,note3 ,images of the original pages are
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,archive_/,american ,libraries4 ,see    
http3_/_/www4archive4org_/details_/spenc
ersphilosop#jjmorgrich   ,transcriber's 
note3        ,text enclosed by          
underscores is in italics 7italics74    
,text enclosed by curly brackets is     
subscripted 7example3       ,h#b,o7     
unless preceded by a carat character1 in
 which       case it is superscripted   
7example3 #b74      ,,spencer',s        
,,philosophy ,,of ,,science  ,the       
,herbert ,spencer ,lecture ,delivered at
 the ,museum #g ,november1 #aiac  by    
,c4 ,,lloyd ,,morgan1 ,f4,r4,s4         
,price ,two ,shillings net  ,oxford ,at 
the ,clarendon ,press ,,mcmxiii  ,oxford
 ,university ,press ,london             
,edinburgh      ,glasgow      ,new ,york
 ,toronto      ,melbourne      ,bombay  
,humphrey ,milford ,m4,a4 ,publisher to 
the ,university     ,,spencer',s        
,,philosophy ,,of ,,science   ,towards  
the close of #ahgj1 while ,i was still  

in my teens1 my youthful enthusiasm was 
fired by reading ,tyndall's ,discourse  
on ,the ,scientific ,use of the         
,imagination4 ,the vision of the        
conquest of nature by physical          
science--a vision which had but lately  
begun to open up to my wondering        
gaze--was rendered clearer and more     
extensive4 ,of the theory of evolution  
,i knew but little2 but ,i none the less
 felt assured that it had come to stay  
and to prevail4 ,was it not accepted by 
all of us--the enlightened and          
emancipated men of science whose ranks  
,i had joined as a raw recruit8         
,believing that ,i was independently    
breaking free of all authority1 to the  
authority that appealed to my fancy1 and
 to a new loyalty1 ,i was a willing     
slave4 ,and here in one glowing sentence
 the inner core of evolution lay        
revealed4    ',strip it naked and you   
stand face to face with the notion that 
not alone the more ignoble forms of     
animalcular and animal life1   not alone

 the nobler forms of the horse and the  
lion1 not alone   the exquisite and     
wonderful mechanism of the human body1  
but that   the human mind               
itself--emotion1 intellect and all their
   phenomena--were once latent in a     
fiery cloud4'#a  ,with sparkling eyes ,i
 quoted these brave words to a friend of
 my father's1 whose comments were often 
as caustic as his sympathy in my        
interests was kindly4 ,with a grave     
smile he asked whether the notion was   
not perhaps stripped too naked to       
preserve the decencies of modest        
thought2 he inquired whether ,i had not 
learnt from ,sartor ,resartus that the  
philosophy of nature is a ,philosophy of
 ,clothes2 and he bade me devote a      
little time to quiet and careful        
consideration of what ,tyndall really   
meant--meant in terms of the exact      
science he professed--by the phrase     
'latent in a fiery cloud'4 ,i dimly     
suspected that the old gentleman--old in
 the sense of being my father's         

contemporary--was ignorant of those     
recent developments of modern science   
with which ,i had been acquainted for   
weeks1 nay more for months4 ,perhaps he 
had never even heard of the nebular     
hypothesis6 ,but ,i felt that ,i had    
done him an injustice when1 next        
morning1 he sent round a volume of the  
,westminster ,review with a slip of     
paper indicating an article on          
',progress3 its ,law and ,cause'4  ,such
 was my introduction to ,herbert        
,spencer1 some of whose works ,i read   
with admiration during the next few     
years4  ,i have no very distinct        
recollection of the impression produced 
on my mind by the germinal essay of     
#aheg1 save that it served to quicken   
that craving1 which is1 ,i suppose1     
characteristic of those who have some   
natural bent towards philosophy--the    
imperative craving to seek and1 if it   
may be1 to find the one in the many4 ,in
 any case ,tyndall's suggestive sentence
 was here amplified and the underlying  

law was disclosed4    ',whether it be in
 the development of the ,earth1 in the  
development   of ,life upon its surface1
 in the development of ,society1 of     
,government1 of ,manufacture1 of        
,commerce1 of ,language1 ,literature1   
,science1 ,art1 the same evolution of   
the simple into the complex1   through  
successive differentiations1 holds      
throughout4 ,from the   earliest        
traceable cosmical changes down to the  
latest results of   civilisation1 we    
shall find that the transformation of   
the   homogeneous into the              
heterogeneous1 is that in which         
,progress   essentially consists4'#b    
,here was just what ,i wanted--on the   
one hand the whole wide universe of     
existence2 and on the other hand a brief
 formula with which to label its potted 
essence4 ,how breathlessly one was led  
on1 with only such breaches of          
continuity as separate paragraphs       
inevitably impose1 right away from the  
primitive fire-mist to one of ,bach's   

fugues or the critical doctrines of ,mr4
 ,ruskin1 guided throughout by the magic
 of differentiation4 ,what if the modes 
of existence1 dealt with in successive  
sections1 were somewhat startlingly     
diverse6 ,was not this itself a supreme 
example of the evolution of that        
diversity which the formula enables us  
to interpret8 ,for if there were a      
passage from the homogeneous to the     
heterogeneous1 the more heterogeneous   
the products--inorganic1 organic1 and   
superorganic1 as ,i learnt to call      
them--the stronger the evidence for the 
law4 ,only by shutting one's eyes to the
 light that had been shed on the world  
by evolution could one fail to see how  
simple and yet how inevitable was the   
whole business4  ,if then               
differentiation be the cardinal law of  
evolution--for the correlative concept  
of integration receives no emphasis in  
this early essay--does not the          
universality of the law imply a         
universal cause8 ,just as gravitation   

was assignable as a cause of each of the
 groups of phenomena which ,kepler      
formulated2 so might some equally simple
 attribute of things be assignable as   
the cause of each of the groups of      
phenomena formulated in terms of        
differentiation4 ,now the only obvious  
respect in which all kinds of ,progress 
are alike1 is1 that they are modes of   
change2 and hence in some characteristic
 of changes in general1 the desired     
solution must be found4 ,thus we are led
 up to the statement of the             
all-pervading principle which determines
 the all-pervading process of           
differentiation4 ,it is this3 ,every    
active force produces more than one     
change--every cause produces more than  
one effect4#c  ,in the first part of the
 ,essay many and varied facts are       
adduced to show that every kind of      
progress is from the simple to the      
complex4 ,the aim of the second part is 
to show why this is so3 it is 'because  
each change is followed by many         

changes'4 ,from the beginning1 the      
decomposition of every expended force   
into several forces has been perpetually
 producing a higher complication1 and   
thus ,progress is not an accident but a 
beneficent necessity4 ,in a brief third 
part we are bidden to remember that     
'after all that has been said the       
ultimate mystery remains just as   it   
was4 ,the explanation of that which is  
explicable does but bring   out into    
greater clearness the inexplicableness  
of that which   remains behind4444 ,the 
sincere man of science1 content to      
follow   wherever the evidence leads him
 becomes by each new enquiry more       
profoundly convinced that the ,universe 
is an insoluble problem4444   ,in all   
directions his investigations bring him 
face to face with   the unknowable2 and 
he ever more clearly perceives it to be 
the   unknowable'4#d  ,there is ,i think
 a growing consensus of opinion that the
 first of these three parts1            
subsequently expanded and illustrated   

with astonishing wealth of detail in the
 volumes of the ,synthetic ,philosophy1 
contains the germ of all that is best in
 the teaching of ,herbert ,spencer2 and 
that it was amid phenomena which        
admitted of interpretation from the     
biological1 or quasi-biological1 point  
of view that he found his most congenial
 sphere of work and the one in which his
 method was most effectively employed4  
,the story of evolution is the story of 
inter-related changes4 ,in any organic  
whole there are certain salient features
 of the historical sequence4#e ,the     
parts get more different from each      
other1 and they also get more           
effectively connected with each other2  
the individual whole gets more different
 from its environment1 and it also      
preserves and extends its connexion with
 the environment2 the several           
individuals get more different from     
others1 while their connexion with      
others is retained and new connexions   
are established4 ,nowadays these central

 ideas may seem familiar enough2 but    
that is just because ,spencer's thought 
has been so completely assimilated4 ,and
 then we must remember that these main  
principles are supplemented by a great  
number of ancillary generalizations1    
many of which have been incorporated in 
the scientific doctrine which is current
 to-day4 ,we must bear in mind that of  
the ,biology ,charles ,darwin wrote3#f  
',i am astonished at its prodigality of 
original thought4' ,of the ,psychology  
,william ,james says#g that of the      
systematic treatises it will rank as the
 most original4 ,these are the opinions 
of experts4 ,no discussion of sociology 
or ethics is complete if it ignores     
,spencer's contributions to these       
subjects4 ,the ,ethics1 says ,james#h is
 a most vital and original piece of     
attitude-taking in the world of ideals4 
,it was his firm and often inflexible   
'attitude' which was a source of        
strength in ,spencer1 though it was the 
strength of rigidity rather than that of

 sinewy suppleness4 ,this was part of a 
certain 'narrowness of intent and       
vastness of extent' which characterized 
his mental vision4 ,he was so obsessed  
with the paramount importance of        
biological relationships that in his    
,sociology1 his ,ethics1 his            
,psychology1 he failed to do justice to1
 or even to realize the presence of1    
other and higher relationships--higher1 
that is1 in the evolutionary scale4 ,but
 it was his signal merit to work        
biological interpretation for all1 and  
perhaps more than1 it was worth4 ,it was
 on these lines that he was led to find 
a clue to those social and political    
developments1 the discussion of which1  
in the ,nonconformist of #ahdb1         
constituted the first step from the life
 of an engineer to that other kind of   
life which led to the elaboration of the
 ,synthetic ,philosophy4#i ,in his later
 years he was saddened to see that many 
of the social and political doctrines1  
for the establishment of which he had   

striven so strenuously1 were not        
accepted by a newer generation of       
thinkers4 ,still1 to have taken a       
definite and1 for all his detractors may
 say1 an honoured position in the line  
of those who make history in the        
philosophy of life and mind--that could 
never be taken away from him4  ,it will 
perhaps be said that this emphasis on   
the philosophy of life and mind does    
scant justice to the range and sweep of 
,spencer's philosophy as a whole2 and no
 doubt others will contend that the     
emphasis should be laid elsewhere2 on   
the mechanical foundations2 on evolution
 as a universal principle4 ,it will be  
urged that ,spencer widened to men's    
view the scope of scientific            
explanation4 ,he proclaimed 'the gradual
 growth of all things by natural        
processes out of natural                
antecedents'4#aj ,even in the           
,nonconformist letters 'there is'1 he   
himself says1#aa 'definitely expressed a
 belief in the universality of law--law 

in the realm of mind as in that of      
matter--law throughout the life of      
society as throughout the individual    
life4 ,so1 too1 is it with the          
correlative idea of universal           
causation4' ,and if there be law it must
 at bottom be one law4 ,thus in ,first  
,principles ,spencer propounded a       
sweeping and sonorous formula1 which    
every disciple knows by heart1 embodying
 the fundamental traits of that         
unceasing redistribution of matter and  
motion which characterizes evolution as 
contrasted with dissolution4 ,was it not
 this that he himself regarded as his   
main contribution to philosophy8 ,did he
 not himself provide a summary1 setting 
forth the sixteen articles of the       
,spencerian creed2 and is not this      
summary given a prominent position in   
the ,preface he wrote to ,howard        
,collins's ,epitome of the ,synthetic   
,philosophy8 ,do not these fundamental  
articles of his faith deal with         
ubiquitous causes1 with the instability 

