ,in so far as the mind conceives a thing under the dictates of reason1 it is affected equally1 whether the idea be of a thing future1 past1 or present4 ,proof4--,whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason1 it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity 7,,ii4 xliv4 ,coroll4 ii471 and is therefore affected with the same certitude 7,,ii4 xliii4 and note74 ,wherefore1 whether the thing be present1 past1 or future1 the mind conceives it under the same necessity and is affected with the same certitude2 and whether the idea be of something present1 past1 or future1 it will in all cases be equally true 7,,ii4 xli472 that is1 it will always possess the same properties of an adequate idea 7,,ii4 ,def4 iv472 therefore1 in so far as the mind conceives things under the dictates of reason1 it is affected in the same manner1 whether the idea be of a thing future1 past1 or present4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,if we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things1 and could determine by reason their periods of existence1 we should contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present2 and the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it conceived as future2 consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future1 and would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of evil in the future1 as we shall presently show4 ,however1 we can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things 7,,ii4 xxxi472 and the periods of their existence 7,,ii4 xliv4 note47 we can only determine by imagination1 which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the present4 ,hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely abstract or general1 and the judgment which we pass on the order of things and the connection of causes1 with a view to determining what is good or bad for us in the present1 is rather imaginary than real4 ,therefore it is nothing wonderful1 if the desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil1 in so far as it looks on into the future1 be more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the present time4 7,cf4 ,,iv4 xvi47 ,,prop4 ,,lxiii4 ,he who is led by fear1 and does good in order to escape evil1 is not led by reason4 ,proof4--,all the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active1 or in other words to reason1 are emotions of pleasure and desire 7,,iii4 lix472 therefore1 he who is led by fear1 and does good in order to escape evil1 is not led by reason4 ,note4--,superstitions persons1 who know better how to rail at vice than how to teach virtue1 and who strive not to guide men by reason1 but so to restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue1 have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves2 wherefore it is nothing wonderful1 if they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow--men4 ,corollary4--,under desire which springs from reason1 we seek good directly1 and shun evil indirectly4 ,proof4--,desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable emotion1 wherein the mind is not passive 7,,iii4 lix471 in other words1 from a pleasure which cannot be excessive 7,,iv4 lxi471 and not from pain2 wherefore this desire springs from the knowledge of good1 not of evil 7,,iv4 viii472 hence under the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by implication shun evil4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,this ,corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick and a healthy man4 ,the sick man through fear of death eats what he naturally shrinks from1 but the healthy man takes pleasure in his food1 and thus gets a better enjoyment out of life1 than if he were in fear of death1 and desired directly to avoid it4 ,so a judge1 who condemns a criminal to death1 not from hatred or anger but from love of the public well--being1 is guided solely by reason4 ,,prop4 ,,lxiv4 ,the knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge4 ,proof4--,the knowledge of evil 7,,iv4 viii47 is pain1 in so far as we are conscious thereof4 ,now pain is the transition to a lesser perfection 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 iii47 and therefore cannot be understood through man's nature 7,,iii4 vi41 and vii472 therefore it is a passive state 7,,iii4 ,def4 ii47 which 7,,iii4 iii47 depends on inadequate ideas2 consequently the knowledge thereof 7,,ii4 xxix471 namely1 the knowledge of evil1 is inadequate4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,hence it follows that1 if the human mind possessed only adequate ideas1 it would form no conception of evil4 ,,prop4 ,,lxv4 ,under the guidance of reason we should pursue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils4 ,proof4--,a good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in reality an evil2 for we apply the terms good and bad to things1 in so far as we compare them one with another 7see preface to this ,part72 therefore1 evil is in reality a lesser good2 hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,we may1 under the guidance of reason1 pursue the lesser evil as though it were the greater good1 and we may shun the lesser good1 which would be the cause of the greater evil4 ,for the evil1 which is here called the lesser1 is really good1 and the lesser good is really evil1 wherefore we may seek the former and shun the latter4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,lxvi4 ,we may1 under the guidance of reason1 seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present1 and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a greater evil in the future4#ae #ae ,maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro4 7,van ,vloten74 ,bruder reads3 ,malum praesens minus1 quod causa est faturi alicujus mali4 ,the last word of the latter is an obvious misprint1 and is corrected by the ,dutch translator into majoris boni4 7,pollock1 p4 #bfh1 note47 ,proof4--,if the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things future1 it would be affected towards what is future in the same way as towards what is present 7,,iv4 lxii472 wherefore1 looking merely to reason1 as in this proposition we are assumed to do1 there is no difference1 whether the greater good or evil be assumed as present1 or assumed as future2 hence 7,,iv4 lxv47 we may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,we may1 under the guidance of reason1 seek a lesser evil in the present1 because it is the cause of a greater good in the future1 and we may shun a lesser good in the present1 because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future4 ,this ,corollary is related to the foregoing ,proposition as the ,corollary to ,,iv4 lxv4 is related to the said ,,iv4 lxv4 ,note4--,if these statements be compared with what we have pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this ,part up to ,prop4 xviii41 we shall readily see the difference between a man1 who is led solely by emotion or opinion1 and a man1 who is led by reason4 ,the former1 whether will or no1 performs actions whereof he is utterly ignorant2 the latter is his own master and only performs such actions1 as he knows are of primary importance in life1 and therefore chiefly desires2 wherefore ,i call the former a slave1 and the latter a free man1 concerning whose disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few observations4 ,,prop4 ,,lxvii4 ,a free man thinks of death least of all things2 and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life4 ,proof4--,a free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason1 who is not led by fear 7,,iv4 lxiii471 but who directly desires that which is good 7,,iv4 lxiii4 ,coroll471 in other words 7,,iv4 xxiv471 who strives to act1 to live1 and to preserve his being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage2 wherefore such an one thinks of nothing less than of death1 but his wisdom is a meditation of life4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,lxviii4 ,if men were born free1 they would1 so long as they remained free1 form no conception of good and evil4 ,proof4--,i call free him who is led solely by reason2 he1 therefore1 who is born free1 and who remains free1 has only adequate ideas2 therefore 7,,iv4 lxiv4 ,coroll47 he has no conception of evil1 or consequently 7good and evil being correlative7 of good4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,it is evident1 from ,,iv4 iv41 that the hypothesis of this ,proposition is false and inconceivable1 except in so far as we look solely to the nature of man1 or rather to ,god2 not in so far as the latter is infinite1 but only in so far as he is the cause of man's existence4 ,this1 and other matters which we have already proved1 seem to have been signifieded by ,moses in the history of the first man4 ,for in that narrative no other power of ,god is conceived1 save that whereby he created man1 that is the power wherewith he provided solely for man's advantage2 it is stated that ,god forbade man1 being free1 to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil1 and that1 as soon as man should have eaten of it1 he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live4 ,further1 it is written that when man had found a wife1 who was in entire harmony with his nature1 he knew that there could be nothing in nature which could be more useful to him2 but that after he believed the beasts to be like himself1 he straightway began to imitate their emotions 7,,iii4 xxvii471 and to lose his freedom2 this freedom was afterwards recovered by the patriarchs1 led by the spirit of ,christ2 that is1 by the idea of ,god1 whereon alone it depends1 that man may be free1 and desire for others the good which he desires for himself1 as we have shown above 7,,iv4 xxxvii474 ,,prop4 ,,lxix4 ,the virtue of a free man is seen to be as great1 when it declines dangers1 as when it overcomes them4 ,proof4--,emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion contrary to itself1 and possessing more power in restraining emotion 7,,iv4 vii474 ,but blind daring and fear are emotions1 which can be conceived as equally great 7,,iv4 v4 and iii473 hence1 no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring than in checking fear 7,,iii4 lix4 note72 in other words 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 xl4 and xli471 the free man shows as much virtue1 when he declines dangers1 as when he strives to overcome them4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,the free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat2 or1 a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind1 whether he elect to give battle or to retreat4 ,note4--,what courage 7animositas7 is1 and what ,i mean thereby1 ,i explained in ,,iii4 lix4 note4 ,by danger ,i mean everything1 which can give rise to any evil1 such as pain1 hatred1 discord1 c4 ,,prop4 ,,lxx4 ,the free man1 who lives among the ignorant1 strives1 as far as he can1 to avoid receiving favours from them4 ,proof4--,everyone judges what is good according to his disposition 7,,iii4 xxxix4 note72 wherefore an ignorant man1 who has conferred a benefit on another1 puts his own estimate upon it1 and1 if it appears to be estimated less highly by the receiver1 will feel pain 7,,iii4 xlii474 ,but the free man only desires to join other men to him in friendship 7,,iv4 xxxvii471 not repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value1 but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason1 and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary importance4 ,therefore the free man1 lest he should become hateful to the ignorant1 or follow their desires rather than reason1 will endeavour1 as far as he can1 to avoid receiving their favours4 ,note4--,i say1 as far as he can4 ,for though men be ignorant1 yet are they men1 and in cases of necessity