,,morals ,,and ,,the ,,evolution   ,,of 
,,man      ,,morals ,,and ,,the         
,,evolution ,,of ,,man    ,,by   ,,max  
,,nordau    ,a ,translation of          
,,biologie ,,der ,,ethik    ,by         
,,marie ,a4 ,,lewenz1 ,m4,a4   ,fellow  
of ,university ,college1 ,london        
,,cassell ,,and ,,company1 ,,ltd        
,london1 ,new ,york1 ,toronto and       
,melbourne   #aibb      ,,to ,,my ,,dear
 ,,wife ,,anna 7ne ,,dons71    the      
sunshine of my life in happy days1 my   
brave   comrade in the storms of the    
world-catastrophe1 with   love and      
gratitude ,i dedicate this book which   
helped   both her and me to endure the  
dark years when we   were homeless      
wanderers4    ,,madrid1 ,september      
#bfth1 #aiaf    ,,contents    ,,chapter 
,,page   #a4 ,,the ,,phenomenon ,,of    
,,morality                            #a
   #b4 ,,the ,,immanence ,,of ,,the     
,,concept ,,of ,,morality               
#df   #c4 ,,the ,,biological ,,aspect   
,,of ,,morality                    #hd  

#d4 ,,morality ,,and ,,law              
#aae   #e4 ,,individual ,,morality ,,and
 ,,collective ,,immorality       #add   
#f4 ,,freedom ,,and ,,responsibility    
#ahe   #g4 ,,morality ,,and ,,progress  
#bae   #h4 ,,the ,,sanctions ,,of       
,,morality                              
#bdg     ,,morals ,,and ,,the           
,,evolution ,,of ,,man     ,,chapter ,i 
,,the ,,phenomenon ,,of ,,morality   ,a 
very well-known experiment in animal    
psychology was once made by ,mbius4 ,an 
aquarium was divided into two           
compartments by means of a pane of      
glass2 in one of these a pike was put   
and in the other a tench4 ,hardly had   
the former caught sight of his prey1    
when he rushed to the attack without    
noticing the transparent partition4 ,he 
crashed with extreme violence again the 
obstacle and was hurled back stunned1   
with a badly battered nose4 ,no sooner  
had he recovered from the blow than he  
again made an onslaught upon his        
neighbour--with the same result4 ,he    

repeated his efforts a few times more1  
but succeeded only in badly hurting his 
head and mouth4 ,at last a dim idea     
dawned upon his dull mind that some     
unknown and invisible power was         
protecting the tench1 and that any      
attempt to devour it would be in vain2  
consequently from that moment he ceased 
from all further endeavours to molest   
his prey4 ,thereupon the pane of glass  
was removed from the tank1 and pike and 
tench swam around together2 the former  
took no notice whatever of his          
defenceless neighbour1 who had become   
sacred to him4 ,in the first instance   
the pike had not perceived the glass    
partition against which he had dashed   
his head2 now he did not see that it had
 been taken away4 ,all he knew was this3
 he must not attack this tench1         
otherwise he would fare badly4 ,the pane
 of glass1 though no longer actually    
there1 surrounded the tench as with a   
coat of mail which effectually warded   
off the murderous attacks of the pike4  

,the fact so often observed1 that man in
 many cases does that which he          
passionately desires to leave undone1   
and refrains from doing that which all  
his instincts urge him to do--this      
phenomenon of ,morality is a            
generalization upon a huge scale of the 
above experiment on animals with the    
pane of glass in a tank4  ,jean ,jacques
 ,rousseau thought out a theoretical    
human being who was by nature good4     
,such a human being does not exist and  
has never existed4 ,from sheer annoyance
 at the provoking obliquity of vision   
which led the enthusiast of ,geneva to  
develop such a theory1 one is sorely    
tempted to go to the opposite extreme   
and declare that man is by nature       
fundamentally bad2 but such an assertion
 is just as nave as ,rousseau's         
contention4 ,good and bad are values    
which we can only learn to appreciate   
when we have felt the effect of the     
phenomenon of ,morality4 ,the concepts  
of good and evil are of much later      

origin than mankind1 and can therefore  
no more constitute a fundamental        
characteristic of man's original nature 
than1 for instance1 the cut and colour  
of his clothes2 though it is open to    
wiseacres to maintain that man's nature 
to some extent actually finds expression
 in the cut and colour of his           
clothes--that is1 in his choice of them4
 ,anyone contemplating primitive man1   
man as he emerges from the hands of     
,nature1 stripped of all the additions  
which he has acquired in the course of  
his historical development1 is bound to 
admit that man is neither good nor bad2 
he is a living being acting according to
 the instincts implanted in his nature2 
just like the pike4 ,but in most        
contingencies he does not obey these    
instincts1 and if he reflects upon      
himself and his actions1 he is astounded
 at realizing this1 and asks3 ,why do ,i
 refrain from revelling in the          
gratification of my desires8            
,innumerable times every day of his life

 he would like to break many or all of  
the ,ten ,commandments2 but he abstains 
from so doing1 and1 what is more1 mostly
 without effort1 without having         
painfully to suppress his desire4 ,what 
prevents him from yielding to his       
impulses8 ,an invisible power which lays
 its commands upon him3 ,thou shalt not6
 ,thou shalt6 ,often his aims and       
inclinations come into violent collision
 with this order1 or this prohibition1  
and are hurled back by the painful      
impact4 ,man hears the threatening1     
imperious voice1 but cannot see whence  
it comes4 ,accustomed to reason by      
analogy1 he concludes that it is1 like  
thunder1 a voice of ,nature4 ,when the  
pike has sufficiently injured his nose  
against the pane of glass1 he assumes as
 an actual fact that an insuperable     
barrier separates him from the tench1   
and1 moreover1 that it is both useless  
and painful to come into contact with   
this4 ,he does not try to discover the  
nature of the obstacle1 and gives up any

 further attempt upon his mysteriously  
protected prey4 ,man1 with a more highly
 developed intelligence than the pike1  
does not accept the phenomenon of       
,morality with dull resignation4 ,since 
he has become conscious of a mysterious 
barrier erected between his volitions   
and his actions1 he has not ceased to   
reflect upon this barrier1 to           
investigate it with a timid yet         
irresistible desire for knowledge1 and  
to try and discover its nature4  ,it    
redounds to man's credit that he has    
devoted so much time and energy to      
investigating the character and essence 
of ,morality4 ,but the result of these  
investigations does not redound to his  
credit4 ,with the exception of theology1
 there is no subject upon which so much 
has been written as upon ethics4 ,yet   
whosoever plunges into this boundless   
sea of literature will emerge with      
feelings bordering upon horror and      
despair4 ,here a free rein is given to  
all man's errors1 to his habit of       

drawing false conclusions1 to his faulty
 modes of thought4 ,incapacity to       
interpret facts1 association of ideas1  
elusive as a will-o'-the-wisp and       
uncurbed by any criticism1 intemperate  
mysticism1 arrogant dogmatism1 shallow  
self-sufficiency--all these vie with one
 another in the presentment of theories 
which either are patently foolish1      
arbitrary or ill-founded1 or else prove 
to be so when impartially examined4  ,it
 is hard for the few reasonable thinkers
 who have taken part in this great      
investigation to make their voices heard
 amid the uproar raised by the solemn1  
unctuous1 dictatorial or pedantic       
tomfools4 ,and even the former are not  
entirely satisfactory1 because they do  
not distinguish clearly enough between  
the form and the substance1 the         
externals and the essence of ,morality1 
and because they do not discriminate    
with sufficient care between questions  
as to its nature1 origin and aim1 and   
its powers or sanctions--questions which

 must on no account be confounded4      
,what is ,morality8 ,obviously it is    
necessary to attempt a clear answer to  
this question before any useful purpose 
can be served by inquiring into the     
group of problems to which it gives     
rise3 its aim1 its laws1 its origin1 its
 method1 its assumptions4 ,the ,stoics  
answer this question as follows3        
,morality is living according to        
,nature4 ,furthermore1 it is quite in   
accordance with the doctrine of the     
,stoics that ,cicero says3 ,virtue1     
however1 is nothing but ,nature         
developed to the highest possible degree
 of perfection 7ad summum perducta74    
,moral therefore means natural2         
,morality and ,nature are equivalent2   
they are one4 ,really a simpler or more 
childlike explanation is hardly         
possible4 ,the most superficial glance  
at human life and at our own soul       
teaches us that ,morality is contrary to
 ,nature1 that it must struggle against 
,nature to assert itself1 that it means 

a victory over ,nature1 in so far as we 
understand by ,nature in this special   
sense the most primitive reaction of man
 to simple and more complicated stimuli1
 the first tendency of impulse1 the     
immediate1 instinctive urge to act4     
,further1 the definition of the ,stoics 
ignores the aggregation of concepts     
which the synthetic conception1         
,morality1 involves2 as if this were    
self-evident and required no definition4
 ,the ,stoics tacitly assume that       
,morality and ,good are synonymous4     
,cicero makes this assumption clearer by
 using the word ,virtue 7virtus7 instead
 of ,morality4 ,but in all languages    
this word implies approbation and       
praise4 ,it is an appreciation of worth 
7,werturteil71 to use the expression so 
appropriately coined by ,lotze4  ,but   
the very fact that we recognize         
,morality as being valuable is by no    
means a matter of course and it demands 
an explanation4  ,certain actions could 
only be judged to be good if they were  

distinguished from others which did not 
suggest the same judgment1 which were   
felt to be not good1 to be bad or       
indifferent4 ,we come to the question1  
,what is ,good1 what is ,bad8 ,the      
,stoics reply1 ,that which is good is   
natural4 ,it is easy to call facts which
 please us natural1 and such as         
displease us unnatural4 ,in reality both
 series of facts are equally natural2   
because everything that happens is      
natural2 because by definition ,nature  
is the synthesis of all phenomena2      
because nothing exists outside of       
,nature1 and within ,nature everything  
is a part of her and therefore is       
natural and can be nothing but natural4 
,if we nevertheless wish to distinguish 
between natural and unnatural phenomena1
 if we call ,good1 ,morality1 and       
,virtue natural1 and compare them       
favourably with the unnatural1 this only
 proves that we use the words natural   
and unnatural as synonyms for good and  
bad1 and that we have a ready-made      

standard by which we measure the        
naturalness or unnaturalness 7that is1  
the goodness or badness7 of actions1 and
 that there exists within ourselves the 
law by which we judge them to be good or
 bad4 ,but how do we come by this law8  
,how1 of what material1 and why do we   
fashion this standard8 ,why do we       
approve of one thing as good and condemn
 another as bad8 ,what qualities do the 
former and the latter possess1 or what  
qualities do we ascribe to them8 ,that  
is what we want to know when we inquire 
as to the significance of ,morality1 and
 the definition of the ,stoics throws no
 light whatever upon the matter4        
,according to ,aristotle ,morality is   
the activity of ,practical ,reason1     
which is accompanied by pleasurable     
emotion4 ,it is not worth while to dwell
 upon this definition4 ,it is absolutely
 valueless4 ,practical ,reason is not a 
definite concept2 ,aristotle does not   
say anywhere what he understands by     
practical when he applies this attribute

 to ,reason2 and to call every activity 
of ,practical ,reason accompanied by    
pleasurable emotion ,morality is mere   
eccentricity4  ,to take only one        
example3 if ,i have a house built1 and  
accept the architect's plans because    
they please me greatly1 my practical    
reason is most certainly active2 the    
gratification induced by my reasonable  
choice of the plans is doubtless a      
pleasurable emotion2 but assuredly no   
one will characterize as moral this     
activity of my practical reason which is
 accompanied by pleasurable emotion4 ,it
 may be that ,aristotle was             
contemplating not a single action1 but  
conduct in life as a whole4 ,in that    
case he has expressed in an unfortunate1
 and much too loose a manner the thought
 that ,morality is ,reason plus         
pleasurable emotion4 ,we shall          
frequently meet with and have to examine
 this idea1 which omits to explain why  
pleasurable emotions attend certain     
activities of ,practical ,reason1       

whatever that may be1 and fail to be    
aroused by others4  ,judaism1 as        
embodied in its law-givers and prophets1
 teaches that ,morality consists in     
living and acting in accordance with the
 divine ,will4 ,maimonides1 who1        
however1 was regarded by many of his    
contemporaries as a heretic1 does not   
consider ,judaism a creed at all1 but a 
code of ,morality4 ,he maintains that   
anyone who repudiates the tenets of the 
,jewish faith1 even the most essential  
one1 namely1 the belief in a single god1
 must not be excluded from the ,jewish  
community as long as he conforms to its 
moral laws4 ,this thinker1 usually so   
accurate and nice in his reasoning1     
overlooks the fact that in this case he 
is contradicting himself in a manner    
wellnigh comic4 ,according to him1 too1 
,morality consists in the endeavour to  
live and act in accordance with the     
divine ,will4 ,how is such an endeavour 
possible for a man who does not believe 
in ,god and for whom consequently no    

divine ,will exists8 ,therefore either  
,morality must be something different   
from an approximation to the standard   
set up by the divine ,will1 or else he  
who denies ,god cannot be moral4 ,but ,i
 will leave the author of the ,guide of 
those who have gone astray to his       
self-contradiction1 and only retain the 
,jewish definition of ,morality as based
 upon the ,will of ,god4  ,without any  
restriction ,christianity has taken over
 this definition from the               
mother-religion4 ,in his zeal to claim  
that ,god alone is the source of all    
,morality1 ,st4 ,augustine allows       
himself to be carried away to such an   
extent that he libels mankind most      
hatefully4 ,just as for ,rousseau man is
 by nature good1 for the ,bishop of     
,hippo he is by nature fundamentally    
bad4 ,left to his own devices he would  
always wallow in the mire of sin and    
vice1 and would never even feel the wish
 to abandon his wickedness4 ,it is      
,god's mercy alone which rescues him    

from his depravity and sets his feet    
upon the path of righteousness1 leading 
him to virtue1 salvation and eternal    
bliss4 ,thomas ,aquinas is no less      
definite on this point4 ,the scriptures 
of ,judaism and ,christianity contain   
the eternal law which ,god has ordained 
for mankind4 ,he points out the paths   
that man should follow4 ,all ,morality  
springs from ,him alone4  ,to this very 
day true believers adhere to this       
doctrine4 ,morality did not originate on
 earth2 the knowledge of it is a gift of
 grace from heaven to mankind4 ,it is   
derived from ,god2 it is that which ,god
 has willed2 or else it does not need   
any special act of volition on the part 
of ,god1 but is the essence of ,god     
himself4 ,that is the teaching of       
,paley1 the classical moral philosopher4
 ,virtue consists in doing good to      
mankind in obedience to the ,will of    
,god1 and in order to attain eternal    
salvation4 ,here stress is laid upon the
 fact that ,morality is active love for 

one's neighbour1 and this is a          
concession on the part of the           
conciliatory ,englishman to the         
utilitarian ethics of his countrymen2   
but for him the necessary and sufficient
 reason for this love of one's neighbour
 is the ,will of ,god and the desire for
 eternal salvation4 ,the ,german        
devotee1 ,baader1 blustering like a     
capuchin1 preaches this twaddle3 ,any   
,morality which is not rooted in divine 
law is the intellectual impiety of our  
time raised to its highest power2 it is 
the perfection of atheism2 for the idea 
of the absolute autonomy of man         
atheistically denies the ,father as     
law-giver2 the theistic denial of the   
necessity for divine aid in fulfilling  
the law does away with the ,son or      
,mediator1 and finally the              
materialistic-pantheistic apotheosis of 
,matter does away with the ,holy ,ghost 
with its sanctifying power4 ,the        
,frenchman ,jouffroy1 though more       
careful and reticent in his manner1     

unmistakably expresses his conviction   
that ethics1 as well as the philosophy  
of law1 inevitably and necessarily lead 
to theology4  ,but this necessity only  
exists for minds whose desire for       
knowledge and truth is easily satisfied 
by words without a meaning that can be  
visualized1 by fabulous statements      
accepted without proof1 by fictions of  
the imagination1 and by shallow juggling
 with the association of ideas4 ,even   
those who do not approve all ,auguste   
,comte's arguments will agree with him  
when he classifies the successive steps 
in the mental development of mankind as 
the theological1 transcendental1 and    
scientific modes of thought4 ,when man's
 understanding is in its infancy he is  
content with a supernatural explanation 
of all phenomena which strike him as    
mysterious1 disquiet him or rouse his   
curiosity4 ,only ,i have never been able
 to understand why ,comte discriminates 
between the theological and the         
transcendental modes of thought1 and    

assigns to the latter a higher place    
than the former4 ,both are on a footing 
of absolute equality2 both raise        
arbitrary fictions of the imagination to
 the position of sources of knowledge2  
both substitute anthropomorphic         
trivialities for the observation of     
phenomena and research into the         
conditions under which they occur and   
their relationship to one another4 ,the 
only difference between them lies in the
 fact that transcendentalism expresses  
itself in choicer language than does    
theology1 that it presents formul that  
are more complicated and pretentious1   
less transparent and honest--formul     
which the unpractised mind does not     
immediately recognize as mythological   
dogmas in a pseudo-scientific disguise4 
,the relationship of theological to     
transcendental thought is much the same 
as that of superstition to religion4    
,both of them are one and the same4     
,religion is shamefaced superstition1   
whereas superstition has not yet learned

 to feel shame4 ,religion is            
superstition in a dress-coat1 and       
therefore fit for polite circles2       
superstition is religion in a cotton    
smock and therefore cannot be admitted  
to society4 ,superstition is the        
religion of the poor and unassuming1    
religion is the superstition of fine    
folk who plume themselves on their      
formal and verbal scholarship4  ,ever   
since man has risen above the level of  
the beasts1 ever since the first faint  
glimmerings of thought began in the     
thick-walled1 narrow and dark skull of a
 hunter of the ,neanderthal or ,cro     
,magnon1 he has ascribed everything     
unintelligible in life and in the world 
around him to divine actions and divine 
sources4 ,how did the world come into   
existence8 ,a god or gods created it4   
,how does ,nature work8 ,in accordance  
with the will of a god or gods1 in      
obedience to divine commands1 as a      
result of divine activities4 ,what is   
life8 ,a divine gift of grace4 ,what is 

consciousness8 ,an irradiation of the   
divinity4 ,what is infinity1 what       
eternity8 ,attributes of the god4 ,god  
is the name that from the beginning of  
time to the present day men have given  
to their ignorance4 ,they find it easier
 to bear disguised by this pseudonym2   
they are even proud of it4 ,with cunning
 self-deception they have endowed the   
word with the dignity pertaining to a   
title of the most awe-inspiring majesty1
 and they no longer feel ashamed of a   
poverty of mind which can boast of such 
a magnificent name4 ,morality also is   
one of those phenomena which are not    
intelligible as a matter of course4 ,the
 questions how1 whence1 why1 and to what
 end ,morality exists1 and what it is1  
cannot be solved at a glance2 its       
life-history is not apparent to every   
observer1 as is that of the domestic    
cat4 ,but why cudgel one's brains8      
,cheap explanations are ready to hand4  
,this way mythology1 you                
maid-of-all-work6 ,morality has been    

ordained by ,god4 ,a moral life is one  
in accordance with ,god's commandments4 
,he who will not content himself with   
this answer is an infidel and does not  
deserve to have any notice taken of him4
  ,let us leave the paltry statements of
 theologians and note how men who       
investigate questions more thoroughly   
have dealt with ,morality4 ,descartes   
defines ,morality as the sustained      
endeavour to do that which one has      
recognized to be right4 ,it is difficult
 to discern in this definition the      
father of scientific scepticism4 ,what  
are the distinguishing marks of ,right8 
,is the decision as to what is right and
 what is wrong to be left to the        
subjective judgment of the individual8  
,in that case ,descartes must concede   
that the action of a burglar is moral1  
if he has recognized that it is right   
for him to perpetrate his crime between 
two and three o'clock in the morning1   
that being the most favourable time for 
it1 and then strives to the best of his 

ability to effect an entrance into the  
building he has selected1 at the moment 
which he has recognized as the right    
one4 ,or shall all mankind1 or at least 
the majority1 and not the individual1   
decide what is right8 ,in that case the 
definition would certainly approximate  
to the one which ,i hold to be true2 but
 for one thing it would suffer from     
vagueness2 and1 moreover1 its originator
 would lay himself open to the reproach 
of not having shown why the individual  
is worthy of praise when he acts in     
accordance with the convictions of the  
majority1 though these be opposed to his
 own1 and in so doing allows his action 
to be determined by a judgment due to a 
psychic mechanism other than his4       
,spinoza's ,ethics leaves the reader in 
great discomfort1 the result of         
vacillating and contradictory           
explanations4 ,obviously ,descartes'    
great disciple had no clear conception  
of the essence of ,morality and held    
either consecutively1 or may be even    

simultaneously1 divers views on the     
subject1 amongst which those of all     
schools of thought are either quite     
clearly expressed or at least implied4  
,by ,good1 he says1 ,i mean that which  
we know for certain to be useful to     
us4#a    #a ,i quote the wording of     
,berthold ,auerbach's translation3      
,b4 de ,spinoza's collected works4      
,translated from the ,latin       by    
,berthold ,auerbach4 ,stuttgart1 ,j4 ,g4
 ,cotta1 #ahga4 ,second       edition1  
,vol4 ,,ii4  ,and again3 ,to act        
absolutely virtuously is merely to act1 
live1 preserve one's being 7these three 
mean the same thing7 in accordance with 
the dictates of ,reason1 because one    
seeks one's own interest4  ,according to
 that ,morality is synonymous with      
egoism1 and its aim is man's individual 
profit or interest4 ,even the most      
pronounced ,utilitarians among ethical  
theorists have not ventured to go to    
such lengths4 ,true1 they have contended
 that the aim of moral action is        

happiness1 but at least they define it  
as the happiness of the whole community 
and not that of the individual1 except  
in so far as he is a member of the      
community and has his fair share of its 
well-being4 ,spinoza foresees the       
objection that the pursuit of one's own 
happiness cannot possibly deserve the   
universal esteem in which virtue is     
held1 and he tries to adduce reasons    
whereby the egoism which he             
characterizes as moral may be justified 
and palliated3  ,everyone exists        
according to the supreme law of ,nature1
 and consequently everyone does1        
according to the supreme law of ,nature1
 that which results from the necessities
 of his own nature2 and therefore every 
man forms his judgment as to what is    
good and bad according to the supreme   
law of ,nature1 pursues his own interest
 according to his lights1 seeks revenge1
 strives to preserve what he loves and  
to destroy what he hates4 ,that is      
possibly the most audacious and at the  

same time the most ill-founded statement
 that has ever been written on the      
subject of ,morality4 ,morality means   
behaviour calculated to further one's   
own interest4 ,morality is therefore    
utility4 ,but man cannot act otherwise  
than morally1 since he always acts as he
 is compelled to do by his own nature4  
,there is no sense in discriminating    
between good and bad1 moral and immoral1
 since one always acts in accordance    
with the behests of ,nature4 ,man       
automatically executes the dictates of  
,nature which is alone responsible for  
his deeds4  ,for the ,stoics1 too1      
,morality is action in accordance with  
the law of ,nature1 but ,spinoza goes   
further than the ,stoics1 in that he    
does away with any universally          
applicable standard of moral conduct1   
and sets up instead of ,nature pure and 
simple1 which is the same for all1 each 
man's individual nature as the authority
 which shall lay down rules of behaviour
 for him4 ,so ,morality is something    

individual and subjective4 ,man acts    
according to the requirements of his    
interest2 his own nature shows him what 
his interest requires2 no other person  
has any right or any qualification to   
form a judgment upon the worth of his   
conduct1 to call it good or bad1 for he 
cannot know what course of action the   
man's personal nature1 peculiar to      
himself and to no other1 may prescribe  
to him4 ,this is the doctrine of anarchy
 and amorality put in a nutshell1 a more
 wordy paraphrase of the ,fais ce que   
vouldras 7please yourself71 the terse   
inscription that ,rabelais put over the 
entrance to his ,abbey of ,thlme1 as the
 only law governing that abode of       
alluring wantonness4 ,spinoza certainly 
does half-heartedly concede to ,reason  
the rle which ,aristotle positively     
assigns to it 7,to act in an absolutely 
virtuous manner is merely to act        
according to the guidance of ,reason1   
etc471 but it is impossible to see how  
,reason can exercise guidance and       

control if everyone does according to   
the supreme law of ,nature that which   
results from the necessities of his     
nature4 ,this can surely only mean that 
everyone may yield to the unbridled     
desires of his natural instincts1 which 
is the very reverse of self-control by  
,reason4 ,if ,nature is to rule         
despotically1 there is obviously no     
place for a constitutional limitation of
 her sole power by the effective counsel
 and protests of ,reason4  ,but ,spinoza
 renounces in a much more definite way  
his views recognizing the right of every
 individual to form his judgment as to  
what is good and bad according to the   
supreme law of ,nature1 for he calmly   
adds3 ,society can be founded1 if it    
reserves to itself the right possessed  
by the individual to take revenge1 and  
to pronounce a verdict on what is good  
and what is bad2 thereby it acquires the
 power to prescribe rules of conduct for
 the community1 to make laws1 and to    
enforce them1 not by means of ,reason1  

which cannot restrict passions1 but by  
threats4444 ,hence in a state of        
,nature1 sin cannot even be imagined4   
,this concession to ,society most       
emphatically contradicts his first      
definition of ,morality4 ,it does away  
with the right claimed for the          
individual to do according to the       
supreme law of ,nature that which       
results from the necessities of his own 
nature1 and by the same supreme law of  
,nature to judge what is good and what  
is bad4 ,it subjects conduct to the     
restraint1 not of ,nature1 but of       
,society4 ,it bears witness to the      
admission that ,reason cannot restrict  
passions1 although ,spinoza has just    
required the virtuous man to act        
according to the guidance of ,reason4   
,spinoza admits that ,morality is not   
the consequence of a law inherent in the
 individual1 but of an extraneous law   
forced upon him by society2 that it is  
not an individual but a social          
phenomenon4 ,in this he agrees with the 

conclusions of modern sociological      
thought1 but his merit is much          
diminished by the fact that he skims    
lightly over the one great difficulty   
which sociological ethics is struggling 
to overcome4 ,he says1 society reserves 
to itself the right 444 to pronounce a  
verdict on what is good and what is bad1
 and thereby acquires the power to      
prescribe rules of conduct to the       
community1 etc4  ,it has the power right
 enough2 police1 judge1 prison and      
gallows bear witness to that2 but has it
 the right8 ,that is not clear without  
further investigation4 ,it requires to  
be proved4 ,the amoralist can           
emphatically deny this1 basing his      
conclusion on ,spinoza's own definition4
 ,he can legitimately declare that he   
need submit to no dictates of society1  
that he owes obedience only to his own  
nature and his own inner needs1 and the 
moral philosopher can only prove to him 
that he is wrong by scornfully          
indicating the penal code and its       

stalwart minions4  ,spinoza1 we see1 has
 already given a whole series of        
mutually destructive and contradictory  
definitions of ,morality3 it is the law 
of life and conduct which society lays  
down for the individual1 though we do   
not learn from him on what principles it
 is based2 it is the pursuit of one's   
own interest as indicated by ,reason2 it
 is obedience to necessity--that is to  
say1 to the demands of one's own nature4
 ,all this does not suffice him4 ,he    
discovers a new aspect of ,morality4    
,recognition of ,good and ,evil is      
nothing but a pleasurable or a          
disagreeable emotion in so far as we are
 conscious of it4 ,and again1 ,pleasure 
is not actually bad 7as the ascetics    
probably contend71 but good2 pain1 on   
the contrary1 is actually bad4  ,in this
 case the ideas pleasure and pain are   
treated as equivalents of good and bad1 
as were useful and harmful in the former
 case4 ,according to the axiom that     
things that are equal to the same thing 

must be equal to one another1           
pleasurable is synonymous not only with 
good1 but also with beneficial1 and in  
like manner painful with bad and        
harmful4 ,brandy undoubtedly produces a 
sensation of pleasure in the drinker2 is
 brandy1 then1 good in a moral sense8   
,above all1 is it beneficial8 ,many such
 questions could be put to ,spinoza1 but
 this one is enough4  ,thus we discover 
,spinoza to be at one and the same time 
a ,utilitarian and a ,hedonist1 the     
champion of ,impulse and again of       
,reason1 an anarchistic individualist   
and a herald of the right of society to 
rule the individual4 ,angry and         
disappointed1 we turn from him1 for     
instead of finding in him the definite  
standard we sought we have met with the 
shifting hues of the chameleon and the  
uncanny changes of form of ,proteus4    
,the views of the ,english thinkers are 
clearer and more convincing although    
they1 too1 do not carry their           
investigations far enough4 ,hobbes uses 

,justice and ,injustice as synonyms for 
,morality and ,immorality1 and he       
definitely recognizes what ,spinoza only
 dimly guessed1 namely1 that these ideas
 could only arise in man when living as 
a member of society and not in a being  
dwelling alone4 ,according to him1      
therefore1 ,morality is a social and not
 an individual phenomenon2 just as the  
moral philosophers of the theological   
school look upon it as the ,will of     
,god1 so he considers it to be the ,will
 of ,society4 ,but he was under the     
obligation 7non-existent for the        
theologian7 to trace to its source this 
social ,will1 to show how it is         
manifested1 to explain why the          
individual not only submits to it1 but  
values this submission far more highly  
than mere utility4 ,man learns the ,will
 of ,god by revelation1 and it is       
forbidden to inquire into its basis4 ,to
 the ,will of ,society ,hobbes cannot   
possibly ascribe the same incontestable 
sanctity4 ,it should not have escaped   

his notice that this ,will is neither   
uniform nor of assured stability1 and   
that it often wavers and is sometimes   
self-contradictory4 ,therefore1 if he   
wants to call the ,will of ,society     
,justice1 as the theologians call the   
,will of ,god ,morality1 and if he wants
 to look upon ,justice and ,morality as 
equivalents1 then it is his duty to     
explain how ,society can make claims    
which conflict with the principles on   
which the universal rules it has drawn  
up are based1 and which1 consequently1  
not being just or moral1 are unjust and 
immoral1 but which1 nevertheless1 must  
be acknowledged by the individual as    
being both just and moral1 simply       
because they are social claims4  ,in    
,kant's moral philosophy we find the    
extremest form of mystic dogmatism2 its 
success would be inexplicable did one   
not know how prone mankind is to be     
intimidated by brusque statements4      
,kant's dictatorial pronouncements have 
become common-places4 ,act only on that 

maxim whereby thou canst at the same    
time will that it should become a       
universal law4 ,that is very impressive4
 ,but what is the maxim on which you    
act8 ,this maxim is the moral law4 ,now 
we yearn to know what this moral law is1
 whence it comes1 and on what it is     
based4  ,but our yearnings remains      
unsatisfied4 ,the moral law is a secret4
 ,it is an incomprehensible power which 
rules our consciousness4 ,ask no        
questions4 ,be silent1 submit and obey4 
,even the theologian discussing moral   
philosophy will listen to reason4 ,he   
gives us the information1 sibylline     
though it be1 that the moral law        
emanates from the ,will of ,god1 and is 
shown to us in the revelations of       
religion4 ,kant does not even give such 
meagre information4 ,the moral law      
exists4 ,that must suffice4 ,the starry 
heavens above thee1 the moral law within
 thee4 ,you retort that that is a       
metaphor which you may call poetical1 if
 you like1 but it is no explanation4    

,you will get the following reply3 this 
metaphor1 rightly understood1 indicates 
that the moral law is eternal1 that it  
is part and parcel of uncreated ,nature 
like the stars1 that it is a phenomenon 
of the same order as all the elements   
that go to make up the universe4 ,the   
moral law does not flow from antecedent 
ideas of ,good and ,evil2 on the        
contrary1 the moral law decides what is 
good and what is evil4 ,it is not       
derived from human experience4 ,the less
 so since it cannot be proved by        
experience that it has at any place or  
any time become real4 ,in other words1  
no one can testify that the ,categorical
 ,imperative has ever been realized1    
that the moral law has at any place or  
any time ceased to be a ,kantian theory 
productive of sacred thrills1 that it   
has ever emerged from the unapproachable
 cell wherein it dwells in the temple of
 human consciousness1 to take a place   
and play an active part among mortals4  
,the lessee of all ,kant's wisdom1      

,hermann ,cohen1 with the clumsiness of 
an over-zealous assistant1 has expressed
 his master's thought in a perfectly    
ludicrous form3 ,the moral law is to be 
conceived as a reality of such kind that
 it must exist1 that its being must be  
7note the elegance and euphony of the   
phrase being must be67 even if no       
creature existed for whom it would be   
valid4 ,true1 the moral law is a maxim  
on which you should act1 a standard of  
human conduct1 but it would still exist 
if there were no human beings and no    
action4 ,it would come to exactly the   
same thing if ,hermann ,cohen said3 the 
railway is to be conceived as a reality 
of such kind that it must exist if there
 were no human beings and consequently  
no travellers2 even if there were no    
earth on the surface of which rails and 
sleepers could be laid4 ,this is such   
palpable nonsense that it would be a    
work of supererogation to prove its     
absurdity4 ,by this grotesque           
exaggeration ,hermann ,cohen has clearly

 brought to light the hollowness and    
weakness of ,kant's ,moral philosophy   
which culminates in the ,categorical    
,imperative4 ,in spite of its arbitrary 
dogmatism1 the formula of the           
,categorical ,imperative has taken a    
hold on the imagination of the          
superficially educated1 and has never   
ceased to be repeated with the fervour  
evinced by a devout man at prayer1 by   
several generations of those who have   
made it their business to cultivate     
mental and moral science4  ,in one of   
his early novels1 ,the ,island of ,dr4  
,moreau1 ,h4 ,g4 ,wells has described   
how an audacious scientist1 by          
performing an operation on the brains of
 the most savage beasts of prey1 such as
 panthers1 wolves1 etc41 transformed    
them into creatures with the powers of  
thought and speech4 ,he succeeds in     
suppressing1 or at least in lulling for 
the time being1 their bloodthirsty      
instincts1 but he is always afraid that 
these may be roused again1 and forbids  

the animals on which he experiments to  
touch blood or fresh meat4 ,he takes    
good care to give no reason for this    
prohibition4 ,he merely issues it       
sternly and threateningly4 ,it is the   
,law1 an unknown1 inexplicable1 but     
terrible power to which one must submit1
 because opposition would expose one to 
unimaginable1 but terrible evils4 ,if   
temptation assails the beasts they flee 
it1 whispering fearfully and warningly  
to one another3 ,the ,law6 the ,law6    
,wells is a trained philosopher1 and    
often has his tongue in his cheek4 ,i   
shrewdly suspect that when he writes of 
the mysterious ,law which fills ,dr4    
,moreau's semi-humanized beasts of prey 
with superstitious terror1 he is poking 
fun at ,kant's ,categorical ,imperative4
  ,the great logical mistake in ,kant's 
moral philosophy is that he conceives   
,morality as a social or collective     
phenomenon1 and yet defines it as an    
individual one4 ,according to ,kant1 the
 ,categorical ,imperative exists within 

us4 ,it is as immutable as the starry   
heavens above us4 ,it gives us the      
criterion by which to discriminate      
between good and evil4 ,its realm is our
 consciousness wherein it lives and     
rules2 it is not introduced from        
outside1 it springs from no power or    
conditions outside our person4 ,all the 
same1 the only law which this ultra     
subjective ,categorical ,imperative     
imposes on us is the most centrifugal   
that can possibly be imagined3 ,act only
 on that maxim whereby thou canst at the
 same time will that it should become a 
universal law4 ,hence our action is     
designed to produce an effect on the    
world around us4 ,it is to become a     
universal law can1 of course1 only mean1
 it is to become a universal law of     
human society1 for ,kant cannot possibly
 have aspired to make the ,categorical  
,imperative impose laws upon the stars  
in their courses4 ,our moral law1 in so 
far as it applies to our actions1 deals 
with society4 ,when we formulate it in  

our minds1 we associate it from its     
first inception with the notion of the  
society to which it is to be applied4   
,it would have been logical to say3     
,your standard of conduct is to be what 
society recognizes as its universal law4
 ,but ,kant puts the cart before the    
horse and says on the contrary3 ,the    
maxims on which thy action is based are 
by thy will to become the universal law 
of society4  ,other philosophers have   
avoided this mistake4 ,hegel declares3  
,it is not until man becomes a member of
 a moral community that the ideas of    
,duty and ,virtue attain a definite     
meaning and become direct               
representatives of a universal spirit in
 subjectivity1 which knows that it is   
actuated in its aim by the universal and
 realizes that its dignity and its      
particular aims are founded upon it4 ,if
 we translate this horribly hazy        
language of ,hegel's into plain speech  
we find it means3 ,the ideas of ,duty   
and ,virtue only acquire a meaning when 

they are applied to the acts of         
commission and omission of the          
individual member of a community4 7,when
 ,hegel speaks of moral community his   
use of the word moral is inadmissible1  
for he takes it for granted that the    
meaning of the word moral has been      
determined and is clearly understood1   
whereas he ought first to have defined  
its meaning47 ,the concepts of ,duty and
 ,virtue denote that the individual in  
taking action thinks of the community1  
that regard for its interests determines
 him1 that his actions do not attain    
dignity and worth until his aim becomes 
the interests of the community1 that    
these interests must coincide with those
 of the individual if his actions in his
 own interests are to merit the         
appellations of dutiful and virtuous4   
,in short3 to act morally is to act so  
as to ensure the well-being of the      
community4 ,the real ,categorical       
,imperative is a social conscience4     
,feuerbach expresses this thought       

clearly and distinctly when he says3    
,there can be no question of ,morality  
in the strict sense of the word except  
where the subject of discussion is the  
relationship of man to man1 of one      
person to another1 of me to thee4       
,recent contemporary ,french writers are
 in no way doubtful of the meaning      
implied by the concept of ,morality4    
,morality1 says ,littr1 is the whole    
collection of rules which determine our 
conduct towards others4 ,moral ,good is 
the ideal1 which at any period of a     
civilization forms opinions and customs 
with respect to this conduct2 moral evil
 is that which offends this ideal4 ,this
 definition is very incomplete and weak1
 as will be seen in the course of our   
remarks1 but on one point it is quite   
clear3 it treats ,morality as a social  
phenomenon1 it paraphrases it as the    
adjustment of individual action to the  
standard set up by the community4 ,the  
question of the origin and the aim of   
this standard is left open4  ,l4        

,lvy-,brhl formulates ,littr's idea more
 clearly4 ,we call by the name of       
,morality the collection of such        
conceptions1 opinions1 feelings and     
customs respecting the mutual rights and
 duties of men in their life as members 
of a community1 as are recognized and   
generally observed at a given time in a 
given civilization4  ,thus1 according to
 some1 ,morality is subjection to an    
absolute law of divine1 or at any rate  
of unexplained and inexplicable origin1 
which religion or a mysterious inner    
voice reveals to man2 according to      
others1 it is the recognition that the  
claims of the community1 or at any rate 
of the majority of one's fellow men1 are
 of binding force upon the actions of   
the individual4 ,these different answers
 to an inquiry as to the origin of      
,morality both contain the tacit        
admission that it is a law which        
peremptorily dictates to man what he    
shall do and what he shall not do4 ,but 
by means of what psychic mechanism does 

this law enforce obedience in the       
consciousness of man8 ,it is remarkable 
that all moral philosophers1 no matter  
to what age1 nation or school they      
belong1 dimly feel or clearly recognize 
that in civilized man at any rate1      
natural instincts and judgment are      
always at war2 that the latter opposes  
the former2 that in the victory of      
judgment over impulse lies the very     
essence of ,morality2 that consequently 
the essence of ,morality implies the    
control and repression of instinct by   
,reason--in a word1 that it is          
inhibition4  ,we have seen that         
,aristotle1 in definite though          
unconscious opposition to the ,stoics1  
who consider ,morality synonymous with  
,nature1 defines it as the activity of  
,reason4  ,henry ,more was the first to 
express this quite clearly3 ,virtue is  
an intellectual force of the soul which 
enables it to control 444 animal        
instincts and sensual passions4  ,and   
,dr4 ,jodl sums up the character of     

,christian morality in the statement3   
,moral philosophy under the influence of
 ,christian ideas makes ,morality always
 appear in the guise of a prohibition2  
at any rate it is apt to conceive       
,morality as acting in an essentially   
restrictive and prohibitive manner upon 
the natural impulses and instincts of   
man4  ,this is not quite correct4 ,this 
,christian code of morals does not      
always manifest itself as a prohibition4
 ,its main precept is3 ,love thy        
neighbour as thyself4 ,that is not a    
prohibition but a positive command4     
,nevertheless1 the point of departure of
 this command is an inhibition4 ,for the
 first instinctive movement of man is   
selfishness and1 as its consequence1    
indifference to one's neighbour2 the    
first imperious impulse is to sacrifice 
the latter's interests to one's own4    
,but if regard for one's neighbour1 nay1
 love for him permeates our feelings1   
thoughts and actions1 that denotes a    
victory of ,christian ideas over the    

impulse of instinct1 a suppression of   
that impulse--that is1 an inhibition    
which1 not content with mere prevention1
 prolongs its efficacy in the same      
direction until it changes the impulse  
of selfishness and inconsiderateness    
into its very antithesis1 that of       
unselfishness and charity4  ,it         
constitutes an important advance in     
knowledge to recognize that ,morality1  
and not1 as ,jodl makes out1 only       
,christian ,morality1 is manifested as  
an inhibition1 as the victory achieved  
by ,reason over ,instinct which is      
contemptuously described as animal1     
simply because its worth is judged by a 
standard already supplied by current    
views on ,morals4 ,it is inadmissible to
 judge by this standard when one        
attempts an impartial investigation into
 the ultimate foundations and the       
essence of ,morality4 ,we have no       
plainly obvious right--no right which   
does not require a proof--simply to     
scorn instinct as animal2 to run it down

 from the start and with a respectful   
bow to give ,reason precedence over it2 
to applaud with satisfaction the        
suppression of rascally ,instinct by    
highly respectable ,reason4 ,instinct is
 no more animal than any other          
manifestation of life in man2 and he    
indulges in pleasant self-deception if  
he imagines that he is other than an    
animal1 that is1 a living organism in   
which all processes take place according
 to the same laws as in all other living
 beings1 from the simplest one-celled   
creature to the most highly developed   
and complicated4  ,in itself ,instinct  
has the same claim to dignity as        
,reason2 according to some people an    
even greater one1 because the former is 
more primitive1 unpremeditated1         
self-assured and firmly established than
 the latter1 and if ,reason claims to be
 the superior1 it must substantiate that
 claim4  ,as a matter of fact1 that     
claim has never been universally        
acknowledged4  ,periods during which    

,reason rules at least in name and is   
treated with the obsequious reverence   
which the model citizen has1 or feigns  
to have1 for his sovereign1 are followed
 by others in which ,instinct revolts2  
rebels dethrone ,reason and set up      
,instinct in its place1 or1 as they call
 it1 passion and nature4 ,the parties   
which in turn wield power in these      
periodic revolutions may be briefly     
termed classical and romantic4 ,the     
classicists are the legitimist          
supporters of ,reason2 the romanticists 
are revolutionaries1 and their leaders  
are men like ,cleon or ,jack ,cade1     
,cromwell1 ,washington or ,robespierre2 
that is to say1 rude demagogues or      
subtle dialecticians in favour of       
,instinct4 ,among the legitimists in    
,reason as in politics1 are to be found 
those who maintain the divine right1 who
 base the right of ,reason to rule over 
,instinct upon the ,will of ,god1 and   
others again1 the constitutionalists1   
who base their support on the ,will of  

the people1 on universal suffrage1 who  
force upon ,instinct the law promulgated
 by society4 ,i need not carry the      
metaphor to extremes4 ,every reader can 
work it out in all its details4 ,i only 
wanted to show quite clearly that almost
 all moral philosophers conceived       
,morality as a struggle between ,reason 
and ,instinct1 as the defeat of         
lawlessness by law4 ,but their views    
diverge widely when they try to explain 
the source of this law and its claim to 
obedience4  ,the theologians find no    
difficulty in this explanation4 ,just as
 the essence of ,morality according to  
their ideas is the nearest possible     
approximation to divine perfection1 so  
the moral law is one enacted by ,god    
,himself1 and it is a sin punishable    
with hell fire to fail to observe it or 
to rebel against it4 ,others look upon  
,man as his own law-giver1 and trace his
 moral conduct1 his willingness to      
combat his own instincts1 to an inner   
voice which teaches him what is right4  

