,center1 ,michigan ,state ,university ,libraries47 ,,know ,,the ,,truth2 ,a ,,critique ,,on ,,the ,,hamiltonian ,,theory ,,of ,,limitation1 ,,including ,,some ,,strictures ,,upon ,,the ,,theories ,,of ,,rev4 ,,henry ,l4 ,,mansel ,,and ,,mr4 ,,herbert ,,spencer ,,by ,,jesse ,h4 ,,jones ,give me to see1 that ,i may know where to strike4 ,,new ,,york3 ,,published ,,for ,,the ,,author ,,by ,,hurd ,,and ,,houghton4 ,,boston3 ,,nichols ,,and ,,noyes #ahfe4 ,entered according to ,act of ,congress1 in the year #ahfe1 by ,,jesse ,h4 ,,jones1 in the ,clerk's ,office of the ,district ,court for the ,southern ,district of ,new ,york4 ,,riverside1 ,,cambridge3 ,,stereotyped ,,and ,,printed ,,by ,h4 ,o4 ,,houghton ,,and ,,company4 ,dedication4 ,,to ,,my ,,fellow-,,students ,,and ,,friends ,,of ,,andover ,,theological ,,seminary ,,who ,,have ,,read ,,mansel ,,and ,,rejected ,,his ,,teachings1 ,this ,little ,treatise ,,is ,,respectfully ,,dedicated ,,by ,,the ,,author4 ,,preface4 ,this book has been written simply in the interest of ,truth4 ,it was because the doctrines of the ,hamiltonian ,school were believed to be dangerous errors1 which this process of thought exposes1 that it was undertaken4 ,logically1 and in the final analysis1 there can be but two systems of philosophical theology in the world4 ,the one will be ,pantheism1 or ,atheism1--both of which contain the same essential principle1 but viewed from different standpoints1--the other will be a pure ,theism4 ,in the schools of ,brahma and ,buddh1 or in the schools of ,christ1 the truth is to be found4 ,and this is so because every teacher is to be held responsible for all which can be logically deduced from his system2 and every erroneous result which can be so deduced is decisive of the presence of an error in principle in the foundation2 and all schemes of philosophy1 by such a trial1 are seen to be based on one of these two classes of schools4 ,just here a quotation from ,dr4 ,laurens ,hickok's ,rational ,psychology will be in point3 ,except as we determine the absolute to be personality wholly out of and beyond all the conditions and modes of space and time1 we can by no possibility leave nature for the supernatural4 ,the clear-sighted and honest intellect1 resting in this conclusion that the conditions of space and time cannot be transcended1 will be ,atheistic2 while the deluded intellect1 which has put the false play of the discursive understanding in its abstract speculations for the decisions of an all-embracing reason1 and deems itself so fortunate as to have found a deity within the modes of space and time1 will be ,pantheistic4 ,the ,pantheism will be ideal and transcendent1 when it reaches its conclusions by a logical process in the abstract law of thought2 and it will be material and empiric1 when it concludes from the fixed connections of cause and effect in the generalized law of nature2 but in neither case is the ,pantheism any other than ,atheism1 for the ,deity1 circumscribed in the conditions of space and time with nature1 is but nature still1 and1 whether in abstract thought or generalized reality1 is no ,god4 ,the ,hamiltonian system is logically ,atheism4 ,perceiving that the ,deity cannot be found in ,nature1 it denies that he can be known at all4 ,what the mind cannot know at all1 it is irrational to believe4 ,if man cannot know that ,god is1 and have a clear sight of his attributes as a rational ground of confidence in what he says1 it is the height of blind credulity to believe in him4 ,and more2 if man cannot have such knowledge1 he has no standard by which to measure teachings1 and be sure he has the truth4 ,under such circumstances1 faith is impossible4 ,faith can only be based on ,reason4 ,if there is no ,reason1 there can be no faith4 ,hence he who talks about faith1 and denies ,reason1 does not know what faith is4 ,the logician rightfully held that ,god could not be found in ,nature2 but he was just as wrong in asserting that man is wholly in ,nature and cannot know ,god1 as he was right in the former instance4 ,the acceptance of his one truth1 and one error1 compels man to be an ,atheist2 because then he has no faculty by which to know aught of ,god2 and few thorough men will accept blind credulity as the basis of ,religion4 ,the author's sense of obligation to ,president ,hickok cannot be too strongly stated4 ,but for his works1 it is believed that this little treatise could never have been written4 ,indeed1 the author looks for but scanty credit on the score of originality1 since most of what he has written he has learned1 directly or indirectly1 from that profound thinker4 ,he has deemed it his chief work1 to apply the principles developed by others to the exposure of a great error4 ,and if he shall be judged to have accomplished this1 his ambition will have been satisfied4 ,after the substance of this treatise had been thought out1 and while the author was committing it to paper1 the essays on ,space and ,time1 and on ,the ,philosophy of the ,unconditioned1 in the numbers of the ,north ,american ,review for ,july and ,october1 #ahfd1 happened to fall under his notice4 ,some persons will appreciate the delight and avidity with which he read them2 and how grateful it was to an obscure student1 almost wholly isolated in the world1 to find the views which he had wrought out in his secluded chamber1 so ably advocated in the leading review of his country4 ,not that he had gone as far1 or examined the subjects in hand as thoroughly as has been there done4 ,by no means4 ,rather what results he had attained accord with some of those therein laid down4 ,of those essays it is not too much to say1 that1 if they have not exhausted the topics of which they treat1 they have settled forever the conclusions to be reached1 and leave for other writers only illustration and comment4 ,if the author shall seem to differ from them on a minor question1--that of quantitative infinity1--the difference will1 it is believed1 be found to be one of the form of expression only4 ,and the difference is maintained from the conviction that no term in science should have more than one signification4 ,it is better to adopt illimitable and indivisible1 as the technical epithets of ,space1 in place of the commonly used terms infinite and absolute4 ,a metaphysical distinction has been incidentally touched upon in the following discussion1 which deserves a more extensive consideration than the scope and plan of this work would permit to it here2 and which1 so far as the author's limited reading goes1 has received very little attention from modern writers on metaphysics4 ,he refers to the distinction between the animal nature and spiritual person1 so repeatedly enounced by that profound metaphysical theologian1 the apostle ,paul1 and by that pure spiritual pastor1 the apostle ,john1 in the terms flesh and spirit4 ,the thinkers of the world1 even the best ,christian philosophers1 seem to have esteemed this a moral and religious distinction1 and no more1 when in fact it cleaves down through the whole human being1 and forms the first great radical division in any proper analysis of man's soul1 and classification of his constituent elements4 ,this is a purely natural division4 ,it is organic in man4 ,it belonged as much to ,adam in his purity1 as it does to the most degraded wretch on the globe now4 ,it is of such a character that1 had it been properly understood and developed1 the ,hamiltonian system of philosophy could never have been constructed4 ,an adequate statement of the truth would be conducted as follows4 ,first1 the animal nature should be carefully analyzed1 its province accurately defined1 and both the laws and forms of its activity exactly stated4 ,second1 a like examination of the spiritual person should follow2 and third1 the relations1 interactions1 and influences of the two parts upon each other should be1 as extensively as possible1 presented4 ,but it is to be remarked1 that1 while the analysis1 by the human intellect1 of these two great departments of man's soul1 may be exhaustive1 it is doubtful if any but the ,all-seeing ,eye can read all their relations and inter-communications4 ,the development of the third point1 by any one mind1 must needs1 therefore1 be partial4 ,whether any portion of the above designated labor shall be hereafter entered upon1 will depend upon circumstances beyond control of the writer4 ,as will appear1 it is believed1 in the development of the subject1 the great1 the vital point upon which the whole controversy with the ,hamiltonian school must turn1 is a question of fact2 viz41 whether man has a ,reason1 as the faculty giving a priori principles1 or not4 ,if he has such a ,reason1 then by it the questions now at issue can be settled1 and that finally4 ,if he has no ,reason1 then he can have no knowledge1 except of appearances and events1 as perceived by the ,sense and judged by the ,understanding4 ,until1 then1 the question of fact is decided1 it would be a gain if public attention was confined wholly to it4 ,establish first a well ascertained and sure foundation before erecting a superstructure4 ,the method adopted in constructing this treatise does not admit the presentation of the matter in a symmetrical form4 ,on the contrary1 it involves some1 perhaps many1 repetitions4 ,what has been said at one point respecting one author must be said again in reply to another4 ,yet the main object for which the work was undertaken could1 it seemed1 be thoroughly accomplished in no other way4 ,the author has in each case used ,american editions of the works named4 ,,know ,,the ,,truth4 ,,part ,i4 ,,the ,,seeking ,,and ,,the ,,finding4 ,in ,april1 #ahei1 there was republished in ,boston1 from an ,english print1 a volume entitled ,the ,limits of ,religious ,thought ,examined1 c41 by ,henry ,longueville ,mansel1 ,b4 ,d4 ,the high position occupied by the publishers1--a firm of ,christian gentlemen1 who1 through a long career in the publication of books either devoutly religious1 or1 at least1 having a high moral tone1 and being marked by deep1 earnest thought1 have obtained the confidence of the religious community2 the recommendations with which its advent was heralded1 but most of all the intrinsic importance of the theme announced1 and its consonance with many of the currents of mental activity in our midst1--gave the book an immediate and extensive circulation4 ,its subject lay at the foundation of all religious1 and especially of all theological thinking4 ,the author1 basing his teaching on certain metaphysical tenets1 claimed to have circumscribed the boundary to all positive1 and so valid effort of the human intellect in its upward surging towards the ,deity1 and to have been able to say1 ,thus far canst thou come1 and no farther1 and here must thy proud waves be stayed4 ,and this effort was declaredly made in the interest of religion4 ,it was asserted that from such a ground only1 as was therein sought to be established1 could infidelity be successfully assailed and destroyed4 ,moreover1 the writer was a learned and able divine in the ,anglican ,church1 orthodox in his views2 and his volume was composed of lectures delivered upon what is known as ,the ,bampton ,foundation2--a bequest of a clergyman1 the income of which1 under certain rules1 he directed should be employed forever1 in furthering the cause of ,christ1 by ,divinity ,lecture ,sermons in ,oxford4 ,such a book1 on such a theme1 by such a man1 and composed under such auspices1 would necessarily receive the almost universal attention of religious thinkers1 and would mark an era in human thought4 ,such was the fact in this country4 ,new ,england1 the birthplace and home of ,american ,theology1 gave it her most careful and studious examination4 ,and the ,west alike with the ,east pored over its pages1 and wrought upon its knotty questions4 ,clergymen especially1 and theological students1 perused it with the earnestness of those who search for hid treasures4 ,and what was the result8 ,we do not hesitate to say that it was unqualified rejection4 ,the book now takes its place among religious productions1 not as a contribution to our positive knowledge1 not as a practicable new road1 surveyed out through the ,unknown ,regions of ,thought1 but rather as possessing only a negative value1 as a monument of warning1 erected at that point on the roadside where the writer branched off in his explorations1 and on which is inscribed1 ,in this direction the truth cannot be found4 ,the stir which this book produced1 naturally brought prominently to public attention a writer heretofore not extensively read in this country1 ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 upon whose metaphysical teachings the lecturer avowedly based his whole scheme4 ,the doctrines of the metaphysician were subjected to the same scrutinizing analysis1 which dissolved the enunciations of the divine2 and they1 like these1 were pronounced wanting4 ,this decision was not reached or expressed in any extensive and exhaustive criticism of these writers2 in which the errors of their principles and the revolting nature of the results they attained1 were presented2 but it rather was a shoot from the spontaneous and deep-seated conviction1 that the whole scheme1 of both teacher and pupil1 was utterly insufficient to satisfy the craving of man's highest nature4 ,it was rejected because it could not be received4 ,something more than a year ago1 and while the ,american theological mind1 resting in the above-stated conviction1 was absorbed in the tremendous interests connected with the ,great ,rebellion1 a new aspirant for honors appeared upon the stage4 ,a book was published entitled ,the ,philosophy of ,herbert ,spencer3 ,first ,principles4 ,this was announced as the foundation of a new system of ,philosophy1 which would command the confidence of the present1 and extort the wonder of all succeeding ages4 ,avowing the same general principles with ,mansel and ,hamilton1 this writer professed to have found a radical defect in their system1 which being corrected1 rendered that system complete and final2 so that1 from it as a base1 he sets out to construct a new scheme of ,universal ,science4 ,this man1 too1 has been read1 not so extensively as his predecessors2 because when one has seen a geometrical absurdity demonstrated1 he does not care1 unless from professional motives1 to examine and disprove further attempts to bolster up the folly2 but still so widely read1 as to be generally associated with the other writers above mentioned1 and1 like them1 rejected4 ,upon being examined1 he is found to be a man of less scope and mental muscle than either of his teachers2 yet going over the same ground and expressing the same ideas1 scarcely in new language even2 and it further appears that his discovery is made at the expense of his logic and consistency1 and involves an unpardonable contradiction4 ,previous to the publication of the books just mentioned1 an ,american writer had submitted to the world a system of thought upon the questions of which they treat1 which certainly seems worthy of some notice from their authors4 ,yet it has received none4 ,to introduce him we must retrace our steps for a little4 ,in #ahdh1 ,laurens ,p4 ,hickok1 then a ,professor in ,auburn ,theological ,seminary1 published a work entitled ,rational ,psychology1 in which he professed to establish1 by a priori processes1 positions which1 if true1 afford a ground for the answer1 at once and forever1 of all the difficulties raised by ,sir ,william ,hamilton and his school4 ,being comparatively a new writer1 his work attracted only a moiety of the attention it should have done4 ,it was too much like ,analytical ,geometry and ,calculus for the popular mind1 or even for any but a few patient thinkers4 ,for them it was marrow and fatness4 ,since the followers of ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 whom we will hereafter term ,limitists1 have neglected to take the great truths enunciated by the ,american metaphysician1 and apply them to their own system1 and so be convinced by their own study of the worthlessness of that system1 it becomes their opponents1 in the interest of truth1 to perform this work in their stead2 viz41 upon the basis of immutable truth1 to unravel each of their well-knit sophistries1 to show to the world that it may know the truth2 and thus to destroy a system which1 if allowed undisputed sway1 would sap the very foundations of ,christian faith4 ,the philosophical system of the ,limitists is built upon a single fundamental proposition1 which carries all their deductions with it4 ,he who would strike these effectually1 must aim his blow1 and give it with all his might1 straight at that one object2 sure that if he destroys that1 the destruction of the whole fabric is involved therein4 ,but1 as the ,limitists are determined not to confess the dissolution of their scheme1 by the simple establishment of principles1 which they cannot prove false1 and which1 if true1 involve the absurdity of their own tenets1 it is further necessary to go through their writings1 and examine them passage by passage1 and show the fallacy of each4 ,in the former direction we can but re-utter some of the principles of the great ,american teacher4 ,in the latter there is room for new effort2 and this shall be our especial province4 ,the proposition upon which the whole scheme of the ,limitists is founded1 was originally enunciated by ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 in the following terms4 ,the ,unconditioned is incognizable and inconceivable2 its notion being only negative of the conditioned1 which last can alone be positively known or conceived4 ,in our opinion1 the mind can conceive1 and consequently can know1 only the limited and the conditionally limited4 ,the unconditionally unlimited1 or the ,infinite1 the unconditionally limited1 or the ,absolute1 cannot positively be construed to the mind2 they can be conceived only by a thinking away from1 or abstraction of1 those very conditions under which thought itself is realized2 consequently1 the notion of the ,unconditioned is only negative--negative of the conceivable itself4 ,for example1 on the one hand we can positively conceive1 neither an absolute whole1 that is1 a whole so great1 that we cannot also conceive it as a relative part of a still greater whole2 nor an absolute part1 that is1 a part so small1 that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole1 divisible into smaller parts4 ,on the other hand1 we cannot positively represent1 or realize1 or construe to the mind1 7as here understanding and imagination coincide17 an infinite whole1 for this could only be done by the infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes1 which would itself require an infinite time for its accomplishment2 nor1 for the same reason1 can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of parts4444 ,as the conditionally limited 7which we may briefly call the conditioned7 is thus the only possible object of knowledge1 and of positive thought--thought necessarily supposes conditions4 ,to think is to condition2 and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought4 444 ,the conditioned is the mean between two extremes--two inconditionates1 exclusive of each other1 neither of which can be conceived as possible1 but of which1 on the principles of contradiction and excluded middle1 one must be admitted as necessary4 ,this theory may be epitomized as follows3--,the ,unconditioned denotes the genus of which the ,infinite and ,absolute are the species4 ,this genus is inconceivable1 is negative of the conceivable itself4 ,hence both the species must be so also4 ,although they are thus incognizable1 they may be defined2 the one1 the ,infinite1 as that which is beyond all limits2 the other1 the ,absolute1 as a whole beyond all conditions3 or1 concisely1 the one is illimitable immensity1 the other1 unconditional totality4 ,as defined1 these are seen to be mutually repugnant3 that is1 if there is illimitable immensity1 there cannot be absolute totality2 and the reverse4 ,within these two all possible being is included2 and1 because either excludes the other1 it can be in only one4 ,since both are inconceivable we can never know in which the conditioned or conceivable being is4 ,either would give us a being--,god--capable of accounting for the ,universe4 ,this fact is assumed to be a sufficient ground for faith2 and man may therefore rationally satisfy himself with the study of those matters which are cognizable--the conditioned4 ,it is not our purpose at this point to enter upon a criticism of the philosophical theory thus enounced4 ,this will fall1 in the natural course1 upon a subsequent page4 ,we have stated it here1 for the purpose of placing in that strong light which it deserves1 another topic1 which has received altogether too little attention from the opponents of the ,limitists4 ,underlying and involved in the above theory1 there is a question of fact1 of the utmost importance4 ,sir ,william ,hamilton's metaphysic rests upon his psychology2 and if his psychology is true1 his system is impregnable4 ,it is his diagnosis of the human mind1 then1 which demands our attention4 ,he has presented this in the following passage3-- ,while we regard as conclusive ,kant's analysis of ,time and ,space into conditions of thought1 we cannot help viewing his deduction of the ',categories of ,understanding' and the ',ideas of ,speculative ,reason' as the work of a great but perverse ingenuity4 ,the categories of understanding are merely subordinate forms of the conditioned4 ,why not1 therefore1 generalize the ,conditioned--,existence ,conditioned1 as the supreme category1 or categories1 of thought8--and if it were necessary to analyze this form into its subaltern applications1 why not develop these immediately out of the generic principle1 instead of preposterously1 and by a forced and partial analogy1 deducing the laws of the understanding from a questionable division of logical proposition8 ,why distinguish ,reason 7,vernunft7 from ,understanding 7,verstand71 simply on the ground that the former is conversant about1 or rather tends toward1 the unconditioned2 when it is sufficiently apparent1 that the unconditioned is conceived as the negation of the conditioned1 and also that the conception of contradictories is one8 ,in the ,kantian philosophy1 both faculties perform the same function1 both seek the one in the many2--the ,idea 7,idee7 is only the ,concept 7,begriff7 sublimated into the inconceivable2 ,reason only the ,understanding which has 'overleaped itself4' ,not stopping now to correct the entirely erroneous statement that both faculties1 i4 e41 ,understanding and ,reason1 perform the same function1 we are to notice the two leading points which are made1 viz43--#a4 ,that there is no distinction between the ,understanding and the ,reason2 or1 in other words1 there is no such faculty as the ,reason is claimed to be1 there is none but the ,understanding2 and1 #b4 ,a generalization is the highest form of human knowledge2 both of which may be comprised in one affirmation2 the ,understanding is the highest faculty of knowledge belonging to the human soul4 ,upon this1 a class of thinkers1 following ,plato and ,kant1 take issue with the logician1 and assert that the distinction between the two faculties named above1 has a substantial basis2 that1 in fact1 they are different in kind1 and that the mode of activity in the one is wholly unlike the mode of activity in the other4 ,thus1 then1 is the great issue between the ,hamiltonian and ,platonic schools made upon a question of fact4 ,he who would attack the former school successfully1 must aim his blow straight at their fundamental assumption2 and he who shall establish the fact of the ,pure ,reason as an unquestionable faculty in the human soul1 will1 in such establishment1 accomplish the destruction of the ,hamiltonian system of philosophy4 ,believing this system to be thoroughly vicious in its tendencies2 being such indeed1 as would1 if carried out1 undermine the whole ,christian religion2 and what is of equal importance1 being false to the facts in man's soul as ,god's creature1 the writer will attempt to achieve the just named and so desirable result2 and by the mode heretofore indicated4 ,it is required1 then1 to prove that there is a faculty belonging to the human soul1 essentially diverse from the ,sense or the ,understanding2 a faculty peculiar and unique1 which possesses such qualities as have commonly been ascribed by its advocates to the ,pure ,reason2 and thereby to establish such faculty as a fact1 and under that name4 ,previous to bringing forward any proofs1 it is important to make an exact statement of what is to be proved4 ,to this end1 let the following points be noted3-- a4 ,its modes of activity are essentially diverse from those of the ,sense or ,understanding4 ,the ,sense is only capacity4 ,according to the laws of its construction1 it receives impressions from objects1 either material1 and so in a different place from that which it occupies1 or imaginary1 and so proceeding from the imaging faculty in itself4 ,but it is only capacity to receive and transmit impressions4 ,the ,understanding1 though more than this1 even faculty1 is faculty shut within the limits of the ,sense4 ,according to its laws1 it takes up the presentations of the ,sense1 analyzes and classifies them1 and deduces conclusions3 but it can attain to nothing more than was already in the objects presented4 ,it can construct a system2 it cannot develop a science4 ,it can observe a relation it cannot intuit a law4 ,what we seek is capacity1 but of another and higher kind from that of the ,sense4 ,sense can have no object except such1 at least1 as is constructed out of impressions received from without4 ,what we seek does not observe outside phenomena2 and can have no object except as inherent within itself4 ,it is faculty moreover1 but not faculty walled in by the ,sense4 ,it is faculty and capacity in one1 which1 possessing inherent within itself1 as objects1 the a priori conditional laws of the ,universe1 and the a priori conditional ideal forms which these laws1 standing together according to their necessary relations1 compose1 transcends1 in its activity and acquisitions1 all limitations of a ,nature2 and attends to objects which belong to the ,supernatural1 and hence which absoluteness qualifies4 ,we observe1 therefore1 b4 ,the objects of its activity are also essentially diverse in kind from those of the ,sense and the ,understanding4 ,all the objects of the ,sense must come primarily or secondarily1 from a material ,universe2 and the discussions and conclusions of the ,understanding must refer to such a ,universe4 ,the faculty which we seek must have for its objects1 laws1 or1 if the term suit better1 first principles1 which are reasons why conduct must be one way1 and not another2 which1 in their combinations1 compose the forms conditional for all activity2 and which1 therefore1 constitute within us an a priori standard by which to determine the validity of all judgments4 ,to illustrate4 ,linnaeus constructed a system of botanical classification1 upon the basis of the number of stamens in a flower4 ,this was satisfactory to the ,sense and the ,understanding4 ,later students have1 however1 discovered that certain organic laws extend as a framework through the whole vegetable kingdom2 which1 once seen1 throw back the ,linnaean system into company with the ,ptolemaic ,astronomy2 and upon which laws a science of ,botany becomes possible4 ,that faculty which intuits these laws1 is called the ,pure ,reason4 ,to recapitulate4 ,what we seek is1 in its modes and objects of activity1 diverse from the ,sense and ,understanding4 ,it is at once capacity and faculty1 having as object first principles1 possessing these as an inherent heritage1 and able to compare with them as standard all objects of the ,sense and judgments of the ,understanding2 and to decide thereby their validity4 ,these principles1 and combinations of principles1 are known as ,ideas1 and1 being innate1 are denominated innate ,ideas4 ,it is their reality which ,sir ,william ,hamilton denies1 declaring them to be only higher generalizations of the ,understanding1 and it is the faculty called the ,pure ,reason1 in which they are supposed to inhere1 whose actuality is now to be proved4 ,the effort to do this will be successful if it can be shown that the logician's statement of the facts is partial1 and essentially defective2 what are the phenomena which cannot be comprehended in his scheme2 and1 finally1 that they can be accounted for on no other ground than that stated4 #a4 ,the statement of facts by the ,limitists is partial and essentially defective4 ,they start with the assumption that a generalization is the highest form of human knowledge4 ,to appreciate this fully1 let us examine the process they thus exalt4 ,a generalization is a process of thought through which one advances from a discursus among facts1 to a conclusion1 embodying a seemingly general truth1 common to all the facts of the class4 ,for instance4 ,the inhabitants of the north temperate zone have long observed it to be a fact1 that north winds are cold2 and so have arrived at the general conclusion that such winds will lower the temperature4 ,a more extensive experience teaches them1 however1 that in the south temperate zone1 north winds are warm1 and their judgment has to be modified accordingly4 ,a yet larger investigation shows that1 at one period in geologic history1 north winds1 even in northern climes1 were warm1 and that tropical animals flourished in arctic regions2 and the judgment is again modified4 ,now observe this most important fact here brought out4 ,every judgment may be modified by a larger experience4 ,apply this to another class of facts4 ,an apple is seen to fall when detached from the parent stem4 ,an arrow1 projected into the air1 returns again4 ,an invisible force keeps the moon in its orbit4 ,other like phenomena are observed2 and1 after patient investigation1 it is found to be a fact1 that there is a force in the system to which our planet belongs1 which acts in a ratio inverse to the square of the distance1 and which thus binds it together4 ,but if a generalization is the highest form of knowledge1 we can never be sure we are right1 for a subsequent experience may teach us the reverse4 ,we know we have not all the facts4 ,we may again find that the north wind is elsewhere1 or was once here1 warm4 ,should a being come flying to us from another sphere so distant1 that the largest telescope could catch no faintest ray1 even1 of its shining1 and testify to us that there1 the force we called gravitation1 was inversely as the cube of the distance1 we could only accept the testimony1 and modify our judgment accordingly4 ,conclusions of to-day may be errors to-morrow2 and we can never know we are right4 ,the ,limitists permit us only interminable examinations of interminable changes in phenomena2 which afford no higher result than a new basis for new studies4 ,from this wearisome1 ,io-like wandering1 the soul returns to itself1 crying its wailing cry1 ,is this true8 ,is this all8 when suddenly1 as if frenzied by the presence of a god1 it shouts exultingly ,the truth6 the truth6 ,i see the eternal truth4 ,the assumption of the ,limitists is not all the truth4 ,their diagnosis is both defective and false4 ,it is defective1 in that they have failed to perceive those qualities of universality and necessity1 which most men instinctively accord to certain perceptions of the mind2 and false1 in that they deny the reality of those qualities1 and of the certain perceptions as modified by them1 and the actuality of that mental faculty which gives the perceptions1 and thus qualified4 ,they state a part of the truth1 and deny a part4 ,the whole truth is1 the mind both generalizes and intuits4 ,it is the essential tenet of their whole scheme1 that the human mind nowhere1 and under no circumstance1 makes an affirmation which it unreservedly qualifies as necessary and universal4 ,their doctrine is1 that these affirmations seem to be such1 but that a searching examination shows this seeming to be only a bank of fog4 ,for instance4 ,the mind seems to affirm that two and two must make four4 ,not so1 says the ,limitist4 ,as a fact1 we see that two and two do make four1 but it may make five1 or any other sum4 ,for don't you see8 if two and two must make four1 then the ,infinite must see it so2 and if he must see it so1 he is thereby conditioned2 and what is worse1 we know just as much about it as he does4 ,in reply to all such quibbles1 it is to be said1--there is no seeming about it6 ,if the mind is not utterly mendacious1 it affirms1 positively and unreservedly1 ,two and two are four1 must be four2 and to see it so1 is conditional for ,,all intellect4 ,take another illustration4 ,the mind instinctively1 often unconsciously1 always compulsorily1 affirms that the sentiment1 ,in society the rights of the individual can never trench upon the rights of the body politic1--is a necessary1 and universally applicable principle2 which1 however much it may be violated1 can never be changed4 ,the whole fabric of society is based upon this4 ,could a mind think this away1 it could not construct a practical system of society upon what would be left1--its negation4 ,but the ,limitists step in here1 and say1 ,all this seems so1 perhaps1 but then the mind is so weak1 that it can never be sure4 ,you must modify 7correct87 this seeming1 by the consideration that1 if it is so1 then the ,infinite must know it so1 and the finite and ,infinite must know it alike1 and the ,infinite will be limited and conditioned thereby1 which would be impious4 ,again1 the intellect unreservedly asserts1 ,there is no seeming in the matter4 ,the utterance is true1 absolutely and universally true1 and every intellect must see it so4 ,illustrations like the above might be drawn from every science of which the human mind is cognizant4 ,but more are not needed4 ,enough has been adduced to establish the fact of those qualities1 universality and necessity1 as inherent in certain mental affirmations4 ,having thus pointed out the essential defect of the logician's scheme1 it is required to state3 #b4 ,what the phenomena are which cannot be comprehended therein4 ,in general1 it may be said that all those perceptions and assertions of the mind1 which are instinctive1 and which it involuntarily qualifies as universal and necessary1 are not1 and cannot be comprehended in ,sir ,william ,hamilton's scheme4 ,to give an exhaustive presentation of all the a priori laws of the mind1 would be beyond the scope of the present undertaking1 and would be unnecessary to its success4 ,this will be secured by presenting a classification of them1 and sufficient examples under each class4 ,moreover1 to avoid a labor which would not be in place here1 we shall attempt no new classification2 but shall accept without question1 as ample for our purpose1 that set forth by one of our purest and every way best thinkers1--,rev4 ,mark ,hopkins1 ,d4 ,d41 ,president of ,williams ,college1 ,mass4 ,the ideas and beliefs which come to us thus1 may be divided into1 first1 mathematical ideas and axioms4 ,these are at the foundation of the abstract sciences1 having for their subject1 quantity4 ,in the second division are those which pertain to mere being and its relations4 ,upon these rest all sciences pertaining to actual being and its relations4 ,the third division comprises those which pertain to beauty4 ,these are at the foundation of aesthetical science4 ,in the fourth division are those which pertain to morals and religion4 ,of these the pervading element is the sense of obligation or duty4 ,of this the idea necessarily arises in connection with the choice by a rational being of a supreme end1 and with the performance of actions supposed to bear upon that4--,moral ,science1 p4 #afa4 ,first4--,mathematical ideas and axioms4 ,take1 for instance1 the multiplication table4 ,can any one1 except a ,limitist1 be induced to believe that it was originally constructed2 that a will put it together1 and might take it apart8 ,seven times seven now make forty-nine4 ,will any one say that it might have been made to make forty-seven2 or that at some future time such may be the case8 ,or again1 take the axiom ,things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another4 ,will some one say1 that the intellectual beings in the universe might1 with equal propriety1 have been so constructed as to affirm that1 in some instances1 things which are equal to the same thing are unequal to one another8 ,or consider the properties of a triangle4 ,will our limitist teachers instruct us that these properties are a matter of indifference2 that for aught we know1 the triangle might have been made to have three right angles8 ,yet again4 ,examine the syllogism4 ,was its law constructed8 ,all ,m is ,x2 ,all ,z is ,m2 ,all ,z is ,x4 ,will any one say that perhaps1 we don't know but it might have been so made1 as to appear to us that the conclusion was ,some ,z is not ,x8 ,or will the ,limitists run into that miserable petty subterfuge of an assertion1 ,all this seems to us as it is1 and we cannot see how it could be different2 but then1 our minds are so feeble1 they are confined in such narrow limits1 that it would be the height of presumption to assert positively with regard to stronger minds1 and those of wider scope8 ,perhaps they see things differently4 ,perhaps they do2 but if they do1 their minds or ours falsify6 ,the question is one of veracity1 nothing more4 ,throughout all the range of mathematics1 the positive and unqualified affirmation of the mind is that its intuitions are absolute and universal2 that they are a priori laws conditional of all intellect2 that of the ,deity just as much as that of man4 ,feebleness and want of scope have nothing to do with mind in its affirmation1 ,seven times seven must make forty-nine2 and cannot by any possibility of effort make any other product2 and every intellect1 if it sees at all1 must see it so4 ,and so on through the catalogue4 ,from this1 it follows in this instance1 that human knowledge is exhaustive1 and so is exactly similar1 and equal to the ,deity's knowledge4 ,second4 ,those ideas and beliefs which pertain to mere being and its relations4 ,take1 for instance1 the axiom1 ,a material body cannot exist in the ,universe without standing in some relation to all the other material bodies in that ,universe4 ,either this is absolutely true1 or it is not4 ,if it is so true1 then every intellectual being to whom it presents itself as object at all1 must see it as every other does4 ,one may see more relations than another2 but the axiom in its intrinsic nature must be seen alike by all4 ,if it is not absolutely true1 then the converse1 or any partially contradictory proposition1 may be true4 ,for example4 ,a material body may exist in the ,universe1 and stand in no relation to some of the other material bodies in that ,universe4 ,but1 few men will hesitate to say1 that this is not only utterly unthinkable1 but that it could only become thinkable by a denial and destruction of the laws of thought2 or1 in other words1 by the stultification of the mind4 ,take another instance1 arising from the fact of parentage and offspring1 in the sentient beings of the world4 ,a pair1 no matter to what class they belong1 by the fact of becoming parents1 establish a new relation for themselves2 and1 after their kind1 they are under bonds to their young4 ,and1 to a greater or less extent1 their young have a claim upon them4 ,as we ascend in the scale of being1 the duty imposed is greater1 and the claim of the offspring stronger4 ,whether it be the fierce eagle1 or the timid dove1 or the chirping sparrow2 whether it be the prowling lion1 or the distrustful deer1 or the cowering hare2 or whether it be the races of man who are examined1 the relations established by parentage are everywhere recognized4 ,now1 will one say that all this might be changed for aught we know2 that1 what we call law1 is only a judgment of mankind2 and so that this relation did not exist at first1 but was the product of growth8 ,and will one further say that there is no necessity or universality in this relation2 but that the races might1 for aught we know1 have just as well been established with a parentage which involved no relation at all2 that the fabled indifference of the ostrich1 intensified a hundredfold1 might have been the law of sentient being8 ,yet such results logically flow from the principles of the ,limitists4 ,precisely the same line of argument might be pursued respecting the laws of human society4 ,but it is not needed here4 ,it is evident now1 that what gives validity to judgments is the fact that they accord with an a priori principle in the mind4 ,third4 ,the ideas and beliefs which pertain to beauty4 ,a science of beauty has not yet been sufficiently developed to permit of so extensive an illustration of this class as the others4 ,yet enough is established for our purpose4 ,let us consider beauty as in proportioned form4 ,it is said that certain ,greek mathematicians1 subsequently to the ,christian era1 studied out a mathematical formula for the human body1 and constructed a statue according to it2 and that both were pronounced at the time perfect4 ,both statue and formula are now lost4 ,be the story true1 or a legend1 there is valid ground for the assertion1 that the mind instinctively assumes1 in all its criticisms1 the axiom1 ,there is a perfect ideal by which as standard1 all art must be judged4 ,the very fact that the mind1 though acknowledging the imperfection of its own ideal1 unconsciously asserts1 that somewhere1 in some mind1 there is an ideal1 in which a perfect hand joins a perfect arm1 and a perfect foot a perfect leg1 and these a perfect trunk2 and a perfect neck supports a perfect head1 adorned by perfect features1 and thus there is a perfect ideal1 is decisive that such an ideal exists4 ,and this conclusion is true1 because ,god who made us1 and constructed the ground from whence this instinctive affirmation springs1 is true4 ,take another instance4 ,few men1 who have studied ,gothic spires1 have failed to observe that the height of some1 in proportion to their base1 is too great1 and that of others1 too small4 ,the mind irresistibly affirms1 that between these opposite imperfections1 there is a golden mean1 at which the proportion shall be perfect4 ,when the formula of this proportion shall be studied out1 any workman1 who is skilled with tools1 can construct a perfect spire4 ,the law once discovered and promulgated1 becomes common knowledge4 ,mechanical skill will be all that can differentiate one workman from another4 ,the fact that the law has not been discovered yet1 throws no discredit upon the positive affirmation of the mind1 that there must be such a law2 any more than the fact of ,newton's ignorance of the law of gravitation1 when he saw the apple fall1 discredited his instinctive affirmation1 upon seeing that phenomenon1 there is a law in accordance with which it fell4 ,now how comes the mind instinctively and positively to make these assertions4 ,if they were judgments1 the mind would only speak of probabilities2 but here1 it qualifies the assertion with necessity4 ,men1 however positive in their temperament1 do not say1 ,i know it will rain to-morrow1 but only1 ,in all probability it will4 ,not so here4 ,here the mind refuses to express itself doubtfully4 ,its utterance is the extreme of positiveness4 ,it says must4 ,and if its affirmation is not true1 then there is no reason why those works of art which are held in highest esteem1 should be adjudged better than the efforts of the tyro1 except the whim of the individual1 or the arbitrary determination of their admirers4 ,fourth4 ,the ideas and beliefs which pertain to morals and religion4 ,we now enter a sphere of which no understanding could by any possibility ever guess1 much less investigate4 ,here no sense could ever penetrate2 there is no object for it to perceive4 ,here all judgments are impertinent2 for in this sphere are only laws1 and duties1 and obligations4 ,an understanding cannot conceive of a moral law1 because such a law is inconceivable2 and it cannot perceive one1 because it has no eye4 ,if it were competent to explain every phenomenon in the other classes1 it would be utterly impotent to explain a single phenomenon in this4 ,what is moral obligation8 ,whence does it arise1 or how is it imposed8 and who will enforce it1 and how will it be enforced8 ,all these1 and numerous such other questions1 cannot be raised even by the ,understanding1 much less answered by it4 ,the moral law of the ,universe is one which can be learned from no judgment1 or combination of judgments4 ,it can be learned only by being seen4 ,the moral law is no conclusion1 which may be modified by a subsequent experience4 ,it is an affirmation which is imperative4 ,to illustrate4 ,it is an axiom1 that the fact of free moral agency involves the fact of obligation4 ,man is a free moral agent2 and so1 under the obligation imposed4 ,at the first1 it was optional with the ,deity whether he would create man or not4 ,but will any one assert that1 having determined to create man such as he is1 it was optional with him1 whether man should be under the obligation1 or not8 ,can man be a free moral agent1 and be free from the duties inherent therein8 ,does not the mind instinctively and necessarily affirm1 that the fact of free moral agency assures the fact of such a relation to ,god's moral government1 that obligation must follow8 ,one cannot hesitate to say1 that the formula1 ,a free agent may be released from his obligation to moral law1 is absolutely unthinkable4 ,again1 no judgment can attain to the moral law of the ,universe2 and yet man knows it4 ,jesus ,christ1 when he proclaimed that law in the words ,thou shalt love the ,lord thy ,god with all thy mind and strength1 and thy neighbor as thyself1 only uttered what no man can1 in thought1 deny4 ,a man can no more think selfishness as the moral law of the ,universe1 than he can think two and two to be five4 ,man not only sees the law1 but he feels and acknowledges the obligation1 even in his rebellion4 ,in fact there would be no rebellion1 no sense of sin1 if there were no obligation4 ,whence comes the authority of the law8 ,no power can give it authority1 or enforce obedience4 ,power can crush a ,universe1 it cannot change a heart4 ,the law has1 and can have authority2 it imposes1 and can impose obligation2 only because it is an a priori law of the ,universe1 alike binding upon all moral beings1 upon ,god as well as man2 and is so seen immediately1 and necessarily1 by a direct intuition4 ,man finds this law fundamental to his self2 and as well1 a necessarily fundamental law of all moral beings4 ,therefore he acknowledges it4 ,and the very efforts he makes to set up a throne for ,passion1 over against the throne of ,benevolence1 is an involuntary acknowledgment of the authority of that law he seeks to rival4 ,it was said above1 that neither ,sense nor ,understanding can take any cognizance of the objects of investigation which fall in this class4 ,this is because the ,sense can gather no material over which the ,understanding can run4 ,is the moral law matter8 ,no4 ,how then can the ,sense observe it8 ,one answer may possibly be made1 viz43 ,it is deduced from the conduct of men2 and sense observes that4 ,to this it is replied a4 ,the allegation is not true4 ,most men violate the moral law of the ,universe4 ,their conduct accords with the law of selfishness4 ,such conclusions as that of ,hobbes1 that war is the natural condition of ,society1 are those which would follow from a consideration of man1 as he appears to the ,sense4 b4 ,if it were true1 the question obtrudes itself1--,how came it there8 ,how came this fundamental law to be8 and to this the ,sense and ,understanding return no shadow of answer4 ,but from the stand-point of a ,pure ,reason1 all is clear4 ,all the ideas and beliefs1 every process of thought which belongs to this sphere1 are absolute and universal4 ,they must be what they are2 and so are conditional of all moral beings4 ,here what the human mind sees1 is just what the ,deity sees2 and it sees just as the ,divine mind sees1 so that the truth1 as far as so seen1 is common to both4 ,although the facts which have been adduced above1 are inexplicable by the ,limitists1 and are decisive of the actuality of the ,reason1 as it has been heretofore described1 yet another line of argument of great wight must not be omitted4 ,there are in language certain positive terms1 which the ,limitists1 and the advocates of the ,reason agree in asserting cannot convey any meaning to1 or be explained by the ,sense and ,understanding4 ,such are the words infinite and absolute4 ,the mere presence of such words in language1 as positive terms1 is a decisive evidence of the fact1 that there is also a faculty which entertains positive ideas corresponding to them4 ,sir ,william ,hamilton's position in this matter1 is not only erroneous1 but astonishing4 ,he asserts that these words express only negative notions4 ,they1 the infinite and absolute1 can be conceived only by a thinking away from1 or abstraction of1 those very conditions under which thought itself is realized2 consequently1 the notion of the ,unconditioned is only negative--negative of the conceivable itself4 ,but1 if this is true1 how came these words in the language at all8 ,negative ideas produce negative expressions4 ,indeed1 the ,limitists are confidently challenged to designate another case in language1 in which a positive term can be alleged to have a purely negative signification4 ,take an illustration to which we shall recur further on4 ,the question has been raised1 whether a sixth sense can be4 ,can the ,limitists find in language1 or can they construct1 a positive term which will represent the negation of a sixth sense8 ,we find in language the positive terms1 ear and hearing2 but can such positive terms be found1 which will correspond to the phrase1 no sixth sense8 ,in this instance1 in physics1 the absurdity is seen at once4 ,why is not as readily seen the equal absurdity of affirming that1 in metaphysics1 positive terms have grown up in the language which are simple negations8 ,here1 for the present1 the presentation of facts may rest4 ,let us recapitulate those which have been adduced4 ,the axioms in mathematics1 the principles of the relations of being1 the laws of aesthetics1 and most of all the whole system of principles pertaining to morals and religion1 standing1 as they do1 a series of mental affirmations1 which all mankind1 except the ,limitists1 qualify as necessary and universal1 compel assent to the proposition1 that there must be a faculty different in kind from the ,sense and ,understanding1--for these have already been found impotent--which can be ground to account of all these facts satisfactorily4 ,and the presence in language of such positive terms as absolute and infinite1 is a most valuable auxiliary argument4 ,the faculty which is required1--the faculty which qualifies all the products of its activity with the characteristics above named1 is the ,pure ,reason4 ,and its actuality may therefore be deemed established4 ,the ,pure ,reason having thus been proved to be1 it is next required to show the mode of its activity4 ,this can best be done1 by first noticing the kind of results which it produces4 ,the ,reason gives us1 not thoughts1 but ideas4 ,these are simple1 pure1 primary1 necessary4 ,it is evident that any such object of mental examination can be known only in1 and by1 itself4 ,it cannot be analyzed1 for it is simple4 ,it cannot be compared1 for it is pure2 and so possesses no element which can be ground for a comparison4 ,it cannot be deduced1 for it is primary and necessary4 ,it can only be seen4 ,such an object must be known under the following circumstances4 ,it must be inherent in the seeing faculty1 and must be immediately and directly seen by that faculty2 all this in such a manner1 that the abstraction of the object seen1 would annihilate the faculty itself4 ,now1 how is it with the ,reason8 ,above we found it to be both capacity and faculty3 capacity in that it possessed as integral elements1 a priori first principles1 as objects of sight2 faculty in that it saw1 brought forward1 and made available1 those principles4 ,the mode of activity of the ,pure ,reason is then a seeing1 direct1 immediate1 sure2 which holds pure truth fast1 right in the very centre of the field of vision4 ,this act of the ,reason in thus seeing pure truth is best denominated an intuition of the ,reason4 ,and here it may be said1--,if perception and perceive could be strictly confined to the ,sense2 concept and conceive to the ,understanding2 and intuition and intuit to the ,reason1 a great gain would be made in accuracy of expression regarding these departments of the mind4 ,having thus1 as it is believed1 established the fact of the existence of a ,pure ,reason1 and shown the mode of its activity1 it devolves to declare the function of that faculty4 ,the function of the ,pure ,reason is1 first3--to intuit1 by an immediate perception1 the a priori elemental principles which condition all being2 second1--to intuit1 by a like immediate perception1 those principles1 combined in a priori systematic processes1 which are the conditional ideal forms for all being2 and third1--again to intuit1 by another immediate perception1 precisely similar in kind to the others1 the fact1 at least1 of the perfectly harmonious combination of all a priori elemental principles1 in all possible systematic processes1 into a perfect unity1--an absolute1 infinite ,person1--,god4 ,to illustrate4 #a4 ,the ,reason asserts that ,malice is criminal2 and that it is necessarily criminal2 or1 in other words1 that no act1 of any will1 can make it otherwise than it is4 ,the assertion1 then1 that ,malice is criminal1 is an axiom1 and conditions all being1 ,god as well as man4 #b4 ,the ,reason asserts that every mathematical form must be seen in ,space and ,time1 and it affirms the same necessity in this as in the former case4 #c4 ,the full illustration of this point would be ,anselm's a priori argument for the existence of ,god4 ,his statement of it should1 however1 be so modified as to appear1 not as an a priori argument for the existence of ,god1 but as an amplified declaration of the fact1 that the existence of ,god is a first principle of ,reason2 and as such1 can no more be denied than the multiplication table4 ,objection4--,this doctrine degrades ,god to the level of the finite2 both being alike conditioned4 ,answer4--,by no means2 as will be seen from the two following points4 #a4 ,it is universally acknowledged that ,god must be self-existent1 which means1 if it means anything1 that the existence of ,god is beyond his own control2 or1 in other words1 that self-existence is an a priori elemental principle1 which conditions ,god's existing at all4 #b4 ,in the two instances under consideration1 the word condition has entirely different significations4 ,god is conditioned only by ,himself4 ,not only is this conditioning not a limitation1 properly speaking1 but the very absence of limitation4 ,the fact that ,he is absolute and infinite1 is a condition of ,his existence4 ,man's conditions are the very opposite of these4 ,he is relative1 instead of absolute2 finite1 instead of infinite2 dependent1 instead of self-existent4 ,hence he differs in kind from ,god as do his conditions4 ,such being the function of the ,pure ,reason1 it is fully competent to solve the difficulties raised by ,sir ,william ,hamilton and his followers2 and the statement of such solution is the work immediately in hand4 ,much of the difficulty and obscurity which have1 thus far1 attended every discussion of this subject1 will be removed by examining the definitions given to certain terms2--either by statement1 or by implication in the use made of them2--by exposing the errors involved2 and by clearly expressing the true signification of each term4 ,by way of criticism the general statement may be made1--that the ,limitists--as was natural from their rejection of the faculty of the ,pure ,reason--use only such terms1 and in such senses1 as are pertinent to those subjects which come under the purvey of the ,understanding and the ,sense2 but which are entirely impertinent1 in reference to the sphere of spiritual subjects4 ,the two following phases of this error are sufficient to illustrate the criticism4 #a4 ,the terms ,infinite and ,absolute are used to express abstractions4 ,for instance1 the infinite1 from a human point of view1 is merely a name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible4 ,it is thus manifest that a consciousness of the ,absolute is equally self-contradictory with that of the ,infinite4--,limits of ,religious ,thought1 pp4 #id and #if4 ,if asked ,absolute what8 ,infinite what8 ,will you allow person1 or other definite term to be supplied8 ,mansel would reply--,no6 no possible answer can be given by man4 ,now1 without passing at all upon the question whether these terms can represent concrete objects of thought or not1 it is to be said1 that the use of them to express abstract notions1 is utterly unsound4 ,the mere fact of abstraction is an undoubted limitation4 ,there may be an ,infinite and ,absolute ,person4 ,by no possibility can there be an abstract ,infinite4 #b4 ,but a more glaring and unpardonable error is made by the ,limitists in their use of the words infinite and absolute1 as expressing quantity4 ,take a few examples from many4 ,for example1 we can positively conceive1 neither an absolute whole1 that is1 a whole so great that we cannot also conceive it as a relative part of a still greater whole2 nor an absolute part1 that is1 a part so small1 that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole1 divisible into smaller parts4 ,on the other hand1 we cannot positively represent1 or realize1 or construe to the mind 7as here understanding and imagination coincide71 an infinite whole1 for this could only be done by the infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes which would itself require an infinite time for its accomplishment2 nor1 for the same reason1 can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of parts4--,hamilton's ,essays1 p4 #bj4 ,the metaphysical representation of the ,deity as absolute and infinite1 must necessarily1 as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged1 amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality4--,limits of ,religious ,thought1 p4 #gf4 ,is the ,first ,cause finite or infinite8444 ,to think of the ,first ,cause as finite1 is to think of it as