of the homogeneous and the              
multiplication of effects1 with         
segregation and equilibration1 and with 
the basal conception of the persistence 
of force8 ,there is here1 it may be     
said1 no special reference to the       
organic and the superorganic4 ,and why8 
,just because ,spencer's interpretation 
is all-inclusive2 because biology1      
psychology1 sociology1 ethics are1      
broadly considered1 concerned only with 
incidents of the later scenes of the    
great mechanical drama of evolution4    
,are we not again and again bidden1 now 
in forecast1 now in retrospect1 to look 
below the surface1 and constantly to    
bear in mind that the aim of philosophy1
 as completely unified knowledge1 is    
'the interpretation of all phenomena in 
terms of ,matter1 ,motion1 and          
,force'8#ab ,it is true that the affairs
 of the mind give pause and seem to     
present something of a difficulty4 ,but 
even here 'specifically stated1 the     
problem is to interpret mental evolution

 in terms of the redistribution of      
matter and motion'4#ac ,an adequate     
explanation of nervous evolution        
involves an adequate explanation of the 
concomitant evolution of mind4 ,it is   
true that the antithesis of subject and 
object is never to be transcended 'while
 consciousness lasts'4#ad ,but if all   
existence1 distinguishable as           
subjective1 is resolvable into units of 
consciousness1 which in their obverse or
 objective aspect are oscillations of   
molecules1#ae what more is required to  
round off the explanation of every      
thing1 save the ,unknowable--save the   
,ultimate ,reality in which subject and 
object are united8 ,in the end we are   
baffled by mystery2 let us1 therefore1  
make the best of it and rejoice4    ',we
 can think of ,matter only in terms of  
,mind4 ,we can think of   ,mind only in 
terms of ,matter4 ,when we have pushed  
our explorations   of the first to its  
uttermost limit we are referred to the  
second   for a final answer2 and when we

 have got the final answer to the       
second we are referred back to the first
 for an interpretation of   it4'#ad     
,and so neither answer is final4        
,finality is only reached when both are 
swallowed up1 not in victory1 but in    
defeat4 ,shall we not then glory in     
defeat and sing its praises often8  ,i  
must leave to some future ,herbert      
,spencer lecturer the discussion of his 
doctrine of the ,unknowable and the     
critical consideration of its place and 
value in philosophy4 ,i would fain leave
 it altogether on one side2 but that is 
impossible4 ,although the ,first        
,principles is divided into two ,parts1 
dealing respectively with the           
,unknowable and the ,knowable1 we have  
not by any means done with the former   
when we turn from the ,first ,part to   
the ,second4 ,with ,spencer we have     
never done with the ,unknowable1 the    
,unconditioned ,reality and the other   
aliases by which it goes4 ,his          
persistence of force is the persistence 

of ,unknowable ,force4 ,in a leading    
passage1 at any rate1 it is avowedly    
'the persistence of some ,cause which   
transcends our knowledge and conception4
 ,in asserting it we assert an          
,unconditioned ,reality without         
beginning or end'4#af ,there must1 he   
holds1 be something at the back of the  
evolutionary drama which we             
study--something that is both a         
principle of activity and a permanent   
nexus4#ag ,the pity of it is that we    
know not1 and can never know1 what on   
earth 7or in heaven67 it is4 ,we only   
know that it exists1 and somehow        
produces the whole show4 ,now it would  
much conduce to clearness of thought and
 of statement if we could agree to      
eliminate those terribly ambiguous words
 'force' and 'cause' when we are dealing
 with the fundamental postulate 7if such
 it be7 that there must be something at 
the back of evolution to make it what it
 is2 and the word ,source seems ready to
 our hand and might well be given this  

special significance4 ,but ,spencer uses
 ,agency1 ,power1 ,cause1 ,force1 in    
this connexion4 ,in how many senses he  
uses the word 'force' ,i am not prepared
 to say4 ,it is often a synonym for     
cause2 it stands alike for matter and   
energy2#ah it is the objective correlate
 of our subjective sense of effort4#ai  
,there is a 'correlation and equivalence
 between external forces and the mental 
forces generated by them under the form 
of sensations'4#bj ,and when we pass to 
human life in society1 whatever in any  
way facilitates or impedes social1      
political1 or economic change1 is spoken
 of in terms of force4#ba ,with an      
apparent vagueness and laxity almost    
unparalleled1 force is used in wellnigh 
every conceivable sense of this         
ambiguous word--except1 perhaps1 that   
which is now sanctioned by definition in
 mathematical physics4 ,i say apparent  
vagueness and laxity because1 subtly    
underlying all this varied usage1 is the
 unifying conception of ,source as the  

ultimate basis of all enforcement4 ,from
 this flows all necessity whether in    
things or thoughts or any combination of
 the two4 ,thus persistence of force is 
,spencer's favourite expression for     
uniform determinism at or near its      
,source4  ,now1 as ,i understand the    
position1 science has nothing whatever  
to do with the ,source or ,sources of   
phenomena4 ,by a wise self-denying      
ordinance it rules all questions of     
ultimate origin out of court4 ,it       
regards them as beyond its special      
sphere of jurisdiction4 ,it deals with  
phenomena in terms of connexion within  
an orderly scheme1 and it does not      
profess to explain why the connexions   
are such as they are found to be4 ,in   
any discussion of this or that sequence 
of events which may fall under the wide 
and rather vague heading of evolution1  
it is just a consistent story of the    
events in their total relatedness that  
science endeavours to tell4 ,the        
question3 ,but what evolves the evolved8

 is for science 7or should ,i say for   
those who accept this delimitation of   
the province of science87 not so much   
unanswerable in any terms1 as           
unanswerable in scientific terms4 ,for  
the terms in which an answer must be    
given are incommensurable with the      
concepts with which science has elected 
to carry on its business as interpreter 
of nature4 ,to this question therefore  
the man of science1 speaking for his    
order1 simply replies3 ,we do not know4 
,is this1 then1 ,spencer's answer8 ,far 
from it4 ,the man of science here makes1
 or should make1 no positive assertion1 
save in respect of the limits of his    
field of inquiry4 ,if you beg him to    
tell you what that which he knows not   
is1 or does1 he regards such a question 
as meaningless4 ,but ,spencer's         
,unknowable1 notwithstanding its        
negative prefix1 is the ,ultimate       
,reality1 and does all that is in any   
way done4 ,we may not know what it is2  
but that it is1 is the most assured of  

all assured certainties4 ,and when it   
comes to doing1 what can be more        
dramatically positive than that which   
bears a name of negation8 ,whatever it  
may not be1 it is the ,power that drives
 all the machinery in this workshop of a
 world2 it is the ,power which lies at  
the back of such wit as man has to      
interpret it1 and1 in some measure1 to  
utilize its mechanism4  ,it seems plain 
enough that ,spencer distinguishes1 or  
seeks to distinguish1 between those     
knowable effects which we call natural  
phenomena and their ,unknowable ,cause  
or ,source4 ,and this seems to be in    
line with the distinction which his     
critic1 ,m4 ,bergson1 draws between 'the
 evolved which is a result' and         
'evolution itself1 which is the act by  
which the result is obtained'4#bb ,an   
act implies an agent1 and the agency of 
which the evolved is a manifestation is 
for ,m4 ,bergson ,life1 while for       
,spencer it is that very vigorous       
agency--the ,unknowable4 ,now in        

criticizing ,spencer1 ,m4 ,bergson says3
    ',the usual device of the           
,spencerian method consists in          
reconstructing evolution with the       
fragments of the evolved4444 ,it   is   
not however by dividing the evolved that
 we shall reach the   principle of that 
which evolves4 ,it is not by recomposing
 the   evolved with itself that we shall
 reproduce the evolution of which   it  
is the term4'#bc  ,but does ,spencer    
ever suggest that we shall thus reach   
the principle of that which evolves--by 
which1 if ,i mistake not1 ,m4 ,bergson  
means the ,source of evolution8 ,does he
 not urge that we can neither reach it  
in this way1 nor in any other way8 ,for 
,m4 ,bergson1 as for ,spencer1 it is    
unknowable by the intellect--it can only
 be known by what ,m4 ,bergson calls    
intuition4 ,for both thinkers1 the      
intellect provides only a world of      
symbols2 and ,spencer's transfigured    
realism may be matched by what ,dr4     
,wildon ,carr calls ,m4 ,bergson's      

transformed realism4#bd ,so long as we  
are dealing with the evolved--which is  
that with which alone science attempts  
to deal--,spencer1 ,m4 ,bergson1 and the
 rest of us are in like case4 ,we must  
stumble on intellectually with our      
symbols as best we may4 ',whether we    
posit the present structure of mind or  
the present subdivision of matter in    
either case we remain in the evolved3 we
 are told nothing of what evolves1      
nothing of evolution4'#be ,nothing of   
what evolves6 ,spencer might exclaim    
with a groan4 ,have ,i then written all 
those pages and pages on the ,unknowable
 for nought8 ,is it not a fundamental   
tenet of my philosophy that there must  
be1 and therefore is1 a ,source of the  
evolved--of the phenomenal world which  
is merely an expression in terms of     
intellectual symbolism1 of that ultimate
 ,power which1 though its nature may    
baffle the intellect1 is none the less  
the most real of all realities8  ,it    
would take us too far from the line of  

,spencer's thought to consider ,m4      
,bergson's doctrine that it is the      
intellect that portions the world into  
lots2#bf that cuts the facts out of the 
interpenetrating whole of reality1 and  
renders them artificially distinct      
within the continuity of becoming4 ,it  
suffices to note that on such a         
presupposition 'the cardinal error of   
,spencer is to take experience already  
allotted as given1 whereas the true     
problem is to know how the allotment was
 worked'4#bg ,i am not prepared to      
give--indeed ,i have been unable to     
find--,m4 ,bergson's own solution of the
 problem4 ,i gather that it was ,life   
itself that somehow allotted concepts   
and objects in such correspondence as   
should be practically useful though     
metaphysically false and illusory4 ,but 
just how it was done ,i have still to   
learn4 ',the original activity was'1 we 
are told1 'a simple thing which became  
diversified through the very            
construction of mechanisms such as those

 of the brain1'#bh which1 as ,life's    
tool1 has facilitated the chopping up of
 a continuous interpenetrating reality  
into mince-meat for intellectual        
assimilation4 ,such a conception was    
foreign to ,spencer's thought4 ,but some
 of us may find it hard to distinguish  
,m4 ,bergson's 'original activity' from 
,spencer's ,unknowable1 which1 so far as
 one can make out1 somehow produced     
precisely the same results4 ,as a matter
 of fact1 ,m4 ,bergson seems to put into
 ,life1 as ,spencer put into the        
,unknowable1 the potentiality of        
producing all that actually exists4     
,for ,spencer1 as for ,m4 ,bergson1 we  
live in a world of change4 ,but neither 
is content to accept changes as facts to
 be linked up within a scheme of        
scientific interpretation4 ,both must   
seek their ,source4 ,now to inquire into
 the ,source or ,sources of phenomena is
 characteristic of man as thinker4 ,and 
if1 in common with those whom ,i follow1
 ,i regard this quest as beyond the     

limits of science1 ,i am well aware that
 such delimitation of fields of inquiry 
is by no means universally accepted4 ,m4
 ,bergson1 for example1 regards         
metaphysics as the ,science#bi which    
claims to dispense with symbols1 which  
turns its back on analysis1 which       
eschews logic1 which dispenses with     
relativity and pierces to the absolute1 
which1 apparently1 uses the intellect   
only to establish its utter incompetence
 in this department of 'science'4       
,merely saying that this1 whatever else 
it may be1 is not what ,i1 for one1     
understand by science--and not1 by the  
way1 what ,m4 ,bergson in other passages
 seems to mean by science#cj--;,i pass  
on to ,spencer's treatment of the       
philosophy of science which1 for him1 is
 'completely unified knowledge'1 'the   
truths of philosophy bearing the same   
relation to the highest scientific      
truths that each of these bears to lower
 scientific truths4'  ,i suppose one of 
the basal truths in his philosophy of   

