,,the ,,pragmatic ,,theory ,,of ,,truth 
,,as ,,developed ,,by ,,peirce1 ,,james1
 ,,and ,,dewey   ,,by   ,,denton        
,,loring ,,geyer  ,b4,a4 ,university of 
,wisconsin1 #aiaj  ,m4,a4 ,university of
 ,wisconsin1 #aiaa   ,,thesis           
,submitted in ,partial ,fulfillment of  
the ,requirements for the ,degree of    
,,doctor ,,of ,,philosophy ,,in         
,,philosophy  ,,in ,,the ,,graduate     
,,school ,,of ,,the ,,university ,,of   
,,illinois  #aiad     ,,contents        
,,introduction   ,,chapter ,i4     ,,the
 ,,pragmatic ,,doctrine ,,as            
,,originally ,,proposed ,,by ,,peirce   
,,chapter ,,ii4     ,,the               
,,interpretation ,,given ,,to           
,,pragmatism ,,by ,,james       ,,james'
 ,,exposition ,,of ,,peirce       ,,the 
,,development ,,of ,,the ,,pragmatic    
,,doctrine ,,through ,,the              
,,earlier ,,writings ,,of ,,james       
,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,truth ,,in        
',,pragmatism' ,,and ',,the ,,meaning   
,,of ,,truth'         ,the ,ambiguity of

 ',satisfaction'         ,the ,relation 
of ,truth to ,utility         ,the      
,relation of ,satisfaction to ,agreement
 and ,consistency   ,,chapter ,,iii4    
,,the ,,pragmatic ,,doctrine ,,as ,,set 
,,forth ,,by ,,dewey       ,,the        
,,experimental ,,theory ,,of ,,knowledge
       ,,contrast ,,between ,,james     
,,and ,,dewey   ,,chapter ,,iv4         
,,summary ,,and ,,conclusion            
,,bibliography     ,,the ,,pragmatic    
,,theory ,,of ,,truth ,,as ,,developed  
,,by ,,peirce1 ,,james1 ,,and ,,dewey4  
,,introductory4   ,this thesis attempts 
to trace the growth of the pragmatic    
doctrine of truth through the works of  
its three most famous advocates in      
,america4  ,an examination of ,peirce's 
initial statement of pragmatism is      
followed by a discussion of his         
objections to the meaning put upon his  
doctrine by his would-be disciples1 and 
his resort1 in order to save himself    
from these 'perversions'1 to a renaming 
of his theory4 ,some evident            

contradictions in his different         
principles are pointed out4  ,the       
changing position of ,william ,james is 
then followed through magazine articles 
and books appearing successively during 
a period of about thirty years4 ,one    
finds here a gradually but continually  
widening divergence from the            
rationalistic theories1 which culminates
 finally in the much-quoted extreme     
statements of the book ',pragmatism'4   
,the few subsequently published         
references to truth seem to consist     
largely of defenses or retractions of   
the tenets there set forth4 ,as has been
 so often said1 ,william ,james was too 
sympathetic toward the doctrines of     
other men to maintain a consistent      
doctrine of his own4 ,his best work1    
like that of the higher literary type to
 which he approached1 was to transcribe 
and interpret the feelings of other men4
 ,his genius lay in the clearness with  
which he could translate these ideas and
 the lucid fashion in which he could cut

 to the heart of ambiguities in them4   
,with the highest and most sincere      
admiration for the spirit of ,james'    
labors in philosophy and psychology1 the
 writer is unable to find there         
permanent contributions to the solution 
of the particular problem which we have 
before us here1 the problem of truth4   
,in his splendid protest against all    
static theories1 he seems to have       
accepted pragmatism for what it was not 
rather than for what it was4 ,it was not
 a cut-and-dried system leaving no room 
for individuality1 and that this was one
 of his strongest reasons for accepting 
it is shown by his asking again and     
again3 ,if this 7pragmatism7 is not     
truth1 what is8 ,he was attempting to   
find a theory--almost any theory1 one   
thinks sometimes--which would serve as  
an alternative to the older doctrines so
 incompatible with his temperament4  ,it
 is interesting to note that the        
frequent protests made by ,peirce       
against the turn given his ideas by his 

followers are always directed against   
the work of ,james and ,schiller1 and   
never1 so far as ,i have been able to   
ascertain1 against that of ,dewey4 ,it  
therefore seems worth while to undertake
 a direct comparison between the views  
of ,peirce and ,dewey4 ,this comparison1
 then1 occupies the latter part of the  
thesis1 with the result1 it may be said 
at once1 that ,dewey's work is found to 
be very closely related to the original 
formulation of pragmatism as made by    
,peirce4  ,the excellent historical     
sketches of pragmatism which have       
appeared during the last five years#a   
have been somewhat broader in scope than
 the present treatise1 for they have    
usually described the development of all
 the pragmatic doctrines in the mass    
while the emphasis here is placed on the
 intensive treatment of a single        
doctrine1 and this doctrine is followed1
 moreover1 through a limited number of  
its expounders4 ,further1 almost all    
such sketches are taken up for the most 

part in showing how pragmatism grew out 
of the older doctrines or in contrasting
 it with various alternative theories   
while the thing attempted here is1      
again1 a careful comparison of the views
 of three thinkers within the ,school   
itself--with of course the writer's own 
reaction to these views4 ,it has thus   
seemed best to undertake no 7necessarily
 fragmentary7 treatment of truth as     
'intuition' or 'coherence' or           
'correspondence' or the rest4      #a   
,see for example an article by ,alfred  
,lloyd on         ,conformity1          
,consistency1 and ,truth in the ,journal
 of         ,philosophy for ,may #bb1   
#aiac2 also ,boodin's ,truth and        
,reality1 ,caldwell's ,pragmatism and   
,idealism1 ,de ,laguna's                
,dogmatism and ,evolution1 ,murray's    
,pragmatism1 ,moore's                   
,pragmatism and ,its ,critics1 and      
others4  ,general criticism of the      
pragmatic theory of truth1 as is evident
 to anyone who has followed the         

controversy1 has been principally       
directed against the more 'radical'     
statements of ,james and ,schiller4     
,whether this is merely because these   
champions of the theory are more        
extreme1 or whether they are really more
 prone to errors in their reasoning1 we 
need not determine here4 ,but it is     
worth pointing out that1 on the other   
hand1 if ,peirce and ,dewey were to be  
taken as the truer representatives of   
pragmatism a large part of the flood of 
recent criticism would be irrelevant4   
,this is by no means to say that the    
work of ,peirce and ,dewey is above     
criticism2 it is merely to call         
attention to the fact that most of the  
criticism of pragmatism is directed     
against principles which these two men  
do not happen to hold4 ,an understanding
 of the doctrine in its more            
conservative terms1 however1 is         
certainly on the increase1 and we are   
seldom nowadays burdened with           
refutations of such alleged pragmatism  

as that anything is true which it is    
pleasant to believe or that any theory  
of procedure is true which happens to   
turn out well4     ,,chapter ,i4  ,,the 
,,pragmatic ,,doctrine ,,as ,,originally
 ,,proposed ,,by ,,peirce4   ,pragmatism
 has been described as an attitude of   
mind1 as a method of investigation1 and 
as a theory of truth4 ,the attitude is  
that of looking forward to outcomes     
rather than back to origins4 ,the method
 is the use of actual or possible       
outcomes of our ideas to determine these
 ideas' real meaning4 ,the theory of    
truth defines the truth of our beliefs  
in terms of the outcome of these        
beliefs4  ,pragmatism as a principle of 
method1 like the ,mendelian laws of     
heredity1 lay for decades in oblivion4  
,it was brought to light and to the     
world's notice in #ahih by ,william     
,james1 who by his wonderful literary   
style immediately gave it the widest    
currency4 ,the doctrine was originally  
proposed in #ahgh by ,c4 ,s4 ,peirce in 

a paper for the ,popular ,science       
,monthly entitled ,how ,to ,make ,our   
,ideas ,clear4 ,this article was the    
second of six on the general topic4     
,illustrations of the ,logic of         
,science4 ,the other articles of the    
series were respectively called ,the    
,fixation of ,belief1 ,the ,doctrine of 
,chances1 ,the ,probability of          
,induction1 ,the ,order of ,nature1 and 
,induction1 ,deduction1 and ,hypothesis4
  ,in the famous discussion of ,how ,to 
,make ,our ,ideas ,clear1 ,peirce       
pointed out that by a clear idea is     
meant1 according to the logicians1 one  
which will be recognized wherever it is 
met with1 so that no other will be      
mistaken for it4 ,but since to do this  
without exception is impossible to human
 beings1 and since to have such         
acquaintance with the idea as to have   
lost all hesitancy in recognizing it in 
ordinary cases amounts only to a        
subjective feeling of mastery which may 
be entirely mistaken1 they supplement   

the idea of 'clearness' with that of    
'distinctness'4 ,a distinct idea is     
defined as one that contains nothing    
which is not clear4 ,by the contents of 
an idea logicians understand whatever is
 contained in its definition1 so that an
 idea is distinctly apprehended1        
according to them1 when we can give a   
precise definition of it1 in abstract   
terms4 ,here the professional logicians 
leave the subject1 but it is easy to    
show that the doctrine that familiar use
 and abstract distinctness make the     
perfection of apprehension1 has its only
 true place in philosophies which have  
long been extinct1 and it is now time to
 formulate a method of attaining a more 
perfect clearness of thought such as we 
see and admire in the thinkers of our   
own time4  ,the action of thought is    
excited by the irritation of a doubt1   
and ceases when belief is attained2 so  
that the production of belief is the    
sole function of thought4 ,as thought   
appeases the irritation of a doubt1     

which is the motive for thinking1 it    
relaxes and comes to rest for a moment  
when belief is reached4 ,but belief is a
 rule for action1 and its application   
requires further thought and further    
doubt1 so that at the same time that it 
is a stopping place it is also a new    
starting place for thought4 ,the final  
upshot of thinking is the exercise of   
volition4  ,the essence of belief is the
 establishment of a habit1 and different
 beliefs are distinguished by the       
different modes of action to which they 
give rise4 ,if beliefs do not differ in 
this respect1 if they appease the same  
doubt by producing the same rule of     
action1 then no more differences in the 
manner of consciousness of them can make
 them different beliefs1 any more than  
playing a tune in different keys is     
playing a different tune4  ,imaginary   
distinctions are made very frequently1  
it is true1 between beliefs which differ
 only in their mode of expression4 ,such
 false distinctions do as much harm as  

the confusion of beliefs really         
different4 ,one singular deception of   
this sort1 which often occurs1 is to    
mistake the sensation produced by our   
own unclearness of thought for a        
character of the object we are thinking4
 ,instead of perceiving that the        
obscurity is purely subjective1 we fancy
 that we contemplate a quality of the   
object which is essentially mysterious2 
and if our conception be afterwards     
presented to us in a clear form we do   
not recognize it as the same1 owing to  
the absence of the feeling of           
unintelligibility4444 ,another such     
deception is to mistake a mere          
difference in the grammatical           
construction of two words for a         
distinction between the ideas they      
express4444 ,from all these sophisms we 
shall be perfectly safe so long as we   
reflect that the whole function of      
thought is to produce habits of action2 
and that whatever is connected with a   
thought1 but irrelevant to its purpose1 

is an accretion to it1 but no part of   
it4  ,to develop a meaning we have1     
therefore1 simply to determine what     
habits it produces1 for what a thing    
means is simply what habits it involves4
 ,now the identity of a habit depends on
 how it might lead us to act1 not merely
 under such circumstances as are likely 
to arise1 but under such as might       
possibly occur1 no matter how           
improbable4444 ,thus we come down to    
what is tangible and practical as the   
root of every real distinction of       
thought1 no matter how subtle it may be2
 and there is no distinction so fine as 
to consist in anything but a possible   
difference in practice4  ,as an example1
 consider the doctrine of               
transubstantiation4 ,are the elements of
 the sacrament flesh and blood 'only in 
a tropical sense' or are they literally 
just that8 ,now we have no conception of
 wine except what may enter into a      
belief either1 7#a7 that this1 that1 or 
the other is wine1 or 7#b7 that wine    

possesses certain properties4 ,such     
beliefs are nothing but                 
self-notifications that we should1 upon 
occasion1 act in regard to such things  
as we believe to be wine according to   
the qualities which we believe wine to  
possess4 ,the occasion of such action   
would be some sensible perception1 the  
motive of it to produce some sensible   
result4 ,thus our action has exclusive  
reference to what affects our senses1   
our habit has the same bearing as our   
action1 our belief the same as our      
habit1 our conception the same as our   
belief2 and we can consequently mean    
nothing by wine but what has certain    
effects1 direct or indirect1 upon the   
senses2 and to talk of something as     
having all the sensible characters of   
wine1 yet being in reality blood1 is    
senseless jargon4444 ,our idea of       
anything is our idea of its sensible    
effects2 and if we fancy that we have   
any other1 we deceive ourselves1 and    
mistake a mere sensation accompanying   

the thought for a part of the thought   
itself4  ,it appears1 then1 that the    
rule for attaining 444 clearness of     
apprehension is as follows3 ,consider   
what effects1 which might conceivably   
have practical bearings1 we conceive the
 object of our conception to have4      
,then1 our conception of these effects  
is the whole of our conception of the   
object4 7,italics mine74  ,an           
application of this method to a         
conception which particularly concerns  
logic occupies the last section of the  
article1--a use of the method to make   
clear our conception of reality4        
,considering clearness in the sense of  
familiarity1 no idea could be clearer   
than this1 for everyone uses it with    
perfect confidence4 ,clearness in the   
sense of definition is only slightly    
more difficult1--we may define the real 
as that whose characters are independent
 of what anybody may think them to be4  
,but however satisfactory this is as a  
definition1 it does not by any means    

make our idea of reality perfectly      
clear4 ,here1 then1 let us apply our    
rules4 ,according to them1 reality1 like
 every other quality1 consists in the   
peculiar sensible effects which things  
partaking of it produce4 ,the only      
effect which real things have is to     
cause belief1 for all the sensations    
which they excite emerge into           
consciousness in the form of beliefs4   
,the question therefore is1 how is true 
belief 7or belief in the real7          
distinguished from false belief 7belief 
in fiction74 ,briefly this may be       
answered by saying that the true belief 
is the one which will be arrived at     
after a complete examination of all the 
evidence4 ,that opinion which is fated  
to be ultimately agreed to by all who   
investigate1 is what we mean by the     
truth1 and the object represented in    
this opinion is the real4 7,note3 ,fate 
means merely that which is sure to come 
true1 and can nohow be avoided47 ,the   
real thus depends indeed upon what is   

ultimately thought about it1 but not    
upon what any particular person thinks  
about it4 ,this is clearly brought out  
in contrast to non-scientific           
investigation1 where personal equation  
counts for a great deal more4 ,it is    
hard to convince a follower of the a    
priori method by adducing facts2 but    
show him that an opinion that he is     
defending is inconsistent with what he  
has laid down elsewhere1 and he will be 
very apt to retract it4 ,these minds do 
not seem to believe that disputation is 
ever to cease2 they seem to think that  
the opinion which is natural for one man
 is not so for another1 and that belief 
will1 consequently1 never be settled4   
,in contenting themselves with fixing   
their own opinions by a method which    
would lead another man to a different   
result1 they betray their feeble hold   
upon the conception of what truth is4   
,on the other hand1 all the followers of
 science are fully persuaded that the   
processes of investigation1 if only     

pushed far enough1 will give one certain
 solution to every question to which    
they can be applied4 ,one man may       
investigate the velocity of light by    
studying the transits of ,venus and the 
aberration of the stars2 another by the 
opposition of ,mars and eclipses of     
,jupiter's satellites2 a third by the   
method of ,fizian4444 ,they may at first
 obtain different results1 but as each  
perfects his method and his processes1  
the results will move steadily together 
toward a destined center4 ,so with all  
scientific research4 ,different minds   
may set out with the most antagonistic  
views1 but the process of investigation 
carries them by a force outside of      
themselves to one and the same          
conclusion4 ,this conclusion1 to be     
sure1 may be long postponed1 and might  
indeed be preceded by a false belief    
which should be accepted universally4   
,but the opinion which would finally    
result from investigation does not      
depend on how anybody may actually      

think4444 ,the reality of that which is 
real does depend on the real fact that  
the investigation is destined to lead1  
at last1 if continued long enough1 to a 
belief in it4  ,it will be seen that    
this article does not intend to put     
forward any new theory of truth4 ,it is 
simply an attempt at expounding a new   
theory of clearness4 ,peirce desires to 
describe a new way of clearing up       
metaphysical disputes1 the method1      
namely1 of finding the meaning of each  
question by reducing it to its          
experimental consequences4  ,for ,peirce
 a doctrine could be perfectly clear and
 yet false4 ,this would be the case     
where one had a vivid idea of all the   
outcomes in experience involved by the  
idea1 but yet was unable to prophesy any
 outcome that should be verified by     
future fact4 ,our idea of the object    
would not in that case 'correspond to   
the reality' in the sense of giving us a
 belief which could be 'verified by all 
investigators'4  ,peirce1 then1 instead 

of having a radical and startling theory
 of truth to propose1 would consider    
himself an ultra-conservative on the    
question of what shall be called truth4 
,approaching the matter from the        
standpoint of a scientist1 7for he says 
in another connection that he had at    
this time spent most of his life in a   
laboratory71 he is concerned only with  
an attempt to apply the fruitful methods
 of science to the barren field of      
metaphysics4 ,for metaphysics seems to  
him very much in need of outside help4  
,his different conception of the two    
disciplines may be seen from the        
following passage4 ,in contrast to      
philosophy1 he is eulogizing the natural
 sciences1 where investigators1 instead 
of condemning each the work of the      
others as misdirected from beginning to 
end1 co-operate1 stand upon one         
another's shoulders1 and multiply       
incontestable results2 where every      
observation is repeated1 and isolated   
observations count for little2 where    

every hypothesis that merits attention  
is subjected to severe but fair         
examination1 and only after the         
predictions to which it leads have been 
remarkably borne out by experience is   
trusted at all1 and then only           
provisionally2 where a radically false  
step is rarely taken1 even the most     
faulty of those theories which gain     
credence being true in their main       
experiential predictions4  ,it is in a  
desire to elevate metaphysics to        
somewhere near this level that ,peirce  
proposes his new theory of clearness1   
believing that much of the useless      
disputation of philosophy1 as he sees   
it1 will end when we know exactly what  
we are talking about according to this  
test4  ,on the question of truth he     
might indeed have referred to another of
 his early articles1 where the same idea
 of the independence of truth from      
individual opinion is brought out4 ,the 
much-quoted paper on ,how ,to ,make ,our
 ,ideas ,clear was1 as we have noted1   

the second of a series called           
,illustrations of the ,logic of         
,science4 ,in order to get his doctrine 
of truth more adequately before us1 we  
may turn for a moment to the first      
article of the series1 the paper called 
,the ,fixation of ,belief4  ,here       
,peirce begins by pointing out four     
methods for fixing belief4 ,in the      
first1 or 'method of tenacity'1 one     
simply picks out the belief which for   
some reason he desires1 and holds to it 
by closing his eyes to all evidence     
pointing the other way4 ,the second1 or 
the 'method of authority'1 is the same  
except that the individual is replaced  
by the state4 ,the third1 or 'a priori  
method'1 makes a thing true when it is  
'agreeable to reason'4 ,but this sort of
 truth varies between persons1 for what 
is agreeable to reason is more or less a
 matter of taste4  ,in contrast with    
these1 and especially with the a priori 
method1 a method must be discovered     
which will determine truth entirely     