limited4 ,to think of it as limited1 necessarily implies a conception of something beyond its limits2 it is absolutely impossible to conceive a thing as bounded1 without conceiving a region surrounding its boundaries4--,spencer's ,first ,principles1 p4 #cg4 ,the last extract tempts one to ask ,mr4 ,spencer if he ever stood on the north side of the affections4 ,besides the extracts selected1 any person reading the authors above named1 will find numerous phrases like these3 infinite whole1 infinite sum1 infinite number1 infinite series1 by which they express sometimes a mathematical1 and sometimes a material amount4 ,upon this whole topic it is to be said1 that the terms infinite and absolute have1 and can have1 no relevancy to any object of the ,sense or of the ,understanding1 judging according to the ,sense1 or to any number4 ,there is no whole1 no sum1 no number1 no amount1 but is definite and limited2 and to use those words with the word infinite1 is as absurd as to say an infinite finite4 ,and to use words thus1 is to multiply words without knowledge4 ,again1 the lines of thought which these writers pursue1 do not tend in any degree to clear up the fogs in which they have lost themselves1 but only make the muddle thicker4 ,take1 for instance1 the following extract3-- ,thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma4 ,the ,absolute cannot be conceived as conscious1 neither can it be conceived as unconscious2 it cannot be conceived as complex1 neither can it be conceived as simple2 it cannot be conceived by difference1 neither can it be conceived by the absence of difference2 it cannot be identified with the ,universe1 neither can it be distinguished from it4 ,the ,one and the ,many1 regarded as the beginning of existence1 are thus alike incomprehensible4--,limits of ,religious ,thought1 p4 #gi4 ,the soul1 while oaring her way with weary wing1 over the watery waste of such a philosophy1 can find no rest for the sole of her foot1 except on that floating carcase of a doctrine1 ,chaos is ,god4 ,the simple fact that such confusion logically results from the premises of the ,limitists1 is a sufficient warrant for rejecting their whole system of thought1--principle and process2 and for striking for a new base of operations4 ,but where shall such a base be sought for8 ,on what immutable ,ararat can the soul find her ark1 and a sure resting-place8 ,man seeks a ,rock upon which he can climb and cry1 ,i ,,know that this is truth4 ,where is the ,everlasting ,rock8 ,in our search for the answer to these queries1 we may be aided by setting forth the goal to be reached1--the object to be obtained4 ,by observation and reflection man comes to know that he is living in1 and forms part of1 a system of things1 which he comprehensively terms the ,universe4 ,the problem is1--,to find an ,ultimate ,ground1 a ,final ,cause1 which shall be adequate to account for the existence and sustentation of this ,universe4 ,there are but two possible directions from which the solution of this problem can come4 ,it must be found either within the ,universe1 or without the ,universe4 ,can it be found within the ,universe8 ,if it can1 one of two positions must be true4 ,either a part of the ,universe is cause for the existence of the whole of the ,universe2 or the ,universe is self-existent4 ,upon the first position nothing need be said4 ,its absurdity is manifested in the very statement of it4 ,a full discussion1 or1 in fact1 anything more than a notice of the doctrine of ,pantheism1 set forth in the second point1 would be beyond the intention of the author4 ,the questions at issue lie not between theists and pantheists1 but between those who alike reject ,pantheism as erroneous4 ,the writer confesses himself astonished that a class of rational men could ever have been found1 who should have attempted to find the ,ultimate ,ground of the ,universe in itself4 ,all that man can know of the facts of the ,universe1 he learns by observation2 and the sum of the knowledge he thus gains is1 that a vast system of physical objects exists4 ,from the facts observed1 he draws conclusions3 but the stream cannot rise higher than its fountain4 ,with reference to any lesser object1 as a watch1 the same process goes on4 ,a watch is4 ,it has parts2 and these parts move in definite relations to each other2 and to secure a given object4 ,if now1 any person1 upon being asked to account for the existence of the watch1 should confine himself wholly to an examination of the nature of the springs1 the wheels1 the hands1 face1 c41 endeavoring to find the reason of its being within itself1 the world would laugh at him4 ,how much more justly may the world laugh1 yea1 shout its ridicule1 at the mole-eyed man who rummages among the springs and wheels of the vast machine of the ,universe1 to find the reason of its being4 ,in the former instance1 the bystander would exclaim1--,the watch is an evidence of intelligence4 ,man is the only intelligent being on the earth2 and is superior to the watch4 ,man made the watch4 ,and his assertion would be true4 ,a fortiori would a bystander of the ,universe exclaim1 ,the ,universe is an evidence of intelligence4 ,an intelligent ,being1 superior to the ,universe1 made the ,universe4 ,and his assertion is true4 ,we are driven then to our last position2 but it is the ,gibraltar of ,philosophy4 ,,the ,,ultimate ,,ground ,,of ,,the ,,universe ,,must ,,be ,,sought ,,for1 ,,and ,,can ,,only ,,be ,,found1 ,,without ,,the ,,universe4 ,from this starting-point alone can we proceed1 with any hope of reaching the goal4 ,setting out on our new course we will gain a step by noticing a fact involved in the illustration just given4 ,the bystander exclaims1 ,the watch is an evidence of intelligence4 ,in this very utterance is necessarily expressed the fact of two diverse spheres of existence3 the one the sphere of matter1 the other the sphere of mind4 ,one cannot think of matter except as inferior1 nor of mind except as superior4 ,these two1 matter and mind1 comprise all possible existence4 ,the ,reason not only cannot see how any other existence can be1 but affirms that no other can be4 ,mind1 then1 is the ,ultimate ,ground of the ,universe4 ,what mind8 ,by examination1 man perceives what appears to be an order in the ,universe1 concludes that there is such an order1 assumes the conclusion to be valid1 and names the order ,nature4 ,turning his eye upon himself1 he finds himself not only associated with1 but1 through a portion of his faculties1 forming a part of that ,nature4 ,but a longer1 sharper scrutiny1 a profounder examination1 reveals to him his soul's most secret depth2 and the fact of his spiritual personality glows refulgent in the calm light of consciousness4 ,he sees himself1 indeed1 in ,nature2 but he thrills with joy at the quickly acquired knowledge that ,nature is only a nest1 in which he1 a purely supernatural being1 must flutter for a time1 until he shall be grown1 and ready to plume his flight for the ,spirit ,land4 ,if then1 man1 though bound in ,nature1 finds his central self utterly diverse from1 and superior to ,nature1 so that he instinctively cries1 ,my soul is worth more than a ,universe of gold and diamonds2 a fortiori must that ,being1 who is the ,ultimate ,ground1 not only of ,nature1 but of those supernatural intelligences who live in ,nature1 be supernatural1 spiritual1 and supreme8 ,just above1 it was seen that matter and mind comprise all possible existence4 ,it has now been found that mind1 in its highest form1 even in man1 is pure spirit2 and as such1 wholly supernatural4 ,it has further been determined1 that the object of our search must be the ,supreme ,spirit4 ,just at this point it is suitable to notice1 what is1 perhaps1 the most egregious and unpardonable blunder the ,limitists have made4 ,in order to do this satisfactorily1 the following analysis of the human mind is presented4 ,the soul is a spiritual person1 and an animal nature4 ,to this animal nature belong the ,sense and the ,understanding4 ,it is universally acknowledged1--at least the ,limitists will not deny1--that the ,sense and the ,understanding are wholly within1 and conditioned by ,nature4 ,observe then their folly4 ,they deny that a part can account for a whole2 they reject ,pantheism2 and yet they employ only those faculties which they confess are wholly within and conditioned by ,nature--for they deny the existence of the ,pure ,reason1 the perceptive faculty of the spiritual person--to search1 only in ,nature1 for the cause of ,nature4 ,a fly would buzz among the wheels of a clock to as little purpose4 ,the result arrived at just above1 now claims our careful attention4 ,the ,ultimate ,ground of the ,universe is ,,the ,,supreme ,,spirit4 ,to appreciate this result1 we must return to our analysis of man4 ,in his spiritual personality we have found him wholly supernatural4 ,we have further found that1 only as a spiritual person is he capable of pursuing this investigation to a final and valid termination4 ,if1 then1 we would complete our undertaking1 we must ascend into a sphere whose light no eagle's eye can ever bear2 and whose atmosphere his daring wing can never beat4 ,there no sense can ever enter2 no judgments are needed4 ,through ,reason--the soul's far-darting eye1--and through ,reason alone1 can we gaze on the ,immutable4 ,turning this searching eye upon ourselves1 we find that man1 as spiritual person1 is a ,pure ,reason1--the faculty which gives him a priori first principles1 as the standard for conduct and the forms for activity1--a ,spiritual ,sensibility1 which answers with emotive music to the call of the ,reason2 and lastly1 a ,will1 in which the ,person dwells central1 solitary1 and supreme1 the final arbiter of its own destiny4 ,every such being is therefore a miniature final cause4 ,the goal of our search must be near at hand4 ,in man appears the very likeness of the ,being we seek4 ,his highest powers unmistakably shadow forth the form of that ,being1 who is ,the ,final4 ,man originates2 but he is dependent for his power1 and the sphere of that power is confined to his own soul4 ,we seek a being who can originate1 who is utterly independent2 and the sphere of whose activity extends wherever1 without himself1 he chooses4 ,man1 after a process of culture1 comes to intuit some first principles1 in some combinations4 ,we seek a being who necessarily sees1 at once and forever1 all possible first principles1 in all possible relations1 as the ideal forms for all possible effort4 ,man stumbles along on the road of life1 frequently ignorant of the way1 but more frequently perversely violating the eternal law which he finds written on his heart4 ,we seek a being who never stumbles1 but who is perfectly wise2 and whose conduct is in immutable accord with the a priori standards of his ,reason4 ,man is a spiritual person1 dependent for existence1 and limited to himself in his exertions4 ,he whom we seek will be found to be also a spiritual person who is self-existent1 and who sets his own bounds to his activity4 ,that the line of thought we are now pursuing is the true one1 and that the result which we approach1 and are about to utter1 is well founded1 receives decisive confirmation from the following facts4 ,man perceives that malice must be criminal4 ,just so the ,eternal ,eye must see it4 ,a similar remark is true of mathematical1 and all other a priori laws4 ,sometimes1 at least1 there awakens in man's bosom the unutterable thrill of benevolence2 and thus he tastes of the crystal river which flows1 calmly and forever1 through the bosom of the ,everlasting ,father4 ,for his own conduct1 man is the final cause4 ,in this is he1 must he be1 the likeness of the ,ultimate4 ,spiritual personality is the highest possible form of being4 ,it is then a form common to ,god and man4 ,here1 therefore1 ,philosophy and ,revelation are at one4 ,with startling1 and yet grateful unanimity1 they affirm the solemn truth1 ,,god ,,made ,,man ,,in ,,his ,,own ,,image4 ,we reach the goal at last4 ,the ,final ,truth stands full in the field of our vision4 ,i am ,alpha and ,omega1 the beginning and the ending1 saith ,jehovah1 who is1 and who was1 and who is to come1 the ,almighty4 ,,that ,,spiritual ,,person ,,who ,,is ,,self-,,existent1 ,,absolute1 ,,and ,,infinite1 ,,is ,,the ,,ultimate ,,ground1 ,,the ,,final ,,cause ,,of ,,the ,,universe4 ,the problem of the ,universe is solved4 ,we stand within the portico of the sublime temple of truth4 ,mortal has lifted1 at last1 the veil of ,isis1 and looked upon the eternal mysteries4 ,it is manifest now1 how irrelevant and irreverent those expressions must be1 in which the terms infinite and absolute are employed as signifying abstractions or amounts4 ,they can have no meaning with reference to the ,universe4 ,but what their true significance is1 stands out with unmistakable clearness and precision4 #a4 ,absoluteness is that distinctive spiritual ,,quality of the necessary ,being which establishes ,him as unqualified except by ,himself1 and as complete4 #b4 ,absoluteness and ,unconditionedness are1--the one the positive1 and the other the negative term expressive of the same idea4 #c4 ,infinity is that distinctive spiritual ,,quality of the necessary ,being which gives to ,him universality4 ,absoluteness and ,infinity are1 then1 spiritual qualities of the self-existent ,person1 which1 distinguishing ,him from all other persons1 constitute ,him unique and supreme4 ,it is a law of ,logic1 which even the child must acknowledge1 that whenever1 by a process of thought1 a result has been attained and set forth1 he who propounds the result is directly responsible for all that is logically involved in it4 ,the authority of that law is here both acknowledged and invoked4 ,the most rigid and exhaustive logical development of the premises heretofore obtained1 which the human mind is capable of1 is challenged1 in the confidence that there can be found therein no jot of discrepancy1 no tittle of contradiction4 ,as germain1 and important to the matter in hand1 some steps in this development will be noted4 ,in solving the problem placed before us1 viz3 ,to account for the being and continuance of the ,universe1 we have found that the ,universe and its ,cause are two distinct and yet intimately and necessarily connected beings1 the one dependent upon the other1 and that other utterly independent2 and so that the one is limited and finite1 and the other absolute and infinite2 that the one is partly thing and partly person1 and that to both thing and person limitation and finiteness belong2 while the other is wholly person1 and consequently the pure1 absolute1 and infinite ,person4 ,we have further found that absoluteness and infinity are spiritual qualities of that one ,person1 which are incommunicable1 and differentiate ,him from all other possible beings2 and which establish ,him as the uncaused1 self-active ground for all possible beings besides4 ,it is then a ,person with all the limitations and conditions of personality1--a ,person at once limited and unlimited1 conditioned and unconditioned1 related and unrelated1 whose limitations1 conditions1 and relations are entirely consistent with his absoluteness and infinity1 who is the final ,cause1 the ,ultimate ,ground of the ,universe4 ,the finite person is self-conscious1 and in a measure self-comprehending2 but he only partially perceives the workings of his own being4 ,a fortiori1 must the infinite ,person be self-conscious1 and exhaustively self-comprehending4 ,the finite person is an intellect1 sensibility1 and will2 but these are circumscribed by innumerable limitations4 ,so must the infinite ,person be intellect1 sensibility1 and will2 but ,his intellect must be ,universal ,genius2 ,his sensibility ,pure ,delight1 and ,his will1 as choice1 ,universal ,benevolence1 and as act1 ,omnipotence4 #a4 ,as intellect1 the infinite ,person is ,universal ,genius4 ,then1 he must possess the primary copies or patterns of what it is possible may be1 in his own subjective apprehension2 or1 in other words1 ,the pure ideals of all possible entities1 lie as pure reason conceptions in the light of the divine intelligence1 and in these must be found the rules after which the creative agency must go forth4 ,these a priori pure ideals are conditional of his knowledge4 ,they are the sum and limit of all possible knowledge4 ,he must know them as they are4 ,he cannot intuit1 or think otherwise than in accordance with them4 ,however many there may be of these ideals1 the number is fixed and definite1 and must be so2 and so the infinite ,person must see it4 ,in fine1 in the fact of exhaustive self-comprehension is involved the fact1 that the number of his qualities1 attributes1 faculties1 forms of activity1 and acts1 are1 and must be limited1 definite1 and so known to him2 and yet he is infinite and absolute1 and thoroughly knows himself to be so4 #b4 ,as sensibility1 the infinite ,person is ,pure ,delight4 ,then he exists in a state of unalloyed and complete bliss1 produced by the ceaseless consciousness of his perfect worth and worthiness1 and his entire complacency therein4 ,yet he is pleased with the good conduct1 and displeased with the evil conduct1 of the moral beings he has made4 ,and if two are good1 and one better than another1 he loves the one more than the other4 ,yet all this in no way modifies1 or limits1 or lessens his own absolute self-satisfaction and happiness4 #c4 ,as will1 the infinite ,person is1 in choice1 ,universal ,benevolence2 in act1 ,omnipotence4 a4 ,in choice1 the whole personality1--both the spontaneous and self activity1 are entirely and concordantly active in the one direction4 ,some of the objects towards which this state manifests itself may be very small4 ,the fact that each receives the attention appropriate to his place in the system of beings in no way modifies the ,great ,heart1 which spontaneously prompts to all good acts4 ,but b4 ,in act1 the infinite ,person1 though omnipotent1 is1 always must be1 limited4 ,his ability to act is limited and determined by the pure ideals1 in which must be found the rules after which the creative agency must go forth4 ,in act he is also limited by his choice4 ,the fact that he is ,universal ,benevolence estops him from performing any act which is not in exact accordance therewith4 ,he cannot construct a rational being1 to whom two and two will appear five2 and if he should attempt to1 he would cease to be perfect ,goodness4 ,again1 the infinite ,person performs an act--of ,creation4 ,the act is1 must be1 limited and definite2 and so must the product--the ,universe be4 ,he cannot create an unlimited ,universe1 nor perform an infinite act4 ,the very words unlimited ,universe1 and as well the notions they express1 are contradictory1 and annihilate each other4 ,further1 an infinite act1 even if possible1 would not1 could not create1 or have any relation to the construction of a ,universe4 ,an infinite act must be the realization of an infinite ideal4 ,the infinite ,person has a thorough comprehension of himself2 and consequently a complete idea of himself4 ,that idea1 being the idea of the infinite ,person1 is infinite2 and it is the only possible infinite idea4 ,he finds this idea realized in himself4 ,but1 should it be in his power to realize it again1 that exertion of power would be an infinite act1 and its product another infinite ,person4 ,no other infinite act1 and no other result1 are rationally supposable4 ,the ,universe1 then1 however large it be1 is1 must be1 limited and definite4 ,its magnitude may be inconceivable to us2 but in the mind of its ,creator every atom is numbered4 ,no spirit may ever have skirted its boundary2 but that boundary is as clear and distinct to his eye as the outline of the ,alps against a clear sky is to the traveller's4 ,the questions ,where8 ,how far8 ,how long8 ,how much8 and the like1 are pertinent only in the ,universe2 and their answers are always limited and definite4 ,the line of thought we have been pursuing is deemed by a large class of thinkers not only paradoxical1 but utterly contradictory and self-destructive4 ,we speak of a ,person1 a term which necessarily involves limitation and condition1 as infinite and absolute4 ,we speak of this infinity and absoluteness as spiritual qualities1 which are conditional and limiting to him4 ,we speak of him as conditioned by an inability to be finite4 ,in fine1 to those good people1 the ,limitists1 our sense seems utter nonsense4 ,it is required1 therefore1 for the completion of this portion of our task1 to present a rational ground upon which these apparent contradictions shall become manifestly consistent4 ,in those sentences where the infinite ,person is spoken of as limited and unlimited1 c41 it is evident that there is a play upon words1 and that they apply to different qualities in the personality4 ,it is not said1 of course1 that the number of his faculties is limited and unlimited2 or that his self-complacency is boundless and constrained2 or that his act is conditioned and unconditioned4 ,nor are these seeming paradoxes stated to puzzle and disturb4 ,they are written to express a great1 fundamental1 and all-important truth1 which seems never once to have shadowed the minds of the ,limitists1--a truth which1 when once seen1 dispels forever all the ghostly battalions of difficulties which they have raised4 ,the truth is this4 ,that ,being whose limitations1 conditions1 and relations are wholly subjective1 i4 e4 find their whole base and spring in his self2 and who is therefore entirely free from on all possible limitations1 conditions1 and relations1 from without himself2 and who possesses1 therefore1 all possible fulness of all possible excellences1 and finds the perennial acme of happiness in self-contemplation1 and the consciousness of his perfect worth2 and being such is ground for all other possible being2 is1 in the true philosophical sense1 unrelated1 unconditioned1 unlimited4 ,or1 in other words1 the conditions imposed by ,universal ,genius upon the absolute and infinite ,person are different in kind from the conditions imposed upon finite persons and physical things4 ,the former in no way diminish aught from the fulness of their possessor's endowments2 the latter not only do so diminish1 but render it impossible for their possessor to supply the deficiency4 ,the following dictum will1 then1 concisely and exactly express the truth we have attained4 ,those only are conditions1 in the philosophical sense1 which diminish the fulness of the possessor's endowments4 ,an admirable illustration of this truth can be drawn from some reflections of ,laurens ,p4 ,hickok1 ,d4 ,d41 which we quote4 ,what we need is not merely a rule by which to direct the process in the attainment of any artistic end1 but we must find the legislator who may determine the end itself444 ,whence is the ultimate behest that is to determine the archetype1 and control the pure spontaneity in its action4 99 99 99 99 99 ,must the artist work merely because there is an inner want to gratify1 with no higher end than the gratification of the highest constitutional craving8 ,can we find nothing beyond a want1 which shall from its own behest demand that this1 and not its opposite1 shall be8 ,grant that the round worlds and all their furniture are good--but why good8 ,certainly as means to an end4 ,grant that this end1 the happiness of sentient beings1 is good--but why good8 ,because it supplies the want of the ,supreme ,architect4 ,and is this the supreme good8 ,surely if it is1 we are altogether within nature's conditions1 call our ultimate attainment by what name we may4 ,we have no origin for our legislation1 only as the highest architect finds such wants within himself1 and the archetypal rule for gratifying his wants in the most effectual manner2 and precisely as the ox goes to his fodder in the shortest way1 so he goes to his work in making and peopling worlds in the most direct manner4 ,here is no will2 no personality2 no pure autonomy4 ,the artist finds himself so constituted that he must work in this manner1 or the craving of his own nature becomes intolerable to himself1 and the gratifying of this craving is the highest good4 ,we attain hereby a mark by which to distinguish the diminishing from the undiminishing condition4 ,a sense of want1 a craving1 is the necessary result of a diminishing condition4 ,hence the presence of any craving is the distinguishing mark of the finite2 and that plenitude of endowments which excludes all possible craving or lack1 is the distinguishing mark of the infinite and absolute ,person4 ,in this plenitude his infinity and absoluteness consist2 and it is1 therefore1 conditional of them4 ,upon this plenitude1 as conditional of this ,person's perfection1 ,dr4 ,hickok speaks further1 as follows3-- ,we must find that which shall itself be the reason and law for benevolence1 and for the sake of which the artist shall be put to his beneficent agency above all considerations that he finds his nature craving it4 ,it must be that for whose sake1 happiness1 even that which1 as kind and benevolent1 craves on all sides the boon to bless others1 itself should be4 ,not sensient nor artistic autonomy1 but a pure ethic autonomy1 which knows that within itself there is an excellency which obliges for the sake of itself4 ,this is never to be found1 nor anything very analogous to it1 in sensient nature and a dictate from some generalized experience4 ,it lies within the rational spirit1 and is law in the heart1 as an inward imperative in its own right1 and must there be found4444 ,this inward witnessing capacitates for self-legislating and self-rewarding4 ,it is inward consciousness of a worth imperative above want2 an end in itself1 and not means to another end2 a user of things1 but not itself to be used by anything2 and1 on account of its intrinsic excellency1 an authoritative determiner for its own behoof of the entire artistic agency with all its products1 and thus a conscience excusing or accusing4 ,this inward witnessing of the absolute to his own worthiness1 gives the ultimate estimate to nature1 which needs and can attain to nothing higher1 than that it should satisfy this worthiness as end2 and thereby in all his works1 he fixes1 in his own light1 upon the subjective archetype1 and attains to the objective result of that which is befitting his own dignity4 ,it is1 therefore1 in no craving want which must be gratified1 but from the interest of an inner behest1 which should be executed for his own worthiness' sake1 that ',god has created all things1 and for his pleasure they are and were created4' ,in the light of the foregoing discussion and illustrations1 the division of conditions into two classes--the one class1 conditions proper1 comprising those which diminish the endowments of the being upon whom they lie1 and are ground for a craving or lack2 and the other class1 comprising those conditions which do not diminish the endowments of the being upon whom they lie1 and which are1 therefore1 ground for perfect plenitude of endowments1 and of self-satisfaction on account thereof--is seen to be thoroughly philosophical4 ,and let it be here noted1 that the very construction1 or1 if the term suit better1 perception of this distinction1 is a decisive evidence of the fact1 and a direct product of the operation of the ,pure ,reason4 ,if our intellect comprised only what the ,limitists acknowledge it to be1 a ,sense and an ,understanding1 not only could no other but diminishing conditions be thought of1 but by no possibility could a hint that there were any others flit through the mind4 ,such a mind1 being wholly in nature1 and conditioned by nature1 cannot climb up out of nature1 and perceive aught there4 ,but those conditions which lie upon the infinite ,person are supernatural and spiritual2 and could not be even vaguely guessed at1 much more examined critically and classified1 but by a being possessed of a faculty the same in kind with the intellect in which such spiritual conditions inhere4 ,the actual processes which go on in the mind are as follows4 ,the ,sense1 possessing a purely mechanical structure1 a structure not differing in kind from that of the vegetable1--both being alike entirely conditioned by the law of cause and effect1--perceives phenomena4 ,the relation of the object to the sensorium1 or of the image to the sensory1 and the forms under which the ,sense shall receive the impression1 are fixed4 ,because the ,sense acts compulsorily1 in fixed mechanical forms1 it is1 by this very construction1 incapable1 not only of receiving impressions and examining phenomena outside of those forms1 but it can never be startled with the guess that there is anything else than what is received therein4 ,for instance3 ,a man born blind1 though he can have no possible notion of what light is1 knows that light is1 from the testimony of those who can see4 ,but if a race of men born blind should be found1 who had never had any communication with men who could see1 it is notorious that they could have no possible notion even that light was4 ,a suspicion of its existence could never cross their minds4 ,this position is strengthened and established beyond controversy1 by the failure of the mind in its efforts to construct an entirely new sense4 ,every attempt only intensifies our appreciation of the futility of the effort4 ,from fragments of the five senses we might1 perhaps1 construct a patchwork sixth2 but the mind makes no presentation to itself of a new sense4 ,the reason is1 that1 to do so1 the ,sense1 as mental faculty1 must transcend the very conditions of its existence4 ,it is precisely with the ,understanding as with the lower faculty4 ,it cannot transcend its limits4 ,it can add no item to the sum of human knowledge1 except as it deduces it from a presentation by the ,sense4 ,hence its conditions correspond to those in its associate faculty4 ,it is manifest1 then1 that a being with only these faculties may construct a system1 but can never develop a science4 ,it can arrange1 classify1 by such standards as its fancy may select1 the phenomena in nature2 but this must be in accordance with some sensuous form4 ,no law can be seen1 by which it ought to be so1 and not otherwise4 ,such classification must always be determined by the number of stamens in the flower1 for instance2 and that standard1 though arbitrary1 will be as good as any other1 unless there comes a higher faculty which1 overlooking all nature1 perceives the a priori law working in nature1 which gives the ultimate ground for an exhaustive development of a science which in its idea cannot be improved4 ,it is manifest1 further1 that those conditions1 to which we have applied the epithet proper1 lie upon the two faculties we have been considering4 ,in this we agree with the ,limitists4 ,it now behooves to present the fact that the faculty whose existence was proved in the earlier part of our work1 is competent to overlook1 and so comprehend nature1 and all the conditions of nature1 and thereby assign to said conditions their true and inferior place1 while it soars out of nature1 and intuits those a priori laws which1 though the conditions of1 are wholly unconditioned by nature2 but which are both the conditions of and conditioned by the supernatural2 and this in an entirely different sense from the other4 ,this is the province of the ,pure ,reason4 ,standing on some lofty peak1 above all clouds of sense1 under the full blaze of eternal truth1 the soul sees all nature spread like a vast map before her searching eye1 sharply observes1 and appreciates all the conditions of nature2 and then1 while holding it full in the field of her vision1 with equal fulness perceives that other land1 the spiritual plains of the supernatural1 sees them too in all their conditionings2 and sees1 with a clearness of vision never approximated by the earthly eye1 the fact that these supernatural conditions are no deprivation which awaken a want1 but that they inhere and cohere1 as final ground for absolute plenitude of endowments and fulness of bliss1 in the ,self-existent ,person4 ,it will be objected to the position now attained1 that it involves the doctrine that the ,pure ,reason in the finite spiritual person is on a par with the ,universal ,genius in the infinite spiritual ,person4 ,the objection is fallacious1 because based upon the assumption that likeness in mode of action involves entire similarity4 ,the mode of action in the finite ,pure ,reason is precisely similar to that of the ,universal ,genius2 the objects perceived by both are the same1 they are seen in the same light1 and so are in accord2 but the range of the finite is one1 and the range of the infinite is another2 and so diverse also are the circumstances attending the act of seeing4 ,the range of the finite ,reason is1 always must be1 partial3 the range of the infinite ,reason is1 always must be1 exhaustive 7not infinite74 ,in circumstances1 the finite ,reason is created dependent for existence1 must begin in a germ in which it is inactive1 and must be developed by association with nature1 and under forms of nature2 and can never1 by any possibility of growth1 attain to that perfectness in which it shall be satisfied1 or to a point in development from which it can continue its advance as pure spirit4 ,it always must be spirit in a body2 even though that be a spiritual body4 ,the infinite ,reason is self-existent1 and therefore independent2 and is1 and always must be1 in the absolute possession of all possible knowledge1 and so cannot grow4 ,hence1 while the infinite and finite reasons see the same object in the same light1 and therefore alike1 the difference in range1 and the difference in circumstance1 must forever constitute them dissimilar4 ,the exact likeness of sight just noticed is the necessary a priori ground upon which a moral government is possible4 ,in thus declaring the basis upon which the above distinction between the two classes of conditions rests1 we have been led to distinguish more clearly between the faculties of the mind1 and especially to observe how the ,pure ,reason enables us thereby to solve the problems she has raised4 ,in this radical distinction lies the rational ground for the explication of all the problems which the ,limitists raise4 ,it also appears that the terms must1 possible1 and the like1 being used to express no idea of restraint1 as coming from without upon the infinite ,person1 or of lack or craving1 as subsisting within him1 are properly employed in expressing the fact that his ,self1 as a priori ground for his activity1 is1 though the only1 yet a real1 positive1 and irremovable limit1 condition1 and law of his action4 ,of two possible ends he may freely choose either4 ,of all possible modes of action he may choose one2 but the constituting laws of the ,self he cannot1 and the moral laws of his ,self he will not1 violate4 ,that point has now been reached at which this branch of the discussion in hand may be closed4 ,the final base from which to conduct an examination of the questions respecting absoluteness and infinity has been attained4 ,in the progress to this consummation it was found that a radical psychological error lay at the root of the philosophy taught by the ,limitists4 ,their theory was seen to be partial1 and essentially defective4 ,qualities which they do not recognise were found to belong to certain mental affirmations4 ,four classes of these affirmations or ideas were named and illustrated2 and by them the fact of the ,reason was established4 ,then its mode of activity and its functions were stated2 and finally the great truth which solves the problem of the ages was1 by this faculty1 attained and stated4 ,it became evident that the final cause of the ,universe must be found without the ,universe2 and it was then seen that ,that spiritual ,person who is self-existent1 absolute1 and infinite1 is the ,ultimate ,ground1 the ,final ,cause1 of the ,universe4 ,definitions of the terms absolute and infinite suitable to such a position were then given1 with a few concluding reflections4 ,from the result thus secured the way is prepared for an examination of the general principles and their special applications which the ,limitists maintain1 and this will occupy our future pages4 ,,part ,,ii4 ,,an ,,examination ,,of ,,the ,,fundamental ,,proposition ,,of ,,the ,,limitists1 ,,and ,,of ,,certain ,,general ,,corollaries ,,under ,,it4 ,it has been attempted in the former pages to find a valid and final basis of truth1 one which would satisfy the cravings of the human soul1 and afford it a sure rest4 ,in the fact that ,god made man in his own image1 and that thus there is1 to a certain extent1 a community of faculties1 a community of knowledge1 a community of obligations1 and a community of interests1 have we found such a basis4 ,we have hereby learned that a part of man's knowledge is necessary and final2 in other words1 that he can know the truth1 and be sure that his knowledge is correct4 ,if the proofs which have been offered of the fact of the ,pure ,reason1 and the statements which have been made of the mode of its activity and of its functions1 and1 further1 of the problem of the ,universe1 and the true method for solving it1 shall have been satisfactory to the reader1 he will now be ready to consider the analysis of ,sir ,william ,hamilton's fundamental proposition1 which was promised on an early page4 ,we there gave1 it was thought1 sufficiently full extracts for a fair presentation of his theory1 and followed them with a candid epitome4 ,in recurring to the subject now1 and for the purpose named1 we are constrained at the outset to make an acknowledgment4 ,it would be simple folly1 a childish egotism1 to pass by in silence the masterly article on this subject in the ,north ,american ,review for ,october1 #ahfd1 and after it to pretend to offer anything new4 ,whatever the author might have wrought out in his own mental workshop1--and his work was far less able than what is there given1--that article has left nothing to be said4 ,he has therefore been tempted to one of two courses3 either to transfer it to these pages1 or pass by the subject entirely4 ,either course may1 perhaps1 be better than the one finally chosen2 which is1 while pursuing the order of his own thought1 to add a few short extracts therefrom4 ,one possibility encourages him in this1 which is1 that some persons may see this volume1 who have no access to the ,review1 and to whom1 therefore1 these pages will be valuable4 ,to save needless repetition1 this discussion will presuppose that the reader has turned back and perused the extracts and epitome above alluded to4 ,upon the very threshold of ,sir ,william ,hamilton's statement1 one is met by a logical faux pas which is truly amazing4 ,immediately after the assertion that the mind can know only the limited and the conditionally limited1 and in the very sentence in which he denies the possibility of a knowledge of the ,infinite and ,absolute1 he proceeds to define those words in definite and known terms6 ,the ,infinite he defines as the unconditionally unlimited1 and the ,absolute as the unconditionally limited4 ,or1 to save him1 will one say that the defining terms are unknown8 ,so much the worse1 then6 ,the ,infinite1 an unknown term1 may be represented by x2 and the unconditionally unlimited1 a compound unknown term1 by ab4 ,now1 who has the right to say1 either in mathematics or metaphysics1 in any philosophy1 that xab8 ,yet such dicta are the basis of ,the ,philosophy of the ,unconditioned4 ,but1 one of two suppositions is possible4 ,either the terms infinite and absolute are known terms and definable1 or they are unknown terms and undefinable4 ,yet1 ,hamilton says1 they are unknown and definable4 ,which does he mean8 ,if he is held to the former1 they are unknown2 then all else that he has written about them are batches of meaningless words4 ,if he is held to the latter1 they are definable2 then are they known1 and his system is denied in the assertion of it4 ,since his words are so contradictory1 he must be judged by his deeds2 and in these he always assumes that we have a positive knowledge of the infinite and absolute1 else he would not have argued the matter2 for there can be no argument about nothing4 ,our analysis of his theory1 then1 must be conducted upon this hypothesis4 ,turn back for a moment to the page upon which his theory is quoted1 and read the last sentence4 ,is his utterance a principle1 or is it a judgment8 ,is it an axiom1 or is it a guess4 ,the logician asserts that we know only the conditioned1 and yet bases his assertion upon the principles1 c4 ,what is a principle1 and how is it known8 ,if it is axiom1 then he has denied his own philosophy in the very sentence in which he uttered it4 ,and this1 we have no hesitation in saying1 is just what he did4 ,he blindly assumed certain fundamental laws of thought1--to quote another of his phrases--to establish the impotence of the mind to know those laws as fundamental4 ,again1 if his philosophy is valid1 the words must1 necessary1 and the like are entirely out of place2 for they are unconditional4 ,in the conditioned there is1 can be1 no must1 no necessity4 ,from these excursions about the principle let us now return to the principle itself4 ,it may be stated concisely thus3 ,there are two extremes1--the ,absolute and the ,infinite4 ,these include all being4 ,they are contradictories1 that is1 one must be1 to the exclusion of the other4 ,but the mind can conceive of neither4 ,what1 then1 is the logical conclusion8 ,that the mind cannot conceive of anything4 ,what is his conclusion8 ,that the mind can conceive of something between the infinite and the absolute1 which is neither the one nor the other1 but a tertium quid--the conditioned4 ,where did this tertium quid come from1 when he had already comprehended everything in the two extremes8 ,if there is a mean1 the conditioned1 and the two extremes1 then excluded middle has nothing to do with the matter at all4 ,to avoid the inevitable conclusion of his logic as just stated1 ,hamilton erected the subterfuge of mental imbecility4 ,to deny any knowledge to man1 was to expose himself to ridicule4 ,he1 therefore1 and his followers after him1 drew a line in the domain of knowledge1 and assigned to the hither side of it all knowledge that can come through generalizations in the ,understanding2 and then asserted that the contradictions which appeared in the mind1 when one examined those questions which lie on the further side of that line1 resulted from the impotency of the mind to comprehend the questions themselves4 ,this was1 is1 their psychology4 ,how satisfactory it may be to ,man1 a hundred years1 perhaps1 will show4 ,but strike out the last assertion1 and write1 ,both are cognizable2 and then let us proceed with our reasoning4 ,the essayist in the ,north ,american presents the theory under four heads1 as follows3-- #a4 ,the ,infinite and ,absolute as defined1 are contradictory and exclusive of each other2 yet1 one must be true4 #b4 ,neither of them can be conceived as possible4 #c4 ,each is inconceivable2 and the inconceivability of each is referable to the same cause1 namely1 mental imbecility4 #d4 ,as opposite extremes1 they include everything conceivable between them4 ,the first and fourth points require our especial attention4 #a4 ,let us particularly mark1 then1 that it is as defined1 that the terms are contradictory4 ,the question1 therefore1 turns upon the definitions4 ,undoubtedly the definitions are erroneous2 but in order to see wherein1 the following general reflections may be made3-- ,the terms infinite and absolute1 as used by philosophers1 have two distinct applications3 one to ,space and ,time1 and one to ,god4 ,such definitions as are suitable to the latter application1 and self-consistent1 have already been given4 ,though reluctant to admit into a philosophical treatise a term bearing two distinct meanings1 we shall waive for a little our scruples1--though choosing1 for ourselves1 to use the equivalent rather than the term4 ,such definitions are needed1 then1 as that absolute ,space and ,time shall not be contradictory to infinite ,space and ,time4 ,let us first observe ,hamilton's theory4 ,according to it1 ,space1 for instance1 is either unconditional illimitation1 or it is unconditional limitation2 in other words1 it is illimitable1 or it is a limited whole4 ,the first part of the assertion is true4 ,that ,space is illimitable1 is unquestionably a self-evident truth4 ,any one who candidly considers the subject will see not only that the mind cannot assign limits to ,space1 but that the attempt is an absurdity just alike in kind with the attempt to think two and two five4 ,the last part is a psychological blunder1 has no pertinence to the question1 and is not what ,hamilton was groping for4 ,he was searching for the truth1 that there is no absolute unit in ,space4 ,a limited whole has nothing to do with the matter in hand--absoluteness--at all4 ,the illimitability of ,space1 which has just been established as an axiom1 precludes this4 ,what1 then1 is the opposite pole of thought8 ,we have just declared it4 ,there is no absolute unit of ,space2 or1 in other words1 all division is in ,space1 but ,space is indivisible4 ,this1 also1 is an axiom1 is self-evident4 ,we attain1 then1 two poles of thought1 and definitions of the two terms given1 which are exhaustive and consistent4 ,space is illimitable4 ,space is indivisible4 ,the one is the infinity of ,space1 the other is the absoluteness of ,space4 ,the fact1 then1 is1 all limitation is in ,space1 and all division is in ,space2 but ,space is neither limited or divided4 ,one of the logician's extremes is seen1 then1 to have no foundation in fact2 and that which is found to be true is also found to be consistent with1 nay1 essential to1 what should have been the other4 ,having hitherto expressed a decided protest against any attempt to find out ,god through the forms of ,space and ,time1 a repetition will not be needed here4 ,god is only to be sought for1 found1 and studied1 by such methods as are suitable to the supreme spiritual ,person4 ,hence all the attempts of the ,limitists to reason from spatial and temporal difficulties over to those questions which belong to ,god1 are simply absurd4 ,the questions respecting ,space and ,time are to be discussed by themselves4 ,and the questions respecting ,god are to be discussed by themselves4 ,he who tries to reason from the one to the other is not less absurd than he who should try to reason from a farm to the multiplication table4 ,in ,sir ,william ,hamilton's behalf it should be stated1 that there is just a modicum of truth underlying his theory1--just enough to give it a degree of plausibility4 ,the ,sense1 as faculty for the perception of physical objects1 or their images1 and the ,understanding as discursive faculty for passing over and forming judgments upon the materials gathered by the ,sense1 lie under the shadow of a law very like the one he stated4 ,the ,sense was made incapable of perceiving an ultimate atom or of comprehending the universe4 ,from the fact that the ,sense never has perceived these objects1 the ,understanding concludes that it never will4 ,only by the insight and oversight of that higher faculty1 the ,pure ,reason1 do we come to know that it never can4 ,it was because those lower faculties are thus walled in by the conditions of ,space and ,time1 and are unable to perceive or conceive anything out of those conditions1 and because1 in considering them1 he failed to see the other mental powers1 that ,sir ,william ,hamilton constructed his ,philosophy of the ,unconditioned4 #b4 ,neither of them can be conceived as possible4 ,literally1 this is true4 ,the word conceive applies strictly to the work of the ,understanding2 and that faculty can never have any notion of the ,infinite or ,absolute4 ,but1 assuming that conceive is a general term for cognize1 the conclusion developed just above is inevitable4 ,if all being is in one or the other1 and neither can be known1 nothing can be known4 #c4 ,they cannot be known1 because of mental imbecility4 ,if man can know nothing because of mental imbecility1 why suppose that he has a mental faculty at all8 ,why not enounce1 as the fundamental principle of one's theory1 the assertion1 ,all men are idiots8 ,this would be logically consistent4 ,the truth is1 the logician was in a dilemma4 ,he must confess that men know something4 ,by a false psychology he had ruled the ,reason out of the mind1 and so had left himself no faculty by which to form any notion of absoluteness and infinity2 and yet they would thrust themselves before him1 and demand an explanation4 ,hence1 he constructed a subterfuge4 ,he would have been more consistent if he had said1 ,there is no absolute and infinite4 ,the conditioned is the whole of existence2 and this the mind knows4 #d4 ,as opposite extremes1 they include everything conceivable between them4 ,what the essayist in the ,north ,american says upon this point is so apt1 and so accords with our own previous reflections1 that we will not forbear making an extract4 ,the last of the four theses will best be re-stated in ,hamilton's own words2 the italics are his4 ',the conditioned is the mean between two extremes--two inconditionates1 exclusive of each other1 neither of which can be conceived as possible1 but of which1 on the principles of contradiction and excluded middle1 one must be admitted as necessary4' ,this sentence excites unmixed wonder4 ,to mention in the same breath the law of excluded middle1 and two contradictions with a mean between them1 requires a hardihood unparalleled in the history of philosophy1 except by ,hegel4 ,if the two contradictory extremes are themselves incogitable1 yet include a cogitable mean1 why insist upon the necessity of accepting either extreme8 ,this necessity of accepting one of two contradictories is wholly based upon the supposed impossibility of a mean2 if the mean exists1 that may be true1 and both the contradictories false4 ,but if a mean between the two contradictories be both impossible and absurd1 7and we have hitherto so interpreted the law of excluded middle17 ,hamilton's conditioned entirely vanishes4 ,upon a system which1 in whatever aspect one looks at it1 is found to be but a bundle of contradictions and absurdities1 further criticism would appear to be unnecessary4 ,having1 impliedly at least1 accepted as true ,sir ,william ,hamilton's psychological error1--the rejection of the ,reason as the intellectual faculty of the spiritual person1--and having1 with him1 used the terms limit1 condition1 and the like1 in such significations as are pertinent to the ,sense and ,understanding only1 the ,limitists proceed to present in a paradoxical light many questions which arise concerning the ,infinite4 ,they take the ground that1 to our view1 he can be neither person1 nor intellect1 nor consciousness2 for each of these implies limitation2 and yet that it is impossible for us to know aught of him1 except as such4 ,then having1 as they think1 completely confused the mind1 they draw hence new support for their conclusion1 that we can attain to no satisfactory knowledge on the subject4 ,the following extracts selected from many will show this4 ,now1 in the first place1 the very conception of ,consciousness1 in whatever mode it may be manifested1 necessarily implies distinction between one object and another4 ,to be conscious1 we must be conscious of something2 and that something can only be known as that which it is1 by being distinguished from that which it is not4 ,but distinction is necessarily a limitation2 for1 if one object is to be distinguished from another1 it must possess some form of existence which the other has not1 or it must not possess some form which the other has4 ,but it is obvious that the ,infinite cannot be distinguished1 as such1 from the ,finite1 by the absence of any quality which the ,finite possesses2 for such absence would be a limitation4 ,nor yet can it be distinguished by the presence of an attribute which the ,finite has not2 for as no finite part can be a constituent of an infinite whole1 this differential characteristic must itself be infinite2 and must at the same time have nothing in common with the finite4444 ,that a man can be conscious of the ,infinite1 is thus a supposition which1 in the very terms in which it is expressed1 annihilates itself4 ,consciousness is essentially a limitation2 for it is the determination of the mind to one actual out of many possible modifications4 ,but the ,infinite1 if it is conceived at all1 must be conceived as potentially everything1 and actually nothing2 for if there is anything in general which it cannot become1 it is thereby limited2 and if there is anything in particular which it actually is1 it is thereby excluded from being any other thing4 ,but again1 it must also be conceived as actually everything1 and potentially nothing2 for an unrealized potentiality is likewise a limitation4 ,if the infinite can be that which it is not1 it is by that very possibility marked out as incomplete1 and capable of a higher perfection4 ,if it is actually everything1 it possesses no characteristic feature by which it can be distinguished from anything else1 and discerned as an object of consciousness4444 ,rationalism is thus only consistent with itself when it refuses to attribute consciousness to ,god4 ,consciousness1 in the only form in which we can conceive it1 implies limitation and change1--the perception of one object out of many1 and a comparison of that object with others4 ,to he always conscious of the same object1 is1 humanly speaking1 not to be conscious at all2 and1 beyond its human manifestation1 we can have no conception of what consciousness is4--,limits of ,religious ,thought1 pp4 #ic-ie4 ,as the conditionally limited 7which we may briefly call the conditioned7 is thus the only possible object of knowledge and of positive thought--thought necessarily supposes conditions4 ,to think is to condition2 and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought4444 ,thought cannot transcend consciousness2 consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and object of thought2 known only in correlation1 and mutually limiting each other2 while1 independently of this1 all that we know either of subject or object1 either of mind or matter1 is only a knowledge in each of the particular1 of the plural1 of the different1 of the modified1 of the phenomenal4 ,we admit that the consequence of this doctrine is--that philosophy1 if viewed as more than a science of the conditioned1 is impossible4 ,departing from the particular1 we admit that we can never1 in out highest generalizations1 rise above the finite2 that our knowledge1 whether of mind or matter1 can be nothing more than a knowledge of the relative manifestations of an existence1 which in itself it is our highest wisdom to recognize as beyond the reach of philosophy4 ,in all this1 so far as human intelligence is concerned1 we cordially agree2 for a more complete admission could not be imagined1 not only that a knowledge1 and even a notion1 of the absolute is impossible for man1 but that we are unable to conceive the possibility of such a knowledge even in the ,deity himself1 without contradicting our human conceptions of the possibility of intelligence itself4--,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,essays1 pp4 #ba1 #bb1 #ch4 ,the various mental attributes which we ascribe to ,god--,benevolence1 ,holiness1 ,justice1 ,wisdom1 for example--can be conceived by us only as existing in a benevolent and holy and just and wise ,being1 who is not identical with any one of his attributes1 but the common subject of them all2 in one word1 a ,person4 ,but ,personality1 as we conceive it1 is essentially a limitation and relation4 ,our own personality is presented to us as relative and limited2 and it is from that presentation that all our representative notions of personality are derived4 ,personality is presented to us as a relation between the conscious self and the various modes of his consciousness4 ,there is no personality in abstract thought without a thinker3 there is no thinker unless he exercises some mode of thought4 ,personality is also a limitation2 for the thought and the thinker are distinguished from and limit each other2 and the various modes of thought are distinguished each from each by limitation likewise4444--,limits of ,religious ,thought1 p4 #ajb4 ,personality1 with all its limitations1 though far from exhibiting the absolute nature of ,god as ,he is1 is yet truer1 grander1 more elevating1 more religious1 than those barren1 vague1 meaningless abstractions in which men babble about nothing under the name of the ,infinite and ,personal conscious existence1 limited though it be1 is yet the noblest of all existence of which man can dream4444 ,it is by consciousness alone that we know that ,god exists1 or that we are able to offer ,him any service4 ,it is only by conceiving ,him as a ,conscious ,being1 that we can stand in any religious relation to ,him at all2 that we can form such a representation of ,him as is demanded by our spiritual wants1 insufficient though it be to satisfy our intellectual curiosity4--,limits of ,religious ,thought1 p4 #ajd4 ,the conclusions of these writers upon this whole topic are as follows3-- ,the mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions subversive of each other as equally possible2 but only as unable to understand as possible two extremes2 one of which1 however1 on the ground of their mutual repugnance1 it is compelled to recognize as true4444 ,and by a wonderful revelation we are thus1 in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite1 inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensive reality4--,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,essays1 p4 #bb4 ,to sum up briefly this portion of my argument4 ,the conception of the ,absolute and ,infinity1 from whatever side we view it1 appears encompassed with contradictions4 ,there is a contradiction in supposing such an object to exist1 whether alone or in conjunction with others2 and there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist4 ,there is a contradiction in conceiving it as one2 and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as many4 ,there is a contradiction in conceiving it as personal2 and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal4 ,it cannot1 without contradiction1 be represented as active2 nor1 without equal contradiction1 be represented as inactive4 ,it cannot be conceived as the sum of all existence2 nor yet can it be conceived as a part only of that sum4--,limits of ,religious ,thought1 pp4 #hd1 #he4 ,we have quoted thus largely1 preferring that the ,limitists should speak for themselves4 ,their doctrine1 as taught1 not simply in these passages1 but throughout their writings1 may be briefly summed up as follows4 ,the human mind1 whenever it attempts to investigate the profoundest subjects which come before it1 and which it is goaded to examine1 finds itself in an inextricable maze of contradictions2 and1 after vainly struggling for a while to get out1 becomes nonplussed1 confused1 confounded1 dazed2 and1 falling down helpless and effortless in the maze1 and with devout humility acknowledging its impotence1 it finds that the highest reason is to pass beyond the sphere and out of the light of reason1 into the sphere of a superrational and therefore dark1 and therefore blind faith4 ,but it is to be stated1 and here we strike to the centre of the errors of the ,limitists1 that a perception and confession of mental impotence is not the logical deduction from their premises4 ,lustrous as may be their names in logic1--and ,sir ,william ,hamilton is esteemed a sun in the logical firmament1--no one of them ever saw1 or else dared to acknowledge1 the logical sequence from their principles4 ,they have climbed upon the dizzy heights of thought1 and out on their verge2 and there they stand1 hesitating and shivering1 like naked men on ,alpine precipices1 with no eagle wings to spread and soar away towards the ,eternal ,truth2 and not daring to take the awful plunge before them4 ,behold the gulf from which they shrink4 ,mr4 ,mansel says3-- ,it is our duty1 then1 to think of ,god as personal2 and it is our duty to believe that ,he is infinite4 ,it is true that we cannot reconcile these two representations with each other1 as our conception of personality involves attributes apparently contradictory to the notion of infinity4 ,but it does not follow that this contradiction exists anywhere but in our own minds3 it does not follow that it implies any impossibility in the absolute nature of ,god4 ,the apparent contradiction1 in this case1 as in those previously noticed1 is the necessary consequence of an attempt on the part of the human thinker to transcend the boundaries of his own consciousness4 ,it proves that there are limits to man's power of thought2 and it proves no more4--,limits of ,religious ,thought1 p4 #ajf4 ,or1 to put it in sharp and accurate1 plain and unmistakable ,english4 ,it is our duty to think of ,god as personal1 when to think of ,him as personal is to think a lie2 to believe that ,he is infinite1 when so to believe is to believe the lie already thought2 and when to believe a lie is to incur the penalty decreed by the ,bible--,god's book--upon all who believe lies4 ,and this is the religious teaching of a professed ,christian minister in one of the first ,universities in the world4 ,not that ,mr4 ,mansel meant to teach this4 ,by no means4 ,but it logically follows from his premises4 ,in his philosophy the mind instinctively1 necessarily1 and with equal authority in each case1 asserts ,that there must be an infinite ,being2 ,that that ,being must be ,self-conscious1 ,must be unlimited2 and that ,consciousness is a limitation4 ,these assertions are contradictory and self-destructive4 ,what follows then8 ,that the mind is impotent8 ,no6 ,it follows that the mind is a deceiver6 ,we learn again the lesson we have learned before4 ,it is not weakness1 it is falsehood3 it is not want of capacity1 it is want of integrity that is proved by this contradiction4 ,man is worse than a hopeless1 mental imbecile1 he is a hopeless1 mental cheat4 ,but is the result true8 ,how can it be1 when with all its might the mind revolts from it1 as nature does from a vacuum8 ,true that the human mind is an incorrigible falsifier8 ,with the indignation of outraged honesty1 man's soul rejects the insulting aspersion1 and reasserts its own integrity and authority4 ,ages of controversy have failed to obliterate or cry down the spontaneous utterance of the soul1 ,i have within myself the ultimate standard of truth4 ,it now devolves to account for the aberrations of the ,limitists4 ,the ground of all their difficulties is simple and plain4 ,while denying to the human mind the faculty of the ,pure ,reason1 they have1 by the 7to them7 undistinguished use of that faculty1 raised questions which the ,understanding by no possibility could raise1 which the ,reason alone is capable of presenting1 and which that ,reason alone can solve2 and have attempted to solve them solely by the assistance1 and in the forms of1 the ,sense and the ,understanding4 ,their problems belong to a spiritual person2 and they attempt to solve them by the inferior modes of an animal nature4 ,better1 by far1 could they see with their ears4 ,all their processes are developed on the vicious assumption1 that the highest form of knowledge possible to the human mind is a generalization in the ,understanding1 upon facts given in the ,sense3 a form of knowledge which is always one1 whether the substance be distinguished in the form1 be a peach1 as diverse from an apple2 or a star1 as one among a million4 ,the meagreness and utter insufficiency of this doctrine1 to account for all the phenomena of the human mind1 we have heretofore shown2 and shall therefore need only now to distinguish certain special phases of their fundamental error4 ,as heretofore1 there will be continual occasion to note how the doctrine of the ,limitists1 that the ,understanding is man's highest faculty of knowledge1 and the logical sequences therefrom respecting the laws of thought and consciousness vitiate their whole system4 ,one of their most important errors is thus expressed3--,to be conscious1 we must be conscious of something2 and that something can only be known as that which it is1 by being distinguished from that which it is not4 ,thought cannot transcend consciousness2 consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of subject and object of thought known only in correlation1 and mutually limiting each other2 while1 independently of this1 all that we know either of subject or object1 either of mind or matter1 is only a knowledge in each of the particular1 of the plural1 of the different1 of the modified1 of the phenomenal4 ,in other words1 our highest possible form of knowledge is that by which we examine the peach1 distinguish its qualities among themselves1 and discriminate between them and the qualities of the apple4 ,and ,sir ,william ,hamilton fairly and truly acknowledges that1 as a consequence1 science1 except as a system of objects of sense1 is impossible4 ,the fact is1 as has been made already sufficiently apparent1 that the diagnosis by the ,limitists of the constitution of the mind is erroneous4 ,their dictum1 that all knowledge must be attained through relation1 plurality1 and difference1 is not true4 ,there is a kind of knowledge which we obtain by a direct and immediate sight2 and that1 too1 under such conditions as are no limitation upon the object thought4 ,for instance1 the mind1 by a direct intuition1 affirms1 ,malice is criminal4 ,it also affirms that this is an eternal1 immutable1 universal law1 conditional for all possibility of moral beings4 ,this direct and immediate sight1 and the consciousness attending it1 are full of that one object1 and so are occupied only with it2 and it does ,,not come under any forms of relation1 plurality1 and difference4 ,so is it with all a priori laws4 ,the mode of the pure reason is thus seen to be the direct opposite of that of the ,understanding and the ,sense4 ,intimately connected with the foregoing is a question whose importance cannot be overstated4 ,it is one which involves the very possibility of ,god's existence as a self-conscious person4 ,to present it1 we recur again to the extracts made just above from ,sir ,william ,hamilton4 ,consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and object of thought known only in correlation1 and mutually limiting each other4 ,subsequently1 he makes the acknowledgment as logically following from this3 that we are unable to conceive the possibility of such knowledge1 i4 e4 of the absolute1 even in the ,deity himself4 ,that is1 ,god can be believed to be self-conscious only on the ground that the human intellect is a cheat4 ,the theory which underlies this assertion of the logician--a theory not peculiar to the ,limitists1 but which has1 perhaps1 been hitherto universally maintained by philosophers--may be concisely stated thus4 ,in every correlation of subject and object1--in every instance where they are to be contrasted1--the subject must be one1 and the object must be another and different4 ,hamilton1 in another place1 utters it thus3 ,look back for a moment into yourselves1 and you will find1 that what constitutes intelligence in our feeble consciousness1 is1 that there are there several terms1 of which the one perceives the other1 of which the other is perceived by the first2 in this consists self-knowledge1 c4 ,mark the several terms1 and that the one can only see the other1 never itself4 ,this position is both a logical and psychological error4 ,it is a logical error because it assumes1 without argument1 that there is involved in the terms subject and object such a logical contradiction and contradistinction that the subject cannot be object to itself4 ,this assumption is groundless4 ,as a matter of fact1 it is generally true that1 so far as man is concerned1 the subject is one1 and the object another and different4 ,but this by no means proves that it is always so2 it only raises the presumption that such may be the case4 ,and when one comes to examine the question in itself1 there is absolutely no logical ground for the assumption4 ,it is found to be a question upon which no decision from logical considerations can have any validity1 because it is purely psychological1 and can only be decided by evidence upon a matter of fact4 ,furthermore1 it is a psychological error1 because a careful examination shows that1 in some instances1 the opposite is the fact2 that1 in certain experiences1 the subject and object are identical4 ,this fact that the subject and object are often identical in the searching eye of human reason1 and always so under the eye of ,universal ,genius1 is of too vast scope and too vital importance to be passed with a mere allusion4 ,it seems amazing that a truth which1 the instant it is stated1 solves a thousand difficulties which philosophy has raised1 should never yet have been affirmed by any of the great spiritual-eyed thinkers1 and that it should have found utterance1 only to be denied1 by the pen of the ,limitists4 ,a word of personal reminiscence may be allowed here4 ,the writer came to see this truth during a process of thought1 having for its object the solution of the problem1 ,how can the infinite ,person be self-comprehending1 and still infinite8 ,while considering this1 and without ever having received a hint from any source that the possibility of such a problem had dawned on a human mind before1 there blazed upon him suddenly1 like a heaven full of light1 this1 which appeared the incomparably profounder question3 ,how can any soul1 not ,god only1 but any soul1 be a self-examiner8 ,why don't the ,limitists entertain and explain this8 ,it was only years after that he met the negative statement in ,herbert ,spencer's book4 ,the difficulty is1 that the ,limitists have represented to their minds the mode of the seeing of the ,reason1 by a sensuous image1 as the eye2 and because the eye cannot see itself1 have concluded that the ,reason cannot see itself4 ,it is always dangerous to argue from an illustration2 and1 in this instance1 it has been fatal4 ,if man was only an animal nature1 and so only a receiver of impressions1 with a capacity to generalize from the impressions received1 the doctrine of the ,limitists would be true4 ,but once establish that man is also a spiritual person1 with a reason1 which sees truth by immediate intuition1 and their whole teaching becomes worthless4 ,the ,reason is not receptivity merely1 or mainly2 it is originator4 ,in its own light it gives to itself a priori truth1 and itself as seeing that truth2 and so the subject and object are identical4 ,this is one of the differentiating qualities of the spiritual person4 ,our position may be more accurately stated and more amply illustrated and sustained as follows3 ,sometimes1 in the created spiritual person1 and always in the self-existent1 the absolute and infinite spiritual ,person1 the subject and object are ,,identical4 #a4 ,sometimes in the created spiritual person1 the subject and object are identical4 ,the question is a question of fact4 ,in illustrating the fact1 it will be proved4 ,when a man looks at his hands1 he sees they are instruments for his use4 ,when he considers his physical sense1 he still perceives it to be instrument for his use4 ,in all his conclusions1 judgments1 he still finds1 not himself1 but his instrument4 ,even in the ,pure ,reason he finds only his faculty2 though it be the highest possible to intellect4 ,yet still he searches1 searches for the ,i am2 which claims1 and holds1 and uses1 the faculties and capacities4 ,there is a phrase universally familiar to ,american ,christians1 a fruit of ,new ,england ,theology1 which leads us directly to the goal we seek4 ,it is the phrase1 self-examination4 ,in all thorough1 religious self-examination the subject and object are identical4 ,in the ordinary labors and experiences of life1 man says1 ,i can do this or that2 and he therein considers only his aptitudes and capabilities4 ,but in this last1 this profoundest act1 the assertion is not1 ,i can do this or that4 ,it is1 ,i am this or that4 ,the person stands unveiled before itself1 in the awful sanctuary of ,god's presence4 ,the decision to be made is not upon the use of one faculty or another4 ,it is upon the end for which all labor shall be performed4 ,the character of the person is under consideration1 and is to be determined4 ,the selfhood1 with all its wondrous mysteries1 is at once subject and object4 ,the ,i am in man1 alike in kind to that most impenetrable mystery1 the eternal ,i ,,am of the everlasting ,father1 is now stirred to consider its most solemn duty4 ,how shall the finite ,i am accord itself to the pure purpose of the infinite ,i ,,am8 ,it may be1 possibly is1 that some persons have never been conscious of this experience4 ,to some1 from a natural inaptitude1 and to others1 from a perverse disinclination1 it may never come4 ,some have so little gift of introspection1 that their inner experiences are never observed and analyzed4 ,their conduct may be beautiful1 but they never know it4 ,their impressions ever come from without4 ,another class of persons shun such an experience as ,balshazzar would have shunned1 if he could1 the handwriting on the wall4 ,their whole souls are absorbed in the pursuit of earthly things4 ,they are intoxicated with sensuous gratification4 ,the fore-thrown shadow of the coming thought of self-examination awakens within them a vague instinctive dread2 and they shudder1 turn away1 and by every effort avoid it4 ,sometimes they succeed2 and through the gates of death rush headlong into the spirit-land1 only to be tortured forever there with the experience they so successfully eluded here4 ,for the many thousands1 who know by experience what a calm1 candid1 searching1 self-examination is1 now that their attention has been drawn to its full psychological import1 no further word is necessary4 ,they know that in that supreme insight there was seen and known1 at one and the same instant1 in a spontaneous and simultaneous action of the soul1 the seer and the seen as one1 as identical4 ,and this experience is so wide-spread1 that the wonder is that it has not heretofore been assigned its suitable place in philosophy4 #b4 ,always in the self-existent1 the absolute and infinite1 spiritual ,person1 the subject and object are identical4 ,this question1 though one of fact1 cannot be determined by us1 by our experience2 it must be shown to follow logically from certain a priori first principles4 ,this may be done as follows4 ,eternity1 independence1 universality1 are qualities of ,god4 ,being eternal1 he is ever the same4 ,being independent1 he excludes the possibility of another ,being to whom he is necessarily related4 ,being universal1 he possesses all possible endowment1 and is ground for all possible existence2 so that no being can exist but by his will4 ,as ,universal ,genius1 all possible objects of knowledge or intellectual effort are immanent before the eye of his ,reason2 and this is a permanent state4 ,he is an object of knowledge1 comprehending all others2 and therefore he exhaustively knows himself4 ,he distinguishes his ,self as object1 from no what else1 because there is no else to distinguish his ,self from2 but having an exhaustive self-comprehension1 he distinguishes within that ,self all possible forms of being each from each4 ,he is absolute1 and never learns or changes4 ,there is nothing to learn and nothing to change to1 except to a wicked state2 and for this there can be to him no temptation4 ,he is ever the same1 and hence there can be no instant in time when he does not exhaustively know himself4 ,thus always in him are the subject and object identical4 ,these two great principles1 viz3 ,that the ,pure ,reason sees a priori truth immediately1 and out of all relation1 plurality and difference1 and that in the ,pure ,reason1 in self-examination1 the subject and object are identical1 by their simple statement explode1 as a ,pythagorean system1 the mental astronomy of the ,limitists4 ,reason is the sun1 and the ,sense and the ,understanding1 with their satellite faculties1 the circumvolving planets4 ,the use of terms by the ,limitists has been as vicious as their processes of thought1 and has naturally sprung from their fundamental error4 ,we will note one in the following sentence4 ,consciousness1 in the only form in which we can conceive it1 implies limitation and change1--the perception of one object out of many1 and a comparison of that object with others4 ,conceive is the vicious word4 ,strictly1 it is usable only with regard to things in ,nature1 and can have no relevancy to such subjects as are now under consideration4 ,it is a word which expresses only such operations as lie in the ,sense and ,understanding4 ,the following definition explains this3 ,the concept refers to all the things whose common or similar attributes or traits it conceives 7con-cepis71 or grasps together into one class and one act of mind4--,bowen's ,logic1 p4 #g4 ,this is not the mode of the ,reason's action at all4 ,it does not run over a variety of objects and select out from them the points of similarity1 and grasp these together into one act of mind4 ,it sees one object in its unity as pure law1 or first truth2 and examines that in its own light4 ,hence1 the proper word is1 intuits4 ,seen from this standpoint1 consciousness does not imply limitation and change4 ,a first truth we always see as absolute1--we are conscious of this sight2 and yet we know that neither consciousness nor sight is any limitation upon the truth4 ,we would paraphrase the sentence thus3 ,consciousness1 in the highest form in which we know it1 implies and possesses permanence2 and is the light in which pure truth is seen as pure object by itself1 and forever the same4 ,it is curious to observe how the ,understanding and the ,pure ,reason run along side by side in the same sentence2 the inferior faculty encumbering and defeating the efforts of the other4 ,take the following for example4 ,if the infinite can be that which it is not1 it is by that very possibility marked out as incomplete1 and capable of a higher perfection4 ,if it is actually everything1 it possesses no characteristic feature by which it can be distinguished from anything else1 and discerned as an object of consciousness4 ,the presence in language of the word infinite and its cognates is decisive evidence of the presence of a faculty capable of entertaining it as a subject for investigation4 ,this faculty1 the ,reason having presented the subject for consideration1 the ,understanding seizes upon it and drags it down into her den1 and says1 can be that which it is not4 ,this she says1 because she cannot act1 except to conceive1 and cannot conceive1 except to distinguish this from something else2 and so cannot perceive that the very utterance of the word infinite excludes the word else4 ,the ,understanding conceives the finite as one and independent1 and the infinite as one and independent4 ,then the ,reason steps in1 and says the infinite is all-comprehending4 ,this conflicts with the ,understanding's conception1 and so the puzzle comes4 ,in laboring for a solution1 the ,reason's affirmation is expressed hypothetically3 ,if it 7the infinite7 is actually everything2 and thereupon the ,understanding puts in its blind1 impertinent assertion1 it possesses no characteristic feature by which it can be distinguished from anything else4 ,there is nothing else from which to distinguish it4 ,the perception of the ,reason is as follows4 ,the infinite ,person comprehends intellectually1 and is ground for potentially and actually1 all that is possible and real2 and so there can be no else with which to compare him4 ,because1 possessing all fulness1 he is actually everything1 by this characteristic feature of completeness he distinguishes himself from nothing1 which is all there is1 7if no-thing--void--can be said to be17 beside him2 and from any part1 which there is within him4 ,thus is he object to himself in his own consciousness4 ,this vicious working of the ,understanding against the ,reason1 in the same sentences1 can be more fully illustrated from the following extracts4 ,god1 as necessarily determined to pass from absolute essence to relative manifestation1 is determined to pass either from the better to the worse1 or from the worse to the better4 ,a third possibility that both states are equal1 as contradictory in itself1 and as contradicted by our author1 it is not necessary to consider4--,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,essays1 p4 #db4 ,again1 how can the ,relative be conceived as coming into being8 ,if it is a distinct reality from the absolute1 it must be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence4 ,but to conceive an object as non-existent is again a self-contradiction2 for that which is conceived exists1 as an object of thought1 in and by that conception4 ,we may abstain from thinking of an object at all2 but if we think of it1 we cannot but think of it as existing4 ,it is possible at one time not to think of an object at all1 and at another to think of it as already in being2 but to think of it in the act of becoming1 in the progress from not being into being1 is to think that which1 in the very thought1 annihilates itself4 ,here again the ,pantheistic hypothesis seems forced upon us4 ,we can think of creation only as a change in the condition of that which already exists2 and thus the creature is conceivable only as a phenomenal mode of the being of the ,creator4--,limits of ,religious ,thought1 p4 #ha4 ,god1 a word which has no significance except to the ,reason3 as necessarily determined1--a phrase which belongs only to the ,understanding4 ,the opposite is the truth3 to pass from absolute essence4 ,this can have no meaning except to the ,pure ,reason3 to relative manifestation4 ,this belongs to the ,understanding4 ,it contradicts the other2 and the process is absurd4 ,the mind balks in the attempt to think it4 ,in creation there is no such process as passing from absolute essence to relative manifestation4 ,the words imply that ,god1 in passing from the state of absolute essence1 ceased to be absolute essence1 and became relative manifestation4 ,all this is absurd2 and is in the ,understanding and ,sense4 ,god never became4 ,the ,creator is still absolute essence1 as before creation2 and the logician's this or that are both false2 and his third possibility is not a contradiction1 but the truth4 ,the fact of creation may be thus stated4 ,the infinite ,person1 freely according his will to the behest of his worth1 and yet equally free to not so accord his will1 put forth from himself the creative energy2 and this under such modes1 that he neither lost nor gained by the act2 but that1 though the latter state was diverse from the first1 still neither was better than the other1 but both were equally good4 ,before creation1 he possessed absolute plenitude of endowments4 ,all possible ideals were present before his eye4 ,all possible joy continued a changeless state in his sensibility4 ,his will1 as choice1 was absolute benevolence2 and1 as act1 was competent to all possible effort4 ,to push the ideal out1 and make it real1 added nothing to1 and subtracted nothing from1 his fulness4 ,the fact must be learned that muscular action and the working of pure spirit are so diverse1 that the inferior mode cannot be an illustration of the superior4 ,a change in a pure spirit1 which neither adds nor subtracts1 leaves the good unchanged4 ,hence1 when the infinite ,person created1 he passed neither from better to worse1 nor from worse to better2 but the two states1 though diverse1 were equally good4 ,we proceed now to the other extract4 ,again1 how can the relative1 etc4 ,if the ,relative is a distinct reality from the absolute1 then each is self-existent1 and independent4 ,the sentence annihilates itself4 ,it must be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence4 ,the image here is from the ,sense1 as usual1 and vicious accordingly4 ,it is1 that the soul is to look into void1 and see1 out of that void1 existence come1 without there being any cause for that existence coming4 ,this would be the phenomenon to the ,sense4 ,and the ,sense is utterly unable to account for the phenomenon4 ,the object in the ,sense must appear as form2 but in the ,reason it is idea4 ,mr4 ,mansel's presentation may well be illustrated by a trick of jugglery4 ,the performer stands before his audience1 dressed in tights1 and presents the palms of his hands to the spectators1 apparently empty4 ,he then closes his right hand1 and then opening it again1 appears holding a bouquet of delicious flowers1 which he hands about to the astonished gazers4 ,the bouquet seems to come from nothing1 i4 e4 to have no cause4 ,it appears to pass from non-existence to existence4 ,but common sense corrects the cheating seeming1 and asserts1 ,there is an adequate cause for the coming of the bunch of flowers1 though we cannot see it4 ,precisely similar is creation4 ,could there have been a ,sense present at that instant1 creation would have seemed to it a juggler's trick4 ,out of nothing something would have seemed to come4 ,but under the correcting guide of the ,pure ,reason1 an adequate cause is found4 ,before creation1 the infinite ,person did not manifest himself2 and so was actually alone4 ,at creation his power1 which before was immanent1 he now made emanent2 and put it forth in the forms chosen from his ,reason1 and according to the requirement of his own worth4 ,nothing was added to ,god4 ,that which was ideal he now made actual4 ,the form as ,idea was one1 the power as ,potentiality was another1 and each was in him by itself4 ,he put forth the power into the form1 the ,potentiality into the ,idea1 and the ,universe was4 ,thus it was that the ,relative came into being4 ,in the same manner it might be shown how1 all along through the writings of the ,limitists1 the ,understanding runs along by the ,reason1 and vitiates her efforts to solve her problems4 ,we shall have occasion to do something of this farther on4 ,the topic now under discussion could not be esteemed finished without an examination of the celebrated dictum1 ,to think is to condition4 ,those who have held this to be universally true1 have also received its logical sequence1 that to the finite intellect ,god cannot appear self-comprehending4 ,in our present light1 the dictum is known to be1 not a universal1 but only a partial1 truth4 ,it is incumbent1 therefore1 to circumscribe its true sphere1 and fix it there4 ,we shall best enter upon this labor by answering the question1 ,what is thinking8 ,first4 ,in general1 and loosely1 any mental operation is called thinking4 ,second4 ,specifically1 all acts of reflection are thinkings4 ,under this head we notice two points4 a4 ,that act of the ,understanding in which an object presented by the ,sense is analyzed1 and its special and generic elements noted1 and is thus classified1 and its relations determined1 is properly a thinking4 ,thus1 in the object cat ,i distinguish specifically that it is domestic1 and generically that it is carnivorous4 b4 ,that act of the finite spiritual person by which he compares the judgments of the ,understanding with the a priori laws of the ,pure ,reason1 and by this final standard decides their truth or error4 ,thus1 the judgment of the young ,indian warrior is1 that he ought to hunt down and slay the man who killed his father in battle4 ,the standard of ,reason is1 that ,malice is criminal4 ,this judgment is found to involve malice1 and so is found to be wrong4 ,third1 the intuitions of the reason4 ,these1 in the finite person1 come after a process of reflection1 and are partly consequent upon it2 yet they take place in another faculty1 which is developed by this process2 but they are such1 that by no process of reflection alone could they be4 ,thinking1 in the ,universal ,genius1 is the sight1 at once and forever1 of all possible object of mental effort4 ,it is necessary and spontaneous1 and so is an endowment1 not an attainment2 and is possessed without effort4 ,we are prepared now to entertain the following statements3-- ,a4 ,so far as it represents thinking as the active1 i4 e4 causative ground1 or agent of the condition1 the dictum is not true4 ,the fact of the thinking is not1 cannot be1 the ground of the condition4 ,the condition of the object thought1 whatever the form of thinking may be1 must lie as far back at least as the ground of the thinker4 ,thus1 ,god's self1 as ground for his ,genius1 must also be ground for all conditions4 ,yet men think of an object in its conditions4 ,this is because the same ,being who constructed the objects in their conditions1 constructed also man as thinker1 correlated to those conditions1 so that he should think upon things as they are4 ,in this view1 to think is not condition1 but is mental activity in the conditions already imposed4 ,thus it is with the ,understanding2 and the process of thinking1 as above designated1 goes on in accordance with the law stated in a1 of the second general definition4 ,it follows1 therefore1 ,b4 ,that so far as the dictum expresses the fact1 that within the sphere of conditions proper1--observing the distinction of conditions into two classes heretofore made1--the finite intellect must act under them1 and see those objects upon which they lie1 accordingly1--as1 for instance1 a geometrical figure must be seen in ,time and ,space1--so far it is true1 and no farther4 ,for instance3 ,to see an eagle flying1 is to see it under all the conditions imposed upon the bird as flying1 and the observer as seeing4 ,but when men intuit the a priori truth1 ,malice is criminal1 they perceive that it lies under no conditions proper1 but is absolute and universal4 ,we perceive1 then1 ,c4 ,that for all mental operations which have as object pure laws and ideal forms1 and that ,being in whom all these inhere1 this dictum is not true4 ,the thinker may be conditioned in the proper sense of that term2 yet he entertains objects of thought which are unconditioned2 and they are not affected by it4 ,thus1 it does not affect the universality of the principle in morals above noted that ,i perceive it to be such1 and that necessarily4 ,assuming1 then1 that by the dictum1 ,to think is to condition1 is meant1 not that the thinker1 by the act of thinking1 constructs the conditions1 but that he recognizes in himself1 as thinking subject1 and in the object thought1 the several conditions 7proper7 thereof1--the following statements will define the province of this dictum4 #a4 ,the ,universe as physical object1 the observing ,sense1 and the discursive ,understanding1 lie wholly within it4 #b4 ,created spiritual persons1 as constituted beings1 also lie wholly within it4 ,but it extends no farther4 ,on the other hand1 #c4 ,created spiritual persons1 in their capacities to intuit pure laws1 and pure ideal forms2 and those laws and forms themselves lie wholly without it4 #d4 ,so also does ,god the absolute ,being in whom those laws and forms inhere4 ,or1 in general terms1 ,when conditions 7proper7 already lie upon the object thought1 since the thinker must needs see the object under its conditions1 it is true that1 ,to think is to condition4 ,but so far as it is meant that thinking is such a kind of operation that it cannot proceed except the object be conditioned1 it is not true2 for there are processes of thought whose objects are unconditioned4 ,the question1 ,what are ,space and ,time8 with which ,mr4 ,spencer opens his chapter on ,ultimate ,scientific ,ideas1 introduces a subject common to all the ,limitists1 and which1 therefore1 should be considered in this part of our work4 ,a remark made a few pages back1 respecting an essay in the ,north ,american ,review for ,october #ahfd1 applies with equal force here in reference to another essay by the same writer1 in the preceding ,july number of that periodical4 ,at most1 his view can only be unfolded4 ,he has left nothing to be added4 ,in discussing a subject so abstruse and difficult as this1 it would seem1 in the present stage of human thought at least1 most satisfactory to set out from the ,reason rather than the ,sense1 from the idea rather than the phenomenon2 and so will we do4 ,in general1 then1 it may be said that ,space and ,time are a priori conditions of created being4 ,the following extracts are in point4 ,pure ,space1 therefore1 as given in the primitive intuition1 is pure form for any possible phenomenon4 ,as unconjoined in the unity of any form1 it is given in the primitive intuition1 and is a cognition necessary and universal4 ,though now obtained from experience1 and in chronological order subsequent to experience1 yet is it no deduction from experience1 nor at all given by experience2 but it is wholly independent of all experience1 prior to it1 and without which it were impossible that any experience of outer object should be4 ,pure ,time1 as given in the intuition1 is immediately beheld to be conditional for all possible period1 prior to any period being actually limited1 and necessarily continuing1 though all bounded period be taken away4--,rational ,psychology1 pp4 #abe1 #abh4 ,again1 a clearly defined distinction may be made between them as conditions4 ,space is the a priori condition of material being4 ,should a spiritual person1 as the soul of a man1 be stripped of all its material appurtenances1 and left to exist as pure spirit1 it could hold no communication with any other being but ,god2 and no other being but he could hold any communication with it4 ,it would exist out of all relation to ,space4 ,not so1 however1 with ,time4 ,time is the a priori condition of all created being1 of the spiritual as well as material4 ,in the case just alluded to1 the isolated spiritual person would have a consciousness of succession and duration1 although he would have no standard by which to measure that duration1 he could think in processes1 and only in processes1 and thus would be necessarily related to ,time4 ,dr4 ,hickok has expressed this thus3 ,space in reference to time has no significancy4 ,time is the pure form for phenomena as given in the internal sense only1 and in these there can be only succession4 ,the inner phenomenon may endure in time1 but can have neither length1 breadth1 nor thickness in space4 ,a thought1 or other mental phenomenon1 may fill a period1 but cannot have superficial or solid content2 it may be before or after another1 but not above or below it1 nor with any outer or inner side4--,rational ,psychology1 p4 #ace4 ,space and ,time may also be distinguished thus3 ,space has three dimensions1 or1 rather1 there can be three dimensions in space1--length1 breadth1 and thickness4 ,in other words1 it is solid room4 ,time has but one dimension1 or1 rather1 but one dimension can enter into ,time1--length4 ,in ,time there can only be procession4 ,space and ,time may then be called1 the one statical1 the other dynamical1 illimitation4 ,following the essayist already referred to1 they may be defined as follows3 ,space is the infinite and indivisible ,receptacle of ,matter4 ,time is the infinite and indivisible ,receptacle of ,existence4 ,both1 then1 are marked by receptivity1 indivisibility1 and illimitability4 ,the one is receptivity1 that material object may come into it2 the other1 that event may occur in it4 ,there is for neither a final unit nor any limit4 ,all objects are divisible in ,space1 and all periods in ,time2 and thus also are all limits comprehended1 but they are without limit4 ,turning now from these more general aspects of the subject1 a detailed examination may be conducted as follows4 ,the fundamental law given by the ,reason is1 as was seen above1 that ,space and ,time are a priori conditions of created being4 ,we can best consider this law in its application to the facts1 by observing two general divisions1 with two sub-divisions under each4 ,space and ,time have1 then1 two general phases1 one within1 and one without1 the mind4 ,each of these has two special phases4 ,the former1 one in the ,sense1 and one in the ,understanding4 ,the latter1 one within1 and one without1 the ,universe4 ,first general phase within the mind4 ,first special phase1 in the ,sense4 ,as pure form in the primitive intuition1 they are wholly limitless1 and void of any conjunction in unity1 having themselves no figure nor period1 and having within themselves no figure nor period1 but only pure diversity1 in which any possible conjunction of definite figures and periods may1 in some way1 be effected4 ,in other words1 they are pure1 a priori1 formal laws1 which are conditional to the being of any sense as the perceiver of a phenomenon2 and yet this sense could present no figure or period1 till some figure or period was produced into it by an external agency4 ,as such necessary formal laws1 ,space and ,time have a necessity of being independently of all phenomena4 ,or1 in other words1 the fact that all phenomena must appear in them1 lies beyond the province of power4 ,this1 however1 is no more a limit to the ,deity than it is a limit to him that he cannot hate his creatures and be good4 ,in our experience the ,sense gives two kinds of phenomena3 the one the actual phenomena of actual objects1 the other1 ideal phenomena with ideal objects4 ,the one is awakened by the presentation1 in the physical sense1 of a material object1 as a house2 the other1 by the activity of the imaging faculty1 engaged in constructing some form in the inner or mental sense1 from forms actually observed4 ,upon both alike the formal law of ,space and ,time must lie4 ,second special phase1 in the ,understanding4 ,although there is pure form1 if there was no more than this1 no notion of a system of things could be4 ,each object would have its own space1 and each event its own time4 ,but one object and event could not be seen in any relation to another object and event4 ,in order that this shall be1 there must be some ground by which all the spaces and times of phenomena shall be joined into a unity of ,space and ,time2 so that all objects shall be seen in one ,space1 and all events in one ,time4 ,a notional connective for the phenomena may determine these phenomena in their places and periods in the whole of all space and of all time1 and so may give both the phenomena and their space and time in an objective experience4 ,the operation of the ,understanding is1 then1 the connection1 by a notional1 of all particular spaces and times2 i4 e4 the space and time of each phenomenon in the ,sense1 into a comprehensive unity of ,space and ,time1 in which all phenomena can be seen to occur2 and thus a system can be4 ,in a word1 not only must each phenomenon be seen in its own space and time1 but all phenomena must be seen in one ,space and ,time4 ,this connection of the manifold into unity is the peculiar work of the ,understanding4 ,an examination of the facts as above set forth enables us to construct a general formula for the application to all minds of the fundamental law given by the ,reason4 ,that law1 that all objects must be seen in ,space1 and all events in ,time1 involves the subordinate law3 ,that no mind can observe material objects or any events except under the conditions of ,space and ,time2 or1 to change the phraseology1 ,space and ,time are a priori conditional to the being of any mind or faculty in a mind capable of observing a material object or any event4 ,this will1 perhaps1 be deemed to be1 in substance1 ,kant's theory4 ,however that may be1 this is true1 but is only a part of the truth4 ,the rest will appear just below4 ,the reader will notice that no exception is made to the law here laid down1 and will start at the thought that this law lies upon the ,deity equally as upon created beings4 ,no exception is made1 because none can be truthfully made4 ,the intellect is just as unqualified in its assertion on this point as in those noticed on an earlier page of this work4 ,equally with the laws of numbers does the law of ,space and ,time condition all intellect4 ,the ,deity can no more see a house out of all relation to ,space and ,time than he can see how to make two and two five4 ,second general phase1 without the mind4 ,first special phase1 within the ,universe4 ,all that we are now to examine is objective to us2 and all the questions which can arise are questions of fact4 ,let us search for the fact carefully and hold it fearlessly4 ,to recur to the general law4 ,it was found at the outset that ,reason gave the idea of ,space and ,time as pure conditions for matter and event4 ,we are now to observe the pure become the actual condition2 or1 in other words1 we are to see the condition realized4 ,since1 then1 we are to observe material objects and events in a material system1 it is fitting to use the ,sense and the ,understanding2 and our statements and conclusions will conform to those faculties4 ,we have a concept of the ,universe as a vast system in the form of a sphere in which all things are included4 ,this spherical system is complete1 definite1 limited1 and so has boundaries4 ,a portion of immeasurable void--,space--has been occupied4 ,where there was nothing1 something has become4 ,now it is evident that the possibility of our having a concept of the ,universe1 or of a space and a time in the ,universe1 is based upon the presence of an actual1 underlying1 all-pervading substance1 which fills and forms the boundaries of the ,universe1 and thus enables spaces and times to be4 ,we have no concept except as in limits1 and those limits are conceived to be substance4 ,in other words1 space is distance1 and time is duration1 in our concept4 ,take away the boundaries which mark the distance1 and the procession of events which forms the duration1 and in the concept pure negation is left4 ,to illustrate4 ,suppose there be in our presence a cubic yard of vacuum4 ,is this vacuum an entity8 ,not at all4 ,it can neither be perceived by the ,sense nor conceived by the ,understanding4 ,yet it is a space4 ,speaking carelessly1 we should say that this cube was object to us4 ,why8 ,because it is enclosed by substantial boundaries4 ,all1 then1 that is object1 all that is entity1 is substance4 ,in our concept1 therefore1 a space is solid distance within the substance1 and the totality of all distances in the ,universe is conceived to be ,space4 ,again2 suppose there pass before our mind a procession of events4 ,one event has a fixed recurrence4 ,in our concept the procession of events is a time1 and the recurring event marks a period in time4 ,the events proceeding are all that there is in the concept2 and apart from the procession a conception of time is impossible4 ,the procession of all the events of the ,universe1 that is duration1 is our concept of ,time4 ,thus1 within the ,universe1 space is solid distance and time is duration2 and neither has any actuality except as the ,universe is4 ,let us assume for a moment that our concept is the final truth1 and observe the result4 ,in that concept space is limited by matter1 and matter is conceived of as unlimited4 ,this result is natural and necessary1 because matter1 substance1 a space-filling force1 is the underlying notional upon which as ground any concept is possible4 ,if matter is truly illimitable1 then materialistic pantheism1 which is really atheism1 logically follows4 ,again2 in our concept time is duration1 and duration is conceived of as unlimited4 ,if so1 the during event is unlimited4 ,from this hypothesis idealistic pantheism logically follows4 ,but bring our concept into the clear light1 and under the searching eye of ,reason1 and all ground for those systems vanishes instantly4 ,instead of finding matter illimitable and the limit for a space1 ,space is seen to be illimitable and pure condition1 that matter may establish a limit within it4 ,and ,time1 instead of being duration1 and so limited by the during event1 is found to be illimitable and pure condition1 that event may have duration in it4 ,this brings us to the ,second special phase1 without or independent of the ,universe4 ,we have been considering facts in an objective experience1 and have used therefore the ,sense and ,understanding1 as was proper4 ,what we are now to consider is a subject of which all experience is impossible4 ,it can therefore be examined only by that faculty which presents it1 the ,pure ,reason4 ,remove now from our presence all material object in ,space1 and all during event in ,time2 in a word1 remove the ,universe1 and what will be left8 ,as the ,universe had a beginning1 and both it and all things in it are conditioned by ,space and ,time1 so also let it have an end4 ,will its conditions cease in its ceasing8 ,could another ,universe arise1 upon which would be imposed no conditions of ,space and ,time8 ,these questions are answered in the statement of them4 ,those conditions must remain4 ,when we have abstracted from our concept all substance and duration1 there is left only void4 ,hence1 in our concept it would be proper to say that without the ,universe is void1 and before the ,universe there was void4 ,also1 that in void there is no thing1 no where1 and no when2 or1 void is the negation of actual substance1 space and time4 ,but pure ,space and ,time1 as a priori conditions that material object and during event may be1 have not ceased4 ,there is still room1 that an object may become4 ,there is still opportunity1 that an event may occur4 ,by the ,reason it is seen that these conditions have the same necessary being for material object and occurring event1 as the conditions of mental activity have for mind2 and they have their peculiar characteristics exactly according with what they do condition1 just as the laws of thought have their peculiar characteristics1 which exactly suit them to what they condition4 ,if there be a spiritual person1 the moral law must be given in the intuition as necessarily binding upon him2 and this is an a priori condition of the being of such person4 ,precisely similar is the relation between ,space and ,time as a priori conditions1 and object and event upon which they lie4 ,the moral law has its characteristics1 which fit it to condition spiritual person4 ,space and ,time have their characteristics1 which fit them to condition object and event4 ,space1 then1 as room1 and ,time as opportunity1 and both as a priori conditions of a ,universe1 must have the same necessity of being that ,god has4 ,they must be1 as he must be4 ,but observe1 they are pure conditions1 and no more4 ,they are neither things nor persons4 ,the idea of them in the ,reason is simple and unanalyzable4 ,they can be assigned their logical position1 but further than this the mind cannot go4 ,the devout religious soul will start1 perhaps1 at some of the positions stated above4 ,we have not wrought to pain such soul1 but only for truth1 and the clue of escape from all dilemmas4 ,the only question to be raised is1 are they true8 ,if a more patient investigation than we have given to this subject shall show our positions false1 then we shall only have failed as others before us have2 but we shall love the truth which shall be found none the less4 ,but if they shall be found true1 then is it certain that ,god always knew them so and was always pleased with them1 and no derogation to his dignity can come from the proclamation of them1 however much they may contravene hitherto cherished opinions4 ,most blessed next after the ,saviour's tender words of forgiveness are those pure words of the apostle ,john1 ,no lie is of the truth4 ,the conclusions to which we have arrived enable us to state how it is that primarily ,god was out of all relation to ,space and ,time4 ,he was out of all relation to ,space1 because he is not material object1 thereby having limits1 form1 and position in ,space4 ,he was out of all relation to ,time1 because he holds immediately1 and at once1 all possible objects of knowledge before the ,eye of his mind4 ,hence he can learn nothing1 and can experience no process of thought4 ,within his mind no event occurs1 no substance endures4 ,yet1 while this is true1 it is equally true that1 as the ,creator1 he is conditioned by ,space and ,time1 just as he is conditioned by himself2 and it may be found by future examination that they are essential to that ,self4 ,but1 whatever conclusion may be arrived at respecting so difficult and abstract a subject1 this much is certain3 ,god1 as the infinite and absolute spiritual ,person1 self-existent and supreme1 is the great ,fact2 and ,space and ,time1 whatever they are1 will1 can in no wise interfere with and compromise his perfectness and supremacy4 ,it is a pleasure to be able to close this discussion with reflections profound and wise as those contained in the following extract from the essay heretofore alluded to4 ,the reciprocal relations of ,space1 ,time1 and ,god1 are veiled in impenetrable darkness4 ,many minds hesitate to attribute real infinity to ,space and ,time1 lest it should conflict with the infinity of ,god4 ,such timidity has but a slender title to respect4 ,if the ,laws of ,thought necessitate any conclusion whatever1 they necessitate the conclusion that ,space and ,time are each infinite2 and if we cannot reconcile this result with the infinity of ,god1 there is no alternative but to accept of scepticism with as good a grace as possible4 ,no man is worthy to join in the search for truth1 who trembles at the sight of it when found4 ,but a profound faith in the unity of all truth destroys scepticism by anticipation1 and prophesies the solutions of reason4 ,space is infinite1 ,time is infinite1 ,god is infinite2 three infinites coexist4 ,limitation is possible only between existences of the same kind4 ,there could not be two infinite ,spaces1 two infinite ,times1 or two infinite ,gods2 but while infinites of the same kind cannot coexist1 infinites of unlike kinds may4 ,when an hour limits a rod1 infinite ,time will limit infinite ,space2 when a year and an acre limit wisdom1 holiness1 and love1 infinite ,space and ,time will limit the infinite ,god4 ,but not before4 ,time exists ubiquitously1 ,space exists eternally1 ,god exists ubiquitously and eternally4 ,the nature of the relations between the three infinites1 so long as ,space and ,time are ontologically incognizable1 is utterly and absolutely incomprehensible2 but to assume contradiction1 exclusion1 or mutual limitation to be among these relations1 is as gratuitous as it is irreverent4 ,,part ,,iii4 ,,an ,,examination ,,in ,,detail ,,of ,,certain ,,important ,,passages ,,in ,,the ,,writings ,,of ,,the ,,limitists4 ,,additional ,,reflections ,,upon ,,the ,,writings ,,of ,,sir ,,william ,,hamilton4 ,it never formed any part of the plan of this work to give an extended examination of the logician's system of metaphysics1 or even to notice it particularly4 ,from the first1 it was only proposed to attempt the refutation of that peculiar theory which he enounced in his celebrated essay1 ,the ,philosophy of the ,unconditioned1 a monograph that has generally been received as a fair and sufficient presentation thereof2 and which he supplemented1 but never superseded4 ,if the arguments adduced1 and illustrations presented1 in the first part1 in behalf of the fact of the ,pure ,reason1 are satisfactory1 and the analysis and attempted refutation of the celebrated dictum based upon two extremes1 an excluded middle and a mean1 in the second part1 are accepted as sufficient1 as also the criticisms upon certain general corollaries1 and the explanation of certain general questions1 then1 so far at least as ,sir ,william ,hamilton is concerned1 but little1 if any1 further remark will be expected4 ,a few subordinate passages in the essay above referred to may1 however1 it is believed1 be touched with profit by the hand of criticism and explanation4 ,to these1 therefore1 the reader's attention is now called4 ,in remarking upon ,cousin's philosophy1 ,hamilton says3 ,now1 it is manifest that the whole doctrine of ,m4 ,cousin is involved in the proposition1 that the ,unconditioned1 the ,absolute1 the ,infinite1 is immediately known in consciousness1 and this by difference1 plurality1 and relation4 ,it is hardly necessary to repeat here the criticism1 that the terms infinite1 absolute1 c4 are entirely out of place when used to express abstractions4 ,as before1 we ask1 infinite--what8 ,the fact of abstraction is one of the greatest of limitations1 and vitiates every such utterance of the ,limitists4 ,the truth may be thus stated3--,the infinite ,person1 or the necessary principle as inhering in that ,person1 is immediately known in consciousness1 and this1 not by difference1 plurality1 and relation1 but by a direct intuition of the ,pure ,reason4 ,in this act the object seen--the idea--is held right in the ,reason's eye2 and so is seen by itself and in itself4 ,hence it is not known by difference1 because there is no other object but the one before that eye1 with which to compare it4 ,neither is it known by plurality1 because it is seen by itself1 and there is no other object contemplated1 with which to join it4 ,nor is it known by relation1 because it is seen to be what it is in itself1 and as out of all relation4 ,a little below1 in the same paragraph1 ,hamilton again remarks upon ,cousin1 thus3--,the recognition of the absolute as a constitutive principle of intelligence1 our author regards as at once the condition and the end of philosophy4 ,the true idea1 accurately stated1 is as follows4 ,the fact that1 by a constituting law of intelligence1 the ,pure ,reason immediately intuits absoluteness as the distinctive quality of a priori first principles1 and of the infinite ,person in whom they inhere1 is the condition1 and the application of that fact is the end of philosophy4 ,these two erroneous positions the logician follows with his celebrated statement of the opinions which may be entertained regarding the ,unconditioned1 as an immediate object of knowledge and of thought4 ,the four opinions1 to which he reduces all those held by philosophers1 are too well known to need quotation here4 ,they are noticed now1 only to afford an opportunity for the presentation of a fifth1 and1 as it is believed1 the true opinion1 which is as follows4 ,the infinite ,person is inconceivable1 but is cognizable as a fact1 is known to be1 and is1 to a certain extent1 known to be such and such2 all this1 by an immediate intuition of the ,pure ,reason1 of which the spiritual person is definitely conscious2 and that ,person is so seen to be primarily unconditioned1 i4 e4 out of all relation1 difference1 and plurality4 ,inconceivable4 ,as we have repeatedly said1 this word has no force except with regard to things in nature4 ,is cognizable as a fact1 c4 ,nothing can be more certain than that an exhaustive knowledge of the ,deity is impossible to any creature4 ,but equally certain is it1 that1 except as we have some true1 positive1 reliable knowledge of him as he is1 we cannot be moral beings under his moral government4 ,take1 for instance1 the moral law as the expression of ,god's nature4 #a4 ,either ,god is love1 or he is not love--hate2 or he is indifferent1 i4 e4 love has no relation to him4 ,if the last alternative is true1 then the other two have no relevancy to the subject in hand4 ,upon such a supposition1 it is unquestionably true that he is utterly inscrutable4 ,then are we in just the condition which the ,limitists assert4 ,but observe the results respecting ourselves4 ,our whole moral nature is the most bitter1 tantalizing falsehood which it is possible for us to entertain as an object of knowledge4 ,we feel that we ought to love the perfect ,being4 ,at times we go starving for love to him and beg that bread4 ,he has no love to give4 ,he never felt a pulsation of affection4 ,he sits alone on his icy throne1 in a realm of eternal snow2 and1 covered with the canopy1 and shut in by the panoply1 of inscrutable mystery1 he mocks our cry4 ,we beg for bread4 ,he gives us a stone4 ,does such a picture instantly shock1 yea1 horrify1 all our finer sensibilities8 ,does the soul cry out in agony1 her rejection of such a conclusion8 ,in that cry we hear the truth in ,god's voice2 for he made the soul4 ,still less can the thought be entertained that he is hate4 ,it is impossible1 then1 to think of ,god except as love4 ,we know what love is4 ,we know what ,god is4 ,there is a somewhat common to the ,deity and his spiritual creatures4 ,this enables us to attain a final law1 as follows4 ,in so far as ,god's creatures have faculties and capacities in common with him1 in so far do they know him positively2 but in all matters to which their peculiarities as creatures pertain1 they only know him negatively2 i4 e4 they know that he is the opposite of themselves4 ,that passage which was quoted in a former page1 simply to prove that ,sir ,william ,hamilton denied the reality of the ,reason as distinct from the ,understanding1 requires and will now receive a particular examination4 ,he says3 ,in the ,kantian philosophy1 both faculties perform the same function2 both seek the one in the many2--the ,idea 7,idee7 is only the ,concept 7,begriff7 sublimated into the inconceivable2 ,reason only the ,understanding which has 'overleaped itself4' ,in this sentence1 and the remarks which follow it1 the logician shows that he neither comprehends the assigned