science is for ,spencer the universality
 of connexion between cause and effect4 
,now let us eliminate ,source as the    
,ultimate ,cause 7so far as that is     
possible in ,spencer72 let us restrict  
our attention to cause and effect in the
 realm of the knowable4 ,when we try to 
do this we find his statements          
concerning them scarcely less puzzling  
than those that refer to force1 with    
which cause is so often identified4     
,thus we are told#ca that 'motion set up
 in any direction is itself a cause of  
further motion in that direction since  
it is a manifestation of a surplus force
 in that direction'2 and elsewhere#cb   
that 'the momentum of a body causes it  
to move in a straight line and at a     
uniform velocity'4 ,a distinction is    
drawn between cause and conditions4 ,but
 both produce effects1 and only on these
 terms can there be that                
'proportionality or equivalence between 
cause and effect' on which ,spencer     
insists4#cc ,there is1 however1 scarcely

 a hint of what constitutes the         
difference between cause and conditions1
 save in so far as he speaks#cd of      
'those conspicuous antecedents which we 
call the causes' and 'those accompanying
 antecedents which we call the          
conditions'4 ,many of the details of his
 treatment ,i find most perplexing2 but 
to recite examples would be wearisome4  
,and then1 in the ninth and tenth       
articles of the ,spencerian creed1 cause
 plays a somewhat different part4 ,for1 
there1 the instability of the           
homogeneous and the multiplication of   
effects are given as the chief causes   
which 'necessitate' that redistribution 
of matter and motion of which evolution 
is one phase4 ,similarly1 as ,i have    
noted above1 in ',progress3 its ,law and
 ,cause'1 the fundamental attribute of  
all modes of change--that every cause   
produces more than one effect--is itself
 spoken of as a cause1 and likened to   
'gravitation as the cause of each of the
 groups of phenomena which ,kepler      

formulated'4 ,in these cases a          
generalization is regarded as the cause 
of the phenomena from which the         
generalization is drawn4 ,but sometimes 
it is spoken of as the reason for the   
phenomena4#ce ,here again1 however1 as  
throughout his work1 reference to       
,source is close at hand4 ,hence1 in    
place of the words cause and force1 the 
word agency#cf sometimes stands for that
 which produces effects2 or the word    
factor may be used4 ,thus we are told#cg
 of phenomena continually complicating  
under the influence of the same original
 factors'2 and we meet with the argument
 7contra ,huxley7 that states of        
consciousness are factors1 that is1 they
 'have the power of working changes in  
the nervous system and setting up       
motions'4#ch ,always close at hand1     
constantly underlying ,spencer's        
thought1 is the notion of power which   
works changes4 ,in his treatment of the 
philosophy of science we are never far  
from the noumenal ,source of phenomena4 

',for that interpretation of things     
which is alone possible for us   this is
 all we require to know--that the force 
or energy   manifested1 now in one way  
now in another1 persists or remains     
unchanged in amount4 ,but when we ask   
what this energy is1 there is   no      
answer save that it is the noumenal     
,cause implied by the   phenomenal      
effect4'#ci  ,was it partly with        
,spencer in view that ,mr4 ,bertrand    
,russell recently urged#dj that the word
 cause 'is so inextricably bound up with
 misleading associations as to make its 
complete extrusion from the             
philosophical vocabulary desirable'8    
,professor ,mach#da had previously      
expressed the hope 'that the science of 
the future will discard the use of cause
 and effect as formally obscure'4 ,and  
as long ago as #ahgj ,w4 ,k4            
,clifford#db tried to show in 'what sort
 of way an exact knowledge of the facts 
would supersede an enquiry after the    
causes of them'2 and urged that the     

hypothesis of continuity 'involves such 
an interdependence of the facts of the  
universe as forbids us to speak of one  
fact or set of facts as the cause of    
another fact or set of facts'4 ,such    
views may1 perhaps1 be regarded as      
extreme2 and the word cause is not      
likely to be extruded from the          
vocabulary of current speech1 of the    
less exact branches of science1 or of   
general discussions of world-processes4 
,still1 a philosophy of science must    
take note of this criticism of the use  
of a term which is1 to say the least of 
it1 ambiguous4 ,we must at any rate try 
to get rid of ambiguity4 ,now we live in
 a world of what1 in a very broad and   
inclusive sense1 may be called things2  
and these things are in varied ways     
related to each other4 7,i must beg     
leave to assume1 without discussion1    
that the relatedness of things is no    
less constitutive of the world with     
which a philosophy of science has to    
deal than the things which are in       

relation47 ,and when things stand in    
certain kinds of relatedness to each    
other changes take place4 ,the trouble  
is that the kinds of relatedness are so 
many and the kinds of change are also so
 many6 ,spencer tried to reduce all     
kinds of relatedness to one             
quasi-mechanical type2 and he signally  
failed--or shall ,i say that he         
succeeded only by ignoring all the      
specific differences on the one hand1   
and1 on the other hand1 by so smudgy an 
extension of the meaning of mechanical  
and physical terms as to make them do   
duty in every conceivable connexion8    
,so long as we can deal with simple     
types of relatedness1 such as that which
 we call gravitative1 in any given      
system of things regarded as isolated1  
we can express in formulae not only the 
rate of change within the system1 but   
also the rate at which the rate of      
change itself changes4 ,and these       
formulae are found to be generally      
applicable where like things are in a   

like field of relatedness4 ,so that     
,spencer's persistence of force 7at     
least in one of its many meanings7 is   
replaced in such cases by sameness of   
differential equations4 ,and in such    
cases we have no need for the word      
cause4 ,of course the value of the      
constants in any such formula depends   
upon the nature of the field of         
relatedness and of the things therein2  
and only certain systems1 in which the  
relations are simple1 or are susceptible
 of simplification1 can be dealt with1  
at present1 in this manner4 ,it is      
imperative to remember that not only the
 rate of change but the kind of change  
differs in different relational         
fields--a fact of which ,spencer took   
too little cognizance1 so bent was he on
 some sort of unification at all        
hazards4 ,revert now to a field of      
gravitative relatedness1 in which the   
motion of things is the kind of change1 
while the rate of change is expressible 
in a formula2 may we not say that the   

co-presence of things in this           
relationship does imply certain motions 
and changes of motion within the system 
to which the term gravitative applies8  
,there seems little room for ambiguity  
if we call what is thus implied the     
effect1 and if we term those modes of   
relatedness which carry this kind of    
implication1 effective4 ,it may1        
however1 be said that it sounds somewhat
 strange to speak of relations as       
effective4 ,how can mere relatedness as 
such do anything8 ,what is implied by   
the effect is surely1 it will be urged1 
a cause in the full and rich sense of   
the word--a cause which produces the    
effect4 ,for what is here suggested is  
nothing more than a generalized         
statement of the truth that the         
relational constitution of the system   
being what it is1 the changes are what  
they are6 ,and so we come back to the   
conception of an agency which in some   
way produces the observable change--of a
 power which is active behind the       

phenomenal scene--of force and cause in 
the ,spencerian sense4 ,but1 so far as  
scientific interpretation is concerned1 
this reference to ,source--for such it  
really is--is useless4 ,the gravitative 
system can be dealt with scientifically 
just as well without it as with it4     
,what1 then1 becomes of the scientific  
conception of energy8 ,is not energy    
that which produces observable change8  
,is it not active in the sense required8
 ,and can we say that this conception is
 useless for scientific interpretation8 
,i suppose most of us1 in our student   
days1 have passed through the phase of  
regarding energy as an active demon     
which plays a notorious part in the     
physical drama4 ,spencer loved it       
dearly4 ,but some of us1 under what we  
consider wiser guidance1 hold that what 
we should understand by kinetic energy  
is nothing of this sort4 ,it is a       
constant ratio of variables1            
conveniently expressed as #a_/bmv#b4    
,that1 however1 it may be said1 is      

absurd4 ,energy is not merely a ratio or
 a formula2 it is something much more   
real2 perhaps the most real of all the  
realities the being of which has been   
disclosed by physical science4 ,granted 
in a sense1 and a very true sense4 ,but 
what is this reality8 ,it is the reality
 of the changes themselves in those     
fields of relatedness to which the      
formula has reference4 ,there is        
nothing1 ,i conceive1 in the modern     
treatment of energy that affords any    
scientific justification of the         
,spencerian view#dc that energy is an   
agent through the activity of which the 
constant ratio of variables is          
maintained in the physical world4  ,i   
feel sure that it will still be said    
that change must inevitably imply that  
which produces change1 and that1 even if
 energy be only a ratio of variables    
within a changing field1 there is still 
the implication of ,force as the real   
,cause of which the change itself1      
however formulated1 is the effect4 ,no  

doubt this is one of the meanings which 
the ambiguous words force and cause may 
carry4 ,it is to remove this ambiguity  
that ,i have suggested that the word    
,source should be substituted for cause 
in this sense4 ,and what about force8   
,in one of its meanings it now generally
 stands for a measure of change4 ,for   
those who accept ,source as a scientific
 concept it may well stand for the      
measure or degree of its activity gauged
 by the phenomenal effect2 for those who
 do not accept it1 the measure or degree
 of the change itself#dd--to be dealt   
with in mechanics in terms of mass and  
acceleration4 ,this leaves outstanding1 
however1 the use of the word force in   
the phrase--the forces of               
nature--gravitative force1 cohesive     
force1 electromotive force1 and so on4  
,it was1 ,i take it1 with this usage in 
view that ,spencer spoke of vital1      
mental1 and social forces4 ,now the     
reference in each of these cases is to  
some specific mode of relatedness among 

the things concerned4 ,we need to name  
it in some way2 and this is the way that
 is1 rather unfortunately1 sanctioned by
 custom and long usage4 ,when we say    
that a thing is in a field of           
electromotive force we mean 7do we not87
 that the relatedness is of that        
particular kind named electromotive1 and
 not of another kind4 ,when ,spencer    
spoke of social forces he had in view   
changes which take place within a field 
of social relationships4 ,we do not     
really need the word force in this      
sense1 since the term relatedness would 
suffice1 and has no misleading          
associations4 ,but there it is3 our     
business should be to understand clearly
 what it means4 ,it does not1 or should 
not1 ,i think1 mean more1 in this       
connexion1 than a particular kind of    
relatedness in virtue of which an       
observable kind of change occurs4  ,we  
may now pass to cause and conditions4   
,when ,spencer distinguishes between    
those conspicuous antecedents which we  

call the causes and those accompanying  
antecedents which we call the           
conditions1 he invites the question3    
,what1 then1 is the essential difference
 between them8 ,if the accompanying     
antecedents are distinguished as        
inconspicuous1 we surely need some      
criterion of the distinction4           
,furthermore1 inconspicuous conditions  
are1 in science1 every whit as important
 as those which are conspicuous4 ,now we
 all know that ,mill regarded the cause 
as 'the sum total of the conditions     
positive and negative taken             
together4'#de ,but he expressly         
distinguishes between events and        
states4#df ,discussing1 for example1 the
 case of a man who eats of a particular 
dish and dies in consequence1 he says3  
',the various conditions1 except the    
single one of eating the food1   were   
not events but states possessing more or
 less of permanency1   and might        
therefore have preceded the effect by an
 indefinite   length of duration1 for   