apart from individual opinion4 ,this is 
the method of science4 ,that is1 ,to    
satisfy our doubt 444 it is necessary   
that a method should be found by which  
our beliefs may be caused by nothing    
human1 but by some external             
permanency--by something upon which our 
thinking has no effect4444 ,it must be  
something which affects1 or might       
affect1 every man4 ,and1 though these   
affections are necessarily as various as
 are individual conditions1 yet the     
method must be such that the ultimate   
conclusion of every man shall be the    
same4 ,such is the method of science4   
,its fundamental hypothesis1 restated in
 more familiar language1 is this3 ,there
 are real things whose characters are   
entirely independent of our opinions    
about them2 those realities affect our  
senses according to regular laws1 and1  
though our sensations are as different  
as our relations to the objects1 yet1 by
 taking advantage of the laws of        
perception1 we can ascertain by         

reasoning how things really are1 and any
 man1 if he have sufficient experience1 
and reason enough about it1 will be led 
to one true conclusion4 ,the new        
conception here involved is that of     
reality4 ,it may be asked how ,i know   
that there are any realities4 ,if this  
hypothesis is the sole support of my    
method of inquiry1 my method of inquiry 
must not be used to support my          
hypothesis4 ,the reply is this3 #a4 ,if 
investigation cannot be regarded as     
proving that there are real things1 it  
at least does not lead to a contrary    
conclusion2 but the method and          
conception on which it is based remain  
ever in harmony4 ,no doubts of the      
method1 therefore1 arise with its       
practice1 as is the case with all the   
others4 #b4 ,the feeling which gives    
rise to any method of fixing belief is a
 dissatisfaction at two repugnant       
propositions4 ,but here already is a    
vague concession that there is some one 
thing to which a proposition should     

conform4444 ,nobody1 therefore1 can     
really doubt that there are realities1  
or1 if he did1 doubt would not be a     
source of dissatisfaction4 ,the         
hypothesis1 therefore1 is one which     
every mind admits4 ,so that the social  
impulse does not cause me to doubt it4  
#c4 ,everybody uses the scientific      
method about a great many things1 and   
only ceases to use it when he does not  
know how to apply it4 #d4 ,experience of
 the method has not led me to doubt it1 
but1 on the contrary1 scientific        
investigation has had the most wonderful
 triumphs in the way of settling        
opinion4 ,these afford the explanation  
of my not doubting the method or the    
hypothesis which it supposes4 7p4#ab7   
,the method of science1 therefore1 is   
procedure based on the hypothesis that  
there are realities independent of what 
we may think them to be4 ,this1 it      
seems1 is what ,peirce regards as the   
fundamental principle of the 'logic of  
science'4 ,this principle1 stated here  

in the first paper1 is again stated as  
we have seen1 towards the close of the  
second paper4 ,there he says again1 ,all
 the followers of science are fully     
persuaded that the processes of         
investigation1 if only pushed far       
enough1 will give one certain solution  
to every question to which they can be  
applied4444 ,different minds may set out
 with the most antagonistic views1 but  
the progress of investigation carries   
them by a force outside of themselves to
 one and the same conclusion4444 ,this  
great law is embodied in the conception 
of truth and reality4 ,that opinion     
which is fated to be ultimately agreed  
to by all who investigate1 is what we   
mean by truth1 and the object           
represented in this opinion is the real4
 ,this is the way ,i would explain      
reality4 7p4#cjj74  ,it is well at this 
point to call attention to a            
distinction4 ,it is to be noticed that  
in the first paper and in the latter    
part of the second he is talking of a   

method for attaining truth4 ,but in the 
body of the second paper he is talking  
of a method for attaining clearness4    
,these two should be kept distinct in   
our minds4 ,the use of the various      
methods described for finding the       
velocity of light were endeavors to find
 the truth1 not to make our ideas clear4
 ,clearness and truth ,peirce believes  
to have no invariable connection4 ,he   
says in ending the article on ,how ,to  
,make ,our ,ideas ,clear1 ,it is        
certainly important to know how to make 
our ideas clear1 but they may be ever so
 clear without being true4 7p4#cjb1     
italics mine47 ,there are1 then1 two    
methods under consideration3 the        
scientific method for reaching truth1   
with its postulate that there are       
independent realities1 and the logical  
method for securing clearness1 which as 
he has just stated1 has no necessary    
connection with truth4  ,now ,i should  
like to point out1 in criticism1 that   
these two methods cannot be used        

together1 or rather that the postulate  
of the 'scientific method' will not     
endure the test proposed by the 'method 
for clearness'4 ,the scientific method  
postulates a reality unaffected by our  
opinions about it4 ,but when we apply   
the method for clearness to this reality
 it seems to vanish4  ,the process is   
this3 ,peirce1 as we will remember1     
begins his discussion of the real by    
defining it as that whose characters are
 independent of what anybody may think  
them to be4 ,then passing on to apply   
his method for clearness he finds that  
reality1 like every other quality1      
consists in the peculiar sensible       
effects which things partaking of it    
produce1 and adds that the only effects 
which real things have is to cause      
belief1 for all the sensations which    
they excite emerge into consciousness in
 the form of beliefs4 ,reality is the   
sum of its sensible effects1 its        
sensible effects are beliefs1 so reality
 is a sum of beliefs4  ,now1 reality    

cannot be the sum of all beliefs        
regarding the real1 because reality is  
defined in another connection as the    
object represented by a true opinion1   
and a true opinion is that which is     
fated to be agreed to after an          
investigation is complete4 ,reality then
 can consist only in certain selected   
beliefs4 ,but if reality is this set of 
ultimately-adopted beliefs1 what is     
truth itself8 ,for truth has been       
defined as the beliefs which will be    
ultimately adopted4  ,in other words1   
when ,peirce applies his method for     
clearness to the concept of reality1 he 
reduces reality to truth4 ,he identifies
 the two4 ,then there remains no        
independent realty which stands as a    
check on truth4 ,and this was the       
postulate of his method of science4     
,since the application of his own method
 for clearness eliminates reality1 it   
looks as though ,peirce must abandon    
either this method or the postulate of  
science4 ,he cannot use both the method 

for clearness and the postulate of the  
method of science4  ,we must remember   
that ,peirce was a pioneer in this      
movement4 ,and in making the transition 
from the older form of thought1 he      
occasionally uses a word both in the old
 sense and in the new4 ,such would seem 
to be his difficulty with the word      
'reality'1 which he uses both in the    
newer sense which the method for        
clearness would show it to have1 and in 
the old orthodox sense of something     
absolute4 ,when he says reality 444     
consists of the peculiar sensible       
effects which things partaking of it    
produce1 he seems to have the two senses
 of the word in one sentence4 ,reality  
consists in sensible effects1 or it is  
that which is produced somehow by means 
of our senses4 ,but1 when things partake
 of reality1 reality exists in advance  
and produces those effects4 ,reality is 
conceived both as the things produced   
and as the producer of these things4  ,a
 somewhat similar difficulty occurs1 as 

,i may point out again in criticism1 in 
the use of the words 'meaning' and      
'belief'4 ,here the confusion is caused1
 not by using a word in two senses1 as  
in the case of 'reality'1 but by using  
both the words 'meaning' and 'belief' in
 the same sense4 ,peirce defines both   
'meaning' and 'belief' as a sum of      
habits1 and indicates no difference     
between them4  ,thus he says of meaning1
 ,there is no distinction of meaning so 
fine as to consist in anything but a    
possible difference in practice4 7#bic7 
,to develop its meaning1 we have1       
therefore1 simply to determine what     
habits it produces1 for what a thing    
means is simply what habits it involves4
 7p4 #bib74  ,but he says similarly of  
belief1 ,belief involves the            
establishment in our nature of a rule of
 action1 or1 say for short1 of a habit4 
,since belief is a rule for action1 it  
is a new starting point for thought4    
,the essence of belief is the           
establishment of a habit1 and different 

beliefs are distinguished by the        
different modes of action to which they 
give rise4 7p4 #bia74  ,now it will be  
agreed that instead of defining belief  
and meaning in terms of the same thing  
and thus identifying them1 we ought     
sharply to distinguish between them4 ,to
 have the meaning of a thing is not at  
all the same as to believe in it4 ,thus 
one may have clearly in mind the meaning
 of centaurs or of fairies or of any of 
the characters of mythology without in  
the slightest degree believing in them4 
,defining these things in terms of      
sensible effects1 we could say that we  
know their meaning in the sense that we 
understand which sensible effects would 
be involved if they did exist4 ,but to  
have a belief about them would mean that
 we would expect these sensible effects4
 ,in other words1 a belief involves the 
possibility of fulfillment or           
frustration of expectation4 ,to believe 
in anything is therefore a distinct step
 beyond understanding it4  ,in inserting

 these theories of reality and of belief
 in this discussion of a method for     
clear apprehension1 ,peirce is passing  
beyond a doctrine of clearness and      
involving himself in a doctrine of      
truth4 ,we have seen that he does not   
seem to be able to maintain the         
postulated reality underlying his       
description of the scientific method for
 attaining truth4 ,and it now seems that
 he is in equal difficulty with belief4 
,if meaning is simply a sum of habits1  
belief is not simply a sum of habits1   
for the two are not the same4 ,and if1  
as we have said1 the quality that       
distinguishes belief from meaning is the
 fact that it involves expectation1 then
 we appear to be on the verge of a new  
theory of truth1--a theory saying that  
truth is simply the fulfillment of these
 expectations4  ,such1 we may note1 is  
the interpretation that ,dewey puts upon
 the pragmatic method1--such is the     
theory of truth that he finds involved  
in it4  ,the interpretations of         

pragmatism which came particularly to   
the notice of ,peirce1 however1 were    
those made by ,james and ,schiller1 and 
against these1 we may say here1 he made 
vigorous protest4 ,these he regarded as 
perversions of his doctrine4 ,and he was
 so desirous of indicating that his own 
theory of clearness involved for himself
 no such developments as these1 that1 in
 order to make the distinctions clear1  
he renamed his own doctrine4  ,his first
 article of dissent1 appearing in ,the  
,monist in #aije1 was directed mainly1  
however1 against the looseness of       
popular usage4 ,he traces briefly the   
doctrine's growth4 ,referring back to   
his original statement in #ahgh1 he says
 of himself that he framed the theory   
that a conception1 that is1 the rational
 purpose of a word or other expression1 
lies exclusively in its conceivable     
bearing upon the conduct of life2 so    
that1 since obviously nothing that might
 not result from experiment can have any
 direct bearing upon conduct1 if one can

 define accurately all the conceivably  
experimental phenomena which the        
affirmation or denial of a concept could
 imply1 one will have therein a complete
 definition of the concept1 and there is
 absolutely nothing more in it4 ,for    
this doctrine he ,peirce1 now speaking  
of himself invented the name of         
pragmatism4444 ,his word 'pragmatism'   
has gained general recognition in a     
generalized sense that seems to argue   
power of growth and vitality4 ,the famed
 psychologist1 ,james1 first took it up1
 seeing that his 'radical empiricism'   
substantially answered to the writer's  
definition1 albeit with a certain       
difference in point of view4 ,next the  
admirably clear and brilliant thinker1  
,mr4 ,ferdinand ,c4 ,s4 ,schiller1      
casting about for a more attractive name
 for the 'anthropomorphism' of his      
,riddle of the ,sphinx1 lit1 in that    
most remarkable paper of his on ,axioms 
as ,postulates1 upon the designation    
'pragmatism'1 which in its original     

sense was in generic agreement with his 
own doctrine1 for which he has since    
found the more appropriate specification
 'humanism'1 while he still retains     
pragmatism in a somewhat wider sense4   
,so far all went happily4 ,but at       
present the word begins to be met with  
occasionally in the literary journals1  
where it gets abused in the merciless   
way that words have to expect when they 
fall into literary clutches4 ,sometimes 
the manners of the ,british have        
effloresced in scolding at the word as  
ill-chosen--ill-chosen1 that is1 to     
express some meaning that it was rather 
designed to exclude4 ,so1 then1 the     
writer1 finding his bantling            
'pragmatism' so promoted1 feels that it 
is time to kiss his child good-by and   
relinquish it in its higher destiny2    
while to serve the precise purpose of   
expressing the original definition1 he  
begs to announce the birth of the word  
'pragmaticism'1 which is ugly enough to 
be safe from kidnappers4 7pp4 #afe-f74  

,three years later ,peirce published an 
article of much more outspoken protest1 
this time including in his repudiation  
the professional philosophers as well as
 the popularists4 ,writing for the      
,hibbert ,journal 7v4#g7 he states his  
case as follows3  ,about forty years ago
 my studies of ,kant1 ,berkeley1 and    
others led me1 after convincing myself  
that all thinking is performed in signs1
 and that mediation takes the form of   
dialogue1 so that it is proper to speak 
of the 'meaning' of a concept1 to       
conclude that to acquire full mastery of
 that meaning it is requisite1 in the   
first place1 to learn to recognize that 
concept under every disguise1 through   
extensive familiarity with instances of 
it4 ,but this1 after all1 does not imply
 any true understanding of it2 so that  
it is further requisite that we should  
make an abstract logical analysis of it 
into its ultimate elements1 or as       
complete an analysis as we can compass4 
,but even so1 we may still be without   

any living comprehension of it2 and the 
only way to complete our knowledge of   
its nature is to discover and recognize 
just what habits of conduct a belief in 
the truth of the concept 7of any        
conceivable subject1 and under any      
conceivable circumstances7 would        
reasonably develop2 that is to say1 what
 habits would ultimately result from a  
sufficient consideration of such truth4 
,it is necessary to understand the word 
'conduct'1 here1 in the broadest sense4 
,if1 for example1 the predication of a  
given concept were to lead to our       
admitting that a given form of reasoning
 concerning the subject of which it was 
affirmed was valid1 when it would not   
otherwise be valid1 the recognition of  
that effect in our reasoning would      
decidedly be a habit of conduct4        
7p4#ajh74  ,after referring to his own  
expositions he continues1 444 ,but in   
#ahig ,professor ,james remodelled the  
matter1 and transmogrified it into a    
doctrine of philosophy1 some parts of   

which ,i highly approved1 while other   
and more prominent parts ,i regarded1   
and still regard1 as opposed to sound   
logic4 ,about the same time ,professor  
,papirie discovered1 to the delight of  
the ,pragmatist school1 that this       
doctrine was incapable of definition1   
which would certainly seem to           
distinguish it from every other doctrine
 in whatever branch of science1 ,i was  
coming to the conclusion that my poor   
little maxim should be called by another
 name2 and ,i accordingly1 in ,april    
#aije1 renamed it ,pragmaticism4        
7p4#aji74  ,my original essay1 having   
been written for a popular monthly1     
assumes1 for no better reason than that 
real inquiry cannot begin until a state 
of real doubt arises1 and ends as soon  
as a real ,belief is attained1 that a   
'settlement of belief'1 or in other     
words1 a state of satisfaction1 is all  
that ,truth1 or the aim of inquiry1     
consists in4 ,the reason ,i gave for    
this was so flimsy1 while the inference 

was so nearly the gist of ,pragmaticism1
 that ,i must confess the argument of   
that essay might be said with some      
justice to beg the question4 ,the first 
part of the essay is occupied1 however1 
with showing that1 if ,truth consists in
 satisfaction1 it cannot be any actual  
satisfaction1 but must be the           
satisfaction that would ultimately be   
found if the inquiry were pushed to its 
ultimate and indefeasible issue4 ,this1 
,i beg to point out1 is a very different
 position from that of ,mr4 ,schiller   
and the pragmatists of to-day4444 ,their
 avowedly undefinable position1 if it be
 not capable of logical                 
characterization1 seems to me to be     
characterized by an angry hatred of     
strict logic1 and even a disposition to 
rate any exact thought which interferes 
with their doctrine as all humbug4 ,at  
the same time it seems to me clear that 
their approximate acceptance of the     
,pragmaticistic principle1 and even that
 very casting aside of difficult        

distinctions 7although ,i cannot approve
 of it71 has helped them to a mightily  
clear discernment of some fundamental   
truths that other philosophers have seen
 but through a mist1 or most of them not
 at all4 ,among such truths1--all of    
them old1 of course1 yet acknowledged by
 few--,i reckon their denial of         
necessitarianism2 their rejection of any
 'consciousness' different from a       
visceral or other external sensation2   
their acknowledgment that there are1 in 
a ,pragmatistical sense1 ,real habits   
444 and their insistence upon           
interpreting all hypostatic abstractions
 in terms of what they would or might   
7not actually will7 come to in the      
concrete4 ,it seems to me a pity that   
they should allow a philosophy so       
instinct with life to become infected   
with seeds of death in such notions as  
that of the unreality of all ideas of   
infinity and that of the mutability of  
truth1 and in such confusions of thought
 as that of active willing 7willing to  

control thought1 to doubt1 and to weigh 
reasons7 with willing not to exert the  
will 7willing to believe74 7pp4#aaa1    
#aab74  ,the difference between the     
position of ,peirce and of ,james may be
 stated in another way as constituted by
 the fact that ,james introduces the    
factor of value as a criterion for      
meaning and for truth1 while for ,peirce
 these elements did not enter the       
question at all4 ,for ,james the value  
of a belief is an apparent evidence for 
its truth1 while for ,peirce value had  
no relation to truth4 ,for an account of
 this development of the pragmatic      
doctrine we pass on now to a discussion 
of ,james4     ,,chapter ,,ii4  ,,the   
,,interpretation ,,given ,,to           
,,pragmatism ,,by ,,james4   ,james     
first uses the term 'pragmatism'1 as    
,peirce had done1 to refer to a method  
for attaining clearness4 ,when1 in      
#ahih1 he brought again before the      
public the original article by ,peirce1 
he was simply expounding the ,peircian  

doctrine without making any attempt to  
pass beyond it4 ,but1 as we have just   
seen1 he later gave it a construction1  
an interpretation as a theory of truth1 
with which its originator could not     
agree4 ,in this chapter we may1         
therefore1 look first at his exposition 
of the doctrine of clearness1 and after 
that1 in order to understand ,james'    
development of the doctrine into a      
theory of truth1 we may turn back for a 
moment to some of his previous          
publications on the question of truth4  
,it will then be possible to trace      
chronologically his developing attitude 
toward the truth controversy4 ,from this
 we may pass finally to an indication of
 some of the difficulties in which he   
becomes involved4 ,the most important of
 these1 it may be said again1 is that he
 construes the test of truth of an idea 
to be1 not merely that the idea leads to
 expected consequences1 but that it     
leads to predominantly desirable        
consequences4 ,the outcomes which stand 

as evidence for truth are then not      
merely outcomes bringing fulfilled      
expectations but outcomes bringing      
happiness4   ,,james' ,,exposition ,,of 
,,peirce4  ,james in expounding the     
doctrine of ,peirce explains the        
pragmatic principle as a method of      
investigating philosophic controversies1
 reducing them to essentials 7clear     
meanings71 and selecting those worthy of
 discussion4#b ,suppose1 he says1 that  
there are two different philosophical   
definitions1 or propositions1 or maxims1
 or what not1 which seem to contradict  
each other1 and about which men dispute4
 ,if1 by assuming the truth of the one1 
you can foresee no practical consequence
 to anybody1 at any time or place1 which
 is different from what you would       
foresee if you assumed the truth of the 
other1 why then the difference between  
the two propositions is no real         
difference--it is only a specious and   
verbal difference1 unworthy of future   
contention4444 ,there can be no         