could afford us human aid1 the most excellent of all things3 therefore it is often necessary to accept favours from them1 and consequently to repay such favours in kind2 we must1 therefore1 exercise caution in declining favours1 lest we should have the appearance of despising those who bestow them1 or of being1 from avaricious motives1 unwilling to requite them1 and so give ground for offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it4 ,thus1 in declining favours1 we must look to the requirements of utility and courtesy4 ,,prop4 ,,lxxi4 ,only free men are thoroughly grateful one to another4 ,proof4--,only free men are thoroughly useful one to another1 and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of friendship 7,,iv4 xxxv41 and ,coroll4 i471 only such men endeavour1 with mutual zeal of love1 to confer benefits on each other 7,,iv4 xxxvii471 and1 therefore1 only they are thoroughly grateful one to another4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,the goodwill1 which men who are led by blind desire have for one another1 is generally a bargaining or enticement1 rather than pure goodwill4 ,moreover1 ingratitude is not an emotion4 ,yet it is base1 inasmuch as it generally shows1 that a man is affected by excessive hatred1 anger1 pride1 avarice1 c4 ,he who1 by reason of his folly1 knows not how to return benefits1 is not ungrateful1 much less he who is not gained over by the gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust1 or by a thief to conceal his thefts1 or by any similar persons4 ,contrariwise1 such an one shows a constant mind1 inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be corrupted1 to his own or the general hurt4 ,,prop4 ,,lxxii4 ,the free man never acts fraudulently1 but always in good faith4 ,proof4--,if it be asked3 ,what should a man's conduct be in a case where he could by breaking faith free himself from the danger of present death8 ,would not his plan of self--preservation completely persuade him to deceive8 ,this may be answered by pointing out that1 if reason persuaded him to act thus1 it would persuade all men to act in a similar manner1 in which case reason would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their forces1 or to have laws in common1 that is1 not to have any general laws1 which is absurd4 ,,prop4 ,,lxxiii4 ,the man1 who is guided by reason1 is more free in a ,state1 where he lives under a general system of law1 than in solitude1 where he is independent4 ,proof4--,the man1 who is guided by reason1 does not obey through fear 7,,iv4 lxiii473 but1 in so far as he endeavours to preserve his being according to the dictates of reason1 that is 7,,iv4 lxvi4 note71 in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom1 he desires to order his life according to the general good 7,,iv4 xxxvii471 and1 consequently 7as we showed in ,,iv4 xxxvii4 note4 ii471 to live according to the laws of his country4 ,therefore the free man1 in order to enjoy greater freedom1 desires to possess the general rights of citizenship4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,these and similar observations1 which we have made on man's true freedom1 may be referred to strength1 that is1 to courage and nobility of character 7,,iii4 lix4 note74 ,i do not think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of strength2 much less need ,i show1 that he that is strong hates no man1 is angry with no man1 envies no man1 is indignant with no man1 despises no man1 and least of all things is proud4 ,these propositions1 and all that relate to the true way of life and religion1 are easily proved from ,,iv4 xxxvii4 and ,,iv4 xlvi42 namely1 that hatred should be overcome with love1 and that every man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself4 ,we may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to ,,iv4 l41 and in other places2 namely1 that the strong man has ever first in his thoughts1 that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature2 so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful and evil1 and whatsoever1 accordingly1 seems to him impious1 horrible1 unjust1 and base1 assumes that appearance owing to his own disordered1 fragmentary1 and confused view of the universe4 ,wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they really are1 and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge1 such as are hatred1 anger1 envy1 derision1 pride1 and similar emotions1 which ,i have mentioned above4 ,thus he endeavours1 as we said before1 as far as in him lies1 to do good1 and to go on his way rejoicing4 ,how far human virtue is capable of attaining to such a condition1 and what its powers may be1 ,i will prove in the following ,part4 ,,appendix4 ,what have said in this ,part concerning the right way of life has not been arranged1 so as to admit of being seen at one view1 but has been set forth piece--meal1 according as ,i thought each ,proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it4 ,i propose1 therefore1 to rearrange my remarks and to bring them under leading heads4 ,i4 ,all our endeavours or desires so follow from the necessity of our nature1 that they can be understood either through it alone1 as their proximate cause1 or by virtue of our being a part of nature1 which cannot be adequately conceived through itself without other individuals4 ,,ii4 ,desires1 which follow from our nature in such a manner1 that they can be understood through it alone1 are those which are referred to the mind1 in so far as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas3 the remaining desires are only referred to the mind1 in so far as it conceives things inadequately1 and their force and increase are generally defined not by the power of man1 but by the power of things external to us3 wherefore the former are rightly called actions1 the latter passions1 for the former always indicate our power1 the latter1 on the other hand1 show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge4 ,,iii4 ,our actions1 that is1 those desires which are defined by man's power or reason1 are always good4 ,the rest may be either good or bad4 ,,iv4 ,thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect the understanding1 or reason1 as far as we can1 and in this alone man's highest happiness or blessedness consists1 indeed blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit1 which arises from the intuitive knowledge of ,god3 now1 to perfect the understanding is nothing else but to understand ,god1 ,god's attributes1 and the actions which follow from the necessity of his nature4 ,wherefore of a man1 who is led by reason1 the ultimate aim or highest desire1 whereby he seeks to govern all his fellows1 is that whereby he is brought to the adequate conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his intelligence4 ,v4 ,therefore1 without intelligence there is not rational life3 and things are only good1 in so far as they aid man in his enjoyment of the intellectual life1 which is defined by intelligence4 ,contrariwise1 whatsoever things hinder man's perfecting of his reason1 and capability to enjoy the rational life1 are alone called evil4 ,,vi4 ,as all things whereof man is the efficient cause are necessarily good1 no evil can befall man except through external causes2 namely1 by virtue of man being a part of universal nature1 whose laws human nature is compelled to obey1 and to conform to in almost infinite ways4 ,,vii4 ,it is impossible1 that man should not be a part of nature1 or that he should not follow her general order2 but if he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with his own1 his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered1 whereas1 if he be thrown among such as are but very little in harmony with his nature1 he will hardly be able to accommodate himself to them without undergoing a great change himself4 ,,viii4 ,whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil1 or to be capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the rational life1 we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems safest to us2 on the other hand1 whatsoever we deem to be good or useful for preserving our being1 and enabling us to enjoy the rational life1 we may appropriate to our use and employ as we think best4 ,everyone without exception may1 by sovereign right of nature1 do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest4 ,,ix4 ,nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any given thing than other individuals of the same species2 therefore 7cf4 vii47 for man in the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful than his fellow--man who is led by reason4 ,further1 as we know not anything among individual things which is more excellent than a man led by reason1 no man can better display the power of his skill and disposition1 than in so training men1 that they come at last to live under the dominion of their own reason4 ,x4 ,in so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of hatred1 one towards another1 they are at variance1 and are therefore to be feared in proportion1 as they are more powerful than their fellows4 ,,xi4 ,yet minds are not conquered by force1 but by love and high--mindedness4 ,,xii4 ,it is before all things useful to men to associate their ways of life1 to bind themselves together with such bonds as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity1 and generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship4 ,,xiii4 ,but for this there is need of skill and watchfulness4 ,for men are diverse 7seeing that those who live under the guidance of reason are few71 yet are they generally envious and more prone to revenge than to sympathy4 ,no small force of character is therefore required to take everyone as he is1 and to restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others4 ,but those who carp at mankind1 and are more skilled in railing at vice than in instilling virtue1 and who break rather than strengthen men's dispositions1 are hurtful both to themselves and others4 ,thus many from too great impatience of spirit1 or from misguided religious zeal1 have preferred to live among brutes rather than among men2 as boys or youths1 who cannot peaceably endure the chidings of their parents1 will enlist as soldiers and choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their father3 suffering any burden to be put upon them1 so long as they may spite their parents4 ,,xiv4 ,therefore1 although men are generally governed in everything by their own lusts1 yet their association in common brings many more advantages than drawbacks4 ,wherefore it is better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us1 and to strive to promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and friendship4 ,,xv4 ,those things1 which beget harmony1 are such as are attributable to justice1 equity1 and honourable living4 ,for men brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous1 but also what is reckoned disgraceful1 or that a man should slight the received customs of their society4 ,for winning love those qualities are especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety 7cf4 ,,iv4 xxxvii4 notes4 i4 ii42 xlvi4 note2 and lxxiii4 note74 ,,xvi4 ,further1 harmony is often the result of fear3 but such harmony is insecure4 ,further1 fear arises from infirmity of spirit1 and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason3 the same is true of compassion1 though this latter seems to bear a certain resemblance to piety4 ,,xvii4 ,men are also gained over by liberality1 especially such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain life4 ,however1 to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the power and the advantage of any private person4 ,for the riches of any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call4 ,again1 an individual man's