,they call this inner voice by different
 names4 ,they call it ,nature1 ,reason  
or ,conscience1 and look upon it as     
something innate1 as a normal           
constituent of man's psychic nature4    
,that is the meaning of ,fichte's       
apodictic statement3 ,that which does   
not meet with the approval of one's own 
conscience is necessarily sin4          
,therefore he who acts on anyone else's 
authority acts in a conscienceless      
manner4  ,with this emphatic utterance  
,fichte dismisses both the devout       
believers1 for whom ,morality is the    
revealed ,will of ,god1 and the         
,rationalists who look upon it as the   
dictate of society4 ,he considers that  
if man claims to act morally1 he can do 
so only on his own authority1 i4e4 on   
that of his conscience4 ,he is not aware
 that in so doing he frivolously        
abandons all rights to pronounce an     
objective moral judgment on any human   
action4 ,he thereby relinquishes the    
power to ask any further question       

except3 ,did he act in accordance with  
his own conscience8 ,if so1 then he has 
acted in a subjectively conscientious   
way1 even if it appears to me to be     
immoral or even criminal and monstrous4 
,if he has acted contrary to the        
promptings of his own conscience1 then  
he is assuredly a sinner1 even if his   
action be in my eyes splendid and       
exemplary4 ,thus ,fichte1 with his      
subjective basis of ,morality1 is led to
 a conclusion which is a ludicrous      
reversal of generally accepted ideas4   
,according to him1 a man would be acting
 conscientiously if1 despising what all 
others hold good1 right and sacred1 he  
wallows in the satisfaction of his      
selfish instincts1 as long as his       
conscience approves or even bids him do 
so2 on the other hand1 he is a sinner   
if1 in opposition to his inner voice1   
but according to moral law1 that is in  
obedience to extraneous authority1 he   
practices all the virtues4  ,all these  
subjective moral philosophers tacitly   

assume with ,rousseau that man is by    
nature good4 ,they take no account of   
the empirically established fact that   
there are men whose ,fichtean           
conscience1 or whose ,kantian           
categorical imperative1 urges them to a 
course of action which according to the 
general opinion is bad1 wicked and      
revolting4 ,this criticism applies to   
,beneke1 according to whom ,morality is 
a development of human nature which     
exists as such within us1 and which we  
need only continue or promote2 it       
applies equally to ,reid and ,dugald    
,stewart1 who describe it as an         
inclination1 which has become a habit or
 a principle1 to act according to the   
dictates of conscience4 ,but conscience 
must be explained4 ,it is by no means   
self-evident that each individual       
conscience will have the same standard  
of good and evil4 ,the moral philosopher
 must not shirk the duty of showing how 
the conscience acquires its concepts of 
moral values1 with what weapons it      

provides ,reason to combat ,instinct1   
which demands satisfaction without      
paying any attention to the warnings of 
conscience4  ,the great majority of     
moral philosophers do not endorse the   
view of ,kant and ,fichte1 that         
conscience is a piece of human nature1 a
 sense inborn in man1 an inner voice    
that is independent of1 and unmoved by1 
external influences2 on the contrary1   
they are convinced that conscience      
originates outside the individual1 that1
 in his consciousness1 it is the        
advocate retained by society1           
commissioned to plead the cause of the  
community before the reason of the      
individual even1 nay1 especially1 when  
the interests of the community run      
counter to those of the individual4     
,bacon calls the presence in our        
consciousness of a defender of the      
interests of society our innate social  
affection1 and treats it unreservedly as
 the source of ,morality4 ,long before  
his time the ,stoics had noted the      

existence of this social affection and  
called it ,greek3 oikeisis2 ,hugo       
,grotius1 with the intellectual         
perspicuity peculiar to himself1 says   
that ,right and ,morality flow from the 
same source1 and this source is a strong
 social instinct natural to man1 it is  
solicitude for the community1 a         
solicitude guided by ,reason4 ,the      
,english philosophers are practically   
unanimous in ascribing both conscience  
and ,morality in general to a social    
source4 ,the welfare of the community1  
says ,richard ,cumberland1 is the       
highest moral law2 ,hutcheson remarks   
that1 in the struggle between egoism and
 universal benevolence1 the decisive    
factor in favour of the latter is the   
accompanying feeling1 the reflective    
emotion of approval4  ,in modern        
parlance we call universal benevolence1 
altruism1 and the reflective emotion of 
approval is a paraphrase of conscience  
which contains an indication of its mode
 of action4 ,for the idea that our      

action will meet with the approval of   
the community and the pleasurable       
emotion of satisfaction are in fact the 
reasons why we mostly submit to the     
dictates of conscience voicing the      
commands of the community4 ,only        
,hutcheson is too venturesome and goes  
too far1 when he maintains unreservedly 
that the reflective emotion of approval 
in the struggle between egoism and      
universal benevolence is the decisive   
factor which turns the scales in favour 
of the latter4 ,this is by no means     
always the case4 ,when it does occur we 
call the action moral1 but we           
characterize it as immoral when1 in     
spite of the reflective emotion of      
approval universal benevolence is       
worsted by egoism4  ,it is unnecessary  
to quote the opinions of other moral    
philosophers4 ,it is enough to observe  
that most of them describe the moral law
 as a social agreement and make         
conscience its accredited               
representative4 ,l4 ,lvy-,brhl repeats a

 doctrine current since the days of     
,pythagoras when he says3 ,the sense of 
duty and that of responsibility1 horror 
of crime1 love of what is good and      
reverence for justice--all these1 which 
a conscience sensitive to ,morality     
thinks it derives from itself and from  
itself alone1 have nevertheless a social
 origin2 and ,feuerbach expresses the   
same view in an entertainingly          
melodramatic fashion when he calls the  
voice of conscience ,an echo of the cry 
of revenge uttered by the injured party4
 ,this cry of revenge would never wake  
an echo in us if we did not possess a   
sounding board which cries of distress  
and lamentation cause to vibrate4       
,schopenhauer1 digging deeper than his  
predecessor1 clearly recognizes this    
sounding board1 and describes its       
characteristics when he says that the   
foundation of ethics is pity1 which in  
its passive form warns us3 ,neminem     
laede6 ,do harm to no one6 ,and in its  
active form gives the order3 ,imo omnes 

quantum potes juva6 ,assist everyone    
with all your might6  ,the assumption1  
that sympathy with his neighbour must be
 present in man's consciousness before  
he is capable of moral action1 is one   
that need not be made by subjective     
moral philosophers1 who hold with ,kant 
and his school that the moral law is an 
inborn categorical imperative1 which    
proclaims its commands without reference
 to any extraneous object1 or to the    
world1 or mankind4  ,in the same way the
 theologians have no need of it1 for    
they consider that what is morally good 
is the ,will of ,god4  ,but he who holds
 with the moral philosophers of         
sociological tendencies that ,morality  
is regard for one's fellow men1 and the 
recognition that the claims of the real 
or supposed interest of the community   
are superior to those of the comfort of 
the individual1 must admit that sympathy
 is a necessary preliminary to moral    
action2 i4e4 that the individual must   
have the ability to picture the         

sufferings of others so vividly that he 
feels their sorrows as his own1 and with
 all his might and all his will strives 
to prevent1 alleviate and heal them4    
,the lack of this ability1 psychic      
ansthesia1 is a symptom of disease4 ,it 
renders the person affected incapable of
 moral action4 ,it is a characteristic  
of the born criminal1 and is the        
essential symptom of that state of mind 
which alienists term moral insanity4    
,even in this condition1 if reason and  
the power of judgment are not affected1 
great offences against current moral law
 can be avoided4 ,but this results from 
the fear of the painful and ruinous     
results which a collision with public   
opinion entails1 even if the offender is
 not actually haled into court4 ,it is  
not due to any inner necessity1 nor to  
the prompting of one's own feelings4    
,only the ,rationalists have any cause  
or reason to inquire into the aims of   
,morality1 whether they look upon the   
moral law as dictated by society or are 

of the opinion that it is the sum total 
of the rules by which ,reason1 of its   
own initiative1 successfully combats the
 urging of ,instinct4 ,if the moral law 
is a creation of society1 and is obeyed 
by the individual out of sympathy with  
his fellow-men or consideration for     
society1 the logical conclusion is that 
society has set up the moral law to     
satisfy some real or imagined need4 ,its
 aim in this case can only be the real  
or supposed welfare of the community4   
,this is the most widely accepted view4 
,morality and universal welfare1 says   
,macchiavelli1 are conceptions which    
coincide4 ,in his calm assurance this   
apodictic writer1 who doubtlessly slept 
well and had an excellent digestion1 is 
never troubled by a doubt as to whether 
there is such a thing as an absolutely  
reliable measure of universal welfare1  
and therefore whether ,morality1 which  
is termed its equivalent1 can provide us
 with a perfectly unimpeachable         
standard4 ,he whose ethical conscience  

is more tender and timid will inevitably
 anxiously ask himself3 ,who decides    
what universal welfare demands and what 
is conducive to it8 ,is it to be the    
masses8 ,is the mob1 incapable of       
thought1 ignorant1 swayed by momentary  
and shifting impulses1 to make moral    
laws for the select few who are its     
natural guides8 ,what tragedies would   
necessarily result from this definition6
 ,how often a strong personality1       
trained to come to independent          
conclusions1 refuses to obey the voice  
of the mob6 ,is the sheep who trots     
bleating along with the herd to be taken
 as the type of a moral being8 ,must we 
necessarily condemn as immoral those who
 swim against the stream1 enlightened   
tyrants who force upon their people     
hateful innovations calculated to ensure
 their welfare1--such men as ,peter the 
,great1 the ,emperor ,joseph ,,ii1 the  
reformer who comes into violent conflict
 with the majority who are creatures of 
habit8 ,the aim of ,morality is the     

welfare of society2 this is indeed the  
essence of ,morality4 ,a sufficiently   
safe and most soothing formula this     
seems2 but really the security it gives 
is most deceptive1 and it leaves        
unsolved the most important problems    
relating to the phenomenon of ,morality4
  ,a numerous group of moral            
philosophers seeks the aim of moral     
conduct in the individual himself1 not  
outside him4 ,in spite of               
,schopenhauer's sympathy1 they doubt    
that consideration for the well-being of
 the community would act forcibly enough
 upon the individual to induce him to   
wage unceasing war on his impulses and  
struggle to overcome them4 ,rather they 
hold that the individual must find in   
his inner consciousness not only the    
spur to moral action1 but also the      
reward for the same1 and they           
characterize this driving force as      
pleasurable emotions in every sense of  
the words4 ,according to them man acts  
morally because1 and in so far as1 he   

anticipates pleasurable results from so 
doing4 ,epicurus considers the aim of   
,morality always to be ,pleasure4 ,he   
makes only the one reservation1 that a  
reasonable man will renounce an         
immediate pleasure for the sake of a    
greater one in the future1 and that he  
may delight in the anticipation of      
pleasurable emotions which defeat and   
dull present pains4 ,thus the martyr may
 be a true ,epicurean1 even if by his   
actions he exposes himself to most cruel
 torture and the most painful death1 for
 he is convinced that the everlasting   
joys of paradise will more than         
indemnify him for his temporary         
sufferings4  ,i have already shown that 
,aristotle considers ,morality the      
activity of practical ,reason1 which is 
accompanied by pleasurable emotions4 ,he
 makes these pleasurable emotions an    
essential part of ,morality1 and        
,spinoza shares this view1 for he says3 
,knowledge of good and evil is nothing  
but a pleasurable or a disagreeable     

emotion in so far as we are conscious of
 it4  ,no less roundly1 one might almost
 say brutally1 ,leibnitz declares3 ,we  
term good that which gives us pleasure2 
evil that which gives us pain1 while    
,feuerbach expresses himself rather more
 carefully and indefinitely thus3 ,the  
instinct for happiness is the most      
potent of all instincts4 ,where         
existence always occurs together with   
volition1 volition and the will to be   
happy are inseparable2 they are1 indeed1
 essentially one4 ',i will1' means ',i  
have the will not to suffer1 not to be  
hindered and destroyed1 but1 on the     
contrary1 to be assisted and preserved2 
that is1 ,i have the will to be happy4' 
,this is a wordy paraphrase of          
,spinoza's3 ,all existence is           
self-assertion1 and ,morality is only   
the highest and purest form of this     
fundamental instinct in a reasonable    
being4  ,among those moral philosophers 
who see in pleasurable emotions the aim 
of ,morality1 its reward and its        

incentive1 we must distinguish two      
groups3 those who understand by         
pleasurable emotions such as appeal to  
the senses--the ,hedonists2 and those   
who spiritualize the meaning of the word
 and expect of ,morality not an         
immediate bodily gratification1 a       
pleasure1 or an insipid satisfaction of 
the sense1 but lasting happiness--the   
,eudmonists4 ,at the first glance the   
,eudmonists seem to have a higher and   
more worthy conception of the subjective
 reaction of moral conduct than have the
 ,hedonists2 for the satisfaction the   
former expect and promise does not apply
 to the lower spheres of our organic    
life1 but to the loftiest functions of  
our mind1 from which alone a feeling of 
happiness can emanate4  ,but if we look 
into the matter more closely we find    
that to draw a sharp distinction between
 the ,hedonists and ,eudmonists is more 
than a little arbitrary4 ,for ,pleasure 
and ,happiness differ hardly at all in  
essentials1 but chiefly in degree2 and  

this would at once be obvious if one    
only took the trouble to define the two 
ideas1 which1 however1 is mostly not    
done4 ,and with good reason1 for it is  
impossible to explain ,pleasure4 ,you   
can use synonyms for it2 you can look   
wise and say3 ,pleasure is that which is
 agreeable1 or that which one desires1  
that in which one delights1 or a certain
 quality of feeling which accompanies   
such organic processes as strengthen or 
vitalize the system2 but all that this  
amounts to is to say in a roundabout    
way1 ,pleasure is ,pleasure4 ,it is a   
fundamental fact of our inner           
consciousness1 just as inexplicable as  
life1 or as its antithesis1 ,pain4 ,but 
if we assume that ,pleasure is something
 given by subjective experience1 then   
the idea of ,happiness can be defined4  
,happiness is a flooding of the         
consciousness with sunshine2 it is      
enjoyment of the moment1 a sense of     
living in the present accentuated by    
pleasurable emotion4 ,if this feeling is

 organically differentiated1 that is1 if
 it springs from a certain section of   
the mind or mechanism of the body and   
can be located there1 it is ecstasy4 ,it
 is only felt as ,happiness when it is1 
so to speak1 melted1 dissolved1         
distributed throughout the organism1    
coenesthetically diffused4  ,if we agree
 to this definition we can take         
,eudmonism into consideration as an aim 
of moral action1 but ,hedonism we shall 
have to discard from the start4 ,if     
,morality is to be inhibition1 a victory
 of ,reason over ,instinct1 then it     
cannot possibly arouse ,pleasure1 since 
the first and most immediate source of  
,pleasure is the surrender to instinct1 
the satisfaction of the organic         
appetites2 but if one resists them1     
suppresses them1 then one experiences a 
privation which at best occasions       
discomfort and may easily cause pain4   
,by its very nature and the mechanism by
 which it works1 ,morality can therefore
 give rise to no pleasure1 but only to  

discomfort4 ,all the same1 it can afford
 a feeling of happiness4  ,it may be    
objected that ,i am guilty of a         
contradiction when ,i assume the        
possibility of ,happiness without       
,pleasure1 as ,i have just described    
,happiness as a particular kind of      
,pleasure2 but in reality there is no   
contradiction4 ,for ,pleasure springs   
from a special organic apparatus1       
whereas ,happiness is not a condition of
 any particular apparatus in our body1  
but a general feeling that cannot be    
located2 if it is roused by moral       
actions it originates in the            
self-satisfaction of ,reason1 in its    
pride in the victory over ,instinct1 in 
the rapture occasioned by one's own     
strength of will2 therefore1 it can well
 exist without any differentiated       
pleasurable emotion located in any      
particular organic apparatus4  ,many    
moral philosophers have for various     
reasons rejected plausible ,eudmonism as
 well as ,hedonism1 and these reasons   

can all be traced back to the           
recognition1 or at least an inkling1 of 
the fact that moral action in the nature
 of things must exclude pleasurable     
emotions2 at any rate immediate ones1   
and such as are perceived by the senses4
 ,perhaps ,fichte does this in the most 
nave fashion1 for he rejects every form 
of ,eudmonism as the aim of moral       
action1 but admits as its purpose only  
bliss1 that is to say1 the              
self-satisfaction of ,reason resulting  
from action in accordance with its own  
laws4 ,however1 he struggles in vain to 
deny that this bliss is of the nature of
 a pleasurable emotion1 or to interpret 
it as differing from ,eudmonism4 ,he is 
only giving the latter another name to  
make it conform in an orthodox manner   
with his doctrine of the ,supreme ,ego4 
,baptizo te carpam6 ,i baptize thee1    
carp6 ,in this way the pious man        
complies with the law enjoining         
abstinence from meat1 and with an easy  
conscience smacks his lips over a roast 

pheasant which he has dubbed fish4      
,plato is among those who most          
emphatically deny that ,pleasure is     
either the motive force1 the            
accompaniment1 the consequence1 or the  
aim of ,morality4 ,but a reasonable     
thinker can derive no profit from his   
arguments in support of this point of   
view1 for they are rambling1 fantastic1 
mystical and visionary4 ,plato thinks it
 a necessary consequence of the very    
nature of ,good that it should be       
absolutely self-sufficient4 ,for        
,pleasure is a perpetual growth1 a      
ceaseless longing for more2 it can      
therefore not be self-sufficient1 and on
 this account can not be the foundation 
of ,morality4  ,however1 it is by no    
means obvious why ,morality should not  
be in a perpetual state of growth 7just 
as ,pleasure is1 according to ,plato71  
or why it should not constantly desire  
an increase of its own activities4 ,on  
the contrary1 this craving is just what 
one would most wish ,morality to have4  

,true1 it would not then attain         
self-satisfaction4 ,but what is the good
 of this self-satisfaction8 ,it is a    
pleasurable emotion1 and according to   
,plato ,morality is supposed to have    
nothing in common with ,pleasure4 ,it is
 not to be contentment and serene       
satisfaction1 but rather tireless       
endeavour4 ,however1 ,plato1 of course1 
cannot admit this1 because for him ,good
 and the deity are identical1 and being 
perfect can therefore advance no farther
 in perfection2 and the striving after  
,good is merely an effort of memory on  
man's part to call to mind more clearly 
the deity whom he saw in his spiritual  
life before birth1 and of whom he       
retains a dim and confused memory in his
 earthly life4 ,it is plainly idle to   
waste reasonable criticism upon such    
visionary arguments4  ,the ,stoics1 too1
 try to sever the connexion between     
moral conduct and ,pleasure1 and to     
conceive the former as a simple activity
 of human nature1 one1 moreover1 from   

which they expect no particular         
satisfaction4 ,they overlook the fact   
that every activity of the impulses and 
instincts of man's own nature affords   
him satisfaction1 and that ,pleasure is 
nothing but this very satisfaction of   
natural instincts4 ,if1 then1 ,morality 
were1 as the ,stoics contend1 only ,life
 in harmony with ,nature herself1 then1 
like every other satisfaction of natural
 desires1 it should be an ever-flowing  
source of pleasurable emotions1 and this
 characteristic would be inseparable    
from it1 though the ,stoics may vainly  
try to deny it4  ,christianity has an   
easier job than ,stoicism4 ,with harsh  
severity1 disregarding any plea for     
indulgence in view of the weakness of   
the flesh1 it absolutely excludes the   
factor of pleasure from the fulfilment  
of moral duties4 ,but this severity is  
only apparent4 ,the good and just man   
can expect no reward for his moral      
conduct here on earth1 but he will find 
a much more ample one in the life to    

come4 ,to the devout believer who gives 
unlimited credit to it1 the promise of  
the joys of paradise has the full value 
of a cash disbursement4 ,it is somewhat 
childish juggling with words to deny    
pleasurable emotion to be the aim of    
moral conduct if at the same time a most
 vivid foretaste of the eternal bliss   
which awaits him after death be given to
 the virtuous man2 as if the            
anticipation of heavenly bliss were not 
a pleasurable emotion of the highest    
degree6  ,kant finds it due to his point
 of view to spurn every weak inclination
 to ,eudmonism4 ,a ,categorical         
,imperative cannot issue commands with  
an eye to profit or comfort4 ,that is as
 clear as daylight4 ,all ,morality of   
action must be founded on the necessity 
which arises from duty and respect for  
the law1 and not from love or           
inclination for the desired result of   
the action4 ,schopenhauer1 ,feuerbach1  
and ,john ,stuart ,mill have recorded   
such irrefutable criticisms of the      

,kantian doctrine of the absolute       
disinterestedness of moral action1 that 
it is unnecessary to add to their       
arguments4  ,only some moral            
philosophers1 and particularly ,mill1   
are guilty of logical inaccuracy when   
they reject ,eudmonism but retain       
,utility as the aim of morality4 ,why do
 the ,utilitarians not realize that they
 are merely ,eudmonists under another   
name1 and that he who disregards his own
 immediate interests in order to further
 the well-being of the community        
experiences a pleasurable emotion of    
high order in the satisfaction he       
derives from the sacrifices whereby he  
has contributed to the good of the      
community8  ,the useless exertions of a 
section of moral philosophers to        
eliminate not only ,hedonism but also   
,eudmonism from moral action are a      
veritable labour of ,sisyphus4 ,hardly  
have these two with difficulty been     
expelled by the door than they return by
 the window or the chimney4 ,it is a    

mere conjuring trick to remove them from
 this world to the next1 as do the      
theologians1 or to substitute universal 
well-being for the feeling of happiness4
 ,all the same1 the desire to purge     
moral action of the least admixture of  
hope of profit or pleasure is           
comprehensible4 ,common experience1     
which is equally forced upon the        
profound thinker and upon the plain man 
in the street least inclined to cudgel  
his brain1 teaches us that ,morality    
consists1 with very few exceptions1 in  
acting against our own immediate        
interest1 in denying ourselves some     
coveted pleasure1 in renouncing some    
attainable profit1 in undertaking some  
disagreeable exertion because ,reason   
bids us do so4 ,from this practical     
experience the man in the street gets   
the impression that duty is a bitter    
necessity and that decency is attended  
by many and varied inconveniences4 ,the 
theorist1 the philosopher1 derives a    
principle from his empirical facts2 he  

observes that the moral man often acts  
against his own immediate interests1 and
 expresses this in the pretentious      
axiom3 ,morality from the very beginning
 excludes all thought of profit4  ,and  
yet the philosophers are guilty of the  
same superficiality as the man in the   
street4 ,they do not go far enough into 
the matter to perceive that the morality
 of pleasure1 of interest1 and of duty1 
,hedonism1 ,utilitarianism and the      
,categorical ,imperative1 all lead in   
very slightly different ways to the same
 goal--,eudmonism4 ,the fulfilment of   
duty affords spiritual satisfaction1 a  
pre-eminently pleasurable emotion which 
increases in direct proportion to the   
effort which its fulfilment demands4    
,interest also implies pleasure1 for    
every interest ultimately comes to this1
 that it is an attempt to secure a      
pleasure4 ,this aim lies at the bottom  
of all interests2 it is the fundamental 
interest from which all seemingly       
different interests are derived2 it is  

the universal goal to which all human   
effort tends1 whether it be a question  
of making money to satisfy ambition1 of 
winning love and friendship1 of         
material1 spiritual1 personal or social 
values4 ,interest is self-assertion and 
the intensifying of the zest for life4  
,but these are always accompanied by    
pleasurable emotions2 thus interest is  
forthwith identified with pleasurable   
emotion1 even though one has to work    
hard1 even though at the moment it      
entails drudgery and discomfort4        
,hedonism makes no secret of its nature 
and its tendency4 ,it openly admits what
 the ,categorical ,imperative denies and
 what ,utilitarianism veils with vague  
phrases3 that the aim and object of     
moral action is ,pleasure and nothing   
else4  ,in our short survey of the      
immense field of literature dealing with
 moral philosophy we have learnt that1  
although the most various and divergent 
views are expressed as to the essence   
and source of ,morality1 nevertheless   

there is but one opinion1 be it clearly 
or vaguely stated1 be it the result of  
knowledge or surmise1 as to the         
mechanism by means of which moral       
concepts determine action1 and as to the
 conscious or unconscious aim of moral  
action3 ,moral concepts do their work by
 means of inhibition1 and the aim of    
moral action is a feeling of happiness4 
,,chapter ,,ii  ,,the ,,immanence ,,of  
,,the ,,concept ,,of ,,morality   ,it is
 natural for man's thoughts to be       
concentrated on himself until he has    
learnt to rise from the deep and narrow 
well of his egoism to a higher and wider
 view of life and1 free from the taint  
of self-love1 to form an idea of his    
place in the world and his relationship 
to it4 ,not till the development of his 
intellect is far advanced does any doubt
 assail him as to the truth of his      
conviction that all his personal        
affairs1 the least as well as the most  
weighty1 are of the greatest importance 
to the universe1 that every ache or pain

 he feels must wake an echo in the      
heavens1 that the ,earth shudders in    
anticipation when he is about to stumble
 and sprain his ankle1 and that the     
stars in their courses mysteriously1    
though intelligibly to the discerning1  
foretell the hour of his birth and of   
his death4 ,an ,indian legend pours     
cruel scorn upon this childlike         
megalomania3 ,a fox had fallen into a   
stream and was drowning4 ,the world is  
coming to an end6 gasped the animal in  
its agony4 ,a peasant standing on the   
brink replied coldly1 ,oh1 no1 ,i see   
only a little fox drowning4  ,many moral
 philosophers1 those of the ,kantian    
school without exception1 labour under  
the delusion of this same1 egocentric   
view4 ,in their eyes the phenomenon of  
,morality is a cosmic one4 ,morality is 
the law of human conduct1 therefore it  
is the law of world processes1 of the   
universe4 ,indeed1 it is the law of the 
universe before it becomes that of human
 conduct4 ,it would exist even if there 

were no men1 no humanity1 no human      
conduct at all4 ,the solemn innocents   
who weightily give utterance to this    
doctrine are unaware how ridiculous they
 are4 ,they do not hesitate to subject  
,sirius to the yoke of the ,ten         
,commandments4 ,they are convinced that 
the ,milky ,way practises virtue and    
shuns1 or ought to shun1 vice1 just as  
we inconsiderable human beings do4 ,the 
precept1 ,thou shalt not steal1 applies 
with binding force to gravity1 and the  
warning1 ,thou shalt not kill1 to       
electricity1 though the latter          
ruthlessly disregards it1 as the results
 of being struck by lightning and       
accidents with high voltage             
installations frequently prove4 ,if they
 do not threaten ,nature with police and
 prison it is only because in their eyes
 ,morality is independent of all        
sanctions1 is superior to rewards and   
punishments1 depends upon itself alone1 
constitutes its own aim1 is by its very 
nature a compelling force1 and therefore

 has no need of adventitious compulsion4
  ,such profound nonsense cannot lay    
claim to serious treatment4 ,it is a    
counterpart to the belief that events in
 the history of mankind1 like war and   
pestilence1 are foretold by heavenly    
signs such as fiery comets4 ,the stars  
revolve1 the clockwork of the universe  
continues undisturbed1 as though the    
earth were still uninhabited1 as it was 
when it was a glowing fluid globe or1   
earlier still1 a nebular mass2 and this 
although man's self-esteem be hurt by   
such a lack of consideration4 ,if we    
care to call the 7so far as we know7    
unalterable laws1 according to which the
 forces of ,nature act and the mechanism
 of the world works1 the ,morality of   
the ,universe1 that may pass4 ,only we  
must in that case clearly realize that  
we are speaking metaphorically1 that we 
are making use of a poetic simile1 that 
we are anthropomorphically attributing  
human traits to the universe4 ,morality 
is a phenomenon restricted to mankind1  

or1 to be strictly accurate1 a          
phenomenon which occurs only among      
living beings2 for the beginnings of    
,morality may be traced in creatures of 
a lower order than man1 and it develops 
simultaneously with the consciousness   
and the mentality of living beings4     
,morality is a function of life1        
dependent upon it1 begotten and         
developed by it1 to meet life's needs   
and serve its interests4 ,the existence 
of ,morality apart from life is as      
unthinkable as that of hunger1 ambition1
 or gratitude4  ,morality is a          
collection of laws and prohibitions     
which ,reason opposes to organic        
instincts1 by means of which the former 
forces the latter into actions from     
which they would like to refrain1 or    
prevents them from carrying out that    
which they yearn to do4 ,the existence  
of ,morality1 therefore1 presupposes in 
the first place that of an intelligence 
sufficiently developed to form a clear  
idea of something that is still in the  

future1 namely1 an image of the         
consequences resulting from an action4  
,guided by this inner contemplation of  
the image of the consequences of an     
action1 ,reason decides to carry out or 
prevent the action4 ,this gives us the  
lowest plane upon which ,morality can   
occur as the cause of action and of     
abstention from action4 ,it implies1    
above all things1 foresight1 and can    
therefore only exist in a consciousness 
which is sufficiently developed to grasp
 the idea of the future and form a      
picture of it4 ,this consciousness must 
be capable of extracting the elements of
 a conception from memory according to  
the laws of the association of ideas1   
and be able to group them logically in a
 new order4 ,in other words1 as long as 
the mind cannot visualize the past and  
from it build up a picture of the       
future1 ,morality can find no place in  
it4  ,this statement requires no        
limitation1 but it demands a short      
explanation4 ,it is quite true that     

,morality is foresight1 but it is only  
among the elect that the latter is      
developed to such a pitch that it is    
possible to form images of the          
consequences of action and abstention   
sufficiently clear and definite to      
exercise a restraining or encouraging   
influence4  ,the average man can act    
morally without first working out a     
clear picture of the future4 ,it is     
enough that he has been trained to the  
habit of respecting current precepts1   
and of accepting the views obtaining in 
his circle as to what is good or bad1   
what is admissible or inadmissible4     
,this morality1 of course1 is merely a  
matter of drill or training2 it is      
unthinking automatism2 it is inferior1  
and not to be compared with the living1 
creative morality of higher natures1    
which1 as a sovereign law-giver1 comes  
to an independent decision in every case
 and1 like the guardian angel of        
childlike faith1 guides man on his path 
through life1 indicates the right course

 at the cross-roads1 and warns him of   
pitfalls and stumbling-blocks4 ,but for 
everyday use mechanical morality may    
suffice4 ,in the uneventful existence of
 the average man1 which passes in a     
stereotyped way1 this mechanical        
morality is an acceptable guide and     
counsellor1 but it remains an outside   
influence foreign to his inner          
consciousness2 he is glad to deceive and
 outwit it1 as a slave does his master's
 bailiff if he can do so without running
 the risk of a thrashing2 but if his    
destiny unexpectedly rises above its    
accustomed dead level1 then this        
dogmatic morality1 which he has never   
really assimilated1 leaves him in the   
lurch1 and mournfully1 in piteous tones1
 he utters the well-known cry1 ,it is   
easy to do one's duty2 it is difficult  
to know where one's duty lies4  ,reason1
 then1 which is capable of foreseeing   
the results of actions1 teaches a man   
what he must do and from what he must   
abstain1 where he may follow his        

instinct and where he must resist it1   
according as it considers the           
presumptive results of yielding to      
impulse good or bad4 ,but whence does   
,reason obtain the standard it applies  
to the actions of men and their results8
 ,how does it acquire the fundamental   
concepts ,good and ,bad1 and what is    
their significance8 ,generally speaking1
 the answer will be as follows3 ,moral  
values are appraised by a standard      
supplied by a general consensus of      
opinion2 ,reason acknowledges as good   
that which meets with the approval of   
the community1 that which the latter    
desires and therefore praises2 the      
community1 for its part1 echoes the     
pronouncements of influential           
personages1 i4e4 of the most respected1 
most powerful1 and most aristocratic2   
,reason condemns as bad that which the  
community disapproves1 and which it     
therefore censures and rejects4 ,this   
definition does not solve the problem of
 good and bad1 it only shifts it4       

,later we shall have to show upon what  
grounds the community discriminates     
between acceptable and reprehensible    
facts1 calling the former good and the  
latter bad4 ,for the present it is      
enough to observe that ,reason derives  
the laws1 which it constantly impresses 
on man1 from the opinion of the         
community4  ,it can happen that ,reason 
rejects the opinion of the community and
 forms a conclusion opposed to it4 ,this
 revolt of individual morality against  
conventional morality is the great      
tragedy of man4 ,it can only occur in   
the soul of a hero1 for mediocre and    
insipid people always bow to the opinion
 of the majority4 ,there is clearly     
imminent danger of making a mistake4    
,not seldom1 however1 the individual is 
right in his opposition to the          
community1 and then the latter is fired 
by his example to examine its           
traditional dogmas and to correct or    
reject them4 ,this is not the only1 but 
it is the most common means by which    

,morality is developed and changed4 ,its
 progress demands martyrs4 ,strong      
personalities must be sacrificed to     
force a revision of moral values4       
,socrates has to swallow the draft of   
hemlock so that unfettered thought may  
acquire the right to doubt the legend of
 the gods4 ,jesus has to incur the      
dangerous anger of the ,pharisees so    
that the adulteress may be treated with 
indulgence and human sympathy instead of
 being punished according to rigorous   
law4 ,but the opposition of a           
self-willed1 subjective ,morality to the
 accepted moral law is always           
exceptional2 the general rule is        
submission to the moral law4 ,this is   
indeed a necessary preliminary to revolt
 against the moral law of the community1
 for it is only by means of a vigorous  
social education that man develops such 
a nicely balanced and keen sense of     
,good and ,bad1 that he cannot prevail  
upon himself to carry out generally     
approved actions which his own          

intelligence does not recognize as      
moral4 ,he whose moral sense has not    
been intensified by strict discipline   
will never be assailed by doubt1 as long
 as he follows in the footsteps of the  
multitude4  ,hence1 as a rule1 ,reason  
exercises its control of the actions of 
man in conformity with the laws         
prescribed by the community4 ,before    
,morality develops into the practice of 
,good and the rejection of ,bad it takes
 the form of consideration for the world
 at large1 since it is the latter which 
has created the concepts of ,good and   
,bad as well as the standard by which   
they are judged1 and in order to avoid  
conflict with the community1 and to     
maintain uninterrupted agreement with   
it1 the individual exerts himself to    
persist in doing good and to refrain    
from doing evil4  ,the establishment of 
these facts gives deep offence to the   
mystics among moral philosophers4 ,what 
a debasement and belittling of          
,morality6 ,what6 ,it is supposed to be 

nothing more than a sort of             
obsequiousness towards the multitude8   
,its laws are observed for the sake of  
pleasing others8 ,it is a comedy played 
to win applause and a call before the   
curtain8 ,that is a libel and a calumny4
 ,the truly moral man looks neither to  
the right nor to the left4 ,he does not 
condescend to ask1 ',what will the world
 say to this8' ,there is but one judge  
in whose eyes he wishes to be justified3
 his conscience4  ,quite right4 ,but    
what is conscience found to be if we    
penetrate the fog of mystic words with  
which it has come to be surrounded8     
,conscience is the permanent            
representative of the community in the  
consciousness of the individual1 just as
 public opinion may be termed the       
conscience of every member of society   
made manifest4 ,metaphorically1 it      
wields the powers pertaining to society2
 it praises and blames1 it condemns and 
exalts1 it punishes and rewards1 as     
society could do2 and it actually       

pronounces judgment in the name of      
society1 even though it does not preface
 such judgment with this formula which  
is tacitly implied and must always be   
mentally added4 ,conscience is the      
invisible link which unites the         
individual with a social group1 just as 
speech1 custom1 tradition1 and political
 institutions are the visible links4    
,but the social origin and              
representative nature of conscience set 
limits to its power4 ,conscience is a   
respected authority with wide powers    
only in the consciousness of those      
individuals who have a highly developed 
social sense4 ,i purposely do not say   
those in whom the instinct to follow the
 crowd preponderates1 because this mode 
of expression might imply blame and     
condemnation which ,i do not intend to  
convey4  ,for social instinct comes     
natural to an individual born1 educated 
and working in a community1 who shares  
its feelings1 views and interests1 nay1 
even its prejudices and mistakes2 and if

 he lacks it1 it is a sign of a morbid  
deviation from the normal4 ,only the    
decadent man is uncannily lonely in     
spirit1 alien1 indifferent or definitely
 hostile to his human surroundings2 he  
is1 according to the violence and       
polarization of his instincts1 the      
passionate anarchist or the born        
criminal2 the public opinion of his     
circle is unintelligible to him and     
makes no impression on him2 it has no   
significance for him2 he attaches no    
importance to its approbation1 and its  
anger leaves him cold2 he would take no 
notice of it1 were it not that he knows 
its power to destroy him1 and fears its 
police1 its prisons1 and its scaffolds4 
,such a man1 organically predisposed to 
crime1 most urgently needs a conscience4
 ,it would arrest him on the downward   
path to which his evil instincts lead4  
,it would warn him to resist the wicked 
impulses of his selfishness4 ,but he1 of
 all people1 has no conscience4 ,he can 
have none4 ,he is anti-social1 he is at 

war with society1 diplomatic relations  
between him and it have been broken off1
 and it has no representative in his    
consciousness4 ,a lively and active     
feeling of joint responsibility with the
 community is a necessary predisposition
 on the part of the individual before   
conscience can have any power4 ,where   
the former is lacking the latter is mute
 and paralysed4  ,the essence of        
,morality1 as we have found1 is the     
subjection of instinct and direct       
organic impulses to the discipline of   
,reason4 ,the latter exercises a        
censorship in pursuance of a law which  
it derives not from within1 but from    
without1 from the ordinances of the     
community which instructs ,reason as to 
what it should permit1 what it should   
forbid1 and what it should demand4      
,conscience ensures respect for its     
commands1 and may be called the         
executive power or police of ,reason1   
acting as the authorized representative 
of ,morality4 ,it is the garrison which 

the community maintains in the          
individual's consciousness1 which it    
arms and supplies with authority and    
instructions2 the power of conscience   
lies in the strength of the community at
 its back1 and is without influence only
 upon those who refuse admission to the 
troops of the community and yield to    
none but actual physical force4 ,all    
this proves irrefutably that ,morality  
is a phenomenon arising from the social 
life of man1 and its power is a function
 of society4  ,if under the conditions  
in which humanity lives nowadays one    
could imagine a man totally detached    
from his species1 leading a solitary    
life1 ,morality would be absolutely     
meaningless to him4 ,the idea is one he 
could never conceive4 ,it would have no 
significance4 ,good and bad would always
 retain their original meaning as labels
 for sensual qualities1 for pleasant or 
unpleasant sensations of taste1 smell1  
etc42 they would never be spiritualized 
or apply to the quality of actions4 ,he 

would be unable to attach any meaning to
 the words duty and right4 ,the terms   
virtue1 vice1 conscience1 repentance    
would convey nothing to him4 ,morality  
can only originate when the individual  
lives united with fellow beings in a    
social community4 ,it is a consequence  
of this union4 ,it is the one condition 
on which alone this union can be        
permanent4  ,the solitary individual    
must1 however1 not be confused with the 
lonely one4 ,robinson ,crusoe1          
shipwrecked on a desert island and      
forced to stay there without            
companionship1 is not primitive man4 ,he
 is a son of civilization who has fallen
 upon evil days4 ,in his enforced       
solitariness he maintains the habits of 
thought of his original surroundings4   
,he preserves the concepts of ,morality 
even though he has no occasion to obey  
its dictates4 ,he can1 if not actually  
yet potentially1 be a paragon of virtue 
or a sink of iniquity2 he can have a    
very delicate or a very dull conscience4

 ,he continues to be a man of social    
instincts cut off from society1 and goes
 on thinking and feeling in a social    
manner4 ,by primitive man ,i mean man as
 he was before society originated4 ,for1
 contrary to the sociological school    
which denies the individual and boldly  
refuses to allow him any existence1     
declaring society to be older and       
earlier than the individual1 ,i think ,i
 have conclusively shown 7,der ,sinn der
 ,geschichte ,the ,meaning of ,history7 
that man is not by nature a gregarious  
animal1 that he lived alone1 being      
self-sufficing as long as the climatic  
conditions1 under which he first made   
his appearance on earth1 enabled him to 
exist by his own unaided efforts and    
capabilities1 and that he banded himself
 together with others in gangs1 troops  
and hordes--the earliest forms of       
subsequent society--when1 after the     
first ice age following his appearance1 
the struggle for existence grew ever    
harder1 ever more laborious1            

transcending the powers of the          
individual so that he could only        
overcome ,nature1 now grown hostile to  
him1 by uniting with others of his kind4
  ,this primitive man of the golden     
geological period before the ,ice ,age  
knew no ,morality1 and as far as human  
intelligence can tell he would never    
have known of it had there been a       
continuance of the paradisaic conditions
 obtaining at the time of his birth1 and
 had the climate not deteriorated4 ,the 
occurrence of murderous frosts1 the     
necessity of seeking protection from    
them in natural caves or artificially   
constructed shelters1 and of kindling   
and maintaining fires1 the diminution or
 disappearance of vegetable food1 and   
the need to replace it by the booty of  
the chase or fishing--all these forced  
him to unite his efforts with those of  
other men who shared his wretched lot on
 earth4 ,but in order to maintain this  
community with others he had to learn a 
new science1 one he had hitherto not    

known because he had had no need of it3 
consideration for his fellows4 ,he might
 no longer think of himself alone1      
consider his own inclinations in all    
eventualities1 give way to all his moods
 or yield to every whim2 he had         
unceasingly to bear his neighbour in    
mind and take care not to annoy him1 not
 to make an enemy of him1 not to become 
hateful to him4 ,forbearance towards his
 neighbour was the necessary condition  
of their life in common1 just as their  
life in common was the necessary        
condition of self-preservation4 ,the    
penalty for selfish indulgence was stern
 persecution1 punishment1 perhaps death2
 in any case1 expulsion from the        
community4 ,man1 therefore1 stood before
 the choice of self-control or          
destruction1 and this dilemma taught him
 ,morality4  ,such1 we must imagine1    
were the beginnings of ,morality4 ,it   
was not prearranged or purposely sought2
 it grew naturally from the             
companionship of men and developed      

simultaneously with society4 ,if the    
struggle for existence made life in     
communities a necessity1 the first      
coercive law of the community was to    
enjoin upon its members a mode of       
conduct which alone rendered the        
existence of the community possible1 and
 the fundamental rule of this conduct   
was mutual consideration4 ,without this 
two egoisms cannot exist side by side   
and develop4 ,they either destroy or    
shun one another4 ,this phenomenon may  
also be observed among the higher       
animals4 ,elephants1 living in herds1   
expel quarrelsome individuals and force 
them to wander alone far from the rest4 
,the natives of ,ceylon and ,india fear 
these bachelor elephants as being       
specially savage and malicious4 ,they   
think that they grow like this because  
of their loneliness4 ,that is probably a
 false conclusion4 ,it is much more     
likely that these animals have been     
driven from their herd because they were
 savage and malicious1 because their    

characters were opposed to discipline4  
,here we come upon the first faint      
foreshadowing of the phenomenon of      
,morality in an animal community4  ,now 
that we have introduced the idea of the 
growth and development of ,morality1 it 
becomes obvious that it must have begun 
with mere indications1 and that from    
rude1 dim1 undeveloped beginnings it    
gradually grows more perfect1 more      
refined1 more nicely differentiated4 ,at
 first man avoids only the most brutal  
injuries to his neighbour1 such as      
hurting him1 doing him bodily harm1     
threatening to kill him1 openly robbing 
him4 ,in proportion as he becomes more  
spiritually sensitive1 as he learns to  
feel the insult and humiliation of      
injuries other than those inflicted with
 a fist or club1 he is led to refrain   
from giving his fellow-men similar      
offence1 which though it deals no gaping
 wounds1 yet hurts his spiritual        
sensibilities4 ,a series of values is   
developed1 growing ever longer1 ever    

more complicated1 with more and more    
gradations1 until1 going far beyond the 
simple1 artless commandments1 ,thou     
shalt not kill1 ,thou shalt not steal1  
,thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's   
wife nor his goods1 it reaches the pitch
 of agonized self-reproach1 because of  
the slightest and most secret impulses  
to dislike1 injustice1 covetousness1    
dissimulation1 etc4  ,morality must be  
regarded as a support and a weapon in   
the struggle for existence in so far as1
 given present climatic conditions on   
earth and the civilization arising      
therefrom1 man can only exist in        
societies1 and society cannot exist     
without ,morality4 ,the chain of thought
 runs as follows3 without morality no   
society1 without society no individual  
existence2 consequently1 ,morality is   
the essential condition for the         
existence of the individual as well as  
for that of the community4 ,however1 we 
must always bear in mind the            
reservation1 given the present climatic 

conditions on earth4 ,had the earth     
continued to be the paradise it must    
have been at the birth of our species   
7since otherwise the latter could simply
 not have originated71 the necessity    
would never have arisen for the         
individual to band himself together with
 others of his kind1 no society would   
ever have developed1 and there would    
have been no ,morality4 ,serious as the 
subject is1 one cannot but smile at the 
thought of the comic figure the learned1
 professorial ,neo-,kantians would cut  
with their dogma of the absolute and    
cosmic nature of ,morality1 if they     
propounded it among men whose wants     
,nature's bounty was able to satisfy as 
easily as the frog is satisfied in his  
puddle or the crow on his tree top4     
,they would find no trace of absolute   
,morality among mankind1 and would be   
reduced to seeking it among the stars4  
,the very nature of ,morality1 in that  
it is an aid to man in the struggle for 
existence1 makes it easy to understand  

the origin and nature of the concepts   
,good and ,bad4 ,there are propensities 
and actions which facilitate life in a  
community which1 indeed1 alone make it  
possible3 love of one's neighbour1      
helpfulness1 liberality1 consideration  
for the feelings of others1 and         
amiability4 ,there are others which make
 such a life difficult or absolutely    
impossible3 uncompromising selfishness1 
violence1 cruelty1 rapacity1 instinctive
 hostility to one's neighbour4 ,men     
recognized that the former were         
beneficial to them1 the latter harmful4 
,the former aroused their liking1 the   
latter their disapproval1 dislike and   
animosity4 ,the quality of feeling which
 accompanied the perceptions of actions 
of the former kind was akin to that with
 which they responded to beneficial1    
profitable1 useful and welcome sense    
impressions4 ,the quality of feeling1   
which actions of the second category    
gave rise to1 was akin to that due to   
harmful and repellent sense impressions4

 ,following the law of analogy1 they    
placed on an equal footing actions which
 were felt to be pleasing and pleasant  
sensations of taste and smell2 similarly
 with disagreeable actions and          
unpleasant sense impressions2 and       
finally they called the former good and 
the latter bad1 using terms originally  
applicable only to the realm of the     
senses4  ,not everything that is        
pleasant to the senses is beneficial4   
,there are poisons which are pleasing to
 taste1 but none the less noxious for   
that1 such as 7to give only one example7
 alcoholic drinks and impressions of a  
certain order1 like voluptuousness1     
which man greedily pursues1 even though 
they ruin his health4 ,but these are    
exceptions4 ,as a rule1 not only man1   
but all living creatures1 derive        
pleasant sensations from beneficial     
things2 and it is probable that that    
category of sensations1 which we are    
conscious of as being pleasant1 is      
nothing but the state of coenesthesis1  

when the organism functions particularly
 energetically under the influence of   
the absorption of food or of a special  
stimulus of the senses1 when it feels   
its life processes carried on           
particularly vigorously1 freely and     
harmoniously2 just as we feel that state
 of coenesthesis to be unpleasant1 which
 occurs when the organism functions     
badly1 slackly1 and in a manner         
calculated to endanger the continuance  
of life4 ,with the reservation that has 
been indicated we can say in general    
that ,good is equivalent to beneficial  
and pleasant1 ,bad to harmful and       
unpleasant4 ,this is true of the        
transferred and spiritualized as well as
 of the immediate and material meaning  
of these expressions of value4 ,the     
significance of the words ,good and     
,bad1 the point of departure1           
development and change of conception    
they indicate1 suffice to justify the   
,utilitarians and the ,hedonists or     
,eudmonists among the moral             

philosophers1 and to confute the        
contentions of their critics1 who deny  
all connexion between ,morality and a   
practical purpose1 profit or pleasure1  
and declare these to be unworthy        
humiliations of its majesty4  ,they     
wriggle1 with the agility of a          
contortionist on the music-hall stage1  
to get over the obvious and palpable aim
 of moral conduct4 ,they display all the
 cunning of dishonest sophistry in their
 arguments to prove that the element of 
subjective satisfaction which moral     
action yields is non-existent1 and that1
 therefore1 the ,hedonists and          
,eudmonists are wrong4 ,they stir up an 
opaque cloud of words1 phrases and      
formul to hide the fact1 which          
nevertheless emerges clearly1 that he   
who acts morally expects to derive      
pleasurable emotions from his action1 or
 at least tries thereby to avoid        
probable painful emotions1 and that     
moral conduct1 just as it is designed to
 give the individual subjective         

satisfaction which is a kind of         
pleasure1 is also meant to be a benefit1
 or at any rate a supposed benefit1 to  
the community4  ,morality must never try
 for a reward and never expect one4 ,it 
must be absolutely disinterested4 ,it   
has no business to pursue any aim       
outside itself4 ,thus say the mystics of
 moral philosophy1 juggling with words2 
and they think they are doing especial  
honour to ,morality and raising it to a 
particularly proud eminence4 ,but       
,morality has no need of this artificial
 and false grandeur to maintain its     
lofty place among the phenomena of life1
 and it is derogatory neither to its    
authority nor to its influence to be    
recognized as a beneficial force        
conducive to happiness4  ,the opponents 
of ,utilitarianism and ,eudmonism in    
,ethics1 if they speak in good faith1   
may be excused on the grounds that their
 analysis of the phenomenon of ,morality
 is shallow4 ,for them ,morality is     
something absolute1 which exists by     

itself as an eternal and unalterable law
 of the ,universe1 but which is revealed
 in the individual and therefore must be
 conceived individually as a quality    
which has become human1 as a human      
value4 ,if anyone persists in looking   
upon ,morality as an absolutely         
individual matter1 without any connexion
 with anything outside the individual1  
if anyone obstinately shuts his eyes to 
the fact that ,morality has not been    
developed by the individual out of his  
own immediate needs and in consideration
 of himself alone1 but that it is1 on   
the contrary1 a creation of society and 
has no sense or significance except as a
 social phenomenon1 then indeed he can  
with some show of justification deny    
,utilitarianism and ,hedonism4 ,for     
truly1 looked at from the point of view 
of the individual1 moral conduct appears
 neither pleasant nor immediately       
beneficial4 ,on the contrary1 it is1 as 
a rule1 directly opposed to his own     
apparent interest1 and it is achieved   

with difficulty by sacrifice and        
renunciation1 which are never pleasant  
and often very painful4  ,once in a     
drawing-room1 during a game of          
definitions1 ,i heard a light-hearted   
young lady define ,duty in the following
 terms3 ,duty is that which we do       
unwillingly4 ,a stern professor         
contradicted her at once with the       
solemnity he thought due to his         
position1 and assured her reprovingly3  
,it is my duty to give lectures1 and ,i 
do this duty gladly4 ,if you were right1
 madam1 expressions such as 'zealous in 
one's duty' and 'willing performance of 
duty' would have no meaning and could   
never have been coined4 ,that seems     
convincing1 but yet it is wrong4        
,expressions such as zealous in one's   
duty and willing performance of duty    
were not coined until society had       
developed its system of ,morality and   
had educated its members to strive for  
its approval by conducting themselves in
 accordance with this system1 to look on

 its approval as a flattering           
distinction and to fear its disapproval 
as a disgrace4 ,such phrases are        
,pharisaical1 calculated to exercise a  
suggestive influence profitable to      
society4 ,they are the sugar to sweeten 
the pill2 but the young lady was honest 
and the professor conventional2 the pill
 is bitter4 ,thinkers recognized and    
admitted this thousands of years ago4   
,antiphon1 the sophist1 says3 ,the law1 
the outcome of an agreement1 coerces    
nature1 the result of growth1 and goes  
against the interest of the individual4 
,the same idea is expressed by the      
tragic poet in the lines3 ,the gods have
 placed sweat before virtue4 ,this was  
said in the very same words by ,lao     
,tse1 the disciple of ,meng ,tse1 the   
pupil of ,confucius and the reformer of 
his doctrine4  ,the law1 not only the   
law of the state which ,antiphon has    
principally in view1 but also the moral 
law1 goes against the interest of the   
individual2 not in reality1 but         

apparently1 at the first superficial    
glance4 ,moral conduct is the reverse of
 natural conduct2 it takes place in     
opposition to instinct by deflecting the
 original impulse2 it is a subjugation  
of inclination1 a victory over the real 
nature of the man4 ,virtue has to exert 
its utmost strength in bitter struggles1
 fought out within the individual1      
before it can reveal itself actively in 
deeds4 ,that is a natural consequence of
 the manner in which ,morality          
originated4  ,the point is that it was  
not created directly for the individual1
 but for the community1 and for the     
former only in so far as he is a part of
 the community1 and from its stability  
and well-being derives a benefit which  
he may1 or may not1 be conscious of2    
which he may1 or may not1 be able to    
appreciate2 which he accepts as         
something natural and self-understood   
without further thought2 for which he   
does not consider any return service to 
be due2 but which is nevertheless of    

real magnitude1 profiting the           
individual1 facilitating his existence1 
or even alone making it possible2 and   
for which1 as for every other gift1 he  
must make sacrifices4 ,for within       
society there can be no gifts4 ,it      
possesses nothing but what it has       
acquired from its members1 and the      
latter must pay full value for          
everything it provides1 unasked or      
otherwise4  ,as the ,moral law          
originated to meet the needs of the     
community1 and was gradually formulated 
in definite precepts1 it is             
comprehensible that the community never 
paused to inquire what subjective effect
 its law would have on the feelings of  
the individual4 ,if you impose a law    
upon someone you hardly ever consider   
how great will be the emotions of       
pleasure or displeasure which its       
enforcement will entail4 ,the order is1 
,obey1 whether you like it or not2 that 
which deeper insight and more far-seeing
 wisdom prescribe is for your good4     

,thus the individual is forced to work  
laboriously for his own good1 which in  
his purblindness he does not even       
recognize4 ,it would be comprehensible  
if the individual1 who does not see     
farther than his own nose and does not  
look beyond the present moment1 formed  
the opinion that ,morality is not       
perceptibly beneficial to him and gives 
him no pleasure1 and that1 therefore1   
the ,utilitarians and the ,hedonists    
talk nonsense4 ,but the moral           
philosopher1 who observes the individual
 in relationship to the community and   
surveys human actions1 the way they are 
connected1 and the way they interact    
upon one another1 has no right to pursue
 the same line of thought as the        
individual1 and deny that ,morality aims
 at utility and pleasure1 even though   
the individual1 when he acts morally1   
does not perceive any personal          
advantage1 nor feel any pleasure except 
the self-satisfaction which he has been 
trained to feel1 since in the eyes of   

others he is so good and honest4 ,that  
,morality aims at utility1 and is at the
 same time a source of pleasure and     
happiness1 may seem dark and doubtful   
while we consider the individual1 but it
 becomes clear as day and indisputable  
when we regard the community4  ,among   
creatures of a lower order than man1    
indeed among all animals that live      
together in flocks or herds1 we find the
 first beginnings of that mode of       
conduct which in man we call moral1 and 
which is not intended to be of direct   
benefit to the individual1 or to add to 
his momentary pleasure1 but which       
subordinates or sacrifices these        
personal satisfactions to the good of   
the community4  ,chamois1 when they are 
grazing1 set one of their number on     
guard upon a rocky eminence with a      
distant view1 and this individual is    
responsible for the safety of the herd4 
,while the others feed in peace and     
comfort1 this guardian chamois forgoes  
the food which is doubtless just as     

attractive to it as to the others1 and  
tirelessly keeps a sharp look out over  
its whole field of vision1 warning its  
companions at the first approach of     
danger by uttering a shrill cry4  ,when 
the great herds of buffaloes still      
inhabited the ,north ,american prairies1
 they had at the head and on the flanks 
of the herd the strongest bulls1 while  
the centre was occupied by the cows with
 their calves and the young animals4    
,before civilization came to trouble    
them1 the grizzly bear was the only     
enemy that threatened them1 and with him
 they were able to deal2 one of them    
would meet the attacking bear in single 
combat1 but did not always emerge from  
it unhurt4 ,often enough at the end of  
the fight both the bull and the bear    
would be terribly injured or even dead2 
yet by sacrificing his life the bull    
saved the rest of the herd4  ,the       
thrilling adventure of the ,abyssinian  
baboon is well known2 first told by     
,alfred ,brehm in his ,tierleben 7animal

 life71 it was afterwards quoted by     
,darwin and many other writers4 ,on a   
hunting expedition ,brehm surprised a   
party of monkeys in a clearing4 ,they   
fled at once and had found shelter in   
the wood before the dogs could reach    
them4 ,only one young one had got       
separated from the rest and was left    
behind alone4 ,it had scrambled up on to
 a solitary rock standing in the plain1 
round which the dogs were barking       
furiously1 and in its terror the        
creature uttered piercing cries for     
help4 ,a little male monkey1 hearing it1
 detached himself from the group1 turned
 back from the safety of the forest1    
made quietly for the rock and fetched   
away the trembling young baboon from    
among the pack1 silent now and shrinking
 in amazement2 and then stroking and    
caressing the little creature he carried
 it safely in his arms to its family in 
the wood1 unmolested by the stupefied   
dogs and spared by the hunter1 lost in  
admiration of this self-sacrificing     

courage4  ,in these three instances we  
see how the joint responsibility among  
gregarious animals develops in them an  
ever increasing sense of duty1 which    
teaches the chamois to forgo its food   
during the hours it is on guard1 rouses 
in the buffalo a savage lust for battle1
 and makes the baboon perform a         
premeditated deed of epic heroism4 ,when
 men act as these animals did1 we       
ascribe this to ,morality4 ,this is     
nothing but joint responsibility in     
action1 the joint responsibility which  
the species is forced by the conditions 
of life to adopt1 if it is to survive4  
,among the moral philosophers the       
mystics are prevented1 by the haze which
 obscures all their thought1 from seeing
 that ,morality originates from this    
joint responsibility4 ,or rather1 if    
they do see it1 they think this origin  
too low4 ,they demand a more exalted    
genealogy for the phenomenon of         
,morality4 ,according to them the ,moral
 law comes straight from ,god4 ,the     

concepts ,good and ,evil are revealed4  
,commands and prohibitions are imposed  
upon the soul by that omnipotence which 
spiritualizes the universe and of which 
the soul is an immortal part4  ,if these
 phrases were anything but moonshine and
 tinkling cymbals they certainly would  
make any other explanation of this      
astonishing fact superfluous2 the fact1 
namely1 that man does what is repugnant 
to him1 and refrains from doing what    
would give him pleasure1 that he is     
content with himself when he has        
voluntarily curbed his impulses and made
 sacrifices1 and that he feels the      
pricks of conscience if he chances to   
experience the pleasure of appeasement  
because he has satisfied his desires4   
,man obeys divine commands4 ,that       
suffices and obviates the necessity of  
seeking for explanations of this        
phenomenon1 which shall satisfy ,reason4
  ,it is a mere mirage1 the reflection  
of an earthly state of affairs in the   
heavens1 to assume that the universe is 

governed by an authority devoid of      
responsibility1 which imposes on its    
subjects1 that is to say men1 laws and  
instructions1 discipline and order4  ,it
 is a form of anthropomorphism1 the most
 widespread and stubborn of errors in   
thought among those men who try to      
understand the unintelligible1 and are  
content with the most unfounded         
explanation which their nave imagination
 freely invents for them4 ,this same    
anthropomorphism1 not even at a loss to 
solve the problem of the origin and     
essence of the universe1 replies        
unhesitatingly that ,god by an act of   
volition created it out of nothing to   
prove to ,himself ,his own omnipotence  
and omniscience2 in like manner it has  
no scruple in ascribing the phenomenon  
of ,morality to a creative act of       
,god's1 and makes ,ethics1 which        
properly speaking form the chief part of
 psychology1 anthropology and sociology1
 a subdivision of theology1 that is1 of 
anthropomorphic mythology4  ,critical   