difference which does not make a        
difference--no difference in the        
abstract truth which does not express   
itself in a difference of concrete fact1
 and of conduct consequent upon that    
fact1 imposed upon somebody1 somehow1   
somewhere and somewhen4444 ,the whole   
function of philosophy ought to be to   
find out what definite difference it    
would make to you and me1 at definite   
instants of our life1 if this           
world-formula or that world-formula be  
the one which is true4 7p4#fge74      #b
 ,the ,pragmatic ,method1 ,university of
 ,california         ,chronicle #ahih4  
,reprinted in ,journal of ,philosophy1  
#aijd1         v4 #a1 p4 #fgc4 ,page    
references are to the latter4  ,this    
doctrine is illustrated by using it to  
secure the essence of two philosophical 
questions1 materialism vs4 theism and   
the one vs4 the many4 ,if we suppose for
 an instant1 he suggests1 that this     
moment is the last moment of the        
universe's existence1 there will be no  

difference between materialism and      
theism4 ,all the effects that might be  
ascribed to either have come about4     
,these facts are in1 are bagged1 are    
captured2 and the good that's in them is
 gained1 be the atom or be the ,god     
their cause4 7p4 #fgg74 ,the ,god1 if   
there1 has been doing just what the atom
 could do--appearing in the character of
 atoms1 so to speak1 and earning such   
gratitude as is due to atoms1 and no    
more4 ,future good or ill is ruled out  
by postulate4 ,taken thus               
retrospectively1 there could be no      
difference between materialism and      
theism4  ,but taken prospectively1 they 
point to wholly different consequences4 
,for1 according to the theory of        
mechanical evolution1 the laws of       
redistribution of matter and motion1    
though they are certainly to thank for  
all the good hours which our organisms  
have ever yielded us and all the ideals 
which our minds now frame1 are yet      
fatally certain to undo their work      

again1 and to redissolve everything that
 they have evolved4444 ,we make         
complaint of materialism for what it is 
not--not a permanent warrant for our    
more ideal interests1 not a fulfiller of
 our remotest hopes4444 ,materialism    
means simply the denial that the moral  
order is eternal1 and the cutting off of
 ultimate hopes2 theism means the       
affirmation of an eternal moral order   
and the letting loose of hope4 ,surely  
here is an issue genuine enough for     
anyone who feels it4444  ,and if there  
be a ,god1 it is not likely that he is  
confined solely to making differences in
 the world's latter end2 he probably    
makes differences all along its course4 
,now the principle of practicalism says 
that that very meaning of the conception
 of ,god lies in the differences which  
must be made in experience if the       
conception be true4 ,god's famous       
inventory of perfections1 as elaborated 
by dogmatic theology1 either means      
nothing1 says our principle1 or it      

implies certain definite things that we 
can feel and do at certain definite     
moments of our lives1 things that we    
could not feel and should not do were no
 ,god present and were the business of  
the universe carried on by material     
atoms instead4 ,so far as our           
conceptions of the ,deity involve no    
such experiences1 they are meaningless  
and verbal1--scholastic entities and    
abstractions1 as the positivists say1   
and fit objects for their scorn4 ,but so
 far as they do involve such definite   
experiences1 ,god means something for   
us1 and may be real4 7pp4#fgh-fhj74     
,the second illustration of the         
pragmatic principle--the supposed       
opposition between the ,one and the     
,many--may be treated more briefly4     
,james suggests certain definite and    
practical sets of results in which to   
define 'oneness'1 and tries out the     
conception to see whether this result or
 that is what oneness means4 ,he finds  
this method to clarify the difficulty   

here as well as in the previous case4   
,in summarizing he says3 ,i have little 
doubt myself that this old quarrel might
 be completely smoothed out to the      
satisfaction of all claimants1 if only  
the maxim of ,peirce were methodically  
followed here4 ,the current monism on   
the whole still keeps talking in too    
abstract a way4 ,it says that the world 
must either be pure disconnectedness1 no
 universe at all1 or absolute unity4 ,it
 insists that there is no stopping-place
 half-way4 ,any connection whatever1    
says this monism1 is only possible if   
there be still more connection1 until at
 last we are driven to admit the        
absolutely total connection required4   
,but this absolutely total connection   
either means nothing1 is the mere word  
'one' spelt long1 or else it means the  
sum of all the partial connections that 
can possibly be conceived4 ,i believe   
that when we thus attack the question1  
and set ourselves to search for these   
possible connections1 and conceive each 

in a definite and practical way1 the    
dispute is already in a fair way to be  
settled beyond the chance of            
misunderstanding1 by a compromise in    
which the ,many and the ,one both get   
their lawful rights4 7p4 #fhe74  ,in    
concluding1 ,james relates ,peirce to   
the ,english ,empiricists1 asserting    
that it was they who first introduced   
the custom of interpreting the meaning  
of conceptions by asking what           
differences they make for life4444 ,the 
great ,english way of investigating a   
conception is to ask yourself right off1
 ',what is it known as8 ,in what facts  
does it result8 ,what is its cash-value 
in terms of particular experience8 ,and 
what special difference would come into 
the world according as it were true or  
false8' ,thus does ,locke treat the     
conception of personal identity4 ,what  
you mean by it is just your chain of    
memories1 says he4444 ,so ,berkeley with
 his 'matter'4 ,the cash-value of matter
 is just our physical sensations4444    

,hume does the same thing with          
causation4 ,it is known as habitual     
antecedence4444 ,stewart and ,brown1    
,james ,mill1 ,john ,mill1 and ,bain1   
have followed more or less consistently 
the same method2 and ,shadworth ,hodgson
 has used it almost as explicitly as    
,mr4 ,peirce4444 ,the short-comings and 
negations and the baldnesses of the     
,english philosophers in question come1 
not from their eye to merely practical  
results1 but solely from their failure  
to track the practical results          
completely enough to see how far they   
extend4 7pp4 #fhe-f74         99        
99       99       99       99  ,it will 
be at once observed that ,james1 as well
 as ,peirce1 is at this point saying    
nothing about a new doctrine of truth1  
but is concerning himself only with a   
new doctrine of clearness4 ,meaning and 
clearness of meanings are his only      
topics in this paper4 ,thus he states1  
,the only meaning of the conception of  
,god lies in the differences which must 

be made in experience if the conception 
be true4 ,god's famous inventory of     
perfection 444 either means nothing1    
says our principle1 or it implies       
certain definite things that we can feel
 and do at certain definite moments in  
our lives4 ,and again in speaking of the
 pluralism-monism controversy1 ,any     
connection whatever1 says this monism1  
is only possible if there be still more 
connection1 until at last we are driven 
to admit the absolutely total connection
 required4 ,but this absolutely total   
connection either means nothing1 is the 
mere word 'one' spelt long1 or else it  
means the sum of all the partial        
connections4444  ,but as we all know1   
,james did afterward embrace the new    
pragmatic theory of truth4 ,while he did
 not in #ahih use the word pragmatism to
 designate anything except a new method 
for securing clearness1 yet it can be   
shown that he had been developing       
another line of thought1 since a much   
earlier date1 which did lead quite      

directly toward the pragmatic theory of 
truth4 ,it may be well at this point    
then to go back and trace the growth of 
this idea of truth through such writing 
as he had done before this time4 ,it    
will be found1 ,i think1 that ,james'   
whole philosophic tendency to move away 
from the transcendental and unitary     
toward the particular was influencing   
him towards this new conception4        
,,development ,,of ,,the ,,doctrine     
,,through ,,the ,,earlier ,,writings    
,,of ,,james4  ,the first article which 
,james wrote on truth1 as he later      
states1#c was entitled ,the ,function of
 ,cognition1 and was published in ,mind 
in #ahhe4 ,commenting on this article in
 #aiji he asserts that many of the      
essential theses of the book            
,pragmatism1 published twenty-two years 
later1 were already to be found here1   
and that the difference is mainly one of
 emphasis4#d      #c ,the ,meaning of   
,truth1 ,preface1 p4 viii4      #d      
,same1 p4 #acg4  ,this article attempts 

to give a description of knowing as it  
actually occurs1--not how it originated 
nor how it is antecedently possible4    
,the thesis is that an idea knows an    
external reality when it points to it1  
resembles it1 and is able to affect it4 
,the plan of exposition is to start with
 the simplest imaginable material and   
then gradually introduce additional     
matter as it is needed until we have    
cognition as it actually occurs4 ,james 
postulates a single1                    
momentarily-existing1 floating feeling  
as the entire content1 at the instant1  
of the universe4 ,what1 then1 can this  
momentary feeling know8 ,calling it a   
'feeling of q'1 it can be made any      
particular feeling 7fragrance1 pain1    
hardness7 that the reader likes4 ,we    
see1 first1 that the feeling cannot     
properly be said to know itself4 ,there 
is no inner duality of the knower on the
 one hand and content or known on the   
other4 ,if the content of the feeling   
occurs nowhere else in the universe     

outside of the feeling itself1 and      
perish with the feeling1 common usage   
refuses to call it a reality1 and brands
 it as a subjective feature of the      
feeling's constitution1 or at most as   
the feeling's dream4 ,for the feeling to
 be cognitive in the specific sense1    
then1 it must be self-transcendent4 ,and
 we must therefore create a reality     
outside of it to correspond to the      
intrinsic quality q4 ,this can stand as 
the first complication of that universe4
 ,agreeing that the feeling cannot be   
said to know itself1 under what         
conditions does it know the external    
reality8 ,james replies1 ,if the        
newly-created reality resemble the      
feeling's quality q1 ,i say that the    
feeling may be held by us to be         
cognizant of that reality4 ,it may be   
objected that a momentary feeling cannot
 properly know a thing because it has no
 time to become aware of any of the     
relations of the thing4 ,but this rules 
out only one of the kinds of knowledge1 

namely knowledge about the thing2       
knowledge as direct acquaintance        
remains4 ,we may then assert that if    
there be in the universe a q other than 
the q in the feeling the latter may have
 acquaintance with an entity ejective to
 itself2 an acquaintance moreover1      
which1 as mere acquaintance it would be 
hard to imagine susceptible either of   
improvement or increase1 being in its   
way complete2 and which would oblige us 
7so long as we refuse not to call       
acquaintance knowledge7 to say not only 
that the feeling is cognitive1 but that 
all qualities of feeling1 so long as    
there is anything outside of them which 
they resemble1 are feelings of qualities
 of existence1 and perceptions of       
outward fact4 ,but this would be true1  
as unexceptional rule1 only in our      
artificially simplified universe4 ,if   
there were a number of different q's for
 the feeling to resemble1 while it meant
 only one of them1 there would obviously
 be something more than resemblance in  

the case of the one which it did know4  
,this fact1 that resemblance is not     
enough in itself to constitute          
knowledge1 can be seen also from        
remembering that many feelings which do 
resemble each other closely1--e4 g41    
toothaches--do not on that account know 
each other4 ,really to know a thing1 a  
feeling must not only resemble the      
thing1 but must also be able to act on  
it4 ,in brief1 the feeling of q knows   
whatever reality it resembles1 and      
either directly or indirectly operates  
on4 ,if it resemble without operating1  
it is a dream2 if it operates without   
resembling1 it is an error4 ,such is the
 formula for perceptual knowledge4      
,concepts must be reduced to percepts1  
after which the same rule holds4 ,we may
 say1 to make the formula complete1 ,a  
percept knows whatever reality it       
directly or indirectly operates on and  
resembles2 a conceptual feeling1 or     
thought1 knows a reality1 whenever it   
actually or potentially terminates in a 

percept that operates on1 or resembles  
that reality1 or is otherwise connected 
with it or with its context4  ,the      
latter percept the one to which the     
concept has been reduced may be either  
sensation or sensorial idea2 and when ,i
 say the thought must terminate in such 
a percept1 ,i mean that it must         
ultimately be capable of leading up     
thereto1--by way of practical experience
 if the terminal feeling be a sensation2
 by way of logical or habitual          
suggestion1 if it be only an image in   
the mind4 ,these percepts1 these        
termini1 these sensible things1 these   
mere matters of acquaintance1 are the   
only realities we ever directly know1   
and the whole history of our thought is 
the history of our substitution of one  
of them for the other1 and the reduction
 of the substitute to the status of a   
conceptual sign4 ,condemned though they 
be by some thinkers1 these sensations   
are the mother-earth1 the anchorage1 the
 stable rock1 the first and last limits1

 the terminus a quo and the terminus ad 
quem of the mind4 ,to find such         
sensational termini should be our aim   
with all our higher thought4 ,they end  
discussion2 they destroy the false      
conceit of knowledge2 and without them  
we are all at sea with each other's     
meanings4444 ,we can never be sure we   
understand each other till we are able  
to bring the matter to this test4 ,this 
is why metaphysical discussions are so  
much like fighting with the air2 they   
have no practical issue of a sensational
 kind4 ,scientific theories1 on the     
other hand1 always terminate in definite
 percepts4 ,you can deduce a possible   
sensation from your theory and1 taking  
me into your laboratory prove that your 
theory is true of my world by giving me 
the sensation then and there4  ,at this 
point ,james quotes1 in substantiation1 
the following passage from ,peirce's    
article of #ahgh3 ,there is no          
distinction in meaning so fine as to    
consist in anything but a possible      

difference in practice4444 ,it appears1 
then1 that the rule for attaining the   
highest grade of clearness of           
apprehension is as follows3 ,consider   
what effects1 which might conceivably   
have practical bearings1 we conceive the
 object of our conception to have4 ,then
 our conception of these effects is the 
whole of our conception of the object4  
,in this early paper of ,james' are to  
be found foreshadowings of pragmatism   
both as a method and as a theory of     
truth4 ,pragmatism as a method is shown 
in the whole discussion of the primacy  
of sensations and of the necessity for  
reducing conceptions to perceptions4    
,this is exactly in line with the       
pragmatism proposed by ,peirce in #ahgh 
and here quoted from by ,james4         
,pragmatism as a theory of truth is     
anticipated by the proposal that the    
idea knows1 and knows truly1 the reality
 which it is able to make changes in4   
,the idea proves its reference to a     
given reality by making these specified 

changes4 ,it is antecedently true only  
if it can bring about these changes4    
,the next step is to say that its truth 
consists in its ability to forecast and 
bring to pass these changes4 ,then we   
have pragmatism as a theory of truth4   
,james did not take this step1 as we    
shall see1 until after #aijd4  ,there is
 also a suggestion of the 'subjectivity'
 of ,james' later theory of truth1 which
 would differentiate him even at this   
time from ,peirce on the question of    
truth4 ,he has said that a true idea    
must indeed resemble reality1 but who1  
he asks1 is to determine what is real8  
,he answers that an idea is true when it
 resembles something which ,i1 as       
critic1 think to be reality4 ,when the  
enquirer finds that the feeling that he 
is studying contemplates what he himself
 regards as a reality he must of course 
admit the feeling itself to be truly    
cognitive4 ,peirce would say that the   
idea is not true unless it points to a  
reality that would be found by all      

investigators1 quite irrespective of    
what the one person acting as critic may
 think4 ,james and ,pierce would        
therefore1 begin to diverge even at this
 early date on the truth question4 ,as  
to what constitutes clearness1 they are 
in agreement4  ,something of the same   
idea is stated again four years later in
 an article which appeared in ,mind#e   
and which was republished the following 
year as a chapter of the ,principles of 
,psychology4#f ,one passage will show   
the general trend2 ,a conception to     
prevail1 must terminate in a world of   
orderly experience4 ,a rare phenomenon1 
to displace frequent ones1 must belong  
with others more frequent still4 ,the   
history of science is strewn with wrecks
 and ruins of theory--essences and      
principles1 fluids and forces--once     
fondly clung to1 but found to hang      
together with no facts of sense4 ,the   
exceptional phenomena solicit our belief
 in vain until such time as we chance to
 conceive of them as of kinds already   

admitted to exist4 ,what science means  
by 'verification' is no more than this1 
that no object of conception shall be   
believed which sooner or later has not  
some permanent object of sensation for  
its term4444 ,sensible vividness or     
pungency is then the vital factor in    
reality when once the conflict between  
objects1 and the connecting of them     
together in the mind1 has begun4        
7,italics mine74      #e ,the           
,psychology of ,belief1 ,mind #ahhi1 v4 
#ad1 p4 #ca4      #f ,vol4 ,,ii1 chapter
 ,,xxi4  ,and in another connection he  
expresses the idea as follows3          
,conceptual systems which neither began 
nor left off in sensations would be like
 bridges without piers4 ,systems about  
fact must plunge themselves into        
sensations as bridges plunge themselves 
into the rock4 ,sensations are the      
stable rock1 the terminus a quo and the 
terminus ad quem of thought4 ,to find   
such termini is our aim with all our    
theories---to conceive first when and   

where a certain sensation may be had and
 then to have it4 ,finding it stops     
discussion4 ,failure to find it kills   
the false conceit of knowledge4 ,only   
when you deduce a possible sensation for
 me from your theory1 and give it to me 
when and where the theory requires1 do  
,i begin to be sure that your thought   
has anything to do with truth4 7#aa3g74 
,in #aijb ,james contributed to the     
,dictionary of ,philosophy and          
,psychology published by ,j4 ,mark      
,baldwin the following definition for   
,pragmatism4  ,the doctrine that the    
whole 'meaning' of a conception         
expresses itself in practical           
consequences1 consequences either in the
 shape of conduct to be recommended1 or 
in that of experience to be expected1 if
 the conception be true2 which          
consequences would be different if it   
were untrue1 and must be different from 
the consequences by which the meaning of
 other conceptions is in turn expressed4
 ,if a second conception should not     

appear to have either consequences1 then
 it must really be only the first       
conception under a different name4 ,in  
methodology it is certain that to trace 
and compare their respective            
consequences is an admirable way of     
establishing the different meanings of  
different conceptions4  ,it will be seem
 that ,james has not in #aijb           
differentiated between pragmatism as a  
method and as a theory of truth4        
,leaving out the one reference to truth1
 the definition is an excellent         
statement of the ,peircian doctrine of  
clearness4 ,this is especially to be    
noticed in the last two sentences1 which
 are perfectly 'orthodox' statements of 
method alone4  ,in #aijd and #aije      
,james published two papers in ,mind on 
the truth question4 ,the first1         
,humanism and ,truth1 may be called his 
'border-line' article4 ,in this he is   
attempting to give a sympathetic        
interpretation of the humanistic theory 
of truth--which he later said is exactly

 like his own--but is still making the  
interpretation as an outsider4 ,in the  
second article he has definitely        
embraced the humanistic theory and is   
defending it4  ,the first article begins
 as follows3#g ,receiving from the      
editor of ,mind an advance proof of ,mr4
 ,bradley's article for ,july on ',truth
 and ,practice'1 ,i understand this as a
 hint to me to join in the controversy  
over ',pragmatism' which seems to have  
seriously begun4 ,as my name has been   
coupled with the movement1 ,i deem it   
wise to take the hint1 the more so as in
 some quarters greater credit has been  
given me than ,i deserve1 and probably  
undeserved discredit in other quarters  
falls also to my lot4      #g ,mind1 ,n4
 ,s4 #ac1 p4 #deg4  ,first1 as to the   
word 'pragmatism'4 ,i myself have only  
used the term to indicate a method of   
carrying on abstract discussion4 ,the   
serious meaning of a concept1 says ,mr4 
,peirce1 lies in the concrete difference
 to someone which its being true will   