want of that event which was requisite  
to   complete the required concurrence  
of conditions4'  ,again he says3        
',when sulphur1 charcoal1 and nitre are 
put together in certain   proportions   
and in a certain manner1 the effect is1 
not an   explosion1 but that the mixture
 acquires a property by which in   given
 circumstances it will explode4 ,the    
ingredients of the   gunpowder have been
 brought into a state of preparedness   
for   exploding as soon as the other    
conditions of an explosion shall   have 
occurred4'  ,and he tells us that       
physiological processes 'often have for 
the chief part of their operation to    
predispose the constitution to some mode
 of action'4  ,this distinction may     
profitably be carried further and       
emphasized in our terminology4 ,take any
 thing1 or any integrated group of      
things1 regarded as that higher order of
 thing which we call a self-contained   
system4 ,process occurs therein1 and    
process involves change4 ,in so far as  

the system is self-contained its changes
 and states are inherent in its         
constitution4 ,we need a term by which  
to designate that which is thus inherent
 and constitutional4 ,the term ground   
might be reserved for this purpose4 ,the
 word ground has its natural home in    
logic4 ,it is here extended 7if it be an
 extension7 to that to which the logic  
has reference in the existing world4    
,one is here following ,spencer1 who    
claims#dg that ',logic is a science     
pertaining to objective existence'4 ,on 
these terms the constitution of any     
system is the ground of the properties1 
states1 and happenings in that system   
regarded as isolated4 ,but the changes  
or properties will be also in relation  
to surrounding things or systems4 ,these
 changes1 or modifications of change1 in
 relation to external things or events1 
may properly be said to be conditioned2 
and we may well restrict the term       
conditions to influences outside the    
constitution as ground4 ,of course1 if  

we accept this usage1 we must not speak1
 with ,mill1 of the constitution of any 
system as the condition of its inherent 
changes or properties4 ,that is why we  
need some such word and concept as      
ground4 ,now we may fix our attention on
 any constituent part of some natural   
system and make that part the centre of 
our interest4 ,that part may be changing
 in virtue of its constitution2 and the 
rest of the system1 regarded as external
 to this selected part1 must therefore  
be regarded as conditioning4 ,it is a   
matter of convenience for purposes of   
scientific interpretation whether we    
select a larger or a smaller            
system-group and discuss its            
constitutional character4 ,thus we may  
think of the constitution of the solar  
system1 or of that of the sun's corona2 
of the constitution of an organism or of
 that of one of its cells2 of the       
constitution of a complex molecule or of
 that of an atom therein4 ,we have here 
reached1 or nearly reached1 the limiting

 case in one direction--that of         
restricting our field of inquiry4 ,the  
limiting case in the other direction is1
 ,i suppose1 the universe4 ,but could we
 so expand our thought as to embrace1 if
 that were possible1 the whole universe1
 then there are no conditions2 for ex   
hypothesi there is nothing for science  
outside the universe4 ,we have reached  
the limiting concept4 ,hence1 for       
science1 the constitution of nature is  
the ultimate ground of all that is or   
happens4  ,let us now see how we stand4 
,consider the following statements3  #a4
 ,the ,unknowable is the cause of all   
the phenomena we observe4  #b4 ,the     
constitution of gunpowder is the cause  
of its explosiveness4#dh  #c4 ,the fall 
of a spark was the cause of the actual  
explosion of the powder4#di  ,or these3 
#a4 ,life is the cause of all vital     
manifestations4  #b4 ,the inherited     
nature of a hen's egg is the cause of   
its producing a chick and not a         
duckling4  #c4 ,the cause of the        

development of the chick embryo is the  
warmth supplied by the incubating       
mother4#ej  ,in each case the reference 
under 7#a7 is to a transcendent cause   
which produces the phenomena under      
consideration4 ,i suggest that the word 
,source should here be used instead of  
cause4 ,in each case the reference under
 7#b7 is to the nature or constitution  
of that within which some process       
occurs4 ,i suggest that the word ground 
should here be used instead of cause4   
,in each case the reference under 7#c7  
is to some external influence4 ,i       
suggest that the word condition should  
here be used instead of cause4 ,we thus 
eliminate the word cause altogether4    
,but since1 in nine cases out of ten1   
the conditions1 or some salient         
condition1 is what is meant by cause in 
popular speech1 and in the less exact   
sciences1 the word cause may perhaps be 
there retained with this particular     
meaning4 ,these are of course merely    
suggestions towards the avoidance of    

puzzling ambiguity4 ,one could wish that
 ,spencer could have thought out some   
such distinctions to help his sorely    
perplexed readers4  ,one could wish1    
too1 that he had devoted his great      
powers of thought to a searching        
discussion of the different types of    
relatedness which are found in nature1  
and to a fuller consideration of a      
synthetic scheme of their               
inter-relatedness4 ,it is imperative    
that our thought of relations should    
have a concrete backing4 ',every act of 
knowing'1 says ,spencer1 'is the        
formation of a relation in consciousness
 answering to a relation in the         
environment4' ,but the                  
knowledge-relations are of so very      
special a type2 and the relations in the
 environment are so many and varied4    
,much more analysis of natural relations
 is required than ,spencer provides4 ,i 
do not mean1 of course1 that there is   
any lack of analysis--and of very       
penetrating analysis--in the            

,psychology1 the ,biology1 the          
,sociology1 and the ,ethics4 ,i mean    
that in ,first ,principles1 which must  
be regarded as his general survey of the
 philosophy of science1 there is no     
searching analysis of the salient types 
of relationship which enter into the    
texture of this very complex world4     
,such omnibus words as differentiation1 
integration1 segregation1 do duty in    
various connexions with convenient      
elasticity of meaning to suit the       
occasion4 ,but apart from qualifying    
adjectives1#ea such as astronomic1      
geologic1 and so on up to artistic and  
literary1 there is too little attempt at
 either a distinguishing of the types of
 relatedness or at a relationing of the 
relations so distinguished4 ,one just   
jumps from one to another after a break 
in the text1 and finds oneself in a     
wholly new field of inquiry4 ,little but
 the omnibus terminology remains the    
same4 ,nor does the ,essay on the       
,classification of the ,sciences1 with  

all its tabulation1 furnish what is     
really required4 ,what one seeks to know
 is how those specific kinds of         
relatedness which characterize the      
successive phases of evolutionary       
progress1 inorganic1 organic1 and       
superorganic1 differ from one another   
and how they are connected4 ,this one   
does not find4 ,the impression one gets1
 here and elsewhere1 is that all forms  
of relatedness must somehow1 by the     
omission of all other specific          
characters1 be reduced to the mechanical
 type4 ,this1 no doubt1 is unification  
of a sort4 ,but is it the sort of       
unification with which a philosophy of  
science should rest content8  ,it may be
 said that unification can only be      
reached by digging down to some         
ubiquitous type of relation which is    
common to all processes throughout the  
universe at any stage of evolution4 ,but
 what1 on these terms1 becomes of       
evolution itself as a problem to be     
solved8 ,surely any solution of that    

problem must render an account of just  
those specific modes of relatedness     
which have been ignored in digging down 
to the foundations4 ,surely there must  
be unification of the superstructure as 
well as of the substructure4 ,here and  
now is our world1 within the texture of 
which things stand to each other in such
 varied relations1 though they may be   
reducible to a few main types4 ,there1  
in the faraway part1 was the primitive  
fire-mist1 dear to ,spencer's           
imagination1 in which the modes of      
relationship were so few and so simple1 
and all seemingly of one main type4 ,how
 do we get in scientific interpretation 
from the one to the other8 ,will it     
suffice to breathe over the scene the   
magic words differentiation and         
integration8 ,spencer appears to think  
so4 ,of course he did exceptionally fine
 work in elucidating the modes of       
differentiation and integration within  
certain relational fields--though he    
sometimes uses the latter word for mere 

shrinkage in size4#eb ,but what one     
asks1 and asks of him in vain1 is just  
how1 within a connected scheme1 the     
several relational fields in the domain 
of nature are themselves related1 and   
how they were themselves differentiated4
 ,how1 for instance1 did the specific   
relationships exhibited in the fabric of
 crystals arise out of the primitive    
fire-mist relations8 ,at some stage of  
evolution this specific form of         
relatedness came into being1 whereas    
before that stage was reached it was not
 in being4 ,no doubt we may say that the
 properties of the pre-existing         
molecules were such that these molecules
 could in due course become thus        
related1 and enter into the latticed    
architecture of the crystal4 ,they      
already possessed the potentiality of so
 doing4 ,and if we have resort to       
potentialities1 all subsequently        
developed types and modes of relatedness
 were potentially in existence ab       
initio--they were1 as ,tyndall said1    

'once latent in a fiery cloud4' ,but it 
is difficult to see how the specific    
modes of relatedness which obtain within
 the crystal1 can be said to exist prior
 to the existence of the crystal within 
which they so obtain4  ,preserving the  
spirit of ,spencer's teaching we must   
regard all modes of relatedness which   
are disclosed by scientific research as 
part and parcel of the constitution of  
nature1 from whatever ,source1 knowable 
or unknowable1 that constitution be     
derived4 ,of these modes there are many2
 indeed1 if we deal with all concrete   
cases1 their number is legion4 ,for     
purposes of illustration1 however1 we   
may reduce them1 rather drastically1 to 
three main types4 ,there are relations  
of the physico-chemical type1#ec which  
we may provisionally follow ,spencer in 
regarding as ubiquitous2 there are those
 of the vital type1 which are restricted
 to living organisms2 there are those of
 the cognitive type1 which seem to be   
much more narrowly restricted4 ,how we  

deal with these is of crucial           
importance4 ,denoting them by the       
letters ,a1 ,b1 ,c we find that there   
are progressively ascending modes of    
relatedness within any given type4      
,there is evolution within each type4   
,within the physico-chemical type ,a1   
for example1 atoms1 molecules1 and      
synthetic groups of molecules follow in 
logical order of evolution4 ,now the    
successive products1 in which this      
physico-chemical type of relatedness    
obtains1 have certain new and           
distinctive properties which are not    
merely the algebraic sum of the         
properties of the component things prior
 to synthesis4 ,we may speak of them as 
constitutive of the products in a higher
 stage of relatedness1 thus             
distinguishing constitutive from        
additive properties4#ed ,similarly when 
,b1 the vital relations1 are evolved1   
the living products1 in which these     
specific relations obtain1 have new     
constitutive properties1 on the         

importance of which vitalists are right 
in insisting1 though ,i emphatically    
dissent from some of the conclusions    
they draw from their presence4 ,for if1 
beyond the physico-chemical1 a special  
agency be invoked to account for the    
presence of new constitutive properties1
 then1 in the name of logical           
consistency1 let us invoke special      
agencies to account for the constitutive
 properties within the                  
physico-chemical--for radio-active      
properties for example4 ,if a ,source of
 phenomena be postulated1 why not       
postulate ,one ,source of all phenomena 
from the very meanest to the very       
highest8 ,there remains the case of     
,c--the synthetic whole in which        
cognitive relatedness obtains4 ,this is 
unquestionably more difficult of        
scientific interpretation4 ,but ,i      
believe that like statements may be made
 in this case also4 ,what we have1 ,i   
conceive1 is just a new and higher type 
of relatedness with specific characters 

of its own4 ,but of this more in the    
sequel4  ,it must be remembered that ,a1
 ,b1 ,c stand for relationships and that
 the related things are progressively   
more complex within more complex        
relational wholes4 ,relationships are   
every whit as real as are the terms they
 hold in their grasp4 ,i do not say more
 real2 but ,i say emphatically as real4 
,and if this be so1 then they ought     
somehow to be introduced into our       
formulae1 instead of being taken for    
granted4 ,we give ,h#b,o as the formula 
for a molecule of water4 ,but that      
molecule is something very much more    
than two atoms of hydrogen  one atom of 
oxygen4 ,the absolutely distinctive     
feature of the molecule is the specific 
relatedness of these atoms4 ,this       
constitutive mode of relatedness is1    
however1 just taken for granted4 ,and it
 is scarcely matter for surprise that1  
when we find not less specific modes of 
vital relatedness in the living         
organism1 they are too apt to be just   