function and province of the ,reason1 nor possesses any accurate knowledge of the mental phenomena upon which he passes judgment4 ,a diagnosis could not well be more thoroughly erroneous than his4 ,for both faculties do not perform the same function4 ,only the ,understanding seeks the one in the many4 ,the ,reason seeks the many in the one4 ,the functions and modes of activity of the two faculties are exactly opposite4 ,the ,understanding runs about through the universe1 and gathers up what facts it may1 and concludes truth therefrom4 ,the ,reason sees the truth first1 as necessary a priori law1 and holding it up as standard1 measures facts by it1 or uses the ,sense to find the facts in which it inheres4 ,besides1 the author1 in this assertion1 is guilty of a most glaring petitio principii4 ,for1 the very question at issue is1 whether both faculties do perform the same function2 whether both do seek the one in the many4 ,in order not to leave the hither side of the question built upon a bare assertion1 it will be proper to revert to a few of those proofs adduced heretofore4 ,the ,reason sees the truth first4 ,take now the assertion1 ,malice is criminal4 ,is this primarily learned by experience2 or is it an intuitive conviction1 which conditions experience4 ,or1 in more general terms1 does a child need to be taught what guilt is1 before it can feel guilty1 as it is taught its letters before it can read2 or does the feeling of guilt arise within it spontaneously1 upon a breach of known law4 ,if the latter be the true experience1 then it can only be accounted for upon the ground that an idea of right and wrong1 as an a priori law1 is organic in man2 and1 by our definition1 the presentation of this law to the attention in consciousness is the act of the ,reason4 ,upon such a theory the one principle was not sought1 and is not found1 in the many acts1 but the many acts are compared with1 and judged by1 that one standard1 which was seen first1 and as necessarily true4 ,take another illustration4 ,all religions1 in accounting for the universe1 have one common point of agreement1 which is1 that some being or beings1 superior to it and men1 produced it4 ,and1 except perhaps among the most degraded1 the more subtle notion of a final cause1 though often developed in a crude form1 is associated with the other4 ,these notions must be accounted for4 ,how shall it be done8 ,are they the result of experience8 ,then1 the first human beings had no such notions4 ,but another and more palpable objection arises4 ,are they the result of individual experience8 ,then there would be as many religions as individuals4 ,but1 very ignorant people have the experience1--persons who never learned anything but the rudest forms of work1 from the accumulated experience of others2 nor by their own experience1 to make the smallest improvement in a simple agricultural instrument4 ,how1 then1 could they learn by experience one of the profoundest speculative ideas8 ,as a last resort1 it may be said they were taught it by philosophers4 ,but this is negatived by the fact1 that philosophers do not1 to any considerable extent1 teach the people1 either immediately or mediately2 but that generally those who have the least philosophy have the largest influence4 ,and what is most in point1 none of these hypotheses will account for the fact1 that the gist of the idea1 however crude its form1 is everywhere the same4 ,be it a ,fetish1 or ,brahm1 or ,god1 in the kernel final cause will be found4 ,it would seem that any candid mind must acknowledge that no combined effort of men1 were this possible1 could secure such universal exactitude4 ,but turn now and examine any individual in the same direction1 as we did just above1 respecting the question of right and wrong1 and a plain answer will come directly4 ,the notion of first cause1 however crude and rudimentary its form1 is organic4 ,it arises1 then1 spontaneously1 and the individual takes it--the one1--and in it finds a reason for the phenomena of nature--the many1--and is satisfied4 ,and this is an experience not peculiar to the philosopher2 but is shared equally by the illiterate1--those entirely unacquainted with scientific abstractions4 ,these illustrations might be carried to an almost indefinite length1 showing that commonly1 in the every-day experiences of life1 men are accustomed not only to observe phenomena and form conclusions1 as ,it is cloudy to-day1 and may rain to-morrow1 but also to measure phenomena by an original and fixed standard1 as1 ,this man is malicious1 and therefore wicked4 ,between the two modes of procedure1 the following distinction may always be observed4 ,conclusions are always doubtful1 only probable4 ,decisions are always certain4 ,conclusions give us what may be1 decisions what must be4 ,the former result from concepts and experience1 the latter from intuitions and logical processes4 ,thus is made plain the fact that1 to give it the most favorable aspect1 ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 in his eagerness to maintain his theory1 has entirely mistaken one class of human experiences1 and so was led to deny the actuality of the most profound and important faculty of the human mind4 ,in view of the foregoing results1 one need not hesitate to say that1 whether he ever attempted it or not1 ,kant never has clearly shown that the idea of the unconditioned can have no objective reality1 for it is impossible to do this1 the opposite being the truth4 ,its objective reality is ,god2 it therefore conveys to us the most important knowledge1 and involves no contradictions4 ,moreover1 unconditionedness is a simple1 positive1 notion1 and not a fasciculus of negations2 but is an attribute of ,god1 who comprehends all positives4 ,a little after1 ,hamilton says3 ,and while he ,kant appropriated ,reason as a specific faculty to take cognizance of these negations1 hypostatized as positive1 under the ,platonic name of ,ideas1 c4 ,here1 again1 the psychological question arises1 ,is the ,reason such a faculty8 ,are its supposed objects negations8 ,are they hypostatized as positive8 ,evidently1 if we establish an affirmative answer to the first question1 a negative to the others follows directly1 and the logician's system is a failure4 ,again1 the discrimination of thought into positive and negative is simply absurd4 ,all thought is positive4 ,the phrase1 negative thought1 is only a convenient expression for the refusal of the mind to think4 ,but ,ideas are not thoughts at all1 in the strict sense of that term4 ,it refers to the operations of the mind upon objects which have been presented4 ,ideas are a part of such objects4 ,all objects in the mind are positive4 ,the phrase1 negative object1 is a contradiction4 ,but1 without any deduction1 we see immediately that ideas are positives4 ,the common consciousness of the human race affirms this4 ,the following remark upon ,cousin requires some notice4 ,for those who1 with ,m4 ,cousin1 regard the notion of the unconditioned as a positive and real knowledge of existence in its all-comprehensive unity1 and who consequently employ the terms ,absolute1 ,infinite1 ,unconditioned1 as only various expressions for the same identity1 are imperatively bound to prove that their idea of the ,one corresponds1 either with that ,unconditioned we have distinguished as the ,absolute1 or with that ,unconditioned we have distinguished as the ,infinite1 or that it includes both1 or that it excludes both4 ,this they have not done1 and1 we suspect1 have never attempted to do4 ,the italics are ,hamilton's4 ,the above statement is invalid1 for the following reasons4 ,the ,absolute1 therein named1 has been shown to be irrelevant to the matter in hand1 and an absurdity4 ,it is self-evident that the term limited whole1 as applied to ,space and ,time1 is a violation of the laws of thought4 ,since we seek the truth1 that ,absolute must be rejected4 ,again1 the definitions of the terms absolute and infinite1 which have been found consistent1 and pertinent to ,space and ,time1 have been further found irrelevant and meaningless1 when applied to the ,being1 the ,one1 who is the ,creator4 ,that ,being1 existing primarily out of all relation to ,space and ,time1 must1 if known at all1 be studied1 and known as he is4 ,the terms infinite and absolute will1 of necessity1 then1 when applied to him1 have entirely different significations from what they will when applied to ,space and ,time4 ,so1 then1 no decision of questions arising in this latter sphere will have other than a negative value in the former4 ,the questions in that sphere must be decided on their own merits1 as must those in this4 ,what is really required1 then1 is1 that the ,one1 the ,person1 be shown to be both absolute and infinite1 and that these1 as qualities1 consistently inhere in that unity4 ,as this has already been done in the first ,part of this treatise1 nothing need be added here4 ,some pages afterwards1 in again remarking upon ,m4 ,cousin1 ,hamilton quotes from him as follows3 ,the condition of intelligence is difference2 and an act of knowledge is only possible where there exists a plurality of terms4 ,in a subsequent paragraph the essayist argues from this1 thus3 ,but1 on the other hand1 it is asserted1 that the condition of intelligence1 as knowing1 is plurality and difference2 consequently1 the condition of the absolute as existing1 and under which it must be known1 and the condition of intelligence1 as capable of knowing1 are incompatible4 ,for1 if we suppose the absolute cognizable1 it must be identified either1 first1 with the subject knowing2 or1 second1 with the object known2 or1 third1 with the indifference of both4 ,rejecting the first two1 ,hamilton says3 ,the third hypothesis1 on the other hand1 is contradictory of the plurality of intelligence2 for1 if the subject of consciousness be known as one1 a plurality of terms is not the necessary condition of intelligence4 ,the alternative is therefore necessary3 ,either the absolute cannot be known or conceived at all1 or our author is wrong in subjecting thought to the conditions of plurality and difference4 ,in these extracts may be detected an error which1 so far as the author is informed1 has been hitherto overlooked by philosophers4 ,the logician presents an alternative which is unquestionably valid4 ,yet with almost1 if not entire unanimity1 writers have been accustomed to assign plurality1 relation1 difference1 and--to adopt a valuable suggestion of ,mr4 ,spencer--likeness1 as conditions of all knowledge2 and among them those who have claimed for man a positive knowledge of the absolute4 ,the error by which they have been drawn into this contradiction is purely psychological2 and arises1 like the other errors which we have pointed out1 from an attempt to carry over the laws of the animal nature1 the ,sense and ,understanding1 by which man learns of1 and concludes about1 things in nature1 to the ,pure ,reason1 by which he sees and knows1 with an absolutely certain knowledge1 principles and laws2 and to subject this faculty to those conditions4 ,now1 there can be no doubt but that if the logician's premiss is true1 the conclusion is unavoidable4 ,if an act of knowledge is only possible where there exists a plurality of terms1 then is it impossible that we should know ,god1 or that he should know himself4 ,the logic is impregnable4 ,but the conclusion is revolting4 ,what must be done1 then8 ,erect some makeshift subterfuge of mental impotence8 ,it will not meet the exigency of the case4 ,it will not satisfy the demand of the soul4 ,nay1 more1 she casts it out utterly1 as a most gross insult4 ,unquestionably1 but one course is left2 and that is so plain1 that one cannot see how even a ,limitist could have overlooked it4 ,correct the premiss4 ,study out the true psychology1 and that will give us perfect consistency4 ,hold with a death-grip to the principle that every truth is in complete harmony with every other truth2 and hold with no less tenacity to the principle that the human intellect is true4 ,and what is the true premiss which through an irrefutable logic will give us a satisfactory1 a true1 an undoubted conclusion4 ,this4 ,a plurality of terms is not the necessary condition of intelligence2 but objects which are pure1 simple1 unanalyzable1 may be directly known by an intellect4 ,or1 to be more explicit4 ,plurality1 relation1 difference1 and likeness1 are necessary conditions of intelligence through the ,sense and ,understanding2 but they do not in the least degree lie upon the ,reason1 which sees its objects as pure1 simple ideas which are self-evident1 and1 consequently1 are not subject to those conditions4 ,whatever knowledge we may have of mammals1 we undoubtedly gain under the conditions of plurality1 relation1 difference1 and likeness2 for mammals are things in nature4 ,but absoluteness is a pure1 simple1 unanalyzable idea in the ,reason1 and as such is seen and known by a direct insight as out of all plurality1 relation1 difference1 and likeness3 for this is a quality of the self-existent ,person1 and so belongs wholly to the sphere of the supernatural1 and can be examined only by a spiritual person who is also supernatural4 ,let us illustrate these two kinds of knowledge4 #a4 ,the knowledge given by the ,sense and ,understanding4 ,this is of material objects4 ,take1 for example1 an apple4 ,the ,sense observes it as one of many apples1 and that many characteristics belong to it as one apple4 ,among these1 color1 skin1 pulp1 juices1 flavor1 c4 may be mentioned4 ,it observes1 also1 that it bears a relation to the stem and tree on which it grows1 and1 as well1 that its several qualities have relations among themselves4 ,one color belongs to the skin1 another to the pulp4 ,the skin1 as cover1 relates to the pulp as covered1 and the like4 ,the apple1 moreover1 is distinguished from other fruits by marks of difference and marks of likeness4 ,it has a different skin1 a different pulp1 and a different flavor4 ,yet1 it is like other fruits1 in that it grows on a tree1 and possesses those marks just named1 which1 though differing among themselves1 according to the fruit in which they inhere1 have a commonality of kind1 as compared with other objects4 ,this distinguishing1 analyzing1 and classifying of characteristics1 and connecting them into a unity1 as an apple1 is the work of the ,sense and ,understanding4 #b4 ,the knowledge given by the ,pure ,reason4 ,this is of a priori laws1 of these laws combined in pure archetypal forms1 and of ,god as the ,supreme ,being who comprehends all laws and forms4 ,a fundamental difference in the two modes of activity immediately strikes one's attention4 ,in the former case1 the mode was by distinguishment and analysis4 ,in the latter it is by comprehension and synthesis4 ,take the idea of moral obligation to illustrate this topic4 ,no one but a ,limitist will1 it is believed1 contend against the position of ,dr ,hopkins1 that this idea of obligation or oughtness is a simple idea4 ,this being once acceded1 carries with it the whole theory which the author seeks to maintain4 ,how may a simple idea be known8 ,it cannot be distinguished or analyzed4 ,being simple1 it is sui generis4 ,hence1 it cannot be known by plurality or relation1 difference or likeness4 ,if known at all1 it must be known as it is in itself1 by a spontaneous insight4 ,such1 in fact1 is the mode of the activity of the ,pure ,reason1 and such are the objects of that activity4 ,in maintaining1 then1 the doctrine of intellectual intuition1 ,m4 ,cousin was right1 but wrong in subjecting all knowledge to the conditions of plurality and difference4 ,near the close of the essay under examination ,sir ,wm4 ,hamilton states certain problems1 which he is confident ,cousin cannot solve4 ,there is nothing very difficult about them2 and it is a wonder that he should have so presented them4 ,following the passage--which is here quoted--will be found what appear simple and easy solutions4 ,but 7to say nothing of remoter difficulties7--7#a7 how liberty can be conceived1 supposing always a plurality of modes of activity1 without a knowledge of that plurality2--7#b7 how a faculty can resolve to act by preference in a particular manner1 and not determine itself by final causes2--7#c7 how intelligence can influence a blind power1 without operating as an efficient cause2--7#d7 or how1 in fine1 morality can be founded on a liberty which at best only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance2--these are problems which ,m4 ,cousin1 in none of his works1 has stated1 and which we are confident he is unable to solve4 #a4 ,liberty cannot be conceived4 ,it must be intuited4 ,there is a plurality of modes1 and there is a knowledge of that plurality4 #b4 ,a faculty cannot resolve to act2 cannot have a preference2 and cannot determine itself at all4 ,only a spiritual person can resolve1 can have a preference1 can determine4 #c4 ,intelligence cannot influence4 ,blind power cannot be influenced4 ,only a spiritual person can be influenced1 and he by object through the intelligence as medium1 and only he can be an efficient cause4 #d4 ,morality cannot be founded on a liberty1 which only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance2 and1 what is more1 such a liberty is impossible1 and to speak of it as possible is absurd4 ,what vitiates the processes of thought of the ,limitists so largely1 crops out very plainly here3 viz41 the employment both in thinking and expressions of faculties1 capacities1 and qualities1 as if they possessed all the powers of persons4 ,this habit is thoroughly erroneous1 and destructive of truth4 ,the truth desired to answer this whole passage1 may be stated in exact terms thus3 ,the infinite and absolute spiritual ,person1 the ultimate and indestructible1 and indivisible and composite unit1 possesses as a necessary quality of personality pure liberty2 which is freedom from compulsion or restraint in the choice of one of two possible ends4 ,this ,person intuits a multitude of modes of activity4 ,he possesses also perfect wisdom1 which enables him1 having chosen the right end1 to determine with unerring accuracy which one of all the modes of activity is the best to secure the end4 ,involved in the choice of the end1 is the determination to put in force the best means for securing that end4 ,hence this ,person decides that the best mode shall be4 ,he also possesses all-power4 ,this is his endowment1 not that of his intelligence4 ,the intelligence is not person1 but faculty in the person4 ,so is it with the power4 ,so then this ,person1 intuiting through his intelligence what is befitting his dignity1 puts forth1 in accordance therewith1 his power2 and is efficient cause4 ,such a being is neither under necessity nor chance4 ,he is not under necessity1 because there is no constraint which compels him to choose the right end1 rather than the wrong one4 ,he is not under chance1 because he is certain which is the best mode of action to gain the end chosen4 ,in this distinction between ends and modes of activity1 which has been so clearly set forth by ,rev4 ,mark ,hopkins1 ,d4 ,d41 and in the motions of spiritual persons in each sphere1 lie the ground for answering all difficulties raised by the advocates of necessity or chance4 ,with these remarks we close the discussion of ,hamilton's philosophical system1 and proceed to take up the teachings of his followers4 ,,review ,,of ,,limits ,,of ,,religious ,,thought4 ,this volume is one which will always awaken in the mind of the candid and reflective reader a feeling of profound respect4 ,the writer is manifestly a deeply religious man4 ,the book bears the marks of piety1 and an earnest search after the truth respecting that august ,being whom its author reverentially worships4 ,however far wrong we may believe him to have gone in his speculative theory1 his devout spirit must ever inspire esteem4 ,though it is ours to criticize and condemn the intellectual principles upon which his work is based1 we cannot but desire to be like him1 in rendering solemn homage to the ,being he deems inscrutable4 ,in proceeding with our examination1 all the defects which were formerly noticed as belonging to the system of the ,limitists will here be found plainly observable4 ,following his teacher1 ,mr4 ,mansel holds the ,understanding to be the highest faculty of the human intellect1 and the consequent corollary that a judgment is its highest form of knowledge4 ,the word conceive he therefore uses as expressive of the act of the mind in grasping together various marks into a concept1 when that word and act of mind are utterly irrelevant to the object to which he applies them2 and hence they can have no meaning as used4 ,we shall see him speak of starting from the divine1 and reasoning down to the human2 or of starting from the human1 and reasoning up to the divine2 where1 upon the hypothesis that the two are entirely diverse1 no reasoning process1 based upon either one1 can reach the other4 ,on the other hand1 if any knowledge of ,god is possible to the created mind1 it is only on the ground that there is a similarity1 an exact likeness in certain respects1 between the two2 in other words1 that the ,creator plainly declared a simple fact1 in literal language1 when he said1 ,god made man in his own image4 ,if man's mind is wholly unlike ,god's mind1 he cannot know truth as ,god knows it4 ,and if the human intellect is thus faulty1 man cannot be the subject of a moral government1 for every subject of a moral government is amenable to law4 ,in order to be so amenable1 he must know the law as it is4 ,no phantasmagoria of law1 no silhouette will do4 ,it must be immediately seen1 and known to be binding4 ,truth is one4 ,he1 then1 who sees it as it is1 and knows it to be binding1 sees it as ,god sees it1 and feels the same obligation that ,god feels4 ,and such an one must man be if he is a moral agent4 ,whether he is such an agent or not1 we will not argue here2 since all governments and laws of society are founded upon the hypothesis that he is1 it may well be assumed as granted4 ,of the three terms1 familiar as household words1 which ,mr4 ,mansel1 in his second lecture1 proceeds to examine1 it is to be said1 that ,first ,cause1 if properly mentioned at all1 should have been put last2 and that ,infinite and ,absolute are not pertinent to ,cause1 but to ,person4 ,so then when we consider the ,deity as ,he is1 we consider him1 not as ,cause1 for this is incidental1 but as the infinite and absolute ,person1 for these three marks are essential4 ,further1 these last-mentioned terms express ideas in the ,reason2 while the term ,cause expresses an a priori ,element of connection1 and thus a primitive understanding-conception4 ,hardly more satisfactory than his use of the term ,cause is his definition of the terms absolute and infinite4 ,he defines the ,absolute to be that which exists in and by itself1 having no necessary relation to any other ,being1 when it is rather the exclusion of the possibility of any other ,being4 ,again1 he defines the ,infinite to be that which is free from all possible limitation2 that than which a greater is inconceivable2 and which1 consequently1 can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence which it had not from all eternity4 ,that which means the thing which1 for which is neuter4 ,mr4 ,mansel's infinite is1 then1 the ,thing4 ,this ,thing is free from all possible limitation4 ,how can that be when the ,being he thus defines is1 must be1 necessarily existent1 and so is bound by one of the greatest of limitations1 the inability to cease to be4 ,but some light may be thrown upon his use of the term limitation by the subsequent portions of his definition4 ,the ,thing which is free from all possible limitation is that than which a greater is inconceivable4 ,moreover1 this greatest of all possible things possesses all possible attributes1 and is in every possible mode of existence from all eternity4 ,respecting the phrase than which a greater is inconceivable1 two suppositions may be made4 ,either there may be a thing greater than1 and diverse from1 all other things2 or there may be a thing greater than1 and including all1 other things4 ,probably the latter is ,mr4 ,mansel's thought2 but it is ,materialistic ,pantheism4 ,this ,being must be in every mode of existence from all eternity4 ,personality is a mode of existence2 therefore this ,being must forever have been in that mode4 ,but impersonality is also a mode of existence1 therefore this ,being must forever have been in that mode4 ,yet again these two modes are contradictory and mutually exclusive2 then this ,being must have been from all eternity in two contradictory and mutually exclusive modes of existence6 ,is further remark necessary to show that ,mr4 ,mansel's definition is thoroughly vitiated by the understanding-conception that infinity is amount1 and is1 therefore1 utterly worthless8 ,can there be a thing so great as to be without limits8 ,has greatness anything to do with infinity8 ,manifestly not4 ,it becomes necessary1 then1 to recur to and amplify those definitions which we have already given to the terms he uses4 ,absoluteness and infinity are qualities of the necessary ,being4 ,absoluteness is that quality of the necessary ,being by which he is endowed with self-existence1 self-dependence1 and totality4 ,or in other words1 having this quality1 he is wholly independent of any other being2 and also the possibility of the existence of any other independent ,being is excluded2 and so he is the ,complete1 the ,final1 upon whom all possible beings must depend4 ,infinity is that quality of the necessary ,being which gives him universality in the totality4 ,it expresses the fact1 that he possesses all possible endowments in perfection4 ,possessing these qualities1 that ,being is free from any external restraint or limitation2 but those restraints and limitations1 which his very constituting elements themselves impose1 are not removed by these qualities4 ,for instance1 the possession of ,love1 ,mercy1 ,justice1 ,wisdom1 ,power1 and the like1 are essential to ,god's entirety2 and the possession of them in perfect harmony is essential to his perfectness in the entirety4 ,this fact of perfect harmony1 exact balance1 bars him from the undue exercise of any one of his attributes2 or1 concisely1 his perfection restrains him from being imperfect4 ,we revert1 then1 to the fundamental distinction1 attained heretofore1 between improper limitations1 or those which are involved in perfection2 and proper limitations1 or those which are involved in deficiency and dependence2 and applying it here1 we see that those limitations1 which we speak of as belonging to ,god1 are not indicative of a lack1 but rather are necessarily incidental to that possession of all possible perfection which constitutes him the ,ultimate4 ,in this view infinity can have no relevancy to number4 ,it is not that ,god has one1 or one million endowments4 ,it asks no question about the number2 and cares not for it4 ,it is satisfied in the assertion that he possesses all that are possible1 and in perfect harmony4 ,it is1 further1 an idea1 not a concept4 ,it must be intuited1 for it cannot be conceived4 ,no analogy of line or surface has any pertinence2 because these are concepts1 belonging wholly in the ,understanding and ,sense1 where no idea can come4 ,yet it may be1 is1 the quality of an intelligence endowed with a limited number of attributes2--for there can be no number without limitation1 since the phrase unlimited number is a contradiction of terms2--but this limitation involves no lack1 because there are no others1 which can be thereby related to it1 as cognate or opposite modes of consciousness4 ,without doubt it is1 in a certain sense1 true1 that the metaphysical representation of the ,deity1 as absolute and infinite1 must necessarily1 as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged1 amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality4 ,this sense is that all reality is by him1 and for him1 and from him2 and is utterly dependent upon him4 ,but ,hegel's conclusion by no means follows1 in which he says3 ,what kind of an ,absolute ,being is that which does not contain in itself all that is actual1 even evil included4 ,this is founded upon the suppressed premiss1 that such a ,being must do what he does1 and his creatures must do what they do2 and so evil must come4 ,this much only can be admitted1 and this may be admitted1 without derogating aught from ,god's perfectness3 viz41 that he sees in the ideals of his ,reason how his laws may be violated1 and so1 how sin may and will be in this moral system2 but it is a perversion of words to say that this knowledge on the part of ,god is evil4 ,the knowing how a moral agent may break the perfect law1 is involved in the knowing how such agent may keep that law4 ,but the fact of the knowledge does not involve any whit of consent to the act of violation4 ,on the other hand1 it may1 does1 become the ground for the putting forth of every wise effort to prevent that act4 ,again2 evil is produced by those persons whom ,god has made1 who violate his moral laws4 ,he being perfectly wise and perfectly good1 for perfectly wise and good reasons sustains them in the ability to sin4 ,there can be1 in the nature of things1 no persons at all1 without this ability to sin4 ,but ,god does not direct them to sin2 neither when they do sin does any stain fall upon him for sustaining their existence during their sinning4 ,that definition of the term absolute1 upon which ,hegel bases his assertion1 is one fit only for the ,sense and ,understanding2 as if ,god was the physical sum of all existence4 ,it is ,materialistic ,pantheism4 ,but by observing the definitions and distinctions1 which have been heretofore laid down1 it may be readily seen how an actual mode of existence1 as that of finite person1 may be denied to ,god1 and no lack be indicated thereby4 ,hegel's blasphemy may1 then1 be answered as follows3 ,god is the infinite and absolute spiritual ,person4 ,personality is the form of his being4 ,the form cannot be empty4 ,organized essence fills the form4 ,infinity and absoluteness are qualities of the ,person as thus organized4 ,the quality of absoluteness1 for instance1 as transfusing the essence1 is the endowment of pure independence1 and involves the exclusion of the possibility of any other independent ,being1 and the possession of the ability to create every possible dependent being4 ,in so far1 then1 as ,hegel's assertion means that no being can exist1 and do evil1 except he is created and sustained by the ,deity1 it is true4 ,but in so far as it means--and this is undoubtedly what ,hegel did mean--that ,god must be the efficient author of sin1 that1 forced by the iron rod of ,fate1 he must produce evil1 the assertion is utterly false1 and could only have been uttered by one who1 having dwelt all his life in the gloomy cave of the ,understanding1 possessed not even a tolerably correct notion of the true nature of the subject he had in hand1--the character of ,god4 ,from the above considerations it is apparent that all the requirements of the ,reason are fulfilled when it is asserted that all things--the ,universe--are dependent upon ,god2 and he is utterly independent4 ,the paragraphs next succeeding1 which have been quoted with entire approbation by ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer1 are thoroughly vitiated by their author's indefensible assumption1 that cause is indispensable to our idea of the ,deity4 ,as was remarked above1 the notion of cause is incidental4 ,the ,deity may or may not become a cause1 as he shall decide4 ,but he has no choice as to whether he shall be a person or not4 ,hence we may freely admit that the cause1 as such1 exists only in relation to its effect3 the cause is a cause of the effect2 the effect is an effect of the cause4 ,it is also true that the conception--idea--of the ,absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation4 ,the position we have taken is in advance of this1 for we say1 involves an actual existence out of all relation4 ,introducing1 then1 not the idea of succession in time1 but the idea of the logical order1 we rightly say1 the ,absolute exists first by itself1 and afterwards becomes a ,cause4 ,nor are we here checked by the third conception1 that of the ,infinite4 ,causation is a possible mode of existence1 and yet that which exists without causing is infinite4 ,how is this8 ,it is thus4 ,infinity is the universality of perfect endowment4 ,now1 taking as the point of departure the first creative nisus or effort of the ,deity1 this is true4 ,before that act he was perfect in every possible endowment1 and accorded his choice thereto4 ,he was able to create1 but did not1 for a good and sufficient reason4 ,in and after that act1 he was still perfect as before4 ,that act then involved no essential change in ,god4 ,but he was in one mode of being before1 and in another mode of being in and after that act4 ,yet he was equally perfect1 and equally blessed1 before as after4 ,what then follows8 ,this3 that there was some good and sufficient reason why before that act he should be a potential creator1 and in that act he should become an actual creator3 and this reason preserves the perfection1 i4 e4 the infinity of ,god1 equally in both modes4 ,when1 then1 ,mr4 ,mansel says1 if ,causation is a possible mode of existence1 that which exists without causing is not infinite1 that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its former limits1 his utterance is prompted by that pantheistic understanding-conception of ,god1 which thinks him the sum of all that was1 and is1 and ever shall be1 or can be2 and that in all this1 he is actual4 ,on the other hand1 as we have seen1 all that is required to fulfil the idea of infinity is1 that the ,being1 whom it qualifies1 possesses all fulness1 has all the forms and springs of being in himself4 ,it is optional with him whether he will create or not2 and his remaining out of all relation1 or his creating a ,universe1 and thus establishing relations to and for himself1 in no way affect his essential nature1 i4 e4 his infinity4 ,he is a person1 possessing all possible endowments1 and in this does his infinity consist4 ,in this view1 creation at any particular moment of time is seen to be the only possible hypothesis by which to account for the ,universe4 ,such a ,person1 the necessary ,being1 must have been in existence before the ,universe2 and his first act in producing that ,universe would mark the first moment of time4 ,no alternative of ,pantheism is1 can be1 presented to the advocates of this theory4 ,on the other hand1 that scheme is seen to be both impossible and absurd4 ,one cannot disagree with ,mr4 ,mansel1 when in the next paragraph he says1 that1 supposing the ,absolute to become a cause1 it will follow that it operates by means of free will and consciousness4 ,but the difficulties which he then raises lie only in the ,understanding1 and may be explained thus4 ,always in ,god's consciousness the subject and object are identical4 ,all that ,god is1 is always present to his ,eye4 ,hence all relations always appear subordinate to1 and dependent upon him2 and it is a misapprehension of the true idea to suppose1 that any relation which falls in idea within him1 and only becomes actual at his will1 is any proper limitation4 ,both subject and object are thus absolute1 being identical2 and yet there is no contradiction4 ,the difficulty is further raised that there cannot be in the absolute ,being any interrelations1 as of attributes among themselves1 or of attributes to the ,being4 ,this arises from an erroneous definition of the term absolute4 ,the definition heretofore given in this treatise presents no such difficulty4 ,the possession of these attributes and interrelations is essential to the exclusion by then possessor of another independent ,being2 and it is a perversion to so use a quality which is essential to a being1 that it shall militate against the consistency of his being what he must be4 ,if then the almost unanimous voice of philosophy1 in pronouncing that the absolute is both one and simple1 uses the term simple in the same sense that it would have when applied to the idea of moral obligation1 viz41 that it is unanalyzable1 then that voice is wrong1 just as thoroughly as the voice of antiquity in favor of the ,ptolemaic system of ,astronomy was wrong2 and is to be treated as that was4 ,on such questions opinions have no weight4 ,the search is after a knowledge which is sure1 and which every man may have within himself4 ,we land1 then1 in no inextricable dilemma4 ,the absolute ,person we see to be conscious2 and to possess complexity in unity1 universality in totality4 ,by an immediate intuition we know him as primarily out of all relation1 plurality1 difference1 and likeness2 and yet as having1 of his own self1 established the ,universe1 which is still entirely dependent upon him2 from which he differs1 and with which he is not identified4 ,again ,mr4 ,mansel says3 ,a mental attribute to be conceived as infinite1 must be in actual exercise on every possible object3 otherwise it is potential only1 with regard to those on which it is not exercised2 and an unrealized potentiality is a limitation4 ,with our interpretation the assertion is true and contains no puzzle4 ,every mental attribute of the ,deity is most assuredly in actual exercise1 upon every one of its possible objects as ideas4 ,but the objects are not therefore actual4 ,neither is there any need that they should ever become so4 ,he sees them just as clearly1 and knows them just as thoroughly as ideals1 as he does as actual objects4 ,all ideal objects are unrealized potentialities2 and yet they are the opposite of limitations proper4 ,but this sentence1 as an expression of the thought which ,mr4 ,mansel seemingly wished to convey1 is vitiated by the presence of that understanding-conception that infinity is amount1 which must be actual4 ,once regard infinity as quality of the necessarily existent ,person1 and it directly follows that this or that act1 of that ,person1 in no way disturbs that infinity4 ,the quality conditions the acting being2 but the act of that being cannot limit the quality4 ,the quality is1 that the act may be2 not the reverse4 ,hence the questions arising from the interrelations of ,power and ,goodness1 ,justice and ,mercy1 are solved at once4 ,infinity as quality1 not amount1 pervades them all1 and holds them all in perfect harmony1 adjusting each to each1 in a melody more beautiful than that of the spheres4 ,even the existence of ,evil is compatible with that of this perfectly good ,being4 ,he does not will that it shall be2 neither does he will that it shall not be4 ,if he willed that it should not be1 and it was1 then he would be thwarted2 but only on such a hypothesis can the conclusion follow4 ,but he does will that certain creatures shall be1 who1 though dependent upon him for existence and sustenance1 are1 like him1 final causes1--the final arbiters of their own destinies1 who in the choice of ends are unrestrained1 and may choose good or ill4 ,he made these creatures1 knowing that some of them would choose wrong1 and so evil would be3 but he did not will the evil4 ,he only willed the conditions upon which evil was possible1 and placed all proper bars to prevent the evil2 and the a priori facts of his immutable perfection in endowments1 and of his untarnished holiness1 are decisive of the consequent fact1 that1 in willing those conditions1 ,god did the very best possible deed4 ,if it be further asserted that the fact1 that the ,being who possesses all possible endowments in perfection could not wisely prevent sin1 is a limitation2 and1 further1 that it were better to have prevented sin by an unwise act than to have permitted it by a wise act2 it can only be replied3 ,this is the same as to say1 that it is essential to ,god's perfection that he be imperfect2 or1 that it was better for the perfect ,being to violate his ,self than to permit sin4 ,if any one in his thinking chooses to accept of such alternatives1 there remains no ground of argument with him2 but only a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the adversary4 ,carrying on his presentation of difficulties1 ,mr4 ,mansel further remarks3 ,let us however suppose for an instant1 that these difficulties are surmounted1 and the existence of the ,absolute securely established on the testimony of reason4 ,still we have not succeeded in reconciling this idea with that of a ,cause3 we have done nothing towards explaining how the absolute can give rise to the relative1 the infinite to the finite4 ,if the condition of causal activity is a higher state than that of quiescence1 the absolute1 whether acting voluntarily or involuntarily1 has passed from a condition of comparative imperfection to one of comparative perfection2 and therefore was not originally perfect4 ,if the state of activity is an inferior state to that of quiescence1 the ,absolute1 in becoming a cause1 has lost its original perfection4 ,on this topic we can but repeat the argument heretofore adduced4 ,let the supposition be entertained that perfection does not belong to a state1 but to ,god's nature1 to what ,god is1 as ground for what ,god does1 and standing in the logical order before his act2 and it will directly appear that a state of quiescence or a state of activity in no way modifies his perfection4 ,what ,god is1 remains permanent and perfect1 and his acts are only manifestations of that permanent and perfect4 ,it follows1 then1 taking the first moment of time as the point of departure1 that1 before that point1 ,god was in a state of complete blessedness1 and that after that point he was also in such a state2 and1 further1 that while these two states are equal1 there is not complete indifference1 because there was a reason1 clearly seen by the ,divine mind1 why the passage from quiescence to activity should be when it was1 and as it was1 and that this reason having been acknowledged in his conduct1 gives to the two states equality1 and yet differentiates the one from the other4 ,again1 how can the ,relative be conceived as coming into being8 ,it cannot be conceived at all4 ,the faculty of the mind by which it forms a concept--the discursive ,understanding--is impotent to conceive what cannot be conceived--the act of creation4 ,the changes of matter can be concluded into a system1 but not the power by which the matter came to be1 and the changes were produced4 ,if the how is known at all1 it must be seen4 ,the laws of the process must be intuited1 as also the process as logically according with those laws4 ,the following is believed to be an intelligible account of the process1 and an answer to the above question4 ,the absolute and infinite ,person possesses as a priori organic elements of his being1 all possible endowments in perfect harmony4 ,hence all laws1 and all possible combinations of laws1 are at once and always present before the ,eye of his ,reason1 which is thus constituted ,universal ,genius4 ,these combinations may be conveniently named ideal forms4 ,they arise spontaneously1 being in no way dependent upon his will1 but are rather a priori conditional of any creative activity4 ,so1 too1 they harmoniously arrange themselves into systems1--archetypes of what may be1 some of which may appear nobler1 and others inferior4 ,this ,person1 being such as we have stated1 possesses also as endowment all power1 and thereby excludes the possibility of there being any other power4 ,this power is adequate to do all that power can do1--to accomplish all that lies within the province of power4 ,so long as the ,person sees fit not to exert his power1 his ideal forms will be only ideals1 and the power will be simply power4 ,but whenever he shall see fit to send forth his power1 and organize it according to the ideal forms1 the ,universe will become4 ,in all this the ,person1 of his own will1 freely establishes whatever his unerring wisdom shows is most worthy of his dignity2 and so the actualities and relations which he thus ordains are no proper limit or restraint1 for they in no way lessen his fulness1 but are only a manifestation of that fulness1--a declaration of his glory4 ,in a word1 ,creation is that executive act of ,god by which he combines with his power that ideal system which he had chosen because best1 or it is the organization of ample power according to perfect law4 ,if one shall now ask1 ,how could he send forth the power8 it is to be replied that the question is prompted by the curiosity of the flesh1 man's animal nature2 and since no representation--picture--can be made1 no answer can be furnished4 ,it is not needed to know how ,god is1 or does anything1 but only that he does it4 ,all the essential requirements of the problem are met when it is ascertained in the light of the ,reason1 that all fulness is in ,god1 that from this fulness he established all other beings and their natural relations1 and that no relation is imposed upon him by another4 ,the view thus advanced avoids the evil of the understanding-conception1 that creation is the bringing of something out of nothing4 ,there is an actual self-existent ground1 from which the ,universe is produced4 ,neither is the view pantheistic1 for it starts with the a priori idea of an absolute and infinite ,person who is before all things1 and by whom all things consist1--who organizes his own power in accordance with his own ideals1 and thus produces the ,universe1 and all this by free will in self-consciousness4 ,on page eighty-four1 in speaking of the atheistic alternative1 ,mr4 ,mansel makes use of the following language3 ,a limit is itself a relation2 and to conceive a limit as such1 is virtually to acknowledge the existence of a correlative on the other side of it4 ,upon reading this sentence1 some sensuous form spontaneously appears in the ,sense4 ,some object is conceived1 and something outside it1 that bounds it4 ,but let the idea be once formed of a ,being who possesses all limitation within himself1 and for whom there is no other side1 nor any correlative1 and the difficulty vanishes4 ,we do not seek to account for sensuous objects4 ,it is pure ,spirit whom we consider4 ,we do not need to form a concept of a first moment in time1 or a first unit of space1 nor could we if we would4 ,to do so would be for the faculty which forms concepts to transcend the very laws of its organization4 ,what we need is1 to see the fact that a ,spirit is1 who1 possessing personality as form1 and absoluteness and infinity as qualities1 thereby contains all limits and the ground of all being in himself1 and antithetical to whom is only negation4 ,from the ground thus attained there is seen to result1 not the dreary ,sahara of interminable contradictions1 but the fair land of harmonious consistency4 ,a ,spirit1 sole1 personal1 self-conscious1 the absolute and infinite ,person1 is the ,being we seek and have found2 and upon such a ,being the soul of man may rest with the unquestioning trust of an infant in its mother's arms4 ,one cannot pass by unnoticed the beautiful spirit of religious reverence which shines through the closing paragraphs of this lecture4 ,it is evident with what dissatisfaction the writer views the sterile puzzles of which he has been treating1 and what a relief it is to turn from them to the ,god who is 'gracious and merciful1 slow to anger1 and of great kindness1 and repenteth ,him of the evil4' ,the wonder is1 that he did not receive that presentation which his devout spirit has made1 as the truth--which it is--and say1 ,i will accept this as final4 ,my definitions and deductions shall accord with this highest revelation4 ,this shall be my standard of interpretation4 ,had he done so1 far other1 and1 as it is believed1 more satisfactory and truthful would have been the conclusions he would have given us4 ,in his third ,lecture ,mr4 ,mansel is occupied with an examination of the human nature1 for the purpose1 if possible1 of finding some explanation of the singular phenomenon of human thought1 which he has just developed4 ,at the threshold of the investigation the fact of consciousness appears1 and he begins the statement of its conditions in the following language3 ,now1 in the first place1 the very conception of ,consciousness1 in whatever mode it may be manifested1 necessarily implies distinction between one object and another4 ,to be conscious we must be conscious of something2 and that something can only be known as that which it is1 by being distinguished from that which it is not4 ,in this statement ,mr4 ,mansel unconsciously assumes as settled1 the very question at issue2 for1 the position maintained by one class of writers is1 that in certain of our mental operations1 viz41 in intuitions1 the mind sees a simple truth1 idea1 first principle1 as it is1 in itself1 and that there is no distinction in the act of knowledge4 ,it is unquestionably true that1 in the examination of objects on the ,sense1 and the conclusion of judgments in the ,understanding1 no object can come into consciousness without implying a distinction between one object and another4 ,but it is also evident that a first truth1 to be known as such1 must be intuited--seen as it is in itself2 and so directly known to have the qualities of necessity and universality which constitute it a first truth4 ,of this fact ,sir ,william ,hamilton seems to have been aware1 when he denied the actuality of the ,reason1--perceiving1 doubtless1 that only on the ground of such a denial was his own theory tenable4 ,but if it shall be admitted1 as it would seem it must be1 that men have necessary and universal convictions1 then it must also be admitted that these convictions are not entertained by distinguishing them from other mental operations1 but that they are seen of themselves to be true2 and thus it appears that there are some modes of consciousness which do not imply the distinction claimed4 ,the subsequent sentences seem capable of more than one interpretation4 ,if the author means that the ,infinite cannot be infinite without he is also finite1 so that all distinction ceases1 then his meaning is both pantheistic and contradictory2 for the word infinite has no meaning1 if it is not the opposite of finite1 and to identify them is undoubtedly ,pantheism4 ,or if he means that the ,infinite cannot be distinguished as independent1 from the ,finite as independent1 and thus1 as possessing some quality with which it was not endowed by the infinite ,person1 then there can be no doubt of his correctness4 ,but if1 as would seem1 his idea of infinity is that of amount1 is such that it appears inconsistent1 contradictory1 for the infinite ,person to retain his infinity1 and still create beings who are really other than himself1 and possessing1 as quality1 finiteness1 which he cannot possess as quality1 then is his idea of what infinity is wrong4 ,infinity is quality1 and the capacity to thus create is essential to it4 ,all that the ,reason requires is1 that the finite be created by and wholly dependent upon the infinite ,person2 then all the relations and conditions are only improper1--such as that ,person has established1 and which1 therefore1 in no way diminish his glory or detract from his fulness4 ,when1 then1 ,mr4 ,mansel says1 ,a consciousness of the ,infinite1 as such1 thus necessarily involves a self-contradiction1 for it implies the recognition1 by limitation and difference1 of that which can only be given as unlimited and indifferent1 it is evident that he uses the term infinite to express the understanding-conception of unlimited amount1 which is not relevant here1 rather than the reason-idea of universality which is not contradictory to a real distinction between the ,infinite and finite4 ,there is also involved the unexpressed assumption that we have no knowledge except of the limited and different1 or1 in other words1 that the ,understanding is the highest faculty of the mind4 ,it has already been abundantly shown that this is erroneous1--that the ,reason knows its objects in themselves1 as out of all relation1 plurality1 difference1 or likeness4 ,dropping now the abstract term the infinite1 and using the concrete and proper form1 we may say3 ,we are conscious of infinity1 i4 e4 we are conscious that we see with the eye of ,reason infinity as a simple1 a priori idea2 and that it is quality of the ,deity4 #b4 ,we are conscious of the infinite ,person2 in that we are conscious1 that we see with the eye of ,reason the complex a priori idea of a perfect ,person possessing independence and universality as qualities of his ,self4 ,but we are not conscious of him in that we exhaustively comprehend him4 ,as is said elsewhere1 we know that he is1 and to a certain extent1 but not wholly what he is4 ,in further discussing this question ,mansel is guilty of another grave psychological error4 ,he says1 ,consciousness is essentially a limitation1 for it is the determination to one actual out of many possible modifications4 ,there is no truth in this sentence4 ,consciousness is not a limitation2 it is not a determination2 it is not a modification4 ,it may be well to state here certain conclusions on this assertion1 which will be brought out in the fuller discussion of it1 when we come to speak of ,mr4 ,spencer's book4 ,consciousness is one1 and retains that oneness throughout all modifications4 ,these occur in the unity as items of experience affect it4 ,doubtless ,dr4 ,hickok's illustration is the best possible4 ,consciousness is the light in which a spiritual person sees the modifications of himself1 i4 e4 the activity of his faculties and capacities4 ,like ,space1 only in a different sphere1 it is an illimitable indivisible unity1 which is1 that all limits may be in it--that all objects may come into it4 ,if1 then1 only one modification--object--comes into it at a time1 this is because the faculties which see in its light are thus organized2--the being to whom it belongs is partial2 but there is nothing pertaining to consciousness as such1 which constitutes a limit1--which could bar the infinite ,person from seeing all things at once in its light4 ,this ,person1 then1 so far as known1 must be known as an actual absolute1 infinite ,spirit1 and hence no thing2 and further as the originator and sustainer of all things1--which1 though dependent on him1 in no way take aught from him4 ,he may be known also1 as potentially everything1 in the sense that all possible combinations1 or forms of objects1 must ever stand as ideals in his ,reason2 and he can1 at his will1 organize his power in accordance therewith4 ,but he must also be known as free to create or not to create2 and that the fact that many potential forms remain such1 in no way detracts from his infinity4 ,another of ,mr4 ,mansel's positions involve conclusions which1 we feel assured1 he will utterly reject4 ,he says1 ,if all thought is limitation1--if whatever we conceive is1 by the very act of conception1 regarded as finite1--the infinite1 from a human point of view1 is merely a name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible4 ,from a human point of view1 and we1 at least1 can take no other1 what follows8 ,that the ,deity can have no thoughts2 cannot know what our thoughts are1 or that we think4 ,but three suppositions can be made4 ,either he has no thoughts1 is destitute of an intellect2 or his intellect is ,universal ,genius1 and he sees all possible objects at once2 or there is a faculty different in kind from and higher than the ,reason1 of which we have1 can have1 no knowledge4 ,the first1 though acknowledged by ,hamilton in a passage elsewhere quoted1 and logically following from the position taken by ,mr4 ,mansel1 is so abhorrent to the soul that it must be unhesitatingly rejected4 ,the second is the position advocated in this treatise4 ,the third is hinted at by ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer4 ,we reject this third1 because the ,reason affirms it to be impossible2 and because1 being unnecessary1 by the law of parsimony it should not be allowed4 ,to advocate a position of which1 in the very terms of it1 the intellect can have no possible shadow of knowledge1 is1 to say the least1 no part of the work of a philosopher4 ,the condition of consciousness is not distinction in the understanding-conception of that term4 ,so consciousness is not a limitation1 though all limits when cognized are seen in the light of consciousness4 ,according to the philosophy we advocate1 ,god is a particular being1 and is so known2 yet he is not known as one thing out of many1 but is known in himself1 as being such and such1 and yet being unique4 ,when ,mr4 ,mansel says1 ,in assuming the possibility of an infinite object of consciousness1 ,i assume1 therefore1 that it is at the same time limited and unlimited1 he evidently uses those terms with a signification pertinent only to the ,understanding4 ,he is thinking of amount under the forms of ,space and ,time2 and so his remark has no validity4 ,he who thinks of ,god rightly1 will think of him as the infinite and absolute spiritual ,person2 and will define infinity and absoluteness in accordance therewith4 ,if the views now advanced are presentations of truth1 a consistent rationalism must attribute consciousness to ,god4 ,we are always conscious of limitation and change1 because partiality and growth are organic with us4 ,but we can perceive no peculiarity in consciousness1 which should produce such an effect4 ,on the contrary we see1 that if a person has little knowledge1 he will be conscious of so much and no more4 ,and if a person has great capabilities1 and corresponding information1 he is conscious of just so much4 ,whence1 it appears1 that the limitation and change spring from the nature of the constitution1 and not from the consciousness4 ,if1 then1 there should be one ,person who possessed the sum of all excellencies1 there could arise no reason from consciousness why he should be conscious thereof4 ,mr4 ,mansel names as the second characteristic of ,consciousness1 that it is only possible in the form of a relation4 ,there must be a ,subject1 or person conscious1 and an ,object or thing of which he is conscious4 ,this utterance1 taken in the sense which ,mr4 ,mansel wishes to convey1 involves the denial of consciousness to ,god4 ,but upon the ground that the subject and object in the ,deity are always identical the difficulty vanishes4 ,but how can man be conscious of the ,absolute8 ,if by this is meant1 have an exhaustive comprehension of the absolute ,person1 the experience is manifestly impossible4 ,but man may have a certain knowledge1 that such ,person is without knowing in all respects what he is1 just as a child may know that an apple is1 without knowing what it is4 ,again ,mr4 ,mansel uses the terms absolute and infinite to represent a simple unanalyzable ,being4 ,in this he is guilty of personifying an abstract term1 and then reasoning with regard to the ,being as he would with regard to the term4 ,absoluteness is a simple unanalyzable idea1 but it is not ,god2 it is only one quality of ,god4 ,so with infinity4 ,god is universal complexity2 and to reason of him as unanalyzable simplicity is as absurd as to select the color of the apple's skin1 and call that the apple1 and then reason from it about the apple4 ,so1 then1 though man cannot comprehend the absolute ,person as such1 he has a positive idea of absoluteness1 and a positive knowledge that the ,being is who is thus qualified4 ,upon the subsequent question respecting the partiality of our knowledge of the infinite and absolute ,person1 a remark made above may be repeated and amplified4 ,we may have a true1 clear1 thorough knowledge that he exists without having an exhaustive knowledge of what he is4 ,the former is necessary to us2 the latter impossible4 ,so1 too1 the knowledge by us1 of any a priori law1 will be exhaustive4 ,yet while we know that it must be such1 and not otherwise1 it neither follows that we know all other a priori laws1 nor that we know all the exemplifications of this one4 ,and since1 as we have heretofore seen1 neither absoluteness nor infinity relate to number1 and ,god is not material substance that can be broken into parts1 but an organized ,spirit1 we see that we may consider the elements of his organization in their logical order2 and1 remembering that absoluteness and infinity as qualities pervade all1 we may examine his nature and attributes without impiety4 ,mr4 ,mansel says further3 ,but in truth it is obvious1 on a moment's reflection1 that neither the ,absolute nor the ,infinite can be represented in the form of a whole composed of parts4 ,this is tantamount to saying1 the spiritual cannot be represented under the form of the material--a truth so evident as hardly to need so formal a statement4 ,but what the ,divine means is1 that that ,being cannot be known as having qualities and attributes which may be distinguished in and from himself2 which is an error4 ,god is infinite4 ,so is his ,knowledge1 his ,wisdom1 his ,holiness1 his ,love1 c4 ,yet these are distinguished from each other1 and from him4 ,all this is consistent1 because infinity is quality1 and permeates them all2 and not amount1 which jumbles them all into a confused1 indistinguishable mass4 ,in speaking of human consciousness as necessarily subject to the law of ,time1 ,mr4 ,mansel says1 ,every object of whose existence we can be in any way conscious is necessarily apprehended by us as succeeding in time to some former object of consciousness1 and as itself occupying a certain portion of time4 ,in so far as there is here expressed the law of created beings1 under which they must see objects1 the remark is true4 ,but when ,mr4 ,mansel proceeds further1 and concludes that1 because we are under limitation in seeing the object1 it is under the same limitation1 so far as we apprehend it in being seen1 he asserts what is a psychological error4 ,to show this1 take the mathematical axiom1 ,things which are equal to the same things1 are equal to one another4 ,except under the conditions of ,time1 we cannot see this1 that is1 we do1 must1 occupy a time in observing it4 ,but do we see that the axiom is under any condition of ,time8 ,by no means4 ,we see1 directly1 that it is1 must be1 true1 and that in itself it has no relation to ,time4 ,it is thus absolutely true2 and as one of the ideas of the infinite and absolute ,person1 it possesses these his qualities4 ,we have1 then1 a faculty1 the ,reason1 which1 while it sees its objects in succession1 and so under the law of ,time1 also sees that those objects1 whether ideas1 or that ,being to whom all ideas belong1 are1 in themselves1 out of all relation to ,time4 ,thus is the created spiritual person endowed2 thus is he like ,god2 thus does he know the ,infinite4 ,hence1 the command1 so often urged upon man by philosophers and theologians1 ',in contemplating ,god1 transcend time1' means1 ,in all your reflections upon ,god1 behold him in his true aspect1 in the reason-idea1 as out of all relation4 ,it is true that to know the infinite exhaustively1 the human mind must itself be infinite4 ,but this knowledge is not required of that mind4 ,only that knowledge is required which is possible1 viz41 that the ,deity is1 and what he is1 in so far as we are in his image4 ,again2 personality is not essentially a limitation and a relation1 in the sense that it necessarily detracts aught from any being who possesses it4 ,it rather adds1--is1 indeed1 a pure addition4 ,we appear to ourselves as limited and related1 not because of our personality1 but because of our finiteness as quality in the personality4 ,hence we not only see no reason why the complete and universal ,spirit should not have personality1 but we see that if he was destitute of it1 he must possess a lower form of being1--since this is the highest possible form1--which would be an undoubted limitation2 or1 in other words1 we see that he must be a ,person4 ,in what ,mr4 ,mansel subsequently says upon this subject1 he presents arguments for the personality of ,god so strong1 that one is bewildered with the question1 ,how could he escape the conviction which they awaken8 ,how could he reject the cry of his spiritual nature1 and accept the barren contradictions of his lower mind8 ,let us note a few sentences4 ,it is by consciousness alone that we know that ,god exists1 or that we are able to offer him any service4 ,it is only by conceiving ,him as a ,conscious ,being1 that we can stand in any religious relation to ,him at all1--that we can form such a representation of ,him as is demanded by our spiritual wants1 insufficient though it be to satisfy our intellectual curiosity4 ,personality comprises all that we know of that which exists2 relation to personality comprises all that we know of that which seems to exist4 ,and when1 from the little world of man's consciousness and its objects1 we would lift up our eyes to the inexhaustible universe beyond1 and ask to whom all this is related1 the highest existence is still the highest personality1 and the ,source of all ,being reveals ,himself by ,his name1 ',i ,,am4' ,it is our duty1 then1 to think of ,god as personal2 and it is our duty to believe that ,he is infinite4 ,we may at this point quote with profit the words of that ,book whose authority ,mr4 ,mansel1 without doubt1 most heartily acknowledges4 ,and for this cause ,god shall send them strong delusion1 that they should believe a lie2 that they all might be damned who believed not the truth1 but had pleasure in unrighteousness4 ,i have not written unto you because ye know not the truth1 but because ye know it1 and that no lie is of the truth4 ,either ,god is personal or he is not4 ,if he is1 then all that we claim is conceded4 ,if he is not personal1 and it is our duty to think of him as personal1 then it is our duty to think and believe a falsehood4 ,this no man1 at least neither ,mr4 ,mansel nor any other enlightened man1 can bring his mind to accept as a moral law4 ,the soul instinctively asserts that obligation lies parallel with truth1 and that no lie is of the truth4 ,so1 then1 there can be no duty except where truth is4 ,and the converse may also be accepted1 viz43 ,where an enlightened sense of duty is1 there is truth4 ,when1 therefore1 so learned and truly spiritual a man as ,mr4 ,mansel asserts that it is our duty to think ,god personal1 and believe him infinite1 we unhesitatingly accept it as the utterance of a great fundamental truth in that spiritual realm which is the highest realm of being1 and so1 as one of the highest truths1 and with it we accept all its logical consequences4 ,it is a safe rule anywhere1 that if two mental operations seem to clash1 and one must be rejected1 man should cling to1 and trust in the higher--the teaching of the nobler nature4 ,thus will we do1 and from the ,divine's own ground will we see the destruction of his philosophy4 ,it is our duty to think of ,god as personal1 because he is personal2 and we know that he is personal because it is our duty to think him so4 ,we need pay no regard to the perplexities of the ,understanding4 ,we soar with the eagle above the clouds1 and float ever in the light of the ,sun4 ,the teachings of the ,moral ,sense are far more sure1 safe1 and satisfactory than any discursions of the lower faculty4 ,therefore it is man's wisdom1 in all perplexity to heed the cry of his highest nature1 and determine to stand on its teachings1 as his highest knowledge1 interpret all utterances by this1 and reject all which contradict it4 ,at the least1 the declaration of this faculty is as valid as that of the lower1 and is to be more trusted in every disagreement1 because higher4 ,still further1 no man would believe that ,god1 in the most solemn1 yea1 awful moment of his ,self-revelation1 would declare a lie4 ,the bare thought1 fully formed1 horrifies the soul as a blasphemy of the damned4 ,yet1 in that supreme act1 in the solitude of the ,sinaitic wilderness1 to one of the greatest1 one of the profoundest1 most devout of men1 ,he revealed ,himself by the pregnant words1 ,i ,,am3 the most positive1 the most unquestionable form in which ,he could utter the fact of ,his personality4 ,this1 then1 and all that is involved in it1 we accept as truth2 and all perplexities must be interpreted by this surety4 ,in summing up the results to which an examination of the facts of consciousness conducted him1 ,mr4 ,mansel utters the following psychological error3 ,but a limit is necessarily conceived as a relation between something within and something without itself2 and the consciousness of a limit of thought implies1 though it does not directly present to us1 the existence of something of which we do not and cannot think4 ,not so2 for a limit may be seen to be wholly within the being to whom it belongs1 and so not to be a relation between something within and something without itself4 ,this is precisely the case with the ,deity4 ,all relations and limits spring from within him1 and there is nothing without to establish the relation claimed4 ,this absence of all limit from without is rudely expressed in such common phrases as this3 ,it must be so in the nature of things4 ,this nature of things is1 in philosophical language1 the system of a priori laws of the ,universe1 and these are necessary ideas in the ,divine ,reason4 ,it appears1 then1 that what must be in the nature of things1 finds its limits wholly within1 and its relations established by the ,deity4 ,with these remarks the author would close his criticism upon ,mr4 ,mansel's book4 ,we start from entirely different bases1 and these two systems logically follow from their foundations4 ,if ,sir ,william ,hamilton is right in his psychology1 his follower is unquestionably right in his deductions4 ,but if that psychology is partial1 if besides the ,understanding there is the ,reason1 if above the judgment stands the intuition1 giving the final standard by which to measure that judgment1 then is the philosophical system of the ,divine utterly fallacious4 ,the establishment of the validity of the ,pure ,reason is the annihilation of the ,philosophy of the ,unconditioned4 ,on the ground which the author has adopted1 it is seen that ,god is a spirit1 infinite1 absolute1 self-conscious1 personal2 and a consistent interpretation of these terms has been given4 ,we have found that certain objects may be seen as out of all relation1 plurality1 difference1 or likeness4 ,consciousness and personality have also been found to involve no limit1 in the proper sense of that term4 ,on the contrary1 the one was ascertained to be the light in which any or all objects might be seen under conditions of ,time1 or at once2 and that this seeing was according to the capacity with which the being was endowed1 and was not determined by any peculiarity of the consciousness2 while the other appeared to be the highest possible form of existence1 and that also in which ,god had revealed himself4 ,from such a ground it is possible to go forward and construct a ,rational ,theology which shall verify by ,reason the teachings of the ,bible4 ,,review ,,of ,,mr4 ,,herbert ,,spencer',s ,,first ,,principles4 ,in the criticisms heretofore made1 some points1 held in common by the three writers named early in this work1 have been1 it may be1 passed over unnoticed4 ,this was done1 because1 being held in common1 it was believed that an examination of them1 as presented by the latest writer1 would be most satisfactory4 ,therefore1 what was peculiar in thought or expression to ,sir ,wm4 ,hamilton or ,mr4 ,mansel1 we have intended to notice when speaking of those writers4 ,but where ,mr4 ,spencer seems to present their very thought as his own1 it has appeared better to remark upon it in his latest form of expression4 ,mr4 ,spencer also holds views peculiar to himself4 ,these we shall examine in their place4 ,and for convenience' sake1 what we have to say will take the form of a running commentary upon those chapters entitled1 ,ultimate ,religious ,ideas1 ,ultimate ,scientific ,ideas1 ,the ,relativity of all ,knowledge1 and ,the ,reconciliation4 ,before entering upon this1 however1 some general remarks will be pertinent4 #a4 ,like his teachers1 ,mr4 ,spencer believes that the ,understanding is the highest faculty of the human intellect4 ,this is implied in the following sentence3 ,those imbecilities of the understanding that disclose themselves when we try to answer the highest questions of objective science1 subjective science proves to be necessitated by the laws of that understanding4--,first ,principles1 p4 #ih4 ,his illustrations1 also1 are all1 or nearly all1 taken from sensuous objects4 ,in speaking of the ,universe1 evidently the material ,universe is present to his mind4 ,his questions refer to objects of sense1 and he shows plainly enough that any attempt to answer them by the ,sense or ,understanding is futile4 ,hence he concludes that they cannot be answered4 ,but those who know of a surety1 that man is more than an animal nature1 containing a ,sense and an ,understanding2 that he is also a spiritual person1 having an ,eye1 the pure ,reason1 which can see straight to the central ,truth1 with a clearness and in a light which dims and pales the noonday sun1 know also that1 and how1 these difficulties1 insoluble to the lower faculties1 are1 in this noble alembic1 finally dissolved4 #b4 ,as ,mr4 ,spencer follows his teachers in the psychology of man's faculties1 so does he also in the use of terms4 ,like them1 he employs only such terms as are pertinent to the ,sense and ,understanding4 ,so also with them he is at fault1 in that he raises questions which no ,sense or ,understanding could suggest even1 questions whose very presence are decisive that a ,pure ,reason is organic in man2 and then is guilty of applying to them terms entirely impertinent1--terms belonging only to those lower tribunals before which these questions can never come4 ,for instance1 he always employs the word conceive to express the effort of the mind in presenting to itself the subjects now under discussion4 ,in some form of noun1 verb1 or adjective1 this word seems to have rained upon his pages2 while such terms as infinite period1 infinitely divisible1 absolutely incompressible1 infinitesimal1 and the like1 dot them repeatedly4 ,let us revert1 then1 a moment to the positions attained in an earlier portion of this work4 ,it was there found that the word conceive was utterly irrelevant to any subject except to objects of ,sense and the ,understanding in its work of classifying them1 or generalizing from them1 so1 also1 with regard to the other terms quoted1 it was found that they not only presented no object of thought to the mind1 but that the words had no relation to each other1 and could not properly be used together4 ,for instance1 infinite has no more relation to1 and can no more qualify period1 than the points of the compass are pertinent to1 and can qualify the affections4 ,the phrase1 infinite period1 is simply absurd1 and so also are the others4 ,the words infinite and absolute have nothing to do with amount of any sort4 ,they can be pertinent only to ,god and his a priori ideas4 ,many1 perhaps most of the criticisms in detail we shall have to make1 will be based on this single misuse of words2 which yet grows naturally out of that denial and perversion of faculties which ,mr4 ,spencer1 in common with the other ,limitist writers1 has attempted4 ,on the other hand1 it is to be remembered1 that1 if we arrive at the truth at all1 we must intuit it2 we must either see it as a simple a priori idea1 or as a logical deduction from such ideas4 #c4 ,a third1 and graver error on ,mr4 ,spencer's part is1 that he goes on propounding his questions1 and asserting that they are insoluble1 apparently as unconscious as a sleeper in an enchanted castle that they have all been solved1 or at least that the principles on which it would seem that they could be solved have been stated by a man of no mean ability1--,dr4 ,hickok1--and that until the proposed solutions are thoroughly analyzed and shown to be unsound1 his own pages are idle4 ,he implies that there is no cognition higher than a conception1 when some very respectable writers have named intuitions as incomparably superior4 ,he speaks of the ,understanding as if it were without question the highest faculty of man's intellect1 when no less a person than ,coleridge said it would satisfy his life's labor to have introduced into ,english thinking the distinction between the ,understanding1 as the faculty judging according to sense1 and the ,reason1 as the power of universal and necessary convictions1 which1 being such1 must necessarily rank far above the other4 ,and finally he uses the words and phrases above disallowed1 and the faculties to which they belong1 in an attempt to prove1 by the citation of a few items in an experience1 what had already been demonstrated by another in a process of as pure reasoning as ,calculus4 ,no one1 it is believed1 can master the volume heretofore alluded to1 entitled ,rational ,psychology1 and so appreciate the demonstration therein contained1 of the utter incompetency of the ,sense or ,understanding to solve such questions as ,mr4 ,spencer has raised by his incident of the partridge1 7p4 #fi17 and the utter irrelevancy to them of the efforts of those faculties1 without feeling how tame and unsatisfactory in comparison is the evidence drawn from a few facts in a sensuous experience4 ,one cares not to see a half dozen proofs1 more or less that a theory is fallacious who has learned that1 and why1 the theory cannot be true4 ,let us now take up in order the chapters heretofore mentioned4 ,,ultimate ,,religious ,,ideas4 ,the summing up of certain reflections with which this chapter opens1 concludes thus3 ,but that when our symbolic conceptions are such that no cumulative or indirect processes of thought can enable us to ascertain that there are corresponding actualities1 nor any predictions be made whose fulfilment can prove this1 then they are altogether vicious and illusive1 and in no way distinguishable from pure fictions1--p4 #bi4 ,so far very good2 but his use of it is utterly unsound4 ,and now to consider the bearings of this general truth on our immediate topic--,ultimate ,religious ,ideas4 ,but this general truth has no bearings upon ultimate religious ideas2 how then can you consider them8 ,no ideas1 and most of all religious ideas1 are conceptions1 or the results of conceptions--or are the products of cumulative or indirect processes of thought4 ,they are not results or products at all4 ,they are organic1 are the spontaneous presentation of what is inborn1 and so must be directly seen to be known at all4 ,man might pile up cumulative processes of thought for unnumbered ages1 and might form most exact conceptions of objects of ,sense1--conceptions are not possible of others1--and he could never creep up to the least and faintest religious idea4 ,on the next page1 speaking of suppositions respecting the origin of the ,universe1 ,mr4 ,spencer says1 ,the deeper question is1 whether any one of them is even conceivable in the true sense of that word4 ,let us successively test them4 ,this is not necessary4 ,it has already been demonstrated that a conception1 or any effort of the ,understanding1 cannot touch1 or have relation to such topics4 ,but it does not follow1 therefore1 that no one of them is cognizable at all2 which he implies4 ,take the abstract notion of self-existence1 for example4 ,no vague symbolic conceptions1 or any conception at all1 of it can be formed4 ,a conception is possible only under relation1 difference1 and plurality4 ,this is a pure1 simple idea1 and so can only be known in itself by a seeing--an immediate intuition4 ,it is seen by itself1 as out of all relation4 ,it is seen as simple1 and so is learned by no difference4 ,it is seen as a unit1 and so out of all plurality4 ,the discursive faculty cannot pass over it1 because there are in it no various points upon which that faculty may fasten4 ,it may1 perhaps1 better be expressed by the words pure independence4 ,again1 it is not properly existence without a beginning1 but rather1 existence out of all relation to beginning2 and so it is an idea1 out of all relation to those faculties which are confined to objects that did begin4 ,because we can by no mental effort form a conception of existence without a beginning1 it does not follow that we cannot see that a ,being existing out of all relation to beginning is4 ,to this let us add that the intuition of such a ,being is a complete explanation of the ,universe1 and does make it easier to understand that it existed an hour ago1 a day ago1 a year ago2 for we see that this ,being primarily is out of all relation to time1 that there is no such thing as an infinite period1 the phrase being absurd2 but that through all the procession of events which we call time he is2 and that before that procession began--when there was no time1 he was4 ,thus we see that all events are based upon ,him who is independent2 and that time1 in our general use of it1 is but the measure of what ,he produces4 ,we arrive1 then1 at the conclusion that the ,universe is not self-existent1 not because self-existence cannot be object to the human mind1 and be clearly seen to be an attribute of one ,being1 but because the ,universe is primarily object to faculties in that mind1 which cannot entertain such a notion at all2 and because this notion is seen to be a necessary idea in the province of that higher faculty which entertains as objects both the idea and the ,being to whom it primarily belongs4 ,the theory that the ,universe is self-existent is ,pantheism1 and not the theory that it is self-created1 though this latter1 in ,mr4 ,spencer's definition of it1 seems only a phase of the other4 ,to say that self-creation is potential existence passing into actual existence by some inherent necessity1 is only to remove self-existence one step farther back1 as he himself shows4 ,potential existence is either no existence at all1 or it is positive existence4 ,if it is no existence1 then we have true self-creation2 which is1 that out of nothing1 and with no cause1 actual existence starts itself4 ,this is not only unthinkable1 but absurd4 ,but if potential existence is positive1 it needs to be accounted for as much as actual4 ,while1 then1 there can be no doubt as to the validity of the conclusions to which ,mr4 ,spencer arrives1 respecting the entire incompetency of the hypotheses of self-existence and self-creation1 to account for the ,universe1 the distinction made above between self-existence as a true and self-creation as a pseudo idea1 and the fact that the true idea is a reality1 should never be lost sight of4 ,by failing to discriminate--as in the ,understanding he could not do--between them1 and by concluding both as objects alike impossible to the human intellect1 and for the same reasons1 he has also decided that the commonly received or theistic hypothesis--creation by external agency--is equally untenable4 ,in his examination of this1 he starts as usual with his ever-present1 fallacious assumption1 that this is a conception2 that it can be1 is founded upon a cumulative process of thought1 or the fulfilment of predictions based on it4 ,these words1 phrases1 and notions1 are all irrelevant4 ,it is not a conception1 process1 or prediction that we want2 it is a sight4 ,hence1 no assumptions have to be made or granted4 ,no proceedings of a human artificer can in the least degree vaguely symbolize to us the method after which the ,universe was shaped4 ,this differed in kind from all possible human methods1 and had not one element in common with them4 ,mr4 ,spencer's remarks at this point upon ,space do not appear to be well grounded4 ,an immeasurable void--,space--is not an entity1 is no thing1 and therefore cannot exist1 neither is any explanation for it needed4 ,his question1 how came it so8 takes1 then1 this form3 ,how came immeasurable nothing to be nothing8 ,nothing needs no explanation4 ,it is only some thing which must be accounted for4 ,the theory of creation by external agency being1 then1 an adequate one to account for the ,universe1 supplies the following statement4 ,that ,being who is primarily out of all relation1 produced1 from himself1 and by his immanent power1 into nothing--,space1 room1 the condition of material existence1--something1 matter and the ,universe became4 ,the genesis of the universe having thus been explained and seen to be the result of external agency1 we are ready to furnish for the question1 how came there to be an external agency8 that true answer1 which we have already shadowed forth4 ,that pure spiritual ,person who is necessarily existent1 or self-existent1 i4 e4 who possess pure independence as an essential attribute1 whose being is thus fixed1 and is therefore without the province of power1 is the external agency which is needed4 ,this ,person1 differing in kind from the ,universe1 cannot be found in it1 nor concluded from it1 but can only be known by being seen1 and can only be seen because man possesses the endowment of a spiritual ,eye1 like in kind to ,his own ,all-seeing eye1 by which spiritual things may be discerned4 ,this ,person1 being thus seen immediately1 is known in a far more satisfactory mode than he could be by any generalizations of the ,understanding1 could he be represented in these at all4 ,the knowledge of ,him is1 like ,his self1 immutable4 ,we ,,know that we stand on the eternal ,rock4 ,our eye is illuminated with the unwavering ,light which radiates from the throne of ,god4 ,nor is this any hallucination of the rhapsodist4 ,it is the simple experience which every one enjoys who looks at pure truth in itself4 ,it is the ,pure ,reason seeing1 by an immediate intuition1 ,god as pure spirit1 revealed directly to itself4 ,it is1 then1 because self-existence is a pure1 simple idea1 organic in man1 and seen by him to be an attribute of ,god1 that ,god is known to be the ,creator of the ,universe4 ,having attained to this truth1 we readily see that the conclusions which ,mr4 ,spencer states on pages #ce1 #cf1 as that self-existence is rigorously inconceivable2 that the theistic hypothesis equally with the others is literally unthinkable2 that our conception of self-existence can be formed only by joining with it the notion of unlimited duration through past time2 so far as they imply our destitution of knowledge on these topics1 are the opposite of the facts4 ,we see1 though we cannot conceive1 self-existence4 ,the theistic hypothesis becomes1 therefore1 literally thinkable4 ,we see1 also1 that unlimited duration is an absurdity2 that duration must be limited2 and that self-existence involves existence out of all relation to duration4 ,mr4 ,spencer then turns to the nature of the ,universe1 and says3 ,we find ourselves on the one hand obliged to make certain assumptions1 and yet1 on the other hand1 we find these assumptions cannot be represented in thought4 ,upon this it may be remarked3 #a4 ,what are here called assumptions are properly assertions1 which man makes1 and cannot help making1 except he deny himself2--necessary convictions1 first truths1 first principles1 a priori ideas4 ,they are organic1 and so are the foundation of all knowledge4 ,they are not results learned from lessons1 but are primary1 and conditional to an ability to learn4 ,but supposing them to be assumptions1 having1 at most1 no more groundwork than a vague guess1 there devolves a labor which ,mr4 ,spencer and his coadjutors have never attempted1 and which1 we are persuaded1 they would find the most difficult of all1 viz41 to account for the fact of these assumptions4 ,for the question is pertinent and urgent2 #b4 ,how came these assumptions to suggest themselves8 ,where1 for instance1 did the notion of self come from8 ,analyze the rocks1 study plants and their growth1 become familiar with animals and their habits1 or exhaust the ,sense in an examination of man1 and one can find no notion of self4 ,yet the notion is1 and is peculiar to man4 ,how does it arise8 ,is it created by the slow action of natural causes8 ,how comes it to belong1 then1 to the rudest aboriginal equally with the most civilized and cultivated8 ,was it created from nothing or from something8 ,if from something1 how came that something to be8 ,we might ask1 ,does not the presentation of any phenomenon involve the actuality of a somewhat1 in which that phenomenon inheres1 and of a receptivity by which it is appreciated8 ,does not the fact of this assumption1 as a mental phenomenon1 involve the higher fact of some mental ground1 some form1 some capacity1 which is both organic to the mind1 and organized in the mind1 in accordance with which the assumption is1 and which determines what it must be8 ,or are we to believe that these assumptions are mere happenings1 without law1 and for which no reason can be assigned8 ,again we press the question1 ,how came these assumptions to suggest themselves8 #c4 ,these assumptions cannot be represented in thought4 ,if thought is restricted to that mental operation of the ,understanding by which it generalizes in accordance with the ,sense1 the statement is true4 ,but if it is meant1 as seems to be implied1 that the notions expressed in these assumptions are not1 cannot be1 clearly and definitely known at all by the mind1 then it is directly contrary to the truth4 ,the ideas presented by the phrases are1 as was seen above1 clear and definite4 ,since ,mr4 ,spencer has quoted in extenso1 and with entire approbation1 what ,mr4 ,mansel says respecting the ,cause1 the ,absolute1 and the ,infinite1 we have placed the full examination of these topics in our remarks upon ,mr4 ,mansel's writings1 and shall set down only a few brief notes here4 ,upon this topic ,mr4 ,spencer admits that we are obliged to suppose some cause2 or1 in other words1 that the notion of cause is organic4 ,then we must inevitably commit ourselves to the hypothesis of a ,first ,cause4 ,then1 this ,first ,cause must be infinite4 ,then1 it must be independent2 or1 to use the established word1 it must be absolute4 ,one would almost suppose that a rational man penned these decisions1 instead of one who denies that he has a reason4 ,the illusion is quickly dispelled1 however1 by the objections he lifts out of the dingy ground-room of the ,understanding4 ,it is curious to observe in these pages a fact which we have noticed before1 in speaking of ,sir ,william ,hamilton's works1 viz43 how1 on the same page1 and in the same sentence1 the workings of the ,understanding and ,reason will run along side by side1 the former all the while befogging and hindering the latter4 ,mr4 ,spencer's conclusions which we have quoted1 and his objections which we are to answer1 are a striking exemplification of this4 ,frequently in his remarks he uses the words limited and unlimited1 as synonymous with finite and infinite1 when they are not so1 and cannot be used interchangeably with propriety4 ,the former belong wholly in the ,sense and ,understanding4 ,the latter belong wholly in the ,pure ,reason4 ,the former pertain to material objects1 to mental images of them1 or to number4 ,the latter qualify only spiritual persons1 and have no pertinence elsewhere4 ,limitation is the conception of an object as bounded4 ,illimitation is the conception of an object as without boundaries4 ,rigidly1 it is a simple negation of boundaries1 and gives nothing positive in the ,concept4 ,finity or finiteness corresponds in the ,reason to limitation in the ,sense and ,understanding4 ,it does not refer to boundaries at all4 ,it belongs only to created spiritual persons1 and expresses the fact that they are partial1 and must grow and learn4 ,only by its place in the antithesis does infinity correspond in the ,reason to illimitation in the lower faculties4 ,it is positive1 and is that quality of the pure spirit which is otherwise known as universality4 ,it expresses the idea of all possible endowments in perfect harmony4 ,from his misuse of these terms ,mr4 ,spencer is led to speak in an irrelevant manner upon the question1 ,is the ,first ,cause finite or infinite8 ,he uses words and treats the whole matter as if it were a question of material substance1 which might be bounded1 with a region surrounding its boundaries1 and the like1 which are as out of place as to say white love or yellow kindness4 ,his methods of thought on these topics are also gravely erroneous4 ,he attempts an analysis by the logical ,understanding1 where a synthesis by the ,reason is required1--a synthesis which has already been given by our ,creator to man as an original idea4 ,it is not necessary to examine some limited thing1 or all limited things1 and wander around their boundaries to learn that the ,first ,cause is infinite4 ,we need to make no discursus1 but only to look the idea of first cause through and through1 and thoroughly analyze it1 to find all the truth4 ,by such a process we would find all that ,mr4 ,spencer concedes that we are obliged to suppose1 and further1 that such a being must be self-existent4 ,and this conviction would be so strong that the mind would rest itself in this decision3 ,a thousand phantasmagoria of the imagination may be wrong1 says the soul1 but this ,i know must be true1 or there is no truth in the ,universe4 ,one sentence in the paragraph now under consideration deserves special notice4 ,it is this4 ,but if we admit that there can be some thing uncaused1 there is no reason to assume a cause for anything4 ,this assumes the truth of a major premise all things are substantially alike4 ,if the word thing is restricted to its exact limits1--objects of sense1--then the sentence pertains wholly to the ,sense and ,understanding1 and is true4 ,but if1 as it would seem1 the implication is meant that there are no other entities which can be object to the mind except such things1 then it is a clear petitio principii4 ,for the very question at issue is1 whether1 in fact1 there is not one entity--thing--which so differs in kind from all others1 that it is uncaused1 i4 e4 self-existent2 and whether the admission that that entity is uncaused does not1 because of this seen difference1 satisfy the mind1 and furnish a reasonable ground on which to account for the subordinate causes which we observe by the ,sense4 ,in speaking of the ,first ,cause as independent1 he says1 but it can have no necessary relation within itself4 ,there can be nothing in it which determines change1 and yet nothing which prevents change4 ,for if it contains something which imposes such necessities or restraints1 this something must be a cause higher than the ,first ,cause1 which is absurd4 ,thus1 the ,first ,cause must be in every sense perfect1 complete1 total1 including within itself all power1 and transcending all law4 ,we cannot criticize this better1 and mark how curiously truth and error are mixed in it1 than by so parodying it that only truth shall be stated4 ,the ,first ,cause possesses within himself all possible relations as belonging to his necessary ideals4 ,hence1 change1 in the exact sense of that term1 is impossible to him1 for there is nothing for him to change to4 ,this is not invalidated by his passing from inaction to action2 for creation involves no change in ,god's nature or attributes1 and so no real or essential change1 which is here meant4 ,but he is the permanent1 through whom all changes become4 ,he is not1 then1 a simple unit1 but is an organized ,being1 who is ground for1 and comprehends in a unity1 all possible laws1 forms1 and relations1 as necessary elements of his necessary existence1--as endowments which necessarily belong to him1 and are conditional of his pure independence4 ,hence1 these restraints are not imposed upon him1 except as his existence is imposed upon him4 ,they belong to his ,self1 and are conditional of his being4 ,so1 then1 instead of transcending all law1 he is the embodiment of all law2 and his perfection is1 that possessing this endowment1 he accords his conduct thereto4 ,a being who should transcend all law would have no reason why he should act1 and no form how he should act1 neither would he be an organism1 but would be pure lawlessness or pure chaos4 ,pure chaos cannot organize order2 pure lawlessness cannot establish law2 and so could not be the ,first ,cause4 ,as ,mr4 ,spencer truly says1 we have no alternative but to regard this ,first ,cause as ,infinite and ,absolute4 ,and now having learned1 by a true diagnosis of the mental activities1 that the positions we have gained are fixed1 final1 irrevocable2 and further1 that they are not the results of reasonings1 but that first there was a seeing1 and then an analysis of what was seen1 and that the seeing is true1 though every other experience be false2 we know that our position is not illusive1 but that we stand on the rock2 and that what we have seen is no symbolic conception of the illegitimate order1 but is pure truth4 ,for the further consideration of this subject1 the reader is referred back to our remarks on that passage in ,mr4 ,mansel's work1 which ,mr4 ,spencer has quoted4 ,a few remarks upon his summing up1 p4 #dc et seq41 will complete the review of this chapter4 ,passing over the consideration of credibility1 and confining ourselves to that of consistency1 we would find in any rigorous analysis1 that ,atheism and ,pantheism are self-contradictory2 but we have found that ,theism1 when rigorously analyzed1 presents an absolutely consistent system1 in which all the difficulties of the ,understanding are explained to the person by the ,reason1 and is entirely thinkable4 ,such a system1 based upon the necessary convictions of man1 and justly commanding that these shall be the fixed standard1 in accordance with which all doubts and queries shall be dissolved and decided1 gives a rational satisfaction to man1 and discloses to him his eternal ,,rest4 ,in proceeding to his final fact1 which he derives as the permanent in all religions1 ,mr4 ,spencer overlooks another equally permanent1 equally common1 and incomparably more important fact1 viz3 that ,fetishism1 ,polytheism1 ,pantheism1 and ,monotheism1--all religions alike assert that a god created the ,universe4 ,in other words1 the great common element1 in all the popular modes of accounting for the vast system of things in which we live is1 that it is the product of an agency external to itself1 and that the external agency is personal4 ,take the case of the rude aboriginal1 who assumes a separate personality behind every phenomenon4 ,he does not attempt to account for all objects4 ,his mind is too infantile1 and he is too degraded to suspect that those material objects which appear permanent need to be accounted for4 ,it is only the changes which seem to him to need a reason4 ,behind each change he imagines a sort of personal power1 superior to it and man1 which produces it1 and this satisfies him4 ,he inquires no further2 yet he looks in the same direction as the ,monotheist4 ,in this crude form of belief1 which is named ,fetishism1 we see that essential idea which can be readily traced through all forms of religion1 that some personal being1 external1 and superior to the things that be1 produced them4 ,nor is ,atheism a proper exception to this law4 ,for ,atheism is not a religion1 but the denial of all religion4 ,it is not a doctrine of ,god1 but is a denial that there is any ,god2 and what is most in point1 it never was a popular belief1 but is only a philosophical ,sahara over which a few caravans of speculative doubters and negatists wander4 ,neither can ,hindu pantheism be quoted against the position taken3 for ,brahm is not the ,universe2 neither are ,brahma1 ,vishnu1 and ,siva4 ,brahm does not lose his individuality because the ,universe is evolved from him4 ,now he is thought of as one1 and the ,universe as another1 although the ,universe is thought to be a part of his essence1 and hereafter to be reabsorbed by him4 ,now1 this part of his essence which was produced through ,brahma1 ,vishnu1 and ,siva1 is individualized2 and so is one1 while he is another4 ,thus1 here also1 the idea of a proper external agency is preserved4 ,the facts1 then1 are decisively in favor of the proposition above laid down4 ,our investigation discloses a fundamental verity in each religion4 ,and the facts and the verity find no consistent ground except in a pure ,theism1 and there they do find perfect consistency and harmony4 ,it is required1 finally1 in closing the discussion of this chapter1 to account for the fact that1 upon a single idea so many theories of ,god have fastened themselves2 or better1 perhaps1 that a single idea has developed itself in so many forms4 ,this cannot better be done than in the language of that metaphysician1 not second to ,plato1 the apostle ,paul4 ,in his ,epistle to the ,romans1 beginning at the #aith verse of the #ast chapter1 he says3 ,because that which may be known of ,god is manifest to them2 for ,god hath shewed it unto them4 ,for the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen1 being understood by the things which are made1 even his eternal power and ,godhead1 so that they are without excuse4 ,because that1 when they knew ,god1 they glorified him not as ,god1 neither were thankful2 but became vain in their imaginations1 and their foolish heart was darkened3 professing themselves to be wise they became fools1 and changed the glory of the incorruptible ,god into an image made like to corruptible man1 and to birds1 and four-footed beasts1 and creeping things4 ,this passage1 which would be worthy the admiring study of ages1 did it possess no claim to be the teaching of that ,being whom ,mr4 ,spencer asserts it is impossible for us to know1 gives us in a popular form the truth4 ,man1 having organic in his mind the idea of ,god1 and having in the ,universe an ample manifestation to the ,sense1 of the eternal power and ,godhead of the ,creator of that ,universe1 corresponding to that idea1 perverted the manifestation to the ,sense1 and degraded the idea in the ,reason1 to the service of base passion4 ,by this degradation and perversion the organic idea became so bedizened with the finery of fancy formed in the ,understanding1 under the direction of the animal nature1 as to be lost to the popular mind1--the trappings only being seen4 ,when once the truth was thus lost sight of1 and with it all that restraint which a knowledge of the true ,god would impose1 men became vain in their imaginations2 their fancy ran riot in all directions4 ,cutting loose from all law1 they plunged into every excess which could be invented2 and out of such a stimulated and teeming brain all manner of vagaries were devised4 ,this was the first stage2 and of it we find some historic hints in the biblical account of the times1 during and previous to the life of ,abraham4 ,where secular history begins the human race had passed into the second stage4 ,crystallization had begun4 ,students were commencing the search for truth4 ,religion was taking upon itself more distinct forms4 ,the organic idea1 which could not be wholly obliterated1 formed itself distinctly in the consciousness of some gifted individuals1 and philosophy began4 ,philosophy in its purest form1 as taught by ,socrates and ,plato1 presented again the lost idea of pure ,theism4 ,but the spirituality which enabled them to see the truth1 lifted them so far above the common people1 that they could affect only a few4 ,and what was most disheartening1 that same degradation which originally lost to man the truth1 now prevented him from receiving it4 ,thus it was that by a binding of the ,reason to the wheels of ,passion1 and discursing through the world with the ,understanding at the beck of the ,sense1 the many forms of religion became4 ,,ultimate ,,scientific ,,ideas4 ,on a former page we have already attempted a positive answer to the question1 ,what are ,space and ,time1 with which ,mr4 ,spencer opens this chapter4 ,it was there found that1 in general terms1 they are a priori conditions of created being2 and1 moreover1 that they possess characteristics suitable to what they condition1 just as the a priori conditions of the spiritual person possess characteristics suitable to what they condition4 ,it was further found that this general law is1 from the necessity of the case1 realized both within the mind and without it2 that it is1 must be1 the form of thought for the perceiving subject1 corresponding to the condition of existence for the perceived object4 ,it also appeared that the ,universe as object1 and the ,sense and ,understanding as faculties in the subject1 thus corresponded2 and further1 that these faculties could never transcend and comprehend ,space and ,time1 because these were the very conditions of their being2 moreover1 that by them all spaces and times must be considered with reference to the ,universe1 and apart from it could not be examined by them at all4 ,yet it was further found that the ,universe might in the presence of the ,reason be abstracted2 and that1 then1 pure ,space and ,time still remained as pure a priori conditions1 the one as room1 the other as opportunity1 for the coming of created being4 ,space and ,time being such conditions1 and nothing more1 are entities only in the same sense that the multiplication table and the moral law are entities4 ,they are conditions suited to what they condition4 ,in the light of this result let us examine ,mr4 ,spencer's teachings respecting them4 ,strictly speaking1 ,space and ,time do not exist4 ,if they exist 7ex sto71 they must stand out somewhere and when4 ,this of course involves the being of a where and a when in which they can stand out2 and that where and when must needs be accounted for1 and so on ad infinitum4 ,again1 ,mr4 ,spencer would seem to speak1 in his usual style1 as if they1 in existing objectively1 had a formal objective existence4 ,yet this1 in the very statement of it1 appears absurd4 ,the mind apprehends many objects1 which do not exist4 ,they only are4 ,thus1 as has just been said1 ,space and ,time1 as conditions of created being1 are4 ,they are entities but not existences4 ,they are a priori entities1 and so are necessarily4 ,by this they stand in the same category with all pure laws1 all first principles4 ,moreover1 to deny that ,space and ,time are things1 and so by implication to call them nothings1 involves the absurdity that there are two kinds of nothings4 ,this sentence involves the absurdity of assuming that nothing is an entity4 ,if ,i say that ,space is nothing1 ,i say that it presents no content for a concept1 and cannot1 because there is no content to be presented4 ,it is then blank4 ,just so of ,time4 ,as nothings they are1 then1 both equally blank1 and destitute of meaning4 ,now if ,mr4 ,spencer wishes to hold that nothing represented by one word1 differs from nothing represented by another1 we would not lay a straw in his way1 but yet would be much surprised if he led a large company4 ,again1 having decided that they are neither nonentities nor the attributes of entities1 we have no choice but to consider them as entities4 ,but he then goes on to speak of them as things1 evidently using the word in the same sense as if applying it to a material object1 as an apple or stone2 thereby implying that entity and thing in that sense are synonymous terms4 ,upon this leap in the dark1 this blunder in the use of language1 he proceeds to build up a mountain of difficulties4 ,but once take away this foundation1 once cease attempting to represent them in thought as things1 and his difficulties vanish4 ,space is a condition4 ,perhaps receptivity1 indivisibility1 and illimitability are attributes4 ,if so1 it has attributes1 for these certainly belong to it4 ,but whether these shall be called attributes or not1 it is certain that ,space is1 is a pure condition1 is thus a positive object to the ,reason1 is qualified by the characteristics named above2 and all this without any contradiction or other insuperable difficulty arising thereby4 ,on the ground now established1 we learn that extension and ,space are not convertible terms4 ,extension is an attribute of matter4 ,space is a condition of phenomena4 ,it is only all physical entities which we actually know as such that are limited4 ,from our standpoint1 that ,space is no thing1 such remarks as ,we find ourselves totally unable to form any mental image of unbounded ,space1 appear painfully absurd4 ,we find ourselves just as totally unable to form any mental image of unbounded love4 ,such phrases as mental image have no relevancy to either ,space or ,time4 ,in criticizing ,kant's doctrine1 which we have found true as far as it goes1 ,mr4 ,spencer evinces a surprising lack of knowledge of the facts in question4 ,in the first place1 he says1 to assert that ,space and ,time1 as we are conscious of them1 are subjective conditions1 is by implication to assert that they are not objective realities4 ,but the conclusion does not follow4 ,if the reader will take the trouble to construct the syllogism on which this is based1 he will at once perceive the absurdity of the logic4 ,it may be said in general that all conditions of a thinking being are both subjective and objective3 they are conditions of his being--subjective2 and they are objects of his examination and cognizance--objective4 ,is not the multiplication table an objective reality1 i4 e41 would it not remain if he be destroyed8 ,and yet is it not also a subjective law2 and so was it not originally discovered by introspection and reflection8 ,again he says1 for that consciousness of ,space and ,time which we cannot rid ourselves of1 is the consciousness of them as existing objectively4 ,now the fact is1 that primarily we do not have any consciousness of ,space and ,time4 ,consciousness has to do with phenomena4 ,when examining the material ,universe1 the objects1 and the objects as at a distance from each other and as during1 are what we are conscious of4 ,for instance1 ,i view the planets ,jupiter and ,saturn4 ,they appear as objects in my consciousness4 ,there is a distance between them2 but this distance is not1 except as they are4 ,if they are not1 the word distance has no meaning with reference to them4 ,take them away1 and ,i have no consciousness of distance as remaining4 ,these planets continue in existence4 ,they endure4 ,this endurance we call time1 but if they should cease1 one could not think of endurance in connection with them as remaining4 ,here we most freely and willingly agree with ,mr4 ,spencer that the question is1 ,what does consciousness directly testify8 but he will find that consciousness on this side of the water testifies very differently from his consciousness3 as for instance in the two articles in the ,north ,american ,review1 heretofore alluded to4 ,here1 the direct testimony of consciousness is1 that spaces and times within the ,universe are without the mind2 that ,space and ,time1 as a priori conditions for the possibility of formal object and during event1 are also without the mind2 but the testimony is none the less clear and direct that ,space and ,time are laws of thought in the mind corresponding to the actualities without the mind4 ,and the question may be asked1 it is believed with great force1 ,if this last were not so1 how could the mind take any cognizance of the actuality8 ,again1 most truly1 ,space and ,time cannot be conceived to become non-existent even were the mind to become non-existent4 ,much more strongly than this should the truth be uttered4 ,they could not become non-existent if the ,universe with every sentient being1 yea1 even--to make an impossible supposition--if the ,deity himself1 should cease to be4 ,in this they differ no whit from the laws of ,mathematics1 of ,logic1 and of ,morals4 ,these too would remain as well4 ,thus is again enforced the truth1 which has been stated heretofore1 that ,space and ,time1 as a priori conditions of the ,universe1 stand in precisely the same relation to material object and during event that the multiplication table does to intellect1 or the moral law to a spiritual person4 ,it will now be doubtless plain that ,mr4 ,spencer's remarks sprang directly from the lower faculties4 ,the ,sense in its very organization possesses ,space and ,time as void forms into which objects may come4 ,so also the ,understanding possesses the notional as connecting into a totality4 ,these faculties cannot be in a living man without acting4 ,activity is their law4 ,hence images are ever arising and must arise in the ,sense1 and be connected in the ,understanding1 and all this in the forms and conditions of ,space and ,time4 ,he who thinks continually in these conditions will always imagine that ,space and ,time are only without him--because he will be thinking only in the iron prison-house of the imagining faculty--and so cannot transcend the conditions it imposes4 ,now how shall one see these conditions8 ,they do exist objectively2 or1 to phrase it better1 they have a true being independent of our minds4 ,in this sense1 as we have seen1 every a priori condition must be objective to the mind4 ,what is objective to the ,sense is not ,space but a space1 i4 e4 a part of ,space limited by matter2 and1 after all1 it is the boundaries which are the true object rather than the space1 which cannot be conceived of if the boundaries be removed4 ,without further argument1 is it not evident that there ,space1 like all other a priori conditions1 is object only to the ,reason1 and that as a condition of material existence8 ,at the bottom of page #di we have another of ,mr4 ,spencer's psychological errors3--,for if ,space and ,time are forms of thought1 they can never be thought of2 since it is impossible for anything to be at once the form of thought and the matter of thought4 ,although this topic has been amply discussed elsewhere1 it may not be uninstructive to recur to it again4 ,exactly the opposite of ,mr4 ,spencer's remark is the truth4 ,the question at issue here is one of those profound and subtile ones which cannot be approached by argument1 but can be decided only by a seeing4 ,it is a psychological question pertaining to the profoundest depths of our being4 ,if one says1 ,i see the forms of thought1 and another1 ,i cannot see them1 neither impeaches the other4 ,all that is left is to stimulate the dull faculty of the one until he can see4 ,the following reflections may help us to see4 ,mr4 ,spencer's remark implies that we have no higher faculty than the ,sense and the ,understanding4 ,it implies1 also1 that we can never have any self-knowledge1 in the fundamental signification of that phrase4 ,we can observe the conduct of the mind1 and study and classify the results2 but the laws1 the constitution of the activity itself must forever remain closed to us4 ,as was said1 when speaking of this subject under a different phase1 the eye cannot see and study itself4 ,it is a mechanical organism1 capable only of reaction as acted upon1 capable only of seeing results1 but never able to penetrate to the hidden springs which underlie the event4 ,just so is it with the ,sense and ,understanding4 ,they are mere mechanical faculties capable of acting as they are acted upon1 but never able to go behind the appearance to its final source4 ,on such a hypothesis as this all science is impossible1 but most of all a science of the human mind4 ,if man is enclosed by such walls1 no knowledge of his central self can be gained4 ,he may know what he does2 but what he is1 is as inscrutable to him as what ,god is4 ,as such a being1 he is only a higher order of brute4 ,he has some dim perceptions1 some vague feelings1 but he has no knowledge2 he is sure of nothing4 ,he can reach no ground which is ultimate1 no ,rock which he knows is immutable4 ,is man such a being8 ,the longings and aspirations of the ages roll back an unceasing ,,no6 ,he is capable of placing himself before himself1 of analyzing that self to the very groundwork of his being4 ,all the laws of his constitution1 all the forms of his activity1 he can clearly and amply place before himself and know them4 ,and how is this8 ,it is because ,god has endowed him with an ,,eye like unto ,his own1 which enables man to be self-comprehending1 as ,he is self-comprehending1--the ,reason1 with which man may read himself as a child reads a book2 that man can make the form of thought the matter of thought4 ,true1 the ,understanding is shut out from any consideration of the forms of thought2 but man is not simply or mainly an ,understanding4 ,he is1 in his highest being1 a spiritual person1 whom ,god has endowed with the faculty of ,,vision2 and the great organic evil1 which the fall wrought into the world1 was this very denial of the spiritual light1 and this crowding down and out of sight1 of the spiritual person beneath the animal nature1 this denial of the essential faculties of such person1 and this elevation of the lower faculties of the animal nature1 the ,sense and ,understanding1 into the highest place1 which is involved in all such teachings as we are criticizing4 ,mr4 ,spencer's remarks upon ,matter are no nearer the truth4 ,in almost his first sentence there is a grievous logical faux pas4 ,he says3 ,matter is either infinitely divisible or it is not2 no third possibility can be named4 ,yet we will name one1 as follows3 ,the divisibility of matter has no relation to infinity4 ,and this third supposition happens to be the truth4 ,but it will be said that the question should be stated thus3 ,either there is a limit to the divisibility of matter1 or there is no limit4 ,this statement is exhaustive1 because