make4 ,strive to bring all debated      
questions to that 'pragmatic' test1 and 
you will escape vain wrangling3 if it   
can make no practical difference which  
of two statements be true1 then they are
 really one statement in two verbal     
forms2 if it can make no practical      
difference whether a given statement be 
true or false1 then the statement has no
 real meaning4 ,in neither case is there
 anything fit to quarrel about2 we may  
save our breath1 and pass to more       
important things4  ,all that the        
pragmatic method implies1 then1 is that 
truths should have practical            
consequences4 ,in ,england the word has 
been used more broadly1 to cover the    
notion that the truth of any statement  
consists in the consequences1 and       
particularly in their being good        
consequences4 ,here we get beyond       
affairs of method altogether2 and since 
this pragmatism and the wider pragmatism
 are so different1 and both are         
important enough to have different      

names1 ,i think that ,mr4 ,schiller's   
proposal to call the wider pragmatism by
 the name of ',humanism' is excellent   
and ought to be adopted4 ,the narrower  
pragmatism may still be spoken of as the
 'pragmatic method'4  ,if further       
egotism be in order4 ,i may say that the
 account of truth given by ,messrs4     
,sturt and ,schiller and by ,professor  
,dewey and his school 444 goes beyond   
any theorizing which ,i personally had  
ever indulged in until ,i read their    
writings4 ,after reading these1 ,i feel 
almost sure that these authors are right
 in their main contentions1 but the     
originality is wholly theirs1 and ,i can
 hardly recognize in my own humble      
doctrine that concepts are teleological 
instruments anything considerable enough
 to warrant my being called1 as ,i have 
been1 the 'father' of so important a    
movement forward in philosophy4#h       
7,italic mine74      #h ,this paragraph 
appears as a footnote4  ,i think that a 
decided effort at a sympathetic mental  

play with humanism is the provisional   
attitude to be recommended to the       
reader4  ,when ,i find myself playing   
sympathetically with humanism1 something
 like what follows is what ,i end by    
conceiving it to mean4 7,italics mine74 
,such is the conservative tone in which 
the article is begun4 ,yet before it is 
ended we find these passages3 ,it seems 
obvious that the pragmatic account of   
all this routine of phenomenal knowledge
 is accurate4 7p4#dfh74 ,the humanism1  
for instance1 which ,i see and try so   
hard to defend1 is the completest truth 
attained from my point of view up to    
date4 7p4#dgb74  ,in a supplementary    
article1 ,humanism and ,truth ,once     
,more1 published a few months later in  
answer to questions prompted by this    
one1 the acceptance of humanism is      
entirely definite4 ,and here ,james     
finds that he has been advocating the   
doctrine for several years4 ,he says1 ,i
 myself put forth on several occasions a
 radically pragmatist account of        

knowledge4 7,mind1 v4 #ad1 p4 #aif74    
,and again he remarks1 ,when following  
,schiller and ,dewey1 ,i define the true
 as that which gives the maximal        
combination of satisfaction 4444        
7p4#aif74   ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,truth 
,,in ',,pragmatism' ,,and ',,the        
,,meaning ,,of ,,truth'4  ,in #aijg when
 he published his book ,pragmatism1     
,james1 as we all know1 was willing to  
accept the new theory of truth          
unreservedly4 ,the hesitating on the    
margin1 the mere interpreting of other's
 views1 are things of the past4 ,from   
#aijg ,james' position toward pragmatism
 as a truth-theory is unequivocal4      
,throughout the book1 as ,i should like 
to point out1 ,james is using           
'pragmatism' in two senses1 and 'truth' 
in two senses4 ,the two meanings of     
pragmatism he recognizes himself1 and   
points out clearly the difference       
between pragmatism as a method for      
attaining clearness in our ideas and    
pragmatism as a theory of the truth or  

falsity of those ideas4 ,but the two    
meanings of 'truth' he does not         
distinguish4 ,and it is here that he    
differs from ,dewey1 as we shall        
presently see4 ,he differed from ,peirce
 on the question of the meaning of      
pragmatism--as to whether it could be   
developed to include a doctrine of truth
 as well as of clearness4 ,he differs   
from ,dewey on the question of          
'truth'--as to whether truth shall be   
used in both of the two specified senses
 or only in one of them4  ,the          
,ambiguity of ',satisfaction'--,the     
double meaning of truth in ,james'      
writing at this date may be indicated in
 this way3 ,while truth is to be defined
 in terms of satisfaction1 what is      
satisfaction8 ,does it mean that ,i am  
to be satisfied of a certain quality in 
the idea1 or that ,i am to be satisfied 
by it8 ,in other words1 is the criterion
 of truth the fact that the idea leads  
as it promised or is it the fact that   
its leading1 whether just as it promised

 or not1 is desirable8 ,which1 in short1
 are we to take as truth1--fulfilled    
expectations or value of results8  ,it  
is in failing to distinguish between    
these two that ,james involves himself1 
,i believe1 in most of his difficulties1
 and it is in the recognition and       
explicit indication of this difference  
that ,dewey differentiates himself from 
,james4 ,we may pass on to cite specific
 instances in which ,james uses each of 
these criteria4 ,we will find1 of       
course1 that there are passages which   
can be interpreted as meaning either    
value or fulfillment1 but there are many
 in which the use of value as a         
criterion seems unmistakable4  ,the     
following quotations may be instanced3  
,if theological views prove to have     
value for concrete life1 they will be   
true1 for pragmatism1 in the sense of   
being good for so much4 ,for how much   
more they are true1 will depend entirely
 on their relation to the other truths  
that have also to be acknowledged4 ,for 

example1 in so far as the ,absolute     
affords comfort1 it is not sterile2 it  
has that amount of value2 it performs a 
concrete function4 ,i myself ought to   
call the ,absolute true 'in so far      
forth'1 then2 and ,i unhesitatingly now 
do so4 7p4#gb74  ,on pragmatic          
principles1 if the hypothesis of ,god   
works satisfactorily in the widest sense
 of the word1 it is true4 ,now whatever 
its residual difficulties may be1       
experience shows that it certainly does 
work1 and that the problem is to build  
out and determine it so that it will    
combine satisfactorily with all the     
other working truths4 7p4 #bii74  ,the  
true is the name for whatever proves    
itself to be good in the way of belief1 
and good1 too1 for definite1 assignable 
reasons4 7p4 #gf74  ,empirical          
psychologists 444 have denied the soul1 
save as the name for verifiable         
cohesions in our inner life4 ,they      
redescend into the stream of experience 
with it1 and cash it into so much       

small-change value in the way of 'ideas'
 and their connections with each other4 
,the soul is good or 'true' for just so 
much1 but no more4 7p4 #ib1 italics     
mine74  ,since almost any object may    
some day become temporarily important1  
the advantage of having a stock of extra
 truths1 of ideas that shall be true of 
merely possible situations1 is          
obvious4444 ,whenever such extra truths 
become practically relevant to one of   
our emergencies1 it passes from cold    
storage to do work in the world and our 
belief in it grows active4 ,you can say 
of it then either that 'it is useful    
because it is true' or that it is 'true 
because it is useful'4 ,both these      
phrases mean exactly the same thing4444 
,from this simple cue pragmatism gets   
her general notion of truth as something
 essentially bound up with the way in   
which one moment in our experience may  
lead us towards other moments which it  
will be worth while to have been led to4
 ,primarily1 and on the common-sense    

level1 the truth of a state of mind     
means this function of a leading that is
 worth while4 7pp4 #bjd-bje1 italics    
mine74  ,to 'agree' in the widest sense 
with reality can only mean to be guided 
either straight up to it or into its    
surroundings1 or to be put into such    
working touch with it as to handle      
either it or something connected with it
 better than if we disagreed4 ,better   
either intellectually or practically6444
 ,an idea that helps us to deal1 whether
 practically or intellectually1 with    
either reality or its belongings1 that  
doesn't entangle our progress in        
frustrations1 that fits1 in fact1 and   
adapts our life to the reality's whole  
setting1 will----hold true of that      
reality4 7pp4 #bab-bac74  ',the true'1  
to put it very briefly1 is only the     
expedient in the way of our thinking1   
just as the 'right' is only the         
expedient in the way of our behaving4   
,expedient in almost any fashion2 and   
expedient in the long run and on the    

whole of course4 7p4 #bbb74  ,we may add
 a passage with the same bearing1 from  
,the ,meaning of ,truth4 ,in this       
quotation ,james is retracting the      
statement made in the ,university of    
,california ,address that without the   
future there is no difference between   
theism and materialism4 ,he says3 ,even 
if matter could do every outward thing  
that ,god does1 the idea of it would not
 work as satisfactorily1 because the    
chief call for a ,god on modern men's   
part is for a being who will inwardly   
recognize them and judge them           
sympathetically4 ,matter disappoints    
this craving of our ego1 and so ,god    
remains for most men the truer          
hypothesis1 and indeed remain so for    
definite pragmatic reasons4 7p4 #ahi1   
notes74  ,the contrast between          
'intellectual' and 'practical' seems to 
make his position certain4 ,if truth is 
tested by practical workings1 as        
contrasted with intellectual workings1  
it cannot be said to be limited to      

fulfilled expectation4  ,the statement  
that the soul is good or true shows the 
same thing4 ,the relation of truth to   
extraneous values is here beyond        
question4 ,the other passages all bear1 
more or less obviously1 in the same     
direction4  ,as ,james keeps restating  
his position1 there are many of the     
definitions that could be interpreted to
 mean either values or fulfillments1 and
 even a few which seem to refer to      
fulfillment alone4 ,the two following   
examples can be taken to mean either3   
',truth' in our ideas and beliefs means 
444 that ideas 7which themselves are but
 parts of our experience7 become true   
just in so far as they help us to get   
into satisfactory relation with other   
parts of our experience1 to summarize   
them and get about among them by        
conceptual short-cuts instead of        
following the interminable succession of
 particular phenomena4 ,any idea upon   
which we can ride1 so to speak2 any idea
 that will carry us prosperously from   

one part of our experience to any other 
part1 linking things satisfactorily1    
working securely1 simplifying1 saving   
labor1 is true for just so much1 true in
 so far forth1 true instrumentally4     
7p4#eh74  ,a new opinion counts as true 
just in proportion as it gratifies the  
individual's desire to assimilate the   
novel in his experience to his beliefs  
in stock4 ,it must both lean on old     
truth and grasp new fact2 and its       
success 444 in doing this1 is a matter  
for individual appreciation4 ,when old  
truth grows1 then1 by new truth's       
addition1 it is for subjective reasons4 
,we are in the process and obey the     
reasons4 ,the new idea is truest which  
performs most felicitously its function 
of satisfying this double urgency4 ,it  
makes itself true1 gets itself classed  
as true1 by the way it works4 7p4#fd74  
,but we can turn from these to a        
paragraph in which truth seems to be    
limited to fulfilled expectations alone4
  ,true ideas are those which we can    

assimilate1 validate1 corroborate1 and  
verify4 ,false ideas are those which we 
cannot4 ,that is the practical          
difference it makes to us to have true  
ideas2 that1 therefore1 is the meaning  
of truth1 for it is all that truth is   
known as4444  ,but what do validation   
and verification themselves             
pragmatically mean8 ,they again signify 
certain practical consequences of the   
verified and validated idea4444 ,they   
head us 444 through the acts and other  
ideas which they instigate1 into or up  
to1 or towards1 other parts of          
experience with which we feel all the   
while 444 that the original ideas remain
 in agreement4 ,the connections and     
transitions come to us from point to    
point as being progressive1 harmonious1 
satisfactory4 ,this function of         
agreeable leading is what we mean by an 
idea's verification4 7pp4#bja-bjb74     
,the ,relation of ,truth to             
,utility--,it seems certain from the    
foregoing that ,james means1 at least at

 certain times1 to define the true in   
terms of the valuable4 ,satisfaction he 
is using as satisfaction by rather than 
satisfaction of4 ,as we have pointed    
out1 one may be satisfied of the        
correctness of one's idea without being 
at all satisfied by it4 ,this           
distinction has been most clearly set   
forth by ,boodin1 in his discussion of  
',what pragmatism is not'1 in the       
following words3 ,the truth satisfaction
 may run counter to any moral or        
esthetic satisfaction in the particular 
case4 ,it may consist in the discovery  
that the friend we had backed had       
involved us in financial failure1 that  
the picture we had bought from the      
catalogue description is anything but   
beautiful4 ,but we are no longer        
uncertain as regards the truth4 ,our    
restlessness1 so far as that particular 
curiosity is concerned1 has come to an  
end4#i      #i ,boodin3 ,truth and      
,reality1 pp4 #aic-d4  ,it is clear     
then1 that the discovery of truth is not

 to be identified with a predominantly  
satisfactory state of mind at the       
moment4 ,our state of mind at the moment
 may have only a grain of satisfaction1 
yet this is of so unique a kind and so  
entirely distinguishable from the other 
contents of the mind that it is         
perfectly practicable as a criterion4   
,it is simply the cessation of the      
irritation of a doubt1 as ,peirce puts  
it1 or the feeling that my idea has led 
as it promised4 ,the feeling of         
fulfilled expectation is thus a very    
distinct and recognizable part of the   
whole general feeling commonly described
 as 'satisfaction'4 ,when 'utility' in  
our ideas1 therefore1 means a momentary 
feeling of dominant satisfaction1 truth 
cannot be identified with it4  ,and     
neither1 as ,i wish now to point out1   
can truth be identified with utility    
when utility means a long-run           
satisfactoriness1 or satisfactoriness of
 the idea for a considerable number of  
people through a considerable period of 

time4 ,the same objection arises here   
which we noted a moment ago--that the   
satisfaction may be quite indifferent to
 the special satisfaction arising from  
tests4 ,as has been often shown1 many   
ideas are satisfactory for a long period
 of time simply because they are not    
subjected to tests4 ,a hope is not a    
hope1 a fear is not a fear1 once either 
is recognized as unfounded4444 ,a       
delusion is delusion only so long as it 
is not known to be one4 ,a mistake can  
be built upon only so long as it is not 
suspected4  ,some actual delusions which
 were not readily subjected to tests    
have been long useful in this way4 ,for 
instance1 basing ourselves on ,lafcadio 
,hearn1 we might quite admit that the   
opinions summed up under the title      
',ancestor-,worship' had been 444       
'exactly what was required' by the      
former inhabitants of ,japan4 ,it was   
good for primitive man to believe that  
dead ancestors required to be fed and   
honored 444 because it induced savages  

to bring up their offspring instead of  
letting it perish4 ,but although it was 
useful to hold that opinion1 the opinion
 was false4 ,mankind has always wanted1 
perhaps always required1 and certainly  
made itself1 a stock of delusions and   
sophisms4#aj     #aj ,lee3 ,vital ,lies1
 vol4 #a1 pp4 #aa1 #ca1 #cc1 #gb4       
,perhaps we would all agree that the    
belief that ',god is on our side' has   
been useful to the tribe holding it4 ,if
 has increased zeal and fighting        
efficiency tremendously4 ,but since ,god
 can't be on both sides1 the belief of  
one party to the conflict is untrue1 no 
matter how useful4 ,to believe that     
7beneficial7 tribal customs are enforced
 by the tribal gods is useful1 but if   
the tribal gods are non-existent the    
belief is false4 ,the beautiful         
imaginings of poets are sometimes useful
 in minimizing and disguising the hard  
and ugly reality1 but when they will not
 test out they cannot be said because of
 their beauty or desirability to be     

true4  ,we must conclude then1 that some
 delusions are useful4 ,and we may go on
 and question ,james' identification of 
truth and utility from another point of 
view4 ,instead of agreeing that true    
ideas and useful ideas are the same1 we 
have shown that some useful ideas are   
false3 but the converse is also         
demonstrable1 that some true ideas are  
useless4  ,there are formulas in pure   
science which are of no use to anyone   
outside the science because their       
practical bearings1 if such there be1   
have not yet been discovered1 and are of
 no use to the scientist himself        
because1 themselves the products of     
deduction1 they as yet suggest nothing  
that can be developed farther from them4
 ,while these formulas may later be     
found useful in either of these         
senses--for 'practical demands' outside 
the science1 or as a means to something 
else within the science--they are now   
already true quite apart from utility1  
because they will test out by fulfilling

 expectations4  ,knowledge that is not  
useful is most striking in relation to  
'vice'4 ,one may have a true idea as to 
how to lie and cheat1 may know what     
cheating is and how it is done1 and yet 
involve both himself and others in most 
unsatisfactory consequences4 ,the person
 who is attempting to stop the use of   
liquor1 and who to this end has located 
in a 'dry' district1 may receive correct
 information as to the location of a    
'blind-tiger'--information which while  
true may bring about his downfall4      
,knowledge about any form of vice1 true 
knowledge that can be tested out1 may   
upon occasion be harmful to any extent  
we like4  ,we may conclude this section 
by citing a paragraph which will show   
the fallacious reasoning by which ,james
 came to identify the truth and the     
utility of ideas4 ,at one point in      
replying to a criticism he says3 ,i can 
conceive no other objective content to  
the notion of an ideally perfect truth  
than that of penetration into a         

completely satisfactory terminus1 nor   
can ,i conceive that the notion would   
ever have grown up1 or that true ideas  
would ever have been sorted out from    
false or idle ones1 save for the greater
 sum of satisfactions1 intellectual or  
practical1 which the truer ones brought 
with them4 ,can we imagine a man        
absolutely satisfied with an idea and   
with all his relations to his other     
ideas and to his sensible experiences1  
who should yet not take its content as a
 true account of reality8 ,the matter of
 the true is thus absolutely identical  
with the matter of the satisfactory4    
,you may put either word first in your  
way of talking2 but leave out that whole
 notion of satisfactory working or      
leading 7which is the essence of my     
pragmatic account7 and call truth a     
static1 logical relation1 independent   
even of possible leadings or            
satisfactions1 and it seems to me that  
you cut all ground from under you4      
7,meaning of ,truth1 p4 #afj74aa     #aa

 ,it is interesting to see that ,peirce 
had the         following comment to    
make in #ahgh upon the utility of truth4
         ,logicality in regard to       
practical matters is the most           
useful quality an animal can possess1   
and might1 therefore1         result    
from the action of natural selection2   
but outside of         these it is      
probably of more advantage to the animal
 to have         his mind filled with   
pleasing and encouraging visions1       
independently of their truth2 and thus  
upon impractical         subjects1      
natural selection might occasion a      
fallacious         tendency of thought4 
7,from the first article in the series  
,illustrations of the ,logic of         
,science1 ,popular ,science             
,monthly1 vol4 #ab1 p4 #c74  ,now it is 
to be observed that this paragraph      
contains at least three logical         
fallacies4 ,in the first sentence there 
is a false assumption1 namely that 'all 
that survives is valuable'4 ',then'1 we 

are given to understand1 'since true    
ideas survive1 they must be valuable'4  
,no biologist would agree to this major 
premise4 ',correlation' preserves many  
things that are not valuable1 as also do
 other factors4  ,in the second sentence
 there is an implied false conversion4  
,the second sentence says1 in substance1
 that all true ideas are satisfactory   
7valuable74 ,this is supposed to prove  
the assertion of the first sentence1    
namely1 that all satisfactory 7valuable7
 ideas are true4  ,in the last sentence 
there is a false disjunction4 ,truth1 it
 is stated1 must either be satisfactory 
7valuable7 working1 or a static logical 
relation4 ,we have tried to show that it
 may simply mean reliable working or    
working that leads as it promised4 ,this
 may be neither predominantly valuable  
working nor a static logical relation4  
,the ,relation of ,satisfaction to      
,agreement and ,consistency4--,james    
continually reasserts that he has       
'remained an epistemological realist'1  

that he has 'always postulated an       
independent reality'1 that ideas to be  
true must 'agree with reality'1 etc4#ab 
#ab ,for example1 in the ,meaning of    
,truth1 pages #aie and #bcc4  ,reality  
he defines most clearly as follows3     
',reality' is in general what truths    
have to take account of4444  ,the first 
part of reality from this point of view 
is the flux of our sensations4          
,sensations are forced upon us4444 ,over
 their nature1 order and quantity we    
have as good as no control4444  ,the    
second part of reality1 as something    
that our beliefs must also take account 
of1 is the relations that obtain between
 their copies in our minds4 ,this part  
falls into two sub-parts3 7#a7 the      
relations that are mutable and          
accidental1 as those of date and place2 
and 7#b7 those that are fixed and       
essential because they are grounded on  
the inner nature of their terms4 ,both  
sorts of relation are matters of        
immediate perception4 ,both are         