ignored6  ,revert now to the empirical  
outcome of scientific research1 for as  
such ,i regard it1 that new constitutive
 properties emerge when new modes and   
types of relatedness occur1 and when new
 products are successively formed in    
evolutional synthesis4 ,this1 it will be
 said1 involves the acceptance of what  
is now commonly called creative         
evolution4 ,i am far from denying that1 
in the universe of discourse where      
,source is under consideration1 the     
adjective is justifiable4 ,but1 in the  
universe of discourse of science1 ,i    
regard it as inappropriate4 ,what we    
have is just plain evolution2 and we    
must simply accept the truth--if1 as ,i 
conceive1 it be a truth--that in all    
true evolution there is more in the     
conclusion than is given in the         
premises2 which is only a logical way of
 saying that there is more in the world 
to-day than there was in the primitive  
fire-mist4 ,not more 'matter and        
energy'1 but more varied relationships  

and new properties1 quite unpredictable 
from what one may perhaps speak of as   
the fire-mist's point of view4 ,this is 
no new doctrine1 though it has received 
of late a new emphasis4 ,mill1 dealing  
with causation1#ee speaks of a 'radical 
and important distinction'4 ,there are1 
he says in substance1 some cases in     
which the joint effect of the several   
causes is the algebraical sum of their  
separate effects4 ,he speaks of this as 
the 'composition of causes'1 and        
illustrates it from the 'composition of 
forces' in dynamics4 ',but in the other 
description of cases'1 he says1 'the    
agencies which are brought together     
cease entirely1 and a totally different 
set of phenomena arise4' ,in these cases
 'a concurrence of causes takes place   
which calls into action new laws bearing
 no analogy to any that we can trace in 
the separate operation of the causes'4  
,they might1 he suggests1 be termed     
'heteropathic laws'4 ,g4 ,h4 ,lewes1    
too1#ef in his ,problems of ,life and   

,mind1 drew the distinction between     
properties which are resultant and those
 which are emergent4 ,these suggestions 
were open to ,spencer's consideration   
long before the last edition of ,first  
,principles appeared4 ,they were1       
however1 too foreign to the established 
lines of his thought to call for serious
 consideration4  ,but if new            
relationships and new properties appear 
in the course of evolutionary progress1 
where is the opportunity for that       
unification of scientific knowledge     
which1 according to ,spencer1 is the    
goal of philosophy8 ,to be frank1 ,i am 
by no means sure that this question can 
be answered in a manner that is other   
than tentative4 ,perhaps we have not yet
 reached the stage at which more than   
provisional unification is possible4    
,such provisional unification as is     
suggested by a survey of the facts is   
that of seemingly uniform correlation in
 a hierarchy of logical implication4    
,there are certain modes of relatedness 

which belong to the cognitive type4 ,it 
would seem that whenever these obtain   
they may be correlated with other modes 
of relatedness which are of the vital or
 physiological type2 and that these1 in 
turn1 may be correlated with those that 
are physico-chemical4 ,thus ,c implies  
,b1 and ,b implies ,a4 ,the order cannot
 be reversed4 ,physico-chemical         
relations1 as a class1 do not imply     
those that are physiological4#eg ,the   
implication is not symmetrical4 ,spencer
 was within sight of this when he       
spoke#eh of the abstract-concrete       
sciences as 'instrumental' with respect 
to the concrete sciences1 though the    
latter are not 'instrumental' in the    
same sense with respect to the former4  
,but unfortunately he regarded the      
'chasm' between the two groups as       
'absolute'4 ,and for him the proper home
 of properties--of all properties it    
would appear--is the abstract-concrete  
group--mechanics1 physics1 and          
chemistry4 ,this seemingly leaves no    

place for a specific type of properties 
connected with vital relatedness as     
such4 ,in fact ,spencer's method of     
treatment reduces all modes of          
relatedness to the ,a type1 the laws of 
which are1 for him1 the primary 'causes'
 of all kinds of differentiation and    
integration4 ,hence the laws of biology 
and psychology can ultimately be        
expressed and explained1 he thinks1 in  
mechanical or mechanistic terms4 ,but in
 the doctrine of implication they are   
just the laws of ,b and ,c respectively1
 though laws of ,a may underlie them in 
a logical sense4 ,and as we ascend the  
evolutionary plane from ,a to ,,ab and  
thence to ,,abc--from the               
physico-chemical to the vital and thence
 to the cognitive--we find new modes of 
relatedness1 new forms of more complex  
integration and synthesis1 new          
properties successively appearing in    
serial order4 ,this seems to me simply  
to express1 in outline1 the net result  
of interpretation based on empirical    

observation--though much1 very much1    
requires to be filled in by future      
research4 ,and the new properties are   
not merely additive of preceding        
properties2 they are constitutive1 and  
characterize the higher evolutionary    
products as such4 ,why they are thus    
constitutive1 science is unable to say4 
,spencer1 of course1 calls in the       
,unknowable to supply the required      
nexus4#ei ,otherwise1 in each case1 he  
confesses that 'we can learn nothing    
more than that here is one of the       
uniformities in the order of            
phenomena'4#fj ,none the less we may be 
able some day to establish an ordinal   
correlation#fa of cognitive processes   
with physiological processes1 and an    
ordinal correlation of these            
physiological processes with those of   
the physico-chemical type4 ,that ,i     
conceive to be the ideal of strictly    
scientific interpretation if it is to be
 raised progressively to a level        
approaching that of the exact sciences4 

,it certainly is not yet attained4 ,but 
,i see no reason why we should not      
regard it as attainable4 ,it will       
involve the very difficult determination
 of many correlation coefficients and   
constants--and for some of these our    
data are1 it must be confessed1 both    
scanty and unreliable4  ,we must here   
note a much-discussed departure on      
,spencer's part from his earlier        
position4 ,on the first page of the     
,biology in the earlier editions1 and in
 the last1 we are told3    ',the        
properties of substances1 though        
destroyed to sense by   combination are 
not destroyed in reality4 ,it follows   
from the   persistence of force that the
 properties of a compound are           
resultants of the properties of its     
components1 resultants in   which the   
properties of the components are        
severally in full   action1 though      
mutually obscured4'  ,there is no hint  
here of ,mill's heteropathic laws nor of
 ,lewes's emergents4 ,but in the last   

edition a special chapter is inserted on
 the ,dynamic ,element in ,life4 ,we    
here find a tardy recognition of the    
presence of specific vital characters4  
',the processes which go on in living   
things are incomprehensible   as the    
results of any physical actions known to
 us4444 ,in brief1   then1 we are       
obliged to confess that ,life in its    
essence cannot be   conceived in        
physico-chemical terms4'#fb  ,i speak of
 this as a tardy recognition2 but it is 
one that does honour to the man2 it is a
 frank admission that his previous      
treatment was in some measure           
inadequate1 which a smaller man would   
not have had the honesty or the strength
 of character to make4 ,of course it is 
traced down to the ,unknowable4 ',life  
as a principle of activity is unknown   
and unknowable2 while phenomena are     
accessible to thought the implied       
noumenon is inaccessible4'#fc ,still1   
certain specific characteristics of     
living organisms are explicitly         

recognized as among the accessible      
phenomena2 and these cannot be conceived
 in physico-chemical terms4 ,but did    
,spencer fully realize how big a hole   
this knocks in the bottom of the purely 
mechanical interpretation of nature he  
had for so long championed8  ,there     
remains for consideration the place of  
the cognitive relation in ,spencer's    
philosophy of science4 ,we need not here
 discuss his transfigured realism4      
,apart from the customary references to 
the ,unknowable1 of which what is       
knowable is said to be symbolic1 it     
comes to little more than laying special
 emphasis on the truism that what is    
known in the so-called objective world  
involves the process of knowing2 from   
which it follows that1 apart from       
knowing it the objective world cannot be
 known4 ,from this ,spencer draws the   
conclusion that terms in cognitive      
relatedness have their very nature      
determined in and through that          
relatedness1 and cannot in themselves be

 what they are1 and as they are1 in the 
field of cognitive symbolism4 ,this may 
or may not be true4 ,i am one of those  
who question the validity of the        
arguments in favour of this conclusion4 
,since1 however1 the philosophy of      
science deals only with the knowable--of
 which the so-called appearances with   
which we have direct acquaintance are   
the primary data--we need not here      
trouble ourselves with the controversy  
between realists and symbolists4 ,even  
on ,spencer's view the world as         
symbolized is the real world for        
science4  ,now one way of expressing the
 fact that the cognitive relation is    
always present where knowledge is       
concerned is to proclaim 'the truth that
 our states of consciousness are the    
only things we can know'4#fd ,but it is 
a terribly ambiguous way of expressing  
the fact4 ,what is here meant by a state
 of consciousness8 ,so far as cognition 
is concerned it is1 or at any rate it   
involves1 a relationship between        

something known and the organism1 as    
knowing--for ,spencer assuredly the     
organism1 though a so-called inner      
aspect therein4 ,of course it is a very 
complex relationship4 ,it comprises     
relations in what is known1 and         
relations in the organism as knowing4   
,hence ,spencer defines life1 psychical 
as well as physical1 as 'the continuous 
adjustment of internal relations to     
external relations'4#fe    ',that which 
distinguishes ,psychology is that each  
of its   propositions takes account both
 of the connected internal   phenomena  
and of the connected external phenomena 
to which they   refer4 ,it is not only  
the one1 nor only the other1 that       
characterises cognition4 ,it is the     
connexion between these two             
connexions4'#ff  ,so far well4          
,cognition is a very complex network of 
relatedness involving many terms4 ,what 
are these terms8 ,for ,spencer the      
internal terms are ultimately nervous   
7psychic7 shocks in highly integrated   

aggregates2 and the external terms are1 
proximately at least1 things in the     
environment4 ,but both alike are spoken 
of as states of consciousness4 ,there is
 surely an opening for ambiguity here4  
,sometimes1 too1 the words subjective   
affections are used in place of states  
of consciousness4 ',thus we are brought 
to the conclusion that what we are      
conscious of as properties of matter1   
even down to its weight and resistance1 
are but subjective affections4'#fg      
,well1 these states of consciousness1   
these subjective affections1 fall into  
two great classes--the vivid and the    
faint4 ,the former1 which we know as    
sensations1 accompany direct and        
therefore strong excitations of the     
nerve-centres2 the latter1 which we know
 as remembered sensations1 or ideas of  
sensations1 accompany indirect and      
therefore weak excitations of the same  
nerve-centres4#fh ,and then we are told 
that the aggregate of the faint is what 
we call the mind1 the subject1 the ego2 

the aggregate of the vivid is what we   
call the external world1 the object1 the
 non-ego4#fi ,it would seem1 then1 that 
the aggregate of vivid subjective       
affections is the objective world so far
 as knowable4 ,to say the least of it1  
this terminology is somewhat perplexing4
  ,no doubt our knowledge of the        
external world involves a subtle and    
intricate inter-relation of what is     
experienced vividly and what is         
experienced faintly--of what is actually
 presented and what is ideally          
re-presented4 ,the distinction between  
them is a valid one4 ,but when ,spencer 
equates this distinction with that      
between the external world and the mind1
 as he does in the passages to which ,i 
have referred1 the validity of his      
procedure is seriously open to question4
  ,it must be confessed that an adequate
 analysis of cognitive relatedness on   
scientific lines is not to be found in  
,spencer's works4 ,i am not sure that it
 is yet to be found in the works of any 