limitation belongs to matter4 ,of these alternatives there can be no hesitation which one to choose4 ,there is a limit to the divisibility of matter4 ,this answer cannot be given by the physical sense2 for no one questions but what it is incapable of finding a limit4 ,the mental sense could not give it1 because it is a question of actual substance and not of ideal forms4 ,the ,reason gives the answer4 ,matter is limited at both extremes4 ,its amount is definite1 as are its final elements4 ,these ultimate parts have an under and an upper surface1 a right and a left side4 ,when1 then1 one of these parts shall be broken1 what results8 ,not pieces1 as the materialist1 thinking only in the ,sense1 would have us believe4 ,when a final part shall be broken1 there will remain no matter1--to the sense nothing4 ,to it1 the result would be annihilation4 ,but the ,reason declares that there would be left ,god's power in its simplicity1--that final ,unit out of which all diversity becomes4 ,the subsequent difficulties raised respecting the solidity of ,matter may be explained thus4 ,and for convenience sake1 we will limit the term ,matter to such substances as are object to the physical sense1 like granite1 while ,force shall be used to comprise those finer substances1 like the ,ether1 which are impalpable to the physical sense4 ,matter is composed of very minute ultimate particles which do not touch1 but which are held together by ,force4 ,the space between the atoms1 which would otherwise be in vacuo1 is full of ,force4 ,we might be more exhaustive in our analysis1 and say--which would be true--that a space-filling force composes the ,universe2 and that ,matter is only ,force in one of its modifications4 ,but without this the other statement is sufficient4 ,when1 then1 a portion of matter is compressed1 the force which holds the ultimate particles in their places is overcome by an external force1 and these particles are brought nearer together4 ,now1 how is it with the moving body and the collision8 ,bisect a line and see the truth4 ,c ,a--------,b #a ,a body with a mass of #d is moving with a velocity of #d along the line from ,a to ,b4 ,at ,c it meets another body with a mass of #d at rest4 ,from thence the two move on towards ,b with a velocity of #b4 ,what has happened8 ,in the body there was a certain amount of force1 which set it in motion and kept it in motion4 ,and just here let us make a point4 ,no force is ever lost or destroyed4 ,it is only transferred4 ,when a bullet is fired from a gun1 it possesses at one point a maximum of force4 ,from that point this force is steadily transferred to the air and other substances1 until all that it received from the powder is spent4 ,but at any one point in its flight1 the sum of the force which has been transferred since the maximum1 and of the force yet to be transferred1 will always equal the maximum4 ,now1 how is it respecting the question raised by ,mr4 ,spencer8 ,the instant of contact is a point in time1 not a period1 and the transfer of force is instantaneous4 ,c1 then1 is a point1 not a period1 and the velocity on the one side is #d and the other side #b1 while the momentum or force is exactly equal throughout the line4 ,if it is said that this proves that a body can pass from one velocity to another without passing through the intermediate velocities1 we cannot help it4 ,the above are the facts1 and they give the truth4 ,the following sentence of ,mr4 ,spencer is1 at least1 careless4 ,for when1 of two such units1 one moving at velocity #d strikes another at rest1 the striking unit must have its velocity #d instantaneously reduced to velocity #b2 must pass from velocity #d to velocity #b without any lapse of time1 and without passing through intermediate velocities2 must be moving with velocities #d and #b at the same instant1 which is impossible4 ,if there is any sense in the remark1 instantaneously must mean a point of time without period4 ,for1 if any period is allowed1 the sentence has no meaning1 since during that period the striking unit passes through all intermediate velocities4 ,but if by instantaneously he means without period1 then the last clause of the sentence is illogical1 since instant there evidently means a period4 ,for if it means point1 then it contradicts the first clause4 ,there1 it is asserted that #d was reduced to #b1 i4 e4 that at one point the velocity was #d1 and at the next point it was #b1 and that there was no time between4 ,if #d was instantaneously reduced to #b1 then the velocity #b was next after the velocity #d1 and not coeval with it4 ,thus it appears that these two clauses which were meant to be synonymous are contradictory4 ,bearing in mind what we have heretofore learned respecting atoms1 we shall not be troubled by the objections to the ,newtonian theory which follow4 ,in reply to the question1 ,what is the constitution of these units8 the answer1 ,we have no alternative but to regard each of them as a small piece of matter1 would be true if the ,sense was the only faculty which could examine them4 ,but even upon this theory ,mr4 ,spencer's remarks respecting the parts of which each atom consists1 are entirely out of place2 for the hypothesis that it is an ultimate atom excludes the supposition of parts1 since that phrase has no meaning except it refers to a final1 indivisible1 material unit4 ,all that the ,sense could say1 would be1 ,what this atom is ,i know not1 but that it is1 and is not divisible1 ,i believe4 ,but when we see by the ,reason that the ultimate atom1 when dissolved1 becomes ,god's power1 all difficulty in the question vanishes4 ,having thus answered the above objections1 it is unnecessary to notice the similar ones raised against ,boscovich's theory1 which is a modification of that of ,newton4 ,mr4 ,spencer next examines certain phenomena of motion4 ,the fact that he seeks for absolute motion by the physical sense1 a faculty which was only given us to perceive relative--phenomenal--motion1 and is1 in its kind1 incapable of finding the absolute motion1 7for if it should see it1 it could not know it17 is sufficient to condemn all that he has said on this subject4 ,for the presentations which he has made of the phenomena given us by the ,sense does not exhaust the subject4 ,the perplexities therein developed are all resolvable1 as will appear further on4 ,the phenomena adduced on page #ee are1 then1 merely appearances in the physical sense2 and the motion is merely relative4 ,in the first instance1 the captain walks ,east with reference to the ship and globe4 ,in the second1 he walks ,east with reference to the ship2 the ship sails ,west with reference to the globe2 while the resultant motion is1 that he is stationary with reference to this larger object4 ,what1 then1 can the ,sense give us8 ,only resultant motion1 at the most4 ,so we see that our ideas of ,motion are not illusive1 but deficient4 ,the motion is just what it appears1 measured from a given object4 ,it is relative1 and this is all the ,sense can give4 ,our author acknowledges that we tacitly assume that there are real motions2 that we take for granted that there are fixed points in space1 with respect to which all motions are absolute2 and we find it impossible to rid ourselves of this idea4 ,a question instantly arises1 and it seems to be one which he is bound to entertain1 viz3 ,how comes this idea to be8 ,we press this question upon ,mr4 ,spencer1 being persuaded that he will find it much more perplexing than those he has entertained4 ,undoubtedly1 absolute motion cannot even be imagined4 ,no motion can be imagined1 though the moving body may be4 ,but by no means does it follow1 much less known4 ,this involves that the knowing faculty is inferior to1 and more circumscribed than1 the imagining faculty1 when the very opposite is the fact4 ,neither does it follow from what is said in the paragraph beginning with1 ,for motion is change of place1 that while we are obliged to think that there is absolute motion1 we find absolute motion incomprehensible4 ,the ,universe is limited and bounded1 and is a sphere4 ,we may assume that the centre of the sphere is at rest4 ,instantly absolute motion becomes comprehensible1 for it is motion measured from that point4 ,surely there can be no harm in the supposition4 ,the ,reason shows us that the supposition is the truth2 and that that centre is the throne of the eternal ,god4 ,in this view not only is motion1 apart from the limitations of space1 totally unthinkable1 but it is absolutely impossible4 ,motion cannot be1 except as a formal body is4 ,hence1 to speak of motion in unlimited space is simply absurd4 ,formal object cannot be1 except as thereby a limit is established in ,space4 ,hence it is evident that absolute motion is not motion with reference to unlimited ,space1 which would be the same as motion without a moving2 but is motion with reference to that point fixed in ,space1 around which all things revolve1 but which is itself at perfect rest4 ,another insuperable difficulty presents itself1 when we contemplate the transfer of ,motion4 ,motion is simply the moving of a body1 and cannot be transferred4 ,the force which causes the motion is what is transferred4 ,all that can be said of motion is1 that it is1 that it increases1 that it diminishes1 that it ceases4 ,if the moving body impinges upon another moving body1 and causes it to move1 it is not motion that is transferred1 but the force which causes the motion4 ,the motion in the impinging body is diminished1 and a new motion is begun in the body which was at rest4 ,again it is asked3 ,in what respect does a body after impact differ from itself before impact8 ,and further on3 ,the motion you say has been communicated4 ,but how8 ,what has been communicated8 ,the striking body has not transferred a thing to the body struck2 and it is equally out of the question to say that it has transferred an attribute4 ,observe now that a somewhat is unquestionably communicated2 and the question is3--,what is it8 ,query4 ,does ,mr ,spencer mean to comprehend the ,universe in thing and attribute8 ,he would seem to4 ,if he does1 he gives a decision by assertion without explanation or proof1 which involves the very question at issue1 which is1 ,is the somewhat transferred a thing or an attribute2 and a decision directly contrary to the acknowledgment that a somewhat has been communicated8 ,on the above-named hypothesis his statement should be as follows3 ,a somewhat has been communicated4 ,thing and attribute comprise all the ,universe4 ,neither a thing1 nor an attribute has been communicated1 i4 e4 no somewhat has been communicated2 which contradicts the evidence and the acknowledgment4 ,if on the other hand ,mr4 ,spencer means that thing and attribute comprise only a part of the ,universe1 then the question is not fairly met4 ,it may be more convenient for the moment to conclude the ,universe in the two terms thing and attribute2 and then1 as attribute is essential to the object it qualifies1 and so cannot be communicated1 it will follow that a thing has been communicated4 ,this thing we call force4 ,it is not in hand now to inquire what force is4 ,it is manifest to the ,sense that the body is in a different state after impact1 than it was before4 ,something has been put into the body1 which1 though not directly appreciable to the ,sense1 is indirectly appreciable by the results1 and which is as real an addition as water is to a bowl1 when poured in4 ,before the impact the body was destitute of that kind of force--motor force would be a convenient term--which tended to move it4 ,after the impact a sufficiency of that force was present to produce the motion4 ,it may be asked1 where does this force go to when the motion diminishes till the body stops4 ,it passes into the substances which cause the diminution until there is no surplus in the moving body1 and at the point of equilibrium motion ceases4 ,if it be now asked1 where does this force ultimately go to1 it is to be said that it comes from ,god1 and goes to ,god1 who is the ,final4 ,the ,sense gives only subordinate answers1 but the ,reason leads us to the ,supreme4 ,if the view adopted be true1 ,mr4 ,spencer's halving and halving again the rate of movement forever1 is irrelevant4 ,it is not a mental operation but an actual fact which is to be accounted for4 ,take a striking illustration4 ,a ball lying on smooth ice is struck with a hockey4 ,away it goes skimming over the glassy surface with a steadily diminishing velocity till it ceases4 ,it starts1 it proceeds1 it stops4 ,these are the facts2 and the mental operation must accord with them4 ,there is put into the ball1 at the instant of contact1 a certain amount of motor force4 ,from that instant onward1 that force flows out of the ball into the resisting substances by which it is surrounded1 until none is left4 ,and it is just as pertinent to ask how all the water can flow out of a pail1 as how all the motor force can flow out of a moving substance4 ,the smallest movement is separated by no more of an impassable gap from no movement1 than it is from a larger movement above it4 ,that which will account for a movement four becoming two1 will account for a movement two becoming zero4 ,the puzzle1 then1 may be explained thus4 ,time is the procession of events4 ,let it be represented by a line4 ,take a point in that line1 which will then mark its division but represent no period4 ,on one side of that point is rest2 on the other motion4 ,that point is the point of contact1 and occupies no period4 ,at this point the motion is maximum4 ,the force instantly begins to flow off1 and continues in a steady stream until none is left1 and the body is again at rest4 ,here1 also1 we take a point4 ,this is the point of zero4 ,it again divides the line4 ,before the bisection is motion2 after the bisection is rest4 ,all this cannot be perceived by the ,sense1 nor conceived by the ,understanding4 ,it is seen by the ,reason4 ,now observe the actual phenomenon4 ,the ball starts1 proceeds1 stops4 ,from maximum to zero there is a steady diminution1 or nearly enough so for the experiment2 at least the diminution can be averaged for the illustration4 ,then comparing motion with time1 the same difficulty falls upon the one as the other4 ,if the motion is halved1 the time must be2 and so1 mentally1 it is impossible to imagine how a moment of time can pass4 ,to the halving faculty--the ,sense--this is true1 and so we are compelled to correct our course of procedure4 ,this it is4 ,the ,sense and ,understanding being impotent to discover an absolute unit of any kind1 the ,sense assumes for itself what meets all practical want--a standard unit1 by which it measures parts in ,space and ,time4 ,so motion must be measured by some assumed standard2 and as1 like time1--duration1--it can be represented by a line1 let them have a common standard4 ,suppose1 then1 that the ball's flight occupies ten minutes of time4 ,the line from m to z will be divided into ten exactly equal spaces2 and it will be no more difficult to account for the flow of force from #aj to #i1 than from #a to #j4 ,also let it be observed that the force1 like time1 is a unit1 which the ,sense1 for its convenience1 divides into parts2 but that neither those parts1 nor any parts1 have any real existence4 ,as ,time is an indivisible whole1 measured off for convenience1 so any given force is such a whole1 and is so measured off4 ,all this appearing and measuring are phenomenal in the ,sense4 ,it is the ,reason which sees that they can be only phenomenal1 and that behind the appearance is pure ,spirit--,god1 who is primarily out of all relation4 ,on page #eh1 near the close of his illustration of the chair1 ,mr4 ,spencer says3 ,it suffices to remark that since the force as known to us is an affection of consciousness1 we cannot conceive the force as existing in the chair under the same form without endowing the chair with consciousness4 ,this very strange assertion can only be true1 provided a major premiss1 ,no force can be conceived to exist without involving an affection of consciousness in the object in which it apparently inheres1 is true4 ,such a premiss seems worse than absurd2 it seems silly4 ,we cannot learn that force exists1 without our consciousness is affected thereby2 but this is a very different thing from our being unable to conceive of a force as existing1 without there is a consciousness in the object through which it appears4 ,if ,mr4 ,spencer had said that no force can be1 without being exerted1 and no force can be exerted1 without an affection of the consciousness of the exertor1 he would have uttered the truth4 ,we would then have the following result4 ,primarily all force is exerted by the ,deity2 and he is conscious thereof4 ,he draws the chair down just as really as though the hand were visible4 ,secondarily spiritual persons are endowed by their ,creator with the ability to exert his force for their uses1 and so ,i lift the chair4 ,the great error1 which appears on every page of ,mr4 ,spencer's book and invalidates all his conclusions1 shows itself fully here4 ,he presents images from the ,sense1 and then tries to satisfy the ,reason--the faculty which calls for an absolute account--by the analyses of that ,sense4 ,his attempt to halve the rate1 his remark that the smallest movement is separated by an impassable gap from no movement1 and many such1 are only pertinent to the ,sense1 can never be explained by the ,sense1 and are found by the ,reason to need1 and be capable of1 no such kind of explanation as the ,sense attempts2 but that the phenomena are appearances in wholes1 whose partitions cannot be absolute1 and that these wholes are accounted for by the being of an absolute and infinite ,person--,god1 who is utterly impalpable to the ,sense1 and can be known only by the ,reason4 ,the improper use of the ,sense mentioned above1 is1 if possible1 more emphatically exemplified in the remarks upon the connection between ,force and ,matter4 ,our ultimate test of ,matter is the ability to resist4 ,this is true to the ,sense1 but no farther4 ,resist what8 ,other matter1 of course4 ,thus is the sensuousness made manifest4 ,in the ,sense1 then1 we have a material object4 ,but ,force is not object to the ,sense directly1 but only indirectly by its effects through ,matter4 ,the ,sense1 in its percept1 deems the force other than the matter4 ,hence it is really no more difficult for the ,sense to answer the question1 ,how could the ,sun send a force through #ie1jjj1jjj of miles of void to the ,earth and hold it1 than through solid rock that distance8 ,all that the ,sense can do is to present the phenomena4 ,it is utterly impotent to account for the least of them4 ,in the following passage1 on page #fa1 ,mr4 ,spencer seems to have been unaccountably led astray4 ,he says3 ,let the atoms be twice as far apart1 and their attractions and repulsions will both be reduced to one fourth of their present amounts4 ,let them be brought within half the distance1 and then attractions and repulsions will both be quadrupled4 ,whence it follows that this matter will as readily as not assume any other density2 and can offer no resistance to any external agents4 ,now if this be true1 there can be no external agents to which to offer any resistance4 ,it is simply to assert that all force neutralizes itself2 and that matter is impossible4 ,but the conclusion does not follow4 ,it is evidently based on the supposition that the attractions and repulsions are contra-acting forces which exactly balance each other1 and so the molecules are held in their position by no force4 ,instead of this1 they are co-acting forces1 which are wholly expended in holding the molecules in their places4 ,the repulsions1 then1 are expended in resisting pressure from without which seeks to crowd the particles in upon themselves and thus disturb their equilibrium2 while the attractions are expended in holding the particles down to their natural distance from each other when any disturbing force attempts to separate them4 ,hence1 referring to the two cases mentioned1 in the first instance the power of resistance is reduced to one fourth1 and this corresponds with the fact2 and in the second instance the power of resistance is increased fourfold1 and this corresponds with the fact4 ,we thus arrive at the end of ,mr4 ,spencer's remarks concerning the material ,universe and of our strictures thereon4 ,perhaps the reader's mind cannot better be satisfied as to the validity of these strictures than by presenting an outline of the system furnished by the ,reason1 and upon which they are based4 ,the ,reason gives1 by a direct and immediate intuition1 and as a necessary a priori idea1 ,god4 ,this is a spontaneous1 synthetical act1 precisely the same in kind with that which gives a simple a priori principle1 as idea4 ,in it the ,reason intuits1 not a single principle seen to be necessary simply1 but the fact that all possible principles must be combined in a perfectly harmonious unity1 in a single ,being1 who thereby possesses all possible endowments2 and so is utterly independent1 and is seen to be the absolute and infinite ,person1 the perfect ,spirit4 ,this act is no conclusion of the ,one from the many in a synthetical judgment1 but is entirely different4 ,it is the necessary seeing of the many in the ,one2 and so is not a judgment but an intuition1 not a guess but a certainty4 ,god1 then1 is known1 when known at all1 not by plurality1 difference1 and relation1 but by an immediate insight into his unity1 and so is directly known as he is4 ,and the whole ,universe is1 that creatures might be1 to whom this revelation was possible4 ,among the other necessary endowments which this intuition reveals1 is that of immanent power commensurate with his dignity1 and adequate to realize in actual creatures the necessary a priori ideas1 which he also possesses as endowments4 ,power is1 then1 a simple idea1 incapable of analysis2 and which cannot therefore be defined1 except by synonymous terms2 and to which ,president ,hopkins's remark upon moral obligation is equally pertinent2 viz3 that we can only state the occasion on which it arises4 ,from these data the a priori idea of the ,universe may be developed as follows3-- ,god1 the absolute and infinite ,person1 possesses1 as inherent endowment forever immanent in himself1 ,universal ,genius2 which is at once capacity and faculty1 in which he sees1 and by which he sees1 all possible ideas1 and these in all possible combinations or ideals4 ,thus has he all possible knowledge4 ,from the various ideal systems which thus are1 he1 having perfect wisdom1 and according his choice to the behest of his own worth1 selects that one which is thus seen to be best2 and thereby determines the forms and laws under which the ,universe shall become4 ,he also possesses1 as inherent endowment1 all power2 i4 e4 the ability to realize every one of his ideals2 but not the ability to violate the natural laws of his being1 as to make two and two five4 ,the ideal system is only ideal3 the power is simply power2 and so long as the two remain isolated1 no-thing will be4 ,therefore1 in order to the realization of his ideal1 it must be combined with the power2 i4 e41 the power must be organized according to the ideal4 ,how1 then1 can the power1 having been sent forth from ,god1 be organized8 ,thus4 ,if the power goes forth in its simplicity1 it will be expended uselessly1 because there is no substance upon which it may be exercised4 ,it follows1 then1 that1 if exercised at all1 it must be exercised upon itself4 ,when1 therefore1 ,god would create the ,universe1 he sent forth two pencils1 or columns of power1 of equal and sufficient volume1 which1 acting upon each other from opposite directions1 just held each other in balance1 and thus force was4 ,these two pencils1 thus balancing each other1 would result in a sphere of space-filling force4 ,the point of contact would determine the first place in ,space1 and the first point in ,time2 from which1 if attainable1 an absolute measure of each could be made4 ,all we have now attained is the single duality space-filling force1 which is wholly homogeneous1 is of sufficient volume to constitute the ,universe1 and yet by no means is the ,universe4 ,there is only ,chaos1 without form and void1 and darkness is upon the face of the deep4 ,now must the ,spirit of ,god move upon the face of the waters2 then through vast and to us immeasurable periods of time1 through cycle and epicycle1 the work of organization will go on4 ,ever moving under forms laid down in the a priori ideal1 ,god's power turns upon itself1 as out of the crush of elemental chaos the ,universe is being evolved4 ,during this process1 whatever of the force is to act under the law of heat in the a priori ideal1 assumes that form and the heat force becomes2 whatever is to act under the law of magnetism1 assumes that form1 and magnetic force becomes2 so of light1 and the various forms of matter4 ,at length1 in the revolution of the cycles1 the ,universe attains that degree of preparation which fits it for living things to be1 and the life force is organized2 and by degrees all its various forms are brought forth4 ,after another vast period that point is reached when an animal may be organized1 which shall be the dwelling-place for a time of a being whose life is utterly different in kind from any animal life1 and man appears4 ,now in all these vast processes1 be it observed that ,god is personally present1 that the first energy was his1 and that every subsequent energizing act is his special and personal act4 ,he organized the duality1 force4 ,he then organized this force into heat-force1 light-force1 magnetic-force1 matter-force1 life-force1 and soul-force4 ,and so it is that his personal supervision and energy is actually present in every atom of the ,universe4 ,when we turn from this process of thought to the sensible facts1 and speak of granite1 sandstone1 schist1 clay1 herbage1 animals1 yes1 of the thousand kinds of substance which appear to the eye1 it is to be remembered that all these are but forms to the ,sense of that reason-conception1 force1--that primal duality1 which power acting upon itself becomes4 ,now as the machine can never carve any other image than those for which it is specially constructed1 and must work just as it is made to work1 so the ,sense1 which is purely mechanical1 can never do any other than the work for which it was made1 can never transcend the laws of its organization4 ,it can only give forms--results1 but is impotent to go behind them4 ,it can only say that things are1 but never say what or why they are4 ,seen in the light of the theory which has thus been presented1 ,mr4 ,spencer's difficulties vanish4 ,matter is force4 ,motion is matter affected by another form of force4 ,the puzzle of motion and rest is only phenomenal to the ,sense2 it is an appearance of force acting through another force4 ,it may also be said that the ,universe is solid force4 ,there is no void in it4 ,there is no nook1 no crevice or cranny1 that is not full of force4 ,to seek1 then1 for some medium through which force may traverse vast distances1 is the perfection of superfluity4 ,from centre to circumference it is present1 and controls all things1 and is all things4 ,so it is no more difficult to see how force reaches forth and holds worlds in their place1 than how it draws down the pebble which a boy has thrown into the air4 ,it is no substance which must travel over the distance1 it is rather an inflexible rod which swings the worlds round in their orbits4 ,whether1 then1 we look at calcined crags or lilies of the valley1 whether astronomy1 or geology1 or chemistry be our study1 the objects grouped under those sciences will be found to be equally the results of this one force1 acting under different laws1 and taking upon itself different forms1 and becoming different objects4 ,that faculty and that line of thought1 which have given so readily the solution of the difficulties brought to view by ,mr4 ,spencer's examination of the outer world1 will afford us an easier solution1 if possible1 of the difficulties which he has raised respecting the inner world4 ,that which is not of us1 but is far from us1 may perchance be imperfectly known2 but ourselves1 what we are1 and the laws of our being1 may be certainly and accurately known4 ,and this is the highest knowledge4 ,it may be important1 as an element of culture1 that we become acquainted with many facts respecting the outer world4 ,it cannot but be of the utmost importance1 that we know ourselves2 for thus only can we fulfil the behest of that likeness to ,god1 in which we were originally created4 ,we seek for1 we may obtain1 we have obtained knowledge in the inner world1--a knowledge sure1 steadfast1 immutable4 ,it seems to be more than a mere verbal criticism1 rather a fundamental one1 that it is not our states of consciousness which occur in succession2 but that the modifications in our consciousness so occur4 ,consciousness is one1 and retains that oneness throughout all modifications4 ,these occur in the unity1 as items of experience affect it4 ,is this series of modifications of consciousness infinite or finite8 ,to this question experience can give no answer4 ,all experiments are irrelevant2 because these can only be after the faculty of consciousness is4 ,they can go no further back than the forms of the activity4 ,these they may find1 but they cannot account for4 ,a law lies on all those powers by which an experiment may be made1 which forever estops them from attaining to the substance of the power which lies back of the form4 ,the eye cannot examine itself4 ,the ,sense1 as mental capacity for the reception of impressions1 cannot analyze its constituents4 ,the ,understanding1 as connective faculty concluding in judgments1 is impotent to discover why it must judge one way and not another4 ,it is only when we ascend to the ,reason that we reach the region of true knowledge4 ,here1 overlooking1 analyzing all the conduct of the lower powers1 and holding the self right in the full blaze of the ,eye of self1 ,man attains a true and fundamental self-knowledge4 ,from this ,mount of ,vision we know that infinity and finiteness have no pertinence to modifications of consciousness1 or in fact to any series4 ,we attain to the further knowledge that this series is1 must be1 limited2 because the constituted beings1 in whom it in each case inheres1 are limited1 and had a beginning4 ,it matters not now to inquire how a self-conscious person could be created4 ,it is sufficient to know that one has been created4 ,this fact involves the further fact that consciousness1 as an actuality1 began in the order of nature1 after the being to whom it belongs as endowment1 or1 in other words1 an organization must be1 before the modifications which inhere in that organization can become4 ,the attainment of this as necessary law is far more satisfactory than any experience could be1 were it possible2 for we can never know but that an experience may be modified2 but a law given in the intuition is immutable4 ,the fact1 ascertained many pages back1 that the subject and the object are identical under the final examination of the ,reason1 enables us to attain the present end of the chain4 ,the question is one of fact1 and is purely psychological4 ,it cannot be passed upon1 or in any way interfered with1 by logical processes4 ,it is only by examination1 by seeing1 that the truth can be known4 ,faraday ridiculed as preposterous the pretension that a vessel propelled by steam could cross the ocean1 and demonstrated1 to his entire satisfaction1 the impossibility of the event4 ,yet the ,savannah crossed1 and laughed at him4 ,just so here1 all arguing is folly4 ,the question is one of fact in experience4 ,and upon it the soul gives undoubted answer1 as we have stated4 ,nor is it so difficult1 as some would have us believe1 to see how this may be4 ,consciousness is an indivisible unity1 and1 as we have before seen1 may best be defined as the light in which the person intuits his own acts and activities4 ,this unity is abiding1 and is ground for the modifications4 ,it is1 then1 now1 and the person now knows what the present modification is4 ,the person does not need to look to memory and learn what the former modification was4 ,it immediately knows what the modification is now4 ,thus a simple attainment of the psychological truth through a careful examination dispels as a morning mist the whole cloud of ,mr4 ,spencer's difficulties4 ,well might ,president ,hopkins say1 ,the only question is1 what is it that consciousness gives8 ,if we say that it does thus give both the subject and the object1 that simple affirmation sweeps away in a moment the whole basis of the ideal and skeptical philosophy4 ,it becomes as the spear of ,ithuriel1 and its simple touch will change what seemed whole continents of solid speculation into mere banks of ,german fog4 ,we have learned1 then1 that it is not possible1 or necessary1 either to perceive or conceive the terminations of consciousness1 because this involves the discovery1 by mechanical faculties1 of their own being and state before they became activities on the one hand1 which is a contradiction1 and on the other an utter transcending of the sphere of their capability1 the attempt to do which would be a greater folly than would be that of the hand to see ,jupiter4 ,but we have intuited the law1 which declares the necessity of a beginning for us and all creatures2 and we ever live in the light of the present end4 ,when1 then1 ,mr4 ,spencer says that ,consciousness implies perpetual change and the perpetual establishment of relations between its successive phases1 we know that he has uttered a fundamental psychological error1 in fact1 that almost the opposite is the truth4 ,consciousness is the permanent1 the abiding1 the changeless4 ,it is the light of the personal ,eye4 ,into it all changes come2 but they are only incidental4 ,in the finite and partial person1 they come1 because such person must grow2 and so1 because of his partiality and incompleteness1 they become necessary incidents2 but let there be a ,person having all knowledge1 who therefore cannot learn1 having all perfection1 who therefore cannot change1 and it is plain that these facts in no way interfere with his consciousness4 ,all variety is immanent in its light1 and no change can come into it because there is no change to come2 but this ,person sees all his endowments at once1 in the unity of this his light1 just as we see some of our endowments in the unity of this our light4 ,the change is not in the consciousness1 but in the objects which come into it4 ,this view also disposes of the theory that any mental affection must be known as like these foregoing ones or unlike those2 that1 if it is not thought of in connection with others--not distinguished or identified by comparison with others1 it is not recognized--is not a state of consciousness at all4 ,such comparison we have found only incidental in consciousness1 pertaining to things in the ,sense and ,understanding and not essential4 ,thus does a true psychology dissipate all these difficulties as a true cosmology explained the perplexities of ,motion and ,rest4 ,take another step and we can answer the question ,what is this that thinks8 ,it is a spiritual person4 ,what1 then1 is a spiritual person8 ,a substance--a kind of force--the nature of which we need inquire about no further than to know that it is suitable to the use which is made of it1 which is organized1 according to a set of constituting laws1 into such spiritual person4 ,the substance without the laws would be simple substance1 and nothing more4 ,the laws without the substance would be only laws1 and could give no being having no ground in which to inhere4 ,but the substance as ground and the complete set of laws as inhering in the ground1 and being its organization when combined1 become a spiritual person who thinks4 ,the ego1 that is the sense of personality1 is only one of the forms of activity of this being1 and therefore cannot be said to think4 ,the pages now before us are all vitiated by the theory that successive impressions and ideas constitute consciousness4 ,once attain to the true psychology of the person1 and learn that consciousness is as stated above1--an abiding light into which modifications come1--and there arises no difficulty in believing in the reality of self1 and in entirely justifying that belief by ,reason4 ,yea1 more1 from such a standpoint it is utter unreason1 the height of folly1 to doubt for an instant1 for immanent and central in the light of ,reason lies the solemn fact of man's selfhood4 ,we arrive1 then1 directly at ,mr4 ,spencer's conclusion1 that ,clearly1 a true cognition of self implies a state in which the knowing and the known are one--in which subject and object are identified1 and we know that such a state is an actuality4 ,mr4 ,mansel may hold that such an assertion is the annihilation of both1 but he is wholly wrong4 ,the ,savannah has crossed the ,atlantic4 ,we attain1 then1 exactly the opposite result from ,mr4 ,spencer4 ,we have seen that ,ultimate ,scientific ,ideas are all presentative of realities which can be comprehended4 ,we have1 indeed1 found it to be true1 that1 after no matter how great a progress in the colligation of facts and the establishment of generalizations ever wider and wider1--after the merging of limited and derivative truths in truths that are larger and deeper1 has been carried no matter how far1--the fundamental truth remains as much beyond reach as ever4 ,but having learned this1 we do not arrive at the conclusion that the explanation of that which is explicable does but bring out into greater clearness the inexplicableness of that which remains behind4 ,on the other hand we know that such a conclusion is erroneous1 and that the method by which it is reached is a false method1 and utterly irrelevant to the object sought4 ,could this lesson but be thoroughly learned1 ,mr4 ,spencer's work1 and our work1 would not have been in vain4 ,only by a method differing from this ,,in ,,kind--a method in which there is no colligation of facts1 and no generalizations concluded therefrom1 but a simple1 direct insight into ,pure ,truth--can the fundamental truth be known2 and thus it may be known by every human soul4 ,god made man in his own image4 ,in our scheme there is ample room for the man of ,science1 with the eye of ,sense1 to run through the ,universe1 and gather facts4 ,with telescope and microscope1 he may pursue them1 and capture innumerable multitudes of them4 ,but having done this1 we count it folly to attempt to generalize truth therefrom4 ,but holding up the facts in the clear light of ,reason1 and searching them through and through1 we see in them the immutable principle1 known by a spontaneous1 immediate1 intuitive knowledge to be immutable1 and thus we know the truth4 ,,the ,,relativity ,,of ,,all ,,knowledge4 ,in the opening of this chapter1 ,mr4 ,spencer states the result1 which1 in his opinion1 philosophy has attained as follows3 ,all possible conceptions have been one by one tried and found wanting2 and so the entire field of speculation has been gradually exhausted without positive result2 the only result arrived at being the negative one above stated--that the reality existing behind all appearances is1 and must ever be1 unknown4 ,he then sets down a considerable list of names of philosophers1 who are claimed by ,sir ,william ,hamilton as supporters of that position4 ,such a parade of names may be grateful to the feelings of the ,limitists1 but it is no support to their cause4 ,the questions at issue are of such a nature that no array of dignities1 of learning1 of profound opinions1 can have a feather's weight in the decision4 ,for instance1 take ,problem ,,xlvii1 of the first book of ,euclid4 ,what weight have human opinion with reference to its validity8 ,though a thousand mathematicians should deny its truth1 it would be just as convincing as now2 and when a thousand mathematicians assert its truth1 they add no item to the vividness of the conviction4 ,the school-boy1 who never heard of one of them1 when he first reads it1 knows it must be so1 and that this is an inevitable necessity1 beyond the possibility of any power or will to change4 ,on principles simple1 fixed1 and final1 just like those of mathematics1 seen by the same ,eye and known with the same intellectual certainty1 and by logical processes just as pure1 conclusive1 demonstrative as those of geometry1 and by such alone1 can the questions now before us be settled4 ,but though names and opinions have no weight in the final decision1 though a demonstration is demanded and must be given1 still it is interesting to note the absence of two names1 representatives of a class1 which must ever awaken1 among the devout and pure-hearted1 attention and love1 and whose teachings1 however unnoticed by ,mr4 ,spencer1 are a leaven working in the minds and hearts of men1 which develop with continually increasing distinctness the solemn and sublime truth1 that the human mind is capable of absolute knowledge4 ,plato1 with serious1 yea1 sad countenance1 the butt of jeer and scoff from the wits and comedians of his day1 went about teaching those who hung upon his lips1 that in every human soul were ,ideas which ,god had implanted1 and which were final truth4 ,and ,jesus ,christ1 with a countenance more beautifully serious1 more sweetly sad1 said to those ,jews which believed on him1 ,if ye continue in my word1 then are ye my disciples indeed2 and ye shall know the truth1 and the truth shall make you free4 ,it may seem to men who grope about in the dismal cavern of the animal nature--the ,sense and ,understanding--wise to refuse the light1 and reject the truths of the ,pure ,reason and the ,god-man1 and to call the motley conglomeration of facts which they gather1 but cannot explain1 philosophy2 but no soul which craves the ,higher ,life will1 can be satisfied with such attainments4 ,it yearns for1 it cries after1 yea1 with ceaseless iteration it urges its supplication for the highest truth2 and it shall attain to it1 because ,god1 in giving the tongue to cry1 gave also the ,eye to see4 ,the ,spiritual person in man1 made in the very image of ,god1 can never be satisfied till1 stripped of the weight of the animal nature1 it sees with its own ,eye the ,pure ,reason1 ,god as the ,highest ,truth4 ,and to bring it by culture1 by every possible manifestation of his wondrous nature1 up to this high ,mount of ,vision1 is one object of ,god in his system of the ,universe4 ,the teaching of the ,word--that august personage1 who came forth from ,god1 and went to ,god1 has been alluded to above4 ,it deserves more than an allusion1 more than any notice which can be given it here4 ,it is astonishing1 though perhaps not wholly unaccountable1 that the writings of the apostles ,john and ,paul have received so little attention from the metaphysicians of the world1 as declarations of metaphysical truths4 ,even the most devout students of them do not seem to have appreciated their inestimable value in this regard4 ,the reason for this undoubtedly is1 that their transcendent importance as declarations of religious truth has shone with such dazzling effulgence upon the eyes of those who have loved them1 that the lesser1 but harmoniously combining beams of a true spiritual philosophy have been unnoticed in the glory of the nobler light4 ,it will not1 therefore1 we trust1 be deemed irreverent to say that1 laying aside all questions of the ,divinity of ,christ1 or of the inspiration of the ,bible1 and considering the writings of ,john and ,paul merely as human productions1 written at some time nobody knows when1 and by some men nobody knows who1 they are the most wonderful revelations1 the profoundest metaphysical treatises the world has ever seen4 ,in them the highest truths1 those most difficult of attainment by processes of reflection1 are stated in simple1 clear language1 and they answer exactly to the teachings of the ,reason4 ,upon this1 ,president ,hopkins says3 ,the identity which we found in the last lecture between the teaching of the constitution of man and the law of ,god1 was not sought4 ,the result was reached because the analysis would go there4 ,i was myself surprised at the exactness of the coincidence4 ,nor is this coincidence to be observed simply in the statement of the moral law4 ,in all questions pertaining to man's nature and state1 the two will be found in exact accord4 ,no law is affirmed by either1 but is accorded to by the other4 ,in fine1 whoever wrote the ,book must have had an accurate and exhaustive knowledge of ,man1 about whom he wrote4 ,without any reference then to their religious bearings1 but simply as expositions of metaphysical truths1 the writings of the two authors named deserve our most careful attention4 ,what we seek for are laws1 final1 fixed laws1 which are seen by a direct intuition to be such2 and these writings are of great value1 because they cultivate and assist the ,reason in its search for these highest ,truths4 ,one need have no hesitation1 then1 in rejecting the authority of ,mr4 ,spencer's names1 aye1 even if they were a thousand more4 ,we seek for1 and can obtain1 that which he cannot give us--a demonstration2 which he cannot give us because he denies the very existence of that faculty by which alone a demonstration is possible4 ,as his empiricism is worthless1 so is his rationality4 ,no deduction from any product of thought1 or process of thought1 is in any way applicable to the question in hand4 ,intuitions are the mental actions needed4 ,light is neither product nor process4 ,we pass over1 then1 his whole illustration of the partridge4 ,it proves nothing4 ,he leads us through an interminable series of questions to no goal2 and says there is none4 ,he gives the soul a stone1 when it cries for bread4 ,one sentence of his is doubtless true4 ,manifestly1 as the most general cognition at which we arrive cannot be reduced to a more general one1 it cannot be understood4 ,of course not4 ,when the ,understanding has attained to the last generalization by these very terms1 it cannot go any farther4 ,but by no means does his conclusion follow1 that ,of necessity1 therefore1 explanation must eventually bring us down to the inexplicable4 ,the deepest truth which we can get at must be unaccountable4 ,comprehension must become something other than comprehension1 before the ultimate fact can be comprehended4 ,how shall we account for the last generalization1 and show this conclusion to be false8 ,thus4 ,hitherto there have been1 properly speaking1 no comprehensions1 only perceptions in the ,sense and connections in the ,understanding4 ,the sense distinguishes quality and conjoins quantity2 the understanding connects phenomena2 the reason comprehends the whole operation of both4 ,the ,reason1 then1 overseeing the operations of the lower faculties1 and possessing within itself the a priori laws in accordance with which they are1 sees directly and immediately why they are1 and thus comprehends and accounts for them4 ,it sees that there is an end to every process of generalization2 and it then sees1 what the ,understanding could never guess1 that after--in the order of our procedure--the last generalization there is an eternal truth1 in accordance with which process and conclusion were and must be4 ,there remains1 then1 no inexplicable1 for the final truth is seen and known in its very self4 ,the passages quoted at this point from ,hamilton and ,mansel have been heretofore examined1 and need no further notice4 ,we will pass on then to his subsequent reflections upon them4 ,it is worthy of remark1 as a general criticism upon these comments1 that there is scarcely one1 if there is a single expression in the remainder of this chapter1 which does not refer to the animal nature and its functions4 ,the illustrations are from the material world1 and the terms and expressions are suited thereto4 ,with reference to objects in the ,sense1 and connections in the ,understanding1 the fundamental condition of thought1 which ,mr4 ,spencer supplies1 is unquestionably valuable4 ,there is likeness as well as relation1 plurality1 and difference4 ,but observe that both these laws alike are pertinent only to the ,sense and ,understanding1 that they belong to things in nature1 and consequently have no pertinence to the questions now before us4 ,we are discussing ideas1 not things2 and those are simple1 and can only be seen1 while these are complex1 and may be perceived1 distinguished1 and conceived4 ,if any one shall doubt that ,mr4 ,spencer is wholly occupied with things in nature1 it would seem that after having read p4 #hj1 he could doubt no longer4 ,animals1 species or genus1 mammals1 birds1 reptiles1 or fishes1 are objects by which he illustrates his subject4 ,and one is forced to exclaim1 ,how can he speak of such things when they have nothing to do with the matter in hand8 ,what have ,god and infinity and absoluteness to do with 'mammals1 birds1 reptiles1 or fishes'8 ,if we can know only these1 why speak of those8 ,it would seem that the instant they are thus set together and contrasted1 the soul must cry out with an irrepressible cry1 ,it is by an utterly different faculty1 and in entirely other modes1 that ,i dwell upon ,god and the questions concerning him4 ,these modes of the animal nature1 by which ,i know 'mammals1' are different in kind from those of the spiritual person1 by which ,i know ,god and the eternal truth4 ,and when this distinction becomes clearly appreciated and fixed in one's mind1 and the query arises1 how could a man so confound the two1 and make utter confusion of the subject1 as the ,limitists have done1 he can hardly refrain from quoting ,romans ,i4 #bj et seq4 against them4 ,let us observe now ,mr4 ,spencer's corollary4 ,a cognition of the ,real as distinguished from the ,phenomenal must1 if it exists1 conform to this law of cognition in general4 ,the ,first ,cause1 the ,infinite1 the ,absolute1 to be known at all1 must be classed4 ,to be positively thought of1 it must be thought of as such or such--as of this or that kind4 ,to begin with the law which is here asserted1 is not a general law1 and so does not lie upon all cognition4 ,it is only a special law1 and lies only upon a particular kind of cognition4 ,this has been already abundantly shown2 yet we reproduce one line of proof4 ,no mathematical law comes under his law of cognition2 neither can he1 nor any other ,limitist1 make it appear that it does so come4 ,his law is law only for things in nature1 and not for principles4 ,since then all ideas are known in themselves--are self-evident1 and since ,god1 infinity1 and absoluteness are ideas1 they are known in themselves1 and need not be classed4 ,so his corollary falls to the ground4 ,can we have any sensible experience of ,god8 ,most certainly not4 ,yet we can have just as much a sensible experience of him as of any other person--of parent1 wife1 or child4 ,did you ever see a person--a soul8 ,no4 ,can you see--have sensible experience of--a soul8 ,no4 ,what is it1 then1 that we have such experience of8 ,plainly the body--that material frame through which the soul manifests itself4 ,the ,universe is that material system through which ,god manifests himself to those spiritual persons whom he has made2 and that manifestation is the same in kind as that of a created soul through the body which is given it4 ,it follows then1--and not only from this1 but it may be shown by further illustration1--that every other person is just as really inscrutable to us as ,god is2 and further1 that1 if we can study and comprehend the soul of our wife or child1 we can with equal certainty study1 and to some extent comprehend1 the soul of ,god4 ,or1 in other words1 if man is only an animal nature1 having a ,sense and ,understanding1 all personality is an insoluble mystery2 all spiritual persons are alike utterly inscrutable4 ,and this is so1 because1 upon the hypothesis taken1 man is destitute of any faculty which can catch a glimpse of such object4 ,a ,sense and ,understanding can no more see1 or in any possible manner take cognizance of1 a spiritual person than a man born blind can see the sun4 ,again1 we say he is destitute of the faculty4 ,will ,mr4 ,spencer deny the fact of the idea of personality8 ,will he assert that man has no such notion8 ,let him once admit that he has1 and in that admission is involved the admission of the reality of that faculty by which we know ,god1 for the faculty which cognizes personality1 and cognizes ,god1 is one and the same4 ,although we do not like certain of ,mr4 ,spencer's terms1 yet1 to please him1 we will use them4 ,some conclusions1 then1 may be expressed thus3 ,god as the ,deity cannot be classed2 he is unique4 ,this is involved in the very terms by which we designate him4 ,yet we cognize him1 but this is by an immediate intuition1 in which we know him as he is in himself4 ,we shall see him as he is1 says the apostle2 and some foretastes of that transcendent revelation are vouchsafed us here on earth4 ,but the infinite ,person1 as person1 must be assimilated with other persons4 ,yet his infinity and absoluteness1 as such1 cannot be grouped4 ,and yet again1 as qualities1 they can be grouped with other qualities4 ,unquestionably between the ,creator1 as such1 and the created1 as such1 there must be a distinction transcending any of the distinctions existing between different divisions of the created4 ,god as self-existent differs in kind from man as dependent1 and this difference continues irrevocable2 while that same ,god and that same man are alike in kind as persons4 ,this is true1 because all spiritual persons are composite beings2 and while the essential elements of a spiritual person are common to created persons and the uncreated ,person1 there are other characteristics1 not essential to personality1 which belong some to the created1 and some to the uncreated1 and differentiate them4 ,or1 in other words1 ,god as person1 and man as person1 are alike4 ,yet they are diverse in kind1 and so diverse in kind that it is out of the range of possibility for that diversity to be removed4 ,how can this be explained8 ,evidently thus4 ,there are qualities transfusing the personality which cannot be interchangeable1 and which constitute the diversity4 ,personality is form of being4 ,qualities transfuse the form4 ,absoluteness and infinity are qualities which belong to one ,person1 and are such that they thereby exclude the possibility of their belonging to any other person2 and so they constitute that one to whom they belong1 unique and supreme4 ,dependence and partiality are also qualities of a spiritual person1 but are qualities of the created spiritual person1 and are such as must always subordinate that person to the other4 ,in each instance it is1 in the nature of things1 impossible for either to pass over and become the other4 ,each is what he is by the terms of his being1 and must stay so4 ,but from all this it by no means follows that the dependent spiritual person can have no knowledge of the independent spiritual ,person4 ,on the other hand1 it is the high glory of the independent spiritual ,person1 that he can create another being in his own image1 to whom he can communicate a knowledge of himself4 ,like as a father pitieth his children1 so ,jehovah pitieth them that fear him4 ,out of the fact of his ,father-hood and our childhood1 comes that solemn1 and1 to the loving soul1 joyful fact1 that he teaches us the highest knowledge just as really as our earthly parents teach us earthly knowledge4 ,this he could not do if we had not the capacity to receive the knowledge2 and we could not have had the capacity1 except he had been able1 in the nature of things1 and willing to bestow it upon us4 ,while1 then1 ,god as the ,unconditioned cannot be classed1 and so as unconditioned we do not know him as of such or such kind1 after the manner of the ,understanding1 yet we may1 do1 see him as he is1 do know that he is1 and is unconditioned1 through the insight of the ,reason1 the eye of the spiritual person1 and what it is to be unconditioned4 ,we now reach a passage which has filled us with unqualified amazement4 ,as much as we had familiarized ourselves with the materialistic teachings of the ,limitists1 we confess that we were utterly unprepared to meet1 even in ,mr4 ,spencer's writings1 a theory of man so ineffably degrading1 and uttered with so calm and naive an unconsciousness of the degradation it involved1 as the following4 ,although for want of room his illustrations are omitted1 it is believed that the following extracts give a fair and ample presentation of his doctrine4 ,all vital actions1 considered not separately but in their ensemble1 have for their final purpose the balancing of certain outer processes by certain inner processes4 ,there are unceasing external forces1 tending to bring the matter of which organic bodies consist1 into that state of stable equilibrium displayed by inorganic bodies2 there are internal forces by which this tendency is constantly antagonized2 and the perpetual changes which constitute ,life may be regarded as incidental to the maintenance of the antagonism4444 ,when we contemplate the lower kinds of life1 we see that the correspondences thus maintained are direct and simple2 as in a plant1 the vitality of which mainly consists in osmotic and chemical actions responding to the coexistence of light1 heat1 water1 and carbonic acid around it4 ,but in animals1 and especially in the higher orders of them1 the correspondences become extremely complex4 ,materials for growth and repair not being1 like those which plants require1 everywhere present1 but being widely dispersed and under special forms1 have to be formed1 to be secured1 and to be reduced to a fit state for assimilation4444 ,what is that process by which food when swallowed is reduced to a fit form for assimilation1 but a set of mechanical and chemical actions responding to the mechanical and chemical actions which distinguish the food8 ,whence it becomes manifest1 that1 while ,life in its simplest form is the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions with certain outer physico-chemical actions1 each advance to a higher form of ,life consists in a better preservation of this primary correspondence by the establishment of other correspondences4 ,divesting this conception of all superfluities1 and reducing it to its most abstract shape1 we see that ,life is definable as the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations4 ,and when we so define it1 we discover that the physical and the psychial life are equally comprehended by the definition4 ,we perceive that this1 which we call intelligence1 shows itself when the