'facts'4444  ,the third part of reality1
 additional to these perceptions 7tho   
largely based upon them71 is the        
previous truths of which every new      
inquiry takes account4 7,pragmatism1 p4 
#bdd74  ,an idea's agreement with       
reality1 or better with all those parts 
of reality1 means a satisfactory        
relation of the idea to them4 ,relation 
to the sensational part of reality is   
found satisfactory when the idea leads  
to it without jar or discord4 444 ,what 
do the words verification and validation
 themselves pragmatically mean8 ,they   
again signify certain practical         
consequences of the verified and        
validated idea4 ,it is hard to find any 
one phrase that characterizes these     
consequences better than the ordinary   
agreement-formula--just such            
consequences being what we have in mind 
when we say that our ideas 'agree' with 
reality4 ,they lead us1 namely1 through 
the acts and other ideas which they     
instigate1 into and up to1 or towards1  

other parts of experience with which we 
feel all the while 444 that the original
 ideas remain in agreement4 ,the        
connections and transitions come to us  
from point to point as being            
progressive1 harmonious1 satisfactory4  
,this function of agreeable leading is  
what we mean by an idea's verification4 
7,pragmatism1 pp4 #bja-b74  ,an idea's  
relation to the other parts of reality  
is conceived more broadly4 ,thus        
pragmatism's only test of probable truth
 is what works best in the way of       
leading us1 what fits every part of life
 best and combines with the collectivity
 of life's demands1 nothing being       
omitted4 ,if theological ideas should do
 this1 if the notion of ,god1 in        
particular1 should prove to do it1 how  
could pragmatism possibly deny ,god's   
existence8 ,she could see no meaning in 
treating as 'not true' a notion that was
 pragmatically so successful4 ,what     
other kind of truth could there be1 for 
her1 than all this agreement with       

concrete reality8 7,pragmatism1 p4 #hj1 
italics mine74 ,agreement with reality  
here means ability to satisfy the sum of
 life's demands4  ,james considers that 
this leaves little room for license in  
the choice of our beliefs4 ,between the 
coercions of the sensible order and     
those of the ideal order1 our mind is   
thus wedged tightly4 ,our 7any7 theory  
must mediate between all previous truths
 and certain new experiences4 ,it must  
derange common sense and previous belief
 as little as possible1 and it must lead
 to some sensible terminus or other that
 can be verified exactly4 ,to 'work'    
means both these things2 and the squeeze
 is so tight that there is little loose 
play for any hypothesis4 ,our theories  
are thus wedged and controlled as       
nothing else is4 ,pent in1 as the       
pragmatist more than anyone else sees   
himself to be1 between the whole body of
 funded truths squeezed from the past   
and the coercions of the world of sense 
about him1 who so well as he feels the  

immense pressure of objective control   
under which our minds perform their     
operations4 7,pragmatism1 pp4 #baa1     
#bag1 #bcc74  ,now on the contrary it   
immediately occurs to a reader that if  
reality be simply what truths have to   
take account of1 and if                 
taking-account-of merely means agreeing 
in such a way as to satisfy the         
collectivity of life's demands1 then the
 proportion in which these parts of     
reality will count will vary enormously4
 ,one person may find the               
'previous-truths' part of reality to    
make such a strong 'demand' that he will
 disregard 'principles' or reasoning    
almost entirely4  ,another may disregard
 the 'sensational' part of reality1 and 
give no consideration whatever to       
'scientific' results4 ,these things1 in 
fact1 are exactly the things that do    
take place4 ,the opinionated person1 the
 crank1 the fanatic1 as well as the     
merely prejudiced1 all refuse to open   
their minds and give any particular     

consideration to such kinds of evidence4
 ,there is therefore a great deal of    
room for license1 and a great deal of   
license practiced1 when the agreement of
 our ideas with reality means nothing   
more than their satisfactoriness to our 
lives' demands4  ,how ,james fell into  
this error is shown1 ,i believe1 by his 
overestimation of the common man's      
regard for truth1 and especially for    
consistency4 ,thus he remarks3 ,as we   
humans are constituted in point of fact1
 we find that to believe in other men's 
minds1 in independent physical          
realities1 in past events1 in eternal   
logical relations1 is satisfactory4444  
,above all we find consistency          
satisfactory1 consistency between the   
present idea and the entire rest of our 
mental equipment4444 ,after man's       
interest in breathing freely1 the       
greatest of all his interests 7because  
it never fluctuates or remits1 as most  
of his physical interests do71 is his   
interest in consistency1 in feeling that

 what he now thinks goes with what he   
thinks on other occasions4 7,meaning of 
,truth1 pp4 #aib1 #baa74  ,the general  
method of ,james on this point1 then1 is
 to define truth in terms of            
satisfaction and then to try to show    
that these satisfactions cannot be      
secured illegitimately4 ,that is1 that  
we must defer to experimental findings1 
to consistency1 and to other checks on  
opinion4 ,consistency must be           
satisfactory because people are so      
constituted as to find it so4 ,agreement
 with reality1 where reality means      
epistemological reality1 is satisfactory
 for the same reason4 ,and agreement    
with reality1 where reality includes in 
addition principles and previous truths1
 must be satisfactory because agreement 
in this case merely means such          
taking-account-of as will satisfy the   
greater proportion of the demands of    
life4 ,in other words1 by defining      
agreement in this case in terms of      
satisfactions1 he makes it certain that 

agreement and satisfaction will coincide
 by the device of arguing in a circle4  
,it turns out that1 from over-anxiety to
 assure the coincidence of agreement and
 satisfaction1 he entirely loses the    
possibility of using reality and        
agreement with reality in the usual     
sense of checks on satisfactions4       
,,chapter ,,iii4  ,,the ,,pragmatic     
,,doctrine ,,as ,,set ,,forth ,,by      
,,dewey4   ,the position of ,dewey is   
best represented in his paper called    
,the ,experimental ,theory of           
,knowledge4#ac ,in the method of        
presentation1 this article is much like 
,james' account ,the ,function of       
,cognition4 ,both assume some simple    
type of consciousness and study it by   
gradually introducing more and more     
complexity4 ,in aim1 also1 the two are  
similar1 for the purpose of each is     
simply to describe4 ,dewey attempts here
 to tell of a knowing just as one       
describes any other object1 concern1 or 
event4 ,what we want1 he announces is   

just something which takes itself for   
knowledge1 rightly or wrongly4     #ac  
,mind1 ,n4 ,s4 #ae1 ,july #aijf4        
,reprinted in ,the ,influence         of
 ,darwin on ,philosophy and ,other      
,essays1 p4 #gg4         ,page          
references are to the latter4  ,let us  
suppose1 then1 that we have simply a    
floating odor4 ,if this odor starts     
changes that end in picking and enjoying
 a rose1 what sort of changes must these
 be to involve some where within their  
course that which we call knowledge8    
,now it can be shown1 first1 that there 
is a difference between knowing and mere
 presence in consciousness4 ,if the     
smell is simply displaced by a felt     
movement1 and this in turn is displaced 
by the enjoyment of the rose1 in such a 
way that there is no experience of      
connection between the three stages of  
the process1--that is1 without the      
appearance of memory or                 
anticipation1--then such an experience  
neither is1 in whole or in part1 a      

knowledge4 ,acquaintance is presence    
honored by an escort2 presence is       
introduced as familiar1 or an           
association springs up to greet it4     
,acquaintance always implies a little   
friendliness2 a trace of re-knowing1 of 
anticipatory welcome or dread of the    
trait to follow4444 ,to be a smell 7or  
anything else7 is one thing1 to be known
 as a smell1 another2 to be a 'feeling' 
is one thing1 to be known as a 'feeling'
 is another4 ,the first is thinghood2   
existence indubitable1 direct2 in this  
way all things are that are in          
'consciousness' at all4 ,the second is  
reflected being1 things indicating and  
calling for other things--something     
offering the possibility of truth and   
hence of falsity4 ,the first is genuine 
immediacy2 the second 7in the instance  
discussed7 a pseudo-immediacy1 which in 
the same breath that it proclaims its   
immediacy smuggles in another term 7and 
one which is unexperienced both in      
itself and in its relation7 the subject 

of 'consciousness'1 to which the        
immediate is related4444 ,to be         
acquainted with a thing is to be assured
 7from the standpoint of the experience 
itself7 that it is of such and such a   
character2 that it will behave1 if given
 an opportunity1 in such and such a way2
 that the obviously and flagrantly      
present trait is associated with fellow 
traits that will show themselves if the 
leading of the present trait is followed
 out4 ,to be acquainted is to anticipate
 to some extent1 on the basis of        
previous experience4 7pp4 #ha1 #hb74    
,besides mere existence1 there is       
another type of experience which is     
often confused with knowledge1--a type  
which ,dewey calls the 'cognitive' as   
distinct from genuine knowledge or the  
'cognitional'4 ,in this experience we   
retrospectively attribute intellectual  
force and function to the smell4 ,this  
involves memory but not anticipation4   
,as we look back from the enjoyment of  
the rose1 we can say that in a sense the

 odor meant the rose1 even though it led
 us here blindly4 ,that is1 if the odor 
suggests the finding of its cause1      
without specifying what the cause is1   
and if we then search about and find the
 rose1 we can say that the odor meant   
the rose in the sense that it actually  
led to the discovery of it4 ,yet the    
smell is not cognitional because it did 
not knowingly intend to mean this1 but  
is found1 after the event1 to have meant
 it4 7p4 #hd74  ,now1 before the        
category of confirmation or refutation  
can be introduced1 there must be        
something which means to mean something4
 ,let us therefore introduce a further  
complexity into the illustration4 ,let  
us suppose that the smell occurs at a   
later date1 and is then aware of        
something else which it means1 which it 
intends to effect by an operation       
incited by it and without which its own 
presence is abortive1 and1 so to say1   
unjustified1 senseless4 ,here we have   
something which is contemporaneously    

aware of meaning something beyond       
itself1 instead of having this meaning  
ascribed to it by another at a later    
period4 ,the odor knows the rose1 the   
rose is known by the odor1 and the      
import of each term is constituted by   
the relationship in which it stands to  
the other4 7p4 #hh74 ,this is the       
genuine 'cognitional' experience4  ,when
 the odor recurs 'cognitionally'1 both  
the odor and the rose are present in the
 same experience1 though both are not   
present in the same way4 ,things can be 
presented as absent1 just as they can be
 presented as hard or soft4 ,the        
enjoyment of the rose is present as     
going to be there in the same way that  
the odor is4 ,the situation is          
inherently an uneasy one--one in which  
everything hangs upon the performance of
 the operation indicated2 upon the      
adequacy of movement as a connecting    
link1 or real adjustment of the thing   
meaning and the thing meant4            
,generalizing from this instance1 we get

 the following definition3 ,an          
experience is a knowledge1 if in its    
quale there is an experienced           
distinction and connection of two       
elements of the following sort3 one     
means or intends the presence of the    
other in the same fashion in which it   
itself is already present1 while the    
other is that which1 while not present  
in the same fashion1 must become present
 if the meaning or intention of its     
companion or yoke-fellow is to be       
fulfilled through the operation it sets 
up4 7p4 #ij74  ,now in the              
transformation from this tensional      
situation into a harmonious situation1  
there is an experience either of        
fulfilment or disappointment4 ,if there 
is a disappointment of expectation1 this
 may throw one back in reflection upon  
the original situation4 ,the smell1 we  
may say1 seemed to mean a rose1 yet it  
did not in fact lead to a rose4 ,there  
is something else which enters in4 ,we  
then begin an investigation4 ,smells may

 become the object of knowledge4 ,they  
may take1 pro tempore1 the place which  
the rose formerly occupied4 ,one may1   
that is1 observe the cases in which the 
odors mean other things than just roses1
 may voluntarily produce new cases for  
the sake of further inspection2 and thus
 account for the cases where meanings   
had been falsified in the issue2        
discriminate more carefully the         
peculiarities of those meanings which   
the event verified1 and thus safeguard  
and bulwark to some extent the employing
 of similar meanings in the future4 7p4 
#ic74 ,when we reflect upon these       
fulfilments or refusals1 we find in them
 a quality quite lacking to them in     
their immediate occurrence as just      
fulfilments and disappointments1--the   
quality of affording assurance and      
correction4 ,truth and falsity are not  
properties of any experience or thing1  
in and of itself or in its first        
intention2 but of things where the      
problem of assurance consciously enters 

in4 ,truth and falsity present          
themselves as significant facts only in 
situations in which specific meanings   
and their already experienced           
fulfilments and non-fulfilments are     
intentionally compared and contrasted   
with reference to the question of the   
worth1 as to the reliability of meaning1
 of the given meaning or class of       
meanings4 ,like knowledge itself1 truth 
is an experienced relation of things1   
and it has no meaning outside of such   
relation4 7p4 #ie74  ,though this paper 
is by title a discussion of a theory of 
knowledge1 we may find in this last     
paragraph a very clear relating of the  
whole to a theory of truth4 ,if we      
attempt to differentiate in this article
 between knowledge and truth1 we find   
that while ,dewey uses 'knowledge' to   
refer either to the prospective or to   
the retrospective end of the            
experimental experience1 he evidently   
intends to limit truth to the           
retrospective or confirmatory end of the

 experience4 ,when he says1 ,truth and  
falsity are not properties of any       
experience or thing in and of itself or 
in its first intention1 but of things   
where the problem of assurance          
consciously enters in4 ,truth and       
falsity present themselves as           
significant facts only in situations in 
which specific meanings and their       
already experienced fulfilments are     
intentionally compared and contrasted   
with reference to the question of the   
worth1 as to reliability of meaning1 of 
the given meaning or class of meanings1 
it seems that truth is to be confined to
 retrospective experience4 ,the truth of
 an idea means that it allows one at its
 fulfilment to look back at its former  
meaning and think of it as now          
confirmed4 ,the difference between      
knowledge and truth is then a difference
 in the time at which the developing    
experience is examined4 ,if one takes   
the experience at the appearance of the 
knowing odor1 he gets acquaintance2 if  

one takes it at the stage at which it   
has developed into a confirmation1 he   
gets truth4 ,knowledge may be either    
stage of the experience of verification1
 but truth is confined to the later1    
confirmatory1 stage4  ,truth1 then1 is  
simply a matter of confirmation of      
prediction or of fulfilment of          
expectation4 ,an idea is made true by   
leading as it promised4 ,and an idea is 
made false when it leads to refutation  
of expectation4 ,there seems to be no   
necessity here for an absolute reality  
for the ideas to conform to1 or         
'correspond' to1 for truth is a certain 
kind of relation between the ideas      
themselves--the relation1 namely1 of    
leading to fulfilment of expectations4  
,,contrast ,,between ,,james ,,and      
,,dewey4  ,if1 now1 we wish to bring out
 the difference between the account of  
truth which we have just examined and   
the account that is given by ,james1 we 
will find the distinction quite evident4
 ,truth1 for ,dewey1 is that relation   

which arises when1 at an experience of  
fulfilment1 one looks back to the former
 experience and thinks of its leading as
 now confirmed4 ,an idea is true1       
therefore1 when we can refer back to it 
in this way and say1 ,that pointing led 
me to this experience1 as it said it    
would4 ,the pointing1 by bringing a     
fulfilment1 is made true--at this point 
of confirmation it becomes true4  ,since
 a true idea is defined1 then1 as one   
which leads as it promised1 it is       
obvious that truth will not be concerned
 in any way with incidental or          
accidental values which might be led to 
by the idea4 ,it has no relation to     
whether the goal is worth while being   
led to or not4 ,james speaks of truth as
 a leading that is worth while4 ,for    
,dewey the goal may be valuable1        
useless1 or even pernicious1--these are 
entirely irrelevant to truth1 which is  
determined solely by the fact that the  
idea leads as it promised4  ,the        
existence of this distinction was       

pointed out1 after the appearance of    
,james' ,pragmatism1 by ,dewey          
himself4#ad ,after a careful discussion 
of some other points of difference1 he  
says of this matter of the place of the 
value of an idea in reference to its    
truth3 ,we have the theory that ideas as
 ideas are always working hypotheses    
concerning attaining particular         
empirical results1 and are tentative    
programs 7or sketches of method7 for    
attaining them4 ,if we stick            
consistently to this notion of ideas1   
only consequences which are actually    
produced by the working of the idea in  
cooperation with1 or application to1    
prior realities are good consequences in
 the specific sense of good which is    
relevant to establishing the truth of an
 idea4 ,this is1 at times1 unequivocally
 recognized by ,mr4 ,james4444 ,but at  
other times any good that flows from    
acceptance of a belief is treated as if 
it were an evidence1 in so far1 of the  
truth of the idea4 ,this holds          

particularly when theological notions   
are under consideration4 ,light would be
 thrown upon how ,mr4 ,james conceives  
this matter by statements from him on   
such points as these3 ,if ideas         
terminate in good consequences1 but yet 
the goodness of the consequence was no  
part of the intention of the idea1 does 
the goodness have any verifying force8  
,if the goodness of consequences arises 
from the context of the idea rather than
 from the idea itself1 does it have any 
verifying force8 ,if an idea leads to   
consequences which are good in the one  
respect only of fulfilling the intent of
 the idea1 7as when one drinks a liquid 
to test the idea that it is a poison71  
does the badness of the consequences in 
every other respect detract from the    
verifying force of these consequences8  
#ad ,what ,does ,pragmatism ,mean by    
,practical81         ,journal of        
,philosophy1 etc41 #aijh1 v4 #e1 p4 #he4
  ,since ,mr4 ,james has referred to me 
as saying 'truth is what gives          

satisfaction' 7p4 #bcd71 ,i may remark  
444 that ,i never identified any        
satisfaction with the truth of an idea1 
save that satisfaction which arises when
 the idea as working hypothesis or      
tentative method is applied to prior    
existences in such a way as to fulfil   
what it intends4444  ,when he says 444  
of the idea of an absolute1 'so far as  
it affords such comfort it surely is not
 sterile1 it has that amount of value2  
it performs a concrete function4 ,as a  
good pragmatist ,i ought to call the    
absolute true in so far forth then2 and 
,i unhesitatingly now do so'1 the       
doctrine seems to be unambiguous3 that  
any good1 consequent upon acceptance of 
belief1 is1 in so far forth1 a warrant  
for truth4 ,of course ,mr4 ,james holds 
that this 'in so far' goes a very small 
way4444 ,but even the slightest         
concession1 is1 ,i think1 non-pragmatic 
unless the satisfaction is relevant to  
the idea as intent4 ,now the            
satisfaction in question comes not from 

the idea as idea1 but from its          
acceptance as true4 ,can a satisfaction 
dependent upon an assumption that an    
idea is already true be relevant to     
testing the truth of an idea8 ,and can  
an idea1 like that of the absolute1     
which1 if true1 'absolutely' precludes  
any appeal to consequences as test of   
truth1 be confirmed by use of the       
pragmatic test without sheer            
self-contradiction8#ae ,an explicit     
statement as to whether the carrying    
function1 the linking of things1 is     
satisfactory and prosperous and hence   
true in so far as it executes the intent
 of the idea2 or whether the            
satisfaction and prosperity reside in   
the material consequences on their own  
account and in that aspect make the idea
 true1 would1 ,i am sure1 locate the    
point at issue and economize and        
fructify future discussion4 ,at present 
pragmatism is accepted by those whose   
own notions are thoroughly rationalistic
 in make-up as a means of refurbishing1 