other philosopher1 though there are many
 signs that the difficult problems it   
involves are receiving serious          
attention4 ,this much seems certain1 for
 those who accept the spirit1 though not
 perhaps the letter1 of ,spencer's      
teaching3 that there it is as a         
constitutive mode of relatedness in the 
realm of nature1 and that1 if it forms  
part of the evolutionary scheme1 if it  
is present in the conclusion1 so far    
reached1 though it was absent in the    
physico-chemical premises1 if it is to  
be included in a philosophy of science  
it must be dealt with by that philosophy
 on lines strictly analogous to those on
 which any other relational problem is  
treated4 ,firmly as we may believe in   
the reality of ,source1 we must not call
 to our aid some psychic entity1 some   
entelechy1 some elan vital1 to help us  
out of our difficulties2 for one and all
 of these lie wholly outside the        
universe of discourse of science2 and   
not one of them affords the smallest    

help in solving a single scientific     
problem in a manner that is itself      
scientific4  ,we have seen that ,spencer
 believed that the task of psychology is
 to investigate the correlation of      
external and internal relations1 and1 in
 that sense1 itself to correlate them   
within a scientific interpretation4 ,now
 the outcome of the former correlation  
is some form of behaviour or conduct on 
the part of the organism4 ,no doubt such
 behaviour affords data to be dealt with
 in subsequent cognition4 ,but it       
implies the prior cognition which leads 
up to it2 and it is this prior          
cognition1 abstracted from the behaviour
 to which it leads1 that we have to     
consider4 ,it is so terribly complex    
that it is difficult to deal with it    
comprehensibly in a brief space4 ,let   
me1 however1 try to do so1 at least in  
tentative outline4 ,there occurs1 let us
 say1 an external event in the physical 
world1 such as the motion of a          
billiard-ball across the table2 and when

 during its progress this stimulates the
 retina1 there is an internal           
physico-chemical process which runs its 
course in retina1 optic nerves1 and the 
central nervous system4 ,we may regard  
these two processes1 external and       
internal1 as so far1 of like physical   
order4 ,with adequate knowledge the two 
could1 in some measure1 be serially     
correlated as such4 ,but the            
physico-chemical processes in the       
organism are not only of this physical  
type4 ,they are vital or physiological  
as well4 ,and this makes a real         
difference4 ,of course this statement is
 open to question4 ,but ,i1 for one1    
believe that there are specific         
relations present in physiological      
processes1 qua vital1 other than those  
of the physico-chemical type--relations 
which are effective and which require a 
distinctive name4 ,so far ,i am a       
vitalist4 ,at some stage of evolution   
these new modes of effective relatedness
 came into being1 whereas in the        

fire-mist and for long afterwards they  
were not in being4 ,none the less when  
they did actually come into being1 under
 conditions of which we are at present  
ignorant--though not so ignorant as we  
were--they were dependent upon1 and1 for
 our interpretation1 they logically     
imply1 the physico-chemical relations   
which are also present4 ,in any given   
case they further imply1 through        
heredity-relatedness1 the evolutionary  
history of the organism in which they   
obtain4 ,this so-called historical      
element in biology no doubt involves a  
characteristic vital relationship4 ,but1
 ,i take it1 the physico-chemical       
constitution of any inorganic compound1 
and of any molecule therein1 has also   
its history--has relationship to past   
occurrences within its type1 which have 
helped to make it what it is4 ,still1 in
 the organism the relation to past      
happenings has a quite distinctive form 
which we deal with in terms of heredity4
 ,see1 then1 how we stand so far4 ,the  

internal physiological process implies a
 long chain of heredity-relationships   
through which the organism is prepared  
for its occurrence4 ,it also implies a  
physico-chemical basis1 an underlying#gj
 physico-chemical process4 ,and this    
implies as a condition of its           
occurrence1 the external event1 the     
passage of the billiard-ball across the 
table4 ,in a broad sense we may say that
 the inner process knows the external   
event which is a condition of its       
occurrence4 ,but we have not yet reached
 cognition of the psychological type4   
,before passing on to indicate1 in      
tentative outline1 the nature of this   
higher mode of relatedness1 ,i pause to 
note two points4 ,the first is that     
knowing in that extended sense which ,i 
have borrowed1#ga is essentially        
selective in its nature4 ,the           
physiological process1 in the case ,i   
have taken1 knows only that external    
event which is directly before the eyes 
and which is serially correlated with   

changes in the retinal images through   
the stimulation of specialized          
receptors4 ,of other external events it 
has no such knowledge4 ,compare this    
with the gravitative knowledge--if a yet
 wider extension of the meaning of the  
word be permitted--which the earth has  
of the sun and all the other members of 
the solar system--nay more1 in degrees  
perhaps infinitesimal1 of all other     
material bodies in the universe4 ,the   
motion of the earth in its orbit implies
 the whole of this vast field of        
gravitative relatedness4 ,the existing  
orbital motion at any moment implies1   
too1 the preceding motion which it has1 
in a sense1 inherited from the past4    
,abolish the rest of the universe at    
this moment and the earth's motion would
 cease to be orbital4 ,in virtue of its 
'inheritance from the past'1 it would   
continue at uniform velocity in one     
direction4 ,the continuous change of    
direction and velocity we observe1 is a 
response which implies gravitative      

knowledge4 ,in a sense1 then1 the whole 
solar system is known by the earth as it
 swings in its orbit4  ,the second point
 may be introduced by a question4       
,granted that we may say1 in a very     
liberal sense1 that the earth in its    
motion has this gravitative             
knowledge--is such knowledge accompanied
 by awareness8 ,we do not know4 ,but the
 point ,i have in mind is this1 that the
 question itself is vague4 ,awareness of
 what8 ,there must be awareness of      
something2 and a definite question      
should be directed towards the nature of
 that something4 ,for example3 is the   
earth aware of its own motion8 ,or is it
 aware of the solar system8 ,or is it   
aware of the relation of the one to the 
other8 ,if it be said that the second of
 these is meant when we ask whether the 
knowledge is accompanied by awareness1  
well and good4 ,the answer will serve to
 define the question4 ,take now a case  
of biological knowledge4 ,are the plants
 in the cottager's window1 when they    

grow towards the light1 aware of a      
process in their own tissues8 ,or are   
they aware of the sunshine8 ,or are they
 in some measure aware of the connexion 
between the one and the other8 ,to all  
these questions we must answer1 ,i      
suppose1 that we do not know4 ,but it   
may have been worth while to ask them in
 a definite way4  ,we pass1 then1 to    
cognition in the usual acceptation of   
the term--to what we speak of as        
knowledge in the proper and narrower    
sense4 ,my contention is that this is a 
mode of relatedness which science must  
endeavour to treat on precisely the same
 lines as it deals with any other       
natural kind of relatedness4 ,at some   
stage of evolution it came into being1  
whereas in the fire-mist1 and for long  
afterwards1 it was not in being4 ,none  
the less when it did come into being1 it
 was dependent on1 and for our          
interpretation it logically implies1    
underlying physiological processes1 as  
they in turn imply physico-chemical     

processes1 in each case serially        
correlated4 ,it is pre-eminently        
selective4 ,and just as any             
physiological process1 however          
externally conditioned1 is grounded     
in#gb the constitution of the organism1 
as such1 so too is any cognitive process
 grounded in the constitution of the    
organism as one in which this higher    
type of relatedness has supervened4     
,again1 just as the physiological       
constitution implies a prolonged racial 
preparation1 describable in terms of    
that mode of relatedness we name        
heredity1 so1 too1 does any cognitive   
process imply1 not only this racial     
preparation of the biological kind1 but 
also an individual preparation of the   
psychological kind--implies relatedness 
to what we call1 rather loosely1 prior  
experience--which itself implies a      
concurrent physiological preparation4   
,now there can be no doubt that         
awareness is a characteristic feature of
 the knowledge of cognition1 whether it 

be present or absent in knowledge in the
 more extended sense4 ,we must just     
accept this as what appears to be a     
fact4 ,in science we do not pretend to  
say why facts are what they are and as  
they are4 ,we take them as they are     
given1 and endeavour to trace their     
connexions and their implications4      
,accepting1 then1 awareness as given1 we
 must ask3 ,awareness of what8 ,it is   
sometimes said that cognition is aware  
of itself4 ,i am not sure that ,i       
understand what this means4 ,if we are  
speaking of the cognitive relation1     
which is an awareness relation1 the     
question seems to be whether a relation 
of awareness is related to itself4 ,but 
of course if a field of cognitive       
relatedness be regarded as a complex    
whole1 any part may be related to the   
rest1 and the rest to any part4 ,that   
kind of self-awareness--if we must so   
call it6--is eminently characteristic of
 cognition in the higher forms of its   
development4 ,on these terms cognition  

is aware of itself--though the mode of  
statement savours of ambiguity4  ,let us
 next ask whether there is awareness of 
the underlying cortical process4 ,if we 
are speaking of direct awareness1       
apparently not4 ,the correlation between
 the two is only discoverable through a 
very elaborate and complex#gc           
application of further cognition in     
interpretative knowledge4 ,we only know 
the correlated cortical process by      
description1 as ,mr4 ,bertrand ,russell 
would say1#gd and never by direct       
acquaintance4  ,parenthetic reference   
must here1 ,i suppose1 be made to       
psycho-physical parallelism4 ,but it    
shall be very brief4 ,the sooner this   
cumbrous term with its misleading       
suggestions is altogether eliminated    
from the vocabulary of science the      
better4 ,the locus of the so-called     
parallelism is1 we are told1 the cortex 
of the brain4 ,but the cortical process 
is only an incident--no doubt a very    
important one1 but still an incident--in

 a much wider physiological process1 the
 occurrence of which1 in what we may    
speak of as primary cognition1 implies  
events in the external world4 ,it is of 
these events that there is direct       
physical1 physiological1 and cognitive  
knowledge4 ,of course there are also    
inter-cortical relations which underlie 
the relations of those ideal cognita    
7,spencer's faint class7 that supplement
 the primary cognita which imply direct 
stimulation of sensory receptors        
7,spencer's vivid class74 ,it is        
questionable whether any form of        
cognition1 properly so called1 is       
possible in their absence4 ,now ,i see  
no objection to labelling the fact 7if  
it be a fact7 that the cognitive process
 implies a physiological process in     
which1 as in a larger whole1 the cortex 
plays its appropriate part1 by the use  
of some such convenient correlation-word
 as psycho-physical2 but only so long as
 this does not involve a doctrine of    
parallelism2 so long as it merely means 

that cognition implies1 let us say1     
certain underlying cortical changes4 ,of
 course it implies a great deal more    
than cortical process only2 but this may
 perhaps be taken for granted4 ,my chief
 objection to the word 'parallelism' is 
that it suggests two separate orders of 
being1 and not two types of relationship
 within one order of being for          
scientific study4#ge ,we do not speak of
 parallelism between physiological and  
physico-chemical processes4 ,we just say
 that scientific interpretation proceeds
 on the working hypothesis that there is
 a correlation of such a kind that      
physiological process implies a         
physico-chemical basis4 ,so too1 ,i     
urge1 we should be content to say that  
scientific interpretation proceeds on   
the working hypothesis that there is a  
correlation of such a kind that         
cognitive process implies a             
physiological basis4  ,it may be said   
that ,spencer accepted the so-called    
identity hypothesis which does not lie  

open to the objection that it suggests  
two orders of being4 ,he believed#gf    
'that mind and nervous action are the   
subjective and objective faces of the   
same thing'1 though 'we remain utterly  
incapable of seeing or even imagining   
how the two are related'4 ,well1 we may 
call them in one passage the same thing1
 we may speak1 in another passage1 of   
the antithesis between them as never to 
be transcended1 and we may try to save  
the situation by reference to duality of
 aspect4 ,but this kind of treatment    
does not help as much towards a         
scientific interpretation4 ,it is true  
that1 in yet another passage1 speaking  
of the correlation of the physical and  
the psychical1 ,spencer says3#gg ',we   
can learn nothing more than that here is
 one of the uniformities in the order of
 phenomena4' ,then why not leave it at  
that8 ,and if there be a constant and   
uniform correlation which is 'in a      
certain indirect way quantitive'1 it    
would seem that we do see1 as far as    