,reason1 which realizes that deceptive  
fictions are not true thought1 but      
dreams--not the result of ripe          
intellectual effort1 but of the childish
 play of the imagination1 seeks the     
roots of ,morality not in the air or in 
the ether1 but in the solid earth2 not  
in some indemonstrable1 transcendental  
sphere1 but in an obvious need of human 
nature4 ,the biological necessities of  
the species1 which can only survive by  
dint of living in communities1          
sufficiently explain the origin of the  
feeling of joint responsibility1 of     
consideration for one's neighbour1 of   
the concepts ,good and ,evil and of     
conscience2 and we have no use for the  
dogmas of revealed ,morality derived    
from some fabulous1 supernatural source1
 or for the ,kantian categorical        
imperative4  ,morality1 understood as a 
form of joint responsibility1 determines
 the inner and outer relations of the   
individual to the community2 that is to 
say1 to as much of it as he comes in    

immediate contact with1 to wit1 his     
neighbour4 ,morality provides him with  
the notions of ,duty and ,right1 of the 
consideration he owes his neighbour and 
of that which he may demand from his    
neighbour4 ,it is customary to look upon
 ,rights and ,duties as opposites4 ,this
 is mere indolence of thought4 ,right   
and ,duty are supplementary1 forming    
together one concept4 ,they are in      
reality one and the same thing regarded 
from different points of view4 ,my ,duty
 is the subjective form of my           
neighbour's ,right2 my ,right the       
subjective form of other people's ,duty4
 ,that which is ,duty1 when ,i have to  
do it out of consideration for others1  
becomes my ,right1 when others have to  
do it out of consideration for me4      
,respect for the personality of others1 
which is the feeling from which the     
concept of ,right and ,duty emanates1   
seems to be a late and noble product of 
,morality and a particularly            
praiseworthy victory of prescient       

intelligence over selfishness4 ,this    
factor of our consciousness which       
determines our will and which gradually 
becomes an instinct1 is really only a   
special application of the law of least 
resistance which governs all organic    
life4 ,we have no selfless1 ideal       
respect for the personality of another2 
but1 made wise by experience and        
observation1 we assume that that other  
has the power to resist and to retaliate
 if a wrong is done to him or he is     
injured2 hence we avoid1 to the best of 
our ability1 actions to which he is     
likely to object1 so as not to come into
 conflict with him1 because to overcome 
his opposition would require effort and 
expose us to danger4 ,respect for the   
personality of another and for his      
rights may be expressed by a mechanical 
formula which runs as follows3 this     
respect varies directly as the real or  
supposed might of the other person1 and 
inversely as our own real or supposed   
might4  ,the society of which he is a   

member1 and which makes his existence   
possible1 prescribes to the individual  
the laws governing his moral conduct4   
,that which a community at any given    
time approves and demands1 rejects or   
forbids1 constitutes the precept whereby
 its members regulate their conduct1 and
 offers ample security for their        
conscience4  ,the concepts ,good and    
,bad originate simultaneously with      
society2 they are the form in which its 
actual conditions of existence are      
conveyed to the consciousness of its    
members4 ,the only immutable thing about
 them is the fact of their continued    
existence4 ,without the coercive        
discipline of a rule conducive to the   
common weal and governing the mutual    
relations between its members1 no       
society could be imagined to exist1     
unless its members were all similar in  
nature1 reacted in an identical fashion 
to all impressions and possessed the    
same feelings and sensations1 the same  
inclinations and the same impulses of   

volition4 ,in that case no difference   
could ever arise between one individual 
and another1 or between an individual   
and the community1 which would have to  
be smoothed over by the moral law       
emanating from the community and        
controlling the individual1 or be       
suppressed by the community's order4    
,every individual could be left to the  
guidance of his own instincts1 for he   
would know himself always to be in      
agreement with the community2 no        
consideration for others need hamper or 
modify his actions2 he could behave just
 as if he were alone in the world4 ,but 
as individuals differ from one another1 
feel1 think and want different things1  
collisions in which they hurt1 cripple  
or even kill one another are the        
inevitable consequence of their opposing
 movements2 and the interference of the 
moral law is absolutely necessary to    
polarize these movements and guide them 
into parallel courses1 so that they do  
not run counter to one another4  ,but   

,good and ,bad derive not only their    
existence but their measure and their   
significance from the views of the      
community4 ,they are therefore not      
absolute but variable2 they are not an  
immutable standard amid the             
ever-changing conditions of humanity1 a 
rule by which the value of the actions  
and aims of mortals are indisputably    
determined1 but are subject to the laws 
of evolution in society and therefore in
 a constant state of flux4 ,at different
 times and in different places they     
present the most varied aspects4 ,what  
is virtue here and now may have been    
vice formerly and at another spot1 and  
vice versa4 ,in the royal family of     
ancient ,egypt marriage between brothers
 and sisters was the prescribed custom4 
,we call this incest and it fills us    
with horror4 ,to the sons of ,egypt it  
seemed meritorious and constituted a    
claim to special veneration4 ,the       
,babylonians and ,canaanites burnt their
 first-born in ,moloch's fiery furnace1 

and this sacrifice was accounted a      
highly praiseworthy act of piety and of 
the fear of ,god4 ,the ,spartans taught 
their sons1 their future warriors1 the  
art of stealing without being caught2   
and he who did this most cleverly       
achieved the most flattering            
recognition4 ,the ,cherusci butchered   
the ,roman prisoners taken from the     
legions of ,varus as a sacrifice to     
their tribal gods1 and a noble-minded   
and brave man like ,arminius considered 
this absolutely honourable and knightly4
 ,the ,aztecs1 who had undeniably       
attained an advanced degree of          
civilization1 at high festivals used    
with obsidian knives to cut open the    
breasts of human sacrifices on the      
altars of their gods1 and tear the heart
 out of their living bodies4 ,that was  
an action finding favour in the sight of
 the gods1 and the people watched it    
with awe and those mystic emotions which
 religious rites are intended to arouse4
  ,moral law in ,europe1 during the     

,middle ,ages and almost up to modern   
times1 permitted1 and even ordained1 the
 punishment by horrible torture and     
death of those whose religious          
convictions differed from the teaching  
of the established church2 and with its 
consent supposed witches were sent to   
the stake4 ,in feudal times the most    
terrible and revolting of crimes was    
felony--that is1 a breach of faith on   
the part of the vassal against his      
overlord--and no torture was too cruel  
as a punishment4 ,nobles1 who had so    
delicate a sense of honour that for a   
wry look or the accidental touch of an  
elbow they would draw their swords1     
enunciated the principle3 the king's    
blood does not defile1 and vied with    
each other in forcing their daughters   
upon the king as concubines4 ,until     
,wilberforce roused the ,english        
conscience at the end of the eighteenth 
century1 and ,schlcher did the same in  
,france in the middle of the nineteenth1
 slavery was considered a state of      

affairs which a moral community could   
tolerate4 ,the ,north ,american         
descendants of those ,puritans whom no  
persecution and no martyrdom could      
prevent from leading a life consonant   
with the dictates of their conscience1  
did not scruple to exercise proprietary 
rights over human beings who1 in the    
case of octoroons and even of quadroons1
 did not even differ from them in       
colour1 supposing that difference of    
colour could be considered an excuse4   
,the code1 which began with the         
,declaration of ,rights1 contained heavy
 penalties for those who helped a slave 
to escape4 ,men1 whose uprightness no   
one could doubt1 did not hesitate to set
 bloodhounds on the track of an escaped 
nigger1 and four years of a bloody civil
 war were needed before refractory      
slave-owners were forced to acknowledge 
the immorality of forced labour4  ,these
 examples have been taken from the      
customs of civilized nations4 ,amongst  
races that have not attained the high   

degree of development to which the white
 man has risen1 we meet with much more  
revolting deviations from the moral law 
obtaining among white men4 ,tribes are  
known in which the commandment1 ,honour 
thy father and thy mother1 is           
interpreted so1 that the children kill  
and eat their parents as soon as the    
latter have attained a considerable age4
 ,the ,north ,american ,indians1 who had
 a well developed sense of honour1 were 
capable of chivalrous feelings and kept 
their word with absolute loyalty1 used  
to torture helpless prisoners and scalp 
their defeated enemies1 even the women4 
,among the ,dyaks1 who are under ,dutch 
rule and are familiar with the laws and 
customs of ,christian ,europe1 a        
marriageable youth must first cut off a 
human being's head before he is allowed 
to wed4 ,he need not overcome his victim
 in honourable combat2 he may creep upon
 him surreptitiously1 and even fall upon
 him in his sleep and murder him in     
cowardly fashion without danger to      

himself4  ,all these are instances which
 we unhesitatingly condemn4 ,to our idea
 they are crimes and misdeeds which     
among us would make their perpetrators  
liable either to contempt and expulsion 
from decent society or to the extremest 
penalties of the law2 yet at their time 
and in their place they were considered 
meritorious and virtuous1 and were      
approved by public opinion and the      
conscience of their authors4 ,but we can
 go farther and subject our own moral   
law to a similar independent            
consideration4 ,we shall find that to us
 also deeds appear permissible1 virtuous
 and even splendid1 which do not differ 
essentially from the thefts of the      
,spartans or the head-hunting of the    
,dyaks4 ,a company promoter who sells on
 the ,stock ,exchange shares that he    
must know to be worthless1 can with     
,spartan cunning rob thousands of       
trustful victims of the fruits of their 
labour and economy1 and reduce them to  
beggary2 and not only does he go        

unpunished1 but if by his knavery he    
becomes a millionaire and uses his      
wealth cleverly1 he can attain the      
highest political and social honours and
 distinctions4 ,we may admit that       
financial roguery of this sort can now  
no longer be classed among strictly     
moral actions1 that public opinion is on
 the verge of placing it in the category
 of vice and crime1 and that legislators
 are beginning to make attempts to      
inflict severe and humiliating penalties
 on its perpetrators4  ,but another     
series of deeds is still generally      
considered so undoubtedly virtuous and  
laudable1 that it evokes the highest    
homage from the best intellects of the  
age1 poets1 musicians1 scientists1      
teachers1 sculptors and painters1 and   
the leaders of the people--the deeds of 
war4 ,the most horrible butchery of men1
 the theft of property and liberty1     
ill-treatment1 destruction are not only 
permissible but obligatory and laudable1
 if they occur in war1 and if their     

authors can point to the fact that they 
are acting in the service of their      
country at the order of a legitimate    
authority4 ,neither the soldiers nor    
their leaders are bound to inquire      
whether the authority1 whether their    
mother country is waging war for a      
purpose that moral law can approve4     
,right or wrong1 my country4 ,in the    
eyes of her sons the country is always  
in the right1 even if it be objectively 
in the wrong1 and by its orders every   
soldier murders1 robs1 burns and        
ravages1 plays the executioner to       
harmless1 unarmed1 innocent strangers1  
compels prisoners to forced labour1     
steals letters that fall into his hands 
and prevents families who are cruelly   
separated from communicating with one   
another2 and his conscience does not    
reproach him in the least1 nor is he    
conscious of being a criminal deserving 
of all the penalties of the law4 ,every 
single one of these actions1 if         
perpetrated by an individual on his own 

account and for his own purposes1 would 
result in the death penalty1 and it     
would be richly deserved1 too4 ,but in  
war1 carried out collectively at the    
bidding of a government1 they become    
deeds of heroism1 filling the doer with 
pride1 moving the community to tears of 
enthusiasm1 and they are held up to     
youth as shining examples to be         
imitated4 ,it is more than likely that  
future times will judge the esteem in   
which these deeds are held not otherwise
 than we do the value placed by other   
forms of society on human sacrifices1   
the slaughter of parents and            
head-hunting4  ,it is hard to determine 
the exact part which conscience plays in
 the changes undergone by the concepts  
,good and ,evil4 ,as conscience is the  
voice of the community in the           
consciousness of the individual1 it     
approves on principle what seems right  
and praiseworthy to the community4 ,just
 as little as conscience prevented a    
,babylonian mother from sacrificing her 

child to ,moloch1 does it in these days 
stop the average citizen from doing a   
soldier's work of killing and destroying
 in time of war4 ,if an individual knows
 himself to be in complete agreement    
with the general opinion1 then he lives 
at peace with his conscience4 ,no       
impulse to change the customs1 to set up
 a new ,morality1 to condemn            
long-established usages1 is to be       
expected from such an one4  ,the        
mechanism whereby changes are wrought in
 views on ,good and ,evil is quite      
different4 ,everywhere and at all times 
there are exceptional persons whose     
abilities render them specially fit to  
feel and think independently4 ,to their 
idea the community has no determining   
but only an advisory voice4 ,they       
reserve to themselves the right of      
decision in every case4 ,in their       
consciousness there persists a clear    
recognition of the fact that the essence
 of ,morality lies in consideration for 
others1 and when the current acceptation

 of the moral law among the majority    
allows them1 nay1 commands them to      
disregard this consideration1 they      
experience a feeling of discomfort which
 dull1 unthinking imitation of the      
general example does not soothe4 ,they  
meditate upon the deviation from the    
fundamental rule of considering one's   
neighbour1 they test its justification1 
and they condemn it1 if its difference  
with the general moral law cannot be    
adjusted4 ,if the essence of ,morality  
is consideration for one's neighbour1   
its purpose is the well-being of the    
community2 its essence must be adapted  
to this purpose1 that is to say1        
consideration for one's neighbour must  
be subordinated to the general welfare4 
,the thief1 the robber and the murderer 
have no claim upon consideration1 and   
even a man with the most delicate sense 
of ,morality will agree that coercion of
 the criminal is desirable4 ,tolstoy's  
warning3 ,do not oppose the evildoer1 is
 not ,morality1 but an exaggerated      

parody of it1 which renders it nugatory4
 ,thus the most moral person will not   
raise any objection to a war waged in   
defence of hearth and home when their   
safety is threatened by a ruthless      
attack4  ,but1 if a mode of action      
which1 though it be generally practised 
and approved1 injures the individual and
 causes him to suffer1 cannot be        
justified on the grounds of an obvious  
benefit to the community1 then a small1 
sometimes an almost infinitesimal       
minority of independent thinkers will   
rise against the custom2 they are not   
afraid of coming into violent conflict  
with generally accepted views2 they     
defend the fundamental principle of     
,morality1 namely1 consideration for the
 individual1 against the exception1     
namely1 oppression of the individual for
 the ostensible good of the community2  
they brand as immoral what is generally 
accounted moral2 they announce that the 
current acceptation of the goodness or  
badness of a certain order of actions   

must cease4  ,the intervention of such  
reformers always gives offence1 and     
arouses anger which at times rises to   
murderous fury4 ,but this wrathful      
indignation is just what makes a break  
in the automatic fashion in which the   
majority of average men act according to
 traditional custom2 the attention of   
more and more minds is arrested1        
critically they examine the accepted    
moral law1 they are penetrated first by 
the suspicion and finally by the clear  
conviction that it is contrary to the   
essence of ,morality1 and they swell the
 ranks of the innovators who inveigh    
against the tradition4 ,the struggle    
lasts long and is carried on pitilessly4
 ,the preachers of the new ,morality    
seem corrupt and criminal to the        
supporters of the old4 ,they are        
persecuted and slandered and not seldom 
have to suffer martyrdom1 but they      
always emerge victorious if their       
doctrine is in agreement with the logic 
of the fundamental principles of ,moral 

law4 ,that is the history of the        
abolition of human sacrifices1 of the   
vendetta1 of slavery1 of legal torture1 
of religious coercion4  ,whoever looks  
about him with open eyes will note that 
civilized men are at the moment adopting
 new ideas with regard to the operation 
of state omnipotence1 to war1 to the    
right of the economically strong to     
exploit others1 to the rights of women1 
to sexual morality1 to the penal system4
 ,the advocates of a new ,morality must 
still put up with the most humiliating  
abuse4 ,he who wishes to defend the     
individual from coercion by the state is
 an anarchist and deserves to be hanged 
or broken on the wheel4 ,he who         
maintains that war is immoral belongs to
 the rabble of vagabonds who own no     
nationality1 for whom no contempt is too
 deep and no punishment too severe4 ,he 
who refuses a duel is a dishonoured     
coward1 and thereby cuts himself off    
from decent society4 ,he who recognizes 
woman's right to motherhood is a        

dastardly purveyor of opportunities for 
prostitution4 ,he who attacks the       
present relation between ,capital and   
,labour as a hypocritical continuation  
of slavery is an ignorant agitator or an
 enemy of society4 ,he who would like to
 see the idea of punishment excluded    
from the law1 as being retrograde and   
unscientific1 and who wishes only the   
point of view of the defence of society 
to be recognized as valid1 talks        
sentimental nonsense1 disarms justice   
and places the community at large at the
 mercy of criminals4  ,but the issue of 
the struggle is not in doubt4 ,the      
present systems1 which present          
exceptions to the moral law of          
consideration for one's neighbour1 must 
go4 ,although they are considered moral 
to-day1 are1 in fact1 ,morality itself1 
to-morrow they will be felt to be       
immoral and be abhorred by all men of   
moral feelings4 ,thus the concepts ,good
 and ,bad gradually change their        
meaning2 views on what is moral and what

 immoral are constantly in a state of   
flux2 and the only permanent thing is   
recognition of the fact that man's      
actions must be withdrawn from the      
control of subjective choice and whim1  
and must be subject to a law set up by  
the community2 the justification of this
 law lies in its being necessary to the 
existence of society4 ,every revision of
 ,moral values originates in some       
vexation1 and ends by refining and      
deepening moral sentiment4 ,in this     
chapter only the scheme of development  
of moral views and of their changes has 
been indicated4 ,the question of moral  
progress will be dealt with fully later 
on4  ,to sum up the arguments of this   
section1 ,morality is not transcendental
 but immanent2 it is a social phenomenon
 and restricted to the sphere of living 
beings4 ,its beginnings may be traced in
 animal societies1 it is developed among
 mankind4 ,the preliminary condition    
necessary for this development is the   
ability to visualize future happenings1 

since moral conduct is determined by    
estimating its effects and results1 that
 is1 by conceiving something in the     
future4 ,morality has a positive1       
concrete aim4 ,it makes the existence of
 society possible1 and this1 given the  
circumstances obtaining on our planet1  
is the necessary condition for the      
preservation of each individual1 and it 
originated from the instinct of         
self-preservation in the species4 ,its  
essence lies in consideration for one's 
neighbour1 because without this the     
communal life of individuals1 that is1 a
 society1 would be impossible4  ,if     
individuals had been able to live alone1
 ,morality could never have come into   
existence4 ,the concepts ,good and ,bad 
characterize those actions which society
 feels to be beneficial or harmful to   
itself4 ,as moral conduct implies       
consideration for one's neighbour1 it is
 often1 if not always1 in conflict with 
selfishness1 that is1 with the immediate
 and instinctive impulses1 and is1 in   

the first place1 accompanied by         
disagreeable sensations4 ,the           
pleasurable emotion of satisfaction     
arises later through habit and          
reflection2 it accompanies the thought  
of the merit and praiseworthiness of the
 victory over self4 ,conscience is the  
voice of the community in the           
individual's consciousness4 ,the idea of
 ,duty is the subjective conception of  
the ,rights of our neighbour2 the idea  
of ,rights is the subjective conception 
of our neighbour's ,duty to us4         
,morality is not absolute1 but relative1
 and is subject to continual changes4   
,to maintain that ,morality is cosmic1  
eternal1 immutable1 that it aims neither
 at profit nor pleasure1 but constitutes
 its own aim1 is pure anthropomorphic   
superstition4     ,,chapter ,,iii  ,,the
 ,,biological ,,aspect ,,of ,,morality  
,morality is a restraint which the      
community imposes on each of its        
members4 ,it demands from the individual
 the sacrifice of his transitory and    

momentary comfort in favour of his      
general welfare which is dependent on   
that of the community4 ,it prohibits the
 pleasure of gratifying his desires in  
order that by this unpleasant           
renunciation his lasting well-being may 
be ensured4 ,subjectively experienced   
and viewed1 therefore1 ,morality always 
implies the limitation of free will1 the
 curbing of desire1 opposition to       
inclinations and appetites1 and the     
diminution or suppression of free1 or   
let us rather say of unbridled1 action4 
,before ,morality can profit the        
community1 it disturbs and incommodes   
the individual1 it rouses in him        
disagreeable sensations which may reach 
such a pitch as to be intense pain4 ,it 
is only after deep reflection1 of which 
not everyone is capable1 that the       
individual realizes that ,morality is an
 essential condition of the life of     
society1 and that the preservation of   
society is an essential condition of his
 own life2 before he investigates1      

before he even meditates on ,morality1  
the individual feels it directly to be  
unpleasant1 laborious1 stern--nay1      
hostile4  ,the control which ,morality  
exercises over the actions1 and indeed  
in many cases over the most secret      
thoughts of the individual1 appears at  
the first glance to be somewhat         
paradoxical4 ,it is by no means obvious 
why the individual should always take   
sides against himself and1 adopting a   
defensive and disapproving attitude1    
hold his instinctive tendencies in      
check4 ,moral conduct would be          
intelligible if the community were      
always ready with means of coercion and 
could constrain the individual by brute 
force to place its interest before his  
own pleasure4 ,but the individual does  
not wait for police intervention on the 
part of the community4 ,he frowns upon  
himself with the awful severity of the  
law4 ,he threatens himself with a       
cudgel4 ,he divides himself into two    
beings1 one of which wants to follow its

 instincts1 while the other curbs them  
vigorously2 one is a rearing1 often a   
refractory1 horse1 the other a rider    
with bridle1 whip and spur4  ,this      
reduplication of the ego1 one-half of   
which establishes control over the      
other1 one-half of which tries to remain
 true to itself1 while the other divests
 itself of its identity and denies      
itself--this is the inner process1 the  
outward manifestation of which is moral 
conduct4 ,this demands investigation and
 explanation4 ,we must show how the     
organism could develop from within      
itself the power to paralyse1 or        
completely repress1 its own elemental   
activities1 and how ,morality was able  
to become an integral part in the       
general scheme of life processes4  ,the 
mechanism whereby the mind1 appraising1 
foreseeing and judging1 checks the first
 movement of impulse1 is inhibition or  
repression4 ,without inhibition moral   
conduct would not be possible4 ,the mind
 would have no method of indicating the 

path and prescribing rules to the       
organism's instinct4 ,it would have no  
means of making its insight prevail over
 the desires of the senses4 ,it would   
have no weapon with which to force its  
being to actions opposed to its organic 
inclinations4 ,without inhibition the   
individual would never give precedence  
to the demands of the community and lay 
himself open to disagreeable emotions in
 order to please the community4         
,inhibition was the necessary organic   
preliminary to the phenomenon of        
,morality4 ,it had to be pre-existent in
 the individual1 so that ,morality could
 make itself at home in his intellectual
 life1 so that it could acquire         
creative1 ruling and practical power    
among the elect1 and become an          
unconscious and easy habit among the    
average4 ,morality took possession of a 
pre-existent organic aptitude and made  
it serve its own purposes4 ,but organic 
aptitudes are not alike in all          
individuals4 ,in some cases they are    

more or less perfect2 in others they may
 be lacking altogether4 ,indeed only    
individuals with highly developed powers
 of inhibition are capable of that      
heroic ,morality which liberates them   
from the weakness of the flesh and makes
 them independent of the demands of the 
body2 those in whom this power of       
inhibition is scantily developed evade  
the influence of ,morality entirely1 and
 it has no authority over them4  ,that  
which is called character is at bottom  
the name we give to the power of        
inhibition4 ,where it is weak we speak  
of lack of character1 whereas by        
strength of character we mean that the  
power of inhibition is great4 ,the will 
makes use of inhibition4 ,with its help 
the will guides the living machine in a 
certain direction and urges it to       
perform given tasks4 ,at the first      
glance it may not seem obvious that     
positive actions can come of repression1
 which is something negative4 ,but if we
 analyse psychologically the actions    

demanded and promoted by the will1 and  
trace them back to their organic        
origins1 we shall find that1 as a rule1 
the first elements consist in the       
prevention of impulsive movements1 and  
that the impetus to positive effort is  
given by the will1 which converts these 
movements into contrary ones4 ,a few    
instances may make this psychic process 
clearer4 ,winkelried1 at ,sempach1      
cleaves a path through the cuirassiers  
while they bury their lances in his     
breast2 he becomes capable of this great
 deed of self-sacrifice in that1 by a   
mighty effort of will power1 he         
suppresses the strongest of all         
instincts1 that of self-preservation1   
and forces all his energies1 which are  
naturally directed towards flight from  
danger1 to challenge danger and yield   
completely to it4 ,the lover who        
overcomes his passion and renounces its 
object1 because his idol is the bride of
 his best friend1 begins with the       
determined inhibition of the impulse    

which urges him towards the woman1 and  
attains renunciation by the suppression 
of his desire2 this renunciation finds  
expression in positive actions1 in the  
rupture of relations which bring him    
happiness1 the avoidance of meetings    
which would prevent the wound in his    
heart from healing1 and so on4 ,the     
brave rescuer who plunges into the waves
 to save a drowning man1 or enters a    
burning house to save a fellow creature 
threatened by the flames1 must first    
overcome his natural shrinking fear of  
the water and the fire2 and not till    
after the suppression of strong impulses
 to avoid the uncanny adventure1 does he
 succeed in making his muscles obey the 
impulse to save life4  ,inhibition1     
therefore1 is the organic foundation on 
which ,morality builds1 not only that   
,morality which consists in abstention  
from certain actions1 but that which is 
manifested in active virtue4 ,but       
inhibition is a faculty which the       
organism has developed for its own ends1

 the better and more easily to preserve 
its own life1 and to render its power of
 achievement greater4 ,morality makes   
use of this faculty1 which it finds     
ready to hand1 for the ends of the      
community1 and very often against the   
immediate interests of the individual   
for whose advantage it is nevertheless  
intended4 ,now the individual would not 
put up with this inexpedient use1 one is
 tempted to say this clever misuse1 of  
one of its organic capacities1 if this  
yielding up of the mechanism of         
inhibition to ,morality were not        
beneficial to life and therefore came   
within the sphere of the biological     
purpose of inhibition4 ,by being grafted
 on a pre-existent organic faculty      
,morality becomes such itself2 it forms 
a link in the chain of biological       
processes within the individual         
organism2 it ceases to be purely a      
product of society forced upon the      
individual to his molestation and in    
spite of his annoyance2 it acquires the 

character of a differentiation of       
inhibition in order to help the         
individual1 or even to make it at all   
possible for him to adapt himself to    
life in a society4  ,that under the     
present conditions obtaining on our     
planet the human individual can only    
live in society demands no proof4 ,and  
as he can only live in society if he    
submits to its rules of good and bad1   
,morality1 which urges him to this      
submission1 aids and even preserves his 
life4 ,we shall now show that           
inhibition1 of which ,morality is a     
differentiation making it easier for the
 individual to adapt himself to the     
conditions of social life1 is of the    
greatest value to the individual from   
the biological point of view4  ,the     
lowest forms of life it is possible for 
us to observe show nothing which can be 
interpreted as inhibition4 ,all external
 influences to which they are not       
indifferent invariably produce the same 
effects4 ,they respond to every stimulus

 with a reflex action which reveals     
nothing that we should be justified in  
describing as an activity of the will4  
,the reaction follows with strictly     
automatic regularity upon the stimulus1 
and nothing intervenes between the two  
which would permit the conclusion that  
in the simple organism there is any     
faculty that could delay1 modify or     
change the reaction to the external     
stimulus4  ,just as iron filings always 
respond to the attraction of a magnet in
 the same way1 just as certain          
combinations of mercury at the impact of
 a blow flare up with an explosion1 just
 as ice when warmed melts and becomes   
water1 and water when cooled to a       
definite point freezes into ice1 so do  
the simplest living things seek out     
certain rays in the spectrum1 certain   
temperatures1 certain chemical          
conditions and avoid others4 ,not only  
unicellular organisms do this1 but also 
comparatively highly developed animals1 
such as the daphni1 for if light is sent

 through a prism into a vessel          
containing water1 these little creatures
 collect at the violet end of the       
spectrum2 such as the wood-lice1 which  
hate the light and creep into dark      
crevices2 such as gnats1 which are      
attracted by the sun and dance in their 
hundreds in its rays4 ,moreover1 we meet
 with a similar phenomenon in man4 ,we1 
too1 in winter and spring seek the sun  
and in summer the shade2 in the cold    
season the warm stove attracts us2 bad  
smells put us to flight1 sweet scents of
 flowers allure us4 ,the simplest       
automatic reflex actions are at the root
 of these attractions and repulsions1   
exactly the same as with the daphni1    
wood-lice and gnats4 ,only we are able  
to control and suppress these reflex    
actions which the lower animals         
apparently cannot4  ,anthropomorphic    
modes of thought easily mislead us into 
thinking that the processes we observe  
in lower animals are due to an exercise 
of will power4 ,we draw near to the fire

 in winter because it is pleasant1 but  
we can quit it if duty calls us into the
 cold streets4 ,one is apt to imagine   
that the simple organisms also          
experience pleasant and unpleasant      
feelings1 that they try and avoid the   
latter1 that the daphnia seeks the      
violet rays because it likes them1 that 
the wood-louse flees the light because  
it dislikes it2 in fact1 that these     
creatures possess a consciousness which 
becomes aware of and distinguishes      
between pleasing and displeasing        
impressions1 and that they possess a    
will which responds to these impressions
 with suitable reactions4 ,very         
distinguished scientists have been      
unable to resist the temptation to      
assume in the lower animals1 even in    
unicellular organisms1 the existence of 
processes with which we are familiar in 
the human consciousness4 ,william ,roux 
introduces us to a psychology of        
protista1 and ,w4 ,kleinsorge goes so   
far as to maintain the existence of     

cellular ethics1 and to devote himself  
to research into its laws4 ,the work of 
both these biologists is as fascinating 
as the most beautiful fairy-tale1 but it
 is probably the creation of a lively   
and fertile imagination1 just as the    
fairy story is4  ,more prosaic and less 
imaginative scientists do not see       
evidences of psychology in the signs of 
life in the protista1 or ethics in the  
movements of a cell1 but merely the     
effects of universal chemical and       
physical laws which also control        
lifeless inorganic matter4 ,to these    
laws they trace the tropisms of simple  
organisms which tempt the imagination1  
prone as it is to anthropomorphism1 into
 errors2 such tropisms1 that is to say1 
as their tendency to seek moderate      
warmth1 certain rays of light and weak  
alkaline solutions1 or to avoid acids1  
heat and ultra-violet rays4 ,the little 
organisms probably do not obey these    
impulses for reasons of pleasure or pain
 any more than the iron filings obey the

 attraction of a magnet for such        
reasons4 ,they do not fly to it because 
it gives them pleasure2 the little metal
 leaves of an electroscope do not move  
apart because contact with each other   
displeases them4 ,all forms of tropism1 
chemicotropic1 thermotropic1 phototropic
 manifestations1 active and passive     
tropisms clearly show that minute       
organisms involuntarily and             
unresistingly respond to the influence  
of natural forces1 just as if they were 
inanimate particles4  ,microscopic      
investigations reveal many phenomena    
which one is tempted to consider signs  
of life1 but which cannot be such1 as   
they occur in connexion with inanimate  
matter4 ,the ,brownian movements are    
rhythmical molecular changes of         
position1 not due to any mechanical     
impulse emanating from the surroundings1
 nor to a current in the fluid in which 
the object of investigation is immersed1
 but arising from the object itself1    
mostly very finely divided1 tiny balls  

of mercury4 ,a very small drop of       
chloroform introduced into a fluid of   
different density behaves exactly like a
 unicellular organism4 ,it sends out    
pseudopods1 wriggles and draws them in  
again4 ,the pseudopods seem to feel and 
examine particles of matter with which  
they come in contact1 and then either to
 withdraw quickly from them or to       
surround and incorporate them in the    
drop4 ,this is deceptively similar to   
the behaviour of a living cell absorbing
 food1 though there can be no question  
of this in the case of the drop of      
chloroform4 ,in the latter it is merely 
a question of the effects of surface    
tension1 that is1 of the normal         
behaviour of matter in accordance with  
the laws governing the forces of nature1
 the investigation of which lies in the 
domain of chemistry and physics4        
,impartial thought comes to a conclusion
 about these phenomena different from   
that derived from anthropomorphic       
delusions4 ,it does not try to smuggle  

dim1 dark life into the collections of  
mercury molecules apparently obeying    
some inner impulse1 or into the seeking 
or feeling about of a pseudopod of      
chloroform4 ,on the contrary1 it        
understands life as the play of natural 
forces under the conditions supplied by 
a living organism1 as the automatic     
working of a machine-like apparatus to  
which natural forces supply the motive  
power4 ,similar manifestations in       
inanimate matter and in elementary      
organisms seem to justify the conclusion
 that the distinction between living and
 non-living matter is arbitrary1 that   
there are only forces1 or perhaps one   
single force1 that is to say1 one       
movement1 in the universe1 whose        
activity is manifested in the most      
manifold forms1 of which life is one4   
,modern ,monism has come to this        
conclusion1 but it is not alone in so   
doing4 ,long before ,monism there was a 
philosophy which conceived all cosmic   
energies to form a unity2 and really it 

is only an obstinate quarrel about      
words1 for the ,hylozoists regard the   
universe as something living and ascribe
 life to all matter and all atoms of    
which matter is made up1 while the      
,materialists regard life as a play of  
forces in matter4 ,fundamentally the    
,hylozoists and ,materialists hold the  
same views1 only that the former call   
force life and the latter call life     
force2 just as the only point of        
difference between them and the         
,pantheists is that these have given the
 majestic title of ,god to the universal
 life they assume--as ,spinoza has it1  
,omnia quamvis diversis gradibus animata
 sunt4  ,the question1 what is life8 is 
the greatest that the human             
understanding can ask of itself4 ,for   
thousands of years man has cudgelled his
 brain over this1 and is as far from    
finding an answer to-day as he was on   
the first day4 ,the definition most     
often repeated runs thus3 ,life is the  
ability possessed by certain bodies to  

react to stimuli1 to absorb nourishment 
and to reproduce themselves4 ,that is a 
statement of observed facts1 but it is  
no explanation4 ,it informs us that we  
are familiar with bodies which behave in
 a way distinguishing them from other   
bodies2 but why they conduct themselves 
differently from others1 what the       
particular thing is which is present in 
certain combinations of matter and      
absent in others--that is an            
impenetrable secret4  ,science has tried
 by the most varied methods to solve the
 problem4 ,it seemed a triumph of       
research that ,woehler produced urea1   
that chemists later on manufactured     
carbohydrates1 that ,fischer is on the  
high road to the production of synthetic
 albumen4 ,what is gained by these      
discoveries8 ,we bring about the same   
combinations as the living cell does4   
,that is1 no doubt1 an interesting      
achievement1 but its value as an        
addition to our knowledge on this point 
is infinitesimal4 ,for we accomplish the

 production of sugar1 urea and amine in 
a manner very different to that of the  
living cell1 and he who copies the      
things turned out in a workshop has     
contributed nothing to our knowledge of 
the workman who plies his trade in the  
workshop4 ,the dividing line between    
life and lifelessness was supposed to   
have been obliterated when elementary   
manifestations of life were proved to   
exist in inanimate matter2 the ,brownian
 movements in the smallest particles2   
the growth of crystals immersed in a    
solution of the same chemical           
composition as themselves2              
crystallization itself which represents 
a kind of very simple organization of   
matter1 and at any rate proves the sway 
of a regulating and directive force2 the
 tendency of certain elements to        
combine1 which has been called their    
affinity4 ,but this name is only a      
poetical metaphor which no one will take
 literally4 ,the growth of crystals in  
their mother liquor is merely mechanical

 precipitation on their surface1 an     
external addition of layers of the same 
material2 but not growth by the         
incorporation of such matter1 that is1  
through the absorption of nourishment4  
,these and similar results of           
observation do not suffice absolutely to
 justify the assumption1 seductive      
though it be1 that life is a fundamental
 attribute of matter1 that it is present
 everywhere though graduated in         
intensity1 that therefore apparently    
inanimate matter differs not            
qualitatively1 but only quantitatively  
from living beings1 that life stretches 
in an unbroken line from the block of   
metal or rock1 in which it is completely
 obscured1 to man1 the most highly      
developed organism we know of2 and that 
at a certain point in its range it      
reveals itself in a form which permits  
no distinction between organic and      
inorganic matter4  ,the origin of life  
is as completely unknown to us as its   
essence4 ,for thousands of years the    

assumption was lightheartedly made that 
under certain1 somewhat vague           
circumstances1 life originated of its   
own accord4 ,pasteur showed that a      
generatio spontanea cannot be proved to 
exist1 that every living thing comes    
from another living thing1 a parent     
organism1 and that the old philosophers 
were right in propounding omne vivum ex 
ovo as a law1 although they only guessed
 it and had not proved it               
experimentally4 ,a very few critics1 who
 are hard to convince1 still dare to    
assert in a small voice that ,pasteur's 
work and all the facts established by   
microbiology do not prove conclusively  
that life does not nevertheless         
originate from inorganic matter under   
conditions which we cannot nowadays     
reproduce in our laboratories4 ,no      
answer can be made to this objection4   
,an experiment is only conclusive for   
the conditions in which it is made1 and 
not for others4 ,all that we can        
positively assert is that on earth the  

genesis of life without a demonstrable  
parent organism has never been observed4
 ,to go farther1 and to assert that a   
generatio spontanea is absolutely       
impossible under any conditions1 on     
earth or elsewhere1 is arbitrary1 just  
as it is to assert the contrary4  ,those
 who are supporters of the theory that  
life can be developed from non-living   
matter for a long time thought they had 
conclusively proved their case2 they    
argued as follows3 ,at the present time 
life exists on our planet2 according to 
the ,kant-,laplace hypothesis our planet
 was formed from a cosmic nebula and    
passed through a state of fluid         
incandescence2 in this state life is    
impossible2 therefore life must have    
originated spontaneously one day after  
the ,earth had cooled down2 consequently
 either the ,kant-,laplace hypothesis is
 wrong or the assertion that life can   
only be generated by life is erroneous2 
the two assumptions are incompatible4   
,this conclusion no longer presents any 

insuperable difficulties4 ,it has been  
observed that spores which have been    
kept for months at the temperature of   
frozen hydrogen1 that is1 very nearly at
 absolute zero1 have retained their     
germinative power and have developed    
when they were brought back to a        
favourable temperature4 ,therefore they 
would not be killed by the cold of      
interstellar space on their way from one
 heavenly body to another1 and could    
become the seeds of life on another     
hitherto inanimate star4 ,that large    
numbers of tiny particles of matter     
exist in interstellar space and are     
precipitated on the heavenly bodies is  
proved by the cosmic dust that arctic   
explorers have collected from the       
surface of snow and ice4 ,therefore the 
,earth may well have been in an         
incandescent state1 and may yet have    
received from interstellar space the    
germs of life which developed and       
multiplied when the ,earth's crust had  
cooled sufficiently to provide the      

conditions favourable to their          
existence2 and these germs may have been
 the ancestors of all the life that     
exists on earth to-day after a period of
 evolution lasting hundreds of millions 
of years4  ,this would account for the  
origin of life upon the ,earth1 but not 
of life in general4 ,the germs1 which   
travel as carriers of life from an older
 heavenly body to a younger one1 must   
have sprung from parents1 and however   
far back we trace their genealogical    
tree we are always finally faced by this
 dilemma3 either life did1 after all1   
originate at one time from something    
lifeless1 and what has happened once    
must be able to happen again1 now and   
always2 or life never originated at all1
 but has always existed2 it is eternal  
like matter1 in forms whose variety we  
cannot even dimly grasp1 its threads1   
having neither beginning nor end1 wind  
through eternity4 ,of these two         
assumptions the latter is incomparably  
more in harmony with our present-day    

views on the universe4 ,we believe the  
matter of which the universe is built up
 to be everlasting4 ,it costs no great  
effort to believe life to be eternal    
too4 ,true1 the idea of eternity is     
inconceivable to us2 it is a dim        
conception which has given rise to a    
word1 a tone picture which portrays     
something indefinite1 but within the    
bounds of the inconceivable there is    
room for both semi-obscurities1 the     
everlastingness of matter and the       
everlastingness of life4  ,but the most 
enigmatical point in the riddle of life 
is not life itself1 which is a form of  
being1 and is neither more nor less     
comprehensible than the existence of an 
inanimate object1 of a stone1 of water1 
of the air2 it is consciousness4        
,descartes proves his own existence to  
himself by the fact that he thinks4     
,life must be accompanied by            
consciousness in order to convince the  
living being that it exists4 ,the       
formula3 cogito ergo sum has been       

admired for hundreds of years4 ,it      
certainly is specious4 ,but how many    
questions it leaves unanswered6 ,has it 
the right to deny life to an entity that
 does not conceive itself8 ,must it not 
be completed by the proof that life     
without thought1 that is1 without       
consciousness1 does not exist1 that     
consciousness is the necessary          
complement of life8 ,and1 above all1    
ought not ,descartes to have given us an
 explanation of what thought and        
consciousness are8  ,i will attempt to  
answer the questions left unanswered by 
,descartes4 ,but ,i must premise one    
thing4 ,every definition of             
consciousness implies a postulate3 life4
 ,though at a pinch we can picture life 
without consciousness1 consciousness    
without life is absolutely              
inconceivable4 ,i do not undertake to   
explain what life is1 any more than ,i  
attempted it above4 ,we must take it as 
something given4 ,consciousness1 then1  
is the subjective realization of        

something objective1 the inward         
realization of something outside4 ,if in
 a living being a picture of its        
surroundings is developed1 then it      
absorbs something which is not a        
necessary part of itself4 ,of course1   
this inner image must not be understood 
to imply an absorption of matter4 ,it is
 a process in the matter of which the   
living being is built up4 ,but1 all the 
same1 the image of the outer world in   
the inner being does signify a          
penetration of the latter by the former4
 ,this image1 which follows the changes 
of the outer world and repeats them in  
the inner being1 is consciousness4 ,it  
may be shadowy and blurred1 or clear and
 distinct2 it may in rapid succession be
 formed and pass away1 and it can be    
preserved as a memory2 it may reflect a 
greater or a lesser portion of the outer
 world2 consciousness is accordingly    
duller or sharper2 its contents are     
scant or plentiful1 it retains the      
images of a shorter or longer series of 

conditions in the surrounding world4    
,between nutrition1 which is recognized 
as an essential phenomenon of life1 and 
consciousness a surprising parallelism  
subsists4 ,both consist in an absorption
 of the outer world by the organism2    
nutrition is the assimilation of matter1
 consciousness that of stimuli4 ,in the 
process of nutrition the organism       
digests small quantities of the outside 
world2 in consciousness it digests the  
world as a whole4  ,this parallelism is 
no mere play of the intellect4 ,if it is
 followed out it leads to significant   
ideas if not to actual knowledge4 ,what 
penetrates from the outer world into the
 inner being of the organism is         
vibration1 movement1 force4 ,is the     
matter which is absorbed as nourishment 
ultimately anything different8 ,here we 
come up against the ultimate problems of
 physics1 the various hypotheses        
regarding the nature of force and       
matter1 the theories that in addition to
 matter there is an ether1 or that the  

ether is a different1 more subtle1 form 
of matter1 or that neither matter nor   
ether exist1 but atoms out of which     
everything is built up1 which themselves
 consist of electrons which are centres 
of force1 motions without material      
consistency4 ,all these theories1 of    
which the last cannot be grasped by the 
human understanding1 we can leave       
severely alone4 ,this is not the place  
to investigate them4 ,but the attitude  
of the living organism towards the outer
 world from which it absorbs nourishment
 and impressions1 converting them into  
power to drive the life machine and     
transmuting them into consciousness1    
lends peculiar support to the           
supposition that force and matter are   
not only inseparable but identical1 that
 in them we must seek a principle1 or   
perhaps regard them themselves as a     
principle1 which must be of the same    
nature as consciousness1 for otherwise  
it could not be transmuted into the     
latter4  ,the senses are the means by   

which the outer world penetrates as an  
image into the inner being4 ,before the 
senses are differentiated the living    
organism possesses a general            
sensitiveness2 that is to say1 that     
under the influence of the outer world  
its cell protoplasm undergoes a process 
of regrouping1 resulting in chemical and
 dynamic changes4 ,the chemical results 
of stimulus are anabolism and           
katabolism1 a building up and breaking  
down of the cell content2 the dynamic   
results are movements which in the      
lowest forms of life are purely         
mechanical1 but in the higher forms     
adapt the organism to the external      
influence in so far as they place it    
either so as to be affected by the      
latter as long and as powerfully as     
possible1 or else so as to evade it4    
,the living organism can experience no  
stimulus and respond to it without      
absorbing and transmuting it1 converting
 it into a chemical process or a        
movement4 ,this inner process is a      

subjective realization of something     
objective1 a penetration by the outer   
world1 therefore an elementary          
consciousness4 ,in proportion as the    
general sensitiveness becomes           
differentiated into specific ones1 as   
the image of the outer world filters    
through the different coloured glass    
panes of the various senses into the    
inner being of the organism1 this image 
becomes multicoloured and varied4  ,it  
lies in the nature of this mechanism    
that the subjective image is not        
identical with the objective original1  
but is modified and even distorted by   
the panes through which it penetrates to
 the inner being of the organism4 ,what 
the subject perceives is never anything 
but a symbol of the object1 never the   
object itself2 but this symbol suffices 
to enable the consciousness to form an  
idea of the object1 just as letters     
enable the reader to take in words and  
thoughts4 ,we must conceive the         
development of consciousness to go hand 

in hand with that of the senses4 ,the   
more windows the organism can open to   
the outer world the more easily and the 
more clearly does its image penetrate4  
,the number of objects which the subject
 can take in is the measure of the      
perfection of its consciousness4 ,the   
protista1 lacking specific sense organs 
and possessing only the general         
sensitiveness of protoplasm1 can form   
only to a very limited extent and with  
very little variety an inner realization
 of the stimuli of the outer world4 ,its
 consciousness is necessarily very      
restricted and exceedingly dim4         
,consciousness is enlarged and grows    
clearer as the organism develops and its
 general sensitiveness is differentiated
 into specific senses1 until we reach   
the level of man whose consciousness    
embraces far more of the outer world    
than does that of any other living      
creature2 because1 lacking new senses1  
he has succeeded in amplifying and      
enlarging those he possesses1 and has by

 artificial means made himself capable  
of perceiving stimuli to which he is not
 directly susceptible and which         
therefore would have remained unknown to
 him2 to a certain extent he has        
translated them into a form which his   
senses can perceive4  ,i do not overlook
 any of the difficulties which my       
attempt to explain consciousness leaves 
untouched4 ,on all sides the most urgent
 and disquieting questions arise4 ,above
 all1 the fundamental question1 the most
 enigmatic of all3 how is an external   
stimulus1 that is a movement1 a         
vibration1 converted into a sensation1 a
 perception8 ,further3 must we in the   
consciousness distinguish between the   
frame and its contents1 the conceptual  
mechanism and the concept8 ,or do the   
two coincide8 ,is there no consciousness
 without a conceptual content8 ,and is  
it the movement entering into the       
organism1 the inner realization of the  
outer world which1 transmuting itself in
 an incomprehensible manner into a      

concept1 creates consciousness1 becomes 
consciousness8 ,is the consciousness of 
the man standing upon the highest plane 
of intellectuality the greatest         
consciousness possible8 ,does there     
exist anywhere in the universe a more   
abundant1 perhaps an infinitely more    
abundant consciousness than that of     
human beings on the ,earth1 and will the
 latter ever rise to this height8 ,it is
 obvious that a development is in       
progress4 ,there was a time when the    
most comprehensive1 the clearest        
consciousness on earth was that of the  
trilobite or the cephalopod4 ,evolution 
has gone as far as man4 ,does it stop at
 that or will it continue8  ,according  
to ,herbert ,spencer evolution is       
progress from the simple to the         
complicated4 ,let us accept this        
definition4 ,have we the right to set up
 a scale of values and place the        
complicated above the simple8 ,is the   
latter not the more perfect because it  
has more power of resistance1 greater   

durability1 and can hold its own        
triumphantly against all destructive    
influences8 ,is not evolution1 then1 a  
retrogression from the perfect1 because 
simple1 to the more complicated1 and    
therefore more fragile1 more easily     
upset and less capable of resistance to 
harm8 ,is it not sheer egocentrism if we
 appraise the value of living beings    
according to their greater or less      
resemblance to ourselves1 and judge them
 to be less or more worthy in proportion
 to their disparity with us8 ,are the   
fish which1 living in the sea wherein we
 cannot exist1 can inhabit the greater  
part of the globe1 are wild duck which  
fly1 swim and walk1 not more perfect    
than we1 who have had to conquer the air
 and the water by artificial means8 ,is 
not the mouse's hearing sharper than    
ours8 ,the eagle's sight keener8 ,the   
dog's scent incomparably more delicate8 
,has not the carrier pigeon an          
infinitely better sense of locality than
 we have8 ,are not many beasts          