galvanizing1 and justifying those very  
notions4 ,it is rejected by             
non-rationalists 7empiricists and       
naturalistic idealists7 because it seems
 to them identified with the notion that
 pragmatism holds that the desirability 
of certain beliefs overrides the        
question of the meaning of the idea     
involved in them and the existence of   
objects denoted by them4 ,others 7like  
myself7 who believe thoroughly in       
pragmatism as a method of orientation as
 defined by ,mr4 ,james1 and who would  
apply the method to the determination of
 the meaning of objects1 the intent and 
worth of ideas as ideas1 and to the     
human and moral value of beliefs1 when  
these problems are carefully            
distinguished from one another1 do not  
know whether they are pragmatists or    
not1 because they are not sure whether  
the 'practical'1 in the sense of the    
desirable facts which define the worth  
of a belief1 is confused with the       
practical as an attitude imposed by     

objects1 and with the practical as a    
power and function of idea to effect    
changes in prior existences4 ,hence the 
importance of knowing what pragmatism   
means by practical4444     #ae ,the last
 four sentences appear in a footnote4   
,i would do ,mr4 ,james an injustice1   
however1 to stop here4 ,his real        
doctrine1 ,i think1 is that a belief is 
true when it satisfies both the personal
 needs and the requirements of objective
 things4 ,speaking of pragmatism1 he    
says1 ',her only test of probable truth 
is what works best in the way of leading
 us1 what fits every part of life best  
and combines with the collectivity of   
experience's demands1 nothing being     
omitted'4 ,and again1 ',that new idea is
 truest which performs most felicitously
 its function of satisfying our double  
urgency'4 7p4 #fd74 ,it does not appear 
certain from the context that this      
'double urgency' is that of the personal
 and the objective demands1 but it is   
probable4444 ,on this basis1 the 'in so 

far forth' of the truth of the absolute 
because of the comfort it supplies1     
means that one of the two conditions    
which need to be satisfied has been met1
 so that if the absolute met the other  
one also it would be quite true4 ,i have
 no doubt that this is ,mr4 ,james'     
meaning1 and it sufficiently safeguards 
him from charges that pragmatism means  
that anything that is agreeable is true4
 ,at the same time1 ,i do not think1 in 
logical strictness1 that satisfying one 
of two tests1 when satisfaction of both 
is required1 can be said to constitute a
 belief true even 'in so far forth'4    
,,chapter ,,iv4  ,,summary ,,and        
,,conclusion4   ,writing as a scientist 
and publishing his work in a scientific 
journal1 ,peirce proposed in #ahgh a new
 method for making our ideas clear4 ,he 
was attempting a description of the     
logic of the sciences4 ,he believed     
himself to be showing how the greatest  
of our modern thinkers do make clear to 
themselves their ideas of the objects   

with which they work4 ,the meaning of   
anything1 said ,peirce1 consists in the 
actual or possible effects which it     
might produce4 ,our idea of the thing is
 clear when we have in mind these       
sensible effects4 ,this theory of       
clearness he called pragmatism4  ,no    
one1 it seems1 paid any especial        
attention to this theory at the time4   
,but twenty years later ,james brought  
the subject to the forefront of         
discussion by explaining it anew in his 
exceptionally lucid way and by making a 
particular application of it to         
religion4 ,but for ,james the method for
 clearness very soon grew into a new    
theory of truth1 and in this way1 in    
spite of the fact that the method had   
been proposed by a scientist as a       
description of the procedure of science1
 he seems to have lost for it the       
support of science4 ,the reason for this
 outcome was his introduction of value  
as a criterion for truth4 ,this1 ,james 
recognizes1 was counter to all the      

scientific ideals of many of the workers
 in science1 for the essence of their   
procedure1 as they saw it1 was to put   
all desire as to outcomes behind them   
and to try to find out how things       
actually prove or test out to be1 quite 
apart from how we would like them to be4
 ,to introduce the general value of an  
outcome1 then1 as a criterion for truth1
 seems to destroy what the scientist had
 been thinking of as 'pure research'1   
and to involve control by an outside    
influence that would determine which    
things are or are not valuable and worth
 investigating4 ,it was sufficiently    
well known to the scientist that most of
 the greatest scientific discoveries    
were made by men who had no appreciation
 or interest in the general utility of  
the outcome1 and whose results were     
applied only much later and1 as it were1
 by accident4 ,to say1 then1 that the   
truth of an idea was influenced by its  
general value was to run afoul of all   
the sorely sensitive ideals which the   

scientist had acquired in his recent    
contest with the domination of the      
church4 ,it is hardly to be wondered at1
 therefore1 that the interpretation of  
pragmatism given by ,james was not      
popular with persons of a scientific    
temperament4  ,further1 if the value or 
desirability of an idea has an influence
 upon its truth1 then truth will vary   
from person to person1 for desirability 
varies with the taste of the person     
concerned4 ,peirce had warned against   
individual standards of truth in his    
discussion of the ,methods of ,fixing   
,belief4 ,the scientific conception1 as 
it had differentiated itself from other 
conceptions of truth1 had attempted to  
secure a kind of truth not determined by
 what we would like or by what can be   
made to seem desirable by oratory or by 
what can be made to win out over other  
opinions by skill in debate1 but by some
 criterion quite apart from desire and  
opinion4 ,peirce had attempted such a   
criterion in his postulate of an        

unchanging eternal reality4 ,instead1   
that is1 of consulting with each other1 
of debating with each other to find the 
truth1 we ought to consult this reality4
 ,in other words1 to undertake          
scientific experiment4 ,such had been   
,peirce's description of the scientific 
and modern method of attaining truth as 
contrasted1 as he says1 with that of the
 medievalists4  ,now the difficulty in  
,peirce's method1 as we have seen1 was  
that this postulate of an external      
reality unaffected by our opinions would
 not endure the test for clearness4     
,every object1 says ,peirce1 reduces to 
the sum of its effects4 ,the only effect
 of real things1 he says again1 is to   
produce belief4 ,from these two         
propositions it would seem to follow    
that reality is a sum of beliefs4 ,but  
this1 of course1 eliminates any         
unchanging reality independent of our   
opinions about it4  ,we saw further that
 ,peirce defined both belief and meaning
 as habit and made no distinction       

between them4 ,now as belief and meaning
 are obviously not the same1 we are in  
need of new definitions for these terms4
  ,at this point we turned to the       
interpretation of ,dewey4 ,for ,dewey   
the distinction would seem to be that   
while meaning may well be defined as    
habit1 belief is to be defined as       
expectation4 ,if we believe in anything1
 this means that we expect certain      
results from it4 ,to believe is to      
suppose that if we were to come into    
relation with the thing we would find   
certain effects to come about4  ,from   
this conception the ,deweyan theory of  
truth would seem to follow immediately4 
,if belief means a sum of expectations1 
the truth of a belief would mean the    
verification of these expectations4 ,a  
true belief simply means one that       
fulfils expectations4  ,the ,deweyan    
development of the pragmatic method is  
obviously very much more in harmony with
 the procedure of science than that of  
,james4 ,james seems to have 'left the  

track' in his interpretation of the     
pragmatic method when he related truth  
to the predominantly valuable4 ,truth we
 have found to have no necessary or     
invariable connection with general      
value1 for many ideas would be          
acknowledged to be perfectly true while 
at the same time being either useless or
 harmful4 ,for ,dewey this matter of    
value has no place in relation to the   
test of the truth of an idea1 for its   
truth means nothing more than its       
ability to lead as it promises4  ,we    
seem1 then1 it may be said in           
conclusion1 to be confronted with       
something like the following            
alternatives3  ,if we believe that      
,dewey could not have made a correct    
deduction from the pragmatic method when
 he developed it into a theory of truth 
making truth dependent upon fulfilled   
expectations alone1 then very obviously 
the next step in this investigation is  
to find the point at which his inference
 went wrong4 ,this means a              

re-examination of each step in his      
reasoning4  ,if we believe that ,dewey  
does make a correct deduction from the  
pragmatic method in this development    
toward truth1 then we are confronted    
with the alternative of either accepting
 the ,deweyan theory of truth or of     
rejecting the ,peircian theory of       
clearness4 ,that is1 if we begin with   
,peirce on method1 we must then go clear
 through to ,dewey on truth4 ,and if we 
reject ,dewey1 while believing that     
,peirce gave a correct description of   
the method of science1 then it seems    
that we must conclude that the method of
 science and the method of philosophy   
are not the same4     ,,bibliography    
,,the ,,works ,,of ,,charles ,,sanders  
,,peirce  #ahfe4 ,on an improvement of  
,boole's calculus of logic4 ,proc4 ,am4 
,acad4           ,arts and ,sci41 v4 #g1
 p4 #bej4  #ahfg4 ,logical ,papers4     
#ahfh4 ,questions concerning certain    
faculties claimed for man4 ,jour4       
,spec4 ,phil4 #b3ajc4        ,nominalism

 and realism4 ,jour4 ,spec4 ,phil4      
#b3eg4        ,on the meaning of        
'determined'4 ,jour4 ,spec4 ,phil4      
#b3aij4        ,some consequences of    
four incapacities4 ,jour4 ,spec4 ,phil4 
#b3adj4        ,grounds for the validity
 of the laws of logic4 ,jour4 ,spec4    
,phil4 #b3aic4  #ahga4 ,review and      
discussion of ,fraser's ,works of       
,berkeley4 ,no4 ,am4           ,rev4    
#aac3ddi4  #ahgh4 ,illustrations of the 
logic of science4         ,i--,the      
fixation of belief4 ,pop4 ,sci4 ,mo4    
#ab3a4         ,,ii--,how to make our   
ideas clear4 ,pop4 ,sci4 ,mo4 #ab3bhf4  
,,iii--,the doctrine of chances4 ,pop4  
,sci4 ,mo4 #ab3fjd4         ,,iv--,the  
probability of induction4 ,pop4 ,sci4   
,mo4 #ab3gje4  #ahgi4 ,illustrations of 
the logic of science4         ,v--,the  
order of nature4 ,pop4 ,sci4 ,mo4       
#ac3bjc4         ,,vi--,deduction1      
induction1 and hypothesis4 ,pop4 ,sci4  
,mo4 #ac3dgj4        ,la logique de la  
science4 ,rev4 ,philos4 #f3eec1 #g3ci4  

#ahhj4 ,on the algebra of logic4 ,am4   
,jour4 ,math4 #c3ae4 ,also1 ,rev4       
,philos4 #ab3fdf4  #ahhc4 7,editor7     
,studies in ,logic4  #ahhd4 ,numerical  
measure of success of predictions4      
,science #d3dec4        ,old stone mill 
at ,newport4 ,science #d3eab4  #ahhh4   
,logical machines4 ,am4 ,jour4 ,psy4    
#a3afe4  #ahij4 ,the architecture of    
theories4 ,monist #a3afa4  #ahia4 ,the  
doctrine of necessity examined4 ,monist 
#b3cba4        ,the law of mind4 ,monist
 #b3ecc4  #ahib4 ,man's glassy essence4 
,monist #c3a4        ,evolutionary love4
 ,monist #c3agf4        ,reply to the   
necessitarians4 ,monist #c3ebf4  #ahif4 
,the regenerated logic4 ,monist #g3ai4  
,the logic of relatives4 ,monist #g3afa4
  #aijj4 ,infinitesimals4 ,science      
#aa3dcj4        ,decennial celebration  
of ,clark ,university4 ,science #aa3fbj4
        ,century's great men of science4
 ,smithsonian ,institute ,reports1      
#aijj1 p4 #fgc4        ,annotations on  
the first three chapters of ,pearson's  

,grammar of           ,science4 ,pop4   
,sci4 ,mo4 #eh3bif4  #aija4 ,campanus4  
,science #ac3hji4  #aije4 ,what         
pragmatism is4 ,monist #ae3afa4         
,the issues of pragmaticism4 ,monist    
#ae3dha4  #aijf4 ,mr4 ,peterson's       
proposed discussion4 ,monist #af3adg4   
,prolegomena to an apology for          
pragmaticism4 ,monist #af3dib4  #aijh4  
,some amazing mazes4 ,monist #ah3bbg1   
#daf1 #ai3cf4        ,a neglected       
argument for the reality of ,god4 ,hib4 
,jour4 #g3ij4  #aiaj4 ,on               
non-,aristotelian logic4 ,monist        
#bj3aeh4   ,,the ,,works ,,of ,,william 
,,james  ,a ,list of the ,published     
,writings of ,william ,james will be    
found in the ,psychological ,review for 
,march #aiaa1 v4 #ah1 p4 #aeg4   ,,the  
,,works ,,of ,,john ,,dewey  ,on ,logic 
and ,metaphysics3  #ahhb4 ,the          
metaphysical assumptions of materialism4
 ,jour4 ,spec4           ,phil4 #af3bjh4
        ,the pantheism of ,spinoza4     
,jour4 ,spec4 ,phil4 #af3bdi4  #ahhc4   

,knowledge and the relativity of        
feeling4 ,jour4 ,spec4 ,phil4 #ag3ef4   
#ahhd4 ,kant and philosophic method4    
,jour4 ,spec4 ,phil4 #ah3afb4  #ahhf4   
,the psychological standpoint4 ,mind    
#aa3a4        ,psychology as philosophic
 method4 ,mind #aa3aec4  #ahhg4         
,illusory psychology4 ,mind #ab3hc4     
,knowledge as idealization4 ,mind       
#ab3chb4  #ahhh4 ,leibniz's ,new ,essays
 ,concerning ,human ,understanding4     
#ahij4 ,on some current conceptions of  
the term 'self'4 ,mind #ae3eh4  #ahia4  
,the present position of logical theory4
 ,monist #b3a4  #ahib4 ,the superstition
 of necessity4 ,monist #c3cfb4  #ahid4  
,the ego as cause4 ,phil4 ,rev4 #c3ccg4 
#ahie4 ,interest as ,related ,to ,will4 
#aijj4 ,some stages of logical thought4 
,phil4 ,rev4 #i3dfe4  #aijc4 ,logical   
,conditions of a ,scientific ,treatment 
of ,morality4        7,and others7      
,studies in ,logical ,theory4  #aijd4   
,notes upon logical topics4             
,i--,a classification of contemporary   

tendencies4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #a3eg4        
,,ii--,the meaning of the term idea4    
,jour4 ,phil4 #a3age4  #aije4 ,immediate
 empiricism4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #b3eig4      
,the knowledge experience and its       
relationships4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #b3feb4    
,the knowledge experience again4 ,jour4 
,phil4 #b3gjg4        ,the postulate of 
immediate empiricism4 ,jour4 ,phil4     
#b3cic4        ,the realism of          
pragmatism4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #b3cbd4       
#aijf4 ,reality as experience4 ,jour4   
,phil4 #c3bec4        ,the terms        
'conscious' and 'consciousness'4 ,jour4 
,phil4 #c3ci4        ,beliefs and       
realities4 ,phil4 ,rev4 #ae3aac4        
,experience and objective idealism4     
,phil4 ,rev4 #ae3dfe4        ,the       
experimental theory of knowledge4 ,mind 
#ae3bic4  #aijg4 ,the control of ideas  
by facts4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #d3aig1 #bec1   
#cji4        ,pure experience and       
reality3 a disclaimer4 ,phil4 ,rev4     
#af3dai4        ,reality and the        
criterion for truth of ideas4 ,mind     

#ae3cag4  #aijh4 ,what does pragmatism  
mean by practical8 ,jour4 ,phil4 #e3he4 
,logical character of ideas4 ,jour4     
,phil4 #e3cge4  #aiji4 ,objects1 data1  
and existence3 ,reply to ,professor     
,mc,gilvary4           ,jour4 ,phil4    
#f3ac4        ,dilemma of the           
intellectualistic theory of truth4      
,jour4 ,phil4 #f3dcc4        ,darwin's  
influence on philosophy4 ,pop4 ,sci4    
,mo4 #ge3ij4  #aiaj4 ,some implications 
of anti-intellectualism4 ,jour4 ,phil4  
#g3dgg4        ,short cuts to realism   
examined4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #g3eec4         
,valid knowledge and the subjectivity of
 experience4 ,jour4           ,phil4    
#g3afi4        ,science as              
subject-matter and as method4 ,science  
n4 s4 #ca3aba4        ,how ,we ,think4  
,influence of ,darwin on ,philosophy1   
and ,other ,essays4  #aiaa4 ,rejoinder  
to ,dr4 ,spaulding4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #h3gg4
        ,brief studies in realism4      
,jour4 ,phil4 #h3cic1 #edf4             
,joint discussion with ,dr4 ,spaulding4 

,jour4 ,phil4 #h3egd4  #aiab4 ,reply to 
,professor ,mc,gilvary's questions4     
,jour4 ,phil4 #i3ai4        ,in response
 to ,professor ,mc,gilvary4 ,jour4      
,phil4 #i3edd4        ,perception and   
organic action4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #i3fde4   
,reply to ,professor ,royce's critique  
of instrumentalism4 ,phil4              
,rev4 #ba3fi4   ,on ,psychology1        
,ethics1 ,education1 etc43  #ahij4      
,moral theory and practice4 ,int4 ,jour4
 ,ethics #a3ahf4  #ahia4 ,psychology4   
,outline of a ,critical ,theory of      
,ethics4  #ahib4 ,green's theory of the 
moral motive4 ,phil4 ,rev4 #a3eic4      
#ahic4 ,teaching ethics in high school4 
,ed4 ,rev4 #f3cac4                      
,self-realization as the moral ideal4   
,phil4 ,rev4 #b3feb4  #ahid4 ,the       
psychology of infant language4 ,psy4    
,rev4 #a3fc4        ,the theory of      
emotion4         ,i--,emotional         
attitudes4 ,psy4 ,rev4 #a3eec4  #ahie4  
,the theory of emotion4                 
,,ii--,the significance of the emotions4