science ever professes to see1 'how the 
two are related4' ,we see1 or conceive1 
how they are related in much the same   
way as we do in the case of the         
connexion between the physiological and 
the physico-chemical1 and in numberless 
other cases4 ,both parallelism and      
identity will have to go by the board in
 a philosophy of science4 ,they must be 
replaced by the far more modest         
hypothesis1 which seems to express all  
that they really mean for science1 that 
cognition always implies certain        
physiological processes in the organism4
  ,if we do speak of mind and nervous   
action as two faces of the same thing1  
it seems pretty certain that the one    
face is not directly aware of the other4
 ,when we speak of awareness in         
cognition we must therefore1 it appears1
 exclude any direct awareness of        
concurrent physiological processes4 ,of 
what1 then1 is there awareness8         
,primarily perhaps of some occurrence in
 the external world4 ,but the difficulty

 here is that1 in the simplest case of  
human cognition there is awareness of so
 many things and in such varying        
degrees4 ,there may be primary awareness
 of events in the external world        
7,spencer's vivid series71 awareness of 
the relations involved in these         
occurrences as such1 of the relations of
 these to ideal re-presentations of like
 kind 7,spencer's faint series71 of the 
relations of any or all of these to     
behaviour as actually taking place or as
 ideally re-presented2 and all in       
different degrees within a relational   
meshwork of bewildering complexity1     
which we have not1 as yet1 adequately   
unravelled4 ,the essential point to bear
 in mind is that the cognitive relation 
always involves relatedness of many     
terms1 and that its discussion involves 
the analysis of what1 in the higher     
phases of its existence1 is probably the
 most complex natural occurrence in this
 complex world4  ,i cannot here follow  
up further the difficult problem of     

cognition#gh--save to add one or two    
supplementary remarks4 ,first3 it is1 ,i
 suppose1 fairly obvious that any given 
field of cognitive relatedness comprises
 all that is then and there selectively 
cognized4 ,just as1 in the very extended
 sense of the word 'knowledge'1 the     
earth knows1 in gravitative fashion1 the
 whole solar system1 as does also any   
one of the planets1 so1 in the          
restricted sense1 is knowledge          
co-extensive with all that is1          
selectively1 in cognitive relationship  
with the organism or that part of the   
organism which is the locus of          
awareness4 ,i speak here of the locus of
 awareness in just the same sense as ,i 
might speak of the earth as a locus of  
gravitative knowledge of the solar      
system4 ,the locus of awareness is just 
a specialized portion of the whole      
relational web4 ,in other words1 the    
relatedness is of the part-whole kind1  
where whole means rest of the whole     
other than the specific part4 ,in any   

such integrated system the part implies 
the whole--which1 by the way1 is quite a
 different matter from saying that the  
part includes the whole1 or1 as ,i      
understand the words1 is equivalent to  
the whole4 ,but1 whereas gravitative    
knowledge is reciprocal--the sun knowing
 the earth in the same fashion as the   
earth knows the sun--cognitive knowledge
 is not reciprocal4 ,my cognitive       
awareness of a spinning-top does not    
imply that the spinning-top is in like  
manner aware of me4 ,the part knows the 
whole in a way that the whole does not  
know the part4 ,the relationship of the 
part to the rest of the whole is not    
reciprocal or symmetrical4 ,this we must
 just accept as a given feature of      
cognitive relatedness4#gi  ,another very
 important point is that cognitive      
relatedness is effective4 ,by this ,i   
mean that just as1 when the earth is in 
gravitative relation to the sun and the 
other planets 7the constitution of      
nature being what it is71 changes take  

place because the parts of the system as
 a whole are in this field of effective 
relatedness2 so too1 when the organism  
is in cognitive relation to its         
environment1 changes in this system also
 take place just because a part of the  
whole system is in cognitive relatedness
 to the rest of the system4 ,that means 
that the cognitive relation really      
counts--that it is not merely an        
epiphenomenal accompaniment of changes  
which would be precisely the same if it 
were absent4 ,the 'sum of energy'       
presumably remains constant4 ,there is  
no necessary interference with physical 
principles4 ,but we know of so many     
cases in which the direction of change  
may be changed without any alteration of
 the 'amount of energy'1 as the phrase  
goes1 that ,i see no reason1 based on   
physical science1#hj for denying this   
kind of effectiveness1 within a field of
 cognitive relatedness1 if the facts    
seem indubitably to point to its        
existence4 ,to assert that the presence 

or absence of cognitive relatedness     
makes absolutely no difference appears  
to me1 ,i confess1 little short of      
preposterous2 to urge that it may be    
brought under the rubric of             
physico-chemical relatedness surely     
involves the ignoring of differentiating
 features1 which science should not     
ignore4 ,but1 on the other hand1 to     
invoke an immaterial psychic            
entity#ha--unless this merely names the 
relatedness itself#hb as gravitation    
names the gravitative                   
relatedness--appears to me quite        
unwarranted in the scientific universe  
of discourse4#hc  ,i must1 however1 draw
 to a conclusion4 ,i cannot but think   
that ,spencer failed to bring cognition 
and the conscious awareness it involves 
into really close touch with the rest of
 his philosophy of science4 ,no such    
double-aspect theory as he accepted     
affords a satisfactory avenue of        
scientific approach4 ,but where ,spencer
 failed1 who has come within measurable 

sight of success8 ,we are only just     
beginning to see our way to stating the 
problem in such a form as to bring it   
within the purview of science4 ,what we 
must insist on1 as followers1 at a      
distance1 of ,herbert ,spencer1 is the  
treatment of this type of relatedness on
 lines similar to our treatment of other
 types of relatedness within one order  
of nature4  ,surveying his work as a    
whole1 we may confidently assert that   
,spencer brought to a conclusion a great
 task1 and was himself great in its     
execution4 ,the present generation can1 
perhaps1 hardly realize how potent his  
influence was on the thought of the     
latter half of the last century4 ,many  
of his conclusions ran counter to those 
which were1 in his day1 widely accepted4
 ,if only they seemed to him to be true1
 however1 he held to them with a        
tenacity which his opponents branded as 
obstinacy4 ,but as he himself said3     
',it is not for nothing that a man has  
in him sympathies with some   principles

 and repugnance to others4 ,he1 with all
 his capacities1   and aspirations1 and 
beliefs1 is not an accident but a       
product of   his time4 ,while he is a   
descendant of the past he is a parent of
   the future2 and his thoughts are as  
children born to him1 which he   may not
 carelessly let die4 ,not as            
adventitious therefore will the   wise  
man regard the faith that is in him4    
,the highest truth he   sees he will    
fearlessly utter2 knowing that1 let what
 may come of   it1 he is thus playing   
his right part in the world4'#hd        
,,notes   #a ,fragments of ,science1    
vol4 ii1 p4 #acb4  #b ,essays1 vol4 i   
7,american reprint71 p4 #c4  #c ,op4    
cit41 p4 #cb4  #d ,op4 cit41 p4 #eh4  #e
 ,cf4 ,w4 ,k4 ,clifford1 ,lectures and  
,essays1 vol4 i1 p4 #ie4  #f ,more      
,letters1 vol4 ii1 p4 #bce4  #g         
,memories and ,studies1 p4 #aci4  #h    
,ibid41 p4 #adj4  #i ,autobiography1    
vol4 i1 p4 #bab4  #aj ,james1 op4 cit41 
p4 #abd4  #aa ,autobiography1 vol4 i1 p4

 #baa4  #ab ,first ,principles1 ,sixth  
7,popular7 ,edition1 p4 #ddf 7hereafter 
,f4 ,p474  #ac ,principles of           
,psychology1 ,third ,edition1 vol4 i1 p4
 #ejh 7hereafter ,ps474  #ad ,ps41 vol4 
i1 p4 #fbg4  #ae ,ibid41 p4 #aeh4  #af  
,f4 ,p41 p4 #aee4  #ag ,ps41 vol4 ii1 p4
 #dhd4  #ah ,there is 'intrinsic force  
by which a body manifests itself as     
occupying space1 and that extrinsic     
force distinguished as energy'4 ,f4 ,p41
 p4 #aej4  #ai ',divest the conceived   
unit of matter of the objective         
correlate to our subjective sense of    
effort and the entire fabric of physical
 conceptions disappears4' ,f4 ,p41 p4   
#aea note4 ,cf4 ,ps41 vol4 ii1 pp4 #bcg1
 #bci4  #bj ,f4 ,p41 p4 #aga4  #ba e4g4 
',social changes take directions that   
are due to the joint actions of citizens
 determined as are those of all other   
changes wrought by the composition of   
forces4' ',the flow of capital into     
business yielding the largest returns1  
the buying in the cheapest market and   

selling in the dearest1 the introduction
 of more economical modes of            
manufacture1 the development of better  
agencies for distribution1 exhibit      
movements taking place in directions    
where they are met by the smallest      
totals of opposing forces4' ,f4 ,p41 pp4
 #aic-f4  #bb ,creative ,evolution1     
,english translation1 p4 #ec4  #bc ,op4 
cit41 pp4 #che1 #f4  #bd ,according to  
,dr4 ,carr's interpretation of ,m4      
,bergson1 ',the whole world1 as it is   
presented to us and thought of by us1 is
 an illusion4 ,our science is not       
unreal1 but it is a transformed reality4
 ,the illusions may be useful1 may1     
indeed1 be necessary and indispensable1 
but nevertheless it is illusion4'       
,problem of ,truth1 p4 #ff4  #be        
,creative ,evolution1 p4 #chi4  #bf     
',but1 when ,i posit the facts with the 
shape they have for me to-day1 ,i       
suppose my faculties of perception and  
intellection such as they are in me     
to-day2 for it is they that portion the 

real into lots1 they that cut the facts 
out of the whole of reality4' ,c4 ,e41  
p4 #chi4  #bg ,creative ,evolution1 p4  
#chi4  #bh ,op4 cit41 p4 #chg4  #bi     
,introduction to ,metaphysics1 ,english 
translation1 p4 #h and passim4  #cj e4g4
 ',organisation can only be studied     
scientifically if the organised body has
 first been likened to a machine4' ,c4  
,e41 p4 #ih4 ,science is1 ,i think1     
generally used by ,m4 ,bergson for      
intellectual knowledge in               
contradistinction to intuitional        
knowledge4  #ca ,f4 ,p41 p4 #ahd4  #cb  
,essays1 vol4 iii1 p4 #ad4  #cc ,essays1
 vol4 iii1 p4 #cff4  #cd ,f4 ,p41 p4    
#aef4  #ce ',there remained to assign a 
reason for that increasingly-distinct   
demarkation of parts1 c4444 ,this reason
 we discovered to be the segregation1   
c4444 ,this cause of the definiteness of
 local integrations1 c4' ,f4 ,p41 p4    
#ddj4  #cf ,f4 ,p41 p4 #dc4  #cg        
,essays1 vol4 iii1 p4 #dg4  #ch ,f4 ,p41
 p4 #agf4  #ci ,f4 ,p41 p4 #aed4  #dj   