physically stronger1 more nimble and    
agile than man8 ,his only claim to      
superiority rests on the greater        
perfection of his consciousness4 ,why do
 not all living creatures participate   
equally in the evolution to which this  
superiority is due8 ,why does it not    
take place in every organism and lead   
the unicellular living being in an      
unbroken ascent to the level of ,goethe 
or ,napoleon1 or to a still more lofty  
one1 if such an one exist anywhere in   
the universe8  ,if one could believe in 
a ,ruling ,power and the plan of the    
universe as its work1 would it not be   
terribly cruel and revoltingly unjust   
that this power1 instead of treating all
 living beings alike1 should make a kind
 of selection of grace and lead some up 
to a higher level while it condemned    
others to lasting lowliness1 and that it
 should ordain that on the road from the
 unicellular organism to man1 countless 
connecting links should be left         
hopelessly behind and not be permitted  

to continue their ascent8 ,or must we   
admit the humiliating conclusion that a 
greater amount of consciousness does not
 necessarily imply higher rank and      
greater dignity1 and that a protista1   
with its almost unimaginably pale and   
narrow consciousness1 can have just as  
great a feeling of well-being as man    
with his immeasurably superior          
intellectual life2 that therefore the   
protista suffers no wrong if it never   
gets beyond its present stage of        
evolution2 and finally that the amount  
of the outer world which man can absorb 
in his consciousness is as far removed  
from the entirety of the universe as the
 contents of the protista's             
consciousness are from that of the human
 mind8 ,no answer can be found to these 
questions4 ,whatever purports to be an  
answer1 be it introduced as theology or 
as philosophy1 is visionary or          
nonsensical4 ,we must resign ourselves  
to moving in a very small circle        
moderately illuminated by ,reason1 while

 all around1 if we seek to penetrate    
beyond it1 we perceive gruesome         
darkness4  ,evolution1 that is a        
progress from the comparatively simple  
to the more complicated1 is a striking  
fact--,i say comparatively simple       
advisedly1 for even in the unicellular  
organism the processes are far removed  
from the absolutely simple4 ,we do not  
know from what part of the organism the 
impulse to evolution comes4 ,here we    
meet with the same mystery which shrouds
 growth1 its duration1 its measure and  
its bounds4 ,as the conception is       
lacking1 a word has been found1 viz41   
entelechy1 which ,driesch introduced    
into biology1 the co-operation of all   
parts of the organism for the purpose   
not only of preserving it but also of   
making it more efficient in the matter  
of self-preservation and more perfect4  
,a critical investigation of entelechy  
would involve the broaching of the whole
 question of life4 ,it does not come    
within the scope of this work4 ,i shall 

therefore content myself with a very few
 remarks4 ,entelechy works as if it were
 reasonable and acted with a set        
purpose4 ,if you think it out           
exhaustively it forces you to the       
assumption that life is an intellectual 
principle1 even in the protoplasm of the
 cell1 long before there is any         
perceptible trace of consciousness2 that
 this intellectual principle makes use  
of matter1 builds it up1 organizes it1  
moulds it into material and tools for   
construction1 and sets up a mechanism in
 which and by which it develops itself4 
,as far as we can see the purpose of    
life is life itself4 ,entelechy directs 
all the work of the organism in such a  
way that it becomes more and more       
capable of self-preservation1 that its  
efficiency becomes greater1 that it can 
absorb more of the outer world and can  
react more vigorously upon the outer    
world4 ,in other words1 life strives    
continuously to make its embodiments    
more permanent1 securer1 richer and more

 manifold4  ,however1 if we do not know 
how the impulse to evolution originates1
 we can at least form an idea of the    
mechanism of evolution4 ,fundamentally  
life consists in the absorption of      
cosmic movements or vibrations1 and     
their transformation into another form  
of movement4 ,the living cell is a      
machine which makes use of cosmic energy
 for physio-chemical work4 ,metabolism1 
warmth1 electric manifestations1        
movement1 and as their concomitant a    
graduated consciousness1 are the result 
of this work which is carried out by    
cosmic energy in the cell power machine4
  ,to start with1 this machine works in 
the very simplest fashion4 ,it uses up  
its motive power as fast as it acquires 
it4 ,energy flows in and immediately    
flows out again in another form4 ,the   
organism is like a pipe or a vessel     
without a bottom1 so that its contents  
cannot be stored4 ,the lower organisms  
which obey tropisms are such bottomless 
vessels4 ,they are continually and      

inevitably subjected to the same        
attractions and repulsions and have no  
means to withstand them4 ,but at a      
certain stage of evolution--how8 why8   
,driesch replies3 ,entelechy6--a new    
part is developed in the machine1       
something like the cam on a cogwheel    
which forces it to come to rest4 ,or1 to
 keep to the earlier simile1 the        
bottomless vessel acquires a bottom with
 a tap that can be opened and closed4   
,with this arrangement the organism is  
able to store the energy it has received
 and then to make use of it according to
 its needs1 to do much more or much less
 work with it1 to achieve much greater  
or much smaller effects1 than it would  
be capable of doing with the amount of  
energy it receives from outside in a    
given unit of time4 ,it is obvious how  
much more efficient the organism becomes
 if it can store up energy and can adapt
 to its needs the amount used up4 ,this 
new part of the machine is ,inhibition4 
,it appears early1 and takes part in the

 general development of the organism2 it
 is indeed the strongest factor in this 
development4 ,before ,inhibition        
intervenes the organism has only one    
response to stimulus3 reflex action4    
,this is of the character of an electric
 discharge4 ,it may be stronger or      
weaker1 but is uniform in kind4 ,it     
varies quantitatively but not           
qualitatively4 ,in the lower organisms  
it is a contraction of the cell         
protoplasm1 a movement4 ,in the higher  
organisms1 in which the life processes  
are carried out on the principle of the 
division of labour and which have       
developed various organs for this       
purpose1 each organ performs the action 
of its specific function2 the muscle    
contracts1 the nerve sends out a nervous
 impulse1 the gland forms a secretion1  
and so on4 ,all reflex actions have this
 in common1 that they serve no other    
purpose than that of relaxing tension in
 the organism4 ,they do not imply any   
co-ordinated effort to promote the      

comfort and the welfare of the living   
being4 ,they cannot fulfil any          
complicated task4 ,they exhaust the     
organism which1 after a series of reflex
 actions1 becomes insensitive to stimuli
 and must rest for a time before it can 
react again4  ,beginning from that stage
 of evolution where inhibition          
intervenes1 reflex action loses the     
character of an automatic response to   
impulse and becomes disciplined4        
,inhibition tries to suppress reflex    
action4 ,its success is more or less    
complete according to the sensitiveness 
and life energy of the tissue receiving 
the stimulus and the degree to which the
 mechanism of inhibition is developed4  
,the organism retains its tension1      
remains charged with energy1 and is able
 to carry out work for definite         
purposes4 ,in place of anarchistic      
reflex action which occurs regardless of
 the needs of the organism1 we find     
economy of energy1 co-ordination of     
effort1 movement directed to a          

profitable end4 ,it is only inhibition  
which can raise the organism from its   
state of passivity1 its helpless        
dependence upon tropism1 to a being in  
which a will is beginning to dawn and   
which by its will becomes               
self-determinative4 ,inhibition is a    
function of the will2 it is the will's  
tool4 ,even ,plato dimly perceived this1
 and he expresses it in the metaphorical
 language peculiar to himself1 when1 in 
the ,republic1 he compares a human being
 to a creature made up of three animals3
 a hundred-headed sea-serpent which must
 at one and the same time be fed and    
tamed1 a blind lion1 and a man who tames
 the serpent by means of the lion4      
,these three animals are desire 7,greek3
 epithumia71 courage 7,greek3 thumos71  
and mind 7,greek3 nous74 ,we say in     
biological language1 reflex action1     
inhibition1 and will or volitional      
reason4  ,all the concepts that are     
referred to here3 purpose1              
co-ordination1 inhibition and will1 are 

every one of them dependent upon one    
fundamental concept1 consciousness4     
,without it they are unthinkable4       
,schopenhauer's unconscious will is a   
word without meaning4 ,i have postulated
 consciousness as the inseparable       
concomitant of life4 ,it is probably the
 essence of life4 ,in its lowest stage  
it is too dim1 its contents too meagre  
and blurred1 properly to distinguish the
 organism in which it dwells from the   
world around4 ,in a higher state of     
development1 when it gradually grows    
clearer and begins to be filled with    
more sharply defined ideas1 it learns to
 keep its organism and the surrounding  
world apart1 and tries to make the      
attitude of the former to the latter one
 of self-defence1 self-preservation and 
self-development4 ,from this stage of   
development onward1 concepts begin to   
connect and group themselves in such a  
way that consciousness contains not only
 an image of the immediate present1 but 
also memories of the past and a forecast

 of the future4 ,the ability to prolong 
the present into the future1 to         
understand the actual as a cause of the 
effects that follow and to foresee these
 effects1 that is the starting point of 
logic and reason4 ,it is the necessary  
antecedent of the will1 which would have
 no meaning if it were not the effort to
 realize a conception of actions and    
their consequences1 previously worked   
out by consciousness4 ,will is a        
function of consciousness which1 in     
pursuance of the well-known biological  
law1 creates an instrument for its      
purposes1 and this instrument is        
inhibition4 ,the higher an organism     
stands on the ladder of evolution the   
more energetically and surely does      
inhibition work1 the nicer and the more 
masterly does its intervention in the   
original reflex actions grow4  ,thanks  
to the piling up of reserves of energy1 
which is a result of inhibition1 the    
organism can carry out its work of      
differentiation1 can develop organs and 

organic systems1 and obtain the power to
 perform more complicated functions2    
these render it ever more independent of
 the outer world and enable it to affect
 the outer world to an increasing       
extent4 ,inhibition plays an important  
part in differentiation4 ,its apparatus 
becomes organized4 ,the nerve centres   
from which the inhibition proceeds form 
a ladder of which each rung is          
subordinate to the next4 ,the peripheral
 nerves are controlled by the nerve     
centres in the spinal cord1 these again 
by the centres in the medulla oblongata1
 and then in succession by the          
cerebellum and the cerebrum1 and finally
 by the corticle4 ,on the principle of  
least resistance1 on which all life is  
based1 the highest centres of inhibition
 unburden themselves by granting the    
lower ones a certain measure of         
independence4 ,the reaction to the most 
ordinary and frequent stimuli is        
controlled and organized in its         
character and strength by the apparatus 

of inhibition1 so that it ensues        
automatically1 and no active inhibition1
 that is1 no conscious effort of the    
will1 is required4 ,the simplest of     
these automatic reflex movements take   
place below the level of consciousness4 
,those organized complexes of movement1 
however1 which we call instincts1 are   
carefully watched by the consciousness  
and subjected to severe check if they   
appear to run counter to the supposed   
interest of the organism4 ,the          
hereditary complexes of movement        
constituting instinct are highly        
organized and oppose inhibition1 only   
yielding to it when it is stronger than 
they are4 ,this can be observed in      
animals which are capable of taming and 
training4 ,all the artificial actions   
and omissions that man teaches them are 
triumphs of inhibition over automatism4 
,among human beings it is only the elect
 who can vigorously suppress their      
instincts by inhibition directed by     
,reason4 ,the being that has attained   

the summit of organic evolution on earth
 is man1 in whom only the lower1        
vegetative life processes are liable to 
the influence of tropism and primary    
reflex actions1 while all the higher and
 highest functions are the work of      
,reason1 which arms the will with       
inhibition and suppresses all impulses  
and actions that hinder its purposes4   
,it is characteristic of these functions
 that they are first worked out as      
concepts by the consciousness before    
they are realized as movements4  ,it was
 essential for ,morality to find this   
whole organic structure ready to its    
hand before it could become a factor in 
human life4 ,this structure had been    
developed and perfected by the organism 
for its own purposes1 for the defence   
and enrichment of its life1 to ward off 
painful and obtain pleasurable feelings4
 ,morality took possession of it and    
used it for its own ends1 which do not  
at the first glance coincide with the   
aims which the individual immediately   

perceives and imagines1 and may indeed  
be diametrically opposed to these1      
preventing pleasurable emotions1 causing
 him pain and even endangering his life4
  ,but ,morality1 which is a creation of
 society1 was only able to dominate the 
individual and gain control of the      
organic apparatus of his vital economy1 
because its purpose is directed towards 
the same goal as the tendencies of the  
individual organism1 prolonging them    
beyond the individual's scope1 aiming at
 his preservation1 and thus coinciding  
with his instinct for self-preservation4
  ,morality limits the individual's     
vainglory and subordinates him to the   
community2 it is the condition on which 
the community allows the individual to  
participate in the mightier and more    
varied means of protection and the      
enrichment of existence which it has to 
offer4 ,but apart from this somewhat    
remote advantage of ,morality1 there is 
another immediate one for the           
individual3 it consists in the continual

 exercise and consequent strengthening  
of inhibition2 therefore1 as we have    
learnt to see in inhibition the main    
factor in the development and           
differentiation of all living creatures1
 it offers a means of raising the       
individual to biological perfection4    
,the faculty of inhibition1 being in a  
continual state of strong tension1 makes
 automatic reflexes subject to the will1
 makes blind impulses obedient to the   
somewhat less blind reason1 and helps   
man along the path of evolution from the
 status of a creature of instinct to    
that of a thinking personality of strong
 character1 capable of judgment and     
foresight1 a personality which does not 
seek to attain the pleasurable emotions 
necessary to every living creature by   
pandering to his senses and satisfying  
the appetites of the flesh1 but achieves
 them by gratification of a higher      
order1 by the triumph of the intellect  
over vegetative life1 by strengthening  
the will in relation to the stimuli of  

the outer world and the organs1 by      
taking pleasure in the fact that the    
will is content with its sway4 ,these   
are harsh but subtle pleasures which1   
when they continue to preponderate in   
the consciousness1 bring about that     
state of subjective happiness which is  
in the highest degree beneficial to     
life4  ,morality is an arrangement which
 has arisen from the needs of society2  
that is to say1 it is not innate1 but is
 an artificial institution of the race4 
,however1 it grafts itself upon the     
natural organs and attributes of man1   
and thus1 from being a sociological     
phenomenon1 it becomes a biological one4
 ,the idea that ,morality is something  
absolute1 a cosmic force1 and that it   
would still exist and be valid if there 
were no human beings1 and even if the   
earth had no existence1 ,i have refuted 
with scorn4 ,we must hold fast to the   
fact that ,morality is a law of human   
conduct1 that it is in force only among 
mankind1 and that apart from mankind it 

is unthinkable4 ,as1 however1 it becomes
 a differentiated function of the       
apparatus of inhibition1 it participates
 in the general processes of life and   
leads us to that point where1 indeed1 we
 face the unnerving outlook upon the    
absolute and the question of eternity4  
,my arguments have led me to many       
phenomena that can be established and   
interpreted as facts of experience1 but 
the explanation of which lies beyond the
 power of the human mind4 ,we have      
examined the riddle of life1 and we have
 distinguished therein a number of      
inexplicable things3 the lack of a      
beginning1 sensitiveness to stimuli1    
consciousness1 the transformation of    
vibrations into sensations and concepts1
 the will1 and inhibition4 ,we are      
forced to the conclusion that the only  
discernible aim of life's activities is 
the preservation of life1 or1 more      
shortly1 that life is its own aim and   
object4 ,morality1 too1 either openly or
 by implication1 sets itself the one    

clearly demonstrable task of ensuring to
 the individual the preservation and    
security of his existence in a higher   
sphere than that of individual          
vegetative life processes4 ,thereby it  
fits into the scheme of existence1 its  
mysteries and aims1 and becomes an      
integral part of the cycle of life which
 emerges from eternity and returns to   
it4     ,,chapter ,,iv  ,,morality ,,and
 ,,law   ,the coercion which the        
community exercises upon its members1 by
 means of which it forces them to adapt 
their actions and abstention from action
 to the standard it has set up1 has two 
forms3 ,custom and ,law4 ,are the two   
really different8 ,what is their        
relation1 one to the other8 ,these are  
questions worth investigating4  ,ever   
since the earliest times1 grave men have
 meditated on the relation between      
,custom and ,law4 ,they were forced by  
evidence and practical experience to    
note a difference between the two       
institutions1 but at the same time they 

had the definite impression that they   
trace their origin to the same source4  
,socrates distinguishes between the     
written laws of his country and the     
unwritten ones which express the will of
 the gods4 ,the former constitute       
positive ,law which the citizen must    
observe and to which he must submit2 the
 latter1 however1 are higher1 for they  
emanate from the gods themselves4 ,the  
immutability of the unwritten laws is a 
proof that they are superior to the     
written ones4 ,written laws vary from   
state to state4 ,they are the work of   
individual law-givers who were sometimes
 wise men and sometimes unreasonable    
tyrants4 ,but all contain certain       
precepts which are everywhere alike1    
which everywhere impose the same rules  
upon man4 ,it is almost as if one and   
the same law-giver had co-operated in   
the making of all the laws that obtain  
in the different towns and countries1   
and are so unlike one another in many   
points4 ,this common law-giver1 whose   

will is manifest in all laws1 however   
far removed they be from one another1 is
 the ,deity4 ,that is essentially       
,socrates' train of thought as given by 
,xenophon in his ,memorabilia4 ,the     
,attic sage speaks the language of his  
time1 which1 by the way1 is still that  
of many present-day people4 ,the ,deity1
 whose will permeates all written laws  
and to whom they may be traced1 is the  
principle of ,morality4 ,hugo ,grotius1 
in a manner more appropriate to modern  
thought1 expresses it thus3 ,law and    
,morality spring from the same source1  
namely1 the strong social instinct      
natural to man4 ,they bear witness to   
reasonable solicitude for the welfare of
 the community4 ,this placing on an     
equality of ,law and ,custom1 of jus and
 mos1 is very remarkable in such a      
strictly professional thinker1 such a   
positive jurist as ,grotius4 ,kant      
discriminates between the doctrine of   
,virtue and the doctrine of ,law2 he    
keeps them apart1 but he emphasizes     

their connexion1 and the two together   
make up his doctrine of ,ethics4  ,as a 
matter of fact1 no fundamental          
difference between ,law and ,custom     
exists2 only ,law is enforced           
differently to ,custom4 ,it would be    
going too far to say3 ,law has sanctions
 and ,custom has none4 ,the latter has  
sanctions too1 but they are of a        
different kind to those of the ,law4 ,he
 who transgresses ,custom will suffer   
the contempt of his fellow men1 and this
 may become so penetratingly severe that
 the most hardened and shameless rascal 
must feel it4 ,in an old1 loose form of 
society where individualism is highly   
developed1 and each one goes his own    
way1 paying little regard to the others1
 there an unscrupulous1 conscienceless  
rogue may sin against ,socrates'        
unwritten law without being penalized4  
,in a young1 closely-knit community1    
however1 in which the feeling of        
intimate connexion between the members  
is lively and vivid1 he would be        

proscribed1 as soon as he was found out1
 and it would be impossible for him to  
remain1 say1 for example1 in a small    
town of the ,united ,states4 ,public    
opinion would make it so hot for him    
that he would be glad to escape with a  
whole skin4 ,but this punishment is     
exceptional for transgressions of       
,custom1 whereas it is the rule for     
those of the ,law4  ,the sanction of the
 ,law is stricter than that of ,custom1 
just as the ,law itself is stricter than
 is ,custom4 ,the ,law concerns itself  
with concrete cases in which            
consideration for one's fellow men must 
be practised1 duties to him fulfilled1  
and his claims respected4 ,these cases  
are defined by ,law as clearly as       
possible1 whereas ,custom confines      
itself to generalities and determines   
the whole attitude of the individual to 
his neighbour4 ,custom embraces the     
outer and inner life of man and         
supervises his opinions1 which are the  
parents of his deeds1 and also his deeds

 themselves2 ,law is only concerned with
 actions1 and refrains from penetrating 
to the intimacy of thoughts1 unless the 
latter alter the essential character of 
the action1 as premeditation in an act  
of revenge and temporary or permanent   
irresponsibility alter the judgment of  
offences and crimes4 ,law is a miserly  
extract of custom1 a meagre selection   
from its variety1 a concentration and   
embodiment of its surging vagueness4 ,it
 may be compared with crystals1 which in
 their geometrically accurate forms are 
crystallized clearly and definitely out 
of a liquid1 the mother liquor2 or with 
the heavenly bodies which agglomerate   
out of surging primal nebul4 ,custom is 
the primitive thing1 ,law is derived    
from it4 ,it appeals to its descent from
 ,custom1 and founds1 at any rate       
tacitly1 its claim to respect on these  
grounds4 ,a law which ran counter to    
,custom1 which was confessedly in       
opposition to ,custom1 could never be   
maintained or prevail1 though it        

bristled with the menace of the most    
dreadful punishments4  ,the relationship
 of mother to child between ,custom and 
,law may be obscure to the majority2 it 
is clear to the analytical mind4        
,recognition of the essential unity of  
both phenomena explains an assumption   
which was widespread among the best     
intellects from the ,middle ,ages until 
well into the eighteenth century1 but   
which has now been abandoned as         
erroneous by more positive1 though      
indeed narrower1 legal minds4 ,this     
assumption is that there is a natural   
,law antecedent to historical ,law1     
which exists and acts beside and above  
the latter1 and which forms the basis   
and the measure of every positive law1  
of every concrete legal judgment4 ,it is
 comprehensible that the nineteenth     
century swept away the idea of natural  
,law and freely made fun of it4 ,to a   
sternly disciplined legal mind it must  
indeed seem grotesque if a judge1 in    
order to arrive at a verdict in some    

concrete dispute1 cites the rights to   
which man is born instead of a certain  
text of the law1 or even1 following     
,schiller's advice1 reaches up to the   
stars and brings down thence the eternal
 ,law4 ,even this procedure is not so   
farcical as it seems to stupid          
article-mongers and hair-splitting      
paragraphists1 for the procedure of     
equity of the ,english judges1 who are  
not prone to clowning1 is at bottom     
nothing but this reaching up to the     
stars and this judging by the rights to 
which man is born4 ,the feud between    
natural ,law and historical ,law was    
really a quarrel about a word4 ,jean    
,jacques ,rousseau1 his contemporaries  
and disciples1 simply made a mistake in 
their choice of an expression4 ,they    
were guilty of an inaccuracy when they  
spoke of natural ,law4 ,they should have
 said3 the innate claim of man that his 
person should be respected1 or1 natural 
consideration for one's fellow man1 or1 
most shortly and simply1 ,morality4 ,to 

the latter legal lights would have      
raised none of the objections with which
 they victoriously opposed natural ,law4
  ,the beginnings of ,morality coincide 
with the beginnings of society1 as the  
latter could not have existed for a     
single day without the former4 ,since   
men1 forced by the struggle for         
existence1 emerged from their original1 
natural solitude and united in a        
community1 they have had to watch over  
their impulses1 suppress their desires1 
do things they disliked1 and in all     
their actions and abstentions from      
action consider their neighbours'       
feelings1 as they demanded that their   
feelings1 too1 should be considered4    
,that was ,morality which limited the   
vainglory and arbitrary conduct of      
unfettered man4 ,it included all rules  
that determine the attitude of man to   
man4 ,there was no distinction between  
,custom and ,law4 ,men were ruled by    
custom which was traditional in their   
community and observed by all2 and their

 ,custom had the force of ,law4         
,formulated laws1 and more especially   
written laws1 appear comparatively late4
 ,true1 ,asia has old examples of such2 
the ,manava ,dharma ,shastra1 the book  
of laws of the ,indian ,manu1 the       
,chinese ,chings1 the law of ,hammu     
,rabi1 and that other law1 akin to this1
 though not derived from it1 but        
probably drawn from a similar older     
source1 the law of the ,pentateuch4 ,the
 laws of ,draco1 ,solon and ,lycurgus   
and the ,roman ,twelve table law are    
appreciably younger2 much later still   
the leges barbarorum were written down1 
some of them1 like the prescriptive ,law
 of the ,germans set down in the        
,sachsenspiegel1 not till the end of the
 ,middle ,ages4 ,it is peculiar to most 
of the old ,asiatic laws that they      
contain both rules of conduct and legal 
regulations1 and that they do not       
differentiate between these two kinds of
 precepts4  ,let us take one example3   
the ,ten ,commandments4 ,beside such    

positive orders as ,thou shalt not      
steal2 ,thou shalt not kill2 ,honour thy
 father and thy mother2 we find such as 
give rules for the character and course 
of spiritual happenings1 regarding which
 others cannot observe whether they are 
obeyed or not1 like the commandments    
respecting man's relationship to ,god1  
or admonishing man not to covet his     
neighbour's wife or goods4 ,those are   
subjective impulses1 spiritual moods    
which are revealed only to the eye of   
conscience as long as they do not betray
 themselves in action1 and which by     
their very nature cannot be the subject 
of ,law which deals only with outward   
manifestations of thought and will1 and 
is concerned only with things done4  ,in
 constitutional ,law1 too1 no less than 
in criminal and civil ,law1 the         
eighteenth century tends to preface     
certain laws with universal moral       
principles1 and to establish by formal  
law that the former are derived from the
 latter4 ,the ,declaration of           

,independence of the ,united ,states in 
,july1 #aggd1 says3 ,we consider the    
following truths self-evident3 that all 
men are born equal2 that the ,creator   
has bestowed upon them inalienable      
rights1 amongst which are the right to  
life1 to freedom1 to the pursuit of     
happiness1 etc4 ,so before these rights 
are guaranteed by the ,law1 they are    
announced to belong by birth and nature 
to man1 to be independent of any        
particular and express bestowal by the  
law-giver1 and beyond all dispute or    
even argument4 ,of the thirteen ,states 
which formed the original ,union1 ten   
accompanied their constitution by a     
,bill of ,rights which repeated the     
essential contents of the ,declaration  
of ,independence of ,july1 #aggd2 seven 
of them placed them as an introduction  
before their fundamental law1 and three 
of them incorporated them in the latter4
 ,two others1 ,new ,york and ,georgia1  
distributed them among various articles 
of their constitution4 ,rhode ,island   

alone refrained from a general          
declaration4 ,the ,states which joined  
the ,union later1 with few exceptions   
followed the example of their           
predecessors and built up their         
constitution on the foundation of an    
explicit statement of the natural rights
 of man4 ,the ,french ,revolution       
followed the course which the ,united   
,states had indicated1 and began its    
constitution of #agia with the          
,declaration of the rights of men and   
citizens1 which is not a law in the     
technical sense of the word1 but is     
superior to all positive ,law1          
constitutes the latter's standard and   
touchstone1 and straightway makes all   
laws invalid which are not animated by  
its spirit or which contradict it4  ,in 
the beginning1 therefore1 there was     
,morality1 and the first laws1 which    
formulated its precepts either in oral  
tradition or in writing1 recommended    
without distinction what was good and   
desirable1 and what was necessary and   

expedient4 ,the differentiation of the  
,morality1 which the commonwealth felt  
to be its code of right and wrong1 into 
,custom and ,law took place in late     
times4 ,it was most definite in ,rome1  
where for the first time a clear        
distinction was made between men's      
relation to their gods and their        
relation to one another2 the former was 
left to the individual's conscience1 the
 latter subjected to the power of the   
,state2 the elements of feeling and of  
dim perception were banished from the   
,law which confined its attention to    
deeds which it regulated in a           
high-handed manner4 ,law chose from out 
the all-embracing sphere of ,morality   
one narrow area1 that of mankind's      
immediate1 material interests1 and took 
this as its sole theme4 ,the object of  
all ,morality is to enable men to live  
together in a community peacefully and  
prosperously2 within the bounds of this 
more general purpose1 the task of the   
,law is to suppress by force the grosser

 hindrances to this harmony among       
individuals1 and by material means of   
coercion emphatically oblige everyone to
 respect the interests of his neighbour4
 ,what every responsible man of sound   
mind demands first and foremost is a    
proper respect for the possessions that 
are his by birth and acquisition1 that  
is for his life1 for his bodily welfare1
 for all the goods he owns that minister
 to his needs1 his comfort and his      
pleasure4 ,he who lays violent hands on 
these possessions1 or threatens to      
endanger them1 is recognized to be an   
enemy2 man arms himself against such an 
one1 fights against him1 tries1 if he   
have a strong character1 to destroy him1
 or flees from him if he is too weak to 
triumph over him2 man only yields to    
such an one if he simply cannot help    
himself1 but he does so with hatred and 
revenge in his heart1 and in a state of 
mind which1 if it becomes fairly        
widespread1 sets every man's hand       
against his fellow-men and leads to the 

ruin and even to the dissolution of the 
community4 ,hence the task of ,law is   
effectively to protect the individual   
from the infringement of his rights by  
others4 ,it places the organized forces 
of the community at the service of the  
individual whose interests are          
threatened1 for the criminal law        
penalizes more or less severely attempts
 against life and health1 unlawful      
seizure of property whether by force or 
cunning1 malicious molestation and      
offence2 the laws of commerce keep watch
 over the faithful fulfilment of        
contracts dealing with the fair exchange
 of goods or the execution of work1 and 
in case of need enforce it4  ,a select  
few1 everywhere only a small minority1  
has a different scale of values to that 
of the masses4 ,for them life is not the
 supreme thing4 ,there are things they  
value more highly4 ,the masses have no  
understanding for these people's needs  
and fine feelings4 ,their self-respect  
and their dignity are dear to them as   

wealth1 their honour more sacred than   
life itself4 ,unhesitatingly they       
sacrifice their property to freedom1 and
 more unbearable than anxiety for their 
material interests is life in           
surroundings in which brutality1 vulgar 
sentiments1 harsh egotism1 malice1      
hypocrisy and treachery preponderate4   
,the ,law does not consider this        
minority4 ,it is the creation and the   
servant of the great majority4 ,it      
clings to earth and is incapable of     
lofty flights4 ,it is of no service to  
the elect in the preservation of their  
noblest spiritual possessions or the    
defence of their ideals against clumsy  
maltreatment4 ,it declares itself to be 
incompetent to deal with any but        
material affairs4  ,therein lies at one 
and the same time the strength and the  
weakness of the ,law4 ,its strength lies
 in the fact that it definitely limits  
its sphere of action and strives to     
achieve positive results by positive    
means1 results intelligible even to a   

mean understanding4 ,its weakness lies  
in the fact that it ignores man's       
highest and noblest interests4 ,and     
these interests are there1 they too     
deserve consideration and protection1   
they have a right to demand that the    
guarantee of the community should       
embrace them as well4 ,the well-being of
 the community1 which is the object of  
,morality and of ,law too1 demands that 
such conditions should be created and   
maintained1 as should enable the elect  
also to enjoy life or at least find     
existence bearable4 ,but ,law does not  
suffice for that4 ,no law enjoins upon  
the careless throng of pachyderms to    
spare the tenderest and noblest         
sensibilities of lofty natures2 no judge
 punishes thoughtless or purposely      
malicious injury to them4 ,to remedy    
this evil we must rise from the lowly   
plain of ,law1 the natural              
dwelling-place of the masses1 to the    
heights of ,morality1 the habitual abode
 of superior minds4 ,at the theological 

stage of civilization refuge is sought  
with the gods in whose hands the        
protection of essential1 spiritual      
possessions is placed4 ,they are        
expected to punish the wicked whose evil
 deeds are beyond the reach of any penal
 code1 they are expected to soothe and  
comfort when life is hard or even       
unendurable4 ,that is the compromise    
that the elect made with life in the    
hard times of ,european barbarism4 ,they
 escaped from the world and thus avoided
 contact with the repugnant masses4     
,they shut themselves up in cloistered  
cells away from mankind and held mystic 
intercourse with ,god4 ,among the       
people1 cruel authorities with          
difficulty maintained discipline and    
scanty law and order by means of        
flogging and the pillory1 torture1 the  
gallows and the wheel4 ,the minority of 
the elect disciplined themselves1       
suppressed their lower impulses by      
self-imposed mortification1 and with the
 help of prayer and belief in ,god's    

promised millennium managed to keep     
their heads above water despite the     
crushing spectacle of the life of those 
times4  ,long before the ,christian era1
 the ,greeks of noble disposition felt  
the need of living in an atmosphere of  
higher intellectuality and morality than
 that of the market-place1 and they hid 
themselves behind the cloud-curtain of  
the ,eleusinian ,mysteries1 where they  
kept to themselves1 escaped the rule of 
the rude ,law1 and followed the nobler  
precepts of ,morality4 ,whenever the    
measure of ,morality contained in       
positive law did not suffice for the    
minority with higher aspirations1 this  
minority adopted the same expedient1 a  
form of esotericism2 small circles were 
formed outside the community in which   
there was added to the current legal    
code a superstructure of stricter rules1
 more finely shaded duties1 more        
courteous consideration4 ,present-day   
life also offers examples of this       
tendency which is met with in all ages4 

,there are select circles and           
professions in which the standard of    
irreproachableness is far higher than   
among the mass of the people4 ,there a  
man is not held blameless1 simply       
because he has never transgressed a     
positive law1 never come into conflict  
with the powers of justice4 ,he must be 
as unspotted in the eye of moral justice
 as he is in that of the ,law4 ,a club  
or association that is self-respecting  
will not admit to membership a candidate
 reputed to lie1 to have an evil tongue1
 to break his word1 to be a toady and a 
snob1 though none of these offences are 
punishable by law4 ,it has happened that
 a corps of ,german officers has forced 
one of their number to send in his      
papers because he has seduced and       
deserted a respectable girl1 an         
adventure flattering to the vanity of   
puppies who1 as like as not1 boast of   
it1 and with which a judge can only deal
 if the injured girl appeals to him--and
 even then he cannot punish the         

offender1 but merely sentence him to pay
 damages4  ,almost the whole world is   
agreed on the point that the ,law does  
not sufficiently protect honour4        
,positive ,law evidently does not       
consider it of such value as material   
possessions1 for the defence of which it
 knows itself to be qualified4 ,but     
there are numbers of people whose honour
 is dearer to them than their fortune1  
even than their life1 and trembling with
 indignation they see that a thief who  
steals their purse with a few shillings 
is haled off to prison1 while a         
slanderer who sullies their honour      
either goes unpunished1 or at most gets 
off with a fine1 which merely adds      
official insult to the injury4 ,in this 
case the ,law has lagged so far behind  
,morality that individuals try of their 
own accord to bridge the gulf without   
counting on the intervention of the     
community4 ,for aspersions of their     
honour the masses take revenge with     
fists and cudgels1 often with bloody    

results2 and among the elect they resort
 to duels with lethal weapons1 a        
preposterous proceeding due to          
desperation1 and a bitter indictment of 
the prevailing laws4 ,it is a deed of   
self-help1 like the formation of a      
vigilance committee among the anarchical
 throng of a lawless rabble4 ,hardly to 
be justified on reasonable grounds1 it  
is intelligible from the point of view  
of historical tradition1 and as a       
survival of dim and primitive ideas4 ,in
 early days a properly regulated duel   
was an ordeal showing the judgment of   
heaven4 ,it was the general conviction  
that ,god would give victory to the     
right and crush the wrong4 ,when human  
,law failed1 the injured party appealed 
to the source of all ,law and placed his
 cause in the hands of the ,almighty4   
,from this point of view the duel is no 
unsuitable means of preventing plots to 
evade the law4 ,even if the injured     
party is inexperienced in the use of the
 weapon1 even if his opponent is skilled

 and vastly his superior1 he need not   
worry1 for ,god fights on his side4     
,therefore he is more sure of success   
than if he entrusted his cause to       
fallible human judges4 ,but from the    
moment that the duel ceases to be       
regarded as a means of arriving at the  
verdict of ,god1 nothing can be urged in
 its defence1 and that it nevertheless  
persists is a fact that can only be     
accounted for by the inadequacy of the  
current laws4  ,it really is astonishing
 that the ,law does not yet appraise    
honour at its true value4 ,educated     
people almost unanimously regret and    
condemn the backwardness of the ,law in 
this respect1 all the more so because   
the tremendous development of the       
respectable1 as well as of the          
disreputable1 ,press facilitates and    
aggravates libel to a hitherto          
undreamed-of extent1 and no defence can 
overtake the slander which is quickly   
spread broadcast4 ,doubtless public     
opinion will urge that measures be taken

 to bring the ,law into line with the   
views now held on all sides on the      
significance of honour1 its             
defencelessness and its need for        
protection4 ,that this has not yet been 
done is due to the slowness with which  
the ,law adapts itself to the demands of
 a ,morality which grows ever more      
profound and more refined4 ,law1 which  
originally devoted itself only to the   
crudest material interests1 very slowly 
extends the range of its protection1 but
 it does so continually1 with an        
ever-widening embrace1 including more   
and more delicate1 more and more noble1 
possessions1 taking into consideration  
ever higher and ever finer needs4 ,what 
early legislator would have thought of  
man's needing protection not only       
against murder1 grievous bodily harm and
 maltreatment1 but also against the     
dangers due to ignorance and            
carelessness in light-heartedly         
spreading infectious diseases1 and      
contaminating water and the air8 ,who   

would have dreamed in former times that 
positive ,law would consider the        
sensitiveness of nerves1 desire for     
beauty1 dislike of ugliness and forbid  
disturbing street noises1 protect the   
countryside from wicked disfigurement1  
and prevent the construction of         
buildings which would spoil the artistic
 architectural plan of a city8  ,these  
little traits1 these concessions to     
personal demands1 which to a coarse mind
 do not seem obviously justified1 go to 
prove that positive ,law continues to   
grow beyond the bounds of its           
unavoidably crude materialism1 and      
strives to rise into the regions of the 
unwritten law of the ,peripatetics1     
where ideal possessions are of more     
importance than those which have        
traditionally come within the scope of  
criminal and civil ,law4 ,law and       
,custom have a natural tendency to      
approach more and more nearly to one    
another1 to become merged in one another
 where the line that divides them is but

 faintly indicated4 ,the closer the     
union between them1 the more perfect is 
the ,morality of a society4 ,absolute   
perfection would be reached if ,law1    
which has been derived by               
differentiation from ,morality1 should1 
after a protracted period of            
development1 return to its source and be
 completely merged again in ,morality4  
,but that is a dream which can never be 
realized as long as man is constituted  
as he is at the present time4           
,enthusiasts have dreamed of it1 and in 
their imagination have seen an          
anarchical and lawless society in which 
no positive ,law1 no sanctions of force 
were needed1 and in which the           
understanding and conscience of         
individuals would suffice to ensure the 
rule of good faith and goodness1 and the
 curbing of selfishness4 ,as far as man 
can tell we shall never attain this     
,utopia4 ,we shall never be able to do  
without positive ,law1 not only on      
account of undeveloped and perverse     

natures1 in which animalism has the     
upper hand of humanity1 and which must  
be kept under strict discipline1 but    
because a sure guide is needed in cases 
of doubt and irresolution which confuse 
even the good1 nay1 the best1 men when  
passion and violent desire1 with their  
heavy thunderclouds1 darken the outlook 
of ,reason1 and judgment wavers amid the
 hurly-burly of a spiritual tempest4    
,all that we may hope for and should    
desire is that ,law should be filled    
with the spirit of ,morality and embrace
 as many moral ideas as possible4  ,it  
lies in the nature of the thing that    
,morality was never clearly and         
definitely formulated1 for as soon as   
this was done it assumed the character  
of ,law4 ,it remained general and       
slightly vague1 it spoke to men in such 
indefinite terms as good1 virtue1 duty1 
love of one's neighbour1 unselfishness1 
patience--terms into which everyone can 
read the meaning which suits his        
thoughts and feelings4 ,mankind has     

never lacked moral teachers4 ,the       
,indian ,shastras and the ,chings1      
,confucius and ,meng ,tse1 the prophets 
of ,israel and ,ben ,sirach1 ,plato and 
the wise men of the ,stoics1 the ,zend  
,avesta1 ,jesus and ,paul1 the platonic 
ethics of ,nicomachus1 those of         
,epictetus and ,marcus ,aurelius1       
thousands of years ago preached the     
principles which exhaust the whole field
 of ,morality1 and beyond the essentials
 of which none of the later moralists   
have gone2 neither the ,imitation of    
,christ nor ,ibn ,bachia1 ,spinoza1 the 
,scotch school and ,kant1 up to ,wundt  
and ,guyau4  ,but what about the effect 
of the doctrines which they advocated   
gently or passionately1 adducing proofs 
or uttering threats8 ,to lend weight to 
them they either appealed to ,god1      
threatening mankind with ,his wrath and 
vengeance1 or to ,reason1 which1        
according to them1 could advise man only
 for his good4 ,perhaps they could      
intimidate those who had blind faith and

 convince the reasonable4 ,but there are
 many of little faith1 and more still   
who are unreasonable1 and on these the  
persuasion1 warnings and conclusions of 
the ,moralists had no effect4 ,for these
 it was imperative to clothe the minimum
 of ,morality1 the minimum without which
 no society can exist1 in the definite  
form of laws1 and so create the ,law to 
which the weapons of the community lend 
compelling force4 ,thus the whole       
material of ,ethics is divided into     
,morality and ,law4 ,the ,theologians   
and ,scholiasts who trace all binding   
rules of human conduct back to          
revelations of the ,divine ,will        
recognized on principle only one single 
law3 but the aspect of practical life   
made even them distinguish between the  
lex indicativa and the lex prceptiva1   
between an indication or counsel and    
precept or command4 ,the lex indicativa 
is ,morality1 the lex prceptiva is the  
,law4  ,codes are the normal expression 
of the ,law4 ,not all ,law is formulated

 in this way1 for there is a recognized 
,law of custom1 but all laws1 codified  
or not1 become a part of the prevailing 
,law4 ,naturally1 and as is only        
reasonable1 all ,law is pre-existent in 
the consciousness of the majority1 and  
the law-giver's rle is limited to       
setting down in paragraphs universally  
acknowledged principles dictated by     
public opinion4 ,however1 there are an  
appreciable number of historical        
instances in which this procedure is    
reversed2 the law-giver1 without        
inquiring whether his ideas were in     
accord with the general conscience1     
arbitrarily clothed his dictates to the 
community in paragraphs which it had to 
accept as ,law4 ,it is clear that this  
procedure is extremely risky4 ,even if  
the law-giver possesses superior wisdom1
 even if he is far in advance of his    
people and his age1 even if his         
intentions are of the best1 there is    
grave danger that the moral feeling of  
the people will revolt against the laws 

thus forced on them4 ,outwardly they    
yield to the pressure of public         
authority1 but they obey the ,law with a
 keen inner sense of opposition2 a chasm
 yawns between conscience and the       
practice of the ,law1 ideas of ,morality
 and ,law become confused1 the moral    
foundation of all laws totters1 and the 
public gets into the habit of regarding 
the ,law as something alien and hostile1
 which cannot be disregarded with       
impunity1 but which it is not only not  
culpable1 but even meritorious to evade4
  ,an enormous amount has been written  
on the subject of what a law is1 and all
 this literature expresses in endless   
words very few and1 almost without      
exception1 very mediocre thoughts4 ,i   
should consider it an unpardonable waste
 of time to devote any considerable     
space to this rubbish1 either in order  
merely to quote opinions or to          
investigate and confute them4 ,perhaps  
the best thing said of the laws is      
,hobbes's description3 ,civil ,law 7the 

law of the country7 is nothing but a    
guarantee of natural ,law4 ,it is true  
that this definition implies a          
supposition3 the existence of natural   
,law which1 however1 is not binding in  
itself but requires the sanctions of the
 law of the country4 ,moreover1 it is   
only correct if we add the limitation   
that it does not guarantee all natural  
,law1 but only a part of it4 ,hobbes is 
also forced by his definition of the law
 of a country to explain what he means  
by natural ,law1 and he does not evade  
this duty4 ,natural ,law1 he says1 is   
the decree of true ,reason 7ratiocinatio
 recta7 with regard to what we must do  
and what avoid for our                  
self-preservation4444 ,transgression of 
natural ,laws is due to false ,reason   
7ratiocinatio falsa74  ,in spite of its 
vagueness this explanation of ,hobbes's 
shows that what he really means by      
natural ,law is ,morality1 and in this  
respect his views on the relation of    
natural ,law to civil ,law1 that is1 of 

,morality to ,law1 practically coincide 
with mine4 ,nevertheless1 he ignobly    
denies the moral decency of his doctrine
 of ,law when later on he coldly and    
dryly remarks3 ,all that the state      
commands is just1 all that it forbids is
 unjust4 ,saying this he stupidly and   
obsequiously makes the civil code the   
source of ,law1 whereas by his own      
definition ,law 7he says ,natural ,law7 
is the source of the civil code4 ,it is 
more pardonable for ,pusendorf1 a formal
 jurist1 to say3 ,law is the decree     
7decretum7 with which a superior binds  
his subject 7sibi subjectum74 ,that     
interpretation of ,law is possible if it
 is considered from outside2 it is a    
means of coercion in the hands of the   
mighty to subjugate the dependant2 this 
point of view ignores the essential2 but
 ,pusendorf has no concern with this1   
for he makes no claim to be a           
philosopher1 he keeps within the bounds 
of juridical practice4  ,the ,bishop of 
,seville1 ,saint ,isidor1 the most      

respected theologian of the time between
 the last patristic writers and ,st4    
,thomas ,aquinas1 gives the following   
definition of ,law3 ,law is an          
institution 7constitutio7 made by the   
people1 by which the nobles 7majores    
natu71 together with the common folk1   
have given a sanction to some ordinance4
 ,this says little about the essence of 
,law1 but it leads to the question of   
the origin of laws4 ,on this subject1   
too1 whole libraries full of books have 
been written since the time of ,plato   
and ,aristotle2 luckily1 for the most   
part1 they now only serve as food for   
moths and worms4  ,from this tangle of  
hair-splitting and sophistry1 from this 
muddle of syllogisms1 dogmatism and     
deep-sounding phrases which mean nothing
 at all1 one thought emerges pretty     
clearly1 to wit1 that only the highest  
authority in the ,state has the right to
 make laws4 ,on this point there is     
perfect unanimity2 and that is natural1 
for it is so obvious that it has no need

 to be circumstantially investigated and
 proved in the fifty thousand books that
 have been written on the subject4 ,it  
is perfectly clear that one cannot      
possibly force all the members of a     
state to obey certain commands and      
prohibitions which the ,law contains1   
unless one is stronger than each one of 
them1 and therefore the ,law must       
necessarily emanate from the highest    
power in the state4 ,it is beside the   
point to obscure this simplest and most 
transparent fact by questions as to the 
right of the law-giver4 ,he needs no    
theoretical right since he has the      
might4 ,to use ,kant's expression1      
positive ,law is not a creation of the  
mind 7,greek3 noumenon71 it is a        
phenomenon2 its existence is a matter of
 empiricism1 not of reason2 it is a     
matter of fact and is under no          
obligation to justify itself            
intellectually to the intellect4 ,no    
law-giver has ever troubled to tack on a
 preamble or an addition to the law he  

promulgates proving that he has the     
right to enact it4  ,but in the         
literature dealing with this matter     
opinions differ widely as to who        
embodies or possesses the highest power 
in the state4 ,according to some it is  
the king1 because he wields the sword   
and therefore can enforce unconditional 
obedience2 according to others it is the
 ,church1 because the ,law1 to be       
binding1 must be moral1 and ,morality is
 established by ,god since the ,church  
is the representative of ,god on earth4 
,others again regard the people as a    
whole as the highest power1 because     
without their assent no law can prevail1
 and because even the king only has the 
power of which the people divests itself
 to transfer it to him4 ,history has    
advanced beyond this quarrel4  ,to-day  
no one dares to dispute the fact that   
the nation alone is qualified to enact  
laws for itself through the agency of   
its chosen representatives1 and that no 
law can be binding for the people       

without their explicit or tacit consent4
 ,in ,switzerland1 where they have      
instituted the referendum1 the people by
 their vote can repudiate a law1 made by
 their representatives in their name1   
before it comes into force2 and in the  
other constitutional states they have   
recourse to the following expedient3    
whenever a law is promulgated which     
seems inacceptable to them1 at the next 
,parliamentary election they vote for   
men who are pledged to do away with it4 
,the people have the power to make laws1
 therefore they also have the right to  
do so1 and they do not hesitate to      
revolt if this right is tampered with4  
,in recent times no nation outside      
,russia has submitted to having laws    
forced on it1 in framing which it has   
not co-operated1 and which it has not   
expressly accepted4 ,the ,united ,states
 tore themselves away from the ,mother  
,country with the cry3 ,no taxation     
without representation6 and more than a 
hundred years before that the ,english  

people had irrefutably proved to the    
,stuart king1 ,charles ,i1 that he had  
no right to make and unmake laws1 by    
condemning him in a court of law with   
legal formalities and then having his   
head cut off by a masked executioner4   
,the legal code is the concrete form of 
the ,law1 and the ,law is the           
crystallization of the most material    
part of ,morality4 ,and as ,morality    
binds every member of the community1 as 
man is only tolerated in the community  
on condition that he respects ,morality1
 it is a matter of logic that he should 
also respect the ,law2 that is to say1  
that he must not only submit to it      
because he fears punishment if he fails 
to do so1 but that he must feel         
obedience to the ,law to be part of his 
,morality1 that he must act lawfully at 
the dictate of his own conscience1 and  
not because of the threat of the power  
of the state4 ,this might be enunciated 
as a principle without reservation and  
without limitation1 if in practice the  

laws always were1 as in theory they     
should be1 moral4 ,but this is not      
necessarily the case4 ,the law is a     
form1 and every form can be abused by   
filling it with unlawful contents4 ,if  
an unscrupulous adulterator of wine     
fills a champagne bottle of the usual   
shape1 complete with metalled and wired 
cork and a label recommending it1 with  
some disgusting mixture and puts it on  
the market1 he is severely punished for 
adulteration of food and infringement of
 the law protecting trade marks4 ,but if
 the government publish in the ,gazette 
foolish1 risky1 and perhaps absolutely  
immoral orders in the form of a law1    
duly arranged in chapters1 articles and 
paragraphs1 as the people are accustomed
 to seeing their moral laws expressed1  
who impugns them for it8  ,the examples 
of this in history are only too         
numerous4 ,to this category belong all  
laws seeking to maintain the validity of
 state authority at the expense of the  
natural rights of thinking and feeling  

men1 e4g4 all religious persecutions1   
the maltreatment of socialists1 excise  
laws and duties which hamper freedom of 
work and movement1 or are tantamount to 
robbing a particular man or all         
citizens4 ,as a rule1 laws of this kind 
can be imposed upon the people only in a
 despotically ruled state1 since the    
people in this case has no share in     
legislation2 but constitutional         
government is no guarantee against it1  
for parliamentary majorities can be     
forced to enact tyrannical laws1 by     
fanning the flame of national or party  
fanaticism1 by encouraging prejudices1  
or by intimidation2 this is proved by   
,bismarck's ,may laws and ,socialist    
laws1 and also by the laws passed by the
 ,national ,assembly at ,versailles     
against the rebels of the ,commune and  
against ,paris4 ,obedience to such laws 
cannot reasonably be demanded4 ,only a  
,hobbes will dispute this1 for whom     
everything that the state commands is   
just1 everything that it prohibits is   

unjust1 or the ,digest according to     
which quod principi placuit1 legis habet
 vigorem 7what pleases the ruler has the
 force of law74 ,legal enactments1      
though they be immoral1 are yet formal  
,law2 as a matter of fact1 however1 they
 are wrong1 and even if their originator
 has the power by brute force to secure 
obedience to them1 no man who tries to  
evade them and to get them abolished    
will be accused of immorality4  ,a      
trivial objection strikes one at once4  
,only a despotic megalomaniac will      
forbid his subjects to make             
representations in the proper quarters1 
and in the proper way1 for the purpose  
of getting a bad law abrogated2 but as  
long as it is in force it must be       
obeyed4 ,for if every citizen were      
allowed to make a selection of the laws 
according to his choice1 acquiescing in 
some and rejecting others1 this would   
lead straight to anarchy4 ,the reply to 
this is that anarchy1 although a        
terrible evil1 is notwithstanding a     

lesser one than an immoral law1 that is1
 a law which sins against ,morality4    
,for the maintenance of law and order   
which the ,state guarantees is only     
preferable to anarchy because it enables
 individuals to live together in peace1 
and guarantees liberty of movement and  
respect for persons1 life and property4 
,but if the ,state acts wrongly1 and    
interferes in the feelings and          
convictions of individuals1 if it uses  
brute force to compel them to actions   
and abstentions against which all the   
good in them rebels1 then its law and   
order is law and disorder1 and it is the
 ,state itself which brings about a     
condition of anarchy by making force the
 ruling factor in the life of the       
individual4 ,for the latter it is all   
one whether he has to yield to the force
 of the ,state or that of his neighbour4
 ,nay1 more1 his position is worse in a 
condition of anarchy caused by the      
,state1 than in that which existed      
before the ,state was formed1 because it

 is easier to meet force with force1    
when this emanates from an individual   
who is one's equal1 than when it is     
exercised by the superior organization  
of the ,state4 ,the ,state which enacts 
immoral laws denies its own principle   
and causes its own dissolution4  ,the   
intellectual constructions of the       
eighteenth century1 of which the most   
famous is ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau's ,social   
,contract1 are not taken literally by   
anyone nowadays4 ,nobody seriously      
believes that one day individuals living
 in a state of nature banded themselves 
together and made a contract1 by virtue 
of which they renounced certain         
liberties and rights and transferred    
them to a superior authority which was  
to rule them so as to promote the       
general welfare1 peace and happiness4   
,but if the procedure was not quite so  
simple as this1 at least it is certain  
that the ,state undertakes the task     
which ,rousseau expressly prescribes as 
its aim4 ,if1 however1 through its      

fault1 the fault of its legislation1 the
 welfare of the community suffers1 and  
peace and happiness are not promoted but
 hindered1 disturbed and destroyed1 then
 every citizen has the moral right to   
revolt against the ,state and paralyse  
its pernicious might2 not because it has
 broken a formal contract with its      
citizens1 but because it has become     
inimical to the peaceful life of        
mankind1 the purpose of every social    
community4 ,if anyone is troubled at the
 thought that there is no reliable      
standard whereby to test the morality of
 a law and no place indicated where such
 a measure can be applied1 he may take  
comfort by remembering that all         
,morality is surrendered to the feelings
 and judgment of the majority and has no
 other sanction than this4 ,history     
teaches us that the majority does not   
acquit itself too badly of its duty4    
,public opinion suffices to maintain    
,morality at a certain level in a       
community4 ,and if public opinion is    

capable of ensuring respect for the     
unwritten law of ,morality without the  
sanctions of ,state ,law1 it may surely 
be recognized as a fit judge of the     
morality of a law4 ,that is the theory  
of the right of citizens to defend      
themselves by all means1 even by force1 
against immoral laws4 ,practically1 it  
is of no importance1 because nowadays1  
at least in all progressive and         
liberally governed ,states1 the people  
have constitutional means at their      
disposal to prevent or quickly to rid   
themselves of laws that are obnoxious4  
,morality includes the ,law1 whereas    
,law is only a part of ,morality4 ,owing
 to its coercive nature1 the ,law is    
obliged to be concrete and material and 
to ignore all the imponderable1 barely  
perceptible1 spiritual and dream-like   
things which hover round ,morality1     
surround it with an atmosphere and      
transport it beyond definite boundaries 
into the realm of the unconscious and   
visionary4 ,the total exclusion of the  

element of feeling which ,morality      
includes1 constitutes the most profound 
difference between it and the ,law4 ,law
 protects order but knows no love4 ,the 
separation of ,law from ,morality is due
 to the pressure of selfishness which   
thinks it has made the greatest possible
 concession when it rises to the height 
of saying with ,ulpian3 ,neminem        
laedere4 ,suum cuique reddere4 ,honeste 
vivere4 ,injure no one2 that is1 refrain
 from the ruthless use of force2 render 
to each his own2 that is1 do not retain 
in rascally fashion what belongs to     
another2 live honourably2 that is1 give 
no offence to your neighbour by         
disorderly conduct and depravity4  ,well
 and good4 ,at a pinch one can live like
 that4 ,but the words pity1 kindness1   
love of one's neighbour do not occur in 
,ulpian's pithy statements1 and the ,law
 knows nothing of them4  ,the ,law      
guards each man's well-earned           
possessions1 but it bids no one make    
sacrifices4 ,morality can demand these4 