external relations to which the internal ones are adjusted begin to be numerous1 complex1 and remote in time and space2 that every advance in ,intelligence essentially consists in the establishment of more varied1 more complete1 and more involved adjustments2 and that even the highest achievements of science are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence1 so cooerdinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur externally4444 ,and lastly let it be noted that what we call truth1 guiding us to successful action and the consequent maintenance of life1 is simply the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations2 while error1 leading to failure and therefore towards death1 is the absence of such accurate correspondence4 ,if1 then1 ,life in all its manifestations1 inclusive of ,intelligence in its highest forms1 consists in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations1 the necessarily relative character of our knowledge becomes obvious4 ,the simplest cognition being the establishment of some connection between subjective states1 answering to some connection between objective agencies2 and each successively more complex cognition being the establishment of some more involved connection of such states1 answering to some more involved connection of such agencies2 it is clear that the process1 no matter how far it be carried1 can never bring within the reach of ,intelligence either the states themselves or the agencies themselves4 ,or1 to condense ,mr4 ,spencer's whole teaching into a few plain every-day words1 ,man is an animal1 and only an animal1 differing nowhat from the dog and chimpanzee1 except in the fact that his life consists in the establishment of more varied1 more complete1 and more involved adjustments1 than the life of said dog and chimpanzee4 ,mark particularly the sententious diction of this newly arisen sage4 ,forget not one syllable of the profound and most important knowledge he would impart4 ,life in all its manifestations1 inclusive of ,intelligence in its highest forms1 consists in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations4 ,see1 there is not a limit1 not a qualification to the assertion6 ,now turn back a page or two1 reader1 if thou hast this wonderful philosophy by thee1 and gazing1 as into a cage in a menagerie1 see the being its author would teach thee that thou art4 ,from the highest to the lowest forms1 life is one4 ,in its lower forms1 life is a set of direct and simple correspondences4 ,but in animals1 and especially in the higher orders of them1 and1 of course1 most especially in the human animal as the highest order1 the correspondences become extremely complex4 ,as much as to say1 reader1 you are not exactly a plant1 nor are you yet of quite so low a type as the chimpanzee aforesaid2 but the difference is no serious matter4 ,you do not differ half as much from the chimpanzee as the chimpanzee does from the forest he roves in4 ,all the difference there is between you and him is1 that the machinery by which the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations is carried on1 is more complex in you than in the chimpanzee4 ,he roams the forest1 inhabits some cave or hollow tree1 and lives on the food which nature spontaneously offers to his hairy hand4 ,you cut down the forest1 construct a house1 and live on the food which some degree of skill has prepared4 ,he constructs no clothing1 nor any covering to shield him from the inclemency of the weather1 but is satisfied with tawny1 shaggy covering1 which nature has provided4 ,you on the contrary are destitute of such a covering1 and rob the sheep1 and kill the silk-worm1 to supply the lack4 ,but in all this there is no difference in kind4 ,the mechanism by which life is sustained in you is more complex1 it is true1 than that by which life is sustained in him2 there arise1 therefore1 larger needs1 and the corresponding intelligence to supply those needs4 ,but sweet thought1 cheering thought1 oh how it supports the soul6 ,your life in its highest form is only this animal life1--is only the constructive force by which that extremely complex machinery carries on the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations4 ,all other notions of life are superfluities4 ,reader1 in view of the teaching of this new and widely heralded sage1 how many superfluities must you and ,i strip off from our conception of life6 ,and with what bitter disappointment and deep sadness should we take up our lamentation for man1 and say3 ,how art thou fallen1 oh man6 thou noblest denizen of earth2 yea1 how art thou cast down to the ground4 ,but a little ago we believed thee a spiritual being2 that thou hadst a nature too noble to rot with the beasts among the clods2 that thou wast made fit to live with angels and thy ,creator1 ,god4 ,but a little ago we believed thee possessed of a psychical life--a soul2 that thou wouldst live forever beyond the stars2 and that this soul's life was wholly occupied in the consideration of heavenly and divine things4 ,a little ago we believed in holiness1 and that thou1 consecrating thyself to pure and loving employments1 shouldst become purer and more beautiful1 nobler and more lovely1 until perfect love should cast out all fear1 and thou shouldst then see ,god face to face1 and rejoice in the sunlight of his smiling countenance4 ,but all this is changed now4 ,our belief has been found to be a cheat1 a bitter mockery to the soul4 ,we have sat at the feet of the ,english sage1 and learned how dismally different is our destiny4 ,painful is it1 oh reader1 to listen2 and the words of our teacher sweep like a sirocco over the heart2 yet we cannot choose but hear4 ,the pyschical life--the life of the soul1 the immortal spark of fire1--and the physical life are equally definable as the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations4 ,we had supposed that intelligence in its highest forms was wholly occupied with the contemplation of ,god and his laws1 and the great end of being1 and all those tremendous questions which we had thought fitted to occupy the activities of a spiritual person4 ,we are undeceived now4 ,we find we have shot towards the pole opposite to the truth4 ,now we perceive that this which we call ,intelligence shows itself when the external relations to which the internal ones are adjusted begin to be numerous1 complex1 and remote in time or space2 that every advance in ,intelligence essentially consists in the establishment of more varied1 more complete1 and more involved adjustments2 and that even the highest achievements of science are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence1 so cooerdinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur externally4 ,in such relations consists the life of the caterpillar4 ,in such relations1 only a little more complex1 consists the life of the sparrow4 ,such relations only does the fowler observe2 such only does the chemist know4 ,this is the path by which we are led to the last1 the highest truth which man can attain4 ,thus do we learn that what we call truth1 guiding us to successful action1 and the consequent maintenance of life1 is simply the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations2 while error1 leading to failure and therefore towards death1 is the absence of such accurate correspondence4 ,what a noble life1 oh1 reader1 what an exalted destiny thine is here declared to be6 ,the largest effort of thine intelligence1 the highest achievement of science1 yea1 the total object of the life of thy soul1--thy psychial life1--is to attain such exceeding skill in the construction of a shelter1 in the fitting of apparel1 in the preparation of food1 in a word1 in securing the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations1 and thus in attaining the truth which shall guide us to successful action and the consequent maintenance of life1 that we shall secure forever our animal existence on earth4 ,study patiently thy lesson1 oh human animal6 ,con it o'er and o'er4 ,who knows but thou mayest yet attain to this acme of the perfection of thy nature1 though it be far below what thou hadst once fondly expected1--mayest attain a perfect knowledge of the truth1 and a perfect skill in the application of that truth1 i4 e4 in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations2 and so be guided to successful action1 and the consequent maintenance of life1 whereby thou shalt elude forever that merciless hunter who pursues thee1--the grim man-stalker1 the skeleton ,death4 ,but when bending all thy energies1 yea1 all the powers of thy soul1 to this task1 thou mayest recur at some unfortunate moment to the dreams and aspirations which have hitherto lain like golden sunlight on thy pathway4 ,let no vain regret for what seemed thy nobler destiny ever sadden thy day1 or deepen the darkness of thy night4 ,true1 thou didst deem thyself capable of something higher than the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations2 didst often occupy thyself with contemplating those things which eye hath not seen1 nor ear heard2 didst deem thyself a son of ,god1 and a joint-heir with ,jesus ,christ1 of things incorruptible and undefiled1 and which fade not away1 eternal in the heavens2 didst sometimes seem to see1 with faith's triumphant gaze1 those glorious scenes which thou wouldst traverse when in the spirit-land thou shouldst lead a pure spiritual life with other spirits1 where all earthliness had been stripped off1 all tears had been wiped away1 and perfect holiness was thine through all eternity4 ,but all these visions were only dreams2 they wholly deluded thee4 ,we have learned from the lips of this latest ,english sage that thy god is thy belly1 and that thou must mind earthly things1 so as to keep up the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations4 ,such being thy lot1 and to fulfil such a lot being the highest achievement of science1 permit not thyself to be disturbed by those old-fashioned and sometimes troublesome notions that truth and those achievements pertained to a spiritual person in spiritual relations to ,god as the moral ,governor of the ,universe2 that man was bound to know the truth and obey it2 that his errors were violations of perfect law1--the truth he knew1--were crimes against ,him who is of too pure eyes to behold iniquity1 and cannot look upon sin with the least degree of allowance2 that for these crimes there impended a just penalty--an appalling punishment2 and that the only real failure was the failure to repent of and forsake the crimes1 and thus escape the penalty4 ,far other is the fact1 as thou wilt learn from this wise man's book4 ,as he teaches us1 the only error we can make1 is1 to miss in maintaining perfectly the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations1--is to eat too much roast beef and plum-pudding at dinner1 or to wear too scanty or too thick clothing1 or to expose one's self imprudently in a storm1 or by some other carelessness which may produce the absence of such accurate correspondence as shall secure unending life1 and so lead to his only failure--the advance towards death4 ,when1 then1 oh reader6 by some unfortunate mischance1 some error into which thine ignorance hath led thee1 thou hast rendered thy failure inevitable1 and art surely descending towards death1 hesitate not to sing with heedless hilarity the old ,epicurean song1 ,let us eat and drink1 for to-morrow we die4 ,sing and be gay ,the livelong day1 ,thinking no whit of to-morrow4 ,enjoy while you may ,all pleasure and play1 ,for after death is no sorrow4 ,thou hast committed thine only error in not maintaining the accurate correspondence2 thou hast fallen upon thine only failure1 the inevitable advance towards death4 ,than death no greater evil can befall thee1 and that is already sure4 ,then let dance and song1 and women and wine1 bestow some snatches of pleasure upon thy fleeting days4 ,delightful philosophy1 is it not1 reader8 ,poor unfortunate man1 and especially poor1 befooled1 cheated1 hopeless ,christian man1 who has these many years cherished those vain1 deceitful dreams of which we spoke a little ago6 ,to be brought down from such lofty aspirations2 to be made to know that he is only an animal2 that ,life in all its manifestations1 inclusive of ,intelligence in its highest forms1 consists in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations4 ,do you not join with me in pitying him8 ,and such is the philosophy which is heralded to us from over the sea as the newly found and wonderful truth1 which is to satisfy the hungering soul of man and still its persistent cry for bread4 ,and this is the teacher1 mocking that painful cry with such chaff1 whom newspaper after newspaper1 and periodical after periodical on this side the water1 even to those we love best and cherish most1 have pronounced one of the profoundest essayists of the day4 ,perhaps he can give us some sage remarks upon laughter1 as it is observed in the human animal1 and on that point compare therewith other animals4 ,but1 speaking in all sincerity after the manner of the ,book of ,common ,prayer1 we can but say1 ,from all such philosophers and philosophies1 good ,lord deliver us4 ,few1 perhaps none of our readers1 will desire to see a denial in terms of such a theory4 ,when a man1 aspiring to be a philosopher1 advances the doctrine that not only is ,life in its simplest form--the animal life--the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions with certain outer physico-chemical actions1 but that each advance to a higher form of ,life consists in a better preservation of this primary correspondence2 and when1 proceeding further1 and to be explicit1 he asserts that not only the physical1 but also the psychical life are equally but the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations2 and when1 still further to insult man1 and to utter his insult in the most positive1 extreme1 and unmistakable terms1 he asserts that even the highest achievements of science are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence1 so cooerdinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur externally1--that is1 that the highest science is the attainment of a perfect cuisine2 in a word1 when a human being in this nineteenth century offers to his fellows as the loftiest attainment of philosophy the tenet that the highest form of life cognizable by man is an animal life1 and that man can have no other knowledge of himself than as an animal1 of a little higher grade1 it is true1 than other animals1 but not different in kind1 then the healthy soul1 when such a doctrine is presented to it1 will reject it as instantaneously as a healthy stomach rejects a roll of tobacco4 ,with what a sense of relief does one turn from a system of philosophy which1 when stripped of its garb of well-chosen words and large sounding1 plausible phrases1 appears in such vile shape and hideous proportions1 to the teachings of that pure and noble instructor of our youth1 that man who1 by his gentle1 benignant mien1 so beautifully illustrates the spirit and life of the ,apostle ,john1--,rev4 ,mark ,hopkins1 ,d4 ,d41 ,president of ,williams ,college4 ,no one who has read his ,lectures on ,moral ,science1 and no lover of truth should fail to do so1 will desire an apology for inserting the following extract1 wherein is presented a theory upon which the soul of man can rest1 as at home the soldier rests1 who has just been released from the ,libby or ,salisbury charnel-house4 ,and here1 again1 we have three great forces with their products4 ,these are the vegetable1 the animal1 and the rational life4 ,of these1 vegetable life is the lowest4 ,its products are as strictly conditional for animal life as chemical affinity is for vegetable1 for the animal is nourished by nothing that has not been previously elaborated by the vegetable4 ',the profit of the earth is for all2 the king himself is served by the field4' ,again1 we have the animal and sensitive life1 capable of enjoyment and suffering1 and having the instincts necessary to its preservation4 ,this1 as man is now constituted1 is conditional for his rational life4 ,the rational has its roots in that1 and manifests itself only through the organization which that builds up4 ,we have1 then1 finally and highest of all1 this rational and moral life1 by which man is made in the image of ,god4 ,in man1 as thus constituted1 we first find a being who is capable of choosing his own end1 or1 rather1 of choosing or rejecting the end indicated by his whole nature4 ,this is moral freedom1 and in this is the precise point of transition from all that is below to that which is highest4 ,for everything below man the end is necessitated4 ,whatever choice there may be in the agency of animals of means for the attainment of their end1--and they have one somewhat wide1--they have none in respect to the end itself4 ,this1 for our purpose1 and for all purposes1 is the characteristic distinction1 so long sought1 between man and the brute4 ,man determines his own end2 the end of the brute is necessitated4 ,up to man everything is driven to its end by a force working from without or from behind2 but for him the pillar of cloud and of fire puts itself in front1 and he follows it or not1 as he chooses4 ,in the above cases it will be seen that the process is one of the addition of new forces1 with a constant limitation of the field within which the forces act4444 ,it is to be noticed1 however1 that while the field of each added and superior force is narrowed1 yet nothing is dropped4 ,each lower force shoots through1 and combines itself with all that is higher4 ,because he is rational1 man is not the less subject to gravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity4 ,he has also the organic life that belongs to the animal4 ,in him none of these are dropped2 but the rational life is united with and superinduced upon all these1 so that man is not only a microcosm1 but is the natural head and ruler of the world4 ,he partakes of all that is below him1 and becomes man by the addition of something higher4444 ,here1 then1 is our model and law4 ,have we a lower sensitive and animal nature8 ,let that nature be cherished and expanded by all its innocent and legitimate enjoyments1 for it is an end4 ,but--and here we find the limit--let it be cherished only as subservient to the higher intellectual life1 for it is also a means4 ,the italics are ours4 ,satisfactory1 true1 and self-sustained as is this theory1--and it is one which like a granite ,gothic spire lifts itself high and calm into the atmosphere1 standing firm and immovable in its own clear and self-evident truth1 unshaken by a thousand assaulting materialistic storms1--we would buttress it with the utterances of other of the earth's noble ones2 and this we do not because it is in any degree needful1 but because our mind loves to linger round the theme1 and to gather the concurrent thought of various rarely endowed minds upon this subject4 ,exactly in point is the following--one of many passages which might be selected from the works of that profoundest of ,english metaphysicians and theologians1 ,s4 ,t4 ,coleridge3-- ,and here let me observe that the difficulty and delicacy of this investigation are greatly increased by our not considering the understanding 7even our own7 in itself1 and as it would be were it not accompanied with and modified by the cooeperation of the will1 the moral feeling1 and that faculty1 perhaps best distinguished by the name of ,reason1 of determining that which is universal and necessary1 of fixing laws and principles whether speculative or practical1 and of contemplating a final purpose or end4 ,this intelligent will--having a self-conscious purpose1 under the guidance and light of the reason1 by which its acts are made to bear as a whole upon some end in and for itself1 and to which the understanding is subservient as an organ or the faculty of selecting and appropriating the means--seems best to account for that progressiveness of the human race1 which so evidently marks an insurmountable distinction and impassable barrier between man and the inferior animals1 but which would be inexplicable1 were there no other difference than in the degree of their intellectual faculties4--,works1 ,vol4 ,i4 p4 #cga4 ,the italics are ours4 ,the attention of the reader may with profit be also directed to the words of another metaphysician1 who has been much longer known1 and has enjoyed a wider fame than either of those just mentioned2 and whose teachings1 however little weight they may seem to have with ,mr4 ,spencer1 have been these many years1 and still are received and studied with profound respect and loving carefulness by multitudes of persons4 ,we refer to the apostle ,paul1 ,there is1 therefore1 now no condemnation to those who are in ,christ ,jesus1 who walk not after the flesh1 but after the spirit4 ,that is1 who do not walk after the law of the animal nature1 but who do walk after the law of the spiritual person1 for it is of this great psychological distinction that the apostle so fully and continually speaks4 ,for they that are after the flesh do mind the things of the flesh2 but they that are after the spirit1 the things of the spirit4 ,for the minding of the flesh is death1 but the minding of the spirit is life and peace2 because the minding of the flesh as enmity against ,god1 for it is not subject to the law of ,god1 neither indeed can be4 ,romans ,,viii4 #a1 #e1 #f1 #g4 ,this ,i say1 then1 ,walk in the spirit and fulfil not the lust of the flesh4 ,for the flesh lusteth against the spirit1 and the spirit against the flesh3 and these are contrary the one to the other4--,galatians ,v4 #af1 #ag4 ,upon these passages it should be remarked1 by way of explanation1 that our translators in writing the word spirit with a capital1 and thus intimating that it is the ,holy ,spirit of ,god which is meant1 have led their readers astray4 ,the apostle's repeated use of that term1 in contrasting the flesh with the spirit1 appears decisive of the fact that he is contrasting1 in all such passages1 the animal nature with the spiritual person4 ,but if any one is startled by this position and thinks to reject it1 let him bear in mind that the law of the spiritual person in man and of the ,holy ,spirit of ,god is identical4 ,the reader will hardly desire from us what his own mind will have already accomplished--the construction in our own terms1 and the contrasting of the system above embodied with that presented by ,mr4 ,spencer4 ,the human being1 ,man1 is a twofold being1 flesh and spirit1 an animal nature and a spiritual person4 ,in the animal nature are the ,sense and the ,understanding4 ,in the spiritual person are the ,reason1 the spiritual ,sensibilities1 and the ,will4 ,the animal nature is common to man and the brutes4 ,the spiritual person is common to man and ,god4 ,it is manifest1 then1 that there is an insurmountable distinction and impassable barrier not only between man and the inferior animals1 but between man as spiritual person1 and man as animal nature1 and that this is a greater distinction than any other in the ,universe1 except that which exists between the ,creator and the created4 ,what relation1 then1 do these so widely diverse natures bear to each other8 ,evidently that which ,president ,hopkins has assigned4 ,because he is rational1 man is not the less subject to gravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity4 ,he has also the organic life that belongs to the plant1 and the sensitive and instinctive life that belongs to the animal4 ,thus far his life is the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions with certain outer physico-chemical actions1--undoubtedly consists in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations2 and being the highest order of animal1 his life consists in the establishment of more varied1 more complete1 and more involved adjustments than that of any other animal4 ,what1 then1 is this life for8 ,this1 as man is now constituted1 is conditional for his rational life4 ,the rational life is united with and superinduced upon all these4 ,as ,god made man1 and in the natural order1 the flesh1 the animal life1 is wholly subordinate to the spirit1 the spiritual life4 ,and the spirit1 or spiritual person of which ,paul writes so much1--does this also1 this ,intelligence in its highest form1 consist in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations8 ,are the words of the apostle a cheat1 a lie1 when he says1 ,for if ye live after the flesh1 ye shall die2 but if ye through the spirit--i4 e4 by living with the help of the ,holy ,spirit1 in accordance with the law of the spiritual person--do mortify the deeds of the body1 ye shall live8 ,and are ,mr4 ,spencer's words1 in which he teaches exactly the opposite doctrine1 true8 wherein he says3 ,and lastly let it be noted that what we call truth1 c41 7see ante1 p4 #afh17 wherein he teaches that if ye live after the flesh1 if you are guided by truth1 if you are able perfectly to maintain the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations1 ye shall not surely die1 you will attain to what is successful action1 the preservation of life1 of the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations1 of the animal life1 and thus your bodies will live forever--the highest good for man2 but if you mortify the deeds of the body1 if you pay little heed to the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations1 you will meet with error1 leading to failure and therefore towards death1--the death of the body1 the highest evil which can befall man1--and so ye shall not live4 ,proceeding in the direction already taken1 we find that in his normal condition the spiritual person would not be chiefly1 much less exclusively1 occupied with attending to the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations1 but would only regard these in so far as is necessary to preserve the body as the ground through which1 in accordance with the present dispensation of ,god's providence1 that person may exert himself and employ his energies upon those objects which belong to his peculiar sphere1 even the laws and duties of spiritual beings4 ,the person would indeed employ his superior faculties to assist the lower nature in the preservation of its animal life1 but this only as a means4 ,god has ordained that through this means that person shall develop and manifest himself2 yet the life1 continuance in being1 of the soul1 is in no way dependent on this means4 ,strip away the whole animal nature1 take from man his body1 his ,sense and ,understanding1 leave him--as he would then be--with no possible medium of communication with the ,universe1 and he1 the ,i am1 the spiritual person1 would remain intact1 as active as ever4 ,he would have lost none of his capacity to see laws and appreciate their force2 he would feel the bindingness of obligation just as before2 and finally1 he would be just as able as in the earlier state to make a choice of an ultimate end1 though he would be unable to make a single motion towards putting that choice into effect4 ,the spiritual person1 then1 being such that he has in himself no element of decomposition1 has no need1 for the preservation of his own existence1 to be continually occupied with efforts to maintain the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations4 ,yet activity is his law1 and1 moreover1 an activity having objects which accord with this his indestructible nature4 ,with what then will such a being naturally occupy himself8 ,there is for him no danger of decay4 ,he possesses within himself the laws and ideals of his action4 ,as such1 and created1 he is near of kin to that august ,being in whoso image he was created4 ,his laws are the created person's laws4 ,the end of the ,creator should be that also of the created4 ,but ,god is infinite1 while the soul starts a babe1 an undeveloped germ1 and must begin to learn at the alphabet of knowledge4 ,what nobler1 what more sublime and satisfactory occupation could this being1 endowed with the faculties of a ,god1 find1 than to employ all his power in the contemplation of the eternal laws of the ,universe1 i4 e4 to the acquisition of an intimate acquaintance with himself and ,god2 and to bend all his energies to the realization by his own efforts of that part in the ,universe which ,god had assigned him1 i4 e41 to accord his will entirely with ,god's will4 ,this course of life1 a spiritual person standing in his normal relation to an animal nature1 would pursue as spontaneously as if it were the law of his being4 ,but this which we have portrayed is not the course which human beings do pursue4 ,by no means4 ,one great evil1 at least1 that the ,fall brought upon the race of man1 is1 that human beings are born into the world with the spiritual person all submerged by the animal nature2 or1 to use ,paul's figure1 the spirit is enslaved by the flesh2 and such is the extent of this that many1 perhaps most1 men are born and grow up and die1 and never know that they have any souls2 and finally there arise1 as there have arisen through all the ages1 just such philosophers as ,sir ,william ,hamilton and ,mr4 ,spencer1 who in substance deny that men are spiritual persons at all1 who say that the highest knowledge is a generalization in the ,understanding1 a form of a knowledge common to man and the brutes1 and that the highest achievements of science are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence1 so cooerdinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur externally4 ,it is this evil1 organic in man1 that ,paul portrays so vividly2 and it is against men who teach such doctrines that he thunders his maledictions4 ,we have spoken above of the spiritual person as diverse from1 superior to1 and superinduced upon1 the animal nature4 ,this is his position in the logical order4 ,we have also spoken of him as submerged under the animal nature1 as enslaved to the flesh4 ,by such figures do we strive to express the awfully degraded condition in which every human being is born into the world4 ,and mark1 this is simply a natural degradation4 ,let us then1 as philosophers1 carry our examination one step farther and ask3 ,in this state of things what would be the fitting occupation of the spiritual person4 ,is it that continuous adjustment8 ,he turns from it with loathing4 ,already he has served the flesh a long and grievous bondage4 ,manifestly1 then1 he should struggle with all his might to regain his normal condition to become naturally good as well as morally good1--he should fill his soul with thoughts of ,god1 and then he should make every rational exertion to induce others to follow in his footsteps4 ,we attain1 then1 a far different result from ,mr4 ,spencer4 ,the highest achievements of science for us1 our truth1 guiding us to successful action1 is that pure a priori truth1 the eternal law of ,god which is written in us1 and given to us for our guidance to what is truly successful action1--the accordance of our wills with the will of ,god4 ,what we now reach1 and what yet remains to be considered of this chapter1 is that passage in which ,mr4 ,spencer enounces1 as he believes1 a new principle of philosophy1 a principle which will symmetrize and complete the ,hamiltonian system1 and thus establish it as the true and final science for mankind4 ,since we do not view this principle in the same light with ,mr4 ,spencer1 and especially since it is our intention to turn it upon what he has heretofore written1 and demolish that with it1 there might arise a feeling in many minds that the whole passage should be quoted1 that there might be no doubt as to his meaning4 ,this we should willingly do1 did our space permit4 ,yet it seems not in the least necessary4 ,that part of the passage which contains the gist of the subject1 followed by a candid epitome of his arguments and illustrations1 would appear to be ample for a fair and sufficiently full presentation of his theory1 and for a basis upon which we might safely build our criticism4 ,these then will be given4 ,there still remains the final question--,what must we say concerning that which transcends knowledge8 ,are we to rest wholly in the consciousness of phenomena8 ,is the result of inquiry to exclude utterly from our minds everything but the relative2 or must we also believe in something beyond the relative8 ,the answer of pure logic is held to be1 that by the limits of our intelligence we are rigorously confined within the relative2 and that anything transcending the relative can be thought of only as a pure negation1 or as a non-existence4 ',the absolute is conceived merely by a negation of conceivability1' writes ,sir ,william ,hamilton4 ',the ,absolute and the ,infinite1' says ,mr4 ,mansel1 'are thus1 like the ,inconceivable and the ,imperceptible1 names indicating1 not an object of thought or of consciousness at all1 but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible4' ,from each of which extracts may be deduced the conclusion1 that1 since reason cannot warrant us in affirming the positive existence of what is cognizable only as a negation1 we cannot rationally affirm the positive existence of anything beyond phenomena4 ,unavoidable as this conclusion seems1 it involves1 ,i think1 a grave error4 ,if the premiss be granted1 the inference must doubtless be admitted2 but the premiss1 in the form presented by ,sir ,william ,hamilton and ,mr4 ,mansel1 is not strictly true4 ,though1 in the foregoing pages1 the arguments used by these writers to show that the ,absolute is unknowable1 have been approvingly quoted2 and though these arguments have been enforced by others equally thoroughgoing1 yet there remains to be stated a qualification1 which saves us from that scepticism otherwise necessitated4 ,it is not to be denied that so long as we confine ourselves to the purely logical aspect of the question1 the propositions quoted above must be accepted in their entirety2 but when we contemplate its more general1 or psychological aspect1 we find that these propositions are imperfect statements of the truth2 omitting1 or rather excluding1 as they do1 an all-important fact4 ,to speak specifically3--,besides that definite consciousness of which ,logic formulates the laws1 there is also an indefinite consciousness which cannot be formulated4 ,besides complete thoughts1 and besides the thoughts which1 though incomplete1 admit of completion1 there are thoughts which it is impossible to complete1 and yet which are still real1 in the sense that they are normal affections of the intellect4 ,observe in the first place1 that every one of the arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated1 distinctly postulates the positive existence of something beyond the relative4 ,to say that we cannot know the ,absolute1 is1 by implication1 to affirm that there is an ,absolute4 ,in the very denial of our power to learn what the ,absolute is1 there lies hidden the assumption that it is2 and the making of this assumption proves that the ,absolute has been present to the mind1 not as a nothing but as a something4 ,similarly with every step in the reasoning by which this doctrine is upheld4 ,the ,noumenon1 everywhere named as the antithesis of the ,phenomenon1 is throughout necessarily thought of as an actuality4 ,it is rigorously impossible to conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of ,appearances only1 without at the same time conceiving a ,reality of which they are appearances2 for appearance without reality is unthinkable4 ,after carrying on this train of argument a little further1 he reaches this just and decisive result4 ,clearly1 then1 the very demonstration that a definite consciousness of the ,absolute is impossible to us1 unavoidably presupposes an indefinite consciousness of it4 ,carrying the argument further1 he says3 ,perhaps the best way of showing that1 by the necessary conditions of thought1 we are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness of this which transcends distinct consciousness1 is to analyze our conception of the antithesis between ,relative and ,absolute4 ,he follows the presentation of certain antinomies of thought with an extract from ,sir ,william ,hamilton's words1 in which the logician enounces his doctrine that in correlatives the positive alone is real1 the negative is only an abstraction of the other2 or1 in other words1 the one gives a substance of some kind in the mind1 the other gives simply nothingness1 void1 absolute negation4 ,criticizing this1 ,mr4 ,spencer is unquestionably right in saying3 ,now the assertion that of such contradictories 'the negative is only an abstraction of the other'--'is nothing else than its negation'--is not true4 ,in such correlatives as ,equal and ,unequal1 it is obvious enough that the negative concept contains something besides the negation of the positive one2 for the things of which equality is denied are not abolished from consciousness by the denial4 ,and the fact overlooked by ,sir ,william ,hamilton is1 that the like holds1 even with those correlatives of which the negative is inconceivable1 in the strict sense of the word4 ,proceeding with his argument1 he establishes1 by ample illustration1 the fact that a something constitutes our consciousness of the ,non-relative or ,absolute4 ,he afterwards shows plainly by quotations1 that both ,sir ,william ,hamilton and ,mr4 ,mansel do1 in certain places1 distinctly imply that our consciousness of the ,absolute1 indefinite though it is1 is positive not negative4 ,further on he argues thus3 ,though ,philosophy condemns successively each attempted conception of the ,absolute2 though it proves to us that the ,absolute is not this1 nor that1 nor that2 though in obedience to it we negative1 one after another1 each idea as it arises2 yet as we cannot expel the entire contents of consciousness1 there ever remains behind an element which passes into new shapes4 ,the continual negation of each particular form and limit simply results in the more or less complete abstraction of all forms and limits1 and so ends in an indefinite consciousness of the unformed and unlimited4 ,thus he brings us to the ultimate difficulty--,how can there possibly be constituted a consciousness of the unformed and unlimited1 when1 by its very nature1 consciousness is possible only under forms and limits8 ,this he accounts for by by hypostatizing a raw material in consciousness which is1 must be1 present4 ,he presents his conclusion as follows3 ,by its very nature1 therefore1 this ultimate mental element is at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible4 ,our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally the unconditioned consciousness1 or raw material of thought1 to which in thinking we give definite forms1 it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence4 444 ,to sum up this somewhat too elaborate argument3--,we have seen how1 in the very assertion that all our knowledge1 properly so called1 is ,relative1 there is involved the assertion that there exists a ,non-relative4 ,we have seen how1 in each step of the argument by which this doctrine is established1 the same assumption is made4 ,we have seen how1 from the very necessity of thinking in relations1 it follows that the ,relative itself is inconceivable1 except as related to a real ,non-relative4 ,we have seen that1 unless a real ,non-relative or ,absolute be postulated1 the ,relative itself becomes absolute1 and so brings the argument to a contradiction4 ,and on contemplating the process of thought1 we have equally seen how impossible it is to get rid of the consciousness of an actuality lying behind appearances2 and how1 from this impossibility1 results our indestructible belief in that actuality4 ,the approval which has been accorded to certain of the arguments adduced by ,mr4 ,spencer in favor of his especial point1 that the ,absolute is a positive somewhat in consciousness1 and to that point as established1 must not be supposed to apply also to that hypothesis of indefinite consciousness by which he attempts to reconcile this position with his former teachings4 ,on the contrary1 it will be our purpose hereafter to show that this hypothesis is a complete fallacy4 ,as against the positions taken by ,sir ,william ,hamilton and ,mr4 ,mansel1 ,mr4 ,spencer's argument may unquestionably be deemed decisive4 ,admitting the logical accuracy of their reasoning1 he very justly turns from the logical to the psychological aspect of the subject1 takes exception to their premiss1 shows conclusively that it is fallacious1 and gives an approximate1 though unfortunately a very partial and defective presentation of the truth4 ,indeed1 the main issue which must now be made with him is whether the position he has here taken1 and which he puts forth as that peculiar element in his philosophical system1 that new truth1 which shall harmonize ,hamiltonian ,limitism with the facts of human nature1 is not1 when carried to its logical results1 in diametrical and irreconcilable antagonism to that whole system1 and all that he has before written1 and so does not annihilate them4 ,it will be our present endeavor to show that such is the result4 ,perhaps we cannot better examine ,mr4 ,spencer's theory than1 first1 to take up what we believe to be the element of truth in it1 and carry out this to its logical results2 and afterwards to present what seem to be the elements of error1 and show them to be such4 #a4 ,we are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness of the ,absolute4 ,without criticizing his use here of consciousness as if it were a faculty of knowledge1 and remembering that we cannot have a consciousness of anything without having a knowledge commensurate with that consciousness1 we will see that ,mr4 ,spencer's assertion is tantamount to saying1 ,we have a positive knowledge that the ,absolute is4 ,it does not seem that he himself can disallow this4 ,grant this1 and our whole system follows1 as does also the fallacy of his own4 ,our argument will proceed thus4 ,logic is the science of the pure laws of thought1 and is mathematically accurate1 and is absolute4 ,being such1 it is law for all intellect1 for ,god as well as man4 ,but three positions can be taken4 ,either it is true for the ,deity1 or else it is false for him1 or else it has no reference to him4 ,in the last instance ,god is ,chaos2 in the second he and man are in organic contradiction1 and he created man so2 the first is the one now advocated4 ,the second and third hypotheses refute themselves in the statement of them4 ,nothing remains but the position taken that the laws of ,logic lie equally on ,god and man4 ,one of those laws is1 that1 if any assertion is true1 all that is logically involved in it is true2 in other words1 all truth is in absolute and perfect harmony4 ,this is fundamental to the possibility of ,logic4 ,now apply this law to the psychological premiss of ,mr4 ,spencer1 that we have a positive knowledge that the ,absolute is4 ,a better form of expression would be1 ,the absolute ,being is4 ,it follows then that he is in a mode1 has a formal being4 ,but three hypotheses are possible4 ,he is in no mode1 he is in one mode2 he is in all modes4 ,if he is in no mode1 there is no form1 no order1 no law for his being2 which is to say1 he is ,chaos4 ,chaos is not ,god1 for ,chaos cannot organize an orderly being1 and men are orderly beings1 and were created4 ,if he is in all modes1 he is in a state of utter contradiction4 ,god is all in every part4 ,he is then all infinite1 and all finite4 ,infinity and finiteness are contradictory and mutually exclusive qualities4 ,god is wholly possessed of contradictory and mutually exclusive qualities1 which is more than unthinkable--it is absurd4 ,he is1 must be1 then1 in one mode4 ,let us pause here for a moment and observe that we have clearly established1 from ,mr4 ,spencer's own premiss1 the fact that ,god is limited4 ,he must be in one mode to the exclusion of all other modes4 ,he is limited then by the necessity to be what he is2 and if he could become what he is not1 he would not have been absolute4 ,since he is absolute1 he is1 to the exclusion of the possibility of any other independent ,being4 ,other beings are1 and must therefore be1 dependent on and subordinate to him4 ,since he is superior to all other beings he must be in the highest possible mode of being4 ,personality is the highest possible mode of being4 ,this will appear from the following considerations4 ,a person1 possesses the reason and law of his action1 and the capacity to act1 within himself1 and is thus a final cause4 ,no higher form of being than this can be needed1 and so by the law of parsimony a hypothesis of any other must be excluded4 ,god is then a person4 ,we have now brought the argument to that point where its connection with the system advocated in this treatise is manifest4 ,if the links are well wrought1 and the chain complete1 not only is this system firmly grounded upon ,mr4 ,spencer's premiss1 but1 as was intimated on an early page1 he has in this his special point given partial utterance to what1 once established1 involves the fallacy not only of all he has written before1 but as well of the whole ,limitist ,philosophy4 ,it remains now to remark upon the errors in his form of expressing the truth4 #b4 ,mr4 ,spencer's error is twofold4 ,he treats of consciousness as a faculty of knowledge4 ,he speaks of a vague1 an indefinite consciousness4 ,let us examine these in their order4 a4 ,he treats of consciousness as a faculty of knowledge4 ,in this he uses the term in the inexact1 careless1 popular manner1 rather than with due precision4 ,as has been observed on a former page1 consciousness is the light in which the person sees his faculties act4 ,thus some feeling is affected4 ,this feeling is cognized by the intellectual faculty1 and of this the person is conscious4 ,hence it is an elliptical expression to say ,i am conscious of the feeling4 ,the full form being ,i am conscious that ,i know the feeling4 ,thus is it with all man's activities4 ,applying this to the case in hand1 it appears1 not that we are conscious of the ,absolute1 but that we are conscious that the proper intellectual faculty1 the ,pure ,reason1 presents what absoluteness is1 and that the absolute ,person is1 and through this presentation--intuition--the spiritual person knows these facts4 ,we repeat1 then1 our position3 consciousness is the indivisible unity1 the light in which the person sees all his faculties and capacities act2 and so is to be considered as different in kind from them all as the peculiar and unique endowment of a spiritual person4 b4 ,mr4 ,spencer speaks of a vague1 an indefinite consciousness4 ,the expression vague consciousness being a popular and very common one1 deserves a careful examination1 and this we hope to give it1 keeping in mind meantime the position already attained4 ,the phrase is used in some such connection as this1 ,i have a vague or undefined consciousness of impending evil4 ,let us analyze this experience4 ,in doing so it will be observed that the consciousness1 or rather the seeing by the person in the light of consciousness1 is positive1 clear1 and definite1 and is the apprehension of a feeling4 ,again1 the feeling is positive and distinct2 it is a feeling of dread1 of threatening danger4 ,what1 then1 is vague--is undefined8 ,this4 ,that cause which produces the feeling lies without the reach of the cognitive faculties1 and of course cannot be known2 because what produces the feeling is unknown1 the intellectual apprehension experiences a sense of vagueness2 and this it instinctively carries over and applies to the feeling4 ,yet really the sense of vagueness arises from an ignorance of the cause of the feeling4 ,strictly speaking1 then1 it is not consciousness that is vague2 and so ,mr4 ,spencer's indefinite consciousness1 which cannot be formulated1 has no foundation in fact4 ,but this may be shown by another line of thought4 ,consciousness is commensurate with knowledge1 i4 e41 man can have no knowledge except he is conscious of that knowledge2 neither can he have any consciousness except he knows that the consciousness is1 and what the consciousness is1 i4 e41 what he is conscious of4 ,now all knowledge is definite2 it is only ignorance that is indefinite4 ,when we say that our knowledge of an object is indefinite1 we mean that we partly know its characteristics1 and are partly ignorant of them4 ,thus then also the result above stated follows2 and what ,mr4 ,spencer calls indefinite consciousness is a definite consciousness that we partly know1 and are partly ignorant of the object under consideration4 ,in the last paragraph but one1 of the chapter now under consideration1 ,mr4 ,spencer makes a most extraordinary assertion respecting consciousness1 which1 when examined in the light of the positions we have advocated1 affords another decisive evidence of the fallacy of his theory4 ,we quote it again1 that the reader may not miss of giving it full attention4 ,by its very nature1 therefore1 this ultimate mental element is at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible4 ,our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally the unconditioned consciousness1 or raw material of thought1 to which in thinking we give definite forms1 it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence4 ,upon reading this passage1 the question spontaneously arises1 ,what does the writer mean8 and it is a question which is not so easily answered4 ,more than one interpretation may be assigned1 as will appear upon examination4 ,a problem is given4 ,to find what the raw material of thought is4 ,since man has thoughts1 there must be in him the raw material of thought--the crude thought-ore which he smelts down in the blast-furnace of the ,understanding1 giving forth in its stead the refined metal--exact thought4 ,we must then proceed to attain our answer by analyzing man's natural organization4 ,since man is a complex1 constituted being1 there is necessarily a logical order to the parts which are combined in the complexity4 ,he may be considered as a substance in which a constitution inheres1 i4 e41 which is organized according to a set of fixed laws1 and that set of laws may be stated in their logical order4 ,it is sufficient1 however1 for our purpose to consider him as an organized substance1 the organization being such that he is a person--a selfhood1 self-active and capable of self-examination4 ,the raw material of all the activities of such a person is this organized substance4 ,take away the substance1 and there remains only the set of laws as abstract ideas4 ,again1 take away the set of laws1 and the substance is simple1 unorganized substance4 ,in the combining of the two the person becomes4 ,these1 then1 are all there is of the person1 and therefore in these must the raw material be4 ,from this position it follows directly that any capacity or faculty1 or1 in general1 every activity of the person1 is the substance acting in accordance with the law which determines that form of the activity4 ,to explain the term1 form of activity4 ,there is a set of laws4 ,each law1 by itself1 is a simple law1 and is incapable of organizing a substance into a being4 ,but when these laws are considered1 as they naturally stand in the ,divine ,reason1 in relation to each other1 it is seen that this1 their standing together1 constitutes ideals1 or forms of being and activity4 ,to illustrate from an earthly object4 ,the law of gravitation alone could not organize a ,universe2 neither could the law of cohesion1 nor of centripetal1 nor centrifugal force1 nor any other one law4 ,all these laws must be acting together1--or rather all these laws must stand together in perfect harmony1 according to their own nature1 thus constituting an ideal form1 in accordance with which ,god may create this ,universe4 ,for an illustration of our topic in its highest form1 the reader is referred to those pages of ,dr4 ,hickok's ,rational ,psychology1 where he analyzes personality into its elements of ,spontaneity1 ,autonomy1 and ,liberty4 ,from that examination it is sufficiently evident that either of these alone cannot organize a person1 but that all three must be present in order to constitute such a being4 ,there are1 then1 various forms of activity in the person1 as ,reason1 ,sensibility1 and ,will1 in each of which the organized substance acts in a mode or form1 and this form is determined by the set of organizing laws4 ,consciousness also is such a form4 ,the raw material of thought1 then1 must be this substance considered under the peculiar form of activity which we call consciousness1 but before the substance thus formulated has been awakened into activity by those circumstances which are naturally suited to it1 for bringing it into action4 ,now1 by the very terms of the statement it is evident that the substance thus organized in this form1 or1 to use the common term1 consciousness considered apart from and prior to its activity1 can never be known by experience1 i4 e41 we can never be conscious of an unconscious state4 ,unconditioned consciousness is consciousness considered as quiescent because in it have been awakened no definite forms--no thinking4 ,in the nature of things1 then1 it is impossible to be conscious of an unconditioned consciousness4 ,yet ,mr4 ,spencer says that our consciousness of the unconditioned1 which he has already asserted and proved1 is a positive1 and therefore an active state2 is identical with1 is literally the unconditioned consciousness1 or consciousness in its quiescent state1 considered before it had been awakened into activity1 which is far more absurd than what was just above shown to be a contradiction4 ,to escape such a result1 a less objectionable interpretation may be given to the dictum in hand4 ,it may be said that it looks upon consciousness only as an activity1 and in the logical order after its action has begun4 ,we are1 then1 conscious1 and in this is positive action1 but no definite object is present which gives a form in consciousness1 and so consciousness returns upon itself4 ,we are conscious that we are conscious1 which is an awkward way of saying that we are self-conscious1 or1 more concisely yet1 that we are conscious2 for accurately this is all1 and this is the same as to say that the subject and object are identical in this act4 ,the conclusion from this hypothesis is one which we judge ,mr4 ,spencer will be very loath to accept1 and yet it seems logically to follow4 ,indeed1 in a sentence we are about to quote1 he seems to make a most marked distinction between self-consciousness and this consciousness of the unconditioned1 which he calls its obverse4 ,but whatever ,mr4 ,spencer's notion of the raw material of thought is1 what more especially claims our attention and is most strange1 is his application of that notion4 ,to present this more clearly1 we will quote further from the passage already under examination4 ,as we can in successive mental acts get rid of all particular conditions1 and replace them by others1 but cannot get rid of that undifferentiated substance of consciousness1 which is conditioned anew in every thought1 there ever remains with us a sense of that which exists persistently and independently of conditions4 ,at the same time that by the laws of thought we are rigorously prevented from forming a conception of absolute existence1 we are by the laws of thought equally prevented from ridding ourselves of the consciousness of absolute existence3 this consciousness being1 as we here see1 the obverse of our self-consciousness4 ,now1 by comparing this extract with the other1 which it immediately follows1 it seems plain that ,mr4 ,spencer uses as synonymous the phrases consciousness of the unconditioned1 unconditioned consciousness1 raw material of thought1 undifferentiated substance of consciousness1 and consciousness of absolute existence4 ,let us note1 now1 certain conclusions1 which seem to follow from this use of language4 ,we are conscious of absolute existence4 ,no person can be conscious except he is conscious of some state or condition of his being4 ,absolute existence is1 therefore1 a state or condition of our being4 ,also this consciousness of absolute existence--as it seems our absolute existence--is the raw material of thought4 ,but1 again1 as was shown above1 this raw material1 this undifferentiated substance of consciousness1 if it is anything1 is consciousness considered as capacity1 and in the logical order before it becomes1 or is1 active2 and it further appeared that of this quiescent state we could have no knowledge by experience4 ,but since the above phrases are synonymous1 it follows that consciousness of absolute existence is the undifferentiated substance of consciousness1 is a consciousness of which we can have no knowledge by experience1 is a consciousness of which we can have no consciousness4 ,is this philosophy8 ,it would be but fair to suppose that there is some fact which ,mr4 ,spencer has endeavored to express in the language we are criticizing4 ,there is such a fact1 a statement of which will complete this criticism4 ,unquestionably1 in self-examination1 a man may abstract all successive mental acts1 may consider himself as he is1 in the logical order before he has experiences4 ,in this he will find that an ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence2 or1 in other words1 that it is an organic law of our being that there cannot be an experience without a being to entertain the experience2 and hence that it is impossible for a man to think or act1 except on the assumption that he is4 ,but all this has nothing to do with a consciousness of the unconditioned1 or of absolute existence2 for our existence is not absolute1 and it is our existence of which we are conscious4 ,the reality and abidingness of our existence is ground for our experience1 nothing more4 ,even if it were possible for us to have a consciousness of our state before any experience1 or to actually now abstract all experience1 and be conscious of our consciousness unmodified by any object1 i4 e4 to be conscious of unconsciousness1 this would not be a consciousness of absolute existence4 ,we could find no more in it1 and deduce no more from it1 than that our existence was involved in our experience4 ,such a consciousness would indeed appear unconditioned by the coming into it of any activity1 which would give a form in it2 but this would give us no notion of true unconditionedness--true absolute existence4 ,this consciousness1 though undisturbed by any experience1 would yet be conditioned1 would have been created1 and be dependent upon ,god for continuance in existence1 and for a chance to come into circumstances1 where it could be modified by experiences1 