resources of character are too limited for him to be able to make all men his friends4 ,hence providing for the poor is a duty1 which falls on the ,state as a whole1 and has regard only to the general advantage4 ,,xviii4 ,in accepting favours1 and in returning gratitude our duty must be wholly different 7cf4 ,,iv4 lxx4 note2 lxxi4 note74 ,,xix4 ,again1 meretricious love1 that is1 the lust of generation arising from bodily beauty1 and generally every sort of love1 which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause1 readily passes into hate2 unless indeed1 what is worse1 it is a species of madness2 and then it promotes discord rather than harmony 7cf4 ,,iii4 xxxi4 ,coroll474 ,,xx4 ,as concerning marriage1 it is certain that this is in harmony with reason1 if the desire for physical union be not engendered solely by bodily beauty1 but also by the desire to beget children and to train them up wisely2 and moreover1 if the love of both1 to wit1 of the man and of the woman1 is not caused by bodily beauty only1 but also by freedom of soul4 ,,xxi4 ,furthermore1 flattery begets harmony2 but only by means of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery4 ,none are more readily taken with flattery than the proud1 who wish to be first1 but are not4 ,,xxii4 ,there is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety and religion4 ,although abasement is the opposite to pride1 yet is he that abases himself most akin to the proud 7,,iv4 lvii4 note74 ,,xxiii4 ,shame also brings about harmony1 but only in such matters as cannot be hid4 ,further1 as shame is a species of pain1 it does not concern the exercise of reason4 ,,xxiv4 ,the remaining emotions of pain towards men are directly opposed to justice1 equity1 honour1 piety1 and religion2 and1 although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance to equity1 yet is life but lawless1 where every man may pass judgment on another's deeds1 and vindicate his own or other men's rights4 ,,xxv4 ,correctness of conduct 7modestia71 that is1 the desire of pleasing men which is determined by reason1 is attributable to piety 7as we said in ,,iv4 xxxvii4 note4 i474 ,but1 if it spring from emotion1 it is ambition1 or the desire whereby1 men1 under the false cloak of piety1 generally stir up discords and seditions4 ,for he who desires to aid his fellows either in word or in deed1 so that they may together enjoy the highest good1 he1 ,i say1 will before all things strive to win them over with love3 not to draw them into admiration1 so that a system may be called after his name1 nor to give any cause for envy4 ,further1 in his conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults1 and will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity3 but he will dwell at length on human virtue or power1 and the way whereby it may be perfected4 ,thus will men be stirred not by fear1 nor by aversion1 but only by the emotion of joy1 to endeavour1 so far as in them lies1 to live in obedience to reason4 ,,xxvi4 ,besides men1 we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice1 and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship2 therefore1 whatsoever there be in nature besides man1 a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve1 but to preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities1 and to adapt to our use as best we may4 ,,xxvii4 ,the advantage which we derive from things external to us1 besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from observing them1 and from recombining their elements in different forms1 is principally the preservation of the body2 from this point of view1 those things are most useful which can so feed and nourish the body1 that all its parts may rightly fulfil their functions4 ,for1 in proportion as the body is capable of being affected in a greater variety of ways1 and of affecting external bodies in a great number of ways1 so much the more is the mind capable of thinking 7,,iv4 xxxviii41 xxxix474 ,but there seem to be very few things of this kind in nature2 wherefore for the due nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature4 ,for the human body is composed of very many parts of different nature1 which stand in continual need of varied nourishment1 so that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything that can follow from its own nature1 and consequently that the mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions4 ,,xxviii4 ,now for providing these nourishments the strength of each individual would hardly suffice1 if men did not lend one another mutual aid4 ,but money has furnished us with a token for everything3 hence it is with the notion of money1 that the mind of the multitude is chiefly engrossed3 nay1 it can hardly conceive any kind of pleasure1 which is not accompanied with the idea of money as cause4 ,,xxix4 ,this result is the fault only of those1 who seek money1 not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants1 but because they have learned the arts of gain1 wherewith they bring themselves to great splendour4 ,certainly they nourish their bodies1 according to custom1 but scantily1 believing that they lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of their body4 ,but they who know the true use of money1 and who fix the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs1 live content with little4 ,,xxx4 ,as1 therefore1 those things are good which assist the various parts of the body1 and enable them to perform their functions2 and as pleasure consists in an increase of1 or aid to1 man's power1 in so far as he is composed of mind and body2 it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good4 ,but seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us pleasure1 and that their power of action is not tempered to suit our advantage1 and1 lastly1 that pleasure is generally referred to one part of the body more than to the other parts2 therefore most emotions of pleasure 7unless reason and watchfulness be at hand71 and consequently the desires arising therefrom1 may become excessive4 ,moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most regard to what is agreeable in the present1 nor can we estimate what is future with emotions equally vivid4 7,,iv4 xliv4 note1 and lx4 note47 ,,xxxi4 ,superstition1 on the other hand1 seems to account as good all that brings pain1 and as bad all that brings pleasure4 ,however1 as we said above 7,,iv4 xlv4 note71 none but the envious take delight in my infirmity and trouble4 ,for the greater the pleasure whereby we are affected1 the greater is the perfection whereto we pass1 and consequently the more do we partake of the divine nature3 no pleasure can ever be evil1 which is regulated by a true regard for our advantage4 ,but contrariwise he1 who is led by fear and does good only to avoid evil1 is not guided by reason4 ,,xxxii4 ,but human power is extremely limited1 and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes2 we have not1 therefore1 an absolute power of shaping to our use those things which are without us4 ,nevertheless1 we shall bear with an equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims of our own advantage1 so long as we are conscious1 that we have done our duty1 and that the power which we possess is not sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely2 remembering that we are a part of universal nature1 and that we follow her order4 ,if we have a clear and distinct understanding of this1 that part of our nature which is defined by intelligence1 in other words the better part of ourselves1 will assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us1 and in such acquiescence will endeavour to persist4 ,for1 in so far as we are intelligent beings1 we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary1 nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything1 save to that which is true3 wherefore1 in so far as we have a right understanding of these things1 the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is in harmony with the order of nature as a whole4 ,,part ,v3 ,of the ,power of the ,understanding1 or of ,human ,freedom ,,preface ,at length ,i pass to the remaining portion of my ,ethics1 which is concerned with the way leading to freedom4 ,i shall therefore treat therein of the power of the reason1 showing how far the reason can control the emotions1 and what is the nature of ,mental ,freedom or ,blessedness2 we shall then be able to see1 how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant4 ,it is no part of my design to point out the method and means whereby the understanding may be perfected1 nor to show the skill whereby the body may be so tended1 as to be capable of the due performance of its functions4 ,the latter question lies in the province of ,medicine1 the former in the province of ,logic4 ,here1 therefore1 ,i repeat1 ,i shall treat only of the power of the mind1 or of reason2 and ,i shall mainly show the extent and nature of its dominion over the emotions1 for their control and moderation4 ,that we do not possess absolute dominion over them1 ,i have already shown4 ,yet the ,stoics have thought1 that the emotions depended absolutely on our will1 and that we could absolutely govern them4 ,but these philosophers were compelled1 by the protest of experience1 not from their own principles1 to confess1 that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them3 and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the example 7if ,i remember rightly7 of two dogs1 the one a house--dog and the other a hunting--dog4 ,for by long training it could be brought about1 that the house--dog should become accustomed to hunt1 and the hunting--dog to cease from running after hares4 ,to this opinion ,descartes not a little inclines4 ,for he maintained1 that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain1 namely1 to that part called the pineal gland1 by the aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body1 and also external objects1 and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various ways4 ,he asserted1 that this gland is so suspended in the midst of the brain1 that it could be moved by the slightest motion of the animal spirits3 further1 that this gland is suspended in the midst of the brain in as many different manners1 as the animal spirits can impinge thereon2 and1 again1 that as many different marks are impressed on the said gland1 as there are different external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it2 whence it follows1 that if the will of the soul suspends the gland in a position1 wherein it has already been suspended once before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another1 the gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits1 driving and determining them to the condition wherein they were1 when repulsed before by a similar position of the gland4 ,he further asserted1 that every act of mental volition is united in nature to a certain given motion of the gland4 ,for instance1 whenever anyone desires to look at a remote object1 the act of volition causes the pupil of the eye to dilate1 whereas1 if the person in question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil1 the mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result1 inasmuch as the motion of the gland1 which serves to impel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would dilate or contract the pupil1 is not associated in nature with the wish to dilate or contract the pupil1 but with the wish to look at remote or very near objects4 ,lastly1 he maintained that1 although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life1 yet it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with other thoughts2 this he endeavours to prove in the ,passions de l'me1 ,i4#ej4 ,he thence concludes1 that there is no soul so weak1 that