,it can insist that the individual      
should freely1 and urged by his own     
inner impulse1 impose sacrifices upon   
himself1 reduce his possessions in      
favour of another1 disturb his personal 
comfort at any moment1 perhaps even risk
 his life2 that is to say1 that of his  
own free will he should do just those   
things from which the ,law carefully    
shields him4 ,where the ,law says3      
injure no one6 ,morality says often     
enough3 injure yourself to do good to   
your neighbour4 ,where the ,law says3 to
 each man his own6 ,morality not seldom 
says3 to each man your own if he needs  
it more than you do4 ,morality counts on
 the existence of a quality of which the
 ,law has no need3 ,sympathy4 ,to be    
moral we must feel in our own being at  
the time1 or retrospectively1 the       
subjective experiences of our neighbour1
 with the same quality of emotion that  
he feels2 his pain must be our pain1 as 
his pleasure must be our pleasure4 ,for 
the man who cannot do this--who realizes

 in his mind the circumstances of his   
neighbour only as an image1 and without 
the concomitant note of feeling--it is  
impossible to rise to the height of     
,morality4 ,it is not his fault1 for the
 gift of sympathy is an organic         
disposition1 which you either do or do  
not possess1 which you can develop or   
suppress1 but which you cannot create if
 it is lacking4 ,nevertheless1 the lack 
of sympathy is a pitiable infirmity1 for
 it prevents a man from scaling the     
heights of ,morality4  ,to respect the  
,law is to practise a wise selfishness4 
,to act morally is to divest oneself of 
selfishness and attain the privilege of 
unselfishness4 ,to behave in strict     
accordance with the ,law earns the      
merited praise of civic blamelessness4  
,but to act morally is a virtue which is
 of incomparably higher quality than    
that of mere blamelessness4 ,the        
law-abiding man1 the honest man1 is     
praised as having been ,integer vitae   
sceleris purus4 ,that is an acceptable  

epitaph4 ,but the man of active         
,morality1 willingly suffering for      
others1 provides an example which       
reconciles millions to the hardships of 
life4 ,the former is a worthy man1 but  
the latter is a saint4     ,,chapter ,v 
,,individual ,,morality ,,and           
,,collective ,,immorality   ,men1 who   
would be deeply offended if their       
,morality were called into question1    
quite coolly investigate the problem as 
to whether the ,state in its actions and
 omissions is bound by the same moral   
laws as the individual1 and the majority
 of them come to the conclusion that in 
its relation to other ,states1 the      
,state must not be guided1 that is to   
say1 hampered1 by moral considerations4 
,they go further than this and not only 
liberate the ,state in its dealings with
 other countries from the trammels of   
,morality1 but claim for the government 
the privilege of standing beyond and    
above the moral law in the conduct of   
public affairs1 because to their mind   

both foreign and home politics move on a
 different plane to that of ethics4 ,if 
anyone objects to this shameless        
contention1 its advocates contemptuously
 dismiss him with the disdainful remark3
 ,that is the drivel of a layman1 and no
 man of science would waste his time on 
it4 ,and if you were to reply3 ,your    
views are those of gaolbirds who try    
after the event to hatch a theory       
justifying their misdeeds1 they would   
probably shrug their shoulders and      
murmur scornfully3 ,the man is obviously
 mad4  ,professorial wisdom has         
formulated pedantically what practical  
politicians1 the heads of states and    
leading ministers have thought1 said and
 done4 ,napoleon remarked at ,st4       
,helena to ,count de ,las ,cases1 who   
respectfully notes the fact in his      
,mmorial de ,sainte ,hlne3 ,the actions 
of a ruler who labours for the          
community1 must be distinguished from   
those of a private individual who is    
free to indulge his feelings2 policy    

permits1 nay1 commands1 the one to do   
what in the case of the other would     
often be inexcusable4 ,perhaps it was   
under the influence of this remark1 with
 which he1 no doubt1 was familiar1 that 
,professor ,nisard one day in a lecture 
at the ,sorbonne in ,paris propounded   
the theory that there was a dual        
,morality1 one public or political1 the 
other private1 and that these two did   
not follow the same rules4 ,that was    
shortly after the ,coup d',etat of      
,napoleon ,,iii1 and it was easy to     
descry1 in the words of the celebrated  
professor of literary history1          
obsequiousness towards the new ,emperor 
and the effort of a courtier to excuse  
the violence which the ,emperor had just
 done to the constitution he had sworn  
to uphold4 ,nisard was one of the       
ornaments of the university1 a teacher  
of youth1 who was as popular as he was  
respected4 ,but the sound ethical       
feeling of his hearers revolted against 
the depravity of the principles he had  

just enunciated1 and the violent        
expression of their indignation drove   
him in shame and disgrace from his chair
 and out of the lecture hall4           
,macchiavelli is the most famous        
advocate of the ,immorality of the      
,state and the right of politics to be  
unethical1 and his name is identified   
with this infamous theory4 ,an enormous 
amount has been written about the       
,florentine statesman1 his book of the  
,prince and the doctrines he advances in
 it2 among these works those in which   
his theories are endorsed preponderate  
to a horrifying extent over those which 
oppose and refute them4 ,mohl and ,paul 
,janet have furnished us with the best  
abstracts of these very numerous        
writings1 and ,i refer the reader to    
them4 ,here ,i can only dwell on the    
main points of the investigation4       
,macchiavelli writes3 ,a man who wishes 
to be perfectly good is without doubt in
 danger among those who are not good4   
,it is therefore advisable that a prince

 should learn not always to be good1 so 
as to be able to put these rules of life
 into practice1 or not1 as circumstances
 may demand4 ,a prince cannot maintain  
loyalty to a treaty if it become        
dangerous to his interests4 ,in short1  
the prince not only may1 but must1 do   
what is in his own interests4 ,he need  
not stop to think whether his actions   
are honest4 ,the only measure of their  
worth and appropriateness is the profit 
they promise4 ,their success always     
justifies them1 only their failure      
proves them to be bad4  ,the most       
revolting thing in the arguments of the 
,prince is the equanimity with which the
 author adduces them4 ,never does he let
 slip a word of excitement1 never does  
an indication of feeling appear4 ,he    
treats his subject not as an            
investigation of principles to which one
 adopts a mental attitude and which one 
should approve or disapprove1 but as a  
description of existing facts which     
arouse one's emotions as little as1 for 

instance1 the enumeration of the        
qualities and characteristics of a      
mineral4 ,it has been said in his       
defence that his book is a concrete     
study1 the presentation of the character
 of ,csar ,borgia1 of his psychology and
 of his principles of government2 and   
that ,macchiavelli wished to give an    
objective account of the philosophy of  
the events he had observed1 but did not 
wish to judge them subjectively2 and    
this1 if for no other reason1 because an
 expression of his own opinion would    
have been too dangerous for him4 ,it is 
further urged that his personal views   
are revealed in the treatise on ,livy4  
,this defence1 however1 is far from     
convincing4 ,in the ,prince             
,macchiavelli maintains the same        
unconcerned and cool note that prevails 
in his account of the treacherous       
assassinations perpetrated in           
,senigaglia by his hero ,csar ,borgia4  
,the only personal feeling1 which peeps 
out occasionally in both works1 is a    

certain perverse1 sthetic satisfaction1 
experienced by the artist with the eye  
of a connoisseur who lingers over a work
 of nature1 perfect in its way1 and     
delights in the harmony of actions      
which1 with absolute logic1 almost with 
mathematical precision1 result from the 
definite premise supplied by a certain  
character4 ,des ,esseintes1 the ideal   
sthete invented by ,joris ,karl         
,huysmans1 may appraise the worth of a  
monster solely by its beauty1 without a 
thought for its morality4 ,but by such  
appraisement he cuts himself off from   
the community of men1 though he1 in his 
arrogance1 being morally insane1 may    
abuse them as philistines4  ,since it   
first appeared1 ,macchiavellism has     
found disciples and admirers in every   
age2 and these1 in liberating politics  
from all fetters of ,morality1 go       
further than its originator4 ,the       
,german jurist of the century of the    
,reformation1 ,schoppe 7#aegf-afdi71    
declares sententiously that politics    

differ from ,morality and have their own
 principles1 just as ,morality has3 he  
considers that the chief difference     
between them is that the latter takes as
 its subject of study that which should 
be2 the former1 that which is4 ,for this
 one phrase this pedant1 who has        
otherwise rightly deserved oblivion1 has
 some claim to be remembered4 ,for here 
he consigns ,morality to the realm of   
pure thought1 of theoretical and        
meditative idealism1 while for politics 
he claims the sphere of practical       
reality and shows the first dim dawning 
of that practical policy 7,realpolitik7 
which1 two hundred and fifty years      
later1 was to be as the light of the sun
 to statesmen4  ,the ,frenchman1        
,gabriel ,naud1 almost a contemporary of
 ,schoppe's1 constituted himself the    
champion of ,coups d',etat1 if they     
promised political advantages2 further1 
he justifies and praises the ,night of  
,saint ,bartholomew1 a very energetic   
measure taken in his lifetime to put an 

end to the religious strife which was   
weakening ,france and causing the       
government much embarrassment2 his only 
regret is that the happy idea of        
slaughtering all the ,huguenots was not 
carried out more completely2 in other   
words1 that the massacre of the         
obnoxious ,protestants was not continued
 until they had been completely wiped   
out4  ,even in ,descartes1 who confessed
 to a somewhat shady opportunism in     
questions of state and1 for instance1   
concedes reasonable and moral           
justification to ,absolutism1 we find   
the depressing statement3 ,against the  
enemy one is1 so to speak 7'quasi'71    
permitted to do anything1 a conscious   
and determined denial of the ,christian 
commandment ,love thine enemies1 which  
perhaps demands too much of the average 
man and can only be expected from       
saints1 but which1 anyway1 contains an  
exhortation for all the world at least  
to be just to one's enemies and act     
according to the dictates of ,morality4 

,d',holbach does not beat about the     
bush1 but declares roundly3 ,in politics
 the only crime is not to succeed4 ,even
 ,macchiavelli did not express it as    
baldly as that4 ,to quote the ,duke of  
,la ,rochefoucauld1 he at least pays    
virtue the compliment of hypocrisy1 for 
he gives this advice3 ,do 7the evil     
which is profitable7 and excuse it      
afterwards4 ,this is a paraphrase of the
 old advice given by a pettifogging     
lawyer for the benefit of the criminal3 
,if you have done it1 deny it1 and of   
the well-known phrase of ,frederick the 
,great which runs something like this3  
,if ,i have a desire for a foreign      
country1 ,i begin by seizing it1 then ,i
 send for lawyers who prove that ,i had 
a right to it4 ,this1 then1 was the     
opinion of that king who wrote an       
,anti-,macchiavelli1 of whom1 however1  
,paul ,janet neatly remarks3 ,nothing is
 more typical of ,macchiavellism than as
 heir presumptive to the throne to      
refute ,macchiavelli's principles1 and  

then as ruling monarch to apply them    
with the more determination4  ,for the  
sake of the incorruptible ,morality     
which ,kant defends in his little work  
,vom ewigen ,frieden 7,of ,eternal      
,peace71 he may be forgiven for his     
weakly worldly wisdom in following up   
the ,critique of ,pure ,reason with the 
,critique of ,practical ,reason4 ,in    
,vom ewigen ,frieden he bravely demands 
harmony between ,politics and ,morality4
 ,more sweepingly than the ,english     
proverb1 ,honesty is the best policy1 he
 demonstrates that honesty is better    
than policy4 ,it is an old tradition of 
all governments1 and especially of      
diplomacy1 to affect secrecy1 since     
their inavowable intrigues shun the     
light of day and the eye of outsiders4  
,to-day the democracy in all            
constitutional states demands that      
foreign policy should be given full     
publicity4 ,kant expressed his opinion  
shortly and sharply a hundred and fifty 
years ago3 ,all political actions which 

cannot be made public are unjust4 ,in   
the eighteenth century1 in which he     
lived and which began with the war of   
the ,spanish ,succession1 went on to the
 wars of ,frederick the ,great1 and     
ended with the war of the ,coalition    
against the ,french ,revolution1 he does
 not dare to make a definite claim that 
force should be expelled from           
inter-state relations and ,law put in   
its place1 but he does say1 if somewhat 
timidly1 that one may dream of an ideal 
in which the quarrels of nations are    
adjusted1 like those of private persons1
 by laws which have been framed and     
approved by all4 ,kant is a comforting  
exception amid the many teachers of     
constitutional law who are almost       
unanimously ,macchiavellian in their    
attitude1 and who regard his point of   
view with contemptuous and condescending
 leniency because he was an unworldly   
philosopher1 a theorist in politics4    
,the ,english and ,scottish moral       
philosophers1 from ,locke to ,j4 ,s4    

,mill and ,herbert ,spencer1 are all    
untainted by ,macchiavellism and        
recognize only one ,morality for the    
state as for the individual1 for        
political as for private action4 ,but it
 must be admitted that their doctrines  
have not yet been generally assimilated 
by the consciousness of their own       
people4 ,now1 as ever1 it is a          
fundamental principle of ,english law   
that the king can do no wrong4 ,that    
means that the king1 the embodiment and 
epitome of the state1 as the source of  
,law is ,law itself1 and is superior to 
all the laws of the country1 which is a 
still more drastic paraphrase of the    
doctrine of the ,digest3 quod principi  
placuit legis habet vigorem2 every whim 
of the potentate has the force of law1  
and the ,english have coined the        
horrible phrase1 ,my country1 right or  
wrong1 a dictum which allows ruthless   
deceivers of the people and destroyers  
of their country to hide their most     
appalling misdeeds beneath the mask of  

patriotism and to disguise deeds worthy 
of a criminal in the habiliments of     
virtue4  ,real patriotism demands that a
 true citizen and an honourable man     
should with might and main1 even at the 
price of his life1 oppose any injustice 
about to be committed by his government 
and his misguided compatriots2 and1     
further1 that he should strive to       
maintain his country in the path of     
,right and ,morality even if1 as        
sometimes happens1 in a dispute between 
his nation and a foreign one the latter 
has ,right and ,morality on its side4   
,on the plea of inevitable partiality a 
judge may refuse to try a case in which 
a near relative of his is involved4     
,that is a permissible concession to    
that human imperfection which causes    
reason to fall silent when feeling      
raises its voice2 and justice does not  
suffer1 for there are other judges who  
can take the seat that has been         
voluntarily vacated4 ,no citizen has the
 right to evade the duty of judging his 

country1 because1 if he fails1 there is 
no other judge who can be put in his    
place and fulfil his duty4 ,every       
citizen is personally responsible for   
the just and moral behaviour of his     
community1 responsible to his own       
conscience1 to his nation1 to the world1
 to the present and to the future2 and  
if he is powerless to prevent depravity 
and misdeeds1 he must at least solemnly 
and loudly condemn them1 as this is his 
only means of avoiding joint            
responsibility for the infamy4 ,if he   
fails to do this1 the public crime      
becomes his personal crime as well4 ,the
 elder ,brutus1 so much and so justly   
admired by the ,romans1 is an example to
 all1 for without mercy he handed his   
own flesh and blood over to the         
executioner1 when according to the law  
his life was forfeit4 ,the state has no 
greater claim to indulgence and mercy   
than had ,brutus's son1 if knowingly and
 intentionally it indulges in vice4 ,for
 if you allow the dictum1 ,right or     

wrong1 my country1 to be valid1 then you
 must also apply it to the state of     
filibusterers that once existed in the  
,antilles1 and must demand of its       
citizens that their patriotism should   
approve and defend theft1 piracy1 rape  
and assassination1 for the systematic   
perpetration of which their state was   
founded4  ,in contrast with this        
wretched ,my country1 right or wrong1   
the inflexible dictum of the ancients   
stands out3 ,fiat justitia1 pereat      
mundus6 7,let justice be done though the
 world perish674 ,and what does most    
honour to the ,french ,revolution is the
 phrase so often mocked by political    
profiteers3 ,sooner shall the colonies  
perish than a principle6 ,that was the  
standpoint of the prophets of ,israel1  
who truly did not love their people less
 than do the wretched scoundrels who    
shout hurray6 and yell songs1 when their
 country deals ,morality and ,right a   
brutal blow1 because the leaders think  
that this will profit the country1 or   

themselves4  ,frederick the ,great and  
,napoleon1 as heads of the state1 acted 
in accordance with ,macchiavelli's      
views4 ,at their time this was expressed
 by saying that they were guided by the 
necessities of the state4 ,in the second
 half of the nineteenth century         
,macchiavellism received the name of    
practical policy 7,realpolitik74 ,the   
despisers of ,morality1 who call the    
misdeeds of the state ,realpolitik1     
apparently do not know that this one    
word implies a very comprehensive       
admission4 ,to their idea ,realpolitik  
is a policy which reckons only with     
realities1 not with desires1 yearnings  
or hope1 or as ,schoppe brutally        
expresses it3 with that which is1 not   
with that which ought to be4 ,it is     
active in the domain of facts1 not in   
that of principles4  ,but1 according to 
the advocates of ,realpolitik1 facts and
 realities mean nothing but the sole    
rule of interest1 selfishness1          
ruthlessness1 force1 cunning and        

contempt for all foreign rights2 whereas
 fairness1 justice1 the curbing and     
suppression of one's own desires1       
consideration for one's neighbour1 love 
of mankind--all these are phrases1 or   
let us rather say ideals1 which are to  
be found1 not in the world1 but in the  
brains of a small minority of           
enthusiasts without influence4 ,he who  
confesses to such views1 to whom the    
worst impulses alone are real1 while he 
relegates ,morality to the sphere of the
 unreal1 of visions far from reality1 is
 a pessimist as long as his convictions 
remain theory2 but if he puts them into 
practice1 or urges the leaders of the   
state to do so1 then he is an evildoer  
who breaks the moral law as soon as it  
appears unaccompanied by the police1 the
 prison and the gallows4 ,in private    
life a man with such views is a criminal
 who obeys his evil instincts whenever  
he may hope to evade the law of the     
state4 ,the bandit1 who is clever enough
 to manage so that police and court of  

justice cannot touch him1 is a practical
 politician1 for the riches he acquires 
by theft1 robbery and murder are        
realities2 the criminal code is but a   
scrap of paper1 something visionary1 as 
long as its minions do not seize him by 
the collar4  ,the immorality of         
politics1 the way in which the          
foundations of ,morality are ignored by 
the state1 is the natural consequence of
 the power of rulers2 for in them all   
the original instincts of the human     
beast still untamed by moral law are    
exaggerated by the intense realization  
of their loftiness1 the glory and the   
illustriousness of their position1 and  
they are not forced by wholesome fear of
 the means of coercion wielded by the   
moral administration to control         
themselves1 to exercise and develop     
their organic powers of inhibition4 ,the
 elevation of this fact of the          
,immorality of the state to a theory    
that the state is not bound by moral    
law1 is derived from the conception     

which philosophers of all ages1 from    
ancient times to the present day1 have  
formed of the character and the purpose 
of the state4 ,plato1 in the ,republic1 
maintains the omnipotence of the state1 
which nothing and no one can limit2 and 
,aristotle1 not rising to such heights  
of error as his master1 says more       
soberly3 ,it is a grave mistake to      
believe that every citizen is his own   
master4 ,the ,italian philosopher       
,filangieri considers the guiding       
principle and motive power of the state 
to be love of power1 which a fool three 
centuries later called the will to      
power1 whereupon other fools declared   
this to be a brand-new discovery4       
,hegel goes farthest of all in his      
idolatry of the state2 according to him 
the state is not alone moral1 but       
,morality itself1 just as ,god is       
according to the theologians4 ,as it    
would be arrogant blasphemy to          
characterize anything that ,god ordains 
as immoral1 as it would be nonsensical  

to wish to impose upon ,god a moral law 
from outside1 not emanating from ,him1  
to which ,he would have to submit even  
against ,his will1 so it is             
reprehensible to judge the actions of   
the state by the standard of individual 
,morality2 and it is equally absurd to  
admit any moral coercion imposed on the 
state from outside1 any guiding         
principle other than the law of its     
necessities and the logic which         
indicates the means needed to attain the
 necessary end4  ,according to          
,treitschke the state is the highest    
form of human existence2 nothing higher 
than the state exists4 ,he has never    
asked himself the question whether1     
after all1 humanity itself is not       
superior to the state which is the form1
 a form1 of its existence and therefore 
not its essence4  ,from his conviction  
that the state is the highest thing     
existing1 ,treitschke concludes that    
certain moral duties1 e4g4 that of      
self-sacrifice1 cannot possibly exist   

for the state4 ,the individual is to    
sacrifice himself for the sake of a     
higher community of which he is a       
member2 but the state is itself the     
highest thing in the outer community of 
mankind1 therefore it can never be      
confronted with the duty of             
self-destruction4  ,how obvious that    
seems6 ,how grossly mistaken it is all  
the same6 ,first of all the state is not
 the highest thing2 there is something  
higher1 and that is humanity2 if then we
 recognize a moral duty of              
self-sacrifice for humanity1            
theoretically this duty may arise just  
as much for the state as for the        
individual4  ,secondly1 the idea that   
owing to ,morality the state might one  
day actually be in such a position as to
 be forced to sacrifice itself is the   
most shocking nonsense4 ,how could that 
possibly be8 ,if the state always acts  
with strict ,morality towards its       
citizens and foreign states1 it is      
simply impossible that it should have to

 sacrifice its existence in the         
fulfilment of some task2 for tasks only 
arise when1 and as long as1 the state   
exists4 ,once it is disintegrated there 
can be no task1 either theoretically or 
practically1 for it to accomplish1      
therefore it cannot have to sacrifice   
itself for such a task4 ,but if the     
,immorality of another state1 or of a   
minority of its citizens1 should        
endanger it1 threaten it with an unjust 
attack from within or without1 then     
there is no rule of ,morality that can  
forbid it to defend itself to the last1 
and its self-sacrifice could then only  
be a result of its complete annihilation
 in a justifiable war of necessity4 ,on 
the other hand1 even the most           
unscrupulous practical politicians do   
not possess any absolute guarantee      
against defeat1 though they declare a   
war of aggression to be permissible1    
whether waged on account of an itching  
for power1 for purposes of conquest1 for
 the winning of prestige1 predominance  

or economic advantages4  ,thirdly and   
lastly1 the duty of self-sacrifice for  
the state can only be envisaged and     
seriously discussed1 if the state be    
conceived as a person to whom the duty  
of ,morality applies in every way2 but  
this conception is mystic               
anthropomorphism1 not sober1 sensible   
recognition of realities such as the    
practical politicians love to boast of4 
,for1 as a matter of fact1 the state is 
not a person but a concept1 an          
institution created by man in the       
interests of one individual1 of a few1  
of many or of all2 an organization of   
habits and interests1 a relation in     
which individuals live together4 ,the   
mysticism of the weak-minded has        
transformed it into a person with human 
features1 with the qualities1 desires1  
duties1 and aims of an individual2 these
 men are intellectually incapable of    
penetrating to the fundamental facts    
underlying the concept1 and cling       
entirely to word-pictures which are mere

 verbalism4 ,scholasticism in the       
eleventh and twelfth centuries was      
chiefly occupied in a quarrel about     
,nominalism and ,realism4 ,it was       
allowed to drop and was not fought out  
to a decision4 ,perhaps because it is   
impossible to convince these superficial
 babblers who take a name or a word for 
an object actually existent in time and 
space1 that they are in error4 ,the     
fight between ,abelard and ,roscelet and
 that between the two of them and ,duns 
,scotus ought to be taken up again4     
,above all1 one ought to knock it into  
the heads of those who make a fetish of 
the state that it is a mere word1 the   
famous flatus vocis of the ,nominalists1
 which they worship1 to which they build
 altars and make human sacrifices4      
,this humiliating form of idolatry is   
practised by the school of sociologists 
known as organicistic1 as well as by the
 practical politicians4 ,this school    
maintains that the individual has no    
independent existence at all1 that he   

continues to exist only in the          
community1 by the community1 as a       
totally subordinate1 dependent and      
incomplete fraction of the community2   
that the only real thing in the species 
is society1 the state2 that this must be
 regarded as a living organism1 in which
 the individual human being is merely a 
cell which in solitude1 outside the     
community and detached from it1 is as   
little capable of life and has as little
 significance as a cell separated from a
 highly differentiated creature1 such as
 a man or some other mammal4 ,in my book
 ,der ,sinn der ,geschichte 7,the       
,meaning of ,history71 ,i threw as much 
light as ,i possibly could on this      
superstition1 and ,i pointed out in     
detail its lack of sense as well as its 
dangers4 ,i can1 therefore1 content     
myself here with a rsum and a few       
indications4  ,there is nothing         
mysterious or supernatural about the    
historic or even the prehistoric origin 
of the state2 part we can learn from    

reliable documentary evidence1 part we  
can gather with certainty from obvious  
facts4 ,from the primitive human family1
 which more probably consisted of a pair
 than of a man and several women1 there 
arose the formless horde1 a crowd of    
individuals of all ages1 connected by   
blood2 this developed into a tribe in   
which age1 strength1 courage and        
intelligence were appreciated in a      
certain order1 and thereby were produced
 the beginnings of discipline1          
co-operation and regularized mutual     
relations2 that is to say1 of           
organization4 ,this embryo of later     
formations1 this sketchy beginning of an
 economic and political community1      
evolved more definite and differentiated
 forms when the wandering huntsmen and  
shepherds1 seeking prolific hunting     
grounds and pasture lands1 and later on 
arable land too1 came upon other groups 
of men and fought with them for the     
possession of the desired domain4 ,in   
the conflict strong and brave men came  

to the front1 and the victor became the 
natural1 and for the most part willingly
 recognized1 leader and master of his   
companions1 while any who opposed him   
were reduced by force to submit to his  
authority4 ,the state crystallized      
around this war-hero1 and by all its    
members its aim was clearly and         
obviously recognized to be defence and  
the increase of property outside the    
state2 that is1 the warding off of      
attacks by foreign robbers and          
acquisitive invasions of neighbouring   
domains--wars of defence and conquest1  
but always war2 and within the state the
 maintenance of a certain measure of    
safety for individuals4 ,this safety1   
however1 had to be purchased dearly by  
the limitation1 often enough the        
complete surrender1 of the right of     
self-determination1 of independence of  
will and freedom2 so dearly1 in fact1   
that the price was far higher than the  
value of the advantages acquired4  ,the 
leader in warfare became the ruler and  

bequeathed his privileges to his        
descendants4 ,the state was he himself1 
the land his property1 the people his   
family in the old sense of the          
word--that is1 his kindred1 his         
servants1 his slaves4 ,his comrades in  
arms who had most distinguished         
themselves became an aristocracy of the 
sword1 the supporters and tools of his  
power1 though often enough they became  
his rebellious rivals and overthrew him4
 ,defeated enemies were robbed of all   
their possessions and slaughtered2 later
 on they were degraded to serfs1 a      
position little better than that of     
beasts of burden4 ,a regular parasitism 
developed1 by means of which the ruler  
and his companions in arms exploited the
 subjugated and productive masses for   
their own profit4  ,the acute form of   
this parasitism was warfare in its      
chronic form1 its prolongation in times 
of peace1 the extortion of contributions
 and duties1 the imposition of taxes and
 forced labour from the people4 ,the    

ruler was clever enough to provide      
himself with a moral right to his       
exercise of brute force1 by inventing a 
divine origin for his person and power1 
and making worship of his person an     
essential tenet of the national         
religion4 ,the systematic suppression of
 the masses without rights became the   
universal practice of the ruler and of  
the instruments of his power1 and this  
gradually spread to the higher classes  
who could still play the master to the  
lower strata1 but were of no more       
account than the vulgar herd in the eyes
 of the ruler1 having to bow their proud
 heads beneath the same yoke4 ,a very   
few races followed a different course of
 development from the primitive horde to
 an organized state4 ,they remained free
 members of the community with equal    
rights1 they allowed no hereditary ruler
 from among themselves to become their  
superior1 and governed themselves as    
republicans1 who nevertheless also waged
 war without exception1 either forced   

thereto by the attacks of greedy        
neighbours or lured into doing so by the
 example of the monarchies within their 
purview or by lust for booty4 ,in       
warfare they won slaves and subjects1   
and changed into oligarchies1 most often
 into despotic states1 and before they  
ultimately declined to the parasitism of
 a single man and his aids fell victims 
to a collective parasitism which gave   
the conquered and subjugated population 
up to the spoliation of the victors4    
,up till modern times the state         
preserved the character of a private    
domain belonging to the ruler and his   
house4 ,wars were waged in the interests
 of dynasties1 and as late as the       
eighteenth century the succession in    
,spain and in certain provinces of      
,austria was the origin and purpose of  
various campaigns4 ,the ,french         
,revolution first wrought a change in   
this4 ,since this great event it has    
been impossible to plunge any ,european 
state into war in order to support the  

claims to property1 more or less legally
 justified1 made by its ruling house4   
,the people have taken the place of     
princes1 and now the principle of       
nationalities furnishes the reason or   
excuse for bloody conflicts between     
states2 and this has become a factor in 
modern politics and history merely      
because dynasties had built up their    
realms regardless of the origin and     
language of the inhabitants of the      
districts which they had conquered1     
stolen1 bought1 or acquired by exchange1
 by marriage or by inheritance1 and were
 indifferent to the national unity of   
their subjects as long as they could    
gain possession of the country and the  
people4  ,from the time of its first    
vague beginnings up till the rise of    
modern democracy1 the state has been    
nothing but a means of parasitism in the
 hands of the ruling person or group1   
and an instrument for the preparation   
for1 and the waging of1 war4 ,all the   
state's tasks1 which apparently lie     

outside the sphere of war1 if they are  
carefully examined1 will be found1 after
 all1 to aim at efficiency in war1 and  
it has gradually selected these tasks   
from the simple consideration that their
 execution increases the guarantees of  
success in warfare and in government4   
,the deification of the ruler in        
,asiatic and ,egyptian lands1 the       
unconditional identification of the     
realm with his person1 the uniform      
enslavement of the whole people1 its    
nave exploitation for the sole benefit  
of the sovereign and his assistants are 
no longer possible in ,europe at the    
present day4 ,the development of the    
nations to a higher plane of            
civilization and a clearer consciousness
 of their own worth forced the state to 
alter its constitution to a certain     
extent and to devote itself1 at least   
theoretically1 more to the interests of 
its citizens than the service of its    
prince4 ,the intellectual constructions 
of the eighteenth century correspond to 

no historical reality4 ,the ,social     
,contract1 the inception of which ,j4   
,j4 ,rousseau described so graphically1 
was never made4 ,hutcheson1 who had     
expressed the idea long before the      
enthusiast of ,geneva1 conceived it only
 as the epitome of the principles which 
the state should embody2 according to   
,hume1 the relations of the citizens to 
each other and to the state are a tacit 
contract which need not be explicitly   
formulated1 because it originates in    
human nature2 and ,fichte even assures  
us that ,rousseau himself did not mean  
his ,social ,contract to be taken       
literally4 ,according to him it was only
 an idea4 ,but societies must act in    
pursuance of this idea1 and they were   
founded1 if not actually1 yet legally   
upon an unwritten contract4 ,anyway1 the
 ideas of ,hutcheson1 ,hume and         
,rousseau have nowadays been assimilated
 by the general consciousness4 ,the     
masses believe in the natural1 inborn   
rights of man1 some of which he         

certainly has surrendered in favour of  
the community2 they demand and expect of
 the state that it should serve their   
just interests1 and they are no longer  
ready to be made use of by the ruler and
 a powerful1 often very small1 minority1
 for purposes which are foreign to them1
 which they do not know1 and for which  
they do not care4  ,those who juggle    
with words1 who talk dark and mysterious
 nonsense about the concept of the      
state1 or dogmatize fanatically on the  
subject1 contemptuously call this       
conception of the nature of the state   
and the relation of its citizens to it  
shallow rationalism1 and from the       
heights of their supposed knowledge they
 look down disdainfully upon arguments  
which they libellously call the laymen's
 babble4 ,they are only in part         
bumptious fools who pretend that        
uncritical1 parrotlike repetition of    
traditional formul is erudition and     
confused thought is profundity1 and who 
declare the clear-headed men who mock   

their silly mysticism1 their            
superstitious dread of word phantoms1 to
 be simply incapable of understanding   
their depth4 ,partly they are very sly  
toadies1 very cunning sycophants of     
power1 or ruthless egoists1 unscrupulous
 freebooters1 who pretend to be         
enthusiastic and devout apostles of the 
divinity of the state and demand the    
most humble submission1 adoration and   
unconditional devotion in order that1 as
 priests in its temple1 they may grind  
their own axes at its altars4  ,such are
 those folk who maintain the double     
thesis that the state is everything1 the
 individual nothing1 the former the sole
 reality1 the latter without any        
separate existence1 and that the state1 
as mankind's highest form of existence1 
need recognize nothing as superior to   
itself1 neither right nor law1 and may  
therefore take as sole guide for its    
actions its own interests and not       
,morality4  ,you cannot maintain a      
single one of these contentions unless  

you and all men are deprived of         
reasoning power2 they crumble away      
instantly in the light of ,reason4 ,it  
is not true that the state alone is real
 and that it is superior to the         
individual1 not only because of the     
forces at its disposal1 the complex of  
which it represents1 but also as an     
entity1 as a thought1 a principle4 ,the 
individual alone in the species1 that   
is1 living1 feeling1 thinking and acting
 man1 is real4 ,the individual created  
the state out of himself4 ,he can also  
destroy it4 ,the practical politicians  
above all people should be of this      
opinion2 as he can do it1 he may do it2 
as he has the power to do it1 he has the
 right to do it4 ,the individualist will
 not make this a question of law1 but   
will simply assert that1 though the     
individual is the father of the state1  
yet he has no reasonable grounds for    
destroying it1 so long as it makes no   
murderous attacks on its creator4 ,the  
individual did not create the state     

consciously1 intentionally and formally 
by means of a social contract1 but      
naturally and organically1 under        
pressure of circumstances4 ,it is       
clearly to his interests to maintain it1
 to furnish the necessary means for its 
existence and efficiency1 but always on 
the one condition that the state should 
really protect and promote the interests
 of the individual1 lighten his burdens 
in the struggle for existence1 and make 
that prosperity1 comfort and happiness  
possible which he cannot secure unaided 
in his struggle with the hostile forces 
of ,nature and with rival fellow-men4   
,but if the state oppresses the         
individual with burdens and duties which
 he feels no inner necessity to fulfil1 
if it confiscates him1 body and soul1   
instead of respecting his freedom and   
his right to self-determination1 then   
the assumption falls to the ground2 the 
state is no longer an institution which 
benefits the individual2 it is inimical 
to the individual1 hinders him in his   

struggle for existence1 destroys his    
happiness2 and he obeys his primitive   
instinct for self-preservation if he    
turns against it1 masters it as he would
 a monster1 draws its teeth and claws1  
and forces it back to the place it was  
meant to occupy1 that of a docile and   
industrious servant of the individual1  
not of one individual who aspires to    
rule the others1 but of all individuals 
who are of the people that make up the  
state4  ,i consider it unnecessary and a
 little ridiculous to quote authorities 
in support of the statement that twice  
two are four2 what is reasonable and    
clear is convincing without further     
recommendation2 nevertheless1 it is a   
fact that may be worthy of mention that 
some of the best intellects of all      
nations have sided with the individual  
against the state4 ,on the one side we  
have ,plato1 whose ideal is ,sparta and 
who would like to see the despotism of  
this model state and its communal meals 
completed by the addition of community  

of property1 of wives1 and of children2 
we have ,hegel1 who has gone farther    
than any one in his idolatry of the     
state2 we have ,auguste ,comte1 who1 in 
his zeal for his newly founded science  
of ,sociology1 conceives society as an  
organism biologically superior to the   
individual1 and thereby has become the  
father of the ,organicists4 ,but against
 these we can put the ,englishman1      
,jeremy ,bentham1 the embodiment of     
sound common sense1 whom the            
muddle-headed fools that pose as deep   
thinkers have good reason to hate and   
fear1 and whom they try to depreciate as
 vulgar and shallow2 further1 his       
compatriot1 ,herbert ,spencer1 who is   
his kindred spirit2 the ,frenchman1     
,frdric ,bastiat1 whose writings sparkle
 with flashes of wit2 the ,german1      
,wilhelm ,humboldt1 who bravely and     
successfully combated the state tyranny 
defended by ,fichte4 ,all these are     
convinced individualists who adduce     
irrefutable reasons for their views4 ,we

 may also include ,kant among them1 as  
he gave utterance to this decisive      
sentence3 ,man is his own aim and end1  
and must never be a mere means2         
consequently it is never permissible to 
sacrifice the sovereignty of one's own  
person to that of the state1 or make use
 of it for the realization of political 
aims by disregarding1 and doing violence
 to1 one's right of self-determination4 
,harald ,hfding contends that progress  
should be measured by the extent to     
which1 in ,kant's sense of the words1   
man is recognized to be his own aim and 
end2 but that is not only a measure of  
progress1 it is the measure of all      
civilization4  ,for civilization1 to my 
idea1 means a state worthy of man1      
implying his mental1 moral and material 
independence of all motive forces other 
than those of his own nature2 its aim is
 the most complete attainment possible  
of this independence2 its measure the   
extent to which the individual          
determines his own fate and is able to  

ward off from it undesired outside      
influences4 ,at the first awakening of  
his consciousness primitive man was     
aware of being exposed to unknown forces
 which controlled him at will and       
against which his will was powerless4   
,from the very beginning1 at first dimly
 and then more and more clearly1 man has
 felt this to be unworthy and           
intolerable4 ,the best of the species   
have always laboured with all their     
strength to liberate themselves1 and the
 great ambition of man throughout his   
development has always been not         
submissively to accept whatever fate was
 accorded him1 but to work out his      
destiny according to his needs and his  
own ideas4  ,the anguish caused by      
wretched dependence upon external forces
 is the origin of religion as of        
superstition1 which both spring from the
 same root4 ,with the anthropomorphism  
peculiar to the earliest stages of      
thought1 man personified the mysterious 
powers which ruled his fate4 ,he created

 gods for himself1 and then1 as far as  
his knowledge permitted1 he sought some 
relation between himself and them1 and  
tried to get at them by every means     
available4 ,he imagined them like unto  
himself1 that is1 vain1 capricious1     
greedy1 easily frightened by dark       
threats1 and then1 very reasonably on   
this hypothesis1 he importuned them with
 prayers1 sacrifices1 hymns of praise   
and vows1 as well as magic formul and   
incantations1 always with the inflexible
 intention of making them serve his     
purposes1 not of serving theirs4 ,the   
contrite ,jewish prayer3 ,thy will be   
done1 ,lord1 ,thy will1 not mine1 is a  
new trait in the religious thought of   
man4 ,the heathen always strives to have
 his will done in opposition to that of 
the gods1 and to divert them from their 
decisions if he dislikes them4  ,in a   
state of advanced development           
theological thought gave way before the 
scientific4 ,man learnt to conceive     
,nature's rule1 not transcendentally1   

but intrinsically4 ,he recognized that  
the forces around him1 which so often   
crossed his purpose1 are not to be      
influenced by prayer and sacrifice1 but 
that it is expedient and possible to    
discover their character and the        
conditions of their activity4 ,by dint  
of long-sustained efforts he has        
succeeded in effectively standing up to 
hostile ,nature and in warding off her  
undesired interference in his destiny4  
,if the tribulations1 which formerly    
suddenly brought his schemes to nought  
and often destroyed him1 are not        
entirely overcome1 it is merely because 
his practice does not conform closely   
enough to the directions evolved by his 
theoretical knowledge1 because he is too
 careless or too clumsy to make proper  
use of the weapons against the elements 
with which science has armed him4  ,but 
this same man1 who has learnt to be a   
match for ,nature1 his creator1 is      
powerless against his creature1 the     
state4 ,he can neither evade it nor     

escape from it4 ,the state disposes of  
him without his consent1 against his    
most obvious interests1 in spite of his 
powerless opposition2 it hurls him      
hither and thither1 annihilates him1    
crushes him by its will and is unmoved  
by the will of the individual4  ,true1  
man has sought to maintain his right of 
self-determination against the forces of
 politics1 as against all others that   
broke his will and intervened in his    
life without his consent4 ,for thousands
 of years all state development has     
tried to protect the modest individual1 
lost in the crowd and featureless1 but  
nevertheless a person1 that is1 a world 
to himself1 against the arbitrariness of
 rulers or leading statesmen4 ,that is  
the one unchanging tendency which leads 
from ,harmodius and ,aristogeiton1 the  
slayers of a tyrant1 the rebellion of   
the elder ,brutus1 the murder of ,csar1 
by way of the ,revolt of the            
,netherlands and the execution of       
,charles ,i of ,england1 to the great   

,revolution1 the risings of #ahdh and   
the struggle for constitutional         
government in all states of the ,old    
,world and the ,new4 ,the formula has   
long been discovered whereby the        
individual can maintain the dignity of  
his sovereign personality and his own   
responsibility for the shaping of his   
destiny4 ,it is civil freedom1          
constitutionalism1 sovereignty of the   
people4 ,there are arrangements1        
carefully thought out1 nicely weighed1  
cleverly worked out to the smallest     
detail1 by which the individual is      
fitted into his place in the community  
without being deprived of the management
 of his own affairs1 by which the       
sacrifices needful for the fulfilment of
 collective tasks are exacted without   
his being reduced to a condition of     
slavery1 by which the independence of   
the individual is safeguarded and yet a 
state of chaos and anarchy is avoided4  
,but this formula fares as do the       
doctrines of science3 hitherto it has   

remained a theory everywhere4 ,the      
franchise1 representation of the people1
 responsibility of ministers1           
constitutional limitation of the ruler's
 power1 are infallibly effective weapons
 or instruments1 but no people has yet  
learnt how to handle them rightly4 ,that
 is why pessimists speak of the         
bankruptcy of civilization1 that is why 
the aim of civilization1 the liberation 
of the person and the enforcement of its
 sovereignty1 has nowhere been attained1
 that is why1 to quote ,napoleon ,i in  
his interview with ,goethe at ,erfurt1  
,in our times the power of fate is      
politics4 ,and yet all these            
institutions of a modern constitutional 
state1 from the ballot-paper and the    
voting of taxes in ,parliament to the   
enforced resignation of the ministry on 
a vote of censure and the oath of the   
ruler to observe the constitution1      
recognize the rights of the individual  
as opposed to the state1 and at least   
theoretically give the lie to the bold  

declaration that the state is everything
 and the individual nothing4  ,it is no 
less untrue to say that the state is    
superior to ,morality and is not bound  
by it4 ,in order to prove this we need  
only be brave enough not to be          
intimidated by the mysterious mien and  
gestures and the dark1 pompous phrases  
of the mystics who worship the state1   
and to penetrate to the real1 conceptual
 idea of the word4  ,the hocus pocus    
that the worshippers of the state       
perform around their idol puts one in   
mind of ,kempelen1 who created a        
sensation with his automaton in the     
beginning of the nineteenth century4    
,this figure1 got up as a ,turkish      
woman1 gave rise to astonishment and1   
among not a few1 to superstitious fear4 
,it played chess1 and so well1 too1 that
 it almost always succeeded in winning1 
even against its most skilled opponents4
 ,people cudgelled their brains to solve
 the riddle1 all sorts of explanations  
were suggested1 one more impossible than

 the other1 but still the mystery       
remained dark1 until the owner1 having  
made enough money and sick of the part  
of an itinerant swindler1 revealed the  
trick4 ,in the hollow figure there sat a
 clever chess player who worked its     
hands and with them carried out the     
moves on the board4  ,this anecdote can 
be applied literally to the state4      
,simpletons1 drunk with phrases1 and    
cunning cheats contend that the state is
 a supernatural creation in which the   
spirit of the universe1 the spirit of   
history takes shape1 and through which  
it realizes its aims2 these aims1       
utterly transcending the understanding  
of the individual1 are unintelligible to
 man4 ,such overwhelming phrases strike 
the simple1 credulous hearer dumb and   
send cold shudders of awe up his spine4 
,but let us look at the inside of this  
magic machine whose works are driven by 
the spirit of the world and with whose  
help this spirit fulfils its            
impenetrable designs4 ,what do we find8 

,men1 quite ordinary mortals1 who sit in
 the machine and work its levers2 men   
whose intellectual powers are only in   
rare cases superior to those of their   
enslaved subjects bereft of will2 men   
who are1 as a rule1 of average          
intelligence and not seldom even below  
the average4  ,these men are the rulers1
 ministers who cling to office1 high    
officials1 party leaders and            
professional politicians who would like 
to become ministers1 generals who seek  
to make themselves conspicuous1         
publicists who hope to derive personal  
profit by dint of bowing and scraping   
before the men in power1 by flattering  
the stupidest and most despicable       
prejudices of the masses1 or even by    
implanting such prejudices with         
persuasive talk and purposely leading   
them astray4 ,these men are formed on   
the same model as all individuals of the
 species and are therefore full of human
 weaknesses1 a prey to all human        
desires1 moved by all human impulses4   