and so could grow4 ,while1 then1 ,mr4 ,spencer's theory gives us the fact of the notion of the necessity of our existence to our experience1 it in no way accounts for the fact of our consciousness of the unconditioned1 be that what it may4 ,but to return from this considerable digression to the result which was attained a few pages back1 viz3 that what ,mr4 ,spencer calls indefinite consciousness is a definite consciousness that we partly know1 and are partly ignorant of the object under consideration4 ,let this conclusion be applied to the topic which immediately concerns us1--the character of ,god4 ,but three suppositions are possible4 ,either we know nothing of ,god1 not even that he is2 or we have a partial knowledge of him1 we know that he is1 and all which we can logically deduce from this2 or we know him exhaustively4 ,the latter1 no one pretends1 and therefore it needs no notice4 ,the first1 even if our own arguments are not deemed satisfactory1 has been thoroughly refuted by ,mr4 ,spencer1 and so is to be set aside4 ,only the second remains4 ,respecting this1 his position is that we know that ,god is and no more4 ,admit this for a moment4 ,we are conscious then of a positive1 certain1 inalienable knowledge that ,god is2 but that with reference to any and all questions which may arise concerning him we are in total ignorance4 ,here1 again1 it is apparent that it is not our consciousness or knowledge that is vague2 it is our ignorance4 ,we might suggest the question--of what use can it be to man to know that ,god is1 and be utterly and necessarily1 yea1 organically ignorant of what he is8 ,let the reader answer the question to his own mind4 ,it is required to show how the theory advocated in this book will appear in the light of the second hypothesis above stated4 ,man knows that ,god is1 and what ,god is so far as he can logically deduce it from this premiss2 but1 in so far as ,god is such1 that he cannot be thus known1 except wherein he makes a direct revelation to us1 he must be forever inscrutable4 ,to illustrate4 ,if the fact that ,god is1 be admitted1 it logically follows that he must be self-existent4 ,self-existence is a positive idea in the ,reason1 and so here is a second element of knowledge respecting the ,deity4 ,thus we may go on through all that it is possible to deduce1 and the system thus wrought will be ,the ,science of ,natural ,theology1 a science as pure and sure as pure equations4 ,its results will be what ,god must be4 ,looking into the ,universe we will find what must be corresponding with what is1 and our knowledge will be complete4 ,again1 in many regards ,god may be utterly inscrutable to us1 since he may possess characteristics which we cannot attain by logical deductions4 ,for instance1 let it be granted that the doctrine of the ,trinity is true--that there are three persons in one ,godhead4 ,this would be a fact which man could never attain1 could never make the faintest guess at4 ,he might1 unaided1 attain to the belief that ,god would forgive2 he might1 with the profound and sad-eyed man of ,greece1 become convinced that some god must come from heaven to lead men to the truth2 but the notion of the ,trinity could never come to him1 except ,god himself with carefulness revealed it4 ,respecting those matters of which we cannot know except by revelation1 this only can be demanded2 and this by inherent endowment man has a right to demand2 viz3 that what is revealed shall not contradict the law already written in the heart4 ,yet1 once more1 there are certain characteristics of ,god that must forever be utterly inscrutable to every created being1 and this1 because such is their nature and relation to the ,deity1 that one cannot be endowed with a faculty capable of attaining the knowledge in question4 ,such for instance are the questions1 ,how is ,god self-existent1 how could he be eternal1 how exercise his power1 and the like8 ,these are questions respecting which no possible reason can arise why we should know them1 except the gratification of curiosity1 which in reality is no reason at all1 and therefore the inability in question is no detriment to man4 ,by the discussion which may now be brought to a close1 two positions seem to be established4 #a4 ,that we have1 as ,mr4 ,spencer affirms1 a positive consciousness that the absolute ,being is1 and that this and all which we can logically deduce from this are objects of knowledge to us2 in other words1 that the system advocated in this volume directly follows from that premiss4 #b4 ,that any doctrine of indefinite consciousness is erroneous1 that the vagueness is not in consciousness1 but in our knowledge2 and further1 that the hypothesis of a consciousness of the raw material of thought is absurd4 ,,the ,,reconciliation4 ,it would naturally seem1 that1 after what is believed to be the thorough refutation of the limitist scheme1 which has been given in the preceding comments on ,mr4 ,spencer's three philosophical chapters1 the one named in our heading would need scarce more than a notice4 ,but so far is this from being the case1 that some of the worst features in the results of his system stand out in clearest relief here4 ,before proceeding to consider these1 let us note a most important admission4 ,he speaks of his conclusion as bringing the results of speculation into harmony with those of common sense1 and then makes the1 for him1 extraordinary statement1 ,common ,sense asserts the existence of reality4 ,in these two remarks it would appear to be implied that ,common ,sense is a final standard with which any position most be reconciled4 ,the question instantly arises1 ,what is ,common ,sense8 ,the writer has never seen a definition1 and would submit for the reader's consideration the following4 ,common ,sense is the practical ,pure ,reason2 it is that faculty by which the spiritual person sees in the light of consciousness the a priori law as inherent in the fact presented by the ,sense4 ,for the sake of completeness its complement may be defined thus3 ,judgment is the practical ,understanding2 it is that faculty by which the spiritual person selects such means as he thinks so conformed to that law thus intuited1 as to be best suited to accomplish the object in view4 ,a man has good ,common ,sense1 who quickly sees the informing law in the fact2 and good judgment1 who skilfully selects and adapts his means to the circumstances of the case1 and the end sought4 ,of course it will not be understood that it is herein implied that every person who exercises this faculty has a defined and systematic knowledge of it4 ,the reader will readily see the results which directly follow from ,mr4 ,spencer's premiss4 ,it is true that ,common ,sense asserts the existence of a reality1 and this assertion is true2 but with equal truth does it assert the law of logic2 that1 if a premiss is true1 all that is logically involved in it is true4 ,it appears1 then1 that ,mr4 ,spencer has unwittingly acknowledged the fundamental principle of what may be called the ,coleridgian system1 the psychological fact of the ,pure ,reason1 and thus again has furnished a basis for the demolition of his own4 ,it was said above that some of the evil results of ,mr4 ,spencer's system assumed in this chapter their worst phases4 ,this remark is illustrated in the following extract3 ,we are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some ,power by which we are acted upon2 phenomena being1 so far as we can ascertain1 unlimited in their diffusion1 we are obliged to regard this ,power as omnipresent2 and criticism teaches us that this ,power is wholly incomprehensible4 ,in this consciousness of an ,incomprehensible ,omnipresent ,power we have just that consciousness on which ,religion dwells4 ,and so we arrive at the point where ,religion and ,science coalesce4 ,the evils referred to may be developed as follows3 ,we are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some ,power by which we are acted upon4 ,this may be expressed in another form thus3 ,every phenomenon is a manifestation of some ,power by which we are acted upon4 ,some doubt may arise respecting the precise meaning of this sentence1 unless the exact signification of the term phenomenon be ascertained4 ,it might be confined to material appearances1 appreciable by one of the five senses4 ,but the context seems to leave no doubt but that ,mr4 ,spencer uses it in the wider sense of every somewhat in the ,universe1 since he speaks of phenomena as unlimited4 ,putting the definition for the term1 the sentence stands3 ,every somewhat in the ,universe is a manifestation of some ,power by which we are acted upon4 ,it follows1 then1 that there is no somewhat in the ,universe1 except we are acted upon by it4 ,our being arises to be accounted for4 ,either we began to be1 and were created1 or the ground of our being is in ourselves1 our being is pure independence1 and nothing further is to be asked4 ,this latter will be rejected4 ,then we were created4 ,but we were not created by ,mr4 ,spencer's some ,power1 because it only acts upon us4 ,in his creation1 man was not acted upon1 because there was no man to be acted upon2 but in that act a being was originated who might be acted upon4 ,then1 however1 we came into being1 another than some ,power was the cause of us4 ,but the act of creating man was a somewhat4 ,every somewhat in the ,universe is a manifestation of some ,power4 ,this is not such a manifestation4 ,therefore the creation of man took place outside the ,universe4 ,or does ,mr4 ,spencer prefer to say that the creation of man is a manifestation of some ,power acting upon him6 ,the position above taken seems the more favorable one for ,mr4 ,spencer4 ,if1 to avoid the difficulties which spring from it1 he limits the term phenomenon1 as for instance to material appearances1 then his assertion that phenomena are unlimited is a contradiction1 and he has no ground on which to establish the omnipresence of his ,power4 ,but another line of criticism may be pursued4 ,strictly speaking1 all events are phenomena4 ,let there be named an event which is universally known and acknowledged1 and which1 in the nature of the case1 cannot be a manifestation of some ,power by which we are acted upon1 and in that statement also will the errors of the passage under consideration be established4 ,the experience by the human soul of a sense of guilt1 of a consciousness of ill-desert1 is such an event4 ,no ,power can make a sinless soul feel guilty2 no ,power can relieve a sinful soul from feeling guilty4 ,the feeling of guilt does not arise from the defiance of ,power1 it arises from the violation of ,law4 ,and not only may this experience be named1 but every other experience of the moral nature of man4 ,in this connection let it be observed that ,mr4 ,spencer always elsewhere uses the term phenomenon to represent material phenomena in the material universe4 ,throughout all his pages the reader is challenged to find a single instance in which he attempts to account for any other phenomena than these and their concomitants1 the affections of the intellect in the animal nature4 ,indeed1 so thoroughly is his philosophy vitiated by this omission1 that one could never learn from anything he has said in these pages1 that man had a moral nature at all1 that there were any phenomena of sin and repentance which needed to be accounted for4 ,in this1 ,sir ,william ,hamilton and ,mr4 ,mansel are just as bad as he4 ,yet in this the ,limitists have done well2 it is impossible1 on the basis of their system1 to render such an account4 ,to test the matter1 the following problem is presented4 ,to account1 on the basis of the ,limitist ,philosophy1 for the fact that the nations of men have universally made public acknowledgment of their guilt1 in having violated the law of a superior being2 and that they have offered propitiatory sacrifices therefor1 except in the case of those persons and nations who have received the ,bible1 or have learned through the ,koran one of its leading features1 that there is but one ,god1 and who in either case believe that the needful sacrifice has already been made4 ,another pernicious result of the system under examination is1 that it affords no better ground for the doctrine of ,deity's omnipresence than experience4 ,mr4 ,spencer's words are3 phenomena being1 so far as we can ascertain1 unlimited in their diffusion1 we are obliged to regard this ,power as omnipresent4 ,now1 if he1 or one of his friends1 should happen to get wings some day1 and should just take a turn through space1 and should happen also to find a limit to phenomena1 and1 skirting in astonishment along that boundary1 should happen to light upon an open place and a bridge1 which invited them to pass across to another sphere or system of phenomena1 made by another ,power1--said bridge being constructed 'alf and 'alf by the two aforesaid ,powers1--then there would be nothing to do but for the said explorer to fly back again to ,england1 as fast as ever he could1 and relate to all the other ,limitists his new experience2 and they1 having no ground on which to argue against or above experience1 must needs receive the declaration of their colaborator1 with its inevitable conclusion1 that the ,power by which we are here acted upon is limited1 and so is not omnipresent4 ,but when1 instead of such a fallacious philosophy1 men shall receive the doctrine1 based not upon human experience1 but upon ,god's inborn ideas that phenomena are limited and ,god is omnipresent1 and that upon these facts experience can afford no decision1 we shall begin to eliminate the real difficulties of philosophy1 and to approach the attainment of the unison between human philosophy and the ,divine ,philosophy4 ,attached to the above is the conclusion reached by ,mr4 ,spencer in an earlier part of his work1 that criticism teaches us that this ,power is wholly incomprehensible4 ,we might1 it is believed1 ask with pertinence1 ,what better1 then1 is man than the brute8 ,but the subject is recurred to at this time1 only to quote against this position a sentence from a somewhat older book than ,first ,principles1 a book which1 did it deserve no other regard than as a human production1 would seem1 from its perfect agreement with the facts of human nature1 to be the true basis for all philosophy4 ,the sentence is this3 ,beloved1 let us love one another1 for love is of ,god2 and every one that loveth1 is born of ,god1 and ,,knoweth ,,god4 ,but the gross materialism of ,mr4 ,spencer's philosophy presents its worst phase in his completed doctrine of ,god4 ,mark4 ,a phenomenon is a manifestation of some ,power4 ,in this consciousness of an ,incomprehensible ,omnipresent ,power we have just that consciousness on which ,religion dwells4 ,and so we arrive at the point where ,religion and ,science coalesce4 ,an ,incomprehensible ,omnipresent ,power is all the ,deity ,mr4 ,spencer allows to mankind4 ,this ,power is omnipresent1 so that we can never escape it2 and incomprehensible1 so that we can never know the law of its action1 or even if it have a law4 ,at any moment it may fall on us and crush us4 ,at any moment this globe may become one vast ,vesuvius1 and all its cities ,herculaneums and ,pompeiis4 ,of such a ,deity the children of men may either live in continual dread1 or in continual disregard2 they may either spend their lives clad in sackcloth1 or purple and fine linen2 bread and water may be their fare1 or their table may be spread like that of ,dives2 by merciless mortification of the flesh1 by scourges and iron chains1 they may seek to propitiate1 if possible1 this incomprehensible1 omnipresent ,power2 or1 reckless of consequences1 they may laugh and dance and be gay1 saying1 we know nothing of this ,power1 he may crush us any moment1 let us take the good of life while we can4 ,the symbols of such a ,deity are the rough and ragged rocks1 the hills1 the snow-crowned mountains ,titan-piled2 the avalanche starting with ominous thunder1 to rush with crash and roar and terrible destruction upon the hapless village beneath it2 the flood gathering its waters from vast ranges of hills into a single valley1 spreading into great lakes1 drowning cattle1 carrying off houses and their agonized inhabitants1 sweeping away dams1 rending bridges from their foundations1 in fine1 ruthlessly destroying the little gatherings of man1 and leaving the country1 over which its devastating waters flowed1 a mournful desolation2 and finally1 perhaps the completest symbol of all may be found in that collection of the united streams and lakes of tens upon tens of thousands of miles of the earth's surface1 into the aorta of the world1 over the rough1 rocky bed of which the crowded waters rush and roar1 with rage and foam1 until they come suddenly to the swift tremendous plunge of ,niagara4 ,it should be further noticed1 that this philosophy is in direct antagonism with that of the ,bible1--that1 if ,spencerianism is true1 the ,bible is a falsehood and cheat4 ,instead of ,mr4 ,spencer's ,power1 the ,bible presents us a doctrine of ,god as follows3 ,and ,god said unto ,moses1 ,i ,,am ,,that ,i ,,am4 ,and he said1 ,thus shalt thou say unto the children of ,israel1 ,i ,,am hath sent me unto you4--,exodus ,,iv4 #ad4 ,this declaration1 the most highly metaphysical of any but one man ever heard1 all the ,limitists1 even devout ,mr4 ,mansel1 either in distinct terms1 or by implication1 deny4 ,that other declaration is this3 ,beloved1 let us love one another3 for love is of ,god2 and every one that loveth is born of ,god1 and knoweth ,god4 ,he that loveth not1 knoweth not ,god2 for ,god is love4--#a ,john ,,iv4 #g1 #h4 ,direct as is the antagonism between the two philosophies now presented1 the later one appears in an especially bad light from the fact1 that1 being very recent and supported by a mere handful of men1 its advocates have utterly neglected to take any notice of the other and elder one1 although the adherents of this may be numbered by millions1 and among them have been and are many of the ablest of earth's thinkers4 ,true1 the great majority of ,bible readers do not study it as a philosophical treatise1 but rather as a book of religious and spiritual instruction2 yet1 since it is the most profoundly philosophical book which has ever been in the hands of man1 and professedly teaches us not only the philosophy of man1 but also the philosophy of ,god1 it certainly would seem that the advocates of the new and innovating system should have taken up that one which it sought to supplant1 and have made an attempt1 commensurate with the magnitude of the work before them1 to show its position to be fallacious and unworthy of regard4 ,instead of this they have nowhere recognized the existence even of this philosophy except in the single instance of a quotation by ,mr4 ,mansel1 in which he seems tacitly to acknowledge the antagonism we have noted4 ,in ,mr4 ,spencer's volume this neglect is especially noteworthy4 ,judging from internal evidence1 one would much sooner conclude that it was written by a ,hindu pundit1 in a temple of ,buddha1 than by an ,englishman1 in a land of ,bibles and ,christian churches4 ,now1 although the ,bible may stand in his estimation no higher than the ,bahgavat-,gita1 yet the mere fact that it is1 and that it presents a most profound philosophy1 which is so largely received in his own and neighboring nations1 made it imperative upon him not only to take some notice of it1 but to meet and answer it1 as we have indicated above4 ,another fault in ,mr4 ,spencer's philosophy1 one which he will be less willing to admit1 perhaps1 than the above1 and1 at the same time1 one which will be more likely forcibly to move a certain class of mind1 is1 that it is in direct antagonism to human nature4 ,not only is the ,bible a falsehood and a cheat1 if ,mr4 ,spencer's philosophical system is true1 but human nature is equally a falsehood and a cheat4 ,to specify4 ,human nature universally considers ,god1 or its gods1 as persons2 or1 in other words1 all human beings1 or at least with very rare exceptions1 spontaneously ascribe personality to ,deity4 ,this position is in no wise negatived by the fact of the ,buddhist priesthood of ,india1 or of a class of philosophical atheists in any other country4 ,man is endowed with the power of self-education2 and if an individual sees1 in the religion in which he is brought up1 some inconsistency1 which he1 thinking it1 as it may be1 integral1 for philosophical reasons rejects1 and all religion with it1 he may educate himself into speculative atheism4 ,but no child is an atheist4 ,not even ,shelley became such1 until he had dashed against some of the distorted and monstrous human theologies of his day4 ,but counting all the ,buddhists1 and all the ,german atheists1 and all the ,english atheists1 and all the ,american atheists1 and all other atheists wherever they may be found1 they will not number one tenth of the human race4 ,on what ground can the unanimity of the other nine tenths be accounted for8 ,there appears none possible1 but that the notion that ,god is a person1 is organic in human nature4 ,another equally universal and spontaneous utterance of mankind is1 that there is a likeness1 in some way1 between ,god and man4 ,there are the grossest1 and in many instances most degrading modes of representing this2 but under them all1 and through them all1 the indelible notion appears4 ,the unanimity and pertinacity of this notion1 appearing in every part of the globe1 and under every variety of circumstance1 and reappearing after every revolution1 which1 tearing down old customs and worships1 established new ones1 can without doubt only be accounted for on the precise ground of the other1--that the notion is organic in man4 ,a third utterance of the human race1 standing in the same category with these two1 is1 that the ,deity can be propitiated by sacrifice4 ,this also has had revolting1 yea most hideous and unrighteous forms of expression1 even to human sacrifices4 ,but the notion has remained indestructible through all ages1 and must therefore be accounted for1 as have been the others4 ,over against the ,i ,,am1 which human nature presents and the ,bible supports2 over against ,him in whose image man and the ,bible say man was created2 and over against ,him who1 those two still agreeing witnesses also affirm1 is moved by his great heart of ,love to have mercy on those creatures who come to him with repentance1 ,mr4 ,spencer gives us1 as the result of ,science1 an incomprehensible omnipresent ,power2 only a ,power1 nothing more2 and that utterly inscrutable4 ,for our part1 whatever others may do1 we will believe in human nature and the ,bible4 ,on the truthfulness of these two witnesses1 as on the ,central ,rock in the ,universe1 we plant ourselves4 ,here do we find our ,gibraltar4 ,mr4 ,spencer further says that on the consciousness of this ,power ,religion dwells4 ,now1 so far is this assertion from according with the fact1 that on his hypothesis it is impossible to account for the presence of religion as a constitutive element of the human race4 ,religion was primarily worship1 the reverential acknowledgment1 by the sinless creature1 of the authority of the ,creator1 combined with the adoration of ,his absolute ,holiness2 but since sin has marred the race1 it has been coupled with the offering in some forms of a propitiatory sacrifice4 ,but if the ,deity is only ,power2 or equally1 if this is all the notion we can form of him1 we are utterly at a loss to find aught in him to worship1 much less can we account for the fact of the religious nature in us1 and most of all are we confounded by the persistent assertion1 by this religions nature1 of the personality and mercy of ,god1 for ,power can be neither personal nor merciful4 ,mr4 ,spencer proceeds to strengthen as well as he can his position by stating that from age to age ,science has continually defeated it 7,religion7 wherever they have come into collision1 and has obliged it to relinquish one or more of its positions4 ,in this assertion1 also1 he manifests either a want of acquaintance with the facts or a failure to comprehend their significance4 ,religion may properly be divided into two classes4 #a4 ,those religions which have appeared to grow up spontaneously among men1 having all the errors and deformities which a fleshly imagination would produce4 #b4 ,the religion of ,jesus ,christ4 #a4 ,from the three great ideas mentioned above1 no ,science has ever driven even the religions of this class4 ,it has1 indeed1 corrected many forms of expression1 and has sometimes driven individuals1 who failed to distinguish between the form1 and the idea which the form overlies1 into a rejection of the truth itself4 #b4 ,respecting the religion of ,jesus ,christ1 ,mr4 ,spencer's remark has no shadow of foundation4 ,since the beginning of its promulgation by ,jehovah1 and especially since the completion of that promulgation by our ,saviour and his apostles1 not one whit of its practical law or its philosophy has been abated2 nay1 more1 to-day1 in these ,american ,states1 there may be found a more widespread1 thoroughly believed1 firmly held1 and intelligent conviction of ,god's personality1 and personal supervision of the affairs of men1 of his ,fatherhood1 and of that fatherhood exercised in bringing order out of confusion1 in so conducting the most terrible of conflicts1 that it shall manifestly redound1 not only to the glory of himself1 but to the very best good of man1 so manifestly to so great a good1 that all the loss of life1 and all the suffering1 is felt to be not worthy to be compared to the good achieved1 and that too most strongly by the sufferers1 than was ever before manifested by any nation under heaven4 ,the truth is1 that1 in spite of all its efforts to the contrary1 criticism has ever been utterly impotent to eliminate from human thinking the elements we have presented4 ,its utmost triumph has been to force a change in the form of expression2 and in the ,bible it meets with forms of expression which it ever has been1 is now1 and ever shall be1 as helpless to change as a paralytic would be to overturn the ,himalaya4 ,the discussion of the topic immediately in hand may perhaps be now properly closed with the simple allusion to a single fact4 ,just as far as a race of human beings descends in the gradations of degradation1 just so far does it come to look upon ,deity simply as power4 ,african ,fetishism is the doctrine that ,deity is an incomprehensible power1 rendered into the form of a popular religion2 only the religion stands one step higher than the philosophy1 in that it assumes a sort of personality for the ,power4 ,on page #ajb the following extract will be found3 ,and now observe that all along1 the agent which has effected the purification has been ,science4 ,we habitually overlook the fact that this has been one of its functions4 ,religion ignores its immense debt to ,science2 and ,science is scarcely at all conscious how much ,religion owes it4 ,yet it is demonstrable that every step by which ,religion has progressed from its first low conception to the comparatively high one it has now reached1 ,science has helped it1 or rather forced it to take2 and that even now1 ,science is urging further steps in the same direction4 ,in this passage half truths are so sweepingly asserted as universal that it becomes simply untrue4 ,the evil may be stand under two heads4 #a4 ,it is too philosophical4 ,mr4 ,spencer undertakes to be altogether too profound4 ,since he has observed that certain changes for the better have been made in some human religions1 by the study of the natural sciences1 he jumps to the conclusion that religion has been under a state of steady growth2 and of course readily assumes--for there is not a shadow of other basis for his assertion--that the first conception of religion was very low4 ,this assumption we utterly deny1 and demand of ,mr4 ,spencer his proof4 ,for ourselves we are willing to come down from the impregnable fortresses of the ,bible upon the common ground of the ,grecian ,mythology1 and on this do battle against him4 ,in this we are taught that the ,golden ,age came first1 in which was a life of spotless purity2 after which were the silver and brazen ages1 and the ,iron ,age in which was crime1 and the low conception of religion came last4 ,how marked is the general agreement of this with the ,bible account6 #b4 ,but more and worse may be charged on this passage than that it is too philosophical4 ,mr4 ,spencer constructs his philosophy first and cuts his facts to match it4 ,this is a common mistake among men1 and which they are unconscious of4 ,now the fact is1 ,science was not the agent which effected the purification4 ,religion owes a very small debt to ,science4 ,science can never be more than a supplement1 a handmaid to ,religion4 ,religion's first position was not a low one1 but nearly the highest4 ,afterwards it sunk very low2 but men sunk it there4 ,science never helped it or forced it one atom upwards4 ,science alone only degrades ,religion and gives new wings and hands to crime4 ,this will be especially manifest to those who remember what ,mr4 ,spencer's doctrine of ,science is4 ,he says3 ,that even the highest achievements of ,science are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence1 so cooerdinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur externally4 ,of course the highest object of ,science will be truth2 and this1 our teacher tells us1 is simply the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations4 ,to interpret4 ,a science of medicine1 a science of ablutions1 a science of clothing1 a science of ventilation1 a science of temperature1 and to some largely1 to many chiefly1 a science of cookery do1 combined1 constitute ,science1 and the preservation of the body is its highest attainment4 ,is this ,science the agent which has effected the purification of ,religion8 ,what then is the truth8 ,lo this have ,i found1 that ,god hath made man upright2 but they have sought out many inventions4--,eccl4 ,,vii4 #bi4 ,the first religion was a communion with ,god4 ,the ,creator taught man1 as a father would his children4 ,but when man sinned1 he began to seek out many inventions1 and sank to that awful state of degradation hinted at in the fragmentary sketches of the popular manners and customs of the times of ,abraham1--,gen4 ,,xii4 ,,xxv42 which ,paul epitomizes with such fiery vigor in the first chapter of ,romans1 and which may be found fully paralleled in our own day4 ,at the proper time1 ,god took mankind in hand1 and began to develop his great plan for giving purity to religion4 ,so he raised up ,moses1 and gave to ,israel the ,levitical law4 ,or if ,mr4 ,spencer shall deny the biblical account of the origin of the five books of ,moses1 he at least cannot deny that they have a being2 and1 placing them on the same ground of examination and criticism as ,herodotus1 that they were written more than a thousand years before the ,christian era4 ,now mark4 ,whoever wrote them1 they remained as they were first framed1 and no one of the prophets1 who came after1 added one new idea4 ,they only emphasized and amplified ,the ,law4 ,so far then as this part of ,religion was concerned1 ,science never helped a particle4 ,yea1 more1 the words to ,moses in the wilderness were never paralleled in the utterances of man before the ,christian era4 ,in the fulness of time ,god sent his own ,son4 ,however defective was the former dispensation1 he1 who appeared to most of the men of his day as only a carpenter's son1 declared to mankind the final and perfect truth4 ,as the system taught by ,moses was not the result of any philosophical developments1 but was incomparably superior to the religion of the most civilized people of the world1 at whose court ,moses was brought up1 and was manifestly constructed de novo1 and from some kind of revelation1 so this1 which the carpenter's son taught1 was incomparably superior to any utterance which the human soul had up to that time1 or has since1 made4 ,it comes forth at once complete and pure4 ,it utters the highest principles in the simplest language4 ,indeed1 nothing new was left to say when ,john finished his writing2 and the canon might well be closed4 ,and since that day1 has ,religion advanced8 ,not a syllable4 ,the purest water is drank at the old fountain4 ,but it will be said that the cause of ,religion among men has advanced4 ,very true1 but ,science did not advance it4 ,you can yet count the years on your fingers since men of ,science generally ceased to be strenuously hostile to ,religion4 ,religion1 in every instance1 has advanced just where it has gone back1 and drank at the old fountains4 ,who1 then1 has purified ,religion8 ,god is the agent which has effected the purification4 ,god is he to whom ,religion owes its immense debt1 not ,science4 ,he it is who has brought her up to her present high position4 ,when1 now1 we see how completely ,mr4 ,spencer--to use a commonplace but very forcible phrase--has ruled ,god out of the ring1 how impertinent seems his rebuke1 administered a few pages further on1 in the passage beginning1 ,volumes might be written upon the impiety of the pious1 to those who believe that ,god means what he says1 and that men may know him4 ,these men at least stand on a far higher plane than he who teaches that an incomprehensible omnipresent ,power is all there is for us to worship1 and his words will sound to them like the crackling of thorns under a pot4 ,there does not appear in this chapter any further topic that has not already been touched upon4 ,with these remarks1 then1 the examination of this chapter1 and of ,mr4 ,spencer's ,first ,principles1 may be closed4 ,,conclusion4 ,if it has ever been the reader's lot to examine ,paley's ,evidences of ,christianity1 or the ,sermons of ,president ,dwight on the ,existence of ,god2 and if he has risen from their perusal with a feeling of utter unsatisfaction1 enduring the same craving for a sure truth harassing as before1 he will have partly shared the experience which drove the author forward1 until he arrived at the foundation principles of this treatise4 ,those works1 and all of that class are1 for the object they have in view1 worthless2 not because the various statements they make are untrue1 not because elegant language and beauty of style are wanting2 but because they are radically defective in that1 their method is irrelevant to the subject in hand2 because in all the arguments that have been or can be brought forward there is nothing decisive and final2 because the skeptic can thrust the sharp sword of his criticism through every one of them2 because1 in fine1 the very root of the matter1 their method itself is false1 and men have attempted to establish by a series of arguments what must be ground for the possibility of an argument1 and can only be established by the opposite1 the a priori method4 ,though the ,limitist ,philosophy has no positive value1 it has this negative one1 that it has established1 by the most thorough-going criticism1 the worthlessness of the a posteriori processes of thought on the matter in hand4 ,yea1 more1 the existence of any spiritual person cannot be proved in that way4 ,you can prove that the boy's body climbs the tree2 but never that he has a soul4 ,this is always taken for granted4 ,lest the author should appear singular in this view1 he would call the attention of the reader to a passage in ,coleridge's writings in which he at once sets forth the beauty of the style and incompetency of the logic of ,dr4 ,paley's book4 ,i have1 ,i am aware1 in this present work1 furnished occasion for a charge of having expressed myself with slight and irreverence of celebrated names1 especially of the late ,dr4 ,paley4 ,o1 if ,i were fond and ambitious of literary honor1 of public applause1 how well content should ,i be to excite but one third of the admiration which1 in my inmost being1 ,i feel for the head and heart of ,paley6 ,and how gladly would ,i surrender all hope of contemporary praise1 could ,i even approach to the incomparable grace1 propriety1 and persuasive facility of his writings6 ,but on this very account1 ,i feel myself bound in conscience to throw the whole force of my intellect in the way of this triumphal car1 on which the tutelary genius of modern idolatry is borne1 even at the risk of being crushed under the wheels4 ,instead of the method now condemned1 there is one taught us in the ,book1 and the only one taught us there1 which is open to every human being1 for which every human being has the faculty1 and respecting which all that is needed is1 that the person exercise what he already has4 ,the boy could not learn his arithmetic1 except he set himself resolutely to his task2 and no man can learn of ,god1 except he also fulfils the conditions1 except he consecrate himself wholly to the acquisition of this knowledge1 except his soul is poured out in love to ,god2 for every one that loveth1 is born of ,god1 and knoweth ,god4 ,we come then to the knowledge of ,god by a direct and immediate act of the soul4 ,the ,reason1 the ,sensibility1 and the ,will1 give forth their combined and highest action in the attainment of this knowledge4 ,as an intellectual achievement1 this is the highest possible to the ,reason4 ,she attains then1 to the ,ultima ,thule of all effort1 and of this she is fully conscious4 ,nor is there awakened any feverish complaining that there are no more worlds to conquer4 ,in the contemplation of the ineffable ,goodness she finds her everlasting occupation1 and her eternal rest4 ,plainly1 then1 both ,reason and ,revelation teach but a single1 and that the a priori method1 by which to establish for man the fact of the being of ,god4 ,let us buttress this conclusion with other lines of thought4 ,reader1 now that it is suggested to you1 does it not seem in the highest degree improbable1 that the most important truths which can pertain to man1 truths which do not concern primarily the affairs of this life1 but of his most exalted life1 the life of the spiritual person as the companion of its ,creator1 should be based upon an inferior1 less satisfactory1 and less adequate foundation of knowledge1 than those of our childhood's studies1 of the arithmetic and the algebra8 ,the boy who cons the first pages of his arithmetical text-book1 soon learns what he knows to be self-evident truths4 ,he who should offer to prove the truth of the multiplication-table1 would only expose himself to ridicule4 ,when the boy has attained to youth1 and advanced in his studies1 the pages of the algebra and geometry are laid before him1 and he finds new and higher orders of self-evident truths4 ,would any evidence1 any argument1 strengthen his conviction of the validity of the axioms8 ,yea1 rather1 if one should begin to offer arguments1 would he not instinctively and rightfully feel that the confession was thereby tacitly made1 that self-evidence was not satisfactory2 and would he not1 finding his spontaneous impulse1 and his education1 so contradictory1 be liable to fall into complete skepticism8 ,if now there be this spontaneous1 yea1 abiding1 yea1 unalterable1 yea1 universal conviction respecting matters of subordinate importance1 can it be possible1--,i repeat the question1 for it seems to carry with it irresistibly its own and the decisive answer1--can it be possible that the decisions of questions of the highest moment1 that the knowledge of the principles of our moral being and of the moral government to which we are amenable1 and most of all of the ,governor who is at once ,creator1 ,lawgiver1 and ,judge1 is not based on at least equally spontaneous1 yea1 abiding1 yea1 unalterable1 yea1 universal convictions8 ,and when the teacher seemingly1 and may it not with truth be said actually1 distrusting the reliability of such a conviction1 goes about to bolster up his belief1 and the belief of his pupil1 in the existence of ,god1 and thereto rakes together1 with painstaking labor1 many sticks and straws of evidence1 instead of looking up to the truth which shines directly down upon him with steady ineffable effulgence1 is it at all strange that the sharper-eyed pupil1 keenly appreciating the contradiction between his spontaneous conviction and his teaching1 should become uncertain which to follow1 a doubter1 and finally a confirmed skeptic8 ,if1 then1 it is incredible that the fundamental principles of man's moral nature--that to which all the other elements of his being are subordinate1 and for which they were created--are established on inferior grounds1 and those less satisfactory than the grounds of other principles2 and if1 on the other hand1 the conviction is irresistible1 that they are established on the highest grounds1 and since the truths of mathematics are also based on the highest ground1 self-evidence1 and since there can be none higher than the highest1 it follows that the moral principles of the ,universe1 so far as they can be known by man1 have precisely the same foundation of truthfulness as the principles of mathematics--they are ,,self-,,evident4 ,but some good ,reader will check at the result now attained because it involves the position that the human ,reason is the final standard of truth for man4 ,good reader1 this position is involved1 and is true2 and for the sake of ,christ's religion it must be taken4 ,the only possible ground for a thoroughly satisfactory and thoroughly unanswerable ,christian ,philosophy1 is the principle that ,the human ,reason is the final standard of truth for man4 ,it has been customary for the devout ,bible-reader to esteem that book as his final standard2 and to such an extent in many instances has his reverential regard for it been carried1 that the expression will hardly be too strong for truth1 that it has become an object of worship2 and upon the mind of such a one the above assertion will produce a shock4 ,while the author would treat with respect every religious feeling1 he would still remind such a person that the ,bible is the moral school-book of the spiritual person in man1 which ,god himself prepared for man's use1 and must in every case be inferior and subordinate to the being whom it was meant to educate2 and furthermore1 that1 by the very fact of making man1 ,god established in him the standard1 and the right to require that this fact be recognized4 ,mark1 ,god made the standard and thus established the right4 ,this principle may be supported by the following considerations3 #a4 ,the church universally has acted upon it2 and none have employed it more vigorously than those who have in terms most bitterly opposed it4 ,one of the class just referred to affirms that the ,bible is the standard of truth4 ,admit1 says a friend standing by1 that it would be if it were what it purports to be2 but what evidence is there that this is the case4 ,thereupon the champion presents evidence from the fathers1 and evidence from the book itself2 and finally closes by saying1 that such an array of evidence is ample to satisfy any reasonable man of its truth and validity4 ,his argument is undoubtedly satisfactory2 but if he has not appealed to a reasonable man1 i4 e4 to the ,reason1 i4 e41 if he has not acknowledged a standard for the standard1 and thus has not tacitly1 unconsciously and yet decisively employed the ,reason as the highest standard of truth1 then his conduct has for us no adequate expression4 #b4 ,nicodemus and ,christ1 in express terms1 recognized the validity of this standard4 ,said the ruler to ,christ1 ,we know that thou art a teacher come from ,god3 for no man can do these miracles that thou doest1 except ,god be with him4--,john ,,iii4 #b4 ,in these words1 he both recognized the validity of the standard1 and the fact that its requirements had been met4 ,but decisively emphatic are the words of our ,saviour3 ,if ,i had not done among them the works which none other man did1 they had not had sin3 but now have they both seen and hated both me and my ,father4--,john ,,xv4 #bd4 ,as if he had said1 ,while ,i appeared among them simply as a man1 ,i had no right to claim from them a belief in my mission2 but when ,i had given them adequate and ample evidence of my heavenly character1 when1 in a word1 ,i had by my works satisfied all the rational demands for evidence which they could make1 then no excuse remained for their rejection of me4 ,the doctrine of this treatise1 that man may know the truth1 and know ,god1 is one which will never be too largely reflected upon by the human mind1 or too fully illustrated in human thought4 ,in no better strain can we bring our work to a close than by offering some reflections on those words of ,jesus ,christ which have formed the title of our book4 ,then said ,jesus to those ,jews which believed on him1 ',if ye continue in my word1 then are ye my disciples indeed2 and ye shall know the truth1 and the truth shall make you free4'--,john ,,viii4 #ca1 #cb4 ,throughout all the acts of ,christ1 as recorded in ,john and especially during the last days of his life1 there may be traced the marks of a super-human effort to express to the ,jews1 in the most skilful manner1 the nature and purport of his mission4 ,he appeared to them a man2 and yet it would seem as if the ,godhead in him struggled with language to overcome its infirmities1 and express with perfectest skill his extraordinary character and work4 ,but he came unto his own1 and his own received him not4 ,being then such1 even the ,divine ,man1 ,jesus ,christ possessed in his own right an absolute and exhaustive metaphysic4 ,we study out some laws in some of their applications2 he knew all laws in all their applications4 ,in these his last days he was engaged in making the most profound and highly philosophical revelations to his followers that one being ever made to another4 ,or does the reader prefer to call them religious8 ,very well3 for here ,religion and ,philosophy are identical4 ,being engaged in such a labor1 it is certain that no merely human teacher ever used words with the careful balancing1 the skilful selection1 the certain exactitude1 that ,jesus did4 ,hence in the most emphatic sense may it be said1 that1 whether he used figurative or literal language1 he meant just what he said4 ,the terms used in the text quoted are literal terms1 and undoubtedly the passage is to be taken in its most literal signification4 ,in these words then1 in this passage of the highest philosophical import1 is to be found the basis of the whole a priori philosophy4 ,they were spoken of the most important truths1 those which pertain to the soul's everlasting welfare2 but as the greater includes the less1 so do they include all lesser science4 ,in positive and unmistakable terms has ,christ declared the fact of knowledge4 ,god knows all truth4 ,in so far as we also know the truth1 in so far are we like him4 ,and mark1 this is knowledge1 a purely intellectual act4 ,love is indeed a condition of the act1 but it is not the very act itself4 ,on this subject it is believed that the ,christian church has failed to assert the most accurate doctrine4 ,too generally has this knowledge been termed a spiritual knowledge1 meaning thereby1 a sort of an impression of happiness made upon the spiritual sensibility2 and this state of bliss has been represented as in the highest degree desirable4 ,beyond all question it is true1 that1 when the spiritual person1 with the eye of ,reason1 sees1 and thus knows the truth1 seeing it and knowing it because his whole being1 will1 and intellect is consecrated to1 wrapt in the effort1 and he is searching for it as for hid treasures1 there will roll over his soul some ripples of that ineffable ,delight which is a boundless ocean in ,deity4 ,but this state of the ,sensibility follows after1 and is dependent upon1 the act of love1 and the act of knowledge4 ,there should be1 there was made in ,christ's mind1 a distinction in the various psychical modifications of him who had sold all that he had to buy the one pearl4 ,the words of ,christ are to be taken1 then1 as the words of the perfect philosopher1 and the perfect religionist4 ,bearing1 as he did1 the destiny of a world on his heart1 and burdened beyond all utterance by the mighty load1 his soul was full of the theme for which he was suffering1 he could speak to man only of his highest needs and his highest capabilities4 ,the truth which man may know1 then1 is not only eternal1--all truth is eternal1--but it is that eternal truth most important to him1 the a priori laws of the spiritual person and of all his relations4 ,the what he is1 the why he is1 and the what he ought to become1 are the objects of his examination4 ,when1 then1 a spiritual person has performed his highest act1 the act of unconditional and entire consecration to the search after the truth1 i4 e4 to ,god2 and when1 having done this he ever after puts away all lusts of the flesh1 he shall in this condition become absorbed1 wrapt away in the contemplation of the truth2 then his spiritual eye will be open1 and will dart with its far-glancing1 searching gaze throughout the mysteries of the ,universe1 and he will know the truth4 ,before1 when he was absorbed in the pursuit of the things of ,sense1 he could see almost no a priori principles at all1 and what he did see1 only in their practical bearing upon those material and transitory things which perish with their using2 but now balancing himself on tireless pinion in the upper ether1 anon he stoops to notice the largest and highest and most important of those objects which formerly with so much painful and painstaking labor he climbed the rugged heights of sense to examine1 and having touched upon them cursorily1 to supply the need of the hour1 he again spreads his powerful ,god-given wings of faith and love1 and soars upward1 upward1 upward1 towards the eternal ,sun1 the infinite ,person1 the final ,truth1 ,god4 ,then does he come to comprehend1 to ,,know1 with all saints1 what is the height and depth and length and breadth of the love of ,god4 ,then do the pure a priori laws1 especially those of the relations of spiritual persons1 i4 e4 of the moral government of ,god1 come full into the field of his vision4 ,then in the clear blaze1 in the noonday effulgence of the ineffable1 eternal ,sun1 does he see the ,law which binds ,god as it binds man1--that ,law so terrible in its demands upon him who had violated it1 that the infinite ,person himself could find no other way of escape for sinning man but in sending his only-begotten ,son into the world4 ,and he who is lifted up to this knowledge needs no other revelation4 ,all other knowledge is a child's lesson-book to him4 ,all lower study is tasteless2 all lower life is neglected1 forgotten4 ,he studies forever the pure equations of truth2 he lives in the bosom of ,god4 ,such an one may all his life-long have been utterly ignorant of books4 ,a poor negro on some rice plantation1 he may have learned of ,god only by the hearing of the ear1 but by one act1 in a moment1 in the twinkling of an eye1 he has passed all the gradations of earthly knowledge1 and taken his seat on the topmost form in heaven4 ,he received little instruction from men2 but forevermore ,god is his teacher4 ,this of which we have been speaking is1 be it remembered1 no rhapsody of the imagination4 ,it is a simple literal fact respecting man's intellect4 ,it is the same in kind1 though of far nobler import1 as if upon this act of consecration there should be revealed to every consecrated one1 in a sudden overwhelming burst of light1 the whole a priori system of the physical ,universe4 ,this is not so revealed because it is not essential1 and so would only gratify curiosity4 ,the other and the higher is revealed1 because it is essential to man's spiritual life4 ,in the culminating act1 then1 of a spiritual person1 in the unreserved1 the absolute consecration of the whole being to the search after truth1 do we find that common goal to which an a priori philosophy inevitably leads us1 and which the purest1 ,christ's1 religion teaches us4 ,thus does it appear that in their highest idea ,philosophy and ,religion are identical4 ,the ,rock upon which both alike are grounded is eternal4 ,the principles of both have the highest possible evidence1 for they are self-evident2 and1 having them given by the intuition of the ,reason1 a man can cipher out the whole natural scheme of the ,universe as he would cipher out a problem in equations4 ,he has not done it1 because he is wicked2 and ,god has given him the ,bible1 as the mathematical astronomy of the moral heavens1 as a school-book to lead him back to the goal of his lost purity4 ,how beautiful1 then1 art thou1 ,o ,religion1 supernal daughter of the ,deity6 how noble in thy magnificent preeminence6 how dazzling in thy transcendent loveliness6 ,thou sittest afar on a throne of pearl2 thy diadem the ,morning ,stars1 thy robe the glory of ,god4 ,founded is thy throne on ,eternity2 and from eternity to eternity all thy laws are enduring truth4 ,sitting thus1 ,o ,queen1 more firmly throned than the snow-capped mountains1 calmer than the ocean's depths1 in the surety of thy self-conscious integrity and truth1 thou mayest1 with mien of noblest dignity1 in unwavering confidence1 throw down the gauntlet of thy challenge to the assembled doubters of the ,universe4 ,it may be that to some minds1 unaccustomed to venturing out fearlessly on the ocean of thought1 with an unwavering trust in the pole-star truth in the human soul1 certain of the positions attained and maintained in this volume will seem to involve the destruction of all essential distinction between the ,creator and the created4 ,if the universe is a definite and limited object1 some created being may1 at some period1 come to know every atom of it4 ,moreover1 if there is a definite number of the qualities and attributes--the endowments of ,deity1 some one may learn the number1 and what they are1 and come at length to have a knowledge equal to ,god's knowledge4 ,even if this possibility should be admitted1--which it is not1 for a reason to appear further on1--yet it would in no way involve that the creature had1 in any the least degree1 reduced the difference in kind which subsists between him and the ,creator4 ,a consideration of the following distinctive marks will1 it would seem1 be decisive upon this point4 ,god is self-existent4 ,his creatures are dependent upon him4 ,self-existence is an essential1 inherent1 untransferable attribute of ,deity2 and so is not a possible attainment for any creature4 ,every creature is necessarily dependent upon the ,creator every moment1 for his continuance in being4 ,let him attain ever so high a state of knowledge2 let him1 if the supposition were rational1 acquire a knowledge equal to that of ,deity2 let him be endowed with all the power he could use1 and he would not have made1 nor could he make an effort even1 in the direction of removing his dependence upon his ,creator4 ,in the very height of his glory1 in the acme of his attainment1 it would need only that ,god rest an instant1 cease to sustain him1 and he would not be1 he would have gone out1 as the light goes out on a burner when one turns the faucet4 ,again1 the mode by which their knowledge is attained is different in kind2 and the creature never can acquire the ,creator's mode4 ,the ,deity possesses his knowledge as a necessary endowment1 given to him at once1 by a spontaneous intuition4 ,hence he could never learn1 for there was no knowledge which he did not already possess4 ,thus he is out of all relation to ,time4 ,the creature1 on the other hand1 can never acquire any knowledge except through processes2 and1 what is more1 can never review the knowledge already acquired1 except by a process which occupies a time4 ,this relation of the creature to ,time is organic2 and this distinction between the creature and ,creator is thus also irremovable4 ,another organic distinction is that observed in the mode of seeing ideals4 ,the ,divine ,reason not only gives ideas1 a priori laws1 but it gives all possible images1 which those laws1 standing in their natural relations to each other1 can become4 ,thus all ideals are realized to him1 whether the creative energy goes forth1 and power is organized in accordance therewith1 or not4 ,here again the creature is of the opposite kind4 ,the creature can never have an idea until he has been educated by contact with a material universe2 and then can never construct an ideal1 except he have first seen the elements of that ideal realized in material forms4 ,to illustrate3 ,the infant has no ideas2 and there is no radical difference between the beginning of a human being and any other created spiritual person4 ,he has a rudimentary ,reason1 but it must grow before it can make its presentations1 and the means of its education must be a material system4 ,let a spiritual person be created1 and set in the ,universe1 utterly isolated1 with no medium of communication1 and it would stay forever just what it was at the beginning1 a dry seed4 ,the necessity of alliance with a material ,universe is equally apparent in the mature spiritual person4 ,such a one cannot construct a single ideal1 except he have seen all the elements already in material forms4 ,he who will attempt to construct an ideal of any thing1 which never has been1 as a griffin1 and not put into it any form of animals which have been on earth1 will immediately appreciate the unquestionableness of this position4 ,therefore it is that no one can1 by searching1 find out ,god4 ,the creature can only learn what the ,creator declares to him4 ,still another element of distinction1 equally marked and decisive as those just named1 may be mentioned4 ,the ,deity possesses as inherent and immanent endowment ,power1 or the ability of himself to realize his ideals in objects4 ,thus is he the ,creator4 ,if this were not so1 there could have been no ,universe1 for there was no substance and no one to furnish a substance but he4 ,the creature1 on the other hand1 cannot receive as a gift1 neither attain by culture the power to create4 ,hence he can only realize his ideals in materials furnished to his hand4 ,pigments and brushes and chisels and marble must be before painters and sculptors can become4 ,each and every one of the distinctions above made is organic4 ,they cannot be eliminated4 ,in fact their removal is not a possible object of effort4 ,the creature may wish them removed2 but no line of thought can be studied out by which a movement can be made towards the attainment of that wish4 ,it would seem1 then1 that1 such being the facts1 the fullest scope might fearlessly be allowed to the legitimate use of every power of the creature4 ,such1 it is believed1 is ,god's design4 ,,the ,,end4 ,transcriber's ,note3 ,archaic_/multiple spellings and punctuation of the original have been maintained4