it cannot1 under proper direction1 acquire absolute power over its passions4 ,for passions as defined by him are perceptions1 or feelings1 or disturbances of the soul1 which are referred to the soul as species1 and which 7mark the expression7 are produced1 preserved1 and strengthened through some movement of the spirits4 7,passions de l'me1 ,i4#bg74 ,but1 seeing that we can join any motion of the gland1 or consequently of the spirits1 to any volition1 the determination of the will depends entirely on our own powers2 if1 therefore1 we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our actions to tend1 and associate the motions of the passions which we wish to acquire with the said decisions1 we shall acquire an absolute dominion over our passions4 ,such is the doctrine of this illustrious philosopher 7in so far as ,i gather it from his own words72 it is one which1 had it been less ingenious1 ,i could hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man4 ,indeed1 ,i am lost in wonder1 that a philosopher1 who had stoutly asserted1 that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from self--evident premisses1 and would affirm nothing which he did not clearly and distinctly perceive1 and who had so often taken to task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities1 could maintain a hypothesis1 beside which occult qualities are commonplace4 ,what does he understand1 ,i ask1 by the union of the mind and the body8 ,what clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended matter8 ,truly ,i should like him to explain this union through its proximate cause4 ,but he had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body1 that he could not assign any particular cause of the union between the two1 or of the mind itself1 but was obliged to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe1 that is to ,god4 ,further1 ,i should much like to know1 what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland1 and with what force can it hold it suspended8 ,for ,i am in ignorance1 whether this gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits1 and whether the motions of the passions1 which we have closely united with firm decisions1 cannot be again disjoined therefrom by physical causes2 in which case it would follow that1 although the mind firmly intended to face a given danger1 and had united to this decision the motions of boldness1 yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended in a way1 which would preclude the mind thinking of anything except running away4 ,in truth1 as there is no common standard of volition and motion1 so is there no comparison possible between the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body2 consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other4 ,we may also add1 that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain1 so placed that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways1 and also that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain4 ,lastly1 ,i omit all the assertions which he makes concerning the will and its freedom1 inasmuch as ,i have abundantly proved that his premisses are false4 ,therefore1 since the power of the mind1 as ,i have shown above1 is defined by the understanding only1 we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the mind the remedies against the emotions1 which ,i believe all have had experience of1 but do not accurately observe or distinctly see1 and from the same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions1 which have regard to the mind's blessedness4 ,,axioms4 ,i4 ,if two contrary actions be started in the same subject1 a change must necessarily take place1 either in both1 or in one of the two1 and continue until they cease to be contrary4 ,,ii4 ,the power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause1 in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause4 7,this axiom is evident from ,,iii4 vii47 ,,propositions4 ,,prop4 ,i4 ,even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind1 so are the modifications of body or the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and associated in the body4 ,proof4--,the order and connection of ideas is the same 7,,ii4 vii47 as the order and connection of things1 and vice vers the order and connection of things is the same 7,,ii4 vi4 ,coroll4 and vii47 as the order and connection of ideas4 ,wherefore1 even as the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place according to the order and association of modifications of the body 7,,ii4 xviii471 so vice vers 7,,iii4 ii47 the order and connection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance with the manner1 in which thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,ii4 ,if we remove a disturbance of the spirit1 or emotion1 from the thought of an external cause1 and unite it to other thoughts1 then will the love or hatred towards that external cause1 and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these emotions1 be destroyed4 ,proof4--,that1 which constitutes the reality of love or hatred1 is pleasure or pain1 accompanied by the idea of an external cause 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 vi4 vii472 wherefore1 when this cause is removed1 the reality of love or hatred is removed with it2 therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are destroyed4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,iii4 ,an emotion1 which is a passion1 ceases to be a passion1 as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof4 ,proof4--,an emotion1 which is a passion1 is a confused idea 7by the general ,def4 of the ,emotions74 ,if1 therefore1 we form a clear and distinct idea of a given emotion1 that idea will only be distinguished from the emotion1 in so far as it is referred to the mind only1 by reason 7,,ii4 xxi41 and note72 therefore 7,,iii4 iii471 the emotion will cease to be a passion4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,an emotion therefore becomes more under our control1 and the mind is less passive in respect to it1 in proportion as it is more known to us4 ,,prop4 ,,iv4 ,there is no modification of the body1 whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception4 ,proof4--,properties which are common to all things can only be conceived adequately 7,,ii4 xxxviii472 therefore 7,,ii4 xii4 and ,lemma ii4 after ,,ii4 xiii47 there is no modification of the body1 whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,hence it follows that there is no emotion1 whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception4 ,for an emotion is the idea of a modification of the body 7by the general ,def4 of the ,emotions71 and must therefore 7by the preceding ,prop47 involve some clear and distinct conception4 ,note4--,seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by an effect 7,i4 xxxvi471 and that we clearly and distinctly understand whatever follows from an idea1 which in us is adequate 7,,ii4 xl471 it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself and his emotions1 if not absolutely1 at any rate in part1 and consequently of bringing it about1 that he should become less subject to them4 ,to attain this result1 therefore1 we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring1 as far as possible1 a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion1 in order that the mind may thus1 through emotion1 be determined to think of those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives1 and wherein it fully acquiesces3 and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause1 and may be associated with true thoughts2 whence it will come to pass1 not only that love1 hatred1 c4 will be destroyed 7,v4 ii471 but also that the appetites or desires1 which are wont to arise from such emotion1 will become incapable of being excessive 7,,iv4 lxi474 ,for it must be especially remarked1 that the appetite through which a man is said to be active1 and that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same4 ,for instance1 we have shown that human nature is so constituted1 that everyone desires his fellow--men to live after his own fashion 7,,iii4 xxxi4 note72 in a man1 who is not guided by reason1 this appetite is a passion which is called ambition1 and does not greatly differ from pride2 whereas in a man1 who lives by the dictates of reason1 it is an activity or virtue which is called piety 7,,iv4 xxxvii4 note4 i4 and second proof74 ,in like manner all appetites or desires are only passions1 in so far as they spring from inadequate ideas2 the same results are accredited to virtue1 when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas4 ,for all desires1 whereby we are determined to any given action1 may arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas 7,,iv4 lix474 ,than this remedy for the emotions 7to return to the point from which ,i started71 which consists in a true knowledge thereof1 nothing more excellent1 being within our power1 can be devised4 ,for the mind has no other power save that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas1 as we have shown above 7,,iii4 iii474 ,,prop4 ,v4 ,an emotion towards a thing1 which we conceive simply1 and not as necessary1 or as contingent1 or as possible1 is1 other conditions being equal1 greater than any other emotion4 ,proof4--,an emotion towards a thing1 which we conceive to be free1 is greater than one towards what we conceive to be necessary 7,,iii4 xlix471 and1 consequently1 still greater than one towards what we conceive as possible1 or contingent 7,,iv4 xi474 ,but to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to conceive it simply1 while we are in ignorance of the causes whereby it has been determined to action 7,,ii4 xxxv4 note72 therefore1 an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply is1 other conditions being equal1 greater than one1 which we feel towards what is necessary1 possible1 or contingent1 and1 consequently1 it is the greatest of all4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,vi4 ,the mind has greater power over the emotions and is less subject thereto1 in so far as it understands all things as necessary4 ,proof4--,the mind understands all things to be necessary 7,i4 xxix47 and to be determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes2 therefore 7by the foregoing ,proposition71 it thus far brings it about1 that it is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom1 and 7,,iii4 xlviii47 feels less emotion towards the things themselves4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,the more this knowledge1 that things are necessary1 is applied to particular things1 which we conceive more distinctly and vividly1 the greater is the power of the mind over the emotions1 as experience also testifies4 ,for we see1 that the pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated1 as soon as the man who has lost it perceives1 that it could not by any means have been preserved4 ,so also we see that no one pities an infant1 because it cannot speak1 walk1 or reason1 or lastly1 because it passes so many years1 as it were1 in unconsciousness4 ,whereas1 if most people were born full--grown and only one here and there as an infant1 everyone would pity the infants2 because infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and necessary1 but as a fault or delinquency in ,nature2 and we may note several other instances of the same sort4 ,,prop4 ,,vii4 ,emotions which are aroused or spring from reason1 if we take account of time1 are stronger than those1 which are attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent4 ,proof4--,we do not regard a thing as absent1 by reason of the emotion wherewith we conceive it1 but by reason of the body1 being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the said thing 7,,ii4 xvii474 ,wherefore1 the