,they are selfish1 vain1 the sport of   
likes and dislikes1 of self-deception as
 to the value of their ideas1 opinions  
and judgments1 disputatious1 arrogant1  
greedy of possessions1 power and        
pleasure1 spurred by the instinct to    
magnify and swell their personality and 
impose it upon others4 ,and these men   
are to be liberated from the discipline 
of the moral law8 ,they are to be       
superior to the moral law8  ,for whom1  
then1 was the moral law created and     
developed if not for these men--whose   
actions1 although they spring from the  
same motives and aspire to the same     
satisfaction of self as those of all    
other men1 can be fraught with          
consequences incomparably more evil1    
because they make use of the state      
machine for their purposes4 ,through the
 force and momentum given by the        
machinery of the state these actions are
 boundlessly augmented1 their range     
being indefinitely increased and their  
results multiplied a thousandfold4 ,the 

simplest logic shows that these men     
within the state machine1 rendered so   
specially dangerous by their terrible   
armament and weapons1 far from being    
liberated from the coercion of moral    
law1 ought to be subjected to it with   
extraordinary severity1 a severity which
 should be greater than that which      
suffices for the average man1 in        
proportion as their power to do harm is 
greater than that of the man in the     
street4  ,now all this time1 rather     
carelessly1 or at any rate weakly1 ,i am
 making a concession to the pious       
devotees of the religion of the state1  
by speaking of the state machine1--a    
dubious expression1 coined to deceive by
 rousing superstitious ideas4 ,the      
phrase is a picture1 a rhetorical figure
 that one must be careful not to take   
literally4 ,there is no state machine4  
,there is only a relation of men to one 
another and to traditional habits1      
organized rules of command1 obedience   
and equable conduct--habits into which  

the community of men has fallen in      
accordance with the law of least        
resistance1 in order to promote their   
own interests1 at least theoretically1  
without being forced to exert themselves
 continually to form new judgments1     
decisions and arrangements which the    
ever-shifting1 ever-changing conditions 
of life render necessary4  ,here again1 
behind the word1 we find men1 always    
only men4 ,just as those who command1   
from whose will all state action        
emanates1 are men1 so also the          
instruments by which they carry out     
their decisions are only metaphorically 
speaking1 levers and wheels1 parts of a 
machine of steel and iron2 in reality   
they are officials1 soldiers and        
policemen1 they are judges and bailiffs2
 in short1 they are men4 ,and these men1
 who in all private relations with their
 fellow men are sternly required to     
submit to the dictates of ,morality and 
the demands of the ,law1 are the same on
 whom other men1 the leaders of the     

state1 impose the duty of breaking all  
these precepts and laws2 as ambassadors 
they must deny and dishonour the        
signatures to treaties2 as leaders or   
paid servants of the press bureau they  
must systematically spread lies2 as     
attorneys of the state they must        
persecute and maltreat those who tell   
the truth2 as policemen they must tear  
the fathers of families from wife and   
children and hunt them into the         
barracks2 as soldiers they must invade a
 foreign land1 murder unknown and       
innocent men1 rob them of their         
property1 burn down their houses1 lay   
waste their lands1 in a word1 do        
everything that is punishable with      
prison and gallows2 they must perpetrate
 all crimes which the aim and end of    
,morality and ,law are to prevent and   
condemn4 ,if one defends such action1   
where can one find the courage and the  
justification to require these men at   
one time to honour the ,ten             
,commandments and at another to         

disregard them1 to be criminals in the  
name of the state in the morning and to 
be moral private persons and law-abiding
 citizens in the afternoon8 ,after all1 
they only have one nature1 one mind1 one
 character and one set of perceptive    
faculties4  ,to realize the monstrosity 
of this doctrine of twofold ,morality1  
public and private1 and of the          
non-compulsoriness of moral law for the 
state1 it suffices to refer again to the
 fundamental concepts of ,morality4     
,individuals have banded themselves     
together in a community in order to be  
able to live more easily1 or to live at 
all1 under the present conditions       
obtaining on our planet4 ,lest society  
should be disintegrated by the quarrels 
of its members1 and the latter should   
find themselves exposed single-handed to
 a hopeless struggle for existence1 a   
limitation of their unfettered whims and
 desires1 the curbing of their          
selfishness1 control of their impulses  
and the exercise of consideration for   

their neighbours have been imposed upon 
them4  ,this coercion is ,morality1 and 
society can enforce it by vigorous      
measures2 but for the most part this is 
unnecessary1 for society has inculcated 
in its members the faculty of urging    
upon themselves in every situation the  
dictates of the community and of        
insisting on obedience to them4 ,this   
faculty is conscience4 ,the means by    
which conscience1 inspired and assisted 
by reason1 determines the will to keep  
in check or to suppress organic impulses
 and inclinations1 desires and          
appetites1 is inhibition2 moreover1 the 
development and strengthening of        
inhibition does not alone promote the   
aims of the community1 but is of the    
highest biological importance to the    
individual himself1 apart from his      
relations to society1 as it renders him 
stronger and more efficient1            
differentiates him more subtly1 and     
raises him to a higher level of         
development4  ,now the state is a       

special development of society2 it owes 
its existence to the same necessities as
 the latter1 its task is to minimize the
 struggle for existence for the         
individual1 to protect him from         
avoidable dangers and to ensure the     
safety of his life1 the fruits of his   
labour and that measure of freedom which
 is compatible with life in a community4
 ,but if the state puts an end to the   
coercion instituted by the community and
 therefore by the state itself2 if it   
does away with ,morality for itself1    
that is1 for a number of individuals1 be
 they few or many1 that act in its name2
 if it allows selfishness1 appetites and
 ruthlessness to have the same free play
 as with creatures of a lower order than
 man1 or as with men before they formed 
themselves into communities2 if in the  
pursuit of its plans beyond the bounds  
of ,morality it intensifies the struggle
 for existence in a tragic manner1      
exposes men to the most terrible        
dangers1 brutally destroys their        

liberty1 gravely threatens their life   
and property or even devotes them to    
ruin--why1 then it destroys the         
assumptions on which the state itself is
 based1 denies its own aim1 deprives    
itself of any right to existence1 and   
the individuals have thenceforward but  
one interest1 namely1 to drive away this
 bogey of the state and with all        
possible means to force the men1 who    
make use of it and the superstitions    
clinging to it1 to respect the moral law
 which the community has created to     
overwhelm anti-social1 immoral          
individuals1 to render them harmless and
 if necessary to destroy them4  ,one    
point there is on which the             
,machiavellian or practical politicians 
are particularly fond of talking        
nonsense1 and that is the state's       
loyalty to treaties4 ,is the state bound
 by a treaty8 ,must it honour its       
signature8 ,must it perform what it has 
undertaken to do8 ,the detestable1      
unanimous answer is ,no4 ,a treaty      

cannot hinder the state from doing what 
its interest demands4 ,prince ,bismarck 
is often cited on this point1 as he once
 said3 ,the only sound foundation for   
the state is state egoism4 ,and another 
time3 ,a treaty is only valid rebus sic 
stantibus1 if the situation is the same 
as when it was concluded2 if the        
circumstances change1 it becomes invalid
 by the very fact4 ,such views are      
revolting1 however great a name be      
appended to them4 ,contract1 or treaty1 
is the basis of the law4 ,whoever breaks
 it is dishonoured1 and doubly          
dishonoured is he who from the beginning
 enters upon it with the idea at the    
back of his mind of deriving every      
possible advantage from it and of       
breaking it when the time comes to      
fulfil obligations4  ,the phrase1 sound 
egoism1 whether it refer to a private   
person or to the state1 must make every 
decent man blush for shame4 ,egoism may 
be sound1 but it is always the contrary 
of moral4 ,it is just as convenient for 

the individual as for the state to think
 only of his own advantage and          
unhesitatingly to sacrifice his         
neighbour's rights to it2 but ,morality 
arose and was constituted a rule of     
human relations in order to break the   
back of this selfishness and to teach   
man consideration for his neighbour4 ,it
 is no valid excuse to say that state   
egoism is no sin1 but a virtue and a    
merit1 that it is different in character
 from the egoism of the individual4     
,that is not true4 ,it is not different 
in character4 ,it is of exactly the same
 character as in private life4 ,the     
responsible leader of the state who is  
guilty of a breach of treaty makes      
believe to himself and others that he   
does not do it for his own sake1 but in 
the interests of the state4 ,but who is 
the state8 ,i have already given the    
answer to this4 ,the state consists of  
men1 the interests served by a breach of
 treaty are those of men1 not1 as a     
rule1 of all1 not even of many members  

of the state1 but of a few1 of a class1 
a group1 perhaps of only one family     
whose power1 wealth and reputation it is
 intended to increase4 ,so-called state 
egoism is in actual fact the private    
egoism of many individuals1 who break   
the law1 or tolerate and condone a      
breach of the law1 for the sake of      
pocketing ill-gotten gains2 and no one  
is so stupid as to let himself be       
bamboozled into believing that the      
shameful crime of breaking a treaty for 
the purpose of sound egoistic grabbing  
becomes moral when it is perpetrated not
 by one individual but by thousands or  
millions of individuals4  ,the          
reservatio mentalis1 too1 of rebus sic  
stantibus is an unwarrantable and wicked
 reservation4 ,nothing prevents a decent
 man when making a contract from adding 
a clause reserving the right to         
terminate it if the essential conditions
 should change4 ,if the other party to  
the contract does not agree to this1    
well1 then the contract cannot be       

concluded4 ,but to sign it with the     
mental reservation that one will disavow
 one's signature if the obligations     
undertaken become irksome1 that is      
swindling4 ,there is one consideration  
so simple that it is inconceivable that 
those who break contracts do not realize
 it4 ,in some concrete case the leader  
of the state judges it to be profitable 
to the state to disregard good faith4   
,what guarantee has he that his judgment
 is right8 ,he is a man1 and no man is  
infallible4 ,but all mankind have made  
good faith the foundation of their life 
in communities1 and if a single man has 
the temerity to draw a conclusion       
violating the immutable convictions and 
doctrines of all mankind1 he must be mad
 not to see that most probably he is    
wrong and that all mankind in every age 
and every clime is right4 ,i have left  
out of consideration the fact that any  
possible advantage arising from the     
breach of faith would not excuse him    
morally1 and setting aside the ethical  

aspect of the case1 ,i dwell only on the
 logical argument4  ,there is one case  
and one only in which a contract is not 
binding1 either on the state or on the  
private individual1 and that is when the
 signatory was forced to enter upon it  
with a knife at his throat4 ,obligations
 which a victor imposes on his defeated 
and disarmed opponent are by their very 
nature invalid4 ,the old cry of         
,brennus3 ,vae victis6 is might and     
cannot constitute a right4 ,civil law   
calls this kind of thing compulsion and 
decrees that it invalidates any         
contract4 ,only a pedantic mind1 stupid 
and depraved1 immersed in hair-splitting
 trickery and incapable of a straight   
thought1 could complacently maintain in 
the face of all common sense that might 
and compulsion1 far from doing away with
 right1 are the source of all right4    
,the silly formula coined for this is3  
,might is right4 ,might may be a fact1  
but it is not right4 ,the source of     
right is not might but ,morality1 which 

might disavows and destroys4 ,the       
necessary condition of any obligation   
which is to be valid is freedom4 ,kant  
proved this1 but his proof was          
unnecessary1 for it is self-evident4 ,a 
forced treaty is no treaty1 for it is   
the victor's fist which has guided the  
hand of the vanquished1 and it is he who
 wrote the latter's signature under the 
document4 ,the will1 the consciousness  
of the seeming signatory were absent at 
the time4  ,but the worst and most      
immoral action of the state1 beside     
which a breach of treaty for selfish    
reasons pales to insignificance1 is the 
war of aggression for purposes of       
profit1 that is1 for the conquest of    
territory1 extortion of money1 increase 
of power1 or fame4 ,war is the          
quintessence of all crimes against life 
and property1 against the body and mind 
of a person1 the prevention of which is 
the aim and object of all ,morality and 
all laws derived from it4 ,any means are
 permissible whereby this wickedness may

 be prevented2 the war of defence1 waged
 by the party attacked1 is not only     
justified but sacred1 as are the        
functions of the institutions that      
society has developed to hunt down and  
punish those who do not respect         
,morality and ,law4 ,and just as it is  
the duty of every society to maintain   
courts of justice1 police and prisons1  
so it is the duty of every state to be  
well armed1 well versed in the use of   
weapons and strong1 so long as it must  
count on the fact that there are        
practical politicians who do not        
recognize ,morality as binding the      
state1 and nations that are ready on the
 first hint of their leaders to         
perpetrate every crime that conscience1 
the ,ten ,commandments and penal law    
forbid4  ,it is idle1 in my opinion1 to 
discuss the question whether war will   
ever disappear from the world4 ,it      
serves no purpose to contradict those   
who declare it to be eternal4 ,it is    
possible that it will continue to exist 

as long as there is vice1 sin and crime2
 and ,i do not believe that these will  
ever be completely exterminated4 ,among 
mankind there will probably never be a  
lack of sick and depraved people whose  
selfishness is monstrously exaggerated1 
whose instincts urge them with stormy   
violence1 whose powers of inhibition are
 scantily developed or altogether       
wanting1 who suffer from ansthesia of   
the feelings and are therefore incapable
 of any sympathy with their fellow men  
and who are mentally too weak to foresee
 the results of their actions4          
,individuals of this kind are born      
criminals whose existence society will  
probably never be able to prevent and   
against whom it is obliged to protect   
itself4 ,now war arises from the same   
psychic conditions as the antisocial    
actions of these born criminals1 and    
therefore the pessimists may be right in
 maintaining that it can never be       
abolished4 ,but it is one thing to      
assert the existence of a deplorable    

fact and quite another to glorify it4   
,to say that war is a part of the       
universe constituted by ,god is         
blasphemy1 even though the saying       
emanates from ,moltke4 ,to extol war    
ecstatically and to sing hymns of praise
 to it1 to declare that it evokes the   
highest virtues of man is a panegyric of
 crime1 a thing anticipated and         
punishable in the penal code4  ,i am not
 here attempting to solve the problem of
 what practical measures can be taken   
whereby right may be set in the place of
 might in inter-state relations1 and    
instead of ruthless selfishness1        
,morality1 that is1 self-control1       
consideration and respect for the just  
claims of one's fellow men and love of  
one's neighbour4 ,that is as far beyond 
the scope of this work as is the        
investigation of the methods of         
education1 criminal justice1 police     
organization or prison conditions       
intended to deal with the tide of crime 
and to stem it as far as possible4 ,i am

 concerned with moral philosophy1 and   
from that point of view ,i show that all
 ,morality is rooted in the desire of   
men to live together peaceably in a     
society1 to have greater security of    
life and property1 greater possibilities
 of happiness1 and that the same needs  
must impose the rules of ,morality upon 
states in their relations to one        
another4 ,according to ,hobbes the      
primitive condition of mankind is that  
of a war of every man against all other 
men1 and only the creation of society   
makes an end of it4 ,but if the state   
unleashes the dogs of aggressive warfare
 it hurls mankind back into its         
primitive condition and destroys the    
work it was created to do4 ,the ,stoic  
,seneca says3 ,homo sacra res homini1   
,man is sacred to man4 ,the practical   
politicians who praise war repeat with  
,hobbes3 ,homo homini lupus1 ,man is a  
wolf to man4 ,the moral man demands a   
return from ,hobbes to ,seneca4 ,if it  
has been possible in the state to tame  

the wolfish instincts of the individual 
and to make him bow down before ,custom 
and ,law1 it must be equally possible to
 do so in the relations of states to one
 another4 ,he who denies this in        
principle disavows ,morality altogether1
 not only for the state but also for the
 individual2 he who admits it in        
principle but in practice scornfully    
disregards it is a bandit1 and it is    
desirable to treat him like any other   
robber and murderer who1 to satisfy his 
wolfish appetites1 tramples on ,morality
 and ,right and acts like a wild beast4 
,to this1 however1 the ,moralist will   
object sadly1 and the practical         
politician with scornful superiority1   
that the state has created institutions 
for suppressing the bandit1 but that    
there are none such to control bandit   
states1 and that self-defence alone1 the
 only means of self-protection for man  
in ,hobbes's primitive condition1 can   
gain a footing between them4 ,clearly   
only the party attacked is in a state of

 self-defence1 but the bandit who has a 
sufficient sense of humour to play the  
pettifogging lawyer can always maintain 
that attack is also self-defence1 the   
preventive form of self-defence4 ,the   
answer to this is3 if society has       
managed to provide judges and police in 
order to secure peace1 then mankind will
 for the same purpose learn how to      
provide courts of justice and a police  
force to deal with the bandits of       
practical politics who endanger peace   
among nations4 ,but that is a practical 
question1 not a theoretical one1 not a  
principle of moral philosophy4 ,the     
latter shows irrefutably that there is  
only one ,morality1 not a private one   
and a public one which is its negation1 
not one kind for the individual and     
another for politics1 for the state4    
,he who defends the thesis of a twofold 
,morality merely shows that he does not 
possess simple ,morality4     ,,chapter 
,,vi  ,,freedom ,,and ,,responsibility  
,theological thought is faced with a    

problem in ethics which presents the    
greatest difficulties4 ,it is the       
problem of ,free ,will4  ,is man who    
perceives1 judges1 has volition and     
acts1 a free being inwardly8 ,can he1   
guided only by his own reasonable       
thoughts and conclusions1 determined    
entirely by his own inner impulses and  
uninfluenced by outer circumstances1    
choose one or the other of two          
conflicting possibilities8 ,when he has 
to make a decision1 is he always like   
,hercules at the cross-roads who has to 
make up his mind alone as to which path 
he shall take1 whether he is to follow  
quiet1 modest virtue1 or alluring1      
voluptuous vice8 ,does he do evil       
because he willed to do so and not      
otherwise1 although it was in his power 
to avoid it8 ,does he decide for the    
good1 because after due investigation   
and consideration he recognized it as   
preferable1 though he might have        
rejected it8 ,or is man always subject  
to coercion from which at no time and no

 place he can escape8 ,are all his      
actions determined by the law of ,nature
 which regulates every one of his       
movements just as mechanically as the   
course of the stars or the fall of a    
body to our earth when its support is   
removed8 ,is he an automaton1 set going 
by cosmic forces1 who possesses the     
doubtful privilege consciously to be    
able to follow the turning of his       
wheels1 the action of his levers1 rods  
and indicators and to listen to their   
humming and knocking without being      
allowed to interfere in their movements 
or to change the least thing in their   
functions or work8 ,is he fettered by   
the chain of causes which have existed  
eternally and continue to act immutably 
to all eternity8  ,theological thought  
is condemned to find an answer to the   
question of freedom or determinism1 as  
it is the necessary condition for the   
essential concepts of the theological   
doctrine of ,morality1 that is1 the     
concept of responsibility and those     

consequent upon this1 namely1 sin1      
reward and punishment4 ,for the true    
believer ,god is the source of          
,morality4 ,he ,himself is ,morality4   
,what ,he ordains is good in itself and 
cannot be otherwise1 for there is no    
room for evil in ,his nature1 since if  
,he could be conceived to do evil1 it   
would by the very fact of ,his doing it 
become good4 ,a man1 to be moral1 must  
approximate to the nature of ,god as    
nearly as it is granted to mortals to   
do4 ,the moral law is revealed by ,god's
 mercy to give man a light which shows  
him the right path and lights him on his
 way4 ,thanks to ,him the poor mortal is
 relieved of the incertitude due to his 
limited mental powers and is endowed    
with the priceless possession of a      
certain precept which he need only obey 
in order to be sure of salvation4       
,however1 granted the correctness of    
this assumption1 it is not              
comprehensible how evil came into the   
world4 ,it contradicts all attributes   

with which faith has endowed the deity4 
,it cannot appear without ,god's        
knowledge1 for ,he is omniscient and    
nothing is hidden from ,him4 ,it cannot 
occur against ,his will1 for ,he is     
omnipotent and nothing resists ,his     
bidding4 ,but least of all can it rage  
with ,his knowledge and consent1 for ,he
 is infinitely good and therefore does  
not permit his creatures to fall victims
 to evil4 ,but experience teaches us    
that evil has a permanent place in human
 life1 and this forces one to the       
conclusion that either ,god is hard and 
cruel1 and therefore not infinitely good
 and not ,morality itself1 or that ,he  
has no knowledge of evil and therefore  
is not omniscient1 but1 on the contrary1
 blind as well as stupid1 or that ,he   
sees the evil but cannot prevent it1 and
 therefore is not omnipotent and must   
recognize the existence of higher powers
 than ,himself against whom ,he is      
impotent4  ,these terrifying conclusions
 have not escaped the notice of the     

devout1 and they have always made the   
most desperate efforts to evade them4   
,some have chosen the easiest way out of
 the difficulty2 they close their eyes  
before the yawning abyss1 fold their    
hands devoutly and invent pious phrases 
about the inscrutable ways of           
,providence and its infinite wisdom1    
which the weak intelligence of mortals  
cannot grasp4 ,others take infinite     
pains2 in the sweat of their brow they  
with difficulty evolve tortuous and     
hypocritical explanations1 which in     
reality explain nothing1 but in a mind  
which lends itself willingly to them    
give rise to the illusion that the      
contradiction has been solved4 ,perhaps 
the most astounding piece of work       
accomplished by this miserable juggling1
 or this delusion of self by means of an
 exuberant flow of words1 is presented  
in the four volumes of the ,thodice1 by 
which ,leibnitz made himself a          
laughing-stock4 ,mazdeism has invented  
an alluring but at the same time risky  

expedient4 ,it lightly assumes that two 
principles obtain in the universe1 a    
good one and a bad one1 the creator and 
the destroyer1 the merciful ,god and the
 cruel demon1 ,ormuzd and ,ahriman4 ,in 
this way everything is easy to          
understand4 ,good is the work of radiant
 ,ormuzd1 evil the deed of dark         
,ahriman4 ,the two fight together with  
very nearly equal forces1 but this      
doctrine reveals the comforting prospect
 of a distant future in which ,ormuzd   
shall finally triumph over ,ahriman1 and
 fills the trembling believer with      
elation at the thought that after ons of
 the tragic struggle between good and   
evil1 at the end of the world the       
curtain will fall on the victory of     
good4 ,by this victory ,mazdeism1 which 
claims to be monotheistic1 rescues its  
single god1 although the introduction of
 a second principle of very nearly equal
 power1 which holds the one god in check
 for an immeasurable period of time1    
brings this system perilously close to  

polytheism4  ,to the purer monotheism of
 ,christianity there is indeed something
 repugnant in the assumption of a       
second1 opposite principle of almost    
equal power1 but yet it has admitted the
 existence of the devil1 who is         
undoubtedly reminiscent of ,ahriman4    
,only he lacks the independence of the  
,mazdean demon4 ,he is not on a footing 
of equality with ,god1 but is subject to
 ,him as is every creature4 ,he is not  
strong enough to oppose ,god and can    
only do evil because ,god allows it4    
,but why does ,he allow it8 ,why does   
,he tolerate the devil8 ,why can the    
latter proceed with his evil work with  
,god's consent8 ,to this theology gives 
a crafty answer which ,goethe has       
clothed in the glorious beauty of       
inimitable poetry4 ,god has assigned to 
the devil the task of tempting man with 
all the arts of seduction in order to   
give him the opportunity of testing and 
developing his moral strength in        
resistance1 of purging himself1 of      

attaining purity and salvation by his   
own efforts4 ,in short1 he exists in    
order to give man a sort of ,swedish    
gymnastics in virtue4 ,the struggle is  
not quite fair1 for the devil is held by
 a halter and is pulled up if he gets   
too big an advantage1 and man is always 
assisted by redeeming mercy1 a hand     
being stretched out to him from the     
clouds which sets him on his feet as    
often as he stumbles4 ,but theology is  
not bound by rules of sport4 ,that is   
how the picture of the universe is      
presented in ,faust4 ,but he who painted
 it is the same ,goethe who on another  
occasion angrily complains3 ,you allow  
man to become guilty--and then leave him
 to his suffering4 ,does the divinity   
allow man to fall a victim to evil      
without turning it aside from him8 ,does
 he only try him in order mercifully to 
rescue him at the moment when he is     
about to succumb8 ,goethe does not      
answer this question without ambiguity4 
,that is not his business either4 ,he   

may contradict himself4 ,he is a poet   
who is allowed to express contradictory 
views4 ,he is not a theologian whose    
duty it is1 by means of a definite      
dogma1 to support those who totter in   
doubt4  ,all these attempts to reconcile
 the attributes of the deity with the   
fact that there is evil in the world    
which continually leads man into danger1
 emanate from the explicit or tacit     
assumption that man possesses ,free     
,will4 ,for if his will is not free and 
he does evil1 then he does it because he
 must and because he cannot do          
otherwise4 ,but this must can only come 
from the deity who is almighty2 it is   
the deity who condemns man1 who forces  
him to do evil4 ,man therefore does evil
 as ,god's tool without volition2       
therefore1 as a matter of fact1 it is   
,god ,himself who does evil4 ,but if    
,god is capable of doing evil ,he is not
 ,morality itself1 or every distinction 
between good and evil is destroyed1 and 
we must recognize what seems evil to us 

to be just as moral as what seems good1 
because the one is as much the work of  
,god as the other4 ,but if this is      
admitted1 and it is logically impossible
 not to admit it1 then the whole        
foundation of transcendental1 that is1  
of theological1 ethics breaks down4 ,the
 latter is therefore forced1 on pain of 
suicide1 to maintain that man has ,free 
,will4  ,but with this assertion        
theological ethics by no means disarms  
all the objections which threaten its   
life4 ,renouvier's book on ,free ,will  
is probably the most thorough and       
exhaustive work on this subject which   
has been treated by thousands of        
thinkers and not a few babblers since   
the time of the ancient ,greeks1 and he 
describes it as follows3 ,will is free  
and spontaneous if ,reason cannot       
foretell its untrammelled action at any 
time other than that at which it        
actually takes place4 ,renouvier makes  
no limitation and no reservation4 ,he   
does not say1 if human reason cannot    

foretell its action1 and this omission  
of the particularizing adjective is not 
carelessness or a mistake on his part1  
it is duly considered2 for the prudent  
dialectician knows very well that he    
would ruin his theory of ,free ,will if 
he only maintained that human reason    
alone should be able to foretell its    
action4 ,there are many happenings which
 human reason cannot foretell1 and which
 nevertheless obey immutable laws and   
take place according to absolutely fixed
 rules without the exercise of any inner
 freedom or authority on the part of the
 individual4 ,if human reason cannot    
foretell these happenings1 it is not    
because no external force of the        
universe determines them and they are   
entirely spontaneous1 but simply because
 the laws controlling them are unknown4 
,therefore the impossibility of         
foretelling them is no proof of their   
freedom1 it is only a proof of the      
ignorance of the human mind4 ,there was 
a time when no human intellect could    

foretell the occurrence of a solar or   
lunar eclipse4 ,was that because the    
heavenly bodies act freely and are      
eclipsed only at their own spontaneous  
desire1 when and how they please8 ,no1  
because man had not discovered and      
comprehended their movements4 ,to this  
very day we are unable to foretell the  
weather on a particular day next year1  
or the result of the next harvest1 or an
 earthquake4 ,does this prove the       
freedom1 the absolute independence of   
these occurrences8 ,no2 it only proves  
the inadequacy of our knowledge4        
,renouvier therefore would achieve      
nothing for his theory of ,free ,will1  
if only human understanding were to be  
unable to foretell the actions of the   
,will4 ,that is why he does not say     
human reason1 but simply ,reason4 ,the  
essence of ,free ,will is that its      
actions altogether shall be incapable of
 being foreseen2 it is not in its nature
 to act in accordance with some         
predetermination which must necessarily 

reckon with outer circumstances and     
given forces2 and the impossibility of  
foretelling its actions exists not only 
for human ,reason but for every         
,reason--for ,reason in general4  ,for  
every ,reason and therefore for the     
divine ,reason as well4 ,and now        
theological ethics must find a way out  
of this dilemma3 either ,god does not   
foresee the decisions of free human     
,will1 then this is a denial of his     
omniscience1 that is1 of one of ,his    
essential attributes2 or ,god foresees  
the decisions of free human ,will1 then 
this is a denial of the ,freedom of the 
,will1 the essence of which1 according  
to ,renouvier1 lies in the fact that it 
cannot be foreseen4 ,for this           
impossibility of being foreseen is      
indeed the quality by which ,free ,will 
stands or falls4 ,let us realize the    
significance of this concept4 ,nothing  
can be foreseen which will not with     
certainty occur4 ,but whatever at some  
future time will become a reality1 must 

even now be virtually a reality for an  
omniscient ,reason not bound by the     
human categories of time and space1     
since for this ,reason neither proximity
 nor distance exists1 but everything is 
on one plane1 and there is no future or 
past1 but everything is present4 ,so if 
the divine ,reason foresees now how the 
free ,will of man will act in the       
future1 that is equivalent to saying    
that this free ,will is forced to act in
 the particular way which ,god foresees 
and not otherwise4 ,therefore the ,will 
is not free but1 on the contrary1       
strictly bound4 ,it is obliged to make  
the event foreseen by ,god a fact1 as   
,god can only foresee what must         
certainly come to pass1 and a foreseen  
event that does not happen would mean a 
mistake1 a false assumption1 of which   
one cannot believe ,god capable without 
denying ,him4 ,this apparent free ,will 
is coercion at sight4 ,as its action is 
foreseen by ,god1 the ,will is subject  
to the law of fate1 but a period of     

delay is granted4 ,every movement of the
 supposedly free ,will becomes a part of
 the order of the universe which has    
been unalterably laid down from         
eternity1 and which the human ,will     
cannot upset without burying ,god in the
 ruins4 ,man may imagine that his ,will 
is free4 ,but that is self-deception1   
and he can only indulge in it because   
what ,god sees clearly is hidden from   
him1 namely1 the goal towards which1    
though he does not realize it1 he is    
inevitably led along strictly defined   
paths by the iron hand of fate4  ,it    
would be unjust towards theology to say 
that it has never seen the              
incompatibility of ,free ,will with     
divine omniscience4 ,this has not       
escaped its notice1 but it has attempted
 by the use of familiar formul to get   
out of the difficulty4 ,in his book ,de 
libero ,arbitrio ,saint ,augustine      
stoutly maintains that the human ,will  
is free1 but he tries to rescue the     
attributes of the deity by reserving to 

it the right or the power to intervene  
by its mercy in the actions of the      
,will1 if in its freedom it comes to a  
decision which endangers the salvation  
of the soul4 ,saint ,thomas ,aquinas    
takes good care not to differ in opinion
 from the ,bishop of ,hippo4 ,the       
reformers1 ,calvin1 ,luther and ,bishop 
,jansen1 too1 were better logicians than
 the patristic writers1 and             
unhesitatingly denied the freedom of the
 ,will1 but they did not notice that    
they made ,god responsible for all the  
misdeeds of man1 lacking freedom and    
acting with ,god's foreknowledge and at 
,his behest4 ,the ,council of ,trent    
scorned all these contradictions and    
unintelligible points1 and declared with
 infallible authority that man's ,will  
is free and that at the same time ,god  
is omniscient4 ,the ,catholic ,church at
 the time was in some countries still in
 a position to meet ,reason1 if it      
raised objections1 with an unanswerable 
argument3 the stake4  ,that is the      

peculiarity of theological as           
distinguished from scientific thought1  
the purest form of which is mathematics4
 ,the former never follows a train of   
thought to its strictly logical         
conclusion1 but only follows a certain  
distance1 to a point where it loses     
itself in an impenetrable black fog1 or 
in a cloud of glory which dazzles the   
beholder4 ,mathematical thought1 on the 
contrary1 develops the train of thought 
to the bitter end1 to its ultimate      
conclusions4 ,these are necessarily     
absurd if the premises are erroneous1   
and their absurdity is so clear that it 
convincingly proves the mistake in the  
point of departure4 ,such a scrupulous  
confutation of self is to be expected as
 little from mystic visions as from     
arrogant dogmatism4 ,the former obey the
 laws of dreams1 in which the           
association of ideas1 unfettered by     
logic1 holds sway and strings together  
the most incompatible ideas to form an  
apparently connected series2 the latter 

demands the privilege of being          
independent of the judgment of ,reason1 
and of being tried by ,faith1 a judge   
who always decides in its favour4       
,those who believe in ,free ,will adduce
 a proof of it which they derive by the 
method of introspection4 ,man1 they say1
 will never be convinced that he is not 
free1 that his actions are not          
determined by his own will alone1 for he
 has the incontrovertible consciousness 
of the contrary4 ,he is quite clear on  
the point that he does a thing because  
it is his will to do so1 that he had the
 choice of doing it or not1 that he does
 what he wants1 that he comes to his    
decision owing to considerations1       
inclinations1 moods or intentions which 
are perfectly known to him1 if to him   
only4 ,at the ,sorbonne in ,paris they  
still remember the professor--when the  
anecdote was told me ,victor ,cousin was
 named as the hero1 but ,i cannot       
guarantee that it was he and no         
other--who used to say in his lecture on

 ,free ,will3 ,man's will is free4      
,there is no need to prove this by      
giving reasons4 ,we feel it immediately 
as a truth4 ,i will show you4 ,i will   
raise my right arm4 ,i raise it--here he
 raised his right arm with a commanding 
gesture1 kept it for a short time in    
this position1 and added triumphantly3  
,you see that my will is free4 ,his     
hearers broke into enthusiastic applause
 at this triumphant demonstration4      
,to-day they would receive it with loud 
laughter4  ,we have learnt to seek the  
roots of most1 perhaps of all1 human    
actions in the subconsciousness4 ,there 
they are worked out under influences    
which cannot be perceived by            
introspection and in which inborn and   
acquired inclinations1 experiences1     
organic conditions at the time1         
instincts1 attractions and repulsions   
play a decisive part4 ,they rise ready  
made into consciousness1 and the latter1
 not having seen them being formed1     
persuades itself that it has produced   

them spontaneously1 and imagines reasons
 why it willed to do actions that were  
determined outside its sphere4 ,the     
professor who authoritatively states1 ,i
 wish to raise my right arm and         
therefore ,i do it1 certainly says this 
in all good faith1 but equally certainly
 he is ignorant4 ,he is not aware of the
 play of forces which end in his        
gesture4 ,he raises his right arm1 which
 he believes he chooses with complete   
freedom1 because he is in the habit of  
using his right arm by preference2 if he
 had been left-handed he would have     
announced his wish to raise his left    
arm1 and would have been equally        
convinced that he had decided1 with     
complete freedom1 for his left arm4 ,if 
he suffered from chronic muscular       
rheumatism in one of his arms1 so that  
it would trouble him or hurt him to move
 it1 he would unconsciously choose the  
other1 sound arm1 and maintain just as  
positively that he had done so with     
complete freedom4 ,i have mentioned as  

instances two particularly crude and    
therefore very obvious reasons which may
 determine the action of this           
simple-minded professor without his     
being aware of it4 ,but each one of our 
more complicated1 and even of our       
simplest1 movements is the outcome of   
numberless subtle causes which are      
partly due to the organized experiences 
and habits of our individual life1      
partly a necessary consequence of our   
inherited qualities1 our bodily and     
intellectual constitution1 and their    
origin goes back to the far distant past
 of our species1 to the beginnings of   
life1 we may even say to eternity4 ,our 
consciousness can tell nothing of these 
causes4 ,they elude our observation and 
investigation and remain ever unknown to
 us4 ,renouvier is quite right when he  
says no understanding--and ,i say       
without his ambiguity no human          
understanding of the present time--can  
foretell the actions of another1 nor    
indeed his own1 but not because they    

come to pass independently of inevitable
 causes1 but simply because these causes
 cannot be descried by our ignorance4   
,it is vain labour to try and derive the
 solution of the question of ,free      
,will1 or even a contribution towards   
it1 from introspection4 ,it is a method 
unsuitable for this purpose4 ,the ,greek
 sage well knew what a great and        
difficult task he set man when he       
admonished him3 ,greek3 gnthi seauton4  
,that is easy to say but difficult if   
not impossible to do4 ,spinoza very     
happily characterized the self-deception
 in which the individual is plunged with
 regard to the part played in           
determining his actions by his conscious
 ,will aided by ,reason2 he says that if
 a stone1 flung by some hand1 had       
consciousness1 it would imagine it was  
flying of its own free will2 and in     
another place he points out without any 
illustrative metaphor1 that a drunk man 
and a child1 who certainly do not act on
 their own initiative1 also believe in  

the freedom of their will4 ,it has been 
possible to prove experimentally how    
ignorant of the real motives of his     
actions the individual may be4 ,it is   
suggested to a person who has been      
hypnotized that on awakening he is to   
carry out a certain action1 something   
particularly absurd1 unjustified and    
aimless being intentionally chosen4 ,the
 subject of the experiment on awaking   
faithfully carries out the suggestion1  
and as he has no memory of what happened
 while he was in the hypnotic state1 he 
is convinced that he is yielding to a   
sudden idea1 a whim1 but that in any    
case his action is determined by his own
 will4 ,but since he must realize the   
absurdity of what he is doing1 he seeks 
for some sufficient motive to explain   
it1 and always finds one to his own     
satisfaction4  ,all the efforts of      
anguished sophists to prove their thesis
 of the ,freedom of the ,will from data 
supplied by introspection have failed   
miserably4 ,but they were forced to     

undertake them1 for theology cannot give
 up the contention that man acts with   
free ,will4 ,it is an important part of 
the religious conception of the universe
 and of the relation in which1 according
 to this1 man stands to ,god4  ,to put  
it shortly1 religion sees in man's life 
on earth a preparation for eternity4 ,it
 gives him the opportunity of coming    
nearer to ,god by his own efforts and   
thus making himself worthy of the       
salvation which secures him a place in  
the sight of ,god to the end of time4   
,thus the life of the flesh is made a   
method of selection by which the sheep  
are sundered from the goats4 ,god       
provides man with free ,will for this   
special purpose1 so that he may make use
 of it to choose good of his own accord 
and to avoid evil4 ,this undoubtedly    
wearisome task is made much easier for  
him1 because ,god in ,his goodness has  
given him laws1 doctrines of ,morality  
and examples which point out the way of 
salvation4 ,if man makes proper use of  

his gifts1 if in pursuance of divine    
admonition1 he treads of his own free   
will the path of virtue1 he acquires    
merit which gives him a legitimate claim
 to the reward of finding favour in     
,god's eyes and to be admitted to the   
company of the just and pure4 ,but if   
man purposely turns to evil1 of which he
 is warned by revelation and which he   
has been given the power to avoid1 then 
he is a sinner and deserves the         
punishment of damnation1 which1 however1
 he may yet escape if ,god in ,his mercy
 forgives him his sin4 ,therefore man   
holds in his hand the fate of his       
immortal soul4 ,it depends on him       
whether this fate be salvation or       
damnation4 ,he is responsible for       
directing it to the former or the       
latter4 ,of course1 ,god has the power  
to force him to virtue and to stop him  
from vice4 ,but it is not ,his plan to  
condemn man to be the slave of virtue4  
,he wants man to choose virtue of his   
own accord1 ,he wants noble souls about 

,him who by freedom have attained       
,morality4  ,this religious view of the 
universe1 which deals in assertions and 
disdains on principle to prove even one 
of them to ,reason by facts that can be 
tested1 contrasts with the scientific   
view of the universe which asserts      
nothing but what can be objectively     
ascertained to be true1 which           
distinguishes sharply between the       
account of what has been observed and   
can be tested by everyone and hypotheses
 for which it demands no belief1 but    
only the recognition of their           
possibility or probability1 and which it
 discards as soon as an ascertained fact
 definitely disproves them4 ,no         
compromise is possible between these two
 views of the universe4 ,nothing can    
bridge the chasm between them4 ,it would
 be superficial to say that the theme of
 the scientific view is realities and   
that of the religious one imagination4  
,imagination is also a reality1 only of 
a different order to that which is      

called so in common parlance4 ,it is a  
subjective reality2 it exists only in   
the mind that conceives it4 ,reality    
itself is for the thinking mind only a  
state of consciousness1 but it is an    
image of conditions which have an       
objective existence1 though in another  
form1 outside the consciousness4 ,the   
supporters of religion maintain that    
there is an objective reality           
corresponding to their concepts1 but    
this cannot be ascertained by any of the
 senses which the living organism has   
developed in order to establish a       
relation between the world1 of which it 
is a part1 and itself4 ,it is perfectly 
useless for supporters of the one view  
of the universe to try and convince     
those of the other4 ,each of them moves 
on a different plane and is             
unapproachable to the other4 ,all that  
can be done is to define both the one   
and the other as clearly as possible and
 prove their incompatibility4  ,for the 
scientific view of the ,universe the    

problem of ,free ,will does not exist   
and cannot exist4 ,all facts that       
science has observed force it to the    
assumption of causation1 which does not 
only mean that every phenomenon is      
produced by a cause1 is the effect of a 
cause and could never have occurred but 
for this cause1 but also means that the 
effect represents the exact equivalent  
of the energy which was its cause4 ,thus
 the hypothesis of the indestructibility
 of the total energy in the universe is 
an essential part of the concept of     
causation1 the fundamental hypothesis   
without which the phenomenon of the     
universe and the things which occur in  
it are simply unintelligible to ,reason2
 and everything in and outside          
ourselves1 everything that we perceive1 
becomes chaos1 chance1 lawless whim or  
miracle in the theological sense of the 
word4  ,it is inconceivable that an     
effect should be anything other than the
 reappearance in a different form of the
 exact quantity of energy that caused   

it2 for if the energy of the effect     
exceeded that of its cause1 then part of
 the effect would have been produced    
without cause2 and if the energy of the 
effect fell short of that of the cause1 
then part of the energy of the cause    
would have been expended without        
producing an effect4 ,that1 however1    
would be the negation of causation1 it  
would be an admission that part of the  
effect 7i4e4 an effect7 could be        
produced without sufficient cause1 i4e4 
out of nothing1 and that a part of the  
cause 7i4e4 energy7 could disappear     
7into nothing7 without producing an     
equivalent effect1 which is obviously   
absurd4  ,the human ,will manifests     
itself by an action or the prevention of
 an action according to the impulse felt
 by our organism4 ,both these are an    
exercise of force1 the amount of which  
can be measured4 ,indeed1 inhibition1   
too1 is a dynamical effort which        
represents the exact equivalent of the  
force with which the impulse which it   

has checked acted on the motory centres4
 ,the ,will1 therefore1 expends energy  
which does work that can be measured4   
,but the ,will must derive this energy  
from some source4 ,it therefore also    
only converts energy derived from the   
energy of the universe1 the total amount
 of which can neither be augmented nor  
diminished2 the ,will consequently is a 
part of the dynamic energy of the       
universe1 and must necessarily be       
subject to its mechanical law2 that is1 
to the law of causation4 ,it is         
therefore not free1 but dependent1 as is
 every phenomenon in the universe4      
,whoever maintains its freedom maintains
 that it is independent1 that it is not 
subject to the law of causation1 that it
 has no cause of which the elements1 if 
they could be fully known to us1 would  
be measurable1 that it expends energy   
which it derives from nowhere1 that it  
produces energy out of nothing4 ,whoever
 maintains this contradicts all         
experience from which the knowledge of  

,nature and her laws has been built up2 
it is obviously hopeless to expect a    
reasonable discussion with such a       
person4  ,now the supporters of free    
,will may reply that they do not deny   
that the ,will derives its energy from  
the organism and therefore from the     
universal source of cosmic energy1 and  
that it makes use of it according to the
 laws of mechanics2 but they assert that
 the direction in which energy is       
expended by the ,will is freely         
determined by it2 further1 that the     
direction does not affect the amount of 
energy used1 and consequently the ,will 
can act absolutely in accordance with   
the mechanical laws of the universe and 
yet can1 independently of outside       
causes1 determine the manner in which   
the energy shall be expended2 that is to
 say1 the ,will can be free4 ,but this  
objection is pure sophistry1 for the    
determination of the direction1 in so   
far as it is not mere imagination and   
therefore ineffective and sterile1 but  

really controls the action1 is an       
expenditure of energy4 ,the controlling 
power uses up energy and obeys a cause1 
so we have arrived at the same dilemma  
again--either the controlling ,will is  
subject to the law of causation1 then it
 is not free2 or it is free and is      
determined by no outside cause1 then we 
must ascribe to it motion without       
driving power and energy derived from   
nothing--which is absurd4  ,no4 ,there  
is no such thing as ,free ,will4 ,the   
concept of freedom itself is an illusion
 of thought which cannot survey         
sufficiently extensive connexions4      
,nothing in the universe is free2 all   
things mutually determine each other4   
,all are cause and effect1 and they fit 
into one another like cog wheels4       
,everything is linked up and dovetailed4
 ,the philosopher's phrase1 ,everything 
is in flux1 is the description of the   
outward appearance of things4 ,against  
it we must set the reality which is3    
,everything is eternally at rest4 ,for a

 circumscribed system of motion without 
beginning or end may mean motion for    
every individual point which describes  
the course1 but is1 as a whole1         
virtually at rest4 ,everything that     
exists1 or ever will exist1 has its     
necessary and sufficient cause in that  
which has always been2 the sequence of  
phenomena has been unalterably          
determined since all eternity for all   
eternity2 what we call chance is an     
occurrence for which our ignorance      
cannot perceive the necessary causes and
 conditions2 past and future would be in
 the same plane1 therefore would be     
present for an omniscience1 which knew  
and understood the machine of the       
universe down to its smallest wheel and 
pin4  ,one of the logical consequences  
of this is that1 without any miracle or 
the assumption of any supernatural      
influences1 it would be possible to     
foretell the most distant events in all 
their smallest details4 ,an intelligence
 sufficiently wide and penetrating      

would1 following the strict law of      
causation1 be able to produce all lines 
of the present with absolute certainty  
immeasurably far into the future4 ,as   
everything that ever will be necessarily
 must be1 it virtually exists at present
 and has always existed2 therefore it is
 only a question of clarity of vision1  
which however1 is denied to man1 to see 
it at any time and to any extent4  ,the 
illusion of flux is explicable4 ,life1  
which like all world processes is a     
cyclical motion1 is passed in an endless
 alternation between the shining forth  
and extinction of consciousness1 the    
bearers of which are an everlasting     
series of organisms following one       
another4 ,every organism lasts a limited
 time1 during which it is carried along 
an inconceivably small fraction of the  
tremendous cycle4 ,it sees all the      
points of this short stretch but once1  
and does not learn that they are        
eternally the same4 ,it gathers the     
false impression that they fly past it1 

whereas they are at rest and it passes  
them1 until it ceases to be a suitable  
bearer of consciousness and disappears1 
making room for a successor4 ,this rigid
 immutability of the whole ,universe is 
certainly intolerably gruesome to the   
imagination1 but then1 every time we    
look beyond the narrow confines of life 
and human circumstances1 to peep into   
the infinity and eternity which         
surrounds us1 do not terrifying vistas  
open up before us8  ,not only the       
religious minded1 but many free         
thinkers1 too1 have ,free ,will at      
heart1 though the latter are otherwise  
guiltless of any mysticism4 ,they claim 
it in the name of man's dignity1 which  
would be deeply humiliated if we had to 
confess ourselves the slaves of outside 
influences1 automata moved by universal 
causation without our having any say in 
the matter4 ,we are not entitled to such
 trumpery pride4 ,let us seek our       
dignity in our striving for knowledge1  
in the subjection of our own instincts  

to the control of our ,reason1 but not  
in an imaginary independence of the laws
 of ,nature1 whose commands we should   
oppose in vain4  ,with ,free ,will      
responsibility also disappears4 ,that is
 obvious4 ,but that means a collapse    
only for theological ,morality4         
,scientific ethics can manage very well 
without responsibility4 ,nay1 more2     
there is no room in it for this concept4
 ,in the system of theological ,morality
 responsibility has a transcendental    
significance4 ,to sum up once more      
shortly what has been dealt with in     
detail above3 according to this system  
,morality is a divine command1 obedience
 to1 or disregard of which results in   
salvation or damnation2 in order that   
reward and punishment may be just1 one  
as well as the other must be merited2   
that implies the assumption that virtue 
is practised or vice chosen             
intentionally and with forethought2 but 
this mode of action must be freely      
willed if man is to be responsible for  

it before his divine ,judge4            
,scientific ethics knows nothing of this
 supernatural dream4 ,in its view       
,morality is an immanent phenomenon     
which occurs only within humanity--or to
 define it more accurately1 within      
humanity organized as a society4 ,it    
arose from a definite necessity2 from   
the undeniable need of men to unite1 so 
as to be able1 in company with one      
another1 shoulder to shoulder1 to       
succeed more easily1 or indeed to       
succeed at all1 in the struggle for     
existence which is too hard for the     
solitary individual4 ,it has a clearly  
recognizable aim3 to teach man to curb  
his selfish instincts and to practise   
consideration for his neighbour1 by     
which means alone peaceable life in     
common and productive co-operation are  
possible4 ,the instinct of              
self-preservation supplies society with 
the laws of ,morality which it          
imperiously imposes on all its members1 
and unconditional obedience to which it 

demands4 ,society does not dream of     
saying to the individual3 ,you are free2
 you must yourself decide whether you   
will follow the path of virtue or that  
of vice4 ,on the contrary1 it says to   
him3 ,whether you wish it or not1 you   
must do that which my doctrine of       
,morality indicates as good and eschew  
that which it declares to be evil4 ,you 
have no choice4 ,i tolerate you in my   
midst only if you submit to the laws of 
,morality4 ,if you transgress them ,i   
shall draw your teeth and claws or      
destroy you altogether4 ,by discipline  
lasting many thousands of years society 
has developed in the individual1 though 
not in all1 an organ that watches that  
his conduct is moral1 and this is the   
conscience4 ,but this is only           
supplementary to1 and representative of1
 society1 which in the main exercises   
police supervision itself1 and sees that
 in general the moral law is obeyed4 ,it
 judges all the actions of the          
individual that come to its knowledge4  