 ,psy4 ,rev4 #b3ac4  #ahif4 ,the        
metaphysical method in ethics4 ,psy4    
,rev4 #c3aha        ,the reflex arc     
concept in psychology4 ,psy4 ,rev4      
#c3ceg4        ,influence of the high   
school upon educational methods4        
,ed4 ,rev4 #d3a4  #ahig4 ,the psychology
 of effort4 ,phil4 ,rev4 #f3dc4         
7,and ,j4 ,a4 ,mc,lellan7 ,psychology of
 ,number and its ,application to        
,methods of ,teaching ,arithmetic4      
,evolution and ethics4 ,monist #h3cba4  
,psychological aspects of school        
curriculums4 ,ed4 ,rev4 #ac3cef4  #ahih4
 ,some remarks on the psychology of     
number4 ,ped4 ,sem4 #e3dbf4        ,w4  
,t4 ,harris's ,psychological ,foundation
 of ,education4 ,ed4 ,rev4 #af3a4       
,social interpretations4 ,phil4 ,rev4   
#g3fca4  #aijj4 ,psychology and social  
practice4 ,psy4 ,rev4 #g3aje4  #aija4   
,psychology and ,social ,practice4      
,are the schools doing what the people  
want them to do8 ,ed4           ,rev4   
#ba3dei4        ,the situation as       

regards the course of study4 ,ed4 ,rev4 
#bb3bf4  #aijb4 ,the evolutionary method
 as applied to morality4                
,i--,its scientific necessity4 ,phil4   
,rev4 #aa3ajg4         ,,ii--,its       
significance for conduct4 ,phil4 ,rev4  
#aa3cec4        ,interpretation of the  
savage mind4 ,psy4 ,rev4 #i3bag4        
,academic freedom4 ,ed4 ,rev4 #bc3a4    
,problems in secondary education4 ,sch4 
,rev4 #ai3ac4        ,syllabus of       
courses4 ,el4 ,sch4 #gc3bjj4        ,the
 school as a social center4 ,el4 ,sch4  
#gc3efc4  #aijc4 ,emerson3 ,the         
philosopher of democracy4 ,int4 ,jour4  
,ethics #ac3dje4        ,shortening the 
years of elementary schooling4 ,sch4    
,rev4 #aa3ag4        ,the psychological 
and the logical in teaching geometry4   
,ed4           ,rev4 #be3chf4  #aijd4   
,the philosophical work of ,herbert     
,spencer4 ,phil4 ,rev4 #ac3aei4  #aijf4 
,culture and industry in education4 ,ed4
 ,bi-,monthly #a3a4        ,the         
,educational ,situation4  #aijg4 ,the   

life of reason4 ,ed4 ,rev4 #cd3aaf4     
#aijh4 7,and ,tufts7 ,ethics4           
,religion and our schools4 ,hib4 ,jour4 
#f3gif4  #aiji4 ,is nature good8 ,hib4  
,jour4 #g3hbg4        ,moral ,principles
 in ,education4  #aiaj4 ,how ,we ,think4
        ,william ,james4 ,jour4 ,phil4  
#g3eje4  #aiaa4 ,is coeducation         
injurious to girls8 ,ladies ,home ,jour4
 #bh3bb4        ,maeterlinck's          
philosophy of life4 ,hib4 ,jour4 #i3gfe4
  #aiac4 ,interest and ,effort in       
,education4        ,an undemocratic     
proposal4 ,vocational ,ed4 #b3cgd4      
,industrial education and democracy4    
,survey #bi3hgj4  #aiad4 ,report on the 
,fairhope experiment in organic         
education4           ,survey #cb3aii4   
,national policy of industrial          
education4 ,new ,republic1 v4 ,i4       
,nature and reason in law4 ,int4 ,jour4 
,eth4 #be3be4   ,,works ,,on ,,truth    
7,see also the list under               
',pragmatism'74  #afbd4 ,herbert de     
,clerbury1 ,e4--,de ,veritate ,prout    

,distinguitur a           ,revelatione1 
a ,possibiliti et a ,falso4  #afgd4     
,malbranche1 ,n4--,de la ,recherche de  
la ,verite4  #afij4 ,locke1 ,j4--,essay 
,concerning the ,human ,understanding4  
#aghj4 ,beattie1 ,james4--,an ,essay on 
the ,nature and ,immutability of ,truth4
  #agha4 ,kant1 ,im4--,kritik der reinen
 ,vernunft4  #ahjj4 ,kant1 ,im4--,logik4
  #ahaa4 ,fries1 ,j4--,system der       
,logik1 p4 #ddh ff4  #ahag4 ,hegel1     
,f4--,encyclopaedie4 ,sec4 #ba4  #ahbf4 
,hume1 ,d4--,treatise on ,human ,nature4
 iv1 sec4 #b4  #ahdj4 ,abercombie1      
,j4--,an ,inquiry ,concerning the       
,intellectual ,powers and           the 
,investigation of ,truth4  #ahdb4       
,thomson1 ,w4--,outlines of the         
,necessary ,laws of ,thought4  #ahed4   
,bailey1 ,s4--,essays on the ,pursuit of
 ,truth4  #ahfb4 ,tiberghien1           
,g4--,logique4 v4 #b1 pp4 #cbb-cee4     
#ahff4 ,hamilton1 ,sir ,wm4--,logic4    
,lectures #bh-ca4  #ahge4 ,forster1     
,w4--,wahrheit und ,wahrschleinlichkeit4

  #ahgg4 ,jevons1 ,w4 ,s4--,the         
,principles of ,science4 #bnd ed41 pp4  
#cgd-cif4  #ahgh4 ,schuppe1 ,w4--,logik4
 v4 #a1 pp4 #fbb-fif4  #ahhj4 ,wundt1   
,w4--,logik4  #ahhb4 ,bergmann1         
,j4--,die ,grundprobleme der ,logik4 p4 
#if;ff4  #ahhd4 ,schulbert-,soldern1 ,r4
 von4--,grundlagen einer                
,erkenntnisstheorie4           p4       
#aef;ff4  #ahhe4 ,royce1 ,j4--,the      
,religious ,aspect of ,philosophy4      
#ahhi4 ,argyle1 ,duke of--,what ,is     
,truth8        ,stephen1 ,l4--,on some  
kinds of necessary truth4 ,mind #ad3ej1 
#ahh4  #ahij4 ,carus1 ,paul--,the       
criterion of truth4 ,monist #a3bbi4     
#ahib4 ,rickert1 ,h4--,der ,gegenstand  
der ,erkenntniss4 ,freib4 pp4 #fc-fd4   
#ahic4 ,bradley1 ,f4 ,h4--,appearance   
and ,reality4 ,chapters #af1 #bd4       
,cousin1 ,victor--,lectures on the      
,true1 the ,beautiful1 and the ,good4   
,soyen1 ,shakn--,universality of truth4 
,monist #d3afa4        ,miller1 ,d4     
,s4--,the meaning of truth and error4   

,phil4 ,rev4 #b3djh4        ,smith1     
,w4--,certitude4 ,phil4 ,rev4 #b3ffe4   
#ahid4 ,gordy1 ,j4 ,p4--,the test of    
belief4 ,phil4 ,rev4 #c3beg4  #ahie4    
,jerusalem1 ,w4--,die ,urteilsfunction4 
p4 #ahe;ff4        ,bosanquet1          
,b4--,essentials of ,logic4 pp4 #fi-gi4 
,sigwart1 ,c4--,logic4 v4 #a1 pp4       
#bie-cbf4  #ahif4 ,hodder1 ,a4--,truth  
and the tests of truth4 ,phil4 ,rev4    
#e3a4        ,wundt1 ,w4--,ueber naiven 
und kritischen ,realismus4 ,phil4       
,studien #ab3ccb4  #ahig4 ,brochard1    
,victor--,de ,l',erreur4        ,jordan1
 ,d4 ,s4--,the stability of truth4 ,pop4
 ,sci4 ,mo4 #d3fdb1 #gdi4               
,struempell1 ,ludw4--,unterchiede der   
,wahrheiten und irrtuemer4 p4 #eh4      
#ahih4 ,baillie1 ,j4 ,b4--,truth and    
history4 ,mind #g3ejf4        ,powell1  
,j4 ,w4--,truth and ,error4  #ahii4     
,eisler1 ,w4--,woerterbuch der          
philosophischen ,begriffe4  #aijj4      
,sidgwick1 ,h4--,criteria of truth and  
error4 ,mind #i3h4  #aija4 ,creighton1  

,j4 ,e4--,methodology and truth4 ,phil4 
,rev4 #aj3djh4        ,french1 ,f4      
,c4--,the doctrine of the twofold truth4
 ,phil4           ,rev4 #aj3dgg4        
,royce1 ,j4--,the ,world and the        
,individual4        ,smyth1 ,j4--,truth 
and ,reality4  #aijb4 ,baldwin1 ,j4     
,m4--,development and ,evolution4       
,chapter #ag4        ,pritchett1 ,h4    
,s4--,what is truth8 ,outlook #gj3fbj4  
#aijc4 ,duprat1 ,guillaume ,l4--,le     
,mesonge4 ,etude de psycho-sociologie   
pathologique et normale4                
,pilate's ,what is truth4 ,catholic     
,world #gg3gje4  #aijd4 ,bradley1 ,f4   
,h4--,on truth and practice4 ,mind      
#ac3cji4        ,glasenapp1 ,g4 v4--,der
 ,wert der ,wahrheit4 ,zeitsch4 f4      
,philos4 u4           phil4 ,kr4        
#abc3ahf1 #abd3be4        ,rogers1 ,a4  
,k4--,james on humanism and truth4      
,jour4 ,phil4 #a3fic4  #aije4           
,alexander1 ,h4 ,b4--,phenomenalism and 
the problem of knowledge4               
,jour4 ,phil4 #b3ahb4        ,alexander1

 ,h4 ,b4--,quantity1 quality1 and the   
function of           knowledge4 ,jour4 
,phil4 #b3dei4        ,hyslop1 ,j4      
,h4--,problems of ,philosophy4 ,chapter 
#g4        ,joachim1 ,h4                
,h4--',absolute' and 'relative' truth4  
,mind #ad3a4        ,joseph1 ,h4 ,w4    
,b4--,professor ,james on 'humanism and 
truth'4           ,mind #ad3bh4         
,knox1 ,h4 ,v4--,mr4 ,bradley's absolute
 criterion4 ,mind #ad3baj4              
,overstreet1 ,h4 ,a4--,conceptual       
completeness and abstract truth4        
,phil4 ,rev4 #ad3cjh4        ,pitkin1   
,w4 ,b4--,psychology of eternal truths4 
,jour4 ,phil4 #b3ddi4        ,taylor1   
,a4 ,e4--,truth and practice4 ,phil4    
,rev4 #ad3bfe4  #aijf4 ,gore1           
,george--,scientific sketch of untruth4 
,monist #af3if4        ,russell1        
,b4--,the nature of truth4 ,mind        
#ae3ebh4        ,review of ,joachim's   
,the ,nature of ,truth4 ,nation #hc3db4 
,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4 ,s4---,the ambiguity 
of truth4 ,mind #ae3afa4                

,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4 ,s4--,joachim's ,the 
,nature of ,truth4 ,jour4               
,phil4 #c3edi4        ,taylor1 ,a4      
,e4--,truth and consequences4 ,mind     
#ae3ha4        ,openmindedness4         
,catholic ,world #hb3gef4  #aijh4       
,bakewell1 ,c4 ,m4--,on the meaning of  
truth4 ,phil4 ,rev4 #ag3egi4            
,creighton1 ,j4 ,e4--,the nature and    
criterion of truth4 ,phil4              
,rev4 #ag3eib4        ,gardiner1 ,h4    
,n4--,the problems of truth4 ,phil4     
,rev4 #ag3aac4        ,moore1 ,a4       
,w4--,truth value4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #e3dbi4
        ,prat1 ,j4 ,b4--,truth and      
ideas4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #e3abb4            
,urbana1 ,f4 ,m4--,on a supposed        
criterion of the absolute truth of      
some propositions4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #e3gja4
  #aiji4 ,bradley1 ,f4 ,h4--,on truth   
and coherence4 ,mind #ah3cbb4           
,bradley1 ,f4 ,h4--,coherence and       
contradiction4 ,mind #ah3dhi4           
,buckham1 ,j4 ,w4--,organization of     
truth4 ,int4 ,jour4 ,eth4 #bj3fc4       

,carritt1 ,e4 ,f4--,truth in art and    
religion4 ,hib4 ,jour4 #h3cfb4          
,knox1 ,h4 ,v4--,the evolution of truth4
 ,quarterly ,rev4 ,no4 #dai4  #aiaj4    
,alexander1 ,h4 ,b4--,truth and nature4 
,monist #bj3ehe4        ,boodin1 ,j4    
,e4--,the nature of truth4 ,phil4 ,rev4 
#ai3cie4        ,bradley1 ,f4 ,h4--,on  
appearance1 error1 and contradiction4   
,mind #ai3aec4        ,jacobson1        
,edmund--,relational account of truth4  
,jour4 ,phil4 #g3bec4        ,russell1  
,b4--,philosophical ,essays4 ,essays #e1
 #f1 #g4        ,schmidt1               
,karl--,hertz's theory of truth4 ,monist
 #bj3dde4        ,tsanoff1 ,r4          
,a4--,professor ,boodin on the nature of
 truth4 ,phil4           ,rev4 #ai3fcb4 
,plea for the half-truth4 ,atlantic     
#aje3egf4        ,truth as once for all 
delivered4 ,bib4 ,world #ce3bai4  #aiaa4
 ,alexander1 ,h4 ,b4--,goodness and     
beauty of truth4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #e3bi4   
,boodin1 ,j4 ,e4--,the divine five-fold 
truth4 ,monist #ba3bhh4        ,boodin1 

,j4 ,e4--,the nature of truth3 a reply4 
,phil4 ,rev4 #bj3ei4        ,boodin1 ,j4
 ,e4--,truth and ,reality4              
,bradley1 ,f4 ,f4--,on some aspects of  
truth4 ,mind #bj3cje4        ,carus1    
,paul--,truth on ,trial4                
,mc,gilvary1 ,e4 ,b4--,the 'fringe' of  
,william ,james's psychology as         
the basis of logic4 ,phil4 ,rev4        
#bj3acg4        ,rother1 ,a4            
,j4--,certitude4        ,royce1         
,j4--,william ,james1 and ,other        
,essays4        ,self-sufficiency of    
truth4 ,bib4 ,world #cg3adg4  #aiab4    
,fawcett1 ,e4 ,d4--,truth's 'original   
object'4 ,mind #ba3hi4        ,larson1  
,c4 ,d4--,what ,is ,truth8              
,leuba1 ,j4 ,h4--,religion and the      
discovery of truth4 ,jour4              
,phil4 #i3djf4        ,review of        
,jordan's ,stability of ,truth4 ,int4   
,jour4 ,eth4 #bc3ib4        ,zahlfeisch1
 ,johann--,ist die ,luege erlaubt8      
,archiv4 f4 system4           ,philos4  
#ah3bda4  #aiac4 ,alexander1            

,s4--,collective willing and truth4     
,mind #bb3ad1 #afa4        ,gerould1 ,k4
 ,f4--,boundarie of truth4 ,atlantic    
#aab3ded4        ,lloyd1 ,a4            
,h4--,conformity1 consistency1 and      
truth4 ,jour4           ,phil4 #aj3bha4 
,moore1 ,a4 ,w4--,the aviary theory of  
truth and error4 ,jour4           ,phil4
 #aj3edb4        ,wright1 ,w4           
,k4--,genesis of the categories4 ,jour4 
,phil4 #aj3fde4        ,wright1 ,h4     
,w4--,practical success as the criterion
 of truth4           ,phil4 ,rev4       
#bb3fjf4  #aiad4 ,bowman1 ,a4 ,a4--,the 
problem of knowledge from the standpoint
 of           validity4 ,phil4 ,rev4    
#bc3a1 #adf1 #bii4        ,bradley1 ,f4 
,h4--,essays on ,truth and ,reality4    
,broad1 ,c4 ,d4--,mr4 ,bradley on truth 
and reality4 ,mind #bc3cdi4             
,capron1 ,f4 ,h4--,anatomy of ,truth4   
,leighton1 ,j4 ,a4--,truth1 reality1 and
 relation4 ,phil4 ,rev4 #bc3ag4         
,rother1 ,a4 ,j4--,truth and ,error4    
,sidgwick1 ,a4--,truth and working4     

,mind #bc3ii4        ,strange1 ,e4      
,h4--,objectives1 truth1 and error4     
,mind #bc3dhi4   ,,works ,,on           
,,pragmatism  7,see also the list under 
',truth'74  #aijj4 ,caldwell1           
,w4--,pragmatism4 ,mind #i3dcc4  #aijb4 
,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4 ,s4--',useless'      
knowledge4 ,mind #aa3aif4               
,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4 ,s4--,axioms ,as     
,postulates4  #aijc4 ,king1             
,irving--,pragmatism as a philosophical 
method4 ,phil4           ,rev4 #ab3eaa4 
,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4 ,s4--,humanism3      
,philosophical ,essays4  #aijd4 ,bawden1
 ,heath--,what is pragmatism8 ,jour4    
,phil4 #a3dba4        ,creighton1 ,j4   
,e4--,purpose as a logical category4    
,phil4 ,rev4 #ac3bhd4        ,leighton1 
,j4 ,a4--,pragmatism4 ,jour4 ,phil4     
#a3adh4  #aije4 ,bode1 ,b4 ,h4--,pure   
experience and the external world4      
,jour4           ,phil4 #b3abh4         
,bode1 ,b4 ,h4--,the cognitive          
experience and its object4 ,jour4       
,phil4 #b3feh4        ,bode1 ,b4        

,h4--,the concept of pure experience4   
,phil4 ,rev4 #ad3fhd4        ,hoernle1  
,r4 ,f4 ,a4--,pragmatism versus         
absolutism4 ,mind #ad3big1 #dda4        
,king1 ,irving--,pragmatic              
interpretation of the ,christian dogma4 
,monist #ae3bdh4        ,moore1 ,a4     
,w4--,pragmatism and its critics4 ,phil4
 ,rev4 #ad3bhd4        ,schiller1 ,f4   
,c4 ,s4--,the definition of 'pragmatism'
 and           'humanism'4 ,mind        
#ad3bce4  #aijf4 ,bode1 ,b4             
,h4--,realism and pragmatism4 ,jour4    
,phil4 #c3cic4        ,colvin1 ,s4      
,s4--,pragmatism1 old and new4 ,monist  
#af3edg4        ,rogers1 ,a4            
,k4--,professor ,james' theory of       
knowledge4 ,phil4           ,rev4       
#ae3egg4        ,rousmaniere1 ,f4       
,h4--,a definition of experimentation4  
,jour4           ,phil4 #c3fgc4         
,russell1 ,j4 ,e4--,pragmatism's meaning
 of truth4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #c3eii4        
,russell1 ,j4 ,e4--,some difficulties   
with the epistemology of                

pragmatism and radical empiricism4      
,phil4 ,rev4 #ae3djf4        ,schiller1 
,f4 ,c4 ,s4--,pragmatism and            
pseudo-pragmatism4        ,sturt1       
,h4--,idola ,theatri1 a ,criticism of   
,oxford ,thought and           ,thinkers
 from the ,standpoint of ,personal      
,idealism4 ,mind #ae3cge4               
,vailati1 ,giovanni--,pragmatism and    
mathematical logic4 ,monist             
#af3dha4  #aijg4 ,brown1 ,w4            
,a4--,pragmatic value of the absolute4  
,jour4           ,phil4 #d3dei4         
,bush1 ,w4 ,t4--,papini on ,introduzione
 al prafmatismo4 ,jour4           ,phil4
 #d3fci4        ,foster1 ,g4            
,b4--,pragmatism and knowledge4 ,am4    
,jour4 ,theol4 #aa3eia4        ,moore1  
,a4 ,w4--,perry on pragmatism4 ,jour4   
,phil4 #d3efg4        ,nichols1         
,h4--,pragmatism versus science4 ,jour4 
,phil4 #d3abb4        ,papini1          
,g4--,what pragmatism is like4 ,pop4    
,sci4 ,mo4 #ga3cea4        ,perry1 ,r4  
,b4--,a review of pragmatism as a       

philosophical           generalization4 
,jour4 ,phil4 #d3dba4        ,perry1 ,r4
 ,b4--,a review of pragmatism as a      
theory of knowledge4           ,jour4   
,phil4 #d3cfe4        ,pratt1 ,j4       
,b4--,truth and its verification4 ,jour4
 ,phil4 #d3cbj4        ,review of       
,schiller's ,humanism4 ,nation #hd3dcf4 
,review of ,papini's ,tragico           
,quotidiano4 ,nation #he3eba4           
,reviews of ,james's ,pragmatism4       
,bookman #bf3bae4 ,no4 ,am4 #ahe3hhd4   
,science n4 s4 #bf3dfd4 ,nation #he3eg4 
,ind4 #fc3fcj4        ,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4
 ,s4--,the pragmatic babe in the woods4 
,jour4           ,phil4 #d3db4          
,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4 ,s4--,cure of doubt4 
,jour4 ,phil4 #d3bce4        ,schiller1 
,f4 ,c4 ,s4--,pragmatism versus         
skepticism4 ,jour4           ,phil4     
#d3dhb4        ,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4       
,s4--,studies in ,humanism4             
,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4 ,s4--,review of      
,james's ,pragmatism4 ,mind #af3eic4    
,sellars1 ,r4 ,w4--,dewey's view of     

agreement4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #d3dcb4        
,shorey1 ,p4--,equivocation of          
pragmatism4 ,dial #dc3bgc4              
,slosson1 ,e4 ,e4--,what is pragmatism8 
,ind4 #fb3dbb4        ,talbot1 ,ellen   
,b4--,the philosophy of ,fichte in its  
relation to           pragmatism4 ,phil4
 ,rev4 #af3dhh4        ,fascination of  
the pragmatic method4 ,cur4 ,lit4       
#dc3ahf4        ,a new philosophy4      
,harper's ,w4 #ea3abfd4        ,the     
newest philosophy4 ,cur4 ,lit4 #db3feb4 
,pragmatic philosophy4 ,ind4 #fb3gig4   
,pragmatism1 a new philosophy4 ,ed4     
,rev4 #cd3bbg4        ,where pragmatism 
fails4 ,cur4 ,lit4 #df3dae4  #aijh4     
,armstrong1 ,a4 ,c4--,evolution of      
pragmatism4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #e3fde4       
,bawden1 ,h4 ,h4--,new philosophy called
 pragmatism4 ,pop4 ,sci4           ,mo4 
#gc3fa4        ,bradley1 ,f4 ,h4--,on   
the ambiguity of pragmatism4 ,mind      
#ag3bbf4        ,burke1 ,j4             
,b4--,fashionable philosophy at ,oxford 
and ,harvard4 ,liv4           ,age      