emotion1 which is referred to the thing which we regard as absent1 is not of a nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power 7,,iv4 vi471 but is1 on the contrary1 of a nature to be in some sort controlled by the emotions1 which exclude the existence of its external cause 7,,iv4 ix474 ,but an emotion which springs from reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things 7see the def4 of reason in ,,ii4 xl4 note4 ii471 which we always regard as present 7for there can be nothing to exclude their present existence71 and which we always conceive in the same manner 7,,ii4 xxxviii474 ,wherefore an emotion of this kind always remains the same2 and consequently 7,v4 ,ax4 i47 emotions1 which are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external causes1 will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more1 until they are no longer contrary to it2 to this extent the emotion which springs from reason is more powerful4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,viii4 ,an emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused4 ,proof4--,many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few 7,,iii4 vii473 therefore 7,,iv4 v471 in proportion to the increased number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused1 an emotion becomes stronger4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note--,this proposition is also evident from ,v4 ,ax4 ii4 ,,prop4 ,,ix4 ,an emotion1 which is attributable to many and diverse causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion itself1 is less hurtful1 and we are less subject thereto and less affected towards each of its causes1 than if it were a different and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a single cause4 ,proof4--,an emotion is only bad or hurtful1 in so far as it hinders the mind from being able to think 7,,iv4 xxvi4 xxvii472 therefore1 an emotion1 whereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of several things at once1 is less hurtful than another equally powerful emotion1 which so engrosses the mind in the single contemplation of a few objects or of one1 that it is unable to think of anything else2 this was our first point4 ,again1 as the mind's essence1 in other words1 its power 7,,iii4 vii471 consists solely in thought 7,,ii4 xi471 the mind is less passive in respect to an emotion1 which causes it to think of several things at once1 than in regard to an equally strong emotion1 which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few or of a single object3 this was our second point4 ,lastly1 this emotion 7,,iii4 xlviii471 in so far as it is attributable to several causes1 is less powerful in regard to each of them4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,x4 ,so long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature1 we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to the intellectual order4 ,proof4--,the emotions1 which are contrary to our nature1 that is 7,,iv4 xxx471 which are bad1 are bad in so far as they impede the mind from understanding 7,,iv4 xxvii474 ,so long1 therefore1 as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature1 the mind's power1 whereby it endeavours to understand things 7,,iv4 xxvi471 is not impeded1 and therefore it is able to form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another 7,,ii4 xl4 note4 ii4 and ,,ii4 xlvii4 note72 consequently we have in such cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,by this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by evil emotions4 ,for 7,v4 vii47 a greater force is needed for controlling the emotions1 when they are arranged and associated according to the intellectual order1 than when they1 are uncertain and unsettled4 ,the best we can do1 therefore1 so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions1 is to frame a system of right conduct1 or fixed practical precepts1 to commit it to memory1 and to apply it forthwith#af to the particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life1 so that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith1 and that it may be always ready to our hand4 ,for instance1 we have laid down among the rules of life 7,,iv4 xlvi4 and note71 that hatred should be overcome with love or high--mindedness1 and not required with hatred in return4 ,now1 that this precept of reason may be always ready to our hand in time of need1 we should often think over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men1 and in what manner and way they may be best warded off by high--mindedness3 we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with the idea of this precept1 which accordingly will always be ready for use when a wrong is done to us 7,,ii4 xviii474 ,if we keep also in readiness the notion of our true advantage1 and of the good which follows from mutual friendships1 and common fellowships2 further1 if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result of the right way of life 7 ,,iv4 lii471 and that men1 no less than everything else1 act by the necessity of their nature3 in such case ,i say the wrong1 or the hatred1 which commonly arises therefrom1 will engross a very small part of our imagination and will be easily overcome2 or1 if the anger which springs from a grievous wrong be not overcome easily1 it will nevertheless be overcome1 though not without a spiritual conflict1 far sooner than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand4 ,as is indeed evident from ,v4 vi4 vii4 viii4 ,we should1 in the same way1 reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear2 the ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and imagined1 together with the means whereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them4 ,but we must note1 that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions we should always bear in mind that which is good in every individual thing 7,,iv4 lxiii4 ,coroll4 and ,,iii4 lix471 in order that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of pleasure4 ,for instance1 if a man sees that he is too keen in the pursuit of honour1 let him think over its right use1 the end for which it should be pursued1 and the means whereby he may attain it4 ,let him not think of its misuse1 and its emptiness1 and the fickleness of mankind1 and the like1 whereof no man thinks except through a morbidness of disposition2 with thoughts like these do the most ambitious most torment themselves1 when they despair of gaining the distinctions they hanker after1 and in thus giving vent to their anger would fain appear wise4 ,wherefore it is certain that those1 who cry out the loudest against the misuse of honour and the vanity of the world1 are those who most greedily covet it4 ,this is not peculiar to the ambitious1 but is common to all who are ill--used by fortune1 and who are infirm in spirit4 ,for a poor man also1 who is miserly1 will talk incessantly of the misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich2 whereby he merely torments himself1 and shows the world that he is intolerant1 not only of his own poverty1 but also of other people's riches4 ,so1 again1 those who have been ill received by a woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy1 treachery1 and other stock faults of the fair sex2 all of which they consign to oblivion1 directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart4 ,thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the love of freedom strives1 as far as he can1 to gain a knowledge of the virtues and their causes1 and to fill his spirit with the joy which arises from the true knowledge of them3 he will in no wise desire to dwell on men's faults1 or to carp at his fellows1 or to revel in a false show of freedom4 ,whosoever will diligently observe and practise these precepts 7which indeed are not difficult7 will verily1 in a short space of time1 be able1 for the most part1 to direct his actions according to the commandments of reason4 #af ,continuo4 ,rendered constantly by ,mr4 ,pollock on the ground that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context4 ,,prop4 ,,xi4 ,in proportion as a mental image is referred to more objects1 so is it more frequent1 or more often vivid1 and occupies the mind more4 ,proof4--,in proportion as a mental image or an emotion is referred to more objects1 so are there more causes whereby it can be aroused and fostered1 all of which 7by hypothesis7 the mind contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion2 therefore the emotion is more frequent1 or is more often in full vigour1 and 7,v4 viii47 occupies the mind more4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xii4 ,the mental images of things are more easily associated with the images referred to things which we clearly and distinctly understand1 than with others4 ,proof4--,things1 which we clearly and distinctly understand1 are either the common properties of things or deductions therefrom 7see definition of ,reason1 ,,ii4 xl4 note ii471 and are consequently 7by the last ,prop47 more often aroused in us4 ,wherefore it may more readily happen1 that we should contemplate other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with something else1 and consequently 7,,ii4 xviii47 that the images of the said things should be more often associated with the images of these than with the images of something else4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xiii4 ,a mental image is more often vivid1 in proportion as it is associated with a greater number of other images4 ,proof4--,in proportion as an image is associated with a greater number of other images1 so 7,,ii4 xviii47 are there more causes whereby it can be aroused4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xiv4 ,the mind can bring it about1 that all bodily modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of ,god4 ,proof4--,there is no modification of the body1 whereof the mind may not form some clear and distinct conception 7,v4 iv472 wherefore it can bring it about1 that they should all be referred to the idea of ,god 7,i4 xv474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xv4 ,he who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves ,god1 and so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions4 ,proof4--,he who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions feels pleasure 7,,iii4 liii471 and this pleasure is 7by the last ,prop47 accompanied by the idea of ,god2 therefore 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 vi47 such an one loves ,god1 and 7for the same reason7 so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xvi4 ,this love towards ,god must hold the chief place in the mind4 ,proof4--,for this love is associated with all the modifications of the body 7,v4 xiv47 and is fostered by them all 7,v4 xv472 therefore 7,v4 xi471 it must hold the chief place in the mind4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xvii4 ,god is without passions1 neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain4 ,proof4--,all ideas1 in so far as they are referred to ,god1 are true 7,,ii4 xxxii471 that is 7,,ii4 ,def4 iv47 adequate2 and therefore 7by the general ,def4 of the ,emotions7 ,god is without passions4 ,again1 ,god cannot pass either to a greater or to a lesser perfection 7,i4 xx4 ,coroll4 ii472 therefore 7by ,def4 of the ,emotions1 ii4 iii47 he is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain4 ,corollary4--,strictly speaking1 ,god does not love or hate anyone4 ,for ,god 7by the foregoing ,prop47 is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain1 consequently 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 vi4 vii47 he does not love or hate anyone4 ,,prop4 ,,xviii4 ,no one can hate ,god4 ,proof4--,the idea of ,god which is in us is adequate and perfect 7,,ii4 xlvi4 xlvii472 wherefore1 in so far as we