,conscience only is the competent       
authority where occurrences are         
concerned which take place simply in the
 consciousness of the individual1 and   
which he alone is aware of4 ,conscience 
is only too often a lenient judge who   
acquits the individual too easily and   
nearly always admits extenuating        
circumstances4 ,society does not let him
 off so lightly2 his punishment is      
certain if he cannot prevent his sin    
from becoming known4  ,responsibility   
therefore also exists in ,morality as   
understood by sociologists4 ,as far as  
his intentions are concerned the        
individual must come to terms with his  
conscience1 which1 as a rule1 he does   
not find difficult4 ,for his deeds he   
must account to society1 and it does not
 ask what took place in his             
consciousness1 but only how his         
spiritual impulses were manifested4 ,for
 his deeds1 then1 he is summoned before 
society's court of justice and must     
answer for them without having recourse 

to the excuse that he acted as he was   
forced to do by his disposition and the 
pressure of circumstances1 and that he  
had no choice and could not act         
otherwise4 ,though ,morality has always 
been necessary for the life of the      
community1 and though the latter has1   
under the pressure of the law of        
self-preservation1 always had to make   
its members strictly subservient to     
,morality1 it has ever had a dim idea   
that the responsibility of the          
individual for his actions is only of   
practical1 not of fundamental or ideal  
significance4 ,it has never pushed      
investigation as to how far the         
individual acted freely or not to any   
great lengths1 never attempted to trace 
it to the foundations of his            
consciousness1 to the inception of the  
impulses of his ,will4 ,where the lack  
of freedom was obvious1 for instance1   
where every layman could see there was  
insanity1 the ,moral law has been       
disregarded ever since ancient times1   

and society has contented itself with   
protecting itself from the intolerable  
actions of the lunatic by rendering him 
harmless4 ,since positive ,law1 made    
concrete in the laws with penal         
sanctions1 was evolved from the         
universal ,moral law1 it has admitted   
the plea of irresponsibility and        
refrained from exercising its coercive  
powers where such irresponsibility has  
been established4 ,in addition to       
madness1 demonstrable coercion and      
self-defence relieve the individual from
 responsibility for the crime and render
 him immune from punishment4  ,in the   
course of evolution society has conceded
 still further limitations of individual
 responsibility4 ,it willingly admits   
new knowledge gained by scientific      
psychology and concedes limited         
responsibility1 not only in case of     
madness1 but in such cases1 too1 where  
experts can convincingly prove to the   
judges1 the guardians of its ,law1 that 
the individual was in an abnormal       

condition and affected by morbid        
influences at the time of the crime4    
,farther society cannot go1 if it does  
not want to put an end to ,moral law and
 do away altogether with positive law4  
,concern for its continued existence    
forbids this4 ,it must leave it to the  
philosophers to continue the            
investigation4 ,they must show that the 
,will is never free1 always fettered1   
not only in the extreme cases of madness
 or when under the influence of         
suggestion4 ,they must make it clear    
that there is only a difference of      
degree and not of kind between the      
determining influences under which the  
individual is constrained to act1 and   
that the causation which binds him      
proceeds by imperceptible degrees from  
the delirium of the maniac and the      
obsession of the abnormal man to the    
passion1 lust and desire of the man with
 strongly developed instincts1 and to   
the slight stimulus of habits1 the      
colourless judgment and shallow         

considerations of the ordinary man with 
a deformed character and no definite    
features4 ,society can draw no practical
 conclusion from the theoretical        
recognition of the lasting limitation   
and lack of freedom of the ,will1       
because moral law by its very nature    
implies coercion1 and therefore excludes
 freedom4 ,whether the individual       
submits to the ,moral law of his own    
accord1 or because he is forced thereto 
by the community's powers of coercion1  
is of no account to society4 ,it deals  
only with the visible results4  ,but it 
is not merely a matter of flat          
utilitarianism1 it is not even unjust1  
if society1 without inquiring whether   
the ,will is free or not1 makes the     
individual responsible for his actions  
and only makes an exception from this   
universal rule in extreme cases4 ,even  
though his will is subject to the law of
 causation1 and the individual always   
acts as he must1 he nevertheless has a  
means of keeping within the moral law   

despite inner impulses and outer        
pressure1 and that is by his judgment   
and its instrument1 inhibition4 ,like   
every organic function which is not     
purely vegetative and therefore beyond  
the influence of the ,will1 judgment and
 inhibition can be strengthened and     
perfected by methodical exercise1 while 
total neglect of them will weaken and   
finally atrophy them4 ,the community may
 demand that each of its members shall  
devote attention to the development of  
the natural functions which permit him  
to discriminate and to suppress any     
inclination to evil which may appear4   
,it facilitates this duty towards itself
 and himself for the individual--for it 
is a question of the increase of his    
organic efficiency and of his personal  
worth--by the institutions it founds for
 the education of youth1 by schools     
which not only impart knowledge1 but    
also form the character1 by instruction 
after the school age1 by the honours    
with which it distinguishes especially  

excellent persons1 thereby holding them 
up to example4 ,the community prescribes
 that everyone should acquire a certain 
minimum of knowledge1 and for this      
purpose forces each individual by law to
 go to school for a certain number of   
years4 ,it may and ought to force him   
also to render himself more capable of  
obeying the moral law by methodical     
exercise of his will4 ,every citizen is 
responsible to the state for being able 
to read and write4 ,in this sense the   
individual is also responsible for      
sufficiently strengthening his faculty  
of inhibition to be able to control his 
selfish1 anti-social and immoral        
desires4  ,the particular purpose for   
which he is to employ his faculty of    
inhibition depends on the current moral 
law of the age1 which is determined not 
by the individual1 but by the community4
 ,the individual does quite enough and  
is free of blame if he strives with all 
his might to approximate his actions to 
the ideal which the community demands at

 a given time for the life of its       
members in common and for their mutual  
relations4 ,to alter and perfect this   
ideal is the business of a few select   
men with wider judgment1 stronger will  
and warmer sympathies than the average4 
,in these exceptional cases it is not   
the community which imposes its ideal on
 the individual1 but1 on the contrary1  
the individual who works out a new ideal
 for the community1 and1 so to speak1   
thanks to his personal qualities1       
establishes a new record in the         
gymnastic of the ,will which beats all  
earlier ones4  ,finally1 it is true1 the
 individual is dependent on his natural 
disposition4 ,to say that he can be1 and
 is to be1 raised above himself is a    
very impressive1 but really nonsensical1
 phrase4 ,he can get out of himself only
 what is in him by nature1 and however  
hard he may try to reach out beyond the 
boundaries drawn by his organic         
disposition1 he finds it impossible to  
overstep them4 ,but1 as a rule1 they are

 far wider than the individual has any  
idea of until he attempts to reach them1
 and he will find many surprises if he  
labours untiringly to develop to their  
fullest extent all the possibilities    
latent in him4 ,even a born weakling    
can1 by dint of methodical practice1    
harden his flaccid muscles sufficiently 
to become a gymnast of average skill1   
though he is hardly likely to become a  
first-class athlete4  ,in just the same 
way a weak-willed or simple person can  
by earnest endeavours rise to a         
consistent morality2 if1 nevertheless1  
there appear in him1 continually or     
occasionally1 organic impulses which    
carry him away1 it is not his fault but 
his misfortune4 ,in that case he is     
subjectively not responsible for his    
immorality4 ,but the community can1 all 
the same1 not liberate him from         
responsibility1 because the law of      
self-preservation forces it to insist on
 observance of the moral law1 and it has
 no means of accurately measuring how   

strong the pressure of instincts and the
 power of inhibition is in any          
individual1 and to what extent he has   
fulfilled the duty of exercising and    
strengthening the latter4 ,the phrase   
,to understand everything is to forgive 
everything shows insight1 but is only   
true in the sense that one must not     
blame an individual for his natural     
imperfection4 ,it comprehends           
recognition of the ,will's lack of      
freedom1 and the inadmissibility1 from  
the philosophical point of view1 of the 
concept of responsibility1 but it does  
not affect the right and the duty of the
 community to demand moral conduct      
regardless of this lack of freedom4 ,it 
is not permitted to forgive because it  
understands4 ,moreover1 there would be  
no sense in forgiveness by the          
community1 for the concept of           
forgiveness implies feeling and kindly  
forgetfulness of an injury inflicted of 
malice prepense2 but insult and offence 
play no part in the punishment by       

society of transgressions of the moral  
law1 and indulgence due to sensibility  
would endanger its existence4  ,the     
certainty possessed by the individual   
that his evil deeds1 if they become     
known1 will have evil consequences for  
him is one of the determining factors   
which is indispensable in helping him to
 make a decision4 ,it is an inadmissible
 affectation to condemn the fear of     
punishment as a motive for moral action1
 because it ought to be the result of   
the conviction that it is absolutely    
right4 ,it is a powerful aid to         
self-discipline1 as also are the thought
 and the foretaste of the satisfaction  
upon which self-respect may count if    
general respect and praise are to be the
 reward of exemplary conduct4  ,the     
great weakness of the ,kantian doctrine 
of ,morality lies in the fact that it   
retains ,free ,will1 even though it     
gives it another name4 ,it is called    
autonomy of ,will and is contrasted with
 heteronomy4 ,this doctrine demands1 and

 considers it possible1 that the ,will  
should be its own lawgiver and should   
not allow others to lay down laws for   
it2 but it fails to examine how the     
,will comes to make laws for itself1 of 
what hypothesis these laws are the      
necessary conclusions1 by what means the
 ,will secures respect for its law1 and 
whether this seemingly self-imposed law 
is not really the inner realization of a
 ready-made law of extraneous origin4   
,the dogma of the autonomy of the ,will 
is a consequence of the preliminary     
error of excluding utility from         
,morality and of declaring its          
imperative to be categorical1 that is1  
not dependent on the aim1 but           
independent and regardless of any aim4  
,the whole tomfoolery of the categorical
 imperative and of the autonomy of the  
,will is transcendental mysticism1 and  
is all the more surprising as it is the 
result of an investigation which claims 
to be the work of pure ,reason4 ,it is  
the shadow of the ghostly bogies of     

religious conceptions in the daylight of
 pure ,reason4  ,from the point of view 
of the community we may speak of merit  
and sin1 but not from the subjective    
point of view4 ,for the community the   
moral conduct of the individual is      
useful1 immoral conduct is              
disadvantageous1 therefore it praises   
the one and condemns and punishes the   
other4 ,that is opportunism1 but not    
moral philosophy4 ,considered           
subjectively1 moral conduct is just as  
little meritorious as beauty1 great     
stature1 muscular strength1 keen        
intelligence1 health1 a good memory1    
prompt reactions of consciousness and   
all other advantages that the individual
 has received without his personal      
intervention as a gift of nature4 ,and  
immoral conduct is just as little       
blameworthy as ugliness1 stupidity1     
sickness and other misfortunes which the
 individual is burdened with by heredity
 or which a hard fate has imposed on    
him4 ,happy is the favoured man6        

,pitiable the unfortunate one6 ,both are
 the work of forces which are absolutely
 beyond the control of their wills4 ,in 
the same way the good man acts morally  
because he possesses insight and        
restraining will-power1 and the bad man 
acts immorally because these perfections
 have been denied him1 and neither the  
one nor the other can do anything in the
 matter4  ,that does not relieve man of 
the duty of labouring assiduously at his
 moral development1 but it does relieve 
him of responsibility for the result of 
his efforts4 ,on one point the          
sociological1 the biological and the    
theological moralists agree3 they all   
bow down humbly before ,grace4          
,,chapter ,,vii  ,,morality ,,and       
,,progress   ,i have fully investigated 
in another book 7,der ,sinn der         
,geschichte7 the problem of progress in 
all its details4 ,i therefore refer the 
reader to that for all particulars1 and 
will here give only a summary of the    
main points4  ,progress implies motion  

from one point to another4 ,this simple 
concept is supplemented by others1 some 
clear and some dim1 which group         
themselves round it3 the conception that
 the point towards which motion is      
directed signifies something better and 
more desirable than the one from which  
the motion takes place1 and the         
assumption that the motion is due to an 
impulse1 either inherent in the moving  
object or complex of objects and an     
essential part of it1 or else impressed 
upon it by outside forces2 further1 that
 the impulse connotes a conscious image 
of the goal arrived at1 recognition of  
its higher worth and the desire for     
greater perfection4  ,all these ideas1  
which are concomitants of the concept of
 progress1 are childish anthropomorphism
 when applied to the universe4 ,to      
define progress as motion from a worse  
point to a better one implies the       
existence of a scale whereby value may  
be measured4 ,now values are clearly    
determined and graded as far as human   

beings or any similar creatures are     
concerned4 ,worse or better means to man
 less or more pleasant1 useful1         
pleasing2 progress1 therefore1 is a     
development to a condition which man    
considers more suitable and useful for  
him and feels to be more harmonious and 
pleasanter4 ,the universe1 from this    
standpoint1 would make progress to      
prepare itself for the appearance of    
man1 to become more intelligible1       
habitable and comfortable for man1 to   
please and delight him4 ,whether it     
obeys its own natural disposition or a  
higher intelligence1 a god1 in carrying 
out this work1 in either case it would  
realize progress to serve mankind4 ,but 
if this ceases to exist1 there is no    
point in characterizing a development as
 progress in the sense of amelioration1 
beautification and perfection4 ,one     
would then have no right to describe1   
for instance1 the solar system with its 
planets as indicating progress from the 
original condition of nebula1 because   

the latter in itself1 apart from man and
 the conditions of his existence1 is not
 better or worse1 not more beautiful or 
uglier1 not more perfect or more        
defective than the former2 the original 
nebula and the solar system are equally 
the result of the play of the same      
cosmic forces1 and the dynamic formula  
of the one is the same as that of the   
other4 ,but ,reason rejects as          
nonsensical any view which declares man 
to be the aim of the universe1 which    
puts all the work of the universe at his
 service1 and conceives it as a huge    
machine functioning for his advantage4  
,for reasons of formal logic1 too1 the  
idea of progress in the universe is     
unthinkable4 ,the understanding cannot  
conceive of the universe as other than  
eternal4 ,now in eternity all progress1 
that is1 all motion from a point of     
departure1 must have reached its goal   
eternities ago1 however slow the motion1
 however distant the goal4 ,eternity and
 progress are two concepts which        

logically exclude one another4  ,in the 
universe there can be no progress in the
 sense of ascent1 of motion from a worse
 to a better thing2 the only thing in   
the universe1 in ,nature1 which is      
comprehensible to the understanding and 
which experience1 derived from sense    
perceptions1 can establish1 is          
evolution1 an eternal1 equable motion   
always on the same level2 and human     
standards of value are not applicable to
 its regular1 successive stages4 ,one   
state is merged without a break in      
another1 the simple becomes more        
manifold until a maximum of complexity  
is reached2 thereupon what is intricate 
gradually falls to pieces1 and the      
complicated is dissolved and returns to 
the simple2 then1 when this point is    
attained1 the same course begins again1 
and so on for all eternity4 ,thus       
evolution in the universe is an endless 
succession of cyclic movements from the 
simple to the intricate and back to the 
simple2 with a constant alternation from

 one point of each single circle to the 
other2 with the most extreme1 crushing  
uniformity in the totality of all       
cycles2 with absolutely equal dignity of
 all the phases of the endless course as
 they develop one from the other2 with a
 synchronism1 inconceivable to man1 of  
all forms of evolution in numberless    
circles revolving side by side within   
the infinite whole of the universe4     
,but the concept of progress1 which     
cannot be derived from the processes in 
the universe and has no sense when      
applied to them1 becomes a reasonable   
one as soon as its validity is limited  
to the evolution of humanity4 ,here we  
no longer deal with conceptions of      
eternity and infinity4 ,it is a question
 of temporal and spacial phenomena4 ,the
 existence of man had a beginning4 ,no  
doubt it will have an end4 ,it appeared 
on earth latest at the commencement of  
the ,quaternary geological period1 but  
more probably towards the end of the    
,tertiary period4 ,it must necessarily  

disappear when the earth1 owing to cold 
and evaporation1 becomes incapable of   
supporting life1 a state of affairs     
which1 according to our present         
knowledge of natural laws1 must         
inevitably come to pass4 ,a few million 
years are allotted to it in which to    
fulfil its destiny1 certainly a short   
span of time compared with the eternity 
of the universe1 but compared with the  
duration of individual and national     
life1 with personal destinies and       
historical occurrences1 an immeasurably 
vast prospect4 ,within the limits of its
 genesis1 its being and its             
disappearance1 it is in a constant state
 of evolution4 ,it is impossible to deny
 this4 ,comparisons between the skulls  
found among remains of the paleolithic  
age and those of our times1 between the 
state of the undeveloped tribes of      
central ,africa and ,australia and that 
of the peoples of ,europe and ,america1 
between the beginnings of human speech  
and the present-day languages1 between  

the thought1 knowledge and abilities of 
former generations and ours--all these  
prove this incontrovertibly4  ,the      
purpose of this evolution is            
unmistakable4 ,it is directed towards an
 ever closer1 ever subtler adaptation to
 the unalterable conditions which are   
imposed on men by ,nature1 and which    
they must make the best of if they are  
not to perish4 ,and it is synonymous    
with progress2 that is to say1 not only 
with change1 simple motion from one     
point to another1 but with amelioration 
and improvement4  ,here we may apply    
standards of value4 ,the aim and object 
of evolution1 which we know and desire1 
supply us with them4 ,here we may judge 
and appraise anthropomorphically4 ,not  
only may we do so1 but we must1 for it  
is a question of matters which concern  
mankind alone4 ,all evolution of        
mankind1 corporal and intellectual1 the 
enlargement of the brain case so as to  
accommodate a larger brain2 the         
development of the muscles of the       

larynx1 palate and hand1 and the        
accurate co-ordination of their         
movements1 which things make clearer and
 more emphatic speech possible and      
render the hands defter2 the            
acquisition1 interpretation and storing 
up of experiences leading to discoveries
 and inventions1 all are directed to the
 same end3 to provide men with more     
reliable weapons in the struggle for    
existence2 to defend them from the      
dangers surrounding them1 the           
destructive forces of ,nature2 to render
 their life more secure1 longer and     
richer2 to save them from fatigue and   
suffering2 to give them pleasurable     
emotions and possibilities of happiness4
 ,and as we have a clear idea of the    
object of our evolution1 as we desire   
this object and continually seek to find
 new means whereby to reach it1 we are  
absolutely justified in calling every   
movement that brings us nearer to the   
aim we have in view1 and aspire to      
reach1 a progressive step1 and in       

calling every stage of evolution which  
realizes a biggish part of the object   
desired an amelioration1 an improvement1
 an ascent4  ,the total amount of       
progress which has secured to mankind   
its development we sum up in the concept
 of civilization4 ,the latter1 however1 
is still far removed from ideal         
perfection4 ,what we know is            
infinitesimally small compared with the 
tremendous bulk of the unknown1 perhaps 
the unknowable1 which greets our view on
 all sides4 ,our technical achievements 
often leave us in the lurch and indicate
 no way out of many difficulties4 ,in   
the human being who knows and can do    
something1 too much still remains of the
 stupid1 helpless1 untamed1 primitive   
beast4  ,nevertheless1 what has been    
achieved is of value1 and it is childish
 to depreciate it4 ,paradoxical minds1  
like ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau and his          
parrot-like imitators1 may deny the use 
of all civilization and declare that the
 so-called state of nature1 the         

ignorance and helplessness of           
undeveloped man amid all too mighty     
,nature1 is preferable4 ,that is an     
intellectual joke which is not very     
amusing4 ,we have not vanquished death1 
but we have prolonged life1 as the      
mortality statistics prove4 ,we cannot  
cure all diseases2 crowded dwellings in 
great cities1 the nature and intensity  
of our occupations--civilization1 in    
short--bring diseases from which we     
should probably not suffer if we were   
savages2 but the cave-dwellers1 too1    
were subject to illnesses1 and our      
antisepsis and hygiene effectually      
prevent many and grave bodily ills4     
,division of labour makes the individual
 dependent on the whole economic        
organism2 it makes it easier for the    
favoured few to exploit the many and to 
be parasites at their expense1 but      
nevertheless the individual can more    
easily satisfy his needs than if1 being 
completely free and independent1 he     
alone had to provide all the objects he 

requires4 ,the speed and facility with  
which the exchange of goods is effected1
 thanks to ever new and ever more       
excellent means of communication1 often 
give rise to artificial wants2 cheap    
travel occasions useless restlessness1  
but the emancipation of the individual  
from the place of his birth1 the        
conversion of the whole globe into one  
single economic domain1 of which every  
part with its own particular            
superabundance of men and products      
supplies the lack of the same in other  
parts1 has at least this invaluable     
advantage1 that it makes man more       
independent of local hazards and makes  
the earth more habitable for him4 ,many 
things provided by civilization are     
obtainable only by the rich1 and the    
spectacle of the luxury of these        
favoured mortals makes the lot of the   
poor harder to bear1 but the possibility
 of working one's way up into the ranks 
of the fortunate is a mighty spur to    
strong characters1 and gives rise to    

efforts which are profitable to many4   
,all the great technical achievements of
 civilization can certainly not bring   
happiness either to the individual or to
 the community1 because happiness is a  
spiritual state which does not depend on
 bodily satisfactions and1 though it may
 be troubled by material conditions1 can
 never be created by them2 but the      
moments of happiness which the          
individual experiences derive an        
extraordinary intensity from the        
instruments of civilization which       
surround and serve us4  ,certainly      
civilization has its bad points1 and it 
requires no great cleverness to discover
 them1 to point them out and to         
exaggerate them4 ,certainly many of its 
most boasted1 supposed benefits are not 
really a blessing1 but either merely    
imaginary or else unimportant--little1  
superfluous things which may be         
pleasant1 but lacking which we can live 
without great deprivation1 and for which
 we undoubtedly pay far too dearly4     

,but1 on the whole1 it is a mighty      
achievement of man's struggling         
intellect1 an invaluable improvement of 
the lot of man1 and if anyone denies    
this he forfeits any claim to serious   
refutation4 ,rousseau's state of nature 
may be a very pleasant change for a     
summer holiday1 but every man of sound  
common sense would decline it as a      
permanent abode4  ,we may therefore     
freely concede the fact of progress in  
civilization in so far as the latter    
implies greater safety1 facility1 order 
and equability of life1 deeper and more 
widely diffused knowledge and more      
perfect adaptation of man to the natural
 conditions in which he finds himself4  
,for it is no reservation to note in the
 course of evolution both individual    
deviations from the path which leads to 
the goal of civilization1 the           
amelioration of the constitution of     
mankind1 and occasional relapses into   
bygone barbarisms4 ,to make use of      
,gumplowicz's expression1 it is not an  

acrochronic and acrotopic illusion 7that
 is1 a form of self-deception which     
consists in thinking the time when one  
lives and the place where one lives the 
best of all times and the most wonderful
 of all places7 if we place the present 
far above all past ages and declare our 
civilization to be incomparably richer  
and more perfect than anything that has 
preceded it4 ,the laudator acti1 the    
cross-grained ,nestor who praises the   
past at the expense of the present1 the 
enthusiast for the good old times1 is a 
figure that has always been familiar4   
,but it proves nothing4 ,this tender    
love of the past is not the outcome of  
objective comparison and consideration1 
but an impulse of subjective psychology4
 ,it is simply the emotion and longing  
which fill an old man's heart when he   
looks back on his youth4 ,he remembers  
the pleasurable emotions which once     
accompanied all his impressions and     
which are now unknown to his worn-out   
organism1 and he thinks the world was   

better because he found more joy in it4 
,the aged man is convinced that in his  
youth the sky was bluer1 the rose more  
odorous1 the women more beautiful than  
now1 but an impartial observer would    
pityingly shake his head at this4  ,but 
can the progress1 which cannot          
reasonably be denied in civilization1   
also be traced in ,morality8            
,philosophers who are by no means       
negligible have roundly replied in the  
negative4 ,buckle declares              
uncompromisingly that the only progress 
possible to man is intellectual1 and by 
this he means that mankind grows in     
knowledge1 foresight and clarity of     
thought1 but not at the same time in    
,morality1 which1 according to him1     
differs from the intellect and          
understanding and is not included in    
them4 ,buckle's unfavourable judgment   
has been turned into a formula which has
 often been repeated4 ,scientifically1  
technically1 we progress2 morally we    
stand still or slip back2 the two orders

 of development move neither in the same
 direction nor with the same speed4     
,that is a view that is widely held4    
,fr4 ,bouillier comes to the same       
conclusion as ,buckle1 though from      
different considerations4 ,he asserts   
that a savage who obeys his conscience1 
however ignorant this may be1 can be as 
virtuous as a ,socrates or an           
,aristides2 one can even go so far as to
 defend the view that social progress   
instead of strengthening individual     
morality weakens it1 for society1 in    
proportion as it is better ordered1     
saves the individual the trouble of a   
great many virtuous actions4  ,however1 
there are other moralists who take the  
opposite view4 ,shaftesbury cannot      
imagine a moral system in which there is
 no place for the idea of constant      
progress1 of continuous improvement4    
,the great ,frenchmen of the eighteenth 
century are convinced of the moral rise 
of humanity4 ,the mass of mankind1 says 
,turgot1 advances constantly towards an 

ever-growing perfection1 and elsewhere3 
,men taught by experience grow in ever  
greater measure and in a better sense   
humane4 ,condorcet defends no less      
emphatically the view that the faculty  
of growing more perfect is inherent in  
man4 ,this is a case of pessimism and   
optimism which have their roots less in 
reasonable thought than in temperament4 
,a worn-out1 weary individual1 or       
generation1 looks back and spends the   
time in futile yearning and melancholy  
visions of the past2 but a sturdy       
generation1 full of life1 and conscious 
of it1 looks forward1 and planning1     
inventing1 and determined to realize its
 creative ideas1 it conjures up the     
image of the future4 ,pessimism regrets 
and groans2 optimism hopes and promises4
 ,the former1 like ,ovid1 thinks the    
,golden ,age is in the past1 the latter1
 like the fathers of the great          
,revolution1 looks for it in the future4
 ,in neither case do they reach         
conclusions as a result of observation  

and logical thought1 rather they invent 
reasons afterwards for their            
conclusions1 as they do interpretations 
of their observations4 ,but he who      
regards life neither with bitterness nor
 with pride1 and tries to understand it 
objectively1 will come to the opinion   
that ,morality too has its fair share in
 the progress of civilization4          
,theological thought interprets moral   
perfection differently from scientific  
thought4 ,according to the former it is 
independent of intellectual development 
and purely a matter of faith4 ,god is   
the ideal of ,morality1 belief in ,him  
the necessary condition for a moral     
life4 ,through its fall mankind withdrew
 from ,god and was left a prey to       
,immorality2 original sin perpetually   
burdened it2 by redemption and grace it 
has been purified from this inborn      
stain1 led back to ,god and once more   
rendered capable of ,morality4 ,for     
mankind only one kind of progress in    
,morality was possible1 and this took   

place1 not gradually and step by step1  
but with one sudden swift advance1 by   
which it immediately attained the       
highest degree of moral perfection      
possible1 and that was when the true    
faith was revealed to it4 ,before the   
revelation mankind did not know real    
,morality1 only its dim shadow1 only a  
vague yearning for it2 by the revelation
 at one blow it was in full possession  
of ,morality1 and now it is the business
 of every individual1 whether he will   
draw near to the divine example by pious
 efforts or ruthlessly withdraw from it4
 ,since the glad tidings of faith were  
announced to humanity there can be no   
question of moral progress for mankind  
as a whole2 it has become a personal    
matter which everyone has to deal with  
himself4 ,criticism of this dogmatism is
 superfluous4 ,it is quite enough to    
place it before the reader4  ,it is     
quite comprehensible1 too1 that those   
whose views permit them to talk with    
,bouillier of a savage who obeys his    

conscience should deny moral progress4  
,they assume that a savage has a        
conscience1 that conscience is an       
element of human nature1 that it is a   
quality or a capacity like sensation or 
memory1 that it is born with man like   
his limbs and organs4 ,in that case it  
might well be asserted that subjective  
,morality has made no progress in       
historic and perhaps even in prehistoric
 times1 and that actually a savage who  
obeys his conscience can be just as     
virtuous as a ,socrates or an           
,aristides4  ,it would hardly be        
possible to give a concrete proof of the
 contrary2 if for no other reason       
because for a long time there have been 
no savages in the strict sense of the   
word anywhere on earth4 ,by savages we  
mean human beings in their primitive1   
zoological condition who have developed 
solely according to the biological forms
 of the species and under the influence 
of surrounding ,nature and have taken   
over nothing of an intellectual         

character from the group to which they  
belong4 ,all savages of whom we know    
form societies which for the most part  
are not even loosely1 but firmly1 knit  
together1 with laws that may seem       
nonsensical and barbaric to us1 but are 
none the less binding with clearly      
defined duties which they impose on     
every member1 with sanctions whose      
cruelty supersedes that of any          
punishment permitted by civilization4 ,a
 man who is a member of a society1 no   
matter how primitive it may be1 may     
certainly have a conscience1 but the    
point is that he is not a savage1 but   
the contrary of a savage1 namely3 a     
social being who has received an        
education from his society1 who is bound
 to conform to its habits1 customs and  
views1 and who in all his actions must  
consider its opinion4 ,but these        
conditions1 as ,i have shown1 produce a 
conscience1 the representative of       
society in the consciousness of the     
individual4 ,conscience is no innate    

feature of man uninfluenced by society1 
it is not a product of ,nature1 it is   
the result of education2 he who         
possesses a conscience is no savage1 but
 a person formed by discipline and      
subservient to it2 conscience is the    
fruit of civilization1 of a certain     
civilization2 in itself it represents   
progress compared with the primitive    
state of man4 ,consequently it is an    
objectionable contradiction to talk of  
conscience and at the same time deny    
moral progress4  ,it is peculiarly      
arbitrary1 too1 to think that a savage1 
if he had a conscience1 could obey it to
 the same extent1 that is1 be just as   
virtuous1 as a ,socrates or an          
,aristides4 ,this would contradict all  
the observations and experience from    
which ,i have derived the doctrine that 
conscience works by means of inhibition1
 and that ,morality and ,virtue from the
 biological point of view are           
inhibition4 ,for inhibition is developed
 by practice and use4 ,except in cases  

of morbid disturbance it develops       
simultaneously with the understanding   
which manipulates it and demands        
efficiency from it4 ,there can be no two
 opinions about the fact that the       
understanding and the faculty of        
inhibition in living beings have        
developed progressively4 ,there is no   
need to adduce any proof that the frog  
is intellectually superior to the       
zoospore1 and man to the frog1 and that 
as we ascend the scale of organisms we  
find their reactions to stimuli are     
increasingly subject to individual      
modification1 and that there is a       
gradual transition from the original1   
purely mechanical tropism to            
differentiated reflex action1 which1    
however1 is still beyond the control of 
the will1 and finally to resistances    
which suppress every externally visible 
reply on the part of the organism to the
 impression it has received4  ,in the   
course of this development the faculty  
of inhibition grows stronger and more   

efficient and obeys the behests of the  
understanding more and more swiftly1    
surely and reliably2 it can reach a     
pitch of invincibility against which all
 the revolts of instinct1 all the storms
 of passion1 are powerless4  ,in the    
savage1 or rather in man at a low stage 
of civilization1 the power of inhibition
 is far from having reached such perfect
 development4 ,it is not very robust1   
works defectively and often fails4      
,little civilized man1 if he has a      
conscience1 cannot even with the best   
intentions always obey it punctually4   
,his instinct is stronger than his      
insight4 ,he is not master of his       
impulses2 rather it is they that master 
him4 ,all who have described tribes of  
low civilization have observed that     
their reactions resemble reflex         
movements and that they lack            
self-control4 ,moral conduct1 that is1  
control of their selfishness and        
consideration for their fellow men1 is  
difficult for them if it demands effort1

 sacrifice and painful renunciation4    
,however1 we need not trouble to go to  
the negroes of the ,congo or the        
inhabitants of the ,solomon ,islands to 
observe the inefficiency of the power of
 inhibition4 ,we need only look around  
us4 ,we shall find enough instances     
among ourselves4 ,the uneducated1 the   
badly educated and abnormal people on   
whom teaching and example make no       
impression cannot follow the precepts of
 ,morality1 although they know them4 ,to
 express it as the ,roman poet does1    
they know the better and approve it1 but
 they have a longing for the worse4 ,so 
it is wrong to say that a savage can be 
just as virtuous as a ,socrates or an   
,aristides4 ,he could not1 even if he   
would4 ,he would lack the organic means3
 a sufficiently trained intelligence to 
point out his moral duty1 a sufficiently
 developed faculty of inhibition to     
follow the admonition of his            
intelligence4 ,bouillier's objection to 
moral progress will not hold water4 ,the

 ,romantics who have invented the fairy 
tale of the noble savage and who declare
 in ,seume's words3 ,see1 we savages are
 better men after all1 are out of touch 
with reality4 ,like civilization1 and   
simultaneously with civilization1       
,morality progresses towards            
improvement1 towards perfection4  ,the  
,kantian moralist1 like the theologian1 
is forbidden by the logic of his system 
to admit the possibility of moral       
progress4 ,if the moral law is          
categorical1 that is1 unlimited by any  
special purpose1 if it exists within us1
 eternal and immutable as the stars     
above us1 we should be hard put to it to
 say how this unalterable block1 placed 
in our souls we know not how or by whom1
 could receive an impetus to progressive
 development1 or in what way this       
development could be carried out4 ,that 
which is categorical is absolute1 and   
the concept of progress in the absolute1
 as in the infinite and the eternal1 has
 no sense4 ,but whoever regards         

,morality from the biological and       
sociological point of view is forced to 
assert its progress1 just as the        
dogmatic mystic1 who believes in the    
categorical imperative1 is forced to    
deny it4  ,let us recapitulate the      
fundamental concepts4 ,regarded         
biologically ,morality is ,inhibition1  
the development of which is of the      
greatest importance to the individual1  
as it enables him not to waste the      
living force of his cell plasm and of   
his organs in sterile reflex movements1 
but to store it up and hold it ready for
 useful purposes4 ,the stronger his     
power of inhibition the better he is    
armed for the struggle for existence1   
and the better he is armed the more     
efficient he is4 ,denial of the         
progressive development of ,inhibition  
implies a denial that modern man can    
maintain himself with more ease and     
security against ,nature and hostile or 
injurious natural phenomena1 and that he
 is more successful in competition with 

other men than his predecessors on      
earth4 ,but this latter denial is       
obviously nonsense4 ,the only           
individuals who do not take part in     
progressive development are the         
degenerates4 ,they are organically      
inferior1 their faculty of inhibition is
 defective or altogether lacking1 they  
are slaves of impulses which their will 
and intelligence have no means of       
controlling1 they are the outcome of    
morbidly arrested or retrograde         
development1 they are the victims and   
refuse of a civilization too intensive1 
too exhausting and wearing for some men1
 and they are destined to fall out of   
the ranks of a race moving majestically 
forward and to lie helplessly by the    
roadside4  ,from the sociological point 
of view ,morality is the bond which     
unites the individuals in a community1  
the foundation upon which alone society 
can be built up and maintained4 ,for it 
implies a victory over self1            
consideration for one's neighbour1      

recognition of his rights1 concession of
 his claims1 even when valued           
possessions must unwillingly be given up
 and painful renunciation of attainable 
satisfaction is required4 ,this is      
neighbourly kindness and the charity of 
the ,bible1 ,hutcheson's and ,hume's    
benevolence1 ,adam ,smith's sympathy and
 ,herbert ,spencer's altruism2 it is the
 necessary condition on which alone     
individuals can live peaceably together 
and helpfully assist each other to make 
life easier4 ,if most or all individuals
 lack it1 we have ,hobbes's war of all  
against all2 then man is as a wolf to   
other men1 and each one is condemned to 
the state of a beast roaming in         
loneliness4 ,if a few1 a minority1 lack 
it1 then the majority will not tolerate 
them in its midst1 but will expel them  
from the community as a dangerous       
nuisance and deprive them of the        
privilege of mutual aid and of the      
advantage of joint responsibility4  ,the
 species of man1 like every other       

species of organism and like every      
individual1 wants to live4 ,it can only 
achieve this by adapting itself to      
existing natural conditions4 ,the more  
suitable and perfect the adaptation the 
more easily and securely it lives4      
,under the present conditions of the    
universe and the earth a solitary human 
individual could not manage to exist1   
let alone develop into an intelligent   
being4 ,the form his adaptation to      
circumstances has taken is that of union
 in an organized community4 ,for the    
existence of society and the adjustment 
of the individual in it is the          
indispensable condition for the life of 
the species as well as of the           
individual4 ,society can only continue  
to exist if individuals learn to        
consider one another and practise       
benevolence towards each other4 ,society
 therefore created ,morality and        
inculcated it in all its members1       
because it was its first need1 the      
essential condition which rendered its  

existence possible1 just as the species 
created society1 because it could only  
continue to live as an organized        
society4  ,thus ,morality with the      
strictest logical necessity has its     
place in the totality of efforts which  
human beings had to make1 and still have
 to make1 in order to preserve life1 to 
make it sufficiently profound and to    
enrich it with satisfactions1 that is1  
with pleasurable emotions of every kind1
 so that they may continue to have the  
will and the eager desire to maintain   
their existence by effort and struggle2 
in short1 in order to make life seem    
worth living1 even at the cost of       
constant toil and moil4 ,without society
 it is impossible for the individual to 
exist2 without ,morality it is          
impossible for society to exist2 the    
instinct of self-preservation furnishes 
society with habits and rules governing 
the mutual relations of its members and 
with institutions for economizing force2
 all these together we call             

civilization4 ,the development and      
improvement of civilization is obvious2 
it is proved by the fact that it draws  
nearer and nearer to its goal1 namely1  
the establishment of satisfactory       
relations between individuals and       
groups1 and the attainment of a maximum 
of satisfaction with a minimum of       
individual effort4 ,but it would be     
incomprehensible if ,morality1 the      
essential condition for the existence of
 society which creates civilization1    
should have no part in the indisputable1
 because easily demonstrable1 progress  
of the latter4  ,morality occupies such 
a large place in civilization that the  
mistaken view has arisen among many     
moral philosophers that it is the aim of
 civilization and has no aim other than 
itself4 ,closer investigation shows this
 to be an error1 a reversal of the true 
relation4 ,morality is no aim1 certainly
 no aim to itself1 it is a means to an  
end1 the most important1 most           
indispensable means to the one end1 to  

bring about civilization1 to maintain   
and refine it1 and adapt it more and    
more to its task4 ,but the task of      
civilization1 as ,i have shown1 is to   
preserve1 facilitate and enrich the life
 of the individual and the species4     
,morality therefore is the most         
important form in which the instinct of 
self-preservation in the species is     
manifested1 and to deny progress to it  
implies the assumption that the species 
does not possess the impulse to preserve
 and beautify its existence1 that its   
instinct of self-preservation flags1    
that it does not recognize its aim and  
is ignorant of the path leading to its  
goal4 ,this assumption1 however1 is     
contradicted by all1 and supported by   
none1 of the phenomena observable in the
 life of the species--the absolute      
increase of the population of the earth1
 the prolongation of individual life and
 of the age of efficiency1 the combating
 of every kind of harmful thing4  ,the  
steadfast self-control of civilized man 

compared with the unreliability of the  
savage1 who appears capricious and      
unaccountable because he freely obeys   
every impulse1 proves the progressive   
development of the faculty of inhibition
 in the individual organism4 ,the order 
and definite organization of modern     
society1 the rule of law1 men's equality
 before the law1 the guarantee of       
freedom and respect for the person1 all 
these compared with the state of nations
 in earlier times 7actually anarchy     
under a mantle of tyranny and the       
unlimited power of a few mighty ones    
over the helpless masses7 prove the     
progressive development of civilization 
in the social organism4 ,but logically  
the progressive development of ,morality
 itself must correspond to the          
progressive development of its          
instrument1 inhibition1 and of its      
product1 civilization4  ,the conclusion 
to which we are forced by theoretical   
considerations is fully endorsed by     
observation of actual life4 ,it is      

sufficient to indicate broad facts to   
one who denies moral progress4 ,slavery1
 which ,aristotle thought a law of      
,nature1 which ,christianity tolerated1 
which modern states1 such as ,england1  
,france1 the ,united ,states and        
,brazil1 defended and protected by law1 
was everywhere abolished some years ago4
 ,the objection is raised that modern   
hired labour is merely slavery of the   
proletariat under another name1 that the
 exploitation of workmen by employers is
 a hypocritical continuation of serfdom4
 ,but that is sophistry4 ,the hired     
labourer is not bound to his contract4  
,he can break it4 ,yes1 at the price of 
starvation4 ,that used to be the case1  
but nowadays organized working men are  
no longer at the mercy of powerful      
capital1 and therein lies progress4     
,they are in a position to make         
conditions and not seldom to force their
 acceptance4 ,they have the right to    
strike1 to move from place to place1 to 
form unions4 ,the community has         

recognized the duty of mitigating1 at   
least to some extent1 the evils to which
 faulty economic organization exposes   
the workman4 ,it has instituted accident
 and health insurance1 old age pensions1
 and1 in some places1 assistance for    
those who are out of work through no    
fault of their own4 ,all this is still  
very defective1 but these are hopeful   
beginnings1 all the same1 and1 above    
all1 it shows the awakening of a social 
conscience that earlier ages did not    
know4  ,justice is administered more and
 more humanely1 that is1 morally4 ,it is
 a century since legal torture was      
abolished4 ,society is ashamed to get at
 the truth easily by torturing a suspect
 who after all may be innocent4 ,the    
condemned man is no longer branded or   
mutilated2 he suffers no corporal       
ill-treatment of which the results can  
never be obliterated4 ,capital          
punishment is still a blot on the honour
 of civilization4 ,but for more than a  
century now1 since the time of          

,beccaria1 it has been violently opposed
 and has already been abolished in some 
states2 the others will no doubt have to
 follow suit within a short time4       
,consider that in ,england at the       
beginning of the nineteenth century a   
thief was hanged if he had stolen a     
thing of no more value than the rope    
that was to hang him1 and even children 
of fourteen years were condemned to this
 fate4 ,to-day the judge pronounces     
sentence of death1 even where it is     
still legal1 with grave misgivings and  
searchings of conscience1 and the       
execution1 formerly a public spectacle1 
is carried out more or less secretly1   
because the conviction is gradually     
ripening in society that by the         
cold-blooded killing of a man it is     
perpetrating a crime which it must keep 
as secret as possible4 ,the sentence is 
now almost everywhere deferred1 and thus
 the conviction becomes a very emphatic 
warning which points out the path of    
repentance1 of conversion and           

improvement to the guilty man1 and      
leaves him the possibility of becoming a
 decent human being again4 ,special     
courts for children mitigate the stern  
penal code and modify it according to   
the needs of unripe1 youthful           
characters4 ,imprisonment for debt is a 
half-forgotten thing of the past and    
regarded more or less as a joke4 ,what  
these changes have in common is that    
they one and all indicate a deepening of
 the community's feeling of duty and    
responsibility towards the individual1  
greater respect for persons on the part 
of the law1 an increase of the will to  
resist the first impulse of anger1      
revenge and mercilessness4 ,these       
tendencies1 however1 are the very       
essence of ,morality4  ,i forbear to    
adduce as a proof of progress that the  
,inquisition no longer rules and nowhere
 burns its victims4 ,for actually there 
is no greater toleration of those who   
hold other opinions than there was      
formerly4 ,religious toleration is      

explained by the fact that the people's 
consciousness no longer attaches such   
enormous importance to religion as in   
past centuries4 ,but political1 sthetic 
and philosophical antagonisms arouse as 
much bloodthirsty rage to-day as did    
formerly heresy in religion1 and        
opponents would unhesitatingly apply    
torture and the stake to one another if 
the great mass of the people would      
develop sufficiently enthusiastic zeal  
for their views to allow their raging   
fanaticism to have recourse to violence1
 as it once permitted domineering       
religious orthodoxy to do4  ,other      
aspects of civilization1 not so         
essential1 are hardly less encouraging  
than the developments on which ,i have  
hitherto dwelt4 ,drunkenness1 formerly  
an almost universal vice1 is on the     
decrease4 ,among the educated classes it
 is only met with exceptionally1 and is 
recognized as a morbid aberration2 among
 the lower classes it continually grows 
less4 ,the statistics of the savings    

banks show an ever-growing determination
 to save4 ,the masses who used to       
rejoice in dirt now manifest an         
increasingly vigorous desire for a      
cleanliness that demands soap and baths4
 ,this indicates control of impulse1 of 
the inclination for alcoholic drinks and
 the tendency to squander1 and an       
increase of self-respect which          
recognizes dirt to be humiliating4      
,these are activities of the moral      
feelings1 their material activities4    
,if1 in spite of these material proofs  
of the progress of ,morality in all     
social functions and in many individual 
habits1 serious-minded men still        
maintain that it stands still or even   
that it shows retrogression compared    
with former times1 this view1 which is  
undoubtedly a mistaken one1 is due to   
wrong interpretation of facts4          
,bouillier's remark that social progress
 instead of increasing individual       
,morality weakens it1 because society1  
in proportion as it is better organized1

 saves the individual the trouble of a  
number of virtuous actions has a        
perfectly correct point of departure4   
,many tasks of neighbourly kindness and 
humane joint responsibility which used  
to be left to the inclination1 the free 
choice and the noble zeal of            
individuals1 and could be carried out or
 neglected by them1 are now methodically
 fulfilled by the community4 ,saint     
,martin no longer needs to divide his   
cloak to give half to a poor shivering  
man4 ,the public charity commission     
gives him winter clothes if he cannot   
afford to buy any4 ,no knights are      
needed to protect innocence1 weakness   
and humility from oppressors4 ,the      
oppressed appeal successfully to the    
police1 the court of justice1 or1 by    
writing to the papers1 to public        
opinion4 ,there is no need for ,knights 
,templar or ,knights of ,st4 ,john to   
care for strangers and tend the sick4   
,inns and public hospitals are at their 
disposal4 ,to-day there would be neither

 occasion nor reason for the miracle of 
,st4 ,elizabeth of ,hungary1 who against
 the orders of her hard husband took to 
the starving bread which was turned into
 roses4 ,the poor are regularly fed in  
municipal and communal kitchens4        
,individual deeds of mercy are less     
necessary now than formerly1 when1 if   
they occurred1 they were the outcome of 
exceptionally noble and devout sympathy 
and heroic self-sacrifice4  ,one is     
therefore inclined to believe that men  
are less capable of such deeds than they
 were in the past4 ,but that is doing   
them a grave injustice4 ,dr4 ,barnardo1 
who opened a home for the little waifs  
and strays of the ,east ,end of ,london1
 is not inferior to ,st4 ,vincent de    
,paul who adopted and brought up        
forsaken children4 ,john ,brown who     
suffered a martyr's death by hanging    
because he attempted with arms to       
liberate the negro slaves of the        
,southern ,states1 ,henry ,dumont who   
devoted the efforts of a lifetime to    

founding the ,red ,cross to help those  
wounded in war1 ,emile ,zola who        
sacrificed his fortune1 his reputation  
as an author1 his personal safety1 and  
suffered persecution1 calumny1 exile1 a 
shameful condemnation in court1 and     
violent threats to his life in order to 
get justice for ,captain ,dreyfus who   
had been wrongfully accused--all these  
can well compare with the saints in the 
,golden ,legend4 ,virtue exists         
potentially in as many cases as         
formerly1 probably in more2 and it is   
actively practised whenever and wherever
 it is appealed to4  ,another result of 
the long evolution of civilization and  
,morality is the development of an      
ethical instinct in all except abnormal1
 degenerate individuals1 which causes   
men to act morally in nearly all        
situations without conscious reflection1
 choice or effort4 ,the individual who  
is ethically well grounded1 in whom     
moral conduct has become an organized   
reflex action1 does what is right       

without any conscious effort1 and       
therefore does not in so doing evoke any
 idea of merit either in himself or in  
witnesses4 ,but to do right habitually1 
carelessly and almost without thought1  
as one breathes and eats1 easily makes  
one unjust in one's judgments4 ,the     
battle between ,reason and blind        
instinct1 between the ,will and         
refractory ,impulse1 the victory of the 
lofty principle1 of spirituality over   
what is irrational and materialistic1   
which give us the illusion that free    
humanity is superior to the fatality of 
cosmic forces1 have something so        
elevated and beautiful about them that  
we are disappointed if they are absent1 
and practical ,morality without this    
dramatic setting does not appear to be  
real ,morality4  ,nevertheless we must  
not give way to this sthetic point of   
view4 ,we must always remember that     
,morality has a biological and          
sociological aim and must soberly admit 
that it is all the better if this aim is

 realized without in every single case  
depending on uncertain individual       
decisions4 ,it would be an ideal state  
of affairs if in a society there were   
such clear knowledge of all its vital   
necessities1 and this had been so       
inculcated in all its members1 that     
their harmonious life together and their
 co-operation for the common weal would 
never more be troubled by the revolt of 
ruthless individual selfishness against 
the love of one's neighbour and         
willingness to sacrifice oneself for the
 community4 ,the ideal of ,morality     
would be attained1 but the concept of   
,merit would be transferred from the    
individual to the community4            
,superficial observation might object to
 finding in individuals no victorious   
struggle against resistance1 hence no   
virtue1 and might bemoan the stagnation1
 nay1 the retrogression1 of ,morality4  
,but whoever views matters as a whole   
would have to admit that it would imply 
the greatest progress in virtue if the  

latter from being an individual merit   
had become an attribute of the          
community4 ,i am far from maintaining   
that we have reached this ideal state2  
but evolution tends unmistakably in this
 direction2 and this is one of the      
reasons why ,morality may appear to make
 no progress4  ,the very rise of the    
community to a higher stage of ,morality
 may be a fresh cause of error          
concerning the progress of ,morality4   
,the work of the strongest and most     
clear-headed thinkers for many thousand 
years1 who have bequeathed as a legacy  
to the community their lifelong labours 
for the amelioration of the lot of      
mankind1 has developed in us an ideal of
 active and passive ,morality which is  
always present1 even to the mind of the 
weak or bad man who cannot or will not  
live up to it4 ,by this ideal1 which is 
that of the community and which we bear 
within us1 we involuntarily judge real  
life as we observe it1 without applying 
the necessary corrections4 ,we          

necessarily note a discrepancy between  
theory and practice1 which appears to us
 to be not mere inadequacy but a        
contradiction of principles1 not a      
quantitative1 but a qualitative         
difference1 and thus he who is not      
forewarned easily becomes doubtful1     
pessimistic1 and bitterly contemptuous  
of mankind4  ,this is the theme with    
which light literature unweariedly      
deals4 ,novels and the drama constantly 
show us types3 ,pillars of society and  
other worthy men1 who pretend to be     
honourable1 who are full of good        
principles1 preach unctuously and       
condemn others with pious indignation1  
but who themselves in all situations    
behave with the most horrible           
selfishness and are sinks of iniquity4  
,the creators of these rogues professing
 virtue1 of these secret sinners1 think 
they are mightily superior2 they think  
they know mankind1 that they are        
deceived by no one and can see deep down
 into men's souls2 they call their      

method realism1 and they look down with 
the greatest contempt upon poets who    
depict good1 unselfish1 noble1 in short1
 moral characters1 and call them        
optimists1 flirts1 distillers of        
rosewater1 who are either too silly or  
too dishonest to see the truth or to    
confess it4 ,if realism happens to be   
the fashion1 the public believes these  
men who depict what is ugly and         
disgusting1 admires them1 is impressed  
by them1 and scorns the idealists who   
have a better opinion of mankind4       
,however1 realism is onesided and       
exaggerated1 and therefore just as far  
from the truth as enthusiastic idealism4
 ,it picks out certain characteristics  
of human nature1 generalizes from them  
and neglects the others1 thereby        
libelling mankind4 ,the same people who 
in their flat1 insipid daily life       
unhesitatingly indulge their poor little
 vanities1 their nave selfishness1 their
 childish jealousy1 their secret        
sensuality and their moral cowardice    

because it is of no consequence1 because
 it alters nothing in the general       
constitution of society1 because the    
community takes good care that moral    
principles shall be maintained1 these   
same people can1 on great occasions1    
which1 however1 seldom occur1 reveal    
virtues which they themselves never     
suspected and which we gaze at in blank 
astonishment with reverent awe4 ,the    
hypocritical ,philistines of realistic  
literature1 rotten at the core1 when the
 ,titanic sank1 during the plague in    
,manchuria1 at the earthquake of        
,messina1 in the mine disaster at       
,courrires1 and on ,arctic and          
,antarctic expeditions1 proved to be    
heroes who came very near to the        
theatrical ideal of ,morality1 if they  
did not quite reach it4 ,if one takes   
the valet's point of view and observes  
man in his dressing-gown and slippers   
when he does not feel called upon to    
pull himself together1 one may very well
 form a poor opinion of him4 ,but if one

 considers the actions of the community 
and dwells on the loftiest deeds of     
individuals1 one will no longer believe 
that the ,morality of the present time  
is inferior to that of any other age4   
,there is one phenomenon1 though1 which 
seems to prove that those who deny moral
 progress are in the right1 and that is 
war4 ,this is indeed the triumph of the 
beast in mankind1 a bestial trampling   
under foot of civilization1 its         
principles1 methods and aims1 and it    
might be adduced as a crushing proof of 
the stagnation or retrogression of      
,morality that to this very day its     
horrors can devastate the earth1 as they
 did hundreds and thousands of years    
ago1 only to an incomparably greater    
extent1 more cruelly and more           
thoroughly4 ,but this1 too1 would be a  
false conclusion4 ,it is certain that   
the men who take it upon themselves     
freely1 purposely and intentionally to  
make war are monsters2 their action is a
 crime that cannot be expiated4         