,proceedings ,aristotelian ,society1    
#aiab-ac1 p4 #a4  #da ,popular          
,scientific ,lectures1 ,english         
translation1 p4 #bed4  #db ,lectures and
 ,essays1 vol4 i1 p4 #aaa4  #dc ',but   
when we ask what this energy is1 there  
is no answer save that it is the        
noumenal cause implied by the phenomenal
 effect4' ,f4 ,p41 p4 #aed4 ,it is      
towards this and like statements that my
 criticism is directed4 ,there can be no
 objection to the treatment1 by         
physicists1 of energy as an entity in   
the sense given below in note #hb4      
,those phenomena to which #a_/b mv#b has
 reference are fundamental realities for
 physical science4  #dd ,in a statement 
of the law of gravitation we may        
substitute the words 'in a degree' for  
'with a force'2 we may speak of 'the    
measure of attraction' instead of 'the  
force of attraction'4  #de ,system of   
,logic1 ,bk4 ,,iii1 ch4 v1 ,sec4 #c1    
,eighth ,edition1 vol4 i1 p4 #chc4  #df 
,ibid41 ,sec4 #c and ,sec4 #e1 pp4 #cgi 

and #chi4  #dg ,ps41 vol4 ii1 p4 #ic2   
cf4 p4 #ig4 ,one has now1 however1 to   
add the realm of subsistence4  #dh ,as a
 more technical example the following   
may be given3--,the difference in       
properties of isomers is caused by      
difference of internal molecular        
structure notwithstanding identity of   
chemical composition4  #di ,if we take  
spark as cause and explosion as effect  
there is obviously no proportionality   
between the cause and its effect4 ,thus 
,m4 ,bergson speaks of the spark as 'a  
cause that acts by releasing'2 and he   
adds that 'neither quality nor quantity 
of effect varies with quality or        
quantity of the cause3 the effect is    
invariable'4 ,creative ,evolution1 p4   
#gg4 ,compare what ,spencer introduced  
into the ,sixth edition of ,f4 ,p4 7pp4 
#agb-c71 concerning 'trigger action     
which does not produce the power but    
liberates it'4 ,according to the        
treatment in the text there can be no   
'proportionality' unless both ground and

 conditions are taken into account4  #ej
 ,spencer says 7,f4 ,p41 pp4 #afi-gj7   
that 'the transformation of the         
unorganised contents of an egg into the 
organised chick is a question of heat'  
'altogether a question of heat'1 in the 
,third ,edition1 and tells us that 'the 
germination of plants presents like     
relations of cause and effect as every  
season shows'4 ,but he also says that   
'the proclivities of the molecules      
determine the typical structure         
assumed'4 ,obviously here the 'heat     
supplied' falls under 7#c7 of the text1 
and 'the proclivities of the molecules' 
is his notion of what should fall under 
7#b74  #ea ,see ,index to ,f4 ,p41 sub  
verbo 'integration'4  #eb e4 g4         
',diminish the velocities of the planets
 and their orbits will lessen--the solar
 system will contract1 or become more   
integrated4' ,essays1 vol4 iii1 p4 #bh4 
,mere condensation is often spoken of as
 integration4 ,but then the term is used
 with bewildering laxity4 ,cf4 ,james1  

,memories and ,studies1 p4 #acd4  #ec ,i
 retain in this connexion the current   
term physico-chemical4 ,it seems that   
the basal type of relatedness here is   
electrical4 ,it may be said that when we
 come down to the atom the things in    
relation are electrical1 are electrons1 
are positive and negative charges4 ,so  
be it4 ,but is it not the electrical    
relatedness that is constitutive of the 
atom as such8  #ed ',a large number of  
physical properties'1 says ,nernst1     
'have been shown to be clearly additive2
 that is1 the value of the property in  
question can be calculated as though the
 compound were such a mixture of its    
elements that they experience no change 
in their properties4' ,but other        
properties are not additive4 ',the kind 
of influence of the atom in a compound  
is primarily dependent on the mode of   
its union1 that is1 upon the            
constitution and configuration of the   
compound4 ,such non-additive properties 
may be called constitutive4' ,quoted by 

,e4 ,g4 ,spaulding in ,the ,new         
,realism1 p4 #bch4  #ee ,system of      
,logic1 vol4 i1 ,bk4 ,,iii1 ch4 vi4  #ef
 ,problems of ,life and ,mind1 ,series  
,,ii1 p4 #bab4  #eg ,of course if a     
particular physico-chemical change 7a7  
is correlated with a particular         
physiological or vital change 7b71 then 
7b7 implies 7a7 as 7a7 implies 7b74 ,the
 statement in the text refers to the    
implications of classes of change4      
,there may be physico-chemical          
relatedness without any correlated vital
 relatedness2 but there does not appear 
to be any vital relatedness which is not
 correlated with physico-chemical       
relatedness4  #eh ,essays1 vol4 iii1 pp4
 #ca1 #ee4  #ei ,ps41 vol4 ii1 p4 #dhd4 
#fj ,f4 ,p41 p4 #agh4  #fa ,an ordinal  
correlation is one that couples every   
term of a series 7a7 with a specific    
term of another series 7b7 and vice     
versa in the same order in each4 ,cf4   
,spaulding in ,the ,new ,realism1 p4    
#age4 ,i shall sometimes speak of such  

correlation as serial4  #fb ,principles 
of ,biology1 ,edition of #ahih1 pp4     
#aag1 #abj4  #fc ,op4 cit41 p4 #abb4    
#fd ,ps41 vol4 i1 p4 #bjh4  #fe ,f4 ,p41
 p4 #fa4 ,cf4 ,ps41 vol4 i1 p4 #acd4    
#ff ,ps41 vol4 i1 p4 #acb4 ,james well  
says ',spencer broke new ground here in 
insisting that1 since mind and its      
environment have evolved together1 they 
must be studied together4 ,he gave to   
the study of mind in isolation a        
definite quietus1 and that certainly is 
a great thing to have achieved'4        
,memories and ,studies1 p4 #adj4  #fg   
,ps41 vol4 i1 p4 #bjf4  #fh ,ps41 vol4  
i1 p4 #abd4  #fi ,f4 ,p41 p4 #abj4 ,ps41
 vol4 ii1 p4 #dgb4 ,cf4 ,ps41 vol4 i1 p4
 #ih4  #gj ,the word underlying is used 
in the sense of occupying a lower       
position in the logical hierarchy above 
indicated4 ,if any one likes to speak of
 the physico-chemical and the vital as  
two aspects of one process1 he is free  
to do so4 ,and if he likes to say that  
the vital is caused by the              

physico-chemical1 let him do so2 but he 
must define the exact sense in which he 
uses the ambiguous word cause4 ,the word
 inner in the text means within the     
organism4  #ga ,see ,s4 ,alexander1 ',on
 ,relations3 and in particular the      
,cognitive ,relation4' ,mind41 vol4 xxi1
 ,n4 ,s41 ,no4 #hc1 p4 #cah4  #gb ,i    
have avoided the use of the word        
determine4 ,it would be well to         
distinguish between that which is       
determined from without1 that is1       
conditioned1 and that which is          
determinate1 that is1 grounded in the   
constitution4 ,i am here1 ,i think1 in  
line with ,bosanquet4 7,see ,principle  
of ,individuality and ,value1 e4 g4 pp4 
#cda1 #ceb47 ,i have also avoided all   
reference to teleology4 ,without        
committing myself to the acceptance of  
all that ,mr4 ,bosanquet says in the    
fourth lecture of the series to which   
reference has just been made1 his       
treatment1 there1 appears to be on right
 lines4 ,there is no opposition in      

teleology1 so treated1 to what is       
determinate4 ,indeed1 such teleology is 
the expression of the logical structure 
of the world1 or1 as ,spencer would say1
 the universality of law4 ,for just as  
higher types of relatedness imply a     
substratum of physico-chemical          
processes1 so do all events imply the   
underlying logic of events4 ,cf4 ,w4 ,t4
 ,marvin1 ,a ,first ,book of            
,metaphysics1 ch4 xiii1 ',on the logical
 strata of reality4'  #gc ,cf4 ,ps41    
vol4 i1 pp4 #ii and #adj4  #gd ,problems
 of ,philosophy1 ch4 v2 cf4 ,proc4      
,aristotelian ,soc41 #aiaj-aa1 p4 #ajh4 
#ge ,it should be distinctly understood 
that ,i here speak of one order of being
 in reference to the phenomena dealt    
with by science1 including the cognitive
 phenomena discussed in the text4       
,whether we should speak of the ,source 
of phenomena as constituting a separate 
order of being is a question ,i cannot  
discuss in a note4 ,does the logic of   
events imply a ,logos8 ,that is the     

question in brief4 ,but1 since the      
implication in question is not of the   
scientific kind1 ,i may leave it on one 
side in considering a philosophy of     
science4  #gf ,ps41 vol4 i1 p4 #adj4    
#gg ,f4 ,p41 p4 #agh4  #gh ,i have      
confined my attention to the cognitive  
type of relatedness4 ,other higher modes
 supervene when the course of evolution 
is traced further upwards4 ,indeed1     
cognition is only part of the underlying
 basis implied by the richer forms of   
distinctively human relational life4    
,spencer has much to say of them in his 
,sociology and his ,ethics1 though he   
fails to realize that the phenomena he  
is dealing with involve essentially new 
constitutive features in man and in     
society4 ,can music or any form of art  
be discussed in terms of cognition only8
 ,i merely add this note to show that ,i
 am not unaware of the patent fact that 
when we have reached the cognitive type 
of relatedness1 we are nowhere near the 
top of the evolutional tree4  #gi ,the  

part which is the centre of awareness1  
may be spoken of as experiencing1 in    
contradistinction to what is            
experienced4 ,it is clear that such     
experiencing is always correlative to   
what is experienced actually or ideally 
7,spencer's vividly or faintly74 ,the   
centre of awareness is either the       
cortex1 or some specific part of the    
cortex1 or 7more generally7 the organism
 as owning the cortex1 in each case in  
accordance with the universe of         
discourse4  #hj ,few physicists would1  
,i think1 be prepared to deny that1     
within a field of effective relatedness1
 there may be1 and very often is1       
guidance without work done or any change
 in the 'amount of energy'4 ,what       
physicists are concerned to insist on is
 their cardinal principle that every    
physical change involves physical terms 
in physical relatedness4 ,this can be   
fully and freely accepted in accordance 
with the doctrine of implication        
sketched in the text4 ,it is when ,life 

or ,consciousness is invoked to play the
 part of a non-physical term1 or thing1 
which acts and reacts as if it were a   
physical term or thing1 that physicists 
enter an emphatic protest4 ,cognitive   
relatedness among physical things may   
well be effective in guidance4 ,to claim
 its presence must not1 however1 be     
regarded as in any sense equivalent to a
 denial of underlying physico-chemical  
relatedness4  #ha ,until those who seek 
to furnish evidence of the existence of 
discarnate spirits can make some        
plausible suggestions as to the nature  
of a comprehensible scheme of           
correlation which shall serve to link   
the discarnate with the incarnate1 one  
is forced to enter their results in a   
suspense account4 ,it is of little use  
to proclaim the existence of 'facts     
scorned by orthodox science'4 ,the      
so-called facts must be incorporated    
within a consistent scheme1 before they 
can claim a place in the fabric of      
scientific truth4  #hb ,as the word     

entity is now often used1 for example by
 ,mr4 ,g4 ,e4 ,moore1 cognitive         
relatedness may be termed an entity4    
',when ,i speak of an entity ,i shall   
mean to imply absolutely nothing more   
with regard to that which ,i so call1   
than that it is or was--that it is or   
was contained in the ,universe2 and of  
anything whatever which is or was1 ,i   
shall take the liberty to say that it is
 an entity4' ,g4 ,e4 ,moore1 ,proc4     
,aristotelian ,soc41 #aiji-aj1 p4 #cf4  
#hc ,i have no space to discuss the     
physiological differentiation which is  
implied by the effectiveness of the     
cognitive relation4 ,it involves1 ,i    
believe1 the differentiation of a       
superior cortical system from an        
inferior system of nervous arcs4 ,i have
 dealt with it in some detail elsewhere4
 ,see ,instinct and ,experience4  #hd   
,f4 ,p41 pp4 #ia-b4     ,,oxford3       
,,horace ,,hart ,m4,a4   ,,printer ,,to 
,,the ,,university