contemplate ,god1 we are active 7,,iii4 iii472 consequently 7,,iii4 lix47 there can be no pain accompanied by the idea of ,god1 in other words 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 vii471 no one can hate ,god4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,love towards ,god cannot be turned into hate4 ,note4--,it may be objected that1 as we understand ,god as the cause of all things1 we by that very fact regard ,god as the cause of pain4 ,but ,i make answer1 that1 in so far as we understand the causes of pain1 it to that extent 7,v4 iii47 ceases to be a passion1 that is1 it ceases to be pain 7,,iii4 lix472 therefore1 in so far as we understand ,god to be the cause of pain1 we to that extent feel pleasure4 ,,prop4 ,,xix4 ,he1 who loves ,god1 cannot endeavour that ,god should love him in return4 ,proof4--,for1 if a man should so endeavour1 he would desire 7,v4 xvii4 ,coroll47 that ,god1 whom he loves1 should not be ,god1 and consequently he would desire to feel pain 7,,iii4 xix472 which is absurd 7,,iii4 xxviii474 ,therefore1 he who loves ,god1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xx4 ,this love towards ,god cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy3 contrariwise1 it is the more fostered1 in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to ,god by the same bond of love4 ,proof4--,this love towards ,god is the highest good which we can seek for under the guidance of reason 7,,iv4 xxviii471 it is common to all men 7,,iv4 xxxvi471 and we desire that all should rejoice therein 7,,iv4 xxxvii472 therefore 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 xxiii471 it cannot be stained by the emotion envy1 nor by the emotion of jealousy 7,v4 xviii4 see definition of ,jealousy1 ,,iii4 xxxv4 note72 but1 contrariwise1 it must needs be the more fostered1 in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice therein4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,we can in the same way show1 that there is no emotion directly contrary to this love1 whereby this love can be destroyed2 therefore we may conclude1 that this love towards ,god is the most constant of all the emotions1 and that1 in so far as it is referred to the body1 it cannot be destroyed1 unless the body be destroyed also4 ,as to its nature1 in so far as it is referred to the mind only1 we shall presently inquire4 ,i have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions1 or all that the mind1 considered in itself alone1 can do against them4 ,whence it appears that the mind's power over the emotions consists3---- ,i4 ,in the actual knowledge of the emotions 7,v4 iv4 note74 ,,ii4 ,in the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an external cause1 which we conceive confusedly 7,v4 ii4 and ,v4 iv4 note74 ,,iii4 ,in the fact1 that1 in respect to time1 the emotions referred to things1 which we distinctly understand1 surpass those referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner 7,v4 vii474 ,,iv4 ,in the number of causes whereby those modifications#ag are fostered1 which have regard to the common properties of things or to ,god 7,v4 ix4 xi474 #ag ,affectiones4 ,camerer reads affectus----emotions4 ,v4 ,lastly1 in the order wherein the mind can arrange and associate1 one with another1 its own emotions 7,v4 x4 note and xii4 xiii4 xiv474 ,but1 in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better understood1 it should be specially observed that the emotions are called by us strong1 when we compare the emotion of one man with the emotion of another1 and see that one man is more troubled than another by the same emotion2 or when we are comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another1 and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than by another4 ,for the strength of every emotion is defined by a comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause4 ,now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only1 and its infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge only3 it therefore follows1 that that mind is most passive1 whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas1 so that it may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by its activities3 on the other hand1 that mind is most active1 whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas1 so that1 although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former mind1 it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas attributable to human virtue1 than by ideas which tell of human infirmity4 ,again1 it must be observed1 that spiritual unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love for something which is subject to many variations1 and which we can never become masters of4 ,for no one is solicitous or anxious about anything1 unless he loves it2 neither do wrongs1 suspicions1 enmities1 c4 arise1 except in regard to things whereof no one can be really master4 ,we may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct knowledge1 and especially that third kind of knowledge 7,,ii4 xlvii4 note71 founded on the actual knowledge of ,god1 possesses over the emotions3 if it does not absolutely destroy them1 in so far as they are passions 7,v4 iii4 and iv4 note72 at any rate1 it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind 7,v4 xiv474 ,further1 it begets a love towards a thing immutable and eternal 7,v4 xv471 whereof we may really enter into possession 7,,ii4 xlv472 neither can it be defiled with those faults which are inherent in ordinary love2 but it may grow from strength to strength1 and may engross the greater part of the mind1 and deeply penetrate it4 ,and now ,i have finished with all that concerns this present life3 for1 as ,i said in the beginning of this note1 ,i have briefly described all the remedies against the emotions4 ,and this everyone may readily have seen for himself1 if he has attended to what is advanced in the present note1 and also to the definitions of the mind and its emotions1 and1 lastly1 to ,propositions i4 and iii4 of ,part ,,iii4 ,it is now1 therefore1 time to pass on to those matters1 which appertain to the duration of the mind1 without relation to the body4 ,,prop4 ,,xxi4 ,the mind can only imagine anything1 or remember what is past1 while the body endures4 ,proof4--,the mind does not express the actual existence of its body1 nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as actual1 except while the body endures 7,,ii4 viii4 ,coroll472 and1 consequently 7,,ii4 xxvi471 it does not imagine any body as actually existing1 except while its own body endures4 ,thus it cannot imagine anything 7for definition of ,imagination1 see ,,ii4 xvii4 note71 or remember things past1 except while the body endures 7see definition of ,memory1 ,,ii4 xviii4 note74 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxii4 ,nevertheless in ,god there is necessarily an idea1 which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity4 ,proof4--,god is the cause1 not only of the existence of this or that human body1 but also of its essence 7,i4 xxv474 ,this essence1 therefore1 must necessarily be conceived through the very essence of ,god 7,i4 ,ax4 iv471 and be thus conceived by a certain eternal necessity 7,i4 xvi472 and this conception must necessarily exist in ,god 7,,ii4 iii474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxiii4 ,the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body1 but there remains of it something which is eternal4 ,proof4--,there is necessarily in ,god a concept or idea1 which expresses the essence of the human body 7last ,prop471 which1 therefore1 is necessarily something appertaining to the essence of the human mind 7,,ii4 xiii474 ,but we have not assigned to the human mind any duration1 definable by time1 except in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body1 which is explained through duration1 and may be defined by time--that is 7,,ii4 viii4 ,coroll471 we do not assign to it duration1 except while the body endures4 ,yet1 as there is something1 notwithstanding1 which is conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of ,god 7last ,prop472 this something1 which appertains to the essence of the mind1 will necessarily be eternal4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,this idea1 which expresses the essence of the body under the form of eternity1 is1 as we have said1 a certain mode of thinking1 which belongs to the essence of the mind1 and is necessarily eternal4 ,yet it is not possible that we should remember that we existed before our body1 for our body can bear no trace of such existence1 neither can eternity be defined in terms of time1 or have any relation to time4 ,but1 notwithstanding1 we feel and know that we are eternal4 ,for the mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding1 no less than those things that it remembers4 ,for the eyes of the mind1 whereby it sees and observes things1 are none other than proofs4 ,thus1 although we do not remember that we existed before the body1 yet we feel that our mind1 in so far as it involves the essence of the body1 under the form of eternity1 is eternal1 and that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time1 or explained through duration4 ,thus our mind can only be said to endure1 and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time1 in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body4 ,thus far only has it the power of determining the existence of things by time1 and conceiving them under the category of duration4 ,,prop4 ,,xxiv4 ,the more we understand particular things1 the more do we understand ,god4 ,proof4--,this is evident from ,i4 xxv4 ,coroll4 ,,prop4 ,,xxv4 ,the highest endeavour of the mind1 and the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge4 ,proof4--,the third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of ,god to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things 7see its definition ,,ii4 xl4 note4 ii472 and1 in proportion as we understand things more in this way1 we better understand ,god 7by the last ,prop472 therefore 7,,iv4 xxviii47 the highest virtue of the mind1 that is 7,,iv4 ,def4 viii47 the power1 or nature1 or 7,,iii4 vii47 highest endeavour of the mind1 is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxvi4 ,in proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge1 it desires more to understand things by that kind4 ,proof--,this is evident4 ,for1 in so far as we conceive the mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of knowledge1 we1 to that extent1 conceive it as determined thus to conceive things2 and consequently 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 i471 the mind desires so to do1 in proportion as it is more capable thereof4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxvii4 ,from this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence4 ,proof4--,the highest virtue of the mind is to know ,god 7,,iv4 xxviii471 or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge 7,v4 xxv471 and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind knows things more by the said kind of knowledge 7,v4 xxiv473 consequently1 he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the summit of human perfection1 and is therefore 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 ii47 affected by the highest pleasure1 such pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own virtue2 thus 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 xxv471 from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxviii4 ,the endeavour or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first1 but from the second kind of knowledge4 ,proof4--,this proposition is self--evident4 ,for whatsoever we understand clearly and distinctly1 we understand either through itself1 or through that which is conceived through itself2 that