,unhesitatingly they have recourse to   
massacre1 robbery1 fire and all other   
horrors in order to satisfy their       
devilish self-seeking which desires the 
fulfilment of their ambition1 that is1  
of their self-love and vanity1 which    
covets riches1 increase of power1 a     
ruling position and its privileges4     
,these they pursue either for themselves
 or for a family or caste1 and they     
pretend that they wish to defend their  
country from its enemies1 to acquire new
 boundaries for it affording better     
protection than the old1 to promote the 
development of the nation by getting    
fresh territory1 to spread its          
civilization and secure a glorious      
future for it4  ,nations1 however1 which
 allow their rulers to plunge them into 
a war of aggression may be foolish and  
clumsy1 but they need not be immoral4   
,they are made drunk with phrases which 
appeal to their noblest feelings1 which 
their government and its intellectual   
bailiffs pour out to them in overflowing

 measure2 they believe the shameless    
lies which are told them boastfully2 and
 this is undoubtedly a lamentable1      
mental weakness which drew from ,dante  
the bitter cry3 ,often one hears the    
people in their intoxication cry3 ',long
 live our death6 ,down with our life6'  
,but having simply accepted these       
preliminary ideas the people act with   
such ,morality as one cannot forbear to 
admire4 ,in a grand flight they rise    
superior to all thought of self1 raise  
their feeling of joint responsibility to
 the pitch of heroism and martyrdom1 and
 gladly sacrifice to their duty to their
 neighbour and to the community their   
possessions1 their comfort1 their health
 and their lives4 ,that is very great   
virtue whose subjective merit is no whit
 diminished by the fact that it is      
manifested in a cause that is           
objectively unjust4 ,and this virtue on 
the part of nations which have been     
misled was never so widespread or so    
real as now4 ,the attitude of           

mercenaries who served the highest      
bidder1 the lack of ideals among the    
soldiers who followed foreign conquerors
 at whose command they tyrannized over  
nations who did not concern them at all1
 the cynicism of the leaders who        
unhesitatingly went over to the enemy   
and fought against their own country and
 people1 these are things that are not  
to be found nowadays and are almost     
unthinkable4 ,no ,napoleon of to-day    
could lead the men of ,wrtemberg and    
,bavaria to ,spain and ,russia1 nor     
could an ,elector of ,hesse sell        
recruits to ,england for the conquest of
 ,north ,america2 no ,louis ,,xiv could 
induce a ,bernard of ,saxe-,weimar to   
fight his battles against ,german       
adversaries1 no ,constable of ,bourbon  
ally himself with ,spain against his    
native ,france4 ,leonidas1 once admired 
and praised as an exception1 is to-day  
the rule4 ,the guards who die but do not
 yield are to be found on every         
battlefield nowadays4  ,in modern       

warfare a higher1 more perfect ,morality
 of the masses obtains than was the case
 in the past4 ,that war itself is the   
most immoral thing does not detract from
 the moral worth of those who are led   
and misled4 ,the masses lack insight and
 judgment1 their understanding is not   
sufficiently developed to realize the   
bestiality of the rulers who put them to
 such evil use2 but the way they        
suppress their own feelings1 the way    
their will controls their impulses1     
their social discipline1 in short1 their
 ,morality1 is admirable4 ,moreover1 the
 conscience of mankind revolts more and 
more against the wickedness of war1 and 
the best men of the time are striving to
 bring the mutual relations of nations1 
like those of individuals1 within the   
jurisdiction of ,law and ,morality4     
,morality will doubtless at no distant  
date do away with war1 as it has        
abolished human sacrifice1 slavery1     
blood feuds1 head hunting and           
cannibalism4  ,no phenomenon of         

individual worthlessness observed within
 a narrow sphere can detract from the   
fact that the community constantly      
improves4 ,a pessimistic view of the    
development of ,morality has no         
justification4 ,progress of civilization
 implies progress of ,morality1 its most
 important instrument in the work of    
adapting the race to the immutable      
conditions of its existence4            
,,chapter ,,viii  ,,the ,,sanctions ,,of
 ,,morality   ,the concept of ,morality 
includes an idea of compulsion1 of      
coercion4 ,a voice says to man3 ,you    
must6 or ,you may not6 ,it commands him 
to do1 or to refrain from doing1        
something4 ,if he obeys1 all is well2   
but if he takes no notice of it1 pays no
 heed to it1 the question arises3 ,what 
now8 ,will the voice rest content with  
crying in the wilderness8 ,will it not  
mind speaking to deaf ears8 ,will the   
refractory individual not suffer for    
disregarding it1 or has it means to     
enforce obedience1 and what are these   

means8  ,the answer to this question    
depends on what view one holds as to the
 nature of this monitory1 warning1      
commanding voice4 ,whoever believes in  
,kant's categorical imperative must     
admit that this word of command is      
denuded of all power of coercion and    
must absolutely rely on the good will of
 the individual in whose soul it makes  
itself heard4 ,according to ,kant the   
moral law aims at no extraneous result1 
no utility4 ,it is its own aim and      
object4 ,but its own aim is fulfilled as
 soon as the categorical imperative has 
spoken1 whether the individual acts in  
accordance with it or not4 ,it has      
therefore in principle no sanction4     
,true1 ,kant contradicts himself1 for   
after having sternly excluded from his  
doctrine all utility as the end of      
,morality1 all trace of feeling from    
moral action1 he smuggles blissful      
happiness in by a back door2 the result 
of submission to the moral law and its  
dutiful fulfilment1 he declares1 will be

 bliss4 ,bliss1 however you interpret   
it1 is a pleasurable emotion4 ,whether  
you act morally with the declared       
intention of attaining the pleasurable  
emotion of bliss1 or whether this       
pleasurable emotion comes of its own    
accord as an undesired reward when you  
have acted morally merely from a feeling
 of duty1 without a thought for such a  
result1 without a wish to attain it1 it 
makes no difference to the fact that    
moral action actually meets with a      
reward4 ,kant does not openly promise   
this1 but with a wink he whispers in    
your ear that there is a prospect of it4
  ,nor does it alter the further fact   
that ,kant1 having contemptuously       
expelled ,eudmonism from his system1    
reinstates it with full honours4 ,once  
it has been conceded that moral conduct 
makes man blissful1 in other words gives
 him a reward1 the categorical          
imperative also has a sanction1 albeit a
 very insufficient one4 ,he who fulfils 
the moral law attains bliss2 that is a  

spur whether you admit it or not4 ,but  
he who does not fulfil it loses this    
advantage1 otherwise1 however1 nothing  
happens to him4 ,the sanction1          
therefore1 is onesided4 ,a reward is    
offered for the fulfilment of the moral 
law1 but there is no punishment for its 
non-fulfilment4 ,for it is no penalty if
 bliss is withheld from him who has no  
conception of it and no desire for it4  
,no matter1 then1 if the moral law be   
eternal and immutable as the stars above
 us1 if it be categorical1 if it be     
fulfilled1 not owing to a conception of 
its effect1 not from liking for this    
effect1 but from an inner necessity1 it 
ceases to be a living force for mankind 
or to have any practical significance2  
for the single thread which unites it   
with human feelings--the whispered1     
vague promise of bliss--is too thin4    
,feeling which has no knowledge of this 
misty bliss1 and therefore no yearning  
for it1 is uninfluenced by the          
categorical moral law4 ,reason is not   

necessarily convinced that it is right  
and valid4 ,the moral law abides like   
the stars with which it is arbitrarily  
compared1 itself a star in airless      
space1 pursuing its course regardless of
 humanity1 having no relation to it or  
connexion with it2 regard for or        
disregard of the moral law makes no     
perceptible difference1 and it ceases to
 have any but a kind of astronomical    
interest for mankind1 a purely          
theoretical interest for purposes of    
scientific observation and calculation1 
and is in no way applicable to the      
feelings1 thoughts and actions of men4  
,theological ,morality adopts a widely  
different point of view4 ,its logic     
compels it to provide the most effective
 sanctions4 ,god is the lawgiver of     
,morality4 ,he prescribes with          
dictatorial omniscience what is good1   
what is bad1 what should be practised   
and what avoided4 ,obedience earns a    
glorious reward1 revolt entails the most
 terrible punishment4 ,reward and       

punishment are eternal1 or may in       
certain circumstances be so1 and this1  
by the way1 is cruelty which ill accords
 with the universal goodness ascribed to
 ,god4 ,for human understanding will    
never be persuaded1 will never be able  
to grasp1 that a sinner1 however grave  
and numerous his sins committed during  
the brief period of the fleeting life of
 man1 can ever deserve an eternity of   
the most fearful punishment4 ,the lack  
of proportion between the deed and the  
penalty is so monstrous that it is felt 
to be the gravest injustice1 against    
which both ,reason and feeling revolt4  
,imagination can conceive hell fire that
 lasts a certain time and has an aim1   
like life with its praiseworthy and     
wicked deeds1 but it boggles at the idea
 of a hell from which there is no escape
 and the agonies of which are endless4  
,the ,old ,testament conceives the      
sanctions of the moral law enunciated by
 ,god in a thoroughly realistic manner4 
,fulfil the commandment that thy days   

may be long in the land4 ,if you        
disobey1 the curse of the ,lord will be 
on you and you will be pursued by ,his  
anger unto the fourth generation4       
,christianity considered it dubious to  
make this life the scene of reward and  
punishment4 ,it is imprudent to let     
divine justice rule here below1 so to   
say1 in public1 before an audience and  
representatives of the ,press who       
attentively follow the proceedings1     
watch all its details1 and can judge    
whether the verdict is put into         
execution4 ,prudence demands that the   
trial should take place in the next     
world1 where it is protected from       
annoying curiosity4 ,mocking onlookers  
cannot then observe that it is only in  
the dramas of noble-minded poets that in
 the last act vice is inevitably        
punished and virtue rewarded1 while in  
real life only too often merit starves1 
suffers humiliation and poverty and     
altogether leads a miserable existence1 
while sin flourishes in an objectionable

 manner and to the very end revels in   
all the good things of this earth4      
,however1 the religious moralists       
painted such a vivid and arresting      
picture of what awaits the sinners in   
the next world1 that if men had not been
 obdurate in their disbelief they must  
have shudderingly realized it1 as if it 
actually happened in this world4 ,words 
from the pulpit admonishing men to obey 
,god's law under penalty of most        
terrible punishment were greatly        
emphasized by the paintings and         
sculpture over the altars and the church
 doors1 where all the tortures of hell  
were depicted by great artists who put  
all their imagination and all their     
genius into the work4  ,as innumerable  
people have testified1 these            
representations were taken so literally1
 not only by the simple-minded masses   
but also by the more highly educated1   
that they were haunted by them1 waking  
and sleeping1 and imagined that in their
 own flesh they felt the torture of     

flames1 of boiling pitch1 of the prick  
of the pitchfork as the devil turned    
them on the grid1 of the teeth with     
which the spirits of hell tore their    
flesh from their bones4 ,the fear of    
hell poisoned many a life up till quite 
recently1 especially in ,scotland1 and  
kept people in a constant state of      
agitation and anguish which occasionally
 rose to mad despair4 ,it is remarkable 
that only punishment was so impressively
 held up to man's view1 but not reward4 
,pictures of paradise are much less rich
 and varied than those of hell1 and its 
joys are peculiarly modest4 ,the        
inventive powers of painters1 sculptors1
 and poets did not rise above a         
beautifully illuminated hall where the  
blessed are ranged around ,god's throne 
and with folded hands sing hymns of     
praise to ,him1 while angels play an    
accompaniment on trumpets and fiddles4  
,a prayer meeting1 a choir and a concert
 of music1 that is all that ,christian  
eschatology holds out as an eternal     

reward to virtue4 ,it redounds to its   
credit that it assumes a sufficiently   
modest taste among the good to make them
 long for these joys and find infinite  
happiness in them4  ,islam does not     
count on such moderation4 ,the joys of  
paradise that it promises are so crudely
 sensual that they may well arouse lust 
in coarse natures1 and can              
counterbalance the fear of hell fire4   
,the ideas of the reward of merit in the
 hereafter held by the northern nations1
 ,germans and ,scandinavians1 are just  
as low and coarse4 ,for the ,mohamedans 
paradise is a harem2 for the worshippers
 of ,odin it is a pot-house where there 
are free drinks and a jolly brawl to end
 up with4 ,heroes who fall in           
battle--they knew no virtues but a      
warlike spirit and contempt of          
death--enter ,valhalla1 where they      
partake of the everlasting orgies of the
 gods1 drink unlimited quantities of    
mead and beer1 and fight for them to    
their heart's content without taking any

 harm4 ,the ,north ,american ,indians   
hope1 after leading a model life1 to be 
gathered to the ,great ,spirit1 and in  
the happy hunting grounds of heaven     
evermore to kill abundant game4 ,only   
,buddhism comforts the virtuous man with
 finer and more spiritual hopes4 ,from  
out his world of weariness and pessimism
 it opens up the prospect of ,nirvana to
 him1 that is1 of the end of all        
feeling1 which after all can only be    
painful1 and of all thought1 which after
 all is only melancholy and despair1 and
 of the volatilization of the           
personality1 the only real release2     
while it condemns the sinner to the     
worst punishment1 continued existence in
 ever new incarnations4  ,these are     
indeed extraordinarily vigorous         
sanctions1 which1 though they fail to   
have any effect on the unbeliever1 make 
a very deep impression on the believer1 
and are well fitted to determine his    
actions4 ,but they imply a debasement of
 the motives for leading a moral life1  

which are no longer the outcome of      
insight and a convinced desire for good1
 but the result of fear and avidity1 a  
speculation for profit1 a prudent flight
 from danger4 ,the practice of morality 
becomes a safe investment for the father
 of a family who hopes to find his      
savings augmented by interest in the    
hereafter1 and the avoidance of vice    
becomes a schoolboy's fear of           
punishment4 ,nevertheless1 the view is  
widely held by superficial1 practical   
men that these imaginary and deceptive  
sanctions of ,morality cannot be        
dispensed with1 that only the fear of   
hell can keep the masses from giving    
themselves up to every form of vice and 
crime1 that only the promise of paradise
 is capable of inducing them to act     
unselfishly and make sacrifices1 and    
that all bonds of discipline would be   
loosened if they ceased to believe in a 
last judgment and an hereafter with its 
rewards and punishments4  ,this whole   
system of sanctions in a future life is 

a transcendental projection 7according  
with primitive1 childlike thought7 of   
immanent practices and forms in the     
positive administration of justice which
 are transferred to a class of actions  
that successfully evade it4 ,traditional
 and customary ,law1 as well as written 
,law1 puts its whole emphasis on        
sanctions2 it partakes itself of the    
nature of a sanction4 ,without sanctions
 it has no meaning4 ,it is not kindly   
counsel1 nor fatherly admonition1 nor   
wise advice1 it is a stern command1 it  
is coercion1 and this arouses only scorn
 if it is not armed with the means to   
make itself a reality to which the      
unwilling must also submit1 because they
 cannot help themselves4 ,there is no   
law1 there can be no law1 which is not  
supplemented by arrangements that make  
it binding for everyone4  ,in the       
,british ,house of ,commons it has been 
customary for many hundred years to     
designate members as the representatives
 of their particular constituency4 ,only

 if a member commits a grave offence    
against the rules of the ,house does he 
run the risk of the ,speaker's calling  
him by name1 but this case has not      
arisen within the memory of man4 ,a     
disrespectful ,irish member of          
,parliament1 urged by perverse          
curiosity1 asked the ,speaker one day3  
,what would happen if you called me by  
my name8 ,the ,speaker thought for a    
short time and then answered with       
impressive gravity3 ,i have no idea1 but
 it must be something terrible4 ,such a 
mysterious threat of an unknown         
catastrophe may suffice for a picked    
assembly whose members would no doubt   
maintain order and observe all the rules
 of parliamentary decency1 even if they 
were not held in check by the fear of   
some dark danger4 ,it would not be      
sufficient by a long way to guarantee   
the rule of ,law in a society which     
includes individuals of the most varied 
disposition1 mind development1 education
 and strength of impulse4  ,positive    

,law1 as ,i have shown1 presents a very 
simplified excerpt of ,morality for the 
use of coarser natures4 ,it is a summary
 of the minimum of self-denial1         
consideration for one's fellow men1 and 
the feeling of joint responsibility1 the
 observance of which the community must 
pitilessly demand from all its members  
if it is to continue to exist and not   
fall back within a very short time into 
the state of ,hobbes's war of all       
against all4 ,the necessity of          
self-preservation makes it a duty for   
the community to provide for the case   
that one of its members refuses to      
accept the minimum of discipline and to 
recognize the claims of another         
personality4 ,the community prevents    
this revolt1 which would frustrate its  
aim and endanger its existence1 by      
employing physical force to break all   
resistance to the ,law which it must1   
for the common weal1 impose on all its  
members4 ,that is an extraneous         
compulsion that certainly has something 

brutal and unworthy of man about it and 
may well arouse discomfort in more      
highly developed minds4 ,it would       
undoubtedly be more dignified and better
 if there were no need for the handcuffs
 of the police1 for prison cells and    
executioners1 if man's own insight and  
the admonition of his conscience were   
enough to constrain everyone to respect 
the ,law1 that is1 to practise a minimum
 of ,morality4  ,but the community      
cannot wait until this stage of moral   
development has been generally attained4
 ,it refuses to entrust its existence to
 the spiritual purity of all its        
members4 ,on principle it disregards    
processes in the consciousness of the   
individual--,i have cited in an earlier 
chapter the few exceptions to this rule3
 investigation as to premeditation1     
accountability1 freedom from undue      
influence--and keeps to actions which   
alone it judges4 ,it declares itself    
incompetent to pronounce sentence upon a
 storm inside a skull1 to quote ,victor 

,hugo4 ,its sphere is that of obvious   
facts4 ,not until subjective impulses   
and decisions are manifested in outward 
form does it intervene with methods of  
the same order1 with outward coercion4  
,the sanctions of its law are material1 
are punishments and fines4 ,it hits the 
wrongdoer over the head and on his hands
 and forcibly empties his pockets4 ,to  
look into his soul and set matters to   
rights there is a task undertaken much  
later by law-givers4 ,it was only after 
they had remembered that the source of  
law is ,morality and that its ultimate  
aim is not the bare attainment of a     
state of mutual respect for one         
another's rights1 but the education of  
the community to a universal condition  
of self-discipline1 consideration and   
neighbourly love1 that the law-givers   
made a point not only of requiting the  
bad man's misdeeds1 but also of trying  
to elevate him morally4  ,at different  
times1 at different stages of           
civilization1 and according to the      

current views of the universe1 society  
has interpreted in different ways the   
punishment it inflicts and which it     
carries out by forcible means1 so as to 
ensure respect for its laws4 ,its       
original character is that of revenge   
for an offence4 ,the wrongdoer has      
offended the community1 it attacks him  
furiously and breaks every bone in his  
body just as an angry individual would  
do in his first access of indignation4  
,that is ,draco's penal code4 ,that is  
the law of literal requital4 ,the       
special characteristic of this sanction 
is its violence and lack of moderation4 
,it does not trouble to find the right  
proportion between punishment and crime4
 ,it does not carefully and fairly weigh
 the force of its blows4 ,the club falls
 with a frightful crash1 but its        
dynamical effect is not calculated      
beforehand in kilogrammetres4 ,the stab 
of a knife is not measured1 as an       
,italian proverb says4 ,thus conceived1 
punishment has something primitive about

 it1 something intolerably barbarous4   
,the community does the very things it  
was created1 by ,morality and ,law1 to  
prevent2 it exercises the right of the  
stronger against the challenger2 it     
promotes war1 not that of all against   
all1 but of all against one1 and its    
punishment is an act of war4  ,in a     
strongly religious society which lives  
in the idea of immediate community with 
the deity1 every transgression of the   
law is felt to be a sin against the     
gods1 and the punishment becomes an     
expiation offered to them so as to avert
 their dangerous anger from the         
commonwealth4 ,in the administration of 
justice dim religious ideas are mingled1
 punishment is tinged with a veneer of  
civilization1 the culprit is1 so to     
speak1 offered as a sacrifice to the    
gods4 ,this supernatural view was       
prolonged by the ,inquisition1 at least 
for a certain class of offences1 until  
almost modern times4  ,when society     
awakens to the consciousness that its   

bond of union is ,morality1 and that its
 most important task is to educate its  
members in ,morality1 it introduces the 
concept of betterment into its penal    
system4 ,it wants not only to punish the
 wrongdoer sharply but also to transform
 him inwardly and purify him4 ,he is to 
feel that the punishment is not only a  
requital but a mental benefit4 ,in the  
,austrian army1 until corporal          
punishment was abolished1 it was a rule 
that the soldier1 after being flogged1  
should approach the officer on duty and 
say1 as he saluted1 ,i thank you for the
 kind punishment4 ,that is the attitude 
that society1 when it gives a moralizing
 tendency to its penal laws1 wishes the 
person who has been punished to attain4 
,in this there is much pleasing         
self-deception not unmixed with a good  
deal of hypocrisy4 ,penal law offers the
 wrongdoer but little scope for         
improvement4  ,all misdemeanours and    
crimes flow from three sources3         
ignorance1 passion and innate1          

anti-social self-seeking4 ,ignorance is 
the main1 almost the exclusive cause of 
wrongdoing among young criminals who    
have been badly brought up or neglected1
 who have never had anything but bad    
examples before them1 and who cannot    
distinguish between good and evil4      
,society may hope to improve these by   
right treatment2 it must not punish1 it 
must educate them4 ,men who commit      
crimes from passion are those who       
possess a consciousness of ,morality and
 a conscience1 who know quite well what 
is right and what wrong1 but have not   
sufficient strength of character1 that  
is1 not an adequately developed power of
 inhibition1 to resist an opportunity1 a
 temptation1 a turmoil of their         
instincts4 ,to want to improve them is  
senseless1 for they are not bad2 they   
are weak1 or at any rate not strong     
enough4 ,what they need is a            
strengthening of their character1 of    
their faculty of inhibition1 and to     
achieve this is beyond the power of     

society4 ,all it can do is to humiliate 
the guilty party by publicly exposing   
his lapse and by condemning him1 and    
then grant a delay of the execution of  
the sentence4 ,in so doing it says to   
him3 ,you have acted basely and ought to
 be ashamed of yourself1 now go and do  
not do it again4 ,if the warning is     
unavailing and he relapses1 then the    
earlier sentence1 as well as the new    
one1 is executed4 ,fear of this is added
 to his motives for acting honestly1 and
 may possibly strengthen his resistance 
to the onslaught of his evil instincts4 
,but his good conduct will always be at 
stake in the struggle between his power 
of inhibition and his instincts1 and the
 stronger of the two will always carry  
the day4 ,and finally1 upon the man     
whose organic disposition makes him     
anti-social1 upon ,lombroso's born      
criminal1 society can have no educative 
effect whatever4 ,it is a hopeless case4
 ,society can render him harmless1 it   
cannot alter him4 ,consideration for his

 neighbour will never find a place in   
his consciousness4 ,he will never learn 
to resist his impulses and desires4 ,his
 spiritual insensibility makes him      
indifferent to the sufferings of others4
 ,incapable of continuous and equable   
effort1 he will always want to prey on  
society by begging1 deceiving1 stealing 
and robbing4 ,he has no conscience and  
does not hear the voice of society in   
his mind4 ,he knows nothing of good and 
evil1 which are both empty phrases for  
him1 words without any meaning1 and he  
is convinced that he acts rightly every 
time he seeks to satisfy his appetites4 
,in his case it is love's labour lost to
 try and give a moral meaning to the    
sanctions of the law4 ,punishment is not
 directed against the soul of the born  
criminal1 only against his body4 ,it    
overwhelms him1 fetters him and makes   
him either for the time being1 or       
permanently1 harmless2 but his organic  
tendency continues to sway him1 and     
whenever he recovers his liberty he is  

the same as before he was punished4     
,the ,mystics give to punishment the    
character of fatherly and chastening    
discipline by which the sinner expiates 
his crime and is purged of the sin2 thus
 it purifies him and leads him back to  
the state of innocence2 a kind of       
anticipatory hell fire which enables him
 to enter paradise4 ,in ,gorgias ,plato 
says explicitly3 ,he who is punished is 
liberated from the evil of his soul4    
,and the ,apostle ,paul teaches us3     
,punishment is ordained for the         
betterment of man4 ,criminal            
anthropology recognizes that it is      
useless to expect this moralizing and   
redeeming effect from punishment4       
,lombroso altogether rejects punishment 
as a means of discipline and expiation1 
and before him ,bentham and ,j4 ,s4     
,mill1 and simultaneously with him and  
after him ,fouille1 ,guyau and ,maudsley
 adopted the same view4 ,according to   
them the sanction of criminal law1 which
 extends and completes it and ensures   

its efficacy1 can have no other aim than
 the law itself1 and this aim is to     
defend society against its active       
enemies1 if possible by converting them1
 if necessary by forcible subjugation4  
,in a book which is full of interest1   
but whose value is considerably         
diminished by a strong admixture of     
mysticism1 ,esquisse d'une morale sans  
obligation ni sanction1 ,m4 ,guyau goes 
much farther than the criminal          
anthropologists and sociological        
opponents of punishment1 and expresses  
the somewhat paradoxical view that the  
real sanction seems to imply complete   
freedom from punishment for the crime   
committed1 as punishment for any action 
that has been accomplished is useless4  
,it is quite correct that no punishment 
under the sun can undo what has been    
done4 ,but it is not feasible for that  
reason to dispense with all punishment  
for misdeeds and to call this systematic
 freedom from punishment a sanction4    
,guyau overlooks the fact that the      

punishment is directed not to the crime 
but the perpetrator4 ,it certainly      
alters nothing in a past transgression  
of the law1 and that is not its object1 
but it may possibly have the effect of  
preventing fresh misdeeds on the part of
 the same wrongdoer or of others1 and   
that would justify it4  ,if society must
 renounce the idea of improving the     
misdemeanant1 especially the man whose  
organic tendencies make him a criminal  
and who is the most dangerous and       
commits the most numerous and worst     
crimes1 it nevertheless assumes that it 
makes an impression on morally doubtful 
characters by punishing misdemeanours   
and crimes1 that it warns them and      
prevents them from erring4 ,that is the 
theory of intimidation1 which also has  
many opponents4 ,it will hardly be      
denied that psychologically it is well  
founded4 ,the conception of the evil    
consequences for himself that his action
 may entail strengthens the impulsive   
man's power of inhibition when he is    

about to do wrong1 and perhaps enables  
him to overcome his immoral instinct4   
,only it is difficult to measure the    
force which the thought of punishment   
adds to the effort of inhibition4 ,this 
force does not come into question at all
 with the man who sins occasionally from
 passion4 ,the flood of his impulses    
sweeps away all barriers which reason   
may oppose1 and their power of          
resistance is not materially increased  
by the fear of consequences1 because the
 mental horizon is completely darkened  
at the time of the storm and no         
prevision is possible4 ,the criminal    
from organic causes exercises no        
inhibition4 ,he knows that society      
condemns his actions1 but he is         
convinced of his personal right to carry
 them out1 and fears no punishment1     
because he hopes to escape it1 and tries
 his utmost by means of planning1       
prudence and self-control to outwit     
society4 ,the theory of intimidation is 
not applicable to these two classes of  

criminals1 and they constitute a large  
proportion of the army of wrongdoers    
against which society has to defend     
itself by force4  ,but there remains the
 great number of mediocre natures whose 
sympathy with their fellow men1 the     
emotional foundation of the subjective  
impulse to ,morality1 is only slightly  
developed1 who have a superficial veneer
 of ,morality1 who act honourably out of
 prudence1 but who would feel no        
repugnance towards perpetrating         
profitable misdeeds1 if they were       
certain that they would incur no risk4  
,these insipid characters whose         
emotional temperature oscillates round  
about freezing point and who are        
incapable of great excitement1 of       
passion1 would see no reason to resist  
any temptation1 to disregard any        
favourable opportunity1 if the penal    
code1 the judge and the policeman did   
not warn them to be careful4 ,for this  
kind of man the penal sanction is really
 a useful and perhaps an indispensable  

means of prevention1 and it has been    
thought out and developed by the        
community with a view to such people4   
,not content with theoretical           
considerations1 people have also        
appealed to practical experience to test
 the theory of intimidation4 ,in some   
countries capital punishment was either 
legally abolished or tacitly suppressed1
 the judges either refraining from      
pronouncing the sentence on the prisoner
 or the head of the state1 when appealed
 to1 commuting it by an act of pardon to
 loss of liberty4 ,statistics seemed to 
show that serious crimes meriting the   
death penalty increased1 and capital    
punishment was reintroduced or the      
practice of systematic pardons was      
abandoned1 with the alleged result that 
the worst crimes grew less numerous4 ,i 
express myself doubtfully1 because ,i do
 not think that the statistics were     
sufficiently conclusive4 ,they embraced 
too small a number of cases and too     
short a period of time4 ,it cannot be   

conclusively proved that the abolition  
of the death penalty resulted in an     
increase of capital crimes2 but it is   
certain that crimes were never more     
frequent or more horrible than in the   
times when criminal justice was most    
cruel and made use of the most terrible 
sanctions4 ,up to the dawn of modern    
times legal torture was administered1 at
 every street corner there were gallows1
 the poor wretch under sentence of death
 was pinched with red-hot pincers1 the  
executioner tore the flesh from his     
bones1 poured boiling pitch over him1   
cut out his tongue1 hacked off his      
hands1 broke him on the wheel or burnt  
him alive2 executions were a sort of    
public entertainment or popular holiday1
 and efforts were made to attract as    
many spectators as possible2 every      
inhabitant of one of the larger towns   
was familiar from childhood with the    
horrid spectacle of mutilated human     
bodies writhing in torture1 and there   
rang in his ears the echo of the screams

 of pain and of the shrill death rattle 
of the victims4 ,but these impressions  
were so far from intimidating the gaping
 crowd that many hurried from the place 
of execution to commit the most         
execrable crimes1 the punishment of     
which they had just witnessed2          
consequently punishments have gradually 
been made less cruel1 and the public is 
excluded from executions1 which clearly 
indicates a decisive rejection of the   
theory of intimidation4  ,the truth is  
that the severity of the punishment has 
no effect upon the frequency or the     
savagery of crimes4 ,the criminality of 
a community depends on the value and    
emphasis of the moral education which it
 bestows upon the rising generation4 ,it
 can prevent its members1 at any rate   
the average1 normal type1 from          
developing into criminals4 ,but the fear
 of punishment has no deterrent effect  
upon those whose criminal impulses have 
not been subjugated by social           
discipline4 ,the severity of the        

punishment does not contribute anything 
to the defence of society4 ,it only     
proves that the lawgiver and the        
criminal judges are on the lowest level 
of civilization which corresponds to a  
widespread and barbarous criminality1   
and that their modes of thought and     
feeling are horribly like those of the  
criminals whom they sentence to torture1
 the gallows1 and the wheel4  ,positive 
law aims at defending society1 and tries
 to attain its end by punishing         
transgressions4 ,it provides no reward  
for conscientious obedience4 ,the law   
has no honours to bestow on             
blamelessness and virtue4 ,society felt 
the want of this and made attempts to   
encourage honourable conduct by         
conferring distinctions1 just as it     
tries to intimidate vice by punishing   
crime4 ,these attempts were not         
particularly happy4 ,the bestowal of    
titles and orders is no recognition of  
virtue1 but a means adopted by          
governments to ensure devotion to power4

 ,an arrangement was made in some places
 to honour model citizens in public and 
crown them with laurels1 but it soon    
came to grief owing to indifference and 
mockery4 ,a private individual wanted to
 fill this gap in social institutions4  
,the ,count of ,montyon1 a son of the   
eighteenth century1 whose philosophy he 
had imbibed1 instituted the prizes for  
virtue which are distributed annually by
 the ,french ,academy4 ,they are        
bestowed on modest integrity in humble  
circumstances which has manifested a    
sense of duty1 neighbourly love and     
self-sacrifice4 ,this friend of man has 
had few imitators1 and that is          
understandable4 ,sound common sense     
realizes that rewards like the ,montyon 
prizes for virtue do not with the       
infallibility of a natural law fall to  
the lot of merit1 but are nearly always 
adjudicated to the prizewinner by       
chance1 by recommendation1 and by all   
sorts of influences that have nothing to
 do with virtue2 and it seems unjust    

that among equal claims some should be  
satisfied while others1 the great       
majority1 are not4 ,it would be vain to 
contend that one virtue which goes      
empty-handed is not unfairly treated    
when another gets a benefit on which it 
has not counted1 and that in a moral    
character1 such as alone would be       
eligible for a prize for virtue1 there  
is no room for envy4 ,that would be the 
moral of the ,gospel concerning the     
labourers who came at the eleventh hour1
 which has met with opposition from     
others besides the contemporaries of    
,jesus4  ,on the whole1 the community   
has never felt called upon to solve the 
moral problem of the reward of virtue4  
,it has always contented itself with the
 punishment of vice and has given its   
law threatening1 but not encouraging1   
sanctions4 ,this attitude shows that it 
has always had a clear conception of its
 moral task4 ,in its positive law it    
never included anything but that minimum
 of ,morality that was absolutely       

necessary to its existence1 and without 
which it would dissolve into its        
original elements1 its order would be   
replaced by chaos1 by the war of all    
against all4 ,it must insist on the     
observance of this minimum2 it must use 
forcible means to achieve this4 ,but it 
does not feel justified in demanding    
more than this minimum1 because more is 
not claimed by its instinct of          
self-preservation4 ,a surplus of virtue 
over and above the amount necessary for 
the life of society is desirable2 but it
 does not lie within the scope of the   
natural functions of the community1     
determined by its organic necessities1  
to achieve this by compulsion and the   
provision of legal rewards as an        
encouragement4 ,it is the business of   
the individual to work at his own moral 
improvement1 and the community cannot   
interfere directly in the matter4 ,it is
 enough that it encourage this work     
indirectly by bestowing care on the     
culture and education of the individual1

 by making it the duty of its public    
schools to inculcate good principles1   
and by creating a public opinion which  
surrounds all the activities of higher  
morality with admiration1 respect and   
gratitude4 ,the moral education of the  
individual is not an object with which  
laws are concerned2 it is the result of 
the constant1 vital influence of the    
community1 and can have no sanction     
other than the increase of well-being of
 every single person within the social  
union1 which is a natural consequence of
 raising the moral level of the         
community4  ,the penal sanctions of     
positive law have a gross materialism   
about them corresponding to the definite
 concreteness of the actions with which 
positive law deals4 ,the broad field of 
,morality1 however1 which is outside the
 narrow sphere of the laws1 has no room 
for sanctions of a material nature4 ,the
 penalties prescribed by law are        
directed to actions which1 if they      
became general1 would in a very short   

space of time result in the dissolution 
of society4 ,the community essays by    
forcible measures to prevent this kind  
of action1 and these measures more or   
less fulfil their aim1 whether you      
interpret their use on the theory of    
discipline1 of expiation and            
purification by repentance1 of          
improvement and moral re-birth1 or of   
intimidation4 ,all these theories were  
invented later on1 after the community  
had been convinced by experience that   
punishment1 if it does not entirely     
prevent crime1 at least limits it       
sufficiently to make the continued      
existence of society possible1 and more 
or less to guarantee to its members the 
safety of their life1 their property and
 their personal dignity4  ,against      
transgressions of the moral law1 the    
results of which are not immediately    
obvious1 such as ruthless selfishness1  
blunted sympathy and lack of active     
neighbourly kindness1 the community does
 not proceed with forcible measures2    

firstly1 because it cannot establish    
their existence convincingly and hence  
cannot try them in a court of justice1  
and secondly1 because it does not       
recognize them as constituting an       
immediate danger to its existence4 ,now1
 as the sanctions set up by society are 
not applicable to these transgressions1 
an individual whose mind does not       
penetrate very far into matters is      
disquieted1 for accustomed as he is to  
the spectacle of the steady justice of  
the state1 he seeks the counterpart in  
the forms of this justice in the world  
of ,morality1 and does not discover it  
at the first glance4 ,he asks anxiously 
where are the police1 the public        
prosecutor1 the examining magistrate1   
the criminal court1 the prison for sins 
against ,morality1 and invents them1    
since he cannot find them4 ,he transfers
 to the hereafter the sanctions of      
,morality1 which are not visible on     
earth4 ,he cannot make up his mind to   
renounce them1 because the fact that    

sins against the moral law go unpunished
 would seem to him to indicate          
intolerable anarchy1 comparable with the
 state of a community where everyone    
could murder1 rob and mutilate to his   
heart's content without incurring the   
risk of the least personal              
unpleasantness4  ,in the sphere of the  
moral law punishment certainly does not 
follow hot foot upon crime1 but it      
nevertheless does not fail to appear1   
and becomes visible when the eye is     
capable of embracing long periods of    
time and of tracing intricate           
connexions4 ,the sanctions of the moral 
law differ from those of criminal law1  
but they are not wanting4 ,they are of a
 subjective and of an objective         
character4 ,the subjective punishment   
for a sin against the laws of ,morality 
is remorse4 ,it is inflicted by the     
inner judge who rules in the            
consciousness of the individual1 by     
conscience1 and penetrates to the very  
deepest depths of a person's mind which 

no outward punishment imposed by the    
community ever reaches4 ,it is not only 
religious and political martyrs who     
endure torture and death with proud     
serenity1 conscious that they are       
morally immeasurably superior to their  
executioners2 even common criminals     
remain perfectly unmoved by their       
punishment and regret only that they are
 weaker than their captors4 ,prisons are
 full of convicts who look upon their   
condition as that of prisoners of war4  
,they have been worsted in their battle 
with law4 ,that seems to them a         
misfortune but not a disgrace4 ,they are
 neither humble nor contrite1 but       
revengeful4 ,they are determined and    
ready to take up the duel with society  
as soon as an opportunity offers and    
they may hope to do so with some        
prospect of success4  ,but remorse is an
 unresisting submission to the verdict  
of conscience and the consciousness of  
one's own unworthiness4 ,it is the      
recognition of the justice of the       

sentence which brands one1 and the      
constant1 anguished realization that    
one's personality has been deservedly   
humiliated1 dishonoured and deprived of 
its rights4 ,as a spiritual process1    
remorse causes the sinner continually to
 relive the misdeed he committed1 while 
at the same time he is fully conscious  
of its atrocity4 ,the ego becomes dual1 
one part active1 the other watching and 
judging4 ,the one again and again       
perpetrates its misdeed1 the other looks
 on horrified and suffers agonies4 ,it  
is one long torture and disgrace of     
self4 ,remorse condemns the sinner      
perpetually to repeat in his mind the   
deed which fills him with horror of     
himself4 ,this state of mind is the     
nearest approach to eternal damnation in
 hell4 ,there is only one means of      
temporary escape3 to extinguish memory  
by narcotics4 ,that is why remorse not  
seldom leads to drunkenness4            
,shakespeare1 with a poet's infallible  
insight into the soul1 has grasped and  

depicted the nature of remorse1 the     
uninterrupted1 torturing presence of the
 misdeed in man's consciousness4 ,lady  
,macbeth sees her hands ever stained    
with the blood of the innocent royal    
victim whom she herself did not even    
murder1 and she complains that all the  
perfumes of ,arabia will not sweeten    
this little hand4 ,leontes1 in the      
,winter's ,tale1 on hearing of          
,hermione's alleged death1 of which he  
believes himself guilty1 mourns3        
,once a day ,i'll visit   ,the chapel   
where they lie2 and tears shed there    
,shall be my recreation3 so long as     
nature   ,will bear up with this        
exercise1 so long   ,i daily vow to use 
it4  ,remorse is the most effective of  
the subjective sanctions of ,morality2  
it is almost too effective1 for owing to
 its duration and severity the          
punishment easily grows disproportionate
 to the crime4 ,but it has one great    
disadvantage1 it affects only better    
natures who have an active conscience   

and spiritual delicacy1 while it spares 
the wicked who have no conscience1 who  
perpetrate their misdeeds contentedly1  
without a qualm1 and regret them only   
when they are discovered and lead to    
unpleasantness4  ,nevertheless1 the     
actions of these hardened sinners do not
 go quite unpunished4 ,moral law always 
takes vengeance for transgressions1 but 
not directly on the evildoer4 ,in       
addition to the subjective1 it also has 
an objective sanction2 when it is       
violated retribution falls on the       
community4 ,the masses have a dim idea  
that every evil deed meets with requital
 and express it in the proverb that     
,though the mills of ,god grind slowly1 
yet they grind exceeding small4 ,they   
have noticed that the curse of an evil  
deed never fails to come1 and is        
consummated with crushing force1 only   
that it does not happen at once4 ,it    
seems objectionably unjust that the     
culprit should not feel the effect of   
his crime1 whilst others do who were not

 born when it was perpetrated4 ,but the 
concept of retributory justice is as    
little applicable to the far-reaching   
relations in the life of humanity as to 
the actions of the laws of ,nature1 for 
instance gravity or electricity4        
,morality is1 as ,i have shown1 an      
adaptation of the species to the natural
 conditions in which it is forced to    
live4 ,morality1 therefore1 has an aim1 
which is to make social life in common  
possible for the individual1 this life  
alone enabling him to maintain his      
existence amid the conditions obtaining 
on this earth4 ,the discipline which    
,morality imposes on the individual     
leaves him a certain amount of free     
play4 ,if he escapes from this          
discipline to a certain small extent    
which does not threaten the existence of
 society1 this revolt has no ill effect 
upon the life of the species1 the latter
 has no grounds for punishing him1 and  
the only1 yet sufficient1 sanction of   
the loose ,morality of an undisciplined 

individual lies in the fact that he is  
more or less inferior to the most       
perfect type of the species1 and visibly
 bears the stamp of his worthlessness in
 his character1 his bearing and his mode
 of thought4 ,but if in his disregard of
 ,morality the individual goes so far as
 to frustrate its aim and endanger the  
existence of society1 then the latter   
must either find ways and means of      
rendering the culprit harmless or else  
it overlooks his misdeed and thereby    
becomes an accessory and justly suffers 
the evils consequent upon a             
deterioration of ,morals which is       
universally tolerated4  ,the means by   
which a society must defend the         
,morality necessary to its existence can
 only be spiritual1 for it is not a     
question of breaches of the positive law
 which result in the intervention of    
justice and of material penalties1 but  
of a disregard of the commands of       
,morality1 which are not drawn up in    
paragraphs4 ,public opinion suffices to 

rouse the individual who despises the   
,moral law to an uncomfortable sense of 
his unworthiness2 if he finds himself   
treated with contempt and sees          
disapproval and dislike in everyone's   
face1 either he will be spurred to an   
effort to overcome his immoral instincts
 or his self-respect will suffer from   
the universal contempt with which he    
meets2 and this suffering is his        
punishment1 therefore it is the sanction
 of a breach of the ,moral law4  ,if    
public opinion does not keep careful and
 severe watch1 such as may be termed the
 function of a higher moral police1 then
 inevitably the moral tone of the whole 
society will sink to a lower level1 and 
this will result in making life harder  
and more difficult1 and in certain      
circumstances may lead to dissolution4  
,this is not a theoretical assumption1  
but an observed fact1 a lesson taught by
 history4 ,it tells us of epochs in     
which the licentiousness of individuals1
 favoured by a society too dull1 weak   

and indifferent to stand up against bad 
examples1 succeeded in corrupting all   
classes4 ,such a period is exemplified  
by the fall of ,rome4 ,common natures   
indulged and wallowed in every vice1 the
 better ones felt such disgust for a    
life without nobility and virtue that   
they discarded it1 and the community    
lost all excuse of joint responsibility 
and became so loosely knit together that
 it was incapable of common effort or   
sacrifice1 and collapsed miserably at   
the first onslaught of a foreign        
aggressor tempted by its depravity4     
,the disintegration of a society1 the   
sanction of its sins against ,morality1 
is a slow process4 ,it does not often   
take place catastrophically1 with       
theatrical effect1 so that even a dull  
observer can grasp the connexion between
 cause and effect4 ,but whoever         
investigates closely will realize that  
all evils from which society suffers1   
which make life more bitter and harder  
for its members1 are ultimately due to  

defective ,morality4 ,what are class    
struggles with their consequent         
hostilities between groups of the same  
nation1 their coercion and damage1 but  
manifestations of self-seeking1 lack of 
consideration and injustice1 that is1 of
 ,immorality8 ,would they be possible if
 members of all classes1 capitalists and
 workers1 agriculturists and townsmen1  
rulers and subjects were inspired by    
neighbourly kindness1 understanding and 
appreciation of the needs1 pretensions  
and feelings of their opponents1 and by 
a spirit of self-sacrifice8 ,would the  
decay of character1 the arbitrariness   
and arrogance of the mighty1 the        
cowardly slavishness of the masses1 with
 the resultant rottenness of public     
affairs1 be conceivable if individuals  
were conscious of their dignity and     
their duty to themselves and the        
community1 and if they had the strength 
and the determination to overcome their 
fear of men8 ,could wars of aggression  
bring ruin upon mankind if leading      

personalities did not give way to the   
desire for outward honours1 to the      
hunger for power1 to avarice1 to the    
itch of vanity1 that is to the lowest   
forms of selfishness1 and if the masses 
out of stupidity or fear of a mental    
effort1 and out of dread for their      
personal responsibility did not allow   
themselves to be misused for base       
purposes8  ,thus we find insufficient   
,morality in individuals1 or the        
complete lack of it1 to be at the root  
of all evils with which the community is
 afflicted1 and we are justified in     
conceiving war1 party quarrels1         
collisions between groups representing  
different interests1 revolutions1 in    
fact1 all tragedies of life in societies
 with the suffering and destruction they
 entail1 as the penal sanction of sins  
against ,morality4 ,morality1 which was 
created to facilitate life for the      
individual or to make it at all possible
 for him1 is no longer able to fulfil   
its aim1 and the society finds itself by

 its own fault back in the condition of 
misery and fear1 owing to which its     
instinct of self-preservation originally
 forced it to make the effort of setting
 up the ,moral law4 ,even the most      
merciless zealot cannot wish for a more 
efficacious and painful punishment of   
,immorality4  ,but ,morality does not   
possess the sanction of punishment      
alone1 it has also the more amiable one 
of reward4 ,we have seen that by        
strengthening the faculty of inhibition 
it raises the individual to a higher    
level of organic development1 that by   
the inculcation of consideration and    
neighbourly kindness it affords the     
community the possibility of working    
together peacefully and profitably4 ,but
 it does more than that4 ,it gives life 
an incomparably higher value than when  
it is dull and uniform1 by enriching and
 beautifying it with heroism and with   
ideals4  ,ideals and heroism are direct 
creations of ,morality and inconceivable
 without it4 ,the ideal is a conception 

of perfection2 the thought of attaining 
it is accompanied by the most           
pleasurable emotions1 and the individual
 regards it as his life's task to strive
 for it4 ,the struggle for the ideal    
implies effort at all times1            
renunciation of the ease of a           
thoughtless and care-free existence1 an 
endless series of difficult victories   
over appetites clamouring for immediate 
satisfaction1 that is1 constant work in 
the service of ,morality4 ,he who has an
 ideal is never troubled by the problem 
of the meaning of life4 ,his life has an
 aim and significance4 ,he knows whither
 he goes1 why he lives1 for what he     
works4 ,he knows nothing of the doubts  
of the aimless wanderer1 of the         
discouraging consciousness of one's own 
uselessness1 and his assurance1 his     
conviction that his efforts are useful  
and worthy come very near to happiness4 
,heroism is the noblest victory of a    
thinking and volitional personality over
 selfishness2 it is altruism which rises

 to self-sacrifice1 the proud           
subjugation by ,reason of the most      
primitive and powerful of all instincts1
 that of self-preservation4 ,it is the  
highest achievement of which ,morality  
is capable4 ,it is never developed for  
the profit of an individual1 but always 
for that of a community1 for a thought1 
for an ideal4 ,his heroic conduct raises
 the hero out of the rut of his         
existence1 liberates him from the       
trammels of his individuality and       
enlarges this to represent a community1 
its longings1 its resolutions1 its      
determination4 ,at the moment of his    
heroic action the hero lives innumerable
 lives1 the lives of all for whom he    
risks his own1 and if death reaches him1
 it can destroy only his single person1 
but cannot put an end to the dynamic    
activity of the community which is      
included in the hero1 while he is       
magnificently elevated far above        
himself4 ,the faculty of forming an     
ideal of existence and activity1 and of 

rising to the heights of heroism1 is the
 royal reward of ,morality which the    
perfect subjection of animal instincts  
to the rule of human ,reason has        
achieved4 ,its punishment for those     
retrograde individuals who never learn  
to control their instinctive reflex     
actions is that they are denied the     
sight of the glory of the ideal1 that   
heroism is unknown and incomprehensible 
to them1 that they lead their lives     
fettered and imprisoned1 unconscious of 
any task1 without prospect or           
exaltation1 as if they dwelt in a cellar
 or in a dark dungeon4 ,these are the   
sanctions of ,morality4 ,it has no      
others1 nor does it need them4  ,in one 
passage of the book cited above ,guyau  
makes the doubting remark3 ,who can tell
 us whether ,morality is not 444 at one 
and the same time a beautiful and useful
 art8 ,perhaps it bewitches us and      
deceives us4 ,let us assume that it is  
an illusion4 ,that would not detract    
from its value for mankind4 ,is not all 

our knowledge of the world1 is not our  
whole view of ,nature an illusion8 ,we  
are made conscious of the universe by   
its qualities1 and these qualities are  
conferred on it by our senses4 ,but all 
knowledge that we derive from our senses
 is an illusion4 ,for the senses do not 
convey reality to us1 but the           
modifications which the influence of    
reality produces in our sense organs4   
,the universe has neither sound nor     
colour nor scent4 ,but we perceive it as
 sounding1 coloured and scented4 ,these 
qualities we attribute to reality are   
illusions of our senses1 but these      
illusions make up all the beauty of the 
world which without them would be dumb1 
blind and without charm for us4  ,life  
for us is an unspeakably oppressive     
riddle4 ,has it an aim1 and1 if so1     
what8 ,we do not know4 ,all thought only
 leads to the conclusion3 life is its   
own aim and end1 we live for life's     
sake4 ,and this conclusion is no        
solution of the problem4 ,then ,morality

 appears1 and not only makes life easier
 and possible1 but even shows us an aim1
 if not for universal1 at least for     
individual life4 ,that aim is the       
humanization of the animal1 the         
spiritualization of man1 the exaltation 
and enrichment of the individual by     
means of sympathy1 neighbourly kindness1
 a sense of joint responsibility1 and   
the subjection of ,instinct to ,reason  
which1 as far as we know1 is the noblest
 product of ,nature4 ,it is possible    
that ,morality1 which hides the eerie   
unintelligibility of life from us1 is an
 illusion4 ,blessed be the illusion     
which makes life worth living4          
,printed in ,england by ,cassell        
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