#beg3eei4        ,bush1 ,w4             
,t4--,provisional and eternal truth4    
,jour4 ,phil4 #e3aha4        ,carus1    
,paul--,pragmatism4 ,monist #ah3cba4    
,hebert1 ,m4--,le ,pragmatisme4 ,etude  
de ses ,diverse ,formes4        ,hibben1
 ,j4 ,b4--,the test of pragmatism4      
,phil4 ,rev4 #ag3cfe4        ,lovejoy1  
,a4 ,o4--,thirteen pragmatisms4 ,jour4  
,phil4 #e3e1 #bi4        ,lovejoy1 ,a4  
,o4--,pragmatism and theology4 ,am4     
,jour4 ,theol4 #ab3aaf4                 
,mc,gilvary1 ,e4 ,b4--,british exponents
 of pragmatism4 ,hib4           ,jour4  
#f3fcb4        ,mc,taggart1 ,j4         
,e4--,review of ,james's ,pragmatism4   
,mind #ag3ajd4        ,salter1 ,w4      
,m4--,a4 new philosophy4 ,atlantic      
#aja3feg4        ,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4     
,s4--,is ,mr4 ,bradley a pragmatism8    
,mind #ag3cgj4        ,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4
 ,s4--,british exponents of pragmatism4 
,hib4           ,jour4 #f3ijc4          
,schinz1 ,a4--,dewey's pragmatism4      
,jour4 ,phil4 #e3fag4        ,sidgwick1 

,a4--,the ambiguity of pragmatism4 ,mind
 #ag3cfh4        ,strong1 ,a4           
,l4--,religious aspects of pragmatism4  
,am4 ,jour4           ,theol4 #ab3bca4  
,strong1 ,c4 ,a4--,pragmatism and its   
definition of truth4 ,jour4             
,phil4 #e3bef4        ,vialiti1 ,g4--,a 
pragmatic zoologist4 ,monist #ah3adb4   
#aiji4 ,agnew1 ,p4 ,g4--,what is        
pragmatism8 ,forum #da3gj4              
,carus1 ,paul--,a ,german critic of     
pragmatism4 ,monist #ai3acf4            
,carus1 ,paul--,a postscript on         
pragmatism4 ,monist #ai3he4             
,carus1 ,paul--,professor ,john ,hibben 
on 'the test of pragmatism'4            
,monist #ai3cai4        ,corrance1 ,h4  
,c4--,review of ,hebert's ,le           
,pragmatisme4 ,hib4           ,jour4    
#g3bah4        ,cox1 ,j4 ,w4--,concepts 
of truth and reality4 ,am4 ,cath4 ,q4   
#cd3aci4        ,huizinga1 ,a4 ,v4--,the
 ,american philosophy pragmatism4 ,bib4 
,sac4 #ff3gh4        ,kallen1 ,h4       
,m4--,affiliations of pragmatism4 ,jour4

 ,phil4 #f3fee4        ,kallen1 ,h4     
,m4--,dr4 ,montague and the pragmatic   
notion of value4           ,jour4 ,phil4
 #f3edi4        ,knox1 ,h4              
,v4--,pragmatism3 the evolution of      
truth4 ,quarterly           ,rev4       
#baj3cgi4        ,ladd1 ,g4 ,t4--,the   
confusion of pragmatism4 ,hib4 ,jour4   
#g3ghd4        ,mc,gilvary1 ,e4         
,b4--,british exponents of pragmatism   
7,a rejoinder74           ,hib4 ,jour4  
#g3ddc4        ,montague1 ,w4 ,p4--,the 
true1 the good1 and the beautiful from a
           pragmatic standpoint4 ,jour4 
,phil4 #f3bcc4        ,montague1 ,w4    
,p4--,may a realist be a pragmatist8    
,jour4           ,phil4 #f3dfj1 #dhe1   
#edc1 #eja4        ,moore1 ,a4          
,w4--,anti-pragmatisme4 ,jour4 ,phil4   
#f3bia4        ,moore1 ,t4              
,v4--,pragmatism of ,william ,james4    
,catholic ,world #ij3cda4        ,moore1
 ,a4 ,w4--,pragmatism and solipsism4    
,jour4 ,phil4 #f3cgh4        ,more1 ,p4 
,e4--,new stage of pragmatism4 ,nation  

#hh3def4        ,murray1 ,d4            
,l4--,pragmatic realism4 ,mind #ah3cgg4 
,pratt1 ,j4 ,b4--,what ,is ,pragmatism8 
,pratt1 ,j4 ,b4--,what is pragmatism8   
,am4 ,jour4 ,theol4 #ac3dgg4            
,schiller1 ,f4 ,c ,s4--,humanism and    
intuition4 ,mind #ah3abe4               
,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4 ,s4--,logic as       
psychology4 ,mind #ah3djj4              
,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4 ,s4--,humanism1      
intuitionism1 and objective             
reality4 ,mind #ah3egj4        ,schinz1 
,a4--,anti-pragmatisme4        ,schinz1 
,a4--,rousseau a forerunner of          
pragmatism4 ,monist #ai3dha4            
,schinz1 ,a4--,a few words in reply to  
,professor ,moore's criticism           
of ',anti-pragmatism'4 ,jour4 ,phil4    
#f3dcd4        ,shackleford1 ,t4        
,m4--,what pragmatism is1 as ,i         
understand it4           ,pop4 ,sci4    
,mo4 #ge3ega4        ,taylor1 ,a4       
,e4--,review of ,james's ,pluralistic   
,universe4           ,mind #ah3egf4     
,tausch1 ,edwin--,william ,james the    

pragmatist4 ,monist #ai3a4              
,origin of pragmatism4 ,nation #hh3ceh4 
,philosophy in the open4 ,bookman       
#bi3ffa4        ,pragmatism as a        
strangler of literature4 ,cur4 ,lit4    
#df3fcg4  #aiaj4 ,boodin1 ,j4           
,e4--,pragmatic realism4 ,monist        
#bj3fjb4        ,carus1                 
,paul--,pragmatist view of truth4       
,monist #bj3aci4        ,carus1         
,paul--,truth4 ,monist #bj3dha4         
,cockrell1 ,t4 ,d4 ,a4--,is pragmatism  
pragmatic8 ,dial #dh3dbb4        ,de    
,laguna1 ,t4--,dogmatism and ,evolution4
        ,fite1 ,w4--,o',sullivan's ,old 
,criticism and ,new ,pragmatism4 ,jour4 
,phil4 #g3dii4        ,gillespie1 ,c4   
,m4--,the truth of ,protagoras4 ,mind   
#ai3dgj4        ,jacoby1 ,gunther--,der 
,pragmatismus4        ,kallen1 ,h4      
,m4--,james1 ,bergson1 and ,mr4 ,pitkin4
 ,jour4           ,phil4 #g3cec4        
,lee1 ,v4--,two pragmatisms4 ,no4 ,am4  
#aib3ddi4        ,lloyd1 ,a4            
,h4--,possible idealism of a pluralist4 

,am4 ,jour4           ,theol4 #ad3djf4  
,macintosh1 ,d4 ,c4--,pragmatic element 
in the teaching of ,paul4 ,am4          
,jour4 ,theol4 #ac3cfa4                 
,mc,giffert1 ,a4 ,c4--,the pragmatism of
 ,kant4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #g3aig4           
,miller1 ,d4 ,s4--,some of the          
tendencies of ,professor ,james's work4 
,jour4 ,phil4 #g3fde4        ,moore1 ,a4
 ,w4--,pragmatism and ,its ,critics4    
,moore1 ,a4 ,w4--,how ideas work4 ,jour4
 ,phil4 #g3fag4        ,o',sullivan1 ,j4
 ,m4--,old ,criticism and ,new          
,pragmatism4        ,russell1           
,b4--,philosophical ,essays4 ,chapters  
#d1 #f4        ,reviews of ,james's     
,meaning of ,truth4 ,nation #ij3hh4     
,hib4 ,jour4           #h3ijd4 ,ed4     
,rev4 #dj3bja4        ,russell1 ,j4     
,e4--,review of ,james's ,meaning of    
,truth4 ,jour4           ,phil4 #g3bb4  
,schinz1 ,a4--,anti-pragmatism4         
,shackelford1 ,t4 ,m4--,what is         
pragmatism8 ,sci4 ,am4 ,s4 #gj3gh4      
,sidgwick1 ,a4--,the ,application of    

,logic4        ,stettheimer1            
,e4--,rowland's ,right ,to ,believe4    
,jour4 ,phil4 #g3ccj4        ,walker1   
,l4 ,j4--,theory of ,knowledge3         
,absolutism1 ,pragmatism1 and           
,realism4  #aiaa4 ,brown1 ,h4 ,c4--,de  
,laguna's ,dogmatism and ,evolution4    
,jour4           ,phil4 #h3eef4         
,cockerell1 ,t4 ,d4 ,a4--,reality and   
truth4 ,pop4 ,sci4 ,mo4 #gh3cga4        
,eastman1 ,max--,dewey's ,how ,we       
,think4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #h3bdd4           
,fawcett1 ,e4 ,d4--,a note on           
pragmatism4 ,mind #bj3cii4              
,jacks1 ,l4 ,p4--,william ,james and his
 message4 ,contemp4 ,rev4 #ii3bj4       
,kallen1 ,h4 ,m4--,boutroux's ,william  
,james4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #h3ehc4           
,kallen1 ,h4 ,m4--,pragmatism and its   
'principles'4 ,jour4 ,phil4 #h3fag4     
,more1 ,p4 ,e4--,the ,pragmatism of     
,william ,james4        ,patten1 ,s4    
,n4--,pragmatism and social science4    
,jour4 ,phil4 #h3fec4        ,pratt1 ,j4
 ,b4--,the religious philosophy of      

,william ,james4 ,hib4           ,jour4 
#aj3bbe4        ,riley1 ,i4             
,w4--,continental critics of pragmatism4
 ,jour4           ,phil4 #h3bbe1 #bhi4  
,russell1 ,j4 ,e4--,truth as value and  
the value of truth4 ,mind #bj3ech4      
,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4 ,s4--,article        
'pragmatism' in ,encyclopedia           
,brittanica4        ,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4  
,s4--,review of ,james's ,some ,problems
 of           ,philosophy4 ,mind        
#bj3ega4        ,turner1                
,w4--,pragmatism3 what does it mean8    
,cath4 ,world #id3agh4        ,vibbert1 
,c4 ,b4--,moore's ,pragmatism and its   
,critics4 ,jour4           ,phil4       
#h3dfh4  #aiab4 ,berkeley1 ,h4--,the    
kernel of pragmatism4 ,mind #ba3hd4     
,ceulemans1 ,j4 ,b4--,metaphysics of    
pragmatism4 ,am4 ,cath4 ,q4 #cg3caj4    
,jacoby1 ,gunther--,bergson1 pragmatism1
 and ,schopenhauer4           ,monist   
#bb3eic4        ,kallen1 ,h4            
,m4--,royce's ,william ,james4 ,jour4   
,phil4 #i3edh4        ,lee1             

,vernon--,vital ,lies4 v4 #a1 part #a4  
,lee1 ,vernon--,what is truth8 a        
criticism of pragmatism4 ,yale          
,rev4 n4 s4 #a3fjj4        ,loewenberg1 
,j4--,vaihinger's ,die ,philosophie des 
,als ,ob4 ,jour4           ,phil4       
#i3gag4        ,macintosh1 ,d4          
,c4--,representational pragmatism4 ,mind
 #ba3afg4        ,montague1 ,w4         
,p4--,review of ,james's ,some ,problems
 of ,philosophy4           ,jour4 ,phil4
 #i3bb4        ,murray1 ,d4             
,l4--,pragmatism4        ,reviews of    
,moore's ,pragmatism and ,its ,critics4 
,nation #ib3ac4 ,int           ,jour4   
,eth4 #bb3bbb4        ,riley1 ,i4       
,w4--,huizinga's ,the ,american         
,philosophy ,pragmatism4                
,jour4 ,phil4 #i3bdh4        ,russell1  
,b4--,review of ,james's ,essays in     
,radical ,empiricism4           ,mind   
#ba3ega4        ,russell1 ,j4           
,e4--,bergson's anti-intellectualism4   
,jour4           ,phil4 #i3abi4         
,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4 ,s4--,formal ,logic1 

,a ,scientific and ,social              
,problem4        ,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4     
,s4--,the 'working' of 'truth'4 ,mind   
#ba3ecb4  #aiac4 ,alexander1            
,s4--,collective willing and truth4     
,mind #bb3ad1 #afa4        ,boodin1 ,j4 
,e4--,pragmatic realism4--,the five     
attributes4           ,mind #bb3eji4    
,carr1 ,h4 ,w4--,logic and life4 ,mind  
#bb3dhd4        ,carr1 ,h4 ,w4--,the    
,problem of ,truth4        ,caldwell1   
,w4--,pragmatism and ,idealism4         
,knox1 ,h4 ,v4--,william ,james and his 
philosophy4 ,mind #bb3bca4              
,moore1 ,a4 ,w4--,pragmatism1 science1  
and truth4        ,perry1 ,r4           
,b4--,realism and pragmatism4 ,mind     
#bb3edd4        ,review of ,vernon      
,lee's ,vital ,lies4 ,nation #if3dad4   
,royce1 ,j4--,psychological problems    
emphasized by pragmatism4 ,pop4         
,sci4 ,mo4 #hc3cid4        ,schiller1   
,f4 ,c4 ,s4--,the 'working' of truths   
and their           'criterion'4 ,mind  
#bb3ecb4        ,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4      

,s4--,humanism4        ,stebbing1 ,l4   
,s4--,the 'working' of 'truths'4 ,mind  
#bb3bej4        ,wright1 ,w4            
,k4--,practical success as the criterion
 of truth4           ,phil4 ,rev4       
#bb3fjf4  #aiad4 ,knox1 ,h4             
,v4--,philosophy of ,william ,james4    
,moore1 ,j4 ,s4--,value in its relation 
to meaning and purpose4           ,jour4
 ,phil4 #aa3ahd4        ,ross1 ,g4 ,r4  
,t4--,aristotle and abstract truth--,a  
reply to ,mr4           ,schiller4 ,mind
 #bc3cif4        ,sidgwick1 ,a4--,truth 
and working4 ,mind #bc3ii4              
,stebbing1 ,l4 ,s4--,pragmatism and     
,french ,voluntarism4        ,wilde1    
,n4--,the pragmatism of ,pascal4 ,phil4 
,rev4 #bc3edj4        ,can socialism be 
identified with pragmatism8 ,cur4       
,opinion #ef3de4     ,,vita4   ,the     
writer was born in #ahhd at ,pomeroy1   
,ohio1 and received his earlier         
education in the country schools near   
that city4 ,his college preparatory work
 was done in the high school of         

,roswell1 ,new ,mexico1 from which he   
was graduated in #aijf4 ,he then entered
 immediately the ,university of         
,wisconsin1 and from this institution   
received the ,bachelor's degree in #aiaj
 and the ,master's degree in #aiaa4     
,from #aiaa to #aiad1 while acting as   
fellow or as assistant1 he studied in   
the graduate school of the ,university  
of ,illinois4     ,transcriber's ,notes3
      ,page numbers have been removed   
from the ,table of ,contents            
,footnotes have been sequentially       
numbered and placed after the           
paragraph where they are noted4   ,other
 changes to the text3      ,,james'     
,,exposition ,,of ,,peirce4 7in the     
,table of ,contents7     7,removed 's in
 ,,james',s to match the title of       
,section in     ,chapter #b1 which is   
consistent with author's usage          
throughout7      consider the doctrine  
of transubstantiation                   
7transubstantiation was                 
transsubstantiation7      true in their 

main experiential predictions           
7experiential was experiental7          
multiply incontestable results          
7incontestable was incontestible7       
false belief 7belief in fiction74     74
 was 17      and then only              
provisionally2     7then was when7      
towards the close of     7the was th7   
cannot be used together     7together   
was togethehr7      if one can define   
accurately all     7accurately was      
acurately7      or false8' ,thus does   
,locke     7missing closing quote added7
      only an image in the mind         
7mind was mand7      try so hard to     
defend     7so was to7      ,in         
,footnote #ab1 the word pages was pagges
      ,yet the smell is not cognitional 
7smell is was small was7      ,let us   
suppose that the smell occurs     7smell
 was small7      thus account for the   
cases where meanings     7cases was     
cses7      their immediate occurrence as
     7occurrence was occurence7         
which the developing experience is      

examined     7experience was experince7 
if one takes it at the stage     7at was
 t7      for truth is a certain         
7certain was certian7      the          
collectivity of experience's demands    
7experience's was experiences7      ,i  
have no doubt that this is     7this was
 his7      true even 'in so far forth'4 
7was missing closing single quote mark7 
,the reason for this outcome     7reason
 was reasons7      ,the scientific      
conception1 as it had differentiated    
itself from     7differentiated was     
differenciated7   ,typographic errors in
 the bibliography have been repaired    
without note1 with the following        
exceptions4      #ahed4 ,bailey1        
,s4--,essays on the ,pursuit of ,truth4 
7,s4 was originally missing7      #aghj4
 ,beattie1 ,james4--,an ,essay on the   
,nature and ,immutability           of  
,truth4     7duplicate entry removed7   
#aijb4 ,pritchett1 ,h4 ,s4--,what is    
truth8 ,outlook #gj3fbj4     7,h4 ,s4   
originally missing7      ,wright1 ,h4   

,w4--,practical success as the criterion
 of truth4     7was ,w4 ,k47      #ahgi4
 ,illustrations of the logic of science4
     7added second header for clarity7  
#ahie4 ,the theory of emotion4          
7added second header for clarity7