is1 ideas which are clear and distinct in us1 or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge 7,,ii4 xl4 note4 ii47 cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused1 and are referred to knowledge of the first kind1 but must follow from adequate ideas1 or ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge2 therefore 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 i471 the desire of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first1 but from the second kind4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxix4 ,whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity1 it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body1 but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity4 ,proof4--,in so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body1 it to that extent conceives duration which can be determined by time1 and to that extent only has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time 7,v4 xxi4 ,,ii4 xxvi474 ,but eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration 7,i4 ,def4 viii4 and explanation74 ,therefore to this extent the mind has not the power of conceiving things under the form of eternity1 but it possesses such power1 because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of eternity 7,,ii4 xliv4 ,coroll4 ii471 and also because it is of the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity 7,v4 xxiii471 for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to the essence of mind 7,,ii4 xiii474 ,therefore this power of conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,things are conceived by us as actual in two ways2 either as existing in relation to a given time and place1 or as contained in ,god and following from the necessity of the divine nature4 ,whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real1 we conceive under the form of eternity1 and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of ,god1 as we showed in ,,ii4 xlv4 and note1 which see4 ,,prop4 ,,xxx4 ,our mind1 in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity1 has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of ,god1 and knows that it is in ,god1 and is conceived through ,god4 ,proof4--,eternity is the very essence of ,god1 in so far as this involves necessary existence 7,i4 ,def4 viii474 ,therefore to conceive things under the form of eternity1 is to conceive things in so far as they are conceived through the essence of ,god as real entities1 or in so far as they involve existence through the essence of ,god2 wherefore our mind1 in so far as it conceives itself and the body under the form of eternity1 has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of ,god1 and knows1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxi4 ,the third kind of knowledge depends on the mind1 as its formal cause1 in so far as the mind itself is eternal4 ,proof4--,the mind does not conceive anything under the form of eternity1 except in so far as it conceives its own body under the form of eternity 7,v4 xxix472 that is1 except in so far as it is eternal 7,v4 xxi4 xxiii472 therefore 7by the last ,prop471 in so far as it is eternal1 it possesses the knowledge of ,god1 which knowledge is necessarily adequate 7,,ii4 xlvi472 hence the mind1 in so far as it is eternal1 is capable of knowing everything which can follow from this given knowledge of ,god 7,,ii4 xl471 in other words1 of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge 7see ,def4 in ,,ii4 xl4 note4 ii471 whereof accordingly the mind 7,,iii4 ,def4 i471 in so far as it is eternal1 is the adequate or formal cause of such knowledge4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,in proportion1 therefore1 as a man is more potent in this kind of knowledge1 he will be more completely conscious of himself and of ,god2 in other words1 he will be more perfect and blessed1 as will appear more clearly in the sequel4 ,but we must here observe that1 although we are already certain that the mind is eternal1 in so far as it conceives things under the form of eternity1 yet1 in order that what we wish to show may be more readily explained and better understood1 we will consider the mind itself1 as though it had just begun to exist and to understand things under the form of eternity1 as indeed we have done hitherto2 this we may do without any danger of error1 so long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion1 unless our premisses are plain4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxii4 ,whatsoever we understand by the third kind of knowledge1 we take delight in1 and our delight is accompanied by the idea of ,god as cause4 ,proof4--,from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence1 that is 7,def of the ,emotions1 xxv471 pleasure1 and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea of the mind itself 7,v4 xxvii471 and consequently 7,v4 xxx47 the idea also of ,god as cause4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,from the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises the intellectual love of ,god4 ,from this kind of knowledge arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of ,god as cause1 that is 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 vi471 the love of ,god2 not in so far as we imagine him as present 7,v4 xxix471 but in so far as we understand him to be eternal2 this is what ,i call the intellectual love of ,god4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxiii4 ,the intellectual love of ,god1 which arises from the third kind of knowledge1 is eternal4 ,proof4--,the third kind of knowledge is eternal 7,v4 xxxi4 ,i4 ,ax4 iii472 therefore 7by the same ,axiom7 the love which arises therefrom is also necessarily eternal4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,although this love towards ,god has 7by the foregoing ,prop47 no beginning1 it yet possesses all the perfections of love1 just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the ,coroll4 of the last ,prop4 ,nor is there here any difference1 except that the mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we feigned to accrue to it1 and they are accompanied by the idea of ,god as eternal cause4 ,if pleasure consists in the transition to a greater perfection1 assuredly blessedness must consist in the mind being endowed with perfection itself4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxiv4 ,the mind is1 only while the body endures1 subject to those emotions which are attributable to passions4 ,proof4--,imagination is the idea wherewith the mind contemplates a thing as present 7,,ii4 xvii4 note72 yet this idea indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external thing 7,,ii4 xvi4 ,coroll4 ii474 ,therefore emotion 7see general ,def4 of ,emotions7 is imagination1 in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body2 therefore 7,v4 xxi47 the mind is1 only while the body endures1 subject to emotions which are attributable to passions4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,hence it follows that no love save intellectual love is eternal4 ,note4--,if we look to men's general opinion1 we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind1 but that they confuse eternity with duration1 and ascribe it to the imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after death4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxv4 ,god loves himself with an infinite intellectual love4 ,proof4--,god is absolutely infinite 7,i4 ,def4 vi471 that is 7,,ii4 ,def4 vi471 the nature of ,god rejoices in infinite perfection2 and such rejoicing is 7,,ii4 iii47 accompanied by the idea of himself1 that is 7,i4 xi4 and ,def4 i471 the idea of his own cause3 now this is what we have 7in ,v4 xxxii4 ,coroll47 described as intellectual love4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxvi4 ,the intellectual love of the mind towards ,god is that very love of ,god whereby ,god loves himself1 not in so far as he is infinite1 but in so far as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity2 in other words1 the intellectual love of the mind towards ,god is part of the infinite love wherewith ,god loves himself4 ,proof4--,this love of the mind must be referred to the activities of the mind 7,v4 xxxii4 ,coroll4 and ,,iii4 iii472 it is itself1 indeed1 an activity whereby the mind regards itself accompanied by the idea of ,god as cause 7,v4 xxxii4 and ,coroll472 that is 7,i4 xxv4 ,coroll4 and ,,ii4 xi4 ,coroll471 an activity whereby ,god1 in so far as he can be explained through the human mind1 regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself2 therefore 7by the last ,prop471 this love of the mind is part of the infinite love wherewith ,god loves himself4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,hence it follows that ,god1 in so far as he loves himself1 loves man1 and1 consequently1 that the love of ,god towards men1 and the intellectual love of the mind towards ,god are identical4 ,note4--,from what has been said we clearly understand1 wherein our salvation1 or blessedness1 or freedom1 consists3 namely1 in the constant and eternal love towards ,god1 or in ,god's love towards men4 ,this love or blessedness is1 in the ,bible1 called ,glory1 and not undeservedly4 ,for whether this love be referred to ,god or to the mind1 it may rightly be called acquiescence of spirit1 which 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 xxv4 xxx47 is not really distinguished from glory4 ,in so far as it is referred to ,god1 it is 7,v4 xxxv47 pleasure1 if we may still use that term1 accompanied by the idea of itself1 and1 in so far as it is referred to the mind1 it is the same 7,v4 xxvii474 ,again1 since the essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge1 whereof the beginning and the foundation is ,god 7,i4 xv41 and ,,ii4 xlvii4 note71 it becomes clear to us1 in what manner and way our mind1 as to its essence and existence1 follows from the divine nature and constantly depends on ,god4 ,i have thought it worth while here to call attention to this1 in order to show by this example how the knowledge of particular things1 which ,i have called intuitive or of the third kind 7,,ii4 xl4 note4 ii471 is potent1 and more powerful than the universal knowledge1 which ,i have styled knowledge of the second kind4 ,for1 although in ,part ,i4 ,i showed in general terms1 that all things 7and consequently1 also1 the human mind7 depend as to their essence and existence on ,god1 yet that demonstration1 though legitimate and placed beyond the chances of doubt1 does not affect our mind so much1 as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual essence of some particular thing1 which we say depends on ,god4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxvii4 ,there is nothing in nature1 which is contrary to this intellectual love1 or which can take it away4 ,proof4--,this intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the mind1 in so far as the latter is regarded through the nature of ,god as an eternal truth 7,v4 xxxiii4 and xxix474 ,if1 therefore1 there should be anything which would be contrary to this love1 that thing would be contrary to that which is true2 consequently1 that1 which should be able to take away this love1 would cause that which is true to be false2 an obvious absurdity4 ,therefore there is nothing in nature which1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,the ,axiom of ,part ,,iv4 has reference to particular things1 in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given time and place3 of this1 ,i think1 no one can doubt4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxviii4 ,in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kind of knowledge1 it is less subject to those emotions which are evil1 and stands in less fear of death4 ,proof4--,the mind's essence consists in knowledge 7,,ii4 xi472 therefore1 in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge1 the greater will be the part of it that endures 7,v4 xxix4 and xxiii471 and1 consequently 7by the last ,prop471 the greater will be the part that is not touched by the emotions1 which are contrary to our nature1 or in other words1 evil 7,,iv4 xxx474 ,thus1 in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge1 the greater will be the part of it1 that remains unimpaired1 and1 consequently1 less subject to emotions1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,hence we understand that point which ,i touched on in ,,iv4 xxxix4 note1 and which ,i promised to explain in this ,part2 namely1 that death becomes less hurtful1 in proportion as the mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater1 and1 consequently1 in proportion as the mind loves ,god more4 ,again1 since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence 7,v4 xxvii471 it follows that the human mind can attain to being of such a nature1 that the part thereof which we have shown to perish with the body 7,v4 xxi47 should be of little importance when compared with the part which endures4 ,but ,i will soon treat of the subject at greater length4 ,,prop4 ,,xxxix4 ,he1 who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities1 possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal4 ,proof4--,he1 who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities1 is least agitated by those emotions which are evil 7,,iv4 xxxviii47--that is 7,,iv4 xxx471 by those emotions which are contrary to our nature2 therefore 7,v4 x471 he possesses the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order1 and1 consequently1 of bringing it about1 that all the modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of ,god2 whence it will come to pass that 7,v4 xv47 he will be affected with love towards ,god1 which 7,v4 xvi47 must occupy or constitute the chief part of the mind2 therefore 7,v4 xxxiii471 such a man will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,since human bodies are capable of the greatest number of activities1 there is no doubt but that they may be of such a nature1 that they may be referred to minds possessing a great knowledge of themselves and of ,god1 and whereof the greatest or chief part is eternal1 and1 therefore1 that they should scarcely fear death4 ,but1 in order that this may be understood more clearly1 we must here call to mind1 that we live in a state of perpetual variation1 and1 according as we are changed for the better or the worse1 we are called happy or unhappy4 ,for he1 who1 from being an infant or a child1 becomes a corpse1 is called unhappy2 whereas it is set down to happiness1 if we have been able to live through the whole period of life with a sound mind in a sound body4 ,and1 in reality1 he1 who1 as in the case of an infant or a child1 has a body capable of very few activities1 and depending1 for the most part1 on external causes1 has a mind which1 considered in itself alone1 is scarcely conscious of itself1 or of ,god1 or of things2 whereas1 he1 who has a body capable of very many activities1 has a mind which1 considered in itself alone1 is highly conscious of itself1 of ,god1 and of things4 ,in this life1 therefore1 we primarily endeavour to bring it about1 that the body of a child1 in so far as its nature allows and conduces thereto1 may be changed into something else capable of very many activities1 and referable to a mind which is highly conscious of itself1 of ,god1 and of things2 and we desire so to change it1 that what is referred to its imagination and memory may become insignificant1 in comparison with its intellect1 as ,i have already said in the note to the last ,proposition4 ,,prop4 ,,xl4 ,in proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection1 so is it more active1 and less passive2 and1 vice vers1 in proportion as it is more active1 so is it more perfect4 ,proof4--,in proportion as each thing is more perfect1 it possesses more of reality 7,,ii4 ,def4 vi471 and1 consequently 7,,iii4 iii4 and note71 it is to that extent more active and less passive4 ,this demonstration may be reversed1 and thus prove that1 in proportion as a thing is more active1 so is it more perfect4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4--,hence it follows that the part of the mind which endures1 be it great or small1 is more perfect than the rest4 ,for the eternal part of the mind 7,v4 xxiii4 xxix47 is the understanding1 through which alone we are said to act 7,,iii4 iii472 the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination 7,v4 xxi471 through which only we are said to be passive 7,,iii4 iii4 and general ,def4 of the ,emotions72 therefore1 the former1 be it great or small1 is more perfect than the latter4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,such are the doctrines which ,i had purposed to set forth concerning the mind1 in so far as it is regarded without relation to the body2 whence1 as also from ,i4 xxi4 and other places1 it is plain that our mind1 in so far as it understands1 is an eternal mode of thinking1 which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking1 and this other by a third1 and so on to infinity2 so that all taken together at once constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of ,god4 ,,prop4 ,,xli4 ,even if we did not know that our mind is eternal1 we should still consider as of primary importance piety and religion1 and generally all things which1 in ,part ,,iv41 we showed to be attributable to courage and high--mindedness4 ,proof4--,the first and only foundation of virtue1 or the rule of right living is 7,,iv4 xxii4 ,coroll4 and xxiv47 seeking one's own true interest4 ,now1 while we determined what reason prescribes as useful1 we took no account of the mind's eternity1 which has only become known to us in this ,fifth ,part4 ,although we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal1 we nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage and high--mindedness are of primary importance4 ,therefore1 even if we were still ignorant of this doctrine1 we should yet put the aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,the general belief of the multitude seems to be different4 ,most people seem to believe that they are free1 in so far as they may obey their lusts1 and that they cede their rights1 in so far as they are bound to live according to the commandments of the divine law4 ,they therefore believe that piety1 religion1 and1 generally1 all things attributable to firmness of mind1 are burdens1 which1 after death1 they hope to lay aside1 and to receive the reward for their bondage1 that is1 for their piety and religion2 it is not only by this hope1 but also1 and chiefly1 by the fear of being horribly punished after death1 that they are induced to live according to the divine commandments1 so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry them4 ,if men had not this hope and this fear1 but believed that the mind perishes with the body1 and that no hope of prolonged life remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of piety1 they would return to their own inclinations1 controlling everything in accordance with their lusts1 and desiring to obey fortune rather than themselves4 ,such a course appears to me not less absurd than if a man1 because he does not believe that he can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever1 should wish to cram himself with poisons and deadly fare2 or if1 because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal1 he should prefer to be out of his mind altogether1 and to live without the use of reason2 these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth refuting4 ,,prop4 ,,xlii4 ,blessedness is not the reward of virtue1 but virtue itself2 neither do we rejoice therein1 because we control our lusts1 but1 contrariwise1 because we rejoice therein1 we are able to control our lusts4 ,proof4--,blessedness consists in love towards ,god 7,v4 xxxvi and note71 which love springs from the third kind of knowledge 7,v4 xxxii4 ,coroll472 therefore this love 7,,iii4 iii4 lix47 must be referred to the mind1 in so far as the latter is active2 therefore 7,,iv4 ,def4 viii47 it is virtue itself4 ,this was our first point4 ,again1 in proportion as the mind rejoices more in this divine love or blessedness1 so does it the more understand 7,v4 xxxii472 that is 7,v4 iii4 ,coroll471 so much the more power has it over the emotions1 and 7,v4 xxxviii47 so much the less is it subject to those emotions which are evil2 therefore1 in proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness1 so has it the power of controlling lusts4 ,and1 since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in the understanding1 it follows that no one rejoices in blessedness1 because he has controlled his lusts1 but1 contrariwise1 his power of controlling his lusts arises from this blessedness itself4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4--,i have thus completed all ,i wished to set forth touching the mind's power over the emotions and the mind's freedom4 ,whence it appears1 how potent is the wise man1 and how much he surpasses the ignorant man1 who is driven only by his lusts4 ,for the ignorant man is not only distracted in various ways by external causes without ever gaining the true acquiescence of his spirit1 but moreover lives1 as it were unwitting of himself1 and of ,god1 and of things1 and as soon as he ceases to suffer1 ceases also to be4 ,whereas the wise man1 in so far as he is regarded as such1 is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit1 but1 being conscious of himself1 and of ,god1 and of things1 by a certain eternal necessity1 never ceases to be1 but always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit4 ,if the way which ,i have pointed out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard1 it may nevertheless be discovered4 ,needs must it be hard1 since it is so seldom found4 ,how would it be possible1 if salvation were ready to our hand1 and could without great labour be found1 that it should be by almost all men neglected8 ,but all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare4 ,end of the ,ethics by ,benedict de ,spinoza #a ,affectiones #b ,forma #c ,animata #d ,a ,baconian phrase4 ,nov4 ,org4 ,aph4 #ajj4 ,pollock1 p4 #abf1 n4 #e ,conscienti morsus--thus rendered by ,mr4 ,pollock4 #f ,by men in this and the following propositions1 ,i mean men whom we regard without any particular emotion4 #g ,so ,van ,vloten and ,bruder4 ,the ,dutch version and ,camerer read1 an internal cause4 ,honor ,gloria4 #h ,see previous endnote4 #i ,ovid1 ,amores1 ,,ii4 xix4 #d1e4 ,spinoza transposes the verses4 ,speremus pariter1 pariter metuamus amantes2 ,ferreus est1 si quis1 quod sinit alter1 amat4 #aj ,this is possible1 though the human mind is part of the divine intellect1 as ,i have shown in ,,ii4 xiii4 note4 #aa ,gloria4 #ab ,ov4 ,met4 vii4#bj1 ,video meliora proboque1 ,deteriora sequor4 #ac ,honestas #ad ,land reads3 ,quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur--which ,i have translated above4 ,he suggests as alternative readings to 'quod'1 'quo' 7 whereby7 and 'quodque' 7 and that74 #ae ,maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro4 7,van ,vloten74 ,bruder reads3 ,malum praesens minus1 quod causa est faturi alicujus mali4 ,the last word of the latter is an obvious misprint1 and is corrected by the ,dutch translator into majoris boni4 7,pollock1 p4 #bfh1 note47 #af ,continuo4 ,rendered constantly by ,mr4 ,pollock on the ground that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context4 ,i venture to think1 however1 that a tolerable sense may be obtained without doing violence to ,spinoza's scholarship4 #ag ,affectiones4 ,camerer reads affectus----emotions4